UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 AT LOS ANGELES 
 
 THE GIFT OF 
 
 MAY TREAT MORRISON 
 
 IN MEMORY OF 
 
 ALEXANDER F MORRISON
 
 THE 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 BY WILLIAM MITFORD, ESQ. 
 
 WITH HIS FINAL ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS. 
 
 TO WHICH IS PREFIXED, 
 
 A BRIEF MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR, 
 
 BY HIS BROTHER, 
 
 THE LATE LORD REDESDALE. 
 
 CAREFULLY REVISED 
 
 BY WILLIAM KING, 
 
 KnlTOR OF THE FIRST POSTHUMOUS EDITION. 
 
 VOL. II. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PRINTED FOR T. CADELL, STRAND; AND 
 W. BLACKWOOD AND SONS, EDINBURGH. 
 
 MDCCCXXXVIII.
 
 LONDON : 
 
 Printed by A. SPOTTISWOODE, 
 New-Street-Square.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 OF THE SECOND VOLUME. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE FROM THE ACCESSION OF XERXES TO THE 
 THRONE OF PERSIA TILL THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST 
 CAMPAIGN OF THAT MONARCH'S EXPEDITION AGAINST 
 GREECE. 
 
 SECT. I. Accession of Xerxes to the throne of Persia. Immense 
 preparations of the court of Persia for conquest in Europe. 
 Assembly of the army at Sardis, and of the fleet in the Hel- 
 lespont. March of the army. Muster of the army. Arrival 
 of the army and fleet at Therme in Macedonia . Page 1 
 
 SECT. II. State of Greece at the time of the invasion under 
 Xerxes. Themistocles. Responses of the Delphian oracle 
 concerning the invasion. Measures for forming a confe- 
 deracy of Grecian commonwealths. Disunion among the 
 Greeks. Assembly of deputies from the confederated com- 
 monwealths at Corinth. The defence of Thessaly given up 
 by the confederates. Measures for defending the pass of 
 Thermopylae . . . .12 
 
 SECT. III. Station of the Grecian army at Thermopylae; of the 
 fleet at Artemisium. Responses of the Delphian oracle. -Pro- 
 gress of the Persian fleet to Sepias ; of the army to Ther- 
 mopylae. Numbers of the Persian forces. Storm and ship- 
 wreck at Sepias. Battle of Thermopylae . . 30 
 
 SECT. IV. Numbers of the Grecian fleet. Sea-fights off Arte- 
 misium. Retreat of the Grecian fleet. March of the Persians 
 towards Athens. Attempt against Delphi . . 45 
 A 2 
 
 43S692
 
 IV CONTENTS. 
 
 SECT. V. Unsteady counsels of the Grecian confederacy. The 
 Athenians, deserted by the Peloponnesians, remove their 
 families from Attica. Aristides. Ostracism. Athens taken 
 by the Persians. Artemisia. Ancient manner of naval action. 
 Battle of Salamis. Return of Xerxes into Asia . Page 58 
 
 APPENDIX TO THE EIGHTH CHAPTER. 
 
 Of the ancient ships of war .' . . .79 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS TO THE 
 CONCLUSION OF THE PERSIAN INVASION. 
 
 SECT. I. Return of the Athenians to their country. Measures 
 of the Grecian fleet. Dedication to the gods for the victory 
 at Salamis. Honours to Themistocles. Revolt of Chalcidice 
 from the Persians. Siege of Potidaea by Artabazus . 84 
 
 SECT. II. Preparations for the campaign. Congress at Athens : 
 speeches of Alexander king of Macedonia., of the Lacedaemo- 
 nian ambassador, and of the Athenian minister. Athens a 
 second time abandoned. Zeal of the Athenian people for the 
 prosecution of the Persian war . . .90 
 
 SECT. III. Campaign in Ba'Otia. Battle of Plataea. Punish- 
 ment of Thebes . . . . 98 
 
 SECT. IV. Measures of the Grecian fleet. Battle of Mycale. 
 End of the expedition of Xerxes , . 126 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 VIEW OF THE PEOPLE OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES POLITI- 
 CALLY CONNECTED WITH THE GREEKS, AND OF THE GRECIAN 
 SETTLEMENTS IN SICILY AND ITALY. 
 
 SECT. I. Of Carthage. Of Sicily : Agrigentum : Phalaris : 
 Syracuse : Gelon. Invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians : 
 battle of Himera . . . 1 34- 
 
 SECT. II. Of Italy : Tuscany : Rome : Latium : Sybaris : Cro- 
 tona : Pythagoras : Thurium : Paestum : Cunia : Campania : 
 Lucania .... 152
 
 CONTENTS. V 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THAT COM- 
 MONLY CALLED THE PERSIAN WAR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT 
 OF SECURITY FOR THE GREEKS AGAINST THE BARBARIANS 
 BY THE SUCCESSES OF CIMON. 
 
 SECT. I. State of the known world at the time of the retreat of 
 Xerxes from Greece. Dedications, festivals, and monuments 
 in Greece, occasioned by the victories over the Persians. Re- 
 storation of Athens : jealousy of the Peloponnesians : admi- 
 nistration of Themistocles : parties at Athens : banishment of 
 Themistocles . . . Page 176 
 
 SECT. II. War prosecuted against Persia, under Pausanias and 
 Aristides; Treason of Pausanias : Athens head of a new 
 confederacy composed of the Greeks of the -^Egean islands, 
 Asia Minor, and Thrace . . . 200 
 
 SECT. III. Administration of Cimon. Death of Xerxes, and 
 accession of Artaxerxes to the Persian throne. Successes of 
 the confederate arms under Cimon : piracy in the JEgean sea : 
 battle of the Eurymedon . . 208 
 
 SECT. IV. Treason and death of Pausanias. Prosecution and 
 flight of Themistocles : his reception t at the Persian court : 
 his death . . . .218 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT FOR ITS SE- 
 CURITY AGAINST PERSIA TO THE TRUCE FOR THIRTY YEARS 
 BETWEEN ATHENS AND LACED^MON. 
 
 SECT. I. Athens the seat of science and arts. Extension of the 
 power of Athens: revolt of Thasos : jealousy of Lacedaemon. 
 Earthquake at Lacedaemon : revolt of the Helots : assistance 
 sent from Athens to Lacedaemon : renunciation of the Lace- 
 daemonian confederacy by the Athenians. War of Argos and 
 Mycenae .... 231 
 
 SECT. II. Change of administration at Athens, and banishment 
 of Cimon. Renunciation of the Peloponnesian confederacy by 
 Megara, and accession to the Athenian. Difficulties of the 
 new Athenian administration : Ephialtes : Pericles : depres- 
 sion of the court of Areopagus : expedition to Egypt. War 
 in Greece : siege of JEgina : relief of Megara by Myronides 
 
 244-
 
 VI CONTENTS. 
 
 SECT. III. War between Doris and Pliocis. Hostilities resulting 
 between Athens and Lacedaemon : battle of Tanagra. Affairs 
 of Boeotia : battle of CEnophyta : successes of the Athenians 
 under Myronides. JEgina taken. Successes of the Athenians 
 under Tolmides : Messenians established in Naupactus. Con- 
 clusion of the Egyptian expedition. War in Thessaly. Expe- 
 dition under Pericles to the western coast of Greece Page 256 
 
 SECT. IV. Coalition of parties at Athens, and recal of Cimon : 
 truce of five years with Peloponnesus. Long walls of Athens. 
 Restoration of the order of knights, or cavalry. Colony of 
 Athenian families sent to the Chersonese. Expedition to 
 Cyprus : death of Cimon . . . 269 
 
 SECT. V. Contest for command of the temple of Delphi. Athens 
 at the summit of her greatness. State of parties : Pericles ; 
 Thucydides. Policy of the Grecian republics for holding the 
 weaker republics in subjection. Revolt of Boeotia; of Euboea; 
 of Megara : invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians. Thirty 
 years truce. Power of Pericles . .276 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE THIRTY YEARS* TRUCE TO 
 THAT COMMONLY CALLED THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, WITH 
 A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF MACEDONIA FROM 
 THE EARLIEST ACCOUNTS. 
 
 SECT. I. Administration of Pericles : science, arts, and fine 
 taste at Athens. Change in the condition of women in Greece: 
 Aspasia. Popular licentiousness at Athens. The Athenian 
 empire asserted and extended. Project for union of Greece 288 
 
 SECT. II. War between Samos and Miletus : interference of 
 Athens : armament under Pericles : Samos taken. Funeral 
 solemnity at Athens in honour of the slain in their country's 
 service .... 299 
 
 SECT. III. Affairs of Corcyra : sedition at Epidamnus : war be- 
 tween Corcyra and Corinth : defect of the ancient ships of 
 war : deficient naval skill of the Peloponnesians : sea-fight off 
 Actium ; accession of the Corcyraeans to the Athenian con- 
 federacy : sea-fight off Sybota : infraction of the thirty years' 
 truce . . . .304- 
 
 SECT. IV. Summary view of the history of Macedonia : war of 
 Athens with Macedonia : enmity of Corinth to Athens : re- 
 volt of Athenian dependencies in Thrace : battle and siege of 
 Potidaea . . 320
 
 CONTENTS. Vll 
 
 SECT. V. Assembly of deputies of the Peloponnesian con- 
 federacy at Lacedaemon : the thirty years' truce declared 
 broken. Second assembly : war with Athens resolved. Em- 
 bassies from Lacedaemon to Athens. Final rejection of the 
 proposals from Lacedaemon by the Athenians . Page 331 
 
 SECT. VI. Attempt of the Thebans against Plataea . 356 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM ITS COMMENCEMENT TO 
 THE DEATH OF PERICLES, WITH A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE 
 HISTORY OF THRACE. 
 
 SECT. I. State of the Athenian and Peloponnesian confederacies. 
 Invasion and ravage of Attica by the Peloponnesians. Oper- 
 ations of the Athenian fleet in the western seas under Car- 
 cinus ; gallant action of the Spartan Brasidas : ravage of the 
 Peloponnesian coast, and acquisition of Cephallenia to the 
 Athenian confederacy. Operation of the Athenian fleet in 
 the eastern seas under Cleopompus. Measures for the se- 
 " curity of Athens ; remarkable decree : extermination of the 
 ^Eginetans. Invasion and ravage of Megaris by the Athe- 
 nians . . . . 364 
 
 SECT. II. Summary view of the history of Thrace : alliance ne- 
 gotiated by Athens with Sitalces king of Thrace and Perdiccas 
 king of Macedonia. Public funeral at Athens in honour of 
 the slain in their country's service. Expedition of the Corin- 
 thians against Acarnania and Cephallenia . 380 
 
 SECT. III. Second invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians. 
 Pestilence at Athens. Operations of the Athenian fleet on 
 the Peloponnesian coast under Pericles ; and on the Mace- 
 donian coast under Agnon. Effects of popular discontent at 
 Athens. First effort of the Peloponnesian fleet. Attempt of 
 the Peloponnesians to send an embassy into Persia. Barbarity 
 of the Grecian system of war. An Athenian squadron 
 stationed in the western sea. Surrender of Potidaea to the 
 Athenians. Death of Pericles . . 385 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM THE DEATH OF PERICLES, 
 IN THE THIRD YEAR, TO THE APPLICATION FOR PEACE FROM 
 LACEDJEMON, IN THE SEVENTH. 
 
 SECT. I. Siege of Plataea by the Peloponnesians . 405
 
 Vlll CONTENTS. 
 
 SECT. II. Operations of the Athenians on the northern coast of 
 the JEgean. Affairs of the western parts of Greece : assistance 
 sent by Peloponnesus to the Ambraciots against the Amphi- 
 lochian Argives and Acarnanians : battle near Stratus : sea- 
 fight between the Peloponnesian fleet, under the Corinthian 
 Machon, and the Athenian fleet, under Phormion : sea-fight 
 between the Peloponnesian fleet, under the Spartan Cnemus, 
 and the Athenian fleet, under Phormion. Attempt to surprise 
 Piraeus. Success of Phormion in Acarnania. Invasion of 
 Macedonia by Sitalces king of Thrace . Page 411 
 
 SECT. III. Fourth campaign : third invasion of Attica. Revolt 
 of Mitylene. Flight of part of the garrison of Plataea. Siege 
 of Mitylene by Paches. Distress and exertions of Athens. 
 Transactions under the Lacedaemonian Alcides, and the Athe- 
 nian Paches on the Ionian coast . ; 430 
 
 SECT. IV. State of the Athenian government after the death of 
 Pericles. Nicias : Cleon. Inhuman decree against the Mity- 
 lenaeans. Death of Paches. Plataea taken . 449 
 
 SECT. V. Sedition of Corcyra : operations of the Athenian fleets 
 under Nicostratus and Eurymedon, and of the Peloponnesians 
 under Alcides . . . 464 
 
 SECT. VI. An Athenian squadron sent to Sicily under Laches. 
 End of the pestilence at Athens. Sixth year of the war : 
 operations of the Athenians, under Nicias on the eastern side 
 of Greece, and under Demosthenes on the western : state of 
 .Sitolia : defeat of Demosthenes near .ZEgitium : a Pelopon- 
 nesian army sent into the western provinces ; Ozolian Locris 
 acquired to the Peloponnesian confederacy : Demosthenes 
 elected general of the Acarnanians ; battle of Olpae ; battle 
 of Idomene : important successes of Demosthenes : peace 
 between the Acarnanians and Ambraciots . 476 
 
 SECT. VII. Seventh campaign : fifth invasion of Attica. Con- 
 quest in Sicily projected by the Athenian administration. 
 Pylus occupied by Demosthenes : blockade of Sphacteria : 
 negotiation of the Lacedaemonians at Athens. Cleon ap- 
 pointed general of the Athenian forces : Sphacteria taken : 
 application for peace from Lacedaemon to Athens . 496 
 
 The Vignette on the Titlepage represents A SILVER COIN OF 
 LACED^EMON, copied from a Specimen in the British Museum.
 
 THE 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE FROM THE ACCESSION OF XERXES TO 
 THE THRONE OF PERSIA TILL THE CONCLUSION OF THE 
 FIRST CAMPAIGN OF THAT MONARCH'S EXPEDITION 
 AGAINST GREECE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Accession of Xerxes to the throne of Persia. Immense prepar- 
 ations of the court of Persia for conquest in Europe. Assembly 
 of the army at Sardis, and of the fleet in the Hellespont. 
 March of the army. Muster of the army. Arrival of the 
 army and fleet at Therme in Macedonia. 
 
 HERODOTUS relates some anecdotes attributing to CHAP. 
 Darius an acrimonious resentment against Athens, 
 very repugnant to his general character, as it stands 
 marked by authors of highest credit, and even by 
 what that historian himself has reported, evidently on p ato ' 
 better authority. Asia, he adds, was agitated for Herodot. 
 three years by preparations for a second expedition & s ' e ' 
 into Greece, to revenge the disgrace of Marathon. 
 Prudence perhaps, not less than honour, would require 
 the attempt ; but three years could not be necessary 
 to the resources of the Persian empire for such a 
 purpose ; and more important objects in the mean 
 time called the attention of its rulers. Egypt re- 
 
 VOL. II. B
 
 i ; 
 
 >c, HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 Itdd^ and- a dangerous dispute about the right of 
 succession to the throne is said to have arisen be- 
 tween the sons of Darius. That monarch had the 
 satisfaction to see the succession amicably settled in 
 favour of Xerxes, his son by Atossa, daughter of 
 Cyrus, in preference to elder sons by a former mar- 
 01.73. 4. riage; but he died soon after, leaving Egypt to be 
 Herodot. ' recovered, and Greece to be punished, by his suc- 
 1.7. c. 7. cessor . The former object was accomplished in the 
 second year of the reign of Xerxes : the other seems 
 to have been for some time neglected. 
 
 But the Persians had not yet forgotten the cha- 
 racter, which their fathers had raised so high, of a 
 warlike and conquering people. They were not ac- 
 customed to insults within their dominion like that 
 of the burning of Sardis ; and still less to defeats in 
 the field like that of Marathon. We cannot suppose 
 Herodotus often well informed of intrigues about the 
 person of the great king ; but we may believe what 
 he puts as a remark into the mouth of Xerxes, * that 
 1.7. c. 8. 'it had not been the custom of the Persians to be 
 * quiet.' Nor is it to be doubted but there would be 
 men about that prince ready to encourage an idea, 
 natural enough to a youth inheriting such immense 
 power from a race of conquerors, that it became him 
 also to be a conqueror, to enlarge still the bounds of 
 his vast empire, and to emulate the military fame of 
 Darius, of Cambyses, and even of the great Cyrus. 1 
 To punish Athens and to conquer Greece were there- 
 
 1 This is the motive also alleged by ^Eschylus, in the person 
 of Atossa, for the expedition of Xerxes. Speaking to the shade 
 of Darius, she says : 
 
 TavTa ToTf xa>co~f o/jti\oov avX'pao'iv JiJa<rjtETaJ 
 
 y, warpaw J' oXfov oiiJiy aifav
 
 PREPARATIONS OF PERSIA. 3 
 
 fore small objects; nor does what Herodotus has Herod. 1.7. 
 suggested appear improbable, that the ardent am- com!*Nep. 
 bition of the youthful monarch, and some among his v/rhemist - 
 counsellors, might look as far as the Western Ocean, 
 howsoever little its shores or the intermediate nations 
 were known to them, for the term of their career of 
 glory. Four years, it is said, were employed in pre- Herodot. 
 paration. An army was collected, greater than the Di^'sic! 
 world ever saw either before or since. The com- i- 11 - 6 - 1 - 
 
 8c seq. 
 
 manders on the western frontier of the empire had 
 had opportunity for observing that the most formi- 
 dable land force could not secure maritime provinces 
 against insults by sea ; and, still more, that the con- 
 quest of maritime states would be in vain attempted 
 without naval power. Every seaport therefore, in 
 the- whole winding length of coast from Macedonia 
 to the Libyan Syrtes, was ordered to prepare ships 
 and to impress mariners. A prodigious work was 
 undertaken for the purpose of making the navigation 
 secure from the Asiatic along the European coast, 
 and to prevent all risk of future disasters like that of 
 the fleet under Mardonius. It was no less than to Herodot. 
 form a canal, navigable for the largest galleys, across r^fsic." 
 the isthmus which joins Athos to the continent of 1 - 11 - c - 2 - 
 Thrace. A fleet was assembled in the Hellespont, 
 under the command of Bubares son of Megabazus, 
 and the crews were employed on the work. Hero- 
 dotus has supposed mere ostentation to have been the 
 motive to this undertaking ; because, he says, less 
 labour would have carried the fleet over land, from 
 one sea to the other ; yet it seems no rash conjecture 
 that policy may have prompted it. To cross the 
 
 ia.y 1% av^foav weibn ffoAXax.!? xXuaiv X.O.XMV, 
 n/y IStwAeycTEv xtXeySov xcu nya-revf*' !< 
 
 Pers. v. 753. 
 
 B 2
 
 t HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. JEgean, even now, with all the modern improvements 
 tn ' in navigation, such are the changes of wind, and 
 multitudes of insulated shores, is singularly dangerous. 
 To double the cape of Athos is still more formidable. 
 The object therefore being to add the countries west 
 of the >Egean sea to the Persian dominion, it was of 
 no small importance to lessen the danger and delays 
 of the passage for a fleet. 2 At the same time, to 
 facilitate the communication by land, a bridge was 
 
 2 Scarcely any circumstance of the expedition of Xerxes is 
 more strongly supported by historical testimony than the making 
 of the canal of Athos. The informed and exact Thucydides, 
 who had property in Thrace, lived part of his time upon that 
 property, and held at one time an important command there, 
 speaks of the canal of Athos, made by the king of Persia, with 
 perfect confidence.* Plato, Isocrates, and Lysiasf all mention 
 it as an undoubted matter ; the latter adding that it was, in his 
 time, still a subject of wonder and of common conversation. 
 Diodorus relates the fact not less positively than Herodotus. 
 That part of Strabo which described Thrace is unfortunately 
 lost ; but the canal of Xerxes remains confidently mentioned in 
 the epitome of his work. The place was moreover so sur- 
 rounded with Grecian settlements that it seems impossible for 
 report of such a matter, if unfounded, to have held any credit. 
 At the very time of the expedition of Xerxes there were no 
 fewer than five Grecian towns on the peninsula itself of Athos, 
 one even on the isthmus, situate, as Thucydides particularly 
 mentions, close to the canal, and many on the adjacent shores. J 
 Yet the poet Juvenal has chosen the story of this canal for an 
 exemplification of the Grecian disposition to lie : and a traveller 
 who two centuries ago visited, or thought he visited, the place, 
 has asserted that he could find no vestige of the work. For 
 myself I will own that I cannot consider the sarcasm of a 
 satirist desiring to say a smart thing, or such negative evidence 
 as that of the modern traveller, of any weight against the con- 
 curring testimonies of the writers above quoted. 
 
 * Thucyd. 1. 4. c. 109. 
 
 t Plat, de Leg. 1.3. p. 699. t. 2. Isocrat. Paneg. p.222. t. 1. Lys. or. funeb. 
 | Herodot. 1. 7. c. 22. Thucyd. 1. 4. c. 109. Excerpt, ex. Strab. 1. 7. 
 Bellon. Singul. Rer. Obser. p. 78.
 
 PREPARATIONS OF PERSIA. 5 
 
 laid over the river Strymon. Magazines meanwhile SECT. 
 
 were formed all along the coast as far as Macedonia, '_ 
 
 chiefly in the towns of the Grecian colonies then 
 subject to Persia. 
 
 At length, the levies being completed, the forces 01. 74 f . 
 from all the eastern and southern provinces were Herodot. 
 assembled at Critali in Cappadocia. Thither the L7 - c - 26 - 
 monarch himself went to take the command. He 
 marched immediately to Sardis, where the land force 
 from the west of Asia Minor joined him. Thence 
 heralds were sent into Greece, to all the cities except 
 Athens and Lacedaemon, where, in violation of the 
 law of nations, even of that age, the Persian heralds, 
 in the reign of Darius, had been cruelly put to death. 
 Earth and water were demanded in token of sub- 
 jection ; and, according to the oriental custom, orders 
 were given to prepare entertainment for the king 
 against his arrival. Xerxes wintered at Sardis. Mean- 
 while a work, scarcely inferior to the canal of Athos, Herodot. 
 was prepared in the Hellespont. Two bridges of boats pi a 't. de 
 were extended from near Abydus on the Asiatic ^JQQ 3 t * 2 
 to near Sestos on the European shore. The width St rabo, 
 
 r i T-U u -J A J 1.13. p. 591. 
 
 is seven furlongs. Ihe bridges were contrived, one 
 to resist the current, which is always strong from 
 the Propontis, the other to withstand the winds, 
 which are often violent from the .ZEgean sea ; so that 
 each protected the other. 
 
 Early in spring; the army moved. For so vast a 01.74. 
 
 . B C 480 
 
 multitude one principal difficulty was so to direct Herodot. 
 the march that water might not fail. Several rivers & 7 s ' e c ' 37 " 
 of some name, of torrent character issuing from 
 mountains, abundant or over-abundant and impetuous 
 in winter, in summer of scanty and quiet current, 
 were found unequal to the supply. Among them is 
 mentioned the celebrated stream of Scamander, cross- 
 
 B 3
 
 6 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, ing the Trojan plain. Seven days and nights were 
 employed unintermittingly in passing the bridges of 
 the Hellespont. The march was then continued 
 through the Chersonese. The fleet, which had been 
 assembled in the Hellespont, was at the same time 
 ordered to proceed along the coast westward. The 
 land and sea forces met again at Doriscus, near the 
 mouth of the Hebrus, where Darius, on his return 
 from his Scythian expedition, had established a 
 Persian garrison. Both the country and the coast 
 there were favourable for the review of so immense 
 an armament, and there accordingly the monarch 
 reviewed his forces of sea and land. 
 
 There too, Herodotus tells us, the army was mus- 
 tered. Later ancient writers have taken upon them 
 to differ from him concerning its strength ; but we 
 may best believe the simple honesty of the original 
 historian, who, in describing the manner of the 
 muster, sufficiently shows that even the Persian ge- 
 nerals themselves knew not how to ascertain the num- 
 bers under their command. Indeed those who know 
 how difficult it is, amid all the accuracy of division 
 and the minuteness of detail in modern European 
 armies, and comparatively handfuls of men, to acquire 
 exact information of effective numbers, will little 
 expect it among the almost countless bands, of va- 
 rious languages and widely differing customs, which 
 composed the military multitude under Xerxes, 
 when, though for Important purposes writing was 
 common, yet a convenient and cheap material for 
 writing was unknown, and memory was necessarily, 
 far more than in modern times, trusted for authority. 
 Herodotus has reckoned among its numbers no less 
 than twenty-nine nations, from Scythia north to 
 Ethiopia south, and from India east to Thrace and
 
 STRENGTH OF THE PERSIAN ARMY. 7 
 
 Libya west. To acquire a foundation for guessing SECT. 
 the total effective strength, without an attempt to 
 ascertain the detail, the method taken by the Persian 
 generals, he says, was this : Ten thousand men, being Herodot. 
 counted, were formed in a circle as close as possible. 1- 1 ' c ' 60- 
 A fence was then raised around them. They were 
 dismissed, and all the army in turn passed into this 
 inclosure, till the whole was thus counted by tens of 
 thousands. According to this muster, such as it was, 
 the historian says the infantry alone amounted to one 
 million seven hundred thousand fighting men ; but 
 he expressly declares that no one ever undertook to 
 give an account of the detail. 3 The cavalry he makes 
 only eighty thousand ; by no means an improbable 1. 7. c.87. 
 number, and likely to have been better ascertained. 
 Arabian camel-riders, and African charioteers he 
 computes at twenty thousand. Horses, mules, asses, 
 oxen, and camels, for the baggage, were besides in- 
 numerable. 
 
 Of the fleet he gives a more particular account. 1.7. c. 89. 
 The trireme galleys of war amounted to twelve hun- 
 dred and seven ; and his distribution, which may 
 show the comparative naval strength of different 
 nations at the time, makes the total appear hardly 
 beyond probability. Three hundred were furnished 
 by the Phenicians with the Syrians of Palestine ; two 
 hundred by Egypt ; one hundred and fifty by Cyprus ; 
 by Cilicia one hundred ; Pamphylia thirty ; Lycia 
 fifty ; Caria seventy ; by the Dorian Greeks of Asia 
 thirty ; one hundred by the lonians ; sixty by the 
 ^Eolians ; seventeen by the islands, and by the Helles- 
 pontine towns one hundred. The average comple- 
 
 3 "Otrov [Atv vvv fKa,/;TO^ tcafei-^ov irX^flo^ e<j apiOfMV, OVK 6%<y elttai 
 TO <xTpKe<;' ov yap Xeyerai npo<; ov$a[A$v avOpuwuv. 1. 7 C. 60. 
 
 B
 
 8 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, ment of men to each trireme galley he reckons at 
 
 VIII. 
 
 ' two hundred. The crews of the whole fleet would 
 
 thus amount to two hundred and forty-one thousand 
 four hundred. But over and above the ordinary crew 
 there were thirty Persians or Medes or Sacians in 
 each galley. These would make an addition of thirty- 
 six thousand two hundred and ten men. The Phe- 
 nician ships, he says, were the best sailers, and among 
 those the Sidonian excelled. Beside these, the trans- 
 ports, some for infantry, some particularly fitted for 
 cavalry, storeships, some of great burthen, together 
 with smaller vessels of various sorts and for various 
 purposes attending the fleet, would not easily be num- 
 bered. He reckons them, by a gross calculation, at 
 three thousand, and their average crews at eighty 
 men : the amount of their crews would thus be two 
 hundred and forty thousand ; and the number of men 
 in the fleet, all together, five hundred and seventeen 
 thousand six hundred and ten. 
 
 Of this extraordinary expedition naturally many 
 anecdotes would be remembered and propagated; 
 many true, many false, mistaken, or exaggerated. 
 Among those related by Herodotus some appear per- 
 fectly probable, some concern circumstances of which 
 he could hardly have had authentic information, and 
 some are utterly inconsistent with the characters to 
 whom they refer. Among the latter I should reckon 
 Herod. 1.7. the ridiculous punishment of the Hellespont by stripes 
 
 c. 35. &39. 11- -I . 11 i- 
 
 ana chains, together with executions, equally impolitic 
 as inhuman, and repugnant to what we learn, on best 
 authority, of the manners of the Persians. But the 
 account which that historian gives of the march of 
 the army, and of the attending motions of the "fleet, 
 is clear and consistent beyond what might be ex- 
 1.7. c. 121. pected. The march was continued from Doriscus in
 
 MARCH OF THE PERSIAN ARMY. 9 
 
 three columns. One, under Mardonius and Masistes, SECT. 
 kept along the coast, the fleet nearly accompanying. ' 
 Another, under Tritantaechmes and Gergis, pro- 
 ceeded far within land. Xerxes himself led the 
 third between the other two, Smordomenes and Me- 
 gabyzus commanding under him. These passed the Herodot. 
 Samothracian towns, the most westerly of which was & s ' e 
 Mesambria on the river Lissus, on whose opposite 
 bank was Stryma, a town belonging to the islanders 
 of Thasos. This river did not suffice for the con- 
 sumption of the army. Maronaea, Dicaea, Abdera, 
 Grecian colonies, lay next on the road. Everywhere 1.7. c. us. 
 the commands to prepare for the reception of the 
 monarch and his forces had been zealously executed. 
 Beside vast magazines of corn, meat, and forage for 
 the troops, many of the cities, emulous to court favour, 
 or anxious to avert wrath, had prepared, with a sump- 
 tuousness proportioned to their hopes and fears rather 
 than to their revenues, for the entertainment of the 
 king and his court. Wherever the halt of the royal 
 train had been announced a superb pavilion was 
 erected, adorned with the most costly furniture. 
 Many cities provided even vessels of gold and silver 
 for the table. The rapacious attendants of the Persian 
 court spared nothing ; in the morning, when the 
 army marched, all was carried off. This eastern 
 style of robbery gave occasion for a saying of Mega- 
 creon of Abdera, which Herodotus has recorded as 
 having become popular, * That the Abderites ought 
 ' to go with their wives in procession to their temples, 
 * and pray to the gods always equally to avert half 
 ' the evils that threatened : for upon the present oc- 
 6 casion their most grateful thanks were due for the 
 ' favour shown in disposing Xerxes to eat but once a 
 ' day : since, if he had chosen to dine on the morrow
 
 10 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. < as he had supped over night, there would have been 
 
 VIII 
 
 _ _ ' an end of Abdera.' 
 
 Not contented with their forces, already innu- 
 Herodot. merable, the Persians continued everywhere on their 
 & no. ' march to press men. The youth, equally Grecian and 
 ML' c.'s. Thracian, were compelled to join either the army 
 or the navy. Yet, according to Herodotus, the 
 Thracians preserved such veneration for the soil which 
 this enormous armament had trodden, that to his 
 time they avoided breaking or sowing it. He does 
 not account for this particularity ; but perhaps the 
 Persians favoured the Thracians against the Greeks ; 
 all whose establishments on that coast were encroach- 
 ments upon Thracian ground. From Abdera the 
 division under Xerxes proceeded to Eion, (a Grecian 
 town on the river Strymon, with a Persian garrison, 
 established there by Darius,) and thence by Argilus 
 and Stagirus to Acanthus, all Grecian settlements. 
 In the neighbourhood of Acanthus the three divisions 
 met : and there Artachaeas, a Persian of high rank, 
 related to the royal family, and in great favour with 
 Xerxes, died. The few words in which Herodotus 
 describes his funeral contribute to show the exten- 
 siveness, and to connect from remotest antiquity the 
 history, of those artificial mounts, numerous in our 
 own country as in many other parts of the world. 
 The whole army, he says, heaped the mount which 
 formed the sepulchral monument of Artachaeas. 4 
 After this solemn ceremony the march was continued 
 
 e icava, ^ ^fa-civj. 1. 7. c. 1 1 7. Homer gives a 
 corresponding description of the sepulchral barrow raised by 
 the Grecian army under Agamemnon in honour of the heroes 
 who fell before Troy. 
 
 A/te<f> avToin J" emirtt ftsyav xal apii/uova 
 Xtvafjuv 'Apytituv lefot a-Vfaroi; aly^nfciia
 
 MARCH OF THE PERSIAN ARMY. 11 
 
 westward, with the country called Chalcidice, full of SECT. 
 Grecian settlements, on the left. The fleet, which 
 had met the army at Acanthus, proceeded thence 
 through the canal of Athos, and round the peninsulas 
 of Sithonia and Pallene, into the bay of Therme; 
 pressing ships and seamen at all the Grecian towns 
 on the coast. The army, arriving soon after, occu- 
 pied with its encampment the whole extent of the 
 Macedonian shore, from Therme and the borders of 
 Mygdonia, to the river Haliacmon near the borders 
 of Thessaly. 
 
 ToT; of vuv yiycta&t, Kctl of fASTOTriySBv fVovTaf. 
 
 Odyss. 1. xxiv. v. 80. 
 
 Now all the sons of warlike Greece surround 
 Thy destined tomb, and cast a mighty mound : 
 High on the shore the growing hill we raise, 
 That wide th' extended Hellespont surveys ; 
 Where all, from age to age, who pass the coast, 
 May point Achilles' tomb .... 
 
 Pope's Odyss. b. xxiv. v. 101. 
 
 The concluding words of the line, ' and hail the mighty ghost,' 
 are an addition of the translator, not warranted by Homer, in 
 this or any other passage of his works. 
 
 The custom of forming these sepulchral barrows, lo'ng lost 
 over the greater part of Europe, is yet preserved in Spain. 
 ' By the road side,' says Townsend, ' are seen wooden crosses, 
 ' to mark the spot where some unhappy traveller lost his life. 
 ' The passengers think it a work of piety to cast a stone upon 
 
 * the monumental heap. . . . Whatever may have been the origin 
 
 * of this practice, it is general over Spain.' Journey through 
 Spain, vol. 1. p. 200.
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 State of Greece at tJie time of the invasion under Xerxes. The- 
 mistocles. Responses of the Delphian oracle concerning the 
 invasion. Measures for forming a confederacy of Grecian 
 commonwealths. Disunion among the Greeks. Assembly of 
 deputies from the confederated commonwealths at Corinth. The 
 defence of Thessaly given up by the confederates. Measures 
 for defending the pass of Thermopylae. 
 
 THE Greeks had long had intelligence of the im- 
 mense preparations making in Asia ; professedly for 
 the punishment of Athens, but evidently enough with 
 more extensive views of conquest. Yet still, as on 
 the former invasion, no measures were concerted for 
 Herodot. the general defence of the country. On the contrary, 
 many of the small republics readily and even zealously 
 made the demanded acknowledgment of subjection 
 to the great king by the delivery of earth and water. 5 
 Nor will this appear strange to those who read the 
 honest historian of the age, and consider the real state 
 of things in the country, however it may militate with 
 later declamation on Grecian patriotism and love of 
 liberty. 6 For it was surely no unreasonable opinion^ 
 
 5 OVTC flovXopevwv TV iroXXSv avrd^re 0-60,1 TOV wXef/.w, MojSt- 
 fyvTtav Se npoOvfji.'^.* This is in a great degree confirmed by 
 Thucydides : Sndvioy yv TUV 'EXX^vwy TWO, apeTyv ry Zepfcov Stva/tet 
 a.vTiTaa<r6a.t f : and still more by Plato : HoXXa Se Xeyuv av TH; 
 TO, Tore yevopeva, icepl tne'tvov TOV woXe^toi', T^? 'EXXaSo? o^Sa^aS^ 
 e^o-^ij/xova av Ka-TVj'yopo'i' (ivS* oil a/Awao-Oai ryv ye 'EXXaSa Xeyav, 
 opOSi; av Xeyot' XX' t [M] TO ie 'AOyvatuv Kal TO AaKeSa^ov/wv 
 KOWTJ fttavoyfta, v^Mve iv\v emovirav SouXe/av, tr^eSsv av IJ&TJ itavT ^v 
 jtxji*7/>ieva, K. T. X.jf. 
 
 6 That declamation had its origin in Greece when Grecian 
 liberty was in decay, but has been mostly produced under the 
 pressure of the imperial despotism of Rome, when men, not 
 
 * Herodot. 1. 7. c. 138. f Thucyd. 1. 3. c. 56. 
 
 t Plat* de Leg. 1. 3. p. 692. t. 2.
 
 STATE OF GREECE. 13 
 
 held by many, that the might of Persia was irresistible. 7 SECT. 
 
 All the Asian Greeks had formerly in vain attempted 
 
 to defend themselves against the very inferior poten- 
 tate of Lydia ; and, when reduced, scarcely found 
 themselves losers, but on the contrary seem to have 
 been in many points gainers by their subjection. But 
 now that immense power which had not only swal- 
 lowed up the Lydian monarchy with all its append- 
 ages, but was already far advanced into Europe, and 
 to a land force that could not be numbered added by 
 far the greatest naval strength, collected from various 
 subject states, that had ever been seen in the world, 
 how was it to be resisted by a few little republics, 
 whose territories together were comparatively but a 
 spot, and which were nevertheless incapable of any 
 firm political union among one another ? Quiet men 
 would naturally think it wisely done to merit favour 
 by early submission ; and the ambitious might hope 
 that their field would even be extended, through the 
 establishment of the Persian dominion in Greece. 
 Some, perhaps not unreasonably, would prefer sub- 
 jection, under the Persian empire to submission under 
 the domineering spirit of the Spartan oligarchy 8 , while 
 
 daring to speak directly of the government under which they 
 lived, enjoyed a weak revenge in reviling it obliquely, or in 
 obliquely exciting opposition to it, through immoderate eulogy 
 of times past. Thus we have seen, in modern Europe, people 
 denied the liberty of speaking, concerning the government of 
 their own country, with eager zeal take an interest in English 
 and American politics. 
 
 This was written while the perhaps ill-undertaken, certainly 
 ill-managed, war between England and its American colonies 
 was going forward. 
 
 7 Even Isocrates admits this as a sufficient apology for the 
 
 Smaller Grecian States : 'Hyovvro yap ra7<; ply TaTtewati; ruv icli'Keuv 
 ntpoa-fjKew tl; aVavro? rpono-j "Cflreiv Tyv truTqpiav. Panegyr. p. 226. 
 
 t. 1. ed. Auger. 
 
 8 See the Panathenaic of Isocrates.
 
 14 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, the more oppressive tyranny of the Athenian demo- 
 cracy had yet little shown itself. Some might even 
 wish for a superintending authority to repress those 
 often horrid violences of domestic faction by which 
 almost every Grecian city was unceasingly torn. Those 
 therefore who had given the demanded earth and 
 water rested satisfied in the confidence that they 
 should suffer no greater than former evils ; those who 
 had refused were in very great alarm. 9 ' And here/ 
 says Herodotus, ' I am driven of necessity to profess 
 
 * an opinion, invidious I know to most men, which 
 
 * yet, as I think it the truth, I shall not withhold. If 
 
 * the Athenians, in dread of the approaching danger, 
 4 had either fled their country, or surrendered them- 
 ' selves, not even an attempt could have been made 
 
 * to oppose the enemy by sea. What then would 
 'have followed may be easily conceived. The for- 
 
 * tiffed lines proposed by the Peloponnesians across 
 ' the Corinthian isthmus would have been nugatory. 
 ' For the Persian, having it in his choice where to 
 
 * make his attack by sea, would have subdued the 
 ' several states one by one ; and the Lacedaemonians 
 'at last, reduced to their single strength, would 
 
 * have had no alternative but to die gloriously, or 
 ' submit to a power which they could no longer with- 
 4 stand ; so that all Greece must inevitably have fallen 
 ' under the Persian yoke. Whoever therefore shall 
 
 * say shat the Athenians preserved Greece will not 
 ' err from the truth : for, to whichsoever party they 
 'joined themselves, that would preponderate. Their 
 ' resolution then being decided by their zeal for 
 ' Grecian independency, THEY excited to energy 
 ' those Grecian states which had not yet submitted 
 
 9 Ot pen yap avreuv, SoVre; yyv re KOU CSup, el%oy Sta.fxr<JS <u< &&ey 
 ayjy.fi trpoi; rov j3a.pta.pov' of Sc, ov 8oWe$, ev Se/*T< (/.eyctXiu 
 Herodot. 1. 7. C. 138.
 
 STATE OF GREECE. 15 
 
 to Persia ; and THEY, next under the gods, repelled SECT. 
 the invasion.' '. 
 
 This testimony in favour of Athens appears upon the 
 whole not less true than honourable. The business of 
 history however being neither panegyric nor satire, 
 but to form a just estimate of the conduct and cha- 
 racters of men, it will be proper, having adverted to 
 the circumstances which might apologise for those 
 Greeks who yielded on the first summons, to advert 
 also to the circumstances which led the Athenians 
 to such determined and animated opposition to the 
 Persian power. Nor is the investigation difficult. 
 The burning of Sardis first, then their treatment of 
 the Persian heralds, and finally their victory at Ma- 
 rathon, had made the Athenians so peculiarly ob- 
 noxious that, in submitting, they could little hope 
 for favourable terms. Though moreover Hippias was 
 now dead, yet the Pisistratidean party still existed, 
 and the court of the satrap of Sardis was the common 
 resort of Grecian refugees ; of whom some, richer 
 or more aspiring, or of rank to introduce them to 
 consideration, carried their intrigues as far as the 
 monarch's court at Susa. Among these Herodotus 
 names some Thessalian princes, some of the Pisistra- 
 tida?, and more particularly Demaratus, the banished 1<7 - c - 104 - 
 king of Sparta, who had received a most liberal pro- 
 vision from the generosity of the late Persian monarch, 
 Darius. All would expect to profit from the success 
 of the Persian arms in Greece, to which indeed many 
 looked as the only circumstance that could ever re- 
 store them to their country ; while, on the contrary, 
 those who now led the affairs of the Athenian com- 
 monwealth must, on that very account, expect from 
 it the more inevitable and deeper ruin. But the 
 glorious day of Marathon would naturally give new
 
 16 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, energy to every Athenian mind. Extraordinary suc- 
 cess easily excites among a people the presumption 
 that nothing is too arduous for them. Now also, as 
 on the invasion under Datis, there arose among the 
 Athenians a leader born for the occasion. Themi- 
 
 Com. Nep. stocles was a man of birth less illustrious than those 
 
 v. Themist. wno na d hitherto generally swayed the Athenian 
 counsels ; but whom very extraordinary talents, joined 
 with a general vehemence of temper, and a singular 
 enthusiasm for glory, could not fail of raising, in a 
 
 Herodot. popular government, to the highest political eminence. 
 We have observed how the war with the little island 
 of ^Egina had contributed to the former spirited op- 
 position of Afhens to Persia. It is the remark of 
 
 Herodot. Herodotus that, upon the present occasion also, 
 
 1.7. c.144. ^ ,, f . 
 
 piut. v. Greece owed its preservation to that war ; for it was 
 Themist. t k at war ^^h fj rst obliged the Athenians to raise 
 Thucyd. a marine. At Laurium, in Attica, was a very pro- 
 1.1. c.i4. ductive silver-mine, public property. But it had been 
 determined, in the true spirit of democracy, that, as 
 the treasury was rich, the revenue from the mine, 
 instead of being reserved for public service, should 
 be divided among all the Athenian people for their 
 private use. That enthusiastic ardour for a great ob- 
 ject which, when genius feels, it can communicate, 
 Themistocles communicated among the Athenian 
 youth. While their minds were generally exaspe- 
 rated against the ^Eginetans he procured a decree, 
 which the graver and more experienced leading men 
 dared not even propose, that no dividend should be 
 made of the income from the mines till it had pro- 
 vided for the building of two hundred trireme galleys. 
 The threatened invasion from the East had stopped 
 the JEgmetan war, and the galleys were now com- 
 plete.
 
 RESPONSES OF THE DELPHIAN ORACLE. 17 
 
 What Herodotus relates concerning the consulta- SECT. 
 tion of the Delphian oracle in this tremendous crisis ' 
 tends much to mark the temper and character of the 
 times, which modern language will more perfectly 
 portray the more nearly it can imitate the expression 
 of the original. ' Neither then,' says the historian, Herodot. 
 continuing his panegyric of Athens, * did the alarm- & 7 8 'eq. 139 * 
 
 * ing oracles from Delphi, however inspiring terror, 
 
 * persuade the Athenians to desert the cause of 
 
 * Greece. . . . For persons deputed by public authority 
 
 * to consult the god 10 , having performed the pre- 
 
 * scribed ceremonies, entered the temple ; and, as 
 ' they sat by the shrine, the Pythoness, whose name 
 
 * was Aristonica/ meaning noble victory, perhaps 
 a name given for the occasion, * prophesied thus : 
 ' Wretches, why sit ye there 9 Leave your houses 
 ' and the lofty ramparts of your city, and fly to the 
 1 farthest parts of the earth. For not the head shall 
 
 * remain flrm, nor the body, nor the extreme feet ; 
 ( not therefore the hands, nor shall aught of the 
 s middle remain, but all shall pass unregarded. For 
 'fire and keen Mars, urging the Syrian chariots, 
 
 * shall destroy. Nor yours alone, but many other 
 ' strong towers shall he overthrow. Many temples 
 
 * of the immortal gods shall he give to the consuming 
 'fire. Even now they stand dropping sweat, and 
 ' shaking with terror. Slack blood fiows over their 
 ( highest roofs, foreseeing the necessities of wretched- 
 ' ness. Depart thereforefrom the sanctuary, and dif- 
 < fuse the mind in evils' The Athenian deputies 
 were thrown into the deepest consternation. Con- 
 sulting with Timon son of Androbulus, one of the 
 principal Delphian citizens, he advised them to take 
 
 10 eeovpovot is their Grecian title, for which modern speech 
 cannot, without many words, give an equivalent phrase. 
 VOL. II. C
 
 18 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, the symbols of suppliants, and go again to the oracle. 
 
 [TL They did so, and addressed the shrine thus : O 
 
 ' sovereign power, prophesy to us more propitiously 
 
 * for our country, regarding these suppliant tokens 
 ' which we bear ; or we will not depart from the 
 
 * sanctuary, but remain here even until we die.' 
 The prophetess answered: 'Minerva is unable to 
 1 appease Olympian Jupiter, though entreating with 
 ' many words and deep wisdom. Again therefore 
 f I speak in adamantine terms. All else, within 
 ( Cecropian bounds and the recesses of divine Ci- 
 f thceron, shall fall : the wooden wall alone Jupiter 
 ' grants to Minerva to remaininexpugnable, a refuge 
 
 * to you and your children. PFait not therefore 
 ( the approach of horse or foot, an immense army, 
 ' coming from the continent ; but retreat, turning 
 ' the back, even though they be close upon you. 
 
 ' divine Salamis ! thou shalt lose the sons of 
 
 * women, whether Ceres be scattered or gathered f' 11 
 
 Writing down this answer, which appeared milder 
 than the former, the deputies returned to Athens. 
 Various opinions were held among the Athenian 
 elders about the meaning of words which interested 
 them so deeply. Some thought they directed the 
 defence of the citadel, which having been anciently 
 surrounded by a palisade, might be intended by the 
 term wooden wall. Others insisted that the wooden 
 wall could mean nothing but the fleet, upon which 
 
 11 These two oracles, though in verse in the original, fall 
 remarkably into English almost word for word ; even the 
 ambiguous expressions almost exactly corresponding in the two 
 languages. It is not every oracle, reported by Greek authors, 
 that can be thus literally rendered, or even rendered at all, 
 in another language, if indeed they bear any certain sense in the 
 original. It has therefore been a prudent practice of translators 
 to give their representations of them in verse.
 
 INTERPRETATION OF SECOND RESPONSE. 19 
 
 alone therefore the oracle encouraged them to de- SECT. 
 pend : yet this construction seemed overthrown by 
 the concluding sentence, which the diviners deemed 
 to portend that, if the fleet ventured a battle, it 
 would be defeated off Salamis. They advised there- 
 fore by no means to risk any kind or degree of en- 
 gagement, but to make use of the fleet for quitting, 
 with their families and effects, a country which they 
 could not defend, and to seek a settlement else- 
 where. 
 
 It was not likely that the prudent managers of 
 the Delphian oracle would prophesy any thing very 
 favourable to Athens, so peculiarly devoted to Persian 
 vengeance, when the innumerable forces of that 
 mighty empire were already assembled at Sardis, 
 while the little country of Greece was so unprepared 
 and so disunited. Yet the consultation was probably 
 a necessary compliance with popular prejudice ; and it 
 depended then upon genius to interpret the response 
 advantageously, after having perhaps suggested what 
 might bear an advantageous interpretation. Themi- 
 stocles was not at a loss upon the occasion. There 
 was one emphatical word, he said, which clearly 
 proved the interpretation of the diviners to be wrong. 
 For, had the last sentence been meant unfavourably S e p ( | d j ibid ' 
 to the Athenians, the oracle would scarcely have Themist 
 used the expression, * O divine Salamis,' but rather, 
 * O wretched Salamis.' Defeat at sea therefore was 
 portended not to them but to their enemies : the 
 wooden wall unquestionably meant their fleet ; and 
 a naval action must save the country. The Athe- 
 nian multitude was predisposed to the character and 
 sentiments of Themistocles. It was determined, in 
 pursuance of his opinion, to put the whole strength 
 of the commonwealth to the navy, to increase the 
 
 c 2
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, number of ships to the utmost possible, and, together 
 VIIL with such other Greeks as could be persuaded to join 
 
 them, to meet the enemy at sea. 
 
 Then at length measures were taken for forming 
 a league among those Grecian states which, accord- 
 ing to the historian's expression, were disposed the 
 better. 12 It was presently agreed that all enmities 
 among themselves should cease ; for many yet ex- 
 isted, and principally between Athens and JEgina. 
 Information came that Xerxes was arrived at Sardis. 
 Besides that his court was a common resort for re- 
 fugee Greeks, many of his Ionian and vEolian sub- 
 jects would be constantly about it, though probably 
 very few ever near his person. Means however were 
 thus open for Greeks to pass with little suspicion, and 
 easily to acquire information concerning all public 
 transactions of the Persian government. To ascertain 
 report, and pry if possible more deeply into things, 
 Herod. 1.7. some confidential persons were sent to Sardis. They 
 Pdysn! 47 ' were a PP renen( led as spies, and condemned to death : 
 strateg. but, the circumstances being reported to Xerxes, that 
 piiit. prince, disapproving the rigid caution of his officers, 
 Apophth. Directed that the spies should be carried round the 
 whole anny, and, after seeing every thing, dismissed 
 with passports to go where they pleased. Some ships 
 about the same time, carrying corn from the Euxine 
 for ^Egina and Peloponnesus, were stopped by the 
 Persian officers in the Hellespont. Xerxes directed 
 that they should be suffered to proceed on their 
 voyage : ' For we are going to the same country,' 
 he said, ' and the corn may be useful to us.' The 
 appearance of magnanimity in this conduct is lessened 
 by the immensity of the Persian armament, seemingly 
 
 12 'EXXqyaw ruv TO. apefvu pfwewTuv* Herod. 1. 7- C. 145.
 
 GENEROSITY OF XERXES. 21 
 
 far over-proportioned to its object ; yet upon the SECT. 
 whole the anecdotes are not unworthy of the son of 
 
 Darius, and grandson of Cyrus. Analogous trans- 
 actions may have happened among other people in 
 other ages : a story similar to the former is related Poiyb. 
 in Roman history. But in justice to Xerxes it ought Li v . L 30. 
 not to be forgotten that he stands first on record for ^: 29 ;. 
 
 rontm. 
 
 this treatment, generous at least, if we refuse to call i. 4 - c. 7. 
 it magnanimous, of enemies whose lives were forfeited 
 by the law of nations of all ages, 
 
 The principal Grecian states, whose resolutions re- Herodot. 
 mained yet doubtful, were Argos, Corcyra, Syracuse, Thucyd- 45 
 and the Cretan cities. Ministers were sent to all, L h c - 14 - 
 urging them to an alliance against Persia. Argos 
 had not, with the power, lost all the pride of her 
 ancient pre-eminence among the Grecian states. Weak 
 still from slaughter in battle and the massacre Herodot. 
 which followed in the invasion under Cleomenes, & 6 s ' e q' 76 ' 
 nourishing, since those events, an increased ani- 
 mosity against Lacedaemon, and fearing worse op- 
 pression from neighbouring Greeks than from the 
 distant Persian, the Argives applied to the Delphian 1.7. c. 148. 
 oracle for advice, or perhaps negotiated for sanction pan S a then.' 
 to resolutions already taken. The response, evi- Herodot. 
 dently composed by a friend to the Argives, appears, & s 'e q ' 
 as far as it can be understood, to favour their ancient 
 pretension to superiority over all other Grecian 
 states, and at the same time to direct them to enter 
 into no league for common defence, but merely to 
 provide for their own security. They nevertheless 
 received the ministers of the confederates with great 
 civility ; and having, in the oracular response, an ex- 
 cuse, which Grecian religion could not dispute, for 
 refusing, if they chose it, to engage in any league, 
 they endeavoured to profit from the pressing ne- 
 
 c 3
 
 2 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, cessity of the occasion for procuring advantageous 
 terms as the price of their assistance. They re- 
 quired, first, that the Lacedaemonians should bind 
 themselves to maintain peace with them for thirty 
 years ; and then they said that, though command 
 among the Grecian states justly belonged to Argos, 
 yet they would be contented to share it equally with 
 Sparta. The Lacedaemonian deputies hesitated, and 
 gave an unsatisfactory answer. The Argives then 
 closed the conference with declaring, * That the 
 
 * Spartan arrogance was intolerable ; they would ra- 
 
 * ther be commanded by the barbarians than sub- 
 
 * ject to Lacedaemon ; ' and they ordered the mini- 
 sters to leave the Argive territory before sunset on 
 pain of being treated as enemies. This, says Hero- 
 dotus, is what the Argives themselves say about these 
 matters. Other reports less favourable to them were 
 current in Greece. But after an account of these 
 the historian adds : * I do not undertake to vouch 
 
 * for these stories, nor for any thing relating to the 
 
 * business, farther than credit is due to what the 
 
 * Argives themselves say. But this I know, that 
 
 * if all men were to bring their domestic disgraces 
 
 * together, for the purpose of exchanging with their 
 
 * neighbours, they would no sooner have inspected 
 
 * those of others than all would most willingly take 
 
 * back their own. Thus neither upon this occasion 
 ' was the conduct of the Argives the most shame- 
 
 * fill.' 13 
 
 The ministers of the confederates were not more 
 successful in Crete. Herodotus, from whom alone 
 
 13 The testimony of Plato to the justice of this assertion (De 
 Leg. 1. 3. p. 692. t. 2.) may suffice to turn upon Plutarch 
 himself that charge of malignity which he has urged against 
 Herodotus.
 
 DISUNION AMONG THE GREEKS. 23 
 
 we have any detail of the political affairs of these SECT. 
 times, was too nearly contemporary to be wholly un- 
 
 biassed by the interest which persons yet living would 
 have in the credit of the principal actors. He makes 
 a handsome apology for the refusal of the Cretans 
 to join in the confederacy. They were desirous, he Herodot. 
 says, of taking their share in the common defence of L 7 ' c> 169> 
 Greece, but an oracle forbade them. In regard to the 
 Corcyraans he has not been scrupulous : he plainly 1.7. c.168. 
 accuses them of scandalous treachery to the Grecian i & n. 10 c'i5 C ' 
 cause, after having engaged to support it. Gelon, 
 tyrant of Syracuse, was a very powerful prince, and 
 his alliance would have been a great acquisition. But 
 difficulties arose in accommodating his pretensions to Herodot. 
 command with those of the leading states of Greece. & s ' e q. 
 Partly absurd pride, partly perhaps a reasonable 
 jealousy, prevented them from immediately acceding 
 to his terms ; and shortly the invasion of Sicily by a 
 Carthaginian army made his whole force necessary 
 at home. 
 
 Corinth was the place appointed for the meeting 
 of deputies from the confederated states to consult 
 about the conduct of the war. None among the 
 Grecian people had been more forward to join the 
 confederacy than the Thessalians. Intelligence ar- 
 rived that the Persian army had crossed the Helles- 
 pont and was directing its march westward. This 
 decided that Thessaly was the frontier to be first 
 attacked. The Thessalians reasonably expected that 
 a force would immediately be assembled, competent, 
 as far as the strength of Greece might admit, for the 
 defence of the passes into their country, by nature 
 very strong. Alarmed to find no measures taken 
 for that purpose they hastened a remonstrance to 
 Corinth, urging that the strength of their province 
 
 c 4>
 
 24- HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, alone was utterly unequal to oppose the prodigious 
 
 ' army coming against them ; that it ought not to be 
 
 expected they should sacrifice themselves with their 
 
 families, for the sake of people who would not stir 
 
 to assist them ; that a powerful body must therefore, 
 
 without delay, join them from the southern states ; 
 
 otherwise, however unwilling, they must necessarily 
 
 endeavour to make terms with the enemy. This 
 
 reasonable remonstrance roused the sluggish and hesi- 
 
 Herodot. tating counsels of the confederacy. A body of foot 
 
 1 7 r 1T% 
 
 Diod. sic. was embarked under the command of Evsenetus a 
 1. 11. c. 2. Lacedagmonian an( i Themistocles the Athenian. They 
 proceeded through the Euripus to Allus, a port of 
 Thessalian Achaia ; and then, marching across the 
 country, occupied the valley of Tempe between the 
 mountains Olympus and Ossa, the only pass from 
 Lower Macedonia into Thessaly. The infantry, from 
 different states, amounted to ten thousand men. 
 Thessaly was the only province of Greece that pos- 
 sessed any considerable strength of cavalry. The 
 whole of the Thessalian horse joined the confederate 
 infantry, and together they made a force cpmpetent 
 to defend the pass against any numbers. 
 Herodot. But the Grecian army had not been many days 
 encamped in Tempe when confidential messengers 
 arrived from Alexander son of Amyntas, a Mace- 
 donian man, as Herodotus in the simple language of 
 his age calls him, though heir apparent of the king- 
 dom of Macedonia through a long race of ancestors 
 of acknowledged descent from Hercules. The Ma- 
 cedonians represented that the invader's force by 
 land and sea was immense ; that there was another 
 way into Thessaly, practicable for an army, from 
 Upper Macedonia through Perrhaebia, to the town 
 of Gonnus, so that, in their station in Tempe, they
 
 DEFENCE OF THESSALY GIVEN UP. 25 
 
 might be taken in the rear u ; and if they would avoid SECT. 
 being trodden under foot by their enemies, they would 
 do well to retreat in time. It was not probably un- 
 known to the commanders of the republican forces 
 that a party among the Thessalians was disposed to 
 the Persian interest. As the Persian army advanced, 
 that party would be likely to gain strength. The 
 Macedonian prince's information being altogether 
 highly alarming, and his advice clearly reasonable, 
 they embarked their troops again, and returned to 
 the Corinthian isthmus. Then presently the Persian 
 became the ruling party in Thessaly, and profession 
 of submission was hastened to the Persian monarch. 
 The following conduct of the Thessalians justified 
 the measure of the commanders of the forces of the 
 confederated republics. 15 
 
 The Grecian confederacy, which remained to re- 
 sist the whole force of the Persian empire, now con- 
 sisted of a few little states, whose united territories 
 did not equal single provinces of France, and the 
 sum of whose population in free subjects was con- 
 
 14 Our geographical information concerning this country* 
 though much improved of very late years, is still very deficient. 
 The able and indefatigable D'Anville seems to have been able 
 to procure none of any value. His map, to which, in the want 
 of another guide of any comparable reputation, I trusted for the 
 former editions, is grossly incorrect. Some better information 
 has been obtained through recent travellers, from which Bar- 
 thelemy has profited. But since his work came out the modern 
 geography of the countries round the JEgean has been very su- 
 periorly given in a map compiled by De la Rochette, and pub- 
 lished by Faden. With its assistance I have ventured to give 
 the explanation in the text of a passage of Herodotus, in itself 
 so far from clear that translators and commentators, would they 
 own the difficulty, might be excused their misconception of it. 
 
 (3a<rt\t'i oivbpts eoVrE? xpvjiriiJi.uTa.TOi. Herod. 1. 7- C. 174.
 
 26 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, siderablv inferior to that of Yorkshire in England. 
 
 VIII * 
 
 ' Nor was there, even among these, either a just unani- 
 
 mity or any established mode of general administra- 
 tion which could command the constant and regular 
 exertion of united strength ; which might have re- 
 pressed the disaffected party among the Thessalians, 
 and, obviating thus the necessity for the precipitate 
 retreat from Tempe, might have delayed, or rendered 
 very hazardous, the march of the Persian multitude 
 over the rough country northward of the Thessalian 
 plain. 
 
 The valuable assistance of Thessaly being lost, the 
 consolation remained for the congress at Corinth, 
 that, as their defence was now narrowed, their 
 strength, such as it was, would be less divided ; the 
 fleet might more certainly co-operate with the army, 
 and if the attack was to begin nearer the centre of 
 the confederacy, the pressure itself of danger might 
 enforce that union in council, without which all de- 
 fence would be hopeless. The nature of their country, 
 and of its surrounding seas, was a farther encourage- 
 ment : the one every where mountainous, the other 
 broken with innumerable islands and headlands, and 
 subject to sudden storms, both were peculiarly fa- 
 vourable for defensive operations. The southern 
 boundary of Thessaly, which now became their fron- 
 tier, was advantageous beyond the rest. The ridge 
 strab. i. 9. of CEta, which forms it, extends from sea to sea ; every 
 P^g 1 ^ where impracticable for an army, or so nearly so that 
 the smallest force might advantageously oppose the 
 greatest. This ridge is crossed, nearly at right angles, 
 by another scarcely less formidable ; which, rising 
 ibid. immediately from the Corinthian isthmus, stretches 
 &p.434. northward, under various names, Helicon, Parnassus, 
 Pindus, and, still in a northerly direction, shoots be-
 
 NATURAL ADVANTAGE FOR DEFENCE. ^ 
 
 yond Grecian bounds far among the barbarous nations. SECT. 
 To enter Attica and Peloponnesus therefore from 
 Thessaly 'Jby the western side of the country, first 
 Pindus, then GEta, then Parnassus, must be sur- 
 mounted ; on the eastern, GEta alone. But here was 
 only one pass practicable for an army, where the ridge, 
 at its eastern extremity, meets the sea. This was 
 termed * the Gate ;* a term of precisely the same im- 
 port in the common speech of many parts of Eng- 
 land. In former ages the Phocians, on the south of 
 the mountains, to prevent predatory incursions upon Herodot. 
 their lands from the Thessalians, who lived on the *' 7 ' c ' 176 ' 
 northern side, had occupied the commanding fast- 
 nesses, and established a garrison there. Across the 
 middle of the narrow, where was a width of about 
 fifty -feet nearly level, they had erected a wall ; and, 
 to strengthen the defence, they formed, on the Thes- 
 salian side, an inundation from some hot springs, 
 which rose near the foot of the mountain. Hence 
 the place became distinguished from other mountain 
 passes by the name of Thermopylae, Hot-gates ; but 
 Pylae, simply the Gates, as the most important pass 
 of the kind within their country, remained always 
 among them the ordinary appellation. A little north- 
 ward of Thermopylae the mountains so closed, and 
 again a little southward, they so pressed upon the 
 sea, as barely to admit the passage of a single car- 
 riage. Nothing could be more commodious than 
 this spot for the small force of the Greeks to make 
 a stand against the immense army of Persia. It had 
 the farther extraordinary advantage that, near at 
 hand, and within ready communication, was a secure 
 road for a fleet ; so landlocked as to favour that also 
 against superior numbers, yet affording means of re- 
 treat. Hither it was determined to send the whole
 
 28 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, naval force that could be collected, together with a 
 
 VIII 
 
 body of troops sufficient to defend the pass. 
 
 But in the conduct even of this business the 
 union of the confederated states was grossly defective. 
 Jealous of one another, destitute of any sufficient 
 power extending over the whole, and fearing, not un- 
 reasonably, the naval superiority of the enemy, which 
 would enable him to choose where, when, and how 
 he would make his attacks, each little republic seems 
 to have been anxious to reserve its strength for future 
 contingencies. Even Lacedaemon again, as in the 
 former war, pretended religion as a hinderance. The 
 
 Herodot. festival called Carnia was to be celebrated, imme- 
 diately after which the whole force of the state should 
 march against the enemy. Most of the Pelopon- 
 nesian cities made similar excuses ; and where no 
 peculiar religious ceremony could be pleaded, the 
 Olympian festival, whose period coincided with these 
 events, was a common excuse for all who desired one. 
 Lacedaemon therefore sent only three hundred men ; 
 
 1.7. c . 202. Corinth four hundred; Phlius two hundred; My- 
 
 1.10. c.20. cena? (at this time, though an inconsiderable town, 
 yet independent of Argos) sent eighty men. The 
 mountaineers of Arcadia alone, less versed in the 
 wiles of politics, and unable to estimate the danger to 
 be expected from naval operations, honestly exerted 
 their strength in the common cause. The cities of 
 Te;ea and Mantinea sent each five hundred soldiers : 
 
 o 
 
 the other towns made the whole number of Arcadians 
 two thousand one hundred and twenty. To these 
 the little city of Thespige in Breotia added no less 
 than seven hundred : Thebes, far more powerful, but 
 ill-affected to the cause, gave only four hundred. 
 The whole strength of Athens went to the naval 
 armament. The other provinces without Pelopon-
 
 STRENGTH OF THE CONFEDERACY. 2 
 
 nesus had no large towns, and their inhabitants, less SECT. 
 
 TT 
 
 civilised, were little politically connected with the ' 
 
 southern states. 
 
 The assembly at Corinth however was not wanting 
 either in industry or ingenuity to persuade and en- 
 courage those nearest to the point of attack to use 
 their utmost exertion against the invader. Ministers 
 were sent through the towns and villages : The 
 force now marching for their protection, it was Herodot. 
 asserted, was only the advanced guard of a powerful 1>7 - c - 203 - 
 army, expected every day. That excessive fear of the 
 Persian power, it was added, which had so pervaded 
 Greece, was absurd : from the sea there was no 
 cause for apprehension : the Athenians, .ZEginetans, 
 and others who composed the allied fleet, were fully 
 equal to the defence of the country on that side. 
 ' Nor was it a god that was coming against them, but 
 
 * a man ; and there neither was, nor ever would be a 
 
 * mortal, in whose lot, from his very birth, evil was 
 
 * not mingled, and most in that of those of highest 
 
 * station. In the common course of things therefore 
 ' their invader, a mere mortal, would be disappointed 
 
 * of his hope.' Hearing these things, continues the 
 historian, whose original and almost contemporary 
 pencil gives us the very lineaments of the age, the 
 Opuntian Locrians marched with their whole force, 
 and the Phocians sent a thousand men. Leonidas, 
 one of the kings of Sparta, commanded in chief.
 
 30 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. 
 VIII. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 Station of the Grecian army at ThermopylcB ; of the fleet at 
 Artemisium. Responses of the Delphian oracle. Progress 
 of the Persian fleet to Sepias ; of the army to Thermopylce. 
 Numbers of the Persian forces. Storm and shipwreck at 
 Sepias. Battle of Thermopylce, 
 
 01. 74. 4. 
 75.1. 
 B.C. 480. 
 
 Herodot. 
 
 1.8. c.12. 
 1.7. c.177. 
 
 XERXES halted several days at Therme, to refresh 
 his troops, to acquire intelligence, and to collect 
 guides capable of conducting his multitudes through 
 the difficult country which he was approaching. It 
 was determined to proceed by Upper Macedonia into 
 
 128. C &\1\ Thessaly ; that road being more favourable than the 
 shorter way by the valley of Tempe. The fleet, no 
 such circuitous course being required for it, waited 
 in the bay of Therme eleven days after the army had 
 recommenced its march. 
 
 Summer was already advanced when intelligence 
 reached the assembly at Corinth that Xerxes was 
 arrived in Pieria. The forces under Leonidas then 
 immediately marched to their station at Thermopylae, 
 and the fleet proceeded to the neighbouring road 
 of Artemisium, on the Euboean coast. Hence three 
 
 c. 179, leo. galleys, one of Troezen, one of .^Egina, the third 
 Athenian, were sent oft' the island of S'ciathus to 
 watch the motions of the enemy. Ten Persian 
 galleys, also sent to explore, fell in with them. The 
 Greeks immediately fled. The Troezenian ship and 
 the .ZEginetan were taken with their crews. The 
 Athenian captain, running his galley ashore near the 
 mouth of the Peneus, escaped by land with his people. 
 The Persians took possession of the deserted vessel. 
 Immediately signals by fire, from the heights of Sci- 
 athus, gave notice to the Greeks at Artemisium of the
 
 DELPHIAN ORACLE. 31 
 
 enemy's approach. So little firm then were the SECT. 
 leaders yet in their counsels, and so dreading the 
 
 enemy's force 16 , that they immediately withdrew their 
 fleet to Chalcis. Scouts were left on the heights at 
 the north-western end of Euboea, to watch the hostile 
 fleet, and it became the purpose to wait attack in the 
 narrow pass of the Euripus, where the enemy's great 
 superiority in numbers would be less availing. 
 
 In this time of extreme difficulty and danger to the 
 Greeks constant and equal prudence appears hardly 
 any where but among the managers of the Delphian 
 oracle. The Delphian citizens, dreading, like others, Herodot. 
 the approaching invasion, consulted their god. The 
 response directed them to pray to the winds ; for 
 these might be powerful assistants to Greece. This 
 divine admonition was communicated among the 
 confederate Greeks, and most thankfully received. 17 
 Another response was reported directing the Athe- c . 189. 
 nians to invoke their son-in-law. According to 
 ancient tradition, Boreas god of the north wind, 
 coming from Thrace, perhaps really a Thracian chief 
 of that name, had married Orithyia daughter of 
 Erechtheus king of Attica. The prayers of the 
 Athenians were therefore particularly directed to the 
 north wind, with some confidence, at least among the 
 vulgar, that they were not without peculiar interest 
 with that deity. Those indeed, who know the power 
 of whistling, or of an eggshell, upon the minds of 
 English seamen at this day, may imagine what the 
 encouragement of the Delphian oracle to expect 
 
 16 Karappu^a-avrei; is the strong expression of Herodotus, 
 1. 7. c. 182. In another place he adds the corroborating adverb, 
 
 ^ Ka<' tr^)*, $tv<; xara^ftiSs'outn rov jSapfapoy, ef ayyt/Xaj/Tef, 
 aflavarov xarefovTO. Herod. 1. 7. C. 178.
 
 32 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, assistance from Boreas and their princess Orithyia 
 _ might do among the Athenians. The event however 
 which soon followed gave more solid ground of hope, 
 and might naturally excite the recollection of the 
 relation of Athens to the north wind, if it had not 
 before been thought of. 
 
 The ten Persian galleys, after the capture of the 
 
 Grecian vessels, proceeded in their business of ex- 
 
 Herodot. ploring ; but in passing between the island of Scia- 
 
 i. 7. c . 183. ^.j lus an( j fa e mam three of them struck upon a rock 
 
 called Myrmex. The fleet in the bay of Therm e, 
 upon intelligence from the exploring ships that the 
 passage to the Grecian coast was clear of the enemy, 
 and dangerous only from rocks, sent vessels with 
 stone to erect a mark on the Myrmex, and Pammon, 
 a Greek of the island of Scyros, (for Herodotus has 
 been careful to record the traitor's name,) was en- 
 gaged to pilot the fleet through the channel of 
 Sciathus. Proceeding then from the bay of Therme, 
 one day brought them to the bay between the town 
 of Casthanaea and the foreland of Sepias on the Thes- 
 salian coast. 
 
 c.m. The army meanwhile had made its way through 
 
 Upper Macedonia into Perrhabia, and across Thes- 
 saly to the neighbourhood of Thermopylae, without 
 opposition. Here Herodotus again enumerates the 
 Persian forces by land and sea, with the addition 
 acquired since the departure of the armament from 
 Doriscus. This addition, he says, cannot be ascer- 
 tained, but may be computed. The Greeks of 
 Thrace and the adjacent islands furnished one hun- 
 dred and twenty ships, whose crews would amount 
 to about twenty-four thousand men. The land force, 
 from the various people of Thrace, Macedonia, and 
 Thessaly, he estimates at three hundred thousand.
 
 ENUMERATION OF THE PERSIAN FORCES. 33 
 
 The number of fighting men in the whole armament, SECT. 
 by sea and land, would thus be two million six 
 hundred forty-one thousand six hundred and ten. 
 The attending multitude, he supposes, could not be 
 fewer, but rather more. Reckoning them equal, the 
 numbers under the command of Xerxes, which ar- 
 rived without misfortune at Sepias and Thermopyla?, 
 were five million two hundred eighty-three thousand 
 two hundred and twenty men, exclusive of women 
 and eunuchs without number, and a vast train of 
 incumbrances, little known to European armies, but 
 .which in all ages have attended the Asiatic. What- 
 ever exaggeration may be in this account, more 
 authentic information does not remain from later 
 writers. Herodotus's detail of the nations from which 
 the .armament was collected, and of the measures 
 taken to provide for its subsistence, defective as the 
 latter is, afford the best of any existing means for 
 forming some idea, if not of its numbers, yet of its 
 immensity. Exactness we cannot have, nor anything 
 approaching it : but we have assurance that Asia has 
 often sent forth armies which appear next to pro- 
 digious ; and every testimony makes it probable that 
 the forces led by Xerxes against Greece were the 
 most numerous ever assembled in the world. 
 
 The road of Casthanaea was open to the north and Herodot. 
 north-east winds ; and so little spacious that an eighth & 7 s ' e c ' 188 " 
 division only of the vast fleet of Persia could be Diod - sic - 
 
 T . J -.. -11 , 1.11. c. 12. 
 
 moored in one line against the shore; the other About the 
 seven rode at anchor with their heads toward the sea. j^f 16 
 Such a situation could never be safe for the ancient ] ? od ^- 
 
 Annal. 
 
 galleys, peculiarly fitted for a navigation where want Thucyd. 
 of sea-room makes a storm most dangerous to the 
 stoutest vessel. The night after their arrival was 
 calm : but in the morning the wind freshened from 
 
 VOL. II. D
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, the north-east. 18 In those seas, where storms are 
 often very sudden and always very dangerous, the 
 seaman, unacquainted with those great principles of 
 navigation which direct a vessel over the globe, but 
 which, in his narrow sphere of action, would be use- 
 less, is yet singularly attentive in observation of the 
 weather, and singularly acute in prognostication of 
 it. As soon as it was perceived in the Persian fleet 
 that a violent storm was approaching, the division of 
 galleys next the shore was drawn upon the beach ; 
 the rest were to provide for their safety as they could. 
 According to Herodotus they seem to have scattered 
 to seek a port, or a safe and unoccupied beach, which 
 to the ancients was a port. But the storm hastily 
 grew excessive. Some of the vessels were stranded 
 on the place ; some were driven upon the Sepiad 
 foreland ; some against the cliffs of Pelion ; some to 
 the towns of Casthansea and Meliboea. Three days 
 the tempest lasted with unabated violence. The 
 Persian commanders were in the utmost alarm ; ap- 
 prehensive not only for what might be lost, but also 
 for what was yet unhurt on shore. The Thessalians 
 
 18 Herodotus calls the wind Apeliotes, but he says the people 
 of the country called it the Hellespontine wind. The apeliotes, 
 according to Stuart's account of the tower of the winds, yet 
 remaining at Athens, was the east. But the Hellespont lay 
 nearly north-east from Sepias; and the effects of the storm 
 described by Herodotus show that the wind must have been 
 some degrees northward of the east. The accuracy however in 
 stating winds, usual with our seamen, was not common among 
 the ancients ; nor is it at this day in the Mediterranean, where 
 generally winds are still named from the countries whence they 
 blow, without any very exact reference to the points of the 
 compass: I have said thus much on a subject, in itself of little 
 consequence, principally because I would not be thought to 
 controvert the authority of the tower of Andronicus Cyrrhestes, 
 or of Stuart's account of it.
 
 WRECK OF THE PERSIAN FLEET. 35 
 
 were but very lately become friends and subjects : a SECT. 
 reverse of fortune might shake their fidelity, and 
 tempt them to hostilities. A rampart was therefore 
 formed around the naval camp, chiefly from the ruins 
 of the wrecked vessels. 
 
 The simplicity with which Herodotus details the 
 actions of men often marks the genuine workings of 
 human nature more faithfully as well as with more 
 animation than the cautious and polished manner of 
 writers of more artificial judgment. The dread 
 which pervaded the Grecian fleet on the approach of 
 the Persian armament may be imagined from the 
 hasty, and apparently improvident, retreat from Ar- 
 temisium ; which must expose the land force at 
 Thermopylae to certain destruction, as the fleet alone 
 could secure it from being taken in the rear. The 
 joy at the view of the rising tempest, and the con- 
 sequent confidence in divine favour, would be propor- 
 tional. The Athenian seamen did not now forget 
 the god of the Thracian wind with his Attic princess. 
 Immediately they set with great earnestness to sacri- 
 fices and prayers, requesting those deities * to vindicate 
 
 * Attica, and bring destruction on the barbarian fleet, 
 
 * as they had formerly done at Athos/ Whether 
 this really induced Boreas to fall upon the barbarians, 
 says Herodotus, I cannot undertake to say 19 ; but the 
 Athenians assert it, and in consequence they have built 
 a temple to him on the bank of the Ilissus. Whether 
 indeed Herodotus believed the oracular admonition 
 to have been promulgated before the event appears 
 dubious : his expressions imply suspicion. On the 
 second day of the storm the destruction and distress 
 produced in the Persian fleet became manifest to 
 
 9 E [*ey vvv S*a rtzv-roc. roia-t f3apd,f>oi<ri of /AZOV <r< o 
 OVK e%w fl-rraj. Herodot. 1. 7. C. 189. 
 
 D 2
 
 30 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, the Grecian scouts on the Euboic heights, and they 
 
 VIII ... 
 
 hastened to Chalcis with the intelligence. Immediately 
 public thanks were returned, and libations poured to 
 Neptune the deliverer : and, in confidence that now 
 the Persian naval force would be no longer formi- 
 dable, it was determined to reoccupy the former 
 station at Artemisium. 
 
 The loss of the Persians was very great. It is 
 not likely that the Greeks would ever have any correct 
 account of it ; but, according to the lowest report, 
 four hundred galleys of war were sunk or destroyed. 
 The loss of men could be computed only from that 
 of vessels : and means were totally wanting to esti- 
 mate the destruction of storeships and attending 
 vessels. As soon as the weather was become moderate 
 and the sea smooth, the Persian commanders, without 
 waiting to collect the scattered remains of their fleet, 
 hastened to leave so dangerous a station : coasting 
 Magnesia, they entered the Pegasaean gulf, known 
 afterward by the name of the Pelasgian. Fifteen 
 galleys, of those dispersed by the storm, following 
 some days after, fell in with the Grecian fleet, which 
 had resumed its station off Artemisium ; and, mis- 
 taking it for the Persian, all were taken. Among 
 the prisoners were Sandoces governor of Cuma in 
 .^Eolis, Aridolis tyrant of Alabandas in Caria, and 
 Penthylus commander of the squadron of Paphos in 
 Cyprus. Of twelve galleys, which Paphos had fur- 
 nished, the one only in which the commander was 
 taken had survived the hurricane. This capture was 
 very fortunate for the Greeks. Beside the loss to 
 the enemy and the gain of so many ships of war to 
 themselves, spirits were added to the multitude, and 
 intelligence was acquired to the commanders. As 
 soon as the prisoners had been examined before the
 
 PROGRESS OF THE PERSIAN ARMY. 37 
 
 principal officers of the fleet they were sent to the SECT. 
 congress at Corinth. 
 
 The prospect of Grecian affairs was now brightened 
 a little. If the fleet could oppose the enemy with 
 but equal success, it might be hoped that the nature 
 of the frontier would render defence against the pro- 
 digious numbers of his army at least possible. To 
 the south of Thessaly, mount CEta, as formerly ob- 
 served, stretches across the country from sea to sea. 
 North of Thermopylae, and bordering upon the Ma- Herodot. 
 
 T U 1 'Jl *!. l ' 7 ' c -!98. 
 
 han bay, is a plain, m one part wide, in others very 
 narrow, inclosed by high and impracticable moun- 
 tains called the Trachinian rocks. The Persian army, c. isi. 
 moving in three divisions from Upper Macedonia, 
 crossed the mountains by the passes indicated to the 
 Greeks by Alexander, and proceeding by Gonnus 
 through Thessaly, to the valley and town of Anticyra, Toward the 
 there again met the sea. Crossing then the river 
 Sperchius, it entered the Malian plain, in the widest 
 part of which, at the town of Trachis, the king fixed 
 his head-quarters. Southward of this town the river Herodot. 
 Asopus, after washing for some way the foot of the 
 mountain, which is a branch of CEta, enters a cleft 
 of it, and the only road is by the course of that river. 
 A little farther southward a small stream called the 
 Phoenix, falling from the hilts, meets the Asopus : 
 and here masonry had been necessary to render the 
 way passable for a single carriage. 20 The Asopus 
 having made its course by the cleft through the 
 mountain-ridge, which is here narrow, enters a valley 
 of some length, but little width, and presently dis- 
 charges itself into the Malian bay. In this valley, 
 
 20 That appears to be the sense of the phrase a^fT? yap piy 
 (Mijv/i S.^ojTaj. Herodot 1. 7. c. 200. The curious reader may 
 consult Wesseling's note. 
 
 D 3 
 
 132633
 
 38 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, on the bank of the Asopus, was the town of Anthela, 
 
 ^ with the temple of Ceres, the temple of Amphictyon, 
 
 and the place of meeting of the Amphictyonic as- 
 sembly. Thermopylae was a little beyond them, and 
 less than two English miles from the junction of the 
 Herodot. Asopus and Phoenix. The Persian monarch com- 
 
 1. 7. c. 201. 
 
 manded all to the north of the mountains ; the 
 Greeks under Leonidas held the pass. 
 
 A prince like Xerxes, wholly inexperienced in 
 war, might expect, as Herodotus says of him, that 
 the force under his orders was capable of any thing 
 against men, and almost against nature. According 
 to that author he waited four days, in expectation 
 that the Greeks would retreat from his irresistible 
 c.207. numbers, and leave him an uninterrupted passage. 
 And this, according to the same honest historian, 
 would actually have happened, but for the superior 
 genius and unshaken courage of the Lacedaemonian 
 king. It has been added, by later writers, that a 
 herald was sent to Leonidas, commanding him, in 
 the name of Xerxes, to come and deliver his arms ; 
 piut. to which the Spartan prince answered, with Laconic 
 Lac. P brevity, * Come and take them/ But among the 
 Persian generals there were probably men of ex- 
 perience and judgment, not incapable of informing 
 their sovereign how useless his numbers would be 
 in the pass of Thermopylae. But numerous as the 
 Greeks were under his command, information more- 
 over might reach him of divisions among those who 
 opposed him, and of a disposition of some to retire. 
 He might also be told that the Spartan king boasted 
 his descent from the hero Hercules, who is said to 
 have ended his mortal life on mount QEta, and to 
 whom, as a god, an altar stood dedicated in the 
 valley of Anthela: but such matters the Persians
 
 BATTLE OF THERMOPYLAE. 39 
 
 would not be likely much to regard ; and of the su- SECT. 
 perior talents of Leonidas, who had never yet had 
 opportunity for making them conspicuous, they could 
 have but little assurance. The credit due then to 
 Herodotus we continue to find very nearly propor- 
 tioned to his probable means of information. When 
 these were good he has seldom or never related absurd 
 tales ; when they have been deficient he has rarely 
 scrupled to report any rumour. Information of public 
 orders to the Persian army might reach him ; but the 
 actions, and still more the passions, of Xerxes upon 
 his throne, which he has pretended to describe, would 
 not be matters of common notoriety. He may how- Herodot. 
 
 , , -, ,1 -, f / , 1.7.C.210. 
 
 ever have had some authority for his report that on 
 the fifth day after his arrival at Trachis, Xerxes com- 
 manded the Medes and Cissians of his army alone to 
 go and bring the Greeks under Leonidas alive into 
 his presence. The attack, made in consequence, is 
 likely to have been ineffectual enough to disgrace 
 those troops, in some degree, in the eyes of their 
 inexperienced sovereign. The Persian guards, called 
 the immortal band, were next ordered to the assault. 
 According to Herodotus the efforts of this band were c -2n. 
 very spirited ; and he accounts very candidly for their 
 want of success. Their short spears were inefficacious, 
 and their numbers useless, against the longer weapons 
 of the Greeks, and on ground so confined. Their 
 attacks were however renewed and varied in all the 
 ways that their leaders could devise. Numbers fell, 
 and no impression was made. The report, which the c - 212 - 
 historian adds, is likely enough to have become after- 
 wards popular in Greece, that the Persian monarch 
 leaped thrice from his throne, as he anxiously viewed 
 the conflict. From the description of the place how- 
 ever it seems impossible that his throne could have 
 
 D 4
 
 40 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, been within sight, and little likely that he should 
 VIII> himself have seen the action. The immortal band, 
 after having suffered severely, was at length recalled, 
 and the Persian generals were greatly at a loss. The 
 attempt was however renewed the next day, in the 
 hope that wounds, and the fatigue of repeated action, 
 might weary the scanty numbers of the Greeks, and 
 oblige them to quit their advantageous ground. But 
 the little army of Leonidas was equal to his purpose ; 
 his reliefs were judiciously managed, and the second 
 day's attack was unavailing like the former. 
 
 Among the various advantages, beyond estimation, 
 which the Persian monarch possessed over the little 
 Grecian confederacy, may be reckoned the means, 
 almost unbounded, of rewarding those who would 
 
 Herodot. serve him. The hope of profiting from these brought 
 
 . 7. c. 213. m f orma tion of another pass over the mountain ; cir- 
 cuitous indeed and difficult, but by which, after the 
 fortifying of Thermopylae, the Thessalians had some- 
 
 c. ITS. times invaded Phocis for plunder. In more settled 
 times it had been neglected ; but, being not unknown 
 
 c.212. & among the neighbouring inhabitants, Leonidas had ap- 
 pointed the Phocians under his command to the guard 
 
 c.2i6. of it. The path began at the cleft in the mountain 
 through which the Asopus has its channel. Hence, 
 by a winding course, it ascended a hill, distinguished 
 by the name of Anopsea, from the heights of CEta 
 on one side, and the Trachinian rocks on the other. 
 Holding then for some space along the top of the 
 ridge, it descended directly to Alpeni, the first town 
 of Locris. A strong detachment, under the command 
 of Hydarnes, marching about dusk, arrived, without 
 
 c.2i7. opposition, by daybreak, near the summit of Anopaea, 
 where the Phocian guard had its station. The oaks, 
 with which the mountain was covered, had concealed
 
 BATTLE OF THERMOPYLAE. 41 
 
 the approach of the enemy. 21 The Phocians, whose SECT. 
 discipline, in general, was probably less cultivated 
 than that of Lacedaemon or Athens, had neglected 
 the necessary precautions of advanced guards and out- 
 sentries. They were first alarmed by the noise of a 
 multitude of men treading among the fallen leaves ; 
 heard, as the weather was perfectly serene, at some 
 distance. Immediately they ran to arms. But with 
 the inconsiderateness of men surprised, imagining 
 themselves the ultimate object of attack, instead of 
 taking proper measures to fulfil the important purpose 
 of their post by preventing the passage of the enemy, 
 they retreated on one side of the path to gain more 
 advantageous ground for defence. The judicious 
 Hydarnes, leaving them to their desired security, 
 continued his march, and quickly descending the 
 mountain, reached the plain unmolested. 
 
 The Persian army so abounded with Greeks, many 
 involuntarily pressed, that deserters would not be 
 wanting to inform Leonidas of whatever could be 
 generally known in the enemy's camp. That very Herodot. 
 
 1^ I ir 1.1. "L J ^ 1.7.C.219. 
 
 night intelligence came that a strong detachment was Dbd. sic. 
 
 marched for the mountains. Early in the morning 1>1L c>8 ' 
 the scouts of the army 22 arrived, with information 
 that the enemy had already passed the Phocian guard, 
 and were descending toward the plain. Immediately 
 
 21 These mountains, according to all travellers, are now 
 woodless. Nor has the destruction been a modern event : it is 
 noticed by Statius, as in his time extensive in the Roman 
 empire, and especially in Greece : 
 
 Nusquam umbrae veteres ; minor Othrys, et ardua sidunt 
 
 Taygeta ; exuti viderunt aera monies. 
 
 Jam natat omne nemus ; caeduntur robora classi. 
 
 ..... Ipsum jam puppibus asquor 
 
 Deficit, & totos consumunt carbasa ventos. 
 
 Stat. Achill. 1. 1. v. 426. 
 
 22 ... ol Atoa-Konoi vcaTa&papjyTEi; ant ruv axpuv, K. r. X. 
 
 Herod. 1. 7. c. 219.
 
 42 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 6th Aug. a council of the Grecian commanders was held. 
 
 Dodw 48< Opinions were divided ; some thinking it became 
 Ann.Thuc.; them still to maintain their post ; others, that the 
 
 but it may ' 
 
 have been consequence of the attempt could be but a useless 
 
 ay waste of lives, which ought by all means to be pre- 
 
 served for the future wants of their country. The 
 debate ended in a general resolution to retreat with 
 all speed to their respective cities, the Lacedemonians 
 Herodot. and Boeotians only remaining. Herodotus mentions 
 1.7. c.220. - ag uncertain whether Leonidas dismissed the rest. 
 The Thespians alone appear to have resolved volun- 
 tarily to abide the event with him : the Thebans he 
 would not suffer to depart ; keeping them as hostages, 
 on account of the known disaffection of their city to 
 the Grecian cause. 
 
 Leonidas himself determined, upon this great oc- 
 casion, to exhibit to the world a memorable example 
 of obedience to that law of Sparta, which forbade, 
 c. 104. under whatsoever disadvantage, to fly from an enemy. 
 Considering the disposition, so widely prevailing 
 among the Greeks, to fear the Persian power, and 
 shrink before it, there appears not less true patriotic 
 wisdom than admirable magnanimity 'in that princess 
 conduct. The oracular response from Delphi, said 
 to have declared that either Sparta or its king must 
 fall, adds nothing to its lustre. Upon fair historical 
 testimony it has been fully equal to the warm and 
 abundant eulogies which writers of various ages and 
 nations have vied in bestowing upon it. Animated 
 by his example, every Lacedaemonian and Thespian 
 under his command was resolved to die ; but to die 
 gloriously for himself, and, as far as possible, usefully 
 for his country. To be surrounded being now un- 
 avoidable, the object was no longer to guard the pass, 
 but to choose the spot where, in sacrificing themselves,
 
 BATTLE OF THERMOPYLAE. 43 
 
 they might make the greatest destruction of the SECT. 
 enemy. The narrow therefore, at the junction of the 
 Phoenix and Asopus, was abandoned, and the little 
 band was collected at the wall of Thermopylae. 
 
 Before sunrise the whole Persian army was under Herodot. 
 arms, the king himself attending, in solemn pomp, & s 'e 2 
 to wait the appearance of the luminary above the 
 horizon, for beginning the devotional ceremonies 
 prescribed for that favourite hour of Persian religion. 
 After these were concluded, the troops were dis- 
 missed to wait for orders. About the middle of the 
 forenoon 23 , when it was .supposed Hydarnes might 
 be nearly arrived in the rear of the Greeks, a chosen 
 bo4y was commanded to the assault in front. Leo- 
 nidas now gave a loose to the fury of men prepared 
 for death. Advancing before the wall, he attacked 
 the Persians in the wider part of the valley ; and the 
 Grecian long spears in the hands of practised men, 
 protected by superior defensive armour, making great 
 slaughter, caused such confusion that, through want 
 of room for the ill -disciplined multitude, numbers 
 were forced into the sea, and many expired under 
 the pressure of their own people. Himself, fighting 
 at the head of his band, fell early. The engagement 
 was nevertheless continued, with advantage on the 
 side of the Greeks, till Hydarnes came in sight in 
 their rear. Then they retreated to the narrow at 
 the wall. The Thebans used opportunity to beg 
 mercy of the conquerors : but, in the very act of sur- 
 rendering, many, through the confusion, were killed : 
 the rest were made prisoners. The surviving Lace- 
 daemonians and Thespians gained a hillock, where 
 they fought, surrounded, till all were slain. 
 
 !3 . . . . xpwov e$ ayopys Y.QV paXia-Ta, nXyOupyv. 
 
 Herodot. 1.7. c. 223.
 
 44 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. Such is the account given by Herodotus of this 
 extraordinary and celebrated action. The circum- 
 stances might come in a great degree authenticated 
 to him through the Greeks who served with the 
 Persians ; and every anecdote that could be collected 
 would be heard with eagerness, and preserved with 
 Herodot. care. 24 The names of all the three hundred Spartans 
 & seq. were still upon record in the historian's time. Two 
 of them survived the battle, having been accidentally 
 c. 224. absent ; Aristodemus, who was, with the prince's 
 leave, for the recovery of his health, at Alpeni ; and 
 Pantites, sent on public business into Thessaly. It 
 being however reported at Lacedaemon that Eurytus, 
 who had also had leave from Leonidas to remain at 
 Alpeni on account of sickness, nevertheless joined on 
 the day of battle, and fell with his comrades, and 
 that Pantites might have so hastened his return as to 
 have shared in the glory of the day, both were dis-> 
 honoured. Pantites, in consequence, strangled him- 
 self: but Aristodemus, with greater fortitude, sup- 
 ported life ; and was happy enough, in the sequel, to 
 find opportunity for distinguishing his courage in 
 the cause of his country, so that his memory has 
 been transmitted with honour to posterity. The body 
 of the Spartan king, as the same historian affirms, 
 
 24 Some seem to have been invented after the age of Hero- 
 dotus, as the annotator Valckenarius has justly observed, n. 92. 
 p. 609. of Wesseling's Herodotus. The report of Diodorus, 
 followed by Plutarch, Justin, and others, that Leonidas with 
 his Spartans attacked the Persian camp by night, and pene- 
 trated to the royal tent, is inconsistent with the other circum- 
 stances, whether of place or time ; nor does it seem too much 
 to say that it is an absurd fiction. Indeed, most of the tales, 
 the omission of which by Herodotus has so much excited the 
 indignation of Plutarch, appear fitter for poetry or romance 
 than history.
 
 BATTLE OF THERMOPYL^. 45 
 
 being discovered amongst the heaps of slain, was, by SECT. 
 order of Xerxes, beheaded, and the trunk ignomi- 
 niously exposed on a cross : but this, he adds, was 
 contrary to the general principles and practice of the 
 Persians, who were accustomed, beyond all other 
 people, to honour military merit, even in their ene- 
 mies. This observation to the credit of the enemies, 
 and in opposition to the prejudices of his country, 
 proves not less the extensive information and just 
 judgment than the candour of Herodotus ; for every 
 authentic account marks the Persians for a people 
 of liberal sentiments and polished manners, beyond 
 almost any other in all antiquity. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 Numbers of the Grecian fleet. Sea-fights off Artemisium. Re- 
 treat of the Grecian fleet. March of the Persian army toward 
 Athens. Attempt against Delphi. 
 
 DURING this memorable scene at Thermopylae the 
 hostile fleets had met in the neighbouring channel. 
 The Persians wanted to force the passage between 
 Eubrea and the main, for the double purpose of a 
 safer navigation than by the more open sea, and of 
 attending more closely the motions of their army. 
 The business therefore of the Grecian fleet, as He- 
 rodotus has observed, was like that of the army, to Herodot. 
 defend the strait. It consisted of two hundred and 
 seventy-one trireme galleys, with a few of those 
 sr-aller vessels called penteconters. The penteconter, 
 the vessel of Homer's age, had, like the modern row- 
 boat, only one tier of oars, and its complement of 
 rowers was from fifty to sixty. The trireme, it is 
 generally supposed, had three tier of oars ; by which 
 it gained that swiftness, so important in the ancient
 
 4.6 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 Herodot. 
 1. 6. c.15. 
 
 mode of naval action. 25 Its ordinary complement of 
 L7.'c.i84. rowers was, at the time of which we are treating, 
 & ,, A from a hundred and fifty to a hundred and sixty ; 
 
 1. u. C. Lo(J. * 7 
 
 beside whom it commonly carried forty soldiers, and 
 sometimes more; but, on emergencies, particularly 
 when boarded, the whole crew acted with arms. Of 
 the triremes, now in the Grecian fleet, no less than 
 one hundred and twenty-seven were furnished by 
 Athens, a very few years before unable to cope at 
 sea with the inhabitants of the ^Eginetan rock ; and 
 more were still preparing in the Athenian ports. 
 Forty were sent by Corinth ; twenty by Megara : the 
 Chalcidians of Eubcea manned twenty lent to them by 
 the Athenians : ^Egina sent eighteen ; Sicyon twelve ; 
 Lacedaemon only ten ; Epidaurus eight ; Eretria 
 seven ; Troezen five ; and the islands of Styros and 
 Ceos each two. The Plataeans, an inland people, 
 unacquainted with naval business, but zealously at- 
 tached to Athens, served, with their best ability, in 
 the Athenian fleet. To these triremes the Opuntian 
 Locrians added five penteconters, and the Ceans two. 
 In an armament to which they contributed so 
 much the largest proportion, the Athenians might 
 seem justly to claim the chief command : yet, such 
 was the reputation and influence which Lacedaemon 
 held among the Greeks, the allies absolutely refused 
 to serve under any but a Spartan commander. Eury- 
 biades was therefore admiral of the fleet. Historians 
 have, upon this occasion, justly applauded the modera- 
 tion of the Athenian leaders, who patiently acquiesced 
 under this decision, and, superior to little punctilio, 
 continued with unabated zeal to prosecute the great 
 purposes of the common cause. But the Athenian 
 
 25 Some remarks on the ancient vessels of war will be found 
 in an Appendix at the end of this chapter. 
 
 Herodot. 
 1.8. c.2. 
 & seq.
 
 NUMBERS OF THE GRECIAN FLEET. 47 
 
 counsels, at this time, were directed by a man who SECT. 
 could conceal unbounded desire of glory under the 
 appearance of modesty, and, with a temper as pliable 
 as his genius was penetrating, weighing the neces- 
 sities of the times, and foreseeing the opportunities 
 of ambition, could not only accommodate himself to 
 all seasons and circumstances, but had skill to lead 
 the froward populace of Athens to submit their pas- 
 sions to his opinion. Herodotus relates an anecdote 
 of him, too remarkable, whencesoever the information 
 was derived, and too characteristical to be omitted. 2 ^ 
 The Persian fleet, collected after its late misfortune, 
 was observed in the road of Aphetae, at the mouth 
 of the Pelasgian gulf, opposite Artemisium, at the 
 distance of not more than ten miles from the station 
 of the Grecian fleet, less diminished in force than 
 had been hoped for. At the same time the whole 
 neighbouring country was filled with the immense 
 multitude of the military host. Alarm spread on all 
 sides, and the contagion reached the commanders of 
 the Grecian squadrons, insomuch that it was proposed 
 to retreat, according to the historian's expression, to 
 the interior seas of Greece. 27 The Euboeans, in the 
 highest consternation, sent to Eurybiades, begging 
 that the fleet might remain for their protection, till 
 they could remove their families and most valuable 
 effects. The admiral refused. The Eubreans then 
 applied to the Athenian commander. Themistocles, 
 
 26 The note 45. p. 621. of Wesseling's Herodotus, may perhaps 
 deserve the notice of the curious reader. Plutarch, who, in his 
 Treatise against Herodotus, has expressed great indignation at 
 this tale, has nevertheless, in his Life of Themistocles, related 
 very nearly the same. 
 
 27 "Era e? ryv 'EXXaSa. Herodot. 1. 8. C. 4. E<ira rfc 'EXXa&o?. 
 
 Plut. vit. Themist.
 
 4S HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, whose opinion was before decided against retreat, 
 told them that, though words could not persuade, 
 gold might j and for thirty talents, something more 
 than seven thousand pounds sterling, he would en- 
 gage that the fleet should remain and fight the Per- 
 sians. The money was presently paid into his hands. 
 Five talents then brought over the commander-in- 
 chief ; and under his orders all the commanders of 
 squadrons readily consented to remain, except Adi- 
 mantus the Corinthian. * To him then,' says Hero- 
 dotus, ' Themistocles swore, saying : Neither shalt 
 
 * thou leave us ; for I will give thee more than the 
 
 * Persian king would send thee for deserting thy 
 ' allies ;' and immediately ordered three talents to 
 be conveyed to his ship. Fear of the accusation, or 
 gratification with the present, prevailed ; and thus, 
 according to the historian, were the commanders 
 bribed to the opinion of Themistocles, and to the 
 protection of the Eubceans : the fleet, probably to 
 the great advantage of the common cause, remained 
 in its station. 
 
 Next morning at daybreak the Persian admirals 
 moved. They had proposed immediately to attack 
 the Grecian fleet ; but after approaching near enough 
 to observe how inferior it was to their own, they con- 
 cluded that, if they should advance, the Greeks would 
 certainly retreat, and, through their knowledge of 
 the narrow seas behind them, would probably escape. 
 On consultation it was therefore determined to send 
 two hundred galleys round Eubcea, to take a station 
 in the rear of the Greeks ; the main body abstaining 
 from attack, till it should be known by signals that 
 the detached squadron was arrived at the station 
 proposed. 
 c.8. &seq. During these transactions, Scyllias, a Greek of 
 
 Herodot. 
 1. 8. c.6. 
 &7.
 
 SEA-FIGHTS OFF ARTEMISIUM. 49 
 
 Scione, an expert diver, who, from having been useful SECT. 
 to the Persian commanders in recovering many things 
 of value from the wreck of their lost ships, had been 
 introduced to means of information, deserted to the 
 Greeks. He brought a more exact account of the 
 actual strength of the enemy's fleet than had yet been 
 obtained, and he gave intelligence of the squadron 
 sent round Eubcea. A council of war was held; and, 
 after much debate, it was determined that the whole 
 fleet should weigh at midnight, and go against the 
 detached squadron, in the just hope that, taken 
 separately, it might easily be overpowered. In the 
 evening however, having received no confirmation of 
 the intelligence (for, to avoid observation, the enemy 
 kept a considerable distance from the Eubcean coast,) 
 the Grecian commanders determined to try an attack 
 upon the main body of the Persian fleet ; or rather 
 perhaps upon some part of it, toward evening, when 
 daylight would not suffice for bringing the whole 
 into action, and when, should they nevertheless be 
 overpowered, night would favour their retreat. They 
 founded hopes also on a friendly disposition in the 
 Ionian commanders ; of whom some were indeed well 
 inclined to them, though others were eager to gain 
 the Persian monarch's favour, and earn the rewards 
 promised for zeal shown in his service. A sharp en- 
 gagement ensued. If we may believe Herodotus, the 
 Greeks took thirty galleys ; though he says after- 
 ward that neither side could claim a victory. Among 
 the prisoners however, made by the Greeks, was 
 Philaon, brother of Gorgus prince of Salamis in 
 Cyprus, a man of great estimation among the enemy's 
 officers. Lycomedes, an Athenian captain, obtained 
 the reward of valour for being the first who took a 
 Persian galley. Antidorus of Lemnos, a Grecian cap- 
 
 VOL. II. E
 
 50 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, tain in the Persian service, deserted with his ship to 
 
 VIII 
 
 ' the confederate Greeks. The Athenian government 
 afterward rewarded him with a grant of land in the 
 island of Salamis. In the night the Greeks resumed 
 their station at Artemisium ; the Persians remained 
 at Aphetae. 
 
 Herodot. The Grecian fleet had scarcely cast anchor when 
 a storm arose, attended with heavy rain and violent 
 thunder. The drift of the storm carried the wreck 
 of the late engagement, and the floating bodies, among 
 the Persian ships. Their cables were entangled, their 
 oars impeded. Repeated flashes of lightning, amid 
 extreme darkness, just served to discover the horrors 
 of the scene, while the uncommon resonance of the 
 thunder, among the neighbouring summits of Pelion, 
 struck the seamen with the imagination that the gods 
 themselves were thus loudly declaring their anger : a 
 fancy likely enough to arise in the minds, at least, of 
 the Grecian seamen in the Persian fleet, who, accord- 
 ing to belief in their age, were making war, under 
 foreign gods, against the gods of their mother-country. 
 
 c. 13. & The detached squadron meanwhile, in the open sea, 
 !i3. as ft was there called where none was truly open sea, 
 driving before the storm, and ignorant of their course, 
 fell among the rocks of that peculiarly dangerous bay 
 of the Euboaan coast called the Coala. 28 All perished ; 
 * and thus,* says Herodotus, * the deity interfered to 
 t reduce the Persian force more nearly to an equality 
 ' with the Grecian/ 
 
 Herodot. ^11 the next day the Persians remained in their 
 
 1. 8. c. 14. . " 
 
 & seq. station ; while a reinforcement of fifty-three Athenian 
 galleys joined the Grecian fleet, bringing with them 
 
 28 Sinus Euboicus, quern Ccela vocant, suspectus nautis.' Liv. 
 Hist. Rom. 1.31. c.41. See note 78. p. 625. of Wesseling's 
 Herodotus.
 
 SEA-FIGHTS OFF ARTEMISIUM. 51 
 
 the welorae news of the destruction of the enemy's SECT. 
 squadron on the Euboic rocks. Thus encouraged, 
 the Grecian commanders were the more intent upon 
 watching opportunities for farther advantages. Means 
 were observed for cutting off the Cilician squadron. 
 The attempt was made in the evening, and succeeded ; 
 and in the night the fleet again resumed its station 
 at Artemisium. 
 
 The Persian commanders, irritated by repeated 
 insults from an enemy so inferior, and apprehensive 
 of blame for remissness, determined, on the following 
 day, to attack the Grecian fleet with their whole re- 
 maining force. About noon they advanced, formed 
 in a semicircle, with a view to surround the enemy. 
 The Greeks waited in their station, probably an ad- 
 vantageous one. The plan of attack of the Persians, 
 if well conceived, appears to have been ill executed. 
 Such a multitude of vessels indeed, manned with 
 people of different nations and languages, who varied 
 both in method and in degrees of skill, would be very 
 liable to disorder in the tumult of battle. Even in 
 approaching the enemy they crossed and fell against 
 one another. The battle nevertheless was warmly 
 maintained ; the Egyptians distinguished themselves ; 
 they took five Grecian galleys, and more than half 
 the Attic squadron was disabled. Apparently it was 
 that part of the Grecian fleet the defeat of which the 
 Persian commanders justly reckoned their most im- 
 portant object. Thus the opportunity was afforded for 
 Clinias son of Alcibiades, grandfather of him who after- 
 ward raised the name of Alcibiades to historical fame, 
 to distinguish himself in a galley which he commanded, 
 built and manned at his own expense, whence the 
 Aristeia, the usual honours for the first merit in the 
 action, were decreed to him by the Athenian people.
 
 P HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. According to Herodotus, the Greeks remained masters 
 
 VIII. 
 
 of the wreck and of the dead ; yet he acknowledges 
 that they suffered greatly, and proceeds to give proof 
 of it, reporting that, in a council of war, held imme- 
 diately after the engagement, it was resolved to re- 
 treat farther on the coast of Greece. This measure 
 Herodot. was hastened by the arrival of Abronychus, an Athe- 
 ne c. C 2i. nian officer, who had been stationed with a light 
 vessel at Thermopylae for the purpose of communi- 
 cating intelligence, bringing information of the cir- 
 cumvention of Leonidas and his party, and the retreat 
 of the rest of the army. It was then resolved not 
 to delay for a moment the retreat of the fleet. The 
 whole moved in the accidental order of the instant ; the 
 Corinthians leading, the Athenians forming the rear. 29 
 c. 19. But Themistocles, ever fertile in expedients, con- 
 
 piut'v ceived the idea of making even the flight of his fel- 
 Themist. low-countrymen useful to his country. With some 
 1.2. c!i2. of the swiftest galleys of the squadron under his com- 
 mand, he went to the watering-places of the road of 
 Artemisium, which he concluded the enemy for ne- 
 cessary supply would visit next day, and there on the 
 rocks he wrote thus : * Men of Ionia, you do ill in 
 
 * making war upon your fathers, and helping to en- 
 
 * slave Greece. Come therefore over to us ; or, if 
 ' that cannot be, remain neuter, and persuade the 
 
 * Carians to the same measure. But, if the necessity, 
 which compels you to the part you are engaged in, 
 
 * is such as to make a secession impracticable, yet, 
 
 29 Later writers tell of Grecian victories off Artemisium 
 utterly inconsistent with the events that followed ; but Plato's 
 slight mention of the actions there confirms Herodotus's ac- 
 count *; and even Plutarch gives some degree of corresponding 
 testimony.f 
 
 * Plat, de Leg. 1. 4. p. 707. t. 2. t Vit. Themist.
 
 RETREAT OF THE GRECIAN FLEET. 53 
 
 when we come to action, avoid exertion against us ; SECT. 
 remembering that you are descended from one blood ' 
 
 * with us, and that the enmity of the Persians was first 
 
 * drawn upon us in your cause.' I imagine, continues 
 the historian, that Themistocles had two views in this. 
 If the inscriptions should be observed only by the 
 Greeks of the Persian fleet, he hoped that some might 
 be persuaded by them ; but if the matter should be re- 
 ported to the Persian chiefs, the lonians would be- 
 come suspected, and perhaps might be excluded from 
 the line of battle in future engagements. 
 
 The road of Artemisium was no sooner clear than Herodot. 
 
 1 8 c 23 
 
 a Greek of the neighbouring town of Histiaea hastened 
 in a light boat to the Persian fleet, to obtain the 
 reward for such intelligence. Some of the swifter 
 vessels were immediately dispatched to ascertain the 
 truth of the report, and at sunrise the whole fleet 
 weighed and proceeded to Artemisium. The same 
 day the Persians took possession of the town of 
 Histiaea, and the neighbouring district of the island 
 sedulously made submission. 
 
 About the same time the army recommenced its c .26. 
 march from Thermopylae. Some Arcadians, poor 
 and without prospect at home, had been tempted by 
 the fame of the great king's riches and liberality to 
 wander thus far to offer their services to him. The 
 practice of seeking hire in foreign military service Thucyd. 
 appears to have obtained among that inland moun- 
 tain-people before it became usual with the other 
 European Greeks. Herodotus seems to relate the 
 story of these adventurers not more for the purpose 
 of eulogy than of admonition to his country. They 
 were introduced, he says, to the presence of Xerxes, 
 and, being asked * what was doing in Greece,' they 
 
 E 3
 
 54 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 answered, with great simplicity, * that it was the 
 O1 - 75 - * season of the Olympian games, and that consequently 
 
 * the Greeks were amusing themselves with seeing 
 
 * athletic exercises and horse-races/ Being then 
 asked, * What was the reward of the conquerors in 
 ' those games,' they answered, * An olive garland.' 
 Upon which Tritantaechmes, a prince of the blood- 
 royal of Persia, exclaimed, <O Mardonius, what a 
 c people have you brought us to fight against, who 
 
 * contend among themselves not for riches but for 
 ' virtue ! ' 
 
 Thucyd.i.3. But whatever might be the general simplicity or 
 Plat. the general virtue of the Greeks of this age, their 
 
 pt 2 patriotism at least was of very various complexion in 
 isocr. Pan. the different states, and in the different factions of 
 
 & Panath. . j-\t* -i a *~r< 
 
 piut. Arist. the same states. Or the provinces from mount LLta 
 to the isthmus Phocis almost alone was faithful to 
 the confederate cause, the cause of Grecian inde- 
 pendency. From the moment when the Persians 
 became masters of Thermopyla3 the adjacent Locris 
 could hardly avoid submission. Doris, and all Bceotia, 
 
 Thucyd. excepting the little cities of Thespiae and Plataea, 
 
 i. 3. c. 62. were i e( } by a f ew principal men of Thebes, who had 
 in view to confirm and advance their own power 
 through the patronage of the great king. Influenced 
 by these men, those provinces had always been adverse 
 to the confederacy, and now with ready zeal acknow- 
 ledged themselves subjects of the Persian monarch. 
 
 Herodot. Herodotus, with great appearance of reason, attri- 
 . c.oo. buteg the fi rm ness even of the Phocians more to their 
 extreme animosity against the Thessalians, their he- 
 reditary enemies, and to the partial consideration of 
 the peculiar interest of their province, than to any 
 generous regard for common welfare, or any enlarged
 
 THE PERSIANS ENTER PHOCIS. 55 
 
 view of Grecian independency. If the Thessalians, SECT. 
 he says, had held with the Greeks, the same animosity 
 would have led the Phocians to join the enemy. 
 
 The Persians proceeded from Thermopylae with 
 the Thessalians for their guides. Turning imme- 
 diately to the right along the root of CEta, they then 
 directed their march through the narrow vales of 
 Doris toward the river Cephissus. The Dorian, as Herodot. 
 a friendly territory, was spared ; but as soon as the Diod'or. 2 ' 
 army entered Phocis, at the instigation of the Thes- i- 11 - c -i4. 
 
 Plut. v. 
 
 salians rather than from the disposition of the Persians, Themist. 
 destruction was begun with sword and fire. The 
 main body of the army followed the course of the 
 Cephissus. Detachments burnt the towns, apparently 
 village towns mostly, of Drymus, Charadra, Erochus, 
 Tethronium, Amphicsea, Neon, Pedieae, Tritese, 
 Elatea, Hyampolis, Parapotamii, Abas, with their 
 temples. The people fled, many to the fastnesses 
 of mount Parnassus, some to Amphissa and other 
 towns of the Ozolian Locrians, beyond the ridges of 
 Parnassus and Helicon, and so in less immediate 
 danger. A few were taken and reduced to slavery. 
 From Panopeae a detachment was sent to seize the 
 treasure of Delphi, known to Xerxes, as Herodotus Herodot. 
 professes to have believed, more exactly and circum- 
 stantially, through the forward information of the 
 Greeks following his banners, than what he had left 
 in his own palace at Susa. The main body continued 
 their march through the friendly province of Boeotia 
 toward Athens. 
 
 The defence of Delphi, itself a curious object, is 
 not less so for the veil with which interested in- 
 genuity industriously covered it, and which super- 
 stitious ignorance would rather double than withdraw. 
 The account transmitted by Herodotus, mixed as it 
 
 E 4
 
 56 
 
 CHAP. 
 VIII. 
 
 Herodot. 
 1.8. c. 36. 
 & seq. 
 Diodor. 
 1.11. c.14. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 is with the preternatural, was apparently altogether 
 current with the credulity of his age. As soon as 
 news arrived, he says, that the Persians were in pos- 
 session of Thermopylae, the Delphian citizens, anxious 
 for themselves, their temple, and the riches of which 
 they were guardians, consulted their own oracle. 
 They requested directions particularly concerning 
 the sacred treasures ; whether they should bury them, 
 or whether they should carry them to some other 
 country. The god, says the historian, would suffer 
 nothing to be moved ; declaring, that he would him- 
 self take charge of what belonged to him. The 
 Delphians, thus relieved from a very heavy responsi- 
 bility to the Greek nation, could more freely direct 
 their cares to themselves and their families. Their 
 wives and children were sent across the Corinthian 
 gulf into Achaia. The men, except a few, perhaps 
 mostly the less able, who withdrew to Amphissa in 
 Locris, occupied the neighbouring fastnesses among 
 the crags of Parnassus. The Corycian cavern, a vast 
 natural vault in the side of the mountain, near the 
 city, received many. 30 All quitted Delphi except 
 sixty men and the prophet. The Persian detachment 
 meanwhile approached by the way of Panope, Daulis, 
 Lilaea, Phocian towns, which they burnt. As they drew 
 near Delphi, and were now in sight of the temple, 
 the prophet, whose name was Aceratus, saw the sacred 
 armour, which it is unlawful for any mortal to touch, 
 brought by some invisible power from the recess of 
 the fane, and laid before the building. But no sooner 
 was the advanced guard arrived at the chapel of Mi- 
 nerva, which is an outbuilding in front of the great 
 temple, than thunder from heaven fell upon them; 
 two vast fragments from the mountain rolled down 
 
 30 This cavern is described by Pausanias, 1. 10. c. 32.
 
 DEFENCE OF DELPHI. 57 
 
 with prodigious noise, and killed many: a voice of SECT. 
 warlike acclamation issued from within the walls. 
 Dismay became general among the Persians. The 
 Delphians then, rushing from the cavern, and de- 
 scending from the summits, attacked them and made 
 great slaughter. The survivors fled precipitately 
 into Bceotia. 
 
 From this story the preternatural being detached, 
 the remainder appears not improbable nor very de- 
 fective. The priests, unwilling to trust the treasures 
 to others, and anxious for the credit of their oracle, 
 which could scarcely but suffer should the place fall 
 into the hands of foreign plunderers, determined upon 
 a bold measure, which they executed with courage 
 and prudence. A clear and firm response from the 
 oracle first inspired the citizens with confidence. 
 Then the best refuge that Greece afforded was pro- 
 vided for their families. The ablest and most trusty 
 men were reserved for the defence of the place. If 
 the mode of defence was uncommon, it appears how- 
 ever to have been perfectly adapted to the situation 
 and circumstances, which were also very uncommon. 
 Surrounded and almost overhung by very lofty moun- strabo, 
 tain summits, the site itself of the city was composed & 9 s ' e q; 416 * 
 of crags and precipices. No way led to it but through ? jQ San * 6 
 mountain defiles, narrow and steep, shadowed with &seq. 
 wood, and commanded at every step by fastnesses i,24. c .6. 
 above; and the approach from Breotia was of consider- ^^j^ 4 - 
 able length through such defiles. Every measure seems c. 65. and 
 to have been taken to make the enemy believe that the modem 
 place was totally abandoned, and to induce them to travellers - 
 advance in all the carelessness of perfect security. The 
 surprise appears in consequence to have been complete. 
 A thunderstorm at midsummer, among the mountains, 
 was likely to be an accidental assistant. The rolling 
 down of the rocky fragments might appear miraculous
 
 58 
 
 CHAP. 
 VIII. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 to those who did not know that numbers of men con- 
 cealed among the crags were prepared to give them 
 motion. Possibly artificial fires and explosions might 
 imitate a thunderstorm and increase the horror. 31 
 The Delphians then attacked with every advantage. 
 The remainder of the Persian detachment, who 
 reached the plains of Bo3otia, readily adopted the 
 reports of superstition to excuse their surprise and 
 flight. Two persons, they said, superior in their 
 appearance to anything human, joined the Delphians 
 in the pursuit and slaughter. The Delphians af- 
 firmed that these could be no other than Phylacus 
 and Autonous, ancient heroes of their country, to 
 whom temples stood, in Herodotus's time, near the 
 chapel of Minerva. Some of the fragments of rock, 
 thrown down from the summits of Parnassus, were 
 preserved within the chapel as memorials of the divine 
 protection afforded upon that pressing emergency. 
 
 SECTION V. * 
 
 Unsteady counsels of the Grecian confederacy. The Athenians, 
 deserted by the Peloponnesians, remove their families from 
 Attica. Aristides. Ostracism. Athens taken by the Persians. 
 Artemisia. Ancient manner of naval Action. Battle of Sala- 
 mis. Return of Xerxes into Asia. 
 
 WHILE any hope remained of defending the pass of 
 
 mount CEta, the Athenian fleet was of the utmost 
 
 consequence to the confederated Peloponnesians : 
 
 without its assistance, every part of their coast would 
 
 Herodot. be open to the enemy's navy. The safety of Attica 
 
 1.8. c.40. t nere f ore being a first object in the plan of operations, 
 
 it had been resolved that, in case the enemy should 
 
 penetrate across the mountains, the whole force of 
 
 the confederacy should meet them in Bceotia, and 
 
 S1 Dutens' Inquiry into the Origin of the Discoveries attri- 
 buted to the Moderns, c. 5. sect. 207.
 
 COUNSELS OF THE CONFEDERACY. 59 
 
 oppose their farther progress. But the usual dila- SECT. 
 toriness of confederacies recurred, enhanced probably 
 by the want of revenue. The Peloponnesian troops Herodot. 
 were yet within their several states when the news i^o/sic' 
 arrived of the death of the Spartan king, with his Ln - c - 15 - 
 little band of self-devoted comrades, and of the re- Themist. 
 treat of the rest of his army. Then all hastened 
 to the Corinthian isthmus, where Cleombrotus, 
 brother of Leonidas, took the command. But the 
 vehemence of the alarm, which spread on all sides, 
 now set selfish counsels again afloat. Shortsighted 
 through fear, the Peloponnesians determined not to 
 risk anything for the preservation of Attica, but to 
 contract their defence to their own peninsula. Their 
 first business was to occupy, as an advanced post, 
 the difficult passage of the Scironian rocks ; another Chandler's 
 Thermopyla?, by which was the only road imme- Greece 3 ," 1 
 diately from Attica into Peloponnesus. Then with c ' 44 ' 
 earnest diligence they commenced strong lines across Herodot. 
 the isthmus. The people assembled there were the 
 Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, Eleans, Corinthians, 
 Sicyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Trcezenians, 
 Hermionians. * These,' says Herodotus, * met in 
 
 * arms at the isthmus, in deepest anxiety for the fate 
 
 * of Greece. The other Peloponnesians, principally 
 
 * the Argives and Achaeans, were careless of the 
 
 * event, or rather, if I may speak freely, they were 
 ' disposed to the party of the enemy.' 
 
 The fleet, in its hasty retreat from Artemisium, 1. 8. c. 40. 
 had made no stop till it arrived in the bay of Salamis, 
 on the Attic coast. There information met the 
 Athenians, whose crews, now in the fleet, were the 
 principal part of their commonwealth, that no force 
 was assembled in Bo3otia ; that the Peloponnesians 
 had resolved to confine their defence to their own
 
 60 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, peninsula ; that they had begun their measures for 
 
 that purpose ; that Attica thus was abandoned to 
 
 destruction. The alarm was extreme. All that could 
 be obtained from their allies was the assistance of the 
 fleet, to transport their families and effects to Sala- 
 mis, ^Egina, and Trcezen ; places less exposed than 
 Athens, but which expected only a delay of ruin. 
 Nor were the Athenians now, like the Greeks of old, 
 practised in wandering, and ready for migration. 
 In proportion to the established security of property, 
 and the peace of domestic life, the distress of families 
 was great. At the awful moment of abandoning 
 their country, a thousand anxious thoughts crowded 
 upon every mind. In such excess of public misfoiv 
 tune administration commonly loses its powers ; the 
 people, as in a shipwreck, become ungovernable 
 through despair. All the wisdom, all the firmness, 
 all the popularity of the ablest statesmen were wanted 
 at Athens to preserve order, and to enforce those 
 measures which political prudence required. 
 piut.v. But one of the wisest and most virtuous citizens 
 
 Anst ' that any country ever boasted was in banishment. 
 ARISTIDES son of Lysimachus, of a noble but not a 
 wealthy family, had been patronised in early youth, 
 and brought forward in public business, by Clisthenes 
 the expeller of the Pisistratidas ; and he is said, 
 together with Themistocles, to have held a high 
 military command under Miltiades, at the battle of 
 Marathon. Themistocles, whose vast ambition was 
 controlled by no scruple, avowed party principles. 
 
 * The gods forbid,' he is reported to have said, ' that 
 I should be in power, and my friends no better for 
 
 * it.' Aristides, on the contrary, was, in public as in 
 private life, so strictly upright and scrupulously im- 
 partial, that the title of THE JUST became applied to
 
 OSTRACISM. 6l 
 
 him as a common appellation. But democratical SECT. 
 jealousy, or rather perhaps the ingenuity of ambitious _ ' 
 
 individuals to make popular passion serve their pri- 
 vate purposes, had invented a peculiar mode of 
 repressing the dangerous superiority which great 
 abilities and superior character might acquire in a 
 republic. An assembly of the people, by what was Diodor. 
 called OSTRACISM, voted an illustrious citizen into pi ut '. v. 
 banishment for five, ten, or twenty years; alleging Themlst - 
 no crime, meaning no punishment, but only guarding 
 against the overbearing influence of individuals : the 
 exile's property and his honour remained unhurt. 
 Aristides had been thus banished ; through the Herodot. 
 management, it is said, of Themistocles : for Ari- piut.v. 
 stides inclined to the aristocratical party ; opposing T l h e S mtt & 
 that increase of the general assembly's power which 
 it had suited the ambition of Themistocles to pro- 
 mote. But, in this tremendous crisis of the com- 
 monwealth, the name of the just Aristides began to 
 be mentioned among the people ; and it became 
 evident that his absence was very generally regretted. 
 Themistccles, whose capacious mind was never, by 
 views of faction, blinded to greater interests, caught 
 at the opportunity for popularity, and had the mag- 
 nanimity himself to propose a decree which would 
 enable his rival to return. 
 
 CIMON, son of the great Miltiades, is said also to Piut. v. 
 have distinguished himself upon this trying occasion. ( 
 Being, by inheritance from a long line of ancestors, 
 one of the principal landed men of the Athenian 
 commonwealth, he would not naturally be forward 
 to abandon his country. But when proclamation was 
 made that all should forthwith remove their families 
 and effects out of Attica, and that every man capable 
 of bearing arms should immediately repair to his
 
 62 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, duty aboard the fleet, Cimon, at the head of a band 
 
 TTTTT * 
 
 ' of the principal youths of Athens, marched in pro- 
 cession through the most public parts of the city, to 
 the temple of Minerva in the citadel. In their hands 
 they carried their bridles, (the ensigns of that military 
 service to which their birth and possessions had des- 
 tined them,) and, with solemn rites, dedicated these 
 to the goddess. Then, arming themselves, the whole 
 party set off for the fleet at Salamis ; not a little en- 
 couraging the admiring citizens by this demonstration 
 of confidence in the gods, and alacrity in devoting 
 themselves to that new service which the actual crisis 
 of their country required. 
 
 Nor were the advantages to be derived from 
 
 Herodot. popular superstition neglected. It was believed from 
 
 piut. C v . ancient times in Athens, that a large serpent, ob- 
 
 Themist. served in the citadel, was a divine guard to the 
 
 temple of Minerva ; and it was an established practice 
 
 to place cakes as an offering to this reptile every new 
 
 moon. The chief priest of the temple declared that 
 
 the cakes, which hitherto had never failed to be eaten 
 
 by the divine serpent, now remained untouched : 
 
 proof that the goddess herself had forsaken the 
 
 citadel. This, says the contemporary historian, 
 
 whatever truth was in it, not a little contributed to 
 
 induce the Athenians readily and quietly to quit 
 
 the city. 
 
 The general business of the confederacy was not 
 conducted either with equal wisdom or equal spirit. 
 The want of one supreme authority was again felt. 
 The measures of the land forces were determined by 
 the assembly at Corinth ; of which the officers, com- 
 manding the troops of the several states, were prin- 
 cipal members: those of the fleet seem not to have 
 been taken into the consideration, but remained for the
 
 ATHENS TAKEN. 63 
 
 commanders of the several squadrons to decide. A Herod, i.e. 
 council was held for the purpose. The great ques- Diod. fj. 4 ' 
 tion was, Where they should now await the attack p^ c- 15 ' 
 of that fleet from which they had been flying. Fear Themist. 
 prevailed, and the majority were for retreating to the 
 Corinthian isthmus ; because there, it was urged, if 
 they should be defeated, which seems to have been 
 expected, though the ships were lost the crews might 
 escape ashore, and still assist by land in the defence 
 of their country. 
 
 The Persian army meanwhile, advancing from Herodot. 
 Thebes, burnt the abandoned towns of Thespiae and & 8 s ' e 50 ' 
 Platasa ; and, entering Attica, found no resistance * >1 ' od - sic - 
 till they arrived at the citadel of Athens. This was 
 still held by some ministers of the temple of Mi- 
 nerva, some of the poorer citizens unable to support 
 the expense of migration, and a few others, obsti- 
 nately addicted to that interpretation of the Delphian 
 oracle which supposed it to declare that the citadel 
 should remain inexpugnable. The city was delivered 
 to those Athenians of the Pisistratidean party who 
 accompanied the Persian army. The citadel was 
 immediately invested. Terms were offered to the 
 besieged by the Pisistratidae, and obstinately refused. 
 After a resistance beyond expectation, the place was 
 taken by assault, and all within put to the sword. 
 
 Intelligence of this event, according to the pro- Herodot. 
 bable detail of Herodotus, came to the fleet while a & se q. 
 council of war was sitting. It occasioned such alarm 
 that some of the commanders of squadrons, without 
 waiting for a decision of the question before them, 
 hastened aboard their galleys and prepared for im- 
 mediate flight. The rest, less panic-struck, were still, 
 for the most part, of opinion that the proposed re- 
 treat to the isthmus should be executed without
 
 t>4 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, delay. Night advanced, and all was confusion. It 
 is not uncommon in human affairs for little circum- 
 stances often to decide the greatest events. The- 
 mistocles, according to the historian, returning to 
 his galley, was met by Mnesiphilus, an Athenian 
 officer, his particular friend, who anxiously asked, 
 What was the determination of the council. * To 
 
 * retreat instantly,' said Themistocles. ' Then,' re- 
 plied Mnesiphilus, * Greece is lost ! for neither the 
 
 * present commander, nor any other man, will have 
 
 * influence to keep the fleet together. All will dis- 
 
 * perse to their several homes ; and, through the folly 
 ' of her chiefs Greece is enslaved for ever ! Is there 
 
 * no possibility of persuading Eurybiades to wiser 
 
 * measures?' Touched by his friend's earnestness 
 in delivering an opinion perfectly coinciding with his 
 own, the active mind of Themistocles could not rest. 
 Returning immediately to Eurybiades, he prevailed 
 to have another council hastily summoned. Naturally 
 vehement in his temper, Themistocles was forward 
 and copious in his discourse upon the subject for the 
 consideration of which the council met, before it 
 was regularly proposed by the commander- in-chief. 
 The Corinthian commander, Adimantus, who was as 
 warmly for different measures, interrupting him, said, 
 ' Themistocles, those who, at the games, rise before 
 
 * their time, are corrected with stripes.' To so af- 
 fronting a reprimand the Athenian chief calmly re- 
 plied, * True, Adimantus, but those who neglect to 
 
 * engage in the contest never win the crown. 32 In 
 
 32 Later writers, to make a better "story, instead of Adimantus, 
 name Eurybiades, and add tbat he shook his cane over the head 
 of Themistocles, who calmly said : < Strike, but^hear me.' Plu- 
 tarch, through an inattention not unusual with him, in his Life 
 of Themistocles has attributed the reprimand to Eurybiades, 
 in his Apophthegms to Adimantus.
 
 COUNCILS OF NAVAL COMMANDERS. 65 
 
 the course of the debate then he urged the importance SECT. 
 of preserving Sal amis, ^Egina, and Megara, which ' 
 upon the retreat of the fleet must immediately fall ; 
 the advantage of the present station, a confined bay, 
 which would render both the numbers and the su- 
 perior swiftness of the enemy's galleys useless ; and 
 the total want of such advantage in any station that 
 could be taken near the Corinthian isthmus. When 
 all this proved ineffectual, he concluded with de- 
 claring, * That if so little regard was shown to the 
 
 * Athenian people, who had risked everything in the 
 
 * Grecian cause, their fleet would immediately with- 
 ' draw from the confederacy, and either make terms 
 ' with the enemy, or seek some distant settlement 
 
 * for a people so unworthily treated.' Eurybiades, 
 alarmed, bent to this argument: a majority of the 
 other commanders either felt its force, or were de- 
 cided by the Spartan admiral ; and it was determined 
 to expect the enemy in the bay of Salamis. 
 
 The Persian fleet had remained three days in the Herodot. 
 road of Artemisium, to refresh the crews after their & 8 s ' e q.' 66 ' 
 sufferings by storms and engagements. Three days 
 then brought them through the Euripus to Phalerum, 
 at that time the principal port of Athens. Herodotus 
 supposes the Persian numbers, by sea and land, not 
 less than on their first arrival at Sepias and Ther- 
 mopylae. For by land they were reinforced by the 
 Malians, Dorians, Locrians, and Boeotians. Their 
 fleet was increased with galleys from Andros, Tenos, 
 Eubrea, and other islands. The recruits to the land 
 forces might easily supply the loss by battle ; but 
 those to the fleet would scarcely balance the damage 
 by storms, which seems to have been very much 
 greater than any hitherto suffered in action. The 
 fleet and army being again met, a council of naval 
 
 VOL. II. F
 
 66 
 
 CHAP. 
 VIII. 
 
 Herodot. 
 1. 7. c. 99. 
 
 1. 8. c. 67. 
 
 & seq. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 commanders was summoned, to consider whether the 
 Grecian fleet should be attacked in its present station. 
 It is difficult to determine how far credit may be due 
 to Herodotus's account of a Grecian heroine in the 
 Persian fleet ; who is yet so mentioned in all histories 
 of the times that she must not be passed unnoticed. 
 Artemisia, daughter of Lygdamis, a Halicarnassian, 
 by a Cretan lady, had married the tyrant of Halicar- 
 nassus, the native city of Herodotus, who had ex- 
 tended his command over the neighbouring islands 
 Cos, Nisyrus, Calydna. On his death, Artemisia 
 succeeded to his authority. When the orders of the 
 Persian court came to the Asian Greeks to prepare 
 forces for the European expedition, she fitted five 
 galleys, which were confessedly superior to any of 
 that vast armament, except the Sidonian ; and she 
 formed the extraordinary resolution of undertaking 
 herself the command of this little squadron. On 
 joining the fleet in the Hellespont, she was regularly 
 admitted to her seat in all councils of war ; and she 
 acquired in a high degree the esteem of the Persian 
 monarch. At the council held off Phalerum she alone 
 dissuaded the proposed attack of the Grecian fleet. 
 ' Offensive measures/ she said, * should be prosecuted 
 
 * only by land. There the superiority was decided, 
 
 * and operations more certain. The fleet should be 
 
 * reserved as an indispensable attendant upon so im- 
 
 * mense an army, which could not fail to suffer ex- 
 
 * tremely, if by any misfortune it should lose the 
 ' means of supply by sea. Besides,' she added, ' the 
 ' Greeks cannot long hold their present advantageous 
 
 * situation ; for, if I am rightly informed, they have 
 
 * no magazines on the island which they occupy, and 
 
 * the main is already yours. Wait therefore only a 
 ' little ; you will see them disperse of themselves, and
 
 WANT OF CONCORD AMONG THE GREEKS. 67 
 
 * all Greece will be open to you.' This wise advice SECT. 
 was overruled, and it was determined to attack the ' 
 Grecian fleet next morning. 
 
 The Grecian commanders meanwhile were far 
 from being all heartily disposed to the measure re- 
 solved on. Eurybiades appears to have been a man 
 not of great abilities : his authority therefore, as com- 
 mander-in-chief, over forces from various independent 
 states, was very uncertain. Themistocles was yet 
 fearful of the defection of some of the squadrons ; 
 and, to insure what, in his judgment, was necessary 
 for the common good, he is reported to have resorted 
 to a very extraordinary measure. A trusty person 
 was sent to the Persian fleet, with orders to say that 
 he came from the Athenian admiral, who was desirous Dbcuajie" 
 of revolting to the Persians ; that he was therefore to ] - n - c.iV 
 give an account of the dissensions among the Grecian 
 commanders, and of what was likely to follow : add- 
 ing that, if the present opportunity for destroying 
 the whole Grecian fleet together should be neglected, 
 such another would not be found. That very night 
 
 1 1 1 < 1 7 
 
 the Persians moved and formed a semicircle, from 
 
 the point of Salamis to the port of Munychia : the ^T 450 
 Egyptian squadron was detached to block the western Herodot. 
 passage ; and a force was landed upon the little island Piut. 
 Psyttalea, between Salamis and the ports of Athens, 
 to assist any of the Persian vessels, and seize any of 
 the Grecian, that might be driven upon it. For the 
 same purpose the Attic shore, to a considerable ex- 
 tent, was lined with troops ; and by daybreak the 
 whole multitude of the army was in motion ; those 
 whom no duty required going, urged by curiosity, to 
 take their stand on the adjacent heights. The most 
 commodious eminence was chosen for the monarch 
 himself, surrounded by his guards, and attended by
 
 68 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, his splendid retinue, to view at leisure the action to 
 
 VIII. 
 
 . ensue. 
 
 Herodot During these preparations of the Persians, Ari- 
 & seq. ^ stides, then in ^Egina, informed of the decree which 
 Themist ^ad put a period to his exile, hastened to restore his 
 & Anstid. services to his country ; and, under favour of the night, 
 passing through the middle of the enemy's fleet, 
 arrived at Salamis. Aristides wanted not magna- 
 nimity, upon this great occasion, to lay aside both 
 private animosity and the animosity of faction. He 
 went directly to Themistocles, his rival and political 
 enemy, related what he had seen, and offered his 
 assistance for anything useful to the commonwealth. 
 Themistocles, who, with a character of far less dis- 
 interestedness, could yet equally command his pas- 
 sions, and well knew the value of such assistance, 
 joyfully accepting the offer, requested that Aristides 
 would accompany him to the council of war then 
 sitting, and deliver his information in person ; which, 
 he said, would have much more weight than any- 
 thing he could repeat, accustomed as he had been to 
 combat the military and political opinions of most 
 of the Grecian commanders. Aristides immediately 
 complied. He had scarcely delivered his intelli- 
 gence, when confirmation of it came by a captain of 
 a trireme galley of the island of Tenos, who had de- 
 serted from the enemy. Then at last, pressed by 
 necessity, the commanders with one voice declared a 
 determination to exert themselves in action. 
 
 Among the ancients, for a naval engagement, a 
 small space sufficed, in comparison of what modern 
 fleets require ; not only because of the smaller size 
 of their vessels, but still more because of the different 
 manner of working and fighting them. Our ships of 
 war, very deep as well as large, and deriving motion
 
 ANCIENT MANNER OF NAVAL ACTION. 69 
 
 only from the wind, with deep and open seas, want SECT. 
 large intervals also between ship and ship. The 
 ancient galleys, on the contrary, always light, how- 
 ever large, and in action receiving impulse from 
 oars alone, could form and move in very close order, 
 and were not afraid of narrow seas. From their mode 
 of engagement also they required comparatively little 
 space. Our ships, whose artillery decides their battles, 
 must bring their broadsides to bear upon the enemy ; 
 avoiding as much as possible to expose themselves in 
 any other direction. They engage therefore, accord- 
 ing to the sea-phrases, close-hauled to the wind, and 
 with the line of battle formed ahead. But the an- 
 cients, whose principal weapon was a strong beak of 
 brass or iron projecting from the stem of the galley, 
 advanced to the attack always with the line of battle 
 formed abreast. The greatest advantage one galley 
 could obtain over another was to bring its head to 
 bear directly upon the enemy's broadside ; the next, 
 to gain the means of an oblique impulse, which might 
 dash away some of his oars. By the success of the 
 former attempt a galley was often sunk ; by that of 
 the other it became unmanageable till the lost or 
 damaged oars could be replaced ; and this gave op- 
 portunity for the more decisive attack with the beak. 
 Hence the importance of oars in actions ; by them 
 alone attacks could be made, warded, or avoided in 
 every direction. But Themistocles appears to have 
 been the first to conceive the full advantage thus to 
 be obtained. Missile weapons were much used by 
 all nations ; but it had been hitherto the great object 
 of the Greeks to grapple ship to ship. The engage- 
 ment then resembled an action by land ; and the 
 superiority of the heavy-armed soldier on the deck 
 decided the contest. It seems to have been partly 
 
 F 3
 
 70 
 
 CHAP. 
 VIII. 
 
 Herodot. 
 1.8. c. 43. 
 & seq. 
 c. 82. 
 Isocr. Pan. 
 p. 226. t.l. 
 ed. Aug. 
 Herodot. 
 
 1.7. C.89.J& 
 184, 185. & 
 
 1. 8. c. 66. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 on this account that the Persian commanders had 
 added thirty men of their best national troops to the 
 ordinary complement of heavy-armed in every galley 
 of their fleet ; and they seem to have depended much 
 on this increase of strength for certainty of victory. 
 The discernment of Themistocles, apparently in- 
 structed by observation in the various actions off Ar- 
 temisium, led him to a contrary principle : he would 
 depend less upon arms wielded by the hands of in- 
 dividuals than upon the vessel itself, as one great and 
 powerful weapon, on a squadron, as a combination of 
 such weapons. It was, with this view, important to have 
 his vessels light and unencumbered. He therefore 
 reduced the complement of soldiers in each trireme 
 to eighteen ; of whom fourteen only were heavy- 
 armed, and four bowmen. 33 
 
 Since the retreat from Artemisium the Grecian 
 fleet had been very considerably reinforced. The 
 Lacedaemonians had added six. triremes to their 
 former ten : the Athenian squadron was increased to 
 a hundred and eighty ; some had been gained from 
 other states ; a few from the islands ; and the total 
 number of triremes was now three hundred and 
 eighty. The triremes of the Persian fleet are said to 
 have been more than a thousand : according to He- 
 rodotus, they were above thirteen hundred. 34 Should 
 
 33 These numbers we have only on the authority of Plutarch, 
 who, being neither soldier nor seaman, merely states the fact. 
 It receives however confirmation from Thucydides and Xeno- 
 phon ; and, as occasion will occur hereafter more particularly to 
 observe, they explain the purpose of the alteration. 
 
 34 The passage of ^schylus*, which mentions the number of 
 the Persian galleys, both as it stands in all the editions of his 
 works, and in Plutarch's Life of Themistocles, seems clearly 
 enough in itself to say that they were in all but a thousand ; yet 
 the commentators and translators have been generally desirous 
 
 [* Pers. v. 341.]
 
 BATTLE OF SALAMIS. 7 
 
 exaggeration be suspected, even in the lowest report, SECT. 
 it is yet little reasonably to be doubted but the fleet ' 
 under Xerxes, however inferior in the size and quality 
 of the vessels, exceeded in the number of men which 
 it bore any other naval armament ever assembled in 
 the world. 
 
 Confident therefore in their strength, and urged 
 by the common necessity of invaders to push vigorous 
 measures, the Persians were impatient for decision. 
 Accident seems to have made the Greeks at last the 
 assailants ; and thus perhaps contributed not a little 
 to the greatness of their success. By daybreak, it is Dodw. 
 said on the twentieth of October, in the four hundred 
 
 and eightieth year before the Christian era, they had 
 formed their fleet in order of battle. The Athenians, Herodot. 
 on the right, were opposed to the Phenician squa- 
 dron : the Lacedaemonians, on the left, to the Ionian. 
 As the sun rose trumpets sounded, paeans were sung, 
 and the Grecian leaders endeavoured by all means 
 to excite that animation among their people which 
 their own divided and hesitating counsels had so 
 tended to repress. A trireme galley returning from Herodot. 
 ^Egina, excluded from the Grecian fleet by the ' 
 
 enemy's line, and nevertheless endeavouring to pass, gic 
 was attacked. An Athenian galley commanded by i.n. c.27. 
 Aminias, brother of the poet ^Eschylus, advanced 
 
 of straining it to mean that, to make the total, the two hundred 
 and seven, which the poet mentions as the swiftest of the fleet, 
 should be added to the thousand. On this Stanley's note may 
 be seen. Plato says the Persian fleet was wXtuv ** en wXeoWv f ; 
 an expression sufficiently indicating that he did not believe it to 
 have been of many more than a thousand. According to Ms- 
 chylus, the Grecian triremes were only three hundred. It is not 
 impossible but Herodotus might have collected more accurate 
 information of the numbers furnished by the several states. 
 * De Leg. 1.3. p. 699. t. 2. 
 F 4>
 
 /^ HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, to her rescue : others followed : then the 
 _ moved, and the battle soon became general. 
 
 The onset was vigorous on both sides. But space 
 did not suffice for the Persians to bring their whole 
 fleet regularly into action, nor for the Phenicians, in 
 particular, to profit from the superior swiftness of 
 their galleys and skill of their seamen. The Athe- 
 nians and .^Eginetans therefore, after a sharp contest, 
 broke the part of the Persian line first engaged. 
 Numbers of galleys, yet out of action, pressed to its 
 support. Among the various nations who composed 
 the Persian fleet, commanded in chief by Persian 
 officers little versed in naval business, while the vast 
 army which lined the Attic shore, with the sovereign 
 of the East at its head, were witnesses of the scene, 
 zeal itself contributed to disorder. Damage and loss 
 of oars, and wounds in the hull from the beaks of 
 their own galleys, ensued ; while the Athenians and 
 ^Eginetans, forgetting their late enmity, or remem- 
 bering it only as an incentive to generous emulation, 
 with the most animated exertion preserved the 
 steadiest discipline. Shortly the sea itself became 
 scarcely visible for the quantity of wreck and floating 
 bodies. Such is the strong expression of the poet 
 who himself fought in the Athenian squadron. In 
 the mean time the business was easier to the Lace- 
 daemonians and other Greeks in the left wing. Some 
 of the Ionian officers exerted themselves to earn the 
 favour of the monarch whom they served ; but others 
 were zealously disposed to the cause of the confede- 
 rates. The confusion arising, thus and variously other- 
 wise in the Persian fleet, spread and rapidly became 
 Herodot. general and extreme. All their galleys which could 
 1.8. c.89. Disengage themselves fled. Some were taken: many 
 were sunk ; and numbers of the crews, inland men,
 
 BATTLE OF SALAMIS. 73 
 
 unpractised in swimming, were drowned. Among SECT. 
 those who perished were very many of high rank, 
 who had been forward to distinguish themselves, in 
 this new species of war, under their monarch's eye. 
 According to Herodotus, Ariabignes, brother of 
 Xerxes, and admiral of the fleet, was among the 
 killed ; but he is not mentioned by ^Eschylus. Forty 
 Grecian galleys are said to have been sunk, or other- Diod. sic. 
 wise destroyed: but the crews mostly saved them- Uhc - 19 -' 
 selves aboard other ships, or on the neighbouring 
 friendly shore of Salamis. When the rout was be- ^schyi. 
 come total, Aristides, landing on Psyttalea at the Herodot. 
 head of a body of Athenians, put all the Persians pf u ' t c ' 95 ' 
 there to the sword, under the very 'eye of Xerxes, 
 who, with his immense army around him, could 
 afford them no assistance. 
 
 In considering Herodotus's account of this memor- 
 able sea-fight we find not less reason than on former 
 occasions to praise his scrupulous honesty and mo- 
 desty/ His narrative is doubtful and incomplete, as 
 all faithful narratives of great battles must be, unless 
 some eye-witness, very peculiarly qualified by know- 
 ledge and situation, be the relater. It is therefore 
 matter of regret, not indeed that .ZEschylus was a 
 poet, but that prose-writing was yet in his age so 
 little common that his poetical sketch of this great 
 transaction is the most authoritative, the clearest, and 
 the most consistent of any that has passed to poste- 
 rity. Concerning a day however so glorious, so 
 singularly interesting to Greece, and particularly to 
 Athens, anecdotes would of course abound ; and a 
 historian, a few years only later, desirous to shine in 
 description rather than to relate the truth, could not 
 have wanted materials. Anecdotes indeed of par- 
 ticular circumstances in great battles may often be
 
 7 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, authenticated ; and to those Herodotus has chiefly 
 
 VIII . 
 
 confined himself; avoiding a detail of the battle at 
 
 large, with an express declaration that he could 
 obtain none upon which he could rely. Among his 
 anecdotes, one is too remarkable and of too much 
 
 Herodot. fame to be omitted. The queen of Halicarnassus, 
 
 1 ft r R7 
 
 88. & 93.' after showing extraordinary bravery during the action, 
 being among the last who fled, was closely pursued 
 by the Athenian galley which Aminias commanded. 
 In this extremity, at a loss for other refuge, she sud- 
 denly turned against the nearest galley of the Persian 
 fleet, which happened to be that of Damasithymus, 
 prince of Calynda in Lycia, with whom she is said to 
 have been upon terms not of perfect friendship : and 
 taking him totally unprepared for such an attempt, 
 the stroke of the beak of her galley against the side 
 of his was so violent and so well aimed that the vessel 
 instantly sunk, and the Calyndian prince and his 
 crew were at the mercy of the enemy and the waves. 
 Aminias, in the hurry of the moment, without means 
 for inquiry, concluding from what he had seen that 
 Artemisia's galley was either one of the confederate 
 fleet, or one that had deserted to it, turned his 
 pursuit toward other vessels, and the queen of Hali- 
 carnassus escaped. According to Herodotus, though 
 in this instance we may have difficulty to give him 
 entire credit, Xerxes, from the shore where he sat, 
 saw, admired, and applauded the exploit. 
 
 It is indeed impossible here not to wish for those 
 Persian histories of these great events which probably 
 once existed, and which a learned orientalist of our 
 own country would flatter us with the hope of still 
 recovering 35 : but most they become objects when the 
 
 35 Richardson's Dissertation on the Languages, &c. of the 
 Eastern Nations.
 
 BATTLE OF SALAMIS. 7 5 
 
 Persian counsels become particularly interesting, of SECT. 
 
 which the Grecian historian has undertaken to give '__ 
 
 a detail that could not come to him duly authen- 
 ticated. Not that an author under a despotic mo- 
 narchy, who often must not publish what he knows 
 or believes, and sometimes may not dare even to 
 inquire, could be put in any general competition with 
 a republican writer, who not only might inquire 
 everywhere and speak anything, but has actually 
 manifested his free impartiality by relating, with the 
 ingenuous severity of a reproving friend, the disgraces 
 of his fellow-countrymen, and by bestowing liberal 
 and frequent eulogy upon their enemies ; yet even 
 from the flatterer of a despot might be gathered some 
 information of which the total wreck of Persian 
 literature hath deprived us. The Greeks however 
 were not without considerable means of information, 
 often even of the intrigues of the Persian court. The 
 eunuchs of the palace, the persons perhaps most 
 intimate about the monarch, (for, according to Xeno- Xenoph. 
 phon, even the great Cyrus preferred eunuchs for his i.7 pai * 
 confidents,) were of any nation rather than Persian. 
 Some of them were Greeks ; at least born among the 
 Greeks, though mostly perhaps of foreign origin as 
 of servile condition. Herodotus mentions a Greek Herodoi. 
 of Chios who acquired great wealth by the infamous ios/ioe. ' 
 traffic of castrated boys. One of these, Hermotimus, 
 born at Pedasa in the territory of Halicarnassus, was 
 in high favour with Xerxes, attended him into Greece, 
 and, both before and after that expedition, was em- 
 ployed in affairs in Asia Minor which would lead 
 him to communication with the principal Greeks of 
 that country. Refugee Greeks moreover, from the 
 various republics, continually swarmed about the 
 courts of the Persian satraps, and even of the monarch
 
 76 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, himself; so that, although the speeches which Hero- 
 [IL dotus puts into the mouths of Persian cabinet coun- 
 
 sellors must be as fictitious as those which Livy 
 attributes to his fellow-countrymen at the head of 
 armies, yet large means were certainly open for 
 Greeks of rank and character to know the manners 
 of the Persian great, and even to pry into the politics 
 of the empire, as far perhaps as the Persians them- 
 selves : for under a despotic government the counsels 
 which direct the greatest affairs are generally open to 
 very few. 
 
 After the battle of Salamis however the transactions 
 of public notoriety bespeak, in a great degree, the 
 counsels that directed them. The defeat of the fleet 
 necessarily deranged the measures of the Persian com- 
 manders. No port was near, capable of protecting 
 its shattered and disheartened, but still large remains. 
 Phalerum, then the principal harbour of Athens, 
 could not contain half its numbers. A hasty order, 
 of the very night after the engagement, is said to 
 ^ ave directed ^ to m o y e immediately for the Helles- 
 pont. Day broke, and the Greeks, who expected a 
 C.96.&108. renewal of the action, looked in vain for an enemy. 
 For the Persian army then quick determination of 
 new measures was necessary. No sufficient maga- 
 zines having been collected, it was, by the departure 
 of the fleet, reduced, with its attending multitudes, 
 yEschyi. to immediate danger of starving. In a few days ac- 
 Herodot. cordingly it withdrew from Attica into the rich and 
 1.8. c. 113. f r i enc i}y province of Boeotia, and thence shortly into 
 
 Thessaly. 
 
 i.e. c.ioo. Probably the punishment of Athens, with the sub- 
 mission of so many other provinces, may have been, 
 in the Persian council, held sufficient, if not to satisfy 
 the monarch's hope of glory, yet to prevent the im-
 
 RETURN OF XERXES. 77 
 
 putation of disgrace, and perhaps even to form some SECT. 
 shadowy claim to honour. The defeat of the fleet _ * 
 
 would be of course attributed to the faults of the 
 immediate commanders, and to the defects and in- 
 feriority to be expected in an armament, not properly 
 Persian, but composed almost entirely of the con- 
 quered subjects of the empire. The spoil of Athens, 
 and among it the statues of Harmodius and Aristo- 
 giton, were sent as trophies, to mark to the interior 
 provinces the exploits of that prodigious armament, 
 which had so diminished their population and ex- 
 hausted their wealth. The affairs of the empire might 
 require the presence of the prince. The conquered 
 countries were not yet so far settled that it could be 
 particularly agreeable to a young monarch, by edu- 
 cation and by disposition probably not much either a 
 warrior or a man of business, to pass the winter among 
 them. To support all his forces there, during the 
 stormy season, even had he still had command of the 
 sea, would have been impossible. Xerxes was there- 
 fore to return into Asia. 
 
 But the projects of conquest were not to be yet aban- 
 doned. Three hundred thousand men were chosen 
 from the whole army to remain under the command 
 of Mardonius, who with that force undertook to 
 complete the reduction of Greece in the following 
 summer. The rejected multitude were to return Herodot. 
 with all haste eastward ; urged by the prospect of JEschyi. *" 
 famine, and the apprehension that the approach of Pers * 
 winter might totally bar the passage of the mountains 
 and rivers of Macedonia and Thrace. Of the three 
 hundred thousand selected by Mardonius, sixty thou- Herodot. 
 sand under Artabazus were to march as a guard for u 
 the royal person as far as the Hellespont. These 
 were perhaps, among the innumerable crowds of
 
 78 
 
 CHAP. 
 VIII. 
 
 4 Dec. 
 B. C. 480. 
 
 Herodot. 
 1. 8. c. 126. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 various nations and languages who attended, or en- 
 deavoured to attend, the monarch's retreat, those 
 who alone deserved the name of soldiers. Of these, 
 as of soldiers forming a guard necessary to the prince's 
 dignity and even safety, some care apparently was 
 taken. The rest suffered beyond description, from 
 the haste of the march, and almost total want of ma- 
 gazines : for the invasion only had been considered, 
 the retreat was unprovided for. The disorderly mul- 
 titude therefore lived by rapine, from friends equally 
 and foes ; but all was insufficient. Other sustenance 
 failing, they ate the very grass from the ground, and 
 the bark, and even leaves from the trees ; and, as the 
 historian, with emphatical simplicity, says, * they left 
 * nothing.' Dysenteries and pestilential fevers seized 
 whom famine spared. Numbers were left sick in the 
 towns of Thessaly, Paeonia, Macedonia, and Thrace, 
 with arbitrary orders, little likely to be diligently 
 obeyed, that support and attendance should be pro- 
 vided for them. On the forty-fifth day from the 
 commencement of his march in Thessaly, Xerxes 
 reached the Hellespont, with an escort which, com- 
 pared with the prodigious numbers a few months 
 before under his command there, might be called no- 
 thing. 36 The bridges were already destroyed by storms 
 and the violence of the current ; but the fleet was 
 arrived. 37 Artabazus immediately marched his de- 
 
 *** . . . aneiyuv Ty$ a-rpatTi^i; ovbev [Afpo^ $ flnai. Herodot. 
 1.8. c.115. 
 
 37 Herodotus is not among the reputable fablers who report 
 that Xerxes in his retreat, without any army, without a fleet, 
 and almost without an attendant, crossed the Hellespont in a 
 cock-boat. He tells indeed another story, not perhaps wholly 
 undeserving attention, as a specimen of tales circulated in Greece 
 concerning these extraordinary transactions, though he declares
 
 OF THE ANCIENT SHIPS OF WAR. 79 
 
 tachment back toward Macedonia. The monarch APPEN. 
 proceeded to Sardis. 
 
 APPENDIX TO THE EIGHTH CHAPTER. 
 
 Of the ancient ships of war. 
 
 THE form of the ancient galleys of war, the trireme 
 and quinquereme, and especially the arrangement of 
 the rowers, have been much objects of inquiry and 
 much of imagination, but yet remain very uncertain. 
 The most satisfactory conjectures that I have met 
 with, by far, are those of general Melvill, of which 
 an account is given in the Appendix to Governor 
 Pownall's Treatise on the Study of Antiquities. 
 Along the waist of the galley, according to the ge- 
 neral's supposition, from a little above the water's 
 edge, a gallery projected at an angle of about forty-five 
 degrees. In this the upper rowers were disposed, 
 checkered with the lower. Space for them being 
 thus gained, partly by elevation, partly by lateral 
 projection, those of the highest tier were not too much 
 above the water to work their oars with effect. The 
 general says he has been confirmed in his opinion 
 that this was the real form of the ancient galleys of 
 war by representations of them, though imperfect, in 
 ancient paintings and reliefs, which he has seen in 
 Italy. He has not specified those paintings and re- 
 liefs. There were, in the collection at Portici, pictures 
 of sea engagements, but so damaged that, when there 
 in the year 1788, I was unable myself to discern the 
 parts of the vessels, so as to judge at all whether they 
 might confirm or confute the general's notions. The 
 most perfect ancient monument to the purpose, 
 
 for himself that he did not believe it. The curious may find it 
 in the 118th and 119th chapters of his 8th book.
 
 80 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, that ever fell in my way, was a marble fragment 
 
 of a bireme in high relief, preserved in the Vatican 
 
 museum at Rome. It had the incorrectness usual 
 in the representations of such objects by the ancient 
 sculptors, but it nevertheless, in my opinion, went 
 far to show that the general's idea was well founded. 
 Moreover it explained, to my mind satisfactorily, 
 Thucyd. the meaning of a nautical term used by Thucydides, 
 which the scholiast, and after him lexicographers and 
 translators, have, I think, certainly misinterpreted. 
 In that curious monument the oars are represented 
 projecting from the vessel's side through apertures, 
 like the rowports in our small ships of war, every 
 oar having about it a bag, attached to the vessel's 
 side, the obvious purpose of which has been to prevent 
 influx of waves and spray ; and the need of it for 
 vessels for which swift rowing was a prime object, 
 and consequently the smallest elevation that might 
 be of the rowlock above the water, will also be ob- 
 vious. Thucydides, describing the march of some 
 seamen to seize some unprovided triremes for a hasty 
 expedition, says every one carried his oar with, ac- 
 cording to the scholiast and following interpreters, 
 his cushion * and loop or thong. The loop or thong 
 to fasten the oar to the rowlock is yet common in 
 boats for some purposes, especially gun-boats. The 
 need for it in the ancient manner of naval action is 
 obvious. If the purpose was to dash away the enemy's 
 oars, the oars of the assailing vessel must be, in a mo- 
 ment, secured ; which could be managed for those 
 projected through a rowport only by letting them 
 float the closest that might be to the vessel's side, 
 attached to it by the loop ; and equally the vessel 
 attacked could avoid the proposed shock only by dis- 
 [* See note 6. on sect. 2. of ch. xv.]
 
 OF THE ANCIENT SHIPS OF WAR. 81 
 
 posing its oars on the attacked side in the same man- APPEN- 
 
 DIX 
 
 ner. But the need for every man to have his cushion ' 
 
 on such an expedition is not equally obvious. I have 
 indeed seen a Thames wherryman use a cushion, but 
 I suppose an invalided seaman, for some disorder. I 
 can little doubt that the word which has been trans- 
 lated cushion meant the bag represented in the marble 
 monument already mentioned, the need for which the 
 historian, in proceeding with his narrative, shows pro- 
 bably to have occurred. The ingenious and learned 
 Winckelmann*, in a treatise on the monument in ques- 
 tion, has blundered, as might be expected of a closet 
 critic, pretending to dissert on rowing without ever 
 having handled an oar. 
 
 In the account of a voyage round the world in 
 1767, and following years, by Pages, an officer of 
 the French navy, there is a description of a vessel of 
 the islands of the western verge of the Pacific ocean, 
 the principle of which is exactly, and the construction 
 very nearly, what general Melvill has imagined for 
 the ancient war-galley. Pages himself, apparently a 
 diligent officer, and a liberal and candid writer, seems 
 to have had little classical learning, and has not indi- 
 cated that he had any idea of a Greek or Roman ship 
 of war while he was describing what seems to have 
 been so nearly the very thing. * The vessel/ he says, 
 ' called booanga (Fr. bouanga) is perhaps but an en- 
 
 * largement of that of the Marian Islands, described 
 
 * in lord Anson's voyage. It is a sort of very long- 
 
 * decked canoe or periagua. The hull does not rise 
 'more than a foot above the water. The upper- 
 
 * works, raised upon it, are very light, much like those 
 
 * of our old shebecks. It consists of a double gallery 
 
 [* See note 22. on sect. 7. of ch. xviii.] 
 VOL. II. G
 
 2 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. * of bamboo, each two feet wide, running nearly the 
 [IL * length of the vessel, leaving a small space beyond 
 
 * it, both at head and stern. The first gallery, rang- 
 
 * ing against the gunwale, on its outside, is about 
 
 * eighteen inches higher than the deck : the second, 
 
 * ranging against the first outward, rises only about 
 ' a foot above it. The first gallery is supported by 
 knees fixed to the upper works : the second by 
 knees fixed to timbers projecting beyond the upper 
 
 * works. Thus there are three rows of rowers on 
 'each side, whose rowlocks are disposed like the 
 ' portholes in a ship's side, the highest over the lowest, 
 'and the middle tier between. The highest oars 
 
 * thus sufficiently overstretch the lowest, so as not to 
 
 * interfere in stroke with them ; and the middle tier 
 
 * avoids interference with either, by taking the middle 
 ' of the interval between every two oars of the upper 
 ' and lower/ 
 
 Thus far the description is almost exactly general 
 MelvilFs of the ancient war-galley. Pages proceeds 
 then to notice an inconvenience of the contrivance, 
 which the ancients probably obviated, though pro- 
 bably otherwise than the islanders of the Pacific 
 ocean. ' Each row,' he says, ' containing from twenty 
 'to twenty-five rowers, the utmost attention would 
 'be constantly required to trimming, if the incon- 
 ' venience of overbalancing was not remedied thus : 
 
 * at about the distance of a sixth of the length of the 
 
 D 
 
 ' vessel from its head and from its stern, are fixed, 
 ' across it, two large bamboos, projecting from twenty 
 ' to twenty-five feet on each side. At each end of 
 ' these, parallel to the vessel's side, are fixed two or 
 
 * three other bamboos, whose buoyancy, assisted by 
 ' so long a lever, prevents any considerable heeling, 
 
 * whether from wind, or from defective trimming ;
 
 OF THE ANCIENT SHIPS OF WAR. 83 
 
 * and, in fine weather, they serve as a fourth bench APPEN- 
 
 * for rowers, who however use not oars, but paddles.' _ 
 
 The author adds, it is difficult to conceive the 
 swiftness of these vessels, though the oars are of awk- 
 ward form, and the rower is too near the rowlock to 
 make the most advantage of his lever. 
 
 The Mahometan Indians, who have eternal enmity 
 with the Spanish Indians of the Philippine Islands, 
 are those whom he mentions as principally using 
 them. 38 
 
 38 When the foregoing observations on the ancient ships of 
 war were first published, Pages' publication was recent. 
 Among numerous following accounts of voyages in the s-ame 
 seas, I have not found any of such vessels as those described by 
 him. Nevertheless, not only as he is a writer of simplicity 
 more than ordinary for a Frenchman, and clearly of general 
 veracity, but more particularly as his account tends beyond 
 anything beside published, with which I am acquainted, to give 
 an idea of the form and general character of the ancient ships 
 of war, I still think it well deserving notice. 
 
 G 2
 
 84, 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS TO 
 THE CONCLUSION OF THE PERSIAN INVASION. 
 
 CHAP. 
 IX. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Return of the Athenians to their country. Measures of the 
 Grecian fleet. Dedication to the gods for the victory at Sa- 
 lamis. Honours to Themistocles. Revolt of Chalcidice from 
 the Persians. Siege of Potidcea by Artabazus. 
 
 THE various affections of Grecian minds after so 
 glorious, so important, so unexpected a victory as 
 
 B.C. 480. that of Salamis, and the consequent hasty retreat of 
 ' that numberless army, the means of resistance to 
 
 which seemed beyond human calculation, may in 
 some degree be conceived, but scarcely can be de- 
 scribed. Neither Persian garrison nor any Pisistra- 
 tidean Athenians appear to have remained in Athens. 
 That city and its whole territory seem to have been 
 recovered by the naval conqueror's party without a 
 struggle. For measures to be taken by the confede- 
 
 Herodot. ra te fleet meanwhile much difference of opinion and 
 
 1.8. c.108. , 
 
 consequent debate arose among the commanders. It 
 was proposed by some to pursue the Persians to the 
 Hellespont, and, at once crushing the naval power of 
 the empire, thus render its gigantic land force less 
 formidable to a country hardly to be successfully in- 
 vaded without a co-operating fleet. This was over- 
 ruled. 1 But the most powerful naval armament that 
 
 1 It appears difficult to determine what should be thought of 
 the story told by Herodotus, Cornelius Nepos, and Plutarch,
 
 DEDICATIONS TO THE GODS. 85 
 
 Greece had ever yet assembled, flushed with unhoped- SECT. 
 
 for success, would not immediately rest. Many of ^ 
 
 the islanders were obnoxious for their forwardness 
 in the Persian cause. It was determined to exact a Herodot. 
 fine from them to be applied to the expenses of the 112.' ' ' 
 war. Themistocles, whose great qualities, according 
 to generally concurring imputations, were sullied by 
 a sordid attention to his private interest, is said on 
 this occasion to have enriched himself through the 
 influence which his high command and high reputa- 
 tion procured him. The Parians avoided all public 
 payment, it is asserted, through a bribe to the 
 Athenian commander. The Andrians alone, of the 
 islanders on the European side of the .^Egean, reso- 
 lutely refused to pay anything. Siege was in conse- 
 quence laid to their principal town, but without effect; 
 and the fleet returned to Salamis. 
 
 Winter approached, with a political calm which 
 for a long time had been little expected by the con- 
 federate Greeks. Gratitude to the gods, for the great 
 deliverance obtained, was among the first emotions 
 of the public mind. It was usual, after a victory, to 
 select some of the most valuable articles of the spoil, 
 to be offered, under the name of Acrothinia, first 0.121. 
 
 and supported in some degree by the authority of Thucydides*, 
 of a message sent by Themistocles to Xerxes, informing him of 
 the intention of the Greeks, after the battle of Salamis, to send 
 their fleet to destroy the bridges of the Hellespont, and interrupt 
 his return into Asia. Herodotus mentions it as an act of treachery } 
 or at least of selfish policy; and were it not for the support de- 
 rived from the slight mention of the circumstance by Thucydides, 
 some incoherence in Herodotus's detail would lead to suspect 
 that it was a mere fabrication of the adverse faction at Athens. 
 Nepos and Plutarch, on the other hand, commend the deed as 
 an act of the most refined, but the most patriotic policy. 
 
 '* Herodot 1.8. c. 108, 109, 110. Corn. Nep. & Plut. vit. Themist. Thucyd. 
 1. I.e. 137. 
 
 G 3
 
 CHAP. 
 IX. 
 
 Herodot. 
 1.8. c. 121, 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 fruits to the supposed propitious deities. On the 
 present occasion three Phenician trireme galleys were 
 first chosen. One was dedicated in Salamis to the 
 hero Ajax ; another at the promontory Sunium, pro- 
 bably to Minerva ; and the third at the Corinthian 
 isthmus to Neptune. 2 Other offerings required more 
 preparation. A statue, twelve cubits high, holding 
 in one hand a galley's prow, was dedicated to Apollo 
 at Delphi. The oracle demanded a particular ac- 
 knowledgment from the ^Eginetans ; because in the 
 glorious contest of Salamis they were said to have 
 excelled among the Greeks. Those. islanders, gladly 
 receiving the honourable testimony, sent to Delphi a 
 brazen mast, adorned with three stars of gold. These 
 
 o 
 
 public dedications being made or decreed, the re- 
 maining booty was divided. The fleet then pro- 
 ceeded to the isthmus, where another ceremony, of 
 established practice among the Greeks, remained to 
 be performed. Honours were to be decreed, first and 
 second, for merit in the war. 3 The chiefs of the 
 several states delivered their opinions in writing upon 
 the altar of Neptune. Every one gave the first vote 
 for himself; but a large majority of the second ap- 
 peared for Themistocles. Thus it remained unde- 
 cided to whom the first honour should be paid, and 
 
 2 Minerva and Neptune are not mentioned by the historian ; 
 but the conjecture seems little hazardous. The ruins of the 
 temple of the Suniad Minerva remain on the promontory to 
 this day ; and Neptune was not only the tutelary deity of the 
 Isthmian games, but esteemed proprietary of the isthmus ; and 
 a statue, we find, was erected to him there upon occasion of the 
 following victory of Plataea. See Herodot. 1. 9. c. 81. & Pausan. 
 1. 2. c. 1. 
 
 3 ... apiyrvfia, Sacroi/ref ,TU afcwca.tu yevopevu 'EMyvav ava. toy 
 
 TCoXtfAOV TOVTOV . . . TOV TT^TOV KO,} TOV SfVTfpOV KpWOVTeS fK 
 
 Herodot. 1. 8. c. 123.
 
 HONOURS TO THEMISTOCLES. 87 
 
 the squadrons separated to their several states; but SECT. 
 the general voice of the people sounded the fame of *" 
 Themistocles far beyond all others. Unsatisfied how- 
 ever with such vague applause, and disappointed of 
 the degree of distinction which his ambition affected, 
 Themistocles went to Lacedsemon, probably knowing 
 that he should be well received. The Spartan go- 
 vernment took upon itself to determine the claims of 
 merit. It would have been invidious to have refused 
 the Aristeia, or first honours for bravery and general 
 conduct, to their own admiral, who had commanded 
 in chief; but a new and singular compliment was in- 
 vented for the Athenian commander : they adjudged 
 to him the prize of wisdom and maritime skill. Eury- 
 biades and Themistocles therefore together received, 
 from the Lacedaemonian commonwealth, the honour- 
 able reward of olive crowns. Themistocles was be- 
 sides presented with a chariot ; and, at his departure 
 from Lacedaemon, three hundred Spartans, of those 
 called Knights, or Cavalry, were appointed to escort 
 him to the frontier 4 ; a kind of honour never, to the 
 time of Herodotus, paid to any other stranger. 
 
 The news of the victory of the Greeks at Salamis, 
 and of the consequent retreat of Xerxes into Asia, 
 was quickly conveyed through all the Grecian settle- 
 ments in uncertain rumours, here exaggerated, there 
 deficient, according to the information, the temper, 
 the interest, the memory, or, sometimes, the invention 
 of individuals reporting it, where public and certain 
 means of extensive communication were little known. 
 But the Greeks of the Thracian colonies, who had 
 seen, with trembling, the proud march of the im- 
 mense host of Persia towards Greece, were also eye- 
 
 4 STcafTiyrsuv XoyaSe?, oSro* ofaep <7Tiree$ KXeavTw. Herodot. 
 1.8. c. 124. 
 
 G 4
 
 88 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, witnesses of the miserable reverse, when the monarch 
 _____ precipitated his retreat into Asia. Their information 
 was however probably little exact concerning the force 
 yet left hovering over their mother-country, and their 
 knowledge of the resources- of the Persian empire 
 generally very imperfect. According therefore to 
 the common nature of that tide of the human mind, 
 which operates generally with more force upon the 
 determinations of a multitude than of an individual, 
 the fruitful province of Chalcidice, on the confines 
 Herodot. O f Thrace and Macedonia, boldly revolted from the 
 
 1.8. c. 126. _ . _ . . J . 
 
 & seq. .Persian dominion, each little town asserting its be- 
 loved but altogether impolitic independency. Mean- 
 while Artabazus, having seen his sovereign safe on 
 the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, hastened back 
 with his detachment, itself a large army, to rejoin 
 Mardonius. But as the quarters of Macedonia and 
 Thessaly were already crowded, he halted in Chal- 
 cidice. Receiving intelligence of the revolt, he 
 reckoned, not unreasonably, that he should scarcely 
 escape censure if he suffered the winter to pass with- 
 out punishing it. Immediately he laid siege to Olyn- 
 thus and Potidsea. Olynthus was presently taken ; 
 and, if Herodotus should be believed, the inhabit- 
 ants, conducted to a neighbouring marsh, were there 
 all massacred. The town, which had been occupied 
 by a colony from Bottiaea on the Macedonian coast, 
 was given to native Chalcidians ; and, according to 
 that common policy of the Persians heretofore re- 
 marked, the government was entrusted to Critobulus, 
 a Greek of the town of Torone in the neighbouring 
 peninsula of Sithonia. 
 
 But the actions of Thermopylae and Salamis had 
 had a quick effect in diminishing the extreme dread 
 before entertained of the Persian power, and in pro-
 
 SIEGE OF POTIDJEA ABANDONED. 89 
 
 moting, among the Greeks, a general emulation in SECT. 
 arms, and in the spirit of independency. The Poti- 
 dseans, whose situation commanded the neck of the 
 fruitful and rebellious peninsula of Pallene, defended 
 themselves so vigorously that little progress was made 
 in the siege. But the wealth of Persia, continually 
 brought forth to supply the deficiency of military 
 science and discipline, formed a weight in the balance 
 of war, against which the Greeks with difficulty found 
 a counterpoise. Timoxenus, commander of the Scio- Herodot. 
 nsean auxiliaries in Potidsea, was bribed to a treason- ' 8 ' c ' 128 ' 
 able correspondence with the Persian general. They 
 communicated by letters, wrapt around arrows, which 
 were shot to spots agreed upon. The accidental 
 wounding of a Potidaean by one of those arrows how- 
 ever discovered the treason before it had gone to any 
 pernicious length. A crowd immediately gathered 
 about the wounded man ; and, on extracting the 
 arrow, a letter from Artabazus to Timoxenus was 
 found upon it. Three months had now been con- 
 sumed in the siege, and little progress made, when 
 the tide, to which many of the recesses of the JEgean 
 sea are subject, flowing to an unusual height, flooded 
 the Persian camp. 5 Immediately upon the ebb the 
 general ordered the army to march, meaning to take 
 a station on higher ground within the peninsula of 
 Pallene. Not half the troops had passed the flats 
 when the flood made again with increased violence. 
 Many of the Persians were drowned ; the Potidseans, 
 sallying in boats, killed many ; and Artabazus found 
 his measures so disconcerted that he raised the siege, 
 and proceeded with the remains of his army into 
 Thessaly. 
 
 5 Herodot. 1. 7. c. 198. note 48. p. 680. of Wesseling's edi- 
 tion may also deserve notice.
 
 90 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Preparations for the" campaign. Congress at Athens : speeches 
 of Alexander king of Macedonia, of the Lacedaemonian am- 
 bassador, and of the Athenian minister. Athens a second 
 time abandoned. Zeal of the Athenian people for the prose- 
 cution of the Persian war. 
 
 CHAP. WHEN Xerxes had reached Asia, the Persian fleet, 
 
 quitting the Hellespont, went part to Samos, part to 
 
 Herodot. Cuma, and in their ports wintered. In the following 
 &seq. spring the whole assembled at Samos. Mistrust of 
 Lll. c.27. those conquered subjects of the empire, who alone 
 were mariners, then led those who directed the affairs 
 of the navy to an alteration of the establishment of 
 their crews, the direct contrary to that which the 
 genius and experience of Themistocles had imagined, 
 and which had proved so advantageous in practice : 
 they increased the proportion of Median and Persian 
 soldiers. The fleet, with its loyalty supposed more 
 assured, remained at Samos, to awe the Asiatic and 
 Thracian coasts and neighbouring islands, making no 
 attempt westward. 
 
 Herodot Spring, and the recollection that Mardonius was 
 
 in Thessaly, according to the histroian's expression, 
 awakened the Greeks. The assembling of the army 
 was yet delayed, but a fleet of one hundred and 
 twenty trireme galleys was collected at ^gina, under 
 Leotychides, king of Lacedaemon. Xanthippus, the 
 prosecutor of Miltiades, commanded the Athenian 
 squadron. During the winter some of the leading 
 men of Chios had conspired against Strattis, whom 
 the Persians had appointed governor, or, in the Greek 
 term, tyrant of their island. They were detected ; 
 but finding opportunity to fly, they went to ^Egina,
 
 MEDIATION OF KING OF MACEDONIA. 91 
 
 and addressed themselves to the naval commanders SECT. 
 there, urging, that all Ionia was ripe for revolt, and 
 wanted only the countenance of the victorious fleet of 
 Greece to make a powerful diversion for the Persian 
 arms. Following history shows this likely to have 
 been the exaggeration of men stimulated by party 
 interest ; for in Ionia political interests were divided 
 nearly as in European Greece. Nevertheless, as it 
 would be desirable to favour any disposition toward 
 stirring against the enemy, the fleet moved as far 
 as Delos, and there took its station. The Persian 
 fleet meanwhile held its port, and the space between 
 Sam os and Delos, as the historian proceeds to ob- 
 serve, remained in peace through mutual fear. 
 
 Mardonius meanwhile had not neglected measures Herodot 
 to promote the success of his arms. Sensible of the & 8 8 ' e q.' 136 * 
 importance of naval co-operation, he resolved upon the 
 endeavour to detach the Athenians from the Grecian 
 confederates ; justly thinking that, if this could be 
 effected, the Persian fleet would immediately resume 
 a decided superiority. Alexander king of Macedonia 
 was chosen for his ambassador to the Athenian com- 
 monwealth. That prince was intimately connected 
 with both the Grecian and Persian nations. His 
 family boasted its descent from Hercules and Perseus 
 through Temenus, the Heraclidean king of Argos. It 
 held, with the Athenian commonwealth, the sacred 
 connexion of hereditary hospitality, in the revered 
 offices of which Alexander himself had communicated 
 with Athens. But his sister Gygaea was married to 
 Bubares, a Persian, high in rank and in command, 
 son of that Megabazus who in the reign of Darius 
 had conquered the western Thracians, and compelled 
 Amyntas, father of Alexander, to the delivery of 
 earth and water. Yet, though Alexander had con-
 
 CHA'P. 
 IX. 
 
 Plut. 
 
 Arist. 
 
 92 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 stantly acted with the Persians, he had nevertheless, 
 as far as his dependent situation would permit, always 
 shown himself friendly to the confederate Greeks. 
 He was accordingly well received at Athens. But 
 as the news of his arrival would quickly be spread 
 through Greece, and would probably excite jealousy 
 
 Herodot. among the confederates, especially the Lacedaemo- 
 ' c ' l ' nians, the leaders of the Athenian administration 
 deferred admitting him to audience before the assem- 
 bly of the people, till ministers came from Sparta. 
 
 Herodotus has not said who, during these remark- 
 able transactions, led those measures of the Attic 
 government, which, both in wisdom and magna- 
 nimity, at least equal anything in the political history 
 of mankind. Plutarch attributes all to Aristides. 
 Supported by the aristocratical party, jealous of the 
 eminence of Themistocles, he appears in all accounts 
 to have been at this time of highest consideration. 
 On the arrival of the Lacedaemonian ministers an 
 assembly of the people was summoned. The Lace- 
 daemonian ministers and the king of Macedonia were 
 together admitted to this public audience. Silence 
 having been, as usual, proclaimed, Alexander rose, 
 and, according to the original historian, spoke in 
 this simple and antiquated, but emphatical style of 
 oratory 6 : 'Athenians, thus saith Mardonius : ' The 
 
 1.8. c. HO. < commands of the king are come to me, saying, I 
 
 * ' FORGIVE THE ATHENIANS ALL THEIR OFFENCES 
 
 * * AGAINST ME. Now THEREFORE,MARDONIUS, THUS 
 ' ' DO : RESTORE TO THEM THEIR TERRITORY, AND 
 4 ' ADD TO IT WHATSOEVER THEMSELVES SHALL 
 
 * ' CHOOSE, LEAVING THEM TO THEIR OWN LAWS; 
 
 6 Testimony is borne to this remarkable transaction by 
 Demosthenes, in his 2d Philippic, as well as by Diodorus Sic. 1 
 1. 11. c. 28. and Plutarch in his Life of Aristides. 
 
 Herodot.
 
 CONGRESS AT ATHENS. 93 
 
 * * AND IF THEY WILL MAKE ALLIANCE WITH ME, SECT. 
 
 * * REBUILD ALL THE TEMPLES WHICH HAVE BEEN 
 
 * ' DESTROYED. Such being the king's commands to 
 
 * ' me, so I must necessarily do, unless you prevent. 
 
 * * From myself I say to you thus : Why would you 
 ' * persevere in the folly of making war against the 
 ' ' king ? You cannot overcome him : you cannot long 
 
 * ' resist him. You know how numerous his armies are, 
 
 * * and what they have effected. You are informed of 
 
 * * the force under my command. Should you overcome 
 ' ' me, which in reason you cannot hope, immediately 
 
 * * a still greater force will be sent against you. As a 
 
 * ' friend I recommend to you not, in the vain con- 
 
 * * test with the king, to lose your country, but to 
 ' * seize the honourable opportunity of this offer, from 
 
 * * the king himself, for making peace. Be free ; and 
 
 * * let there be alliance between us without fraud or 
 
 * * deceit.' These things, O Athenians, Mardonius 
 ' commanded me to say to you. For my own part, 
 ' I shall omit to enlarge upon the friendship I bear 
 ' you, since this is not the first occasion upon which 
 
 * you have had experience of it. I beseech you to 
 
 * accept the terms proposed by Mardonius ; for I 
 
 * well see the impossibility of your long contending 
 
 * against the Persian empire. Upon no other con- 
 ' sideration would I have come to you thus com- 
 
 * missioned. But the king's power is more than 
 
 * human: his arm is of unmeasurable length. I 
 
 * dread the event for you if you refuse the great con- 
 
 * ditions now offered. The very situation of your 
 1 country should indeed admonish you : lying in the 
 
 * road to the rest of the confederates you alone are 
 
 * first exposed, and actually bear all the brunt of the 
 ' war. Comply therefore ; for it is not a little honour- 
 
 * able to you that you alone among the Greeks are
 
 94 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. < selected by that great king for offers of peace and 
 
 ' * friendship.' 
 
 Herodot. The king of Macedonia concluded, and the chief 
 
 ' ' c ' 'of the Spartan ministers rose : * The Lacedaemonians,' 
 
 he said, * have sent us to request that you will admit 
 
 * nothing to the prejudice of Greece, nor receive any 
 
 * proposal from the Persian. For such a proceeding 
 
 * were unjust, unbecoming any Grecian people, and 
 ' on many accounts most of all unbecoming you. To 
 ' you indeed we we owe this war, which was excited 
 *' contrary to our inclination. The quarrel was ori- 
 ' ginally with you alone ; now it is extended to all 
 ' Greece. That the Athenians therefore, who from 
 
 * of old have, more than all mankind, asserted the 
 ' liberties of others, should become the authors of 
 
 * slavery to Greece, were most heinous. We grieve 
 
 * for your sufferings, that now for two seasons you 
 
 * have lost the produce of your lands, and that the 
 
 * public calamity should so long press so severely upon 
 
 * individuals. The Lacedaemonians and the other 
 ' confederates are desirous of making you reparation. 
 ' They will engage, while the war shall last, to main- 
 
 * tain your families, and all those of your slaves who 
 ' may not be wanted to attend you on military ser- 
 
 * vice. Let not therefore Alexander the Macedonian 
 
 * persuade you, softening Mardonius's message. He 
 
 * is certainly acting in his proper character : a tyrant 
 
 * himself, he co-operates with a tyrant. But for you, 
 ' prudence utterly forbids what he advises : you well 
 know that among barbarians there is no faith, no 
 truth.' 
 
 In the name of the Athenian people the following 
 
 c.i43. answer, in the report of Herodotus, was then made 
 
 to the king of Macedonia, according to Plutarch by 
 
 Aristides : * We know that the power of the Persian
 
 CONGRESS AT ATHENS. 95 
 
 ' empire is many times greater than ours. With this SECT. 
 
 * therefore it was needless to reproach us. Never- 
 
 * theless, independency being our object, we are de- 
 ' termined to defend ourselves to the utmost, and 
 
 * you would in vain persuade us to make any terms 
 
 * with the barbarian. You may therefore tell Mar- 
 
 * donius, that the Athenians say : ' While the sun 
 ' * holds his course we will never make alliance with 
 
 * * Xerxes ; but, trusting in our assisting gods and 
 
 * * heroes, whose temples and images he setting at 
 
 * ' naught has burnt, we will persevere in resisting 
 
 * * him/ Come then no more to the Athenians with 
 
 * such proposals, nor, with any view of promoting 
 
 * our welfare, recommend what is dishonourable and 
 ' unjust. For yourself, we shall always be desirous 
 of showing you all the friendship and respect to 
 
 * which the ancient hospitality and alliance between 
 
 * us entitle you.' 
 
 The orator is reported to have then addressed the Herodot. 
 Lacedaemonians ministers thus : * The apprehension 
 ' of the Lacedaemonians, that we might accept the 
 
 * terms proposed by the barbarian, was, upon a general 
 
 * view of human nature, certainly not unreasonable : 
 
 * but, after the proof you have had of the resolution 
 
 * of the Athenians, it becomes a dishonourable appre- 
 ' hension. No riches, nor the offer of the finest 
 ' country upon earth, should bribe us to connect 
 f ourselves with the Persians to the enslaving of 
 
 * Greece. Were it possible that we could be so dis- 
 ' posed, yet the obstacles are many and great. First, 
 
 * and what principally affects us, the images and 
 
 * temples of the gods burnt and reduced to rubbish. 
 ' This it is our indispensable duty to resent, and 
 revenge to the utmost, rather than make alliance 
 
 * with the perpetrator. Then, as a Grecian people,
 
 96 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. < our connexion in blood and in language, our com- 
 ' ' mon dedications to the gods, our common sacrifices, 
 
 and our similar customs and manners. Of these 
 
 * the Athenians cannot become the betrayers. Know 
 
 * then this, if before you knew it not, that, while one 
 
 * Athenian survives, we never will ally ourselves with 
 
 * Xerxes. Gratefully we acknowledge your kind 
 
 * attention, amid the distress and ruin of our private 
 
 * affairs, in proposing to maintain our families. We 
 
 * will however still make the best we can of our own 
 
 * means, without burthening you. These then being 
 
 * our resolutions, let there be, on your side, no delay 
 
 * in corresponding measures. Your army must march 
 
 * immediately ; for, according to all appearances, it 
 
 * will not be long before the barbarian will invade 
 
 * our country : he will move instantly upon receiving 
 
 * information that we have rejected his proposals. 
 
 * Before therefore he can arrive in Attica, it will 
 
 * behove us to meet him in Boeotia.' With these 
 answers the king of Macedonia and the Lacedaemonian 
 ambassadors departed. 
 
 Herodot. Mardonius did not deceive the expectation of the 
 Athenian leaders : he advanced immediately, by 
 nearly the same road that Xerxes had taken, toward 
 Attica. The wonted hesitation and dilatoriness mean- 
 while prevailed in the counsels of the Peloponnesians : 
 the Persian army was already in Bceotia, and no 
 measures were taken by the confederacy for defending 
 Attica. Once more therefore it became necessary 
 
 c.3&6. for the Athenians hastily to abandon their country. 
 
 Aristid.' Probably however the necessity was less grievous than 
 on the former occasion: for, beside being more pre- 
 pared, they had less to apprehend ; their own fleet 
 now commanding the Grecian seas. In their own 
 island of Salamis therefore their families and effects
 
 ATHENS AGAIN ABANDONED. 97 
 
 would, for the present at least, be beyond annoyance SECT. 
 from the Persian arms. Thither all were removed ; 
 and, about eight months after Xerxes had quitted June, 
 Athens, Mardonius, unopposed, retook possession of oi^'s 4 * 9 " 
 that city. 
 
 The conduct of the Peloponnesians, but most par- 
 ticularly of the Lacedaemonians, the leading state, is 
 marked by Herodotus, whom Plutarch here has fol- 
 lowed, as ungenerous, ungrateful, and faithless, if 
 not even dastardly 7 : that of the Athenians mag- 
 nanimous even to enthusiasm. Deprived of their 
 country, and apparently betrayed by their allies, the 
 Persian general thought this a favourable opportunity 
 for attempting once more to draw the Athenians 
 from the Grecian confederacy. Accordingly he sent 
 Murichides, a Hellespontine Greek, to Salamis, with Herodot. 
 the same offers which he had before made by the pi u 't.v. 
 King of Macedonia. The minister was admitted to Anstld - 
 audience by the council of Five Hundred. Lycidas, 
 alone of the counsellors, was for paying so much 
 attention to the proposal as to refer it to an assembly 
 of the people. This circumstance was communicated; Herodot. 
 and, so vehement was the popular zeal for persevering pe 
 in enmity to Persia, a tumultuous crowd, on the de ^ 
 rising of the council, stoned Lycidas to death. The ed. 
 frenzy spread ; and what it may be desirable not to de ok 1C 
 believe, though Herodotus the friend and panegyrist L3- c>11 * 
 of Athens affirms it, and the philosophic Plutarch 
 seems even to applaud the deed, the Athenian women 
 attacked the house of the unfortunate senator, and 
 his widow and children perished under their hands. 
 The law of nations was at the same time so far 
 
 7 Plutarch, in his Treatise against Herodotus, has censured 
 that historian for relating what, in his Life of Aristides, he has 
 himself in strong terms confirmed. 
 VOL. II. H
 
 98 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, respected that Murichides was dismissed without in- 
 jury or insult. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 Campaign in Bceotia. Battle of Platcea. Punishment of Thebes. 
 
 Herod, i. 9. MINISTERS had been sent from Athens, accompanied 
 piut. v. by others from Plataea and Megara, to remonstrate 
 Anstid. with the Lacedaemonian government on their shame- 
 ful neglect of their engagements, and to learn what 
 were now to be the measures of the confederacy. 
 B.C. 479. The Lacedaemonians were celebrating their feast of 
 *" the Hyacinthia, one of the most solemn of their 
 calendar. This furnishing some pretext, the ephors, 
 Herod. 1.9. those magistrates who had usurped a power in the 
 c 7 '&8 1 * Spartan government superior to that of the kings, 
 delayed their answer from day to day for ten days 
 successively. The works at the Corinthian isthmus, 
 never meanwhile intermitted, were now nearly com- 
 pleted. The Athenian ministers, thinking themselves 
 insulted and their country betrayed, determined on 
 '- the morrow to declare to the Lacedaemonian senate 
 
 their sense of such treatment, and to leave Sparta. 
 At length however the Lacedaemonians, after con- 
 sultation with their allies, and, it is added, some 
 reproaches from them, had determined upon juster 
 measures. Five thousand Spartans marched silently 
 out of the city in the evening, under the command 
 of Pausanias son of Cleombrotus, regent for his 
 cousin Plistarchus son of Leonidas, yet a minor. 
 Five thousand Lacedaemonians of the country towns 
 c.28. were ordered to follow. Next morning, when the 
 Athenian ministers came to make their final complaint 
 to the senate, they were told that the Lacedaemonian 
 army was already on the confines of Arcadia in its
 
 MARCH OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS. 99 
 
 way to meet the Persians. The Argives, according to SECT. 
 Herodotus, were so thoroughly in the Persian in- 
 terest that they had undertaken to intercept any 
 Spartan troops which should attempt to quit Laconia. 
 The suddenness and secrecy of the march defeated 
 their intention. Receiving intelligence that the Lace- 
 daemonian army had entered Arcadia, they hastened 
 information to Mardonius. 
 
 While the Persian general had any hope of leading 
 the Athenians to his purpose he had carefully spared 
 Attica ; but as soon as he was assured that their 
 resolution was immoveable, he gave up the country 
 for plunder to his troops, and destroyed the city. Herodot. 
 Learning then that the Peloponnesians were ad- 1-9> ' 13 ' 
 vancing, he returned into Bceotia ; a country more c. is. 
 commodious for the action of his numerous cavalry, i.nl'c.^s. 
 nearer to his magazines, which were principally at j H g rodo h 
 Thebes, and whence, in any misfortune, retreat would 
 be more open, while in success the way was equally 
 ready into Peloponnesus. He fixed his camp in the 
 Theban territory, extending it along the course of 
 the Asopus, from Erythrae toward Hysiae, on the c.is. 
 border of the Plataean lands. Within this tract he 
 chose a situation where he fortified a space of rather 
 more than a square mile. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians were joined at the isthmus 
 by the other Peloponnesians of the confederacy ; and 
 there, according to the constant practice of the Greeks 
 in all momentous undertakings, after solemn sacri- 
 fices, the bowels of the victims were observed, whence 
 persons believed to be inspired, or, if such were not 
 to be found, persons who had reputation for skill in 
 divination, undertook to know how far and upon what 
 conditions the gods would be propitious. Tisamenus, c.33. 
 an Elean, attended Pausanias in quality of prophet 
 
 H 2
 
 100 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, to the army. The Lacedaemonians had such con- 
 
 IX- fidence in the fortune and prophetical abilities of this 
 
 man that, to secure him to themselves, when he had 
 
 refused all other price, they admitted him and his 
 
 brother to the full privileges of Spartan citizens ; an 
 
 honour never, to the time of Herodotus, conferred 
 
 upon any other person. Among the Greeks policy 
 
 and superstition were so intimately blended that it is 
 
 often difficult to discover what should be attributed 
 
 Herodot. to each. Upon the present occcasion the symptoms 
 
 were very favourable'; which would perhaps commonly 
 
 happen when measures were already resolved upon. 
 
 c. 19. &28. At Eleusis the combined army was joined by the 
 
 J. n. c! C 30. Athenian forces, to the chief command of which Aris- 
 
 Aristid tides had been raised, by a particular decree of the 
 
 people, marking the prevalence of the aristocratical 
 
 interests. Sacrifices were there repeated, and the 
 
 symptoms of the victims were again favourable. The 
 
 army therefore proceeded with confidence into Bceotia, 
 
 and took a position at the foot of mount Cithaeron, 
 
 opposite to the camp of the Persians, the river Asopus 
 
 flowing between them. 
 
 Mardonius had judiciously left the passage of the 
 mountains uninterrupted to the Grecian troops ; his 
 business being to draw them into the champaign 
 country, where, through his cavalry, on which then 
 as at this day was the principal reliance of Asiatic 
 armies, victory would be nearly certain to him, and 
 Herodot. probably easy. But Pausanias would not move from 
 1.9. c.20. j^ advantageous ground ; and his position was so 
 strong that an attempt to force it could not prudently 
 be ventured. Mardonius therefore, whose numbers, 
 in a confined territory, made early decision necessary, 
 ordered Masistius, his general of the cavalry, to ad- 
 vance with all the horse, and, by harassing in various
 
 CAMPAIGN IN BCEOTIA. 101 
 
 parts, to make the Greeks uneasy in their situation ; SECT. 
 not neglecting at the same time, if he could find or 
 create opportunity, to attempt an impression. The 
 Persian cavalry all used missile weapons, darts or ar- 
 rows, or both ; a practice by which, more than four 
 centuries after, they destroyed the Roman army under 
 Crassus, and in which the horsemen of the same coun- 
 tries are wonderfully skilful at this day. Like the 
 eastern cavalry at this day also, they commonly at- 
 tacked or harassed by small bodies in succession ; 
 vehement in onset, never long in conflict, but, if the 
 enemy was firm in resistance, retreating hastily, still 
 to prepare for another charge. 
 
 The Megarian camp was in the part of the Grecian 
 
 line the most accessible to cavalry. Hither there- p^y 2 
 fore Masistius directed his principal efforts. The Arist - 
 Megarians, somewhat surprised at the novel manner 
 of the attack, nevertheless maintained their station. 
 Wearied however at length by the unceasing suc- 
 cession of fresh troops, all of whom approached just 
 enough to give opprobrious language, and discharge 
 their darts and arrows, after which they instantly re- 
 tired, the Megarian leaders sent to inform Pausanias 
 of their distress, adding that they must abandon their 
 post if not quickly relieved. Pausanias himself was 
 at a loss how effectually to oppose those desultory 
 attacks of the Persian cavalry. He assembled the 
 generals for advice, and expressed his wish that vo- 
 lunteers could be found to undertake a business so 
 new to him that he was unwilling to risk orders upon 
 it. The Athenians alone offered themselves. Aris- 
 tides had had the advantage of serving in a high com- 
 mand under the great Miltiades at the battle of 
 Marathon. Upon the present occasion he selected pi u t, v . 
 an active officer named Olympiodorus, under whose Arist 
 
 H 3
 
 102 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 Herod. & orders he placed three hundred chosen heavy-armed 
 sup ' foot, with a large proportion of bowmen and dartmen. 
 These seem to have been, in the Athenian armies, 
 superior to the light troops of the Peloponnesians, 
 and probably also to those of the Megarians ; who, 
 being a Dorian people from Peloponnesus, would 
 pride themselves upon adhering to the Peloponnesian 
 discipline, that of the phalanx, heavy-armed, in which 
 the Peloponnesians had an allowed superiority. Olym- 
 piodorus hastened to the relief of the pressed part 
 of the line. The Persian horse, who, by the swift- 
 ness of their retreat, eluded every effort of the 
 Megarian heavy-armed foot, found themselves un- 
 expectedly incommoded by the Athenian bowmen. 
 Charging to disperse them, they were received by 
 the supporting heavy-armed foot, upon whom they 
 could make no impression, but suffered in the attempt. 
 Masistius, vexed to be thus baffled, and anxious to 
 recover an advantage from which he had promised 
 himself credit, advanced to direct and encourage those 
 desultory attacks, so harassing to regular infantry. 
 In the instant of a charge, his horse, wounded with 
 an arrow, reared upright, and he fell. His troops, 
 attentive to their usual evolution, without adverting 
 to their general's misfortune, wheeled and retreated 
 at full speed. The Athenian heavy-armed foot, rush- 
 ing forward, overpowered the few remaining about 
 Masistius. His horse was caught and led off by the 
 Greeks. Himself, lying on the ground, after the ex- 
 cellence of his armour, said to have been complete like 
 that of the knights of western Europe in the times of 
 chivalry, had resisted many efforts of the Athenian 
 soldiers, was at length pierced in the eye by a javelin, 
 which penetrated to the brain. The Persian cavalry 
 halting at their usual distance from the enemy, waited
 
 CAMPAIGN IN B(EOTIA. 103 
 
 in vain for fresh orders. Perceiving then their loss, SECT. 
 the whole body prepared to charge together, to re- 
 venge their slain general, or at least to recover the 
 body. Olympiodorus, expecting this, had sent for 
 succour ; but the Persians made their charge before 
 any sufficient reinforcement could arrive, and the 
 Athenians were obliged to retire for more advan- 
 tageous ground. Assistance however was not de- 
 layed. The Grecian foot charged the Persian horse, 
 put them to flight, and recovered their prize. The 
 cavalry stood again at the distance of about a quar- 
 ter of a mile ; but, after some consultation among 
 the principal surviving officers, retreated to their 
 camp. 
 
 Masistius was a man very high both in rank and 
 in esteem among the Persians, and, as Herodotus in- 
 
 dicates, next in command to Mardonius. His death l ' 9 ' 
 was therefore lamented in their camp, with all the 
 pomp of public mourning, and every honourable testi- 
 mony of general grief. The event was, on the c.25. 
 other hand, not a little encouraging to the Greeks. 
 The leaders derived just confidence from the ex- 
 perience that the formidable cavalry of the East 
 could be resisted ; and the body of the slain gene- 
 ral, borne on a carriage through the whole camp, 
 however in itself a melancholy object, was, in this 
 season, an animating spectacle to the soldiers. It 
 was now determined to quit the present ground, 
 which, though otherwise advantageous, had been 
 found inconvenient from scarcity of water, (for the 
 decided superiority of the enemy's cavalry made it 
 difficult to water from the Asopus,) and to venture 
 to a lower situation, within the Plataean territory, 
 near the Gargaphian fountain. In their march from 9 Sept. 
 Erythrae they held the mountain-ridge by Hysiae, but 
 
 H 4
 
 104 
 
 CHAP. 
 IX. 
 
 Herodot. 
 1.9. c.25, 
 26. 
 
 c.27. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 the ground of encampment consisted of* gentle emi- 
 nences only. 
 
 In this situation, nothing forbidding, the troops 
 of every Grecian state claimed their accustomed post 
 in the line. The Lacedaemonians, having been long 
 the leading people of Greece, had the right as their 
 acknowledged privilege. The Athenians, unquestion- 
 ably next in consequence, thought themselves entitled 
 to the second rank ; but having never acted in any 
 large body with Peloponnesian armies, no custom had 
 established their degree of precedency. The Tegeans 
 therefore claimed the left of the line, as their post 
 by ancient prescription. The dispute was brought 
 before a meeting of the officers of the army. The 
 Tegeans urged their claim in a studied oration, sup- 
 porting it by a long detail of the great actions of their 
 ancestors. Aristides answered for the Athenians. 8 
 
 * We understand,' he said, * that we came hither not 
 
 * to harangue, but to fight. Otherwise, were we dis- 
 ' posed to boast of the deeds in arms of our ancestors, 
 
 * we could go as far into antiquity as the Arcadians, 
 ' and perhaps find more honourable testimonies in 
 ' our favour. For what has passed in our own times 
 
 * we need only mention Marathon. But we think it 
 ' highly unbecoming, in a moment like the present, 
 
 * to be disputing about precedency. We are ready 
 
 * to obey you, Lacedemonians, wheresoever, and next 
 
 * to whomsoever you think it for the common advan- 
 
 * tage to place us. Wherever our station may be 
 ' appointed, we shall endeavour to act as becomes us 
 
 * in the common cause of Greece. Command there- 
 
 * fore, and depend upon our obedience.' The La- 
 
 8 Herodotus, in relating this transaction, speaks of the 
 Athenians in general, without naming any one : Plutarch at- 
 tributes all to Aristides, and, though too often careless of 
 authority, probably here on good ground.
 
 CONFEDERATE FORCES. 105 
 
 cedaemonians without hesitation and with one voice SECT. 
 
 exclaimed, * The Athenians ought to have the post m 
 
 ' of honour in preference to the Arcadians/ Herodot. 
 
 The army was then disposed in the following order : 1<9 ' c ' 28 ' 
 five thousand Spartans of the city held the first place 
 on the right, attended each by seven light-armed 
 Helots, thus making a body of forty thousand men : 
 then five thousand Lacedaemonians of the other towns 
 of Laconia, attended each- by one Helot : so that, ac- 
 cording to the historian, the whole Lacedaemonian c.29. 
 force was fifty thousand. Next to these were the 
 Tegeans, in number fifteen hundred : then five thou- 
 sand Corinthians, three hundred Potidaeans from Pal- 
 lene, six hundred Orchomenians of Arcadia, three 
 thousand Sicyonians, eight hundred Epidaurians, one 
 thousand Troezenians, two hnndred Lepreats, four 
 hundred Mycenaeans and Tirynthians, one thousand 
 Phliasians, three hundred Hermionians, six hundred 
 Eretrians and Styrians, four hundred Chalcidians, 
 five hundred Ambraciots, eight hundred Leucadians 
 and Anactorians, two hundred Paleans of Cephal- 
 lenia, five hundred ^ginetans, three thousand Me- 
 garians, six hundred Plataeans. The Athenians were 
 eight thousand, holding the extreme of the left wing. 
 Thus the heavy-armed foot were thirty-eight thou- 
 sand seven hundred. But every Spartan of the city 
 having seven attending Helots, every other Lace- 
 daemonian one, and the slaves attending the other 
 Greeks, and acting as light-armed soldiers, being, 
 according to Herodotus, nearly in the proportion of U9. c.29, 
 one to every heavy-armed soldier, the light-armed 
 would be, in all, sixty-nine thousand five hundred, 
 and the total number of fighting men 9 a hundred and 
 
 fA.awiA.uv. There were perhaps other slaves who did 
 not bear arms, and there might be light-armed soldiers who
 
 CHAP. 
 IX. 
 
 Herodot. 
 1.9. c.31. 
 &.40. 
 
 106 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 eight thousand two hundred. There were besides 
 eighteen hundred Thespians, not regularly armed, 
 who would make the whole a hundred and ten thou- 
 sand. Herodotus mentions no horse in the Grecian 
 army; probably because the force was inconsiderable, 
 and utterly incompetent to face the numerous and 
 excellent cavalry of Persia. 
 
 As soon as it was known that the Greeks had filed 
 off toward Plataea, Mardonius also moved and en- 
 camped over against them, keeping still the Asopus 
 in his front. Herodotus supposes his army to have 
 consisted now of three hundred and fifty thousand 
 fighting men ; of whom, including Macedonians, 
 
 c. 31. fifty thousand were Greeks ; but, he says, the number 
 was never exactly ascertained. With regard to the 
 others also he has omitted to deduct those probably 
 lost in the march of Artabazus and in winter-quarters, 
 together with the sick, besides those, by his own ac- 
 count, destroyed at the siege of Potidaga. The report 
 
 Com. Nep. of Cornelius Nepos thus seems likely to have been 
 
 v Arist. 
 
 nearer the truth, making the infantry two hundred 
 thousand, and the horse twenty thousand. But these, 
 being all chosen troops, would not require less than 
 the usual proportion of attendants on Asiatic armies. 
 Among the Greeks, under the Persian banners, a 
 thousand Phocians followed with extreme reluctance ; 
 while their fellow-countrymen, who had taken refuge 
 among the fastnesses of Parnassus, were, with all the 
 activity that the zeal of revenge and the lust of 
 plunder united could excite, continually harassing 
 the outskirts of the army. 
 
 Mardonius, as well as Pausanias, had an Elean 
 prophet in his pay. Herodotus affirms that he even 
 
 were not slaves. Such apparently the Thespians were. On 
 this subject the note 4-9. p. 706. of Wesseling's Herodotus may 
 deserve attention. 
 
 Herodot. 
 ut ant. 
 
 Herod. 1.9. 
 c. 37, 38.
 
 CAMPAIGN IN BCEOTIA. 107 
 
 solicitously consulted Grecian oracles concerning the SECT. 
 event of the war; and gives a very detailed account 
 of his application to the prophetical cavern of Tro- 
 phonius at Lebadea in Bceotia. Possibly he may have 
 judged well in thinking it advantageous to propa- 
 gate among the Greeks, both his auxiliaries and his 
 enemies, the belief that their own gods favoured the 
 Persian cause, and more especially as the Greeks 
 under his command had their particular prophet, 
 whose predictions might be inconvenient to him, and 
 against whom a Grecian prophet, under his own 
 influence, might be useful. For himself, it is utterly 
 unlikely that he would pay any regard to the oracles 
 of deities, the belief in whom the religion of his 
 country taught him to despise and abhor. The Gre- 
 cian prophets however in both armies, on inspection 
 of the sacrificed victims, foretold victory to their own, 
 provided it received the attack. These prophecies, 
 if dictated by policy, appear on both sides judicious. 10 
 For the Greeks had only to keep their advantageous 
 ground, while the vast camp of their enemy consumed 
 its magazines, and they would have the benefit of 
 victory without risk. To the Persians also the same 
 predictions might be useful ; to account to the sol- 
 dier for the inaction of his general before an army so 
 
 10 If the simple Herodotus sometimes tires with reiterated 
 details of the superstition of his age, yet the philosophical 
 Plutarch is far more disgusting. Herodotus, drawing his pic- 
 tures from the life, is often informing, and never fails to be 
 in some degree amusing. It may be indeed sometimes difficult 
 to judge what he believed himself; and often it may be desired 
 in vain to discover how far the real belief of statesmen and 
 generals has operated, and where their policy only has made 
 use of the credulity of the vulgar. Here assistance might be 
 expected from the philosopher of an enlightened age, but he is 
 wholly disappointing.
 
 108 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, inferior, and to keep him quiet under sufferings from 
 scarcity and probably badness of provisions, together 
 with the want of many things to which Asiatics were 
 accustomed, while the means were sought to entice or 
 force the Greeks from their position. Eight days 
 passed without any material attempt on either side. 
 
 Herodot. But, during this pause, Mardonius obtained exact 
 information of the defiles of mount Cithreron, through 
 which the Grecian army received its supplies. On 
 
 17 Sept. the evening of the ninth day a large body of horse 
 marched. Just where the defile meets the plain they 
 fell in with a convoy. They killed men and cattle 
 till sated with slaughter, and drove the remainder to 
 their own camp. Two days then again passed without 
 any considerable event, neither army venturing to 
 pass the Asopus ; but the Persian horse, in detached 
 bodies, were unceasingly harassing the Greeks. 
 
 Whether the Grecian soothsayer in the Persian 
 general's pay was really intractable, or whether only 
 the historian's zeal for the credit of the religion of 
 his country induced him to propagate, and perhaps 
 believe, the report, Mardonius, we are told, at length 
 determined to disregard the Grecian prognostics, 
 which forbade attack, and to follow the laws and cus- 
 toms of the Persians alone in engaging the enemy. 
 
 Herodot. The conduct however, which Herodotus attributes 
 to him upon this occasion, shows both the general 
 
 20 Sept. and the politician. Having summoned the principal 
 Grecian officers of his army, he asked if they knew 
 of any oracle declaring that a Persian army should 
 perish in Greece. Report of such an oracle, it seems, 
 had been circulated, but none would own they knew 
 of any such. ' Then,' said Mardonius, ' I will tell 
 * you that I well know an oracle has foretold the 
 ' destruction of a Persian army that shall plunder the
 
 CAMPAIGN IN BCEOTIA. 10Q 
 
 c temple of Delphi. Be however assured that the SECT. 
 ' army under my orders shall never violate that 
 
 * temple. The Greeks therefore, allies of the Per- 
 * sians, may proceed, confident of the favour of their 
 
 * gods, and of victory.' He then declared his intention 
 to attack the confederates on the next day, and di- 
 rected to prepare accordingly. As the historian had 
 conversed with Boeotians of rank who served under Herodot. 
 Mardonius, the account of this transaction, in itself 
 probable, might come to him well authenticated. 
 
 Among those of Grecian race now subjects of the 
 Persian empire, Alexander king of Macedonia, from 
 an independent sovereign become the follower of a 
 Persian general, would not naturally be the most 
 satisfied with his new situation. Revolving in his 
 mind the possible consequences of the approaching 
 day, he could not rest. At midnight he mounted his c. 44, 45. 
 horse, rode to the Athenian line, and demanded to 
 speak with the general. Aristides, informed that an 
 unknown person on horseback from the Persian camp, 
 and apparently of rank, demanded to speak with him, 
 assembled some of his principal officers, and went 
 with them to the place. The king of Macedonia told 
 them, ' that Mardonius had determined to attack the 
 
 * Grecian camp next morning, and had given his 
 ' orders for the purpose. Should anything neverthe- 
 
 * less prevent the attack from taking place, he advised 
 
 * that the Grecian generals should persevere in hold- 
 
 * ing their present situation, for the deficiency of the 
 
 * magazines would soon compel the Persians to retire. 
 
 * His affection for the Greek nation in general, and 
 ' his particular regard for the Athenian people, had 
 
 * induced him to hazard the very dangerous measure 
 
 * in which they saw him engaged. He need not 
 
 * therefore, he was sure, request from them that
 
 110 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. * secrecy which his safety required ; but, on the con- 
 
 * trary, should the war at last have a favourable issue 
 1 for them, he trusted that his known inclination for 
 
 * the Grecian cause, and more especially his service 
 ' of that night, would be remembered, when Greece, 
 ' being free, might assist Macedonia in recovering 
 < independency. * Alexander hastened back to his 
 
 Herodot. own camp ; Aristides immediately went to Pausanias 
 with the intelligence he had received. 
 
 On the arrival of the Athenian general at the 
 Commander-in-chief's tent, the important consultation 
 was entered upon, in what manner to resist the attack, 
 expected in a few hours, which was to decide the 
 fate of Greece. It had been observed that the native 
 Persians, esteemed far superior to the other Asiatic 
 infantry, held the left of the enemy's line, against 
 the Lacedaemonians, and the Greeks in the Persian 
 service the right, against the Athenians. Pausanias 
 proposed a change in the order of the Grecian army; 
 that the Athenians, who alone of the confederates 
 had any experience of action with the Persians, and 
 who were elate, not only with the memory of their 
 great victory at Marathon, but also with the event 
 of their recent engagement with the cavalry, should 
 move to the right wing, and that the Lacedaemonians, 
 long accustomed to be superior to all the Greeks, 
 should take the left. Aristides readily consented, and 
 orders were given accordingly. 
 
 21 Sept. Day broke, and the Persian generals observed the 
 
 i H 9c47. Grecian troops in motion. This unexpected circum- 
 P^-.Y- stance induced them to defer the intended attack. 
 
 Anstul. 
 
 Change in their own disposition might become ne- 
 cessary ; changes were made ; the day was consumed 
 in evolutions of both armies, and the Persian infantry 
 never came into action. But the cavalry harassed
 
 CAMPAIGN IN BfEOTIA. Ill 
 
 unceasingly the more accessible parts of the Grecian Herodot. 
 line. Generally they did no more than discharge piut.v. 49 ' 
 their bows, and hastily retire ; thus however keeping Aristid - 
 a constant alarm, and, while they inflicted many 
 wounds, receiving little injury. But a more serious 
 attack was made upon that part of the Lacedaemonian 
 line which guarded the Gargaphian fountain : there 
 the Persian horse remained masters of the field. 
 
 Night put an end to this desultory kind of action, Herodot. 
 when, after a day of unremitted fatigue 11 , the Gre- ' ' c ' 50 ' 
 cian army was without water. Provisions also began 
 to fail, the activity of the Persian horse intercepting 
 supplies. To move therefore was indispensable. At 
 little more than a mile from the Gargaphian fountain, c.si. 
 toward Plataea, the waters of the Asopus, in their Arfstid. 
 descent from mount Cithseron, formed an island, 
 not half a mile wide. This spot, for the sake of water, 
 it was determined to occupy. At the same time it 
 was resolved to send half the army to the mountains, 
 to bring in a convoy of provisions which waited there, 
 not daring to stir beyond the defiles. But it was 
 feared to attempt a movement in the plain, in pre- 
 sence of the Persian horse, which in the very camp 
 had given such annoyance. The second watch of the 
 night was therefore the time appointed for the march. 
 But when, danger pressing, fear ran high, the troops 
 of each independent state little regarded the orders 
 of the commander-in-chief. The Tegeans steadily Herodot. 
 observed the motions of the Lacedaemonians, and the i^Jfcta. 
 Platasans those of the Athenians ; but the rest, P-} 07 - 
 instead of halting at the island, fled (for that is the piut. v. 
 term used by Herodotus, and confirmed even by 
 Plutarch) as far as the temple of Juno, under the 
 
 11 Ketvyv pev Tyv ypefyv itacrav Trpoavcet/Ae'vij; T^I; JW-ou, f%ov vovov 
 
 . Herodot. 1. 9. c. 52.
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, walls of Plataea, at the distance of two miles and a 
 
 half from the Gargaphian fountain. 
 
 Herod. 1.9. The obstinacy of a Spartan officer, from which 
 Piut'y 54 on ty unfortunate consequences could be reasonably 
 Aristid. expected, led immediately to the great and most 
 important victory which followed. Amompharetus, 
 whose military rank was that of locage, but who was 
 besides vested with the sacred dignity of priesthood, 
 urging the laws of his country against his general's 
 orders, absolutely refused to retreat. Pausanias, in- 
 censed at this disobedience, yet, as the circumstance 
 was altogether new in the Spartan service, at a loss 
 how to act, detained the Lacedaemonian forces while 
 the others were pressing their march. But the 
 Athenian general, ever attentive to the interest of 
 the confederacy at large, before he would suffer his 
 own troops to move, sent to inquire the cause of the 
 delay of which he was informed among the Lacedae- 
 Herodot. monians. The officer dispatched upon this occasion 
 Piut. C v. found the commander-in-chief in high altercation 
 Anstid. with Amompharetus ; who at the instant of the 
 Athenian's arrival, taking up a large stone in both 
 his hands, in allusion to the Grecian mode of voting, 
 by casting a shell, a pebble, or a die into an urn, 
 threw it before his general's feet, saying, * With this 
 * die I give my vote not to fly from the strangers : ' 
 for by that gentle term the Lacedaemonians usually 
 distinguished foreigners, whom the other Greeks 
 called barbarians. Pausanias desired the Athenian 
 officer to report to his immediate commander what 
 he had seen, and to request that the motions of the 
 Athenian troops might be directed by what should 
 be observed of the Lacedaemonian. At length, day 
 Herodot. breaking, he gave his orders for the Lacedaemonians 
 with the Tegeans, who alone of the other confederates
 
 CAMPAIGN IN BCEOTIA. 113 
 
 remained with him, to move toward the proposed SECT. 
 ground of encampment. They directed their march 
 along the hills ; the Athenians only ventured in the 
 plain. Then at last Amompharetus, yielding some- 
 thing of his obstinacy, ordered his lochus, with a slow 
 pace, to follow the rest of the army. 
 
 The dawn again discovered to the Persians the 22nd Sept. 
 Grecian army in unexpected motion. The horse, 1.9. c . 57. 
 always alert, and now elated with the success of the 
 preceding day, was quickly upon the Lacedaemonian 
 rear. The movement of the Greeks being taken for c. 58. 
 flight, Mardonius led the Persian infantry in pursuit. 
 The whole army followed, with great haste, and not c. 59. 
 without somewhat of the confusion of an ill-dis- 
 ciplined multitude, eager to share in certain victory. 
 The Grecian general had not been immediately 
 aware of the cowardly disobedience of that large part 
 of his forces which had pushed on beyond the ground 
 intended to be occupied. It was now advisable, if 
 possible to join them ; but the Persian horse so c.eo. 
 annoyed his rear, with desultory attacks continually 
 reiterated, that it became necessary to make a stand. 
 He sent therefore to inform the Athenian general of 
 all circumstances, and to request his immediate co- 
 operation in an effort to repel the enemy's cavalry. 
 Aristides readily consented ; but, before he could join C.GI. 
 the Lacedaemonians, the Grecian troops in the Per- 
 sian service were upon him, and he had himself to 
 contend with superior numbers. The Lacedaemonians 
 and Tegeans however of themselves formed a con- 
 siderable army* They were above eleven thousand 
 heavy-armed foot, attended by more than forty thou- 
 sand light-armed slaves. But the light-armed of the 
 Peloponnesians were of so little estimation that, 
 notwithstanding their numbers, Pausanias had par- 
 
 VOL. II. I
 
 114r HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, ticularly desired a reinforcement of Athenian bow- 
 
 ^ men. The ground however, consisting of the rugged 
 
 roots of mount Cithaeron, with the Asopus flowing at 
 the bottom, was favourable for defence, and adverse to 
 the action of cavalry. The Persian infantry was there- 
 
 Herodot. fore brought up ; and a fierce engagement ensued. 
 
 & seq. The Persians, after discharging their missile weapons, 
 closed upon the Greeks, and showed themselves, 
 says the impartial historian, neither in strength nor 
 in courage inferior. 12 But they were very inferior in 
 arms for close fight, and not less so in practice and 
 in science. With their undefended bodies and short 
 weapons they nevertheless made vigorous assaults, 
 many of them seizing and even breaking the long 
 spears of the Greeks. Unacquainted with that ex- 
 actness of close formation and that steady march, in 
 which the Greeks, and especially the Lacedaemonians, 
 excelled, they rushed forward singly, or in very small 
 bodies, and perished in vain attempts to penetrate the 
 Spartan phalanx. As their efforts at length, through 
 repeated failure, began to relax, the Greeks advanced 
 upon them. The Tegeans, according to Herodotus, 
 made the first impression ; the Lacedaemonians then 
 pushed forward, and confusion soon became general 
 among the Persian infantry. 
 
 Mardonius, who, a little before, had thought him- 
 self pursuing an enemy neither able nor daring to 
 withstand him, was seized with the deepest anguish 
 on finding victory thus turning against him. Had 
 he instantly determined upon retreat, he might pro- 
 bably still have avoided any considerable loss ; for 
 his infantry would soon have been safe in the plain, 
 
 12 To the same purpose also even Plutarch speaks : Uspa-uv 
 
 jroXXot? . . . owe airpaKTui; ovSe aOvpux; iciitrovrat;. Vit. Aristid. And 
 
 at least as much is implied by Plato, Laches, p. 191. t. 2.
 
 BATTLE OF PLAT^EA. 115 
 
 under the protection of his numerous cavalry. But SECT. 
 possibly signal and speedy success was indispensable 
 to him. His fortune, perhaps his life, and the lot Herod, i.e. 
 of all his family, might depend upon it: less however c -"- &10 - 
 through the caprice of the prince than that of the 
 people; always most dangerous under a despotic go- < 
 vernment, which, as Aristotle has well observed, is Arist. Poiit. 
 congenial with that of universal suffrage. His army 
 was too numerous to subsist long in a narrow and 
 mountainous country, without supplies by sea. The 
 necessity of decision therefore urging, in the crisis 
 before him, he determined to rest all upon the for- 
 tune of the present moment. At the head of a 
 chosen body of cavalry, he hastened to rally and sup- 
 port his broken infantry. By a vigorous and well- 
 conducted charge, notwithstanding the disadvantage 
 of the ground, he checked the progress of the Spartan 
 phalanx : but he could not break that firm and well- 
 disciplined body. In his efforts, after some of his 
 bravest officers and many of his soldiers had been 
 killed, he received himself a mortal wound. His 
 fall then was the signal for instant flight to those 
 about him, and through them to his whole army. 
 For in Asiatic armies, the jealousy of despotism being 
 adverse to that close succession of various ranks in 
 command which, in the European, contributes so 
 much to the preservation of order in all events, the 
 death of the commander-in-chief can scarcely fail to 
 superinduce complete confusion, and the certain ruin 
 of the enterprise. Artabazus, next in command to 
 Mardonius, is said not only to have differed in opinion 
 from his general in regard to the mode of conducting 
 the war, but to have disapproved of the war itself. 
 It does not appear that he was at all engaged in the 
 
 i 2
 
 116 
 
 CHAP. 
 IX. 
 
 Herodot. 
 1.9. c.67. 
 Plut. v. 
 Aristid. 
 
 Herodot. 
 1.9. c.68. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 battle. l3 As soon as he was assured of the rout of 
 , the Persian infantry, leaving the rest of the army to 
 any who would take charge of it, he retreated with 
 forty thousand men, who had been under his imme- 
 diate orders, hastily towards Phocis. 
 
 While the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans were thus 
 unexpectedly victorious upon the hills, the Athenians 
 were sharply engaged with the Boeotians in the plain 
 below. The greater part of the other Greeks in the 
 Persian service, little earnest in the cause, kept aloof. 
 The abilities of Aristides therefore, and the valour 
 of the Athenians, not exposed to a contest too un- 
 equal, at length prevailed. The Boeotians fled toward 
 Thebes. The rest, prepared to act according to 
 circumstances, made a timely retreat. The crowd 
 of Asiatics, of various nations, dreading the charge 
 of the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans, fled profusely 
 on the first appearance of flight among those bands 
 of native Persians who had borne the brunt of the 
 battle. The horse however, both Persian and Boeo- 
 tian, still kept the field, and gave considerable pro- 
 tection to the fugitive infantry. 
 
 13 Rollin, though he sometimes mistakes the Greek military 
 writers, as Thucydides and Xenophon, on subjects merely mili- 
 tary, is otherwise, in this early part of Grecian history, generally 
 exact ; but I know not where he learnt that Artabazus distin- 
 guished himself by his gallant exertion in this battle. Herodotus 
 mentions on a prior occasion*, that Artabazus got credit for his 
 conduct in the business of Plataea ; apparently for his counsel 
 given before the battle, which was justified by the event; and 
 for an able retreat, by which alone any part of the army was 
 saved ; but neither Herodotus nor Diodorus nor Plutarch, in 
 describing the battle, mention that he was at all engaged. Dio- 
 dorus gives an account of his retreat exactly corresponding with 
 that of Herodotus. 
 
 * 1.9. C.41.&66. 

 
 BATTLE OF PLAT^A. 117 
 
 Intelligence had quickly passed to the Greeks Herodot. 
 under the walls of Plataea, that the Lacedaemonians ' ' c ' ' 
 and Tegeans were engaged and successful. Anxious 
 then to repair their shameful misconduct, with that 
 usual unhappiness of error which leads to farther 
 error, they advanced with more haste than good order 
 toward the field of battle ; and the Megarians and 
 Phliasians, venturing by the plain, were attacked by 
 the Theban horse, who killed six hundred, and drove 
 the rest to the mountains. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians and Tegeans meanwhile, ani- c. 70. 
 mated by unexpected success, yet steady through 
 
 practised discipline, repelling all the efforts of the ^g^ 8 ^' 
 Persian cavalry, pressed on to the fortified camp, 
 the refuge of the greatest part of the routed troops, 
 and the depositary of all the valuables of the army. 
 Immediately they attempted an assault ; but the La- 
 cedaemonians, as remarkable for ignorance of sieges 
 as for skill in the field, were baffled with loss till the 
 Athenian forces arrived. Under the direction of the 
 Athenian officers, after vigorous efforts on both sides, 
 an assault succeeded. A horrid slaughter ensued. 
 The victory indeed of a free people, fighting for their 
 possessions, their families, and their independency, 
 against foreign invaders, is never likely to be mild. 
 Of near two hundred thousand Asiatics, the lowest 
 reported numbers of the Persian army, only three 
 thousand, exclusively of those who retreated under 
 Artabazus, are said to have survived. Both Hero-* 
 dotus and Plutarch however avoid all detail of this 
 massacre. How much of it happened within the 
 fortified camp, and what execution was done on 
 fugitives over a country so surrounded by seas and 
 mountains that it would be difficult for one to escape, 
 information at all approaching to exactness is indeed 
 not to be expected. 
 
 i 3
 
 118 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. When opposition ceased within the Persians lines, 
 
 and the spirit of slaughter was at length sated, the 
 
 rich plunder of the camp drew the attention of the 
 conquerors. Here the wealth of the lords of Asia 
 displayed a scene so new to the citizens of the little 
 Grecian republics that they were at a loss on what 
 
 Herodot. objects in preference to fix their avidity. The Te- 
 geans however, who had first surmounted the ram- 
 part, and throughout the action had well supported 
 their pretension to precedency among the Greeks, 
 having the fortune also to arrive first at the mag- 
 nificent pavilion of Mardonius, did not hesitate to 
 stop there. Instantly they laid their rapacious hands 
 upon all its rich contents, great part of which had 
 been the furniture of Xerxes himself, which, on his 
 hasty departure for Asia, he had presented to his 
 general and brother-in-law. But they were not per- 
 mitted entirely to enjoy this precedency in pillage. 
 
 ibid. The commander-in-chief quickly issued orders, That 
 none should presume to appropriate any part of the 
 booty, but that the whole should be collected, to be 
 fairly divided among those who had together earned 
 it. A brazen manger only, of very curious workman- 
 ship, the Tegeans were allowed to retain, as an ho- 
 norary testimony to their particular valour arid for- 
 tune. The Helots attending the Lacedemonian forces 
 were ordered to collect the rest. Tents and their 
 furniture, adorned with gold and silver, collars, 
 bracelets, hilts of cimeters, golden cups, and various 
 other utensils of gold and silver, together with horses, 
 camels, and women, were the principal spoil. Rich 
 clothes in abundance, which at another time, says the 
 historian, would have been thought valuable plunder, 
 were now disregarded. But the vigilance of those 
 appointed to superintend the business did not suffice 
 to prevent the Helots from concealing many thing
 
 PAUSANIAS ENTERTAINS HIS OFFICERS. 119 
 
 of value, which they sold, principally to the ./Egine- SECT. 
 tans ; a nation (if we may so call the inhabitants of 
 a rock) of merchant-pirates, who, by this unworthy 
 traffic, acquired riches before unknown among them. 
 
 The booty being collected, a tenth was set apart, Herodot. 
 according to the customary piety of the Greeks, for Diod^'sic.' 
 an offering to the gods. From the produce of this, 1>1L c<33< 
 continues the contemporary historian, was dedicated 
 to the god at Delphi the golden tripod which stands 
 upon the three-headed brazen serpent next the altar, 
 the brazen statue of Jupiter at Olympia, ten cubits 
 high, and the brazen statue of Neptune, seven cubits 
 high, at the isthmus. The Tegeans dedicated their 
 manger at Tegea in the temple of the Alean Minerva. 
 To attribute to them a modesty becoming their valour, 
 and which had profited from reproof, we might desire 
 to interpret the goddess's title, from analogy in a 
 language derived from the Arcadian, to signify, That 
 divine wisdom which directs what human ignorance 
 calls Chance. The rest of the spoil was divided 
 among those who had fought for it. 
 
 Among the anecdotes transmitted concerning this Herodot. 
 
 . 1 9 c 82 
 
 great event, one, related by the original historian, 
 has been particularly celebrated. The appendages 
 of the royal household were found in Mardonius's 
 tent, nearly entire ; and most of the domestic slaves 
 had escaped the massacre. Pausanias, after admiring 
 the various riches of the scene and the many con- 
 trivances of luxury, ordered a supper to be prepared 
 by the Persian slaves, exactly as it would have been 
 for Mardonius, had he been living and in his com- 
 mand. The orders were diligently executed : the 
 splendid furniture was arranged ; the sideboard dis- 
 played a profusion of gold and silver plate ; the table 
 was covered with exquisite elegance. Pausanias then 
 
 I 4
 
 120 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, directed his usual Spartan supper to be placed by the 
 ' side of this sumptuous entertainment. Little pre- 
 paration was necessary. Then sending for the prin- 
 cipal Grecian officers, * I have desired your company 
 
 * here/ he said, * to show you the folly of the Persian 
 
 * general. Living as you see at home, he came thus 
 
 * far to take from us such a miserable pittance as 
 
 * ours/ 
 
 Herodot. The Mantineans had arrived from Plataea presently 
 after the storming of the camp. Vexed to have lost 
 their share of glory and reward, both so extraordinary, 
 they marched immediately, contrary to the inclin- 
 ation of Pausanias, in pursuit of Artabazus. Having 
 reached the borders of Thessaly however, they re- 
 turned without effecting anything. Presently after 
 them the Eleans had arrived. The generals of both, 
 on their return to their respective countries, were 
 punished with banishment. 
 
 c.85. After the collection of the spoil, the next care of 
 
 the Greeks, and what upon all occasions they esteemed 
 a necessary and sacred office, was the burial of their 
 slain. The Lacedaemonians formed three separate 
 burial-places ; one for those who had borne sacred 
 offices 14 , of whom the gallant Amompharetus had 
 fallen ; another for the other Lacedaemonians; and 
 
 14 This obvious interpretation of the term *'/>ea?, which stands 
 in all the editions of Herodotus, does not appear to me loaded 
 with any difficulty. I wish to avoid discussion of matters which 
 lie within the proper province of the critic or the antiquarian 
 father than of the historian ; yet I must own 'that I think the 
 ingenious conjectures of Valckenarius and others upon this pas- 
 sage, stated in the notes of Wesseling's edition, all more open 
 to objection than the old reading. [The reading now adopted 
 by Schweighaeuser and others is Iffva.^. In his Lexicon Hero- 
 doteum it is thus explained : ' 'Ipyv, (sive Elpyv,) evo^ o, Ado- 
 ' lescens, Juvenis, Lacedaemoniorum sermone.'j
 
 BURIAL OF THE SLAIN. 12 
 
 the third for the Helots. Herodotus relates a re- SECT. 
 markable instance of the severity of their maxims of 
 discipline at this time. Aristodemus, who in the 
 preceding year had been disgraced for not taking his 
 share in the action at Thermopylae, distinguished 
 himself beyond all others in the battle of Platea, 
 and was at length slain. The merit of his behaviour 
 was acknowledged ; but it was admitted only as suf- 
 ficient, in his circumstances, to obviate infamy, and 
 not to earn honour. The historian however, with 
 the inclination, has not wanted the power, to bestow 
 on him more liberal reward ; and the eulogy of He- 
 rodotus will transmit the name of Aristodemus with 
 glory probably to the latest generations. The Athe- 
 nians, Tegeans, Megarians, and Phliasians had each 
 a single burying-place. Barrows, raised according 
 to that extensive practice of antiquity which occasion 
 has occurred already to notice, distinguished to fol- 
 lowing ages the several spots. 15 
 
 15 Plutarch in his Life of Aristides expresses wonder, and 
 in his Treatise against Herodotus much indignation, at the 
 assertion that the Lacedaemonians, Tegeans, and Athenians alone 
 gained the victory of Plataea ; yet in the former work, relating, 
 much in the same manner as Herodotus, the disorderly flight 
 of the other Greeks before the battle, he has given no indirect 
 testimony of the fact. Lysias, in his funeral oration, asserts it 
 positively. (Lys. Or. Fun. p. 107. vel 195.) It is indeed little 
 likely that, while memory of the transaction was yet fresh, a 
 historian, writing for the Greek nation, would venture a false 
 assertion so dishonourable to so large a part of it, concerning facts 
 in their nature of such public notoriety ; and it is still less likely 
 that such an assertion would remain to be refuted in Plutarch's 
 age. The interest which the Lacedaemonians and Athenians 
 afterward had in courting the other Grecian states may suf- 
 ficiently account for the epigrams, barrows, and other such 
 uncertain evidences as Plutarch has quoted. Indeed, before 
 Plutarch's testimony against Herodotus can be of any weight,
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 piut. v. These solemn ceremonies were scarcely over, when 
 
 a dangerous jealousy broke out between the Athe- 
 
 nians and Lacedaemonians on the question to whom 
 
 the accustomed Aristeia, or first honours of military 
 
 merit, were due upon this great occasion. Immediate 
 
 ill consequences were however prevented through the 
 
 Herodot. influence of the Corinthian leaders ; who, interfering 
 
 fhiicyd. as mediators, named the Platseans as having merited 
 
 1.3. c.54. bgycmcl all others. When the common cause par- 
 
 ticularly required exertion by sea, they, though an 
 
 inland people, had served aboard the fleet ; and in 
 
 the campaign by land, which had now had so glorious 
 
 an issue, none had more distinguished themselves by 
 
 their zeal and bravery. Their actions on the day of 
 
 Plataea are not particularly recorded by any writer ; 
 
 i T 3 UCy 55 apparently because, being citizens of Athens, as they 
 
 & 63. are modestly called by Thucydides, or subjects, as 
 
 uTclbs *^ e y are P erna P s mor e truly styled by Herodotus, 
 
 piut. Arist. they had formed one body with the Athenians, under 
 
 Thucyd. ne or( j ers O f Aristides. Their commonwealth was 
 
 1. o. c.oo. 
 
 too small to excite jealousy : all the other Greeks 
 approved the determination of the Corinthians ; and 
 the Lacedaemonians and Athenians acquiesced. 
 
 This threatening business being thus accommo- 
 
 he must be first reconciled to himself. It does however appear 
 extraordinary, that Herodotus, in his narrative of this great 
 event, should never once have mentioned the Plataeans. The 
 assertion of Plutarch, that the Greeks decreed to the Platseans 
 the first honours for military merit on the occasion, though 
 Diodorus differs from him, is confirmed by Thucydides, against 
 whose authority that of Diodorus is not to be mentioned. Pos- 
 sibly on account of their following fate Herodotus might have 
 had some reason for omitting all mention of them, similar to 
 that, whatever it was, which has made him totally silent con- 
 cerning the first two Messenian wars. Considering his extreme 
 freedom by turns with all the most powerful states of Greece, 
 both omissions appear mysterious.
 
 PUNISHMENT OF THEBES. 123 
 
 dated, a council was held to consider of farther SECT. 
 measures. The battle of Plataea, it is said, was 
 fought on the twenty-second of September. 16 The B.C. 479. 
 season was therefore not too far advanced for taking 
 vengeance on those Greeks who had joined the Per- 
 sians. It was determined to march immediately Herodot. 
 against Thebes, and to require the delivery of Time- & 
 genides and Attaginus, heads of the faction which 
 had led the Breotians to the Persian alliance. On 
 the eleventh day from the battle of Plataea the army 3d Oct. 
 entered the Theban lands. The delivery of the ob- 
 noxious persons being refused, plunder and waste 
 of the country and preparations for the siege of the 
 city were begun. This was borne during twenty 
 days. Timegenides then, fearing the turn of popular 
 favour against him, proposed to the Theban people 
 to offer the payment of a fine, as atonement for the 
 transgression of the republic against the common 
 cause of Greece ; declaring that if it should be re- 
 fused, he would be ready to surrender himself with 
 
 16 Thus the chronologers have determined, not without 
 authority : but the Grecian calendar was yet too little exact for 
 absolute certainty to a day. Tav-ryv ryv pa.-%rp e/xa%eo-avTo (says 
 Plutarch, speaking of the battle of Plataea) TTJV rerpafti rov Bo^j- 
 
 SfOjowSvo? <rTjM.ev6v /car 'AOyvat'ovi;, Kara, 8e BOIUTOVI; rerpei^i TOV 
 ITave/Aou fBtvovTO/;, y KOU vvv en TO 'EXXiji/t/cov tv nXaraia?? ot,0pof- 
 JJera* truveS/xov, Kai &vov<ri fS eXevOepiu Au ITXaTae? vieep T>J? 
 VMOJ$. Tyv 8e TVV ypepuv ayt' ( waX/av ov S"av/Aao-Teov, OTTOV Kal vvv, 
 StyKp^ia/Aevuv TUV ev atrrpo^oji^ jw.aXXoy, aXX^jv aXXo* [vqvoc, ctfyjfjV 
 
 KO,} TeXevryv ayovtrtv. Plut. vit. Aristid. The fourth day of the 
 Attic month Boedromion, according to our chronologers, would 
 correspond with the 23rd of September ; but they have preferred 
 the authority of the copies of Plutarch's Life of Camillas, and 
 of his treatise on the Glory of Athens, in both of which the 
 third of the month Boedromion is named as the day of the battle 
 of Plataea. The day of the battle being fixed, Herodotus 
 furnishes the other dates given in the margin.
 
 24 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. Attaginus, rather than be the occasion or pretence 
 for the destruction of his country. The proposal was 
 accepted by the assembly. But in the following night 
 Attaginus fled, leaving his own family, as well as his 
 associate Timegenides, to the mercy of the enraged 
 Thebans. His children were immediately delivered 
 to the commander-in-chief of the confederate Greeks. 
 But the Spartan prince did not want liberality to 
 distinguish between the criminal father and the 
 innocent offspring, whom he immediately dismissed 
 unhurt. Timegenides and some other principal 
 Thebans being then demanded, were surrendered. 
 They expected that time would be allowed them to 
 prepare for a public defence, and trusted that their 
 interest, assisted by money well bestowed, would 
 insure their safety. Pausanias, suspecting this, deter- 
 mined to prevent it. Detaining them till the con- 
 federate forces separated for their several homes, and 
 then leading them to Corinth, he caused them to be 
 there executed : a salutary severity, no doubt, for the 
 security of Greece against the common enemy, but, 
 as far as appears, unsupported by the solemnity of a 
 trial, and certainly unauthorised by any positive law. 
 
 Meanwhile Artabazus, who had withdrawn from 
 the field of Plataea with numbers forming still a 
 powerful army, nevertheless, on receiving informa- 
 tion of the extent of the disaster to the Persian arms, 
 saw no small difficulty and danger before him in the 
 retreat to Asia. He was aware that even those na- 
 tions which had been most forward in submission to 
 Xerxes at the head of advancing myriads would not 
 scruple to avow their real disposition of hostility 
 toward him, were the defeat of Mardonius known, 
 and his own march taken for flight. He therefore 
 gave out that his forces were only the advanced guard
 
 BATTLE OF THE STRYMON. 125 
 
 of the victorious army, which was immediately fol- SECT. 
 lowing. Using rapidity and precaution, he passed 
 the mountains of Thessaly and crossed Macedonia 
 without loss. But report would soon outstrip the 
 march of his numbers. Alexander king of Mace- 
 donia, who had found himself forced, as a kind of 
 hostage, to follow the train of the Persian general, 
 would not fail, on the defeat of the Persian army, to 
 use his best diligence for returning to his kingdom. 
 The Macedonian forces assembling, under the com- 
 mand of his son Perdiccas, hung on the rear of Ar- 
 tabazus. The difficult passage of the large river 
 Strymon afforded opportunity which was ably and 
 successfully used. A large part of the Persian army 
 was cut off, and such numbers made prisoners that 
 the portion of their ransom, which Grecian piety 
 usually offered to the gods, provided a statue of gold 
 which Alexander dedicated at Delphi. How far his 
 conduct was consistent with faith pledged to Persia 
 remaining history fails of assurance ; but the Athe- 
 nian people acknowledged in it the virtue of a Grecian 
 patriot : they voted honours and privileges to Per- 
 diccas, and the battle of the Strymon had lasting 
 fame, as the consummation of misfortune and dis- 
 grace to Persia, and of safety and glory to Grecee. 17 
 
 17 . . TeXetov raTi^vj/xa itoiyo-avrt rtj> /3a<r<Ae~. Demosth. wept 
 
 o-wTaf. p. 173. and in Aristocr. p. 687. ed. Reiske. In both these 
 orations Perdiccas is mentioned as the person to whom the Athe- 
 nian people decreed honours, though they differ somewhat in 
 regard to the amount. The great Philip, afterward king of 
 Macedonia, in his letter to the Athenian people, preserved with 
 the oration of Demosthenes entitled, On the Letter, mentions 
 only Alexander, in whose name the dedications of course would 
 be made, and under whose authority the army which defeated 
 the Persians would act, though Perdiccas might be the imme- 
 diate commander. Ep. Phil, ad Ath. p. 164. ed. Reiske.
 
 126 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. 
 IX. 
 
 B.C. 479. 
 01.75.J. 
 
 Herodot. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 Measures of the Grecian fleet. Battle of Mycak. End of the 
 expedition of Xerxes. 
 
 WHILE the arms of the confederate Greeks were 
 thus wonderfully attended with success and glory 
 against the immediate invaders of their country, the 
 fleet, which during the summer had lain inactive at 
 Delos, was at length excited to enterprise. In the 
 island of Samos there had been always a strong party 
 ready to take any opportunity for spirited opposition 
 to Theomestor, whom the Persians had raised to the 
 tyranny of the island. Engaging in their views He- 
 gesistratus, son of Aristagoras the Milesian chief, the 
 r>bd C s?c Samians deputed Lampon and Athenagoras, two prin- 
 1.11. c.34. cipal men among them, to attend him on a mission 
 to the commanders of the confederate fleet. In a 
 conference with Leotychides and Xanthippus, Hege- 
 sistratus represented, * That on the least encourage- 
 
 * ment the whole Ionian people would revolt against 
 
 * the Persians and join the Grecian cause : that the 
 ' bare appearance of the G recian fleet off their coast 
 would suffice to excite them to spirited action : that 
 ' the Persian government was remiss and weak be- 
 
 * yond what could be rea dily believed j insomuch that 
 
 * never did the means offer to the commanders of a 
 
 * powerful armament for so rich a booty with so little 
 
 * risk.' He proceeded to urge the Spartan king and 
 the Athenian chief, invoking their common gods, to 
 use the means so easily in their power, for rescuing 
 a Grecian people from i subjection to barbarians ; and 
 he offered, for himself and his colleagues, if their 
 fidelity was doubted, to remain hostages with the 
 fleet. Leotychides, according to a common super-
 
 MEASURES OF THE GRECIAN FLEET. 
 
 stition of both Greeks and Romans, struck with the SECT. 
 name of Hegesistratus (signifying the leader of an 
 
 armament) as a favourable omen, readily acceded to Herod, i. 9. 
 the measure proposed. Dismissing the two other de- C - 9L&92 - 
 puties, he detained Hegesistratus ; and, only one day 
 being allowed for preparation, the whole fleet, con- 
 sisting, according to Diodorus, of two hundred and Diodor. 
 fifty trireme galleys, moved, on the next, for Samos. U1 - c>34 ' 
 
 The season was so far advanced that the com- Herodot. 
 manders of the Phenician squadron in the Persian lt9 ' Ct96 ' 
 service, finding enterprise neither intended by the 
 Persian admiral, nor expected from the Greeks, had 
 requested leave to depart for their own distant ports 
 before the equinoxial storms should set in ; and this 
 had been granted. Having thus incautiously parted 
 with their best ships and ablest seamen, the Persians 
 were highly alarmed with intelligence that the Grecian 
 fleet was approaching. Hastily quitting Samos, they 
 passed to the neighbouring promontory of Mycale on 
 the Ionian coast ; where an army, according to He- 
 rodotus, of sixty thousand men, was encamped under 
 the command of Tigranes. Here, says the historian, c .97. 
 near the temple of the venerable deities, and that 
 temple of the Eleusinian Ceres which Philistus son 
 of Pasicles built when he followed Neleus son of 
 Codrus to the founding of Miletus, they hauled their 
 galleys upon the beach, and, with stones found upon 
 the place, and palisadoes formed of olive and other 
 cultivated trees, they raised a defence around them. 
 
 The Grecian commanders had expected to find c.98 
 the Persian fleet in full force at Samos, and proposed 
 to engage it on that friendly coast ; but they were 
 not prepared for the more hazardous measure of fol- 
 lowing it to the Asiatic shore. A council of war was
 
 128 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, therefore held, in which it was deliberated whether to 
 retire again immediately to their own seas, or first to 
 make some attempt in the Hellespont. But intel- 
 ligence received of the departure of the Phenician 
 squadron gave encouragement ; the spirit of vigorous 
 enterprise gained ; and it was shortly determined to 
 seek the enemy's fleet. On approaching the Ionian 
 coast, it was not without surprise that they found the 
 sea completely yielded to them, and the enemy pre- 
 pared for opposition by land only. Ardour on one 
 side rose in proportion to such evident backwardness 
 on the other, and the bold measure was resolved upon 
 to debark the whole of their force capable of acting by 
 land, which would be by far the larger part of their 
 crews, and to attack the Persians in their fortified 
 camp. Probably the leaders had reasonable hopes, 
 and perhaps confirmed information, that the nume- 
 rous Greeks among the Persian forces wanted only 
 opportunity to revolt. Leotychides however prac- 
 tised an expedient like that of Themistocles at Arte- 
 misium. He sent a herald in a boat, within hearing 
 of the Ionian camp, who made proclamation, accord- 
 Heredot. ing to the original historian, in these words : * Men 
 Diodsic! ' f Ionia, attend to what I say, of which the Persians 
 1. 11. c.34. < will understand nothing. When we engage, it will 
 
 * become every one of you to think of the liberty of 
 
 * all : the word is Hebe. Let those who hear inform 
 Herodot. * those who are out of hearing.' The Samians had 
 i>foc. c si!?.' become suspected by the Persian leaders, through 
 1.11. c.35. their generous kindness to about five hundred Athe- 
 nian prisoners, who had been brought from Attica 
 and disposed of as slaves in Asia Minor, having ran- 
 somed all, and sent them, with subsistence, to Athens. 
 The Samian troops in the Persian army were there-
 
 BATTLE OF MYCALE, 
 
 fore deprived of their arms ; and the Milesians, being SECT. 
 also suspected, were detached on pretence of service. 1 
 Leotychides debarked his forces without opposition 
 
 18 
 
 at some distance from the Persian camp. To add to D?L 
 their animation, he caused report to be spread, that p 
 Pausanias had gained a complete victory over Mar- strateg. 
 donius in Bceotia ; though intelligence of this could 
 not have arrived if, as historians affirm, it was the 
 very day of the battle of Plataea. Possibly however 
 information of the death of Masistus, with some ex- 
 aggeration of the success obtained upon that occasion, 
 might have reached him. The Grecian forces marched Herodot. 
 in two columns ; one under the command of Xan- 
 thippus, composed of the Athenian, Corinthian, Sicy- 
 onian, and Trcezenian troops, holding the plain against 
 the shore ; the other, consisting of the Lacedaemo- 
 nians with the remaining allies, under Leotychides, 
 going by the more inland and hilly road. The former 
 arrived first, and, eager to engross the glory of the 
 day, proceeded immediately to assault ; and this was 
 so sudden, so well conducted, and so vigorous, that 
 they had already entered the Persian rampart before 
 the Lacedsemonians could arrive. The rashness was 
 favoured, and perhaps justified, by the ready zeal of 
 the Greeks in the Persian service to give them every 
 assistance. The Samians, exasperated by the treat- c. 103. 
 ment they had received, exerted themselves, though un. c.36. 
 unarmed, by all means in their power ; and their ex- 
 hortations and example determined the other Asian 
 
 18 It is evident, from the account of the nearly contemporary 
 historian, that the Persian commanders were yet unaware of the 
 kind of policy requisite for gaining hearty co-operation from the 
 republicans, even those most hostile to the enemies of the Per- 
 sians, but which, in course of long communication, their suc- 
 cessors, as in the sequel of this history will appear, learned., 
 
 VOL. II. K
 
 130 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. Greeks. From all reported by Herodotus it appears 
 that the proper Persians had not yet deserved to lose 
 that military reputation which they had acquired 
 under the great Cyrus ; but of all the infantry in the 
 service of the empire they almost alone seem to have 
 merited the title of soldiers. Probably the propor- 
 tion of them at Mycale was not great. The other 
 Herodot. Asiatics shrunk before the vehemence of the Athenian 
 
 1. 9. c. 102. 
 
 attack ; but the Persians were still resisting when 
 the Lacedaemonians arrived. Then they were over- 
 powered, and mostly destroyed. Tigranes, general 
 of the Persian land forces, and two of the principal 
 naval commanders, were among the slain. Of the 
 Greeks in the Persian service the only man of rank 
 
 c. 103. who fell was Perilaus, commander of the Sicyonians. 
 Mycale was a small peninsula; and from the 
 place of action was no retreat by land, but through 
 narrow passes over a mountain. The Persian com- 
 manders, little expecting so sudden an attempt upon 
 their numerous forces within fortified lines, thought 
 they had provided sufficiently for security by dis- 
 arming the suspected Samians, and detaching the 
 
 c. 104. Milesians to guard the passes. Their confidence in 
 these however was grossly misplaced. The Milesians, 
 with the most determined enmity, intercepted the 
 fugitives, and of the whole army, it is said, few 
 escaped. When slaughter ceased, the Greeks, re- 
 maining quiet possessors of whatever the Persian camp 
 and fleet had contained, carried off every valuable of 
 easy removal, and then set fire to the rest. The ships 
 
 c. io6. were the next object, and the whole Persian fleet was 
 burnt. 
 
 After this signal blow to the Persian power the 
 
 c.106. Grecian fleet returned to Samos. A council was im- 
 
 i D iT!'c! C 37. mediately held to consider what measures should be
 
 COMPLETE SUCCESS OF THE GREEKS. 131 
 
 taken for the present security and future welfare of SECT. 
 the revolted lonians. The islanders might be safe 
 under protection of the fleet. Against this it would 
 be difficult, even for the resources of the Persian em- 
 pire, soon to raise a force capable of disputing the 
 command of the sea. But it was generally deemed 
 impossible for any power of Greece to protect the 
 long but narrow extent of continental colonies against 
 the land force immediately behind them. Confirm- 
 ation arriving of the news of the complete victory over 
 the Persian arms in Boeotia, the Peloponnesian com- 
 manders proposed to remove the lonians from Asia 
 to Greece, and to put them in possession of all the 
 seaports of those states which had sided with the 
 Persians. But the Athenians dissented ; not only 
 denying the necessity of so violent a measure, but 
 insisting peremptorily that the Peloponnesians had 
 no right to interfere in the disposal of Athenian co- 
 lonies, and the Peloponnesians had the moderation to 
 yield to this argument. Under example then of the 
 Samians, Chians, and Lesbians, the most powerful of 
 the islanders all took solemn oaths to be faithful to 
 the Grecian confederacy. Their sea-girt shores would 
 afford present refuge for those continentals, most 
 obnoxious to Persian vengeance, whom the walls of 
 their towns could not protect. Farther measures 
 being then taken into consideration, it was observed 
 that Sardis was too near, the force there too great, 
 and the season besides too much advanced, for any 
 farther attempt in Ionia; but that the Hellespont, 
 more distant from the centre of the Persian force, 
 was open to enterprise by sea. Thither therefore the Herodot 
 fleet directed its course, with the purpose especially n^sk. 4 ' 
 of destroying the bridges, which were supposed to be 1<n< c * 37 ' 
 
 K 2
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, still standing, and protected by a garrison ; but they 
 ' had already yielded to the weather and current, and 
 
 the Persians had deserted the place, 
 
 ?9 r cii8 Winter now approaching, Leotychides, with all the 
 fhucyd. ' Peloponnesians, returned to Greece. Xanthippus 
 DiodTsic! resolved nevertheless, with his Athenians and their 
 1.11. c.37. Ionian allies, to attempt the recovery of the Cher- 
 sonese, an Athenian colony, where the Greeks were 
 still numerous. The Persians, exposed to attacks in 
 various parts through the command which the Athe- 
 nian fleet possessed at sea, collected their force in 
 Sestos. After an obstinate defence, pressed by famine, 
 they made good their retreat ; upon which the Grecian 
 inhabitants joyfully surrendered the town to the 
 Athenians. 
 
 Herodot. The Persian monarch had remained in Sardis so as 
 IDS. ' to see the sad relics of his forces which found means 
 ni d 'c S 36 to fly from Mycale, and to receive the calamitous 
 strabo, news of the still greater loss of his army in Greece. 
 M. T. cic. Shortly after he moved to his distant capital of Susa. 
 DeOT. at i. i, O n ms departure he ordered all the Grecian temples 
 & de Leg. within his power to be destroyed, it is said, by fire > 
 whether supposing the deity offended with his long 
 sufferance of them, or thinking to gain popularity 
 among his subjects of the upper provinces by this 
 sacrifice to the prejudices of the Magian religion. 
 Accounts of the destruction of the earlier Grecian 
 temples by fire, often said to have been accidental, 
 are too numerous, some of too high authority, for 
 the fact to be doubted ; and hence it may be con- 
 cluded that, as in the temple of Solomon at Jerusa- 
 lem, timber was much more employed in them than 
 in those of later times, whose valuable though injured 
 relics to this day show much of what once they were.
 
 END OF EXPEDITION OF XERXES. 133 
 
 Such was the conclusion of the expedition of SECT. 
 Xerxes, after two campaigns, wonderfully glorious to 
 Greece, and, both in themselves and for their known 
 consequences, perhaps the most remarkable and im- 
 portant in the annals of mankind. 
 
 K 3
 
 134f HISTORY OF GREECE, 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 VIEW OF THE PEOPLE OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES POLI- 
 TICALLY CONNECTED WITH THE GREEKS, AND OF THE 
 GRECIAN SETTLEMENTS IN SICILY AND ITALY. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Of Carthage. Of Sicily : Agrigentum: Phalaris: Syracuse: 
 Gelon : invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians : battle of 
 ffimera. 
 
 CHAP. DURING those great transactions in Greece and its 
 eastern colonies, which decided, for the time, the 
 fate of Europe and Asia, and then first displayed that 
 superiority of the former over the rest of the world, 
 which it still maintains, events less important for 
 their consequences, and less intimately affecting the 
 interests of the mother-country, less accurately also 
 related to us, yet upon sufficient evidence great and 
 glorious, were taking place among the western settle- 
 ments of the nation. 
 
 The warlike and enterprising spirit of the Greeks 
 had long ago driven the industrious and informed 
 Phenicians from all their ancient establishments in 
 the Grecian seas ; had then wrested from them the 
 greater part of the distant and large island of Cyprus, 
 whose situation would seem to allot it rather to the 
 Phenician than the Grecian dominion, and had ap- 
 propriated all that valuable part of the African coast 
 which, after the powerful kingdom of Egypt, lay 
 nearest to the Phenician shore. But in maritime 
 skill, and still more in commercial system, in the
 
 THE PHENICIANS. 135 
 
 spirit of commercial adventure, and in those manu- SECT. 
 factures which formed the principal and most advan- 
 tageous basis of commerce, the Phenicians remained 
 yet unrivalled. On the coast of Africa, from the 
 deserts bounding the Grecian colonies on the west, 
 they had extended their settlements to the western 
 extremity of the Mediterranean, penetrated into the 
 ocean beyond, and have been supposed to have carried 
 their traffic as far as the shores of Britain, then the 
 extreme of the known world, and, excepting the Phe- 
 nicians, unknown among civilised nations. Where- 
 ever the Greeks did not interfere, the Phenicians 
 were superior, in arms as in arts, to all maritime 
 people. Nevertheless, confined at home within a 
 narrow territory ; pressed, on the land first by the 
 power of the Jewish kingdom, then by the more 
 overbearing weight successively of the Assyrian and 
 Persian empires ; and, on the sea, interrupted by the 
 Grecian spirit of war, and, it must be added of piracy, 
 they were equally prevented from becoming a great 
 nation on their own continent, and from assuring their 
 dominion over their distant maritime settlements. 
 
 In their voyages westward, the large projection of 
 AFRICA, over against Sicily, could not fail, by its 
 position to attract, and by its circumstances to fix, 
 the attention of the Phenician navigators. At a 
 very early period accordingly some settlements were Veil, 
 formed there, among which Utica had the fame of c . 2. 
 being the most ancient. Afterward the princess im- ;[ U J U JjJ* 1 
 mortalised by Virgil's poetry, driven to seek refuge j S [^ bo> 832 
 with her adherents from the tyranny of her brother 
 the king of Tyre, is said either to have founded or 
 increased the colony which in process of ages became 
 the powerful and renowned CARTHAGE. The era of 
 these transactions is very uncertain. The more re- 
 
 K 4
 
 136 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, ceived system places Dido two centuries later than 
 
 the Trojan prince, whose intercourse with her the 
 
 Roman bard hath so interestingly described : New- 
 ton's calculation, reducing the age of the Trojan war, 
 makes them contemporary. Carthage however, situate 
 nearly midway between Phenicia and the ocean, 
 happy in its climate and territory, and preferable to 
 Utica for its port, was a most eligible situation for a 
 place of arms, to command the communication with 
 the invaluable western settlements, with Spain, the 
 country of silver and gold mines, the Indies of the 
 old world. For in the eastern part of the Mediter- 
 ranean navigation was exposed to continual piracy 
 strabo, from the Greeks, who possessed the northern and 
 ' p ' ' southern shores ; and in the western from the Tus- 
 cans. Thus principally Carthage seems to have risen 
 early to eminence, and to have become in some degree 
 the capital of the Phenician colonies. The troubles 
 Hist des of Phenicia, and the wars which, with its very scanty 
 nies ^r 10 " territorial strength, it had to sustain against the 
 ie Baron force of the Assyrian empire, seem to have given to 
 
 de S. Croix, . * t i 11 
 
 P. 32. its dependencies an emancipation which perhaps they 
 did not desire ; and for which no struggle remains 
 reported. Probably, on the reduction of Tyre by 
 Ch.e. s.2. Nabuchodonosor king of Assyria, many Tyrian fami- 
 f this Hist. Y IGS would migrate to the colonies ; and Carthage 
 was likely to attract the greatest number. Carthage 
 however then profiting from its strength and its 
 situation, appears to have taken decidedly the lead. 
 It is remarkable that, excepting Assyria and Egypt, 
 whose extreme antiquity, together with the uncer- 
 tainty of their early history, makes them exceptions 
 to all rule, none of the ancient people, who flourished 
 by arts, arms, and policy, were great nations, like 
 those which form the states of modern Europe ; but
 
 CARTHAGE '. SICILY. 137 
 
 each a small society of men, inhabiting one city, and SECT. 
 there served by slaves, who were commonly the far 
 larger portion of the population. The Carthaginian 
 government, established, like all the Grecian, upon 
 these principles, in taking the lead among the sister 
 colonies, did not associate but subjected them. Even 
 the towns in its immediate neighbourhood were not Arist.p iit. 
 admitted to a share in the government : each had its p i y b.' ' 
 own municipal administration ; and so far each was s 6 ^';* 98 ' 
 a separate commonwealth; but all were held under p. 32. & 37. 
 political subjection, and that apparently a severe sub- 
 jection, to Carthage ; while Carthage itself appears 
 to have had the best balanced and wisest constitution 
 known to antiquity. 
 
 As long as the Phenician settlements remained Thucyd. 
 under the authority and protection of the mother- s.Croix. 
 country, few or perhaps none were more than fac- 
 tories ; for the government of Tyre was little able to 
 maintain armies and make conquests at the farther 
 end of the Mediterranean. But when Carthage was 
 become the independent capital of those colonies, 
 greater views than the mere acquisition of riches by 
 commerce began to animate the ambition of her 
 citizens. Along the coast of Africa, as far as the 
 Atlantic ocean, and on the extensive shores of Spain, 
 having only ignorant barbarians to contend with, 
 they established their dominion, apparently with little 
 difficulty, wherever they chose to exert their force. 
 But on the nearer coast of SICILY, the Phenician 
 factories, some of them probably as old as Carthage 
 itself, had been disturbed by the successive arrival of 
 Grecian adventurers ; skilled as well as daring in the 
 practice of arms, and, though not always averse to 
 commerce, generally preferring piracy. Against those 
 new occupants of that fruitful country other pre-
 
 188 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, cautions were necessary than had sufficed against the 
 ' simplicity of the native barbarians. Uniting there- 
 
 Thucyd. fore their factories, which had been scattered all 
 around the island, the Phenicians confined themselves 
 to three settlements ; Solois and Panormus (now 
 Palermo) on the northern coast, and Motya at the 
 western extremity ; and they began to cultivate more 
 attentively the friendship of the ancient inhabitants, 
 
 Ch.5. s.2. particularly of the Elymians, a mixed people, it is 
 said, Greek, Trojan, and Sicel, who held the towns 
 of Eryx and Egesta. This easy acquiescence of the 
 Phenicians, which, till the age of Xerxes, allowed no 
 opportunity for the Greek historians to boast of a 
 single feat of arms to the honour of their nation in 
 Sicily, sufficiently proves that, though the foundation 
 of the city of Carthage may have been as ancient as 
 it has been pretended, yet the power of the Cartha- 
 ginian state was comparatively of late growth. The 
 Phenician colonies thus assembled toward the western 
 part of the island might readily receive such pro- 
 tection as Carthage could give ; and their need of 
 protection would lead them to admit willingly its 
 superintending authority. As soon therefore as 
 Carthage itself became independent, the Phenician 
 settlements in Sicily would become appendages of 
 its dominion ; and disputes between Carthage and 
 the Greek settlements would be consequently un- 
 avoidable. 
 
 Little remains for history concerning the GRECIAN 
 COLONIES in Sicily, till toward that splendid period 
 which has been treated in the preceding chapters ; 
 and indeed it appears that, before that period, the 
 Sicilian and Italian Greeks had no important trans- 
 actions, and little political connexion with the 
 mother-country, unless with the one commercial
 
 AGRIGENTUM. 139 
 
 commonwealth of Corinth. Some of the towns how- SECT. 
 ever appear to have been populous and wealthy ; 
 Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, Camarina divided be- 
 tween them the southern coast, fruitful beyond the 
 rest of that island, fruitful especially in grain ; Syra- 
 cuse had one of the most commodious harbours of 
 the Mediterranean, in a situation very advantageous 
 for trade, and surrounded also by a territory of un- 
 common fertility. 
 
 Already in the age of Solon AGRIGENTUM, ori- 
 ginally a colony from Gela, was become a considerable 
 independent commonwealth, when Phalaris, a Cretan, B. c.seo. 
 acquired the sovereignty. Crete had been, jointly oi. 5 54. 
 with Rhodes, the mother-country of Gela. Phalaris, nearl y- 
 whose history, on more than one account, excites 
 curiosity, is represented as a monster in human 
 nature ; possessing, with very extraordinary abilities, 
 the most opposite virtues and vices, the most abo- 
 minable cruelty, with the most exalted magnanimity 
 and generosity. But though all traditions concerning 
 that famous tyrant are extremely doubtful and im- 
 perfect, yet the contradictions concerning his cha- 
 racter are not wholly unaccountable. He fell, we 
 find, a victim to the party in opposition to his go- Cic. a e Off. 
 vernment, and that party held the sway in Agrigentum, ' ' c% 7 ' 
 under a democratical form of administration, sixty 
 years. What happened in Athens, on the expulsion 
 of the Pisistradidae, would happen, during this period, Ch.7. s.5. 
 , from the same causes, in Agrigentum. To render 
 odious the character of the deceased tyrant would 
 tend to weaken the credit of his party, and propor- 
 tionally to strengthen the situation of the ruling 
 party and advance their power. Nothing therefore 
 that could produce such effects would be neglected. 
 
 SYRACUSE was already considerable, yet not, as far
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, as appears, particularly eminent among the Sicilian 
 ' Greek cities till, toward the age of Xerxes, it was 
 raised to power and fame by its great and beloved 
 tyrant Gelon. That illustrious man was born of an 
 Herodot. ancient and noble family, of Rhodian origin, esta- 
 blished at Gela. The Sicilian colonies, beyond all 
 other Grecian states, were remarkable for frequent 
 revolutions, the sudden elevation and downfal of 
 tyrannies, and every change of government and every 
 calamity which faction and internal war could occa- 
 c.i54. sion. Oleander, tyrant of Gela, being killed by Sa- 
 B.c.484* byllus, a Geloan citizen, was nevertheless succeeded 
 Thucyd. nn ' m * ne sovereignty by his brother Hippocrates. .Gelon, 
 already of reputation for abilities and bravery, was 
 appointed by the new tyrant commander-in-chief of 
 the Geloan cavalry ; for in Sicily, a country much 
 more generally adapted than Greece to the breeding 
 of horses and the operations of cavalry, that service 
 was early and extensively cultivated. 1 Hippocrates, 
 an ambitious and able prince, made successful war 
 upon some of the Sicel tribes, and upon the Grecian 
 states of Syracuse, - Callipolis, Naxus, Leontini, and 
 Messena ; all of which, excepting Syracuse, he com- 
 pelled to acknowledge his sovereignty. The Syra- 
 cusans, defeated in a great battle and reduced to 
 extremity, applied to Corinth, their metropolis, for 
 assistance. The interference of that rich maritime 
 commonwealth, in conjunction with its powerful 
 colony of Corcyra, procured an accommodation j by 
 
 [ * This date is at variance with the computation of Mr. Clinton, who con- 
 siders B.C. 485. to be the date of the occupation of Syracuse by Gelon, as he 
 reigned seven years, and was succeeded in the eighth by Hiero, B. C. 478.] 
 
 1 Arduus inde Acragas ostentat maxima longe 
 Mcenia, magnanimum quondam generator equorum. 
 
 Virg. jEn. 1. 3. v. 703.
 
 SYRACUSE. 14,1 
 
 which however the town of Camarina, previously sub- SECT. 
 ject to Syracuse, was yielded to the Geloan prince. 
 Hippocrates was soon after killed in an action with 
 the Hyblaean Sicels. Gelon, who had distinguished 
 himself very advantageously in all the late wars, was 
 left guardian of his infant sons, and administrator of 
 their government. To this trust, according to He- Herodot 
 rodotus, Gelon was unfaithful. Gathering a pretence l * 7 ' c - 155> 
 of some commotions among the Geloans, which were 
 repressed by arms, he assumed the sovereignty. At 
 Syracuse, about the same time, in the prosecution of 
 that contest for power between the higher and lower 
 citizens, which was nearly perpetual in almost every 
 Grecian commonwealth, the leaders of the populace, 
 engaging the slaves of the rich in the party against 
 their masters, compelled these to seek their personal 
 safety by flight. Finding refuge at Casmenas they 
 applied to Gelon, who readily undertook their cause. 
 The Syracusans in possession dreaded the power of 
 that prince ; but according to the same historian, 
 who imputes to him treachery against the sons of 
 Hippocrates, they had confidence in his character. 
 The result is highly remarkable. They professed 
 themselves not unwilling to readmit the refugees, 
 and to restore their property, provided only security 
 could be given that an equal government should be 
 established; that an act of amnesty for what had 
 passed should be strictly observed ; that the nobles, 
 on being restored to wealth, honour, and authority, 
 should neither exert their power and influence to the 
 persecution of individuals who had been active in 
 expelling them, nor to the subversion of the con- 
 stitution of the commonwealth, by the establishment 
 of oligarchal despotism. The expedient in which 
 both parties concurred was to appoint Gelon supreme
 
 142 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, moderator between them, making him king of Syra- 
 ' cuse. 
 
 This important acquisition of dominion thus ex- 
 traordinarily made, it became the object of Gelon to 
 mould into one the many little states which acknow- 
 ledged his authority. The circumstances of every 
 Grecian government required that the capital should 
 be strong, and all the dependent towns weak. For, 
 on account of the universal narrowness of territory, 
 C M" f;. 1 * occasion has occurred heretofore to observe, it was 
 
 of this Hist. ' 
 
 necessary that every cultivated spot should have its 
 fortified town at hand for refuge and protection ; 
 and, on account of the universal scantiness of public 
 revenue, it was necessary that the inhabitants of every 
 town and its district should be the garrison. If then 
 these were able to defend themselves against an enemy, 
 they might also defy the authority of their own ca- 
 pital. The interest or the ambition of individuals 
 would often lead the municipal government to aspire 
 to independency ; and the interest or ambition of 
 neighbouring states would seldom fail to afford en- 
 couragement for such views. But if it was necessary 
 for every Grecian government to attend to these cir- 
 cumstances, it was peculiarly so for the dominion of 
 Gelon, composed of so many conquered cities, com- 
 prising now, with a small part of the northern coast 
 and the greatest part of the southern, the whole 
 eastern of the island. 
 
 Among the towns of this range of country Syra- 
 cuse possessed advantages which attracted the notice 
 of Gelon. His native city, recommended by its ter- 
 ritory, the celebrated Geloan plain, eminent even 
 among the Sicilian fields for fruitfulness, was near 
 one extremity of his dominion, and without a port. 
 A cent situation, the completest harbour of the
 
 GELON. 143 
 
 island, the largest town, a rich surrounding country, strabo, 
 
 * 1 f\ O7rt 
 
 and a people of whose favour he was apparently most fhucyd. 
 secure, determined Gelon to make Syracuse the seat 1<6< 
 of his government. This being decided, he proceeded 
 to the arduous business of forming the heterogeneous 
 parts which composed his dominion into one harmo- 
 nised whole. His measures, in the present circum- 
 stances of Europe, would appear violent and extra- 
 vagant ; yet, if we may judge from what we learn of 
 their effects, they were wisely accommodated to the 
 times in which he lived ; and perhaps beyond any 
 other that could have been devised productive of 
 happiness to his subjects, as well as of security to his 
 own authority. Without a distribution of powers 
 legislative, judicial, and executive, among a favouring 
 party, a tyranny could hardly subsist. Of that fa- 
 vouring party it was necessary to have in the capital 
 a decided majority ; and it was also necessary that 
 the other towns should want the protection of the 
 capital, and be unable to resist its force. With these Herodot. 
 views, destroying Camarina, Gelon established all its Thucyd 156 ' 
 people in Syracuse: he removed thither more than g 6> b c>5 ' 
 half the Geloans : of the Eubreans in different towns p. 268. &c. 
 he gave the higher ranks only to enjoy the privileges 
 of the capital 2 ; leaving the poorer, with their several 
 municipal administrations, to cultivate the country : 
 but the lower people of the Megarians of Hybla he 
 sold for slaves, with an express obligation on the 
 purchasers to transport them out of Sicily, as the 
 last resource against those disturbances which their 
 mutinous disposition, and rancour against their supe- 
 riors, would, if they lived within the same country, 
 perpetually occasion. 
 
 2 noXnyras tiroAjtre. Herodot. 1. 7. C. 156. IIoX/Tj? 8' 
 v} ruv aXXuv opt^erat juaXXov y rS /xere^Eiv Kpfoeus /ca* 
 Aristot. Polit. 1. 3. c. 1 .
 
 CHAP. 
 
 Herodot. 
 1.5. c.41. 
 &46. & 
 1. 7. c. 158. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1. I.e. 17. 
 Herodot. 
 1. 7. c. 165. 
 Diod. 1.9. 
 c. 20. & 77. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 The state of Sicily when Xerxes invaded Greece 
 then appears to have been this : the barbarian Sicans 
 and Sicels yet held the centre of the island, and the 
 Elymians the western corner. A part of the northern 
 coast was possessed by the Carthaginians ; never, pro- 
 bably, in perfect friendship with all the Greeks, an$ 
 lately in open hostility with some ; for, while Cleo- 
 menes, king of Sparta, was yet living, his half-brother 
 Dorieus, elder brother of the renowned Leonidas, 
 conducting a fleet with the view to settle a colony in 
 Sicily, in action with a Carthaginian fleet, was de- 
 feated and killed. The dominion meanwhile com- 
 manded by Gelon, very small compared with the 
 kingdoms of modern Europe, and still more below 
 comparison with the Persian empire then existing, 
 was yet considerably larger than any under one go- 
 vernment elsewhere among the Greeks ; and this he 
 ruled with such wisdom, uprightness, and vigour that 
 he was e( l ua lly beloved by his subjects and respected 
 by all neighbouring powers. At the same time Agri- 
 gentum was administered by Theron, a man also of 
 high merit, who had raised himself to that called 
 tyranny ; and he had lately reduced Him era on the 
 northern coast, ejecting its tyrant Terillus. 
 
 This was what gave immediate occasion to the first 
 considerable effort of the Carthaginians toward ex- 
 tending their dominion in Sicily ; the first important 
 transaction in which they were engaged with the 
 Greeks, while the Romans, afterward conquerors of 
 Carthage, Greece, and the known world, had yet 
 scarcely a name among nations. It is therefore to 
 be regretted that Herodotus has treated this part of 
 history so slightly, and that little satisfactory remains 
 upon it from any other writer. The narrative of 
 Diodorus is the injudicious, and sometimes even 
 ridiculous attempt of a man little versed in political^
 
 GELON. 
 
 and still less in military business, to exalt his fellow- SECT. 
 countrymen, the Sicilian Greeks, above the fame of 
 Lacedaemon and Athens. Circumstances enough how- 
 ever remain, either reported or confirmed by better 
 authority, whence a general idea may be gained of 
 the principal events. 
 
 It was a solace, among the miseries occasioned by 
 the frequent revolutions in the little Grecian re- 
 publics, that as every state had always enemies, open 
 or secret, the exiled of every state could generally 
 find some degree of friendship and a disposition to 
 protection somewhere. But beside the resources 
 within Greece itself, the Persian empire had been, 
 for some time, a common refuge for the unfortunate 
 who were of any consideration in their own country : 
 Tuscany also had afforded settlements to some ; and 
 now Carthage, rising to new importance among 
 foreign powers, offered prospect of new relief. Here 
 the expelled prince of Himera applied, and found a 
 favourable reception. The opportunity was inviting 
 for the Carthaginians to extend and secure their own 
 dominion, by crushing that of the Greeks in Sicily ; 
 while the collected force of the Persian empire, on 
 the point of overwhelming Greece itself, would effect- 
 ually prevent any assistance thence. Under pretence 
 therefore of reinstating their ally in his dominion they 
 assembled a very powerful armament. By a treaty pin d- 
 with the Tuscans they engaged the naval force of V . y i38. & 
 that people in their service ; and, according to the $^o\.' ap ' 
 practice which is found afterward usual with them 
 in their wars with the Romans, they collected merce- 
 nary land forces from many of the barbarous nations 
 with which they had commercial intercourse. Be- 
 side those of Phenician blood, Herodotus mentions 
 Africans, Spaniards, Ligurians, Elisycians, (a name 
 
 VOL. II. L
 
 146 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, not occurring elsewhere,) Sardinians, and Corsicans, 
 x * The command in chief was committed to Hamilcar, 
 
 one of the two magistrates who, with the title of 
 Herodot. Suffete. presided over the Carthaginian common- 
 
 1.7. c. 165. -,-, r T T -, 
 
 Poiyb. i. 6. wealth, and whose eminence or dignity and authority 
 was such that the Grecian writers, generally averse 
 to foreign terms, not unusually styled them kings. 
 
 In the same summer in which Xerxes invaded 
 Greece Hamilcar passed into Sicily, and immediately 
 laid siege to Himera. Theron, unable with his own 
 forces to cope with the Carthaginian armament, ap- 
 plied to the king of Syracuse for assistance. Though 
 the war was professedly intended only against the 
 Agrigentine prince, yet the whole Grecian interest 
 in Sicily was too evidently concerned in the event 
 for Gelon to remain a quiet spectator. Putting 
 himself therefore at the head of his army, which, ac- 
 cording to the most probable accounts, consisted of 
 about ten thousand heavy-armed foot, and two thou- 
 sand horse, and, with the usual addition of light-armed 
 slaves, might be in all perhaps twenty-five thousand 
 men, he marched to join the Agrigentine forces. 
 His fleet, according to Herodotus, two hundred tri- 
 reme galleys, and, as we are assured by Thucydides, 
 more powerful than that of any other Grecian poten- 
 tate of the age, he committed to his brother Hieron. 
 This prince met and defeated the combined fleets of 
 Carthage and Tuscany. About the same time the 
 United armies of Syracuse and Agrigentum engaged 
 the Carthaginian army near Himera, with complete 
 success. Hamilcar himself fell; a large proportion 
 of his army was destroyed, and almost the whole re- 
 mainder were made prisoners. 
 
 The concurring testimony of ancient writers to 
 these glorious events, which appear to have at once
 
 BATTLE OF HIMERA. 147 
 
 terminated the war, little as we are assured of any SECT. 
 particulars, is confirmed by the irrefragable evidence 
 of the growing greatness and lasting splendour of Sy- 
 racuse and Agrigentum. The prisoners, according 
 to the practice of the times, were all condemned to 
 slavery. The larger share, we are told, was acquired 
 by the Agrigentines, who employed great numbers 
 on public works, which remained to late ages, and 
 some even yet remain, proofs both of the greatness 
 of the victory, and of the taste of the victors.. Here 
 however, on considering the account given by the 
 Sicilian Diodorus, the zealous eulogist of his country, 
 a suspicion cannot but arise that all those prisoners 
 were not Carthaginian soldiers. For the battle was 
 fought near Himera, on the northern coast of the 
 island. The Carthaginians, in the confusion of their 
 defeat, says Diodorus, fled in great numbers up the 
 country, and mostly toward the Agrigentine territory, 
 where they were afterward taken by the Agrigentines. 
 It seems much more probable that they would have 
 directed their flight toward their own garrisons of 
 Solo'is and Panormus, which were not far distant on 
 the coast ; or, if they were cut off from these, and 
 compelled to take an inland road, Egesta, the strong 
 hold of their Elymian allies, would have been their 
 object, rather than the Agrigentine territory. But if 
 they fled up the country, and did not reach Egesta, 
 they would get among the highlands held by the 
 Sicans and Sicels ; and would be much more likely to 
 stop there than pass on into the Agrigentine lands. 
 It seems farther improbable, that the powerful Gelon 
 would permit his people to be defrauded of their fair 
 share of the booty by those who owed to them, not 
 only the victory, but perhaps even their existence as a 
 people. Upon the whole therefore it seems more than 
 
 L 2
 
 148 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, probable that the Agrigentines took advantage from 
 
 '__ the blow given to the Carthaginian power, perhaps 
 
 making a pretence of some shelter afforded to fugi- 
 tives, for oppressing the Sicans and Sicels of their 
 neighbourhood ; and that the stupendous works of 
 art, which travellers yet admire at Girgenti, were 
 in large proportion the produce of the labour and the 
 misery of those unfortunate barbarians. It is the 
 purpose of history to represent men not such as they 
 should be, but such as they have been : and thus 
 learning what they should be, through observation 
 of what they should not be, far more valuable in- 
 struction, both political and moral, may be gathered 
 than from any visionary description of perfection in 
 human nature. Thus at least Herodotus and Thu- 
 cydides and Xenophon and Polybius and Sallust 
 and Tacitus thought ; though some other historians, 
 Greek, Roman, and modern, have written upon a 
 different plan. It is indeed little allowable for the 
 historian to go beyond authority ; yet when some im- 
 portant facts are certain, with some attending circum- 
 stances doubtful, it will be his duty to lead his reader 
 as near to the whole truth as he can. The general 
 spirit of the Grecian commonwealths, and even the 
 doctrine of the Grecian philosophers, the methods 
 ordinarily practised among the Greeks to obtain 
 slaves, the full assurance we have of the great works 
 executed at Agrigentum, and the account even of 
 Diodorus, partial as he is to his fellow-countrymen, 
 compared with the known state of Sicily at the time, 
 all concur to mark the conjecture ventured concern- 
 ing the prisoners made by the Agrigentines as very 
 likely to be true, and even very near the truth. 
 
 Among the deficiencies of Sicilian history however 
 nothing is so much to be regretted as the scantiness
 
 POPULARITY OF GliLON. 149 
 
 of information about the form of government esta- SECT. 
 blished by Gelon, and the civil occurrences of his 
 reign. It is not the number of prisoners he made 
 nor the buildings he erected that excite curiosity, 
 so much as the general prosperity of the country 
 under his administration, and the lasting popularity 
 of his character. Of the former some valuable testi- 
 mony remains transmitted by the arts, which the 
 literature of his age, much less proportionally ad- 
 vanced, does not afford. There are golden coins 
 yet existing of Gelon and his immediate successor, 
 though no commonwealth of Greece, not Athens 
 
 o 
 
 itself, coined gold, as far as can now be discovered, 
 for more than a century after. Nor are the coins of 
 Gelon more remarkable on this .account than for the 
 beauty of the design and workmanship ; which are 
 of a perfection at any rate surprising, and which 
 would appear almost miraculous, did we not learn 
 from an author living so near the time and so pos- 
 sessing means of information as Herodotus, that the 
 western Greek colonies had constant communication 
 and intimate connection with those of Asia. With 
 regard then to the government of Gelon, comparing 
 what remains from Herodotus with the anecdotes 
 reported by later writers, we can but gather some 
 general idea. Power, it appears, was committed 
 principally to the higher ranks of citizens, yet Gelon 
 was always the favourite of the lower ; and in this he 
 appears to have been singular among the Grecian 
 political leaders, that he could reconcile the jarring 
 pretensions of the two, and maintain concord between 
 them. Probably the forms of a mixed republic were 
 observed, as under the Pisistratidas at Athens, and an 
 impartial administration of just laws assured property 
 and civil liberty to all. We are told that, after the defeat 
 
 L 3
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 of the Carthaginians, and the return of the Grecian 
 forces to their several homes, the people were sum- 
 moned to a general assembly at Syracuse, with a re- 
 quisition that they should come completely armed as 
 for a military expedition. Gel on attended in the 
 habit of a private citizen, unarmed and without 
 guards. The assembly being formed, he mounted 
 the speaker's stand, and, after giving a detailed ac- 
 count of his administration in peace and in war, con- 
 cluded with observing to the people that he was now 
 in their hands : if he had done well, they would re- 
 ward him with their good words and good wishes ; 
 if he had done ill, his doom was in their power. He 
 was answered with loud acclamation ; styled bene- 
 factor, deliverer, and king, and required to continue 
 the exercise of the supreme authority ; and a decree 
 was passed directing that a statue should be erected 
 at the public expense, representing him, in memory 
 of this transaction, habited as a private citizen. Nor 
 was this mere flattery to the living prince : above a 
 hundred and thirty years after, when, in circum- 
 stances most likely to excite democratical fury, a 
 decree was proposed for the demolition or removal 
 of all statues of tyrants, the surviving fame of the 
 Demetr.de just and beneficent administration of Gelon had such 
 weight with the popular mind that an exception was 
 made in favour of his statue, which was accordingly 
 preserved in its place. 
 
 The history of Carthage, where literature never 
 flourished, is still more defectively transmitted than 
 that of Syracuse ; so that it does not appear to what 
 should be attributed the total inexertion of its go- 
 vernment in Sicily for near a century after the battle 
 of Himera. The testimony of Aristotle to the lasting 
 internal quiet of that wisely-constituted common- 
 
 Eloc. s.312. 
 Plut. v. 
 Timol.
 
 CARTHAGE. 151 
 
 wealth seems to warrant belief that no domestic SECT. 
 trouble impeded ; and this tends to corroborate the 
 presumptive evidence, arising from other circum- 
 stances, that Carthage had yet no great resources. 
 She was providing them by the successful extension 
 of her commerce, and of her settlements on the 
 western shores of the Mediterranean ; and accord- 
 ingly, between sixty and seventy years after, Carthage 
 is found accounted by Thucydides, not formidable 
 
 as a warlike state, but the richest commonwealth 
 
 known. Her factories in Sicily therefore, where less 
 
 profit was to be acquired with far greater difficulty 
 
 and hazard, were neglected; and thus Motya became Diodor. 
 
 an Agrigentine garrison. Panormus and Solo'is ap- ' ' c ' 90 ' 
 
 pear to have remained to the Carthaginians, who, as 
 
 we learn from Thucydides, continued to hold esta- Thucyd. 
 
 blishments in the island ; but among the various wars 
 
 of the Sicilian Greeks, between themselves and with 
 
 the barbarians, in whose number Thucydides reckons c. 11. 
 
 the Elymians of Egesta, for more than seventy years 
 
 no mention occurs of any interference of the Cartha- 
 
 ginian government. 8 
 
 3 Scarcely any equally important transactions in Grecian his- 
 tory remain so unsatisfactorily related as those of the Himeraean 
 war. Herodotus says the Carthaginian army was of three hun- 
 dred thousand men. This, the only improbable circumstance 
 (indeed nearly an impossible one) in his concise narrative, and 
 expressly given, not as what he would vouch for, but only as a 
 Sicilian report, is the only one in which he has been followed 
 by Diodorus and some later writers, who have added largely to 
 the tale from stores now unknown. They say the fleet con- 
 sisted of two thousand galleys ; nearly double the number re- 
 ported of the fleet of Xerxes, which has passed with some for 
 incredible. (Diod. 1. 11. c. 20.) The Carthaginians never, in 
 the most flourishing times of their empire, sent out an army of 
 half three hundred thousand men, and still less a fleet of two 
 thousand galleys. They say then that Gelon led from Syracuse 
 
 L 4<
 
 x. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Of Italy: Tuscany: Rome: Latium: Sybaris: Crotona: Pytha- 
 goras: Thurium: Pcestum: Cuma: Campania: Lucania. 
 
 CHAP. AMONG the early inhabitants of Italy, the people 
 named by the Romans Etruscans and Tuscans, and by 
 the Greeks Tyrrhenes or Tyrsenes, became eminent, 
 
 fifty thousand foot and more than five thousand horse ; ne- 
 glecting the account of Ephorus, a much earlier writer than 
 Diodorus, (which has been preserved to us by the scholiast on 
 Pindar,) who says Gelon's army was of ten thousand foot and 
 two thousand horse. Neither has the confident assertion of 
 Diodorus, that the Carthaginian invasion of Sicily was made in 
 consequence of a treaty between the Carthaginian commonwealth 
 and the Persian court, merited the credit that it has found. 
 Herodotus evidently had never heard of such a treaty : indeed 
 his account virtually contradicts its existence. Not that it was 
 impossible but, through the medium of Tyre, there may have 
 been communication between the Carthaginian commonwealth 
 and the Persian court. It was however widely alien from the 
 temper of that court at that time to make treaties with little, 
 distant, and almost unheard-of republics upon the terms men- 
 tioned by Diodorus. Herodotus sufficiently expresses it as 
 Gelon's opinion, that the only terms upon which alliance could 
 be made with Persia were submission, not only to the hu- 
 miliating ceremony of delivering earth and water, but also to 
 the payment of tribute. (Herodot. 1.7- c. 163.) That the Car- 
 thaginians were not, in that age, powerful enough to attract the 
 notice of Persia upon a footing at all approaching to equality, 
 the annoyance which the disunited little piratical Grecian re- 
 publics in Sicily were always capable of giving them, and the 
 success of the distant colony of Massilia against their fleet, 
 amply indicate. (Herodot. 1. 1. c. 166. Thucyd. 1. 1. c. 13.) 
 Justin, in reporting a treaty between Carthage and the Persian 
 court, which however he attributes to the reign of Darius 
 (Justin. 1. 19 .c. 1.), describes terms that could only be imposed 
 on a subject people, and would never be aceeded to by a state 
 capable of raising at the same time an army of three hundred 
 thousand men, and a fleet of two thousand ships of war. But
 
 ITALY I TUSCANY. 153 
 
 not only by their military prowess, and the extent of SECT. 
 dominion which they acquired, but by their policy, . 
 their knowledge of letters, and their proficiency in 
 arts. Concerning their origin, which the existing Herodot. 
 monuments of early art among them principally make s'trabo, 
 an object of reasonable curiosity, Strabo agrees with l - ? P- 219 - 
 
 * ... Dion. Hal. 
 
 Herodotus in tracing it from Lydia. 4 Dionysius of Ant. Rom. 
 
 what Herodotus relates of the leading steps to the Carthaginian 
 expedition into Sicily is perfectly consistent with everything 
 that we learn on best authority of the circumstances of the times, 
 and fully sufficient to account for the undertaking, without any 
 assistance from fancied treaties with the court of Susa, by which 
 the merchants of Carthage were to share the conquest and spoil 
 of Europe with the monarch of the Persian empire. Finally, 
 the silence of Thucydides concerning the immensity of the Car- 
 thaginian armament, and the splendour of the victory of Gelon, 
 where, in treating of the principal military actions of the Greeks, 
 he speaks of the power of the Sicilian tyrants of that age 
 (Thucyd. 1. 1. c. 14.), sufficiently proves that, if any such reports 
 were in his time current, he thought them unworthy of notice. 
 The account which Diodorus proceeds to give of the terrors at 
 Carthage, lest Gelon, with his victorious army, should imme- 
 diately cross the sea and lay siege to that city ; of the tears of 
 the Carthaginian ambassadors, and the generosity of the Syra- 
 cusan prince, who scorned to conquer Africa, while he was 
 really unable to drive the Carthaginians out of Sicily ; all these, 
 with some other circumstances in the course of his narrative of 
 this war, are too puerile for serious criticism. The naval victory 
 is not noticed by either Herodotus or Diodorus, but remains re- 
 ported in a quotation from the historian Ephorus by the scholiast 
 on Pindar, and is mentioned by Pindar himself in his first 
 Pythian ode, which is addressed to Hieron. Some notice of it 
 also occurs in Pausanias, 1. 6. c. 19. p. 499. The value of these 
 authorities has been very ably discussed by West in a note to 
 his translation of the ode above mentioned. 
 
 4 The ancient vases, which of late years have so much excited 
 the attention of the lovers of antiquity and the arts, have con- 
 tributed in some instances to give a celebrity to the Etruscan 
 name which is not its due. The proof however of the pro- 
 ficiency of the Etruscans in the arts does not rest only upon the
 
 154 
 
 CHAP. 
 X. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1.4. c.109. 
 
 T. Liv. 
 Hist. 
 Rom. 1.1. 
 c. 1. & 5. 
 
 Fab.Max.& 
 C. Sempron. 
 ap. Dion. 
 Hal. 
 
 c.l. p. 9. 
 Strabo, 1.5. 
 p. 220. 222. 
 228. 232. 
 &233. 
 Virg. ^En. 
 1.6. v.96.& 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 Halicarnassus dissents ; yet a concurrence of ancient 
 testimony makes it appear probable that the Tuscans 
 migrated from the shores of the ^Egean sea, where 
 the Tyrrhene name appears to have been once ex- 
 tensive, and so late as the age of Thucydides was 
 retained by a people on the Thracian coast. These 
 were of acknowledged Pelasgian origin ; and, not- 
 withstanding the declared opinion of Dionysius, the 
 evidence collected by him tends strongly to show that 
 the Tuscans, like the Greeks, were at least in part 
 of Pelasgian race. 5 The question however is not im- 
 portant to Grecian history ; and it may suffice that, 
 according to every report collected on the subject by 
 Dionysius and Strabo, and everything remaining from 
 the Roman writers, traditions of some authenticity 
 were preserved of migrations from the countries 
 around the .ZEgean sea, at different times of the early 
 ages, into Italy, and of settlements in Tuscany and 
 on its northern and southern borders. The Ligurians 
 were supposed a colony from Greece ; Pisa and Caere 
 in Tuscany, Formic, Antium, Aricia, Ardea, Tibur 
 and Praeneste in Latium, and Rome itself, were held 
 to be Grecian towns. 
 
 A colony however of later date, and concerning 
 which testimony is more ample and more precise, 
 
 merit and the authenticity of the vases attributed to them. The 
 sepulchral monuments of the ancient city of Tarquinii give more 
 unquestionable and more complete information upon the subject. 
 It is to be regretted that these are not yet better known by 
 the publication, long promised, of the accurate delineations and 
 description of the late James Byres. 
 
 3 According to Thucydides the ancient inhabitants of Athens, 
 and according to Sophocles those of Argos, were Tyrrhene 
 Pelasgians, Thucyd. 1. 4. c. 109. Sophocl. ap. Dion. Hal. Antiq. 
 Rom. 1. 1. p. 17. This indeed is testimony only to a name ; but 
 from such early authors it is remarkable testimony.
 
 TUSCANY. 155 
 
 may have carried science and the arts into Tuscany, 1.8. v.54. 
 in a state of at least as much advancement as they Cecil, ap. 
 
 seem ever to have attained there. It was led by 
 Demaratus from Corinth, upon occasion of the re- Liv - Hisu 
 volution in that city, through which the democratical sup. 
 party, under Cypselus, became masters of the govern- i. 1 p.' 22 . 
 ment ; when the oligarchal chiefs, and particularly J^ n< ^ 
 the family of the Bacchiadae, of which Demaratus is T.Liv. 
 said to have been, would find it desirable, or perhaps i. i.e. 34. 
 necessary, to seek settlements elsewhere. Demaratus ofthfaHii'. 
 found in Tarquinii, the principal city of Tuscany, a 
 safe and honourable retreat for himself, his friends, 
 and dependants ; he married a lady of high rank 
 there, and died in the peaceable possession of wealth, 
 then esteemed extraordinary. A son of that marriage, 
 inheriting the wealth, became, with the name of 
 Tarquinius Priscus, king of Rome by election of the 
 Roman people. The concurrence of testimonies, 
 Greek and Roman, to these facts, though of so early 
 an age, seems to go far toward proving one of two 
 things ; either that the Tuscans, and it may be added, 
 the Romans, esteemed the Corinthians a kindred 
 people, or that they found them a people superior to 
 themselves in arts and general knowledge. 
 
 For the history of Etruria materials are very Herodot. 
 scanty. It appears however that its people, like the strabo/ ' 
 Greeks, but unlike the other Italians, applied them- J^gl^ 9 * 
 selves much to maritime affairs. Like the Greeks 1.6. p. 267. 
 also they were at the same time a piratical and a 
 commercial people. While they remained united 
 under one government their power by land and sea 
 was formidable ; they extended their arms with suc- 
 cess into Lombardy ; they conquered Campania; and 
 the shores of Sardinia and Corsica became appen- 
 dages of their dominion. Afterward, separating into
 
 156 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, several commonwealths, power sunk, arts declined, 
 ' and, while the growing strength and growing am- 
 
 bition of Rome gave constant alarm on the land side, 
 the Etrurian maritime force went into neglect and 
 decay. Thus, except in one instance, which will 
 require notice hereafter, they were prevented from 
 interfering very materially with the interests of the 
 Grecian colonies in Italy. 
 
 In the decline of the power of Tuscany the Car- 
 thaginians succeeded to a more entire command of 
 the western parts of the Mediterranean : the shores 
 of Sardinia and Corsica passed from the Tuscan to 
 1 the Carthaginian dominion ; and but for the newly 
 risen power of Rome there would have been Car- 
 Poiyb. thaginian garrisons on the Latin coast. Assurance 
 J.s. p. 177. Q f j.jjjg remams i n th^ remarkable treaty between 
 
 Carthage and Rome, in the time of the first consuls, 
 twenty-eight years before the invasion of Greece by 
 Xerxes, the original of which, engraved on a brazen 
 tablet, remained to the time of Polybius among the 
 archives in the Capitol. What gave cause to the 
 strabo, treaty, with assistance from a passage of Strabo, its 
 1.5. p. 232. own W ords explain. The maritime towns of Latium 
 carried on some commerce, but were more ad- 
 dicted to piracy. Even after their subjection to 
 Rome, associating themselves with the corsairs of 
 Tuscany, they pushed maritime depredation some- 
 times as far as the African coast ; but they were 
 principally annoying to the commerce with the new 
 Carthaginian settlements in Sardinia and Corsica. 
 At the same time Rome itself, powerful enough to 
 hinder those strong measures of coercion by land, 
 which the Carthaginian government had apparently 
 attempted, was also rich enough to be an object for 
 the Carthaginian merchants. Hence the equality
 
 ROME : LATIUM : SYBARIS. 157 
 
 established for the subjects of the two republics by SECT. 
 some articles of the treaty, while the general tenor 
 of it is accommodated entirely to secure and promote 
 the peculiar interest of Carthage ; and nothing in it 
 affords the least ground for supposing, with some 
 modern writers, in opposition to all the Roman 
 historians, that Rome had then any naval establish- 
 ment. 
 
 While therefore the Sicilian Greeks, by their 
 success against the Carthaginians, earned a glory 
 which we want means justly to estimate, their fellow- 
 countrymen in Italy, unassailed by any formidable 
 foreign power, had no opportunity to acquire any 
 similar fame. Their republics have nevertheless be- 
 come objects of curiosity to posterity by the residence 
 of the philosopher Pythagoras, and some of his prin- 
 cipal disciples, among them, and by the wonderfully 
 beneficial effects, political and moral, attributed to 
 the propagation of his doctrine there. Unfortunately 
 however, Pythagoras living while writing was little 
 practised in Greece, both the doctrine and its effects, 
 notwithstanding very assiduous researches of many 
 learned men, remain very deficiently and uncertainly 
 known ; and the reports of the extraordinary popu- 
 lousness of some of the Italian. Greek cities, and of 
 the military force which, for want of a foreign foe 
 worthy of it, they exerted against one another, though 
 supported in some degree by authority so far re- 
 spectable that they excite wonder, will not be found, 
 upon examination, to deserve belief. 
 
 We learn however, on sufficient authority, that 
 about the age of Solon and the Pisistratida?, some of 
 the Italian Greek cities were considerable. SYBARIS strabo, 
 had twenty-five towns within its territory, and held Athenl 
 four neighbouring tribes of barbarians in subjection. 1 - 12 - c - 6 -
 
 158 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. The luxury of its citizens became proverbial. The 
 ' application of the term luxury to anything that could 
 
 exist among the little republics of that age has been 
 ridiculed by some eminent modern writers ; yet, if 
 we sufficiently consider the circumstances of those 
 republics, we shall find perhaps reason to think the 
 charge of luxury against them may have been founded, 
 though the accounts of their military force are evi- 
 dently fabulous. The luxury indeed of a narrow 
 society, where manual labour is the business of slaves 
 only, will differ from that of a great nation where all 
 ranks are free ; and it will be likely to differ par- 
 ticularly in this, that, while general elegance in the 
 style of living of persons in easy circumstances will be 
 very inferior, particular indulgences will be carried 
 to greater extravagance. We are told by Diodorus 
 that, in consequence of the victory of the Sicilian 
 Greeks over the Carthaginians near Himera, the 
 number of slaves acquired by the Agrigentines was 
 so great that many individuals shared each five hun- 
 dred ; and it is to be presumed, from his account, 
 that no citizen would be without a share. Allowing 
 here largely for exaggeration, a probable fact may 
 yet remain, so involving with it a sudden, general, 
 great, and most pernicious change of manners that, 
 among the modern nations of Europe, nothing can 
 be imagined within the bounds of possibility parallel 
 to it. Would we indeed see examples of the character 
 of luxury among the ancient republics, we must seek 
 them perhaps rather in our colonies than in our 
 capitals. Though then the luxury of Sybaris remains 
 chiefly recorded by writers who lived not till some 
 iicrodot. centuries after Sybaris ceased to exist ; for Herodotus 
 mentions only one Sybarite remarkably luxurious, 
 yet we may not unreasonably believe that luxury was
 
 SYBARIS: CROTONA. 159 
 
 extravagant there. It may have been even elegant, SECT. 
 through the intercourse, which we learn was intimate, ' 
 with the Asiatic Grecian cities ; and in regard to Herodot. 
 some points we are assured of its elegance ; for some 
 of the Sybarite coins, yet existing, are of a beauty 
 that modern art will with difficulty rival. Indeed the 
 JLydian court might communicate, among the Greeks 
 of its neighbourhood, many refinements little known 
 in Proper Greece, which yet from Miletus might pass 
 to the wealthy towns of Italy. 
 
 The government of Sybaris however was not better Diodor. 
 
 1 12 c 9 
 
 established than that of many other Grecian states. 
 In the usual contest of the aristocratical and demo- 
 cratical factions the lower people, under the conduct 
 of a demagogue named Telys, expelled the richer 
 citizens, to the number of five hundred, and shared 
 their property. The exiles found refuge in the neigh- 
 bouring city of CROTONA. The Sybarite people under 
 Telys, confident in their strength, (for the population 
 of Sybaris far exceeded that of any other Italian city, ) 
 demanded the fugitives, and, on refusal, made war 
 upon Crotona. Herodotus, in his account of this 
 war, speaks with little confidence of any particulars, 
 though, within little more than half a century after, 
 he resided upon the spot. The current reports were 
 evidently known to him, and his history appears to 
 have been finished in Italy ; yet he mentions neither 
 the philosopher Pythagoras, whom some later writers 
 have made the counsellor of the Crotoniats upon the 
 occasion, nor his disciple, the celebrated athlete Milo, 
 who is asserted, on the same authority, to have been 
 their general and hero. The event, which alone we 
 learn with certainty, was, that the Sybarites were de- 
 feated, their city taken and destroyed, their common- 
 wealth annihilated, and the very name lost.
 
 160 
 
 CHAP. 
 X. 
 
 Herodot. 
 1.3. c. 131, 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 Such is the account that can be now collected of 
 Sybaris ; and it involves almost the whole political 
 history of the rival and conquering city Crotona. 
 But the fame of Crotona does not rest on its political 
 eminence only. We have already had occasion to 
 observe, that, in many points of art and science, the 
 Grecian colonies went before the mother-country. 
 The medical school of Crotona, probably derived from 
 Pythagoras, who is universally said to have applied 
 himself, and to have directed his scholars, much to 
 the study of nature, was of reputation, before the 
 first Persian war, superior to any then in the world ; 
 insomuch that its fame reached the court of Susa, 
 where the Crotoniat Democedes became the most 
 esteemed physician, and acquired high favour with 
 Darius. It is indeed remarkable that not any school 
 within Greece, but that of the distant colony of 
 Cyrene in Africa, held even the second rank in me- 
 dical reputation. But Crotona acquired extraordi- 
 nary renown also in another line : its air was esteemed 
 singularly salubrious ; whence the natives were sup- 
 posed to derive a peculiar firmness of muscle, with a 
 general superiority of strength and agility ; and no city 
 boasted so many victors in the athletic contests at the 
 Olympian games. Of the political system established 
 in Crotona by Pythagoras, or the scholars of Pytha- 
 goras, we have little or nothing on any good authority. 
 The later Greeks alone mention it ; while the earlier 
 agree in ascribing all that was most valuable in legis- 
 lation among the Italian and Sicilian cities to Zaleucus 
 and Charondas. That the arts however flourished, the 
 Crotoniat medals, yet remaining, testify ; and the 
 reputation of the physical school, in the want of 
 authentic information more precise, would suffice 
 to mark Crotona for a populous, wealthy, and well-
 
 CROTONA. l6l 
 
 regulated city, where security and leisure were en- SECT. 
 joyed for the pursuit of science, and means for its 
 encouragement. 6 
 
 6 The accounts given by Diodorus, and other ancient writers, 
 of the wonderful populousness of Crotona, and still much more 
 of Sybaris, in themselves utterly improbable, are not only un- 
 authorised, but virtually contradicted by the earlier Greek 
 authors. They have therefore been rejected from the text; yet, 
 as they have not only been followed by modern writers on the 
 subject, but are countenanced by the respectable authority of 
 Strabo among the ancients, it may be proper to take some farther 
 notice of them in a note. The Sybarites, according to Diodorus, 
 marched against Crotona, forming an army of three hundred 
 thousand citizens. The Crotoniats met them with only one 
 hundred thousand ; but their general Milo, habited and armed 
 in the wild manner ascribed by the poets to Hercules, was himself 
 equal to half an army ; and the astonishing slaughter, which he 
 made with his club, was a principal cause of the victory, in con- 
 sequence of which Sybaris was destroyed. Strabo also reports 
 that the Sybarite army was of three hundred thousand men : 
 but he has not, like Diodorus, called them citizens ; so that, 
 admitting his account, the greater part might be slaves. Before 
 this event, according to Justin, 1. 20. c. 3. et 4., (though he makes 
 no mention of the event itself,) but after it, as it should seem 
 from Strabo, 1.6. p. 261., a hundred and thirty thousand Cro- 
 toniats were defeated by the Locrians and Rhegians. This then 
 will deserve notice : Strabo informs us that Herodotus the 
 historian accompanied the Athenian colony which raised Thurium 
 on the ruins of Sybaris, about sixty years, according to Diodorus, 
 after its overthrow ; and the authority of Strabo here is sup- 
 ported by a passage in the history itself of Herodotus which has 
 manifestly been written in Italy, and for the Italian Greeks. 
 The traditions preserved among the descendants of the Sybarites 
 concerning their city, as well as those of their conquerors, have 
 evidently enough been known to him. But if only a report 
 remained of such a superiority of population in the Italian cities 
 over those of Greece, it must have been striking. It never was 
 nor can be imputed to Herodotus that he was backward to relate 
 reports ; and yet, though he mentions the destruction of Sybaris, 
 with some disputed circumstances concerning it, he has not a 
 syllable of the extraordinary numbers of the Sybarite and Cro- 
 
 VOL. II. M
 
 62 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. The other Italian Greek cities, of which Cuma, 
 Rhegium, Locri-Epizephyrii, Tarentum, Brundu- 
 sium were populous and rich, are scarcely objects for 
 
 toniat armies. Herodotus and Thucydides are very seldom 
 found in contradiction ; and the silence of the latter upon this 
 occasion strongly confirms the negative testimony of the former; 
 for Thucydides, professedly enumerating all the Grecian states 
 which had been eminent for military power, and mentioning 
 the naval strength of the Sicilian tyrants, far inferior to what 
 Athens afterward possessed (Thucyd. 1.1. c. 14.), could not 
 through ignorance, and would not through design, have omitted 
 all notice of those immense armies of the Italian Greeks, to which 
 no other Grecian state ever had anything comparable, had such 
 armies existed. It is farther observable that Aristotle mentions 
 Sybaris only to quote an instance of sedition. The name I be- 
 lieve never occurs in Plato's works, and the name of Crotona is 
 mentioned by neither of them : an omission utterly unaccount- 
 able but upon the supposition that the effects attributed by later 
 writers to the doctrine of Pythagoras were, for some ages after 
 the time to which they are ascribed, unheard of. We may indeed 
 wonder where later writers, and particularly Cicero (Cic. Tusc. 
 Quaest. 1. 1. c/16. and 1. 4. c. 1.), had their information. Herodo- 
 tus, who mentions Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus (1. 4. c. 90.), 
 as an eminent sophist in Samos, has not taken the least notice of 
 his residence in Italy. Plato, in the same passage in which he 
 speaks of Charondas as the admired legislator of the Sicilian and 
 Italian Greeks, mentions Pythagoras in contradistinction to the 
 great reformers of republics, as a private teacher, singularly be- 
 loved and respected indeed by his disciples, but the mere founder 
 of a sect. (Plat, de Rep. 1. 10. p. 599, 600. t. 2.) It is there 
 only in Plato's works that his name occurs. Aristotle (Ethic. 
 1. 1 . c. 1.) mentions him as the first who attempted to teach moral 
 philosophy among the Greeks, and refers to his physical and 
 metaphysical doctrines, but nowhere gives the least hint that 
 he was even a speculative politician. Isocrates (Busir. Encom. 
 p. 4<02. t. 2.) also affirms that he was the first who brought phi- 
 losophy into Greece, and that he introduced new magnificence 
 in religious ceremonies ; but of his politics he says nothing. 
 The earliest testimony, in any extant author, to the Pythago- 
 reans of Italy, is that of Polybius (1. 2. p. 126.) : of Pythagoras 
 himself that author makes no mention. In short, what remains
 
 CROTONA. 163 
 
 history, but as they become occasionally connected SECT. 
 in transactions with states of greater political import- 
 ance. To avoid interruption therefore in the account 
 of the affairs of the leading republics of Greece, it 
 may be convenient here to look forward to some of 
 those transactions of the Italian states which princi- 
 pally deserve attention. 
 
 Among the consequences of the conquest of Sybaris 
 by the Crotoniats, one is recorded, which particularly 
 merits notice; because, though now of extraordinary 
 appearance, yet, in the early ages, it was so far from 
 uncommon, that it forms one among the charac- 
 teristical marks of difference between the political 
 state of the ancient and of the modern w r orld. The 
 Sybarite territory, chiefly a plain, watered by the 
 little rivers Sybaris and Crathis, of no great extent, s'traboV 
 but uncommon fertility, scarcely forty miles from the l - 6 - ? 263> 
 
 from earlier writers concerning this celebrated philosopher is 
 next to nothing ; later accounts are contradictory, and abound 
 with gross and palpable fictions. ' Ne' libri che si leggono,' 
 as the learned Florentine doctor Antonio Cocchi, in his treatise 
 concerning the Pythagorean diet, observes, ' ci si vede far figura, 
 ' or di operator di miracoli per la sua bonta, ed ora di mago 
 ' ridicolo e d'impostore.' That the Samian Pythagoras was emi- 
 nent among the earliest fathers of Grecian philosophy is clearly 
 established ; but that he was a legislator the silence of all the 
 earlier writers, and especially of Aristotle, seems to confute. 
 
 The passage of Herodotus which proves that a part of his 
 history was written in Italy, and for the Italian Greeks, is in 
 his fourth book; where, after describing some circumstances 
 of the Tauric Chersonese, he illustrates them, for the inhabitants 
 of Proper Greece, by a comparison with some circumstances 
 of Attica ; but as this might be no illustration for many of 
 those among whom he then lived, he proceeds thus : *O<; 8e rfc 
 
 'ArTKyi; Tavrot, (MI ira.pa,TrTfX&)K, eyu Se aXXw? 8ijX<y<7&>* u<; el T^?, 
 aXXo e6vo<;, Kod JM] 'lynvyei;, apfa/x.ei'Oi e'/c 'Bpevreo'tov 
 tro /At%pt Tapavro?, /cal vepo/aro ryv an^v. 1. 4. C. 99. 
 M 2
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, conquering city Crotona, and adjoining, or nearly so, 
 . to its domain, after the destruction of the city lay 
 
 fifty-eight years unoccupied. The Crotoniats were 
 unable to protect their own people in the cultivation 
 of it, and their jealousy, perhaps a reasonable jea- 
 lousy, deterred others. At length some Thessalians 
 ventured to attempt a settlement there ; but they 
 were quickly expelled by the Crotoniats. Not thus 
 however totally discouraged, associating such remnant 
 of the Sybarite people as they could collect, they ap- 
 plied first to Lacedosmon and then to Athens for 
 support. It was little in the general disposition of 
 the Lacedaemonian government to engage in such 
 enterprises ; and, its circumstances at the time being 
 adverse, as occasion will occur to observe more par- 
 ticularly in the sequel, nothing was obtained there. 
 The circumstances of Athens, on the contrary, made 
 such an application welcome. Under authority of 
 the Athenian government, a proclamation was pub- 
 lished over Greece to engage volunteers for the 
 colony. To give efficacy to this, an encouraging re- 
 sponse was procured from the oracle of Delphi ; and 
 ten ships of war, under the command of Lampon and 
 Xenocritus, were furnished for the expedition. The 
 strabo, adventurers became numerous, and some were of enii- 
 Diog.Laert. nencc ; particularly Herodotus the historian, Prota- 
 L y r. r or. a fon. g oras the philosopher, scholar of Democritus, and 
 Eratosth. Lysias, son of Cephalus, the friend of Socrates, him- 
 self afterwards the celebrated rhetorician, many of 
 whose orations remain extant. Measures were wisely 
 taken ; and the colony was established, as far as ap- 
 pears, without opposition. The chosen spot was at 
 a small distance from the ancient site of Sybaris, 
 where the fountain Thuria afforded the advantage of 
 a plentiful supply of water. The town was built on
 
 THURIUM. 165 
 
 a regular plan, with three streets crossing four others SECT. 
 at right angles ; and the ancient name being rejected, 
 as of ill omen, the colonists assumed the appellation 
 of Thurians, and the town was called Thuria or 
 Thurium. 7 A constitution was framed for the new 
 state, according to Diogenes Laertius, by Protagoras. 
 Probably he took the system of Charondas for his 
 model, and thence may have arisen the mistake of 
 Diodorus, who attributes to Charondas the honour of 
 having founded the Thurian constitution. 
 
 When the advantageous circumstances under which 
 this colony was established are considered, the un- 
 common abilities and uncommon power of the patron 
 of the undertaking, (the great minister of Athens, 
 Pericles,) the superiority of the men engaged in it, 
 and the celebrity of the laws under which it long 
 flourished, and we then look forward to what remains 
 of its history, it is at the same time curious and shock- 
 ing to find how little personal security was enjoyed 
 under the best politcial constitutions of that age; 
 how much less than under those governments of 
 modern Europe which we, under a better constitu- 
 tion, are accustomed most to reprobate and despise ; 
 and then, while we exult in the singular blessings 
 which we ourselves enjoy, we may be less disposed to 
 blame others, who, in political circumstances far less 
 fortunate, choose yet rather to rest under the lot de- 
 
 7 Aeyera* 8e Qovpta, KOU Qovpiov. Schol. in Aristoph. Nub. 
 v. 331. Diodorus has transmitted the ichnography of Thurium 
 and the names of the streets. The four parallel streets were 
 called Heraclea, Aphrodisias, Olympias, Dionysius ; or Her- 
 cules-street, Venus-street, Olympia-street, and Bacchus-street. 
 Instead of favourite deities an analogous superstition, in the same 
 country, in modern times, would have named them from some 
 favourite saints. The other streets were called Heroa, Thuria, 
 and Thurina. 
 
 M 3
 
 166 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, rived from their ancestors than risk the horrors of 
 ' civil war, to obtain, with final success, perhaps only 
 a revival of those miseries with which most of the 
 ancient republics abounded, and from which the hap- 
 piest were never secure. 8 All the wise regulations 
 of Protagoras could not prevent the growth of sedi- 
 
 t. Poiit. tion in Thurium. Disputes arose early between the 
 
 1. 5. c. 3. f , -I i o i 
 
 strabo, foreign colonists and the oybantes who were asso- 
 
 1.6. p. 263. c | a j. e( j ^jj them; and those disputes ended only 
 
 with the massacre of a part, and the final dispersion 
 of the rest, of that remnant of unfortunate people. 
 
 A remnant of the Sybarite people nevertheless 
 survived, and it may be ventured even to add that 
 they flourished; though ancient history has left scarcely 
 three words about them. We are uninformed whether 
 it was in the exuberance of the population of Sybaris 
 that the colony was sent out, or in the calamity of 
 the city that a portion of its people fled, to that ex- 
 tensive bay on the western coast of Italy, now called 
 the gulf of Salerno ; where the Greek city of Posi- 
 DONIA, otherwise named P^ESTUM, acknowledged Sy- 
 baris for its mother-country. To this day the mag- 
 nificent remains of the public buildings of that place, 
 amid the desolation surrounding them, interest as 
 they astonish the curious traveller, whether ancient 
 political history, or the history of the arts, or art 
 itself be his object ; while the obscurity and almost 
 nullity of tradition concerning them afford endless 
 room for conjecture. 
 
 It were difficult to say what advantage the world 
 may or may not derive from those speculations on the 
 ancient state of mankind, those visionary inquiries 
 
 8 This sentiment was deduced simply from Grecian history ; 
 having been long written, and some time published, before 
 France began to exhibit horrors beyond all recorded example.
 
 P^ESTUM. 167 
 
 into ancient history, in prosecution of which so much SECT. 
 ingenuity hath of late been employed, to overthrow 
 every traditionary testimony transmitted by the earliest 
 writers. But when, on one side, we see it asserted 
 that what have been four thousand years the finest 
 climates of our globe were in its first ages unin- 
 habitable through excess of heat, and that all science 
 had its birth in the now frozen regions of Tartary, 
 then alone, by their height above the ocean, affording 
 that temperature of air in which men could live; 
 when, on the other, we find not less force of erudition 
 or of reason engaged in the attempt to show that the 
 progress of things has been the reverse ; and that the 
 first civilised nations lived on a portion of the globe 
 now covered to the depth of many hundred fathom 
 by the Atlantic ocean ; it seems probable that, these 
 militating systems destroying one another, the fashion 
 of all will pass ; and that learned men, however 
 wishing for better information about the early state 
 of mankind than the oldest authors furnish, may 
 nevertheless come to acknowledge that better is not 
 likely to be obtained. In the spirit of inventive his- 
 tory it has been a supposition of late cherished by 
 some among the curious and learned, that the noble 
 piles whose ruins remain at Paestum, as well as the 
 various existing monuments of the arts of ancient 
 Etruria, have been the produce of science and im- 
 provement not derived from Greece or the East, but 
 the native growth of Italy; or however that, whether 
 Italy received the arts from the lofty plains of Tartary, 
 or from the submerged Atlantic continent, she had 
 them before Greece, and at least assisted the eastern 
 nations in communicating them to that country. I 
 would avoid long discussion of matters which are 
 rather of the province of the antiquarian ; and indeed 
 
 M 4
 
 168 
 
 CHAP. 
 X. 
 
 Ch.5. s.2. 
 of this Hist. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1.6. c.34. 
 et al. 
 Xen. Hel. 
 1.6. c. 2. 
 s. 17, 18. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 upon the subject in question it seems enough for the 
 . historian that neither Cicero, with all his partiality 
 for Italy, and all his diligence, and all his means of 
 inquiry, nor Horace, with all his desire to gratify his 
 Etruscan patron, nor Virgil, nor Livy, nor Pliny 
 appears to have had the least suspicion that their 
 fellow-countrymen had any claim to the priority in 
 science and art which it has been proposed by some 
 learned moderns to attribute to them. Without 
 therefore adding anything to what has been already 
 said about Tuscany, I shall proceed to state some 
 circumstances, not alien from the purpose of Grecian 
 history, which may afford ground for estimating the 
 state of civilisation and improvement among the 
 inhabitants of the middle and southern parts of Italy, 
 previous to the migration of the first Grecian colonies 
 thither. 
 
 Occasion has heretofore occurred to mention that 
 CUMA, situated a few miles north-west of the present 
 city of Naples, was esteemed the oldest Grecian 
 colony westward of the Ionian sea. The distance of 
 Cuma from its mother-country Eubcea, and the 
 extent of barbarian shores that, in the coasting navi- 
 gation of the age, must be passed to reach it from any 
 part of Greece, here deserve consideration. Of the 
 course that was usually, or, it may be said, constantly 
 held, if storms did not force the navigator out of his 
 way, we are perfectly informed. The shores of Greece 
 were measured, in fair weather, from headland to 
 headland ; but if the sky threatened, it was along the 
 windings of the coast, as far as the island of Corcyra. 
 The navigator then became particularly anxious for 
 a serene sky and quiet water to cross the Ionian 
 gulf. Having made the lapygian promontory, if fair 
 weather continued, he would avoid the circuit of
 
 CUMA : CAMPANIA. 160 
 
 the gulf of Tareritum, and stretch away for the SECT. 
 Lacinian promontory, whence the coast would con- 
 duct him to the Messenian strait. The ancients seem 
 to have little known the art of profiting from any 
 wind that did not blow nearly in their course. The 
 wind therefore, which had favoured the navigator from 
 Eubcea to the southern capes of Peloponnesus, would 
 oppose his progress toward the Epirot coast. In 
 proceeding then to Messina, he would want another 
 change ; and to hold his way thence, between two and 
 three hundred miles northward to Cuma, a third ; or, 
 in defect of these, weather so calm as not to impede his 
 oars. The course from the nearest part of Greece to 
 Cuma would be, even with favouring weather, about 
 six hundred miles, and from Eubcea near a thousand. 
 
 With this length of navigation, and these diffi- 
 culties insuperable from it, difficulties with which the 
 Mediterranean coasting seamen are to this day well 
 acquainted, the settlers at Cuma, it is evident, must 
 rest their safety upon their own strength, com- 
 pared with that of those who were likely to oppose 
 them, and not upon any assistance to be expected 
 from Greece. Those adventurers then, so risking 
 themselves out of all reach of support from home, 
 chose for their settlement no barren and worthless 
 corner, likely to be neglected in a country which had 
 
 any civilised inhabitants, but a critical post, on the Poiyb. 
 
 J . i ii ,1.3. p. 336. 
 
 verge of the CAMPANIAN plain, emphatically named strabo, 
 the Happy Campania, the richest, and, from earliest 1 5 ' p- 243 ' 
 ages, the most coveted part of Italy. The local cir- 
 cumstances deserve notice ; and the whole Cumasan 
 territory is so trodden by travellers, for the sake of 
 the antiquities, the natural curiosities, and the pic- 
 turesque beauties with ^ which it abounds, that in 
 speaking of it I shall speak of what is more familiar
 
 170 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, to many English readers than most parts of their 
 own country ; and its features are so characteristical 
 that to those who never saw it a good map may give 
 sufficient assistance. 
 
 At the foot of the mountains which occupy so 
 large a portion of the interior of Italy, the Cam- 
 panian plain stretches about fifty miles in length, 
 from the Massic hills to those which divide the bay 
 of Naples from that of Salerno, and sometimes twenty 
 in width, from the Apennine to the sea. The in- 
 clination of the ground suffices, in most parts, to give 
 course to the streams which cross this plain, and yet 
 scarcely any visible inequality interrupts the apparent 
 level of the surface, except where a series of volcanoes 
 has given form to the coast, from the bay of Cuma 
 to the bay of Stabia. Of the hills however in this 
 tract, except Vesuvius, none are too high for cul- 
 tivation ; and the subterranean fires, which produced 
 them, had long been quiet before the Greeks became 
 acquainted with them ; even Vesuvius having been 
 unknown to any ancient writer as a burning moun- 
 tain till the eruption happened which destroyed Her- 
 culaneum and Pompeii. 9 
 
 When Megasthenes, with his band of Euboean 
 adventurers, arrived on the Campanian coast, the bay 
 of Baise, one of the best roadsteads that the Italian 
 shores afford, presented harbours so commodious for 
 the vessels of the age that they might have fixed the 
 choice of those whose object was either commerce or 
 piracy. But Megasthenes looked to greater things. 
 
 9 The Cumaean territory was however known to be volcanic 
 ground as early as Pindar's time, as we learn from his first 
 Pythian ode. Perhaps Mount Epomeus, in the neighbouring 
 island of Ischia, might then emit flame. For this Strabo may 
 be seen, 1. 5. p. 24-8.
 
 CAMPANIA: CUMA. 171 
 
 The Oscans, who then held the Campanian plain, are SECT. 
 said to have won it by arms from the Ausonians ; 
 yet the evident weakness of those barbarian con- 
 querors excited a hope that so rich a possession 
 might be ravished from them. This view seems to 
 have directed the founder in choosing the site of his 
 town : and for the three purposes of security to a 
 garrison, of commanding an extent of coast abounding 
 with harbours, and of carrying on enterprise against 
 the possessors of the plain, a spot could not perhaps 
 have been more judiciously selected than the rocky 
 summit, toward the western end of the volcanic hills, 
 and at some distance from the shore, where the ruins 
 of the castle of Cuma still remain. Immediately 
 below is a small plain, guarded on the land side by 
 the castle and by the hills themselves ; and so pro- 
 tected toward the sea, by marshes, lakes, and broken 
 ground, that a small force might defend it against a 
 large one. This plain, in the infancy of the colony 
 perhaps nearly sufficing to supply it with bread, 
 became, in its increase, as relics everywhere still to be 
 discovered testify, in large proportion covered by the 
 city and its appendages. For his port Megasthenes 
 chose, not the harbour of Misenum, whose superior 
 advantages, considered by themselves, decided the 
 Romans afterward to make it their principal naval 
 arsenal, but a spot preferable for his purpose, on 
 account of its readier communication with Cuma, 
 where the town of Dicaearchia was built, better 
 known afterward by the Roman name Puteoli. 
 
 The early success of the Eubrean adventurers 
 answered the prudence with which their measures 
 appear to have been concerted ; for, though at what 
 time and through what struggles we are uninformed, 
 
 they conquered the Campanian plain. But they were 1>5 ' P- 242>
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, not allowed the quiet enjoyment of so valuable an 
 ' acquisition ; the Tuscans, then in the height of their 
 power, whether solicited by the oppressed Oscans, 
 or incited merely by ambition and avarice, carried 
 their arms thither, and the force of Cuma was un- 
 equal to the contest. The Tuscans made themselves 
 complete masters of the plain ; they founded the city 
 of Capua, which became its capital ; and from them, 
 according to Strabo, descended the people afterward 
 known by the name of Campanians. 
 
 The Cumaeans, after this reverse, which extin- 
 guished their hope to become a considerable power 
 by land, nevertheless prospered as a maritime colony. 
 They extended their maritime settlements, and, in 
 spite of the force of Campania, vindicated to them- 
 selves the possession of the hills on the coast, at the 
 eastern extremity of which they built the town of 
 Naples. It was not till after they had flourished some 
 centuries that faction, the common bane of Grecian 
 cities, at length superinduced their ruin. The Cam- 
 strabo, 1.5. panians, with whom they seem to have had almost 
 246. perpetual warfare, thus first got footing in Naples ; 
 
 and afterward reduced Cuma itself. 10 
 
 Such then having been the weakness and barbarism 
 of the Italian tribes, the Tuscans alone excepted, 
 that, according to every testimony of Greek and 
 Roman writers, wherever almost a Grecian pirate 
 chose to form a settlement on the coast he found no 
 force among the natives capable of preventing his 
 purpose, it seems needless to seek for other proof that 
 such people were not the founders of those edifices 
 at Posidonia, which have existed now between two 
 
 10 According to Diodorus, in the fourth year of the eighty- 
 ninth Olympiad, the twelfth of the Peloponnesian war, and 420 
 before the Christian era. Diod. 1. 12. c. 76.
 
 LUCANIA. 173 
 
 and three thousand years, and survived, nine cen- SECT. 
 turies, the total destruction of the city. It appears 
 from Strabo that, when the Sybarite adventurers strabo, 
 arrived there, they found a town either unfortified, 6>p - 251 - 
 or fortified so slightly that the barbarous inhabitants 
 abandoned it almost without resistance, and betook 
 themselves to the neighbouring mountains. The 
 local circumstances were not such as the Greeks CH. i. s.s. 
 generally coveted for a settlement, yet such as they 
 sometimes accepted. The place was strong, not by a 
 lofty rock offering itself for a fortress, but by a marsh 
 on which it bordered, and by a stream with which 
 a surrounding ditch might be floated. These, with 
 the neighbourhood of the sea, and the extent and 
 fertility of the adjacent plain, were the advantages of 
 the situation. The inconveniences at the same time 
 were great. The neighbouring marsh infected the strabo, 
 air, and the water of the stream is brackish and un- <5 ' c - 251 - 
 wholesome. But security and sustenance were the 
 great objects of the Sybarites. Having fortified the 
 town, they thence commanded a large portion of the 
 plain ; and how they flourished, their works, now re- 
 maining amid wide desolation melancholy monuments 
 of past human grandeur, largely testify. 
 
 But though, in the early ages, a small body of 
 Sybarites, not the most renowned in arms among 
 the Greeks, was superior to any force the barbarian 
 Italians could oppose to them ; though a few fugitive Ch.6. s.i. 
 Phocasans from Asia Minor could establish them- 
 selves, and flourish in their settlement of Velia on the 
 LUCANIAN coast, which became one of the earliest 
 seats of philosophy ; yet in process of years, arts and 
 knowledge introducing themselves among the Italians, 
 their population and their political strength increased ; 
 and those who had been unable to oppose the infancy
 
 174< 
 
 CHAP, 
 
 ' 
 
 strabo, 
 ' - 5 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 of the Grecian towns could overpower their maturity. 
 Thus not only the Campanians, who came originally 
 fraught with all the arts of Etruria, reduced Cuma 
 and its dependencies, but the once savage Lucanians 
 conquered Posidonia and Velia. 11 Afterward, under 
 Roman protection, Posidonia prospered again with 
 the name of Paestum, survived the Roman empire in 
 the west, and about the beginning of the tenth cen- 
 tury, in one unhappy hour, received its total ruin 
 from the destructive hands of the Saracens. 12 
 
 11 Virgil, expressly bringing civilisation to Italy from Asia 
 Minor, 
 
 (.(Eneas - 
 
 Bellum ingens geret Italia, populosque feroces 
 
 Contundet, moresque viris et mcenia ponet. 
 
 jn. 1.1. v.263.) 
 
 attributes barbarian cruelty and ignorance particularly to the 
 tribes in the neighbourhood of Velia. Mn. 1. 6. v. 359. 366. 
 
 12 The style of the ruins of Paestum, nearly resembling that 
 of most of the temples remaining in Sicily, and of one of which 
 small relics only are left at Pompeii, differs from what is found 
 common in Greece and among the Grecian settlements in Asia, 
 by greater massiveness, and a characteristical simplicity. Hence 
 some have been disposed to infer that the Paestan, Sicilian, and 
 Pompeian buildings have all been anterior to the age to which 
 they are commonly attributed, and that they are Italian and not 
 Grecian architecture. But, without referring to the total want 
 of testimony to the existence of an Italian people capable of 
 teaching architecture to the Greeks, the following considerations 
 may account for the difference between the style of the Attic 
 and that of the Sicilian and Paestan buildings. Sybaris was 
 destroyed about eighteen years before the invasion of Greece by 
 Xerxes, and the buildings of Agrigentum, where the noblest 
 ruins of Sicily remain, were raised, according to Diodorus, im- 
 mediately after that event, when Athens was also to be restored, 
 after its complete destruction by the Persians. It is likely that 
 the Agrigentines and Sybarites would build in the style of their 
 forefathers : but we are well informed that the Athenians did 
 otherwise. Themistocles, who superintended the rebuilding of 
 Athens, splendid in his disposition, rather to excess, acquainted
 
 P^STUM. 175 
 
 with the elegancies of Asia Minor, and possessing power to SECT, 
 command the science, art, and taste of that country, would not I1 - 
 
 restore when he could improve. Cimon, who succeeded him in 
 
 the administration, was also remarkable for his magnificence; 
 and he too had seen whatever the Asiatic coast possessed of 
 great and beautiful. But the ornamental buildings of both 
 these great men were comparatively little to what were after- 
 ward raised under the superintendence of Pericles and the 
 direction of Phidias. The fame of the buildings of Athens then 
 spreading over Greece, a new style of architecture was intro- 
 duced gradually everywhere. The Ionic order had been im- 
 ported into Attica from Asia ; the Corinthian was soon after 
 invented by an Athenian architect ; and the Doric itself began 
 to change its ancient simple and massive grandeur, for more 
 embellishment, lightness, and grace. 
 
 Mistakes about things often arise from mistakes about names. 
 The order of architecture called Doric has been supposed, even 
 by Vitruvius, originally peculiar to the Dorian Greeks ; but 
 apparently, indeed almost evidently, without foundation. For 
 till after the age of Xerxes only one order of architecture, as we 
 are well assured, was known in Greece ; and that is not likely 
 to have had a name; because names arise only from the ne- 
 cessity of distinguishing in speech two or more things of the 
 same kind. But when the Ionic order was imported from 
 Ionia in Asia by the Athenians, who were themselves original 
 lonians, the term Ionic would naturally grow into use as a 
 distinguishing name for the new order; and then, and not before> 
 a name was wanted for the old one. Ionic and Doric being the 
 two great distinctions of the Greek nation, and the old style of 
 architecture holding its vogue among the Dorian cities, for some 
 time after the new one had been adopted by the Athenians, the 
 Doric name thus would as naturally adhere to the one as the 
 Ionic to the other.
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THAT 
 COMMONLY CALLED THE PERSIAN WAR TO THE ESTA- 
 BLISHMENT OF SECURITY FOR THE GREEKS AGAINST 
 THE BARBARIANS BY THE SUCCESSES OF CIMON. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 State of the known world at the time of the retreat of Xerxes 
 
 from Greece. Dedications, festivals, and monuments in Greece 
 
 occasioned by the victories over the Persians. Restoration of 
 
 Athens : jealousy of the Peloponnesians : administration of 
 
 Themistocles : parties at Athens: banishment of Themistocles. 
 
 CHAP. RETURNING to the period whence we digressed, 
 XI * and looking over the world as far as history may 
 carry the view, this appears to have been nearly the 
 state of things : toward the east, the Persian empire, 
 crippled for external exertion by immense waste of 
 men and treasure, nevertheless continued to hold its 
 power over almost all that was known of the Asiatic 
 continent ; for Scythia, though its formidable hordes 
 had military fame, as a country, may be said to have 
 been almost unknown. In the west, the rising power 
 of Carthage had been checked by the great defeat 
 received from the Greeks in Sicily ; Tuscany, divided 
 into several republics, was in a kind of natural decay ; 
 the growing strength of Rome, engaged in continual 
 struggles with little states in its immediate neigh- 
 bourhood, was hardly heard of beyond them ; the 
 southern Italians, excepting the Campanians, lived
 
 STATE OF THE KNOWN WORLD, ETC. 177 
 
 unpolished among their mountains ; the Greek cities SECT. 
 on the Italian coast unconnected, and thus in the 
 concerns of nations, inconsiderable, were nevertheless 
 prosperous and wealthy seats of science and arts ; the 
 Sicilian Greeks, united under the abilities of Gelon, 
 were the most powerful and flourishing people of the 
 Grecian name. Civilisation had hitherto moved in 
 a line eastward and westward, in the climate most 
 favourable for the first exertions of man in society ; 
 and was confined there to the countries in the most 
 favourable circumstances. Jt could not penetrate the 
 mountainous and frozen continent immediately north 
 of Greece. Under a more genial sky, Spain, though 
 a great object for Carthaginian commerce, affords 
 nothing for history ; and of the extensive country of 
 Gaul little was known beyond the small portion of 
 its coast washed by the Mediterranean, the most in- 
 viting spots of which were occupied by the Massilian 
 Greeks. Germany was one vast forest, impenetrable 
 to civilised man ; and Britain, esteemed almost be- 
 yond the limits of the world, was heard of only 
 through uncertain reports of traders 1 , Carthaginian 
 
 1 The earliest mention of the British islands, that has fallen 
 in my way, is that of Aristotle, in his treatise entitled, < On the 
 ' World.'* Great Britain, with the name of Albion, and Ireland, 
 with that of lerne, (the same evidently with the modern Celtic 
 name Erin,) were known to him to be islands, larger than any 
 in the Mediterranean, with many smaller islands, near their 
 shores ; and all together were called the BRETANIC ISLANDS. 
 Aristot. de Mundo, c. 3. In the age of Augustus, according 
 to the circumstantial and probable account of Diodorus, the 
 trade between the shores of the Mediterranean and those of 
 Britain was carried across Gaul, by using the ready advantage 
 of the rivers Rhone and Seine. Phenician or Carthaginian 
 
 [* The treatise wepi xos-pov is suspected not to be Aristotle's, and the very 
 passage to which Mr. Mitford here refers has been considered a proof that it is 
 the work of some other author. Indeed Mr. Mitford himself, quoting from it in 
 vol. i. p. 93., speaks less positively, and says that it is ' ascribed to Aristotle.'] 
 
 VOL. II. N
 
 178 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, or Phenician, unless the Massilian Greeks might 
 ' have already interfered in the distant and hazardous, 
 yet perhaps often lucrative, commercial adventure 
 hither. 
 
 Such was the state of the known world when the 
 Persian monarch withdrew from those great scenes 
 
 O 
 
 of action where his immense armies and fleets had 
 been destroyed, leaving to his officers, instead of the 
 splendid views of conquest with which the war had 
 been undertaken, the melancholy care to defend 
 
 barks may possibly have explored the length of hazardous coast 
 from the strait of Gibraltar to that of Dover, and so may have 
 reached Britain ; but I know of no ancient authority for the 
 notion of some modern writers, not, I think, duly considering 
 the imperfection of ancient navigation, that the commerce of 
 tin, the principal object of trade with Britain, was so carried on. 
 The situation of Massilia afforded advantage to the Greeks of 
 that eminent commercial republic, which, according to all indi- 
 cations, they used, for becoming masters of the trade with Gaul, 
 and through them probably came that knowledge, not of Britain 
 only, but also of the sea northward, which Aristotle possessed. 
 
 Ireland seems not then to have been known by any descrip- 
 tion but that of one of the Bretanic islands. Even Diodorus 
 mentions it without a distinguishing name, but Strabo describes 
 it by that of the ' Bretanic lerne.' The three writers agree in 
 calling all the islands, great and small collectively, ' the Bre- 
 < tanic Islands.' Diod. 1. 3. c. 38. Strabo, 1. 2. pp. 63. & 129. 
 
 When the crowns of England and Scotland were united, 
 James the First wisely promoted the abolition of habitual anti- 
 pathies, and assisted the foundation laid for uniting the people, 
 by affording them one common name, through the elegant title 
 he assumed of King of Great Britain. When the union was 
 lately formed with Ireland, it may seem that the same just po- 
 licy, and a similar sense of elegance, led to the Latin title which 
 his Majesty's ministers recommended. Why the English title 
 should so differ, has never been declared, and is not obvious. 
 Its unwieldly frame seems calculated for nothing but to exclude 
 the Irish from community in a name to which they have so old 
 and clear a title, and to prevent the advantage of such a com- 
 munity, which is important for people living under one govern- 
 ment.
 
 DEDICATIONS AND FESTIVALS. 179 
 
 the maritime provinces of his vast empire. Among SECT. 
 the Greeks on the other hand the late events, dis- 
 pelling those terrors of subjection to a foreign yoke 
 which had been long impending, gave them, in the 
 security of peace, to enjoy at leisure their exultation 
 in the wonderful and glorious deliverance, which, 
 under Divine Providence, their own valour and skill 
 in arms, and the wholesome institutions, prevailing 
 under pressure of necessity against the vices of their 
 governments, had procured for them. 
 
 The usual piety of the Grecian people, exerting 01. 75. . 
 itself upon this great occasion, was not limited to 
 the dedications made or decreed as already related, 
 immediately after the division of the Persian spoil. 
 Eighty talents of silver, allotted to Plataea, were em- 
 ployed by that heroic little commonwealth in building 
 a temple to Minerva, and adorning it with paintings 
 by the most eminent artists of the time, which were 
 preserved with so much care that they remained per- 
 fect above six hundred years, according to Plutarch's 
 testimony, to his time. A funeral solemnity was at Thucyd. 
 the same time instituted, to be annually performed by pi 3 ut . c ;. 08 ' 
 the Plataeans ; in which the first fruits of their country 
 were offered to the gods, preservers of Greece, and to 
 the souls of the heroes who had died in its defence ; 
 and this also remained in Plutarch's time. A festival 
 repeated every fifth year in commemoration of the 
 victory, probably not instituted till after the age of 
 Thucydides, who mentions only the annual ceremony, 
 was of similar duration. 
 
 After thanks to the gods, the merits of the men 
 who had fallen in their country's service were taken 
 into consideration. Means had not hitherto been 
 open for paying due honours to the heroism of those 
 who, in the preceding year, had fallen in the extra- 
 
 N 2
 
 180 HVSTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 Herodot. ordinary action under Leonidas. The care of their 
 Lycurg. or. obsequies, and of erecting monuments to perpetuate 
 c - Leocr. their well-earned fame, was now committed to the 
 or. Gr. ed. Amphictyonic Assembly. Two structures of marble 
 
 Reiske. i i i i c ^ i 
 
 strabo, marked the place or the engagement, with mscnp- 
 rHod P s1c 9 ti ns which remained many ages ; and which, having 
 1.11. c.33. been recorded by Herodotus, will probably be secured 
 
 Antholog. J . . i -1 i 
 
 by the press against perishing while the world shall 
 last. One was in honour of the Peloponnesians col- 
 lectively, without mentioning the other Greeks who, 
 under Leonidas, defended the pass ; the other com- 
 memorated only the Lacedaemonians who fell with 
 that prince. The simplicity of these inscriptions cha- 
 racterises the manners of the age ; and the partiality 
 to Peloponnesus and Lacedaemon marks the preva- 
 lence of Peloponnesian influence in the assembly. 
 They were, as was then usual, in verse. The former 
 may be literally translated thus : * Here four thou- 
 
 * sand men from Peloponnesus fought with three 
 
 * millions :' the other, * Stranger, tell the Lacedae- 
 1 monians that here we lie in obedience to their 
 < laws/ 2 
 
 2 Strabo says the monument, with the inscription, was in his 
 time still in its place. The inscription remains reported by 
 Herodotus, the Athenian orator Lycurgus, Strabo himself, Dio- 
 dorus, and others, with some little variations, which show that 
 some of them at least have trusted to memory. Cicero says it 
 was composed by Simonides, and he has given a Latin transla- 
 tion of it thus : 
 
 Die, hospes, Spartae nos te hie vidisse jaeentes, 
 Dum sanctis patriae legibus obsequimur. 
 
 M. T. Cic. Tusc. Quzest. 1. 1. c. 42. 
 
 The original is thus variously reported : 
 
 'ii E~V', ayytXXeiv AaxE^aif-uvioi^ O'TI T?Je 
 
 Ket/ueQa, TO?? xtivtov j/tiftairi miQofjttvoi. Herodot. 
 
 Lycurg. & Diod. 
 iV aira.yyti\w, x.. r. X. Strab.
 
 MONUMENTS OF THE SLAlN. 181 
 
 More pressing cares meanwhile engaged the Athe- SECT. 
 nians, the restoration of their country laid waste, and 
 of their city reduced to ruins and ashes : yet now, 
 according to Diodorus, they also instituted their Diod.sic. 
 public funeral anniversary; to which the superior ' n ' ' 33 ' 
 genius of their orators, who pronounced the praises 
 of the deceased, together with the political eminence 
 which their commonwealth acquired, gave afterward 
 a celebrity unequalled in other parts of Greece. 
 Public funerals in honour of those who had merited 
 highly of the commonwealth, as we learn from higher 
 authority, were of earlier date ; yet the ceremony Th cyd. 
 may have been now first established in that form 
 which became the rule for following times. Now 
 also probably were raised the columns or terms, 
 which remained many ages, on the barrows covering 
 the bodies of those who fell in the field of Marathon ; 
 for it is little likely that monuments erected for such 
 a purpose would have escaped the destructive hands 
 of the Persians, and of those Greeks who sided with 
 the Persians, while they possessed the country. Pau- Pausan. 
 sanias, visiting the spot above six hundred years after, 
 found them, with the inscribed names of the slain, 
 still perfect. One barrow covered the Athenians, 
 another the Plataeans, together with the slaves; and, 
 to make some amends to the memory of Militiades 
 for the ingratitude with which he had been treated 
 when living, though he had not fallen in the field, a 
 particular monument to his honour was erected there. 3 
 
 3 The inscription on the Athenian barrow remains reported 
 by the orator Lycurgus thus : 
 
 *EXAvw 7rpon*a^o3vTf 'AfSuvaToi MapaSaivi 
 Xfvirotyofan Mriboev lo-ropstrav SuvajM.iv. 
 
 ' The Athenians, fighting at Marathon as the advanced guard 
 
 * of the Greek nation, overthrew the force of the gold-bearing 
 
 * Medes.' 
 
 N 3
 
 182 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. The Athenians, in retaking possession of the site 
 of their city, found only a small part of the walls stand- 
 
 Thucyd. m & w ith a f ew Bouses which had been reserved for 
 1. 1. c. 89. the residence of the principal Persian officers. During 
 the past summer Themistocles appears to have been 
 in no public situation. Some jealousy excited by the 
 Herodot. high distinction shown him at Sparta, and too boast- 
 i>io'dor. ' ful a display of his own glory, had given disgust, and 
 p/ut v 27 the chief commands had been committed to Aristides 
 Themist. and Xanthippus. In the following autumn however, 
 when the reparation of the ravages of war came under 
 deliberation, Themistocles again stepped forward, 
 again found means to acquire the favour, and through 
 that favour to become the ruler of the Athenian people. 
 In restoring the city, which was the most urgent 
 business, the late events would impress strongly upon 
 their minds the necessity of providing, in the most 
 effectual manner possible, for its future security. 
 What others were anxious for, each with a view to 
 his domestic ease, Themistocles urged to promote 
 the political greatness of his country, to which he 
 looked for the foundation of his own greatness. At 
 Thucyd. his instigation therefore it was determined to post- 
 pone every thing to the completion of the fortifica- 
 tions ; and these were put under his direction. A 
 larger space was marked out than had been included 
 within the former walls, and the work was prosecuted 
 with the most zealous diligence. 
 
 While the Athenians were thus employed in repair- 
 ing the past mischiefs of war, and providing against 
 the future, the Lacedemonians, who had suffered no- 
 thing but the loss of a very inconsiderable proportion 
 of their citizens, had full leisure to contemplate the 
 state of things around them, and the probable con- 
 sequences of the late events. They had long been
 
 JEALOUSY OF THE PELOPONNESIANS. 183 
 
 accustomed, not only to esteem themselves, but to SECT. 
 be esteemed by all Greece, as the superior state, en- 
 titled by a kind of prescriptive right to take the lead 
 in all common concerns of the nation. This right 
 had been disputed hitherto only by the Argives, who 
 still claimed hereditary pre-eminence, transmitted, as 
 they urged, from the Danaidean, Persidean, and Pe- 
 lopidean monarchs, through the elder branch of the 
 Heraclidean family. But Argos, continually torn by isocrat. ad 
 internal faction, and weakened by almost every ex- p.aVo.'t. i. 
 ternal war in which it had been engaged, wanted ed - Au s er - 
 force to support its claim ; while Sparta had the ad- 
 vantage, in public opinion, of boasting the regular 
 descent of its reigning princes from Hercules, Pelops, 
 and Perseus, with the more solid advantage of pos- 
 sessing superior military strength ; and this farther 
 supported by the confidence of the Peloponnesian 
 states in the wisdom and steadiness, which, through 
 the superiority of its constitution, seldom failed to 
 appear in its counsels. But the late transactions had 
 brought forward a people hitherto of very inferior 
 political weight among the Grecian states, of very 
 inferior military power, and of the Ionian race, far 
 inferior, in general estimation, to the Dorian. This 
 rising state had been nearly crushed under the over- 
 whelming pressure of the Persian arms ; but what 
 had threatened its annihilation directed its strength 
 to a new mode of exertion, through which it had 
 acquired a new kind of power, to an amount that 
 Lacedaemon could not hope immediately to rival. 
 A jealousy thus unavoidably arose, and every motion 
 of the Athenians was watched with suspicious atten- 
 tion ; a jealousy, according to the candid Thucydides, Thucyd. 
 greater among some of the allies of Laceda?mon than 
 among the Lacedaemonians themselves. 
 
 N 4
 
 184 
 
 Ol. 75. J.4 
 B.C. 477* 
 Diodor. 
 1.11. c.39, 
 Plut. & 
 Corn. Nep. 
 v. Themist. 
 Justin. 
 1. 2. c. 15. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1.1. c.90. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 No sooner therefore were the new fortifications of 
 Athens begun than the JEginetans, whose ancient 
 enmity had been smothered, not extinguished, by 
 the terrors of the Persian invasion, sent ministers to 
 excite the interference of Sparta. A remonstrance 
 came in consequence to Athens. * Experience,' it 
 was urged, ' had proved, that Athens, however for- 
 
 * tified, could not withstand the force of the Persian 
 
 * empire. The erection therefore of fortifications, 
 
 * beyond Peloponnesus, was but forming a strong- 
 ' hold for the enemy ; and the common interest of 
 
 * Greece required rather that all fortified places, 
 
 * so situate, should be dismantled. Peloponnesus 
 ' would suffice as a temporary retreat for all who 
 
 * should be obliged to quit their possessions in the 
 ' more exposed part of the country.' Such, we are 
 told by Thucydides, was the avowed policy, not of 
 the Lacedaemonians only, but of all their Peloponne- 
 sian allies. If these arguments should immediately 
 be enforced by arms, Athens was not in condition to 
 resist: to temporise was necessary; and the conduct 
 of Themistocles, upon this occasion, has been cele- 
 brated as a masterpiece of policy, where nothing was 
 omitted by which a genius equally fertile, pliable, 
 and daring could prosecute its purpose. To the 
 Lacedemonian ministers, who brought the remon- 
 strance, it was answered that * Their government 
 
 * must certainly have been misinformed, both of what 
 ' was doing and what was intended by the Athenian 
 ' people. Athens was not, like Lacedsemon, an in- 
 
 * land town : near as it lay to the coast, if totally 
 
 4 This date and the next are conjectural. Dodwell is evi- 
 dently wrong in supposing the walls completed, as well as all 
 the negotiations about them, within the year. [* B. C. 478. 
 ' The Athenians rebuild their walls, and complete the walls of 
 ' the Piraeus.' Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 254-.]
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF THEMISTOCLES. 185 
 
 c unfortified, it would be liable to insult from every SECT. 
 
 * daring pirate. But, for their own sakes, not less 
 
 * than for the common interest of Greece, (for which 
 ' of all Grecian people surely the Athenians least 
 ' merited the suspicion of deficient zeal,) they would 
 ' be careful not to form strong-holds for the common 
 
 * enemy. Ambassadors should however be imme- 
 
 * diately sent to Lacedaemon, who should account 
 
 * satisfactorily for the proceedings of the Athenian 
 
 * government.' With this reply the Lacedaemonians 
 were dismissed, according to the usual practice of the 
 Greeks, the jealous temper of whose little common- 
 wealths did not readily admit any long residence of 
 foreigners in a public character. 
 
 Themistocles himself undertook the embassy to 
 Sparta ; and, to give it all possible weight and dig- 
 nity, as among the ancients an embassy commonly 
 consisted of more than one person, Aristides was Thucyd. 
 appointed to accompany him, together with Abrony- 
 chus, otherwise known only as the officer command- CLS. s.4. 
 ing the vessel stationed at Thermopylae to communi- 
 cate between the army under Leonidas and the fleet 
 at Artemisium. 5 Themistocles hastened his journey; 
 but he provided that his colleagues, or at least one 
 of them, should be detained till the walls of the city 
 were of such a height as to give some security to a 
 garrison. In the prosecution of the work the zeal 
 of the people seconded the policy of their leader: 
 freemen did not scruple to toil among slaves; the 
 very women and children would assist for whatever 
 their strength and skill were equal to ; reliefs were 
 established, so that in no hour of the day or night 
 was the business intermitted; and, to save the time 
 which the preparation of materials would have con- 
 
 5 The name of his father, Lysicles, mentioned both by He- 
 rodotus and Thucydides, identifies him.
 
 186 
 
 CHAP. 
 XI. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1.1. c.131. 
 
 Pint. v. 
 Themist. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 ut sup. 
 Demosth. 
 in Leptin. 
 p. 478.;t. 1. 
 ed. Reiske. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 sumed, whatever could serve the purpose was taken, 
 wherever it could be found, from the remains of build- 
 ings public and private, and even from the tombs. 
 The patchwork thus occasioned, Thucydides observes, 
 was evident in his time, in the external appearance 
 of the walls of Athens. 
 
 Themistocles meanwhile arriving at Sparta was in 
 no haste to open the business of his embassy. When 
 at length urged by the Spartan ministry, he excused 
 himself by saying, * He waited for his colleagues, who 
 
 * had been detained by some business for which their 
 
 * presence was indispensable ; but he expected them 
 
 * hourly, and indeed wondered they were not yet 
 ' arrived.' The Lacedemonians, it appears, even at 
 home, notwithstanding the severity of their institu- 
 tions, were not universally inaccessible to bribery ; and 
 of the expertness of Themistocles in the use of that 
 engine of policy instances are recorded. Plutarch 
 mentions it as reported by the historian Theopompus 
 that he found means to corrupt even some of the 
 Ephors. Certain it is that, through his management, 
 time was gained for the Athenians to execute a very 
 great work. The progress made however could not 
 remain entirely unknown at Lacedaemon, and Themi- 
 stocles was reproached with it. In reply, he denied 
 that the Lacedaemonians had any just information 
 upon the subject, and urged that it ill became them 
 to found their proceedings upon unauthenticated re- 
 ports. * Let men of sufficient rank,' he said, ' and 
 
 * unimpeachable character be sent to Athens, whom 
 
 * the Athenians may respect, and in whom yourselves 
 
 * may place entire confidence. I will remain a hostage 
 
 * in your hands, to insure the proper conduct of 
 
 * the Athenian people.' This requisition, boldly put, 
 appearing in itself not unreasonable, was complied
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF THEMISTOCLES. 187 
 
 with. Three persons of the first consequence in La- SECT. 
 
 cedaemon were sent to Athens ; where, in pursuance 
 
 of directions from Themistocles, they were received 
 
 and treated with the utmost respect, but secretly Thucyd. 
 
 watched; and effectual measures were taken to pre- l ' 1 ' c ' 91 ' 
 
 vent their departure, should any violence or restraint 
 
 be put upon the Athenian ambassadors. 
 
 Not till the walls of Athens were advanced to that 
 height which was, according to the expression of 
 Thucydides, most indispensably necessary to give due 
 advantage to a garrison, Aristides and Abronychus 
 joined Themistocles at Sparta. The senate being then 
 assembled, gave audience to the embassy ; and The- 
 mistocles, laying aside that dissimulation which was 
 no longer necessary, declared that, * By the last in- 
 4 telligence received, he had the satisfaction to learn 
 ' that Athens was now sufficiently fortified for its 
 
 * security. The Lacedaemonians/ he added, * and 
 
 * their allies, whenever they communicated with the 
 ' Athenians by embassies, ought to consider them as 
 6 a people capable of judging both what their own 
 4 interest and what the common cause required. 
 
 * With regard to the object of their present meeting, 
 4 all Greece surely ought to rejoice in the restoration 
 1 of a city whose people, by their counsels, their 
 ' actions, and their sufferings, had demonstrated that 
 
 * they consulted the interest of the whole nation not 
 ' less than their own : nor would the Lacedaemonians 
 ' themselves blame what had been done, unless they 
 
 * would prove to the world that, not the welfare of 
 f Greece, but the extension of their own command, 
 ' was the object of their solicitude.' Whatever the 
 Lacedemonians might feel upon this occasion, the 
 steady wisdom, usual in their administration, showed 
 itself in the suppression of all appearance of resent- c.92.
 
 188 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. ment. No reproaches of any kind were vented ; but, 
 on the contrary, a civil apology was made for the 
 interference of the Lacedaemonian government in a 
 matter concerning whioh the Athenian people, it was 
 acknowledged, were to decide for themselves ; though 
 admonition (which was all that had been intended) 
 to an ally, and concerning a point in which it was 
 supposed the common interest and that of the Athe- 
 nian people were one, could not be improper. The 
 ambassadors of each state then returned home : and 
 thus, by a train of conduct hazardous to comment 
 upon, for its policy admirable, for its morality doubt- 
 ful, yet commendable at least for its patriotism, 
 Themistocles delivered his country from imminent 
 danger of falling under the yoke of Lacedaemon, im- 
 mediately after, and almost as a consequence of, its 
 glorious exertions and heroic sufferings in the com- 
 mon cause against Persia. 
 
 This important and difficult negotiation thus suc- 
 cessfully concluded, the views of Themistocles were 
 yet but opening. Amid all her sufferings from the 
 Persian war, Athens, through the superior abilities 
 of her leaders, had been gradually rising to a rank 
 far above what she had formerly held among the 
 Grecian states. It had been the ancient policy, we 
 are told, of the Athenian government, to discourage 
 maritime commerce and a turn to naval affairs among 
 the people ; relying upon agriculture as the source 
 of wealth, and the land force as the means of being 
 secure and respectable. Themistocles had already 
 successfully combated this policy, with the highest, 
 most undeniable, and most flattering advantage to 
 the commonwealth ; for Athens not only owed the 
 preservation even of its existence to its navy, but for 
 the last two years had existed almost only in its iiavy;
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF THEMISTOCLES. 189 
 
 and this navy was become, not only superior in SECT. 
 strength to that of any other Grecian state, but 
 superior, by the glory of its actions, to any the world 
 had yet known. It was now the purpose of Themi- 
 stocles, after having given security to the Athenian 
 people, to lead them to empire; and with this view he 
 extended his favourite policy to a very extraordinary 
 length. The circumstances of the times had indeed 
 already gone far in preparing the business ; for they 
 had made almost all the Athenian people seamen : 
 his object was to keep them so always. 
 
 The first thing wanting was a sufficient port. The Thucyd. 
 Attic shore, in the part nearest to the city, had three ' ' c ' 93 ' 
 nearly adjoining inlets, named, from three adjacent 
 villages, Phalerum, Munychia, and Piraeus. Pha- 
 lerum, nearest of the three to the city, had been 
 hitherto the principal harbour and arsenal ; and it 
 had sufficed for all the purposes of the state, when, 
 without assistance from Corinth, Athens could not 
 meet at sea the inhabitants of the ^Eginetan rock. 
 But it was insufficient for the actual navy, and still 
 more unequal to the great views of Themistocles. 
 Munychia, much the smallest, was also otherwise 
 comparatively incommodious. Piraeus, most distant, Diodor. 
 but far most capacious, might, with some labour, be 
 so improved as to form, for vessels of the ancient Descr. 
 construction, drawing little water, the completest Go^de 
 harbour of Greece. It was naturally divided into ^Bei'ib ' 
 an inner port and an outer ; the former capable of 
 being made a perfect basin, fortified so as effectually 
 to prevent the entrance of an enemy's fleet. Within 
 this basin is a smaller basin, now, according to the 
 report of travellers, choked with sand, but in the wheeier's& 
 age of Themistocles in a different state ; whence Travels in 
 Thucydides describes Piraeus as having three natural Greece -
 
 190 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, harbours. Adjoining to the outer port, on the south- 
 ' west, is an excellent roadstead, protected by the 
 islands Psyttalea and Salamis, which would be ines- 
 timable for a modern navy, and was not without its 
 value to the ancients. 
 
 B. c. 481. The natural advantages thus offered did not escape 
 i.iTc.93. the penetrating eye of Themistocles. When in the 
 Thu<Tad nH ' ffi ce of archon, in the year, it is supposed, before 
 ann.Diodor. the expedition of Xerxes, having already meditated 
 to make Athens a naval power, works had been under 
 his direction begun for improving the port of Piraeus, 
 and constructing a naval arsenal there. He would 
 now pursue the plan, but he still feared interruption 
 from the jealousy of Lacedaemon. This he would 
 have precluded by secrecy in preparation ; but a de- 
 mocratical government little admits secrecy : it was 
 absolutely necessary to have the sanction of the 
 01. ifjj.f assembled people. To obtain this therefore, without 
 [s'ee'note'4. betraying his project, he declared that he had mea- 
 *"?] sures to propose of the utmost importance to the 
 ut sup. prosperity and greatness of th& commonwealth ; but 
 a public communication of them would defeat the 
 purpose. He therefore wished that two men might 
 be chosen, who should be thought best to deserve 
 public confidence, to whom he might propose his 
 plan ; and who, if they judged it for the public good, 
 might be authorised to direct the execution. Ari- 
 stides and Xanthippus were accordingly named ; po- 
 pular jealousy itself favouring so advantageous a 
 choice ; for those two great men were generally po- 
 litical opponents of Themistocles. They nevertheless 
 declared their approbation of his proposal. But fresh 
 jealousy seized the people; they suspected that appa- 
 rent coalition of the leaders of opposite parties, and 
 nothing less would satisfy them than the commu-
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF THEMISTOCLES. 191 
 
 nication of the project to the council of Five Hundred, SECT. 
 who should be bound to secrecy. The council how- 
 ever also approved, and then the business was com- 
 mitted to Themistocles. 
 
 Preparations were made with the utmost despatch, 
 while the purpose remained a secret. Whatever the 
 keenest politician could devise was practised ; first to 
 lull the Spartan government, and then to gain its 
 approbation of the measure ; tending, it was asserted, 
 to nothing more than the forming of a port fit for 
 the combined navy of Greece, and not at all to in- 
 terfere with the views of the Lacedaemonians, who 
 never affected maritime power. Fortifications mean- Thucyd. 
 while, much more complete than those of the city, pja' t c ' 93 ' 
 arose around a space sufficient for a town almost 
 
 equal to the city ; the walls, of a thickness to admit P 
 two carriages abreast, were formed of large blocks of 
 marble, squared and exactly fitted, without cement, 
 but the outer stones firmly connected by cramps of 
 iron fixed with lead. Only half the intended height 
 was ever accomplished ; the purpose of Themistocles 
 having been to make the place defensible with the 
 smallest possible garrison, old men and boys, so that 
 every citizen capable of more active service might be 
 spared, and the whole force of the commonwealth 
 exerted at sea ; yet, such as Piraeus under his care 
 became, it was the completest naval arsenal that the 
 world had yet seen. 6 
 
 6 Plutarch delighted in telling a good story, and, for what is 
 here related, he has substituted one so brilliant that among 
 modern writers of Grecian history (the diligent compilers of the 
 ancient Universal History, as far as my observation has gone, 
 are alone to be excepted) it has quite eclipsed the simple and 
 probable narrative of Diodorus. The Athenian assembly, says 
 Plutarch (vit. Themist.), directed Themistocles to communicate 
 his proposal to Aristides alone. Aristides declared that nothing
 
 192 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. Meanwhile the disappointment, rather a disgracing 
 disappointment, which had attended the attempt to 
 
 could be either more advantageous or more wicked ; upon which 
 the people commanded that it should be no more thought of. 
 Whether Aristides was the rogue, or Themistocles the fool, 
 afterward to divulge the secret, Plutarch, with a thoughtlessness 
 ordinary with him, omits to inform us: but he asserts, with 
 perfect confidence, that the proposal of Themistocles was to burn 
 the allied Grecian fleet assembled in the bay of Pagasae ; and 
 with a farther thoughtlessness, which has justly excited the 
 indignation of the good Rollin, he appears to give his appro- 
 bation to such an infernal project as a great idea. But the 
 evident impolicy of the measure, without taking anything else 
 into consideration, might reasonably lead us to doubt the truth 
 of the tale. Had it been executed, the Athenians indeed alone 
 would have had a fleet ; but where would they have found an 
 ally ? What would have been their prospect of command, and 
 what even the security of their country, a continental territory, 
 against the united resentment of Greece? 
 
 Thucydides mentions neither Plutarch's tale, nor what is 
 related by Diodorus. But it was not his purpose to give a 
 connected history of this period ; and though Diodorus might 
 perhaps stretch a point to favour his fellow-countrymen the 
 Sicilian Greeks, or to tell a story of a hero with a club and a 
 lion's skin, yet it was not his disposition, without authority, to 
 relate a simple fact, merely illustrative of the inconvenience of 
 democracy and of the temper of the Athenian people. We find 
 however in Tulip's Offices, 1.3. c. 11., the very story which 
 Plutarch has told, but with the material difference, that the pro- 
 posal of Themistocles was to burn, not the fleet of the whole 
 Grecian confederacy in the bay of Pagasae, where, after the 
 battle of Salamis, we may venture to affirm that fleet never was, 
 but only the Lacedaemonian fleet in the port of Gythium. This 
 indeed appears not at all an improbable project for Themistocles 
 to have conceived, when the forcible interference of Lacedaemon 
 for preventing the fortifying of Athens and Piraeus was appre- 
 hended ; but we still want information how, consistently with 
 the other circumstances of the story, it could be publicly known. 
 Farther then it is to be observed that in Tully's moral works 
 many doubtful and even contradicted reports are stated, not as 
 authenticated, or even believed by the writer, but merely as 
 ground for animadversion.
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF THEMISTOCLES. 1Q3 
 
 prevent the fortifying of Athens, had not damped the SECT. 
 ambition or changed the policy of the Lacedaemonian 
 government. Ever attentive to strengthen and ex- 
 tend their ascendancy over the other Grecian com- 
 monwealths, and now more than ever jealous of 
 Athens, yet cautious of farther interference in its 
 internal concerns, they directed their intrigues to 
 another quarter. In the council of Amphictyons, at 
 their instigation, it was proposed that every Grecian piut. v. 
 state, which had taken part with the Persians in the Themist ' 
 late war, should be deemed to have forfeited all its 
 Amphictyonic rights. This was particularly aimed 
 against the Argives and Thebans ; in the well- 
 grounded hope that two of the most powerful states, 
 and most inimical to Lacedaemon, being excluded, 
 Lacedaemonian influence would thenceforward govern 
 the assembly. But the vigilance and activity of 
 Themistocles here again thwarted them. Inciting 
 the sluggish and encouraging the cautious, he pro- 
 cured a decision, * That it would be utterly unjust to 
 
 * deprive any Grecian state of its ancient privileges, 
 
 * on account of the crimes of those who, at any par- 
 
 * ticular time, had directed its councils.' 
 
 Thus successful in his political administration, The- 
 mistocles took the command of the fleet, and going Pim. v. 
 round the ^Egean collected the subsidies apportioned 
 to the island and Asiatic states toward carrying on 
 the war against Persia. In the course of this business 
 he was attentive to strengthen and extend the in- 
 fluence of Athens ; but he is accused of having been Plutarch. 
 on this occasion, and not on this alone, too attentive g e } 8 
 to his own interest. The factions, between which c. in, 112. 
 almost every little Grecian commonwealth was di- 
 vided, would furnish abundant opportunity for both 
 public service and private lucre. In one place nearly 
 
 VOL. II. O
 
 194 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, balanced, and each party, beyond all things, afraid of 
 the other, they would contend for the favour and sup- 
 
 port of the Athenian government : in another, some 
 wealthy citizens, banished, would be ready to pay 
 largely for the interest of the Athenian admiral to 
 procure their restoration. Loud complaints of par- 
 PJut. v. tiality were circulated against Themistocles ; and 
 
 Themist. - i i i r 
 
 Plutarch has transmitted some fragments of poems 
 composed on the occasion by Timocreon, a principal 
 man of lalysus in Rhodes, valuable as genuine relics 
 of political invective, of an age prior to the oldest 
 remaining Greek historian. Timocreon had been 
 banished for treason to the common cause of Greece, 
 or, as the Greeks termed it, for Medizing: and he 
 had gone far ; for it appears by his own free con- 
 fession that he had bound himself by oath to the 
 Persian cause. He hoped nevertheless, through his 
 interest with Themistocles, with whom he was con- 
 nected by hospitality, to procure his restoration. 
 Being disappointed, he exerted his poetical talents 
 in revenge. ' Let others,' his poem says, ' extol Pau- 
 
 * sanias, or Xanthippus, or Leotychidas : my praise 
 
 * shall be for Aristides, the best man of sacred Athens. 
 
 * For Latona detests Themistocles, the false, the un- 
 
 * just, the traitor; who for paltry pelf deserted the 
 
 * interest of Timocreon, his friend and host, and 
 
 * refused to restore him to his native lalysus. Money 
 
 * guided the destructive course of the fleet ; while 
 
 * the corrupt commander, restoring unjustly, perse- 
 
 * cuting unjustly, some into banishment, some to 
 ' death, as the larger bribe persuaded, filled his cof- 
 4 fers. Most ridiculously then at the isthmus he 
 
 * courted favour with his entertainments : those who 
 
 * feasted on his dainties wished his ruin.' From the 
 concluding sentence it appears that a splendid hospi-
 
 PARTIES AT ATHENS. 
 
 tality was among the means by which Themistocles SECT. 
 endeavoured to extend his influence in Greece. 
 
 Though we should not perhaps give entire credit 
 to the angry Rhodian, yet imputations against The- 
 mistocles are too numerous, and too general among 
 ancient writers, to permit the supposition that he 
 supported a rigid integrity. Openings were thus 
 found for giving efficacy to intrigue, which was 
 always busy against every great public character in 
 Athens. The superiority which Themistocles was 
 not contented to possess, but would ostentatiously 
 display, excited heartburnings among the old Athe- 
 nian families. In political opposition to him Ari- 
 stides had been scrupulously just, Xanthippus mo- 
 derate, but Alcmaeon, head of the long powerful 
 house of his name, became violent. He was warmly 
 supported by all the influence of the Lacedaemonian 
 government. Aristides and Xanthippus, though not 
 disposed to entire concurrence with him, were among 
 his friends : the latter was his near kinsman. To 
 gain the zealous co-operation of Cimon son of Milti- 
 ades seemed the one thing wanting to acquire to the 
 party a decisive superiority. Cimon, yet a young piut.v. 
 man, was however of young men by far the first in lhemist - 
 Athens ; great by his father's greatness ; powerful 
 by his large possessions and the inherited influence 
 of his family ; of eminent abilities ; of rough yet con- piut. v. 
 descending and popular manners ; with a supercilious Cim> 
 neglect of elegant accomplishments, the reverse of the 
 general Athenian temper, but marking him as a man 
 to be connected with the Lacedaemonians. The house 
 of Alcma3on had indeed been the principal agents in 
 procuring the condemnation of Miltiades. To over- 
 come the repugnance which a generous young mind 
 would feel at the proposal of a coalition with that 
 
 o 2
 
 196 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, house, much diligence was used to stimulate the am- 
 ' bition of Cimon. To connexion with the Lacedaemo- 
 nians he did not object, but by a union with the 
 powerful house of Alcmaeon only he could hope to 
 rise to the first situations in the commonwealth. 
 Flattery, ably and assiduously applied, gained him to 
 their party, while his openness, simplicity, and un- 
 bending integrity, not less than his abilities and in- 
 fluence, recommended him to Aristides, who wanted 
 his support against the overbearing ambition of The- 
 mistocles. 
 
 But another party in Athens, more formidable than 
 all the rest, was growing adverse to Themistocles. 
 The party of the lower people, by whom he had 
 raised himself, and whose power therefore it had 
 been his policy to favour, was become of increased 
 importance, by the events of the Persian war, beyond 
 what even Themistocles desired. The temporary 
 ruin of the country, the destruction of houses and 
 estates, the ceasing of all income, the community of 
 lot among families in the removal beyond sea, and 
 the still nearer equality among men long engaged 
 together in one common military service, from which 
 no rank gave exemption, had tended strongly to level 
 distinctions. Flattery and indulgence to the multi- 
 tude had often been necessary toward keeping order 
 and persuading to patience under hardship and mis- 
 fortune. The extraordinary success afterward of their 
 arms elevated and emboldened them. Victory they 
 would then consider not as their leader's, but as 
 their own. Did the commonwealth require their 
 arms by sea or by land, they were ready to serve 
 the commonwealth, because they were the common- 
 wealth : having fought for their existence, they were 
 ready still to fight for glory and power ; but it must
 
 CLAMOURS AGAINST THEMISTOCLES. 197 
 
 be for themselves, not for others as their superiors. SECT. 
 Argument, such as will weigh with the people, and 
 orators to urge it, may always be found in favour of 
 the popular cause ; and so irresistible the torrent of 
 popular ambition became that even Aristides was piutv. 
 reduced to temporise, so far as not only to admit, Anstld - 
 but to promote, a very great change in the consti- 
 tution of the government. The laws of Solon had 
 gone far to level distinctions of birth : all Athenian 
 citizens were reckoned sufficiently noble to execute 
 the highest offices in the commonwealth, the priest- 
 hood only excepted ; though for civil offices a quali- 
 fication by property was yet required. This restraint Arist - Polit - 
 was now wholly done away. In the actions of Mara- 
 thon, Salamis, and Plataea the poor had contributed 
 equally with the rich to save and to ennoble their 
 country. All civil and military offices were therefore 
 laid open, not only to those of meanest birth, but 
 to those totally without property ; and the most im- 
 portant of the civil offices being conferred by ballot, ch.s. s.4. 
 though the expensiveness of most of them generally 
 deterred the indigent from seeking them, yet the 
 scrutiny of the Dokimasia, often perhaps a vain form, 
 remained the only legal check. 
 
 While this condescension of Aristides to the am- 
 bitious requisition of the multitude increased his 
 popularity and strengthened his situation, various 
 clamours of the allies reached Athens against The- 
 inistocles. Occasional sallies of that ostentation in 
 the display of his glory, which had before injured 
 him, again gave umbrage. The intrigues of Lace- 
 daemon were at the same time taking effect : reports 
 were circulated of secret correspondence with the 
 Persian satrap ; and it was insinuated that Themi- 
 stocles carried his views to the tyranny of Athens, if 
 
 o 3
 
 198 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, not of all Greece. This probably was calumny ; for 
 ' Aristides, we are told, refused to join in any severe 
 
 piut. v. measure against him. But Alcmseon, taking the lead 
 
 nstid. Q ^g opposition, engaged Cimon in his purpose. A 
 
 capital accusation was not yet ventured ; but that 
 
 less invidious attack of the ostracism, against which 
 
 ' o 
 
 the integrity and modesty of Aristides had formerly 
 been insufficient protection, all the policy of Themi- 
 stocles proved now unable to resist, and he was com- 
 pelled to leave Athens. 
 
 When this took place we are with no certainty 
 informed. The summary account remaining from 
 Thucydides of transactions in Greece from the Per- 
 sian to the Peloponnesian war, inestimable for the 
 authority with which it ascertains most of the prin- 
 cipal facts reported by later writers, does not always 
 distinguish their dates, or even the order in which 
 they happened* ; and, though we have the lives of 
 Themistocles, Aristides, and Cimon written with 
 much detail by Plutarch, and in a more abridged 
 manner, with the addition of the life of Pausanias, 
 by Cornelius Nepos, though we have the history of 
 the times by Diodorus, distinguishing, as far as his 
 information and judgment enabled him to distinguish, 
 the events of every year, marking the year by the 
 
 [* In his Fasti Hellenici, p. 253., Mr. Clinton denies that the 
 Summary of Thucydides is liable to these imputations. ' In 
 ' reality,' he says, ' that Summary is valuable with a view to 
 ' the chronology of the times ; and accurate in following the 
 
 * order of time, which is only neglected in two cases : the first 
 ' is the case of the Messenian war, the termination of which, 
 
 * for the sake of clearness, is subjoined to the account of its 
 
 * commencement ; the other is the Egyptian war, the termina- 
 ' tion of which is also related in connexion with the preceding 
 
 * events of that war. And the recital of these had been delayed 
 
 * by the historian that he might not break the continuity of his 
 narrative.']
 
 BANISHMENT OF THEMISTOCLES. 199 
 
 names of the archons of Athens and the consuls of SECT. 
 Rome, and stating both the number of the olympiad _ ' 
 and the name of the victor in the stadion, yet the 
 chronology of these times remains very imperfect. 7 
 The removal of Themistocles would seemingly be 
 the removal of an obstacle to that concert, which 
 was now renewed between Lacedaemon and Athens, 
 for the prosecution of hostilities against Persia. But 
 the great works executed at Athens under his direc- 
 tion required considerable time. His policy might 
 incline him to yield something to Spartan jealousy, 
 rendered more dangerous by the state of parties at 
 home, and perhaps even to desire the appointment 
 of his rivals, Aristides and Cimon, to a distant com- 
 mand. His own residence at Athens would enable 
 him the better to prosecute those great public works 
 by which he meant to establish his country's power 
 and his own glory ; and it may have been desirable 
 either for the prosecution of the projects of which he 
 
 7 ' Tandem aliquando ad Pausaniae, Themistoclis, et Ciraonis 
 ' chronologiam constituendam accingimur, quae omnis est in Dio- 
 ' doro vitiosissima.' Dodw. Ann. Thuc. ad ann. A. C. 470. The 
 faults in the chronology of Diodorus are evident and gross, and 
 the labours ofDodwell to elucidate the order of the transactions 
 of these times are highly valuable. His assistance indeed is so 
 great a relief to me that I can never willingly reject it ; but he 
 has certainly trusted too much to Plutarch, Justin, and other 
 late writers, sometimes giving authority to merely constructive 
 evidence from them. Plutarch seldom aims at exactness in the 
 course of events. When he means to be exact indeed, he gene- 
 rally quotes his authorities, and thus gives additional value to 
 his testimony. But taking Thucydides for my polar star, and 
 trusting later writers only as they elucidate what he has left 
 obscure, and, for the rest, comparing circumstances, and con- 
 sidering the probable, or even the possible connexion and course 
 of things, I cannot but sometimes differ from Dodwell. I never 
 quit him however but with regret, and always put myself under 
 his uidance again the moment I can regain the same track. 
 
 o 4
 
 200 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, was accused, or to counterwork the calumnies of his 
 
 XI. 
 
 accusers. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1.1. c.94. 
 Diodor. 
 1.11. c. 44. 
 Plut. v. 
 Arist. et 
 Cim. 
 Ol. 77. f. 
 B. C. 470. 
 Dodw. 
 Ann. Thuc. 
 [01. 75. 4. 
 B.C. 477. 
 C1.*J 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 War prosecuted against Persia, under Pausanias and Aristides. 
 Treason of Pausanias : Athens head of a new confederacy, 
 composed of the Greeks of the ^Egean Islands, Asia Minor, 
 and Thrace. 
 
 CIRCUMSTANCES yet called for exertion against 
 Persia. The efforts of that empire had been severely 
 checked by the late glorious successes of the Greeks; 
 but its disposition to hostility remained, and its re- 
 sources were immense ; its spirit was damped more 
 than its power was reduced ; and many Grecian towns, 
 not only in Asia, but even in Europe, remained yet un- 
 der its dominion. A fleet was therefore assembled, to 
 the command in chief of which Pausanias was appoint- 
 ed : Aristides, attended by Cimon, commanded the 
 Athenian squadron. They sailed first to Cyprus. 
 The Persian garrisons there, cut off from all support 
 through the mastery which the Greeks possessed of 
 the sea, were apparently more solicitous to obtain fa- 
 vourable terms for themselves than to defend the island 
 for their prince. It has already occurred to observe 
 that it was ordinary with the Persian government to 
 intrust command largely to persons selected from 
 
 [* In affixing the date to this event Mr. Mitford has adopted the theory of 
 Dodwell. Mr. Clinton, in his Fasti Hellenici, pp. 248 252., controverts Dod- 
 well, and follows Diodorus. His careful and minute discussion of this point 
 forms Chap. VI. of the Appendix, which, though too long for quotation here, 
 will not admit of abridgment. The concluding words however present a sum- 
 mary of the objections which he considers established by his arguments against 
 the hypothesis of Dodwell : ' There is nothing then in Isocrates to warrant the 
 theory of Dodwell. It is contrary to the probable course of events; contrary 
 to the implied meaning of Thucydides, and to what has been delivered by 
 Plutarch and Aristides; and to the duration assigned to the Athenian empire 
 by Lysias, Isocrates himself, Plato, Demosthenes, Aristides, and, we may 
 perhaps add, Lycurgus.'J
 
 WAR PROSECUTED AGAINST PERSIA. 201 
 
 among the conquered people, and it seems probable SECT. 
 that so it has been in Cyprus. Most of the Gyprian 
 
 Greek cities however were rescued from the Persian 
 dominion with so little effort that historians have 
 left no particulars of the transactions. The fleet 
 then proceeded to the Hellespont and the Propontis. 
 The extraordinary advantages of situation which By- 
 zantium possessed had not escaped the observation of 
 the Persian commanders. It was made their prin- 
 cipal place of arms for the countries around, and the 
 key of communication with their European dominions. 
 Pausanias laid siege to it, which the garrison main- 
 tained some time, but at length capitulated on such 
 terms that several Persians of high rank, among whom 
 are said to have been some connected by blood with & {^ 
 the royal family, became prisoners. 
 
 The mind of Pausanias was not of strength to bear 
 his fortune. The lustre of his own glory won by the 
 victory of Plata3a (the greatest yet known on the re- Herodot. 
 cords of European fame) had dazzled him. Early 
 after that victory he had displayed a very indiscreet 
 instance of vanity and arrogance. On the golden 
 tripod dedicated at Delphi, in pursuance of a com- 
 mon decree of the confederates, an inscription was 
 to be engraved commemorating the glorious event. 
 The business being committed to Pausanias, he di- 
 rected what may be literally translated thus : ' Pau- Thucyd. 
 * sanias, general of the Greeks, having destroyed the cohuMfop. 
 * Persian army, dedicated this memorial to Apollo.' v - Paus - 
 This gave great offence at Lacedaemon as well as 
 throughout Greece. Accordingly the words were 
 by order of the Spartan government erased, and a 
 new inscription engraved, attributing the dedication 
 to the cities of the confederacy, without any mention 
 of the general. The splendour of Persian magni-
 
 202 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, ficence and the sweets of Persian luxury, laid open to 
 ' his view, allured him ; the austere simplicity of Spar- 
 tan manners began to appear sordid and miserable, 
 and especially the return from a great command to 
 the insignificance and even subjection of Spartan 
 royalty in peace too degrading. But beyond all 
 things his haughty temper could least support the 
 consideration that, after shining the first character 
 in the known world, the leader of the glorious con- 
 federacy which had brought the pride of the Persian 
 empire to crouch beneath it, he must yield the reins 
 of command to the young king, his kinsman, and 
 sink into the situation of a private citizen of Sparta. 
 
 But his communication in Asia, and the circum- 
 stances attending the conquest of Byzantium, com- 
 pleted the corruption of the mind of Pausanias and 
 decided his views. He observed his kinsman, De- 
 maratus, the banished king of Lacedamon, lord of 
 Xen. Hei. the ^Eolian cities of Pergamum, Teuthrania, and 
 ^. c.i. Halisarnia, given by the Persian monarch to himself 
 and his heirs, living in ease and splendour that might 
 leave, in most minds, little regret of the parsimonious 
 and jealously- watched dignity of Spartan royalty ; 
 perhaps indeed more an independent sovereign than 
 a Spartan king living in Sparta. He became ac- 
 Thucyd. quainted with an Eretrian, named Gongylus, whose 
 X C H e 2 i 8 ' treacner 7 to his country, at the time of the invasion 
 under Datis and Artaphernes, had been rewarded by 
 the liberality of the Persian court with the hereditary 
 lordship of four towns, also in JEolia. On the cap- 
 ture of Byzantium he became, through the Persians 
 of rank, his prisoners, more intimately acquainted 
 with Persian manners ; the pomp of command, the 
 wide distinction between the higher and lower people, 
 and all the refinements of the table, the bath, and
 
 TREASON OF PAUSANIAS. 203 
 
 every circumstance of Asiatic luxury. He formed SECT. 
 friendship with Gongylus, already master of the Per- _ 
 sian language, and versed in Persian manners. He 
 even committed to that refugee the government of 
 Byzantium, together with the custody of the prin- 
 cipal Persian prisoners. These were all permitted, 
 at several times, to escape, and at length Gongylus 
 himself was despatched to the Persian court, carrying 
 proposals from Pausanias for services, but stipulating 
 for very high conditions. It is asserted to have been 
 proposed that all Greece should be reduced under 
 the Persian dominion ; that, in reward for this, a 
 daughter of Xerxes should be given in marriage to 
 Pausanias, with every advantage of rank, command, 
 and fortune that might become such lofty alliance. 
 Not only this proposal is said to have been very fa- 
 vourably received, but Artabazus was sent to super- 
 sede Megabates in the Phrygian satrapy, purposely to 
 prosecute the negotiation. Pausanias became elated 
 beyond all bounds of moderation and discretion. As 
 if already a Persian satrap, and son-in-law of the great 
 king, his manners, dress, table, and his whole style of 
 living and communication became Persian ; inso- 
 much that a guard of his Median and Egyptian pri- 
 soners became his constant attendants. 
 
 While the extent of the treason was yet hardly 
 suspected high discontent arose in the armament. 
 The Spartans were disgusted by the splendid and 
 luxurious manner of living of their general ; the 
 allies were incensed by his tyrannical haughtiness; Thucyd. 
 his affectation of Asiatic pomp was offensive to 
 
 all, and excited suspicion. Consultations were held 1 - 11 - c - 44 - 
 among the principal officers, by some of whom Pau- 
 sanias was publicly insulted ; and shortly a general 
 determination was taken to submit to his arrogance
 
 204 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. no longer. The Peloponnesian allies sailed to their 
 ' respective homes ; the Asiatics, Hellespontines, and 
 islanders, who had a nearer interest in the prose- 
 cution of the war, offered to follow Aristides, if, in 
 taking them under his command, he would assure 
 them of his protection. The Lacedaemonians them- 
 selves then, neither able nor desirous to support their 
 chief in his extravagant and odious conduct, sent 
 home charges against him, in consequence of which 
 he was recalled, and Dorcis came commissioned to 
 supersede him. 
 
 But the Lacedaemonian command had received a 
 wound not of easy cure. The allies, whose affections 
 the great and amiable characters of Aristides and 
 Cimon had largely conciliated, refused obedience to 
 Dorcis. That commander then with his principal 
 officers, judging that to act in an inferior situation 
 neither became themselves, nor would be satisfactory 
 to the Spartan government, withdrew that portion of 
 the allied armament which remained attached to La- 
 cedaemon, and returned home. The principal men 
 in the Lacedaemonian administration seem to have 
 thought, and perhaps justly, that the present was 
 not a moment either for resenting the conduct of the 
 seceding allies, or for making any farther attempt to 
 resume their lost authority. By a most sudden, un- 
 projected, and unforeseen revolution thus that supe- 
 riority among the Grecian states, which all the energy 
 of the administration of Themistocles had been un- 
 able to procure for his country, was gratuitously given 
 to the mild virtues, accompanying great abilities, in 
 Aristides and Cimon. 
 
 The moderation of the Lacedaemonian government 
 upon this occasion, like that of the Athenian when 
 the confederate fleet was first assembled to oppose
 
 MODERATION IN LACED^MON. 205 
 
 the invasion of Xerxes, has been a subject of eulogy SECT. 
 among ancient and modern writers. Commendation 
 is certainly due to the wisdom of the leading men of 
 both states ; but it may be useful toward obtaining 
 an insight into Grecian politics, having observed the 
 causes of that moderation among the Athenians upon 
 the former, to advert also to what appears to have 
 influenced the conduct of the Lacedaemonians upon 
 the present occasion. The Lacedaemonian admini- 
 stration was evidently weak : probably distracted by 
 party. One of the kings, Leotychides, being of ad- Herodot. 
 vanced age, and under imputation of taking bribes Dbd? i!n. 
 when commanding an expedition in Thessaly, the p * usan - 
 other, Plistarchus son of Leonidas, having scarcely i'hucyd. 
 reached manhood, neither, implicated as Greece yet 
 was in war with the Persian empire, could stand in 
 any competition, among the allies, with the great and 
 popular characters of Aristides and Cimon. Even at 
 home the small power which the constitution gave 
 them was overborne by the influence and the intrigues 
 of Pausanias. The change of the seat of war more- 
 over was unfavourable to the Lacedaemonian command. 
 Led, or rather forced, by the circumstances of the 
 times to exertions toward the establishment of a 
 marine, little congenial either to the temper of the 
 government or the disposition of the people, Lace- 
 daemon was yet so inferior as to be almost without a 
 hope of equalling the naval power of Athens. If 
 therefore weakness and distraction had not prevented 
 exertion, policy, even an ambitious policy, mfght have 
 induced the Lacedaemonian administration quietly to 
 let the rival republic waste itself in distant warfare, 
 and in making precarious distant acquisitions, while 
 Sparta, nourishing her force at home, might watch 
 opportunities for extending her power and influence
 
 206 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, in Greece itself, where her former connexions re- 
 
 YT 
 
 ' mained entire, and no subordination to Athens was 
 acknowledged. Thus Lacedaemon wisely yielded to 
 the necessity of the moment, while the weak ambition 
 of Pausanias assisted Aristides and Cimon to make 
 Athens, for the purpose of prosecuting the war be- 
 yond sea against Persia, the leading state of Greece. 
 
 But probably neither the Lacedaemonian nor even 
 the Athenian administration was immediately aware 
 of all the extent of advantage about to accrue to 
 Athens from this revolution. No great dissatisfac- 
 tion, we are assured, appeared in Lacedaemon upon 
 
 Thucyd. the occasion. Themistocles was obnoxious there ; 
 but the Athenian people, whatever jealousies existed 
 among some warmer politicians, were not generally 
 so. On the contrary, there was virtue enough among 
 the greater part of the Lacedaemonian people to in- 
 
 c.75. duce them to admire and esteem the Athenian cha- 
 racter for the noble spirit shown during the Persian 
 invasion. They were besides generally desirous to 
 avoid being farther engaged in the prosecution of a 
 war which must now lead them far from home ; and 
 they were therefore not displeased to have the Athe- 
 nian government undertake the direction of those 
 operations, whether for protecting Greece against 
 attacks by sea, or for prosecuting hostilities offen- 
 sively beyond sea, in which the superiority of its fleet 
 to that of all other Grecian states gave it the fairest 
 claim to command. 
 
 The wise moderation of Aristides and Cimon mean- 
 while, in the direction of the Athenian affairs, tended 
 greatly to prevent occasion of jealousy among the La- 
 cedaemonians and their adherents, and to strengthen 
 the attachment of the other Grecian states to Athens. 
 A system of executive command, and in some degree
 
 DEATH OF ARISTIDES. 207 
 
 even of legislation, for the new confederacy was ne- SECT. 
 cessary. Corinth, as the place most equally accom- 
 modating the confederated states within and without 
 Peloponnesus, had been originally chosen for the 
 meeting of deputies from all ; but latterly the su- 
 periority generally allowed to Lacedaemon had led to Thucyd. 
 the consideration of Sparta as a common capital, and Diodor. 43 ' 
 the place of assembly. Aristides, avoiding to claim 1 - 11 - c - 45 - 
 any such superiority for Athens, appointed, for the 
 place of meeting, the little island of Delos ; venerated 
 all over Greece as sacred ground, the favourite pro- 
 perty of Apollo, and of whose people no state could 
 have any political jealousy. The temple itself of the Thucyd. 
 deity was made both senate-house and treasury. Some Diodor. 
 indication however of a disposition to arrogate a dan- pj^' ^ 47 * 
 gerous superiority seems to have appeared in the Aristid. 
 appointment of treasurers, who with the name of 
 Hellenotamiae, Treasurers of Greece, became a per- 
 manent magistracy, at the election, and under the 
 controul, of the Athenian people. But the wisdom 
 and equity of Aristides, who was first placed at the 
 head of that board, satisfied the allies in present, and 
 blinded them to consequences. The sum agreed upon to 
 be annually raised was four hundred and sixty talents, 
 about a hundred and fifteen thousand pounds ster- 
 ling ; and this was assessed upon the different states 
 with such evident impartiality that not a murmur 
 was heard upon the occasion, but, on the contrary, 
 every part of Greece resounded the fame of the just 
 Aristides. 
 
 The extraordinary success of that truly great man, 
 in the execution of so hazardous and invidious an 
 office, is the last public act in which history has noticed 
 him. Probably he died soon after ; but we are with- 
 out certain information of the time, the place, or any
 
 208 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CI xi P ' ^ *k e C ^ rcumstances of his end. Employed as he 
 _ had been in the most important offices of the Athe- 
 nian commonwealth, civil and military, and vested 
 piut.v. with its highest honours, it is said that he lived poor, 
 and at his death left not enough to pay for a funeral. 
 
 
 p 1 69o StOCr ' ^he commonwealth therefore, in honour of his virtues 
 and in gratitude for his services, took upon itself the 
 charge of his obsequies and the care of his family. 
 A monument to his memory was raised in Phalerum, 
 which remained in the time of Plutarch : an allot- 
 ment of land, a sum of money, and a pension were 
 given to Lysimachus, who seems to have been his only 
 son, and suitable marriage-portions to his daughters. 
 Lysimachus never put himself forward in public busi- 
 ness ; but the testimony of Plato remains to his having 
 
 P. iso. t. 2. been of respected character in private life, living in 
 intimacy with Sophroniscus the father of Socrates ; 
 and in advanced years, after the death of his friend, 
 still the companion in leisure of the first men of the 
 commonwealth. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 Administration of Cimon. Death of Xerxes, and accession of 
 Artaxerxes to the Persian throne. Successes of the confe- 
 derate arms under Cimon : piracy in the jEgean sea : battle 
 of the Eurymedon. 
 
 THE banishment of Themistocles and the death of 
 Aristides left Cimon without an equal in favour and 
 authority with the Athenian people, at a time when, 
 through the exertions of a succession of great men, 
 amid favouring contingencies, to be the first citizen of 
 Athens was nearly to be the most important person- 
 age in the world. No state ever before had such a 
 fleet, such naval arsenals, such naval skill and disci-
 
 CONFEDERATE ARMS UNDER CIMON. #09 
 
 pline, as Themistocles had formed for his country, to SECT. 
 
 promote her glory and his own, and had left in the '_ 
 
 hands of his rivals. With these advantages, in ad- 
 dition to those of high birth, hereditary fame, and 
 great talents, in the ninth year after the battle of 01.77.3. 
 
 R f 1 4.70 
 
 Plataea, Cimon was appointed to the command in chief 
 of the confederate forces by sea and land. 
 
 The circumstances of the Persian empire at this 
 time invited attempts against it. Xerxes, disgusted 
 with public affairs through the miserable failure of 
 his great enterprise against Greece, is said to have 
 abandoned himself to indolence and debauchery. In 
 one of those intrigues of the palace, often so full of 
 horrors in despotic countries, but of which the final 
 catastrophe commonly alone becomes with certainty 
 known to the public, the monarch and his eldest son Diodor. 
 were murdered; each under the shocking imputation ctVsias, 69 ' 
 of having at least intended the murder of the other. P ers . ic - 
 
 . . . Justin. 
 
 I A civil war ensued ; and it was not till after a bloody 1.3. c.i. 
 contest that peace was restored to the interior of the 1.5. c.io. 
 empire, Artaxerxes, third son of the late king, then 
 obtaining possession of the throne. 
 
 It was important for the Greeks to avail themselves 
 of the opportunity for strengthening their confe- 
 deracy, by rescuing from the Persian dominion the 
 many Grecian cities yet remaining under it. Those 
 of Europe attracted the first attention. Cimon led 
 the confederate armament against Eion on the river 
 Strymon in Thrace, formerly the settlement of the 
 unfortunate Ionian chiefs Histiasus and Aristagoras, 
 and now commanded by a Persian noble, whose name, 
 variously written by Greek authors, was, in the or- 
 thography of Herodotus, Boges. Cimon, having re- 
 duced the garrison to extremity, offered permission 
 for their retreat into Asia. But Boges, with that 
 
 VOL. ii. p
 
 210 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, ferocious heroism which is sometimes found in sultry 
 
 V T 
 
 ' climates and under despotic governments, obstinately 
 refused all terms ; and, when provisions totally failed, 
 Herodot. scattering all the gold and silver within the place 
 Thucyd ? m t the Strymon, he caused a vast pile of wood to 
 ke formed, killed his wife, concubines, children, and 
 
 l.ii. c. 60. slaves upon it, and then, setting fire to it, killed 
 
 TM * fir ^* 
 
 Com. Nep. himself, and all were consumed together. The gar- 
 
 v. dm. in no condition to stipulate, surrendered at 
 
 discretion ; and, according to the common practice 
 of the Greeks of that age, were made profitable by 
 being made slaves. 
 
 Mascames, the Persian governor of Doriscus, 
 either was more able than Boges, or commanded a 
 stronger garrison. He baffled all the many attempts 
 Herodot. made by different Grecian commanders against him, 
 and, while he lived, held Doriscus for the Persian 
 king. Herodotus alone, among the Grecian histo- 
 rians remaining, has had the candour to mention this, 
 or to acknowledge that a Persian garrison continued 
 to exist in Europe. But these events being posterior 
 to the period which he had fixed for the term of his 
 history, he has noticed them only incidentally ; so 
 that we are without information of any farther par- 
 ticulars concerning that remarkable defence of Do- 
 riscus by Mascames. Every other garrison, both in 
 Thrace and on the Hellespont, a name under which 
 the early Grecian writers commonly included the 
 whole water from the JEgean sea to the Euxine, with 
 the shores on each side, yielded to the Grecian arms. 
 
 From the Trojan war to the invasion of Xerxes, 
 Greece had never seen a fleet assembled from its 
 several maritime states ; nor had any extensive con- 
 federacy been formed among them. It had depended 
 therefore upon every state by itself to take the mea-
 
 ABATEMENT OF ZEAL IN CONFEDERACY. 
 
 sures which its own convenience required, or its SECT. 
 power admitted, for repressing those piracies which 
 had never ceased to disturb the navigation of the 
 ^Egean. The inhabitants of the little island of Scyrus, 
 of Thessalian origin, had made themselves parti- 
 cularly obnoxious by maritime depredations. The 
 Amphictyonic assembly therefore, according to Plu- 
 tarch, demanded that the armament which Cimon 
 commanded should put an end to such enormities, pi u t. v . 
 and give peace to the Grecian seas, as well against Cim> 
 domestic ruffians as foreign enemies. The Scyrians, Thucyd. 
 however, compelled to surrender at discretion, were Diod? sic. 
 sold for slaves, and their lands were given to a colony j;^ ^ 
 
 from Athens. The Carystians of Euboea by some & p . lut - 
 means also incurred the indignation of the confede- 
 racy, insomuch that war was made upon them ; but 
 they obtained terms of accommodation. 
 
 Those great interests and urgent necessities, which 
 had given birth to the confederacy against Persia, 
 now ceased to exist ; for Greece could no longer be 
 supposed in any immediate danger from the ambition 
 or the resentment of that empire. Yet the main- 
 tenance of a powerful navy, to deter or to repel any 
 future attacks from a neighbour still so formidable, 
 might be highly advisable ; and the private interest 
 of individuals, who enjoyed or hoped for commands, 
 and the particular political interest of the Athenian 
 commonwealth, whose power and influence were so 
 greatly increased by its situation at the head of the 
 confederacy, would concur both to enforce the main- 
 tenance of the navy, and to keep that navy employed. 
 Many of the inferior states however, when danger Thucyd. 
 no longer pressed, became first lukewarm, then averse & 99.' 
 to the continuance of the war and the burthens with 
 which it loaded them. The citizens grew tired of & 
 
 p 2
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, an endless service on shipboard, under what they 
 
 ' _ esteemed, in some measure, a foreign command, and 
 
 to promote no obvious interest of their several com- 
 monwealths. Their administrations therefore, accus- 
 tomed to perfect independency, would still determine, 
 each for itself, when it would no longer exert itself 
 in the irksome and invidious office of taxing its citi- 
 zens for the expenses of the navy, and the still more 
 invidious office of compelling them to take their turn 
 of personal service. The Athenian government, on 
 the other hand, at first modest, and, under the ad- 
 ministration of Aristides, scrupulously just in the 
 exercise of its supremacy, began to grow first rigid, 
 and then imperious 8 ; and some of the subordinate 
 commonwealths, either by some public interest, or by 
 the interest and influence of a party, induced to con- 
 cur in the measures of Athens, were jealous of the 
 defection of others, and ready to join in compelling 
 adherence to the confederacy. 
 
 The first to venture opposition were the people of 
 the rich and populous island of Naxos. Confiding 
 Ch.7. s.i. in that strength with which they had once baffled 
 the force of the Persian empire, they sustained war 
 for some time against the confederate arms. They 
 were however at length compelled to capitulate, upon 
 terms by which they surrendered their independency, 
 and, contrary to the articles of confederacy, were 
 reduced under subjection to the Athenian common- 
 wealth. 9 
 
 This example being made of the Naxians, some 
 exertion against the common enemy became perhaps 
 
 3 '\Kf&u/s fTipaa-a-ov KOU "kwicvifoi ya-av, is the candid confession 
 of the Athenian historian. Thucyd. 1. 1. c. 99. 
 
 9 Hapa, TO KaOesTyKoi; e'SovXw&j, is again the free confession of 
 Thucydides, 1. 1. c. 98.
 
 OPPOSITION TO ATHENIAN COMMAND. 213 
 
 necessary to prevent clamour, and to keep up that SECT. 
 spirit of enterprise without which the confederacy 
 could not long exist in vigour ; and circumstances 
 arose to call for the efforts of its arms. For, in the 
 Grecian states bordering on the Persian empire, all 
 who had been or who aspired to be tyrants, all, 
 and they were often very numerous, whom faction 
 had banished, all who were discontented at home 
 with the government under which they lived, and 
 bold enough to be active in attempting a change, 
 but too weak to depend for success upon themselves 
 alone, still looked to Persia for patronage. The pros- 
 pect of revived vigour in the councils of that empire, 
 under the administration of the new king, gave en- 
 couragement to such views, and most of the Cyprian 
 towns had renounced the Grecian confederacy. There 
 were moreover Grecian cities in Lesser Asia which 
 had not yet been rescued from the Persian dominion. 
 The confederate arms had not been carried so far 
 southward as Caria ; and the people of Phaselis, a pi u t. v. 
 Grecian settlement in the adjoining province of Cim 
 Pamphylia, did not scruple to profess preference of 
 the Persian dominion to the Grecian alliance. 
 
 These considerations directing the Athenian coun- 01.77. 3. 
 
 T> /~t Af\Q 
 
 cils, Cimon led his forces to the Carian coast. Such D ' od ^ ' 
 then was the terror which the fame of their unin- Ann> lhuc< 
 terrupted success inspired that several towns were 
 deserted by those who bore arms before any enemy 
 came in sight ; and the spirit of the confederate 
 troops, directed by the abilities of Cimon, quickly 
 brought all the rest to surrender. Conquest was yet 
 pursued ; the army entered Pamphylia, and laid 
 siege to Phaselis. But here was experienced the 
 common bane of confederacies, discordant interests 
 and jarring affections. The friendly connexion be- 
 
 p 3
 
 CHAP, 
 XL 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 tween the people of Phaselis and of Chios had been 
 such that the Chions of Cimon'sarmy still considered 
 the Phaselites, attached as they were to Persia, and 
 consequently inimical to Greece, as friends to Chios. 
 To save them therefore from the ruin which now 
 threatened, they gave information by letters, fastened 
 to arrows, of all measures taking against the town. 
 The treason however was discovered, and Phaselis 
 was at length compelled to submission. 
 
 The government of Artaxerxes was yet insuf- 
 ficiently established in the centre of the extensive 
 empire to admit any great exertion on the frontiers, 
 but it was beginning to acquire steadiness. The 
 command of so many maritime provinces, especially 
 Phenicia, gave means to be still formidable at sea. 
 For the purpose of defence nevertheless apparently 
 rather than of conquest, a numerous fleet had been 
 assembled in the river Eurymedon on the Pamphy- 
 
 r i .,, , 
 
 lian coast, and an army, to co-operate with it, en- 
 gj 11 ^ - 60 ' camped on the banks : a reinforcement of eighty 
 Com. Xep. Phenician triremes was expected, and upon its arrival 
 
 &PIut. v. . ... 
 
 Cim. it was proposed to begin operations. 
 
 Intelligence of these circumstances determined 
 Cimon to quit the objects before him on the continent, 
 and endeavour to bring the enemy to action by sea 
 before the arrival of the expected squadron. Em- 
 barking therefore a considerable part of his forces, 
 for, among the ancients, naval operations were almost 
 always intimately connected with those by land, he 
 sailed for the Eurymedon. On his arrival the ene- 
 my's fleet, already much more numerous than his 
 own, came out to meet him. But the Persians, dis- 
 heartened by the repeated ill success of their arms, 
 sustained the action with no vigour. Quickly retreat- 
 ing with much confusion into the river, the crews 
 
 Thucyd. 
 
 1.1. c.100.
 
 BATTLE OF THE EURYMEDON. 
 
 landed to join the army drawn up on the shore. The SECT. 
 ships being thus abandoned to the enemy, no less than ' 
 
 two hundred trireme galleys, little damaged, are said 
 to have been taken ; some were destroyed in action ; 
 a very few escaped. 
 
 The Greeks, elate with this easy victory, joyfully 
 received their commander's orders immediately to 
 land, and attack the Persian army. Here the con- 
 test was more obstinate ; and in the exertion of the 
 Athenian leaders, anxious to support a reputation 
 equal to the new glory of their country, many men 
 of rank fell. After a long and bloody struggle how- 
 ever the Greeks obtained a decisive success ; what 
 survived of the Persian army was dissipated, and its 
 camp became the prey of the conquerors. Thus Thucyd. 
 Cimon acquired the singular glory of erecting two ' ' c ' 10 ' 
 trophies for two victories, one at sea, the other at 
 land, gained by the same armament in one day. Re- 
 ceiving intelligence then that the re-enforcement of piut. v. 
 Phenician galleys, which had been expected to join 
 the Persian fleet, lay in the port of Hydrus in Cy- 
 prus, he hastened thither with a sufficient squadron 
 of his best ships, and every trireme was either de- 
 stroyed or taken. 10 
 
 By this great success the naval strength of Persia 
 was so broken, its land forces so disheartened, and 
 the spirit of enterprise, which had formerly animated 
 its councils and excited its commanders, was so de- 
 pressed that offensive operations against Greece were 
 totally intermitted ; and it became the boast of the 
 
 10 This fact I have ventured to relate on the authority of 
 Plutarch ; Thucydides, in his concise mention of the affair of 
 the Eurymedon, saying nothing of it. According to Diodorus, 
 the Athenian fleet went twice to Cyprus ; but his account alto- 
 gether is both romantic and blind, and appears indeed to have 
 been written with little consideration of what was possible. 
 
 p 4
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 Greek nation that no armed ship of Persia was to 
 
 eop. 
 
 & Areo. be seen westward of the Chelidonian islands on the 
 
 coast f Pamphylia, or of the Cyanean rocks at the 
 entrance of the Euxine ; and that no Persian troops 
 dared show themselves within a horseman's day's 
 journey of the Grecian seas. 11 
 
 11 In aftertimes report arose that a treaty of peace was regu- 
 larly made between the Persian monarch and the Athenian com- 
 monwealth, in which it was forbidden for any Persian forces of 
 land or sea to come within the limits mentioned in the text. 
 Plutarch, in his Life of Cimon, speaks of it as the immediate 
 result of the battle of the Eurymedon. Diodorus reports con- 
 fidently that it took place twenty years later, in the fourth year 
 of the eighty-second Olympiad ; and he asserts it to have been 
 stipulated, that no Persian ship of war should appear between 
 Phaselis and the Cyaneans ; that no land forces, nor even a sa- 
 trap, should approach within three days' journey of the Grecian 
 seas ; and that all Grecian towns should be free. 
 
 Plutarch, not here bold in assertion like Diodorus, has treated 
 the subject in his best manner, warning his reader that the ex- 
 istence of such a treaty was not undisputed, and giving autho- 
 rities on both sides. Craterus, he says, in a collection of state 
 papers which he published, inserted a copy of the treaty in 
 question, as a genuine deed. But Callisthenes affirmed that no 
 such treaty was ever concluded: Persian subjects indeed, he 
 said, avoided navigating the .ZEgean sea, and approaching its 
 shores by land ; but it was only through fear of the Greeks, and 
 not in consequence of any treaty. In the sequel of this history 
 occasion will occur to observe that pretended state papers, among 
 the Greeks, were not always to be trusted. 
 
 But, beyond the doubt that may thus arise, supported by the 
 positive denial of credit by Callisthenes, powerful objections 
 remain from the highest authorities. From the informed and 
 accurate Thucydides we have a summary of the principal trans- 
 actions of the Grecian republics before the Peloponnesian war. 
 It is hardly imaginable that one so remarkable as such a treaty 
 should escape his knowledge, or that he should leave one so 
 important unnoticed ; but in his history no mention of any such 
 appears. Nor is his testimony simply thus negative : a degree 
 of positive proof is involved in his narrative ; which shows that 
 hostilities between the Greeks and Persians, though at times re-
 
 REPORTED TREATY OF PEACE. 217 
 
 mitted, never entirely ceased; and that the Persian court, though SECT, 
 perhaps not the worst patron of the free constitutions of the Asian- *** 
 Greek cities, yet, far from admitting the perfect independency 
 asserted by the pretended treaty, never desisted from its claim 
 to a paramount dominion over all their territories, or from a re- 
 quisition of tribute from all. Thucyd. 1. 8. c. 5. & 6. Conso- 
 nant testimony is found in a summary of the transactions of the 
 same age by Plato, or however an author of Plato's age. No 
 such treaty as Diodorus and Plutarch describe is mentioned, 
 but the existence of such a treaty is virtually contradicted, in 
 the boast that Greece owed its freedom from foreign attack to 
 the perseverance of Athens in active hostilities against Persia, 
 far from home, in Cyprus especially and in Egypt. Plat. Menex. 
 p. 241. t. ii. To the same purpose also Isocrates has spoken. 
 The lonians, he says, never ceased to wage war with the bar- 
 barians, whose lands they held in spite of them. Isocr. Paneg- 
 p. 246. t. i. ed. Auger. 
 
 Nevertheless it is proper to observe that two of the most emi- 
 nent Athenian orators, Lycurgus and Demosthenes, mention a 
 treaty in some degree corresponding in character with that re- 
 ported by the authors before mentioned. They do not indeed 
 pretend stipulations so disgraceful and injurious to Persia : they 
 describe the treaty only as generally advantageous and honourable 
 to Greece, and commonly allowed so among the Greeks. The 
 nogotiator, Callias, is named ; but the time is not indicated. It 
 seems however to have been long after that to which Plutarch 
 and Diodorus attribute the treaties they describe, and apparently 
 not long before that concluded by the Lacedaemonians, which 
 became so well known by the title of the treaty of Antalcidas. 
 Probably some treaty was made by Callias with some of the sa- 
 traps, which may have afforded some ground for the assertions 
 of Lycurgus and Demosthenes. But had a treaty of the tenor 
 reported by Diodorus and Plutarch ever been concluded, its 
 existence would not have been left doubtful by Grecian writers ; 
 it would not have had less notoriety than the treaty of Antal- 
 cidas ; it would not less have been blazoned with panegyric 
 than that treaty has been with reproach. The treaty of Callias, 
 it may be reasonably presumed, from its being so little noticed, 
 afforded really little ground for boasting. 
 
 But the fact, that Persian subjects dared not navigate the 
 JEgean sea, that at times they could not even by land approach 
 its shores, was, not unreasonably, matter of great national pride 
 among the Greeks, and especially the Athenians. It would be
 
 <21S HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 Treason and death of Pausanias. Prosecution and flight of 
 Themistocles : his reception at tJie Persian court : his death. 
 
 CHAP. WHILE the power and renown of Athens were thus 
 wonderfully advancing under the conduct of Aris- 
 
 a favourite topic for orators, desiring to cultivate popularity, or 
 to put the people in good humour ; and we find even the sober 
 Isocrates, when his purpose was to improve the joy of the Pan- 
 athenaic festival, pushing the boast to great extravagance. Not 
 contented with asserting the exclusion of Persian subjects from 
 the ^gean sea and its Asiatic shore, he says, (as if he would 
 imply, though he could not venture to state, a treaty,) that the 
 Persians were not allowed to come with arms westward of the 
 river Halys. We must yield to the judgment of Isocrates for 
 what might become the orator of the Panathenaic festival ; but 
 it could not be too much to pronounce such an assertion, from 
 a historian, a monstrous extravagance ; since it would make 
 Sardis, with all Lydia and Phrygia, Grecian conquests ; whereas 
 it is abundantly evident, from Thucydides and Xenophon, that 
 no Grecian force, before that under Agesilaus, could ever ven- 
 ture fifty miles from the shore, and Agesilaus himself never was 
 within a hundred of the Halys. 
 
 Since the first publication of these observations, the very 
 learned Dr. Hales of Dublin has controverted my conclusion. 
 I have thence been led to advert to some passages of Thucy- 
 dides bearing upon the point, which, while engaged with the 
 foregoing note, had escaped me. Occasion has occurred to 
 notice both in the sequel of this history ; one at the end of the 
 5th section of the 16th chapter, the other in the 6th section of 
 the 19th chapter; the former showing that the Persian terri- 
 tory extended in one part to the TEgean sea, the other, that a 
 Lacedaemonian in high authority acknowledged the king of 
 Persia's authority over the whole of Lesser Asia. 
 
 For the reader practised in observing matters for history 
 otherwise than in his closet, it may seem superfluous to add the 
 consideration of the evident want of inducement for the Persian 
 court to conclude any such disadvantageous and disgraceful 
 treaty.
 
 TREASON OF PAUSANIAS. 219 
 
 tides and Cimon, a train of circumstances continued SECT. 
 long to deprive the Lacedaemonian government of the ' 
 
 ability to take any leading part in the common con- 
 cerns of the Greek nation. Pausanias, when recalled Thucyd. 
 from his command, had been brought to trial ; but 
 his interest had sufficed to procure his acquittal from 
 all public crimes ; though suspicion, and, as it should 
 seem from Thucydides, even proof, was strong against 
 him. He was however convicted of injuries to in- 
 dividuals, and condemned to amends. But this did 
 not suffice to repress his rash and extravagant am- 
 bition. The king his nephew was yet a minor, and c, 131, 132. 
 himself still in the high office of regent. Without 
 commission or authority from the government, hiring 
 a Hermionian trireme galley, he went again to the 
 Hellespont, and renewed his negotiation with Arta- 
 bazus. As a more commodious situation for com- 
 municating with the satrap, he ventured even to pro- 
 ceed to Byzantium, then occupied by an Athenian 
 garrison ; hoping perhaps to find the more favour there 
 as he had less in his own country. But he was quickly 
 compelled to leave that place, and he passed to 
 Colonae in Troas. The Lacedaemonian government 
 meanwhile, informed of his procedure, and both irri- 
 tated and alarmed by the audaciousness of it, sent a 
 herald bearing a scytale to Colonae. The scytale was Piut. v. 
 the ensign of high office among the Lacedaemonians, ysa 
 common to the general and the herald. It was a staff 
 exactly tallied to another in possession of the ephors ; 
 and all orders and communications requiring secrecy 
 were so written that, till applied in a particular man- 
 ner to that staff, they were illegible. 12 By such an 
 
 12 The Athenian proboulos, in the Lysistrata of Aristophanes 
 (v.985.), mistook the scytale borne by the Lacedaemonian herald 
 for a spear. The staff and the written order communicated by 
 it seem equally to have borne the name of scytale.
 
 220 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, order Pausanias was commanded to accompany the 
 r _ herald whithersoever he should go; with a denun- 
 
 ciation of the enmity of the Spartan state against 
 him if he disobeyed. His former indiscreet con- 
 duct had so baffled his own purposes that his scheme 
 was yet very far from ripe for execution : he could 
 have no hope of prosecuting it with success unless 
 he could reingratiate himself with his own country ; 
 and such was already the deviation from the institu- 
 tions of Lycurgus at Lacedaemon that, as Thucydides 
 says confidently, he trusted in means to bribe the 
 leading men for security against accusation. Obey- 
 ing therefore implicitly the order contained in the 
 Thucyd. scytale, he accompanied the herald to Sparta. On 
 132. ' ' his arrival he was arrested by authority of the ephors, 
 whose power now extended to the imprisonment 
 even of the kings ; but intrigue shortly procuring his 
 liberty, he publicly defied accusers. 
 
 Emboldened now by repeated success in repelling 
 crimination, he began again to seek means for prose- 
 cuting his treachery, and realising his dreams of en- 
 joyment in all the oriental splendour and luxury of 
 royalty. The obstacles to his reinstatement in that 
 foreign command, which had formed his fairest ground 
 of hope, seemed insuperable ; but prospect appeared 
 of other means to accomplish his purpose. The neigh- 
 bouring commonwealth of Argos not only bore the 
 most inveterate enmity to Sparta, but had sought 
 alliance with Persia ; and at Argos resided Themi- 
 stocles, whose banishment might induce him to join 
 in a project for his own aggrandisement at the ex- 
 c.135. pense of his country. It appears that they actually 
 riut. & corresponded on the subject ; though how far The- 
 mistocles acceded to the views of Pausanias remains 
 
 i. i?* in. uncertain. But in every Grecian state, and particu- 
 larly in Laconia, the number of slaves, very far ex-
 
 TREASON OF PAUSANIAS. 
 
 ceeding that of freemen, invited the attention of the SECT. 
 seditious. Pausanias tampered with the Helots ; pro- 
 posing not only freedom, but all the rights of Spartan 
 citizens as the reward of their successful support to 
 him. Some of them betrayed his secret : but the 
 deposition of slaves was esteemed insufficient ground 
 for proceeding against a citizen. His correspondence 
 with Artabazus meanwhile was continued as oppor- 
 tunity offered ; till a slave, charged with a letter to 
 the satrap, suspecting danger in the service he was 
 sent upon, from having observed that, of many mes- 
 sengers despatched toward the same quarter, not one 
 had ever returned or been heard of, opened the letter 
 intrusted to him ; and having thus assured himself 
 both of his master's treason and of his own intended 
 fate, (for the letter mentioned that the bearer should 
 be put to death,) he carried it to the ephors. The 
 extreme wariness which the Spartan institutions pre- 
 scribed, and which the temper of the government dis- 
 posed it to observe, in criminal prosecution against 
 any Lacedaemonian citizen, but particularly against 
 one of the blood of Hercules, uncle to the king, and 
 actually in the high situation of regent, had very 
 much favoured the treason of Pausanias, and en- 
 couraged him in it. Even his own letter was not Thucyd. 
 thought ground to convict him upon, the evidence L1 - c - 133 
 to its authenticity being deemed incomplete. 
 
 But the knowledge of his treasonable practices was 
 now become too certain, and the danger of them too 
 great and alarming, to allow the Spartan administra- 
 tion, however composed in part of those who were 
 still his friends, any longer to neglect measures for 
 putting an effectual stop to them. To obtain com- 
 plete legal proof against him was the object, and the 
 superstition of the age furnished the means. The
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, slave, who brought the letter, must avoid the revenge 
 
 ' of his master. While therefore his communication 
 
 Thucyd. with the ephors remained yet unknown to Pausanias, 
 
 1 1 c 133 * 
 
 i>iod.sic. he was directed to betake himself as a suppliant to 
 1. 11. c . 45. *u^ temple of Neptune on mount Taenarus ; and, 
 
 v.Paus. within its sacred precinct, to form a hut for his 
 shelter, with a partition, behind which witnesses might 
 be concealed. Pausanias, alarmed, as was foreseen, 
 on hearing that his messenger, instead of executing 
 the commission intrusted to him, had fled to an 
 
 Thucyd. asylum, hastened to the place ; and the conversation 
 ensuing afforded the most unequivocal proof of his 
 guilt. The ephors, who, with some chosen attend- 
 ants, overheard all, proposed to arrest him on his 
 return to the city ; but one of them, more his friend 
 than the rest, giving him intimation of his danger, 
 
 ibid. he resorted to the temple of Minerva Chalciceca, a 
 sanctuary highly venerated. Religion forbidding to 
 force him thence, and yet his execution appearing 
 
 B'C^IO aDS l u t e ty indispensable for the security of the com- 
 
 Dodw. monwealth, a wall was built around the temple, and 
 he was starved to death ; but to obviate profanation, 
 when it was known that he was near expiring, being 
 brought without the sacred place, he died in the 
 hands of those who bore him. Superstition however 
 being even thus alarmed, the Delphian oracle was 
 consulted ; and, in obedience to the supposed mean- 
 ing of the obscure response, the body was buried in 
 front of the temple 13 , the spot remaining marked by 
 a monument with an inscription in the time of Thu- 
 cydides, and two brazen statues were dedicated to the 
 goddess. 
 
 The fate of Pausanias involved with it that of 
 
 13 'Ev rS
 
 FLIGHT OF THEMISTOCLES. 223 
 
 Themistocles. The Spartan administration pretended Thucyd. 
 that, in the course of their inquiry into the conduct Dbdo'r. 135 ' 
 of the former, full proof was discovered of the par- I; 11 ' ; 55> 
 
 * .* . Corn. Nep. 
 
 ticipation of Themistocles in the concerted treason & pl ut- v - 
 against the liberties of Greece ; and they insisted that 
 he ought to be brought to trial, not before the Athe- 
 nian assembly, or any Athenian judicature, but before 
 the Amphictyons, or some other court of deputies 
 from all the states of the Greek nation. The party 01. 78. f. 
 adverse to him, now ruling at Athens, acceded to the D dw? 66 ' 
 requisition; and, under the joint authority of the 
 government of Athens and Lacedsemon, persons were 
 sent with orders to apprehend him, wherever he could 
 be found. He had resided, since his banishment, 
 principally at Argos ; but he went occasionally to 
 other parts of Peloponnesus, where he had cultivated 
 an interest. Through his numerous friends and ad- 
 herents he received information of his danger in time 
 to pass to the island of Corcyra ; whose people, in 
 gratitude for particular good offices done to their 
 commonwealth, were disposed to show him kindness. 
 Though among the most powerful of the Grecian mari- 
 time states, they however could not venture to pro- 
 tect him in defiance of the united force of Lacedasmon 
 and Athens. He proceeded therefore to the coast 
 of Acarnania, and, at a loss otherwise to evade his 
 pursuers, resolved to apply to Admetus king of the 
 Molossians ; trusting apparently in his knowledge of 
 the magnanimity of that prince, from whom other- 
 wise he had little reason to expect offices of friendship, 
 Admetus having formerly been his open opponent 
 in a transaction with the Athenian government. 
 
 The anecdote of his reception, reported by the 
 authentic pen of Thucydides, affords a curious spe- 
 cimen of the relics then still subsisting in that remote
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, province of the ancient hospitality connected with 
 
 '_ religion, which, with some difference of ceremony 
 
 perhaps in different places, appears to have prevailed 
 in the days of Homer throughout Greece. It hap- 
 pened that, when Themistocles arrived at the usual 
 Thucyd. residence of Admetus, that prince was absent. He 
 applied however to the queen ; and, having the good 
 fortune to conciliate her favour, she furnished him 
 with means to insure protection from her husband. 
 Aristoph. Among the Greeks some altar was the usual resource 
 
 Lysistr. /./ /* i 11 t -i 
 
 v. 1139. of fugitives ; if they could reach one, their persons 
 1.1^24. were generally secure against violence. But the 
 queen of the Molossians, delivering her infant son to 
 Themistocles, directed him to await the king's return, 
 sitting by the hearth, with the child in his arms. No 
 manner of supplication was held by the Molossians 
 so sacred, so enforcing attention as a religious duty. 
 An audience being thus insured, Themistocles won 
 Admetus to receive him, not only into protection, but 
 into friendship. The Lacedemonian and Athenian 
 messengers arrived soon after. The Molossian prince 
 then, careful not to give unnecessary offence, urged 
 the custom of his country, sanctified by religion, in 
 excuse for a decisive refusal of permission to appre- 
 hend, within his dominion, a suppliant who had ac- 
 quired a claim upon him so implicated with duty to 
 the gods. 
 
 Molossis however was not a situation in which 
 it was desirable for Themistocles to remain. With 
 assistance therefore from his protector, having made 
 the difficult journey across the mountains of Epirus 
 and Macedonia to the seaport of Pydna, he embarked, 
 in disguise, aboard a merchant-ship going for Asia. 
 In the passage he was forced by stress of weather to 
 the island of Naxos, where the confederate armament
 
 FLIGHT OF THEMISTOCLES. 
 
 under Cimon then lay. Choosing among dangers SECT. 
 before him, he made himself known to the master of 
 the vessel, alarmed him with representation of the 
 consequences of having so far favoured the escape of a 
 proscribed person, allured him with promises of large 
 reward, and at length prevailed on him to put to sea 
 again without permitting any of his people to go 
 ashore. Arriving then safe at Ephesus, he proceeded 
 immediately up the country under protection of a 
 Persian to whom his introduction had been prepared. 
 All his property that could be Discovered at Athens, 
 when the order was issued for apprehending his 
 person, had been confiscated ; yet his faithful friends 
 there and at Argos had found means to preserve 
 effects to a large amount, which they remitted to him 
 as soon as they learned that he was in a place of 
 security. The sum confiscated, as Plutarch informs ' 
 us, was, according to Theophrastus, eighty talents ; 
 but, as Theopompus reported, a hundred, about 
 twenty-five thousand pounds sterling. What was the 
 value of the effects preserved by his friends we are 
 not informed, but before entering on public business 
 his whole property, according to Plutarch, had not 
 amounted to three talents. 
 
 Though we are not assured that Themistocles was 
 entirely innocent of the crime for which Pausanias 
 suffered, yet that the prosecution against him was prin- 
 cipally urged by party-spirit is sufficiently evident ; and 
 it is therefore no wonder if it was conducted with 
 an acrimony regardless of justice, of humanity, and 
 even of policy. Plutarch reports, on the authority Piut. v. 
 of the historian Stesimbrotus, that Epicrates, at the 
 prosecution of Cimon, was condemned to death and 
 executed, for procuring the escape of the wife and 
 children of Themistocles from Athens, and conveying 
 
 VOL. IT. Q
 
 226 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, them in safety to the residence of Admetus. It may 
 be hoped, for the sake of the generally amiable cha- 
 racter which Cimon bore, that this was not strictly 
 true in the unqualified manner in which it is related 
 to us ; yet the report shows, at least, what was thought 
 possible of the temper of party-spirit in Athens. No 
 law surely could exist at Athens to make the friendly 
 and humane action of Epicrates a capital crime. His 
 condemnation could proceed only from a decree of 
 the absolute sovereign, the people. Plutarch ex- 
 presses himself doubtful of the authority of Stesim- 
 brotus, yet it appears not to have been because he 
 thought the Athenian people incapable of making 
 such a decree. 
 
 The sole hope then of security remaining to The- 
 mistocles, against the most cruel persecution that 
 party-spirit could urge, was in the chance of pro- 
 tection from the great enemy of his country, the king 
 of Persia. He might indeed think himself, beyond 
 all others, obnoxious to the Persians, as a principal 
 cause of their disgraces and losses in their attempts 
 against Greece. Yet, as it had long been the policy 
 of the Persian court to protect and encourage Gre- 
 cian refugees, he might hope that the acquisition of 
 him as a future friend would be valued, in proportion 
 as he had been heretofore a formidable enemy. The 
 state of the Persian empire, scarcely yet restored to 
 secure internal quiet, moreover favoured his views. 
 Thus encouraged he ventured to address a letter to 
 Artaxerxes, then lately settled on the throne. Re- 
 Thucyd. ceivinff a favourable answer, he applied himself dili- 
 
 1. L c. 138. , i i , r T> i J 
 
 gently to learn the Persian language, and acquire 
 01. 78. f. information of Persian manners. Not then till he had 
 Dodw. thus employed a year did he go to Susa. His re- 
 Ann. Thuc. ce p t i on at t j ie cour t there was such as no Greek had
 
 RECEPTION OF THEMISTOCLES IN PERSIA. 227 
 
 ever before experienced. After having been treated SECT. 
 some time with the highest distinction, an extensive 
 command in Asia Minor was conferred upon him, 
 with a revenue far exceeding ordinary Grecian ideas 
 of private wealth. In the usual style of oriental 
 magnificence, three the most flourishing of the Gre- strabo, 
 cian cities yet remaining under the Persian dominion L14 -P- 636 - 
 were, with their territories, assigned for the nominal 
 purpose of supplying his table only : Magnesia was 
 to furnish bread, Myus meat, Lampsacus wine. Ac- 
 cording to Thucydides, the reduction of Greece 
 under the Persian dominion was the return which 
 he was expected to make to the king for such muni- 
 ficence. 
 
 Plutarch says that Themistocles lived long in this 
 splendid banishment ; but his account is not altogether 
 coherent ; and from earlier writers it rather appears 
 that he did not live long : from all accounts it is evi- Thucyd. 1.1. 
 dent that he did nothing memorable ; and probably i. ii.c.57, 
 he had little real enjoyment in all the advantages of 58> 59- 
 high fortune to which the bounty of the Persian 
 monarch raised him. His warm temper is likely to 
 have been violently agitated by consideration of the 
 circumstances in which he stood, and the business he 
 had undertaken. To raise his country to power and 
 splendour had been the object that through life his 
 mind had pursued with singular ardour. He had suc- 
 ceeded, and his success had covered him with no com- 
 mon glory. The thought of being engaged, now in ad- 
 vanced years, in the purpose of bringing on that coun- 
 try destruction or slavery, of ruining his own great 
 work, could not but embitter his best hopes ; while at 
 the same time every fair hope was highly precarious ; 
 the envy and jealousy of his new friends being little 
 less to be apprehended than the swords of his ene- 
 
 Q 2
 
 228 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, mies ; and defeat, in such a cause, must involve him 
 xi L 
 
 in tenfold misery and disgrace. Reports gained that 
 
 he procured a voluntary death by poison : but, though 
 the truth was not certainly known, Thucydides seems 
 rather to have thought that his end was natural. A 
 magnificent monument raised to his memory in the 
 agora of Magnesia, on the Maeander, where had been 
 his principal residence, mentioned by that early his- 
 torian, is reported by Plutarch as yet remaining ; but 
 his bones, in pursuance of his dying request, were 
 carried to Attica, and privately buried there. This 
 circumstance, to which, though it seems not to have 
 been fully authenticated, Thucydides evidently gave 
 credit, would mark strongly the regret he had in 
 undertaking the part against his country to which 
 the ruthless violence of his political opponents drove 
 him. 14 
 
 It cannot but be wished that the imputations 
 against this great man could, with due regard to 
 historical authority, be more completely done away : 
 yet it may be owing to him to make large allowance 
 for calumny, arising from that party-spirit from which 
 in Greece, beyond all other countries, high political 
 worth was wont to suffer. 15 In abilities, and by his 
 
 14 Plutarch omits, in his Life of Themistocles, to inform us at 
 what time the death of that extraordinary man happened. In 
 his Life of Cimon, he says that Themistocles died about the time 
 of the expedition into Cyprus under Cimon, and but little before 
 the death of Cimon himself. Neither Thucydides nor Diodorus 
 give any precise information upon the subject ; but it is rather 
 implied in their narrative, and seems upon many accounts more 
 likely, that he died some years earlier. 
 
 Dodwell, following Plutarch, places the death of Themistocles 
 in the same year with that of Cimon, B. C. 449., twenty after 
 his banishment, and sixteen after his journey to Susa. 
 
 15 Plato and Xenophon, whose authority is weighty, from the 
 age in which they lived, as well as from their characters, and
 
 CHARACTER OF THEMISTOCLES. 22! 
 
 actions, Themistocles was certainly one of the greatest SECT. 
 
 men that Greece or the world ever produced. Not, 
 
 like Leonidas and Pausanias, placed by the accident 
 of birth at the head of the affairs of Greece, but 
 born to an inferior station in an inferior common- 
 wealth, he first raised himself to the head] of that 
 commonwealth, and then raised his little common- 
 wealth, the territory of a single city, to be the leading 
 power in the political affairs of the known world ; 
 and, even when afterward banished from that com- 
 monwealth and from Greece, and reduced to the 
 simple importance of his own character, he remained 
 still the most important political character of his 
 time. Whatever relates to such a man is interesting. 
 It appears, says Plutarch, by his statue still remaining 
 at Athens in the temple of Diana Aristobule, built 
 under his direction, that his person and countenance 
 announced something uncommonly great and heroic. 
 For the character of his understanding, we may best 
 take it from Thucydides ; who, by his own abilities, 
 and by the age in which he lived, was most competent 
 to form a just judgment. ' In the mind of Themis- 
 
 * tocles,' says that historian, * seems to have been 
 
 * displayed the utmost power of human nature ; for 
 
 * the evident superiority of his capacity to that of all 
 ' other men was truly wonderful. His penetration 
 
 * was such that, from the scantiest information and 
 
 * with the most instantaneous deliberation, he formed 
 
 * the justest judgment of the past, and gained the 
 
 * clearest insight into the future. He had a.discern- 
 
 whose united authority is the greater on account of their differ- 
 ence in political principles, both give very honourable testimony 
 to Themistocles. Plato in Theages, p. 126. 1. 1. and in Menon, 
 p. 93. t. 2. ; and Xenophon in his Memorials of Socrates, 1. 2. c. 6. 
 s. 115. Nor is the eulogy of Aristophanes, in his comedy of The 
 Knights, v. 812. and 884., of no consideration. 
 
 Q 3
 
 230 
 
 CHAP. 
 XI. 
 
 Pausan. 
 1. 1. c. 1. 
 
 Plut. v. 
 Themist. 
 Plat. 
 Menon. 
 p. 93. t.2. 
 
 Plut. v. 
 Themist. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 * ment that could develope the advantageous and the 
 4 pernicious in measures proposed, however involved 
 ' in perplexity and obscurity ; and he had not less 
 
 * remarkably the faculty of explaining things clearly 
 
 * to others than of judging clearly himself. Such, in 
 
 * short, were the powers of his genius and the readi- 
 
 * ness of his judgment that he was beyond all men 
 
 * capable of directing all things upon every occasion.' 16 
 
 He died, according to Plutarch, in his sixty-fifth 
 year, leaving a numerous progeny, to whom a large 
 share of the bounty of the Persian monarch was con- 
 tinued. Nor was a restoration to the privileges of 
 their father's country denied them, when, the interest 
 of party no longer urging their persecution, the 
 merits of Themistocles were remembered as far out- 
 weighing his failings. Some of his daughters were 
 married to Athenian citizens ; and Cleophantus, his 
 third son, is mentioned by Plato as having resided at 
 Athens, but remembered for no higher qualification 
 than that of a most extraordinary horseman, such as 
 might vie with those who in our days most excel in 
 public exhibition. We do not indeed find that any 
 of his posterity were eminent as political characters ; 
 but the estimation in which his own memory was 
 held contributed to their benefit to late generations. 
 By a decree of the people of Magnesia honours were 
 granted to his family, which were still enjoyed by 
 Themistocles, an Athenian, the friend of Plutarch, 
 above six hundred years after the death of his great 
 ancestor. 
 
 16 From Lysias we have a corresponding eulogy of him in one 
 
 ghort^sentence ... trrpaTyyvoy jtAev ffAKTT6KXtct, iKayuratrov tlTtetv KOU 
 yvSvai Kal w/>aou (Or. Fun. p. 194. vel 105.) ; and from Cicero, 
 in a still shorter phrase, a very high panegyric, ' Themistoclem, 
 ' quern facile Graeciae principem ponimus.' M. T. Cic. Lucul- 
 lus, s. 1.
 
 POWER OF ATHENS. 231 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ITS 
 SECURITY AGAINST PERSIA TO THE TRUCE FOR THIRTY 
 YEARS BETWEEN ATHENS AND LACEDJEMON. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Athens the seat of science and arts. Extension of the power of 
 Athens : revolt of Thasos : jealousy of Lacedcemon : Earth- 
 quake at Lacedcemon : revolt of the Helots : assistance sent 
 from Athens to Lacedcemon : renunciation of the Lacedaemo- 
 nian confederacy by the Athenians. War ofAraos and Mycenae. 
 
 ATHENS, become, within a very few years, from SECT. 
 the capital of a small province, in fact, though not 
 yet in avowed pretension, the head of an empire, 
 exhibited a new and singular phenomenon in politics, 
 a sovereign people ; a people, not, as in many other 
 Grecian democracies, sovereign merely of that state 
 which themselves, maintained by slaves, composed, 
 but supreme over other people in subordinate re- 
 publics, acknowledging a degree of subjection, yet 
 claiming to be free. 1 Under this extraordinary po- 
 
 1 Through alterations which have taken place in things, words 
 are not always to be found in any modern language to express 
 with precision ancient ideas. Perhaps the word vassal, most 
 nearly of any in our language, expresses what the Greeks un- 
 derstood by their word "r-mj/coo?. Yet feudal vassalage, though 
 in many circumstances similar, so differed in the original idea - 
 from the kind of subjection by which the inferior Grecian com- 
 monwealths were bound to the more powerful that the use of 
 the term in Grecian history, wanting as a term may be, would 
 
 Q 4
 
 232 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. Htical constitution philosophy and the arts were be- 
 1__ ginning to make Athens their principal resort. Mi- 
 grating from Egypt and the east, they had long been 
 fostered on the western coast of Asia. In Greece 
 itself they had owed some temporary encouragement 
 principally to those called tyrants ; the Pisistratidse 
 at Athens, and Periander at Corinth. But their 
 efforts were desultory and comparatively feeble till 
 the communication with the Asian Greeks, checked 
 and interrupted by their subjection to Persia, was re- 
 stored, and Athens, chief of the glorious confederacy 
 by whose arms the deliverance had been effected, 
 began to draw everything toward itself as a common 
 centre, the capital of an empire. Already science 
 and fine taste were so far perfected that ^Eschylus 
 had exhibited tragedy in its utmost dignity, and So- 
 phocles and Euripides were giving it. the highest 
 polish, when Cimon returned in triumph to his coun- 
 try. Together with trophies, such as Greece had 
 never won before in so distant a field, he brought 
 wealth to a large amount, the fruit of his victories ; 
 part of which enriched the public treasury, part re- 
 warded the individuals who had fought under him, 
 and a large proportion, which he had had the virtue 
 and the good fortune to acquire without incurring 
 
 not be warrantable. Similar difficulty may be observed about 
 many other terms. AJ/-MJV signified a port or harbour for ship- 
 ping ; but the ancients often called by that name what our sea- 
 men would not allow to be a port or harbour. We are often at 
 a loss to render the verb icXeu otherwise than by our verb to sail, 
 though they are far from being of the same precise import. The 
 use of oars, so prevalent in Grecian navigation, is so little known 
 in our seas that to sail is our only general term for going by sea, 
 and sailor is another word for seaman. Thus also for avayu and 
 t'oppeu we must risk the sea-phrase to get utider way, or con- 
 tent ourselves with the inaccurate expression to set sail.
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF CIMON. 233 
 
 any charge of rapaciousness, became an addition to .SECT. 
 the large property inherited from his forefathers. 
 
 It was the peculiar felicity of Athens in this period 
 that, of the constellation of great men which arose 
 there, each was singularly fitted for the situation in 
 which the circumstances of the time required him to 
 act ; and none filled his place more advantageously 
 than Cimon. But the fate of all those great men, 
 and the resources employed, mostly in vain, to avert 
 it, sufficiently mark, in this splendid era, a defective 
 constitution, and law and justice ill assured. Aris- 
 tides, we are told, though it is not undisputed, had 
 founded his security upon extreme poverty : Cimon 
 endeavoured to establish himself by a splendid, and 
 almost unbounded, yet politic liberality. To ward Aristoph. 
 against envy, and to secure his party with that tre- ^J * 1 ^ 11 ' 
 mendous tyrant, as the comic poet not inaptly calls a P- Athen - 
 the sovereign people, he made a parade of throwing Corn. 
 down the fences of his gardens and orchards in the 
 neighbourhood of Athens, and permitted all to par- 
 take of their produce ; a table was daily spread at his 
 house for the poorer citizens, but more particularly 
 for those of his own ward, whom he invited from the 
 agora, the courts of justice, or the general assembly ; 
 a bounty which both enabled and disposed them to 
 give their time at his call whenever his interest re- 
 quired their support. In going about the city he 
 was commonly attended by a large retinue, hand- 
 somely clothed ; and if he met an elderly citizen ill 
 clad, he directed one of his attendants to change 
 cloaks with him. To the indigent of higher rank 
 he was equally attentive, lending or giving money, as 
 he found their circumstances required, and always 
 managing his bounty with the utmost care that the 
 object of it should not be put to shame. His con-
 
 34< HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, duct, in short, was a continual preparation for an 
 ' election ; not, as in England, to decide whether the 
 candidate should or should not be a member of the 
 legislature ; but whether he should be head of the 
 commonwealth or an exile. In his youth he had 
 affected a roughness of manners, and a contempt for 
 the elegances generally reckoned becoming his rank, 
 and which his fortune enabled him to command. In 
 his riper years he discovered that virtue and gross- 
 ness have no natural connexion : he became himself 
 a model of politeness, patronised every liberal art, 
 and studied to procure elegant as well as useful in- 
 dulgences for the people. By him were raised the 
 first of those edifices which, for want of a more pro- 
 per name, we call porticos, under whose magnificent 
 shelter, in their torrid climate, it became the delight 
 of the Athenians to assemble, and pass their leisure 
 in promiscuous conversation. The widely celebrated 
 groves of Academia acknowledged him as the founder 
 of their fame. In the wood, before rude and without 
 water, he formed commodious and elegant walks, and 
 adorned them with running fountains. Nor was the 
 planting of the agora, or great market-place of Athens, 
 with that beautiful tree the oriental plane, forgotten 
 as a benefit from Cimon ; while, ages after him, his 
 trees flourished, affording an agreeable and salutary 
 shade to those who exposed their wares there, and to 
 those who came to purchase them. Much, if not the 
 whole of these things, we are given to understand, 
 was done at his private expense ; but our information 
 upon the subject is inaccurate. Those stores, with 
 which his victories had enriched the treasury, pro- 
 bably furnished the sums employed upon some of the 
 public works executed under his direction, as, more 
 especially, the completion of the fortification of the
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF CIMON. 235 
 
 citadel, whose principal defence hitherto, on the SFCT. 
 southern side, had been the precipitous form, of the . ' 
 rock. 
 
 While with this splendid and princely liberality 
 Cimon endeavoured to confirm his own interest, he 
 was attentive to promote the general welfare, and to 
 render permanent the superiority of Athens among 
 the Grecian republics. The citizens of the allied xhucyd. 
 states grew daily more impatient of the requisitions piu t c ' v 99 ' 
 regularly made to take their turn of service on ship- cim - 
 board, and longed for uninterrupted enjoyment of 
 their homes, in that security against foreign enemies 
 which their past labours had, they thought, now 
 sufficiently established. But that the common in- 
 terest still required the maintenance of a fleet was a 
 proposition that could not be denied, while the Per- 
 sian empire existed, or while the Grecian seas of- 
 fered temptation for piracy. Cimon therefore pro- 
 posed that any commonwealth of the confederacy 
 might compound for the personal service of its citi- 
 zens, by furnishing ships, and paying a sum of money 
 to the common treasury : the Athenians would then 
 undertake the manning of the fleet. The proposal 
 was in the moment popular ; most of the allies ac- 
 ceded to it, unaware or heedless of the consequences ; 
 for, while they were thus depriving themselves of all 
 maritime force, making that of Athens irresistible, 
 they gave that ambitious republic claims upon them, 
 uncertain in their nature, and which, as they might 
 be made, could now also be enforced, at its pleasure. 
 
 Having thus at the same time strengthened itself 
 and reduced to impotence many of the allied states, 
 the Athenian government became less scrupulous of 
 using force against any of the rest which might dis- 
 pute its sovereign authority. The reduction of Eion,
 
 236 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, by the confederate arms under Cimon, had led to 
 
 V" TT ^ 
 
 new information of the value of the adjacent country; 
 
 Herodot. where some mines of gold and silver, and a lucrative 
 commerce with the surrounding Thracian hordes, 
 C 10 ' exc ^ e< ^ avidity. But the people of the neighbour- 
 1. 11. c.7o. ing island of Thasos, very anciently possessed of that 
 &piut. ep commerce, and of the more accessible mines, insisted 
 v. Cim. that th es6j w hen recovered from the common enemy 
 by the arms of that confederacy of which they were 
 members, should revert entire to them. The Athe- 
 nians, asserting the right of conquest, on the con- 
 trary, claimed the principal share as their own. The 
 B. c. 465. Thasians, irritated, renounced the confederacy. Cimon 
 Dod'w. ' then was commanded to lead the confederate arma- 
 Ann. Thuc. men t against them. They venturing an action at 
 sea, were defeated ; and Cimon, debarking his forces 
 on the island, became quickly master of everything 
 but the principal town, to which he laid siege. The 
 Athenians then hastened to appropriate that inviting 
 territory on the continent, which was their principal 
 object, by sending thither a colony of no less than 
 ten thousand men, partly Athenian citizens, partly 
 from the allied commonwealths. 
 
 Thucyd. The Thasians had not originally trusted in their 
 
 own strength alone for the hope of final success. 
 Early in the dispute they had sent ministers to La- 
 cedasmon, soliciting protection against the oppression 
 of Athens. The pretence was certainly favourable, 
 and the Lacedaemonian government, no longer pressed 
 by domestic troubles, determined to use the oppor- 
 tunity for interfering to check the growing power of 
 the rival commonwealth, so long an object of jealousy, 
 and now become truly formidable. Without a fleet 
 capable of contending with the Athenian, they could 
 not send succour immediately to Thasos: but they
 
 SIEGE OF THASOS. 
 
 were taking measures secretly for a diversion in its SECT. 
 favour, by invading Attica, when a sudden and extra- 
 ordinary calamity, an earthquake which overthrew 
 the city of Sparta, and in its immediate consequences B. c. 465. 
 threatened destruction to the commonwealth, com- bodw. 
 pelled them to confine all their attention at home. m"^ 1 
 Nevertheless the siege, carried on with great vigour, ci.*] 
 and with all the skill of the age under the direction of 
 Cimon, was, during three years, obstinately resisted. 
 Even then the Thasians obtained terms, severe in- B.C. 463. 
 deed, but by which they obviated the miseries, death ' ' *' 
 often for themselves and slavery for their families, to 
 which Grecian people, less able to defend themselves, 
 were frequently reduced by Grecian arms. Their 
 fortifications however were destroyed ; their ships of 
 war were surrendered ; they paid immediately a sum 
 of money ; they bound themselves to an annual tri- 
 bute ; and they yielded all claim upon the opposite 
 continent, and the valuable mines there. 
 
 The sovereignty of the Athenian people over the 
 allied republics would thus gain some present con- 
 firmation ; but in the principal object their ambition 
 and avarice were, apparently through over-greedingss, 
 disappointed. The town of Eion stood at the mouth 
 of the river Strymon. For the new settlement a place 
 called the Nine-ways, a few miles up the river, was 
 chosen ; commodious for the double purpose of com- 
 municating with the sea, and commanding the neigh- 
 bouring country. But the Edonian Thracians, in 
 whose territory it was, resenting the encroachment, 
 infested the settlers with irregular but continual hos- 
 tilities. To put an end to so troublesome a war the 
 
 [* Mr. Clinton settles this date from Pausan. iv. 24. 2. emended, compared 
 with Diod. xi. 70., ' consistently with Thucyd. i. 101., who states the earthquake 
 ' at Sparta and revolt of the Helots to have happened after the Thasian revolt, 
 ' and with some interval.']
 
 238 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, whole force of the colony marched against them. As 
 
 XII 
 
 ' the Greeks advanced, the Edonians retreated ; avoid- 
 ing a general action, while they sent to all the neigh- 
 bouring Thracian tribes for assistance, as in a com- 
 mon cause. When they were at length assembled in 
 sufficient numbers, having engaged the Greeks far 
 within a wild and difficult country, they attacked, 
 overpowered, and cut in pieces their army, and an- 
 nihilated the colony. 
 
 Com. Nep. Cimon, on his return to Athens, did not meet 
 v. cim. the acclamations to which he had been accustomed. 
 WLTO^ 8 * Faction had been busy in his absence. Apparently 
 the fall of the colony of the Nine-ways furnished 
 both instigation and opportunity, perhaps assisted by 
 circumstances of which no information remains. A 
 prosecution was instituted against him, on the pre- 
 tence, according to the biographers, that he ought to 
 have extended the Athenian dominion by conquest 
 in Macedonia, and that bribes from Alexander, king 
 of that country, had stopped his exertions. The 
 covetous ambition indeed of the Athenian people, 
 inflamed by interested demagogues, was growing 
 boundless. Cimon, indignant at the ungrateful re- 
 turn for a life divided between performing the most 
 important services to his country, and studying how 
 most to gratify the people, would enter little into 
 particulars in refuting a charge, one part of which 
 he considered as attributing to him no crime, the 
 other as incapable of credit, and therefore beneath 
 his regard. He told the assembled people that 
 { they mistook both him and the country which it 
 
 * was said he ought to have conquered. Other ge- 
 
 * nerals had cultivated an interest with the lonians 
 
 2 I am not perfectly satisfied with these dates assigned by Dodwell, but cannot 
 undertake to correct them.
 
 EARTHQUAKE AT LACEDJEMON. 239 
 
 ' and the Thessalians, whose riches might make an SECT. 
 
 * interference in their concerns profitable. For him- 
 
 * self, he had never sought any connexion with those 
 
 * people ; but he confessed he esteemed the Mace- 
 
 * donians, who were virtuous and brave, but not rich ; 
 
 * nor would he ever prefer riches to those qualities, 
 ' though he had his satisfaction in having enriched 
 ' his country with the spoils of its enemies.' The 
 popularity of Cimon was yet great ; his principal 
 opponents apparently found it not a time for pushing 
 matters to extremity against him, and such a defence 
 sufficed to procure an honourable acquittal. 
 
 Meanwhile Lacedaemon had been in the utmost Thucyd. 
 confusion and on the brink of ruin. The earthquake Diod.'i.n". 
 came suddenly at midday, with a violence before p'iuf.' v 64 ' 
 unheard of. The youths of the principal families, Cim - 
 assembled in the gymnasium at the appointed hour 
 for exercise, were in great numbers crushed by its 
 fall : many of both sexes and of all ages were buried 
 under the ruins of other buildings : the shocks were 
 repeated ; the earth opened in several places ; vast 
 fragments from the summits of Taygetus were tum- 
 bled down its sides : in the end only five houses 
 remained standing in Sparta, and it was computed 
 that twenty thousand lives were lost. 
 
 The first strokes of this awful calamity filled all 
 ranks with the same apprehensions. But, in the con- 
 tinuance of it, that wretched multitude, excluded 
 from all participation in the prosperity of their 
 country, began to found hope on its distress : a pro- 
 posal, obscurely made, was rapidly communicated, 
 and the Helots assembled from various parts with 
 one purpose, of putting their severe masters to death, 
 and making the country their own. The ready fore- 
 sight and prudent exertion of Archidamus, who had
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, succeeded his grandfather Leotychides in the throne 
 ' of the house of Procles, preserved Lacedaemon. In 
 the confusion of the first alarm, while some were en- 
 deavouring to save their most valuable effects from 
 the ruins of the city, others flying various ways for 
 personal safety, Archidamus, collecting what he could 
 of his friends and attendants about him, caused 
 trumpets to sound to arms, as if an enemy were at 
 hand. The Lacedaemonians, universally trained to 
 the strictest military discipline, obeyed the signal ; 
 arms were the only necessaries sought ; and civil rule, 
 dissipated by the magnitude of the calamity, was, for 
 the existing circumstances, 'most advantageously sup- 
 plied by military order. The Helots, awed by the 
 very unexpected appearance of a regular army instead 
 of a confused and flying multitude, desisted from 
 their meditated attempt; but, quitting the city, spread 
 themselves over the country, and excited their fel- 
 lows universally to rebellion. 
 
 Thucyd. The greater part of those miserable men, whom 
 
 the Lacedaemonians held in so cruel a bondage, were 
 descendants of the Messenians, men of the same 
 blood with themselves, Greeks and Dorians. Memory 
 of the wars of their ancestors, of their hero Aristo- 
 menes, and of the defence of Ithome, was not ob- 
 solete among them. Ithome accordingly they seized 
 and made their principal post ; and they so outnum- 
 bered the Lacedaemonians that, though deficiently 
 armed, yet, being not without discipline acquired in 
 attendance upon their masters in war, they were ca- 
 pable of being formidable even in the field. Nor was 
 it thus only that the rebellion was distressing. The 
 Lacedaemonians, singularly ready and able in the use 
 of arms, were singularly helpless in almost every 
 other business. Deprived of their slaves they were
 
 ASSISTANCE FROM ATHENS. 
 
 nearly deprived of the means of subsistence \ agri- SECT. 
 culture stopped, and mechanic arts ceased. Applica- 
 tion was therefore made to the neighbouring allies for 
 succour. The zealous friendship of the JEginetans 
 upon the occasion we find afterward acknowledged ' 2> c ' 27 ' 
 by the- Lacedaemonian government, and assistance 
 came from as far as Platsea. Thus re-enforced the 
 spirited and well directed exertions of Archidamus l - } c - 101 - 
 quickly so far reduced the rebellion that the insur- 1.11. c.64. 
 gents remaining in arms were blockaded in Ithome. 
 But the extraordinary natural strength of that place, 
 the desperate obstinacy of the defenders, and the 
 deficiency of the assailants in the science of attack, 
 giving reason to apprehend that the business might Thucyd. 
 not be soon accomplished, the Lacedaemonians sent i)iodor. ut' 
 to desire assistance from the Athenians, who were ^^ It * 
 esteemed, beyond the other Greeks, experienced and 
 skilful in the war of sieges. 
 
 This measure seems to have been on many accounts 
 imprudent. There was found at Athens a strong 
 disposition to refuse the aid. But Cimon, who, with 
 a universal liberality, always professed particular 
 esteem for the Lacedaemonians, prevailed upon his 
 fellow-countrymen to take the generous part ; and a QJ^g 4 ? 1 ' 
 considerable body of forces marched under his com- 
 
 mand into Peloponnesus. On their arrival at the 
 camp of the besiegers an assault upon the place was 
 attempted, but with so little success that recourse 
 was again had to the old method of blockade. It 
 was in the leisure of that inactive and tedious mode 
 of attack that principally arose those heartburnings 
 which first occasioned an avowed national aversion 
 between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, and led, 
 not indeed immediately, but in a direct line, to the 
 
 VOL. II. R
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, fatal Peloponnesian war. All the prudence and all 
 the authority of Cimon could not prevent the viva- 
 cious spirit of the Athenians from exulting, perhaps 
 rather insultingly, in the new pre-eminence of their 
 country : wherever danger called, they would be 
 ostentatiously forward to meet it ; and an assumed 
 superiority, without a direct pretension to it, was 
 continually appearing. The Spartan pride was of- 
 fended by their arrogance ; the Spartan gravity was 
 disturbed by their lively forwardness : it began to be 
 considered that, though Greeks, they were lonians, 
 whom the Peloponnesians considered as an alien race ; 
 and it occurred that if, in the continuance of the 
 siege, any disgust should arise, there was no security 
 that they might not renounce their present engage- 
 ments, and even connect themselves with the Helots; 
 who, as Greeks, had, not less than the Lacedaemo- 
 nians, a claim to friendship and protection from every 
 other Grecian people. Mistrust thus arose on one 
 side ; disgust became quickly manifest on both : and 
 the Lacedemonians shortly resolved to dismiss the 
 Athenian forces. This however they endeavoured 
 to do, as far as might be, without offence, by declaring 
 that an * assault having been found ineffectual, the 
 
 * assistance of the Athenians was superfluous for the 
 f blockade, and the Lacedaemonians would not give 
 
 * their allies unnecessary trouble.' All the other 
 allies were however retained, and the Athenians alone 
 returned home ; so exasperated by this invidious dis- 
 tinction that, on their arrival at Athens, the party 
 adverse to Cimon proposing a decree for renouncing 
 the confederacy with Lacedasmon, it was carried. An 
 alliance with Argos, the inveterate enemy of Sparta, 
 immediately followed ; and soon after the Thessalians 
 acceded to the new confederacy.
 
 WAR OF ARGOS AND MYCEN^. 243 
 
 While Lacedsemon was engaged with this danger- SECT. 
 ous insurrection, a petty war arose in Peloponnesus, 
 affording one of the most remarkable, among the 
 many strong instances on record, of the miseries to 
 which the greater part of Greece was perpetually 
 liable from the defects of its political system. Argos, 
 the capital of Argolis, and formerly of Peloponnesus 
 under the early kings of the Danaidean race, or per- 
 haps before them, lost its pre-eminence, as we have 
 already seen, during the reigns of the Persidean and 
 Pelopidean princes, under whom Mycenae became the 
 first city of Greece. On the return of the Heraclidae, 
 Temenus fixed his residence at Argos, which thus 
 regained its superiority. But, as the oppressions, 
 arising from a defective political system, occasioned 
 very generally through Greece the desire, so the 
 troubles of the Argive government gave the means 
 for the inferior towns to become independent re- 
 publics. Like the rest, or perhaps more than the rest, 
 generally oppressive, that government was certainly 
 often ill-conducted and weak ; and Laceda3mon, its 
 perpetual enemy, fomented the rebellious disposition 
 of its dependencies. During the ancient wars of 
 Sparta and Messenia the Argives had expelled the 
 people of their towns of Asinaea and Nauplia, and 
 forced them to seek foreign settlements ; a re- 
 source sufficiently marking a government both weak 
 and oppressive. Mycenae was now a much smaller 
 town than Argos ; but its people, encouraged by 
 Lacedaemon, formed lofty pretensions. The far- 
 famed temple of Juno, the tutelar deity of the country, Diodor. 
 situated about five miles from Argos, and little more stlabo!' 65 ' 
 than one from Mycenae, was considered by the Ar- pjjjj, 377 ' 
 gives as theirs ; and, from the time, it was supposed, i. 2. c. is. 
 of the Heraclidae, the priestess had been appointed &L8.C.33. 
 
 R 2
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, and the sacred ceremonies administered under the 
 protection of their government. Nevertheless the 
 Mycenaeans now claimed the right to this superin- 
 tendency. The games of Nemea, from their insti- 
 tution, or, as it was called, their restoration, had been 
 under the direction of the Argives; but the Myce- 
 naean government claimed also the prior right to pre- 
 side there. These however were but branches of a 
 much more important claim ; for they wanted only 
 power, or sufficient assistance from Sparta, to assert 
 a right of sovereignty over Argos itself and all Ar- 
 golis ; and they were continually urging another pre- 
 tension, not the less invidious to Argos because better 
 founded, a pretension to merit with all the Greek 
 nation for having joined the confederacy against 
 Persia, while the Argives allied themselves with the 
 common enemy of Greece. The favourable oppor- 
 tunity afforded by the Helot rebellion was eagerly 
 seized by the Argives for ridding themselves of such 
 troublesome and dangerous neighbours, whom they 
 considered as rebellious subjects. Laying siege to 
 B.c. g 464. Mycense, they took the place, reduced the surviving 
 [B. c. ' people to slavery, and, dedicating a tenth of the 
 spoil to the gods, destroyed the town, which was 
 never rebuilt. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Change of administration at Athens, and banishment of Cimon. 
 Renunciation of the Peloponnesian confederacy by Megara, and 
 accession to the Athenian. Difficulties of tlie new Athenian 
 administration : Ephialtes : Pericles : depression of the court 
 of Areopagus : expedition to Egypt. War in Greece : siege of 
 JEgina : relief of Megara by Myronides. 
 
 AT Athens, after the banishment of Themistocles, 
 Cimon remained long in possession of a popularity
 
 BANISHMENT OF CIMON. 245 
 
 which nothing could resist ; and his abilities, his SECT. 
 
 ii 
 
 successes, and his moderation, his connexion with the _ ' 
 
 aristocratical interest, and his favour with the people, 
 seemed altogether likely to insure, if anything could 
 insure, permanency and quiet to his administration. 
 But in Athens, as in every free government, there 
 would always be a party adverse to the party in the 
 direction of public affairs : matters had been for some 
 time ripening for a change ; and the renunciation 
 of the Lacedaemonian alliance was the triumph of 
 the opposition. The epithet Philolacones, friends to 
 Lacedaemon, was circulated as the opprobrium of the 
 existing administration. Cimon had always professed 
 himself friendly to the Lacedaemonians, and an ad- 
 mirer of their institutions. His partiality had gone 
 so far as to induce him to name his eldest son Lace- 
 daemonius ; and, the more completely to prove that he Piut. v. 
 did not esteem the Athenian character a model of 
 perfection, (apparently by way of admonition, both to 
 his family and to his country, ) he named his two other piat. 
 sons Thessalus and Eleus. All these circumstances p'lut' 
 were now turned to his disadvantage, with all the c r Q - Ne P 
 acrimony of party-spirit : a favourable moment was 
 seized while the popular mind was heated ; the ostra- 
 cism was proposed and carried ; and by his banishment 
 the party in opposition to him became fully possessed 
 of the government. 
 
 In the divided state of Greece meanwhile circum- 
 stances were arising still to promote the power of the 
 Athenian commonwealth. An ancient dispute be- 
 tween Megara and Corinth about the limits of their 
 respective territories led to hostilities, in which the 
 Megarians were pressed by the superior strength 
 of their enemy. Megara was of the Lacedaemonian 
 confederacy, but so also was Corinth, and the leading 
 
 R 3
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. Megarians could obtain no partial favour from the 
 JI ' Lacedaemonian government. Under these circum- 
 stances the democratical party in Megara proposing 
 to renounce the Peloponnesian for the Athenian con- 
 federacy, the oligarchal was obliged to yield. The 
 situation and circumstances of their territory gave 
 them importance. Almost wholly mountainous, it 
 formed a very strong frontier for Attica against Pelo- 
 ponnesus : its situation against the isthmus completely 
 commanded the communication by land between the 
 peninsular and northern Greece : and its ports of 
 Nisaea on the Saronic and Pega3 on the Corinthian 
 gulf were valuable acquisitions to a maritime power ; 
 on one side depriving the enemy of means to annoy 
 Attica, on the other affording opportunity to distress 
 the Peloponnesians, and to extend the Athenian 
 command in the western seas. The new Athenian 
 administration therefore very gladly accepted the 
 proposal of the Megarians, and, under pretence of 
 providing in the most effectual manner for the se- 
 curity of their new allies, they took the most effectual 
 measures for holding them in subjection. Athenian 
 garrisons were placed, not only in the port of Pegae, 
 but also in the city of Megara ; those who led the 
 Megarian affairs submitting to this through fear of 
 domestic, far more than of foreign foes. Fortifications 
 were then raised connecting the city with its port of 
 Nisaea, and these brought Megara itself in some 
 degree under the controul of the Athenian fleet. 
 
 These circumstances, employing the minds of the 
 Athenian people and flattering their ambition, were 
 favourable to the new administration. Probably also 
 the party in Megara, which effected the revolution 
 there, would not so readily have connected themselves 
 with the former Athenian administration, which was
 
 EPHIALTES I PERICLES. 24*7 
 
 better disposed toward Lacedaemon, and less friendly SECT. 
 to unbalanced democracy. But the liberality of Cimon 
 was quickly missed : to equal it from their own stores pi ut . v . 
 was beyond the private means of the new rulers ; yet 
 to find means for gratifying the people as they had 
 been accustomed to be gratified, or even more, was 
 absolutely necessary for those who took the lead in 
 public affairs, if they would hold their situation, or if 
 they would avoid the risk even of taking the place of 
 Cimon in banishment. The public treasury tempted ; 
 but all issues thence were under the controul of the 
 court of Areopagus, a large majority in which was of 
 the aristocratical party, adverse to them and friendly 
 to Cimon. No resource occurred but in that de- 
 spotic power which the people in assembly might 
 arrogate : the people might probably be persuaded to 
 consent to the prostitution of the public money to 
 their private emolument ; and while thus, in reality, 
 they bribed themselves, popular favour would accrue 
 to the advisers of the gratifying measure. This was 
 indeed hazardous in the extreme : the great barrier 
 established by the constitution against'excess of popular 
 caprice would be done away : but the necessities of 
 the administration were pressing ; and the leading 
 men, it was hoped, might still be able, by their 
 influence, or their oratory, to guide the proceedings 
 of the general assembly. 
 
 It was indeed not by ordinary men that Cimon 
 was removed from his situation at the head of the 
 commonwealth, and that these violent and hazardous 
 
 changes were made. The ostensible head of the Piutv. 
 
 p ' i 
 party was Ephialtes; but Pericles, son of Xanthippus, 
 
 had lately been gaining a superiority in popular esti- 
 mation. Pericles possessed extraordinary advantages Com. Nep. 
 from nature and from fortune. His father, a man of p er id.' V 
 
 R 4
 
 248 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, one of the first families of Athens, and of large pro- 
 ' perty, had distinguished himself in the prosecution of 
 the great Miltiades, and had afterward much more 
 advantageously distinguished himself in the command 
 of the Athenian forces on the glorious day of Mycale. 
 He married Agariste, niece of Clisthenes, chief of 
 the Alcma3onidean family, and leader of the party 
 
 piut. v. that expelled the Pisistratidae. Their son, born with 
 ' uncommon abilities, was educated under the ablest of 
 V 2 tnose fathers of science and fine taste who at this 
 time arose in Athens, or resorted thither from the 
 various establishments of the Greek nation. Anax- 
 
 piat. ibid, agoras and Pythoclides are mentioned as the in- 
 structors of his youth ; Damon as the companion of 
 his riper years. It was observed by old men that in 
 person, manner, and voice he remarkably resembled 
 Pisistratus : and this circumstance, communicated 
 among a superstitious people, infused a jealousy that 
 long deterred him from putting himself forward in 
 public business. In his youth therefore arms em- 
 ployed his active hours, and science was the pursuit 
 of his leisure. But when, Aristides being dead, 
 Themistocles banished, and Cimon mostly absent on 
 military commands, no superior man remained to 
 take the lead in the popular assembly, Pericles was 
 induced to show himself. His powers of eloquence 
 
 piut. v. f ar exceeded those of any orator of his age ; and his 
 speeches were distinguished by a new polish of style 
 and manner which singularly captivated the 'Athe- 
 nian people. His family-interest and his party-con- 
 nexions joined to put him in unavoidable opposition 
 to the aristocratical interest ; which his private judg- 
 ment and private inclination otherwise disposed him 
 to support. He had taken a part in the prosecution 
 instituted against Cimon on his return from the con-
 
 EPHIALTES: PERICLES. 
 
 quest of Thasos : yet the moderation with which he SECT. 
 conducted himself in it showed private esteem in the ' 
 midst of political opposition. The banishment by 
 ostracism being reputed not a punishment, or at least 
 no disgrace, he did not scruple to concur in such a 
 measure, when its consequence would be to give his 
 own party complete possession of the government. 
 He was then induced, by the necessities of that party, 
 to concur in the proposal, so fatal to the Athenian 
 constitution, for contracting the powers and reducing 
 the dignity of the court of Areopagus. Ephialtes Arist.poUt. 
 was the instrument to bring forward the measure. j)iodor. 
 What Ephialtes proposed the people willed, and it p/^'y ' 77 * 
 was done : the more important of those causes which, cim. & 
 
 Pericl 
 
 under the constitution of Solon, were cognisable by the 
 court of Areopagus only, in future were to be brought 
 before the assembly of the people ; and the assembly of 
 the people was to direct, without controul, issues from 
 the public treasury. 3 This was the finishing stroke 
 to form at Athens that union of all the powers of 
 government, legislative, executive, financial, and ju- 
 dicial, in the same hands, which, according to the 
 sage Montesquieu, constitutes the essence of despot- 
 ism ; and hence the term tyrant was, even in that 
 age, applied to the assembled Athenian people. 4 
 
 An individual despot has generally his favourites, 
 who govern him, but a despotic multitude must ne- 
 
 3 Dodwell refers this transaction to the year B. C. 462., the 
 year, according to him, preceding the banishment of Cimon; but 
 his proof is very deficient. I think Diodorus more probably right, 
 in placing it in the first year of the 80th Olympiad, B.C. 460. 
 
 4 .... TTaVTEJ O.V- 
 
 8f<u7Toi btSiatri y' Sao"- 
 
 mp avtya Tvpcwov. Aristoph. Eq. v. 1112. 
 
 "Qtnrep rvpavxp, Ty SVJ/AW ^api^of/.evot. Aristot. Polit. 1.2. C. 12. 
 
 Quotations from Thucydides, equally strong to the same purpose, 
 will be found in following notes.
 
 250 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, cessarily have its favourites to guide its measures. The 
 favourite of the multitude then becomes the real de- 
 
 spot ; whence, among the Greeks, demagogues were 
 so frequently qualified with the title of tyrant. Under 
 the direction of Ephialtes, Pericles, and some other 
 leading men, new or increased pay was given to the 
 people for attendance upon the general assemblies and 
 the courts of judicature : amusements the most ele- 
 gant were provided for their leisure at the public 
 expense : the sublime dramas of ./Eschylus, Sophocles, 
 Euripides, and the jocose satire of the comic poets, 
 were alternately exhibited in magnificent theatres : 
 the religious festivals were increased in number and 
 celebrated with new splendour : on days of business 
 the pay for attending the courts and assemblies fed 
 the many ; on holidays the numerous victims of the 
 sacrifices feasted them. But to support the increased 
 expenses new supplies were necessary. The com- 
 manding power of the Athenian people, and the 
 depression of the allies, were thought now so esta- 
 blished that the former might exercise, and the 
 latter must bear, any tyranny. Not only therefore 
 the common treasury of the confederacy was removed 
 from Delos to Athens % but the moderate assessment 
 of Aristides, to which all the allies had cheerfully 
 Xenoph. submitted, was greatly advanced. If disputes arose, 
 Athen. the tribunals of Athens were to decide ; and hence 
 new profit, new power, and very flattering distinction 
 
 5 That this removal took place, and about this time, seems 
 unquestionable, though Thucydides has not particularly men- 
 tioned it. Plutarch, in his Life of Aristides, quotes Theophrastus 
 for its being the act of Aristides, with whose character it seems 
 less congenial. In his Life of Pericles, he makes that able but 
 less scrupulous statesman apologise for it as his act, and with 
 this the account of Justin corresponds.
 
 MEASURES OF ATHENS. 251 
 
 to even the meanest of the Athenians, who were to SECT. 
 
 ii 
 be judges, with most grievous humiliation and op- ' 
 
 pression to the people of those subject states which 
 were still called allies. 
 
 These circumstances superinduced new necessity 
 for maintaining the navy in vigour. But to be main- 
 tained in vigour it must be employed : and it was 
 highly desirable that it should be employed, as under 
 Cimon it had been, so as to bring new gratification 
 to the people, and at the same time to acquire some- 
 thing toward the expense of its own maintenance. 
 Cyprus appearing the most inviting object then in 
 view, a fleet of two hundred trireme galleys was 
 sent thither under Charitimis. 6 But shortly a more 
 alluring field of action presented itself. 
 
 In the relaxation of the Persian government du- Thucyd. 
 ring the last years of Xerxes, and the confusion which Doctor. 104 ' 
 followed his death, Inarus, chief of some African 1 - 11 - C - 7L 
 tribes on the western border of Egypt, engaged 
 the greater part of that rich country in rebellion. 
 But when the empire became again settled under 
 Artaxerxes, apprehensive that he should be unable 
 to withstand its collected force, which would probably 
 be soon directed against him, he looked round for 
 foreign alliance. The little Athenian commonwealth, 
 commanding the navy of the Grecian confederacy, 
 
 6 Barthelemy (Anacharsis, p. 269. v. 1. ed. 8vo.) gives the com- 
 mand of this expedition to Cimon, and quotes Thucydides and 
 Plutarch. He has probably trusted to his memory, which has 
 deceived him. Neither Thucydides, nor Plutarch, nor Diodorus 
 has mentioned the commander's name. It is here given on the 
 authority of Ctesias. I will however say for Barthelemy that, 
 for myself, I prefer a writer who, if he makes a mistake, may 
 be corrected from the authority which himself quotes, to those 
 who fastidiously require their readers to believe all on their own 
 assertion.
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, was at this time by far the first maritime power in 
 ^ the world : and the difficulty of approach to Egypt 
 
 by land, together with the command which the Per- 
 sian monarch possessed of the Phenician navy, made 
 a maritime ally of great importance to Inarus. The 
 Grecian infantry of this age was also not less beyond 
 all other in esteem ; and though, among themselves, 
 Thucyd. the Peloponnesian, and especially the Lacedemonian, 
 had the reputation of superiority, yet among foreigners 
 no Grecian name was of higher renown than the 
 Athenian. Inarus therefore sent to Athens proposals 
 of alliance ; offering very advantageous returns for 
 assistance to complete the deliverance of Egypt from 
 the Persian dominion. 
 
 Hist, of the Sir Walter Raleigh, who looked upon this part of 
 b.2. r c.'7. history certainly with a master's eye, but with too 
 s - 5 - transient a glance, has imputed folly to the Athenian 
 
 government for their conduct ; when, having it in 
 their power to make the valuable acquisition of Cy- 
 prus, which their naval force would have enabled 
 them to keep, they quitted so desirable an object for 
 the wild project of acquiring dominion on the con- 
 tinent of Africa. If indeed the Athenian empire, as 
 the confederacy under the controul of the Athenian 
 commonwealth is often called by ancient writers, had 
 been connected by any regular and settled form of 
 government, or if the constitution of Athens itself 
 had been such as to be capable of carrying any steady 
 command, the observation would certainly have been 
 just. But the circumstances of Athens offer at least 
 an apology for those able men who promoted the 
 expedition to Egypt. For, however valuable an ac- 
 quisition Cyprus might in time have been made, 
 under such a course of prudent and steady manage- 
 ment as the constitution of Athens seemed utterly
 
 WAR IN GREECE. 253 
 
 to deny, the wealth of Egypt was a far more tempting SECT. 
 present object. There, it was hoped, victories might 
 be obtained to rival those of Cimon ; which through 
 the ransom of wealthy prisoners, the spoils of Persian 
 camps, and the produce of Thracian mines, had 
 wonderfully enriched individuals and supplied the 
 public treasury. Charitimis therefore was ordered to 
 lead the whole force under his command from Cyprus B. c. 459. 7 
 
 Ol 80. - * 
 
 to the Nile. His rapid success appeared at first to 
 justify the enterprise : all yielded before him till he Thucyd. 
 arrived at Memphis, the capital of Lower Egypt, and Diodo' r . LO ' 
 he possessed himself of two divisions out of three I; 9 ' p'g;' 
 which composed that vast city. A numerous body B.C. 458. 
 
 Ol 80 ? 
 
 of Persians, and of those Egyptians who had not 
 joined in the revolt, retiring into the third division, 
 prepared for a vigorous defence. 
 
 Meanwhile the acquisition of Megara had involved 
 Athens in war with the Corinthians, and in some 
 measure with the whole Peloponnesian confederacy, 
 of which Corinth was an important member, and La- Thucyd. 
 
 , I 1 1 -I T 1 TT T ' !' C - 105- 
 
 cedaemon remained the head. In a descent at Halias, Dbdor. 
 on the Argolic coast, their forces were defeated by 
 the Corinthians assisted by the Epidaurians. Shortly 
 after, in a naval action offCecryphalia, the Athenians 
 defeated the Peloponnesians. The JEginetan fleet, 
 which was considerable, then joined the Corinthian ; 
 and the assistance of the other Peloponnesian allies 
 being called in, the Athenians also collected the 
 
 7 I know not why, for the dates of the Egyptian war, Dod- 
 well has given implicit credit to Diodorus, who, in regard to 
 these, is as evidently contradictory to Thucydides, as he is 
 clearly proved wrong by Dodwell himself, in regard to many 
 preceding transactions. The account of Thucydides however 
 not sufficing to ascertain the dates, they can be assigned only 
 by conjecture. [* Mr. Clinton places the commencement of the 
 Egyptian war B. C. 460. See note on the date of its termi- 
 nation, p. 265.]
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, naval force of their confederacy. An action ensued, 
 1L in which the Athenians gained a complete victory, 
 
 took seventy ships, and then landing upon ^ 
 under the conduct of Leocrates, laid siege to the 
 
 Arist. Rhet. capital town. It was an object, urged by Pericles, to 
 
 piut.v. ' subdue that island, which, from its situation, its naval 
 strength, and the active and adverse temper of its 
 people, he called emphatically the eye-sore of Piraeus. 
 The same circumstances made the Peloponnesians 
 the more anxious to provide for its defence. Three 
 hundred heavy-armed Corinthians and Epidaurians 
 were introduced into the place. A larger re-enforce- 
 ment might have endangered a failure of provisions, 
 while the Athenians commanded the sea ; but, to give 
 more effectual relief, the Corinthians invaded the Me- 
 garian territory, seized the heights of Gerania com- 
 manding the passage from the isthmus into northern 
 Greece, and advanced toward Megara ; in confidence 
 
 Timcyd. that, while so large a part of the Athenian force was 
 . c.ios. a k sen t. m Egypt, either Megara must be exposed, or 
 the siege of ./Egina raised. 
 
 While, from the division of Greece into so many 
 little republics, great talents were mostly confined 
 within a very narrow circle, whence they could 
 scarcely by any possibility emerge, the circumstances 
 of Athens, little favourable to private security or 
 domestic happiness, gave singular opportunity and 
 ample scope for genius, wherever it existed among 
 the people, to come forward and exert itself: and 
 Athens was fruitful of great men at this period. 
 Among those less known to fame, but high in merit, 
 was Myronides, who, upon the present occasion, was 
 appointed to the command of the forces ; for such 
 was the general spirit of the Athenian people that, 
 the leading men dreading the imputation of a timid 
 
 ibid. policy, it was determined, with such an army as could
 
 WAR IN GREECE : MYRONIDES. 255 
 
 yet be collected within Attica, old men chiefly and SECT. 
 boys, to march to the relief of Megara, rather than 
 recal their more vigorous troops from a favourite en- 
 terprise. Myronides, with the army, such as it was, 
 under his command, did not scruple to meet the 
 flower of the Corinthian youth ; and, though the 
 event would not justify the boast of a decisive victoiy, 
 he remained master of the field, and erected on it 
 his trophy. The Corinthians, retreating within their 
 own territory, were ill received by their fellow-citi- 
 zens ; who upbraided them with their inglorious re- 
 turn from a fruitless expedition, in which they had 
 yielded the honour of the day to an enemy unable to 
 conquer them. Urged by shame, and under no good 
 conduct, on the twelfth day from the battle, the 
 Corinthian youth returned to the field ; and, to vin- 
 dicate their honour, erected their own trophy in claim 
 of victory. The able Myronides, using an advan- 
 tageous opportunity for issuing with his motley troops 
 from the walls of Megara, destroyed the detachment 
 employed to erect the trophy, and then attacking 
 the supporting army, put it completely to rout. A Thucyd. 
 large body of the vanquished, pressed in their flight 
 by the conquerors, and missing their road, entered 
 an enclosure surrounded by a ditch, so wide and 
 deep as to preclude passage. The Athenians, ap- 
 prised of this, secured the only outlet with a suf- 
 ficient body of their heavy-armed, and then disposing 
 their light-armed around, plied their missile weapons 
 so effectually that every Corinthian within perished. 
 Corinth was so weakened by this severe blow as to 
 be for some time incapable of any considerable exer- 
 tion. It will be no wonder then if, after so cruel a 
 use of the right of war, animosity and even hatred 
 toward the Athenian people should be found popular
 
 256 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, passions at Corinth, and not dying with the existing 
 generation, but passing to their children, and in the 
 end bringing no small return of evil upon Athens. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 War between Doris and Phocis. Hostilities resulting between 
 Athens and Lacedcemon : battle of Tanagra. Affairs of 
 JBo3otia : battle of CEnophyta : successes of the AtJienians under 
 Myronides. JEgina taken. Successes of the Athenians under 
 Tolmides : Messenians established in Naupactus. Conclusion 
 of the Egyptian expedition. War in Tliessaly. Expedition 
 under Pericles to the western coast of Greece. 
 
 LACEDJEMON, weakened by natural calamity, pressed 
 by domestic disturbance, and usually slow in councils, 
 had not been induced by the revolt of Megara, nor 
 by the sufferings of so close an ally as Corinth, added 
 to the inimical measures before taken by Athens, to 
 come to an open rupture with that rising rival. But 
 the division of Greece into so many little states pre- 
 cluded the possibility of secure peace through the 
 country ; and hostilities, begun in any obscure corner, 
 always endangered the tranquillity of the whole. The 
 rugged province of Doris, the mother-country of the 
 greater part of the Peloponnesians, destitute of any 
 
 Thucyd. considerable city, had three small towns, Breon, Cy- 
 tinion, Erineon, (names hardly elsewhere occurring in 
 Grecian history,) in which the little public business of 
 so poor and thinly peopled a territory was transacted. 
 The Phocians, invading Doris, took one of those towns. 
 The Lacedaemonians, who always bore a religious re- 
 gard for their mother-country, were no sooner in- 
 formed of its distress than they prepared to relieve it. 
 
 B.C. 457. Fifteen hundred heavy-armed of their own people, 
 
 Ol. 80 3 
 
 Dodw. ? with no less than ten thousand of their allies, which, 
 Ann.Thuc. iig n t_ arme d slaves attending, would make
 
 HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS AND LACED^EMON. 257 
 
 an army of perhaps twenty -five thousand men, marched SECT. 
 toward Phocis. Nicomedes son of Cleombrotus com- 
 
 manded, as regent during the minority of his nephew, 
 Plistoanax son of Pausanias, to whom the sceptre of 
 Sparta had fallen by the premature death of Plistar- 
 chus son of Leonidas. The Phocians, unable to re- 
 sist such a force, surrendered the Dorian town, and 
 submitted to the conditions imposed by the Lacedae- 
 monians. 
 
 There were at this time some of the aristocratical Thucyd. 
 party in Athens so far from considering Lacedaemon LL c ' 107 ' 
 as a hostile state, that they looked toward it for relief 
 from the oppression which they suffered under the 
 present administration of their country, and for the 
 restoration of that constitution under which Athens 
 had become great, and without which they thought 
 it could not long flourish. Accordingly they opened 
 a secret correspondence with Nicomedes. But the 
 same circumstances, which led the partisans of aristo- 
 cracy to desire a friendly connexion with Sparta, in- 
 duced the leaders of the democratical interest, now 
 ruling the republic, to confirm and inflame the ani- 
 mosity of the people against that state, and to per- 
 suade them of its determined enmity to Athens. It 
 was therefore resolved to oppose the return of the 
 Peloponnesian army into the peninsula, and means 
 were much in their power : for possessing the strong 
 places of Megara on one side of the isthmus, and 
 Pegae on the other, and keeping a guard on mount 
 Gerania, they completely commanded the passes by 
 land ; and the port of Pegae, together with an in- 
 terest which they possessed among the towns of the 
 Achaean coast, enabled them to keep a fleet in the 
 Corinthian gulf, which would prevent an army from 
 crossing it. Nicomedes was in consequence much at 
 
 VOL. II. S
 
 258 
 
 CHAP. 
 XII. 
 
 B.C. 456. 
 01. 80. 4. 
 [B.C. 457. 
 
 about Nov. 
 Cl.] 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1.1. c.108. 
 Diodor. 
 1.11. c.80. 
 Pausan. 
 1.1. c.29. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 a loss what measures to take ; but some political 
 intrigues at Thebes, together with the overtures re- 
 ceived from the aristocrat]" cal party at Athens, deter- 
 mined him to wait and watch opportunities ; and he 
 wintered in Bceotia. 8 
 
 This was highly suspicious to the Athenian ad- 
 ministration. They had expected that the approach 
 of the severe season, and the impatience of his troops, 
 would have urged Nicomedes to the hazardous at- 
 tempt of forcing the passage of the mountains : but 
 observing no appearance of a disposition to move from 
 his present situation, and suspecting intrigue, they 
 resolved in the spring to attack him in the plain. A 
 body of cavalry, which they obtained from their allies 
 of Thessaly, they hoped would enable them to do this 
 with advantage. Collecting therefore what other 
 auxiliary troops they readily could, among which 
 were a thousand from Argos, they formed, with their 
 own forces, a body of fourteen thousand heavy-armed 
 foot. These, with the cavalry and the attending 
 slaves, would make an army of scarcely less than 
 thirty thousand men, with which they marched into 
 Bceotia. Nicomedes met them at Tanagra, and a 
 severe action ensued, so equally maintained, that 
 neither side could claim the victory. It was re- 
 newed on the following day, when the treachery of 
 the Thessalian horse compelled the Athenians, after 
 great slaughter on both sides, to leave the Pelopon- 
 nesians masters of the field. Nicomedes then, plun- 
 dering and wasting the Megarian territory as he 
 
 8 The chronology of Diodorus here so accords with and illus- 
 trates the summary narrative of Thucydides that he may have 
 credit for this circumstance, not specified by Thucydides. [See 
 Mr. Clinton's examination of this statement, as well as the de- 
 fence of his date appended in the margin, quoted below, p. 260.]
 
 BATTLE OF TANAGRA. 
 
 passed it, without attempting to make any farther SECT. 
 use of his victory, returned into Peloponnesus. 
 The Thebans, always claiming rights of sove- 
 
 reignty over the other towns of Bceotia, but humbled j^Jj^f 01 
 by the event of the Persian war, had judged the op- ' 6 - c - 108 - 
 
 f T -i i T-. i i Thucyd. 
 
 portumty favourable, while the reloponnesian army lay i. 3. c .6i. 
 in their neighbourhood, to attempt the recovery of 
 their ancient authority. With this view they had 
 engaged in a treaty with the Spartans; who readily 
 acceded to the purpose of enabling a city, without 
 Peloponnesus, to balance the power and curb the am- 
 bition of Athens. Thus most of the Bo30tian towns 
 seem to have been terrified into a composition : they 
 were admitted to the honour and advantages of the 
 Peloponnesian confederacy, as dependents of Thebes ; 
 acknowledging the supremacy of that city for super- 
 intending the general protection, and, for that pur- 
 pose, directing the military affairs of all the Boeotian 
 people. 9 Whatever within Bceotia was immoveably 
 adverse to their proposal, and particularly the heroic 
 little commonwealth of Plataea, the ancient and faith- 
 ful ally of Athens, was of course to be oppressed. 
 Phocis and the Opuntian Locrians joined in their 
 alliance. 
 
 Neither the force however nor the spirit of Athens 
 were broken by the check received at Tanagra. As 
 soon as the motions in Bceotia were known, it was 
 determined to obviate their effects. Myronides was 
 appointed general of the Athenian forces. On the 
 
 9 'H<ye/>w)>et;ecr0at inc" avruv, according to the expression which 
 Thucydides puts into the mouth of a Theban orator (1. 3. c. 6J .). 
 The value of this term is in some degree to be collected from a 
 following passage (c. 67.) in the speech of the same orator, 
 addressing himself to the Lacedaemonians :
 
 260 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 B.C. 456 sixty-second day after the unfortunate action of Ta- 
 
 Ol 81 1 
 
 Thiicyd. nagra he met the Boeotian army, much more nu- 
 . i. c. IDS. merous than his own, at CEnophyta, and gained a 
 
 10 I think Dodwell clearly right in placing this event one year 
 later than Diodorus, who has crowded together transactions that 
 could not have passed within the year. Allowing this, the 
 account of Diodorus will assist to illustrate that of Thucydides. 
 The battle of Tanagra was fought in the spring of the year 456. 
 before Christ, toward the conclusion of the fourth year of the 
 eightieth Olympiad ; for the Olympian year began a little after 
 midsummer. The battle of CEnophyta was fought in the begin- 
 ning of the first year of the eighty-first Olympiad, in the autumn 
 of the same year, before Christ 4-56.* 
 
 Thucydides says that the Peloponnesian army, in passing 
 through the Megaris, after the battle of Tanagra, cut down the 
 trees. Smith, in his translation of Thucydides, interprets Sev- 
 fyoTopjo-TVTes by the expression, having cut down the woods. 
 The mistake is of a kind that an Englishman who never travelled 
 in more southern countries might easily fall into, if he did not 
 consider how little it could answer the Spartan general's purpose 
 to delay his march by such laborious waste as that of cutting 
 down, what in English is properly called, woods. Thucydides 
 
 [* On Mr. Mitford's dates and reasoning here Mr. Clinton makes the following 
 observations: ' In fact Dodwell never questions Diodorus in placing the Theban 
 ' war in Olymp. 80. 4., and distinctly asserts that the battle of Tanagra took 
 ' place in the autumn of that year in which the Lacedaemonian army returned 
 ' from its campaign in Doris. According to Mr. Mitford's date that army must 
 ' have kept the field without hazarding a passage through the winter : for which 
 ' he quotes Diodorus, giving him credit for this circumstance, not specified by 
 ' Thucydides. [Note, p. 258.] But the two historians are at variance. In ZVm- 
 ' cydides, the Lacedaemonians after the action at Tanagra effect their passage 
 * home through the Isthmus : in Diodorus, it would seem that they remained 
 ' in Bosotia till the battle of CEnophyta, at which, according to his account, the 
 ' Lacedaemonians assisted ; while Thucydides mentions no Lacedaemonian forces 
 ' at OZnophyta. Plato (Menex. p. 242. b.) agrees with Thucydides in both 
 ' these particulars : and Aristides (Panath. p. 156.) argues upon the assumption 
 ' that the Lacedaemonians withdrew immediately after the battle of Tanagra.' 
 To these remarks he subjoins in a note : ' Plutarch is aptly quoted by Dodwell 
 ' to confirm the fact that the battle of Tanagra was fought in winter : Cimon. 
 ' C. 17. vevotD^lvot Iv Ta.va.yfa,, x.ai wpotrJoxaJVTE ? EIJ Sipav ETOUJ a-Tfa,-reiav 
 1 nEXoTrowtKnaJV ITT' airous. Pericl. C. 510. riTTyfjitwvs iiei fZv opcw T?J 
 ' 'ATTtxJJj, TTfoa-^onSavrag Js nai &apuv tf Irwf eapav 7roXe/u.o. "Slpa, Iran? 
 ' would be ' the ensuing spring.' We may therefore place the battle of Tanagra 
 ' about November ; towards the end of autumn or beginning of winter.' Fasti 
 Hellen. p. 255.]
 
 CAMPAIGN OF MYRONIDES. 
 
 complete victory* Tanagra was taken and dismantled ; SECT. 
 through all the towns encouragement was commu- 
 nicated to the democratical party, everywhere adverse 
 to the Lacedaemonian connexion ; and all Bceotia, ex- 
 cept Thebes, was rapidly brought into alliance with 
 Athens, which was, in effect, to be under its dominion. 
 The democratical party was strong in the neigh- 
 bouring country of Phocis, yet the oligarchal, sup- li3 - c - 95> 
 ported by Thebes and Lacedasmon, still prevailed 
 there. Myronides without loss of time entered that 
 province, and, overbearing opposition, committed the 
 power in all the towns to those whose interest would 
 keep them dependent on Athens ; and thus Phocis, 
 like Bo30tia, became an appendage of the Athenian 
 empire. The Opuntian Locrians, more attached to 
 their oligarchal government and the Lacedaemonian 
 alliance, but dreading the attack with which they 
 next were threatened, delivered a hundred of their 
 principal men as hostages to ensure the compliance 
 of their state with terms imposed. This campaign 
 of Myronides, though no detail of it remained even 
 in the time of Diodorus, was esteemed equal to the 
 most brilliant achievements of the Athenian arms. 11 
 
 has intended only, or almost only, fruit-trees, principally olives 
 and vines. He mentions no other waste, the corn having been 
 probably not forward enough to be readily destroyed. 
 
 11 Thucydides in his concise mention of the expedition under 
 Myronides, though he particularises that the battle of CEnophyta 
 was fought on the sixty-second day after the battle of Tanagra, 
 does not name Thebes. I have been very cautious of following 
 any other writer, in relating the transactions of these times, when 
 not in some degree supported by him. Diodorus tells of many 
 glorious and very surprising feats of Grecian arms, utterly un- 
 known to Thucydides ; of which his account of the expeditions 
 to Cyprus and to Egypt afford some remarkable instances. They 
 may however be nearly paralleled out of Livy ; who tells of 
 many victories gained by the Roman arms against the forces of 
 Hannibal in Italy, and leaves us to wonder why they had no 
 
 S 3
 
 CHAP. 
 XII. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 It was no small addition to the joy, which the im- 
 portant conquests of Myronides gave at Athens, that 
 about the same time Leocrates returned victorious 
 over the little barren island of .ZEgina. Cut off from 
 B.Wse!' all relief, through the command which the Athenians 
 OL81.1* possessed of the sea, the ^Eginetans had at length 
 capitulated: their ships of war were surrendered, 
 their fortifications were demolished, and they bound 
 themselves to the payment of a perpetual tribute. 
 
 The Greeks, it has already occurred to remark, 
 and will again occur, both coveted and dreaded mari- 
 time situation. Solicitous for communication with 
 the sea, they nevertheless generally avoided for their 
 towns, but especially for a town the seat of a govern- 
 ment, a site immediately on the shore. Athens was 
 five miles from its port. But thus while one danger 
 was obviated another was incurred. An enemy supe- 
 rior in the field, though unable to force either city 
 or port, might put both in danger, and especially 
 distress the city, by stopping communication between 
 them. Athens was peculiarly liable to this incon- 
 venience since it was become an imperial city ; be- 
 
 consequences, till, upon looking into Polybius, we find the 
 greatest reason to believe that they never had more than an 
 imaginary existence. There is seldom equal temptation to 
 romance concerning circumstances merely political. The nar- 
 rative of Thucydides, in the part in question, though it may 
 have sufficed for his contemporaries, and for his particular view- 
 in the prefatory part of his work, leaves us totally uninformed 
 of the motives to the Boeotian war. These however may be 
 gathered from some passages which afterward occur in his His- 
 tory (1. 3. c. 62. & 95.), and from what we find in Plato on the 
 subject (Menex. p. 242. t. 2.) ; and thus what is here supplied 
 from Diodorus, in itself probable, and consistent with every 
 authenticated fact, appears sufficiently established. 
 
 [* Mr. Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 256., seems to bring the surrender of ^-Egina 
 down to B.C. 455. In the Summary of Thucydides it is placed after the com- 
 pletion of the long walls : . . . TO. re ttix* to- ea-vrZv TO, (taMpa. 'imTiKta-ttv. 
 ' nftaXoyvyav Si xai Aiyivfrrai f/.tra. ravra rot; 'ASwat'oif, n. T. A. i. 108.]
 
 LONG WALLS OF ATHENS. 263 
 
 cause, to maintain empire, a large part of the strength SECT. 
 of the city must be on distant service often, ready 
 for it always, and the remainder, it had been found 
 now by experience, hardly sufficed for remaining pro- 
 bable needs. 
 
 But, for a long course of years after the banish- 
 ment, and even after the death of Themistocles, the 
 spirit of that great man seemed to animate the Athe- 
 nian councils. In all the changes of administration 
 measures were in a great degree directed by the po- 
 litical principles which he first conceived, and of 
 which he so forcibly demonstrated the advantage in 
 practice : his ideas for ensuring safety, for acquiring 
 power, for extending dominion, continued to be car- 
 ried into execution. In prosecution of them, and 
 with a spirit which distinguishes this age of Greece, 
 and particularly of Athens, a very great and very 
 costly work had been some time since begun ; no less 
 than to unite the city with its ports by strong forti- 
 fications, which might secure the communication 
 against any interruption from an enemy. A wall Thucyd. 
 was conducted to Phalerum, the distance about four l &\ ' l ^ f 
 miles, and another to Piraeus, five miles, with towers 
 at proper intervals. Thus Athens and Piraeus came 
 to be often distinguished by the names of the upper 
 and the lower town, as two parts only of the same city. 
 This great work was completed in the summer in which B. c.456. 
 
 O1 ft! 1 
 
 the empire of the Athenian people was extended so ' 
 
 widely over the northern continent of Greece by the 1<L c>108 * 
 conquests of Myronides, and their maritime superiority 
 was assured by the surrender of ^Egina to the arma- 
 ment under Leocrates. 
 
 Confident now in their strength, the Athenian go- Thucyd. ib. 
 vernment resolved to prosecute offensive operations o^s^ 
 against their Peloponnesian enemies. Tolmides, with odvf ',
 
 264 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, a strong squadron under his command, sailing round 
 L Peloponnesus, burnt the Lacedaemonian naval arsenal 
 
 at Gythium, and, proceeding into the Corinthian gulf, 
 debarked his forces, defeated the Sicyonians in an 
 action by land, and took the town of Chalcis, a Co- 
 rinthian settlement on the coast of .^Etolia. It was 
 not till the tenth year of the blockade of Ithome that 
 the Helots there had been induced to capitulate ; and 
 they obtained liberty for themselves and their families, 
 upon condition however that they should finally quit 
 Peloponnesus. Tolmides collected those fugitives, 
 and settled them at Naupactus, on the northern 
 shore of the Corinthian gulf, which he conquered 
 from the Ozolian Locrians. There with the revived 
 name of Messenians, which they had never entirely 
 lost, forming a free republic, or at least a republic of 
 free citizens under the protection of Athens, they 
 became once more numbered among the Grecian 
 people. 
 
 While success was so generally attending the Athe- 
 nians within Greece, their forces engaged in the 
 distant operations in Egypt were experiencing a 
 variety of fortune. Grecian valour and Grecian dis- 
 cipline at first so overbore the efforts of oriental arms 
 that the Persian government was at a loss what to 
 oppose to them. The measure taken marks very 
 strongly what may be the weakness of despotic em- 
 pire, while its territory and population are immense. 
 Thucyd. Megabazus was sent with a large sum of money to 
 DiodoV. Lacedaemon, to endeavour to obtain by bribes the 
 1. 11. c.74. a lli ance O f that little republic, and procure the in- 
 vasion of Attica by a Peloponnesian army. It tells 
 very highly to the honour of the Spartan government 
 of the time, from an Athenian writer almost con- 
 temporary, that Sparta was not to be bribed to a
 
 CONCLUSION OF EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION. 265 
 
 measure to which resentment, ambition, and political SECT. 
 interest contributed so powerfully to incite. Mega- 
 bazus, after having spent a part of his treasures use- 
 lessly, in ways which Thucydides does not explain, 
 returned with the remainder into Asia, without having 
 in any degree accomplished his purpose. 
 
 Then at length measures more consonant to the 
 former dignity of the empire were taken for the 
 recovery of Egypt. A very numerous army was B.C. 457. 
 assembled on the confines of Cilicia and Syria, and a ' 
 
 fleet was prepared in Phenicia and the other maritime 75< 
 
 provinces. Megabazus, or Megabyzus, son of Zo- 
 pyrus, head of one of the six great families of Persia, 
 was appointed to the command in chief. The spring 
 and summer were employed in collecting troops ; the 
 autumn and winter in the endeavour to restore dis- 
 cipline and skill in arms among them; in the fol- B.C. 456. 
 lowing spring Megabyzus led them into Egypt. His 
 measures appear to have been judicious, and cor- 
 respondent success followed. The Egyptians ven- 
 turing a battle were defeated. The little army of 
 Greeks, compelled to raise the siege of the White- 
 castle of Memphis, retired into an island of the Nile 
 called Prosopitis, where their fleet joined them. In 
 this strong situation their valour and discipline defied 
 the Persian assaults. Wealth and numbers however, 
 under able management, may supply great deficiencies. 
 Forming dikes and cutting water-courses, Mega- 
 byzus drained the channel in which the Athenian 
 galleys lay ; and while he thus made the fleet useless, 
 which had been hitherto a great annoyance to him, 
 he laid the army open to wide attack. Thus, after a B. c. 454. 
 siege of eighteen months, he took Prosopitis : a part Thucyd. 3 
 
 [* Mr. Clinton remarks that Mr. Mitford justly rejects Dodwell's chronology, rj$ r' AZC.' 
 founded on Diodorus, for the dates of the Egyptian war ; ' but,' he adds, ' in 1.*] 
 ' fixing its termination at B. C. 454. he seems to have brought it down one year
 
 266 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, of the Grecian troops, forcing their way through 
 ' Libya, escaped to Cyrene ; but the greater part pe- 
 rished. Inarus, the mover of the war, betrayed by 
 his followers, was put to death by crucifixion ; and 
 all Egypt, except the marshes, held by a chief named 
 Amyrtaeus, submitted again to the Persian dominion. 
 The misfortunes of the Athenian arms in this part 
 Thucyd.ib. of the world did not close thus. Fifty trireme 
 galleys, going to Egypt, to relieve an equal number 
 of the fleet there, entered the Mendesian mouth of 
 the Nile, ignorant of what had happened. The 
 Phenician fleet attacked them with superior force 
 in the river, while the Persian army assisted from 
 the shore : a few ships forced their way to sea and 
 escaped, but the greater part were destroyed or 
 taken. Such was the conclusion of the Athenian 
 enterprise against Egypt, when it had been carried 
 on six years. 
 
 Circumstances meanwhile were arising still to 
 extend the devastation of war within Greece. The 
 early eminence of the Thessalians, and the following 
 troubled state of their country, and the consequent 
 Ch.i. s.3. deficiency of its history, have occurred heretofore 
 of this Hist, for notice. Hereditary royalty seems to have been 
 abolished there about the same age as in the southern 
 provinces of Greece, so that every Thessalian town 
 became a republic claiming independency. The 
 expediency of some political union, such that the 
 weaker might not be oppressed by the stronger, nor 
 the stronger by a coalition of many weaker, was 
 
 ' too low. For Thucydides plainly determines that they still held out at the time 
 ' of the expedition into Thessaly, which was followed by the campaign of Pericles. 
 ' The campaign of Tolmides is fixed to B.C. 455. by the surrender of Ithome, 
 ' with which it is coincident : and the campaign of Pericles is fixed to the autumn 
 ' of B.C. 454. The Egyptian war then ended in the course of the year 455.' 
 Fasti Hellen. p. 256.]
 
 THESSALY. 267 
 
 nevertheless admitted as desirable ; and the possibility SECT. 
 of need for all to hold union for resistance to a 
 foreign enemy was obvious. A superintending au- 
 thority was therefore committed to a general assembly 
 of deputies from all the towns ; a kind of states- 
 general or parliament. Experience of war then had 
 been sufficient among them to establish conviction of 
 the necessity for simplicity in military command. 
 To supply this part of the office of the kings of old 
 therefore a commander in chief was elected, appa- 
 rently for unlimited time, with the peculiar title of 
 Tagus ; and, as to the generals in chief of the Athe- 
 nian republic, so still more to those of the Thessalian 
 confederacy, it was found expedient to commit a 
 considerable share of civil superintendency. 
 
 Occasion will occur hereafter to observe that the 
 union of the Thessalian republics was extremely im- 
 perfect, so that the office of tagus would be likely to 
 be often of great difficulty. Contention for more 
 power on his side, jealousy, and often unreasonable 
 opposition, on the part of those who led the counsels 
 of the several republics, could not fail to ensue. At 
 the time of which we are treating the tagus Orestes, 
 son of Echecratides, styled by Thucydides king of Thucyd. 
 Thessaly I2 , was compelled to fly his country. In no 
 other part of Greece was the distinction of nobility 
 and commonalty so maintained as in Thessaly. Cir- 
 cumstances make it probable that Orestes had been 
 raised by the favour of the many, or, after his elevation, 
 
 12 Probably an Athenian version of the title tagus, peculiar to 
 Thessaly, as consul to the first magistrates, chief military com- 
 manders at Rome, and suffetes to those of Carthage. These we 
 find the Greek writers designated by their term basileus, king, 
 though the character of their office was more nearly that of the 
 Roman consuls.
 
 268 
 
 CHAP. 
 XII. 
 
 B. C. 454. 
 OJ.81.3. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1.1. c.lll. 
 & 115. & 
 L4. c.21. 
 Plut. v. 
 Pericl. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 courting their support, had been expelled by the 
 order of nobles. He implored assistance from Athens. 
 The Athenian people, exasperated against the Thes- 
 salian government for the treachery of their troops 
 in the affair of Tanagra, and the Athenian chiefs, 
 hoping to secure an effectual interest in that rich and 
 populous province by supporting an opposing party, 
 concurred in zeal for the cause of the young prince. 
 An army composed of the newly acquired auxiliary 
 force of Breotia and Phocis, together with a body of 
 Athenian troops, was placed under the command of 
 Myronides. He entered Thessaly, and penetrated 
 as far as Pharsalus. But with the usual deficiency 
 of the southern Greek armies in cavalry, he was 
 unable to contend with the Thessalian horse in the 
 Thessalian plains. In the field wherever he turned 
 his force nothing ventured to resist him ; but he 
 could detach nothing, and, according to the expression 
 of Thucydides, beyond the immediate reach of his 
 arms he could keep nothing. After an ineffectual 
 attempt therefore upon the city of Pharsalus, he 
 withdrew his 'army from Thessaly and returned to 
 Athens. 
 
 Meanwhile the leading men in the Athenian 
 councils were still directing their attention to extend 
 the power of the republic on all sides. Masters of 
 the j3gean sea, with the greater part of its shores 
 and islands, and commanding a large proportion of 
 the continent of Greece, they had great influence 
 even in Peloponnesus. Argos was connected with 
 them by its own necessary interest : the greater part 
 of Achaia was in their dependency ; and, possessing 
 Naupactus near the entrance and Pegse at the bottom 
 of the Corinthian gulf, they commanded its navi- 
 gation. With the general view apparently to protect
 
 COALITION AT ATHENS. 
 
 269 
 
 their allies, molest their enemies, and extend their SECT. 
 authority and influence, as opportunity might offer, . 
 
 a thousand Athenian soldiers were put aboard the Thucyd. 
 squadron lying at Pegae, and the command was com- 
 
 mitted to Pericles. Crossing the gulf, the troops j^ c- 84 ' 
 were landed on the territory of Sicyon ; and, the pl ^- v - 
 Sicyonians quitting their walls to protect their fields, 
 Pericles gave them battle and defeated them. Then 
 taking aboard a re-enforcement of Achaeans, he pro- 
 ceeded to the Acarnanian coast, and after an un- 
 successful attempt upon GEniadae, but not without 
 a large collection of booty from the territory, always 
 a great object of ancient warfare ' 3 , he conducted his 
 squadron home. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 Coalition of parties at Athens, and recal of Cimon : truce of five 
 years with Peloponnesus. Long walls of Athens. Restoration 
 of the order of knights, or cavalry. Colony of Athenian 
 families sent to the Chersonese. Expedition to Cyprus : death 
 of Cimon. 
 
 THE Athenian leaders thus, among some reverses 
 altogether greatly successful, had however a most 
 arduous office to sustain ; the administration of what 
 has been called an empire, but an empire without any 
 regular constitution ; held together partly by force, 
 partly by accidental circumstances ; the capricious 
 populace of Athens being the sovereign ; a large 
 majority of the principal men in opposition ; and a 
 
 13 In modern warfare it has reasonably been reckoned fair to 
 raise contribution in an enemy's country ; that is, to make the 
 public revenue, which would in ordinary course have passed 
 into the enemy's coffers, enabling him to continue the contest, 
 pass into those of the invading power, whether in money or in 
 contributions in kind for the subsistence of its forces.
 
 270 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, war to be conducted against a J confederacy, whose 
 ^ land force far exceeded theirs. The very conquests 
 already made distressed them ; they were at a loss 
 for means to keep what they had acquired. Feeling 
 then that some respite from war was necessary, they 
 knew that the most powerful enemies, the Lacedae- 
 monians and Corinthians, would be highly averse to 
 any negotiation with them, but would readily treat 
 with their opponents of the aristocratical party, and 
 especially with Cimon. Pressed thus, they were 
 perhaps farther stimulated by some ebullitions of 
 democratical extravagance, disturbing or threatening 
 their measures, to desire a coalition with the aristo- 
 cratical leaders. The opposition, which looked to 
 Cimon, though in exile, as its chief, was powerful ; 
 and the circumstances of a story related by Plutarch, 
 however of a romantic cast, if founded, as it may 
 have been, in truth, would not a little increase its 
 weight. When the Athenians marched to meet the 
 Lacedaemonian forces at Tanagra, Cimon, according 
 piut.v. to that writer, joined them where they passed the 
 Attic border ; and, the law of his exile not absolutely 
 forbidding, desired to act with the troops of his ward 
 as a volunteer. His request was denied, and he was 
 ordered to quit the camp ; but before he departed he 
 had opportunity to communicate with his friends, 
 whom he earnestly exhorted to prove, by their be- 
 haviour in the battle to ensue, the falsehood of the 
 charge in which they were in some degree involved 
 with him. Accordingly a band of a hundred pledged 
 themselves to one another not to fly ; and when the 
 army was routed, they continued to fight around the 
 panoply of Cimon, which they had carried into the 
 field as their banner, till they were killed to a man. 
 It would be difficult then any longer to contend that
 
 RECAL OF CIMON. 
 
 Cimon or the friends of Cimon were enemies to their SECT. 
 country. But, whatever may have been the motives, 
 a coalition of the principal men, it is evident, was 
 effected, and Pericles himself moved the decree for 
 the recal of Cimon, after the expiration of only five 
 years of the term of his banishment. 14 
 
 Cimon was living on the lordship, his paternal Andoc.de 
 inheritance, in the Thracian Chersonese ; perhaps t^uJnGr." 
 more at ease there, though a fortified dwelling and Reiske - 
 an armed train might be requisite for security against 
 the neighbouring barbarians, than in Athens, amid 
 the turbulence of a factious and jealous democracy. 
 He did not however refuse himself to the call of his 
 country. Nor was the expectation of advantage from 
 his return disappointed. His liberality seems to 
 have been met with corresponding liberality by the 
 chiefs of those who had been his political adversaries, 
 and a calm ensued in the administration of the com- 
 monwealth. Cimon was connected by hospitality 
 with the Lacedaemonian state. The lead in the Andoc. ut 
 negotiation, on the part of Athens, being com- sup ' 
 mitted to him, a cessation of hostilities was quickly B.C. 453. 
 agreed upon. But among the numerous republics 
 concerned as allies of Lacedaemon, all interests were 
 not to be easily reconciled. Three years of inter- oi.82.. 
 mitted war elapsed before any treaty was concluded, 
 and then nothing more was effected than a truce for 
 five years. 
 
 Such a pause however, used wisely and diligently, 
 
 14 Plutarch relates more circumstances than any other writer; 
 yet his account is unsatisfactory in itself, and ill accords with 
 the course of events marked in the Summary of Thucydides, to 
 which I refer as a standard for authenticating other information. 
 The reader who will take the trouble to compare the accounts 
 of the battle of Tanagra and its consequences in Plutarch's Lives 
 of Cimon and Pericles with the 107th to the 112th chapter of 
 the first book of Thucydides may judge for himself.
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, was very advantageous for Athens. To prepare in 
 ' peace for the exigencies of war is a maxim that must 
 be universally approved, and yet is rarely acted upon, 
 unless with ambitious views ; the peaceful being sel- 
 dom to be persuaded to the trouble and expense till 
 danger becomes alarming. In the leisure of the five 
 years' truce however, whether indeed more with 
 peaceful or ambitious purposes among some of the 
 leaders perhaps may be questioned, a third long wall 
 was added to the former two, passing between them 
 to the middle harbour Munychia. Thenceforward, 
 should an enemy force either of the outer walls, the 
 city would still have secure communication with one 
 of its harbours, either the northernmost Phalerum, 
 or the greater and far more important one on the 
 south, Piraeus. Pericles was the orator who under- 
 piat. Gorg. took to persuade the people to pass the decree direct- 
 ing this laborious and expensive work. From Plato 
 we have the not uninteresting information that his 
 master, Socrates, then a youth, was present when the 
 successful speech was delivered. 
 
 The deficiency of the commonwealth in cavalry 
 was also taken into consideration. The order of 
 knights, or horse-soldiers, was old at Athens ; it had 
 been retained in the constitution of Solon, and flou- 
 rished under Pisistratus and his sons ; but after them 
 had fallen into insignificancy, if it was not even an- 
 nihilated. No mention is found of Athenian cavalry 
 either at Marathon or at Plataea ; whence it seems 
 probable that, for the attachment of that superior 
 order of citizens to the Pisistratidean party, it had 
 been depressed, if not abolished by Clisthenes. Under 
 Andoc. de the joint administration of Cimon and Pericles how- 
 Pace, p. 92. ever if. was restored to credit and efficacy ; so that 
 the Athenian cavalry acquired estimation as among 
 the best of Greece, Though peaceful views are rarely
 
 ORDER OF KNIGHTS : SCYTHIAN BOWMEN. 273 
 
 prominent in Athenian counsels, yet such might lead SECT. 
 to this measure ; for, among the Greeks, cavalry was ' 
 
 valued especially as a defensive weapon, for its supe- 
 rior efficacy in giving protection to the fields against 
 the plunder and waste which were so commonly 
 principal objects of Grecian invading armies. But 
 possibly the coalesced leaders had moreover a view 
 to their own security, and that of civil order alto- 
 gether, in restoring that military establishment which 
 is most efficacious for awing and repressing civil tur- 
 bulence, so apt to break out where every individual 
 of the people flattered himself that he was a sove- 
 reign. 
 
 Nearly at the same time another addition was made 
 to the military strength of the republic, perhaps not 
 wholly without also a similar political view. It is 
 remarkable how many circumstances occur, in the 
 course of Grecian history, showing the truth of that 
 observation pf Aristotle, which might appear on first 
 view a paradox, That democracy and tyranny are very 
 nearly related. Among the Greeks it was reckoned [Aristot. 
 a common distinction between legitimate monarchy f 5^101 
 and tyranny, that kings had subjects for the guard 
 of their persons, tyrants preferred foreigners. But 
 the armed attendants of the magistrates of Athens, 
 as it has been formerly observed, were foreign slaves, 
 generally Scythians, whence Scythian came to be the 
 common title of those armed attendants. Three hun- Andoc. de 
 dred Scythian bowmen were now bought (such pre- 
 cisely is the expression in the original) for the use of 
 the republic. A valuable addition probably to the 
 military force, they would however perhaps still more 
 strengthen the arm of the civil magistrate. 1 ' 
 
 15 The oration on peace, transmitted under the name of An- 
 docides, passed, it appears, to the Augustan age as a speech of 
 VOL. II. T
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. But so large a proportion of the Athenian people 
 ' had now been so long accustomed to subsist by war, 
 whether from pay or from plunder, that the cessation 
 of hostilities filled the city with a very inconvenient 
 number of men little disposed, and most of them 
 little able, to earn a comfortable livelihood by peace- 
 ful industry ; all however proud of the dignity of 
 Athenian citizens, proud of their services to their 
 country, and ready to claim support and reward suit- 
 able to that imaginary dignity, and to those services 
 which they would not estimate below their worth. 
 The inconvenience, or at least some degree of it, was 
 common among the Grecian states ; and the ordinary 
 resource of the powerful was to send out colonies. 
 Cimon's Thracian lordship in the Chersonese afforded 
 opportunity, advantageous at the same time perhaps 
 to the republic and to himself. Of particulars how- 
 ever we are no farther informed than that a squa- 
 dron of fifty trireme galleys, under the, command of 
 Pericles, convoyed a thousand families of Athenian 
 citizens to whom lands were allotted in that rich 
 peninsula. Tolmides conducted an equal number, 
 whether of Athenians to Naxos, or of Naxians to 
 Euboea, does not clearly appear. 
 
 that orator ; but Dionysius of Halicarnassus believed it wrongly 
 attributed to him. It was however in that critic's time ancient, 
 and probably of the age of Andocides. That it has suffered 
 from injury to copies or carelessness of transcribers, is evident. 
 The five years' truce is spoken of in it as lasting thirteen years. 
 But we have satisfactory assurance from Thucydides, that 
 Athens was engaged in war again before the end of the five 
 years, and that it was another truce, afterward made for thirty 
 years, which was broken in the fourteenth. It seems beyond 
 question also, that the names of Miltiades and Cimon have been 
 inverted, so that, for MiX-na&ijv rov K/^wvo?, we should read
 
 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT : DEATH OF CIMON. 
 
 But such was become the constitution of the Athe- SECT. 
 nian commonwealth, such the temper of the people, 
 and such the consequent difficulties to be contended 
 with in the endeavour to preserve quiet at home, 
 that, as soon as present peace was established by the 
 conclusion of the five years' truce, Cimon concurred 
 in the purpose of turning the spirit of enterprise once 
 more toward foreign conquest, and exertion against 
 the common enemy, in the hope so to prevent brood- 
 ing faction at Athens, and brooding war within 
 Greece. With this view he resumed the design of 
 adding Cyprus to that dominion, which under the 
 title of Confederacy the Athenian commonwealth 
 held over so large a portion of the Greek nation. 
 A fleet of two hundred trireme galleys was equipped, 
 of which himself took the command. Amyrtaeus, 1 - 1 - c - 11 2. 
 chief of the Egyptians of the marshes, maintained 
 still the war against Persia. At his request Cimon 
 
 sent sixty, having in view, apparently, to distract the pi u t.v. 
 attention of the Persian government, and perhaps to Cim - 
 collect some booty, rather than to pursue any romantic 
 purpose of conquest in Egypt. With his remaining 
 force he laid siege to Cittium in Cyprus; and in the 
 camp before that place, to the great misfortune of 
 Athens and of Greece, he died. Foreseeing, it is B.C. 449. 
 
 Ol 82 3 
 
 said, both his own end, and the necessity of abandon- Dodw. v 
 ing the enterprise, which, as we learn from Thucy- p"^' uunt 
 dides, arose immediately from want of provisions, he 
 gave suitable directions to those in trust about him, 
 with a requisition that his death should be concealed, 
 and orders issued still in his name as if he was living. 
 In passing Salamis the fleet was attacked by the Per- Thucyd. 
 sian fleet, composed of squadrons from Phenicia, 
 Cilicia, and Cyprus, which it defeated. The army, 
 quitting Cittium, and marching along the coast to
 
 276 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, meet the fleet at a more commodious place for em- 
 
 \r TT 
 
 " barkation, was also attacked, and also gained the 
 victory. Being joined then by the squadron from 
 Egypt, the whole armament returned to Attica. 
 The relics of Cimon, carried to Athens, were buried 
 there ; and a magnificent monument erected to his 
 memory remained, with the name of the Cimoneia, 
 to Plutarch's time. 
 
 Great as the military character of Cimon was, his 
 wisdom, his integrity, his moderation, his conciliating 
 temper, and the influence which enabled him to lead 
 his fellow-countrymen in the paths of wisdom, in- 
 tegrity, and moderation, were found to be the qua- 
 lities for which his loss was most to be regretted. 
 Others could command fleets and armies, but others 
 could not equally divert that compound, in the Gre- 
 cian temper, of military spirit with the spirit of fac- 
 tion, from civil feud and domestic war. After Cimon, 
 Piutv. as Plutarch has justly observed, for a long time no- 
 thing great was done or even attempted against the 
 barbarians ; but the Greeks turned their arms against 
 one another, to the great advantage of Persia, and 
 to the unspeakable injury of Greece. 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 Contest for command of the temple of Delphi. Athens at the 
 summit of her greatness. State of parties : Pericles : Thu- 
 cydides. Policy of the Grecian republics for holding the 
 weaker republics in subjection. Revolt of Sceotia; of Eubcea; 
 of Megara: invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians. Thirty 
 years' truce. Power of Pericles. 
 
 DIVIDED among so many little republics, each ne- 
 cessarily jealous of the others, public rights and pri- 
 vate in constant danger, and every citizen therefore
 
 COMMAND OF THE TEMPLE OF DELPHI. 277 
 
 always ready with arms, the Greek nation was singu- SECT. 
 larly framed to be formidable to all around, if it could 
 be united in steady confederacy, and otherwise to be 
 always lacerating and preying upon itself. In Lace- 
 damon, under the consideration of her diminished 
 authority and lowered rank among the Grecian people, 
 some uneasiness of the public mind would be natural, 
 and not wholly unreasonable ; and this could not but 
 be heightened by a view of the rapid progress Athens 
 had made in power, with indications of ambition hold- 
 ing corresponding growth. In these circumstances 
 a dispute arose among some communities of little 
 weight themselves, involving nevertheless matter of 
 
 O 7 O 
 
 such deep national interest as imperiously to require 
 the interposition of the more powerful states. 
 
 The common federal government of the several 
 towns of the province of Phocis had been long, as 
 formerly has been observed, the guardian of the Ch.3. s .s. 
 temple and oracle and treasury of Delphi. The Thucyd!"*' 
 Delphian citizens, on what old or new pretension g t ^ b c ' 112 ' 
 does not appear, now claimed that important office L9 - P. 423. 
 to the exclusion of the other Phocians, and resort to Perici. 
 arms was threatened. It might become the Lace- 
 dsmonians to interfere ; and they did so, but not 
 under wise or apparently just counsel. Instead of 
 calling for the common support of the Greeks, and 
 assuming their wonted lead with a dignified modera- 
 tion, they took upon themselves to decide all ; and, 
 sending a military force into Phocis, they put the B.C. 448. 
 Delphians into possession of the temple. The Del- **' *' 
 phians then, with ready gratitude, passed a decree 
 granting to Lacedaemon the honours of the Promanteia, 
 or precedency in the consultation of the oracle, and 
 caused it to be engraved on the forehead of a brazen 
 statue of a wolf consecrated in the temple. 
 
 T 3
 
 278 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. So arbitrary an exertion of exclusive authority by 
 ' the Lacedaemonian government in what was esteemed, 
 beyond all things, a common concern of the Greek 
 nation, could not fail to excite indignation at Athens ; 
 and the more as the power of that state had recently 
 been so extended in northern Greece, and as Phocis 
 was among its allies. An army was ordered to march, 
 and the command was committed to Pericles. Thus 
 what the Greeks call a sacred war was kindled. 
 But, through the incapacity of the little Grecian states 
 to maintain troops on foreign service, the Lacedae- 
 monian troops being gone, the Delphians felt their 
 inability to resist, and no bloodshed seems to have 
 ensued. Pericles restored the supremacy of the 
 temple and its appendages to the Phocian people ; 
 who immediately passed a decree giving the Pro- 
 manteia to Athens, which they caused to be en- 
 graved on the side of the same brazen wolf whose 
 forehead bore the decree of the Delphian citizens in 
 favour of Lacedaemon. Whether the command which 
 the Athenians through their possession of the Mega- 
 rian territory held of the isthmus, or, what seems 
 not improbable, civil dissension in Lacedasmon, and 
 the prevalence of a party adverse to that which had 
 directed the ill-judged expedition to Delphi, was the 
 cause, no measures of resentment seem to have fol- 
 lowed. 
 
 This appears to have been the era of the most ex- 
 tensive empire of the Athenian commonwealth. On 
 the continent of Greece it commanded Megaris, 
 Boeotia, Locris, Phocis, and the territory of Nau- 
 pactus. In Peloponnesus an Athenian garrison held 
 Trcezen ; Athenian influence governed all Achaia, 
 properly so called ; and even Argos was but a sub- 
 ordinate ally. The large and fruitful island of Eu-
 
 POWER OF ATHENS : STATE OF PARTIES. 279 
 
 bcea, separated only by a narrow strait, had long been SECT. 
 an appendage of Attica ; and all the other islands of ' 
 the ^Egean sea, Melus and Thera with part of Crete 
 excepted, most of the Grecian cities of Asia Minor, 
 and all those of Thrace, the Hellespont, and the Pro- 
 pontis, acknowledged the sovereignty of the Athenian 
 people. 
 
 Had Athens had a government so constituted as 
 to be capable of a wise and steady administration, 
 men were not wanting, qualified by abilities and by 
 information, to direct the business of an empire. 
 While Cimon lived Pericles was contented to be the 
 second person of the republic ; and, harmony sub- 
 sisting between them, the disposition to party vio- 
 lence among inferior men was restrained by their 
 influence, and the aristocratical and democratical in- 
 terests were held in unusual union. But all would 
 not be equally pleased with the suspension of party- 
 distinctions, which of necessity admitted some to 
 situations that would have been the lot of others had 
 either party ruled alone. On Cimon's death some 
 of his principal adherents could ill brook the ascend- 
 ancy which superior talents, superior popularity, an 
 accumulation of advantages gave at once to Pericles : 
 they would have one of their own party still at the 
 head of the republic's affairs. Thucydides son of 
 Melesias, brother-in-law of Cimon, to whom they 
 looked in preference, was indeed a person well en- 
 titled to high consideration. His birth, his family Plat, 
 alliances, his conduct through life, his public estima- p . 179!' 1.2. 
 tion, all were advantageous ; and he was not without 
 military reputation, though more known as an expe- 
 rienced statesman and an able speaker. Apparently 
 he was of himself disposed to liberality in poli- 
 tics j but unfortunately without sufficiently possessing 
 
 T 4
 
 280 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. Cimon's firmness to resist, or influence to repress, the 
 ' imprudent heat or interested ambition of political 
 
 associates. A war of oratory ensued, of which little 
 account remains beyond an anecdote marking the 
 extraordinary powers of Pericles, and the candid ac- 
 knowledgment of them by Thucydides : * When I 
 
 * wrestle with Pericles/ he said, ' if I throw him ever 
 
 * so decidedly, he can persuade the spectators that he 
 
 * threw me.' The aristocratical and democratical 
 interests were thus anew divided, never equally, as 
 under the joint lead of Pericles and Cimon, again to 
 coalesce. 
 
 The breach however appears to have been gradual ; 
 Pericles did not at once set himself in direct oppo- 
 sition to the friends of Cimon. Meanwhile, though 
 there was a powerful aristocratical party, there was 
 no acknowledged constitutional balance to the demo- 
 cratical power, which was truly despotic. For hold- 
 ing the many states, which owned subjection to 
 Athens, in any degree attached, never was liberality 
 in administration more wanted than now. For the 
 Athenian people, less than thirty thousand families, 
 to coerce all by their own strength, was obviously 
 impossible. But every untempered government must 
 be jealous ; and democracy, even beyond other un- 
 tempered governments, is naturally selfish. The 
 enlarged policy of the mixed constitution of Rome, 
 which enabled her to become mistress of the world, 
 associating conquered people, could not even be safely 
 mentioned at Athens ; and indeed there was very 
 generally, among the Grecian republics, a strong 
 prejudice against it. The policy for maintaining 
 sovereignty common to all Grecian republics, which 
 acquired dominion over other Grecian republics, 
 rested on that division into parties to which occasion
 
 POLICY FOR MAINTAINING SOVEREIGNTY. 281 
 
 has occurred so often to advert. In the ordinary SECT. 
 course of things, when, after a critical contest in _ ' 
 
 any republic, the aristocratical party prevailed, the 
 leaders only of the lower people were expelled, with 
 a few of the more turbulent of their followers, who 
 were sometimes sold into foreign countries for slaves; 
 and the rest were held under a severe subjection. 
 But if the democratical party obtained the supe- 
 riority, they often expelled all those men of rank 
 and property whom they did not kill, and they shared 
 among themselves their houses, estates, slaves, and 
 whatever other effects they could seize. In all the 
 many republics, where Athenian influence now ex- 
 tended, the democratical party was supported by 
 Athenian patronage, and held all the powers of go- 
 vernment. The prevalence then of that party, and 
 especially the welfare of its chiefs, depending upon 
 the connexion with Athens, the citizens of that party 
 were themselves the garrison to hold their state in 
 obedience to the Athenian commonwealth. Thus 
 alone they could hope to maintain themselves in pos- 
 session of the houses, the estates, and the honours of 
 those whom they had killed or driven into banish- 
 ment ; toward whom they looked with the abhorrence 
 natural for those who dreaded, at the same time, the 
 loss of such advantages, and revenge for having 
 usurped them. In Athens itself not the principles 
 of democracy only, but more especially those by which 
 democratical empire might best be promoted, would 
 be sedulously inculcated and would become popular 
 topics ; and hence apparently what has been called, 
 by later writers, the conquest of Bceotia by Myro- Plat. 
 
 * . \ r Menex. 
 
 nides, was sometimes spoken or, among contempo- p .242. t.2. 
 raries, as the deliverance of the country and the 
 establishment of its freedom. On this pretence (and
 
 282 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 XII. 
 
 Thuc-yd. 
 1.1. c.113. 
 Diodor. 
 
 CHAP, apparently to promote ambitious purposes) the Athe- 
 nian citizens killed in that expedition were honoured 
 with a funeral at the public expense, the first after 
 those who fell in the Persian invasion. 
 
 Through circumstances like those just related 
 Greece always swarmed with exiles ; and those un- 
 happy men were perpetually watching opportunities 
 for a revolution which might restore them to their 
 country. The impossibility of exact discrimination 
 always left them some friends in their respective 
 cities ; and thus the foundation of sedition was ever 
 ready. Those Breotians who had been banished in 
 consequence of the Athenian conquest found oppor- 
 hi2. c.6. tunity to make themselves masters of Orchomenus, 
 
 Plut. v. * 
 
 Perici. Chaeronea, and. some smaller towns. Hopeless then 
 of being permitted to retain quiet possession, ne- 
 cessity not less than inclination incited them to push 
 for farther advantages. The Athenian government 
 prepared an army to reduce them, composed chiefly 
 of allies, with only one thousand heavy-armed Athe 
 nians. Tolmides, already renowned for his achieve- 
 ments in the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus, was 
 appointed to the command. Apparently the party 
 of Thucydides had been gaining ground, and Tol- 
 mides was of that party ; for Pericles, as Plutarch 
 informs us, disapproved the appointment of Tolmides, 
 and augured ill of the expedition. Chaeronea how- 
 ever was taken ; those men of the best families and 
 principal influence in Boeotia, who had held it, were 
 condemned to slavery *, and a garrison was put in 
 
 [* ' . . . IXoVre? KO.} av$peviroW<ravTe<;. Mr. Mitford has expanded 
 ' the last word into a charge against the Athenians : ' those men 
 ' < of the best families and principal influence in Boeotia, who had 
 ' ' held Chaeronea, were condemned to slavery.' But it appears 
 ' from the edition of Mr. Bekker that the words KOU avfyavoW- 
 ought to be omitted.' Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. ix.J 
 
 B.C. 447. 
 Bl. 83. i.
 
 REVOLT OF BCEOTIA, EUBCEA, MEGARA. 283 
 
 the place. But meantime exiles from various parts, SECT. 
 Boeotians and others 16 , had assembled in large num- ' 
 
 bers at Orchonaenus, and the Locrians, who by timely 
 submission to Athens and giving hostages had pre- 
 vented any expulsion of their people, joined them 
 with their whole strength. A powerful army was thus 
 collected. The Athenian forces, returning toward [B.C. 447. 
 Attica, were attacked near Coronea : Tolmides was 
 killed, his army was completely defeated, and almost C1 -J 
 every surviving Athenian was made prisoner. 
 
 The consequence of this misfortune is one among 
 many instances of an inherent weakness in the go- 
 vernments of the little Grecian republics, which was 
 not lessened at Athens by the extent of its command. 
 Few Athenian families were wholly uninterested in 
 the prisoners taken at Coronea, and the administra- 
 tion could ill avoid sacrificing public advantage to 
 private feelings. But, in addition to the fermenta- 
 tion within the state, circumstances were threatening 
 without. The Boeotians, now strong of themselves, 
 would scarcely fail of assistance from Peloponnesus ; 
 for the enmity of Lacedsemon, though smothered on 
 occasion of the affair of Delphi, could not but be ap- 
 prehended when any encouraging opportunity might 
 offer. At the same time therefore to gratify the 
 people with the recovery of their captive kinsmen and 
 friends, and to prevent, as far as possible, a combina- 
 tion of enemies which might endanger the remaining 
 dependencies of the commonwealth, the Athenian 
 administration hastily concluded a treaty with the 
 Boeotians ; agreeing to evacuate immediately what- 
 ever they still held in Bceotia, and surrender all claim 
 upon that rich bordering province, apparently the 
 
 16 Ol <peijywTes HoKaruv Ka,Tf\66vT<;, KO,} ol XXo< itoiyreq. TllUC. 
 
 1. 1. c. 113. We want information who all the others were.
 
 284 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, most desirable of all possible addition to the Athenian 
 ' dominion. 
 
 The event showed the urgency for acceding to 
 
 conditions seemingly so disadvantageous ; for even 
 
 thus the apprehended evils were not entirely obviated. 
 
 The success of the Boeotians had encouraged others 
 
 B.C. 446. to follow their example. Eubrea, the nearest of the 
 
 Ol RS 3.17 
 
 transmarine dependencies of Athens, and the most 
 important, revolted. An army, under the command 
 of Pericles, hastened to that island. It was scarcely 
 i. i.e. ii4. landed when intelligence reached Athens that the 
 c.'5.& 7. adverse party in Megara,with assistance from Corinth, 
 had risen upon the Athenian garrison, overpowered 
 it, and put all to the sword who could not effect 
 their retreat into Nissea. This then was quickly fol- 
 lowed by information still more alarming, that the 
 Lacedaemonians were preparing for an invasion of 
 Attica with the whole force of their confederacy. 
 
 The death of Tolmides and the distress of the 
 commonwealth concurred to put all the powers of 
 government into the hands of Pericles. That able 
 statesman and general immediately led back his forces 
 from Eubcea, defeated the Megarians, with their 
 allies, who rashly attempted to protect their fields 
 against his ravages, and compelled them to confine 
 themselves within their walls. 
 B.C. 445. The Peloponnesian invasion did not take place till 
 
 OL ? i. 4.. 
 
 the following spring. 18 A very formidable army then 
 
 17 Diodorus places the revolt of Megara in the first year of 
 the 83d Olympiad, the battle of Coronea in the second, and the 
 revolt of Euboea in the third. But Thucydides asserts expressly, 
 that the news of the revolt of Megara arrived just as Perisles 
 had debarked his forces in Eubcea to suppress the revolt there ; 
 which happened, he says, not long after the conclusion of the 
 treaty with the Boeotians that followed the battle of Coronea. 
 
 18 Thus Dodwell, upon a comparison of authorities and cir-
 
 INVASION OF ATTICA. 285 
 
 marched. The command was committed, not to the SECT. 
 
 v 
 mature age and tried abilities of Archidamus, whether ' 
 
 because he was the personal friend of Pericles, or 
 mere Lacedaemonian party-interest decided, but to 
 the king of the Eurysthenidean house, Plistoanax, 
 so young that Cleandridas was joined with him as 
 the adviser of his inexperience. The army entered 
 Attica, ravaged the Thriasian plain, and encamped 
 near Eleusis. Pericles, with the whole force of 
 Athens, took a station over against it : but, consider- 
 ing that a battle lost in existing circumstances might 
 be fatal to the commonwealth, and delay, the ordinary 
 resource of defensive war, would endanger all its de- 
 pendencies, he had, it was commonly supposed, re- 
 course to policy. Without any apparent cause the 
 
 Peloponnesian army retreated into the peninsula, and &L2. c .2i. 
 the allies were dismissed as if the purpose of the ex- perici!' 
 pedition had been accomplished. It was commonly 
 supposed that Pericles had succeeded in an attempt 
 to bribe the Spartan general. In Lacedaemon such 
 dissatisfaction ensued that Cleandridas took alarm, 
 and fled : in his absence, capital condemnation was 
 pronounced against him, and the young king himself 
 being called into judgment, a fine was imposed upon 
 him to such an amount that, being unable to discharge 
 it, he also quitted his country. Pericles, in the usual 
 report of the expenses of his command, stated ten piut. v. 
 talents, about two thousand five hundred pounds I 
 sterling, as employed for a necessary purpose, with- 
 out expressing what. Secret-service money was not, 
 it seems, commonly allowed to Athenian generals ; 
 and it is mentioned as an instance of singular con- 
 
 cumstances, has apparently well determined. Ann. Thuc. ad 
 ann. 445.
 
 286 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, fidence in Pericles, that the Athenian people per- 
 mitted that article to pass unquestioned. 
 
 Thucyd. The army under Pericles being then again trans- 
 
 ported into Eubrea, the whole island was quickly 
 reduced. The Histiaeans were expelled, and their 
 territory was apportioned among Athenian families. 
 These, according to the universal course of the 
 Greeks, were the garrison, as well as the ruling body 
 under the supremacy of Athens, and their slaves cul- 
 tivated the lands. The rest of the Eubreans were 
 admitted to a capitulation, by which their estates 
 and the municipal administration of their towns were 
 preserved to them. 
 
 Thucyd. The experienced insecurity of that command, which 
 
 1.1. c.115. , . . r . 1111 
 
 Diodor. the Athenian people held over so many other little 
 
 p/ut'. v. ? * republics, now induced their leaders to seek an ac- 
 
 Perici. commodation with the Peloponnesians. Callias and 
 
 Chares, according to Diodorus, were the managers 
 
 of the treaty on the part of the Athenians ; and, 
 
 ^ odw - before the end of the winter after the invasion of 
 
 Ann. Thuc. 
 
 adann. Attica, a truce was 'concluded for the term of thirty 
 years. The conditions, which remain reported by the 
 historian Thucydides, appear very disadvantageous to 
 Athens. Boeotia was already lost ; the city of Me- 
 gara was lost ; but the Athenians yet held the 
 Megarian ports of Nisaea and Pegae ; they had still a 
 garrison in the Peloponnesian city of Troezen ; and 
 the Peloponnesian province of Achaia was in their 
 interest. All these advantages were surrendered : 
 garrisons were withdrawn ; and where, as in the 
 Achaean towns, the democrat ical party were as the 
 garrison for Athens, no support from Athens was in 
 future to be given to that party. The aristocratical 
 interest then recovering predominant power, but 
 wanting for its security the patronage of Lacedaemon,
 
 THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE. 287 
 
 Achaia would return of course to the Lacedaemonian SECT. 
 alliance. 19 Such concessions, without any equivalent, ' 
 
 sufficiently mark the sense which the Athenian ad- 
 ministration had of the tottering fabric of the empire, 
 and of the necessity for the leisure of peace to confirm 
 that command which remained to the commonwealth 
 over so many islands and so many transmarine states 
 and colonies. 
 
 The train of distressing circumstances following 
 the defeat of Tolmides concurred with the various 
 successes of the new general to ruin the aristocratical 
 interest at Athens. The opposite interest being then 
 decisively superior in the popular assembly, Thucy- 
 dides was banished by ostracism. Thus the oppo- 
 sition, which had compelled Pericles to resume the 
 lead of the democratical interest against the aristo- 
 cratical, contributed to advance his power and glory, 
 making him in a manner prince of Athens. But as 
 it was a power that could only be maintained by still 
 cultivating the democratical interest, to the utter 
 overthrow of the aristocratical, and the destruction 
 of all balance in the constitution, the result was ulti- 
 mately most pernicious to the commonwealth, and 
 involved incalculable evils for all Greece. 
 
 19 ' Quae fuerit ilia Achaia, juxta cum ignarissimis ignore. 
 ' Nam de tota provincia, quae Achaia dicitur, locum intelligere, 
 ' absurdum foret.' Not. 5. c. 115. 1. 1. Thuc. ed. Duk. I must 
 confess I am at a loss to guess at the difficulty. If any could 
 arise upon the simple consideration of the passage in question, 
 it appears fully cleared by what precedes and follows, c. 3. 1. 1. 
 c. 9. 1.2. and c. 21. 1.4. The fancy of Palmer and Hudson, 
 that an obscure Corinthian settlement in ^Etolia, of the name 
 of Chalcis, was intended, appears strangely wild.
 
 288 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE TO 
 THAT COMMONLY CALLED THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, 
 WITH A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF MACE- 
 DONIA FROM THE EARLIEST ACCOUNTS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Administration of Pericles : science, arts, and fine taste at Athens. 
 Change in the condition of women in Greece : Aspasia. Popular 
 licentiousness at Athens. The Athenian empire asserted, and 
 extended. Project for union of Greece. 
 
 CHAP. ATHENS now rested six years, unengaged in any 
 XIIL hostilities ; a longer interval of perfect peace than 
 she had before known in above forty years elapsed 
 since she rose from her ashes after the Persian in- 
 vasion. It is a wonderful and singular phenomenon 
 in the history of mankind, little accounted for by 
 anything recorded by ancient, or imagined by modern 
 writers, that, during this period of turbulence, in a 
 commonwealth whose whole population in free sub- 
 jects amounted scarcely to thirty thousand families, 
 art, science, fine taste, and politeness should have 
 risen to that perfection which has made Athens the 
 mistress of the world through all succeeding ages. 
 Some sciences indeed have been carried higher in 
 
 . c5 
 
 modern times, and art has put forth new branches, 
 of which some have given new helps to science : but 
 Athens, in that age, reached a perfection of taste 
 that no country hath since surpassed ; but on the
 
 PERICLES. 
 
 contrary all have looked up to, as a polar star, by SECT. 
 which, after sinking in the deepest barbarism, taste 
 has been guided in its restoration to splendour, and 
 the observation of which will probably ever be the 
 surest preservative against its future corruption and 
 decay. 
 
 Much of these circumstances of glory to Athens, 
 and of improvement, since so extensively spread 
 over the world, was owing to Pericles. Pisistratus 
 had nourished the infancy of Attic genius ; Pericles 
 brought it to maturity. In the age of Pisistratus 
 books were scarcely known, science was vague, and 
 arts still rude. But during the turbulent period 
 which intervened things had been so wonderfully 
 prepared that, in the age of Pericles, science and 
 every polite art waited, as it were, only his magic 
 touch to exhibit them to the world in meridian 
 splendour. The philosopher Anaxagoras of Clazo- Plat. 
 mene, whose force of understanding and extent of p . lis/t.a 
 science acquired him the appellation of the Intellect, 
 had been the tutor of the youth of Pericles, and 
 remained the friend of his riper years. Among those 
 with whom he chiefly conversed was also the Athenian 
 Phidias, who, with a capacity for every science, pos- 
 sessed the sublimest genius for the fine arts, and 
 Damon, who, professing only music, was esteemed 
 the ablest speculative politician that the world had 
 yet produced. Nor must the celebrated Aspasia be 
 omitted in the enumeration of those to whom Pericles 
 was indebted for the cultivation of his mind ; since 
 we have it on the authority of Plato that Socrates Plat. 
 himself acknowledged to have profited from ^the in- 
 struction of that extraordinary woman. 
 
 It will not be the place here to enlarge upon the 
 manners any more than upon the arts and knowledge 
 
 VOL. II. U
 
 290 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, of the age of Pericles ; yet it may be requisite to 
 
 advert to one point, in which a great change had 
 
 taken place since the age which Homer has described. 
 The political circumstances of Greece, and especially 
 of Athens, had contributed much to exclude women 
 of rank from general society. The turbulence, to 
 which every commonwealth was continually liable 
 from the contentions of faction, made it often unsafe, 
 or at least unpleasant, for them to go abroad. But in 
 democracies their situation was peculiarly untoward. 
 That form of government compelled the men to asso- 
 ciate all with all. The general assembly necessarily 
 called all together ; and the vote of the meanest 
 citizen being there of equal value with that of the 
 highest, the more numerous body of the poor was 
 always formidable to the wealthy few. Hence fol- 
 lowed the utmost condescension, or something more 
 than condescension, from the rich to the multitude ; 
 and not to the collected multitude only, nor to the 
 best among the multitude, but principally to the 
 most turbulent, illmannered, and worthless. Not 
 those alone who sought honours or commands, but all 
 who desired security for their property, must not 
 only meet these men upon a footing of equality in 
 the general assembly, but associate with them in the 
 gymnasia and porticos, flatter them, and sometimes 
 cringe to them. The ladies, to avoid a society which 
 their fathers and husbands could not avoid, lived 
 with their female slaves, in a secluded part of the 
 house ; associating little with one another, scarcely at 
 all with the men, even their nearest relations, and 
 seldom appearing in public but at those religious 
 festivals in which ancient custom required the women 
 to bear a part, and sacerdotal authority could ensure 
 decency of conduct toward them. Hence the edu-
 
 ASPASIA. 291 
 
 cation of the Grecian ladies in general, and particu- SECT. 
 larly the Athenian, was scarcely above that of their ' 
 slaves ; and, as we find them exhibited in lively See also 
 picture in the little treatise upon domestic economy ^'"t 
 remaining from Xenophon, they were equally of un- Di g iton - 
 instructed minds and unformed manners. 
 
 The deficiencies to which women of rank were 
 thus condemned, by custom which the new political 
 circumstances of the country had superinduced upon 
 the better manners of the heroic ages, gave occasion 
 for that comparative superiority through which some 
 of the Grecian courtesans attained extraordinary 
 renown. Carefully instructed in every elegant ac- 
 complishment, and, from early years, accustomed to 
 converse among men, and men of the highest rank 
 and most improved talents, if they possessed under- 
 standing it became cultivated ; and to their houses 
 men resorted, not merely in the low pursuit of sensual 
 pleasure, but to enjoy, often in the most polished 
 company, the charms of female conversation, which, 
 with women of rank and character, was totally for- 
 bidden. Hence, at the time of the invasion under 
 Xerxes, more than one Grecian city is said to have 
 been engaged in the Persian interest through the 
 influence of Thargelia, a Milesian courtesan, who piut.v. 
 afterward became, as her title is expressed by his- Pench 
 torians, queen of Thessaly. 
 
 Aspasia was also a Milesian, the daughter of Axi- 
 ochus ; for her celebrity has preserved her father's 
 name. With uncommon beauty were joined in 
 Aspasia still more uncommon talents ; and, with a 
 mind the most cultivated, manners so decent that, 
 in her more advanced years, not only Socrates pro- 
 fessed to have learned eloquence from her, but, as 
 Plutarch relates, the ladies of Athens used to accom- 
 
 u 2
 
 292 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, pany their husbands to her house for the instruction 
 
 V 1 T I 
 
 ' of her conversation. Pericles became her passionate 
 
 admirer, and she attached herself to him during his 
 
 life : according to Plutarch he divorced his wife, with 
 
 whom he had lived on ill terms, to marry her. We 
 
 Plat. are informed, on higher authority, that he was not 
 
 p!94 n t.2. fortunate in his family, his sons being mentioned by 
 
 & Aicib. i. pi a t as youths of mean understanding. After he 
 
 p. 118. t. 2. * 
 
 was firmly established at the head of the Athenian ad- 
 ministration, he passed his little leisure from public 
 business mostly in company with Aspasia and a few 
 select friends ; avoiding that extensive society in 
 which the Athenians in general delighted, and sel- 
 dom seen by the people but in the exercise of some 
 public office, or speaking in the general assembly : 
 a reserve perhaps as advantageous to him as the con- 
 trary conduct was necessary to the ambitious, who 
 were yet but aspiring at greatness, or to the wealthy 
 without power, who desired security for their property. 
 Policy united with natural inclination to induce 
 Pericles to patronise the arts, and call forth their 
 finest productions for the admiration and delight of 
 the Athenian people. The Athenian people were 
 the despotic sovereign ; Pericles the favourite and 
 minister, whose business it was to indulge the sove- 
 reign's caprices that he might direct their measures ; 
 and he had the skill often to direct even their 
 caprices. That fine taste, which he possessed emi- 
 nently, was in some degree general among the 
 Athenians ; and the gratification of that fine taste was 
 one mean by which he retained his influence. Works 
 were undertaken, according to the expression of Plu- 
 tarch, in whose time they remained still perfect, of 
 stupendous magnitude, and in form and grace ini- 
 mitable ; all calculated for the accommodation or in
 
 SCIENCE, ARTS, AND TASTE. 293 
 
 some way for the gratification of the multitude. Phi- SECT. 
 dias was superintendent of the works : under him _ ' 
 many architects and artists were employed, whose 
 merit entitled them to fame with posterity, and of 
 whose labours (such is the hardness of the Attic 
 marble, their principal material, and the mildness of 
 the Attic atmosphere) relics, which have escaped the 
 violence of men, still, after the lapse of more than two 
 thousand years, exhibit all the perfection of design, 
 and even of workmanship, which earned that fame. 
 
 Meanwhile Phidias himself was executing works 
 of statuary which, while they lasted, were the ad- 
 miration of succeeding times. Nor does the testimony 
 to these works rest merely upon Grecian report ; for 
 the Romans, when in possession of all the most ex- 
 quisite productions of Grecian art, scanty relics of 
 which have excited the wonder and formed the taste 
 of modern ages, were at a loss to express their ad- 
 miration of the sublimity of the works of Phidias. 
 When such was the perfection of the art of sculpture, 
 it were a solecism to suppose that the sister art of 
 painting could be mean, since the names of Panaenus, 
 kinsman of Phidias, and Zeuxis and Parrhasius, con- 
 temporaries, remained always among the most cele- 
 brated of the Grecian school. At the same time the 
 chaste sublimity of the great tragic poets .^Eschylus, 
 Sophocles, and Euripides, and that extraordinary 
 mixture of the most elegant satire with the grossest 
 buffoonery, the old comedy as it is called, were al- 
 ternately exhibited in immense theatres, at the public 
 expense, and for the amusement of the whole people. 
 
 Thus captivating the Athenians by their relish for 
 matters of taste and their passion for amusement, 
 Pericles confirmed his authority principally by that 
 great instrument for the management of a people, his 
 
 u 3
 
 294 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, eloquence : but this was supported by unremitted 
 assiduity in public business, and evident superiority 
 
 of capacity for the conduct of it ; and, above all, by 
 piut v. an ostentatious integrity. The whole Athenian com- 
 pf' monwealth thus, with all its appurtenances, or, in 
 AI io4 l 2 ^ e wor( ^ s f contemporary authors, revenues, armies, 
 fleets, islands, the sea, friendships and alliances with 
 kings and various potentates, and influence that com- 
 manded several Grecian states and many barbarous 
 nations, all were in a manner his possession. Plutarch 
 says that, while thus during fifteen years ruling the 
 Athenian empire, so strict and scrupulous was his 
 economy in his private affairs that he neither increased 
 nor diminished his paternal estate by a single drachma : 
 but, according to the more probable assertion and 
 isocr. de higher authority of Isocrates, his private estate suf- 
 f 2 C6 ed 254 ' f ere d in maintaining his public importance, so that 
 Auger, he left it less to his sons than he had received it from 
 his father. 
 
 But the political power of Pericles resting on the 
 patronage, which he professed, of democracy, he was 
 obliged to allow much of what a better constitution 
 would have put under more restraint. Such was the 
 piut. v. popular licentiousness that the comic poets did not 
 fear to vent, in the public theatres, the grossest jokes 
 upon his person, the severest invectives against his 
 administration, and even the most abominable calum- 
 nies upon his character. His connexion with Aspasia 
 was not likely to escape their satire. She was calledj 
 on the public stage, the Omphale of her time, the 
 Dejanira, and even the Juno. Many circumstances 
 of the administration of Pericles were malevolently 
 attributed to her influence, and much gross abuse 
 and much improbable calumny was vented against 
 both of them. It would indeed be scarcely possible
 
 POPULAR LICENTIOUSNESS. 295 
 
 to distinguish almost any truth amid the licentiousness SECT. 
 of wit, and the violence, not to say the atrociousness, 
 of party-spirit at Athens, had we not generally, for 
 this interesting period of history, the guidance of a 
 contemporary author, Thucydides son of Olorus ; of 
 uncommon abilities and still more uncommon im- 
 partiality, and whose ample fortune, great connexions, 
 and high situation in the commonwealth opened to 
 him superior means of information. For what is 
 deficient in the concise view of Grecian affairs, which 
 he has prefixed to his history of the Peloponnesian 
 war, we have sometimes some testimony from Xeno- 
 phon, Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, or the orators. To 
 later writers, when not in some degree supported by 
 these, it is seldom safe to trust. Sometimes they 
 have adopted reports carelessly ; and often, as we 
 find Plutarch frequently acknowledging, they have 
 been unable to unravel truth amid contradiction and 
 improbability. Indeed Plutarch, though often ex- 
 tremely negligent, is yet often, and especially for 
 the life of Pericles, our best assistant. Frequently 
 quoting authorities, he is then always valuable ; and 
 generally it may be gathered from his manner where 
 he deserves respect, where he has been led by pre- 
 judice, and where he has been writing what occurs 
 too frequently, not history but romance. 
 
 Notwithstanding then the vague accusations re- 
 ported by Diodorus and others, the united authorities 
 of Thucydides, Isocrates, and Plutarch may warrant 
 belief that the clear integrity of Pericles, not less 
 than the wisdom of his public conduct, was his shield 
 against the scurrility of the comic poets, so adapted 
 to make impression on the popular mind, as well as 
 against every effort of the opposing orators. 1 One 
 
 1 The expression of Thucydides is of that forcible kind which 
 is peculiar to him, and to which his character gives a weight 
 
 U 4
 
 296 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, great point however of his policy was to keep the 
 
 people always either amused or employed. During 
 
 peace an exercising squadron of sixty trireme galleys 
 was sent out for eight months in every year. Nor was 
 this without a farther use than merely engaging the 
 attention of the people, and maintaining the navy in 
 vigour. Himself occasionally took the command ; and, 
 sailing among the distant dependencies of the em- 
 pire, settled disputes between them, and confirmed 
 the power and extended the influence of Athens. 
 The .ZEgean and the Propontis did not bound his 
 voyages : he penetrated into the Euxine ; and finding 
 the distant Grecian settlement of Sinope divided be- 
 tween Timesileos, who affected the tyranny, and an 
 opposing party, he left there Lamachus with thirteen 
 ships, and a land force, with whose assistance to the 
 popular side the tyrant and those of his faction were 
 expelled. The justice of what followed may indeed 
 appear questionable. Their houses and property, ap- 
 portioned into six hundred lots, were offered to so 
 many Athenian citizens ; and volunteers were not 
 wanting to accept the offer, and settle at Sinope. 
 To disburthen the government at home, by providing 
 advantageous establishments, in distant parts, for the 
 poor and discontented among the sovereign citizens of 
 Athens, was a policy more than once resorted to by 
 Pericles. The colony conducted by himself to the 
 Ch. 12. s.4. Thracian Chersonese has been formerly noticed. It 
 
 of this Hist. , i i i ' -i 
 
 was then during his administration, in the year, ac- 
 
 Diod.i. 12. cording to Diodorus, in which the thirty years' truce 
 
 Ch.2. s*2* w as concluded, that the deputation came from the 
 
 ofthisfhst. Xhessalian adventurers who had been expelled by the 
 
 Crotoniats from their attempted establishment in the 
 
 which it would hardly have from any other writer : 
 
 . . . Svvaro? av T rf a*/Aa-n KCU rrj 
 
 ei/opevos. Thucyd. 1. 2. C. 65.
 
 EMPIRE EXTENDED. 297 
 
 deserted territory of Sybaris, in consequence of which, SECT. 
 under his patronage, the colony was settled with 
 which the historian Herodotus then, and afterward 
 the orator Lysias, passing to Thurium, both esta- 
 blished themselves there. 
 
 Plutarch has attributed to Pericles a noble project, 
 unnoticed by any earlier extant author, but worthy 
 of his capacious mind, and otherwise also bearing 
 some characters of authenticity and truth. It was no 
 less than to unite all Greece under one great federal 
 government, of which Athens should be the capital. 
 But the immediate and direct avowal of such a pur- 
 pose would be likely to raise jealousies so numerous 
 and extensive as to form insuperable obstacles to the 
 execution. The religion of the nation was that alone 
 in which the Grecian people universally claimed a 
 clear common interest ; and even in this every town 
 and almost every family claimed something peculiar 
 to itself. In the vehemence of public alarm, during 
 the Persian invasion, vows had been, in some places, 
 made to the gods for sacrifices, to an extent beyond 
 what the votaries, when blessed with deliverance be- 
 yond hope, were able to perform ; and some temples, 
 destroyed by the invaders, were not yet restored ; 
 probably because the means of those in whose terri- 
 tories they had stood were deficient. Taking these 
 circumstances then for his ground, Pericles proposed 
 that a congress of deputies from every republic of the 
 nation should be assembled at Athens, for the pur- 
 pose first of inquiring concerning vows for the safety 
 of Greece yet unperformed, and temples, injured by 
 the barbarians, not yet restored ; and then of pro- 
 ceeding to concert measures for the lasting security 
 of navigation in the Grecian seas, and for the pre- 
 servation of peace by land also between all the states
 
 298 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, composing the Greek nation. The naval question, 
 but still more the ruin which, in the Persian invasion, 
 had befallen Northern Greece, and especially Attica, 
 while Peloponnesus had felt nothing of its evils, gave 
 pretensions for Athens to take the lead in the busi- 
 ness. On the motion of Pericles, a decree of the 
 Athenian people directed the appointment of minis- 
 ters to invite every Grecian state to send its deputies. 
 Plutarch, rarely attentive to political information, has 
 not at all indicated what attention was shown, or what 
 participation proposed, for Lacedsemon. His preju- 
 dices indeed we find very generally adverse to the 
 Lacedaemonian government, and favouring the Athe- 
 nian democracy. But, judging from the friendship 
 which, according to the authentic information of 
 Thucydides, subsisted between Pericles and Archi- 
 damus king of Lacedaemon through life, it is little 
 likely that, in putting forward the project for the 
 peace of Greece, Pericles would have proposed any 
 thing derogatory to the just weight and dignity of 
 Sparta ; which indeed would have been, with peace 
 the pretence, only putting forward a project of con- 
 test. Pericles, when he formed his coalition with 
 Cimon, seems to have entered heartily into the en- 
 larged views of that great man ; and, with the hope 
 that, through their coalition, both the oligarchal and 
 the democratical powers in Athens might be held 
 justly balanced, had early in view to establish the 
 peace of Greece on a union between Athens and La- 
 cedaemon. It is however evident, from the narrative 
 of Thucydides, that Archidamus rarely could direct 
 the measures of the Lacedaemonian government. On 
 a view of all information then it may seem probable 
 that the project of Pericles was concerted with Ar- 
 chidamus ; and that the opposition of those in Lace-
 
 WAR BETWEEN SAMOS AND MILETUS. 2Q 
 
 daemon of an adverse faction concurred with op- SECT. 
 position from those in Athens, who apprehended in- 
 jury to their interest from a new coalition with the 
 aristocratical party, to compel the great projector to 
 abandon his magnificent and beneficent purpose, in 
 a stage so early that it was no object for the notice 
 of the able and accurate contemporary historian, in 
 that valuable abridgment of early Grecian history 
 which precedes his narrative of the Peloponnesian 
 war. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 War between Samos and Miletus : interference of Athens : ar- 
 mament under Pericles : Samos taken. Funeral solemnity at 
 Athens in honour of the slain in their country's service. 
 
 PEACE between Lacedaemon and Athens was indis- 
 pensable toward the quiet of the rest of the nation, 
 but, in the want of such a union as Pericles had pro- 
 jected, was unfortunately far from ensuring it ; and, 
 when war began anywhere, though among the most 
 distant settlements of the Grecian people, how far it 
 might extend was not to be foreseen. A dispute 
 between two Asiatic states of the Athenian confede- 
 racy led Athens into a war which greatly endangered 
 the truce made for thirty years, when it had scarcely 
 lasted six. Miletus and Samos, each claiming the B.C. 440. 
 sovereignty of Priene, originally a free Grecian com- ^'J^*' 
 monwealth, asserted their respective pretensions by 1. i.e. 115. 
 arms. The Milesians, not till they were suffering 
 under defeat, applied to Athens for redress, as of a 
 flagrant injury done them. The usual feuds within 
 every Grecian state furnished assistance to their 
 clamour ; for, the aristocracy prevailing at that time
 
 300 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, in Samos, the leaders of the deinocratical party joined 
 the enemies of their country in accusing the proceed- 
 ings of its government before the Athenian people. 
 The opposition at Athens maliciously imputed the 
 Piut. v. measures following to the weak compliance of Pericles 
 with the solicitations of Aspasia in favour of her na- 
 tive city ; but it appears clearly, from Thucydides, 
 that no such motive was needful : the Athenian go- 
 vernment would of course take cognisance of the 
 cause; and, as might be expected, a requisition was 
 sent to the Samian administration to answer, by de- 
 puties at Athens, to the charges urged against them. 
 The Samians, unwilling to submit their claim to the 
 arbitration of those who they knew were always 
 systematically adverse to the aristocratical interest, 
 refused to send deputies. A fleet of forty trireme 
 galleys however brought them to immediate submis- 
 sion ; their government was changed to a democracy, 
 in which those who had headed the opposition of 
 course took the lead ; and, to ensure permanent ac- 
 quiescence from the aristocratical party, fifty men 
 and fifty boys, of the first families of the island, were 
 taken as hostages, and placed under an Athenian 
 guard in the island of Lemnos. 
 
 What Herodotus mentions, as an observation ap- 
 plicable generally, we may readily believe was on 
 this occasion experienced in Samos, * that the lower 
 ' people were most unpleasant associates to the 
 * nobles/ 2 A number of these, unable to support 
 the oppression to which they found themselves ex- 
 posed, quitted the island, and applied to Pissuthnes, 
 satrap of Sardis. The project of conquering Greece 
 by arms appears to have been abandoned by the Per- 
 sian government ; but the urgency for constantly 
 
 a,^ i aptTwraTov. Herodot. 1. 7. C. 156
 
 WAR BETWEEN SAMOS AND MILETUS. 301 
 
 watching its politics, and interfering, as occasion SECT. 
 might offer, with a view to the safety, if not to the 
 extension, of the western border of the empire, was 
 obvious ; and it appears that the western satraps were 
 instructed accordingly. The Samian refugees were 
 favourably received by Pissuthnes. They corresponded 
 with many of their party yet remaining in the island, 
 and they engaged in their interest the city of By- 
 zantium, itself a subject ally of Athens. Collecting 
 then about seven hundred auxiliary soldiers, they 
 crossed by night the narrow channel which separates 
 Samos from the continent, and, being joined by their 
 friends, they surprised and overpowered the new 
 administration. Without delay they proceeded to 
 Lemnos, and so well conducted their enterprise that 
 they carried off their hostages, together with the 
 Athenian guard set over them. To win then more 
 effectually the favour of the satrap, the Athenian pri- 
 soners were presented to him. Assured of assistance 
 from Byzantium, being also not without hopes from 
 Lacedaemon, they prepared to prosecute their success 
 by immediately undertaking an expedition against 
 Miletus. 
 
 Information of these transactions arriving quickly 
 at Athens, Pericles, with nine others, according to ^ c<116 > 
 the ancient military constitution, joined with him in 
 command, hastened to Samos with a fleet of sixty 
 trireme galleys. Sixteen of these were detached, 
 some to Chios and Lesbos, to require the assistance 
 of the squadrons of those islands, the rest to the 
 Carian coast, to look for a Phenician fleet in the 
 Persian service, which was expected to support the 
 Samians. Pericles, with the remaining forty-four 
 ships, met the Samian fleet of seventy returning from 
 Miletus, and defeated it. Being soon after joined
 
 302 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, by forty more galleys from Athens, and twenty-five 
 " from Chios and Lesbos, he debarked his infantry on 
 
 the island of Samos, and laid siege to the city by 
 land and sea. Intelligence meanwhile arriving that 
 the fleet from Phenicia was approaching, Pericles 
 went with sixty of his galleys to Caunus in Caria; 
 apparently apprehensive for his small squadron there. 
 The Samians, under the conduct of the able Me- 
 lissus, (who, as not unusual in that age, united the 
 characters of philosopher and military commander,) 
 hastened to profit from his absence. Issuing un- 
 expectedly from the harbour with their fleet, they 
 attacked the Athenian naval camp, which was un- 
 fortified, destroyed the ships stationed as an advanced 
 guard 3 , and then defeated the rest of the fleet, hastily 
 formed for action against them. Becoming thus 
 masters of the sea, during fourteen days they had all 
 opportunity for carrying supplies into the town. 
 Thucyd. Meanwhile an assembly of deputies from the states 
 
 1.1. c. 41. O f the Peloponnesian confederacy was held at Sparta, 
 to consider whether the democratical party in Samos 
 should be protected in what, according to Grecian 
 political tenets extensively held in that age, was re- 
 bellion. 4 The Corinthians, yet weak from the con- 
 sequences of their last war with Athens, principally 
 decided the assembly to the rejection of the proposal. 
 
 3 T? w/jopuXa/c/Sa? vavi; : for which may be consulted ScheSer's 
 Treatise de Militia Navali, 1. 3. c. 4>. p. 108., though he is not 
 very satisfactory. I would not however undervalue his laborious 
 compilation, which may often guard against the supposition of 
 what was not, where it fails to inform what was. 
 
 4 Ministers from Corinth, afterward giving an account to the 
 Athenian assembly of what had passed at Sparta upon the 
 occasion, affirmed that their deputies had asserted the right of 
 every leading city to PUNISH its allies : TOV? <rprreoov<; Iv/ 
 
 afnov rwa KoXev. Thucyd. 1. 1. c. 43.
 
 WAR BETWEEN SAMOS AND MILETUS. 303 
 
 Indeed, unless an invasion of Attica by land might SECT. 
 have been effectual, the confederacy had not means 
 to carry it into execution, for its naval strength was 
 very unequal to contention with that of Athens. 
 
 The Samians, thus disappointed of assistance from 
 Peloponnesus, were weakly supported by the satrap, 
 and the promised succour from Byzantium was de- 
 layed. The return of Pericles therefore compelled 
 them to confine themselves within their harbour : and 
 shortly a reinforcement arrived, which might have 
 enabled a less skilful commander to overbear op- 
 position ; forty galleys from Attica, under Thucydides, 
 Agnon, and Phormion 5 , were followed by twenty 
 more under Tlepolemus and Anticles, while thirty 
 came from Chios and Lesbos. The Samians made 
 one vain attempt to cut off a part of this formidable 
 naval force ; and then, in the ninth month from the 
 commencement of the siege, they capitulated : their 
 ships of war were surrendered, their fortifications 
 were destroyed, they bound themselves to the pay- 
 ment of a sum of money by instalment for the ex- 
 penses of the war, and they gave hostages as pledges 
 of their fidelity to the sovereign commonwealth of 
 Athens. The Byzantines, not waiting the approach 
 of the coercing fleet, sent their request to be re- 
 
 5 The historian not having distinguished the Thucydides 
 here spoken of by the mention of his father's name, it remains 
 in doubt who he was. Some have supposed him the historian 
 himself; others, the son of Melesias, once the opponent of 
 Pericles, now reconciled to him ; while others have imagined a 
 third person of the name, nowhere else mentioned in history. 
 Certainty cannot be had, and the matter is not important ; but 
 the first supposition appears to me far the most probable. In 
 the course of the history Agnon and Phormion become farther 
 known.
 
 304 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, admitted to their former terms of subjection, which 
 
 XIII. -, 
 
 was granted. 
 
 This rebellion, alarming and troublesome at the 
 time to the administration of Athens, otherwise little 
 disturbed the internal peace of the commonwealth ; 
 and, in the event, contributed rather to strengthen 
 its command over its dependencies. Pericles took 
 occasion from it to acquire fresh popularity. On the 
 return of the armament to Athens the accustomed 
 solemnities, in honour of those who had fallen in the 
 war, were performed with new splendour ; and, in 
 speaking the funeral oration, he exerted the powers 
 of his eloquence very highly to the gratification of 
 the people. As he descended from the bema, the 
 stand whence orations were delivered to the people, 
 the women presented him with chaplets ; an idea de- 
 rived from the ceremonies of the public games, where 
 the crowning with a chaplet was the distinction of 
 the victors, and, as something approaching to divine 
 honour, was held among the highest tokens of admir- 
 ation, esteem, and respect. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 Affairs of Corcyra : sedition at Epidamnus : war between Cor- 
 cyra and Corinth : defect of the ancient ships of war : de- 
 ficient naval skill of the Peloponnesians : sea-fight off Aclium : 
 accession of the Corcyrceans to the Athenian confederacy : sea- 
 fight off" Sybota : infraction of the thirty years truce. 
 
 THE threatened renewal of general war in Greece 
 having been obviated by the determination of the 
 Peloponnesian congress not to interfere between the 
 Athenians and their Asiatic allies, peace prevailed 
 during the next three years after the submission of 
 the Samians ; or, if hostilities occurred anywhere,
 
 AFFAIRS OF CORCYRA. 305 
 
 they were of so little importance that no account of SECT. 
 them remains. A fatal spark then, raising fire in a 
 corner of the country hitherto little within the notice 
 of history, the blaze rapidly spread over the whole 
 with inextinguishable fury; insomuch that the farther 
 history of Greece, with some splendid episodes, is 
 chiefly a tale of calamities, which the nation, in cease, 
 less exertions of misdirected valour and genius, brought 
 upon itself. 
 
 The island of Corey ra had been occupied, in an 
 early age, by a colony from Corinth. The political 
 connexion of colonies with the mother-country will 
 always depend upon their respective strength ; and 
 the Grecian colonies, all having been the offspring of 
 very small states, in many instances acquired more 
 than the parent's force. Corcyra thus had grown too 
 powerful to remain obedient to Corinth, and, in in- 
 dependency, was too near a neighbour, and too much 
 engaged in the same course of maritime commerce, 
 not to become the rival, and thence the enemy, of 
 its metropolis. Yet it was common for the Grecian 
 colonies, even when they acknowledged no political 
 subjection, to esteem a reverential regard for the 
 mother-country a duty ; holding themselves bound 
 by a kind of religious superiority. Thus, unless in Thucyd. 
 actual hostility, the citizens of the mother-country h h c>25 ' 
 were complimented with the precedency at public 
 sacrifices and all festivals ; and, if a colony was to be c. 24. 
 sent out, it was usual to desire a citizen of the mo- 
 ther-country for the leader. Thus, it was supposed, 
 the gods of their forefathers would still be their gods, 
 would favour the enterprise, and extend their lasting 
 protection to the settlement. 
 
 Corcyra, already populous, had not yet entirely 
 broken its connexion with Corinth, when the resolu- 
 
 VOL. II. X
 
 306 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, tion was taken by its government to settle a colony 
 on the Illyrian coast. An embassy was therefore 
 sent, in due form, to desire a Corinthian for the 
 leader. Phalius, of a family boasting its descent from 
 Hercules, was accordingly appointed to that honour : 
 some Corinthians and others of Dorian race accom- 
 panied him ; and Phalius thus became the nominal 
 founder of Epidamnus, which was however considered 
 as a Corcyraean, not a Corinthian colony. 
 
 But in process of time Epidamnus growing populous 
 and wealthy followed the example of its niother- 
 country, asserted independency, and maintained the 
 claim. Like most other Grecian cities, it was then, 
 during many years, torn by sedition ; and a war 
 supervening with the neighbouring barbarians, it fell 
 much from its former flourishing state. But the spirit 
 of faction remaining in spite of misfortune untamed, 
 the commonalty at length expelled all the higher 
 citizens. These, finding refuge among the Illyrians, 
 engaged with them in a predatory war, which was 
 unremittingly carried on against the city by land and 
 sea. Unable thus to rest, and almost to subsist, the 
 Epidamnians in possession requested assistance from 
 Corcyra. Conscious however that their state had no 
 claim of merit with the mother-country, and the 
 more doubtful of a favourable reception as at this time 
 the Corcyraean government was aristocratical, those 
 deputed for the purpose, instead of presenting them- 
 selves with the confidence of public ministers, put on 
 the usual habit of suppliants, betook themselves to 
 the temple of Juno, as a place whose sanctity would 
 ensure them present security, and thence offered 
 their petition ; in which still they ventured to solicit 
 nothing more than the mediation of their metropolis 
 with their expelled fellow-citizens, and protection
 
 EPIDAMNUS BESIEGED. 307 
 
 against the barbarians. Even this humble supplication SECT. 
 however was rejected. 
 
 On the return of their ministers, the Epidamnians, Thucyd. 
 in great distress, determined to recur to the ancient LL c ' 25 ' 
 resource of desponding states, the Delphian oracle. 
 Sending a solemn deputation to Delphi, they put 
 the question to the god, ' Whether it would be proper 
 ' for them to endeavour to obtain protection from 
 
 * Corinth, by acknowledging that city as their me- 
 
 * tropolis, and submitting themselves accordingly to 
 
 * its authority.* The response directed them, in clear 
 terms, to do so ; and, thus warranted by the deity, 
 they hastened a deputation to Corinth. 6 
 
 Fortunately for their object, though peace had not 
 yet been broken, yet animosity between Corinth and 
 Corcyra had so risen that the Corcyra3ans, who had 
 long refused political dependency, now denied to the 
 Corinthians all those honours and compliments usually 
 paid by Grecian colonies to their parent states. 
 Under stimulation thus from affront, and with en- 
 couragement from the oracle, the prospect of an 
 acquisition of dominion was too tempting, and the 
 proposal of the Epidamnians was accepted. Adven- 
 turers were collected to strengthen the colony ; and 
 
 ' . . . E 
 
 O ' avroti; avelXe, TrapaSoi/va*, KOU yyefAov/zi; ittufivBai. Thucyd. 
 
 1. 1. c. 25. In Thucydides's account of the disputes between 
 Corinth, Corcyra, and Epidamnus, and of that which followed 
 about Potidaea, we have more authentic information concerning 
 the proper connexion between a Grecian colony and its metro- 
 polis than is perhaps elsewhere to be found ; but we are without 
 means of determining the e?,act import of the expressions nafa.- 
 Soyva* T7)V TToAiv u<; oiKwrfy an d v)ye[Mva,i; iioteta'da.i, and we are 
 equally uninformed of the proper authority of those Corinthian 
 magistrates whom we find, in the sequel, annually sent 'to the 
 colony of Potidaea in Thrace.
 
 308 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, a body of Corinthian troops, with some Ambraciot 
 
 lIL and Leucadian auxiliaries, was appointed to convoy 
 
 them. Fearful however of the naval force of Corcyra, 
 
 B.C. 436. which far exceeded that of Corinth, they passed by 
 
 land to Apollonia, and, there embarking, proceeded 
 
 by sea to Epidamnus. 
 
 The measures of the Epidamnians in possession 
 becoming known to the expelled, these, before appa- 
 rently hoping for final success with their own strength, 
 and desirous to avoid dependency, now at length in 
 alarm sent a deputation to solicit support from Cor- 
 cyra. No sooner then was it known there that the 
 Corinthians had taken possession of a colony in whose 
 affairs the Corcyraeans themselves had refused to 
 interfere than the affair was taken up with warm 
 resentment. Twenty-five triremes were immediately 
 dispatched, with a requisition to the Epidamnians to 
 receive their expelled fellow-citizens, (for these had 
 now been supplicating protection from Corcyra,) and 
 to dismiss the Corinthian colonists and garrison. 
 This being refused, a re-enforcement was sent to the 
 squadron, which, in conjunction with the expelled 
 Epidamnians and the neighbouring Illyrians, laid 
 siege to the town. 
 
 Thucyd. The Corinthian government was prepared to expect 
 
 1.1. c.27. suc ^ measures . As soon therefore as intelligence of 
 them was received, a proclamation was published, 
 offering the privileges of a citizen of Epidamnus to 
 any who would go immediately to settle there. What 
 the proposed advantages of the citizenship of Epi- 
 damnus were we are not informed. An allotment of 
 land however would be among them, and perhaps a 
 dwelling in the town, with a vote in an assembly, 
 whether of more or less power. All however would 
 be precarious, and especially the land, in the actual
 
 CORCYRA AND CORINTH AT WAR. 309 
 
 circumstances, would be most insecure property. The SECT. 
 sense which the Corinthian government had of this 
 is marked in the farther offer of the same advantages 
 to any who, avoiding the dangers of the present cir- 
 cumstances, would pay fifty drachmas, less than three 
 pounds sterling, toward the expense of the expedition. 
 Corinth had rich men, and throughout Greece poor 
 commonly abounded, ready for any adventure. Ac- 
 cordingly some were found to offer their persons, 
 and some to pay for the chance of profit from the 
 event. But Corinth had at this time only thirty ships 
 of war, whereas. Corcyra was able to put to sea near 
 four times the number ; being, next to Athens, the 
 most powerful maritime state of Greece. Application 
 for naval assistance was therefore made to the re- 
 publics with which Corinth was most bound in friend- Thpcyd. 
 ship, and thus more than forty vessels were obtained; &c.3o! 7 ' 
 Megara sending eight, the Paleans of Cephallenia 
 four, Epidaurus five, Hermione one, Trcezen two, 
 Leucas ten, Ambracia eight, all with their comple- 
 ments of men ; the Eleans some unmanned. Loans 
 of money were obtained from the Eleans, Phliasians, 
 and Thebans. 
 
 It had been the settled policy of the Corcyrseans, c .32. & 
 islanders and strong at sea, to engage in no alliances. seq< 
 They had avoided both the Peloponnesian and the 
 Athenian confederacy ; and hitherto with this policy 
 they had prospered. But, alarmed now at the com- 
 bination formed against them, and fearing it might 
 still be extended, they sent ambassadors to Lacedae- 
 mon and Sicyon ; who prevailed so far that ministers 
 from those two states accompanied them to Corinth, c - 2a - 
 as mediators in the existing differences. In presence 
 of these the Corcyraean ambassadors proposed to 
 submit the matters in dispute to the arbitration of 
 
 x 3
 
 310 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, any Peloponnesian states, or to the Delphian oracle, 
 
 which the Corinthians had supposed already favourable 
 
 to them. The Corinthians however, now prepared 
 for war, and apparently persuaded that neither La- 
 cedaemon nor Sicyon would take any active part 
 against them, refused to treat upon any equal terms, 
 and the Corcyraan ambassadors departed. 
 B.C. 435. The .Corinthians then hastened to use the force 
 they had collected. The troops were already em- 
 barked when they sent a herald to Corcyra formally 
 to declare war j a ceremony required by custom, 
 which, throughout Greece, was held sacred. But, 
 though they would not omit this, they would delay 
 it till it might in the least possible degree answer its 
 proper purpose. The armament consisting of seventy- 
 five triremes, with two thousand heavy-armed infantry, 
 under the command of Aristeus son of Pellicas, pro- 
 ceeded for Epidamnus. Off Actium in the Anac- 
 torian territory, at the entrance of the Ambracian 
 gulf, where the temple of Apollo stands, (so the 
 contemporary historian describes the place destined 
 to be in after-times the scene of more important 
 action,) a vessel came to them with a herald from 
 Corcyra, deprecating hostilities. The Corey rasans 
 had manned those of their ships which were already 
 equipped, and hastily prepared some of those less in 
 readiness, when their herald returned, bearing no 
 friendly answer. With eighty galleys then they 
 quitted their port, met the enemy, and gained a 
 complete victory, destroying fifteen ships. Return- 
 ing to Corcyra, they erected their trophy on the 
 neadland of Leucimne, and they immediately put to 
 death all their prisoners, except the Corinthians, 
 whom, as pledges, they kept in bonds. Epidamnus 
 surrendered to their forces on the same day.
 
 CORCYCA AND CORINTH AT WAR. 311 
 
 The opportunities now open, for both revenge and 
 profit, were not neglected by the Corcyraeans. They _ 
 first plundered the territory of Leucas, a Corinthian 
 colony, still connected with the mother-country ; and 
 then, going to the coast of Peloponnesus, they burnt 
 Cyllene, the naval arsenal of Elis. During that year, 
 unopposed on the sea, there was scarcely an inter- 
 mission of their smaller enterprises ; by some of which 
 they gained booty, by others only gave alarm, but 
 by all together greatly distressed the Corinthians and 
 their allies. It was not till late in the following B.C. 434. 
 spring that the Corinthians sent a fleet and some ' '* 
 troops to Actium, to give protection to their friends, 
 wherever occasion might require. All the ensuing 
 summer the rival armaments watched one another 
 without coming to action. On the approach of winter 
 both retired within their respective ports. 
 
 But since their misfortune off Actium the Corin- Thucyd. 
 thians had been unremittingly assiduous in repairing 
 their loss, and in preparing to revenge it. Triremes 
 were built, all necessaries for a fleet were largely 
 collected, rowers were engaged throughout Pelopon- 
 nesus, and where else in any part of Greece they 
 could be obtained for hire. The Corcyraans, in- 
 formed of these measures, notwithstanding their past 
 success, were uneasv with the consideration that their 
 
 9 
 
 commonwealth stood single, while their enemies were 
 members of an extensive confederacy ; of which, 
 though a part only had yet been induced to act, more 
 powerful exertions were nevertheless to be appre- 
 hended. In this state of things it appeared necessary 
 to abandon their ancient policy, and to seek alliances. 
 Thucydides gives us to understand that they would 1.1. c.28. 
 have preferred the Peloponnesian to the Athenian 
 confederacy ; induced, apparently, both by their 
 
 x 4
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. 
 XIII. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1.1. c.31. 
 
 kindred origin, and their kindred form of government. 
 But they were precluded by the circumstances of the 
 existing war, Corinth being one of the most con- 
 siderable members of the Peloponnesian confederacy ; 
 and it was beyond hope that Lacedzemon could be 
 engaged in measures hostile to so old and useful an 
 ally. It was therefore finally resolved to send an 
 embassy to Athens. 
 
 A measure of this kind, among those ancient com- 
 monwealths which had any mixture of democracy, 
 was unavoidably public ; and this is one among cir- 
 cumstances favourable to ancient history, which coun- 
 terbalance the want of some advantages open to the 
 historians of modern ages. Gazettes were then 
 unknown ; records and state writings were com- 
 paratively few ; party-intrigues indeed abounded ; but 
 public measures were publicly decided ; and some of 
 the principal historians were statesmen and generals, 
 bred to a knowledge of politics and war, and pos- 
 sessing means, through their rank and situation, of 
 knowing also the facts which they related. Such 
 particularly was Thucydides, son of Olorus, who 
 has transmitted to us the transactions of the times 
 with which we are now engaged. From him we 
 learn that, as soon as the purpose of the Corcyraeans 
 was known at Corinth, ambassadors were sent thence 
 to Athens to remonstrate against it. 
 
 The Athenian people were assembled to receive 
 
 the two embassies, each of which, in presence of the 
 
 other, made its proposition in a formal oration. The 
 
 point to be determined was highly critical for Athens. 
 
 A truce existed, but not a peace, with a confederacy 
 
 ' ' inferior in naval force, but far superior by land ; and 
 
 Attica, a continental territory, was open to attack by 
 
 c. 40. & 43. land. That recent circumstance in the Samian war,
 
 ALLIANCE OF CORCYRA WITH ATHENS. 313 
 
 the assembling of a congress at Sparta for the purpose SECT. 
 of considering whether the Samians, an Ionian people, 
 a colony from Athens, and members of the Athenian 
 alliance, should not be supported in war against the 
 head of their confederacy, also their mother-state, 
 would weigh in the minds of the Athenian people. 
 The mere summoning of such an assembly, to discuss 
 such a question, strongly indicated the disposition at 
 least of a powerful party in the Lacedaemonian con- 
 federacy ; and the determination of the question, in 
 the negative, rather demonstrated a present unrea- 
 diness, principally among the Corinthians, for the 
 renewal of hostilities, than any friendly disposition 
 toward Athens. The security of that state rested 
 principally on its maritime superiority. But next to 
 Athens Corey ra was the most powerful maritime 
 republic ; and to prevent the accession of its strength, 
 through alliance, or through conquest, to the Pelo- 
 ponnesian confederacy, was, for the Athenian people, 
 highly important. In the articles of the truce more- 
 over it was expressly stipulated, that any Grecian 
 state, not yet a member of either confederacy, might 
 at pleasure be admitted to either. But, notwith- 
 standing this, it was little less than certain that, in 
 the present circumstances, an alliance with Corcyra 
 must lead to a rupture with the Peloponnesians ; and 
 this consideration occasioned much suspense in the 
 minds of the Athenians. Twice the assembly was 
 held to debate the question. On the first day, the 
 arguments of the Corinthian ambassadors had so far 
 effect that nothing was decided : on the second, the 
 spirit of ambition, ordinary in democracy, prevailed, 
 and the question was carried for alliance with Cor- 
 cyra. 
 
 Thucydides gives no information what part Pericles 
 took in this important and difficult conjuncture. If
 
 314- HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, it was impossible, as it seems to have been, to establish 
 
 X T I T 
 
 ' secure peace with Lacedaemon, it would become the 
 leader of the affairs of Athens to provide for main- 
 taining future war ; strengthening the Athenian 
 confederacy, and obviating accession of strength to 
 the Lacedaemonian. But we are enough informed 
 that Pericles would be farther pressed by other cir- 
 cumstances. The difficulty of keeping civil order in 
 a community of lordly beggars, such as the Athenian 
 people were, which had driven Cimon, in advanced 
 years, to end his life in distant enterprise, we shall 
 find, in the sequel, a difficulty for which, even in 
 speculation, the wisest politicians were unable to pro- 
 pose any remedy, beyond finding the fittest objects 
 for restless ambition. It is therefore every way likely 
 that Plutarch had ground for asserting that the elo- 
 quence of Pericles was directed to promote the 
 decision to which the people came. The character 
 of the measure taken, in pursuance of the decision, 
 may then seem to indicate the wisdom of Pericles, 
 guiding the business. With all other states of the 
 confederacy the alliance was offensive and defensive ; 
 with Corcyra it was for defence only. 
 
 Thucyd. Meanwhile the earnestness with which the Corin- 
 
 thians persevered in their purpose of prosecuting war 
 against the Corcyrseans, now to be supported by the 
 power of Athens, appears to mark confidence in 
 support, on their side, from the Lacedaemonian con- 
 federacy ; some members of which indeed were evi- 
 dently of ready zeal. The Corinthians increased 
 their own trireme galleys to ninety. The Eleans, 
 resenting the burning of Cyllene, had exerted them- 
 selves in naval preparation, and sent ten triremes 
 completely manned to join them. Assistance from 
 Megara, Leucas, and Ambracia made their whole 
 fleet a hundred and fifty : the crews would hardly be
 
 SEA-FIGHTS OFF SYBOTA. 315 
 
 less than forty thousand men. With this large force SECT. 
 they sailed to Chimerion, a port of Thesprotia, over ' 
 
 against Corcyra, where, according to the practice of 
 the Greeks, they formed their naval camp. 
 
 The Athenian government meanwhile, desirous to Thucyd. 
 confirm their new alliance, yet still anxious to avoid ' ' 
 a rupture with the Peloponnesian confederacy, had 
 sent ten triremes to Corcyra, under the command of 
 Lacedaemonius son of Cimon ; but with orders not to 
 fight, unless a descent were made on the island, or 
 any of its towns were attacked. The Corey raans, on 
 receiving intelligence that the enemy was approaching, 
 put to sea with a hundred and ten triremes, exclusive c - 47 - 
 of the Athenian, and formed their naval camp on one 
 of the small islets called Sybota, the Sowleas or Sow- 
 pastures, between their own island and the main. 
 Their land forces at the same time, with a thousand 
 auxiliaries from Zacynthus, encamped on the head- 
 land of Leucimne in Corcyra, to be prepared against 
 invasion ; while on the opposite coast of the continent 
 the barbarians, long since friendly to Corinth, assem- 
 bled in large number. 
 
 The necessity among the ancients for debarking 
 continually to encamp their crews arose from the 
 make of their ships of war. To obtain that most 
 valuable property for their manner of naval action, 
 swiftness in rowing, burden was excluded ; insomuch 
 that not only they could not carry any stock of pro- i4. c.ze. 
 visions, but the numerous crews could neither sleep 
 nor even eat conveniently aboard. When the Co- 
 rinthians quitted the port of Chimerion, with the 
 purpose of bringing the Corcyrasan fleet to action, 
 they took three days' provision ; which Thucydides 1.7. c. 39. 
 seems to have thought a circumstance for notice, 
 because it appears to have been the practice of the
 
 316 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. Athenians, when action was expected, hardly to en- 
 cumber themselves with a meal. The Corinthians 
 
 however, moving in the night, perceived in the dawn 
 Thucyd. the Corcyraean fleet approaching. Both prepared 
 immediately to engage. So great a number of ships 
 c. 50. had never before met in any action between Greeks 
 and Greeks. The onset was vigorous ; and the 
 battle was maintained, on either side, with much 
 c.49. courage but little skill. Both Corcyraean and Co- 
 rinthian ships were equipped in the ancient manner, 
 very inartificially. The decks were crowded with 
 soldiers, some heavy-armed, some with missile wea- 
 pons ; and the action, in the eye of the Athenians, 
 trained in the discipline of Themistocles, resembled 
 a battle of infantry rather than a sea-fight. Once 
 engaged, the number and throng of the vessels made 
 free motion impossible : nor was there any attempt 
 at the rapid evolution of the diecplus, as it was called, 
 for piercing the enemy's line and dashing away his 
 oars, the great objects of the improved naval tactics ; 
 but the event depended, as of old, chiefly upon the 
 heavy-armed soldiers who fought on the decks. 
 Tumult and confusion thus prevailing everywhere, 
 Lacedaemonius, restrained by his orders from fighting, 
 gave yet some assistance to the Corcyraeans, by 
 showing himself wherever he saw them particularly 
 pressed, and alarming their enemies. The Corcy- 
 raeans were, in the left of their line, successful : 
 twenty of their ships put to flight the Megarians and 
 Ambraciots who were opposed to them, pursued to 
 the shore, and, debarking, plundered and burnt the 
 naval camp. But the Corinthians, in the other wing, 
 had meanwhile been gaining an advantage which 
 became decisive through the imprudent forwardness 
 of the victorious Corcyraans. The Athenians now
 
 SEA-FIGHTS OFF SYBOTA. 317 
 
 endeavoured, by more effectual assistance to their SECT. 
 
 TTT 
 
 allies, to prevent a total rout : but disorder was 
 already too prevalent, and advantage of numbers too 
 great against them. The Corinthians pressed their 
 success ; the Corcyraeans fled, the Athenians became 
 mingled among them ; and in the confusion of a 
 running fight acts of hostility passed between the 
 Athenians and Corinthians. The defeated however 
 soon reached their own shore, whither the conquerors 
 did not think proper to follow. 
 
 In the action several galleys had been sunk ; most Thucyd. 
 by the Corinthians, but some by the victorious part '* ' c ' 5 ' 
 of the Corey raean fleet. The crews had recourse 
 as usual, to their boats ; and it was common for the 
 conquerors, when they could seize any of these, to 
 take them in tow and make the men prisoners : but 
 the Corinthians, in the first moment of success, gave 
 no quarter ; and, unaware of the disaster of the right 
 of their fleet, in the hurry and confusion of the occa- 
 sion, not easily distinguishing between Greeks and 
 Greeks, inadvertently destroyed many of their un- 
 fortunate friends. When pursuit ceased, and they 
 had collected whatever could be recovered of the 
 wrecks and the dead, they carried them to a desert 
 harbour, not distant, on the Thesprotian coast, called, 
 like the neighbouring islets, Sybota : and depositing 
 them under the care of their barbarian allies, who 
 were there encamped, they returned, on the after- 
 noon of the same day, with the purpose of renewing 
 attack upon the Corcyrsean fleet. 
 
 The Corcyraeans meanwhile had been considering 
 the probable consequences of leaving the enemy 
 masters of the sea. They dreaded descents upon 
 their island, and consequent ravage of their lands. 
 The return of their victorious squadron gave them
 
 318 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, new spirits : Lacedaemonius encouraged them with 
 
 '__ assurance that, since hostilities had already passed, 
 
 he would no longer scruple to afford them his utmost 
 support ; and they resolved upon the bold measure of 
 quitting their port, and, though evening was already 
 approaching, again giving the enemy battle. In- 
 stantly they proceeded to put this in execution. The 
 paean, the song of battle, was already sung, when 
 the Corinthians began suddenly to retreat. The 
 Thucyd. Corcyraeans were at a loss immediately to account 
 for this ; but presently they discovered a squadron 
 coming round a headland, which had concealed it 
 longer from them than from the enemy. Still un- 
 certain whether it might be friendly or hostile, they 
 also retreated into their port ; but shortly, to their 
 great joy, twenty triremes under Glaucon and An- 
 docides, sent from Attica, in the apprehension that 
 the small force under Lacedaemonius might be un- 
 equal to the occurring exigencies, took their station 
 by them. 
 
 c.52. Next day the Corcyraeans did not hesitate, with 
 
 the thirty Athenian ships, for none of those under 
 Lacedaemonius had suffered materially in the action, 
 to show themselves off the harbour of Sybota, where 
 the enemy lay, and offer battle. The Corinthians 
 came out of the harbour, formed for action, and so 
 rested. They were not desirous of risking an en- 
 gagement against the increased strength of the enemy, 
 but they could not remain conveniently in the station 
 they had occupied, a desert shore, where they could 
 neither refit their injured ships, nor recruit their 
 stock of provisions ; and they were encumbered with 
 more than a thousand prisoners ; a very inconvenient 
 addition to the crowded complements of their galleys. 
 Their object therefore was to return home : but they
 
 END OF CORCYR^AN WAR. 319 
 
 were apprehensive that the Athenians, holding the SECT. 
 truce as broken by the action of the preceding day, 
 would not allow an unmolested passage. It was 
 therefore determined to try their disposition by send- Thucyd. 
 ing a small vessel with a message to the Athenian L l ' c * 53 ' 
 commanders, without the formality of a herald. This 
 was a service not without danger. Those Corcy- 
 raeans, who were near enough to observe what passed, 
 exclaimed, in the vehemence of their animosity, 
 
 * that the bearers should be put to death ;' which, 
 considering them as enemies, would have been within 
 the law of war of the Greeks, The Athenian com- 
 manders however thought proper to hold a different 
 conduct. To the message delivered, which accused 
 them of breaking the truce, by obstructing the pass- 
 age of Corcyra, they replied that * it was not their 
 4 purpose to break the truce, but only to protect 
 
 * their allies. Wherever else the Corinthians chose 
 ' to go, they might go without interruption from 
 
 * them ; but any attempt against Corcyra, or any of 
 ' its possessions, would be resisted by the Athenians 
 
 * to the utmost of their power.' 
 
 Upon receiving this answer, the Corinthians, after c. 54. & 55. 
 erecting a trophy at Sybota on the continent, pro- 
 ceeded homeward. In their way they took by stra- 
 tagem Anactorium, a town at the mouth of the Am- 
 bracian gulf, which had formerly been held in common 
 by their commonwealth and the Corcyraeans ; and, 
 leaving a garrison there, proceeded to Corinth. Of 
 their prisoners they found near eight hundred had 
 been slaves, and these they sold. The remainder, 
 about two hundred and fifty, were strictly guarded, 
 but otherwise treated with the utmost kindness. 
 Among them were some of the first men of Corcyra ; 
 and through these the Corinthians hoped, at some
 
 320 
 
 CHAP. 
 XIII. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 future opportunity, to recover their ancient interest 
 and authority in the island. 
 
 The Corcyrasans meanwhile had gratified them- 
 selves with the erection of a trophy on the island 
 Sybota, as a claim of victory, in opposition to the 
 Corinthian trophy on the continent. The Athenian 
 fleet returned home ; and thus ended, without any 
 treaty, that series of actions which is distinguished 
 among Greek writers by the name of the Corcyraean, 
 or, sometimes, the Corinthian war. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 Summary view of the history of Macedonia. War of Athens 
 with Macedonia : enmity of Corinth to AtJiens : revolt of 
 Athenian dependencies in Thrace : battle and siege of Po- 
 tidcea. 
 
 THE contemporary historian has strongly marked 
 the difficulties of those who might have desired to 
 guide the sovereign people of Athens in the paths of 
 peace and moderation. The Corcyraean war was far 
 Thucyd. too small an object for their glowing minds : the view 
 1.6. c.90. toward Sicily and the adjacent Italian shores were 
 fondly looked to for new enterprise. Nor was it in- 
 tended to stop there. Where spoil allured, no dif- 
 ficulty daunted ; and the wild vision of conquest was 
 extended from Calabria to Tuscany, and from Sicily 
 to Carthage. Pericles endeavoured to repress this ex- 
 travagant and dishonest ambition ; and his view was 
 assisted by circumstances which necessarily engaged 
 attention nearer home. 
 
 The towns which the Athenians held under their 
 dependency on the northern shores of the ><33gean, 
 some highly valuable for their mines of gold and 
 silver, others furnishing the principal supplies of na- 
 
 Piut. ibid,
 
 MACEDONIA. 321 
 
 val timber, and all paying some tribute, gave Athens SECT. 
 a near interest in the affairs of MACEDONIA. Peopled ' 
 
 by the same Pelasgian race which principally gave ^Eschyi. 
 origin to the Greeks, and brought afterward under [Suppl.250. 
 the dominion of a Grecian colony, that country ^ g -] n 
 claimed always to be a part of Greece.* Its history 1.7. c.i. 
 however, as that of most other Grecian states, is al- 
 most only known through connexion with Athenian 
 history. Thucydides, who must have had superior 
 opportunity, appears to have been able to discover 
 little more than the genealogy of its kings, down- 
 ward from Perdiccas, who was ancestor in the seventh 
 degree to Alexander son of Amyntas, the reigning 
 prince at the time of the invasion of Greece under 
 Xerxes. 
 
 Thucydides and Herodotus agree in ascribing the Herodot. 
 foundation of the Macedonian monarchy to Per- ^hucyd 1 . 3 
 diccas ; but later writers have given the honour to a 1 - 2 - c - 99 - 
 prince whom they call Caranus, reckoning Perdiccas 
 his grandson. This addition to the pedigree of the 
 Macedonian kings cannot but appear utterly doubtful, 
 being opposed by the united authority of Herodotus 
 and Thucydides, almost within whose memory that 
 pedigree had been judiciously discussed at the Olym- 
 pian meeting. 7 Three brothers, according to Hero- 
 dotus, Heraclida? of the branch of Temenus, of whom 
 Gavanes was the eldest, and Perdiccas the youngest, 
 passed from Argos into Macedonia, where the latter 
 acquired the sovereignty ; and it seems not impro- 
 bable that the ingenuity of chronologers, with a little 
 
 * Macedonia is reckoned among the unquestioned parts of 
 Greece by Strabo, 1. 7. p. 465. 
 
 7 Thus the learned and generally judicious Henry Dodwell : 
 ' Tres illos reges Eusebianos rescindendos arbitror.' Annal. 
 Thucyd. ad ann. A. C. 454. 
 VOL. II. Y
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, alteration of the name, has converted the elder bro- 
 
 XIII 
 
 ther into the grandfather. 8 The founder of the 
 
 Macedonian royal family however was, according to 
 every account, an Argive, descended from Temenus 
 the Heraclidean, whence the princes of that family 
 were commonly called Temenidse. By a series of 
 Herodot. adventures, of which romantic reports only remain, 
 1.8. c. 137. jj e acquired command among the Macedonians; a 
 Pelasgian clan, who held the inland province of 
 jiEmathia, otherwise called Macedonia proper, to 
 the north of Thessaly, and then esteemed a part of 
 Thrace. 
 
 Schoi.ad The Macedonian name, according to fable, fabri- 
 liiad. ' ' 4 cated however apparently in a late age, had its origin 
 from Macedon, son of Jupiter and ^Ethria. What 
 led the followers of Perdiccas to assume it, and by 
 what wars or what policy they acquired extensive do- 
 minion, precise information fails ; but circumstances 
 whence to deduce some probable conjecture remain 
 reported. The innumerable clans who shared that 
 extensive continent, being in a state of perpetual 
 warfare among one another, the situation of the 
 Macedonians, when the Argive adventurers arrived 
 among them, might be such as to make them glad 
 to associate strangers, whose skill in arms and general 
 knowledge were superior. While civil and military 
 pre-eminence were therefore yielded to the new- 
 comers, and royalty became established in the family 
 of their chief, the name of the ancient inhabitants, 
 as the more numerous, remained. In the course of 
 six or seven reigns the Macedonians extended their 
 
 8 According to the chronologers, Caranus began to reign 814 
 years before the Christian era, and 36 before the first Olympiad ; 
 Perdiccas 729 years before the Christian era, in the fourth year 
 of the 12th Olympiad.
 
 MACEDONIA. 323 
 
 dominion over the neighbouring provinces of Pieria, Thueyd. 
 Bottiasa, Mygdonia, part of Pasonia, Eordia, Almopia, st?ab?'"' 
 Anthemous, Grestonia, and Bisaltia; all, together |; d 7 ' o p j 468 ' 
 with yEmathia or Macedonia proper, forming what 
 acquired the name of Lower Macedonia, which ex- 
 tended from mount Olympus to the river Strymon. 
 The people of some of these provinces were exter- 
 minated-, of some extirpated ; some were admitted to 
 the condition of subjects, and many probably reduced 
 to slavery. The expelled Pierians established them- 
 selves in Thrace, at the foot of mount Pangaeus ; the 
 Bottiaeans found a settlement nearer their former 
 home, in a tract on the border of Chalcidice, which 
 Thucydides distinguishes by the name of Bottica. Thucyd. 
 Lyncestis and Elimiotis, with some other inland and c ".ioi. 
 mountainous provinces, under the government of 
 princes, in the manner of feudatories, acknowledging 
 the sovereignty of the Macedonian kings, became 
 known by the name of Upper Macedonia. 
 
 While wars almost unceasing with savage neigh- 
 bours, and frequent rebellions of conquered subjects, 
 prevented the progress of civilisation among the Ma- 
 cedonians, the weakness of the prince and the wants 
 of the people concurred to encourage Grecian esta- 
 blishments on the coast ; of which however the prin- 
 cipal, those of Chalcidice and the three peninsulas, 
 had been made probably before the Macedonian king- 
 dom had acquired any considerable extent. But in 
 so little estimation was Macedonia held by the Greeks 
 at the time of the Persian wars, that when, in his 
 father's lifetime, Alexander son of Amyntas offered 
 himself as a competitor for the prize of the stadion 
 at the Olympian games, it was objected to him that 
 he was a barbarian. The prince however producing 
 testimony that he was not only a Greek, but a He-
 
 32 i HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, raclidean of the race of Temenus, and this being 
 xiir 
 
 ' admitted by the Hellanotics, and approved by the 
 
 assembly, that illustrious origin of the royal family 
 
 Herod, i. 5. of Macedonia, fully acknowledged by both Herodotus 
 
 1. 9. c. 45. and Thucydides, was, among all the invectives of the 
 
 i.2 U cf99.& Grecian orators in aftertimes, never disputed. 9 Tht 
 
 H 5 rod 8 marr ^ a g e f Gygaea, sister of Alexander, with Bubaris, 
 
 i.5.c.2i.& a Persian of high rank, contributed to the security 
 
 Justin. ' of the Macedonian kingdom when Xerxes invaded 
 
 i. 7. c. 3. Greece. Alexander was a prince of considerable 
 
 ability, improved by communication both with Greeks 
 
 and Persians ; but after the retreat of Xerxes he had 
 
 so many wars to sustain against the neighbouring 
 
 barbarians that, though generally successful, he had 
 
 little leisure for attending to the advancement of 
 
 arts and knowledge among his people. 
 
 Long before the establishment of the Athenian 
 sovereignty over the islands and coast of the ^Egean, 
 there had been friendly connexion between the com- 
 monwealth and the Macedonian kings ; and in conse- 
 quence, at the time of the Persian invasion, Alexander 
 son of Amyntas, as it has been before observed, was 
 esteemed the hereditary guest of Athens. While he 
 Herodot. lived the friendly connexion seems not to have been 
 
 1.8. c.136. . . J . , , . 
 
 interrupted or impaired by any acquisition or sove- 
 reignty to the commonwealth extending over towns 
 which might be esteemed within Macedonia. Alii 
 ance with the republic seems to have passed as an 
 
 9 Demosthenes, among other illiberal language, adapted to 
 excite his audience against the great Philip, would call that 
 prince a barbarian, ^schines called Demosthenes a barbarian, 
 and showed his ground for it ; but Demosthenes has not ven- 
 tured an attempt to show any for his imputation : he has merely 
 thrown out the ugly nickname to the Athenian populace, for 
 the chance of the vogue it might obtain, and the effect it might 
 produce.
 
 WAR OF ATHENS WITH MACEDONIA. 3*25 
 
 inheritance to his son and successor Perdiccas, who SECT. 
 
 IV 
 
 had been honoured with adoption to the citizenship of ' 
 
 Athens, for merit with the Greek nation, in defeat- 
 ing a division of the Persian army, which, after the 
 battle of Plataea, retreated from Greece under Ar- 
 tabazus. 
 
 But differences afterward arose. One of the prin- 
 cipalities of Upper Macedonia was the appanage of 1>2> c ' 100t 
 Philip, younger brother of Perdiccas, and another 
 was the inheritance of Derdas, a prince more distantly 
 related to the royal family. About the time of the 
 Corcyrsean war, Perdiccas proposing to deprive both 
 his brother and his cousin of their commands, the 
 Athenian administration thought proper to take those 
 princes under its protection, and support them against 
 the intended injury. Perdiccas resented this as a 
 breach of the ancient alliance ; and perhaps he was, 
 not without reason, jealous of the ambition of the 
 Athenian people. The authority and influence of 
 the two princes however were so considerable that 
 to attack them, while they could be supported by the 
 power of the Athenian commonwealth, would have 
 been hazardous : but the circumstances of the times 
 offered a resource suited to the genius of the Mace- 
 donian king ; who, not possessing all his father's 
 virtues, was not without abilities. The Athenians 
 had just taken a decided part in the Corcyraean war. 
 The hostile disposition of Corinth toward them was 
 in consequence avowed ; that a similar disposition 
 prevailed in Lacedaemon was well known ; and op- 
 portunity occurred for intrigue, which would pro- 
 bably involve the Athenian commonwealth in war, 
 with Corinth immediately, and ultimately with La- 
 cedaemon. Thus invited, Perdiccas, ambitious, active, 
 crafty, and unrestrained by any principle of integrity, 
 
 Y 3
 
 326 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, (so the historian, describing only his conduct, marks 
 
 his character,) determined to persevere in his purpose. 
 
 The town of Potidaea, critically situated on the 
 isthmus which connects the fruitful peninsula of Pal- 
 lene with Macedonia where it bordered on Thrace, 
 was a Corinthian colony ; so far still dependent upon 
 the mother-country as to receive magistrates annually 
 thence, and yet, such were the complicated interests 
 of the Grecian republics, tributary allies of Athens. 
 Perdiccas sent an offer to Corinth to assist in re- 
 covering Potidaea from the Athenian dominion. At 
 the same time he sent to Lacedaemon a proposal to 
 become a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy. 
 Meanwhile he negotiated not only with the Potidaeans, 
 but also with the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, subjects 
 of Athens in his neighbourhood, to induce them to 
 revolt. 
 
 The Athenian government, informed of these trans- 
 actions, and aware of the hostile disposition of Corinth, 
 judged immediate precaution necessary for the pre- 
 servation of their command on the northern shores 
 of the ^Egean. A squadron of thirty ships of war 
 was already preparing in the port of Piraeus, to be 
 accompanied by a thousand heavy-armed infantry, 
 for the support of the Macedonian princes, Philip 
 and Derdas. According to that despotic authority 
 which the Athenian people assumed over the Grecian 
 Thucyd. states of their alliance, peremptory orders were sent 
 fcf? to the Potidaeans to demolish their fortifications on 
 the side of Pallene, to give hostages for security of 
 their fidelity, and to send away their Corinthian ma- 
 gistrates and receive no more. The Potidaeans, afraid 
 to dispute, yet very averse to obey, sent ministers to 
 c.58. Athens requesting a recal or a mitigation of these 
 commands ; but at the same time, in common with
 
 REVOLT OF CHALCIDICE. 327 
 
 the Corinthians, they communicated privately with SECT. 
 Sparta, soliciting protection, if the Athenians should 
 persevere in their requisition. From the Athenian 
 people no remission was obtained. The leading men 
 in the Spartan administration 10 promised that, if the 
 Athenians attempted to enforce their commands by 
 arms, a Peloponnesian army should invade Attica. 
 The Potidseans communicated with the Chalcidians 
 and Bottiaeans ; a league was formed and ratified in 
 the usual manner by oaths, and all revolted together. 
 Ample assurance remains that the command of the 
 Athenian people over their subject states, always arbi- 
 trary, was often very oppressive ; but, as accounts of 
 the times have reached us mostly from Athenian 
 writers, particulars have been transmitted almost only 
 when the circumstances have been extraordinary. By 
 an Athenian writer however information is afforded of 
 the measure next resorted to by the Chalcidians ; and, 
 under the foreseen necessity for such a measure, it 
 must apparently have been a galling oppression that 
 could induce a people to revolt. The lands of their 
 rich peninsula would be open to ravage from the 
 Athenian fleet, decidedly commanding the jEgean 
 sea. Its produce then not only would be lost to 
 them, but would assist the enemy to carry on the 
 war against them. Founded on this view an extra- 
 
 o 
 
 ordinary proposal was made to them by the king of 
 Macedonia : that they should destroy all their sea- 
 port towns, except Olynthus, which should be made 
 their one strong place ; and that all their people, beyond 
 what the defence of that city might require, aban- 
 doning their lands, should remove, with their families, 
 to a fruitful territory, which he would assign them, 
 
 10 Ta TC'AVJ rSv 
 
 Y 4
 
 328 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, about the lake Bolbe in Mygdonia ; by the cultiva- 
 
 ' tion of which they might subsist till the war should 
 
 be over. Severe as the sacrifice must have been, the 
 
 Chalcidians accepted the offer, and the measure, at 
 
 least in great part, was executed. 
 
 Thucyd. These transactions were yet unknown at Athens, 
 
 &59. when the armament intended for Macedonia sailed 
 under the command of Archestratus. His instruc- 
 tions directed him to go first to Potidsea, and see the 
 orders of the Athenian government executed there ; 
 then to take any measures that might appear ex- 
 pedient for preventing revolt in any other towns in 
 that neighbourhood of the Athenian dominion or 
 alliance ; terms apparently equivocal, or nearly so, 
 as applied to those towns ; and not, till these were 
 secured, to prosecute the proposed operations in Ma- 
 cedonia. On his arrival in Chalcidice, finding the 
 revolt already complete, he judged his force insuf- 
 ficient for any effectual measures there, and he there- 
 fore turned immediately toward Macedonia, to favour 
 a projected invasion of the inland frontier of that 
 kingdom by the king's brother, Philip. 
 
 c,40.&60. Meanwhile the Corinthians, who had dissuaded 
 war when the common cause of their confederacy 
 only had instigated, became vehement in the call to 
 arms when the particular interest of their own state 
 c. 69. 71. was endangered. No negotiation was proposed, no 
 &78 ' desire to have differences accommodated, according 
 to the stipulations of the existing treaty, was men- 
 tioned ; but while their ministers were everywhere 
 assiduously endeavouring to excite alarm and indig- 
 nation among their allies, they prepared themselves 
 immediately to assert their cause by force. Sixteen 
 hundred heavy-armed and four hundred light-armed 
 troops, partly volunteers of Corinth, partly engaged
 
 WAR OF ATHENS WITH CORINTH. 329 
 
 for hire among other states of Peloponnesus, were SECT. 
 sent to Potidaea, under Aristeus son of Adimantus, ' 
 
 who had particular connexions with that colony, and 
 was esteemed there : and, so much diligence was 
 used in the equipment, it was only the fortieth day 
 after the revolt (the contemporary historian's term) 
 when they arrived. 
 
 The Athenians, on receiving intelligence of these Thucyd. 
 proceedings of the Corinthian government, sent Cal- u> c ' 61 ' 
 lias son of Calliades, with forty triremes and two 
 thousand heavy-armed, to join the little army under 
 Archestratus. That army, with the assistance of its 
 Macedonian confederates, had already taken Therme 
 and was besieging Pydna, when Callias arrived. The 
 business of the revolted colonies being deemed of 
 more importance than the prosecution of hostilities, 
 however successful, against Perdiccas, proposals were 
 made to that prince. As he was not himself scru- 
 pulous, so apparently he had little confidence in any 
 treaty with any of the republics. Views to present 
 advantage prompting, not peace only between him 
 and the Athenian republic, but a treaty of alliance 
 was hastily concluded, in which, rather in opposition 
 to his views, some care apparently was taken of the 
 interests of his brother and the other revolted princes ; 
 the interest of Athens so requiring. The whole 
 Athenian force, and a considerable body of allied 
 infantry, with the valuable addition of six hundred 
 Macedonian horse, sent by Philip, then marched for 
 Potidaea. These particulars, otherwise little in- 
 teresting, are important, together with those which 
 follow, toward a just understanding of the policy of 
 the Grecian republics in the times of their greatest 
 celebrity. 
 
 Perdiccas held his engagement with the Athenians
 
 3-30 
 
 CHAP. 
 .XIII. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1.1. c.62. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1. 1. c. 63. 
 
 c.64. 
 
 c. 65. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 no longer than to serve a present purpose. Possibly 
 some gross insolence of the Athenian government, 
 which the contemporary historian would prudently 
 avoid to notice, offended him ; for often those who 
 best know can least properly or safely declare poli- 
 tical truths. So complete however was his tergi- 
 versation that he sent two hundred horse to join the 
 army of the Corinthians and their allies. In this 
 confederate army then it was necessary to establish, 
 by common consent, some system of command. It 
 may seem that the Macedonian king, in this new 
 choice of republican allies, was again disappointed ; 
 though perhaps the course taken by those republicans 
 was that of prudence and reason. By election Ari- 
 steus, general of the Corinthian forces, was appointed 
 commander-in-chief of the infantry, and Perdiccas of 
 the cavalry. The Macedonian prince, apparently 
 little satisfied with the compliment, deputed his 
 general lolaus to execute the office. The Athenian 
 army soon after approaching, an action ensued, in 
 which Aristeus, with a chosen body, performing the 
 duty more of a brave soldier than of an able general, 
 for so the custom of war seems to have required, 
 broke and pursued a part of the enemy's line, while 
 the rest completely routed his remaining army, and 
 drove the survivors for refuge within the walls of 
 Potidaea. Callias, the Athenian general, was killed : 
 but Aristeus, returning from pursuit, not without 
 difficulty and loss, by a hazardous effort, joined his 
 defeated troops in the town. The Athenian army 
 sat down before it, and, being soon after re-enforced 
 with sixteen hundred men under Phormion, block- 
 aded it by land and sea. 
 
 Aristeus, who, if error in the battle should be 
 imputed to him, appears nevertheless to 'have been a
 
 WAR OF ATHENS WITH CORINTH. 331 
 
 man of considerable abilities, as well as daring courage SECT. 
 and indefatigable activity, having regulated things 
 within the place in the best manner for sustaining 
 the siege, found means to pass out of the harbour 
 in a vessel unnoticed by the Athenian guard-ships. 
 Going himself to Olynthus, to take the command of 
 the allied forces there, he hastened dispatches to 
 Peloponnesus with information of what had passed, 
 and pressing for a re-enforcement, without which 
 Potidaea, he said, could not be saved ; for Phormion 
 was now so superior that, after having completed a 
 contravallation against the place, he could spare a 
 part of his army to ravage Chalcidice and the Bot- 
 tiaean territory, where he took some smaller towns. 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 Assembly of deputies of the Peloponnesian confederacy at Lace- 
 dcemon : the thirty years' truce declared broken. Second 
 assembly : war with Athens resolved. Embassies from Lace- 
 dcemon to Athens. Final rejection of the proposals from 
 JLacedcemon by the Athenians. 
 
 IT is from the account, remaining from Thucy- 
 dides, of that complicated and lasting war, to which 
 the affairs just related immediately led, that we de- 
 rive our best knowledge of the political and military 
 state of Greece, with much collateral information 
 concerning science, arts, and manners during the 
 period most interesting ; that remarkable period, 
 when the leading Grecian commonwealths had a 
 political importance in the affairs of the world, beyond 
 all proportion to their natural strength, and when 
 science and art arose among them to a splendour 
 totally unknown in preceding ages, and never in all 
 points equalled since. If therefore, in following the 
 steps of that able writer, we meet with circumstances
 
 332 
 
 CHAP. 
 XIII. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1.1. c.67. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 which on first view appear little ; if armies engaged 
 are not numerous ; if the affairs of single towns, and 
 sometimes of small ones, occupy some space in nar- 
 ration ; it must not be concluded that the subject is 
 trifling, since those apparently little matters are con- 
 nected with consequences among the most important 
 that occur in the history of mankind. 
 
 Of those Greeks who were not held in subjection, 
 the Corinthians appear to have been most affected by 
 the rising power of Athens. Their commerce was 
 checked, and their colonial dependencies, not abso- 
 lutely taken from them, were however compelled to 
 acknowledge a degree of sovereignty in the Athenian 
 people, and to pay a tribute ; originally, and still no- 
 minally, for common purposes of Greece, but more 
 really for the particular benefit of Athens. The 
 irritation excited by the check given, in former wars, 
 to the ambition of those adverse to the Athenian su- 
 premacy, and particularly by the loss of friends and 
 relations in the unfortunate action in which Myro- 
 nides commanded against them, was thus kept alive, 
 and the Corinthians nourished the sharpest animosity 
 against the Athenians. When therefore intelligence 
 came from Aristeus of the transactions in Chalcidice, 
 far from remitting their ardour for war, the Corinthians 
 applied themselves with increased sedulity to excite 
 their whole confederacy, and especially Lacedasmon, 
 to take up their cause : * The truce,' they exclaimed, 
 
 * was already broken, and Peloponnesus insulted and 
 
 * injured.' At the same time the JEginetans, who 
 bore most impatiently their subjection to Athens, 
 yet feared to make any open demonstration of a dis- 
 position to revolt, complained, by secret negotiation 
 among the Peloponnesian states, of the dependency 
 in which they were held, contrary, as they contended,
 
 PELOPONNESIAN CONGRESS. 333 
 
 to the treaty ; and they redoubled their importunity SECT. 
 as they found a growing disposition to that hostility 
 which would favour their cause. Thus instigated, 
 the Lacedaemonians at length convoked the usual 
 assembly of deputies from the states of their confe- 
 deracy; and they invited the attendance of ministers 
 from any other Grecian republics which might have 
 any complaint to prefer against Athens. 
 
 The detail remaining from Thucydides of the 
 debates and negotiations which followed afford so 
 much insight into the politics, the political manners, 
 and the temper of Greece at the time, that, with the 
 risk of some appearance of uncouthness to the modern 
 reader, I shall venture to report the more material 
 parts without abridgment, and with the least deviation 
 that may be from the expression of the original. The 
 deputies of the confederacy, or a large proportion of Thucyd. 
 them (for it appears to have been not a full meeting) 
 being arrived at Sparta, the general assembly of the 
 Lacedemonian people was convened. There hap- 
 pened to be present at the time ministers from Athens, c.72. 
 commissioned on some other public business, and 
 these were allowed to attend the audience. All 
 being met, proclamation was made, according to the c.67. 
 custom of the Grecian assemblies, declaring per- 
 mission to speak on the subject for which the assembly 
 was convened. Many came forward exhibiting various 
 complaints against the Athenian government, mostly 
 little important or doubtfully founded, excepting 
 those of the Megarians and Corinthians. The former 
 urged that, contrary to existing treaty, they were, by 
 a decree of the Athenian people, prohibited all com- 
 mercial intercourse by land with Attica, and excluded 
 from all ports within the Athenian dominion. The 
 Corinthians reserved themselves, till the others should
 
 334- HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, have prepared the minds of the Lacedaemonian people 
 
 ' for warmer instigation, and then spoke nearly thus : 
 Thucyd. ' That strict faith, Lacedaemonians, which cha- 
 
 1. 1. c. 68. < racterises your conduct in public and in private 
 ' affairs, inclines you to disregard accusations against 
 
 * others ; and hence indeed you obtain the just praise 
 ' of moderation and equity, but you remain ignorant 
 ' of the transactions of foreign states. Often we have 
 
 * forewarned you of the wrongs which the Athenians 
 
 * were preparing for us ; but not till there was actual 
 
 * war, and we had already suffered, would you sum- 
 
 * mon this assembly of our confederacy, in which we 
 
 * have perhaps more cause than others to come for- 
 
 * ward, injured as we have been by the Athenians, 
 
 * and neglected by you. Not that we alone are in- 
 
 * terested : all Greece is concerned ; many states being 
 
 * already reduced to subjection, and others notoriously 
 
 * threatened ; among which some, from treaties of 
 
 * alliance, have especial claim to our protection. Cor- 
 
 * cyra, capable of furnishing a fleet superior to that 
 
 * of any republic of our confederacy, is already taken 
 
 * from us ; and Potidaea, our most important post for 
 
 * holding dominion or carrying on commerce in 
 
 * Thrace, is at this time besieged. 
 
 c-69 - * Nor can we avoid saying that these injuries, 
 
 * which we have thus suffered, are in great measure 
 
 * to be imputed to you. After the Persian war, you 
 
 * permitted the Athenians to fortify their city ; then 
 
 * to build their long walls ; and still you have con- 
 
 * tinued to look on, though boasting to be vindicators 
 
 * of the freedom of Greece, while they have deprived 
 f of freedom, not only their own, but our confede- 
 ' rates. Even now the convention of this assembly 
 ' has been with difficulty obtained ; and even now we 
 
 * meet apparently not for the purpose which ought
 
 PELOPONNESIAN CONGRESS. 335 
 
 1 to be the object of our consideration. For is this SECT. 
 ' a time to inquire whether we have been injured ? 
 
 * No, rather how we shall repel injury. You have 
 
 * the reputation of being provident and circumspect ; 
 
 * but facts do dot justify the opinion. The Persians, 
 ' we know, came against Peloponnesus from the 
 
 * farthest parts of the earth before you had made any 
 
 * adequate preparation for defence ; and now you are 
 
 * equally remiss against the Athenians in your neigh- 
 ' bourhood. Thus, as the barbarian failed principally 
 
 * through his own misconduct, so their errors, and 
 
 * not your support, have enabled us hitherto to main- 
 1 tain ourselves against the Athenians. Let it not 
 
 * however be imagined that this expostulation is 
 
 * prompted by resentment ; we expostulate with our 
 c friends who err ; we criminate our enemies who 
 
 * injure us. 
 
 * But you seem unaware what kind of people the xhucyd. 
 ' Athenians are, and how totally they differ from you. L ' c-70> 
 
 * They are restless projectors, and quick to execute 
 ' their projects. You are ever bent upon the pre- 
 
 * servation of what you possess ; averse to new mea- 
 
 * sures, and in execution, even of those necessary, 
 
 * deficient. They, again, are daring above their 
 ' strength, adventurous even beyond their own opi- 
 
 * nion of prudence, and full of hope in the midst of 
 
 * misfortune. It is your disposition always to do less 
 ' than your power admits, to hesitate even when act- 
 
 * ing on the surest grounds, and to think yourselves 
 ' never free from danger. They are quick, you di- 
 
 * latory ; they fond of roaming, you more than all 
 ' others attached to your home ; they eager to make 
 
 * acquisitions in any distant parts ; you fearful, in 
 
 * seeking more, to injure what you already possess. 
 
 * They push victory to the utmost, and are least of
 
 336 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. ' all men dejected by defeat ; exposing their bodies 
 " * for their country, as if they had no interest in them, 
 
 yet applying their minds in the public service, as if 
 
 * that and their private interest were one. Disap- 
 
 * pointment of a proposed acquisition they consider 
 
 * as loss of what already belonged to them ; success in 
 
 * any pursuit they esteem only a step toward farther 
 
 * advantages ; and, defeated in any attempt, they 
 
 * turn immediately to some new project by which to 
 
 * make themselves amends : insomuch that, through 
 
 * their celerity in executing whatever they propose, 
 t they seem to have the peculiar faculty of at the 
 
 * same time hoping and possessing. Thus they con- 
 
 * tinue ever, amid labours and dangers, enjoying no- 
 
 * thing through sedulity to acquire ; esteeming that 
 4 only a time of festival in which they are prosecuting 
 
 * their projects ; and holding rest as a greater evil 
 
 * than the most laborious business. To sum up their 
 ' character, it may be truly said, that they were born 
 
 * neither to enjoy quiet themselves, nor to suffer 
 ' others to enjoy it. 
 
 Thucyd. * When such a commonwealth is adverse to you, 
 
 1.1. c.7i. < Lacedaemonians, you still delay. You will consider 
 
 * those only as your enemies who avow hostility ; 
 
 * thinking to preserve peace through your antiquated 
 ' maxims of policy and equity, defending yourselves, 
 
 * but offending none ; which are no longer fit for 
 
 * these times. It has been by other maxims, by new 
 
 * arts, and by a policy refined through modern ex- 
 
 * perience, that Athens has risen to a greatness which 
 ' now threatens us all. Let this then be the term 
 
 * of your dilatoriness : give at length that assistance 
 4 to your allies which, by the stipulations of our con- 
 
 * federacy, you owe them, and relieve the distressed 
 ' Potidseans. This can no longer be effectually done
 
 PELOPONNESIAN CONGRESS. 337 
 
 f but by an immediate invasion of Attica ; the mea- SECT. 
 
 AT" 
 
 * sure necessarily to be taken, unless you would leave ' 
 ' a friendly and kindred people a prey to your most 
 
 * determined enemies, and compel us, disposed by 
 
 * every consideration of interest, affection, and habit 
 
 * to maintain our connexion with you, through de- 
 
 * spair to seek some new alliance. Consult then your 
 
 * own interest, and do not diminish that supremacy 
 
 * in Peloponnesus, which your forefathers have trans- 
 
 * mitted to you.' 
 
 The Athenian ministers judged it consonant neither Thucyd. 
 to the dignity of their commonwealth, nor to the 1 - 1 - c - 72 - 
 commission under which they acted, to answer par- 
 ticularly to the charges thus urged by the deputies 
 of the Peloponnesian confederacy before the Lace- 
 daemonian people ; yet they thought it not proper, 
 on such an occasion, to be entirely silent. They 
 applied therefore to the ephors for leave to address 
 the assembly, which was allowed n , and they spoke to 
 the following purpose : * They considered themselves/ c .?3. 
 they said, ' not at all in presence of those who had 
 ' any right to assume cognisance of the conduct of 
 
 * the Athenian commonwealth or of its allies ; yet as 
 ' they had been so publicly witnesses to so virulent 
 
 * an invective against those in whose service they were 
 
 * commissioned, they thought it proper to admonish 
 
 * the assembly not to determine lightly and hastily 
 ' concerning a matter of very great moment.' Having 
 
 then mentioned the merit of the Athenian people Ci73 . & 74 . 
 with all Greece in the two Persian invasions, and 
 the sense which the Lacedaemonians themselves at 
 
 1 HpocreXOovTet; ovv TO?*; AaKe^at^ovion; e<fa.(ra.v |9ovAecr0a< KOU avrol e$ 
 TO wXyOo; avrSv clirew. Oum igitur ad Lacedcemoniorum magis- 
 trates accessissent. This translation is justified by the context, 
 and by other passages of the author. 
 
 VOL. II. Z
 
 338 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 the time expressed of it, they proceeded to observe 
 
 M U T75 *^ at ' ^ e comman d f the Athenian people among 
 
 * the Grecian states had been acquired, not by vio- 
 ' lence, but by the dereliction of the Lacedemonians, 
 ' and by the consent, and even at the solicitation, of 
 
 * the subordinate republics : that they had a fair inte- 
 
 * rest in so glorious a possession, so honourably earned, 
 
 * which their reputation, not less than the advantages 
 
 * of command, would urge them to maintain ; and 
 
 * that even their just apprehensions forbade them to 
 
 * relinquish it, since the jealousy of the Lacedaemo- 
 ' nians, long apparent, and now especially evident in 
 
 * the transaction of the present day, amply demon- 
 
 * strated what would be their danger in surrendering 
 c. 76. & 77. * the smallest portion of their present power.' They 
 
 then endeavoured to palliate, but they were indeed 
 equally unable to deny as to justify, the general 
 despotism of the Athenian people over their subject- 
 c- 78. states, and the particular measures of severity which 
 had been taken against some of them. In conclusion 
 they asserted, that the truce was not broken by them, 
 neither had they yet to complain that the Lacedae- 
 monians had broken it. They exhorted therefore 
 perseverance in peaceful measures ; they claimed for 
 their commonwealth the justice to which it was en- 
 titled by the stipulations of the existing treaty, which 
 directed a mode of judicial proceeding for the deter- 
 mination of disputes that might arise ; and they de- 
 clared themselves, in the name of their commonwealth, 
 ready to abide judgment accordingly. ' Should the 
 ' Lacedaemonians determine to refuse such justice, 
 4 they submitted their cause to the gods, who had 
 
 * been invoked to attest the treaty, and their com- 
 
 * monwealth would defend itself and its just command 
 ' to the utmost.'
 
 PELOPONNESIAN CONGRESS. 339 
 
 When the Athenians had concluded, the foreign Thucyd. 
 ministers were required to withdraw, and it remained 
 for the Lacedaemonians to debate and to decide upon 
 the question. Thucydides, in his exile, as himself 1.5. c.26. 
 informs us, had opportunities, not open to many 
 foreigners, for acquiring information concerning the 
 internal transactions of the Lacedaemonian state. 
 The greater number of speakers, as he proceeds to 1.1. c.79. 
 relate, declared their opinion that the Athenians had 
 already broken the truce, and that war should be 
 immediately commenced. Archidamus then came 
 forward ; the prince who above thirty years before 
 had deserved so well of his country by his conduct 
 in the Helot rebellion. In advanced age now, he 
 maintained, the historian says, the reputation of a 
 wise and temperate man 12 , and he addressed the 
 assembly thus : * I, Lacedaemonians, have had ex- c.so. 
 
 * perience of many wars, and I see those among you, 
 
 * my equals in age, who will not, as happens to many 
 ' through inexperience, urge war as in itself desirable, 
 ' or in its consequences certain. Within Pelopon- 
 
 * nesus indeed, against bordering states, when hostili- 
 
 * ties arise, decision may be quick ; and, the forces 
 
 * on both sides being the same in kind, the prepon- 
 
 * derancy of one or the other may be a subject of 
 
 * calculation. But the war now proposed is widely 
 
 * different : operations are to be carried far from our 
 ' frontier, against those whose fleets command the 
 ' seas, who are superior to every Grecian state in 
 
 * wealth, population, and forces, cavalry as well as 
 ' infantry, and who besides have under their dominion 
 
 * many tributary allies. In our present unprepared 
 
 * situation, to what do we trust for success in attack- 
 ' ing such an enemy ? To our fleet ? No ; we are too
 
 340 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, 'inferior. To our riches? Far less: neither our public 
 
 XIII 
 
 ' treasure nor our private wealth can bear any com- 
 parison with theirs. We are superior, it is said, in 
 Thucyd. ' the force of infantry of our confederacy, and we 
 
 * will ravage their country. But they have large 
 
 * possessions far beyond the reach of your infantry, 
 ' and a fleet that will come and go with the produce, 
 ' undisturbed by any force you can oppose to it, while 
 ' your irresistible infantry will starve amid the de- 
 
 * vastation itself has made. Instead therefore of 
 ' bringing your enemy immediately to terms by such 
 
 * measures, I rather fear you will leave the war as an 
 ' inheritance to your posterity. 
 
 c.82. ' Let it not however be imagined that I advise to 
 
 * suffer tamely the oppression of our allies, or to leave 
 
 * designs against ourselves unnoticed till the moment 
 
 * of execution. Let us, on the contrary, prepare for 
 ' war ; let us endeavour to extend our alliances, even 
 
 * among barbarous nations, if either naval or pecu- 
 
 * niary assistance can be obtained from them ; let us 
 
 * also contribute liberally from our private properties 
 ' to form a public fund equal to the probable need. 
 ' But in the mean time let an embassy be sent to 
 ' Athens ; and, if our reasonable demands are com- 
 ' plied with, our business will thus have its best con- 
 
 * elusion. In all events however, till we are fully 
 
 * prepared for war, let their country remain unhurt. 
 ' It is a pledge always ready to our hands, the value 
 
 * of which we should not wantonly diminish. 
 
 c. 83. ' Nor let it be supposed that the delay, which I 
 
 * advise, will mark any pusillanimity. War is a busi- 
 
 * ness less of arms than of expense, which alone can 
 
 * make arms efficacious 13 ; especially in the contest 
 
 v ETTv o 
 
 06% otrXuv TO irXeov, XX 
 
 , Si'
 
 PELOPONNESIAN CONGRESS. 341 
 
 of a continental with a maritime people. Money SECT. 
 therefore must in the first place be provided. As _ ' 
 
 * for that slowness and dilatoriness with which you Thucyd. 
 
 * have heard yourselves upbraided, they flow from & 35? ' 
 
 * those institutions of our ancestors, which teach us, 
 
 * in public as in private life, to be modest, prudent, 
 
 * and just. Hence it is our character to be, less than 
 1 all others, either elated by prosperity or dejected 
 
 * by misfortune : hence we are neither to be allured 
 
 * by the flattery which we have been hearing, nor 
 
 * irritated by the reproach : hence we are at the same 
 
 * time warlike and circumspect ; and hence we shall 
 
 * not be disposed to utter sounding words against our 
 
 * enemies, when we are unable to follow them up by 
 
 * deeds. 
 
 * Let us not then wander from those maxims and 
 
 * institutions of our forefathers, through which our 
 ' state has long flourished great and free, and beyond 
 
 * all others glorious : nor let us hurry, in one short 
 
 * portion of a day, to a decision which must involve 
 
 * with it the lives of many individuals, the fortunes 
 
 * of many families, the fate of many cities, and our 
 
 * own glory. Other states may be under necessity 
 
 * of taking measures hastily : our strength gives us 
 
 * the option of leisure. Since then the Athenians 
 
 * profess themselves ready to submit the subjects of 
 
 * complaint to a legal decision, it appears little con- 
 ' sonant to justice to proceed against those, as de- 
 1 cidedly criminal, who offer themselves for trial. Let 
 ' your determination therefore be to send an embassy 
 to Athens, but meanwhile to prepare for war. Thus, 
 ' more than by any other measure, you will be for- 
 midable to your adversaries ; and thus you will best 
 consult both your advantage and your honour.' 
 
 The effect, which this sensible and dispassionate c.ae. 
 z 3
 
 342 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, discourse should have had, was overborne by the fol- 
 tIL lowing blunt speech of the ephor Sthenelaidas : * The 
 
 * verbose oratory of the Athenians I do not under- 
 ' stand. They have been large in their own praise, 
 
 * but their injurious conduct toward our allies, and 
 
 * toward Peloponnesus, they have not denied. If 
 ' their behaviour formerly against the Persians was 
 ' praiseworthy, and is now against us the reverse, 
 
 * they deserve double punishment ; for ceasing to be 
 
 * meritorious, and for becoming blameworthy. We 
 
 * have not yet changed our conduct ; and if we are 
 
 * wise, we shall not now overlook the wrong done to 
 
 * our allies, nor delay to revenge it. Others have 
 
 * money, and ships, and horses : we have good allies, 
 
 * who ought not to be abandoned to the Athenians. 
 
 * Nor are such disputes to be determined by words 
 
 * and legal process. It has not been by words that 
 
 * our allies have been injured. We must therefore 
 
 * avenge them quickly, and with our utmost force ; 
 
 * nor let any one persuade, that when we are injured 
 c we ought to deliberate. Those rather ought to 
 
 * take long time for deliberation who mean to com- 
 
 * mit injury. Let your determination therefore, La- 
 
 * ceda?monians, be, as becomes the dignity of Sparta, 
 
 * for war ; nor suffer the Athenians to increase in 
 
 * power, nor betray your allies, but, with the help of 
 
 * the gods, let us march against those who wrong us.' 
 Thucyd. Having thus spoken, Sthenelaidas proceeded, in 
 
 the function of his office, to put the question to the 
 assembly. A clamour being raised on each side, (for 
 in the Lacedaemonian assembly votes were given by 
 the voice, and not, as at Athens, by silently holding 
 up hands or by the perfect secrecy of a ballot), the 
 presiding ephor declared he could not distinguish 
 which had the majority. Thinking therefore, as
 
 PELOPONNESIAN CONGRESS. 343 
 
 Thucydides supposes, that the necessity of manifest- SECT. 
 ing more openly his party would urge every one the ' 
 rather to vote for war, he put the question again thus : 
 
 * Whoever is of opinion that the truce is broken, and 
 ' that the Athenians have been the aggressors, let 
 
 * him go to that side ; whoever is of a contrary opinion, 
 ' to the other side.' Upon the division, a large ma- 
 jority appeared for the affirmative. The deputies 
 of the allies, then called, were informed of the de- 
 termination, and farther told, that it was the wish 
 of the Lacedaemonians to have another meeting of 
 deputies from all the states of the confederacy, who 
 should come authorised and prepared to decide, both 
 concerning peace and war, and how the war, if re- 
 solved upon, should be carried on. With this the 
 congress broke up, and the deputies of the allies 
 hastened to their several homes. The Athenian mini- 
 sters waited to finish the business of their mission. 
 
 The Lacedaemonian government, the contemporary Thucyd. 
 historian says, was now determined for war; not 1>1 - c - 88 - 
 influenced so much by the representations of their 
 allies, as by their own apprehensions of the growing 
 power of the rival state. The Athenian dominion, 
 within Greece, had indeed been greatly contracted 
 by the conditions of the thirty years' truce, and by the 
 losses which led to it : but during fourteen years fol- 
 lowing, under the able administration of Pericles, it had 
 been gaining consistency : its force was now so beyond c. 122. 
 that of any other single state of Greece that not even 
 the extensive confederacy over which Lacedaemon 
 presided was, at the instant, in condition to begin 
 hostilities. To acquire a sanction therefore for their 
 undertaking, which might encourage those engaged 
 in it, they sent a solemn deputation to Delphi, to c. lie. 
 inquire of the god if they might hope for success. 
 
 z 4
 
 34>4f HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. According to report, (so Thucydides expresses him- 
 self, ) the god assured them that, if they carried on 
 
 * the war with becoming vigour, they would be vic- 
 
 * torious ; and that his favour should attend them, in- 
 
 * voked or uninvoked.' 
 
 Thucyd. Meanwhile the Corinthians were sedulous in can- 
 
 vassing the several states of the confederacy separately; 
 endeavouring to alarm their fears and excite their 
 indignation, and to promote by every imaginable 
 method the resolution for war. Accordingly, when 
 the congress met again at Lacedaemon, most of the 
 deputies were vehement in accusation of the Athe- 
 nians, and in requisition of the immediate commence- 
 ment of hostilities. The Corinthians, in pursuance 
 of their former policy, reserved themselves to the 
 last, and then spoke thus : 
 
 c.120. * We no longer, confederates, blame the Lace- 
 
 * dagmonians, who, having now resolved on war, have 
 ' summoned this assembly to desire its concurrence 
 ' in the resolution. Presiding over the confederacy, 
 
 * the general prosperity requires that they should pay 
 
 * due attention to their own particular situation and 
 
 * circumstances ; and hence arose their past delay ; 
 
 * while the honours we pay them, and the command 
 
 * with which they are invested, impose on them the 
 
 * duty of constantly consulting the welfare of the 
 ' whole ; and hence flows their present determination. 
 
 * It were needless, we are indeed persuaded, to ad- 
 
 * monish any of you, who have had any experience of 
 
 * the Athenians, how much it behoves us to be upon 
 
 * our guard against them ; but we will observe, that it 
 ' imports the people of the inland commonwealths to 
 
 * reflect that, unless they support the maritime states, 
 
 * not only they will be deprived of the many advan- 
 
 * tages which accrue, even to them, from maritime
 
 SECOND ASSEMBLY AT LACED^EMON. 345 
 
 commerce, but if they look on till we are subdued, SECT. 
 their subjection must follow. Ultimately thus we 
 
 are all equally interested in the matter on which we 
 
 * are going to decide ; differing more in regard to 
 ' the time when we may expect the evil to fall upon 
 ' us, than the degree in which it will affect us. 
 
 ' It is then to repel and to prevent injuries, and 
 
 ... . , Li. c. 121. 
 
 ' not with any ambitious view, that we are earnest 
 
 * for war. Our cause of complaint against the Athe- 
 
 * nians is ample : but when we have redressed our 
 
 * wrongs, peace will be our object. Nor have we 
 
 * reason to doubt of success. Our land force is 
 
 * greater than theirs, and in military skill we excel 
 ' them ; and surely a more unanimous zeal may be 
 ' expected in our confederacy than in theirs. They 
 
 * are strong at sea : but if we duly employ the means 
 ' which we severally possess, and add the wealth 
 ' which we may borrow from Delphi 14 and Olympia, 
 ' we can equal them even on that element. The 
 
 * offer of greater pay would entice the people of their 
 
 * alliance from their service ; for it is to be remem- 
 
 * bered, that the power of Athens consists more in a 
 
 * purchased than a native force ; whereas ours de- 
 
 * pends less upon our riches than upon ourselves. 
 
 * One naval victory would therefore probably com- 
 ' plete our business. Should that not immediately 
 ' be obtained, yet their maritime skill will soon cease 
 ' to give them any advantage, because ours will of 
 
 14 It appears from this passage and some following ones 
 (1. 1. c. 143. and 1. 2. c. 9.) that through some revolution, not 
 particularly mentioned by Thucydides, but probably a con- 
 sequence of the thirty years' truce, not only Delphi was again 
 brought under Lacedaemonian influence, but the Phocian people 
 were gained to the Lacedaemonian interest ; or, which would 
 operate to the same purpose, were put under oligarchal go- 
 vernment.
 
 346 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. course improve with increased experience. But, 
 _ * even without a superiority at sea, we possess abun- 
 
 * dant means to distress them ; among which we may 
 
 * reckon, as very important, the easy possibility of 
 
 * gaining their allies. 
 
 * It is however not our purpose to persuade you 
 
 * that the dispute before us resembles those which, 
 
 * for ages, have been common within Greece, of each 
 
 * republic with its neighbour, of nearly equal force, 
 
 * concerning the limits of their respective territories. 
 
 * On the contrary, it deserves your most serious con- 
 
 * sideration that the Athenians have attained a degree 
 .' of power to enable them to contend with us alto- 
 
 * gether ; and, what is disgraceful to Peloponnesus 
 ' even to mention, the question is, whether we shall 
 ' remain independent, or become their subjects. Our 
 
 * fathers were the vindicators of the freedom of 
 
 * Greece. We fall short indeed of their worth, if we 
 
 * cannot maintain our own freedom ; and, while we 
 
 * anxiously oppose the establishment of monarchy in 
 
 * any state, yet suffer an ambitious commonwealth to 
 
 * be tyrant over all. 15 
 
 Thucyd. < To undergo any labour and risk any danger, in a 
 
 * virtuous cause, hath been transmitted to us for an 
 
 * hereditary rule of conduct. Ill would it become us 
 ' now to deviate from it ; and, so much richer and 
 ' more powerful as we are than our forefathers, to 
 ' lose amid abundance what they gained in penury. 
 
 * Let us therefore cheerfully engage in a war which 
 
 * the god himself hath recommended, with even a 
 
 15 Tvpawov Se eapfv ejKaOea-rdvcn noXtv, c. 122. Thucydides after- 
 ward puts a similar expression into the[mouths bothof Pericles and 
 of Cleon, when speaking to the Athenian assembly, and having 
 in view something very different from reproach, 1. 2. c. 63. and 
 1. 3. C. 37.' Tvpxvvfta. e^ere ryv
 
 EMBASSIES FROM LACED^MON. 34<7 
 
 ' promise of his favour in it. All Greece will be with SECT. 
 
 * us ; and right is on our side ; as not only notorious 
 4 facts prove, but the god has declared. Nor let 
 
 * there be delay ; for be it remembered that the 
 
 * Potidaeans, Dorians, our kinsmen, are at this time 
 
 * besieged by an Ionian army. Let us therefore 
 
 * immediately take measures to reduce that proud 
 ' republic which is aiming at the tyranny of Greece, 
 ' that we may ourselves live in peace and independency, 
 
 * and that we may restore freedom to those Grecian 
 
 * states which are now so injuriously held in sub- 
 
 * jection.' 
 
 This speech concluding the debate, the question 
 was put, and war was the determination of the 
 majority. Notwithstanding however the clamour for 
 hastening hostilities, and notwithstanding even the 
 danger of delay after such a resolution so publicly 
 taken, it was presently found, so deficiently was the 
 confederacy yet prepared, that delay was unavoidable. 
 The leading men therefore recurred to negotiation, 
 in which they had three distinct purposes : to induce 
 the Athenians to suspend hostilities while their own 
 preparations should be advancing ; to strengthen 
 their own cause among the Grecian states, by making 
 the Athenians the refusers of offered peace ; and to 
 sow dissension among the Athenians themselves. 
 
 With these objects in view, ministers were sent to c.126. 
 Athens, commissioned to make representations con- 
 cerning a matter wholly foreign to every thing that 
 had been yet in dispute between the two republics, 
 and of no importance but what Grecian superstition 
 might give. Complete atonement, it was pretended, 
 had never been made for the sacrilege committed, 
 near a century before, when, under the direction of 
 the archon Megacles, the partisans of Cylon were
 
 348 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, taken from the altars to be executed. Many who 
 
 XIII . .... 
 
 now enjoyed the privileges of Athenian citizens, it 
 
 was urged, stood affected by that pollution ; which, 
 according to prevailing ideas of the age, adhered to 
 all the descendants of the sacrilegious. Lest there- 
 fore the contamination should bring down the ven- 
 geance of the gods of Greece in some general 
 calamity, the Lacedaemonians, as assertors of the 
 common welfare, required that all such persons 
 should be banished, and the pollution completely 
 expiated. This was intended as a blow principally 
 Thucyd. against Pericles, who, by his mother, was descended 
 1. 1. c. 127. f rom Megacles : not however with the expectation 
 that the requisition would produce his banishment ; 
 but with the hope that, through alarm to the popular 
 mind, some embarrassment might be created for the 
 administration. 
 
 Pericles however was not at a loss for a measure 
 to oppose to this. Two sacrilegious pollutions were 
 recollected, in which many of the principal families of 
 Lacedaemon were involved ; the death of Pausanias 
 who had been starved in the temple of Minerva 
 Chalcioeca, and the execution of some Helots who 
 had been dragged from the sanctuary of Neptune on 
 mount Taenarus. The latter was esteemed a pro- 
 fanation so grossly impious that popular superstition 
 attributed to it that tremendous calamity the great 
 earthquake of Sparta. It was therefore required of 
 the Lacedaemonian government to set the example 
 of regard for the welfare of Greece, and respect for 
 the gods its protectors, by removing all those who 
 were contaminated through either of those sacrileges. 
 With an answer to this purpose, the Lacedaemonian 
 ministers returned to Sparta, 
 c. 139. A second embassy arrived at Athens soon after,
 
 DEBATES AT ATHENS. 349 
 
 very differently instructed. As preliminaries to a SECT. 
 general peace, these ministers urged that the siege 
 of Potidsea ought to be raised, and ^Egina restored 
 to independency ; but chiefly they insisted, that the 
 prohibitory decree against Megara should be revoked ; 
 and, that only being done, they pledged themselves 
 that Lacedsemon would not commence hostilities. 
 The two first propositions, little insisted on, were 
 with little ceremony rejected. To the third it was 
 answered that * the Megarians had made themselves 
 
 * obnoxious to gods and men by cultivating the ex- 
 ' tralimitary land between the boundaries of Attica 
 ' and Megaris, which was consecrated to the Eleu- 
 
 * sinian goddesses I6 ; and that they received and 
 
 * encouraged Athenian runaway slaves/ With this 
 answer the second embassy returned to Sparta. Soon 
 after arrived a third, of three members, Rhamphias, 
 Melesippus, and Agesander ; probably men of more 
 eminence than the former ministers, Thucydides dis- 
 tinguishing only these by name. In their repre- 
 sentations they noticed none of the requisitions of 
 their predecessors, but they demanded, as the one 
 condition of peace, that all Grecian states held in 
 subjection by Athens be restored to independency. 
 
 An assembly of the people was then convened, 
 and it was proposed to consider of a decisive and final 
 answer. Many spoke, some urging war, some con- 
 tending for peace, and particularly insisting that the 
 offensive decree against Megara ought not to remain 
 
 ei; Tcepjaa-ia,v idle, Meyapevcri T^I; yys rq; tepS,^ KO,} 
 tys aopta-Tov. Megarensibus crimini dantzs quod sacrum nullis- 
 que limitibus Jinitum solum colerent. Land that was sacred; 
 land not marked out for culture. Smith. These interpretations 
 are totally unsatisfactory. The scholiast, who has not equally 
 evaded the difficulty, seems to warrant the sense ventured in 
 the text.
 
 350 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, an obstacle. At length Pericles ascending the bema 
 
 ' declared himself thus : 
 
 Tbucyd. ' * My opinion, Athenians, has been always, that 
 L i. c. 140. < we ought no t to su bmit to the Peloponnesians, and 
 
 * it remains the same ; sensible as I am that men sel- 
 
 * dom support a war throughout with the same ani- 
 4 mation with which they ordinarily begin it, but 
 
 * that, in disasters, even such as must in the course 
 
 * of things be expected, their spirits droop, and their 
 
 * opinions change. Beforehand therefore I claim, 
 
 * from those who agree with me in opinion now, to 
 
 * concur with me in effort whenever misfortune may 
 ' arise ; or else at once to renounce all pretension 
 ' to merit, should success attend our endeavours. 
 
 * With regard to the grounds of my opinion, the 
 
 * insidious designs of the Lacedaemonians against this 
 1 commonwealth have long been obvious, and are now 
 
 * become more than ever manifest. For, notwith- 
 ' standing that the articles of the existing treaty point 
 
 * out the manner in which disputes between the two 
 
 * states should be adjusted, declaring that in the mean 
 
 * time each party should hold what it possesses, yet 
 
 * not only they have not desired such adjustment, but 
 
 * they refuse to admit it. They are, in short, evi- 
 
 * dently enough determined to support their allega- 
 
 * tions against us, not by argument, but by arms : 
 ' they come to us, not accusing, but commanding : 
 
 * they require imperiously, that the siege of Potidaea 
 
 * shall be raised ; that .ZEgina shall be independent ; 
 ' that the decree against Megara shall be annulled ; 
 
 * and, now at last, that we shall renounce our com- 
 
 * mand over all Grecian states. Let it not be ima- 
 
 * gined that even the Megarian decree is too light a 
 ' matter to be supported as a cause for war. That 
 ' comparatively little matter has been proposed merely
 
 DEBATES AT ATHENS. 351 
 
 ' to try your steadiness. Were you to yield that SECT. 
 
 * point, a greater trial would quickly be imposed V- 
 
 * upon you : resisting that, you give them to under- 
 
 * stand that they must treat with you as equals, not 
 
 * command you as subjects. 
 
 * It behoves you therefore at once to resolve either Thucyd. 
 ' to submit to a state of dependency, without uselessly l ' l ' c ' 
 
 ' incurring the unavoidable evils of resistance, or, 
 ' what appears to me far preferable, to take arms 
 
 * with a determination to yield to no command, 
 
 * whether concerning a matter in itself of great or 
 ' of little moment, nor at any rate to hold what you 
 { possess in fear and under controul. For in the mo- 
 
 * ment in which you give up your right of judgment, 
 
 * and yield obedience to a command, however unim- 
 
 * portant the object of that command, your subjection 
 ' is decided. 
 
 * If then we cast our view upon the means of each 
 
 * party, we shall find ours not the unfavourable pro- 
 
 * spect. The funds of the Peloponnesians must be 
 ' drawn from the produce of Peloponnesus ; for they 
 ' have no foreign dependencies capable of affording 
 ' considerable supplies ; and in Peloponnesus neither 
 
 * private nor public wealth abounds. 17 In protracted 
 
 * war, and in maritime war, they are equally un- 
 
 * experienced ; for their poverty has always disabled 
 ' them for both. They cannot equip fleets ; nor can 
 ' they send armies often, or maintain them long from 
 
 * home. For, through the scantiness of their public 
 
 * revenue, every man must subsist on service from 
 
 17 We find this observation repeated more than once in the 
 speeches reported by Thucydides, without any exception for the 
 Corinthians, who were commercial and rich, and had colonies ; 
 but their wealth bore but small proportion either to the resources 
 of Athens, or to the wants of Peloponnesus.
 
 352 
 
 CHAP. 
 XIII. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1.1. c.142. 
 
 c. 143. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 * his private means ; and, by long absence from their 
 
 * domestic affairs, even those means must be ruined. 
 
 * A superfluity of wealth alone, and not the strained 
 
 * contributions of a people barely above want, can 
 
 * support lengthened and distant hostilities. Such 
 
 * people are commonly readier to make war with their 
 
 * persons than with their purses : they hope that 
 ' those will finally escape ; but these may be com- 
 
 * pletely drained and the business yet unfinished. The 
 
 * Peloponnesians indeed, with their allies, for a single 
 
 * battle might be equal to all the rest of Greece. But 
 4 for protracted war, besides their want of money, 
 
 * which is their great and insuperable deficiency, 
 
 * wanting one common administration, each state 
 
 * having its equal voice for the decision of measures, 
 
 * and each its separate interest 18 , each anxious for its 
 
 * own particular concerns, the general good will be 
 ' sometimes thwarted, often neglected, and no great 
 
 * design can be steadily pursued. 
 
 * You need therefore neither fear that posts will 
 ' be occupied and fortified within your country, with 
 
 * which some would alarm you, nor that a formidable 
 ' navy can be raised against you. Since the Persian 
 ' war, now above fifty years, you have been assidu- 
 
 * ously applying to naval affairs, and your proficiency 
 
 * is still far below perfection. Naval science, and the 
 
 * skill of experienced seamen, are not to be acquired 
 ' by a people when they please, and in moments of 
 
 * leisure : on the contrary, they require practice to 
 
 * the exclusion of almost all leisure. Nor, should 
 ' the Peloponnesians seize the Olympic or Delphian 
 
 * treasures, will even that avail them, to the degree 
 
 * that some seem to suppose. They cannot, with 
 
 3 
 
 KO. QI/%
 
 DEBATES AT ATHENS. 35 
 
 * these, form naval commanders and seamen, such as SECT. 
 ' we possess among our own citizens, more and abler 
 
 ' than all Greece besides : nor is it to be supposed 
 ' that the seamen of our allies, for a temporary in- 
 
 * crease of pay, will banish themselves from their 
 
 * country, and join the party which has the worst 
 ' prospect of final success. 
 
 ' Such are the deficiencies under which the Pelo- 
 
 * ponnesians labour, while we not only are free from 
 
 * these, but possess advantages peculiar to ourselves. 
 ' If they are strong enough to invade our country 
 
 * by land, we are equally able to harass them by sea ; 
 ' and should we waste but a small part of Pelopon- 
 
 * nesus, and they even the whole of Attica, the dis- 
 
 * tress would be far greater to them than to us ; for 
 
 * they have no other country whence to obtain sup- 
 ' plies, while we have our choice among islands and 
 
 * continents. The command of the sea is indeed a 
 ' most important possession. Consider then : were 
 ' we islanders, who would be so secure against all 
 4 hostile attempts ? What therefore should be now 
 
 * our aim, but to put ourselves as nearly as possible 
 
 * into the situation of islanders ? Our lands and 
 
 * their appurtenances within Attica should be put out 
 
 * of consideration : no vain attempt should be made 
 
 * to protect them against the superior land force of 
 ' the enemy : our whole attention should be directed 
 
 * to the safety of the city and the command of the 
 
 * sea. Could we gain a battle, fresh and perhaps 
 
 * greater forces would be brought against us. But 
 1 should we lose one, the revolt of our allies, the 
 
 * sources of our wealth and strength, would follow ; 
 
 * for they will no longer rest under their present 
 ' subjection than while we have power to compel 
 
 * them. Not the loss of lands and houses therefore, 
 
 VOL. II. A A
 
 354, 
 
 CHAP. 
 XIIT. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1. 1. c. 144. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 * but the loss of valuable lives, whenever it may hap- 
 
 * pen, is to be deplored ; for lands cannot produce 
 
 * men ; but let us keep ourselves strong in men, and 
 
 * we shall not want for lands. If therefore I thought 
 
 * I could persuade you, I would propose that you 
 
 * should yourselves go forth and waste Attica ; to 
 
 * show the Peloponnesians how vain is their expect- 
 6 ation that the fear of such an evil may induce you 
 
 * to surrender your independency. 
 
 ' I have indeed many other grounds for clear hope 
 
 * of success, provided our own impatience and rash- 
 4 ness, and the wild desire of conquest, when defence 
 
 * should be our object, injure us not more than the 
 
 * strength or policy of our enemies. On these topics 
 
 * however admonition may better be reserved for the 
 
 * circumstances when they arise. The answer now 
 
 * to be returned to Lacedsemon should be this : * Our 
 
 * * ports and markets shall be open to the Megarians, 
 
 * * provided the Lacedaemonians will abrogate their 
 
 * ' prohibitions of the residence of strangers within 
 
 * * their territory, as far as regards us and our allies : 
 ' * for the treaty of truce leaves these matters equally 
 
 * * open to both parties. 19 We will give independency 
 
 * < to those states of our alliance, which were inde- 
 
 19 The rough manner in which the Lacedaemonians executed 
 their decrees for the expulsion of strangers, is noticed by Ari- 
 stophanes in his comedy of the Birds : 
 
 Meton. Ti J'ls-Ti JEIVOV; Pisthetaerus. "iitrw-sp Iv AaxeJai^ovi, 
 SsvrjXa-rovvTai, x.a.1 ntnim/rai TIVEJ 
 nxjyai fv^yal na-r airru. V. 1014. 
 
 Where it seems also implied that Lacedaemon afforded tempt- 
 ation for strangers to go thither, probably for gain by sale or 
 exchange of commodities. In the difficulties made for com- 
 merce by the Lacedaemonian laws, especially the prohibition of 
 money, the trader would always have advantage over the ex- 
 changer, not a professional trader.
 
 END OF NEGOTIATION. 355 
 
 < * pendent when the truce was concluded, whenever SECT. 
 
 * ' the Lacedaemonians will allow to the states of their 
 
 * * alliance free agency in whatever concerns their 
 
 * ' several governments, and will no longer enforce 
 ' ' among them a constitution and a mode of admini- 
 
 * ' stration which, under the show of independency, 
 ' * keep them in effectual subjection to Lacedaemon. 20 
 ' * Finally, we are ready to submit any disputed points 
 ' * to a judicial determination according to the terms 
 ' of the treaty ; and we will not begin war, but we 
 
 * * will defend ourselves to the utmost.' Such an 
 ' answer will be just, will be honourable, will be con- 
 
 * sonant to the renown and to the wisdom of our an- 
 
 * cestors, who raised this empire, which we ought not 
 ' to transmit diminished to our posterity.' 
 
 The assembly assented to the opinion of Pericles, Thucyd. 
 and an answer was accordingly delivered to the La- "*' ' 145 ' 
 cedsemonian ambassadors nearly in the terms of his 
 speech ; concluding with the declaration, That the 
 
 * Athenian commonwealth would obey the commands 
 ' of no power upon earth, but would readily abide 
 
 * the event of a judicial determination, conducted 
 
 * upon a footing of equality between the parties, in 
 ' the mode directed by the existing treaty.' 21 
 
 With this answer the Lacedaemonians returned 
 home, and no more embassies were sent. Hitherto 
 the people of the two states had communicated, as 
 in peace, without the intervention of a herald, though Thucyd. 
 not without caution and suspicion; for, since the 1>2> c>1 * 
 
 "OTOIV KUKfivoi -rau$ etxvruv onrosucri sroAecr* /A.-^ <ript<ri TO% 
 
 t; eTrtTvjSe/iy^ <zvTovo[Ae7(r8a,t, K. T. X. To turn this into 
 
 modern language, or perhaps into any language, long circum- 
 locution is necessary. 
 
 21 We want information from Thucydides what that A//O? 
 KUTO, T? ^VV^KO,^ which he so repeatedly mentions, was to have 
 been. 
 
 A A 2
 
 356 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, affairs of Corcyra and Potidaea, the truce was con- 
 
 XIII 
 
 ' sidered on both sides as broken, and war as impend- 
 ing. But now, though no hostilities immediately 
 ensued, yet communication was ventured on neither 
 side without the same formalities as if war had been 
 declared. 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 Attempt of the Thebans against Platcea. 
 Herodot. WHILE want of preparation still withheld the Pe- 
 
 1. 6. c. 198. , . , r r 
 
 Thucyd. loponnesians, the Inebans, judging war to be now 
 1.2. c.s. unavoidable, thought the moment of suspense advan- 
 tageous for an attempt toward the more complete 
 establishment of their own sovereignty over Boeotia : 
 Lacedaemon must favour them ; Athens would fear to 
 attack them. 
 
 The little town of Plataea, with a territory of 
 scarcely half a dozen miles square, utterly unable by 
 its own strength to subsist in independency, never- 
 theless, for near a century, had been resolutely re- 
 sisting all controul from Thebes, whence it was less 
 than nine miles distant. When, before the Persian 
 war, Cleomenes king of Sparta was with an army in 
 Herodot. the neighbourhood, the Plataeans, to obtain the pro- 
 Thuc P d tection, had offered to put themselves under the do- 
 1.3. c.55. minion of Lacedaemon. The answer which, with his 
 usual expressive simplicity, Herodotus attributes to 
 the Lacedaemonians upon the occasion, strongly paints 
 the state of Greece : ' We,' they said, * live afar off, 
 ' and ours would be a cold kind of assistance 22 ; for 
 ' you might be overpowered and sold for slaves, before 
 'any intelligence about you could reach us. We
 
 DEPENDENCY OF PLATJEA. 357 
 
 ' recommend to you therefore rather to put your- SECT. 
 * selves under the dominion of Athens 23 , a bordering 
 ' state, and able to protect you.' This advice, adds 
 the historian, they gave, not through any goodwill 
 to the Plataeans, but with a view to create embarrass- 
 ment for the Athenians by embroiling them with the 
 Boeotians. The Plataeans however followed the ad- 
 vice. The solemnity of the sacrifice to the twelve 
 gods being chosen for the occasion, ambassadors were 
 sent to Athens, but in the habit and character of 
 suppliants. Placing themselves at the altar, accord- 
 ing to the customary forms of supplication, these 
 ministers thence urged their petition that 'their 
 ' commonwealth might be taken under the sove- 
 ' reignty and protection of Athens.' 24 The Athe- 
 nian people acceded to the humble request. 
 
 The Thebans, upon the first intelligence of this 
 transaction, marched against Plataea. An Athenian 
 army moved at the same time to protect the new de- 
 pendency of the commonwealth. The Corinthians 
 however interfering, it was agreed to submit the 
 matter to their arbitration. Actuated apparently by 
 a spirit of justice and of liberty, and desirous to give 
 as great extent as the nature of things would admit 
 to that doubtful independency which could be enjoyed 
 by the smaller Grecian commonwealths, the Corin- 
 thians decided, ' That the Thebans were entitled to 
 ' no sovereignty over any towns of Bceotia whose 
 ' people chose to renounce the advantages of that 
 ' Boeotian confederacy of which the Thebans had as- 
 ' sumed the lead.' On this the Athenians moved 
 homeward. The Thebans, irritated by the decision 
 
 23 The expression of Herodotus is very strong, Sow/aw fytE? 
 IK;, to give yourselves- 
 
 'E8/3o<rv vipeas airov/;. 
 
 A A 3
 
 358 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, which the presence of the Athenian force had en- 
 ' couraged, followed and attacked it. Being defeated, 
 the Athenians then took upon themselves to prescribe 
 terms. They extended the limits fixed by the Co- 
 rinthians for the Platsean territory ; took the neigh- 
 bouring little town of Hysiae also under their pro- 
 tection ; and, to provide better security for the Pla- 
 taean and Hysian lands, declared the river Asopus 
 their boundary against the Thebaid. 
 
 Thenceforward Plataea, more than ever averse to 
 Thebes, became warm in political attachment to 
 Athens. The whole force of the little commonwealth 
 was exerted on the glorious day of Marathon, in the 
 honour of which the Plataeans alone partook with the 
 Athenians. In the not less memorable action of Sa- 
 lamis, though an inland people, they had their share 
 aboard the Athenian fleet ; and they had distinguished 
 themselves, under the command of Aristides, in that 
 great and decisive battle, fought near their town, 
 which, beyond all other circumstances, hath given 
 celebrity to its name. Under the patronage of Athens 
 democracy of course prevailed at Plataea. But as 
 Athens itself was not without an aristocratical party, 
 so there were in Platasa persons to whom democra- 
 tical government, sometimes perhaps partially oppres- 
 sive, and always an obstacle to their ambition, would 
 be dissatisfactory. Their cause being hopeless under 
 the dominion of Athens, Thebes remained the pro- 
 tecting power to which they looked for an alteration 
 in their favour. 
 Thucyd. In these circumstances a plot was concerted be- 
 
 J 2 /> 9 
 
 tween Nauclides, the leading man of the aristocratical 
 Platasans, and Eurymachus, who held the greatest 
 influence in Thebes. The official directors of the 
 Theban government were gained to it ; and, in the
 
 ATTEMPT AGAINST PLAT.EA. 359 
 
 fifteenth year of the thirty years' truce, when Chrysis SECT. 
 was in the forty-eighth year of her priesthood at 
 Argos, ^Enesias ephor at Sparta, and two months 
 were yet wanting to complete the archonship of Py- 
 thodorus at Athens, in the sixth month after the 
 battle of Potidasa, the spring then beginning, (thus, 
 in the want of a readier and more perfect method, 
 Thucydides has marked the date,) an armed body, B.C. 431. 
 of somewhat more than three hundred Thebans, Si May, 
 reached Platasa about the first sleep. The Bceo- J^Thuc. 
 tarchs Pythangelus and Diemporus commanded, and but more 
 
 ,r i i -n i T n likely 8th 
 
 they were accompanied by hurymachus. in so small April." 
 a city, which scarcely had a public revenue, no guard 
 was maintained : the gates only for security were shut 
 at night. These were now opened by the party 
 friendly to the enterprise, and the Thebans entered 
 unresisted. Nauclides and the Platagans about him, 
 in the too commonly atrocious spirit of Greek sedi- 
 tion, would have completed the business by the im- 
 mediate massacre of the principal of their fellow- 
 townsmen of the opposite party. But Eurymachus 
 and the Bceotarchs, not equally stimulated by the 
 passions either of fear or resentment, refused con- 
 currence in the proposal. Reckoning themselves 
 already masters of the place, and depending upon 
 the ready support of a body of troops, which was to 
 follow from Thebes, they lodged their arms in the 
 agora ; and sending heralds around the town, with 
 a conciliating proclamation, they invited all, who were 
 
 25 Eighty days, according to Thucydides (1. 2. c. 19.), after 
 the corn of Attica was nearly ripe. Eighty days from the eighth 
 of April would be the twenty-seventh of June, rather a late 
 harvest season in Attica. Eighty days after the seventh of May, 
 namely the twenty-sixth of July, wheat is often ripe in the 
 south of England. 
 
 A A 4> 
 
 ..-%'-*
 
 360 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, disposed to accede to the confederacy of the Boeotian 
 people, to come and place their arms by theirs. 
 
 Thucyd. The Plataeans, hastily and in great alarm assem- 
 
 bling, rejoiced, in the moment, on finding a dis- 
 position so far friendly among those who seemed to 
 have them, their families, and their whole state com- 
 pletely at mercy. They showed therefore a ready 
 disposition to accede to the terms proposed. But 
 in the course of the ensuing communication, having 
 opportunity to discover, amid the darkness, how few 
 the Thebans were, they began to observe to one an- 
 other that they were abundantly able to overpower 
 those who had thus insidiously surprised them ; and 
 the resolution was taken to make the attempt. That 
 they might not be noticed in preparation, they broke 
 ways through the partitions of houses, and they 
 formed a barricade of carts and waggons, from behind 
 which they might make their assault. Waiting then 
 till just before daybreak, while darkness might yet at 
 the same time give them the greater advantage from 
 their intimate knowledge of the place, and increase 
 the alarm and uncertainty of the enemy, they began 
 the attack. Twice or thrice they were repulsed ; 
 but they returned to the charge, the women and 
 slaves at the same time throwing stones and tiles from 
 the house-tops, with an unceasing clamour which en- 
 hanced the confusion, while a heavy rain made the 
 obscurity more complete. The Thebans, unable to 
 hear commands or see commanders, and thus inca- 
 pable of acting in concert, at length fled, each as he 
 could find a passage, in darkness and in dirt, mostly 
 ignorant of the ways, while their pursuers were ac- 
 quainted with every turn. A Platasan had shut the 
 gate of the town by which they had entered, and 
 which alone had been open ; and, for want of other
 
 ATTEMPT AGAINST PLAT^EA. 361 
 
 means at hand, fastened it by thrusting the head of SECT. 
 a javelin into the catch of the lock. Checked thus 
 
 in their hope of flight, some of the Thebans mounted 
 the rampart, and throwing themselves down on the 
 outside mostly perished : some, finding a gate un- 
 guarded, obtained an axe from a woman, with which 
 they forced the lock, and a few thus escaped. Many 
 were killed, scattered about the town ; but the greater 
 part, who had kept more in a body, entered a large 
 building adjoining the rampart, whose door, which 
 stood open, they mistook for the town-gate. This 
 being observed by the Plataeans, measures were im- 
 mediately taken to confine them there. It was then 
 proposed to set fire to the building and burn those 
 in it ; but, offering to surrender, they were received 
 as prisoners at discretion ; and shortly after, all the 
 rest, who remained alive within the town, came and 
 delivered their arms. 
 
 The march of the troops which should have sup- Thucyd. 
 ported the enterprise had been retarded by the rain. ' 2 ' c ' 5 ' 
 Arriving at the river Asopus, they found it swelled 
 so as to be not without difficulty forded ; and before 
 they could reach Plataea, the miscarriage of those who 
 had entered the place was complete. As soon as 
 they were aware of this, the resource they resolved 
 upon was to seize all the people they could find in 
 the villages and fields as hostages for the security of 
 their own people, prisoners in Plataea, and also to take 
 all the moveable property. The Plataeans, expecting 
 such a measure, sent a herald, threatening immediate 
 death to the prisoners if any farther attempt were 
 made against the persons or effects of the people of 
 Plataea, but promising to restore them if the Thebans 
 would immediately quit their territory. The agree- 
 ment was presently made and ratified by oath, and
 
 362 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, the Theban army retired accordingly. Such, says 
 lIL Thucydides, is the Theban account : but the Pla- 
 taeans deny that any oaths passed, and that any pro- 
 mise was given for the restoration of the prisoners, 
 except on condition that a treaty should be concluded 
 between the two states. The Platasans however al- 
 lowed no opportunity for farther treaty. Hasten- 
 ing the removal of their effects from the country 
 within their fortifications, they put to death all their 
 prisoners, to the number of a hundred and eighty, 
 among whom was Eurymachus, the author of the 
 enterprise. 
 
 Such was the inauspicious prelude to the Pelo- 
 ponnesian war. The execution of the unhappy pri- 
 soners, supposing no compact to forbid it, seems 
 indeed to have been in strict conformity to what 
 may be called the national law of the Greeks ; upon 
 the principle on which spies, traitors, and pirates 
 are liable to capital punishment by the law of nations 
 in modern Europe. The Grecian law of humanity 
 then was not so extravagantly violated but that, 
 Thucyd. through the intervention of heralds, the bodies were 
 restored for burial. But the Plataeans, aware that 
 the Thebans would feel upon the occasion, and per- 
 haps reason, differently from themselves, prepared 
 for resisting the revenge to be expected. Immedi- 
 ately upon discovery that the town was surprised, a 
 messenger had been dispatched to Athens with the 
 intelligence ; and as soon as the Thebans were made 
 prisoners another was sent. On receiving the first 
 news the Athenian administration issued orders for 
 seizing all Boeotians within Attica : in return to the 
 second, directions were sent to keep the prisoners 
 made in Platsea in safe custody, till the Athenian 
 government should determine what farther was to
 
 ATTEMPT AGAINST PLATJEA. 363 
 
 be done. Unfortunately, such was the inconsiderate SECT. 
 haste of the Platasans, the fatal execution was com- ' 
 
 pleted before the messenger with this order arrived. 
 So severe a measure, even supposing no breach of 
 faith, plighted or implied, would, by its operation 
 upon the passions, preclude negotiation. An Athe- 
 nian army was therefore sent with a convoy of pro- 
 visions to Plataea ; a small body was left to strengthen 
 the place ; and the women, children, and whatever 
 else would be useless in a siege, were brought away.
 
 364 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM ITS COMMENCEMENT 
 TO THE DEATH OF PERICLES, WITH A SUMMARY VIEW 
 OF THE HISTORY OF THRACE. 
 
 CHAP. 
 XIV. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1.2. c.7. 
 
 c.8. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 State of the Athenian and Peloponnesian confederacies. Invasion 
 and ravage of Attica by the Peloponnesians. Operations of the 
 Athenian fleet in the western seas under Carcinus : gallant 
 action of the Spartan Brasidas : ravage of the Peloponnesian 
 coast, and acquisition of Cephallenia to the AtJienian con- 
 federacy. Operations of the Athenian fleet in the eastern seas 
 under Cleopompus. Measures for the security of Athens : 
 remarkable decree : extermination of the JEginetans. Invasion 
 and ravage of Megaris by the Athenians. 
 
 THIS unfortunate transaction between two inferior 
 republics, which no prudence in the leading states 
 could prevent or foresee, made accommodation more 
 than ever impracticable ; and both parties prepared 
 for hostilities with the most serious diligence. At 
 this time, says Thucydides, who was a living witness, 
 Greece abounded with youth, through inexperience 
 ardent for war, while among those of more sober 
 age many things contributed to stimulate ambition, 
 or excite apprehension. Many oracular responses 
 were circulated, many signs and wonders were re- 
 ported ; and some phenomena really occurred, of a 
 kind to affect the imaginations of men in a super- 
 stitious age : to raise hope or inspire alarm. Among 
 these, what most engaged attention was an earth-
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 365 
 
 quake that shook the sacred island of Delos ; which SECT. 
 never before, within the reach of tradition, had been 
 so affected. Amid this universal irritation of men's 
 minds, a very general disposition prevailed, so the 
 candid Athenian in the most explicit terms avows, 
 to favour the Lacedaemonian cause, as the cause of 
 liberty and independency ; while animosity and in- 
 dignation were the sentiments excited by that arbitrary 
 and oppressive command which a large portion of 
 the Grecian people experienced, and the rest dreaded, 
 from the sovereign Many of Athens. 
 
 The two confederacies, now upon the point of 
 engaging in war, were very differently composed, 
 but the force of the Greek nation was very equally 
 divided between them. With the Lacedemonians all Thucyd. 
 the Peloponnesian states joined, except the Argives, 
 who remained neuter, and the Achaeans ; of whom 
 the Pellenians only took part in the beginning. Of 
 northern Greece, the Megarians, Boeotians, Locrians, 
 Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians 
 joined the Peloponnesian alliance. The navy was to 
 be formed by the Lacedasmonians, Corinthians, Sicy- 
 onians, Pellenians, Eleans, Megarians, Ambraciots, 
 and Leucadians. The Boeotians, Phocians, and Lo- 
 crians furnished cavalry ; the other states infantry 
 only ; their mountainous territories being mostly ill 
 suited to either the breeding of horses or action with 
 them. It was proposed to raise no less than five 
 hundred trireme galleys within the confederacy ; its 
 proportion being assessed upon every maritime state ; 
 and contributions in money were required from all. 
 Ministers were sent to endeavour to form alliances 
 among foreign nations ; and the great king, as the 
 king of Persia was called, or oftener simply the King, c. 7. 
 was not neglected j but for external assistance the c . 41.'
 
 366 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, principal expectation was from the Italian and Sicilian 
 XIVi Greeks, who possessed considerable maritime force, 
 
 and mostly favoured the Peloponnesian interest. 
 
 Athens had few allies, properly so called. On the 
 continent of Greece the principal were the Thessalians 
 and the Acarnanians ; the former little engaged by 
 
 Thucyd. interest or inclination, but bound by a treaty of long 
 standing : most of the Acarnanian towns, though 
 some were adverse, joined with more zeal in the 
 
 c.9. Athenian cause. The Platseans are besides named, 
 
 and the Messenians of Naupactus : the republic of 
 the former however, the mere garrison of their town 
 excepted, existing only within the walls of Athens; 
 and that of the latter holding means to exist only 
 under Athenian protection. Of the islands, Corcyra, 
 Zacynthus, Chios, and Lesbos are alone to be pro- 
 perly reckoned among the allies of Athens. Chios 
 and the several republics of Lesbos had been still 
 treated with some respect by the Athenian govern- 
 ment, as independent states ; and they still possessed 
 their own fleets. All the other islands of the ^Egean 
 sea, except the Lacedaemonian colonies of Melos and 
 Thera, all the numerous and wealthy Grecian cities 
 of Asia Minor, the Hellespont, and Thrace, were 
 tributary subjects of the Athenian people ; not al- 
 lowed to possess ships of war, but dependent upon 
 Athens for protection, and liable to every kind and 
 degree of controul from the people of that imperial 
 state. 
 
 c. 10. News of the transactions at Platasa arriving at 
 
 Lacedaemon hastened the measure, before in some 
 degree resolved upon, to invade Attica. Summonses 
 were sent through the confederacy, in pursuance of 
 which two-thirds of the whole land force of the Pe- 
 loponnesian states met the Lacedsemonian army, on
 
 ADVANCE OF ARCHIDAMUS. 367 
 
 an appointed day, at the Corinthian isthmus. The 
 command in chief was not denied to the venerable 
 king Archidamus, notwithstanding his known dis- 
 approbation of the war, nor did he scruple, in that 
 command, to show his steadiness in the principles he 
 had always professed. Before he would lead his 
 forces out of Peloponnesus he sent a herald, to make 
 one more trial whether the threatening storm, now 
 ready to burst, might have produced any disposition 
 in the Athenians to relax. Thucydides has left no 
 room to doubt either that his purpose was liberal and 
 generous, or that to guide the counsels of the con- 
 federacy in the way of liberality and generosity, the 
 way which the common good of Greece required, and 
 the good of Lacedgemon with all Peloponnesus, as 
 inseparable from the common good of Greece, re- 
 quired, his influence was very deficient. Answer 
 was returned, probably under direction of Pericles, 
 importing that, if the Peloponnesians would commu- 
 nicate with the Athenians, they must withdraw their 
 army, and send the troops of the several states to 
 their respective homes. The Lacedemonian herald, 
 charged with the communication, was required to 
 leave Athens the same day, and, for his security, was 
 conducted by a guard to the Attic border. Archi- 
 damus then proceeded on his march. The Thebans, 
 sending a part of their force to waste the Plataean 
 lands, joined him in the Megarian territory with the 
 remainder. 
 
 While the Peloponnesian troops were assembling, Thucyd. 
 Pericles had been engaged in the arduous office of pre- 
 paring the minds of the Athenian people for what 
 he foresaw would follow ; exerting himself to obviate 
 the clamours of faction, to calm the discontent which 
 would arise from the unavoidable calamities of a
 
 368 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, defensive war, and lessen the jealousies to which his 
 own situation of first minister of the commonwealth 
 would now more than ever expose him. According 
 to the ordinary military establishment of Athens, he 
 had been elected with nine colleagues to command 
 the Athenian forces. But, since the first Persian 
 invasion, the practice seems to have gained to appoint, 
 by popular election, one of the ten commander in 
 chief, with the title of general of the commonwealth, 
 and with the sole power to convoke, at his discretion, 
 extraordinary assemblies of the people. Pericles was 
 now so elected. He had always lived in habits of 
 friendship with the Spartan king Archidamus ; en- 
 gaged with him in the league of hospitality, deemed 
 sacred. Possibly Archidamus, amid the general ra- 
 vage of Attica, might, in kindness to Pericles, pro- 
 cure favour to his estates : possibly, to excite envy 
 and jealousy against him, the Lacedaemonians most 
 hostile to him might procure ostentation of such 
 favour toward him. In the assembly of the people 
 Pericles declared his apprehension of this ; adding 
 that, if any of his lands should be more spared than 
 those around them, they should be no longer his 
 own but the public property. At the same time he 
 took opportunity for repeating his exhortation to the 
 people, to disregard the waste of their possessions in 
 Attica, to avoid at any rate a general engagement by 
 land, and give their utmost attention to their navy. 
 This alone, he said, could maintain their dominion 
 over their invaluable transmarine possessions and 
 dependencies, and only those could ensure them that 
 final success which superiority of revenue, under the 
 direction of wise counsels, must always give. He 
 proceeded then to a display of the means which the 
 commonwealth possessed. The annual tribute from
 
 MEANS OF ATHENS. 369 
 
 transmarine dependencies, exclusively of other sources SECT. 
 of revenue, he observed, amounted now to six hundred L 
 talents, about one hundred and fifty thousand pounds 
 sterling. But there were actually in the treasury, in 
 coined money, no less than six thousand talents, or 
 one million five hundred thousand pounds sterling. 
 The uncoined gold and silver which might be em- 
 ployed, should the necessities of the commonwealth 
 require, offerings public and private, sacred vases 
 used in processions and public festivals, Persian spoils, 
 and a variety of smaller articles, would amount to 
 not less than five hundred talents. Besides all this, 
 the pure gold about the single statue of Minerva 
 in the acropolis was of the weight of forty talents ; 
 precisely, according to Arbuthnot, a ton avoirdupois, 
 in value about a hundred and fifty thousand pounds 
 sterling ; and this quantity had been so adapted by 
 Phidias that the whole might be taken off for use 
 without injury to the statue, and replaced if returning 
 public wealth in settled peace might afford means. 
 The quantity of gold, to be so employed, may seem 
 enormous. But when gold was amassed, means to 
 make interest of it were not in those days ready ; 
 and to secure it against democratical extravagance, 
 for a resource in calamity, no method was so effectual 
 as dedicating it in a temple. 
 
 The military force of the commonwealth was at 
 the same time formidable. The native heavy-armed 
 foot were no less than twenty-nine thousand men. 
 Sixteen thousand of these sufficed for guards and 
 garrisons ; and the eldest and the youngest of the 
 citizens were competent for that service j so that there 
 remained thirteen thousand, the flower of the Athe- 
 nian youth, to be employed in annoying the enemy 
 wherever opportunity might offer. The cavalry, in- 
 
 VOL. II. B B
 
 370 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, eluding the horse-bowmen, were twelve hundred ; the 
 ' foot-bowmen were sixteen hundred ; and the whole 
 
 native force of the commonwealth thus amounted 
 to near thirty-two thousand men, exclusively of the 
 numerous light-armed slaves always attendant upon 
 Grecian armies. What should be added for the 
 forces which might be raised among the allies and 
 subjects of the state no historian has informed us. 
 The fleet consisting of three hundred trireme galleys, 
 the crews would be more than fifty thousand men. 
 How far slaves were employed, and how far the 
 citizens of subject states, we have no precise inform- 
 Thucyd. ation. But every Athenian was more or less a sea- 
 & 6 ai. C " 91 man * even * ne heavy-armed sometimes worked at 
 the oar ; and upon occasion all the seamen equally 
 served by land. The mere sailor was commonly of 
 Xen. Hei. the lowest order of citizens, carried only light armour, 
 s . i, 2. and was esteemed of inferior military rank to the 
 heavy-armed, and perhaps to the middle-armed sol- 
 dier. 
 
 Thucyd. Persuaded, says Thucydides, by these and other 
 
 arguments which Pericles was accustomed to urge, 
 the Attic people applied themselves to the ungrateful 
 task of stripping their own country, and fixing them- 
 selves with their families within that space, ample of 
 its kind, which the walls surrounding Athens, and 
 connecting it with its ports, inclosed. All their 
 furniture they brought with them ; and many even 
 the frames of their houses ; valuable in a country 
 where the materials for building were wood and 
 marble ; the former scarce ; the latter, though plen- 
 tiful, yet in workmanship costly. Their cattle, great 
 and small, and attending slaves, were transported to 
 the neighbouring islands, principally to Eubrea. This 
 measure however was not resolved on, even upon
 
 MEASURES OF ATHENS. 371 
 
 conviction of the pressure of necessity, without ex- SECT. 
 treme reluctance ; for, continues the contemporary 
 writer, the Attic people were, beyond all other 
 Greeks, attached to their country possessions and a 
 country life. The ravages of the Persian war were 
 now repaired, with large improvement upon the 
 ancient state of things ; most of the houses were 
 newly built ; some lately completed, and elegantly 
 and expensively furnished, so that, according to Iso- 
 
 J & 
 
 crates, they were superior to the houses in the city. P . r i3o!t.2 
 The temples also in the several borough towns, 
 destroyed in the Persian war, had been zealously 
 restored ; and the people were warmly attached to 
 those which they esteemed their own inherited re- 
 ligious rites, peculiar to that town which had been 
 the town of their ancestors, before Theseus concen- 
 trated the religion, government, and jurisprudence 
 of the country in Athens. 
 
 Beside the prejudices thus to be violated and 
 imaginary evils to be supported, the real inconve- 
 niencies, unavoidably attending the measure, were 
 great. While their improvements were to be de- 
 molished, and the revenues from their estates to 
 cease, only a few of the more opulent could obtain 
 houses for the habitation of their families ; and but 
 a small proportion could be received into those of 
 their friends. The numerous temples of Athens 
 afforded an incommodious shelter to many. All were 
 occupied, excepting those within the citadel, and the 
 magnificent and highly venerated Eleusinium, the 
 fane of the mysterious Ceres, with one or two others, 
 which were firmly locked. Even the superstition 
 which had taught to dread the roof of the temple 
 called the Pelasgic, as under a curse from the deity, 
 yielded to the pressing necessity of the times. Those 
 
 B B 2
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, who, in the actual circumstances, took the lead in 
 [v ' public business, had certainly a difficult and hazard- 
 ous office : it was of urgent necessity for them to 
 be cautious of pressing upon a larger portion of the 
 sovereign multitude in favour of a smaller ; and hence 
 perhaps the distressed individuals from the country 
 were not objects, as apparently they ought to have 
 been, of the care of government, but were left almost 
 entirely to their own means and their own discretion. 
 When the temples were all occupied, the turrets of 
 the city-walls were resorted to for private residence. 
 But neither buildings nor space within the city suf- 
 ficed for the multitude. Many families formed for 
 themselves the best shelter they were able on the 
 vacant ground inclosed within the long walls and 
 about the port of Pirasus. In this space, had the 
 administration been provided with power to use the 
 foresight and diligence, which it seems to have pos- 
 sessed, in the manner best for the public, all perhaps 
 might have been tolerably accommodated. Measures 
 against the enemy showed ability and energy. The 
 most effectual steps were taken for applying the force 
 of the allies ; and a fleet of a hundred triremes was 
 prepared for an expedition against Peloponnesus. 
 Thucyd. The Peloponnesian army had already entered 
 
 Attica by the way of CEnoe, and laid siege to that 
 town, critically situated for the defence of the border 
 against Boeotia, and therefore strongly fortified and 
 well provided. The reluctance of the Athenians to 
 abandon their estates had been such that much of 
 their effects might have been the prey of the invaders, 
 if the delay occasioned by the siege of CEnoe had not 
 given opportunity to complete the removal. Com- 
 plaint was in consequence loud against Archidamus. 
 That worthy prince had scarcely now given up all
 
 INVASION OF ATTICA. 373 
 
 hope that some disposition to concession on the part SECT 
 of the Athenians might afford opportunity for opening L 
 a treaty, and saving Greece from the ruin threatened 
 by the exertion of its whole force so equally divided 
 against itself. The siege was pressed for several Timcyd. 
 days, with the machines then in use, and in all the L2< c ' 19 ' 
 known ways of attack upon fortifications 1 , yet little 
 progress was made. Discontent then spreading and 
 growing more vehement through the army, and no 
 symptom appearing of a disposition among the Athe- 
 nians to treat, Archidamus yielded to the wishes of 
 his troops. About eighty days after the attempt of 26th June. 
 the Thebans upon Plataea, when the corn was nearly 
 ripe, raising the siege of CEnoe, he advanced into 
 Attica with an army, according to Plutarch, of sixty Piut. v. 
 thousand men. The Eleusinian and Thriasian plains 
 were immediately ravaged : a body of Athenian horse 
 was defeated near Rhiti ; and the army, keeping 
 moun .ZEgaleon on the right, passed by the way of 
 Cecropia to Acharnse, the largest and richest borough 
 of Attica, situate within eight miles of Athens, 
 
 Archidamus had expected that the Athenian Thucyd. 
 people, strong in numbers, naturally high-spirited 
 and impatient, and prepared for war as they had 
 never been before, would not have borne, without 
 opposition, the waste of the Eleusinian and Thriasian 
 lands ; but he depended still more upon the ruin now 
 hanging over Acharnae. ( The people of that borough 
 formed no fewer than three thousand heavy-armed 
 foot ; they could not but have great weight in the 
 Athenian assembly ; and Archidamus thought it pro- 
 bable that their impatience, under the destruction 
 of their property, would influence the whole people 
 
 Te KOU aXXw 
 B B 3
 
 374 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, to require that they should be led out to battle : or 
 av ' otherwise, that when the Acharnians saw their own 
 estates ruined, they would with little zeal engage in 
 the defence of those of others, and thus he might 
 proceed with more security to ravage all the rest of 
 the country. What passed in Athens proved the 
 justness of his judgment. From the time of the 
 Persian war, remembered only by a few of the oldest 
 citizens, Attica had been exempt from that evil, so 
 ordinary in many parts of Greece, the ravage of an 
 
 Thucyd. enemy. About fourteen years before the Eleusinian 
 and Thriasian plains had been plundered by the 
 army under Plistoanax ; and so much was supported 
 now as matter to be expected. But when the Pelo- 
 ponnesians encamped within sight of Athens, and 
 the rich Acharnian vale was to be the next object of 
 devastation, the whole city was in uproar. Some 
 were vehement for marching out to defend their 
 property ; others as warmly opposed a measure which 
 would so endanger the commonwealth ; but on all 
 sides there was an outcry against Pericles ; who, 
 whether as advising the war, or refusing the means 
 of engaging the enemy, was reproached as the prin- 
 cipal author of the present evils. 
 
 c. 22. Amid all the vehemence of clamour, the intrigues 
 
 of faction, and the threats of popular animosity, Pe- 
 ricles remained immoveable. Leaving the ferment 
 to evaporate in altercation among individuals, he 
 would convene no assembly ; he would hold no coun- 
 cil ; but while he gave his own attention, he directed 
 also that of others as much as possible to what, in any 
 moment of sober reflection, all would admit to be 
 of the first importance, the guard of the city and 
 the preservation of good order. Meantime he was 
 frequently sending out parties of cavalry to cut off
 
 RAVAGES OF THE ATHENIANS. 375 
 
 stragglers and prevent the extension of ravage to any SECT. 
 distance from the Peloponnesian camp. Expectation ' 
 thus raised, and an interest created for the public 
 mind, popular passion was diverted, popular combin- 
 ation dissipated, and ruinous resolutions were pre- 
 vented. In an action with the Boeotian horse the 
 Athenian and Thessalian had the advantage, till a 
 body of Peloponnesian foot coming up compelled 
 them to retreat. They so far however vindicated 
 the honour of their arms as to carry off their dead, 
 without a truce, which the defeated usually solicited 
 for the purpose ; and it was not till the next day that 
 the Peloponnesians, in claim of victory, erected a 
 trophy on the field. After some time, provisions Thucyd. 
 beginning to fail in the Peloponnesian camp, and 1- 
 every provocation appearing ineffectual against the 
 resolution of the Athenians not to risk a general 
 engagement, the army moved from Acharnse. Ra- 
 vaging the lands between the mountains Parnes and 
 Brilessus, they proceeded by Oropus, whose territory 
 they also ravaged, into Bosotia, and returning into 
 Peloponnesus dispersed to their several homes. 
 
 While, in this first summer of the war, Attica so 
 suffered, a fleet of a hundred trireme galleys, with a 
 thousand heavy foot and four hundred bowmen, under 
 three commanders, Carcinus, Proteas, and Socrates 
 son of Antigenes, was sent to retaliate devastation 
 upon Peloponnesus. Fifty galleys from Corey ra, and 
 a few from some of the other allies, joined this arma- 
 ment, A descent was made first on the Messenian c .25. 
 coast, and the troops marched toward Methone, a 
 town then ill fortified, and without a garrison. As 
 it was known that there was no considerable military 
 force in the neighbourhood, they encamped, scattered 
 around the place, at the same time to prevent valuables 
 B B 4
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, from being carried out and to collect booty from the 
 country. But Brasidas, who commanded the district 
 with only a hundred Lacedaemonians, piercing their 
 camp, got into Methone ; and by the order which he 
 established among the inhabitants, together with the 
 small force which he brought, (for the Spartans were 
 all bred to be either soldiers or officers as occasion 
 might require,) secured the place against an assault. 2 
 The Athenian commanders finding their design thus 
 frustrated, for it was not at all their purpose to en- 
 gage in a siege, re-embarked their forces. By this 
 bold and successful effort Brasidas gained great credit 
 in Sparta, and became considered as an officer supe- 
 riorly qualified for commands which might require 
 activity and daring exertion. 
 
 The Peloponnesians early found that a navy was 
 not to be created so rapidly as some of their warmer 
 politicians had promised them. A wide extent of 
 coast remained, and was likely to remain, open to the 
 attacks of the Athenian fleet. The land force was 
 again debarked near the Elean town of Phea, which 
 was taken ; the neighbouring country was ravaged, 
 and the Eleans, assembling in haste to protect their 
 property, were defeated. To keep Phea being how- 
 ever no object to the Athenian commanders, the 
 Eleans were no sooner collected in force sufficient to 
 oppose them than they re-embarked their troops, and, 
 proceeding northward along the coast, continued 
 their depredations wherever they found most tempt- 
 
 OVK tvovruv is the phrase used by Thucydides in 
 first speaking of Methone. In the very next sentence he says 
 that Brasidas fSo-^Oei rots lv rS xuptu. His meaning therefore 
 was, that there were no Lacedemonians in the place, and con- 
 sequently no soldiers ; the inhabitants being all unarmed Mes- 
 senians and Helots.
 
 RAVAGES OF THE ATHENIANS. 377 
 
 ation and least danger. They took Solium, a small Thucyd. 
 town on the .^Etolian coast belonging to the Co- 
 rinthians, and gave it to the Acarnanians of Palira. 
 They took Astacus in Acarnania, and, expelling its 
 tyrant Evarchus, they committed the supreme power 
 to the popular assembly, and the city became a mem- 
 ber of the Athenian confederacy. They proceeded 
 then to Cephallenia, which was at that time divided 
 between no less than four republics, Pale, Crane, 
 Same, and Prone. The particularity with which 
 Thucydides describes its situation and circumstances 
 implies that in his time those western islands were 
 little generally known among the Greeks. Without 
 any act of hostility, the whole of Cephallenia was 
 induced to accede to the Athenian alliance. After 
 these considerable services, the armament returned to 
 Attica. 
 
 While war thus was carried into the western seas c.26. 
 of Greece, a squadron of thirty galleys, under Cleo- 
 pompus, sailed eastward and northward, to protect 
 Eubrea, and to annoy the hostile states in its neigh- 
 bourhood, especially Locris. Some of the lands on 
 the Locrian coast were ravaged ; the town of Thro- 
 nium, capitulating, gave hostages to ensure perform- 
 ance of some compact ; probably for paying a subsidy 
 and abstaining from hostility. The Locrians of the 
 other towns, taking the field to relieve Thronium, 
 were defeated at Alope. To prevent depredations c.32. 
 on the Eubrean coast, which the Opuntian Locrians 
 were accustomed to make, the little island of Ata- 
 lanta, near the coast of Locris, was fortified, and a 
 small naval force was stationed there. 
 
 Within Attica meanwhile, after the departure of 
 the Peloponnesian army, the counsels of the admini- 
 stration were diligently directed to provide the best
 
 378 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, security for the country that its exposed situation 
 and the inferiority of its land force would admit : 
 
 posts were occupied on the frontier, and guard-ships 
 were stationed on different parts of the coast. A 
 measure followed which, taking place at the time 
 when Thucydides wrote and Pericles spoke, and while 
 Pericles held the principal influence in the admini- 
 stration, strongly marks both the inherent weakness 
 and the indelible barbarism of democratical govern- 
 ment. A decree of the people directed that a thou- 
 sand talents should be set a part in the treasury in the 
 citadel, as a deposit, not to be touched unless the 
 enemy should attack the city by sea ; a circumstance 
 which implied the prior ruin of the Athenian fleet, 
 and the only one, it was supposed, which could super- 
 induce the ruin of the commonwealth. But in a 
 decree so important, sanctioned only by the present 
 will of that giddy tyrant the multitude of Athens, 
 against whose caprices, since the depression of the 
 court of Areopagus, no balancing power remained, 
 confidence so failed that the denunciation of capital 
 punishment was added against whosoever should pro- 
 pose, and whosoever should concur in, any decree for 
 the disposal of that money to any other purpose, or 
 in any other circumstances. It was at the same time 
 ordered, by the same authority, that a hundred tri- 
 remes should be yearly selected, the best of the fleet, 
 to be employed on the same occasion only. 
 
 Another measure, of no small actual severity, was 
 
 thought justified by public expediency, and by the 
 
 right and the duty of obviating public danger. It 
 
 was judged unsafe to permit a people so inveterately 
 
 Thucyd. inimical as the .ZEginetans, and known to have been 
 
 *" ' active in exciting the war, any longer to hold, though 
 
 under the controul of an Athenian garrison, that island
 
 EXTERMINATION OF THE .EGINETANS. 379 
 
 which had been emphatically termed the Eye-sore of SECT. 
 Piraeus. To disencumber the city of a part of the 
 multitude which so inconveniently crowded it, was 
 also desirable. With this double view the JEginetans 
 were expelled from their island, and a colony of Athe- 
 nians took possession. Thus by the same measure 
 the government was relieved of some portion of the 
 care incumbent on it to provide for citizens who were 
 unable to provide for themselves, and a garrison was 
 maintained in ^Egina without public expense. A Piut. v . 
 distribution of money from the public treasury alle- 
 viated the immediate wants of the remaining poor in 
 Athens. For the exterminated ^Kginetans no pro- 
 vision seems to have been made or proposed by the 
 Athenian government. Instances indeed are so fa- 
 miliar, in Grecian history, of an obnoxious people, 
 a Grecian people, reduced to slavery by a Grecian 
 people, that it might perhaps be thought an act of 
 clemency to allow them to migrate in search of a 
 better lot, which they were fortunate enough to find. 
 The Lacedaemonians gave them the Thyreatis, a small Thucyd. 
 territory on the confines of Laconia and Argolis, of u 
 which they would be as a garrison to protect the 
 former against the inroads from the latter. 3 A few 
 only of the exiles found more peaceful establishments 
 among their friends in other parts of Greece. Among 
 the events of this summer Thucydides mentions a 
 nearly total eclipse of the sun, beginning soon after 3rd Aug. 
 mid-day, which ascertains the chronology. Ann W Thuc. 
 
 3 The failure of mention, by the historian, of any former in- 
 habitants appears to indicate that it had remained uninhabited 
 and uncultivated, being so insecure a possession, divided by lofty 
 mountains from the rest of Laconia, but more open to Argolis, 
 that, unless under Argive protection, it could be an object only 
 for those in the miserable condition of the expelled ^ginetans. ,
 
 380 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. Toward the close of autumn the whole force of 
 Y ' Athens marched, under the command of Pericles, to 
 retaliate the vengeance and reap the profit of ravage, 
 where it could be done most readily, and now with 
 complete security, in the bordering territory of Me- 
 gara. The fleet under Carcinus, just returned. from 
 the western sea, was at .^Egina. Proceeding to the 
 Megarian coast, its land force joined that under Pe- 
 ricles. Thus was formed, according to Thucydides, 
 the largest Athenian army ever assembled in the 
 course of the war. The Athenians were not less 
 than ten thousand, and the Metics, those denizens 
 of Athens who had not the privileges of Athenian 
 citizens, were four thousand heavy-armed foot : the 
 number of light-armed he does not state, saying 
 only that they were a large body. When plunder 
 and waste had been carried as far as circumstances 
 allowed, the whole armament returned to Piraeus and 
 Athens. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Summary view of the, history of Thrace : alliance negotiated by 
 Athens with Sitacles king of Thrace and Perdiccas king of 
 Macedonia. Public funeral at Athens in honour of the slain in 
 their country's service. Expedition of the Corinthians against 
 Acarnania and Cephallenia. 
 
 DURING these, the principal military transactions 
 of the first summer of the war, negotiation had been 
 diligently prosecuted by the Athenian government, 
 chiefly with the view to provide security for that re- 
 venue, arising in tribute from transmarine Grecian 
 states, which enabled Athens to maintain the most 
 powerful navy then in the world, and to withstand 
 the superior land force of the Peloponnesian con-
 
 THRACE. 381 
 
 federacy. The enmity of the king of Macedonia SECT. 
 threatened inconvenience ; and, especially to obviate . 
 this, an improvement of friendly connexion with the 
 extensive monarchy of Thrace was desirable. 
 
 Thrace, as we have formerly observed, appears to 
 have been occupied in early times by the same Pe- 
 lasgian hordes who principally gave origin to the 
 Grecian people. But instead of advancing with the 
 Greeks in knowledge and civilisation, those glimmer- 
 ings of science which, according to the oldest Gre- 
 cian traditions, beamed upon their country before 
 they reached Greece, were totally lost ; and two pre- 
 judices, perhaps brought by hordes from the moun- 
 tains of the interior, who overwhelmed the civilised 
 inhabitants of the coast, becoming leading principles 
 over the whole nation, made the Thracians incor- 
 rigibly barbarous : ' To live by war and rapine/ says Herodot. 
 Herodotus, * is their delight and their glory ; and ' ' c< ' 
 * nothing they esteem so dishonourable as agriculture.' 
 A most indispensable ornament of their persons was 
 to have the skin punctured in various figures ; a 
 whimsical practice of barbarism, remarkable for its 
 extension ; found anciently among our ancestors the 
 Britons, in the extreme of the old world, and lately 
 among their antipodes in the little islands of the Pa- 
 cific ocean ; who, but for the wonderful improve- 
 ments of modern European navigation, must have 
 remained ever equally unknown to the people of the 
 old world, and of what has been called the new. 
 Between mount Haemus and the Danube lived the 
 Getes, founders, it has been supposed, of the Gothic 
 name ; a Thracian people, according to Thucydides, Thucyd. 
 but still more barbarous than the other Thracians ; l $' c>96 
 resembling in manners the Scythians, who wandered, 
 to an unknown extent, over the vast continent to the
 
 382 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, northward and north-eastward of the Danube and the 
 
 XIV. 
 
 Under Darius the whole of the Thracian country 
 had been brought to acknowledge the Persian do- 
 minion. The retreat of the Persians out of Europe, 
 after the defeat of Xerxes, appears to have given op- 
 portunity for forming among its people an empire 
 such as had been before unknown. Of what wars or 
 what policy led to it information fails ; but we are 
 assured that Teres, chief of the Odrysian clan, became 
 sovereign of all the Thracians, from the .^Egean sea 
 to the Danube, and from the Euxine to the Strymon ; 
 a country considerably larger than all Greece. Some 
 mountaineers of the borders, and some clans of the 
 plains, in the central part of the continent beyond 
 the Strymon, alone maintained independency. The 
 Grecian towns on the coast, all for safety to their 
 commerce paying tribute to Athens, found it con- 
 venient also to pay tribute to the Thracian prince for 
 safety to their lands. So far then owning subjection, 
 and contributing to the strength and splendour of the 
 monarchy, they were not objects of jealousy and op- 
 pression, but rather of protection and encouragement; 
 for the Thracians, wealthy by the possession of ample 
 and fruitful territory, by the produce of mines of the 
 richest metals, and by the command of numerous tri- 
 butaries, scorning to employ themselves in agriculture 
 or commerce, did not despise conveniencies, or even 
 luxuries, which only agriculture and commerce can 
 give. 
 
 On the death of Teres the extensive monarchy of 
 Thrace devolved to his son Sitalces, who had mar- 
 ried the sister of Nymphodorus, a citizen of the Gre- 
 cian town of Abdera, one of the subject dependencies 
 of Athens. An advantageous opening was thus
 
 THRACE. 383 
 
 offered to the Athenian government for improving SECT. 
 their interest with the Thracian king. Through 
 Nymphodorus an alliance was formed with Sitalces : 
 and, such was the ascendency which the little republics 
 of Greece had acquired among foreign nations, Sa- 
 docus, eldest son of the powerful monarch of Thrace, 
 accepted, as a valuable honour, his admission to the 
 name and privileges of one of the Athenian people. 
 The brother-in-law of Sitalces then undertook to be 
 mediator between the king of Macedonia and the 
 Athenian commonwealth ; and, for the cession of the 
 town of Therme to him in sovereignty, Perdiccas 
 joined the Thracian prince in the Athenian alliance. 
 
 Winter setting in, and military operations being 
 suspended, Pericles did not neglect the means, which 
 established custom offered, for animating the Athe- 
 nian people in the cause in which they were engaged, 
 and converting even the calamities of war into an 
 occasion of triumph. The funeral of those who had 
 fallen in their country's service was publicly so- 
 lemnised ; and the manner of it remains particularly 
 described by Thucydides. Three days before the Thucyd. 
 ceremony of burial, the bones, collected from the ' 2 ' c> ' 
 bodies previously burnt according to the ordinary 
 practice of the Greeks, were arranged under an ample 
 awning. While thus, according to the modern phrase, 
 they lay in state, it was usual for the relations to 
 visit them, and throw on any thing that fancy or 
 superstition gave to imagine a grateful offering to 
 the spirits of the deceased, or honourable to their 
 memory among the living. The day of the burial 
 being arrived, the bones were placed in ten chests of 
 cypress-wood, raised on carriages, one for each ward 
 of Attica ; and an eleventh carriage bore an empty 
 bier with a pall, in honour of those whose bodies could
 
 381 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. 
 XIV. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 ibid. 
 
 not be recovered. Procession was then made in solemn 
 march to the public tomb in the Ceramicus, the most 
 Thucyd. beautiful suburb of the city ; the female relations of 
 & 2 Not' 3 ed * ne deceased attending, and, according to the Grecian 
 custom, venting their lamentations aloud. From the 
 time when the ceremony was instituted, the tomb in 
 the Ceramicus had been the receptacle of all who 
 had been honoured with a public funeral, excepting 
 those who had fallen at Marathon ; who, for the su- 
 pereminence of their merit, and the singular glory of 
 the action, had been buried in the field of battle, 
 where their peculiar monument was raised over them. 
 Always a person of superior dignity and acknowledged 
 eminent ability was appointed by the people to speak 
 the funeral panegyric. On the actual occasion every 
 circumstance directed the public choice to Pericles. 
 When therefore the ceremony of entombing was over, 
 Pericles passed through the crowd to a lofty stand 
 raised for the occasion, so that he might be heard by 
 the attending multitude the most extensively possible; 
 and thence delivered that oration, the heads of which 
 at least Thucydides, who was probably present, has, 
 from his own professions, it is to be presumed, faith- 
 fully collected, preserving in a great degree even the 
 phrases. It remains to us a finished model of the 
 simple and severe sublime in oratory, which, in its 
 original language, has been the admiration of all 
 succeeding ages ; but which must sink in any trans- 
 lation, denies abridgment, and defies either imitation 
 or paraphrase, perhaps beyond any composition that 
 ever was committed to writing. 
 
 1.2. c.33. The winter was not for all parts of Greece, as for 
 Athens, a season of repose. Evarchus, the expelled 
 tyrant of Astacus in Acarnania, applied to Corinth 
 
 1.1. c.22. 
 1.1. c.35. 
 &46.
 
 COUNSELS OF PERICLES AND ARCHIDAMUS. 385 
 
 for assistance to restore him to his little dominion. SECT. 
 The ancients rarely ventured upon maritime expedi- 
 tions in short days and stormy seasons ; the narrow- 
 ness of their seas, the height and rockiness of their 
 coast, the frequency of sudden squalls, and the want 
 of a guide in cloudy weather, rendering it far more 
 dangerous than where the ocean is at hand, and, in a 
 stout vessel, under guidance of the compass, distance 
 from land is safety. The zeal of Corinth however 
 was not to be deterred. Forty ships of war and 
 fifteen hundred heavy foot, under Euphamidas, with 
 some auxiliary mercenaries raised by Evarchus, re- 
 covered Astacus. Attempts were made upon some 
 other towns of Acarnania, but without success. The 
 Corinthians then moving homeward debarked in Ce- 
 phallenia on the Cranasan lands. The Cranseans, 
 amusing them with the pretence of a disposition to 
 capitulate, attacked them unawares, and forced them 
 to re-embark with loss. Without attempting anything 
 farther they then returned to Corinth. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 Second invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians. Pestilence at 
 Athens. Operations of the Athenian fleet on the Pelopon- 
 nesian coast under Pericles ; and on the Macedonian coasf 
 under Agnon. Effects of popular discontent at Athens. First 
 effort of the Peloponnesian fleet. Attempt of the Pelopon- 
 nesians to send an embassy into Persia. Barbarity of the 
 Grecian system of war. An Athenian squadron stationed in 
 the western sea. Surrender of Potiddcea to the Athenians. 
 Death of Pericles. 
 
 THE events of the first campaign justify the wisdom 
 both of Pericles and of Archidamus in the counsels 
 they respectively gave before the commencement of 
 hostilites. The Peloponnesians were evidently not 
 prepared to wage offensive war against Athens with 
 
 VOL, it. c c
 
 386 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, any advantage. A considerable part of Attica had 
 ' been ravaged ; the harvest had been consumed, carried 
 off, or destroyed. But Athens could support that 
 * loss ; and the Athenian fleets had meanwhile, with 
 less expense and inconvenience, and probably with 
 more profit, been dealing destruction and gathering 
 spoil in various parts of Peloponnesus and its confe- 
 derate states. At the same time negotiations had 
 been concluded which promised great access of 
 strength to Athens for the campaigns to ensue ; 
 while the Peloponnesians, endeavouring also to ex- 
 tend their alliances, had nowhere yet succeeded. 
 B.C. 430. In the second year the Peloponnesian army was 
 assembled in spring ; and, toward the beginning of 
 summer, under the command of Archidamus, again 
 entered and ravaged Attica. But a natural calamity, 
 far more terrible than the swords of their enemies, 
 now attacked the Athenians ; a pestilential fever, in 
 many points nearly resembling that scourge which, 
 under the name of the plague, has been, in modern 
 times, continually desolating the fine climates of the 
 east ; yet, according to the accurate Thucydides, 
 differing in some essential circumstances. It was 
 then new to the Greeks. Like the modern plague, 
 it was supposed to have originated in Ethiopia ; 
 whence, passing into Egypt, it was quickly commu- 
 nicated over the greater part of the Persian empire. 
 Among; the Greeks it was first observed in some 
 
 o 
 
 towns of the Asian coast, and of the neighbouring 
 islands, particularly Lemnos. Its first appearance 
 among the Athenians was in Piraeus ; and so little 
 were they aware how it came, or what it was, that a 
 fancy arose, and gained some credit among them, 
 that the wells had been poisoned by the Pelopon- 
 nesians. Quickly it made its way into the upper
 
 PESTILENCE AT ATHENS. 387 
 
 town, as Athens was often called, and then the mor- SECT. 
 tality increased rapidly. What was the cause of this 
 malady, says Thucydides, I will leave to others to 
 investigate ; but I will describe its effects, which I 
 can undertake to do exactly ; having both experienced 
 them in my own person, and seen numbers of others 
 under the same affliction. 
 
 The year, it is universally acknowledged, was re- Thucyd. 
 markably healthy till the pestilence appeared ; and 2< c ' 49 " 
 then every existing sickness seemed to change into 
 that one, or lost its symptoms in the violence of the 
 supervening disorder. Persons, apparently in perfect 
 health, were suddenly seized, first with extreme heat 
 in the head, attended with particular redness and 
 inflammation of the eyes ; then quickly the tongue 
 and throat assumed a bloody appearance, the breath 
 became fetid, frequent sneezing followed, with hoarse- 
 ness of the voice ; and before long the breast laboured, 
 and a violent cough ensued. The stomach was then 
 affected ; evacuations in all ways followed, attended 
 with excessive colicky pains, and often with violent 
 hiccoughs and spasms. The flesh meanwhile, not 
 externally hot to the touch, appeared reddish and 
 livid, and broke out in pustules and ulcers. But the 
 internal fever was such that the patient could scarcely 
 bear the lightest covering ; and what the affection of 
 the moment gave to imagine as the most agreeable 
 relief, was to plunge into cold water. Many of the 
 poorer sort, ill attended, ran to the wells, and there 
 indulged in extreme the immediate calls of immode- 
 rate thirst. Through the whole of the disorder to 
 sleep was impossible ; yet, considering the violence of 
 the symptoms, the sufferers were less weakened than 
 might have been expected. The fever was mostly 
 spent by the seventh, or, at farthest, by the ninth 
 
 c c 2
 
 388 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, day ; and if the patient resisted so long, he was gene- 
 ' rally left not without some strength to combat what 
 
 was to follow. But the ulceration of the bowels, 
 which then took place, and the flux in consequence, 
 destroyed numbers. For the disease, beginning with 
 the head, pervaded the whole body, and finally fixed 
 upon the extremities ; so that some who had sup- 
 ported all the vehemence of its attack upon the vital 
 parts, survived, not without the loss of their hands, 
 their feet, their privy members, or their eyes. Some 
 were totally deprived of memory ; on their recovery 
 not knowing their nearest friends, nor even them- 
 selves. The extreme and singular virulence of the 
 disorder appeared also remarkably in the refusal of 
 Thucyd. animals of prey to touch the numerous unburied 
 
 1 2 c 50 
 
 corpses, and in the death which ensued to the more 
 ravenous few which fed on them. Of birds of prey 
 indeed there was a very remarkable scarcity, almost 
 a dereliction of the country, so that the effect was 
 observed principally in dogs. 
 
 c. si. For this terrible disease the skill of physicians was 
 
 found utterly vain, and all attempted remedies were 
 either useless or totally uncertain ; what seemed to 
 relieve some patients appearing even injurious to 
 others. Nor did any strength of constitution avail ; 
 but the robust and the infirm were nearly equally 
 affected. Among the first symptoms, and the most 
 grievous, an extreme dejection of spirits was almost 
 universal ; the patient lost the ability even to struggle 
 for life ; and this despondency was rendered the more 
 fatal by the infectious nature of the disorder, which 
 either deterred assistance, or quickly involved the 
 attendants upon the sick in the same evil and the 
 same inability with those whom they served, or to 
 whom their charity was afforded. Many therefore
 
 PESTILENCE AT ATHENS. 389 
 
 died wholly unattended ; while others received little SECT. 
 advantage from every assistance that could be given. 
 One only comforting circumstance appeared to alle- 
 viate this dreadful calamity ; different from the 
 modern plague, the disease was among those which, 
 through some inscrutable management of Providence, 
 the human frame is incapable of receiving more than 
 once ; or, if not perfectly secured by once suffering 
 against all future injury from the virulence of the 
 infectious matter, yet incapable of receiving twice 
 the full force of the disorder. Of those who had 
 recovered from the Athenian pestilence none were 
 again so infected by any communication with the 
 diseased as to appear in any danger of their lives. 
 Thus hope first shone upon the sick, upon those yet 
 in health, and upon those who had borne the disease ; 
 thus alarm first ceased to be universal, and thus the 
 Athenian people seemed at length warranted against 
 that utter extinction which the effects of the disorder 
 had appeared to threaten. 
 
 The mortality was however tremendous ; and the Thucyd. 
 misery was greatly enhanced by the increase of mul- L2 ' c ' 52 ' 
 titude in the city, which the war had occasioned. 
 The want of sewers, a convenience unknown in Gre- strabo, 
 cian towns, and of which the Romans appear to have 
 given the first example, would also be severely felt 
 upon this occasion. 4 It was the hot season ; and not 
 
 4 The necessity of a drain for the marshy soil, as well as of 
 a vent for the filth which accumulated in the hollow between the 
 Palatine hill and the Capitoline, seems to have given occasion to 
 that wonderful structure the Cloaca Maxima at Rome, perhaps 
 the first and the greatest of its kind. Sewers are seen among 
 the ruins of Carthage, or were so when Shaw visited the site 
 of that city in the beginning of the past century ; but whether 
 Carthaginian works or Roman, does not appear. Shaw's Travels,. 
 p. 151. ed. fol. 1738. 
 
 C C 3
 
 390 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, only every house was fully occupied, but very many 
 ' families of the poorer people were crowded together 
 in stifling huts, where they died in heaps. To bury 
 all regularly was impossible : corpses were rolled out 
 into the streets, and there left ; and numbers were 
 to be found dead and dying about every fountain, 
 whither intolerable thirst impelled them to seek relief. 
 What would before have been esteemed a portentous 
 pollution became now familiar ; the temples of the 
 gods, occupied as the habitations of men, were filled 
 with dead bodies. Funeral rites were not less pro- 
 faned, and a singular kind of robbery became com- 
 mon. When those who had means of burning the 
 bodies of their deceased friends, according to the 
 established practice, had formed their funeral pile, 
 others would put on their dead, and immediately set 
 fire to it. With less scruple, of course, where a pile 
 was found burning, many, without ceremony, would 
 throw on it a corpse, and go their way. 
 
 The moral effects of this extraordinary visitation, 
 reported by that judicious eye-witness to whom we 
 owe this detail, deserve notice. Wherever the doc- 
 trine of retribution in a life to come, for good and 
 evil deeds in this world, has taken any hold on the 
 minds of men, a general calamity strongly tends to 
 check the passions, to inspire serious thought, to 
 direct attention toward that future existence, and to 
 make both hope and fear converge to the great 
 Author of nature, the all-powerful, all-wise, and all- 
 just God, who can recompense the sufferings of the 
 good with endless blessings, and convert to lasting 
 misery any short-lived joys that can arise from the 
 perpetration of evil. But in Athens, where the Deity 
 was looked to very generally and very anxiously, 
 and almost only, for the dispensation of temporal
 
 EFFECTS OF .THE PESTILENCE. 
 
 good and evil, it was otherwise. 5 The fear of the SECT. 
 divine power, says Thucydides, ceased ; for it was ' 
 
 observed, that to worship or not to worship the gods, 
 to obey or not to obey those laws of morality which 
 have always been held most sacred among men, 
 availed nothing. All died alike ; or, if there was a 
 difference, the virtuous, the charitable, the generous, 
 exposing themselves beyond others, were the first 
 and the surest to suffer. An inordinate, and before 
 unknown, licentiousness of manners followed. Let 
 us enjoy ourselves, let us, if possible, drown thought 
 in pleasure to-day, for to-morrow we die, was the 
 prevailing maxim. No crime therefore that could 
 give prospect of any enjoyment was scrupled ; for 
 such were the ravages of the disease that for per- 
 petrator, accuser, and judges, all to survive, so that 
 an offender could be convicted in regular course of 
 law, was supposed against all chance. The final con- 
 summation already impending over equally the 
 criminal and the innocent, by the decree of fate or 
 of the gods, any punishment that human laws could 
 decree was little regarded. How most to enjoy life 
 while life remained became the only consideration; 
 and this relaxation, almost to a dissolution of all 
 moral principle, is lamented by Thucydides as a 
 lasting effect of the pestilence of Athens. 
 
 The Peloponnesian army had already begun the ximcyd. 
 ravage of Attica when the pestilence was first publicly 54' cA7 ' 
 observed. They wasted all the vale of Athens, and 
 then proceeded through the sea- side country, more 
 fruitful and better cultivated than the inland hills, 
 
 5 Anaxagoras, the preceptor of Pericles, seems to have been 
 the first who taught that better religion, if the term may be 
 allowed, which was afterward propagated by Socrates and his 
 disciples, and he was persecuted for it as an atheist. 
 
 C C 4>
 
 392 HISTORY OF. GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, toward the silver-mines of mount Laurium. The firm 
 ' mind of Pericles meanwhile was not to be depressed 
 by all the calamities which surrounded him, nor by 
 all the terrors which threatened, from the war, from 
 the pestilence, and, above all, from the irritation and 
 despair of the despotic people whose minister he was. 
 Steadily persevering in his former policy, of avoiding 
 any decisive action with the land force of the enemy, 
 he prosecuted offensive operations by sea as if Athens 
 were under no affliction ; thinking probably in some 
 Thucyd. degree to divert the public mind from brooding over 
 c.56. domestic misfortune, and to suspend any rising acri- 
 mony against himself. He took the command of the 
 armament destined against Peloponnesus, consisting 
 of a fleet of a hundred Athenian and fifty Chian and 
 Lesbian triremes, with an army of four thousand foot 
 and three hundred horse. It appears from Thucy- 
 dides that this was the first instance of the cavalry 
 of any Grecian state going on an expedition by sea ; 
 though the practice was not new to the Asiatics, the 
 Persians having, sixty years before, sent a large force 
 of horse across the .^Egean under Datis and Arta- 
 phernes. Vessels were sometimes built, sometimes 
 only fitted, for the purpose, with the name of hippa- 
 gogi, horse-transports. For the present occasion some 
 old triremes were converted under the direction of Pe- 
 ricles. The first descent was made on the Epidaurian 
 territory, the greater part of which was ravaged. The 
 operations of waste and plunder were then continued 
 along the coast, through the Trcezenian, Halian, and 
 Hermionian lands. The troops being then re-em- 
 barked, the fleet, having passed the friendly Argive 
 coast, a second descent was made in Laconia, near 
 the town of PrasiaB, which was taken. Ravage then 
 having been extended through the neighbouring
 
 EMBASSY TO LACED.3EMON. 393 
 
 country, as far as circumstances permitted, the whole SECT. 
 armament returned to Piraeus and Athens. The ' 
 
 country was then clear of an enemy. The Pelopon- 
 nesians, alarmed by the accounts given by deserters, 
 probably slaves, of the rapid progress of the pestilence, 
 and of its fatal effects in Athens, and seeing the fre- 
 quent blazing of funeral piles, had hastened their re- 
 treat homeward, about the fortieth day after entering 
 Attica. 
 
 The Athenian armament soon sailed again under Thucyd. 
 Agnon son of Nicias, and Cleopompus son of Clinias, 
 two of the nine colleagues of Pericles in the supreme 
 military command. The purpose was to press the 
 siege of Potidaea, which remained still blockaded by 
 Phormion. This was apparently an ill-judged, and 
 certainly an unfortunate measure. The fresh troops, 
 carrying with them the pestilential disorder from 
 Athens, not only fell themselves in great numbers, ibid. & 
 
 1 3 r 17 
 
 but communicated the infection to Phormion's army, 
 which had before been healthy. After losing, within 
 forty days, no fewer than fifteen hundred of his four 
 thousand foot, Agnon returned with the remainder 
 to Attica. Phormion, with about three thousand, 
 continued the blockade of Potidaga. 
 
 Accumulated evils, public and private, at length 1.2.0.59. 
 irritated beyond sufferance the minds of the Athe- 
 nian people. Popular discontent will find an object 
 on which to vent itself, and that object now was Pe- 
 ricles. Such was the depression of the public spirit 
 that ambassadors were sent to Lacedaamon, to try the 
 temper of the Peloponnesians, and endeavour to ne- 
 gotiate a peace ; but as the Athenians drooped, the 
 Lacedaemonians and their allies became arrogant, and 
 the negotiation failed. The shame of disappointment 
 and increased apprehension from the failure, being
 
 394- HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, thus added to former popular feelings, the ferment 
 " was such that Pericles judged it expedient more than 
 
 previously to hold communication with the sovereign 
 multitude. In his capacity of general of the com- 
 monwealth, or first of the board of war, if we may 
 so express it, he had a right to summon the general 
 assembly whenever he thought proper. The people 
 met, and he mounted the speaker's stand. He began 
 his oration with urging a maxim applicable to all 
 states, but the force of which would be more particu- 
 Thucyd. larly sensible in the little Grecian republics, * That 
 
 * every individual has a deeper interest in the public 
 ' than in his private prosperity ; for the decay of 
 
 * private affluence must ever be involved with the 
 
 * country's ruin ; but while the country flourishes op- 
 
 * portunity will be open for the recovery of private 
 ' fortune.' He proceeded then to assert, with manly 
 confidence, his own claim to the merit of integrity 
 above suspicion, and to reproach the people with that 
 want of firmness which disposed them to impute, as 
 a crime to him, a public misfortune, impossible equally 
 to be prevented and to be foreseen ; and which could 
 reasonably be ascribed only to the inscrutable will of 
 
 c. 61, 62. the Deity. * So far then,' he added, ' from having 
 1 just cause for that despondency which infected them, 
 
 * they were still in full possession of what, well used, 
 
 * would give them certain superiority over all their 
 ' enemies. No potentate upon earth possessed such 
 
 * a navy as theirs, nor could any one prescribe bounds 
 
 * to the empire which they might acquire by it. Such 
 
 * an opinion he never had declared before ; and, but 
 ' for the universal depression of the public mind, he 
 
 * would not now have uttered a truth too flattering 
 c to 'them, and too alarming to all the world besides. 
 ' What then were their houses and fields, the mo-
 
 ORATION OF PEMCLES. 
 
 ' mentary loss of which they deplored, in comparison SECT. 
 
 * with such a possession ? To others indeed neces- _ 
 
 * saries ; but to them merely incidental decorations 
 ' of high fortune ; or, at most, luxuries and super- 
 ' fluous conveniencies, with which they might well, 
 
 * for a time, dispense. Their fleet, on the contrary, 
 ' was truly essential ; not only to their command, but 
 
 * to their independency ; not only to their prosperity, 
 
 * but to their safety against the revenge which that 
 
 * invidious empire, that tyranny which they had long Thucyd. 
 
 * extensively held 6 , could not fail to excite. What - 2 - c>63 ' 
 ' we suffer from the gods,' continued Pericles, ' we <?.64. 
 
 ' should bear with patience ; what from our enemies, 
 
 * with manly firmness ; and such were the maxims of 
 
 * our forefathers. From unshaken fortitude in mis- 
 
 * fortune hath arisen the present power of this com- 
 
 * monwealth, together with that glory which, if our 
 
 * empire, according to the lot of all earthly things, 
 
 * decay, shall still survive to all posterity. Let no 
 
 * more begging embassies then be sent to Lacedas- 
 
 * mon, nor let it any way appear that you are sinking 
 
 * under your misfortunes ; but be assured that the 
 
 * steadiest resistance will bring our troubles to their 
 
 * best conclusion.' 
 
 This speech had not all the effect which Pericles c.es. 
 hoped from it. So far he prevailed that it was de- 
 termined no more to take any measure bearing the 
 appearance of suing for peace from Sparta. But the 
 acrimony excited among the people by their private 
 sufferings was not to be immediately appeased : many 
 of the poor were reduced to total want, while the 
 rich bore with extreme uneasiness the loss of revenue 
 from their estates in Attica, the destruction of their 
 country-houses, their favourite residences, and the 
 
 ** 'fi? Tvpawfia yap ?j8j e%er avTyy (r^v
 
 396 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, waste of all the expense bestowed on them. But 
 what now, says Thucydides, principally affected all 
 was, that instead of peace they had war ; not, as often 
 formerly, war far from home, but all the present evils 
 of war at their doors, and apprehension of conse- 
 quences which could not be considered without shud- 
 dering. The ferment did not subside till Pericles 
 
 O 
 
 was deposed from his military command, and mulcted 
 in a heavy fine. 7 
 
 At the same time with this public disgrace, Peri- 
 cles was suffering under the severest domestic mis- 
 fortunes. Several of his children, some in this year, 
 some in the former, had died of the pestilence ; which, 
 with the return of warm weather, had broken out again 
 in Athens. The same cruel disorder had deprived 
 him of others of his nearest relations, together with 
 some of those invaluable friends in whose assistance 
 he could best confide for the administration of public 
 affairs. During these successive and complicated 
 scenes of private woe, rendered more distracting by 
 the public calamity, and the pressure of that popular 
 discontent which arose from it, the firmness of his 
 mind was the admiration of all around him. That 
 philosophy, then new in Greece, which had been the 
 favourite study of his leisure, inculcated rather the 
 pride of disdaining to complain, and of being above 
 the feelings of humanity, than a just resignation to 
 the will of a Supreme Being, infinitely wise and good ; 
 
 7 Thucydides, in mentioning the fine, does not name the sum. 
 According to Diodorus, if we may trust our copies, it was no 
 less than eighty talents, about nineteen thousand pounds ster- 
 ling. (Diod. 1. 12. c. 45.) But Plutarch says that, among 
 various accounts extant in his time, none made it exceed fifty 
 talents, about twelve thousand five hundred pounds ; whereas 
 some asserted it to have been no more than fifteen, less than 
 four thousand pounds sterling.
 
 RESTORATION OF PERICLES. 397 
 
 though such a Being it acknowledged for the author SECT. 
 and preserver of nature. No complaint was heard ' 
 
 from the disciple of Anaxagoras, no change of counte- 
 nance or manner was perceptible in him, till he lost 
 his favourite son Paralus. Even then he would not 
 seem to feel the anguish which oppressed him. But 
 when, according to custom, in the funeral ceremony, 
 he approached the bier to put the chaplet on the pi ut . v . 
 head of the deceased youth, the sight overcame him, Pencl> 
 and he burst into tears. 8 In this accumulation of 
 distress to retire from public business was, in the 
 moment, a relief. 
 
 But the people had no sooner vented their anger 
 than they repented of what they had done : the keen 
 sensation of distress in their private affairs, says the 
 contemporary historian, abated, while, upon reflec- 
 tion, they became aware that no other man was qua- 
 lified, like Pericles, for the supreme direction of public 
 business. First, or equal to any, in birth, clearly 
 superior in abilities, eminent in tried integrity, in all 
 together he had not a second. None of the other 
 orators therefore, with all the support of faction they 
 were able to muster, could satisfy the multitude. 
 With loud and anxious voices Pericles was called to 
 mount the bema, and declare his opinion of public 
 affairs ; what was the situation of things, and what 
 measures, in his judgment, ought to be taken. He 
 did not refuse to obey the honourable summons ; and 
 
 8 According to Plutarch, Pericles lost all his legitimate sons 
 by the pestilence, one of his own name, who survived him, being 
 illegitimate. But Xenophon mentions Pericles, son of- Pericles, 
 without noticing any irregularity of his birth (Xen. Mem. 
 Socr. 1. 3. c. 5.) ; and it appears that he long survived his father. 
 Plato also speaks of a son or sons of Pericles surviving him, and 
 not as illegitimate.
 
 98 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, quickly a strong reflux of popular favour restored him 
 to the situation of commander in chief and prime 
 minister, if we may use the term, the nearest which 
 modern language affords, but inadequate to express 
 the plenitude of that power, which absolute possession 
 of the favour of the people gave him over the Athenian 
 empire. 9 
 
 hucyd. While Athens, weakened by the pestilence, and 
 
 2. c.66. . . . . , . i i. i i , 
 
 labouring with internal discord and depression of 
 public spirit, was in some degree disabled for exertion, 
 the Peloponnesians, for the first time, ventured upon 
 a naval expedition. A hundred triremes, with a 
 thousand heavy-armed Lacedaemonians, sailed to Za- 
 cynthus ; an Achaean colony, but of the Athenian 
 confederacy. The troops debarking ravaged great 
 part of the open country. But the fortified places 
 all either deterred or resisted their efforts : the people 
 could neither by threats nor promises be induced to 
 treat, and the armament returned home. 
 .67. Toward the end of the summer a measure was taken 
 
 rod( *- in another line, from which more important advan- 
 tages were expected. An embassy was appointed to 
 go to the Persian court, with a view to negotiate an 
 alliance, and particularly to obtain pecuniary as- 
 sistance. It consisted of three Lacedaemonians, 
 Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Pratodemus, with the Co- 
 rinthian Aristeus, the Tegean Timagoras, and Polis an 
 Argive, who went unauthorised by his own common- 
 wealth ; whence it appears that he was of the party 
 in opposition to the ruling party there. But means 
 to make their journey to Susa were not obvious ; for 
 the Athenians commanded all the western coast of 
 
 ov flXovro KO,} noivrct no. n pay pa-roc, ficeTpe^av. Thucyd. 
 
 1. 2. c. 65.
 
 LAW OF RETALIATION. 399 
 
 Asia Minor with the Hellespont ; and the hazards SECT. 
 that might attend the unusual passage by the way of 
 Phoenicia were many to their knowledge, and probably 
 many which they could not know. It was therefore 
 determined to go first to the court of Sitalces king of 
 Thrace, whose alliance with Athens did not bind him 
 to be the enemy of Lacedsemon ; hopes on the con- 
 trary being entertained of detaching him from the 
 Athenian interest; and his protection, it was reckoned, 
 might be trusted for the journey through his dominion 
 to the satrapy of Pharnaces, on the Asiatic side of 
 the Hellespont, whence the progress to Susa, though 
 long, would be secure. Though two Athenian mi- 
 nisters, Learchus and Aminiades, were with the 
 Thracian prince, the Lacedaemonians found a gra- 
 cious reception ; but their endeavours to withdraw 
 him from the Athenian alliance failed. No opposi- 
 tion to their journey however occurred,' and they 
 proceeded. The Athenian ministers, equally unable 
 to engage Sitalces in all their views, found however 
 the zeal of an Athenian citizen in Sadocus his eldest 
 son. That prince took upon himself to send a party, 
 under the orders of Learchus and Aminiades, in 
 pursuit of the Peloponnesian ministers, who were 
 seized before they could cross the Hellespont. Being 
 conveyed to Athens, a decree of the people, without 
 a trial, consigned them to the executioner. Thucy- 
 dides acknowledges the most illiberal policy in his 
 fellow-countrymen as, in part at least, instigating this 
 measure : they dreaded the enterprising abilities of 
 the Corinthian Aristeus, which had been conspicuous 
 in operations against them in Chalcidice and Mace- 
 donia. The law of retaliation was alleged in justi- 
 fication of it ; and such was the illiberal and cruel 
 spirit of war among the ancients that the law of re-
 
 400 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, taliation might generally be pleaded to justify almost 
 any atrocity. From the beginning of the war the La- 
 
 Thucyd. cedaemonians, wherever they seized merchant-ships of 
 the Athenians or their allies, or even of the neutral 
 Greeks, had usually put the crews to death. 
 
 c.68,69. Such were the transactions of the summer. In the 
 beginning of winter circumstances arose, in the north- 
 western parts of Greece, to call the attention of the 
 Athenian administration ; and Phormion, recalled 
 from his command in Chalcidice, was sent with a 
 squadron of twenty ships to block the Corinthian 
 gulf. Meanwhile, though the Peloponnesians had 
 no fleet at sea, yet their privateers 10 , harbouring on 
 the coasts of Caria and Lycia, had been annoying the 
 Athenian trade with Asia Minor and the eastern parts 
 of the Mediterranean. A squadron of six triremes 
 was thought sufficient, to prevent such depredations, 
 and also to collect the tributes from the dependent 
 states in those parts. But Melisander, who com- 
 manded, undertaking an expedition up the country 
 of Lycia with the troops of his little squadron and 
 some auxiliaries which he collected, was overpowered 
 in an action in which he lost his life. 
 
 c . 70. The winter was not far advanced when the Po- 
 
 ^, tidamns, pressed by famine so that they had begun, 
 the historian says, to eat one another, and hopeless 
 of succour, desired to capitulate. Xenophon, son of 
 Euripides, who with two other generals commanded 
 the besieging army, considering what their troops 
 must suffer in winter operations, and what expense 
 the commonwealth had already incurred by the siege, 
 which was not less than two thousand talents, about 
 
 10 To XTJO-TJKOV TUV Ue^oirovvvja-iuv. Thucyd. 1. 2. C. 69.
 
 DEATH: OF PERICLES. 401 
 
 five hundred thousand pounds sterling, was induced SECT. 
 to treat. The garrison and people were allowed to 
 quit the place ; the men each with one garment, the 
 women with two ; and both with a small specified sum 
 of money, which might enable them to travel to such 
 retreats as they could find in Chalcidice, or elsewhere 
 in the neighbouring country. Xenophon and his 
 colleagues did not escape censure from their sovereign, 
 the Athenian people, for granting, without first con- 
 sulting them, terms, even such terms ; the Potidseans 
 being considered as meriting vengeance, and, after 
 the surrender it was found, were incapable of longer 
 resistance. Thus however the Athenians, unable, in 
 their full strength, to defend their own country, yet 
 persevering amid affliction, gained that distant object 
 of contention which had given immediate rise to the 
 war. 
 
 Pericles lived probably to know the success of the 
 Athenian arms against Potidaea, and it was not long 
 after that he fell a victim to that calamity, the en- 
 demial disorder, which had already carried off so 
 many of his nearest relations, and most valued friends. 
 He survived however the violence of the fever, and piut. v. 
 died in full possession of his senses, of a lingering Penc1 ' 
 illness which it superinduced. 
 
 No man seems to have been held in such estimation 
 by most of the ablest writers of Rome equally as of 
 Greece for universal superiority of talents as Pericles. 
 The accounts remaining of his actions hardly support 
 his renown ; which was yet perhaps more fairly earned 
 than that of many, the merit of whose achievements 
 has been in a great degree due to others acting under 
 them, whose very names have perished. The philo- 
 sophy of Pericles taught him not to be vain-glorious, 
 but to rest his fame upon essentially great and good, 
 
 VOL. II. D D
 
 402 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, rather than upon brilliant actions. It is observed by 
 ' Plutarch that, often as he commanded the Athenian 
 forces, he never was defeated ; yet, though he won 
 many trophies, he never gained a splendid victory. 
 Saxe'sMe- A battle, according to a great modern authority, is 
 the resource of ignorant generals : when they know 
 not what to do, they fight a battle. It was almost 
 universally the resource of the age of Pericles : little 
 conception was entertained of military operations 
 beyond ravage and a battle. His genius led him to 
 a superior system, which the wealth of his country 
 enabled him to carry into .practice. His favourite 
 maxim was to spare the lives of his soldiers ; and 
 scarcely any general ever gained so many important 
 advantages with so little bloodshed. It is said to 
 have been his consolation and his boast, in his dying 
 hours, that he never was the cause that a fellow- 
 citizen wore mourning : a glorious and perhaps a sin- 
 gular subject of exultation for a head of a party in 
 Greece ; where, in the struggles of faction, secret 
 assassinations, numerous public executions, and bloody 
 contests in arms, were so ordinary. Pericles might 
 almost equally have made it his boast as general of 
 the commonwealth : for, when his soldiers fell, they 
 fell victims to the necessity of their country's service, 
 and not to the incapacity, rashness, or vanity of the 
 commander. Had he been less a patriot, less a phi- 
 losopher, less humane, his achievements might have 
 been more brilliant, but he would not equally have 
 earned, from the mouth of Socrates, and the report 
 jf Plato, the praise of supereminence in what was 
 wise, great, and becoming. 11 
 
 11 ITep</cXe'a ovru peyaXoTrpeirSi; (rofov avfya. is a phrase which 
 
 Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates, immediately after the 
 mention of Themistocles and Aristides. Plat. Menon. p. 94. t. 2.
 
 CHARACTER OF PERICLES. 403 
 
 This splendid character however perhaps may seem SECT. 
 to receive some tarnish from the political conduct of _ 
 
 Pericles ; the concurrence, at least, which is imputed 
 to him, in depraving the Athenian constitution, to 
 favour that popular power by which he ruled, and the 
 revival and confirmation of that pernicious hostility 
 between the democratical and aristocratical interests, 
 first in Athens, and then, by the Peloponnesian war, 
 throughout the nation. But it is remarkable that 
 Thucydides and Xenophon, both suffering banish- 
 ment, one for twenty years, the other for life, from 
 that democratical power with which both express 
 themselves abundantly dissatisfied, nevertheless always 
 speak with the highest respect of Pericles. The tes- 
 timony of Isocrates will also deserve consideration. 
 Complaining of the depraved state of the Athenian 
 constitution in his own time, that patriotic statesman 
 says : ' Pericles found the constitution less perfect 
 
 * than it had been, but still tolerably good ; yet he did 
 
 * not use his extraordinary power for his own profit, 
 ' but, leaving his private fortune less than he had re- 
 
 * ceived it from his father, he carried into the treasury 
 
 * eight thousand talents (near two millions sterling) isocrat 
 ' over and above the proceeds of the sacred revenue.' 
 This concurrence of three such men, in successive 
 ages, (of whom, Thucydides probably had personal 
 acquaintance with him, ) all friendly to the aristocra- 
 tical interest, and all anxious for concord with Lace- 
 daemon, strongly indicates that what may appear ex- 
 ceptionable in his conduct was, in their opinion, the 
 result not of choice but of necessity ; a necessity pro- 
 duced by the violence of a party in opposition to him 
 
 The force and elegance of the Greek, expressing in one com- 
 pound adverb the great and the becoming, cannot be given 
 perhaps in any other language. 
 
 D D 2
 
 404 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, at home, together with the violence of a party in Pe- 
 loponnesus adverse to the politics of his friend the 
 king of Lacedaemon, Archidamus. By no other 
 conduct probably the independency of Athens could 
 have been preserved; and however the power of 
 Athens, unless it might be moderated and modelled 
 by an extraordinary union of political wisdom and 
 moral rectitude in the leaders, was threatening to the 
 liberty of every other Grecian state, yet the inde- 
 pendency of Athens, as the event showed, was in- 
 dispensable for the liberty of Greece. On such a 
 view of things those three great writers may seem to 
 have formed their judgment of the political conduct 
 of Pericles, and to have reckoned that on his wisdom, 
 his probity, and his influence, had his life been length- 
 ened, would have rested the best chance for an ad- 
 vantageous settlement of the singularly troubled state 
 of the Greek nation.
 
 SIEGE OF PLAT^A. 405 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM THE DEATH OF 
 PERICLES, IN THE THIRD YEAR, TO THE APPLICATION 
 FOR PEACE FROM LACEDJEMON, IN THE SEVENTH. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Siege of Plattea by the Peloponnesians. 
 
 IN the third spring of the war the Peloponnesians SECT. 
 changed their plan of offence. By the invasion and I> 
 ravage of Attica for two following summers, though B. c. 4-29. 
 much injury had been done to the Athenians, little p L w 7 '|' 
 advantage had accrued to themselves : the booty was Thucyd. 
 far from paying the expense of the expedition ; the 
 enemy, it was found, could not be provoked to risk 
 a battle, and the great purpose of the war was little 
 forwarded. The Peloponnesians were yet very unequal 
 to attempt naval operations of any consequence. Of 
 the continental dependencies of Athens none was so 
 open to their attacks, and none so completely excluded 
 from naval protection, none so likely by its danger 
 to superinduce that war of the field which they wished, 
 as Platsea. Against that town therefore it was de- 
 termined to direct the principal effort ; and success 
 was more reasonably expected as public councils at 
 Athens were no longer directed, and popular passion 
 no longer restrained, by the wisdom and influence of 
 Pericles. 
 
 Accordingly, under the command still of Archi- 
 D D 3
 
 406 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, damus, the confederate army entered the Platseid, 
 ' and ravage was begun. The Plataeans sent ministers 
 to deprecate hostilities ; urging the ancient merit of 
 their commonwealth in the Persian wars, and the 
 privileges solemnly granted to it when, after the 
 glorious battle in their territory, Pausanias sacrificed 
 to Jupiter the deliverer in the agora of their city. 
 Thucyd. Archidamus was not disposed to harsh measures, and 
 &73. he offered them neutrality. The Platasans professed 
 that, if they could choose for themselves, they should 
 willingly accept his offer; but without the consent 
 of the Athenians, in whose power their wives and 
 children were, they could decide nothing. Besides, 
 should they lose the protection of Athens, they could 
 never be secure against the superior power of the 
 Thebans, their most bitter enemies, longer than while 
 a Peloponnesian army remained in the neighbour- 
 hood. To obviate the latter objection, Archidamus 
 made this remarkable proposal : * If such are your 
 
 * fears, deliver your city, your lands, and all your 
 ' immoveable property in trust to the LacedaBmo- 
 
 * nians. Show us the boundaries of your territory, 
 
 * number your fruit-trees, and take an exact account 
 ' of whatever else admits numeration or description. 
 
 * Go then yourselves wherever you can find the most 
 
 * convenient residence while the war shall last ; and 
 
 * we will provide that your lands shall be duly culti- 
 
 * vated; we will engage that subsistence shall be 
 
 * regularly remitted to you ; and, when the war is 
 
 * over, every thing shall be restored.' The Platasan 
 deputies returning with this answer, the assembled 
 people, or rather garrison, agreed to accept the con- 
 ditions, provided the consent of the Athenian go- 
 vernment could be obtained. Leave was readily 
 granted by the Spartan prince to send to Athens ;
 
 SIEGE OF PLAT.EA. 40? 
 
 but those deputed returned with requisition that the SECT. 
 Platasans should abide by the terras of their confe- ' 
 deracy with Athens, accompanied with assurance of 
 every assistance. The Plataeans in consequence re- Thucyd. 
 solved to remain firm to the Athenian alliance ; and, 1>2 - c - 74 ' 
 without sending to the Peloponnesian camp, they 
 declared from their ramparts, * That it was impossible 
 
 * for them to comply with the demands of the Lace- 
 ' daemonians/ Archidamus then made this solemn 
 address to the deities of the country : * Ye gods and 
 
 * heroes who preside over Platasa, be witnesses that, 
 ' not till the Plataeans had renounced the sworn terms 
 
 * of the general confederacy of the Greeks, we act 
 
 * hostilely against this land, in which our fathers, 
 
 * after due invocation to you, vanquished the Persians, 
 
 * you rendering it propitious to their arms. We 
 ' have made liberal offers, which have been rejected. 
 
 * Grant therefore that they may receive that punish- 
 
 * ment which breach of faith deserves, and that we 
 ' may obtain the success to which a righteous cause 
 
 * entitles.' 
 
 Then immediately was begun that siege, the first c.75. 
 of which any connected detail remains in the annals 
 of mankind. The town was small, as may be judged 
 from the very small force which sufficed for an ef- 
 fectual garrison ; only four hundred Plataeans, with c .?8. 
 eighty Athenians. There were besides in the place 
 a hundred and ten women to prepare provisions, and 
 no other person free or slave. The besieging army, 
 composed of the flower of the Peloponnesian youth, 
 was numerous. The first operation was to surround c .?5. 
 the town with a palisade, which might prevent any 
 ready egress ; the neighbouring forest of Cithaeron 
 supplying materials. Then, in a chosen spot, ground 
 was broken, according to the modern phrase, for 
 
 D D 4
 
 408 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, making approaches. The business was to fill the 
 _ town-ditch, and against the wall to form a mound, 
 
 on which a force sufficient for assault might ascend. 
 For this operation also the woods of Cithaeron were 
 highly serviceable. Either extremity of the mound 
 was made firm with interwoven piles, and the interval 
 was filled with wood, stones, earth, any thing that 
 came readiest to hand. Seventy days were employed 
 unintermittingly on this work : reliefs being esta- 
 blished through the army, and Lacedaemonian officers 
 always superintending ; those appointed to the allies 
 bearing the peculiar title of Xenage. 
 
 Such was at that time the inartificial process of a 
 siege. Thucydides appears to have been well aware 
 that it did no credit to the science of his age. The 
 principal dependence of the besieging army, he says, 
 was on the disproportionate superiority of its numbers. 
 To oppose this mode of attack, the first measure of 
 the besieged was to raise, on that part of their wall 
 against which the mound was forming, a strong wooden 
 frame, covered in front with leather and hides ; and, 
 within this, to build a rampart with bricks from 
 the neighbouring houses. The wooden frame bound 
 the whole, and kept it firm to a considerable height : 
 the covering of hides protected both work and work- 
 men against weapons discharged against them, espe- 
 cially fiery arrows. But the mound still rising as the 
 superstructure on the wall rose, and this superstruc- 
 ture becoming unavoidably weaker with increasing 
 height, while the mound was liable to no counter- 
 balancing defect, it was necessary for the besieged 
 to devise other opposition. Accordingly they broke 
 through the bottom of their wall, where the mound 
 bore against it, and brought in the earth. The Pe- 
 loponnesians, soon aware of this, instead of loose
 
 SIEGE OF PLAT^EA. 
 
 earth, repaired their mound with clay or mud inclosed 
 in baskets. This requiring more labour to remove, 
 the besieged undermined the mound ; and thus, for 
 
 1 2 c 7fi 
 
 a long time unperceived, prevented it from gaining 
 height. Still however, fearing that the efforts of 
 their scanty numbers would be overborne by the mul- 
 titude of hands which the besiegers could employ, 
 they had recourse to another device. Within their 
 town-wall they built, in a semilunar form, a second 
 wall connected with the first at the extremities, 
 which extended, on either side, beyond the mound ; 
 so that should the enemy possess themselves of the 
 outer wall, their work would be to be renewed in a 
 far less favourable situation. 
 
 Machines for battering walls were already known Piut. v. 
 among the Greeks. According to the historian 
 Ephorus, as Plutarch informs us, though he says it 
 was disputed by other writers, they were first used 
 by Pericles at the siege of Samos, under the direc- 
 tion of a lame engineer named Artemon ; who, being 
 commonly carried among his works in a litter ', had 
 thence the surname of Periphoretus. Battering- 
 rams were certainly of much earlier date in the east ; 
 and Thucydides would scarcely have left unmen- 
 tioned the first introduction of so remarkable a mili- 
 tary engine among the Greeks, had it happened 
 within his own memory. The Peloponnesians were 
 not without it at the siege of Platrea, but they seem 
 to have been unskilful in its use ; and probably the 
 machine itself was far less adapted to its purpose than, 
 through various improvements, it afterward became. 
 A ram, advanced upon the Peloponnesian mound, 
 battered the superstructure on the Platsean rampart,
 
 410 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, and shook it violently ; to the great alarm of the 
 ' garrison, but with little farther effect. Other ma- 
 chines of the same kind were employed against dif- 
 ferent parts of the wall itself, but to yet less purpose. 
 The Plataeans, letting down ropes from the rampart, 
 dragged some out of their direction ; others they 
 broke by dropping on them weighty beams suspended 
 with chains. No means however were neglected by 
 the besiegers that either approved practice suggested, 
 or their ingenuity could devise, to promote their 
 purpose ; yet, after much of the summer consumed, 
 they found every effort of their numerous forces so 
 completely baffled by the vigilance, activity, and re- 
 solution of the little garrison, that they began to 
 despair of succeeding by assault. Before however 
 they would recur to the tedious method of blockade 
 they determined to try one more experiment, for 
 which their numbers and the neighbouring woods of 
 Cithaeron gave them more than ordinary facility. 
 Preparing a very great quantity of faggots, they filled 
 with them the town-ditch in the parts adjoining to 
 their mound, and disposed piles in other parts around 
 the place, wherever ground or any other circum- 
 stance gave most advantage. On the faggots they 
 put sulphur and pitch, and then set all on fire. * The 
 ' conflagration,' says Thucydides, * was such as was 
 never before known to have been prepared by the 
 * hands of men ; though in mountain-forests the 
 ' friction of dry wood, by the agitation of the wind, 
 may sometimes have produced greater.' Had the 
 wind favoured, it must have had all the effect that 
 the besiegers desired : great part of the town actually 
 became unapproachable. But, fortunately for the 
 garrison, a heavy rain, brought on by a thunder-
 
 EXPEDITION TO CHALCIDICE. 411 
 
 storm without wind, extinguished the fire, and re- SECT. 
 lieved them from an attack far more formidable than ' 
 
 any they had before experienced. 
 
 This attempt failing, the Peloponnesians deter- Thucyd. 
 mined to reduce the siege to a blockade ; which, eth July.' 
 though slow and consequently expensive, would in 
 the end be sure. To the palisade, which already 
 surrounded the town, a contravallation was added ; 
 with a double ditch, one without, and one within. 
 A sufficient body was then appointed to the guard of 
 these works : the Boeotians undertaking one half, the 
 other was allotted to detachments drafted from the 
 troops of every state of the confederacy, and a little 
 after the middle of September the rest of the army igth Sept. 
 was dismissed for the winter. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Operations of the Athenians on the northern coast of the JEgean. 
 Affairs of the western parts of Greece : assistance sent by 
 Peloponnesus to the Ambraciots against the Amphilochian 
 Argives and Acarnanians : battle near Stratus : sea-fight be- 
 tween the Peloponnesian fleet, under the Corinthian Machon, 
 and the Athenian fleet, under Phormion : sea-fight between the 
 Peloponnesian fleet, under the Spartan Cnemus, and the 
 Athenian fleet, under Phormion. Attempt to surprise Pirceus. 
 'Success of Phormion inAcarnania. Invasion of Macedonia 
 by Sitacles king of Thrace. 
 
 WHILE the Peloponnesians were thus bending their B. c. 429. 
 whole strength, and hitherto so vainly, against the p^'w.'a!" 
 little town of Platsea, offensive operations were not T !! ucy( L 
 neglected by the Athenians. Xenophon son of Eu- 
 ripides, who had commanded the Athenian forces at 
 the taking of Potidasa, was sent again into Chalcidice 
 with a body of two thousand heavy foot and two 
 hundred horse. A little before harvest he entered
 
 <12 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. Bottiaea, and ravaged the country about Spartolus. 
 ^j Often in the wars of the Greeks among one another 
 the intrigues of faction did more than arms. Through 
 such intrigue the Athenian general entertained hope 
 of acquiring Spartolus ; but timely support, which 
 the party in opposition to the Athenian interest ob- 
 tained from the neighbouring city of Olynthus, dis- 
 appointed him. A battle ensuing, the superiority of 
 the enemy in cavalry prevailed against the superior 
 discipline of the Athenian heavy foot : Xenophon, 
 with two general officers his colleagues, and above 
 four hundred of their heavy-armed, were killed ; and 
 the remainder, who found an immediate refuge in 
 Potida3a, too weak to prosecute offensive operations, 
 returned to Athens. 
 
 Through this extensive war, upon which the Athe- 
 nians fixed the name of the Peloponnesian, we become 
 in some degree acquainted with the history of some 
 parts of Greece, which otherwise might have re- 
 mained wholly unknown. The Amphilochian Argos, 
 a city on the border of Acarnania against Epirus, 
 'hucyd. was founded, according to Thucydides, by Amphi- 
 ' c ' ' lochus, son of that Amphiaraus who is celebrated 
 among the heroes of the war of Thebes. Amphi- 
 lochus himself fought at Troy. On his return to 
 the Peloponnesian Argos, his native city, little satis- 
 fied with the state of things under the usurpation of 
 ^Egisthus, he departed with such as chose to follow 
 his fortune, and settled his colony at the bottom of 
 that gulf anciently called the Amphilochian, but 
 afterward the Ambracian. To the town which he 
 built there he gave the name of that from which he 
 had migrated ; and the same partiality fixed upon 
 the river, near whose mouth it stood, the name of 
 the Peloponnesian stream of Inachus. The epithet
 
 OPERATIONS IN ACARNANIA. 413 
 
 Amphilochian was added to the town for the conve- SECT - 
 nience of distinction. Situate among barbarians, at 
 the extremity of Greece, or where Grecian and bar- 
 barian states were intermixed, the city of Amphi- 
 lochus flourished ; the inferiority in arts and know- 
 ledge of the neighbouring clans, to whom the 
 Amphilochian name was communicated, but who, 
 according to Thucydides, were barbarian, being per- 
 haps a principal cause of its prosperity. Afterward, 
 through various misfortunes, its strength was so re- 
 duced that it was scarcely able to support itself as an 
 independent commonwealth ; and, to obviate other 
 evils, its people recurred to a dangerous expedient 
 for weak states, that of associating a number of fa- 
 milies from the neighbouring Corinthian colony of 
 Ambracia. Disputes arose between the two people, 
 and in the end the Ambraciots expelled the Argives 
 from their own city. These applied to the neigh- 
 bouring people of Acarnania, and the Acarnanians 
 to the Athenians ; who, a little before the beginning 
 of the Peloponnesian war, sent Phormion with thirty 
 triremes to their assistance. Through the abilities 
 of that officer, and the superior discipline of the very 
 small body of Athenians which he commanded, Argos 
 was taken by assault. The city and territory were 
 restored to the Argives, with whom some Acarna- 
 nians were associated ; and, according to the barbarous 
 practice not unusual with the most polished of the 
 Greeks, the Ambracian inhabitants and garrison 
 were condemned to slavery. Hence followed the 
 alliance of both Acarnania and the Amphilochian 
 Argos with Athens, which has been mentioned as 
 subsisting when the Peloponnesian war began. 
 
 In the second summer of that war, while the pes- 
 tilence was raging at Athens, the Ambraciots, in-
 
 414- HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, censed against the Argives by the treatment of their 
 ' captive fellow-citizens, determined to attempt revenge. 
 Associating the Chaonian and some other barbarous 
 clans of their neighbourhood, they overran the ter- 
 ritory of the Acarnanian Argos, but, after some vain 
 efforts against the city, returned home. In the fol- 
 lowing year, that of the siege of Plataea, they pro- 
 Thucyd. posed not only to take Argos, but to conquer all 
 1.2. c.80. Acarnania. With this view they applied to Lace- 
 daemon ; promising that, if they might have such 
 support, naval and military, as they desired, not only 
 they would reduce their particular enemies the Acar- 
 nanians, but they would bring over the neighbouring 
 islands of Zacynthus and Cephallenia to the Pelo- 
 ponnesian confederacy, and they hoped also to take 
 Naupactus. Thus the Athenians would be deprived 
 of what principally enabled them to carry expeditions 
 around Peloponnesus, and keep a fleet in the western 
 seas. The project was alluring : the Corinthians in- 
 stantly and zealously engaged in it ; incited by their 
 enmity to Athens, their connexion with Ambracia, 
 the desire of revenge against Corcyra, and the hope 
 of recovering their power in that island, to which any 
 success in the proposed measures would be at least 
 a step ; and they induced the Lacedaemonians to 
 concur. 
 
 The Athenian administration, receiving intelli- 
 gence of these motions and preparations, and judging 
 Phormion, apparently on account of his experience 
 of the western people and western seas, most proper 
 for the command there, recalled him from Chalci- 
 dice, and sent him, as we have seen, with twenty 
 triremes to Naupactus. In the following summer, 
 in pursuance of the measures concerted with the 
 Peloponnesians, the naval force of the Leucadians,
 
 OPERATIONS IN ACARNANIA. 415 
 
 Anactorians, and Ambraciots was assembled at Leu- SECT. 
 cas ; and the Spartan admiral Cnemus had the good 
 fortune to join them from Cyllene, with a small 
 squadron and a thousand heavy- armed Peloponnesian 
 infantry, undiscovered in his passage by the Athe- 
 nians. Assistance was also received from Molossis 
 and Macedonia. The Corinthians and Sicyonians 
 were preparing their naval force, but could not so 
 readily escape out of their own gulf. Cnemus 
 therefore, without waiting for them, determined to 
 begin operations, by marching directly for Stratus, 
 the largest town of Acarnania, in the hope of carry- 
 ing it by assault ; expecting thus so to break the 
 force of the province that it would become an easy 
 conquest. 
 
 The Acarnanians, informed that, beside the for- Thucyd. 
 midable army already in their country, a fleet was 
 expected which might choose its points of attack 
 upon their coast, resolved to remain within their 
 respective towns, and attempt the protection of their 
 fields, only so far as, with their strength and oppor- 
 tunities offering, might be prudent. In hope of 
 assistance from the Athenian admiral at Naupactus 
 they were disappointed. He gave them to understand 
 that he could spare no part of his scanty force from 
 attendance upon the Peloponnesian fleet in the Co- 
 rinthian gulf which was ready to sail. Thus the 
 hostile army marched unopposed from Leucas 
 through the Argive territory into Acarnania, dis- 
 posed in three columns ; the Peloponnesians and 
 Ambraciots forming the left, the Leucadians, Anac- 
 torians, and some other Greeks the right, and the 
 barbarian Epirots the centre. The Greeks kept 
 their columns regularly formed, and chose their 
 ?amps carefully ; which, according to their usual
 
 416 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, practice in an enemy's country, they constantly forti- 
 fied. But theEpirots, and particularly the Chaonians, 
 vain of their reputation for superior prowess among 
 the clans of that part of the continent, disdained the 
 trouble and delay of nice choice of ground ; they 
 pressed forward in confidence that the town would 
 yield to their first assault, and the glory would be all 
 their own. Intelligence of these circumstances being 
 carried to the Stratians by their scouts, they planted 
 an ambush, into which the imprudent Epirots fell. 
 The forces from the town sallied ; the Epirots, partly 
 through surprise, partly through the vigour of the 
 attack, were instantly put to flight, a great number 
 were killed, and the rest were pursued till they 
 reached the Grecian camps. The Stratians would 
 neither make any attempt upon these, nor risk any 
 close engagement against the superior discipline of 
 the Peloponnesians ; but they gave unceasing annoy- 
 ance from a distance with their slings ; in the use of 
 which the Acarnanians, through universal practice, 
 excelled. 
 
 Information of this important success obtained by 
 the Stratians was rapidly forwarded through all the 
 Acarnanian towns, accompanied with exhortation to 
 assemble the force of the country, and drive out a 
 half-conquered enemy. Cnemus meanwhile found 
 his measures so broken by the defeat of the Epirots 
 that in the ensuing night he retreated to the river 
 Anapus, ten miles from Stratus. Thence he sent a 
 herald to desire a truce for the burial of the slain ; 
 and soon after, falling back to CEniadae, he dismissed 
 the allies, and embarked himself for Peloponnesus. 
 Acarnania thus was completely freed from so alarm- 
 ing an invasion. 
 
 During these transactions by land, the allied fleet,
 
 OPERATIONS IN THE CORINTHIAN GULF. 417 
 
 consisting of forty-seven trireme galleys, under the SECT. 
 Corinthian admirals Machon, Isocrates, and Aga- 
 tharchidas, sailed out of the gulf. It was the purpose 
 of Phormion, who, with only twenty, watched them 
 from Chalcis and the river Evenus, on the ^Etolian 
 coast, to let them pass the straits, and attack them 
 in the more open sea. The Corinthians, strong in 
 men as well as in ships, but less confident in naval 
 skill, hugged, according to the sea phrase, the southern 
 shore as far as Patrae ; and thence, in the night, 
 pushed across for the Acarnanian coast ; their object 
 being less to fight the Athenians, than to join their 
 allies in the prosecution of the preconcerted purposes 
 of the campaign. The daring vigilance of Phormion 
 surprised them in the middle of the passage. Though 
 it was night, yet being perfectly clear and calm, they 
 perceived his approach at some distance. Imme- 
 diately they formed their fleet in a circle, the largest 
 they could, so as not to give opportunity for that 
 evolution of piercing the line, called the diecplus, in 
 which the Athenians excelled, and which their ene- 
 mies dreaded. The prows of course were on all sides 
 outward ; the transports 2 , with a reserve of five of 
 the swiftest triremes, were stationed in the centre ; 
 and thus, in posture of defence, as if to oppose an 
 enemy who outnumbered them, forty-seven triremes 
 remained to receive the attack of the twenty under 
 Phormion, if, which they could not readily believe, 
 he should be bold enough to attack them. 
 
 But the Athenian admiral, confident in his own Thucyd. 
 abilities and experience, and in the practised skill ' ' ' 
 of his people, and observing the order of the enemy 
 to be very readily susceptible of confusion, bore 
 
 VOL. II. E E
 
 418 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, immediately upon them with his line of battle formed 
 ahead, and rowed around them ; having first directed 
 his captains to threaten as near as possible, so as to 
 avoid engaging, till they should have the signal from 
 him. He well knew that when the breeze from the 
 gulf sprang up, which seldom failed about daybreak, 
 the enemy's circle could not long remain perfect ; 
 and his purpose was, by alarming, to hasten and 
 enhance the confusion. It happened. precisely as he 
 foresaw : the first of the breeze drove the windward 
 ships against the transports in the centre : confusion 
 immediately arose ; clamour, with expostulation from 
 ship to ship, ensued ; orders were no longer heard ; 
 signals remained unobserved ; the attention of the 
 crews was wholly engaged in obviating the continually 
 threatened shock of one ship against another, or of 
 many against one ; and the swell, quickly arising, 
 sufficed to prevent any effectual use of oars by rowers 
 so little skilful. Phormion seized the critical moment 
 for giving the signal of attack. In the first onset 
 one of the Corinthian admirals was sunk ; several 
 other ships were quickly disabled ; and such was the 
 confusion that resistance was scarcely attempted, but 
 the first effort of the Peloponnesians was to fly toward 
 the friendly ports of Patrse and Dyrrie. The Athe- 
 nians took twelve triremes, the greater part of whose 
 crews they put to the sword. Having pursued as 
 far as was judged convenient, they returned with 
 their prizes to the ./Etolian coast ; according to the 
 usual practice, which landlocked and stormy seas, 
 the want of the compass, and the deficiency of accom- 
 modation in the ancient ships of war made necessary. 
 On the headland of Rhium they raised a trophy, and 
 dedicated to Neptune one of the captive triremes. 
 After these ceremonies they returned to their station
 
 OPERATIONS IN THE CORINTHIAN GULF. 419 
 
 at Naupactus. Then the defeated Peloponnesians SECT. 
 moved from the places of their first refuge to the 
 Elean port of Cyllene, where Cnemus, with the 
 forces from Acarnania, soon after joined them. 
 
 This action of Phormion, though the forces em- 
 ployed on either side were too small for the conse- 
 quences to be very important, yet for the boldness 
 of the attempt, the ability displayed in the execution, 
 and the completeness of the success, has been de- 
 servedly reckoned by Plutarch among the most bril- 
 liant achievements of the war. 3 It appears to have 
 disturbed, not a little, the Peloponnesians, and par- 
 ticularly the Lacedaemonians. Those who directed Thucyd. 
 the administration of their government, unversed in c ' 
 naval affairs, could not readily conceive a superiority 
 of science among the Athenian commanders, and of 
 skill among their seamen, that should give the ad- 
 vantage against more than double their numbers 
 without great misbehaviour on the part of their own 
 people ; especially as in land war the superiority of 
 the Peloponnesians, to all the world besides, was 
 held incontestable. The unwise practice of dividing 
 military command, ordinary with most of the other 
 Greeks, was little usual with the Lacedaemonians ; 
 but now, in some indignation that the Peloponnesian 
 navy should, by a squadron of only twenty ships, be 
 excluded from the western seas, which were esteemed 
 more peculiarly their own, three Spartan officers, 
 Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron, were sent to 
 be of council with Cnemus in his command. The 
 ships damaged in the late action were diligently 
 repaired ; a re-enforcement was required from the 
 
 3 We find a compliment to Phormion, which seems to mark 
 the popularity of his character, in the comedy of Aristophanes 
 called The Knights, v. 551. 
 
 E E 2
 
 420 
 
 CHAP. 
 XV. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1.2. c.86. 
 
 c. 85. 
 
 c.88. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 maritime states of Peloponnesus ; and a fleet of seventy- 
 seven triremes was thus collected, which proceeded 
 from Cyllene to Panormus on the Achaean coast ; 
 where a land army, in the ancient manner of naval 
 war generally capable of advantageous co-operation 
 with a fleet, was also assembled. 
 
 Phormion, informed of these preparations, had 
 sent intelligence of them to Athens, and desired a re- 
 enforcement. Twenty triremes were in consequence 
 ordered to join him. It is upon this occasion that 
 we first discover in history the importance of the loss 
 of Pericles, and the want of those superior abilities 
 for the direction of public affairs, which had hitherto, 
 in so great a degree, obviated misfortune and com- 
 manded success. Nicias, a Cretan of Gortynium, 
 having in view to advance his own power, proposed 
 to the Athenian government the reduction of Cydonia 
 in Crete, a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy. 
 It would be an easy conquest, he said, for the fleet 
 which was ready to sail for Naupactus, and, with the 
 assistance to be readily procured within the island, 
 could occasion little delay. The Athenian people 
 were ill-advised enough to decree as he desired. The 
 armament went to Crete, and ravaged without opposi- 
 tion the Cydonian lands j but the town was found 
 so strong, and its people so determined, that there 
 appeared no probability of taking it without the 
 tedious process of a siege, or perhaps a blockade. 
 The commanders would have then hastened their 
 voyage to Naupactus, but contrary winds detained 
 them long in Crete. 
 
 Meantime Phormion was left to exert his abilities 
 and his vigilance against an enemy who too much 
 outnumbered him. Yet though they had nearly four 
 times his strength, so confident was he in superior
 
 OPERATIONS IN THE CORINTHIAN GULF. 
 
 skill that not only he did not refuse, but he appears SECT. 
 to have been desirous to meet them wherever he 
 could have sea-room. Moving therefore from Nau- 
 pactus, he took a station just without the gulf, near 
 the headland of the Molycrian or northern Rhium ; 
 and a small army, composed chiefly of Naupactian 
 Messenians, joined his naval camp on the shore, to Thucyd. 
 assist in case of any attempt from a superior force 1>2 ' c>90 ' 
 upon the fleet in its station. This movement was 
 not without danger, as the event proved ; but the 
 apprehension that the squadron expected from Attica 
 might be intercepted and overpowered by the Pelo- 
 ponnesian fleet, appears to have been his motive for 
 quitting the security of his station at Naupactus, 
 before that assistance arrived. 
 
 The Peloponnesians however, with all their ad- 
 vantage of numbers, with all the pride of reputed 
 pre-eminence in arms, and all the zeal of the Lace- 
 daemonian commanders to incite them, so felt their 
 inferiority in naval action, from the event of the late 
 engagement, that they perseveringly avoided the 
 open, and directed their endeavours to draw the 
 Athenians into the narrow sea. From Panormus, 
 which is a little within the gulf, and nearly opposite 
 Naupactus, they moved to the Achaean or southern 
 Rhium, over against the station of the Athenians. 
 The two headlands, forming the mouth of the gulf, 
 are less than a mile asunder : the stations of the two 
 fleets would be somewhat more. 
 
 During six or seven days they watched one another c.86. 
 without moving. The Peloponnesians then practised 
 a s tratagem, apparently well imagined, for forcing 
 the Athenian admiral to action within the gulf. The 
 town of Naupactus, while its youth were in the army 
 attending the Athenian fleet, was left almost without 
 
 E E 3
 
 422 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, defence. At daybreak the Peloponnesians moved 
 ' eastward, along the Achaean coast, in a column with 
 four triremes abreast j twenty of the swiftest forming 
 an advanced guard. Phormion was immediately in 
 alarm for Naupactus. Hastening his people aboard 
 from the naval camp, he proceeded eastward by the 
 northern coast of the gulf, with his line of battle 
 formed ahead; the Messenians at the same time 
 pressing their march along the shore toward their 
 town. This was precisely what the Peloponnesians 
 wished. They no sooner saw the Athenian fleet irre- 
 coverably engaged within the straits than, trusting 
 to the advanced guard for preventing its escape into 
 the harbour of Naupactus, they formed for action in 
 line of battle abreast, and pushed across the gulf. 
 
 The eleven headmost ships of the Athenian line, 
 through superior swiftness, outstretching the right 
 wing of the Peloponnesians, escaped attack : the nine 
 others were intercepted, overpowered, and forced 
 ashore. One was taken with its whole crew : all fell 
 into the hands of the Peloponnesians ; but, of their 
 people, many escaped by swimming ; the rest were 
 mostly put to the sword. What followed, reported 
 by the authoritative pen of Thucydides, proves how 
 important, in the ancient system of naval war, the 
 co-operation of an army might be to a fleet. The 
 brave Messenians, zealous in hereditary enmity to 
 Lacedasmon, arriving on the beach, dashed completely 
 armed through the surf, boarded the stranded galleys, 
 and, driving out the conquerors, recovered all ; though 
 some were already taken in tow. 
 
 Thucyd. Meanwhile the twenty galleys of the Peloponnesian 
 
 1.2. c.9i. advanced guard were pursuing the eleven Athenian 
 
 which had overstretched the main body. Ten of 
 
 these reached the harbour of Naupactus ; and, form-
 
 OPERATIONS IN THE CORINTHIAN GULF. 423 
 
 ing against the shore, prepared to resist any attack SECT. 
 that might be attempted against them. A Leuca- 
 dian trireme, the swiftest of the allied fleet in which Thucyd. 
 was Timocrates, the first of the Lacedaemonian com- 1>2 ' c ' 92 ' 
 missioners appointed to be of council with the admi- 
 ral, pursued the eleventh, and gained upon her so fast 
 that to escape into the harbour of Naupactus seemed 
 impossible. It happened that a large merchant-ship C.QI. 
 was lying at anchor off the harbour's mouth. The 
 Athenian captain having passed this vessel, turned 
 close round it, and judged his time so well, and ma- 
 naged the evolution with such combined rapidity and 
 exactness, that with his beak he struck the galley of 
 the amazed Leucadians amidship, and with such force 
 that she presently sunk. Timocrates, in a fit of pas- 
 sionate despair, stabbed himself; and his gored body, 
 floating into the harbour of Naupactus, was taken up 
 there. The rest of the advanced squadron was fol- 
 lowing in a disorderly manner, the crews singing the 
 song of triumph, as if already completely conquerors.* 
 The catastrophe of their comrades, happening within 
 sight of all, astonished and alarmed them. Some 
 rested on their oars to await the main body of their 
 fleet ; but the main body of their fleet was far off, 
 and the enemy near. Some, through ignorance of the 
 coast, struck upon shoals. Their hesitation and dis- 
 tress were as a signal to the Athenians in the harbour. 
 The Athenians, quickly aware of all circumstances, 
 advanced in good order against the enemy yet in con- 
 
 4 The song of battle and the song of victory, both hymns to 
 the gods, one a prayer before battle, and at the same time a signal 
 for engaging, the other a thanksgiving for success, were equally 
 called Paean ; but Thucydides distinguishes that it was the song 
 of triumph which was sung upon this occasion : . . . e 
 -rt a,fA.ot TrXeovTe? v<; vevwqKOTfi;. 
 
 E E 4
 
 424 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, fusion. The contest was not long : the Peloponne- 
 sians fled for their port of Panormus, on the opposite 
 coast of the gulf, distant about seven miles, losing six 
 triremes taken by the Athenians. The main body of 
 their fleet, too distant to give any considerable sup- 
 port, and apparently fearful of passing the night on 
 a hostile coast with which they were imperfectly ac- 
 quainted, also sought the security of the port. 5 The 
 success of the Athenians was altogether extraordinary: 
 they took six of the enemy's triremes ; they sunk one : 
 they recovered all their own which had been taken or 
 forced ashore, excepting only that which had fallen 
 into the enemy's hands with its crew aboard ; they 
 collected the wreck and their own slain ; they re- 
 stored the slain of the enemy only through the cus- 
 tomary ceremony of a truce solicited for the purpose ; 
 and, erecting their trophy, which was an easy part of 
 the business, they vindicated to themselves, against 
 a force so superior, every ordinary mark of decided 
 victory. The Peloponnesians also erected a trophy 
 at the Achaean Ehium, on pretence of their success 
 in the early part of the day, and placed by it the 
 single captured ship which had not been retaken, as 
 an offering to the god of the sea. 
 
 If the event of the former action against Phormion 
 had excited indignation at Lacedaemon, that of the 
 recent battle would give Cnemus, and his two sur- 
 viving coadjutors, to apprehend no very favourable re- 
 ception on their return thither. A project therefore 
 occurring, while the fleet remained yet assembled on 
 
 5 Thucydides does not with his usual accuracy account for 
 the inefficiency of the main body of the Peloponnesian fleet in 
 the latter part of the day. Perhaps there was among them some- 
 thing of that mismanagement frequently incident to confederate 
 armaments, of which he was not himself perfectly informed.
 
 PROJECT AGAINST PIR^US. 425 
 
 the Corinthian coast, for attempting an important SECT. 
 stroke against the enemy before they dispersed for IL 
 the winter, was received, particularly by the enter- 
 prising Brasidas, with eager joy. It was known to Thucyd. 
 the Megarians that the Athenian government, secure ' 2 ' c ' 93 " 
 in naval superiority, left their harbour of Piraeus with- 
 out an adequate guard. That most important place 
 therefore it was proposed to surprise. A select body 
 of seamen was marched by land to Megara, each 
 carrying his oar with its bag and thong. 6 Arriving 
 in the evening, they with all haste launched forty 
 triremes which had been laid up in the port of Nisaea, 
 and putting immediately to sea made for the Attic 
 coast. A contrary wind presently arising gave them 
 to apprehend that they should not be able to reach 
 Piraeus in time to accomplish a surprise. Doubtful 
 therefore of the possibility of executing their original 
 plan, they determined upon a smaller enterprise, 
 which was clearly within their power. Instead of 
 pushing for Pirasus, they debarked on Salamis. No- 
 tice communicated to Athens, by fire-beacons, raised 
 an alarm there, says Thucydides, equal to anything 
 experienced in the course of the war. The imme- 
 diate apprehension was, that the Peloponnesians were 
 
 6 TTJV KUTC-TIV KOU TO ftir-fipea-tov KOU TOV Tpoitunvipa,. Cum Singulis 
 remis, et singulis pulvinis, quos sibi remigantibus substernerent, 
 et cum singulis scalmis. "Tirripea-iov <TT* TO *&>$ y KiKa,9v]]>Tau 
 ol fpearovTei;, $ TO [M] <rvvTpif(r6cu ainSv rat; Tzvya?. Schol. This 
 
 passage of Thucydides, and the Latin translation, and the 
 scholiast's interpretation have been already noticed in the 
 Appendix to the 8th chapter of this history. In the former 
 editions I proposed for those who have leisure for the inquiry to 
 decide whether the tnrypea-tov of Thucydides may have been such 
 a case or bag, rather ,han a cushion to sit upon. Nothing 
 having, to my knowledge, been advanced against the supposition, 
 I have now ventured to adopt it in the text.
 
 426 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, already in Piraus ; and the inhabitants of that place 
 supposed them at least masters of the town of Salamis, 
 and that attack on themselves would presently follow. 
 At daybreak the whole strength of Athens moved 
 down to the port ; a strong garrison was appointed 
 to Piraeus, while the galleys were hastily launched 
 and manned. The danger however was over almost 
 as soon as known. The Peloponnesians meanwhile 
 collected some booty, made some defenceless people 
 prisoners, seized three tiremes from which the crews 
 had fled, and then hastened back to Nissea, not with- 
 out apprehension that their leaky vessels might founder 
 before they reached that port. Had the Pelopon- 
 nesians persevered, says Thucydides, in their first 
 design, supposing no hinderance from the wind, they 
 might easily have succeeded. The event therefore 
 was salutary to Athens, by the admonition it gave. 
 A proper guard was thenceforward kept in Pira?us, 
 the mouth of the harbour was shut with a chain, and 
 precaution was observed against surprises. 
 
 Winter, considered as forbidding naval enterprise, 
 
 now approaching, the Peloponnesian seamen returned 
 
 to their fleet, the ships were sent to their several 
 
 homes, and laid up. But the active Phormion did 
 
 not let the severe season pass unemployed. A party 
 
 Thucyd. adverse to that which favoured the Athenian alliance 
 
 1.2. c. 102. wag stron g j n some O f the Acarnanian towns. As 
 
 soon as certain intelligence arrived that the Pelopon- 
 nesian fleet was dispersed, nothing remaining to be 
 feared for Naupactus, he sailed to Astacus. De- 
 barking there four hundred heavy-armed Athenians 
 and as many Messenians, he marched through Acar- 
 nania, and, concerting measures with the friendly at 
 Stratus, Coronta, and other principal towns, he ba- 
 nished the obnoxious. Such was the precarious con-
 
 ATTEMPT TO DETHRONE PERDICCAS. 
 
 dition of the people of the Grecian republics, the SECT. 
 population everywhere divided into parties, and the 
 families of each uncertain when they might not be 
 expelled from their little state, to seek their liveli- 
 hood by adventure or beggary. GEniadae, strongly 
 situated among marshes near the mouth of the Ache- 
 lous, alone of all the Acarnanian cities maintained 
 its alliance with the Peloponnesians. Phormion then 
 re-embarking with his escort returned to Naupactus, 
 In spring he proceeded to Athens, taking with him 
 the captured ships, and the prisoners : of whom the 
 freemen were shortly exchanged for so many Athe- 
 nians, prisoners with the Peloponnesians. 
 
 During these transactions in the western part of 
 Greece, while in Lacedaemon and Athens war seemed 
 to sleep for the winter, far more alarming movements 
 occurred on the northern borders. Philip, brother of 
 
 Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, dying, his son Amyn- 
 
 tas claimed the succession to the principality which 
 
 he had held in Upper Macedonia. Perdiccas, who had ch.ia. s.4. 
 
 proposed to deprive his brother of that little subordi- 
 
 nate sovereignty, seized it on his death. What the 
 
 Macedonian law on the subject may have been we 
 
 have no information, and perhaps it was not very well 
 
 defined. Amyntas however resorted to the neighbour- 
 
 ing powerful sovereign of Thrace, Sitalces. This prince, 
 
 by his recent alliance with Athens, for what advan- 
 
 tages in return is not said, had engaged to compel 
 
 the revolted dependencies of Athens in Chalcidice to 
 
 return to their obedience. Ready therefore with his 
 
 army he took Amyntas under his patronage ; and, 
 
 Perdiccas refusing to reinstate his nephew in the 
 
 principality which had been held by his brother, he 
 
 resolved to dethrone Perdiccas, and make Amyntas 
 
 king of Macedonia.
 
 428 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 Xen. Hei. Winter was approaching ; but with the Thracians, 
 
 in severer climate, winter warfare, we find, was more 
 
 Thucyd. common than with the Greeks. The forces of Sital- 
 
 1.2. c.98. ces ^ un ijk e t^ \\ft\e arm ies O f the Grecian republics, 
 
 almost rivalled in numbers the hosts of Asia : but, 
 far alien from Asiatic effeminacy, Thrace was held 
 by the Greeks themselves to be the favourite residence 
 of Ares and Enyo, or, as the Romans named them, 
 Mars and Bellona, the deities of war. Sitalces put 
 himself at the head of, it is said, a hundred thousand 
 foot and fifty thousand horse ; and, taking with him 
 the Macedonian prince, marched toward that inland 
 district of the Macedonian kingdom which had been 
 c. 100. his father's appanange. Here Amyntas had still friends, 
 and the towns of Gortynia and Atalanta readily 
 opened their gates to his protector. Perdiccas, though 
 of no mean talents, and commanding a considerable 
 dominion, yet weakened by civil war with the princes 
 of his family, was utterly unequal to meet the Thra- 
 cian army in battle. With his cavalry only he at- 
 tended upon its motions, while his people sought 
 refuge, some in the fortified towns ; but as these in 
 Macedonia, a country yet little improved, were few 
 and small, the greater part fled to the marshes, woods, 
 and mountains. 
 
 The first opposition that Sitalces met was from the 
 town of Idomene, which he took by assault. He 
 next attacked Europus ; but, unskilled in sieges, and 
 unprovided for them, he there failed. Meanwhile 
 the Macedonian horse, armed for defence in the 
 Grecian manner, did not fear to meet superior num- 
 bers ; and it was found that against the most nume- 
 rous body of Thracians, wherever they made a charge, 
 they made an impression, Being nevertheless con- 
 stantly in the end overpowered, and continually liable
 
 INVASION OF MACEDONIA. 
 
 to be surrounded, they soon desisted from efforts SECT. 
 which were found unavailing. All the open country 
 therefore was at the mercy of the Thracian prince : 
 the provinces of Mygdonia, Grestonia, Anthemous, 
 and ^Emathia were wasted. It had been concerted Thucyd. 
 with the Athenian government, that an Athenian * 2 ' ' 101 ' 
 fleet should co-operate with the Thracian army : but, 
 with so little expectation that Sitalces would perform 
 his engagement at that season, or so little disposition 
 among the Athenians to meet the usual storms of 
 that season in vessels so ill adapted to bear them 
 as the ancient ships of war, the fleet was never sent. 
 As soon however as it was known that the Thracian 
 prince had actually entered Macedonia, an embassy 
 was dispatched to apologise for the omission, carry- 
 ing presents, as the Thracian custom required. Si- 
 talces, not to fail in his part of the engagement, sent 
 a part of his army into Chalcidice, to the gratifica- 
 tion of the revenge, rather than of any real interest 
 of the Athenian people. The ravage of that coun- 
 try was added to the destruction made through so 
 many other provinces, but the people found personal 
 security in their towns ; for against a Grecian town, 
 moderately fortified, unless by surprise or by the 
 slow operation of a blockade, all the force of Thrace 
 was little efficacious. 
 
 The apprehensions excited by the fame of the vast 
 army of Sitalces were not confined to Macedonia. 
 All the Greeks, as far as Thermopylae, were in alarm, 
 and took measures for resisting the storm, should it 
 reach them. The various clans of free Thracians, 
 north of the Strymon, were not less apprehensive and 
 not less in motion. But want and the rigour of the 
 season began soon to press severely upon such a
 
 430 
 
 CHAP. 
 XV. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 multitude, so unprovided as the army of Sitalces. 7 
 The able Perdiccas used the opportunity for nego- 
 tiation. He found means, through confidential per- 
 sons, to communicate with Seuthes, nephew and 
 principal favourite of the Thracian monarch. Strato- 
 nice, sister of Perdiccas, was offered him in marriage, 
 with a large portion. The intrigue succeeded : the 
 restoration of Amyntas to his father's principality 
 was of course allowed ; and, after a month spent in 
 wasting Macedonia and Chalcidice, but no farther 
 purpose of the expedition accomplished, Sitalces led 
 his forces home. A treaty of amity followed be- 
 tween the two monarchs, and the Macedonian prin- 
 cess gave her hand to Seuthes. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1. 3. c. 1. 
 B.C. 428. 
 01. |j. f. 
 P.W.4. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 Fourth campaign: third invasion of Attica. Revolt ofMitylene. 
 Flight of part of the garrison of Platcea. Siege of Mitylene 
 by Paches. Distress and exertions of Athens. Transactions 
 under the Lacedaemonian Alcidas and the Athenian Paches 
 on the Ionian coast. 
 
 IN the former summer, as we have seen, invasion 
 of Attica was intermitted by the Peloponnesians ; but 
 in the year to whose transactions we now proceed, 
 the fourth of the war, they entered that country for 
 the third time, still under the command of the Spar- 
 tan king Archidamus. They chose, as usual, the 
 season just before harvest, and extensive waste fol- 
 
 7 There is a remarkable resemblance between this expedition 
 of the king of Thrace, as compendiously related by Thucydides, 
 and that of the Khan of Crim Tartary, described at large by 
 Baron Tott, who accompanied the Tartar prince in his winter 
 campaign, in war between Russia and Turkey.
 
 THIRD INVASION OF ATTICA. 431 
 
 lowed: but the Athenian cavalry was successful in SECT. 
 
 in 
 desultory attacks, and repressed the excursions of ' 
 
 the Peloponnesian light troops beyond the protection 
 of their heavy-armed, so that the lands immediately 
 around Athens were little infested. After no long 
 stay, the Peloponnesian army, having consumed the 
 small stores brought with it, and what could be col- 
 lected in Attica, returned home and was disbanded. 
 
 But new troubles were preparing for Athens, the 
 more dangerous as they had their source in the de- 
 fective constitution of the empire. Among its most 
 valuable and most powerful dependencies was the 
 island of Lesbos, about forty miles long only, and 
 ten wide, yet divided between six republics, each 
 claiming its separate and equal independency of all the 
 rest, though all owned the sovereignty of the Athe- 
 nian people. But in population and power Mitylene 
 and Methymne were far superior to any of the other 
 four. A consideration for their ^Eolian extraction Thucyd. 
 tended to dispose all to the Lacedasmonian alliance, 1-3 ' c<2 ' 
 but more especially to the Boeotian, rather than to 
 the Athenian, to which the course of events, the 
 naval superiority of Athens, and their own situation 
 as islanders, had led them. But the momentary in- 
 terest of faction overwhelmed all other considera- 
 tions, deadened all feeling for the ties of blood, and 
 blinded to all views of enlarged policy. In Methymne 
 the democratical party was decidedly superior, and 
 its people held close alliance with those of the neigh- 
 bouring island of Tenedos, who were influenced by 
 the same political principles. The Methymnseans 
 and Tenedians were therefore warmly attached to 
 Athens. But in Mitylene the aristocratical party 
 was powerful ; and an aristocratical party, if not even
 
 432 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, oppressed, must be always insecure, where Athenian 
 ' influence prevailed. Nor could men of observation 
 and foresight consider without great apprehension 
 what had already befallen other states of the Athe- 
 nian confederacy ; all of which, except those of Les- 
 bos and Chios, were deprived of their marine, for- 
 bidden even fortifications for their defence, and re- 
 duced to complete subjection under the despotic will 
 of the Athenian multitude. 
 
 Accordingly, before the war broke out between 
 Athens and Lacedaemon, the principal Mitylenaeans 
 had sent offers to the Lacedaemonian administration 
 to renounce the Athenian, and reunite themselves 
 with the Peloponnesian confederacy. Their views 
 indeed extended farther than the mere change of 
 Thucyd. their domestic constitution and foreign connexions : 
 they proposed to reduce the rival republic of Me- 
 thymne, or at least to repress the democracy there ; 
 they had already a secure influence in the four in- 
 ferior commonwealths ; and thus the whole island 
 would be brought under one dominion, in which they 
 would have the principal, if not the sole authority. 
 The Lacedaemonians however seemed to have judged 
 far better on the occasion than the Mitylenaeans. 
 Aware that they were utterly incapable of protecting 
 an ally across the ^Egean, against the Athenian 
 navy, they declined the proposal. The former senti- 
 ments nevertheless continuing to animate the Mity- 
 lenaeans, when they saw the Athenians, between in- 
 vasion and pestilence, in deep distress, they thought 
 the season favourable for the execution of their pro- 
 ject : they built ships of war ; they strengthened the 
 walls of their town ; they took measures for giving 
 security to their harbour ; they imported corn from
 
 MITYLENE THREATENED. 433 
 
 the Euxine to form magazines ; and they increased SECT. 
 their military force by hiring archers from the same 
 parts. 
 
 Information of these transactions at Mitylene, and Thucyd. 
 of the prevailing political sentiments there, was re- ' 3 * c ' 3 ' 
 peatedly given to the Athenians by the Methym- 
 nasans, by the Tenedians, and by the democratical 
 party in Mitylene itself; but in the dejection of the 
 public mind, under severe and complicated calamity, 
 there was great unwillingness to give it credit. At 
 length commissioners of inquiry and inspection were 
 sent, with a requisition for the Mitylenseans to desist 
 from measures which gave alarm to the neighbouring 
 commonwealth of Methymne, and umbrage to Athens. 
 The Mitylenaeans nevertheless continued active in 
 preparation. On the return of the commissioners 
 then the energy of the Athenian administration and 
 people was roused, and it was determined to use 
 every exertion for checking, in its beginning, an evil 
 which, in its progress, might involve the ruin of the 
 commonwealth. 
 
 The Peloponnesian army had now quitted Attica ; 
 and the news of the extraordinary successes of Phor- 
 mion, manifesting a decided superiority in the Athe- 
 nian marine, had somewhat reanimated administration 
 and people. A squadron of forty triremes, under 
 the command of Cleippides, was ready to sail on an 
 expedition against the Peloponnesian coast. It was 
 recollected by the Athenian administration that the 
 festival of the Maloeian Apollo was approaching, in 
 the celebration of which the whole Mitylenagan people 
 would go in procession out of the city, Cleippides 
 was ordered with his squadron to surprise them in 
 the performance of this ceremony ; but apparently a 
 vote of the general assembly was deemed necessary 
 
 VOL. II. F F
 
 434 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, to authorise the measure. To prevent the commu- 
 
 XV ... . 
 
 ' nication of intelligence therefore, ten Lesbian triremes, 
 then in the ports of Attica as auxiliaries to the Athe- 
 nian fleet, were stopped, and their crews put into 
 safe custody. A private Lesbian nevertheless carried 
 the intelligence. Hastening to Geraestus in Eubcea, 
 and procuring a small vessel, he reached Mitylene 
 on the third day from Athens. The Mitylenasans 
 in consequence kept within their walls, and prepared 
 for defence. Cleippides arriving shortly after, and 
 
 Thucyd. finding the intended surprise frustrated, demanded 
 the surrender of all ships of war, and the demolition 
 of the fortifications of the city ; informing the Mity- 
 lenaeans that his instructions required him, in case of 
 refusal, to denounce war against them, and imme- 
 diately to begin operations. The Mitylenaeans, yet 
 incompletely prepared, endeavoured to gain time by 
 negotiation ; and Cleippides, thinking his force in- 
 sufficient for the reduction of the place, permitted 
 them to send a deputation to Athens. The deputies 
 were directed to assure the Athenian people that no 
 defection from political engagements had been in- 
 tended by the Mitylenasans ; and to give some colour 
 to the assertion, one of the persons who had sent in- 
 telligence to Athens, but who had been gained over 
 to the ruling party in Mitylene, was appointed of 
 the deputation. Looking however only for the relief 
 of delay from this sinister measure, the Mitylenseans 
 at the same time privately dispatched information to 
 Lacedsemon, with solicitation for assistance. 
 
 c. 5. The Mitylenaean deputies returning from Athens 
 
 without procuring any relaxation of the terms re- 
 quired, both parties prepared for hostilities. All 
 Lesbos declared for the Mitylenaeans, except Me- 
 thymne, whose whole force joined the Athenian
 
 PREPARATIONS TO INVADE ATTICA. 435 
 
 armanent ; and this was farther strengthened from SECT. 
 Imbrus, Lemnos, and other places. The Mityle- 
 nasans at first endeavoured to gain credit to their 
 cause by making a parade of their strength in taking 
 the field against the Athenians ; but, after an action 
 in which, though not defeated, no advantage was ob- 
 tained, they retired within their fortifications. Then 
 the Athenian general sent with more confidence to 
 require assistance from the other allies ; and these 
 came in with readier zeal as they began to conceive 
 a worse opinion of the M itylenasan affairs. The siege 
 of Mitylene was thus regularly formed. 
 
 The Mitylenaean ministers arriving at Sparta Thucyd. 
 found no very earnest disposition to engage in their Q^aa 8 * 
 cause. The Lacedemonian government would nei- B.C. 428. 
 ther of itself undertake it, nor call a congress of the 
 confederacy. The season of the Olympian festival, 
 the Mitylenaeans were coldly told, was at hand. At 
 Olympia they would find some principal persons of 
 every state of the Lacedaemonian alliance, and there 
 might have opportunity to learn how each was dis- 
 posed. Going accordingly, they found readier favour 
 among the subordinate than in the imperial govern- 
 ment. After the conclusion of the festival, a meet- Thucyd> 
 ing of deputies of the several states being held, it J - 3 - c - 12. 
 was determined to receive the Lesbians into alliance, 
 and to make immediately a diversion in their favour by 
 a fresh invasion of Attica. Summonses were issued 
 for two thirds of the force of the confederacy to 
 repair without delay to Corinth ; and, to give new 
 efficacy to the invasion, frames were prepared, on 
 which to drag the triremes, which lay in the Corin- 
 thian gulf, across the isthmus, that a fleet might 
 co-operate with the army ; for, weakened as the 
 Athenians were by the pestilence, by the repeated 
 
 F F 2
 
 4>3O HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, waste of their territory, and by the distraction of 
 ' their forces, it was supposed impossible that they 
 could make any considerable opposition by sea, with- 
 out withdrawing their squadrons ' employed in the 
 siege of Lesbos and on the coast of Thrace, and thus 
 they would expose their maritime dependencies. 
 Thucyd. This new crisis roused the spirit of the Athenian 
 
 & 17' administration and people. It was indeed become 
 of the utmost importance to show that they had still 
 resolution to dare, and still strength to execute. The 
 formidable state of their navy at this time, which 
 enabled so small a commonwealth to command such 
 extensive dominion, and to resist such a powerful con- 
 federacy, is indeed truly wonderful, and does the 
 highest honour to the foresight and exertions of The- 
 mistocles, by whom it was first raised, and of Pericles, 
 by whom principally it was maintained and improved. 
 Forty triremes were at this time employed at Lesbos, 
 ten on the Thracian coast ; thirty under Asopius 
 son of Phormion were circumnavigating and ravaging 
 Peloponnesus ; and guard-ships were in various parts 
 of the coasts of Attica and Eubcea. None were 
 called in. A hundred remaining ready for service 
 in the harbour of Pirasus, it was determined imme- 
 diately to use these. Every Athenian was in some 
 degree a seaman. Excepting only those of the 
 highest orders, distinguished by the titles of knights 
 and peritacosiomedimnians, to whom, with the super- 
 annuated and the minors, the charge of the city was 
 left, all within the age for foreign service, resident 
 foreigners as well as Athenians, were required aboard. 
 August The fleet moving immediately for the isthmus dis- 
 played its strength in sight of the Peloponnesians, 
 who remained in their ports motionless. Debark- 
 ations were made at pleasure, on various parts of the
 
 SIEGE OF MITYLENE. 437 
 
 Peloponnesian coast, and a watch was kept on the SECT. 
 movements of the Peloponnesian army. 
 
 The Lacedaemonian leaders were astonished and 
 distressed by this well-judged and successful bravado. 
 They had confided in the report of the weakness of Timcyd. 
 Athens, which the Lesbians were led by their inte- h 3 ' c> 16 ' 
 rest to exaggerate. They had depended upon the c. 15. 
 compliance of their allies with the summons for their 
 proportions of troops for the invasion of Attica ; and 
 there too they were disappointed. Where the people 
 are at the same time cultivators and soldiers, they 
 cannot be always ready to go on distant expeditions, 
 and leave the care of their domestic affairs to women 
 and slaves. The Peloponnesians were now busy with 
 their harvest ; they were already wearied with fruitless 
 invasions of Attica, and they delayed to obey the call 
 to arms. Meanwhile intelligence arriving that the 
 armament under Asopius was ravaging Laconia, the 
 projected invasion of Attica was abandoned, and the 
 Lacedaemonian forces marched home. Then the 
 Athenian fleet also retired' with in its ports. 
 
 The purpose of the Lacedaemonian government to c.ie. 
 obviate the immediate pressure of the siege of Mity- 
 lene had nevertheless been in some degree fulfilled. 
 The Athenian force in Lesbos was so little equal to 
 its object that the Mitylenaeans, holding intelligence 
 with the aristocratical faction in Methymne, marched 
 to that place in hope of having it betrayed to them. 
 They were disappointed ; but in their return they 
 regulated, at leisure, the affairs of the subordinate 
 republics of Antissa, Pyra, and Eresus, and without 
 . any effectual opposition from Cleippides, returned 
 into Mitylene. Upon receiving intelligence of this, 
 the Athenian government sent Paches son of Epi- Begin. 
 curus, with a re-inforcement of a thousand heavy- 
 
 F F 3
 
 438 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, armed Athenians, to take the command in Lesbos. 
 
 Y \T 
 
 ' This sufficed to ensure superiority ; and by the be- 
 ginning of winter a contravallation was completed, 
 and Mitylene was blockaded by land and sea. 
 
 Thucyd. The expenses of the war however had been so 
 
 great to Athens that its treasury, wealthy as it had 
 been at the beginning, was now exhausted. The 
 daily pay of every Athenian foot-soldier on distant 
 service (Thucydides mentions particularly those em- 
 ployed in the siege of Potidam) was no less than two 
 Attic drachmas, about twenty pence English ; one 
 drachma, for his own subsistence, the other for a slave- 
 servant. The pay of the fleet was the same. Thucy- 
 dides does not specify that the seamen had their 
 servants aboard, but, what may imply the contrary, he 
 says that the thousand soldiers, who went with Paches 
 to Lesbos, themselves rowed the vessels which carried 
 them. Upon other occasions also we find Athenian 
 soldiers doing duties that would seem to be rather 
 the business of servants, if any were attending ; and 
 as none are mentioned by the historian, we must sup- 
 pose the indulgence was not always allowed. Sieges 
 were the most expensive military operations of the age, 
 and generally lasting. Extraordinary measures there- 
 fore were necessary to provide means for prosecuting 
 the siege of Mitylene ; and accordingly now, for the 
 
 c.19. first time, a contribution, apparently in the way of a 
 free gift, was collected from the Athenian citizens, to 
 the amount of two hundred talents. This manner 
 of taxation became afterward, as was likely in a go- 
 vernment where the multitude was despotic, a source 
 of intolerable oppression upon the higher ranks. A 
 reduction of pay to the soldiers and seamen seems to 
 have taken place, as a correspondent tax upon the 
 lower; for we learn from Thucydides, that the pay
 
 SIEGE OF PLATJEA. 439 
 
 was afterwards considerably below what he states it SECT. 
 to have been till this time. Exactions from the sub- 
 ject cities supplied the farther wants of the common- 
 wealth. 
 
 While the vengeance of Athens was thus directed Thucyd. 
 against the seceders from its confederacy, its faithful 1>3> c ' 20 * 
 allies of the little republic of Plataea seem to have been 
 forgotten. Closely blockaded now for above a year 
 and a half, distress was coming fast upon them. It 
 was already winter ; they had nearly consumed their 
 stores, relief was despaired of, to hold out much longer 
 was impossible, and from their besiegers no mercy was 
 expected. In this situation of their affairs the com- 
 mander of the garrison, Eupolpidas, encouraged by 
 his friend Theametus, who was, either by reputation 
 or by office, a prophet, proposed to attempt his escape, 
 by forcing their passage across the enemy's lines. 
 The proposal was at first joyfully accepted by the 
 whole garrison, and preparation was made zealously 
 for the execution ; but on the nearer view of so ha- 
 zardous an undertaking full half retracted. About 
 two hundred and twenty however persevered with 
 the commander. Friendly union fortunately remained 
 between the parties, and co-operation proceeded pro- 
 bably the more readily, as, on one side, it would be 
 considered that escape would be easier for half than 
 all, and, on the other, that when half were gone, sub- 
 sistence would last longer for the remainder, while 
 relief from allies, or other favourable contingencies, 
 might be hoped for. Accordingly ladders were pre- 
 pared, equal to the height of the enemy's wall, which 
 was calculated by counting the rows of bricks. The 
 interval between the walls- of circumvallation and con- 
 travallation, to use terms the nearest to the purpose 
 that our language possesses, was sixteen feet. This 
 
 F F 4
 
 440 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, space, being roofed, formed barracks for the besieg- 
 
 ' ing army, the appearance being that of one thick 
 
 Thucyd. wall, with a parapet and battlements on each side. 
 
 .3. c.2i. ^ t | ie j n j. erva i O f ever y ten battlements were towers 
 
 of equal width with the space enclosed by the walls ; 
 and in these the guards of the besieging army were 
 kept, and, in bad weather, the sentries sheltered. 
 B. c. 427. It was midwinter when all was ready for the un- 
 January. dertaking. A dark stormy night was chosen, with 
 rain and sleet falling. The adventurers were all 
 compactly armed; and, to tread more surely on the 
 slippery soil, they went with the right foot bare. To 
 avoid the clashing of arms, keeping distance, they 
 directed their way to the middle of the interval be- 
 tween two towers. They passed the ditch unper- 
 ceived, and then, placing ladders, twelve light-armed, 
 with only a short sword and a breastplate, mounted 
 under the command of Ammeas son of Coroebus, who 
 himself led. On reaching the top they divided, six 
 toward each tower, and waited. Others meanwhile 
 hastened to support them, light-armed with small 
 spears ; their shields, that they might climb more 
 nimbly, were borne by those who followed. Many 
 had already mounted, while the din of the storm and 
 the extreme darkness of the night prevented discovery, 
 when a tile accidentally thrown from a battlement, 
 fell with so much noise as to alarm the guard in the 
 neighbouring tower. The call to arms was immediate, 
 and the whole besieging army was quickly in motion. 
 The remaining garrison, according to the plan con- 
 certed, attentive to this, sallied from the opposite 
 part of the town, and made a feigned attack upon 
 the contravallation. The besieging army being thus 
 distracted, and in darkness and tempest unable to 
 discover what were the real circumstances, none
 
 SIEGE OF TLAT^EA. 441 
 
 dared quit his post : a body of three hundred only, SECT. 
 appointed as a picket-guard to move whithersoever 
 emergency might require, went without the wall of cir- 
 cumvallation, directing their march by the clamour. 
 Fire-signals were raised to give notice to Thebes ; 
 but, to render these unintelligible, the garrison formed 
 similar signals in various parts of the town. 
 
 Meanwhile those Plataeans who first mounted the 
 wall had forced the towers on each side, put the 
 guards to the sword, and, proceeding by their ladders 
 to the tops of the towers, discharged missile weapons 
 with advantage against those who approached to 
 disturb the passage of their comrades. To make 
 the passing easier, the parapet between the towers 
 was thrown down ; ladders were placed on the 
 outside, and every one, as soon as over the outer 
 ditch, forming on the counterscarp, with arrows and 
 darts co-operated with those on the towers in pro- 
 tecting the rest. To cross the ditch however was 
 not easy ; for there was much water in it, frozen, but 
 not so as to bear ; and before those from the tower- 
 tops, who were the last to descend, could pass, the 
 enemy's picket-guard approached. But the torches 
 which these carried, of little use to themselves, en- 
 abled the Plataeans to direct missile weapons against 
 them, and so efficaciously as to give opportunity for 
 the last of their own people to reach the unbroken 
 ground. All then hastened off, and struck directly 
 into the Theban road, as that which they would least 
 be expected to take, leaving the temple of the hero 
 Androcrates on the right ; so Thucydides describes 
 their march. The stratagem was completely suc- 
 cessful : they could plainly perceive the Pelopon- 
 nesians with their torches pursuing along the Athe- 
 nian road by Dryocephalae toward mount Citheeron.
 
 442 
 
 CHAP. 
 XV. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1.3. c.16. 
 
 c.25. 
 
 After 
 23rd Feb. 
 
 B.C. 427. 
 P. W.5. 
 Thucyd. 
 1.3. c.26. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 Having themselves followed the Theban road about 
 three quarters of a mile, they turned short to the 
 right, and, passing by Erythrae and Hysiae, soon 
 gained the mountains, whence they proceeded se- 
 curely to Athens. 
 
 Of those who engaged in this hazardous but well- 
 planned and ably-executed enterprise, two hundred 
 and twelve profited from its success ; none were killed ; 
 one only was taken on the counterscarp of the cir- 
 cumvallation ; five or six returned into the town 
 without attempting to scale the wall. These told the 
 garrison that their comrades, who persevered, were 
 all cut off. Next morning therefore a herald was sent 
 to solicit the dead for burial, and by his return the suc- 
 cess of the undertaking was first known in the town. 
 
 Relief of Mitylene meanwhile was not neglected 
 at Lacedasmon. Requisitions were sent to the several 
 maritime states of the confederacy to furnish their 
 proportion of a fleet of forty ships of war ; and toward 
 spring, while these were preparing, Salasthus was 
 forwarded with a single trireme to inspect the state 
 of things, and direct what might be necessary. Sa- 
 laethus, landing at Pyrrha, learnt that the contraval- 
 lation, where it crossed a deep water-course, was 
 incomplete, and he found opportunity that way to 
 enter Mitylene. The people, pressed by the able 
 and vigorous conduct of Paches in the command of 
 the besieging armament, were already talking of capi- 
 tulation ; but the exhortations of Salaethus, with 
 assurance of speedy succour, encouraged them to 
 persevere in defence. Early in summer the fleet, 
 which the zeal of the confederacy had increased to 
 forty-two ships of war, sailed for Mitylene under the 
 command of Alcidas ; and, shortly after, the Pelo- 
 ponnesian army, commanded by Cleomenes, as regent
 
 SIEGE OF MITYLENE. 443 
 
 for his minor nephew Pausanias, son of the banished SECT. 
 king Plistoanax, invaded Attica. Not only the pro- 
 duce of the earth was destroyed, wherever cultivation 
 had been attempted in the tract formerly ravaged, 
 but parts of the country before untouched were now 
 laid waste ; so that, excepting that of the second year 
 of the war, this was the most destructive inroad that 
 Attica had experienced. 
 
 Meanwhile, Alcidas loitering long on the coast of Thucyd. 
 Peloponnesus, and then not pressing his voyage across 1- 3 ' Cl 29 * 
 the .^Egean, the Mitylenaeans, distressed by scarcity 
 of provisions, began to despair of timely succour. 
 Salasthus himself at length grew hopeless of that as- c.27. 
 sistance of which he had brought the promise ; but 
 he thought he saw a resource in the yet unexerted 
 strength of the garrison. The oligarchal party in 
 Mitylene, according to a policy common in the Gre- 
 cian commonwealths, reserved to themselves exclu- 
 sively the complete armour and efficacious weapons 
 of the heavy-armed, and allowed the lower people 
 the use of the inferior arms, and the practice of the 
 inferior discipline, of the light-armed only. Salaethus, 
 who, in an oligarchy supported by the extraordinary 
 institutions of Lycurgus, was accustomed to see all 
 the citizens, without inconvenience, equally intrusted 
 with the completest armour, and trained in the com- 
 pletest discipline, thought that to enable the Mity- 
 lenagans, instead of starving within their walls, to 
 meet Paches in the field, nothing was wanting but to 
 distribute among the lower people the arms lying in 
 their stores. The experiment was made under his 
 authority, but the event was very wide of his hope. 
 The lower people were no sooner vested with this 
 new military importance than they assumed civil 
 control ; they held their own assemblies ; they re-
 
 [44 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, quired that the remaining stock of provisions should 
 xv ' be open to public inspection, and distributed equally 
 to the people of all ranks ; and they threatened, in 
 case of refusal, to make immediately their own terms 
 with the Athenians. In this state of things the 
 leading men thought no time was to be lost : they 
 proposed at once to the people to treat for a capitu- 
 lation, in which all should be included. This was 
 approved : a herald was sent to the Athenian general, 
 and the following hard terms were accepted : That 
 the Mitylenaeans should surrender themselves to the 
 pleasure of the Athenian people : That the Athenian 
 army should be immediately admitted into the city : 
 That the Mitylena3ans should send deputies to Athens 
 to plead their cause : That, before the return of these, 
 the Athenian general should neither put to death, 
 reduce to slavery, nor imprison any Mitylenaean. The 
 concluding stipulation was intended particularly for 
 the security of those of the aristocratical party who 
 had been active in the negotiation with Lacedaemon. 
 Many of them nevertheless, whether doubtful of 
 Athenian faith, or apprehensive of vengeance from 
 their fellow-citizens, who through their means chiefly 
 had been led to their present disastrous situation, 
 took refuge at the altars. Paches removed them under 
 a guard to the island of Tenedos, there to await the 
 judgment of the Athenian people. Such was the un- 
 happy state of politics in the Grecian republics. 
 
 Alcidas, with the fleet which should have relieved 
 Mitylene, was no farther advanced than the islands of 
 Icarus and Myconus, when report of its surrender 
 met him. Desirous of more authentic information 
 he proceeded to Embatus, a port of the Erythraean 
 territory on the Ionian coast ; and there receiving 
 assurance that the Athenian forces had been seven
 
 SURRENDER OF MITYLENE. 445 
 
 days in possession of Mitylene, he summoned a council SECT. 
 of war to concert measures. In the fleet were some _ ' 
 Ionian refugees. These proposed to excite a de- Thucyd. 
 fection of Ionia, the richest dependency of Athens, L3 ' c ' 31 ' 
 the great source of that revenue which supported the 
 war. The people, they affirmed, would be found not 
 averse : it would only be necessary, by a sudden and 
 vigorous exertion, to get possession of some one Ionian 
 city, or of Cuma in .^Eolis, for which the strength 
 of the armament was more than sufficient, and the 
 business would be done ; and beside that hardly a 
 greater blow could be given to the Athenian power, 
 it would lead of course to communication with the 
 Persian satraps of the western provinces, who might 
 probably be induced to form alliance with the Pelo- 
 ponnesians. The assertions of the lonians were cor- 
 roborated, and the project recommended, by those 
 Mitylena3an ministers who had been sent to Pelopon- 
 nesus, and were now with the fleet on their return. 
 But Alcidas was not enterprising : all proposals for ibid. 
 vigorous exertion were rejected, and he was most 
 inclined to move immediately home. Weakness 
 indeed seems to mark equally what was blameable 
 and what was praiseworthy in his conduct. He pro- c. 32. 
 ceeded at length eastward along the coast, as far as 
 appears, without any decided object, unless to make 
 prize of merchant-ships, of which he took numbers ; for 
 since he had been in those seas none had avoided him ; 
 some, not suspecting that a Peloponnesian fleet could 
 show itself on the Asiatic coast, had made toward it, 
 supposing it Athenian. At Myonnesus, in the Teian 
 territory, he put to death the greater part of the 
 prisoners thus made. Alarm spread in consequence, 
 and deputies from Samos came to him, deprecating 
 such barbarities. Convinced by their representations,
 
 446 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, at least of the impolicy of his proceeding, he dis- 
 missed many of his surviving prisoners, particularly 
 the Chians, and he made no more such executions. 
 Thucyd. Meanwhile intelligence reaching Paches that the 
 
 1.3. c.33. _. . 
 
 Peloponnesian fleet was on the Ionian coast occa- 
 sioned no small uneasiness. It was the ordinary po- 
 licy of the Athenian imperial democracy, for holding 
 subject republics in obedience, to demolish the for- 
 tifications of their towns ; thus making them de- 
 pendent upon the power or renown of the sovereign 
 people for security against foreign enemies, arid open 
 to ready coercion from the same power, through the 
 force which the Athenian navy could readily carry 
 anywhere. But thus the rich commercial towns of 
 Lesser Asia were now open also to attempts from the 
 Peloponnesian fleet. Paches therefore hastening to- 
 ward them with his fleet learnt in the way that the 
 cautious Alcidas had already turned his course toward 
 Peloponnesus. Paches having followed as far as Lat- 
 mos *, and there finding pursuit vain, resolved to go 
 himself to Ionia ; opportunity being there open for 
 doing service to his country; but it was by an act of 
 c. 34. united treachery and cruelty, which, through the im- 
 partial justice of the admirable historian his contem- 
 porary and fellow-countryman, has marred with a 
 blot of eternal infamy a character otherwise of some 
 glory, not without extending a stain to that of the 
 Athenian government and people, who for the profit 
 approved the deed. 
 
 Aristot. Colophon, once famous for the wealth of its citizens, 
 
 i. 4. c. 4. and its general prosperity, was afterward, through 
 
 ut h "up. d violence of civil contention, greatly reduced. It was 
 
 however still considerable when, about three years 
 
 before the time of which we are treating, one party, 
 
 * [ . . f*fXft |t*iy navfjiov, x. r. x. ed. Bekker. 1. c.]
 
 COLOPHON : NOTIUM. 447 
 
 not scrupling to solicit Persian support, obtained from SECT. 
 
 a neighbouring Persian officer what gave them so clear 
 
 a superiority that their opponents withdrew from the 
 
 city. It has been formerly observed that the capitals ch. 12. s. 3. 
 
 o \\_ n IT of this Hist. 
 
 or the Grecian maritime republics were mostly at 
 some distance from their ports. Notium was the 
 port of Colophon ; and the fugitives, gaining posses- 
 sion of that important place, maintained it so as to 
 become there esteemed a separate commonwealth. 
 But all the evils they had suffered through violence 
 of faction were insufficient admonition to guard them 
 against the growth of that common bane of every 
 Grecian republic. It rose so among them that one 
 party adopted the resource which had produced the 
 division of their state and their own banishment from 
 their capital, soliciting support from the neighbour- 
 ing Persian satrap, Pissuthnes. Already the Persian 
 satraps of the provinces bordering on the Grecian 
 possessions in Asia had adopted the policy, for which 
 the state of Greece afforded abundant opportunity, 
 of entertaining a Grecian military force, composed 
 mostly of exiles from their several republics, destitute 
 of other means for subsistence. But in ancient Greece 
 the Arcadians, as in modern Europe the Swiss, more 
 than any other Greeks, perhaps on account of the 
 poverty of their country, sought foreign military 
 service. Pissuthnes had a body of these in his pay, 
 which he sent to support the party soliciting assist- 
 ance, together with a body of those whom the Greeks 
 called barbarians, intrusting the chief command to 
 the Arcadian commander, Hippias. Their opponents 
 were in consequence expelled ; but the result was not 
 to their wishes ; the satrap required the re-union of 
 the Colophonian state, by which they became effect- 
 ually subjects of their most inveterate enemies, their
 
 448 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 C x v P * fellow-citizens who had retained possession of the city. 
 This was the state of things when Paches came with 
 his fleet into the neighbourhood. While their cir- 
 cumstances were thus probably uneasy enough, their 
 fellow-citizens whom they had expelled would be far 
 more deeply distressed. With joy and new hope 
 therefore they saw an Athenian fleet approaching. 
 They hastened to apply to Paches, claiming his pro- 
 tection, and that of the Athenian commonwealth, to 
 which, they asserted, they had been faithful against 
 barbarians and rebels, by whom they were oppressed. 
 Paches, going accordingly to Notium, and landing 
 his forces, desired a conference with Hippias, the 
 commander of the Arcadian troops. Hippias, trust- 
 ing in a safe-conduct, went into his camp, but was 
 immediately arrested ; and Paches advancing with his 
 forces to Notium, where no such attempt was appre- 
 hended, took it, and put all the Arcadian and Persian 
 troops to the sword. Not satisfied with this efficacious 
 treachery, as if in mockery of good faith, conducting 
 Hippias unhurt into the town, and claiming so to 
 have complied with the terms of his engagement, he 
 ordered that deluded officer to execution. The 
 Colophonians of the party adverse to the Persian 
 interest were then put in possession of Notium, and 
 Paches returned to Mitylene. Notium was soon 
 after strengthened by a colony of Athenians ; the 
 ancient constitution was superseded by the Athenian 
 law, and the town was made an immediate append- 
 age of Attica. 
 
 The measure which followed, on the return of 
 Paches to Mitylene, seems to have been as little con- 
 sistent with his plighted faith as his treatment of 
 the unfortunate Hippias. All those Mitylenaeans 
 remaining in the city who had been active in the
 
 STATE OF ATHENIAN GOVERNMENT. 449 
 
 revolt, that is, all the aristocratical party, were ap- SECT. 
 prehended ; and, together with those who had been 
 lodged in Tenedos, were sent to Athens. The La- 
 cedaemonian Salaethus, who had been discovered in 
 concealment during the absence of Paches, was sent 
 prisoner with them. The greater part of the forces 
 were sent home : the general remained to administer 
 the affairs of the island. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 State of the Athenian government after the death of Pericles. 
 Nicias : Clean. Inhuman decree against the Mitylenceans : 
 death of Paches. Platcea taken. 
 
 THE supreme direction of the Athenian affairs had 
 now passed into very different hands from those whose 
 extraordinary abilities had raised the commonwealth 
 to its present power. After the abolition of royalty, 
 and even after the establishment of the constitution 
 of Solon, which reduced the aristocracy, while demo- 
 cratical sway was gradually advancing, illustrious birth 
 had still been greatly considered among the Athenian 
 people, and was almost necessary for rising to high 
 political situations. For, little willing as the Athe- 
 nians were to allow superiority of rank, superiority 
 of political situation was indispensably to be given to 
 some ; and they submitted to it less impatiently in 
 families which they had been accustomed for ages to 
 respect than in new men, yesterday their equals or 
 inferiors. Themistocles and Aristides seem to have 
 been the first whom the most extraordinary advan- 
 tages of ability and character could raise, from even 
 middle rank to that eminence which enabled them 
 to take a decisive lead in public affairs. After them, 
 
 VOL. II. G G
 
 450 HISTORY OF GREECE, 
 
 
 
 CHAP, in Cimon, and again in Pericles, superior talents met 
 xv ' with illustrious birth. But even the constitution of 
 Solon had contributed to transfer to riches that re- 
 spect which was formerly paid to high ancestry. 
 Other circumstances afterward assisted to give im- 
 moderate influence to the possession of wealth. The 
 great Cimon set the injurious example, though pro- 
 bably not the first example, of bribing the people 
 from his private purse. The great Pericles set the 
 still more ruinous example of bribing the people from 
 the public treasure. After his death no man was 
 found capable of wielding like him a democracy, 
 commanding, with little interruption, for fifteen years, 
 a people, every individual of whom claimed equality 
 with himself, as if he had, by the most undisputed 
 claim, been their legal sovereign. But a constant 
 succession of men possessing superior abilities, with 
 disposition and constitution to exert them in public 
 business, is not to be expected among the small 
 numbers who compose the highest rank in any state. 
 Nicias son of Niceratus, to whom the principal fami- 
 lies, and sober men in general, now looked as the 
 fittest person to lead the councils of the common- 
 wealth, was a man of high merit, but unfortunately 
 not, like the great men who had preceded him, born 
 for the peculiar circumstances of the situation for 
 which he was wanted. His abilities, political and 
 military, were considerable. Integrity, piety, gene- 
 rosity, a pleasant complying temper, and an elegant 
 taste were conspicuous in him. Decidedly adverse 
 to democratical power, he was nevertheless so clear 
 a friend to public welfare, so ready and so judicious 
 in the employment of his large fortune in gratifica- 
 tions for the multitude, so humane and liberal in re- 
 lieving the distressed and promoting the advantages
 
 NICIAS : CLEON. 451 
 
 of individuals, that he was in no small degree a favour- SECT. 
 ite of the people. But he was bashful and diffident : 
 of clear courage in the field, in the assembly of the 
 people he was a coward ; while a reserve, the effect 
 of bashfulness, injured him as if it had been the effect 
 of pride. It was said of him, that his generosity was 
 a revenue to the deserving, and his fearfulness to the 
 undeserving. Under a better government his cha- 
 racter might have been splendid ; but his diffidence 
 and want of firmness, amid the civil turbulence in 
 which it was his fate to live, gave it sometimes the 
 appearance even of weakness. 8 
 
 In opposition to Nicias stood a man such as never 
 before was known to sway the Athenian assembly. 
 Cleon seems to have been as remarkably born for 
 the depression of Athens as Miltiades, Themistocles, 
 Aristides, Cimon, and Pericles for its exaltation. 
 Bred among the lowest of the people, the son of a 
 tanner, and said himself to have exercised that trade, 
 he was the opposite of Nicias in character as in po- 
 litical interest. Of extraordinary impudence and 
 little courage, slack in the field, but forward and noisy 
 in the assembly, corrupt in practice as in principle, 
 but boastful of integrity, and supported by a ready 
 though coarse eloquence, he had gained such con- 
 sideration, flattering the lower people and railing at 
 the higher, that he stood in the situation of head of 
 a party. 9 
 
 8 Plato certainly esteemed Nicias an able statesman and 
 general. See the dialogue Laches throughout, but particularly 
 p. 198. t. ii. ed. Serran. Plutarch is large upon his defects. 
 
 9 ' Xerxes himself did not suffer more by the flattery of his 
 courtiers than the Athenians by that of their orators.' Lord 
 Littleton's dialogue of Pericles and Cosmo de' Medici. 
 
 G G 2
 
 452 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 B.C. 427. Such was the state of things when the unhappy 
 
 Ol 87 i 
 
 p/w.'ll Mitylenasans surrendered their lives and fortunes to 
 fa"? 36 t ^ ie pl easure f ^e Athenian people. On the arrival 
 of the prisoners, the Lacedaemonian Salaethus was 
 ordered, by the absolute command of the assembled 
 people, for immediate execution. To obtain a re- 
 spite he made large offers, and, among other things, 
 undertook to procure the raising of the siege of 
 Plataea ; but in vain. The assembly then deliberated 
 concerning the punishment to be inflicted upon the 
 Mitylenaean people ; and sentiments of anger, in- 
 flamed by the boisterous eloquence of Cleon, prevail- 
 ing, the inhuman decree passed for putting every 
 man to death, and reducing the women and children 
 of all ranks to slavery. Such was the right which 
 the Athenian people claimed over Greeks whom they 
 called allies, and who had every pretension so to con- 
 sider themselves ; and such the punishment for re- 
 nouncing that alliance, to connect themselves with 
 other Greeks. The assembly was no sooner dis- 
 missed than a trireme was dispatched, with orders 
 for Paches to carry the decree into immediate exe- 
 cution. 
 
 But the Athenians were not universally of a temper 
 to sleep upon such a deed without remorse. The 
 very next morning extensive repentance became evi- 
 dent ; and many of the principal men joined the 
 Mitylenaean deputies, in pressing the summoning of 
 a second assembly, for the purpose of reconsidering 
 the decree j and they prevailed. The people were 
 hastily called together, and various opinions were de- 
 livered. The mild Nicias was a weak opponent to 
 the insolent Cleon, who harangued with vehemence 
 in support of the measure already taken. * What 
 1 folly,' he said, ' to rescind, on one day, what had
 
 DECREE AGAINST THE MITYLEN^ANS. 4-53 
 
 * been, on due deliberation, resolved but on the pre- 
 
 * ceding ! Without more stability in measurest here 
 
 * was an end of government. With regard to the 
 
 * purport of the decree complained of, example was 
 
 * become absolutely necessary ; and a more just ex- 
 ' ample than that decreed against the Mitylenaeans 
 
 * never could be found. They had always been 
 
 * treated by Athens not only with justice but with 
 
 * kindness, not only without offence, but with cautious 
 ' respect. And as nothing could be more unprovoked 
 ' than the revolt, so nothing could be less defended 
 
 * upon any plea of necessity. The Mitylenaeans could 
 
 * not be compelled to the part they had taken : being 
 ' islanders, attack could hardly reach them ; possess- 
 
 * ing ships and fortifications, they could have repelled 
 it. Enjoying then these advantages, they had be- 
 
 < fore their eyes the example of others, who, having 
 revolted against Athens, had been punished by de- 
 ' privation of their marine, demolition of their for- 
 tifications, and reduction under a strict subjection. 
 
 < Nevertheless, unsatisfied with possessed felicity, un- 
 
 * deterred by obvious example, they not barely re- 
 
 * nounced their political connexion, but they united 
 
 * themselves with those whose professed purpose was 
 
 * the destruction of Athens. Such being the case, 
 ' it would be weakness to let sentiments of mercy 
 
 * prevail ; and it would be folly even to delay that 
 
 * decision which wisdom required, but which, if the 
 
 * present anger of the people cooled, they would 
 want resolution to make/ These were the prin- 
 cipal arguments in support of the inhuman sentence. 
 But Cleon would enforce argument by menaces ; 
 and knowing that he could not use a more effectual 
 weapon against the timid Nicias, impudently im- 
 puting corrupt motives to any who should dare to 
 
 G G S
 
 454 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, oppose him, he threatened criminal prosecution before 
 that wild judicature, the assembled people. 
 
 The assertor of the cause of humanity, upon this 
 occasion, was Diodotus son of Eucrates. He must 
 have deserved to be better known, but upon this 
 occasion only we find him mentioned in history. 10 
 In the debate of the preceding day he had been the 
 Thucyd. principal opponent of Cleon ; and he now again came 
 1.3. c.4i. f orwar( i w j^ firmness, with zeal, and at the same time 
 with prudence, to plead a cause which, he insisted, 
 was not more that of humanity than of political wis- 
 dom. Such was the ferment of men's minds, and so 
 much passion entered into the decision of political 
 c . 4248. questions at Athens, that he would not venture to 
 attribute injustice to the decree ; he would not venture 
 to affirm that the Athenians might not, in strict right, 
 condemn the whole Mitylenaean people to death ; but 
 he desired them to consider, * that the lower Mity- 
 
 * lenaeans had no sooner had the power, in consequence 
 
 * of having arms put into their hands, than they 
 
 * compelled the aristocratical party to treat with 
 ' the Athenian general. Setting aside however the 
 
 * question of right and justice, he would consider the 
 ' matter upon the point of expediency only. The 
 
 * terror of capital punishment, it was notorious, did 
 not prevent the commission of crimes : it was the 
 
 * business therefore of a wise policy, by attentive pre- 
 ' caution, to prevent revolt and not to enhance evils, 
 
 * to which negligence or misrule might give occasion, 
 
 * by making the situation of those engaged in revolt 
 completely desperate : it was the business of a wise 
 
 10 A brother of Nicias was named Eucrates (Lys. or. pro fil. 
 Eucr.), and the manner in which family names were usually 
 distributed among the Greeks would favour the supposition that 
 the father of Diodotus may have been brother of Niceratus, the 
 father of Nicias.
 
 DECREE COUNTERMANDED. 455 
 
 * policy to draw profit from conquest, and not to SECT, 
 
 * convert a city, capable of paying large tribute, into 
 
 * a heap of ruins, and a cultivated country to a desert. 
 
 * The lower people, he observed, even in the subject- 
 
 * states, were in general attached to Athens. Even 
 ' were it just therefore, nothing could be more 
 
 * impolitic than, by an act of extreme severity, to 
 
 * alienate, in every subject-state, that party which 
 ' alone was, or ever would be, well-disposed to them.' 
 He concluded with recommending, 'that those who 
 
 * had been selected by Paches as most involved in the 
 
 * guilt of revolt should be, not condemned in haste 
 
 * and in anger, but judged at leisure with dispassionate 
 
 * deliberation, and that the rest of the Mitylensean 
 ' people should have a free pardon.' 
 
 The speeches being concluded, the question was Thucyd, 
 put, and Diodotus prevailed ; but the influence of 1 * 3- c * 49 ' 
 Cleon was such that he prevailed but by a very small 
 majority. It was, after all, very much feared that 
 notice of the second decree could not be conveyed to 
 Mitylene in time to prevent the execution of the 
 first; orders for which had been forwarded nearly 
 twenty-four hours. A trireme was in all haste 
 dispatched, with no small promises to the crew for 
 arriving in time. They rowed incessantly, refreshing 
 themselves with a preparation of meal, wine, and oil, 
 which they could take without quitting their labour, 
 and sleeping by reliefs. Fortunately no adverse 
 wind impeded ; and the trireme with the first decree, 
 going on an odious errand, did not press its way. It 
 arrived however first ; the general had opened the 
 dispatches, and was taking measures for executing 
 the horrid order, when the second trireme arrived 
 with the happy countermand. 
 
 The case of those whom Paches had sent to Athens, 
 as principal actors in the revolt, seems to have been 
 
 G G 4
 
 456 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, hopeless, since Diodotus himself had not ventured 
 xv> to offer a word in their favour, farther than to claim 
 for them a dispassionate trial. They were more than 
 1.3. c.so. a thousand, and all were put to death. Nor were 
 those saved from the executioner treated with the 
 generosity which Diodotus recommended. All the 
 ships of war of the Mitylenaean commonwealth were 
 confiscated to the use of the Athenian people ; the 
 fortifications of the city were demolished, and the 
 lands were disposed of in a manner which appears to 
 have been new. According to the genius of demo- 
 cracy, it was calculated rather for private emolument 
 than public advantage ; being either required by the 
 sovereign people, as an indulgence which they wished 
 and could command, or proposed by some leading 
 men as a bribe to obtain popular favour. The whole 
 island of Lesbos, except the territory of Methymne, 
 was divided into three thousand portions. Three 
 hundred of these were dedicated to the gods ; for 
 such was Grecian religion that it was supposed the 
 deity might be thus bribed, not only to pardon, but 
 even to favour the most atrocious inhumanity. The 
 remainder was divided by lot among the Athenian 
 citizens, who were however not to have possession of 
 the lands : that was to remain with the Lesbians, who, 
 for each portion, were to pay a yearly rent, in the 
 nature of our quitrents, of two mines, about eight 
 pounds sterling. A territory belonging to the Les- 
 bians, on the neighbouring continent, was disposed 
 of in the same manner. Both the insular and the 
 continental territory were reduced under complete 
 and immediate subjection to the sovereignty of the 
 Athenian people. But the gratification of individuals 
 only was provided for ; the public treasury derived 
 nothing from the arrangement. 
 
 A very remarkable fact, unnoticed by Thucydides,
 
 DEATH OF PACHES. 457 
 
 is however so asserted by Plutarch as authenticated SECT. 
 
 iv 
 
 that it must require mention here. The conduct of ' 
 
 Paches, throughout his command, appears to have 
 been able, and his services were certainly important. 
 On his return to his country, he expected honour and 
 respect suitable to those services ; but he found 
 himself called upon to answer a charge of peculation 
 before the assembled people. The orators who con- 
 ducted the accusation were virulent : their harangues Piutv. 
 had evident effect upon the multitude; and the in- 
 dignation of Paches, perhaps less an orator than a 
 soldier, was so raised that, in presence of the assembly, 
 he stabbed himself to the heart. 
 
 After proceeding thus far in Grecian history, we 
 become so familiarised with instances of slaughter 
 committed in cold blood, generally not without some 
 claim of sanction from lawful authority, and a pre- 
 tence to the execution of justice, that the horror 
 lessens, and we are prepared for the tragedy which 
 closed the siege of Plataea. We find Thucydides so 
 often giving due measure of censure to his fellow- 
 countrymen that it seems reasonable to suppose they 
 would not have escaped his animadversion for neg- 
 lecting all endeavour to succour the brave little gar- 
 rison of that place, had there been any prospect of 
 success from any attempt within their power. We 
 may conceive indeed that the pestilence first, and 
 then the revolt of Lesbos, would greatly weaken 
 their means ; not only reducing their ability for 
 exertion, but increasing the danger of hazardous 
 measures. The besieging army however alone would 
 scarcely deter them ; but the force of Boeotia was at 
 hand, equally to support the besieging army, or to 
 take advantage of the absence of the Athenian forces 
 from Attica, and to intercept their return ; and the
 
 458 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, loss of a battle, in the critical circumstances of that 
 
 XV. 
 
 ' time, might have endangered all the dependencies 
 
 of Athens, and even Athens itself. 
 
 Thucyd. Such being the inability of the Athenians to relieve 
 Plataea, in the course of the summer, the third of the 
 siege, the garrison began to be severely pressed by 
 famine. The first proposal for a capitulation was 
 nevertheless made by the Lacedaemonian general, in 
 pursuance of instructions, the result of an illiberal 
 and even treacherous policy, which we should deem 
 more unworthy of Sparta, were there fewer instances 
 of it upon record to her shame. The success of the 
 Peloponnesians in the war not having been so great 
 and so rapid as they had promised themselves, it was 
 foreseen that to restore places taken on both sides 
 might probably become a necessary condition of any 
 peace. But it was an object with the Lacedaemonian 
 government, in compliment to Thebes, not to restore 
 Plataea. As soon therefore as it was known that the 
 garrison were in extremity of want, the general sent a 
 herald with the proposal, * that if they would volun- 
 
 * tarily submit themselves to the Lacedaemonians, 
 ' and take them for their judges, the guilty only 
 
 * should be punished, and none without trial.' The 
 Plataeans, utterly unable to struggle for better terms, 
 acceded to these, and surrendered their town and 
 themselves to the Lacedaemonians. 
 
 Commissioners shortly arrived from Sparta, au- 
 thorised to pronounce the doom of the unfortunate 
 garrison, which seems to have been already deter- 
 mined ; for the mode of trial promised nothing 
 equitable. No accusation was preferred, but the 
 simple question was put to the Plataeans, ' Whether, 
 
 * in the existing war, they had done any service to 
 
 * the Lacedaemonians or their allies ? ' Startled at
 
 DISTRESS OF THE PLAT^ANS. 45 
 
 such a proceeding, the Plataeans requested that they SECT. 
 might be permitted to speak more largely for them- _ ' 
 selves than merely to answer that question. This 
 being not denied, Astymachus and Lacon, the latter 
 connected by hospitality with Sparta, were appointed 
 to speak for the whole body. After urging their 
 confidence in the justice of the Lacedaemonians, and 
 the expectation of a different kind of trial, which had 
 induced them to surrender themselves, they pleaded 
 the acknowledged merit of their commonwealth with 
 Lacedaemon and with all Greece in the Persian wars ; 
 and they mentioned their service to Sparta in par- 
 ticular in the Helot rebellion. They stated the 
 refusal of the Lacedaemonians to undertake the pro- 
 tection of their commonwealth against the oppression 
 of Thebes, which above ninety years before had 
 given origin to their alliance with Athens ; and they 
 expatiated on the extreme hardship of their case, if 
 they were to be punished for fidelity to that alliance, 
 which they could not have deserted without the 
 basest ingratitude and the foulest dishonour. They 
 expostulated on the proposed desolation of those 
 temples where thanksgiving had been offered to the 
 gods for blessing Greece with liberty, through the 
 glorious success obtained against the Persians, and 
 on the abolition which, from the destruction of their 
 commonwealth, would ensue to those solemn rites 
 then appointed, by the grateful voice of Greece 
 united, to be performed by the Plataean people* 
 Finally, adjuring the Lacedaemonians by the sepul- 
 chres of their ancestors, to which the Plataeans paid 
 annual honours, they deprecated, beyond all things, 
 being delivered to their inveterate enemies the The- 
 bans, whose insidious attempts against them, they 
 said, after having successfully resisted, they had justly
 
 4DU HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, punished ; and they required rather to be restored 
 ' to the possession of their town, to which, by the 
 terms of the capitulation, they were equitably entitled, 
 there to have the choice of their mode of perishing: 
 but on the mercy of the Lacedsemonians they would 
 willingly throw themselves. 
 
 The Thebans, with exasperation not abated by 
 time, but rather increased by the difficulties they had 
 undergone in obtaining means to revenge their friends 
 and relations, murdered, according to their sentiment, 
 by the Plataeans, undertook to reply. They began 
 
 Thucyd. with asserting their claim to sovereignty over Platsea, 
 
 * ' c ' * derived from their ancestors, founders of all the mu- 
 nicipal governments of Bosotia, when they conquered 
 the country. They would allow no merit to the 
 Platseans for their exertions in the Persian war ; to 
 which they were led, it was insisted, not by an en- 
 larged spirit of patriotism, not by any liberal regard 
 for the common cause of Grecian freedom, but merely 
 by an attachment to Athens, founded on the separate 
 interest, not even of their city, but only of a faction 
 
 e."63. in their city. No connexion with Athens however 
 could excuse their defection from the general confe- 
 deracy of the Greek nation, under the presidency of 
 Lacedsemon, of which Athens itself had been a 
 member. On the contrary, if it was dishonourable to 
 betray any engagement, into which they had un- 
 guardedly entered with Athens, much more dis- 
 honourable and more criminal was it to betray the 
 common cause of Greece, by supporting the Athe- 
 nians in their endeavours to subdue the whole nation, 
 against the Lacedaemonians and their allies, whose 
 only purpose was to protect its liberties. Thus, 
 
 c.64. among others, the ^Sginetans, whose commonwealth 
 had been a member of the general confederacy, were
 
 EXASPERATION OF THE THEBANS. 46l 
 
 already reduced to a state of subjection : and yet, SECT. 
 notwithstanding these offences, liberal offers had been ' 
 made to the Platasans before the siege, and had been 
 rejected. 
 
 * With regard then/ continued the Theban orator, Thucyd. 
 
 * to the attempt to surprise your city during an ' c * " 
 ' existing truce, which is so vehemently objected to 
 
 * us, had it been a measure of our own, or had we 
 ' come hostilely against you, ravaged your lands and 
 ' attacked your persons, you might indeed reasonably 
 ' have accused us. But the leaders in that business 
 
 * were the best of your own citizens ; they invited 
 
 * us ; they opened your gates to us ; under their au- 
 ' thority, who had the best title to authority among 
 
 * you, we acted ; nothing hostile was done, nothing 
 ' intended, but the sole purpose was the salutary 
 
 * one of withdrawing you from a foreign connexion, 
 ' and reuniting you to the body of the Bo3otian 
 
 * people. Nevertheless the death of those of our c.66. 
 ' fellow-citizens who fell in arms we are willing to 
 
 ' pass over ; but for the assassination of those others, 
 who submitted themselves to your mercy, whom in 
 ' the moment you spared, and for whose safety you 
 
 * pledged yourselves to us, how can it be excused ? 
 
 * Shall then, Lacedemonians, their lamentations and c.67. 
 
 * prayers for mercy avail them ? The fathers of those 
 
 * gallant youths, who have been thus murdered, were 
 
 * the very men who, by their deeds in the field of 
 
 * Coronea, rescued Breotia from the Attic yoke, and 
 ' restored it to the Grecian confederacy. Some of 
 ' them fell there ; some, now in old age, living to 
 
 * bewail the treacherous massacre of their sons and 
 
 * the orbitude of their families, are with far better 
 
 * plea your suppliants for revenge. We therefore 
 
 * demand of you, Lacedaemonians, in the punishment
 
 4*62 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. of these men, that justice to which the laws and 
 . * customs of Greece, so nefariously violated by them, 
 
 * entitle us.' 
 
 Thucydides, cautious almost to extreme of offend- 
 ing against that impartiality so valuable and so un- 
 common in a contemporary historian, avoids declaring 
 any sentiment as his own upon this extraordinary 
 transaction ; the more important to be related in 
 some detail, because it was afterward but too much 
 drawn into precedent, and because the circumstances, 
 and the speeches commenting upon them, tend much 
 to explain both the nature of the Grecian confederacy, 
 and the ideas prevailing at the time, concerning the 
 laws of nature and of nations. It is not indeed likely 
 that the speeches made upon the occasion would 
 come very exactly reported even to Thucydides. In 
 what that historian therefore has given us for those 
 speeches, as well as in what he attributes to the La- 
 cedaemonian commissioners as the ground of their 
 proceeding, he seems rather to have stated the argu- 
 ments publicly circulated by the friends of the several 
 parties. It appears to have been very generally held 
 among the Greeks of that age, that men were bound 
 by no duties to each other without some express 
 compact. The property of foreigners might be any- 
 where seized, and themselves reduced to slavery, or 
 even put to death, without the breach of any human 
 law ; and not only without the breach of any divine 
 law, but prayers were addressed to the gods for favour 
 and assistance in the commission of such violences. 
 Those connected with them by political or social 
 compact the Greeks described by a term peculiar to 
 themselves, ENSPONDI ; meaning, originally, persons 
 with whom they had poured wine to the gods, or 
 with whom they had made a compact, sanctified by
 
 FATE OF THE TOWN AND PEOPLE. 463 
 
 the ceremony of pouring wine to the gods : those SECT. 
 who were bound to them by no compact, or who had ' 
 
 forfeited their claim to the benefit of a compact once 
 existing, they called ECSPONDI, out of compact, or 
 outlaws. The Lacedaemonian commissioners, upon Thucyd. 
 
 1 O ftQ 
 
 the present occasion, determined that the Plataean 
 people, in consequence of their renunciation of the 
 Lacedaemonian confederacy, and of their refusal of 
 equitable terms offered them immediately before the 
 siege, were ecspondi; and not only so, but they were 
 ecspondi who had treated the Lacedasmonians and 
 their allies injuriously. It was therefore resolved 
 that the sentence should rest upon the answer that 
 could be given, and supported, to the simple question 
 first proposed. Accordingly the Plataeans were again 
 called upon, one by one, to say, * Whether in the 
 
 * present war they had done any service to the La- 
 
 * cedaemonians or their allies.' All answering in the 
 negative, they were severally led aside and imme- 
 diately put to death, to the number of not fewer 
 than two hundred Plataeans, and twenty-five Athe- 
 nians ; to whom probably this severity was extended 
 with the less hesitation, in consequence of the late 
 execution of the Spartan, Salaethus, at Athens. The 
 women were condemned to slavery ; the town and 
 territory were given to the Thebans. A few Plataean 
 refugees of the aristocratical party, together with 
 some Megarians, whom faction had also driven from 
 their own city, were permitted to inhabit Platsea 
 during one year. Afterward the lands were con- 
 fiscated to the public use of the Theban state, and 
 let to Theban citizens on leases for ten years ; the 
 town was levelled with the ground, the temples how- 
 ever being carefully preserved; and, adjoining to the 
 temple of Juno, an inn two hundred feet square,
 
 464 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, something like the modern caravanserais of the East, 
 
 ^ was built with the materials. In the spirit of Grecian 
 
 piety, with which revenge was congenial, and no vice 
 absolutely inconsistent, furniture for the inn, made 
 of the iron and brass found in the town, was dedicated 
 to Juno ; and a new temple, a hundred feet long, 
 was erected to the same goddess. Such was the fate 
 of Platsea, in the ninety-third year from its first 
 alliance with Athens. 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 Sedition of Corcyra : Operations of the Athenian fleets under 
 Nicostratus and Eurymedon, and of the Peloponnesian under 
 Alcidas. 
 
 FROM this scene of bloodshed and desolation, such 
 is the tenor of Grecian history, we proceed to an- 
 other still more shocking, whence we should will- 
 ingly avert our eyes, but for the more than curious 
 information, the valuable instruction, which, as from 
 a well-imagined tragic fable, may be derived from it. 
 In the island of Corcyra, since its connexion with 
 Athens, the democratical had been the prevailing 
 interest. In the sea-fight with the Corinthians, off 
 Ch. 13. s. 3. Sybota, a number of Corcyrasans of rank, as we have 
 Bt * seen, had been made prisoners. To conciliate these 
 became then the policy of the Corinthian government, 
 in the hope, through them, to bring over Corcyra to 
 the Peloponnesian confederacy, which would of course 
 restore some portion of the ancient influence and 
 Thucyd. authority of Corinth in the island. The Corcyraean 
 .3. c.70. no b} es readily acceded to the first idea ; and possibly 
 a less reward than the change from a dungeon, with 
 daily fear of death, to liberty, affluence, and power
 
 SEDITION OF CORCYRA. 465 
 
 might have induced them to accede to the second ; SECT. 
 
 TT 
 
 for to be masters of their island, under the sovereignty 
 of Corinth, was likely to be far preferable to living 
 under the rod of democratical rule in the hands of 
 their fellow-citizens. They were accordingly set at 
 liberty ; bound, as it was given out, by sufficient 
 pledges to pay a large sum for their ransom. The 
 real ransom however appeared in the sequel : every 
 Corcyraean was canvassed separately for his support, 
 in the general assembly, to a proposed motion for re- 
 nouncing the Athenian alliance, and renewing the 
 ancient connexion of Corcyra with Corinth its mother- 
 city. Success in this intrigue was considerable ; but 
 party became warm, and the whole island was in com- 
 motion. The democratical leaders, in alarm, sending 
 information to Athens, the Athenian government 
 dispatched ministers to watch over the interests of the 
 commonwealth in Corcyra. Ministers from Corinth 
 arrived nearly at the same time. An assembly of 
 the Corcyrsean people was held in presence of both ; 
 the question concerning the alliance was discussed ; 
 and the Corinthians so far prevailed that, though it 
 was resolved to maintain the alliance with Athens, it 
 was resolved also to maintain peace with Pelopon- 
 nesus. 
 
 How far it might have been possible for the ari- 
 stocratical party to stop there, and preserve quiet, 
 means for judging fail ; but that no discreet zeal 
 directed their following measures amply appears. A 
 prosecution was commenced against Pithias, chief of 
 the democratical party, the most powerful individual 
 of the island, warm in the Athenian interest, and a 
 public guest of the Athenian commonwealth. The 
 vague accusation urged against him was, ' that he 
 ' had subjected, or endeavoured to subject, his country 
 
 VOL. II. H H
 
 466 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. to Athens.' The aristocratical party had so ill 
 ' considered their strength, or so ill concerted their 
 measures, that he was acquitted. It was then perhaps 
 necessary for him to ruin those who would ruin him ; 
 and the interest which had enabled him to repel the 
 attack would be likely to give him means of revenge. 
 He accused five of the wealthiest of the aristocratical 
 party of cutting stakes in the sacred groves of Jupiter 
 and Alcinous. Superstition furnished the crime, 
 and party- spirit would decide upon the fact. We 
 have difficulty indeed to imagine an inducement for 
 men of wealth and rank to risk the penalty, which 
 was a stater, about a guinea, for every stake. The 
 five were all condemned in fines to an amount that 
 would reduce them to indigence. Immediate pay- 
 ment or imprisonment were the alternative, to be 
 avoided only by flight, if indeed that were now prac- 
 ticable, or by taking refuge at the altars. They 
 chose the latter expedient, hoping that their friends 
 might yet obtain for them a mitigation of the penalty. 
 The interest of Pithias however prevented ; and, 
 more master in the supreme council in consequence 
 of the absence of the five, he procured a resolution 
 for proposing to the people an alliance offensive as well 
 as defensive with Athens. The suppliants, looking 
 upon their ruin and that of their party as complete 
 if this should be carried, in the rage of despair quitted 
 the altars, collected some of their adherents, armed 
 themselves with daggers, and rushing into the council- 
 hall killed Pithias, with others, some counsellors, 
 some private persons, to the number of sixty. Those 
 counsellors of the democratical party, who avoided 
 the massacre, fled for refuge to the Athenian trireme, 
 which lay in the harbour. 
 
 The five were no sooner thus masters of the council
 
 SEDITION OF CORCYRA. 467 
 
 than they summoned an assembly of the people, ac- Thucyd. 
 knowledged what they had done, and claimed merit 
 from it, as what alone could save the commonwealth 
 from subjection to Athens ; and then immediately 
 proposed a decree for maintaining a strict neutrality, 
 for refusing to admit more than one ship of war at a 
 time belonging to either of the belligerent powers, 
 and for declaring any attempt to introduce more into 
 any port of Corcyra an act of hostility. Their own 
 influence was extensive, their opponents were inti- 
 midated and without a head, the decree, moderate 
 in its purposes, was well calculated to gain in the 
 instant the approbation of all who were not violent 
 in party, and it was carried. Ministers were then 
 dispatched to Athens to apologise to the Athenian 
 government for what had passed, as a measure, with- 
 out forethought, produced by the crisis of the 
 moment, and they were directed to reconcile, if pos- 
 sible, the Corcyra3ans who had fled thither. But 
 instead of being received at Athens as deputed by 
 due authority, they were apprehended as rebels, and 
 sent in custody to .ZEgina. 
 
 Meanwhile the aristocratical party in Corcyra, far 
 from being decidedly masters of the government, 
 drawing encouragement from the arrival of a Co- 
 rinthian ship with ministers from Lacedamon, at- 
 tacked, and in the moment overpowered their oppo- 
 nents ; who however not only held still the citadel, 
 but also some of the higher parts of the town. Col- 
 lecting then their strength, they took possession of 
 one of the ports of the city, called the Hyllaic. The 
 aristocratical party remained yet in possession of the 
 principal port, and also of the agora, the common 
 place of general assembly. Next day both sent de- 
 tachments into the country, inviting the peasant- c.73. 
 H H 2
 
 468 
 
 CHAP, 
 
 ' 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1.3. c.74. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 slaves to their assistance, with promises of freedom. 
 In this the democratical party had the greater success. 
 The nobles on the other hand obtained eight hun- 
 dred Epirot auxiliaries from the continent. In the 
 course of the day light skirmishes passed with missile 
 weapons. 
 
 On the next day but one matters were brought to 
 a crisis. System was now in some degree restored in 
 the conduct of the affairs of the democratical party ; 
 and leaders were become settled in command and in- 
 fluence, in the room of those who had been assas- 
 sinated : superior in numbers, they possessed also, 
 within the city, the more commanding situations. 
 With these advantages, issuing from their quarters, 
 they attacked their opponents ; and, such was the 
 effect of party-spirit, the women took a zealous part 
 in the action, throwing bricks and tiles from the 
 house-tops, and supporting the tumult of battle, says 
 Thucydides, with a resolution beyond their nature. 
 Late in the evening the aristocratical party were 
 compelled to yield ; and, fearing that their opponents, 
 pressing upon them in their retreat, might become 
 masters of the naval arsenal and the port, their last 
 refuge, they set fire to all the buildings about the 
 agora, sparing neither their own houses (for there 
 the principal men mostly had their residence) nor 
 those of others ; so that, beside dwellings, many 
 warehouses full of valuable merchandise were con- 
 sumed ; and, had any wind blown toward the city, 
 the whole would have been destroyed. The confla- 
 gration effectually checked pursuit, and prevented 
 that immediate destruction which the aristocratical 
 party had apprehended ; but their reverse produced 
 defection among their friends. In the night the 
 greater part of the Epirot auxiliaries returned home,
 
 SEDITION OF CORCYRA. 469 
 
 and the commander of the Corinthian trireme con- SECT. 
 suited his safety by sailing away. ' 
 
 At the beginning of this civil war the democratical 
 party had sent intelligence to Naupactus, where Ni- 
 costratus son of Diitrephes commanded the Athenian 
 squadron. On the next day after the departure of Thucyd. 
 the Epirot troops and the Corinthian ship Nicostra- 1 * 3 ' c ' 75 ' 
 tus arrived in the harbour of Corcyra with twelve 
 triremes and five hundred heavy-armed Messenians. 
 His purpose of course was to support the democratical, 
 which was the Athenian party ; but, in the actual 
 circumstances, his arrival perhaps gave greater joy to 
 the defeated nobles, who dreaded nothing so much 
 as the unrestrained revenge of their fellow-citizens. 
 Nor did he deceive their expectation : proposing a 
 treaty, he succeeded in mediating an agreement, by 
 which it was determined that ten only, who were 
 named as the most guilty of the nobles, should be 
 brought to trial, and that the rest should retain all 
 their rights as citizens, under a democratical govern- 
 ment. He provided then that even the selected ten 
 should have opportunity to escape ; and thus a se- 
 dition, begun with the most outrageous violence, was 
 composed in a manner little heard of in Grecian 
 annals, totally without bloodshed. The proposal for 
 a league offensive and defensive with Athens was 
 carried, as in the circumstances might be expected, 
 without opposition. 
 
 Nicostratus would then have returned with his 
 whole squadron to Naupactus ; but, the more com- 
 pletely to ensure the continuance of quiet so happily 
 restored, the democratical leaders requested that he 
 would leave five of his ships ; undertaking to supply 
 him with as many of their own, completely manned. 
 The magistrates, whose office it was to appoint citizens 
 
 H H 3
 
 470 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, for this service, thought to gain farther security 
 against fresh commotion by selecting for it many of 
 the aristocratical party. Unfortunately a suspicion 
 arose among these that the pretence of service was 
 only a feint : that the purpose was to send them to 
 Athens ; where, from the sovereign people, they ex- 
 pected no favourable measure. Under this persuasion 
 they betook themselves, as suppliants, to the temple 
 of Castor and Pollux, which no assurances from Ni- 
 costratus could persuade them to quit. This extreme 
 and apparently weak mistrust excited suspicion among 
 the democratical party. Arming themselves, they 
 broke into the houses of the nobles to seize their 
 arms ; and they would have proceeded to bloodshed, 
 if Nicostratus had not prevented. The alarm of the 
 aristocratical party then became universal, and four 
 hundred took sanctuary in the temple of Juno. All 
 the labours of Nicostratus to restore peace and har- 
 mony were thus frustrated ; for mutual jealousy pre- 
 vented the possibility of accommodation. While the 
 suppliants of Juno feared assassination, should they 
 quit their sanctuary, and starving, if they remained, 
 their opponents were apprehensive of some sudden 
 blow meditated by them. To prevent this therefore 
 they proposed to remove them to a small island not 
 far from the shore, near which the temple stood, 
 promising not only safety, but regular supplies of 
 provisions. The utter inability of the suppliants in 
 any way to help themselves induced them to consent. 
 The same confidence earlier given to the oaths of 
 their adversaries, under support of the faith of the 
 generous Nicostratus, might have prevented the mi- 
 series that followed. 
 
 Thucyd. Things had rested thus four or five days, when a 
 Peloponnesian fleet of fifty-three ships of war ap-
 
 SEDITION OF CORCYRA. 4/71 
 
 peared in sight. Alcidas, its commander, had been Thucyd. 
 ordered for the relief of Lesbos ; but, on arriving at 
 Cyllene, had found counter-orders requiring him to 
 go immediately to Corcyra, with thirteen additional 
 ships, taking Brasidas for his colleague in command. 
 Consternation and tumult presently pervaded the c.?7. 
 town ; the party now triumphant scarcely knowing 
 whether most to dread the Peloponnesian armament 
 or their own fellow-citizens. They however obeyed 
 Nicostratus, who, with his little squadron, quitting 
 the port to meet the Peloponnesian fleet, directed the 
 Corcyraeans to support him as they could get their 
 triremes ready. Sixty were immediately launched ; 
 but they were manned with so little selection that, 
 as they advanced, scattered, toward the enemy, two 
 deserted ; and in some others the crews went to 
 blows among themselves. The Peloponnesians, ob- 
 serving their confusion, detached twenty triremes 
 against them, retaining thirty-five, including the two 
 deserters, to oppose the Athenian squadron. Nicos- 
 tratus showed himself not less able in military than 
 prudent and humane in civil command. By supe- 
 riority in evolution, avoiding the enemy's centre, he 
 attacked one wing, and sunk a ship. The Pelopon- c .78. 
 nesians then, as in the engagement with Phormion 
 off Rhium, formed in a circle. Nicostratus, as 
 Phormion had done, rowed round them. With twelve 
 triremes he was thus acting with advantage against 
 thirty-five, when the detached squadron, which had 
 obtained more decisive advantage against the Cor- 
 cyraean fleet, returned to support their own. Ni- c.?9. 
 costratus then retreated toward the port, in such 
 order as to enable the distracted Corcyraeans also to 
 reach it without farther loss ; but thirteen of their 
 ships had been already taken. 
 
 H H 4)
 
 472 
 
 CHAP. 
 XV. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1.3. c.80. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 Evening was now advanced, and the alarm and 
 confusion in Corcyra were extreme. An immediate 
 attack was expected from the victorious fleet, while 
 it was scarcely possible to be secure against the do- 
 mestic foe. But the domestic, if powerful, being 
 commonly the more horrible foe, among measures 
 for the defence of the town, such as might be taken 
 in the tumult of the moment, the removal of the 
 suppliants of Juno from the island to their former 
 situation in the temple, it being a great object to 
 secure such hostages against relief from the Lacedae- 
 monian fleet, is alone specified by the historian. The 
 inability however of the Spartan commander in chief, 
 and apparently his cowardice, uncommon as that de- 
 fect was in a Spartan, seem to have given them their 
 best security. After his naval victory, instead of 
 immediately pushing his success and profiting from 
 the consternation of the enemy, he retired with his 
 prizes to the harbour of Sybota. Even on the next 
 day the active zeal of Brasidas in vain exhorted 
 attack upon the city ; Alcidas would carry exertion 
 no farther than to debark some troops, on the head- 
 land of Leucimne, and ravage the adjacent fields. 
 The democratical Corcyraeans nevertheless remained 
 in the most anxious suspense. Their domestic op- 
 ponents were indeed completely in their power, but 
 a superior enemy might severely revenge any severity 
 exercised against them. It was therefore resolved 
 to try, in a conference, to make some arrangement 
 for mutual benefit. The body of the aristocratical 
 party still refused all confidence to their opponents : 
 but some, both of those who had and of those who 
 had not taken refuge in the temples, less fearful, con- 
 sented to serve in the fleet ; and thirty triremes were 
 manned with mixed crews, those of the aristocratical
 
 SEDITION OF CORCYRA. 473 
 
 party being distributed so as best to obviate danger SE^T. 
 from their disaffection. Alcidas however, attempting 
 no attack, about noon re-embarked his ravaging troops, 
 and returned to his harbour of Sybota. In the 
 evening he received intelligence by fire-signals, that 
 a fleet of sixty Athenian ships of war was approaching. 
 Immediately then he got under way ; and hastening Thucyd. 
 his course close under shore, as far as Leucadia, would 
 not double the cape of that peninsula, but dragged 
 his galleys across the isthmus, and so passed undis- 
 covered to Peloponnesus. 
 
 No sooner were the democratical Corcyraeans as- 
 sured of the approach of the Athenian fleet and the 
 flight of the Peloponnesians, than every dark passion 
 mixed itself with the joy which instantly superseded 
 their fears ; and measures were deliberately taken 
 for perpetrating one of the most horrid massacres 
 recorded in history. The Messenians, hitherto en- 
 camped without, to oppose the foreign enemy, were 
 now introduced within the walls. The fleet was then 
 directed to pass from the town port to the Hyllaic port. 
 In the way all of the aristocratical party among the 
 crews were thrown overboard, and in the same instant 
 massacre began in the city. The suppliants only in 
 the temple of Juno remained protected by that su- 
 perstitious dread, which so generally possessed the 
 Greeks, of temporal evil from the vengeance of the 
 gods for affronts to themselves, while no apprehension 
 was entertained for the grossest violation of every 
 moral duty. The fear of starving nevertheless induced 
 about fifty of them, on the persuasion of their op- 
 ponents, to quit their situation and submit to a trial. 
 They were all summarily condemned and instantly 
 executed. Their miserable friends in the sanctuary, 
 informed of their fate, yielded to extreme despair : 
 some killed one another within the temple ; some
 
 47* HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, hanged themselves on the trees of the adjoining sacred 
 ' grove ; all, in some way, put a hasty end to their 
 wretchedness. 
 
 In the city, and through the island, the scene of 
 murder was not so quickly closed. For seven days 
 the democratical party continued hunting out their 
 opponents, and massacring wherever they could find 
 them. Some had taken sanctuary in the temple of 
 Bacchus. Superstitious fear prevented any direct vio- 
 lence there, but a wall was built around the temple, 
 and they were starved to death. Nor was difference 
 of political principles and political connexions the 
 only criterion of capital offence. Opportunities for 
 private revenge, or private avarice, were in many in- 
 stances used. Debtors cancelled their debts by the 
 murder of their creditors; the nearest relations fell 
 by each other's hands : audaciousness in crime went 
 so far that some were forced from the temples to be 
 murdered, and some even murdered in them ; and 
 every enormity, says the historian, usual in seditions, 
 was practised, and even more. 
 
 Thucyd. The Athenian admiral, Eurymedon son of Thucles, 
 
 1.3. c.85. j av [ n ne harbour with his powerful fleet, the quiet 
 and apparently approving spectator of these disgrace- 
 ful transactions ; and not till the democratical Cor- 
 cyraeans had carried revenge to the utmost sailed 
 away. The impolicy of his conduct seems to have 
 been equal to the inhumanity. Nicostratus, inter- 
 fering as a generous mediator, had put Corcyra into 
 a situation to be a valuable ally to Athens. The 
 licence, which Eurymedon gave, to massacre all who 
 were supposed adverse to the Athenian interest, had 
 a very different effect. 11 About five hundred had 
 
 11 Thucydides in his manner of marking the different cha- 
 racters and different merits of the two Athenian commanders,
 
 SEDITION OF CORCYRA. 475 
 
 escaped ; some aboard the triremes which had de- SECT. 
 serted to the Peloponnesians, some on other occa- ' 
 sions. They took possession of some forts and lands, 
 which had belonged to the Corcyraean people, on the 
 continent opposite to their island ; and thence, with 
 all the activity that the spirit of revenge, the thirst 
 of plunder, and the desire of recovering their ancient 
 possessions united could excite, they carried on hos- 
 tilities against Corcyra ; seizing ships, making de- 
 scents on the coast, living by depredation, and wasting 
 whatever they could not carry off. After this expe- 
 rience of the weakness of their adversaries, they de- 
 termined to attempt the recovery of the island ; and 
 having in vain solicited assistance from the Lacedae- 
 monians and Corinthians, who would no more risk 
 their fleet against the naval force of Athens, they, 
 with a few auxiliaries, who made their whole number 
 only six hundred, debarked on Corcyra. The con- 
 duct of these undoubtedly brave, but apparently ill- 
 judging men, misled by passion, remarkably supports 
 an observation which Strabo, who lived in an age to 
 see a long train of consequences, and advert to them 
 at leisure, has made upon the conduct and character 
 of his fellow-countrymen. The warmth of temper, 
 
 offers an admirable model for writers of contemporary history. 
 Without any offensive observation, merely stating facts in the 
 simplest manner, he gives the reader fully to discover which 
 deserved the highest praise, and which disgraced himself and 
 his country. Nicostratus, arriving in the very height of the 
 sedition, with only a small force, with which he had soon to cope 
 with a very superior enemy, interfered as a generous mediator, 
 and so efficaciously as to prevent all outrage. Eurymedon came 
 commanding what deterred opposition ; stayed seven days, 
 during which all the enormities were committed, and went away. 
 This is absolutely all that the historian says of Eurymedon: but 
 that so short a tale, with so few circumstances marked, might 
 not escape the reader's notice, with a slight variation of words, 
 he has repeated it.
 
 476 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, which perpetually engaged their whole souls in party 
 disputes and petty quarrels, disabled them for great 
 objects ; insomuch that they were continually em- 
 ploying, for mutual destruction, abilities and courage 
 which, with more political union, might have enabled 
 them to defend their independency for ever, against 
 Rome, and against the world. The aristocratical 
 Corcyraeans, had they directed their views to their 
 establishment on the soil where they had found re- 
 fuge, might probably have raised a powerful city there. 
 But passion, to an extraordinary degree, still directed 
 their measures. Immediately on landing in Corey ra, 
 determined to maintain themselves or die, they burnt 
 those vessels by which they had hitherto been suc- 
 cessful and even powerful. They then occupied 
 mount Istone, a post naturally strong, and fortified 
 it ; and, from that advantageous post, issuing as op- 
 portunity offered, they compelled their adversaries 
 to confinement within their walls, and themselves 
 commanded the desolated country. The calamities 
 which followed, being connected with Athenian his- 
 tory, will be for notice hereafter. 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 An Athenian squadron sent to Sicily under Laches. End of the 
 pestilence at Athens. Sixth year of the war : operations of the 
 Athenians, under Nicias on the eastern side of Greece, and 
 under Demosthenes on the western : state of JEtolia : defeat 
 of Demosthenes near JEgitium : a Peloponnesian army sent 
 into the western provinces; Ozolian Locris acquired to tJie 
 Peloponnesian confederacy: DemostJienes elected general of 
 the Acarnanians ; battle of OlpCB ; battle of Idomene : im- 
 portant successes of Demosthenes : peace between the Acar- 
 nanians and Ambraciots. 
 
 THE Sicilian Greeks, mostly well-disposed to the 
 Peloponnesians, and engaged in alliance with them,
 
 END OF THE PESTILENCE AT ATHENS. 477 
 
 but distracted by a variety of political interests within SECT. 
 their island, had given no assistance in operation. VI * 
 War had now broken out among themselves ; and B> c 427> 
 toward the end of summer, after the return of Eury- Ji.^s. 2. 
 medon from Corcyra, the Athenians sent a squadron Thucyd. 
 of twenty ships, under Laches son of Melanopus, to 
 assist the Leontines, an Ionian people, against the 
 Syracusans, who were of Dorian race. The imme- 
 diate consequences were not very important ; but those 
 more remote will require much notice hereafter. 
 
 In the beginning of the ensuing winter the pesti- c. 87. 
 lence again became a subject for the historian of 
 Athens. It had never yet entirely ceased, though 
 after the two first years there had been a remission : 
 but in the renewal of its fury it seems to have worn 
 itself out, and we hear of it no more. In its whole 
 course it carried off not less than four thousand four 
 hundred Athenians of the vigorous age in which they 
 were required for enrolment among the heavy-armed, 
 and three hundred men of the higher rank who served 
 in the cavalry. Of the multitude of other persons 
 who perished by it no means existed for ascertaining 
 the number. 
 
 Archidamus king of Sparta did not long outlive 
 the friend of his youth, whom, in elderhood, he was 
 destined to oppose in arms, the illustrious citizen 
 who with more than regal sway had directed the 
 affairs of the Athenian democracy. Pericles died 
 about the beginning of the third campaign of the 
 war. Archidamus commanded the Peloponnesian 
 army which invaded Attica in the following spring ; 
 and it is the last occasion upon which the contem- 
 porary historian mentions him. In the fifth year 
 Cleomenes, regent for the minor king of the other 
 reigning family, had the office of general of the con-
 
 478 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 B. c. 426. federacy ; and now in the sixth spring the command 
 p.'w.&T was given to Agis son of Archidamus. The forces 
 /^Tsg were assembled at the Corinthian isthmus for a pro- 
 posed invasion of Attica, when the terrors of repeated 
 earthquakes, which affected various parts of Greece 
 with uncommon violence, checked the design, and 
 the troops were dismissed. 
 
 As the war drew out in length, every circumstance 
 tended more and more to justify the councils which 
 led the Athenians to engage in it. Notwithstanding 
 that calamity, beyond human prudence to foresee, 
 which had so reduced the strength of the common- 
 wealth ; notwithstanding the loss of those talents 
 which had prepared its resources during peace, and 
 directed them during the two first years of hostility ; 
 Athens was advancing toward a superiority which 
 promised, under able conduct in the administration, 
 to be decisive. Indeed the energy of the Athenian 
 government, directed for near a century by a suc- 
 cession of men of uncommon abilities, was so put 
 into train that, notwithstanding the inferiority of the 
 present leaders, it was scarcely perceived to slacken. 
 Democracy, though a wretched regulator, is a power- 
 ful spring. The highest offices in Athens were now 
 open to the lowest people. Great competition of 
 course arose ; and one consequence was, that men of 
 rank and education, however unambitious, were forced 
 to put themselves forward in public business, that 
 they might avoid being trodden upon by their in- 
 feriors. Thus Nicias seems to have been rather com- 
 pelled by circumstances, than induced by his own 
 inclination, to accept the situation in which he was 
 placed. He had succeeded Pericles in the office of 
 Piut. v. commander-in-chief. Plutarch says that his cautious 
 temper led him always to choose commands where
 
 OPERATIONS UNDER NICIAS. 479 
 
 success might be certain, though the glory would SECT. 
 be small ; not from any defect of personal, but of m 
 political courage ; he was less afraid of the swords of 
 enemies than of the voices of fellow-citizens. After 
 the reduction of Lesbos he had conducted the Athe- 
 nian forces against a fortified islet, called Minoa, at 
 the mouth of the harbour of Nisaea, the seaport of 
 Megara. It was without much difficulty taken, and 
 a garrison was left in it. The purpose was to prevent 
 any future surprise, like that lately attempted upon 
 Piraeus, and to curb more effectually the Megarian 
 privateers ; which, notwithstanding the look-out from 
 Salamis, annoyed the Athenian trade. 
 
 In the present summer it was determined to send 
 out two expeditions. Having recovered the principal 
 of those dependencies in Thrace, whose revolt had 
 given rise to the war, having checked defection in 
 Asia by the severe punishment of the Lesbians, having 
 learnt to despise the ravage of Attica, and, safe within 
 their walls, possessing a navy that commanded the 
 seas, the Athenian leaders had leisure and means to 
 prosecute offensive operations. Nicias, with a fleet Thucyd. 
 of sixty triremes, went to the island of M elos ; whose 
 people, a Lacedaemonian colony, though through 
 dread of a naval x force of Athens they had avoided 
 acting with the Peloponnesians, yet rejected the Athe- 
 nian alliance, and refused to pay tribute. It was 
 expected that the waste of their lands would have 
 brought them to submission ; but the Melians shut- 
 ting themselves within their walls with a declared, 
 determination not to treat, the tedious business of a 
 siege was postponed for another enterprise, which 
 had been concerted before the fleet left Attica. 
 Passing to Oropus, on the confines of Bceotia, Nicias 
 landed his forces by night, and marched immediately
 
 480 
 
 CHAP. 
 XV. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 to Tanagra. There he was met by the whole strength 
 of Athens, under Hipponicus son of Callias, and 
 Eurymedon son of Thucles, whose conduct at Cor- 
 cyra, it appears, had not displeased the people his 
 sovereign. The day was spent in ravaging the Ta- 
 nagrasan lands. On the following day the Tana- 
 graeans, re- enforced by a small body of Thebaris, 
 ventured an action, but were defeated. The forces 
 under Hipponicus and Eurymedon then erecting 
 their trophy marched back for Athens, and the 
 others to their ships. Nicias proceeding with the 
 fleet to the Locrian coast plundered and wasted what 
 was readily within reach, and then returned home. 
 The expedition indeed seems to have had no great 
 object. Apparently the principal purpose was to 
 acquire a little popularity to the leaders and obviate 
 clamour against them, by retaliating the evils of in- 
 vasion of those of their enemies who were most within 
 reach, and by holding out the recompense of pillage 
 to gratify the vulgar mind. 
 
 The purpose of the other expedition was to sup- 
 port the allies, and extend the influence of Athens, 
 in the western parts of Greece ; a service on which 
 a squadron had been employed every summer from 
 the beginning of the war. Phormion, during his 
 command on that station, had so endeared himself 
 to the Acarnanians that they particularly requested 
 his son, or at least some relation, for his successor. 
 A petition so honourable to so deserving an officer was 
 not denied. In the fourth year of the war Asopius 
 son of Phormion was appointed to the command of 
 a squadron of thirty ships. According to his instruc- 
 tions in circumnavigating Peloponnesus he landed on 
 the coast of Laconia, where he was successful in ravage 
 and plunder, with which he sent home eighteen ships,
 
 OPERATIONS UNDER DEMOSTHENES. 481 
 
 and then proceeded to his station at Naupactus with SECT. 
 only twelve. Anxious, on his arrival there, to show . 
 himself worthy of the preference given to a son of 
 Phormion, he seems to have undertaken what his 
 force was unequal to ; and after an unsuccessful at- 
 tempt against QEniadae he lost his life in an attack 
 upon Leucas. In the next year we find the command B.C. 425. 
 committed to Nicostratus, who had distinguished p.w!?! 
 himself so advantageously both in the Corcyraan se- Timcyd. 
 dition and in action with the Peloponnesian fleet. ' ' c ' 9K 
 Thirty triremes were now sent to Naupactus, under 
 Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes. 
 
 Demosthenes began operations by the surprise of c -94- 
 Ellomenus, a port of the Leucadian territory, whose 
 garrison he put to the sword ; and then collecting 
 the allies of those parts, Acarnanians, Zacynthians, 
 and Cephallenians, in addition to the Naupactian 
 Messenians, who were in effect Athenian subjects, 
 and obtaining fifteeen triremes from Corcyra, he pro- 
 ceeded against Leucas itself. The Leucadians, un- 
 able to resist such a force in the field, abandoned 
 their territory to its ravages, and confined themselves 
 within their walls. The Acarnanians were highly 
 desirous to reduce a city perpetually hostile to them, 
 and situate in a manner within their country. But, 
 before the siege could be formed, Demosthenes was 
 allured by a more splendid, though far more hazardous 
 project, suggested by the Naupactian Messenians. 
 
 JEtolia was a much more formidable foe to Nau- 
 pactus than Leucas to Acarnania. Always numbered 
 among the members of the Greek nation, and accord- 
 ing to Homer, in the age which he describes, among 
 the most respectable, yet when science and art were 
 approaching meridian splendour in Attica, scarcely 
 
 VOL. II. I I
 
 48*2 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, sixty miles from their borders, the ^Etolians were a 
 " _ most rude people. Since the Trojan war, barbarism 
 instead of civilisation had gained among them. They 
 lived scattered in unfortified villages : they spoke a 
 dialect scarcely intelligible to the other Greeks ; and 
 Thucyd. one clan of them at least, the Eurytanian, was said 
 to feed on raw flesh : they used only light arms ; yet 
 their warlike character was high. This barbarous 
 and hostile people, the Messenians urged, might be 
 subdued with the force now collected ; and then no- 
 thing would remain, in that part of the continent, 
 able to oppose the confederate arms. These argu- 
 ments engaged the attention of Demosthenes, and 
 the view which they opened led him to a more ex- 
 tensive plan. Having reduced .^Etolia, he thought 
 he should be able, without other force than that 
 within his command, to penetrate through the Ozo- 
 lian Locris, and, keeping the impassable summits of 
 Parnassus on the right, traverse the high lands as far 
 as Cytinion in Doris. Thence the descent would be 
 easy into Phocis, whose people he hoped, from of old 
 friendly to Athens, would zealously join him with 
 their forces ; for they had been withheld from the 
 Athenian confederacy only by their situation, sur- 
 rounded by the allies of the Peloponnesians ; and if 
 a party adverse to the Athenian interest should now 
 prevail among them, his force would suffice to re- 
 store the superiority to its friends. Arrived in Phocis, 
 he should be on the border of Bceotia ; and, assisted 
 by the Phociari forces, he could make such a diver- 
 sion on the northern or western frontier of that 
 powerful hostile province, that, with due co-opera- 
 tion from Athens, and some assistance from a party 
 favouring democracy, which was to be found in every
 
 ENTERPRISE AGAINST ^ETOLIA. 483 
 
 Grecian state, there was no degree of success against SECT. 
 the enemies of the commonwealth, in the northern ' 
 
 parts of Greece, to which it might not lead. 
 
 In the opinion of Thucydides, if we may judge 
 from the manner of a writer so cautious of declaring 
 an opinion, the enterprise was ably projected ; but ob- 
 stacles occurred against the projector's hopes. The 
 Acarnanians, disappointed in their own views, and 
 offended at the preference apparently given to the 
 Messenians, refused to join in it. The Corcyraeans, 
 whose government, pressed by a domestic enemy, 
 could ill spare any part of its strength, took the op- 
 portunity of example for returning home. The Ce- 
 phallenians, Zacynthians, and Messenians remained ; 
 apparently altogether no great force, and the Athenian 
 infantry were only three hundred ; but the Ozolian 
 Locrians of CEneon, inveterate enemies of the ^Eto- 
 lians, were ready to join in any attempt against them ; 
 and their intimate knowledge of the country, and 
 practice in war with the people, would make their 
 assistance particularly valuable. The Messenians 
 moreover, who were best acquainted with the strength 
 of ^Etolia, and were likely to be the greatest sufferers 
 from a miscarriage of the undertaking, persevering 
 in recommending it, Demosthenes was unwilling to 
 give up a favourite project, with opportunities which 
 might not recur. It was accordingly determined 
 that the siege of Leucas should be postponed, and 
 that the forces under the Athenian general should 
 enter ^Etolia by the nearest way from CEneon, while 
 the CEneonians took a circuit to meet him in the 
 interior country. 
 
 The army of Demosthenes was so little numerous Thucyd. 
 that the whole passed a night in the precinct of the L3 * c ' 96 ' 
 temple of Nemean Jupiter, on the borders of Locris, 
 
 i i 2
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, where, according to report current in the country, 
 the poet Hesiod died. Nevertheless, no force ap- 
 pearing in the field capable of opposing him, the three 
 towns of Potidanium, Crocylium, and Tichium were 
 taken in as many days ; and plunder was collected to 
 such an amount as to influence the decision of future 
 measures. It was sent to Eupolium in Locris, while 
 
 Thucyd. the army remained at Tichium. As soon as it was 
 safely lodged, pursuing still the advice of the Mes- 
 senians, without waiting for the Locrians, who had 
 not yet joined him, Demosthenes proceeded to ^Egi- 
 tium, which, as unfortified, was abandoned on his 
 approach, and he took possession of the empty town. 
 
 ibid.& He was now in a mountainous and woody country, 
 
 full of defiles, with his little army consisting almost 
 wholly of heavy-armed infantry. Meanwhile the 
 
 1. 3. c. 86. .ZEtolians, who had early gathered his intention from 
 his preparations, and who, by the time he passed 
 their frontier had already collected their forces from 
 the most distant parts, arrived in the neighbourhood 
 of .^Egitium. Well knowing their advantage, they 
 would come to no regular engagement ; but oc- 
 cupying the heights around, made desultory attacks 
 upon the allied army in various parts, running down 
 the hills, throwing their darts, retiring whenever the 
 enemy advanced, pursuing when they retired, and, 
 both in pursuit and in retreat, with their light armour, 
 holding certain advantage. 
 
 Demosthenes had now to regret that he had not 
 waited the arrival of his Locrian allies, armed like 
 the .^Etolians, and accustomed to contend with them 
 in their desultory mode of action. As long as the 
 
 c.98. f ew bowmen of his army had a supply of arrrows, 
 wherever they could give their assistance, their 
 weapons, of longer flight, kept off the enemy, ill
 
 DEFEAT OF DEMOSTHENES. 485 
 
 armed for defence. But when, at length, all were SECT. 
 worn with long exertion, and their arrows were nearly 
 spent, their commander received a mortal wound. 
 Presently then they dispersed, each to seek safety as 
 he best might. The heavy-armed then, unable to 
 stand the darts of the .^Etolians, whom, with their 
 weapons, they could not reach, had no resource but 
 in hasty retreat. Pursued by active men, practised 
 in running among rocks and mountains, many were 
 killed. A Messenian, on whom they had principally 
 depended as their guide in this wild and rough country, 
 was among those who early fell. Some then strayed 
 into impassable dells, and a considerable body en- 
 tering a pathless wood, the .ZEtolians set fire to it, 
 and all were destroyed. Order was now totally lost, 
 and every form of flight and of destruction, says the 
 contemporary historian, was experienced by the Athe- 
 nians and their allies. Procles, the second in com- 
 mand, was killed, with a hundred and twenty of the 
 three hundred heavy-armed Athenians ; and of all 
 the youth of Athens who fell in the whole war, con- 
 tinues the historian, those were the prime. Of the 
 allies also a large proportion were slain. The sur- 
 vivors with difficulty reaching the coast, at the dis- 
 tance of about ten miles from the place of action, 
 proceeded to CEneon. The bodies of the dead, through 
 the usual ceremony, being obtained for burial, those 
 of the Athenians were carried to Athens by the 
 returning fleet ; but the unfortunate commander, 
 fearing to meet the anger of his sovereign, the Athe- 
 nian people, remained at Naupactus. 
 
 A circumstance which, in the eye of dispassionate Thucyd. 
 reason, must tend to justify the attempt of Demos- Cl 100 ' 
 thenes, would perhaps enhance the immediate in- 
 dignation of an ill-informed public. The -<32tolians had 
 ii 3
 
 486 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, sent three ambassadors, one from each of their prin- 
 
 XV 
 
 ' cipal clans, to Corinth and Lacedaemon, requesting 
 assistance against the common enemy ; proposing, as 
 their particular object, to take Naupactus, which 
 would deprive the Athenians of their best means for 
 keeping a fleet in the western seas. The success ob- 
 tained against Demosthenes appears to have obviated 
 former objections, and it was resolved to gratify the 
 JEtolians. Whether the jealousy of the kings or of 
 the people was the obstacle, to send a Lacedaemonian 
 force beyond the Lacedaemonian frontier otherwise 
 than under royal command seems always to have 
 met with objection. The business of ^Etolia being 
 thought not important enough to require one of the 
 kings of Sparta, no Lacedaemonian troops were sent : 
 a body of three thousand of the allies only were, 
 toward autumn, assembled at Delphi, and, such was the 
 Lacedaemonian authority, placed under the orders of 
 three Spartans, Eurylochus, Mecarius, and Menedaeus. 
 The Ozolian Locrians, whose country lay between 
 j^p}^ and^Etolia, were then in alliance with Athens. 
 But the people of Amphissa, one of the principal 
 towns, alarmed at the prospect of attack from the 
 Peloponnesian confederacy, and still more appre- 
 hensive of an interest which their neighbours and 
 inveterate enemies, the Phocians, might acquire with 
 the Lacedaemonian commanders, proposed to Eury- 
 lochus to revolt to the Lacedaemonian alliance, adding 
 assurance that, so little firm was the Ozolian Locris 
 in the Athenian interest, he might acquire the whole 
 more readily by negotiation than by arms. The 
 proposal perfectly suiting the views of the Spartan 
 general, he sent ministers through all the towns. 
 The narrow territory was at this time divided between 
 no less than thirteen republics. Urged then at once
 
 ARRIVAL OF A PELOPONNESIAN ARMY. 
 
 by the Peloponnesian arras, ready to fall upon them, 
 and by both the example and the persuasion of the 
 Amphissians, eight of those republics acceded to the 
 Peloponnesian confederacy. Of the remainder, the 
 Olpaeans gave hostages as pledges that they would 
 commit no hostility against the Peloponnesians, but 
 refused to engage in offensive alliance against the 
 Athenians. The Hyagans refused even to give hos- 
 tages, till the Peloponnesian forces entered their 
 territory and took one of their villages. The CEne- 
 onians and Eupolitans persevering in fidelity to their 
 engagements with Athens and with their neighbours 
 of Naupactus, their towns were attacked and taken. 
 The hostages were sent to Cytinion in Doris; the Timcyd. 
 ^tolian forces joined the Peloponnesian, and Eury- 
 lochus, entering the Naupactian territory, ravaged 
 the whole, and took the suburbs of Naupactus, which 
 were unfortified. Postponing then the siege of the 
 town, he proceeded to the easier conquest of the 
 neighbouring town of Molycrium, a Corinthian 
 colony, but long since subject to Athens. 
 
 Demosthenes, living as a private individual at 
 Naupactus, saw with the utmost anxiety these con- 
 sequences of his rash enterprise. Uncommissioned 
 he went into Acarnania ; and, though at first ill 
 received, he persevered in apology, remonstrance, 
 and solicitation, till he obtained a thousand heavy- 
 armed Acarnanians, with whom he passed by sea to 
 Naupactus. The principal hope of taking the place 
 having been founded on the extent of the fortifi- 
 cations, and the disproportionate smallness of the 
 garrison, this seasonable re-enforcement gave it se- 
 curity ; for blockade by land would be nugatory 
 against a town open to the sea, of which the Athe- 
 nians were masters. 
 
 i i 4}
 
 488 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. The disappointment on this occasion was lessened 
 
 '__ to Eurylochus by greater views offering in another 
 
 quarter. Ministers from Ambracia had solicited his 
 assistance for the conquest of the Amphilochian 
 Argos. Success, they urged, would be attended with 
 the immediate submission of all Amphilochia ; Acar- 
 nania might then be attacked with advantage ; and the 
 consequence, reasonably to be hoped for, would be the 
 acquisition of all that part of the continent to the La- 
 cedaemonian confederacy. Eurylochus acceded to the 
 proposal, and, withdrawing his forces from Naupactus, 
 waited in ^Etolia while the Ambraciots should prepare 
 for the execution of their part of the undertaking. 
 Thucyd. Autumn was already advanced when a body of 
 
 1.3. c.105. t nree thousand Ambracian heavy-armed foot entered 
 Argia (so the territory of the Amphilochian Argos 
 was called) and seized Olpae, a strong fortress upon 
 a hill close upon the gulf; belonging to the Acar- 
 nanians, but little more than three miles from Argos. 
 Intelligence was immediately communicated through 
 Acarnania, and the force of the country was assem- 
 bled ; part marched to the assistance of Argos, part 
 was stationed at Crenas in Amphilochia, to watch the 
 approach of Eurylochus, and despatches were sent to 
 Aristoteles son of Timocrates, then commanding the 
 Athenian squadron in the western seas, requesting 
 succour. Meanwhile the Acarnanians came to a 
 resolution of appearance somewhat extraordinary. 
 Notwithstanding the offence they had taken at his 
 preference of other interests, as they reckoned them 
 to theirs, notwithstanding his lamentable failure in 
 the measures to which he so gave his preference, and 
 while he was, in consequence of that failure, yet 
 afraid to meet the judgment of the despotic multitude 
 in his own country, in this critical moment they sent
 
 DEMOSTHENES GENERAL OF ACARNANIA. 489 
 
 him an invitation to take the office of commander in SECT. 
 chief of the forces of all the Acarnanian republics. 
 This remarkable fact, highly honourable to Demos- 
 thenes, proves more than that he was personally 
 esteemed among the Acarnanians. Their country was 
 nearly equal in extent to Attica, and at least pro- 
 portionally populous in free subjects, though not in 
 slaves ; but being divided among a number of village 
 republics, no man could have either the education of 
 Athenians of rank, or that acquaintance with public 
 business upon a great scale, which the Athenians in 
 office acquired. Hence, in a great measure, the 
 admitted superiority of the Athenians and Lacedae- 
 monians to the other Greeks ; and hence the Acar- 
 nanians felt the want of a man better educated and 
 better initiated in public business than any among 
 themselves to take, in the present moment of danger, 
 the supreme direction of their affairs. 
 
 Eurylochus, informed of the movement of the Thucyd. 
 Ambraciots, crossed the Achelous into Acarnania. ' 3 ' c ' 106 * 
 Avoiding the towns, he passed unnoticed through 
 the deserted country, the men being with the army, 
 the women in the fortified places, till he reached 
 Agrais, a detached district, occupied by an ^Etolian 
 tribe. Thence proceeding over an uncultivated moun- strab. 
 
 1 ft n 'lift 
 
 tainous tract, and evading thus the body of Acar- 
 nanians appointed to watch his entrance into Amphi- 
 lochia, he descended by night into Argia, passed 
 unperceived between the town of Argos and the 
 Acarnanian camp, and joined the Ambraciots in Olpa?. 
 Strong with this junction, he moved next morning, 
 and chose a situation not far distant, where he en- 
 camped. 
 
 Aristoteles meanwhile, with his squadron of twenty Thucyd. 
 ships, arrived in the Ambracian gulf, accompanied
 
 $0 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, by Demosthenes, who brought a small re-enforcement, 
 two hundred heavy-armed Messenians, and sixty 
 Athenian bowmen. The whole strength of Acar- 
 nania was already collected at Argos, with only a 
 small body of Amphilochians, of whom the greater 
 part, though friendly to the Athenian interest, were 
 withheld by the Ambraciots. Invited by the Acar- 
 nanians only, Demosthenes was now elected com- 
 mander in chief of all the allied forces ; and the 
 resolution was taken, by common consent, to give 
 the enemy battle. The army in consequence moved 
 toward Olpse, and Demosthenes encamped on ground 
 divided only by a deep valley from the camp of 
 Eurylochus. 
 
 Thus situated, both armies rested five days, and 
 on the sixth both prepared for battle. Demosthenes 
 had observed that the enemy outnumbered him, and, 
 to prevent being surrounded, he placed four hundred 
 heavy and as many light-armed Acarnanians in a 
 hollow covered with bushes, whence they could have 
 opportunity to attack, in the rear, that extreme of 
 the enemy's line which would overstretch his flank. 
 The Messenians were placed in the right, with a few 
 Athenians, apparently from the fleet, with whom he 
 took post himself. The Amphilochians, who were 
 not regular heavy-armed, but used javelins, were 
 mixed with the Acarnanians in the rest of the line; 
 the Argives are not mentioned, few of them probably 
 being to be spared from the garrison of their town. 
 On the other side Euryclochus, with a chosen body, 
 took the left of his line, against Demosthenes and 
 the Messenians : the Mantineans were posted next 
 to him ; the other Peloponnesians were mixed with 
 the Ambraciots ; who, being a Corinthian colony, 
 preserved the Peloponnesian arms and discipline, and
 
 BATTLE OF OLPJE. 491 
 
 were esteemed the best soldiers of that part of the SECT. 
 
 VI. 
 
 continent. 
 
 The armies meeting, the Peloponnesian left, out- 
 stretching the right of the enemy, was wheeling to 
 attack their flank, when they were themselves attacked 
 in the rear by the Acarnanians from the ambush. 
 Eurylochus was killed ; the Peloponnesians about 
 him, panic-struck, fled ; and this immediate defeat 
 of what was reputed the firmest part of the army 
 spread dismay as far as the knowledge of it was com- 
 municated. Demosthenes profited from the oppor- 
 tunity, the Messenians in particular seconding him 
 with a valour worthy of the fame of their ancient 
 heroes ; and quickly the left and centre of the enemy 
 were completely routed, the Mantineans only re- 
 treating into Olpas in some order. But in the mean 
 time the Ambraciots and others, who held the right 
 of the Peloponnesian army, had defeated the Acar- 
 nanians opposed to them, and pursued as far as Argos. 
 Here however the flying troops found refuge, while 
 the conquerors, returning toward the field of battle, 
 were met by superior numbers, and many fell ; the 
 remainder joined their defeated comrades in Olpze. 
 The slaughter of the Peloponnesian army altogether 
 was very great : of the three Spartan generals, Me- 
 nedzeus only survived. 
 
 By the unforeseen train of circumstances which led 
 to this battle, and much by the activity and able 
 conduct of Demosthenes, both in previous measures 
 and in the action itself, the face of things was now 
 completely changed in the western countries : the 
 Athenian affairs were at once restored, as if the 
 disaster in ^Etolia had never happened ; and instead 
 of gaining Naupactus, lately considered as the last 
 refuge of the Athenian interest in those parts, the
 
 4yz HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. Peloponnesian cause was in a far worse situation than 
 
 XV 
 
 ' before any force from Peloponnesus was sent into the 
 Thucyd. country. Menedseus, with whom the command of 
 the defeated army remained, was at a loss for measures. 
 He had force indeed sufficient to defend the fortress 
 he held, but means were wanting to subsist there. 
 He had no stores, and by land a victorious army, by 
 sea the Athenian fleet, excluded supplies. On the 
 day after the battle therefore, when he applied for 
 leave to bury the dead, he sent proposals for sur- 
 rendering Olpae, upon condition of having safe passage 
 for his troops to their several homes. Leave to bury 
 the dead was readily granted ; the rest was openly 
 refused; but assurance was secretly given, that the 
 Peloponnesians might depart in safety, if they would 
 go quietly and quickly. In this Demosthenes and 
 the Acarnanian chiefs had two objects ; to have the 
 Ambraciots, and the mercenary troops in their service, 
 at mercy ; and to weaken the Peloponnesian interest 
 in those parts, by rendering the Peloponnesian name, 
 and particularly the Lacedaemonian, odious for self- 
 interestedness and treachery. Menedseus did not 
 scruple to accept the conditions ; the dead were 
 hastily buried ; and then the Peloponnesians, of whom 
 the Mantineans were the largest surviving portion, 
 went out in small parties, under pretence of gathering 
 herbs and firewood. The Ambraciots and others, as 
 soon as it was observed that all the Peloponnesians 
 had quitted the place, and were already at a distance, 
 in great alarm followed, in hope to overtake them. 
 The Acarnanians from their camp perceiving this, 
 without waiting for orders, immediately pursued 
 equally Peloponnesians and Ambraciots ; and when 
 their commanders interfered, some went so far as to 
 throw darts at them, supposing the public interest
 
 SUCCESSES OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 betrayed. The matter being however at length ex- SECT. 
 plained, the Peloponnesians, where they could be with ' 
 
 certainty distinguished, were permitted to pass un- 
 molested. But much doubt arose, and much con- 
 tention, which were Peloponnesians ; for the Am- 
 braciots retained so nearly the armour, habit, and 
 speech of their mother-country that the discrimina- 
 tion was difficult. About two hundred were killed ; 
 the rest reached Agrais, whose prince, Salynthius, 
 gave them a kind reception. 
 
 The chiefs of Ambracia, on receiving intelligence Thucyd. 
 that their troops were possessed of Olpae, had hastened ' ' c ' no * 
 to support them with their whole remaining strength. 
 Ignorant of what had since passed, they had already 
 entered Amphilochia, when information of their 
 march was brought to Demosthenes. Immediately 
 that general sent a strong detachment of Acarnanian c. 112. 
 troops to pre-occupy the defiles among the highlands, 
 which the enemy must cross to enter the plain of 
 Argia. A few miles from Olpae were two lofty hills, 
 called Idomene, at the highest of which the detach- 
 ment arrived by night, unperceived by the Ambra- 
 ciots who were encamped on the other hill. De- 
 mosthenes, after having made the remainder of his 
 army take refreshment, marched in the evening in 
 two divisions ; one he led himself by the plain, the 
 other he sent over the Amphilochian mountains. 
 About daybreak both arrived at the camp of the 
 Ambraciots, who were still at their rest. Demos- 
 thenes had formed his advanced guard of Messe- 
 nians ; who, speaking the Doric dialect, deceived the 
 Ambraciot out-guards, while it was yet too dark to see 
 distinctly, so as to be taken for their friends from 
 Olpae. The surprise was in consequence complete, 
 and the rout immediate. Great slaughter was made
 
 494i HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, on the spot ; the fugitives sought the highlands ; but 
 
 ^J the roads were pre-occupied by the Acarnanians of 
 
 the advanced detachment ; and the light-armed Am- 
 philochians, among their own mountains, were terrible 
 in pursuit of the Ambraciots, ignorant of the country, 
 and encumbered with their panoply. Some who had 
 made toward the gulf, seeing the Athenian triremes 
 close in with the shore, swam to them ; in the urgency 
 of the moment, says Thucydides, choosing to receive 
 their death from Grecian foes rather than from the 
 barbarous and most inveterately hostile Amphilo- 
 chians. As if blushing to declare in express terms 
 their catastrophe, the historian adds no more than 
 that a very small portion only of the defeated army 
 escaped to Ambracia. 
 
 Thucyd. Next day a herald arrived from the Ambraciots, 
 c - 113 - wn o had escaped with the Peloponnesians from Olpse 
 into Agrais, for leave to bury those who had been 
 killed on that occasion. Ignorant of what had since 
 passed, and astonished at the number of his slaughtered 
 fellow-citizens, whom he saw lying scattered over the 
 country, on being informed of the extent of the ca- 
 lamity, he was so overwhelmed with grief that he 
 returned without executing his commission. During 
 the whole war, says Thucydides, no Grecian city 
 suffered equally, within so short a time ; and could 
 Demosthenes have pursuaded the Acarnanians and 
 Amphilochians to march immediately to Ambracia, 
 it must have yielded to the .first assault. But a cause 
 for jealousy, of which their chiefs were politicians 
 enough to be aware, prevented. While there were 
 cities in those parts connected with the Pelopon- 
 nesians, the Acarnanians would be necessary allies to 
 the Athenians, and would be treated with deference ; 
 but, were nothing remaining adverse to the Athenian
 
 MODERATION OF THE ACARNANIANS. 495 
 
 interest, they would not long avoid the fate of so SECT. 
 many other states, once allies, but now subject to VI - 
 the despotic rule of the Athenian people. Winter 
 approaching, ordinarily the season of rest from war- 
 fare, it was resolved that the allies might go to their 
 several homes ; the spoil being first divided, of which 
 a third was allotted to Athens. In pursuance of a h3 ' ' 114 ' 
 vote of the army then three hundred panoplies were 
 selected for a present to their Athenian general, as 
 an honourable testimony to his merit, and these De- 
 mosthenes, no longer fearing to meet his fellow- 
 citizens, dedicated in the temples of Athens. 
 
 After the departure of Demosthenes and the Athe- 
 nian fleet, the conduct of the Acarnanians was directed 
 by a wise and liberal policy, of which we cannot but 
 wish that Grecian history afforded more examples. 
 They permitted the refugees in Agrais to pass, under 
 assurance of safety, to QEniadse, and thence to their 
 several homes ; and soon after they concluded a treaty 
 of alliance offensive and defensive, for a hundred 
 years, with the Ambraciots, including in it the Am- 
 philochians ; with a condition, judiciously added, that 
 neither the Ambraciots should be bound to act of- 
 fensively with the Acarnanians against the Pelopon- 
 nesians, nor the Acarnanians with the Ambraciots 
 against the Athenians. The only concessions required 
 were, that whatever towns or lands the Ambraciots had 
 taken from the Amphilochians should be restored, and 
 that the Ambraciots should not assist Anactorium in 
 the war in which it was engaged with Acarnania. This 
 wise moderation of the Acarnanians was not without 
 its reward. It established for a long time, in their 
 part of the continent, not perfect peace, but more 
 quiet than was usual among the Grecian republics ; 
 and it tended to fix upon them that character of
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 Poiyb. benevolence and uprightness by which we find they 
 
 1. 4. p. 299. ... . 
 
 were long honourably distinguished, and for which 
 they were respected throughout the Greek nation. 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 Seventh campaign : fifth invasion of Attica. Conquest in Sicily 
 projected by the, Athenian administration. Pylus occupied by 
 Demosthenes : blockade of Sphacteria : negotiation of the 
 Lacedemonians at Athens. Cleon appointed general of the 
 Athenian forces : Sphacteria taken : application for peace from 
 Lacedcemon to Athens. 
 
 THE Athenians were now so familiarised to the in- 
 vasion and waste of Attica, and to the inconvenience 
 of confinement within their fortifications, which ex- 
 perience would teach to alleviate, that the eloquence 
 and authority of Pericles had ceased to be necessary 
 for persuading to bear them. The want of his wisdom 
 and the want of his authority were however felt in 
 the general conduct of affairs ; an authority capable 
 of controlling every part of the administration, and 
 of preserving concert and consistency throughout. 
 B. c. 425. While, in the seventh year of the war, Attica was a 
 P^vV' fifth time the prey of the Peloponnesian forces, now 
 Thucyd. commanded by Agis king of Lacedsemon, the Athe- 
 nians, contrary to the admonition of Pericles, were 
 looking after foreign conquest. Instead of merely 
 enabling their Sicilian allies to support themselves, 
 and preventing naval assistance to Peloponnesus from 
 their Sicilian enemies, the experience of their naval 
 power led them to covet acquisition in that rich 
 island, and to imagine that they might reduce the 
 1 3 c us. wn l e under subjection. In the winter a fleet of 
 forty triremes had been preparing for that service. 
 Pythodorus was hastened off', with those first ready,
 
 DEMOSTHENES AGAIN COMMISSIONED. 497 
 
 to supersede Laches in the command in Sicily ; and SECT. 
 in spring the larger number followed, under Eury- 
 medon son of Thucles ancj Sophocles son of Sostrati- Thucyd. 
 das. Intelligence having been received that the city c ' 2 ' 
 of Corcyra was reduced to extreme famine by the 
 expelled Corcyraeans, now masters of all the rest of 
 the island, Eurymedon and Sophocles had orders to 
 relieve it, in their way to Sicily. Those officers, and 
 Pythodorus also, were apparently of the ten generals 
 of the establishment. Demosthenes was in no office, 
 military or civil ; but he was now become a favourite 
 of the people ; and irregularities of all kinds were 
 growing familiar in the Athenian government. 
 Without any public character, and without any mili- 
 tary rank 12 , for under the Athenian government no 
 military rank appears to have been held beyond the 
 term for which the people specifically granted it, he 
 was authorised to embark in the fleet with Eurymedon 
 and Sophocles, and, during the circumnavigation of 
 Peloponnesus, to employ its force, though those of- 
 ficers were present, as he might think proper. 13 
 
 No opportunity for any service, within the plan of 
 Demosthenes, had occurred, when, off the Laconian 
 shore, under which description Thucydides commonly 
 includes the Messenian, intelligence was met that a 
 Peloponnesian fleet of sixty triremes had sailed from 
 Cyllene, and was already at Corcyra. Eurymedon 
 and Sophocles, probably never well pleased with the 
 unusual interference in their command, thought 
 
 12 *QvTl 
 
 13 We are not accurately informed of the nature of the joint 
 commands, so usual in the Athenian and other Grecian services. 
 Thucydides sufficiently marks that there was a gradation, though 
 the inferiors appear to have had some controlling power. The 
 commission given to Demosthenes was of a different kind. 
 
 VOL. II. K K
 
 498 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, themselves now justified in refusing to delay their 
 ^J _ voyage for any operations on the coast of Pelopon- 
 nesus. Demosthenes on the contrary, claiming the 
 authority committed to him by the Athenian people, 
 insisted that they should stop at Pylus on the Mes- 
 senian coast ; and when that service for which he 
 was sent, and which the interest of the commonwealth 
 required, was performed there, it would be time 
 enough to proceed for Corey ra. The admirals per- 
 sisted in refusal ; but it happened that a storm com- 
 pelled them to seek refuge in the very port which 
 Demosthenes desired to make. 
 
 Thucyd. The harbour of Pylus, one of the best of Greece, 
 
 etlii ' 3 ' vvas at this time deserted : the ruins only of an old 
 strab. 1.7. castle remained, and the bordering country, to a con- 
 
 Descr. de . .. . ' , T 
 
 siderable extent, was uninhabited; for the Lacedae- 
 
 m ' monians, in conquering Messenia, had acquired what, 
 according to their institutions, they could little use. 
 Here it was the purpose of Demosthenes to fortify 
 some advantageous post, and place in it a garrison of 
 Messenians from Naupactus ; whose zeal in vindi- 
 cating a possession, which they esteemed of right their 
 own, would second his views, and whose Doric speech 
 would give them great advantage for incursion upon 
 the Lacedaemonian lands. Unable however to per- 
 suade the generals at all to co-operate with him, he 
 had recourse to a very dangerous expedient, for which 
 democracy gave licence : he applied first to the soldiers 
 and then to the officers, but still in vain. A regular 
 system of military command, under a democratical 
 government, was hardly possible ; and indeed due 
 subordination appears to have been, in this age, no- 
 where established by law among the Greeks, ex- 
 cepting only the Lacedaemonians. But the military 
 spirit of the Greek nation must have been great,
 
 PYLUS OCCUPIED BY DEMOSTHENES. 4>99 
 
 when with subordination so deficiently enforced, and SECT. 
 in some cases so ill understood, a regularity of con- 
 duct, that would do credit to troops under the severest 
 discipline, so generally prevailed. It happened that 
 foul weather continuing prevented the departure of 
 the fleet from Pylus ; and at length, the soldiers, 
 tired of inaction, took the inclination, for amusement, 
 to construct the proposed fort. No preparation had 
 been made for the work, no tools were brought for 
 it. Loose stones, found about the spot, were carried 
 by hand, and laid in the most advantageous manner 
 that their accidental form and size permitted ; and 
 the interstices were filled with mud, which, for want 
 of better means, the soldiers bore on their backs; 
 bending, and locking their hands behind them. The 
 fancy, thus taken, grew into zeal ; all diligence was 
 used to render the place defensible before it should 
 be attacked, and the greater part of the circuit was 
 strong by nature. In six days the rest was fortified, 
 so far that, with the crews of five triremes, which the 
 generals now consented to leave at Pylus, Demos- 
 thenes resolved to remain, while the fleet proceeded 
 on its destination. 
 
 When the first intelligence of these transactions Thucyd. 
 arrived at Lacedaemon, the people were celebrating 
 one of those religious festivals which so much engaged 
 the Greeks. The news gave little alarm, but rather 
 excited ridicule ; for, confident in the superiority of 
 their land force, yearly experienced in the unopposed 
 invasion of Attica, the Lacedaemonians could not 
 immediately believe that the Athenians, through any 
 management, could become formidable by land in 
 Peloponnesus ; and a fort raised in six days, they 
 thought, could not cost the strength of Lacedsemon 
 much time to take and destroy. The same intelligence 
 
 K K 2
 
 500 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, however, carried to the army in Attica, made a dif- 
 
 xv ' ferent impression. Moreover the invasion there 
 
 Thucyd. having been made earlier than ever before, the corn 
 
 i. 4. c. 6. Q f ^ county commonly a considerable resource for 
 
 After mid- the subsistence of an invading army, was yet green ; 
 
 die of May. p rov j s i ons began to fail, and the weather, unusually 
 
 stormy for the season, pressed them. After a stay 
 
 therefore of only fifteen days in Attica, Agis hastened 
 
 back into Peloponnesus. 
 
 Thucyd. It was not long before the business of Pylus began 
 
 .4. c.8. Q k e more seriously considered also at Lacedaemon. 
 A fortress on their coast, occupied by an enemy com- 
 manding the sea, and garrisoned by men connected 
 by blood with their slaves, of whom they were, not 
 without cause, ever apprehensive, might indeed give 
 very reasonable alarm ; and the measures immediately 
 taken in consequence would alone go far to justify 
 what had been deemed at first, both by friends and 
 foes, the improvident and extravagant project of De- 
 mosthenes. Beside promoting the evacuation of 
 Attica, Corcyra was instantly relieved, the Pelopon- 
 nesian fleet being in all haste recalled thence ; and, 
 to avoid observation and consequent attack from the 
 Athenian fleet, it was again hauled across the Leu- 
 cadian isthmus. Requisitions for auxiliary troops 
 were at the same time despatched to all the allies 
 within Peloponnesus ; and the Spartans of the city 
 marched for Pylus, while the Lacedaemonians of 
 the provincial towns, just returned from one expedi- 
 tion, required some time for preparation to proceed 
 on another. 
 
 The situation of Demosthenes however was highly 
 critical. Already part of the enemy's forces was 
 arrived to form the siege of his little garrison, when 
 he descried their fleet also approaching. He just
 
 DEMOSTHENES BLOCKADED IN PYLUS. 501 
 
 saved opportunity for sending two of his triremes SECT. 
 with despatches to Eurymedon at Zacynthus, and 
 
 presently he was blockaded by land and sea. 
 
 It became immediately the object of the Lacedae- 
 monians to push assault, so as to complete their 
 business before the Athenian fleet could arrive ; and 
 this they hoped would not be difficult, against a fort 
 so hastily constructed, and a garrison so small. At 
 any rate however they wished to avoid a naval 
 action, and yet to keep the command of the harbour ; 
 and then the fort, scantily provided, and cut off from 
 supplies, could not hold long. The harbour of Pylus, Thucyd. 
 nowNavarino, is a spacious basin with two entrances, 
 
 one at each end of an island, then called Sphac- Goifede 
 
 11 i -i-ii Vemse, par 
 
 tena, near two miles long, uncultivated and woody. Beiiin. 
 The northern entrance, near which stood the Athe- 
 nian fort, barely admitted two triremes abreast ; the 
 southern not more than eight or nine. This island 
 the Lacedaemonians occupied with a body of troops ; 
 other troops they disposed along the shore ; and both 
 entrances of the harbour they proposed to defend 
 with triremes, moored with their prows toward the 
 sea. Beyond the harbour's mouth, the coast was 
 rocky and without landing-place. 14 
 
 Meanwhile Demosthenes, to make the most of the Thucyd. 
 small force under his command, hauled ashore the c ' 9 * 
 three triremes which remained to him, and formed 
 of them a kind of outwork against the sea, under 
 his fort. Two small Messenian privateers had acci- 
 dentally put into Pylus ; and with some shields, 
 mostly of wicker, and other sorry armour which he 
 found aboard them, he armed the sailors from his 
 
 I 4 'Atipeva. 
 KK 3
 
 502 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, triremes. 15 Forty heavy-armed Messenians, who had 
 ' formed part of the complement of the privateers 
 were a more valuable addition to his garrison. In 
 the hasty construction of his fort, he had been most 
 careful to strengthen it toward the land, as the side 
 on which the Lacedaemonians were generally most .to 
 be apprehended. Toward the sea it was far weaker, 
 but then on that side it could be approached only 
 from the sea. To resist an army and a fleet moving 
 in concert to attack him, he selected, from his whole 
 force, sixty heavy-armed and a few bowmen, whom 
 he posted upon the beach to oppose debarkation, and 
 of whom he took himself the immediate command. 
 The remainder he appointed to the defence of the 
 walls. 
 
 Where soldiers are members of that assembly in 
 which sovereign power legally resides, and where per- 
 suasion may with impunity be attempted to induce 
 them to disobey their officers, encouraging speeches 
 previous to action may be often necessary ; and to 
 such a little band as that with which Demosthenes 
 had engaged in a very arduous undertaking they 
 Thucyd. would be easily addressed. ' My fellow-soldiers, and 
 1.4. c.io. ( com p an i ons J n the chance of war,' said that able 
 officer, ' let no man now think to show his wisdom 
 
 * by computing the exact magnitude of the danger 
 
 * which threatens us, but rather let every one cheer- 
 
 * fully resolve to exert himself to the utmost, as the 
 
 * one thing necessary to the safety of us all. Never- 
 
 * theless, I think, notwithstanding the disproportion 
 
 * of numbers, the circumstances are in our favour, if 
 
 15 Navra?. Those who constructed the fort were soldiers, 
 <rrp*T*5Ta<, but the historian does not mention what proportion 
 there was of each.
 
 LACEDEMONIANS BESIEGE PYLUS. 503 
 
 * we make the most of advantages in our possession- SFCT. 
 
 * We Athenians, practised in naval war, well know '_ 
 
 ' that debarkation in the face of an enemy is no easy 
 
 * business, if opposed with firmness. Let the Pelo- 
 
 * ponnesians then, who have not the same experience, 
 ' now try it ; for, adding the difficulties of this rocky 
 
 * shore, which will fight for us, I have no doubt of 
 
 * success, if we are only true to ourselves.' This 
 simple oratory, adapted to excite, not the boiling 
 spirit of enterprise, which in the circumstances might 
 have been even injurious, but the deliberate valour 
 which defence requires, had the desired effect, and 
 the Athenians waited in due preparation to receive 
 the attack. 
 
 The Peloponnesian fleet consisted of forty-three Thucyd. 
 triremes, mostly of the allies, but commanded in 
 chief by Thrasymelidas, a Spartan. 16 While the fort 
 was threatened on all sides by sea and land, the 
 principal attack was made from the fleet, precisely 
 where Demosthenes expected. But a few triremes 
 only could approach at a time, and those not without 
 risk from the rocks and the surf. The attack was 
 therefore carried on by reliefs, and no exhortation 
 was omitted to promote exertion. Some of the cap- 
 tains and masters l7 nevertheless hesitating at the view 
 of the dangers of the shore, the Spartan Brasidas, 
 who commanded a trireme, became presently distin- 
 guished by the Athenians, loud in expostulation : 
 
 * 111 it became them,' he said, ' to spare their timbers, 
 
 * when the enemy possessed a post in the country : 
 
 * the Lacedaemonians deserved better things of their 
 
 * allies. Striking, splitting, landing anyhow, they 
 
 16 NJa/>%o$. 
 
 17 TptTjpapxot not Kvteprrrrat, answering precisely to our terms 
 captain and master. 
 
 K K 4
 
 504, 
 
 CHAP. 
 XV. 
 
 Thucyd. 
 1.4. c.12. 
 
 c. 13. 
 
 c.12. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 * should make themselves masters of the place and of 
 ' the men who held it.' Brasidas was not of a 
 disposition thus to exhort others, without setting the 
 example himself. Having compelled his master to 
 lay his galley close to the shore, he was stepping upon 
 the gangboard 18 , to lead the landing, when a number 
 of the enemy's missile weapons at once struck him ; 
 insomuch that he fainted and fell backward, for- 
 tunately into the ship, while his shield, which among 
 the ancients it was highly disgraceful and even crimi- 
 nal to lose, dropped into the sea. Notwithstanding 
 this ill success of Brasidas, the attempt to force a 
 landing was repeated through the whole of that day, 
 and part of the next, but was resisted so efficaciously 
 that at length the fleet drew off. Demosthenes then, 
 for the encouragement of his people, and not without 
 just claim of victory, erected his trophy, of which 
 the shield of Brasidas, taken by the Athenians, 
 became the honourable ornament. No stain however 
 could ensue to the reputation of the owner ; but, on 
 the contrary, the story being related through Greece, 
 it was everywhere remarked, as a singular result of 
 the incident, that what disgraced others brought 
 glory to Brasidas. 
 
 The Lacedemonian commanders, hopeless now of 
 succeeding by assault, prepared immediately to pro- 
 ceed to a regular siege, and with that view sent some 
 ships for timber to make battering-engines. Before 
 these could return, Eurymedon arrived with the 
 Athenian fleet ; which, with the junction of four 
 Chian ships, and a re-enforcement taken from the 
 station of Naupactus, consisted of forty triremes. 
 Approaching enough to observe that the harbour of 
 Pylus was occupied by the enemy's fleet, and the
 
 DISASTERS OF THE BESIEGERS. 50 
 
 island before it and the shore on each side by their SECT. 
 
 VTT 
 
 army, Eurymedon withdrew, and encamped for the '_ 
 
 night on the small island of Prote, at no great dis- 
 tance. On the morrow he prepared for action, deter- End of 
 mined to attack the enemy in the harbour, if they ay ' 
 would not meet him in the open sea. 
 
 The Peloponnesian fleet seems to have been ill 
 commanded : the resolution was taken to await the 
 enemy within the basin ; where the confined space, 
 and the army surrounding, it was thought, would 
 give advantage ; and the previously proposed blockade 
 of the entrances was omitted. A larger proportion 
 of the crews would thus have their nightly rest ashore, 
 and the Lacedaemonians would desire to maintain 
 their strength as entire as possible, to balance, as far 
 as might be, the enemy's superiority of skill. But so 
 deficient were they in circumspection that the Athe- 
 nian fleet was entering the basin by both the mouths lt4 ' c ' 14 
 while the greater part of the Peloponnesian crews 
 were but quitting their camp to go aboard. Some 
 ships were already under way ; but the crews, seeing 
 they should not be supported, instantly fled to the 
 shore. Five triremes were taken ; the men however 
 escaping from all except one. The Athenians then 
 proceeded to attack the ships upon the beach, and to 
 haul away those from which the crews had fled. The 
 Lacedaemonian land forces, mortified by the disaster 
 of their fleet, but far more alarmed for their troops 
 in the island, pressed toward the shore. A fierce 
 engagement ensued, between the Athenians from 
 their galleys and the Lacedaemonians dashing into 
 the water to defend theirs. After much bloodshed 
 on both sides, the Lacedaemonians secured all their 
 ships except the five first taken, with which the
 
 506 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. Athenians drew off, masters also of the enemy's dead, 
 ' who were restored on the usual application from the 
 defeated. Eurymedon erected his trophy, and then 
 directed his care to keep a strict watch upon Sphac- 
 teria, looking upon the Lacedaemonians there as 
 Thucyd. already his prisoners. They were four hundred and 
 twenty, drafted by lot from the several lochi of the 
 army, with attending Helots, whose number the his- 
 torian does not mention. These indeed were little 
 thought of; but among the others were some con- 
 nected with most of the principal families of Lace- 
 daemon. 
 
 The following transactions furnish very remarkable 
 proof of the importance of a very few citizens to the 
 most powerful of the little republics of Greece. Those 
 republics were all so constituted that they could bear 
 neither diminution nor any considerable increase of 
 their citizens without inconvenience. It was not the 
 loss of inhabitants to the country that would be felt, 
 though of a small republic, when four hundred men 
 were killed or taken ; but it was the loss of those in- 
 timately connected with the ruling powers, by ties of 
 blood, by religious prejudices, by political prejudices, 
 and most of all if by party prejudices. Those who 
 formed the strength of every Grecian state for every 
 other purpose, the slaves, could not be trusted with 
 arms. But the military establishment was composed 
 of all the freemen capable of bearing arms. Losses 
 in war therefore could be recruited only by time, 
 which would bring boys to manhood, and by fresh 
 births ; unless the invidious and hazardous resource 
 were admitted, of associating foreigners, or of raising 
 slaves to be citizens. Of the small proportion then 
 of the inhabitants who filled the military function,
 
 NEGOTIATION FOR PEACE. 507 
 
 four hundred lost would affect a great number of fa- SECT. 
 milies ; and hence private passion had such influence 
 on public measures. 
 
 Intelligence of the transactions at Pylus filled 
 Sparta with consternation. The men in Sphacteria 
 had not, like the Romans whom, we are told, their 
 country refused to ransom, disgraced themselves by 
 flight or by the surrender of their arms ; but, placed 
 in their present 'situation in the accidental turn of 
 duty, with their honour clear, they were likely to be- 
 come a sacrifice to the mismanagement or deficient 
 exertion of those who, by more effectually opposing 
 the Athenian fleet, ought to have preserved them 
 from such calamitous circumstances. The principal Thucyd. 
 magistrates therefore of Lacedaemon, the leaders of l ' 4l c ' 15 * 
 the administration 19 , came to the camp at Pylus to 
 assure themselves of the exact state of things ; and, 
 when they were satisfied that to rescue those in the 
 island was impossible, it was immediately determined 
 to enter into negotiation with the enemy, with a 
 view to a treaty of peace. A truce was accordingly 
 agreed upon, of which these were the conditions : 
 
 * That, as a preliminary measure, all the Peloponne- 
 
 * sian ships of war which had been in the late action, 
 
 * and all others then in any port of the Lacedaemo- 
 
 * nian territory, should be delivered as pledges to the 
 
 * Athenian admiral at Pylus : That Lacedaemonian 
 
 * ambassadors should be conveyed to Athens in an 
 
 * Athenian trireme to treat concerning a peace, and 
 
 * brought back again by the same conveyance : That 
 ' the truce should hold during their absence, and 
 
 * that, on their return, the ships delivered should be 
 
 * restored : That, in the mean time, the Laceda3mo- 
 
 * nians should be permitted to supply their people 
 
 19 Ta
 
 508 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. in the island with provisions in specified quantities, 
 under the inspection of Athenian officers : that the 
 
 * Athenians should still keep their naval guard over 
 
 * the island, but not land upon it ; and that the La- 
 cedaemonians should send no vessel thither, but in 
 
 * conformity to the terms of the truce : That a breach 
 ' of any one article of the treaty should be esteemed 
 ' an annihilation of the whole.' 
 
 The Lacedaemonian ambassadors , arriving at 
 Athens, had a business to manage, in itself difficult, 
 and rendered more so by the forms of democratical 
 administration, and the ready jealousy of a sovereign 
 multitude. The distress which occasioned the ne- 
 gotiation was peculiar to their own state, but in any 
 treaty their allies must be included ; the discussion 
 of whose interest, before the assembled Athenian 
 people, could scarcely be conducted so as to avoid 
 offence. Before the assembled Athenian people how- 
 ever it was necessary that some declaration should 
 be made of the purpose of their mission. In their 
 speech therefore they simply proposed a treaty of 
 peace, together with an alliance offensive and de- 
 fensive between Lacedasmon and Athens, each party 
 keeping what it possessed ; and in return for the 
 restoration of their fellow-countrymen, in a manner 
 prisoners in Sphacteria, they offered simply the glory 
 which would redound to Athens from a peace soli- 
 cited by those who were heretofore in a situation 
 rather to grant conditions, together with gratitude 
 for a generous deed, whence might arise that mutual 
 good will between the two republics which alone 
 could make a peace lasting. 
 
 20 The name of the chief of the embassy, Archeptolemus, not 
 mentioned by Thucydides, is given by Aristophanes, Equit. 
 v. 794.
 
 CLEON DEMAGOGUE. 
 
 509 
 
 It was not however without probable ground for Thucyd. 
 supposing the proposal would be welcome at Athens Anstoph. 
 that the Lacedaemonian administration had deter- 
 mined thus to sue for peace. They knew that a 
 large portion of the Athenian people had always been 
 averse to the war ; and that a majority of them, since 
 they had experienced its evils, had more than once 
 manifested great anxiety for a conclusion of it. But, 
 at this time, the favour which Cleon had acquired with 
 the lower people proved an obstacle of which they 
 could not be entirely aware. . That turbulent orator 
 reminded the assembly, that the Megarian ports of 
 Nisaea and Pegae had once belonged to the Athenian 
 people ; that the Athenian people had commanded 
 the city of Trrezen ; that all Achaia had been of 
 their confederacy ; and that these possessions had 
 been wrested from them, not in war, but by a treaty ; 
 to the hard terms of which a calamity, similar to that 
 which now pressed the Lacedaemonians, had com- 
 pelled them to consent. This therefore was the time 
 for recovering those possessions. It should be in- 
 sisted that the Lacedaemonians in Sphacteria should 
 be brought prisoners to Athens ; to be released as 
 soon as Nisas and Pegae were surrendered to the Athe- 
 nians, and the administrations of Achaia and Trcezen 
 restored to the footing upon which they stood before 
 the thirty years' truce. Accordingly such were the 
 terms which the sovereign assembly of Athens re- 
 quired. 
 
 To debate before a whole people concerning pro- 
 positions affecting to such a degree the interests of 
 the allies of Lacedasmon, the Lacedaemonian ambas- 
 sadors judged utterly imprudent. Instead therefore 
 of giving any answer, they desired that commissioners 
 might be appointed to discuss the several points at
 
 510 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, more leisure than the nature of a general assembly 
 admitted. This proposal suited the views of Cleon, 
 only as it afforded opportunity to infuse into the 
 people a jealousy of the ambassadors, and of those 
 who were disposed to favour their purpose, and an 
 opinion of his own political sagacity. He exclaimed 
 against it accordingly in a style of indecent passion : 
 
 * Well he knew before,' he said, 'that the Lacedse- 
 
 * monian ambassadors came with injurious views, and 
 
 * for clandestine purposes ; but now their refusal to 
 ' declare themselves before the people, and their re- 
 
 * quisition to treat with a small number of commis- 
 ' sioners, must make it manifest to all. If they had 
 
 * any thing just and honourable to propose, they need 
 
 * not hesitate to speak it publicly.' The ambassadors, 
 highly desirous of an accommodation upon any mode- 
 rate terms, yet seeing the Athenian people imprac- 
 ticable through the sway which Cleon held among 
 them, and considering the probable ill consequences 
 of publicly proposing conditions disagreeable to their 
 allies, which might after all be rejected, immediately 
 took their leave. 
 
 Thucyd. They arrived at Pylus about the twentieth day 
 
 & 4 c.3^ 3 ' after their departure thence, and with their return 
 End of the truce of course expired. The Lacedaemonians 
 
 June. 
 
 then demanded the restoration of their ships accord- 
 ing to the treaty : but the Athenians refused ; alleging 
 some hostility committed against the garrison of the 
 fort, and some other matters of little importance, 
 contrary to the strict letter of the convention, but 
 altogether, in the opinion evidently of the impartial 
 but cautious Thucydides, not warranting a procedure 
 so contrary to the spirit of it. Whether Demosthenes 
 or Eurymedon was the principal actor in this business, 
 we are not informed ; but, in favour of either, it may
 
 BLOCKADE OF SPHACTERIA. 511 
 
 be observed that to exercise any discretionary power SECT. 
 was extremely hazardous, when responsibility was 
 immediate to that despotic and wayward sovereign 
 the Athenian people under the influence of Cleon. 
 If Cleon, or any other turbulent orator, could per- 
 suade the people that their generals ought not to 
 give up, of their own authority, any advantage that 
 the letter of the treaty warranted, their utter ruin, 
 even capital condemnation, might have been the con- 
 sequence of a contrary conduct. 
 
 Both parties now prepared to prosecute hostilities 
 with vigour. The Athenians directed their attention 
 particularly to the guard of Sphacteria : two triremes 
 were constantly circumnavigating it during day, and 
 at night the whole fleet kept watch ; in moderate 
 weather all around the island ; but fresher winds in- 
 duced the necessity of leaving the side toward the 
 sea unguarded. A re-enforcement of twenty triremes 
 from Attica made the number of the besieging fleet 
 seventy. 
 
 The Peloponnesians meanwhile pushed the siege 
 of the fort. But the object for which the Lacedae- 
 monians were most anxious was to relieve their people 
 in Sphacteria; and what they chiefly apprehended 
 for them was famine. Large rewards therefore were Thucyd. 
 offered, freedom to Helots, and money to any free- L 4< Ct 26> 
 men, who would introduce provisions. Many thus 
 were allured to the attempt ; and though some were 
 taken, some succeeded ; especially in blowing nights, 
 when the Athenian triremes could not hold their 
 station at the back of the island. Some supply was 
 also carried by divers, who swam under water across 
 the port, rising occasionally only for air, and dragging 
 after them skins filled with bruised linseed, or with 
 poppy-seed mixed with honey.
 
 512 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP. The blockade of the island being thus protracted, 
 ' the Athenians began to suffer those very wants through 
 which they had hoped to compel the Lacedaemonians 
 to surrender. In their fort was one small spring, 
 ample for the garrison, but very inadequate to the 
 supply of the whole armament ; the greater part of 
 which was reduced to the use of brackish water, ob- 
 tained by digging in the sand under the fort. All 
 the rest of the coast was possessed by the superior 
 land force of the Peloponnesians : and the triremes, 
 far from capable of carrying supplies for any length 
 of time, had not convenient room even for their crews 
 to sleep or to eat aboard ; insomuch that Thticydides 
 mentions it among their hardships upon this occasion, 
 Thucyd. that they went ashore by reliefs for their meals, living 
 * otherwise aboard their triremes at anchor. 
 
 The uneasiness hence arising in the fleet and army 
 was ere long communicated to Athens, and reasonable 
 apprehension arose that approaching winter would in- 
 crease the difficulties; that it would become impossible 
 to supply the armament with provisions by the navi- 
 gation around the capes of Peloponnesus, which in 
 summer they found could not be done in the requi- 
 site extent ; and that, even if supplies could be fur- 
 nished, the fleet could not remain during the stormy 
 season, on a coast where they possessed no port. It 
 was then farther considered that, if the Lacedaemo- 
 nians should recover their people from Sphacteria, 
 not only an opportunity for making an advantageous 
 peace was lost, but future opportunities were pre- 
 cluded : at least the first proposal must hereafter come 
 from themselves ; for the Lacedaemonians would 
 scarcely risk the disgrace of a second refusal. 
 
 Public indignation was rising fast against Cleon, 
 as the evil counsellor of the commonwealth, and />
 
 ARROGANCE OF CLEON. 513 
 
 author of the evils felt or apprehended. He found SECT. 
 it necessary, for obviating popular clamour and dis- 
 gust, to exert himself in the assembly ; and, in a very 
 extraordinary train of circumstances that followed, 
 his impudence and his fortune (if, in the want of 
 another, we may use that term) wonderfully favoured 
 him. He began with boldly insisting that ' the cir- 
 
 * cumstances of the fleet and army were not so ad- 
 
 * verse as they were reported.' This assertion called 
 forward the officers who brought the intelligence : 
 they desired that, * if they were thought unworthy of 
 ' belief, proper persons might be sent to examine into 
 
 * the state of things/ The assembly assented to this 
 request, and Cleon himself was named among those 
 to be commissioned for the purpose. Pressed by this 
 proposal, which he was aware would not answer his 
 end, and anxious anyhow to throw the weight of the 
 business upon others, he seems in the moment to have 
 lost his guard. * It were idle waste of time/ he said, 
 
 * to send commissioners to inquire, when they should 
 
 * rather send generals to execute. If those who di- 
 
 * rected the military affairs of the commonwealth 
 
 * were men, it would be easy, with the force which 
 
 * they could at all times command, to subdue the 
 
 * little band in Sphacteria : were he in that station, 
 
 ' he would engage to effect it.' The unenterprising Thucyd. 
 Nicias, at this time commander-in-chief, being thus 
 called upon, in his anxiety to obviate crimination, 
 miserably betrayed the dignity of his high office. ' As 
 ' far as depended upon him,' he said, * Cleon might 
 
 * take what force he pleased, and make the attempt.' 
 Cleon immediately accepted the offer, thinking it not 
 seriously made ; but Nicias persisting, Cleon would 
 have retracted, saying, * Nicias, not he, was general 
 
 * of the republic.' Nicias however, observing that 
 
 VOL. II. L L
 
 51 4> HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, his proposal had not displeased the people, declared 
 solemnly before the assembly that, for the business 
 of Pylus, he waived his right to command. The more 
 then Cleon appeared still anxious to withdraw, the 
 more the people, in the usual temper of mobs 21 , (such 
 is the historian's observation,) insisted that he should 
 make his words good ; with clamour requiring that 
 Nicias should resign the command, and that Cleon 
 should take it. Thus appointed general, Cleon, 
 though alarmed with the danger, was elated with the 
 extravagant honour ; and in the next assembly held 
 on the business 22 he resumed his arrogant manner : 
 
 * He did not fear the Lacedaemonians,' he said ; ' and 
 ' for the expedition to Pylus, he would desire no 
 
 * Athenian forces : he would only take the Lemnian 
 
 * and Imbrian heavy-armed, at that time in Attica, 
 ' with the middle-armed of ^Enus, and four hundred 
 ' bowmen of the allies ; and, with that small addition 
 
 * to the armament then at Pylus, he would, within 
 
 * twenty days, either bring the Lacedaemonians in 
 4 Sphacteria prisoners to Athens, or put them to the 
 
 * sword upon the spot.' Amid the many very serious 
 considerations involved with the business, this pomp- 
 ous boast excited a general laugh in the assembly, yet 
 even the graver men, says the historian, were upon 
 the whole pleased with the event, upon considering 
 that of two good things one must result ; either an 
 important advantage must be gained over the Lace- 
 daemonians, or, what they rather expected, they should 
 be finally delivered from the importunity of Cleon. 
 
 It however soon appeared that though for a man, 
 
 21 Qilov o%\o$ uXe7 voie'iv. Thucyd. 1. 4. C. 28. 
 
 22 Thucydides does not specify that it was in a second 
 assembly ; but from the circumstances, and from the tenor of 
 his narrative, it should seem that it must have been so.
 
 CLEON GENERAL. 515 
 
 like Cleon, unversed in military command, the un- SECT. 
 dertaking was rash, and the bragging promise abun- 
 dantly ridiculous, yet the business was not so desperate 
 as it was in the moment generally imagined ; arid in 
 fact the folly of the Athenian people, in committing 
 such a trust to such a man, far exceeded that of the 
 man himself, whose impudence seldom carried him 
 beyond the control of his cunning. He had received Thucyd. 
 intelligence that Demosthenes had already formed ' 4 * c ' 29 " 
 the plan, and was preparing for the attempt, with the 
 forces upon the spot or in the neighbourhood. Hence 
 his apparent moderation in his demand for troops ; 
 which he judiciously accommodated to the gratifica- 
 tion of the Athenian people, by avoiding to require 
 any Athenians. He farther showed his judgment, 
 when the decree was to be passed which was finally 
 to direct the expedition, by a request, which was 
 readily granted, that Demosthenes might be joined 
 with him in the command. 
 
 The natural strength of Sphacteria, uneven, rocky, 
 woody, together with ignorance of the enemy's force 
 there, had long deterred Demosthenes from attempt- 
 ing any attack ; and the more, because his misfortune 
 in .^Etolia had arisen from incautiously engaging him- 
 self, in a rough and woody country, against unknown 
 numbers. But it had happened that a fire, made by 
 the Lacedaemonians for dressing their provisions, had 
 accidentally caught the woods, and, the wind favour- 
 ing, had burnt almost the whole. Their best defence 
 being thus destroyed, Demosthenes, now enabled to 
 see his enemy and his ground, no longer hesitated 
 concerning measures. He had sent for such re-en- 
 forcements as might be obtained from the nearest 
 allies, but before they could join him Cleon arrived. 
 
 Demosthenes himself had been appointed to an 
 LL 2
 
 516 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, anomalous command, interfering; with the authority 
 
 XV . 
 
 ' of the regular generals of the commonwealth ; and it 
 does not appear that he made any difficulty of yield- 
 ing to the wayward will of his sovereign, and taking 
 the second rank in the command with Cleon. When 
 the new general arrived at Pylus with his re-enforce- 
 ment, it was determined first to try if their business 
 could not be managed by negotiation ; and a message 
 was accordingly sent to the commander-in-chief of 
 the Lacedaemonian army, proposing that the men in 
 Sphacteria should surrender themselves prisoners, 
 with the condition, that they should be liberally 
 treated in confinement, till the two republics might 
 come to some accommodation. 
 
 Thucyd. This being refused, Cleon and Demosthenes pre- 
 
 pared to use the force under their command. Giving 
 one entire day of rest to their troops, on the next, 
 at night, they embarked all their heavy-armed, who 
 were only eight hundred, and, a little before dawn, 
 landed at the same time on both sides of Sphacteria, 
 from the harbour and from the open sea. An ad- 
 vanced post of the Lacedaemonians was surprised, 
 and the guard put to the sword. As soon as day 
 
 c.3i, 32. broke, the rest of the forces were landed, consisting 
 of eight hundred bowmen, about as many middle- 
 armed, a few Messenians and others from the garrison 
 of the fort, and, except the rowers of the lowest 
 bench, distinguished by the name of thalamians, all 
 the seamen of the fleet ; who, as the triremes were 
 more than seventy, would be a large body. The force 
 all together was not of the most regular kind, but it 
 was ample against those who held Sphacteria ; of 
 whom the Lacedaemonians, the only regular troops, 
 had been originally but four hundred and twenty, 
 and thirty of those were killed in the outpost. Of
 
 ATTACK UPON SPHACTERIA. 
 
 517 
 
 the number of attendant slaves, and of those who, SECT. 
 
 after landing provisions, may have remained in the _ 
 
 island, we are not informed. Epitadas, the com- 
 mander, had posted himself, with his main body, in 
 the central and plainest part, near the only spring 
 the island afforded. A small reserve he placed in an 
 ancient fort, of rude construction, but strong by si- 
 tuation, at the extremity next Pylus. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians, and indeed all the Pelopon- 
 nesians, seem to have been absurdly attached, through 
 a point of honour, to the exclusive use of weapons for 
 close fight. Among the early Greeks, the first pur- 
 pose of arms, after self-defence, was to defend their 
 cattle : the second, when civilisation advanced, to 
 protect their harvest, and cultivated fruits : the third, 
 and not least important, to hold a secure superiority 
 over their numerous slaves. Hence, as well as because 
 of the more determined courage requisite for the use' 
 of them, and of their greater efficacy in the hands of 
 brave and able men, whenever they can be used, arms 
 for stationary fight in plains were deemed more ho- 
 nourable than missile weapons. But as, under many 
 circumstances, especially in mountainous countries, 
 like the greatest part of Peloponnesus and of all 
 Greece, it was easy to evade the force of the heavy- 
 armed, yet we find the Lacedemonians often suffering 
 for want of light troops and missile weapons. Epitadas 
 chose, with his little band, to meet an enemy who so 
 outnumbered him, in the levellest part of the island ; 
 not only because the fountain there was necessary, 
 but because there the weapons and the discipline of 
 his people would be most efficacious. But among 
 the Athenians, though the first honour was given to 
 the panoply, yet the use of the bow was cultivated ; 
 and we find the Athenian archers frequently men
 
 518 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, tioned as superior troops of their kind. Demosthenes 
 ^J had been taught by misfortune both how to value 
 light troops, and how to use them ; and Cleon's pru- 
 dence left him the direction of operations. Placing his 
 light-armed in detached bodies of about two hundred 
 each on the heights around the Lacedaemonian station, 
 he proceeded with his heavy-armed within a certain 
 distance of the front of it, and then halted. 
 Thucyd. Epitadas did not refuse to meet superior numbers ; 
 
 1. 4. c. 33. . 
 
 but, as he advanced to attack Demosthenes, he was 
 assailed on each flank and in his rear with darts, 
 arrows, and stones. If he turned, those who thus 
 annoyed him instantly fled from his attack, and his 
 heavy-armed would in vain pursue them ; but the 
 moment he resumed his march towards Demosthenes, 
 they renewed their annoyance. Such was the cha- 
 racter of the Lacedemonian heavy infantry at this 
 time in Greece, that, with all the advantage of numbers 
 on their side, the light-armed of the Athenian army 
 had not approached them without awe, and, as Thu- 
 cydides expresses it, a kind of servile apprehension. 
 But encouraged by the effect which their first wary 
 exertions derived from the able disposition of Demos- 
 thenes, and by the evident inability of the Lacedae- 
 monians for efficacious pursuit, the light-armed pressed 
 their attacks. This desultory manner of action 
 astonished the Lacedaemonians with its novelty : the 
 ashes and dust, formed by the late conflagration, 
 rising and mingling their darkness with that of the 
 constant flight of missile weapons, disabled them from 
 seeing their enemy, whom with their arms they could 
 not reach, if they could see ; while the clamorous 
 noise of the irregular assailants drowned the voice of 
 Thucyd. command. Utterly at a loss for means of effectual 
 
 1.4. c.35. . . . ' 
 
 opposition, when many were already severely wounded,
 
 ATTACK UPON SPHACTERIA. 519 
 
 they retreated in a compact body toward their reserve SECT. 
 in the castle, which was not far distant. The light- VIL 
 armed then pressed their assault with increased ar- 
 dour : the Lacedaemonians gained the fort, but not 
 without loss. 
 
 The efficacy of the light troops being now ob- 
 viated, Demosthenes led his heavy-armed to the 
 attack ; but the Lacedaemonians having great advan- 
 tage of ground, as well as some defence from the old 
 walls, maintained an equal conflict against superior 
 numbers. It was already late in the day ; both parties 
 were suffering from heat, thirst, and fatigue, and 
 neither had any prospect of decisive advantage, when 
 the commander of the Messenian troops coming to Th ucyd. 
 Cleon and Demosthenes, told them he had discovered 
 a way by which, with a party of light-armed bow- 
 men, he thought he could scale the fort. The party 
 he desired being accordingly put under his orders, 
 he led them, so as to avoid being seen by the enemy, 
 to a precipitous part of the rock, where, through 
 confidence in the natural strength of the place, no 
 guard was kept. Climbing with great difficulty, he 
 made his way good, and appeared suddenly on the 
 summit. Effectual resistance was now no longer c.37. 
 possible for the Lacedaemonians, worn with incessant 
 action through a sultry day, and surrounded by su- 
 perior numbers. Cleon and Demosthenes therefore, 
 desirous of carrying them prisoners to Athens, checked 
 their troops, who would shortly have put them to 
 the sword ; and sent a herald to offer quarter, upon 
 condition that they should surrender themselves to 
 the mercy of the Athenian people. It was doubted 
 vvhether, even in their hopeless situation, Lacedae- 
 monians would submit to become prisoners ; but as 
 soon as they saw the heralds approaching they
 
 >20 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, grounded their shields and waved their hands, inti- 
 mating that they were disposed to hear proposals. 
 Epitadas was no more ; Hippagretes, his second in 
 command, had been so severely wounded that he lay 
 for lifeless among the slain ; Styphon, on whom the 
 command had thus devolved, desired permission to 
 send a herald to the Lacedaemonian army on the con- 
 tinent for orders. This was refused, but the Athe- 
 nian generals sent for a herald from the Lacedaemo- 
 nian army ; and after the interchange of two or three 
 messages a final answer came to the garrison of the 
 island in these terms : * The Lacedaemonians permit 
 ' you to consult your own safety, admitting nothing 
 * disgraceful.' 23 After a short consultation, they then 
 surrendered, according to the Greek expression, their 
 arms and themselves. 
 
 On the morrow the commanders of the Lacedae- 
 monian army on the continent sent a herald for their 
 slain, and the Athenians erected their trophy. The 
 killed were a hundred and twenty-eight Lacedaemo- 
 nians, and the prisoners two hundred and ninety-two. 
 Of the fate of the Helots and others, who were with 
 the Lacedaemonians in Sphacteria, we have no inform- 
 ation. The blockade, from the action in the harbour 
 to that in the island, had continued seventy-two days, 
 including the truce of twenty days, during which the 
 garrison was regularly served with provisions. For 
 the rest of the time they had only had such casual 
 supplies as could be introduced by stealth ; yet, such 
 had been the economy of Epitadas, provisions re- 
 mained when the island was taken. The Athenian 
 commanders, leaving a garrison in Pylus, sailed away 
 with the fleet j Eurymedon with his division for 
 
 23 
 
 M^jSev
 
 TREATMENT OF THE PRISONERS. 
 
 Corcyra and Sicily, and Cleon and Demosthenes for SECT. 
 Attica: and the engagement of Cleon was completely _ 
 fulfilled ; for they entered the port of Piraeus with Toward 
 their prisoners within twenty days after he had 
 quitted it. 
 
 Nothing during the whole war, says Thucydides, 
 
 ., i J 1-4. c.40 
 
 happened so contrary to the general opinion and ex- 
 pectation of the Greeks as this event ; for it was sup- 
 posed that neither hunger, nor the pressure of any 
 other the severest necessity, would induce Lacedae- 
 monians to surrender their arms ; insomuch that 
 among some it was doubted whether the prisoners 
 were of the same race, or at least if they were of equal 
 rank with their comrades who had been killed. Hence 
 an Athenian auxiliary, with more ill manners than 
 wit, asked one of the prisoners, ' Whether those who 
 
 * fell in the island were the men of superior rank and 
 ' merit.' 24 To which the Spartan coldly replied, ' An 
 
 * arrow would indeed be a valuable weapon, if it 
 
 * could distinguish rank and merit.' 
 
 The prisoners, being many of them connected with 
 the first families of Sparta, were considered by the 
 Athenians as most valuable pledges. It was deter- 
 mined by a decree of the people, that they should be 
 kept in chains 25 till the two republics should come to 
 some accommodation, unless any invasion of Attica 
 should be attempted by the Peloponnesians. In that 
 case the decree declared, in terror to the Lacedae- 
 monian public, that they should be put to death. 
 Such were at that time the maxims of warfare among 
 those who boasted to be the most civilised, and indeed 
 the only civilised people upon earth ; and such the 
 
 24 KaXoi KayaOo'i, a phrase which cannot be exactly translated. 
 
 2o 
 
 VOL. II. M M
 
 522 HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAP, motives for preferring death in the field to the con- 
 
 ^ dition, in modern Europe so mild, except in France 
 
 during the usurpation, of a prisoner of war. 
 
 By the event of the business of Pylus, the Lace- 
 daemonians were in a state of distress totally new to 
 them. From the first establishment of their ancestors 
 in Peloponnesus, it was not known by tradition that 
 such a number of their citizens had fallen into the 
 hands of an enemy ; and it was as little remembered 
 that an enemy had ever possessed a post within their 
 country. Pylus was now so fortified that, as long as 
 it was open to supplies by sea, no mode of attack by 
 land, with which the Lacedaemonians were acquainted, 
 would be effectual against it : a garrison of Messenians 
 from Naupactus infested the neighbouring country 
 with continual incursions ; and the Helots, deserting 
 in numbers, found sure protection. In this situation 
 of things, the Lacedaemonian government, anxiously 
 desirous of peace, expected only insult from the 
 haughty temper of their enemy, should they send 
 ministers publicly to propose terms. They made 
 however repeated trials by secret negotiation. The 
 wiser and more moderate Athenians, and those of 
 higher rank in general, would gladly have profited 
 from present prosperity, to make an advantageous 
 accommodation. But the arrogance of the people, 
 fed by success, and inflamed by the boisterous elo- 
 quence of Cleon, now the popular favourite, made all 
 endeavours for the salutary purpose fruitless. 
 
 END OF THE SECOND VOLUME. 
 
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