ncroft-WhitneyCo. 
 
 PUBLISHERS 
 
 AND SELLERS OF 
 
 .AW BOOKS 
 
 SAN FRANCISCO 
 
 
 THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES 
 
 SCHOOL OF LAW
 
 PLEADING AND PRACTICE 
 
 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY. 
 
 Vol. I.
 
 PLEADING AND PRACTICE 
 
 OF THE 
 
 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY. 
 
 BY THE LATE 
 
 EDMUND ROBERT DANIELL, 
 
 BARKISTER-AT-LAW. 
 
 <&txtj) American lEUttion, 
 
 WITH NOTES AND REFERENCES TO AMERICAN DECISIONS; AN APPENDIX OF 
 
 PRECEDENTS ; AND OTHER ADDITIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS, 
 
 ADAPTING THE WORK TO THE DEMANDS OF 
 
 AMERICAN PRACTICE IN CHANCERY. 
 
 Based on the Sixth English Edition, and the Fourth 
 and Fifth American Editions. 
 
 By J. C. PERKINS, LL.D. and W. F. COOPER, LL.D. 
 
 By JOHN M. GOULD, Ph.D. 
 
 author of " the law of waters," joint author of "notes on THE REVISED 
 
 STATUTES," EDITOR OF STORY'S "COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY 
 PLEADINGS," TENTH EDITION, ETC. 
 
 IN THREE VOLUMES. 
 
 Vol. I. 
 
 BOSTON: 
 LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY. 
 
 1894.
 
 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1871, by 
 
 J. C. PERKINS, 
 
 In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 
 
 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1879, by 
 
 LITTLE, BROWN, <fc CO., 
 
 In the Office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington. 
 
 Copyright, 1894, 
 By Little, Brown, & Co. 
 
 t 
 
 The University Pbebs, Cambridge, Mass., U. S. A.
 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 TO THE SIXTH AMERICAN EDITION. 
 
 Several years after the publication of Judge Cooper's learned 
 and carefully prepared edition of this classic treatise, the elaborate 
 Sixth English Edition appeared, which combined with a review of 
 the new procedure under the Judicature Acts a more exhaustive 
 collection of the English decisions upon the subject than had pre- 
 viously been attempted. This edition, to which Lord Esher has 
 since referred as " a text-book of great accuracy," 2 has been made, 
 so far as applicable to American practice, the basis of this edition ; 
 and the text and notes of the editions of Judge Cooper and Mr. 
 Perkins have all been carefully compared therewith and corrected 
 or amplified therefrom. In order to secure space for the notes 
 of the present editor, which are usually indicated by letters at the 
 foot of the pages, though very many additions of decisions and 
 statements have also been added to the old notes, the plan adopted 
 in the last English edition, of stating the principles with their 
 limitations in the text, and transferring the illustrations thereof 
 to the old notes, has in general been followed. All, however, that 
 has heretofore made this treatise so valuable and conclusive upon 
 all questions of equity procedure has been retained in the text or 
 the accompanying notes. 
 
 Three years of nearly constant research and investigation have 
 now been devoted to the task of making this edition complete and 
 fully abreast of the times. Special attention has been given to the 
 latest decisions, both English and American, and to the equity side 
 of the Code procedure, now in force in a majority of the States ; and 
 
 1 Butler v. Butler, 16 Q. B. D. 374, 377. 
 
 a 6 7^36
 
 VI PREFACE. 
 
 while the details of local practice have not been neglected, it is 
 believed that few, if any, decisions upon matters of general interest 
 have failed of notice. The constant aim has been to preserve unity 
 of system and to make the book useful and exhaustive as an 
 encyclopaedia. The citations now added nearly double those of the 
 last American edition, and the new cases number fully ten thousand. 
 The paging indicated by stars, in the margin, is that of the Fourth 
 American Edition. 
 
 The late Mr. Justice Bradley has referred 1 to Daniell as the 
 leading authoritative commentary upon the equity practice of the 
 Federal Courts ; and as this work has been so intimately connected 
 with the history and development of equity in those courts, the 
 uniformity of whose procedure, and whose great increase of decisions 
 in recent years, render them of first importance, the most careful 
 attention has been devoted to their growth and development of 
 practice, and their relation to State practice. The equity rules of 
 the United States Supreme Court and their amendments are now, 
 for the first time, annotated, with all the Federal decisions relat- 
 ing to their construction. 
 
 The hope is indulged that so vast a labor will be of good service 
 in its completed form to a profession which, as a whole, rarely errs 
 in accuracy of judgment. 
 
 J. M. GOULD. 
 
 Newton, Mass., July 1, 1894. 
 
 1 la Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U. S. 104.
 
 PREFACE 
 
 TO THE FIFTH AMERICAN EDITION. 
 
 The work, a new edition of which is now offered to the public, 
 has an established reputation, and fills a place in the professional 
 library, occupied by no other book. It contains, it is true, much 
 that is purely local to the practice of the English High Court of 
 Chancery, and even more based on recent British legislation and 
 Orders of Court, all of which may be said to have little or no 
 application to the American equity system. But it is precisely 
 because the work is thus complete, giving us the old English prac- 
 tice in Chancery, with the modern changes, that it is indispensable 
 to the Judge, the practitioner, and the diligent student. It is impos- 
 sible to thoroughly master a difficult point of practice, or even to 
 apply with intelligence a well-settled point, without understanding 
 its origin, and tracing it through all its changes, legislative and 
 judicial. From no other work can the necessary information be 
 obtained except the " learned and accurate " treatise of Mr. Daniell, 
 as adapted to the American practice by the late Judge Perkins. 
 
 The main duty of the present editor has been to bring the anno- 
 tations down to the present day by a citation of the English and 
 American authorities since the publication of the last edition. To 
 do this thoroughly, he has been compelled to examine nearly a 
 thousand volumes of reports, and has digested and cited about 
 twenty-five hundred cases. The Chancery reports proper, both 
 English and American, have generally been examined case by case. 
 He lias particularly directed his attention to questions of practice 
 which have come into prominence within the last decade, such as 
 those relating to injunctions, especially in tax and bond cases, 
 receivers, cross-bills, consolidation of causes, etc. He has aimed
 
 Vlll PREFACE. 
 
 to make the citations complete and accurate, with such a statement 
 of the ruling as, not only to illustrate the subject under considera- 
 tion, but to enable the reader to see at once whether any particular 
 case bears upon the point he is investigating. He has recast the 
 old notes in many instances with a view to the recent decisions, 
 and to bring out clearly the points ruled. Of course, in so volumi- 
 nous a work, prepared in the intervals of active judicial duty, there 
 will be errors of omission and commission, and the editor can only 
 hope that, as these defects cannot mar the original work nor the 
 labors of his predecessor, they will not be found sufficient to 
 seriously interfere with the practical utility of the additions. 
 
 Perhaps he should add that he has cited the English decisions 
 since the Judicature Act of 1873 went into effect without using 
 the letters L. R. as a prefix, and has invariably used R. as the 
 abbreviation of railroad, and Ry. for railway. He has also, occa- 
 sionally, for the benefit of students, called attention to the fact that 
 particular chapters, or parts of chapters, were local or statutory, 
 and not applicable to the American Chancery practice. The table 
 of cases and the indexes have been revised so as to cover all 
 additions. The side paging, and the numbering of the notes follow 
 the last edition, with which the profession have become familiar, 
 and are always referred to. 
 
 W. F. C. 
 
 Nashville, Tenn. 
 Sept. 6. 1879.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 VOLUME I. 
 
 PAGB 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED xiii 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE COMMENCEMENT OF A SUIT 1-4 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 Sect. I. The Queen's Attorney-General 5-16 
 
 II. Foreign Governments and States 17-20 
 
 III. Corporations, Joint-Stock Companies, and Partnerships 20-26 
 
 IV. Persons residing out of the jurisdiction 27-36 
 
 V. Paupers 37-44 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 Sect. I. Generally 45 
 
 II. Aliens 45-53 
 
 III. Persons attainted or convicted 53-58 
 
 IV. Bankrupts 58-66 
 
 V. Infants 66-82 
 
 VI. Idiots, lunatics, and persons of unsound or weak mind 82-86 
 
 VII. Married women 87-128 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 Sect. I. Generally 129-130 
 
 IL The Queen's Attorney-General and Solicitor-General 130-140 
 
 III. Foreign Sovereigns, States, and Ambassadors 141-142 
 
 IV: Corporations, Joint-Stock Companies, and Partnerships 143-148 
 
 V. Persons out of the jurisdiction of the Court 149-154 
 
 VI. Paupers 154-156 
 
 VII. Persons attainted or convicted 156 
 
 VIII. Bankrupts 157-160 
 
 IX. Infants 160-175 
 
 X. Idiots, lunatics, and persons of unsound or weak mind 175-178 
 
 XI. Married women 178-189
 
 X CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sect. I. Necessary parties, in respect of the concurrence of their interests 
 
 with that of the plaintiff -;._ 190-245 
 
 II. Parties to a suit, in respect of their interest in resisting the demands 
 
 of the plaintiff 246-286 
 
 IIL Objections for want of parties 286-295 
 
 IV. Joinder of uninterested parties 295-304 
 
 CHAFIER VI. 
 
 THE BELL. 
 
 Sect. I. The different sort of bills 305-306 
 
 II. The authority to file the bill 306-311 
 
 III. Bv whom prepared 311-313 
 
 IV. The matter of the bill 313-355 
 
 V. The form of the bill 355-391 
 
 Generally 355-357 
 
 1. Address of the bill 357 
 
 2. Names and addresses of the plaintiffs 357-360 
 
 3. Stating part 360-372 
 
 4. Charge of confederacy 372 
 
 5. Changing part 372-374 
 
 6. Interrogating part 374-377 
 
 7. The prayer for relief 377-389 
 
 8. Prayer for process 389-391 
 
 VI. In what cases the bill must be accompanied by an affidavit .... 392-396 
 
 VII. Printing and filing the bill 396-401 
 
 VIII. Amending the bill 401-427 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 PROCESS BY SERVICE OF A COPY OF THE BILL ON FORMAL DE- 
 FENDANTS, AND PROCEEDINGS BY SERVICE OF NOTICE OF THE 
 DECREE. 
 
 Sect. I. Process by service of a copy of the bill on formal defendants . . . 428-432 
 II. Proceedings by service of notice of the decree 432-438 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 PROCESS TO COMPEL, AND PROCEEDINGS LN DEFAULT OF, 
 APPEARANCE. 
 
 Sect. I. Service of the copy of the bill 439-456 
 
 II. Proceeding where no service of a copy of the bill can be effected . . 456-460 
 
 III. Proceedings by the plaintiff, where service of the copy of the bill has 
 
 been effected " 460-472 
 
 IV. Against particular defendants 472-479 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 INTERROGATORIES FOR THE EXAMINATION OF THE DE- 
 FENDANTS IN ANSWER TO THE BILL 480-487
 
 CONTENTS. il 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 PROCESS TO COMPEL, AND PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT OF, 
 
 ANSWER. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sect. I. Against defendants not privileged, nor subject to disability .... 48 ^" 4 ^ 6 
 
 II. Against particular defendants tn t - - 
 
 III. Effect of a contempt upon the proceedings in the cause . . . . . 504-dO* 
 
 IV. In what manner contempts in process may be cleared, waived, or 
 
 discharged 5K~H2 
 
 V. Process by filing a traversing answer or traversing note au-oio 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 TAKING BILLS PRO CONFESSO. 
 
 Sect. I. Preliminary order toI~^o 
 
 II. Hearing, decree, and subsequent proceedings 525-532 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 THE DEFENCE TO A SUIT 533-535 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 APPEARANCE 536-541 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 Sect. I. The general nature of demurrers 542-546 
 
 II. The different grounds of demurrer 547-584 
 
 III. The form of demurrers 585-591 
 
 IV. Filing, setting down, and hearing demurrers 591-597 
 
 V. The effect of allowing demurrers 597-599 
 
 VI. The effect of overruling demurrers 600-602 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 Sect. I. The general nature of pleas 603-625 
 
 II. The different grounds of pleas 625 681 
 
 III. Form of pleas 681-689 
 
 IV. Swearing, filing, setting down, and arguing pleas 689-696 
 
 V. Allowing pleas 696-699 
 
 VI. Saving the benefit of a plea to the hearing 699-700 
 
 VII. Ordering a plea to stand for answer 700-701 
 
 VIII. Overruling pleas 701-703 
 
 IX. Amending pleas, and pleading de novo 703-705 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 DISCLAIMERS 706-710
 
 xii CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 ANSWERS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sect. I. General nature of answers 711-729 
 
 II. Form of answers 729-738 
 
 III. Swearing, filing, and printing answers 738-758 
 
 IV. Exceptions to answers 758-774 
 
 V. Further answers — answers to amended bills 775-777 
 
 VI. Amending answers — supplemental answers 777-784 
 
 VII. Taking answers off the file 784-786 
 
 VIII. From what time answer deemed sufficient 786 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 THE JOINDER OF SEVERAL DEFENCES 787-789 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 DISMISSING BILLS, OTHERWISE THAN AT THE HEARING, AND 
 STAYING PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 Sect. I. Generally . . . 790-801 
 
 II. For want of prosecution 801-812 
 
 III. Where the suit has abated, or become otherwise defective .... 812-815 
 
 IV. Cases of election 815-818 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 MOTION FOR A DECREE 819-827 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 REPLICATION 828-835 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 Sect. L Admissions 836-849 
 
 II. The onus proband i 849-852 
 
 III. Confined to matters in issue 852-860 
 
 IV. Of the effect of a variance . . 860-862 
 
 V. Documentary evidence which proves itself 862-874 
 
 VI. Documentary evidence which does not prove itself 874-881 
 
 VII. Proving exhibits at the hearing under an order 881-885 
 
 VIII. Who may be witnesses 885-887 
 
 IX. Manner of, and time for, taking evidence 887-891 
 
 X. Affidavits, and ex-parte examinations before an examiner 891-903 
 
 XI. Viva voce evidence . 903-919 
 
 XII. Interrogatories 920-926 
 
 XIII. Examination of witnesses by the examiner on interrogatories . . . 926-932 
 
 XIV. Examination of witnesses de bene esse 932-941 
 
 XV. Demurrers by witnesses 942-945 
 
 XVI. Publication. . . 945-950 
 
 XVII. Suppression of depositions 950-951 
 
 XVIII. Re-examination of witnesses 952-955 
 
 XIX. Examination of witnesses after publication 955-961
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references are to the star paging.] 
 
 A. 
 
 A. v. B. 540 
 
 Abadom v. Abadom 801 
 
 Abbey v. The R. L. Stevens 630, 
 
 1427 
 
 Abbot v. Allen 1653 
 
 v. Johnson 334, 335, 346 
 
 Abbott v. Bayley 88 
 
 v. Edgerton 1661 
 
 v. Foote 1621 
 
 v. Middleton 1503 
 
 v. Monti 1073 
 
 v Parsons 1127 
 
 v. Sworder 990, 1400 
 
 Abby v. Gilford 1202, 1798 
 
 Abel v. Nodes 1307 
 
 Abell v Heathcote 1316 
 
 v. Schreech 1213 
 
 Abels v. Mobile R. E Co. 1551 
 
 Aberaman Ironworks Co. v. 
 
 Wickens 230, 279, 1469 
 
 Aberavon Tin Plate Co. , lie 27 
 
 Aberdeen v. Chitty 1734 
 
 Abergavenny, Lady v. Aber- 
 gavenny, Lady 354 
 Abergavenny, Lord v. Powell 952, 
 954, 1574 
 v. Thomas 1164 
 Aberystwith, &c. Ry. Co. v. 
 
 Pierey 335 
 
 Abingdon, Lord v Thornhill 397 
 Abouloffw Oppenheimer 287,664 
 Abraham v. Bubb 1630, 1634 
 
 v. Hannay 243 
 
 v. Newcombe 96 
 
 Abram v. Ward 431 
 
 Abrams v. Winshup 858 
 
 Abrey v. Newman 203, 1514 
 
 Abud v. Riches 508, 1045 
 
 Accidental and Marine Ins. Co. 
 
 v. Gibbon 1553 
 
 v Mercati 26, 27 
 
 Accumulator Co. v. Consolidated 
 
 E S. Co. 1069 
 
 Acerro v. Petroni 920 
 
 Acherley v. Roe 560, 561, 640, 641 
 Acheson v. Stevenson 1638 
 
 Acker, Re 1705 
 
 v. Leland 1071 
 
 Ackerson v. Lodi Branch R. 
 
 Co. 215 
 
 Acklin v Paschall 1158 
 
 Ackroyd v. Briggs 207, 208, 245 
 
 v. Suiithson 1430 
 
 Acland v. Gravener 1725 
 
 Acme CopyingCo. v. McLuro 1172 
 Acomb v. Landed Estate Co. 1821 
 Acquacknock Water Co. v. Wat- 
 son 1639 
 Acraman v. Bristol Dock Co. 1667 
 v. Price 1081 
 Acres v. Little 79 
 Acton v Market 1672 
 Adair v. Adair 1238 
 
 Adair v. Barrington 
 
 809 
 
 v. New River Co. 
 
 274, 276 
 
 v. Shaw 
 
 1423 
 
 v. Winchester 
 
 197, 19!t 
 
 v. Young 
 
 • 261 
 
 Adair County v. Ownby 
 
 1756 
 
 Adames v. H.illett 
 
 1423 
 
 Adams, Ex parte 
 
 86 
 
 v. Adams 354, 726,844, 991, 1229 
 v. Bankart 1104 
 
 v. Barry 224 
 
 v. Batley 567 
 
 v. Bradley 200, 223 
 
 v. Bridgewater Iron Co. 759, 828 
 v. Brown 999, 1224, 1232, 1244, 
 1247, 1248, 1208 
 v. Claxton 1310, 1337 
 
 v. Clifton 1418 
 
 v. Colthurst 32 
 
 v. Crittenden 1663 
 
 v. Dixon 1560, 1561 
 
 v. Evans 1074 
 
 v. Fisher 1717, 1829 
 
 v. Haskell 1747 
 
 v. Heathcote 1776 
 
 v Holbrook 255, 259 
 
 v. Howard 559, 590, 1381, 1642 
 v. Hudson Co. Bank 1676 
 
 v. Johnson 2300 
 
 v. Kehlor Milling Co. 860 
 
 v. Lockwood 1591 
 
 v. Mevrose 314 
 
 v. Michael 1635, 1636 
 
 v. Munter 1073 
 
 v. Myers 1305 
 
 v. Nixon 1561 
 
 v. Paynter 431 
 
 v. Peirce 92 
 
 v. Phillips 418 
 
 v Porter 372, 563, 564, 579, 
 
 1457, 1557 
 v. Russell 950 
 
 v Sharon 1120 
 
 v. Shelby 837 
 
 V. Soule 1147 
 
 v. Stevens 151,290,518, 
 
 1507, 1071 
 v. Valentine 1551 
 
 v. Waller 644, 1210 
 
 v. Whitcomb 1704 
 
 t' Woods 1733,1749 
 
 Adams County v Burlington & 
 
 M. R. R. Co 402 
 
 Adamson v. Adamson 38 
 
 v. Blackstock 465 
 
 v Hull 813, 1512, 1543, 1679 
 
 v. Hull 813, 1543 
 
 v. Wilson 1666 
 
 Adamson's Appeal 1461 
 
 Adcock v. Peters 236, 645 
 
 Adderly v. Smith 32 
 
 Addis v. Campbell 1823, 1828 
 
 Addison v. Hindmarsh 1485 
 
 Addison?;. Williamson 1131 
 
 Addleman v. Masterson 906 
 
 Aderholt v. Henry 1290 
 
 Ad^er v. Pringle 790 
 
 Adkins v. Bliss 1044, 1064, 1793 
 
 Adkisson v. Dent 1168, 1320 
 
 Aduey v. Flood 413 
 
 Adreveno v. Mutual Reserve F. 
 
 L. Ass'n. 576 
 
 Advocate, Lord v. Douglas, Lord 1464 
 v Dunglas 1495 
 
 Adye v. Hanna 563 
 
 iEtna Ins. Co. v. Tyler 1241 
 
 African Co. v. Parish 565 
 
 African Meth. Ep. Church v. 
 
 Conover 388, 1614 
 
 African Soc v. Varick 22 
 
 Agabeg v. Hartwell 1400 
 
 Agar v. Fairfax 1150, 1152, 1162 
 
 v. Gurney 769, 1208 
 
 v. Macklew 670 
 
 v. Regent's Canal Co. 10, 717, 
 
 718, 1078, 1686 
 
 Agar-Ellis, lie 70, 108 
 
 Agens v. Agens 560 
 
 Ager v. Blacklock & Co. 731 
 
 Aggas v. Pickerell 559 
 
 Aglionby ti James 1147 
 
 Agnew v. Bank of Gettysburg 25 
 
 v. Dorman 630, 1427 
 
 v. McGill 840 
 
 v. Whitney 1302 
 
 Agriculturist Cattle Ins. Co., 
 
 lie 1327, 1328. 1330, 1738 
 
 Aguilar v. Aguilar 102, 104, 106 
 
 Aholtz v. Durfee 1120, 1580 
 
 Ahrend v Odiorne 365, 552, 561 
 
 Ahronfeldt v. Ahrenfeldt 1350 
 
 Aiekles's Case 878 
 
 Aiken v. Kilburne 571 
 
 v. Smith 678 
 
 Aikin r. Ballard 360, 361, 373 
 
 v. Harrington 532, 1484 
 
 Ails v. Sublit 033 
 
 Ainsley v. Sims 30, 63, 411, 413, 426, 
 
 427 
 
 Ain«lie v. Medlicott 109, 182 
 
 v. Sims 601, 791 
 
 Ainsworth v. Bentley 1654 
 
 v. Roe 1388 
 
 v. Starkie 1557 
 
 v. Walmsley 1649 
 
 Airey v Hall 1826 
 
 Aislabie v. Rice 1403 
 
 Aitchison v Lohre 1503 
 
 Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. , Ex 
 
 parte 815 
 
 v. Lott 1661 
 
 Alabama G. S Ry. Co. v. Hill 1566 
 Alabama Iron & Ry. Co. v An- 
 
 niston Loan & T. Co. 1743 
 
 Alabama Warehouse Co. v. 
 Jones 418
 
 XIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Alan v. Jourdan 843 
 
 Alardea p. Campbell '"" 
 
 Albany, &c Mln. Co. v. Au- 
 ditor-General 1661 
 Albany Bank v Schermerhorn 174'2 
 Albeer. Carpenter 90,117 
 Albert V Perry 1353, 1354 
 Albert, Prince v. Strange 39, 155, 
 911, 1647 
 Albert Average Ass'n, Re 1739 
 Albion Steel & Wire Co. v. Mar- 
 tin 1381 
 Albrecht v. St. Paul 1675 
 H Sussman 50. 51, 54 1 
 Albritton V. Bird 1621, 1624 
 Alciuous v. Nigren 49, 61, 53 
 Alcock v. Alcock 113 
 Alcott v. Avery 1608 
 Aldborough, Lord v. Burton 2« 
 Alden t>. Beckley 147 
 v Foster 1000, 1224 
 v. Trubee 1624 
 Alderman v. Bannister 1543 
 Alderson v. Biggars 642 
 v. Harris 292 
 v. Henderson 801 
 Aldinger v. Pugh 1685 
 Aldred v. Halliwell 1104 
 Aldrich v. Sharp 1255 
 v. Wilcox 328 
 Aldridge v. Dunn 1539 
 v. Menser 1568, 1569, 1570 
 v Thompson 1565, 15' 9 
 r. Westbrook 730, 1390, 1413 
 Aldworth v. Robinson 972 
 Alexander v. Adams 633 
 v. Alexander 110, 1136 
 v. Barker 1126 
 v. Berney 21, 143 
 V. Cana 220, 279 
 v. Colcord 1081 
 r Easten 1594 
 v. Gibson 1101 
 v Hoffman 231,279 
 v. Katte 26 
 ..Lee 2f 
 v. Markham }°<° 
 »■ Miller iM J""i 
 v. Mills 1282, 1401 
 v. Mortgage Co '*" 
 v. Moye 597 
 v. Nurse »92 
 v. Osborne %* 
 v. Pendleton 6(5, 1682 
 v. Searcy 2 V. 
 v. Taylor 361, 41( 
 v. United States 5(8 
 r. Wallace 844 
 r. Wellington, Duke of 1485 
 v Williams 840 
 v. Wolley 1168 
 Alexandria Palace Co., Re 14o 
 Alford v. McCormac 8J4 
 Alikeni' Howell 1133 
 Alison, Re , Johnson V. Mounsey 652 
 Allan v. Allan 317,1572,1573 
 v Copeland °4( 
 v. Hoffman 15"8 
 v. Houlden 599 
 v United Kingdom Tel. Co. 1028 
 A Hard v. Carleton 303 
 Allay v. Hutchins 1100 
 Allrard v. Skinner 560 
 Allcrofti' Farnan 226 
 AlMav v Fletcher 1485 
 Alleghany & K. B. Co. v. We>- 
 
 denfeld 1661 
 
 Allegre v. Maryland Ins. Co 6/1 
 
 Allen Re 1449, 1847 
 
 v. Allen 91, 637, 830, 1048, 1314, 
 
 1549, 1650 
 
 v. Annesley 936 
 
 v. Archer »* 
 
 r. Bahcock ™' 
 
 v. Barksdale ™ 
 
 V Baugus . 643 'i^ 
 
 v. Belcher I* 3 * 
 
 Allen v Blunt 1002, 1146,^1147 
 
 v Bone am'Rffl 
 
 V. Bonnett 8bb uV? 
 
 v. Central R. Co. \g* 
 
 v. Chosen Freeholders 163b 
 
 v. Coffman 3(9 
 
 v Crobcroft lbb » 
 
 v. Crocket J97 
 v. Curtis 26, 144, 242 
 
 v. Davidson 68 
 
 v. Demarest &■* 
 
 iZS" 1282.S 
 
 v. Forbes 95 
 
 •■ Gille,te ilift 
 
 v. Harding 16b" 
 
 v. Hawley 16<< 
 
 v. Hilton 16o8 
 
 v. Houlden n f6( 
 
 ■v. Hyde l' 1 ^ 
 
 v. Jarvis 1235, 1442, 1474 
 
 v. Kennett 10(2 
 
 t>. Knight 224 
 
 v Lemoyne tuw 
 
 t> Lewis 1381 
 
 v. Lloyd 1734 
 
 v. Loder 4o9 
 
 ». McNew no? 
 
 t>. Macpherson 40, 552, 664 
 
 „ Miller 344 ', 3 oa 
 
 ». Minor 1680 
 
 v. Montgomery 59 
 
 i). Montgomery R. Co. 341 
 
 v. New York 517 
 
 v. 0" Donald 723, 840 
 
 v. Poole 281 
 
 D. Rand 906 
 
 V. Randolph 603, 661, 669 
 
 v. Robbins 1233, 1245 
 
 v. Boll 220, 1550 
 
 v. Saul paw 1" '3 
 v Seckham 674, 1080, 1638, 1663 
 
 v. Shanks 1309 
 
 v, Simons !'?( 
 
 v. Smith 294, 406, 624 
 
 v. Spring 426, 1515 
 
 ,. State Bank 395,892 
 
 „. Taylor 894 
 
 v. Tritch 1548 
 
 v. Turner 26, 246, 287, 289 
 
 v Watt , 633 
 
 v. Wilkins 90, 114, ,117 
 
 v. Williams W51 
 
 v. Wilson I"} 9 
 
 v. Winstandly °\° 
 
 v. Woodruff f, 14 
 
 v . Woolley 644 
 
 r Woonsocket Co. Jig" 
 
 Allender ». Trinity Church U30 
 
 Aller v. .lones tbb( 
 
 Alley • Carroll 1546 
 
 v. Quintcr „ 390, £31 
 
 Allfrevr. Allfrey 34E I, 66( ,668, 
 771, 840, 1185, 1186, 1230, 1268. 
 148( 
 
 Allgood i' Merrybent & D Ry- 
 
 Co. 1'°" 
 
 Allhusen r Ubouchere 354 
 
 Alliance Milling Co 0. Eaton (1-J 
 
 Allin ». Hall 296 
 
 Ailing i.. Ailing 641 
 
 Allis, Re 888, J33 
 
 v Bnrkstaff „ " W \?„i 
 
 v. Stowell 314, 782, 829, 1069 
 
 Allison Re 1346 
 
 " Drake 280, 1580, 1584 
 
 v. Herring 1845 
 
 Alloway Creek (S. P. Inhab. of) 
 
 v. Strong 22 
 
 Allsup r. Allsup 251 
 
 Allyn v. Davis 443 
 
 Alma o. I.oehr lobl 
 
 Almack v Moore 68 
 
 Almond v Wilson 334 
 
 Almony v. Hicks 648, 652, 1624 
 
 Almyv Daniels 659 
 
 v. Pycroft «w 
 
 Alpena r. Kelley 1650 
 
 Alpha v. Payman 779 
 
 Alsager v. Johnson 724, 728 
 
 v Rowley 323 
 
 Alsop v. Bell 1428, 1527, 1542 
 
 v. Oxford, Lord 1440, 1449 
 
 Alston v. Alston 1358, 1551 
 
 v. Boyd 
 
 v. Jones HO 
 
 v. Trollope 643, 644, 1211 
 Alt v. Banholzer 605 
 Althause v. Radde 1150 
 Altman v. Royal Aquarium So- 
 ciety 1653 
 Alton v. Harrison 1057 
 Altree v. Horden 402, 796, 797 
 
 v. Sherwin 
 
 Alvanley, Lord v. Kinnaird 1169, 
 1276, 1283, 1844 
 Alven v. Bond 1752 
 
 Alviue v Bond 1271 
 
 Alvord v. Stone 1463 
 
 Alwood v. Mansfield 1666 
 
 Ambler v. Macon 1358 
 
 Ambrose v. Dunmow Union 1399 
 v. Nott 815 
 
 Ambrosio v. Francia 959 
 
 Ambury v. Jones 547, 1557 
 
 Amelung v. Seekamp 1631, 1669 
 
 America Life Ass. v. Boogher 1642 
 American Academy of Arts and 
 Sciences v. Harvard College 
 
 2182, 2207, 2208 
 
 American Bell Tel Co v. Brown 
 
 Tel. Co. 1642 
 
 v Globe Tel. Co. 1642 
 
 v. McKeesport Tel. Co. 1642 
 
 v. Pan Electric Tel. Co. 149 
 
 v. Southern Tel. Co. 314 
 
 American Bible Society V. Price 417 
 
 American Box M. Co. v. Cros- 
 
 man 1411 
 
 American Carpet Linen Co. v 
 
 Chipman _ 843 
 
 American Diamond Drill Co v 
 
 Sullivan M. Co 1408 
 
 American Diamond R. B. Co v. 
 
 Sheldons 1120 
 
 American Dock & Imp. Co. v 
 
 Public School Trustees 1073 
 Ameiican E. Co. v. Fuller 378, 974 
 American Exchange, Re 887 
 
 American Exchange Bankr. An- 
 drews 1516 
 V. Inloes 386 
 American File Co. v. Garrett 843 
 American F L. M. Co. v. Ben- 
 son 149 
 v. Sewell 545, 586 
 American Freehold L. & M. Co. 
 
 v. Jefferson 385 
 
 American Ins. Co. v. Oakley 533, 
 
 1272, 1284, 1286, 1290, 1470 
 
 American Life Ins. & Trust Co. 
 
 v. Bayard 777, 1534 
 
 r. Sackett 886 
 
 American Loan & Trust Co. v. 
 
 East & West Ry Co. 766 
 
 American Middling Purifier Co. 
 v. Atlantic Milling Co. 1640 
 
 v. Christian 1640 
 
 American Mortgage Co. v. 
 
 O'Harra 843 
 
 American Refrigerating, &c. Co 
 
 r. Linn *» 
 
 American R. P Co v. Knopp 314 
 American Solid Leather Button 
 Co v. Empire State Nail 
 Co. 314 
 
 American Tobacco Co. V. Guest 1648 
 American Water Works Co. v. 
 
 Venner l°b<J 
 
 American Wine Co v Brasher 386 
 American ZylnniteCo v. Cellu- 
 
 loid Manuf Co. ' "i«(5 
 
 Amerman v. Deane 1654 
 
 Ames v. Ames *""
 
 Ames v. Birkenhead Docks 173L 
 
 v. Brooks _ ^ 
 
 v Chicago, &c. Ry. Co. m 
 
 v. Commyns 110 ° 
 
 ::S a3 374,377,1648,1650 
 Ames Iron Works v. West 157 
 
 Amey v. bong „ n 
 
 Amherst and Belchertown R. «• 
 
 t-. Watson A »* 
 
 Amhurstv. King '^ 
 
 Ammant v. New Alexandria, 
 
 &c. Tump. Co 
 Amon w. Bobbett 
 Amory v. Brodrick 
 
 v- Brown 
 
 v. Fairbanks 
 
 v. Fellows 
 
 v. Francis 
 
 v Lawrence 
 
 v. Lowell 
 Amos v. Chadwick 
 
 v Heme Bay Pavilion Prome- 
 nade Co. 145, 195, 
 
 t;. Hughes 
 Amsinck v. Barklay 
 
 1051 
 
 1548 
 
 817 
 
 327, 1643 
 
 284 
 
 906, 918, 929 
 
 284 
 
 737 
 
 1411, 2021, 2282 
 
 797, 1120 
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Andrews v. City Permanent 
 
 Benefit Building Society ila 
 
 v Cole RO 110 
 
 v. Cradock 69 110 
 
 v. Emerson *f°° 
 
 v. Essex Ins. Co. !££ 
 
 v. Farnham <**> 
 
 v Ford 1450 
 
 v. Oilman 782,1548,1550 
 
 v. Glenville Woollen Co. ™ 
 
 v. Hobson 1549 
 
 v. Huckabee <?°* 
 
 ■ti Kihbec AuuU 
 
 v . Lorkwood 604, 1527, 1543 
 
 v. McGuffog \ 6 
 
 v. Merchant Tailors' Co. 
 
 Anon v. Anon. 
 3Atk. 567 
 3 " 672 
 3 " 644 
 3 " 691 
 3 " 809 
 1 Barb. Ch. 73 
 5 Beav 92 
 3 " 420 
 
 1093 
 
 1700. 1701, 
 
 1707, 1712 
 
 Amv v. Manning 726, 1743 
 
 Sot E.parle 1689,1690,1693 
 
 Anderson v. Anderson MOD 
 
 v. Bank n , . . \ 8 4* 
 
 v Bank of British Columbia bit, 
 
 <22 
 
 V. Baxter 652 
 
 v. Brown ^ 
 
 v. Caraway "i™ 
 
 v. Carr jji* 
 
 v. Caunter j^O 
 
 v. Cramer 852, 10kJ 
 
 v. De Soer 3,8 
 
 v. Dow ling io-i 
 
 f Dwv6r i^uo 
 
 r. Foulke 1061, 1283, 1284, 1286, 
 
 v. George 
 
 v. Guichard 
 
 v. Henderson 
 
 v. Irvine 
 
 v. Jacksonville R. Co 
 
 v. Kissam 
 
 934, 940 
 
 1358, 1359 
 
 1743 
 
 108 
 
 1286, 1481 
 
 576 
 
 652 
 
 797, 1640 
 
 1734 
 
 215 
 
 16 
 
 462, 1019, 1610 
 
 363 
 
 1132, 1138 | 
 
 811, 1725 I 
 
 1320 
 
 165, 997 
 
 287 
 
 720 
 
 447, 448, 652, 1674 
 
 1579 
 
 201 
 
 864 
 
 1467 
 
 1642 
 
 1320 
 
 1503 
 
 686, 1618 
 
 1672 
 
 216, 852 
 
 1601 
 
 1705, 1712 
 
 , Lewis 
 
 v. McNeal 
 
 v. McRoberts 
 
 v. May 
 
 v. Moberly 
 
 v. Monroe 
 
 v. Moore 
 
 v Morice 
 
 v. Mullenix 
 
 v. Noble 
 
 v. Northrop 
 
 v Palmer 
 
 V. Stamp 
 
 v. Stather 151, 162, 449, 452, 515, 
 
 746, 897 
 
 v. Titmas 113* 
 
 v. Ward 1551 
 
 v. Watts »7 
 
 v. Wells 1»° 
 
 v. Wilkinson 1561 
 
 v Wilson 390 
 
 v. Yates 71, 80, 980, 1008, 1599 
 
 Andover v. Merrimac Co. 115, 116 
 
 Andrew v. Aitken 1507, 1539 
 
 v. Andrew 1218, 1318 
 
 v. Raeburn JM 
 
 v. Spurr 1973 
 
 v. Wrigley 641 
 
 Andrewes v. Walton 1069, 1453, 1492 
 
 Andrews, In re 1352, 1364 
 
 Andrews, Re, Edwards v. 
 
 Dewar 100 
 
 Andrews v. Barnes 1408, 1563 
 
 v. Bishop 1560, 2010, 2199 
 
 v. Bohannon 1028 
 
 v. Brown 642, 685, 964, 1081 
 
 v. Palmer 
 
 v. Partington 
 
 v. Paschen 
 
 v. Salt " 
 
 v. Scotton 
 
 v Solomon 
 
 v. Sparhawk 
 
 v. Spears 
 
 v. Stanton 
 
 v. Stelle' 
 
 v. Trinity Hall 
 
 v. Walton 
 
 v. Williams 
 Androscoggin & Kennebec R 
 Co. v. Androscoggin R. Co 
 4 50R, 1046, 1683, 1684, 2150 
 Angel v. Smith 1056, 1057 1058, 
 1715,1717,1718,1743,1-44 
 
 Angell, Ex parte 1*» 
 
 Angell v. Angell Jdi* 
 
 v. Davis 1463,14641465 
 
 v. Hadden 1206, 1560, 1564, lo65, 
 
 15b9 
 
 v. McLellan 
 V. Penn. R. Co. 
 v. Smith 
 V- Stone 
 v. Westcombe 
 Angerstein V. Hunt 
 Angier v May 
 I v. Stannard 
 
 v. Webber 
 1 Anglo- African Steamship Co., 
 
 lie 149,447 
 
 Anglo Californian Gold Mining 
 
 Co , Re 146 1 
 
 Anclo-Danubian Co. v. Roger- 
 
 son 26, 817, 1082, 1666 
 
 Anglo-Greek Nav Co , He 1610 
 
 Anglo-Italian Bank v. Davies 1035, 
 
 ft 1037, 1063, 1716 
 
 Anglo-MoravianH.J. Ry.^,^ 
 
 Angus v. Clifford 26 
 
 v. Robinson 645,653,815 
 
 Annesley v Ashurst 
 
 Annin V. Annin 
 
 1360 
 
 402, 779 
 
 42 
 
 197 
 
 547, 1557 
 
 1683, 1685 
 
 1676 
 
 1412 
 
 1654 
 
 Anning V. La vers 
 Anon Amb. 237 
 " 252 
 v. Anon. 
 
 XV 
 
 512, 536, 1684 
 235 
 298 
 1539 
 660 
 982 
 947, 940 
 872, 1574 
 
 v. Bridgewater Canal Co. 1671 
 
 IBro.C C.376 1699,1702 
 
 2Cha. Ca. 161 6(6, 6i9 
 
 2 " 163 160, 1055 
 
 2 " 164 331 
 
 2 Chit. 425 113 » 
 
 1 Clarke. 423 1299, 1300 
 
 1 Col 273 " 8 
 
 1 C. P. Coop, t Cott. 61, n. 1489 
 IDeG. &S. 321 429 
 
 4 " 547 
 
 1 Desaus. 124 
 
 2 Dick. 775 
 1 D. & L. 725 
 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 11 
 1 
 1 
 2 
 2 
 
 1 Atk, 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 89 
 491 
 521 
 670 
 1 
 
 14 
 113 
 210 
 469 
 471 
 607 
 17 
 70 
 129 
 219 
 277 
 350 
 485 
 524 
 630 
 
 346 
 1266 
 1573 
 928 
 564 
 1540 
 90 
 1698, 1702 
 37, 111 
 643 
 1398 
 1671 
 1699 
 887 
 1069 
 469 
 393, 552, 673 
 666, 684 
 815 
 1070 
 139 
 1626 
 1678 
 1189 
 600 
 
 75 
 80 
 
 66, pi. 
 166, pi. 
 
 1073 
 31 
 1139 
 1231 
 328 
 1560 
 
 : 181 
 
 219, 
 228,272 
 
 2 " 166, pi. 27 272 
 
 in the Duchy, 2 Eq Cas 
 
 Abr. 594, pi. 3 
 Freem. 22, pi. 20 
 
 2 Freem. 62 
 
 1 Hare, 317 n. 
 10 " App. 27 
 
 1 Hayw. 347 
 
 1 Hayw. 144 
 
 1 Hill (s. a), 251, 258, 259 
 
 Hopk. 27 
 " 101 
 
 1 John. 143 
 
 Uur. N.S. 973, V. C. W. 
 
 260 
 652 
 668 
 430 
 160 
 1047 
 23 
 960 
 
 ■ Jur. 1038 
 
 324, 
 839, 
 588, 
 385, 
 1124, 
 
 U " 28, L. C. 
 
 11 " 258, V. C 
 
 17 " 435 
 
 17 " 827, V. C 
 
 18 " 770 
 2 J. & W. 553 
 
 L I. Hall, 16 July, 1816, 
 
 E 
 W. 
 
 1605 
 
 1594 
 
 1030 
 
 177, 444 
 
 95, 100 
 
 520 
 
 1801 
 
 96 
 
 1139 
 
 515 
 
 69 
 
 972 
 
 1606 
 
 161 
 
 733 
 
 MS. 
 23 L. J. Ch. 24 
 9L T. N. S. 674, M. R. 
 1M. &C. 78 
 1 Mad. 657 
 
 395 
 
 246 
 
 494 
 
 252 
 
 253 
 
 271 
 
 276 
 
 461 
 
 463 
 
 494 
 10 
 
 6 " 276 
 9 Mod. 43 
 Mos. 6 
 " 66 
 » 68 
 » 86 
 ■< 175 
 " 238 
 " 304 
 
 1 Newl. 573 
 
 2 Pick. 165 
 Pree. Ch. 331 
 
 9 Price, 210 
 
 1 P. Wms. 301 
 
 2 " 68 
 
 1775 
 945 
 152, 521 
 348 
 695 
 817 
 1320 
 1286, 1287 
 351 
 1115 
 974 
 1408 
 78 
 910, 927 
 1287 
 1652 
 1706, 1709 
 1652 
 81, 1429 
 167, 172 
 39 
 37 
 32 
 752 
 691 
 1115 
 921 
 469, 1047 
 1204 
 842, 843 
 1112, 1114, 1115
 
 XVI 
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Anon r. A 
 
 non. 
 
 2 P. V> 
 
 ms. 283 
 
 2 
 
 464 
 
 2 
 
 481 
 
 lSulk 
 
 152 
 
 1 " 
 
 153 
 
 1 " 
 
 405 
 
 2 " 
 
 645 
 
 2 " 
 
 649 
 
 3 " 
 
 81 
 
 4 Sim 
 
 359 
 
 8 " 
 
 346 
 
 12 " 
 
 202 
 
 2 Sim. 
 
 N. S. 54 
 
 3 Swan. 139 
 
 1 Tenn. Ch. 2 
 
 2 Ventr. 361, N 
 
 1 Vern. 45 
 
 60 
 104 
 116 
 131 
 253 
 261 
 283 
 318 
 351 
 707 
 
 1 Yes. Jr. 66 
 1 " 93 
 
 6 
 8 
 9 
 V' 
 11 
 11 
 12 
 11 
 16 
 V, 
 V, 
 19 
 
 140 
 410 
 453 
 286 
 332 
 335 
 336 
 515 
 148 
 656 
 287 
 
 288 
 612 
 613 
 573 
 69 
 341 
 287 
 169 
 170 
 4 
 207 
 169 
 174 
 300 
 321 
 
 1577 
 690 
 508 
 1095 
 1095 
 1109, 1110 
 1131 
 1126 
 10i>3 
 1773, 1781 
 1353 
 33, 1605 
 1349 
 208 
 497, 740 
 . 2 677 
 
 1239 
 387 
 815 
 791 
 1027 
 932, 950 
 254 
 1227, 1231 
 281,635 
 1560, 1571 
 118 
 1786 
 974, 1472, 1576, 
 1653 
 1662 
 37, 28, 74 
 1286, 1288 
 1291 
 179, 182 
 1275 
 1281 
 1732 
 1286 
 347, S54 
 1057, 1717, 1718, 
 1744 
 1058 
 1291 
 1291 
 934 
 1458, 1559 
 1169 
 30 
 793, 806, 811 
 1046 
 1722 
 1455 
 1371 
 609, 806 
 934 
 936 
 1025 
 653, 1556 
 1707 
 
 Anthony o. Leftwicb 361 
 
 v. Rogers 1239 
 
 r Savage 894 
 
 v. State 190 
 
 Antoine i'. Morshead 50 
 
 Antrobus v. East India Co. 1112 
 
 Apollinaris Co.'s Trade Marks, 
 
 In re 27. 28, 197, 1648 
 
 Apollinaris Co. v. Wilson 28 
 
 Apperly v. Page 240, 243, 544 
 
 Appleby v. Duke 160, 216, 710 
 
 Appleton v. Donovan 149 
 
 v. Horton 844 
 
 v. Sturgis 710 
 
 Appold v. Prospect Building 
 
 Ass'n 1509 
 
 Apps v. Day 1130 
 
 Apthoro v. Comstock 1073, 10.6, 
 '1077,1112,1114,1124,1135, 
 1136, 1677, 1830 
 Arabin, Re 98 
 
 Archbold v. Commissioners 328, 382 
 
 1 Ves. Sr. 326 
 
 2 " 451 
 2 " 489 
 2 " 497 
 2 " 520 
 2 " 631 
 
 2 " 661 
 5 '* 656 
 1 Wila. 22 
 
 W. N. (1876)219 
 
 3 V. & B. 94 
 
 1 Y. & C. Ex 331 
 
 2 " 310 
 v. Bailey 
 
 v Bridge water Canal 
 r Bromley 
 v. Cooper 
 v. Davies 
 v. Jolland 
 
 Ans.l.'ll v. Ansdell 1079, 1122 
 
 Anson v. Towgood 797, 1275, 1277 
 Anspach, Margravine of v. Noel 
 
 988,1220 
 Anstey r. Ilobson 
 Anstice, lie 
 Anstruther v. Adair 
 
 v. Roberts 
 Anthony v. Cowper 
 
 v. Dunlop 
 
 1713 
 1241, 1719 
 103 
 
 1467 
 552 
 663 
 877 
 286 
 
 1716 
 
 91 
 
 915 
 
 1437 
 
 '1071 
 
 30 
 
 605 
 
 1070 
 
 347. a54 
 
 1256 
 
 354 
 
 1129 
 
 1605 
 
 960 
 
 1061 
 
 726 
 
 1780 
 
 696 
 
 135,156 
 
 127 
 
 687. 688 
 
 1755, 1756 
 
 521 
 
 642 
 
 95 
 
 688 
 620 
 1628 
 
 Archboll v. Barrell 
 Archdeacon v. Bowes 
 Archer o. Gardner 
 v . Hudson 
 v Meadows 
 v. Mosse 
 v Slater 
 Archibald v. Means 
 Arcot, Nabob of r. East India 
 
 Co. 628, 629, 658, 683, 704 
 
 Arden v. Arden 560, 652, 1040 
 
 v. Patterson 1961 
 
 V. Tucker 1104 
 
 v. Walden 444 
 
 Ardley v. Guardians of St. Pan- 
 eras 1639 
 Arendell v. Blackwell 217, 288. 
 405 
 Argall r. Pitts 
 Argenbright v. Campbell 
 Argo, The 
 Aria v. Emmanuel 
 Arkansas Yalley L. & C. Co 
 
 Mann 
 
 Arkwright v. Newbold 
 
 Armengaud v. Coudert 
 
 Armistead v. Bozman 829, 834 
 
 v. Durham 421, 598, 802, 1672. 
 
 1673 
 
 Armitage v. \Yadsworth 605, 628, 
 
 1558 
 
 Armour v. Walker 915 
 
 Armsby v. Wood 885 
 
 Armstrong v. Armstrong, 633, 986, 
 
 1119, 1147, 1170, 1653, 1750, 
 
 2088 
 
 v. Athens Co. 344 
 
 v. Beaty 1046 
 
 v. Blake 1397 
 
 v. Burrows 918 
 
 v. Campbell 560, 644, 1259, 
 
 1260 
 
 v. Chemical National Bank _ 1551 
 
 v. Cooper 973, 974 
 
 v. Crocker 720 
 
 v. Hickman 1680 
 
 v. Lear 1355 
 
 r. McClure 1277 
 
 r. Milburn 645 
 
 v. Potts 1668 
 
 v. Pratt 1550 
 
 v. Ross 418 
 
 t>. Savannah Soap Works 145 
 
 v. Scott 737, 846 
 
 v, Stockham 1801 
 
 v. Storer 244, 284, 790, 1390, 
 
 1424 
 
 v. Syracuse Screw Co. 109 
 
 t>. Wilson 974, 1019, 1548 
 
 Arnett v Paulett 
 
 v. Welch 
 Arnlieim v. Finster 
 Arnold v. Arnold 
 v. Bainbrigge 
 v. Blencowe 
 v. Cheseborough 
 t\ Congreve 
 v. Dixon 
 v. Foot 
 v. Heaford 
 v. Mayor of Poole 
 v. Middletown 
 v. Patuxet Yalley Water Co. 
 
 579, 1817 
 v. Slaughter 737, 759, 1309 
 
 v. Thompson 
 v. Yoorhies 
 Arnot v. Biscoe 
 Arnott v. Hayes 
 Arnoux v. Steinvrenner 
 Arlington v. Liscom 
 
 v. Yarborough 
 
 Arrowsmith o. Hill 
 
 Arthur v. Case 
 
 ?•. Hughes 
 
 v. Lamb 
 
 Artisans 1 Bank v. Treadwell 1741 
 
 Arundel v. Arundel 546. 930 
 
 Corp. oiv. Holmes 1556 
 
 v. Pitt 952 
 
 Arundell, Lady v. Phipps 1624,1652 
 
 Arzbacher v. Mayer 545 
 
 Asbach v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. 
 
 Co. 601 
 
 Asbee v. Shipley 954, 1522 
 
 Ascough v. Townshend 1683 
 
 Asevado r. Orr 586 
 
 Ash v. Cummings 1638 
 
 v. Daggy 619 
 
 Ashbee v. Cowell 1291 
 
 Ashburnham v. Thompson 1396, 
 1416 
 Ashburton, Lord, v. Ashburton, 
 
 Lady 1365 
 
 Ashby v. Ashby 119 
 
 v. Bates 1096 
 
 v. Bell 1031 
 
 v. Kiger 1463 
 
 v. Power 869 
 
 Ashford v. London, C. & D. Ry. 
 
 Co. 1774 
 
 v. Patten 1580 
 
 Ashlev i'. Ashley 1129, 1205, 1208 
 
 1120 
 
 782 
 
 1642 
 
 334,338 
 
 214 
 
 251 
 
 782, 888, 2391 
 
 2182 
 
 1264 
 
 1245 
 
 605 
 
 307 
 
 1661 
 
 995 
 165 
 846 
 866 
 
 792, 1382 
 378 
 121 
 611 
 303 
 250 
 
 1630, 1726 
 
 v. Zane 
 Armstrong's Foundry 
 Armytage v. Haley 
 A maud v. Grigg 
 Arndt t>. Griggs 
 Arnett v. Finney 
 
 1412 
 57 
 1130 
 
 i, 782 
 149 
 660 
 
 r. Baillie 
 
 675 
 
 v. Little Rock 
 
 334, 1071 
 
 V. Taylor 
 
 536, 1513, 1534 
 
 Ashlin v. Lee 
 
 657 
 
 Ashmall v. Wood 
 
 202, 203, 204, 
 
 
 1188, 1339 
 
 Ashmead, Re 
 
 224 
 
 v. Colby 250, 
 
 200,1232,1248, 
 1298, 1315, 1317 
 
 
 Ashmore v. Evans 
 
 657 
 
 Ashton v. Ashton 
 
 922 
 
 v. Atlantic Bank 
 
 200, 220, 222, 
 
 
 257, 327 
 
 v. Shorrack 
 
 1597 
 
 v. Stock 
 
 1632 
 
 v. Wood 
 
 1321 
 
 Ashton Charity, Re 
 
 1855 
 
 Ashuelot R. Co. v. 
 
 Cheshire R. 
 
 Co. 
 
 1517 
 
 Ashurst t>. McKenzk 
 
 1164, 1638 
 
 Ashwell, Re 
 
 653 
 
 v. Lomi 
 
 852 
 
 Ashworth v. Lord 
 
 1241, 1385 
 
 v. Munn 
 
 1794 
 
 r. Outram 
 
 1686 
 
 v. Roberts 
 
 720, 1556 
 
 v. Wrigley 
 
 1699 
 
 Asiatic Banking Co 
 
 . v. Ander- 
 
 son 
 
 448 
 
 Askew v. Booth 
 
 229, 266 
 
 v. Millington 
 
 796, 1588 
 
 v. Peddle 
 
 1030, 1178 
 
 v. Poulterers' Co. 
 
 867, 870, 1682
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 XV11 
 
 Askew o. Townsend 1544, 1683 
 
 Asp v. Warren 1320 
 
 Aspden V. Seddon 1448, 1453, 1629 
 Aspen Mining & Smelting Co 
 
 v Billings 313, J 120 
 
 Aspinalls to Powell 1082 
 
 Aspinwall v. Balch 1270 
 
 v Bourne 1312 
 
 Astley v. Fountain 286, 288, 091) 
 
 w. Micklethwait 1430 
 
 v. Powis 1D33, 1259 
 
 Aston, lie 942, 944, 945 
 
 v Ashton 676, 1633 
 
 v. Curzon 678 
 
 v. Exeter, Lord 579, 1558 
 
 v. Galloway 399 
 
 v. Meredith 1157 
 
 Astor v Turner 1719 
 
 Atchesou v. Atcheson 92 
 
 Atchison v Murfree 1287 
 
 Atchison Street Ry. Co. v. Nave 3()3 
 
 Atchley v Sprigg 851 
 
 Athenaeum Life Assurance Soc. 
 
 v. Pooley 552 
 
 Atherton v. British Nation Ass. 
 
 Co. 1470 
 
 v. Newhall 365 
 
 v. Nowell 103 
 
 Athol, Earl of v. Derby, Earl of 
 
 1060 
 Atkins, lie 1611 
 
 Atkins v. Billings 231 
 
 v Chilson 1638, 1656 
 
 v. Cooke 27, 30, 31, 33, 359, 
 
 1605 
 v. Faulkner 525, 526, 531 
 
 v. Hatton 713, 1164 
 
 v Palmer 383,935 
 
 v. Volmer 283 
 
 v. Wabash &c. Ry. Co. 1734 
 
 Atkinson, Ex parte 1087 
 
 Atkinson, lie 40 
 
 v. Abbott 307 
 
 v. Beckett 1069 
 
 v. Bedel 1713 
 
 v. Farmer 1283 
 
 v. Flannigan 1561 
 
 v. Foster 843, 844 
 
 v. Hanway 583 
 
 v. Henshaw 251, 1725 
 
 v. Leonard 1698, 1699, 1700, 
 
 1703, 1704, 1708, 1713 
 v. Macreth 269, 448 
 
 v Mauks 973, 974, 994, 1459, 
 
 1560, '561, 1562. 1563, 
 1568, 1569 
 v. Marks 1570 
 
 v. Parker 1525, 2059 
 
 v. Smith 1765 
 
 Atkison t» Murfree 1286 
 
 Atkyns v. Willoughby, Lord 370, 
 713 
 v. Wright 1818, 1822, 1828, 1832, 
 1833 
 Atlanta Mills v. Mason 1110, 1168, 
 1548 
 Atlanta Real Estate Co. V- At- 
 lanta National Bank 26 
 Atlantic De Laiue Co. V- Tre- 
 
 di.k 1651 
 
 Atlautic Insurance Co. v. Le- 
 
 mar 601 
 
 v. Wilson 840 
 
 Atlantic R Co. v Speer 1663 
 
 Atlantic Trust Co. v. Cons. El. 
 
 Storage Co. 369 
 
 Atlas Bank v. Nahant Bank 244, 
 
 794, 1056, 1613, 1741, 1748 
 
 Attaquin )\ Fish 1631 
 
 Attenborough v. St. Katharine's 
 
 Dock Co 1560, 1561 
 
 Atterbury v. Gill 23^8 
 
 v. Wallis 675 
 
 Attorney General v. Acton Local 
 
 Board 10, 1637 
 
 v. Akers 10 
 
 v. Alford 1259, 2061 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Attorney-General v. Algonquin 
 Club 1654 
 
 v Ancaster 1619 
 
 v. Ashburnham 16, 140 
 
 v. Aspinall 596 
 
 v Attwood 1232 
 
 v. Avon, Portreeve of 401, 407, 
 
 1515 
 v. Backhouse 676 
 
 v. Bank of Columbia 395, 1733, 
 
 1738 
 v. Barker 6, 10, 981 
 
 v. Basingstoke 10, 13, 1637 
 
 v. Berkeley 1834 
 
 v Bermondsey Vestry 299 
 
 v. Berry 15 
 
 v. Birmingham 245, 406, 417, 
 
 1525, 1636, 1638 
 v. Birmingham, &c. Board 1586, 
 
 1683 
 v Birmingham, &c. Ry. Co. 10 
 v. Bishop of Worcester 16 
 
 v. Bolton 15 
 
 v. Boston 1483 
 
 v Boston Wharf Co. 10 
 
 v. Boucherett 12, 16 
 
 v. Bouwens 250 
 
 v Boyle 1008, 1620, 
 
 1681 
 v. Bradford Canal 1636, 1638 
 
 v. Bradlaugh 10, 735. 886 
 
 v. Brandreth 1799 
 
 v Brecon 1620 
 
 v. Brereton 13 
 
 v. Brewers' Co. 15, 1397, 1415 
 
 v. Brickdale 1800 
 
 v. Bristol, Mayor of 140 
 
 v Brooke 12, 1475, 1478 
 
 v. Brookshank 2095 
 
 v. Brown 8, 10, 273, 547, 584, 
 
 599, 1637 
 v. Buck nail 13 
 
 v. Bulpit 1101 
 
 v. Burch 810, 1558 
 
 v. Burridge 10 
 
 v. Burrows 1678 
 
 v. Butcher 1466 
 
 v. Butler 12 
 
 v. Cambridge 10 
 
 v. Cambridge Consumers' Gas 
 Co. 13, 407, 417, 826, 1636, 
 
 1637 
 v. Carmarthen, Corp. of 342 
 
 v. Carriugton 510, 1440, 
 
 1449 
 v. Carte 15, 1436, 1437 
 
 v. Carver 517, 625 
 
 v. Catherine Hall, The Master 
 
 and Fellows of 2280 
 
 v. Chamberlaine 10 
 
 v. Chambers 10, 983 
 
 v. Chester 16, 1407, 1436 
 
 v. Chesterfield, Earl of 247, 323 
 v. Chicago, &c R. Co. 1650 
 
 v Christ Church 2182 
 
 v. Churchill 6 
 
 v. Clack 1342 
 
 v. Clapham 1004, 1S25 
 
 v. Clare Hall 1854 
 
 v. Cleaver 1620, 1636 
 
 v. Clements 10 
 
 V. Clergy Society 8 
 
 v. Clerkenwell Vestry 10, 1637 
 
 v. Cockermouth Local Board 10, 
 11, 13 
 v. Cohoes 10 
 
 v. Colney Hatch Asylum 13. 983, 
 1635, 1637, 1638, 1640, 1650 
 v. Compton 8 
 
 v Constable 6, 10 
 
 v. Consumer's Gas Co 10 
 
 v. Continental Life Ins. Co. 10 
 v. Cooper 404, 409, 426. 427, 
 
 583, 805 
 v Cornthwaite 235 
 
 v. Coventry, Mayor of 1058 
 
 v. Cox 1503 
 
 Attorney-General v. Cradock 336, 
 337, 689 
 v. Crofts 10 
 
 v. Crossman 6, 16 
 
 v. Cuming 1413, 1436, 1652 
 
 v. Day 657, 1283, 1733, 1738 
 
 v. Dean & Canons of Manchester 
 311 
 v. Delaware, &c. R. Co. 1620 
 
 v. Detroit 10 
 
 v. Devonshire 7 
 
 v. Dew 951 
 
 v. Dounington Hospital 430, 748 
 v. Dorking Guardians 10, 287, 1637 
 v. Drapers' Co. 16, 144o, 1449 
 
 v. Du Plessis 5, 564, 565, 568 
 
 v. Durham, Earl of 342 
 
 v. Dyson 1263 
 
 v. East Dereham Corn Ex- 
 change 14.5 
 v. East India Co. 11 
 v. Eastlake 8, 1620, 1629, 1640, 
 
 1663 
 v. East Retford 146, 724. 1419 
 
 v. Edmunds 6, 134, 727, 731, 
 
 1400 
 v. Ellison 1830 
 
 v. Ely, &c. Ry. Co. 1640 
 
 v. Etheridge 757, 758 
 
 v. Evart Booming Co. 10, 12, 
 
 1639 
 l'. Exeter, Mavor, &c. of 1472 
 
 v. Fea 1861 
 
 v. Federal Street Meeting 
 
 House 10 
 
 v. Fellows 311, 422 
 
 v. Finch 807 
 
 v. Fishmongers' Co. 15, 16, 415, 
 1436, 1534 
 t>. Flint 1111 
 
 v. Forbes 1636 
 
 v. Foster 1519, 1532 
 
 v Fox 1 I 
 
 v Fullerton 1164, 1165 
 
 v. Galway, Mayor of 1370, 1734 
 v Gardiner 10 
 
 v . Garrison 10 
 
 v. Gas Light and Coke Co. 10 
 
 v Gaskill 1650 
 
 v. Gaunt 261 
 
 v. Gee 1733 
 
 v. Gibbs 1417, 1420, 1424, 1426, 
 
 1485 
 v. Goldsmith's Co. 342 
 
 v. Gould 1653 
 
 v. Gower 678 
 
 v. Great Eastern Ry. Co. 10, 13 
 V. Great Northern Ry. Co. 10, 2328 
 v. Great Western &c. Ry. Co. 10, 
 
 2328 
 v. Green 261 
 
 r. Greenhill 13, 1031 
 
 v. Haberdashers' Co. 10, 14 
 
 1383, 1436 
 v. Hackney Local Board 1636 
 
 v. Halifax 837, 1378, 1394 
 
 v. Hallett 6 
 
 v. Hailing 6, 134 
 
 v Hamilton 1152 
 
 v. Hane 10 
 
 v. Hanmer 16, 1458 
 
 v. Hardy 386 
 
 v. Hartley . 16 
 
 v Harvey 14 
 
 v. Heath 12 
 
 v. Heelis 239, 242 
 
 v. Henderson 748 
 
 v. Hewitt 1861 
 
 v. Hill 291 
 
 v Hitchcock 1101 
 
 v. Hobert 1417,1418 
 
 v. Horner 10 
 
 v. Howe 9 
 
 v. Hudson 743, 744, 748 
 
 v. Hullett 134 
 
 v. Hunter 1680 
 
 v. Hurst 1427, 1430, 1536 
 
 VOL. I.
 
 XV111 
 
 Attorney-General v Ilchester 2207 
 V I re :i mongers' Co. 15, 140 
 
 v Jackson 276,288,627 
 
 r. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct 10 
 
 f Jeanes 13, 384 
 
 V. Johnson 10, 1636 
 
 v. Kerr 15, 16, 1436 
 
 V. Kingston 6, 134 
 
 v . Kiugston-on-Thames, 
 
 Mayor of 13, 1636, 1650 
 
 V. Knight 16 
 
 v. Kohler 1513 
 
 v Lambe 7, 16 
 
 v. Lauibirth 169 
 
 v Lawes 1411, 1431, 1432 
 
 V. Leathersellers' Co. 1069 
 
 v Leeds 10, 1636, 1637 
 
 r. Leicester 248, 268 
 
 v Le«is 16,140,899 
 
 V. Lichfield 8 
 
 v Life & Fire Ins. Co. 1748 
 
 V. Liverpool, Corp. of 1663 
 
 v. Logan 10 
 
 V. London 6, 10, 16, 134, 415, 579, 
 601, 761, 1411, 1557, 1829, 1831, 
 1832 
 v. London & N W. Ry. Co., 542, 
 1591 
 r. Lonsdale, Earl 1802 
 
 v. Lubbock 1222 
 
 r Lucas 10, 105, 568, 717 
 
 v. Lutou Board of Health 
 
 1638, 1663, 1681 
 v. Manchester 15, 1638 
 
 v. Manchester & Leeds Ry. Co. 
 
 1008, 1620, 
 v. Marlborough, Duke of 1634 
 v. Marsh 424, 597, 1675 
 
 r. Mayor of Gal way 12 
 
 v Mercers' Co. 16, 145, 1406, 1821 
 t'. Merchant Tailors' Co. 289, 
 
 343, 559 
 v. Merrimack Manuf. Co. 10 
 
 v. Metropolitan Board of 
 
 Works 13, 1650 
 
 v. Metropolitan District Ry. Co. 6 
 V. Middleton 12 
 
 v. Mid-Kent Ry. Co. 10 
 
 v. Mid Kent Ry. Co. & South- 
 
 Eastern Ry. Co. 1613, 1657, 
 1662, 2323 
 v. Milward 871, 872 
 
 V. Molitar 10 
 
 » Monro 1469 
 
 v. Montgomery 1112, 1125, 1136 
 r. Moses 239, 336 
 
 v. Mullay 10, 105 
 
 V. Monro 1440, 1653 
 
 V. Murdoch 1417, 1653 
 
 v Murray 13, 69, 86, 110, 307 
 
 li. Naylor 276 
 
 v. Nethercoat 413, 952, 1450 
 
 n. Newark, Corp. of 1276 
 
 v. Newcombe 405 
 
 II. New York, &c. R. Co. 1479 
 
 v. Nicbol 1636, 1637, 1665 
 
 «. North America Life Ins. 
 
 Co. 1756 
 
 II. North Met. Tramways Co. 720 
 j; Norwich 8, 1233, 1620 
 
 v. Norwood 1629 
 
 « Oglender 12, 15, 1405 
 
 II Owen 1405 
 
 v. Oxford &c. Ry. Co. 10 
 
 V. Parker 12, 13, 14 
 
 v. Parkhust 9, 83 
 
 li. Parmenter 10 
 
 v. Parnther 852 
 
 li. Payne 1825 
 
 * . Pearson 268, 540, 883 
 
 f. Penruddocke 1164 
 
 v Phimtree 14 
 
 v Plymouth 16 
 
 v Plymouth, Mayor of 6 
 
 v. Poole 288, 337, 558, 2089 
 
 li. Pretyman 1174 
 
 r. Ray 872, 873, 940, 1574 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Attorney-General v. Read 10 
 
 v. Rees 485, 724 
 
 v. Kevere Copper Co. 10 
 
 v Reynolds 568 
 
 v. Richards 10, 1636 
 
 ti. Richmond 13, 1638 
 
 v. Rickards 156, 349, 630 
 
 v Rumford Chemical Works 8 
 v. Hyder 663 
 
 v. St. Aubyn 6, 7, 16 
 
 ii. St. Cross 1174 
 
 v. St. Cross Hospital 342 
 
 v. St. Helens 1620 
 
 v. St. John's Hospital 16 
 
 v Salem 10 
 
 v. Sands 53 
 
 v. Scott 1502 
 
 v. Severne 10, 105 
 
 v. Sheffield 1640 
 
 v. Sheffield Gas Consumers' 
 
 Co 1635, 1637, 1663 
 
 li. Shelly 276 
 
 v. Sherbourne Grammar 
 
 School 10, 12 
 
 v. Shield 506, 508, 592, 784 
 
 v. Shore 1174,1175 
 
 li. Shrewsbury 8, 1853 
 
 v. Shrewsbury Bridge Co. 3,6, 10, 
 1H37 
 v. Sidney Sussex College 660 
 
 », Sittingbourne & Sheerness 
 
 Rv. Co. 16,231,278,1222 
 
 li. Skinners' Co. 13, 15, 16, 1069 
 ». Smart 12, 14 
 
 v. Southampton, Guardians of 8, 
 1620 
 v. Southampton, Mayor 1635 
 
 v. Staffordshire Copper Co. 1636 
 li. Stamford 444, 474, 980, 1856 
 v Stamford, Mayor of 13 
 
 li. Stephens 209, 873, 1163 
 
 v Steward 1668 
 
 v. Stewart 16 
 
 v. Sudell 549, 563 
 
 v. Sutton 662 
 
 v Swansey, &c. Co. 1470 
 
 v. Tarr 10 
 
 li Tarrington 16, 230 
 
 v Taylor 15 
 
 li. Teather 10 
 
 ». Terry 10, 1636, 1639 
 
 i>. Thames River, Conserva- 
 tors of 1024, 1025, 1026 
 v. Thetford 1039 
 ii. Thompson 579, 1817, 1828, 1829 
 v. Thurnall 858 
 v. Tomline 10, 427, 974, 1031, 1639 
 ii. Tonna 1383 
 v. Tudor Ice Co. 10 
 v. Tunstall Local Board 1636 
 li. Twisden 200, 249 
 t>. Tyler 9, 12, 16 
 v. U. K. Elec. Tel. Co. 1635, 1636 
 v Utica Ins. Co. 10, 16*55 
 ii. Vernon 5, 10 
 v. Vigor 1750 
 v. Vincent 387 
 ii. Vint 1799 
 v. Vivian 10, 11, 13 
 v. Wakeman 415 
 v. Walthamstow Local Board 1637 
 v. Wareing 10 
 ii. Warren 137 
 n. West Hartlepool Imp. 
 
 Com'rs 8, 1620 
 
 v. Whiieley 12, 1368 
 
 v. Whorwood 377, 483, 484 
 
 v. Wigan, Mayor ol 8, 1021, 1620, 
 1670 
 v. Wilkins 675 
 
 v. Williams 10 
 
 v. Williamson 10, 12 
 
 v. Wilson 13, 22, 143, 193, !»7 
 v. Wiltshire 10, 13 
 
 ». Winchelsea 1427, 1430 
 
 v. Windsor, Dean and Canons 
 of 140, 1502, 1503 
 
 Attorney-General ;». Woolrich 9. 10, 
 
 83. 84 
 
 ti. Worcester 21, 143, 731, 778, 783 
 
 v. Worcester, Bishop of 1579, 
 
 1854, 1855, 1856 
 
 v. Wright 10. lf.95 
 
 v Wy burgh 276,627 
 
 v. Wyggeston's Hospital 16 
 
 v. Wvnne 200, 249 
 
 ». Wyville 730, 1413 
 
 Attleboro Nat. Bank v. Wendell 1407 
 
 Attrill v. Rockaway Beach Imp. 
 
 Co. 1765 
 
 Attwood v. 407 
 
 Atwood ii. Banks 1626, 1655 
 
 » Hawkins 288 
 
 v. Small 299, 841 
 
 Atwater v Fowler 641 
 
 i'. Kinman 3!*2 
 
 li. Russell 1411 
 
 v Townsend 48 
 
 Atwell ii Fowles 1254 
 
 A twill v. Ferrett 547, 557, 585 
 
 Atwood ii Chichester 178, 186 
 
 li. Portland 314 
 
 ii. Shenandoah V. R. Co 1517,1530 
 li. Small 1491 
 
 Atwoo) v. Ferrier 347 
 
 v Merry weather 26, 243 
 
 Atwyn v. Perkins 671 
 
 Aubrey v. Brown 2001 
 
 v. Hoper 1447 
 
 Auburn Button Co. v. Syl- 
 vester 1051 
 Audenreid ?'. Railroad Co. 1662 
 Auditor, The v Johnson 197 
 Auditor-General v. Smith 1029 
 Audsley v. Horn 214, 271 
 Augusta Ice Co. v Gray 1734 
 Augusta Nat. Bank v. Printup 6^1 
 Aultman v. Steinan 324 
 Aurora, &c. R. Co. v. Lawrence- 
 burgh 1650 
 Austen v. Bird 406 
 v. Gibbs 1138 
 li. Oilman 1540 
 v. Nicholas 867 
 Auster v. Haines 229, 1524 
 Austerberry i'. Oldham 1654 
 Austin v. Austin 1004, 1862 
 ii. Bainter 1147 
 ii Bank of England 148 
 v. Chambers 855 
 v. Evans 1133 
 ii. Jackson 1376 
 v. Jones 1542 
 r. Raiford 334 
 t» Ramsey 327 
 li. Riley 517, 1031 
 ». Rutland R. Co. 60 
 Australasia Nat. Bank ii. United 
 
 Hand in-Hand. &c. Co. 214 
 
 Australian Steam Co. v. Flem- 
 ing 26, 27, 34 
 Austria, Emperor of v. Day 18, 1648, 
 1670, 1881 
 Automatic W. M. Co. ti. Com- 
 bined W. M. Co. 1409 
 Autothrepic Steam Boiler Co. 
 
 lie 1440 
 
 Avarne v. Brown 1220 
 
 Avegno v. Schmidt 283 
 
 Aveline v. Melhuish 1358 
 
 Aveling v. Martin 492 
 
 Averill v. Longfellow 1845 
 
 ii. Taylor 543 
 
 Avery v. Fitch 330 
 
 v. Griffin 995, 1081 
 
 ii Holland 602, 987 
 
 v. Kellogg 346,347 
 
 r. Osborne 1419 
 
 n. Wilson 1600 
 
 n. Wood 1434 
 
 Avory v. Andrews 1684,1685 
 
 Axers v. Mussulman 318 
 
 Axmand v. Lund 1643 
 
 Ayer v. Ayer 108
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Ayer v. Messer 
 
 737 
 
 Ayers v. Chicago 
 
 1548 
 
 v. Valentine 
 
 424 
 
 v Wright 
 
 197, 296, 344 
 
 Ayles v. Cox 
 
 1280 
 
 Aylesford, Earl of v 
 
 Morris 1386 
 
 v Poulett 
 
 1044 
 
 Aylesworth v. Brown 
 Ay let v DoJd 
 
 v. Easy 
 Aylett v. Ashton 
 
 406 
 1655 
 1552 
 
 186 
 
 v Lowe 
 Ayliffe v Murray 
 Aylmer v Aylmer 
 
 1129 
 894 
 1256 
 
 Aylmer v. Winterbottom 
 Ay 1 ward v Lewis 
 Aymer v. Gault 
 Aynsley v Glover 
 Ayres v. Carver 
 
 v Wiswall 
 Ayscough v. Bullar 
 
 XIX 
 
 1416. 1420 
 215, 283 
 1568, 1569 
 1080 
 1553 
 259 
 405 
 
 B. 
 
 Baas v. Pain 1556 
 
 Babb v. Lindley 231 
 
 Babbitt v. Dotten 328 
 
 v. Savoy 1661 
 
 Babcock v New Jersey Stock- 
 yard Co. 1638, 1661 
 
 1272 
 737 
 
 779 
 
 51 
 
 815 
 
 1621 
 
 312 
 
 1638, 1665 
 
 901 
 
 165 
 
 871 
 
 1027 
 
 1320 
 
 1002 
 
 1259 
 
 402, 524 
 
 v. Perry 
 v Smith 
 Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Pio- 
 neer Iron Works 
 Baby v. Dubois 
 Bach v Tuch 
 Bachelder v Bean 
 Bachman ?>. Einhorn 
 Back v. Stacy 
 Backhouse v. Alcock 
 v. Hornsey 
 v. Middleton 
 v. Wilde 
 Bacon v. Abbott 
 v. Childs 
 v. Clerk 
 v. Griffith 
 v. Jones 1079, 1642, 1663, 1681 
 v. Robertson 26 
 
 v. Rogers 1188 
 
 v. Spottiswoode 1681 
 
 Baddeley v. Bailey 888 
 
 v. Curwen 722 
 
 v. Harding 32 
 
 Badeau v. Rogers 1560, 1561, 1562. 
 1567, 1568, 1569, 1570 
 V. Tylee 1565 
 
 Badeley v. Consolidated Bank 269 
 Badenx' Trust, Re 193 
 
 Badgeley v Bruce 1165 
 
 Badger v. Badger 327, 371, 560, 659 
 v. McNamara 547 
 
 v. Titcomb 331 
 
 Badische A. & E. Fabrick v. 
 
 Schott 984, 1655 
 
 Baesh v. Moore 
 Baggett v. Beard 
 
 v Meux 
 Baggott v. Henry 
 
 v. Sawyer 
 Baglehole, Ex parte 
 Bagley v. Searle 
 Baguall v. Carlton 
 
 1504 
 
 1081 
 
 100 
 
 764 
 
 1290 
 
 50 
 
 819 
 
 387, 1039, 1400, 
 
 1408 
 
 v. Davies 1654 
 
 v. Villar 1630 
 
 Bagot?; Bagot 1465, 1630, 1705, 
 
 1733 
 
 v. Easton 334, 346, 384 
 
 v Legge 1433 
 
 Bagshaw v. Batson 837 
 
 v. Buxton Local Board 1639 
 
 v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co. 26, 
 
 199, 206, 241 
 
 v. Newton 
 
 v. Winter 
 Bahin v. Hughes 
 Baile v. Baile 
 Bailey, Re 
 
 v. Adams 
 
 v iEtna Ins. Co. 
 
 1427 
 
 101, 102, 108 
 
 189 
 
 1846 
 
 277, 10&5 
 
 1780 
 
 606, 640 
 
 313 
 
 i' American Cent. Ins. Co. 1622 
 v. Bailey 508, 861, 874, 1614 
 
 v Benton 379 
 
 v. Birkenhead Ry. Co. 333, 544, 
 658 
 
 Bailey v. Blanchard 
 v. Burchall 
 v. Burton 
 v Cadwell 
 v Collett 
 v Collius 
 v Crane 
 v. Devereux 
 v Dunkerley 
 v. Forbes 
 v. Ford 
 v. Gundry 
 v. Holden 
 v. Holson 
 v. Inglee 
 v- Lambert 
 v. Landingham 
 v. Leal 
 v. LeRoy 
 v. Macaulay 
 v. Maule 
 v. Morgan 
 v. Myrick 
 
 1228, 1231 
 
 1847 
 
 328 
 
 1699 
 
 1277, 1801 
 
 1654 
 
 646 
 
 511 
 
 1820 
 
 784 
 
 1599 
 
 27, 33. 358. 359 
 
 601 
 
 1630 
 
 149, 224, 247 
 
 709, 792 
 
 1120 
 
 1260 
 
 603 
 
 1093 
 
 1492 
 
 288 
 
 213, 260, 287, 886, 
 
 1180, 1237, 1300 
 
 839 
 
 v. O'Bannon 
 v. Robinson 
 
 v. Ryder 314, 326 
 
 v Sewell 1111 
 
 v. Sisson 1150 
 
 v. Smith 58 
 
 v Tindall 1805 
 
 v. Todd 1308 
 
 v. Vincent 157 
 
 v Wilson 722 
 Bailey Washing Machine Co. v. 
 
 Young 732 
 
 Baile v. Baile 78, 81 
 
 Bailis v. Cochran 918 
 
 Baillie v. Baillie 1627, 1628 
 
 v Blanchet 447 
 
 v. Jackson 153, 170. 1264, 2291 
 
 v. Sibbald 619, 639, 646 
 
 Treharne 
 
 Baily v Baily 
 v Bruton 
 v Haines 
 v. Macau ley 
 v Taylor 
 v Worrall 
 
 Bain v. Att -Gen. 
 v Fothergill 
 
 Bainbridgo, Re 
 v. Burton 
 v Pinhorn 
 v. Wilcocks 
 
 Baiubrigge, Re 
 
 122 
 
 1270 
 
 303 
 
 1126 
 
 1128, 1131 
 
 1642, 1643, 1681 
 
 230 
 
 1573 
 
 1082 
 
 157 
 
 237, 242 
 
 255 
 
 371, 667, 668, 1259 
 
 1186 
 
 Baddely 413, 421 , 582, 598, 802 
 
 1467, 1536, 1579, 1722, 1725 
 
 v. Blair 
 v. Moss 
 
 v. Orton 
 Baines v. Babcock 
 
 v Baker 
 
 v Bromley 
 
 v. Geary 
 
 v. Lumley 
 
 v McGee 
 
 v. Ridge 
 
 i'. Story 
 Bains v. Perry 
 Baird v. Baird 
 
 159 1234, 1414 1512, 
 1737, 1741, 1764, 1765 
 35, 36, 360, 423. 594, 
 731,1448 
 
 358, 680 
 269 
 1636 
 1407 
 1655 
 653 
 314 
 441 
 269 
 1640 
 281 
 
 Baird v Goodrich 1653 
 
 v. Jackson 334 
 
 v. Powers 1^)3 
 
 v. Turnpike Co. 994 
 
 v. Wells 332, 1653 
 
 Baisley v Baisley 149, 536 
 
 Baker, Re gg 
 
 Baker v. Athill 370 
 
 Backus 1716, 1722, 1729, 1733 
 228 
 106 
 371, 555, 641, 667, 668 
 697 
 545 
 1122 
 2001 
 327, 328, 852 
 547, 1557 
 
 v Baker 
 
 v Bayldon 
 
 v. Biddle 
 
 v. Bird 
 
 v. Booker 
 
 v. Boon 
 
 v Boyldon 
 
 v. Bradley 
 
 v. Bramah 
 
 v. Brown 
 
 v Carter 
 
 v. Clarke Institution 
 
 v. Commonwealth 
 
 v. Dean 
 
 v Dumaresque 
 
 v. Farmer 
 
 v. Grundy 
 
 v. Haily 
 
 v. Hart 
 
 1130, 1561 
 1419 
 1411 
 1841 
 
 520 
 1704 
 1346 
 
 645 
 17( 
 
 1002, 1070, 1112, 1137, 
 1139 
 v. Harwood 218, 320 
 
 v. Henderson 1842 
 
 v Herts & Essex W. Co. 1731 
 v. Holmes j is 
 
 v. JeSeries 1714 
 
 v. Keen 513 
 
 «• King 1118, 1119, 1135 
 
 ■v- Lee 1502, 1503 
 
 v. Loader '298 
 
 v. Mayo 1253 
 
 v Mellish 300,583,584,592,597, 
 1660 
 v. Mo Pac. Ry. Co. 313 
 
 v. Morgan 1276 
 
 v. Morris 1254 
 
 v. Pritchard 563, 570 
 
 t\ Redd 1625 
 
 v. Sebright 1633 
 
 v. Shy 1218 
 
 v. Sowter 168 
 
 v. Taylor 1668 
 
 v Wetton 370 
 
 V. Whiting 560, 644, 1463, 1472 
 1479, 1530, 1575, 1581, 2169 
 v Williamson 1229 
 
 v Wind 1392 
 
 v. Wood 1395 
 
 v Young 1031 
 
 Balch v. Smith 1350 
 
 v. Symes 1830, 1843 
 
 v. Tucker 1078 
 
 v. Wastall 8. 135, 156 
 
 Balchen v. Crawford 1564, 1568 
 
 Balcolm v N. Y. Life Ins. and 
 Trust Co. 678, 679, 759 
 
 Balcom v. Terwilliger 
 Baldwin v. Baldwin 
 
 v. Bank of Newbury 
 
 v . Canfield 
 
 v. Darner 
 
 v- Hale 
 
 v. Lawrence 
 
 v. Mackown 
 
 v. Miles 
 
 1381 
 
 107, 116 
 
 458 
 
 190 
 
 809 
 
 458 
 
 245 
 
 1535 
 
 1461
 
 XX 
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Baldwin v. Salter 
 
 ,. Tucker tool 
 
 r Useful Knowledge Society 1656 
 Balfour v. Cooper l-l? 
 
 Balguy u Broadhurst 5<8, (17, I°£! 
 
 v. Chorley 
 Ball v. Ball 
 
 i . Coutts 
 
 « Etches 
 
 ». Harris 
 
 ». Kemp-Welch 
 
 v. Mabry 
 
 v. Mannin 
 
 v. Montgomery 
 
 v. Oliver 
 
 v Kay 
 
 v. Sawyer 
 
 v. Tompkins 
 
 102 
 
 1166 
 
 108 
 
 425. 510 
 
 166 
 
 1163 
 
 1743 1 
 
 83 
 
 104, 107, 1415 
 
 251,1725, 1726 
 
 1635, 1637 
 
 737 
 
 553 
 
 BaTl ^"Socket Fastener Co. v. 
 
 Kraetzer * 
 
 Ballard v. Catling 39, 41, 1590 
 
 V Eckman "*g 
 
 * McCluskey 888,912,1463,2391 
 
 r. White 9bl > 1 * J "' 
 
 Balientine 17. Beall 23b 
 
 Ballin 17. Ferst ^ a 
 
 Ballou v. Chicago & N. W. *y 
 
 Co 14 b3 
 
 ,, Hopkinton 303, 1413, 1639 
 
 Balls ». Margrave 581, 680, 1558 
 
 » Strutt „ nl ™- 4- 
 
 Bally v. Kenrick .24, 72o, W< 
 
 v. Williams 31J, i-ft 
 
 Baltic Co v. Simpson 983 
 
 Baltimore v. Ohio R. Co 1561, lobrf 
 BaUimore &c R Co v. Adams 
 
 Express Co 314 
 
 Baltimore & Ohio R Co. v. 
 
 Arthur lobl 
 
 V Fitzpatrick 6» 
 
 u. Wheeling, City of, 26, 144 
 
 146, 73o, 846 
 Baltimore R. Co. v Strauss 1639 
 Baltimore & O Tel. Co v. In- 
 
 terstate Tel. Co. 334, 81 1 
 
 Baltzel V. Hall &£> 
 
 Ban.ford ». Bamford 116., 119. 
 
 ,• Watts 13.2, 1600, 1610 
 
 Bampfield ». Vaugban <£<$ 
 
 Bamptont. Birchall ^ 560 ' 1 ^ 
 
 Bampton & Longtown Ry Co 1 
 
 989 i Bank of England 
 
 v. Moffat 
 
 v. Morice 
 
 v. Parsons 
 Hindustan v. Hodgson 
 
 r. Robinson 
 Kentucky v. Gay 
 Marietta v Pindall 
 Metropolis v Guttschlick 
 Michigan v. Williams 
 
 Lunn 147, 148 I Bardwell v. Ames 
 
 v. Baker 
 v. Barker 
 
 Mobile T Planters' and Merch- I v Nash 
 
 ants' Bank 837, 1796 | Barker, Re 
 
 Monroe v Schermerhorn 16.6, 
 
 lb. I 
 
 Niagara, Matter of 1234, 1414, 
 
 B 1i4i 
 
 Ogdensburg v. Arnold 284, 1717, 
 
 Ontario v. Strong 444 
 
 Orleans v. Skinner 20, 395, 1619, 
 1669 
 St Marv v. St John 525 
 
 Scotland v Kerr 24 
 
 Statesville v, Foote 14W 
 
 Tenn v Burke jj 
 
 United States r. Magill 
 
 1639 
 
 659 
 
 883, 1679 
 
 1654, 1683 
 
 159 
 
 303 
 
 810 
 
 1321 
 
 1490 
 
 1269 
 
 209; 321. 362, 1163 
 
 560, 1264, 1346, 1365, 
 
 1841 
 
 1074 
 
 1577 
 
 „' Belknap 659, 1484, 1549, 1550, 
 
 1553 
 
 148 ' v Baird 
 1615 Barfield v. Kelly 
 148 v Nicholson 
 397 Barger v Buckland 
 397 Barham v. Hostetter 
 1624 i v Longman 
 24 Baring and Doulton, Re 
 652 ! Baring v. Harris 
 24 661 ! v Moore 
 
 v Ritchie 
 v. Schultz 
 v Weisiger 
 v. White 
 Utica v. Messere 
 
 69, 160, 997 
 
 361 I 
 
 1016 1 
 
 1597,2379 
 
 574, 576, 720, 
 
 721, 758 
 
 "Virginia v. Craig 130* 
 
 Washtenaw v. Montgomery lA 
 
 Waterville v W. W. Back 2j 
 
 Banker's Case, The 133 
 
 Banker r. Walters ,„„,.,£?« 
 
 Bankhart v. Houghton 1635, lb4U 
 Bankheadt' Alloway bbi 
 
 Bankier v. Poole 44. 
 
 Banks v. American Tract Society 1638 
 
 l.gS" 287,1291,1292, 732 
 
 Banbury i 
 
 Peerage Case 
 Bancroft v Sawin 
 v Wardour 
 v Wentworth 
 Band v Randle 
 Banda, Re 
 Banert v Day 
 Bangs v Hall 
 
 v. Strong 
 Banigan v. Worcester 
 Banister v. Bigge 
 
 v Way 
 Bank, The v. Butler 
 
 v. Carrollton Railroad 
 
 t; Cowan 
 
 v Dugan 
 
 v Farques 
 
 v. l.abitut 
 
 v. Rose 
 
 v. Simonton 
 
 v. Trapier 
 
 560, 646 
 
 617 
 
 313 
 
 1639 
 
 153, 232, 1283 
 
 458 
 
 217 
 
 1099 
 
 617 
 
 884 
 
 1019 
 
 792, 793 
 
 21.24 
 
 1233 
 
 .. Booth 
 v Caitwright 
 v Gibson 
 v. Goodfellow 
 v. Judah 
 v. Klein 
 1). Long 
 v. Manchester 
 v. ParKer 
 v. Walker 
 Bannatyne v. Leader 
 Banner, Ex parte 
 
 v Berridge 
 Bannon v. Comegys 
 Banta v. Calhoon 
 v. Moore 
 „ Banwen Iron Co., Re 
 133 Banyster v. Trussell 
 951 Baptist Church v. Uetfield 
 
 1073, 1074 
 1231 
 
 1649, 1660 
 1385 
 560 
 
 1580 
 
 542, 843 
 
 1624 
 
 339 
 
 1832, 1835 
 
 1209 
 
 642 
 
 1517 
 
 161, 167 
 
 547, 584 
 
 1597 
 
 156 
 
 1765 
 
 323 
 1029 
 547 
 849 
 815 
 986 
 1259 
 1277, 1278 
 1409 
 977, 1508 
 107 
 27 
 1731 
 447, 449, 809, 1413 
 1029 
 293 
 683, 1124 
 1290 
 815 
 1562 
 991, 1584 
 1404 
 1794 
 191, 244, 385 
 1423, 1437 
 982 
 Barkhampstead v. Parsons 22 
 
 Barklay v. Reay, Lord 431 539, lwM, 
 
 Barksdaie v Butler 
 Barkwell v. Swan 
 Barkworth V. Young 
 Barlee v. Barlee 
 
 v Birch 
 
 v. Craig 
 
 v. Dacie 
 
 v. Dixie 
 
 v. Dumaresque 
 
 v. Flagg 
 
 v Gregory 
 
 v. Harper 
 
 v Hemming 
 
 v. Johnson 
 
 v. Lea 
 
 v Lidwell 
 
 v Mariott 
 
 v. Piele 
 
 v. Purvis 
 
 v. Railton 
 
 v. Ray 
 
 v Richardson 
 
 v Smark 
 
 V. Swain 
 
 v Todd 
 
 v Venables 
 
 v. Vogan 
 
 v. Walters 
 
 v Wardle 
 
 v. Wyld 
 
 601 
 
 378 
 
 365, 561, 2086 
 
 112, 113 
 
 732 
 
 1637 
 
 100 
 
 1393, 1734, 1735 
 
 295. 403, 426 
 
 Barber, lie 1368, 1414 
 
 Barber, Re, Burgess v. \inm- 
 
 come "J° 
 
 Dardier » Chapman 1 ' 
 
 Barber v Barber 549,586,588,602 
 
 041 
 
 560, 645 
 
 362 
 
 328, 991, 1260, 1581 
 
 1638 
 
 115, 117 
 
 201 
 
 589 
 
 v Houston 
 V Hunter 
 v Mackrell 
 v Pen ley 
 v Slade 
 v. Walker 
 Birbey's Appeal 
 
 BankartV Tennant 324, 1407. 1408 
 Bank Commissioners v. Bank of 
 
 Buffalo 30- 
 
 Bank of Hindustan, Re 944 
 
 Bank of Alexandria v. Patton lb» 
 
 Augusta v. Earle *& 
 
 Bellows Falls v. Ru tland „„ & ,^o D 
 
 Bur R. Co. 555, 628, 1628 
 
 Bethel v. Pahquioque Bank 1.41 
 
 Danville v. Travers J50 
 
 Edwardsville v. Simpson i» 
 
 Barbon v Searle 15'9 
 
 Barbour v. Watts 8b. 
 
 v Whitlock iYl 
 
 Barclay v. Bank of New South 
 Wales 
 
 v. Bowen 
 
 v. Brown 
 
 r Culver 
 
 v Plant 
 
 v Russell 
 Bard v Bingham 
 Barden v. Briscoe 
 
 Barley v Pearson 
 Barlow v Bailey 
 
 v. Devany 
 
 v. Gains 
 
 v. Osborne ay i285, 1286"," 1288, 'iKh 
 
 v. Scott ]°8} 
 
 Barnaby v. Tassell }-oji 
 
 Barnam V McDaniels io.o 
 
 Barnard, Re, Barnard v. White 108j 
 
 Barnard, Re, Edwards v. Bar- 
 
 nard 2 - 9 
 
 Barnard V. Adams 1411 
 
 v- Bartholomew 1253, 1^58 
 
 ». Darling '46, .48 
 
 v Ford bb 
 
 r. Ford, Carrick v Ford 66, 92 
 v. Hunter 485, 621, 716, 760, 
 
 v. Lea 
 v. Wallis 
 v. Wieland 
 Barnardiston r Gibbon 
 Barnardo r. Mcllugh 
 Barndt v. Frederick 
 Barne, Re 
 669 ! Barnebee .'. Beckley 
 1476 | Barned V. Barned 
 1002. 14!>3 V Laing 
 
 1.385 i Barnegat City Beach Association 
 1491 v. Buzby J™ 
 
 17, 20, 136, 472 Barnes, Re 
 
 1727 I Barnes r Abram 
 1463 1 v Addy 
 
 1624 
 
 838 
 
 1611 
 
 68 
 
 815 
 
 1368 
 
 13i >9 
 
 652 
 
 i, 1705 
 
 947
 
 Barnes v. Chicago, &c. Ry. Co. 991 
 
 v. Dewey 1578 
 
 v Dickinson 413 
 
 V. Dowling 1628 
 
 v. Harris 576 
 
 v. Hathorn 1635 
 
 v. Mays 1290 
 
 v Offer 1577 
 
 v. liacster 1390 
 
 v. Ridgway 410, 440 
 
 v. Robinson 92 
 
 v. Saxby 354 
 
 v. Taylor 585, 586. 1845, 2087 
 
 v. Trenton Gas Light Co 545 
 
 V. Tweddell 784, 1451 
 
 v. West 354 
 
 v Wilson 1026, 1027 
 
 Barneslv v. Powel 664, 184 i 
 
 Barnett V Cline 1624 
 
 v. Grafton 420 
 
 v. Leuchars 1649 
 
 v. Montgomery 443 
 
 v Noble 419 
 
 v. I'eople's Bank 594 
 
 v. Spencer 1600 
 
 v. Watson 930 
 
 v. Woods 314 
 
 Baruey v. Baltimore 149, 190 
 
 v. Luckett 1661 
 
 v Puck 334 
 
 V Saunders 1369 
 
 Barnhaui v Roberts 573 
 
 Barnhardt v. Smith 933 
 
 Barnsdale v. Lowe 1574 
 
 Barnsley Canal Co. v. Twibell 1678 
 
 Barnwell v. Ironmonger 1411 
 
 Baron v. Korn 630 
 
 Barr p. Barr 1726 
 
 v. Carter 251 
 
 v. Clayton 314 
 
 v Ilarding 1387 
 
 v Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co 1395 
 
 Barr's Trust, Re 846 
 
 Barrack v. McCulloch 822, 843 
 
 Barraclough v. Greenhough 877 
 
 Barraque ?». Manual 327 
 
 v Siter 713 
 
 Barre National Bank v. Hing- 
 
 ham Manuf Co. 334 
 
 Barrel v Benjamin 48 
 
 v. Joy 1259 
 
 Barrere v. Barrere 2289 
 
 Barret v Oliver 169 
 
 Barrett v. Brown 193. 200 
 
 v. Buck 992, 1430 
 
 v. Burke 1658 
 
 v Carter 1461 
 
 v. Day S54, 1618 
 
 v. Doughty 109, 589 
 
 v. Gaines 989 
 
 v Hartley 1391 
 
 v. Long 1091,1092 
 
 v McAllister 365 
 
 v. Oliver 68 
 
 v. Pardow 917 
 
 v. Pearson 1658 
 
 v. Power 32 
 
 v Sirgeant 852 
 
 v. Short 790 
 v. Stockton and Darlington 
 
 Ry. Co. 327 
 
 v Watson 905,918 
 
 v. Wheeler 860 
 
 v. White 1524 
 
 Baxribeare v Brant 1538 
 
 Barriclo v. Trenton Mut. Life 
 
 and Fire Ins. Co. 1523, 1531, 
 
 1535 
 
 Barringer v. Andrews 392 
 
 Barrington, He 160, 1607 
 
 v Brien 1581 
 
 v Tristram 1427 
 
 Barritt v. Barritt 489, 742 
 
 v. Tidswell 785 
 
 Barron v Barron 117 
 
 v. Gvillard 184, 591 
 
 v. Lancefield 1389 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Barron v. Robinson 1122 
 
 Barrow t). Barrow 102,104,106,107. 
 
 2001 
 
 v. Isaacs 1660 
 
 v Manning 92 
 
 v. Rhinelauder 667, 884, 1468, 1578 
 
 v Richards 1654 
 
 v. Wadkin 47 
 
 Barrs v. Fewkes 320, 1470 
 
 v. Jackson 6G3 
 
 Barry, Ex parte 1069 
 
 v. Abbott 542, 758 
 
 v. Barry 334, 1026 
 
 V. Briggs 1463 1491 
 
 V Cane 180, 181, 499, 500 
 
 v Croskey 446, 539, 599, 1556 
 
 v. Jenkius 33 
 
 v. Missouri, K & T. Ry Co 149, 
 
 215 
 
 v Stevens 551 
 
 v. Wrey 1389 
 
 Barstow v. Smith 5S4 
 
 Barteau v. Barteau 324 
 
 Bartee v. Tompkins 335. S45 
 
 Bartels v. Schnell 659 
 
 Barter v Dubeux 659 
 
 Bartholomew /•. Harwinton 1576 
 
 Bartle v. Wilkin 1387 
 
 Bartles v Gibson 639 
 
 Bartlett, Ex parte 1863 
 
 Re ' 2203 
 
 Bartlett,/??, Newman ;\ Hook 294 
 
 v. Bartlett 316, 1696, 1789 
 
 v. Fifield 10o2, 1576, 1577 
 
 B. Gale 737,760,839,846 
 
 v. Gillard 839 
 
 v Harton 809, 811, 970, 1601 
 
 v Johnson 1386, 1391 
 
 17. Marshall 1257 
 
 v Parks 191, 297, 551, 1929 
 
 v. Pickersgill 196 
 
 V. Smith 1098 
 
 v. The Sultan 1561 
 
 v. West Met'n T. Co 1731 
 
 v. Wood 1008,1381,1411 
 
 Bartley v. Bartley 1837 
 
 Barton v. Barbour 1743 
 
 v Barton 234, 304, 793. 811, 843, 
 
 1371, 1402 
 
 v. Beatty 1002 
 
 V. Beer 87 
 
 v Chambers 1597 
 
 v. Cooke 1429, 1431 
 
 v Latour 1279, 1373. 1610 
 
 V. Moss 844 
 
 v North Staffordshire Piv. 
 
 Co. 644, 933 
 
 V. Rock 811, 1458 
 
 v Tattersall 643, 21 Si! 
 
 v. Trent 15"6 
 
 v. Whitcombe 459, 832 
 
 Barwell v. Corbin 76 
 
 v. Parker 1257, 1258 
 
 Basanquet v Marsham 4o9 
 
 Basey v. Gallagher 313, 594, 1147 
 
 Bastaam, Re 1409, 1411 
 
 Baskett r Cafe 056,2117 
 
 Basore v. Henkel 1628 
 
 Bass i'. Bass 641 
 
 Bassard v Lester 793 
 
 Basset v Nosworthy 677 
 
 Bassett V. Bratton 1699 
 
 v. Johnson 1110,1111,1111, 
 
 1119, 1124 
 
 t;. Leslie 1561 
 
 v. Salisbury M.nnuf. Co. 686,689, 
 
 696, 699, 700, 1031, 1636, 1688. 
 
 1640 
 
 Basse vi v. Serra 1432 
 
 Basslord v. Blakesley 1830, 1838 
 
 Bastard V Page 1009 
 
 t'. Smith 1102,1104 
 
 Bastin r. Bidwell 1417 
 
 v. Carew H 199 
 
 Bastow i' Bradshaw 324 
 
 Basye v. Beard 1567 
 
 Batchelder, Petitioner 1561 
 
 XXI 
 
 Batchelor, Re 90 
 
 D Mi.ldleton 1387 
 
 Bate H Bate 1819, 1&20 
 
 v Hooper 1370. 1416, 2060 
 
 Bate Refrigerator Co. V Gillett 
 
 1197, 1320, 1642 
 
 Bateman v Bateman 14. 6 
 
 v Cook 
 
 744 
 
 v Foster 
 
 2292 
 
 v Margerison 
 
 225, 295, 1367 
 
 v. Murray 
 
 1658 
 
 v. Snoddy 
 
 630 
 
 v AViatt 
 
 1673, 1685 
 
 v. Willoe 
 
 1621 
 
 Bateman's Trust, 
 
 Re 55 
 
 Bates v. Babcock 
 
 365, 601 
 
 V. Bates 
 
 407 
 
 v. Bonnor 
 
 1287, 1288, 1292 
 
 v. Brothers 
 
 803, 1719, 1730 
 
 v. Christ's College 
 
 v. Dandy 
 
 124, 125, 126, 127 
 
 v. Delavan 
 
 867, 1018 
 
 v. Eley 
 
 1225 
 
 v. Gage 
 
 1147 
 
 v. Graves 
 
 1125 
 
 v. Great Western Tel. Co. 1576 
 
 v. Loomis 
 
 1600 
 
 v. Plonsky 
 
 334 
 
 v. Preble 
 
 1108 
 
 v. Sabin 
 
 1299 
 
 v. Wheeler 
 
 385 
 
 Bateson v Choate 
 
 385, 1051 
 
 Bath, Earl of i: Abney 124 
 
 v. Bradford 1258, 1314, 1321 
 
 v. Sherwin 1682 
 
 Bath, Lord, v. Sherwin 1661 
 
 Bathe, Re 83 
 
 ii. Bank of England 87, 111, 179, 
 
 253 
 
 Bather ?' Kearsley 403 
 
 Bathurst, Earl v. Burden 1655 
 
 Batre v. Auze 458 
 
 Batt v Birch 954 
 
 v. Proctor 149 
 
 Battaile v. Maryland Insane 
 
 Hospital 986 
 
 Battel 1 v. Matot 85, 634 
 
 Battelle v. Youngstown Rolling 
 
 Mill 633 
 
 Batten v Dartmouth Harbor 
 
 Com'rs 1411, 1424 
 
 v. Earnley 1256 
 
 v Gedhye 553, 630 
 
 v Wedgwood Coal & Iron Co 1765 
 
 Battenhauaen v. Bullock 1003 
 
 Batterman v. Albright 212 
 
 Batterson v. Ferguson 720 
 
 Batthyany b Walford 354 
 
 Batthyny, Re 542 
 
 Battle'?' Bering 1033 
 
 v. Davis 1751 
 
 v (iriffin 1409 
 
 v. Street 659 
 
 Batty v. Hill 1649 
 
 I Bauer, Ri' 576 
 
 i Bauer's Estate 418 
 
 Bauer v. Mitford 16, 1469 
 
 Baugfa c. Uainsey 849 
 
 v. Reed 1427 
 
 Baughei- r. Eichelberger 860 
 
 Bauknight o. Sloan 334 
 
 Bauin, Ex parte 157 
 
 Bauman !• Matthews 1081 
 
 Baumgarten V Broadway 1654 
 
 Bawtree 0. Watson 1455, 1842, 
 
 1845, 1846 
 
 Bax r. Whitbread 1004 
 
 Baxendale v Mi-Murray 827 
 
 v. Weft Midland Ry. Co. 602 
 
 >■. West.. lint urn R. W. Co. 543 
 
 Baxter v. Abbott 851, 852 
 
 r Blodgett 1809 
 
 v. Conoly 2265 
 
 v Knollvs 1150 
 
 v. New York, T & M. Ry 
 
 Co 839 
 
 v Nurse 1135
 
 xxn 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Baxter v. Portsmouth, Earl of 
 
 v. West 
 Bayard's Appeal 
 Bayes v Hogg 
 Bayless v. Orue 
 Bay ley, lie 
 v Adams 
 c. Cass 
 
 v. De Walkiers 
 r. Edwards 
 ti. l«ominster 
 v Mansell 
 t> Powell 
 Baylies v. Baylies 
 
 v Payson 
 Ba\ lis v Lawrence 
 ii Lucas 
 
 v Watkins 876,1071,1317,1642 
 Bayly v. Bayly 501, 503 
 
 v Muehe f™» 
 
 v Powell 1410 
 
 Baynard V. Woolley 223, 2116 
 
 Bayue's Goods, lie 251 
 
 Bay ties v. Ridge 453 
 
 Baynham v Guy's Hospital J 
 Bay State Iron Co. v. Goodall 
 Ba'vzor v. Adams 
 
 83 
 
 1727 
 
 1051 
 
 46 
 
 26 
 
 1440 
 
 618, 700 
 
 890 
 
 734,737 
 
 633 
 
 1658 
 
 1263 
 
 1415 
 
 1749 
 
 1001,2182, 2260 
 
 1M7 
 
 1001, 1092 
 
 Beatty v. Leacy 
 Beaty V Bcaty 
 
 v. .ludy 
 
 v M'Corkle 
 
 v. Veon 
 
 351 
 
 1626 
 
 303 
 
 886 
 1286 
 
 T. > trvii _ eon 
 
 Beauchauip V. Gibbs 419, 54 J, 589, 
 
 r. Huntley, Marquis 
 ?>. Putnam 
 ?>. Winn 
 Beaufort v. Morris 
 Duke of v. Berty 
 v. Morris 
 Phillips 
 
 800 
 1552 
 1510 
 2309 
 1352, 1364 
 1112, 1113, 1683 
 1030 
 
 Beach v. Beach 
 
 v. Bradley 
 
 v. Fulton Bank 
 
 v. Mupgrove 
 
 v. Shaw 
 
 v. Sleddon 
 
 v White 
 Beaching v Gower 
 Beadel v Perry 
 
 Beadles v. BurcU 
 Beadon V King 
 Beaird v. Foreman 
 Beat v Gibson 
 Beale v. Beale 
 
 v Hayes 
 
 v. Seiveley 
 
 v Thompson 
 Beales v Spencer 
 Beall v. Shaull 
 
 v. Smith 
 Beals v. Cobb 
 
 1961 
 
 334 
 
 584 
 
 249 
 
 778, 952, 1462 
 
 149, 259, 1580 
 
 978 
 
 111 
 
 197 
 
 1098 
 
 1613, 1638, 1662, 
 
 1663, 1682, 2323 
 
 378 
 
 578, 645 
 
 295 
 
 1672, 1675 
 
 1168 
 
 543 
 
 989 
 
 946 
 
 178 
 
 559 
 
 83 
 
 190, 256, 259, 260, 
 
 261. 28" 
 
 v. Guernsey 
 
 v. Illinois, &e. R. Co 
 Beaman r. Elliot 
 Beamon r Ellice 
 Bean v Clark 
 
 v Griffiths 
 
 v. Heath 
 
 V Morgan 
 
 v. Qnimby 
 
 v. Smith 
 Beane v Morgan 
 Beaney v. Elliot 
 Bear, Re 
 
 v Smith 
 Bearblock v. Taylor 
 Tyler 
 
 1118 
 
 694, 843 
 
 2099 
 
 1101 
 
 694, 830 
 
 398, 964, 985 
 
 1060 
 
 179 
 
 576. 916 
 
 2276 
 
 88 
 
 1368 
 
 779 
 
 1367, 1801 
 
 1149 
 
 1114, 1123, 1137 
 
 Duke of v. Taylor 1822 
 
 Beaumont v. Bouftbee 378,383,bb< 
 
 v. Carty ™* 
 
 v. Meredith 243. U <•-• 
 
 Beayan v. Burgess ,'Sg'-?g£r 
 
 v. Carpenter 810 , 14o8 , 15o3, 
 
 v. Mornington 1019, 1021, 1028. 
 
 v. Oxford, Earl of 
 v. Waterhouse 
 Bebb v. Bunny 
 Bechtel v. Sheafer 
 Beck v. Allison 
 v. Beck 
 v. Henderson 
 v. Pierce 
 Becke. lie 
 
 Beckenbridge v. Churchill 
 Beckett v. Attwood 
 v. Bilbrough 
 v. Buckley 
 Beck ford v. Hood 
 v. Kemble 
 v. Wade 
 V. Wildman 
 Beckhaus v. Ladner 
 Beckwith v. Butler 
 v. Carroll 
 v. Smith 
 v. Wood 
 Peckworth v. Butler 
 Bectiye, Countess of v. Hodgson 
 
 1502, 1503 
 
 Beddall v. Maitland 154, 1081, 1407. 
 
 1548 
 
 v. Page 
 Beddinger v. Smith 
 Beddingfield v Zouch 
 Beddington v Beddington 
 ISeddow v. Beddow 
 Bedell v. Bedell 
 
 1034 
 
 760 
 
 1278 
 
 1561 
 
 1660, 1663 
 
 1548 
 
 1003 
 
 189, 642 
 
 1841 
 
 560 
 
 1461 
 
 329 
 
 1037 
 
 366 
 
 1627 
 
 559, 560 
 
 1830, 1838 
 
 843 
 
 840, 1302 
 
 1753 
 
 1698 
 
 15 12 
 
 1230 
 
 469 
 
 68 
 
 1050 
 
 154 
 
 1613 
 
 592, 739 
 
 Beets v. State 
 Beevor v Lawson 
 
 r. Luck 
 Beford y. Crane 
 Begbie v. Fenwick 
 Beggs, Matter of 
 Behr v. Willard 
 Behrens v. Pauli 
 
 v. Sieye King 
 Bein v. Heath 
 Beioley v. Carter 
 Beirne v. Wadsworth 
 Belaney v. Belaney 
 
 v. Ffrench 
 Belcher v. Belcher 
 
 v. M'Intosh 
 
 v. Whitmore 
 
 v. Williams 
 Belchier v. Butler 
 I Belden v. Dayis 
 I Belding v. Willard 
 Belew v. Jones 
 Belfast, Earl of v. Chichester 
 
 1099 
 
 2222 
 
 213 
 
 845 
 
 1449 
 
 1463 
 
 230 
 
 663 
 
 633, 637, 663 
 
 87, 109, 111 
 
 228 
 
 945 
 
 1479 
 
 1842 
 
 800, 1169 
 
 1096 
 
 992 
 
 730. 1163 
 
 1390 
 
 838 
 1276 
 1029 
 317, 
 1573 
 
 Belford V. Scribner 1643 
 
 Belknap v. Belknap 1639, 1680 
 
 v Stone 305,311,314,374,389, 
 
 402, 408 
 
 v. Trimble 1076, 1639 
 
 Bell, Re 1°°9 
 
 Bell, lie, Carter v. Stadden 
 
 Bell, lie, Lake v. Bell 
 V. Alexander 
 v. Antwerp Line 
 v. Bell 
 v. Bird 
 V. Cade 
 v. Chapman 
 v. Cunningham 
 v Dayidson 
 v. Donohue 
 v. Dunmore 
 v. Farmers' Deposit 
 
 Bank 
 v. Gittere 
 v Gordon 
 v Hastings 
 v. Hunt 
 ik Hyde 
 v. Johnson 
 
 Bearcroft v Berkeley 119 
 
 Beard V. Bowler 692 
 
 v Heide "lb 
 
 v Powis, Earl 1543, 1799 
 
 Beardmore v. Gregory 108. 109, 201, 
 
 251,319,401,407,1515 
 
 v. Lead well 
 Beardsell r Schwann 
 Beare v. Prior 
 Beart v. Hewitt 
 Beasley v. Kenyon 
 
 v. MaGrath 
 Beasney, Re 
 Beatniffr Gardner 
 Beatrice, The 
 Beattie v. Johnstone 
 
 Beatty V Beatty 
 ii De Forrest 
 v Hinckley 
 v. Kurtz 
 
 1635 
 
 2316 
 
 1239 
 
 2314 
 
 250 
 
 841 
 
 1795 
 
 609 
 
 18 
 
 1348, 1352, 
 
 1353 
 
 1669 
 
 1062 
 
 334 
 
 239 
 
 Hoffman 15G0, 1570, 1571 
 
 Bedford Charities, Re 12, 1855 
 
 Bedford v Bedford no J°J?, 
 
 v. Leigh 2m \?^l 
 
 Earl of r. Romney, Earl of 19,3 
 
 Bedingfield, Re J414 
 
 Bedminster Charities, Re lbUo 
 
 Bedsole v. Monroe ^ 
 
 Bedwell v. Prudence 823, 0-4 
 
 Bed win v. Asprey *g 
 
 Beebe v. Guinault Mod 
 
 v. Louisville, &c. R. Co. 3J3 
 
 v. Morris 212 
 
 Beech v. Haynes 711, 839, 840, 843, 
 
 v. Woodyard 797 
 
 Beecher v. Anderson 145 
 
 v. Marquette Mill Co 1461 
 
 Beeching v. Lloyd 234, 240, 303 
 
 Beekman v. Peck 978, 1030 
 
 V Saratoga and Schen. R. R. 
 Co. W76 
 
 Beeler v. Bullitt 165, 997 
 
 v . Dunn 251, 1359 
 
 Beem v. Newaygo Circuit Judge 
 
 Beer v. Tapp 1421 
 
 Beerfield v Petne 113-i 
 
 Beers v. Botsford 856, 1002 
 
 v. Broome _ 986 
 
 Beeson v. Beeson 571, 1081 
 
 641 
 
 202 
 
 149 
 
 807, 1540 
 
 6) 
 
 1001 
 
 49,52 
 
 1624 
 
 951 
 
 26 
 
 780, 781 
 
 Nat'l 
 
 843 
 
 313 
 
 1003 
 
 429 
 
 1560 
 
 179, 445 
 
 560, 867, 885, 896, 
 
 1580 
 
 v. Mexborough, Lord 1484 
 
 v Moon °43 
 
 v. Morrison 91:j 
 
 v. New York, Mayor of 1240, 1242 
 v. Pate 1440 
 
 v Read 1224 
 
 ti Rees 1668 
 
 v Shrock 19' 
 
 r Singer Manuf Co. lb2U 
 
 v. Stocker 189 
 
 v. Thompson «8o 
 
 v. Tinney , J>7 
 
 v Turner 892,1264 
 
 v United States Stamping 
 
 Co 23 *> 
 
 v. Von Dadelszen * ? 
 
 v. Walker „„ 1 n„'J 
 
 v. Waudby 402, 830 
 
 ii Wilson „ _ "J! 
 
 v Woodward 342, 346, 34 1, 611, 
 683, 700, 703, 1111, 1H2, UlO; 
 
 Bellaby v. Grant M4g 
 
 Bellamy, In re, Elder v. Pearson U. 
 Bellamy v. Bellamy 
 
 r. Brickenden 
 
 v Cockle 
 
 v. Debenham 
 
 »;£ 280, 281, 2927400, '418 
 VSSb 
 Bellchamber v Giani 39, 1380. 1602 
 Belle v. Thompson ll»i 
 
 Bellenger v. People, The oui 
 
 Bellerophon, The &£1 
 
 Bellew V. Bellew 438, 1428 
 
 710, 1425 
 
 1266 
 
 364,989 
 
 933,936,937
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 XX111 
 
 Bellingham v. Norrish 
 
 v Pearson 
 Belloat v. Morse 
 Bellona Co's Case 
 Bellows v. Bellows 
 
 v Sowles 
 
 2265 
 1117 
 
 31:» 
 1669 
 1071 
 
 238 
 
 v. Stone 403, 406, 408, 579, 580, 
 
 581, 615, 724, 725, 829. 844, 845, 
 
 846, 860, 861. 1190, 1222, 1227, 
 
 1230, 1248, 1531, 1623 
 
 Bellwood v. Wetberell 579 
 
 Beluiont Nail Co. v. Columbia 
 
 Iron & Steel Co. 236 
 
 Belmonte !'. Aynard 29, 32 
 
 Behnore, Lord v. Anderson 747,918, 
 929 
 Belohradsky v Kuhn 1651 
 
 Belshami) Percival 1009,1017,1544. 
 1833 
 Belt, R<- 99 
 
 v. Bowie 334, 517 
 
 v Lawes 1130 
 
 Bel ton v Smith 1468 
 
 v. Williams 197 
 
 Beltzhoover v. Blackstock 572, 573 
 Bemis v I'pham 303, 1638, 1639 
 Benand, Re 1347 
 
 Beabow v. Davies 528,710 
 
 », Low 324, 579, 720, 785, 855 
 
 Bencraft v. Rich 1778 
 
 B ndey v. Townsend 2398 
 
 lien. 1. she, Re 94,1608 
 
 Benedick v. Lynch 369 
 
 Benedict v. Williams 318 
 
 Benefit Life Ass. Co. v. Super- 
 visors 1661 
 Benfie.d v. Solomons 59,61. 62, 323, 
 324, 1549 
 Bengley v. Wheeler 243 
 Ben ham, Re 1795 
 v Ro.ve 1239,1247 
 Benicia Agr. Works v. Creighton 669 
 Bentaoo v. Wortley 161 
 Betiner v. Kendall 1638 
 Be, meson v Bill 1732 
 Bennet College v. Carey 1376 
 Bennet » Bennet 1360 
 v. Davis 59 
 v Lee 170, 174, 175, 1577 
 v Leigh 170 
 v Kunyon 873 
 v Vade 384,552,063 
 r. Whitehead 1362 
 Bennett's Trusts, Re 62 
 Bennett v. Allcock 1130 
 v Attkins 1396, 1416, 1419 
 v Baxter 1170, 1814 
 V Bennett 128 
 v. Biddies 1611 
 v. Bury 1120 
 v Butterworth 313 
 v. Chudleigh 39, 155 
 v Colley 1724 
 v. Edwards 167 
 v. Fenton 149 
 v. Gamgee 63 
 v Glossop 1831 
 v. Going 1416, 1422, 1423 
 v Hamill 164, 174, 1276 
 v. Hamlin 759 
 v. Harfoot 168 
 v. Hoefner 1031 
 v . Honeywood 421 
 v Leeds Manuf. Co. 354 
 v. Lytton 1207 
 v. Moore 1002, 1866 
 v Neale 713, 1078 
 v. Oliver 1505 
 v. Pardini 1675 
 v. Partridge 1387 
 v, Rees 1216 
 v. Robins 1748 
 v. Skeffington 262 
 v Van Sykel 1463 
 v. Walker 569, 675 
 v Waller 392 
 v Williams 1002 
 
 Bennett v. Winfield 109 
 
 v. Winter 1028, 1030 
 
 v. Wood 438, 1213 
 
 Bennington Iron Co. v Camp- 
 bell 422, 770, 776 
 
 Bennison «/. Jervison 11' 5 
 
 Benscotter v. Green 
 
 Benson v. Frederick 
 v. Cutler 
 v. Glastonbury Canal Co 
 
 v. Hadfield 
 v. Joues 
 v. Leroy 
 v. Olive 
 v. Vernon 
 v. Woolverton 
 
 v. Wright 
 Bensusan v. Nehemias 
 Bent v. Birch 
 
 v. Smith 
 
 v. Yardley 
 
 v. Young 
 Benthani v. Haincourt 
 Bentley, Re 
 
 v. Bentley 
 
 v. Cowman 
 
 v. Craven 
 
 v. Fleming 
 
 v. Long Dock Co. 
 
 v. Mercer 
 
 v Robinson 
 
 790 
 
 1130 
 
 1400 
 
 861, 
 
 1775 
 
 337, 599, 715 
 
 607 
 
 885, 1180, 1615 
 
 869 
 
 1026 
 
 844, 1016, 1539, 
 
 1545 
 
 68 
 
 1394 
 
 991 
 
 844 
 
 335 
 
 562, 1556 
 
 1237 
 
 1355 
 
 1213 
 
 706 
 
 1202 
 
 1109, 1128 
 
 1160 
 
 8«)3 
 
 162, 177, 475, 476, 
 
 498 
 
 Bentlif v. London, &c. F. Co. 149 
 
 Benton v. Gibson 1669 
 
 Bentsen v Taylor 32 
 
 Benyon v . Amphlett 180 i 
 
 v. Nettleford 564 
 
 Benzein v. Kobinett 383, 1361) 
 
 Benzien v. Lovelass 419 
 
 Berdanatti ;>. Saxton 1576 
 
 Berdoe v. Dawson 13S6 
 
 Beresford, Ex parte 105 
 
 v. Batthany 561 I 
 
 Lady v. Driver 1829 
 
 Berg v. Radcliffe 2197 
 
 Berger v Armstrong 1654 
 
 o. Jones 1587 
 
 Bergholtz v. Ruckman 1580 
 
 Bergmann v. McMillan 216 
 
 Berjce v. Harris 342 
 
 Berkeley, lie 433 
 
 v. King's College 1730 
 
 v. Standard Discount Co. 145 
 
 Berkhampstead Free School, Ec 
 
 parte 1854 
 
 Berkley v Ryder 782, 1550 
 
 Berks and D mphin Co v. Myers 22 
 
 Berlin v. Melhorn 1274 
 
 Bermes v. Frick 559 
 
 Bermingham v. Tuite 1565 
 
 Bernal r. Donegal, Marquis of 1703 
 
 Bernall v Donegal, Lord 885 
 
 Bernard v. Papineau 961 
 
 Lord, Case of 1633 
 
 v. Toplitz l!il8 
 
 Bernaseoni v. Farebrother 1134 
 
 Berndston v Churchill 792 
 
 Berne v. Eyre 1384 
 
 City off. Bank of England 17, 18 
 
 Bernett V Taylor 875, 1116 
 
 Bernev v. Chambers 778 
 
 v Eyre 1148, 1149, 1383, 1384 
 
 v. Harvey 1077 
 
 v. Sewell 1716, 1719, 1724 
 
 Bernheim v. Bernheim 313 
 
 Bernie v. Vandever 1170 
 
 Berrey v. Small 1237 
 
 Berridge v Bellew 1449 
 
 Berrigan v. Fleming 1540, 1546 
 
 Berrington v. Evans 1211 I 
 
 Berrow v. Morris 1530, 1537, 2060 j 
 
 Berry, Re 1361 
 
 v Armistead 2269 
 
 v. Attorney General 1461, 1480 | 
 
 v. Clements 67 , 
 
 Berry r. Gibbons 
 v. Hebblethwaite 
 v. Johnson 
 v Jones 
 v. Rogers 
 v. Sawyer 
 
 280, 1342 
 1390 
 1276 
 1732 
 175, 556 
 723, 810 
 Berrvhill v. M'Kee 987, 14o2 
 
 v. Wells 1255 
 
 Berryman v. Graham 1548 
 
 Bertel v. Neveux 364 
 
 Bertie v. Abington, Lord 1752 
 
 r. Falkland, lx>rd 1017, 1543 
 
 Bertiue v. Varian 560, 641, 645 
 
 Bertolacci v. Johnstone 415 
 
 Berwick, Mayor of v. Murray 207, 
 350, 351, 837, 895, 1394, 1830 
 Besant v. Wood ln9 
 
 Besemeres v. Besemeres 1670 
 
 Besley, Ex parte 1475 
 
 v. Besley 4ti5 
 
 Bessant v. Noble 203 
 
 Bessey v. Windham 1126 
 
 Best v Applegate 9'J9 
 
 v. Drake 1632 
 
 v. Stampford 125 
 
 v. Stouehewer 1170,1203,1405,1428 
 Betagh ;;. Concannon 1771, 1781 
 
 Bethea v. Call 68 
 
 Bethel v Abraham 1342 
 
 v. Wilson 217 
 
 Bethell v. Casson 579, 1826 
 
 Bethia v M'Kay 793 
 
 Bethuue )» Bateman 414, 770, 776 
 v Farebrother 195, 196 
 
 v. Kennedy 10U7 
 
 Bettes?). Dana 15<*9 
 
 Bettison v. Farringdon 1818, 1833 
 Betton, Re 125 
 
 Betts v. Barton 453, 536, 790 
 
 v. Cleaver 1440, 1149 
 
 v Clifford 1379, 1440, 1681 
 
 ti De Vitre 143, 145, 147, 1081 
 r. Gallais 1081, 1643 
 
 v. Menzies 578 
 
 v. Neilson 1080, 1081, 1643 
 
 v. Rimmel 398, 774 
 
 v Thompson 23!t, 243 
 
 Betty ». Taylor 844 
 
 Bevau v. Bevan 1279 
 
 Kevau and Whitting, Re 184.3 
 
 Bevaus j' Diugman's Turnpike 145 
 Beveridge v. Ohetlain 861 
 
 Beverley v. Miller 161 
 
 v. Walden 844, 1073, 1116 
 
 Bevin v. Powell 1071, 1551 
 
 Bewick v. Alpena Harbor Co. 1168 
 Bewicke r. Graham 617, 1829 
 
 Bewley v. Ottinger S97 
 
 v. Seymour 307 
 
 Bevnon v. Cook 1386 
 
 Bianca, The 406 
 
 Bibb v. Htiwley 212 
 
 Bibby v. Naylor 1525 
 
 Bick v. Matley 1299 
 
 v. Motley 1311, 1367 
 
 Bickel's Appeal 560 
 
 Biekerton v. Burrell 197 
 
 Bickett V. Morris 1639, 1662 
 
 Bickl'ord v Skeeves (or Skewes) 444, 
 506,507, 1114 
 Bickham v. Cross 999 
 
 Bickley r Dorrington 323 
 
 Bicknell !'. Bicknell 79 
 
 v Field 1627 
 
 v. Gough 612, 655 
 
 Bicycle Stepladder Co. v. Gor- 
 don 542 
 Bidder v. Bridges 314, 546, 579,717, 
 933 
 v McLean 586 
 r. Trinidad P. Co. 1656 
 Biddinger V. Wiland 68 
 Biddis v. James 863 
 Biddle, Re 1389 
 v Mason 1716 
 v. Ramsey 1658, 1682 
 Biddies v. Jackson 96
 
 XXIV 
 
 Biddulph, Re 1798 
 
 t'. Camoys, Lord 177, 451, 452, 
 
 476, 766, 872, 939, 1574 
 
 v. Dayrell 177, 476 
 
 v Fitzgerald 
 
 1169 
 
 v. St. George, Vestry of 
 
 1650 
 
 t>. St. John 
 
 847 
 
 Bidlack v. Mason 
 
 1751 
 
 Itidulph v. Bidulph 
 
 1383 
 
 Bidwell v. Paul 
 
 1716 
 
 Biel, Re 
 
 852 
 
 Bierue v. Ray 
 
 843 
 
 V Wads worth 
 
 801 
 
 Bilicld v. Taylor 220, 222, 257 
 
 Bige!ow v. Bigelow 560 
 
 644, 1772 
 
 v Oassedy 
 
 212 
 
 v. Hartford Bridge Co. 
 
 1637 
 
 v. Magee 
 
 235 
 
 v. Morong 1411, 
 
 1427, 1431 
 
 v. Winsor 994 
 
 , 995, 2356 
 
 Biggleston v. Grubb 
 
 1402 
 
 Biggs v. Kowns 
 
 1562, 1564 
 
 v. Penn 
 
 268 
 
 Bigler v. Reyber 
 
 573 
 
 Bignal v. Brereton 
 
 1256 
 
 Bignell, Re 
 
 1361 
 
 v. Atkins 
 
 1509, 1533 
 
 v. Chapman 
 
 1732 
 
 Biguold v. Audland 394, 1561, 1562, 
 
 1563, 1564, 
 
 2003, 2158 
 
 v. Cobbold 
 
 481 
 
 Bigsby v. Dickinson 
 
 858, 1488 
 
 Biles's Appeal 
 
 1163 
 
 Bill v- Cureton 
 
 230 
 
 v Sierra Nevada Co. 
 
 1620 
 
 v. W U. Tel. Co. 
 
 26 
 
 Billing v. Brooksbank 
 
 875 
 
 v. Flight 604 
 
 , 612, 2095 
 
 Biilings v. Aspen Mining 
 
 & S. 
 
 Co. 
 
 257, 560 
 
 v Mann 
 
 552, 586 
 
 Billingslea v Gilbert 
 
 736, 1675 
 
 v Ward 
 
 656 
 
 Billout v. Morse 
 
 407 
 
 Billson v. Scott 
 
 168, 2291 
 
 Bilmver v Sherman 
 
 209, 236 
 
 Bilston, Re 
 
 1589 
 
 Bilton v. Bennett 
 
 523, 524 
 
 Binfield v. Lambert 
 
 875 
 
 Bin ford v Bawden 
 
 93,99 
 
 v Dommett 
 
 1125 
 
 Bingham v. Bingham 
 
 1622 
 
 v Cabot 314, 358, 3 
 
 v. Clanmorris 166, 
 
 1226, 1227 
 
 v. Dawson 
 
 1581 
 
 v. King 
 
 1390 
 
 v. Yeomans 
 
 417, 736 
 
 Binglev v. Marshall 
 
 1666 
 
 Bingley School, Re 
 
 1852 
 
 Binkert v. Wabash Ry. Cc 
 
 402 
 
 Binks v. Binks 
 
 1516, 1585 
 
 Binney v. Plumley 
 
 22 
 
 Binuey : s Case 20, 26 
 
 468, 729, 
 732, 733 
 
 
 Binnington v. Harwood 
 
 1393 
 
 Binns v. Mount 
 
 1776 
 
 V. Parr 
 
 1781 
 
 Binsted v. Barefoot 
 
 1611 
 
 Birce v. Bletchley 
 
 365 
 
 Birch, Re 
 
 1610 
 
 Birch v. Birch 
 
 1053 
 
 v. Corpin 
 
 147 
 
 v. .loy 
 
 1500 
 
 v. Sumner 
 
 1359 
 
 v. Williams 
 
 979 
 
 Birchall, Re, Wilson v. Birchall 
 
 Birchel, Ex parte 
 
 Birchett v. Balling 
 
 Bird, Re 
 
 Bird v. Appleton 
 
 v. Bird 
 
 v. Brancker 
 
 v. Butler 
 
 v. Davis 
 
 v. Gill 
 
 v. Harris 
 
 v. Heath 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Bird v. Hustler 413 
 
 v. Inslee 561 
 
 v. Kerr 1123 
 
 v. Lake 840, 884, 1598, 1599, 1670 
 
 v. Littlehales 1055, 1056, 1057, 
 
 1058 
 
 v. Styles 844 
 
 Bird-all o. Colie 1727 
 
 v. Hewlett 1253,1431 
 
 Birdseye v. Heilner 694 
 
 Birdsong v. Birdsong 190, 259, 287, 
 
 1505 
 
 Birkenhead Docks v. Laird 826, 1001 
 
 1484, 2182 
 
 Birkett, In re 1770 
 
 Birks v. Micklethwait 1413 
 
 Birley v. Kennedy 1(77 
 
 Birmingham v. Gallagher 243 
 
 Birmingham Brewing Co., Re 1172, 
 
 1767 
 
 Birmingham Estates Co. v. Smith 
 
 561 
 Birmingham W. & E. Co. v. 
 
 Eivtou Land Co. 545 
 
 Birnbaum t>. Solomon 1675 
 
 Birne v. Hartpole 1584 
 
 Biron v. Edwards 1120 
 
 v. Scott 200 
 
 Birrell v. Dryer 546 
 
 Birt v. Leigh 1096 
 
 Bisbee v. Kvans 560 
 
 Bischof^beim v. Baltzer 888, 933, 
 
 1573, 23! H 
 
 v. Brown 1838 
 
 Bischoffshein v. Taaks 888 
 
 Biscoe v. Brett 793, 806, 1216 
 
 v. Great Eastern Ry. Co. 1080 
 
 v. Jackson 13 
 
 v. Land Bank, Undertakers of 274 
 
 v. Waring 360 
 
 v. Wilks 1402 
 
 Bishop, Ex parte 271, 1257, 1448, 
 
 1453 
 
 Re 1347 
 
 v. Abom 1019 
 
 v. Balkis Cons. Co. 26 
 
 v. Bishop £61, 374, 1791 
 
 v. Chichester 713 
 
 v. Church 953 
 
 v. Godfrey 1033 
 
 v. Jones 52 
 
 v. Lewis 996 
 
 v. Little 645 
 
 v. McGillis 815 
 
 v. Williams 1168 
 
 v. Willis 732, 1472, 1611 
 
 v. Wood 402 
 
 Bisbopp v. Colebrook 119 
 
 Bishop's Waltham R. Co., Re 1037 
 
 Bishopsgate, Re 1770 
 
 Bissell v Briggs 458 
 
 v. Heath 1743 
 
 v. Kellogg 1624 
 
 Bisset v. Burgess 1437 
 
 Bithray, Re 1037 
 
 Bitzer v. Hahn 1253 
 
 Biven v. Bostwick 860 
 
 Bixby v. Bent 986 
 
 Bizzey v Flight 1432 
 
 Black v. Black 587, 603 
 
 v. Blakely 1260, 1418 
 
 v. Bordelon 256 
 
 v. Caruthers 1634, 1666 
 
 v. Creighton 1780 
 
 v. Delaware, &c. Canal Co. 418, 
 
 1650 
 
 1346 v. Enrich 1643 
 
 1046 v. Henry G. Allen Co. 1643 
 
 1233 v. Huggins 26, 1664 
 
 1138 v. Jones 1126 
 
 83 v. Lamb 848, 1075, 1110, 1111, 
 
 749 1115, 1116, 1117, 1124, 1139, 1463 
 
 876 v. O'Brien 1381 
 
 109, 498, 886 v. Scott 149 
 
 1238 v. Shreve 1077, 1110, 1112. 1115, 
 
 307,437 1116,1117,1119,1121,1124 
 
 1030, 1843 Blackbeard v. Liudigren 1282 
 
 Blackborough v Ravenhill 1735 
 
 Blackburn v. Caiue 998 
 
 v. Gregson 1147 
 
 v. Jep.on 22, 1077, 1475, 1489 
 
 v. Selma R. Co. 1286, 23i9 
 
 v. State 1774 
 
 v. Warwick 1252 
 
 Blacker v Phepoe 855 
 
 Blacket v. Finney 369 
 
 Blackett v. Bates 1663 
 
 v. Black 553 
 
 v. Blackett 201, 318, 1722 
 
 Blackford v. Davis 1221, 1232, 1233, 
 1236, 1388 
 Blackhall v. Coombs 1622 
 
 Blackham v. Sutton Coldfield 239 
 Blackie v. Osmaston 542 
 
 Blacklock v. Barnes 1240 
 
 v. Small 1427 
 
 Blackman r. Cornish 1025 
 
 Blackmore v. Barker 1281. 1492 
 
 v. Edwards 423, 427 
 
 v. Glamorganshire Canal Nav- 
 igation 893, 1663 
 v. Howlett 162, 476 
 v. Smith 159, 808, 815 
 Blackwell v. Blackwell 254, 407 
 v. Harper 366 
 Blackwood, Re 1607 
 
 r. 1665 
 
 Blagden v. Bradbear 656, 657 
 
 Blagrave v. Blagrave 868, 870 
 
 Blaiberg v. Parke 894 
 
 Blain , Ex parte 20, 26, 147 
 
 v. Agar 25, 243 
 
 Blair v. Boggs Township School 
 
 District 1667 
 
 v. Bromley 200, 302, 645, 880 
 
 v. Cordner 354, 1847 
 
 v. Drew 641 
 
 v. Johnson 553 
 
 v. Lippincott Glass Co. 197 
 
 v. Ormoud 236 
 
 v. Porter 1560, 1562 
 
 v Reading 790 
 
 v. St. Louis H. & K. R Co. 324 
 
 v. Toppitt 175S 
 
 Blaisdell v. Bowers 715, 844 
 
 v. Stevens 417, 760 
 
 Blake, Re 68 
 
 v. Albion Life Ass. Co. 348, 349 
 
 v. Alluian 256 
 
 v. Barnes 313, 790 
 
 v. Blake, 5, 45, 87, 421, 629, 630, 
 
 804, 1589, 1726, 1771 
 
 v. Cox 819, 828 
 
 v. Foster 1581 
 
 v. Gale 1214 
 
 v Garwood 1561 
 
 v. Hey ward 986 
 
 v. Heywood 1033 
 
 v. Hinkle 361 
 
 v. Jones 206 
 
 v. Smith 86 
 
 v. Veysie 860 
 
 Blakeley Ordnance Co., Re 1038 
 
 v. Blakeley 1261 
 
 Blakemore v. Allen 734 
 
 v Glamorganshire Canal Co. 1661 
 
 Blakeney v. Dufaur 29, 31, 1728, 
 
 1732 
 
 v Ferguson 842 
 
 Blakeslee v. Murphy 1625 
 
 Blakesley v. Pegg 1209 
 
 Blakewell V. Tagart 1213 
 
 Blakey v. Johnson 1079 
 
 v. Latham 1409 
 
 Blaksley's Trusts, Re 1691 
 
 Blanc v. Paymaster Mining Co. 206 
 
 Blauchard, Re 1841 
 
 v. Hawthorne 1685,1730 
 
 v. Cooke 158,517,1071, 
 
 1110 
 
 v. Detroit R. Co. 1663 
 
 v. Hill 1649 
 
 Bland v. Bland 40 
 
 v. Daniel 438, 1213, 1383, 1428
 
 TABLF OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 XXV 
 
 Bland v. Davison 429, 1507, 1522, 
 
 1527, 1542 
 
 v. Fleeman 100 
 
 •>>. Dawes 100 
 
 v. Lamb 40, 14-i2 
 
 v. Warren 1131 
 
 v. Winter 267 
 
 v. Wyatt 204 
 
 Blandheir v. Moore llln 
 
 Blandin, Re 109 
 
 Blaney v. Hendricks 1257 
 
 v. Sargeant 850 
 
 Blann v. Bell 1213, 1430, 1472 
 
 Blanshard v. Drew 159, 808 
 
 Blantru v. Brackett 844 
 
 v. Hall 296 
 
 Blatch v. Archer 467 
 
 Blatchford v Chicago Dredging 
 
 Co. 1663 
 
 Blatherwick v. Carey 843 
 
 Blauvelt v. Ackerman 1296 
 
 v. Smith 1062 
 
 Blaxland V. Blaxland 1328 
 
 Blaydes v Calvert 1702 
 
 Blease V. Garlington 1003, 1504, 2391 
 
 Bleckley v Rymer 719 
 
 Bledsoe v Carr 1576 
 
 Bleeker v. Bingham 557 
 
 Bleight v. M'llroy 1577 
 
 Bleniel v. Shattuck 1591 
 
 Blenkarne v Jennens 675 
 
 Blenkhorn v. Penrose 418 
 
 Bleukinsop v. Foster 1423, 1437 
 
 Bleukinsopp v. Blenkinsopp 449, 
 
 451, 452, 1055, 1824, 1834 
 
 Blennerhassett v. Day 644 
 
 Blessing v. Galveston 1661 
 
 v. John Trageser 8. C. Works 314 
 
 Blest v Brown 1394, 1399, 1407 
 
 Bleuett v Jessop 1424 
 
 Blevins i> Sympson 1416, 1417 
 
 Blewett v. Blewett 1548 
 
 Blewittu Blewitt 672 
 
 Blewit v. Thomas 319 
 
 v. Tregonning 1104 
 
 Bleyer v. Blum 1699 
 
 Bliffi.is v. Wilson 1299 
 
 Bligh, Re 85 
 
 Bligh v. Benson 580 
 
 v. Darnley, Lord 1033 
 
 v. O'Connell 86 
 
 v. Trodgett 110, 307, 309, 454 
 
 Blight v. Banks 842, 1381 
 
 Bliley v. Taylor 1728 
 
 Blind School v Goven 1796 
 
 Blinkehorne v. Feast 1385 
 
 Bliss V. Collins 806, 1675 
 
 v. Little 1463 
 
 v. Putnam 202, 1527 
 
 Blithman, Re 61 
 
 Block » Atchison, T. & S. F. R 
 
 Co 149 
 
 Blockett v. Bates 1485 
 
 Blodget v. Hobart 841, 1548 
 
 Blogg v. Johnson 3S3, 1256 
 
 Blois v. Betts 1766 
 
 Blouifield v. Eyre 388, 13-32, 1614, 
 
 1682 
 
 Bloodgood v. Clark 898. 1505, 1598, 
 
 1720, 1734 
 
 v. Kane 618 
 
 Bloomar, Re 166, 1162 
 
 Bloomstein V. Brien 296, 1624 
 
 v . Clees 542 
 
 Blore v. Ashby 406 
 
 Blossom v. Railroad Co. 1492 
 
 Blount v Bestland 90 
 
 v. Burrow 227, 1229 
 
 v. Garen 549, 584 
 
 v, Kimpton 576 
 
 v O'Connor 1370 
 
 v. Winterton 259 
 
 Blower v. Morrets 1558 
 
 Bloxam !•. Chichester 756 
 
 v. Hopkinson 1040 
 
 v Metropolitan Ry. Co. 26, 241, 
 
 244, 245, 899, 1598 
 
 Bloxsome v. Chichester 
 Bloxton v Drewit 
 Bluck v. Colnaghi 
 
 v. Elliot 
 
 v. Galsworthy 
 Bludworth v. Take 
 Blue v. Watson 
 Blue Ridge Clay Co. t 
 
 Jones 
 Bluestone Coal Co. v. Bell 
 Bluett v. Jessop 
 Blum v. Goldman 
 
 756 
 
 882, 883 
 
 793,896, 811 
 
 6t33 
 
 578, 1834 
 
 652 
 
 1562, 1563 
 
 . Floyd- 
 
 830 
 1660 
 1214 
 1511 
 
 Blumenthal v. Brainerd 1743, 1752 
 
 Blundell, Re 14H 
 
 Bluudell v. Blundell 2 l J8 
 
 Blundeu v. De»art 1842 
 
 Blunt, Re 1694, 16'J6 
 
 v. Clitherow 1750 
 
 v. Cumyus 1402 
 
 v Gee 1165 
 
 Blyth v. Green 178 
 
 v. Lafone 1862 
 
 Blythe v. Fladgate 217, 223, 269, 2116 
 
 v. Peters 1025 
 
 Board man v. Davidson 380 
 
 ■ Jackson 1228, 1229 
 
 v. Meriden Britannia Co. 1649 
 
 Board way v. Scott 1381 
 
 Boatwright v Boatwright 648 
 
 Bobb v. Bobb 334 
 
 Bobbctt v. South Eastern Ry 
 
 Co. 649 
 
 Bock v. Bock 1507 
 
 Bod lam V. Riley 1258 
 
 Boddington v. Rees 354 
 
 v Woodley 40, 43, 894 
 
 Boddy v. Kent 814, 1511, 1542, 1589 
 Bode, Baron de, Re 133 
 
 Boden v Dill 1081, 1666 
 
 Bodeu's Trust, Re 193 
 
 Bodger v. Bodger 824, 9.14 
 
 Bodicoate v. Steers 1151, 1157 
 
 Bodington o Harris 1134 
 
 Bodkin u Fitzpatrick l'J4 
 
 Bodman v. Lake Fork Drainage 
 
 District 630 
 
 Bodmin, Lady v Vandenbendy 677 
 Bodwell v. Wilcox 1591 
 
 Boehm v De Tastet 508 
 
 v. Wood 1700, 1701, 1702, 1708, 
 1710, 1711, 1713, 1729, 1741 
 Boeve « Skipwith 1533 
 
 Bofil v. Fisher 228 
 
 Bogacki v. Welch 1679 
 
 Bogirdus v. Rosendale Manuf. 
 
 Co. 26 
 
 v. Trinity Church 607. 615. 617, 
 625, 654, 694, 695, 697 
 Boger, Re 1685 
 
 Bogert v City of Elizabeth 1661 
 
 v II light 395, 1619 
 
 Bogg ti. Midland Ry. Co 10'>1 
 
 Boggs v. Brown 
 Bogle v. Bogle 
 Bo^ue v. Hnulston 
 Bogwell v. Elliot 
 Bohman v Lohinan 
 Boileau v. Ratlin 
 Boils v. Boils 
 Bointon v. Parkinson 
 Boisgerard V. Wall 
 Bolander v. Peterson 
 Bolckow ;>. Fisher 
 Bol len v. Nicholay 
 Bolders v Saunders 
 Holding v. Lane 
 Bolgiano v. Cooke 
 Holland, Er parte 
 Bolles c. Bolles 
 Boiling v. Turner 
 Bollinger v. Chouteau 
 Bolman V Lohman 
 Bolster v Catterlin 
 Bolton, Re 
 
 v. Bolton 
 V. Bull 
 
 1765 
 1551, 1655 
 367, 1643 
 
 874 
 304 
 
 s:;s 
 
 1673 
 461 
 190 
 1648 
 329, 720 
 187 
 727 
 653 
 363 
 157 
 334 
 83 
 1244, 1246 
 402 
 1631 
 108 
 1560 
 409, 906, 937 
 1612 
 
 Bolton v. Dickens 561, 602 
 
 v. Flournoy 1'iTi 
 
 v Gardner 40, 617, 618, 669, 685, 
 
 723,787, L462 
 
 v. Lambert 196,561 
 
 v. Liverpool 571, 572, 579, 943, 
 
 1831, 1834 
 
 V. Powell 324 
 
 V. Ridsdale 407, 1515 
 
 c Salmon 259 
 
 v. SUnnard 222 
 
 v. Williams 1569 
 
 Bolion, Duke of v. Williams 1564 
 
 Bol ware V Craig 378 
 
 Bomar v. Hagler 9:il 
 
 v. Means 303 
 
 v. Parker 790 
 
 Bombay Civil Fund Act, Re 1395 
 
 Bonaparte v. Camden, Jtc. R. Co 46 
 
 Bond, Ex parte 1360 
 
 Re 1346 
 
 v Barnes 70, 398, 798 
 
 v. Bell 1401 
 
 v. Conway 113 
 
 V. Graham 250 
 
 v. Green 996 
 
 V. Greeuwald 1019, 1468, 1618 
 
 v. Hendricks 286, 390 
 
 v. Hopkins 559, 1660 
 
 v Ma\ or of Newark 1661 
 
 v. Simmons 114 
 
 Bonelli, Re 864 
 
 Bonelli's El. Tel. Co., Re 1607 
 
 Bones v Angier 447 
 
 Bontield v Grant 161,176,177,476 
 
 Boiitil V. Purchas 1510 
 
 Bon ham c. Newcomb 10U3 
 
 Bonithon v Hockniore 1246 
 
 Bonnard v. Perryman 1620 
 
 Bonnardet v. Taylor 1837 
 
 Bounell v. Griswold 545 
 
 v. Lewis 1003 
 
 Bonner v. Illinois Land Co. 1507 
 
 v. Johnston 1775 
 
 v. Worthington 1710 1711 
 
 v. Young 889 
 
 Bonnewell v. Jenkins 1096, 1105 
 
 Bonny v. Bonny 216 
 
 Bouser v. Bradshaw 81, 1079, 1725. 
 
 1847 
 
 v. Cox 1505 
 
 Bonus r. Flack 1183, 1184 
 
 Bookless c Crummack 1617 
 
 Boon v. Colingwood 1713 
 
 v McGuckea 1069 
 
 v Pierpont 390, 586, 890 
 
 r. Rahl 536 
 
 Boone r. Chiles 361,569,678 
 
 Boone County v. Burlington & 
 
 M. R. Co. 1584 
 
 Booracm r North Hudson 
 
 County R. Co. 1637 
 
 v Wells 287 
 
 Bnosey ». Fairlie 46 
 
 Booth v Booth 815,837,1391,21ir, 
 V.Clark 1742,1751 
 
 v. Coulton 1256, 1735 
 
 v Leicester 791, 800, 1256, 1553, 
 1614. 1626, i628 
 V Milns 1096 
 
 v. Penser 1309 
 
 v. Rich 167 
 
 v Smith 354, 759, 760 
 
 v Stamper 341, 601 
 
 v Thompson 1502 
 
 v. Turle 655, 657 
 
 v. Wiley 660 
 
 v. 793 
 
 Boothby v. Walker l-i"> 
 
 Bootle v. Blundell 875, 876. 1014, 
 1116, 1124, 1135 
 Boovev v. SutclifTe 1710 
 
 Borah v. Archers 208,1158 
 
 Borden r. -Curtis 208 
 
 Bordierti. Burrell 1071 
 
 Boreham v. Bignall 430, 432, 1405, 
 1427
 
 xxvl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging. ] 
 
 Boren v. Billington 402 
 
 Borer v. Chapman 553, 1933 
 
 Borland v. Haveu 313 
 
 B. Thornton 1621, 1640 
 
 Borneo Company v. Robinson 654, 
 670 
 Borough v. Whichcote 867 
 
 Borrowscale v. Tuttle 994, 995 
 
 Bors i> Preston 45 
 
 Borthwick v. Evening Post 1648 
 
 Borton v. Dunbar 1490 
 
 Bosauquet v. Marsham 682, 1531 
 v. Shortridge 1126 
 
 Bosehetti v. Power 462, 749, 1780 
 Bosher v Richmond & 11. L. 
 
 (.o. 303 
 
 Bosley v. M'Kiin 550 
 
 v. Phillips 233, 313, 408 
 
 v. Susquehanna Canal 1683 
 
 Bostic v Love 845 
 
 Bostock v. N. Staff. Ry Co. 1635, 
 
 2307 
 
 Boston v. Boylston 251 
 
 Boston Bank v. Skillings, &c. 
 
 Lumber Co. 1561 
 
 Boston Diatite Co v. Florence 
 
 Manuf Co. 1620, 1642, 1644 
 
 Boston Iron Co. v. King 1232, 1244, 
 1248, 1251 
 Boston Rubber Shoe Co. V. Bos- 
 ton ll ubber Co. 10, 1648 
 Boston Water Power Co. v Bos- 
 ton & Worcester R. R. 549, 
 1637 
 Boston Woven Hose Co. v. Star 
 
 Rubber Co. 197 
 
 Boston & Lowell R. Co. v. Salem 
 
 & L. R Co. 1623, 1635, 1640 
 Bostou & Prov. R. Co v. New 
 
 York & N E. E. Co. 1719 
 
 Bostwi* k v Menek 1742, 1751 
 
 Bosville v. Brander 92, 122, 125 
 
 v. Van Voorhis 542 
 
 Boswell v. Coaks 68, 164, 307, 1381, 
 
 1440 
 
 v. Otis 457 
 
 Boswortb, lie 1411 
 
 Boteler v. Allington 569 
 
 Bothomley v Squires 324,598,599, 
 
 602, 803, 965 
 
 Bothomly V. Fairfax 1740 
 
 Bothwell ». Bonshell 86 
 
 Botifeur v. Weyman 641,667 
 
 Botsford v. Botsford 1407 
 
 v Burr 196,374 
 
 Botten v Codd 87,179 
 
 Bottle Seal Co v De La Vergne 
 
 B. & S. Co. 314 
 
 Bottoms?). Corley 109 
 
 Bottorf v Conner 650, 601 
 
 Bntts r. Patton 249 
 
 Bouche v. Ryan 37, 74 
 
 Boucher v Boucher 1 120 
 
 Bouchier v. Dillon 1497 
 
 Boucicault r. Delafield 63, 64, 814, 
 1009, 1017. 1544 
 Bouck v. Bouck S23, 335, 336 
 
 v. Wilber 671 
 
 Bodinot r. Small 324 
 
 Bouldenr. Lanahan 280,1056 
 
 Bouldin ». Baltimore 1668 
 
 Boulter v. Mut. Loan Ass'n 1652 
 Boulton v. Beard 1418 
 
 v. Pritchard 1129 
 
 Boulo v. New Orleans, &c R. 
 
 Co 1631 
 
 Bound V. Wells 512, 536 
 
 Bourbaud v. Bourbaud 6.3, 814, 
 
 1588, 1675 
 
 Bourdillon v. Adair 95 
 
 V. Baddeley 823 
 
 Bourdin v. Oreenwood 646 
 
 Bourdon v. Martin 1591, 1743, 1756 
 
 Bourgeois v. Schrage 1461 
 
 Bourke v Callanan 1073 
 
 v Davis 749. 892 
 
 v. Donoghue 1387 
 
 Bourke v Kelly 
 
 v Nicol 
 Bourn v. Bourn 
 Bourne, Ex parte 
 
 v Brickton 
 
 v. Coulter 
 
 630 
 354 
 
 1287 
 152 
 
 1470 
 402, 423 
 
 v Hall 1551, 1552 
 
 i'. Mole 1772 
 
 Bourton v. Williams 993 
 
 Bousfield v. Hodges 1293 
 
 v. Mould 834 
 
 Bouslog v. Garrett 371 
 
 Bousquet v. Bent 1008 
 
 Boussmaker, Ex parte 51, 52 
 
 Bouton v Dement 236 
 
 Bovill v. Bird 911 
 
 v. Clark 781 
 
 v Cowan 943, 1826 
 
 v. Crate 1663 
 
 v. Goodier 1139, 1525, 1652, 
 
 1643 
 
 v. Hitchcock 1071, 1080 
 
 v. Smith 579 
 
 Bowden, lie 250 
 
 v Crow 324 
 
 v. Parrish 1290 
 
 V. Russell 1( 70 
 
 Bowditch v. Banuelos 2030, 2031 
 
 v. Soltyk 1411, 1427, 156u 
 
 Bowdon v. Allen 564 
 
 Bowen, He 1043 
 
 Bowen, lie, Andrew v. Cooper 200 
 
 v. Brecon Ry. Co. 1743 
 
 v. Cross 402, 778, 780 
 
 v. Evans 675 
 
 v. Fairman 1772 
 
 v. Gilleylen 1461 
 
 v. Idley 71, 294, 403, 406, 409, 
 
 776 
 
 v. Pearson 1825 
 
 v. Price 374, 480 
 
 Bower v. Baxter 1661 
 
 v Cooper 1063 
 
 v. Morris 1260 
 
 v. Sockte des Affreteurs du 
 
 Great Eastern 217 , 324 , 602 
 
 v. Swadlin 609 
 
 Bower Barff R. L. Co. v. Wells 
 
 R I. Co. 759 
 
 Bowers v. Keesecher 334,341 
 
 v. Smith 68, 170, 1001 
 
 Bowersbank v Colasseau 1738,1739 
 
 Bowes, lie 171 8 
 
 v. Bute, Marquis of 1163 
 
 t;. Farrar 732 
 
 v. Fernie 1824 
 
 v. Heapes 1386 
 
 v. Law 1081, 1654 
 
 Bowie v. Ailsa 40, 1462 
 
 v. Minter 302, 1518 
 
 Bowker v Nickson 13o3, 1311 
 
 Bowland v. Sprauls 418 
 
 Bowles' Case 1633 
 
 Bowles v Drayton 1369 
 
 v Rump 1151, 1161 
 
 v. Stewart 298, 378 
 
 v. Weeks 1263 
 
 Bowling v. Scales 1722, 1845 
 
 Bowling Green, &c. v. Todd 1841 
 
 Bowman v Ash 369 
 
 v. Bell 1734 
 
 v. Bowman 1099 
 
 v Burnley 302 
 
 v. Chicago, &c. Ry. Co. 779 
 
 v. Floyd 1648, 1650 
 
 V. Griffith 674 
 
 v. Lygon 689 
 
 v Marshall . 701 
 
 v Middleton 1073 
 
 v. O'Reilly 860 
 
 v. Ilodwell 944 
 
 ii. Wathen 560 
 
 Bown, lie 100 
 
 v. Child 933, 935, 936 
 
 v. Stenson 989 
 
 Browne v. Ritter 1281 
 
 Bowra v. Wright 73, 166, 1162 
 
 Bowser v. Colby 882, 884, 1111, 
 
 1658 
 
 v. Hughes 62 
 
 Bowsher v. Watkins 200. 324 
 
 Bowyer v. Beamish 604, 1527 
 
 v. Bright 1473, 1535, 1537 
 
 v Covert 252, 290 
 
 v. Griffin 1411 
 
 v. Pritchard 1568 
 
 v. Woodman 102, 653 
 
 Box v Jackson 119 
 
 Boxy v . McKay 245 
 
 Boyce v. Grundy 630 
 
 v. Wheeler 1159 
 
 Boyd, Ex parte 1556 
 
 v. Alabama 659 
 
 v. Boyd 68 
 
 v. Brookes 1425 
 
 v. Eby 852 
 
 v . Gill 193 
 
 v. Hamilton 1073 
 
 v. Heinzelman 816 
 
 v. Higginson 643 
 
 v. Hoyt 303, 334, 338, 340, 346, 
 
 559 
 
 v Jaga 824,825 
 
 v. Jones 212 
 
 v. Mills 590, 601, 760 
 
 v. Moyle 344, 368. 429 
 
 v Murry 1722 
 
 v. Petrie 1003, 1209 
 
 v. Royal Ins Co. 1743 
 
 v State 1614 
 
 v Stewart 1120 
 
 v. Vanderkemp296, 526, 1476, 1580 
 
 v. Wiley 560, 1290 
 
 Boydell v. Manby 1266 
 
 Boyden v Partridge 193, 200, 222 
 
 Boyer?'. BlackweU 1288 
 
 v. Clark 1845 
 
 B03 es v. Cook 973 
 
 Boyle v. Brettws Llantwit C 
 
 Co. 1732 
 
 v. Hardy 1253 
 
 v. Lysaght 1658 
 
 v Sacker 1474 
 
 v. Smithman 1835 
 
 v Wiseman 1103, 1105, 1125 
 
 v. Zacharie 1 
 
 Boynton r. Barstow 314 
 
 v. Boynton 64, 1422, 1507, 1538 
 
 11. Brastow 2061 
 
 v. Djer 1369 
 
 v. Kneeseville E. L. Co. 536 
 
 v. Richardson 1417 
 
 Boys v. Morgan 1477 
 
 BoVse, Re 1627 
 
 B03 se. He, Crofton v. Crofton 915 
 
 v. Cokell 766, 820, 1821 
 
 v. Colclough 664,890,1148 
 
 v Rossborough 552, 876, 1074, 
 
 1075 
 
 Bozon v. Bolland 540, 1842, 1845 
 
 v. Williams 674 
 
 Brace v. Blick 883 
 
 v. Harrington 199 
 
 v. Marlborough, Duchess of 678, 
 
 1390, 1424 
 
 v Ormond 1432 
 
 v. Ta\ lor 329 
 
 v. Wehnert 1660 
 
 Bracebridge »> Buckley 1658, 1659 
 
 Bracey v Sandiford 77 
 
 Bracken v. Kennedy 690 
 
 Brackenbury v Brackenbury 10i'9 
 
 Brackett v. Tillot^on ll'Bfl 
 
 Bracton v. Morris 1481 
 
 Bradberry v Brooke 40,1482 
 
 Bradhurv Butler 313 
 
 V. Dickens 1648, loon 
 
 v. Sharp l fi 4 ,J ! 
 
 v. Shawe 607, 79, 
 
 Bradby v. Whitchurch 1417 
 
 Bradford Allen 1381 
 
 v. Bradford 597, 1-134 
 
 ik Central Kansas L. & T 
 
 Co. 1842
 
 Bradford v. Felder 407, 1507 
 
 v. Geixs 238:1 
 
 v. Hamilton 1292 
 
 v. Nettleship 1800 
 
 v. Peckhain 1614, 1677 
 
 v. Young 205, 553, 663, 1469, 
 
 1794 
 Bradford School of Industry, 
 
 lie 16 
 
 Bradish v. Ellamea 1267 
 
 v Gee ' 973, 974, 1585 
 
 v. Gibbs 
 
 v . Oruut 
 
 Bradlaugh v. Clarke 
 
 v Newdegate 
 Bradley v. Amidon 
 v. Bevington 
 v. Borlase 
 v Chase 
 v. Converse 
 v. Crackenthorp 
 v. Dibrell 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 Brandred v. Paterson Machine 
 
 XXV11 
 
 v. Emerson 
 v Hitchcock 
 v. McKenna 
 v. Morgan 
 v. Richardson 
 v. Riches 
 v Root 
 V. Snyder 
 V. Stelfox 
 v. Webb 
 
 100, 186 
 
 402 
 
 10 
 
 1558 
 
 69 
 
 987, 1072, 1078 
 
 710 
 
 1397 
 
 860 
 
 939 
 
 402, 1536 
 
 87, 90 
 
 1387 
 
 122 
 
 197 
 
 1623 
 
 674 
 
 885. 886 
 
 1243 
 
 798 
 
 844 
 
 Shop 395 
 
 Braudreth v. Lance 1644 
 
 Brandt v. Klein 944 
 
 Bran ford v. Branford 564 
 
 Branger v. Chevalier 1310 
 
 Branham v. Commonwealth li£5 
 Branksea Island Co., lie 669 
 
 Branscomb v. Gillian 1157 
 
 Brantley v. Gunn 1315 
 
 Brasbridge v. W'oodroffe 1427 
 
 Brasfield v. French 597 
 
 Brasher v. Cortlandt 286, 538 
 
 v. Macey 208, 1630 
 
 v. Van Cortlandt 83,175, 100, 390 
 Brass & Iron Works v. Payne 552, 
 1648 
 Brassey v. Chalmers 
 
 v New York, &c. R, Co. 
 Brassington v. Brassington 
 Brasted v. Sutton 
 Brattle v. Waterman 
 Braund v. Devon, Earl of 
 Braunstein v. Lewis 
 Brawell v. Reed 
 
 Bradley & H M Co v. Charles 
 
 Parker Co. 1642 
 
 Bradshaw v. Bradshaw 907, 909, 943, 
 
 1353, 1778, 1780 
 
 v Outram 283 
 
 Bradstock v. Whalley 765 
 
 v. Whatley 291, 352, 461, 763 
 
 Bradstreet v. Baldwin 915 
 
 v. Supervisors, &c. 46 
 
 Bradt v. Kirkpatrick 328, 329, 558 
 Brad well v. Weeks 49, 51, 538 
 
 Brady v Brady 
 
 Hamlett 
 
 v. McCosker 
 
 v. Waldron 
 
 v. Weeks 
 Bragg v. Lyon 
 Braham v. Bustard 
 Brain v. Brain 
 lira man I v. Jones 
 
 v Moss 
 Braithwaite, lip. 
 
 1180 
 1019 
 298, 1520, 1546 
 1030 
 303, 34. 
 1157 
 1649 
 
 399 
 1254 
 1578 
 
 433 
 
 Braxton v. Lee 
 v. Willing 
 Bray, lie 
 
 v Akers 
 
 v. Creekmore 
 
 v. Fromont 
 
 v. Laird 
 
 v. Thatcher 
 
 v. West 
 Wood ran 
 
 209 
 
 1734 
 
 1842 
 
 1717 
 
 410 
 
 311 
 
 100 
 
 1723 
 
 997 
 
 1077 
 
 1803 
 
 180, 181, 182 
 
 418 
 
 219 
 
 1491 
 
 345 
 
 1436 
 
 969 
 
 1347 
 
 26, 334 
 
 1576, 1581 
 
 974, 993, 1460 
 
 1267 
 
 1258 
 
 1469, 1471 
 
 324 
 
 1841 
 
 1111 
 
 586 
 
 325 
 
 162, 475 
 
 1257 
 
 905, 918 
 
 Braithwaite, Re, Braithwaite v. 
 
 Wallis I779 
 
 Braithwaite v. Kearns 891, 914 
 
 r Robinson 232 
 
 Braker v Devereaux 208 
 
 Braman v. Wilkinson 1551 
 
 Bramblett f>. Pickett 1030 
 
 Bramley v. Teal I775 
 
 Brampton v. Barker 678 
 
 Bramston v. Carter 421, 802 
 
 Bramwell v Halcomb 1645, 1646 
 Branch, Ex parte 985 
 
 Branch r;. Booker 219 
 
 v. Browne I345 
 
 i'. Dawson ttq 
 
 Branch Turnp Co v. Yuba 
 Brande r. Gilchrist 
 
 v. Grace 
 Branden v. Cabiness 
 Branilett v. Lance 
 Brandford v. Freeman 
 Brandling v. Humble 
 Brandlyn )'. Ord 
 Brandon, Ex parte 
 Brandon v Brandon 
 
 Bray Electric Tramway, lie 1378 
 Braybrooke v Attorney-General 
 
 1501 
 Braybrooke, Lord v. Inskip 1220 
 Braye, Re Hill 
 
 Drayton v. Smith 1711 1713 
 
 Brazier Fortune 571 
 
 Brazil, Emperor of v. Robinson 18 
 Breach, Ec parte 1795, 1815 
 
 v. Casterton 1131 
 
 Breadalbane, Marquis of v. 
 
 Chandos 664, 1626 
 
 Brearcliff v. Dorrington 1040 
 
 Brechen v. Hussell 
 Breck ?'. Smith 
 Breckenridge v. Brooks 
 
 v Crouch 
 v. Curling 
 v Mullenix 
 v. Xesbitt 
 Sands 
 
 1631 
 
 313, 1551 
 
 1660 
 
 280, 856 
 
 1647 
 
 1128 
 
 1800, 1801 
 
 659, 674 
 
 149 
 
 281, 1476, 
 
 1525, 1749, 1768 
 
 987, 1599 
 
 52 
 
 917, 950 
 
 51 
 
 547, 548 
 
 Brandon Man. Co. v. Prime- 601 
 
 1548 
 
 Brecton v. Russell 
 Bree v. Marescaux 
 Breed v. Lynn 
 
 v. Pratt 
 Breeding i' Finley 
 Breedlove v. Nicolet 
 Breeze v. English 
 Brend v. Brend 
 Brendle v. Herren 
 Brennan v. Preston 
 ' v. Vogt 
 
 Brenner ». Bigelow 
 Brent, lie 
 
 v Dold 
 
 v. Maryland 
 Brentwood Brick and Coal Co 
 
 In re 
 Brereton v. Edwards 
 
 V. Gamul 
 Breslauer r. Brown 
 Bresler n. Pitts 
 Bressemlen v. Decreets 
 
 418 
 
 1698 
 
 551, 1247, 
 
 1259, 1260 
 
 417 
 
 449 
 
 1168 
 
 851 
 
 27 
 
 45 
 
 411, 423,992 
 
 1003 
 
 Brewer, Ex parte 
 
 v. Boston Theatre 
 
 D Bowman 
 
 v. Connecticut 
 
 v. Squire 
 
 v. Tyringham 
 
 v . Yorke 
 
 Brewis v. Lawson 
 
 Brewster, Matter of 
 
 v. Bours 
 
 v. Hatch 
 
 v. Luut 
 
 v. Thorpe 
 
 v Wakefield 
 
 Breyfogle v. Beckley 
 
 Briaut, In re, Poulterti. Shackel 90, 
 
 92 
 
 v. Dennett 1797 
 
 v. Reed 15C0, 1562, 1564 
 
 v. Thomas 334 
 
 Brice v. Banister 1:9 
 
 v. Mallett 632 
 
 r. Miller 113 
 
 Brick v. Staten Island Ry. Co. 1642 
 
 Brickhouse v. Hunter 1250 
 
 Brickill v Baltimore 560 
 
 v. New York 1195, 13n4 
 
 Brickwood v. Harvey 523 
 
 Bridge v. Bridge 953, 955 
 
 v. Brown 1359 
 
 v. Burns 964 
 
 v. Eddows I077 
 
 v. Johnson 1502 
 
 Bridesburg Manufacturing Co.'s 
 
 Appeal 1561 
 
 Bridger v. Parfold 1288 
 
 v. Thrasher 303, 314 
 
 Bridges v. Canfield 27 
 
 v. Hinxmau 
 
 v. Longman 
 
 v. McKenna 
 
 v. Mitchell 
 
 v. Robinson 
 
 v. Sheldon 
 
 v. Sperry 
 Bridewell Hospital, lie 
 Bridget v. Hamer 
 
 232 
 
 1408 
 109 
 641 
 
 1653 
 1299,1381,1440 
 
 1158 
 
 1847 
 223 
 
 Bridgewater v. DeWinton 726, 
 
 774, 1835 
 Bridguian v. St. Johnsbury & 
 
 L C. R. Co. 190 
 
 Bridgwood v. Wynn 1131 
 
 Bridson v. Benecke 1642 
 
 1029 
 905 
 546 
 1624 
 1799 
 1073 
 1841 
 
 1653 
 1040 
 
 Bressler v. McCune 
 Breton v. Mockett 
 Brett, Re 
 
 v. Carmichael 
 
 677, 679, 700 
 
 157 
 
 1164 
 
 283, 288, 
 
 289, 419 
 
 1468 
 
 973 
 
 1615 
 
 1203 
 
 v. East India & London Ship 
 
 ping Co. 
 
 v. Forcer 
 
 v. Imperial Gas Co. 
 Brevard v. Summar 
 Brevoort ?>. Brevoort 
 
 v. Detroit 
 
 v. McJimsey 
 
 1657 
 92 
 
 1666 
 797, 1003 
 228 
 146.8 
 16B0 
 
 v. M'Alpine 
 Brien v Buttorff 
 
 v. Harriman 
 
 v. Jordan 
 
 v. Paul 
 BrJerly v. Ward 
 Brieseh ». M'Cauley 
 
 1642 
 543 
 1732 
 
 700 
 
 1588, 1743, 1744 
 
 526, 528 
 
 1622 
 
 Brings r. Beale 416, 804. 809 
 v French 1615, 1627, 1965, 2274 
 v. Law 1623 
 
 V liirhmond 2^1 
 v. Shaw 1R23 
 
 V Smith 1040 
 v. Wilson 643, 644,646. 1211 
 
 Brigham v. Luddington 149, 191 
 
 1743 
 
 v Wheeler 1352 
 
 V. While 1677 
 
 Brighouse >< Margetson 536, 1600 
 
 Bright, Ex parte 157 
 
 Bright v. Boyd 2219 
 
 v Bright 1271 
 
 v. Eynon 1129 
 
 V. Legerton 1003 
 
 v. Rowe 2182 
 
 v. Spratt 1599 
 
 v. Tvndall 1001 
 
 Brignall v. Whitehead 1510, 1690 
 
 Brigstocke ?>. Roch SlO, 1573 
 
 Brill v Styles 542 
 
 Brink V Morton 1111 
 
 Brinkerhoffr. Brown 303, 334, &38, 
 
 588, 982, 1290 
 
 V. Franklin 1026, 1550
 
 XXVIU 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Brinkerhoffti. Lansing 1392,1399, 
 
 v. Thalhiuier 284 
 
 Ki80 
 
 Brinklcv v. Att.-Gen. 1573 
 
 c Avery 48 
 
 Brinson v. Halden 1765 
 
 Briuton v. Birch 2u3 
 
 Brisco v. Kenrick 214 
 
 Bristed v. Wilkins 1039, 1H41 
 
 Bristol v. Morgan 194 
 
 Bristol Hydraulic Co. v. Boyer 1639 
 
 Bristol. &c. Co v. Maggs 364 
 
 Bristow v. Towers 50 
 
 v. Whitmore 1001,2182 
 
 Bristowe v. Needham 5<l4, 1747, 
 
 1750, 1755 
 
 Britain v. Cowen 161, 445 
 
 British Dynamite Co. v. Krebs 1014, 
 
 1503 
 
 British Empire Shipping Co v. 
 
 Somes 552, 1556, 1557, 1625 
 
 Britisli Equitable Ass. Co v. 
 
 Vale of Neath By. Co. 1513 
 
 British Imperial Co , Re 1596 
 
 British Mut. lnv. Co. v. Cob- 
 bold 1841 
 British South Africa Co. v. 
 
 Conipanhia de Mozambique 629 
 British & Foreign Gas Co., lie 1611 
 Britnell v. Walton 508 
 
 Briton Medical Life Ass. Ass'n, 
 
 lie 1620, 1658 
 
 Briton Medical & G. L. Ass. Co. 
 
 v. Jones 1120 
 
 Briton v. South Wales Ry. Co. 1130 
 
 Brittain v. Dickson 1508 
 
 Britten v. Britten 95 
 
 Brlttin v. Crabtree 843 
 
 Brittlebank, He 1358 
 
 v. Goodwin 644, 1420 
 
 v. Smith 892 
 
 Brittou v. Brewster 328 
 
 v. Johnson 993 
 
 Broad v. Wickham 1743 
 
 Broadbent ?'. Imperial Gas Co. 1635, 
 
 1637 
 
 Broadhead v. Marshall 1134 
 
 Broadhurst v. Tunnicliff 1019, 1492 
 
 Broadwood, Re 9!) 
 
 Brocas v. Lloyd 905, 908 
 
 Brock v. North Western Fuel Co. 357 
 
 Brocken V. Martin 816 
 
 Brocker v. Hamilton 1699 
 
 Brocklebank, Ex parte 68,84 
 
 V. East London By. Co. 1744, 1752 
 
 r. King's Lynn Steamship Co. 26, 
 
 Si 
 
 Brorklesby v. Munn 1661 
 
 Brocksopp v. Barnes 1233 
 
 Brockway r.Copp 547,721,837,1042 
 
 v. Wells 1392 
 
 Broder v. Saillard 211, 261, 4"6, 
 
 1168, 1637 
 
 Broderlck's Will 552 
 
 Broderick v. Broderick 1622 
 
 Brodie r Barry 1723 
 
 v. Bolton 1437, 1438 
 
 v. Johnson 1144 
 
 v. St Paul 1388, 1404 
 
 v. Skelton 457 
 
 Brograve v. Watts 1050 
 
 Brokaw r. Brokaw 200, 314 
 
 V. McDougall 1159 
 
 Bromage v. Davies 1284 
 
 Bromberg v. Heyer 368, 545, 707 
 
 Bromfield V Chichester 508 
 
 Bromilow v. Phillips 887, 1069 
 
 Bromley. Re 187 
 
 v. Hnlland 197,247,552,1680 
 
 v. Kelly 316, 1779 
 
 v. Smith 135, 156, 243, 1386 
 
 r. Williams 241 
 
 Bronson's Case 1069 
 
 v. Keokuk 149, 191 
 
 v. Kinzie 1241 
 
 v. La Crosse, &c. R. Co. 26, 287, 
 
 1463, 1548 
 
 Bronson v. R. R. Co. 
 
 994 
 
 Brooch v. Kelly 
 
 940 
 
 Brook, Re 
 
 1168 
 
 v. Alcock 
 
 39 
 
 v. Archer 
 
 1081 
 
 v. Biddall 
 
 908 
 
 v. Smith 
 
 166, 1345 
 
 Brook, Lord v. Hertford, Lord 72, 73 
 
 Brooke, Ex parte 
 
 157 
 
 v. 
 
 1219 
 
 v. Brooke 
 
 1525 
 
 V. Clarke 
 
 1679 
 
 V. Hewitt 
 
 543 
 
 v. Hickes 
 
 92, 105 
 
 v. Mosn n 67, 68, 16E 
 
 ,801,1584 
 
 v. Tarbell 
 
 K'76 
 
 v. Todd 
 
 977 
 
 Brooke, Lord v. Warwick 
 
 Earl 
 
 of 
 
 1489 
 
 Brooker, Ex parte 
 
 157 
 
 Re 
 
 1616 
 
 v. Brooker 
 
 1616, 1734 
 
 v. Collier 
 
 1268 
 
 v. Smith 
 
 449 
 
 Brookes v. Boucher 
 
 380. 721 
 
 v Burt 
 
 152 
 
 v. Wbitworth, Lord 
 
 335, 346 
 
 Brookfield v. Bradley 
 
 1029, lf.24 
 
 *'. Williams 
 
 1156-1158 
 
 Brooking v. Maudslay 349, 354, 1573 
 v. Skewis 1387 
 
 Brooklyn White Lead Co. v. 
 
 Masury 1648, 1649 
 
 Brookman, Re 1608 
 
 Brooks v. Barrett 851 
 
 v. Brooks 110, 179 
 
 v. Byam 723, 760, 1377, 1381, 1405 
 v. Cannon 
 
 v. Carpentier 
 v. Bias 
 v. fJibbons 
 v. Gillis 
 v. Greathed 
 
 v. Hamilton 
 r. Howard 
 r. Jones 
 v. Kelly 
 V. Lewis 
 v. M'Kean 
 v. Martin 
 v. Mead 
 v. Miller 
 v. Mills County 
 V. Moody 
 v. Morison 
 l<. O'Hara 
 v. Purton 
 
 325 
 
 1631 
 
 587, 588 
 
 844 
 
 1057, 1058, 1717, 
 
 1718, 1744 
 
 324 
 
 1120 
 
 1507 
 
 1274, 1551 
 
 295 
 
 905, 918 
 
 154S 
 
 829 
 
 378, 1642 
 
 634 
 
 777 
 
 452 
 
 314, 659, 1663 
 
 690. 702, 706. 1590. 
 
 1624, 1675, 2129 
 
 v. Railroad Co. 1019, 1120 
 
 v. Reynolds 236, 250, 1207, 1615 
 
 v. Silver *43 
 
 v. Snaith 1287 
 
 v. Spann 418 
 
 v Sutton 669, 700 
 
 v. Taylor 807 
 
 r. Wigg 888 
 
 Brooksbank v Higginbottom 795 
 
 v. Smith 645 
 
 Broome, E.r parte 1727 
 
 Brophy v. Bellamy 1342, 1359 
 
 v. Holmes 1467, 1477 
 
 Brotherton v. Chance 774 
 
 v. Hatt 675 
 
 Brougham, Lord v. Poulett, 
 
 Lord 1428 
 
 Broughton v Broughton 1234, 1235, 
 
 1413, 1414 
 
 V. Lashmar 791 
 
 v. Martvn 507 
 
 IV Fitch'ford 1778 
 
 Broward r. Hoeg 214 
 
 Browder v Jackson 190 
 
 Brower i' Cothran 1120 
 
 Brown's Appeal 1657 
 
 Brown, Ex parte 168, 553, 907, 
 
 1120, 1756, 1854 
 
 Brown, Re 70, 191, 494, 571, 1048,- 
 1407, 1449, 1798, 1874 
 r. Armistead 997 
 
 v. Ashley 1639 
 
 v. Aspden 1472 
 
 v. Bark ham 1259 
 
 v. Bigley 1846 
 
 v. Brown 79,553, 713, 846, 847, 
 1029, 1228, 1320, 1626, 
 2012 
 v. Bruce 732 
 
 v. Buck 334 
 
 v. Bulkley 737, 844, 845, 951 
 
 v. Burdett 1213, 1411, 1528 
 
 v. Burke 1076 
 
 v. Butter 802 
 
 v Byrne 1168 
 
 V.Chambers 856,875 
 
 v. Clark 85, 102 
 
 v. Clarke 1138 
 
 V. Collins 108 
 
 v. Commonwealth 1624 
 
 v. Concord 1661 
 
 v. County of Buena Vista 561 
 v. Crane 989 
 
 v Crowe 447 
 
 v. Dailey 1299 
 
 v. Dawson 41, 43 
 
 v. Desmond 629 
 
 v. De Tastet 219, 1232, 1250, 1318, 
 1782, 2242, 2279 
 v. Douglas 599 
 
 v. Dowthwaite 255 
 
 v Duluth, &c. R. Co. 26 
 
 v. Easton 1081, 1666 
 
 v Edsall 548 
 
 v. Elton 92 
 
 v. Frost 1284 
 
 v. Fuller 1667, 1677 
 
 v. Gellatley 1448 
 
 v Gilmer 1288 
 
 v. Guarantee Trust Co 334 
 
 v. Half 1663, 1699, 1702 
 
 v. Hammond 658 
 
 v. Haskins 1678 
 
 v. Hay ward 185, 876 
 
 v. Higgs 1475 
 
 v. Home 518, 526, 528 
 
 v. How 1417 
 
 v. Hull 68 
 
 v. Johnson 197, 199, 260, 287 
 
 v. Jones 1081 
 
 v J. Wayland Kimball Co. 552 
 v. Kahnweiler 844 
 
 v Kalamazoo Circuit Judge 1071 
 v. Keating 764, 2124 
 
 v. Kelty 1775 
 
 v. Lake 244, 779, 1170, 1206, 1540 
 v. Lake Superior Iron Co. 517, 
 560, 1734 
 v. Lamphear 1973 
 
 V. Launan 874 
 
 v Lee 471,507,741 
 
 v. Lexington and Danville K. R. 
 
 Co 633,659,800 
 
 v. McDonald 379 
 
 v. Marzyck 1062 
 
 v. Mathews 1481 
 
 v. Metropolitan Gas Light Co. 1661 
 v. Miner 378, 1003, 1073 
 
 v. Minis 17 
 
 v. Newall 1553 
 
 v. North 113 
 
 v. Oakshott 1290, 1834 
 
 v. Pay son 571 
 
 v. Perkins 670, 1250, 1827 
 
 v. Pickard 839 
 
 v Pierce 837,2389 
 
 v Piper 314 
 
 v. Pitman 251 
 
 v. Porter 643 
 
 v. Pringle 1795 
 
 v. Rentfro 974 
 
 v. Bbinehart 418 
 
 v. Ricketts 217, 225,238, 415, 417, 
 692, 828, 834, 1598 
 v. Riggin 255 

 
 Brown v. Robertson 
 
 1594 
 
 v, Rogers 
 
 63,417 
 
 v. Runals 
 
 887 
 
 v. Rye 
 
 1391 
 
 v. Sawyer 
 
 4u3 
 
 If. Seidel 
 
 1646 
 
 v. Severson 
 
 1576 
 
 if. Sen ell 
 
 380, 1440 
 
 v. Simons 1237, 1239, 1243, 1245, 
 1246, 1247, 1258, 13./1, 1392 
 v. Smith 1353, 1358, 1361 
 
 v , South Boston Savings Bank 
 
 1385, 1918 
 If Stanton 452 
 
 if. Stead 259 
 
 v. Stewart 1677 
 
 if. Storey 1127 
 
 if. Story 39, 154 
 
 v. Swann 1556 
 
 v. Thomas 1517 
 
 v. Thornton 1557 
 
 if Trotman 1041, 1206 
 
 v. Troup 1551 
 
 if. Trustees 1620 
 
 if. Turner 1157 
 
 if. Vandermeuleu 1716 
 
 if. Vand} ke 371, 667, 668 
 
 v. Wales 342, 1558 
 
 if. Walker 249 
 
 v. Wallace 1061, 1276, 1283 
 
 v Warner 1544 
 
 v. Weatherby 232 
 
 if. Weatherhead 79 
 
 If. Weldon 313 
 
 v. White 409, 991, 1576, 1580, 
 
 2382 
 if. Williams 1299 
 
 if. Winans 1677 
 
 if. Wincoop 986 
 
 if. Winehill 1440 
 
 v. Wood 457, 875 
 
 Browne, Matter of 1S41 
 
 v Blount 151, 1718 
 
 v. Browne 598 
 
 V. Collins 1225, 1413 
 
 v Groombridge 1428, 1528 
 
 v Huggins 229 
 
 v. Lockhart 972, 1378, 1601, 1835 
 * McClintock 1120, 1121, 1139 
 v. Monmouthshire Ry. and 
 
 Canal Co. 243 
 
 v. Murray 1097 
 
 v. Radford 649, 650 
 
 if. Savage 881, 981 
 
 v. Smith 978 
 
 Browne's Hospital, Re, v. Stam- 
 ford 13, 16 
 Brownell 17, Brownell 371, 667, 668 
 v Curtis 548, 563, 691 
 Browning v. Barker 1192 
 V. Barton 1192 
 V. Bettis 1720 
 v- Pratt 327 
 v. Sloman 783 
 v. Watkins 1561, 1562 
 Brownlee v. Lockwood 251 
 v. Martin 1071 
 v Warmack 1548 
 Brownsword v. Edwards 315, 542, 
 549, 563, 587, 602, 615, 697 
 Browse, lie 1589 
 Broyles v. Arnold 1841 
 Brine v. Allen 592 
 v. Bainbridge 1408 
 v. Bonney 1961, 2281 
 v Gale 1381 
 v. Kinloek 1600, 1610 
 v. Manchester & Keene R Co. 1743 
 v. Prebendary of Deer 1503 
 v. Rawlins " 1130 
 Bruen v. Crane 197 
 Bruere v. Wharton 999 
 Bruff v. Cobbold 894, 1026, 1460 
 Bruin v. Knott 1360, 1415 
 Bruiton if. Birch 203 
 Brumagmi v. Chew 1462, 1472, 147'1, 
 1479 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Brumfit v. Hart 821, 823 
 
 Brumley v. Westchester Co. 
 
 Mauuf. Soc. 145, 146, 735 
 
 Brundage v Goodfellow 1307 
 
 BruuUige v Morrison 1285 
 
 v. Rutherford 216 
 
 Brundred v. Paterson Machine 
 
 Co. 1668 
 
 Bruner v Battell 1031 
 
 17. Planters' Bank 1622 
 
 v Threadgill 1385 
 
 Brungger v. Smith 576 
 
 Brunker, Ex parte 1698,1699,1700, 
 
 1705 
 
 Brunsdon v Allard 1846 
 
 Brunskill v. Giles 1093, 1094 
 
 Brunswick v. Lamb 790 
 
 Brunswick, Duke of v. Cambridge, 
 
 Duke of 726, 764 
 
 if. Hanover, King of 17, 18, 20, 
 
 141. 142 
 
 Brurton v. Rutland 1151 
 
 Brufclike v. Der Nord Chicago 
 
 Schuetzen V'erein 691. 1580 
 
 Brush Electric Co. v. Brush-Swan 
 
 E L. Co. 1548 
 
 v. California Electric Light Co. 197 
 
 Bryan, lie, Godfrey i> Bryan 92 
 
 v. Bl} the 334, 342, 346, 347, 559 
 
 v. Bryan 
 
 v. Connick 
 
 v. Kales 
 
 v. Kennett 
 
 v McGee 
 
 v. Mansion 
 
 v. Morgan 
 
 v. Parker 
 
 v. Reed 
 
 v Rooks 
 
 v. Sanderson 
 
 v. Spruill 
 
 v. Truman 
 
 v. Twigg 
 
 v. Wastell 
 Bryant, Ite 
 
 v. Blackwell 
 
 v. Bull 
 
 v. Bu^k 
 
 v. Erskine 
 
 v. Leland 
 
 v. Livi-rmore 
 
 v. Packett 
 
 v. Puekett 
 
 V Reading 
 
 v. Russell 
 
 v. Tracy 
 Brydges v Hatch 
 Brygger v Schweitzer 
 Brynier v. Buchanan 
 Bryou v Metropolitan Saloon 
 
 Omnibus Co. 1064,1408 
 
 Bryson v Nichols 1235 
 
 v. Petty 388, 1042, 1480, 1705 
 
 v. Warwick and Birmingham 
 Canal Co. 398, 910 
 
 v. Whitehead 2265 
 
 Bubb v. Yelverton 1633 
 
 Buccleugh v. Cowan 334 
 
 Buccleugh, Duke of v. Metro- 
 politan Board of Works 1860 
 Buchanan v. Berkshire Life Ins. 
 
 91 
 
 1717, 1744 
 
 553. 560 
 
 1584 
 
 251 
 
 1805 
 
 1168 
 
 1111 
 
 980 
 
 114 
 
 1062 
 
 121, 122, 324, 545 
 
 783 
 
 176, 1525 
 
 410 
 
 1673, 1684 
 
 1390 
 
 1037, 1453 
 
 1402 
 
 261 
 
 155 i 
 
 68 
 
 644 
 
 89 
 
 1326 
 
 1381 
 
 68 
 
 933 
 
 1029 
 
 1570 
 
 XXIX 
 
 Buck v. Webb 991 
 
 Buckell v. Blenkhorn 2198 
 
 Buckeridge v. Whalley 909, 1252, 
 
 1253. 1478, 1479 
 
 Buckingham v. Buckingham 1682 
 
 v. Corning 1517, 1523, 1537, 1579, 
 
 1584 
 
 v. Peddicord 524 
 
 v. Wesson 1548 
 
 Buckles v. Chicago, M. & St P 
 
 Ry. Co 
 Buckley, lie 
 
 v. Baldwin 
 
 v. Cooke 
 
 v. Corse 
 
 v Cross 
 
 v. Howe 
 
 v Howell 
 
 v. Lyttle 
 
 v. Puckeridge 
 
 v. Royal N. L. V. Ass'n 
 Buckmaster v. Buckmaster 
 
 1576 
 
 1814 
 
 1716 
 
 9U6 
 
 412 
 
 4D6 
 
 411 
 
 1874 
 
 52 
 
 79 
 
 1731 
 
 108, 
 
 1753 
 
 1487 
 
 145,296 
 
 1558 
 
 1580 
 
 1022 
 
 1358 
 
 1594 
 
 858 
 
 68 
 
 207 
 
 Co. 
 
 1716 
 
 v. (lurry 
 
 51 
 
 v Deslmn 
 
 46 
 
 t; Green way 
 
 710, 1224 
 
 v. Hodgson 
 
 691, 1831 
 
 v Lloyd 
 
 1411 
 
 v. .Malins 
 
 1510 
 
 v. 01 well 
 
 1653 
 
 Buchard v Boyce 
 
 216, 240 
 
 Buck v Brown 
 
 53 
 
 v. Dowley 
 
 380 
 
 V. Evans 
 
 1548 
 
 v Fawcett 
 
 1460 
 
 v. Lodge 
 
 1775 
 
 v. McCaughtry 
 
 361 
 
 v. Smith 
 
 1663 
 
 v Harrop 
 Buckner v. Abrahams 
 
 v. Ferguson 
 Bucknor v. Forker 
 Bucks, Duchess of !'. Sheffield 
 Buckworth ('. Buckwo/th 
 Budd, Ex parte 
 
 v. Davison 
 
 v Rutherford 
 Budden v. Wilkinson 579, 1829 
 
 Budding v. Murdock 384, 406, 417, 
 418 
 Buildington v. Woodley 411 
 
 Budeke v Rattermau 1222, 1250 
 
 Buden if. Dore 579 
 
 Budge ». Budge 796, 1409, 1457 
 
 Budgeu if. Sage 797, 800 
 
 Buehler v. Cheuvront 1461 
 
 Buel v. Street 1462 
 
 Buenos Ayres Ry Co. v North- 
 ern Ry. Co 629, 1070 
 Buerk v. Imhaeuser 378, 547, 559, 
 726, 2385 
 Buffalo ». Pocahontas 334 
 Buffalo Stone Co. v. Delaware, 
 
 &c. R. Co. 630 
 
 BufTalow v BufTalow 347 
 
 Buffiugton v. Harvey 256. 1463, 
 
 1479, 1575, 1577 
 Buffum's Case 1032, 1056, 1686 
 
 Buford 17. Holley 1071 
 
 v. Kucker 735. 986 
 
 v Keokuk. &c. Packet Co losi 
 Bugbee's Appeal 1320 
 
 Bugbee 17. Sargent 287, 334, 341 
 
 B ugden v Smith 1829 
 
 Bugg 17. Franklin 122 
 
 Buie v. Mechanics' Building 
 
 Ass'n 216 
 
 Bulkeley if. Dunbar 298, 707, 708 
 
 if. Eglinton, Earl of 1436 
 
 Bulkley if. Jones 2308 
 
 v. Van Wyck 68, 169, 737, 753 
 
 Bull 17. Bell 
 
 17. Bull 
 
 v. Falkner 
 
 If. Griffin 
 
 v. Jones 
 
 If. Loveland 
 
 v. Nims 
 
 v Withey 
 B u lien 17. Michel 
 
 v. Ovey 
 Buller c. Walker 
 Bui ley V. Bulley 
 Bullinger v. Mackey 
 Bullniore if. Wynter 
 Bullock, Ex parte 
 
 Ite 
 
 v. Adams 
 
 v. Boyd 
 
 v. Brown 
 
 v- Chapman 
 
 846 
 590 
 
 324,1161 
 
 602, 1065 
 
 312, 733 
 
 1611 
 
 907 
 
 1031 
 
 188, v. *'.* 
 
 875,1116 
 
 1686 
 
 366 
 
 1847 
 
 829 
 
 87 
 
 53 
 
 83 
 
 378 
 
 668 
 
 1551 
 
 1622
 
 XXX 
 
 Bullock v. Corry 
 
 v. Holds 
 
 v. Gordon 
 
 V. Knox 
 
 v. Menzies 
 
 r. Perkins 
 
 v. Kiehardson 
 
 v Sadlier 
 
 a Wheatley 
 Buluier o Allison 
 Buloid V. Miller 
 Bulow v W'itte 
 Bulstrode v. Bradley 
 Bum pass v. Morrison 
 Bumpus v Platner 
 
 673 
 
 53, 55, 58 
 
 1076 
 
 3:34, 851 
 
 102, 104 
 
 42b' 
 
 484 
 
 t>77 
 
 1418 
 
 1278 
 
 1463, 1465 
 
 105 
 
 1224 
 
 1051 
 
 675, 1653 
 
 Buubury v. Buubury 5( (, 5i».i-£< ' 
 1731, 1834 
 Bundine v. Shelton 1| 7 ' 
 
 Bunford V. Steele f** 
 
 Buun, Ex parte «* 
 
 v. Buun 717, 1835 
 
 Bunnell's Appeal J<»' 
 
 Buuuett, lie 1610 
 
 t; Foster 1 *^ 
 
 Buutain ». Wood °*^ 
 
 Buutin V Lagow M* 
 
 Buuvau ». Mortimer 181, loo, 44o, 
 
 4! 19 
 
 Burbauk v Burbauk , D „. 1 ^' Q 12 
 
 Burbridge » Robinson 1824, 18i< 
 
 Bun-h v. Coney 232, 586 
 
 i' Rich *"" 
 
 »! Scott 1018, 1019, 1030 
 
 Burcliard o. Macfarlane 581 
 
 v. Phillips 1205 
 
 Burdell v. Denig «« 
 
 ». Hay 1*0 
 
 Burden v. M'Elmoyle <<» 
 
 v Stein lb40 
 
 Burdett v Hay 328, 1619 
 
 v. Norwood 115 , 
 
 v Rockley 1057, 1059, 1060 
 
 Burdick v. Garrick 90, 304, 551, 641 
 
 644, 12a9 
 
 Bnrditt v. Grew Pi 8 ',^* 
 
 Burdoine » Shelton 1002, Ion 
 
 Burdon ». Dean 10o, I-- 
 
 "»£» 309,1234,1414 
 
 e. Burns **" 
 
 Burger v. Potter ^l 
 
 Burgess, Re *j° 
 
 i> Bennett 8 ™ 
 
 v Bottomley 68 
 
 D Burgess J Y™ 
 
 ». C. Aultman & Co. i« 
 
 v. Graffam 2g 4 l» 
 
 r hSSST 795, 1380, 1395 
 
 I Hills 79 5 ; 1380, 1395 
 
 v Ungley 1 J*J 
 
 *• 8mith 1<K 1TC 
 
 t; Wheate 135, 1* 
 
 •. Wilkinson 1197, 1198, 1296, 
 
 Burgh « Kenny 13< • 
 
 Burgin v. Giberson (80 
 
 Burgoine v. Taylor 9,9 
 
 Burk v. Brown 5*, lob, obi) 
 
 Burke, lie 86, 1361 
 
 »• Vurke mB _ Jj»J 
 
 v. Crosbie 187, 12ib 
 
 v. Daly If ii 
 
 v. Fuller 1«*« 
 
 D. Jones 64- 
 
 v Lidwell 37 
 
 Burkett v. Griffith 313 
 
 v. Randall 10(8 
 
 v Spray 1433,1457,1465 
 
 v Wall 1632 
 
 Burkitt I) Ransom 143 1 
 
 Burland's Trade Mark, /Jl re 149 
 
 Burlen v Shannon 1«7 
 
 Buries t>. Popplewell 1616 
 
 Burleson ». MoDermott 2 
 
 Burlew v II ill man 138 1 
 
 v. Quarrier 844 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Burling r. Tompkins 357 
 
 Burlingaine V HoODS dUd, I»i» 
 
 Burlington bank W. Cottin 44d 
 
 Burlington, &c. R. Co. v. York 
 
 County \]>*'\ 
 
 Burliugtou v Carpenter 1UM 
 
 Burmesler v. Baron Von Stenz 2o, 
 813, lold 
 Burn r Bowes . B . l Vt\ 
 
 Burnaby v. Baillie 56 *',^i 
 
 r. Griffin "02 
 
 Burnaud r. Kodocanacni Ado 
 
 Burn. i p v Haskins Steam-En 
 
 giue Co. 
 Burnbly v Stainton 
 Burne v. Breen 
 Burnell, He 
 
 v. Wellington, Duke of 
 Burnet v. Claghry 
 
 v Denni-ton 
 
 v. Theobald 
 Burnetts Anderson 
 
 V. Boyd 
 
 v. Chetwood 
 
 V. Craig 
 
 V. Kinnaston 
 
 v. Lester 
 
 v. Nicholson 
 
 v. Sanders 
 
 v. Tate 
 Burney v. Macdonald 
 
 V. Morgan 
 Burnham v. Bennett 
 
 v Bailing 712, 797. 852, 1016, 1408 
 
 v. Kempton 303, 1637, 1639, lb' 
 
 v. Rangely 
 Burnhisel v Firman 
 Burnley v Jeffersonville 
 Burns v. Beck Co. 
 v. Cushing 
 
 641 
 13l1 
 £92 
 630, 1624 
 991 
 1099 
 583, 586 
 851 
 430 
 417 
 461 
 383, 1577 
 321 
 1639 
 1C33 
 1649 
 1732 
 851, 1077 
 378, 844 
 1168 
 1576 
 149, 447 
 728 
 702 
 68. 630 
 1576, 1578 
 874 
 v Trowbridge Waterworks Co 
 
 v. United States 1580 
 
 v Watk ins l obi 
 
 Bushby v. Munday 800, 1626, 1628 
 
 Bushel v. Commonwealth Ins. 
 
 Burton v. Dickinson 
 V. Fort 
 
 v. Galveston &c Ry. Co 
 v. Gleason 
 II Perry 
 v. Plummer 
 V. Robertson 
 v. Scott 
 v Shaw 
 v. Shildbach 
 v. Tebbutt 
 Burts v Beard 
 Burwell v. Coates 
 v. llobson 
 
 v. Vance County Com'rs 
 Bury v Bedford 
 v. Newport 
 v. Phillpot 
 Busby v. Littlefield 
 
 v. Mitchell 
 Buscher v Knapp 
 Busfield, lie 
 Bush v. Adams 
 v Bush 
 v Linthicum 
 v Madeira 
 v. Sheldon 
 
 142 
 
 1257 
 
 716 
 
 334 
 
 843 
 
 1029 
 
 1228 
 
 569, 584 
 
 311, 392 
 
 1576, 1777, 2237 
 
 295 
 
 Edgefield 
 
 v. Fay 
 
 v. llobbs 
 
 v. Lynde 
 
 v. Rosenstein 
 Burpee v Smith 
 Burr's Trial 
 Burr v. Burton 
 
 v Sherwood 
 
 v Wilson 
 
 v. Wimbledon Local Board 
 Burrall v Eames 
 
 v. Kaineteaux 
 Burrard v. Calisher 
 Burras v Looker 
 Burrell, lie 
 Burrell v. Andrews 
 
 v. Delevante 
 
 v. Hatkley 
 
 v. Nicholson 
 v. Smith 
 Burris v. Adams 
 Burrough v. Martin 
 Burroughs v. Booth 
 v. Elton 
 v. M'Neill 
 V. Oakley 
 
 144 
 
 183 499 
 
 ' 361 
 
 1698 
 
 1680 
 
 31 
 
 220 
 
 1020, 1949 
 
 317 
 
 1411 
 
 974 
 
 907 
 
 759 
 
 117 
 
 1351 
 
 230 
 
 1 
 
 592, 739 
 
 1168, 1366 
 
 417, 736 
 
 1437 
 
 946 
 
 1406 
 
 6°4, 830 
 
 2, 580, 1831 
 
 706 
 
 324 
 
 1099 
 
 915 
 
 1209 
 
 1298 
 
 989, 1774, 1775 
 
 Co. 
 Bushell v. Bushell 
 Bushnell v. Avery 
 v. Bushnell 
 v. Hartford 
 Busk v. Beetham 
 Busney v. Spear 
 Butchardt v. Dresser 
 Butcher v. Jackson 
 
 v. Pooler 
 Butchers' Ass'n v. Boston 
 Butchers' Slaughtering Ass 
 
 Boston . 
 
 Butchers" Union Co. v. Howell lb«5 
 Bute, Marquess of v. James 888 
 
 Bute, Marquis of v. Glamorgan 
 
 shire Canal Co. 182J, l»d<5 
 
 Bute, Marquis of v. Stuart "4<, 
 
 1348, 1627 
 
 Butler, Ex parte 59 
 
 v. He *£ 
 
 v. Ball !642 
 
 v Borton l°" 
 
 v. Butler 109, 223, 407, 1358, 170| 
 
 659 
 
 Burrow v Greenough 
 
 v Ragland 
 Burrowes v. Forrest 
 
 v Gore 
 
 v Lock 
 Burrows v. Jemineau 
 
 v. Stryker 
 
 v Unwin 
 
 v. Wene 
 Burrv Port Co. V. Bowser 
 Bursill v. Tanner 5(3, 6(b, J4d 
 
 Burson v. Dosser 1&H 
 
 Burstall v. Beyfus , r ^\^i 
 
 v Fearon 433, 438, 1507, 1540 
 
 Burt v. British National Life 
 Ass Ass'n 244 
 
 v. Dennett «' 
 
 v Ryner . }"J» 
 
 Burton v. Darnley, Earl of ldoo 
 
 657 
 552 
 
 1861 
 323 
 
 1398 
 664 
 200 
 
 1108 
 
 1120 
 43 
 
 563,844 
 
 295 
 
 457 
 
 718 
 
 187 
 
 1518 
 
 1259 
 
 1347 
 
 42, 43, 1600 
 
 465, 1048 
 
 989 
 
 v Catlin 
 v. Clark 
 
 v. Cooper 
 
 v. Cot ting 
 
 v Cumpston 
 
 v. Cunningham 
 
 v. Duncomb 
 
 v. Freeman 
 
 v. Gardener 
 
 v. Matthews 
 
 v. O'Hear 
 
 v Rashfield 
 
 v. Rashleigh 
 
 v. St Louis Life Ins. Co. 
 
 v. Spann 
 
 r. Wearing 
 
 v Withers 
 Butler's Trusts, Hughes v. An- 
 
 derson, In re jjj 
 
 Butler Wharf Co., Re t ™-\ 
 
 Butlin v. Arnold J^if 
 
 v. Masters 1082, 1120, 146,, 14(6, 
 1642 
 Butman v. Ritchie 951 
 
 Butt, Re „ 1( ^5 
 
 v. Imperial Gas Co. 16d8 
 
 Butterfield v. Macomber ** 
 
 Butters, Ec parte ™ 
 
 Butterworth v. Bailey 408, low 
 
 473 
 473 
 865 
 335 
 1055 
 1790
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 XXXI 
 
 Butterworth v. Robinson 1845, 
 
 1646 
 
 Buttler v. Mathews 620, 521, 522 
 
 BuMon <;. Price 1504 
 
 Buttrk-k i' llolden 845,982 
 
 Butts v. Genung 282 
 
 Buxton v. Buxton 2080 
 
 v. James 46, 1640, 1643, 1863 
 
 v Lister 1405 
 
 v Maidin 1134 
 
 v. Monkhouse 1725 
 
 Buzard v Houston 830 
 
 v McAnulty 839, 1071 
 
 Byain v. Stevens 45 
 
 v. Sutton 203, 1809 
 
 Byde v. Masterman 349, 352, 728 
 
 Byers v. Kranklin Coal Co. 1019 
 
 Byfield v. Provis 1475 
 
 Byington v. Call 1591 
 
 v. Wood 1302, 13i)3 
 
 Byue, Ex parte 1069 
 
 v. Potter 969 
 
 Byng v Clark 742 
 
 Bvnum r. Ewart 545 
 
 Byrd v Nunn 785 
 
 Byrne v. Brown 406 
 
 v. Byrne 1515, 1661 
 
 v. Frere 811, 869, 952, 953 
 
 v. Love 1350 
 
 v. Norcott 1421 
 
 v. Romaine 407 
 
 Byron, Lord i<. Johnston 1665, 1669 
 
 Bywater's Estate, In re 1734, 2127 
 
 c. 
 
 C v. D. 
 
 Cabburn, Re 
 Cabeen v. Gordon 
 Cabel, Re 
 
 Cabell v. Megginson 
 Cable ?'. Alvord 
 
 V, Ellis 
 Cabrera, Ex parte 
 Cadbury v. Smith 
 Gaddick v. Masson 
 Cadigan v Brown 
 Cadle ft Fowle 
 Cadogan v. Kennett 
 Cadwell's Rank, Re 
 Cady v. Whaling 
 
 1570 
 
 1412 
 
 292, 294 
 
 1802 
 
 392 
 171(1 
 1120 
 
 142 
 
 652 
 64, 814 
 
 3(13 
 1472 
 1652 
 1417 
 
 221 
 
 Caermarthen, Marquis of v 
 
 Uawson 1054, 1060 
 
 Cafe v. Bent 1342 
 
 Caffrey v. Darby 1417 
 
 Cage v Courts 916 
 
 Cigill v. Wooldridge 1751 
 
 C iliala v. Monroe 557 
 
 Ciben, Ex parte 83 
 
 Cahill v. Cahill 92, 109 
 
 v Shepherd 52 
 
 Cahoon v. Utica Bank 334 
 
 Cahoone Barnett Manuf. Co. v. 
 
 Rubber & Celluloid Harness 
 
 Co. 298, 1642 
 
 Caillard v. Caillard 1735 
 
 Caillaud's Co v. Caillaud 26 
 
 Cain v. Worford 1463, 1491 
 
 Caincs v. Fisher 497, 519, 524, 530 
 
 Caird v Moss 645 
 
 v. Sime 1643, 1647 
 
 Cairnes v Chabert 1724 
 
 Cairo & Fulton R. Co. v. Titus 1123 
 
 Cake's Appeal 1299 
 
 Cakraft v. Gibbs 1126 
 
 r Thompson 1081 
 
 Caldecott v. Caldecott 217 
 
 r Harrison 96 
 
 Calder v. Henderson 1029 
 
 Caldicott v. Baker 38, 87, 110, 111, 
 
 179 
 
 Caldwell v. Albany, Mayor, &c. 
 
 of 1493 
 
 v. Karnest 812 
 
 v. Fellowes 126, 1432 
 
 v. Hawkins 287 
 
 v Hodsden 1491, 1494 
 
 v King 402, 545 
 
 v. Knott 550, 1629 
 
 v. Leiber 1460 
 
 i'. Montgomery 560 
 
 v. Pagham Harbour Reel. Co. 
 
 10, 408, 561 
 
 v Stirewalt 1663 
 
 v. Taggart 190 
 
 v. Vanvlissengen 1642, 2315 
 
 Cale v Shaw 1274 
 
 Caledonian Rv. Co. v. Solway 
 
 Junction Ry. Co. 1620 
 
 Caley v. Caley 81 
 
 Calhoun v. Powell 657 
 
 California &c. Co. v. Cheney El. 
 
 Light Co. 339 
 
 California Electrical Works v. 
 Finck 559, 850 
 
 California Fig Syrup Co. v. Im- 
 proved Fig Syrup Co. 145, 1648 
 Calkins v. Evans 986 
 
 Call v Ewing 318 
 
 Callaghan v. Callaghan 1504 
 
 v. Myers 1643 
 
 v Rochfort 959, 960 
 
 Callahan v. Jennings 1459 
 
 Callanan v. Shaw 1463 
 
 Calland v. Conway 1150 
 
 Callendar v. Teasdale 1892 
 
 Callender v Colgrove 1226 
 
 Caller v Dade 318 
 
 v. Shields 1576, 1579 
 
 Calley v. Richards 576, 1834 
 
 Callow v. Callow 102 
 
 v. Howie 185 
 
 v. Mince 1193 
 
 Calloway v. Dobson 402 
 
 Calltim v Emanuel 284 
 
 Calmady v. Calmady 1163 
 
 Calne Ry. Co., Re 1037 
 
 Calverly v. Phelp 220, 222, 257 
 
 v. Williams 1402, 1549 
 
 Calvert v. Adams 1726 
 
 v. Day 27 
 
 v. Godfrey 166, 168, 1261, 1275, 
 1278 
 Calvit v. Markham 371, 688 
 
 Calwell v. Boyer 841 
 
 Camac v. Grant 36 
 
 Cambefort v. Chapman 269 
 
 Camblosv. Philadelphia R Co. 1662 
 Cambottie ?>. Ingate 53 
 
 Cambridge University, hi re 1858 
 Cambridge Water-works v. 
 Somerville Dyeing, &c. Co. 
 
 334, 342 
 
 Camden v. Mayhew 1285 
 
 v. Stuart 1302, 1320 
 
 Camden and Ambov R.R Co. v. 
 
 Stewart 326. 327, 347, 349, 350, 
 
 361, 362, 363, 790, 856, 1463, 
 
 1492, 1676 
 
 Camden, &c. v. Rower 21 
 
 Camden Rolling Mill Co. v. 
 
 Swede Iron Co. 149 
 
 Cameron v. Abbott 360 
 
 v. Cameron 449 
 
 v. San Francisco 639 
 
 Cameron's Coalbrook, &c Rail- 
 way Co., Re 574, 909, 1842 
 Camille v Donato 1004, 1440 
 Cammack v. Johnson 1715 
 Cammann v. Traphagan 662 
 Cammell v. Sewell 664 
 Cammeyer v. United German 
 
 Lutheran Churches 302 
 
 Camp " Bates 1259, 1628 
 
 v. Mills 334 
 
 v. Simon 843 
 
 v. Taylor 26 
 
 v. Waring 418 
 
 Campana v. Webb 899, 1669 
 
 Campbell, In re 83 
 
 v. Allen 552 
 
 v. Allgood 1633 
 
 v. Andrews 358 
 
 v. Attorney-General 908,934, 1574 
 
 Campbell v Bainbridge 1120 
 
 v. Baker 1283, 1285 
 
 v. Beaufoy 604, 608 
 
 V- Bowles 860 
 
 v. Bowne 1508. 1515 
 
 v Braxton 1770 
 
 v Brown 365, 1841 
 
 v. Campbell 70, 857, 992, 1236, 
 1419, 1425, 1503 
 v. Compagnie Generale 1716 
 
 v. Crutcher 1028 
 
 v. Dalhousie, Earl of 1574 
 
 v. Dickens 293 
 
 v. Foster 582, 1551 
 
 v French 95, 97 
 
 v. Gardner 1284, 1286, 1289, 
 
 1290, 1291 
 v. Graham 2182 
 
 v. Hall 986 
 
 v. Harding 93, 96, 1795 
 
 v. Holy land 16 >0 
 
 v. Home 1412 
 
 v Im Thurm 157 
 
 W.Joyce 158,411,696,812 
 
 v. Lloyd's Bank 1716 
 
 v. Mackay 335, 336, 337, 340, 544, 
 545 1 355 
 v. Macomb 284,' 1242 
 
 v. Mesier 1016 
 
 v. Morrison 386, 395, 1619, 1669 
 v. Moxhav 1266 
 
 v. New York 1120, 1517 
 
 v. Paris, &c. R. Co. 360 
 
 v. Patterson 843 
 
 v. Powers 314, 417, 986 
 
 v. Price 1579 
 
 v. Railroad Co. 257 
 
 v. Richards 1100 
 
 v Runyon 1675 
 
 t'. Scholfleld 1644 
 
 v. Scott 1642 
 
 v Scougal 925 
 
 v . Seaman 1635 
 
 v Seeley 830 
 
 v Sheldon 201, 251, 392, 395, 555 
 v. Sloane 860 
 
 v. Snlomans 1559 
 
 v. Taul 351, 759 
 
 v. Tousey 251 
 
 v. Walker 1271 
 
 v. Wallace 201,251.553 
 
 v. Watson 222. 257 
 
 v. West 1508 
 
 v. Western 671 
 
 Campden Charities, Re 13 
 
 Campe v. Sanrier 1285 
 
 Campian v. Kille 546, 778, 780, 864, 
 1142 
 Camps v. Marshall 177 
 
 Canal Co. v. Clark 1648 
 
 Canal Company v. Railway Com- 
 pany 863 
 Canby r. Ridgeway 194. 986 
 Candler v. Pettit 406, 1316, 1515, 
 1531 
 Cane v. Martin 1*44 
 Canedy v. Marcy 1973 
 Caney v Bond 2060 
 Canneld t'. Andrew 1638
 
 XXXll 
 
 Carifield v. Sterling 1569, 1570 
 
 Canham v. Fiske 1138 
 
 v Jones lb48 
 
 v Neale 799, 1617 
 
 Cann » Cann 940, 1070 
 
 v. Wilson 2b' 
 
 Cannell v Beeby 1433, 1456 
 
 Canning v. Canning 1158, 1160 
 
 Cannock v. Jauncey 1832, 1835 
 
 Cannon v. Beely 1456 
 
 v. Beggs 1257 
 
 v. Cannon 564 
 
 v. Collins 852 
 
 v. Hemphill 997, 1023 
 
 v. McNabb 1556, 1557 
 
 v. Norton 287, 841 
 
 v. Trask 26 
 
 Canterbury, Archbishop of, Ex 
 
 parte 1799 
 
 Canterbury, Viscount, Re 133 
 
 u. Attorney-General 133 
 
 Canton v. McGraw 334, 885 
 
 Canton Steel R Co. v. Kanne- 
 
 berg 1642 
 
 Canton Warehouse Co. v. Potts 586. 
 601 
 Cant's Estate, Re 1004, 1464 
 
 Cape v. Adams 90 
 
 Cape Breton Co v. Fenn 26 
 
 Cape Fear Bank v. Stiuemetz 24 
 
 Cape May, &c. R. Co. v. John- 
 son 1614 
 Capehart v. Huey 1382 
 Capel v. Butler 153, 539 
 v. MeCollum 361 
 Capell v. Landano 991 
 Cape Sable Co.'s Case 1676 
 Capes v. Brewer 448 
 Caplinger v. Sullivan 99 
 Capner v Flemington Co. 395 
 Capon v. Miles 665 
 Cappeau v. Baker 916 
 Capps v. Capps 229, 1524 
 Caproni v. Alberti 1643 
 Capt v. Stubbs 1424 
 Capwell v. Sipe 887 
 Carberry v. German Ins. Co. 1842 
 Cardale v. Watkins 1557 
 Cardell » Hawke 236, 1209 
 Cardiff, Mayor of v. Cardiff 
 
 Water-works Co. 1640 
 
 Cardot v. Burney 1752 
 
 Cardross, Re 96 
 
 Cardwell v Cheatman 676 
 
 v. Molyneux 1630 
 
 v. Tomlinson 83 
 
 Carett v. Elubbell 1281 
 
 Carew, Ex parte 157 
 
 Carew, fie 1291 1851 
 
 v. Cooper 974, 1053, 1730 
 
 v. Davis 1836 
 
 v. Johnston 173, 372 
 
 Carej » Brown 223, 243, 1459 
 
 v Hatch 312 
 
 v. Hillhouse 286 
 
 v Hoxey 290 
 
 v. Smith 402. 424, 425 
 
 v Williams 857, 992, 1599 
 
 Cargile V- Itagan 1274 
 
 Cargill v. Bower 26 
 
 v. Kountze 1556 
 
 Carleton v. Leighton 62 
 
 v. L'Estrange 420 
 
 v. M'Enzie 182 
 
 v Rugg 1638, 1663 
 
 Carlisle v. Cooper 815, 1073, 16&5 
 
 v. Foster 1075, 1115 
 
 v. South Eastern Railway Co. 
 
 241, 242 
 
 V. Stevenson 1631, 1602 
 
 v. Tindall 1624 
 
 v United States 57 
 
 Countess v. Berkley, Lord 1737 
 
 v. Carlisl , Earl 1737 
 
 Earl of v. Goble 1584 
 
 Carll v. Snyder 1655 
 
 Carlon v. Farlar 1037 
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Carlos v. Brook 960 
 
 Carlsbad v. Tibbetts 357, 390, 551, 
 1648 
 Carlyle v. Carlyle Water Co. 608 
 Carmarthen, Mayor, &c. of v. 
 
 Evans 1095 
 
 Carmichael v Bowder 342 
 
 v. Carmichael 655, 1252 
 
 v. Hughes 1358 
 
 v. School Lands, Trustees of 25 
 
 v. Wilson 1234, 1414 
 
 Caruace v. Grant 27 
 
 Carnan v. Bowles 1646 
 
 Carnatic, Nabob of the v. East 
 
 India Co. 17, 628, 629, 658, 
 
 704 
 
 Carue o. Braucker 1081, 1343, 1366 
 
 v. Nicholl 1089, 1128 
 
 Carueal v. Banks 1003 
 
 v. Day 626 
 
 v. Streshley 526, 538 
 
 v Wilson 718 
 
 Carnegie v. Carnegie 100 
 
 Carnes v. Piatt 573 
 
 v. Polk 1459 
 
 Carney v. Emmons 986 
 
 v. Hadley 1638, 1663 
 
 Carnick v. McKesson 843 
 
 Carnochan v. Christie 1550 
 
 Caro v. Maxwell 1461 
 
 Carow v. Mowatt 281, 287, 1515, 
 
 1516 
 
 Carpenter v Aldrich 30 
 
 v. Cincinnati R. Co. 212 
 
 v. Cushman 1299 
 
 v. Eastern and Amboy R. 
 
 Co. 1148 
 
 v. Edwards 840 
 
 v. Gray 1548 
 
 v. Groff 1118 
 
 v Hoboken 298 
 
 v. Muchmore 1030, 1031 
 
 v. Providence Ins. Co. 1241 
 
 v. Reynolds 1461 
 
 v. Ritchie 830 
 
 v. Robinson 256 
 
 v. Snelling 881 
 
 v. Talbot 149 
 
 v. Wall 1101 
 
 Carpmael v. Carvell 1403 
 
 v Powis 574, 943, 1834 
 
 Carr, Re 92, 1800 
 
 v. Appleyard 947 
 
 v. Callagban 249 
 
 v. Eastabrooke 104, 107, 1801 
 
 v. Henderson 1390, 1423 
 
 v. Inglehart 329, 558 
 
 v. Living 1347, 1361 
 
 v. Morlce 899, 1619, 1669 
 
 v. Taylor 90, 105 
 
 v. United States 129, 141 
 
 v. Weld 729, 1676 
 
 Carrick v. Ford 66, 92 
 
 v. Prater 840 
 
 v. Wigan Tramways Co. 1411 
 
 v. Young 815, 817, 818, 969 
 
 Carrington o. Brents 161, 1032, 1033 
 
 v. Cantillon 448 
 
 'v. Cornock 870 
 
 v. Holly 793, 794 
 
 V. Pell 881, 981 
 
 v. Sweeney 1468 
 
 Carrington, Lord v. Payne 875, 
 
 1116 
 
 Carritt v. Real & P. A. Co. 674 
 
 Carrodus v. Sharp 990, 14H8 
 
 Carrol v Connel 12 : 13 
 
 Carroll v. Brown 1624 
 
 v. Kerschner 214 
 
 v. Parran 1579 
 
 v. Parsons 739 
 
 v. Richardson 1548 
 
 v. Koosevelt 334 
 
 v. Sand 1624 
 
 v. Waring 603, 639, 686 
 
 Carron Co. v. Maclaren 1615, 1627, 
 
 1674 
 
 Carrow v. Adams 982 
 
 v. Ferrior 1683, 1720, 1725 
 
 Carskadon v. Minke 334 
 
 Carson v. Dunham 1618 
 
 v. Hughes 1157 
 
 v. Pickersgill 42. 155 
 
 v. Richardson 980, 1018 
 
 Carta Para Mining Co., Re 32 
 
 Carte v. Ball 230, 380. 714 
 
 Cartee v. Spence 586, 972, 1 1 78 
 
 Carter, In re 1755 
 
 v. Balfour 336 
 
 v Barnard 1440 
 
 v. Bennett 1677 
 
 v. Bentall 431 
 
 v. Bosanquet 784 
 
 v. Campbell 1147 
 
 v. Carter 314, 1073, 1254, 1381, 
 
 1432 
 
 v. Colrain, Lord 1228 
 
 v. Draper 925 
 
 v. Ewing 892 
 
 v. Green 1436 
 
 v. Ingraham 378, 390, 991 
 
 v. Jones 193 
 
 v. Mills 230. 231 
 
 v. Montgomery 160, 161, 1382, 
 
 1457 
 
 v. New Orleans 149 
 
 v Pritchard 676 
 
 v. Privatt 987 
 
 v. Roundtree 1274 
 
 v Sanders 230, 233, 304 
 
 v. Silber 122 
 
 v. Sleeper 844 
 
 v. Taggart 104, 108, 2001 
 
 v. Thorn 1254 
 
 v. Torrance 523. 978 
 
 v. Treadwell 334, 2087, 2094, 
 
 2(197 
 
 v. United Ins. Co. 197, 199 
 
 v. Wollschlager 329 
 
 Carteret, Lord v. Paschal 125, 127, 
 
 1585 
 
 Carthaus v. Ferrers 1249 
 
 Carthew v. Barclay 972, 1601 
 
 Cartier v. Carlile 1649 
 
 Cartwright, Re 1610, 1628 
 
 v. Cartwright 171. 864 
 
 v. Clark 1548, 1549, 1550, 1551, 
 
 1552 
 
 v. Green 184, 563. 564 
 
 v. Hateley 145, 632 
 
 v. Last 983 
 
 v M'Gown 1150 
 
 v. Shepheard 1526 
 
 v. Wise 68 
 
 Cartwright's Case 1069, 1765 
 
 Caruthers v. Hartsfield 1680 
 
 Carver v. Leite 579 
 
 v. 1'eck 236, 629 
 
 v. Richards 1403 
 
 Carwardine V Wishlade 445 
 
 Cary v. Bertie 1362 
 
 v. Cary 1699 
 
 v. Domestic S B. Co. 1675 
 
 v. Faden 1646 
 
 v. Hamilton 1381 
 
 v. Herrin 124S, 1298, 1300, 1322 
 
 v. Hills 201, 319 
 
 v. Knowles 1370 
 
 Cary Manuf. Co. v. De Haven 1642 
 
 Casamajor v. Strode 1614, 1619 
 
 Casberd V. Attorney General 133 
 
 Casborne v. Bersham 1114 
 
 Case v Abeel 1185, 1186, 1305 
 
 v. Blood 940 
 
 v. James 1693 
 
 v. Midland Ry. Co. 983, 1635, 
 
 2307 
 
 v. Minot 627, 630 
 
 v. Potter 1228 
 
 v. Towle 1486 
 
 Casey v. Arnott 454 
 
 v. Cincinnati Typog. Union 1642 
 
 v Goodinire 1772 
 
 Cash v. Belcher 215, 709, 710
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star pagiug.] 
 
 XX. till 
 
 Cashell v. Kelly 
 Casliin B I'radock 
 CaskaJJou v. Kennedy 
 Cason V. Round 
 Cas* v. Higeubutaui 
 Cassady v Woodbury 
 Cassedy v. liigelow 
 Cassell v. .Stiff 
 Cassels v. Stewart 
 Cassiday V McDauiel 
 Cassidy v. Mc Far land 
 c. Sliimuiiu 
 
 302, 715 
 
 350, L827 
 
 231 
 
 678 
 
 1770 
 
 379, 3S0 
 
 1472, 1491 
 
 46, 320, 1643 
 
 219 
 
 193, 247, 286 
 
 1221 
 
 149, 154, 191 
 
 Cassoux i». Great Luxembourg 
 
 364 
 
 908, 1209. 1600 
 
 553, 1664 
 
 149 
 
 778 
 
 1450 
 
 325, 328 
 
 1009 
 
 64 
 
 190 
 
 549, 584 
 
 Fanshaw, 
 
 643 
 
 1459 
 
 664 
 
 1648 
 
 1653 
 
 27 
 
 1643 
 
 1412 
 
 236, 1071 
 
 661 
 
 445 
 
 199 
 
 1568 
 
 929 
 
 876, 
 
 1071 
 
 415, 914, 1004 
 
 13^6, 1440, 1449, 1450 
 
 1104 
 
 Ky. Co. 
 Cast v. Poyser 
 Castelli v. Cook 
 Castello v. Castello 
 Caster v. Wood 
 Castle, Re 
 Castle v. Bader 
 Castle's Case 
 
 Castle Mail Co., Ex parte 
 Castlemau v Berry 
 
 v. Veitcli 
 Castleton, Lord v 
 
 Lord 
 Caston v. Caston 
 Castrique ;», Itnrie 
 Caswell v Davis 
 
 v. Gibbs 
 Catchcart v Hewson 
 Ca'e v. Devon, &c Co. 
 Cater, Re 
 Cates v. Allen 
 
 v. Loftus 
 
 v Woodson 
 Cathcart v Lewis 
 Catherall v. Davies 
 Catherine Dock Co. v. Mantzgu 
 Catholic Publishing Co., He 
 
 v. Wyman 
 Catlin, Re 
 
 v. Barker 
 
 v. Harned 1394, 1424 
 
 Catling v. King 365, 561 
 
 v. Valentine 1635 
 
 Cato v. Easly 161, 997 
 
 Caton v. Caton 1377 
 
 v Coles 393, 1558 
 
 v. Lewis 1824 
 
 v Kidout 1230 
 
 v Willis 371 
 
 Cator v. Butler 232 
 
 v. Croydon Canal Co. 206, li>99 
 
 v Reeves 1265, 1266 
 
 Catt v. Tourle 485, 760 
 
 Cattell v. I.owry 1661 
 
 v Simons 507,1205,1207,1408, 
 
 1842 
 
 Catterall v. Hindle 1127 
 
 v. Purchase 1577 
 
 Catterina Chiazzare, The 633 
 
 C. B. Keog Mauuf. Co. v. Wins- 
 ton 1716 
 Cecil v. Cecil 843 
 v. Salisbury, Lord 170 
 Cecil Natioual Bank v. Thur- 
 
 ber 2047 
 
 Celluloid Manuf Co. v. Arling- 
 ton Manuf. Co. 911 
 v. Cellonite Manuf. Co. 1302 
 v. Goodyear Dental Co. 10, 1644 
 v. Russell 888 
 Central Co. v. Cushman 1654 
 Central Georgia Bank v Iver- 
 
 son 1585 
 
 Central Georgian R Co. v. 
 
 Mitchell 629 
 
 Central Mauuf Co. v. Harts- 
 home 20, 440 
 Central National Bank v Con- 
 necticut M. L. Ins Co. 686, 830 
 Central Pacific R Co. v Dyer 334 
 Central Railroad & Banking 
 
 Co. v Pettus 1411 
 
 Central R. Co. v. Central Trust 
 
 Co. 1576, 2379, 2398 
 
 v Cincinnati, J. &M. Ry. Co 1746 
 v Kast Tennessee, V. & G. 
 
 Ry. Co. 1743 
 
 v. Grant L. Works 1580, 1584 
 
 v. Hiawassee Co. 986 
 
 v. Marietta & N G. Ry. Co. 1029 
 v. St. Louis, &c Ry Co. 1743 
 
 v. Saeffield, &c Ry. Co. 1743 
 
 v. Southern Inland Nav. & 
 
 Imp. Co 1683 
 
 v. Texas, &c. R. Co 320, 740, 991 
 v Virginia Steel and Iron 
 
 Co 1120 
 
 t; Wabash, &c Ry. Co. 1209, 
 
 1299, 1716, 1743, 1746 
 
 Central Ry. Co. v Kisch 1502 
 
 Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News 
 
 Cattley v Arnold 
 Catton v Banks 
 
 v. Carlisle 
 
 v. Wyld 
 Cauley );. Lawson 
 Causton v. Holdich 
 Cauty v. Houlditch 
 Cavanaugh v. Scott 
 Cave v. C ive 
 
 v. Cork 
 
 v. Saunders 
 
 1157 
 
 1163 
 
 1531, 1535 
 
 1081 
 
 344 
 
 1423, 1437 
 
 1598 
 
 1542 
 
 674, 2345 
 
 1509, 1538, 1540 
 
 641 
 
 Cavender v. Bulteel 1488 
 
 v Cavender "26, 828, 855 
 
 Cavendish v. Fleming 1234 
 
 v. Mercer 1308, 1358, 1360 
 
 Caverly v. McOwen 1841 
 
 Cavil v. Smith 1054 
 
 Cawley v Leonard 1026 
 
 Cawthorn v. Chalie 588 
 
 Cayce v Powell 87 
 Cay ley v. Sandycroft Brick 
 
 Co. 720 
 
 Cazenove v. Cutler 1243,1245,1247 
 
 v. Pil king ton 2270 
 
 VOL. I. — c 
 
 Co. 
 
 Chace v. Holmes 
 Chadbourne v. Coe 
 Chadoin v. Magee 
 Chadwell, Re 
 
 v. Jones 
 
 v Jordan 
 
 v. Winston 
 Chadwick, Ex parte 
 
 545 
 
 417, 736 
 
 256 
 
 1623 
 
 1567 
 
 815 
 
 1614, 1623, 1624 
 
 989 
 
 506 
 
 Broadwood 420, 615, 667, 702, 
 
 704 
 
 v. Chadwick 15:H) 
 
 v. Holt 1036, 10.39 
 
 v Island Beach Co. 1062 
 
 v. Maden 
 
 v. Pubble 
 
 v. Turner 
 Chaffen v. Wills 
 Chaffers v Baker 
 
 v. Headlam 
 Chaffin v Hull 
 
 v. Kimball 
 
 v. St. Louis 
 
 230,231,279 
 
 1S21 
 
 780, 782, 1485 
 
 1107 
 
 520, 1592, 15"4 
 
 203, 204, 1771 
 
 550 
 
 326, 327, 526, 85'! 
 
 1627 
 
 Chaffraixv. Board of Liquidation 197 
 
 Chalfant v. Monroe 
 
 
 170 
 
 Chalk v Raine 829, 881, 8! 
 
 982, 
 
 
 
 1720 
 
 «>. Thompson 
 
 1183, 
 
 use 
 
 v. Wyatt 
 
 
 1639 
 
 Challenger v. Royle 
 
 1640, 
 
 1642 
 
 Challie v. Gwynne 
 
 795, 
 
 1601 
 
 Challnor v. Murhall 
 
 
 318 
 
 Chalmer v. Bradley 
 
 
 725 
 
 Chalmers v. Chambers 
 
 378, 3' 
 
 v. Laurie 
 
 
 434 
 
 Chalon v. Webster 
 
 
 251 
 
 Chamberlain, Ex parte 
 
 
 1743 
 
 lie 
 
 
 1798 
 
 v. Ager 
 
 
 657 
 
 V. Almy 
 
 
 1561 
 
 o. Chamberlain 
 
 
 1328 
 
 v. Gallup 
 
 
 1461 
 
 v. Juppiers 
 
 
 1110 
 
 v. Knapp 
 
 
 570 
 
 v. Thacker 
 
 
 223 
 
 Chamberlayne v. Brockett 1491 
 
 v. Dummer 1633,2306 
 
 Chamberlin v. Estey 1418 
 
 Chambers, Ex parte 1359 
 
 v. Baptist Edu. Society 20 
 
 v. Bicknell 202, 252 
 
 v. Bull 180 
 
 v. Caulfield 1130 
 
 v. Chalmers 361, 379 
 
 v Chambers 658 
 
 v. Goldwin 194, 260, 261, 668, 
 
 1719, 1769 
 
 v. Penland 1625 
 
 v. Robinson 1135 
 
 v. Smith 837, 857, 1233, 1394 
 
 v. Toy u bee 1594 
 
 v. Warren 844 
 
 v. Wright 288 
 
 Chambless v. Taber 1621 
 
 Chainbliss v. Smith 841 
 
 Cbamley, Lord v. Dunsany, Lord 
 
 842, 86S, 1370 
 
 Champ v. Moody 1368 
 
 Chanipernowne v. Scott 1299, 1843 
 
 Champion, Ex parte 1258,1259 
 
 v. Brown 285 
 
 V. Parish 318 
 
 Champliu v McLeod 1653 
 
 v. New York, Corp. of 735 
 
 v. Parish 254.365 
 
 Champueys v. Buchan 417, 834, 
 
 2369 
 
 Chancey v. Fenhoulet - 568 
 
 ». May 25, 238 
 
 Chaurellor v. Gummere 1284 
 
 v. Morecraft 223, 268 
 
 Chandler, He 1840 
 
 v. Brainard 916 
 
 v. Goodrich 1156 
 
 v. Herrick 852 
 
 v. Home 1101 
 
 v. Jenks 986 
 
 v. Pettit 1315 
 
 v. Siddle 1742 
 
 Chandos, Duke oft'. Talbot 183 
 
 Chant v. Broyvn 577 
 
 Chapeaurouge v Carteaux 1707 
 
 Chapin v Coleman 618, 626, 842 
 
 v. Mann 2342 
 
 v. Perrin 1459 
 
 v. Sears 334 
 
 v. Walker 1551 
 
 Chaplin, He 1611 
 
 v. Chaplin 163 
 
 Chapline r. Beatty 734 
 
 v. Betty 1676 
 
 v Chapiine 1061, 1277 
 
 v. Moore 1358 
 
 Chapman, Re 1770 
 
 v. Banker & Tradesman Pub 
 
 Co. 236, 312, 329 
 
 i'. Barney 402 
 
 v. Beach 1727 
 
 v. Brown 1020 
 
 v. Butler 560 
 
 v. Chapman 379, 381, 859 
 
 v. Corpe 652 
 
 v. Farmer 1237 
 
 v. Ferry 567 
 
 v. Forbes 559 
 
 v. Fowler 1286, 1292 
 
 v Hamilton 287,288 
 
 v . Hammersley 1462 
 
 v. Hunt 212, 314, 368 
 
 v. Lee 1556 
 
 v. Lipscomb 313 
 
 v McMillan 1299 
 
 v. Midland Ry. Co. 1444 
 
 v. Partridge 1138 
 
 v. Pittsburg & S. R. Co 208, 390, 
 1221 
 v. Real Property Trust, Lim'd. 
 
 9S5, 1589 
 v. Robertson 1238 
 
 v. Smith 1111, 1112. 1248 
 
 D. Tibbits 1363, 1364 
 
 v. Toy Ling 1632
 
 XXXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 1385 
 660 
 819 
 
 lu20 
 
 Chappedelaine v Dcchenaux665,668 
 
 Chappellv Davidson lbbb 
 
 v Gregory 1463, 14b4 
 
 v. Griffith *»* 
 
 v. Purday "o4 
 
 v. Rees £«" 
 
 Chappie v. Cadell *» 
 
 Charitable Asso. v. Baldwin ^ -& 
 
 Charitable Donations, Comm'rs 
 
 of v. Hunter "id 
 
 Charkieh, The **1 
 
 Charles w. Dunbar -,« So- 
 
 ». Fiuchley Local Board IV,. «° 
 r. Jones 
 D. Kowley 
 v. Shepherd 
 Charles Lafitte & Co., Be 
 Charles River Bridge v Warren 
 
 Bridge 945, 961, 1042, lOib, 
 
 1079,1110,1629,1635 
 Charleston Ins. Co. ». Hotter bdO 
 Charleston Ins. & Tr. Co. v. 
 
 Sebrig ZD 
 
 Chariotte, Columbia, &c. R. ^°- 
 
 m. J'' iin' 10 id 
 
 Charlton v. Charlton 1450, 1840 
 
 v. Coombes 578, 943, 1834 
 
 v. Scoville 
 v. West 
 
 Charman v. Charman 
 
 Charnock v. Dewing 
 
 Charras v. Pickering 
 
 Charter, Ex parte 
 Charter 
 
 Chennell, Re, Jones V. Chennell 
 
 80, o5o 
 
 v. Martin 1179,1181,1182,1185, 
 
 119 1 
 
 Chenowith v. Smith 1492 
 
 Chepstow Bobbiu Mills Co., Re 31 
 
 Cheraw, &c R. Co v. Marshall 
 
 150i 
 
 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 129 
 
 Cherry v. Belcher 90 
 
 v. Clements «« 
 
 v. Monro 
 
 v. Stein 
 
 Chesapeake & Ohio Co. •■ 
 
 Young !6dl 
 
 Chesapeake &c. Canal Co. v. B. 
 
 & O. R. R Co. 16i5, 16.6 
 
 Chesapeake, &c. R Co. i». Huse 395 
 Cheshire Iron Works v. Gay 
 
 Child v. Comber 
 
 v. Gibson 
 
 v Godolphin 
 
 v. Mann 
 • v Stenning 
 Childers v. Dean 
 Childress v. Harrison 
 
 v. Hurt 
 
 v. Vance 
 Childs v Horr 
 
 655 
 
 m 
 
 655 
 
 1560, 1566, 1569 
 
 334, 385, 406 
 
 1260 
 
 12*7 
 
 1281, 1-90 
 
 1278 
 
 829, 982 
 
 Chase, lie 
 v. Cannon 
 t> Chase 
 v. Dunham 
 v. Heaney 
 tr. Joiner 
 v. Kenniston 
 v. Lincoln 
 v. Locherman 
 v. Manhardt 
 v. Minot 
 Palmer 
 
 779 
 
 177, 476 
 
 1026 
 
 1102 
 
 36 
 
 1182, 1319 
 
 1411 
 
 1381 
 
 334 
 
 634, 1621 
 
 413, 414 
 
 1841 
 
 1285 
 
 920 
 
 875 
 
 1411 
 
 841, 1668, 1771 
 
 1638 
 
 90,314 
 
 Cheshunt College, He 
 Chess v. Chess 
 Chester v Apperson 
 v. Canfield 
 v Chester 
 v Halliard 
 v. Life Association 
 v Me'vopolitan Ry. Co. 
 Chester Iron Co. v. Beach 
 Cheswell v. Chapman 
 Chesworth V Hunt 
 Chetham v. lloare 
 Chetwood v Brittan 
 
 v. Coffin 
 Chetwynd v. Lindon 
 
 1852 
 
 1118 
 
 386 
 
 749 
 
 1540 
 
 v. Searls 334, 335. 338, 341, 588 
 
 v. Springvale Mills Co 
 v. Tuttle 
 v. Vanderbilt 
 v. Winans 
 Wooster 
 
 940 
 1642 
 
 145 
 1071 
 1642 
 
 Cheuvete v. Mason 
 
 Chevet v. Jones 
 
 Chew v. Bank of Baltimore 
 
 v. Hyman 
 Chewett v. Moran 
 Chibnall v. Paul 
 Chicago v. Cameron _ 
 
 v. Wright 1620, 16o0 
 
 Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Union __ 
 Rolling Mill Co ' 
 
 Chicago & A. R. Ferry Co v. 
 Wiggins Ferry Co 
 
 " » -n New 
 
 1657 
 
 1742 
 
 58 
 
 1620 
 
 129, 130 
 
 1425, 1778 
 
 1459 
 
 324 
 
 137 
 
 959 
 
 4<-2 
 
 1653 
 
 15H f 15^1532; 1533 Chicago & A R Co. .. New 
 
 1 ?. 1 ^! l °- 1 ' ' cin i Vnrk &c R. Co. 
 
 Keokuk 
 
 1 
 
 Union 
 
 1743 
 
 Chase's Case 584 590 617, 787, 
 
 1047,1166, Iil5. lilb 
 Chatfield v. Berchtoldt 441, 453 
 
 Chattanooga Medicine Co. v. 
 
 Thedford 1548 
 
 Chatteris v. Isaacson &o- 
 
 v Young laoi, ld>d 
 
 Chatterton v. Thomas 409, 505 
 
 v Young 18 " 
 
 Chauncey v. Tahonrden 568 
 
 Chav tor v. Trinity College 239 
 
 Chealefl Kenward 1J"'- 
 
 Cheatham v. Audley, Lord 1236 
 
 v Grugeon 128b, l ^ 
 
 v. Huff ■>". 
 
 v . Morrison ££ 
 
 v . Pearce bl ',£a 
 
 Cheavinw Walker lb4H 
 
 Chedworth, Lord V. Edwards 1652 
 
 Cheek v. Tilley 16" 
 
 Cheeseborough v. Wn g h * 4 ^ 4 ^J 
 
 Cheesman, Re 1*40 
 
 v Thorne ***&» 
 
 Cheever v. Perley 64 652 
 
 t> R. & B. R R Co 4, 1021, 
 
 1639, 1716, 1724, 1736 
 
 Cheltenham & S. Ry Carriage 
 
 and W. Co., lie 10 1 
 
 Cheney v. Belcher »w 
 
 „. Glea.son 986, 1168, 1470 
 
 r. Patton 65° 
 
 »i Straube 54- 
 
 Chenuel v Churchman 
 
 York. &c R. Co 
 Chicago. S.c. R. Co. v 
 
 &c Packet Co. 
 Chicago. &c R. Co. .. 
 
 R M. Co. 1548 
 
 Chicago & S. E. R Co. v. Cason 
 
 lilb, lido 
 Chicago, &c. R Co V. Frary 1061 
 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Ot- , 
 
 tawa lbM 
 
 Chicago Artesian Well Co. V. 
 
 Conn Mutual Ute Ins. Co. 1 
 
 lOOd 
 
 Chicago Building Society r.^^ 
 
 Chicago & Calumet R M. Co ^^ 
 
 v Scully 9 , 9 
 
 Chicago Land Co. v. Peck ^ 
 
 Chicago, m. & st. P. Ry • 
 
 Third Nat. Bank 1548 
 
 Chicago Mun. G. & F. Co. v. 
 
 Lake „ 
 
 Chicago P S Exchange v. Mc- 
 
 Claughrv H*" 
 
 Thicarro St L. & N. R Co 
 Chl Macomb 178, 388, 543, 586 
 590, io» 
 Chichester v Chichester 
 
 B Kansas City, &c. R Co. 15 I 
 B Chiles v. Boon 458, 513 
 
 1638 | Chillingworth v. Chillingworth 
 
 Chils v. Gronlund J';43 
 
 Chilton ». Campbell 156i, 1664 
 
 ■K.London 239, 3bl,83i 
 
 Chinn v. Caldwell ^"O 
 
 Chinnock v Ely, Marchioness 
 of lu 
 
 v Sainsbnry 1081 
 
 Chion, Ex parte oJ 
 
 Chipman v. Hartford, City of 
 , v Sabbaton 
 303 Chippendale v Tomlinson 
 287, 1533 Chisholm v. Adams 
 795, 1394 v. Georgia, State of 
 1553 Chissum v. Dewes 
 
 Chittenden v Brewster 
 Chitty v. Bray 
 
 v. Parker 
 Chivers v. Bax 
 Chlein v. Rabat 
 Choate v. Tighe 
 Cholmley v. Oxford, Counters ^ 
 
 Cholmondeley v. Clinton 200, "212, 
 
 213 216, 229, 230, 233, 234 266, 
 
 41 5, 408, 420,559, 577.672 1237, 
 
 1461,1559,1619,1650 
 
 Earl v. Oxford, Earl j33 
 
 Chorltonf. Dickie 970 9^9 
 
 Choteau v. Rice 368, 82b, (Ml, ibdb 
 
 Chowick ». Dimes old, 104* 
 
 Chownev Bajlis oo 
 
 Christian r. Anderson Wis 
 
 «. Atlantic &N.C. R. Co. 133 
 
 v Cabell 
 
 v Crocker 
 
 v. Devereux 
 
 v. Foster 
 
 v State 
 
 v. Taylor 
 
 v Wrenn 
 
 Christiansborg, The 
 
 Christie, He 
 
 v. Cameron 
 
 v Christie 
 
 I v. Craig 
 
 v. Gosling 
 
 v Griffing 
 
 i Christ Church, Ex parte 
 
 ! Christ-Church Inclosure 
 
 i fie 
 
 I Christmas v. Campbell 
 
 Christopher v. 
 
 v Cleghorn 
 Christophers v. Spaike 
 v. White 
 
 794 
 
 302 
 
 206, 250, 319 
 
 1432 
 
 560 
 
 724 
 
 868, 1553 
 
 633 
 
 1358 
 
 162, 476 
 
 347, 34 !» 
 
 16c3 
 
 1503 
 
 1677 
 
 1611 
 
 Act, 
 
 239 
 1670 
 897 
 431 
 284 
 1235, 1414 
 
 Christ's College v. Widdrington 843 
 Christ's Hospital, Exgorte^^ 
 
 v, Donegal, Marquis of 
 
 v. Hunter 
 Chick v. Nicholls 
 Chickering, Re 
 
 v Fullerton 
 Chicot V. Ivequesne 
 Chicot County w Sherwood 
 rhidwick v. Prehble 
 Child v. Brabson 
 
 858, 875, 
 
 883, 912 
 
 722, 769, 
 
 1829 
 
 813 
 
 1423 
 
 212, 236 
 
 197 
 
 297, 892 
 
 545 
 
 1821 
 
 508 
 
 13, 415, 1459 
 i. Attorney- 
 
 138 
 
 1157 
 
 618 
 
 1202 
 
 169 
 
 113, 187, 1411 
 
 421. 506. 509 804, 
 
 1031, 1589, 1591 
 
 Chugg v Chugg 382, 1369 
 
 Church v. Holcomb « . < 
 
 v. Ide " ' ]071 
 
 ^S 39,41,42,1590 
 
 v Grainger 
 
 Governors of 
 General 
 Christy's Appeal 
 Christy v. Christy 
 Chubb v. Carter 
 
 v Griffiths 
 
 v. Stretch 
 Chuck v. Cremer
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 XXXV 
 
 Churchill v. Bank of England 1042 
 
 v Collier 830 
 
 v. Lauer 303 
 
 Churchward v. The Queen 133 
 
 Churton v. Douglas 1649, 1654, 
 
 1655 
 
 v. Frewen 577, 781, 1834 
 
 Chute v. Dacre, Lady 778 
 
 Cincinnati v. Cameron 355 
 
 Cincinnati R. Co. v. Sloan 1463, 
 
 1491 
 
 Citizens Coach Co. v. Camden 
 
 Horse R. Co. 1664, 1669 
 
 Citizen's National Bank v. Day- 
 ton 221 
 Citizens' Street Ry. Co. v. 
 
 Spahr 314 
 
 City Bank v. Bangs 842, 1470, 1481, 
 
 1563, 1564, 1567, 1568, 1569, 1571 
 
 v. Bartlett 334 
 
 t> Skclton 1565 
 
 City of lierlin. The 149i) 
 
 City of Glasgow Bank, Re 1069 
 
 City of London Brewery Co. v. 
 
 Tennant 1631 
 
 City of Moscow Gas Co. v. Int'l 
 
 Financial Society 26 
 
 Citv National Bank v. Hunter 1461 
 
 Clack v. Carlon 1235, 1414 
 
 Claflin v. Bennett 417 
 
 v. Gordon 23-5 
 
 v Hamlin 161S 
 
 v Hopkinton 1661 
 
 Clagett, lie 1212 
 
 v. Phillips 572, 1834 
 
 v. Worthington 271 
 
 Clancarty v. Latouche 666 
 
 Clancy v. Craine 585 
 
 Clanricarde, Marquis of v. Hen- 
 
 ning 1397 
 
 Claparede v Commercial Union 
 
 Association 417, 785 
 
 Clapp v. Balch 30 
 
 v. Bromagham 1151 
 
 t; Dittman 313 
 
 v. Shephard 317 
 
 v. Sherman 1299, 1309 
 
 v. Stoughron 89, 128 
 
 v. Thaxter 1002, 1018, 1019, 1020, 
 1030, 1475, 1575, 1579 
 Clarbrough v. Toothill 1860 
 
 Clare v. Clare 1411 
 
 v. Wood 884, 1037 
 
 Clare County v. Auditor-Gen- 
 eral 1381 
 Clarendon, Earl of v. Hornby 1156, 
 1157 
 Claridge v. Hoare 563, 564, 610 
 Clark's Appeal 1661 
 Clark, Re. 99 
 v. Abington, Lord 1254 
 v Ball 1004 
 v. Bell 1270 
 v . Blair 659 
 v. Brown 1120 
 v. Burgh 125 
 v. Carlton 1168 
 v. Clapp 1618 
 v. Clark 98, 109, 389, 491, 1481, 
 1648, 1699 
 v. Congregational Society 1112. 
 1116, 2337 
 v. Cort 2043 
 v. Covenant, &c. Ins. Co. 1624 
 v. Crout 68 
 v. Davis 395, 557 
 v. Dew 505, 1721, 1725 
 v. Dibble 033 
 v. Fergusson 28, 1643 
 v. Fisher 852 
 v. Flint 550, 630, 1902 
 v. Freeman 1648 
 v . Ganz 1661 
 v. Garrett 15W1 
 v Gill 908,911 
 V. Oirdwood 298. 1416, 1433 
 V. Ha.l 1013, 1028, 1029, 1030 
 
 Clark v. Harwood 
 
 
 360 
 
 v. Hershey 
 
 
 1168 
 
 v. Hezekiah 
 
 
 109 
 
 v. Hull 
 
 
 1531 
 
 v. Hunt 
 
 
 846 
 
 v. Jacques 
 
 
 1600 
 
 v. Jeffersonville R. Co 
 
 354, 1631 
 
 v . Keene 
 
 1530 
 
 1532, 163o 
 
 v. London School Hoard 1081, 
 
 
 
 1380, 1401 
 
 v. Long 
 
 
 287, 292 
 
 v. Malpas 822, 889 
 
 , 912, 1028, 
 
 
 1083 
 
 1440, 1554 
 
 v. Molyneux 
 
 
 1126 
 
 v. Oakley 
 
 
 844 
 
 v. Patterson 
 
 
 634 
 
 v. Phelps 
 
 547, J 
 
 v. Piatt 
 
 
 68 
 
 v. Raymond 
 
 
 1716 
 
 v. Reed 1376, 
 
 1381, 
 
 1386, 13:t!>, 
 1400. 1448 
 
 v. Reyburn 
 
 1,256 
 
 998, 2214, 
 2215 
 
 4, 360, 38 •> 
 
 v. Rivers, Lord 
 
 322, £ 
 
 v. Robbin 
 
 
 1246 
 
 v. Saginaw City Bank 
 
 617 
 
 v. Sawyer 
 
 
 1411 
 
 v. Simpson 
 
 
 1610 
 
 v. Slay ton 
 
 
 2 
 
 v. Smith 197 
 
 , 1242, 
 
 1345, 1246 
 
 v. Soc. in Keene 
 
 403 
 
 406, 1076. 
 
 1120 
 
 , 1121, 
 
 1125, 1147 
 
 v. Spears 
 
 
 837 
 
 v. Stephenson 
 
 
 1159 
 
 v Taylor 
 
 
 1551 
 
 v. Turnbull 
 
 
 354 
 
 v. Wardwell 
 
 246, 
 
 1661, 2323 
 
 v. Waters 
 
 
 448 
 
 v. Webb 
 
 
 253 
 
 v. Willis 
 
 
 1221 
 
 v. Willoughby 
 
 
 987 
 
 t>. Wilson 
 
 
 325, 979 
 
 v. Wood 
 
 
 1490 
 
 v. Wray 
 
 
 418 
 
 v. Wright 
 
 
 878 
 
 Clarke, Ex parte 
 
 
 511, 1069 
 
 Clarke, Re 
 
 70, S 
 
 v. Abingdon 
 
 
 1254 
 
 v. Batters 
 
 
 1653 
 
 v. Birley 
 
 
 322 
 
 v. Brad la ugh 
 
 
 154, 886 
 
 v. Bridge 
 
 
 1484 
 
 v. Byne 
 
 
 1565 
 
 v. Callow 
 
 
 561 
 
 v Calvert 
 
 
 58 
 
 v. Clark 
 
 
 1638 
 
 v. Clarke 
 
 
 424, 434 
 
 v. Clayton 
 
 
 1151, 1161 
 
 v. Cookson 
 
 
 1071 
 
 v. Dunn 
 
 
 964, 96S 
 
 v. Klliott 
 
 
 1774, 1775 
 
 v. Hart 
 
 
 L377, 150.3 
 
 v. .Jennings 
 
 
 956 
 
 v. Law 
 
 
 889 
 
 v Morey 
 
 
 49 
 
 v. Ormond, Earl of 388 
 
 .666,667, 
 
 669, 1615, 
 
 1616, 1617 
 
 J' Ormonde 
 
 
 1626 
 
 v. Periam 
 
 
 348, 853 
 
 v. Price 
 
 
 1654 
 
 v. Rawlins 
 
 
 710 
 
 ». Siffery 
 
 
 920, 1099 
 
 v. Sampson 
 
 
 1411, 1413 
 
 V Seton 
 
 
 1254 
 
 V. Sibley 
 
 
 1239 1 
 
 v Thornton 
 
 
 1737 
 
 V. Tinsley 
 
 
 951 
 
 v. Tipping 
 
 63, 385, 4.1 
 
 
 
 814, 1928 
 
 v. Toleman 
 
 
 710 
 
 t>. Turton 
 
 
 852 
 
 V. Van Reimsdyk 
 
 841 
 
 , 842, 843, 
 846 
 
 v. White 
 
 
 844 
 
 v. Wilmot 
 
 
 160. 710 
 
 O. Wilson 
 
 
 195, 1774 
 
 t\ Woodward 
 
 
 95 
 
 Clarke v Wyburn 40, 1482 
 
 v Yorke 418 
 
 Clarke's Charity, Re 1854 
 
 Clarkson v. De Peyster 237, 2U5, 
 
 301, 303, 315, 557, 559. 1253, 
 
 1369, 1770, 1771, 1778 
 
 v. Dunning 159 
 
 v. Edge 1072,1081,1654 
 
 v. Elbridge 460 
 
 v. Read 1281, 1282 
 
 v. Scrogins 793 
 
 Clason v. Lawrence 301 
 
 v- Morris 524, 532 
 
 Clavey v. Lord 1071 
 
 Clay v. EJgerton 313 
 
 v. Gurley 3:34 
 
 v. Pennington 1359, 1360 
 
 v. Richardson 1382 
 
 v. Ruflbrd 245 
 
 v. Towle 737 
 
 Clay and Tetley, Re 251 
 
 Clay brook v Wade 532 
 
 Clayton v. Anthony 1624 
 
 v Chichester 525 
 
 v. Clarke 71. 80 
 
 v Finch 1053 
 
 v. Glover 1284 
 
 v. Gresham 98, 18o9 
 
 v. Martin 1666 
 
 v. Meadows 703. 705 
 
 v. Nugent 111!) 
 
 v. Thompson 842 
 
 v. Yarrington 1121, 1136 
 
 Clayton Mills Manuf Co., Re 1476, 
 
 Claxton, Ex parte 74, 112 
 
 v. Claxton • 68 
 
 Clearke v. Angier, Lord 90 
 
 Cleaver v. Smith 801 
 
 v. Younger 1705 
 
 Cleaves v. Foss 365 
 
 Cleeve v. Gascoigne 1121, 1123, 1137 
 
 V. Mahaney 1635 
 
 Clegg v. Clegg 170 
 
 v. Kdmondson 722 
 
 v. Fishwick 200, 1728, 1729 
 
 i'. Hands 324, 1654 
 
 ». Rowland 250 
 
 ?'. Varnell 335 
 
 Cleland, Ex parte 1846 
 
 v. Casgrain 334 
 
 v Cleland 201, 251, 319 
 
 Clement v. Langthorn 63 
 
 v. Maddick 1648. 2314 
 
 ». Scott 1845 
 
 Clement Manuf. Co. i\ Upton & 
 
 Hart Co. 197 
 
 Clements, Re 1069 
 
 v. Bowes £34, 303, 304, 1514 
 
 J' Breresford 1756 
 
 v. Clifford 792 
 
 r. Greenwell 418 
 
 v. Gri lith 899, 1598 
 
 v Lumpkin 418 
 
 v. Moore 737, 828, 840, 844, 1229 
 
 v. Welles 1654 
 
 Clemons v Elder 256 
 
 Cletnonston v. Blessig 49. 51 
 
 Clench v. Dooley 1569 
 
 Chphane v. Lord Provost 1503 
 
 Clerihew v. Lascelles 073 
 
 Clerk b. Udall 11.35 
 
 v. Wright 655 
 
 Gierke v. Anglesey, Lord 90 
 
 C'erkson v. Bowyer 221 
 
 Cleveland ;\ Burnham 1463 
 
 v. Chambliss 1548 
 
 v. Citizens' Gas Light Co. 1636 
 
 Cleveland F. & B. Co. v. United 
 
 States R. S Co. 1642 
 
 Cleveland Target Co. v. U. S. 
 
 Pigeon Co. 852 
 
 Cleveland's Harte Estates. Duke 
 
 of, Re 160, 1607, 1694 
 
 Cleveland, &c. R. Co. v. Erie, 
 
 City of 632, 6-33 
 
 Cleveland, &c. Ry. Co. v. Jewett 
 
 1735
 
 XXXVI 
 
 Cleverly v. Cleverly 1617 
 
 Clews r. Brunswick 418 
 
 t;. Woodstock Iron Co. 149. 536 
 
 Click v. Hums 1284 
 
 Cliff i'. Bull 907,909 
 
 v. Wadsworth 1392 
 
 Cliffe v. Wilkinson 34, &5 
 
 Clifford v. Coleuian 829, 833 
 
 v. Turrill 1015,1843,2117 
 
 Clilton r. Anderson 1621 
 
 v. ISeutall 354. 785 
 
 v. Cnckuurn 1622 
 
 v. Haig 201, 252, 292, 294, 417, 
 
 419 
 
 v. Orchard 13s*8 
 
 v Robinson 1664 
 
 Ciiuon lro.i Co. i: Dye 1638 
 
 Clinan v Cooke 1407 
 
 Clinch v. Financial Corp. 26, 241. 
 
 243,244,1399,1821,1826 
 
 Clinton, Re 1800 
 
 v. Webster 1777 
 
 Clippendale v. Masson 1097 
 
 Clive v. Beaumont 321, 372, 1897 
 
 p. Carew 
 
 185, 187 
 
 Cloake, Re 
 
 895 
 
 Clodfelter v. Hulett 
 
 324 
 
 Cloete. He 
 
 142 
 
 Clogstoun 0. Walcott 
 
 1355 
 
 Clotwortby r Mellista 
 
 772 
 
 Cloud v. Gresley 
 
 629 
 
 v. Hamilton 
 
 214, 1265 
 
 V. Whiteman 
 
 378, 991, 1003 
 
 Clough, He 
 
 1030 
 
 v. Adams 
 
 417,418 
 
 v. Cross 
 
 471 
 
 v Lambert 
 
 1934 
 
 Clouston v. Shearer 
 
 1961 , 2040 
 
 Clowes v. Beck 
 
 1397 
 
 V. Dickenson 1459, 1467, 1489 
 
 v. Hilliard 
 
 316, 405 
 
 Clum v. Brewer 
 
 1676 
 
 Clutton v. Lee 
 
 280 
 
 v. Pardon 1368, 1376, 1448, 1611, 
 1843 
 
 C'.vburn r. Reynolds 991, 1734 
 
 Clyde v. Richmond & D. R. 
 Co 1743 
 
 Clvmer v. James 292 
 
 v. Shaw 1562 
 
 Coaks v. Boswell 68, 164 
 
 Coal E Gas Co., Re, Grover's 
 
 case 890 
 
 Coale r. Chase 735 
 
 v. Garrison 1629 
 
 v. Mildred 199 
 
 Coann r. Atlanta Cotton Factory 
 Co. 243,2386 
 
 Coast Line R Co. r. Cohen 1637 
 
 Coates >■. Cunningham 1716 
 
 v. Day 279 
 
 v. Lashley 1272 
 
 v Legard 334 
 
 v. McK.-e 186 
 
 r. Merrick Thread Co. 888, 1648 
 v. Pearson 976, 1552 
 
 Coats r Chadwick 1069 
 
 v. Elliott 1054 
 
 v. Holbrnok 45 
 
 Cobb* Baxter 1548 
 
 v. Covenant M B. Ass. 1110 
 
 v. Jamison 1168 
 
 V. Rice 1018, 1411, 1561 
 
 Cobbett v. Iludson 1101 
 
 Cobbev v. Knapp 
 ' Wright 
 
 Cohden v Maynard 
 
 Cobham r. Dal ton 
 
 Coburn r. Ames 
 v. Cedar Valley Land Co, 
 
 Coch v. Allcock & Co. 
 Cochran v. American 
 Co. 
 
 v. Goodell 
 
 v. Lynch 
 
 v. Miller 
 
 830 
 830 
 
 1267 
 157 
 
 1765 
 1517. 
 
 16:-7 
 
 9a5 
 
 Opera 
 
 243 
 212 
 1314 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Cochrane, Ex parte 1743, 1744 
 
 v. Fearon 27, 154, 1605 
 
 v. O'Brien 147, 1560, 1568, 1570 
 
 v Phillips 1525 
 
 r. Willis 315, 542, 602 
 
 Cock v. Evans 285, 402, 424, 778, 781 
 
 v. Rivie 1702 
 
 Cockburn v. Edwards 1082, 1407 
 
 r. I'eel 17'il 
 
 r. Riphael 13,969,1440,1731, 
 
 1737 
 
 v. Thompson 25, 217, 243, 291 
 
 Cockcroft. Ex parte 1464 
 
 Cockcroft, lie, Broadbent v. 
 
 Groves 68 
 
 Cocke r. Gilpin 987, 1507 
 
 v. Trotter 844, 1553 
 
 v. Opshaw 11)73 
 
 Cockel v. Phipps 106 
 
 Cockell v Taylor 1392 
 
 Cockerell v. Barber 1236 
 
 v. Cholnieley 954 
 
 Cockes v. Sherman 214, 277 
 
 Cocking v. Pratt 672, 1622 
 
 Cockle r. Joyce 970, 979 
 
 Cockney v. Anderson 447. 449, 549 
 
 550 
 
 Cockran v. Lynch 1321 
 
 Cockrane v. Cockrane 1286 
 
 Cockrell v Cockrell 1350 
 
 v. Gurley 371 
 
 v. Warren 1549 
 
 Cockrill v. Maney 281 
 
 v. Sparke 647 
 
 Cocks v. Chandler 1649 
 
 v. Foley 329 
 
 v. Gray 1388 
 
 v. Purday 1601 
 
 v. Stanley 777 
 
 v. \arney 334 
 
 Cockshott v. London General 
 
 Cab Co. 970, 979 
 
 Codd v. Wooden 1624 
 
 Coddington v. Idell 1381 
 
 Coddrington v. Webb 1122 
 
 Codington v. Mott 403, 406,415,425 
 
 Codman r. Rodgers 641 
 
 Codner v. Hersey 737 
 
 Codrington v. Codrington 122. 718 
 
 v. Johnstone 170, 175, 1742, 1748, 
 
 1769 
 
 v. Lindsay 122 
 
 v. Parker 1241,1719 
 
 v. Shelburn, Earl of 185 
 
 Codwise v. Gelston 1587 
 
 v Taylor 284. 1004 
 
 Coe v. Beckwith 236, 288 
 
 v Louisville & N R. Co. 298 
 
 V. Turner 341, 559 
 
 Coeur d'Alene C. & M. Co v. 
 
 Miners' Union 1620, 1663 
 
 Coffee v. Norwood 254 
 
 Coffeen v. Brnnton 1648 
 
 Coffev v. Norwood 256 
 
 Coffin v. Chattanooga W. & P. 
 
 Co. 283 
 
 v Cooper 347, 351, 1218 
 
 r Easton 1110 
 
 v. Heath 68, 165, 167 
 
 v. Jones 916 
 
 r. Morrill 117 
 
 v. Murphy 887 
 
 Coffman o Allin 778 
 
 v Langston 418 
 
 Cogan v. Duffield 115 
 
 v. Ebden 1109 
 
 V. Stephens 991 
 
 Cogdell v. Cogdell 1253 
 
 Coger r. Coger 168 
 
 ('oglan v. Requeneau 1672 
 
 Cogswell v. Bull 26 
 
 p. Dolliver 1228 
 
 Coham v. Coham 1350 
 
 Coheen v Gordon 249 
 
 Cohen, Ex parte 1686 
 
 V- Alcan 449 
 
 v Ellis 1290 
 
 Cohen v. Goldsboro 1650 
 
 v. L'Engle 1614 
 
 v. Me > era 1463 
 
 v. Mitchell 58, 157 
 
 v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. 51 
 
 v. Poland 1661 
 
 v. Sharp 1624 
 
 *. Shyer 37, 1359 
 
 v. Waley 1791 
 
 v. Wolff 303 
 
 v. Woollard 1543, 1653 
 
 Cohens r. Virginia 129 
 
 Cohn ». Loui ville, N. 0. & T. R. 
 
 Co. 357 
 
 Coiron v. Millaudon 149, 191 
 
 Coke v. Fountain 868, 869 
 
 v. Gilbert 819 
 
 r. Wilcocks 679, 700 
 
 Coker, Ex parte 157 
 
 v. Dawkins 1286 
 
 v. Farewell 1112, 11'8 
 
 Colheck, Re, Hall v. Colbeck 405 
 
 Colburn v. Barrett 722 
 
 v. Bronghton 341 
 
 v. Duncombe 320, 1644 
 
 v. Simms 1381, 1395, 1654, 
 
 1681 
 
 Colchester, Mayor and Aldermen 
 
 of v 301. 315 
 
 Colclough v. Bolger 709 
 
 r. Boyse 876 
 
 v. Ev^s 1523, 1534 
 
 v. Sterum 1275, 1276 
 
 Colcock ?>. Furguson 1680 
 
 Colden v. Haskins 76 
 
 Colding v. Badger 1295, 1298 
 
 Coldwell v. Giles 1019 
 
 Cole v. Bean 1071, 1073 
 
 v. Burgess 1617 
 
 v. Cole 1252 
 
 v. Cunningham 629, 1618 
 
 v. Duke 1661 
 
 v. Eaton 1360 
 
 v. Flitrraft 633,634 
 
 v. Gray 184 
 
 v. Lake Co. 197 
 
 v. M'Glathry 645. 649 
 
 v. Miller 165, 997, 1575 
 
 v. Oil-Well Srpply Co. 1743 
 
 v. Peyson 1629 
 
 v. Sands 16 ;9 
 
 v Savage 386 
 
 v. Scott 1459 
 
 v. Sewell 1152, 1162 
 
 v. Shetterly 843 
 
 v. Trnll " 1258 
 
 Cole Silver Mining Co. v. Vir- 
 ginia, etc. Water Co. 1662 
 Colebourne v. Colebourne 1734 
 Colebrook p. Jones 28 
 Colebrooke, Er parte 133 
 r. Attorney-General 133, 134, 139 
 v. Clarke 1291 
 Cole County v. Angney 601 
 Colegrave v. Juson 1122 
 V Manley 1844 
 Coleman, Re 86, 576, 1361, 
 1814 
 v. Barnes 276, 338, 345 
 v Colgate 920 
 v. Flavel 1648 
 v. Franklin 1472 
 v. Gage 1676 
 t. Hudspeth 1668 
 v. Hutchinson 1150 
 v . Llewellin 999 
 v. Lvne 526 
 r. Martin 287, 2391 
 v. Mawby 1141 
 v. Mellersh 667, 1232 
 v. Moore 1377, 1553 
 v. I'inkard 233, 408 
 v. Ross 845 
 v . Ryan 1845 
 v. West Hartlepool Ry. Co. 1070, 
 1837 
 Colerick v. Hooper 197
 
 Coles v. Barrow 58 
 
 v. Booue 365 
 
 v. Buchanan 361 
 
 v Bullman 1137 
 
 v. Coles 1103 
 
 v. Forrest 257, 13*7 
 
 v. Gurney 448 
 
 v. Morris 821, 823, 888, 1599 
 
 v Sims 324, 1640, 1654, 1657, 1603 
 
 v Trecothick S81, 981 
 
 Coley v. Coley 956 
 
 Colgate v. Compagnie Francaise 145, 
 
 1556 
 
 v. Western U. T. Co. 1120, 1580 
 
 Collard v. Allison 1642 
 
 v. Cooper 1667 
 
 v. Groom 997 
 
 v Hare 1454 
 
 v. Marshall 1620 
 
 t;. Roe 1464 
 
 v. Smith 181, 182, 498, 524, 733, 
 
 754, 784 
 
 Collas v. Ilesse 205 
 
 College v Pike 1120 
 
 Collet v Wollaston 157, 255 
 
 Collett v. Collett 1426 
 
 v Dickenson 186, 187 
 
 v. Hover 231 
 
 v. Maule 1814 
 
 v. Preston 415, 1409 
 
 Collette v. Goode 785 
 
 Collier v. Bank of Newbern 1544 
 
 v. Chapman 841 
 
 v. Gray 1257 
 
 v. Nokes 1102, 1103 
 
 v. Whipple 1280, 1290 
 
 Collinge v. 1408 
 
 Collings v City of CamJen 1661 
 
 Colliugwood v Russell 315, 543, 
 
 602 
 
 Collins, lie 1840 
 
 Collins, Matter of 177 
 
 v. Barksdale 395 
 
 v. Burton 1490 
 
 v. Carey 1414 
 
 v. Casey 1235 
 
 v. Castle 1654 
 
 v. Collins 1633, 1699, 1859 
 
 v. Collyer 518 
 
 v. Elliot 915 
 
 v Greaves 793, 806, 811, 1216 
 V. Gresley 579 
 
 v. Griffith 267 
 
 v. Ins. Co. 2 
 
 v Knight 334, 385 
 
 v. Lamport 1653 
 
 v. Locke 670 
 
 v. Loftus 200, 997 
 
 v. North British & M. Ins. Co 843 
 v. North side Pub. Co. 723 
 
 V. Saurey 1073 
 
 v. Shirley 157, 215 
 
 v Sinclair 1081 
 
 v Stix 334 
 
 v. Stuteley 1081 
 
 V. Taylor 244, 794, 1027 
 
 v. Walker 2318 
 
 Collins Co. v. Brown 24, 1649 
 
 v. Walker 1380, 1395 
 
 Collins Manuf. Co. v. Ferguson 149 
 
 Collinson v 389, 1705, 1706, 
 
 1707, 1708 
 
 v. Jackson 417 
 
 v. Lister 1009, 1017, 1485, 1544, 
 
 2061 
 
 Collis v. Collis 792, 1773 
 
 v. Swayne 54" 
 
 Colliss v. Hector 203, 204 
 
 Colloway v. Dobson 780 
 
 Collyer v. Fallon 1053. 1730 
 
 Oilman v Crump ' 1648 
 
 v Eastern Counties Ry. Co. 26, 
 
 241, 242. 245 
 
 v. Northcote 163, 183. 498, 7">4 
 
 v. Sarell 1029, 1410 
 
 v. Turner 792, 1197 
 
 Colmer v Colmer 103 J 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Colmer v Ede 1843 
 
 Colmore v. North 1737 
 
 Colue Valley & Halstead Rail- 
 way, lie 1791 
 Colonial Bank v. Hepworth 855 
 Colonial Life As.-uiauce Co. v. 
 
 Home & Colonial Co. 1649 
 
 Colonial & U. S. Mortgage Co V 
 
 Hutchinson Mortgage Co. 145 
 Colorado Coal & Iron Co. v. 
 
 United States 8 
 
 Colorado Manuf. Co V. McDon- 
 ald 295 
 Colpoys v Colpoys 2182 
 Col^uhoun, He 1448, 1449, 14Jl 
 Colson v. Willi ims 1^71 
 Colston v. Gardiner 1050, 1054, 1055 
 Colstrum v. Minneapolis & St. 
 
 L. Ry Co 334 
 
 Colt i- Colt 68, 991, 1584, 2397 
 
 v Cornwell 16*25 
 
 v Lesnier 240, 291, :s92 
 
 Coltart v Him ltiOd 
 
 Colton ». Ross 378, 379, 384, 1073, 
 
 1074 
 
 v. Ward 989 
 
 Columbia Bank v Black 846 
 
 Columbia County v. Bryson 1620 
 
 Columbian Book Co v. De Gol- 
 
 yer 1734 
 
 Columbian Gov"t v. Rothschild 18, 
 19,20, 141,385 
 Columbine v. Chichester 314, 549, 
 550 
 Columbus las. Co. v Humphries 334 
 Columbus, etc. R. Co. v. Ellis 830 
 Columbus & W. Ry. Co. v. With- 
 
 erow 1675 
 
 Colverson v. Bloomfield 1702 
 
 Colvin, In re 
 
 v. Campion 
 
 v. Cor win 
 Colder v Colyer 
 
 v. Finch 
 Combe v. Hughe3 
 v London, Corp. of 572, 580,' 1832 
 1834 
 Combs v Buswell 
 
 v. Tarlton 
 Comer v Himes 
 Comfort v. McTeer 
 Comfort, The 
 Comley V Hendricks 
 Commercial Bank v Buckner 
 v. Corbett 
 v. French 
 
 v. New York State Bank 
 Commercial Bank Co.. Re 201, 664 
 Commercial Bank of India and 
 
 the East, Re 250 
 
 Commercial Mut. Ins Co. v Mc- 
 
 Loon 344, 347, 1961, 1966 
 
 Commercial Wharf Co. v. Win- 
 
 sor li)7, 1654 
 
 Commerell v Bell 407, 1509, 1529, 
 
 153-1, 1531 
 
 v. Hall 407, 1509, 1529, 1530 
 
 v. Poynton 1844 
 
 Commina v. Brownfield 730 
 
 ", Scott 602 
 
 Commissioners v. Andrews 10 
 
 Commissioners of Sewers t>. Gel- 
 
 latly 243, 272, 406 
 
 v Glasse 239, 272, 345, 579, 597, 
 
 873, 1381, 1675 
 
 Commonwealth v. Andre 46 
 
 1715, 1741 
 
 1114 
 
 330 
 
 433, 437, 1213, 
 
 1526, 1825 
 
 675 
 
 1430, 1433 
 
 846 
 
 197, 815 
 
 1579 
 
 287 
 
 1019, 1120 
 
 1K5 
 
 545 
 
 1734 
 
 22 
 
 1553 
 
 v. Arrison 
 
 v. Boston, &c. R Co. 
 
 v. Buzzell 
 
 v. Desmond 
 
 v Drake 
 
 v. Eagle Fire Ins. Co. 
 
 v. Eddy 
 
 v. Franklin Ing Co 
 
 v. Gould 
 
 10 
 10 
 886 i 
 546 
 &34, 576 | 
 1733, 1745, 
 1751, 1755 
 851 
 1743 I 
 1766, 
 
 xxxvii 
 
 Commonwealth v. Hawkins 1101 
 
 v Hide in Leather Ins Co. 1734 ' 
 
 v. Hill 886 
 
 v. Ins. Co 1298 
 
 v. Jetfiies 907 
 
 v. Kneeland 546 
 
 v McLaughlin 1323 
 
 v. Mauley 116, 123 
 
 v. Mechanics' Ins Co. 1411 
 
 v . Perkins 720 
 
 v. Roby llu7 
 
 v. Sumner 2 
 
 Compagnie du Senegal v. Woods 671, 
 
 1718 
 
 Compauia de Mozambique v 
 
 British South Africa Co. 629 
 
 Couiptou c Bearcroft 1734 
 
 v Blox-ham 877 
 
 v. Grey, Earl 579 
 
 Comstock v. Frederickson 1743 
 
 v. Hadhme 852 
 
 v. Herron 360, 843 
 
 v. Rayiord 334 
 
 Couacher v , Couacher 1597 
 
 Coualley v. Peck 418 
 
 Conally v Cruger 1678 
 
 Conant i>. Joues 1548 
 
 v. Kendall 13u0 
 
 v. Warren 87,547 
 
 Couard v Atlantic Ins. Co 1241 
 
 Concaunou v. Cruise 876 
 
 Concha u. Concha 664,914, 1495, 1507 
 
 G L. Ins 
 
 Harts- 
 
 1561 
 737 
 1600 
 1053 
 1003 
 1377 
 1260 
 
 457 
 
 Murrieta 1495, 1507 
 
 Concklin v. Coddington 1386, 1392 
 
 v. Hall 160 
 
 Concord v. Norton 514 
 
 Condict v King 1569 
 
 Conethard v. Hasted 949 
 
 Coney, Re 1734 
 
 Cong Ion v Aylesworth 579, 737 
 
 Conger v. Cotton 843 
 
 Congregational Church, Re 1855 
 Congreve, hi re 1310, 1449 
 
 Coningsby, Lord, v. Jekyll 419, 597 
 Conington v Gilliat 102, 1096, 1105 
 Conley v Alabama 
 Co. 
 
 v Nailor 
 Conlon t>. Prior 
 Conn v. Garland 
 
 v. Penn 
 Connable v Bucklin 
 Connecticut v Jackson 
 
 Central Manuf. Co 
 home 
 Connecticut & P. R. R. Co 
 
 Hendee 790, 794 
 
 Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Kav- 
 
 anagh 328 
 
 Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v 
 
 SchaetTer 573, 576 
 
 v. Smith 417 
 
 V. Union Trust Co. 576 
 
 Connecticut River Lumber Co 
 
 Olcott Falls Co. 
 Connell, Re 
 Connelly v. Carlin 
 
 v Fisher 
 
 Connelly Manuf. Co v. Wattles 1663, 
 1675 
 Conner »> Armstrong 
 
 v. Chase 
 
 v. Smith 
 ConnitTc Kahn 
 Connolly »'. Connolly 
 
 v. M'Dermot 
 
 v. Pardon 
 
 ti. Wells 
 Connop i'. Hayward 
 Connor v. Board of Education 
 
 D Connor 
 Connors v Connors 
 Conolan V Leyland 
 Conover v Conover 
 
 V Sealy 
 
 v. Wailing 1282, 1284, 1286, 1289 
 Conrad v Buck 536 
 
 1164 
 1038 
 
 846 
 852 
 
 1559 
 
 841 
 
 402 
 
 1459 
 
 1576 
 
 360 
 
 1411 
 
 149, 193, 208 
 
 840, 1253 
 
 557 
 
 1726 
 
 371 
 
 87 
 
 634, 639, 644 
 
 334
 
 XXXV111 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star pagiog.] 
 
 Conrad v. Mullison 287 
 
 Conro f. Port Henry Iron Co 235 
 Couroy v. Oregon Construction 
 
 Co. ^ 542 
 
 Conseuua v. Fanning 371,377,666, 
 608, 1221, 1232, 1258, llbl, 
 148«J, 21«J3 
 Conserva, The 141 
 
 Consett V Bell 324 
 
 Cousociated Pres. Co. of Green's 
 
 Farms v. Staples 1562 
 
 Consolidated B A. Co. v. Amer- 
 ican P. F. Co 790 
 Consolidated Coal 1.0. Schniis- 
 
 seur 1654 
 
 Consolidated El S Co v. Atlan- 
 tic Trust Co. 1586 
 Consolidated E. L. Co. v. Crush- 
 Swan E L. Co. 334 
 Consolidated Fruit Jar Co. v 
 
 Strong i.379 
 
 Consols Insurance Co , Official 
 
 Manager of, v. Wood 808 
 
 Const v Barr 780, 1049, 1050, 16d3 
 
 v. Ebers 510 
 
 v. Harris 596,598,1671,1727 
 
 Constable v Angel 1114 
 
 v Ho « iik 1000, 1224 
 
 Constance V. Brain 1102 
 
 Constitution, The 141 
 
 Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. 
 
 Harless 1770 
 
 Contee v *>awson 191, 671, 736, 829 
 v. Lyons 1580 
 
 v Pratt 1580 
 
 Continental Ins. Co. v Webb 570, 
 1548, 1553 
 Continental Life Ins. Co. v Cur- 
 rier 1621 
 Continental Trust Co. v. Wet- 
 more 1051, 1743 
 Contois v. Carpentier 48 
 Contract and Agency Co., In re 27 
 Contract Co v. Tottenham & H 
 
 J Ry. Co W. N. 1731 
 
 Converse v Hood 1648 
 
 v. Johnson 648 
 
 v Michigan Diary Co. 559 
 
 v Meyer 920 
 
 v Ware S Bank 1503 
 
 Conway v Alexander 1244 
 
 v. Felton 1233 
 
 v Stroud 200 
 
 Conybeare v. Lewis 272 
 
 Conyers v. Abergavenny, Lord 1682 
 v. Gray 1699 
 
 School, Re 1857 
 
 Cood v. Cood 1627, 1628 
 
 Coogan v McCarron 1548 
 
 Cook »• Arnham 1583 
 
 v. Bam6eld 1577 
 
 « Bath , Mayor & Corp of 1637 
 v Bay 993, 1125 
 
 v. Beardsall 1131 
 
 V. Bee 781 
 
 V. Blunt 230 
 
 v. Bolton 1170, 1540 
 
 v. Brooinhead 948, 1552 
 
 v. Butt 262 
 
 v Catchpole 1861, 1862 
 
 v. Collingridge 1232, 1250, 2279 
 v Cook 1196 
 
 v. Detroit & M. R Co 1735 
 
 v. Dews 732, 733 
 
 v. Dey 448 
 
 f. Dorsey 1877 
 
 v Enchmarch 1072 
 
 v. Forbes 1637 
 
 v. Fowler 1257 
 
 v. French 1031, 1576 
 
 i! Had ley 191 
 
 v Hall 938 
 
 v. Hart 1390 
 
 v Hath way 64, 160, 1422 
 
 v. Hilliard 215 
 
 v. Houston County Commis- 
 sioners 1169 
 
 235 
 
 280, 281, 379, 695 
 
 326, 378, S'i'J, 383 
 
 1638 
 
 14ll 
 
 lo71 
 
 1637 
 
 1561, 1565, 
 
 1570 
 
 61 
 
 873 
 
 1516 
 
 58 
 
 560, 644 
 
 452 
 
 1608 
 
 1576, 1J83 
 
 1355 
 
 1132, 1134 
 
 1596, 1661, 1662 
 
 1074 
 
 843 
 
 195,671,703, 1439 
 
 802 
 
 1340 
 
 1081, 1635 
 
 70, 110 
 
 87, 179 
 
 201,251,319.631 
 
 1654 
 
 993, 1366 
 
 852 
 
 1113, 1557 
 
 1743 
 
 534 
 
 243 
 
 568, 716, 1074, 
 
 1440 
 
 689, 732 
 
 744. 892 
 
 973, 1226, 1731, 
 
 _ 173ii 
 
 Cooksey v. Haynes 1107, 1131 
 
 Cookson v. Bingham 1429 
 
 v. Ellison 300 
 
 v. Lee 162, 177, 476, 498, 
 
 1476 
 Cool v. Higgins 225 
 
 Coolev >'. Harris 1551 
 
 v. State 838 
 
 Conmbe r Hughes 1433 
 
 v. Stewart 9!l9 
 
 Coombs r Brooks 1082 
 
 v. Smith 1743 
 
 t/. Warren 547, 550 
 
 Coon 7' Abbott 890 
 
 Coondo r. Mookerjee 563 
 
 Coop r Dr. Savage P D Insti- 
 tute 314, 843 
 Coope r. Caiter 1370 
 v. Cresswell 658, 839, 1717, 172(1 
 Cooper, He 160, 611, 674, 1406, 16o7 
 
 Cook v. Ligon 
 v. Maucius 
 t». Marty u 
 v. Miller 
 v. Muuu 
 
 v. New York C M. Co. 
 v. North, &c R. Co. 
 V- Uosslyu, Earl of 
 
 v. Sturgis 
 v Torton 
 v. 'full 
 ii. Whellock 
 v. Williams 
 V. Wood 
 v Woodbury 
 Cooke v bamneld 
 v Beale 
 v Berry 
 iv Chilcott 
 v. Choluiondeley 
 v Clayworth 
 v. Cooke 
 v Da vies 
 v. Dealey 
 V. Forbes 
 v. Fryer 
 v Fuller 
 v. Gettings 
 v. Gilbert 
 v (iwyn 
 v. Lamotte 
 v Marsh 
 v. Orange 
 v. Richards 
 v. Smith 
 v. Turner 
 
 v. Westall 
 v Wilby 
 Cookes v. Cookes 
 
 Blisset 
 v. Brown 
 v. Cooper 
 v Crabtree 
 v. Dcnne 
 v. Doild 
 v. Eggington 
 v. Green 
 v. Hubbuck 
 v Knox 
 v. Lewis 
 
 230 
 Ms"> 
 
 1199. 1471, 1503 
 
 211, 329, 1033 
 
 989 
 
 1068 
 
 1096 
 
 444 
 
 1638. 1663 
 
 1589, 1590 
 
 602, 701, 1590 
 
 London, &e. Ry. Co. 1387, 1 
 v. Macdonald 100, 906, 1203 
 
 v. McNeil 1434 
 
 v. Martin 194 
 
 v. New Haven Steamboat Co. 630, 
 1427 
 v Pitcher 1405, 1427 
 
 v. Powi--, Earl 588 
 
 v. Pnrton 30, 30 
 
 v. Reilly 1730 
 
 v. Scott 1464, 1482 
 
 v. Uttoexeter Burial Board 779, 
 7^0 
 v. Vesey 195 
 
 Cooper v. Webb 243 
 
 v. Whittingham 1381 
 
 v. Wood 448 
 
 Coosaw Mining Co. v. South 
 
 Carolina 10 
 
 Coote v. Ingram 1071 
 
 v Whittington 201, 319 
 
 Cooth v. Jackson 607, 656, 699, 813, 
 
 1405 
 
 Cope v. Cope 319, 1809 
 
 v. De La Warr, Earl 1020 
 
 v District Fire Ass'n 1650 
 
 r. Parry 195, 689, 732 
 
 v. Russell 459 
 
 v Thames Haven Dock Co. 1102, 
 
 1106 
 
 Copeland ». Crane 845, 846, 1180, 
 
 1223, 1226, 1249, 1250, 1302 
 
 v Granger 110, 182 
 
 v. Mape 1059 
 
 v. Stanton 904, 930 
 
 v. Webb 1071 
 
 v. Wheeler 169 
 
 Copis c Middleton 279 
 
 Copley v. Smithson 153 
 
 Coppard v. Allen 248, 268 
 
 Coppeard r Mayhew 312, 399 
 
 Copper v Wells 670 
 
 Coppin v. 118 
 
 v. Coppin 1404 
 
 v Gray 643 
 
 Coppinger v Gubbins 1630 
 
 v Shekleton 1419 
 
 Coppring v. Cooke 1237 
 
 Coquillard v. Suydam 365 
 
 Corbet v Davenant 1160 
 
 v Tottenham 1358 
 
 Corbett v. Corbett 39, 43, 940, 1118, 
 
 1457 
 
 v. Jonas 1638 
 
 Corbin v Emerson 197 
 
 Corbus v. Teed 834, 843 
 
 Corbyn ». Birch 474 
 
 Corcoran v Chesapeake, &c Co. 1370 
 
 v Witt 
 Cordner v Guedalla 
 Cordwell, Re 
 Core v. Bell 
 
 v. Stickler 
 Corey v Moore 
 
 v. Voorhies 
 Cork, Earl of?/. Russell 
 Cork v- \\ illock 
 Corker v. Jones 
 Corley v. Corley 
 
 1378, 1379 
 
 1440 
 
 102 
 
 1628 
 
 1576 
 
 1120, 1309 
 
 1667, 1675 
 
 277, 1035 
 
 640 
 
 68 
 
 91 
 
 Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co. 
 
 1643 
 
 Cormack v. Beisly 1846 
 
 Cormick v- Ronayne 1846 
 
 Cornell v. Green ' 314, 545 
 
 v. Hudson 647 
 
 v. McCam 1264 
 
 v. Utica &c. R. Co. 1663 
 
 Cornelius v Post 1631, 1668 
 
 Cornet v Bertelsmann 843 
 
 Cornill v. Hudson 652 
 
 Corning v. Baxter 457, 458 
 
 v. Cooper 974 
 
 t\ Lowerre 1637 
 
 v. Smith 277, 339 
 
 v. Troy Iron & Nail Factory 1459, 
 
 1639 
 
 Cornish v. Gest 208,263,1163 
 
 v Tanner 1561 
 
 Cornwall, Re 28 
 
 v. Hoyt 88 
 
 v. Saurin 243 
 
 Cornwell »' Lee 346 
 
 Corn well Manuf. Co. r. Swift 303 
 
 Corpening v. Worthington 542 
 
 Corradine v. O'Connor 517 
 
 Torrance r. Corrance 113 
 
 Correspondent Newspaper Co. v. 
 
 Saunders 1648 
 
 Corrie v Allen 406 
 
 v Clarke 1801 
 
 Corry v. Curlewis 805 
 
 v. Trist 23 1 

 
 Corsellis, Re 68, 178, 1414 
 
 v. Corsellis 1863 
 
 Cort v. Lassard 1657 
 
 Cortes Co. v Tannhauser 933 
 
 Cortleyeu v. Ilathaway 1717 
 
 Corwin v. Campbell 1631 
 
 Cory v. Gertcken 169, 530 
 
 v. Hamilton 1463 
 
 v. Jacobsen 449 
 
 v. Thames Iron Works 1398 
 
 v. Yarmouth & Norwich Ry 
 
 Co. 1678 
 
 Cosby v. Wickliffe 282, 360 
 
 Cosens v Cognor Ry. Co. 1656 
 
 Cosgrove v. Fisk 324 
 
 Cosine o. Graham 365, 604 
 
 Coslake v. Till 2265 
 
 Cossey v. London & Brighton 
 
 Ry. Co. 573 
 
 Costabadie v Costabadie 1342 
 
 Costa Rica v Strousberg 1058 
 
 Costeker v Horrox 1777 
 
 Coster v. Bank of Georgia 457 
 
 v. Clarke 1459 
 
 v. Coster 101, 102, 1202 
 
 v. Merest 1132 
 
 v. Murray 560, 641, 642, 644, 702 
 
 Cotching v. Bassett 1638 
 
 Cotes v. Turner 601, 761 
 
 Cotham v. West 1182, 1252, 2298 
 
 Cother v. Midland Railway Co. 1672 
 
 Cottain v. Partridge 2095 
 
 Cotten v. Fidelity &c. Co. 779 
 
 Cotterell v. Stratton 1388, 1393, 
 
 1411, 1443 
 
 Cottier v. Stimson 843 
 
 Cottiugham v. Shrewsbury , Lord 
 
 842, 1370 
 
 Cottington o. Fletcher 655 
 
 Cottle v. Harrold 1663 
 
 v. Kremeutz 694, 830 
 
 Cotton, Re 1440 
 
 v. Banks 11*53 
 
 v. Clark 1409, 1412, 1416 
 
 v. Harvey 1177 
 
 v. Manering 628 
 
 v. Parker . 1478 
 
 t; Penrose 1431 
 
 v. Scott 1548 
 
 v. Trefusis 175 
 
 Cotton Plantation Co., Re 1705 
 
 Cottrell, Re 1360 
 
 v. .Stua Life Ins. Co. 586 
 
 v Finney 1387, 1393 
 
 Cottrill v. Cramer 354 
 
 Coughliu v. N Y Cent. R Co. 563 
 
 Coulburn v. Carshaw 448 
 
 Coulson, Re 1*00 
 
 v. Graham 508 
 
 v. Walton 560 
 
 v. White 1'538 
 
 Coulstingfl. Coulsting 38, 40, 111 
 
 Coulston z. Gardiner 1055, 1057 
 
 Coulthurst v. Coulthurst 1548 
 
 Coulton, Re, Uamling v. Elliott 
 
 1594 
 Counce v. Persons Unknown 11 (3 
 Council If lull's v. Stewart 1638 
 
 Count de Wall's Case 48 
 
 County Attorney v. Mav 10, 137 
 
 County Life Ass. Co., Re 1844 
 
 Coupous v. Kauffman 178 
 
 Courage v. Wardell 521 
 
 Courand v. Hanner 1411, 1747, 
 
 1748 
 Courier, The 1440 
 
 Course v. Humphrey 730, 1413 
 
 Court v. Jeffery 226 
 
 Court of <Hi«ncery, The Suitors 
 
 of the, Re 1441 
 
 Courtecn v. Touse 1093 
 
 Courtcnay r. Hoskins 930, 931, 1193 
 Courthope v. Mapplesden 1632 
 
 Courtney v. Stock 978 
 
 v. Turner 45 
 
 Courtois, Re 1605 
 
 Courtoy v. Vincent 1040, 1694 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging ] 
 
 Cousens v. Cousens 1440 
 
 v . Rose 334. 346 
 
 Cousins v. Smith 596, 1671 
 
 t; Vasey 821,823,842 
 
 Coutts v. Acworth 852 
 
 Covell v Chadwiek 1620 
 
 Covenhoven v Shuler 301 
 
 Coventry v. Coventry 1163, 1528 
 
 v. Loudon, Brighton, & South 
 
 Coast Railway Co. 715 
 
 Coveny v. Athill 936, 1573 
 
 Coverdale v Eastwood 14-1 
 
 Covington v Gilliat 108 
 
 Cowan v. Anderson 161, 445 
 
 Coward v. Chadwiek 152, 1718 
 
 v. Coward 1228 
 
 v. I urn hi 1404 
 
 Coward & Adams, Re 87, 123 
 
 Cowart v. Perrine 641, 644 
 
 Oowbridge Railway Co , Re 1"35 
 
 Cowdin v. Crani 1700, 1702, 1713 
 
 Cowdray v Cross 469, 1047 
 
 Cowdrey v. Railroad Co. 1309, 1731, 
 
 1752, 1845 
 
 Cowdry v. Cheshire 247 
 
 v. Day 1392, 13l»9 
 
 Cowell v. Lippitt 1281 
 
 v. Simpson 1843, 1845 
 
 v. Taylor 32, 64 
 
 Cowen v. Alsop 837 
 
 Cowgill v. Rhodes 1071, 1075, 1384 
 
 Cowin, Re, Cowin v. Gravett 1827 
 
 Cowlan v Williams 1565 
 
 Cowles v. Carter 726 
 
 ti Whitman 1376, 1377, 1381 
 
 Cowley v Cowley 302 
 
 Cowls v. Cowls 1350 
 
 Cowman v. Lovett 402 
 
 Cowper v. Scott 1464 
 
 v. Taylor 1054 
 
 Earl v. Baker 1632 
 
 Cowslad v. Cely 150, 252, 271, 2:»0 
 
 Cowslade v. Cornish 1181 
 
 Cowtan v. Williams 1565, 1570 
 
 Cox i). Allingham 838, 858, 953, 955 
 
 v. Baunister 449 
 
 v. Barker 346, 1001 
 
 v Barnard 223 
 
 v. Bennett 13 
 
 v. Bockett 859 
 
 v. Chamberlain 1402 
 
 v. Colley 1573 
 
 v. Cox 1073, 1163 
 
 v. Dolman 644. 653 
 
 v. Hart 1276 
 
 v. James 68 
 
 v. Kitchin 1126 
 
 v. Land and Water Journal 
 
 Co. 1645, 1727 
 
 v. Lynn 1580 
 
 v. McLaughlin 860 
 
 r. Mitchell 633 
 
 r Mobile, &c. R. Co. 1625 
 
 V. Paxtous 1652 
 
 v Peters 1727 
 
 v. Pierce 815, 1195. 1320 
 
 v. Roome 254 
 
 v. Scott 16fl9, 1702, 1710 
 
 v. Sprode 28> 
 
 v. Stephens 203, 269, 270, 292, 
 
 891,914 
 
 v. Taylor 2<i.3 
 
 v. Wheeler '^S+ 
 
 v. Wills Mil 
 
 i;. Worthington 922 
 
 v. Wright 68. 78, 1595 
 
 Coxer. Hilsted 1269, 1270, 1272, 1608 
 
 v. Smith 1151 
 
 v. Phillips 354 
 
 Coykendall v. Robinson 354 
 
 Coyle v. Alleyne 353, 354, 508, 524, 
 
 765 
 
 Cozine v. Graham 365, 561, 655, 657 
 
 Crabb v. Orth 536 
 
 v. Tnomas 425 
 
 Crabbe v. Moubery ltil 
 
 Crabtree v. I. .inks 1548 
 
 XXXIX 
 
 Crackelt v Bethune 1417 
 
 Cracknall v. Janson 213, 348, 351, 
 
 894, 895, 1407, 1449, 1490 
 
 Craddock, Re 102 
 
 v. Shirley 989 
 
 Cradock v. Cradock 920, 921 
 
 v. Owen 1029, 1321 
 
 v. Piper 1234, 1235, 1414, 
 
 1490 
 
 Craft j>. Russell 
 v. Thompson 
 
 569 
 
 544, 1625 
 
 Cragg v. Alexander 
 
 1386 
 
 v, Taylor 
 
 1039 
 
 Craggs v. Gray 
 
 1339 
 
 Cragin r. Lovell 
 
 1584 
 
 Craig v. Barbour 
 
 294 
 
 v. Bolton 
 
 28,30 
 
 v. Briggs 
 
 891 
 
 v. Craig 
 
 1258, 1302 
 
 v. Fenn 
 
 1093 
 
 v. Johnson 
 
 197 
 
 t>. Leipe 
 
 612, 676 
 
 v. People 
 
 1636 
 
 v. Phillips 
 
 1399 
 
 v. Sebrell 
 
 1002 
 
 v. Smith 
 
 243 
 
 v. Steamer Hartford 
 
 994 
 
 Craige r. Craige 
 
 852 
 
 Craighead v. Bank 
 
 642 
 
 Crain v. Parker 
 
 169 
 
 v. Prather 
 
 560 
 
 C raker v. Parrott 
 
 226 
 
 Cramer, Ex parte 
 
 203 
 
 v. Bird 
 
 241 
 
 v Bode 
 
 517 
 
 v. Clouah 
 
 1548 
 
 v . Morton 
 
 226, 227, 251 
 
 v. Watson 
 
 334 
 
 Crammer v. Atlantic 
 
 City Gas 
 
 Co. 
 
 72^,843 
 
 Cranborne, Viscountess v. Dal- 
 
 mahoy 
 
 113 
 
 Cranbourne, Lady v. Crispe 272 
 
 Cranch v. Brissett 
 
 1405 
 
 Crandall v Dare 
 
 659 
 
 r. Gallup 
 
 986 
 
 v. Slaid 
 
 37, 74, 79 
 
 Crane v. Brigham 
 
 1608 
 
 v Bunnell 
 
 1623 
 
 v. Decamp 
 
 1484, 1491 
 
 v. DemiDg 
 
 287, 558 
 
 v Ely 
 
 1551 
 
 v. Fairchild 
 
 334,335 
 
 v Jullion 
 
 448 
 
 v. Kilpin 
 
 1253 
 
 v. McDonald 
 
 1561 
 
 v. Powell 
 
 619 
 
 v. Prather 
 
 645 
 
 Crane Bros. Manuf. Co B Morse 354 
 Cranford v. Tyrrell 1638 
 
 Cranston p. Smith 365, 561, 656 
 
 Cninstown, Lord v. Johnston 629, 
 843, 855, 1392, 1627 
 Crapo «•. Kelly 1743 
 
 Crapp v. Dodd 1511 
 
 Orary v. Sprague 111-8 
 
 Crass v. Memphis & Charleston 
 
 R. Co 1561 
 
 Craven v Shair 1228 
 
 D. Tickell ' 1257 
 
 V. Traill 1469 
 
 v. Wright 1201 
 
 Cravens v. Dyer lnl 
 
 c Harrison 951 
 
 Crawcour v. Salter 1462 
 
 Crawford v. JEtt\n Life Ins. Co 51 
 
 v. Attorney-General 133.139 
 
 v. Chorlev *17 
 
 t). Crawford 37, 1622 
 
 v Fisher 1560, 1564, 1570 
 
 v. Forshaw 254 
 
 v. Harvey 386 
 
 v. Hornsea Steam Brick Co. A080 
 
 v. Liddel 641 
 
 v. Moore 860 
 
 v. Nral 1320 
 
 -. l'.-u» 49,50
 
 xl 
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging. ] 
 
 Crawford v. Protestant Insane 
 
 Hospital 1636 
 
 v. Ross 1663, 1734 
 
 Crawley v. Clarke 10(56 
 
 Crawshaw v Thornton 1565 
 
 Orawshay, Re 1409 
 
 v. Collins 1250, 1860, 1861 
 
 v Thornton 1561, 1564, 1566, 1610 
 
 Creak v. Capell 1781, 1782 
 
 Crease v. Babcock 256 
 
 v. Barrett 1126 
 
 Creasor v. Kobinson 201, 251, 310 
 
 death v. Smith 1580 
 
 Credit Co , Re 885, 896 
 
 v. Arkausas Central R Co. 325, 
 
 714 
 
 Credits Gerundeuse v. Van Weede 150 
 
 Creed v. lir\ ne 443 
 
 v. Fisher 1091, 1130 
 
 v. Lancaster Bank 1577 
 
 v Perry 119 
 
 v. Railway 256 
 
 v Scruggs 1625 
 
 Creely v. Bay State Brick Co 555, 
 
 1631, 1662 
 1379 
 1677 
 
 380 
 1451 
 
 287 
 
 Creen v. Wright 
 Cregar v. Creamer 
 Creigh v. Boggs 
 Creuietti v. Croin 
 Crenshaw v. Ullman 
 Crenver Mining Co. v. Willyams 214 
 Crerar v. Sodo 1106 
 
 Cresap v. Keuible 369 
 
 Crescent City L. S. Co. v. Butch- 
 ers' U L S. Co. 543, 634, 2383 
 Cresset v. Mitton 
 Cresswell, Ex parte 
 
 v. Bateman 
 
 v. Cheslyn 
 
 v. Haines 
 
 v. Jackson 
 
 v. Parker 
 
 '■. Smith 
 Creswick v. Creswick 
 Cresy v. Beavan 
 
 v. Bevau 
 Creuze v. Hunter 
 
 v London, Bishop of 
 
 v. Lowth 
 Creveling v. Moore 
 Crew v. Jolliff 
 Crewe* Lord v. Edleston 
 Crews v. Burcham 
 Crick v. Hewlett 
 Crickett v Dolby 
 
 368, 370 
 
 1019 
 
 229, 266, 1520 
 
 1430 
 
 1404 
 
 1577 
 
 628 
 
 719, 1037 
 
 948, 1552 
 
 1619, 1678 
 
 409, 583 
 
 1255, 1256, 1259, 
 
 1368, 1369 
 
 1738, 1739 
 
 1256, 1369 
 
 1031 
 
 1148, 1383 
 
 1731 
 
 210 
 
 801 
 
 1253, 1254 
 
 Cridland v. De Mauley, Lord 
 
 Crighton v. Daluner 
 Crim v. Handley 
 Crippen v Hermauce 
 
 v Ingersoll 
 Cripps v. Wood 
 Crips v. Talvande 
 Crisman v Hiederer 
 Crisp v. Platel 
 Crispin v. Cumano 
 
 v. Miller 
 Criterion Gold M. Co., Re 
 Crittenden, Ex parte 
 Canfield 
 
 421, 
 1825 
 
 1620 
 1625 
 1400 
 1600 
 1152 
 
 1548 
 
 1830, 1835 
 
 1052, 1053 
 
 1507 
 
 27 
 
 993 
 
 68 
 
 v. Field 1075, 1076, 1077, 1463, 1639 
 
 v. Posey 119 
 
 Crocker v. Collin3 542 
 
 v. Craig 
 
 v. Dillon 
 
 v Higgins 
 
 v. Loweiithal 
 
 v. Rogers 
 
 v. Whitney 
 Crocket v. Lee 
 Crockett v. Bishton 
 
 v. Drew 
 
 v. Sexton 
 
 Crcckford v Alexander 
 Croft ?i Arthur 
 v. Graham 
 
 230, 245 
 
 630 
 
 190, 195, 324, 361 
 
 1489 
 
 314 
 
 363 
 
 327, 361, 1003 
 
 894 
 
 161 
 
 1281 
 
 1632 
 
 1645 
 371 
 
 Croft v. Waterton 
 Crofton v. Ilsley 
 Crofts v. Middleton 
 
 v Oldfield 
 
 v. Wortley 
 Croggan v. Allen 
 CroggOD v Symons 
 Crognan v Minor 
 
 201 
 
 1235 
 
 915 
 
 1056, 1057 
 
 633,638 
 
 1411 
 
 1561, 1567 
 
 339 
 
 Cromack v Heath coate 574 
 
 Crompton v. Anthony 235 
 
 v Lea 1639 
 
 v. Wombwell 1523, 1534 
 
 Cromwell v. County of Sac 659 
 
 Crone v. O'Dell 12^1 
 
 Cronin v. Watkins 602 
 
 (Jronise v. Carper 991 
 
 Cronkright v. liaulenbeck 1103 
 
 Crook c. Brown 191 
 
 v Crook 895 
 
 v. Turpin 1507 
 
 Crooker i' Houghton 1576 
 
 Crookes v. Whitworth 113 
 
 Crooks v. Whittord 197 
 
 Cropper v Burton 837 
 
 v. Coburn 333 
 
 v Mellersh 215 
 
 v. Smith 402 
 
 Crosbie, Ex parte 157 
 
 Crosbv v. Hetherington 546 
 
 v. Stephan 1381 
 
 v. Wickliffe 235 
 
 Croskey v. Bank of Wales 243 
 
 v. European and American 
 Shipping Co 551, 552. 771. 
 
 1186, 1525, 1526, 1625 
 Crosley v. Marriot 1699 
 
 Cross, Re 560, 1693 
 
 v. Bean 230 
 
 v Cross 69, 80, 814 
 
 v. De Valle 1001 1548 
 
 v. Eglice 370 
 
 v. Keunington 1437 
 
 v. Morgan 779 
 
 v Thomas 461, 538. 1510, 1525 
 Crosse v. Bedingfield 392, 395, 842, 
 1246, 1254, 1558 
 v. Crosse 459 
 
 v General Reversionary Co. 1390 
 Crosseing v Honor 322 
 
 Crosskill v. Bower 1234, 1257, 1413 
 Crossley j> Crowther 307 
 
 v. Glasgow Life Ass. Society 251, 
 1405 
 v. Lightowler 16*5, 1638, 1639 
 
 v. Maycock 199, 203, 561 
 
 v. Parker 1440 
 
 v Stewart 774 
 
 v. Tomey 579 
 
 Crossman v Card 1253 
 
 Crothers v. Lee 860 
 
 Croton Tump, v Rider 1623 
 
 Crotty i». Eagle 68 
 
 Crouch v. Credit Foncierof Eng- 
 land 18 
 v. Hickin 589, 788 
 v. Kerr 542 
 v. Waller 38, 39, 40, 111, 187, 
 1482 
 Croughton, Re 100 
 Crow?; Blythe 1008 
 v. Cross 335 
 V. Owensboro & N. R. Co 378 
 v. Tyrell 408, 548, 619, 1558, 1559 
 v. Wood 1058, 1737 
 Crowder v Moore 1716 
 v. Searcy 713 
 v. Stewart. 1425 
 Crowe v. Del Ris 1556 
 v. Price 1053 
 Crowell v. Botsford 441 
 v. Keene 1003 
 Crowfoot v. Mander 429, 1522 
 Crowley's Case 98 
 Crowley v. Page llnl 
 Cnwn Bank, Re 887 
 Crowningshield v. Crowning- 
 bhield 851, 852 
 
 Crowther v. Appleby 907 
 
 Croxon v. Lever 168 
 
 Croxton v. May 108, 1795 
 
 Cruger v. Haliday 314 
 
 Cruikshauk v. Dutlin 1401 
 
 v Neath & Brecon Ry. Co. 1735 
 Cruin v. Moore 1*519 
 
 Crumb, Ex parte 1352,1364 
 
 Crumlish v. Shenandoah Valley 
 
 R. Co. 334, 402 
 
 Crump, Re 98, 100 
 
 v. Baker 1233 
 
 v. Ingersoll 630 
 
 v Lambert 1635, 1637, 2307 
 
 v. Perkins 1523 
 
 Crutchneld r, Stewart 1029 
 
 Crutchley v. Jerningham 1775, 
 
 1780 
 
 Cudahy v. Rhinehardt 1120 
 
 Cuddon v Hubert 156 
 
 v. Morley 1681, 2309 
 
 v Tite 367, 544 
 
 Cudworth v. Thompson 1358 
 
 Cuff v. Platell 197, 301, 302, 315, 
 
 557 
 
 Culbertson v. Luckey 846 
 
 Cullen, Re 1841 
 
 v. Dawson 1561 
 
 v. Queensberry, Duke of 190. 216, 
 
 238,272 
 
 Culley v. Ilickling 1672 
 
 Cullison v. Bossom 579 
 
 Culloway v. Dobson 778 
 
 Culver v McKeown 1381 
 
 Culverhouse v Beach 46 
 
 Culvert v. Godfrey 1284 
 
 Cumberland v. Copeland 1644 
 
 Cumberland Tel. Co. v. United 
 
 El. Ry. Co. 1650 
 
 Cumberland Union Banking Co 
 
 v. Mary port Co. 1267 
 
 Cumming, In re 177 
 
 v. Fraser 251 
 
 v. Roebuck 58 
 
 v. Slater 797 
 
 v. Waggoner 1190 
 
 Cummings v. Barrett 328, 329, 1639 
 v. Burleson 10nl 
 
 v. Coleman 675, 677, 714 
 
 v. Cummings 378 
 
 v. Parker 1580 
 
 v. Stone 546 
 
 v. White 551 
 
 Cummins v. Adams 1004 
 
 v Bennett 632, 659, 793, 796 
 
 V. Bromfield 1413 
 
 r. Cummius 227, 840, 1357 
 
 r. Fletcher 213 
 
 v. Little 1270 
 
 v. Nutt 1160 
 
 v. White 630 
 
 Cundell v. Pratt 1103 
 
 Cuningham v. Antrobus 116, 117 
 Cunliffe v. Manchester and Bol- 
 ton Canal Co. 26, 144 
 Cunningham v. Butler 629 
 v Campbell 702 
 v. Ferry 846 
 v. Foot 654 
 v. Freeborn 713, 844, 847 
 v. Hall 940 
 v. McGrady 1845 
 v. Pell 223, 402, 539 
 v. Rogers 1536 
 v. Rome R.R. Co. 1637 
 v. Schley 974 
 v. Steele 526 
 v. Wegg 628 
 v. Williams 1281 
 Cunvngham v. Cunyngnam 1475, 
 1478, 1486 
 Cupples v. Strahan 405 
 Curd v. Curd 992, 1824 
 v Davis 1653 
 v. Lewis 632 
 Cureton ?'. Taylor 1381 
 Curlewis v. Carter 876, 1071 

 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 xli 
 
 Curlewis v Whidborne 398 
 
 Curling v. Austin 1261, 1366, 1368, 
 
 1369, 1375 
 
 v. Flight 1218 
 
 v. Townsheud, Marquis 738, 781, 
 
 1717 
 
 Curran v. Arkansas 141 
 
 v Craig 1743 
 
 » St. Charles Car Co. 197, 1548 
 
 Curie v, Bowyer 1617 
 
 Currev, Re, Gibson V. Way 100 
 
 Currie v Lewiston 634 
 
 v. Pye 1333, 1436, 1437 
 
 Currier v. Howard 197 
 
 v. Studley 641 
 
 v. Webster 1240, 1245. 1386, 
 
 1392 
 
 Curriers' Co v Corbett 
 
 1081, 1082, 
 
 
 11338 
 
 Curry v. Lloyd 
 
 378 
 
 v. McCauley 
 
 60, 630 
 
 v. Peebles 
 
 1576 
 
 v. Stokes 
 
 1461 
 
 Curteis v Candler 
 
 1411, 1412 
 
 Curtess v Smalridge 
 
 1122 
 
 Curteuius v Grant 
 
 Rapids K 
 
 
 Cushing v Smith 
 
 
 844 
 
 Co. 
 
 
 
 1650 
 
 Cushman v. Bonfield 
 
 
 860 
 
 Curtis v Curtis 
 
 
 1165 
 
 1 16 J 
 
 Cussen v. O'Connor 
 
 
 1655 
 
 v. Fulbrook 
 
 
 
 919 
 
 Cust v. Boode 
 
 
 592, 593 
 
 v Goodenow 
 
 
 
 418 
 
 v Southee 
 
 
 680 
 
 v Gooding 
 
 
 
 212 
 
 distance v. Cunningham 
 
 1668 
 
 v. Lloyd 
 
 
 
 793 
 
 Cutfield D. Richards 
 
 
 1390 
 
 v. Luun 
 
 
 
 675 
 
 Cuth! ert v. Chauvet 
 
 
 68 
 
 v. March 
 
 
 
 1131 
 
 v. Creasy 
 
 
 560 
 
 v. Master 
 
 
 
 658 
 
 v. Ediuborough 
 
 
 371 
 
 v. Muudy 
 
 
 74, 
 
 1824 
 
 v. Purrier 
 
 
 1795 
 
 v. Piedmont Co. 
 
 
 
 634 
 
 v \\ estwood 
 
 
 262, 274 
 
 v. Piatt 
 
 
 
 1139 
 
 !'. Wharniby 
 
 
 1204 
 
 v. Price 
 
 
 
 1276 
 
 Cutler, In re 97 
 
 101 
 
 102, 2001 
 
 o. Robinson 
 
 
 
 1417 
 
 v. Creuier 
 
 
 950 
 
 v Sheffield 1507, 
 
 1527 
 
 1583. 
 
 1584 
 
 II Simons 
 
 
 1775 
 
 v. Williams 
 
 
 1561, 
 
 1562 
 
 v. Tuttle 
 
 
 190 287 
 
 Curtiss i>. Grant 
 
 
 
 449 
 
 Catting, Ex parte 
 
 
 1461, 1463 
 
 v Liviugstou 
 
 
 
 545 
 
 V- Dana 
 
 
 550, 555 
 
 Curtius v Caledonian Ins 
 
 Co. 
 
 203 
 
 v. Florida Ry. Co 
 
 
 1299 
 
 Curts n. Bardstown 
 
 
 
 994 
 
 v. Gilbert 
 
 
 303 
 
 Curwen v. Milburn 
 
 
 
 646 
 
 Cutts v. Pickering 
 
 
 575 
 
 Curzon, Ex parte 
 
 
 1440, 
 
 1450 
 
 v. Thodi'y 
 
 
 196, 231 
 
 v De la Zouch 
 
 506,; 
 
 592 
 
 Cu.. ler v. Bogert 
 
 71 
 
 ". 720, 758 
 
 v. Lyster 1153, 
 
 1155, 
 
 1158, 
 
 1159 
 
 v. Morelaud 
 
 338, 347, 1461 
 
 D. 
 
 Dabbs v. Dabbs 987, 1077, 1080 
 
 v. Nugent 551 
 
 Da Costa v. Da Costa 71, 1248, 1298, 
 
 1321 
 
 Dade v. Alexinder 121 
 
 v. Madison 841 
 
 Didswell ,'. Jacobs 1825 
 
 Daggett v. Pratt 1257 
 
 Dagley v. Kentish 1841 
 
 Dagly v. Crump 779 
 
 Dahlman v. Jacobs 630 
 
 Dailey v Kinsler 190, 256, 674 
 
 Daily v. Litchfield 246 
 
 Daiuese v. Hale 864 
 
 v Kendall 1029 
 
 Daintree v. Haynes 42, 43 
 
 Dak in v Cope 2265 
 
 v Union Pacific Ry. Co. 590 
 
 Daking v. Whimper 230 
 
 Dakins v. Garratt 481, 1379, 1601 
 
 Dalby v Pullen 1267 
 
 Dale r. D lie 1163 
 
 v. Griffith 407 
 
 v. Hamilton 1267 
 
 v. Kent 1463 
 
 v. M'Kvers 845, 982 
 
 v Rosevelt 868, 986, 1073, 1075 
 
 1485, 1486, 1489 
 
 Daley v. Russ 
 Dalgiish v Jarvio 
 
 411 
 
 1588, 1593, 1664, 
 1672, 1675, 1678 
 1555 
 
 Dallas v Glyn 
 Dallimore v O^ilby 
 Dally v. Worham 
 D.ilmer v. Dashwood 
 Dalrymple v. Lamb 
 Dalston v. Coatsworth 
 D'AHeyrac v Long 
 Dalton v Angus 
 i v. Carr 
 
 v. Fulham 
 ' v Hayter 
 
 v. Midland Riilway 
 
 v Roach 
 
 v West End Street Ry. Co 
 Daly v. Amberg 
 
 v Duggan 
 
 v. Kelly 
 
 v. Kirwan 
 
 v. Toole 
 Dalzell v. Dueber W. C. M Co 
 Darner v Portarlington, Lord 
 Dameron v. Jameson 
 Dan v Brown 
 Dana v Nelson 
 
 1796 
 
 774 
 
 1717 
 
 37,74 
 
 1075 
 
 1056 
 
 1502 
 
 1552 
 
 1070 
 
 386, 833 
 
 197 
 
 1003 
 
 974 
 
 1685 
 
 740 
 
 281, 1652 
 
 588 
 
 784 
 
 700 
 
 794 
 
 256 
 
 875 
 
 881 
 
 Dana v. Valentine 301, 1629, 1631, 
 1637 
 D.inbury v Robinson 1385, 1337 
 Danby v. Danby 1770 
 v. Poole 877 
 Dancer v Evett 1583 
 v. Hastings 1748, 1749 
 Dando v Dando 1202 
 Dandridge v Washington 254 
 Dane v. Allen 117, -!27 
 v. Walker 1411, 1561 
 Danell i'. Page 771 
 Danford v Cameron 1045, 1452 
 v. McAnulty 674 
 Dan forth » Bangor 933 
 v. Dinforth 1517 
 v. Morrical 1624 
 v. Phila. &c. Ry. Co. 663 
 v Smith 379 
 Dangar's Trusts, Re 1791 
 Dangar v. Stewart 85, 525 
 Dangerfield v. Claiborne 524, 951 
 D'Angibau, Re, Andrews v. An- 
 dre ws 96 
 Daniel v. Boullard 841, 842 
 v. Brown 16 3 
 v. Ferguson 1665 
 v. Hanagan 68, 161 
 v. Metropolitan Ry Co 1105 
 
 Mitchell 
 
 tt Morrison 
 
 v. Sinclair 
 
 v. Stewart 
 Daniel I v. Skipwith 
 Daniels v Benedict 
 
 v. Davison 
 
 v. Taggart 
 
 844, 1479, 2273 
 
 341, 1548, 1549 
 
 668 
 
 1624 
 
 284 
 
 2027 
 
 860 
 
 666, 695, 697. 829 
 
 .1462 
 
 Danner v Danner 249 
 
 Danner Land Co. v. Stonewall 
 
 Ins. Co. 855 
 
 Dansey v Richardson 1139 
 
 D'Aranda v. Whittingham 251, 283. 
 288 
 Darbey v Whitaker 670 
 
 Darbv w. Oilligan 1756 
 
 v. Ouselev 1096, 1102, 1106 
 
 Darkiu v. Marye 1274, 1278 
 
 Darlev v Darley 1358 
 
 v. Nicholson 389, 898, 1706, 1714 
 Darling, Re 85 
 
 v. Hammer 334 
 
 v Osborue 1381 
 
 v. Stauiford 953 
 
 Darlington's Appeal 418 
 
 Darlington. Earl v. Bowes 1124, 1137 
 Darlow v. Simlock 520 
 
 v. Sinnock 620, 528 
 
 Darnell v. Reyny 691 
 
 Darn ley, Lord v. London, Chat- 
 ham, and Dover Ry. Co. 418 
 Darrah v. Boyce 586 
 
 Darrel v. Elen 1^60 
 
 Darrell v Pritchard 1072, 1081, 1638, 
 1641, 1662 
 Darrington v. Borland 161, 1270 
 
 Darrow v H R Home Produce Co 543 
 Darst v Brockway 1651, 1665 
 
 v. Gale 1081 
 
 Darston v. Oxford, Earl of 1228 
 
 Dart v. Palmer 293 
 
 Darthez v. Clemens 360, 368 
 
 Dartmouth, Lady v. Roberts 869 
 Dartmouth and Torbay Ry. Co., 
 
 Re 1800 
 
 Dartmouth Harbour Com'rs v. 
 
 32 
 150, 272, 290 
 1828 
 1790 
 1918 
 830 
 1487 
 1440 
 1255 
 1319 
 1. 53 
 
 v. Richardson 
 Dareh v. Toyer 
 
 »'. Tozer 
 D'Arey v. Blake 
 Darcy t' Kelley 
 Darden v Burns 
 Dare Vallev R Co., 
 Darey v. Whittaker 
 
 Be 
 
 161 
 1106 
 1126 
 1165 
 13 
 1571 
 1860 
 
 113 
 
 Dartmouth 
 Darwent ?' Walton 
 Darwin v. Clarke 
 
 i'. Darwin 
 Dary r. Kane 
 Dascomb V Marston 
 Dashwood v Bulkeley, Lord 
 
 v. Magniac 
 Daub v Martin 
 Daubeney r. Coghlan 
 Dauhignv V. Davallon 
 Daubney v. Leake 438, 1213, 1428 
 
 v. Shnttleworth 1594 
 
 Daubuz v. Peel 291 
 
 Daugars v. Rivaz 143, 1653, 1686 
 Daugberty v. De-.rdorf 259 
 
 Daunmeyer w Coleman 26 
 
 Dauntley v. Hvde 1128 
 
 Dausman v. Hooe 1581 
 
 D'Auxy, Duchesse r Porter 149 
 
 Davenport ?> Auditor General 843 
 
 v. Davenport 37. 39, 74. 77 165, 
 354,1226, 1632. 1671,2286 
 
 v. Dows 26. 144 
 
 v. Goldberg 906, 1071, 1072, 1075, 
 1079, 1080, 1643
 
 xlii 
 
 avenport v. Uarbert 
 
 1081 
 
 V .1. -lines! 
 
 212 
 
 v. Jepson 
 
 1071 
 
 v. Lamson 
 
 1156 
 
 v. Phillips 
 
 1080 
 
 v Powell 
 
 1787 
 
 v. Receivers 
 
 1752 
 
 V. Ky lands 972, 1081 
 
 v. Sniffen 592, 739 
 
 v Stafford 383, 974, 1003, 1013, 
 
 1014, 1369, 1478 
 
 v. Whitmore 2088 
 
 Davers v. Davers 885, 896 
 
 Davev V. Bennett 113 
 
 v. burrant 505, 796, 908, 1380, 
 
 1602 
 
 v. Plestow 1617 
 
 David r Frowd 1206, 1208 
 
 v. Williams 1201 
 
 Davidson, Re 61 
 
 v. Bowden 72, 164, 165 
 
 t> Burke 378 
 
 v. Butler 1542 
 
 v. Cooper 273 
 
 t; Foley 1515, 1520 
 
 v. Hastings, Marchioness of 444, 
 
 449, 453, 456, 512, 536, 1066 
 
 v. Isbam 1635 
 
 v. Leslie 454 
 
 v Stanley 1107 
 
 Davies, Re 1069, 16:3 
 
 v. 687 
 
 v. Boulcott 202, 204 
 
 v. Bush 1846 
 
 v. Clough 1651 
 
 v . Cracraft 1755 
 
 v. Davies 170, 217, 281, 324, 859, 
 
 1009, 1017, 1544, 1635 
 
 v. Dodd 207 
 
 v. Getty 1621 
 
 v Jenkins 186, 187 
 
 v. I^eo 1669 
 
 v. Marshall 487, 801 1440, 1605, 
 
 1638, 1681 
 
 v. Nixon ,500, 1049. 1454 
 
 v. Otty 365, 385, 561, 657, 891 
 
 v. Racer 1654 
 
 v. Spurling 371, 669, 840 
 
 v. Whitehead 110 
 
 v. Williams 227, 582. 588 
 
 Davile 17. Peacock 1673 
 
 Davis, Re 60, 135, 649, 892, 1846 
 
 Davis, The 141 
 
 Davis's Trusts, Re 13,_56 
 
 Davis v. Amer 1729 
 
 j». American & F C. Union 1548 
 
 V Angel 316, 317, 660 
 v Ashwin 1264 
 
 V Ballenden 186 
 r. Barrett 1594 
 v. Battine 669, 815 
 v Bay State League 243, 1411 
 v Bean 1238 
 v. Bluck 1537. 1577, 1578, 1579 
 t; Chanter 201, 202, 598, 1459, 
 
 1460 
 v Chicago 1661 
 
 v. Clayton 841 
 
 v. Combermere 1173, 1256 
 
 v Cook 1548 
 
 v. Cripps 344, 352, 759 
 
 v Davis 31 1 . 312. 313, 431 . 524, 
 760,777,973, 1031, 1052, 
 1055, 1102, 1120, 1317, 
 1511, 1675 
 ti Dean 235 
 
 v. Delaware Poor Overseer 1621 
 v. Dendey 1246 
 
 v. Dowding 168 
 
 v. Duncan 1743 
 
 v Dver 1071 
 
 v. Dysart, Earl ol 316, 768, 1440. 
 1447 
 v. Estey 251 
 
 v. Franklin 1001, 1590 
 
 v. Fulton 1669 
 
 v. Qalmoye 464 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging. 
 
 Davis v. Gray 1482, 1743, 1751, 1752 
 v. Guiltord 860 
 
 v. Hall 556, 669 
 
 v. Hardy 1129 
 
 v. Harrington 1380 
 
 j'. Hart 1675 
 
 v. Headley 664 
 
 v. Hemingway 221, 256, 257 
 
 v. Hole 478 
 
 v. Hooper 288 
 
 v. James 354 
 
 v Logan 1166 
 
 v. Lowndes 1135 
 
 v. McNeil 1448 
 
 v. Mapes 718,721,723,724 
 
 v. Marlborough, Duke of 1717, 
 1719, 1729, 1731, 1734, 
 1741, 1764 
 v. May 1241, 1251 
 
 v. Miller 334, 346 
 
 v. Morris 147 
 
 v Morton 633 
 
 v. Newton 90, 91. 102, 122 
 
 v. Parker 629, 2072, 2259 
 
 v. Phelps 13i)3 
 
 v. Prout 108, 109, 430, !i60 
 
 v Read 815 
 
 v. Reaves 1551 
 
 v. Reed 1631, 1637, 1667 
 
 v. Reid 944 
 
 v. Rogers 287 
 
 v. St- Louis & S. F Ry. Co. 1120, 
 1168 
 t>. Sigourney 878 
 
 z;. Simpson 296 
 
 v. Smith 641 
 
 v Snell 59, 157 
 
 v. Speiden 597, 1031, 1576 
 
 v. Stevens 843 
 
 v. Sullivan 281 
 
 v. Symonds 1398 
 
 v. Taylor 1128, 1131 
 
 v. Tollemache 742 
 
 v. Turvey 1163 
 
 v. Whiffen 595, 1590 
 
 v. Whitmore 710 
 
 Davis S M. Co. v Dunbar 1580, 
 
 1584 
 
 Davison v. Attorney-General 139, 760 
 v Johnson 607, 613, 632, 670. 
 
 694, 695 
 v. Rake 254 
 
 v. Kobiuson 867, 879, 1020 
 
 v. Schemerhorn 655, 684 
 
 v. White 11(56 
 
 Davoue v Fanning 217, 342. 526, 
 660, 1019, 2296 
 
 Davy, Re ^3 
 
 v. Garrett 313, 324, 350, 855 
 
 r. Morgan 881 
 
 v. Seys 1422, 1423, 1474 
 
 Davys v. Richardson 1794 
 
 Daw v. Eley 579, 580, 1070, 1096 
 
 Dawes v. Benn 230 
 
 v. Betts 1218, 1219 
 
 v Head 251 
 
 r Howard 1358, 1360 
 
 v Taylor 1427 
 
 Dawkins r. Antrobus 332, 1653 
 
 v. Mortan 821, 823, 842, 1317, 
 
 1327 
 
 v. Penrhyn 560, 639 
 
 B. Simonetti 800, 1627 
 
 Dawson, Re 1318,1350 
 
 Dawson, Re, Johnston v Hill 176 
 v. Amey 790, 1548 
 
 v. Clark 1512 
 
 v. Dawson 371, 664, 668, 1278, 
 
 17<i2 
 r. Drake 1239 
 
 v. Ellis 843, 1380 
 
 v. Fitzgerald 671 
 
 v. Harris 1138 
 
 v Jay 1348, 1350, 1600 
 
 j\ Joy 2293 
 
 v Lepper 560 
 
 v. Newsome 796, 1588 
 
 Dawson v. Parrot 
 
 1416 
 
 v. Parsons 
 
 1716 
 
 v. Pilling 
 
 605, 628 
 
 v. Prince 
 
 1487 
 
 v. Princeps 
 
 1619 
 
 v. Raynes 
 
 1756, 1763, 1767 
 
 v. Sadler 
 
 590, 1621 
 
 v. Scriven 
 
 1017, 1033 
 
 v. Shepherd 
 
 406 
 
 v. Yates 1720, 1729, 1736 
 
 Day, Ex parte 1618 
 
 v. Allaire 1120 
 
 v. Argus Printing Co. 1029 
 
 v. Arundle 676, 677 
 
 r;. Batty 433, 437, 1174, 1428 
 
 v Brownrigg 546, 1648 
 
 t; Croft 1172, 1610, 1695, 1726, 
 
 1746 
 
 v. Cummings 197 
 
 v. Day 1040, 1265, 1696 
 
 v. Drake 262 
 
 v. Edwards 1129 
 
 r. Essex County Bank 144 
 
 r Cudgen 710 
 
 v. Holloway 1130 
 
 v Kerr 161 
 
 v Merry 1634 
 
 v. Perkins 844 
 
 v Postal Telegraph Co 1120, 1733 
 
 v. Snee 806, 1682 
 
 v. Walker 991 
 
 v. Whittaker 1346 
 
 Dayrell » Champness 1630 
 
 Dayton ?-. Dayton 216, 378 
 
 v. Dusenbury 1653 
 
 v. Melick ' 1550, 1653 
 
 Dazet v. Landry 1286 
 
 Deacon r. Deacon 709 
 
 Deaderick v. Smith 1061, 1281, 1283, 
 
 1567 
 
 r Wilson 334 
 
 Deakin's Case 468 
 
 Dealty v. Murphy 361 
 
 Dean, Re, Dean v. Wright 1490 
 
 v. Abel 978 
 
 v. Allen 1207 
 
 v. Crall 2101 
 
 v. Dean 655, 657 
 
 v. Emerson 1298,1317,1321 
 
 v. Lethbridge 455 
 
 v Madison 1961 
 
 V Richmond 88 
 
 v. Smith 1698 
 
 v. State 851 
 
 v Williams 1260 
 
 v. Wilson 1070, 1169 
 
 Dean, &c. of St. Paul's, Ex 
 
 parte 1017 
 
 Deane v. Hamber 815 
 
 v House for Aged Colored 
 
 Women 1427 
 
 Deans r. Wilcoxon 334 
 
 Dear v Sworder 1548 
 
 v Webster 632, 700 
 
 Dearden i>. Villiers 62 
 
 Deare v. Attornev-General 134, 139, 
 
 140 
 
 ti. Soutten 103 
 
 Dearfield v. Nims 26 
 
 Dearin v Fitzpatrick 122 
 
 Dearman v. Wye he 652, 655, 656, 
 
 1024, 2095 
 
 Dearsley v Middleweek 1448 
 
 Dearth v. Hide and Leather 
 
 National Bank 630, 778 
 
 Deas r. Harvie 580 
 
 c Thorne 280,281 
 
 Dea^e r. Moody 844 
 
 Deaver r. ISeynolds 1282 
 
 Deaville v. Deaville 912 
 
 De Balinhard v Bullock 434 
 
 De Baun v New York 1661 
 
 De Bay v. Griffin 1846 
 
 Debazin v. Debazin 1714 
 
 De Beaumont, Er parte 1801 
 
 De Be;iuvoir v. Benyon 1479 
 
 v Owen 639
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star pagiDg.J 
 
 xl 
 
 111 
 
 DeBeauvoir v Rhodes 
 
 Debeuhain v. Ox 
 
 Debenture Co. v. De Murrietta 
 
 De Beruardy v Hardiug 
 
 De Biel Gray v. Waruer 
 
 De Bode V. Reg. 
 
 De lirassac v. Martyn 
 
 De Brito v. Hillel 
 
 Delirox's Case 
 
 De Burgh V Clarke 
 
 De Burgh Lawson, Re 
 
 De Carriere v. De Callone 
 
 Decarters v. La Farge 
 Decker v Caskey 
 
 v. Miller 
 
 v Ruckman 
 De Coster v. La Farge 
 Decouche ». Savetier 
 Dederick v. Farquhar 
 
 v. Fox 
 
 v. Hoysradt 
 Deegan v. Capner 
 Deeks v. Stanhope 
 
 707 
 1398 
 406 
 
 my 
 
 14148 I 
 
 133 
 
 972 \ 
 
 915, »19 
 
 951 I 
 
 1491, 14:)3 
 
 100 
 
 i, 49, 1698, 
 
 li99, 1704 
 
 974, 1479 
 
 1072, 1073, 1148 
 
 1411, 1414, 1772 
 
 1484, 1491 
 
 1459 
 
 644 
 
 418 
 
 630 
 
 1567 
 
 243 
 
 240, 243, 598, 
 
 1511, 1527 
 
 157 
 
 1631, 1641 
 
 1029 
 
 1448 
 
 983 
 
 1475 
 
 2010 
 
 1120 
 
 555 
 
 Deere, Re 
 
 v. Guest 
 
 v. Nelson 
 
 v. Robinson 
 Deerburst V. Jones 
 
 v. St. Albans, Duke of 
 Deering v. 'fucker 
 
 v. Winona H. Works 
 Deery v. McClintock 
 Deeny v. Mazarine, Duchess of 178, 
 179 
 Deeves v. Met'n Realty Co. 1071 
 
 De Feucheres v. Dawes 1590 
 
 Defflis v. Goldschtuidt 1795 
 
 De Florez v. Raynolds 1029 
 
 De Francesco v. Barnum 1657 
 
 Defiles, Re 867 
 
 v. Creed 1744 
 
 De (Jaillon o. L'Aigle 1141 
 
 De Geer v. Stone 47 
 
 De Geneve v. llannam 804, 806 
 
 De Go ley v. De Godey 1678 
 
 ]»e Golls v. Ward 157, 225, 295 
 
 De Giaffenreid v. Brunswick, 
 
 &c. R. Co. 
 De Greiff v. Wilson 
 De Greuchy v. Wills 
 De (iroot v. Jay 
 De Hart v. Baird 
 
 v. Stevenson 
 De lloghton v Money 
 Dehou v. Foster 
 
 1743 
 
 405 
 
 189 
 
 1743, 1757 
 
 844 
 
 645 
 
 230 
 
 I, 629, 630, 
 
 1032, 1613, 1615, 1627, 
 
 1628, 1995 
 
 Deignan v. Deignan 
 Deiniel v. Brown 
 De .lough v Newman 
 Delahere v. Norwood 
 Delabigarre v. Bush 
 De la Borde v Otlion 
 De Lacy v. Adams 
 
 v H urst 
 Delafield v. Anderson 
 
 v. Colden 
 
 i'. Guanabeus 
 
 v Illinois, State of 
 De la Garde v Lempriere 
 Delahanty v. Warner 
 Delahay v McConnel 
 Delaucey v. Seymour 
 Delancy v Wallis 
 Delany v Mansfield 
 Delap v. Hunter 
 Delapl line i». Lawrence 
 De la Rue v. Dickinson 
 De la Salle v Moorat 
 De Lashmutt v. Sellwood 
 De la Torre ?'. Bernales 
 Delauney v. Mitchell 
 Delavan V Duncan 
 De la Vega v Vianna 
 De la Vergne v. Evertson 
 
 840, 843, 850 
 
 819 
 
 214, 279 
 
 284 
 
 1742 
 
 1660 
 
 407,418 
 
 341 
 
 1 + 12 
 
 1665 
 
 17.24 
 
 92 106 
 
 1650 
 
 1476 
 
 1073 
 
 1674 
 
 1716 
 
 987,994 
 
 1492 
 
 722, 2316 
 
 797 
 
 214 
 
 762 
 
 1096 
 
 989 
 
 48 
 
 237 
 
 De la Warr, Karl V Miles 1137. 1575 
 Delaware, &c. R. Co. v. Erie R 
 
 Co. 1731 
 
 Del & Rar Canal, &c. and \. 
 R. & T Co v. Bar. & Del. 
 Bay R. Co. 1618, 1H23. 1639. 
 
 1640, 1050, 1662, 1668, 1678 
 Delaware L &c. R To )). Central 
 
 Stock-yard & T. Co. 1662, 1663 
 He Leou l>. Hubbard 892 
 
 Delevaute, Re 1366, 1367, 1370. 
 1374 
 v Child 1366, 1367, 1370. 1374 
 Delfe v. Delamotte 2314 
 
 Dell B Barlow 1482 
 
 v. Griffits 401 
 
 v. Hale 548 
 
 Delondre v. Shaw 46, 302, 315 
 
 Deloraiue v Brown 1580 
 
 v. Browne 559 
 
 Deloiue V lL)llingsworth 320 
 
 De Louis v Meek 324 
 
 Del Pout v. Tastet 349 
 
 Delta, The 633 
 
 Delta County Com'rs v. Gunni- 
 son County Com'rs 1621 
 Delves v. Bagot, Lord 922 
 v. Delves 129J 
 De Manneville v De Manneville 74, 
 453, 1045, 1350, 1705 
 Demaree v. Driskill 829 
 Demarest v. Berry 1237, 1239 
 v. Hardham 303 
 v. Wyukoop 186, 221, 569, 640, 
 675, 1395 
 Demartin v. Albert 313 
 De Mattos v. Gibson 1653, 16o6 
 Demill c. Moffat 1381 
 De Minckwitz v. Udney 606, 69 I 
 Deiuing v. James 1661 
 De Montmorency v Devereux 371. 
 667, 668 
 D. M Osborne & Co. v Missouri 
 
 Pac. R. Co 1638 
 
 De Mott v Starkey 678 
 
 Deuipsey v. Deuipsey 1278 
 
 Den c. Farley 915 
 
 v Pidcock 1381 
 
 v. Tellers 1269 
 
 v. Wood 946 
 
 Dence v. Mason 58, 63, 157, 160 
 
 Deudel v. Sutton 215, 255 
 
 Deudy v Cross 1830 
 
 v. Dendy 266, 1526 
 
 Denis i». Rochussen 481, 485, 761, 776 
 
 Deuison Paper Manuf. Co v. 
 
 Robinson Manut Co 630 
 
 Deniston v. Little 292, 384, 408, 
 
 8^0, 861 
 
 Denn v Barnard 1129 
 
 V. Spinning 221 
 
 Deuuer v. Chicago, &c Ry. Co 313, 
 
 630 
 
 Dennerlein v Dennerlein 1282 
 
 Dennett v. Codman 2222 
 
 v Dennett 1479 
 
 Denning v. Henderson 1278 
 
 v. Smith 678 
 
 Dennis, Re 1491 
 
 v. Dennis 371 
 
 v. Perry 26 
 
 v. Riley 1457 
 
 Dennisou v. Bassford 524, 733, 737, 
 
 784 
 
 v Lee 1258 
 
 v. Yost 564 
 
 Denniston v. Chicago, &c. R. 
 
 Co 1741 
 
 Dennv i'. Denny 83 
 
 v. Filmer 158:^ 
 
 v Oilman 560 
 
 v. Hancock 1004 
 
 v Mars 35 
 
 Densem v. El worthy 222 
 
 Denson v Denson 1577 
 
 Denston v. Ashton 'i4 
 
 Dent v Auction Mart Co. 1638 
 
 815 
 1060 
 lto66 
 555, 
 
 156 
 
 1491 
 
 26 
 
 630 
 
 1101 
 
 1566 
 
 570 
 
 147, 1564 
 
 575, 944 
 
 1054, 10.55 
 
 646 
 
 346 
 
 Dent v. Dent 1053, 1177, 1826 
 
 v. Hertford Hundred of 1131 
 
 v. London Tramways Co '^41 
 
 v. Turpin 208, 1649 
 
 V. Wardel 4^6 
 
 Denton v. Denton 1699, 1703, 1704 
 
 v Jackson 930, 953 
 
 Denver & R. G. Ry. Co v. Deu- 
 
 ver &c. R. Co. 1548 
 
 Denver R. L. & C. Co. v. Union 
 
 Pacific Ry. Co. 586 
 
 Deuys v. Locock 615, 617, 620, 656, 
 20.5 
 De Penny v Christie 149 
 
 De Pereda v De Mancha 1347 
 
 De Peyster v. Golden 881 
 
 v. Graves 1675, 1676, I6s5 
 
 Depue v. Sergent 782 
 
 De fuy v Wabash 
 Derby v Ancram 
 
 Bank v. Heath 
 
 Earl of v. Athol, Duke of 
 
 611, 629, 1556 
 Derbyshire, &c Ry. Co. v. Baiu- 
 
 brigge 1037 
 
 v. Serrell 1621 
 
 De Kivafinoli v. Corsetti 1699, 1700, 
 1702 
 De Rothschild v. Morrison 
 Derrick «'. l^imar 
 Derry v. Peck 
 
 v. Ross 
 De Sailly v. Morgan 
 Desboro v. Harris 
 Desborough v. Curlewis 
 
 v Harris 
 
 v. Rawlins 
 Desbrow v Crommie 
 Deshon v. Eaton 
 Desilla v Schunck 
 Des Moines & M. R Co. v Alley 385 
 Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines 
 
 1650 
 
 v. West 1717 
 
 De Sorbien v Bland 1"68 
 
 Despau v. Swindler 546 
 
 Desplaces v. Goris 347, 352, 721, 
 
 728 
 De Tastet v Bordenave 10' 
 
 v. Bordieu 
 
 v. Lopez 
 
 v Sharpe 
 
 v. Tavern ier 
 De Teissier Settled Estates, Re 1233 
 Detillin v. Gale 1385, 1391 
 
 Detroit v Dean 26 
 
 v Detroit City Ry. Co. 790 
 
 V. Wayne Circuit Judge 1675 
 
 Detroit Bank ?>. E. G. Barnum 
 
 Wire Works 1765 
 
 Detroit, &c. Fire Ins. Co. v. 
 
 Rentz 491 
 
 Detroit, &c. Ry. Co. v. Detroit 1638 
 Detweiler v. Holderbaum 149 
 
 De Uprev v. De Uprey 1157 
 
 Devall v. Scales 1625 
 
 Devaucene v. Devaucene 1056, 1062 
 De Vaughn V Hustead 1073 
 
 Devavnes v Morris 813, 1539 
 
 v. Robinson 201,268,271,1834 
 De Veney v. Gallagher 1631 
 
 Devenish?' Devenish 461 
 
 Devereaux v. Cooper 722, 723 
 
 Devey v. Thornton 1367,1411, 1418 
 Devie v. Brownlow, Lord 636, 1139 
 Devine v. Harkness 1290 
 
 De Visme v. De Vi-me 1278 
 
 De Visser v. Blackstone 1743 
 
 De Vitre v. Betts 1503 
 
 Devlin r Commonwealth 1508 
 
 v, Chester 614 
 
 De Voe r Ithaca & Oswego R.R 
 
 Co ^ 1053 
 
 Devousher v Newenham 265. 581, 
 
 585,600, 1661, 1682 
 
 Devonshire, Re 1610 
 
 Dew v. Clark 155, 936 
 
 1083 
 1729 
 776 
 658 
 324
 
 xliv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The leferences are to the star paging.] 
 
 1726 
 
 Dew v Clarke 
 
 De Wall's Count, Case 47 
 
 Dewberry v Shannon 334 
 
 Dewduey , Ex parte 559, 643, 646 
 
 v Palmer 1098 
 
 Dewees v. Dewees 1553 
 
 De Weever v Kochport 1350,1361, 
 
 2294 
 
 v Rockport 2294 
 
 Dewell, A'e, Edgar v. Reynolds 2o2 
 
 Dewey v St. Albans Trust Co. 991 
 
 Dewing v. Perdicaries 26 
 
 De Whelpdale v. Milbirn 262 
 
 De Wiutou v. Brecon. Mayor of 
 
 1731, 1744 
 De Witt v. Hayes 1631 
 
 De Wolf V. A. & W. Sprague 
 
 Mauuf. Co. 334 
 
 v. De Wolf 219, 237, 288 
 
 v. Johnson 157, 885 
 
 v. Long 837, 845 
 
 v. Mallett 286, 445 
 
 Dexter v Arnold 221,284,285,64(1, 
 
 764, 841. 1062, 1019, 1030, 1240, 
 
 1241, 1242, 1315, 1317, 1575, 
 
 1576, 1577, 1578, 1579, 15,^0, 
 
 1581, 1584 
 
 v Codnian 1110 
 
 v. Providence Aqueduct Co 1639 
 
 Dey v. Dunham 855, 1902 
 
 V. Walton 1497 
 
 Deybel's Case 546 
 
 De Zouche v Garrison 1561 
 
 Duegetoft v. Loudon Assurance 
 
 Co. 197 
 
 D"Hornuisgee v. Grey 28 
 
 Dial v. Gary 1019 
 
 v. Reynolds 277, 339, 1627 
 
 Dias v Bouchaud 272, 287, 557 
 
 v. Merle 1523, 1578, 1580 
 
 Dibbs v. Goren 152 
 
 Dicas v. Lord Brougham 2 
 
 Dice v. McCauley 1164 
 
 Dick v Dick 334 
 
 v. Muuder 28, 358 
 
 v Oil Well Supply Co. 314 
 
 v. Strut hers 1743 
 
 v. Swintou 1700, 1704, 1706, 1713 
 
 Dickenson v. Blake 1128, 1134 
 
 v Fisher 1122 
 
 v. Grand Junction Canal 1657, 
 
 1681, 1682 
 
 v. Lockyer 1404 
 
 j) Teasdale 649, 608 
 
 Dicker v Clarke 447, 449, 460. 461 
 
 v. Popham 1080 
 
 Dickerson v. Ilodges 710 
 
 v. Stoll H''4 
 
 v. Talbot 1294 
 
 « Winslow 334, 545 
 
 Dickev v. Allen 844 
 
 v. Reed 1683 
 
 Dickins v Harris 205, li22 
 
 Dickinson v. Davis 3<>2 
 
 v Lamoille Co. Nat. Bank 215 
 
 v Legare 1257 
 
 V Railroad Co. 841 
 v Seaver 1440 
 
 V Shee 1102 
 Dicks v Brooks 858, 890, 1620 
 
 v. Yates 1377 
 
 Dickson v. Harrison 195 
 
 Didier v. Davison 609 
 
 Dierden v Villiers 62 
 
 Dierdon, lie 880 
 
 Dietrich v. Northwestern Ry. 
 
 Co. 1639 
 
 Dietrichsen v. Cabburn 1656 
 
 Diffenderffer v. Winder 1369 
 
 Digby v. Boycatt 1202, 1798 
 
 v. Browne 1287 
 
 Lord v. Meech 320 
 
 Diggens v Gordon 1503 
 
 Diggle v. Boulden 1062 
 
 Diggs o. Wolcott 1627 
 
 Dighton v. Withers 284, 1390. 1424 
 Dike v. Greene 545, 557 
 
 Dill v. Shahan 1548, 1553 
 
 Dillard v. Harris 261, 853 
 
 v. Krise 1209 
 
 v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. 51 
 
 Dillon v. Ashwin 710 
 
 v Barnard 545 
 
 v. Davis 409, 1536 
 
 v. Francis 312 
 
 t>. Mount Cashell, Lady 1722 
 
 Lord v. Alvaies 6ii3 
 
 Dills v. Doebler 1655, 1663 
 
 Dilly v. Barnard 844 
 
 v. Doig 339, 1644 
 
 v Heckrott 361 
 
 Dilmau v Schultz 45 
 
 Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal 
 
 Co. 1023 
 
 v. Steinberg 251, 664 
 
 DiuiUioch v Atkinson 97 
 
 Dimmock v. Bixby 237. 341. 549, 
 
 559, 684 
 
 Dinckle v Tiuirod 1150 
 
 Dines v. Scott 1181, 1187, 1230 
 
 Dingle v. Rowe 950 
 
 Dingwall v. Heming 1458, 1565, 1558 
 
 Diusuiore v Crossmau 392,395, 1556, 
 
 1558 
 
 v. Hazelton 
 
 v. Westtott 
 
 Diuwiddie v Bailey 
 
 v. Bell 
 Dios v. Merle 
 Diplock v. Hammond 
 
 Dipper v. Durant 
 Di Savini v. Lousada 
 Lisbrow v. Heushaw 
 
 v Johnson 
 Disney, lie 
 Di Sora v Phillipps 
 District Attorney v. Lynn 
 
 Boston R. Co. 
 Dix v. Briggs 
 Dixon, lie 
 
 v. Atley 
 
 v. Buell 
 
 v. Dawson 
 
 v. Dixon 
 
 v. Donaldson 
 
 v. Eaton 
 
 v. Enoch 
 
 v. tarrer 
 
 v. Krazer 
 
 v Gay fere 
 
 v. Higgius 
 
 v. Holden 
 
 722 
 
 441 
 
 561 
 
 1157 
 
 1177 
 
 1560. 1561, 
 
 1566, 1567 
 
 413 
 
 1346 
 
 1497 
 
 881, 981, 1031 
 
 102 
 
 Dod v. Paul 
 
 659 
 
 Dodd, Ex parte 
 
 228 
 
 v. Bellows 
 
 1565 
 
 v. Beuthal 
 
 378 
 
 v- Cook 
 
 1965 
 
 V- Flavel 
 
 1081 
 
 v. Ghiselin 
 
 74 
 
 v. Hartford 
 
 1661 
 
 v. Holbrook 
 
 1069 
 
 v. Neal 
 
 1138 
 
 v. Webber 
 
 449 
 
 v. Wilkinson 
 
 349 
 
 Dodder v Bank of 
 
 England 136 
 
 Dodge v. Briggs 
 
 334 
 
 v. Dodge 
 
 1530 
 
 v Essex Ins. Co 
 
 645 
 
 v. Fuller 
 
 281, 287 
 
 864 
 
 & 
 
 10 
 
 329 
 
 1488, 1603 
 
 1774, 1775 
 
 197 
 
 1433 
 
 1298 
 
 286 
 
 1558 
 
 1556 
 
 6,10 
 
 720 
 
 649 
 
 890 
 
 1620, 1648 
 
 133 
 
 686 
 
 657, 961, 1405 
 
 790, <9l 
 
 1267 
 
 1057 
 
 801, 804 
 
 970 
 
 1058 
 
 .. Sumner County ConTrs 26 
 
 v. Wilkinson 1341 
 
 v. Wyatt 1522, 1523, 1524, 1531, 
 
 1540 
 
 Dobbs v. Protho 16-5 
 
 Dobede v. Edwards 804, 809, 1593 
 
 Doboy & Union Tel Co. v. De 
 
 v Loudon Small Arms Co. 
 
 v. Olmiu8 
 
 v. Parker 
 
 v. Parks 
 
 V, Pyuer 
 
 v. Rowe 
 
 v. Rutherford 
 
 v. Shuui 
 
 v. Smith 
 
 Mngathias 
 D'Obree, Ex parte 
 Dobree v. Nicholson 
 Dobson v. Bowness 
 
 c. Dobson 
 
 v. Faithwaite 
 
 v. Festi 
 
 v. Grahiim 
 
 v Hartford Carpet Co. 
 
 v. Land 
 
 V, Leadbeater 
 
 v Pattinson 
 
 r Pearce 
 Docker v. Horner 
 Dockray v. Mason 
 
 26 
 
 67 
 
 707 
 
 1136 
 
 1493 
 
 1526 
 
 149 
 
 1556 
 
 517, 1408 
 
 1246 
 
 622, 677 
 
 1417 
 
 1615,1627 
 
 1809 
 
 256 
 
 v. Gri.-wold 1073, 1076,1120, 1123, 
 
 1147, 1453 
 
 v Israel 924 
 
 v. Northrop 1584 
 
 v. Pei kins 314, 358, 374, 555, 656, 
 
 628, 1258 
 
 v. Strong 1621 
 
 v. Tulleys 200 
 
 v Woolsey 26 
 
 Dodgson, lie 1809 
 
 Dodslej v Kinnersley 1642 
 
 Dodsou v. Bishop 1271 
 
 v Lomax 295, 1566 
 
 v. McKelvey 417 
 
 v. Scammell 974, 1459 
 
 Dodsworth, lie, Spence v. Dods- 
 
 worth 894 
 
 Doe c. Andrews 575 
 
 v. Burdett 873 
 
 V. Childress 159 
 
 v. Deakin 873 
 
 v. Doe 406, 1631 
 
 v. Green 347, 1450 
 
 v. Horniblea 46 
 
 v. Perkins 1099 
 
 t>. Robertson 46 
 
 v. Roe 28, 313, 1097, 1135, 1675 
 v Sanger 660 
 
 v. Vallejo 1121 
 
 v. Warren 1259 
 
 v. Wolley 873 
 
 Doe d. Bather v. Brayne 1128 
 
 Fox v. Bromley 1097 
 
 Gilbert v. Ross 1127, 1138, 1139 
 Goslee v. Goslee 1106 
 
 Lewis v Barter 1109 
 
 Mason v Mason 1129 
 
 Norton v. Webster 1098 
 
 Phillips v. Benjamin 1127 
 
 RowcliHe*'. Egreuiont, Earl of 1105 
 Strickland v. Strickland 1127 
 
 Tathamv Wright 1125,1126 
 
 Tindalf Roe 1132 
 
 Tynham v. Tyler 1126 
 
 Walsh v. Langfield 1126 
 
 Wildgoose ti. Pearce 1098 
 
 Worcester Trustees v. Row- 
 lands 1096 
 Doechsner v. Scott 39, 111, 112 
 Doggett v Eastern Counties Ry. 
 
 Co 1528 
 
 Doherty r. Allman 1628 
 
 v Holiday 243 
 
 v. Stevenson 109, 286, 390 
 
 Dolder v Bank of England 17, 18, 
 
 764, 780 
 
 v Huntingfield, Lord 17, 18, 53, 
 
 300, 546, 592 
 
 Dole v. Wooldredge 
 
 Dollard V. Taylor 
 
 Dolling v Evans 
 
 Dollman v Collier 
 
 Dolly v Challin 
 
 Dolman, lie 
 
 v. Cook 
 Dominicetti v Latti 
 Dommett v. Bedford 
 Domville t>. Barriugton 
 
 v. Solly 
 Don ti. Lippman 
 
 1071, 1110 
 
 1463 
 
 561 
 
 1299 
 
 414, 421 
 
 33 
 
 P.38 
 
 1175 
 
 1399 
 
 1267, 1271 
 
 1777, 1780 
 
 48
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging ] 
 
 Donahue v. Flackler 
 
 1279 
 
 Donald v. Bather 
 
 201, 262 
 
 Donaldson v. Fairfax 
 
 1103 
 
 v Johnson 
 
 1312 
 
 Done's Case 
 
 1703, 1705 
 
 Done v Read 
 
 689, 732, 783 
 
 Donerail, Lord v. Donerail, Lady 853 
 
 Donne v. Hart 124 
 
 v. Lewis 1017 
 
 Donnell v Bennett 15, 96 
 
 v Columbian Ins Co 130'* 
 
 v King 612, 674,677 
 
 v. Parrott 
 Donnellan v. Hardy 
 Donnelly v Ewart 
 Donner v Quartermaa 
 Donohoe V Mariposa Min Co 
 Donohue ?>. Chase 
 Donovan v. Dunning 
 
 v Finn 
 
 v Fricker 
 Dooby v. Watson 
 Doody, Re, Fisher v. Doody 
 
 1623 
 867 
 411 
 1511 
 1553 
 1299 
 334 
 1037 
 1251 
 642 
 1235, 
 1414 
 
 v. Higzins 97, 191, 222, 225 
 
 v. Pierce 215, 260, 829, 834, 887, 
 
 1180, 1226, 1237, 1241 
 
 Dooley v. Potter 1253 
 
 Doolittle v. Gooking 845 
 
 v. Lewis 251 
 
 v. Walton 1689 
 
 Doon v. Bayer 846 
 
 Doran v Everitt 1564 
 
 v. Simpson 323 
 
 Dore Gallery, Re 911 
 
 Dorft;. Walter 1556 
 
 Dorin v Dorin 1503 
 
 Dorian v. Guie 1642 
 
 Dormer v. Fortescue 393, 602, 611, 
 
 987,1362,1532,1533,1558 
 
 Dorn v Bayer 734, 737 
 
 Dornford v Dornford 13-39 
 
 Dorr v. Harrian 1*554 
 
 v. Tremont National Bank 1071, 
 
 1110 
 
 865 
 
 648, 
 
 1572 
 
 291 
 
 1061, 1277 
 
 1845 
 
 52 
 
 334 
 
 1400 
 
 52 
 
 Dorrett v. Meux 
 
 Dorset, Duke of v. Girdler 
 
 Dorsett v. Dorsett 
 Dorsey v. Campbell 
 v. Corn 
 v. Kyle 
 v Lake 
 v Smith 
 v. Thompson 
 Dorsheimer v. Rorback 83,249, 1029, 
 1368 
 Doss v. Tyack 974 
 
 v. Secretary of State for India 
 
 18,629,1558 
 719 
 560 
 117 
 721 
 517 
 1027 
 1610 
 1158 
 385 
 1242 
 1576 
 417 
 
 llul 
 
 Dos Santos V. Frietas 
 Dossee v. Mookerjee 
 Doswell v. Earle 
 Dott v Hoyes 
 Dotterer v. Freeman 
 Doubleday v. Sherman 
 Doubtfire v. Elworthy 
 Doughaday v. Crowell 
 Dougherty v. Humpson 
 
 v. M'Colgan 
 
 v. Morgan 
 
 v. Murphy 
 
 v. Shown 
 Doughty v. West, B 
 
 Manuf. Co. 
 Douglas v. Andrews 
 
 v. Archbutt 
 
 & C 
 
 2396 
 
 1360 
 
 858, 890, 1234, 1414, 
 
 1601 
 
 v. Butler 109 
 
 v. Clay 250, 1207 
 
 v. Horsfall 221, 245, 273 
 
 t>. Terry 1704 
 
 v. Walbridge 334 
 
 Douglass v. Baker County 1675 
 
 v. Cline 1734 
 
 v. Culverwell 1399 
 
 v. Douglass 560 
 
 Douglass v Evans 
 
 525 
 
 v. Harrisville 
 
 1661 
 
 v Joyner 
 
 1567 
 
 v. M'Chesney 
 
 1073 
 
 v. Merceles 
 
 13U9 
 
 v. Phenix Ins. Co. 
 
 604 
 
 v Sherman 
 
 1507, 15H8 
 
 v. Thompson 
 
 1677 
 
 Dougrey v. Topping 
 
 737, 1677 
 
 Douthit v. Hipp 
 
 214 
 
 Douthwaite v. Spensley 
 
 1782 
 
 Douw v. Sheldon 
 
 328, 558 
 
 Dovenby Hospital, Re 
 
 1611 
 
 Dover v- Uarrell 
 
 674 
 
 v. Portsmouth Bridge 
 
 1637 
 
 Dover Harbor, Warden, 
 
 &c. of 
 
 v. London, Chatham, & 
 
 Dover Ry Co 
 
 1640 
 
 Dovey v. Hobson 
 
 1092, 1128 
 
 Dow v Berry 
 
 630 
 
 v. Dickinson 
 
 1137 
 
 V. Eley 
 
 1554 
 
 v. Jewell 68, 163, 164, 165, 167, 
 
 169, 170, 171, 997 
 
 1530, 1533 
 
 Dowdall v. Lennox 
 
 1381 
 
 Dowden v Hook 
 
 38, 111 
 
 v Junker 
 
 1069 
 
 Dowdeswell v. Dowdeswel 
 
 201, 249, 
 
 292,! 
 
 Dowell v Applegate 
 
 597 
 
 v. Covenhoven 
 
 108, 110 
 
 ti. Mitchell 
 
 630, 659 
 
 t». Tuffnell 
 
 ■ 1285 
 
 Dowle v. Lucy 
 
 1293 
 
 Dowley v. Winfield 
 
 1795 
 
 Dowling v. Falmouth 
 
 U. S 
 
 Board 
 
 1829 
 
 v Hudson 152 
 
 1718, 1735 
 
 v. Legh 
 
 838 
 
 Down v. Yearley 
 
 897 
 
 Downer v. Dana 
 
 1021 
 
 v. Wilson 
 
 1515 
 
 Downes v. East India Co 
 
 595 
 
 v. Friel 
 
 1019 
 
 Downey v. Bullock 
 
 1359 
 
 Dowuie v. Nettleton 
 
 579, 1556 
 
 Downing, Re 
 
 58, 157 
 
 v Palmateer 284 
 
 1628, 1630 
 
 v Pickeu 
 
 1801 
 
 Downing College Case 1440 
 
 Downshire v. Tyrrell 1735 
 
 Downshire, Marquis of v. San- 
 dys, Lady 1634 
 Dows v McMichael 695, 697, 704 
 Dowson v Hirdcastle 1570 
 v Solomon 964 
 Doyle, petitioner 1120 
 v. Muntz 302, 419, 699 
 v San Diego Land & Town 
 
 Co. 145 
 
 v. Wiley 938 
 
 v Wisconsin 1467 
 
 Dozier v Edwards 216 
 
 v. Sprouse 992 
 
 Drage )». Hartopp 149 
 
 Drake r Brooki.jg 139 i 
 
 v Delliker 216 
 
 V. Drake 722, 984, 1003, 1577 
 
 v Goodridge 287,406 
 
 v. Syrnes 403, 485, 724, 776 
 
 Dranquet v. Prudhomrne 850 
 
 Drant r. Vause 161 
 
 Draper ?>. Buxton 14^2 
 
 v Clarendon, Lord 277 
 
 v. Crowther 628, 629 
 
 v. Jennings 214 
 
 v. Manchester & Sheffield Ry. 
 
 Co 1837 
 
 Drapers' Company v. Davis 1256 
 
 Dravo v F'avel 551, 737 
 
 Drax v. Somerset & Dorset Ry. 
 
 Co. 278 
 
 Drayton v Logan 1076 
 
 v. Wells 1U8 
 
 Drennan o. Andrew 32, 40, 1482 
 
 v. Huskey 1003 
 
 Dresser v. Morton 40, 519, 528 
 
 xlv 
 
 Drever v. Maudesley 27. 53, 1205, 
 
 1291. 1752 
 
 Drevon v. Drevon 892, 915 
 
 Drew v Beard 1299, 418, 1296. 
 
 131 < 
 
 v Drew 6)5, 684, 721 
 
 V. Ilarman 259 
 
 v. Long 825 
 
 v. Norbury, Earl of 280 
 
 v. O'Hara 280 
 
 v. Power 66S 
 
 Drewer. , Re 1814 
 
 Drewiy v. Barnes 1731 
 
 v. Thacker 1615, 1617, 1684, 
 
 1686 
 
 Drexel v. Berney 378, 1618 
 
 Dreyfus v. Peruvian Guano Co. ;<62, 
 
 1556 
 
 Drickle v. Timrod 1166 
 
 Driggs v. Daniels 14ti3 
 
 v. Rockwell 944 
 
 Drinan v. Mannix 36. Ill, 112 
 
 Dringer v. Erie Ry. Receiver 1584 
 
 v. Jewett 1029, 1584 
 
 Drioli v Sedgwick 809 
 
 Driver v. Cobb 1625 
 
 v Fortner 325,378,379 
 
 Drogheda v. Malone 603, 612, 674 
 
 Dromgoolei). Spence 657 
 
 Drope V. Miller 2335 
 
 Drought V. Redford 1321 
 
 Droullard v. Baxter 368, 411 
 
 Drover v Beyer 389, 1699, 1706 
 
 Druce v. Denison 105, 1809 
 
 Druiffy Parker, Lord 1961 
 
 Drummond v Drummond 449 
 
 v. Magruder 418 
 
 v. St Albans, Duke of 641 
 
 v. Tillinghurst 29 
 
 v Westervelt 543 
 
 Drury v. Bonner 630, 845, 846, 
 
 847 
 
 v Molins 1656, 1672 
 
 Drybutter v. Bartholomew 1404 
 
 Dryden v. Foster 798 
 
 v. Froat 1388 
 
 v Robinson 670 
 
 Du Barre v. Livette 576 
 
 Duberley v. Day 119, 127 
 
 Dubless v. Flint 1780, 1782 
 
 Dublin, &c. Ry Co. v. Slat- 
 
 tery 1503 
 
 Dubois v. Dubois 874 
 
 j>. Hole 179,181,445,499 
 
 Duboll v Field 1461 
 
 Dubourg de St. Colombe v 
 
 United States 857, 1221 
 
 Dubout v. Macpherson 406, 447, 
 1596 
 Duchess of Westminster Silver 
 
 Ore Co , Re 1490 
 
 Duekcri). Wood 1130 
 
 Duckett v Gover 26, 242, 3i>8, 
 
 599 
 
 Duckworth v Duckworth 360, 361 
 
 v. Trafford 1734 
 
 Ducoign v. Schreppel 1-127 
 
 Dudgeon v Corley 730 
 
 v. Thomson 1492. 161 Q 
 
 v. Watson 83. i;:;o 
 
 Dudley v Bachelder 365, 661, 655 
 
 v. Balch 37 
 
 t\ Burgen 123S 
 
 v. Congregation 378 
 
 v Facer 13*1 
 
 v Grayson 46 
 
 v. Witter 2*1 
 
 Dues v. Smith 95 
 
 Dufaur, Re 1044 
 
 v. Sigel 1405 
 
 Duff?> Barrier 1029 
 
 v. Duff 630 
 
 v. First National Bans 328, 560 
 
 v. McDonough 
 
 Duffield v. Denny 1203 
 
 v. Elwes 1044, 1742, 1793 
 
 tJ. Greaves 586
 
 xlvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging ] 
 
 Duffield l) Robeson 851, 852 
 
 V ^turges 819. 828 
 Dutfort v. ArrowsmMi 70. 799 
 Duffy, lie li'4 
 
 v. Jovce 27 
 
 V Moran 1074 
 Dufour v. Kious 13S1 
 
 v. Long 1029 
 
 v Sigell 350, 759 
 
 Dugau V Gittings 845 
 
 Dugdale v Dugdale 1431 
 
 v Johnson 1600 
 
 v Robertson 2309 
 
 Dnggan, He 1610 
 
 Duhamuiel r Pickering 50 
 
 Duke v Barnett 988 
 
 r Harper 563 
 
 V Palmer 122 
 Duke of Newcastle, lit 1035, 1037 
 Duke of Somerset, lie 87 
 Dula v. Seagle 1281 
 Dulwich College, Re 15 
 Dumford v. Duniford 632 
 Duuimer v Chippenham 143, 145, 
 
 297, 378, 566 
 
 v Pitcher 117 
 
 Dumond v. Magee 90, 734, 2285 
 
 Dumont v Fry 322, 630, 1168 
 
 Dumoussay v. Delevit 48 
 
 Duuphy v. Kleinsmith 1076 
 
 Dumville v Ashbrooke 1731 
 
 Dunball v. Walters 1638 
 
 Dunbar v. Boldero 1609 
 
 e Johnson 371 
 
 v. Woodcock 986, 1259 
 
 Duncalfu. Blake 611 
 
 Duncan v Campan 1463 
 
 v Campbell 104. 107 
 
 v. Chesapeake, &c. R Co. 1734 
 
 v Dixon 122 
 
 v. Dodd 1286 
 
 v Ewing 1257 
 
 v Findlater 1752 
 
 v Greenwalt 313 
 
 v. Haves 1635 
 
 v. King 1110 
 
 v. Luntley 197 
 
 v Lvon 551 
 
 v. M Calmont 1626 
 
 v. Varty 1137, 1139, 1148, 1149 
 
 v. Vereker 348 
 
 r Wiekliffe 285 
 
 Duncomb v. Daniel 1096 
 
 Duncombe, Ex parte 1699 
 
 v. Davis 761 
 
 v Greenacre 92, 101, 102, 108 
 
 v. Hansley 283 
 
 v Levy 431 
 
 v Lewis 413 
 
 Dundas v. Dutens 307, 309, 1037, 
 
 1053 
 
 Dungannon, Lord v Skinner 886 
 
 Dungey v Angove 1560, 1561, 1562, 
 
 1563, 1564, 1565, 1567, 1570 
 
 Dunham v. Gates 842, 843, 847 
 
 Dunham v Hyde Park 549 
 
 v Jackson 847, 1702, 1705 
 
 Miiiard 1061, 1283 
 
 v. Ramsey 267 
 
 v. State 1070 
 
 v Wiuans 930, 147y 
 
 Dunklev v. Dunkley 102 
 
 v Scribnor 1055 
 
 v. Van Buren 815 
 
 Dunklin v Harvey 986, 1584 
 
 Duulap r Clibbs 559 
 
 V M'Elvoy 458 
 
 v. Stetson 1624 
 
 V. Wilson 844 
 
 Dunlevy v Dunlevy 1580 
 
 Dunlop v Hubbard 1569, 1570 
 
 Dunn, Ez parte 129 
 
 v. Barnum 674 
 
 v. Campbell 1561 
 
 v Clarke 447 
 
 v. Coates 553, 1556 
 
 v. Dunn 79, 81. 336,345, 443, 449, 
 
 539, 844, 1111, 1121, 1S39, 
 
 1842 
 
 v. Ferrior 412. 423 
 
 v. Graham 846 
 
 v. Keegin 686 
 
 v. McEvoy 32 
 
 r Snowden 17!<5 
 
 v Whitney 1228 
 
 v. Wolf 256 
 
 Dunne v. Dunne 2198 
 
 v. Engiish 852, 1782 
 
 Dunnell v. Henderson 1317 
 
 Dunning v Hards 1214 
 
 v Stanton 457 
 
 Duunock v. Dunnock 630 
 
 Dunny v Filmore 1580, 1583 
 
 Duuphy v. Traveller Newspaper 
 
 Association 334 
 
 Dunsany v Shaw 697 
 
 Duusback v. Collar 369 
 
 Dunscomb v Dunscomb 1412 
 
 v. Ualtz 12s2 
 
 Dunshee v. Parmelee 1259 
 
 Dunstan v Patterson 1387 
 
 Dunster v. Mitford 1467, 1468 
 
 Dunthorne v. Bunbury 1380 
 
 Dupignac v Van Buskirk 1591 
 
 Du Plessisv Attorney-General 5 
 
 Dupont v. Johnson 1358, 1404, 1415. 
 
 1417 
 
 v. Ward 508 
 
 Duponti v Massey 407, 828, 2385 
 
 Dupuy t\ Gorman 1286 
 
 v Strong 208 
 
 r Welsford 68, 75 
 
 Durand v Hutchinson 635 
 
 Durant v. Bacot 
 
 
 1973 
 
 v. Crowell 
 
 
 1734 
 
 v Kssex Co. 
 
 659, 
 
 790, 994 
 
 v. Moore 
 
 
 1685 
 
 Durbaine v. Knight 
 
 
 188 
 
 Durburow v Niehoff 
 
 
 243 
 
 Durdant v. Redman 
 
 
 588 
 
 Durell v. Pritchard 1072, 1080, 1081, 
 
 1638, 1641, 1661 
 
 Durfee v. Durfee 878 
 
 v. McClurg 737,846 
 
 v. Old Colony, &c. R R Co 26 
 
 Durham v Brackles 98, 710 
 
 v. Jackson 389 
 
 v Legard 1526 
 
 v. Taylor 448 
 
 Durkee v Stringham 1484 
 
 Durr v. Bowyer 91, 122 
 
 Durrand, Ex parte 133 
 
 Dursley v. Berkley 316 
 
 Lord, v Fitzhardinge 317, 1572, 
 
 1573 
 
 Duryee v. Lingheimer 1550 
 
 Dustin v. Newcomer 14ol 
 
 Dutch Church, &c. v Mott 989 
 
 ti Smock 1320 
 
 Dutch West India Co. t' Van 
 
 Moyses 24 
 
 Dutton i'. Thomas 1734 
 
 Du Val v. Marshall 1722 
 
 Duval v. Mount 1278 
 
 Dtivall v. Farmers' Bank 90. 91, 122 
 
 v Speed 272 
 
 v. Waters 1629, 1634, 1669 
 
 Du Vigier v Lee 652 
 
 Du Wahl v. Brauue 89 
 
 Dux Bucks v. Gayer 1237 
 
 Duxbury v. Isherwood 150 
 
 Dwight Central Vermont R. Co 590, 
 
 603, 634 
 
 v. Humphreys 311,312 
 
 v. Northern, &c R Co. 1081 
 
 v Pomeroy 849, 832 
 
 v Smith 369 
 
 Dwinal v Smith 716 
 
 Dwyer v. Olivari 216 
 
 v. St. Louis & S. F R Co 1071 
 
 Dyckman v. Kernochan 1567, 1623 
 
 I Dyer, Re, Dyer v. Paynter 1157 
 
 v Clark 1950 
 
 v Kearsley 1615, 1616 
 
 v. Lincoln 658 
 
 v Potter 1382, 1401 
 
 v. Pulteney 279 
 
 V. Shurtleff 1381 
 
 v. Vinton 1157 
 
 Dyers Co v. King 1638 
 
 Dvett v N. A. Coal Co. 443, 445 
 
 Dyke v. Cannell 1168 
 
 v Stephens 7, 68 
 
 Dykes v. Taylor 1264, 1657 
 
 Dymond v. Croft 448, 1175, 1596 
 
 Dvnevor Duffryn Collieries Co., 
 
 Re 1611 
 
 DyotttJ Anderton 1186 
 
 v Dyott 31 
 
 Dvson v. Benson 592 
 
 v. Hornby 61, 225, 1277 
 
 v. Morris 227, 252, 540. 857, 980, 
 
 1510, 1533 
 
 Dzialynski v. Jacksonville Bank 584, 
 
 E. 
 
 Eado t'. Jacobs 579 : 
 
 v. Lingood 868 
 
 Eadem v Lutman 1141 
 
 Eaden v. Firth 876, 1071. 1072, 1080, 
 
 1640,1641,1643 
 
 Endes v. Harris 152, 281, 302, 1517 
 
 Eadie v. Addison 364 
 
 Eady v Watson 1798 
 
 Eager, Re Eager v. Johnstone 449 
 
 v Price 1523, 1535, 1537 
 
 r Wiswall 1825, 1833 
 
 Eagle v Beard 558, 586 
 
 v Le Breton 426 
 
 Eagle Bank v. Chapin 25 
 
 Eagle fire Ins Co v. Cammet 194,228 
 
 Eagle Ins Co v. Lent 389 
 
 v Pell 1246 
 
 Eagle Iron Works, Matter of 173:) 
 
 Eagle Manuf. Co. t>. Miller 2 19 
 
 Eakin V. Herbert 1275 
 
 Eames v. Eames 987, 1079, 1080, 
 
 1110 
 
 v. Hacon 201, 202, 224, 250, 254 
 
 v Smith 1126 
 
 Eardley B Knight 1381 
 
 Eardy ». Headford 30 
 
 Earl r Beadleston 1639 
 
 v De Hart 1637, 1662 
 
 v. Ferris 109, 179, 182, 754 
 
 v. Matheny 1621 
 
 Earl's Trust, Re 892 
 
 Earle v Holt 207 
 
 v. Pickin 1192, 1193 
 
 v. Sidebottom 322, 336, 1169 
 
 v U'ood 1885 
 
 Eirles » Earles 801 
 
 Earp v. Lloyd 580, 725, 726, 774, 
 
 1831 
 
 Easlev v Tarkington 853 
 
 Eastr East 334.1229 
 
 v. Ryal 1418 
 
 East Anglian Railway Co v. 
 
 Goodwin 912, 913 
 
 Eastburn v. Kirk 1381, 1463, 1668.
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 xivil 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Eastern Counties Ry. Co., Re 1860 
 East India Co. v. Atkius 565 
 
 V. 
 
 Bjizett 
 
 1123, 1124, list 
 
 V. 
 
 BoJdain 
 
 1475, 1478 
 
 V. 
 
 Campbell 
 
 563, 564, 7u2, 7o4 
 
 V. 
 
 Coles 
 
 287, 559 
 
 V. 
 
 Donald 
 
 713, 848 
 
 V. 
 
 Edwards 1561 
 
 , 1563, 1564, 1565 
 
 V. 
 
 Ekines 
 
 1393 
 
 V. 
 
 Henchman 
 
 370, 506, 544 
 
 V. 
 
 Keighley 
 
 1188, 1236, 1318 
 
 V. 
 
 Naish 
 
 935 
 
 V 
 
 Neave 
 
 565 
 
 V. 
 
 Kumbold 
 
 444 
 
 V 
 
 Vincent 
 
 1.338 
 
 Edee v Strunk 
 Edelin v. Lyon 
 
 Edelsteu v. Edelsten 
 
 1661 
 
 770 
 
 324 
 
 East Lancashire Ry Co v. Hat- 
 
 tersley 1598, 1631, 1671 
 
 East Llangynog Lead Mining Co , 
 
 Re 28 
 
 East Saginaw S. Ry. Co 
 
 Wiidman 
 East St Louis v Trustees 
 East St. Louis C. R. Co v. 
 
 People 
 
 Eastman v. Amoskeag Manuf. 
 
 Co. 1631, 1634, 1635, 1337, 1638, 
 
 1639, 1640, 1641 
 
 v. Batehelder 1546 
 
 v. McAlpice 844 
 
 v. Plumer 385, 1889 
 
 v Savings Bank 334 
 
 v Simpson 380, 1082 
 
 Eastman Co v Reichenbach 1650 
 
 Easton v. Houston & T. Ry. 
 
 Co 1746 
 
 r Houston & T. C. R. Co. 986, 
 
 1019, 1770 
 
 v. London Joint Stock Bank 1440, 
 
 1449 
 
 v. New York, &c. R Co 1029, 
 
 1665 
 
 East Pant United L. M. Co. v. 
 
 Merryweather 241, 306 
 
 East Tennessee R. Co v. Atlanta 
 
 R Co. 1743 
 
 East & West India Docks v. 
 
 Littledale 151, 1564, 1566, 1568 
 1728 
 1611 
 1081 
 844 
 1683 
 1576 
 631 
 1677 
 
 lass 
 
 1247 
 
 987 
 
 1463 
 
 Eastwick v. Conningsby 
 Eastwood v. Glenton 
 
 v. Lever 
 Eaton's Appeal 
 Eaton, Re 
 
 v. Dickinson 
 
 v. Eaton 
 
 v. Jenkins 
 
 v. Lyon 
 
 v Simonds 
 
 v, Truesdail 
 Eaton R. Co. v. Varnum 
 Eatough & Co. Lim'd, Ex 
 
 parte 630 
 
 Eaves v Hickson 1418, 1421 
 
 Ebb* v Boulnois 62, 157 
 
 Eberhart v Gilchrist 1291 
 
 Eberly v. Gross 3f4 
 
 Eborn v. Zimpelman 879 
 
 Ebrard v. Gassier 28 
 
 Ecaubert v. Appleton 354 
 
 Ecclcs v. Liverpool Borough 
 
 Bank 1601 
 
 v Timmons 128 
 
 Ecclesall, Overseers of, Re 1855 
 
 Ecclesiastical Commissioners, 
 
 Ex parte 1610 
 
 v. Marshall 280 
 
 v. North Eastern Ry. Co. 560, 649 
 Eehliff!;. Baldwin 1652, 1665 
 
 Eckrrt v. Binkley 779 
 
 v Wilson 1258 
 
 Eckford v. Dekay 885 
 
 v. Eckford 1411 
 
 Eckleman v Miller 1639 
 
 Eddleston v Collins 125 
 
 Eddowes v. Argentine Loan Co. 894 
 Eddy, Ex parte 1743 
 
 v. Caprin 334 
 
 v Lafayette 1621 
 
 1716 
 
 610 
 
 13S1. 1394, 
 
 1648, 1649 
 
 720 
 
 1504 
 
 1250 
 
 1031, 1568 
 
 1611 
 
 Edelston v. Russell 
 Edeu v. Bute, Karl 
 V. Linireut'elter 
 v Naish 
 v. Thompson 
 Eden borough v Canterbury, 
 
 Archbishop of 1435, 1436, 1653 
 Eden.-or v. Roberts 1570 
 
 Kdevain v. Cohen 417, 659, 785 
 
 Edgar v. Cleveuger 1516 
 
 v. Reynolds 133 
 
 Edgcumbe v. Carpenter 1618 
 
 Ed^ell v Francis 1130 
 
 v. Haywood 237, 559, 1037 
 
 v. Lowell 917 
 
 Edgerv. Knapp 1134,1137 
 
 Edgertou v. Muse 1029 
 
 Edge's Parent, Re 1071 
 
 Edgett v Douglass 630 
 
 Edgill v Brown 15-8 
 
 Edgson v. Edgson 171. 429, 442 
 
 Edichal Bullion Co v. Columbia 
 
 G M. Co. 860 
 
 Edie v. East India Co 1132 
 
 Edinboro Normal School v 
 
 Cooper 1381 
 
 Edington v. Banham 429, 1522 
 
 Edison Electric Light Co v. 
 United States Electric Light- 
 ing Co. 578, 581 
 Edison & S Electric Light Co. 
 
 v. Holland 406 
 
 Edlesten v. Vick 2319 
 
 Edm.inds v. Brougham, Lord 348, 
 
 355 
 
 195 
 
 2313 
 
 1826 
 
 461 
 
 1517 
 
 125, 246 
 
 508 
 
 1126 
 
 418 
 
 1169 
 
 1725 
 
 911 
 
 157, 663 
 
 703 
 
 974 
 
 856, 858 
 
 295 
 
 147 
 
 394,395 
 
 Edmond v. Caldwell 
 Edmonds v. Benhow 
 
 v. Foley, Lord 
 
 v. Nichol 
 
 v. Robinson 
 Edmond>on v Harris 
 Edmonson V Ueyton 
 
 v. Machell 
 Edmund's Appeal 
 Edmunds v. Acland 
 
 v. Bird 
 
 v. Brougham 
 
 v Waugh 
 Edmundson v. Hartley 
 Edney v Edney 
 
 v. Jewell 
 
 v King 
 Edridge v. Ed ridge 
 Edriugton v. Allsbrooks 
 Edsall v. Vandemark 
 Edsell v. Buchanan 370, 587, 640, 
 650 
 S69 
 100, 109 
 
 Edson v. Girvan 
 
 Edward v. Cheyne 
 
 Edward Barr Co. v. New York 
 
 &c. Co. 
 Edwardes v. Burke 
 Edwards, Ex parte 
 Ed war, Is, Re 
 
 v. Abrey 
 
 v. Banksmith 
 
 V. Batley 
 
 v . Boiline 
 
 v. Carroll 
 
 v Chilton 
 
 v. Coombe 
 
 V Cunliffe 
 
 v Davies 
 
 v. Dignum 
 
 v Drake 
 
 v. Edwards 
 
 v. Evans 
 v Gill 
 v. Goodwin 
 v . Harvey 
 
 v. Hope 
 
 1642 
 
 29,31 
 
 1353, 1584 
 
 108, 1348, 1765 
 
 86 
 
 281 
 
 1526 
 
 1663 
 
 1580 
 
 1653 
 
 157 
 
 1000 
 
 ss 
 
 1182 
 
 542 
 
 283, 811, 173*. 1741, 
 
 1771, 1780 
 
 1126 
 
 1274 
 
 1181 
 
 224, 1382. 1400, 1408, 
 
 1421, 1795 
 
 1447 
 
 Edwards v. Jones 1823, 1829 
 
 v Lowther 406 
 
 tf M'Lear 780 
 
 v. MXeay 7-1 
 
 v. Massey 361, 1047, 1698, 1699 
 
 v. Matthews 11^8 
 
 V Maupiu 1274 
 
 v. Morgan 948, lo52 
 
 v Poole 1(>44 
 
 v. Rogers 860 
 
 v Sartor 334 
 
 v Scott 1138 
 
 v Spaight 915 
 
 v . Tuck 1795 
 
 Edwards-Wood v Baldwin 561 
 
 Edwardson v. Maseby 1576, 1577 
 
 Edwick v. Hawkes 1082 
 
 Edwiu v. Thomas 1124, 1137 
 
 Eedes v. Eedes lU4, lu7 
 
 Effingham, Lady v. Napier, 
 
 Sir J . 73 
 
 Egan v. Baldwin 1424 
 
 Egbert v. Greenwalt 851 
 
 v. Woods 217, 303 
 
 Egerton v. Egerton 1417 
 
 v. Jones 1218 
 
 Egg v Devey 793, 811 
 
 Eggiutou v Burton lo2 
 
 Eggleston v Boardman 1845 
 
 Kglin v. Dryden 100 
 
 v. Saudtr>on 1419 
 
 Eglington, Earl of v. Lamb 1144, 1825 
 
 Egmout v. Darell 876, 10* J , 1072, 
 
 1U74 
 
 v Smith 195 
 
 Egremout v. Cowell 360, 595 
 
 v. Egremout 161 
 
 v Thompson 229, 266 
 
 Earl of v. Hamilton 1542 
 
 Eidam v Fiunegan 68 
 
 Eigleburger v. Kibler 645 
 
 Eillert v Craps 888, 947 
 
 Ela v. Ela 560, 641 
 
 Elam v . Barnes 556 
 
 v Donald 1290 
 
 v Garrard 237 
 
 Elborne v. Goode 1427, 1430, 1432 
 
 Elcock v . Glegg 171 
 
 Elder v Bradley 353 
 
 v. Carter 1825 
 
 v. First National Bank 314 
 
 v Harris 779 
 
 v. Maclean 1696 
 
 El lerkiu v. Elderkin 68 
 
 v. Fitch 793 
 
 v. Shultz 197, 199 
 
 Elders v Johnston 14vl 
 
 Elderton, Re 70 
 
 V. Lack 1112,1113 
 
 Eldridge v. Burgess 63, 977, 979 
 
 v Hill 1681, 1682, 2'>40 
 
 v. Howell 1476, 1481 
 
 i' Porter 1599 
 
 n Wiirhtman 1031 
 
 Electric Telegraph Co , Re 944, 1594 
 
 v Nott 1598 
 
 Electrical Accumulator Co. v. 
 
 Brush Electric Co 794 
 
 v. Julien Electric Co. 1120 
 
 Electrolibration Co v. Jack 
 
 son 314, 594 
 
 Eley, Re 1847 
 
 ?) Positive Ass. Co 307 
 
 Elgce v Lovell 52 
 
 Elias r Suowden Slate Quarries 
 
 Co. 1632 
 
 Elibank, Lady v. Montolieu 92, 105, 
 106 
 Elizabethtown Gaslight Co v 
 
 Green 630 
 
 Elkart Car Works v. Ellis 1743 
 
 El lame, Re 1267 
 
 Ellcr i: Bergling 190 
 
 Ellerbe, Re 909 
 
 Ellerton v Thirsk 1671, 1684, 
 
 1686 
 Ellice v. Goodson 201, 409, 583
 
 xlviii 
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging ] 
 
 EUice v. Roupell 681,1572, 1573, 1575 
 
 v. Walmsley 505 
 
 Ellicott v. Nichols 64o 
 
 v. Warlord 17-11 
 
 Ellington 0. Clark 1444 
 
 Elliugwuotl V. Stevenson 504 
 
 Elliot v. Cochran 1029, 1308 
 
 ii Halinarack 106y, 1W70 
 
 v. Sinclair WOG 
 
 v. touth Devon Railway Co. 1127 
 
 v. Van Voorst 131 
 
 v. Waring 122, 199 
 
 Elliott r Amazon Ins. Co. 860 
 
 v. Balcoiu 1575, 1577, 1578. 1579, 
 
 1582, 1584 
 
 1794 
 
 98 
 
 37, 110, 111, 187, 1111 
 
 1141 
 
 Elton v. Elton 
 
 v. Larkius 
 Elvy v. Norwood 
 Elwell v Crowther 
 Klwes v. Payne 
 Elworthy v. Billing 
 Elwyn v. Williams 
 Ely v. Early 
 
 v. Edwards 
 
 v. Gay ford 
 
 1162| 
 1100 
 
 331,653 
 1638 
 1663 
 1271 
 
 119, 125 
 
 1073 
 
 407 
 
 202, 204, 1514 
 
 v Elliott 
 v. Hooper 
 v I nee 
 v. Nicklin 
 II Osborne 
 v. Pell 
 
 v. Kemmington 
 v Trahern 
 Ellis, Ex parte 
 Re 
 
 v Atkinson 
 
 v. Boston, &c R. Co. 
 
 v Bowman 
 
 v. Davis 
 
 v. Deane 
 
 t; Ellis 
 
 v. Essex M. Bridge 
 
 v. Fletcher 
 
 v Foster 
 
 v Griffiths 
 
 v. King 
 
 v. Mi Henry 
 
 V Maxwell 
 
 v Medlicott 
 
 v. No Pacific R. Co. 
 
 v. Reynolds 
 
 v. Saul 
 
 v. Silber 
 
 v. Stewart 
 
 v. Vernon Ice Co. 
 v. Wait 
 
 v. Walmsley 
 
 v. Woods 
 
 v. Wren 
 Ellison, Ex parte 
 Re 
 
 v. Burgess 
 v. El win 
 v Kittridge 
 v. Salem C. & M. Co 
 v Sharp 
 v. Thomas 
 V. Wright 
 Elliston v. Morrison 
 Ellsworth 0. Curtis 
 Ellwand ti McDonnell 
 Ellzey 0. Lane 
 Elmendor ll Delancy 
 Elmendorfr. Taylor 
 Elmer v. Creasy 
 
 Elmhirst » Spencer 1636. 1637, 1638 
 El Modello C M Co v. Gato 586 
 Elms v. Hughes 115 
 
 Elm^lie v Beresford *>Z 
 
 v. Boursier 
 
 Delaware and Schuylkill 
 
 1673 
 1005, 1370, 1550 | 
 95 I 
 830 
 59 
 100 
 97 
 1734 
 1114 
 533 
 882 
 87. 1413 
 1364 
 1381 
 1278 
 1224 
 964 
 631 
 1321 
 878 
 334, 659 
 149 
 713, 783 
 60,553 
 37 
 1743 
 1440 
 505 
 678 
 1638 
 99, 1802 
 706 
 354 
 119, 125 
 1424 
 1548 
 1528 
 438, 1460 
 1388 
 1639 
 707, 708 
 724 
 1575 
 286, 390 
 149, 558. 560 
 30ii, 720 
 220, 418 
 
 v. New Mexico & A. R. Co. 369 
 630 
 v. Stewart 922 
 
 v. Warren 861, 941 
 
 v. Wilcox 1624 
 
 Eniack v. Kane 1642 
 
 Emans v. Emans 303, 331, 335, 339. 
 340, 346. 347, 559, 5c-3, 598 
 
 Embury v Bergamini 1027 
 
 v. Klemm 1029. 1580 
 
 Emden !'. Carte 
 
 Emeric v Alvarado 
 
 Emerick v Armstron 
 
 Emeris v Woodward 
 
 Emerson 0. Atkinson 
 v. Atwater 
 
 Enochs v. Harrelson 
 Enos v. Capps 
 Enraght v. Fitzgerald 
 Ensign v. Kellogg 
 Ensminger v. Powers 
 Ensworth v. Card 
 
 590 
 
 163 
 
 1027, 1215 
 
 197, 199 
 
 1580 
 
 1427 
 
 Badger 
 v. Berkley 
 
 v Davies 
 
 v. Emerson 
 
 v. UarlanJ 
 
 v. Sims 
 
 V. Udall 
 
 r. Walker Township 
 Emery's Trusts, Re 
 limery v. Bidwell 
 
 v. Downing 
 
 v. Erskine 
 
 v. Mason 
 
 v. Newsou 
 
 v. P.irrot 
 
 v Van Sickle 
 
 59, 406 
 
 1461, 1716 
 
 1461, 1485 
 
 1031 
 
 385, 1918 
 
 1300 
 
 1649 
 
 882, 884 
 
 1478, 1479, 2334 
 
 805, 809 
 
 622, 2095 
 
 378 
 
 1623 
 
 314 
 
 123, 179 
 
 547 
 
 524, 525, 529, 740 
 
 303 
 
 1168 
 
 169, 516 
 
 176 
 
 1622 
 
 v. Lambert 194, 294, 1532, 1533 
 Enthoven v. Cobb 1834 
 
 Episcopal Church v Leroy 619 
 
 Equestrian & P. B. Co., Re 27 
 
 Equitable Life Ass. Soc. v. Laird 
 
 402. 458 
 v. Patterson 190, 334, 589 
 
 Equitable Reversionary Interest 
 
 Society v Fuller 1791 
 
 Erhardt v. Boaro 1628, 1638 
 
 Erickson v. Nesmith 144, 149, 150, 
 
 152, 267, 271, 272, 273, 282, 290, 
 
 458, 1935 
 
 v. Smith 443 
 
 Erie Ry. Co. v. Heath _ 2394 
 
 v. Ramsey 1557, 1567, 1568 
 
 Erie Tel. Co. v. Grimes 586 
 
 Ernest v. Govett 796, 801, 806 
 
 v. Partridge 590, 595, 796, 1440 
 
 Weiss 26, 315, 542, 868, 1394 
 
 Errat v. Barlow 
 
 Errington v. Attorney-General 
 
 Emigrant Industrial S Bank v. 
 
 Goldman 214 
 
 Emma Silver Mining Co., Re 909 
 v. Emma Silver Mining Co of 
 
 New York 607 
 
 v Grant 157 
 
 v. New York Emma S M. Co. 
 
 1168 
 Emmerson, Re 
 
 v. Ind 
 Emmet v. Tottenham 
 
 v. Aynesly 
 Erskine, Re 
 
 v. Bize 
 
 v. Garthshore 
 
 v. Henry 
 Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. 
 
 Co. 
 Erwin v. Davenport 
 
 v Lowry 
 
 v. Meyrose 
 
 v Oldham 
 
 v. Reese 
 
 v. Vint 
 Esdaile ;•. La Nauze 
 
 v Molineux 
 
 1358 
 139, 
 1562 
 1660 
 
 106 
 1828 
 
 347 
 1481 
 
 1686 
 1835 
 259, 1386, 
 1391 
 610 
 1824 
 1517 
 
 Emmott v- Mitchell 
 
 v. Walters 
 Emory v. Keighan 
 Empire Loau & B. Ass'n v. At 
 
 lanta 1663 
 
 Empress Engineering Co., Re 323 
 Empringham v. Short 1059, 1304 
 
 Canal Co 
 
 r. M'Aulay 
 Elridge r Smith 
 Elritigton >■ Elrington 
 Elrod ;• Myers 
 Elsam v. Allcock 
 Elsev v. Adams 
 Elsom, He, Thomas t 
 Elston v Blanchard 
 
 r Elston 
 
 v Wood 
 Elt v Burial Board 
 Kiting B. Dayton 
 El toft I) Brown 
 Elton f Curteis 
 
 1614 
 
 322,323 
 
 552 
 
 95 
 
 1360 
 
 39 
 
 791. 898, 1669 
 
 Elsora 71 
 
 324 
 
 9«5 
 
 185 
 
 396 
 
 418 
 
 1175 
 
 999, 1259 
 
 Empson v. Bowley 
 
 v. Fairfax 
 Emslie v Wildman 
 Endicott v. Mathis 
 Endo v Caleham 
 Endter v Le-mon 
 Engel e Scheuerman 
 Engelhardt, Ex parte 
 England, Re 
 
 v. Codrington 
 
 v Curling 
 
 v. Downs 
 
 v. Ventham 
 
 1309, 1453 
 
 4S1 
 
 1109 
 
 1132 
 
 1664, 1684 
 
 665 
 
 1618 
 
 1627 
 
 157 
 
 1349, 1359 
 
 1392 
 
 2236 
 
 109, 1191, 1416 
 
 1510 
 
 England Bank, East of, Re 1041, 
 
 1048 
 
 Engleback r Nixon 157 
 
 Engleheart v. Ordell 1740 
 
 English v. Baring 1253, 2194 
 
 v. Foxall 378, 379 
 
 v Hayman 1540 
 
 «. Smock 1637 
 
 v Tottie 573 
 
 Ennorr Barwell 1599,2309 
 
 v. Galena 1120 
 
 Eno 0. Tatam 1491 
 
 26 
 
 1752 
 
 1468 
 
 1576 
 
 1037 
 
 587 
 
 1026, 1030 
 
 1651 
 
 681,701,764, 766, 
 
 2124 
 
 r\ Peacock 1407 
 
 0. Stephenson 1218, 1219, 1220 
 Eshhach 0. Slonaker 149 
 
 Espey v. Lake 1651 
 
 E'pin v. Pemberton 675 
 
 E>pinola v Blasco 378 
 
 Essex Co. v. Lawrence Machine 
 
 Shop 1935 
 
 Essex Freeholders v. Newark City 
 
 Nafl Bank 630 
 
 Essex Paper Co. v Greacen 586 
 
 Estcourt v. Estccurt's H E. Co. 
 
 1397, 1650 
 
 0. Ewington 181, 182, 500 
 
 Este 0. Strong 986 
 
 Estep v. Wat kins 361, 847, 994 
 
 Esterbrook Steel Pen Manuf. Co 
 
 0. A hern 159 
 
 Estes r. Belford 149 
 
 v. Worthington 269, 634 
 
 Estill v. Clay 
 E.-tis v Patton 
 Estwick Conningsby 
 Etches v Lance 
 
 286 
 1625 
 1728 
 1670, 1704, 1707, 
 1708 
 
 Etna, The 
 Etting 0. Marx 
 Etty 0. Bridges 
 Eubank 0. Wright 
 Eubanks v. Leveridge 
 European Bank, Re 
 European Central Ry. Co., Re 
 Eustace r. Lloyd 
 Evan 0. Avon 
 Evans, Ex parte 
 
 Re 
 
 v. Bacon 
 V Bagshaw 
 v Benyon 
 v. Bicknell 
 v. Bremridge 
 
 560 
 
 1693 
 
 1599 
 
 652 
 
 1603 
 
 1255 
 
 1627 
 
 8,547 
 
 1037, 1063, 1585, 
 
 1733, 1736 
 
 70 505,1168 
 
 1584, 1585, 2069 
 
 401,407 
 
 1491 
 
 324. 843 
 
 553,1625
 
 Evans v. Brown 
 v Buck 
 
 v. Caiman 
 v. Carrington 
 v. Cassidy 
 v. Chism 
 v. Clement 
 v. Cleveland 
 v. Cogan 
 
 v. Coventry 234, 304, 1671, 1728 
 
 v. Davies 1064 
 
 v. Davis 387, 1398 
 
 v De Lay 109 
 
 v. Dillingham 1743 
 
 v Eaton 915 
 
 v. Evans 200, 315, 542, 602, 868, 
 970,1157, 1297,1300,1713 
 
 v. Gage 1661 
 
 v. Goodwin 630 
 
 v Harris 603,619,620 
 
 v. Jones 1429 
 
 v. Lewis 630 
 
 v. Mathias 1743, 1748 
 
 v. Parrott 1575 
 
 v. Richard 1818, 1833 
 
 v. Kobinson 1138 
 
 t> Schafer 378 
 
 v. Sheldon 790 
 
 v. Smallcombe 1-5' »3 
 
 v. Staples 1553 
 
 v. Tatein 251 
 
 v. Taylor 1618 
 
 v Twredy 642 
 
 v. Union Pacific Ry. Co. 2398 
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 58 Evans v. Van Hall 504 
 
 334 v. Williams 516, 1035 
 
 189 Evans's Estate, lie 1411 
 179, 553 Evansville R. Co. v. Maddux 542 
 5, 45, 87 Evarts v. Beeker 457, 458, 518 
 
 190. 292 v. Nason 1268 
 
 1576 Evartson v. Tappan 1369 
 
 1542 Eveland v. Stepheusou 312 
 
 185 Eveleth v. Wilson 849 
 
 Evelyn v. Chippendale 28 
 
 v. Evelyn 320 
 
 v. Lewis 1(43 
 
 Everard v. Warren 1227 
 Everest v. Buffalo L. O. Co. 1122, 
 1403, 1642 
 
 Everett v. Backhouse 14U4 
 
 v. Paxton 100 
 v. Prythergch 348, 354, 507 
 
 v. Winn 197, 424 
 
 v. Yowells 1107 
 
 Everhart v. Everhart 553 
 
 v. Huntsville College 357 
 
 Everitt v. Watts 615, 620 
 
 Evershed v. Evershed 1585 
 
 Everson v. Matthews 38 
 
 Evitt v. Price 1650 
 
 Evory « Candee 2397 
 
 Ewart v. Chubb 87, 179 
 
 v. Williams 1232 
 
 Ewer v. Ambrose 1100 
 
 Swing v. Armstrong 997 
 
 v. Duncan 360 
 
 v. Handley 121 
 
 v Highbee 161 
 
 xlix 
 
 Ewing v. Maury 
 
 635 
 
 v Nickle 
 
 1625 
 
 v. Orr Ewing 
 
 S57, 629 
 
 v. Shaunahan 
 
 644 
 
 Ewings v. Waite 
 
 1292 
 
 Ewins v. Gordon 
 
 385 
 
 Exchange Banking Co ,Re 644 
 
 Exeter Bank v. Sullivan 646 
 
 Exeter College v. Rowland 345 
 
 Exeter and Crediton Railway Co. 
 
 v Buller 241, 306 
 
 Expo.-ito v. Bowdea 51 
 
 Exton v. Greaves 1244 
 
 v. Turner 1122 
 
 Evkyn, Re 117 
 
 Eyles p. Ward 1178, 1590, 1592 
 
 Eyre f. Barrow 1069 
 
 V. Bret 1525, 1526 
 
 ». Cox 236, 645 
 
 v. Dolphin 679, 698, 850 
 
 v. Guiding 1254 
 
 V. Hughes 1550 
 
 v. M'DoweU 1503 
 
 V. Marsden 1428-1430. 1465 
 
 v. Potter 328, 382 
 
 v. Rogers 579 
 
 v. Shaftesbury, Countess of 1347, 
 
 1350, 1352, 1354 
 
 *'. Smith 157, 553 
 
 Eyster v. Gaff 159, 197 
 
 Eyton v. Denbigh 1744 
 
 v. Eyton 185, 1475 
 
 F. 
 
 Fabre v. Colden 90 
 
 Fabrilius v. Cock 1133 
 
 Facer v. Midvale 8. W. Co. 1642 
 
 Fackler v. Worth 1056, 1062 
 
 Fadden v. McFadden 1586 
 
 Fadelle v. Bernard 68, 164 
 
 Fagau v. Strong 27 
 
 Fagg v. James 710 
 
 Fahie v. Lindsay 1562 
 
 Fahs v. Roberts 1517 
 
 Failey v. Talbee 1743 
 
 Fairbank v. Cudworth 1630 
 Fairbanks v. Amoskeag Bank 10U3 
 
 v. Belknap 
 Fairbrothf r v. Pratteut 
 
 1561, 1565 
 151, 1560, 
 1568 
 Fairburn v. Pearson 1727 
 
 Fiirchild v. Hunt 1400 
 
 F lircloth, He 36 
 
 Fairfield v. Weston 1744 
 
 Fairham, &c. Co. v. Adams 1636 
 Fairlie v I) •ut.ou 1104 
 
 Fairly v Priest 344 
 
 Fairmao v. Green 1358 
 
 Fairthorne v Weston 333. 722 
 
 Fait i v. M'Intyre 1106 
 
 Faithful v Hunt 257 
 
 Faithful! V Ewen 1040, 1847 
 
 F.ilcke '■. Scottish Imperial Ins. 
 
 Co 1580, 2064 
 
 Falk v. Gast Lithograph Co. 1643 
 
 v Howell 1643 
 
 v. Janes 1743 
 
 v. Turner 844 
 
 Falkland Islands Co. v. Lafone 396, 
 
 397, 731, 1548 
 
 Fdk'and. Lady v. Cheney, Lord 1475 
 
 Faikner v. Equitable Reversion 
 
 Falls of Neuse Manuf. Co. v. 
 
 Georgia Home Ins Co. 1120 
 
 Falmouth, Earl of v. Roberts 1128 
 
 Fane v Fane 1405 
 
 v. Richards 1525 
 
 Fanning v. Dunham 386, 1602 
 
 v Fly 1003 
 
 v. Foley 164 
 
 v Pritchett 841,842 
 
 Fanshaw v. Fanshaw 629 
 
 Fanshawe v. Tracy 1614, 1683 
 
 Fant v. Miller 843, 1116 
 
 Farabow v. Green 1628 
 
 Farebrother v. Welchmau 1625 
 
 Fargo v. Southeastern Ry. Co 1427 
 
 Farhall v. Farhall 1842 
 
 Farina v. Silverlock 995, 1649, 
 
 2319 
 
 Farington, Re 
 Farland V. Wood 
 Farley v. Blood 
 
 850,895 
 
 369 
 
 1560-1562. 1564, 
 
 1565, 1568-1570 
 
 1476 
 
 604, 689, 830, 843 
 
 1287 
 
 ary Soc. 
 
 1276 
 
 t; Grace 
 
 983 
 
 Fill P. 
 
 53,57 
 
 p Elkins 
 
 1726 
 
 Fallon v. Railroad Co 
 
 1663 
 
 Fallo.ves v. Williamson 
 
 1509, 1511. 
 
 
 1538, 1541 
 
 Billow* v. Dillon. Lord 
 
 1367 
 
 VOL. I. — d 
 
 
 t). Farley 
 v. Kittson 
 
 Farlow v Wieldon 
 
 Farmer v Curtis 214, 215 
 
 v Dean 127 1 
 
 v. National Life Ass. 149 
 
 v. Rogers 334 
 
 Farmers' Bank v. Beasten 1744 
 
 v. Haunon 190 
 
 Farmers', &o. Bank v. Ruse 1622 
 v. Vanmeter 1621, 1622 
 
 Farmers' and Planters' Bank v. 
 
 Martin 1283 
 
 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. 
 
 Bankers' & M. Tel. Co 1517 
 v. Burlington & S. W. Ry. 
 
 Co 1743 
 
 f Central R. Co. 1168, 1467, 1743, 
 1746 
 v. Green Bay R. Co. 1580 
 
 v. Hoffman House 1734 
 
 v. Kansas City R. Co. 1716 
 
 v Northern Pac. R. Co. 1743 
 
 v. Reed 163 
 
 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. 
 
 Seymour 1508, 154 
 
 v. Texas Western Ry Co. 517 
 
 V. Toledo & S. H. R. Go. 1561 
 
 v. WateTman 1461 
 
 Farmers' Loan Co. v. Central 
 
 Iowa R. Co. 1168 
 
 v San Diego Street Car Co. 339 
 
 Fanners' National Bank v. Llovd 214 
 
 Farnam v. Brooks 324, 372, 560, 
 641,644,645, 649,667 
 
 Farnham v. Campbell 237, 559, 
 
 1716 
 
 v. Clements 365, 558, 561, 655 
 
 Farnell v. Bowman 133 
 
 Farnsworth v. Cole 1166 
 
 v. Fowler 1673, 1684 
 
 Farnum v. Blackstone Canal 
 
 Corp. 2312 
 
 v Boutelle 284 
 
 v. Burnett 844 
 
 v. Pitcher 1110 
 
 Farquharson v. Balfour 725, 771, 
 
 772, 773, 1439, 1828 
 
 v. Pitcher 806. 1380, 1601, 1621 
 
 v. Seton 664, 842, 868, 1370 
 
 Farr t». Scott 989 
 
 0. Sheriffe 730, 1413, 1432 
 
 Farrall r Davenport 1728 
 
 Farrand v. Yorkshire Banking 
 Co. 674 
 
 Farrant r. Lee 1630 
 
 0. Lovel 1630 
 
 Farrar v. Barraclough 2116 
 
 v. Cooper 671 
 
 v Farrars 1271 
 
 Farrel p. 856 
 
 Farrell v. Smith 250, 1207 
 
 Farrer v, Clark ia53 
 
 )■ Hutchinson 1780 
 
 f Lacy 32 
 
 v. Sykes 899 
 
 Farrindon i>. Lee 641 
 
 Farrington v. Chute 670 
 
 v. Harrison 843 
 
 v. Parker 1412
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Farris v. Houston 1675 
 
 Farrow v. Austin 1425 
 
 v. Kees 1394 
 
 Farwell v Sturdivant 1241, 1252, 
 
 1259, 1260 
 
 Faulconberg, Lord v. Peirce 1121 
 
 Faulder v. Stuart 300, 483, 720 
 
 Faulk v. Fau.k 1076 
 
 Faulkland v. Stanion 52 
 
 Famkner, lie 18l7 
 
 v. Bolton 1001 
 
 i v Daniel 201,291,292,1731 
 
 v . Llewellyn 815 
 
 Fauquier v. Tynte 877, 919 
 
 Faure v. Winans 124*3 
 
 Faussett v. Oruisby 1478 
 
 Favershani Charities, lie 1797, 1852 
 
 Faviel v. Eastern Counties Ry. 
 
 Co. 307 
 
 Fawrett v. Lawrie 241 
 
 Fawcus v. Charlton 543 
 
 Fawkner v. Watts 1358 
 
 Fawkes v. Pratt 390 
 
 Fay v. Bradley 1255 
 
 V. Howe 1369 
 
 v. Jones 584 
 
 Fay lor v. Brice 565 
 
 Fear v. Cattle 189 
 
 Fearev v Hayes 402, 417 
 
 Fearns v. Young 81, 1233 
 
 Fearusjde v Flint 650 
 
 Fearon v Desbrisay 1031 
 
 Fearv v. Stephenson 1510, 1533 
 
 Feather V Reg. 133 
 
 Featherstonaugh v. Lee Moor 
 
 Clay Co 1650 
 
 Feather-tone v. Cooke 332, 1728 
 
 v. Ormonde Cycle Co. 1642 
 
 Feaver v. Williams 578, 1834, 1835 
 
 Fechheimer v. Baum 313, 1381 
 
 Feehter v. Montgomery 1654 
 
 Feckhan v. Buffum ' 860 
 
 Feehan v. Maudeville 407 
 
 Feemster v. Markham 1507 
 
 Feilden v. Slater 1657 
 
 Feise v. Parkinson 1132, 1133 
 
 Feiscel v. King's College 1678, 1694, 
 
 1697, 1730 
 
 Felch v. Hooper 287, 292, 629, 841 
 
 Fell man v Gamble 850 
 
 Felkin v. Herbert, Lord 131, 462, 
 
 536, 887, 1070, 1832 
 
 V. Lewis 1602 
 
 Fell v. Brown 149, 151, 152. 194, 
 
 214, 283, 997 
 
 v. Christ's College 351, 539 
 
 v. Jones 1801 j 
 
 v. Lutwidge 318, 1409 
 
 Fellingham v Sparror 10!)8 
 
 Fellow r. Jermyn 134*3 
 
 Fellows v. Barrett 37, 74 j 
 
 v. Deere 34, 403 j 
 
 v. Fellows 334, 338, 341, I'll!) 
 
 v Muller 354 ; 
 
 Felstead v. Gray 972, 973 I 
 
 Felthamt; Clark 291 
 
 V Turner 881 
 Felthouse v. Bailey 910 
 Felts v. Mayor of Memphis 23, 1512 
 Felty v Calhoon 1576 
 Female Orphan Asylum v. 
 
 Waterlow 1081 
 
 Fenrott v. Clarke 885, 896, 1827 
 
 Fendall v. Nash ia58 
 
 v O'Connell 354 
 
 Fcnelev v. Mahonev 37, 75 
 
 Fcnhouletr' Passavant 348,349,354 
 Fenn v Edmonds 1564 
 
 v. Holme 313 
 
 Fennall v. Brown 891, 1669 
 
 Fenner v. Agutter 1299 
 
 V London & South Eastern 
 
 Ry. Co. 573 
 
 * Taylor 106,107,1437 
 
 i'. WTson 1642 j 
 
 Feonessy v Clark 720 | 
 
 v D .y 1395 | 
 
 Fennings v. Humphrey 
 
 815 
 
 817, 
 1589 
 425 
 
 Fenno v. Coulter 
 
 
 Feutiman v. Feutiman 
 
 1359, 
 
 22: i2 
 
 Feutou v. Browne 
 
 
 1399 
 
 v. Clayton 
 
 
 429 
 
 v. Crickett 
 
 1310, 
 
 1449 
 
 V Cumberlege 
 
 
 901 
 
 v. Hughes 145, 
 
 157, 296, 3( 
 
 v. Lowther 
 
 
 10.33 
 
 v. Lumberman's Bank 1591 
 
 v. Queen's Ferry Wire Rope 
 
 Co. 157, 225, 307 
 
 v. Wills 1430 
 
 Fenwiek v. Bell 1100 
 
 v. Bulman 230,2,9 
 
 v. James 1112 
 
 v. Macey 640 
 
 v. lieed 299, 873, 1825, 1827 
 
 Ferebeu v. Proctor 254 
 
 Fergus v. Gore 642, 12t»0 
 
 Ferguson v. Applenhite 
 
 v. Beavan 
 
 
 2126 
 
 v. Dent 
 
 
 39 
 
 v. Ferguson 
 
 
 227,1069 
 
 v. Fisk 
 
 
 292 
 
 v. Gibson 
 
 
 1437 
 
 v. Kimball 
 
 
 1489 
 
 v. Miller 
 
 
 658, 661 
 
 v. O Harra 
 
 
 717. 788 
 
 v. Smith 
 
 182,' 
 
 v. Tadman 
 
 
 1471 1814 
 
 v. Wilson 
 
 912, 1081 
 
 13bl, 1488 
 
 Fernandez, Ex parte 1)42, 1103 
 
 t> Corbiu 449, 1452 
 
 Fernie v. Young 1071. 1080, 1087, 
 
 1120, 1149, 1502 
 
 Fernyhough v Naylor 897 
 
 Ferraby v. Hobsou 328, 381 
 
 Ferrand v. Bradford 397 
 
 v. Hamer 424, 698, 1675 
 
 v. Milligan 1126 
 
 v. Pelham 739 
 
 Ferrar v. Ferrar 347 
 
 Ferrer v. Barrett 267 
 
 Ferrers v. Cherry 1542 
 
 Countess of v. Ferrers, Eirl 1256 
 
 Ferrier v. Atwool 579, 1832 
 
 Ferrior, In re 17i0 
 
 Ferris v. Hard 843, 850 
 
 v. Streeper 14*37 
 
 Ferriss v. Lewis 266, 457, 1150, 1157 
 
 Ferry v. Fisher 929 
 
 v. Laible 334 
 
 Festiug v . Allen 1383 
 
 Fetherly v . Waggoner 873 
 
 Fettiplaee ». Gorges 186 
 
 Feucheres, Baron de v. Dawes 748 
 
 F'eutchwanger v. M'Cool 354, 749 
 
 Few v. Guppy 581, 1113, 1557 
 
 Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Shenandoah 
 
 Iron Co. 1168, 1312, 1408 
 
 Fidelity Ins Co.'s Appeal 1163 
 
 Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. 
 
 Weitzel 843 
 
 Fidelity Trust Co. v. Gill Car Co. 60 
 
 Fidelity Trust & S. V. Co v. 
 
 Mobile St. Ry. Co. 243, 1548, 
 
 1743 
 
 Fidel le v. Evans 791 
 
 Field, Ex parte 1689, 1690 
 
 v. Ashley 565 
 
 v Beaumont 1558 
 
 v. Great Western Ry. Co. 1138 
 
 r. Hitchcock 
 
 
 1231 
 
 v. Holland 
 
 841 
 
 1077, 1221 
 
 v. Holzman 
 
 
 334 
 
 v Hopkins 
 
 
 1414 
 
 v. Hutchinson 
 
 
 561 
 
 v. Jones 
 
 
 1715, 1741 
 
 v. Maghee 
 
 
 197 
 
 v Moore 
 
 
 108 
 
 v Op|>enstein 
 
 
 1381 
 
 v. Robinson 
 
 
 794 
 
 v. Ross 
 
 
 993 
 
 v. Schieffelin 948, 1364, 1479, 1549, 
 1550 
 
 Field v. Seward 1214 
 
 v. Sowle 186, 850 
 
 v. Titmus 236, 1209, 1210 
 
 v. Wilbur 813 
 
 v. Williamson 165, 167 
 
 Fielde v. Cage 838 
 
 Fielden v. Blackburn, Corp. of 1638 
 
 v. lioscheu 888 
 
 v. Northern Ry. of B. A. Co. 611 
 
 V. Slater 842, 891 S19, 1654 
 
 Fieldtrv Fielder 1288 
 
 v Higgiusou 1400,1408 
 
 Fields v. Helms &34 
 
 v. Hur.-t 1168 
 
 v. Wheatley 284 
 
 Fiery v. Knimert 26, 334, 345 
 
 Fieske v. Buller 451 
 
 Fife v. Clayton 380, 3«5, 1551 
 
 Filth National Bank v. Long 131 
 
 Fifty Associates v. Tudor 1638 
 
 Fiider v. Bellingham l'i92 
 
 Fildes v. Hooker 1219 
 
 Fi.kin v. Hill 418 
 
 Finance Co. v. Charleston &c. 
 
 R Co. 1734 
 
 Financial Corporation v. Bristol 
 
 and North Somerset Ry. Co. 785 
 
 Finch v Brown 1252 
 
 v. Finch 153, 227, 565, 643 
 
 v. Hoi linger 1625 
 
 v Shaw 676, 999, 1000, 1469 
 
 v. Westrope 426 
 
 v. Wincuelsea, Lord 1538, 1539, 
 
 1544, 1799 
 
 Finden v. Stephens 316, 1378, 1379, 
 
 1602 
 
 Findlay v. Lawrence 805, 808 
 
 Findley v. Hinde 392, 395 
 
 Fingal v. Blake 1074, 1720, 1725, 
 
 1732 
 
 Finks, lie 1770 
 
 Fiuley v. Bank of U. S. 194. 214, 
 
 1207 
 
 v. Harrison 344 
 
 V. Lynch 989 
 
 v. Taylor 1580, 1584 
 
 Finn's Case 1118 
 
 Finney v. Bedford Ins. Co. 195, 325 
 
 v. Godfrey 351 
 
 v Hinde 1041 
 
 Finska A. A v. Brown 1385 
 
 Firkins v. Low 579 
 
 Firuiin ;;. Pulham 1417 
 
 First Congregational Society v. 
 
 Trustees of the Fund, &c. 550 
 First National Bank, Be 1507 
 
 v. Bininger 1566 
 
 v. Bohne 659 
 
 v. Douglass County 16*31 
 
 v. Forest 133 
 
 v. Houts 1051 
 
 V. Kingsley 546 
 
 v. Moore 334 
 
 v Navarro 1663 
 
 v. Salem Capitol Flour Mills 
 
 .Co 214, 1553 
 
 v. Smith 542 
 
 r. Stephenson 860 
 
 v Taylor 1639 
 
 v West River R. Co. 1569 
 
 First Universalist Society v. 
 
 Fitch 2030 
 
 Firth v. Bush 449 
 
 v. Ridley 418 
 
 v. Slingsby 642, 646 
 
 v. The Queen 133 
 
 Fischers. Blank 1648 
 
 v. Hayes 314, 829, 890, 1168, 2391 
 
 v. Laack '03 
 
 v. O'Shaugnessey 314 
 
 v. Wilson 829, 830 
 
 Fish v Dodge 1635 
 
 v. Howland 193, 220, k38 
 
 v. Miller 614, 669, 695, 697, 829 
 
 Fishback v. State 1069 
 
 v. Weaver 991 
 
 Fishburn v, Sanders 1255
 
 Fishel v. Lueckel 
 Fisher, Re 
 
 v. Board 
 
 v. Brierley 
 
 v. Bunbury 
 
 v Carroll 
 
 1643 
 1770 
 1653 
 1503 
 28 
 1072 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging] 
 
 Flegg v. Prentia 1036 
 
 Fleischauer v. Dittenhoefer 1743 
 
 Fleming v. Armstrong 1103 
 
 v- Collins 1634 
 
 V. East 1317, 1366, 1374 
 
 li 
 
 v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. 550 
 v. Coffey 893 
 
 v. Essex Bank 148 
 
 v. Fair 1120 
 
 v. Fisher 63, 740, 814, 1544 
 
 v. Holden 1517 
 
 v H ipper 1150 
 
 v. Hubbell 216 
 
 v. Kay 285 
 
 v. Keane 332, 1(363 
 
 v London Offices Co. 309 
 
 v. Mee 691, 816 
 
 v. Melles 83, 86 
 
 v. Moog 349, 378, 737 
 
 v. Owen 347. 579 
 
 v. Porch 1073 
 
 v Price 722 
 
 v Quick 791 
 
 v. Stovall 794 
 
 v. Tucker 644 
 
 fishmongers' Co. v. East India 
 
 Co. 1637 
 
 Fisk, Ex parte 1556, 1573 
 
 Fisler v. Porch 844, 1073, 1076, 
 
 1230 
 Fitch v. Brower 1561 
 
 v. Chapman 681 
 
 v Fitch 68 
 
 v. Minshall 1274 
 
 v. Richardson 1713 
 
 v. Weber 47 
 
 Fittou's Estate, Re 1366 
 
 Fitton v. Macclesfield 39, 1576, 1583 
 v. Phoenix Ass Co. 1071 
 
 Fitzgerald, He 1433 
 
 v. Bult 810, 1558, 1625, 1672 
 
 v. Caldwell 1255 
 
 V. Chapman 123, 179 
 
 v. Cummings 584 
 
 v. Deshler 1663 
 
 v. Fitzgerald 123, 661, 1174 
 
 v. Gray 1698 
 
 v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 357 
 
 v. O' Flaherty 839,855 
 
 v. Priugle 1416, 1419 
 
 Fitzgerald & M. C. Co. v. Fitz- 
 gerald 149 
 Fitzgibbon v. Barry 243 
 Fitzherbert v. Fitzherbert 875, 876 
 Fitzhugh V Everingham 1720 
 v Fitzhugh 1120, 1147 
 v. Lee 935 
 v. McPherson 518, 539. 844 
 Fitzmaurice v. Sadlier 617 
 Fitzpatrick v Domingo 2388 
 v M Donald 1817 
 v. Mahony 1252 
 v. Power 422 
 v. Smith 671 
 Fitzsimmons v Ogden 669 
 Fitzwater, Re 170 
 v Waterhouse 170 
 Flack v Holm 49, 1703, 1704, 1712, 
 1713 
 Fladong v Winter 1209 
 Flagg v. Bonnell 632, 697 
 v. Mann 657, 844, 2254 
 Flamang's Ca«e 1632 
 Flanagan v Nolan 1419, 1421 
 Flanders v. Chamberlain 378 
 v. Hall 659 
 Flaunagan v. Kips 1629 
 Flannery v. Flannery 1381 
 Flash v. Wilkerson 236, 313 
 Flavel v. Harrison 1649 
 Flavell v. Flavell 918, 930 
 Fleece v. Russell 601 
 Fleet v. Perrina 89, 118 
 Fleetwood v. Dorsey Machine 
 Co 860 
 v. Green 988 
 
 v Gilmer 
 v. Grafton 
 v. Nunn 
 Fletcher v. Beatey 
 v Coleman 
 v. Crosbie 
 v. Dodd 
 v. Gibbon 
 v. Green 
 v. Holmes 
 v. Moore 
 
 248 
 
 235 
 
 1618 
 
 1638 
 
 214 
 
 1105 
 
 1755, 1756 
 
 268 
 
 842, 1370 
 
 230, 245, 1550 
 
 70, 411 
 
 v. New Orleans, N. E. R Co 313, 
 
 565, 1654 
 
 v. Pollard 1250 
 
 v. Reed 1195 
 
 v. Rodgers 1627, 1628 
 
 v Rogers 1001 
 
 v. Wier 841, 886 
 
 Flewellen v. Crane 545 
 
 Flight v. Bolland 68.69 
 
 v. Couiao 1278 
 
 v. Cook 1652 
 
 v. Marriott 1491 
 
 p. Robinson 578, 1834 
 
 v. Thomas 1501 
 
 Fliudt v. Waters 51 
 
 Flint v. Brandon 1660 
 
 v Field 3i0 
 
 v Hutchinson S B Co 1620 
 
 Flint River Steamboat Co. v. 
 
 Roberts 1071 
 
 Fliut.jffy Uaynes 1212 
 
 Flippin v. Knaffle 1619. 1664, 1675 
 
 Flockton v. Peake 551, 912, 1440, 
 
 1144, 1799, 18:56 
 
 v Slee 1526 
 
 Flood v Patterson 648 
 
 Flora v. Rogers 778 
 
 Florence v. Mallinson 1381 
 
 Florence Gas Co v Hanby 1743 
 
 Florence Sewing Machine Co v. 
 
 Grover & Baker Sewing 
 
 Machine Co. 149 
 
 v Singer Manuf. Co. 149 
 
 Florida v Georgia 135, 441 
 
 Florida Central R. Co. v. Bisbee 991 
 
 Flour City Nat. Bank v Wech- 
 
 selberg 26 
 
 Flower v. Baker 449 
 
 v Klumbach 615 
 
 v. Bright 491 
 
 v Buller 113, 186, 206 
 
 v Gedye 971. 978 
 
 V. London, Brighton, and 
 
 South Coast Ry. Co 1650 
 
 v. Lloyd 438, 1504, 1575, 1584 
 
 v Rose 
 
 149 
 
 v. Walker 
 
 1217 
 
 Flowerday v. Collet 
 
 930 
 
 Flowers v. Barker 
 
 212 
 
 Floyd v Barker 
 
 1411 
 
 v Jones 
 
 860 
 
 v. Nangle 
 
 512, 536 
 
 v Ritter 
 
 361, 407, 1567 
 
 Fludyer v Cocker 
 
 1402 
 
 Flu^d v. Fluid 
 
 1791 
 
 Fluker v. Taylor 
 
 551, 1929 
 
 Flux v. Best 
 
 1403 
 
 Flynn, Re, Guy v McCarthy 
 
 Foakes v. Webb 
 Foden v Finney 
 Fodringham v. Chomeley 
 Fogg v. Blair 
 
 v Merrill 
 
 v Nevada C O. Ry. Co 
 
 v Order of the Golden Lion 
 
 v Price 
 
 v Rogers 
 
 v Union Bank 418 1504 
 
 Foley v. Hill 551, 655. 678. 679, 
 
 1929, 2095 
 
 237, 
 
 1437 
 
 573, 578 
 
 97 
 
 1671 
 545 
 517 
 303 
 
 17.33 
 560 
 338 
 
 Foley D Maillardet 449, 452 , 453, 536, 
 
 550 
 
 v. Smith 505, 796, 1787 
 
 Foliguo, Re 1412 
 
 Foliugo v Martin 1221, 1282 
 
 Folland v. Lamotte 1595 
 
 Follett v Delany 1663 
 
 v .lefferyes 577, 1651 
 
 Folley v City of Passaic 1650 
 
 Folsom v Marsh 1646, 1647, 1973, 
 
 2314 
 
 Fonda v. Burton 1320 
 
 v Sage lb"24 
 
 Fongay v. Conrad 996 
 
 Fontelieu v . Gates 1461 
 
 Fooks, Re 1203 
 
 v Wilts Ry. Co. 1631 
 
 Foote v Cuuard Mining Co. 26 
 
 v. Despain 1625 
 
 v Gibbs 659, S94, 995 
 
 v tlayne 576 
 
 *; Mass Benefit Ass'n 536 
 
 V Sewall 1381 
 
 v Van Ranst 1311 
 
 Footman v Pray 190, 252, 253, 296 
 
 Footner e Figes 1136 
 
 Fopping v. Van Pelt 157 
 
 Forbes v Forbes 933 
 
 Memphis, &c R. Co. 287, 531 
 
 v. Uverby 
 v. Peacock 
 v. Phipps 
 v. Preston 
 v. Skelton 
 v. Stevens 
 v. Tanner 
 v. Taylor 
 v Tucker 
 v. Tuckerman 
 v Whitlock 
 
 Force v. Martin 
 
 Ford, Re 
 
 560 
 
 1182, 1196 
 
 119 
 
 322, 802, 807, 808 
 
 612, 625. 2095 
 
 405, 407, 416, 418 
 
 718. 1829 
 
 1404, 1427 
 
 602 
 
 87, 986, 1018 
 
 584 
 
 1100 
 
 102, 103 
 
 v 877 
 
 v. Bartlett 441 
 
 v. Boucher 29 
 
 v. Chesterfield 160, 708, 710 1390, 
 
 1411, 1424, 1425 
 
 v De Pontes 1834 
 
 v Dolphin 1827 
 
 v Ford 960 
 
 v. Gardner 1113, 1120 
 
 v. Kansas City, &c. R Co. 1716 
 
 v Kurtz 1396 
 
 v. Lacy 1127 
 
 v Peering 320, 546 
 
 v. Philpot 1244 
 
 v. Rosenthal 236 
 
 v. Tennant 190,574,578,902 943 
 
 v. Tynte 983, 133", 1633 
 
 v. Wastell 998, 999 1028 
 
 v. White 61, 1*30, 216 
 
 Ford's Charity, Re 1852, 1856 
 
 Forderi). Wade 877 
 
 Fordyce v. Beecher 1765 
 
 v. Bridges 265 
 
 v. Ford 988 
 
 Fore v. Fore 1491 
 
 v . Foster 197 
 
 Foreign Bondholders v. Pastor 142 
 
 Fore Street Warehouse Co v 
 
 Durrant 444 
 
 Foreman r. Cooper 18 J7 
 
 v South wood 797 
 
 Forgay v. Conrad 994, 996, 1461, 
 
 1463, 1491, 1492 
 
 Fornian v Blake 797 
 
 v. Homfray 332 
 
 Forniquet V. Forstall 345 
 
 Fornshill v Murray 1076 
 
 Forrest v. Elwes 1769 
 
 v. Forrest 1698. 1707 
 
 v. Manchester, &c. Ry. Co. 26, 246 
 
 e. Robinson 601 
 
 v. Warrington 115 
 
 Forrester v. Helme 885. 896 
 
 v. Read 1399 
 
 v. Vason 860
 
 lii 
 
 Forrester v. Waller 
 
 v. Wilson 
 Forrester's Casi- 
 Forsaith Machine Co 
 
 Mills L. Co. 
 Forshaw, Re 
 v. Mot train 
 Forster v. Abraham 
 v. Davies 
 v. Hale 
 v. M'Kenzie 
 v. Menzies 
 r Patterson 
 v. Thompson 
 Forsyth, Re 
 v. Clark 
 v Ellice 
 Forsythe v. McCreight 
 
 v. McMurty 
 Fort v. Battle 
 v. GarUide 
 v Groves 
 v Orudorf 
 v. Ragusin 
 Fortescue V. Hallett 
 Forth v. Xenia 
 Fort Smith v. Brogan 
 Fosbrook v. Woodcock 
 Fosdick V. Schall 
 Foss v. Crisp 
 v Harbottle 
 v. Haynes 
 v. Waguer 
 Foster, Re 
 Foster v. Ballenberg 
 v. Bell 
 v. Bonner 
 B Bowman 
 v. Bradford 
 t>. Burem 
 V. Cautley 
 v. Cockerel! 
 V. Coleman 
 v Cooke 
 v Crossin 
 v Dawber 
 v. Deacon 
 V Donald 
 v. Elsworth 
 V . Everard 
 Usher 
 
 1647 
 1625 
 1647 
 Hope 
 
 1663 
 
 1844 
 
 60 
 
 1282 
 
 1434, 1440 
 
 365 
 
 643, 1211 
 
 448, 461, 538, 1510 
 
 651 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging ] 
 
 Foulkes v. Davies 230, 233, 335, 40 
 
 643 
 
 1841 
 
 846, 1230 
 
 857, 939 
 
 1621 
 
 790 
 
 68 
 
 1860 
 
 1631, 1636 
 
 325 
 
 936 
 
 472,491,519 
 
 1081 
 
 1517 
 
 1667 
 
 1731, 1741 
 
 46 
 
 26, 241, 243, 549 
 
 341 
 
 29, 1127 
 
 38, 40, 111 
 
 1637 
 
 1755 
 
 1526 
 
 1003 
 
 1283 
 
 1461 
 
 160, 161, 176 
 
 1492 
 
 1661 
 
 379, 385 
 
 1642 
 
 706, 1418 
 
 281, 1517 
 
 1777 
 
 1548 
 
 88 
 
 789 
 
 . Jones 691 
 
 Fountain v. Caine 173 
 
 v. Ware 920 
 
 v. Young 576 
 
 Fournier v Kent, Duchess of 1273 
 Fourniquet v. Perkins 987,13'58, 1371 
 
 Fourth Nat. Bank v. Frauklyn 546 
 
 Fouty v. Poar ' '9 
 
 Fowke v. Draycott 64& 
 
 Fowkes v. Chadd 1135 
 
 v Pascoe 
 
 Fowle v. Laurason 551 
 
 v. Torrey 217 
 Fowler, Re, Fowler v. Odell 
 
 v Foster 438, 553, 618. 630, 694. 
 857, 1261, 1264, 1346, 1522 
 v Gladstoue 
 
 v. Barstow 
 v Bayldon 
 V. Davies 
 v. Down 
 v Fowler 
 v. James 
 v. Lee 
 v Lewis 
 v. Liles 
 v. Osborne 
 v Keynal 
 v Reynolds 
 v. Roberts 
 v Roe 
 v. Scott 
 i\ Sunderland 
 v Ward 
 Fowlet v Lewis 
 Fowlkes v. Webber 
 Fowley v. Palmer 
 Fox v. Abbott 
 
 v. Bearblock 
 
 v. Birch 
 
 v. Blew 
 
 v. Charlton 
 
 v. Evans 
 
 v. Ford 
 
 v. Frost 
 
 v Garrett 
 
 v Hill 
 
 v Hudson 
 
 v. Mackreth 
 
 v.. Morewood 
 
 v. Scard 
 
 v Suwerkrop 
 
 v. Yates 
 
 452, 628 , 
 
 203, 222, 1514 | 
 
 38, 43 
 
 58 
 
 1842 
 
 228 
 
 1564, 1567, 1571 
 
 287, 986 
 
 401 
 
 852 
 
 268, 302, 859, 1367 
 
 975 
 
 1616 
 
 1676 
 
 1264 
 
 860 
 
 1775, 1776 
 
 68 
 
 460,536 
 
 1246 
 
 1511 
 
 894 
 
 1775 
 
 27 
 
 1031 1381 
 
 875 
 
 1073 
 
 329 
 
 1425 
 
 1625 
 
 1666 
 
 1479, 1781 
 
 805 
 
 1654 
 
 71, 1347 
 
 604, 608, 688, 6h2 
 
 v. Goddard 
 v. Gressett 
 
 * Hall 
 
 * Harvey 
 v Hawden 
 v Hill 
 v Hodgson 
 t' Kenosha 
 v. Knowles 
 v. Mansfield, C 
 
 Co 
 
 v Mayer 
 
 V Menzies 
 
 v. McGregor 
 
 v Parker 
 
 v Roberts 
 
 v State 
 • v Steele 
 
 v. Sutton 
 
 v. Swasey 
 
 t;. Townsend 
 
 v Trowbridge 
 
 v. Tyler 
 
 v Vassall 
 
 V. Watson 
 . v Woodfin 
 Foster's Trusts, Re 
 Foteaux v. Lepage 
 
 1309, 1316, 2196 
 
 1315 
 
 90, 571, 572. 573 576 
 
 749, 892, 1266 
 
 1108 
 
 & h 
 
 314 
 
 559, 560 
 
 16H1 
 
 417 
 
 M. R 
 
 26, 1584 
 
 1770 
 
 448, 1510 
 
 1815 
 
 166, 167 
 
 1386 
 
 6 
 
 1135 
 
 951 
 
 550,555 
 
 1841 
 
 212 
 
 1461. 1481, 1485 
 
 629, 633, 637, 684 
 
 550 
 
 1017 
 
 905 
 
 law 
 
 Foxcroft v. Devonshire 1129 
 
 Foxen v. Foxen 1432 
 
 Foxon v. Gascoigne 1846, 1847 
 
 Foxwell v. Bostock 398 
 
 v. Greatorex 65, 160, 1382. 1540 
 v Webster 339, 797, 801. 16- 
 
 Foy i> Foy 
 
 Foye v Patch 
 
 Fozier v Audrews 
 
 Fradella J'. Weller 
 
 Fraedrich v. Flieth 
 
 Frampton v. Stephens 
 v. Webb 
 
 Francis, The 
 
 v Bailey 
 
 v. Brooking 
 
 v. Browne 
 
 v. Castleuian 
 
 v. Flinn 
 
 n. Francis 
 
 r. G rover 
 
 v Harrison 
 
 v. Hay ward 
 
 v. Wigzell 
 
 v. Wilson 
 Francklyn v. Colhoun 
 
 v Fern 
 
 1576 
 
 659 
 
 1416 
 
 1380 
 
 1071 
 
 1165 
 
 177, 178 
 
 50 
 
 1685 
 
 102,20111 
 
 412, 964, 985 
 
 1257 
 
 1620 
 
 1842 
 
 654 
 
 200, 212, 215, 257 
 
 1662 
 
 183, 186, 719 
 
 1254 
 
 1052 
 
 1391 
 
 Fotherby V. Hartridge 652 
 
 Fothergill v Kendrick 1(40 
 
 v. Rowland 599, 1596, 1663 
 
 Fougeres v Murbarger 334, 1620 
 Poulds v. Midgley 941, 1458, 15.4 
 
 Franco v Bolton 564 
 
 v Franco 104, 223, 224 
 
 v. Meyer 809 
 
 Francome v. Francome 394, 891, 
 1562, 1669, 1709 
 
 Frank v Basnett 817 
 
 r Brunneman 165jj 
 
 v. Denver, &c Ry. Co. 1738 
 
 v. Frank 98, 1096 
 
 Frank v. Humphreys 1073 
 
 v Morrison 743 
 
 Frankland v. Overend 780 
 
 Frankle v. Jackson 1743 
 
 Franklin v. Bank of England 148 
 v Beamish 1370 
 
 v. Franklin 2u4 
 
 v. Frith 1417 
 
 v. Greene 379, 1076, 1147 
 
 v. Hersch 815 
 
 v. Keeler 350, 759, 1315. 1316 
 
 v. Meyer 985, 1168 
 
 v Osgood 379 
 
 Frauklin S. Bank v. Taylor 1576, 
 1584 
 Franklin Tel Co v. Harrison 630 
 Frauklinski V Ball 1081 
 
 Franklyn v. Colquhoun 1052, 1)94 
 Franks, Ex parte 88 
 
 v Weaver 1649 
 
 Frantzius, Carl Von, Re 133 
 
 Fraser v Charleston 255, 865 
 
 v. Cooper, Hall & Co. 243 
 
 v Fraser 1795 
 
 v. Hoyt 324 
 
 v Kershaw 1729 
 
 v. Palmer 1414 
 
 v. Thompson 162, 177, 475, 1457 
 v. Whaley 1678 
 
 v Whalley 241 
 
 Fray v Drew 1024, 1025, 1026 
 
 Frazer v Gordon 15"1 
 
 v. Jones 1387 
 
 v. Palmer 28, 1234 
 
 v. Sypert 1575 
 
 Frazier v. Barnum 1715 
 
 v. Hall 1286 
 
 v, Pankey 232 
 
 v Swain 1302 
 
 v. Tubb 1491 
 
 Freake v. Cranfelt 560, 642 
 
 v. Horsey 221 
 
 Fream r Dickinson 930 
 
 Frearson v. Loe 1642 
 
 Frede e Pflugradt 1551 
 
 Frederick v. Aynscombe 877 
 
 v David 471 
 
 v. Frederick 1364 
 
 Free v. Buckingham 279, 334 
 
 v. Hinde 1J20 
 
 Freebody r. Perry 1775 
 
 Freehold Land and Brick-making 
 
 Co v . Spargo 26 
 
 Freehc44 Mut. Loan Ass. v 
 
 Brown "32 
 
 Freeholders v. State Bank 1733, 1742 
 Freel v. Market St. Cable Ry. 
 
 Co 576 
 
 Freeland B Cocke 1228, 1229 
 
 v. Heron 666 
 
 b Johnson 606, 669, 702, 704 
 
 r. Stansfeld 1729. 1948 
 
 v. Wright 1110, 1299 
 
 Freeman v Arkell 1126 
 
 v. Butler 1835, 1836 
 
 v. Carpenter 1618 
 
 B Clay 1580 
 
 B. Cox 1780 
 
 b. Elniendorf 1624 
 
 b. Fairlie 106, 306, 580, 1250, 
 
 1773, 1777, 1779, 1828 
 
 b. Freeman 228 
 
 b. Howe 1553 
 
 B Ledbetter 532 
 
 v. Pennington 1525 
 
 v Scofield 981 
 
 v. Staats H47 
 
 v. Stephenson 10il 
 
 v Tatham 839. 12-9 
 
 b. Tottenham and Hampstead 
 
 Railway Co. 1071, 10^0. 
 
 ' 1641 
 
 v. Whitbread 1512, 1524 
 
 Freeman's Bank v. Vose l!'71 
 
 Freer?. Hesse 1401,1408,1484 
 
 v. Rimner 10^4 
 
 Freese v. Swayze 606
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 liii 
 
 Freeston v. Clay don 807 
 
 Freichnecht v. Meyer 1073 
 
 Freidlander v. Pollock 536 
 
 Freight Money v. Monadnock 292 
 
 Frelinghuysen v. Golden 1719 
 
 v. Nugent '90 
 
 Fremont v. Merced Mining Co. 555 
 
 French, Ex parte 66 
 
 v. Baron 232, 1246 
 
 v . Chittenden 1476, 1480 
 
 v. Dmchy 1765 
 
 v. Dear 312 
 
 v. Dickey 549 
 
 v First National Bank 145 
 
 v. French 659 
 
 V. Gibbs 1168 
 
 v. Griffen 1550 
 
 v. Hay 1531 
 
 v Jacko 727 
 
 v Riiney 300, 720, 722 
 
 v. Robrchard 1561 
 
 v Scully 166 
 
 v Shoemaker 994 
 
 v. Shotwell 611. 700, 721, 974, 
 
 1459 
 
 v. Windsor 1234 
 
 Frere v. Green 934, 936. 937, 939 
 
 Frese v. Bachof 407,1648 
 
 Freston, Re l'»69 
 
 Fretz v. Stover 1540, 1546 
 
 Frewen, Re, Frewen v. Frewen 200, 
 
 250 
 
 Frey v. Demarest 551 , 552, 553 
 
 v. Frey 1369 
 
 v. Lowden 303 
 
 v Owens 402 
 
 Frey tag v Hoeland 845 
 
 Frick w Christian County 554 
 
 Fricker v. Peters & C. Co. 1734 
 
 Friedlander v Ehrenworth 1675 
 
 v. London Ass. Co. 1099 
 
 Friedman v. Fennell 545 
 
 Friend v. Solly 1440, 1449 
 
 Frierson v. Alexander 794, 985 
 
 r'ries v. Watson 1255 
 
 Frietas v. Dos Sandos 362 
 
 Friley v. Hendricks 1579 
 
 Frink v. Adams 843 
 
 v. Stewart 1638 
 
 Fripp v. Chard Railway Co. 1725, 
 
 1727, 1731 
 
 Frisbie v. Bateman 1716 
 
 Frisby, Re, Allison v. Frisby 649 
 
 v. Balauee 1381 
 
 Friswell v. King 
 
 1844 
 
 Frith v. Lawrence 
 
 1302 
 
 17. Lewis 
 
 98 
 
 v. Wallaston 
 
 631 
 
 Frits, Matter of 
 
 68,71 
 
 Fritz v. Hobson 972, 996, 1030, logo, 
 
 1140, 1366, 1368, 1491, 1639 
 
 Frodsham v. Frodsham 1323 
 
 Fromew, Re 1791 
 
 Frost v. Beekman 678 
 
 v. Belmont 1411, 1434, 1453, 1661, 
 
 2191, 2323 
 
 t>. Brunson l'-15 
 
 v. Hamilton 992 
 
 v. Hilton 970, 979 
 
 v. Koon 214 
 
 v . Spitley 557, 2040 
 
 v. Ward 70, 799 
 
 v. Warren 13J9 
 
 v Wood 799, 800 
 
 Frotherstone v. Jolland 1756 
 
 Frow v. De La Vega 532 
 
 F'rowd v. Baker 799 
 
 v. Lawrence 511, 1618 
 
 Fry, Ex parte 39 
 
 v Ernest 505 
 
 v. Feanister 1299 
 
 c Fry 91, 101, 104, 122, 13 S 
 
 v. Hardy 1108 
 
 v. Lane 328 
 
 v. Mantell 732. 78 «, 784 
 
 v. Martel 732, 783, 784 
 
 v. Moore 149 
 
 v. Noble 1167 
 
 v Penn 547 
 
 c Richardson 630, 698 
 
 v. Street 1286 
 
 Fryer, Re 1261 
 
 t\ Davies 1027 
 
 v. Wiseman 74, 86, 112, 164, 178 
 
 Fry rear v. Lawrence 714 
 
 Fuentes v. Gaines 1567 
 
 Fulcher v. Howell 160 
 
 Fulham v. M'Cartliy 206, 230 
 
 Fullagar v. Clark 1079 
 
 Fuller v. Benjamin 150, 216 
 
 v. Cadwell 1621, 1623 
 
 v. Daniels 303 
 
 v. Fuller 1253 
 
 v. Green 1424 
 
 v Hovey 989 
 
 v. Ingram 553, 1557, 1625, 1664 
 
 v Knapp 601,715,759,2385 
 
 v. Lance 84 
 
 Fuller v. Melrose 1640, 1661 
 
 v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 972 
 
 v. Montague 42 
 
 v. Redman 644, 646, 1211 
 
 v. Smith 68 
 
 v. Taylor 1664 
 
 v. Townsley-Myrick D. G.Co. 1621 
 
 v. Willis 1474, 1475 
 
 Fullerton v. Jackson 328, 558 
 
 o. Martin 266, 1524, 2059 
 
 Fulton v. Davidson 1234, 1414 
 
 v. Gilmore 778, 780, 781, 782 
 
 v Golden 633, 635, 951 
 
 v. Greacen 1517 
 
 «■. Rosevelt 33, 37, 71, 74 
 
 r. Woodman 844 
 
 Bank v Beach 182, 386, 512, 
 
 733, 734. 736, 754, 784, 1494 
 
 v. N. Y & Sharon Canal Co. 146, 
 
 735. 886, 1457, 1458, 1476, 1535, 
 
 1677 
 
 Fulweiler v. Hog's Back Cons. 
 
 M. Co. 737 
 
 Fuhvider v. Ingels 314 
 
 Fulwood v Fulwood 1640, 1681 
 
 Fund v. Bossieux 1493 
 
 Funk v. M'Keoun 997 
 
 v. Rentchler 545 
 
 Furber v. Furber 710 
 
 t>. King 448 
 
 Furlong v. Riley 560 
 
 Furman v. Clark 1676 
 
 t\ Edwards 782 
 
 v. North 417 
 
 Furneaux, Ex parte 1258 
 
 Furuess v. Booth 13i0 
 
 v. Caterham Railway Co. 1731 
 
 Furnival !■ Bogle 974 
 
 »>. Brooke 177 
 
 Furrer r. Ferris 1299 
 
 Furtailo v. Furtado 78, 1595 
 
 Furze v. Asker 1106 
 
 v. Hennet 799, 973 
 
 v. Sharwood 291 
 
 Fussel t>. Downing 316 
 
 t;. Elwin 269, 291, 975 
 
 Futcher v. Callow 561 
 
 v. Futcher 365, 561, 657 
 
 Futvoye v. Kennard 505, 506, 507, 
 
 797,806,9 
 
 Fvfe's Case 202, 203 
 
 Fyfe v. Arbuthnot 1416 
 
 Fyler v. Fyler 1030 
 
 Fynn, Re 1348, 1349, 1863 
 
 G. 
 
 G , Re 
 
 68,108 
 
 Gabbett v Cavendish 
 
 1822 
 
 Gabriel v. Sturgia 
 
 710 
 
 Ga.ld. Re 
 
 1342 
 
 v. Worrall 
 
 1619 
 
 G affne v » Hevey 
 
 1436 
 
 Gafney v. Reeves 
 
 881 
 
 Gagan, Re 
 
 576 
 
 Gage v. Arndt 
 
 1221 
 
 v. Billings 
 
 1624 
 
 v. Brewster 
 
 1245 
 
 v. Brown 
 
 402 
 
 v. Bulkeley 
 
 664 
 
 v. Chapman 
 
 1624 
 
 v. Ewing 
 
 59 
 
 v. Graham 
 
 1661 
 
 v Harbert 
 
 604 
 
 v. Hunter 
 
 956 
 
 v. Kaufman 
 
 557, 630 
 
 v Mayer 
 
 1548 
 
 v . Parker 
 
 1517 
 
 v. Parmele 
 
 668 
 
 v. Rohrback 
 
 1624 
 
 v. Smith 
 
 604, 1716 
 
 v. Stafford 
 
 33,635 
 
 Gaines v. Agnelly 
 
 722, 2384 
 
 Gaines v. Brockerhoff 1320 
 v. Chew 335, 345, 552 
 
 v. Fuentes 552 
 
 v Hale 1613 
 
 v. Kennedy 1624 
 
 v. Mau.sseaux .'£{4 
 
 it. Miller 630 
 
 v. New Orleans 313, 1302, 1550 
 
 Gainsborough, Countess of t>. 
 
 Gilford 778, 1621 
 
 Gainsford v. Blachford 1131 
 
 v. Gammer 848 
 
 Gait v. Osbaldeston 640, 1559 
 
 Galatian v. Erwin 674, 678, 1548, 
 
 1549 
 
 Gale v. Abbot 1681 
 
 v. Clark 458 
 
 v. Michie 1491 
 
 v. Niekerson 329 
 
 Gallagher v. Roberts 694, 695 
 
 Gallagher's Appeal 1051 
 
 Galland v. Galland 1686 
 
 Gallatian v. Cunningham 612, 674 
 
 Gallemore v. Gill 978 
 
 Galley v. Baker 173 
 
 Galloway v. Barr 1401 
 
 Galloway v. Galloway 
 
 378 
 
 v Hamilton 
 
 658, 660 
 
 v. Jenkins 
 
 303 
 
 v. London, Mayor of 1468, 1469, 
 
 1660 
 
 v. Mackersey 1152 
 
 v. Perry 1309 
 
 Galluchat, Er parte 1722 
 
 Galphin v. M' Kinney 249, 254 
 
 Gal pin r. Page 1841 
 
 Galsworthy v. Durrant 61 
 
 Gait v. Carter 1073, 1076 
 
 Galton v. Emass 1291 
 
 v. Hancock 282 
 
 Galveston R Co. v. Cowdrey 287 
 
 Gamage v Harris 630 
 
 Gambert >■. Hart 1M1 
 
 Gambie v. Atlee 111 
 
 Gamble j> Gibson 1320 
 
 t;. Johnson 290, 837. 848 
 
 v. Loof 1624 
 
 Games v. Bonnor 989 
 
 (i tmewell Fire-Alarm Tel Co. v. 
 
 Brooklyn 314 
 
 v. Chillieothe 334 
 
 v. Mayor 313, 717
 
 liv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CTTED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Gammon v. Stone 1396 
 
 Ganahl v. Bleisner 1320 
 
 Gandee v. Stansfield 1832 
 
 Ganderton v. Ganderton 1299 
 
 Gandv ■ r. Gandy 193,322 
 
 Gann v. Gregory 877 
 
 v. Johnson 1502 
 
 Gaus v Harmison 1120 
 
 v. Reoshaw 989 
 
 Gansev.>ort v. Limn 46 
 
 Gant v. Alenloglu 2310 
 
 Ganvill, Re 39 
 
 Garard v. Garard 542 
 
 Garcias v. Ricardo 664, 1468 
 
 Gardener v. Crossman 779 
 
 ?■. Enuor 1399 
 
 Gardiner v. Griffith 658 
 
 v Mason 447, 448, 1552 
 
 v. Miles 986 
 
 v. Rowe 1078 
 
 v. Simmons 1504 
 
 v. Tyler 1753 
 
 Gardner v. 1600 
 
 v Mane 1352 
 
 v. Broadbent 1643 
 
 v. Dangerfield 1824, 1836 
 
 v. Dering 1028, 1029 
 
 v. Field 1322 
 
 v. Gardner 186. 187, 642, 1076, 
 
 1415, 1417, 1679 
 
 v. Garret 1616, 1617 
 
 v. Hooper 91 
 
 v Irvin 1835 
 
 v Kelso 254 
 
 v. Landcraft 529 
 
 v. London, &c. R. Co. 1035, 
 
 1731 
 
 v. Marshall 102, 1378 
 
 v Newburgh 303, 1639 
 
 v. Parker 1425 
 
 v, Raisbeck 860 
 
 v Schermerhorn 1284, 1286 
 
 t>. Sharpe 1735 
 
 v. Smith 1750 
 
 v. Tapling 170 
 
 v Terry 1621 
 
 Garey v. Whirtingham 180, 181, 499, 
 
 730, 1404, 1432, 1610 
 
 Garforth v. Bradley 89, 114, 118 
 
 Gariss v. Gariss 1678 
 
 Garland?' Garland 1733, 1738, 
 
 1739 
 
 v. Littlewood 1370,2061 
 
 v Living 168 
 
 v Oram 579 
 
 v. Riordan 307 
 
 v. Scott 571 
 
 Garle v. Robinsnn 1556 
 
 Gar ick r. Jackson 1224 
 
 v. Lawson 1001 
 
 r McArthur 844 
 
 v Strong 110, 402, 419, 588 
 
 Garling v. Royds 1078 
 
 Garlington v. Copeland 418, 986 
 
 Garner v. Hriggs 1036 
 
 t>. Garner 1846 
 
 e Moore 1342 
 
 Garnett, Re, Gandy v. Macauley 667 
 
 Garnett » Bradley 28, 30, 42, 1503 
 
 t; Mason 986, 989 
 
 Gamier, Re 61, 85, 86 
 
 Garnum r. Marshall 448 
 
 Garr v. Bright 145, 296 
 
 v. Drake 68, 72 
 
 v. Gower 63 
 
 Garrard v. Dinorben, Lord 1257 
 
 v. Edge 354, 1817 
 
 v. Frankel 1973 
 
 v. Webb 987, 994 
 
 Garratt, Re 655 
 
 v Niblock 1588, 1796 
 
 Garraud !). Lindley 1642 
 
 Garretson v. Clark 2306 
 
 v. Cole 1056 
 
 v. Weaver 1728 
 
 Garrett v. Bansted & Epsom 
 
 Downs Railway Co. 1664 
 
 Garrett t». Lancefield 
 
 
 1524 
 
 Geake v. Ross 1257 
 
 v Lynch 
 
 
 1676 
 
 Geary v. Norton 1395 
 
 r. Miss ssippi & Alabama R 
 
 
 Geast v. Belfast, Lord lb65 
 
 Co 
 
 
 345 
 
 Geddes, Ex parte 97 
 
 v. New York Transit Co 
 
 
 605. 
 
 Gedge v. Traill 324 
 
 
 
 2398 
 
 Gedye v. Matson 270 
 
 Garrick v. Ford 
 
 
 92 
 
 v. Montrose, Duke of 815 
 
 Garrison v. Atlanta 
 
 
 1620 
 
 Gee v. Bell 1734 
 
 Garrod v Holdeu 
 
 501 
 
 ,503 
 
 v. Cottle 180, 181, 445, 498, 499, 
 500,523 
 
 Garrold. Re 
 
 
 1841 
 
 Garrow v. Carpenter 
 
 
 713 
 
 v. Gee 75 
 
 Garstone v. Edwards 
 
 
 1287 
 
 v. Gurnev 1003 
 
 Garth v. Cotton 1630, 
 
 1631, 
 
 1634 
 
 v Mahood 1214, 1427 
 
 v. Townsend 
 
 1405 
 
 1427 
 
 v. Pritchard 1620, 1648 
 
 v. Ward 
 
 
 280 
 
 v. Swan 1107, 110s, 1128 
 
 Gartland v. Nunn 293, 297 
 
 298, 
 
 Geer v. Winds 1156, 1160 
 
 
 
 302 
 
 Geldand v Randall 1271 
 
 Gartside v. Gartside 
 
 
 216 
 
 Cell v. Hayward 370 
 
 v. Isherwood 
 
 1022 
 
 1581 
 
 v Watson 1775 
 
 v. Outram 
 
 565, 
 
 1651 
 
 Gelpeke v. Milwaukee, &c, R. 
 
 Garvey v. Hibbert 
 
 
 8ii2 
 
 Co. 1062 
 
 Garvin v Luttrell 
 
 
 1505 
 
 Geltson ?• Hoyt 978 
 
 »'. Watkins 
 
 
 517 
 
 General Exchange Bank, Re 1070 
 
 Garwood v. Curteis 48' 
 
 . 482 
 
 1551 
 
 General Hospital v. State Mot. 
 
 v Eld ridge 
 
 1073 
 
 1076 
 
 Life Ins. Co. 555 
 
 Gary v. Burnett 
 
 
 892 
 
 General Ins. Co. v. Benson 550 
 
 v. May 
 
 
 283 
 
 ?'. Kuhner 1713 
 
 v Mickler 
 
 
 985 
 
 Genet v. Delaware & H. Canal 
 
 Gascoygne's Case 
 
 
 1069 
 
 Co. 1073 
 
 Gascoyne v. Chandler 
 
 834 
 
 1626 
 
 Genett v Tallmadge 1364 
 
 v. Lamb 
 
 
 859 
 
 Gent, Re 1069 
 
 Gaskell v Chambers 
 
 445, 
 
 1772. 
 
 v. Harris 102, 108, 2001 
 
 
 1777 
 
 1834 
 
 Gentil v Arnaud 1631 
 
 v. Durdin 
 
 
 280 
 
 Grorge v. Dean 1661 
 
 v. Gaskell 
 
 
 209 
 
 v. Goldsby 121 
 
 Gaskill v Sine 
 
 
 845 
 
 v. Johnson 641 
 
 Gaskin v. Balls 324, 1654, 1661, 
 
 1662, 
 
 v. Pilcher 1568 
 
 
 
 1663 
 
 v. Reed 403 
 
 Gason v. Wordsworth 
 
 
 939 
 
 v. St. Louis Cable <S W. Ry. 
 
 Gasquet v. Crescent City B 
 
 
 Co. 236 
 
 Co. 
 
 
 1312 
 
 v. Smith 1648 
 
 Gass, Re 
 
 
 1801 
 
 v. Whitmore 987, 1072. 1079 
 
 v. Arnold 
 
 
 843 
 
 Geo. A. Macbeth Co. v. Lip- 
 
 v. Mason 1077 
 
 1079 
 
 1147 
 
 pencott Glass Co. 1642 
 
 v- Stinson 
 
 959, 960 
 
 George's Creek To v Detmold 311 
 
 Gassett v. Grout 
 
 
 91 
 
 Georgia v. Brailsford 1619, 1670 
 
 Gaston v. Frank um 372, 989 
 
 1897 
 
 Georgia, Governor of v. Ala- 
 
 Gas Works Const. Co. v 
 
 Moe 
 
 - 
 
 drago 17 
 
 heimer 
 
 
 1542 
 
 Georgia Lumber Co. v. Bissell 
 
 v. Standard G. L. Co. 
 
 
 1542 
 
 1705 
 
 Gaters v. Madeley 
 
 
 114 
 
 Gephart v. Starrett 1744 
 
 Gates v. Boomer 
 
 
 230 
 
 Gerard v. Penswick 1824 
 
 v. Buckland 
 
 89 
 
 ',898 
 
 Geraty v. Druiding 1621 
 
 V. Gates 
 
 
 1809 
 
 Gerber v. Grabel 1638 
 
 v. Jacob 
 
 
 640 
 
 Gere v. New York Central Co. 
 
 Gatewood v. Leak 
 
 790 
 
 1591 
 
 1675 
 
 Gathercole v. Wilkinson 
 
 
 448 
 
 German v. Chapman 1657 
 
 Gatti r. Webster 
 
 
 1366 
 
 v. German 15"'5 
 
 Gatty ?'. Farquharson 
 
 
 1130 
 
 v. Machin 350 
 
 Gaudet Freres, Re 
 
 
 1031 
 
 German-American Seminary v. 
 
 Gaugh v Da vies 
 
 
 58 
 
 Saenger 1540 
 
 Gaullaherr. Gaullaher 
 
 
 657 
 
 German-American Title & T. Co. 
 
 Gault v. Goldthwaite 
 
 
 1081 
 
 r. Shallcross 659 
 
 v. Hoagland 
 
 
 531 
 
 German Reformed Church v. 
 
 v. Wallis 
 
 
 1620 
 
 Von Puechelstein 358 
 
 Gaunt v. Froelicb 
 
 
 586 
 
 Gernoe v. Boccaline 395, 695, 1703, 
 
 v Johnson 
 
 249, 4; 
 
 1707 
 
 v. Taylor 730, 1207, 
 
 1255, 
 
 1413, 
 
 Gerrard v. Dawes 1845 
 
 
 142!i, 
 
 1424 
 
 Gerrish v. Black 410, 414, 986, 1239, 
 
 Gause v Knapp 
 
 
 542 
 
 1247 
 
 Ganther v. Meinertzhaageu 
 
 447 
 
 v. Bragg 1548 
 
 Gavin v. Osborne 
 
 
 435 
 
 v. Hunt 1621 
 
 Oawthorpe v. Gawthorpe 
 
 
 1722 
 
 v. Mason 851 
 
 Gawtry v Leland 
 
 
 1654 
 
 v. Towne 343, 385, 846 
 
 Gay v. Brierfield Coal 
 
 & 1 
 
 
 Gerry v. Stimson 1624 
 
 Co. 
 
 
 ' 634 
 
 Gest v. Packwood 569 
 
 v Gilmore 
 
 
 630 
 
 Gething v. Keighley 371, 668 
 
 v. Skeen 
 
 
 588 
 
 v Vigurs 558 
 
 Gayle v. Johnson 
 
 243 
 
 1411 
 
 Getman v. Beardsley 1413, 1417 
 
 v. Singleton 
 
 
 1004 
 
 Gerzler v. Saroni 1576 
 
 Gaylord v. Beardsley 
 
 
 354 
 
 Geyer v. Douglass 1584 
 
 Gaylords v. Kelshaw 
 
 
 256 
 
 Giacometti v. Prodgers 92, 102, 104, 
 
 Gayner v. Wilkinson 
 
 
 120 
 
 106 
 
 Gay nor v. Blewett 
 
 
 1716 
 
 Giant Powder Co. v. California 
 
 Gaynor's Goods, Re 
 
 
 252 
 
 Powder Works 601, 1120, 
 
 Gaytes v. Franklin Sav. Bank 
 
 1625 
 
 1591 
 
 Geach v. Ingall 
 
 1096, 
 
 1128 
 
 v Safety Nitro Powder Co. 703
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 IV 
 
 [The references are to the star paging ] 
 
 Gilbert v. Gilbert 28, 29, 30, 33 
 
 v. Guignon 1449 
 
 v, James 295 
 
 v. Lee 1417 
 
 v. Lewis 157, 158, 299, 324, 656, 
 578, 589 
 
 v. McEachen 1359 
 
 v. Mosier 846 
 
 v. Nantucket Bank 30 
 
 v. Schwenck 13'54 
 
 t;. Showerman 1635 
 
 v. Sutliff 287 
 
 v. Tomlinson 1525, 1526 
 
 v. Van Arman 945, 2392 
 
 v. Wetherell 1187 
 
 Gilbertson v. Gilberts 1428, 1528 
 Gilchrist, Ex parte 157, 1488 
 
 v. Cannon 1491, 1507, 1509 
 
 v. Oator 102 
 
 v Stevenson 193 
 
 Gildart v. Moss 1307 
 
 Gile v Devens 1710 
 
 v. Eaton 755 
 
 v. Giles 778, 1536 
 
 v. Powell 1104 
 
 Gill v. Continental Union Gas 
 
 Co. 1038 
 
 v. Eyton 1835 
 
 v. Fleming 61 
 
 v. Gilbard 895 
 
 v. Rayner 410, 416, 819 
 
 Gillam v Tavlor 1433 
 
 Gillespie ». Alexander 1206, 1207, 
 
 1208 
 
 v. Cummings 334 
 
 Gillett » Hall 1532, 1536 
 
 v. Robbins 843 
 
 Gillette v. Wiley 560 
 
 Gilliam v. Spence 233 
 
 Gillian v. Allen 1675 
 
 Gilliland v Cullum 991, l"3l 
 
 Gillis v. Hall 1678 
 
 Gillon v. Turnbull 1253 
 
 Gillot v. Kettle 1648 
 
 Gillott v. Esterbrook 1649 
 
 Gills, Re 108 
 
 Gilnian v. Cairnes 288, 290 
 
 v. Sheboygan 1650 
 
 Gilmer v. Slorris 659 
 
 v. Wallace 860 
 
 Gilmore v. Anderson 378. 1642 
 
 v. Gilmore 1046, 1150, 1180, 1188, 
 13C0 
 
 v McClure 542 
 
 v Patterson 842 
 
 v. Sapp 517 
 
 Gilpatriek ;• Glidden 402. 1019 
 
 Gilpin v. Southampton, Lady 1617 
 Gilpin County Mining Co v. 
 
 Drake 313 
 
 Gilpins v Consequa 918, 919, 929 
 Gilroy*s Appeal 1614 
 
 Gilson v. Hutchinson 1168 
 
 Giltenan v. Lamert 1624 
 
 Gingell v. Home 552, 664 
 
 Girard Life Ins. Co. v Cooper 
 
 1299 
 Girdlestone ,' Lavender 1266 
 
 Girod v. Michoud 993 
 
 Gisborne v. Qisborne 1503 
 
 Gist v. Cattel 644 
 
 V. Frazier 1284 
 
 !J Gist 1234 
 
 Githcrs v Clarke 1511 
 
 Sittings t> Dew 1629 
 
 Giveans v McMurtrv 886 
 
 Givens v. M'Calmont 1240, 1242, 
 1244 
 t'. 'j'idmore 845 
 
 Gladdon v. Stonemin 1723 v. Houston 
 
 Gl.idson v Whitne" 232 
 
 Gladstone v. Musurus Bey 141,142, v. Locke 
 1631 147 »•. Thorpe 
 
 395, 1703 v. Ottoman Bank 18, 142, 599 Gobe v Carlisle 
 
 1246, 1746 Gladwin v Gladwin 2360 I Goble v Andruss 
 
 675,895,974,1031, Giaenzer v Wiederer 1642 I v. Gale 
 
 1045, 1793 Glaister v Hewer 101 I v. Grant 
 
 Gibbes v. Greenville, &c. R. 
 
 Co. 1743 
 
 Gibbins v. Howell 1291, 1749 
 
 v Mainwaring 1718. 1735 
 
 v North Eastern Metropol- 
 tan Asylum District 990 
 
 Gibbon's Appeal 1172 
 
 Gibbons v Bressler 1625 
 
 v. Caunt 1306 
 
 v. Kibbey 95, 98 
 
 v. Ogdeu 1828 
 
 v. Waterloo Bridge Co. 145, 842 
 
 Gibhs?' Bryant 1253 
 
 v. Churton 1542 
 
 t;. Clagett 346, 347, 559 
 
 v. Daniel 1470 
 
 v David 1724, 1729, 1734 
 
 v Gihbs 396, 1443, 1562, 1570 
 
 v Guild 560,645,649 
 
 v. Hodge 216 
 
 v. Hooper 1121, 1122, 1137 
 
 v. La SociiHe Industrielle 631 
 
 v. Meraud 1700, 1702 
 
 v Parkinson 634, 815 
 
 v Philhpson 1069 
 
 v Pike 1127,1137 
 
 t\ Ross 577 
 
 v. Tunaley 1130 
 
 Gibby c. Hall 1677 
 
 Gibert v. Colt 1698, 1704, 1705, 
 
 1707, 1709, 1710, 1713 
 
 Gibney r Clayton 1837 
 
 Gibraltar v. Malta Banking 
 Co. 1603 
 
 Gibson, Re 86 
 
 v American Loan & T. Co. 243 
 v- Black 830 
 
 v Broadfoot 1320 
 
 v Burgess 629, 974 
 
 v. Carson 361 
 
 v. Charters 1678 
 
 v. Clarke 1774, 1775 
 
 t>. Compton 1459 
 
 i; Cranley, Lord 795, 977, 1380 
 v. Crehore 1013, 1028, 1234, 1247, 
 1252, 1259 
 
 v Fifer 
 
 645 
 
 v. Goldsmid 
 
 385 
 
 v Goldthwaite 
 
 1561, 1562, 1564, 
 
 
 1565 
 
 v. Green 
 
 1579 
 
 v. Hewett 
 
 1836 
 
 V. Ingo 
 
 295, 403, 417, 455 
 
 v. Jayne 
 
 584 
 
 v. Kinven 
 
 1004 
 
 v M'Cormick 
 
 378, 379 
 
 v. McCarty 
 
 43 
 
 v Marshall 
 
 1062 
 
 v Martin 
 
 17*5 
 
 v. Moore 
 
 1621 
 
 v. Muskett 
 
 1129, 1135 
 
 v. Nicol 
 
 710, 1387 
 
 t; Peters 
 
 1743 
 
 v Randolph 
 
 1462 
 
 v. Reese 
 
 425, 1371 
 
 v Scevengton 
 
 518 
 
 ti Seagrim 
 
 2213 
 
 r. Smith 
 
 1670 
 
 v. Tilton 
 
 734, 735, 1676 
 
 v Trowbridge Furniture Co. 
 
 236, 303 
 
 v Whitacre 629 
 
 »'. Whitehead 609 
 
 v Wills 202. 203 
 
 v. Wollard 1328 
 
 Gidding's Appeal 1051 
 
 Giddings (> Giddings 35.36 
 
 Giffard v. Hort 228, 259, 265. 1276, 
 
 1461,1478,1521,1584 
 
 v. Williams 123C 
 
 GifTord v. Thorn 986 
 
 Gilbert, Ex parte 564 
 
 v Arnold 
 
 v Colt 
 
 v. Deneley 
 
 v. Endean 
 
 Glann v. Younglove 115 
 
 Glanvil v. Trelawney 262 
 
 Glanvill, Re, Ellis v. John- 
 son 110, 113, 187 
 Glascott v. Lang 328, 382, 1619, 
 1626, 1678 
 Glasuer v. Weisberg 1561 
 Glass v. Beach 1118 
 v. Hulbert 380, 847 
 v. Oxenham 2)0 
 Glasscott v. Coppe" Miners' Co. 
 
 145, 585, 1678 
 
 Glassington v. Thwaites 707, 708, 
 
 761, 7J5, 1736 
 
 Glasson, Re 1366 
 
 Glazbrook i> Gilatt 1604 
 
 Glaze v. Drayton 997 
 
 Glazier v. ISailey 1624 
 
 v. Rolls No 1, 26 
 
 Gleason v. Bisby 1698, 1699. 1702. 
 
 1713 
 
 v Clisby 1709 
 
 v. Cook 630 
 
 v. Smith 1461 
 
 Gleaves v. Ferguson 1264, 1302 
 
 o. Morrow 347, 349, 715, 722, 724, 
 
 758, 759, 764 
 
 v. Payne 91 
 
 Gledhill v. Hunter 1072 
 
 Glee v. Manhattan Co. 640 
 
 Glegg v. Legh 569, 579, 584, 597. 
 
 606 
 
 Gleghorne r. Gleghorne 843 
 
 Glen v. Fisher 90, 1395 
 
 v. Hall 1648 
 
 Glen Iron Works, Re 1579 
 
 Glengall, Earl of v. Frazer 724, 
 
 1822 
 
 Glenn v. Blackford 1278 
 
 v. Clapp 1291 
 
 v Clark 1548 
 
 v. Cockey 383 
 
 v. Dimmock 1019, 1120 
 
 v. Doyle 281 
 
 v. Fowler 1623 
 
 v. Hebb 829 
 
 v. Maguire 642, P525 
 
 t\ Marbury 1741 
 
 v. Noonan 1019 
 
 v. Wotten 1270 
 
 Glenny t\ Smith 1049 
 
 Glenton v. Clover 1712 
 
 Glines v. Supreme Sitting 
 
 Order 1718 
 
 Globe Ins. Co. v. Boyle 334 
 
 c. Lansing 284 
 
 Globe Ins. Co., Receivers of the. 
 
 In re 1715 
 
 Glos v. Randolph 2119 
 
 Glossop V. Heston Local Board 
 
 10, 1637 
 Glossup v. Harrison 1767 
 
 Gloucester, Mayor and Corp. of 
 
 v. Wood 1469, 1470 
 
 Glover v. Dauheny I486 
 
 v. Greenback Alkali Co. 898 
 
 r. Hall 1557, 1830, 1832, 1833 
 
 r Hembree 542. 1299 
 
 i'. Hodges 1489 
 
 v. Millings 918 
 
 v. Rogers 710 
 
 v. Webber 77 
 
 r. Weedon 108. 700 
 
 Glyn v. Caulfield 578, 1825, 1826, 
 
 1834 
 
 v. Duesbury 1560, 1564 
 
 v. Soarcs 301 
 
 Glynn v. Bank of England 843, 
 
 565, 1129, 1556, 
 1557 
 1560, 1569, 1570 
 1740 
 221 
 323, 544. 545 
 269 
 852
 
 lvi 
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Godbold v Ellis 
 Godbolt v. Watts 
 Goddard v. Cox 
 
 v. Haslam 
 
 v. Jobnsoo 
 
 v. Keeble 
 
 v. May 
 
 v Ordway 
 
 v. Parr 
 Godfrey v. Chadwell 
 
 17. Furzo 
 
 v. Littel 
 
 v. Maw 
 
 v. Tucker 
 
 1276, 1316, 1317 
 
 203 
 
 90, 116 
 
 369 
 
 1561 
 
 1467 
 
 354, 785, 894 
 
 214, 277, 278 
 
 59 
 
 1163, 1164 
 
 797 
 
 315. 401,407,542, 
 
 1037, 1394, 1515 
 
 1558 
 
 1242, 1245, 1246 
 
 1150, 1381 
 
 113 
 
 449 
 
 1501 
 
 Railway 
 
 390 
 
 1017 
 
 946 
 
 887, 1103 
 
 819 
 
 137 
 
 1777 
 
 642 
 
 417, 834 i Goodday v Sleigh 791 
 386 I Goodden v. Coles 190, 212 
 
 Goodell v. Blumer 1624 
 
 Goodenough v. Alway 866 
 
 V Goodenough 1166 
 
 v Powell 1077 
 
 Goodess v. Williams 266 
 
 Goodfellow v. Prince 1648 
 
 V. Turner 
 v. Watson 
 v White 
 Godkin v. Ferrers, Earl 
 Godson v. Orok 
 
 v. Hale 
 Goebel v. American 
 
 Supply Co. 
 
 Goelct v Lansing 
 
 Goff ». Goff 
 
 Goffln ?•. Donnelly 
 
 Gohegan v. Barlow 
 
 Goiug v. Emery 
 
 Gold v. Canham 
 
 V- Whitcomb 
 
 Goldberser v. Manhattan R. Co. 1321 
 
 Golden v. Maupin 1166 
 
 v. Newton 528 
 
 t>. The Morning News 149 
 
 Golden Fleece Co. v. Cable, &c, 
 
 Co. 46, 865 
 
 Golder v. Golder 797, 799 
 
 Goldey v. Beeker 328 
 
 GoMhawk o. Duane 1254 
 
 Goldicut v. Beagin 1128 
 
 Goldman « Page 217 
 
 Goldmark v. Kreling 1675 
 
 v. Rosenfeld 1461 
 
 Goldsby v. Goldsby 1580 
 
 Goldsmid v. Tunbridge Wells 
 Improvement Commission- 
 ers 1638 
 v. Stonehewer 200 
 Goldsmith v. American P. C. Co. 197 
 v. Gilliland 60, 149, 
 314, 627 
 40, 42, 478, 495, 
 1051, 1054, 1055 
 1918 
 59, 156, 1438 
 215, 222, 257 
 Wells Imp. 
 
 1687 
 1624 
 1347 
 385, 1551 
 817 
 674 
 576 
 1608 
 1413 
 675 
 1744 
 940 
 349, 505, 510, 728 
 1413 
 1625 
 378 
 586, 1584 
 1744 
 1044, 1674, 1683. 
 1684 
 25, 216, 239, 405, 
 1203, 1206, 1369 
 Goodacre v Skinner 
 Goodale v Gawthorne 
 
 v. Goodale 
 Goodall's Trade-mark 
 Goolall v. Harris 
 v Little 
 v Skerratt 
 
 Goodford v. Stonehouse & Nails- 
 worth Railway Co. 231 
 Goodhand v. Ayseough 1-143 
 Goodhue v. Churchman 1575 
 Goodier v. Ashton 167 
 Goodloe v. Dean 843 
 Goodman v. Barbour 287 
 
 v. Jones 
 
 v. Kine 
 
 t. Niblack 
 
 r. Sayers 
 
 v. Whitcomb 1727 
 
 Goodlier v. Browning 
 Goodrich v. Marsh 
 
 v . Pendleton 
 
 1300 
 
 1014, 1630 
 
 149 
 
 1700 
 
 1728, 1736 
 
 1228 
 
 215, 222, 257 
 
 27, 30. 603, 607, 
 
 618, 645, 700, 702, 13S2, 1412 
 
 v. Goldsmith 
 
 v. Osborne 
 
 v. Russell 
 
 v. Stonehewer 
 
 v. Tunbridge 
 Com'rs 
 Goldstein v. Kelly 
 Goldsworthy, Re 
 Goldthwait v. Day 
 ' v. Lynch 
 Goleborn v Alcock 
 Gnltra v. Wolcott 
 Gr>mbault, Re 
 Gomley v. Wood 
 Gomm v. Parrott 
 Gomme v. West 
 Gompertz v. Ansdell 
 
 v. Best 
 
 v. Kensit 
 
 v. Pooley 
 Gonzales v. Hukil 
 Gooch v. Green 
 
 v. Haworth 
 r Marshall 
 
 Good i'. Blewitt 
 
 T. Roilnev 
 
 v. Shotbolt 
 Goodright v. Sanl 
 Goodson v. Ellison 
 
 v. Richardson 
 Goodwin, lie 
 
 v. Archer 
 
 v. Bell 
 
 v. Bishop 
 
 v. Clarke 
 v. Gibbons 
 v. Goodwin 
 
 70, 944 
 1663 
 1648 
 1347, 1352 
 576, 578, 1829, 1834 
 1510 
 
 347, 349, 363 
 
 1571 
 
 1138 
 
 219 
 
 1631 
 
 162, 1285 
 
 32 
 
 430 
 
 639, 759, 1253, 
 
 2124 
 
 1700, 1701 
 
 1135 
 
 255, 294, 405, 410, 
 
 416, 1530, 1532 
 
 845 
 
 Gorely r. Gorely 1601 
 
 Gorham v. Gorham 9, 83, 208 
 
 v- Toomey 1628 
 
 Gorham Co. v. White 1648 
 
 Gorman v. M'Culloch 15F3 
 
 v Russell 272 
 
 Gormley v. Bunyan 608, !*33 
 
 v. Clark lub2 
 
 Gornall, lie 351,1353 
 
 Gorrell v. Gates 
 Gort, Viscountess v. Clark 
 Goslin v. Corry 
 
 v. Wilcock 
 Gosling v. Gosling 
 Gosman, lie 
 Gosnell v. Bishop 
 Goss, Re 
 
 v. Simpson 
 
 V. Singleton 
 Gossett v. Kent 
 Gossom v Donaldson 
 Gossop j'. Wright 
 Gut ». Cook 
 Gottfried u.CresceDt Brewing (^o. 
 
 1309, 1320 
 
 v. Miller 
 Goucher v. Clayton 
 Gough v. Crane 
 
 v. Herbert 
 
 v. Offley 
 Gould r. Dnmmett 
 
 v. Hammond 
 v. Jones 
 v. Miller 
 v. Moore 
 
 v. New York R. Co. 
 v. Robarts 
 Goodyear v Day 
 v. Providence Rubber Co. 
 
 251 
 
 99 
 1650 
 18 
 1643 
 1079, 
 2397 
 Goodyear Dental V. Co. v. White 
 
 1507, 1542 
 Goodyear Rubber M Co. v. 
 
 Goodyear Rubber Co. 1648 
 
 Goodyere v. Lake 1368, 1486 
 
 Goold v. Great Western Deep 
 
 Dean Coal Co. 1650 
 
 v. O'Keeffe 885 
 
 Goose v. Bedford 385 
 
 Gordon v. Bell 844 
 
 v. Cheltenham Railway Co. 1663 
 
 v. Gordon 326, 852, 941. 1004, 
 
 1117, 1119 
 
 243 
 
 724 
 
 1221, 1240, 1296, 1920, 
 
 1926, 2193, 2229 
 
 406 
 
 214 
 
 630 
 
 v. Jesson 65, 159, 1510. 1512, 1525 
 v. Lewis 1231, 1240, 1241, 1242, 
 1243, 1244, 1252, 1296, 1302 
 
 v . Green 
 v. Hammell 
 v. Hobart 
 
 v. Holland 
 
 r Horsfall 
 
 James 
 
 v. Moore 
 
 T. Pym 
 
 v. Rockafellow 
 
 V Ross 
 
 r. Rothley 
 
 v. St. Paul H Works 
 
 v Shaw 
 
 v. Simpkinson 
 
 v Sims 
 
 17 
 
 240 
 
 678 
 
 1584 
 
 1781, 1782 
 
 334 
 
 624, 678 
 
 262, 547 
 
 Godchild v. Terrett 
 
 232 
 
 844, 1061, 1281, 1282, 
 
 1284, 1286, 1290 
 
 v. Stevens 1166 
 
 Gore Langton, Re 1610 
 
 Gore v. Bowser 574, 943 
 
 v. Harris 574, 943 
 
 v. I'urdnn 1022, 1476 
 
 r. Stacpoole 266, 1501 
 
 Go.ee v. Clements 860 
 
 10«1 
 1127 
 1129 
 1001 
 
 133 
 
 1600 
 
 8:3 
 
 840 
 
 986, 989 
 
 302 
 
 1276 
 
 418 
 
 161, 1457 
 
 197 
 
 511, 153 I 
 
 630 
 
 1558 
 
 581,1833 
 
 1443 
 
 v. Elgin City Banking Co. 1195 
 v. Gould 645, 844, 1997 
 
 v. Granger 
 
 v. Hayes 
 
 v. Head 
 
 v . Kemp 
 
 v. Norfolk Lead Co. 
 
 v. Spencer 
 
 17. Stanton 
 
 v. Tancred 
 
 v. Twine 
 
 v. Wheeler 
 
 p. Williamson 
 Goulder v. Camm 
 Gourand v. Trust 
 
 1463 
 
 225, 23 T 
 
 26 
 
 147 
 
 1101 
 
 443, 488 
 
 986 
 
 1251, 1577, 1583 
 
 507 
 
 259 
 
 843, 844, 847 
 
 191 
 
 1649 
 
 Gourkey v. Toledo & Ohio K?. 
 
 Co. 1168 
 
 Gonroud v. Edison & G. Tel. Co. 26 
 Gout v. Aleploglu 1649 
 
 Gouthwaite v. Rippon 424, 1602, 
 1671 
 Gouvernenr v Elmendorf 948, 1549 
 
 v Titus 
 Gove v. Lyford 
 
 v. Pettis 
 Gover v. Christie 
 
 t\ Lucas 
 Stilwell 
 
 1680 
 
 994, 995, 1515 
 
 562 
 
 197 
 
 924 
 
 1379, 1798 
 
 Governesses' Benevolent Institu- 
 tion v. Rusbridger 316, 1431, 
 1779 
 Governors of Grey-Coat Hospital 
 
 v. Westminster Imp. Com'rs 277 
 Govet v. Armitage 59 
 
 Gowan, Re, Gowan v. Gowan 108 
 Gowan r Broughton 1430 
 
 v. Jefferies 1718 
 
 Gower v Gower 12; 
 
 Gowing v. Mowberry 710 
 
 Gowland v. De Faria 13Sti 
 
 Gozman v. Cruger 1st; 
 
 Grabenheimer v Blum 1517 
 
 Graces. Hunt 111 
 
 v. Neel 15 1 ; 
 
 v. Nesbit ■ • ■ 
 
 v. Terrington 217, 13. 4 
 
 Graff v Barnum 140'2 
 
 Gratham v. Turnbull 554, 670, 1-' 8 
 Grafton V Hilliard 1635 
 
 v. Watson 1043 
 
 Graham, Re 1347. 1790 
 
 v. Berryman 378, 844, 886, 1550, 
 1961 
 
 v. Birkenhead Railway Co. 241 
 
 r. Boston H. & E R. Co. 560, 
 
 1584
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging ] 
 
 lvii 
 
 Graham v Campbell 1466, 1652, 1678 
 
 v Carter 216,221 
 
 v. Coape 707, 708 
 
 v Dahlonega Gold M. Co. 334, 
 
 1038 
 
 v Davidson 667 
 
 a Elmore 562, 590 
 
 v Fitch 183, 445, 499 
 
 v. Geneva Lake C M Co. 197 
 
 v. Graham 1233, 1299, 1338, 1342 
 
 v Hardin 994 
 
 v Horn 1392 
 
 v. Ingleby 897 
 
 v Maxwell 800, 1615, 1617, 1627 
 
 v. Minneapolis 190 
 
 v Nelson 561, 654 
 
 v. Newcastle-upon-Tyne 1638 
 
 v. Oliver 856 
 
 v Railroad Co. 1003, 2193 
 
 v. Sublett 161, 841 
 
 v. Tankersley 782, 1548 
 
 v. Torrance 641 
 
 v Wick ham 1233, 1438 
 
 v. Williams 1258 
 
 v. Wiuterson 60 
 
 Grainge v. Warner 1696 
 
 Grainger v Slingsby 1485 
 
 Granard, Karl of v. Dunkin 1648 
 
 Granberry v. Granberry 1247 
 
 Grandin v Leroy 650 
 
 Gi-aud Juuction Canal Co v. 
 
 Dimes 1614 
 
 Grand Rapids v Weiden 1638 
 
 Grand Rapids & I R. Co. v. 
 
 Sparrow 1071 
 
 Grand Rapids School Furniture 
 Co v. Haney School Furni- 
 ture Co. 1642 
 Grand Trunk Company v 
 
 Brodie 808 
 
 Grand U. Order v. Merklin 314 
 
 Grane v. Cooper 1836 
 
 Granely v. Barnard 1654 
 
 Granger v. Bassett 912 
 
 v. Batchelder 974 
 
 Grangers' Business Ass'n v. 
 
 Clark 2120 
 
 Grannis v. Clark 363 
 
 Grant, Re 103, 205 
 
 ?> Anderson 445 
 
 v Bryant 1745 
 
 v Davenport 1737 
 
 v. Dexter 1745 
 
 v East & West R. Co. 986, 1029 
 
 v. Easton 664 
 
 v. Grant 424, 1699, 1712, 1714, 
 
 1798 
 
 v. Ingram 36 
 
 t\ Lathrop 1624 
 
 v Mills 113 
 
 v. Phoenix Ins. Co. 334, 617, 1029, 
 
 1720 
 
 v Schmidt 300, 303 
 
 v. Thompson 83 
 
 v . Van Schoonhoven 109, 160, 
 
 161, 191 
 
 Grant's Cases 1042, 1359 
 
 Granville v. Betts 585 
 
 Earl v. M'Neill 254 
 
 Lady v. Ramsden 582, 660 
 
 Grassman o Bonn 267 
 
 Grassmeyer v. Beeson 1161 
 
 Grattan v. Appleton 2025, 2205 
 
 v. Wiggins 284 
 
 Gravatt v Tann 71 
 
 Grave, In re 1297 
 
 Gravel v. Clough 1385 
 
 Gravely v. Barnard 1672 
 
 Gravenor r>. Miles 1292 
 
 v Woodhouse 1126 
 
 Graves v. Alden 846 
 
 v Blondell 604 
 
 v. Budgel 884 
 
 f. Corbin 33-4 
 
 v. Downey 649, 684 
 
 v Fresh 559 
 
 v. Pinchback 249 
 
 Graves v. Short 1108 
 
 v Wright 1209, 1210 
 
 Gray, Re 307 
 
 v. Adamson 710 
 
 v. Barnard 166, 168, 228 
 
 v Bateman 920 
 
 v Beck 630 
 
 v Bell 73, 166 
 
 v Brignardello 999, 1017 
 
 v Campbell 425, 508, 510 
 
 v. Chaplain 25, 242 
 
 v. Chaplin 1724 
 
 v. Chicago R Co. 1614, 1683, 2897 
 v. Chiswell 236 
 
 V. Faris 844 
 
 v. Gaither 1722 
 
 v Gray 1282, 1377 
 
 c Haig 403, 1250, 1552 
 
 V Hays 419, 549 
 v. Lewis 26, 244, 1743 
 v Murray 930, 952 
 v National Steamship Co. 191 
 v. Ohio <& Pennsylvania R 
 
 Co 1640 
 
 v. Parke 68 
 
 v. Paul 1558 
 
 u.- Pent land 907 
 
 v Russell 1646 
 
 v. Sherman 2012 
 
 c. Smith 365 
 
 v. Thompson 1418 
 
 v. Washington 667 
 
 v, Wilson 671 
 
 Graydon v Church 1751 
 
 V Graydon 1157 
 Grays, lie 108 
 Grayson y Atkinson 875 
 
 v. Moncure 1165 
 
 v Virginia 446 
 
 Grazbrook v. Giliatt 1696 
 
 Greames v. Stritho 1699 
 
 Greasby, He 1705 
 
 Greason v. Keteltas 671 
 
 Great Australian Gold M. Co v. 
 
 Martin 452, 628 
 
 Great Eastern Railway Com- 
 pany, Ex parte 1028 
 Great Eastern Ry Co., Re 1030 
 Great Falls Manuf. Co. v. 
 
 Henry 1623 
 
 v. Worster 1032, 1628, 1639 
 
 Great Luxemburg Rv Co v 
 
 Magnay "300, 721, 1397 
 
 Great Northern Copper M. Co., 
 
 Re 1027 
 
 Great Northern Ry. v Man- 
 chester, Sheffield, & Lin- 
 colnshire Ry. 1656 
 Greatrex v. Greatrex 1663 
 Great Western Colliery Co v. 
 
 Tucker "3^0, 720, 722 
 
 Great Western Compound Co 
 
 v Etna Ins Co. 302 
 
 Great Western Ry. Co. v. Bir- 
 mingham & Oxford Ry 
 Co 1619, 1652, 1661 
 
 v Cripps 1622 
 
 v. Oxford, Worcester, and 
 Wolverhampton Ry. Co. 
 
 1663, 1678 
 v. Oxford, &c. 1640 
 
 v. Rushout 1620 
 
 Great Western Ry of Canada v. 
 
 Braid 1127 
 
 Great wool v. Sims 1138 
 
 Greaves, He 176, 643, 1607 
 
 v Atkinson 669,674 
 
 17 Gouge 26 
 
 v. Greaves 626 
 
 v. Griffith 1699 
 
 v. Smith 434 
 
 v. Tofleld 675 
 
 Greece, King of v. Wright 18 
 
 Greedup v Franklin County 1661 
 
 Greedy v. Lavender 104, 107, 73o 
 
 1432 
 
 Greele v. Emery 1290 
 
 Greeley v. Provident Bank 1716 
 
 Green, Ex parte 1359 
 
 r. Arnold 279 
 
 v. Badley 69, 160, 1370 
 
 v. Bostwick 1742 
 
 v. Branton Imj 
 
 v. Briggs 1440 
 
 v. Charnock 28, 29, i3 
 
 v Coleby 973 
 
 i; Covillaud 385 
 
 v. Creighton 553, 630 
 
 v. Crockett 974 
 
 v. Dodge 546 
 
 v. Gascoyne 1430 
 
 v Grant 243 
 
 v. Green 109, 867, 974 
 
 v. Harrison 37, 13, 1 
 
 v. Huey 1081 
 
 v. Humphreys fr4o 
 
 v . .i.-iikms 1576, 1577, 1579, 
 
 1583 
 v. Lanier 1297 
 
 v. Low 825, 1600, 1671 
 
 v. Lowes 1652 
 
 v. Lyon 187 
 
 v McKenney 286 
 
 v Mc Kinney 457 
 
 V. Massie 1568 
 
 ; Measures 1175 
 
 Monks 1217 
 
 v. Morris 1973 
 
 v Mumford 1560, 1565 
 
 t;. Neal 633, 635, 637 
 
 v. Otte 106 
 
 17. Pallas 1668 
 
 v. Phila Freestone & Granite 
 
 Co. 1081 
 
 v. Pledger 449, 456, 842, 1335, 
 1370, 1596, 1615 
 v. Poole 282 
 
 v. Pulsford 1675 
 
 v. Richards 334, 346, 9S9 
 
 v Robinson 544 
 
 v. Rutherforth 629 
 
 v. Sevin 384, 785 
 
 v. Snead 655, 657, 712, 821 
 
 v. Tanner 844 
 
 v Terwilliger 714 
 
 v. Thomson 508 
 
 v Tippah County Super- 
 visors 418 
 v. Vaughan 844 
 v. Weaver 566 
 v. Wheeler 932 
 v. Winter 1233, 1467, 1468, 
 22! 17 
 v. Wright 1138 
 Green, Re, Green v. Pratt 83 
 Greenaway v. Adams 1103 
 v Rotheram 112 
 Greencastle v. Hazelett 1638 
 Greene v. Canny 303 
 v. Greene 1165 
 v. Harris 2, 615, 617, 624, 666, 
 667. 703 
 r. Mumford 1560, 1661 
 v. Sisson 237, 290, 292 
 v. United States Dealers' Ass'n 
 
 1643 
 Greenfield v Frierson 1625 
 
 Greenhalgh r. Manchester & 
 Birmingham Railway Co. 
 
 1631,1663 
 
 v Rumney 1525, 1526 
 
 Greenhouse, Ex parte 1191, 1851 
 
 Grecnin v. Hoey 1675 
 
 Greening v Beckford 1696 
 
 r. Greening 512 
 
 Greenlaw v Greenlaw 1284 
 
 v. Kernahan 161, 1625 
 
 v. King 571 
 
 Greenleafr Queen 288,1515 
 
 Greenlee v. McDowell 1567, 1578 
 
 Greenough v. Eccles 1100 
 
 v. Gaskell 571, 672, 6 7 4, 575, 576, 
 
 943. 1834 
 
 v. Shorrock 113, 187
 
 lviii 
 
 Greenslade v Dare 676 
 
 Greenwalt v. Duncan 1548 
 
 Greenway v. Bromfield 653 
 
 Greenwell v. Greenweil 1308, 135* 
 
 Greenwich Bank v. Loom is 1575 
 
 Greenwood v. Atkinson 282, 781, 
 
 1533 
 
 v. Churchill 346 
 
 v. Firth 284 
 
 v. Greenwood 1824, 1832 
 
 v. Hornsey 1662 
 
 v. Parsons 956 
 
 v Percy 1151 
 
 v. Kothwell 1835 
 
 v. Sutcliffe 1395 
 
 v Sutherland 1001 
 
 v Taylor 284 
 
 Gree v. Laws 364 
 
 v. Turner 1517, 1580 
 
 v Willis 1120 
 
 Gregg, Re 892, 1044, 1840 
 
 v Garrett 614 
 
 v. Massachusetts Med Soc. 
 
 1653 
 
 r Slater 1393 
 
 v. Taylor 1082, 1212, 1319 
 
 Gregor v. Molesworth 659. 1583 
 
 Gregory v. Boston Safe Deposit 
 
 Co 1770 
 
 v. Dodge 1467, 1481 
 
 v. Forrester 200 
 
 v Gardiner 1056 
 
 v. Molesworth 72, 73, 997 
 
 v. Paul 88 
 
 v. Pierce 88 
 
 v. Pike 154S 
 
 v. Power 10U3 
 
 v. Spencer 793, 806, 811 
 
 v. Stetson 149, 190 
 
 v. Swift 149 
 
 v. Weaver 747 
 
 v. West 1367 
 
 Gregson, Re 642, 1465, 1488, 1842 
 
 v Oswald 1544, 1545 
 
 Gr< ig v. Somerville 1206, 1208 
 
 Grenfell v. Windsor, Dean of 1730 
 
 Grepe v. Loam 354 
 
 Gresham V. Luke 2190 
 
 v. Peterson 1698 
 
 v Price 1416, 1417 
 
 Greshold v Markham 214 
 
 Gresley v, Adderley 1717, 1718 
 
 v Mousley 577, 1822 
 
 Gretton v Mees 1395 
 
 Greville r Greville 1338 
 
 Grew v Breed 477, 1042, 1053, 
 
 1585, 1691 
 
 Grey, Re 100 
 
 v fliiswell 1033 
 
 v. Dickenson 1013 
 
 v. Northumberland, Duke of 
 
 1633, 1675 
 Grey's Brewery Co., Re 1847 
 
 Grey Coat Hospital v. West- 
 minster Impr. Commission- 
 ers 1531 
 Grey de Wilton, Lord v. Saxon 
 
 1655, 1672 
 
 Grider v. Apperson 633 
 
 G Hells v. Gansell 953 
 
 Grier v Wilt 314 
 
 Grierson v Eyre 1634 
 
 Grimes v. Grimes 1163 
 
 Griffin v. Archer 157 
 
 v Brady 664, 1380 
 
 v. Merrill 339 
 
 v Morgan 1508, 1524, 2359 
 
 v. Pickett 1624 
 
 v . Spence 254 
 
 v. State Bank 735 
 
 v Wilson 281. 1516 
 
 Griffing v. Gibb 544, 639 
 
 Griffith v. Augusta & K. R 
 
 Co 545 
 
 r Bateman 200, 249 
 
 v Hronaugh 1539 
 
 0. Coleman 90 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging] 
 
 Griffith v. Griffith 612, 675, 678, 
 
 1147, 1713, 1741,1765,1766 
 
 V. Hadley 1272, 1291 
 
 v. Hilliard 1638 
 
 v. Hood 109, 110 
 
 B Lewis 329 
 
 v. Merritt 1549 
 
 v. Pound 200, 212, 243 
 
 v. Kicketts 317, 357, 358, 909, 
 
 1097 
 
 v Segar 334 
 
 v. Vanheythuvsen 230, 301 
 
 Griffiths, Ex parte 62 
 
 v. Cow per 1045 
 
 v. Crvstal Palace, &c. Co. 1774 
 
 v Griffiths 1844, 1848 
 
 v Hamilton 663 
 
 v Hatchard 1280 
 
 v Jones 1273 
 
 v. Wood 732 
 
 Griffy v. Enders 1159 
 
 Giigg V Landis 369 
 
 v. Sturgis 710 
 
 Grigg's Case 629 
 
 Griggs v. Gear 1576, 1582, 1583 
 
 v. Gibson 1359 
 
 v. Staplee 230, 301, 384, 751, 
 
 1400 
 
 v Thompson 1562 
 
 Grignon v. Astor 222 
 
 Grigsby v. Weaver 1073, 1136 
 
 Grillion v. Rotch 1525 
 
 Grim v Walbert 138 
 
 v Wheeler 715 
 
 Grimes v. French 326, 378, 379, 
 
 380 
 
 v Grimes 586, 1584 
 
 v Harrison 1444 
 
 V March 1395 
 
 Grimmett's Trusts, Re 83, 85 
 
 Grimsby v. Webster 1696 
 
 Griniston v. Timm 1463 
 
 Grimwood v. Shave 40, 1482 
 
 Grinnell v. Merchants' Ins. Co 
 
 1205, 1207 
 Grissell v. Peto 1284 
 
 Grist v. Forehand 1355 
 
 Gnswold v. Central Vermont R. 
 
 Co 634 
 
 v. Griswold 906 
 
 v. Hazard 1312, 1580 
 
 V. I ii man 805 
 
 v. Jackson 9S6 
 
 v McMillan 59 
 
 v Simmons 1552 
 
 v Waddington 49 
 
 Grocev Field 1580 
 
 Groch v. Stenger 1017 
 
 GrofTs Appeal 1650 
 
 Groom, Re 1862 
 
 r. Attorney-General 497. 523 
 
 v. Stinton 1024, 1483 
 
 Groome v. Sporne 541 
 
 Gross c George W. Scott Man uf 
 
 Co. 149, 2386 
 
 v. Pearcy 1281, 1282 
 
 Grosvenor V Allen 237, 559 
 
 v White 542 
 
 Grote v. Bing 1735 
 
 Grotenkemper v. Carver 1546 
 
 Grove, Re 102, 103 
 
 v. Bastard 1001, 1408 
 
 v Fresh 346. 347. 1249 
 
 v. Rentch 324. 328, .341, 363 
 
 v. Young 933, 935, 936, 937, 1148, 
 
 1384 
 
 Grover v. Stilwell 1611 
 
 Grover & Baker Sewing Machine 
 
 Co. v Millard 519. 526 
 
 v. Radcliffe 664 
 
 Groves v. Clarke 106, 1516 
 
 v. Gordon 46 
 
 v. Groves 1209, 1795, 
 
 1836 
 v Lane 201,203 
 
 v. Levi 201, 203 
 
 V. Perkins 106 
 
 Groves v. Webber 
 
 
 1624 
 
 Grubb v. Browder 
 
 
 1459 
 
 v. Kolb 
 
 
 1625 
 
 v. Lockabill 
 
 
 231 
 
 Gruber v. Baker 
 
 
 324 
 
 Grugeon v. Gerrard 
 
 
 1073 
 
 Gruggen v. Cochrane 
 
 
 1256 
 
 Grumbrecht v. Parry 
 
 
 720 
 
 Grundy v. Grice 
 
 
 2214 
 
 Gruning v Prioleau 452, 53 
 
 •,591 
 
 Grunwell v Garner 
 
 229 
 
 1524 
 
 Guadalupe County v Johnston 368 
 
 Guaga Iron Co. V Dawson 
 
 24 
 
 Guavus v. Fontaine 
 
 
 1050 
 
 Gubbins t' Creed 
 
 
 1242 
 
 Gude v. Mumford 
 
 
 354 
 
 Gudger V. Western N. C. 
 
 R. Co 
 
 
 
 269. 31 
 
 Guebelle v. Epley 
 
 
 1683 
 
 Guernsey r. American Ins Co. 
 
 334 
 
 v Carver 
 
 
 330 
 
 Guest c. Brooklyn 
 
 
 1624 
 
 v. Cuwbridge Ry. Co 
 
 
 1035 
 
 v. Honifray 
 
 
 1398 
 
 v. Sims 
 
 
 165 
 
 v. Smythe 895, 
 
 1271 
 
 1285 
 
 Guilbert v. Hawles 
 
 
 793 
 
 Guild v. Phillips 
 
 
 1584 
 
 Guilden Sutton, Ex parte 
 
 1323 
 
 Guilford, Mayor of v. Clark 
 
 546 
 
 Guill v. Pierce 
 
 
 1511 
 
 Guillam v. Holland 
 
 
 1253 
 
 Guillon v. Rotch 
 
 
 1526 
 
 Guinness v. Land Co 
 
 
 1650 
 
 Guion r. Liverpool, &c 
 
 Ins 
 
 
 Co 
 
 
 1461 
 
 Gulf, C. & S. F. R. 
 
 Co. v 
 
 
 Nelson 
 
 
 '1556 
 
 v Washington 
 
 324 
 
 ,601 
 
 Gullan v. Trimbey 
 
 
 100 
 
 Gullett v Housh 
 
 1576. 
 
 1580 
 
 Gully's Case 
 
 
 58 
 
 Gully v. Remy 
 
 
 1257 
 
 Gultenberger v. Woods 
 
 
 1639 
 
 Guuby v. Thompson 
 
 
 1716 
 
 Gunn v Bolckow 
 
 
 1770 
 
 v Mason 
 
 
 1505 
 
 v. Prior 
 
 605,6! 
 
 Gunnell v. Bird 
 
 
 843 
 
 v. Whitear 
 
 
 1413 
 
 Gunther v. Liverpool, L 
 
 & G 
 
 
 Ins. Co 
 
 
 1440 
 
 Gunton r Zantzinger 
 
 
 1282 
 
 Guppy v Brown 
 
 
 916 
 
 Gurden V. Badcock 
 
 1751, 
 
 1757 
 
 Gurish v Donovan 
 
 
 409 
 
 Gurney, Re 
 
 
 224 
 
 v Ford 
 
 
 860 
 
 v Jackson 
 
 no, 
 
 1425 
 
 Gurnev, Re, Mason v Mercer 560 
 
 Guthrie r. Kahle 1240 
 
 v. Morrell 256 
 
 v Quinn 736 
 
 v. Walrond 1526 
 
 Guy v. Churchill 1517 
 
 v Doak 1733 
 
 v. Guy 70, 71, 78, 79, 1595 
 
 t). Hernance 1961 
 
 v. Pearkes 103 
 
 Guyot v Hilton 1556 
 
 Gwatkin v. Campbell 245, 304, 417 
 
 Gwillim v 
 
 Gwilt v. Crawley 
 
 Gwin v. Harris 
 
 Gwinett v. Bannister 
 
 Gwinn v Whitaker 
 
 Gwjer v. Peterson 
 
 Gwynn v. Butler 
 v. Dorsey 
 v Leth bridge 
 v. Lethbrigge 
 
 Gwvnne v. Ldwards 
 
 v. Gell 
 Gwyon v. Gwyon 
 Gyles v Wilcox 
 Gynn v- Gilbard 
 
 734, 737 
 
 1131 
 
 1031 
 
 1621 
 
 1255 
 
 797 
 
 417 
 
 1235 
 
 1467, 1468, 1470 
 
 380 
 
 1461, 1476, 
 
 1480 
 
 560 
 
 819, 1535 
 
 1645 
 
 68.1347
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 11X 
 
 H. 
 
 H , /?e 1840 
 
 H's Estate, Re 1719 
 
 Haas v Chicago Building Soc. 1719, 
 1734 
 Haase v . Roehrschied 1368 
 
 Haberdashers' Company v. At- 
 torney-General 1417, 1418 
 Habcrghani v. Ridehalgh 1433 
 v. Stansfield llHo 
 v. Vincent 416 
 Hack v. Leonard 1659 
 Hacker v. Mid Kent Railway Co. 279 
 
 Hackett V Baiss 
 Hack ley v Draper 
 
 v. Mack 
 Hackney v. Vawter 
 Hackwith v Damron 
 Hackwood v. Lockerby 
 
 1638 
 1743 
 1551 
 1650 
 287 
 453, 460, 
 462, 540 
 930, 952 
 390 
 803 
 645 
 1127 
 Tr. 
 
 144 
 
 Haddix v. Haddix 
 
 Haddoch v. Thomlinson 
 
 Had Ion v. Peeler 
 
 Hadix v. Davison 
 
 Hadley v. Baxendale 
 v. Freeduian's Sav. 
 
 Co. 
 
 v. London Bank of Scotland 1652, 
 1664 
 v. McDougall 1826 
 
 v. Pethcal 1600 
 
 v Russell 267, 273 282 
 
 Haffey v. Haffey 1702 
 
 Hagaman v. Cloud County 1661 
 
 Hagan v. Blindell 
 
 v Buck 
 
 v. Patterson 
 
 v. Walker 
 Hagar v. Whitraore 
 Hagell v. Currie 
 
 1620 
 
 198 
 
 313 
 
 214, 253, 3^3 
 
 779 
 
 1772, 1774, 
 
 1780 
 
 Hagenhach v. Howard 1661 
 
 Hagerstown Turnpike v. Creeger 22 
 
 Hagerty v Lee 1663 
 
 llagewisch v. Silver 1736 
 
 Haggard v Benson 37 
 
 V. Pelieier Frferes 354 
 
 Haggarty v. Pittman 1720, 1723 
 
 Haggett v. Welsh 1860 
 
 Haggin v. Comptoir d'Escompte 
 
 de Paris 149. 445 
 
 v Raymond 1071 
 
 Haggitt v. Iuiff 744, 892 
 
 Hagthorp v. Elook 374, 614, 
 
 675,717,720, 758,844,1239, 
 
 1242, 1245, 1462 
 
 Hague v Wheeler . 1638 
 
 Hal id v. Concordia Society 1654 
 
 Haig v Gray 216 
 
 v. Homan 1576 
 
 Haljrh, Re 1858 
 
 v. Dixon 430 
 
 v Grattan 1747 
 
 v. Haigh 186, 979 
 
 v .laggar 1632 
 
 v Kaye 619, 657 
 
 Haunt v. Burr 1716 
 
 v. Case 1668 
 
 v. Lucia 1676 
 
 v. Morris Aqueduct, Prop, of 735, 
 
 845, 891 
 
 Haikman v. Fernie 
 
 Haine v. Taylor 
 
 Haines v. Beach 
 
 v Carpenter 
 
 v Hewitt 
 
 v . Oatman 
 
 v Taylor 
 Hair v. Avery 
 Hake t> Brown 
 Hakell r. Wright 
 Hake well, In re 
 
 v Webber 
 
 1128 
 
 16&5. 1636 
 
 194, 277 
 
 834, 1627 
 
 1159 
 
 68 
 
 1637, 1640 
 
 119 
 
 1120 
 
 1654 
 
 111 
 
 978 
 
 Hakewill, Ex parte 38,39,1863 
 Re 39 
 
 Halcomb v, Halcomb 1315 
 
 v. Kelly 418 
 
 v. Managers New Hope D. B. 
 Co. 1147 
 
 Haldane v. Eckford 505, 1526, 1825 
 
 Halldeuby v Spofforth 1411, 14--3 
 
 Hale V. Boustead 157 
 
 v. Continental Life Ins. Co 519, 
 735, 759 
 0. Cove 1108, 1138 
 
 v. Duncan 1743 
 
 v. Hale 991, 1584, 1728 
 
 v. Lewis 979 
 
 v. Nashua & Lowell R. Co 334 
 v. Point Pleasant & R R. 
 
 Co 1663 
 
 v Saloon Omnibus Co. 1566, 1570 
 e Sheldrake 99 
 
 v Thomas 1684 
 
 Hales v. Pomfret 245, 262, 839 
 
 v. Shaftoe 1053, 1054 
 
 Haley v. Bagley 260 
 
 v Bannister 
 
 Halfhide r. Kenning 
 v. Robinson 
 
 Halifax Joint Stock B. Co 
 Gledhill 
 
 1360 
 
 671 
 
 83 
 
 ' 675 
 v. Sowerby Bridge T. H Co. 323 
 
 Hall, Re 
 v. Austin 
 v Baldwin 
 V Barrows 
 v. Bennett 
 v. Bodley 
 ; Bushill 
 v. Byron 
 v. Claggett 
 v. Clive 
 v. Craig 
 v. Dana 
 v. Dodge 
 v Doran 
 v Eve 
 v. Ewin 
 v. Kowlkes 
 v Hall 
 
 880, 1794. 1840 
 
 251, 252, 268, 272 
 
 1561 
 
 1G48, 1649 
 
 309 
 
 723 
 
 1404 
 
 850 
 
 737 
 
 1524, 1525, 1526, 2059 
 
 1565 
 
 1042 
 
 994 
 
 1111 
 
 371 
 
 1654 
 
 380, 582, 1548 
 
 155,333, 059,852,1159, 
 
 1660, 1727, 1728, 1771. 1 
 Hallett 1251, 1419 
 
 v. Harris 
 
 v. Hoddesdon 
 
 v. Hugonin 
 
 v Jenkiuson 
 
 v. Jones 
 
 v. Lack 
 
 v. Lamb 
 
 v Laver 
 
 v. Law 
 
 v. Lay ton 
 
 v. Linn 
 
 v Macdonald 
 
 v. Mcl'herson 
 
 v. Maltby 
 
 v. Morris 
 
 v . Muiliner 
 
 v. Noyes 
 
 v. Paulet 
 
 v Pierce 
 
 v Radcliffe 
 
 V. Roche 
 
 v. School District No 4 
 
 v. Stone 
 
 v. Stothard 
 
 v. Stout 
 
 v. Taylor 
 
 v. Truman 
 
 v. Turner 
 
 v. Urquhart 
 
 v Warren 
 
 )'. Westcott 
 
 t 1 . Whiston 
 
 220, 1551 
 
 548, 871, 1573 
 
 119 
 
 1729, 1774 
 
 1354 
 
 404 
 
 1031 , 1492 
 
 309. 1S45 
 
 1151 
 
 1076 
 
 1071 
 
 1425, 1778 
 
 793, 1614 
 
 327, 852, 856 
 
 279 
 
 1307 
 
 605, 615 
 
 39 
 
 378 
 
 539, 1510 
 
 466 
 
 418 
 
 1130 
 
 1134 
 
 933 
 
 1168 
 
 485, 760, 889 
 
 590 
 
 1291 
 
 852 
 
 1302 
 
 1961, 2274 
 
 Hall v. Wood 722, 723 
 
 v. Young 115, 117 
 
 Hall's Charity, Re 1854, 1855 
 
 Hall Dore's Contract, Re 1282 
 
 Hall's Estate, Re 865 
 
 Hallack v. Loft 659, 15*4 
 
 Hallady v. Johnson 1550 
 
 Hallett v. Cousins llol 
 
 v. Cumpton 551 
 
 v. Furze 214 
 
 v. Hallett 190, 217, 225. 236, 238, 
 
 240, 303, 1177, 1507 
 
 Hal lev v. Webster 852 
 
 Halliday, Re 1863 
 
 v. Temple 1820 
 
 Halliley v. Henderson 1205 
 
 Halliwell v. Phillipps 1633 
 
 Hal lock v. Bacon 1317 
 
 v. Smith 214, 215, 930, 952 
 
 234, 243, 303, 
 
 915 
 
 181, 499 
 
 726 
 
 852, 1620 
 
 1467, 1498 
 
 1727 
 
 Hallows v. Fernie 
 
 Halsam, Ex parte 
 Halsey v. Ball 
 
 v Brotherhood 
 
 v. Van Auiringe 
 
 r. Windham 
 Halstead v. Commissioners of 
 
 Lake ' 46 
 
 v Shepard 345 
 
 Halstead United Charities, Re 1610 
 Halsted v. Meeker 378 
 
 v. Tyng 1226 
 
 Haly v . Barry 1039, 1041 
 
 v Goodson Di53 
 
 Ham v Schuyler 1624 
 
 Hambly v. Trott 1634 
 
 Uamblyn v. Ley 1055, 1057, 1058 
 Hambrick v. Jones 1029, 1031 
 
 Hambridge v De la Crouee 307 
 
 Hambrook v Smith 568. 764 
 
 Hamburger v. Poetting 27, 28 
 
 Uamer-ley v. Brown 948 
 
 v Lambert 50, 51, 52, 947, 948, 
 949, 956, 1578 
 
 Hamerton V. Rogers 
 Hamilton v. Arrowsmith 
 
 v. Bankin 
 
 ti Brewster 
 
 v. Buckmaster 
 
 v. Cummings 
 
 v. Davies 
 
 r Denny 
 
 v. Dobbs 
 
 v. Eaton 
 
 v Gilman 
 
 v Girdlestone 
 
 v. Hamilton 
 
 v. Hibbert 
 
 v. Houghton 
 
 v Littlejohn 
 
 v. Lyster 
 
 r Marks 
 
 v Morris 
 t' Nott 
 
 13!»2 
 95 
 297 
 1766 
 1328 
 1961 
 448 
 1245 
 1622 
 51 
 163 
 1722, 1733 
 100, 122 
 691 
 1258, 1276, 158 i 
 1501 
 679 
 394, 395, 1562, 1563, 
 1567, 1667 
 1151 
 673 
 Savannah, F. & W Uy. Co. 149 
 v Sheppard 645 
 
 v. Southern Nevada M. Co. 402, 
 991, 1221 
 v. Whitridge 1637 
 
 v. Williford 674 
 
 v Wood 640, 1675 
 
 V. Worsefold 1632 
 
 v. Wvnne 1723 
 
 Duke" of p. Meynal 939 
 
 Hamilton Loan & T.Co V.Gor- 
 don 843 
 Hainley v. Gilbert 2182 
 Hamlin v. Bridge 178 
 v. Stephenson 67 
 « Wright 1742, 1751 
 Ilaiimi v Stevens 290
 
 Ik 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Hammersch!ag Manuf. Co. v. 
 
 Judd 888 ' 
 
 H.iinmerslaugh v Farrior 892 j 
 
 Hauiuierslev v. barker 791 
 
 v. Wyckoli 395, 1619 | 
 
 Hauimertou v. Honey 1004, 1106 
 
 Hammond v Attwood 59 
 
 v. Fuller 1662 
 
 v Hammond 486, 1253 
 
 r. Maundrell 16S9 
 
 V. Messenger 198, 199, 550, 2043. 
 20b9 
 
 v Michigan Bank 
 
 v. Neame 
 
 v. Puller 
 
 v Schofield 
 
 v. Taylor 
 
 V Winchester 
 
 v. Wordsworth 
 Uamond 8 
 
 v Bradley 
 
 v. Walker 
 
 Hamond's Case 
 
 II s 1 1 1 1 > v Hamp 
 
 v. Robinson 
 
 335 
 
 147, 1431 
 
 1639 
 
 269 
 
 467 
 
 1663 
 
 919 
 
 932 
 
 168 
 
 223,447,1771. 
 
 1779 
 
 951 
 
 1079 
 
 252,253,288,337, 
 
 371, 598, 1675, 1734 
 
 1075 
 
 1780 
 
 1417 
 
 1133 
 
 1425, 1426 
 
 Hanon v. Weil 1716 
 
 Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v Brown 
 
 830 
 Hanover, King of v. Wheatley 17, 
 18, 925 
 Hanover Nat Bank v Klein 842 
 
 Hansard r Hardy 650, 999 
 
 Hans-ell v Hansell 709 
 
 Hansen v Miller 116, 117 
 
 Hanslip v. Kitton 895, 1821, 1825 
 Hansom Cab Co. v. Verkes 26 
 
 Hanson, He 
 
 v. Bean 
 
 v. Gardiner 
 
 v. Keating 
 
 v Lake 
 
 u Murray 
 
 v. Patterson 
 
 v. Reece 
 Hansucker V. Walker 
 Hapgood w. Houghton 
 Haralson v. George 
 Harbeu V. Phillips 
 
 1856, 1857 
 
 576 
 
 1631, 1668, 1670 
 
 91,124,385 
 
 1404 
 
 1790 
 
 1002 
 
 1846 
 
 1286 
 
 90,117 
 
 1274, 1282 
 
 26, 241, 244, 
 
 1650 
 
 1234, 1414 
 
 1433 
 
 Hampden v. Hampden 
 
 v Wallis 
 Hampshire v. Bradley 
 
 v. Harris 
 Hampsou v. Brandwood 
 
 v. Hampson 1077, 1082, 1124 
 
 Hampton v Coddington 312, 732 
 
 v Holman 1001 
 
 v. Nicholson 418 
 
 v. Pool 1701 
 
 v Quayle 418 
 
 Hanbury r. Hussey 1157 
 
 v. Litchfield 380 
 
 r. Ward 539, 1510 
 
 Hanby v Henritze 1517 
 
 Hanchett v Briscoe 119 
 
 Hancock, He 653 
 
 v. Attorney-General 156 
 
 v. Carlton 612, 697, 699 
 
 v. Hancock 166, 641 
 
 v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. 51 
 
 v. Rollison 807 
 
 v Toledo, &c. R. Co. 1734 
 
 v Walsh 1614 
 
 v Wooten 236 
 
 Hancocks v. Lablache 178, 631 
 
 Haud B Dexter 558 
 
 v. King 807 
 
 v. Savannah & C. R. Co. 1411 
 
 v Weidner 843 
 
 Handford v. Handford 1003. 1189 
 
 v Storie 243, 790, 793, 794 
 
 Handler v Billings 1197 
 
 r Davies 1427 
 
 r. Heflin 1556 
 
 v. Metcalf 1785 
 
 Handly v Munsell 1548 
 
 Hands v Hands 1699 
 
 Ilandv V. Cleveland & M. R. 
 
 Co. 1765 
 
 v. Scott 1299 
 
 Haney, Re 1596, 1607 
 
 Hanger v. Fowler 1846 
 
 Hankey v. Simpson 667 
 
 V. Vernon 1621 
 
 Hankin v Middleditch 933 
 
 Hanlon r. Doherty 576 
 
 v. Primrose 314 
 
 Hanly v. Levin 68 
 
 Hantnan v. Riley 215,257 
 
 Hanmer v. Chance 861 
 
 Hannah r. Hodgson 1551 
 
 Hannam v South London Water 
 
 Works Co 809, 1659 
 
 Hannas v Hannas 991 
 
 Hannay v. McEntire 1670, 1700. 
 
 1707 
 
 Hannibal. &c. R Co. v. Shipley 
 
 1666 
 
 Hano v Bigelow 1654 
 
 Harbin v Darby 
 
 v. Masterman 
 Harborough, Earl v Shardlow 1139 
 Harborough, Lord v. Wartnaby 
 
 1274, 1307, 1592, 1594, 1685 
 Hardcastle o. Smithson 274 
 
 Hardee v. Gibbs 1512 
 
 » Wilson 1029 
 
 Hardeman v. Harris 718 
 
 Harden v. Hays 852 
 
 Hardenburgh v. Blair ld37 
 
 Harder v. Harder 294, 302 
 
 Hardey v. Baley 
 Hardie !». Bulger 
 Hardiman, lie, Pragnell V 
 
 Batten . 
 Hardin v. Boyd 
 
 v Swoope 
 Harding v Cox 
 
 v Durand 
 
 v. Egin 
 
 v. Glover 
 
 418 
 
 1157 
 
 4< 2 
 334 
 416, 418 
 560 
 657, 590, 788 
 1728 
 
 v Handy 149, 285, 324, 361, 1226 
 
 131 '< 
 
 v. Harding 734, 1282 
 
 v Hardrett 675 
 
 v. Hawkins 843 
 
 v. Tingey 419, 425, 480, 598, 
 
 1602 
 
 v. Wheaton 2279 
 
 v. Wick ham 654, t.70 
 
 v. Williams 866 
 
 v Yarbrough 1282 
 
 Hardingham v. Nicholls 677 
 
 Uardman v El lames 609, 615, 620, 
 
 622, 624, 673, 678, 682, 1822, 1833, 
 
 2095 
 
 Hardt V. Liberty Hill C M. Co 
 
 1675 
 Hardwick v. Bassett 526, 837, 978, 
 
 v. Wright 
 Hardy v Beaty 
 v. Caley 
 v Dartnell 
 v Eckersley 
 v. Hardy 
 v Heard 
 Hull 
 
 1231, 1825 
 
 1381 
 
 298 
 
 814 
 
 1398 
 
 807, 810 
 
 837 
 
 429. 1449, 1522 
 
 v Reeves 560, 561, 640, 650, 679 
 
 1668 
 875 
 North Western 
 
 190 
 
 1173. 1411 
 
 217, 219 
 
 771 
 
 900, 1408 
 
 1829 
 
 911 
 
 Summers 
 Hare v- Hare 
 v London & 
 
 Ry. Co 
 
 v. Rose 
 
 Hares v. Stringer 
 
 Harford v. Lloyd 
 
 v. Purrier 
 
 v. Rees 
 
 v Reeves 
 
 Hargrave » Harerare 68, 851, 1015, 
 
 1026, 1027, 1034, 1112, 1114, 1115, 
 
 1137, 1456, 1726 
 
 Hargrave v. Kettlewell 1794 
 
 v. Tindal 164 
 
 Hargraves v. White 972 
 
 Hargreaves, He 236, 989 
 
 v. Michell 642, 654 
 
 v Wright 344 
 
 Haring v. Kauffman 1684 
 
 Harker, Ex parte 1698 
 
 Harkinson's Appeal 1654 
 
 Harlan v. Barnes 997 
 
 Harland v. Bankers & M. Tel 
 
 Co 1427, 1743 
 
 v Emerson 615, 619, 620 
 
 v. Garbutt 85 
 
 v. Person 334,542 
 
 Harlock v. Ashberry 652, 1072 
 
 v. Smith 1440 
 
 Harloe v Harloe 1213, 1528 
 
 Harlow v. Mister 193 
 
 Harman v Davis 1584 
 
 v. Easton 1666 
 
 v Foster 1755 
 
 v. Jones 1640 
 
 v. Lewis 1120 
 
 v Wagner 1716 
 
 Harmer v. Gooding 367, 544 
 
 v. Harris 1409,1449 
 
 v. Plane 1642 
 
 v. Priestly 2230 
 
 Harmon v. Byram 281 
 
 v Campbell 525, 531 
 
 v. Kentucky Coal Co. 1716 
 
 Harner v. Price 1621 
 
 Harnett v. Yielding 1405 
 
 Harnish v Bramer 1621 
 
 Harnsberger i' Cochran 1168 
 
 Harp v. Osgood 195, 325 
 
 Harper v Elberton 1071 
 
 v. Hayes 1285 
 
 v. Hendricks 559 
 
 v. McElroy 1638 
 
 v. Munday 1420, 1421 
 
 v. (VBrien 633 
 
 v. Uaveuhill 319 
 
 v. Vaughan 1461 
 
 Harpham v. Shacklock 674 
 
 Harrald, He 1447 
 
 Harrell v Wilson 1-90 
 
 Harries v. Kees 298, 1778 
 
 Harrigan v. Bacon 417 
 
 Harrington v. Becker 814, 1539, 
 
 1541 
 
 v. Chastel 1680 
 
 v. Du Chatel 16S0 
 
 v. Harrington 547,868,1221,1469, 
 
 1614 
 
 r. Slade 1532, 1536 
 
 Harris, Ex parte 1750 
 
 He 98, 893, 1608, 1847 
 
 v. Brisco 563, 1558 
 
 v Butterley 1138 
 
 v.- Carter 286,287 
 
 v. Clap 1254 
 
 v. Collett 1556, 1625, 1672 
 
 v. Collins 844, 1073 
 
 v Cornell 231 
 
 v De Tastet 1178 
 
 v. Dietrich 522 
 
 v Edmondson 1577 
 
 v. Fleming 452, 536 
 
 v. Fly 992, 1221, 1296, 
 
 1599 
 
 v. Gamble 785 
 
 v. Gaudy 799 
 
 v. Hamlyn 162, 177, 475, 1387 
 
 v. Harris 70, 168, 620, 622, 749, 
 
 1167, 1551, 1832 
 
 v. Hess 1770 
 
 v. Billiard 996, 1378 
 
 v Hines 790 
 
 v. Hooper 214 
 
 v Ingledew 232,679, 695,697,875, 
 
 883 
 
 v. James 261, 732 
 
 v. Jenkins 347 
 
 v. Knickerbacker 408, 860 
 
 v. Lee 103
 
 Harris v. Lewis 
 v Lightfoot 
 v. Macintosh. 
 v. Milburn 
 v. Mills 
 
 v. Mutual Life Ins Co. 
 v Pepperell 
 v- Pollard 
 v. Quine 
 v . Rich 
 t; Roth well 
 v. Schryock 
 i;. Start, 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging. J 
 
 1596 Hart v. Coffee 267 
 
 800 v. Colley 1648 
 
 1110 v. Denham 1723, 1768 
 
 201 ?■. (iranger 378 633 
 
 560, 639, 640 v. Hannibal, &c R. Co. 1663 
 
 v. Il.irt 880, 9S1, 1542 
 
 v. Henderson 418 
 
 n. Herwig 1663 
 
 v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct 10 
 
 v. McKeese 314 
 
 v. Mallet 630 
 
 v. Montefiore 1825 
 
 v. Phillips 637 
 
 v. Roberts 801, 964 
 
 v. Sanderson 617 
 
 ki 
 
 v. Andrews 
 v Arniitage 
 v Borwell 
 v Coydell 
 V Crewster 
 v. Crown 
 v. Buckle 
 v. Cage 
 v. Cockerell 
 v. Coppard 
 v. Delinont 
 v. Eldridge 
 v. Every 
 v Fane 
 t'. Farnsworth 
 v. Farrington 
 V. Forth 
 v Gibson 
 v. Good 
 v. Guest 
 v. Gurney 
 v- Hall 
 v Harrison 
 v. Hart 
 v. Hogg 
 
 41 
 
 1973 
 
 1610 
 
 643 
 
 1543 
 
 328 
 
 1650 
 
 15!»0 
 
 542, 1629 
 
 1102, 1104 
 
 59 
 
 283, 561, 652, 815 
 
 321 
 
 236 
 
 165, 167, 997 
 
 1233 
 
 721 
 
 122 
 
 332, 1728 
 
 712, 1805 
 
 1755 
 
 v. Johnson 
 
 v. Kennedy 
 
 v. Lane 
 
 v. Leutner 
 
 v. Lynes 
 
 v. MeMennomy 
 
 v, Masselin 
 
 V. Mexican Ry. Co 
 
 r Morton 
 
 v. Nettleship 
 
 t>. Nixon 
 
 r. 1'ennell 
 
 t*. Pryse 
 
 v Ray 
 
 r. Richards 
 
 v Righter 
 
 f. Rowan 
 
 v. Rumsey 
 
 v. St. Mark 
 
 1551 
 26 
 92 
 
 1129 
 
 1667 
 
 13! )9 
 
 733, 783 
 
 1165 
 
 1203 
 
 1129 
 
 994 
 
 608, 726 
 
 675 
 
 641 
 
 1636 
 
 328, 382 
 
 800, 1626 
 
 1479 
 
 76,77, 1132, 11&3 
 
 2231 
 
 303, 339, 340, 365, 366. 
 
 588 
 
 842,886,887 
 
 187 
 
 796, 1588 
 
 1443 
 
 815 
 
 1382 
 
 1323 
 
 599 
 
 287 
 
 663, 1621 
 
 361 
 
 277 
 
 247 
 
 2027 
 
 1169, 1342 
 
 200, 323, 324 
 
 175, 288, 290, 556 
 
 973 
 
 Church 1635 
 
 v. Southampton, Corp. of 1020 
 r. Southampton, Mayor of 1474 
 v. Southcote 563, 569, 607, 611. 
 676, 1385 
 v. Stewardson 225. 237, 257, 277. 
 521 
 1649 
 1440 
 1675 
 1741 
 107S 
 55, 56 
 230 
 1392 
 645 
 
 v. Taylor 
 v. Wearing 
 i'. Yerby 
 
 Harrisson v. Duignan 
 
 Harrod v. Harrod 
 
 Harrop, Re 
 
 Harry v. Davey 
 
 Harryman v. Collins 
 
 Harsell v. Kelley 
 
 Hart v. Albany, Mayor, &c. of 1629, 
 
 1631 
 
 v. Bleight 1284 
 
 v. Brand 1401 
 
 v. Carpenter 844 
 
 v. Scruggs 891 
 
 v. Small 1593 
 
 v. Stephens 114 
 
 v. Ten Eyck 284, 839. 840, 843, 
 
 844, 1176, 1180, 1229, 1230 
 
 v. Tims 1720 
 
 v. Tulk 403 448, 454. 1012. 1015. 
 
 1510, 1597, 1734, 1738, 2059 
 
 v. Wingate 997 
 
 Hartell v. Van Buren 632, 635 
 
 Harter v Colman 213 
 
 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Bonner 
 
 M. Co. 303, 334 
 
 Hartga v. Bank of England 148 
 
 Hartland v Dancocks 1114 
 
 Lady v. Atcherley 176 
 
 Hartley, Re 1734 
 
 v. Boynton 536 
 
 v. Gilbert 85 
 
 v. Matthews 385, 842 
 
 v. Russell 557, 563 
 
 v. Swayne 1563 
 
 llai-tinan i'. Dowdel 120 
 
 Hartmann i< Hartmann 1150 
 
 Hartridge, Ex parte 1620 
 
 v. Rockwell 1640, 1664 
 
 Hartshorn v. Eames 590. 787, 
 
 Hartshorne v. Hartshorne 
 
 v. Watson 
 Hartt v. Harvey 
 Hartwell v. Colvin 
 
 v. Townsend 
 
 v. Whitman 
 Hartwright v. Badham 
 Hartz v. Schrader 
 Harvard College v. Soc. for Pro- 
 moting Theolog Education 10, 
 137, 138 
 
 1150, 
 1165 
 
 1098 
 1619 
 1205 
 1583 
 845, 846 
 1131 
 1729 
 
 Harvey, Re 
 v. Ashley 
 v. Beck with 
 v. Bignold 
 v. Bradley 
 v. Branson 
 v. Clayton 
 v. Cooke 
 v Coxwell 
 v. Crawford 
 
 187,1841 
 100 
 145 
 243 
 743, 1370, 1581 
 9! 13 
 576 
 294 
 70, 799 
 1260 
 
 v. Croyden Union R. S. Au- 
 thority 973, 1031 
 v. E-ist India Co. 391 
 
 Hall 
 Harvey 
 
 412, 1675, 1685 
 225, 1045, 1055, 1069, 
 1213. 1527 
 
 V. Hewitt 
 v. Jacob 
 v. Lord 
 v. Lovekin 
 v. Mitchell 
 r. Morris 
 v. Mount 
 r. Mountague 
 i». Murrell 
 v. Renon 
 v. Tebbutt 
 v. Towle 
 v. Tyler 
 r. Varney 
 v. Wilde 
 Uarvie v. Banks 
 
 1237 
 
 1131 
 32 
 407 
 564 
 1106 
 570 
 1394 
 1683 
 1578 
 522 
 1392 
 967 
 628 
 1743 
 1209 
 1246 
 
 Harwell v. Lehman 214, 550 
 
 v Potts 17.33 
 
 Harwood V Kirby 279 
 
 V Railroad Co. 1640 
 
 Hasbiouck v. Shuster 1516 
 
 Haskell l>. Haskell 57J 
 
 v. Hilton 197 291,557 
 
 v- New Bedtord 1638 
 
 v Raoul 994. 1578 
 
 Haskius v. Rose 1684 
 
 Ha<lar t> Ho; lis 781 
 
 Hasluck 17. Stewart 449 
 
 Hassall v. Wright 1643 
 
 Hassan !'. City of Rochester 1661 
 Hassel) v. Van Houten 295 
 
 Ilastie v. Hastie 858, 890, 1019 
 
 Hastings (Lady), Re, Uallett v- 
 
 Hastings 109, 642 
 
 v. Belden 589, 1618 
 
 v. Cropper 1561, 15<>3 
 
 v. Ivall 163J. 1832 
 
 v. Palmer 806 
 
 v. Wiswall 1259 
 
 Lord, v. Beavan 1039, 1040, 1694 
 Haston v Castner 235 
 
 Hatch v , H83, 1781 
 
 v. Calvert l<i0 
 
 V. Dana 269 
 
 v. Eustaphieve 311, 395, 733 
 
 v. Indianapolis & S. R. Co. 1304, 
 2395 
 v. Searles 1213 
 
 v. Spoffbrd 633 
 
 v. The Newport 1120 
 
 v. Wallamet I B. Co. 1675 
 
 v. White 284 
 
 Hatcher v. Chambersburg Nat. 
 
 Bank 1120 
 
 v. Hatcher 385, 1584 
 
 v Massey 190 
 
 Hatchett v. Cremome 1322 
 
 Hatfield v Montgomery 640 
 
 Hathaway v. Baldwin 351 
 
 v. Crocker 1101 
 
 v. Hagan 790, 1298, 1299, 1548, 
 
 1551 
 
 v Russell 1168 
 
 0. Scott 746 
 
 Hathornthwaite v. Russel 1722 
 
 Hat-Sweat M. Co. v. Davis S M. 
 
 Co. 790, 1642 
 
 Hatton, Re 157 
 
 v. Harris 1029 
 
 ?•. Haywood 1037, 1054 
 
 Haughwort v. Murphy 281 
 
 Haulenbeck v. Cronkr'ight 1156,1321 
 
 Hauser v. Roth 1079, 1298, 1310 
 
 Ilausmeister v. Porter 630 
 
 Hautton v. Hager 42 
 
 Havelock, lie 1610 
 
 v. Havelock 1358 
 
 Haverfield v. Pyman 1828, 1829 
 
 Haverhill Loan Fund Assoc, v. 
 
 Cronin 284 
 
 Havers v . Havers 1722 
 
 Haverstick v. Sipe 1638 
 
 Haviland ». Bloom 90, 102, 105 
 
 Hawv Vickers 202 
 
 Hawarden )• Dunlop 452, 456 
 
 Hawes v. Bamford 893, 1671 
 
 r. Draeger 851 
 
 V. Johnson 39 
 
 ?•. Oakland 26 
 
 r. State 573 
 
 Hawke, Re 1797 
 
 ?• Kemp 1595 
 
 Hawker v. Himcombe 1029, 1030 
 
 llaukes v. Barrett 800 
 
 ?'. Hawkes 1163 
 
 v. Holland 1735, 1741 
 
 v Kennebeck 546 
 
 Hawkesley V. Gowan 1694 
 
 Hawkesworth v. Chaffey 561 
 
 v. Dewsnap 879 
 
 Hawkins 7'. Blake 405 
 
 v. Craig 225 237 
 
 v. Crook 518, 523, 1059, 1061
 
 Ixii 
 
 Hawkins v. Day 1314 
 
 v D d 1801 
 
 v- Gardiner ' ! 'l 
 
 v. Gathercole 460, 578, 1730, 1743, 
 1834 
 
 v. Hale 
 
 V. Hall 
 
 v. Ha»kins 
 
 v. Holmes 
 
 0. Lusconibe 
 
 r. Pearson 
 
 v. Smith 
 
 V. Watts 
 Hawkshaw v Parkins 
 Hawkswortb, lie 
 
 v Hawksworth 
 Hawley v. Bennett 
 
 v. Cramer 
 
 f Donnelly 
 
 v. James 
 
 v. Steele 
 
 V Wolverton 
 Haworth v. Bostock 
 Hawse v Moody 
 Hawtayue v Bourne 
 Hawthorne, He, Graham v 
 
 443 
 
 1452. 1453 
 
 38, 217, 218, 370 
 
 655 
 
 74, 170 
 
 418 
 
 1841 
 
 1359 
 
 1652 
 
 1794 
 
 108 
 
 1543, 1544, 
 
 1686 
 
 269, 551 
 
 893 
 
 1001, 1489 
 
 133, 211, 261, 1639 
 
 349, 373, 759 
 
 841 
 
 334 
 
 Massey 
 Hay v Bowen 
 
 v. Estell 
 
 v. State 
 
 v- Willoughby 
 Haycock v. Haycock 
 Hay den V. BuckliQ 
 
 o. Marmaduke 
 
 v. Thrasher 
 Hajes, He 
 
 v Bickelhoupt 
 
 v. Billings 
 
 v. Brotzman 
 
 629 
 
 1405, 1411 
 
 1150, 1151 
 
 892 
 
 983 
 
 208*, 211, 255 
 
 281 
 
 2H4 
 
 1675 
 
 99, 1802 
 
 1424 
 
 1675 
 
 1751 
 
 v. Dayton 334, 543, 601, 2383, 2384 
 
 v. Hayes 197 
 
 v. Johnson _ 1560 
 
 v. Leguin 747, 784 
 
 v. Miles 1588 
 
 Hayes's Appeal 334 
 
 Haygarth v. Wearing 1386 
 
 Hayllar v. Sherwood 58 
 
 Havman v Rugby School 
 
 Ha_\ mes v. Cooper 
 Hayne t'. Gould 
 
 v Hayne 
 Hayner v. Stanly 
 Haynes V Ball 
 
 1040, 1696, 1846 
 
 1157 
 
 607, 1075, 1550 
 
 659 
 
 493, 508, 509, 512, 
 
 526 
 
 681,1611 
 
 1795 
 
 v. Barton 
 v. Haynes 
 
 v. Hazlerige 1664 
 
 Hayney v. Coyne 563 
 
 Havnie v. Hail 645 
 
 Hays, Ex parte 135!» 
 
 v. Carr 860 
 
 v. Cornelius 214 
 
 v. Harmony Grove Cemetery 989 
 
 v. Hays 1296 
 
 v. Humphreys 283 
 
 v. Jackson 1772 
 
 v. State 546 
 
 Hayter, Ex parte 1589 
 
 Havward V Andrews 197 
 
 v. Carroll 841 
 
 v. East London Waterworks 
 
 Co 16«2 
 t'. French 1180 
 v Pry 8, 136. 156 
 v. tlray 1180 
 v. Havward 771, 772, 773, 1327 
 v. National Bank 378, 379 
 t;. Pile 203, 1527 
 t>. Price 1327 
 v. Roberts 732 
 v. Stephens 893 
 v. Stillingfleet 1630 
 Havwarden, Viscountess v. Dun- 
 lop 1596 
 Haywood v. Brunswick P. B. 
 Society 1654 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Haywood v. Hutchins 551 | 
 
 v Lincoln Lumber Co. 1734 i 
 
 v. Marsh 645, 1475, 1476 | 
 
 0. Miner 12'j6, 1317 
 
 v. Ovey 271 
 
 Hajzlett V McMillan 161 i 
 
 Hazard v. Dillon 303. 334 
 
 v Durant 26. 149. 235, 489, 505, 
 507, 526, 531, 608, 1743 
 v. Griswold 314, 324 
 
 v Hidden 974 
 
 Hazeldine v. Grove H2i 
 
 Hazelhurstt; Sea Isle City Hotel 
 
 Co 843 
 
 Hazeu v Durliug 236, 1615 
 
 v Thurber 1166 
 
 Hazleton V. Bright 1069 
 
 Hazzard v. Credit Mobilier 26 
 
 Heacock v. Stoddard 916 
 
 Head II. Egerton 676 
 
 v. Godlee 1473, 1581 
 
 v Head 76, 851, 1578 
 
 v Teyuhani, Lord 206 
 
 Heald v. Hay 448, 1674 
 
 Healey, He 887 
 
 v. J agger 834, 952 
 
 v. Simp.-ou 542 
 
 Heanley v. Abraham 805, 830 
 
 Heap v. Hartley 197 
 
 v. Jones 1436 
 
 Heaps v Commissioners of 
 
 Churches 40 
 
 Heard v. Borgwardt 406 
 
 v. March 1522 
 
 v. Pilley 196, 365, 561 
 
 Hearle v. Greenbank 97 
 
 Hearn v. Way 593 
 
 v. Tennant 1673, 1683, 1684 
 
 Hearne v. Ogilvie 525 
 
 v. Stowell 1127 
 
 Heartt v Corning 603,614,685, 
 686, 689, 690, 699, 1250 
 Heath v. Ashley 997 
 
 v. Bucknall 1637, 1638 
 
 v. Chadwick 59 
 
 t\ Chapman 1530 
 
 v. Crealock 362, 674, 878, 907, 
 909 
 v. Ellis 26, 242, 296 
 
 v. Erie Ry. Co. 193, 1556 
 
 v. Fisher 1264 
 
 v. Griswold H68 
 
 v. Heath 90, 91 
 
 v. Lewis 87, 107, 123. 179, 407, 
 513, 832, 1512, 1530, 1531 
 v. Percival 21 0, 250 
 
 ,.. Pugh 649, 652. 1072 
 
 v Vrelan 149- 
 
 Heathcote v Edwards 1588, 1796 
 v- North Staffordshire Rail- 
 way Co 1620, 1663 
 Heather v Waterman 495 
 Heathley t> Thomas 187 
 Heatlev v Finster 678 
 v. Newton 195, 14 1 4 
 Heaton J'. Dearden 209 
 Heavner v. Morgan 860 
 Hebbard v. Haughian 574 
 Hechmer v Giliigan 1561 
 Heck v. Buckley 1687 
 v. Vollmer 109, 1676 
 Heckman v Mackey 41 
 Hecksher v Crosley 28 
 Hedges v. Bowen 861 
 v Cardonnel 1318, 1486 
 I Heeman v. Midland 1828 
 Hftfield Waterworks v. Yeomans 543 
 Hffflmi v. Bowers 1675 
 Heffron v. Gage B'62 
 | v Gore 559 
 Hefner v. Hesse 1081 
 Heggie v. Hill 334 
 Heidritter v. Oil-cloth Co. 1743 
 Heighington v. Grant 668, 1252, 
 1260, 1416, 1420, 1421, 1432, 
 1449, 1464 
 Heineman v. Hale 149 
 
 Heinlen v. Cross 
 Heinrich, The 
 
 Heinrich v. Sutton 
 llciii>lir v Friedman 
 1 1 . iron. Re 
 Ilea- > . liexley. Lord 
 
 v. Ogle 
 Heller v. Royal Ins. Co. 
 Hellnian, Re 
 Helm i- Hardin 
 Helmetag v. Frank 
 Helmick v. Davidson 
 Helms v. Franciscus 
 Heniberow v. Frost 
 Heming v Archer 
 
 v. Dingwall 
 
 t\ Leilchild 
 
 1675 
 1S46 
 307 
 
 907 
 
 1064, 1066 
 
 202,204,643 
 
 520 
 
 590 
 
 1798 
 
 220, 256, 1505 
 
 860 
 
 790 
 
 76, 90, 91 
 
 852 
 
 1279 
 
 1555, 1558, 2047 
 
 1399, 1449 
 
 v Swinnerton 554, 1621, 1857, 
 
 1858 
 
 Hemings o Pugh 551 
 
 Hemming, Ex parte 62, 157 
 
 v Dingwall 414, 770, 776, 1458 
 
 v. Maddick 
 Hemphill v. M'Kenna 
 
 r. Miller 
 Hemry V. Macdonald 
 Hemsley v. Myers 
 Hendee v. Howe 
 
 1'iukt-rton 
 Henderson, He 
 v. Alloway 
 t;. Atkins 
 v. Campbell 
 v. Carbondale Coal & 
 
 Co. 
 v. Cook 
 
 415, 1102 
 1664 
 951 
 1417 
 1620 
 1381 
 146 
 555,664 
 1639 
 
 v. Dennison 
 t'. Dodds 
 v- Henderson 
 v. Henshall 
 v. Hopper 
 v. Jones 
 v. M'lver 
 v Mathews 
 v Meggs 
 v Meyers 
 v. Moss 
 v. Phillipson 
 v Runcorn 
 
 Co. 
 v. Sherman 
 v- Underwriting & A. Ass 
 
 v Walker 
 Hendruk v. Robinson 
 
 v Wood 
 Hendricks v. Craig 
 
 v McLean 
 Hcndriks v. Montngu 
 
 447 
 
 Coke 
 
 387. 1019 
 
 582, 587, 589, 1579, 
 
 1580 
 
 601 
 
 1423, 1437 
 
 555. 664, 1628 
 
 1029 
 
 443 
 
 2319 
 
 1235 
 
 736.801 
 
 518 
 
 417 
 
 1770 
 
 905 
 
 & Alkali 
 
 1079 
 
 Soap 
 
 334 
 
 39, 
 
 1556 
 
 1752 
 
 1028 
 
 629 
 
 915 
 
 997 
 
 328, 1648 
 
 560 
 
 Uendrickson v. Uendrickson 
 
 v. Hinckley 1625 
 
 v. Wallace 659 
 
 Hendrig v. Clay 1528 
 
 Ileneage v Aikin 1600 
 
 Henley v Brooke 1044 
 
 v. H. nley 542 
 
 v. Phillips 1412. 1415 
 
 v. Stone 280, 681, 742 
 
 Henly v Gore 
 
 Henman v Lester 
 
 Helm v Walsh 
 
 Itencegal 0. Evance 
 
 Hennessee v. Ford 
 
 Hennessey v. White 
 
 Hennessy v. Wright 
 
 Hennet o. Luard 
 
 Hennewinkle v. Georgetown 1661 
 
 Henniker r Chafy 1611 
 
 Henuing v. Raymond 743 
 
 v Samuel H32 
 
 v. Willis 200, 210, 367, 1395 
 
 Henuinger r. Heald 334. 659 
 
 Hennings v. Conner 7^8 
 
 Henrick v. Blair 671 
 
 Heurie r- Johnson 1157 
 
 I Henry v. Armstrong 852 
 
 1103, 1126 
 1727, 1728 
 909 
 632 
 87 
 581 
 794, 795
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 lxiii 
 
 Henry v. Blackburn 
 v. Browu 
 
 v. (J lark 
 V- Costello 
 v. Doctor 
 v. Ellis 
 
 187 
 406 
 
 2227 
 784 
 
 10.33 
 
 lutiy 
 
 v. Great Northern Railway 
 
 Co. 1652 
 
 v. Gregory 312, 732 
 
 v. Lee 1099 
 
 v McKittrick 334 
 
 v- Ogle 91 
 
 v Suttle Sol) 
 
 v Travellers 7 Ins. Co. 417, 1029. 
 1290, 1461, 1523, 1825 
 v. Tapper 1624 
 
 v. United States 1381 
 
 County v. Winnebago Drain- 
 ing Co. 560 
 Henr. Clay and Bock & Co. Re 1648 
 Henshaw v. People's Mutual N. 
 G Co. 1638 
 v. Wells 1370, 1716, 1734 
 Hensley v. Whiffin 214 
 Hen>loe's Case 227 
 Hen wood v Jarvis 1623, 1678 
 Hepburn v. Auld 989 
 v. Dunlap 989 
 v. Durand 726 
 v- Lordan 1635, lb'38 
 Hepburn's Case 49 
 Hepworth v. Uenshall 888 
 v. Heslop 1265, 1278, 1390 
 Herbert v. Hedges 1163 
 v Herbert 324, 500 
 v. Kowles 52 
 V. Sayers 58 
 v. Torball 67 
 v. Wren 1105 
 Lord v. Pusey 7*54 
 Hercy v. Ballard 644 
 v. Diuwoody 1&J7 
 v. Ferrers 581 
 Herd v. Lupton 809 
 Herdsman ;;. Lewis 1071, 1073 
 Hereford, Bishop of v. Adams 1437 
 Herefordshire Banking Co., Re 1253 
 Her^el v. Laitenberger 287, 1548 
 Herle v. Greeubank 1308 
 Herman v- Duuba.r 1610, 1741, 1705 
 Herndon v. Gibson 1290 
 v. Hurter 1746 
 Herr p. Bierbower 1031 
 Herrell v. 11 iimum 1037 
 Herrett v. Reynolds 507, 509, 800 
 Herrkk v. Belknap 1195, 1294, 1298, 
 1300, 1301, 1309 
 v Racine Warehouse Co. 1493 
 Herring v. Bischoffsheiin 350 
 v. Clobery 574, 1468, 1487 
 v. Goodson 851 
 v. Polley 1019 
 v. Swain 707 
 v. Wickham 675 
 v. Yeo 228 
 Herrington v. Hubbard 287 
 v. Robertson 1381 
 Hersey v. Veazie 26, 144 
 Hershberger v. Blewett 790 
 1 Hershee v. Hershey 974 
 1 Hershy v. Baer ' 1017 
 
 Hersou v. Chicago & Alton R. 
 1 Co. 1463 
 
 Hertford, Borough of v. Hert- 
 ford, Poor of 1419 
 Marquis of, Re 1089. 1090, 
 1691, 1693 
 v. Boore 309 
 v. Suisse 446, 461, 1590 
 t) Zichi, Count de 255 
 Hertford Charities, Re 1610 
 Hertz v Union Bank 1019 
 Hervey v. Beckwith 272 
 v. Fitzoatrick 1722 
 v. Smith 1635, 1002 
 v. Talbutt 1457 
 Hesing v. Attorney-General 12, 146 
 
 Hesketh, The 32 | 
 
 Heslop v. Metcalfe 1844 
 
 Hess v. Lowrey 1511 | 
 
 v. Vose 60, 1150 
 
 Hester v. Hester 307, 074 
 
 v. Thorn. -uu 1-21 
 
 V. Weston 589, 590 
 
 Hettihewage Siman Appu v. 
 
 Queen s Advocate 141 
 
 Heugh v. Kail ot Abergavenny 298 
 
 v. (Jairett 
 0. Scard 
 Heusner ? 
 Co. 
 
 579, 720 
 1417 
 Mutual Life Ins. 
 
 1561 
 
 553 
 
 983 
 
 1187 
 
 250. 326,403, 
 
 Heu.^tis V. Johnson 
 Heward v. Wheatley 
 Hewes v. Hewes 
 llewett V- Adams 
 
 406, 425, 853, 971, 1716, 1732, 
 
 1733 
 
 v. Foster 1416, 1420 
 
 Hewitson v. Sherwin 355 
 
 p. Todhunter 202, 203, 204, 896 
 
 Hewitt, Re 
 
 193 
 
 v. Campbell 
 
 843 
 
 v. Dement 
 
 418 
 
 v. Hewitt 
 
 611, 618, 704 
 
 v. Loosemore 
 
 674 
 
 v. M'Cartney 
 
 505 
 
 v. Montclair 
 
 287 
 
 v. Nanson 
 
 1266, 1207 
 
 v. Prime 
 
 576 
 
 v. v\ hite 
 
 396 
 
 Hewitt's Case 
 
 176, 1149 
 
 Hewlett v. Cruchley 
 
 1132 
 
 v. Davis 
 
 1273, 1282 
 
 v. Miller 
 
 380 
 
 Hextv. Walker 
 
 296 
 
 Hey v. Schooley 
 
 993 
 
 Heyer v. Bromberg 
 
 334 
 
 v Pruyn 
 
 652 
 
 Heygate v. Annesley 
 
 118 
 
 v. Thompson 
 
 182, 031 
 
 Hey man, Ex parte 
 
 897 
 
 v. Landers 
 
 1607 
 
 v. Uhlman 
 
 536,829 
 
 Heyn v. Heyn 
 
 1175 
 
 Hey s v. Ashley 
 
 657 
 
 Hey wood v. City of Buffalo 
 
 v. Miner 
 
 1112 
 
 v. Wait 
 
 L594, 1673, 1684 
 
 Hiatt v. Brooks 
 
 68 
 
 Hibbard V. Eastman 
 
 1621,1022, 
 
 
 1023 
 
 v. Morrison 
 
 1021 
 
 Hibbert v. Durant 
 
 726 
 
 v. Hibbert 
 
 1737 
 
 Hiberuia S. & L. Co. 
 
 t>. Jones 145, 
 
 
 417,418, 779 
 
 Hicheus i>. Congreve 
 
 240, 295, 403, 
 1772 
 
 193 
 
 v Kelly 
 
 Hick v. Lockwood 
 
 1733 
 
 Hie key, Ex parte 
 
 1009 
 
 v. Stone 
 
 801 
 
 Hickman v. Cooke 
 
 347 
 
 v. Upsall 
 
 652,850 
 
 Hickok v. Farmers' and Mecha- 
 
 nics' Bank 
 
 906, 928, 929 
 
 Hickox v. Elliott 
 
 200 
 
 Hicks v. Blanchard 
 
 576 
 
 v. Campbell 
 
 190. 338, 598 
 
 v. Chadwell 
 
 1249, 1300 
 
 r. Ferdinand 
 
 1120, 1580 
 
 o. Hastings 
 
 1103 
 
 v. Hicks 
 
 1750 
 
 v. Hogan 
 
 1108 
 
 v. Jackson 
 
 559 
 
 v. Oliver 
 
 418 
 
 D. Raincock 
 
 5*6 
 
 v. Wrench 
 
 1412 
 
 Hickson /'. Aylward 
 
 007 
 
 r. Lombard 
 
 328, 382 
 
 v. Mobley 
 
 709 
 
 »'. Rucker 
 
 12«2 
 
 Hidden v. Jordan 1240, 12 
 
 
 1246 
 
 Hiddingh v. Denyssen 1120 
 
 Hide v. Haywood 1410 
 
 v. Petit 1050 
 
 Hiern v. Mill 379, 380, 075 
 
 Higbee v Bacon 1230 
 
 v. Brown lcilO 
 
 v. Camden & Amboy R. Co 1601," 
 
 1677 
 
 Higdon v. Higdon 851. 9S0 
 
 v. Thomas 195 
 
 Higginbotiiam v. Burnet 547, 584 
 
 Higgins !■. Crawfurd 0-.2 
 
 e. Krankis 710 
 
 v. Hoppock 590 
 
 v Mills 1480 
 
 v. New York 1508 
 
 v Shaw 1642 
 
 v. Woodward 1669, 1676, 1085 
 
 Higgin.-on v. Adir 17i:9 
 
 v. Blockley 704, 21^4 
 
 v. Hall ' 68, 83, 18^5 
 
 v Wilson 182,031 
 
 High v. Batte 283, 612, 074, 077, 
 
 678, 726 
 
 v Worley 237 
 
 Higham, Ex parte 90 
 
 Highstone v. Franks 314, 639 
 
 High ton v. Treherue 980 
 
 Hightour v. Rush 1067 
 
 Hightower v. Mustian 288 
 
 v. Smith 1377 
 
 Hilary, Re 1347 
 
 Hildebraud v. Beasley 1518 
 
 Hildreth v. Skillenger lo77 
 
 Hildyard v . Cressy 408, 624, 681, 
 
 694, 729, 1559 
 
 Hiles v. Case 1743 
 
 i' Moore 1734, 1735 
 
 Hill v. Adams 261 
 
 v. Barclay 1658, 1659 
 
 v. Billingsley 1623 
 
 v. Biuuey 840 
 
 v. Bonner 204 
 
 v. Bowers 1003 
 
 v. Bush 843 
 
 v. Bute, Earl ot 737, 738, 760 
 
 v. Campbell 534 
 
 v. Challinor 1528 
 
 v. Chapman 1360, 1486, 1489, 
 
 1801 
 
 v. Cooper 87 
 
 v. Crarv 720 
 
 v. Curtis 319, 1027 
 
 v. Davison 1653 
 
 v. Durand 200 
 
 v. Eyre 418 
 
 v. Fulbrook 1103 
 
 ?'. Gaunt 813 
 
 v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 380 
 
 v. Greenwood 1108 
 
 r. Hart-Davis 454, 895, 1020 
 
 v. Hibbit 868, 940, 1440 
 
 v. Hill 334, 418, 885, 1530 
 
 v. Hoare 1079 
 
 v. Hoover 986 
 
 v. King 983, 1330 
 
 v. Lewis 250 
 
 v. Managers 10 
 
 v- Maury 1580 
 
 v. Newman 204 
 
 v. Proctor 149, 191, 1164 
 
 v. Keardon 28, 315, 542, 1394 
 
 v. Reno 1150 
 
 v. Rimell 1594, 1596, 1607, 1735 
 
 v. Saylea 1638, 1639 
 
 v. Smith 243, 1408 
 
 v. South Staffordshire Ry. Co. 
 
 1027, 1028. 1257 
 t». Thompson 1642, 1644, 1070 
 
 v. Tollit 744 
 
 v. Townley 283, 50* 
 
 v. Townsend 121 
 
 v. Turner 1551,1624 
 
 v. Walker 643, 1425 
 
 v. Ward 1075 
 
 v. Williams 844 
 
 v. Yates 1092, 1128
 
 lxiv 
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Hill v. Young 1157 
 
 Uillearv, Re 1440 
 
 v. Hurdle 379 
 
 v. Thompson 1003 
 
 Hiller v. Collins 1675 
 
 Uilliard v. Eiffe 328, 382 
 
 v. Fulford 1426 
 
 v. 1 1 1 1 i - 1 1 n 1570 
 
 v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. 
 
 Co. 51 
 
 v. Smyth 140 
 
 Hilligoss v. (irinslade 1620 
 
 llilluianr. Hurley 1638 
 
 Hillsr Barnard 243 
 
 v. Croll 1656 
 
 v. Evans 1081 
 
 v. Hills 73 
 
 ti. M'Rae 216, 269,324 
 
 v. Nash 216, 2ly 
 
 v. Parker 1743 
 
 v. Putnam 243 
 
 v. Reeves 1743 
 
 v. Springett 266, 407 
 
 Hilton v. Fowler 1130 
 
 v. Granville, Earl 1640, 1663, 1664 
 
 v. Guvot 664 
 
 v. Lawson 629, 1586 
 
 v. Lothrop 87, 260, 285,392,305, 
 
 1556, 1558 
 
 v. Woods 1381 
 
 Hi me v. Dale 1645 
 
 Hinchman v. Kelley 560 
 
 v. Paterson Horse R. Co. 303, 
 
 1635 
 
 Hinckley v. Gilman, &c. R. Co. 
 
 1461, 1492 
 
 v, Pfister 385, 1120 
 
 Hiucks, lie 307 
 
 Hincks v. Nelthorpe 570 
 
 Hind v. Whitmore 36, 74, 111, 796, 
 
 811, 1378 
 
 Hinde v. Blake 1043 
 
 v. Morton 813, 1511, 1512, 1526, 
 
 1527 
 
 v. SkeUon 631 
 
 v. Vattier 873 
 
 Hinder v. Streeten 1404 
 
 Hindle v. Birch 1131 
 
 v. Dakin 1278 
 
 Hindley v. Emery 1080, 1641, 1656 
 
 Hindman v. Aledo 712 
 
 v. Taylor 640. 1559 
 
 Hindmarsh v. Southgate 164, 174 
 
 Hinds v. Keith 1120 
 
 Hindson v. Weatherell 664, 913, 
 
 1488 
 
 Hine v. Dodd 843, 846 
 
 r. New Haven 556, 630, 801 
 
 Hiues v. North Carolina, State 
 
 of 17, 24 
 
 v. Spruill 642 
 
 Hinings v. Hinings 1802 
 
 Hinkley v. Moreau 48 
 
 Hinrichs v. Berndes 1620 
 
 Hinsdale D. G. Co. v. Tilley 236 
 
 Hinson v. Adrian 214 
 
 v. Pickett 1479 
 
 Hinton v. citizens' Mutual Ins. 
 
 Co. 779 
 
 v. Galli 1731, 2127, 235.3 
 
 v. Winsor 1461 
 
 Hiorns v. Holtom 710, 1266 
 
 v. Holton 1425 
 
 Hipkins ». Hipkins 1065 
 
 Hipp v. Babin 556, 630 
 
 Hippesley v. Horner 1111 
 
 v. Spencer 1630 
 
 Hirsch v. Im Thura 1861 
 
 v. Whitehead 1618 
 
 Hirst, Re 1267 
 
 v Procter 895 
 
 HHop v. Wvkeham 1610 
 
 Hitch v. Walls 1124 
 
 v. Wells 162, 476 
 
 Hitchcock r. Carew 883 
 
 t>. Caruthers 601 
 
 v. Clendiuen 95 
 
 Hitchcock v. Giddings 
 
 v . Jacques 
 
 v. Rhodes 
 
 v. Skinner 
 
 v. Tremaine 
 Hitchen v. Kirks 
 Hitchens v. Congreve 
 
 V. Lauder 
 Hitehman v. Stewart 
 Hite v. Hite 
 
 v. Salter 
 Hitner v. Suckley 
 Hix i'. Gosling 
 
 v. Whittemore 
 Ilixon v. Eastwood 
 Hoagland v. Titus 
 Hoare, A'e 
 
 lie, Hoare v. Owen 
 
 v. Breniridge 
 
 v. Contencin 
 
 v. Dickson 
 
 v. Hoare 
 
 1400 
 
 410 ! 
 
 763 
 
 961, 1151, 1158 
 
 1479 
 
 251, 1720, 1725 
 
 26,160 
 
 605,658 
 
 271, 2250 
 
 1254 
 
 1112 
 
 447 
 
 186, 402 
 
 852 
 
 214 
 
 1675, 1677 
 
 1347 
 
 1716 
 
 1624 
 
 550 
 
 39 
 
 13 
 
 v. Niblett 
 v. Parker 
 v. Peck 
 v Silverlock 
 Uobart v. Abbot 
 o. Andrews 
 
 v Johnstone 841, 1188, 1315, 1339 
 
 269 
 
 614, 683 
 
 550, 560 
 
 1132 
 
 194, 215, 261 
 
 197, 199, 260. 365, 
 
 668, 860 
 
 v. Frisbie 361 
 
 v. Stone 1772 
 
 Hobarts v. 1263 
 
 Hobbs, Re, Hobbs v. Wade 651 
 
 v. Dane Manut. Co. 63 
 
 i'. McLean 1411 
 
 v. Memphis R. Co. 549, 864 
 
 v. Reid 203 
 
 t>. Wayet 477 
 
 Hobday v. Peters 187 
 
 Hobhouse v. Courtney 447, 448 
 
 v. Hollcombe 1742, 1743 
 
 Hobler, Re 974 
 
 Hoboken Savings Bank v. Beck- 
 
 man 
 Hobson, Re 
 
 v. Bagnall 
 
 v. Doe 
 
 v. M'Arthur 
 
 v- Shearwood 
 
 v Sherwood 
 Hoby v. Hitchcock 
 Hock v. Hock 
 Hoddel v. Pugh 
 Hodder v. Rufnn 
 Hodgden !'. Hodgden 
 Hodgdon r. Farrell 
 
 v Heidnian 
 
 v. White 
 Hodge v. Hawkins 
 
 ?'. Holmes 
 Rexworthy 
 
 726 
 
 1063 
 
 1616 
 
 1118 
 
 379 
 
 1694, 1845 
 
 1152. 1743, 1748 
 
 29, 31, 32, 53 
 
 875 
 
 1384 
 
 1281, 1283, 1285 
 
 1255 
 
 1269 
 
 283 
 
 630 
 
 1369 
 
 284 
 
 1308 
 
 Hodgen v. Guttery 1624 
 
 Hodgens r. Hodgens 106 
 
 Hodges, Re 1323, 1347, 1606, 1797 
 v. Ancrum 1106 
 
 V. Beverley 116 
 
 v. Bowen 861 
 
 v. Don 1 ton 890 
 
 v. Fincham 1623 
 
 r. Hodges 598, 690 
 
 v. Millikiu 1578, 1579 
 
 v. Mullikin 1005, 1031 
 
 v- New England Screw Co. 26 
 
 v. Patrick 975 
 
 v. Pingree 1112, 1150, 2027, 2325 
 
 v. Salomons 
 
 
 1315 
 
 v. Screw Co. 
 
 
 144 
 
 v. Seaboard & R. R. 
 
 
 1638 
 
 v. Smith 
 
 1568, 
 
 1569 
 
 v. Welsh 
 
 
 1646 
 
 v. Williams 
 
 
 186 
 
 v. Wise 
 
 
 445 
 
 Hodges's Trust, Re 
 
 
 68 
 
 Hodgkin v. Longden 
 
 547 
 
 ,548 
 
 Uodgkinson v. National 
 
 Live 
 
 
 Stock Ins. Co. 
 
 
 243 
 
 Hodgman v. Chicago, &c. R. 
 
 Co. 1661 
 
 Hodgson, Re 217 
 
 Re, Beckett v. Ramsdale 269 
 
 v. Barvis 1138 
 
 v. Butterfield 764 
 
 v. Cash 1413 
 
 v. Clarke 1427 
 
 v. Duce 1638, 1661, 1682 
 
 v. Espinasse 360, 3(59 
 
 v. Farrell 1289 
 
 v. Forster 311, 1129 
 
 v. Hodgson 462,465,521, 
 
 1048 
 v. Merest 858 
 
 v. Powis, East 1640 
 
 v. Shaw 1279 
 
 v. Smithson 1461 
 
 v. Thornton 712 
 
 v. Williamson 187, 642 
 
 Hodle v. Healey 640 
 
 Hodson v. 877 
 
 v. Ball 1370, 1536, 1537, 1579, 
 
 1581, 2060 
 
 v. Cash 730 
 
 v. Coppard 1683 
 
 v. Warrington, Earl of 885. 896 
 
 v. Watson 1731 
 
 Hoe t>. Wilson 287 
 
 Hoffman v. Duncan 1732 
 
 v. Knox 986, 1576 
 
 v. Livingston 1591, 1669 
 
 v. McMorran 860 
 
 v. Pearson 974 
 
 v. Postel 1083 
 
 v. Savage 1156 
 
 v. Schoyer 517 
 
 v. Skinner 1402, 1450 
 
 v. Smith 1147 
 
 v. Van Dieman 1770 
 
 Hoffmann v. Postill 579, 580, 716, 
 
 718, 719, 720, 764, 1020, 1554 
 
 Hofiick v Reynolds 593, 598 
 
 Hogan , Re 749, 891 
 
 D. Branch Bank ol Decatur 735 
 
 v. Burnett 324 
 
 v- Kavanaugh 553 
 
 v. McFarland 418 
 
 v. Short 195 
 
 v. Walker 279, 290, 292 
 
 Hogarth v. Miller 1503 
 
 Hoge r. Fisher 851 
 
 v Penn 1801 
 
 Hogencamp ?>. Ackerman 718 
 
 Hogg v. Kirby 1642, 1648 
 
 v. Price 592 
 
 v. Scott 1641, 1681 
 
 Hoggart v Cutts 1560, 1564, 1565 
 
 v. Scott 989 
 
 Hoggat v. McCrory 551, 552 
 
 Hogge v. Burgess 1503, I860 
 
 Hoghton, Re 174, 1370 
 
 Re, Hoghton v. Fiddey 1580 
 
 v. Fiddey 1578 
 
 v Hoghton 852, 855, 1367 
 
 Hogue v. Curtis 817 
 
 Holiorst v. Howard 1507 
 
 Hoitt v. Burleigh 1076, 1078, 1079, 
 
 1110. 2334 
 
 Holabird v. Burr 1224, 1240, 1248, 
 
 1298, 1299, 1317 
 
 Holbecke v. Sylvester 1310, 1449 
 
 Holbrook v. Henderson 142 
 
 Holbrooke v. Cracroft 1457 
 
 Holcomb v. Mosher 369 
 
 Holcombe v. Antrobus 1590 
 
 v. Holcombe 868, 1235, 1461, 1485. 
 
 1745, 1746, 1747 
 
 v. Trotter 813 
 
 Holden, Ex parte 1033 
 
 Re 99, 1802 
 
 v. Gilbert 1238 
 
 v. Hearn 68, 170. K59 
 
 v. Holden 156, 580, 884 
 
 v. Hoyt 1743 
 
 v. Kvnaston 236, 794, 795, 1395 
 
 v. McMakin 1463
 
 Holden v. Silkstone, &c. Co. 1120 
 
 v. Stickuey 246 
 
 v. Upton 1743 
 
 v. Waterlow 113 
 
 Holder v. Durbin 1263 
 
 Holderman 0. Jones 1120 
 
 Holderness v. Lamport 1653 
 
 lloldemesse v. Hankin 843, 1560 
 
 Holderstaffe v. Saunders 1620 
 
 Holding, Ex parte 985 
 
 v. Barton 655, 657, 712, 2115 
 
 Holdrege v Gwynne 305, 1619, 1677 
 
 Holdsworth v. Dartmouth (May 
 
 1100 
 
 2 92 
 
 1643 
 
 674 
 
 1643 
 
 270, 271 
 
 1411 
 
 909 
 
 1548 
 
 1416, 1430 
 
 68 
 
 403, 702 
 
 723 
 
 257, 277 
 
 1071 
 
 1601 
 
 477, 1386 
 
 1157 
 
 116 
 
 252 
 
 2095 
 
 1720 
 
 956 
 
 1353 
 
 1169 
 
 503 
 
 410 
 
 1061 
 
 1666 
 
 1707 
 
 1501 
 
 1411 
 
 171 
 
 1542, 1543 
 
 887, 1069 
 
 1385 
 
 v. McDonald 1576, 1577, 1578 
 
 v. Shakeshaft 315, 317, 383, 542. 
 
 1369, 1394 
 
 Hollington, Re 1064 
 
 Hollinrake v. Truswell 1643 
 
 llollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron 
 
 Co. 1734 
 
 Hollis v. Bulpett 386 
 
 v. Burton 782 
 
 v. Shaffer 1648 
 
 Hollis's Case 214, 279. 642 
 
 Hollister v. Barkley 844, 1180, 1222, 
 
 1230, 1256, 1257, 1250, 
 
 1676, 1677 
 
 v. Lefevre 1561 
 
 v. Stewart 634 
 
 Holloway, lie 573 
 
 v. Cheston 1474 
 
 v. Holloway 1651 
 
 v. Millard 327 
 
 v. Phillips 398, 964, 985 
 
 Holly v. Bass 517, 1031 
 
 Holly Manuf. Co. v. New Ches 
 
 ter Water Co. 
 Hollyford Copper M. Co., Re 
 Holman v Bank of Norfolk 
 v. Kimball 
 
 or) 
 
 v. Holdsworth 
 
 v. McCrea 
 
 v Shannon 
 Hole v Bradbury 
 
 v Harrison 
 Ilolfnrd v. Phipps 
 
 v Yate 
 Holgate v. Eiton 
 
 v. Haworth 
 Holker v. Parker 
 Holkirk !». Holkirk 
 Holladay Case, The 
 Holland v Baker 
 
 v. Challen 
 
 v Craft 
 
 v. Cruft 
 
 v. Holland 
 
 v. Moody 
 
 v. Prior 
 
 v. Sproule 
 Hollenbeck v. Donnell 
 Holies v. Carr 
 Holley v. Chamberlain 
 
 v. Glober 
 
 v. Younge 
 Holliday v. Biordon 
 
 v. Bruner 
 
 v. Meyers 
 
 v Riodan 
 Hollier v. Eyre 
 Hollinger v. Syms 
 Hollings v. Kirkby 
 Hollingshead's Case 
 Hollingsworth V. Duane 
 
 v. Koon 
 
 ". Riddle 
 
 v. Vallejo 
 Holme v. Brown 
 
 v. Guy 
 
 v. Pringle 
 Holmes, Re 
 
 v. Arundel, Corp. of 
 
 214 
 
 1069 
 342 
 576 
 
 1577 
 
 860 
 
 1624, 1625 
 
 311 
 
 1501 
 100, 1&3, 629 
 
 1313 
 
 v. Baddeley 572, 
 
 v. Bell 
 v. Chester 
 
 VOL. I. — e 
 
 740, 1551, 1S19. 
 
 1S34 
 
 1718, 1726 
 
 296 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Holmes v. Eastern Counties 
 
 Railway 1307 
 
 v. Field 69 
 
 v. George 1677 
 
 v. Holmes 114, 547, 548, 12y8. 
 
 129y, 1300, 1726 
 
 v. Penney 178 
 
 v. Remsen 994 
 
 v. Shaver 1282 
 
 v. Sherwood 145 
 
 v Turner 2217 
 
 v. Upton 1631 
 
 v. Weaver 1081 
 
 Holroyd v. Wyatt 1278, 1285, 1286 
 
 Holsuian v Boiling Springs 
 
 Bleaching Co. 1635, 1637, 1638, 
 
 1639 
 
 Holstcomb v. Rivers 1230 
 
 Holt, He 160, 898, 1049, 1671, 1675 
 
 v. Daniel 590 
 
 v Holt 12!i0 
 
 v. Jesse 1031 
 
 v. Mill 214 
 
 v. Weld 83 i 
 
 Uolworthy v. Allen 1409 
 
 V. Mortloek 1622 
 
 Holyoake v. Shrewsbury & B 
 
 Ry. Co. 1637 
 
 Holvoke v. South Hadley Falls 
 
 Ice Co. 887 
 
 Homan v Moore 1565 
 
 Home v. Fish 645 
 
 v. Jobs 1677 
 
 v. Patrick 183, 499 
 
 v. Wallis 880 
 
 Home Assurance Ass., Re 26, 31, 
 
 1605 
 
 Home Ins. Co v. Atchison &c 
 
 R Co 313 
 
 v Howell 1627 
 
 Hone v. Van Schaick 1461, 1489 
 
 Honeyman v- Lewis 1133 
 
 v. Marryat 1501 
 
 Honeywood v. Selwin 717 
 
 Honner#. Morton 119, 125 
 
 Honore v. Colmesnil 668, 951, 1320 
 
 Hony v. Honv 559, 612, 624, 646, 
 
 617 
 
 Hooberrv v. Harding 1037 
 
 Hood v. Aston 1651, 1665 
 
 v. Burlton 97 
 
 v. Clapham 1370 
 
 ». Cooper 1013 
 
 v Green 1580 
 
 v- Hood 286 
 
 v. Inman 349, 361, 728 
 
 v. Irwin 313 
 
 v. Lynn 1661 
 
 v. Marquess 1(173 
 
 v. N. Y. & N. H. R Co. 1628 
 
 v- North Eastern Ry. Co. 1394, 
 
 1400 
 
 v. Oglander 988 
 
 v. Phillips 307, 308, 300 
 
 v. Pimm 858, 1487 
 
 v. Wilson 1437 
 
 Hooe v Marquess 1073 
 
 Hook v. Dorman 395, 588, 683, 1558 
 
 v. Ross 471 
 
 Hooker v. Olmstead 284 
 
 Hookham v. Pottage 1648 
 
 Hooks v. Sellers 1311,1314 
 
 Hoole v. Great Western Railway 
 
 Co. 241, 244 
 
 v. Roberts 1610, 1694, 1696 
 
 v. Smith 322 
 
 Hoolcv ?'. Hatton 851 
 
 Hooper, Re 1317 
 
 v Brodrick 1656, 1662 
 
 v. Campbell 015 
 
 v. Goodwin 12«>I 
 
 v. Gumm 576, 1021, 1834, 1836 
 
 v- Hooper 1417 
 
 v. Lane 1069 
 
 v. Paver 1590 
 
 v. Winston 1713, 1742, 1749. 1751. 
 
 1762 
 
 lxv 
 
 Hooper v. Yonge 1062 
 
 Hoover v . Donnally 230 
 
 v. Montclair. &c. R. Co. 1731 
 
 v. Mo. Pac Ry Co 890 
 
 v. Rawlings 892 
 
 Hope v. Atkins 1132 
 
 v. Carnegie 180, 182, 186, 448, 
 
 409, 1463, 1627, 1683, 1684 
 
 v. Fiddell 868, 883, 900, 912, 943, 
 
 1827, 1842 
 
 v. Fox 109 
 
 v. Hope 447, 448, 935. 936, 937, 
 
 938, 1147, 1348, 1360. 2129, 2293 
 
 V. Threlfall b90, 913, 1488 
 
 Hopewell v. Barnes 1040 
 
 Hopkiu v. Hopkin 749. 891, 17o9 
 
 Hupkius, Re, Dowd v. Hawtiu 1169, 
 
 1722 
 
 v. Clay brook 457 
 
 v. Counel 1752 
 
 v De Kobeck 142 
 
 v. Gilman 671 
 
 v. Hopkins 229, 266 
 
 v- Lee 986 
 
 v Medley 1150 
 
 v. Ito.-eclare Land Co. 279 
 
 v- Snedaker 385 
 
 v. Spurlock 840 
 
 v. Stephenson 1242 
 
 v. Strump 871 
 
 v. Walker 2346 
 
 v. Worcester & B. Canal 1727 
 
 v. Young 3o3 
 
 Hopkiusou v. Bagster 1182 
 
 v. Burghley, Lord 1647, 1837 
 
 v. Ellis 1432, 1433 
 
 v. Rolt 1503 
 
 v. St. James 1444 
 
 Hopkirk v. Bell 51 
 
 v. Page 190 
 
 Hopper v. Fisher 161 
 
 v. Hopper 713 
 
 Hoppock v. Cray 378, 153) 
 
 Hopson v . Harrell 298 
 
 Hopwood v Derby, Earl of 1075, 
 
 1079, 1112 
 
 Horan v. Wooloughan 1389 
 
 Horbach v Hill 233 
 
 Hord v. Colfert 1073 
 
 Hore v. Becher 123 
 
 Horford ;■ Wilson 1126 
 
 Horlock v. Priestley 1422 
 
 v. Smith 1252, 1389, 1841 
 
 v. Wilson 515 
 
 Horlor v. Carpenter 1127 
 
 Horn v Coleman 1464 
 
 v. Detroit Dry- Dock Co. 986 
 
 v Kilkenny Railway Co. 1615 
 
 Hornby v. Cardwell 406 
 
 v Holmes 447 
 
 v. Matcham 2215 
 
 Hornet'. Barton 1473,1476 
 
 v. Home 1437 
 
 i). McKenzie 1090 
 
 v 1'ountain 85 
 
 V Shepherd 1411 
 Horner v Horner 318, 630 
 
 v. Ovler 1443 
 
 V Wheelwright 895 
 Hornor v. Hanks 1548 
 Hornsby v. Eddy 1743 
 
 v. Lee 119 
 
 Hornum Patent Man. Co. v. 
 
 Brooklyn R. Co 334 
 
 Horrellr. Witts 1726 
 
 Horry v. Calder 429 
 
 Horseburg v. Baker 1528 
 
 Horsley v. Bell 273 
 
 v. Chaloner 1417 
 
 v. Cox 1440 
 
 v. Fawcett 223, 421 
 
 Horton, Re 362 
 
 v. Baptist Church and 
 
 Society 1560, 1569 
 
 v. Bassett 659 
 
 v. Brorklehurst 416, 417, «34 
 
 v. Sayer 671
 
 lxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging. ] 
 
 Horton v. Thompson 582, 1531 
 
 Horwood, Be 894 
 
 v. Schmedes 987,991,1539 
 
 Ho.sack v. Rogers 1053, 1411, 1412, 
 
 1771 
 
 Hosford v. Nichols 1260 
 
 HosUen v. Sincock 1391, 1394, 1395 
 
 Ho.-king v. Terry 1577, 157rf 
 
 Hoskins, lie 86, 226 
 
 v. Campbell 798 
 
 V. Cole 639 
 
 v. Lloyd 609 
 
 V. White 68 
 
 Hospes v. Northwestern Manuf. 
 
 Co. 1051, 2048 
 
 Hoste V. Pratt 1359 
 
 Hotchkiss v. Trustees, &c. 20 
 
 llotten v. Arthur 1645 
 
 Hottenstein v. Conrad 1734 
 
 Houck v. Bridwell 68 
 
 v. Camplin 121 
 
 Hough v Oanby 169 
 
 v. Doyle 169 
 
 v. Lawrence 918 
 
 D. Martin 1669, 1818 
 
 v. Richardson 645, 844 
 
 v. Ryley 95 
 
 v. Williams 1191, 1196 
 
 Hougham v. Sandys 1194 
 
 Houghton v. Bankart I860 
 
 v. Barney 1448 
 
 v. Davis 197 
 
 v Godschall 1543 
 
 t; Kendall 1560, 1569, 1572 
 
 v. Reynolds 360, 370 
 
 v. Sowles 1163 
 
 v. West 1577 
 
 Houlditch v. Donegal, The Mar- 
 quis of 635, 855, 1522, 1731 
 Hou.se, Ex parte 1584 
 Be 659 
 V. Dexter 285 
 v. Lockwood 1551 
 V. Mullen 334, 559, 659 
 V. Walker 1291 
 Houseman v. Houseman 1411 
 House Property Co. v. H. P. 
 
 Horse Nail Co. 211 
 
 Houseworth v. Hendrickson 1712 
 
 Hously v. Lindsay 1283 
 
 Houston v Blackman 254, 261, 405 
 
 v. Briscoe 812, 1512 
 
 v Levy 243 
 
 v. Mossman 1255 
 
 v. Sadler 816 
 
 v Sledge 830 
 
 v Sligo 659 
 
 Hovelman v. Kansas City H. 
 
 R Co. 1650 
 
 Hovenden ?> Anneslev, Lord 135, 
 136, 543, 559, 560, 644, 645 
 Hovey v McDonald 1743 
 
 V Rubber Tip Pencil Co. 1081 
 
 How, Be 1799 
 
 v . Best 146, 296 
 
 v. Hall 878 
 
 v. Jones 1461 
 
 v. Strode 1126 
 
 Howard, Matter of 1205 
 
 Re 1851 
 
 v. Barnwell 1151,1152,1161 
 
 V. Bond 1062 
 
 v. Chaffers 1366, 1374 
 
 r. Gossett 1096 
 
 v. Gunn 1647 
 
 v. Howard 28 
 
 v. Lowell Machine Co. 1073, 1765 
 v. Milwaukee &c. R. Co. 1062 
 
 t; Moffatt 90, 101 
 
 V. Newman 507 
 
 V. Okeover 561 
 
 v. Palmer 1734 
 
 V. Papera 1722 
 
 «. Prince 319, 1604 
 
 v. Rhodes 1416 
 
 V. Robinson 18*5 
 
 v. -Salisbury, Earl of 1362 
 
 Howard v. Scott 1298, 1299 
 
 v. Smith 1411 
 
 v. ft Paul Plow Works 1642 
 
 v Stephenson 1168 
 
 v. Thompson 1643 
 
 v. Warfield 1624 
 
 Howard Man. Co v. Water Lot 
 
 Co 367 
 
 Howarth, Be 166 
 
 Howuen v. Rogers 1700, 1703 
 
 Howe v. Duppa 586, 673 
 
 v. Grey 505, 810 
 
 v Harvey 358, 562 
 
 v Hunt 1081 
 
 v. Jones 1750 
 
 v. Lemon 1062 
 
 v M'Kernan 721 
 
 v. Nickerson 554 
 
 v Robius 390 
 
 v Russell 777, 778, 780, 1232, 
 
 1248, 1298, 1300, 13*1, 1322 
 
 v South Park Com'rs 1461 
 
 v. Willard 399, 439, 441. 457, 539, 
 
 1618, 1667, 1675, 1684 
 
 Howe Sewing Machine Co., Be 27 
 
 Howel v. Howel 1475 
 
 Howell v. Arkmore 145 
 
 v. Ashmore 146, 569, 570- 579 
 
 v. City of Buffalo 334 
 
 ■v. Coningsby, Lord 1055 
 
 v Foster 190 
 
 *. George 843, 1380 
 
 v Harding 1845 
 
 v. Kightley 1312 
 
 v. Lewis 83 
 
 v. Sebring 324, 327, 402, 415, 1289 
 
 v. Tyler 1440 
 
 v. Waldron 633 
 
 v. West 346 
 
 v Western R. Co. 284 
 
 Howell's Estate 888 
 
 Howells v. Wilson 1550 
 
 Howerton v. Sprague 1678 
 
 Howes, Matter of 1457 
 
 v. Chester 52 
 
 v Downing 737 
 
 v Patterson 418 
 
 Howkins v. Bennett 448, 710 
 
 v. Howkins 389, 1701, 1702, 1703, 
 
 1705 
 
 Howland v. Fish 225 
 
 v Kenosha County 586 
 
 Rowland's, Sir R , Case 67 
 
 llowlett v. Central Carolina 
 
 Und Co 1743 
 
 Howling v. Butler 701 
 
 Howorth v. Samuel 1137 
 
 Howse v. Chapman 1427. 1429, 1430 
 
 Howthv Owens 193,208,627,1567 
 
 Hoxey v. Carey 295, 801 
 
 Hoxiev Carr 190,289 
 
 ?' Scott 740 
 
 Hoxsey ik New Jersey M. R. Co 560 
 
 Ho\al v. Brvson 837 
 
 Hoye v. Penn 443, 1460 
 
 Hoyland S C. Co , Be 1738 
 
 Hoyle v Livesey 972 
 
 v. Moore 390 
 
 Hoyt v Clarkson 371 
 
 V- Gelston 1463 
 
 V. Hellen 1352 
 
 v. Hilton 68 
 
 v Hovt 328, 382, 630, 1648 
 
 v. Jesse 973, 974 
 
 v Smith 402 
 
 Hubbard. Be 1449 
 
 v. Borden 195 
 
 v. Burrell 256 
 
 v. Epps 642, 1211 
 
 v. Gorham 354 
 
 v. Hewlett 1186 
 
 v. Hubbard 851, 1163 
 
 v. Johnson 230 
 
 v Latham 438, 1213, 1428 
 
 v. McNaughton 324 
 
 v. Town 1638 
 
 v. Turner 682, 1551 
 
 Hubbell v Currier 1901 
 
 V. De Laud 701, 8i3 
 
 v. Merchants' Bank 256 
 
 v. Von Schoening 9e9 
 
 v. Warren 244, 245, 1169 
 
 tluber v. Myers S Depot 
 
 
 197 
 
 Hubertson v Goold 
 
 
 
 1511 
 
 Huble v Clark 
 
 
 
 878 
 
 liuckenstine's Appeal 
 
 
 
 1635 
 
 Huddleston v. Briscoe 
 
 
 
 981 
 
 lluddlestone v. Uuddlestone 
 
 1166 
 
 Uudgins v Kemp 
 
 
 
 1302 
 
 llutlnit v Nash 
 
 
 214, 
 
 1265 
 
 Hudson v. Allison 
 
 
 
 974 
 
 •c Heunett 
 
 795, 
 
 1380, 
 
 1395 
 
 v Brown 
 
 
 
 1"96 
 
 v. Buck 
 
 
 
 561 
 
 v Dungworth 
 
 
 
 430 
 
 v Eiseiunayer Milling Co 
 
 236 
 
 v. Fernvhough 
 
 
 
 418 
 
 v. Grenifell 485 
 
 ,716 
 
 760, 
 
 1819 
 
 v. Hudson 
 
 
 
 1553 
 
 v. Maddison 
 
 303 
 
 344, 
 
 1678 
 
 v. Majoribanks 
 
 
 
 11: .8 
 
 v. Temple 
 
 
 
 1624 
 
 v Trenton, &c, Manuf 
 
 Co. 
 
 857, 
 
 1004, 
 
 1221, 
 
 1232 
 
 Hue v. Richards 
 
 
 
 1*29 
 
 Huerstal v. Muir 
 
 
 
 1461 
 
 Huffv Miller 
 
 
 
 1461 
 
 v Ri pley 
 
 
 
 552 
 
 Huffard v. Gottberg 
 
 
 
 284 
 
 Huffman v Barkley 
 
 
 
 933 
 
 v Hummer 
 
 
 
 778 
 
 Huger v. Huger 
 
 
 
 168 
 
 v S Carolina 
 
 
 
 446 
 
 Hugg v. City of Camden 
 
 
 1662 
 
 Huggins v York Buildings Co. 
 
 611, 
 
 
 636, 
 
 1262 
 
 1538 
 
 Hughes v. Biddulph 
 
 571 
 
 572, 
 
 1824 
 
 * Blackwell 
 
 
 
 844 
 
 v. Blake 661, 695, 82 
 
 v. Bloomer 
 
 
 771 
 
 ,781 
 
 v Boone 
 
 
 
 576 
 
 v. Budd 
 
 
 
 1131 
 
 v. Came 
 
 
 
 1517 
 
 v. Chester and Holyhead Ry 
 
 
 Co 
 
 
 
 ' 983 
 
 v. Clerk 
 
 
 774 
 
 1559 
 
 v. C«iok 
 
 
 
 342 
 
 v. Devlin 
 
 
 
 1150 
 
 v Dunlap 
 
 
 
 1071 
 
 v. Eades 
 
 
 152, 8i 
 
 v Edwards 
 
 
 
 640 
 
 v Empson 
 
 
 
 2060 
 
 v Evans 
 
 
 
 108 
 
 V- Garner 6' 
 
 8, 846, t 
 
 t> Garth 
 
 
 
 677 
 
 v Hamilton 
 
 
 
 1286 
 
 !'. Hatchett 
 
 
 
 1716 
 
 v. Hughes 559, 1135 
 
 1359, 
 
 1300, 
 
 
 
 1743 
 
 1748 
 
 v Jones 556. 826 
 
 ,978 
 
 979, 
 
 1029, 
 
 10ai, 1123, 1124, 
 
 1368 
 
 1577 
 
 15H0 
 
 v- Key 
 
 
 
 1413 
 
 v Lewis 
 
 
 
 805 
 
 V. Lipscombe 
 
 
 
 1282 
 
 v London &c Assurance Co 
 
 836 
 
 v Millikin 
 
 
 
 1584 
 
 v. More 
 
 
 
 196 
 
 v. Phelps 
 
 
 
 881 
 
 v Science 
 
 
 
 1347 
 
 v- Smith 
 
 
 
 1369 
 
 v. Spittal 
 
 913, 
 
 1189 
 
 1339 
 
 v. Stickney 
 
 
 
 1576 
 
 v. Tennison 
 
 
 
 338 
 
 v. Thomas 
 
 
 
 767 
 
 v. Washington 
 
 
 
 1017 
 
 v Wells 
 
 
 
 187 
 
 v. Wheeler 
 
 
 
 1724 
 
 v Williams 749, 
 
 1182 
 
 1235 
 
 ,1244 
 
 v. Wynne 
 
 
 642 
 
 , 1254 
 
 Hughey v. Bratton 
 
 
 
 1548 
 
 Hughson v. Cnokson 
 
 
 
 211 
 
 Hugill v. Wilkinson 
 
 
 
 652 
 
 Hugonin v. Baseley 
 Huguenin v. Basely 
 
 
 1720 
 
 , 1721 
 1470
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging] 
 
 lxvii 
 
 Hugunin v. Thatcher 28 
 
 Huish v. Sheldon 1133 
 
 Hukill v. Guffey 565 
 
 II ulbe't v. Douglas 1561 
 
 v. McKay 1209, 17U7 
 
 Hulett v. Stockwell 1071 
 
 Hulfish v. O'Brien 1653 
 
 Huliug v. Farwell 1221 
 
 Hulkes v. Day 1040, 1694, 1695, l>i96 
 Hull v. Oaughy 1461 
 
 v. Falconer 1205, 1206, 1208 
 
 v. Noble 369 
 
 Hull & Hornsea Ry. Co., Re 1035, 
 1037 
 Huilett v. Spain, King of 17, 141 
 Hulley v. Security Trust Co. 1630 
 Hulni & Lewis, Re 1069 
 
 Hulme v. Shreve 1639 
 
 v. Tenant 186 
 
 Hulsted v. Meeker 383 
 
 Hulton v Sandys 885 
 
 Humber Iron Works Co , Re 1474 
 Humberd v. Kerr 190 
 
 Humberston v. Humberston 135 
 
 Humbert v. Trinity Church, Rec- 
 tor, &c. 560 
 Humble v Humble 1278 
 v. McDonough 840 
 v. Shore 280 
 Hume v. Babington 539 
 v. Commercial Bank 715, 971, 
 1467 
 v. Pocock 418, 1487 
 v. Scott 960 
 Humes v. Scruggs 659, 828 
 1 1 uin page v. Rowley 1114 
 Humphrey v. Archibald 581 
 v Browning 1845 
 v. Foster 987, 989 
 v. Hollis 230 
 v. Morse 1383 
 Humphreys v. Atlantic Milling 
 Co. 630 
 v. Blevins 1116, 1124, 1147 
 v. Cousins 211 
 v. Harrison 1630 
 v. Hopkins 1743 
 v. Humphreys 318, 407, 691, 1671 
 v. Incledon 318, 1510 
 v. Pensam 868 
 V. Tate 321 
 Humphries v. Roberts 1291 
 V. Taylor Drug Co. 1556 
 Humphrys v. Moore 1422 
 Hungarian Hill O. M. Co. v. 
 
 Moses 1551 
 
 Hungate v. Gascoigne 674 
 
 v. Gascoyue 1537, 1577, 1578 
 
 Hungerfor'd v. Cushing 341. 1734 
 
 v. Jagoe 1137 
 
 Hungerford's Case 1461 
 
 Hunham v Llewellyn 560 
 
 Hunn v. Norton 1259, 1381, 1415. 
 
 1417 
 
 Hunnewell v. Goodrich 2361 
 
 Hunnings v. Williamson 354, 564 
 
 Hunt v. Acre 233 
 
 v. Anderson 553, 1557 
 
 v. Andover 1427 
 
 v. Blackburn 578 
 
 v. Booth 38, 109 
 
 v. Chicago Horse Ry. Co. 10 
 
 v. Clarke 887 
 
 v . Columbian Ins. Co. 1751 
 
 v. Ellison 1003 
 
 v. Elmes 679, 1831, 1832 
 
 v. Fisher 1286 
 
 d. Fownes 1387 
 
 Hunt v. Gookin 
 
 717, 721 
 
 v. Hayt 
 
 365 
 
 v , Holland 
 
 409, 422 
 
 v. Hunt 
 
 108, 553, 1626 
 
 v. Johnson 
 
 619 
 
 v. Lever 
 
 448 
 
 v. Lewin 
 
 998, 1377, 1463 
 
 v. McClanahan 
 
 1846 
 
 v. Nevers 
 
 1258 
 
 v Niblett 
 
 515 
 
 v. Peacock 
 
 219 
 
 v. Penrice 
 
 617, 619, 701 
 
 v. Priest 
 
 1058, 1718 
 
 v. Pullen 
 
 914 
 
 v. Rooney 
 
 190, 194 
 
 v. liousmaniere 
 
 419, 846, 2357 
 
 v. Strong 
 
 1460 
 
 v. Terril 
 
 663 
 
 v. Van Derveer 
 
 216 
 
 v. Wallis 
 
 739 
 
 v. Wickliffe 
 
 287, 295, 457 
 
 
 1044, 1452, 1590 
 692 
 
 v. Ayre 
 
 v. Belcher 
 
 551, 1459 
 
 v. Daniel 
 
 1529 
 
 v. Dash wood 
 
 1382 
 
 v. Dublin &c Ry. 
 
 Co. 881, 1817 
 
 v. Fletcher 
 
 917 
 
 v. Hallett 
 
 117, 124 
 
 i'. Hutton 
 
 986 
 
 v. Jones 
 
 837 
 
 v. Kennedy 
 
 1120 
 
 v. Lawrence 
 
 1364 
 
 v. McCoy 
 
 378 
 
 v. Macklew 
 
 214 
 
 v. Marlboro 
 
 1463 
 
 v. Myatt 
 
 2214 
 
 v. Nockolds 653, 690, 692, 702, 
 741, 1397 
 v. Potts 61 
 
 v. Robbins 523 
 
 v. Spotswood 645 
 
 v. Stewart 664 
 
 v. Walters 675 
 
 v. Wortley 1528 
 
 v. Young 250 
 
 Huntingdon, Trustees of v. 
 
 Nicoll 1462 
 
 Huntington v. Allen 1624 
 
 v. Little Rock &c Ry. Co. 991,1580 
 v. Palmer 26 
 
 v. Saunders 319, 737 
 
 Huntingtower, Lord v. Sherbom 63. 
 813, 814. 1451 
 Hunton v. Equitable Life Assur- 
 ance Society 313 
 Huntress v. Epsom 14-34 
 Hurd v. Aschernian 334, 843 
 v. Case 1548 
 v. City of Elizabeth 1742, 1751 
 v. Everett 402, 40B 
 v. Haines 739 
 ''. Simpson 559 
 Hurlhatt v Harnett 1168 
 Hurlburd v. Freelove 1473, 1478 
 Hurlburt v. Britain 829 
 v. Hurlburt 576 
 Hurlbut v. Hutton 972 
 Hurlbutt v. N. W. Spaulding 
 
 Saw Co. 313 
 
 Hurley v. Coleman 1653 
 
 v. Murrell 1205 
 
 Hursell v. Bird 236 
 
 Hurst v. Coe 26 
 
 v. Everett 634 
 
 v. Hurst 168, 285, 447, 1265, 1266, 
 
 1430 
 
 v. Jones 839 
 
 Hurst v. Padwick 28 
 
 Hurt !•. Stull 1267 
 
 v. Long 165, 1576, 1580 
 
 Husband, hire 894 
 
 v. Aldrich 1150 
 
 Huse v. Washburn 1073 
 
 Husham v. Dixon 462 
 
 Husley v. Robinson 1019 
 
 Huson v. McKenzie 217 
 
 Hussey v. Dole 190, 287, 292 
 
 v. Home Payne 364. 561 
 
 Huston v. Cassidy 1318 
 
 v. M'Ciarty 285, 286, 287, 289, 
 
 295, 3:h) 
 
 v. Noble 285 
 
 Hutcheon v. Mannington 892 
 
 Hutcheson v. smith 1250 
 
 Hutchings, lie 100 
 
 v. Smith 119 
 
 Hutchins v Childless 842 
 
 Hutchinson, Re 1169 
 
 V- Ay res 559 
 
 v. Blumberg 1643, 1648 
 
 v. Brock 49, 52 
 
 v. Freeman 438, 1213, 1374, 1428 
 
 v. Hampton 1753 
 
 v. Haslam 553 
 
 v Horner 1594 
 
 v. Hutchinson 1786 
 
 17. Massarene 1715, 1741 
 
 v. Mershon 334 
 
 v. Norwood 68 
 
 v. Piper 1134 
 
 v. Reed 294, 406, 709 
 
 v. Sinclair 846, 847 
 
 v. Stephens 972 
 
 v. Swift 358, 1474 
 
 v. Tindall 1230 
 
 Hutson v. Sadler 1294 
 
 Hutton v. Beeton 1754 
 
 v. Hepworth 1600 
 
 v. Mansell 1277, 1278 
 
 v. Mayne 166 
 
 v. Rossiter 236, 1225 
 
 v. Scarborough Cliff Hotel Co. 1650 
 
 v. Sealy 1265 
 
 v. Smith 441, 511 
 
 Hutts v. Martin 1163 
 
 Huxham v Llewellyn 598 
 
 Hyam v. Terry 1468 
 
 Hyatt, Re 1075 
 
 Hyde v. Edwards 366, 1349 
 
 v. Forster 1059, 1545 
 
 v. Greenhill 1059, 1060 
 
 i'. Hyde 113, 893, 1048 
 
 v. Lamherson 1580 
 
 v. Lodge 1175 
 
 v Price 1255 
 
 v. Warden 1729 
 
 v. Warren 1563 
 
 v. Whitfield 1704, 1707, 
 
 1712 
 
 Hyer?> Caro 1523 
 
 v. Deaves 1267 
 
 v. Little 737 
 
 Hygeia Water Ice Co. v. New 
 
 York H. I. Co 1648 
 
 Hyliard v. White 681 
 
 Hylton i'. Morgan 1661 
 
 Hyman v. Devereux 1081 
 
 v. Helm 633, 800 
 
 v. Smith 1274, 1575 
 
 v. Wheeler 33t 
 
 Hynam v. Dunn 1638, 1663 
 
 Hynson v. Voshell 844 
 
 Hyre )>. Lambert 314 
 
 Hyslop v. Powers 1461 
 
 Hythe, Mayor of, v. East 1081, 1082
 
 lxviii 
 
 TABLE OK CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 I. 
 
 laege v. Bossieux 1302 
 
 Iasigi v. lirown 2178 
 
 v. Chicago, B & Q R. Co. 1417 
 Ibbetson, Ex parte 157 
 
 Ibbottson v. Rhodes 848 
 
 Idaho & Oregon Land Imp. Co. 
 
 v. Bradbury 1071 
 
 Ide v. Ball Engine Co. 1548, 1642 
 Idley v Bowen 1461, 1489 
 
 lglehart v. Bierce 221 
 
 v. Vail 188!) 
 
 Ihl v St. Joseph Bank 933 
 
 Ihlee v Henshaw 197 
 
 Ilchester, Earl of, Ex parte 1004, 
 1350, 1351, 1352 
 Her v. Roath 1076, 1576 
 
 lies v Flower 40 
 
 v. Turner 1128, 1135 
 
 Illiugworth !'. Rowe 1561 
 
 Illinois v. Illinois Central R. Co. 6 
 Illinois Laud Co. v. Speyer 586 
 
 lllsley v. Jewett 646 
 
 llsley v. Nichols 1710 
 
 Inolay v. Carpentier 1622 
 
 Imperial Bank of India v. Bank 
 
 of Hindustan 26, 27 
 
 Imperial Fire Ins. Co v. Gun- 
 ning 1682 
 Imperial Gas Co v. Broadbent 1637 
 Imperial Mercantile Credit As- 
 sociation, lie 1038 
 Imperial Refining Co v. Wyman 405, 
 418 
 Importers' Bank v. Littell 1556 
 Improvement Commissioners v. 
 
 N. J. Midland R. Co. 1637 
 
 Inby v. M"Crea 652 
 
 Ince's Case 907 
 
 Inchbald v Barrington 1629, 1635, 
 1639, 1641 
 v. Robinson 1071, 1635, 1639 
 
 Inchiquin r. French 1619 
 
 Inchley v Alsop 244, 1540 
 
 Incledon ?>• Northcote 124 
 
 Incorporated Society v. Rich- 
 ards 1252 
 Ind, Coope & Co. v. Emmerson 674, 
 675 
 India Mutual Tns Co. v. Bigler 1573 
 Indianapolis Land Trust v. Hoff- 
 man 630 
 Indianapolis Nat. Gas Co. v. 
 
 Kibby 1638 
 
 Indianapolis Water Co. v. Am- 
 erican Strawboard Co. 1638 
 India Rubber Comb Co. v. 
 
 Phelps 2389 
 
 Indigo Co v. Ogilvy 149 
 
 Indurated Fibre I. Co. v Grace 314 
 Inebriates' Home v. Kaplan 1517 
 Ingalls v. Lord 
 lngate v. Lloyd Austriaco 
 Iugersoll v. Ingersoll 
 
 v. Stjger 
 Ingham v. Bickerdike 
 
 v. Ingham 
 
 Waskett 
 
 Iugilby v. Shafto 
 
 Iugle v. Partridge 
 
 v. Richards 
 Inglee v. Coolidge 
 luglessi v. Spartali 
 lnglis v Campbell 
 
 v. Haigh 
 Ingraham v. Dunnell 
 
 v. Hall 
 v. Postell 
 Ingram, lie 
 v. Little 
 v. Mitchell 
 v. Morgan 
 v. Sherard 
 v Smith 
 v. Stiff 
 
 1576 
 
 449 
 
 68, 532 
 
 843 
 
 1352 
 
 775 
 
 1525 
 
 579, 722, 1556 
 
 808, 809 
 
 643 
 
 630 
 
 724 
 
 529, 1452 
 
 2095 
 
 263, 1629, 
 
 1637, 1610 
 
 330 
 
 1253 
 
 1791 
 
 178, 841 
 
 953 
 
 1653 
 
 642 
 
 842, 1370 
 
 1648, 1666 
 
 Inhabitants, &c. v. Seymour 1620 
 
 Inloesi* Harvey 
 Inman v. Wearing 
 
 v. Whitley 
 Innes v. Evans 
 v. Jackson 
 V. Lansing 
 v Mitchell 
 
 1056 
 
 337, 3S5, 386, 
 
 587, 1928 
 
 725 
 
 615, 620 
 
 292 
 
 635, 1727 
 
 298, 345, 449, 
 
 452 
 
 87, 122, 179 
 
 633 
 
 1751 
 
 Insole, lie 
 
 Insurance Co. v. Bnme 
 v. Needles 
 
 International & G. N. By Co. 
 v. Smith 
 V- Williams 
 
 International Trust Co. r. In- 
 ternational Loan & T. Co 
 
 Interstate Land Co. v. Maxwell 
 Land Grant Co. 
 
 Investment Co v Ohio & N. 
 W. R. Co. 
 
 Inwood v. Twyne 
 
 Iowa Barb Steel Wire Co v. 
 Southern Barbed Wire Co. 
 
 1591 
 27 
 
 1648 
 545 
 
 1743 
 
 1365 
 
 Ipswich Co v- Story 
 Irby v. Irby 
 i. M'Crea 
 
 145, 
 1642 
 1772 
 1282, 1433 
 1256 
 
 Ireland v. Abbott 
 
 1248, 1252 
 
 v. Eade 
 
 1741, 1752 
 
 v. Trembath 
 
 95 
 
 Ireson v. Denn 
 
 213 
 
 Ireton v. Lewis 
 
 216 
 
 Iron Age Pub. Co. v 
 
 Western 
 
 Union Tel. Co. 
 
 543 
 
 Irons v, Crist 
 
 161,538 
 
 Irvin v. Clark 
 
 1276 
 
 o. Ellis 
 
 1051 
 
 v. Gregory 
 
 2, 305 
 
 Irvine i' McRee 
 
 1062 
 
 v Sullivan 
 
 952, 1078, 1413 
 
 v. Viana 
 
 762 
 
 v . Young 
 
 666 
 
 Irving, He 
 
 157 
 
 v. DeKay 1426 
 
 v. Dunscomb 
 
 1495 
 
 v Pearson 
 
 266 
 
 Irwin v. Dearman 
 
 1130 
 
 v. Drake 
 
 1551 
 
 v. Everson 
 
 1728 
 
 v. Grey 
 
 133 
 
 v. Lewis 
 
 1624 
 
 v. Meyrose 
 
 890 
 
 v. Reed 
 
 1118 
 
 v. Vint 
 
 1030 
 
 Isaac, lie, Jacob v. Isaac 
 
 v Gompertz 
 
 1798 
 
 v. Humpage 
 
 1621, 1668 
 
 Isaacs v Boyd 
 
 68 
 
 v. Clark 
 
 323 
 
 v. Cooper 
 
 1643 
 
 v. Steele 
 
 378 
 
 v Weatherhouse 
 
 1779 
 
 Isenberg v. East India House 
 
 Estate Co. 
 
 1081, 1638, 
 
 
 1663 
 
 Isham v. Miller 
 
 707 
 
 Isle of Wight Ferry Co., Re 10*5, 
 
 Isle of Wight Ry. Co. 
 
 v. Tahour- 
 
 din 
 
 26 
 
 Ismoord v. Claypool 
 
 999 
 
 Isnard v. Cazeaux 3S 
 
 , 41, 1593, 1598 
 
 Israel v. Jackson 
 
 1071 
 
 Iverson v Saulsbury 
 
 985 
 
 Ives v. Ashelby 
 
 790 
 
 v. Hazard 
 
 844 
 
 v. Medcalfe 
 
 839 
 
 v. Sumner 
 
 641 
 
 Iveson v. Harris 
 
 1619 
 
 Ivory, lie, Hunkin v. 
 
 Turner 1726 
 
 Ivy J'. Clawson 
 v. Kekewick 
 
 1071 
 579 
 
 Izard v. Bodine 857, 1221. 1248, 
 
 1298, 1321 
 
 J. 
 
 Jacklin v. Wilkins 1594, 1596, 
 Jackman v. Mitchell 
 Jackson, lie 
 
 v. Adams 
 
 v. Ashton 314, 327, 357, 358, 
 374, 407, 
 
 v. Bailey 
 
 v. Barry 
 
 v. Benson 200, 210, 
 
 v. Betta 
 
 v. Blanshan 
 
 !>. Brighton Aquarium Co. 
 
 v. Britton 
 
 v. Cartwright 
 
 i). Cassidy 898, 
 
 v. Catliu 
 
 v. Cator 324, 
 
 16R7 
 
 Jackson v Christman 
 
 873 
 
 Jackson v. Innes 125 
 
 1398 
 
 v. Cutright 
 
 
 778 
 
 v. Ivimey 806 
 
 323 
 
 v. Davenport 
 
 
 29, 1527 
 
 v. Jackson 161, 980, 1018, 1180, 
 
 46 
 
 v Denison 
 
 
 907 
 
 1181, 1184, 1185, 1297, 1299, 
 
 361, 
 
 ?'. Duchaire 
 
 
 1138 
 
 1300, 1317, 1358, 1546, 1576, 
 
 , 556 
 
 v. Edwards 
 
 
 266, 1283 
 
 1579, 1580, 1663 
 
 1118 
 
 v. Ewer 
 
 
 569 
 
 v. Jones 1677 
 
 1075 
 
 V. Forrest 
 
 
 334 
 
 v. King 851 
 
 ,367 
 
 v. French 
 
 
 576 
 
 v Kruger 405 
 
 875 
 
 v. Freyer 
 
 
 1507 
 
 v. La Grange 875 
 
 873 
 
 v. Given 
 
 
 675 
 
 v. Leaf 388, 799, 1615, 1617 
 
 1070 
 
 v. G\o* 
 
 
 559 
 
 v. Lever 1277 
 
 46 
 
 v. Grant 
 
 1548, 
 
 1549, 1553 
 
 v. Lingan 1215 
 
 361 
 
 v. Hankey 
 
 
 2294 
 
 v. Mawby 508 
 
 1669 
 
 v. Haworth 
 
 183, 499, ', 
 
 v. McChesney 569, 675 
 
 53 
 
 v. Henry 
 
 
 569, 675 
 
 v. Newcastle, Duke of 1081, 1638 
 
 1670 
 
 v. Hull 
 
 
 830 
 
 v. North Eastern Ry. Co. 63
 
 Jackson v. North Wales Rv. Co. 369. 
 601 
 149, 16a 
 603, 1394 
 656, 657, 712, 714, 
 840 
 780, 782 
 1433 
 1698, 1700, 1703, 1706, 
 1707 
 10, 137, 138, 2207 
 809 
 189, 267 
 324 
 
 v. Riga Railway 63, 814, 1525 
 
 v. Rowe 612, 674, 675, 676, 677, 
 679, 704, 2095 
 
 v. Norton 
 
 v. Ogg 
 
 v. Oglander 
 
 v. Parish 
 v. Pease 
 v. Petrie 
 
 v. Phillips 
 v. Puruell 
 v. Rawlins 
 v. Itceve 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star pacing J 
 
 Jamison v. Burlington & W. R. 
 Co. 1120 
 
 v. May 1622 
 
 Janes's Appeal 1381 
 
 Janney v. Boyd 860 
 
 Jauson v. Rauy 846 
 
 v Solarte " 719 
 
 Jaques v. Esler 1(353 
 
 V. Hall 1516 
 
 v. Method. Epis. Church 9«7, 
 
 1317, 1371, 1491 
 
 Jaquet v. Jaquet 1312, 1317, 1366, 
 
 1595 
 
 v. Saunders 295 
 
 Jarmain v. Chatterton 1461 
 
 I XIX 
 
 v. Rowell 
 v. Saunders 
 v Scauher 
 v. Shanks 
 v Stevenson 
 v Stiles 
 v Strong 
 v. Turner 
 v. Turnley 
 v. Van Dusen 
 v. Vandyke 
 v. Ward 
 v. Woolley 
 
 324 
 
 1658 
 
 254 
 
 447 
 
 1654 
 
 1594 
 
 408, 1559 
 
 167, 9'17 
 
 1001, 2182 
 
 851, 852 
 
 875 
 
 266, 1525, 1526 
 
 647 
 
 Jacksonville Ry Co. v. Ameri- 
 can Const. Co. 1411 
 Jacob o. Hall 
 
 v. Lorenz 
 
 v. Lucas 
 Jacob i v. Schloss 
 Jacobs v Hooper 
 
 v. Laybourn 
 
 v. Richards 
 
 v. Tarleton 
 
 v. Turpin 
 Jacobsou v. Blackhurst 
 Jacoby v Qoetter 
 
 v. Kiesling 
 
 v Whitinore 
 Jacoway v. McGarrah 
 Jacques v. Miller 
 Jacquet v. Jacquet 
 J affray p. Raab 
 Jaffrey v. Brown 
 
 James, Ex parte 
 v. Ash ton 
 
 V, Atlanta Street R. Co 
 v. Atlantic Delaine Co 
 v. Bion 
 v. Brooks 
 v. Center 
 v. Cresswicke 
 v. Crow 
 v Despott 
 v Dore 
 v. Downes 
 v. Fisk 
 v. Gwynne 
 v. Harding 
 v Herriott 
 
 1517 
 
 230 
 
 1491 
 
 594 
 
 1098 
 
 852 
 
 1106 
 
 1489 
 
 1560 
 
 1675 
 
 1732, 1734 
 
 1655 
 
 1549 
 
 1082 
 
 654 
 
 1746 
 
 313, 1290, 1299, 
 
 1320 
 
 1622 
 
 201, 203 
 
 586 
 
 256, 815 
 
 806 
 
 1076, 1120 
 
 1461 
 
 523 
 
 970, 979 
 
 149 
 
 39, 518 
 
 1683, 1685 
 
 1576 
 
 1331 
 
 1517, 1525 
 
 547, 1557 
 
 v James 169, 170, 218, 406, 410, 
 753, 1383 
 
 v Jefferson 1672 
 
 v. Kerr 564 
 
 v. Lawrence 330 
 
 v McKernon 327, 377, 852 
 
 v McPhee 843 
 
 v. North 1714 
 
 v. Owens 1673 
 
 v- Parnell 875,1116 
 
 v- Philips 511 
 
 v. Prichard 1566 
 
 v. Rice 528 
 
 v . Sadgrove 626 
 
 v Sams 1561 
 
 v. Smith 196, 365 
 
 Jameson v. Brick & Stone Co. 58 
 
 v. Deshields 288,295 
 
 v. Moseley 997 
 
 Jamieson v. Teague 1395, 1655 
 
 Jarman v. Wiswall 
 Jarrett v. Jarrett 
 
 V White 
 Jarrold v. Houlston 
 
 260, 1029 
 
 1077 
 
 1151 
 
 1645, 1646, 
 
 2314 
 
 553, 1621, 1626 
 
 590, 684, 700 
 
 34 
 
 1852, 1856 
 
 663, 664 
 
 1642 
 
 880 
 
 Jennet v. Bishopp 
 
 554 
 
 Jenuey v. Bell 
 
 60 
 
 v. Mackintosh 
 
 629 
 
 Jenning v. Smith 
 
 1819 
 
 Jennings v. Beale 
 
 1618 
 
 v Uevey 
 
 456 
 
 v. Dolan 
 
 1299 
 
 v. Durham 
 
 1071 
 
 v. Foster 
 
 1163 
 
 V. Johnson 
 
 197 
 
 Jarvis v. Chandler 
 
 v Palmer 
 
 v. Shand 
 Jarvis' Charity, Re 
 Jauncy v Sealey 
 Jay v. Ladler 
 Jearrard v. Tracy 
 Jebb v Tugwell 170, 266, 1512, 1524, 
 2059 
 Jeff Davis, The 
 Jefferies v. Harrison 
 Jeffers v. Forbes 
 Jefferson v. Cullis 
 
 v Dawson 
 
 v. Durham, Bishop of 
 
 v. Gaines 
 
 B. Hamilton 
 
 v Jefferson 
 Jeffery v. Bowles 
 
 v. Fitch 
 
 V Stephens 
 Jeffery s v. Boosey 
 
 v. Dickson 
 
 v Smith 
 Jeffreys v. Marshall 
 
 v Yarborough 
 Jeffries v. Jeffries 
 Jeffria ». Whittuck 
 Jeff ryes v Agra, &c Bank 
 
 Jegon v Vivian 
 Jellard, lie 
 
 Jencks v Probate Court 
 Jenkin v. Vaughan 
 Jenkins, Re 
 
 v. Bennett 
 
 v. Briant 
 
 v. Bryant 
 
 v. Bushby 
 
 v. Cross 
 
 v. Eldredge 
 
 1846 
 
 1422 
 
 303 
 
 703 
 
 688 
 
 8 
 
 334 
 
 1614 
 
 790, 1003 
 
 1646 
 
 1120 
 
 380 
 
 46, 1643 
 
 280 
 
 1727, 1768, 1800 
 
 1417 
 
 1301 
 
 417 
 
 922 
 
 1397, 
 
 1398 
 
 881 
 
 1794 
 
 852 
 
 832, 969 
 
 116, 205 
 
 1835 
 
 1296, 1757 
 
 454, 1256, 1847 
 
 1071, 1079, 1829 
 
 1537 
 
 659, 856. 957, 9(30, 
 
 v. Jordan 212, 213, 215, 257, 280 
 
 v. Merton College 780 
 
 v Moore 675 
 
 v. Nugent 1568 
 
 v. Paterson 255, 1207 
 
 v. Pearce 596, 692 
 
 v. Philadelphia & R R. Co. 1.16 
 
 v Pierce 7<J0 
 
 v- Rigby 1035 
 
 v . Springs 403 
 
 Jennison v. Hapgood 1234, 1236 
 
 Jeuour v. Jenour 1004, 1431, 1464, 
 
 1466, 1528, --181 
 
 Jensen, Re 1765 
 
 Jepson v. Greenaway 935 
 
 Jerard v. Sauders 678 
 
 Jerdein v. Bright 307, 308, 314, 323, 
 
 336 
 
 640 
 
 1686 
 
 457, 458 
 
 1559 
 
 1346 
 
 96 
 
 180 
 
 392, 394, 1562 
 
 Jeremy v. Best 
 Jermain v. Chatterton 
 
 v. Langdon 
 Jermy v. Best 
 
 V. Preston 
 Jernegan v. Baxter 
 
 v. Glasse 
 Jerome ». Jerome 
 
 994, 1029, 1030, 1191, 1194, 1472 
 1479, 1186, 1523, 1533, 1537, 
 1575. 1577. 1578, 1583, 2101 
 
 v Greenwald 
 t> f l.-i II II.-IU 
 
 v Hiles 
 
 v. Intern'l Bank 
 
 v Jackson 
 
 v Jones 
 
 v. Morris 
 
 v. Noel 
 
 v- Parkinson 
 
 v Prewit 
 
 v Rees 
 
 ?\ Van Schaack 
 
 t\ Waller 
 
 v. Wild 
 Jenkinson v. Royston 
 
 t' Vermillion 
 Jenkyus v Bushby 
 Jenner v. Jenner 
 
 8S5, 886, 2394 
 630 
 
 1517 
 
 1408, 1638 
 
 658 
 
 852, 1123, 1126 
 
 46 
 
 1699, 1701 
 
 1578 
 
 354, 418 
 
 1150, 1151 
 
 1675 
 
 1476 
 
 713 
 
 369 
 
 571, 1834 
 
 1001, 1071, I072, 
 
 1622 
 
 v. Morris 103, 1189, 1&39, 1381. 
 
 1408, 1485, 1839 
 
 V. Traeey 5fil) 
 
 Jenness i> Smith 217 
 
 v. McCarter 214, 1731 
 
 v. Ro^s lt>31 
 
 Jerrard v. Saunders 569, 673, 715, 
 1661 
 Jersey City G. L. Co. v. Con- 
 sumers' Gas Co. 1663 
 Jervis v. Berridge 280, 385, 1929 
 v. Uenwood 1660 
 v. White 872, 1777, 1782 
 v. Wolferstan 1233. 1438 
 Jervoise, Me 1785, 1794 
 v. Clark 1526 
 v. Clarke 1268 
 v. Northumberland, Duke of 877 
 v Silk 1358 
 Jesse v. Bennett 218, 222, 224, 226 
 269 
 v. Lloyd 1233 
 Jessel v. Chaplin 1641 
 Jesson v. Brewer 1017 
 Jessop v. King 1658 
 Jessup v. Hill 1712 
 v. Illinois Central R. Co. 190, 1548 
 Jesus' College v Bloom 1634 
 v. Gibbs 713, 714. 7h3 
 Jeudwine v. Agate 1169, 1212, 1254 
 v. Alcock 1218 
 Jew v. Wood 1564, 1565, 1567 
 Jewell v. Rock River Paper Co 1309 
 Jewett v . Bowman 651, 1683 
 
 v. Cunard 
 v- Dringer 
 v . Miller 
 v. Palmer 
 v. Scott 
 v. Tucker 
 
 Jewin V. Taylor 
 
 Jewitt, Re 
 
 1^39 
 
 1468 
 
 1284 
 
 612, 674. 677, 678 
 
 1156, 1160 
 
 243. 250 
 
 354. 7S5 
 
 1069, 1843 
 
 .lewson v. Moulson 90, 92, 101, 102, 
 124 
 Jeyes v. Foreman 1591 
 
 Jinks )>. Banner Lodge 630 
 
 J. L. Mott Iron Works r. Stand- 
 ard Manuf Co. 888 
 ■load ?'. Ripley 1796 
 Job, Rv 1046 
 v. Banister 1659 
 v. Job 1260, 1370, 1581 
 Joberns v. Couch 1525 
 Jochumsen v. Suffolk Savings 
 
 Bank 1507
 
 lxx 
 
 Joddrell v. Joddrell 
 Jodiell n. Jodrell 
 
 v. Slauey 
 Johu v. Brown 
 
 v. Jones 
 
 r. Lloyd 
 Johnassou v. Bonhote 
 Johues v. Clauguton 
 Johns v Harper 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging] 
 
 355 
 1361 
 
 726 
 1536 
 
 »al 
 
 422 
 602 
 1058 
 1584 
 
 Johnson v. Slawsen 
 v. Story 
 v. Swain 
 v. Telford 
 v. Thomas 
 
 v. James " 226, 579 
 
 e Johns 1734, 1735 
 
 v. Keardon 214 
 
 Johnson, Ex parte 894,1047 
 lit 1069, 1366, 1734 
 
 Re, Sly v. Blake 654 
 
 Re, Steele v . Cobham 1722 
 
 v. Ames 560 
 
 v. Arnwine 932 
 
 v. Aston 1772 
 
 v Atkinson 1561, 1565 
 
 v. Atlantic Ave R. Co. 1221 
 v Barnes 453, 455, 536, 537 
 
 v. Board ot Education 1463 
 
 i;. Bower 632 
 
 v. Branch 1120 
 
 v. Britt 1161 
 
 v Brooklyn & C. R Co. 1642 
 
 ii. Br»wu 338 
 
 v. Burgess 1036,1054 
 
 v. Candage 237,257, 2i2 
 
 v. Cherokee Land Co. 324 
 
 v. Chippindall 1052, 1057 
 
 V. Christian 256 
 
 t; Clendenin 1608, 1711 
 
 v. Compton 236, 300 
 
 v. Cooper 548 
 
 v. Corey 1677 
 
 v. Crippen 843 
 
 v Curtis 138, 371, 666 
 
 v Desiuineere 518 
 
 v Donnell 617,998 
 
 v. Drumniond 303 
 
 v. Durner 418 
 
 v Edge 1642 
 
 v. Everett 987, 993 
 
 v. Faruum 1716 
 
 v. Hesseuuieyer 3i9 
 
 v. Fitzhugh 607, 1508 
 
 v Florida Transit Co. 1517 
 
 v. Foster 259 
 
 v. Freer 403, 1552 
 
 v. Gallagher 113, 187, 1D03 
 
 v. Gardiner 1385 
 
 v Garrett . 1269, 1272 
 
 v. Gere 1653 
 
 v Gillett 1491 
 
 v. Goldswaine 1655 
 
 v. Hainesworth 1079 
 
 v. Hammersley 244, 1170, 1525, 
 1540 
 
 v. Harrison 51, 630 
 
 v . Helmstaedter 224, 361 
 
 v. Hines 1276 
 
 v. Horlock 813 
 
 v. Hunter 37 
 v. Johnson 104, 106, 444, 1166, 
 1461, 1485, 1584 
 
 v. Kelly 1031 
 
 v. Lander 122 
 
 v. Leake 1528 
 
 v. Lindsay, No 2 40 
 
 v. Lusk 117 
 
 v. McCabe 68 
 
 v. Mantz 378 
 
 v. Mever 216, 1195 
 
 v. Na'gle 443 
 
 v. Northey 1585 
 
 V. I'urkiuson 334 
 
 V Peck 1528 
 
 t'. Petrie 1032 
 
 v. Pierson 844 
 
 v. Pinney 504, 1591 
 
 v. Prendergast 382, 1369 
 
 v Rankin 192, 1505 
 
 17. Richardson 843 
 
 t-. St. Louis, &c. Ry. Co. 1618 
 
 v. Shepard 793 
 
 844 
 1845 
 779 
 1235 
 281, 1166, 1517, 1527 
 1542 
 
 v. Todd 1082, 1118, 1405 
 
 v. Tomlinson 1031 
 
 v- Touchet 126 
 
 v. Tucker 350, 352. 431, 759, 760, 
 707, 831, 1716, 1718, 1719, 
 1835 
 V. Tulare C. S. Court 1039 
 
 v. Turner 
 v. Vail 
 
 86 
 
 108,109,110, 111, llll, 
 1903 
 
 v. Walker 1061 
 
 v. Waters 236, 418, 536, 1019 
 
 v. Wilcox & Giblis S. M. Co. 542 
 v. Wyatt 1071, 1081, 1666, 1681 
 
 Johnson R. S. Co. v. Union S. k 
 
 S. Co 1548 
 
 Johnson Steel Street-Rail Co. v . 
 
 Northbranch Steel Co. 1817 
 
 Johnston v. Glenn 1660 
 
 v. Hanuer 1575 
 
 v. Hvde 1631 
 
 v. Johnston 117, 585, 586, 1468 
 v. Keener 1743 
 
 v. McArthur 1624 
 
 v. Macconuell 443 
 
 v. Markle Paper Co. 236 
 
 v. Reardon 1300 
 
 v. Roe 560 
 
 v. Salvage Association 851 
 
 v. Standard Min. Co. 560 
 
 v. Todd 1113, 1114, 1124, 1136, 
 1427, 1432, 1433, 1595 
 v. Trade Ins. Co. 43 
 
 V. Ure 1184 
 
 Johnstone v. Baber 1151, 1157 
 
 v. Beattie 1348, 1350, 1352. 
 
 1355 
 v. Browne 1*9 
 
 v Cox 674, 14!!l 
 
 v. Hall 1638 
 
 v. Hamilton 437 
 
 v. Royal Courts Co. 1661 
 
 Joint Stock Discount Co , lie 202, 
 203 
 
 v Brown 
 
 202, 407, 1529 
 
 Joley v Stockley 
 
 1669 
 
 Joliet Street Ry. Co 
 
 v. Call 1556 
 
 Joliffe v. Baker 
 
 328 
 
 v. Hector 
 
 1236 
 
 v. Twyford 
 
 1428 
 
 Jolland v. 
 
 1732, 1755, 1756 
 
 Jolliffe v. East 
 
 1427, 142U 
 
 v. Mundy 
 
 1137 
 
 v. Pitt 
 
 641, 648 
 
 Jolly v . Arbuthnot 
 v. Carter 
 
 707, 1370 
 347, 729 
 
 Joly v. Swift 
 
 883 
 
 Jones, Ex parte 
 
 58,61,1070 
 
 Re 61, 109, 
 
 1213, 1286, 1328, 
 1389, 1428, 1802 
 
 1362 
 
 Re, Calver v. Laxton lu34, 1425 
 
 v. Abraham 
 
 843 
 
 v. Adair 
 
 165 
 
 v Alephsin 
 
 1700, 1707, 1712 
 
 v- Andrews 
 
 1829 
 
 v. Bailey 
 
 1266 
 
 v Barker 
 
 314 
 
 v. Barrett 
 
 208 
 
 v Bartholomew 
 
 1597 
 
 v. Basset 
 
 1518 
 
 v. Batten 
 
 399, 1379,. 1600 
 
 v. Beet 
 
 844 
 
 v Belt 
 
 844 
 
 v. Beverley 
 
 532 
 
 v Binns 
 
 158, 420, 698 
 
 v. Bolles 
 
 328 
 
 v. Boston Mill Corp 477. 1042, 
 
 IKO.1 
 
 v. Brain 
 
 1617 
 
 v. Brandon 
 
 449, 522 
 
 v- Brent 
 
 172 j 
 
 ones v. Brinker 361 
 
 v. Brittan 829 
 
 v. Cargill 447 
 
 v. Chappell 211, 1628 
 
 v. Charleuiont 588, 804, 1590 
 
 v Commissioners 1650 
 
 .". Com. Bank of Columbus 1672 
 v Couoway 645 
 
 v Cowles 300 
 
 v. Davenport 417, 1576, 1578 
 
 v. Davids 315, 542, 1S94 
 
 v. Da vies 125 
 
 v. Davis 497, 531, 605. 619, 630 
 v Dr.-.ke 161, 445 
 
 v. Evans 1425 
 
 v. Ewing 1687 
 
 v Farrell 199, 1564 
 
 v. Fawcett 37, 111, 112 
 
 v. Fa^ erweather 1579 
 
 v. Foster 334 
 
 v. Foulkes 203, 18n9 
 
 v. Foxall 855 
 
 v. Frost 588, 607, 1847 
 
 v. Fulghum 539, 1653 
 
 v. Gale 646 
 
 v. Garcia del Rio 242, 243, 344 
 
 v. Geddes 452, 1626, 1628 
 
 v. Gilham 1567,1568,1569 
 
 v. Goodchild 135. 224 
 
 v. Goodrich 1725 
 
 v. Graham 1508 
 
 v. Gregory 552, 1479 
 
 v. Griffith 829, 881, 883, 982 
 
 v . Hardesty *41 
 
 v. Harris 166 
 
 v. Hart 197,296 
 
 v. Heavens 1654 
 
 v. Holliday 1463 
 
 v. Hough 1133 
 
 v. How 223, 225, 255 
 
 v. Howell 819 
 
 v. Howells 319, 1510, 1533. 1809 
 v. James 220, 226 
 
 v. Jones 247, 292, 362, 379. 593, 
 679, 690, 756, 807 810, 841, 
 844, 846,940,984, 1117, 
 1228, 1229. 1382, 1421, 
 1516, 1523, 1533, 1558, 
 1617, 1632, 1685, 1861 
 v. Keen 116, 555, 630, 1745 
 
 v. Kennicott 1705 
 
 v Kenrick 1583 
 
 v. Kirkpatrick 221 
 
 v. Lamar 1299 
 
 v. Langham 354 
 
 v. Lansing 793, 794 
 
 v. Leadville Bank 1734 
 
 v Lewis 740, 1142, 1382, 1406, 
 1417, 1604 
 v. Little Rock 1637 
 
 v. Lloyd 83 
 
 v. Lucas 920 
 
 v. Magill 1676 
 
 v Mason 444, 845, 1402 
 
 v Massey 1169, 1544, 1679 
 
 v MrKenna 1507, 1539 
 
 i>. McPhillips 402, 407 
 
 v. Mitchell 1433 
 
 v. Morehead 1407 
 
 v. Morgan 809 
 
 v. Morrall 1368, 1370, 2061 
 
 v. Newhall 652 
 
 v. Nixon 659, 661 
 
 v. North 1709 
 
 v. Payne 68 
 
 v Pengree 641 
 
 v. Perrott 807 
 
 v. Pickslav 710 
 
 v. Planters' Bank 353 
 
 v. Powell 72, 80, 1178, 1179, 1309, 
 1347, 1352, 1353, 1510, 
 1542, 1787 
 v. Pugh 1720 
 
 r. Reese 418 
 
 v. Reid 334 
 
 v. Richards 578 
 
 v. Richardson 90, 114, 111
 
 Jones v. Ricketts 
 
 
 1399 
 
 v. Roberts 
 
 1587 
 
 1591 
 
 v. Robinson 
 
 
 1162 
 
 v. Rose 
 
 404 
 
 1069 
 
 v. Sampson 
 
 
 1700 
 
 v. Schall 
 
 
 1735 
 
 v. Scott 
 
 
 642 
 
 v Searle 
 
 
 1410 
 
 v. Segueira 637, 661, 695, 097 
 
 v. Shepherd 394, 1502 
 
 v. Skipwith 430 
 
 v. Skipworth 002 
 
 v. Sims 1507 
 
 v SI tin son 334 
 
 v. Smith 213, 249, 331, 922, 1543, 
 1550, 1765 
 
 v. Spencer 347, 351, 700, 951 
 
 v. Stoekett 1253 
 17. Strafford, Earl of 590, 690, 810 
 
 v. Stroud 1099 
 
 o. Taylor 596, 1671 
 
 v. T hacker 1548 
 
 Thomas 678, 1560 
 
 v. Thome 1463 
 
 v. Tinney 795 
 
 v. Totty 1156, 1159 
 
 v. Tuberville 652, 841 
 
 v Turnbull 893, 1608 
 
 v Turner 986 
 
 v. Van Doren 378, 418 
 
 v. Wadsworth 417, 1381 
 v. Ward 1260, 1351, 1352, 1364 
 
 v Wattier 692, 694 
 
 v Wedgewood 1861 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Jones v. Welling 418 
 
 v. Williams 631,1138,1543 
 
 v. Wilson 987, 994, 1491 
 
 v. Wood Street Warehouse Co. 9U5 
 
 v. Zollicoffer 1575 
 
 Jones's Mortgage, In re lol 
 
 Jones's Settled Estates, Re 1329 
 
 J ope v. Mor.-head 1152 
 
 Jopling v. Stuart 402, 524 
 
 Jopp v. (Jeering 1528 
 
 v. Wood 230, 1460, 1461, 1473. 
 
 1480, 1581 
 
 Jopp's Case 1770 
 
 Jordan, Ex parte 287, 1401 
 
 v. Agawam Woollen Co. 980 
 
 v. Clarke 378, 379 
 
 v. Cummings 87, 88 
 
 v. Jones 186 
 
 v. Jordan 758 
 
 v. Sawkins 656 
 
 v. Seifert 659 
 
 v. Thomas 1621 
 
 V. Williams 1623 
 
 Jorden v. Money 847 
 
 Jordon v. Trumbo 386 
 
 Jortin v. South Eastern Ry. Co. 2115 
 
 Joseph v. Doubleday 1676 
 
 v. Goode 1169 
 
 v. Macowsky 1648 
 
 v. Mott 1033 
 
 v. Perry 1085 
 
 v. Turkey 62 
 
 v. Webster, lie 1603 
 
 Josey v. Rogers 1548, 1549 
 
 lxxi 
 
 Joslin v. Wheeler 553, 638 
 
 Jossaume v. Abbot 318 
 
 Jourueay v. Brown 1403 
 
 Jourolmon v. Massengill 059 
 
 Jowett v. Broad 1321 
 
 Joy v. St Louis 629 
 v. Wirtz 149, 151, 190, 2y4 
 
 Joyce />• De Moleyns 
 
 
 675 
 
 v Gunnels 
 
 
 617 
 
 V. Rawlins 
 
 
 1526 
 
 Judah v. Chiles 
 
 
 1687 
 
 Judd v. Bushnell 
 
 
 328 
 
 v. Hatch 
 
 
 1677 
 
 v. Lawrence 
 
 
 45 
 
 v. Plum 
 
 
 1443 
 
 v. Seaver 
 
 386,841 
 
 ,842 
 
 v. Wartnaby 
 
 
 742 
 
 v. Wilson 
 
 
 332 
 
 Judkius, Re 
 
 
 1203 
 
 v. Lovelace 
 
 
 334 
 
 Judson i'. li kiln- hard 
 
 
 68 
 
 t'. Courier Co 
 
 256, 418, 
 
 2396 
 
 ?'. Emanuel 
 
 
 194 
 
 v. Gibbons 
 
 
 227 
 
 v. Toulmin 
 
 334 
 
 , 345 
 
 Julia Fisher, The 
 
 
 154 
 
 Julian v. Reynolds 
 
 
 251 
 
 v. State 
 
 
 10 
 
 Jumpson v. Pitchers 
 
 
 1220 
 
 Jupp, Re 
 
 
 109 
 
 Justice v. McBroom 
 
 1544, 
 
 1683 
 
 Justices v. Cosby 
 
 
 395 
 
 v Croft 
 
 1660, 
 
 1663 
 
 of Coventry, Re 
 
 1610, 
 
 1797 
 
 K. 
 
 aehler v. Dobberpuhl 
 
 1675 
 
 V. Halpin 
 
 1614 
 
 aighn v. Fuller 
 
 1677 
 
 ain o. Ross 
 
 801 
 
 alorania, The 
 
 815 
 
 Kamm v. Stark 1613, 1062 
 
 Kauipf v. Jones 1413 
 
 Kanawha Lodge v. Swann 1548 
 
 Valley Bank v. Wilson 1576 
 
 Kane v. Bloodgood 560, 644, 652 
 
 v. Hamilton 16o8 
 
 v. Huggins Cracker Co. 1642 
 
 v. Maule 16 
 
 v. Reynolds 16, 1513 
 
 v. Vanderburgh 1629, 1630, 1633 
 
 v. Van Vranker 833, 1398, 1600 
 
 v. Whitman 993 
 
 v. Whittick 987, 993, 1400 
 
 Kankakee &c. R Co. v. Horan 839 
 
 Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Atchison 367 
 
 v Bayles 1743 
 
 Kaolatvpe Engraving Co v. 
 
 Hoke 314 
 
 Karr v. Karr 457, 1369 
 
 Kase v. Greenough 991 
 
 Kauffman v. Griesmer 2o4 
 
 o. Walker 1269, 1274 
 
 Kivanagh v. Wall 456, 1735 
 
 Kay v. Fowler 1171, 1221, 12i»6 
 
 v. Hargreaves 570 
 
 v Johnson 1081 
 
 v. Jones 303,341,344 
 
 d, Marshall 609, 690, 1499, 1642, 
 
 2ii95 
 
 v. Scates 1961 
 
 v. Smith 889, 1020, 1823 
 
 v. Watson 1580 
 
 Kaye, In re 1346, 1858 
 
 v Bank of Louisville 1377 
 
 v. Cunningham 1058 
 
 v Fosbrooke 59, 225 
 
 v. Wall 722, 761 
 
 Kean v. Johnson 26, 287 
 
 v Lathrop 793, 794 
 
 Keane, Re 1070 
 
 Kearley, Re 61, 157 
 
 Kearney v. Harrell 
 
 v. Jackson 
 
 v. Macomb 
 
 v. Smith 
 Kearsley v. Phillips 
 Keates v. Burton 
 
 V. Lyon 
 Keating v. Sparrow 
 Keats v Hugo 
 Kebel v. Philpot 
 Keck «'. Allender 
 Kedive, The 
 Keeler v. Green 
 
 v. Keeler 
 Keen, Re 
 
 v. Breckenridge 
 
 v. Stanley 
 Keenan v. Keenan 
 Keene V. Johnston 
 
 f. Kimball 
 
 i\ Price 
 Keener 11. Moss 
 Keeper, Lord v. Wyld 
 Kehoe v. Carville 
 Keiffer v. Barney 
 Keighley r. Brown 
 Keil v. West 
 
 1073 
 
 1468 
 
 2010 
 
 1625 
 
 578 
 
 254 
 
 324, 1654 
 
 1658 
 
 1638 
 
 1114 
 
 1576 
 
 1470 
 
 1657 
 
 225,237 
 
 1010 
 
 1743 
 
 783 
 
 249 
 
 100 
 
 1643 
 
 1184 
 
 1157 
 
 2, 357, 675 
 
 740 
 
 1002 
 
 797 
 
 1031, 1062 
 
 Keisselbrack v. Livingston 1401 
 
 Keith v. Day 999 
 
 v. Keith 334 
 
 v Trapier lli;c> 
 
 Keithley r. Keithley 1071, 1073 
 
 Kekewich v. Langston 1358, 2292 
 
 v. Marker 1633 
 
 Kelk v. Archer 798, 800 
 
 v Pearson 893, 1637 
 
 Kellam v. Sayer 287 
 
 Kellar v. Beelor 217, 1507 
 
 Kellaway p. Bury 354 
 
 »'. Johnson 268, 272 
 
 Keller v. Stolzenbach 659, 829, 2384 
 
 Kelletfv. Kellett 1459, 1496, 1502 
 
 Kelley v Bradford 989 
 
 v. Greenleaf 1950, 2246, 2290 
 
 v- Kelley 630, 1122 
 
 v. McKinney 1120 
 
 Kelley v. Ypsilanti Stay M. Co. 1642 
 
 Kellner v. Mutual Life Ins Co. 694 
 
 Kellock, Re 307, 1847 
 
 Kcllock's Case 284 
 
 Kellogg, Matter of 1745 
 
 v. New Britain 324 
 
 v. Rockwell 1240 
 
 v. Wood 855 
 
 Kellom v. Easley 1679 
 
 Kelly, Matter of 1841 
 
 v Crapo 1743 
 
 v. Eckford 1553, 1819 
 
 v. Hooper 1380, 1395, 1681 
 
 v. Hutton 1694, 1646, 1727, 1837 
 
 v. Israel 215 
 
 v. Jackson 298, 617 
 
 v. Kershaw 417 
 
 V. Leunon 1476 
 
 v Rogers 298, 308 
 
 v. Sherlock 1130 
 
 v. Wallace 324 
 
 Kelminster V Pratt 64 
 
 Kelner v. Baxter 238, 269 
 
 Kelsall 0. Hennet 678 
 
 v. Kelsall 170, 174. 175 
 
 v. Minton 1800 
 
 Kelsey v Kelsey 1724 
 
 v. Snvder 906 
 
 v. Weston 1459, 1467 
 
 Kelso v. Jessop 1282, 1294 
 
 v. Taber 186 
 
 Kelson v. Kelson 1323 
 
 Keltv v. High 1019 
 
 Kemball r. Walduck 159, 808, 815 
 
 Kemble v. Kean 1654, 1656 
 
 Kemp i' Bird 1654 
 
 v. Burn 1417, 1419 
 
 v. Latter 628 
 
 v. Lyon 974 
 
 v. Mackrell 1123, 1528, 1549. 1622 
 
 v. Pryor 651. 552 
 
 v. Squire 1026 
 
 v. Tucker 650, 1621 
 
 v. Waddingham 1034 
 
 v. Wade 1177, 1179, 1188, 1309, 
 
 1339
 
 lxxii 
 
 Kemp v. Westbrooke 
 Keuipgon b Ashbee 
 Keuiptou v. Burgess 
 Kenan v. Miller 
 Kendall v. Beckett 
 
 t;. Granger 
 
 v. Hamilton 217, 269, 288 (527 
 
 v. Hovey 1165, 1166 
 
 v. Mawters 387, 996. 1410 
 
 Kendall ville Refrigerator Co v 
 
 Davis 1556 
 
 Kendig v. Dean 149, 790 
 
 Keudrick v. Whitfield 555 
 
 t;. Whitney 1476 
 
 Kenebel v. Scrafton 1390, 1424 
 
 Keniston v. Keniston 1168 
 
 Kenmare v. Casey 354 
 
 Kenn v. Neek 1127 
 
 Kenuard v Christie 1280 
 
 v. George 1971, 1972 
 
 Kennaway v. Tripp 29, 31 
 
 Kennebec Railroad v. Portland 
 
 R-tilroad 334 
 
 Kennebec & Port. R. R. Co. v. 
 Port & Kennebec R. R. Co. 
 22, 145, 261, 296, 314, 334, 335, 
 338, 344 
 
 Kennedy v. Ball 
 V. Baylor 
 V. Bell 
 v. Brown 
 v. Cassillis 
 v. Creswell 
 v. Daly 
 v. Davis 
 v. Edwards 
 v. George 
 V- Green 
 
 v. Indianapolis &c. R. Co 
 
 1576, 1577, 1678 
 
 845 
 
 1579 
 
 563 
 
 1626 
 
 695 
 
 187, 1584 
 
 197 
 
 36,598,797,806 
 
 1836 
 
 675, 1830 
 
 1071, 
 
 1743 
 
 249, 344, 1294, 1548 
 
 424, 1675 
 
 658, 717, 943 
 
 v . Kennedy 
 
 v. Lewis 
 
 v. Lyell 
 
 v Meredith 
 
 v. Sedgwick 1795 
 
 v. St. Paul R. Co 1731 
 
 v. Thorp 1742 
 
 v. Wakefield 364, 579 
 
 v. Winn 560 
 
 Keuner v Hard 1544 
 
 v . Smith 1577 
 
 Kennerty v. Etiwan Phosphate 
 Co 418 
 
 Kenney v Consumers' Gas Co. 10 
 v. Kelliher 1591 
 
 v. Ranuey 1743 
 
 Keunon v Dickins 1259 
 
 Kenny v. Gillet 1648 
 
 v. Cdall 90, 101, 102, 121, 122 
 
 Kenrick v. Clayton 592, 690 
 
 v. Danube C. & M Co. 1644 
 
 v. Wood 110, 1450, 1595 
 
 Kensington v Inglis • 51 
 
 Kensington, Lord P. Bouverie 328 
 v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 1395 
 
 Kensit v. Great Eastern Ry. Co. 1639 
 
 Kent r Burgess 1079 
 
 v. Freehold Land and Brick- 
 making Co 1459 
 v. Jacobs 429 
 v. Kent 1539 
 v. Lake Superior Ship Canal 
 
 Co 545, 660 
 
 v. Lee 342 
 
 v. Owensboro Bank 545 
 
 v. Pickering 1616 
 
 v. Ricards 1625 
 
 Kenton Furnace R. & M. Co. v. 
 
 McAlpin 313 
 
 Kentucky & Indiana Bridge Co. 
 
 v. Krieger 1069 
 
 Kentucky S. M Co. v. Day 357 
 
 Kenyon v Clarke 1624 
 
 f. Kenyon 70, 1165 
 
 v. Worthington 250, 1207 
 
 Keogh, lie 10H9 
 
 Keogh Manuf. Co. v. Whlston 1716 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 2231 I Keokuk N. L. Packet Co. v. Da- ) 
 
 852 vidson 1765 : 
 
 659, 79U I Kepley v. Carter 830 
 
 298 Keppell v. Bailey 308 i 
 
 421 i Ker v. Cloberry 1303, 1312 
 
 1853 Kerchuer v. Kempton 108, 185, 187 
 
 v. McEachern !i74 
 
 Kern V. llazierigg 280 
 
 v. Strausberger 1625 
 
 v. Wyatt 1580 
 
 Keruagliau v. Williams 241, 243, 
 
 244 
 
 Keruick v. Kernick 102, 104, 107, 
 
 354, 785, 894 
 
 Kernot v Critchley 426, 1399 
 
 v. Potter 551 
 
 Kerou v. Coon 1677 
 
 Kerr v. Campbell 815 
 
 v. Freemau 850 
 
 v Gillespie 27, 28, 31, 358, 359, 
 
 402, 577 
 
 v. Lansing 3 '3 
 
 v- Love 1258 
 
 v- Munster, Duchess of 28 
 
 v. Preston 1620 
 
 v. Hew 1558 
 
 v. South Park Com'rs 1017 , 1(173 
 
 Kerrick v. Brausby 552, 663 
 
 v. Saffery 215 
 
 Kerrison v Stewart 200, 256 
 
 Kershaw, lit, Whittaker v 
 
 179, 187 
 
 Kershaw 
 v. Kelsey 
 v. Matthews 
 v. Thompson 
 Kessinger v. Whittaker 
 
 1729. 1736 
 
 1042, 1056 
 1063 
 
 Ketchaui v. Brazil B. C. Co 
 
 l."i;5 
 
 Ketchum v. Breed 1120, 1580 
 
 v Driggs 556 
 
 Kettle v. Crary 217, 238 
 
 v. Van Dyck 260, 261 
 
 Kettlewell v. Barstow 320, 674, 692, 
 
 812, 1826 
 
 Kevan v Crawford 180, 355, 892, 
 
 996. 1001, 1370, 1409 
 
 Key v. Snow 109 
 
 Keyesr. Pueblo S.& R Co. 1073, 1H63 
 
 Keymer v. Pering 931 
 
 Keys v. Bush 1723 
 
 v . Keys 1731 
 
 v. Mathes 3u3 
 
 Keyser v. Renner 314, 405, 1517 
 
 Keystone Manganese and Iron 
 
 Co v. Martin 
 Keyworth, In re 
 Kibler r. Whiteman 
 Kidd, Ex parte 
 
 v, Cheyue 
 
 v. Hiirry 
 
 p. Mauley 
 Kiddie r. Debrutz 
 Kitldill v. Farnell 
 Kidger v. Worswick 
 
 Kidney v. Cockburn 
 
 Kiff r. Roberts (No. 2) 
 
 Kihlholz v. Wolff 
 
 Ki bee v. Sneyd 
 
 Kilbey o. Haviland 
 
 Kilbourn v. 8underland 
 
 Kilbourne v. Allyn 
 
 Kilbreth v. Root 
 
 Kilby v. Stanton 
 
 Kilcrease v Blythe 
 
 Kildare. F^irl of v. Eustace 
 
 Kilgore o, Hair 
 
 Kilgour v. New Orleans Gas 
 Liirht Co. 149, 191, 334. 384 
 
 Killian v. Ebbinghaus 630, 1071, 
 1561 
 
 Killinger ?'. Hartman 407 
 
 Killock r Gregg 319 
 
 Kilminster r. Pratt 814 
 
 Kilmorey, Lord v. Thackeray 1655 
 
 Kimball v Brown 642 
 
 v New Hampshire Bible Soc- 
 iety 1111 
 
 1029 
 
 1778 
 
 379, 385 
 
 1581 
 
 438, 1460, 1581 
 
 1620 
 
 852 
 
 837 
 
 1801 
 
 485, 621, 760, 
 
 1819 
 
 1124 
 
 39 
 
 1019 
 
 1317 
 
 1080 
 
 217, 630 
 
 1061 
 
 830, 1551 
 
 227 
 
 161. 538 
 
 1050 
 
 1734 
 
 Kimball v. Ward 
 
 733 
 
 Kimber v. Emsworth 
 
 2(2 
 
 v. Press Ass'n 
 
 KfiO 
 
 Kimberley v. Fox 
 
 1961 
 
 v. Jennings 
 
 1656 
 
 Kimberly v. Arms 1320, 1576, 15S0, 
 
 1584 
 
 v. Sells 547, 549, 584 
 
 Kimble v. Seal 1517 
 
 Kimmel v. Kimmel 960 
 
 Kimpton v. Eve 1656, 1673. 1685 
 
 Kinahan v. Kinahan 149 
 
 Kiucaid, Re 97, 101, 102, 103 
 
 Kincart v Sanders 1507 
 
 Kindell v. Titus 108, 161 
 
 Kinder v. Forbes 448 
 
 v. Jones 1633 
 
 King, lie 1416, 1417, 1648 
 
 v. Alberton 1134 
 
 V. Allen 548 
 
 v. Arundel, Countess Dowager 
 
 of 5 
 
 v. Baldwin 551 
 
 v Bardeau 2'^59 
 
 v. Barnes 986, 10fi9 
 
 v. Bill 11162 
 
 v Brigham 1164 
 
 v. Bryant 506, 528, 1175, 1424 
 
 v. Burr 1398 
 
 v. Carr 781 
 
 v. Clark 1457 
 
 v. Corke 328, 384, 417, 861 
 
 v. Davis 324 
 
 v. Dundee Mortgage, &c. Co. 1576, 
 
 1579 
 
 v. Enterprise Ins Co. 1550 
 
 v. Galloway 295 
 
 V. Heniing 626 
 
 v Higgins 1624 
 
 v. Holcombe 700 
 
 v. Howard 670 
 
 v. Isaacson lt-02 
 
 v. King 68, 393, 1379, 1411 , 1490, 
 
 1558, 1617, 1725 
 
 v. Little 128 
 
 v. Lucas 113 
 
 v. McVickar 715 
 
 v Malcott 643 
 
 r Martin 158,256 
 
 v. Morris and Essex R. Co. 1637, 
 
 1650 
 
 v. Noel 807 
 
 v. Pratt 894 
 
 v. Ray 723, 726 
 
 v. Rossett 379 
 
 v. Ruckman 1029, 1472 
 
 v. Sandeman 979 
 
 v. Savery 1029, 1442 
 
 v. Smith 284, 1614, 1630, 1699 
 
 v. t-tate Mutual Fire Ins Co 1239, 
 
 1241, 1246 
 
 v Stewart 215 
 
 v. Strong 1426. 1427 
 
 v Taylor 1431, 1433 
 
 v. Townshend 2040 
 
 v Trice 368 
 
 v. Turner 424 
 
 v. Williamson 1097 
 
 v. Wooten P69 
 
 Kingdom v. Boakes 843 
 
 Kinglake v. Bevis 1127 
 
 Kingley v. Young 296 
 
 Kingman v. Maisey 1618 
 
 Kingsbury v. Buckner 68. 1548, 
 
 1580 
 
 t' Flowers 216,334 
 
 Kingsford v. Poile 457, ! 98 
 
 Kingsland r. Roberts 641 
 
 Kingsley, Re 87, 179 
 
 v. Young 197, 247 
 
 Kingsman v. Kingsman 111 
 
 Kingston v. Corker 324 
 
 j Cowbridge Ry Co. 1731 
 
 v . Tappen 930 
 
 Kingston"s, Duchess of, Case 576, 
 
 664 
 
 Kingwood Bank v. Jarvis 1294
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star pagiug ] 
 
 Kinlock ». Meyer 254 
 
 Kinmonth v. Brigham 144, 2200 
 
 Kinnaird v. Trollope 815 
 
 Lord i). Christie 12S0 
 
 Kinnan v. 42d St., &c. R. Co. 60 
 
 Kinuesley (' Simpson 605 
 
 Kinney v. Cous'd Va. M- Co. 385 
 
 v. Crocker 1743 
 
 v. Ensign 1772 
 
 v. Pierce 1298 
 
 Kino v. Rudkin 280, 1096, lluo, 
 
 1517, 163l 
 
 Kinsey, Re 1340 
 
 v. Grimes 848 
 
 v. Howard 334 
 
 v. Kinsey 660 
 
 Kinsliela v. Lee 992 
 
 Kinsler v. Clark 1668 
 
 Kinsman v. Barker 1253 
 
 Kinzie v. Penrose 665 
 
 Kipp v. llanna 407, 499 
 
 Kirby v. Barton U>18 
 
 v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co 145, 
 
 217 
 
 v. Tavlor 694, 700 
 
 Kireton Coal Co., Ex parte 1459 
 
 Kirk v. Bromley Union 1544 
 
 v. Clark 205, 220 
 
 v. Du Bois 378, 1507 
 
 v. Jones 1278 
 
 v. Kirk 953, 954 
 
 v. Milwaukee D. C. Manuf Co. 
 
 1070 
 v. Morrow 314 
 
 v. Keg. 133 
 
 Kirk by Ravensworth Hospital, 
 
 Ex parte 1853 
 
 Kirkham v. Smith 1391 
 
 Kirkneaton Local Board v 
 
 Ainley 1638 
 
 Kirkland v. Telling 1003 
 
 Kirkley v. Burton 312, 422 
 
 Kirkman v Andrews 684 
 
 v. Booth 1230, 1414 
 
 v. Handy 1629 
 
 v. Honnor 1674 
 
 v. Jervis 1096 
 
 v Vanlier 1222 
 
 Kirkpatrick v Buford 295 
 
 v. Corning 222, 243, 34:t 
 
 v. Love 1229 
 
 v. Meers 490 
 
 v. Peshine 1654 
 
 v White _ 611 
 
 Kirksey v. Means 378, 379 
 
 Kirkwood v. Lloyd 989 
 
 v. Webster 1440 
 
 Kirsch v Derby 542 
 
 Kirtland v Moore 1561 
 
 Kirwan v. Daniel 151, 2!»1 
 
 v. Kirwan 444 
 
 v. Latour 58 
 
 Kisor v. Stancifer 377 
 
 Kitcat v. Sharp 887, 1070 
 
 Kitchen v. Himble 1525 
 
 v. Itavburn 314 
 
 Kitcherside v. Mvers 630 
 
 Kitchin V Himble 1510 
 
 v. Hughes 522 
 
 Kitching v. Kitching 1072 
 
 Kitchins v. Harrall 
 Kittle v. De Graaf 
 
 !•. De Lamater 
 
 v. Kogers 
 
 v Van Dyck 
 Kittlewell v. Barstow 
 Kitto, Re 
 
 192 
 314 
 1081 
 1642 
 194 
 411 
 1411 
 
 Kittredge v. Claremont Bank 630, 
 
 722, 723, 724, 735. 759, 769 
 
 v. McLaughlin 1259, 1391 
 
 Klaus v State 68 
 
 Klein v. Fleetford 1675 
 
 v . Horiue 425 
 
 v. Jewett 1752 
 
 Klepper V Powell 692 
 
 Kline v. Baker 864 
 
 c. L'Auioureux 1360 
 
 Klock v. Robinson 1255 
 
 Kloebe, lie 47, 202 
 
 Klumpp v. Gardner 15i*l 
 
 Knapman, lie 1409 
 
 Knapp v. Buruaby 1254 
 
 v. Burnham 1238 
 
 v. Douglass Axe Co. 1613, 1639, 
 
 1662, 2323 
 
 v. Marshall 987 
 
 v. Snyder 1623 
 
 v. White 1317 
 
 v. Williams 1/31 
 
 Knapping v. Tomlinson 99 
 
 Knatchbull v. Fearnhead 1411 
 
 v. Fowle 68, 74, 86, 112, 163, 164, 
 
 178 
 
 v . Hallett 357 
 
 Knebell v. White 386, 1928 
 
 Kneeland v. Brass Foundry 1743 
 
 v. Luce 
 Knibb 8. Dixon 
 Knickerbocker v De Freest 
 
 v. Harris 
 Knierim v. Schmauss 
 Knight, Be 
 
 v. Atkisson 
 
 v. Bowyer 
 
 v. Brawner 
 
 v. Bulkley 
 
 v. Cawthron 
 
 v. Corv 
 
 f. De Blaquiere 
 
 c. Duplessi 
 
 1743 
 
 1073 
 161, 
 163 
 846 
 
 1205 
 901 
 561, 659, 994, 1579 
 387 
 118 
 
 1053 
 
 431 
 
 28, 358 
 
 27,3i 
 
 1725 
 
 v. Houghtalling 1062 
 
 v. Knight 70, 92, 109. 282, 283 
 
 1054, 1202, 1T*>8 
 
 v. Maclean 1254 
 
 v. Marjoribanks 594, 1291 
 
 v. Martin 1U2 
 
 v. Mosely 8 
 
 v. Plimouth, Lord 1751 
 
 v. Pocock 212, 226, 257, 277, 433 
 
 v. Pursell 1449 
 
 v Sampson 576 
 
 v. Watts 1708 
 
 ?) Weiskopf 1461 
 
 v. Yarborough 1562 
 
 v Young 530, 1026 
 
 Brothers v. Ogden 797 
 
 Knight's Trusts Re 1411, 1412 
 
 Knoblauch B Minneapolis 1675 
 
 Knoop v. Bohmricb. 26 
 
 Knott, Re 
 v. Coitee 
 v. Cottee 
 
 v. Morgan 
 v. Stearns 
 Knowles, Re 
 v. Chapman 
 v. Greeuhill 
 Haughton 
 
 lxxiii 
 
 1416 
 
 1051 
 
 1252, 1267, 1416, 1420, 
 
 2295 
 
 2319 
 
 1365 
 
 1809 
 
 1245, 1251, 1^52 
 
 14T9 
 
 332 
 
 v. Rhydydefed Colliery Com- 
 
 pauy 
 
 v. Roberts 
 
 v. S pence 
 Kuowltou v. Hanbury 
 Knox v. Brown 
 
 v- Columbia L. I. Co, 
 
 v. Gye 
 
 v, Hayman 
 
 V. M;i_\0 
 
 v. Mo.-er 
 v- Picket 
 i'. Smith 
 v. Symmonds 
 
 810, 1591 
 354 
 969 
 1548 
 158, 791 
 986 1019, 
 1120, 1576 
 313, 315, 418, 560, 561, 
 641,649 
 26 
 1163 
 974, 1020 
 1411, 1412, 1418 
 361 
 414, 770, 7J6 
 
 Knox County v Harshmau 
 
 2398 
 
 Knye v. Moore 206, 345 
 
 Kobbi v. Underhill 550 
 
 Koeber v. Sturgis 102 
 
 Koehler v. Farmers & Drovers 
 
 Nat. Bank 1684 
 
 Kohn v. McXulta 1071 
 
 Koons v. Blanton 1071 
 
 Kooutz e. Northern Bank 1749 
 
 Kopper v. Dyer 517, 1548, 1918 
 
 Koppiuger v. O'Donnell 
 Korue v. Korne 
 Kornegay v. Carroway 
 Kortjohn v. Seimers 
 Kortright v. Cady 
 
 Kraker v. By rum 
 Krapt v. Wickey 
 Krehl v. Burrell 
 
 1561, 1562 
 334 
 378 
 1501 
 1243, 1246 
 1360 
 
 ia>5 
 
 986, 987, 1080, 
 1140, 1662 
 1368, 1376 
 1621 
 790 
 314, 369 
 287 
 656 
 1548 
 1320 
 1680 
 418, 1677 
 855 
 
 v. Park 
 Kreichbaum v. Bridges 
 Kreider v. Mehaffy 
 Krick v. Jansen 
 Krippendorf v. Hyde 
 Kronheim v. Johnson 
 Krueger r. Ferry 
 Krumbhaar v. Griffiths 
 Kruson v. Kruson 
 Kuhl v Martin 
 Kuhliger v. Bailev 
 Kunkel p. Markell 214, 341, 361, 368 
 Kuntz r. White Co. 1675 
 
 Kurtz v. Spence 418 
 
 Kuttner v. Haines 1580 
 
 Kutz's Appeal 1299 
 
 Kuyper b. Reformed Dutch 
 Church 584,588,590,601,694, 
 718,720,721,761 
 Kyle v. McKenzie 1548 
 
 v. Perdue 1548 
 
 v. Riley 788 
 
 Kynaston v. East India Co. 166 
 
 v- Perry 797 
 
 L. 
 
 Labadie v. Hewitt 346, 559 
 
 1150 
 
 Lacon v. Mertins 
 
 1245 
 
 Labouchere !> Dawson 
 
 
 1655 
 
 Lacroix v. Lyons 
 
 313 
 
 v. Wharncliffe 
 
 
 1653 
 
 j'. May 
 
 590 
 
 Lacassagne B. Chapuis 
 
 
 790 
 
 Lacy !■. Burchnall 
 
 70 
 
 Lacey, Ex parte 
 
 
 157 
 
 v. Hill 
 
 1174 
 
 v. Baker 
 
 
 1461 
 
 v. Rnckett 
 
 63 
 
 v. Forrester 
 
 
 1129 
 
 v. Wilson 
 
 675 
 
 Lachlan V. Reynolds 
 
 1276 
 
 1284 
 
 Ladbroke v. Sloane 797, 
 
 799, Dil- 
 
 Lackett v. Rumbaugh 
 
 636 
 
 1770 
 
 Ladbrooke v. Bleadou 
 
 798 
 
 Lackey v. Curtis 
 
 
 29C 
 
 Ladd o. Chase 
 
 1561 
 
 Ladd r Harvey 
 
 r. Putnam 1238 
 Ladies Benevolent Soc. v. Bene- 
 volent Soc. 1662 
 Ladner v. Ogden 1548 
 Lafavour r. Justice 601 
 Lafayette v. Fowler 1661 
 Co v. Neely 324, 328, 2398 
 Ins Co, v. French 357 
 Lafferty v. Turley 64S
 
 lxxiv 
 
 Lafitte, Re 1440 
 
 Latitte's Claim 1440 
 
 Lafoue v. Falkland Islands Co. 413, 
 577, 786, 1651, 1552. 1555, 1821, 
 1824, 1834, 1838 
 Laforest, Re 62 
 
 La Grange, &c. R. Co. V- Mem- 
 phis, &c. K. Co. 1370, 1550, 
 1577 
 Laidlev v. Merrifield 987, 1491 
 
 Laiglit v. Morgan 893, 394, 547 
 
 v. Cell 1284, 1290 
 
 Laiug v Kaine 848 
 
 v. Zeden 1566, 1569, 1618 
 
 Lainhart v. Reilly 287 
 
 Luiuson v. Lainson 1256, 1257 
 
 Laird v. Boyle 378 
 
 v. Briggs 384, 401, 782, 10u3 
 
 Lake v. 734, 737 
 
 v. Austwick 1546 
 
 v. Causfield 877 
 
 v. Deer 1129 
 
 v Haseltine 154 
 
 v. Hayes 643 
 
 v Meares 1050 
 
 v. Peisley 866, 868 
 
 v. Skinner 882, 883 
 
 Lake Krie & W. R. Co. V. Hatch 546 
 Lake Superior Iron Co. v. Brown 
 
 1286, 1507 
 Lake's Trusts, Re 649, 650 
 
 Lakeman v. Agua Fria Gold M. 
 
 Co. 683 
 
 Lakens v Fielden 592, 739, 748 
 
 Lakin, Ex parte 1357 
 
 Lamar v. Micou 546 
 
 Lamare V- Dixon 1889 
 
 Lamb v. Beaumont Temperance 
 
 Hall Co. 1051 
 
 V. Evaus 1650 
 
 V- Jeffrey 597 
 
 v. Munster 564, 717 
 
 Lambe v. Orton 1312, 1366, 1477, 
 1487, 1795, 1823 
 Lambert v. Addison 332 
 
 v Fisher 1137 
 
 v. Hill 1594, 1971 
 
 v. Hutchinson 1040, 1041 
 
 v. Jones 425 
 
 v. Lambert 281, 601, 1549, 1550 
 v. Lomas 482 
 
 v. Lyddon 1138 
 
 v Maris 892 
 
 v Neuchatel Asphalt Co 26, 1650 
 v. Newark 1606, 1797 
 
 v. Northern Railway of Bu- 
 enos Ay res 243 
 v People 563, 567 
 v. Peyton 1004 
 v Rogers 581 
 v. Turner 162, 476 
 Lambie v . Lambie 1798 
 LaMert V. Stanhope 809 
 Laming v. Gee 438, 1370, 1577, 1581, 
 1584 
 Lamon v. McKee 1069, 1770 
 Lampton p. Lampton 844 
 Lamson v. Drake 378, 1309 
 Lanahan v. Gahan 1631 
 Lancashire v. Lancashire 1079, 1465, 
 1600, 1721, 1725 
 and Yorkshire Ry. 
 Co. r. Evans 791, 808, 810 
 Lancashire, &c. Bank v. Tee 187 
 Lancaster, Re 38, 40, 111 
 v. Choate 1626,2284,2349 
 v. DeTrafford 1081 
 v. Evors 300, 720, 722, 1829 
 v. Lair 811 
 v. Lancaster 1573 
 v. Roberts 586 
 v. Thornton 77 
 v. Ward 848, 1079, 1116 
 Lancaster and Carlisle Ry. Co 
 
 v. North-Western Ry. Co 1620 
 Lancaster Mills v. Merchants' 
 Cottonpress Co. 517 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 1209, 1407, 
 1423 
 548 
 1515 
 1364 
 1475, 1479 
 Canada v. 
 
 1817 
 
 Lancefield l>. Iggulden 
 
 Lancy !'. Randlett 
 Land v. Cowan 
 v. Land 
 v. Wick nam 
 Corporation of 
 
 Pules ton 
 Credit Co. v. Fermoy 193, 
 
 1029, 1064, 1678 
 Credit Society of Ireland, Re 
 
 943 
 Landars v. Allen 1001 
 
 Landed Estates Co. v. W*eediug_ 138 J 
 
 Lander v. lngersoll 
 
 v. Parr 
 
 v. Weston 
 Landis v Olds 
 Landou v. -Morris 
 
 v. Ready 
 Lane, Re 
 
 v. Crombie 
 
 v. Ellzey 
 
 v. Hardwicke 
 
 v. Hobbs 
 
 v. Jackson 
 
 v. Lane 
 
 6 
 
 27,111 
 .19 
 
 378, 381 
 
 1721 
 
 402, 530 
 
 892, 1359, 1360 
 
 850 
 
 504,658, 1591 
 
 162, 169. 448, 476 
 
 1029, 1030 
 
 675, 1040 
 
 1738 
 
 v. Loudou Bank of Scotland 732 
 v. Newdigate 1639, 1662, 1663, 
 
 v. Oliver 
 v. Paul 
 v. Schouip 
 V. Smith 
 v. Sterne 
 
 Li7l 
 1061 
 763, 1821 
 1637 
 62, 63, 158, 606, 631 
 1743 
 
 Lanesborough v. Kilmaine 676, 677 
 Laufranchi v. Mackenzie 
 
 247 
 
 Lang, Ex parte 
 
 v. Brown 
 
 v. Griffith 
 
 v. Superior Court 
 
 v. Waring 
 
 v. Whiddon 
 Langdale v. Briggs 
 
 v. Gill 
 
 v. Langdale 
 
 Lady v. Briggs 
 Langdon v. Branch 
 
 v. Goddard 
 
 v. Pickering 
 v. Potter 
 v. Roane 
 Lange 0. Jones 
 Langell V. Langell 
 Langen v. Tate 
 Langford, Re 
 v. May 
 v. Pitt 
 v. Wray 
 Langham v. Great Northern Ry 
 
 Co 795, 1380, 1667 
 
 Langhorne v. Harland 1397 
 
 Langley, Ex parte 1665. 1673, 
 
 6 ' 1684, 1686 
 
 1057 
 
 1060 
 
 856, 945, 964. 1399 
 
 1723 
 
 2r5 
 
 1062 
 
 1003 
 
 1246 
 
 1560, 1563, 
 
 1564 
 
 1425. 1778 
 
 1571 
 
 12ft5, 1390 
 
 386, 774 
 
 1274 
 
 157 
 
 1298 
 
 1697 
 
 1591 
 
 216, 9! 4 
 
 83 
 
 1001, 2182 
 
 1530 
 
 792 
 
 1001 
 
 303 
 
 720, 728, 759, 844. 
 
 852. 1997 
 
 349, 350, 729, 759 
 
 318 
 
 1003 
 
 277 
 
 545 
 
 915 
 
 1743, 1791 
 
 913 
 
 989 
 
 1488 
 
 v Bredon 
 
 v. Breydon 
 
 v Fisher 
 
 v. Hawk 
 
 v. Oxford, Earl of 
 
 v. Voll 
 Langmaid v. Reed 
 Langstaffe V. Fenwick 
 Langston r. Boylston 
 
 Langton v. Higgs 
 o.'Horton 
 
 V'. Langton 
 
 v. Wait* 
 Langyher v. Patterson 
 Lanham v. Pirie 191, 832, 967, 2042 
 Lanier v. Alison 1628 
 
 v Hill 407 
 
 Lankford v. Jackson 1284 
 
 Lann v. Church 1845 
 
 Lanning v. Heath 412. 424 
 
 Lanoy v. Athol 97, 105, 1360 
 
 Lansdale v. Smith 660 
 
 Lansdown v. Elderton 690 
 
 Lausdowue, Marquis of v. Lans- 
 dowue, Marchioness Dow- 
 ager of 1634 
 Lansiug v. Albany Ins. Co. 1576, 
 1676, 1578 
 v. Easton 1683, 1686 
 v. Goelet ^84 
 v. Mcpherson 1026, 1286 
 v. Pine 562, 567 
 v. Russell 1120, 1124, 1125 
 Lanum v. Steele 518 
 Lapev Taylor 1417 
 Lapej ra v. United States 67 
 Lapham v. Green 195 
 Lapresse V. Falls 1073. 1076 
 Laprimaudaye v. Teissier 116, 1778, 
 1785, 1794 
 Lapton v. Almy 1277 
 Larabrie v. Brown 394, 1563 
 Larcom r. Olin 1620 
 Lardner v Ogden 1548, 1551 
 Lareau V. Davignon 46 
 Largan v. Bowen 1615 
 Large v. De Ferre 77 
 v. Van Doren 212, 220, 259 
 I^argeu v. Bowen 1764 
 Larimore v. Wells &J4 
 Larkin v. Mann 526, 1073, 1163, 
 1154, 1166. 1158 
 Larkins v. Biddle 334, 340, 402 
 ci Murphy 12:i5 
 v. Pax ton 1423. 1437 
 Larmuth v. Simmons 1624 
 Laroche V. Wakeman 58 
 Larrqbee v. Grant 1120 
 Larrison, v. Peoria, &c. R. Co. 
 
 733 
 Larrowe v. Beame 676 
 
 Larsen v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. 
 
 Co. 830 
 
 Larsh v. Brown 846 
 
 Larue v. Larue 994 
 
 Lasell v. Powell 1272 
 
 Lash ». McCormick 1671 
 
 v. Miller 159, 1510, 1524, 1525, 
 
 2059 
 
 Lashlev v. Hogg 793, 1205 
 
 Laslett v. Cdffe 1266 
 
 Lasseur v. Tyrconnel 1809 
 
 Lataillade r. Orena £45 
 
 LaUh v. Latch 226, 251, 433, 438 
 
 Latham v. Chafee 634, 1734 
 
 i'. Kenrick 64 
 
 v. Wiswall 424 
 
 Lathbury v. Brown 1130 
 
 Lathrop v Knapp 1751 
 
 v Nelson 1277 
 
 v. Sn.alley 1417 
 
 v Stewart 546 
 
 Latimer, Ex parte 1440 
 
 v Ayletbury, itc. Ry. Co. 1656, 
 
 1730, 1731 
 
 v. Neate 1830, 1833, 1835 
 
 Latouch v. Dunsany 1549 
 
 Latouche r. Sampson 768 
 
 Latour v. Bland 1644 
 
 Latta Ex parte 28. 1605 
 
 V. Kilbourn 1029 
 
 Latter v. Da^hwood 1252 
 
 Latting v. Hall 881 
 
 v. Latting 339, 340 
 
 Laud v. Cowan 326 
 
 v Sargent 604 
 
 Lauderdale Co r Foster 60 
 
 Laughlin r. President, &c. 1631 
 
 Laugh ton V. Atkins 874 
 
 v. Harden 266, 584 
 
 Laura Jane v. Hagen 652 
 
 Laurence ;\ Maule 868 
 
 Lauri v. Renad 46 
 
 Laurie v. Burn 515 
 
 v. Crush 1525, 1526 
 
 v. Laurie 1673 
 
 Lautour v. Attorney-General 315, 
 
 643,602
 
 Lautour v. Holcombe 27, 34, 796, 810 
 
 Lautz v. Gordon 1548 
 
 La Vega v. Lapsley 2391) 
 
 Laverty v. Moore 1029 
 
 Lavihart v. Reilly 390 
 
 Law, Re 86, 1 61 
 
 v. Ford 1718, 1727, 1728 
 
 f . Garrett 671 
 
 v Hunter 857, 1189 
 
 v Law 324, 94b 
 
 v. London Indisputable Co 485, 
 
 621,716,760,1819,1820 
 
 v. Philby 283 
 
 v Rigby 561, 633 
 
 v. Scott 111 7 
 
 Liwes v Gibson 1397, 1398, 1403 
 
 Lawtord v. Spicer 
 Lawlesx v. Mansfield 
 Lawley v llalpeu 
 
 v. Waldon 
 Lawrance v. Norreys 
 Lawrell v. Titchborne 
 Lawrence, Re 
 
 v- Austin 
 
 1008, 1070 
 371 
 112 
 209 
 324, 354, 392 
 949 
 1841 
 1081, 1638. 1641, 
 1661, 1663 
 v. Bank of the Republic 256 
 
 v. Berney 1580 
 
 v. Bolton 1523, 1535 
 
 t'. Bowie 1421 
 
 v. Campbell 577, 1834 
 
 r Cornell 1028 
 
 u Derby 354 
 
 v. Hester 860 
 
 v. Horton 1638. lfWil 
 
 V. Lane 280 281 
 
 v. Lawrence 37, 38, 713, 845 ' 
 
 v. Maule 870 I 
 
 t;. Philpot 1677 
 
 v Pool 694 
 
 v Remington 633 
 
 v. Richmond 1017 
 
 v. Rokes 149, 150, 151, 216, 219, 
 290, 641 
 v. Smith 1642, 1645 
 
 t> Traner 545 
 
 Lawrence Manuf. Co v. Janes 
 
 ville Cotton Mills 
 Lawrenson v. Butler 
 Lawne v. Lees 
 Lawry v. Houston 
 Lawson v. Barker 
 V. Drake 
 v. Jordan 
 v. Menasha W. Co. 
 v. Stoddart 
 
 Wright 
 Lawton v. Green 
 
 f Lawton 
 
 v Price 
 Lay v Brown 
 Layton v. Ivans 
 
 »'. Mortimore 
 Lazarus v. Mozley 
 Lea v. Parker 
 
 r Keed 
 
 V. Robeson 
 
 v Sax by 
 Vanbibber 
 
 1586 
 
 1405 
 
 1339 
 
 121 
 
 254 
 
 1300 
 
 1566 
 
 1639 
 
 908, 1336 
 
 270 
 
 1666 
 
 161 7 
 
 908, 944, 1225 
 
 91 
 
 424 
 
 156. 502 
 
 1822 
 
 32 
 
 666 
 
 645 
 
 720 
 
 402, 524 
 
 Lea Conservancy Board !'. Tot- 
 tenham Local Board 1638 
 Lea's Trust, Re 193 
 Leach v Fobes 844, 1902, 2264, 2338 
 v. Jones 1019 
 v. Leach 13eJ[ 
 Leacraft o. Demprey 590, 617, 668 
 682, 694, 700, 703, 788, 789 
 
 Leaoroft v Maynani 
 Leadhetter v. , 
 
 Leadbitter, Re 
 Leader, The 
 Leader v. Moody 
 Leah, Re 
 Xeahy v. Arthur 
 Leake v Bundy 
 
 v. Cordeaux 
 
 v. Leake 
 
 v. Smith 
 
 1384, 143: 
 1646 
 
 59,61,157 
 1846 
 1654 
 1843 
 1719 
 1508 
 1929 
 1699 
 1663 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging J 
 
 Leauian v. Brown 451, 452, 4S0, 481 
 
 Learned v. Castle 1638 
 
 v. Tillotson lo71 
 
 V. Walton 1051 
 
 Learoyd u. Halifax Joint Stock 
 
 B Co, 571, 573, 1835 
 
 Leary v Long 659 
 
 Leather Cloth Co. v American 
 
 Leather Cloth Co 164', 1649 
 
 v. Bressey 426 
 
 v. Hirschfield 852, 1082 
 
 v. Lorsont 1649, 1654 
 
 Leathes v. Newit 262 
 
 Leatuley v. McAndrew 20, 26 
 
 Leavenworth ;;. Pepper 360 
 
 Leavitt v Cruger 180, 182, 445, 476, 
 498, 499, 524, 538, 733, 754, 784 
 v. Fisher 1569 
 
 Leavy v. Leavy 255 
 
 Leaycraft v. Deuipsey 361, 371, 668 
 v Heddeu 186 
 
 Le Baron v. Cronibie 1118 
 
 Lechuiere v. Brasier 165, 858, 859, 
 1276. 1276 
 v. Brazier 1214, 1218, 1423, 1806 
 v Brotheridge 100 
 
 »' Clamp 832, 969, 998 
 
 v. Clapp 820 
 
 Lechmere Bank v. Boynton 2152 
 Lechuiere Charlton's Case 1070 
 
 Le Clea v Trot 17 13 
 
 Leddel v Starr 1550, 1716 
 
 Leduc v. Ward 190 
 
 Ledwich, Ex parte 1069 
 
 Ledwith v. Jacksonville 1517, 1620 
 2048 
 Lee, Ex parte 52 
 
 v. Angas 907. 909, 1097 
 
 v. Beatty 1073, 1076, 1124 
 
 v. Bickley 1406 
 
 v. Blackstone 417 i 
 
 v. Boutwell 378 I 
 
 v Braxton 997 | 
 
 v. Brown 1398, 1427 1 
 
 v. Cargill 1667, 1675 I 
 
 v. Cone 380 
 
 v Delane 1405, 1426, 1427 
 
 v Dennistoun 65, 835 
 
 v. Gibbings 1620, 1643 
 
 v Haley 1649 
 
 p. Hammerton 945 
 
 v Lee 63, 64, 1234, 1530. 1544 
 
 v . Melendez 2329 1 
 
 V. Milner 1636 | 
 
 v. Pain 851 j 
 
 v Park 1615, 1616 I 
 
 r Pmdle 383, 1368. 1381 ' 
 
 r Read 564, 741 
 
 i'- Rogers 52 | 
 
 v Kuggles 1624 | 
 
 I 1 Ryder 177 
 
 v. Saogster 65 \ 
 
 v Shaw 992 j 
 
 * Shore 1129, 1135 
 
 '•• Stig-:r fa; ; 
 
 v Stone 331 | 
 
 11 Walker 1402 ; 
 
 v. WiKock 1298 ■ 
 
 v. Wilmot 646 
 
 Leech i' Bailey 713 
 
 v. Bolland 889 
 
 v. State ]614 
 
 v Trollop 570, 675 
 
 Leedham v, Cbauner 1423 
 
 Leeds v Lewis 1327 
 
 v. Mar Ins. Co. 841 
 
 Duke of r Amherst, Earl of 649 
 v. Amherst, Lord 1634 
 
 v Strafford. Earl of 1164 
 
 Leeds Estate Co v. Shepherd 26 27 
 Leeming. Re 1354 
 
 Lees i). Jones 1727 
 
 v. Lees 893 1457 
 
 v. Nuttall 1484 1611 
 
 II Patterson 1704, 1705. 1712, 1714 
 Leese v. Knight 160. 162, 163 177, 
 460, 476, 533, 538 
 
 lxxv 
 
 Leeson v Smith 1130 
 
 Leet v. Gersham Life Insurance 
 
 Society 1096, 1128 
 
 v. Jenkins 14>;0 
 
 Leete v. Jenkins 14;1 
 
 Lefevre v. Laraway 1286, 1290, 12.(1 
 
 Leffingwell v Chave 1667 
 
 Le Fort v. Delafield 72 
 
 Lefroy v Lefroy 1286, 1287 
 
 Leftwick v. Hamilton 469, 1625 
 
 Legal v. Miller 380 
 
 Legard v. Daly 1123, 1136, 1139 
 
 v Hodges 1799 
 
 v. Sheffield 829 
 
 Le Gendre v. Byrnes 56 J 
 
 Legg i>. Mackrell 1416 
 
 Legge v. Edmonds 564 
 
 Leggett v. Dubois 1544 
 
 11 Postley 563, 564, 721, • 1557 
 
 v Sellon 169 
 
 Leggo v. Richards 2060 
 
 Leggott v. Barrett 1665 
 
 Legh r. HaVerfield 380, 860 
 
 v. Hewitt 1655 
 
 v. Holloway 1148 
 
 Le Grand v- Hampden Sidney 
 
 College 20 
 
 r. Whitehead 1368 
 
 Le Grange v. McAndrew 3d 
 
 Le Heup, Ex parte 347 
 
 Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. 
 
 v. Central R Co. 1743 
 
 Lehigh R Co. v McFarlan 361, 
 
 797, 1682 
 
 Lehman 11 Dozier 
 
 v. Ford 
 Lehmann v. McArthur 
 Lehmans v Ford 
 Lehuoti v. Fisher 
 Leicester, Ex parte 
 
 v. Leicester 
 
 1551 
 1548 
 1081, 1889 
 1553 
 1591 
 1825 
 816 
 
 Earl ol v. Perry 606, 1558 
 
 I Leigb, Re 1594 
 
 Re, Leigh v. Leigh 108 
 
 I »' Birch 720, 721, 722 
 
 I »• Boyd 880 
 
 v. Clark 1676 
 
 » Everhart 563 
 
 !'• Leigh 369, 1660 
 
 v Macaulay 1774, 1776 
 
 v. Thomas 236, 24o 
 
 v. Turner 637, 638, 697, 1312 
 
 Leighton v Lelghton 1427,1661, 
 
 1682 
 
 v Merrill 13«1 
 
 v Orr 852 
 
 » Young 313. 1621 
 
 Leitch v Abbott 324, 328 666 
 
 v Cumpston 1029, 1602 
 
 v Wells 281 
 
 11 Wentworth 1661 
 
 Leite v Johnston 801 
 
 v Vicmi 627 819 
 
 Leitendorfer 11 King 310 
 
 Leitn, He 1769 
 
 Lei t ham 11 Cuoick 1631 
 
 Leland v. Griffith 1287 
 
 Leman v. Alie 1385, 1405 
 
 v Newnham 465 
 
 Lemaster r Burkhart 361, 849, 862 
 
 Lemheek v Nye 1638 
 
 Leinmon r Dunn 256 
 
 Lemoine v. Garston 1648 
 
 Lemon, Re 68 
 
 v Yorkshire Waggon Co. 405 
 
 Lcnaghan v. Smith 181, 183, 217, 
 
 219 
 
 Lenders v. Anderson 449 
 
 Le Neve r. Le Neve 675 
 
 V. Norris 1576 
 
 Leng v. Hodges 1795 
 
 Lengsfield v. Richardson 673 
 
 Lennon v Napper 1658 
 
 v Porter 261 
 
 Lenoir v Winn 418 
 
 Lenox v. Mitchell 1469 
 
 v Netrebe 169
 
 lxxvi 
 
 Lent v. Padelford 
 Lentilhon 0. Moffat 
 Lenton v Brudenel 
 Lenz v. Prescott 
 Leo v Lambert 
 v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. 
 
 Leonard v. Atwell 
 
 v. Cook 
 
 v. Groome 
 
 v Jamison 
 
 v. Ozark Land Co. 
 
 v. White 
 
 v. Wildes 
 Leon N Bank v Gill 
 Leopard v People 
 Leroy v. Dickinson 
 Le Roy v Servis 
 
 V. \ eeder 
 Leslie v. Baillie 
 
 v. Cave 
 
 v. Leslie 
 Lespinasse v. Bell 
 Lesquire v. Lesquire 
 Lester v Archdale 
 
 v. Bond 
 
 v- Garland 
 
 v Mathews 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 363 
 303 
 1209 
 334 
 1713 
 26, 314, 
 1614, 2398 
 1686 
 1517 
 214 
 1568 
 2398 
 1551 
 1260 
 1461 
 1556 
 1669 
 547 
 392, 547 
 128 
 579 
 349, 728 
 1738 
 282 
 809 
 449 
 67 
 974, 1584, 1585 
 Le Texier u. Auspach, Margrave 
 
 of 184 
 
 v Anspach, Margrave and 
 
 Margravine of 145 
 
 v. Anspach, Margravine of 15 
 
 Lewis, Re 
 v. Allenby 
 v. Armstrong 
 V. Baird 
 Baldwin 
 
 Letliem V. Hall 
 Lethley v. Taylor 
 Lett, lie 
 
 v. Morris 
 
 v. Parry 
 
 v Randall 
 Leucke v. Tredway 
 Leuty v. Hillas 
 Levan v. Patton 
 Le Ya.-seur v Scratton 
 Levenson v Elson 
 Lever v. Goodwin 
 
 v. Heritage 
 Leverich v Adams 
 Leverick v. Meigs 
 Leveridge v. Marsh 
 Levert V Redwood 
 
 loi, 
 299.378 
 1355 
 181 
 1446 
 
 Levett v Letteney 
 Levi v Evans 
 v Heritage 
 
 385, 722 
 
 527 
 
 559 
 
 231 
 
 1625 
 
 119 
 
 1730 
 
 1648, 1649 
 
 808, 810, 815 
 
 1355 
 
 325 
 
 214 
 
 526, 881, 1296, 
 
 1314 
 
 1046 
 
 536, 630 
 
 159, 808, 810, 
 
 815 
 
 513 
 
 52,68 
 
 178, 841 
 
 863 
 
 868 
 
 l> Ward 
 
 Levine v, Taylor 
 
 Levmg v. Caverly 
 
 Levisay v Delp 
 
 Leviston v French 
 
 Levitt v. Levitt 8!>3 
 
 Levv, Re, Levin v. Levin 894 
 
 v. Baillie 1130 
 
 t Uvy 163. 1075 
 
 v. Milne 1129 
 
 v. ?.hrevpport 1661 
 
 v Stfinbach 1625 
 
 r Wa.ker 1655, 1660 
 
 I^wark v Carter 1282 
 
 Lewarne t'. Mexican Int'l Imp 
 
 Oo 559, 2398 
 
 Lewellin v. Cobbold 431 
 
 n Mackworth 1581, 1584 
 
 Lewen v Stone 1961 
 
 l#wer Earl of v Barnett 157 
 
 Lewers v. Shaftsbury, Earl of 1081, 
 1889 
 
 v. Bank of Kentucky 
 v. Brass 
 v. Campau 
 v Clewes 
 v Clowes 
 
 I/ewes, Re 
 
 > Morgan 
 Lewin, lie 
 
 v. Allen 
 
 v. Guest 
 
 V Jones 
 
 V. Moline 
 
 v Wilson 
 Lewin's Trust, Inre 
 
 850, 1389, 1795 
 
 1255, 1684 
 
 41 
 
 268 
 
 1220, 1408 
 
 710 
 
 972 
 
 652 
 
 104, 107, 2001 
 
 61, 94,299 
 
 993, 1436, 1588 
 
 1380, 1602 
 
 617,716 
 
 452, 453, 536 
 
 24 
 561 
 1463 
 640 
 980 
 
 Cocks 552, 556, 630, 1071, 1699 
 
 v Cooper 
 v. Darling 
 v. Davies 
 v. Duncombe 
 v. Dwight 
 r Edmund 
 v. Evans 
 v. Fielding 
 v. Fullarton 
 v. Glass 
 v. Godman 
 V- Hawkins 
 v. Herndon 
 v. Hiuton 
 v. James 
 v King 
 v_ Lewis 
 
 602 
 
 232, 287, 418 
 
 1835 
 
 653 
 
 1254 
 
 336 
 
 1453 
 
 679 
 
 1642, 1645, 1646 
 
 1551 
 
 1195 
 
 278, 815 
 
 989 
 
 1027 
 
 889, 1776 
 
 1772 
 
 372, 974, 1302 
 
 1817 
 
 Londesborough, Earl of 
 Loper 
 
 334 
 Loxham 1405 
 
 v Maris 875 
 
 o. Marshall 641 
 
 v. Mason 843 
 
 v Matthews 438, 1428 
 
 v. Mew 281 
 
 v. Mohr 545 
 
 v. Morland 468 
 
 v. Nangle 216 
 
 v Nobbs 68, 69 
 
 v Outlaw 171, 839, 1509, 1540, 
 1546 
 v. Owen 841, 844, 92.5 
 
 v Pennington 575 
 
 v. Pleasants 1580 
 
 V- Providence 1650 
 
 v. St Albans Iron Works 334 
 
 v. Shainwald 389 
 
 v Simonton 740, 1031 
 
 v Smith 1466, 1600, 1651, 1676 
 1661 
 
 v Spencer 
 
 v Thomas 1079 
 
 n. Trask 1411 
 
 v. Webber 1391 
 
 v. Wilson 1463 
 
 v Zouche, Lord 1738 
 
 Lewis's v. Goodbody 1648 
 
 v Lewis 974 
 
 Lewisburg Bank v. Sheffey 1019 
 
 Lewi.-ton Falls Manuf Co. v. 
 
 Franklin Co 388 
 
 Lexington Natl Bank v. Guynn 1661 
 
 Trustees of v. McConnell 20 
 
 Ley t>. Cox 1157 
 
 v. Ley 1"38 
 
 Leycester v Logan 1626 
 
 v. Norris 203, 152 1 
 
 Levland V. Ley land 417, 1524 
 
 Lh'oneux v. Hong Kong & S 
 
 Banking Co. 27 
 
 Libby v. Hodgdon 144 
 
 v Norris 243 
 
 ji Scherman 860 
 
 Lichfield, Earl of v. Bond 717. 763 
 
 Lichtenauer v. Cheney 314, 409, 41 1 , 
 
 2382 
 
 Lick v Ray }624 
 
 Lidbetter v Long 598, 14H0 
 
 v. Smith 1275 
 
 Liddall v Nicholson 893, 1801 
 
 Liddell, lie, Liddell v. Liddell 168 
 
 v. Liddell 1726 
 
 l, MVickar 1231, 1235 
 
 Lidney & Wigpool Iron Co. 
 
 v Bird 27, 1444, 1794 
 
 Liebig's Cocoa Works Limited, 
 lie 149 
 
 Liebig's Extract of Meat Co. B 
 
 Hanbury 1649 
 
 Liebmann v. McGraw 418 
 
 Liebstein v. Mayor of Newark 1661, 
 
 1677 
 
 Life Association v. Boogher 1644 
 
 Ligan v. Henderson 314 
 
 '.i^gett r. Glenn 576, 634 
 
 Liggon r Smith 778 
 
 Light v Governor 933 
 
 v. Light 9, 83, 86 
 
 Lightbourne v Holyday 116 
 
 Lightburn r. Swift 1276 
 
 Lightfoot v Bass 186 
 
 v. Price 1260 
 
 Like v Beresford 104. 1599 
 
 Lillard v. Porter 4<>3 
 
 Lilley. Re 1605 
 
 v. Allen 1775 
 
 Li Hie v Legh 1490 
 
 v Lillie 27, 28, 29 
 
 LMiendahl v. Detwiller 334 
 
 Lillienthal !■ Washburn 689,843 
 
 Lima& H F. Ry Co., Re 1591 
 
 Limehouse Works Co., Re 1026 
 
 Lincoln » Bassett 58, 60 
 
 v. Purcell 549 
 
 v Rut. & Bur R. R Co. 1560, 
 
 1561 
 
 v. Windsor 1234, 12&5, 1413, 1414 
 
 v. Wright 655, 657, 712, 921, 
 
 922, 1001, 1590 
 
 Bishop of v Ellis 869 
 
 Lind v Isle of Wight Ferry Co 
 
 1650, 1831 
 
 Linder v. Lewis 224, 517 
 
 Lindesay v. Lindesay 1573 
 
 Lindlev v. Cravens 288 
 
 v. Russell 334 
 
 Lindsay, Ex parte 1069 
 
 v. American M Co. 1716 
 
 v Eth ridge 1668 
 
 v. Gibbon 1166 
 
 v. Homerton 1235 
 
 v. Lindsay 652 
 
 v. Lynch 384, 408, 847, 860, 861 
 
 ii. Rankin 675 
 
 v. Tyrrell 37, 39, 75, 1474, 1483 
 
 Petroleum Co v. Hurd 850 
 
 Lindsey v. 1731 
 
 v Stevens 740 
 
 v Western Mutual Aid Society 378 
 Lindsley v. James 145 
 
 v. Personette 586 
 
 Liney v . Wetherley 9 
 
 Linford v. Cooke 1796 
 
 Ling v. Colman 248, 253 
 
 Lingan v Henderson 182, 379, 385, 
 457, 532, 618, 734, 885, 933, 1005 
 Lingen v Simpson 1829 
 
 Lingood v. Croucher 297, 298 
 
 Lingwood r. Stowmarket Paper- 
 Making Co. 1639, 1672, 2308 
 Link v. Jarvis 417 
 Linley I) Taylor 1428, 1528 
 Linn v. Carson 408 
 v. Green 324 
 v Wheeler 1675 
 Linnell v Battey 1624 
 Linton v Denham 1677 
 v. Mayor of Athens 1661 
 Linwood v Andrews 1069 
 Linzee v Mixor 1654 
 Lippencott v. Ridgway 837 
 Lippiat 1' Holley 796 
 Liupincott v. Shaw Carriage Co. 
 
 1411 
 Lippitt v American Wood 
 
 Paper Co. 1051 
 
 Lipscomb v. Palmer 1861 
 
 Lisbon Steam Tramways Co., Re 905 
 Lishey v Lishey 
 
 v. Smith 550 
 
 Listen ?■ Reave 197, 325 
 
 List's Case 1069 
 
 List Pub. Co v Kellel 1643 
 
 Lister v , Bell 1336 

 
 Lister v Leather 
 
 v Lister 
 
 v. Meadowcroft 
 
 V Muudell 
 
 v Sherringham 
 
 v Thompson 
 
 v Wood 
 Lister's Hospital, Re 
 Litch v Clinch 
 Litchfield v. Ballou 
 
 v Jones 
 Lithgow !> Lyon 
 
 Little, Re, Harrison v. Harrison 
 
 100 
 
 v. Archer 584 
 
 v Buie 295 
 
 v. Cooper 548 
 
 t< Dusenberry 1743 
 
 v. Knox 1556 
 
 v. Merrell 1249, 1550 
 
 v. Parkfield C. Co. 1650 
 
 v Price 1640 
 
 v. Stephens 694, 830 
 
 Littlehales v Gascoyne 1418 
 
 Littlejohn V. Attrill 1638 
 
 v. Muun 733, 784 
 
 Littler v. Thomson 887, 1070 
 
 Littlewood i». Collins 798, 79:) 
 
 Litton i> Armstead 312 
 
 v Litton _ 1256 
 
 Liverpool v Chippendall 771, 784 
 
 & G. \V Steam Co. v Pboeuix 
 
 Ins Co. 546 
 
 Household Stores Ass'n v. 
 
 Smith 1613 
 
 Marine Credit Co v. Hunter 47 
 
 Mayor, &c, of v Chorley 
 
 Waterworks Co 1636 
 
 Livesay v. Feamster 1675 
 
 Livesey v. Harding 1265. 1696 
 
 v. Livesey 171, 1316, 1522 
 
 v. Wilson 781 
 
 Livey v. Winton 402, 1551 
 
 Livingston v. Kreelaud 1522 
 
 v. Gibbons 536, 828 
 
 v. Harris 563, 564, 721 
 
 v. Hayes 418 
 
 v. Hubbs 1577, 1578, 1579, 1581, 
 
 1582, 1583 
 v. Kane 634, 815, 816 
 v Livingston 392, 547. 549. 
 
 555, 760, 1631, 1676 
 v Lvnch 24 
 
 v Marshall 418 
 
 v Maryland Ins. Co 50 
 
 v Met El. Ry. Co 1320 
 
 v Noe 164, 1276, 1577, 1578, 
 
 1583, 15"<4 
 v Story 313, 547, 628, 787 
 v. Tompkins 563, 1657 
 v Van Ingen 1613, 1613 
 
 Living-tone v Cooke 510 
 
 Llanelly Ry. Co. v. London & 
 
 N W Ry Co. 671 
 
 Llangynog Lead Mining Co , 
 
 Re 26 
 
 Llanover v Homfray 868, 870 
 
 Llewellyn v. Badeley 1824 
 
 Lloyd, Re 1041 
 
 Re, Allen v Lloyd 75, 1732 
 
 v. Adams 1556, 1557, 1624, 1625, 
 
 1664 
 
 v Attwood 675 
 
 v. Brewster 379, 381, 385, 402, 408, 
 
 424, 426, 1450 
 
 v. Cheetham 1053, 1730 
 
 v Cross 436, 437 
 
 v. Davies 75 
 
 v Dimmack 267,269 
 
 t; Griffith 1262 
 
 v. Gurdon 1651, 1665 
 
 v. Hicks 986 
 
 v Johnes 228, 229, 265, 266, 1276, 
 
 1519, 1520, 1521 
 
 v .Jones 3*3 
 
 v. Kirkwood 1584 
 
 v Lauder 157, 255 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 791, 1599 Lloyd v. Lloyd 431, 1233, 1423 
 
 1047 1157 v Loaring 24, 25, 236, 238, 239, 
 
 289 245, 289, 405. 419, 597 
 
 1133 v- London, Chatham, and Do- 
 
 1426 ver Ry Co. 1650, 1654. 1657 
 
 720 v. Maheam 403 
 
 2315 v. Mason 106, 1742, 1846, 2001 
 
 311, 1852 i>. Mytton 183 
 
 850, 1548 v. Passingham 1103, 1720, 1721 
 
 328 v Pennie 888 
 
 578 ! v. Pughe 117 
 
 1257 v. Purves 1831 
 
 v. Smith 223, 267, 606, 669 
 
 v. Solicitors and General Life 
 
 Assurance Co 593, 690, 756, 831 
 
 V. Spillet 1415 
 
 v Trimleston 1725 
 
 v. Waring 58, 65, 1512 
 
 v. Whitty 15li9 
 
 v Williams 106, 1258 
 
 Loader v. Price 1528 
 
 Loames v. Edge 1889 
 
 Lock v. Armstrong 668 
 
 v Bagley 403, 405 
 
 v Foote 171,839 
 
 v. Lomas 710 
 
 v. vvilson 646 
 
 Locke v. Bennett 551 
 
 v. Colman 1121, 1122, 1124, 1139 
 
 v. Sioux, &c Ky. Co 879 
 
 Lockett v. Cary 1827 
 
 v Lockett 722, 724, 727, 857 
 
 v Rumbough 236 
 
 Lockey v. Lockey 641 
 
 Lockhard v. Brodie 573 
 
 Lockhart v Cameron 115 
 
 v City of Troy 1669, 1677 
 
 v. Gee 123:» 
 
 v. Reilly 2116 
 
 Lockier v Smith 1772 
 
 Locking v Parker 649, 652 
 
 Lockley v Pye 1130 
 
 Loekman v Reilly 214 
 
 Lockwood v. Cleveland 1029, 1551, 
 
 1576 
 
 v Fenton 1350 
 
 v. Kitteringham 1624 
 
 v. London <& North Western 
 
 Railway Co 1081 
 
 v. Nye 633 
 
 Loder o Whelpley 576 
 
 Lodge v Pritchard 1232, 1250, 1419 
 
 v. Twell 1029 
 
 Loeb v. Willis 659 
 
 Loeustein v. Biernbaum 1699 
 
 Lofland v. Coward 797, 1120 
 
 Loftus v. Swift 1237, 1385, 1391, 1393 
 
 Logan v. Coorg, Princess of 1731 
 
 v. Fairlie 201,250, 1*50 
 
 v Grant 497, 531 
 
 v Greenlaw 634 
 
 v. McCall Pub. Co. 2127 
 
 V. Steele 906 
 
 v. Troutman 1234 
 
 v Weinholt 1254 
 
 Login v Coorg, Princess of 1144 
 
 Loinsworth v Rowley 825 
 
 Loker v. Rolle 370, 545, 547, 552 
 
 Lomas v. Wright 1934 
 
 Lomax v. Hide 214, 277, 278, 1245, 
 
 1388. 1389 
 
 Lombard v Morse 68, 83, 109, 405 
 
 Inv. Co v Carter 1770 
 
 Lomerson v. Vroom 243 
 
 London v. Att.-Gen. 12 
 
 v. London 1165 
 
 v Mitford 1)358 
 
 v. Nash 1660 
 
 V.Perkins 274,341,870 
 
 v. Pugh 1655 
 
 v Richmond 207. 257 
 
 v Thomson 1819 
 
 v Wilmington 1661 
 
 Bishop of v Fytche 564 
 
 v. Nicholls 84, 208 
 
 Corp. of v. Liverpool, Corp. 
 
 of 607 
 
 lxxvii 
 
 London, Corp. of v. Southgate 1080 
 Mayor of i>. Ainsiey 563 
 
 v. Bolt 1665 
 
 v. Hedger 1656 
 
 v. Levy 566, 583, 584, 611, 1558 
 Association v Londou & In- 
 dia Docks Joint Committee 12 
 Ast>uiaiice t' East ludia Co. 590, 
 601 
 &c. R. Co v Lancashire, &c 
 
 R. Co. 1631 
 
 &c. Ry. Co. v Imperial Mer- 
 cantile Credit Association 602 
 »; Kirk 573 
 
 Bank v. Hart 888- 915 
 
 Birmingham & Bucks Rail- 
 way, Re 1440, 14-50 
 & Birmingham Ry. Co v. 
 Grand J unction Canal Co 1008, 
 1070 
 v. Winter 380, 853, 861 
 & Blackwall Ry Co. v Cross 211, 
 354 
 v. Limehouse Board of Works 424, 
 1379, 1602, 1671 
 Brewery Co v. Teuueut 1080 
 Brighton, and South Coast 
 
 Ry. Co , Re 1852, 1855 1856 
 
 & C. B Co. v Lewis 1651 
 
 Chartered Bank of Australia 
 
 v Lempriere 100, 187, 328, 
 
 3s2 
 
 and Chatham Ry Co., Ex 
 
 parte 1800 
 
 C. &. D. Ry Co. v. Land Fi- 
 nanciers 1775 
 Chatham, and Dover Ry Co. 
 v Imperial Mercantile Credit 
 Assoc 596, 1671 
 Chatham, & Dover Ry v 
 South-Eastern Ry. 542, 671, 
 1378 
 and Colonial Co. v Elworthy 807 
 and County Assurance Co., 
 
 Re 1327 
 
 and County Banking Co. v. 
 
 Bray 87 
 
 & County B. Co. v. Dover 1264 
 Flour Co , Re 1070 
 
 Gas Light Co )'. Spottiswoode 269 
 Joint Stock Bank i> Mayor 
 
 of London 391 
 
 & Lancashire Paper Mills Co , 
 
 Re 942 
 
 Monetary Advance Co. v. 
 
 Bean 528 
 
 Monetary Advance and As- 
 surance Co v Brown 998 
 & N. W. Ry. Co., Ex parte 1794 
 t; Evans 1632 
 and North-Western Railway 
 
 v. Lancaster, Corp. of 1774 
 
 & P. Bank v. Bogle 187, 189 
 
 & Prov Ins. Co. v Seymour 664 
 Road Car Co v. Kellv 39 
 
 Steam Dyeing Co. v. Digby 1008, 
 1395 
 & S. W. Ry. Co Ex parte 1610 
 & S. W. Bank v Facey 1735 
 
 Syndicate v Lord 1781 
 
 v Love 1777 
 
 Tilbury, & S. Ry. Co. v- 
 
 Kirk 720 
 
 Waterworks Co , Ex parte 1610 
 
 & Y Bank v Pritt 1655 
 
 Londonderry, Lady, v Baker 5!»8, 
 
 659, 661 
 
 t' Bramwell 821 
 
 Londonderry and Enniskillen 
 
 Ry. Co t» Leishman 554 
 
 Lonergan v. Illinois Cent. R Co. 357 
 Long, Re 161 1 
 
 vBilke 1182,1133 
 
 v. Bowring -- 1 ' 
 
 v. Bullard H20 
 
 v. Burton 403, 1552 
 
 t' Crossley 406, 1534
 
 lxxviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging] 
 
 Long v. Dickinson 190 
 
 v Dupuy 270 
 
 r Grauberry 1542,1577,1578, 
 
 1579 
 
 r Ilitclicock 11"1 
 
 r. Jarratt 1274 
 
 ii Kee 1051 
 
 v Long 1031, 12.54, 1255. 1276 
 
 V McGregor 385 
 
 v. Majestre 322, 323.324 
 
 v. Smith 1625 
 
 v. Stone 1514 
 
 i>. Storie 202, 204, 632, 637. 796, 
 
 797, 811 
 
 v Tampico, The 141 
 
 o. Tardy 30 
 
 v- Totteuham 30 
 
 v Welter 1282 
 
 v. White 108, 847 
 
 n Yonge 243 
 
 Dock Co v. Bentley 1618 
 
 Longbottoui v. Pearee 96 
 
 Longboume v. Fisher 1169 
 
 LougJeudale Cotton Spinning 
 
 Co., Re 798 
 
 Long.ellow v Longfellow 993 
 
 Longinotto v Morss 1404 
 
 Longman v Winchester 1645, 1646 
 Longmire v Fain 1320 
 
 Lougwood Valley R Co v 
 
 Baker 1662 
 
 Longworth v Bellamy 182, 445, 452 
 
 v Flagg 995 
 
 v. Hunt 645 
 
 v Taylor 280,406,422,539 
 
 Lonsdale v. Moies 1296 
 
 Earl of v. Wordsworth 1226 
 
 Lord v. Littledale 297 
 
 Lookout Bank v. Susong 417 
 
 Loonies v Stotherd 1423, 1424, 1425 
 
 Loomis » Fay 840 
 
 Lopez, Ex parte 157 
 
 v Deacon 1826 
 
 Lord, Re 1225, 1859 
 
 v. Bigelow 24 
 
 v. Colvin 885, 891, 896. 919, 977, 
 
 1144, 1469, 1470, 1845, 2130 
 
 v Copper Miners, Gov. & Co. 
 
 ot 242. 243 
 
 v. Kellett 306, 533 
 
 v. Lord 1214, 1225 
 
 v Purchas 1722 
 
 v Thornton 354 
 
 v. Underdunck 230, 287 
 
 v Wardle 1126, 1138 
 
 v Wormleighton 1616, 1843 
 
 Lorentz v. Lorentz 1580 
 
 Lorenz v. Jacobs 1157 
 
 Lorillard ;• Coster 287, 1001 
 
 Lorimer p. Lorimer 805, 811 
 
 Loring v. Marsh 634 
 
 v. Salisbury Mills 197 
 
 v. Steinman 850 
 
 v. Thomdike 1560, 2334 
 
 Lorton V Kingston 429 
 
 v Seaman 1590 
 
 Lorwall v. Gridley 405 
 
 Lorway v. Lousada 629 
 
 Los Angeles ?\ Signoret 367 
 
 Loscombe V Russell 332 
 
 Loskey v Reid 1355 
 
 Lothbury v Brown 1142 
 
 Lothrop c Commercial Bank 24 
 
 Lottery Co. v Clark 1378 
 
 Lottinier r Lord 1715 
 
 Lou bier v Cross 1582 
 
 Loud v Holden 2220 
 
 v Sargent 604 
 
 Louis v Meek 302 
 
 Louisiana National Bank V New 
 
 Orleans 1661 
 
 State Lottery Co. v Clark 1561 
 
 Savings Bank Co , Re 1765 
 
 Louisville, N. O &c. R. Co v 
 
 R. an 1029 
 
 Louisville and R R Co v Stet- 
 son 314, 374 
 
 Louisville, Trustees of v. Gray 1680 
 
 Louisville Underwriters v. Pence 779 
 
 Loundes v. Miller 1461 
 
 Louusbun V Purdy l!)61 
 
 Lousada v. Tempter 408, 548, 1559 
 
 Louvall v Gridley 216 
 
 Louvallev Menard 1158 
 
 Love v. Allison 1778 
 
 v Baker 1626 
 
 v. Blewit 1576, 1577, 1578, 1579 
 
 v Braxton 843, 847, 1147 
 
 v. J acorn b 254 
 
 v Keowne 334 
 
 v Morrill 1164 
 
 v. White 641 
 
 Lovedeu v Milford 937 
 
 Luvejoy i' Chapman 1381 
 
 v. Irelan 246, 256 
 
 Lovelaud (,' Garner 840 
 
 Lovell v Andrew 242 
 
 v. Cragin 1548 
 
 v. Farrington 191. 327. 361, 365 
 
 v. Galloway 1458, 1556, 1557, 
 
 1559, 1614, 1625, 1672. 2047, 
 
 2126 
 
 e. Hicks 1486, 1487 
 
 Lovering v King 283 
 
 Loves; v Smith 256, 405 
 
 Lovett, Re, Ambler v. Lindsay 201, 
 
 227, 319 
 
 v. Longmire o'.>0 
 
 v Lovett 106, 107, 1112, 
 
 1114 
 
 r Steam Saw Mill Ass 845 
 
 Loving v Marsh 633 
 
 Lowr Bouverie 26,1398 
 
 v. Carter 1412, 1419 
 
 v Innes 1638, 1672 
 
 t- Mills 1029, 1031 
 
 v. Mussey 633, 659, 800, 994 
 
 V. Rou Hedge 46, 1643 
 
 ti Ward 46, 1646 
 
 Lowden v. Blakey 573 
 
 Lowdon v Hierons 1129 
 
 Lowe v. 1565 
 
 v. Baker 1626 
 
 v. Blake 507 
 
 v Burke 586 
 
 v Farlie 250 
 
 v Firkins 948 1552 
 
 v. Fox 8 1 
 
 v. Holme 1407 
 
 v .lolliffe HOI 
 
 v Lowe 987, 1752 
 
 v- Lucey 1669 
 
 v Morgan 211,212 
 
 v Peacock 633, 1557 
 
 v Richardson 1565 
 
 v Thompson 354 
 
 v Travnor 1147 
 
 v Watson 266. 1526 
 
 v Williams 349,352,593,690, 
 
 727, 756, 765 
 
 Lowell v. Leland 284 
 
 Lowenbein v Fuldner 1657 
 
 Lowenstein )'■ Biernbaum 1381 
 
 V Glidewell 1548, 1553 
 
 Lowery v Craig 123 
 
 Lowes v Lowes 1540 
 
 Lowndes, Re 68 
 
 v. Bettle 1632, 1633, 1682 
 
 v. Chisolm 1242 
 
 v. Collens 1257 
 
 v Cornford 1561 
 
 v. Garnett and Mo=eley Gold 
 
 Mining Co. 590, 610, 617, 618, 
 
 Lowson v Copeland 
 Lowten v Colchester 
 
 Lowther v. Andover 
 
 v Carlton 
 
 t'. Heaver 
 Loy i' Duckett 
 Loyd v. Cardy 
 
 v. Freshfield 
 
 v Hicks 
 
 v Malone 
 
 v Mansell 
 
 v. Spillet 
 
 » Wuittey 
 Lozear v Shields 
 Lozier v Van Saun 
 Lubiere v- Genou 
 
 Lucas ?• Arnold 
 i . Bank of Darien 
 
 v. Norton 
 
 v Robertson 
 
 v Taylor 
 Lownds v Williams 
 Lowry v Armstrong 
 
 v Jackson 
 
 v. Morrison 
 
 V Tew 
 
 v. Williams 
 Lows, Ex parte 
 
 1633 
 
 35 
 
 59,225 
 
 1207 
 
 845 
 
 354 
 
 1542 
 
 678 
 
 1463 
 
 970, 979 
 
 v. Bank of Georgia 
 
 v Calcraft 
 
 v. Commerford 
 
 v. Dixon 
 
 v. Evans 
 
 v. Harris 
 
 v Hickman 
 
 v. Holder 
 
 v. King 
 
 v. Lucas 
 
 v. Moore 
 
 v Morse 
 
 v. Oliver 
 
 1418 
 
 477, 1053, 
 
 1528 
 
 999 
 
 675 
 
 417, 1660 
 
 224, 1795 
 
 1700, 1704. 1706 
 
 576 
 
 1029 
 
 164. 174, 1580 
 
 172, 173, 1584 
 
 1415 
 
 1266 
 
 1392, 146.5 
 
 1560, 1564 
 
 868,871, 1189, 
 
 1553 
 
 264 
 
 149, 236, 286, 
 
 844 
 
 24 
 
 1166, 1167 
 
 1660 
 
 365 
 
 568 
 
 1053, 1734 
 
 1698, 1699, 1700 
 
 637 
 
 1151 
 
 169 
 
 1286 
 
 1381 
 
 360 
 
 Peacock 1440, 1449, 1696, 1845 
 
 v Rickerich 128 
 
 v Seale 227 
 
 v. Siggers 634 
 
 ?>. Temple 1310, 1449 
 
 v Williams 881 
 
 Bank v. King 1163 
 
 Luce v. Graham 409. 422 
 
 Lucena v Barnewall 2205 
 
 Luckett v. White 346, 347 
 
 Lucknow v. Brown 1358 
 
 Lucton Free School v Smith 4U5 
 
 Luddy's Trustee v. Peard _60 
 
 Ludgater v Cliannell 1757 
 
 Ludlow v. Greenhouse 1461, 1853, 
 
 1854, 1856 
 
 1002, 1577 
 
 1042, 1056 
 
 62 
 
 550, 551 
 
 77 
 
 382, 1399 
 
 329 
 
 407 
 
 v. Kidd 
 
 v. Lansing 
 
 v Ramsey 
 
 v. Simond 
 Ludolph v Saxby 
 Luff v. Lord 
 Lufkin v Galveston 
 Luft v. Gossrau 
 Luke v 
 Co 
 Luker v Dennis 
 Lull v. Clark 
 Lumb 17. Beaumont 
 
 V. Milnes 
 Lumley v. Desborough 
 
 v Hughes 
 
 v. Timms 
 
 v. Wagner 
 Lumsden v. Fraser 
 Lun v Johnson 
 Lund v Blanchard 
 
 outh Kensington Hotel 
 
 212, 223 
 
 1596, 1654 
 
 1320 
 
 354, 1817 
 
 122 
 
 28 
 
 230 
 
 1654, 1656, 1663 
 
 287, 289, 569 
 
 837 
 
 25, 268, 288, 
 
 289, 336, 599 
 
 V. Skanes Enskilda Bank 1548 
 
 Lunt v. Stephens ^ 1516 
 
 Lupton v Lupton 76,2012 
 
 v. Stephenson 1732 
 
 v. White 1231, 1241 
 
 Lury v. Pearson 1861, 1862 
 
 Lush, Re 122 
 
 Lush's Trust, Re 92 
 
 Lushington v. Boldero 1630, 1634 
 
 v. Sewell 162, 177 
 
 Lusk v. Thatcher 559 
 
 Luthwich V Attorney-General 133 
 
 Lutterel's Case 67, 1630 
 
 Lutwych v Winford 1275 
 
 Lux t\ Haggin 1639
 
 Luxton v . Stephens 1383 
 
 Luyties v Holleuder 164S 
 
 Lyall v. Fluker t>5l 
 
 Lydall V. Martinson 292, 9.6 
 
 Lyddon v Ellison 1795 
 
 Lyde v. Eastern Bengal Ry. Co. i43 
 
 Lyell v. Kennedy 59, .354. 408, 571, 
 
 57a, 5/y, bl7, 1556 
 
 Lygon v. Coventry, Lord 1360 
 
 Lyle v. Bradford 280, 390 
 
 v. Ell wood 892 
 
 v. Scarth 1393 
 
 v Yarborough, Earl of 99U 
 
 Lyles v. Hatton 1624 
 
 v. Lyles 1463 
 
 Lyman v. Bonney 26, 144 
 
 Lynch to Chance 1440 
 
 v Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 633, 815 
 
 v. Johnson 342 
 
 v. Lecesne 785, 2129 
 
 v. Macdonald 1071 
 
 v. Morse 881 
 
 v. St. John 1461 
 
 v. Willard 392, 550 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Lynchburg Iron Co v. Tayloe 197 
 
 Lvnde v Columbus &c Ry. Co. 
 
 2101 
 v. Eastern Bengal Ry. Co. 1620 
 
 Lyndon National Bank v. Wells 
 
 River Manuf Co. 298 
 
 Lyndsay v. Lynch 995 
 
 Lyne v. Lockwood 87!) 
 
 v. Lyne 1163, 1366, 1370 
 
 v. Pennell 1610, 1571 
 
 v. Willis 167 
 
 Lynn v. Beaver 1405, 1426. 1427 
 
 v Bradley 119, 122 
 
 v Buck 1183 
 
 Lyon v Baker 1414 
 
 v. Clark 1254 
 
 v. Colville 642 
 
 v. Oreenbay Ry. Co. 186 
 
 v. Home 852, 1397 
 
 v. Hunt 846 
 
 v. McKenna 1422 
 
 v. McLaughlin 1637 
 
 v. Mercer 176 
 
 v. Park 1542 
 
 Ixxix 
 
 Lyon v Perin & Gaff Manuf. Co. 986 
 v. Powell 2b3 
 
 v Saudford 194, 277 
 
 v. Tallmadge 401, 417, 659, 660, 
 828, 852, 1019 
 v . Tevis 296, 2U8 
 
 v. Tweddell 324, 579, 720 
 
 Lyons, lie 2, 1346 
 
 v. Bienkin 70, 1349 
 
 v. Brooks 713 
 
 v. McCurdy 334 
 
 v. Piper __ 1508 
 
 v. Read 732, 783 
 
 v Van Riper 1546 
 
 Lys v. Lee 1512, 1530, 1540 
 
 v. Lys 1157 
 
 Lysagiit v. Clark 144 
 
 v. Edwards 286 
 
 Lyse v. Kingdon 1411, 1417 
 
 Lyster v. Stickuey 790,1517 
 
 Lyttou v. Great Northern Rail- 
 way Co. 1660 
 v. Lytton 1580 
 v. Steward 1636, 1669, 1677 
 
 M. 
 
 M., Re 
 
 Maber v . Hobbs 
 
 v Maber 
 Maberly v. Turton 
 Maberry v. Neely 
 Mabry v. Churchwell 
 
 508 
 883 
 646 
 1358 
 186 
 790, 1286 
 
 McCampbell v Brown 
 
 v. Henderson 
 M'Campbell v. Gill 
 MeCatuy v. Key 
 M'Canu v. Beere 
 
 217 
 
 1542 
 
 837, 846 
 
 283 
 1825 
 
 McAllister v. Bishop of Roches- 
 ter 406 
 
 v. Clopton 837, 846 
 
 M'AUister v. M'Allister 319 
 
 v. Olmstead 1350 
 
 McAlpin v. Jones 1751 
 
 M'Andrew v. Bassett 1380, 1394, 
 1395, 1649 
 M'Anslan v. Green 1233 
 
 Macarmick v. Buller 98 
 
 M' Arthur V- Dudgeon 1225 
 
 v Kelly 1670 
 
 McArthur v. Matthewson 1638 
 
 v. Scott 
 
 v. Williamson 
 Macartney v. Garbutt 
 
 v. Graham 
 Macarty v. Gibson 
 Macaulay v. Phillips 
 
 200, 216 
 
 2542, 1507 
 
 142 
 
 207, 1394 
 
 1755 
 
 101, 104, 
 
 107 
 
 v. Shackell 565, 566, 1556 
 
 Macauley v Collier 1597 
 
 v. White Sewing Machine Co. 629, 
 
 1507 
 
 McBean v. Chandler 1661 
 
 Macbeath V. Ellis 1132 
 
 Macbeth v. Haldeman 133 
 
 McBride v. Commissioners 1628 
 
 v. Gwynn 1276, 1302 
 
 v. Lindsay 273 
 
 v. Mclntyre 195 
 
 M' Bride v. .Malcomson 1163 
 
 M'Broom v. Somerville 811 
 
 Macbryde v Eykyn 109 
 
 McBurney v. Carson 149 
 
 McCabe v Bank of Ireland 39 
 
 v. Bellowes 214, 216, 334, 
 
 347 
 
 1505 
 
 1517 
 
 121, 191 
 
 1113, 1578 
 
 Maccabe v. Hussey 
 
 McCaffrey v. Benson 
 
 McCaleb v. Crichfleld 
 
 McCall v. Graham 
 v. Harrison 
 v. McCall 1001 
 
 v. McCurdy 1576 
 
 v. Yard 259, 292 
 
 Maccallum v. Turton 563, 564 
 
 M'Calmont v. Rankin 151, 152, 382, 
 1490 
 
 M'Camber v. Oilman 1242, 1245 
 
 McCann v. Borradaile 39, 111, 112 
 
 v South Nashville Street R. 
 
 Co. 1663 
 
 McCarren v. Coosan 790 
 
 McCarron v. Cassidy 1243, 1244 
 
 McOarcer's Estate, Re 1418 
 
 McCarthy, Re 576 
 
 M'Carthy v. Goold 1053, 1730 
 
 McCartin v. Trephagen 249 
 
 McCartney v, Calhoun 341 
 
 v Cassidy 1675 
 
 McCarty v Chalfant 1302 
 
 McCasker v. Brady 1538 
 
 v Golden 114 
 
 McCauley v. Kellogg 1661 
 
 v. Sears 1561 
 
 v. Six 216, 15ii8 
 
 McClanahan v. Davis 547 
 
 v. Henderson 1158 
 
 v. Ware 1677 
 
 v. West 630 
 
 McClane v. Shepherd 669, 830 
 
 McCla^key v. Barr 759 
 
 t; O'Brien 322,127:* 
 
 McClean, Re 74 
 
 McClellan v. McClellan 73 
 
 McClenny v. Ward 517 
 
 Macclesfield, Earl of v. Blake 1292 
 
 v. Bradley 1134, 1138 
 
 McCloskey v. Barr 604, 608 
 
 McClungt). Sueed 560 
 
 v. Steen 790 
 
 McClure v. Farthing 68 
 
 v Harris 989 
 
 M'Comb v. Armstrong 588 
 
 v. Wright 989, 1215, 2261 
 
 McComb v. Chicago, St Louis 
 
 &c. R. Co. 145 
 
 v. Lobdell 860 
 
 v. Spangler 339 
 
 McConihay v. Wright 313 
 
 McConnaughty v Pennoyer 30.3 
 
 McConnel v. Hodson 1550 
 
 v. Holobush 1243, 1244, 1246 
 
 v. Smith 1017, 1541, 
 
 1551 
 
 M'Connell v. Hector 60 
 
 v. M'Connell 190, 314, 384, 1382, 
 
 1407 
 
 M'Connico v. Curzen 1258 
 
 McConomy v. Reed 1299 
 
 McConville v. Gilmour 149 
 
 McCorkle v. Breni 1677 
 
 McCormack v. James 1168, 2394 
 
 McCormick v. Chamberlin 700, 760 
 
 v. Garnett 95, 864 
 
 v. Grogan 1503 
 
 v. Hilbrook 186 
 
 McCormick Harvesting M Co. 
 
 v. Schneider 536 
 
 M'Corquodale v. Bell 573 
 
 M'Coun v. Delauy 9y4 
 
 McCoy v. Allen 322, 991 
 
 v. Boley 212, 686 
 
 v. Broderick 37 
 
 v. Nelson 314 
 
 v. Rhodes 1229 
 
 McCrackan Valentine 1180, 1188 
 
 McOracken v Finley 1578, lo79 
 
 McCrady v. Davie 780 
 
 v. Jones 782, 1299 
 
 McCray v. Lowry 1029 
 
 McOrea v. New York El. R. Co. 208 
 
 M'Crea v. Purmort 373 
 
 M'Cready v. Thomson 1638 
 
 McCredie v. Senior 1462, 1683 
 
 M'Creery v. AUender 46 
 
 McCreery v. Cobb 145, 1556 
 
 McCreight v. Foster 197, 279 
 
 Maccubbin v Matthews 918 
 
 McCulla v. Beadleston 360, 547 
 
 McCullen v. Metropolitan Life 
 
 Ins Co. 1561 
 
 M'Cullochs, He 1347, 1352 
 
 M'Cullnck v. Cotbatch 1286 
 
 v. Dawes 643 
 
 v. Gregory 1284 
 
 McCullough t) Barr 843 
 
 v. Merchants' Loan and Tr 
 
 Co. 1733 
 
 MeCully v. Peel 843 
 
 Mr Daniel James 1579 
 
 r. Marvgold 1147 
 
 McDanieis V. Cutler 1841 
 
 v Harbour 1298 
 
 M'Daniells v. Barnum 386, 844 
 
 McDermot v Blois 68 S 
 
 McDermott v. French 178 
 
 v . Kealy 1023, 1028 
 
 v. Thompson 162 
 
 M'Dermutt v. Strong 236 
 
 Macdonald v. Macfarlane 1525 
 
 v. Shepard 1381 
 
 McDonald v. Asay 1517 
 
 v Burke 1440 
 
 v. Crockett 550 
 
 v. Des Moines Valley R. Co. 991
 
 lxxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 McDonald v. M'Cleod 844 
 
 v. M Donald 68,844 
 
 v. Mc.Mahon 1507 
 
 v. Mobile Life Ins. Co. 526, 531, 
 
 li)03 
 
 v. Murphee 1661 
 
 v Rehrer 630 
 
 v. S.ilcui Capital F. M. Co. 605 
 
 v. Unaka Timber Co. 1381 
 
 v. Weir 68 
 
 v. Whitney 1580 
 
 v. Willis 892 
 
 v. Yungbluth 1551 
 
 M'Donnel v. Evans 1102 
 
 McDonnell v Eaton 109, 216, 334 
 
 v. Mc.Mahon 1385 
 
 MacDouough v. Gaynor 1699. 1700, 
 
 1703, 1704," 1706, 1708, 1709. 
 
 1712, 1713 
 
 v. O'Flaherty 154 
 
 Macdougal v Purrie: 782 
 
 McDougaid v Dougherty 295, 406, 
 
 424, 1076, 1182, 1298, 1321 
 
 v. Gardiner 26, 242 
 
 v U'illiford 401, 418 
 
 Macdougall v. Gardner 26, 242 
 
 w. Jersey Imperial Hotel Co 243 
 
 McDowell's Appeal 1381 
 
 Mc Dowel, v. Bank of W. & B. 1073 
 
 v. Heath 560 
 
 v. McDowell 1621 
 
 v. Morrell 1580 
 
 v. Perrine 1120, 1580 
 
 M'Dowl v. Charles 113, 118, 560, 
 
 721 
 
 McDufl v. Beauchamp 1512 
 
 M'Elhattan V Howell 91 
 
 McElrath v Pittsburgh, &c. R. 
 
 Co. 1627 
 
 McElroy v. Ludlum 842 
 
 v. Swope 1320 
 
 McElwain v Willis 288, 329, 402, 
 
 408, 419, 558, 1535 
 
 M'Elwee v. Sutton 392, 393, 1457 
 
 M'Evers v. Lawrence 1750 
 
 McEvoy v. Leonard 334 
 
 McEwan v. Crombie 1411 
 
 McEwen v. Broadhead 613, 636, 
 
 637, 695, 697 
 
 v. Butts 1286 
 
 ». Zimmer 149 
 
 Macey v Childress 365, 561, 633, 
 
 635, 637, 1548, 1615 
 
 v. Metropolitan Board of Works 
 
 1650 
 
 McFadden 8 Schill 559 
 
 McFarlan v. Rolt 578, 1834 
 
 McFarlai.d, Re 1411 
 
 v. McDowell 1676. 1677 
 
 Marfarlane, Re 1361 
 
 M'Farlane, Re 86 
 
 M'Gachen v. Dew 268 
 
 McGahee v. Gold 1625 
 
 M'Gahee v. Sneed 678 
 
 McGan v. O'Neil 1071 
 
 M'Gnrel v. Moon 485, 716 
 
 M'G.irrah v. Prather 1563 
 
 McGavock v. Bell 164, 1293 
 
 v. Elliott 526 
 
 M'Gee v. Davie 284 
 
 v. McGee 1706, 1707, 1711 
 
 u. Smith 1004, 1631, 1675 
 
 McGehee v. Lehman 1031 
 
 v. Mott 974 
 
 v. Polk 1707, 1708, 1709 
 
 McGillin v. Claflin 536 
 
 M'Gilldowney v- Pemberton 109 
 
 McGillvray v. Moser 1777 
 
 McGinnis v. Erie County 560 
 
 McGlaughlin v O'Rourke 1550 
 
 McGlothlin v. Hemery 378 
 
 McGoldrick r. McGoldrick 213 
 
 M'Gowan v. Hall 784 
 
 v. .'ones 1076 
 
 McGowan v. Middleton 1548 
 
 McGowen v. Young 838, 844, 845 
 
 McGown v. Sandfori 1284 
 
 McGown v. Yerks 
 
 1532 
 
 1533 
 
 v. Yorks 
 
 1:4, 215 
 
 McGrath, Re 
 
 68, 108 
 
 M'Gregor, Ex parte 
 
 
 1271 
 
 v. Bainbrigge 
 
 
 1122 
 
 v. Comstock 
 
 
 1845 
 
 v. McGregor 
 
 227 
 
 1550 
 
 v. Shaw 
 
 
 29 
 
 v. Topnam 1021,1112, 
 
 1116, 
 
 1124, 
 
 1137, 1139, 
 
 1147, 
 
 1469 
 
 Macgregor v. Cunningham 
 
 1676 
 
 MacGregor v. East India Co. 
 
 622, 
 
 
 640 
 
 1559 
 
 McGuffey v. McCain 
 
 
 334 
 
 Mcduffie i'. Planters' Bank 
 
 840 
 
 McGuire v. Circuit Judge 
 
 
 1548 
 
 )'. Wright 
 
 
 1^99 
 
 McHan );. Ordway 
 
 
 324 
 
 M'Hardy v. Hitchcock 
 
 800, 
 
 1780, 
 1829 
 
 Macheca v Panesi 
 
 
 1320 
 
 MacHenry v Daviet 
 
 113, li 
 
 Mc Henry, Re 
 
 157 
 
 1490 
 
 v. Lewis 24c 
 
 ,633 
 
 1628 
 
 i . Moore 
 
 
 1317 
 
 v. New York, P. & 0. R. Co. 26 
 Macher v. Foundling Hospital 1656 
 Machinists' National Bank v. 
 
 Field 378 
 
 McHugh v. Astrophe 32 
 
 I Mcllvoy v Alsop . 163, 538 
 
 Mcintosh v. Alexander 346 
 
 v. Great Western Ry. Co. 145, 
 
 414 724, 842. 871. 933, 9:35, 
 
 936,938, 939. 1257, 1300. 
 
 1369, 1470, 1822, 1833 
 
 v Ogilvie 1615, 1703 
 
 v. Stewart 1068 
 
 Macintosh v. Townsend 1475 
 
 Mclntvre v. Connell 267, 599, 1038 
 
 v. McDonald 1381 
 
 v. Maucius 564, 1557 
 
 v. Storey 1661 
 
 v. Thomson 2333 
 
 v. Union College, Trustees of 145, 
 
 349, 718, 729, 759, 764 
 
 v. Wright 
 
 360 
 
 Mclver v. Clarke 
 
 385 
 
 M'lver v. Wattles 
 
 630 
 
 Mack v. Spencer 
 
 1642 
 
 Mackall v. Casilear 
 
 378 
 
 v. Mackall 
 
 1580 
 
 v. Richards 
 
 1539, 1676 
 
 v. West 
 
 334 
 
 Mackay v. Dick 
 
 5H1 
 
 McKay v Broad 
 
 230 
 
 v. McKay 
 
 411, 779, 782 
 
 v . Wakefield 
 
 221 
 
 M'Kay v. Smith 
 
 314 
 
 M'Kenire v. Fraser 
 
 873, 875 
 
 M'Kenna v. Everett 
 
 183, 9&5, 936, 
 
 
 937 
 
 v. George 
 
 270 
 
 v Everitt 
 
 2129, 21H7 
 
 Mackenzie v. Childers 
 
 1654 
 
 v. Coulson 
 
 1966 
 
 v Flannery 
 
 1551 
 
 v. Fox 
 
 334 
 
 v. Mackenzie 893, 1047, 1842 
 
 v. Powis, Marquis of 474, 1057 
 v. Taylor 1426 
 
 McKenzie ?'." Ward well 1845 
 
 Mackerell v Fisher 421 
 
 Mackett v. Heme Bay Commis- 
 sioners 1070 
 M'Keverakin v. Cort 177, 476 
 McKewan v. Sanderson 702, 1398 
 Mackey v. Bell 994, 1575 
 Mackie t> Cairnes 1424 
 o. Darling 1771 
 McKillop r. Taylor 1686 
 McKim v. Odoin 145, 418, 458, 477, 
 497. 1067 
 v. Thompson 778, 782, 841, 1460. 
 1462, 1770, 1771 
 v. Voorhes 1627 
 McKinley v. Irvine 247 
 
 McKinney v Kuhn 1561 
 
 v Pierce 1248, 1300 
 
 M'Kinnie v. Rutherford 199 
 
 McKiunon v. McDonald 1425 
 
 o. Wolfenden 1461 
 
 Mackintosh, Ex parte 39 
 
 v. Flint & P. M R. Co. 1517 
 
 MeKinzie v. Mathews 1081 
 
 McKleroy v Tulane 385 
 
 Macklin v Richardson 1681 
 
 McKnight v. Walsh 1358, 1369 
 
 McKomb v. Kankey 1061, 1275 
 
 McKusick v. Seymour 1051 
 
 Mackworth v. Briggs 1201 
 
 v. Marshall 158 
 
 v. Penrose 868 
 
 v. Thomas 1254 
 
 McLachlan v. Lord 890 
 
 McLane v. Manning 325 
 
 McLaren, Ex parte 157 
 
 M'Laren v. Charrier 891 
 
 v. Steapp 584 
 
 Maclaren v. Stainton 800, 1596, 
 
 1615, 1627, 1664 
 
 Maclary v. Reznor 1675 
 
 McLaughlin, Re 149, 1596 
 
 M'Laughlin v. Daniel 361 
 
 r. Gilmore 576 
 
 McLaurin r. Wilson 933 
 
 Maclean v. Dawson 201, 203, 449, 
 
 452, 453, 536 
 
 v. Jones 579, 1829 
 
 McLean v. Fleming 1648, 1663 
 
 v. Lafayette Bank 334 
 
 v. McKay 1654 
 
 v. Presley 284 
 
 McLear v. Hunsicker 864, 1250 
 
 M' Lellan v. Crofton 641 
 
 v. Osborne 339, 406 
 
 McLennan v. Johnson 243 
 
 r. Kansas City &c R. Co. 894 
 
 M'Leod v. Annesley 218, 220, 226, 
 
 280 
 
 v Lyttleton 403 
 
 v. Phelps 1741 
 
 Macleod v. Buchanan 1696 
 
 MLin v. M'Namara 399, 857, 971, 
 
 992, 1599 
 
 ?•. Robinson 1623 
 
 McLure v. Colclough 784 
 
 McMahon v Burchell 327, 855, 856, 
 
 984, 1003. 1929 
 
 v Rawlings 318 
 
 v. Rooney 324. 517 
 
 v. Sisson 807 
 
 McMaken v. McMaken 233, 287 
 
 McMann v. Westcott 418 
 
 McManus v. Cooke 365, 847 
 
 M'Mechen v. Story 413 
 
 Mc.Michael v. Brennan 779 
 
 McMicken v. Perin 1019, 1175, 1302 
 
 McMillan B Baxley 559 
 
 v Lauer 1638 
 
 v. N. Y. Waterproof Paper 
 
 Co. 1961 
 
 V. Otis 860 
 
 v. Richards 652 
 
 M'Millan v. Eldridge 1463 
 
 McMillin v. St. Louis & M. V. 
 
 T.Co. 314 
 
 McMinn )' Phipps 1291 
 
 McMinnville, Sue. R. Co. If. Hug- 
 gins 1613, 1662 
 McMish v. Richardson 547 
 M'Morris v. Elliot 728 
 Mc Mullen v. Richie 664, 1553 
 Mc.Murray v. Van Gilder 303 
 Macnab v. Mensal 490 
 Macnaghten v, Boehm 1470 
 McNair v. Pope 1734 
 t'. Toler 52 
 McNairy v. Eastland 378 
 v. Mayor of Nashville 1491 
 M'Namara v. Arthur 995 
 v. Dwyer 254, 1704, 1707, 1709 
 1713 
 v Irwin 1668
 
 Macnamara v. Sweetman 361 
 
 M'Naughtan v. Hasker 795, 1380 
 
 M'Naughten's Case lloO 
 
 McNaugntou v. Osgood 1110 
 
 McNeil v. OaU 1258, 1391, 1392 
 
 V. Garratt 1673, 1686 
 
 v. Magee 569, 847 
 
 M'Neill v. Cahill 994 
 
 v. Masterson 216 
 
 Macnet v. Macnet 1350 
 
 M'.Vew v. Toby 329 
 
 McNitt v. Logan 675 
 
 McNultat) Lockridge 1743 
 
 MePhee v. Veal 1663 
 
 McPherson v. Cox 563, 1845 
 
 v. Horsel 444 
 
 v. Israel 1234 
 
 v. Rathbone 907 
 
 v. Rockwell 1491 
 
 v. Watt 852, 1841 
 
 McPike v. Pen 1624 
 
 v. Wells 149, 191 
 
 M'Queen v. Farquhar 675, 1402. 
 
 1403 
 
 MoQuigan v. Delaware L. & W. 
 
 R. Co. 1556 
 
 Maequire v. O'Reilly 328 
 
 McRae, Re 254, 324, 1342 
 
 v. London, Brighton, and 
 
 South Coast Ry. Co, 1080,1081 
 
 Macrae, Re, Foster v. Davis 1722 
 
 v. KUerton 1390 
 
 v. Smith 800, 1615 
 
 Mac Kite v. Holdsworth 1643 
 
 v. McRea 251 
 
 v. Wood 1125 
 
 McRea, Re, Norden v. McRea 237 
 
 v Atlantic, &c. R. R. Co. 1619 
 
 v David 779, 781 
 
 McReightti. Aitken 83 
 
 Macreth v. Nicholson 443, 453, 536 
 
 McSween v. McCown 1168 
 
 Mactier v. Osborn 565 
 
 McTighe v. Dean 1780 
 
 McVeagh, Re, McVeagh v. Cro- 
 
 all 1177, 1209, 1474, 1825 
 
 McVeigh v United States 62 
 
 McVey v. Rrendel 1648 
 
 M'Vicar v. Wolcott 1463 
 
 McWhirtertf. Halsted 1561 
 
 McWhorter v. McMahan 860 
 
 v. Standifer 986 
 
 Mc Williams v. Morgan 1666 
 
 MeWorterv Benson 1233 
 
 Mad Plank Road Co. v. Wat. 
 
 Plank Road Co 611 
 
 Maddeford v. Austwick 1231 
 
 Maddisoa i>. Alderson 655, 847 
 
 v Chapman 1428 
 
 V. Pye 1430 
 
 Maddox v Apperson 1584 
 
 v Maddox 675 
 
 Madeley v. White 1381 
 
 Maden v. Catanach 887 
 
 v. Veevers 678 
 
 Maderias v Cutlett 194 
 
 Madgwick v. Wimble 1729 
 
 Madison Avenue Baptist Church 
 
 v. Oliver Street Baptist Church 
 
 1239 
 
 Madison University v. White 1073 
 
 Madox v- Jackson 203, 267, 271, 
 
 282 
 
 Madrazzo, Ex parte 130 
 
 Magan v. Magan 398, 496, 1589 
 
 Magarity v. Shipman 1320, 1381 
 
 Magbee V. Kennedy 8!K) 
 
 Magdalen College v Athill 342 
 
 v. Sibthorp 292 
 
 Magee p. Magee 630 
 
 Magennis v. Parkhurst 1686 
 
 Maggi. Re 1257 
 
 He, Winehouse v. Winehouse 1034 
 
 Magic Ruffle Co. v. Elm City 
 
 Co. 570, 1320 
 
 Magill, lie 1069 
 
 v. Kauffman 1118 
 
 VOL. I. f 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Magill v. Mercantile Trust Co. 790 
 
 Maguay p. Davidson 203 
 
 v. Knight 1133 
 
 v. Mines Royal Co. 1614, H25 
 
 Magnus v. National Bank 05y, 1685 
 
 Magnusson v. Charleson 1168 
 
 Magrane v. Archbold 1658 
 
 Magrath v. Muskerry, Lord 1658 
 
 Maguire v. Allen 1718 
 
 v. Maddiu 14ti6 
 
 v. Maguire 186 
 
 Mahalm v. M'Cullagh Life Ass. 
 
 Co. 1440 
 
 Mahan v. Brown 1638 
 
 v Cavender 10 Tl 
 
 Mahaney v. Lozier 734, 737 
 
 Mahaska County State Bank v 
 
 Christ 402, 1551 
 
 Mahler v. Schmidt 334 
 
 Mahuke v. Neale 1073 
 
 Mahon, Re 864 
 
 v. Crothers 1719 
 
 Mahoney v. Frasi 1135, 1139 
 
 Mahony v. Widows' Assurance 
 
 Fund 573 
 
 Mahurin v. Bickford 1255 
 
 Mail Co. v. Flanders 1459 
 
 Main v. Main 1029 
 
 Maine Wharf v. Custom-house 
 
 Wharf 1639 
 
 Mainland v. Upjohn 260 
 
 Mai u price v. Pearson 53 
 
 Mair v. Himalaya Tea Co. 1667 
 
 Maitland v. Backhouse 1651, 1672 
 
 v. Rodger 492, 525 
 
 v. Wilson 677 
 
 Major v. Aruott 359, 724 
 
 v. Auckland 59 
 
 v. Fickiin 737 
 
 6. Major 1014, 1411, 1600 
 
 Makepeace v. Haythorne 197, 301, 
 
 302, 305 
 
 v Rogers 551 
 
 v. Romieux 354, 785 
 
 Makepeice v. Dillon 469 
 
 Makings v. Makings 1422 
 
 Malan v. Young 984 
 
 Malcolm v. Andrews 1698 
 
 v. Montgomery 1734 
 
 v O'Caliaghan 1745, 1747 
 
 v. Scott 855, 856, 1491 
 
 Maiden v. Fyson 1403 
 
 Malev v. Shattuck 50 
 
 Mali Ivo, The 633 
 
 Malin v. Malin 86, 193, 220, 294 
 
 v. Tavlor 1127 
 
 Mating 'v. Hill 1403 
 
 Matins v. Greenway 308, 1527, 
 
 15'J9 
 
 v. Price 1137, 1148, 1440 
 
 Mallabar v. Mallabar 1419 
 
 Mai lack v. Galton 167, 1S7 
 
 Mallett v Dexter 1997 
 
 Mallory Manuf. Co. v. Fox 1434, 
 
 2396 
 
 Mallow v. Hinde 149, 151, 216, 290 
 
 v. Kelley 852 
 
 Malmesbury Ry. Co. v. Budd 671, 
 
 1862 
 
 Malone v. Malone 1119 
 
 v, Morris 951 
 
 Maloney v. Dewey 1620 
 
 Malony, Re 224 
 
 v. Kernan 612 
 
 v. Kourke 212 
 
 Malpas v. Ackland 249 
 
 Malthis v. Town of Cameron 1661 
 
 Man v. Rickets 58, 65. 159.398. 873, 
 
 876, 985, 1075, 1275, 1283, 
 
 1383, 1407, 1502, 1503, 1504, 
 
 1512 
 
 Manatt v Starr R43 
 
 Manaudes » Mann 560 
 
 Manbv, lie 307, 809 
 
 v. Bewicke 28, 358, 579, 866, 867, 
 
 889,1003,1004 1822, 
 
 1823, 1831 
 
 lxxxi 
 
 Manby v. Manby 
 
 643 
 
 v. Owen 
 
 1681 
 
 v. Robinson 
 
 1562, 1567 
 
 Manchester v. Day 
 
 1677 
 
 v. Dey 
 
 1669 
 
 v Mathewson 
 
 1546 
 
 Manchester College v. Isher- 
 
 wood 797 
 
 Manchester, Duke of v. Bon- 
 ham 1431 
 Manchester Fire Ass. Co v. Stock- 
 ton C. H. & A. Works 145, 547 
 v Wykes 1558 
 Manchester & L. R. Co. v. Con- 
 cord R. Co 564 
 Manchester and Leeds Ry. Co., 
 
 Re 1605 
 
 Manchester New College, Re 1854, 
 1855, 1856 
 Manchester Railway v. Worksop 
 
 Board 1635 
 
 Manchester and Sheffield Ry. 
 Co. v. Worksop Board of 
 Health 741, 769, 770, 775, 1638 
 Manchester & Stafford Ry. Co. 
 
 v. How 448 
 
 Mandell v. Green 1411 
 
 Mandeno v. Mandeno 1264, 1433, 
 1456 
 Mander v. Falcke 1654, 1685 
 
 Manderson v. Commercial Bank 26, 
 144 
 Mandeville r. Harman 1655 
 
 v. Mandeville 1722 
 
 v. Reynolds 861 
 
 v. Riggs 190, 273 
 
 v. Wilson 641 
 
 Maugan t. Met. E. S. Co. 1071, 
 
 1463 
 Manhattan Co. v. Evertson 678, 
 
 1171 
 v. Wood 1648 
 
 Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v War- 
 wick 51 
 Manhattan Man & Fert. Co. v. 
 
 N. J. Stockyard Co. 1662 
 
 v. Van Keuren 1662 
 
 Maniere v. Leicester 516, 819 
 
 Manigalt v. Deas 1576 
 
 Manion v. Fahey 987, 1575 
 
 v. Titsworth 123 
 
 Manisty v. Kenealy 628, 1072 
 
 Mankel v. Belscamper 385 
 
 Mauks v. Holroyd 394 
 
 Mauleverer v. Warren 178 
 
 Manley v. Robinson 1563 
 
 v Slason 1032 
 
 Manlove v. Ball 1245 
 
 r. Burger 1751 
 
 Manly v. Bewicke 2114 
 
 Mann t>. Appel 328, 552 
 
 0. Bruce 255 
 
 v. Butler 190, 238 
 
 t>. Edwards 860 
 
 v. Flower 1618 
 
 v. Higgins 120, 334 
 
 V. Richardson 633, 999, 1224, 
 
 1248 
 
 v. Ricketts 1017, 1022 
 
 t'. Stennett 1767 
 
 i'. Stephens 324 
 
 v. Utica 1624 
 
 r Ward 885 
 
 v. Wilkinson 2310 
 
 v. Young 1591 
 
 Manners r. Charlesworth 1156, 1159 
 
 v. Furze 1291, 1722, 
 
 1737 
 
 0. Johnson 1654, 1662 
 
 ?'. Manners 1151 
 
 v. Mew 674 
 
 Manning v Gloucester 301, 315 
 
 v. Klein 243 
 
 v. Lechmere 862, 1230 
 
 v. Manning 726, 1238 
 
 v. Pursell 877 
 
 v. Thesiger 226, 238
 
 lxxxii 
 
 Marios v. De Tastet 390 
 
 Mausel v Clauricarde 901 
 
 Mansell v. Feeuey 327, 356, 485, 
 
 590, 618, 620, 624, 701, 716, 788, 
 
 1822, 1823, 1824, 1829 
 
 Manser v. Dix 572, 578, 1834, 
 
 v. Jenner 1669 
 
 Mansfield v. Gambril 720 
 
 v. Green 1801 
 
 v Shaw 1665 
 
 v. Shi up 1562 
 
 v. Whatcum First Nat Bank 
 
 1770 
 Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry Co. 
 
 v Swan 1427 
 
 Mansfield, Earl of v. Ogle 1036, 1266 
 Mauson v Burton 815 
 
 Mansony v. Bank 1463 
 
 Mansur v. Pratt 68, 161 
 
 Mansy v. Mason 856 
 
 Mant v. Leith 1418 
 
 Mantle v. Noyes 2081 
 
 Mauton v. Bates 1130 
 
 v Man ton 1052 
 
 v. Hoe 236, 794 
 
 Many v. Beekman Iron Co 145, 334 
 Mapes v. Coffin 1459, 1489, 1401 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CTTED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Marling 1>. Stonehouse & Nails- 
 worth Ky. Co. 231, 279, 1731 
 
 Maple v. Shrewsbury 
 Mapleson v. Bentham 
 
 v. Massini 
 Marasco I). Bolton 
 Marble Co. v. Ripley 
 March v. Davison 
 
 t). Eastern R. Co. 
 
 Marlow v. Barlow 186 
 
 Marouey v. O'Dea 1240 
 
 Marquis of Londonderry t>. 
 
 Rhoswydol Lead M. Co. 406 
 
 Marr v. Littlewood 1726 
 
 v. Southwick 1258, 125'J 
 
 Marriage v. Skiggs 1400, 1615 
 
 Marrigauld v. beas 986 
 
 .Marnot v. Marriot 664 
 
 Marriott v Anchor Reversionary 
 
 Company 944, 945 
 
 v. Chamberlain 576. 579 
 
 v. Kirkham 215, 1266 
 
 v Marriott 347, 1384 
 
 Marrow, Be 1389, 1610 
 
 Marryatt v. Marryatt 316, 1779 
 
 Marsack v. Reeves 
 
 Marsden, Be 
 
 v. Blundell 
 
 v. Bound 
 
 Marselis v. Morris Canal, &c. 
 
 Martin, Be 
 v. Atkinson 
 v. Baldwin 
 v. Beauchamp 
 v D'Arcy 
 v. Dwelly 
 v. Foley 
 v. Fust 
 v. Gilleylen 
 v. Gleasou 
 v. Graves 
 v. Greene 
 v Hadlow 
 
 1794 
 
 1654 
 
 154 
 
 1667 
 
 1663 
 
 563, 566, 570, 
 
 1557 
 
 26, 238, 245, 
 
 670, 1628, 2185, 2196 
 
 v. Head 105 
 
 v. Ludlum 573 
 
 Marchaut v Marchant 1739 
 
 Marco v. Low 1627, 1628 
 
 Marcos v. Pebrer 336 
 
 Marcus Sayre Co. v. Bernz 196 
 
 Marder v. Wright 378 
 
 Mare v. Earle 1398 
 
 v. Lewis 1841 
 
 V Malachy 240 
 
 v. Sandford 1398 
 
 v . Warner 1398 
 
 Margetson v. Wright 1643 
 
 Margetts v. Perks 336 
 
 Margrave v. Le Hook 213, 330 
 
 Maria v. Hall 49 
 
 Maries v. Maries 307 
 
 Marine Bank v Biays 1245 
 
 Marine Ins Co. v. Hodgson 1621, 
 
 1623 
 
 v St Louis, &c. Ry Co. 197 
 
 Marine Inv Co. v. Haviside 881 
 
 Marine Mansions Co., Be 
 
 Marine & Fire Ins., &c. t 
 
 Early 
 
 Marine & R. P. &c. Co. v. Brad- 
 ley 553 
 Marion v. Titswortb. 121 
 Marke v. Locke 430, 431 
 Markell v. Kasson 1548 
 Marker v Marker 1633 
 Markham, Be 1461 
 v . Augier 1625 
 v. Howell 1628 
 v. Middleton 1130, 1141 
 v. Smith 2K2 
 v Townsend 1296 
 Markle v. Markle 178, 500 
 Marks v Beyfua 581 
 v. Fox 1320 
 v. Jaffa 1643 
 v Murphy °8 fi 
 Marks A W. C. Co v. Wilson 1381 
 Maikwell, Be 1852 
 Mark wick v Hardingham 651 
 v Pawson 793 
 Marlatt v. Smith 1311 
 t; Warwick 886, 1180, 1289, 1540. 
 1545 
 Marlborough, Duchess of v. 
 
 Wheat 1299 
 
 13S1 
 
 y?o 
 
 939 
 341, 
 684 
 221 
 2 
 1743 
 550, 555 
 785 
 385, 485, 716, 719, 722, 
 943 
 1027 
 214 
 395, 564, 587, 597 
 v. Mayor of Pontefract 350 
 
 v. Mitchell 782, 839, 853 
 
 Marsh v. Austin 
 v. Crawford 
 v Goodall 
 v Haywood 
 v. Hunter 
 v. Keith 
 
 v. Lasher 
 v. Lee 
 v Marsh 
 
 378 
 
 v. Oliver 
 v. Parks 
 v. Railroad 
 v Sibbald 
 v. Supervisors 
 v. Whituiore 
 Marshal v. Crutwell 
 Marshall, Be 
 v Anderson 
 v. Cave 
 v. Cliff 
 v. Colman 
 v. Conrad 
 v. Cooper 
 v. Dudley 
 v. Fowler 
 v. Frislde 
 v. Gilliard 
 v. Gil man 
 v. Hills 
 
 v Holloway 
 
 v- Lewis 
 
 v. Lockett 
 
 v. Love lass 
 
 v. McAravey 
 
 V. Marshall 
 
 v. Means 
 
 v Meech 
 
 v. Mellersh 
 
 v, Minter 
 
 v Olds 
 
 v. Otto 
 
 r. Rench 
 
 v. Ross 
 
 v. Sladden 2E 
 
 v. Smith 
 
 t>. Thompson 
 
 v. Turnbull 
 
 v. Watson 
 
 v. Wheeler 
 Marshall!, Be 
 Marshfield, Re 
 
 v. Weston 
 Marshman v. Conkling 
 Mars ton V. Brackett 
 
 227, 560 
 
 1411 
 
 1299, 2185, 2106 
 
 1113 
 
 1661 
 
 560 
 
 117 
 
 438 
 
 1166 
 
 1242 
 
 849 
 
 332 
 
 46 
 
 1845 
 
 1255 
 
 102 
 
 916 
 
 334, 336 
 324 
 998 
 
 1233, 1414 
 
 123, 124 
 
 1743 
 
 419 
 
 284 
 
 149,1073,1648 
 
 335. 344 
 1845 
 
 728, 1593 
 1081 
 418 
 1765 
 1150 
 1649, 1087 
 ,382. 1400, 1417 
 653 
 1073, 1076 
 368, 629, 1618 
 1660 
 1279 
 1805 
 653, 1817 
 1227 
 186 
 , 918, 1075, 
 1076, 1079, 1115 
 Martano v. Mann 30, 111 
 
 Martelli v. Holloway 1503 
 
 Marten v Wichelo 859 
 
 Marter v Marter 826 
 
 Martigny v. Smith 515 
 
 v. Headon 
 v. Iteming 
 v. Hewitt 
 v. Holgate 
 v. Kerridge 
 v. Kilbourn 
 v. Lutkewitte 
 v. McBryde 
 v. Martin 
 
 83,1840 
 
 782 
 
 634 
 
 39 
 
 1501 
 
 1463 
 
 1168 
 
 424, 1602, 1671 
 
 1580 
 
 1038 
 
 1961 
 
 846 
 
 1264, 1510, 1524, 
 
 1526 
 
 1638 
 
 2047 
 
 v. Mayberry 
 v. Meyer 
 v Mitchell 
 v. Morris 
 v. Murphy 
 v. Norman 
 v. Nutkin 
 v. Parsons 
 v. Patching 
 v Peck 
 v Pond 
 v. Powning 
 v. Price 
 v. Purnell 
 
 1503 
 
 494, 1048 
 
 1481 
 
 382 
 
 290, 368 
 
 91, 104, 122, 345, 586, 
 
 645, 1033, 1615, 1746 
 
 1567 
 
 149 
 
 106 
 
 259 
 
 1655 
 
 514 
 
 1653 
 
 1625 
 
 540 
 
 251 
 
 149 
 
 60,634 
 
 1638 
 
 1510, 
 
 1526 
 
 913, 1044, 1488, 1490 
 
 30 
 
 v. Py croft 
 
 v. Russell 
 
 v. Smith 1151 
 
 v . Spicer 482 
 
 v. Spiers 551 
 
 v. Thraster 1249 
 
 v. Travellers' Ins. Co. 1100 
 
 v. Tyree 1542 
 
 v. Van Schaick 1727, 1728 
 
 v. Weil 354 
 
 v. Whichelo 859 
 
 v. White 1305 
 
 v. Whitmore 38, 39 
 
 v. Willis 1057 
 
 v Wright 1648 
 
 Martindale v. Brown 1492 
 
 v. Picquot 1261 
 
 Martine v. Lowenstein 1463 
 
 Martinius v Helmuth 151, 1567 
 
 Marty n v. Blake 1256 
 
 v Podger 1134 
 
 Martyr v. Lawrence 14*2 
 
 Marvel v. Ortlip 1675 
 
 Marvin v. Elwood 1561 
 
 v. Stew 1772 
 
 Marx v. Heidenheimer 920 
 
 Mary, The 564,717 
 
 Marye v Dyche 584 
 
 Maryland and New York Coal 
 
 and Iron Co. v. Wingert 845 
 Manet v. Pittsburgh 
 
 Mason. In re 
 v Bogg 
 v Brentini 
 v. Broadbent 
 v. Codwise 
 v. Cotton 
 v. Crosby 
 v, Daly 
 V- Debow 
 v. Eakle 
 v. Foster 
 v. Franklin 
 v. Gardiner 
 v. Gardner 
 v. Goodburn 
 v. Haddon 
 v Hamilton 
 
 406, 1842 
 
 284 
 
 1407 
 
 653 
 
 1214, 1423, 2191 
 
 1639 
 
 1322 
 
 1003, 1317 
 
 170, 753, 778 
 
 1255 
 
 361 
 
 291, 295, 339 
 
 1549 
 
 31, 386 
 
 1572 
 
 1862 
 
 1569, 1570
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 lxx 
 
 Xlll 
 
 Mason v. Harper's Ferry Bridge 
 Co 1675 
 
 Harris 26, 241 
 
 V. Hartford, &c. R. Co. 830, 1517, 
 1542, 23S5 
 v. Hoyle 303 
 
 v. Lake 387, 419 
 
 v. La Society des Metaux 26 
 
 v McGirr 1550 
 
 v. McGore 845 
 
 v. Mason 349, 759, 1073 
 
 v. Murray 424 
 
 v. Peck 844 
 
 v Pelletier 867 
 
 v. Ponieroy 236 
 
 V. Rollins 1636, 1637 
 
 v. Roosevelt 1363 
 
 v. Sanborn 1629 
 
 v. Sanford 1542 
 
 v. Spurlnck 323 
 
 v. Supreme Court 1716 
 
 v. Wakeman 722, 2114 
 
 v. York and Cumberland R. 
 R Co. 197, 23S, 403, 793, 1293, 
 1300, 1516, 1518, 1536 
 Massa v. Cutting 329 
 
 Massachusetts General Hospital 
 v. State Mut. Life Ins. Co 555, 
 630 
 Massachusetts Mutual L. Ins. 
 Co v. Chicago & A R. Co. 149, 
 641 
 Massam v. Thorley's C. F Co. 1681 
 Massereene, Lord, Re 1803 
 
 Massey v Allen 26, 32, 942 
 
 v Gillelan 27, 33 
 
 v. Gorton 236 
 
 v. Goyder 1097 
 
 v. Massey 328, 1370 
 
 Massie v. Donaldson 170, 444. 526 
 v. Graham 1576, 1577, 1578, 1579, 
 1580, 1582 
 v. Watts 1032, 1615, 1627 
 
 Massou v. Anderson 797, 1548 
 
 Massy v. Batwell 280 
 
 v. Massy 885 
 
 v. Rowen 1503 
 
 Master v Hamilton 1115 
 
 v Hansard 324, 1654 
 
 Masterman v. Lenin 1568 
 
 v. Lewis 1676 
 
 v Midland Railway of Ireland 414 
 v Price 843, 1467 
 
 Masters r Barnes 248,252 
 
 v. Barnwell 1131 
 
 v Beckett 1548 
 
 v Braban 1077 
 
 v. Rossie Galena Lead Mining 
 Co 145 
 
 Masterson v Finnegan 328 
 
 v. Herndon 1461, 14H5 
 
 v. Howard 52 
 
 Mastin v Hallev 1663 
 
 Mather, Ex parte 386 
 
 v. Lay 1626 
 
 v. Nesbit 1743 
 
 v. Shelmerdine 42 
 
 Mathews v. Bishop of Bath 1150 
 v. Jones 1652 
 
 v Tripp 1071 
 
 Mathias v Witts Nav Co 1620 
 
 v. Yetts 298 
 
 Matson v. Melchor 852 
 
 v Swift 1265, 1610 
 
 Mattel v. Conant 634 
 
 Matthaei v. Galitzin 629 
 
 Matthew v. Northern Assurance 
 
 Co. 1770 
 
 Matthewman, Ex parte 187 
 
 Matthews v. Bagshaw 1236 
 
 v Chichester 37 593, 594, 690, 
 
 756 
 
 v. Copeland 128 
 
 v. Herdtfelder 933 
 
 v. Hoagland 576, 578 
 
 v Lalance & G. M. Co. 700, 843 
 
 v. Lloyd 256 
 
 Matthews v. Matthew, 
 v Mears 
 v. Mu nster 
 v Palmer 
 v. Roberts 
 v Smith 
 v Stubbs 
 v Swallow 
 v. Walwvn 
 v. Whittle 
 
 1150 
 
 1507 
 
 974 
 
 797 
 
 632, 637, 986 
 
 1070 
 
 1285 
 
 2255 
 
 260, 667, 668, 1253 
 
 189, 371 
 
 Matthewsou v. Stockdale 1645, 1646 
 
 Matthias v Warrington 
 Matthison v Clarke 
 Mattocks v. Tremaine 
 
 378 
 12^4, 1414 
 395, 1705, 
 1707, 1708 
 1469 
 345 
 430 
 1610 
 1642 
 318, 4ti5 
 1099 
 278 
 
 Mattos v Gibson 
 Maud v Acklom 
 Maude v. Copeland 
 
 r. Maude 
 Mauger v Dick 
 Maughan V Blake 
 
 v Hubbard 
 Maule v. Beaufort, Duke of 
 
 v Bruce 8b/, St>8 
 
 Mauley v. Shaw 1110 
 
 Maultsby v. Carty 2 
 
 Maund v. Allies 948, 949, 1836 
 
 Maunder v Lloyd b'29 
 
 Maundrell v. Maundrell 1661 
 
 Mauusell v. Egan 1766 
 
 v. Midland Great Western 
 Railway Co 1650 
 
 Maupin v Daniel 1298 
 
 Maurice v. Wainewright 1277 
 
 Mauricet v. Brecknock 1130 
 
 Maury v Lewis 361, 407, 847, 
 
 1296 
 
 ii. Mason 714. 721, 1003 
 
 Maury County v. Lewis County 22 
 Mavor v. Dry 406, 426 
 
 Maw v. Pearson 63, 248, 323, 551, 
 1525 
 Mawe v. Heaviside 98 
 
 Mawer v Mawer 518 
 
 Mawer's Case 1705 
 
 Mawhood v. Labouchere 430 
 
 v Milbanke 1806, 1841 
 
 Mawman v. Tegg 1646 
 
 Maxfield v. Burton 674, 679 
 
 Maxim Nonlenfelt Guns Co. v. 
 
 Nordenfelt 
 
 
 1655 
 
 Maxwell c Cochran 
 
 
 236 
 
 v. Finnie 
 
 
 246 
 
 v. H.igg 
 
 
 1648, 1649 
 
 v. Johnson 
 
 
 843 
 
 v. Maxwell 
 
 
 1426, 1503 
 
 v. Stewart 
 
 
 1625 
 
 v. Wettenhall 
 
 
 1213, 1258 
 
 v. Wightwick 
 
 
 710 
 
 Maxwell L. G. & 
 
 R. 
 
 Co. v. 
 
 Thompson 
 
 
 1579 
 
 May v. Armstrong 
 
 
 101, 1549 
 
 V. Bisgendeu 
 
 
 912, 1397 
 
 t>. Darden 
 
 
 1463 
 
 v Eastin 
 
 
 1391 
 
 v Goodwin 
 
 
 550 
 
 v Head 
 
 
 979 
 
 v. Hook 
 
 
 511 
 
 v. May 
 
 
 1168 
 
 v. Newton 
 
 
 243 
 
 v. Parker 
 
 
 314, 555 
 
 v Prinsep 
 
 
 893 
 
 v Roper 
 
 
 97 
 
 v. Selby 223, 236, 291, 292, 360 
 
 v. Skey 
 
 
 103 
 
 v Sloan 
 
 
 656 
 
 v Thomson 
 
 
 364 
 
 Mayberry.f. Brooking 
 
 154,291. 
 
 
 1008 
 
 1473, 1475 
 
 Maybury v. Grady 
 
 
 1411 
 
 Mayburry v. Brien 
 
 
 1165 
 
 Mayd v. Field 
 
 
 187, 1432 
 
 Mayer v. Claretie 
 
 
 149 
 
 t'. Denver, &c. R 
 
 Co. 
 
 26, 334 
 
 v. Frith 
 
 
 766 
 
 D Galluchat 
 
 719 
 
 1234, 1414 
 
 v Journeymen S. 
 
 C. A 
 
 -s'n 1620 
 
 Mayer v. Mayer 1581 
 
 v. Murray 328, 652, 1239, 1260 
 v. Speuce 1599, 1U44, 1670 
 
 v. Tyson 524 
 
 v. Woodhall 1623 
 
 Mayes v. Hendry 740 
 
 v. Mayes 1209 
 
 Mayfair Property Co. v. John- 
 ston 1161 
 Mayfield v. Wadsley 1127 
 May her v. W Va. Oil Co. 1274 
 Mayhew, lie 1411, 1842 
 v. Maxwell 1683, 2314 
 Maynard v. Bond 1744 
 v Esher 1638 
 v. Green 1517 
 v. Moseley 1004 
 v. Pomfret 1052 
 v. Tilden 407 
 Mayne v Butler 892 
 v. Butter 893, 1801 
 v. Griswold 379 
 v. Hawkey 1844 
 v Hochin 413, 414, 770, 776 
 r Macartney 1287 
 Mayo v. Foster 1630 
 v. Harding 853, 1286 
 v. Jones 852 
 v. Murchie 302 
 Mayor v. Coffin 1120 
 v Collins 717, 1824 
 v . Cooper 630, 1427 
 v. Murray 1370 
 Mayor of Bristol v. Cox 573 
 Mayor of Lyons v Advocate- 
 General of Bengal 13 
 Mayor of N. Y. v. N Y Ferry 
 
 Co. 1683 
 
 Mayre v. Root 545 
 
 Mays v. Wherry 1580, 1715 
 
 Mayse v. Biggs 801 
 
 Mazarredo v. Maitland 596, 694, 
 
 720, 761, 776 
 
 Meach v Chappell 894 
 
 v. Perry 655 
 
 v. Stone 365, 561 
 
 Meachain v Cooper 906, 1225 
 
 v. Williams 341 
 
 Meacher v. Young 1359, 2292 
 
 Mead v Arms 1030, 1479, 1575, 1576 
 
 v Ask-w 850 
 
 v. Combs 860 
 
 v Day 837, 850 
 
 v. Merritt 554, 1032, 1627 
 
 v. Orrery, Lord 1736, 1737 
 
 v. Piatt 630 
 
 t>. Raymond 860 
 
 r. Stirling 369, 1620 
 
 v. Walker 1071 
 
 Meadbury v. Isdall 885 
 
 Meade, Re 157 
 
 v. Norbury 1468 
 
 Meaden v Sealey 1734, 1735 
 
 Meader v. M'Cready 1394 
 
 Meades v. Guedalla 202 
 
 Meadors v Askew 361, 860 
 
 Meadow Valley Mining Co. t\ 
 
 Dodds 1463 
 
 Meadows v. Kingston, Duchess 
 
 of 614, 663, 664, 679 
 
 Meagher t;. Minnesota T. M. 
 
 Co. 1461 
 
 Meagoe v. Simmons 1106 
 
 Mealea v. Meales 90 
 
 Mealor v. Talbot, Lord 1564, 1565 
 Means v. Dowd 653, 1995 
 
 Meara v Holbrook 1752 
 
 Mears v. Best 168, 1266 
 
 r. Dole 417. 1320 
 
 Mebane t> Mebane 371 , 668 
 
 Mechanics' Bank v Bank of N. 
 
 Brunswick 1307, 1311, 1312 
 
 v Goodwin 24 
 
 v. Landauer 217, 1765 
 
 v. Levy 361, 373, 377, 715, 718, 721 
 v. Setons '-95 
 
 Mechanics' Foundry v. Ryall 1663
 
 lxxxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Meddowcroft v. Campbell 59, 109, 
 290 
 M.-der v. Birt 678 
 
 Medler v. Albuquerque Hotel 
 
 Co. 1299 
 
 Med lock r Cogburn 1567 
 
 Medow, Re 1610 
 
 Medsker »>. Bonebrake 1320 
 
 Medway Cotton Manuf. v. Adams 22 
 
 Meek v. Burnley 25 
 
 v. Carter 1659 
 
 v. Chamberlain 1-5 
 
 „ Kaly 1507 
 
 v. McCall 1073 
 
 v. Mathis 987, 994, 1492 
 
 v. Ward 820, 898 
 
 v. Witherington 5^9 
 
 Meeker v Evans 1272 
 
 v Marsh 607, 677, 695, 700, 703 
 
 v Sprague 1716 
 
 v. W'inttarop Iron Co 26 
 
 Meggot v. Meggot 1166, 1167 
 
 Meggy v Imperial Discount Co. 157 
 
 Mehan v. Chicago, &c. R Co. 1122 
 
 Meier v. Kansas Pac Ry Co. 1765 
 
 Meigs v. Lister 1635 
 
 Meiklam v. Elmore 63, 64, 808, 814 
 
 Meiklau v. Campbell 452 
 
 Meinertzhagen v Davis 992 
 
 Meiuuai'd v Youngblood 295, 1120, 
 
 1614 
 
 Meissner v. Buek 1548 
 
 Meldrum v. Hayes 75, 1413 
 
 v. Scorer 200, 254 
 
 Melford v. Peters 1191 
 
 Melhado v Watson 157 
 
 Melhuish v Collier 1100, 1101 
 
 Melin v Taylor 1129 
 
 Meliorucchi v. Royal Exchange ____ 
 
 Assurance Co 177 1 
 
 Meliorucchy v Meliorucchy 30, 53 
 
 Melien v Banning 216 
 
 v Moline Iron Works 149 
 
 Mellersh v Brown 652 
 
 Mellick i). President, &c. of the 
 
 Asylum 2182 
 
 Mellingr Bird 1611 
 
 v. Melliug "6 
 
 Mellish o. Williams 1576 
 
 Mellor r Hall 592, 691 
 
 v. Porter 73, 165 
 
 t> Thompson 984 
 
 Mellows i\ Bannister 448 
 
 Melsheimer v Hommel 559 
 
 Melton v. Withers 1515 
 
 Meluish v. Milton 663 
 
 Melville v. Matthewson 1591 
 
 Memphis Appeal Pub. Co v. Pike 148 
 Memphis Bank v. Oldham 10(3 
 
 Memphis City v. Dean 26 
 
 Memphis Gayoso Gas Co. v. Wil- 
 liamson 26 
 Memphis and Charleston R. Co. 
 
 v. Gaines 1661 
 
 Memphis & V. R. Co. v. Owens 596 
 Mendenhall v. Hall 283 
 
 Mendes v. Guedalla 109, 204, 820 
 ii Mendes 1351 
 
 Mendham v. Robinson 65, 159, 1512 
 Mendizabel v Hullett 413,414 
 
 v Machado 640, 155!) 
 
 Meneely v Meneely 1649 
 
 Meneudez r Holt 1648 
 
 Menier v. Hooper's Tel. Works 26 
 Menifee v. Menifee 844 
 
 Menude v. Delaire 659 
 
 Menzies v Connor 797 
 
 Mercantile Bank v. Carpenter 411 
 Mercantile Ins &c. Co. v. River 
 
 Plate, &c Co. 629 
 
 Mercantile S. D. Co. v. Dimon 1561 
 
 Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kanawha 
 
 & Ry. Co. 314, 1743 
 
 v. Missouri, &c. Rv. Co. 283 
 
 v Missouri, K. &T. Ry. Co 1120 
 
 v. Portland & O. R. Co 149, 215 
 
 v. Rhode Island H T. Co. 586 
 
 Mercartuey v. Crittenden 790 
 
 Mercers' Co., Ex parte 30, 42 
 
 v. Great Northern Ry. Co 889,1598 
 
 Merchant v. Bowyer 779 
 
 Merchants' Bank V. McLeod 1743 
 
 v. Masonic Hall Trustees 407 
 
 v. Moulton 1071. 1073, 1110 
 
 v. Stevenson 235, 41H, 257 
 
 Merchants' Detective Ass'n v. 
 
 Detective M. Agency 1648, 1659 
 Merchants' Int'l S. B. Co. v. 
 
 Lyon 634 
 
 Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Chat- 
 tanooga Construction Co. 
 
 Co 
 
 Hogle 
 v. Sabin 
 v. Trustees 
 Merchant Tailors 
 
 Gen. 
 Merchants' Trading Co 
 
 ner 
 Mercier v Lewis 
 
 v. Pepperell 
 Meredith, Re 
 
 v. Johns 
 Meredyth v. Hughes 
 Merest v Harvey 
 
 v. Hodgson 
 Meriden Britania Co. 
 
 ker 
 Meridian News Co. v. 
 
 Wing Paper Co 
 Meriel v. Wymoudsold 
 Merithew v. Sampson 
 Meriwether v. Booker 
 Merklein v. Trapnell 
 Merlin v. Blagrave 
 
 586 
 1556 
 547 
 v. Att - 
 
 599, 1436 
 v. Ban- 
 
 1596 
 
 1549 
 
 1860 
 
 1051 
 
 1625 
 
 1448, 1453 
 
 1130 
 
 185 
 
 v. Par- 
 
 1649 
 Diem & 
 
 1716 
 272 
 1930 
 121, 124 
 1157 
 34, 1405, 142 
 
 Metcalfe, Re 
 Re, Hicks v. May 
 v. Beckwith 
 v. Brown 
 v. Metcalfe 
 
 5, 45, 87 
 1205 
 1165 
 589 
 
 318, 1541 
 
 . I'ulvertoft 280, 1720, 1734 
 
 M. E Church v. Jaques 100, 186, 
 374, 715, 717, 720, 758 1228, 
 1302, 1377, 1381, 1543, 1800 
 Methodist P. Church v. Balti- 
 more. Mayor, &c. of 1622 
 Metier v. Metier 184, 1!"5, 498, 547, 
 562, 570, 584, 886, 1556, 1557 
 Metropolitan Bank, Re 942 
 v Offord 157, 158, 314, 420, 698 
 v. Pooley 354 
 Metropolitan Board of Works v. 
 
 Sant 1072 
 
 Metropolitan Coal Consumers' 
 
 St. 
 
 560 
 
 Merrewether v. Mellish 626, 682,703 
 
 Merriam v. Barton 
 
 v Baxter 
 
 v Goodlett 
 
 v Goss 
 
 v. Holloway Pub Co 
 
 v Smith 
 Merrifield v. Ingersoll 
 
 v. Jones 
 
 v. Lombard 
 Merrill, Re 
 
 v. Elam 
 
 v. Houghton 
 
 v. Humphrey 
 
 v. Lake 
 
 v. Merrill 
 
 v. Plaintield 
 
 V. Washburn 
 Merrimack Mauuf. 
 
 ner 
 Merriman, Re 
 
 v Can no van 
 
 v Goodman 
 
 v Polk 
 Merritt v. Brown 
 
 v Hughes 
 Merry v Freeman 
 
 v. Nickalls 
 Merryfield v Jones 
 Merr.vweafher v Mellish 
 
 v. Moore 
 Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gihhs 
 
 1635, 1752 
 Mersey Railwav, fn re 1733 
 
 Mersey Steel Co. v. Nay I or 2^4 
 
 Merteus v Haigh 4i'3, 1555, 1828, 
 
 Merwin v. Smith 1269, 1272, 1668, 
 1669, 1676, 1677 
 Messchaert v Kennedy 
 
 1240, 1463 
 
 1248, 1298 
 
 385 
 
 1244, 1385 
 
 586 
 
 197 
 
 1029 
 
 1666 
 
 1638 
 
 1294 
 
 1716, 1734, 2127 
 
 530 
 
 1661 
 
 303 
 
 349 
 
 545, 2323 
 
 324 
 
 Co. v. Gar- 
 
 1648 
 
 102 
 
 561. 642 
 
 152, 528 
 
 1624 
 
 369, 844 
 
 2027 
 
 256 
 
 1471 
 
 1666, 23 4 
 
 1843 
 
 1650 
 
 402 
 1847 
 1129 
 
 Messenger, In re 
 Messer v. Boyle 
 
 v Storer 
 Messervey v. Barelli 
 Messonier v. Kauman 
 Metcalfi'. Cady 
 
 V. Hervey 
 
 V. Hoopingardner 
 
 v. Metcalf 
 
 V. Putnam 
 
 1842,184 
 
 1266 
 
 545 
 
 242 
 
 1467, 1468 
 
 334, 335 
 
 584, 1561, 1562 
 
 277,1158 
 
 1071 
 
 1961 
 
 Ass'n, Re 
 Metropolitan Nat Bank v 
 
 Louis Dispatch Co. 
 Metropolitan Ry Co., Re 
 
 v. Wright 
 Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Tona 
 
 wanda, &c. R. Co. 214 
 
 Wletzv Wood 418 
 
 Metzger v. Metropolitan El. Ry. 
 
 Co. 840 
 
 Metzler v Wood 1096, 1105, 1648 
 Meule v. Goddard 1138 
 
 Meurer's Will 1411 
 
 Meux v. Bell 1297, 1563, 1570 
 
 v. Maltby 
 v Watkius 
 Mewshaw v. Mewshaw 
 Mexborough, Earl of v Bower 
 Mexican Central Ry. Co. 
 
 Pinkney 
 Mexican Ore Co. l> 
 
 M Co 
 
 Mey v Gulliman 
 
 Meyer ?>. Campbell 
 
 v. Gateus 
 
 v. Herrera 
 
 v. Johnston 
 
 v. Meyer 
 
 v. Moutriore 
 
 v Montriou 
 
 Meyers v. Busby 
 
 v Dittmar 
 
 v Scott 
 
 Meymott v. Meymott 
 
 Mey rick, Re 
 
 v James 
 
 v. Laws 1339 1341, 1605, 1851 
 
 Meysinberg v. Schleiper 1081 
 
 Michael v Fripp 1578, 1580 
 
 Michel v. Bullen 1448, 1453 
 
 Michell v. Harris 671 
 
 v. Michell 100 
 
 Michelmore v. Mudge 119, 121 
 
 Michielsv The Empire Palace 28 
 
 Michigan State Bank v. Gardner 190, 
 
 191,223 
 
 v. Hustings 129 
 
 Miehoud v Girod 994,997 
 
 Mickle v. Maxfield 1028, 1120, 1579 
 
 Mickles v Dillaye 1243, 1244, 1245 
 
 v. Thayer 659. 994 
 
 Micklethwait t/. Micklethwait 1633, 
 
 1671 
 
 v. Moore 579. 1819 
 
 Micklethwaite v. Atkinson 178, 841 
 
 v. Winstanley 254, 340. 1207 
 
 Micou v Ashurst 334, 385 
 
 v Davis 1284 
 
 Middaugh v. Fox 560 
 
 Middlebrook v. Bromley 561,687 
 
 Middlecomer Marlow 92 
 
 Middleditch v Sharland 66< 
 
 r Williams 68 
 
 Middlemas v. Wilson 351, 894, 1003 
 
 Middlesex Bank v Minot 284 
 
 Middleton, Re 1433 
 
 v Bankers' Tel. Co. 1304 
 
 v Barned 1104,1127 
 
 756 
 371 
 670 
 
 536 
 Mexican G. 
 
 1661, 1687 
 838 
 933 
 1548 
 45 
 1731 
 1712 
 1188 
 1339 
 314 
 1492 
 334 
 983, 1330 
 1852 
 919
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 lxxxv 
 
 Middleton v. Chichester 820 
 
 v. Dodswell 1665, 1722, 1734 
 
 v. Flat River Co, 
 v. Franklin 
 V. Greenwood 
 v. Magnay 
 
 v. Middleton 
 v. Poole 
 v. Selby 
 v. Sherburne 
 
 v. Spicer 
 v. Younger 
 Lord v. Eliot 
 
 303 
 
 1637 
 
 1082 
 
 1081, KI82 
 
 1149, 1384 
 
 1778 
 
 1551 
 
 1074, 1079, 1721, 
 
 1725, 1734 
 
 135 
 
 1801 
 
 1392 
 
 Miller v. Furse 
 v. Gow 
 v. Gregory 
 V. Hall 
 v. Harris 
 v. Henderson 
 v. Howard 
 v. Huddlestone 
 v. Jackson 
 
 Middletown S. Bank v. Bach- 
 
 arach 283 
 
 Midland Counties Benefit Build- 
 ing Society, Re 1479 
 Midland, &c. Ferry Co. v. Wil- 
 son 1637 
 Midland Ry Co., Re 1797 
 v. Brown 1440 
 v. London & North-Western 
 Ry Co. 1650 
 Midleton, Lord v. Power 387 
 Midiner v. Midmer 418, 860 
 Miers v. Zanesville & Maysviile 
 
 Turnpike Co. 635 
 
 Milan Steam Mills v. Hickey 1663 
 
 Milbank v. Revett 
 
 
 1726, 1728 
 
 Mildniay v. Methuen 
 
 
 1257 
 
 v Miidmay 
 
 
 677 
 
 v. Quieke 
 
 
 1163 
 
 Mildred v. Austin 
 
 
 277, 10&5 
 
 v. Robinson 
 
 
 1033 
 
 Miles v Boyden 
 
 
 68 
 
 v . Davis 
 
 
 224 
 
 v Durnford 
 
 
 230, 233. 3)3 
 
 v. Harrison 
 
 
 1428 
 
 t>. Hawkins 
 
 
 203 
 
 v. Kaigler 
 
 
 68 
 
 v. Knight 
 
 
 1338, 1795 
 758, 843, 844 
 
 v. Miles 374, 722, 
 
 v. New Zealand A. 
 
 E 
 
 Co. 365 
 
 v. O'Hara 
 
 
 1118 
 
 V Presland 
 
 1039, 
 
 V. Stanley 
 
 
 671 
 
 V. Strong 
 
 
 418 
 
 v Williams 
 
 
 7 
 
 Milhan v. Sharp 
 
 
 1637 
 
 Milk v. Moore 
 
 
 1075, 1076 
 
 Milkman v. Ordway 
 
 
 380 
 
 Mill v. Mill 
 
 
 957, 958 
 
 Mill's Estate, Re 
 
 
 1451 
 
 Mt Han v. Hood 
 
 
 601 
 
 Millar v. Craig 
 
 
 1230 
 
 v. El win 
 
 
 620, 521 
 
 v. Harper 
 
 
 1720 
 
 Millard v. Burroughes 
 
 1450 
 
 V Mairor 
 
 • 
 
 328 
 
 Millard's Case 
 
 
 677 
 
 Mill-dam Foundry v 
 
 Hovey 146, 
 
 35 
 Mill River Loan Fund Ass. v. 
 
 Clatlin 591 
 
 Miller, Re 354, 1694 
 
 v. Avery 737, 846, 884, 1653 
 
 v. Baltimore C M. Co. 334 
 
 v. Bear 
 
 
 197 
 
 ?>. Beverleys 
 
 
 1231 
 
 v. Buchanan 
 
 
 349 
 
 v. Cabell 
 
 
 68 
 
 v. Cameron 
 
 
 231 
 
 v Campbell 
 
 
 102 
 
 v. Caruthers 
 
 
 875 
 
 v. Chittenden 
 
 
 1150 
 
 V- Clark 
 
 
 1576 
 
 v. Cook 
 
 402 
 
 986, 1517 
 
 v. Cotten 
 
 
 S26 
 
 v. Davidson 
 
 
 236 
 
 v ■ District of Columbia 
 
 840 
 
 v. Dorsey 
 
 
 643 
 
 v- Dows 
 
 
 627 
 
 V. Fasse 
 
 
 590 
 
 v. Fenton 
 
 
 607, 1550 
 
 v. Ford 
 
 
 547 
 
 V. Foree 
 
 
 843 
 
 787 
 
 840,843 
 
 711, 1550 
 
 256, 457 
 
 334, 336 
 
 197, 215 
 
 1317 
 
 223, 1051, 1052 
 
 860 
 
 v. Jamison 302, 337, 380, 557, 587 
 
 ('.Justice 986 
 
 v. Kershaw 194 
 
 v. Lincoln 1239, 1386, 1393, 1448 
 
 v. Lord 378 
 
 v. M'Can 292, 295, 403, 4i in 
 
 v. MoCarr 1623 
 
 t>. Mackenzie 1742, 1751 
 
 v. M'Crea 287, 289 
 
 v . McDougal 1677 
 
 V. M Intyre 560, 639 
 
 v. Miller 1048, 1157, 1712, 1771, 
 
 2289 
 
 v. Palmer 1622 
 
 v. Pine Mining Co. 357 
 
 v. Powell 798 
 
 v. Pridden 218, 859, 991, 1409, 
 
 1694 
 
 v. Rushforth 1031, 1322 
 
 v. Russell 1118 
 
 t\ Saunders 715 
 
 v. Scammon 552 
 
 v. Sherry 1276, 1280 
 
 v. Smith 403 
 
 v. Taylor 402, 1129 
 
 v. Thatcher 361 
 
 v. Tobin 972 
 
 v. Tolleson 843 
 
 v. Wack 840, 844, 1073, 1076 
 
 u. Warmington 135, 209, 1161 
 
 i\ Wheatley 762 
 
 v. Whittaker 247, 409 
 
 v. Whittier 287, 294, 1241, 1245, 
 
 1302 
 
 v. Wright 529 
 
 Miller-Magce Co. v. Carpenter 542. 
 
 551 
 
 MiUican v. Vaoderplank 1275, 1294 
 
 Milligan v. Milledge 149, 150, 219, 
 
 290, 390, 603 
 
 v. Mitchell 240, 245, 292, 295, 
 
 403, 405, 416, 417, 582, 715, 1579, 
 
 1653 
 
 Milliken v. Barrow 1743 
 
 Millington v. Fox 1376, 1380, 1381, 
 
 1394, 1395, 1649, 1681 
 
 v. Loring 348 
 
 Mills v. Bally 700 
 
 v. Banks 1475, 1476 
 
 v. Barlow 114 
 
 v. Bowyers' Co. 1860 
 
 v . Brown 544, 545 
 
 v Cobby 1686 
 
 v. Dennis 68, 163, 165, 167, 168, 169, 
 
 170, 753, 997 
 
 v. Dudgeon 813 
 
 v. Dunham 1655 
 
 v. Farmer 16, 140, 1436 
 
 t\ Finlay 1843 
 
 v. Fox 108 
 
 e Fry 815, 817 
 
 t'. Gleason 1661 
 
 v. Gore 841 
 
 v. Hanson 1780, 1781, 1797 
 
 v. Hoag 993, 1461, 1516, 1518- 
 
 v. Hurd 334 
 
 «; Jennings 200,212,213,215, 
 
 257 
 
 v. Knapp 630 
 
 v. Mason 1549 
 
 t> Metcalf 314 
 
 v. Northern Railway of Buenos 
 
 Avres Co. 243 
 
 v. Parkhurst 815 
 
 v. Pitman 828 
 
 v. Scott 417 
 
 v. Townsend 147 
 
 v. Wayne Circuit Judge 1675 
 
 Millsaps v. Pfeiffer 1537, 1556 
 
 Millspaugh v. M' Bride 978, 1026, 
 
 1030, 1284 
 
 Milltown, Lord v. Stuart 826, 970, 
 
 1597. 1609, l»»l 
 
 Milly v. Harrison ' 1429, 1459 
 
 Milner v. Colmer 92, 97 
 
 v. Harewood, Lord 170 
 
 v. Meek 1489 
 
 t). Milner 1515 
 
 Milner's Settlement, Re 100 
 
 Milues v. Busk 100 
 
 V. Davisou 1396 
 
 v. Gery 671 
 
 Milsingtown, Lord v. Portmore, 
 
 Earl of 1667 
 
 Milson v. Carter 1029 
 
 Miltenberger v. Loginsport Ry. 
 
 Co. 1716, 1738, 1743 
 
 Milward v. Oldfield 406 
 
 Mil. & Chil. Turnpike Co. v. 
 
 Brush 22 
 
 Milwaukee i>. Sullivan 354 
 
 &c R. Co. v. Soutter 1463, 1491, 
 
 1715, 1731 
 
 Mims v. Mims 214, 837 
 
 Miner v. Caples 1164 
 
 v. Smith 259 
 
 Minet v. Hyde 95, 97 
 
 v. Morgan 573, 575, 1832 
 
 Mineve v. Row 950 
 
 Minirie v. Railway Passengers 
 
 Ass. Co. 671 
 
 Mining Co. v Delany 1684 
 
 Miuke v. Hopeman 1635 
 
 Minn v. Stant 295 
 
 Minneapolis, &c. Ry. Co. v. Mil- 
 ner 1620 
 Minnesota Bank v. Hayes 1770 
 Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. 1517, 
 1553 
 Mining's Appeal 1631 
 Minor, Ex parte 1275 
 Minors v. Battison 1342,1503 
 Minot v. Curtis 20 
 Minshaw v. Jordan 1680 
 Minter, lie 1043, 1170 
 Minthnrne v. Tomkins 1018, 1042 
 Minturn v. Seymour 1668, 1672. 1675 
 Minuse v. Cox 14.3 
 Mireliouse v. Herbert 1260, 1397 
 Mississippi Mills v. Cohn 630 
 Miss. R. Co. v. Gaster 24 
 Mississippi and Mobile R Co. v. 
 
 Cromwell 1889, 1902 
 
 Missouri K. & T. Rv. Co. v. El- 
 liott 630 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mc- 
 
 Cartv 1508 
 
 v. Texas & P Ry. Co. f.nr,, 12li9, 
 1299, 1309, 1743 
 v. Tex. Pac. Ry. Co 1743 
 
 Missouri R. Co v. Commission- 
 ers 1650 
 Mitchel v. Manchester, Duke of 
 
 1743, 1748 
 Mitchell, Re 1327, 1337, 1850 
 
 Re, Wavell v. Mitchell 215 
 
 /•. Bailey 291 
 
 V. Berry 1268, 1290, 1577, 1578, 
 1580 
 v Bunre 633, 1032 
 
 v. Bunch 1627, 1698, 1699, 1700, 
 1704, 1713 
 v. Cline 1157 
 
 i\ Commissioners 1661 
 
 v Condy 1070, 1765 
 
 0. Dors 1032 
 
 v. Draper 1054 
 
 r Green 547, 570, 584 
 
 v. Harris 671 
 
 v. Hayne 1560, 1565, 1671 
 
 V. Homfray 852 
 
 v. Kingman 83 
 
 t'. Koecker 563 
 
 v. Lenox 287, 292, 642, 558, 604, 
 1486
 
 lxxxvi 
 
 Mitchell v. Lowndes 
 
 V. Miii 5 . 1 1 1 
 
 V. Oakley 
 
 v. SehouQover 
 
 v Smart 
 
 v. Smith 
 
 v. Thome 
 
 v. Tighe 
 
 V. Walker 
 
 t>. Wiuslow 
 Mitchell's Case 
 
 Mitford v. Mitford 120, 122, 125, 127 
 v Reynolds 1318,1436 
 
 Mittens v. Foreman 354 
 
 Mix v. Hotchkiss 341, 344, 1246 
 
 Moat v. Holbien 1673, 1684, 1685 
 Mobile Savings Bank v. Board 
 of S u pervisors 324 , 334 
 
 v. Burke 334 
 
 Moblev i . Dubuque, &c. Co. 841 
 v. Hamit 904, 918, 930 
 
 Mocatta v. Lousada 1432 
 
 v Murgatroyd 1392 
 
 Moch v Virginia Fire Ins. Co. 664 
 Mockett, He 14!'l 
 
 Moelle v. Sherwood 674, 1019, 1120 
 Moenich v. Fenestre 1655 
 
 Moet v. Couston 1394, 1395, 1600, 
 1649, 1679 
 Moffat v Buruie 1202 
 
 v. United States 8 
 
 Moffats v. Farquharson 238 
 
 Moffatt v. Barnes 1254 
 
 v Farquharson 216,238,269 
 
 Moftvt r. Claberts 856 
 
 Mogg v. Mogg 1619, 1632 
 
 Moegridge v. Hall 938, 1574 
 
 t, Thackwell 16, 140, 1436 
 
 v. Thomas 1594, 1596, 1667 
 
 Mogul Steamship Co. v. Mc- 
 Gregor 1620, 1664 
 Mohawk" Bank v. Atwater 886, 1272 
 Bridge Case 1151 
 and Hudson R. Co. v. Ant- 
 
 cher 1637 
 
 v Clute 1561,1562,1563,1564, 
 
 1565, 1571 
 
 Mohler v. Wiltberger 793 
 
 Mohun V. Mohun 143b 
 
 Moiru Mudie 1844 
 
 Mold v. Wheatcroft 1082, 2321 
 
 Mole v. Mansfield H5< 
 
 v. Smith 188, 339, 974, 1307, 2182, 
 
 2265 
 
 Molesworth, Re 1357 
 
 v. Howard 72. 
 
 v. Rolibins *°« 
 
 v Snead 825, 972, 1373 
 
 v Lord Vernev 801 
 
 MollfU *•. Enequist 1556, 1621. 1625, 
 
 1669, 1672, 1675 
 
 Mollineux V. Powell 227, 1630 
 
 Moloney u. Smith 28 
 
 Molonv v. Kernan 675,677 
 
 Molyneux lie 1161,1169 
 
 Moncaster, Lord V. Braithwaite 783, 
 
 784 
 
 Monck v. Tankerville, Earl of 427 
 
 Monrkton r Attorney-General 131 
 
 Mondey V. Mondey 163, 167 
 
 Monell r. Lawrence 1459 
 
 Money, Re „ 39 
 
 v. Jordan 847, 1676, 16*3 
 
 Monil v. Lawson 13i 
 
 Monk v. Pomfret 323 
 
 Monkhouse v. Bedfo-d, Corp. of 
 
 1000, 1470, 1478 
 Monmouth v. Leeds 1381 
 
 Monnett V Turpie 629 
 
 Monnins v. Monnins 568 
 
 Monro v. Taylor 990, 1400 
 
 Monroe v. James 
 
 V. Lewald 1120 
 
 Monroe's Will, Re 576 
 
 Monroe Cattle Co. v. Becker 843 
 
 Monroy c Monroy 728 
 
 MoDtague v. 778 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [Tho references are to the star paging.] 
 
 8"4 Montague v. Boston & Albany 
 361,837 R. Co. 1309 
 
 1623 v. Flockton 1654, 1657 
 
 1507 v. Lobdell 197, 199 
 
 1567 v. Selb 780 
 
 61,562,1556 v. Turpin 271 
 
 303, 320 Lord v. Dudman 570, 1556, 1620 
 328, 558 Montara v. Hall 1314, 13*30 
 
 1301 Montefiore v. Behrens 1039 
 
 120 Mouteith v. Taylor 158, 159, 808 
 576 Montesquieu !•. Sandys 327 
 
 Montgomerie v. Bath, Marquis 
 
 of 212 
 
 Montgomery, Re 1747 
 
 v. Attoiney-GeDeral 1122 
 
 v. Calland" 1252, 1391, 1393 
 
 v Chadwick 1240, 1243 
 
 v. Floyd 253 
 
 v. 01 Well 1548,1551 
 
 v. Itich 986 
 
 v. Whitworth 296, 1567 
 
 Monti r. Bishop 1551 
 
 Moutitiori v. Browne 1205 
 
 Mom penny v. 424, 1602, 1671 
 
 v. Deriug 170, lo20, 1021 
 
 v. Monypenny 1470, 1503 
 
 Mooar v. Harvey 648 
 
 Moodalay v Morton 145, 331, 1557 
 
 Moodie v. Bainbridge 1808 
 
 v. Baunister 152, 290, 644, 658, 
 
 1211 
 
 Moore v. Langford 
 v. Lipscombe 
 v. Lockett 
 v. Lyttle 
 v. McClintock 
 v. McGaha 
 v. M Nauiara 
 v. Meynell 
 v. Mitchell 
 r. Moberly 
 v. Moore 
 
 1182 
 
 1463 
 
 837 
 
 328, 558 
 
 846 
 
 1621 
 
 280 
 
 180 
 
 378 
 
 270 
 
 91,120,302.469,511, 
 
 1047, 1577, 1581 
 
 202 
 
 214 
 
 552 
 
 177, 476 
 
 1669, 1676 
 
 1009, 1016 
 
 1003 
 
 350, 351, 895 
 
 Moody v. Fry 
 
 233 
 
 v. Gay 
 
 149, 150 
 
 v llebberd 
 
 1594, 1597 
 
 v. Learning 
 
 947 
 
 v. Metcalf 
 
 844 
 
 v. Payne 
 
 946, 949 
 
 v. Rowell 
 
 920 
 
 v Steggles 
 
 1639 
 
 Mooers v. White 
 
 641 
 
 Moon v Trask 
 
 652 
 
 Mooney v. Cooledge 
 
 1631 
 
 Moons v. De Bernales 
 
 857. 865, 1079 
 
 Moor v. Anglo-Italian Bank 629. 
 
 
 1627, 1628 
 
 v. Somerset 
 
 629 
 
 v. Veazie 
 
 197, 240 
 
 v. Welsh Copper Co 
 
 632. 635 
 
 Moore, lie 
 
 1069, 1694 
 
 v. Alden 
 
 1411 
 
 v. Anderson 
 
 286 
 
 V. Armstrong 
 
 682, 601 
 
 v. Barnheisel 
 
 1561 
 
 v. Beaman 
 
 1120 
 
 V. Beauchamp 
 
 219 
 
 v. Blagrave 
 
 200, 249 
 
 v. Booth 
 
 1069 
 
 v. Bray 
 
 573 
 
 v. Bruce 1172 
 
 v. Cabel 
 
 1240 
 
 v. Cable 1242, 1244, 12 
 
 v. Cord 
 
 1624 
 
 v. Craven 
 
 579, 717 
 
 v. Crawford 
 
 560. 860 
 
 v. Deakin 
 
 1071 
 
 v. Degraw 
 
 1237, 1240 
 
 v. Dixon 
 
 1432 
 
 v. Edwards 
 
 656, 657 
 
 v. Fountleroy 
 
 1381 
 
 v. Frowd 
 
 1234, 1413 
 
 v. Gamble 
 
 1623 
 
 v. Gennett 
 
 149, 443, 449 
 
 v. Gentry 
 
 100 
 
 v. Gleaton 
 
 225, 1707 
 
 v. Granger 
 
 1463 
 
 t>. Green 
 
 517 
 
 t>. Greene 
 
 324 
 
 v. Hallum 
 
 1624 
 
 V. Harper 321, 868 
 
 871, 891, 1553 
 
 v Hood 
 
 251 
 
 v. Holt 
 
 633. 635. 695 
 
 f. Hudson 180, 
 
 389, 1705, 1706 
 
 v. Hunter 
 
 737 
 
 v Huntington 
 
 1576 
 
 v. Hylton 
 
 1676, 1677 
 
 v. Knight 
 
 298, 645 
 
 v. Lake Co. 
 
 860 
 
 v. Morris 
 
 v. Morton 
 
 v Munn 
 
 v. Platel 
 
 v. Reed 
 
 v. Robinson 
 
 v. School Trustees 
 
 v. Smith 
 
 v. Stevenson 
 
 v. Taylor 1734 
 
 v. Titman 1170 
 
 v. Tuckwell 1126,1127 
 
 v. Osher 1560, 1561 
 
 v. Walker 1644 
 
 v. Walter 1339 
 
 V. Wright 458 
 
 v Zabriskie 1236 
 
 Moore's Appeal 1777 
 
 Moores v. Moores 348, 852, 853 
 
 Moors v. Moors 87, 712, 843 
 
 v. Washburn 1381 
 
 Moran v. Hays 249 
 
 v Johnston 1716, 1734 
 
 v. Palmer 360 
 
 v. Pellifant 197 
 
 Morant, Re 1607 
 
 Mordaunt v. Benwell 1346 
 
 v. Hooper 1725 
 
 Mordue v. Palmer 1408^1861 
 
 More II, Mayhow 677, 678 
 
 Moreau v. Edwards 1655 
 
 v. Polley 1696 
 
 V. Saffarans 346 
 
 Moredock v. Williams 1668, 1677 
 
 Morehouse v. Jackson 12^8 
 
 it. Newton 1250 
 
 Moreland v. Richardson 1632 
 
 Morenhout p. Higuera 1150 
 
 Mores v. Mores 150, 152 
 
 Moreton v. Chandler 645 
 
 v. Harrison 607, 618, 829 
 
 Morewood v. Currey 236 
 
 v. Hall 1152 
 
 Morey v. Forsyth 19" 
 
 v. Vandenbergh 824 
 
 Morford V Hamner 1716. 1720, 1730 
 
 Morgan, Ex parte 987, 1147, 1149 
 
 Re . 349,674 
 
 v . 1586 
 
 v. Bovne 235 
 v. Davey 595, 599, 602, 730, 731, 808 
 
 v. Day 540 
 
 v. Elam 186 
 
 v. Elford 1471 
 
 v. Elstob 1213 
 
 v. Fuller 1078, 1083 
 
 v. Graham 1661 
 
 r. Great Eastern Ry. Co. 795, 1380 
 
 v. Harris 548 
 
 v. H.tchell 1338, ia50 
 
 v. Higgins 1232 
 
 v. Huggins 1411 
 
 v. Jones 177, 444 
 
 v. Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. 26 
 v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. 1164 
 
 v. Lariviere 18, 142 
 
 v. Lewis 1190 
 
 V. M'Adam 1649 
 
 ii. Marsack 1566 
 
 v Meuth 378 
 
 v. Morgan 163, 230, 285, 461. 661, 
 989, 1362, 1368, 1459, 
 1536, 1716 
 v. New York and Albany R. 
 
 Co. 239,406
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxxvn 
 
 Morgan v. Palmer 
 
 
 
 1638 
 
 v. 
 
 Railway Co. 
 
 
 
 149 
 
 v. 
 
 Scudauiore 
 
 
 1527, 
 
 1528 
 
 v. 
 
 Shaw 
 
 575, 
 
 943, 944 
 
 1774 
 
 V 
 
 Shepherd 
 
 
 
 334 
 
 v. 
 
 Smith 
 
 
 
 321 
 
 V 
 
 Thorne 
 
 
 
 68 
 
 v. 
 
 Tifdon 
 
 
 
 844 
 
 v. 
 
 Tipton 
 
 
 
 1551) 
 
 V 
 
 Turner 
 
 
 
 1061 
 
 V 
 
 Worthington 
 
 
 
 365 
 
 Morgan's La.,&c. 
 
 Co. 
 
 v. Texas 
 
 Hot 
 
 Central Ky. Cc 
 iarty v. Mason 
 
 . 
 
 1019, 
 
 154S, 
 1553 
 
 ?yo 
 
 Morire p. Durham, Bishop of 1290 
 Monson v. Morison 72, 163, 505, 543 
 v. Tumour 619 
 
 Moritz v. Splitt 378 
 
 Morley V. Bridges 1393 
 
 v. Ulavering 1043, 1220, 17:»3 
 
 v. Green 290 
 
 v. Morley 212, 226, 257, 259, 891 
 v. Rennoldson 150 
 
 v. White 200, 409, 630 
 
 Morniug Journal Ass'n v. Ru- 
 therford 1029 
 Moruington v. Keen 42 
 Moruiugton 573, 578, 1834 
 
 Earl of v. Smith 
 
 807, 809 
 
 Lord v. Keane 
 
 1830 
 
 Morocco Co v. Fry 
 
 542, 13'.)4 
 
 Morphett v. Jones 
 
 847, 1668 
 
 Morrall v. Pritchard 
 
 1370, 1577, 
 
 
 1578, 1594 
 
 Morrell v Dickey 
 
 1355, 1412 
 
 v. Fisher 
 
 1428 
 
 v. Kelley 
 
 1320 
 
 v. Pearson 
 
 1683 
 
 t>. Wootten 
 
 1825 
 
 Murret v. Westerne 
 
 214,277,278, 
 
 
 660 
 
 Morrice v. Bank of England 1033, 
 
 
 1615 
 
 v. Swaby 
 
 1824, 1825 
 
 Morrill v. Morrill 
 
 778, 1150, 1157, 
 
 
 1158 
 
 Morris v. Ashbee 
 
 1645, 1646 
 
 v. Barclay 
 
 287 
 
 v. Barker 
 
 726 
 
 v. Bull 
 
 1278 
 
 v. Caonan 
 
 1382 
 
 v. Clarkson 
 
 1270 
 
 v. Cleasby 
 
 1129 
 
 v. Colinan 
 
 1654, 1727 
 
 V. Davies 
 
 974, 1137, 1460 
 
 v. Dillingham 
 
 1256 
 
 v. Edwards 
 
 485, 579, 889 
 
 v. Elme 
 
 1750, 1768 
 
 v. Fort 
 
 363 
 
 v Hay ward 
 
 468 
 
 v. inn 
 
 1683 
 
 v. Honeycombe 
 
 743 
 
 v. Howell 
 
 1817 
 
 r;. Hoyt 
 
 846 
 
 v Islip 
 
 1393 
 
 v. Kelly 
 
 320, 1644 
 
 v. Llanelly Ry. and Dock Co. 
 
 983, 1330 
 v. M'Neil 1700 
 
 v. Merritt 1073 
 
 v. Morris 86, 170, 243, 349, 1573, 
 
 1633, 1860 
 v. Morris & C. D. Co. 855 
 
 v Mowatt 
 
 1061, 1209, 1282 
 
 v Nixon 
 
 841 
 
 v Owen 
 
 1590 
 
 v Parker 
 
 721, 723. 724 
 
 v. Peyton 
 
 974, 1019 
 
 v. Richardson 
 
 987, 1484, 1491 
 
 v. Robinson 
 
 87 
 
 v. Ross 
 
 671 
 
 v Smith 
 
 1049 
 
 v. Taylor 1, 963, 1168, 1296, 1314 
 v. Timmins 1163 
 
 t>. Vivian 1107,1108.1131 
 
 v. White 843, 1584 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Morris v. Williams 943 
 
 v. Wilson 990 
 
 v. Wright 1643, 1645 
 
 Canal, &c, Co. v. Biddlet 1675 
 v. Central Ry. Co. 1631, 1637, 
 
 1669 
 v. Dennis 1621 
 
 V. Fagan 1631, 1677 
 
 v. Fagin 1613 
 
 v. Jersey City 1661, 1668 
 
 and Essex R. Co. v. Hudson 
 
 Tunnel R. Co. 1631 
 
 v. Pruddeu 303, 1661 
 
 Morris Wilsou & Co. v. Coventry 
 
 M. Co. 1643 
 
 Morrish v. Murray 1127 
 
 Morrison, He 1361, 1801 
 
 v. Arnold 1673, 1574 
 
 v Barrow 987, 1072, 1079, 1148, 
 
 . 2338 
 
 v. Beckwith 1653 
 
 v. Bowman 378 
 
 v. Coleman 1675 
 
 v. Durr 843 
 
 v. Hart 361, 849, 862 
 
 v. M'Leod 1240 
 
 v . Marquardt 1638 
 
 v. Mayer 782 
 
 v. Moat 1070, 1651, 2319 
 
 v. Morrison 1423, 1470, 1471, 
 
 1548, 1768, 1769 
 
 v. Searight 1530, 1536, 1549 
 
 v. Stewart 843 
 
 Morrisse v. Inglis 1276, 1286 
 
 Morrissey v. Broomal 1071 
 
 Morrit v. Walton 1526, 2059 
 
 Morrow v. Fossick 1533 
 
 v. Lawrence 247, 296 
 
 v. Wessell 1282 
 
 Morse v. Buckworth 565 
 
 v. Earl 89 
 
 v. Hill 560, 844, 1320 
 
 v. Hovey 191, 737 
 
 v. Lyman 255 
 
 v- Machine Water Power Co. 287 
 
 v Roach 877 
 
 v. Royal 842 
 
 v. Sadler 225 
 
 v. Slason 851 
 
 v. Smith 997, 1459 
 
 v. Stearns 1411, 1561 
 
 v. Worcester 1638 
 
 Morshead v. Frederick 1284 
 
 v. Reynolds 1213 
 
 Morss v. Domestic S. M. Co. 1686 
 
 Mortgage Co. v Jefferson 385 
 
 Mortimer v. Cipsey 4~>7 
 
 v. Cottrell 1632 
 
 v. Fraser 546, 599 
 
 ^.Hartley 315, 542, 6o2 
 
 v. M'Callon 1126 
 
 v. Mortimer 202, 203, 204 
 
 v. Orchard 380, 843, 860, 861, 
 
 14H6 
 
 v. Picton 1791 
 
 « West 69, 685 
 
 M >rtimore v. Soares 818 
 
 Mortland v. Mortland 552, 1302 
 
 Mortlock v. Buller 989, 995 
 
 v. Leathes 1772 
 
 v. Mortlock 399 
 
 Morton, lie 98 
 
 v. Great Eastern Ry. Co. 1775 
 
 v. Grenada Academies 549, 557, 
 
 71< 
 
 v. Miller 1175, 1596 
 
 v. New Orleans &c Ky. Co. 402 
 
 v. Palmer 39, 5"5 
 
 v. Weil 338 
 
 v White 881 
 
 Mosbv v. Haskins 1623 
 
 v. Withers 1286 
 
 Moscatti r. Lawson 1105 
 
 Moseby ?'. Partee 1676 
 
 Moseley V. Armstrong S4l 
 
 v. Brush 197, 19!) 
 
 v- Cocke 9S6 
 
 Moseley v. Cresseys Co. 240, 241, 242 
 v. Gassett 837 
 
 v Hankinson 1276 
 
 v. Moseley 1617 
 
 v . Victoria Rubber Co. 576 
 
 v. Ward 
 Mosely v. Mosely 
 
 v. Virgin 
 Moser r. Marsden 
 Moses v. Brodie 
 
 v. Mayor, <&c. 
 
 v. Murgatroyd 
 
 i\ Wooster 
 Mosier v. Beale 
 Moiw, lie 
 
 1416, 1417 
 
 951 
 
 1404, 1660 
 
 406 
 
 367 
 
 1620 
 
 1412 
 
 1507 
 
 87 
 
 1844 
 
 v. Anglo-Egyptian Nav. Co. 561, 
 661, 1548, ,545) 
 
 v. Bainbrigge 324, 1008 
 
 v. Baldock 1475 
 
 v. Buckley 615 
 
 v. Dunlop 96 
 
 v. McCall 1003 
 
 v. Syers 397. 1601 
 
 Most} d v. Brooke 164, 1584 
 
 v. Emmanuel 1525 
 
 v. Vabrigas 643 
 
 v. Mostyn 1276 
 
 Motion !\ King 1539 
 
 v. Moojen 58 
 
 Motley v. Downman 1*>49 
 
 Mott v. Black wall Ry. Co. 1111 
 
 v . Carter 221 
 
 V. Hall 760 
 v. Harrington 
 
 1248, 1298, 1299. 
 
 1301) 
 
 940 
 
 211, 1080, 1407 
 
 284 
 
 London Assurance 
 
 197 
 403 
 1129 
 144 
 904, 918, 930 
 230 
 
 v. Ramsey 
 
 v. Shoolbred 
 
 v. Shreve 
 Motteux v. 
 Co. 
 
 t>. Mackreth 
 Mould v. Griffiths 
 Moulin v Ins. Co 
 Moulson v. Hargrave 
 Moulton 17. Chaffee 
 
 v. Edmonds 1218 
 
 v. Reid 1492 
 
 v. Richardson 1081 
 
 Mounce v. Byars 780, 1075 
 
 Mound Citv Life Ins. Co v. 
 
 Harding 1286, 12?9 
 
 Moundsville v Ohio River R. Co. 312, 
 
 1662 
 
 Mounsey v. Burnham 
 
 i v. Earl of Lonsdale 
 
 Mounson r. West 
 Mount v. Manhattan Co. 
 v. Potts 
 
 426 
 1378, 1379, 
 1600 
 1107 
 682 
 842. 1370 
 
 Mount Carbon Coal Co. v. Blanch- 
 
 ard 
 
 Mountcastle r Moore 
 Mountford, Ex parte 
 
 r. Scott 
 
 v. Taylor 
 Mountfort, Ex parte 
 
 331 
 1284 
 1&54 
 675 
 726 
 1349. 1357, 
 1603 
 Mount Hope Iron Co. v. Dear- 
 den 1157 
 Mountnorris, Earl of r. White 1658 
 Mount Olivet Cemetery v. Budcke 
 
 '410, 412, 1675 
 Mountstuart v. Mountstuart 1355 
 Mount Vernon Bank v. Stone 328 
 Mourilyan, Re 1044. 1590 
 
 Mouseley v. Basnett 816, 817 
 
 Mowatt v. Graham 942 
 
 Mower v. Kip 1254 
 
 Mowrev v. lad. and Cinn. R. 
 
 Co. 1614 
 
 Mowrv v. Baraboo Bank 1381 
 
 v. Bishop 1259, 1260 
 
 Davenport 1120 
 
 r. Hill 313 
 
 V Whitney 10 
 
 Moxhay V Inderwick 1^54 
 
 Moxon v. Bright 551
 
 lxxxviii 
 
 Moxon v. Payne 328 
 
 Moye v. Bateman 1848 
 
 Hoyezs v. Coiner 175(5 
 
 Mozeley t'. Cowie 328, 417 
 
 Mozley v. Alston 26, 240, 242, 243 
 
 v. (Jowie 284 
 
 Mrzena v. Brucker 349, 728, 75!) 
 
 M. Schandler B. Co. v. Welch 1620 
 
 Muckleston v. Brown 483, 647 
 
 Mudd v. Suckermore 1147 
 
 Mudgett v. Gager 149, 150. 191 , 
 
 216, 219, 290 
 
 Muggeridge, Re 1491 
 
 Muir v. Howell 1663 
 
 Muirhead v. Evans 1090 
 
 Muldoon v. Muldoon 1561 
 
 Muldrow v. Du Bose 792, 793, 794 
 
 Mulford v. Reilly 1031 
 
 Mulbearo v. Press Pub. Co. 887 
 
 Mulholland v Hendrick 856 
 
 Mullakin v. Mullakin 830 
 
 Mul an v. United States 8 
 
 Mullen v. Strieker 1638 
 
 Mulleue v Hussey 1285 
 
 Muller v. Dows 357 
 
 v. Henry 1683 
 
 Mullett v. Christmas 28 
 
 Muliikiu v. Mullikiu 1282 
 
 Mullins v. Aiken 1003 
 
 v. Howell 1603 
 
 v. Hussey 385 
 
 v. Towushend 1276 
 
 Mullock v. Jenkins 242 
 
 Mullows f. Bannister 448 
 
 Mulloy v, Paul 715, 971 
 
 v. Young 861 
 
 Mulock v. Mulock 559, 956, 1076, 
 
 1124, 1678 
 
 Mulvey v. Gibbons 215 
 
 Mum ford v. Muniford 49 
 
 v. Murray 90, 122, 2297 
 
 v. Stohwasser 1398 
 
 Munch v. Cockerell 247, 248, 268 
 
 v. Shabell 418 
 
 Munchus v. Harris 860 
 
 Munday v. Knight 324, 360, 370 
 
 v. Shatzell 392 
 
 v. Vail 853 
 
 Mundv v. Howe, Earl 1359 
 
 v. JollitTe 38 
 
 v Mundy 1150,1165,1166 
 
 Mundy's Landing Co. v Hardin 
 
 378 
 Munn v. Marsh 283 
 
 Munns v. Isle of Wight Ry. Co. 1222 
 Munor o. De Tartel 152 
 
 Munro v Meech 659 
 
 v. Smith 1643 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Munro v. Wivenhoe & Bright- 
 lingsea Ry. Co. 1598, 1664, 1671 
 
 Muuroeff. Tousey 1643 
 
 Mudsoi) v Bowen 334 
 
 v. Curtis 1381 
 
 v. Reed 1073, 1076 
 
 Munster v. Lamb 887, 1103 
 
 Munt v. tih lies 88 
 
 v. Shrewsbury and Chester Ry. 
 Co. 1620 
 
 Murch v. Concord Railroad 545 
 
 Murdock v. Ratcliffe 346 
 
 I v. Walker 1620 
 
 Murdoek's Case 780, 781, 1630, 
 
 1639, 1664 
 
 Murfree v Carmack 67 
 
 v. Leeper 27 
 
 Murkle V. Murkle 754 
 
 Murphev v. Amer. Life Ins. and 
 
 Trust Co. 1460 
 
 Murphy v. Clark 314, 385 
 
 v. Conway 1501 
 
 v. Gibbs 418 
 
 v. Jackson 235, 247, 258, 270, 779 
 v. Lincoln 590, 1638 
 
 V. Murphy 1468 
 
 v. New York Central R. Co. 940 
 v. New York Police Board 1620 
 v. Oldis 41, 43, 154 
 
 v. Savannah 1585 
 
 v. Smith 13*0 
 
 v. Spaulding 1468 
 
 v. Vincent 889 
 
 v. Work 918 
 
 Murray , Re 1299, 1841 , 1846 
 
 v. Ballou 678, 679, 1382 
 
 v. Barlee 113 
 
 v. Barlow 280 
 
 v. Blatchford 844, 1013, 1028, 
 
 1029, 1594 
 v. Bogue 1646 
 
 v. Bush 1503 
 
 v. Butler 1096 
 
 v. Clayton 1686 
 
 v. Cockerell 1726 
 
 v. Coster 560. 720, 721 
 
 v. Dehon 1263, 1603 
 
 v. De Rottenham 2220 
 
 v. Elibank, Lord 96, 101, 106, 
 
 107, 1516 
 v. Elston 907, 1676 
 
 v. Finster 678 
 
 v. Hay 302,303,341,345 
 
 v. Lylburn 280 
 
 v. Newbon 114 
 
 v. Phillips 1382 
 
 v. Schooner Betsey 50 
 
 v. Shadwell 634 
 
 Murray v. Toland 666, 668 
 
 v. Vipart 447 
 
 v. Walter 1825, 1826 
 
 Murrell v. Clapham 37, 74 
 
 Murriet v. Lvon 180 
 
 Murrow v. Wilson 30, 31 
 
 Muscott v. Halhed 355 
 
 Muse v. Egerton 113 
 
 Musgrave, Ex parte 60 
 
 v. Medex 310, 1712 
 
 v. Nevinson 1129 
 
 v. Parry 67 
 
 v. Pulido 17, 628 
 
 v. Stevens 1072 
 
 Musgrove v. Flood 96 
 
 v. Lusk 164, 974, 1296, 1317, 1575 
 
 v. Nash 1754 
 
 v. Staylor 1679 
 
 Muskerry v. Skerrington 1411 
 
 Mussel v. Morgan 1584 
 
 Mussell v. Cooke 655 
 
 Musselman *>. Stohl 1508 
 
 Musselwhite v. Spicer 1654 
 
 Mussina v. Bartlett 462, 5i'4 
 
 Musters v. Wright 226 
 
 Mutrie v. Binney 354, 555, 633, 664 
 
 Mutter v. Chauvel 1516, 1523 
 
 v. Eastern & M. Ry. Co. 26 
 
 v. Hudson 1261 
 
 Muttleburv v. Haywood 1849 
 
 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Balch 1275 
 
 v. Cokefair 759 
 
 v. Sturges 524, 1286 
 
 Mutual Society, Re 1438 
 
 Mycock v. Beatson 552 
 
 Myer v. Hart 1381 
 
 Myers v. Bradford 1313 
 
 v. Daniels 1463 
 
 t». Dorr 695 
 
 v. Farrington 302 
 
 v. Fenn 287 
 
 v. Gemmel 1638 
 
 v. Hanlon 645 
 
 v. Kin/.ie 844 
 
 v. McGahagan 601 
 
 v. Murray 357 
 
 v. Myers" 68, 90, 91, 1253, 1259, 
 
 1260, 1358, 1369 
 
 v. Pickett 1580 
 
 v. Raymond 1282 
 
 v. Trimble 1686 
 
 v. United Guaranty, &c. Co. 276. 
 
 338 
 
 Myles v. Burton 100 
 
 Mynatttf. Hubbs 1131 
 
 Mynd v. Francis 586 
 
 Mynn v. Hart 29 
 
 Myrick v. Adams 458 
 
 N. 
 
 N. v. N. 162 
 
 N. & W. R. Co. v. Nunnally 634 
 
 Nacoochee, &c. Co. v. Davis 1468 
 
 Naddo v. Bardon 560 
 
 Nadin v. Bassett 915 
 
 Nagle c. Edwards 713 
 
 Nagle-Gillman v. Christopher 108, 
 
 Nail v. Mobley 334 
 
 v. Punter 319 
 
 Naish v. Browne 
 Nalder v. Hawkins 6 
 
 Nalle v. Austin 
 Namee v. Groot 
 Nanney !'. Martin 
 
 v. Vaughan 
 
 v. Williams 
 Napier r Bullwinkle 
 
 v. Daniel 
 
 v. Effingham 73, 173, 
 
 v. Elam 
 
 840, 1229, 
 
 ,341 
 
 ,780 
 1106 
 3,71 
 
 314 
 1021 
 
 118 
 lfi78 
 1362 
 1638 
 1109 
 174, 
 
 175 
 1553 
 
 Napier v. Napier 101, 102, 106, 784 
 
 r. Routledge 2304 
 
 v Staples 1223,1225 
 
 Nash » Dillon 1422 
 
 v. Evangelical Lutheran 
 
 Church, Rector of 144 
 
 v. Hunt 1302 
 
 v. Nash 116 
 
 v New England Life Ins. Co. 303 
 v. Smith 287, 289. 294. 394, 585, 
 586, 1561, 1562, 1563, 1566, 1567 
 v. Suinburn 1131 
 
 Nashua & Lowell R. Co. v. Bos- 
 ton & L. R. Co. 1221 
 Nashville &c. R. Co. v. Conk 313 
 Nasom r. Clarkson 1251 
 Nathan r. Tompkins 542, 1675 
 Manuf. Co. v. Craig 314 
 Newman & Co., Re 149, 447 
 Nation v Cameron 314 
 National Association v. Carstairs 
 
 449, 452, 453, 536, 889 
 
 National Bank v. Bryant 
 v. Carpenter 
 v. Garlingame 
 v. Goddard 
 v. Insurance Co. 
 v. National Bank 
 
 867 
 2384 
 186 
 295 
 830 
 907 
 
 v. Sprague 1281, 1296, 1299, 1316, 
 1492, 1550 
 v. United Hand in Hand Co. 
 
 1393 
 of Commerce v. Smith 418 
 
 & P. Bank v. Thomas 187 
 
 Bolivian Nav. Co. v. Wilson 1438 
 Cash R. Co. v. Boston Cash I. 
 
 & R. Co. 1642 
 
 Furnace Co. v. Moline M. I. 
 
 Works 842 
 
 Hotel Co. v. Crane Brothers 
 
 Manuf. Co. 790 
 
 Life Ins. Co. v. Pingrey 1561 
 
 Manuf. Co. v. Meyers 314 
 
 Park Bank v. Halle 545
 
 National Permanent M. B. B. 
 
 Society v. Raper 1224 
 
 Provincial Bank v. Evans 170 
 
 v. Jackson 674 
 
 Provincial Plate Glass Ins. Co. 
 
 v. Prudential Ass. Co. 1080, 
 
 1398, 1638 
 
 S. S. Co. v Tugman 357 
 
 Trust Co. v. Murphy 1742 
 
 Union Bank v Reed 324 
 
 Natz v. M'Phersou 678 
 
 Naudain v. Ormes 545 
 
 Naumberg v. Hyatt 313 
 
 Navulshaw v. Brownrigg 551 
 
 Naylor, Ex parte 1205 
 
 v. Bvland 170 
 
 v. Middleton 1678 
 
 v. Smith 1169 
 
 v. Wright 422 
 
 Neaderhouser v. State 546 
 
 Neafie v. Neafie 635, 659, 660, 094 
 
 1019 
 
 Neal, Re, Weston v. Neal 39, 797 
 
 v. Foster 1548, 1553 
 
 v. Keel 1258 
 
 v. Ogden 846 
 
 v. Rathell 334 
 
 v. Robinson 861, 1230 
 
 Neale, Re 1347 
 
 v. Bealing 1055, 1749 
 
 v. Cripps 1632 
 
 V. Hagthorp 254, 715, 837, 992, 
 
 1239, 1243, 1245, 1599 
 
 v. Neale 1622 
 
 v Neales 417, 418, 23'.)8 
 
 v. Pink 1741 
 
 v. Ute 287 
 
 Neary v. Jones 11*54 
 
 Neate v. Dennian 628 
 
 v Latimer 1830,1835 
 
 t'. Marlborough, Duke of 1037 
 
 Neave v Douglas 1745 
 
 Nebraska v. Iowa 13S1 
 
 Neck v. Gains 420, 692, 696, 699, 
 
 780 
 
 Needham v. Needham 512, 1030, 
 
 1043, 1703 
 
 v. Smith 176, 1487 
 
 Needier v. Deeble 214, 277 
 
 v. Kendall 1583 
 
 Needles v. Needles 114, 118, 121, 
 
 _ 123 
 
 Neely v. Anderson 287, 288 
 
 Neep »'. Abbot 884 
 
 Neeson v. Clamp 914 
 
 Neilson v Betts 1080, 1503 
 
 V. Churchill 192 
 
 v. Dickinson 846 
 
 v. Frv 313 
 
 v. M 'Donald 2278 
 
 Neininger v. State 777 
 
 Nell v. Snowden 1125 
 
 Nellis v. Pennock Manuf. Co. 107, 
 
 334, 402 
 
 Nelms v. Clark 1463 
 
 Nels v. Yocum 542 
 
 Nelson, Ex parte 1054, 1055, 1057 
 
 v. Barter 394, 1560, 1563, 1566 
 
 v. Becker 576 
 
 v. Booth 1232, 1251, 1252, 1259, 
 
 1261 
 
 v. Dubois 365 
 
 v. Duncombe 86 
 
 v. Dunn 1549 
 
 v. Ferdinand 109, 385 
 
 v. Hill 346 
 
 v. Hubbard 1734 
 
 v . Oldfield 663 
 
 v. Pastorino 149, 536 
 
 v. Pinegar 836, 837 
 
 v. Ponsford 723 
 
 v. Seaman 206. 976 
 
 v. United States 951 
 
 Earl v. Bridport, Lord 864, 1200, 
 
 1381 
 
 Nelthorpe v. Holgate 197 
 
 r. Pennyman 1285 
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 [The reterences are to the star paging.] 
 
 Nephi Irrigation Co. v. Jenkins 
 
 1168 
 Neptune Ins. Co. v. Dorsey 1245 
 
 Neror v. Hurnand 1468, 1470 
 
 Nesbit v. St. Patrick's Church 497, 
 520 
 Nesbitt v. Berridge 315, 542, 544, 
 1386, 13:i4 
 736, 784, 785 
 361,881 
 2027 
 1463 
 1638 
 325 
 824 
 635, 1211 
 870 
 1386 
 844. 886 
 829,881,982 
 1477 
 9! 14 
 1973 
 726 
 1234, 1413 
 176 
 1638 
 1400 
 
 lxxxix 
 
 ?'. Dallam 
 Nesmith v. Calvert 
 
 V. Dinsmore 
 Nestor v. Swift 
 Nethery v Payne 
 Neuman v. Godfrey 
 Neve v. Pennell 
 
 v. Weston 
 Nevil v Johnson 
 Nevill v. Snelling 
 Neville v. Demeritt 
 
 v. Fitzgerald 
 Nevinson v. Stables 
 Nevitt v. Bacon 
 Nevius w. Dunlap 
 New v. Barne 
 
 v. Jones 
 
 v. New 
 New Albany v. White 
 Newall v. Smith 
 
 t 1 . Telegraph Construction Co 
 
 485,1824 
 
 v. Wilson 1643 
 
 v. Wright ' 284 
 
 Newark Aqueduct Board v. Pas- 
 saic 1636 
 
 and N Y R. Co. v. Mayor of 
 
 Newark 1, 1076, 1077 
 
 Plank Road Co v. Elmer 993, 
 
 1684 
 
 Savings Inst. v. Jones 200 
 
 Newavgo County Manuf Co v. 
 
 Stevens 843 
 
 Newbegin v. Bell 1424, 1437 
 
 Newberry, Re 108 
 
 v. Alexander 1120 
 
 v. Iilatchford 10, 1548 
 
 v. Stuart 1320 
 
 Newbery, Re 226, 1862 
 
 v. James 1651 
 
 Newbiggin by the Sea Gas Co. r. 
 Armstrong 307, 308 
 
 Newbigging v. Adam 
 
 552 
 
 Newbold. Re 
 
 436 
 
 v. Ridgeway 
 
 1166 
 
 Newbould r. Smith 
 
 652 
 
 New Braintree v Southworth 190 
 
 New Brunswick & Canada Rail- 
 
 way Co. r. Conybeare 
 
 1399 
 
 Newhurgh u Bickerstaffe 
 
 1362 
 
 Earl of v. Newburgh, Count- 
 
 ess of 
 
 1111 
 
 &c, Turnpike V Miller 
 
 1623, 
 
 
 1680 
 
 Newbury v Marten 
 
 167 
 
 Lnrd v. Wren 
 
 636 
 
 Newhy v. Harrison 
 
 1666, 1678 
 
 v. Highway Com'rs 
 
 1638 
 
 v. Sharpe 
 
 384, 401 
 
 Newcastle. Duke of, Re 
 
 1349 
 
 v. Broxtowe, Inhab. of 
 
 1126 
 
 Newcastle-upon-Tyne V. 
 
 Att- 
 
 Gen 
 
 1650 
 
 Newcomb v. Clark 
 
 195, 325 
 
 v. Horton 230, 240, 344 
 
 v. White 
 
 790 
 
 Newcombe v Chicago N. W. Ry 
 
 Co 
 
 334 
 
 Newcomen r Coulson 
 
 1666 1678 
 
 Newdigate v. Johnson 
 
 629 
 
 V. Newdigate 
 
 1536, 1537 
 
 Newell v. Burbank 
 
 329 
 
 v. Newton 
 
 546 
 
 v Nichols 
 
 850 
 
 v. Sass 
 
 1661 
 
 v. Smith 
 
 1752 
 
 v- West 
 
 1299 
 
 v. Wheeler 
 
 1624 
 
 Newen v. Wetten 
 
 1262 
 
 New England Bank v. Lewis 615, 
 
 726, 844 
 
 &c , Bank v. Newport 
 
 Steam Factory 216,262, 260, 
 
 282, 335 
 
 New England M. S Co. v Powel. 3S5 
 
 Newenham v. Pemberton 443, 444 
 
 Newgong Tea Co , Re 945 
 
 Newhall v Hobbs 715, 720, 721 
 
 V Kastens 1560, 1561 
 
 Newhouse v Mitford 1029 
 
 New Jersey v. New York 17, 129, 
 
 446, 536, 543 
 
 &c. Co. v. Ames 220 
 
 Mut. Life Ins Co v. Corbin 1434 
 
 Patent Tauning Co. v. Turner 658 
 
 Protection and Lombard Bank 
 
 v. Thorp 24 
 
 Zinc Co. v. N. Y. Franklinite 
 
 Co. 1472, 1476, 1479, 1519, 
 
 1521, 1538 
 
 Newkirk v. Willett 570 
 
 Newland v. Champion 324 
 
 v. Gaines 1017 
 
 v. Gentry 68 
 
 v. Glenn 1019 
 
 v. Horseman 664, 056 
 
 v. Rogers 334, 341 
 
 v. Steer 907, 1177, 1209, 1820, L825 
 
 New Loudon Bank v. Lee ^36, 202, 
 
 294, 550 
 
 Newlove v. Callaghan 726 
 
 Newman v. Alford 1648 
 
 v. Auling 1255 
 
 v. Davenport 1743 
 
 v. De Lorimer 652 
 
 v. Godfrey 146, 197, 296. 300 
 
 v. Hatch 1437 
 
 v. Hodgson 318, 1809 
 
 v. Hutton 684 
 
 v. James 845 
 
 v. Kendall 930, 052 
 
 v. Landrine 27, 30. 31 
 
 w.Moody 590,857,2397 
 
 v. Morris 1625 
 
 w. Norris 1209 
 
 v. Selfe 161. 176, 178, 1266 
 
 v. Wallis 605. 627, 703. 704 
 
 v. White 690, 741 
 
 New Mexico Land Co. v. Elkins 
 
 206, 418 
 New Orleans v. Gaines 1296, 1302 
 r. Paine 1620 
 
 v. Peake 1029, 1716 
 
 G. L & B. Co. v. Dudley 658, 
 
 1073, 1079, 1110, 1125 
 M. & C. R Co. t'. New Orleans 
 
 659. 1003 
 Nat. Bank w. Bohne 630 
 
 N. B. Ass v. Le Breton 255 
 
 & N. E. R. Co. v Mississippi 
 
 &c. R. Co. 1663 
 
 R. Co. v. Dunn 1661 
 
 Railroad v. Morgan 1491 
 
 Newport, &c Bridge Co. w. Doug- 
 lass 1719 
 Newry v. Kilmorey 486, 776 
 Newsham v. Gray 791 
 Newxom v. Bowyer 89 
 v. Shearman 1448 
 Newton, Re 894 
 w. Askew 1069, 1604 
 w. Baker 1320 
 v Bennett 1360, 1420 
 v. Chorlton 1597, 1600, 1667 
 w. Curzon _ 1359 
 v- Dimes 719, 774 
 w. Dousilass 1567 
 v Egmont, Earl of 257, 258, 270. 
 277 
 j'. Egmont, Lord 289, 699 
 r. Grand Junction Ry. Co 1450 
 0. Lucas 13^3 
 v. Metropolitan Ry. Co 31 S 
 w. Newton 63'l 
 v Ricketts 506, 805,981, 1601. 
 1726
 
 xc 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging] 
 
 Newton v. Swasey 365, 657 
 
 B. Taylor I860 
 
 v. Terry 779 
 
 v. Thayer 589, 603, 694, 828, 829, 
 830 
 v Thomson 1847 
 
 v. Willis 1213 
 
 New Westminster Brewery v. 
 
 Hannah 405 
 
 New York v. Connecticut 17 
 
 New York & B. C. P. Co. v. 
 
 New York C P. Co. 8, 933, 1573 
 New York B. & P Co. v. Ma- 
 
 gowan 1642 
 
 New York Chem. Co. v. Flowers 
 
 180, 524, 754, 784 
 New York Co. v. Water Co. 630 
 
 New York Drv Dock Co. v. Amer- 
 ican Life' Ins. & Trust Co. 1621 
 New York Filter Co v Schwartz- 
 
 walder 1642 
 
 New York Fire Ins. Co. v. Ely 24 
 v. 'looker 402 
 
 New York Guaranty Co. V. Mem- 
 phis Water Co 197 
 New York Ice Co. v. N. W. Ins. 
 
 Co. 385 
 
 New York Life Ins Co. v. Clop- 
 ton 51 
 v. Statham 51 
 New York, <Xrc. R. Co. v. Haws 1625 
 
 v. Robinson 
 N Y. & N. H. 
 
 Schuyler 
 New York, N. H. 
 
 Martin 
 
 830 
 R. R. Co. v. 
 
 585 
 & H. R. Co. v. 
 
 974, 1840 
 
 New York &c. Pol. Co. v. New 
 York C P. Co. 10 
 
 New York Printing Co. v. Fitch 
 
 1631, 1664 
 
 New York P. & R. Co. v New 
 
 York, L. E. & W. R. Co. 1743 
 
 New York & W. U. Tel. Co. v. 
 
 Jewett 1765 
 
 Nias v. Adamson 157 
 
 v. Northern and Eastern Ry. 
 Co. 572, 578 
 
 Nihertt). Baghurst 1621, Lo75 
 
 Niblett v. Daniel 883 
 
 Nice v. Purcell 1073, 1"76 
 
 Nichol v. Bestwick 1130 
 
 v. Davidson County 726 
 
 v. Ridley 657, 867 
 
 v. Steger 1360 
 
 v Vaughan 1077 
 
 Nicholas v. Murray 586 
 
 Nicholl v. Boyd 1765 
 
 v. Jones 571, 803, 809, 889, 1823, 
 
 1834 
 
 v. Wheeler 485, 579, 889 
 
 Nicholls, Re 1611 
 
 v. Dowding 1098 
 
 v. E'.ford 795, 977 
 
 v. Haslam 1440 
 
 v. Ibbetson 912, 1670 
 
 v. Kearsly 1666 
 
 v. Nichols 1209, 1210 
 
 v. Perry Patent Arm Co 1715 
 
 v. Roe 554, 1621, 1858 
 
 v. Ward 180, 181, 182, 500 
 
 Nichols, Ex parte 199 
 
 v. t'olville 1467 
 
 v. Eaton 1037 
 
 V. Ela 1110, 1299 
 
 v Levy 1037 
 
 to Nixey 157 
 
 v. Pitman 1643, 1647 
 
 v. Rogers 324, 407 
 
 v. Scranton Steel Co. 418 
 
 v. Williams 231 
 
 Nicholson, Re 83, 1610 
 
 v Carline 92, 102 
 
 v. Drury Estate Building Co. 87, 
 
 123 
 
 1413, 1422 
 
 Nicholson v. Knapp 
 
 v. Norton 
 
 v. Patterson 
 
 v. Peile 
 
 v. Pirn 
 
 v. Squire 
 
 v Wilborn 
 Nickersou v. Atchison 
 
 Co. 
 Nickle v. Stewart 
 Nicklin v. Hobin 
 
 v. Patten 
 Nickolson v. Knowles 
 Nickson v. Richardson 
 Nicol v. Vaughan 
 Nicoll v Boyd 
 
 v. Huntington 
 
 v. Roosevelt 
 Niell v. Motley 
 Niemann v. Harris 
 Nightingale J>. Dodd 
 
 v Lawson 
 Niles, Matter of 
 
 v. Anderson 
 
 v. Williams 
 Nimmo v Commonwealth 
 Nims v. Nims 
 Nisbett v Murray 
 Nix v. Winter 
 Nixon v. Albion Marine Ins. Co. 
 
 849, 881, 981 
 
 v. Richardson - 1609, 1700 
 
 v. Sheldon 32 
 
 Noad v. Backhouse 1730 
 
 Noake, Re 108 
 
 Nobel's Explosives Co. v. Jones 298, 
 "j,41" 
 Nobkissen v. Hastin; 
 Noble v. Edwardes 
 
 v. Garland 
 
 v. Kennoway 
 
 v. Martin 
 
 v. Meymott 
 
 v. Moses 
 
 v. School Directors 
 
 v. Stow 
 
 1652 
 1409, 1845 
 1625 
 421 
 555 
 1588 
 1351 
 ;c. R. 
 
 313 
 
 1576, 1584 
 
 1618 
 
 765, 766 
 
 1561 
 
 1698 
 
 851, 1077, 1082 
 
 1765 
 
 1382, 1400, 1680 
 
 1541 
 
 85 
 
 899, 1669 
 
 885 
 
 1233 
 
 1841 
 
 544. 545 
 
 556, 630 
 
 1234 
 
 1221 
 
 1427, 1429 
 
 360 
 
 607, 703 
 
 989 
 
 548 
 
 1130 
 
 1118 
 
 1411 
 
 349 
 
 1029 
 
 1373, 1525, 1540, 1579, 
 
 1778, 1785, 1794. 1795 
 
 v. Wilson 1315, 1316, 1676, 1677 
 
 Nobles v. Hogg 1172 
 
 Nodine r Greenfield 194, 229 
 
 Noe v. Gibson 1743 
 
 v. Noe 617 
 
 Noel v Fitzgerald 952 
 
 v. King 403, 740, 1551, 1552 
 
 v. Noel 182, 986, 1120, 1824 
 
 v. Robinson 1475 
 
 316, 681 
 
 314, 1659 
 
 908, 16n0, 1659 
 
 v. Ward 
 Nokes v Fish 
 
 v. Gibbon 
 
 v Seppings 1772, 1773 
 
 Nolan v. Shannon 930 
 
 Noland v. Turner 217 
 
 v. Ormston 1580 
 
 Nolen v. Woods 378 
 
 Nonmagnetic Watch Co. v. As- 
 sociation Horlogere Suisse 149, 
 517 
 Noonan v. Bradlev 1472 
 
 v. Caledonia Gold M. Co. 402 
 
 v. Lee 1042 
 
 v Orton 887, 888 
 
 Norbury e. Calbeck 1419 
 
 v. Meade 1459, 1467, 1496, 
 
 1498 
 
 Lord v. Kitohin 1662 
 
 Norcom ». Rogers 8, 9, 10, 83, 84. 
 
 86 
 
 Norden v. Defries 573 
 
 Norfolk, Duke oft'. Worthy 195 
 
 & W. R. Co. v. Postal Tel 
 
 Falkner 
 Gibb 
 J eyes 
 
 1530 
 1329, 1344 
 
 Cable Co. 
 Trust Co. v. Marye 
 Norman, Re 
 v. Beaumont 
 v. Huddleston 
 v. Johnson 
 v. Stiby 
 
 579, 1556 
 1661 
 •27, 31, 34 
 1092, 1128 
 1550 
 1406 
 602 
 
 Norman v. Villain 88, 179 
 
 Norman Scott-Russed v. London, 
 
 Chatham and Dover Ry. 1682 
 
 Normandie, The 933 
 
 Normauville v. Stauning 1599, 1670 
 
 Norris v. Bean 236 
 
 v. Chambres 629 
 
 v. Cotterill 449, 452 
 
 v. Freeman 1129 
 
 v. Haggin 334, 560 
 
 v. Harris ia50 
 
 v. Hassler 216 
 
 v. Jackson 336, 1081, 1660 
 
 v. Lake 1716 
 
 v, Leman 243 
 
 v. Le Neve 1165, 1576 
 
 v. McLam 314 
 
 v. Norris 1410 
 
 v. Ormond 1660 
 
 v. Scott 324 
 
 v. Wright 268 
 
 Nortclitfe v. Warburton 280, 400, 
 
 1034 
 
 North v. Great Northern Ry. 
 
 Co. 1380 
 
 v. Great Western Ry. Co. 795, 
 
 796 
 
 v. Perrow 1677 
 
 v. Peters 295 
 
 v. Stafford, Earl of 584 
 
 North American Coal Co. e. 
 
 Dyett 402, 1476, 1480, 
 
 1533^ 
 
 North Australian Territory Co. , 
 
 Re 720, 942 
 
 North Carolina Gold Amalg 
 Co. v. N. C. Ore Dressing 
 Co. 1666 
 
 North Carolina R. Co. v. Drew 888 
 North-Eastern Ry. Co. v. Mar- 
 tin 551 
 North London Ry. Co. V- Great 
 
 Northern Ry. Co. 211,671, 
 
 1858 
 North, Lord v. Gray, Lord 1573 
 
 North Penn. Coal Co. v Snow- 
 den 1071 
 North River Bank v. Rogers 424 
 North River Ins. Co. v. Holmes 
 
 1286 
 North Staffordshire Steel Co. v. 
 
 Camoise 1660 
 
 North Western Bank v. Nelson 601 
 North Wheal Exmouth Min Co., 
 
 Re 915, 1333 
 
 North Whitehall v. Kellar 974 
 
 Northam, Ex parte 39 
 
 Northampton Coal Co. v. Mid- 
 land Waggon Co. 27, 1474 
 Northampton National Bank v. 
 
 Crafts 200 
 
 Northcote v. Duke 1658 
 
 r. Northcote 764 
 
 Northern Counties Ins. Co v. 
 
 Whipp 674 
 
 Northern Counties Union Ry. 
 
 t>. North-Eastern Ry. 1775 
 
 Northern Illinois C. & I. Co. v. 
 
 Young 1584 
 
 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. 
 
 Amacker 2040 
 
 v. Cannon 1618 
 
 r Herbert 1120 
 
 v Paine 313, 850 
 
 v. Roberts 586 
 
 v. Walker 334 
 
 v. Whalen 1638 
 
 Northern R. Co. v. Ogdensburg, 
 
 &c. R. Co. 1551 
 
 Northern Transportation Co v. 
 
 Chicago 1635 
 
 Northey v . Northey 255 
 
 v. Pearce 1661 
 
 Northfleet Brick Co , Re 1610 
 
 Northman v. Liverpool, &c. Ins. 
 
 Co. 63, 355, 1508, 1518 
 
 Northop v Wright 873
 
 Northumberland, Duke of v. 
 
 Bowman 649 
 
 v. Todd 749, 892 
 
 Northup v. Hatch 563, 564, 567 
 
 Northy v. Northy 1238 
 
 Norton, Ex parte 116, 1029 
 
 v. Berlin Iron Bridge Co. 149 
 
 v. Cooper 307, 309, 1244, 1393, 
 1464, 2213 
 v. Florence Land Co. 629, 633 
 
 v. Grover 1734 
 
 v. Hepworth 448, 454 
 
 v. Hixon • 1031 
 
 v. Meador 186 
 
 v. Nichols 1643, 1679, 1681 
 
 t;. Pritchard 1051 
 
 v. Russell 1408 
 
 v. Steinkopf 820, 826, 1420 
 
 t>. Talmadge 1033 
 
 v. Turvill 642. 714 
 
 v. Walsh 1120 
 
 v. Warner 722, 723 
 
 v. White 813, 814, 1512 
 
 v. Woods 146, 759, 1409 
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Norvall v. Pascoe 800 
 
 Norway v. Norway 1436 
 
 v. Kowe 349. 728, 1201, 1631, 
 
 1717, 1727,1768 
 
 Norwich v. Brown 243 
 
 Norwood v. Manning 1255 
 
 v Norwood 674, 846, 12-2 
 
 Nothard v. Proctor 173.1 
 
 Notley v. Palmer 1359, 1524 
 
 Nottidge v . Priehard 1503 
 
 v. Prince 852 
 
 Nottingham Union Guardians 
 
 v. Tomkinson 849 
 
 Nottley v. Palmer 99, 1802, 205:> 
 
 Nourse v Finch 1426 
 
 Novosielski v. Wakefield 1001,2222 
 Nowell, Re 1040, 1694, 1697 
 
 XC1 
 
 v Whitaker 
 Nowgong Tea Co , Re 
 Nowland v. Glenn 
 Noyes v. Crawley 
 
 v. Hall 
 
 v. Inland & S. C. Co 
 
 41, 156 
 
 945 
 
 1014 
 
 560, 641 
 
 215 
 
 840 
 
 v. Rich 
 
 1736, 1742, 1750 
 
 Noyes v. Sawyer 
 
 194, 212 
 
 ,405 
 
 v. Willard 
 
 607 
 
 ,608 
 
 Noysomhed, The Danish Ship 
 
 553 
 
 Nudd o. Powers 
 
 
 560 
 
 Nugent v. Jenkinson 
 
 
 803 
 
 v Vetzera 
 
 1346, 
 
 1348 
 
 Nultou's Appeal 
 
 
 8*3 
 
 Nulton v. Isaacs 
 
 
 334 
 
 Nuneaton Local Board 
 
 v. Gen 
 
 
 eral Sewage Co. 
 
 
 10 
 
 Nunn v. Barlow 
 
 
 1425 
 
 v. D'Albuquerque 
 
 
 1649 
 
 v. Hancock 
 
 
 1004 
 
 v. Harvey 
 
 
 1358 
 
 v. Nunn 
 
 
 1299 
 
 Nurse v. Bunn 
 
 
 839 
 
 v. Durnford 
 
 86 
 
 .307 
 
 Nushaum v. Stein 
 
 
 1734 
 
 Nussbaum v. Heilbron 
 
 
 1556 
 
 Nutting U. Hebdin 
 
 
 632 
 
 Nye v Maule 
 
 43, 
 
 1082 
 
 Nyse wander v. Low man 
 
 
 815 
 
 o. 
 
 Oakes v. Turquand 
 Oakey v Dal ton 
 Oakley V. O'Neill 
 
 v. Patterson Bank 
 
 V- Trustees 
 Oats v. Chapman 
 O'Bannon v Myer 
 Ober v. Gallagher 
 
 v. Planting Co 
 Oberle v. Lerch 
 Obert v. Obert 
 O'Brian v. Fry 
 O'Brien v. Bowes 
 
 v. Creig 
 
 IT. Klli >t 
 
 v Heeney 
 
 v Hulfish 
 
 1600 
 
 1507 
 
 497, 520 
 
 1715 
 
 1624 
 
 599 
 
 844 
 
 149, 191 
 
 1735 
 
 1365 
 
 1151 
 
 844 
 
 1072, 1079 
 
 1624 
 
 844 
 
 287 
 
 1550 
 
 v. Lewis 1042, 1065, 1485, 1486 
 
 v Mahon 1538 
 
 v Maitland 162, 476 
 
 v Manders 497 
 
 v. Obrien 1633 
 
 v Stephens 1032 
 
 v. Tyssen 542 
 
 O'Bryne v. O'Bryne 1147 
 
 O'Callaghan v. Barnad 1670 
 
 v. Cooper 1416, 1421 
 
 v. Murphy 93'J 
 
 Occleston v. Fullalove 229 
 
 Ocean Ins. Co. v. Bigler 1573 
 
 v. Field 563, 564 
 
 Ochsenbein v. Papelier 664, 1621 
 
 O'Counell v M'Namara 1586 
 
 V. The Queen 1091 
 
 O'Conner v Sierra Nevada Co. 30, 
 
 35.36 
 
 v. Wilson 1624 
 
 O'Connor v. Cook 1075, 1123 
 
 v. Cooke 1076 
 
 v. Debraine 1713 
 
 v. Delaney 8'i0 
 
 V. Malone 1119,1137,113 1 
 
 v. Mechanics' Bank 1746 
 
 v. Richards 1287 
 
 O'Dayt). Bowker 1029 
 
 Odd Fellows J. 8. Ass'n v. 
 
 Merklin 190 
 
 Oddie t>. Hrown 1430 
 
 v. Woodford 14fi9 
 
 Odell v. Hart 504 
 
 Odiorne v. Seavey 1154 
 
 Odom v. Owen 582, 1548, 1551 
 
 Odorless Excavating Co v. Lau- 
 
 man 1642 
 
 Oelrichs v. Spain 630, 1081, 1666 
 O'Farrel v. O'Farrel 937 
 
 O'Ferrall, Ex parte 103 
 
 Offeley v. Morgan 586 
 
 Otfen v Harman 1408 
 
 Official Manager v. Carstairs 449, 
 452, 453, 889 
 Official Receiver, Ex parte 576 
 
 Offley v. Jenney 
 Ogden v. Battams 
 
 v. Davidson 
 
 v. Fossick 
 
 v. Gibbons 
 
 v. Kip 
 
 v. Moore 
 
 v . Ogden 
 
 v. Thornton 
 
 v. Walker 
 Ogg v. Leinart 
 Ogilby v. Gregory 
 Ogilvie. Re 
 
 v. Hearne 
 
 v. .leaffreson 
 
 v. Knox Ins. Co. 
 Oglander ?> Baston 
 
 v. Oglander 
 Ogle v. Bell 
 
 v. Brandling 
 
 v. Cook 
 
 v. Ege 
 
 v. Koerner 
 Oglesby v. Attrill 
 O'Grady v. Barry 
 Oijshury v. La Farge 
 O'llagao, Ex parte 
 O'Halloran v. King 
 O'Hara v. Eiliott 
 
 v- McConnell 
 
 226. 227, 252 
 1232 
 1276 
 1657 
 406,23')8 
 1664 
 4H 
 720 
 
 417, 418 
 1661 
 1376 
 
 905 
 
 1035 
 
 33, 37, 530 
 
 677 
 
 274, 287 
 
 89. 118 
 
 1263 
 
 1463 
 
 9S4 
 
 875, 1116 
 
 1613 
 
 790 
 
 418, 659 
 402, 406 
 
 9' 14 
 
 1847 
 
 100 
 
 1440 
 
 163, 189, 1467 
 
 2379 
 
 1536, 1587 
 
 868,828 
 
 v. Shepherd 
 O'Hare v Downing 
 Ohio v Ellis 303, 344, 346, 34 
 
 Ohio Central R. Co. v Central 
 
 Trust Co. 1042 
 
 Ohio, &c. R Co. v. Fitch 1742 
 
 Ohio & Miss. R. Co. v. Anderson 
 
 1743 
 Ohling v. Lnitjens 550, 860 
 
 Ohlsen v. Terrero 906, 1100 
 
 Ohm v. San Francisco 545 
 
 Ohrlv v. Jenkins 710 
 
 Oil Run Petroleum Co. v. Gale 
 
 1567 
 O'Keefe v. Cannon 369 
 
 V Casey 1352 
 
 O'KelleyV Oholston 1290 
 
 O'Kelly v. Bodkin 1211 
 
 Olcott v. Bynum 284 
 
 Old v. Old 1680 
 
 Oldaker v. Hunt 1635, 1638 
 
 Oidalev. Whitcher 28 
 
 Oldfield v. Cobbett 38, 39, 155, 
 
 491, 505, 509, 796, 813, 1049, 
 
 1454, 1683 
 
 Old Folks' Society v. Millard 991 
 
 Oldham v. Collins 90, 217 
 
 v. Kboral 1547, 1585 
 
 v Hughes 97 
 
 v. Oldham 1707, 1708 
 
 v. Stonehouse 1481), 1491 
 
 Old Hickory Distilling Co. v. 
 
 Bleyer 594, 985 
 
 Olding v. Poulter 324 
 
 Olin v. Hungerford 1033 
 
 Oliva v. Bunaforza 334, 559 
 
 Oliver v. Bank of Tennessee 916 
 
 v. Burt 1796 
 
 Cunningham 215, 659 
 
 1727. 
 
 ?». Hamilton 
 
 v, Hunting 
 
 v. Look 
 
 v. Memphis, &c R. Co 
 
 v Moore 
 
 v. Mut Comm. Mar. Ins. Co 1966 
 
 V. Oliver 108, 1004 
 
 v. Palmer 190, 385 
 
 v. Piatt 334, 335, 346 347 
 
 1728 
 655 
 314 
 
 1661 
 
 886 
 
 v. Richardson 
 
 v Wright 
 Ollendorff?' Black 
 Ollerenshaw v. Harrop 
 
 Olley v. Fisher 
 Olmstead v Loomis 
 Olnev t> Eaton 
 Olwell v Montgomery 
 
 1166 
 
 912 
 
 46, 1643 
 
 1019,1021, 
 
 1027 
 
 315 
 
 303, 1637 
 
 1033 
 
 637 
 
 Olvphant v. St. Louis Ore & 
 
 Steel Co. 214 
 
 Omaha S Rv. Co. v. Beeson 287 
 
 O'Mahonev v. Belmont 1715, 1743 
 
 V. Burdett 1503 
 
 v. Lucke 1743 
 
 O'Malley v. Blease 1413 
 
 Omaly v Owen 284 
 
 O'Mealey v Wilson 50 
 
 Omerod v. Hardman 988, 989, 1475 
 
 Omvchund v. Barker 891 
 
 Omierdonk v. Gray 1237, 1550 
 
 O'Neal v. Boone 860 
 
 Oneida Countv Bank v. Bonney 634 
 
 ONeil v Hamill 1191 
 
 v. Jones 1658 
 
 v. Kansas City, S. & M. R. 
 
 Co. 1434
 
 xcu 
 
 Onge v. Truelock 
 Ong.ey v. Hill 
 O'Niell v. Walker 
 Ouioiis 17. Cohen 
 
 v. Naish 
 
 v. Tyrer 
 Only v. Walker 
 Onslow, lit 
 
 796, 1457 
 906 
 1051 
 
 385, 1400 
 1131 
 1004 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 O'Rourke v. Cleveland 608 Ottey v. Pensam 
 
 17. Commissioner for Railways 1860 
 
 v. Elsbree 1492 
 
 Orphan Asylum v. McCartee 793, 
 1715, 1722 
 
 99 
 1630, 1656 
 v. Wallis 1485 
 
 Ontario Bank v. Mumford 197, 199 
 v. Hoot 365, 657 
 
 v. Schermerhorn 411 
 
 v. Strong 457 
 
 Onward Building Society v. 
 
 Smithson 645 
 
 Onyon v. W'ashbourne 1744 
 
 Ooddeen v Oakeley 1672, 1675 
 
 Oppeuheini v. Leo Wolf 1561 
 
 v. Martin 877 
 
 Oram v. Dennison 457, 524, 529 
 
 Orange v. Pickford 849, 873, 881, 
 981, 2190 
 Co. Bank v. Worden 1691 
 
 Orchard's Case 1069 
 
 v Hughes 1042 
 
 Orcutt v. Orms 700 
 
 Ord v Fawcett 1829 
 
 v. Huddleston 630, 697 
 
 v. Noel 1576, 1578 
 
 v Smith 650 
 
 Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Gates 1618 
 v. Swinburne 726 
 
 & T. R. Co. v. Northern Paci- 
 fic R. Co. 1517 
 Oregonian Ry. Co v. Oregon Ry 
 
 & Nav. Co. 26, 354, 630 
 
 O'Reilly v. Brady 1315, 1316 
 
 Orendorf v. Budlong 543 
 
 Orford, Earl of v. Churchill 1426 
 Orgain v. Ramsey 1076 
 
 Organ v- Gardiner 1585 
 
 v. Memphis & L. R. Co. 1150 
 
 Orger v. Sparke 1162 
 
 Orient Steam Nav. Co v. Ocean 
 
 Marine Ins. Co. 1770 
 
 Oriental Bank v. Nicholson 652, 
 
 1565, 1571 
 
 Steam Co. ». Briggs 598, 1490 
 
 Original Hartlepool C. Co. v. 
 
 Gibbs 10S1 
 
 Orkey v. Bend 296 
 
 Orme, Re, Evans v. Maxwell 1425 
 
 Ormerod v. Bleasdale 1488 
 
 Ormes ?>. Beadel 712 
 
 Ormond.Lady v. Hutchinson 839, 1559 
 
 Marquis of v, Kynnersley 1860 
 
 Ormsby, Re 1747 
 
 v. Bakewell 886 
 
 v. Palmer 739 
 
 v. Union Pacific Ry. Co. 542 
 
 O'Rourke v. Central City Soap 
 
 Co. 1648 
 
 Orr v. Bowles 
 v. Diaper 
 v. Dickinson 
 v. Littlefield 
 
 v Merrill 
 
 28 
 
 1556, 1557, 1558 
 1653 
 
 1642, 1643, 1676, 
 1677 
 
 1676 
 
 Orr W. D. Co. v Larcombe 1561 
 
 Orrell v. Busch 634 
 
 Orrell General Colliery, &c Co., 
 
 A'e 659 
 
 Orrock v. Binney 224 
 
 Orser v. Hoag 46 
 
 Orthwein v. Thomas 851 
 
 Ortigosa v. Brown 674 
 
 Ortley v. Messere 83 
 
 Orton v. Baiuurigge 794 
 
 v. Smith 552, 1624 
 
 Orwell v. Hincbinbrooke, Lord 1213 
 Osbaldeston v. Askew 1217 
 
 Osbaldiston v. Crowther 177 
 
 Osborn v Heyer 1734, 1735 
 
 v. London Dock Co. 2047 
 
 v Morgan 
 v. Thompson 
 v. U. S Bank 
 Osborue, Re 
 v. Barge 
 v. Denne 
 v. Foreman 
 v. Harvey 
 
 2001 
 
 1096 
 
 129, 1651, 1661 
 
 109, 1004 
 
 214, 1548, 1553 
 
 15, 81, 1437 
 
 223, 1285, 1288 
 
 1729, 1734 
 
 v. Jullion 585, 586, 591, 592, 593, 
 
 598, 789, 2087 
 
 v. Lawrence 363 
 
 v. London Dock Co 942, 1103 
 
 v. Morgan 92, 98 
 
 to Rowlett 1401 
 
 v. Taylor 225 
 
 v. Usher 1461 
 
 v. Van horn 1358 
 
 r. Williams 668, 1675 
 
 v. Wisconsin Central R. Co. 303 
 
 Osbourn v Fallows 257, 259 
 
 Osgood v. Breed 874 
 
 O'Shea v. O'Shea 1069, 1835 
 
 O'Sheehy v. O'Sheehy 448 
 
 Osmaston v. Land Financiers 894 
 
 Osmond v. Tindall 350, 951 
 
 Ostell v. LePage 664, 800 
 
 Osterberg v. Union Trust Co. 1283 
 
 Ostle v. Christian 1611 
 
 Ostrander ■;;. Webber 630 
 
 Oswald, Re 1144 
 
 v Kampmann 149 
 
 Oteri v. Scalzo 552, 1320, 1660 
 
 Other v. Smurthwaite 324, 381, 911 
 
 Otis v. Lindsay 1259 
 
 v. Shants 542 
 
 v. Wells 457 
 
 1304, 1305, 1307, 
 1308, 1309, 1310 
 1423, 1427 
 1469, 1470 
 113, 499 
 
 Ottley v. Gilby 
 Otto v. Lindford 
 Ottway v. Wing 
 
 Ousley v. Anstruther 1278 
 
 Outhwaite v. Outhwaite 1167 
 
 Outland v. Outland 334 
 
 Outlaw v. Cherry 1517 
 
 Outram v. Outram 1102 
 
 Outwell v. Van Winkle 120 
 
 Outwin, Re 1604 
 
 Overend & Gurney Co. r. Gibb 26 
 Ovenugtou v. Ward 201, 318, 1722 
 Overly v. Tipton 243 
 
 Overman v. Overman 1525 
 
 Wheel Co v. Elliott Hickory 
 
 Cycle Co. 
 
 
 314 
 
 Overstreet v. Bate 
 
 
 560, 644 
 
 v. Thompson 
 
 
 926 
 
 Overton v. Bauister 
 
 
 684 
 
 v. Bigelow 
 
 
 1475, 1476 
 
 v. Bolton 
 
 
 1257 
 
 v. Memphis, &c. R 
 
 Co. 
 
 1734 
 
 Overy v. Leighton 
 
 
 761 
 
 Ovey, Re, Broadbent v. Barrow 13 
 Ovington v. Smith 1081 
 
 Owden v. Apel 1571 
 
 v. Bankhead 402, 1017 
 
 v. Campbell 109 
 
 v. Cooper 1579 
 
 v. Fields 1639 
 
 v. Ford 1662 
 
 v. Foulks 1292 
 
 v. Griffith 1393, 1397, 1463, 1464 
 v. Homan 1715, 1717 
 
 v. Jones 838 
 
 v. Nodin 344 
 
 v. State 129 
 
 v. Thomas 849, 881. 981 
 
 v. Warburton 1131 
 
 v. Wynn 1829 
 
 Owens v Dawson 838 
 
 v. Dickenson 186, 226, 236, 1209, 
 1210 
 v. Emmens 894 
 
 v. Hanney 52 
 
 Owing's Case 292, 1004, 1507, 1724 
 Owings v Norwood 917 
 
 v. Owings 1476 
 
 v. Rhodes 1561 
 
 v. Worthington 1463 
 
 Oxburgh v. Fincham 1540 
 
 Oxenden v. Cropper 32 
 
 Oxenham v. Esdaile 706 
 
 Oxford v. Reid 100 
 
 and Cambridge, the Univer- 
 sities of v Kichardson 1642, 
 1643 
 Oyster v. Oyster 659 
 
 Oystermouth Ry. & T. Co. v. 
 
 Morris ■ 241 
 
 Ozark Land Co. v. Leonard 713, 1031 
 
 P. 
 
 Pace v. Bartles 720 
 
 v. Marsden 168 
 
 v. Potter 536 
 
 Pacific Hotel Co v. Lieb 1661 
 
 Nat. Bank 17. Mixter 1561 
 
 Ry. Co. v. Atlantic & P. R. 
 
 Co. 216, 334, 560 
 
 v. Cutting 991, 1548 
 
 v. Ketchum 1504, 1716 
 
 v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. 1584 
 
 v. Wade 1071 
 
 Steam Co. v. Gibbs 26, 1666 
 
 Packer v. Packer 96 
 
 17. Wyndham 115, 124, 125 
 
 Packham v. Newman 1132 
 
 Packington's Case 1633 
 
 Packington v. Packington 1678 
 
 Pack wood v Maddison 
 Paddock v. Lance 
 Paddon v. Winch 
 Padgett ». Baker 
 Padley v. Lincoln Waterworks 
 Co. 297,671,721, 
 
 Padwick v. Hurst 360, 651. " 
 
 r. Piatt 206, 
 
 Page v. Bennett 
 
 v. Foster 1243, 
 
 17. Lever 
 
 v. Olcott 
 
 v. Page 
 
 v. Townsend 301, 302, 
 
 v. Webster 
 
 v. Whidden 
 
 v. Young 
 
 798 
 
 Page Woven-Wire Fence Co. v. 
 
 860 
 
 Land 
 
 
 1642 
 
 1444 
 
 Paget v. Ecte 
 
 
 629 
 
 1565 
 
 v. Foley 
 
 
 653 
 
 
 Paige v. Smith 
 
 
 1743, 1752 
 
 ,722 
 
 v. Willett 
 
 
 850 
 
 1929 
 
 Pain v. 
 
 
 180, 681 
 
 ,302 
 
 Paine v. Edwards 
 
 
 795, 1265 
 
 1659 
 
 v. Hutchinson 
 
 
 2255 
 
 1245 
 
 v. Noelke 
 
 
 864 
 
 677 
 
 v. Schenectady Ins. 
 
 Co 
 
 324, 633, 
 
 327 
 
 
 
 864 
 
 1184 
 
 v Slocum 
 
 
 517 
 
 ,315 
 
 v Warren 
 
 
 1556 
 
 1150 
 
 Pakington v. Benbow 
 
 
 1406 
 
 334 
 
 Pale v Mitchell 
 
 
 124 
 
 630 
 
 Palk, Re 
 
 
 224
 
 Palk v. Clinton, Lord 213, 214, 295, 
 
 379,383 
 
 Palmer, Re 970, 979 
 
 V. Aylesbury, Lord 934, 940, 1117 
 
 v. Carlisle, Karl of 212, 259 
 
 v. Flower 1524 
 
 v. Goren 1275 
 
 v. Joues 1233, 1411 
 
 v. Locke 324, 1040, 1401 
 
 v. McCorinick 149 
 
 v. Mallet 212, 1»355 
 
 v. Merrill 1461 
 
 v. Oakley 1353 
 
 v. Palmer 369, 445 
 
 v. Perry 1368 
 
 v. Ranken 1381 
 
 v. Scriven 1743 
 
 v. Stevens 219 
 
 v. Travers 1620 
 
 v. Trower 1101 
 
 v. Truby 1770 
 
 v. Van Doren 885, 886, 1699 
 
 v. Vaughan 1730 
 
 v. Walesby 83, 86, 307, 308 
 
 v. Wright 1723. 1825 
 
 Palo Alto Banking Co. v. Mabar 1620 
 
 Pankey v Raum 1075 
 
 Panueil v. Uurley 1538 
 
 v. Tayler 1704, 1710 
 
 v. Taylor 180 
 
 Pante v. Bethel 998 
 
 Pan ton v Labertouche 35 
 
 v. Tefft 843 
 
 v. Williams 1107 
 
 Paper Bottle Co., lie 27 
 
 Paper Staining Co., Ex parte 157 
 
 Parailice v. Sheppard 37, 38 
 
 Paragon & Spero Mining Co , 
 
 Re 1041, 1044 
 
 Paramore v. Greenslade 1275 
 
 Paray v. Hodgson 1363 
 
 Parberry v. Gorarn 294 
 
 Pardee V De Cola 855 
 
 v. Steward 214 
 
 Pardo v. Bingham 647, 652, 1459, 
 
 1462 
 
 Pare v. Clegg 241, 419, 1734 
 
 Paredes v. Lizardi 985 
 
 Parfit v. Lawless 852 
 
 Pariente v. Bensusan 414, 770, 776 
 
 Paris v Gilham 1560, 1564, 1565, 
 
 15H9 
 
 v Hughes 1194 
 
 Parish v. Poole 1440 
 
 v Sloan 341 
 
 Park » Ballentine 406 
 
 v. Johuson 986, 989, 990, 995, 
 
 1013 
 
 v Meek 994 
 
 v. New York, &c. R. Co. 1743 
 
 v Wiley 1770 
 
 Parke v. Brown 1031 
 
 v. Christy 735, 750 
 
 Parker, Re 1734, 1794 
 
 v. Alcock 667, 669, 692, 20: 15 
 
 v Ausell 1135 
 
 v- Ash 652 
 
 v. Backus 1734 
 
 v Baker 8m 
 
 v. Barker 1561, 1562, 1563, 1566 
 
 v. Beavans 326 
 
 v- Blighton 1845 
 
 v. Blythmore 697 
 
 v- Britt 1567, 1625 
 
 v. Browning 1743, 1748, 1750 
 
 v. Carter 373, 576 
 
 v. Concord 830 
 
 v. Dacres 1918 
 
 v. Dawson 506 
 
 v. Dee 1027 
 
 v- Downing 1021, 1026 
 
 v. Dunn 1741, 1752 
 
 v. Fairlie 727 
 
 v- Flagg 597 
 
 v. Foote 1638 
 
 v ■ Ford 408, 1559 
 
 v. Francis 1594 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Parker v. Fuller 214 I 
 
 v. Grant 402, 424, 524, 529, 1026 
 v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 1667 
 v. Great Western Ry. Co. 1129 
 
 v. Hayes 917, 951 
 
 XC1U 
 
 Hutchinson 
 v. Lech mere 
 v. Lloyd 
 v. Logan 
 v. McKeuna 
 v. M' William 
 v. Marco 
 v. May 
 v. Moore 
 v. Morrell 
 
 v. Newland 
 v. Nickersou 
 
 v. Nickson 
 v. Nightiu" 
 
 1257 
 117 
 449 
 986 
 1399 
 1101 
 887 
 7, 9. 10 
 1720 
 842, 984, 1003, 1082, 
 1467, 1476, 1491, 2336 
 1576 
 630, 1071, 1073, 
 1302, 1320 
 368, 426 
 1654, 2313 
 
 He 
 
 v. Parker 1411, 1510, 1703, 17 1 
 
 v. Partlow 1283 
 
 v. Peters 228 
 
 v. Phetteplace 843 
 
 v Riugham 1615 
 
 v. Simpson 796 
 
 v. Small 215 
 
 v. Thornton 1095, 1128 j 
 
 v. Watkins 1389 ! 
 
 v Williams 1667, 1673 I 
 
 v. Wiunipiseogee Lake Co. 550, 630 
 
 Parkersburg v. Brown 328 
 
 Parkes v. Gorton 840 
 
 v. Stevens 1148 
 
 v. White 1407, 1417 
 
 Parkes' Charity, Re l->55 
 
 Parkhurst v. Cory 1241 
 
 v. Kinsman 1537, 1577, 1579, 
 
 1715, 1722, 2388 
 
 v. Lowten 563, 565, 567, 577, 879, 
 
 942, 943, 944 
 
 v. Race 1003 
 
 v. Van Cortlandt 2278 
 
 Parkin v. Moore 920 
 
 Parkins v Hawkshaw 576 
 
 Parkinson v. Chambers 38, 33, 485, 
 
 1822, 1831 
 
 v. Francis 865 
 
 v. Hanbury 41, 42. 43, 371, 666. 
 
 792, 981, 1440, 1479 
 
 v. Ingram 1196, 1197 
 
 v. Lee rag 663 
 
 v. Lucas 1331, 1542 
 
 v Potter 142 
 
 v. Trousdale 758, 1676, 1677 
 
 v. Wentworth 49, 52 
 
 Parkman v. Aicardi 290 
 
 v. Welch 846 
 
 Parks v. Doty 159 
 
 v. Jackson 1571 
 
 v. Parks 1584 
 
 v. Rucker 641 
 
 Parlement Beige, The 141 
 
 Parlett ?» Guggenheimer 1648 
 
 Parley's Park S. M. Co. v. Kerr 314 
 
 Parmalee r. Lewis 1^77 
 
 Parmelee v. Kgan 237, 243. 559 
 
 Parmiter r. Coupland 1107 
 
 v. Parmiter 1460, 1461, 1480 
 
 Parmley v. St Louis, &c. R. Co 1661 
 
 Paniell v. Kingston 191 
 
 v. Price 1369 
 
 v. Wood 896, 1S17 
 
 Parr v Att -Gen 887 
 
 v. Jewell 382 
 
 v. London, Chatham & Dover 
 
 Ry Co 573 
 
 v. Lovegrove 989, 9S10 
 
 Parrill v. McKinley 425 
 
 Parrot v. Paulet 828 
 
 v. Treby 1396, 14 ID 
 
 Parrott, lie, Walter v. Parrott 108 
 
 v. Quernan 1014 
 
 v. Shellaud 554, 670 
 
 Parry, Re 1611 
 
 v. Ashley 1776 
 
 Parry v. Owen 851, 553 
 
 v. Rogers 1573 
 
 Parsous, Re, Stockley v. Parsons 316 
 Parsons v. Dunne 95,97 
 
 v. Greenville R. Co. 633 
 
 v. Groome 1041, 16! 6 
 
 v. Hardy 782 
 
 v. Heston 324, 852 
 
 v. Howard 149, 191, 216 
 
 v. Neville 216 
 
 v. Parsons 91, 120 
 
 v. Robertson 1824 
 
 v. Robiuson 1029 
 
 v. Spoouer 2.3 
 
 Parsons Water Co. v. Hill 418 
 
 Partee v. Kortrecht 545 
 
 v. Thomas 143. 314 
 
 Partington v. Att -Gen. 201, 250 
 v- Bailey 199, 808 
 
 v. Booth 1683, 16S6 
 
 v. Reynolds 26, 27, 33, 39, 359, 
 796, 1260, 1370, 1578. 1579, 
 1581, 1605 
 Partridge v. Foster 1037 
 
 v. Haycraft 326, 356, 378, 414, 
 
 761, 764, 770, 771, 776 
 v. Jackson 312 
 
 v. Perkius 1576 
 
 v. Usborne 1578, 1582 
 
 Pascall v. Scott 948, 1552 
 
 Pascault v. Cochran 1716 
 
 Paschall, In re 1845 
 
 v. Thurston 1585 
 
 Pascoe v. Pascoe 127 
 
 Pashler v. Vincent 157 
 
 Pasley v. McConnell 1051 
 
 Pasman v. Montague 860 
 
 Pasmore, Re 33, 1605 
 
 Passiugham v. Sherborn 1368 
 
 Passmore v. Moore 165, 1286 
 
 Passumpsic Savings Bank v. Na- 
 tional Bank 1551 
 Patch v. Dalton 230 
 v. Gray 1031 
 v. Ward 173, 373, 280, 1002, 1021, 
 1381, 1399, 1584, 1832 
 1835, 2069 
 Patching v. Barnett 1433 
 v. Dubbins 1654, 1681 
 v. Gubbins 1654 
 Patent Type Co. v Walter 1642, 2315 
 Paterson v. Long 230 
 v. Scott 1480 
 r. Zachariah 1096 
 & Hud. R. R. Co. v. Jersey 
 City 368, 545 
 Patman v. Harland 674 
 Paton c. Langley 256 
 v. Majors 328, 1556 
 V. Rogers 990, 1219 
 Patrick, Re 1432 
 r. Andrews 178 
 v. Blackwell 725, 726 
 v. Clay 1257 
 v. Harrison 1651, 1665 
 v. Isenhart 378. 590 
 v. Jackson 1667 
 v. Joyner 1618 
 v. McManus 354 
 v. Warner 1042 
 V. White 295 
 Pattee V Harrington 114 
 Patten r. Cilley 1029 
 r. Moor 576 
 Patten Paper Co v. Kaukauna 
 
 Waterpower Co 303, &34 
 
 Patterson r. Baugs 1558 
 
 v. Bloomer 1081 
 
 v. Clark 1716 
 
 V. Cobb 643 
 
 v. Eakin 1120 
 
 v. Gaines 846 
 
 v. Kellogg 334 
 
 r. Kingland 1081 
 
 v- Lvnde 26 
 
 v. Miller 1613, 1619 
 
 v. Patterson 563, 564, 906
 
 XC1V 
 
 Patterson v. Read 1120 
 
 t'. Scott 843 
 
 v. Slaughter 674, 778, 1578 
 
 r. Stapler 197 
 
 Pattison v. Hull 1550 
 
 Patton v. Ashley 844 
 
 v. Bencini 237 
 
 v. Cone 668, 857 
 
 v. Glatz 334, 552 
 
 v. J. M, Brunswick & Balke 
 
 Co. 737 
 
 v. Overton 251 
 
 Paty v. Simpson 414, 770, 776 
 
 Patty r. Middleton 674 
 
 Paul v. Baltimore & 0. & C. R. 
 
 Co. 357 
 
 v. Paul 1115,1147 
 
 v. York 1365 
 
 Pauli r. Von Melle 1563 
 
 Paulison v. Van Iderstein 109 
 
 Paull ». Mortimer 1722 
 
 Paulling v. Creagh 1548 
 
 v. Sturgis 845 
 
 Pauncefort v. Lincoln, Lord 3 8 
 
 Pavie v. Acourt 180, 500, 681 
 
 Pawiet v. Delavel 100 
 
 v. Lincoln, Bishop of 210, 293 
 
 Pawson v. Smith 708 
 
 Paxton v. Bell 32 
 
 v. Douglas 236, 388, 564, 565, 
 
 1182, 1615, 1617 
 
 v. Wood 191 
 
 Payne, Be, Randle v. Payne 37, 
 
 111, 796 
 
 v. Baxter 1743 
 
 v. Beech 62, 159, 606, 1577 
 
 v. Berry 302, 543, 547, 557 
 
 v. Bullard 1556 
 
 v. Coles 868 
 
 v. Collier 1773, 1774 
 
 v. Compton 270, 569 
 
 v. Cowan 1667 
 
 v. Dicker 68, 59, 598, 1463 
 
 v. Evens 1416 
 
 v. Hathaway 645 
 
 v. Hook 149, 313 
 
 v. Ibbotson 1100 
 
 v. Kansas, &c. Rv. Co. 630, 1638 
 
 v. Little 35, 36, 69, 110, 112, 415, 
 
 905, 1438 
 
 v. Long 1795 
 
 v. O'Shea 1621 
 
 v. Parker 223, 1417, 1420 
 
 v. Richardson 287 
 
 Paynes v. Coles 1230 
 
 Paynter v. Carew 794, 795, 1754 
 
 v. Houston 1212, 1298 
 
 Pavson v. Lamson 630, 1618 
 
 P. Caland, The 1503 
 
 Pea v. Waggoner 643 
 
 Peabody v. Flint 22, 26, 144, 238, 
 
 1640 
 
 v. Hamilton 45 
 
 v. Kendall 1003, 1073 
 
 v. Norfolk 1650, 1987, 2064 
 
 v. Tarbell 1081 
 
 Peace, Re 1847 
 
 Peace & Waller, Re 87. 186 
 
 Peaoham v. Daw 1774 
 
 Peachie v. Twyecrosse 586 
 
 Peacock, Ex parte 157 
 
 Peacock, Re 109 
 
 v. Bedford, Duke of 776, 778, 783 
 
 v. Colling 243 3t6 
 
 v. Evans 1380 
 
 v. Lowe 1557 
 
 v. Monk 235, 1211 
 
 v. Peacock 1727, 1728 
 
 v. Penson 230 
 
 v. Saggers 224 
 
 v. Sievier 804 
 
 Peacock's Case 928 
 
 Peake v Highfield 1077 
 
 v. Ledger 223, 224 
 
 v. Peake 1071 
 
 t>. Young 1279 
 
 Pearce. Ex parte 157 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Pearce Re 1799 
 
 v. Boggs 1U73 
 
 v. Crutchfield 1660, 1085 
 
 v. Foster 573 
 
 v. Gray 663, 1001, 1590 
 
 v. Grove 779 
 
 v. Lindsay 1025, 1026, 1027, 1441), 
 
 1483 
 
 v. Morris 1385 
 
 v. Newlyn 13'.'8 
 
 r. Nix 840 
 
 v. Pearce 81, 1^85 
 
 » Piper 25 
 
 v. Rice 594,694 
 
 r. Watts 1394 
 
 v. Wrighton 809, 813 
 
 Pearcy v. B\bee 1104 
 
 Peareth v. Peareth 561 
 
 I'earl v. Nashville 551 
 
 Pearne v. Lisle 1699, 1703 
 
 Pears v. Laing 657 
 
 Pearse, Ex parte 1382, 1457 
 
 v. Brooks 1042 
 
 v. Cole 111, 15:i5 
 
 v. Dobinson 660, 700, 769, 1019, 
 
 1584 
 
 v. Green 1369 
 
 v. Laing »,52 
 
 v. Pearse 348, 354, 577, 
 
 1834 
 
 Pearson, Re 149 
 
 v. Bank of England 148 
 
 V. Belchier 41, 43 
 
 v Belsher 42 
 
 i>. Cardon 1561,1565 
 
 v- Carr 1029 
 
 v. Darrington 1191 
 
 v. Knapp 1182, 1315 
 
 v. Northern R. Co. 780 
 
 v- Pearson 1427 
 
 i'. Rowland 955 
 
 v. Tower 645 
 
 v. Ward 933, 937, 938 
 
 v. Wilcox 893 
 
 v Wolfe 42 
 
 Peart, Ex parte 1606 
 
 v. Taylor 392, 393 
 
 Pease v. Benson 1386 
 
 v. Cheesbrough 236, 248, 253 
 
 v. Fletcher 1719 
 
 v. Pattinson 13 
 
 v 1'ea.se 570 
 
 Peaslee v. Barrey 1028 
 
 Pea.- ley, Re 564 
 
 v. Barney 365 
 
 Peatfield v. Benn 1342 
 
 v. Barlow 1486 
 
 v Barrow 1846 
 
 Peay v. Duncan 6H7 
 
 v. Shenck 1725 
 
 Peck v. Ashley 570, 1557 
 
 v. Burgess 669 
 
 v. Crane 1618 
 
 v. Elder 303, 1035 
 
 v. Gaither 1889 
 
 v. Hamlin 11^3 
 
 v. Henderson 254 
 
 v. Hozier 48 
 
 v. Hunter 850 
 
 v. Mallows 321 
 
 v. Peck 378, 379, 732 
 
 t>. Sexton 552 
 
 v. Stimpson 1411 
 
 v. Trinsmaran Iron Co. 1727 
 
 Peckettv Short 1136 
 
 Peckam v Haverhill, North 
 
 Parish in 144 
 
 v. Peckham 1352 
 
 Pedder v. Pedder 880, 1525 
 
 Pedrick v. White 1523, 1524, 1531 , 
 1535 
 
 Peek v. Boone 576 
 
 v. Gurney 1503 
 
 D. Matthews 1654 
 
 v. Spencer, Earl 405, 940 
 
 Peel, Re 83 
 
 Peeler v. Lathrop 843 
 
 Peer v. Cookerow 1461, 1467, 1476, 
 
 1485, 1507, 1508, 1527, 1539, 
 
 1540, 1542, 1545, 1546 
 
 Peerce o Alley 1666 
 
 t>. Atney 1081 
 
 Peers v. Ceeley 1388 
 
 v. Needham 1156, 1157, 1159 
 
 Pegg v. Capp 444 
 
 v. Davis 524, 525 
 
 r. Wisden 1276 
 
 Pegce v. Burnell 940 
 
 Peile v. Stoddart 412, 421, 1832, 
 
 2114 
 
 Peirce v. Graham 1580 
 
 v. Watkin 877 
 
 v Young 1136 
 
 Pelhani v. Edelmeyer 314, 843 
 
 v Gregory 264 
 
 Lord v. Harley, Lord 1061 
 
 v. Newcastle, Duchess of 1053, 
 
 1056, 1057, 1059 
 
 Pell v Elliott 1507 
 
 Northampton Ry. Co. 1731 
 
 Pellatt v. Nichols 
 Pellet r. Shephard 
 
 Pel lew v. 
 
 Polling r. Goddard 
 Pells v. Brown 
 
 v. Coon 
 Pelly v- Wathen 
 
 Pel ton v. Harrison 
 Pember v. Mathers 
 Pemberton, Ex parte 
 Re 
 
 Langmore 
 
 824, 1599 
 
 1961 
 
 760 
 
 1770 
 
 266 
 
 813 
 
 387, 1389, 1842, 
 
 2218 
 
 100, 187, 1408 
 
 843, 846, 848 
 
 1842 
 
 1459 
 
 431 
 
 v. MGill 187, 445, 707, 774 
 
 V. Marriott 97 
 
 v. Pemberton 876, 1124, 1125, 1371 
 
 v. Popham 236 
 
 v. Riddle 199 
 
 v. Topham 794 
 
 Pence », Pence 190 
 
 Pender v. Lushington 26, 241, 242 
 
 Pendergast v. Greenfield 1071 
 
 Penderil v. Penderil 953 
 
 Pendlehury v. Walker 588 
 
 Pendleton v. Bank of Kentucky 24 
 
 v. Dalton 659, 860. .663 
 
 v. Eaton 1400 
 
 v. Evans 518,525.526 
 
 v. Fay 1509, 1523. 1537, 1546. 
 
 1577, 1578, 1579, 1580, 15X1 
 
 v. Rooth 
 
 264,151 
 
 v. Russell 
 
 1743 
 
 Penedo v. Johnson 
 
 20 
 
 Penfoid v. Kelly 152, 429, 453 
 
 v ■ Mould 
 
 97 
 
 v. Nunn 
 
 207 
 
 v. Ramsbottom 
 
 596 
 
 Peninsular Bank, 7?e 
 
 1471 
 
 v Darther 
 
 1625 
 
 Peninsular Iron Co. v. Stone 1427 
 
 Penkethman v. White 
 
 1827 
 
 Penn v. Baltimore, Lord 
 
 20, 136, 
 
 
 262, 1627 
 
 o. Bibby 1081, 1120, 
 
 1121. 1127, 
 
 
 1643 
 
 v. Craig 
 
 1272 
 
 v. Jack 1081, 1105 
 
 1107, 1643 
 
 v. Tolleson 1270 
 
 1286, 1290 
 
 Pern Bank's Estate 
 
 1320 
 
 Pennefather v Short 
 
 1068, 1069 
 
 Pennell r. Davison 
 
 913 
 
 v. Deffell 
 
 59 
 
 r. Home 
 
 65,835 
 
 v- Roy 
 
 1615, 1628 
 
 Penney v Goode 
 
 1826, 1827 
 
 v Todd 
 
 1741 
 
 Pennie v. Reis 
 
 545 
 
 Penniman v Hill 
 
 1102 
 
 v. Hollis 
 
 264, 266 
 
 v. Norton 
 
 1508. 1522 
 
 Pennington v. Alvin 37, 111. 112 
 
 v. Beechey 
 
 678. 2i"i95 
 
 v Brins..p Hall Coal Co 
 
 1637,1638 
 
 v Buckley 
 
 224, 1431
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 XCV 
 
 Pennington v. Gittings 846 
 
 v. Governor 392 
 
 v. McVVhirter 200 
 
 v. Muncaster, Lord 1302, 1311 
 
 Pennock v. Ela 369, 379, 383 
 
 v Freeman 645, 916 
 
 Pennoyer v. Neff 149, 458, 029 
 
 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge 
 
 Co. 10, 1576, 1662 
 
 Pennsylvania Ins. Co. v Bauerle 
 
 216. 255 
 v. Jacksonville R, Co. 1743 
 
 Pennsylvania R Co v. Allegh- 
 eny R. Co. 551 
 v. Davenport 634 
 v Thompson 1687 
 Penny v. Beavan 236, 794 
 v. Francis 800 
 v. Hoper 321 
 v. Jackson 324 
 V Parker 1614 
 V. Penny 268, 1528 
 v. Pretor 1345 
 v. Watts 201, 251, 675, 1117, 2089 
 Penrice v. Parker 563 
 v. Williams 996, 1366 
 Pen roth v. Penroth 72 
 Penruddock v. Hammond 578 
 Pensermeau v. Pensenneau 385 
 Pensotti v. Pensotti 1463 
 Pensou v. Lee 1096 
 Pentlarge v. Kirby 630, 1427 
 v. Pentlarge 702 
 Peutney v. Lynn Paving Comm'rs 
 
 1081, 1619, 1650 
 Penvill i) Luscombe 663 
 
 Peop.e v. Albany & Vt. R. Co. 
 
 1663 
 v. Allison 1841 
 
 v. Auditor-General 1381 
 
 v. Ballard 10 
 
 v. Barnes 1687 
 
 v- Barton 1699 
 
 v. Beaudry 10 
 
 v. Bennett 1042 
 
 V, Berry 354 
 
 v. Houcbard 1614 
 
 v. Brooklyn, &c. Ry. Co. 10 
 
 v. B rower 1590 
 
 v. Buffalo Common Council 1461 
 v . Canal Board 1650 
 
 v. Chee Kee 646 
 
 v. Clark 12 
 
 v. Cole 1841 
 
 v Conklin 46 
 
 v. Cooper 645 
 
 v. Craft 443 
 
 v. Davis 961 
 
 v. Donohue 1508 
 
 v. Dwyer 1461 
 
 v. Elmer 470 
 
 v Globe M. Ins. Co. 1282 
 
 v. Goodrick 1841 
 
 v Harris 676, 578 
 
 v. Huron Circuit Judge 1576 
 
 v. Ingersoll 10 
 
 v. Jacob 12 
 
 v . I ones 1755 
 
 v. Kirkpatrick 1381 
 
 v. Leary 1841 
 
 1 v. Lindsay 1461 
 
 ( v. McC umber 354 
 
 3 v. McKenna 324 
 
 , v McLain 1150 
 
 v. Mahon 573 
 
 v. .Marine Court Justices 1508 
 
 V. Mather 564, 960 
 
 v. Mercien 1350 
 
 v. Met Tel Co. 10 
 
 v. Morrill 335, 341 
 
 v. Mutual Benefit Associates 1746 
 v Mut. Union Tel. Co. 10 
 
 v. North San Francisco Home- 
 stead Ass. 12 
 V. Norton I735 
 V . Pfeiffer 1461 
 V. Purviance 12 
 
 People v. Rice 1461 
 
 v. Rogers 1047 
 
 v. Simouson 10 
 
 v. Sliuev 676 
 
 v. Spalding 891 
 
 v. Spauldiug 1686 
 
 v Stapleton 1069 
 
 v. Sturtevant 1684 
 
 v. Swift 728 
 
 v. Tweed 10 
 
 v. Van Buren . 1685 
 
 v. Wheeler 470 
 
 v. Wilson 1069 
 
 v. Wong Wang 545 
 
 v. Wood 646 
 
 People's Bank v. Fancher 1734 
 
 Gas Co. v. Tyner 1620 
 
 Savings Bank v. Bates 569 
 
 3. Bank v. Look 1561 
 
 Peoria Ry. Co. v. Mitchell 1463 
 
 v. Shertz 1650 
 
 Peper v Fordyce 
 Pepper v. Green 
 
 v. Henzell 
 
 v. Pepper 
 Peppitt, Re 
 
 193, 1427 
 145 
 
 62, 158, 631 
 1028, 1030 
 192 
 
 Perceval v. Perceval 1432 
 
 Percival v. Caney 178,781, 841 
 
 v. Dunn 199 
 
 v. Stamp 1710 
 
 Lord and Lady v. Phipps 1648 
 
 Percy v. Percy 112 
 
 Perdue v. Brooks 1168, 1385 
 
 Periue v. Dunn 659, 9!)4, 998, 
 
 2222, 2225 
 
 v. Swaine 182, 754, 784, 951 
 
 Pering, Re 133 
 
 Perianal v. Squire 43 
 
 Perkin v Bradley 291 
 
 v. Proctor 58 
 
 Perkins v. Bradley 65, 56, 140, 147 
 
 v. Brock 843 
 
 v. Collins 395, 1619 
 
 v. Ede 1276 
 
 v. Elliott 186 
 
 v. Fourniquet 987, 989, 1492 
 
 v. Guy 574 
 
 v. Hays 418 
 
 v. Hendryx 313, 536, 779, 986, 
 
 1122 
 
 v. McGavock 1381 
 
 v. Nichols 843, 982 
 
 v. Partridge 1578, 1579 
 
 v Perkins 1457, 1846 
 
 I'erkinson v. Trousdale 720 
 
 Perks v. Stothert 1463 
 
 v. Stottart 908 
 
 v. Wycombe Ry. Co. 138Q 
 
 Perkyns v Baynton 1259 
 
 Perls v. Saalfeld 1655 
 
 Perot v. Cooper 669 
 
 Perpetual Curate, Ex parte 1408 
 
 Penin v. Lebus 1279 
 
 v. Lepper 195, H68 
 
 Perrine v. Cooley 861 
 
 Perring v Tucker 1097 
 
 Perrot v. Perrot 1630 
 
 Perry, lie 86 
 
 v. Barker 284 
 
 v. Carr 361 
 
 v . Dorset 1707 
 
 v. Hamilton I860 
 
 v. Jenkins I542 
 
 v. Knott 219, 268, 272 
 
 v. Littlefield 586 
 
 v. Marston 650 
 
 v. Merchants" M. Ins. Co. 659 
 
 v. Michaux 1677 
 
 v. Oriental Hotel Co. 1716 
 
 v. Parker 1629, 1637, 1664 
 
 v. Perry 165 402 
 
 v. Phelips 1473, 1576, 1577, 1580, 
 
 1581, 1615 
 
 v. Phillips 1014 
 
 v. Shipway 11,53 
 
 V. Truefitt 1649 
 
 v. Turpin 435, 716 
 
 Perry v Walker 40, 41, 42, 43, 1594, 
 
 1626 
 
 v. Weller 1^7 
 
 Perry, &c Iron Mining Co., lie 154 
 
 Perryclear v. Jacobs 1^2 
 
 Person v. Merrick 214 
 
 v. Nevitt 15K4 
 
 Pertou, Re 851 
 
 Peru. Republic of v Weguelin 20 
 
 Peruvian Guano Co. v. Bock- 
 
 woldt 633 
 
 Pesbeller v. Uammett 593 
 
 Pestel v . Primm 1548 
 
 Petch v. Dalton 230, 262 
 
 Peter v. Thomas-Peter 160, 229 
 
 Peterborough v. Norfolk 868 
 
 Peters v. Delaplaine 939 
 
 v. Grote 1361 
 
 v. Lilly 39 
 
 v. Neely 390 
 
 v. Rosseter 1ij02 
 
 v. Rule 1072, 1080 
 
 v. Van Lear 341 
 
 Petersburg Savings Co. v. Man- 
 hattan Fire Ins Co. 920 
 Peterson v. Bailiff 68 
 v. Peterson 1261 
 v. Poignard 294 
 v. Simpkins 890, 1642 
 Petit c. Chevelier 2319 
 Petley v. Eastern Counties Rail- 
 way Co 1667 
 Peto v. Attorney General 523 
 v. Brighton, Uckfield, & Tun- 
 bridge Wells Railway Co. 1650 
 v. Hammond 278 
 Petrakion v. Arbeely 13S1 
 Petre v. Duncombe 230, 279 
 »■ Petre 675, 1526, 2059 
 Lord, Ex parte 1360 
 Pettes v. Bingham 851, 852 
 Pettibone v. Derringer 918 
 v. Hamilton 303 
 v. Stevens 1233 
 Pettit v. Baird 190 
 v. Candler 726 
 v. Cooper 991 
 v. Hope 545 
 v. Shepherd 1624 
 Pettit's Estate, Re 61. 157 
 Petty v. Daniel 1598 
 v. Fogle 334 
 v. Hannum 53^ 
 v. Lonsdale 489, 804 
 v. Malier 87 
 V. Petty 1796 
 v. Taylor 843 
 Peugh v. Porter \\\ 
 Pewabic Mining Co. v. Mason 1271 
 1312 
 Peyton v. Bond 75 
 v. GreeYi 1230 
 v. McDowell 1882 
 v. Smith 1232, 1350 
 Pfanschmidt v. Kelly M. Co. 1120, 
 1580 
 Pfeaff v. Jones 1019 
 Pfeiffer v. Kiehn 1147 
 PtVltz v. Pfeltz 1018, 1577 
 Pfingst v Senn 1638 
 Pflster v. Wade 1561 
 Pfohl v. Simpson 243, 3<i3 
 Phelan, Re 1791 
 ».'. Ganebin 1743 
 Phelps v. Elliott 60, 313, 402, 700 
 v . Garrow 604 
 v. Green 1151, 1163, 1166 
 v Harding 1624 
 v. Hartwell 850, 851 
 v. McDonald 629 
 v. Olive 725 
 v. Peabody 1640 
 v. Phelps 444 
 v. Prothero 384, 779, 780, 781 
 817, 1490, 1491, 1618, 1625, 1634 
 v. Sproule 252, 667, 68.0, 2n:i5 
 PhemTs Trusts, Re 850, 1795
 
 XCV1 
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging. ] 
 
 Philadelphia R. Co. v. Cooper 163S 
 
 & Trenton K. Co. v. Simpson 2397 
 
 Puilaiutnopic Society v. Hobson 1422 
 
 Plnlhower v. Tod 406 
 
 Pliiiipps v. Clark 1522 
 
 Philips v. Atkiuson 172!l 
 
 v. Darbie 1545 
 
 v. Gibbons 690 
 
 v. Philipps 320, 321, 326, 360, 
 
 363, 368, 1411 
 
 v. Turner 1250 
 
 Phillipo v. Munnings 652 
 
 Phillipott's Charity, Re 1854 
 
 Phillips Ex parte 1365 
 
 He 108 
 
 v. Allen 1929 
 
 V. Barbaroux 1395 
 
 v. Beal 644 
 
 v. Belden 668 
 
 v. Benson 1271, 1274 
 
 v. Board man 1639 
 
 17. Carew 394, 934, 1573 
 
 v. Chamberlaine 877 
 
 v. Davies 1407 
 
 v. Earner 1102 
 
 v. Eiland 1716, 1720 
 
 v. Evans 1835 
 
 ti. Ford 850 
 
 v. Furber 60 
 
 v. Goding 415 
 
 v. Gutteridge 1266 
 
 v. Hassell 91 
 
 v. H afield 1130,1137 
 
 v. Hudson 239, 1490 
 
 v. Hunter 61 
 
 v. Kearney 537 
 
 v. Kingfield 960 
 
 v Langhorn 698 
 
 v. Leavitt 215 
 
 v. Library Co. 149 
 
 v. Martin 1129 
 
 v. Mullings 852 
 
 v. Negley 1584 
 
 v. Phillips 42, 551 674. 675, 680, 
 
 712, 1003, 1483, 1929, 2246 
 
 v. Prentice 894 
 
 v. Prevost 720, 721 
 
 v Prichard 1664 
 
 v. Richardson 846 
 
 v. Royal Niagara Hotel Co. 378 
 
 v. Rudle 1482 
 
 v. Schooley 360 
 
 v. Sinclair 561, 640 
 
 V Sylvester 1653 
 
 v. Symes 309 
 
 v Thomas 1961 
 
 v. Thompson 952, 986, 1151, 2335 
 
 r Warde 890 
 
 v. Wesson 287 
 
 V. Willetts 1105 
 
 Phillipson v. Gatty 218, 220 
 
 v Gibbon 988, 992, 1395 
 
 Philps, Re 86 
 
 Phinizv i'. Augusta & K R Co. 1765 
 
 Phippen v. Brown 1510, 1524 
 
 Phipps v. Bishop of Bath and 
 
 Wells 1716 
 
 r. Henderson 1201 
 
 v Jackson 1657 
 
 v Kelly 60 
 
 v. Sedgwick 186 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Abbott 236 
 
 v. Day 586 
 
 M. L. Ins. Co. v. Ilinesley 860 
 
 Nat. Bank e Cleveland Co 313 
 
 Phosphate Sewage Co. v. Hart- 
 
 mont 298 
 
 v. Molleson 633, 634 
 
 Piatt v. Oliver 603, 615, 617, 683, 
 
 702 
 
 Picard v Hine 110, 187, 1411, 1903, 
 
 2289 
 
 Pickatice, Re 893, 1608 
 
 Pickard v. Mattheson 1029, 1030 
 
 v Roberts 98 
 
 Pickel r. Isgrigg 542 
 
 Pickens v. Kuisely 378, 418 
 
 Pickens v. McCoy 1073 
 
 Pickering v. Cape Town Ry. Co. 1469 
 
 Dawson 
 
 i'. Day 
 
 v. Ely, Bishop of 
 
 v. Hanson 
 
 v. Pickering 
 
 v. Rigby 
 
 v. Stephenson 
 
 v. Williams 
 Picket v. Merchants' Bank 
 Pickett v Chilton 
 
 v. Ferguson 
 
 v. Hewlings 
 
 v. Loggan 
 Pickford v. Brown 
 
 1134 
 
 843 
 
 1656 
 
 424 
 
 369. 667 
 
 1819 
 
 26, 243 
 
 241 
 
 1840 
 
 829, 997 
 
 1618 
 
 1320 
 
 796, 1026, 1457 
 
 266, 1428, 1433. 
 
 1512, 1524, 2059 
 
 307 
 
 633, 635, 660, 797 
 
 154 
 
 418 
 
 287, 443 
 
 2086, 2088 
 
 177 
 
 1649, 1663 
 
 1184 
 
 176 
 
 78, 1595 
 
 v. Ervington 
 v. Hunter 
 
 Pickle v Pickle 
 
 Picquet v. Augusta 
 v Swan 
 
 Pictou v. Lockett 
 
 Piduocke v. Boultbee 
 
 Pidding v. How 
 
 Piddock v. Brown 
 
 Piddocke v. Smith 
 
 Pidduck v. Boultbee 
 
 Piedmont, &c Ins. Co. v Maury 287 
 
 Pierce v. Beattie 1235 
 
 v. Brady 1579 
 
 v. Burnham 89 
 
 v. Equitable Life Ass. Society 1621 
 v. Faunce 190, 246, 287, 1240, 
 
 1242, 1243, 1245. 1246, 1248, 
 1252, 1260, 1298, 1971 
 v Fesigans 634 
 
 v. Franks 1399 
 
 v. Gates 844 
 
 v Hammond 1317 
 
 v. Lamson 1961 
 
 v. McClellan 714 
 
 v. Nichols 989 
 
 v. Thornly 120 
 
 v Union Pac. Ry Co. 1556 
 
 v. West 
 
 v. Wilson 
 Piercy v. Adams 
 
 v. Beckett 
 Pieri v. Shieldsboro' 
 Pierpont v. Fowle 
 
 v. Harrisville 
 Piers v. Piers 
 Piersou v Barclay 
 
 v. Catlin 
 
 v. Clayes 
 
 v. Cutler 
 
 v. David 
 
 v. Ivey 
 
 v. Meaux 
 
 v. Robinson 
 
 v. Ryersoa 
 
 v. Smith 
 Pierstoff r. Jorges 
 Pieters v. Thompson 
 Pietroni V Transatlantic Co 
 Piety v. Stace 
 Piffard v Beeby 75, 485 
 
 Pigg v Corder 
 Piggin v. Cheetham 
 Piggott v Croxhall 
 
 v. Stewart 
 Pigot v Stace 
 Pigott, Re 
 
 v. Pigott 
 
 v. Stratton 
 
 v. Young 
 Pigue v. Young 
 Pike v. Bates 
 
 v. Dickinson 
 
 r. Fitzgibbon 
 
 v. Frank 
 
 v. Hoare 
 
 t>. Keene 
 
 v. Nicholas 
 
 422, 829, 834 
 
 1484 
 
 365 
 
 1517 
 
 589 
 
 550, 555, 589, 
 
 1151 
 
 1650 
 
 1503 
 
 267 
 
 847 
 
 843, 844 
 
 843 
 
 230, 517, 560 
 
 644 
 
 722, 837 
 
 269 
 
 840 
 
 118 
 
 659 
 
 32, 815 
 
 398 
 
 1417 
 
 760, 1045, 
 
 1819 
 
 10r>3 
 
 993 
 
 959, 960 
 
 206 
 
 691 
 
 1694 
 
 12\ 222 
 
 1654 
 
 797, 1402 
 
 617 
 
 1675 
 
 60 
 
 113, 187 
 
 147 
 
 1075 
 
 20,26 
 
 1643, 1645 
 
 Pilcher, Re 1072 
 
 v Arden 1843, 1847 
 
 Pile o. McBratney 457 
 
 Pilkington v Baker 1732 
 
 v. Himsworth 743, 748. *<98 
 
 Pilkintou v. Cotten 1298 
 
 v. Wignall 1515, 1534 
 
 Pillan v. Thompson 905, 910 
 
 Piller v. Roberts 406 
 
 Pillers, Ex parte 1055 
 
 Pilley v. Robinson 406, 559, 627 
 
 Pilling v. Aruiitage 847 
 
 v Pilling 1267, 2346 
 
 Pillow v. Pillow 379 
 
 v. Sentelle 1548 
 
 v. Shannon 678, 951, 1505 
 
 v. Thompson 1640 
 
 Pillsbury r. Dugan 997 
 
 Pillsworth v. Hopton 1632 
 
 Pirn v. Wilson 1626, 1655 
 
 Pimbley v. Molyneux 794 
 
 Pimm v. Insall 1293 
 
 Pince v. Beattie 1413, 1414 
 
 Pincers V Robertson 746 
 
 Piuch v. Anthony 407, 1515, 1523, 
 
 1524 
 
 Pinchin v. London and Black- 
 
 wall Ry. Co. 
 Pindall v. Trevor 
 Pindar v. Pindar 
 
 v. Smith 
 Pine, Re 
 
 v. Ellis 
 
 t» Shannon 
 
 985, 1663, 1664 
 
 257 
 
 1526 
 
 1113, 1119 
 
 1177. 1209, 1825 
 
 1177, 1209, 1825 
 
 212 
 
 13l»7 
 
 Pine Lake Iron Co. v La Fayette 
 
 Car Works 1756 
 
 Pineo v . HefTelfinger 1675 
 
 Pinfold v. Bouch 1417 
 
 v. Piulold 808 
 
 Pingree v. Coffin 152, 197, 378, 886, 
 
 887, 917, 927, 961, 1013, 
 
 1028, 1081, 1181, 1299, 1317, 
 
 1368, 1484, 15H8, 1509, 1511, 
 
 1524, 2181, 2185. 2186, 2196, 
 
 2222, 2226, 2229, 2252, 2367, 
 
 2372 
 
 v. Hodges 1119 
 
 Pink v. Trade and Labor Unions 
 
 1620 
 Pinkard V. Smith 121 
 
 Pinkers v. Peters 1510 
 
 Pinkerton v. Barnsley Canal Co 892 
 Pinkett v. Wright 1468 
 
 Pinkum v. Eau Claire 586 
 
 Pinkus v. Peters 267, 1533 
 
 Pinneo v. Goodspeed 1320 
 
 Pinner v. Knights 307, 308, 309 
 
 Pinney v. Hunt 205, 663, 877, 1726 
 Pinnock v. Clough 1400 
 
 Pinson ». Williams 852 
 
 Pioneer Gold Mining Co v. 
 
 Baker 
 Pioneer Manuf. Co v. Phoenix 
 
 Ass. Co 
 Pioneer Wood Pulp Co. v. Bens 
 
 ley 
 Pipe v. B:i reman 
 Piper v Gittens 
 v . Piper 
 
 v. St Paul Trust Co 
 Pisani v. Attorney-General 
 
 v. Lawson 
 
 Pit it. Cholmondelev 668 
 
 Pitcher v. Helliar 1718, 1734, 1735 
 
 Pitman v. Thornton 1019 
 
 Pitt o. Arglass, Earl of 1580, 1583 
 
 v. Bonner 
 
 v Brewster 
 
 v. Lord Dacre 
 
 v. Hill 
 
 v. Hunt 
 
 v. Maclew 
 
 v. Mackreth 
 
 v . Page 
 
 v. Pitt 
 
 v. Snowden 
 
 Pitt man v. McClellan 
 
 145 
 
 372 
 
 1637 
 
 190 
 
 805 
 
 1628 
 
 1381 
 
 74, 852 
 
 45 
 
 1754 
 
 253 
 1438 
 
 663 
 124, 125 
 
 312 
 131) 
 1466 
 178, 180 
 1748 
 
 526
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 XCVll 
 
 itts v Hooper 
 
 722, 758 
 
 v. La Fontaine 
 
 64 
 
 v. Mower 
 
 195 
 
 v. Powledge 
 
 1550 
 
 v. Short 
 
 589 
 
 v. Tilden 
 
 1254 
 
 Pittsburgh Co. 's Appeal 630 
 
 Pittsburgh, &c. Ry. Co v. Bal- 
 timore & 0. R. Co. 1157 
 Pittsford v. Chittenden 851 
 Pixley v. Roai oke Nay. Co. 630 
 Place v. Provideuce 726, 843 
 Plants. Barclay 1491, 1624 
 v. Kendrick 1826 
 v Pearman 280 
 Plant Seed Co. v. Michel Plant 
 
 Co. 1381 
 
 Planters' Bank v. Fowlkes l*i79 
 
 v Laucheimer 1675 
 
 Planters' Ins. Co. v. Selma Sav- 
 ings Bank 418 
 Plasket v. Beeby 164 
 Platel v. Craddock 109 
 PlatiDg Co. v. Farquharson 8-7, 
 1070 
 Piatt v. Button 1643 
 v. Gilchrist 1653 
 v. Judson 525 
 v. Mead 324 
 v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 1716, 
 173o 
 v Routh 1610 
 v. Squire 194, 208, 212, 415, 425, 
 1386, 1407, 1408 
 v. Walter 398 
 Platts v. Button 1643 
 Plaut v. Plaut 390 
 Player v Anderson 27, 358 
 Playford v. Hoare 1402 
 Pleasanton v. Raughley 842 
 Pleasants v. Glasscock 334, 379, 3"*5, 
 551 
 v. Kortrecht 1845 
 v Logan 406, 1533 
 v. Ross 671, 1123 
 P. & M. Bank v. Dundas 1577 
 Pledge v. Bass 1399 
 Plestow v. Johnson 35, 1737 
 Pleydell v. Dorchester, Earl of 1130 
 Plimpton v. Spiller 1663 
 v. Winslow 149 
 Plintoffu Haynes 1369 
 Plitt, Ex parte 1214 
 Piomer v. Macdonough 1069 
 Plomley, Re 70 
 v. Felton 1U5 
 Plowden v Campbell 28 
 Plowes v. Bossey 564, 851 
 Plowman v. Williams 67 
 Piumbev Plumbe 321 
 Plume v. Beale 663 
 Plumer v. Gregory 269 
 v Macdonald 1(169 
 v McDonald Lumber Co. 1507 
 Plummer v. Doughty 221 
 v. May 296, 299, 632 
 Plunket v. Joyce 72, 404, 418 
 v. Penson 283, 290, 613 
 Plunkett v. Cavendish 623, 662 
 v. Cobbett 1096 
 v. Lewis 797, 1314 
 Plymouth v. Russell Mills 1585 
 Plymouth, Countess of v. Bladon 659, 
 817 
 Pocock v. Att.-Gen. 13 
 v. Reddington 1420 
 Podmore v. Gunning 1721 
 v. Skipwith 781, 782 
 Pogson v. Owen 191 
 Pohl v. Pontier 365 
 Poindexter v. Blackburn 117 
 v. Jeffries 90, 105 
 Pointon v. Pointon 334 
 Poirier v. Fetter 1650 
 Pole v. Joel 1488, 1603 
 v. Leask 1501 
 Polhemus v. Emson 385, 1158 
 VOL. I. — g 
 
 Polini v. Gray 1469 
 
 Polk v. Gallant 197 
 
 v. Plummer 23 
 
 Pollard v. Doyle 808, 1234, 1413. 
 
 1591 
 v. Photographic Co. 1643 
 
 v. Yoder 1257 
 
 Pollock v, Birmingham, Wolver- 
 hampton, and S. Valley Ry. 
 Co. 99, 1802 
 
 v Boyd 1618 
 
 v. Braiuerd 1395 
 
 v. Buie 68 
 
 v. Hester 2307 
 
 v. Lester 303, 345, 1635 
 
 v. Rabbits 1654 
 
 Pomeroy v. Baddeley 1102 
 
 v. Fullerton 385 
 
 v. Manin 2397 
 
 v. Winship 1073 
 
 Pomfret, Earl v. Windsor, Lord 646, 
 882 
 Pond v Allen 1051 
 
 v. Clark 197 
 
 v. Cook 1743, 1751 
 
 v. Sib'ey 149 
 
 v. Vermont Valley R. Co. 801 
 
 Ponder v. Cox 1621 
 
 Pondir v. New York,&c. R. Co. 1765 
 Ponsardin v. Peto 1649 
 
 v. Stear 801 , 806 
 
 Ponsford v. Hankey 321, 322 
 
 v. Hartley 236, 360 
 
 v. Swaine 298, 671 
 
 v. Walton 880 
 
 Pontchartrain R. Co. v. New Or- 
 leans & Carrollton R. Co. 1640 
 Pool v. Dial 1320 
 
 v. Gramling 1299 
 
 v. Horton 1463 
 
 v. Lloyd 548 
 
 v. Morris 101 
 
 v. Pool 1378 
 
 v. Sacheverell 1070 
 
 Poole v. Franks 64, 1421, 1448, 1453 
 v Gordon 773 
 
 v. Larkins 1236 
 
 v Lloyd 547 
 
 v. Marsh 209 
 
 v. Pass 1411, 1436 
 
 v. Poole 642 
 
 v. Shergold 12 1 7 
 
 Pooley, Re 1414 
 
 v. Bosanquet 280 
 
 v. Driver 1444 
 
 v. Quilter 1490 
 
 v. Ray 250, 1207 
 
 Pooley's Trustee v. Whetham, 32, 64 
 Poor v. Carleton 1668, 1669, 1672, 
 1675, 1676, 1677, 1995 
 v Hazleton 120 
 
 v. Robinson 1250 
 
 Poor's Lands Charity, In re 13 
 
 Poore v. Clark 210 
 
 Pope, Re 98, 1035 
 
 v. Al'.is 838, 840, 860 
 
 v. Bell 1675 
 
 V. Bish 703 
 
 v. Briggs 1511 
 
 v Curl 1647,1648,2314 
 
 v Duncannon 1621 
 
 v. Erdman 1282 
 
 v Great Eastern Ry. Co. 1775, 
 1776 
 v. Gwyn 164 
 
 v. Lem aster 997 
 
 v. Leonard 26 334 
 
 v Melone 209 
 
 v. Salamanca Oil Co. 312, 334 
 
 V. Stansbury 584 
 
 Poplar & Blackwall Free School, 
 
 Re 13 
 
 Poplin v. Hawke 874 
 
 Poppers v. Meagher 1527 
 
 Popple v. Henson 13S3, 1407 
 
 Porch v. Fries 1351, 1352 
 
 Porous Plaster Co. v. Seabury 313 
 
 Porrett v. White 1780 
 
 Portarlington v. Damer 1469 
 
 Earl of v. Damer 797, 798, 799 
 
 1591, 1615 
 
 Lord v. Graham 1674 
 
 v. Soulby 618, 714, 721, 1627, 
 
 1628, 1651,21)95 
 
 Port Clinton R. Co. v. Cleveland 
 
 R. Co. 1663 
 
 Portal v. Hine 1050 
 
 Porter v. Bank of Rutland 841 
 
 v. Bauks 1320 
 
 v. Burton 1460 
 
 v. Cooper 1142 
 
 v. Cox 64, 814 
 
 v Frenchman's Bay, &c. Co. 545 
 
 v Hill 646 
 
 v. Jennings 840 
 
 v. Kingman 1734 
 
 v. Lopez 1163, 1726 
 
 v. Neckervis 20 
 
 v. Porter 83, 1731 
 
 v. Sabin 1743 
 
 v. Sherman Countv B. Co. 559 
 
 v. Spencer 395, '551, 1698, 1699, 
 
 1702 
 
 v. Vaughan 811 
 
 v- Young 334 
 
 Porter's Trusts, Re 865 
 
 Portis v. Fall 1620 
 
 Portland, Countess of v Prod- 
 
 gers 89, 178, 179 
 
 Portlington v. Tarbock 1586 
 
 Portman v. Mill 1218 
 
 Portoues v. Holmes 1320 
 
 Port Royal Railroad Co. v. Ham- 
 mond 629 
 Portsmouth, Earl of v Fellows 348 
 Portsmouth, Lord v. Effingham, 
 
 Lord 1577, 1578 
 
 Portsmouth Livery Co v. Wat- 
 son 24, 25 
 Portugal, Queen of v. Glyn 658 
 Portz v. Schantz 1381 
 Post v Boardman 146 
 v. Kimberly 551 
 v . Lee 1269 
 v. Leet 1286, 1290 
 v Mackall 176, 214 
 v. Marsh 1400 
 v Stevens 1416 
 v. Toledo, &c. Railroad 145, 562, 
 1556 
 Postal Tel. Cable Co v. Norfolk 
 
 & W R. Co 1683 
 
 Postell?' Skirving 96 
 
 Postgate r. Barnes 92, 110, 149, 152 
 Postmaster-General, Ex parte 58, 
 61, 157 
 Postlethwaite, Re 576, 678 
 
 v. Howes 249,287 
 
 v. Maryport Harbour Trus- 
 tees 1727, 1731 
 v. Travers 521 
 Poston v. Eubank 194 
 Pott v Gallini 7«l7 
 Potter, Re 110 
 v. Baker 1481 
 v. Barclay 1536 
 V. Beal 1029,1178 
 v. Chapman 1672 
 v. Gardner 232 
 v. Hiseox 1355 
 v. Holden 287, 289, 294 
 v. Hoi lister 629 
 i>. Potter 840, 858, 1819 
 v. Waller 387, 720 
 Webb 1254 
 V. Whitney 1642 
 Potter Land & W. Co. v. Bas- 
 
 kin 149 
 
 Potts v. Britten 153 
 
 v. Butler 1672 
 
 v. Hahn 334 
 
 i> Leighton 1747, 1754, 1755 
 
 i>. Smith 1638 
 
 v. Thames Haven & Dock Co 223
 
 XCV111 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Potts v Trotter 1311, 1312 
 
 v. Turts 953 
 
 v. Warwick, &c. Canal Co. 1731, 
 1744 
 v. Whitmore 415, 421, 492, 493, 
 500 
 Pouder v. Tate 1517 
 
 Poulson v. Collier 881 
 
 Poultney v La Fayette 2397 
 
 Pountain, In re 83 
 
 Poupardtf. Fardell 890 
 
 Powden v. Johnson 885 
 
 Powell, Re 1049 
 
 t;. Aiken 2309 
 
 t\ Bernard 28 
 
 v. Calloway 972 
 
 v Cleaver 875, 1116, 1350 
 
 t'. Clement 1463 
 
 v. Cockerell 303,346,431,432,583, 
 1600 
 v. Davton, &c. R. Co. 303 
 
 v. Dowdle 1551 
 
 v. Elliott 1376 
 
 r. Hall 1549 
 
 v. Heather 1538 
 
 v. Hopson 1468 
 
 v Jewesbury 409,583 
 
 v. Kane 347, 894, 895, 1598 
 
 v. Knight 272 
 
 v. Lovegrove 1490 
 
 v. Hanson 844, 1116, 1117, 1124 
 i». Martin 968, 970 
 
 v. Martyr 1402 
 
 v. Mayo 418 
 
 v. Merrett 96 
 
 v. Monson Manuf. Co. 1165, 1905, 
 2288 
 v. Pacific R. Co. 666 
 
 v. Phillips 229 
 
 v . Powell 109, 813, 814, 1264, 
 
 1276, 1327, 1417, 1512 
 v Powis, Earl of 345 
 
 v. Prentice 180, 183 
 
 v. Robins 165, 168 
 
 v. Sanger 1654 
 
 v Sims 1638 
 
 v. Sonnett 1109 
 
 v Thomas 324 
 
 v. Trotter 1245, 1391, 1392, 
 
 1393 
 v. Wallworth 1169 
 
 v Williams 1071 
 
 v Wood 1114 
 
 v. Wright 149, 150. 280, 1652 
 
 v. Young 378 
 
 Powell, &c. Coal Co. v. Taff 1663 
 Power v Barham 1104 
 
 v. Holman 61 
 
 v. Keeder 551 
 
 v Reeves 1466 
 
 v. Walker 1644 
 
 Powers v. Heery 1628, 1631, 1669 
 v. Large 1071 
 
 t>. McKenzie 639 
 
 v Raymond 1071, 1110 
 
 Powlet, Earl v. Herbert 1418 
 
 Powley v. Walker 1655 
 
 Powys v Blaerave 757, 1634, 1732 
 b. "Mansfield 327, 852 
 
 v Shrewsbury Potteries Ry. 
 Co 1513 
 
 Poyer v. Des Plainea 1620 
 
 Poynes v. Creagh 303 
 
 Poyser v Minor 979 
 
 Praed i> Graham 1130 
 
 Prall v Hunt 1591 
 
 Prance, lie 892 
 
 v. Sympson 560 
 
 Pratt i'. Archer 424 
 
 v Bacon 406, 425, 828, 1448 
 
 v Bank of Windsor 443 
 
 v. Barker 294, 406, 410 
 
 v Boston & Albany Rail- 
 road 197 
 v. Brett 1630, 1656 
 v. Bull 1033 
 v California Mining Co. 560 
 
 Pratt p. Inman 
 
 1059 
 
 v. Jenner 
 
 179, 1802 
 
 v. Keith 
 
 288, 589 
 
 v. Lamson 
 
 1299 
 
 v. Northam 
 
 1997 
 
 f. Pond 
 
 1961, 2274 
 
 v. Rathbun 
 
 1205 
 
 v Koseland Ry. Co. 
 
 1638 
 
 v. Taunton Copper Co. 
 
 197 
 
 . v. Taylor 
 
 628,687 
 
 v. Tenner 
 
 87 
 
 v. Walker 
 
 1600 
 
 Preble v. Longfello 
 
 1359 
 
 Preece r. Corrie 
 
 127 
 
 v. Seale 
 
 1407 
 
 Prees v. Coke 
 
 998, 1386 
 
 Prendergast v. Lusbington 153, 
 
 ldfiQ 
 
 v. Prendergast 
 
 1502, 1503 
 
 Prentice v. Kimball 
 
 287 
 
 v. Phillips 
 
 1836 
 
 v. Prentice 
 
 191 
 
 Prentiss v. Paisley 
 
 1576 
 
 Preschbaker r. Freeman 
 
 847 
 
 Prescott v. Everts 
 
 368, 371 
 
 v. Hubbell 
 
 402 
 
 Presley v. Davis 
 
 1358 
 
 Pressley v. Harrison 
 
 1733 
 
 Prestall's Case 
 
 156 
 
 Prestidge v. Pendleton 
 
 371 
 
 Prestney v Colchester 
 
 1602 
 
 Preston v. Aston 
 
 197 
 
 v Barker 
 
 1286, 1292 
 
 v. Carr 
 
 571 
 
 v Carter 
 
 236 
 
 v. Collett 
 
 412,801 
 
 v Dickinson 
 
 451, 452 
 
 v. Fitch 
 
 1511 
 
 v. Grand Collier Dock Co. 241 
 
 v. Guyon 241 
 
 v. Lamont 628 
 
 v. Luck 1663 
 
 v. Smith 545,547,1556,1620,1628, 
 1638 
 v. Walsh 230, 560 
 
 v Wilson 60, 553 
 
 Preston Corp. v. Fullwood Local 
 
 Board 402 
 
 Preteca v Maxwell Land Grant 
 
 Co. 630 
 
 Prevost o. Benett 860, 1407 
 
 v. Gorrell &3S 
 
 Prewit v. Graves 378 
 
 Prewitt v. Lambert 855 
 
 Price, Ex parte 1846 
 
 Re 1433, 1440 
 
 v. Berrington 85,328,813 1078 
 
 v. Carter 165 
 
 v. Carver 165, 166, 167, 168, 
 
 2217 
 
 v. Clavenger 1676 
 
 v. Coleman 314, 334 
 
 v. Copner 650 
 
 v. Dewey 659 
 
 v Dewhurst 1470,1480,1481, 
 
 1627 
 
 v Evans 1616 
 
 v. Gardiner 985 
 
 v Gardner 398, 964 
 
 v. Hobbs 1166 
 
 v. Hutchison 456, 1069 
 
 v .lames 547 
 
 v Lawton 1653 
 
 v Loaden 1417 
 
 r Lvtton 840, 1183 
 
 v M'Beth 1234. 1413 
 
 r Manning 920. 1099 
 
 v. Mavo 578 
 
 v Meth. Epis. Church 1669 
 
 r. Minot 26, 334,342, 
 
 1001 
 
 v. Moxon 1290 
 
 v. Nesbit 987, 1491, 1492 
 
 v. North 1169 
 
 v. Price 679, 1288, 1381, 1392, 
 
 1600 
 
 v Rickards 63,64 
 
 Price v. Salusbury 
 j'. Sanders 
 v. Severne 
 v. Shaw 
 v. Thompson 
 v. Tyson 
 v, Upshaw 
 
 415, 1469 
 216 
 1130 
 1226 
 1271 
 728 
 642 
 
 v. Webb 422, 455, 512, 536, 537, 
 1590 
 v. White 1745 
 
 v. Williams 670, 1141, 1717 
 
 v. Winter 68 
 
 Price's Candle Co. v. Bauwens 
 
 Candle Co. 1642 
 
 Prichard v. Gee 936 
 
 i'. Littlejohn 1551 
 
 v Murray 719 
 
 v. Norris 1203 
 
 Prichittr Kirkman 1001 
 
 Prickett r. Tuller 1676 
 
 Pride v. Budd 100 
 
 v. Fooks 1420 
 
 Prideaux v Prideaux 1288 
 
 Priest v. Hamilton 69 
 
 v. Perrott 1003 
 
 Priestley's Appeal 1580, 1584 
 
 Priestly v. Wilkinson 1386 
 
 Priestman v. Thomas 553 
 
 Prigmore v. Shelton 1276 
 
 Prime o Titmarsh 1129 
 
 Prime's Estate, He 1120 
 
 Primm v. Raboteau 378 
 
 Primrose, Tie 1412 
 
 Prince v. Boston 10 
 
 v. Cooper 1264 
 
 v Farrell 1551 
 
 v. Gundaway 536 
 
 v. Hevlin 644 
 
 v. Hine 730, 731, 1356, 1359, 
 
 1413 
 
 v. Howard 1013 
 
 r. Samo 1104 
 
 v. Smith 1228 
 
 Prince Henry, He 892 
 
 Prince Manuf. Co. v. Prince's 
 
 Metallic Paiut Co. 1648 
 
 Prince of Wales Assoc, v. Pal- 
 mer 204 
 Princeton r. Adams 2012 
 Pring, Re 1611 
 Pringle v. Gloag 1408,1447, 1846 
 r. Hodgson 102 
 v Pringle 116, 117 
 Printup v. Patton 838 
 v. Rome Land Co. 586 
 Prioleau v. United States 17, 20, 24, 
 141, 145, 296 
 Prior v. Bagster 1746 
 Priors v. White 30 
 Pritchard r. Draper 1370, 1515, 
 1520 
 v Fleetwood 1724 
 r. Foulkes 923 
 v. Hicks 217, 254, 1412 
 v. Roberts 81 
 Privett v Calloway 1463 
 Probasco V. Probasco 1734 
 Probate, Judge of v. Heydock 1254 
 Proctor v. Bayley 554, 1380, 1395 
 v Cheshire City Council 406 
 v. Cooper 1035 
 v. Farnam 1285 
 v. Ferebee 1032 
 r. National Bank of the Re- 
 public 629 
 v. Reynel 1060 
 v. Smiles 576 
 v. Webber 22 
 Produce Bank v. Morton 1463 
 Prole v. Soady 87, 116, 119, 122, 179, 
 893 
 Proper v. Monmouthshire Canal 
 
 Co. 1503 
 
 Proskauer v. People's 9. Bank 349 
 
 Prosser r Bank of England 865 
 
 v. Northern Pac. R. Co. 1639 
 
 Protheroe v. Forman 663, 1621, 1624 

 
 Proud v. Bates 
 Proudfit v. Pickett 
 Proudfoot v. Hume 
 Prout v. Underwood 
 Providence Bank v. Wilkinson 
 
 v Wilson 
 Providence Institution v. Barr 
 
 1449 
 
 536 
 1780 
 726 
 1565 
 1560 
 605, 
 608 
 
 Providence Rubber Co. v. Good- 
 year 1580 
 Provident Institution v. White 1060 
 Provincial Bank v. Brocklebank 686 
 Provincial Banking Co. v. Til- 
 
 lett • 159 
 
 Provost v. Gratz 1479 
 
 Prowett v. Mortimer 1648 
 
 Prudential Ass. Co.?'. Edmonds 1503 
 v. Knott 1620, 1644. 1648 
 
 v. Thomas 1567, 1568, 1623 
 
 Prussia, King of v. Kuepper 18 
 
 Prutzman r. Pitesell 753 
 
 Prver v Gribble 796, 1031, 1588 
 
 Pryor v. Hill 104, 122 
 
 Pryse v. Cambrian Ry. Co. 1775 
 
 v. Pryse 316, 552 
 
 Prytherch, Re, Prytherchf .Wil- 
 liams 1716 
 Pudge v. Pitt 813 
 Pugh, Ex parte 102, 2001 
 lie 113 
 v. Arton 1390 
 v. Bell 645 
 v. Currie 216 
 v. Golden Valley Ry. Co. 1650 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Pugh v. Heath 649 
 
 v Holt 994 
 
 v. Vaughan 1631 
 
 v. Winona, &c. R. Co. 1461 
 
 Pugsley v. Freedniau'a Sav. & 
 
 Tr. Co 460, 536 
 
 Pulbrook, Ex parte 1014, 1015 
 
 r. Richmond Cons. M Co. 244 
 
 Pulhani v. McCarthy 302 
 
 Pullan v. Cincinnati, &c, R. Co 281, 
 
 1619 
 
 v. Rawlins 878 
 
 Pullen v. Baker 395 
 
 v. Pullen 1120 
 
 v. Ready 1622 
 
 v. Smith 718 
 
 v Snelus 655, 656 
 
 v. White 1106 
 
 Pulley v Hilton 1113 
 
 Pulliam v. Christian 987, 1492 
 
 o. Pulliam 857, 1252, 1305, 23l»5 
 
 XC1X 
 
 Pullman v. Baltimore & Ohio 
 
 R. Co. 1642 
 
 v. Stebbins 256, 334 
 
 Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Cen- 
 tral Trans. Co. 790, 1548, 1621 
 v. Missouri P. Ry Co. 545 
 
 Pulteuey v Shelton 448, 1655. 
 
 1685 
 v. Warren 1362, 1634, 1660 
 
 Pulver v Harris 1845 
 
 Punchard v. Tomkins 1040 
 
 Punderson O. Dixon 1013 
 
 Purcell v. Blennerhassett 643 
 
 Purcellr. M'Namara959, 1171, 1181, 
 
 1185, 1196 
 
 v Manning 1581 
 
 v. Miner 1580 
 
 v. Purcell 844 
 
 Purdew v. Jackson 119, 125 
 
 Purdy v. Henslee 790 
 
 Purefoy v. Purefoy 213, 330 
 
 Pure Spirit Co v. Fowler 27 
 
 Purkis v Date 892 
 
 Purser v. Darby 1377, 1404 
 
 Pusey v. Clenison 1235, 1772 
 
 v Desbouvie 605, 700, 1622 
 
 v. Wright 843, 844, 850 
 
 Puterbaugh v. Elliott 601 
 
 Putnam v. Clark 850, 1576 
 
 v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. 1299 
 
 v. Day 1577 
 
 v. Hollender 314, 334 
 
 v. I.yon 418 
 
 v Putnam 1386, 1507 
 
 v. Ritchie 1364 
 
 v. Sweet 26, 239, 303 
 
 v Valentine 1631 
 
 Pybus, Re 1847 
 
 Pycroft v Williams 1044 
 
 Pyke v Holcombe 113 
 
 t'. North wood 1774 
 
 r. Waddingham 989 
 
 Pyle v. Cravens 90 
 
 v. Price 288, 588 
 
 Pym v. Pym 1365, 1731 
 
 Pyncent v. Pyncent228, 675, 922, 951 
 
 Pyrah v. Woodcock 33d, 649 
 
 Q. 
 
 Quaokenboss, Ex parte 1588 
 
 Quackenbush v. Leonard 994, 1169, 
 
 1543 
 
 v. Van Riper 1677 
 
 Quantot-k v. Bullen 170,406,410. 859 
 
 Quarles v. Quarles 1005 
 
 Quarman v. Williams 1040, l'i41, 
 
 1695 
 
 Quarrell v Beckford 1241, 1244, 
 
 1251, 1368, 1370, 1376, 1448, 
 
 1719, 1780 
 
 Quarrier v. Carter 1002, 1576 
 
 v. Colston 1651 
 
 Quartz Hill C. G M. Co. v. 
 
 Beall 1620, 1643, 1670 
 
 Queade's Trusts, lie 
 
 
 100, 123 
 
 Quinby v. Carhart 
 
 850 
 
 Queen, The (See R) 
 
 
 
 v. Conlan 
 
 1071 
 
 Queen's Case 
 
 1102 
 
 1103, 1104 
 
 Quince v Quince 
 
 253 
 
 Queen's Benefit B. 
 
 3ocie 
 
 ty, Re 
 
 Quincy v. Sharpe 
 
 646 
 
 
 
 1611 
 
 v. Steel 
 
 26, 313 
 
 Queensberry, Duke 
 
 off. 
 
 Sheb- 
 
 Quincy, &c. R. Co. 
 
 f. Hum- 
 
 beare 
 
 
 1647 
 
 phrevs 
 
 1734, 1743 
 
 Queen's College, Ex 
 
 parte 
 
 Quin Ian v. Reiser 
 
 668 
 
 v. Darby 
 
 
 1620 
 
 Quinn v. Brittain 
 
 1242 
 
 Quitter v. Heatly 
 
 
 896 
 
 v Leake 
 
 360, 557, 801 
 
 V. Mapleson 
 
 
 1488 
 
 Quintz v. Quintz 
 
 1320 
 
 Quin v. Britham 
 
 
 1719 
 
 Quirolo i\ Ardito 
 
 314 
 
 v. Green 
 
 
 1562, 1566 
 
 Quitman County v. Stritze 
 
 v. Patton 
 
 
 1566 
 
 
 
 v. Ratcliff 
 
 
 1822, 1831 
 
 
 
 R. 
 
 R I 
 
 . Abingdon, 
 
 Earl of 
 
 
 1106 
 
 V 
 
 Adey 
 
 
 
 
 1105 
 
 V. 
 
 Ashwell 
 
 
 
 
 564 
 
 V. 
 
 Aspinall 
 
 
 
 
 546 
 
 V 
 
 Ball 
 
 
 
 
 1101 
 
 V. 
 
 Ball de Bewdley 
 
 
 
 1112 
 
 V. 
 
 Uarber 
 
 
 
 
 1105 
 
 V 
 
 Barthwick 
 
 
 
 
 874 
 
 V. 
 
 Bell 
 
 
 
 
 1106 
 
 V. 
 
 Bignold 
 
 
 
 
 1106 
 
 V 
 
 Boyes 
 
 
 717 
 
 ,942 
 
 1103 
 
 V 
 
 Brooke 
 
 
 
 
 1102 
 
 V. 
 
 Burdett 
 
 
 
 
 1108 
 
 V. 
 
 Burridgo 
 
 
 
 
 1092 
 
 V. 
 
 Castro 
 
 
 
 
 1070 
 
 V. 
 
 Chapman 
 
 
 
 
 920 
 
 V. 
 
 Colley 
 
 
 
 
 1101 
 
 V. 
 
 Cox 
 
 
 
 
 578 
 
 V 
 
 Cumberland Justices 
 
 
 307 
 
 V 
 
 v. 
 
 Despard 
 Doutre 
 
 
 
 1087 
 
 1092 
 133 
 
 V. 
 
 Duncombe 
 
 
 
 
 1102 
 
 V 
 
 Edmonds 
 
 
 
 1091 
 
 1095 
 
 R. v. Edwards 
 
 1108 
 
 v . Fitzwater, Lord 
 
 1108 
 
 v Fowler 8 
 
 135,156, 1108 
 
 v. Grant 
 
 1127, 1137 
 
 t> Grosvenor 
 
 1636 
 
 v. Hancock 
 
 17->:J 
 
 r. Hart 
 
 1"86 
 
 v. Hilditch 
 
 1106 
 
 v. Hill 
 
 1098 
 
 t'. Home 
 
 Him; 
 
 v. Hughes 
 
 1094 
 
 v. Johnson 
 
 1092, 1109 
 
 v. Jordan 
 
 1069 
 
 0, Kin near 
 
 1108, 1131 
 
 i'. Mainwaring 
 
 865 
 
 v. Marsden 
 
 1106 
 
 V. Martin 
 
 1108 
 
 v. Millis 
 
 1501 
 
 v. Murphy 
 
 1108 
 
 v. Newman 
 
 1102 
 
 v. Norwich 
 
 1650 
 
 v. Ramsden 
 
 1100 
 
 v . Richardson 
 
 1131 
 
 R. v. St. George 
 
 1101 
 
 v. Sealhert 
 
 1108 
 
 r. Staffordshire County Court 
 
 Judge 
 
 1069 
 
 v Teal 
 
 1126 
 
 i Truro, Lord 
 
 744 
 
 v. Watklnson 
 
 575 
 
 r. Watson 
 
 1103, 1104 
 
 v. Weaver 
 
 865 
 
 v. Webb 
 
 1102 
 
 V. Whitehead 
 
 1098 
 
 v. Wooller 
 
 1109, 1131 
 
 V. Wylde 
 
 1101 
 
 V. Wyndham 
 
 146 
 
 Rabberman v. House 
 
 860 
 
 Rnhheth r Squire 
 
 732, 783 
 
 Babbitts ''• Woodward 
 
 1051 
 
 Rabe v Dunlip 
 
 26 
 
 Raby v Ridehalgh 
 
 1370 
 
 Rackham r Siddall 
 
 706, 1484 
 
 Radam v. Capital M D. 
 
 Co. 779 
 
 Radcliff v. Corrothers 
 
 15*1 
 
 v. Rowley 
 
 645
 
 -TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Radcliffe, Re 134, 895, 2191 
 v. Eccles 1345 
 t>. Kursuian 672, 584 
 v. Portland, Duke of 163* 
 v. Varuer 1023 
 Radclyffe. Re 1417 
 Radu- v. Yeargin 1221 
 Radford v Folsom 634, 659, 1750 
 j>. in nes 1675 
 v. Roberts 461 
 v. Wills 1403 
 v. Wilson 678 
 Ridley !> Ingram 2191 
 R.ie v. Mayor, &c. 1463 
 Raeburu V Andrews 28 
 Rifalsky v. Boehm 542 
 R.ttierty v. Central Traction Co 3(i3 
 Ratfety v. King 302, 715 
 Rigau v. Echols 885 
 Raggett, ite, Ex parte Williams 213 
 Ragland v. Broaduax 1548, 1553 
 Ragsdale v. Holmes 334 
 Raguec «. Roll 1238 
 Raiker v Pike 2238 
 Railroad Co., Ex parte 281, 1548. 
 1553 
 v. Bradley 1491 
 v. Duraut 861 
 V. Harris 144 
 v. Neal 1625 
 v Orr 243 
 v. Smith 1743 
 v. Soutter 1491 
 Railway Co. v. McCarthy 1650 
 Railway Sleepers Supply Co., Re 67 
 Raincock v. Simpson 1748 
 v Young 780, 782 
 Raine v. Wilson 177, 444 
 Rainey v. Rainey 737, 1677 
 Rains v. Rainey 1214 
 Rainsdon, Re 111 
 Rainsdon's Trusts, Re 87. 179 
 Rainwater v. Elmore 1101 
 Raistrick v. Elsworth 784, 8u2 
 Rajah Salig Ram v. Secretary 18 
 Rakes v. Brown 1508 
 Ralli v. Universal Marine As- 
 surance Co. 1470 
 v. UniversalMarine Insurance 
 Co. 1490 
 Ralph v. Carrick 1431 
 Ralphs v. Hensler 546 
 Ralston v. Sharon 1584 
 Ram. Ex parte 224 
 Ramey v. Green 1536 
 Ramkissenseat v. Barker 45, 736, 
 750, 891, 948, 1552 
 Ramon v. Ramon 1356 
 Ramsbotham v Senior 1355 
 Ramsbottom v. Freeman 1667, 1735 
 Ramsdall v. Craighill 1673 
 Ramsden v. Brearley 87 
 v. Dyson 1660 
 v. Hylton 1622 
 v. Langley 1245, 1388 
 Ramsey v. Brailsford 989 
 v. Temple 546 
 Ramshaw v Greenhill 1059 
 Ramv v Kir 892 
 R-mcliffe v Parkyns 873 
 Rand v. Cutler 1385 
 v. Macmahon 876, 878 
 
 V Redington 1623 
 v. Walker 200 
 
 Randall v. Chesapeake, &c. 
 
 Canal Co. 671 
 
 v. Christianson 407, 418 
 
 v. Morgan 365 
 v. Mumford 63, 64, 1508, 1679 
 v. Pavne 986, 1017, 1576, 1584 
 
 v Peckham 1021, 1476 
 
 v. Phillips 844 
 
 v Pryor 1062 
 
 V Randall 1320 
 v. Richardson 1638 
 v. Riehford 954 
 v. Sanderson 1638 
 
 Randall v. Songer 1002 
 
 v. Venabie 2391 
 
 Raudell, In re, Randell v. Dixon 13 
 Handheld v. Randrield 1742, 1743, 
 1744 
 Randie v Adams 1160 
 
 v Boyd 986 
 
 Randolph v. Daly 269, 338, 344, 368 
 v Dickenson 110, 1507, 1546 
 
 v. Glos 850 
 
 v. N. J West Line R. Co. 1961 
 v Rmdolph 641, 1578 
 
 v Rosser 1377, 1463 
 
 Randolph's Appeal 982, 1552 
 
 Randon v. Cartwright 1580 
 
 Rands v. Pushmau 1318 
 
 Raney v. Kirk 892 
 
 Ranger v. Champion Cotton- 
 Press Co 26, 559 
 v. Great Western Rv. Co 145, 
 582, 671, 1534, 1535, 1537, 1821 
 Rangley v Webster 458 
 Ranken v East and West India 
 Docks R'way Co. 1662, 1663 
 v. Harwood 1615 
 Rankin V Harwood 1615 
 v. Hnskisson 1654, 1663 
 v. Maxwell 838 
 Ranking, Re 202, 203, 1611 
 Ranning v Reeves 1081 
 Ransom v Davis 1301 
 v. Geer 191, 227, 390, 991 
 v. Stonington Savings Bank 146, 
 
 735 
 1359 
 
 lfiSO 
 378 
 
 1128 
 760 
 
 Ransome v. Burgess 
 Rantzen v. Rothschild 
 Raper t». Sanders 
 Raphael v Bank of England 
 v. Birdwood 
 V. Boehm 1251, 1260, 1420 
 
 2'. Ongley 448 
 
 v Thames Valley R. Co. 1657 
 
 Rapier v. Gulf City Paper Co. 340, 
 860 
 Rar & Del, Bay R. Co. v. Del. 
 & Rar. Canal & C. & A. R. 
 and T. Cos. 2323 
 
 Rasbotham v. Shropshire Union 
 
 Rv. Co. 720 
 
 Rushleigh v. Dayman 972, 973 
 
 Rashley v Masters 1383, 1411, 1414 
 
 Ratcliff v Roper 455 
 
 v. 8tretch 369 
 
 Ratcliffe v. Winch 1616, 1617,2060 
 
 Rathbone v. Eckford 796 
 
 v. Warner 1680 
 
 Rather v Young 1029 
 
 Ratteubury v. Fenton 660, 1482 
 
 Rattison v. Hull l'J95 
 
 Rattray v. Bishop 1673, 1683 
 
 v . Darley 1552 
 
 v. George 42 
 
 Ratzer r Hatzer 633, 1470 
 
 Rau v Robertson 1461 
 
 v Von Zedlitz 236, 1548 
 
 Raub v. Masonic M. R. Ass'n 1461 
 
 Raupman v. Evausville 1081 
 
 Raven r Kerl 71, 1347 
 
 Rawlings v. Lambert 201 , 318, 385, 
 
 419, 425, 598, 1602 
 
 v Rawlings 1576 
 
 Rawlins r Desborough 1104 
 
 v. M'Mahon 203, 1809 
 
 v. Powel 779, 1489 
 
 v. Wickham 905, 915, 1400. 2237 
 
 Rawlinson v. Moss 1844. 1848 
 
 v. Stringer 1051, 1059 
 
 Rawnsley v. Trenton Mut. Ins. 
 
 Co. 1715 
 
 Raworth v. Parker 824, 826 
 
 Rawson, Ex parte 1584 
 
 v. Copland 1238 
 
 v. Samuel 972 
 
 Rawstone v. Preston Corporation 571 
 Rawstorne v. Bentley 1658 
 
 Ray r. 1055 
 
 v. Conner 1030, 1602 
 
 Ray v. Conners 
 
 v. Doughty 
 
 v. Feu wick 
 
 v. Lines 
 
 v. Oliver 
 
 v. Walton 
 
 v. Womble 
 Rayl v. Hammond 
 Rayley v. Best 
 
 1591 
 
 1(>76 
 199 
 
 1638 
 
 1269 
 906 
 408 
 
 1381 
 209, 1164 
 
 Raymond v . Boston Woven Hose 
 
 Co. 
 
 v Brown 
 
 v . Came 
 
 v. Isham 
 
 v. Lakeman 
 
 v. Russell 
 
 v, Simonson 
 
 v. State 
 
 v . Tapson 
 Rayner, Re 
 
 v. Castlee 
 
 v. Jones 
 
 v. Julian 
 
 v . Koehler 
 
 t>. Oastler 
 
 v. Pearsall 
 
 v . Stone 
 Raynes v. Wyse 
 
 1642 
 
 884,912 
 
 1249 
 
 1258 
 
 1288, 1291, 1450 
 
 573 
 
 542,641,692 
 
 129 
 
 901 
 
 160 
 
 640 
 
 1120 
 
 335,586 
 
 319 
 
 650 
 
 641 
 
 1660 
 
 1700, 1701 
 
 Raynham Congregational Society 
 v. Raynham Fund 630 
 
 Raynor v. Mintzer 
 Rea v. Longstreet 
 
 v. Rea 
 Reab v. M'AUister 
 Read, Re 
 
 v. Barton 
 
 v. Consequa 
 
 v. Cramer 
 
 v. Dews 
 
 v. Fite 
 
 v. Patterson 
 
 v. Prest 
 
 v. Read 
 
 v. Wotton 
 Read's, Sir Thomas, Case 
 Readdy v. Pendergast 
 Reade v Bentley 
 
 v. Lacy 
 
 v Sparkes 
 
 v Woodroffe 
 
 Reading v. Ford 
 
 v. Stover 
 
 Dispensary, Re 
 Ready v. Munday 
 
 v. Scott 
 Reagan v. Bishop 
 
 v. Evans 
 
 256 
 
 1624 
 
 894 
 
 1253 
 
 1317 
 
 592, 785, 1439 
 
 413, 748, 1672 
 
 378, 379, 382 
 
 1670, 1672, 1683 
 
 1795 
 
 243 
 
 222, 980 
 
 1165 
 
 334 
 
 1050 
 
 852 
 
 1443 
 
 2314 
 
 1406, 1413 
 
 300, 621, 720, 727, 
 
 760 
 
 829 
 
 586 
 
 1854 
 
 666 
 
 582 
 
 1290 
 
 418 
 
 Real Estate Associates v. San 
 
 F'raucisco Supr. Court 1735 
 Real P. A. Co. v. McCarthy 1449 
 
 Rearden v. Minter 1134 
 
 Reay, Re 880 
 
 v. Raynor 407 
 
 Reckefus v. Lyon 334 
 
 Rector v. Fitzgerald 1580 
 
 v. Mark 1253 
 
 v. Rector 842 
 
 Redding v. Wilkes 365 
 
 v Wright 933 
 
 Reddington v. Lanahan 1556 
 
 Redeeker v. Bowen 1163 
 
 Redfearn v . Sowerby 1844 
 Redfern v. Redfern 564, 717, 1824 
 Redfield v. Genesee Co., Super- 
 
 visors of 
 
 v Gleason 
 Redin v. Branhan 
 Red Jacket Tribe v. Hofl 
 Redman v. Forman 
 Redmond v. Dana 
 
 v. Dickerson 
 Redondo v. Chaytor 
 Reece, Re 
 
 1565 
 380 
 557 
 589 
 
 1638 
 
 346 
 
 545 
 
 28, 53, 359 
 
 1443 
 
 J?e, Gould V. Dummett 1012 
 
 v. Reece 1013, 1136, 1470 
 
 v. Taylor 1037, 1039. 1041
 
 Reece v. Trye 578, 1834 
 
 Reed v. Bauk of Newbury 550 
 
 v. Barton 449, 1U45 
 
 v. Brooks 1284 
 
 v. Clark 84!) 
 
 v. Clarke 550 
 
 v. Conococheque Bank 24 
 
 v. Cumberland, &c. Canal Co. 10 
 
 v. Cumberland M. F. Ins. Co. 590, 
 
 726, 759 
 
 v. Dews 1640 
 
 v. Don Pedro Mining Co. 992 
 
 v. Holliday 1643 
 
 v. Jones 1222, 1236, 1250, 1300, 
 
 1301, 1315 
 
 v. Kemp 1553 
 
 v Lawrence 1120 
 
 v Noe 989 
 
 v. O'Brien 368 
 
 v. Prest 905, 906 
 
 v. Reed 216, 334, 845, 1232, 1242, 
 
 1243, 1244, 1245, 1248, 1252, 
 
 1259, 12H8 
 
 v Rens. Glass Manuf. Co 1253 
 
 v. Warner 736 
 
 Reeder v. Machen 1461 
 
 Reeks, Re 188 
 
 Rees, Ex parte 1854, 1 56 
 
 Re 438, 1593 
 
 v. Bradley 448 
 
 v Evans 347 
 
 v. Lawless 838 
 
 v. Metropolitan Board of 
 
 Works 1233 
 
 v. Peltzer 1666 
 
 v. Richmond 243 
 
 v. Smith 10!)7 
 
 v. Waters 90 
 
 Reese v. Copeland 1286 
 
 v. Kinkead 324 
 
 v. Reese 586 
 
 Reese Kiver Silver Mining Co. 
 
 v. At well 59, 225, 405 
 
 v. Smith 1503 
 
 Reeve, lie 1213, 1428 
 
 v Attorney-General 131, 133 
 
 v. Dalby 108, 636 
 
 v. Gibson 1434 
 
 v. Goodwin 1771 
 
 v. Hodson 506, 865, 872, 1115, 1559 
 
 v. Parkins 1652 
 
 v. Reeve 1261 
 
 v. Richer 223 
 
 v. Whitmore 1228 
 
 Reeves ». Adams 296 
 
 v. Baker 348, 814 
 
 v. Cooper 1623 
 
 v. Glastonbury Canal Co. 993 
 
 v. Greenwich Tanning Co. 543 
 
 v. Neville 1765 
 
 v People 106:) 
 
 v. Reeves 1158 
 
 Reformed Dutch Church v. Fox 1003 
 
 Hegeustein i'. Pearstein 1777 
 
 Regiua (See R.) 
 
 Regla v. Martin 174 
 
 Re hden v Wesley 821 , 823 , 824 
 
 Rehkopf v. Kuhland 1168 
 
 Reichel v. Magratb. 354, 728 
 
 Reid, Ec parte 360 
 
 v. Atlanta 1638 
 
 v. Barton 1439, 2129 
 
 v. Bead 584 
 
 v. Explosives Co. 1743 
 
 v. Gilford 203, 1639, 1676 
 
 v. Huff 1209 
 
 v. Langlois 576, 577, 944, 
 
 1825, 1834 
 
 v. McCallister 843 
 
 v- Middleton 1742, 1743 
 
 v. Morton 1274 
 
 v. Reid 102 
 
 v. Steam 1567 
 
 v. Stuart 1507, 2056 
 
 v. Vanderheyden 217, 1461 
 
 Reifsnider v. American Imp. P. 
 
 Co. 149, 536 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Reilly v Reilly 659, 790 
 
 Reimers v. Druce 664 
 
 Reinbeek, The 633 
 
 Reiner v. Marquis of Salisbury 51, 
 133, 629, 1556, 1558 
 Reinhardt v. Meutasti 261, 1638 
 
 Reiustadler v. Reeves 636 
 
 lieissner v. Anuess 607 
 
 Remer v Mackay 149 
 
 v. McKay 1548 
 
 Remingtou v. Foster 630 
 
 Remington Paper Co. v. La. 
 
 Printing Co. 1743 
 
 Remnant v. Hood 730, 1376, 143-' 
 Remsen v. Remsen 857, 1171, 118 >, 
 1191, ll94, 1195, 1221, 1222, 
 1227, 1296, 13 il 
 Renals v. Cowlishaw 324, 1654 
 
 Reoard V. Livinstein 1670 
 
 Rend v. Venture Oil Co. 1638 
 
 Rendall v. CrystalPalace Co. 1650 
 v. Rendall 1725, 1726 
 
 Rendell v. Carpenter 642 
 
 Rendle v. Metropolitan & Pro- 
 vincial Bank 888, 944 
 v. Rendle 1648 
 Renfro v. Goetter 1548 
 Renick v. Ludington 991 
 Rennell v Kimball 1300, 1317 
 Reno v. Hale 1271 
 Renshaw v Taylor 283 
 Rentfroe v. Dickinson 967, 1675 
 Renton v. Chaplin 1727 
 Renvoize v. Cooper 194, 216, 221, 
 1000 
 Renwick v. Macomb 194, 277 
 v Wilson 402, 412, 413, 424 
 Repplier v. Buck 379 
 Republic of Chili v. Rothschild 20 
 Republic of Costa Rica v. Er- 
 
 langer 18, 19, 20, 27, 32, 
 
 141 
 
 v. Strousberg 1661 
 
 Kepulilie of Honduras?'. Soto 18 
 
 Republic of Liberia v Imperial 
 
 Bank IS, 19, 507, 801 
 
 v. Roye 19, 20, 26, 141, 507 
 
 Republic of Paraguay, Ex 
 
 parte 1025 
 
 v. Lynch 1070 
 
 Republic of Peru v Dreyfus 18, 
 
 567 
 
 v. Peruvian Guano Co. 18, 354, 
 
 542 
 
 t\ Ruzo 868 
 
 v. Weguelin 19, 141, 1471 
 
 Requa v Rea 1281, 1286, 1290 
 
 Res pass v. Breckenrid^e 1158 
 
 v. McClanahan 1576, 1578, 157!) 
 
 v. Morton 1505 
 
 Rt-spulilica v. De Longchamps 142 
 
 Rettig c. Newman 782 
 
 Retzer v. Wood 560 
 
 Reuben v Thompson 454 
 
 Reubens v. .loel 313 
 
 Revell v. Rlake 66 
 
 Revere v. Boston Copper Co. 26, 
 
 144 
 
 v. Boston Cotton Co. 1661 
 
 Revill, He 1366 
 
 Revolk v. Kraemer 1628 
 
 Rex (See R.) 
 
 Reyburn v Mitchell 407 
 
 Reynell v. Sprve 298, 388, 578, 1 166, 
 
 1614, 1682, 1824, 1828, 1829, 
 
 1834 
 
 Reynes ?\ Dumont 1621 
 
 Reynolds, Ex parte 60, 553, 564, 
 
 717, 942, 1103 
 
 Re . 99, 1047, 1451 
 
 v. Rank 1071 
 
 v. Blake 1276 
 
 v. Bullock 1660 
 
 v. Crawfordsville Bank 642, 829 
 
 v. Everett 1679 
 
 v First Nat. Bank 794 
 
 v. Godlee 578, 1827, 1837 
 
 CI 
 
 Reynolds v. Hennessy 659, 790 
 
 v. Howell 308,309, 851 
 
 v. Jones 747, 897 
 
 v. Lewis 1615 
 
 v. McMillan 1845 
 
 v. Morris 860 
 
 v. Nelson 805 
 
 v. Pharr 846 
 
 v. Pitt 1658, 1659 
 
 v. Reynolds 851, 1576 
 
 v. Stockton 1743, 1765 
 
 Reynoldson v. Perkins 264, 265, 
 998 
 
 Rhea v. Allison 676 
 
 v. Puryear 418 
 
 v. Rhenner 88 
 
 Rheinstein v. Bixby 1734 
 
 Rlioads v. Rhoads 68 
 
 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts 2, 
 17, 604, 607, 695 
 
 Rhodes, Re 850 
 
 In re, Rhodes v. Rhodes 85 
 
 v. Buckland 1652 
 
 v. Cousins 1698, 1699, 1700, 1702, 
 1707, 1708 
 v. Dawson 26, 29, 32, 1571 
 
 v. Dunbar 1635 
 
 v. Hayne 810 
 
 v Mostyn, Lord 1717, 1718 
 
 v. Moxhay 284 
 
 v. Rhodes 868, 1189, 1327 
 
 v. Swithenbank 68 
 
 v. Williams 994 
 
 Rhymney Railway v Rhymney 
 Iron Co. 383 
 
 Ricardo v. Cooper 417 
 
 v . Garcias 664 
 
 Ricards, Ex parte 1357 
 
 Rice, He 1841 
 
 v. First Division, &c. R. Co. 
 
 1461 
 v. Gordon 1835 
 
 v. Hale 395, 1698, 1699, 1703, 1707, 
 1709, 1711, 2103, 2329 
 v. Hosiery Co. 360 
 
 v. Howard 1099 
 
 v. Hunt 293. 298 
 
 v. Merrimack Hosiery Co. 314, 
 843 
 v. Orgies 1423 
 
 v. Peet 83 
 
 v. Rice 1178 
 
 v. Tobias 1675 
 
 v. Yakima & P. C. R. Co. 586 
 
 Rich v. Austin 844 
 
 v. Brav 553 
 
 v. f'ockell 100 
 
 v. Thomas 1668 
 
 Richards, Ex parte 1389 
 
 Re 674 
 
 v. Allis 790, 986 
 
 v. Barlow 1409 
 
 v. Butcher 1648 
 
 v. Butler 316, 1556 
 
 v. Chambers 98, 186 
 
 v. Chave 1725 
 
 v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. 
 
 1733 
 v. Cooper 214 
 
 V. Curlewis 822, 890 
 
 v. Dadley 533 
 
 v. Davies 332 
 
 v. Evans 370 
 
 v. Griffith 674 
 
 v. Jackson 571 
 
 v. Mackall 560 
 
 v. Millett 109 
 
 v. Morris Canal, &c. Co. 1213, 
 1309,1310 1811 
 v. Perkins 1722, 1723 
 
 v. Pierce 334, 338, 341 
 
 v. Platel 1477, 1482, 1612. 1843 
 v. Revitt 1657 
 
 v. Richards 114, 220, 365, 1752 
 v. Rose 1136 
 
 v. Salter 1563, 1564, 1568, 158U, 
 2004
 
 cii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging. ] 
 
 Richards v. Scarborough Market 
 Co. 404, 1847 
 
 v. Swan 1364 
 
 v. S vines 1112,1123 
 
 v. Todd V6M, 1548 
 
 v. Travellers' Ins Co. 843 
 
 v. Watkms 1823, 1824, 1825 
 
 v. West lti 1 3 
 
 v. Wood 1027, 1481 
 
 Richardson, Re 143i 
 
 v. Allan 1101 
 
 v. bank of England 1777, 1780, 
 1781, 1782 
 v. Brooks 334 
 
 v. Davidson 1018 
 
 v. Douehoo 759 
 
 v. Eyton 796, 1588 
 
 v. Keary 1103 
 
 v. Fisher 1133 
 
 v. Gilbert 320, 367 
 
 v. Golden 924, 951 
 
 v. Hadsall 212 
 
 v. Hastings 190, 237, 240, 243, 
 591, 600, 1827, 1837, 2086 
 v. Horton 1303, 1306 
 
 v. Huluert 247 
 
 v. Jenkins 1437 
 
 v. Jones 1042, 1061, 1462 
 
 v. Larpent 239, 241, 243 
 
 v. Leake 645 
 
 v. Lightfoot 1677 
 
 v. M'Kinson 334 
 
 v. Miller 71 
 
 v. Peacock 1654 
 
 v. Richardson 42, 43, 409, 647 
 
 v. Rusbridger 1431 
 
 v. Scott 1661 
 
 v. Wallace 779, 782 
 
 v. Wallis 1239 
 
 v. Ward 1261, 1321, 1764, 1765 
 v. Younge 651 
 
 Riches v. Owen 60 
 
 Richmond v. Adams Nat Bank 83 
 v. Gray 369. 989, 1031 
 
 v. Dubuque R Co. 1682 
 
 v. Irons 236, 402, 405, 407, 418, 
 1210 
 v. Richmond 848, 961, 1116 
 
 v. Tayleur 164, 165, 173, 174, 
 
 1584 
 v. White 1425, 1778 
 
 v. Yates 1720 
 
 Richmond, Duke of v. Miln 46 
 
 Richmond Enquirer v. Robin- 
 son 1625 
 Richter v. Jerome 933 
 v. Union Trust Co. 933 
 Richwiuev. Presbyterian Church 
 
 1517 
 
 Rickard v. Talbird 1166 
 
 Rickards v. Attorney-General 349, 
 
 1463, 1492, 1503 
 
 t>. Hough 919 
 
 v. Murdork 1100 
 
 v. Rickards 1163 
 
 Rickcord v. Nedriff 447 
 
 Ricker v. Alsop 224 
 
 v. Brooks 334 
 
 v. Powell 1584 
 
 Ricketson V. Merrill 1411 
 
 Rirkett v. Johnson 1628 
 
 Ricketts v. Lewis 15"] 
 
 v. Martin 1025 
 
 v. Mornington 505 980 
 
 V. Turquand 876, 1075, 1383 
 
 Ricks v. Baskett 557 
 
 Rico v. Gualtier 1702, 170.3 
 
 Ridabock v. Lew 1481 
 
 Riddell v. Errington 98 
 
 Riddle v Bowman 1245 
 
 r. Motley 584,1515,1531 
 
 v. Whitehill 641 
 
 Rideout, fie 564. 849 
 
 Rider v. Bngley 1716 
 
 v. Kidder 453, 1045 
 
 Ridgeley v. Warfield 607 
 
 Ridgely v. Bond 235, 363, 1527, 1528 
 
 Ridgeway v. Darwin 1229 
 
 v. Toram 1580 
 
 Ridgley v. Riggs 363 
 
 Ridgway v. Bank of Teun. 1625 
 
 r. Clare 194li 
 
 v. Edwards 156 
 
 v. Ewbauk 1096 
 
 v. Gray 1283 
 
 v Kyunersley 710 
 
 v. Newstead 1474 
 
 v Phillips 1097 
 
 v. Roberts 1079, 1640 
 
 v Wharton 657 
 
 Ridifer v O'Brien 1226, 1317 
 
 Riding V. Hawkins 417 
 
 Ridings v. Johnson 283, 313, 630 
 
 Ridler v. Ridler 9, 83 
 
 Ridley v. Obee 780 
 
 v. Ridley 891,914,1316 
 
 v. Tiplady 1331 
 
 Ridout v. Plymouth, Earl of 
 
 1737 
 Ridsdale Allanbee v. Great 
 
 Western Ry. Co. 448 
 
 Riegel v. American Life Ins. 
 
 Co 713 
 
 Rigby v. Connol 1652, 1653 
 
 v. Great Western Ry. Co. 1148, 
 
 1640 
 
 v. Macnamara 1285, 1292 
 
 v. Rigby 516, 624, 731, 777, 1829 
 
 v. Strangways 432, 797 
 
 Rigdon v. Conley 720 
 
 Rigg v. Hancock 378, 1614 
 
 v. Wall 968, 970, 979 
 
 Riggs v. Dickinson 1156 
 
 r Huffman 1579 
 
 v. Murray 1468 
 
 Riley, Re 1029 
 
 v. Carter 324 
 
 v. Croydon 791 
 
 v. Lyons 634. 683 
 
 v. Western Union Tel Co. 1661 
 
 Riudskopf, Re 933 
 
 v. Platto 1556 
 
 Rinehart v. Long 334 
 
 v Rinehart 227 
 
 Ringgold v. Jones 898, 951. 1073 
 
 v. Ringgold 1003, 1253. 1259, 
 
 1260, 1369 
 
 v. Stone 324, 702 
 
 Ringgold's Case 1459, 1460, 1468 
 
 Ringo v. Woodruff 1548 
 
 Ringold v. Jones 1250 
 
 Ringrose v. Todd 1124 
 
 Ringwalt v. Ahl 1117 
 
 Rio Grande R Co. v Scanlan 1661 
 
 Riopelle v Doellner 1550, 1557 
 
 Ripley v Moysey 1428 
 
 V. Sawyer 170 
 
 v. Warren 546 
 
 v. Waterworth 261 
 
 v. Woods 122 
 
 Ripon v Hobart 1629 
 
 Rippe r. Stogdill 334 
 
 Rippon v. Priest 877 
 
 Risca Coal Co., lie 807, 980, 1016. 
 
 1473 
 
 Riselev V. Sheppard 865, 1543 
 
 Rishton v. Grissell 771, 1221, 1250. 
 
 1296 
 
 Ri-t v. Hobson 365 
 
 Ritchie v. Aylwin 607 
 
 v. Howsfie'ld 1134 
 
 v Broadbent 98 
 
 v Humberstone 797 
 
 v. Williams 1772 
 
 Ritter's Appeal 643 
 
 Rirtson v. Stordy 47 
 
 River Steamer Co., Re 646 
 
 Rivers v Gregg 1360 
 
 Roach v. Garvan 887, 1069, 1861, 
 
 ia52 
 
 V. Hillings 312 
 
 v Rutherford 989 
 
 Rnake v. Kidd 989 
 
 Roane v. Pickett 271 
 
 Roanoke Gas Co. v. Roanoke 860 
 
 Roath v. Driscoll 1639 
 
 v. Smith 221 
 
 Robarts v. Buee 1408, 1846 
 
 V. L lay ton 1561 
 
 Robb v. Carnegie 1638 
 
 Robbins v, Abrahams 182 
 
 v. Arnold 2511 
 
 v. Codman 850 
 
 v. Cooper 2' 37 
 
 v. Goldingham 1844 
 
 v. Robbius 169 
 
 v. Sand Creek T. Co. 334 
 
 Roberdeau v. Rous 543, 555, 584 
 
 Robert V. Brice 1265 
 
 Robert Gere Bank v. Innian 340 
 
 Roberts, Re 101, 1254, 1411, 1482, 
 
 1616, 1745, 1798 
 
 v. Anderson 868, 1669, 1677 
 
 v. Ball 1042, 1065, 1455 
 
 v. Birgess 844, 10^7 
 
 V. Chamberlain 256 
 
 v. Clayton 321, 589 
 
 v. Collett 96, 97 
 
 v. Eberhardt 332, 1727, 1728 
 
 V. Evans 87, 109 
 
 v. Hartley 612, 690 
 
 v. Hodges 1675 
 
 v. Hughes 710, 1128, 1131, 1282 
 
 v. Johns 1168 
 
 V. Jones 696 
 
 v. Kelly 847 
 
 v. Kendall 933 
 
 v. Kerslake 1149, 1384 
 
 v. Kuights 45, 48, 629 
 
 v. Kuffin 668 
 
 v. Le Hir 700 
 
 v. Lloyd 42 
 
 v. Madocks 319, 6"5 
 
 v. Marchant 286, 1484 
 
 v. Moreton 61 
 
 v. Morgan 1791 
 
 V. Oppenheim 573, 1838 
 
 v. Peavey 1549 
 
 v. Quincv, 0. & K. R Co 815 
 
 v. Roberts 228, 316, 795,850, 977. 
 
 1290, 1380, 1652 
 
 v. Russell 135 
 
 v. Salisbury 844, 846, 1462 
 
 v. Scoones 1384 
 
 v. Stanton 161 
 
 v. Starke 334 
 
 v. Stower 1051 
 
 v. Tennell 837 
 
 v. Totty 1468 
 
 v. Tunstali 269 
 
 v. Walker 56, 58, 1430, 2182 
 
 v. Walley 579 
 
 v. White 1081 
 
 v. Williams 370, 1307, 1391 
 
 Robertshaw v. Bray 1775 
 
 Robertson, Re 1847 
 
 v. Archer 1228 
 
 v. Armstrong 248 
 
 V Barbour 874 
 
 v. Biugley 547, 617, 787, 987, 1462 
 
 v. Campbell 1635 
 
 v. Carson 149 
 
 v. Crawford 518 
 
 v. Great Western Ry Co. 230 
 
 v. Howard 543 
 
 v. Kemble 202, 204 
 
 r. Londonderry, Lord 583 
 
 r. Lubbock ' 702 
 
 v Miller 524, 526, 529, 1026, 1027 
 
 V. Nnrris 1225 
 
 v. Quiddington 1660 
 
 v. Robertson 37, 38. 39 
 
 v. Scott 316. 1779 
 
 v. Shewell 1828 
 
 v. Skelton 1275. 1282 
 
 v. Southgate 159, 230, 1525, 1527, 
 
 1529 
 
 v. Stevens 341,342 
 
 v. Wilkie 48, 1703 
 
 v. Winch 1697 
 
 v. Winchester 1029, 1553
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 cm 
 
 Robeson v. Pittinger 1638 
 
 Robin, The 1444 
 
 Robins, lie 99 
 
 v. Hodgson 283 
 
 Robinson, Ex parte 1019, 1841 
 
 Re 113 
 
 Re, Robinson v. Robinson 92 
 
 v. Allison 190 
 
 v, Anderson 1073 
 
 v. Aston 162, 177, 475 
 
 v Atlantic Ry. Co. 1743 
 
 v. Bailey 1542 
 
 v Battle House Co. 855 
 
 v. Baugh 303 
 
 v. Belt 1029 
 
 v. Bingley 589 
 
 v Bland 1224 
 
 v. Brown 867 
 
 v Brutton 36 
 
 v. Byron, Lord 1631. 1632, 1639, 
 1662, 1668, 1672, 1683, 1687 
 v. Campbell 1 
 
 v. Cook 1126, 1127 
 
 v. Cooper 171. 839 
 
 v. Cropsey 1381 
 
 v. Cross 334, 335 
 
 v. Cumming 1228, 1251, 1256 
 
 v. Dart 186 
 
 v. Davies 919 
 
 v Dhuleep Singh 245, 867 
 
 v. Dix 559 
 
 v. Dolores Land Co. 324 
 
 v. Drakes 1491 
 
 v. Elliott 1424 
 
 v. Frainpton 1524 
 
 v Galland 1053 
 
 v. Gallier 850 
 
 v. Govers 1540 
 
 v. Guild 334, 342, 344, 584 
 
 v. Iladley 1734 
 
 v. Hardin 847 
 
 v. Harrison 1610 
 
 v. Hiutrager 217 
 
 v Hook 560 
 
 v. India Chartered Bank 602 
 
 v. International Life Ins. Co. 51 
 v. Jenkins 1561 
 
 v Joplin 1624 
 
 v. Kitchin 566 
 
 v. Lewis 1475 
 
 v. Litton 67, 1630 
 
 v. Lowater 826 
 
 v. Mandell 840 
 
 v. Manuelle 1015 
 
 v. Missisquoi R. Co. 4u2 
 
 v. Nash 512, 536 
 
 v. Newdick 1024, 1026 
 
 v. Norton 63, 64, 814, 1542 
 
 v. Pett 12*3, 1234, 1413 
 
 v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 679, 
 855 
 v. Pickering 186, 187 
 
 v. Preswick 1630 
 
 v. Reid 1625 
 
 v. Reynolds 88, 179 
 
 v. Robinson 220, 334, 1586, 2262 
 v. Rokeby, Lord 442, 445 
 
 v. Rosher 71) 1 
 
 v. Rudkins 1019 
 
 v. Sampson 841, 1479, 1575 
 
 v Satterlee 2391 
 
 V Scotney 1229 
 
 v. Simmons 1320 
 
 v. Smith 26, 190 287, 290. 292, 
 558, 564, 588, 604 
 v. Springfield Co. 197, 334 
 
 v. Stewart 843, 847 
 
 v. Stigleman 844 
 
 v. Taylor 1473, 1483. 1734 
 
 K Thompson 581,586 
 
 v. Townsend 525 
 
 v. Wall 1458, 1555, 1559 
 
 v. Wheeler 1621, 1625 
 
 v. Williamson 1126 
 
 v. Wood 1306, lt;94 
 
 t>. Woodgafe 726 
 
 Robinson's Trusts, Re 1030 
 
 Robinson Tobacco Co. v. Phil- 
 lips 855 
 Robsou, Re 133 
 v. Cranwell 11)26 
 v. Devon, Earl of 159, 521, 808, 
 815, 1397 
 v. Dodds 240, 245, 399, 1070 
 v. Flight 721.843 
 v. Wnittinghain 995, 1072, 1081. 
 1638 
 Roby i'. Cossitt 544 
 v. Scholes 1044 
 Roch v. Callen 1422 
 Rochdale Caoal Co v. King 3^4, 
 485, 760, 1657, 1678, 1819, 1822 
 Roche v. Morgell 378. 381, 611, 613, 
 616, 619, 669, 670 
 Rochester, Re 1770 
 i\ Anderson 381 
 v. Lee 790 
 Rochester, Corp of v. Lee 21, 9!i5, 
 1137, 1148. 1149, 1464 
 Rochester, Major, &c, of v 
 
 Curtiss 1664, 1670 
 
 Rochester Distilling Co. v. Dev- 
 
 endorf 817 
 
 Rochester, H. & L R. Co. v. 
 
 New York, &c. R. Co. 1684 
 
 Rochester R. Co v. Robinson 313 
 Rochfort c. Battersby 59, 157, 1496 
 Rock v. Cook 1064, 1744 
 
 v. Mathews 1G68 
 
 Rock Portland Cement Co. v. 
 
 Wilson 1082 
 
 Rocke v. Hart 1416 
 
 Rockwell ik Folsom 933, !»37 
 
 V. Morgan 347, 1202 
 
 Rodlaui o Hetherington 81, 17o4, 
 
 1706, 1707, 1713 
 
 v. Morley 658 
 
 Roderigas v. East River Savings 
 
 Institution 1507 
 
 Rodes v Blythe 1260 
 
 Rodgers t>. Dibrell 1576 
 
 v. Ellison 444 
 
 v. Jones 418 
 
 v. Nowill 1112, 1113, 1136, 1147, 
 
 1642, 1649, 1681 
 
 v Rodgers 406, 1677 
 
 Rodick v. Gandell 1827 
 
 Hodman v. Forline 1492 
 
 Rodney v. Hare 829. 834, 983 
 
 Roe v. Davies 384, 861, 890, 1058, 
 
 1451 
 
 v. Gudgeon 1781 
 
 Roemer v. Neumann 517. 1019, 1031 
 
 v. Simon 1019. 1504 
 
 Roffey, Ex parte 642 
 
 v Bent 1089 
 
 v. Miller 63, 1525 
 
 Rogers, Ex parte 1051 
 
 v. Abbott 1643 
 
 v. Acaster 119, 123, 127 
 
 v. Blackwell 334 
 
 v. Burton 1099 
 
 v. Challis 1081 
 
 v. Cincinnati 1627 
 
 v. Clark D55 
 
 v. Cruger 169, 734, 753, 1497 
 
 v. Danforth 1668 
 
 v. De Forrest 424 
 
 v. Duhart 313 
 
 v. Fryer 412 
 
 v. Goore 970 
 
 v. Gore 834 
 
 v. Holly 1403 
 
 v. Hooper 38, 830 
 
 v. Horn 110, 307, 973, 974, 1"31 
 
 v Hosack 141)3 
 
 v. Hull Dock Co. 1650 
 
 v. Jones 203, 1444 
 
 v. King 635 
 
 r. Kirkpatrick 493 
 
 v. Lambert 1561 
 
 v. Linton 150, 219 
 
 v. M'Maeham 1550 
 
 v. Maddocks 1655 
 
 Rogers v. Marshall 870 
 
 v. Mitchell 829, 844, 845, 982 
 
 v. N. Y. & T L. Co. 313, 378 
 
 v. Parker 1625 
 
 v. I'aterson 504, 1481, 1591 
 
 v. Rathbuu 386 
 
 v. Reissner 1120 
 
 v. Rogers 257, 294, 401, 402. 415, 
 
 418. 424, 552, 1008, 1018, 
 
 1028, 1080, 1074, 1369, 137'), 
 
 1460, 1600, 177'.', 1793 
 
 v. Ross 1426, 1427. 1724 
 
 v. Saunders 369 
 
 v. Solomons 407, 1530 
 
 v. Thomas 851 
 
 v . Traders' Ins Co. 198 
 
 v . Van Nortwick 26 
 
 v. Vosburgh 354, 634, 815, 816, 
 
 1618 
 
 v. Ward 187, 361, 368, 1903 
 
 Rogers Locomotive and Machine 
 
 Works v. Erie It. Co. 1662 
 
 Rogers T. Co. v. Mergenthaler L. 
 
 Co. 1642 
 
 Rolfe v. Gregory 560 
 
 v. Harris 1659 
 
 v. Peterson 1(555 
 
 v Rolfe K557 
 
 Hollestot. v. Morton 277 
 
 Rollins v. Forbes 557 
 
 v Henry 1720, 1725 
 
 v. Hinks 1643 
 
 luv. Co. v. George 298 
 
 Rolls v Miller 1662 
 
 v. Yate 195 
 
 Rolt, Re 133 
 
 v. Somerville, Lord 584 
 
 V. White 199 
 
 Romaine v. Hendrickson 243, 374, 
 
 430 
 
 Rome Bank v. Haselson 236 
 
 Rome, &c R. Co. v. Rochester 1663 
 
 Romilly v. Grint 42 
 
 Romine v. State 1381 
 
 c. Vance 992 
 
 Romney v. 750 
 
 Rondanez v. Mayor of New 
 
 Orleans I650 
 
 Rooke v Kensington, Lord 1001, 
 
 2182 
 
 Rookes v. Rookes 1318 
 
 Roome v Nicholson 354 
 
 Hooper v. Harrison 832 
 
 Roosevelt v. Crommelin 45 
 
 V. Ellithorp 1382 
 
 Root v Lake Shore Ry. Co. 630 
 
 v Paine 1062 
 
 v. Ry. Co. 6.TI 
 
 v. Wood worth 1517 
 
 v Woolworth 1584 
 
 Rootham v Dawson 393 
 
 Roots v. Mason City S & M 
 
 Co. ir>51 
 
 Koper, Re, Roper v. Doncaster 109, 
 
 179 
 
 Rr, Taylor v. Bland 1368 
 
 v. Lencion 671 
 
 v. Wren 1258 
 
 Lumber Co v Wallace 313 
 
 Ropes v. Upton 1654 
 
 Roscarrick v. Barton 214 264 
 
 Rose V Blakemore 1103 
 
 v. Brown '.171, 1506 
 
 v. Calland 988, 1401, 1402 
 
 v Clark 197 
 
 v. Clarke 2043 
 
 v. Gannel 547,548,1557, 1572 
 
 !'. King 419 
 
 v. Mvnatt 361, 407, 861 
 
 v. Page 214, 279 
 
 v Rolls 95 
 
 v. West 555 
 
 v. Woodruff 617, 518 
 
 Rosenberg r. Lind ) 1355 
 
 Rosehorough r Rosohorough 1359 
 
 Rosenbaum v. Couucil Bluffs Ins. 
 
 Co. 313
 
 CIV 
 
 Rosenbaum v. Foss 
 
 674 
 
 Rosenkrans v. Snover 
 
 1158 
 
 Rosenthal v. McMaun 
 
 659 
 
 v. Reynolds 
 
 1648 
 
 Roskell v. Whitworth 
 
 1071,1079, 
 
 1080 
 
 1637, 1639 
 
 Ross, Ex parte 
 
 643 
 
 v. Aglionby 
 
 1077 
 
 v. Boswell 
 
 546 
 
 v. Butler 
 
 1635, 1636 
 
 v. Carpenter 406, 420, 2382 
 
 v Colville 
 
 1047 
 
 v. Crary 
 
 217 
 
 v. Ewer 
 
 186 
 
 v. Gibbs 
 
 573, 577 
 
 v. Gutteriuge 
 
 157 
 
 v. Harper 1486, 
 
 1623, 2305 
 
 v New England Ins. Co. 1110 
 
 t;. Page 
 
 1631 
 
 v. Koss 
 
 316, 1779 
 
 v. Shearer 
 
 147, 1689 
 
 t'. Tatham 
 
 1207 
 
 v. Union Pacific R. Co. 
 
 1663 
 
 v. Wharton 
 
 117 
 
 V. Williams 
 
 1766 
 
 v. Woodford 
 
 892 
 
 v. Woods 
 
 1625 
 
 Rosse v. Rust 
 
 994 
 
 Rossiter v. Miller 
 
 655, 990 
 
 * Pitt 
 
 859 
 
 Ro-well's Case 
 
 1630 
 
 Rotherham v. Battson 
 
 1404 
 
 Rothschild v. Portugal, Queen of '20 
 
 v. Whitman 
 
 542 
 
 Rothwell v. Benshall 
 
 178 
 
 v. King 
 
 576 
 
 v. Rothwell 
 
 1172, 1773, 
 
 
 1780 
 
 Rouche v. Williamson 
 
 46 
 
 Roudabush v. Miller 
 
 1286 
 
 Rough v Simmons 
 
 314 
 
 Roulston v Ralston 
 
 351 
 
 Round v . Bell 
 
 653 
 
 Roundell v. Breary 
 
 1003 
 
 v. Currer 
 
 1543, 1799 
 
 Roundlett v. Jordan 
 
 841 
 
 Roundtree v. Gordon 
 
 846 
 
 Rourke, Re 
 
 135 
 
 Rouse v Jones 
 
 1615, 1616 
 
 Rouskulp v Kershner 
 
 542,694 
 
 Routh v. Kinder 
 
 248 
 
 v Peach 
 
 371 
 
 v. Webster 
 
 1648 
 
 Routledge v. Low 
 
 46, 1643 
 
 Roveray v. Grayson 
 
 151 
 
 Row, lie 
 
 99 
 
 v. Row 
 
 1429, 1430 
 
 Rowan v. Bowles 
 
 326, 361 
 
 v. Mercer 
 
 214 
 
 v. State Bank 
 
 1298 
 
 Rowbotham t». Jones 
 
 303 
 
 Rowe v. 
 
 933,938 
 
 v. Brenton 
 
 1106 
 
 v Granite Bridge 
 
 1637 
 
 v. Gudgeon 
 
 769 
 
 v. Jackson 
 
 106 
 
 V. London School Board 1082 
 
 v. Patterson 
 
 324 
 
 v. Phillips 
 
 658 
 
 v. Teed 
 
 607, 656 
 
 17. Tonkin 
 
 583, 591 
 
 v. White 
 
 2040 
 
 v. Wood 607, 670, 671 
 
 , 672. 1239, 
 
 1624 
 
 1719, 1768 
 
 Rowell v. Jewett 
 
 314 
 
 v. St. Louis 
 
 1115 
 
 Rovt land v. Evans 
 
 203, 1267 
 
 v. Garman 
 
 294 
 
 v. Miller 
 
 1654 
 
 t;. Oakley 
 
 95 
 
 v. Sturgis 829, 881, 
 
 Rowlands v. Tucker 
 
 1437 
 
 Rowlandson v. Fenton 
 
 1097 
 
 Rowlatt v. Cattell 
 
 1594 
 
 Rowley v Adams 1189, 
 
 1192. 1193, 
 
 1198, 1280, 1373, 
 
 1468,1477, 
 
 
 1610 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Rowley v. Benthuysen 987 
 
 v. Burgess 1202 
 
 v. Eccles 358, 600, 603. 680, 702 
 
 v. Ridley 495, 953, 1055 
 
 v. Scales 2 
 
 v. Van Benthuysen 1460, 1462,1463 
 
 v. Williams 694 
 
 Rowley's Appeal 843 
 
 Rownaon, tie, Fields. White 643 
 
 Roworth v. Wilkes 366 
 
 Rowsell v. Morris 201, 280, 288, 292, 
 
 319 
 
 Rowth v Howell 1751 
 
 Rowtou v. Rowton 657 
 
 Roy v. Gibbon 1772, 1773 
 
 Rot al v. Johnson 9!l4 
 
 Royal Mail Packet Co. v. Braham 449 
 
 Royall v. McKenzie 1315 
 
 Royce v. Tarrant 287. 289 
 
 Royds v. Royds 1416, 1419 
 
 Royle, Re, Fryer v. Royle 236, 645 
 
 v. Wynne 816 
 
 Rubber Co. v. Goodyear 536, 1224 
 
 Rubery v. Grant 348 
 
 v. Morris 155 
 
 Ruby *;.Abyssinian Society 1242, 1243 
 
 v. Strother 175 
 
 Rucker v. Howard 1395 
 
 v Scholefield 203, 1009, 1017 
 
 Ruckman v. Astor 1237, 124S 
 
 v. Cory 560 
 
 v. Decker 561, 714, 993, 1017, 
 
 1018 1366 
 
 v. Palisade Land Co. 68, 74 
 
 v. Stephens 87. 215 
 
 Rudd v. Darling 1069 
 
 v. Rowe 794 
 
 v. Speare 176 
 
 Ruddy, Be 205 
 
 Rude v. Whitchurch 839, 1229 
 
 Rudge v. Weedon 87, 179, 181, 538, 
 
 1526 
 
 Rudow v. Great Britain M. L. 
 
 Ass. Society 1406 
 
 Rue v. Meirs 68 
 
 Ruegger i<. Indianapolis R. Co. 634 
 
 Ruffles v. Alston 92 
 
 Ruffner v. Hewitt 190, 1370 
 
 Rufford v Bishop 1297 
 
 Rugan v. Sabiu 560 
 
 Ruge v. Apalachicola 0- C. Co. 1663 
 
 Ruirgles v. Eddy 782 
 
 Ruhling v. Hackett 1971 
 
 Rulluff, Ex parte 232 
 
 Rumbly r. Staiuton 790 
 
 Rumbold v Cowl 670 
 
 v. Forteath 579, 673, 694, 812, 
 
 1337, 1319, 1822, 1831 
 
 Rumney v. Maud 200 
 
 v. Mead 24'J 
 
 v. Walter 1070 
 
 v. Willis 1396 
 
 Rump v. Greenhill 335, 336, 589, 
 
 797, 2086 
 
 Rumsey v. Rumsey 1329 
 
 Rundell v. Marquis of Donegal 214 
 
 v. Murray 1643 
 
 v. Rivers, Lord 1210 
 
 Rundle v Foster 574, 943, 'J44 
 
 v. Rundle 69 
 
 Runge v. Schleicher 852 
 
 Runk v St. John 1751 
 
 Rush, Re 1054, 1555 
 
 v. Higgs 236, 1015 
 
 v. Smith 1102 
 
 Rushbrooke v. Farley 418 
 
 Rushing v. Thompson 1031 
 
 Rushout v. Turner 822 
 
 Rushworth v. Pembroke, Countess 
 
 of 869 
 
 v. Smith 1743 
 
 Rusling v. Bray 1320 
 
 v Rusling 1071 
 
 Ruspini v. Vickery 590 
 
 Russ v. Wilson 1640 
 
 Russell v. Ashby 1699, 1700, 1707, 
 
 1713 
 
 Russell v. Atkinson 
 
 958 
 
 v. Austin 
 
 1166 
 
 V. Ball 
 
 1092 
 
 v. Barstow 
 
 630 
 
 v. Blake 
 
 1242 
 
 v. Buchanan 
 
 1319 
 
 v Cambefort 140, 147, 14!), 445 
 v. Chicago Trust & S. Bank 1120 
 v Clark 652 
 
 v. Clarke 149, 151, 289 
 
 v. Copp 646 
 
 v. Craig 1508 
 
 v. Di' keschied 1556 
 
 v. East Anglian Rv. Co. 1057, 
 
 1058, 1683/1731, 1743, 1744 
 v Ely 652 
 
 v. Fanning 1147 
 
 v. Garrett 334 
 
 v. Gregg 779 
 
 v. Jackson 573, 576, 577, 578, 
 
 1834 
 v Lamb 790, 1548 
 
 v. Lath roo 986 
 
 v. London, Chatham and 
 
 Dover Ry. Co. 1618, 1682 
 
 v. Loring 550, 630 
 
 v. McLellan 1176, 1573 
 
 v. Moffit 845 
 
 v. Pellegrini 1861 
 
 v. Place 659 
 
 v. Plaice 1344 
 
 v Russell 332, 671, 1463 
 
 v. Sharp 75, 76, 163 
 
 v. Shenton 211 
 
 v. Skipwith 49 
 
 v. Smithies 1240, 1242 
 
 v. Southard 1239, 1241 
 
 v. Tapping 1017 
 
 v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. 1752 
 
 v. Wakefield Waterworks Co. 26, 
 
 241, 243 
 
 Russia Cement Co. v. Le Page 1648 
 
 Rust v. Mansfield 8il 
 
 v. Rust 1150 
 
 v. Victoria Graving Dock Co. 211 
 
 Rustomjee v. Reg. 133 
 
 Ruston v. Tobiu 26, 888 
 
 Rutgers v. Hunter 2259 
 
 v Kingsland 1961 
 
 Rutherford, Re 560, 1462 
 
 v. Dawson 1771 
 
 v. Douglas 1726 
 
 v. Metcalf 504, 1662, 1664, 1683, 
 
 1684 
 
 v. Miller 159 
 
 v Nelson 904,918.930 
 
 v. Wilkinson 1768, 1769 
 
 Rutland v. Paige 1548 
 
 Rutley v. Gill 1278 
 
 Rutter v Baldwin 184 
 
 v Marriott 1278 
 
 v. Tallis 1744 
 
 v. Tregent 785 
 
 Rutty v. Person 1073 
 
 Rutzen, Baron de v. Farr 1125, 1126 
 
 Ryan v Anderson 200, 302 
 
 v Anglesea R. Co. 2124 
 
 v Ashton 1841 
 
 v. Blount 967 
 
 v. Lamson 1561 
 
 v. McLeod 986 
 
 v. Mutual Tontine W C. 
 
 Ass'n 1654. 1660 
 
 v. Nesbitt 1411, 1421 
 
 v Ring 27 
 
 v. Shawneetown 334 
 
 Rychman v. Parkins 1733 
 
 Ryder v Bentham 1638, 1602 
 
 v. Gower 1290, 1461 
 
 v. Inverarity 986 
 
 v Topping 216, 334 
 
 Rye, Re 1323 
 
 Ryes v. Wellington, Duke of 131 
 
 Rylandsv. Latouche 1538, 1547, 1585 
 
 Rymer v. Cook 1106 
 
 Ryves v. Coleman 1368 
 
 v. Ryves 370, 547, 552
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 CV 
 
 S. 
 
 S. v. h. 
 
 Sabin v. Gilman 
 Sablicich v. Russell 
 Sachs v. Speiluian 
 Sackett v. Hill 
 
 508 
 1355 
 
 553 
 
 328, 666 
 
 1068 
 
 Sackett's Harbor Bank v. Blake 26 
 Sackvill v. A.yleworth 316, 1573 
 
 Saddingtou v. Kinsman 120, 122 
 Sadler v. Glover 686 
 
 v- Green 1481 
 
 v. Lovett 1516 
 
 Safety Fund Bank v. Westlake 860 
 Safford v. People 1058, 1752 
 
 Saffron Waldeu S. B. B. Society 
 
 v. Rayner 307, 674 
 
 Sage v. Central R. Co. 1460, 1485, 
 1492 
 v. Memphis &. L. R. Co. 1734 
 
 Sagory v. Bay less 1018, 1022 
 
 Sahlgaard 8 Kennedy 100, 1584 
 
 Sainstry v. G rammer 207 
 
 St. Albans, Duke of v. Skipwith 1630 
 St. Albyn v. Harding 1386 
 
 St. Aubvn v. Smart 269 
 
 St. Clair v. Smith 161 
 
 Sainter v. Ferguson 1654, 1657 
 
 St. Felix v. Rankin 1158 
 
 St. George, Re 1852 
 
 v. St. George 726 
 
 St. Giles, lie 1852 
 
 St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tip- 
 ping 1635 
 St. John ». Besborough, Earl of 37 
 Lord v. St. John, Lady 348 
 v. Harrison 435 
 St. John's College v. Carter 1683, 
 1686 
 v. Pratt 1683, 1686 
 St. Joseph R. Co. v. Smith 1752 
 St. Joseph & St. Louis R. Co. v. 
 
 Humphreys 1743 
 
 St. Katherine Dock Co. v. 
 
 Mautzgu "47 
 
 St. Lazaire, He 1368 
 
 St. Louis Life Ins. Co. v. Alliance, 
 
 &c. Life Ins. Co. 1568 
 
 St Louis Perpetual Ins. Co. v. 
 
 Cohen 144 
 
 St. Louis &e. Ry. Co. v. Wilson 26 
 St. Luke's v. St. Leonard's 1104 
 
 St. Mary Magdalen College, 
 
 Pres. of v. Sibthorp 408, 418. 
 1490 
 St. Nazaire Co., Re 401 
 
 St. Paul's. Minor Canons of v. 
 
 Crickctt 659 
 
 St. Paul's, Warden and Minor 
 
 Canons of v. Kettle 1078 
 
 v. Morris 1124, 1125 
 
 St. Sepulchre, Vicar of, Re 1014 
 
 St. Stephens, Re 13 
 
 St. Victor v. Devereux 38, 43, 1590, 
 
 1779, 1780 
 
 Sale r. Kitson 215, 257 
 
 v. McLean 552, 1548, 1549 
 
 v. Meggett 1073 
 
 v. Sale 71, 1347 
 
 v. Saunders 127 
 
 Salem, City of v. Eastern R. R 
 
 Co. 1640 
 
 Salem National Bank v. Salem 
 
 Co. 1548 
 
 Sales v. Lusk 1716 
 
 Saleski v. Bovd 974, 1459 
 
 Salfield v. Sutter County Land 
 
 Imp Co. 313 
 
 Salisbury v. Baggot 662 
 
 v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 241, 245 
 Bishop of v Phillips 1157 
 
 Earl of v. Cecil 580 
 
 Earl of v. Newton 122 
 
 Salisbury Mills v. Townsend 197, 1561 
 
 Salkeld v. Johnston 1491 
 
 v. Phillips 583 
 
 v Science 685, 670, 676, 680 
 
 Sallee v. Duncan 846 
 
 Salmina v. Juri 1381 
 
 Salmon v. Anderson 1785, 1794 
 
 v. Clagett 374, 720, 734. 758, 
 
 843, 845 
 
 v. Dean 611, 618 
 
 v. Green 429 
 
 v. Osborn I860 
 
 v. Smith 842 
 
 v. Wooton 633 
 
 Salomon v. Hertz 1650 
 
 Salomons v. Knight 1620 
 
 v Laing 144, 241 
 
 Saloy v. Block 2u8 
 
 Salsbury v. Falk 324 
 
 Salt v. Cooper 1037, 1585, 1733, 1734 
 
 Salter, Ex parte 1603 
 
 v. Hradshaw 1386 
 
 v. Kreuger 256 
 
 v. Scarborough 547 
 
 v. Tildt-sley 795, 799, 800 
 
 V- Tobias 654 
 
 Saltmarsh v. Hockett 709 
 
 Saltus v. Tobias 607, 609 
 
 Salvidge v. Fulton 893 
 
 17. Hyde 336, 337, 346 
 
 Salvin v. North Brancepeth Coal 
 
 Co. 1635 
 
 Salway v. Salway 1751 
 
 Same v. Sackett 777, 1534 
 
 Samis v. King 26 
 
 Sammes v. Rickman 1368, 1419 
 
 Sammis v. Bennett 1459 
 
 v. L'Kugle 1561 
 
 v. Wightman 200 
 
 Sammon v Bennett 576 
 
 Sample v. Frost 576 
 
 v. Sample 349 
 
 Samples v. Bank 722, 2384 
 
 Sampson v. Appleyard 1129 
 
 v. Hunt 1002 
 
 v. Mudge 1622 
 
 v. Smith 1636 
 
 v. Swettenham 579 
 
 & Wall, Re 108 
 
 Samsinego v. Stiles 197 
 
 Samson v. Samson 234 
 
 Samuda v. Furtado 664 
 
 v Lawford 1660 
 
 Samuel v. Jones 1409, 1411, 1412 
 
 v. Rogers 449, 550 
 
 v. Samuel 255, 1174 
 
 v. Wiley 161)8 
 
 Sanborn v. Adair 334, 346, 837 
 
 v. Dwineli 334 
 
 v Kittredge 361, 844 
 
 v. Perry 14ti3 
 
 v Rogers 365 
 
 v. Sanborn 406, 425 
 
 Sanchez v. Newman 1461 
 
 Sanders, Re 226 
 
 v. Benson 315, 603, 1394 
 
 v. Gate wood 986, 1031 
 
 v. Godley 444 
 
 v. Gray 1283 
 
 v. Howe 915 
 
 v. Kelsey 345 
 
 v. King 605, 615, 619, 620, 669, 
 
 2095 
 
 v. Miller 1428, 1432, 1433 
 
 ?'. Murney 691 
 
 v Page 124 
 
 v. Peck 1385 
 
 v. Plunkett 1675 
 
 v. Pope 165!) 
 
 v. Sanders 651 
 
 v. Wilson 1239 
 
 Sanders v. Yonkers 2040 
 
 Sanderson, Re 1443 
 
 v. Chadwick 1404 
 
 v. Cockermouth Railway Co. 
 
 1660 
 
 v. Sanderson 334, 591 
 
 v. Stoddart 14L'3 
 
 v. Walker 1420, 1610 
 
 Sandeford v. Lewis 790 
 
 San Diego v. Allison 1624 
 
 Sand ford v. 1193 
 
 v. Ballard 1726 
 
 v. Biddulph 1197 
 
 v. Clarke 1408 
 
 v. Head 1019,1031,1584 
 
 v. McLean 1166 
 
 v. Morrice 842. 1370 
 
 v. Remington 575, 951 
 
 v. Sandford 75 
 
 Sandilauds v. Innes 217 
 
 Saudon v. Hooper 1242, 1243, 2213, 
 
 2223 
 
 Sands v. Beardsley 1073 
 
 v. Champlin 1997 
 
 v. Codwise 1459 
 
 v. Hildreth 978 
 
 v. Thompson 649 
 
 Sandys v. Long 358 
 
 v. Watson 1419 
 
 Saner v. Bilton 1407. 1630 
 
 v. Deaven 813, 977 
 
 Sanford v. Sinclair 1735 
 
 Sangar v. Gardiner 1453 
 
 Sanger v. Newton 418 
 
 v. Nightingale 639 
 
 v. Wood 634, 815 
 
 Sangosa v. East India Co. 290 
 
 Sanitary District v. Cullerton 1108 
 
 Sauquirico v. Benedetti 1654, 1657 
 
 Sansoni v. Sansom 1053 
 
 Sanxary v. Hunger 1624 
 
 Sanxter v. Foster 1640, 1642 
 
 Sapp v. Phelps 334, 1386 
 
 Sapphire, The 18 
 
 Sapte v. Ward 153, 188, 253, 539 
 
 Sarah, The 1395 
 
 Saratoga County Supervisors v. 
 
 Seabury 1561 
 
 Sargant v. Read 1727, 1732, 1734, 
 
 1735 
 
 Sargeant v. First National Bank 836 
 
 v. Howley 1508 
 
 Sargent v. Johnson 1734 
 
 v. Sargent 1411 
 
 v. Wilson 214 
 
 Sarsfield v. Van Vaughner 328 
 
 Sartwell v. Fields 1463, 1491 
 
 Satrerfield v. Malone 569 
 
 Satterley V. Robinson 671 
 
 Satterwhite v. Davenport 768 
 
 Saul v. Met'n Ry. Co. 1686 
 
 Saull v. Browne 300, 720, 1»'20 
 
 Sauls c. Freeman 16>>3 
 
 Saum r. Stingley 369, 1577 
 
 Saumarez v. Saumarez 230, 1740 
 
 Saunders v. Allen 844 
 
 v. Druce 200, 324, 604, 608, 612, 
 
 1474 
 
 v. Frost 1, 406, 411, 638, 123 ', 
 
 1243, 1246, 1252, 1376, 1381, 
 
 1385, 1386, 1391, 1392, 1400, 
 
 1515 
 
 v. Gatling 
 
 v. Gray 1282 
 
 v. Gregory 1401 
 
 v. Hord 560 
 
 v. Jones 324, 579, 720, 855 
 
 v. Leslie 698, 850 
 
 v. Prunty 1299 
 
 v. Saunders 295. 1435 
 
 v. Smith 1643, 1645
 
 CV1 
 
 Saunders v. Soutter 
 v. Tottenham,(&c. Ry. Co 
 
 V. Walter 
 
 v. Warton 
 
 v. Wiel 
 Sauza v. Belcher 
 Savage, Ite 
 
 v. Aiken 
 
 v. Brocksopp 
 
 V. Carrol 
 
 v . Carter 
 
 v. Lane 
 
 v. Merriain 
 
 v. Suialebroke 
 
 v. Snell 
 Savery v. King 
 Savile v. Bruce 
 
 v. Savile 
 Saville, lie 
 
 v. Tancred 
 Savin, Ex parte 
 Savings Bank v. Benton 
 
 v. Holt 
 
 1327, 1367 
 55 
 567 
 547 
 307, 309, 1611 
 830 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 313 Schenck v- Peay 447, 1553 
 
 1774 Schennerhorn v. Barhydt 233 
 
 v. Maliaffie 974 
 
 Schermerhorne v, Schermer- 
 horne 2293 
 Schettler v. Fort Howard 1661 
 
 175, 1078 
 
 1553 
 
 236 
 
 318 
 
 590 
 
 1524 
 
 1503 
 
 1001 
 
 1284, 1285 
 
 1611 
 
 223 
 
 1069 
 
 1111 
 
 1385 
 
 Savings, &c. Society v. Austin 1661 
 Savory v. Dyer 388, 1614 
 
 Sawtelle v. Rollins 68, 63 
 
 Saw\er. He 16*3 
 
 i'. Baldwin 90,91,96,1427 
 
 v. Birchmore 944, 945, 1206, 1208 
 
 417 
 
 '09, 782 
 
 1576 
 
 1973 
 
 1648 
 
 795 
 
 334, 330 
 
 189, 518 
 
 1642 
 
 216 
 
 933 
 
 1620 
 
 Schmidt v. Dietericht 
 
 v. Limehouse 
 
 v. Miller 
 Schmitten v. Faulks 
 Schneider v. Batt 
 
 v. Brown 
 
 v. Foote 
 
 v. Lizardi 
 
 v. Campbell 
 
 v. Davis 
 
 V- Hovey 
 
 v. Kellogg 
 
 v. Mills 
 
 v. Noble 
 
 v. Sawyer 
 
 Spindle Co v. Turner 
 Sawyers o. Bakers 
 Sax v. Davis 
 Saxby v. Easterbrook 
 
 v. Manchester &c S. Rv. Co. 261 
 
 v. Saxby 1592, 1594, 1685 
 
 Saxon v. Barksdale 588, 590 
 
 Saxton v. Davis 60, 340, 553 
 
 Say v. Creed 218 
 
 Sayer v. Austin 1255 
 
 v. Bradley 1503 
 
 v Devore 314 
 
 v. Wagstaff 200 
 
 Sayers v. Collyer 1080, 1654 
 
 Sayles v. Tibbitts 206, 287, 325, 659, 
 994 
 Saylor t>. Mockbie 504 
 
 Saylors v. Saylors 259 
 
 Sayre v. Elyton Land Co. 1274 
 
 v Fredericks 847 
 
 Scaffold v. Hampton 799, 973 
 
 Scaife v. Scaife 1140, 1385 
 
 40, 1485, 1486 
 
 70, 108 
 
 1260 
 
 1640 
 
 713 
 
 1501 
 
 46 
 
 1376 
 
 327 
 
 Si-ales v. Nicliols 529 
 Scan Ian, fte 
 
 v. Houston 
 
 V. Howe 
 
 v. Scanlan 
 
 v. Usher 
 
 v. Wright 
 Scarborough v. Burton 
 Scarf v Soulby 
 Scarisbrick v. Skelmersdale, 
 
 Lord 1476, 1580 
 
 Scarpellini »>. Ateheson 114 
 
 Scarry v. Eldridge 259 
 
 Scarth v. Cotton 165 
 
 Scatchmer v. Foulkard 42 
 
 Scattergood v. Harrison 1233 
 
 v Keeley 1390 
 
 Scawin v. Scawin 296 
 
 Schalkt'. Schmidt 1619, 1675 
 
 Schauer v. Field _ 1643 
 
 Scheetz's Appeal 1076, 1631 
 
 Seheiffelin v. Weatherred 1551 
 
 Schi'lcamp v. Schrader 1631 
 
 Schell v. Schroder 1772 
 
 Schelmardine v. Harrop 193 
 
 Schenck v. Conover 1275, 1467, 
 
 1468, 1470 
 
 v. Ellingwood 220 
 
 v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 313 
 
 Schieffelin v. Stewart 1253, 1369 
 
 Schindel v. Gates 646 
 
 Sclijott v. Schjott 68, 110, 308 
 
 Schlecht's Appeal 17'20 
 
 Schlesinger v. Turner 1395, 1643 
 Schlettor v. Smith 371 
 
 Schley v. Dixon 26, 144 
 
 Schluderberg v. Robertson 1463 
 
 Schluter v. Harvey 1665 
 
 Schmemann v. Rothfus 1377 
 
 Schniid v. Scovill Manuf. Co. 
 
 1381 
 
 302 
 
 1257 
 
 1304 
 
 1664 
 
 406 
 
 1638 
 
 313 
 
 20,597,598,599,6i2, 
 
 1675 
 
 v. Seibert 1008 
 
 Schnur j>. Hickcox 1770 
 
 SchoefTer v. Hunnewell 1463 
 
 Scholefield v. Heafield 166, 168, 269, 
 1345 
 Scholes v. Brook 26 
 
 Scholey v. Central Railway 1469 
 
 Schomp v. Schenck 563 
 
 School Commissioners v. Tuller 
 
 1676 
 
 School District v. Blaisdell 24 
 
 v. Brown 1461 
 
 v. Price 1164 
 
 v. Weston 1568 
 
 Schoole v. Sail 193, 815 
 
 Schoonmaker v. Gillet 1683, 1684 
 
 Schoonover v. Bright 1638 
 
 Schotsmans v. Lancashire & 
 
 Yorkshire Ry. Co. 1080 
 
 Scho.-e v. Schmincke 1643 
 
 Schram v. Baker 1543 
 
 Schreffler v. Nadelhoffer 830 
 
 Schroederu-Cleugh 1450 
 
 v. Loeber 60 
 
 Schroeppel v. Redfield 328, 329, 558 
 Schroers v. Fisk 313 
 
 Schubkagel v- Dierstein 576 
 
 Schulenberg-Boeckeler Lumber 
 
 Co. v. Hay ward 329 
 
 Schulenburg. Ex parte 1069 
 
 Schultzr. Third Ave. R. Co. 
 
 v. Winter 
 Schumacher v. Schwencke 
 
 Scott v. Broadwood 
 v Carter 
 v. Clarkson 
 v. Cons. Ban 1 ; 
 v. Crawford 
 v. Cumberland 
 v. Dunbar 
 v. Duucombe 
 v. Fenhoulett 
 v. Fenwick 
 v. Fleming 
 v. Hancock 
 v. Hastings, Lord 
 v. Homer 
 v. Jackman 
 v. Jailer 
 v. Jones 
 v. Lalor 
 
 v. Liverpool, Corp. of 
 v. Liverpool, Mayor of 
 v. McOann 
 v. Macfarland 
 v. Malcolm 
 
 803 
 
 1643, 
 1648 
 
 Schuyler v Curtis 1*543 
 
 v. Hoyle 90, 117, 121, 123 
 
 v. Pelissier 1564, 1567 
 
 v. Schlicht 1556 
 
 Schuyler's Steam T. Co , He 1743 
 
 Schwab v. City of Madison 1620 
 
 v. Mabley 901 
 
 Schwabacher v. Becker _95 
 
 Schwartz v. Keystone Oil Co. 1756 
 
 v. Wechler 559 
 
 Schwarz v. Wendell 666 
 
 Schwoerer v. Boylston Market 
 
 Assoc. 208,287,302 
 
 Sclater v. Cottam 1234, 1387, 1413 
 
 Scofield v. Bokkelen 
 
 v. Stoddard 
 Sconce v. Whitney 
 Scoones v. Morrell 
 Score v. Ford 
 Scott. /?<- 
 
 v. Allett 
 
 i'. Allgood 
 
 v. Ames 
 
 v. Armstrong 
 
 v. Avery 
 
 v. Becher 
 
 1619 
 
 1195 
 
 163 
 
 990, 14 8 
 
 1779 
 
 1069, 1851 
 
 785 
 
 370 
 
 1676 
 
 1743 
 
 670, 671 
 
 1722, 1723 
 
 640, 1559 
 
 781 
 
 829 
 
 68 
 
 1463 
 
 1430 
 
 1397, 1399 
 
 229 
 
 261 
 
 860 
 
 1844 
 
 643 
 
 1040 
 
 1327 
 
 1280 
 
 1042 
 
 642 
 
 1550, 1551 
 
 671 
 
 890 
 
 891 
 
 221 
 
 855 
 
 v. Mansfield, &c. R. Co. 287 
 
 v. Maxwell 1169 
 
 v. Miller 563 569, ft" 
 
 v Neely 1071, 1556 
 
 v. Nesbitt 386, 1286 
 
 v. Nicholl 193 
 
 v. Nixon 989 
 
 v. Onderdonk 1961 
 
 v. Padwick 973 
 
 v. Pinkerton 1249 
 
 v. Platel 1755 
 
 v. Porter 445 
 
 v. Rand 633 
 
 v. Rayment 995, 1081 
 
 v. Rowland 1551 
 
 v. Royal Wax Candle Co. 449 
 
 v. Sampson 852 
 
 v. Scott 1404 
 
 v. Spashett 102, 2001 
 
 v. Stanford 1646 
 
 v. Streatham 221 
 
 v. Walker 865 
 
 v Wharton 1629, 1630 
 
 v. Wheeler 454, 515, 1510, 1828 
 Scottish Union Ins. Co. v. 
 
 Steele 895 
 
 Scottish Widows' Fund v. Craig 190 
 Scottof. Stone 70S 
 
 Scotts v. Hume 722 
 
 Scouren v. Bender 1516 
 
 S C. Railroad Co. v. Toomer 1119 
 ScrafTord v. Gladwin County 
 
 Supervisors 1381 
 
 Scranton v. Stewart 576 
 
 Screven v. Clark 1751 
 
 Screwmen v. Smith 1120 
 
 Screw Mower v. Mettler 1621 
 
 Scribner t;. Henry G. Allen Co. 
 
 1643 
 
 v. Williams I486 
 
 Scrimeger v. Buchannon 341 
 
 Scriven, He 803 
 
 v. Tapley 106 
 
 Scrivener, Ex parte 386 
 
 Scruby v. Payne 229 
 
 Scrujrgs v. Driver 251 
 
 Scrutton v. Pattillo 117 
 
 Scuddem. Bogert 729 
 
 v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co. 
 
 10J6 
 Scullv v. Lord Dundonald 974, 
 } 1589 
 
 Sculthorpev. Tipper 1420 
 
 Scurrah ». Scurrah 1213, 1726 
 
 Scurry v. Morse 252 
 
 Scutt v. Freeman 984 
 
 Seabright v. Seabright 894 
 
 Seabury v. Grosvenor 1648 
 
 Sea, Fire, and Life Assurance 
 
 Company, Re 1°20 
 
 Seager v. Aston 647 
 
 Seaeers, Ex parte 18o6 
 
 Seagram v. Tuck 642, 1755, 1757 
 
 Seagrove v. Parks 149
 
 Sea Ins. Co. v. Day 833 
 
 v Stebbins 894, 1717, 1719, 
 
 1748 
 
 Seal v. Brownton 1385 
 
 Sealey v. Gaston 87, 110, li'o 
 
 Seals V. Phfeiffer 334, 418 
 
 Sealy v. Laird 17' '5 
 
 Seauian, In re 1755 
 
 i;. Hicks 12(59, 1282 
 
 v. Ne'herclift OS 7. Uu3 
 
 v. Itisrgiua 1286 
 
 v. Slater 1511 
 
 v. Stoughton 63 
 
 Se, miens v. Kiggins 1289 
 
 Se.ir.h v. Search 314, 360 
 
 Searey v . Morgan 165 
 
 Searight v. Payne 611, *> LT 
 
 Searing v. Searing 117, 118 
 
 Searle v. Colt 652 
 
 v. Cooke 1164 
 
 v. Fairbanks 1381 
 
 v. Lane 1033 
 
 v. Matthews 1570 
 
 Searles v. Jacksonville R. Co. 287, 
 
 1715 
 
 Searls v. Bouton 843 
 
 Sears v. Barnum 86(1 
 
 v. Bellingham 875 
 
 v. Carrier 341, 345, 634 
 
 V. Hardy 243 
 
 v. Hyer 732 
 
 v. Jackson 659, 1457 
 
 v. Powell 291 
 
 Seat v Knight 1748 
 
 Seaton v. Clarke 149 
 
 v. Uraut 26, 245, 317, 329, 399, 
 
 7-45, 790 
 
 t> Seaton 108, 122 
 
 Seaver v. Phelps 83 
 
 Seay v. Fergus.in 402 
 
 v. Hughes 1625 
 
 Seborn v. Beckwith 418 
 
 Sebring v. Mersereau 279 
 
 v. Sebring 560, 801 
 
 Seccomb v. Allyn 2148 
 
 Secconibe v, Fitzgerald 1077 
 
 Sechler v. Stark 1381 
 
 Secombe v. Campbell 674, 843 
 
 Second Cong. Society v. First 
 
 Cong. Society 885 
 
 Secoru. Singleton 312. 590, 1517 
 Secretary of State for War v. 
 
 Chubb 16 
 
 Bedden t;. Connell 26 
 
 Seddon v. Bolton Bank 1417 
 
 v. Virginia, &c. Co. 145 
 
 Sedgwick v Cleveland 63. 159, 197, 
 
 280, 281, 1508, 1518, 1520. 1522, 
 
 1534, 1540 
 
 v. Watkins 1704, 1705 
 
 Seear v. Home Property & Inv. 
 
 Co. 278 
 
 v. Lawson 63, 1517. 1525, 1545 
 
 v. Webb 801,826,970 
 
 Seebor v. Hess 639, 1600, 1607, 
 
 1686 
 
 Seeley v. Mahew 11.33 
 
 Seely v. Hills 314 
 
 Seelye v. Boehm 407 
 
 Secrle v. Richardson 940 
 
 Seers v. Hind 1416 
 
 Sefton, Lord v. Salisbury, Lord 
 
 1682 
 Segee v. Thomas 339 
 
 Segram v. Tuck 1711 
 
 Seguiu v. Maverick 1575, 1576, 
 
 1577, 1584 
 Seibert v. Minneapolis, &c. R. 
 
 Co. 212 
 
 Seibert C. O. C. Co. v. Newark 
 
 L. Man. Co. 779 
 
 Seibert 0. O. Co. v. Phillips 
 
 L Co. 197 
 
 Seideubach v. Denklespeil 1765 
 
 Seidentopf V. Annabil 1491 
 
 Sei.ller, Ex parte 27, 31, 1605 
 
 Seifred v. People's Bank 617 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star pacing.] 
 
 Seifreid v. People's Bank 512, 615, 
 
 7S4 
 
 Seighortuer v. Weisseuboin 1727 
 
 Seigle v. Seigle 
 
 1320 
 
 Seilaz v. Hausou 
 
 3-. 53 
 
 Seinieus v. Sellers 
 
 •J 10 
 
 Seitz v. Mitchell 
 
 843, 844 
 
 Seixas v. King 
 
 629 
 
 Seixo v. Piovezeude 
 
 lo49 
 
 Selby v. Crew 
 
 563 
 
 V. Nettlefold 
 
 l<i39 
 
 v. I'ouifret 
 
 213 
 
 v. Powis 
 
 1129 
 
 v. Selby 
 
 1682 
 
 Selchow v. Baker 
 
 1663 
 
 Selden v. Preston 
 
 52 
 
 v. Vermil,>a 
 
 1675 
 
 Self v. Jeukins 
 
 1650 
 
 v. Madox 
 
 1056 
 
 Selfe v. Pare 
 
 1540 
 
 Seligman v. Real Estate 
 
 Trust 
 
 Co. 
 
 579 
 
 Sellars v. D.iwson 
 
 1542 
 
 Sellaa v. Dawson 64 
 
 814, 1542 
 
 Sellers v. Dawson 
 
 64, 814 
 
 ?». Phoenix Ins. Co. 
 
 26 
 
 Sellon v. Lewen 
 
 700 
 
 Sells v. Hubbell 
 
 249, 255 
 
 Selway v. Chappell 
 
 955 
 
 Selwyn v. Garfit 
 
 372 
 
 CV11 
 
 Seymour v. Hazard 395, 1699, 1702 
 
 Long Dock Co. 
 v. Sevuiour 
 Shackelford v. Shackelford 
 Shaik.e v. Baker 
 Shackleford '•. Helm 
 Shacklett 0. Polk 
 Shadden v. Patrick 
 Saaetler V Chambers 
 
 Selyard, Lady v. Harris, Ex- 
 ecutors of 248, 271 
 Semmens v. Walters 035 
 Semmes v. Boykin 424 
 
 v. Mutt 803 
 
 Semple v. Holland 803 
 
 v. London & Birmingham Ry. 
 
 Co. 58 
 
 Semrow v. Semrow 1069 
 
 Seneca Falls, Village of v. Mat- 
 thews 1668, 1669, 1676 
 Senft v. Manhattan R. Co. 1517 
 Sen house v. Earl 570, 660, 675 
 
 v. Hall 1485 
 
 Senior v. Armytage 1656 
 
 v. Pawson "1081, 1613 1619, 1635, 
 
 1638, 1:540, 1662,2038. 
 
 2312, 2323 
 
 v. Pritchard 1614, 1625, 1672 
 
 Sentance v. Porter 1395 
 
 Senter v. Mitchell 60 
 
 Serff V. Acton Local Board 196 
 
 Sergeson v. Sealey 1365 
 
 Sergison v. Beavan 447, 1025 
 
 Sergrove v. Mayhew 62, 158, 606, 
 
 
 632 
 
 , 669, 703 
 
 Serle v Fardell 
 
 
 1168 
 
 v St. Eloy 
 
 
 77, 4H 
 
 Scries v, Cromer 
 
 
 9S6 
 
 Seroka r. Kattenburg 
 
 
 180 
 
 Servi e v. Castaneda 
 
 
 142 
 
 Servis v. lieatty 
 
 
 676 
 
 Sessions v. Romadka 
 
 
 843 
 
 Seton v. Slade 
 
 369 
 
 , 709. 99(1 
 
 Settled Estates Act, Re 
 
 12S5 
 
 Setzer ?>. Beale 
 
 
 1073 
 
 Severn V. Fletrher 
 
 
 408, 1559 
 
 Sevier )' Given way 
 
 
 1301 
 
 Sevin v. Deslandes 
 
 
 1C5:5 
 
 Sewall e. Robbins 
 
 
 040 
 
 v. Sewall 
 
 
 1395 
 
 Sewel v. Freeston 
 
 
 1122 
 
 Sewell v Ashley 
 
 
 22(5 
 
 v. Bridge 
 
 
 666 
 
 v. Gadden 
 
 
 446, 4(51 
 
 v. Johnson 
 
 
 1284 
 
 v. Moxcy 
 
 
 2043 
 
 Sewing Machine Co. v 
 
 Dunbar 1'jSo 
 
 Sexsmitb v Smith 
 
 
 1661 
 
 Sexton, Ex parte 
 
 
 1791 
 
 V. Henderson 
 
 
 1401 
 
 v. Smith 
 
 
 SIT 
 
 Seybert v. Rol)inson 
 
 
 848 
 
 Seymer v. Noswnrthy 
 
 
 677 
 
 Seymour r. Bailey 
 
 
 52 
 
 V . Delancey 
 
 989, 
 
 1073, 22(5(5 
 
 V. Edwards 
 
 
 216 
 
 1 
 
 5)0 
 
 17(55 
 
 ]>,.,;, 
 
 13S1 
 
 186 
 
 11^7 
 
 1239, 1242, 
 
 lzdl. 1252 
 
 334 
 
 Shafer r. O'Brien 
 
 Siiafer Iron Co. v. Iron Circuit 
 
 Judge 149 
 
 Shaffer v. Fetty 334 
 
 Shalt i>. Pheuix Mut. Life Ins. 
 
 Co. 1587 
 
 Shaftesbury, Earl of v. Marl- 
 borough, Duke of 1731 
 Shaitesbury, Lady v. Arrow- 
 smith 570, 1831 
 Shafto v. Bolchow 210, aj4 
 Shaftoe v. Shaftoe 1705 
 Shaft-bury 's, Earl of, Case 1351 
 Shaftsbury, Lord !'. Haunam 1351 
 Shainwald v. Lewis 140, 3S9, 1051, 
 1584. 169J, 1732 
 Shakel v. Marlborough, Duke of 1720 
 v. Roche 1620 
 Shakels v. Richardson 232 
 Shakopee Manuf. Co., Re 1734 
 Shallcross v. Hibber-on 1286 
 Shales r. Barrington 1385, 1404 
 Shampeau v. Connecticut R. L 
 
 149, 830 
 
 Co. 
 
 Shaud v. Kidd 
 Shann v. Jones 
 Shannon v. Bradstreet 
 
 v. Davis 
 
 v. Erwin 
 
 v. Fechheimer 
 
 v. Hanks 
 
 v. Marselis 
 
 v. Speers 
 Shapherd, Re 
 Shapiro v. Burns 
 Shapland, Re 
 Shapleigh v. Chester Electric 
 
 Light & P. Co. 
 Shard, Re 
 
 Shardlow v Cotterill 
 Sharon v. Hill 634, 829, 2392 
 
 v. Terry 1507 
 
 Sharon Canal Co v. Fulton Bank 20 
 Sharp v. Ashton 424 
 
 1281 
 126 
 1734 
 378, 380 
 418 
 1734 
 1653 
 2222 
 1037 
 1482 
 1059 
 
 39 
 661 
 
 Brice 
 u. Carter 
 v. Hesa 
 v. Hullett 
 v. Lu-Oi 4 
 
 v. McHenry 
 v. Morrow 
 c Kcissner 
 V. Roalule 
 v. Runk 
 v. St. Siuveur 
 v. Scarborough, Earl of 
 /■ Taylor 
 
 V \\ ilife-il.ie 
 
 V. Wright 
 Sharps » Allen 
 
 V. lilondeau 
 
 r Foy 
 
 r. i !:imon 
 
 v. Sin Paulo R. Co. 
 
 r Sharps 
 Sharpies v. Sharpies 
 Shirro.l v. Winfield 
 Sharxhaw v (Jibo< 
 Sbattock B Shattock 
 Shattuck ?•. (Larson 
 Shaver v. Brain ird 
 
 r. Lawrenre County 
 
 v. Williams 
 Shaw. E.r parte 
 
 V. Abbott 
 
 v. Beck 
 
 1130 
 
 563, 1741 
 
 1282, 1461, 1402 
 
 (53. si 4 
 
 , 1174, 1225, 1528 
 
 60 
 
 857, 1232 
 
 843 
 
 1402 
 
 886 
 
 47 
 
 1254 
 
 389, 1705. 2185 
 
 313 
 
 144S, 1752 
 
 985 
 
 4 51, 158 
 
 113, 122, [87 
 225 
 200, 226, 325 
 lisr, 
 1426 
 1(517 
 1608 
 1^7 
 1961 
 2S7 
 298 
 155(1 
 
 1827 
 
 1918 
 444 
 
 lou7
 
 CV111 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Shaw v. Bill 1532 
 
 v. Chase 586 
 
 v. Chiug 300, 182U 
 
 v. Colwell Lead Co. 843 
 
 v. Coster 394, 1560, 1561, 156a, 
 1563, 1564, 1566, 1570 
 
 v. Dwight 
 
 v. Earl of Jersey 
 
 V. Forrest 
 
 v. Foster 
 
 v. Hardingham 
 
 i>. lloadley 
 
 v. Jolinsou 
 
 v. Lindsay 
 
 V. Lindsey 
 
 v. Millsaps 
 
 v. Neale 
 
 1624 
 
 lb58 
 
 1601 
 
 197, 279 
 
 222 
 
 259 
 
 653, 1413 
 
 449, 9z9, 952 
 
 593 
 
 1548 
 
 1036, 1846 
 
 v. Norfolk Countv R R Co, 220, 
 
 222, 25"7, 273, 1076, 2220 
 
 v. Patterson 602, 987, 1371 
 
 v . Pickthall 1431 
 
 v. Hhodes 1754 
 
 v. Simpson 1268 
 
 v. Smith 1817, 1838 
 
 v. Stanton 1641 
 
 v. Wier 1668 
 
 V.Wright 1052,1054,1055,1059, 
 
 1741 
 
 Shaw's Claim (No. 2), Re 10(4 
 
 Shay 47. Pettes 1973 
 
 Shea v. Knoxville, &c. R. Co. 314 
 
 Sheafe v. Sheafe 1961 
 
 Shealy v. Toole 542 
 
 Shearman v. Christian 1481 
 
 v. Findley 449 
 
 Shedd v. Garfield 374, 584, 658 
 
 SUedden v. Patrick 1074, 1080, 1122, 
 
 1127, 1502 
 
 Shee v. Harris 1734 
 
 Sheehan v. Great Eastern Rv. 
 
 Co. 208, 287, 406. 559 
 
 Sheeler v. Speer 920 
 
 Sheffield v. Buckingham, Duchess 
 of 165, 474, 1022 
 
 v. Buckinghamshire, Duchess 
 
 of 1624, 1626 
 
 v. Sheffield 1463 
 
 Sheffield & B. Coal Co. v. Gor- 
 don 1221, l'i99 
 Sheffield Canal Co. v. Sheffield 
 
 & Rotherham Ry. Co. 1824 
 
 Sheffield Furnace Co. v. With- 
 
 erow 590 
 
 Sheffield and Rotherham Ry. Co., 
 
 Re 1341 
 
 Sheffield Water Works v. Yeo- 
 
 mans 274, 602, 1682 
 
 Sheidley v Auttman 894 
 
 Shelberry v. Briggs 188 
 
 Shelburne, Countess of v. Inchi- 
 
 quin, Lord 77 
 
 Shelby v. Shelby 642, 645, 856 
 
 Shelden v. Walbridge 1556 
 
 Sheldon v. Fortescue 173, 1492 
 
 v. KenkukNo Line P. Co 303,559 
 
 v. Rockwell 1639, 1640, 1663 
 
 v. Weldman 
 
 642 
 
 Shelley V. 
 
 936, 937 
 
 Shelly v. Pelham 
 
 1748 
 
 v. Shelly 
 
 1601 
 
 Shellman v. Scott 
 
 1677 
 
 Shelton v Johnson 
 
 281 
 
 v. Van Kleeck 
 
 1576, 15S0 
 
 v. Watson 
 
 2182 
 
 Shenandoah Valley 
 
 R. Co. v. 
 
 Dunlnp 
 
 378 
 
 v. Griffith 
 
 418 
 
 Shepard v. Aker8 
 
 1257, 1366, 1369 
 
 v. Brown 
 
 551, 552 
 
 v. Ford 
 
 734 
 
 v. Manhattan Ry. 
 
 Co. 208 
 
 v. Shepard 
 
 123, 361 
 
 v. Taylor 
 
 1120 
 
 Shephard, Re, Atkins v. Shep- 
 
 hard 
 
 1507 
 
 v. Guernsey 
 
 236 
 
 v. Merrill 
 
 406, 671, 1532 
 
 Shephard v. Ross 1032 
 
 Shepherd v. Churchiil 166, 1151, 
 
 1162, 1163 
 
 v. Groff 1657 
 
 v. Gwinnett 280 
 
 v. Hirsh, Pritchard, & Co. 147, 
 
 445 
 
 v. Hughes 1540 
 
 v. Jones 394, 1562 
 
 v. Lloyd 589 
 
 v. McClain 1180, 1382 
 
 v. Morris 1819 
 
 v. Pepper 1720 
 
 v. Ross County 1062 
 
 v Thompson 915 
 
 v. Titley _ 1586 
 
 v. Towgood 1537. 2061 
 
 Sheppard v. Akers 383, 737, 760 
 
 v. Duke 653 
 
 v. Elliott 1251 
 
 v. Gilmore 324, 1071 
 
 v. Harris 162. 475 
 
 v. Lane 1580 
 
 v. Nixon 630 
 
 r. Oxenford 1728 
 
 v. Sheppard 1410, 1433, 1795, 1803 
 
 v.Smith 1417,1419 
 
 v. Starke 217, 302, 1029 
 
 v. Yocum 1461 
 
 Shepperd (». Murdock 640 
 
 She' atz )'. Nicodemus 327 
 
 Sherburne v. Middleton 1501 
 
 Sheridan v. Andrews 281 
 
 v. Cameron 390 
 
 v Colvin 1620 
 
 Sheriff v. Axe 1234 
 
 v. Oil Co. 334 
 
 Sherin v. Smith 987, 1371 
 
 Sherlock v. Barned 1138 
 
 Sherman v. American Stove Co. 303 
 
 v. Ballou 1363 
 
 v. Beale 671 
 
 v. Burnham 109 
 
 v. Cox 277 
 
 v. Elder 100 
 
 v. Fitch 1961 
 
 v. Partridge 1569 
 
 v. Reigart 121 
 
 v. Sherman 666, 1702, 1707 
 
 v. Withers 641 
 
 Sherratt v Bentley 1436 
 
 v Mountford 1487 
 
 v. Sherratt 108, 113 
 
 Sherrill v. Harrell 1677 
 
 Sherrington v. Smith 1580, 1583 
 
 Sherrit v. Birch, 217, 266 
 
 Sherry v. Perkins 1638 
 
 v. Smith 588 
 
 Sherwiu v. Shakespear 1004, 1020. 
 
 1400, 1489 
 
 Sherwood, Re 1234, 1413 
 
 v Beveridge 1003,1276,1291 
 
 v. Clark 590 
 
 v. Rivers 430 
 
 v. Smith 1360 
 
 v. Sutton 641, 645 
 
 v. White 1672 
 
 Sheward v. Citizens' Water Co. 542 
 
 v. Sheward 1574 
 
 Shewell v. Jonefc 1449 
 
 v. Shewell 1202 
 
 Shewen v. Vanderhorst 643, 644, 
 
 794. 1210 
 
 Shickle v. South St. Louis 
 
 Foundry Co. 334 
 
 Shickle Iron Co. v. S. L. Wiley 
 
 C. Co. 149 
 
 Shield v. Anderson 645 
 
 Shields v. Arndt 1639 
 
 v. Barrow 149, 287, 290, 293, 294, 
 
 334, 384, 385, 425, 1548 
 
 *. Boucher 1122. 1137 
 
 v. Bryant 161, 165 
 
 v. McClung 1625, 1675 
 
 v. Sniff 2K3 
 
 v. Thomas 207, 345 
 
 | Shiers, Re 157 
 
 Shillaber v. Robinson 193 
 
 ShillKu v. Collett 92, 1863 
 
 Shiilitoe o Claridge 1138 
 
 Shinier v. Morris Cana , &c. Co 
 
 1631 
 
 Shine v. Boiling 985 
 
 v. Gough 1207 
 
 Shiukie v. Covington 1620 
 
 Ship v. Crosskill 1399 
 
 Shipbrooke, Lord v. Hinchin- 
 
 brook, Lord 1368, 1588, 
 
 1799 
 
 Shiphard v. Lutwidge 164 
 
 Shipley v. Johns 1542 
 
 v. Reasoner 402 
 
 Shipman v. Holt 1648 
 
 Shipton v. Rawlins 268, 272 
 
 Shipwav r. Ball 96 
 
 Shirk o. Covle 1508 
 
 Shirley v. Ferrers, Earl 933, 936, 
 
 1176, 1258, 1306. 1474, 1573 
 
 t\ Hugar 68 
 
 v Matthews 1127 
 
 Shirt v. Westby 1258 
 
 Shittler v Shittler 1383, 1437 
 
 Shobev Carr 1253 
 
 Shoecraft v. Beard 1385 
 
 Shoemaker r National Bank 1614 
 
 v. South Bend S. A Co. 1642 
 
 Shoe & Leather Rep. Ass'n v. 
 
 Bailey 579 
 
 Shoesmith v. Byerly 1639 
 
 Shone v. City of London Real 
 
 Property Co. 1638 
 
 Shore v. Shore 1745 
 
 v. Wilson 12 
 
 Short v. Downer 518 
 
 v Kieffer 369 
 
 v. Lee 1075 
 
 v. Macaulay 2338 
 
 Shorthill v. Ferguson 417 
 
 Shortley v. Selby 1214 
 
 Shortridge, lie 887 984 
 
 Shotbolt v. Biscow 1560 
 
 Shotts v. Bovd 586 
 
 Shotwell v. Smith 1717, 1719 
 
 v. Taliaferro 282 
 
 Shovelton v Shovelton 1413 
 
 Showell r. Winkup 316, 405 
 
 Shrader v. Walker 295 
 
 Shrapnel v. Gamgee 744 
 
 v. Laing 1385 
 
 Shrewsbury, Earl of v. North 
 
 Staffordshire Ry. Co. 602, 
 
 1531 
 v. Trappes 398, 1440, 1471 
 
 Shrewsbury Hospital, Ex parte 
 
 1800 
 Shrewsbury R. Co. v. London 
 
 Rv. Co. 987, 1491 
 
 Shrewsbury School, Re 1611, 1854, 
 1855 
 Shrewsbury & B. Ry. f. Stour 
 
 Valley Ry. 2328 
 
 Shrewsbury & Chester Ry. Co. 
 v. Shrewsbury & Birming- 
 ham Ry. Co. 1652, 1661, 
 1663 
 Shrimpton v. Laight 1649 
 Shropshire r. Lvle 569 
 Shropshire U. R. & C. Co. v. 
 
 Reg. 674 
 
 Shrubsole v. Schneider 1084, 1114, 
 1463 
 Shubrick v. Guerrard 1628 
 
 Shuee v. Shuee 385 
 
 Shuff v ■ Holdaway 1749,1766 
 
 Shugart r Thompson 3.1 
 
 Shull v. Kennon 1156 
 
 Shulties v- Reiser 1461 
 
 Shuman r. Shuman 851 
 
 Shurmer v. Hodge 1596, 1G07 
 
 Shurts v. Howell 235 
 
 Shute v. Gustin 974 
 
 v. Hogee 119 
 
 Shuttloworth v. Bristow 1225 
 
 v. Howarth 217, 438, 1213, 1428
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging ] 
 
 Shuttleworth v. Uowatt 
 
 v. Laycock 
 
 v. Lonsdale, Earl of 
 
 v. Lowtlier 
 
 v. Nicholson 
 
 v. Noyes 
 Shye v Llewellen 
 
 1213 
 331 
 1066 
 
 1391 
 
 1105 
 
 116 
 
 1460 
 
 Sibbald v Lowrie 413, 786, 1552, 
 
 1555, 1821 
 
 Sibbering 17. Balcarras, Earl of 27, 
 
 357, 358 
 
 Sibert v. McAvoy 1147 
 
 Sibley v. Saffel 1861 
 
 v. Simonton 262 
 
 Sicard o. Whale 48 
 
 Sichell v. Raphael 1707,1712, 1713, 
 
 1714 
 
 Sichler v. Look 214 
 
 Sickell v. Raphael 2330 
 
 Sickles v. Gloucester Co. 2391 
 
 Siddcn v. Forster 1183 
 
 v. Lediard 709 
 
 Sidebothani 8. Barrington 1400, 
 
 1408 
 
 Sidebottom v. Adkins 489, 717, 
 
 942 
 
 v. Barrington 1219 
 
 v. Sidebottom 398 
 
 Sidener v. White 1625 
 
 Sides v Scharff 256 
 
 Sidgiert). Tyte 524 
 
 Sidingham, Re 1354 
 
 Sidney v. Perry 663, 691 
 
 v. Ranger 1267, 1271 
 
 v. Sidney 883, 1652 
 
 v. Wilnier 1610, 1611 
 
 Sieveking v. Behrens 1563, 1564, 
 
 1567 
 
 Sifflun v. Davis 168, 215, 1266 
 
 Signiau v. Lundy 1548 
 
 Sikes v. Truitt 547 
 
 Silber Light Co. v. Silber 26, 68, 
 
 242 
 
 Silberberg v. Pearson 586 
 
 Silcock, Re _ 99 
 
 v. Roynon 707, 710 
 
 Silk v. Osborne 58 
 
 Sill v. Worswick 61 
 
 Sillibourne v. Newport 1342 
 
 Sillman v. Bowen 1166 
 
 Silloway v. Columbian Ins. Co. 144, 
 
 235, 1938 
 
 Sills i'. Brown 1100 
 
 Silsbee v. Lucas 1081 
 
 Silva. lie 83, 85 
 
 v. Garcia 1628 
 
 Silver i' Campbell 1282 
 
 v. Kendrick 303 
 
 v. Norwich, Bishop of 1718, 
 
 1730 
 
 r.Stein 201,203,1514 
 
 Silver Lake Bank v. North 24, 1245 
 
 Silver Spring Co. v Wansuck 
 
 Co 1638 
 
 Simmonds, Re 1426 
 
 V. Du Barre 747 
 
 v. Great Eastern Ry. Co. 1015 
 v. Kinnaird, Lord 495, 1053 
 
 v. Palles 526 
 
 Simmons v. Bates 176 
 
 v. Baynard 68,165,1163 
 
 v. Gutteridge 1181, 1182 
 
 v. Hanover 193 
 
 v. Heaviside 1607 
 
 v. Ingram 216 
 
 D.Jacobs 1168,1171,1221,1296, 
 1300, 2185, 2198 
 v. Rose 1736, 1767 
 
 v Saul 55:5 
 
 v. Shirley 1237 
 
 v. Simmons 830, 869 
 
 v. Stover 1449 
 
 v Tongue 1282 
 
 v. Wood 498, 516, 1749 
 
 Simms v Guthrie 149 
 
 V. Lloyd 1401 
 
 v. Richardson 287 
 
 Simms v. Thompson 
 SiuioD v. Ash 
 
 v. State 
 
 v. Townsend 
 Simons, Re 
 
 v. Bagnell 
 
 v. McAdam 
 
 v Milman 
 Simplot?' Simplot 
 Simpson, Ex parte 
 
 v. Alexander 
 
 v. Barton 
 
 v. Bathurst 
 
 1019 
 
 1825 
 
 851 
 
 1677 
 
 991 
 
 794. 1109 
 
 1391 
 
 319, 030 
 
 378, 856, 860 
 
 347.351,354 
 
 68, 69, 72 
 
 492 
 
 63 
 
 v. Brewster 632, 793, 796, 1409 
 v. Brown 677, 1834 
 
 v. Burton 3o8 
 
 v. Carson 1770 
 
 v. Chapman 1654 
 
 v. Dennison 1620 
 
 v. Denny 215, 257 
 
 v. Downs 1575 
 
 v. Fogo 645, 664 
 
 v. Hart 1463 
 
 v. Holliday 1120 
 
 v. Howden, Lord 1621. 1680 
 
 v. Malherbe 914, 1439 
 
 v. Ritchie 1163 
 
 v. Sadd 818, 989, 2257 
 
 v Savage 211 
 
 v. South Staffordshire Water- 
 works Co. 1650 
 v. Terry 1221 
 v. Wallace 334 
 v Watts 1577 
 v. Westminster Palace Hotel 
 Co. 241, 1503, 1650 
 Sims v Adams 334 
 v. Bonner 27 
 v. Burk 1548 
 v Cross 1004 
 v. Laws 1468 
 v. Lyle 603, 614, 617 
 V Ridge 1169 
 Sinclair v. Commissioners 1661 
 v. Jackson 331, 652, 653 
 v. Price 1135, 1136 
 i\ Sinclair 68 
 v. Stevenson 1100 
 Singer v. Audsley 1599 
 v. Steele 1299 
 Singer Man. Co. v. Domestic 
 
 Sewing Machine Co. 1642, 
 
 1644 
 Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. 
 
 Button Hole Co. 1657 
 
 Singer Sewing Machine Manuf. 
 
 Co. v. Wilson 891, 914, 1003, 
 1642, 1648 
 Singleton v. Cox 215 
 
 v Gale 526 
 
 v. Gayle 287, 841 
 
 v. Hopkins 166, 227, 265, 1162, 
 1103 
 v. O'Blenis 197 
 
 v. Scott 860 
 
 v. Selwyn 340, 561 
 
 v. Singleton 1575, 1578, 1579, 
 
 15*1 
 v. Tomlinson 1382 
 
 Sinnett r. Herbert 1491 
 
 v. Moles 1676 
 
 Sinnickson v Bruere 1248, 1298, 
 1321 
 Sioux City, kc. Rv. Co. v. Chi- 
 cago, &c. Ry Co. 295 
 Sird-field v Thacker 1008 
 Siter v. Jordan 121 
 Sitlington r Brown 735, 743 
 Sitwell r. Millersh 1280 
 r. Sitwell 1273, 1274 
 Sivell v Abraham 794, 795, 13*0 
 Skarf v. Soulby 991 
 Skeats v Hurst 906 
 Ske.4 v Spraker 276, 838 
 Skeene v. I'epper 1213 
 Skeet v. Lindsay 646 
 Skeetes, lie 1862 
 
 C1X 
 
 448, 1044 
 1479 
 895 
 1490, 1615 
 1854, 1855 
 328, 301 
 1159 
 926, 1057 
 Great Northern Ry. Co. 573 
 
 Judson 564, 567,721 
 
 M'Douall 365, 656 
 
 Skegg v. Simpson 
 Skeggs, Re 
 Skidmore, Re 
 Skiggs, Re 
 Skiuuer, Ex parte 
 
 V. Bailey 
 
 v. Carter 
 
 v. Dayton 
 
 v Shew 
 V. Todd 
 Skinners" Co. v Irish Society 
 
 1642 
 
 187 
 
 1599, 
 
 1724 
 
 Skip, Ex parte 386 
 
 v. Harwood 1684, 1715, 1716, 1728 
 
 Skipp v. Wyatt 1389 
 
 Skipwonh v Westfield 1555, 1558 
 
 Skirrett v. Athy 1397 
 
 Skirrow v. Skirrow 1432 
 
 Skrine v. Powell 1458, k"74 
 
 Skrymsher v. Northcote 1029, 1030. 
 
 1430, 1432 
 
 Slack v. Black 561, 2103 
 
 v. Evans 349, 728 
 
 v. Midland Ry. Co. 1082 
 
 v. Walcott * 1508 
 
 v. Wood 1622 
 
 Slade, Re, Slade v. Hulme 1053 
 
 v. Rigg 259, 2231 
 
 Slagle v Bodmer 987 
 
 Slaney v. Sidney 1564, 1566 
 
 v. Wade 1124, 1137 
 
 Slason v Wright 845, 1548, 1553 
 
 Slater v. Banwell 715, 1556 
 
 v Canada Central R. W. Co. 378 
 
 v. Cobb 1548 
 
 v Slater 1794 
 
 v. Smith 365 
 
 Slatter v. Carroll 251 
 
 Slee v. Bloom 1314, 1320 
 
 v. Manhattan Co. 1385, 1391, 1392 
 
 Sleech v Thorington 1<_>2 
 
 Sleeman v. Sleeman 171 
 
 V Wilson 560 
 
 Sleght v. Kade 53 
 
 Sleight b Lawson 328, 1232 
 
 Slessinger v Buckingham 843 
 
 Slevin, Re, Slevin v. Hepburn 13 
 
 Slingsby v. Boulton 
 
 1566 
 
 v. Hale 
 
 1583 
 
 v. Moulton 
 
 1561 
 
 Sloan v. Little 
 
 722, 723 
 
 v Sloan 
 
 1580, 1584 
 
 Sloggett v. Collins 
 
 403 
 
 v Viant 
 
 29, 359, 1553 
 
 Sloman v. Kelley 
 
 564 
 
 r New Zealand 
 
 20, 142, 445 
 
 V Walter 
 
 1657 
 
 Sloop Chester Case 
 
 50 
 
 Small v. Attwood 196 
 
 243, 301, 403, 
 684, 719 
 
 
 v. Boudinot 
 
 324 
 
 v. Small 
 
 1071 
 
 Smallcombe's case 
 
 660 
 
 Smalley v Clark 
 
 1846 
 
 v. Corliss 
 
 1315, 1316 
 
 Smallwood v. Lewin 
 
 754,781,782 
 
 V Butter 
 
 70 
 
 Smart v Bradstock 
 
 225. 237 
 
 v Flood 
 
 1736 
 
 v. Hunt 
 
 050 
 
 v. M'Lellan 
 
 1283 
 
 v Tranter 
 
 663 
 
 Smedburg v Mark 
 
 1699, 1707 
 
 Smedes v. Umightalin 
 
 g 1254 
 
 Smedlev V Hill 1125 
 
 Smets v Williams 328, 329, 558, 004 
 Smiley v. Bell 197, 199 
 
 v. Jones 549 
 
 Smilie v. Siler 
 
 Smilie's Estate 121 
 
 Smith, Ex parte 1584, 1846 
 
 Re 61, 62, 10r», 102. 108. 157. 043. 
 653, 1504, 1002, 1073, 1844 
 
 Re, Williams v. Frere 909, 1825
 
 ex 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Smith r. A< ton 1015 
 
 v. Allen 544, 1025 
 
 V. Altuus 11S7, 1189, 1191 
 
 v . Amer. Ins. & Tr. Co 1567 
 
 r. Audrews 222, 1932 
 
 v Armitage 328 
 
 r. -Armstrong 1312, 13o0 
 
 v. Atkinson 190 
 
 v. Attorney-General 316 
 
 v. Aykwell 1651 
 
 v. Babcock 402, 703, 778, 781 
 
 v. Badbani 64 
 
 v. Bailey 1391 
 
 v Baker 823, 842, 901, 913, 1370 
 v. Baldwin 294 
 
 v Ballantyne 601 
 
 v. Barber 1156 
 
 v. Barnes 419, 597, 1832, 1835 
 
 r. Bartholomew 292 
 
 v Bate 1352 
 
 v. Beaufort, Duke of 580, 1S29, 1 31 
 v. Betty 848, 10i3, 1147 
 
 v. Bicknell 135 
 
 v. Biggs 9^2 
 
 v. Black 1271, 1286 
 
 v. Blackman 858, 875 
 
 v. Blake 1663 
 
 v. Blivens 1638 
 
 v. Biofield 509 
 
 v. Bolden 224, 1417 
 
 v. Boston, C. & M. R. Co. 670 
 
 v. Bourbon County 630 
 
 v. Bricker 815 
 
 v. Britain 1283 
 
 v. Brittenham 197, 517, 790 
 
 v. Britton 237, 287 
 
 v. Brooksbank 200, 249 
 
 v. Brownlow, Earl 239, 243, 341,873 
 v. Brush 1224, 1248 
 
 v. Bryon 585, 777 
 
 v. Buller 915, 1378, 1440, 1449 
 v. Burnham 1, 83, 374, 406, 856 
 v. Butler Co , Conim. of 7 
 
 v. Capron 321, 369 
 
 v. Castles 30 ,'31 
 
 v. Chambers 837, 857, 1233, 1394 
 V. Chandos 1250 
 
 V. Chapman 277 
 
 v Charter Oak Life Ins Co. 51 
 r. Chichester 1842 
 
 v. Clark 374, 844 
 
 v. Clarke 853, 1666 
 
 v. Clay 561 
 
 v. Coffin 887 
 
 v. Coleman 418 
 
 v Collyer 1629, 1 33 
 
 v. Cook 991, 1686 
 
 v. Cooke 1634 
 
 v. Copleston 1254 
 
 v. Cornfoot 358 
 
 v. Cowell 986, 1037, 1585, 1733 
 v. Creagh 319 
 
 v. Creasy 1520 
 
 v Cremer 1416 
 
 v Croom 1076, 1110, 1478 
 
 v. Cunningham 532 
 
 v. Dale 1410 
 
 v Daniell 575, 1832 
 
 v. Daniel ly 542 
 
 v. Davidson 833 
 
 v Davies 893, 998 
 
 v. Day 1446,1661,1662 
 
 V Dearmer 1149, 1384 
 
 v. Dixon 424, 1602 
 
 v. Dorn 559 
 
 v. Dowling 1829 
 
 v Drake 645 
 
 v. East India Co. 581 
 
 r. Edwards 152 
 
 v Effingham 1147, 1440, 1468, 
 
 1474, 1488. 1738. 1744 
 v Etches 28,37,38,109, 111 
 
 v. Eustis 1165 
 
 v. Everett 552. 1660 
 
 v Ewing 843, 850 
 
 v. Fisher 721 
 
 v. Floyd 37, 74 
 
 Smith v. Fly 
 
 
 645 
 
 v. Ford 
 
 
 991 
 
 v. Fox 
 
 560 
 
 1558 
 
 v. Gage 
 
 
 190 
 
 v. Gale 
 
 
 287 
 
 v Gauilen 
 
 
 785 
 
 v. Godbold 
 
 383, 
 
 1369 
 
 v. Goldsworthy 
 
 
 273 
 
 v. Gooch 
 
 
 216 
 
 v. Graham 
 
 
 1193 
 
 v Great Western Rv. Co. 1503 
 
 v. Green 298, 1391 
 
 v. Grim 256 
 
 v. Giiswold 552 
 
 v. Guy 797, 798, 800 
 
 v. Hadley 402, 418 
 v. Hammond 29, 1409, 1565, 1571 
 
 v. Harley 197 
 
 v. Harrigan 1271 
 
 v. Harris 1765 
 
 v. Hartley 781 
 
 v. Harwood 1610 
 
 v Ilaitwell 1651, 1665 
 
 V. Henley 880, 981 
 
 v. Hibernian Mine Co. 150 
 
 v. Hill 652, 653 
 
 v. Holmes 1467 
 v. Horsfall 812, 1511, 1512, 1526, 
 1527 
 
 v. Huntington 906 
 
 v. Hurst 236, 1037 
 
 t'. Jackson 1774 
 
 v. J eyes 1727, 1728 
 
 v. Jones 330 
 
 v Kane 122 
 
 v. Kay 562 
 
 v. Kelley 590, 787, 788 
 
 r. King 1638 
 
 v. Kirk patrick 929 
 
 v Lakeman 1070 
 
 «'. Lampson 1253 
 
 v. Lard 1619 
 
 v. Lasher 723, 726 
 
 v. Lathrop 633 
 
 v. Lawrence 227 
 
 v. Leathart 238, 245 
 
 v. Leveaux 551 
 
 v. Lloyd 1774, 1775 
 v. London and South Western 
 
 l!y. Co. 1642 
 
 v. Long 128 
 
 v. Lowe 1727 
 
 v. Lowry 1622 
 
 v Lyon 149 
 
 v Lrster 1764 
 
 v. McDonald 165 
 v. McLain 334, 1567, 1625 
 
 v. McNeal 659 
 
 v Manchester 1650 
 
 V. Manning 1507 
 
 v. Marable 1097 
 
 v. Marshall 448 
 
 v. Martin 1073 
 
 v. Massie 1824 
 
 v. Matthews 91, 329 
 
 V. Mitchell 287 
 
 v. Moff.tt 68, 59, 60, 61 
 
 v. Moore 194 
 
 v Morchead 550 
 
 V. Morpnn 1034, 1099 
 
 v Mules 1654 
 
 v. Nelson 1276 
 
 v. Nethersole 1704 
 
 v Northumberland 725 
 
 v. O'Grady 1411 
 
 v Owen 1638 
 
 v. Palmer 161 
 
 v. Parke 443 
 
 r. Patton 334, 1120 
 
 v Pawson 39, 41 
 
 v. Payne 197 
 
 v. Pearce 1621 
 
 r. Pearman 999 
 
 v. People 1069 
 
 V. Peters 1662 
 
 v. Pettingill 1631, 1632 
 
 v Pierce 1381 
 
 Smith v. Pilgrim 858, 890 
 
 v. Pilkiuton 1241, 1252 
 
 v. Pouifret, Earl of 857, 15!'9 
 
 v. Ponath 892 
 
 v. Poor 26 
 
 v. Portland 200 
 
 v. Potter 737, 837, 846 
 
 v Poyas 1634 
 
 v. Head 569 
 
 v. Republic Life Ins. Co. 395 
 
 v. Richnell 193 
 
 v. Kobinson 1266 
 
 V. Rock 630, 1169 
 
 v. Rowe 313 
 
 v. Rvan 1621 
 
 v. Sackett 191 
 
 v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
 
 145, 402, 524, 712. 737, 760, 837, 
 
 1531, 1533, 1567, 1615 
 
 v. Schwed 1621 
 
 v. Serle /29, 785 
 
 v. Shaffer 1381 
 
 v. Shane 846 
 
 v. Sherman 417 
 
 v. Smacksmen Ins. Co. 1136 
 
 v. Smith 68, 102, 303, a25, 358, 
 
 381, 383, 426, 680, 780, 793. 916, 
 
 1003, 1080, 1158, 1301, 1314, 
 
 1369, 1426, 1427, 1476, 1493, 
 
 1517, 1624, 1638, 1641, 1662, 
 
 1663, 1681, 1718, 1722, 1723 
 
 v . Snow 217, 219 
 
 v Spence 100 
 
 v. Spinolla 48 
 
 v. Standard L M. Co. 269 
 
 v. Steen 1210 
 
 v. Swansea Dock Co 1599, 1671 
 
 v. Sweet 100 
 
 v Swormstedt 238, 239. 241 
 
 v Target 1565 
 
 v Tebbitt 852 
 
 v. Thomas 1818 
 
 v. Thompson 465 
 
 v Todd 1255 
 
 v. Trimble 517,531,1004 
 
 v. Turner 321, 974, 1575, 1583 
 
 v. Turrentine 294 
 
 v. A'anderhurst 1255 
 
 v Weguelin 18, 141, 448 
 
 v. Wells 904, 968 
 
 r. West 249, 829, 834 
 
 v. Wheatcroft 380, 861, 1551 
 
 v. Whitmore 554, 670, 1020 
 
 v. Wigton 402 
 
 v Wilkinson 1232 
 
 v. Williams 2-13, 329 
 
 v. Wilson 576 
 
 v Winter 1845,1847 
 
 v. Wood 324, 560 
 
 v Woodfolk 405,986 
 
 v Worthington 1274 
 
 v. Wycoff 262 
 
 v Yell 575 
 
 Smith's Case 1109 
 
 Estate 119 
 
 Goods, lie 251 
 
 Smith, Knight & Co , Re 905 
 
 Smitha e Flournoy 546 
 
 Smith-Barrv v. Dawson 1685 
 
 Smithbv v. Stinton 200 
 
 Smithefs V Fitch 1638 
 
 Smithly r Hinfon 252 
 
 Smoot v Strauss 860 
 
 Smyth, lie 178,1575,1578 
 
 v Balch 1625 
 
 V. Carter 1633 
 
 v. McKernan 1320 
 
 v Myers 109 
 
 v. N" O C & B. Co. 630 
 
 Smythe v Clay 1580 
 
 v Fitzsimmons 1576 
 
 v Henrv 653 
 
 Snaggr. Frizell 1393 
 
 Snapp v Purcell 381 
 
 Snavely v. Harkrader 346 
 
 Snead v. Green 655, 657, 712, 821 
 
 v. M'Coull 425
 
 Sneed v. Atherton 1158 
 
 v. Ewing _ _ 1074 
 
 Snelgrove v. Snelgrove 676, 677, 678 
 
 Snell, In re 1842 
 
 v. De Land 1221 
 
 v Dwight 986 
 
 v. Fewell . 2120 
 
 v. Harrison lod 
 
 v. Hyat 176 
 
 v. Mitehel) 1889 
 
 v. Timbrel! 1132 
 
 Snelling v. Boyd 197 
 
 v. Watrous 507 
 
 Snodgrass v. Butler 1565 
 
 Snook Pearsall 559 
 
 v Sutton 1364 
 
 v. Watts 176 
 
 Snoutfer v Hansbrough 1120 
 
 Snow v. Alley 815 
 
 v. Bolton 1045, 1051, 1451 
 
 v. Booth 653 
 
 v. Boston Blank Book Manuf. 
 
 Co. 560, 714 
 
 v Oounselman 683 
 
 v. Hole 69, 160, 170 
 
 v. Teed 1463 
 
 Snowball v. Dixon 39, 155 
 
 Suowden v. Snowden 4.38 
 
 v. Tyler 630 
 
 Snowdon v Metropolitan Rail- 
 way Co. 1474 
 Snowhill v. Snowhill 113, 115, 117 
 Snowman ». Harford 369 
 Snyder v. Botkin 1576 
 v. Cabell 211 
 v. Hopkins 1628 
 v. Martin 830 
 v. Pharo 1071 
 v Seeman 1675 
 v. Snyder 1159 
 v. Summers 1497 
 Soames v. Edge 1080, 1660 
 Sobernheimer v. Wheeler 236 
 Sobey v. Sobey 1702, 1705, 1713 
 SocitHe Fonciere v. Milliken 149 
 Society Generate v. Dreyfus 
 
 Brothers 452 
 
 Society for Prop. Gosp. v. Hart- 
 land 190 
 v. New Haven 24 
 v. Wheeler 24, 50 
 v. Young 24 
 Socola v. Grant 314, 586 
 Soden V. Soden 378 
 Soffe v. Prince 938 
 Sohier ?>. Burr 1561 
 v. Williams 227, 229 
 Solicitor, A, Re 1555, 1685, IU17 
 Sol ley v. Wood 307 
 Sollory v. Leaver 1724 
 Solly v. Greathead 1046 
 Solomon v. Hritton 1129 
 v Fitzgerald 216 
 v. Solomon 2S1, 286, 1517 
 v. Stalman lo')4, 1597 
 Soltau v. De Held 1597, 1635, 1«37 
 Somerby v. Buntin 589 
 Somers v. Torrey 347, 729 
 Somerset, Re 68 
 Somerset County Bank v. Veghte 655 
 Somerville v Mackay 1818, 1829 
 v. Mayes 1666 
 Somes v. Martin 1610 
 Somner v. Charlton 1286 
 Sonnet v. Powell 1190 
 Sonsmith v. J. P. Donaldson, 
 
 The 518 
 
 Soper v. Manning 314 
 
 Sorchan v. Mayo 1765 
 
 Sorden v. Conton 1127 
 
 Soria v. Stowe 1031 
 
 Sorrel v. Proctor 1418 
 
 Sortwell i". Montpelier & W. R. 
 
 R. Co. 1253 
 
 Sotheran v. Smear 92, 103 
 
 Soudon v. Hooper 1240 
 
 Soulby v. Pickford 1104 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Soule v. Corning 816 
 
 South «'. Leavy 1^58 
 
 South & North Alabama R. Co. 
 
 v. H'il.-on 860 
 
 Southall !'. British Mutual Life 
 
 Assurance Co. 780 
 
 v. McKeand 1136 
 
 Southampton Co. v. Southamp- 
 ton Board 551 
 Southampton &c., Co. v. Pinnock 26 
 v. Rawlins 26, 485, 807, 809 
 
 CXI 
 
 Southard v. Rexford 564 
 
 v. Russell 15*0 
 
 v. Sutler 212 
 
 v . Sutton 280 
 
 Southbrijge Savings Bank v. 
 
 Mason 1320 
 
 South Carolina v Georgia 1576 
 
 South Carolina Bank v. Case 24 
 
 Southeastern Ry. Co., lie 99, 1802 
 Southeastern Ry. Co v. Brogden 551 
 v London. Brighton, & South 
 
 Coast Ry. Co. 1775 
 
 v. Martin 551 
 
 v. Submarine Telegraph Co 547, 
 
 810, 1557. 1558, 2047 
 
 Southern Express Co. v. Western 
 
 N.C. R. Co. 1743 
 
 So. Life Ins & Trust Co. v. 
 
 Lanier 302 
 
 Southern Marble Co. v. Stegall 324 
 Southern Medical College v. 
 
 Thompson 1648 
 
 Southern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trear 861 
 Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton 551 
 Southern Pacific R Co. v. Oak- 
 land 1663 
 Southern Ry. News Co v Russell 564 
 Southern Steam Packet Co. v. 
 
 Roger 443 
 
 Southey v. Nash 1101 
 
 v. Sherwood 1645, 1647 
 
 Southmayd v. McLaughlin 1631 
 
 South Molton v. Attorney-Gen- 
 eral 13 
 South Ottawa v. Perkins 863 
 South Park Com'ra v Kerr 361 
 South Platte Land Co. v. Buf- 
 falo County 1601 
 South Sea Co. v. Bumsted 505 
 v. Doliffe 576 
 v. Wymondsell 645, 648, 655 
 South Staffordshire Ry. Co. v. 
 
 Hill 791. 808, 810 
 
 South Wales Ry. Co. V. Wythes 1668 
 Southwestern L. & D. Co. v. 
 
 Robertson 10.39 
 
 Snuthwick, Matter of 1846 
 
 Southwort.h v. Taylor 1666 
 
 Soutter v. Milwaukee, &c. R. 
 
 Co 1517 
 
 Souverhye v Arden 22s3 
 
 Souzer w De Meyer 589, 612, 615, 
 
 617, 652, 653, 674, 694, 700, 704, 
 
 787 
 
 Soward v. Leggatt 
 
 Sowdon v. Marriott 
 
 Sowerhy I) Fryer 
 
 * Lockerby 
 
 v. Warder 
 
 Sowle ?). Champion 
 
 Sowles v. First Nat. Bank 
 
 v. Witters 
 Sowry v. Sowry 
 Sowton r Cutler 
 Bpaddacinl v. Treaey 
 Spain, King oft'. Hullett 
 
 1006 
 
 1401 
 
 1630 
 
 11 29 
 
 506 
 
 1291 
 
 553 
 
 1743 
 
 99, 1802 
 
 1686 
 
 894 
 
 20, 164, 
 
 421 
 
 v Machado 17, 18, 197, 301. 802, 
 
 315, 557, 1468, 1469, 1881 
 
 v. Mendazahel 17 
 
 Spain, Queen of v. Parr 20 
 
 Spalding v. Dodge 357 
 
 v. Ruding 2231 
 
 Spang v. Robinson 1395 
 
 Spanish General Agency Co. f . 
 
 Spanish Co. 1675 
 
 Spann v. Spann 1029 
 
 Sparenburgh v. Bannatyne 49 
 
 Spargur w. Heard 87, 109 
 
 Sparhawk v. Buel 67, 14S9 
 
 v. Wills 1-32, 1238, 1239, 1243, 
 
 1248, 1298, 13o0, 1317,2-^3 
 
 Spark v. Long 13 >9 
 
 Sparke v. Ivatt 1112 
 
 Sparkes v. Barrett 1097 
 
 Sparks, lie 14u4 
 
 v Farmers' Bank 1073 
 
 )• Liverpool Water Works Co. 1058 
 
 Sparling V B re re ton 533 
 
 Sparrow v. E»ing 9b9 
 
 v. Fiend 1150, 1157 
 
 v Hill 1407, 14-19 
 
 Spartali v. Constantionide 209 
 
 Spaulding v. Farwell 349, 728, 759 
 
 v. Keeley 1069 
 
 v. Warner 1150 
 
 Speak v. Metcalf 177, 444 
 
 v. Ranso.n 1588, 1668, 1673, 1675 
 
 Spearing V Lynn 1030 
 
 Special Bank Commissioner v. 
 
 Cranston Savings Bank 1304 
 
 v. Franklin Sav. Inst. 1745 
 
 Special Reference, lie 1009 
 
 Speedlove v. Speedlove 1725 
 
 Speer v. Crawter 209, 547, 1163. 
 
 1164 
 
 Speering's Appeal 26 
 
 Sueidall v. Jervis 801 
 
 Speidel v. Ilenrici 560, 860 
 
 Speller v Bristol Steam Nav. Co. 449 
 
 Spence, lie 1348 
 
 v Allen 952 
 
 v. Armour 1281, li91 
 
 v. Dodd 843 
 
 v. Hanford 1737 
 
 v. Hogg 231 
 
 ». McDonough 1638 
 
 v Simis 1221 
 
 Spenceley v. De Willott 1102 
 
 Spencer, Re 298,323, 1809 
 
 Re, Thomas v. Spencer 100 
 
 v. Allen 1065 
 
 v. Armstrong 235 
 
 v. Boyes 164 
 
 v Bryan 692 
 
 v. Bryant 43. 156 
 
 v. De Willott 1132 
 
 v. Fortescue 850 
 
 v. Lee 216 
 
 v. London & Birmingham Ry. 
 
 Co. 1636, 1663 
 
 v. Luttrell 576 
 
 v. Pee 1573 
 
 v. Shaw 201,318,1722 
 
 v. Stearns 1463 
 
 v Van Duzen 407 
 
 v. Ward 1422, 1432 
 
 Spendler v. Potter 262 
 
 Spensley, Re 14'23 
 
 Sperling v. Rochfort 93, 96, 100. 186 
 
 Sperrj v Miller 550 
 
 Speyers v. Desjardins 3^5 
 
 Spicer v Dawson 907 
 
 V. Hoop 1619, 1054 
 
 v. Martin 324, 1654 
 
 v. Taylor 559 
 
 Spickernell v. Hotham 1075 
 
 Spies v Chicago. &c. R Co 193 328 
 
 Spike v Harding 1151, 1163, 1104 
 
 Spill v. Celluloid Manuf Co. 1580 
 
 Spillane t' Missouri Pac. Rv. 
 
 Co. 001,630 
 
 Spiller, Re 1861, 1491 
 
 v. Spiller lii47 
 
 Spink v. Francis 1620,1686 
 
 Spires v Sowell 796, 797 
 
 Spirett r. Willows 103, 105, 108 
 
 Spitley v. Frost &59 
 
 Spin e v. Hughes 913, 1189, 1339 
 
 V. WaltOTi 897, 1098 
 
 Spivey v. Frazee 784 
 
 v. .Jenkins 290 
 
 Spofford r. Manning 590, 708, 787
 
 CX 11 
 
 Spokes v. Banbury Board of 
 
 Health 1638, 168 
 
 Spong v. Hogg 
 Spoonor, He 
 
 v. McConnel 
 
 v. Payne 
 Sporle v . Barnaby 
 Sporrer v. Eitler 
 Spottiswoode v. Clarke 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 1134 
 
 1320 
 
 1670 
 
 521, 1053 
 
 97 
 
 S81 
 
 1640, 1645, 
 
 1663, 167s 
 
 59, 61, 224 
 
 1553 
 
 1386 
 
 1029 
 
 2397 
 
 1133 
 
 557, 1635 
 
 457 
 
 760 
 
 1561 
 
 Spragg v. Binkes 
 
 v. Corner 
 Sprague v. Graham 
 v Joues 
 v. Litherberry 
 v. Mitchell 
 V- Rliodes 
 v. Sprague 
 d. Tyson 
 v. Wesc 
 A. & W. Sprague Manuf. Co. v. 
 
 Hoyt 60 
 
 Spring v. Albin 361 
 
 Spring v. Domestic S. M. Co. 630 
 
 v. Gray 641, 642 
 
 v Jenkins 294 
 
 v. Sandford 12S3 
 
 v South Car. Ins. Co. 1563, 1565, 
 
 156U 
 
 v. Woodworth 1360 
 
 Springer ». Austin 971 
 
 v. Yanderpool 249, 255 
 
 Spriugett v. Dashwood 1417, 141'.' 
 
 Springfield v Hurst 262 
 
 r Ollett 1405 
 
 Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley 
 
 1620, 1648 
 Sproull's Appeal 1298 
 
 Spiunt v. Hugh 1033, 1C51, 1755 
 Spr\e o. Reynell 796 
 
 Spurgeon v. Hooker 1664 
 
 Spurlock v. Fulks 15'15 
 
 Spurr v Benedict 1624, 1961 
 
 v Scoville 149,151,458, 629 
 
 Spurrier v Fitzgerald 619 
 
 v. Spurrier 1801 
 
 Squibb v. McFarland 1461 
 
 Squier v. Shaw 785 
 
 Squire, Ex parte 880 
 
 v Hewlett 630 
 
 v Lincoln 236 
 
 v 1'ardoe 13S5 
 
 v Pershall 1466 
 
 Squirrel v. Squirrel 37, 74 
 
 S S. White Dental Co. v. Sib- 
 ley 1643 
 Stables, Re 86 
 Stace v. Gage 222, 257 
 v. Mabbot 1121,1124 
 Stacey v. Southey 1202 
 v. Spratley 1075, 1148, 1384 
 Stack, lie 1744 
 Stackhouse v. Barnston 559, 560, 
 561, 639, 642 
 v. Jersey, Countess 676 
 Staekpole v. Beaumont 105 
 v. Curtis 1061 
 Stackpoole v. Callaghan 28 
 Stadler v. Hertz 732 
 Stafford v. American Mills Co. 1743 
 V- Anglesey, Earl of 135 
 v. Brown 373, 467, 488. 531, 760. 
 763, 893, 1590 
 v. Bryan 560, 844, 123n, 1378. 
 1379, 1579, 1600 
 v. Burn 497 
 v. Coxen 1082 
 V Fi.ldon 1369 
 V. Hiiiginbotham 42 
 v. Howlett 406, 407, 1515, 1531 , 
 1534, 1535 
 v London, City of 208 
 v Mott 1255 
 v. Rogers 1313, 1319 
 Stafford, Earl Df v. Buckley 7 
 Stafford Charities, Re 1432 
 Stafford Nat Bank v. Sprague 313 
 
 Staffurth v. Pott 
 Stagg v. Beekman 
 
 V. Kuowles 
 Stagoll, lie 
 Stahl v. Gotzenberger 
 Stahle v. Winter 
 
 710 
 1772 
 
 8u8 
 1611 
 1147 
 
 1525 
 
 Stahlschmidt v. Lett 159, 643, 969, 
 
 137a, 1425, 1446, 1525 
 
 Staight v. Burn 1638 
 
 Staines v. Giffard 1801 
 
 v. Maddox 37, 79, 80, 81, 1455, 
 
 1457 
 
 v. Morris 1381, 1400, 1402 
 
 v. Kudlm 1266 
 
 Staiutou v Carron Co 200, 324, 
 
 800, 1004, 1253, 1723 
 
 v. Chadwick 579, 1469, 1832 
 
 Staley v. Barrett 2115 
 
 v. Murphy lti2l 
 
 Stalling r. Goodloe 1583 
 
 Stamford, Re lb7* 
 
 Stamford, Earl of v. Dawson 1444 
 
 Stamford v. Stamford Horse R. 
 
 Co. 659 
 
 Stamper v. Barker 119, 122 
 
 Stamps v. Birmingham k Stour 
 
 Valley Railway Co. 780 
 
 Standard Bank v. Stokes 163!' 
 
 Standen v. Edwards 1123,1137, 1148 
 
 Staudering v. Hall 99 
 
 Standewicke v. Watkins 1131 
 
 Standish v. Liverpool 1640 
 
 v. Parker 633 
 
 v. Radley 1576, 15M 
 
 v. Whitwell 13y9 
 
 Standley v. Roberts 1561 
 
 Stanes v. Parker 1234 
 
 Stanford v Murphy 402 
 
 Stanger Leathes v. Stanger Leatbes 
 
 1730 
 Stanhope v. Nott 576 
 
 v. Stanhope 87 
 
 Staniar v. Evans 298, 1029, 1414 
 
 Staniland v. Staniland 7u, 71 
 
 r. Willott 1399 
 
 Stanley, Re 98 
 
 v. Bond 526, 1039, 1041, 1678 
 
 v. Coulthurst 1765 
 
 v. Kean 874 
 
 v. Mather 283 
 
 v. Risse 1071 
 
 v. Robinson 712 
 
 v. Sullivan 1062 
 
 v. Wrigley 1151 
 
 Stanley, Lady v. Earl of Shrews- 
 bury 1080 
 Stannard v. Graves 1120 
 r. Harrison H73 
 v. St. Giles Vestry 1670 
 Stanney v. Walmsley 954. 955 
 Stansbury v. Arkwright 362. 371 
 Stan.-field v. Habergham 1630, 1631, 
 li,33 
 v. Hobson 211, 212, 257, 259 651 
 Stanton v. Ala., &c. R. Co 1316, 
 1320, 1731, 1743, 1752 
 v. Embrey 633, 634 
 v. Hatfield 1437, 1438 
 v. Knight 642 
 v. Percival 178, 829, 841 
 Stan way, Re 1794 
 Stamford v. Tudor 1182 
 Stapilton v. Stapilton 74, 384 
 Stapler t'. Hardeman 1029 
 Staples v. Staples 1120 
 v. Turner 1624 
 Stapleton, Ex parte 64 
 v. Conway 1256 
 Stapylton v. Peill 1713 
 Starbuck v. Mitchell 86 
 Stark v. Cheathem 214, 1265 
 v. Hunton 644 
 v. Starr 659 
 v. Thompson 974 
 Starkie, Ex parte 1358, 1363 
 v Richmond 1639, 1662 
 Starks v. Redfield 1375 
 
 Star N. Co. v. O'Connor 1655 
 
 Starue v. Farr lb3 
 
 Staines v. Newson 550, 555, 1081, 
 1663 
 Starr v. Maidstone 1380 
 
 Starr's Estate 855 
 
 Starteu v. Bartholomew 70, 71, 1347 
 State v. Allen 552, 1073 
 
 v- Anderson 10 
 
 v. Bank of Tennessee 129 
 
 v. Benniugham 10 
 
 v. Black Kivcr Phosphate Co. 321 
 v. Blakemore 1254, 1766 
 
 v. Boswell 960 
 
 v. Brown 334, 1463 
 
 v. Buck 1069 
 
 v. Butler 1756 
 
 v. Calloway 1650, 1661 
 
 v. Central R. Co. 21 
 
 v. Churchill 1071 
 
 v. Civil District Judge 1620 
 
 v. Clark 67, 1:359 
 
 v. Columbia 842 
 
 v. County Court 1637, 1650, 1661 
 v. Cross 864 
 
 v. Cutler 1683, 1G84 
 
 v. Davis 1069 
 
 v. Dayton & S. E. R. Co. 10 
 
 v. De Wolf 886 
 
 v. District Court 536 
 
 v. District Judge 1675 
 
 v. Durein 16£3 
 
 v. Fagan 1637 
 
 v. Farish 1119 
 
 v. Farmers' L. & T. Co. 10 
 
 v. Foot 236, 334 
 
 v- Frew 887, 1069 
 
 v. Gooch 1756 
 
 v. Hannibal, &c. R. Co. 1120 
 
 i'. Hardie 6 
 
 r. Hemingway 794 
 
 V. Henthorn 1069 
 
 v. Hill 123 
 
 v. Hopkins 879 
 
 v. Horner 536 
 
 v. Hyde 1309 
 
 v. Jacksonville, &c. R. Co. 1742 
 v. Johnson 1463 
 
 v. Kennedy 10 
 
 v. King 1716 
 
 v. Knight 1069 
 
 v. Kolsem 1576 
 
 v. Lewis 1381 
 
 v. Levy 904 
 
 v. Litchfield 907 
 
 v. Lon.-dale 944 
 
 v. Mclutire 1168, 1170, 1171, 
 
 1298, 1317 
 v. Mariou County Com'rs 10 
 
 v. Maury 566 
 
 v. Mayes 10 
 
 v. Mead 21 
 
 v. Mewberter 574 
 
 V. Nashville Savings Bank 894 
 v. New Orleans, &c. R. Co 634 
 r. Northern, &c. Ry. Co. 1716 
 
 v. Paris Ry. Co. 10 
 
 v. Pierce 1683 
 
 v. Roanoke Nav. Co. 1286 
 
 v. Rush County Com'rs 1614 
 
 v. Rust 1686 
 
 v. St. Louis, &c. Ry. Co. 354 
 
 v. Samuels 881 
 
 v. Saunders 1620 
 
 v. Schwtickardt 1620 
 
 v. Spartanburg, &c. R. Co. 1492 
 v . Sturgis 1744 
 
 r. Temple 133 
 
 v. Turner 190 
 
 v. Ward 129 
 
 v. Wavman 1254 
 
 v. White 572 
 
 v. White's Creek Turnpike Co. 10 
 v. Williams 324 
 
 v. Wolfenden 1661 
 
 v. Wormick 1434 
 
 State Bank v. Bell 1608
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 State Bauk v Edwards 845 
 
 v. Reeder 422 
 
 State las Co. v. Gennett 147, 994, 
 
 1561, 1570 
 
 v Sax 148 
 
 State ot Ohio v. Hinchin 864 
 
 State Railroad Tax Cases 1661 
 
 Statham v llall 1564 
 
 Staunton v Harris 1278, 1283 
 
 Stead, Re 652, 653 
 
 v Course 1-72 
 
 v. Stead 798 
 
 Steam Gauge & L. Co v. Mey- 
 
 rose 659 
 
 Steam Stone Cutter Co v Sears 1051 
 
 Stearns v. Hubbard 657 
 
 v. Page 617, 788, 1997 
 
 v. Reidy 860 
 
 v. Stearns 843 
 
 Stebbing v. Atlee 9J5 
 
 Stebbins b. St. Aune 303, 331 
 
 v Savage 1461 
 
 Steed v. Cragh 126 
 
 Steedman v. Marsh 369 
 
 v. Poole 805 
 
 Steeds v. Steeds 669 
 
 Steel v. Cobb 176, 178 
 
 v Chester 1846 
 
 v Matthews 645 
 
 v. Parsons 445 
 
 r. Preece 1264 
 
 Steele v. Cobham 1734 
 
 v. Gordon 461 
 
 v. Uutchina 16s6 
 
 v Lewis 289, 2:i5 
 
 V. Maunder 259 
 
 v. Mi Hand Ry. Co. 426 
 
 v. Mott 43 
 
 v North Met R Co. 1620 
 
 v. Plomer 452, 476, 498, 512, 784 
 
 v. Savory 9i 19 
 
 v Smirt 453 
 
 v. Stewart 577, 1834 
 
 v. Stuart 449, 452 
 
 ti. Taylor 281, 287 
 
 v. White 1461 
 
 Steer u Steer 201,318, 917, 1722 
 
 Stees v. Kranz 1675 
 
 Sreff v. Andrews 612 
 
 Stegner v. Blake 933 
 
 Steiger i». Heidelberger 843 
 
 v. Hillen 1166 
 
 Stein v Benedict 589 
 
 v. Bienville W. S. Co. 1637 
 
 v. Bowman 917 
 
 v. Hauck 1638 
 
 v. Kobertson 385 
 
 Steinau v. Gas Co. 1657 
 
 Steinbach e Hill 329 
 
 o. Relief Fire Ins. Co. 1961, 1966 
 
 Steinberg v. Tyler 365 
 
 Steines v. Franklin County 1463, 
 
 1479 
 
 Steinhauser v. Mason 1540 
 
 v Spraul 418 
 
 Steinkeller v Newton 1099 
 
 Steinmetz v. Halthin 103, 106, 122 
 
 Steinriede B. Tegge 417 
 
 Steinway v Steinway 852 
 
 Stent B. Wickens 774 
 
 Su-nton v. Jerome 371 
 
 Stephen, Re 1485, 1608 
 
 v B all 186, 212 
 
 v Diniels 1661 
 
 v. Yandle 644 
 
 Stephens, Re 642 
 
 v. Berry 628, 629 
 
 v. Biehnell 617, 531 
 
 v. Biney 866 
 
 v Frost 295 
 
 v. Giylord 1772 
 
 v. Heathcote 821, 822. 823. 842 
 
 v. James 1350, 2294 
 
 v Lawry I860 
 
 v. Louch 486 
 
 v Monongahela Nat. Bank 634 
 
 v. Neale 465, 489 
 
 VOL. I. — A 
 
 Stephens v Newboroug'n 1440 
 
 v. Orman 844 
 
 v. Overstolz 586 
 
 v. Porter 83, 108 
 
 v. Totty 123 
 
 v Wanklin 911 
 
 v Whitehead 334 
 
 v. Workman 1687 
 
 Stephenson v. Austin 190 
 
 v. Biney 868 
 
 v. Davis 144, 149, 305, 314, 440, 
 458, 549, 555, 1032 
 v Houlditch 1586 
 
 v. Mackay 8U9 
 
 v. Stephenson 68, 79, 169, 170, 737, 
 753 
 v. Strutt 88, 179 
 
 v Wilson 1622 
 
 Stephenton v Gardiner 592, 663 
 Stepp v. National Life Associa- 
 tion 850 
 Steptoe v Pollard 1003 
 Sterl v. Sterl 1549 
 Sterling, Ex parte 1842, 1843 
 v. Ashton 1931 
 v. Thompson 1314 
 Sterm v Drinker 365 
 Stern v. Sedden 441 
 Sternberger v. McGovern 313 
 Sterndale v. Hankinson 643, 1211 
 Sterrick v Pugsley 357 
 Sterry v. Arden 952, 1549 
 Steuart v Gladstone 839, 855, 859. 
 976, 1660 
 Stevens, Ex parte 1611 
 v Beals 90, 116 
 v. Beekman 1631 
 v Benning 1644 
 v. Brett 795 
 v. Coffeen 1008 
 v. Cooper 655, 849 
 v. Davison 1731 
 v Dewey 1578 
 v. Guppy 378, 381, 384, 995, 
 1027 
 v. Hayden 360 
 v. Hey 1577, 1578 
 v Keating 812, 1379, 1640, 1642 
 v Lock wood 330 
 v Melcher 1508 
 v. Miner 1298 
 v. Ni*bet 1770 
 v Pell 1142 
 v. Pillen 1423 
 v Post 713, 737, 840, 846 
 v. Praed 804, 809, 9.»5 
 V. Railroads 794 
 v. Smith 11 a> 
 v South Devon Railway Co. 243, 
 1620 
 v. Stevens 70, 139, 1548, 1549. 
 1553 
 tt Trevor-Garrick 100 
 v. Van Cleve 8">1 
 v. Warren 1560 
 V. Williams 37, 111 
 Stevenson v Abington 438 
 v. Anderson 150, 151. 1560. 1562, 
 1565. 1567, 200.3 
 v. Austin 237, 257, 272 
 v. Buxton 385 
 r Hano 1395 
 Steward v. Bank of England 142 
 v. East India Co. 145, 297 
 v. Gordon K60 
 v. North Met. Tramways Co. 418, 
 785 
 v Roe 403, 15£2 
 v Steward 1700 
 Stewart, In re 1514, 1*02 
 v. Barry 1676 
 v. Beard 1026 
 v Beebe 1751 
 v. Chesapeake & O. Canal 
 
 Co. 149, 659 
 
 v. Clark 999, 1224. 1248 
 
 v. Crane 1309 
 
 Stewart v. Dunn 
 v. Duvall 
 v Fauiler 
 v Flint 
 v. Flowers 
 
 CX111 
 
 273 
 
 169, 406 
 
 1407 
 
 586, 601 
 1816 
 
 v Forbes 973, 1013, 1029, U5:i, 
 
 14ii3 
 
 D.Graham 1704.1705,1708,1713 
 
 v. Great Western Ry. Co. 553, 
 
 1625 
 
 v. Hoare 1846 
 
 v Huntington 815 
 
 c lnglehart 1073 
 
 v. Jackson 221 
 
 v. Johnson 1677 
 
 v Lay 1752 
 
 v Lispenard 851 ' 
 
 v Meuzies 1503 
 
 v. Noble 1258 
 
 v Nurse 1443 
 
 v. Pollard 1232 
 
 v. Smithson 1648 
 
 v. Stewart 29,30,31,334,426 
 
 v Townsend 779 
 
 v. Turner 1168 
 
 v U. S Ins Co. 24 
 
 v. Wilson 1253 
 
 Stickland v. Aldridge 657 
 
 Stifle v. Everitt 98, 104. 123 
 
 Stiles v. Allen 1188 
 
 v Donaldson 641 
 
 Still v. Reading 197,314 
 
 Stilphen V Read 1120 
 
 Stilson v. Leeman 1381 
 
 Stilt v. Hilton 1677 
 
 Stilwell v Adams 367 
 
 v. M'Neely 220, 588 
 
 v Wilkius 1721 
 
 Stimpson v. Green 1258, 1298 
 
 v. Putnam 1046, 1683, 1684, 
 
 2150 
 
 Stimson v. Lewis 272 
 
 v. Meade 1281 
 
 Stinson v. Ashley 100 
 
 v. Hil.Jrup 312 
 
 V. Pickering 68 
 
 Stinton v. Taylor 807, 809, 830, 831 , 
 
 833 
 
 Stirrat v Excelsior Manuf Co. 314, 
 
 349 
 
 Stitt r. Hilton 1675 
 
 Stitwell B. Williams 1721 
 
 Stobart v Todd 906 
 
 Stock v Vining 1433 
 
 Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Cone 
 
 Iron Works 305, 1086, 1440 
 
 v. Hudson Iron Co 1071, 1076, 
 
 lllo, 1675 
 
 Stocken r Stocken 1359, 1485 
 
 Blocker v Heggerty 1562 
 
 V. Planet R. Society 1660 
 
 v. Wedderhun 1656 
 
 Stock ley r Rowley 550 
 
 v. Stock lev 1580, 1622 
 
 Stockman B Wallis 1716 
 
 Stockport District Water Works 
 
 Co b. Jowett 1672 
 
 Stockton v. Anderson 193 
 
 V Briggs 1619 
 v. Lockwood 2040 
 r Williams 1031 
 
 Stockton & Darlington Ry. Co. 
 
 V. Hrown 1650 
 
 Stockton & Hartlepool Ry. Co. 
 v. Leeds & Thirsk Ry Co. 
 
 1620 
 Stoddard v. McLane 320 
 
 v. Sloan 894 
 
 Stoever v Stoever 59 
 
 Stogden v. Lee 100 
 
 Stoke v. Robson 193 
 
 Stokes v Citv Offices Company 
 
 983, 1330, 1638 
 v. Clendon 270 
 
 V Edmeades 1072 
 v. Heron 1.503 
 v. Holdcn 56, 135
 
 CX1V 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Stokes v. Taylor 232 
 
 Stokoe v. Rob.-on _ 1&*2 
 
 Stuue V. Anderson 372. 37'J, 443 
 
 V Bartlett 212,261, 1*39, 1245 
 
 v. Blackburn 1098 
 
 r. Boston & Maine Railroad 58 
 
 v Buckner 279 
 
 , v City of London Real Prop 
 
 trty Co 1638 
 
 V. Damon 851 
 
 v Davies 422 
 
 v Dennis 671 
 
 v Duncan 518, 532 
 
 v Hobart 1613,1021 
 
 v Hyde 1845 
 
 v Lickorish 1235, 1414 
 
 v Lidderdale 1053. 1730 
 
 *• Locke 212, 809, 1259, 1377, 1381. 
 1463, 1466, 1926 
 542, 692, 713, 758, 845 
 63 
 1561 
 1107 
 60,553.630 
 1169 
 1650, 173> 
 
 v. Moore 
 
 v Parks 
 
 v. Reed 
 
 v State 
 
 V. Thomas 
 
 v Van Heythusen 
 
 v. \\ etuiore 
 
 Straker v. Ewing 1399 
 
 v. Graham 1131 
 
 Strange v. Bell 1560 
 
 v. Collins 378, 384, 782 
 
 v Harris 1771 
 
 v. Thouias 1182 
 
 !■ Watson 378, 3:4 
 
 Strangeways, Ex parte 182 
 
 Strangford v Green 1249 
 
 Strattord v Baker 1540, 1594, 161 H I 
 v. Boswortb 1399 
 
 Strathmore v. Bowes 1633 
 
 Strattou v. Davidson 151, 171s, 
 
 1729 
 
 v. Hernon 
 
 v Physio-Medical College 
 v. Reisdorph 
 
 Straughan r. Hallwood 
 v. Wright 
 
 Strauss v. Goldschmidt 
 
 Stray er v Stone 
 
 Street v. Auderton 
 v. Maryland Cent. Ry Co. 
 
 v Wishart 75, 1732 
 
 Stouemetz Printers' M Co v. 
 
 Brown Folding M. Co. 334, 349, 
 1548 
 Stoney V. Saunders 1017 
 
 Stouington Savings Bank v 
 
 Davis 1221, 1246, 2193 
 
 Stooke v Vincent 109, 636 
 
 Stopturd v. Canterbury. Lord 
 
 1360 
 Storer v. Great Western Ry 
 
 Co. 4?4 
 
 v Jackson 1678 
 
 t; Johnson 1840 
 
 Storev v Lennox 620 
 
 v People 1069 
 
 Storm v Davenport 159, 249, 280 
 
 « Mann 1629, 1669 
 
 Stormout?" Wickens 1167 
 
 Storms v . Storms 828 
 
 Storr v, Pannell 161 
 
 Storrs v. Barker 2271 
 
 v Benbow 1476 
 
 v. Payne 1566 
 
 v. Wallace 334 
 
 Storry v. Walsh 1277 
 
 Story, Ex parte 1H9 
 
 . v Brown 1222 
 
 v Hawkins 9j4 
 
 v. .lerscv City and Bergen 
 
 Point Plank Road Co. 1620 
 v. Johnson 1156, 1158, 1486 
 
 v Livingston 100,191,287.302, 
 1180, 1195. 1222. 
 1302, 1316 
 v Odin 1638 
 
 v Official Manager 
 
 v. Rigby 
 Streeten v Whitmore 
 Strelley V Pearson 
 Stretch v Gowdey 
 
 v. Stretch 
 
 Strettou v. 
 
 Stribling v. Hart 
 Strickland v. Strickland 
 426, 607 
 
 V Weldon 
 Strike v. McDonald 
 Strike's Case 
 Striker v Mott 
 Stringer, lie 
 
 v Harper 
 Stringer's Case 
 Strode r Blackburne 
 
 v. Little 
 Strohuieyer v Zeppenfeld 
 Strong, lie 
 
 v. Blanchard 
 
 v Shultz 
 
 v. Tonge 
 
 v Vermont 
 
 V. Windsor, Lord 
 
 Stotesbury v. Vail 
 Stothart v Burnet 
 Stntt v Meanock 
 Stoughton v. Lynch 
 
 Stonrton v Stourton 
 Stout » Cook 
 
 l> Curry 
 
 v Seabrook 
 Stoutenburgh v. Peck 
 BcovrII b Banks 
 Stow /•. Russell 
 Stowell v Waddingham 
 
 I.i.l y p Cole 
 Stracy p. Blake 
 Btrader v Byrd 
 
 v. Graham 
 Btradley v. Circuit Judge 
 Str.iit v. National Harrow Co. 1642 
 
 1240 
 
 99 
 
 1553 
 
 662. 676, 677, 
 
 678,1725, 1727 
 
 748, 1676 
 
 551 
 
 164. 174. 13H7 
 
 668, 1250, 
 
 1257 
 
 10S 
 
 630 
 1628 
 
 560 
 1676 
 14«i2 
 
 545 
 1628 
 1539 
 1126 
 658, 1002 
 
 630 
 1031 
 
 v. Carlyle Press 
 
 v Moore 
 
 v. Smith 
 
 v. Sproul 
 
 v Strong 
 Strother r. Dutton 
 Stroud v Deacon 
 Stroughill v. Gulliver 
 Strousberg v. Republic of Costa 
 
 Rica 141 
 
 Strudt v. Roberts 1126 
 
 Strudwick v. Pargiter 
 
 552 
 
 1411 
 
 214 
 
 1517 
 
 1151 
 
 406 
 
 13M 
 
 172 . 
 
 1743. 
 
 1765 
 
 671 
 
 1 b3 
 
 1661 
 
 1745, 1755 
 
 287 
 
 1278 
 
 1031 
 
 252, 406, 
 
 , 947, 1513 
 
 12 
 
 918, 1476 
 
 945 
 
 209 
 
 544 
 
 1428, 1433 
 
 26 
 
 677, 1163 
 
 629 
 
 1407 
 
 64 
 
 1237, 1239, 1241. 
 
 1244 
 
 1461 
 
 434, 436 
 
 115. 117 
 
 354 
 
 268, 1611 
 
 992 
 
 579 
 
 1474 
 
 StuUtf Goode 781 
 
 Stulz v. Stulz 879 
 
 Stumui v. Dixon 1169 
 
 Stump v Beattv 458,513 
 
 Stuuz v. Stuuz 1150 
 
 Stupart v. Arrowsmith 234, 3U4 
 
 Sturch v. Young 1600, 1724 
 
 Sturge, lit re 1361 
 
 v. Dimsdale 1440, 1450, 1608 
 
 v Eastern Union Ry Co. 1652 
 
 v. Starr 247 
 
 Sturgeon r. Burrall 334 
 
 v Booker '.'73, 1474, 1593, lot '3 
 
 Sturgcs v Knapp 1255 
 
 r Longworth 457 
 
 Sturgess v. Cary 1930 
 
 I Sturgis, lie, M P. Syndicate 27 
 
 v Cary 
 
 2252 
 v. Champneys 91, 92 
 
 v Corp 100, 186 
 
 v Morse 891, 919, 1484 
 
 Sturla v. Freccia 32 
 
 Sturoc, lie 1069 
 
 Sturt v Hellish 641, 648 
 
 Sturtevant v Jaques 989 
 
 r Waterbury 846, 847 
 
 Sttirz v. De la Rue 1644, 1670 
 
 Stutz v Handiey 236 
 
 Stuyvesant v New York, Mayor, 
 &c , of 
 
 Style o. Martin 
 
 Styles v Shipton 
 
 Suher v Allen 
 
 Sublette v. Tinney 
 
 Sublicich v. Russell 
 
 Suckling v. Gabb 
 
 Suess v. Noble 
 
 Suffern v. Butler 
 v Johnson 
 
 Suffield, Lord e Bond 
 and Watts, Re 
 
 Suffolk, Earl of v Green 
 
 i84 
 
 1584 
 
 792 
 
 334 
 
 560 
 
 1567 
 
 1770 
 
 1620 
 
 1677 
 
 284 
 
 352, 756 
 
 1040 
 
 584, 611, 
 
 1573 
 
 v Howard 1385 
 
 Sugden r Hull 469, 470, 1047 
 
 v. Lord St. Leonards 1462 
 
 Suggt' Silber H'71 
 
 v Thornton 536 
 
 Suggitt. Re 102, 103, 108 
 
 Sui>se v Lowther, Lord 1470 
 
 Sulger, Ex parte 1055 
 
 Sullings v. Goodyear Dental Vul- 
 
 Stuart, lie 
 v Ancell 
 v. Barrowes 
 r. Boulware 
 v Bute, Lord 
 v. Colter 
 v. Gay 
 
 v. Hendricks 
 v. Lloyd 
 v. Moore 
 
 v. Welsh 
 
 r. Worrall 
 Stubbings v. McGregor 
 Stubbs. Re, Hanson v. Stubbs 
 
 v. Burwell 
 
 v Dunsany 
 
 V be:ivitt 
 • v Leigh 
 
 v Sargon 
 Stucker r. Stucker 
 Stucky v. Stuckv 
 Studabaker v. Markley 
 Studd v Acton 
 Studdert v. Grosvenor 
 
 V. Von Steiglitz 
 Studholme v. Hodgson 
 
 1389 
 
 1679 
 15S8 
 
 1746, 1756 
 
 724 
 
 341, 1151,1163 
 
 1286 
 
 1299 
 
 415, 2168 
 
 68, 1347, 1348, 1-350. 
 
 1627 
 
 1560, 1561 
 
 2225 
 
 1600 
 
 1034 
 
 951 
 
 978 
 
 1622 
 
 1518 
 
 96, 1177, 1485, 1595 
 
 194, 212 
 
 canite Co. 
 Sullivan V Bevan 
 v. Iron S M. Co. 
 v. Jacob 
 v. Jennings 
 v Judah 
 r Latimer 
 r O Conner 
 r I'lii;lips 
 li Portland, &c. R Co 
 
 633 
 
 1424 
 
 313, 545 
 
 1488 
 
 1^82 
 
 1673, 11384 
 
 1172 
 
 1120 
 
 303, 1638 
 
 560, 561, 
 
 630, 714 
 
 v. Rcdfield 1643 
 
 v Sullivan 69 
 
 r Winthrop 1254 
 
 Sullivant v. Weaver 518 
 
 Sully v Drennan 26 
 
 Sultan v. Providence Tool Co 630 
 Suizbacher v. Shoe & Leather 
 
 Bank 1563 
 
 Sulzer r. Watson 10il 
 
 Summerfield v. Prichard IS 
 
 Summerlin v. Fronterina S. M. 
 
 328 
 1463 
 468 
 26 
 837 
 1426. 1427 
 Studwell v. Palmer 1003, 1481, 1504. 
 1505 
 
 Co. 
 Summers v. City Bank 
 
 v. Dame 
 
 li Farish 
 
 v. Moseley 
 
 r Murray 
 Summersett v. Jarvis 
 Sumner B. Sessoms 
 
 r Thorpe 
 
 v Waugh 
 Snmsinn V Crutwell 
 Sunderland, Freemen, 
 Ex parte 
 
 303 
 
 87 
 
 890, PS6 
 
 1673 
 
 1102 
 
 617, 682, 789 
 
 58 
 
 1286 
 
 665 
 
 281 
 
 1719 
 
 &c, of, 
 
 1121
 
 Supervisors v. Deyoe 1682 
 
 v. Durant 1017 
 
 n Keuuieott 14rfl 
 
 v. Mineral Point R. Co _378 
 
 &c. v. Mississippi, &c R. Co 733, 
 
 759, 784, 838 
 
 Supreme Council V. Bennett 1561 
 
 Supreme Sitting of Order v. 
 
 Baker 1716, 1734 
 
 Surget v. Byers 852 
 
 Surr v. Walmsley 905 
 
 Sussex, Earl of v. Temple 86'J 
 
 Sussex I'eerage Case 864 
 
 Sutcliffe, Re 720 
 
 Suter v Matthews 552 
 
 Sutherland v De Virenne 202, 2n3, 
 
 201 
 
 v. Lake Canal Co. 211 
 
 v Straw 281 
 
 v. Young 9> 
 
 Sutphen v. Fowler 1032, 13-12, 
 
 1457 
 
 Sutton, Re 199 
 
 v. Dog.-ett 1437, 1433 
 
 v. Downing 23 il 
 
 v. Furniss 1566 
 
 v. Gatewood 601 
 
 v. .(ones 1732 
 
 V. Mashiter 1617 
 
 v. Rees 1745 
 
 v Scarborough, Lord 655 
 
 v. Schonwald 1284 
 
 n Stone 264, 1054 
 
 v. Sutton 650 
 
 Sutton Pit. t Parish v Cole 22 
 
 Sutton Harbour Co. v. Hitchens7'»l, 
 
 14,2, 1405 
 
 Suydam v Truesdale 780 
 
 Swabey v. Dovey 482 
 
 v. Sutton 720, 721, 722 
 
 Swaby v. Dickon 1747, 1750 
 
 Swain, lie 560 
 
 v. Follows 32, 111 
 
 v Hall 1129 
 
 Swaine v. Great Northern Ry. 
 
 Co. 1072, 1650 
 
 v. Maryott 8.50 
 
 v Perine 1165, 1166 
 
 v. Wilson 1652 
 
 Swale v. Milner 1424 
 
 v. Swale 798, 799, 1723 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Swallow o. Binns l'Jl, 202, 203, 204, 
 
 1514 
 
 v. Day 780, 781 
 
 Swau, Inre 1713 
 
 v. Castleman 544 
 
 v Clark 292 
 
 v. Dent 13W 
 
 v Horton 161 
 
 v. Swan 279 
 
 v. Webb 1264 
 
 v. Wheeler 1231 
 
 Swan Land & Cattle Co v. Frank 
 
 26 
 Swan's Settlement, Re 101 
 
 Swanholm v. Reeser 843 
 
 Swann v. Swann 110. 307 
 
 Swansea v. Quirk 573 
 
 Swansea Shipping Co v. Duncan 
 
 lo'.tf 
 Swansea Vale Ry. Co. v. Budd 1837 
 Swauston v. Lishniau 1838 
 
 v. Twickenham Local Board 
 
 1468 
 Swanzy v. Swanzy 30, 31, 53, 359 
 Swart v. Central Trust Co. 1770 
 
 S vartz v. Chickering 8>»9 
 
 Swayne v. Swayne 1696 
 
 v Lyon 186 
 
 Swayze v. Swayze 335, 347 
 
 Swearingen v Pendleton 251 
 
 Swedesborough Church v. Shivers 
 
 328, 329 
 
 Sweeny v. Coffin 460, 536 
 
 v. Hull 4<>3 
 
 v. Williams 630 
 
 Sweet ?'. Converse 559 
 
 v. Meredith 1220, 1282 
 
 v. Parker 222. 737 
 
 v. Southcote 569, 675 
 
 v. Syracuse 1 '34 
 
 Sweetzer v. Buchanan 1556 
 
 Sweny v. Smith 241 
 
 Swepson v. Exchange & D. Bank 
 
 334 
 
 v. Rouse 63 
 
 Swett v. Stark 569 
 
 Swift, Re 95 
 
 E.r parte 1359 
 
 v. Eckford 334, 339, 342, 402 
 
 424 
 
 v. Edson 259 
 
 cxv 
 
 Swift v. Grazebrook 79, 1469, 1470 
 v. Jenks 1637 
 
 v. Meyers 149 
 
 V. Munn 1126 
 
 v. State Lumber Co. 190 
 
 v Stebbius 200,222,457 
 
 v. Swift 724, 1213, 14^8, 1862 
 
 V. Wiley 875 
 
 Swinbanks, Ex parte 630 
 
 Swiuborne V. Nelson 300, 720. 721. 
 1829, 2114 
 Swindall v. Bradley 1668, 1669 
 
 Swindell v Birmingham Syn- 
 dicate 1071 
 Swine, Re, Mellor v. Swine 1029 
 Swiuteu v. Swinfen 974, 1121, 1124, 
 114H, 1385 
 Swinnerton v. Stafford, Marquis 
 
 of 1129, 1135 
 
 Switzer v McCulloch 1638 
 
 v Skiles 365, 655 
 
 Sword v Allen 1663 
 
 Syckel r. Emery 1629, 1630, 1676 
 
 Sydney v. S> dney 
 
 
 1726 
 
 Sydolph v. Moukston 
 
 
 764 
 
 Sykes, Re 
 
 
 18,7 
 
 v. Dyson 
 
 
 1061 
 
 V. Hastings 
 
 
 1732 
 
 v. Sacerdotti 
 
 
 154 
 
 v. Schofield 
 
 
 1157 
 
 V. Sykes 
 
 
 1648 
 
 S. kes' Trusts, Re 
 
 
 914 
 
 Sylvester v. Craig 
 
 
 601 
 
 r Hall 
 
 
 1097 
 
 V. Jerome 
 
 
 780 
 
 Sylvis v. Svlvis 
 
 
 313 
 
 Sym's Case 
 
 
 126 
 
 Syme v. Johnson 
 
 
 1481 
 
 Symes v. Glynn 
 
 236, 248. 2 
 
 v. Magnay 
 
 1564 
 
 1570 
 
 Symmes v. Strong 
 
 73 
 
 ',842 
 
 Symonds n. City Bank 
 
 
 324 
 
 v. Cumberland, Duchess of 
 
 510 
 
 v. Jenkins 
 
 
 1779 
 
 v. \ ilkes 
 
 
 100 
 
 S} mons Re, Luke v. Tomkin 
 
 328, 
 
 
 1260, 
 
 1581 
 
 f. De Barros 
 
 
 508 
 
 v. Mnlkern 
 
 
 674 
 
 Sympsnn v Prothero 
 
 1845, 
 
 1846 
 
 Syz B Redfield 
 
 
 1309 
 
 T. 
 
 Tabbernor v. Tabbernor 308 
 
 Tabele v. Tabele 1425 
 
 Tabor v. Cunningham 328,383,139) 
 Tabuteau v. W irburtou 1600 
 
 Taendsticksfabriks A. Vulcan v. 
 
 Myers 1648 
 
 Taft !>. Taft 860 
 
 Tagg v. South Devon Ry. Co. 1837 
 
 Xasgart v. Boldin 117 
 
 Tainter v. Clark 845, 982 
 
 v. Morristown, Mayor of 1677 
 
 Tait v Jenkins 1723 
 
 v - N. Y Life Ins Co. 51 
 
 r. Northwick, Lord 1286 
 
 Taite v Gosling 324, 1654 
 
 v. Pallas li)4 
 
 Talbot v Bowen 657 
 
 v. Braddill 1244 
 
 v. Cruger 817 
 
 v. Frere 652, 1392 
 
 v. Keay 810 
 
 v. Kemshead 710 
 
 v. M'Gee 1550 
 
 v. Marshfleld 1342, 1362. 1417. 
 
 1420, 1771, 1824, 1834. 1836 
 
 v. Radnor, Lord 401, 407 
 
 v. Rutledge 1229 
 
 v Shrewsbury, Earl of 1.352, 1355 
 
 v. Staniforth 1386, 1622 
 
 Talbot v. Talbot 76, 77 
 
 »'. Todd 993,994 
 
 Earlr Hope Scott 1632.1721, 
 
 1723, 1725 
 
 Taliaferro v. Branch Bank 1621 
 
 v. Foot 361, 392 
 
 v. Minor 1234 
 
 Talleyraud V Boulanger 48. 1704 
 
 Tallmadge v. Lovett 561, 588 
 
 Tally v Tally 1588 
 
 Talmadge r. Bell 1552 
 
 Talmage v. Pell 286, 302, 780 
 
 Tamarra v. Southern Illinois 
 
 University 1^81 
 
 Tampier v. Ingle 421, 1600 
 
 TampUn v James 1080, 1082 
 
 Tarn worth, Lord v Ferrers, 
 
 Lord 1633, 1672 
 
 Taner r. Ivie 37, 72, 80, 13^8 
 
 Tanev v. Woodmansee 1381 
 
 Tanfield r. Davenport 92 
 
 p. Irvine 152, 1718, 1734 
 
 Tangve r Stott 1080 
 
 Tanker-lv v. Pettis 1576 
 
 Tann, AV 1"426 
 
 Tanner, Re 70 
 
 v. Carter 1488, 1490, 1603 
 
 v. Dancey 1423 
 
 v. Heard 1393 
 
 I Tanner v. Strutton 770 
 
 J Tanuueray ti Bowles 794 1380 
 
 Tansev v. McDonnell 63 1 1553 
 
 Tanswell v Scurrab 811.914 
 
 1 Tantlinger v Sullivan 1638 
 
 Tapley v Goodsell 1507 
 
 Tapling v. Jones 1638 
 
 Tappan v. Evans 542, 603. 1072, 
 
 1075 1110,1528, 1941,2384 
 
 v. Smith 1616, 1517, 1518 
 
 v. Western & A. R Co. 41S 
 
 Tappen v Norman 72, 161 
 
 Tnppln v. Heath 671 
 
 Taprell v. Tavlor 43 
 
 Tarbell v. Dnrant 378 
 
 Tarbuck v. Tarbuck 309, 1001, 
 
 1590 
 
 V Woodcock 698. 730 
 
 Tardrew V Howell 13«3. 1437 
 
 Tarleton v. Barnes 687, 661 
 
 ti. Dver 170,421 
 
 v. Bfornbv 59, 60, 553, 606, 659 
 
 Tarratt p. Lloyd 202, 203, 204. 
 
 2127 
 
 Tarver v. Tarver 5.72, 874 
 
 Tasburgh, Re 94 
 
 Tash l) Adams 1640, 1661 
 
 Tasker v Small 230, 1459, 1485, 
 
 1489
 
 CXV1 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging ] 
 
 Tassell v. Smith 213 
 
 Tate v. Goff 1150 
 
 v. Leithead 1524, 1526 
 
 v. Ohio & Miss R. Co. 303, 334 
 
 Tateui v. Gilpin 1002 
 
 Tatham v. Parker 1059 
 
 v. Wright 876, 1117, 1124, 1149, 
 
 1385 
 
 Taton !>. National Standard Land 
 
 M. & I. Co. 1220 
 
 Tattcrsall v. Groote 670 
 
 Tattershall v. Crampton 5ol 
 
 Tattou » London and Lanca- 
 shire Fire Ins. Co. 979, 1079 
 Tatuni v. Hines 1003 
 
 v Walker 378, 407 
 
 Taunton v. Morris 92, 102, 104 
 
 v l J epler 669 
 
 Tavenuer v. Barrett 195 
 
 Tawell v. State Co. 1072 
 
 Tayleur, In re 316, 1573 
 
 Tayloe v. Bond 1001 
 
 Taylor, Ex parte 193 
 
 lie 13, 69, 86, 438, 1213, 1428, 
 1361, 1842, 1851 
 1862, 1863 
 r. Allen 253, 1722 
 
 v. Ans.'ey 162, 476 
 
 v. Aditon 1126 
 
 v. B&iUj 601.789 
 
 v Baker 1385, 1392 
 
 ». Bank of Alexandria 24 
 
 r. Bank of Illinois 24 
 
 v Barclay 19, 546 
 
 V. Bate 286 
 
 v. Bay City Street Ry. Co. 303 
 v. Best 142 
 
 r. Boardman 1743 
 
 v. Bogert 778 
 
 r. Bogg 1430 
 
 r. Bouehier 40 
 
 v. Boyd 1062, 1250 
 
 r. Brown 1074 
 
 v. Brownfield 1081 
 
 f. Carpenter 45, 1648, 1649, 1087, 
 2318 
 V. Central R. & B Co. 1120 
 
 v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co 1580 
 v. Coates 993 
 
 v. Colgate 1061, 1277 
 
 v. Columbian Ins Co. 1751 
 
 v. Commonwealth 
 v. Cooper 
 
 D'Egville 
 V. Dodd 
 v. Dowlen 
 r. Duckett 
 V. Duncanson 
 v. Eckersley 
 v. Fisher 
 r. Foster 
 v. Glanville 
 t>. Gooch 
 v. Gordon 
 r. Grange 
 r. Hall 
 v. Haylin 
 
 Heming 
 
 867 
 1277 
 1312 
 
 1465 
 
 973 
 
 617. 666 
 
 1729, 1744 
 
 390, 489, 490, 742 
 
 576 
 
 1412 
 
 779 
 
 443 
 
 1487 
 
 1396 
 
 371,666 
 
 740, 1819 
 
 v Holmes 109, 145, 545, 560, 1622 
 
 t\ Jardine 
 
 v Johnston 
 
 v. Keily 
 
 v. Kilgore 
 
 v. King 
 
 V. Leiteh 
 
 v. Life Ass'n. 
 
 v. Luther 
 
 »'. Ma\ rant 
 
 »'. Meads 
 
 r Midland Ry. Co. 
 
 v. Milner 
 
 f. Mitchell 
 
 r. Morton 
 
 v. Neate 
 
 ?'. Obee 
 
 v. Oldham 
 
 v. Pearson 
 
 1063 
 
 852 
 
 894 
 
 1302, 13-0 
 
 334 
 
 1707 
 
 313 
 
 722, 723, 2227 
 
 1135, 1136 
 
 100. 186 
 
 197, 1470 
 
 592,690 
 
 563 
 
 1624 
 
 1728 
 
 780 
 
 70, 1732 
 
 1583 
 
 Taylor v. Pede 
 v. Person 
 v. Philips 
 v. Phillips 
 l\ Pophaui 
 
 v. Portington 
 v. Read 
 
 v. Robertson 
 
 v. Roe 
 
 V. Ruudell 
 
 v. Russell 
 
 v. Salmon 
 
 V. Satti rthwaite 
 
 v. Scrivens 
 
 v. Sharp 
 
 v. Shaw 
 
 v Sheppard 
 
 v. Smith 
 
 v. Soper 
 
 V. Southgate 
 
 v. Tabrum 
 
 v. Taylor 
 
 177 
 
 1076 
 73, 166 
 443 
 1409, 1464, 1473, 
 1474 
 1660 
 994, 1317, 1319, 1491, 
 1494 
 1296 
 1051 
 724, 1826, 1827 
 674 
 240, 508, 1837 
 1561 
 1806 
 1575, 1577, 1579 
 420, 699, 789 
 1(21 
 334,338 
 1737 
 797, 1465 
 381, 1421 
 183. 324, 499, 505, 
 1256, 1536, 1582, 2060 
 v. Titus 780 
 
 v. Tompkins 
 V. Topham 
 v. Waters 
 V. Webb 
 v. W'emyss 
 v. Wood 
 v. Wrench 
 Taylor's Estate, lie 
 
 551 
 1409 
 1799 
 256,287, 1131 
 630, 6*8 
 942 
 762 
 402 
 Taylor County v. Standley 815 
 
 Taylor, McBean, & Co. v. Chan- 
 dler 1661 
 Tazewell v. Saunders 1254 
 Tazewell County v. Fanners' L. 
 
 & T. Co. 1584 
 
 Tea Co r. Jones 157 
 
 Teaff v., Hewitt 986 
 
 Teague v. Dendy 729 
 
 v. Richards 992, 1616 
 
 Teal r. Wood worth 175 
 
 Teale ». Teale 1572, 1574 
 
 Teall v. Slaven 560 
 
 ? . Watts 1157 
 
 Tebbs r Carpenter 1416, 1420 
 
 Tebbutt r Potter 796 
 
 Tedder ?•. Stiles 402 
 
 Tediowe v. Esher 951 
 
 Teed v. Carruthers 706. 7 10 
 
 i. Marvin 1407 
 
 v. Reese 1208 
 
 Tehama County v. Bryan 313 
 
 Tekait Doorga Persad Singh r. 
 
 Tekaitni Doorga Konwari 659 
 
 Telegraph Co v. Davenport 19" 
 
 Tel'ord r Met' n Board 1620 
 
 v. Ruskin 724 
 
 Tempest v. Camoys, Lord 319, 631, 
 
 700, 1342 
 
 r. Ord 1750, 1764 
 
 Templar r. Sweat 12!il 
 
 Temple r Baltinglass, Lady 663 
 
 v. Bank of England 147, 1663 
 
 r. Foster 628 
 
 v Lawson 1376, 1410 
 
 ?•. London and Birmingham 
 
 Railway Co 59 
 
 v. Scott 216 
 
 Temple Bar, The 1i»ti 
 
 Templeman v Warrington 1610 
 
 Tenant V Ellis 30 
 
 v. Grav 1254 
 
 v. Hamilton 1101 
 
 Tench v. Cheese 352, 728, 729, 759, 
 
 1697 
 
 Tenham, Lord v. Herhert 16S2 
 
 Tennant ;•. Trtnchard 1"13 
 
 v. Wilsmore "81 
 
 Tennent v. Battey 235 
 
 t'. Patton 993 
 
 Tennessee Hospital r. Fuqua 1361 
 
 Tenney v. Bell 553 
 
 Tenney's Case 1070 
 
 Tentle v Muncy 123 
 
 Terhune v. Colton 1484, 1489 
 
 v. Midland Ry. Co. 1601 
 
 Terrell, lie 1443 
 
 v. Higgs 1625 
 
 v. Iugersoll 1461 
 
 v Souch 511 
 
 Terre Haute & L. R. Co. v. 
 
 Sherwood 601 
 
 Terrewest v. Featherby 1616 
 
 '1'errill v. Higgs 552 
 
 Terry, Ex parte 1478 
 
 He 1069 
 
 v. Abrahams 1461 
 
 v. Brunson 123 
 
 v Cape Fear Bank 991, 1209 
 
 v. Commercial Bank 974, 1584, 
 
 1585 
 
 v. Murtin 1756 
 
 v. Munger 815 
 
 v. Rosell 385, 652 
 
 v. Sharon 1507 
 
 v. Stukeley 1481 
 
 Terwit v. Gresham 869 
 
 Tetley v. Giidith 113 
 
 Tetraultr Labbe 634 
 
 Tevis v. Richardson 90, 91, 457 
 
 Tew r. Winterton, Earl of 1254, 1256 
 
 Tewart v. Lawson 1765 
 
 Texas v. Hardenberg 378 
 
 Texas Cent. Rv Co. v. Stewart 68 
 
 Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cox 1743 
 
 v. Boyd 1743 
 
 v Johnson 1743 
 
 Texas Trunk R Co v Lewis 1765 
 
 Texeire v. Da Costa 1728 
 
 Teynham, Lady v. Lennard 1352 
 
 Thacker v. Key 1427 
 
 Thackeray r. Parker 11-3 
 
 Thames and Medwav Canal Co. 
 
 v. Nash 1568 
 
 Thames & Mersey M. Ins. Co. 
 
 v. Continental Ins. Co 780 
 
 Thames Haven Co. v. Hall 307 
 
 Than v Smith 175, 177 
 
 Thanet, Earl of r. Patersou 1663 
 
 Thannhauser v Cortes Co 28 
 
 Tharp, He 1768 
 
 Tharpe v. Stallwood 1133 
 
 r. Tharpe 1738, 1739 
 
 Thatcher r. Lambert 778 
 
 Thayer r. Holland 1385 
 
 v. Lane 1150 
 
 v. Mann 652, 1233 
 
 D. Smith 1961 
 
 v. Tha\er 1157 
 
 r. Turner 385 
 
 Theed v. Debenham 1638 
 
 Thellusson v. Rendlesham, Lord 1503 
 
 r. W'oodfnrd 1731, 2197. 2344 
 
 Therry r. Henderson 71^8, "99 
 
 Theurer v. Brogan 216 
 
 Tbewlis v. Farrar 85, 1525 
 
 Thexton v. Edmonston 858, 889, 
 
 890 
 
 Thever v. Tombs 1399 
 
 Thickuesse v. Acton 183, 499 
 
 Thiedemann v. Goldschmidt 1651 
 
 1 hielman v. Carr 1 r .5 1 
 
 Third v Goodier 1131 
 
 Third Avenue R Co. r. Mayor 1682 
 
 Third Avenue Sav. Bank v. 
 
 Din.ock 780 
 
 Third Burnt Tree Building So- 
 ciety, Re 1610 
 Third National Bank r Skillings 
 
 Lumber Co. 1561 
 
 Thistlethwaite ;•. Gamier 1524 
 
 Thomas, Ex parte 1488 
 
 Re 286, 894, 912 
 
 r. Adams 287, 289, 294 
 
 v. Atherton 1249, 1400 
 
 v Beals 385 
 
 r Bernard 417, 426. 826 
 
 v. Bibb 1071 
 
 t\ Boswell 190 
 
 v. Brashear 542, 692, 1624, 1680 
 
 i
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging. ] 
 
 CXVll 
 
 Thomas v. Burt 1580 
 
 v. Buxton 1539 
 
 v. Cole 1481 
 
 v. Cross 1035, 1037, 1040, 1696 
 v. Davidson 1282 
 
 v. Davies 318, 1734, 1WJS 
 
 v. Dawkin 1 i38. 1739 
 
 v. De Baum 1062, 1275, 1283 
 
 v. Dike 69 
 
 v. Doub 341, 782 
 
 v. Dougty 32 
 
 v. Dunning 212,225,272- 
 
 v. Eastwood 1399 
 
 v. Ellis 43 
 
 v. Elson 1474 
 
 »\ Finlayson 
 
 v. Griffith 1207, 1208, 1212 
 
 v. G wynne 166 
 
 v. Bail 1046 
 
 f Harvie 1577,1579,1580 
 
 v. Hawkins 1662 
 
 v. Hite 3i9 
 
 v. Hobler 242, 385 
 
 v. Horn 1677 
 
 v James 1631 
 
 v. Jersey 444, 474 
 
 v. Jones 1437, 1438, 1801, 2309 
 v. Lloyd 1400 
 
 v. Marshall 645 
 
 v. Merchants' Bank 144 
 
 v. Montgomery 1202 
 
 v. Nokes 1044 
 
 v. Oakley 1632, 1633 
 
 v. Paliu 1743, 1793 
 
 V. Parry 9n8 
 
 v. Phillips 13:i9 
 
 v. Powell 1279 
 
 v. i 'rice lo0 
 
 v. Puddlesbury 1393 
 
 v. Rawlings 770, 774, 943, 1559, 
 1576, 1577, 1579 
 v. Rees 336, 345 
 
 v. Reg. 133 
 
 V. Roberts 1349 
 
 r Safe Deposit Co. 1411 
 
 v- Selby 429 
 
 u. Sellman 334 
 
 v. Sheppard 101 
 
 v. Stokes 1463 
 
 v. Taylor 423 
 
 v Thomas 162, 475, 793, 1795 
 
 V Townsend 1402 
 
 v. Tyler 602 
 
 v. Visitors of Frederick Co. 
 School 402, 409, 781. 784, 828, 
 1407, 1532 
 v. Walker 1349 
 
 v. Warner 361, 4 "7 
 
 v. Western Car Co. 1756 
 
 v. White 644 
 
 v. Williams 1350, 1620 
 
 v. Wilson 1255 
 
 Thomas Huston El. Co. v. Sperry 
 
 El Co 334 
 
 Thomason v. Moses 1405, 1 427 
 
 v. Neeley _ 1553 
 
 v . Smithson 378, 379 
 
 Thomasson v. Kennedy 1124 
 
 v. Tucker 841 
 
 Thoinlinson v. Dixon 1080 
 
 Thomond, Lord, Case of 1565 
 
 Thompson, Ex parte 386 
 
 Re 56, 57, 87, 100 
 
 He, Stevens v. Thompson 111 
 
 v. Allen 1676 
 
 j; Andrus 1657 
 
 v. Baskerville 214 
 
 v. Boyle 1845 
 
 v. Brown 236, 986, 1033, 1615, 
 
 2246, 2294, 2297 
 
 v. Butler 123 
 
 V. Catlett 1299 
 
 v. Childress 1234 
 
 v. Clark 843, 855 
 
 v. Clay 294 
 
 v. Clive 1408, 1426, 1427 
 
 v. Cooper 1214, 1424 
 
 Thompson v. Corrie 410 
 
 v. Derham 1626 
 
 v. Dimond 1282 
 
 v. Donaldson 865 
 
 v. Dunn 720, 721, 1829 
 
 v. Ebbetts 1571 
 
 v. Falk 677, 1-34 
 
 v. Geary ltji6 
 
 v. German Valley R. Co. 907 
 
 v. Goulding 980, lul6, 1018, 1019, 
 1028, 1030, 1110, 1475, 1575 
 v Graham 227 
 
 v. Griffin 1358, 1359 
 
 r. Hall 1679 
 
 v. Harrison 885 
 
 v. Hawley 380 
 
 v. Hey wood 378 
 
 v. Hill 814, 1507, 1515, 1544 
 
 v. Hudson 710 j 
 
 v. Jones 162, 448, 476 
 
 p. Judge 416 | 
 
 v. Knight 795 I 
 
 v. Lake 23> I 
 
 v. Lambe 840, 1229, 1230 
 
 v. London, University of 54:», 
 
 589, 699, 1854 
 
 197 
 974, 1575, 1580 
 1624 
 72ii 
 1642 
 1444 
 372 
 890 I 
 801 
 293, 986 
 v. Pennsylvania R Co. 106'J, 1683 
 v. Phoenix Ins Co. 560, 1743 
 
 v. Planet Building Society 599 
 
 t'. Railroad Cos. 313, 630 
 
 v. Reno Savings Bank 
 
 v. McDonald 
 v. Maxwell 
 o. Mebane 
 v. Mills 
 
 v. Montgomery 
 V. Moore 
 v. Moxey 
 v. Partridge 
 v. Paul 
 v. Peebles 
 
 t>. Scott 
 v. Seiby 
 v. Smith 
 r. Stanhope 
 v. Symonds 
 v. Thompson 
 v. Todd 
 v. Tompkins 
 ii. Trotter 
 v. Turner 
 
 v. Union Elevator Co. 
 v. Waithman 
 v. Walker 
 v. Watson 
 v. Webster 
 p. Wild 
 t>. Woodfine 
 >. Wooldridge 
 
 1743, 1752, 1984 
 
 691. 1734 
 
 1653, 1703 
 
 1647 
 
 336 
 
 12, 88. 790, 856 
 
 657 
 
 1696, 1778 
 
 1175 
 
 1073 
 
 1380 
 
 647 
 
 1035 
 
 12 
 
 849, 881, 9 a l. 1400 
 
 701, 7n3 
 
 1106 
 
 830 
 
 360 
 
 919 
 
 14'H 
 
 328, 357, 642, 652. 
 
 653 
 
 19 
 
 653,14*3 
 
 517, 1576 
 
 1417 
 
 Thompson's Appeal 
 Thompson's Case 
 Thomson p. Dean 
 V. Eastwood 
 
 v. Powles 
 v. Thomson 
 P. Woo st or 
 Tliorby r. Yeates 
 Thorley's Cattle Food Co V. Mas 
 
 sam 162<\ 1648 
 
 Thorn v. Germand 406, 415, 417, 
 
 692 
 
 v. Smith 175,444 
 
 r Sweeney 1631 
 
 Thorndlkev Hunt 1697, 1797, 1840 
 
 p. Thorndike 1627 
 
 Thome p. Halsey 395, 1703, 1707 
 
 v- Mosher 353 
 
 v. Newman 1240, 1242 
 
 v. Sweeney 1668 
 
 v. Towanda Tanning Co- 631 
 
 Thorneloe p Hill 1648 
 
 Thornewell v. Johnson 674 
 
 Thornevcroft v. Crockett 1244 
 
 Thomh'ill p. Manning 999, 1028 
 
 v. Milbank 1802 
 
 v. Thornhill 1286, 1750 
 
 Thornley v. Thornley 122 
 
 Thornton V Fairfax 281 
 
 V. Finch 1035 
 
 v. Grant 1639, 1640 
 
 r. Henry 655, 657 
 
 v. Highland Ave. R. Co. 1461 
 
 t;. Hi^li tower 2,3 
 
 ti. Houtze 559 
 
 v. M'Kewan 1625 
 
 v. Ramsden 324 
 
 r. Roll 1638 
 
 v Stewart 392 
 
 v. Washington S. Bank 1716 
 
 Thorp e Farquer 195 
 
 r. Holdsworth 7»5 
 
 v Minor 68 
 
 v. Pettit 1676 
 
 Thorpe v. Freer 1403 
 
 v. Ja.kson 269 
 
 v. Macauley 564, 584, 597, 600, 
 
 720 
 
 v. Mattingley 1503, 1507 
 
 Thorson v. Peterson 546 
 
 Thouron v. East Tennessee, &c. 
 
 R. Co. 1770 
 
 Three Towns Banking Co. v. 
 
 Maddever 560 
 
 Threldkeld v Dobbins 371 
 
 Threlfell i: Harrison 12b5 
 
 v. Wilson 113 
 
 Thrifts B Fritz 659 
 
 Thring v. EJgar 605, 615, 619, 620, 
 
 621,624,678 
 
 Throckmorton v. Crowley 737, 1403 
 
 v. Throckmorton 838 
 
 Thropp v. Field 1683 
 
 Thrupp v. Goodrich 112. 113 
 
 Thnrgood v. Cane 528 
 
 Thurlow v. Tr.eby 459 
 
 Lord, Case of 1291 
 
 Thurman v Morgan 1765 
 
 r. Shelton 334, 346, 347, 559 
 
 Thurmand ;■. Clark 418 
 
 Thurmond v. Durham 1558 
 
 Thurston v. Arnold 1889 
 
 i\ Ma^tcrton 873 
 
 Thurston County v. Scammel 1381 
 
 Thurtell v. Beaumont 1133, 1134 
 
 Thwaites v. Sainsbury 1139 
 
 Thvnne p. Cary 6<;2 
 
 v. Shove 552, 1660 
 
 r. St. Maur 87 
 
 Tibballs v. Bidwell 296 
 
 v Sargeant 1734, 1735 
 
 Tibbetts v. Perkins 1079 
 
 Tib'.its v. Tibbits 1163 
 
 Tibbitts v. Phillips 1727 
 
 Tibbs, Re 1359 
 
 Tice v. School-district No. 18 560 
 
 Tichborno v. Mostyn 887, 1070 
 
 v. Tichborne 204, 251, 1070, 
 
 1726 
 
 Ticke! r. Short 666 
 
 Tickner v. Smith 1417 
 
 Tidd P. Clare 589 
 
 i Lister 92, 104, 118. 123 
 
 Tidman p. Trego 179 
 
 Tidswell. Re 1860 
 
 p Bowyer 780 
 
 Tidwell p. Ariel 1405 
 
 Tirl, /.■,. 1030 
 
 Tieman v Austin 1961 
 
 Tiernan p. Wilson 1269, 1272, 14 IS 
 
 Tiernay v Klein 1842 
 
 Tiffin P. Parker 398 
 
 Ti.-ard !• Moffitt 1638 
 
 Tighlman p. Proctor 1830 
 
 Tilden P, Green 13 
 
 Tildesley v. Harper 402, 406, 417, 
 
 785. 861 
 
 Tilghman v. Camden 1320 
 
 r. Werk 1576, 1680 
 
 Till. E.r parte 1735 
 
 Tillett, Re 1828 
 
 r. Pearson 
 Tilley v. Bridges 12S2 
 
 v. Thomas 989
 
 CXV111 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Tillinghast V Champlin 328, 778, ' 
 
 780, 1715, 1741 | 
 
 Tillman v Reynolds 1845 
 
 v. Thonias 586 
 
 Tiliotsou r. Hargrave 74, 163, 1190 | 
 
 v. Mitchell 890 | 
 
 Tillott, lie, Lee v. Wilson 18a' 
 
 TilMone, Ke 1785, 1794, 179 
 
 Tilly v. Wharton 
 T ilunn v. Cannon 
 Tilton tf. Barrell 
 
 V. Cofield 
 
 tf. Tilton 
 Timberlake v. Cobbs 
 Tiuims tf. Shannon 
 
 1122 
 106 i I 
 659 
 281, 1"25 
 406, 1531 
 842 
 361 
 
 Timp.-ou t'. Loudon & N. Y. R. 
 
 Co. 85 
 
 Tinison tf. Wilson 1071 
 
 Tindal v. Cobham 1776 
 
 Tindallr. Castle 1654 
 
 Tink tf. Rundle 1743 
 
 Tinkler If. liiudmarsh 1727 
 
 v. Rowland 1109. 1127 
 
 v. Swaynie 212, 216 
 
 Tinsley tf. Penniman 860 
 
 Tippiu If- Coleman 349 
 
 Tipping v. Clarke 722, 725. 726 
 
 It. Power 284, 710, 1390, 1423, 1778 
 
 V. St. Helen's Smelting Co 1637 
 
 Tippins v. t oates 943, 944 
 
 Tipton !'. Wcrtham 334 
 
 Tipton G. C. Co. v. Tipton M. 
 
 C. Co 1388 
 
 Tison v. Tison 1551 
 
 Tittensen It. Peat 605, 670 
 
 Titterton it. Osborne 309 
 
 Titus v. Hobart 48 
 
 Tobey v. Bristol, County of 671 [ 
 
 v. Foreman 1549 i 
 
 v. Leonard 844 I 
 
 Tobin tf. Dixon 121 
 
 v. Queen, The 133, 511 
 
 v. Reg 131, 133 ; 
 
 v. Walkinshaw 190. 844 j 
 
 v. Wilson 394, 1562 
 
 Tod tf Baylor 1166 
 
 v. Tod 1465 
 
 Todd. Re 95 
 
 v. Bishop 920 
 
 v. Dowd 1281 
 
 v. Em by 1133 
 
 v. Fisk 1621 
 
 v. Gee 548, 584 
 
 v. Lackey 1576 
 
 v. Minn. & St. L. Ry. Co. 
 
 196 
 
 v. Muu.-on 576 
 
 v. Rich 1732 
 
 v. Sterrett 225, 295 
 
 v. Stewart 157 
 
 v. Studholme 1208 
 
 v. Taft 1902 
 
 Toder v. Sansam 973 
 
 Toker v. Tokei 852 
 
 Toland if. Sprague 641 
 
 Tolderly v. Colt 1721, 1725 
 
 Toledo, &c. R. Co. v. Detroit, 
 
 &c. R Co. 1663 
 
 v. Pennsylvania Co. 1620 
 
 Toledo Tie & L. Co. v. Thomas 689 
 
 Tiller v Carteret 629, 1627 
 
 Tolman v. .lohnstone 1101 
 
 Tolson if. Dykes 1047 
 
 v. Jervis 1016 
 
 Tomkin v. Lethbridge 592,785 
 
 Tomkins v. Harrison 936, 938 
 
 v. Lane 1800 
 
 Tomkinson v. Balkis Cons. Co. 26 
 
 tf. South Eastern Ry. Co. 340, 354 
 
 Tomliuson if. Harrison 1704, 1708 
 r. Laud and Finance Co. 32 
 
 v. Lymer 579 
 
 t>. Swinnerton 788 
 
 V. Tomlinson 1486 
 
 v. Ward 1377, 1381, 1734. 1736 
 Tomliuson & VV, M. Co. v. Shatto 
 
 1734 
 
 Tommey v. Sprang 1502 
 
 v. White 1576 
 
 Tompkins v. Anthon 694 
 
 it. Halleck 1643 
 
 v. Hollister 699 
 
 v, Stephens 1073 
 
 v. Tompkins 874 
 
 Tompkyns v. Ladbroke 105 
 
 Tompson v. Bank of Redemption 545 
 
 v. Knights 1380 
 
 Tomson ». Judge 1515 
 
 Tung v. Oliver 1676, 1677 
 
 Tonkin v. Lethbridge 1515, 1520, 
 
 1534, 1547 
 
 Tonvbee v. Ducknell 1-79 
 
 Toofn Foley 149,536 
 
 Tooke v. Hartley 284 
 
 Tooley v. Kane 1274 
 
 Tonmer v. Rhodes 1001 
 
 Toosey v. Burchell 281, 1174, 1175, 
 
 1517 
 
 Tootal v. Spicer 1437 
 
 Tooth v. Canterbury, Dean and 
 
 Chapter of 210,230,262,579 
 
 Topham v. Lightbody 992 
 
 v. M'Gregor 1099 
 
 v. Portland 1144 1471 
 
 Topliffiv Jackson 2, 1250, 1297 
 
 v. Topliff 1302 
 
 Topp r. I'ollard 1368, 1371 
 
 v. White 629, 1653 
 
 v. Williams 1I''>4 
 
 Toppan v. Evans 1532 
 
 Topping ?>. Searson 454, 1848 
 
 Tori .<K'k v. Laing 1128 
 
 v. Lamy 1109 
 
 Tcrkington, Ex parte 894 
 
 Torpedo Co. v Clarendon 1620 
 
 Torr v. Torr 521. 527 
 
 Torrance v. Bolton 1395 
 
 Torre ». Brown 1256, 1503 
 
 Torrence !». Davidson 1461 
 
 Torrent tf. Booming Co. 1624 
 
 v. Hamilton 334 
 
 tf. Rogers 314 
 
 Torre\ v. Camden, &c. R Co. 1640 
 
 v Shaw 12-^1 
 
 Totten v. Nance 1031 
 
 Tottenham if. Barry 536, 628 
 
 v. Emmet 259, 13S6, 1391 
 
 Totty v. Ingleby 461 
 
 Touline v. Clark 844 
 
 Toulmin v Copland 1250, 1536, 1537, 
 
 1578, 1579, 1777 
 
 v- Hamilton 3'>2 
 
 r. Hedley 1126 
 
 o. Keid 385, 1561, 1563, 1564, 
 
 1568 
 
 Tourton if. Flower 288, 318, 599 
 
 Towend If. Toker 1526 
 
 Tower Manuf. Co. tf. Thompson 236, 
 
 Towle v. American Building So- 
 ciety 1716, 
 It. Bannister 
 v. Janvrin 
 v Pierce 150,216,219,288, 
 
 Tomlin If. Budd 
 
 v. Luce 
 
 it. M 'Chord 
 
 v Tomlin 
 Tomline tf. Reg. 
 Tomlins v. Palk 
 Tomlinson v. Claywell 
 
 t'. Greenfield 
 
 v. Gregg 
 
 1403 
 
 1271 
 
 989 
 
 236, 857 
 
 133 
 
 1029. 1030 
 
 342 
 
 646 
 
 1392 
 
 v. Swasey 
 
 tf. Towle 
 Town tf. Needham 
 Towne if. Bonnin 
 
 v. Smith 
 Town ley v Bed well 
 
 v Deare 
 
 v. Jones 
 Townsend, Re 
 
 v. Bogert 
 
 v. Carpenter 
 
 616 
 
 1079, 
 313, 
 
 1734 
 
 284 
 
 552 
 
 290, 
 
 361 
 
 1411 
 
 1666 
 
 840 
 
 .740 
 
 844 
 
 1476 
 
 1569 
 
 1131 
 
 13S9 
 
 1556 
 
 197 
 
 Townsend v. Champernowne 285, 
 
 
 1403, 1408 
 
 v. Graves 
 
 1073, 1076 
 
 v. Griggs 
 
 444 
 
 v. Hargraves 
 
 365 
 
 v. Ives 
 
 1116 
 
 v. Kendall 
 
 1347, 1355 
 
 v. Mcintosh 
 
 845 
 
 v. Parton 
 
 314 
 
 v. Simon 
 
 1282 
 
 v. Smith 978, 1479, 1492 
 
 v. Townsend 1120 
 
 1476, 1493 
 
 v. Tuttle 
 
 235 
 
 v. Williams 
 
 905 
 
 Townshend v. Duncan 
 
 361, : 79 
 
 tf. Ives 
 
 875 
 
 v. Norwich, Bishop of 
 
 1436 
 
 v Townshend 639, 644, 702, 852 
 
 Marquis off Stangroom 1399 
 
 Towsey v Groves 
 
 71,76 
 
 Trabue V. B'ankhead 
 
 281, 1534 
 
 tf. Holt 
 
 443 
 
 Tracewell v. Boggs 
 
 779 
 
 Tracy v Tracy 
 
 1630 
 
 Trade-mark Cases 
 
 1648 
 
 Tradesmens' Bank r. Hyatt 722 
 
 Trafford V. Blanc 
 
 417 
 
 v. Wilkinson 
 
 602 
 
 v Young 
 
 874 
 
 Traill v. Baring 
 
 382 
 
 Transatlantic Co. t; Pietroni 31, 
 
 
 1720 
 
 Trant, Re 
 
 1731 
 
 Traphagen v. Jersey City 
 
 1663 
 
 v. Voorhees 
 
 1579 
 
 Trapier tf. Waldo 
 
 283 
 
 Trappes 1). Meredith 
 
 418, 1144 
 
 Trash v. White 
 
 661,640 
 
 Trask v. Stone 
 
 69 
 
 Traver If. Purdy 
 
 850 
 
 Travera v. Buckly 
 
 476, 499 
 
 if. Ross 542, 603, 692, 758, 760, 
 785 
 v. Townsend 1370, 1421 
 
 Traverse City, &c. R. Co. v. Sey- 
 mour 1614 
 Travis v. Challenor 869 
 v Milne 200. 324 
 v. Waters 987, 994, 1377, 1381, 
 1410, 1463, 1472, 1476, 1479, 
 1491,1527 
 Trayer v. Reeder 861 
 Trayhern v. Mechanics' Bank 1019 
 Treadwell tf Brown 334, 379, 584, 
 1557 
 if. Cleaveland 617, 518, 716 
 v. Lennig 737, 843 
 v. Patterson 329 
 
 Trecothick tf. 1391 
 
 r. Austin 197. 560. 644 
 
 Tredegar, Lord if. Windus 817, 1618, 
 1625, 1634 
 Tredwell r. Byrch 37, 244 
 
 Trefusis v. Clinton 1277, 1292 
 
 v. Cotton 174 
 
 Trefz tf. Knickerbocker Life Ins. 
 
 Co. 664 
 
 Treiber v. Shafer 68 
 
 Trelawney tf. Thomas 1138 
 
 tf. Williams 554 
 
 Treleaven ». Bray 230 
 
 Tremaine tf. Tremaine 354, 785 
 
 Tremolo Patent 418 
 
 Tremper v. Brooks 1743 
 
 Trench If. Semple 1510 
 
 Trenchard r. Warner 1003 
 
 Trentham If. Deverill 1099 
 
 Trenton Banking Co. v. Rossell 1119, 
 1124 
 ». Woodruff 1075, 1110, 1716 
 
 Trescott If. Smith 
 Trethewy v. Helyar 
 
 Trevanian v. Mosse 
 Trevelyan v. Charter 
 Trevet v. Creath 
 Trevillian tf. Knight 
 
 270 
 1213, 1428, 
 1430 
 677 
 1029 
 68 
 1026
 
 Trevor v Bluck 1770 
 
 Trewick v. Paramore 13i3 
 
 Trezevant v. Broi'ghton 113, 1538 
 v. Frazer 1196, 1215, 1311, 1319, 
 1695 
 Tribble V. Tribble 
 Triebert v. Burgess 
 Triggc. Trigg 
 
 Trilly r. Keefe 
 Trim v. Baker 
 
 v. Barker 
 Trimble v. Dodd 
 
 Trimleston v. Hamill 
 
 v. Kemmis 
 
 Lord v. D'Alton 
 
 v. Hauiil 
 
 v. Lloyd 
 Trimmer v. Todd 
 Trinity House v. Burge 
 Triplett v. Jameson 
 
 v. Wilson 
 Tripp v. Cook 
 
 90 
 
 395, 17:35 
 
 1154, 13n2 
 
 528 
 
 601 
 
 739 
 
 857. 992. 1236, 
 
 1358, 1599 
 
 1239, 1240 
 
 815 
 
 1119 
 
 1393 
 
 1119 
 
 1507 
 
 567 
 
 1234 
 
 1576 
 
 1284, 1290, 14<X), 
 
 1462, 1463 
 
 v. Gifford 68 
 
 v. Vincent 327, 978, 1026, 1463 
 
 Tritt v. Caldwell 115 
 
 v. Cohvell 121 
 
 Trollope v. Routledge 14 (2 
 
 Trotter v. Heckscher 1548, 1603 
 
 v. Maclean 639, 1395, 1632 
 
 v. Trotter 463, 1197, 1198 
 
 v. Walmesley 992 
 
 Troughton v Binkes 323 
 
 v. Gettey 301, 315 
 
 v. Gilley 157 
 
 v. Hill 88 
 
 Troup v. Haight 668,901,930, 1238, 
 
 1550, 1551 
 
 v. Ricardo 61, 312 
 
 v. Sherwood 957, 959, 960 
 
 v. Troup 1009, 1017, 1528 
 
 v. Wood 1965, 
 
 2273 
 
 Trousdale v. Maxwell 
 
 
 1675 
 
 Trout y. Emmons 
 
 
 845 
 
 Trow v. Berry 
 
 
 1320 
 
 Troward v. Attwood 
 
 792, 7! 
 
 v. Bingham 
 
 
 1422 
 
 Trowbridge v. Caulkins 
 
 
 1157 
 
 Trow City D. Co. v. Curtin 
 
 
 565 
 
 Trowell v- Shenton 
 
 
 602 
 
 Troy & Greenfield Railroad 
 
 v. 
 
 
 Commonwealth 
 
 
 141 
 
 Troy Iron and Nail Factory 
 
 V. 
 
 
 Corning 
 
 
 2356 
 
 Trubody v. Brain 
 
 
 1138 
 
 Trueheart v. Price 
 
 
 1680 
 
 Trufort, Re 
 
 417, 6' 
 
 Truitt v. Truitt 
 
 
 281 
 
 Trull v. Rice 1294 
 
 Trulock v. Uobey 214, 1003, 1240, 
 1241, 1576, 1926, 2223 
 Truman v. McCollum 313 
 
 v. Redgrave 1657, 1663, 1725 
 
 Trumbull v. Gibbons 734. 736, 748, 
 784, 785, 951 
 Trust and Fire Ins. Co. v. Jen- 
 kins 402, 409, 524, 776 
 
 Trustees v. Field 
 
 1031 
 
 v. Greenough 
 
 1411 
 
 v. Proctor 
 
 1053 
 
 Try v. Try 
 
 1744 
 
 Tryatt v- Lindo 
 
 735 
 
 Tryon v. National 
 
 Provident 
 
 Inst. 
 
 287, 405 
 
 Tsclieider v. Biddle 
 
 671, 1658, 1861 
 
 Tubb v- Fort 
 
 630 
 
 Tubbs, Re 
 
 102. 103. 108 
 
 Tubman v. Wason Manuf. Co. 2048 
 
 Tuck v. Manning 
 
 1770 
 
 v. Rayment 767 
 
 v. Silver 1642, 1666 
 
 Tucker v. Andrews 90. 91 
 
 v. Bean 165 
 
 v. Buffuin 1240, 1244, 1247, 1258 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Tucker v. Cheshire R. Co. 758, 759, 
 
 764 
 
 t>. Collinson 41 
 
 v. Dabbs 68 
 
 r. Heruainan 157 
 
 v. Kenniston 1961, 2040 
 
 v Sanger 1073 1075 
 
 v. Tucker 341,345, 
 
 13*3 
 
 v. Welsh llol 
 
 v. Wilkins 1528 
 
 v. Wilsun 68, 1525 
 
 v. Zimmerman 200 
 
 Tuckley v. Thompson 284, 13:0 
 
 Tuder v Morris 215 
 
 Tudway v Jones 59, 407, 420, 699, 
 
 1530 
 
 Tuer's Will Trusts, Re 85 
 
 Tufuell, Re 133 
 
 «. Constable l!'34 
 
 Tufton V H.irdinge 1566 
 
 Tnfts b Little 1716 
 
 Tugwell ?' Hooper 431, 577, 578, 
 
 lr34 
 
 Tulk v. Moxhay 1654, 1662 
 
 Tullar v. Baxter 559 
 
 Tullett v. Armstrong 15 9 
 
 Tullit v. Tullit 1365 
 
 Tulloch v. Hartley 1163 
 
 v. Tulloch 1264 
 
 Tullock v. Belleville P. & S. 
 
 Works 394 
 
 Tune v. Cooper 121 
 
 Tunnard tf- Littell 110 
 
 Tunno v. Edwards 58 
 
 Tunstall v Boothby 1730 
 
 v. Pollard 251 
 
 Tupper v. Powell 386 
 
 Turbot v. 950 
 
 Turley v Turley 1299 
 
 Turnbull, hire 893 
 
 v. Janson 908 
 
 v. Prentiss Lumber Co. 1734 
 
 Turner, Re 1826 
 
 v. Alabama Mining Co. 26 
 
 v . Baptist Missionary Union 335, 
 34o, 1624 
 v. Berry 190, 1580, 1583 
 
 v- Burkinshaw 1820 
 
 v. Burleigh 882, 926, 930 
 
 v. Clifford 1054 
 
 v. Cole 1544, 1679 
 
 v. Collins _ 852, 1435 
 
 v. Conant 334 
 
 v. Correy 1230 
 
 v. Cuthrell 1675 
 
 v. Davis 815 
 
 v. Debell 624 
 
 v. Dorgan 505 
 
 v. Doubleday 336 
 
 v. Frampton 1427 
 
 v. Gowdon 1432 
 
 v. Hancock 1411, 1416 
 
 v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 1793 
 v. Highway Board 1631 
 
 v. Hill 1551 
 
 v. Hind 223 
 
 v. Hodgson 1028 
 
 V. Holman 842, 847 
 
 V. Hughes 1222, 1250 
 
 v. Indianapolis, &c. Ry. Co. 1286, 
 1743 
 v. Johnson 1385 
 
 v Letts 81, 1842, 1843 
 
 V. London & 3 W. Ry. Co. 1009, 
 1016, 1544 
 v. Major 1660 
 
 0. Marriott 1551, 2256, 2266 
 
 v. Maule 1117 
 
 v. Mirfield 1681 
 
 v. Mitchell fill 
 
 v. Morgan 1157 
 
 v. Moy 241, 243 
 
 v. Mullineux 1412 
 
 v Muskegon Co. 1440 
 
 CX1X 
 
 Turner v. Nicholls 631 
 
 v. Pearte 10h8 
 
 v. Pierce 334, 1004 
 
 v. Robinson 62, 158, 336, 606, 631 
 
 v. Rutledge 1003 
 
 v. Scott 1»>72 
 
 v. Snowdon 162, 452, 476 
 
 v. Sowden 162, 449, 452. 176 
 
 v. Spooney 1638 
 
 v. Tepper 15»I 
 
 v. Trelawny 953, 954 
 
 v. Turner 37, 74, 78, 108. 382, 524, 
 
 908, <J74, 1259, 1320. 1321, 
 
 1369 1386, 1437, 1449, 1-450, 
 
 1476, 1478, 1484, 1487, 1602, 
 
 1743, I8ti0 
 
 v. Wight 1652 
 
 v. Wright 1624. L633 
 
 Turner Coal Co. v. Glover 586, 830 
 
 Turner's Sir E , Case 124, 1^5 
 
 Turney v. Bay ley 1829, 1830 
 
 Turnham v. Turnham 191 
 
 Turuipseed v. Hawkins 875 
 
 Turnley v. Hanua 940 
 
 Turnock v. Satoris 1440 
 
 Turquand v. Dawson 1132,1138 
 
 v. Kirby 26 
 
 v. Knight 576 
 
 v. Marshall 26, 243, 1397 
 
 Turrill v. Muzzy 644 
 
 Turton v Barber 573 
 
 v. Turton 1648 
 
 Tussaud t'. Tussaud 1648 
 
 Tuthill v. Scott 1383 
 
 Tutin, He 102 
 
 Tuttle v. Church 1630 
 
 v. Dewey 997 
 
 v. Fowler 121 
 
 Tutton v. Andrews 1125 
 
 Tutwiler v- Dunlap 259 
 
 v- Tuskaloosa Coal Co. 334 
 
 Tuxbury's Appeal 1460 
 
 Tweddell v. Tweddell 1622 
 
 Tweed ile, Re 95, 13 17 
 
 Tweedie v. Phelps 1045 
 
 Tweedy, Re 1(305 
 
 Twenty man v. Barnes 1113 
 
 Twigg v. Fifield 1277 
 
 v. Potts 1126 
 
 Twiggs v. Chambers 1845, 18 16 
 
 Twistleton v. Thelwel 1422 
 
 Twognod v. Swanston 668 
 
 Two Sicilies, King of v. Wilcox 17, 
 
 18, 567, 1881 
 
 Twycross v. Drevfus 18 
 
 Twytord v. Traill 251, 1316 
 
 Twynam v. Porter 2n.'f, 1846 
 
 Tylden, Re 99, 1802 
 
 Tylee v Tylee 1731, 1737 
 
 Tyler, Re 99, 1743 
 
 Re. Tyler 0. Tvler 13 
 
 v. Bell 250, 289, 598 
 
 ' v. Connolly 1069 
 
 v Drayton 579, 580, 1818, 1824, 
 
 1829. 1^30 
 
 o.Galloway 209. 1 18 
 
 v. Savage 630 
 
 v Simmons 1295,1309,1176, 
 
 1481 
 
 v. Thomas 280, 281, 4<H) 
 
 v. Toms 1279 
 
 v. Tyler 576 
 
 Tyndale r. Warre 1286 
 
 Tvng r. Thaver 1188.12 49 
 
 Tyntet'. Hodge 29,33, 34, .358. 1537, 
 
 1553, 1582 
 
 Tyree v. Bingham 12 
 
 v. Williams 989 
 
 Tvron v. Sutton 116 
 
 Tysen v. Wabash Ry. Co. 1716 
 
 Tvson. E.r parte 53 
 
 v. Applegate 200, 212 
 
 t>. Cox 1467 
 
 r. Fairclough 1726 
 
 v Pole 560
 
 cxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 IT. 
 
 Udall v. Kenney 91 
 
 Uhle v. Buruham 933 
 
 Uhlfelder v. Levy 16^8 
 
 Uhlmanu v. Arnholt & S. B. Co. 
 
 737, 838 
 
 Uhthoff v. Huntlngfield, Lord 713, 
 
 860 
 
 Ulbricht v. Eufaula Water Co. 303 
 
 Urufreville v. Johnson 211, 303 
 
 Uinpleby v. Waveney Valley 
 
 Railway Co. 14(55, 1510, 1527, 
 
 1529 
 
 Underdown v. Stannard 893 
 
 Underhill, Re 911 
 
 v. Mobile Fire D. Ins. Co. 560 
 
 v. Van Cortlandt 550, 555, 671, 
 
 852, 906, 947, 948, 949, 951, 1524 
 
 Underwood v. Dugan 5:30 
 
 v. Frost 1731 
 
 v. Gerber 417 
 
 v. Hatton 1207 
 
 V. Hitchcox 1405 
 
 v. Jee 797 
 
 r. Pack 1284 
 
 v . Secretary of State for India 
 
 1823 
 
 v. Trower 1417 
 
 Underwood's Case 1684, 1686 
 
 Ungar v. Sugg 1642 
 
 Ungless v. Tuff 1791 
 
 Union Bank v. Crine 313 
 
 v. Geary 737, 845, 846 
 
 v. Kent 674 
 
 v. Kerr 388, 1561 
 
 v. Knapp 641, 1228 
 
 Union Branch R. R. Co. v. East 
 
 Tenn. & Georgia R. R. Co. 603 
 Union Fire Ins Co. v. Osgood 21 
 Union Ins. Co. v Benit 1463 
 
 v. Van Rensselaer 1392, 1457 
 
 Union M. E. Church v. Wilkinson 216 
 Union Mut. Ins Co. v. Commer- 
 cial Mut. Mar. Ins. Co. 1897, 
 2265 
 v. Kellogg 717 
 
 Mut Life Ins. Co. v. Chicago 
 
 & W. I. R. Co. 1770 
 
 v. Slee 1172 
 
 Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Balti- 
 more 1556 
 v. Botsford 1556 
 i'. Cheyenne 303 
 v. Chicago &c. Ry Co. 629 
 v. Hall 1663 
 v. Harmon 986 
 v. Lincoln County 1650 
 V. McShane 1661 
 v. Mertes 39, 797 
 v. Reese 933 
 Union Passenger Ry. Co. v. 
 
 Baltimore 630 
 
 Union Sugar Refinery v. Ma- 
 
 thiesson 1, 978, 1028, 1322 
 
 Union Trust Co. v. Illinois Mid- 
 land Ry. Co. 1743 
 v. St. Louis R. Co. 1731 
 v. Souther 1743 
 t;. Walker 1743 
 United Horse-shoe Co. v. Stewart 
 
 1081 
 United Lines Tel. Co. v. Boston 
 
 Safe Deposit Co. 1276 
 
 v. Grant 630, 1620 
 
 v. Stevens 974, 1019, 1584 
 
 United Merthyr &c. Collieries 
 
 Co., Re 12.33, 1632 
 
 United Nickel Co. v. Worthing- 
 
 ton 269 
 
 United Ports and General Ins. 
 
 Co., Re, Brown's Case 1020 
 
 United R. Co. v . Hoppock 548, 1558 
 
 United Railroad & Canal Com- 
 panies v. Long Dock Co. 782 
 
 United Security Life Ins. Co. v. 
 
 Vandergrift 283 
 
 United States v. Alexandria 560 
 
 V. American Bell Telephone 
 Co. 8, 149, 313, 334, 402, 779, 
 888 
 v. Arnold 1254 
 
 v. Babcock 907 
 
 v. Bank of the Metropolis 129 
 
 v. Barney 129 
 
 v Beebe 8, 560 
 
 v. Bell Telephone Co. 608 
 
 V. Benner 142 
 
 v. Blight 17 
 
 v. Budd 843 
 
 v. California Land Co. 604, 674 
 v. Cameron 933, 1573 
 
 v. Central Pacific R. Co. 190 
 
 v. Clarke 129, 141 
 
 v. Colgate 8 
 
 v. Curtner 334 
 
 v. Dal es Military Road Co. 697 
 v. Des Moines Nav. Ry. Co. 545 
 
 Duluth 
 
 Emerson 
 
 Ferguson 
 
 Gillespie 
 
 Gomez 
 
 Green 
 
 Gunning 
 
 Hancock 
 
 Hawkins 
 
 Holmes 
 
 Horn Hing 
 
 Hutton 
 
 Iron Silver M Co 
 
 Jeffers 
 
 Lafontaine 
 
 Loughrey 
 
 Lyman 
 
 Mc Daniel 
 
 McElroy 
 
 McGraw 
 
 McLaughlin 
 
 McRea 1 
 
 1614 
 
 1069 
 
 815, 843. 850 
 
 217, 559, 2384 
 
 1003, 1017 
 
 1350 
 
 8, 10, 890 
 
 8 
 
 129 
 
 1070 
 
 933 
 
 1556 
 
 142 
 
 1422 
 
 536 
 
 10 
 
 129 
 
 560 
 
 8 
 
 354, 759, 1556 
 
 18.20,387,56" 
 
 611,626, 680,696, 864, 1881 
 Marshall Silver M. Co. 8 
 
 Masich 1716 
 
 Maxwell Land Grant Co. 8 
 
 Memphis & L. R R Co. 1687 
 Minor 8 
 
 Morris 
 
 Parniele 
 
 Parrott 
 
 Patterson 
 
 Pereheman 
 
 Peters 
 
 Pings 
 
 780 
 
 195, 325 
 
 190, 1628, 1677 
 
 10»;9 
 
 17 
 
 17 
 
 933 
 
 Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. 10 
 
 Pratt Coal Co. 87, 334, a", 
 
 2380 
 17, 18, 20, 141, 1881 
 129 
 129 
 
 Prioleau 
 
 Ringgold 
 
 Robeson 
 
 Rose 
 
 Samperyac 
 
 San Jacinto Tin Co. 
 
 Smith 
 
 Southern Pacific R. Co. 
 
 1076, 1147, 1576, 
 
 1578, 1580 
 
 8,10 
 
 906 
 
 586, 
 
 1381 
 
 . Throckmorton 8 
 
 . Tichenor 8, 560 
 
 . Tilden 933 
 
 . Trans-Missouri Freight Ass. 855 
 . Treadwell 630, 1427 
 
 . Trinidad Coal & C. Co. 8 
 
 . Twenty-Eight Packages, 
 &c. ' 563, 564 
 
 United States v. Union Pac. R. 
 Co. 
 t\ Wagner 
 
 v. Wells 
 v. Wentz 
 v. White 
 v- Wilder 
 v. Wilkins 
 
 10 
 17, 18. 19, 141, 145, 
 296, 1881 
 129 
 
 129 
 
 V. Workingmen's Am Council 
 
 737, 1620, 1663 
 United States, Pres. of v. Drum- 
 
 mond 20 
 
 United States C. S. Co. v. Am- 
 erican C. I. Co 314 
 United States Ins. Co. v. Central 
 
 Bank 712 
 
 United States Mutual Ace. Ins. 
 
 Co. r Rei.-inger 1621 
 
 United States Trust Co. v. Roche 
 
 222 
 
 v. Wabash W. Ry. Co. 1743 
 
 United Tel. Co. v. Patterson 1378 
 
 United Telephone Co. v. Bassano 64, 
 
 157 
 
 v. Don oboe 850 
 
 Univer.-ity v. Cambreling 443 
 
 v. Finch 52 
 
 v. Miller 46 
 
 University of Aberdeen v. Irvine 
 
 1503 
 University College v. Foxcroft 1059, 
 1060, 1510 
 University of Glasgow v. Balliol 
 
 College 149 
 
 University of Oxf. & Camb. v. 
 
 Richardson 1C29 
 
 University Life Ass. Co. r. Metro- 
 politan Railway Co. 1650 
 Unsworth, Re 1391 
 v. Woodcock 1818, 1829 
 Untereiner v. Miller 1493 
 Untermeyer v. Freund 1642 
 Updike?;. Bartles 1457 
 v. Doyle 244, 643, 794, 1221. 1296, 
 1298, 1309, 1615 
 Upfull,7?e 1814 
 Upham v. Brooks 1241 
 v. Draper 726 
 Upington v. Oviatt 303 
 Upjohn v. Upjohn 993 
 Upman v. Elkan 1649 
 Upmann v. Forrester 261 
 Upperton v. Harrison 1390 
 v. Nickolson 1339 
 Upton v. Brown 1225, 1227, WZ, 
 
 v. Ferrers, Lord 
 
 v. Lowten 
 
 v Sow ten 
 
 v. Tribilcock 
 
 v. Vanner 
 Upton, Warren, Re 
 Ure v. Lord 
 Urey v. Urey 
 Urlin v. Hudson 
 Urmston v. Singleton 
 Urner v. Kayton 
 Urquhart, Re. 
 
 v. Butterfield 
 Usborne v. Usborne 
 Usher v. Jouitt 
 
 v. Martin 
 Utica Ins. Co. v. Lynch 
 
 Utley v . Fee 
 Utten v. Utten 
 Utterson v. Mair 
 Uvedale v. Uvedale 
 Uxbridge, Earl of, Ex parte 1841 
 Lord v. Staveland 322, 360, 387 
 
 174S 
 
 1257 
 
 732 
 
 732 
 
 274 
 
 304 
 
 1854, 1856 
 
 1526, 1527 
 
 1411 
 
 636, 638, 688 
 
 1043, 1220 
 
 1381 
 
 447 
 
 864 
 
 1630 
 
 1425 
 
 1561 
 
 718, 720. 
 
 723 
 
 991 
 
 1712 
 
 323, 543, 1723 
 
 164, 1422
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 CXXi 
 
 V. 
 
 Vaccaro v. Cicalla 1411 
 
 Vacuum Oil Co. v. Buffalo L. 0. 
 
 Co. 1642 
 
 Vacy v. Vacy 2<i3 
 
 Vadala v Lawea 6*54 
 
 Vaiden v. Stubblefield 292 
 
 Vaigneur v. Kirk 1073 
 
 Vail v. Central R Co. 543 
 
 Vail Ian t v. Dodemead 576, 944 
 
 Vaise v. Delaval 1131 
 
 Vale v. Bayle 113S 
 
 v. Davenport 1285 
 
 v. Merideth 707, 710 
 
 v. Oppert 1842 
 
 Valensin v. Valensin 109 
 
 Valentine v. Ford 88 
 
 v. Teller 1056, 1002 
 
 Vallance v. Birmingham &c. Inv. 
 
 Co. 406 
 
 Vallence v. Weldon 1311, 1312, 1320 
 
 Van v . Corpe 1194 
 
 v. Price 1070 
 
 Van Allen, In re 1716 
 
 Van Alstw. Hunter 1074, 1124, 1130 
 
 Van Benschooten v. Lawson 1260 
 
 Van Bergen v. Van Bergen 1639, 
 
 1602 
 
 Vanbibher v. Beirne 313 
 
 Van ISokkelen v. Cook 190 
 
 v. Tinges 200 
 
 Van Huren v. Olmstead 13!l2 
 
 Vanbussum v. Maloney 1270, 1270 
 
 Vance, Re 1909 
 
 v. Edwards 1370 
 
 v. Lancaster 330 
 
 v. Vance 847 
 
 Vancleave v. Beam 233 
 
 Vancleef v. Sickles 303 
 
 Vancouver v. Bliss 843, 1380, 1381, 
 
 1403 
 
 Vandant v. Allmon 37? 
 
 Vandegrift v. Herbert 844, 845 
 
 Vandemark v. Schoonmaker 1631 
 
 Vamlenburg v. Van Rensselaer 1596 
 
 Vanderbeck v. Peck 422 
 
 Vanderbilt v. Central R. Co 1743 
 
 Vanderhaise v. Hugues 1238, 1247 
 
 Vanderheyden v. Vanderheyden 
 
 1235, 1745 
 Vanderpoel v. Van Valkenburgh 233 
 Vanderveer v. Holcombe 1548 
 
 Vandervere v. Reading 777, 778, 780, 
 781 
 Vandervoort v. Williams 167) 
 
 Van Deventer " Stiger 529 
 
 Van Doren v. Robinson 220, 256, 292 
 v. Van Doren 1279 
 
 Van Dresser v. Oregon R & N 
 
 Co. 149 
 
 Van Duzen v Van Duzen 91, 108 
 
 Vand\keu. Brown 371 
 
 Vandyne v. Vandyne 1270, 1272 
 
 v. Vreeland 657 
 
 Vane v. Barnard, Lord 1633 
 
 v. Cobbold 1127 
 
 v. Cockermouth Railway Co I860 
 
 v. Vane 83, 88, 650, 3574 
 
 Earl v. Rigden 200, 324 
 
 Van Epps v. Van Deusen 91, 101, 
 
 120, 122, 287,294 
 
 Van Every v. Adams 1843 
 
 Van Gelder v. Sowerby Bridge 
 
 Flour Society 405 
 
 Van Giesen v. Van Houten 1257 
 
 Vangilder v. Hoffman 1073 
 
 Van Hook v. Pendleton 901 
 
 v. Throckmorton 280, 1062, 1516, 
 
 1518 
 
 v. Whitlock 500, 607, 609, 721 
 
 Van Horn v. Pendleton 2391 
 
 v. sfniith 920 
 
 Van Houten v. Van Winkle 334 
 
 Van Keuip v. Bell 1300 
 
 Van Kuren v. Trenton, &c, 
 
 Manuf Co. 1677, 2319 
 
 Van Leonard v. Stocks 295 
 
 Van Mater v Couover 1652 
 
 v. Sickler 340 
 
 Vanmeter v. Borden 1002 
 
 Vann v. Barnett 1734, 1782 
 
 Van Namee v. Groot 951 
 
 Vauner v Frost 300 
 
 Vannerson v. Cord 1282 
 
 v. Leverett 630 
 
 Van Ness v. Van Ness 1172, 1320 
 
 Van Oulen v Van Ohlen 1845 
 
 Van L'elt v. Chattanooga R. Co. 68 
 
 Van Reimsdyke v. Kane 149, 842 
 
 Vanrenen v. Piffard 798 
 
 Van Rensselaer v. Brice 728, 729, 
 
 704 
 
 v Bruce 759 
 
 Van Rhyn v. Vincent 644 
 
 Van Saudau, Ex parte 511, 1070 
 
 He 1684 
 
 i>. Moore 25, 26, 242, 243, 730 
 
 v. Rose 1673, 10S5 
 
 Van Sehaak v. Saunders 283 
 
 Vansciver v. Bryan 853 
 
 Vansittart v. Collier 1274 
 
 v. Vansittart 1404 
 
 Van Tyne v. Bunce 329, 558 
 
 Van Valtenburg v. A 1 berry 734, 1551 
 
 Van Vechten ?\ Terry 273 
 
 Van Vleet v Sledge 560 
 
 Van Vorst, Ex /» rte 1794, 1796 
 
 Van Vronkerv. Eastman 1247, 1248, 
 
 1252 
 
 Van Walters v Marion County 
 
 Board 920 
 
 Van Weel v. Winston 324 
 
 Van Wert v Boyes 1517 
 
 Van VVt-zel v. Van Wezel 1481 
 
 Van Wych v. Seward 663. 1073 
 
 Vanzandt v. Argentine M Co. 1675 
 
 V'anzeller v. Vanzeller 1703, 1704, 
 
 1708 
 
 Vardon's Trusts, Re 122 
 
 Varick v. Briggs 569, 675 
 
 v. Dodge 604 
 
 v. Smith 334, 589 
 
 Varley,J?e 891,1608 
 
 Varner v. Young 804 
 
 Varney v. Bartlett 197 
 
 v Pope 1039 
 
 Varnon's Trusts, Re 100 
 
 Varrian v. Berrian 1501 
 
 Vartcg Chapel, Re 893, 1608 
 
 Vass v. Arrington 1274 
 
 Va-sar ». Hill 740 
 
 Vattier v. Hinde 509 
 
 Vaughan v. Central Pac. R. Co. 570 
 
 v. Cutrer 1570 
 
 v. East Tenn. & Va R Co. 570 
 
 v. Fitzgerald 548, 871, 1383, 1573, 
 
 1574 
 
 v. Gooch 1294 
 
 v. IIi<*gins 1401 
 
 v. Llovd 1192 
 
 v. Martin 1099 
 
 v. Parr 106, 114 
 
 v. Rogers 528 
 
 v. Thurston 1419 
 
 v. Vanderstegen 187, 1843. 1844 
 
 r Vaughan 1616, 1740, 1700 
 
 v. Welsh 691, 816 
 
 v. Williams 495 
 
 v Wilson 113 
 
 v. Worrall 954, 955, 1098 
 
 Vaughn v Fuller 1621 
 
 v HalHday 1459 
 
 v. Uann 1578 
 
 Vaughn v. Vaughn 
 Vauu v. Hargett 
 Vavasseur v. Krupp 
 Veach v. Schaup 
 Veal v. Veal 
 
 1846 
 341 
 141 
 
 1246 
 95 
 
 Veazie v. Williams 196, 302, 1523, 
 
 1530 
 
 Veeder v. Fonda 1269 
 
 v. Moritz 395 
 
 Veghte v. Raritan Water Power 
 
 Co. 346, 347 
 
 Veile v. Blodgett 843, 846 
 
 Veitch r. Irving 34 
 
 Venable v. Smith 1003 
 
 Venables v. Schweitzer 942, 944 
 
 Venderhaise v. Hugues 1246 
 
 Venner v Atchison, T. & S F. 
 
 R Co 547 
 
 Venning v. Loyd 635, 800, 1027, 
 
 1770 
 Vent v. Paeey 571, 572, 808 
 
 Ventilation and Sanitary Im- 
 provement Company v. Ed- 
 elston 791 
 
 Vent nor Harbor Company, Re 1035, 
 1037 
 Venus, The 50 
 
 Verdier v Foster 719 
 
 Vere v. Glynn 4'2 
 
 Vereker v. Gort 1309 
 
 Veret v. Duprez 204, 251 , 1726 
 
 Verity v. Wylde 1842, 1845 
 
 Vermillion v Bailey 1298 
 
 Vermilye v. Verniilye 1401 
 
 Vermilyea v. Fulton Bank 145, 146, 
 735 
 v. Odell 415, 806, 833 
 
 Vermont Copper Mining Co v. 
 
 Barnard 1397 
 
 Vermont R Co. v. Vermont, &c 
 
 R Co. 1731 
 
 Verney, Earl v. Macnamara 779 
 
 v Thomas 1548 
 
 Vernon, JBe 674 
 
 Re, Ewens, & Co. 298 
 
 v. <'holmondcley 1257 
 
 v Croft 1794 
 
 v. Cue 412 
 
 v. Hal lam 1055 
 
 v. Hunkey 1134 
 
 v. St .lames's Vestry 1637 
 
 V. Thellu.-son 1016 1617 
 
 v. Vawdry 667, 668 
 
 v. Vernon 368, 558, 1070 
 
 »'. Wright 14:>6 
 
 Verplanck v. Caine? 543, 584. 1715 
 
 v. Mercantile Ins Co. 286, 390, 
 
 401, 402, 400,. 407, 424, 425, 1735, 
 
 1748 
 
 Verree v. Hughes 1255 
 
 Vesev ». El worthy 1274 
 
 Vestris v. Hooper 63.814 
 
 Vetten v. Wallace 851 
 
 Vctter v Schreiher 573 
 
 Vetterlein v. Barker 1680, 1684 
 
 V. Barnes 200 
 
 Vial!, He 1389 
 
 Vialle v. O'Reilly 1735 
 
 Vibart v. Vihart 281 
 
 Vicar of St Sepulchre, Re 1014 
 
 Vicarv P. Farthing 1108 
 
 r. \Vidgcr 1567 
 
 Vice v. Thomas 652 
 
 Vickercy !• London, &c. Ry. 
 
 Co. 1141 
 
 Vickers v. Bell 227, 252 
 
 v. Vickers 1397 
 
 Vickshurg &c. R. Co. v. Phil- 
 lips 236 
 Victor Scale Co v. Shurtleff 1701 
 \ idler v. Parrott 1791, 1795
 
 CXX11 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Vigel v. Hopp 843 
 
 Viney v. Bignold 
 
 671 
 
 Vigere v. Audley, Lord 406, 445, 
 
 v. Chaplin 1030, 1031, 1410 
 
 1491 
 
 5U8, 592, 1532, 1534 
 
 Vint v. Padget 
 
 213 
 
 Vigrass v. Binfield 1773 
 
 Viutun v King 
 
 1238 
 
 Village of Nunda v. Crystal 
 
 Yirden v. Needles 
 
 991 
 
 Lake 1661 
 
 Virginia v Dunaway 
 
 1621 
 
 Yillard v. Chorin 13 j9 
 
 Virginia Manuf. Co. v Hale 
 
 145, 
 
 Villavaso v. Barthet 634 
 
 
 547 
 
 Vinal ti Continental C & I. Co. 26 
 
 Virtue v. Miller 
 
 68 
 
 Vinee !■ Walsh 2360 
 
 Vivian v. Kennelly 
 
 78 
 
 Vincent, lie 236 
 
 v. Little 
 
 1817 
 
 Re, Parhani v Vincent 645 
 
 Vliet v. Lowmasou 
 
 1676 
 
 v. Godson 1615 
 
 v. Sherwood 
 
 1618 
 
 v. Going 652, 1281 
 
 v. Wyckoff 
 
 1395 
 
 r. Hunter ' 29, 359, 1553 
 
 Voak v National Inv. Co. 
 
 779 
 
 v. Matthews 974 
 
 Vogler v. Montgomery 
 
 1624 
 
 r Spicer 1633,2307 
 
 Voigtlander v. Brotze 
 
 1062 
 
 v. Watts 429 
 
 Ycifljn v. Commercial M. In* 
 
 . 
 
 Viue, Ex parte ' 58,157 
 
 Co. 
 
 852 
 
 Volans o. Carr 1361 
 
 Voorhees v. De Myer 197, 989 
 
 v. Polbenius 68 
 
 v. Voorhees 844 
 
 Voorheez v. Bonesteel 382 
 
 Vorlev r. Jerram 884 
 
 Vose v. Philbrook 149, 216, 219 
 
 269, 314, 374 
 
 V. Trustees 1467 
 
 Voshell v. Hynson 1715, 1716, 1734 
 
 Vowles p. Young 504 
 
 Vredenburg r. Johnson 328,558 
 
 Yreeland r Bramhall 850 
 
 v. N. J. Stone Co. 1677 
 
 r. Yreeland 334 
 
 Vroom v. Ditmas 658, 1017, 1385, 
 
 1392 
 
 Vyse v. Foster 269, 1233, 1474 
 
 Yyvyan v. Vyvyan 1562, 1563 
 
 w. 
 
 Wabash and Erie Canal 
 
 Co. v. 
 
 Walburn v. Ingilby 199 
 
 320, 1468, 
 
 Walker v. Kendall 
 
 1255 
 
 Beers 
 
 990 
 
 
 
 I4t;9. !<•>>■< 
 
 v. Kennedy 
 
 1821 , 1822 
 
 Wabash &c Ry. Co. v. Central 
 
 Walcot r. Walcot 
 
 
 428, 429 
 
 v. Locke 365, 547, 561. 619, 655, 
 
 Trust Co. 
 
 214, 1120 
 
 v Walker 
 
 
 1645 
 
 1557 
 
 2095,2103 
 
 Wabash Ry. Co. v. Dykeman 1716 
 
 Walcott v Lyons 
 
 
 405 
 
 r. Main 
 
 973 
 
 Waddilove v. Taylor 
 
 454, 1389, 
 
 v Melick 
 
 
 loas 
 
 v. Micklethwait 511 
 
 , 553. 1063. 
 
 1696 
 
 1801, 1848 
 
 V. Watson 
 
 
 843 
 
 
 1614, 1625 
 
 Wade v. Amer. Col. Soc 
 
 1463 
 
 Walden v Chambers 
 
 115, 118 
 
 t Morris 
 
 1276 
 
 v. Boxly 
 
 121 
 
 Waldo V- Caley 
 
 1467, 
 
 1469, 1471, 
 
 v Mottram 
 
 K355 
 
 V. Keefe 
 
 162 
 
 
 
 1475 
 
 v Needham 
 
 1127 
 
 v. Ordway 
 
 1131 
 
 Waldron, Ex parte 
 
 1350 
 
 v. Page 
 
 165 
 
 v. Pulsifer 
 
 559, 590 
 
 v. Frances 
 
 
 1437 
 
 v Poole 
 
 894 
 
 r. Stanley 
 
 309 
 
 Waldy v- Gray 
 
 
 878 
 
 v. Powers 
 
 303, 334 
 
 v Ward 
 
 1390 
 
 Waletf. Salter 
 
 
 37 
 
 v. Seligmann 
 
 438 
 
 Wadeer v. East India Co. 
 
 145, 5S1 
 
 Wales o. Bank of Michigan 
 
 V S breve 
 
 1625 
 
 Wadeson v. Rudge 
 
 236, 24S 
 
 v. Newbould 
 
 
 347 
 
 v. Siggers 
 
 972 
 
 Wadtiam V. Rigg 
 
 1327 
 
 r. Wales 
 
 
 1745 
 
 v. Simpson 
 
 1777 
 
 Wadhams v. Gay 
 
 1586 
 
 Wales, Prince of 
 
 • Lamb 
 
 1832 
 
 r. Smalwood 
 
 280 
 
 Wad ley, Re 
 
 1591 
 
 Princess of v 
 
 .iverpoo 
 
 , Earl 
 
 v. Smith 
 
 852 
 
 Wadman v. Birch 
 
 1201 
 
 of 16, 364, 
 
 579. 740 
 
 796. 1818, 
 
 v. Stevens 
 
 1841 
 
 Wadsworth v. Spain, Queen of 
 
 
 1819, 
 
 1826, 1833 
 
 v. Stone 
 
 1675 
 
 Wafer v. Mocato 
 
 1659 
 
 Wales Associatior 
 
 , Prince of t'. 
 
 r. Symonds 268 
 
 1486, 2116 
 
 Waffle v. Yanderheyden 
 
 £39, 1667 
 
 Palmer 
 
 
 204 
 
 v Taylor 
 
 74 
 
 Waggoner v. Gray 
 
 1228, 1229, 
 
 Walford v. 
 
 
 197, 279 
 
 v. Wainwright 
 
 1626 
 
 
 1250 
 
 Walker, Re 
 
 106,108 
 
 851, 1433. 
 
 v Walker 118,323,726 
 
 , 1342. 1660 
 
 t\ Wolf 
 
 1120 
 
 
 
 1608 
 
 v. Ware, &c, R. Co 
 
 1221 
 
 Wagner v. Cohen 
 
 1277 
 
 v. Armstrong 
 
 
 418 
 
 v. Wheeler 
 
 1657 
 
 v. Mears 
 
 41, 43 
 
 v. Beanlands 
 
 
 1844 
 
 v. Wild 
 
 1763, 1767 
 
 v. Railway Co. 
 
 1614 
 
 v. Berry 
 
 
 840 
 
 v. Wildman 
 
 575 
 
 Wagstaff v. Bryan 
 
 352, 729 
 
 v. Blackmore 
 
 
 159 
 
 v. Wingfield 
 
 1303, 1312 
 
 v. Read 
 
 677 
 
 v. Blakeman 
 
 
 63 
 
 r. Wocdward 
 
 857, 1189 
 
 Waine v Crocker 
 
 561 
 
 v Bradford Old Bank 
 
 199 
 
 v. Zorn 
 
 1624 
 
 Wainford v Heyl 
 
 187 
 
 r. Brewster 
 
 261, 
 
 1635, 1637 
 
 Walklin r. Johns 
 
 28 
 
 Wainwright v. SeweJl 
 
 795. 1395 
 
 v Brooks 
 
 
 197, 1654 
 
 Walkup v. Zehring 
 
 341 
 
 Waite r Bingley 
 
 877, 1157 
 
 v. Brown 
 
 
 1556 
 
 Wall o. Bushby 74, 
 
 v Morland 
 
 123, 179 
 
 v Bunke'.l 
 
 
 1168 
 
 v. Cockerell 
 
 2270 
 
 v. Semple 
 
 1212 
 
 v. Burchnall 
 
 
 1716 
 
 v. Fairley 
 
 191 
 
 t\ Tern pier 
 
 218 
 
 v. Campbell 
 
 
 737 
 
 v. Livezay 
 
 850 
 
 v. Waite 
 
 1213 
 
 V. Carey 
 
 
 1003 
 
 v. Rogers 
 
 67, 68, 119 
 
 t\ Wingate 
 
 790 
 
 v Chicago Cou 
 
 ■ier Co. 
 
 1030 
 
 v. Stubbs 658, 686, 68 
 
 7, 688, 732, 
 
 Wakalee v. Davis 
 
 560 
 
 v Christian 
 
 
 1704, 1714 
 
 
 733 
 
 Wake v. Conyers 
 
 1164 
 
 v. Clarke 
 
 
 1642 
 
 v. Thomas 
 
 149 
 
 v Parker 
 
 108, 109 
 
 v. Crowder 
 
 
 75 
 
 Wallace v. Auldjo 
 
 92. 106 
 
 Wakefield v. Buccleugh, 
 
 Duke 
 
 v Crystal Palace D. G 
 
 Po 1440 
 
 v. Castle 
 
 1468 
 
 of 
 
 16«6 
 
 v. Devereaux 
 
 385, 
 
 388, 1614, 
 
 v. Clark 
 
 2379, 2397 
 
 V. Childs 
 
 1166 
 
 
 
 1618 
 
 r. Greenwood 
 
 1346 
 
 v. Llanelly Railway and 
 
 Dock 
 
 v. Drury 
 
 
 102 
 
 v Holmes 
 
 292 
 
 Co. 
 
 654, 670 
 
 r. Duncan 
 
 
 860 
 
 v. Loomis 
 
 860, 1731 
 
 v. Marr 
 
 165 
 
 v. Easterby 
 
 
 28 
 
 r Mease 
 
 915 
 
 r Newton 
 
 1842 
 
 v. Ferrin 
 
 
 68 
 
 v. Pat ton 
 
 1503 
 
 Wakeham ;• Lome 
 
 168 
 
 p. Fletcher 
 
 
 394, 1562 
 
 r Railroad Co. 
 
 359 
 
 Wakelin v. Walthal 
 
 843 
 
 v. Gilbert 
 
 
 1531 
 
 v. Sortor 
 
 329, 1561 
 
 Wakeman v. Bailey 
 
 299 
 
 t; Grady 
 
 
 1073 
 
 v. Taliaferro 
 
 115 
 
 v Gillespy 
 
 1676. 1677 
 
 v. Hallett 
 
 145, 161 
 
 . 286. 457, 
 
 v. Wallace 
 
 737. 760 
 
 v. Grover 214, 2 
 
 
 
 1299, 1457 
 
 r. Wilson 
 
 1062 
 
 
 844 
 
 v. Hill 
 
 
 737 
 
 v. York 
 
 1081 
 
 v. Kingsland 
 
 1561 
 
 v. Hull 
 
 
 68 
 
 Wallack v. Society, &c 
 
 1620 
 
 v. Rutland, Duchess of 
 
 1262 
 
 v. Hurst 
 
 
 461 
 
 Wallamet Iron Bridge 
 
 Co. e 
 
 Walbanke v. Sparks 
 
 1567 
 
 v. Jefferies 
 
 
 294 
 
 Hatch 
 
 l.'SO 
 
 Walbridge v English 
 
 215 
 
 v. Jones 
 
 
 1663 
 
 Wallasey Local Board v. Gracey 12
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 CXX111 
 
 Wallaston v. Tribe 
 Walleu v. Williams 
 Waller v. Bassett 
 
 v. Demint 
 
 v. Hanger 
 
 v. Harris 
 
 v. Pedlington 
 
 v. .shannon 
 
 v. Taylor 
 
 v. Turner 
 Walley v. Walley 
 Walling v Beers 
 
 852 
 
 1042, 1056 
 
 1207 
 
 560 
 
 14 
 
 999, 1619, 2222 
 
 804, 805 
 
 334 
 
 334 
 
 1034 
 
 150 
 
 629 
 
 Wallingford v. Mutual Society 
 
 324, 371 
 Wallis, Re 
 
 v. Dai by 
 
 v. Frazier 
 
 V. Hirsch 
 
 v. HoJ;son 
 
 V Ho Ison 
 
 V. Morris 
 
 V. Portland, Duke of 
 
 V. Portland 
 
 1414 
 515 
 365 
 
 1862 
 
 858, 875 
 
 67 
 
 277 
 
 563 
 
 1558 
 
 1277 
 
 1029, 1030 
 
 794, 808, 1395 
 
 1665 
 
 508 
 
 42 
 
 392, 1558 
 
 1476 
 
 1250 
 
 V Sarel 
 v Thomas 
 V. Wallis 
 v Willis 
 
 Wallop v. Brown 
 
 v. Warburton 
 
 Walmsley !', Child 
 
 v. Foxhall 
 
 v Walnislev 
 
 Wallworth v Holt 26, 239, 241. 332 
 
 Wallwyn V Lee 676, 677 
 
 Walpole v. Cooper 354 
 
 Walrond v. Parker 1452 
 
 v Walrond 1404 
 
 Walser v. Seligman 26 
 
 Walsh, Re 108 
 
 v. Gilmer 383 
 
 v. Ma«on lu41 
 
 v. Memphis &c. R. Co. 26 
 
 v. Smyth 402, 406, 422, 1479 
 
 V Trevannion 170 
 v. United States 10 
 v. Walsh 68, 73, 1355, 1359, 
 
 1802 
 v. Wason \i<h 
 
 v Wright 860 
 
 Walsham v Stainton 337,571,577, 
 1834 
 
 Walsingham, Lord v Goodrieke 572 
 578, 943, 1834 
 
 Walter v Baltimore Bank 1461 
 
 v. Fow'er 354 
 
 v. Glanville 625, 669 
 
 v. MeNabb 840 
 
 v. Maunde 1433 
 
 v Patey 13 >6 
 
 V. Riehl 214 
 
 v. Rutter 909 
 
 v. Saunders 124 
 
 v Selfe 1635,2307 
 
 v. Steinkopff 1381, 1643 
 
 Walters, In re Moore v. Bemrose 
 
 1434 
 Re, Neison v. Walters 838 
 
 v. Anglo-American M. & T. Co 
 
 1738 
 v Northern Coal M. Co. 708 
 
 v. Upton 1775 
 
 v. Walters 216, 1425 
 
 v. Webb 649', 1448 
 
 v. Woodbridge 68, 1233 
 
 Walthall v. Riyes 314 
 
 Waltham, Ex parte 1611 
 
 v. Broughton 1378 
 
 Waltham Bank v. Waltham 1241 
 
 Walton )> B.oadbent 354, 785 
 
 v. Cody 371 
 
 v. Coulson 170, 2»7 
 
 v. Detroit C. & B. R. Mills 1561 
 V. Herbert 441 
 
 v Hill 1771 
 
 v. Hobbs 840 
 
 v. Johnson 1614, 1743 
 
 v. Perkins 378 
 
 Walton v United States 129 
 
 v Van Mater 980 
 
 v Walton 845 
 
 v Westwood 360, 545 
 
 v. Withingion 1Z42 
 
 Wambaugh c. Gates 1276 
 
 Wainburzee v. Kennedy 417,419,644, 
 
 645 
 
 Wamesit Power Co. v. Sterling 
 
 Mills H50 
 
 Wampler v. Wolfinger 52 i 
 
 Wand v. Docker 1036 
 
 Wandsworth, &c Co v. Wright 241 
 Wankford v. Wankford 1772 
 
 Wanklyn v. Wilson 1780 
 
 Wanmaker v Van Buskirk 644, 844 
 Wanneker v Hitchcock 553 
 
 Wanner v. Sisson 868 
 
 Warbass v. Armstrong 1417 
 
 Warbritton v. Demorett 545 
 
 Warburton v. Kdge 1843 
 
 v. Hill 1039, 1040, 1694, 1616 
 
 v. London and Blackwall Rail- 
 way Co. 424,593,1675 
 
 Ward, Re 
 
 v. Alton 
 v. Amory 
 v. Arch 
 v Arredondo 
 v. Bassett 
 v. Booth 
 
 v. Cartwright 
 v Clay 
 v. Cooke 
 v. Cornwall 
 V- Davidson 
 v. Eyre 
 v Gamgee 
 v. Higgs 
 v. Hill 
 
 160, 1361, 1607, 1736, 
 1814 
 1181 
 93, 96, 97 
 653 
 149, 1032, 1627 
 223 
 401, 407, 1055, 105 
 
 v Hollins 
 v. Jewett 
 v. Kent 
 v. Longsden 
 v. Lowndes 
 v. Macliinlay 
 v. Meath 
 
 538, 1510, 1529 
 
 588 
 
 346, 1291 
 
 1059 
 
 1381 
 
 1257 
 
 744 
 
 1072 
 
 1073, 1076, 1077, lo80, 
 
 1463 
 
 257, 1276 
 
 1296, 1318 
 
 1576 
 
 476 
 
 1271 
 
 1265, 1390, 1424 
 
 185 
 
 v. Northumberland, Duke of 310 
 v Paducah & M R. Co. 1168 
 
 v. Parlin 417 
 
 v. Patton 418 
 
 v Peck 547 
 
 v. St Paul ' 1352 
 
 v Sebring 447 
 
 v Seymour 280 
 
 v. Shakeshaft 236,710,1036,1425, 
 1525 
 
 V Sheffield 4^8 
 
 v. Sittingbourne &c. Ry. Co 26, 
 5S5. 5! '9 
 P. Society of Attorneys 1050 
 
 v. Swift 454,455, 1741, 1743, 
 
 1750, 1755 
 r. Trathen 1276 
 
 V. Van Bokkelin 107, 1877 
 
 v. Ward 37, 38, 64, 75. 7''. 32 
 
 ■3 17.300,807,814, 1320, 1411 
 
 P. Waterman 
 v. Whitfield 
 v. Woodcock 
 v. Wyld 
 
 V Yates 
 Ward's Case 
 Warde, Re 
 
 V Dickson 
 v. Warde 
 
 230 
 
 402 
 503 
 1408 
 102, 103, 108, 1432 
 156 
 1791 
 826, 1276 
 576, 578, 1«34. 
 1863 
 Warden v. Borts 1412 
 
 Wardlaw v Erskine 1172 
 
 Wan lie v Carter 1027 
 
 v. Claxton 596, 1671 
 
 Wardman v Belliouse 1127 
 
 Wards v Billups 1883 
 
 Wardsboro v. Whittingham 1625 
 Wardwell v. Wardwell 1350 
 
 Ware v. Cumberlege 16 
 
 "• Curry 334, 559 
 
 v. Galveston City Co 560 
 
 v. Grand Junction Water 
 
 Works Co 1020 
 
 v. Horwood 1022 
 
 v Supreme Sitting Order 1743 
 
 v. Watson 1286, I288 
 
 Warfield v Banks 7^9 
 
 v Fisk 83 
 
 Waring?; Crane 71,78 
 
 v. Lockett 808 
 
 v. Robinson 794 
 
 v. Tnrton 2<mj 
 
 Waringtou v Wheatstone 1561, 
 
 1562, 1563, 1567 
 
 Warman r Zeal 996,1028 
 
 Warne v. Routledge 187. 1644 
 
 Warner, Re Kyi 
 
 v Armstrong 1380, 1602 
 
 v. Baynes H57 
 
 v. Burton 14S4 
 
 v. Daniels 550, {'Ah 
 
 v. De Witt County Bank 214 
 
 v. Gouveruour 1717 
 
 v Hare 1299 
 
 v. Jacob 644. 652 
 
 v. McMillin 1621 
 
 v. United States Land Co. 364 
 
 v. Warner 109, 1120, 1580 
 
 Warnig v. Manchester, Sheffield, 
 
 & Lincolnshire Railway Co. 1600 
 
 Warren, Re 100 
 
 v. Buck 109 
 
 v. Burton 214 
 
 v. Fursteuheim 1507 
 
 v Hofer 13,55 
 
 v. Hoi brook 564 
 
 v. Howard 200 
 
 v. Marcy 281 
 
 v. Moody 409 
 
 v. Postlethwaite 430, 1432 
 
 r. Swiuburi.e 892 
 
 v. Twilley 982 
 
 v. Warren 334, 335, 341, 
 
 711 
 
 v. Williams 1159 
 
 Warrick v. Hull 1548 
 
 v. Queen's College i'39, 
 
 243, 398, 984, 985, 1817, 1827 
 
 Warring v. Freear 1073 
 
 Warrington v Sadler 208 
 
 Warter v Anderson 1417 
 
 Warthen v. Brantley 302, 337 
 
 Warthy r Shields " 1073 
 
 Wartman v. Swindell 329 
 
 Wartnaby v. Wartnaby 86 
 
 Warwick v. Bruce 1133 
 
 v. ('<>x 798 
 
 Earl of v Beaufort, Duke of 806 
 
 Charities, /,', 1855, 1856 
 
 Wash v Beard 458 
 
 Washburn V Great Western Ins. 
 
 Co. 1981 
 
 Washburn >K" Mncn Manuf Co 
 
 v Chicago G W F. Co. 230 
 
 V. Patterson g2 
 
 Washineton v Emery 1613, 1619 
 v. Parks 1624 
 
 Washington Bank V Eccleston 1031 
 Washington Sc G. R. Co. v. Dis- 
 trict of Columbia ]820 
 Washington &c. K. Co. v. Brad- 
 leys 830 23«2 
 Wasliington Bridge Co. r Stewart 9^6 
 Washington City, &c. R. Co v. 
 
 Southern Md It Co. 1461 
 
 Washington Ins Co v Slee 1513 
 Washington University 0. (ireen 
 
 1613, 1677 
 Washoe Mining Co. v Ferguson 
 
 26, 29, 82, 1553 
 
 Waska V Klaisner 1221 
 
 Wasney V. Tempest 579. 580, 1832 
 
 Wason v. Sanborn 1613, 1631,1635, 
 
 1637, 1689, 1640 
 
 v Westminster Imp. Com'rs 157S
 
 CXXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Wastell v. Leslie 1440, 1525, 1697, 
 1745,1753, 1797 
 Waterhouse v. Comer 1743 
 
 v. Wilkinson 1285, 1291 
 
 v. Worsnop 83 
 
 Waterlow v Bacon 553, 1623 
 
 v. Burt 1213, 1428 
 
 v. Stiarp 1723 
 
 Waterman v. Banks 1320 
 
 v. buck 715, 1168, 1221, 1517 
 
 v. Clark 565 
 
 r. Curtis 1247 
 
 v. Dutton 1075, 1079, 1110, 
 
 1111 
 V. Shipman 1716 
 
 Waters v. Barton 1743 
 
 v. Chambers 691 
 
 v. Couily 1076 
 
 v. Creagh 846 
 
 v. Glanville 625 
 
 v. Mayhew 688, 703 
 
 v. Perkins 559 
 
 v. Shaftsbury, Earl of 563, 857, 
 1835 
 v Taylor 332, 508, 1727, 1728, 
 1S41 
 v. Travis 1495 
 
 v. Waters 448, 1121, 1124, 1275 
 Waters P. O. Co v. Little Kock 1620 
 Waterton v. Burt 1428 
 
 v. Croft 447, 448, 601, 740, 1551 
 Watertown o Cowen 302, 930 
 
 Watford Burial Board, Re 1852 
 
 Wattord & Rickmansworth Rail- 
 way Co. r. London & North- 
 Western Railway Co. 551, 671 
 Watkin v. Parker 501, 503 
 
 Watkins v. Atchison 910, 1117, 1574 
 v. Brent 251, 1725, 1726 
 
 v. Bush 597 
 
 v. Carlton 1120 
 
 t». Harwood 639 
 
 v. Hatchet 676 
 
 v. Jerman 1062 
 
 v. Law ton 1576 
 
 V. Maule 1213 
 
 v. Scottish Imperial Ins. Co. 149 
 v. Stockett 361,843 
 
 v. Stone 607, 662, 683, 703 
 
 v. Washington 190 
 
 Watkyns v. Watkyns 104, 107 
 
 Watlington v. llowley 281 
 
 Watmore V. Dickson 959 
 
 Watney v. Trist 332, 1660 
 
 Watson, Re 99, 1802 
 
 Ex parte 157 
 
 ». Bennett 1860 
 
 v. Birch 1211, 1289, 1290 
 
 v. Bvrd 544 
 
 v. Cave 245, 1461 
 
 v. Citizens' Sav. Bank 1841 
 
 r. ('leaver 822, 870, 890 
 
 v. Cox 341 
 
 v Dennis 119 
 
 v. Ferrell 1638 
 
 v. Fuller 1255 
 
 v. Great Western Ry. Co 1137 
 
 t>. Hawkins 583 
 
 v. Holliday 157 
 
 v. Life 414 
 
 v. Lion Brewing Co. 190 
 
 v. Loveday 1525 
 
 v. Lvon 1843, 1845 
 
 v. Manhattan Ry. Co. 1071 
 
 v. Marshall 97, 101, 102, 108 
 
 V- Murray 368 
 
 V Northumberland, Duke of 
 
 1152, 1154, 1159, 1160 
 v. Palmer 846 
 
 v. Parker 984, 1003, 1558, 1934 
 v. Reeve 1131 
 
 v. Renwick 1828 
 
 t> . Rodwell 354, 880, 1003, 1841 
 v. Row 1409, 1410, 1449 
 
 v. Smith 974 
 
 v Stevens 1576 
 
 v Stockett 846 
 
 Watson r. Sutro 2027 
 
 v. Olbricht 1284 
 
 v. Waruock 1350 
 
 v. Wells 328 
 
 V. Whitmore 1127 
 
 v Wigginton 1551 
 
 v. Williams 986 
 
 Watt v. Barnett 447 
 
 v. Cobb 1622 
 
 v. Crawford 1533 
 
 v. Leach 83 
 
 v. Watt 758 
 
 Watteu v. Billam 29, 30, 359, 1553 
 
 Watters v Jones 215 
 
 Watts, lie 1393, 1589 
 
 Re, Smith v. Watts 1327 
 
 v Adler 630 
 
 v. Eglinton, Lord 418, 588, 598 
 
 v Gayle 271 
 
 v Hughes 448 
 
 v. H\de 292,384,418 
 
 v. Jefferyes 1040. 1041, 1694 
 
 v Kelly 28, 358, 359 
 
 v. Lawrence 1829 
 
 v. Martin 1287, 1288, 1290 
 
 v. Overstreet 1051 
 
 v. Penny 1458, 1555, 1559 
 
 v. Porter 1040 
 
 v. Steele 1358 
 
 v. Sweeney 1548 
 
 v. Svmes 213, 1489 
 
 v. Thomas 127 
 
 v. Tittabawassee Boom Co. 1381 
 
 o. Waddle 989, 1032, 1033 
 
 v. Watts 899, 1520 
 
 Waugelin v Goe 1661,1679 
 
 Waugh, Re 110 
 
 v. Riley 46 
 
 v- Schlenk 517 
 
 v. Wren 189 
 
 Wauters v. Van Vorst 1714 
 
 Wavell v. Mitchell 200 
 
 v. Watson 1638, 1661, 1C63 
 
 Way v Bragaw 237, 338, 559, 632, 
 
 633,634 
 
 v. Fov 1468, 1470 
 
 t;. Mullett 1918 
 
 Way land v. Tysen 354 
 
 Wayn v. Lewis 285, 1266 
 
 Wayne County S Bankr. Airey 1561 
 
 Wead ?'. Cantwell 68 
 
 Weak v. Calloway 1134 
 
 Weakley v Pearce 1003 
 
 Weale v. West Middlesex Water 
 
 Works 243 
 
 Wearing v. Ellis 60, 62 
 
 Weatherhead v. Blackburn 581, 586 
 Weatherley V Ross 1638 
 
 Weatherspoon v. Carmichael 324 
 Weaver v Alter 1548 
 
 v. Field 634 
 
 v. Livingston 402, 524 
 
 r. Miss Boom Co. 1638 
 
 v. Poyer 1625 
 
 Webh v. Bvng 1001 
 
 v. Claverden 552,1148,1149, 
 
 1383, 1384, 1385 
 v. Crawford 860 
 
 v. De Bcauvoisin 1428 
 
 v. Direct London and Ports- 
 mouth Railway Co 1020 
 v. East 5fi4. 879, 943 
 v. England 315, 542, 1394 
 v. Foster 354 
 v. Fox 58 
 v. Fuller 639 
 V Hunt 1638 
 v. Kirbv 202 252 
 v. Pell "841, 1576, 1577, 1579, 1583 
 v. Plummer 1656 
 v. Portland Manuf. Co. 303, 1639 
 v. Robbins 860 
 v. Rose 1647 
 v. Salmon 448 
 v. Shaftesbury, Earl of 1263, 
 1342, 1366 
 v. Shaw 1320 
 
 Webb v. Vermont Central R. Co 193 
 
 v. Ward 
 v. Wardle 
 v. Webb 
 
 v. York 
 Webb's Appeal 
 
 Ca-e 
 Webber o. Gage 
 
 v. Hunt 
 
 v Randall 
 
 v. Taylor 
 
 v. Webber 
 Weber v. Weitling 
 Webster, Re 
 Armstrong 
 
 58 
 
 407, 1509, 1530 
 
 730, 974, 995, 1234, 
 
 1413, 1575 
 
 1244 
 
 119, 121 
 
 1647 
 
 317, 1637 
 
 1013, 1251, 
 
 1252 
 
 1029 
 
 247, 287 
 
 1795 
 
 1289, 1305 
 
 1840 
 
 659 
 
 British Empire Assurance 
 
 Co. 
 
 v. Diamond 
 
 v. Dillon 
 
 v. Friedeberg 
 
 v. Guy 
 
 v. Hall 
 
 v. Harwinton 
 
 v. Higgins 
 
 v. Hill 
 
 r. Hitchcock 
 
 v. Leigh Hunt 
 
 v. McDaniel 
 
 v. Manby 
 
 v. Peet 
 Power 
 
 203, 1257 
 1584 
 
 1654, 1656 
 
 1129 
 
 37 
 
 1561 
 
 1274 
 
 993, 1516, 1523 
 
 1843, 1844 
 
 1564 
 
 812, 1378, 1379, 
 
 1450 
 
 860, 1628 
 
 324,325 
 
 v. South-Eastern Railway Co. 1631 
 
 v. Taylor 1063 
 
 v. Thompson 801 
 
 v. Threlfall 313, 719 
 
 v. Webster 615, 648, 1648 
 
 v. Whewall 885, 896 
 
 v. Woodford 83 
 
 Webster Loom Co v. Higgins 1120 
 
 Weddall v. Nixon 1402 
 
 Wedderbum v. Wedderburn 95, 800, 
 
 817, 1250, 1614, 1618, 1628 
 
 Wedderburne v. Llewellyn 1597, 
 
 1601, 1602 
 
 v Thomas 519 
 
 Wedgwood v Adams 995, 1405, 
 
 1423, 1427 
 
 Wedlake v. Hutton 683 
 
 Wedmore v. Bristol, Mayor of 1081, 
 
 1650 
 
 Weed v. Small 665, 667, 668, 1548, 
 
 1551 
 
 v Mutual Ben. Life Ins Co. 852 
 
 Weeding v Mason 1142 
 
 Weeding 398, 1803 
 
 Weeks v Cole 
 
 v. Evans 
 
 v Heward 
 
 v Milwaukee, &c. R. Co 
 
 v Stourton 
 
 v. Weeks 
 Weems v. Brewer 
 Weeuer v. Brayton 
 Weguelin v. Lawson 
 Wehle v Loewy 
 Weide r. Porter 
 Weider v Clark 
 Weigel v. Walsh 
 Weighley v Coffman 
 Weightman v. Powell 
 Weil v Lehmayer 
 Weinberg r Weinberg 
 Weinreich v. Weinreich 
 Wei.% Blatter of 
 
 v. Goetter 
 Weise v Wardle 
 
 31 
 233 
 h 13 
 669 
 
 Weisman v. Heron Mining Co. 
 
 v. Smith 
 Weiss v Dill 
 Wekett v. Raby 
 Welby v Still 
 Welch v Barber 
 
 v. Bunce 
 
 1150 
 
 1283 
 
 1648 
 
 1045 
 
 354 
 
 196 
 
 837 
 
 1631 
 
 790 
 
 410, 425, 522 
 
 1411 
 
 815 
 
 216 
 
 177 
 
 1734 
 
 157, 256 
 
 626. 
 717 
 1550 
 1235 
 1466 
 1069 
 1069
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 cxxv 
 
 Welch v. Knott 
 
 1649 
 
 v. Lewis 
 
 1546 
 
 v. Welch 
 
 430 
 
 Welchman, Re 
 
 102 
 
 Weld v. Bon ham 
 
 237, 544 
 
 Weldhen 8. Scattergood 
 
 111 
 
 Weldon v. Gounod 
 
 150 
 
 v. Neal 
 
 418 
 
 v. Riviere 
 
 87 
 
 v. Winslow 
 
 87 
 
 Welford V. Daniell 
 
 501 
 
 v. Liddel 
 
 641 
 
 v. Stainthorpe 
 
 1833 
 
 Wellbeloved V. Jones 
 
 137, 138 
 
 Wellborn s. Tiller 346, 559, 586 
 
 Welter v. Fifzhugh 1413 
 
 Wellesley v. Beaufort 2293 
 
 v. Beaufort, Duke of 1346, 1347, 
 
 1348, 1349 
 
 v. Mornington 38, 39, 111, 16!l4, 
 
 1760 
 
 v. Wellesley 37, 38, 42. Ill, 588, 
 
 598, 1019, 1021, 1061, 1346, 1347, 
 
 1349, 1483, 1633 
 
 Lord v. Mornington, Earl of 
 
 523, 1673, 1683, 1685, 2127 
 Wellesley's Case 1070 
 
 Welling v. La B au 1120, 1320 
 
 Wellington 8. Mackintosh 671 
 
 Wellman v. Howland C. & I. 
 
 Works 26 
 
 Wells, Ex parte 57 
 
 Re 37 
 
 v. Beall 1151, 11 >5 
 
 v. Bridgeport, &c. Co. 344, 360 
 
 v. Cooper 10! 12 
 
 v Dayton 1661 
 
 v. Fish 645, 915 
 
 v. Gibbs 1039, 1409, 1694 
 
 v. Glen 1176 
 
 v Houston 844 
 
 v. Kilpin 1037, 1718 
 
 v. London, T. & S. Ry. Co 1639 
 
 v. Malbon 87, 123, 179, 1113 
 
 v. Miner 1561 
 
 v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co. 349 
 
 v. Partri Ige 334 
 
 v Roloson 1771 
 
 v. Sewell's Point Guano Co. 334, 
 
 559 
 
 v Smith 68, 369, 538 
 
 v. Strange 190, 216, 269, 342, 385 
 
 v. Stratton 731, 841 
 
 v- Vermont R Co. 1675 
 
 v. Wales 1753 
 
 v. Wood 778, 780, 782 
 
 Wells. Fargo, & Co l\ Miner 60 
 
 v Oregon Ry & Nav. Co. 1683 
 
 Wells' Will Case 874 
 
 Weltnan v Welman 852 
 
 Welsh v. Solenberger 517 
 
 Welton c. Dickson 16^0 
 
 Weltzler v Shaunman 12K4 
 
 Wendell, Matter of 2337 
 
 v French 1234, H14 
 
 v Highstone 890 
 
 v. Lewis 1448, 14S6 
 
 v. Van Rensselaer 190, 238, 2271 
 
 Wenham, He, Hunt v. Wenham 
 
 643 
 
 v. Bowman 1047 
 
 v. Switzer 8!K) 
 
 Wenman, Lord v Osbaldiston 504 
 
 Wenn v. Wenn 1362 
 
 Wenner v. Thornton 991 
 
 Wentworth v. Lloyd 919, 943, 1440, 
 
 1503, 1504 
 
 Werdermann 8. Societe Generale 
 
 d'Electricite" 287, 559 
 
 Werner v. Reinhardt 991 
 
 Wernwagg v. Brown 1002, 1255 
 
 Wesket V. Carnevali 1672 
 
 Wesling v. Schrass 611 
 
 WesselU v. Wessells 857, 992, 1599 
 Wesson v. Washburn Iron Co. 1635 
 West, In re 65 
 
 v. Chamberlain 284 
 
 West w Coke 
 
 424 
 
 v. Davis 
 
 9 
 
 v. Duncan 
 
 l!)0 
 
 v. Hall 
 
 361 
 
 v. Jones 
 
 1392, 1399 
 
 v. McMullan 
 
 601 
 
 v. Ma) or of New York 
 
 1620 
 
 v. Miller 
 
 212 
 
 v. Paige 
 
 1,961 
 
 v. Randall 149. 190, 200, 217, 
 
 219, 224, 236, 238, 239, 240, 2ft6, 
 
 334, 342 
 
 v. Shaw 1576 
 
 v. Skip 1249, 1586 
 
 v. Smith 290, 443, 643, 1603, 
 
 1611, 1667, 1675 
 
 v. Swan 1734 
 
 v. Swinburne 799, 1617 
 
 v. Tvlor 313 
 
 l'. Utica 1381 
 
 p. Vincent 1292 
 
 v. Walker 1639 
 
 v. Weaver 1716 
 
 v. White 1071, 1114 
 
 West Boylston Manuf. Co. v. 
 
 Searle 195 
 
 Westbrook Manuf. Co. v. Warren 1639 
 Westbrook's Trusts 1610 
 
 Westbury-on-Severn Rural Sani- 
 tary Authority B Meredith 329 
 Westby v. Westby 70, 77, 1039, 1722 
 Westcott » Cady 1546 
 
 v. Culliford 1405 
 
 West Devon Great Consols Mine, 
 
 He 974 
 
 Westerfield v. Bried 748 
 
 Western v. Macdermott 324, 1654 
 Western Benefit Building Soci- 
 ety, Re 891 
 Western of Canada Oil Lands 
 Co., In re 903,906,942 
 v. Walker 26 
 Western Division R Co v. Drew 
 
 2391, 2392, 2395 
 Western Ins. Co v. Eagle Fire 
 
 Ins. Co. 214 
 
 Western Land Co. v. Guinault 
 
 334, 559 
 Western National Bank v. Perez 149 
 Western Pacific R Co. v. United 
 
 States 8 
 
 Western Ry. v. McCall 418 
 
 Western Reserve Bank v. Potter 215 
 v. Stryker 778, 780 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Am- 
 erican Bell Tel Co. 790 
 v. Western & A. R Co. 1618 
 Westf ill v. Scott 296 
 Westfield b. Skipwith 1555, 1558 
 West Hartlepool Ry. Co. v. 
 
 Jackson 1513 
 
 Westhead v. Riley 1716 
 
 v. Sale 965 
 
 Westinghouse Air-Brake Co. v. 
 
 Carpenter 1642 
 
 Westlake v. Farrow 334 
 
 W'estley B. Williamson 1382, 1421 
 Westmeath b. Salisbury 1003 
 
 West Midland Railway Co. v 
 
 Nixon 230 
 
 Westminster & Brymbo Colliery 
 
 Co. v. Clayton 1824 
 
 Dean of ;» Cross 689 
 
 v Willard 601 
 
 Westmoreland B. Martin 1168 
 
 Westmoreland Co. v. F'ielden 60 
 
 West of England Bank v. Can- 
 ton Ins Co. 1556 
 v Nickolls 720 
 Weston v. Berkeley 678 
 v Bowes 262 
 v Clowes 1437 
 v Empire Assurance Co. 327, 829, 
 855. 859 
 v Haggerston 1031, 1321 
 V. Hunt 23 
 v. Jay 1186 
 
 Weston v Keighley 2C3 
 
 v Watts 1746 
 
 Weston's Case 1485 
 
 Westover B, Chapman 1411 
 
 West Portlaud H. Ass'n t. Lowns- 
 
 dale 639 
 
 West Retford Church Lands, Re 
 
 1854 
 
 W. Va Oil Co. v. Vinal 1548 
 
 Westwood, lie 1356 
 
 Wetenhall B. Dennis 1423. 1437 
 
 Wetherell B. Collins 259, 260, 1387 
 
 Wetmore v. Dyer 458 
 
 B. Fiske 1548 
 
 v. Harper lul9 
 
 v St Paul & P R. Co. 1584 
 
 Wetteuhall r. Davis 1423, 1437 
 
 Weymouth v. Boyer 219, 382. 885_, 
 
 v. Lambert 
 Whalan v. Cook 
 Whale v. Griffiths 
 Whalen v. Olmstead 
 Whaley v Braucker 
 
 v. Dawson 
 
 v. Norton 
 Whalley v Ramage 
 
 v. Suffield, Lord 
 
 v. Whalley 
 Wham v. Love 
 Wharam )\ Broughton 
 
 1407, 1467 
 448 
 1576 
 743 
 
 108 
 
 1632, 1666 
 
 33!". 1161 
 
 348, 852 
 
 1410 
 
 795, 977, 1380 
 
 645, 1848 
 
 1233 
 
 172, 188, 
 
 1032, 1(154. 1U58, 1059, 1060, 1543 
 Wharton b. May 1032, 1626, 1627 
 
 B. Stoutenburgh 
 
 v. Swann 
 
 ?> Wharton 
 Whatton v. Craddock 
 Wheat v . Graham 7! 
 
 v. Griffin 
 Wheatcraft, In re 
 Wheatcroft V Hickman 
 Wheatley, Re 
 
 v. Bastow 
 
 1461 
 413 
 726 
 
 1259 
 J, 742, 769. 
 
 1837 
 328 
 
 1849 
 
 1503 
 123 
 
 1840 
 
 v. Westminster Brymbo Col- 
 
 liery Co 
 Wheaton v. 
 Co. 
 
 1663. 1741. 1861 
 Atlantic Powder 
 
 411 
 13!'l 
 1638 
 1646 
 87 
 
 v. Graham 
 
 v. Maple 
 
 t;. Peters 
 
 v. Phillips 
 Wheeler, Re 
 
 v Alderman 
 
 v. Bartlett 
 
 v Bedford 
 
 v. Gill 
 
 v. Howell 
 
 v. Le Marchant 
 
 v. Matins 
 
 V. Perry 
 
 v. Piper 
 
 v. Trotter 
 
 v. United Kingdom Tel. Co. 
 
 v. West 
 
 Wheeler, &c. Man. Co. v. Shakes- 
 peare 1649 
 Wheelhouse v. Calvert 800 
 Wlieelock, Re 1718 
 
 B. Lee K'71 
 
 Wlielan B. Cook 1578 
 
 V. Sullivan 182,426 
 
 Wheldaleo. Partridge 1405 
 
 Whelplev v. Van Epps 745 
 
 Whereattu Ellis 1168, 1461 
 
 Whetley Brick & P. Co., He 1756 
 Whetstone o. Daviefl 1072 
 
 Whicherley r Whicherlev 122 
 
 Whicker v Hume 1383, 1436, 143 
 
 1299 
 441 
 659 
 
 1253 
 
 652 
 
 573 
 
 63, 64, 814. 1679 
 
 2010 
 615 
 
 a53 
 
 354 
 
 339 
 
 Whipple r. Brown 
 
 ?'. Dow 
 
 V. Fair Haven 
 
 V. Whitman 
 Whistler, The 
 
 v. Ay 1 ward 
 
 v. Newman 
 
 v. Webb 
 
 11 <-8 
 
 1358, 1360 
 
 378 
 
 974 
 
 759 
 
 1044 
 
 1418 
 
 250
 
 CXXV1 
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging. ] 
 
 Whistler v. Wigney 724 
 
 Whitaker, In re 85, 1351 
 
 v. Dillard lt*>l 
 
 v Forhes 629 
 
 t'. Leach 1027 
 
 v. Newman 1075 
 
 v. Thurston 1175 
 
 v. Wi.ker.sham 1621 
 
 v Wright 1192, 1194, 1209, 1210, 
 
 1615 
 
 Whitbeck v. Edgar 337, 557, 1548 
 
 Wuitbread v. Gurney 578 
 
 v. Lyall 997 
 
 r. Roberts 1266 
 
 Whitby, Be 86 
 
 Whitchurch, Ex parte 467 
 
 v. Bevis 365, 619, 657 
 
 r. Golding 392, 393, 1558 
 
 Whitcomb v. Minchin 160, 1534, 
 
 1540 
 
 White, Re 192 
 
 972 
 
 313 
 
 r. Allatt 
 i'. Baker 
 r. Bank of U. S. 
 t' Barker 
 v. Bartlett 
 v. Barton 
 v. Baugh 
 v. Bigelow 
 v. Bower 
 v. Boyce 
 v. Bromige 
 Brown 
 
 658 
 724 
 214 
 1772 
 1751 
 334 
 1551 
 552 
 36, 39, 423. 598 
 999, 1000, 1241, 1246 
 v. Buccleugh, Duke of 1503 
 
 v. Buloid 1548, 1549, 1550, 1552, 
 1553 
 1029 
 • 371 
 555 
 222 
 109, 1635, 1637, 1638 
 
 v. Butcher 
 
 v. Campbell 
 
 v. Carpenter 
 
 v. Chitty 
 
 v. Cohen 
 
 v. Cox 
 
 v. Curtis 287, 288, 342 
 
 v. Davis 390 
 
 v. Delschneider 293 
 
 V. Duvernay 
 
 v Eastern Union Railway 
 
 Company 
 v. Empire Assoc. Co. 
 V. Fitzhugh 
 
 1085 
 
 368 
 
 1544 
 
 1401 
 
 350, 922, 951. 959, 
 
 1486 
 
 1052, 1053 
 
 778, 783 
 
 1&59 
 
 29,30 
 
 1390 
 
 153. 604 
 
 734, 737, 778, 844, 
 
 846, 1042, 1298, 1315, 1317, 1318 
 
 Hayward 1059, 1060 
 
 96, 98, 100 
 
 893 
 
 177, 405 
 
 214 
 
 592, 785 
 
 1077 
 
 1416. 1419 
 
 1748 
 
 211, 261 
 
 798, 1302. 1314, 1320. 
 
 1322 
 
 f. Jones 1655 
 
 V. Kennedy 269 
 
 V. Kibling 1118 
 
 v. Lee 843 
 
 v. Lisle 1082, 1119, 1137, 1139, 
 1149, 1379, 1467, 1476 
 
 v. Foljambe 
 v. Fussell 
 
 v. Geraerdt 
 
 v. Godbold 
 
 v. Grane 
 
 v. Greathead 
 
 t'. Gudgeon 
 
 v. Ball 
 
 v. Hampton 
 
 v Herrick 
 v. Hess 
 v. Hinton 
 v. Holman 
 v. Howard 
 v. Hussy 
 v. Jackson 
 v. James 
 v. Jameson 
 v. Johnson 
 
 v. Lowgher 
 
 t'. North West Stage Co. 
 
 v. Okisco Co. 
 
 v. Owen 
 
 t>. Park 
 
 V. Parnther 
 
 v. Pearce 
 
 629 
 1491 
 1317 
 195 
 286 
 1586 
 1846 
 
 White v. Peterborough, Bishop 
 of 1390, 1424, 1719, 1730 
 
 v. Robinson 68 
 
 v Secor 221 
 
 v. Smale 322, 360, 1725, 1748 
 
 v. Soto 402 
 
 17. Steinwacks 1678 
 
 v. Steward 433, 1517 
 
 v. Story 115J 
 
 v. Taylor 923 
 
 v. Tommey lu29 
 
 v. Utlev 1461 
 
 v. Walker 1031, 1296, 13»1 
 
 v. Warner 1659 
 
 v. White 339, 346, 559, 779, 1263, 
 1551, 2320 
 v. Williams 724, Vs31, 1238 
 
 v. Wilson 852, 1124. 1149, 1287, 
 1290, 1383, 1384 
 v. Yaw 361 
 
 White's Creek Turnpike Co. v. 
 
 Davidsou County 1637 
 
 White Star C G. M. Co., Re 417 
 Whiteaves r. Melville 204 
 
 Whitebread v. Brockhurst 365, 607, 
 608, 656 
 Whitecotton v. Simpson 328 
 
 Whitehall Lumber Co. v. Ed- 
 mans 354 
 Whitehaven Bank v. Thompson 448 
 Whitehead v Bellamv 1166 
 v. Bennett 1703, 1705, 1749 
 v. Cunliffe 783 
 v- Eutwhistle 1071 
 v. Kitson 1620, 1642, 1644 
 v. Lvnes 611, 1063, 1755 
 v. North 1O30 
 v. Shattuck 1071 
 Whitehouse v. Hemmant 1127 
 f. Partridge 1702, 17o5, 
 1712 
 Whitehurst v. Coleen 1071 
 Whitelegg v Whitelegg 1669 
 Whiteley, Re, Whiteley v. Lea- 
 royd 1035 
 v. Davis 1505 
 Whiteley & Roberts, Re 1860 
 Whitelocke v. Baker 43 
 Wbiteman's Estate 1282 
 Whitenach v. Stryker 852 
 Whiteside v. Puiliam 1170, 1175, 
 1317 
 Whitesides v. Dorris 90 
 v Lafferty 570, 1741, 1752 
 White Water Valley Canal Co. 
 
 ?• Comegvs 1565 
 
 Whitfield, Ex parte 1354, 1364 
 
 v. Aland 1099 
 
 v. Evans 334 
 
 v. Lequeutre 1276 
 
 v Priekett 1040, 1042, 1694 
 
 v. Roberts 999, 1266 
 
 Whitford v. Clark County 932 
 
 Whiting v. Bank of V. S. 190. 294, 
 
 994, 996, 998, 1019, 1575, 
 
 1576, 1577, 1579 
 
 v. Bassett 95, 893 
 
 r. Hollister 3'i 
 
 v. Rush 707 
 
 )•. White 650 
 
 v. Whiting 1150.2037 
 
 Whitley v Honeywell 445, 448 
 
 v Martin 855 
 
 Whitlock B Marriot 312 
 
 r. Willord 1461 
 
 Whitman v. Abernathy 277 
 
 V. Brotherton I486 
 
 r. Fisher 553 
 
 Whitmarsh v. Campbell 350, 402, 
 
 406, 424, 759 
 
 v Robertson 123, 1411 
 
 Whitmore v. Francis 386 
 
 v. Oxborrow 63, 814 
 
 v. Rvan 449. 452 
 
 v. Turquand 1770, 1780 
 
 Whitney v. Belden 720, WXt, 1008, 
 
 Whitney i\ Bigelow 
 
 646 
 
 v. Cotton 
 
 216 
 
 V. Cowan 
 
 1560 
 
 v. Demiug 
 
 1386 
 
 v. Fairbanks 
 
 334 
 
 v. Goddard 
 
 647 
 
 v. Leimiiuster Savings Bank 1320 
 v. M'Kiuney 194, 197, 260 
 
 p. Mayo 190,191,239,241,272 
 v New York, Mayor &c. of 806 
 v. Preston 830 
 
 v. Sauche 546 
 
 v. Smith 217, 280, 438 
 
 v- Stearns 165 
 
 v. Union Railway Co. 347, 1654 
 v. Whitney 342 
 
 Whitridge v. Whitridge 560 
 
 Whitsett r. City Building As- 
 sociation 1214,1411,1437 
 Whittaker v. Fox . 398 
 ?'. Howe 1663 
 r. Marlar 79, 80 
 v Whittaker 1218 
 Whittemore, Re 1716 
 r. Ad;ims 48 
 v. Amoskeag Nat. Bank 2398 
 v. Cowell 256 
 r Fisher 1320 
 Whitten v. Jennings 1643, 1644, 
 1670 
 V. Sawyer 107 
 v. Whitten 339 
 Whittenton Manuf Co. v. Mem- 
 phis & R. P. Co. 313 
 Whitthorue v. St. Louis Mut. 
 
 Life Ins. Co. 615, 682 
 
 Whittingham, Re 122 
 
 r. Burgoyne 587 
 
 v. Wooler 1643, 1645, 1646, 
 
 1681 
 Whittingham's Trusts, Re 87, 179 
 Whittingstall r. King »>" 
 
 Whittington p. Edwards 244, 513, 
 797,804 
 v. Gooding 203, 253 
 
 Whittle v. Artis 536 
 
 v Henning 99, 119, 123 1225 
 
 Whitton v. Jennings 1343, 1644, 
 1670 
 v. Wass 648 
 
 v Whitton 279, 1150 
 
 Whitwood v. Kellogg 1386, 1391, 
 1393 
 Whitwood Chemical Co v. Hard- 
 man 1657 
 Whitworth v. Davis 157 
 v. Gaugain 1720 
 v. Whyddon 251, 1485, 1488, 
 1603. 1725 
 Whopham v. Wingfield 81, 1429 
 Whyman v. Legh 547 
 Whvte v. Ahrens 666 
 v. Whyte 851 
 Wice ?'." Commercial Fire Ins. 
 
 Co. 37 
 
 Wich v. Parker 485, 761, 776 
 
 Wichalse v. Short 1584 
 
 Wiche'8 Case 125 
 
 Wickenden r. Rayson 1025, 1027, 
 1265, 1266 
 Wickens r Townsend, Mar- 
 chioness of 182, 1748 
 Wickersham v. Crittenden 334 
 v. Denman 1163 
 Wickham, Re, Marony v. Tay- 
 lor 354, 505, 797, 980, 1069, 
 1453 
 v. Evered 1774 
 v. Hardy 1861 
 r. Nicholson 1266 
 Wickliffe r. Breckenridpe 281 
 v. Clav 293, 1480, 1550 
 Wick« v. Clutterbuck 1126 
 v. Hunt 1081 
 Widgery v. Tepper 117. 123. 438, 
 1039, 1579, 1584 
 Wiegleb v. Thomsen 1029
 
 Wier v Simmons 
 
 V. Tucker 
 Wier's Appeal 
 Wigan v. Kowlaud 
 Wiggin v. Heywood 
 
 200 
 
 722, 1720 
 
 1696 
 
 877 
 236 
 
 Wiggingtou v. Pateman 70U, 792 
 
 Wiggins r. Bethune 74 
 
 i° Peppin 307, 533, 1449 
 
 v. Pryor 905,915 918. 930 
 
 Wiggle c. Owen 994, 1492 
 
 Wigglesworth v. Dallison 1656 
 
 Wigham v. Measor 1263 
 
 Wiglit v. Prescott 844 
 
 Wightinan !'. Brown 1028 
 
 v. Whieltou 821, 822, 823, 1070, 
 
 2126 
 
 Wigram v. Rowland 824 
 
 Wike v. Lig'.itner 900 
 
 Wilber e. Seldcn 1118 
 
 Wilherforce b Hearfield 1103 
 
 Wilbur v Collier 406 
 
 v Tobey 40 
 
 Wilcher V Robertson 1270 
 
 Wilcocks v. Carter 1620 
 
 v. Wlkocks 1054 
 
 Wilcox v. Badger 659 
 
 v. Davis 324 
 
 v. Drake 1349 
 
 v. Henry 49 
 
 v. M Lean 1587 
 
 V. Pratt 197 
 
 v Saunders 313 
 
 v Sturt 663 
 
 v. Wheeler 1637, 1640 
 
 v. Wilcox 4, 1352, 1478 
 
 v. Wilkinson 1475 
 
 Wilcoxon v. Wilkins 449, 401 
 
 Wild v. Bauning 1205 
 
 V.Gladstone 686,688 
 
 v. Hobson 39, 796, 797, 1457 
 
 v Murray 29, 359, 1553 
 
 v. Wells 1166 
 
 Wilde v. Gibson 328,382 
 
 v. Jenkins 666, 668 
 
 v. Lock hart 1390 
 
 V. Walford 1409 
 
 v. Wilde 795, 1380 
 
 Wilder v Boynton 793 
 
 v. Ember 68 
 
 v. Keeler 1204, 1516, 1517 
 
 v. Pigott 83 
 
 Wildes !'. Dudlow 1200 
 
 Wilding v. Andrews 1277, 1775 
 
 v. Bean 149 
 
 Wildman v. Lade 1027 
 
 Wiles v. Cooper 730, 1413 
 
 v. Hiles 101 
 
 Wiley v Angel 284 
 
 v. Pistor 885, 890 
 
 Wilford v Beaseley 1552 
 
 Wilbelm v. Byles 230 
 
 Wilhelm'a Appeal 560 
 
 Wilheui v. Keynolds 824 
 
 Wilboit V. CunTiingham 313 
 
 Wilkes v. Rogers 1316, 13">8 
 
 v. Saunion 1'_'33 
 
 v. Smith 214 
 
 Wilkes's Case 7 
 
 Wilkin v. Nainby 507, 508, 519, 
 
 529, 1590 
 
 v. Wilkin 379, 1151, 1106 
 
 Wilkins o Aikin 1645, 1646 
 
 v. Fry 227 
 
 v. Kirkbride 277, 339 
 
 v. May 8i5 
 
 v Reeves 215 
 
 v. Shalcroft 629 
 
 V. Sibley 1691 
 
 v Stevens 1319, 1589 
 
 v Wilkins 526 
 
 v. Williams 1738, 1739 
 
 v Woodfln 846, 847 
 
 Wilkinson, Re 1010 
 
 v. Bauerle 542 
 
 v. Beal 152, 170, 378. 379 
 
 v . Belsher 37,40,42,301,406, 
 
 414, 792 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Wilkinson /•. Bewick 1752 
 
 v. Brewer 1436 
 
 v. Castle 1103 
 
 v. Charlesworth 92. 105. 113, 813 
 
 v. Clements 1596, 1600, lo63 
 
 v. Dobbie 233, 313, 349, 385 
 
 v Dodd 349 
 
 v. Fowkes 282, 982, 1531, 1533, 
 
 1535 
 
 w.Gibson 87,122, 179,349 
 
 v. Hartley 990, 1408 
 
 i;. Henderson 324 
 
 v. Hensiiaw 1379, MX) 
 
 v. Hull &c Dock Co. 1491 
 
 v. Joberns 1103 
 
 v. Letch 1301 
 
 v. Lewis 29 
 
 v. Lindgren 1427 
 
 v- Malin 1138 
 
 v. Oliver 165, 997 
 
 v. Parish 1577 
 
 v. Payne 1129 
 
 v. Perrin 254, 1507 
 
 v. Rutherford 1743 
 
 v. Schneider 95 
 
 v. rearcy 1561 
 
 v. Stringer 912 
 
 v. Trustees 1110 
 
 v. Turner 520 
 
 v. Wilkinson 997, 1235 
 
 Wilks v. Fitzpitrick 98, 104 
 
 Willan, lie 161 
 
 v. Willan 956, 1189, 1196, 1197, 
 
 1215, 1467, 1471, 1578, 1579 
 
 Willard v. Fiske 1380, 1393 
 
 v Sperry 330 
 
 v. Willard 2027 
 
 v. Wood 1071 
 
 Willats v. Bushby 150 
 
 v. Cay 96 
 
 Willbauks v. Duncan 1680 
 
 Willcock v. Terrell 1033, 1053 
 
 Willcocks v. Butcher 1256 
 
 Willcox v Bellaers 14"1 
 
 Willenhall Chapel, Re 1852 
 
 Willes v. Levett 815 
 
 Willesford v Watson 671 
 
 Willett v. Thiselton 1824 
 
 v Woodharns 388 
 
 Wm. Braufoot, The v. Hamilton 
 
 1440, 1444 
 William Rogers Manuf. Co. v. 
 
 Rogers 1657 
 
 Williams, Ex parte 1358,1658 
 
 He 1844 
 
 Re, Williams v . Williams 1034 
 v. Adkyns 1434 
 
 V. Allen 86, 201, 202, 218, 226,269 
 1361, 1802 
 v. Attenborough 1271, 1278, 1280, 
 1292 
 v. Attorney-General 811, 1725 
 
 v. Ayrault 1027 
 
 v. Baily 553 
 
 v. Bank of M. 25 
 
 v. Bankhead 149, 190, 191 
 
 v- Hegnon 14^3 
 
 v. Benet 1120 
 
 c. Benton 1215 
 
 v- Berry 328, 1070 
 
 v. Bevnon 1466 
 
 v. Bishop 1147 
 
 v. Blakey 1073 
 
 v. Bolton, Duke of 1630 
 
 v. Brisco 561 
 
 v. Broadhead 866, 870 
 
 r. Butcher 14^5 
 
 v. Carle 114 1552 
 
 v. Carmarthen & Cardigan Ry 
 
 Co. 1028," 1030 
 
 v. Cassady 1434 
 
 v Chard 1169, 1540 
 
 v. Close 1024 
 
 v. Cooke 1539 
 
 v. Corwin 525 
 
 v. Coward 87, 178 
 
 v. Crosling 32 
 
 CXXV11 
 
 Williams v. Currie 1130 
 
 v. D.ivies 763, 1097, 1624, 1609 
 v. Day 194 
 
 v. De Boiuville 1594 
 
 v. Douglas 351 
 
 v. Dunn 272 
 
 v. Farrington 567 
 
 v. First Presby't Society 324 
 
 v. Gibbea 1206, 1207, 1208 
 
 v. Gleuton 1471 
 
 v. Goodchild I486, 1488, 1490, 
 
 16H3 
 v. Grant County Court 303 
 
 V- Gray 838 
 
 v. Great Western Railway 
 
 Company 1093,1128 
 
 v. Gue.-t 1U77, 1082 
 
 v. Halbert 1505 
 
 v. Hall 1676, 1677 
 
 v. Headland 1207 
 
 v. Hilton 1243, 1246 
 
 v. Hintermeister 1716 
 
 v. Hodgson 842 
 
 v. Hollingsworth 678, 986 
 
 v. Uoughtaling 1200 
 
 v. Hubbard 271 
 
 v. Jacksou 407, 1509, 1522, 1530 
 v. Jenkins 17a6, 17^:9, 1734 
 
 v. Jersey 324, 1654, 1663 
 
 v. Johns 1069 
 
 v. Johnson 1048 
 
 v. Jones 210, 236, 367, 380, 707, 
 
 1411 
 v. Kinder 1508 
 
 v. Knipe 859 
 
 v. Lee 663, 664, 665 
 
 v Llanelly Ry & Dock Co 266 
 
 V- Llewellyn 852 
 
 v. Longfellow 708 
 
 v. M'Namara 1633 
 
 V. Maitland 886 
 
 v- Matthews 1561 
 
 v. Mattocks 1395 
 
 v. Mellish 1582 
 
 v. Morgan 1746 
 
 v. Neel 334, 345 
 
 v. Neil 974 
 
 v. Newton 493 
 
 v. Nolan 1719 
 v. Page 201, 203, 304, 809. 810, 
 812, 994, 1021, 1022. 1027, 
 1397, 1407 
 
 v. Palmer 1459 
 
 v. Parkinson 501 
 
 v. Poole 203 
 
 v- Pouns 1468 
 
 v. Powell 1420 
 
 v. Preston 1490 
 
 v.Price 230,1074,1239 
 v. Prince of Wales Life Co 1837 
 
 v. Raggett 1032 
 
 v. Rhodes 1276 
 
 v. Roberts 1624 
 
 v. Rome 314 
 
 v. Rowland 807 
 
 V Russell 190 
 
 v. St. George's Harbor Co 1476 
 
 v. Salmnnd 234, 242, 243, 94 
 
 v- Savage Manuf Co 778, 779 
 
 v. Sexton 314 
 
 v. Shaw 380 
 
 v. Smith 215, 200 
 
 v- Sorrell 1391, 1395 
 
 v. Starke 425 
 
 v. Starr 860 
 
 it. Steward 547 
 
 v. Stewart 280, 1623 
 
 v. Svmonds 1694, 1697 
 
 v. Thomas 855, 1896 
 
 v. Thompson 623. 5'24 
 
 v. Thorn 1°37 
 
 v. Unitea States 8, 328. 1120 
 
 v. Vreeland 886. 951 
 
 v. Wager 1299 
 
 v. Walker 1668 
 
 v. Ware 1794
 
 CXXV111 
 
 Williams v. Watkina 
 v. West 
 V. Wheaton 
 v. Whingates 
 v. Wilcox 
 v WilKins 
 
 644 
 341 
 334 
 232 
 1127 
 42 
 
 v. Williams 248,251,252,266,679, 
 
 823, 824, 843, 868, 870, 876, 
 
 891, 9U6, 936, 1071, 1075, 
 
 1163, 1384, 1484, 1485, 1525, 
 
 1526, 1634, 1654, 1665 
 
 v. Winans 280, 281, 1515, 1517. 
 
 1531 
 
 v. Woodruff 1290 
 
 v Wright 1563 
 
 v. Young 575 
 
 Williamson v Barbour 371, 667 
 
 v. Beckham 186 
 
 v Belsher 38 
 
 v. Dale 1284, 1286, 
 
 1290 
 
 v. Gordon 167 
 
 v. Ha> cock 333. 841 
 
 v. Hyer 1462 
 
 v. Jeffreys 1005, 1517, 1525 
 
 v. Johnson 997 
 
 v. London & N. W. Ry. Co. 830 
 
 v. Lonsdale 230,262 
 
 v. M'Clintock 354 
 
 v. Montgomery 1079 
 
 V. More 951 
 
 V. Naylor 1205 
 
 v. New Albany R. Co. 1733 
 
 v. New Jersey Southern R 
 
 Co 220 
 
 v. North Staffordshire Ry. Co 
 
 1444 
 
 V Seaber 2061 
 
 v. Selden 256 
 
 v. Smoot 24 
 
 v. Swindle 1167 
 
 V. Sykes 524,529 
 
 v. Wilson 794, 1715, 1716, 1727, 
 
 1728, 1745, 1747, 1764 
 
 Willie v Lugg 213 
 
 Williman r Holmes 266 
 
 Willimautic Linen Co v. Clark 
 
 Thread Co. 378, 1580 
 
 Willimott v. Ogilby 1017 
 
 Willing v. Consequa 48, 916 
 
 Willingale v. Maitland 239 
 
 Willingham v. King 369 
 
 Willis v. Baddeley 1556, 1825 
 
 v. Beauchamp 354 
 
 V. Childe 774 
 
 v. Corlies 1734 
 
 v. Cowper 1033 
 
 v- Evans 422 
 
 v. Farrer 1122 
 
 v. Garbutt 32 
 
 V. Henderson 190, 238, 252 
 
 v. Hiscox 1419 
 
 t;. Howe, Earl 650 
 
 v. Jernegan 666, 667 
 
 v Parkinson 1029, 1164 
 
 v Willis 170 
 
 Williston v. Mich Southern and 
 
 Northern Ind R. It. Co 
 
 144, 190, 23S, 403 
 v. Salmon 1561 
 
 Willitts v Waite 1751 
 
 Willmer v. Kidd 1744 
 
 Willmott v. Barber 324. 1377, 1395 
 Willoughby v Chicago Junction 
 
 Railways &c. Co. 635 
 
 v. Lawrence 1654 
 
 v. Storer 13 
 
 v. Willoughby 1726 
 
 Wills, Re 37, 111, 351. 
 
 1404 
 v. Dunn 253 
 
 v. Luff 999, 1037 
 
 v. Mc Kinney 840 
 
 v. Pauly 87, 109 
 
 v. Pugh 807 
 
 V. Slade 209 
 
 V. Whitmore 281 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging ] 
 
 Willson, Re, Att.-Gen. v Wood 
 
 hall 406 
 
 Willway, Re 1874 
 
 Willyauis v Hodge 178 
 
 Wilu.er r R/tilroad Co 1731, 1743 
 
 Wilmington M. Co v. Allen 388, 
 
 1614 
 
 Wilinot v. Freehold H P Co 32, 
 
 354,639 
 
 v. Hellaby 1074 
 
 v. Kellaby 1074 
 
 v. Maccabe 566 
 
 Wilson, Re 102, 1342, 2001 
 
 v. Allen 990, 1408 
 
 v. Augers 1279 
 
 v. Applegarth 992 
 
 v. Balcarres B. S. Co, 406 
 
 f>. Itanium 1115 
 
 v. Bates 605, 506, 507, 
 
 797 
 v. Beadle 402 
 
 v. Beddard 1124. 1137 
 
 v. Bellows 279, 559 
 
 v. Bird 387 
 
 v. Biscoe 279 
 
 v. Blanco 142 
 
 v. Brownsmith 1427 
 
 v. Bull 1156 
 
 v. Carver 837 
 
 v. Chickering 197 
 
 v. Church 19, 145, 272, 
 
 406, 1469 
 v. City Bank 290, 292 
 
 v. City of Mineral Point 1631 
 
 v. Clifton 897 
 
 v. Cluer 1252 
 
 v. Davidson County 197 
 
 v. Davis 1463 
 
 v. De Coulon 916 
 
 v. Donaldson 887 
 
 v. Doran 1770 
 
 v. Eifltr 287, 1481 
 
 v. Emmett 1844 
 
 v. Ferrand 633, 800 
 
 V. Forster 579 
 
 v. Ginger 1114 
 
 v. Grace 738 
 
 v. Gray 398 
 
 v. Green 1157 
 
 v Greenwood 1727, 1728, 1729, 
 1732, 1948 
 v Gutteridge 1841 
 
 v. Haecker 1081 
 
 v. Hall 601 
 
 v Hammonds 356, 620, 630 
 
 n. Hart 1164, 1654 
 
 v. Hayward 277 
 
 v. Heaton 1428 
 
 v. Hicks 1130 
 
 v. Hill 586 
 
 v. Hillyer 678 
 
 v. Holcomb 846 
 
 v. Hooil 1847 
 
 v. Horr 378 
 
 v. Hyatt 1624 
 
 v. Kilcannon 652 
 
 v. Lynt 346, 347 
 
 v. McCullough 1624 
 
 v. Marsh 1255 
 
 v. Martin-Wilson A F. A. Co 149 
 v. Me ne-ohas 68 
 
 v. Metnilfe 506, 1052, 1148, 1241, 
 1251,1319, 1369, 1370, 1393, 
 1542 
 V. Mitchell 91S 
 
 v. Moore 200, 269 
 
 v. New York, Mayor of 1661 
 
 v. Northampton, &c R Co 573, 
 578, 1080, 1834 
 v. O'Leary 851 
 
 v. Parker 834 
 
 v. Polk County 369 
 
 v. Rastall 575, 576 
 
 v. Rhodes 268 
 
 v. Riddle 797, 1073 
 
 v. Roach 1364 
 
 v Robertson 1627 
 
 Mlson v Rockwell 
 
 1638 
 
 v. Round 
 
 1847 
 
 v. Kusling 
 
 801 
 
 v. Scruggs 
 
 702 
 
 v. Shawe 
 
 497 
 
 v. Shively 
 
 12 
 
 v. Smith 
 
 892 
 
 v Squire 
 
 1427, 1431 
 
 v. Stanhope 
 
 243, 544, 602 
 
 v. Stolley 
 
 2385 
 
 v. Thomson 
 
 1406, 1448 
 
 v. Thornbury 
 
 884. 1077 
 
 v. Todd 
 
 1536, 1537, 
 
 
 2060 
 
 v. Towle 
 
 737, 846 
 
 v. Troup 
 
 573 
 
 V. Turner 
 
 1361 
 
 v. Union Bank 
 
 21 
 
 v. Watermau 
 
 517 
 
 v. Webb 
 
 1577 
 
 v Webber 
 
 579, 1554 
 
 t>. Welch 
 
 1736, 1743 
 
 v. West Hartlepool Ry. Co 1469, 
 1470 
 v. Weatherherd 817 
 
 v. Wilson 307, 308, 553, 694, 810, 
 936,1234, 1247, 1311 1481, 
 1527, 1723, 1377 
 v Win term ute 782 
 
 Wilton » Clifton 746 
 
 v. Hill 37,67,68,111,112,1779 
 v. Jones 223, 257 
 
 v. Rum ball 432 
 
 Wiltshire, Re 1261 
 
 v. Marshall 85, 908 
 
 Wiltshire Iron Co., Re 1486 
 
 Wil ts Railway Co , Re 1347 
 
 Wimberg v. Schwegeman 1663 
 
 Wimbleton Local Board v Croy- 
 den Rural Sanitary Author- 
 ity 1675 
 Winans v Winans 844, 1271 
 Winbourn.iJe 1743 
 Winch v. Page 92 
 Wincham Shipbuilding Co , Re 26 
 Wiucliell v Coney 334 
 Wiucbelsea v Garretty 1695 
 r Wauchope 1124 
 Winchelsea, Earl of v. Garettv 1077, 
 1078, 1082, 1462 
 Winchester v. Browne 830 
 v. Evans 1627 
 v. Jackson 664, 842, 1627 
 v. Loud 149 
 v. Winchester 165, 974, 1120, 
 1439, 1576 1577 
 Winchester, Bishop of v Beavor 
 
 167, 194, 261, 278 
 
 v. Bowker 1825, 1829 
 
 v. Knight 1634 
 
 v Mid Hants Ry Co 230, 231, 
 
 278, 1U21 
 
 v. Paine 281, 999, 1402 
 
 Winder v Diffcnderffer 942 
 
 Windham v. Cooper 810, 1556 
 
 v. Giuhilei 1742 
 
 v. Graham 1405, 1426 
 
 Windley v. Bradway 891 
 
 Windrin v Philadelphia 1662 
 
 Windsors. Cross 1029 
 
 v. McVeigh 853 
 
 v Windsor 286, 390 
 
 Windsor & Annapolis Ry. Co. v. 
 
 Keg. 133 
 
 Winfield v Bacon 1565 
 
 Wing v. Angrave 850, 1503 
 
 v. Davis 194, 212 
 
 v. De La Rionda 1508 
 
 v. Fairhaven 1620, 1640, 1641, 
 
 1664, 1668, 1669, 1675 
 
 v Goodman 1548, 1551 
 
 v. Morrell 230 
 
 v. Sherrer 552 
 
 v. Spaulding 1561 
 
 v. Tottenham, &c R. Co 1221 
 
 v. Wing 660 
 
 Wingard v. Jameson 1584
 
 Wingate v. Haywood 1623 
 
 Wingfield, Ex parte 157 
 
 Wingo v. Hardy 545, 726 
 
 Wingrove v. Thompson 202 
 
 Wioham v. Crutcher 325, 531 
 
 Wiukworth v Wiakworth 096, 1796 
 
 Winn v. Albert 1515, 1523 
 
 v. Bowles 197 
 
 v. Bull 561 
 
 v. Fletcher 630 
 
 v. Patterson 873 
 
 Winue v. Reynolds 1108 
 
 Winnebrenner v Colder 327 
 
 Winninghoff v Wittig 1120 
 
 Winnipissiogee Lake Co v. Perley 
 
 1971, 1972, 
 
 v. Worster 287. 292, 358, 374, 
 
 1613, 1631,1637, 1639 
 
 v Young 20, 25, 325, 358, 
 
 546, 561 
 
 Winooski Turnp. Co. v. Ridley 915 
 
 Winpenny v. Courtney 1197 
 
 Winscom, Re 1863 
 
 Wiuship v. Bass 1772 
 
 v Pitts 1634 
 
 v. Waterman 1309 
 
 Winslow e. Ancratn 1255 
 
 v. Collins 1463, 1464, 1405 
 
 v Dousman 341 
 
 v. M. & P. R. Co. 257 
 
 v Nason 378, 1069, 1684 
 
 Winsor v. Bailey 334, 737 
 
 v. Pettis 338 
 
 Winston v. Campbell 165, 170, 753 
 
 v. Mitchell 418 
 
 v. Tennessee and Pac R. Co. 1650 
 
 Winter v. Butt 1100 
 
 v. City Council 1461 
 
 v. Dancie 919 
 
 V. Innes 1298, 1588 
 
 • v. Mobile Savings Bank 830 
 
 v. Quarles 5*2 
 
 v. Smith 334 
 
 Winterbottom v. Ingham 1215 
 
 Winterfield i\ Bradnum 154 
 
 Winters v. Claitor 542 
 
 Winthrop v. Elderton 688 
 
 v. Ethel 1029, 1461 
 
 v. Farrar 403, 405, 1512 
 
 v. Murray 413, 707, 792, 808, 1407 
 
 v. Royal Exch. Ass Co. 28 
 
 v. Winthrop 796, 1588 
 
 Winthrop Iron Co. v. Meeker 1716 
 
 Wintle, Re 865 
 
 Wintle v. Bristol and South 
 
 Wales Railway Co 1663 
 
 Wirdman » Kent 1403, 1466 
 
 Wirt ». Hicks 314 
 
 Wisconsin i». Pelican Ins. Co. 357 
 
 Wisden » Wisden 903 
 
 Wise, Re 1606 
 
 v Grand Ave. R Co. 314 
 
 v. Lamb 1073 
 
 v. Williams 357 
 
 Wiser v. Bliehly 254, 282, 1030, 
 
 1478, 1575, 1570, 1577, 1578, 
 
 1579, 1581, 1582 
 
 Wisewold, Re 1044, 1590 
 
 Wisner v Barnet 559, 644 
 
 v. Grant 2897 
 
 Wistar's Appeal 1889 
 
 Wiswall v. Sampson 1207 
 
 Wiswell v Starr 149, 790, 1732, 
 
 1733, 1735 
 
 Witby v. Norton 1017 
 
 Witham v Bland 1050, 1055, 1057 
 
 v. Salim 430 
 
 Wither v. Winchester, D and C. 
 
 of 8 
 
 Witherell i;. Wiberg 652 
 
 Witherington v Banks 1240 
 
 Withers v. Morrell 1653 
 
 v. Sims 334 
 
 v. Warner 21 
 
 Witney v Haigh 1601 
 
 Withrow v. Smithson 177 
 
 Withy v Mangles 1499 
 
 VOL. I. — i 
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Witkowski v. Hern 418 
 
 Wits v. Polehampton 1130, 1134 
 
 Witt v. Corcoran 1086, 1403 
 
 v Ellis 692 
 
 Wittenbrock v. Bellmer 1461 
 
 Witters v. Foster 15n7 
 
 v Sowles 2, 630, 1019, 1120, 1320 
 Wittrnau v. Oppenneim 1643 
 
 Witts v. Campbell 112, 403 
 
 Witty r. Marshall 1352 
 
 W J Johnson Co. v. Hunt 1657 
 Woddrop v. Price 986, 1033 
 
 Woffeuden v. Woffenden 
 Wolcote v Robbins 
 Wolf v. Wolf 
 
 v Underwood 
 Wolfe v. Birch 
 
 v. Burke 
 
 v. Matthews 
 Wollaston v. Hakewell 
 Wollen3ak t' Reiher 
 
 V Sargent 
 Wollet v. Roberts 
 Wolley v. Brownhill 
 Wollstonecraft, Ex parte 
 
 CXX1X 
 
 1164 
 563, 564 
 1556 
 1630 
 1620 
 1652 
 1098 
 500 
 1642 
 839 
 713, 841 
 1350, 
 2293 
 Wolmershausen v. Wolmers- 
 
 hausen 1642 
 
 Wolverhampton & Staffordshire 
 
 Banking Co. v. Bond 447, 448 
 Wolverhampton & W Rv Co i\ 
 
 London & N.W.Ry. Co. 671, 1596 
 Woman's Union Miss. Society v. 
 
 Mead 1411 
 
 Womerslev, Re 1040 
 
 v. Church 1638 
 
 v. Merritt 24. 25, 26, 239, 405 
 
 Wonham v. Machiu 1265, 1390, 1424 
 
 Wontner, Re, Brown v. White 868 
 
 Wood, Re 99, 100. 974 
 
 v. Ainley 1394 
 
 v. Anderston Foundry Co. 149 
 
 v. Ay 1 ward 
 
 
 364 
 
 v. Barker 
 
 
 1398 
 
 v. Barnicott 
 
 
 1168 
 
 v. Beadell 
 
 
 388, 1614 
 
 v Boosey 
 
 
 46 
 
 v. Boucher 
 
 
 1610 
 
 v. Bradell 
 
 
 388 
 
 v. Braxton 
 
 
 1628 
 
 v. Brewer 
 
 
 1463 
 
 v. Briant 
 
 
 652, 1253 
 
 v. Brush 
 
 
 780 
 
 v. Carpenter 
 
 
 560 
 
 v. Chart 
 
 
 46 
 
 v. Cole 
 
 
 916 
 
 v. Cooper 
 
 
 1099, 1459 
 
 V. Currey 
 
 
 555 
 
 v. Downes 
 
 
 1777,1781 
 
 v. Dummer 
 
 
 272 
 
 v. Edwards 
 
 
 1775 
 
 v. Farthing 
 
 
 1467 
 
 v. Freeman 
 
 
 1061 
 
 v. Gregory 
 
 
 1157 
 
 v Griffith 1460, 1468 
 
 1477. 1473, 
 
 
 
 1480 
 
 v. Hammerton 
 
 
 959 
 
 v, Harpur 
 
 
 749, 891 
 
 v. Hitchings 570, 
 
 "17, 
 
 1725. 1726, 
 1750 
 
 v. Hubbard 
 
 
 997 
 
 v. Hudson 60, 
 
 551 
 
 1286, 1556 
 
 v. Hurd 
 
 
 1129 
 
 v. Keyes 
 
 
 1017 
 
 v. King Mauuf. Co 
 
 
 545 
 
 v. Lambirtta 
 
 
 1311 
 
 V. Lee 
 
 
 1166, 1234 
 
 v. Lenox 
 
 
 1621 
 
 V. Lillies 
 
 
 671 
 
 t>. Logsden 
 
 
 162, 498 
 
 v. Lyne 
 
 394 
 
 , 1562, 1563 
 
 ?• Mackinson 
 
 
 1102 
 
 v. Majoribanks 
 
 
 1406 
 
 v. Mann 349, 569, 676. 728, 729, 
 
 948, 949, 952, 956, 957, 959. 960, 
 
 1061, 1275, 1277. 1281, 1284, 
 
 1623, 1577, 1578 
 
 Wood v. Met'n Life Ins. Co. 418 
 
 v. Midgley 365, 561, 588, 2086 
 
 V. Miluer 1468 
 
 v. Oregon Dev. Co. 1734 
 
 v. Robson 671 
 
 v. Rowcliffe 1652 
 
 v. Rowe 607, 671, 672 
 
 v. Silcock 561 
 
 v. Skelton 2095 
 
 v. Stane 858, 876 
 
 v. Strickland 615, 697, 704, 879 
 v. Sutcliffe 1637. 1663 
 
 v. Taunton 1860 
 
 v. Taylor 709 
 
 v. Thompson 599 
 
 v. Vincent 1040, 1041, 1695 
 
 v. Warner 1032 
 
 v. Westborough 630 
 
 v. White 230, 231 
 
 ?•. Williams 193 
 
 v. Wood 46, 109, 110, 329, 1678 
 Woodall v. Holliday 58 
 
 v. Moore 1580 
 
 Woodard v. Eastern Counties 
 
 Ry. Co. 855 
 
 Woodburn v Woodburn 1120 
 
 Woodburn's Trusts, lie 1412 
 
 Woodbury v. Luddy 2259 
 
 Woodcock v. Bennet 377, 1229 
 
 v. King 810, 1558 
 
 v. Oxford, Worcester, & Wol- 
 verhampton Railway Co. 1601 
 Wooden v. Wooden 1676 
 
 Woodfin, Re 1585 
 
 v. Anderson 236, 643 
 
 v. Phoebus 553 
 
 Woodford v. Eades 1130 
 
 Woodgate v Field 236, 1209, 1210 
 Woodger v Crumpter 783 
 
 Woodhatch v Freeland 840, 894, 
 1822 
 Woodhouse ». Woodhouse 201 
 
 Wondhull v. Neafie 1282 
 
 Wooding v Bradley 1309 
 
 Woodley v. Johnson 1115 
 
 Woodman v. Coolbroth 921 
 
 v. Freeman 630 
 
 v. Saltonstall 1961 
 
 Woodroffe v. Daniel 424, 764, 1836, 
 2124 
 v. Titterton 1191 
 
 v. Wood 1075 
 
 Woodroft v. Soys 139.3 
 
 Woodruff v Brown 1653 
 
 v. Depue 1258 
 
 V. Dubuque &c. R Co. 737 
 
 v. North Bloomfield G. M. Co. 3*5 
 v. Straw 1168 
 
 r. Woodruff 231 
 
 r. Young 303 
 
 Woodrum v Kirkpatrick 1553 
 
 Wo.. a- v. Dike 657 
 
 v. 1'itz 546 
 
 v. M' Innes 452 
 
 r. Monell 1271 
 
 V. Morrell 340. 347, 349, 722, 723. 
 726, 728, 729, 759, 760, 768 
 v. Oliver 1225 
 
 v. Rankin 1259 
 
 v. Sowerby 236, 336, 360. 645 
 
 V. Svmmes 1707 
 
 v. Woods 571. 578, 730, 834. 1026, 
 1413, 1^:J4 
 Woodside r Morgan 1120 
 
 v. Woodside 994, 1492 
 
 Woodson v. Palmer 1381 
 
 V. Smith 1215 
 
 Woodstoek Bank v Lawson 1245, 
 1246 
 Woodward v. Astley 354 
 
 v. Brace 1304 
 
 v. Conebear 181,493,1453 
 
 v. Donally 1864 
 
 ?'. Dromgoole 1621 
 
 v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co. 1395 
 v. Oylea 1655 
 
 v. Hall 191, 334
 
 cxxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 Woodward v. King 1674, 1683, 1687 
 V. Lincoln, Earl 1074, 1683 
 
 v. I'liillips 
 v. Pratt 
 v. Roberta 
 r. Schatzell 
 V, Twinaine 
 V. Williamson 
 
 I Wood 
 
 r Woodward 
 
 Woodworth >■ Campbell 
 
 v. Edwards 
 
 r Spring 
 
 v. Van Buskirk 
 Woodyard v. I'olsley 
 Woodyatt v. Gresley 
 Woodyear v. Schaefer 
 Wool.' Matter of 
 
 i . Tow nsley 
 Wooley !■. Drew > 
 Woolf v. Pemberton 
 Woolfryes v Woolfryes 
 Woollam v Hearn 
 
 1244, 1245, 13S6 
 
 '.15 
 
 881 
 
 1699, 1704 
 
 509, 784 
 
 212,220,287 
 109, 1407, 1533 
 
 2i>ll 
 
 392, 395 
 
 1355 
 
 1021 
 
 1209 
 
 1724, 1734 
 
 1638 
 
 1841 
 
 1590 
 
 1580 
 
 68, 69, 70 
 
 84 
 
 408, 860, 861, 
 
 995 
 
 v. Ratcliff 1649 
 
 Woollauds v. Crowther 96, 98 
 
 Woollaston v. Wright 245 
 
 Woollatt v Woollatt 1425 
 
 Woolley v Colman 1159, 1267 
 
 v. North London Ry. Co. 573 
 
 Woolley's Trusts, Re 868, 893 
 
 Woolman v. Ilearn 384 
 
 Woolridge v McKenna 74 
 
 Wools v. Walley 387 
 
 Woolwich v Forrest 22 
 
 Woolv v. Drag 1245 
 
 Wooster v. Blake 700, 2383 
 
 p.Clark 890,945,2392 
 
 r. Gumbirnner 1171, 11S0, 2394 
 
 v. Handy 2397 
 
 v. Muser 694 
 
 V. Plvniouth 1071 
 
 v. Woodhull 524, 529, 1026 
 
 Wooten v. Smith 1668, 1677 
 
 Woots /•. Tucker 1583 
 
 \\ ooten v. Wooten 1405 
 
 Wootten v. Burch 545, 718 
 
 Worcester v. Truman 1683 
 
 Worden v. Ellers 1662 
 
 v. Searls 1029 
 
 Wordsworth v. Dayrell 100 
 
 ,■ Parkins 1520 
 
 Worgan v Rvder 1167 
 
 Work v. McCoy 779 
 
 Working-Men's Mutual Society, 
 
 Re 911 
 
 Wormald » De Lisle 368 
 
 Worman V. Worman 555, 659 
 
 Worms r. De Valdor 5 
 
 Worruser v. Merchants' Nat 
 
 Bank 1716 
 
 Wormslev. R» 286, 351, 1449 
 
 /,'. . Haines )•. Wormsley 8P5 
 
 Worsham v. Goar 916 
 
 v. Gove 915 
 
 Worsley ?'. Watson 570 
 
 Worssam. Re 852 
 
 Worswick, Re, Robson v. Wors- 
 
 wick 571, 1835 
 
 Worth v. M'Kenzie 176 
 
 Wortham v. Dacre, Lord 1377, 1404 
 
 v. Pemberton 91, 110, 111 
 
 Wortheu v Badgett 1061 
 
 Worthington, lie 99, 1802 
 
 v. Batty 1643 
 
 v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. 51 
 
 v. Dublin &c. Ry. Co. 573 
 
 v. Hiss 
 v. Lee 
 v M'Craer 
 v. Scribner 
 v. Ware 
 Wortlcy, Re 
 v. Birkhead 
 
 1320 
 
 215, 708, 1018 
 
 1359 
 
 581 
 
 1620 
 
 798 
 
 173, 582, 660. 1581 
 
 V Start 
 Worraker v. Pryer 
 Worral v. Miller 
 
 v. Nicholls 
 Worrall v. Harford 
 
 v, .Johnson 
 
 r. Marlar 
 
 v White 
 Worrell v. Wade 
 Worrill v. Coker 
 
 1225 
 
 236, 245 
 
 1395 
 
 13D6 
 
 1845 
 
 1842, 1S45 
 
 102 
 
 36 
 
 1548, 1553, 1556 
 
 1716 
 
 Wotherspoon v. Currie 
 
 1648 
 
 Wotton v. Copeland 
 
 209 
 
 Woven Tape Skirt Co., 
 
 Re 1746 
 
 Wragg, Re 
 
 1280 
 
 v. Morley 438, 
 
 Wray, Re 
 
 1069 
 
 r. Hutchinson 
 
 715 
 
 v. Jamison 
 
 1751 
 
 v. May 
 
 1117 
 
 v. Thorn 
 
 1128 
 
 v. Thornes 
 
 1092 
 
 Wren v. Kirton 
 
 1277, 1752 
 
 Wrench v. Wynne 
 
 1041 
 
 Wright, Re 
 
 100, 1798 
 
 v. Angle 593, 690 
 
 , 756, 805, 831 
 
 v. Arnold 
 
 97 
 
 v. Atkyns 388, 1614, 1630 
 
 v. Barlow 
 
 299. 301, 791 
 
 v. Bates 
 
 845 
 
 v. Black 
 
 29 
 
 v. Bourdon 
 
 369 
 
 r. Bundy 
 
 214, 220 
 
 v. Campbell 
 
 783 
 
 v. Cantzou 
 
 1287 
 
 v. Castle 
 
 307, 3"8, 533 
 
 v. Chard 
 
 180, 187, 1409 
 
 v. Clifford 
 
 979 
 
 v. Cornelius 
 
 270 
 
 v. Dame 145, 146 
 
 , 361, 547, 588 
 
 V. Dorset 
 
 1511 
 
 v. Dufield 
 
 1^40 
 
 v. Dunklin 
 
 985 
 
 v. Eaton 
 
 1623 
 
 v. Edwards 
 
 822 
 
 v. Everard 
 
 28 
 
 v. Frank 
 
 1548 
 
 v. Gay 
 
 1584 
 
 r. Howard 
 
 303, 13li9 
 
 r. Hunter 
 
 1404 
 
 v. Irving 
 
 398 
 
 r. King 
 
 101, 454, 1847 
 
 v. Kirby 
 
 1390, 1424 
 
 v. Larnmth 
 
 905, 1213 
 
 r. Lukes 
 
 1781 
 
 v. Lvnde 
 
 1397 
 
 v. McKean 
 
 857 
 
 v. Maidstone, Lord 
 
 3! «2 
 
 r. Mayer 
 
 574, 1825 
 
 v. Mayo 
 
 571 
 
 v. Meek 
 
 607, 1517 
 
 Wright v. Miller 165. 1019 
 
 v. Mills 18, 196, 581 
 
 v. Mitchell 1799 
 
 v. Mudie 1409 
 
 v. Navlor 1347 
 
 v. Phillips 991, 1567 
 
 v. Phipps 1517 
 
 v. Plumptree 545 
 
 v. Robotham 1162 
 
 r. Rutter 97 
 
 v. Santa Clara Mining Asso- 
 ciation 296 
 v. Smith 1403 
 v. Strother 986 
 v. Tatham 810, 1458, 1573, 1574 
 v. Vanderplank 1358 
 v. Vernon 1158, 1535, 1734, 1831 
 v. Wellesley 1051 
 v. Wilkin 385, 756, 906, 945, 1725 
 v. Willcox 1097, 1105 
 v. Wright 88. 311, 312, 389, 408, 
 1061,1119, 1148. 1232,1234, 
 1260, 1277, 1369, 1384, 1412, 
 1845 
 Wrixon v. Vize 652, 1741 
 Wroe v. Clayton 463, 1453 
 v. Seed 1417, 1418 
 Wrottrs Case 133 
 Wrotteslev r. Bendish 169, 183, 568 
 
 v. Methodist Episcopal Church. 
 Trustees of 
 
 S, 
 
 1827 
 
 1437 
 
 1386 
 
 994 
 
 561 
 
 1069 
 
 1169 
 
 1551 
 
 1120 
 
 1350 
 
 182 
 
 644 
 
 144, 296, 842 
 
 1675 
 
 1221 
 
 Wycombe Railway Co v. Don- 
 
 nington Hospital 995, 1081 
 
 Wye Valley Ry. Co r. Hawes 243 
 Wyersdale" School, Re 1857 
 
 Wvkes v. Ringleberg 179 
 
 Wvkliam v. Wykham 1405 
 
 w'\Mr. Ward 10n3 
 
 Wj Hie v Ellice 29, 30, 31, 33, 409, 
 583, 681, 1362, 1590 
 v. Green 1047 
 
 Wylly A. Trustees v. Sanford 334 
 
 Wroughton v. Barclay 
 
 v. Colquhoun 
 Wyatt v. Cook 
 
 v. Garlington 
 
 v. Luton 
 
 v. People 
 
 v. Sadler 
 
 v. Sweet 
 
 v. Thompson 
 
 v. Wood 
 Wybourn v Blount 
 Wych r. East India Co 
 
 v. Meal 
 Wyckoff v Cochran 
 AVycoff v. Combs 
 
 Wylson v. Dunn 
 AVyman v Babcock 
 
 v. Knight 
 
 v. Southward 
 
 r. Wilcox 
 Wymer v. Dodds 
 Wyndham v Ennismore 
 
 v. Ennismore, Lord 
 Wynkoop v. Van Beuren 
 Wvnn v. Morgan 98 
 
 Wynne v. Callander 
 
 v. Edwards 
 
 v Griffith 
 
 i: Hughes 
 
 r. Humberston 
 
 r. Newborough, Lord 
 
 364 
 
 1923, 2227, 
 
 2228 
 
 1062 
 
 48 
 
 418 
 
 406 
 
 221 '4 
 
 1355 
 
 1675 
 
 ), 990, 1408 
 
 346 
 
 1003 
 
 1220 
 
 70S 
 
 1825, 1S34 
 
 173:-!, 1738, 
 
 1739, 1749 
 
 Y. 
 
 Yalden, Ex parte 
 Vale v. Baum 
 
 '■. hoderer 
 Yancy v Batte 
 
 V Ken wick 
 Yard v. Ocean Beach Ass'n 
 
 1843 
 1679 
 186 
 1158 
 361 
 1317, 
 1395 
 
 Yardley '•. Arnold 
 
 v. Holland 
 Yare v Harrison 
 Yarnall v. Rose 
 Varrington v Robinson 
 Yate v. Lighthead 
 Yates v Compton 
 
 1098 
 
 Yates >•. Crewe 
 
 167 
 
 640 
 
 v. Farebrother 
 
 1772 
 
 771, 1781 
 
 v. Hambly 
 
 260, 1251, 1252 
 
 701 
 
 v. Hardy 
 
 763. 1184 
 
 243 
 
 ?'. Jack 
 
 1638 
 
 396, 1526 
 
 v. Law 
 
 334 
 
 227, 254 
 
 v. Madden 
 
 2182
 
 Fates v. Mouroe 296, 1123 
 
 v. Plumbe 1328 
 
 i Sherrington 116, 117 
 
 v. Tiadale 1564 
 
 v. University College 1459 
 
 Tattoo v. Loudon & L. F. Ins. 
 
 Co. .1071 
 
 Yauger v. Skinner 85, 366 
 
 Yeager v. Wallace 1743 
 
 Yearsley v. Uudgett 519, 521 
 
 i). Yearsley 1379, 1589, 1590 
 
 Yearwood's Trusts, Jit 349 
 
 Yeatman v. Belluiaiu S8 ; 189 
 
 v Mou-ley 440 
 
 8 Read 1012 
 
 v Yeatman 200,251,324 
 
 Ye it'in v Lenox 303 
 
 Vi o ! Krere 1316 
 
 Yeoui ins v Haynes 1213 
 
 v Kilvington 1683 
 
 Yerbury, Re, Ker v. Dent 1035 
 
 Yescombe v. Landor 1037 
 
 Yetts v Biles 1601 
 
 v Norfolk Ry. Co 242, 243 
 
 v. Palmer 1722, 1725 
 
 Yewens v. Robinson 59 
 
 Yick Wo v. Crowley 1620 
 
 Yingling v Hesson 1117 
 
 Yoke v. Barnet 91 
 
 Yonge v. McCormick 1677 
 
 Yongus » Billups 1622 
 
 York v. Brown 1234, 1413 
 
 v. Pilkington 1164 
 
 v. White 244. 794 
 
 York, Archbishop ofv. Stapleton 582, 
 
 1182 
 
 York Buildings Co., Case of 6, 1.33 
 
 York, Mayor of v. Pilkington 272, 
 
 341, 1620. 1682 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [The references are to the star paging.] 
 
 York Mauuf. Co. v. Cutts 544 
 
 York and North Midland Ry. 8. 
 
 Hudson 742. 1513 
 
 Yorke r Fry 605, 615, 619, 620 
 
 v. Yorke 536 
 
 Yorkshire Banking Co. 8. Mul- 
 
 lau 418, 1650, 1716 
 
 Yorkshire Waggon Co. v. New- 
 port Coal Co. 406 
 Yosi v. Aldersou 1031 
 8. Devault 1081 
 Youde 8. Cloud 1416 
 Youl, Re . 1611 
 Youle v. Richards 711, > s 44 
 Young, Ex parte 147 
 Ex parte, lit Quartz Hill 
 
 Co. 889 
 
 v. Aronson 60 
 
 v. Bank of Alexandria So:; 
 
 v. Brassey 1669 
 
 v. Buckett 1728 
 
 v. Bush 793 
 
 v. Butler 1653 
 
 v. Clarendon Township 560 
 
 v. Clarksville Man. Co. 732 
 
 8. Cusliing 149 
 
 8. Davis 67 
 
 8. Dearborn 1845 
 
 8. Edwards 1163 
 
 v. Emery 1620 
 
 v. English 1843 '• 
 
 8. Everest 1374, 1422, 1437 i 
 
 8. Fernie 876, 1071, 1642 \ 
 
 8 Gentis 830 j 
 
 8. Goodson 1591 i 
 
 v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. 1120 
 
 8. Grundy 837 
 
 v. Henderson 986, 1576 
 
 8. Hodges 334 I 
 
 cxxxi 
 
 Young v. Hopkins 
 
 846 
 
 8. Keighly 
 
 1576, 1577, 1578 
 
 v. Leamington 
 
 
 v. Lillard 
 
 989 
 
 8. Lyons 
 
 267,271,341 
 
 v Macrae 
 
 1049 
 
 i. Montgomery & Eufaula R. 
 
 Co. 2U,743 
 
 8. Quincey B05, B 7 
 
 v. Rathbone 369, 989, 1218 
 
 v. Key uolds 
 
 1227 
 
 r. Rodes 
 
 199 
 
 v. Rondout & K G. L. 
 
 Co. 1675 
 
 v State 
 
 57.; 
 
 V. Sutton 
 
 1163 
 
 r. Teague 
 
 1286, 1291 
 
 v. Tliomas 
 
 1381. 1463 
 
 V. Ward 
 
 215 
 
 r Waterpark, Lord 
 
 653 
 
 v. Wheeler 
 
 
 r. White 609, 617, 61! 
 
 8. Wiight 
 
 848 
 
 r. Young 
 
 815, 1157 
 
 Youngblood 8. Schamp 
 
 395. 11 -. 
 
 
 1668, 1669 
 
 v. Youngblood 
 
 552 
 
 Younge v. Cocker 
 
 73 
 
 v. Cooper 
 
 1161 
 
 r. Duncouibe 
 
 1774 
 
 8 Pate 
 
 1255 
 
 Youngs, Re, Doggett 8. Revett 39, 
 
 
 797, 14^-0 
 
 Yourie v. Nelson 3* 
 
 , 177 1233. 
 
 
 1457, 1846 
 
 Yovatt v Winyard 
 
 1650 
 
 Yow 8. Townsend 
 
 1031 
 
 Yuengling 8. Johnson 
 
 1614 
 
 Yule 8. Yule 1699 
 
 17o4. 1706, 
 
 
 1707, 1708 
 
 z. 
 
 Zabel v Harshman 
 
 Z ibriskie v. .Jersey City & 1 
 
 It. R. Co. 
 7. imbaco v. Cassavetti 
 Zane v. Cawley 
 
 v Kink 
 Zearing v. Ruber 
 Zecharie v. Bowers 
 
 590 
 
 Zeininger r Schnitzler 
 
 860 
 
 
 Zell's Appeal 
 
 641 
 
 1637 
 
 Zelle v. Workingmen's B. Co. 
 
 190 
 
 764 
 
 Ziegler 8. Chapin 
 
 1071 
 
 844 
 
 Zieverink v. Kemper 
 
 2 
 
 197 
 
 Zihlman v. Zihlman 
 
 1561 
 
 1654 
 
 Zimmer v. Miller 
 
 1401 
 
 458 
 
 Zimmerman 8. Huber 
 
 1301 
 
 Zimmerman 8. Willard 324 
 
 Ziou Church 8. St. Peter's Church 
 
 25 
 
 Zivi v. Einstein 840 
 
 Zulueta 8. Vincent 446, 461 . 462, 
 
 520, 711 
 
 Zunkel v. Litchfield 920, 1168 
 
 ADDENDA. 
 
 Dawson >' Whitehaven Bank 125 
 De Stacpoole v. De Stacpoole 108 
 Driskill v. Cobb 1621 
 
 General Share Trust Co. v. Chap- 
 man 1842 
 
 Howard v. Shrewsbury, Earl
 
 THE PRACTICE 
 
 OF THE 
 
 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY. 
 
 * CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE COMMENCEMENT OF A SUIT. 
 
 *1 
 
 The practice of the Court of Chancery, and of its various offices, is 
 regulated by rules laid down in Acts of Parliament, in the General Orders 
 of the Court passed or promulgated from time to time, in the Regula- 
 tions of the Judges for the conduct of business in their chambers and 
 of the Registrars of the Court respecting the transaction of business in 
 their office, and by custom or usage, to be ascertained generally from 
 former decisions of the Court; 1 the decisions of the Court are also 
 important in determining the construction to be put upon the Acts of 
 Parliament, General Orders, and Regulations. 
 
 It will be the object of this Treatise to explain the practice of the 
 Court in reference to its equitable jurisdiction. 2 
 
 t " Ancient and uniform practice consti- 
 tutes the law of the Court, as much as a positive 
 order," per Lord Eldon, 2 Mer. 2. " Great care 
 is necessary," says Mr. Justice Clifford, "in 
 Equity suits, in following closely the rules of 
 the Court and the settled course of practice; 
 otherwise the bar would become confused, and 
 the Court rind itself involved in difficulties far 
 greater than need be if the regular course of 
 practice is pursued." Union Sugar Ref. v. 
 Mathiesson, 3 Cliff. 146. 
 
 2 By the original Judiciary Act, and now 
 by the U. S. Rev. Stats. § 913, the forms and 
 modes of proceeding in suits of Equity in 
 the U. S. Courts shall be according to the 
 principles, rules, and usages which belong to 
 Courts of Equity. And the settled doctrine of 
 the U. S. Supreme Court is, that the remedies 
 in Equity are to be administered according to 
 the practice of Courts of Equity in England, the 
 parent country from which we derive our 
 knowledge of them. Robinson v. Campbell, 3 
 Wheat. 222; Boyle ». Zacharie, 6 Pet. 658; 
 Clark v. Reyburn, 8 Wall. 323 ; Smith v. 
 Burnham, 2 Sumner, 612, 625. And by Rule 
 90 of the Rules of Practice, prescribed in 
 
 VOL. I. — 1 
 
 1842 by the U. S. Supreme Court for the 
 Courts of Equity of the United States, it is 
 provided that where those rules or the rules 
 of the Court itself do not apply, the practice of 
 the Circuit Court shall be regulated by the pres- 
 ent practice of the High Court of Chancery in 
 England, "so far as the same may reasonably 
 be applied consistently with the local circum- 
 stances and local convenience of the district 
 where the Court is held, not as positive rules, 
 but as furnishing just analogies to regulate the 
 practice." 
 
 In the States of the Union, the old rules of 
 English Chancery practice are recognized as 
 the basis of their Chancery practice. West o. 
 Paige, 1 Stockt. 203, Morris v. Taylor, 23 N.J. 
 Eq. 131, 134; Newark and N Y. R. Co r. Mayor 
 of Newark, id. 515, 517; Bur rail v. Karnes, 
 5 Wis. 260. "Not," as said by Wilde J. in 
 Saunders t>. Frost, 5 Pick. 272, " indiscrimi- 
 nately, but only as they appear reasonable and 
 comformable to the spirit of nur system of juris- 
 prudence and general rules of practice." Rules 
 of Court are designed for the general guidance 
 of suitors; but the Chancellor may make an 
 order in a particular case altering or departing
 
 *3 
 
 THE COMMENCEMENT OF A SUIT. 
 
 * 2 * A suit on the Equity side of the Court of Chancery, on behalf of 
 
 a subject, is ordinarily commenced by preferring a petition, con- 
 taining a statement of the plaintiff's case, and praying the relief which 
 he considers himself entitled to receive. 1 (a) This petition, when pre- 
 ferred by a subject, is called in the old books an English Bill, by way of 
 distinction from the proceedings in suits within the ordinary or common- 
 law jurisdiction of the Court, 2 which, till the statute of 4 Geo. II. c. 26, 
 were entered and enrolled, more anciently in the French or Norman 
 tongue, and afterwards in Latin ; whereas bills in Chancery were, from 
 very early times, preferred in the English language. 3 The bill is ad- 
 dressed to the Lord Chancellor, Lord Keeper, or Lords Commissioners, 
 for the custody of the Great Seal ; 4 unless the seals are in the Queen's 
 hands, or the holder thereof himself is a party, 5 in which case the bill is 
 addressed to the Queen herself, in her Court of Chancery. 6 
 
 If the suit is instituted on behalf of the Crown, or of those who 
 partake of its prerogative, or whose rights are under its particular pro- 
 tection, such as the objects of a public charity, the matter of complaint 
 is offered to the Court, not by way of petition, but of information 7 by 
 the proper officer, of the rights which the Crown claims on behalf of 
 itself or others, and of the invasion or detention of those rights 
 
 * 3 for which the suit is instituted. 8 This proceeding * is then 
 
 styled an information. 1 The rules of practice incidental to these 
 
 from a rule of Court. Greene v. Han-is, 11 
 R. I. 5, citing Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 
 14 Pet. 210, 257; Rowlev v. Scales, 1 S. & S. 
 511; In re Lyons, 1 Dr. & W. 327, 333; Dicas 
 v. Lord Brougham, 6 C. & P. 249; Burrell ». 
 Nicholson, 6 Sim. 212. See also Marsh v. 
 Crawford, 1 Swan, 116, and compare Maultsby 
 v. Carty, 11 Hum. 361. 
 
 1 As to the value of the subject-matter, see 
 Cons. Ord. IX. 1. (b) 
 
 2 As to the procedure on the common-law 
 side of the Court, see 12 & 13 Vic. c. 109; 
 Orders of 29 Dec., 1848, and 3 Aug., 1849, 
 Chitty's Arch., 1741 ; and post, Chap. XXXIX. 
 § 7, Receivers. 
 
 3 See Ld. Red. 8: 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 368; 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 7. There are some bills in 
 early times in the French language. See Cal. 
 Proc. Chan., printed by Public Rec. Com., 
 1827, cited Ld. Red. 8, "n. (o). 
 
 4 Ld. Red. 78. As to Lords Commissioners, 
 see Hardy's Life of Ld. Langdale, vol 2, p. 
 258, et seq. In the United States, suits are 
 commenced by bill or petition addressed to 
 tire Chancellor, Judge, or Judges presiding in 
 
 the particular Court, either by name or official 
 designation. Infra, 357, n. 1; Story, Eq. PL 
 § 26; Barb. Ch. Pr. 35. 
 
 5 See Lord Keeper v. Wyld, 1 Vera. 139; 
 Coop. Eq. PI. 23. 
 
 6 Ld. Red. 7. In Massachusetts, where 
 cases in Equity may be commenced by bill 
 or petition, with a writ of subpoena, according 
 to the usual course of proceedings in Equity, 
 or inserted in an original writ of summons, 
 or of summons and attachment, &c.,'see Pub. 
 Stats, c. 151 , §§ 6, 7. " Had the statute omitted 
 to prescribe any form of process, or to give any 
 authority to the Court to make one, the bill as 
 used in England in Chancery proceedings, and 
 the proceedings under it, as there practised, 
 would necessarily have been adopted here." 
 Per Parker C. J. in Commonwealth v. Sumner, 
 5 Pick. 365, 366. An action of contract, praying 
 for relief in Equity, is to be treated as a suit 
 in Equity. Topliff v. Jackson, 12 Gray, 565; 
 Irvin r. Gregory, 13 Gray, 215. 
 
 7 Ld. Red. 7. 
 
 8 Ld. Red. 22; Story, Eq. PL § 8. 
 
 i The title " information " is no longer 
 
 (a) The date on which the bill is filed is 
 the earliest that can be assigned as the 
 commencement of a suit in Equity. Clark v. 
 Slayton, 63 N. H. 402; Collins v. Ins. Co. 91 
 Tenn. 432. The notice by lis pendens begins 
 only when service is made on the defendant. 
 Duff v. McDonough (Penn.). 25 Atl. Rep. 608. 
 See Burleson v. McDermott (Ark.), 21 S. W. 
 2 
 
 Rep. 222; Zieverink r. Kemper (Ohio), 34 N. 
 E. Rep. 250. The time when judicial proceed- 
 ings were begun to avoid the bar of a statute 
 may be proved by parol evidence. Witters v. 
 Sowles, 32 Fed. Rep. 765. 
 
 (b) The Chancery Consolidated General 
 Orders of 1860 were repealed by the Rules of 
 the Supreme Court, 1883.
 
 THE COMMENCEMENT OP A SUIT. * 3 
 
 two methods of instituting a suit in Equity are substantially the 
 same. 
 
 Where, however, the relief sought to be obtained is the administration 
 of the estate of a deceased person, a summary and inexpensive practice 
 has been established by the Act to Amend the Practice of the Court 
 of Chancery, 2 which provides that, in cases of this description, without 
 either formal pleading, or any direct application to the Court itself, 
 a summons may at once be obtained at the chambers of the Master of 
 the Rolls, or of a Vice-Chancellor, and an order be made on the hearing 
 thereof to administer the estate. Where, also, it is sought to obtain 
 the appointment of a guardian for an infant, or an allowance out of 
 his property for his maintenance, the application may be made by 
 summons. 3 
 
 Again, under Lord Justice Turner's Act, 4 a very convenient form of 
 application to the Court was provided for cases where the parties, agree- 
 ing upon the facts that form the foundation of their claims, are desirous 
 of obtaining a judicial decision upon the construction of an instrument, 
 or tipon almost any point of law resulting from the admitted facts. In 
 cases of this description, the parties are enabled, without going through 
 any forms of pleadings, at once to submit the case that they have agreed 
 upon for the decision of the Court. 
 
 Many Acts of Parliament, under which statutory powers are con- 
 ferred upon the Court, point out the particular mode by which relief 
 thereunder is to be sought from the Court ; and it may be stated, as a 
 general rule, that a person seeking the aid of the statutory jurisdiction 
 must apply by a petition, which is not regarded as the commencement 
 of a formal suit. 5 
 
 used in England, the proceedings being by 
 waj' of action and commenced by writ of 
 summons. Att.-Gen. v. Shrewsbury Bridge 
 Co. W N. (1880) 23; 42 L. T. 79^ and see 
 K. S. C. Ord. I. 1. 
 
 2 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, §§ 45,47. This Act, 
 being either obsolete, superseded, or repro- 
 duced by the R. S. C. 1883, was repealed by 
 46 & 47 Vic. c. 49, § 4. Sched. 
 
 3 See post, Chap. XXIX. § 2, Proceedings 
 in the Judges' Chambers (Infants). 
 
 * 13 & 14 Vic. c. 35, §§ 1-18. 
 
 5 Infra, Chap. Xl.IV. General Equity juris- 
 diction in Massachusetts was conferred upon 
 the Supreme Judicial and Superior Courts 
 by Pub. Stats, c. 151 ; Stat, of 1883, c. 223, and 
 1891, c. 383. In New York, the jurisdiction 
 of Equity, part of which was to exercise its 
 powers at all times, devolved upon the Su- 
 preme Court. A justice of that Court might 
 hear a petition in Chambers in those matters 
 where the usage of the Chancellor was so to 
 do Wilcox v. Wilcox, 14 N. Y. 575. 
 
 In regard to the jurisdiction of the Court 
 of Chancery in Vermont, see Cheever v. R. & 
 B. R. R. Co. 39 Vt. 654. In Maine, see 
 
 Androscoggin & Kennebec R R. Co. v. An- 
 droscoggin 1!. It. Co. 49 Maine, 392. 
 
 By the " Supreme Court of" Judicature Act " 
 of 1873 it was provided in England that all 
 suirs previously commenced by bill or informa- 
 tion in the High Court of Chancery shall he 
 instituted in the tligh Court of Justice estab- 
 lished by that Act, by a proceeding to be 
 called an action: that "suit" shall include 
 "action," and "action" shall mean a civil 
 proeeedingcommeneed by writ, or in such other 
 manner as may be prescribed by rules of Court, 
 and shall not include a criminal proceeding by 
 the Crown ; that "cause" shall include any 
 action, suit, or other original piuceeding be- 
 tween a plaintiff and a defendant, and any 
 criminal proceeding by the Crown; and "mat- 
 ter" shall include every proceeding in the 
 Court not in a cause. L. R. 8 Stat. 349,350. 
 This Act also provides, in effect, for the ad- 
 ministration of equitable relief to either plain- 
 tiff or defendant in all cases in which such 
 relief would have been given by a Court of 
 Equity. Ibid. 317. See 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. 
 (6th Eng. ed.) Introd.
 
 *5 * CHAPTER II. 
 
 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 Section I. — The Queen's Attorney-General. 
 
 It is a general rule, subject to very few exceptions, that there is no 
 sort or condition of persons who may not sue in the Court of Chan- 
 cery, and this rule extends from the highest person in the State to the 
 most distressed pauper. 1 
 
 The Sovereign herself has the same right which a subject has to insti- 
 tute proceedings in her own Courts for the assertion of any right claimed 
 either on behalf of herself or others ; and the same principles which entitle 
 a subject to the assistance of the Courts, to enable him to assort his rights, 
 are equally applicable to the Sovereign. Thus a suit has been instituted 
 on behalf of the Queen to have the benefit of a discovery from persons 
 charged to be aliens, of the place of their birth, in order to assist her in 
 a commission to inquire into their lands, with the view of seizing them 
 into her hands by inquisition. 2 For the same reason, where an office 
 cannot be found for the Crown without the aid of a Court of Equity, the 
 Court will, at the suit of the Crown, interfere to restrain the commission 
 of waste in the mean time. 8 
 
 It has been said that the Queen is not bound to assert her rights in any 
 particular Court, but that she may sue in any of her Courts which she 
 pleases, without reference to the question whether the subject-matter 
 of her suit is such as comes within the peculiar jurisdiction of such 
 Court. 4 Thus she may have a quare impedit in the Queen's Bench, 5 or 
 she may elect to sue either in a Court of Common Law or in a Court of 
 Equity. 6 Upon an accurate examination, however, of the cases that have 
 given rise to these general assertions of the rights of the Crown, it ap- 
 pears that equitable grounds were alleged in each case for instituting the 
 
 l As to a person under disability suing in 2 Du Plessis v. Att.-Gen., 1 Bro. P. C. ed. 
 
 a foreign country, see Worms v. De Valdor, Toml. 415, 419. 
 
 W. N. (1880) 16; 28 W. R. 346, Fry J. As 3 Att.-Gen. v. Du Plessis, 2 Ves. 286. As 
 
 to disabilities arising from (1) outlawry in a to office found, see now 22 & 23 Vic. c. 21, § 25. 
 
 civ 1 action abolished by the Civil Procedure 4 n R ep . 68b; ib. 75 a; Plowden, 236, 240, 
 
 Acts, Repeal Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vic. c. 59, 244. 
 
 § 3), and 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (5th ed.) pp. 52- « 11 Rep- 68 b 
 
 54; (2) excommunication was abolished by 6 The King r. Arundel, Hob 109 ; Att.-Gen. 
 
 53 Geo III. c. 127, § 3, and popish recusancy v. Vernon, 1 Vern. 2(7, 370; 2 Ch. K. 353; 
 
 was virtually abolished bv 31 Geo. III. c. 32; 1 Eq. Cas. Ab. 75, pi. 1; 133, pi 16; and see 
 
 (3) as to duress and civil" status of a nun, see the cases cited 8 Beav. 283, and the Judg. 
 
 Re Metcalfe, 2 De G. J. & S. 122; 10 Jur. ment, p. 287. 
 N S 224, 287; Evans v. Cassidy, 11 Ir. Eq. 
 243; Blake v. Blake, 4 lr. Ch. 349. 
 4
 
 THE QUEEN'S ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
 
 *6 
 
 proceedings in Chancery. It seems, nevertheless, to be true, that 
 the Queen may proceed, in questions relating to * the property *6 
 to which she is entitled in right of her Crown, either in a Court 
 of Law or in a Court of Equity ; and that where she has caused a Court 
 of Equity to be informed that an intrusion has been committed on her 
 land, although no matter of equitable jurisdiction has been stated, yet 
 the information has been entertained : but in such cases, if any ques- 
 tion of law arises, the Court will put it in the course of trial by a Court 
 of Law, and retain the information till the result of such trial is known. 1 (a) 
 In general, however, suits on behalf of the Crown are instituted in the 
 Court which, by its constitution, is most properly adapted to the case, 
 and the Court of Exchequer being the general Court for all business 
 relating to the Queen's revenue or property, the practice has been to insti- 
 tute there all proceedings relating to the property of the Crown. 
 
 i Att.-Gen. to the Prince of Wales v. Sir J. 
 St. Aubyn, Wightw. 167, and the cases there 
 cited; see also Att.-Gen. r. Mayor of'Plymouth, 
 id. 134. By the 5 Vic. c. 5, § 1, it is enacted, 
 that on Oct. 15, 1841, all the power, authority, 
 and jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer at 
 Westminster as a Court of Equity, should be 
 transferred and given to the High Court of 
 Chancery. Upon tills statute Lord Langdaie, 
 M. R., in Att.-Gen. v. London, 8 Beav. 285, 
 said he thought " the almost unavoidable con- 
 struction of the Act made it so operate as to 
 leave to the Court of Exchequer everything that 
 was not exercised or exercisible by that Court 
 as a Court of Equity, and to transfer to the 
 Court of Chancery all that was exercised or 
 exercisible by the Court of Exchequer as a 
 Court of Equity." Hence, in all matters af- 
 fecting the rights, property, and revenue of 
 the Crown, the Court of Exchequer, sitting on 
 the Equity side, had, before the Act, a juris- 
 diction, notwithstanding the Crown might, in 
 the particular cases, have had a legal remedy, 
 and that this jurisdiction has by the Act been 
 transferred to the Court of Chancery; and 
 that, by virtue of that transfer, the Crown is 
 now enabled, in matters of revenue depend- 
 ent upon legal rights, to sue in the Court of 
 Chancery, even though there would be no 
 jurisdiction in similar cases between subject 
 and subject. This decision was affirmed by 
 the House of Lords; but their lordships care- 
 
 (a) It is for the officers of the Crown to 
 make out clearly the prerogative in an}- case 
 where they claim to be on a different footing 
 from the subject, as regards procedure in any 
 litigation; and in an information in the nature 
 of a transitory action, the Attorney-General 
 may lay and retain the venue where he pleases. 
 Att.-Gen. v. Churchill, 8 M. & W. 171; Att.- 
 Gen. to the Prince of Wales v. Grossman, L. R. 
 1 Ex. 381, 386; Dixon v. Farrer, 56 L. J. Q. B. 
 63, affirming 55 id. 497; 17 Q. B. D. 658. 
 
 fully avoided determining this question, as to 
 which they expressed great doubt. 1 H. L. 
 Cas. 440 In whatever way this question may 
 be ultimately decided, it has been held by the 
 Court of Exchequer that it still retains an 
 equitable jurisdiction in matters of revenue. 
 Att.-Gen. v. Hailing, 15 M. & W. 687, 700 ; Att.- 
 Gen. v. Hallett, id. 97; 8 Beav. 288, n. But 
 see Att.-Gen. v. Kingston, 6 Jur. 155, Ex; Att.- 
 Gen. v. Barker, L. R. 7 Ex. 177. The procedure 
 in suits by information in the Court of Ex- 
 chequer relating to the revenues of the Crown 
 was regulated 03* " The Crown Suits Act, 
 1865 " (28 & 29 Vic. c. 104), and Reg. Gen. 
 Exch. 14th March, 1866; L. R. I Ex. 389; 
 12 Jur. N. S. Pt. II. 182. The power of that 
 Court over revenues is now possessed by the 
 Queen's Bench Division, Sup. Ct. of .Fud. 
 Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vic. c. 66), as modified 
 by order in Council of Jan. 6, 1881. See Att.- 
 Gen. v. Metropolitan District Ry. Co. 5 Ex. 
 D. 218, C. A.; Att.-Gen. r. Constable, 4 Ex. 
 D. 172; Att.-Gen. v. Barker, L. R. 7 Ex. 177; 
 Att.-Gen. v. Shrewsbury Bridge Co. W. N. 
 (1880) 23, M. R. Where "the Court of Chancery 
 would have jurisdiction, as between subject 
 and subject, it seems clear that the Crown, 
 may file an information in that Court for an 
 account. Att.-Gen. v. Edmunds, L. R. 6 Eq. 
 381,392, V. C G. : and see Att.-Gen. v. Lon- 
 don, 1 H. L. Cas. 440; see also the case of 
 York Buildings Co. 2 Atk. 56. 
 
 As to criminal and quo warranto infor- 
 mations, see Shortt on Informations; 10 Am. 
 & Eng. Encl. of Law, 702. An informa- 
 tion in the nature of a quo warranto, though 
 a criminal proceeding in form, is a civil 
 remedy. State v. Hardie, 1 Ired . (N. C.) 42; 
 Saunders t\ Gatling, 81 N. C. 298; Ames v. 
 Kansas, 111 U. S. 449; Foster v. State, 112 
 U.S. 201; Illinois v. Illinois Central R. Co 
 33 Fed. Rep. 721.
 
 * 8 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 *7 * In all cases where the rights of the Queen, or of those 
 
 who partake of her prerogative, are the subject of the suit, the 
 name of the Sovereign is not made use of as the party complaining; but 
 the matter of complaint is offered to the Court by way of information 
 given by the proper officer. That officer, if the information is exhibited 
 in any of the Superior Courts at Westminster, is the Attorney-General, 
 or if the office of Attorney-General should happen to be vacant, the 
 Solicitor-General. 1 
 
 Besides the cases in which the immediate rights of the Crown are 
 concerned, the Queen's officers may, in some cases, institute proceed- 
 ings on behalf of those who claim under the Crown, by grant or other- 
 wise ; or, more correctly speaking, those who claim under the Crown may 
 make use of the Queen's name, or of that of her proper officer, for 
 the purpose of asserting their right against a third party, 2 or they may 
 sue in their own names, but in such case they must make the 
 *8 Attorney-General * a party to the suit. 1 (a) 
 
 i Ld. Red. 7, 21, 22: Wilkes's case, 4 
 Burr. 2527; Story, Eq. PI. § 49. The Sover- 
 eign also has officers of the same description 
 in the county palatine of Lancaster and in 
 the Duchy of Lancaster. But the Attorney- 
 General in a county palatine, or other like 
 jurisdiction, is not recognized as such in 
 Westminster- Hall : arguendo, Att.-Gen. to 
 the Prince of Wales v. St. Aubyn, Wightw. 
 178; see Same v. Lambe, 11 Beav. 213; Same 
 r. Grossman, L. R 1 Ex. 381; 12 Jur. N. S. 
 712; Att.-Gen. v. Devonshire, 14 Q. B. I). 
 195; Dyke v. Stephens (No. 2), W. N. (1885) 
 177 ; and 11 Geo. IV.; 1 Will. IV. c. 70; and 6 
 & 7 Will. IV. cc. 19, 87, as to the jurisdictions of 
 the Bishops of Durham and Ely, and as to Wales 
 and Chester. Rights purely public are to be 
 enforced in the name of the State, or the officer 
 intrusted with the conduct of public suits. 
 Smith v. Comm. of Butler County, 6 Ohio, 101. 
 While the office of Attornev-General was abol- 
 
 (a) A certified copy of an order from the 
 U. S. Attorney-General to a District Attorney, 
 directing a suit in Equity to be proceeded 
 with, proves that the bill was filed by the for- 
 mer's authority. Mullan v. United States, 118 
 U. S. 271 ; 10 Fed. Rep. 785. A bill in equity 
 lies to annul a patent for land which recites that 
 it is brought by the United States by a certain 
 U. S. District Attorney, and is signed with the 
 name of the Attorney-General by such District 
 Attorney. Ibid. When the United States is 
 bound to issue a patent to the true owner of 
 land, its Attorney-General may sue in equity 
 in its name, to annul a patent for the land, issued 
 through the patentee's fraud. United States v. 
 Beebe, 127 U. S. 338; Colorado Coal &,Iton 
 Co. v. United States, 123 U. S. 307; United 
 States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61; United 
 States v. Marshall Silver M. Co. 129 U. S. 
 
 ished in Massachusetts, most of the duties of 
 that officer, which were not required to be per- 
 formed by him personally, having been dis- 
 tributed among and vested in the District 
 Attorneys, as the local prosecuting officers, 
 Shaw C. J. said he was " strongly inclined to 
 the opinion that the filing of an information 
 in Equity was not a duty which the Attorney- 
 General was required to do personally; that 
 duty would have vested in a Solicitor-General, 
 if there had been one; it was necessarily inci- 
 dent to the office of Attorney-General, and was 
 vested in the District Attorneys in their respec- 
 tive districts." Parker v. May, 5 Cush. 340. 
 
 2 Dwyer, 1 PI. 7, 8; Keilw. 169; 5 Bac. 
 Ab. tit. Prerog. F. 3; Miles v. Wi'liams, 1 P. 
 Wins. 249, 252; Earl of Stafford v. Buckley, 
 2 Ves. Sr. 170, 181. 
 
 i Balch v. Wastall, 1 P. Wins. 445; Hay- 
 ward v. Fry, id. 446 ; see also Rex v. Fowler, 
 Bunb. 38. 
 
 579; United States v. Hancock, 133 U. S. 193; 
 United States r. Trinidad Coal & C. Co 137 
 U. S. 160; United States v. Tichenor, 12 Fed. 
 Rep. 415; United States v. McGraw, id. 449 ; 
 United States v. White, 17 id. 561; United 
 States r. Rose, 24 id. 196. The same rule 
 applies to a patent obtained by mistake which 
 prejudices the rights of the government or the 
 public. United Mates v. San Jacinto Tin Co. 
 125 U. S. 273; Western Pacific R. Co. v. United 
 Siates, 108 U. S. 510; Williams v. United 
 States, 138 U. S. 541; 30 Fed. Rep. 3u9. Such 
 fraud or mistake must be specifically averred 
 and clearly proved. United States v. Maxwell 
 Land Grant Co. 122 U. S. 365; United States 
 r. Iron Silver M. Co. 128 U. S. 673. In such 
 cases the government is not precluded by fraud 
 of its officers in issuing the patent. Moffat v. 
 United States, 112 U. S. 24. If not the real 

 
 THE QUEEN'S ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
 
 9 
 
 Informations may also be exhibited by the Attorney-General or 
 other proper officer, in support of the rights of those whose protection 
 devolves upon the Crown as supreme head of the Church. Thus the 
 Queen, as supreme head of the Church, is the proper guardian of the 
 temporalities of the bishoprics; and an information may, therefore, be 
 brought by the Attorney-General to stay waste committed by a bishop. 2 
 
 In like manner, the Attorney-General may exhibit informations on 
 behalf of those who are considered to be under the peculiar protection 
 of the crown as parens patrice : such as the objects of general charities, 3 
 idiots and lunatics. 4 Moreover, this privilege of the Attorney-General 
 is not confined to suits on behalf of charities, strictly so-called, but has 
 been held, in many instances, to extend to cases where funds have been 
 made applicable to legal and general purposes. 5 The rule in such cases 
 appears to be, " that where property affected by a trust for public pur- 
 poses is in the hands of those who hold it devoted to that trust, it is 
 the privilege of the public that the Crown should be entitled to intervene 
 by its officer, for the purpose of asserting, on behalf of the public gen- 
 erally, that public interest and that public right which probably no 
 individual could be found willing effectually to assert, even if the interest 
 were such as to allow it." 6 
 
 * Suits on behalf of idiots and lunatics are usually instituted *9 
 by the committees of their estates ; but where there has been no 
 committee, or where the interest of the committee is likely to clash with 
 that of the persons whose estates were under his care, informations have 
 
 2 See Knight v. Mosely, Amb. 176 ; Wither 
 v. D. & C. of Winchester, 3 Mer. 421,427; 
 Jefferson v. Bishop of Durham, 1 Bos. & Pull. 
 129, 131. 
 
 3 See Att.-Gen. v. Clergy Society, 8 Rich. 
 Eq. (S. C.) 190; Wright v. Trustees of Meth. 
 Epis. Church, 1 Hoff. Ch. R. 202; 2 Kent, 285- 
 288, 4 id. 507. 
 
 4 See Norcom v. Rogers, 16 N. J. Eq. 
 484. 
 
 5 Att.-Gen. v. Brown, 1 Swanst. 265; Att.- 
 Gen. c. Shrewsbury, 6 Beav. 220, 227 ; Evan 
 v. Avon, 29 Beav. 144; 33 Beav. 67; 6 Jur. 
 N. S. 1361; Att.-Gen. v. Lichfield, 11 Beav. 
 120; Att.-Gen. v. Norwich, 16 Sim. 225,229; 
 Att.-Gen. v. Guardians of Southampton, 17 
 Sim. 7, 13; Att.-Gen. v. Eastlake, 11 Hare, 
 205; 17 Jur. 801; Att.-Gen. v. Wigan, Kay, 
 
 party in interest, it is affected by laches on the 
 part of those whose interests it supports. United 
 States v. Beebe, supra ; Same t. Wentz, 34 
 Fed. Rep. 154. The bill need not offer to re- 
 pay the purchase money. Moffat v. United 
 States, supra ; United States r. Minor, 114 
 U. S. 233. 
 
 The United States may also maintain a bill 
 in equity to cancel a patent for an invention 
 obtained by fraud. United States v. American 
 Bell Tel. Co. 128 U. S. 315; 32 Fed. Rep. 591; 
 
 268; 5 De G. M. & G. 52; 18 Jur. 299; Att.- 
 Gen. v. West Hartlepool Imp. Commissioners, 
 L. R. 10 Eq. 152. 
 
 6 Per Sir J. L. Knight Bruce V. C. in Att.- 
 Gen. v. Compton, 1 Y. & C C. 417, 427. In 
 Massachusetts under Pub. Stats, c. 17, § 6. the 
 Attorney-General is required to enforce the 
 due application of funds given or appropriated 
 to public charities within the State, and prevent 
 breaches of trust in the administration thereof. 
 The power of the Attorney-General or public 
 prosecutor to institute a proceeding for the 
 enforcement of a public charity, is a common- 
 law power, incident to the office. Parker v. 
 May, 5 Cush. 336, 338, per Shaw C. J. See 
 Wright v. The Trustees of the Meth. Epis. 
 Church, 1 Hoff. Ch. 11. 202; and Code of Ten- 
 nessee, § 3409, tt seq. 
 
 United States v. Gunning, 18 id. 511; New 
 York & B. C P. Co. r. New York C. P. Co. 
 9 id. 587. Such a bill is not maintainable on 
 grounds that have already been sustained in a 
 suit for infringement of the patent. United 
 States v. Colgate, 32 Fed. Rep. 624. The 
 Attorney-General cannot, in his own name, 
 "as he is the Attorney-General of the United 
 States," maintain a bill to repeal a patent for 
 an invention. Att.-Gen. v. Rumford Chemical 
 Works, 32 Fed. Rep. 608. 
 
 7
 
 * 10 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 been exhibited on their behalf by the Attorney-General, as the officer 
 of the Crown ; ! and in such a suit, if no committee has been appointed, 
 the Court will proceed to give directions for the care of the property of 
 the lunatic, and for proper proceedings to obtain the appointment of a 
 committee. 2 Persons incapable of acting for themselves, whether com- 
 ing under the description of idiots or lunatics or not, may sue by their 
 next friend, without the intervention of the Attorney-General. 3 
 
 It seems that when an information is filed on behalf of a lunatic, he 
 must be named as a party to the suit, and that merely naming him as a 
 relator will not be sufficient ; 4 a distinction, however, appears to be taken 
 between cases where the object of the suit is to avoid some transaction 
 of the lunatic, on the ground of his incapacity, and those in which it is 
 merely to affirm a contract entered into by him for his benefit, or to 
 assert some claim on his behalf. 5 In the former case it was held, that 
 the lunatic ought not to be named as plaintiff, because no man can be 
 heard to stultify himself; if he is named, however, it is no ground for 
 demurrer. 6 The reason for making a lunatic a party in proceedings of 
 this nature appears to be, that as no person can be bouud by a decree in 
 a suit to which he, or those under whom he derives title, are not parties, 
 and as a lunatic may recover his understanding, the decree will not have 
 the effect of binding him unless he is a party ; and upon the same prin- 
 ciple it is held, that where a suit is instituted on behalf of the lunatic 
 by his committee, the committee must be named as a co-plaintiff, in 
 
 order that the interest of the committee in the lunatic's estate 
 *10 may be barred. 7 The * same reason does not apply to cases of 
 
 idiots, because in contemplation of law they never can acquire 
 their senses ; they are, therefore, not considered necessary parties to the 
 proceedings on their behalf. 1 
 
 1 SeeAtt.-Gen. v. Parkhurst, 1 Ch. Cas. 1 Att.-Gen. v. Woolrich, 1 Ch. Cas. 153; 
 112; Att.-Gen.tr. Woolrich, id. 153; Att.-Gen. and see post. Chap. III. § 7, Idiots and Luna- 
 v. Tyler, 1 Dick. 378: 2 Eden, 230; Norcom v. tics (Plaintiffs). The powers conferred upon 
 Rogers, 16 N. J. Eq. 484. the Attorney-General and Commissioners by 
 
 2 Att.-Gen. v. Howe, Ld. Red. 30, n (m). 59 Geo. III. c. 91, continued by 2 & 3 Will. IV. 
 
 3 Liney v. Wetherley, Ld. Red. 30, n. (n); c. 57, § 11, to institute proceedings concerning 
 Light v. Light, 25 Beav. 248; West v. Davis, charities, were practically superseded by ''The 
 Rolls, 1863, W. No. 83: and see post, Chap. Charitable Trusts Acts. 1853 to 1869," 16 & 17 
 III. § 7, Idiots and Lunatics (Plaintiffs). Vie. c. 137; 18 & 19 Vic. c. 124; 23 & 24 Vic. 
 Infra, 86, n. 1. c. 136: 25 & 26 Vic. c. 112; 32 & 33 Vic. c. 
 
 * Att.-Gen. v. Tyler, 1 Dick. 378; 2 Eden, 110. See post, Chap. XXXVIII. As tothemar- 
 230; Ridler v. Ridler, Eq. Cas. Ab. 279. See riage laws of England and proceedings there- 
 Story Eq. PI. § 64; Gorham v. Gorham, 3 Barb, under, see 4 Geo. IV. c. 76; 6 & 7 Will. IV.c.85; 
 Ch. R. 24. 1 Vic. c. 22; 3 & 4 Vic. c. 72 ; 19 & 20 Vic. c. 
 
 6 Att.-Gen. v. Parkhurst, 1 Ch. Cas. 112; 119; 12 & 13 Vic. c. 68, § 15; 24 & 25 Vic. c. 
 
 Att.-Gen. v. Woolrich, id. 153. 100, § 53; 36 & 37 Vic. c. 66, § 34 (2); R. S. C. 
 
 6 Ridler v. Ridler, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 279, pi. 5; Ord. 1. 1 ; Att.-Gen. v. Willshire, W. N. (1875) 
 
 and see Tothill, 130. See infra 83. 182; Same v. Severne, 1 Col. 313 ; 8 Jur. 595; 
 
 1 Norcom v. Rogers, 16 N. J. Eq. 484. 9 .Tur. 574; Same v. Lucas, 2 Hare, 566; 2 
 
 Under the 16 & 17 Vic. c. 70, the custody of Phil. 753; Same v. Teather, 29 W. R. 347; 
 
 the estate is usually committed to the commit- Same v. Wareing, 28 W. R. 623 ; Same v. 
 
 tee by an order of the Lord Chancellor or Akers, W. N. (1872) 45; 2 Seton. 768; Same 
 
 Lords Justices, which, however, by § 63, has v. Clements, L. R. 12 Eq. 32; Same v. Read, 
 
 the same force and validity as a grant under id 38; Same v. Mullay, 4 Russ. 329; 7 Beav. 
 
 the Great Seal. For form of order, see Elmer's 351. 
 Prac. 126. 
 
 8
 
 THE QUEEN'S ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
 
 *10 
 
 In all cases of suits which immediately concern the rights of the 
 Crown, its officers proceed upon their own authority, without the inter- 
 vention of any other person;' 2 (a) but where the suit does not iinniedi- 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 22, Att.-Gen. v. Vernon, 1 Vern. 
 277, 370; Att.-Gen. v. Crofts, 1 Bro. P. C. ed. 
 Toml. 136. 
 
 The Attorney-General cannot bring a bill or 
 information to redress a private wrong, as, for 
 example, to restrain a city council from mak- 
 ing a water-rate merely nominal, under a 
 statute which required the revenues to be 
 
 (a) As to informations against purprestures, 
 or intrusions and encroachments upon the 
 Sovereign's rights in tide lands, and public 
 nuisances, see Att.-Gen. v. Richards, 2 Anst. 
 603; Same v. Burridge, 10 Price, 350; Same v. 
 Parmenter, id. 378, 412; Same v. Terry, L. R. 
 9 Ch. 423; Same v. London, 18 L J. Ch. 314; 
 Same v. Chambers. 4 De Gex & J. 55; Same v. 
 Johnson, 2 Wils. Ch. 87 ; Same v. Cbamberlaine, 
 4 K. & J. 292; Glossop ?;. Heston Local Board, 
 12 Ch. D. 102; A.-G. v. Tomline, id. 214; Same 
 v. Shrewsbury Bridge Co. 21 Ch. D. 752; Same 
 v. Williamson, 60 L. T. 930; Pennsylvania v. 
 Wheeling Bridge Co. 18 How. 518; 13 id. 518; 
 United States v. Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. 26 Fed. 
 Rep 113 ; Story, Eq. Jur. § 921. As to penalties, 
 see Att.-Gen. v. Bradlaugh, 14 Q. B. D. 667. 
 
 In the earlier periods of the English law 
 the Sovereign doubtless sued as did the subject, 
 by the same writ, "by his attorney," and with 
 the same process and incidents; and even at 
 the present day, the right of the Crown in 
 England is not limited to informations, but 
 extends to the bringing of an action in the ordi- 
 nary sense. See Bradlaugh v. Clarke, 8 App. 
 Cas". 354, 375; Dixon v. Fairer, 17 Q. B. D. 
 658. The Exchequer Division in England now 
 has all the powers formerly possessed by the 
 Court of Exchequer respecting the revenue, un- 
 affected by the Judicature Acts. Att.-Gen. v. 
 Constable^ 4 Ex. D. 172. 
 
 The Attorney-General may maintain an in- 
 formation in Equity to restrain a corporation, 
 exercising the right of eminent domain under 
 legislative authority, from so abusing or per- 
 verting its powers as to create a public nui- 
 sance or endanger public interests. Agar v. 
 Regent's Canal Co. Cooper temp. Eldon, 77; 
 Att.-Gen. v. Great Northern Ry. 1 Dr. & Sm. 
 154; Att.-Gen. v. Mid-Kent Ry. L R. 3 Ch. 
 100; Att.-Gen. v. Leeds Corp. L. R. 5 Ch. 583; 
 Att.-Gen. v. Great Eastern Ry. Co. 11 Ch. D. 
 449; 5 App. Cas. 473; Att.-Gen. v. Great 
 Northern Ry. 4 De G. & Sm. 75; Att.-Gen. 
 v. Leeds, 18 W. R. 517; Nuneaton Local Board 
 v. General Sewage Co. L. R. 20 Eq. 127; 
 Att.-Gen. v. Shrewsbury Bridge Co. 21 Ch. D. 
 752; Coosaw Mining Co. v. South Carolina, 
 144 U. S. 550; People v. Ballard (N. Y.), 32 
 
 appropriated to keep down the interest on the 
 debt created for the erection of the waterworks, 
 and to the creation of a sinking-fund to meet 
 the principal. Att.-Gen. v. Salem, 103 Mass. 
 140. Or, to restrain a private trading corpora- 
 tion from doing acts not authorized by its 
 charter. Att.-Gen. v. Tudor Ice Co. 104 Mass. 
 239. 
 
 N. E. Rep. 54; Att.-Gen. v. Cohoes, 6 Paige, 
 133; Att.-Gen. v. Cambridge, 16 Gray, 247; 
 Att.-Gen. v. Tudor Ice Co. 104 Mass. 239, 
 Att.-Gen. v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct, 133 Mass. 
 361. 
 
 But this remedy does not preclude an 
 individual from maintaining a suit at law or 
 in Equity founded upon injury to his private 
 property. Attorney-General v. Logan (18SU), 
 2 Q. B*. 100: 65 L. T. 162; Hart v. Jamaica 
 Pond Aqueduct, 133 Mass. 488. The Attor- 
 ney-General, when suing, either ex 'j/iciu or at 
 the relation of a private individual, to restrain 
 a railway company or public body from trans- 
 gressing statutory powers, or to enforce the 
 terms of an express enactment, is not required 
 to prove that the public suffers injury from the 
 act complain' d of. Att.-Gen. v. Cockermoutb 
 Local Board, L. R. 18 Eq. 173. See Same v. 
 Oxford &c. Ry. Co. 2 VV. R. 330; Same v. 
 Great Eastern Ry. Co. 11 Ch. D. 449; 5 App. 
 Cas. 473. The information may be granted 
 with costs, when such illegal acts tend to 
 injure the public, although no evidence of 
 actual injury is given. Att.-Gen. v. Shrews- 
 bury Bridge Co. 21 Ch. D. 752. As to his 
 proceeding to restrain the opening of railways 
 ordered to be postponed by the Board of Trade 
 in England, see 5 & 6 Vic. c. 55, § 6; 7 & 8 
 Vic. c. 85, §§ 17, 18; Att.-Gen. v. Great West- 
 ern &c. Ry. Co. 4Ch. D. 735; Same v. Same, 
 L. R. 7 Ch. 767, 770; Same v. Birmingham 
 &c. Ry Co. 4 De G. & S. 490 ; Same v. Great 
 Northern Ry. Co. 1 Dr. & Sm. 154, 162; 6 Jur. 
 1006. In England an action may by amend- 
 ment be changed to an information and action 
 without prejudice to a pending motion in the 
 action, the Attorney-General's sanction being 
 obtained. Caldwell v. Pagham H. R. Co. 2 
 Ch. D 221. 
 
 In Massachusetts informations in Equity in 
 the name of the Attorney-General are, apart 
 from statute, sustained in only two classes of 
 cases : — 
 
 1st. Those of public nuisances which affect 
 or endanger the public safety or convenience, 
 and require immediate judicial interposition, 
 like obstructions of highways, public landings, 
 and navigable waters. District Attorney v.
 
 10 
 
 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 ately concern the rights of the Crown, they generally depend upon the 
 relation of some person whose name is inserted in the information, and 
 
 Lynn & Boston R. Co. 16 Gray, 242; Att - 
 Gen v Cambridge, id. 247; Att. -Gen v. Boston 
 Wharf Co. 12 Gray, 553; Att.-Gen. v. Tudor 
 Ice Co. 104 Mass. 239; Att.-Gen. v Tarr, 148 
 Mass. 309. See Att.-Gen. v. Gardiner, 117 
 Mass. 329; Att.-Gen. v. Williams, 140 Mass. 
 329; People v. Beaudry (Cal.), 27 Pac. 610, 
 Att.-Gen v. Brown, 24 N. J. Eq. 89; Hunt v. 
 Chicago Horse Ry. Co. 121 III. 638; 20 III. 
 App. 282; United States, v. Pittsburgh &c. R. 
 Co. 26 Fed. Rep. 113. Such an information 
 lies against a quasi public corporation to re- 
 strain acts which are ultra vires and illegal, 
 impair public rights in waters reserved for 
 public uses, and injure the public health. Att.- 
 Gen. v Jamaica Pond Aqueduct, 133 Mass. 
 361. See Hart v. Same, id. 488; Att.-Gen. v. 
 Revere Copper Co. 152 Mass. 444; Att.-Gen. 
 v. Hane, 50 Mich. 447; State v. Paris Ry. Co. 
 55 Texas, 76. In cases of public nuisai ce, the 
 Attorney-General ma}' proceed at the relation 
 of any person, though such person does not reside 
 near it and is not interested in the property. 
 Att.-Gen. r. Basingstoke, 24 W. R. 817. A 
 local board may in England act as relators in a 
 suit brought by the Attorney-General. Att.- 
 Gen. v. Logan (1891), 2 Q. B.'lOO. 
 
 2d. Those of trusts for charitable purposes, 
 •where the beneficiaries are so numerous and 
 indefinite that the breach of trust cannot be 
 effectively redressed except by suit in behalf of 
 the public. County-Attorney v. May, 5 Cush. 
 336; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539; Att.- 
 Gen. B Garrison, 101 Mass. 223. In these cases 
 the Attorney-General alone, without a relator, 
 may represent those beneficially interested. 
 Burbank v. Burbank, 152 Mass. 254; State v. 
 Benningham (Wis.), 51 N. W. Rep. 724. 
 
 Informations have also been held maintainable 
 for other purposes: as to prevent the perversion 
 of public funds, People v. Tweed, 13 Abb. Pr. 
 N. S. 25, 152 (overruled in People v. Ingersoll, 
 58 N. Y. 1), see Att.-Gen. v. Detroit, 26 Mich. 
 263 ; or to prevent the discontinuance of a public 
 market, Att.-Gen. v. Detroit, 71 Mich. 92, see 
 Att.-Gen. v. Horner, 14 Q. B. D. 222. State v. 
 Dayton & S. E. R. Co. 36 Ohio St. 434; but 
 not apparently to remedy maladministrations 
 in office by trustees or executors. People v. 
 Simonson, 126 N. Y. 299. 
 
 An information in the nature of scire facias 
 lies by the government to annul letters-patent 
 for an invention obtained by fraud : Mowry v. 
 Whitney, 14 Wall. 434; Celluloid Manuf.Co. 
 v. Goodyear D. V. Co. 13 Blatch. 375; New 
 York &c. Pol. Co. v. New York C. P. Co. 9 
 Fed. Rep. 587; United States v. Gunning. 18 id. 
 511, or a patent for land so obtained, U. S v. 
 San Jacinto Tin Co. 125 U. S. 273; or in the 
 
 10 
 
 nature of a bill of discovery and account where 
 no bond for duties is given, or where such 
 bond is lost or destroyed. U. S. v. Lyman, 1 
 Mason, 182; Walsh v. U. S. 3 Wood. & M. 
 341. Informations in Equity do not lie to 
 impeach collaterally the title to office of the 
 board of police of a city appointed by the 
 Governor, the proper remedy being by an in- 
 formation in the nature of a quo warranto, 
 Prince v. Boston, 148 Mass. 285; or to restrain a 
 private trading corporation from doing acts not 
 authorized by its charter, or at the relation of 
 an individual to protect his private interests by 
 restraining a corporation from further use of its 
 powers and the usurpation of public franchises 
 not its own : Kenney v. Consumers' Gas Co. 
 142 Mass. 417, Boston Rubber Shoe Co. v. 
 Boston Rubber Co. 149 Mass. 436; Att.-Gen. v. 
 Salem, 103 Mass. 138; Att.-Gen, v. Tudor Ice 
 Co. 104 Mass. 239; Reed v. Cumberland & O. 
 Canal Co. 65 Maine, 132; People v. Ingersoll, 
 58 N. Y. 1; Com'th v. Arrison, 15 Serg. & 
 R. 127; Att.-Gen. v. Moliter, 26 Mich. 444; 
 Att -Gen. v. Great Eastern Ry. Co. 11 Ch. 
 D. 449; 5 App. Cas. 473; United States v. 
 Union Pac. R. Co. 98 U. S. 569; Att.-Gen. B. 
 Utica Ins. Co. 2 John. Ch. 471; 20 Cin'n. Law 
 Bull. 287, 302; or for the redress of private in- 
 juries. Ibid.; Att.-Gen. v. Evart Booming Co. 
 34 Mich. 462: United States v. San Jacinto Tin 
 Co. 125 U. S. 273, People v. Brooklyn &c Ry. 
 Co. 89 N. Y 75; State v. Farmers' L. & T. 
 Co. (Texas) 17 S. W 60; State v. Kennedy, 
 id. 67. An order will not be made upon an 
 information to do an impossible act; and, in 
 compelling the performance of public duties, if 
 existing conditions are to be changed, the Court 
 will consider the balance of convenience. Att.- 
 Gen. v. Dorking Guardians, 20 Ch. D. 595, 
 Att.-Gen. v. Gas Light and Coke Co. 7 Ch. D. 
 217; Same*. Acton Local Boa>d, 22 Ch. D. 221; 
 Charles v. Finch ley Local Board, 23 Ch. D. 
 767; Att.-Gen. v. Clerkenwell Vestry (1891), 3 
 Ch. 527; 05 L. T. 312, Hill v. Managers, 4 Q. 
 B. D. 433. As to the employment of addi- 
 tional counsel by the Attorney-General, see 
 Julian v. State, 122 Ind. 68; State v. Mayes, 28 
 Miss. 706; State v. Anderson, 29 La. ah 774; 
 People v. Met. Tel. Co. 64 How. Pr. 66; Att.- 
 Gen. v. Continental Life Ins. Co. 88 N. Y. 571 ; 
 People v. Met. Tel. Co. 11 Abb. N. Cas. 304; 
 People v. Mut. Union Tel. Co 2 Civ. Proc. Rep. 
 295 ; Commonwealth v. Boston ike. R. Co. 3 
 Cush. (Mass.) 25. As to his personal liability 
 for the costs of an unsuccessful suit against a 
 county, see State v. Marion County Com'rs, 85 
 Ind. 489. In a suit instituted by the trustees of 
 a charity to obtain the instruction of the Court, 
 the Attorney-General should be made a party
 
 THE QUEEN'S ATTORNEY-GENERAL. * 11 
 
 who is termed the Relator? This person in reality sustains and directs 
 the suit, and he is considered as answerable to the Court and the parties 
 for the propriety of the proceedings, and the conduct of them ; 4 but he 
 cannot take any step in the cause in his own name, and independently of 
 the Attorney-General. 5 Where, therefore, a notice of motion was given 
 on behalf of a relator, it was held that the notice was irregular. 6 And 
 where the relator was also plaintiff the Court refused to hear him in 
 person on behalf of the Attorney-General. 7 
 
 It sometimes happens that the relator has an interest in the matter in 
 dispute, of an injury to which interest he is entitled to complain. In 
 this case his personal complaint being joined to and incorporated 
 with the information given to the Court by the * officer of the *11 
 Crown, they form together an information and bill, and are so 
 termed. In some respects they are considered as distinct proceedings ; 
 and the Court will treat them as such, by dismissing the bill and retain- 
 ing the information, even though the relief to be granted is different 
 from that prayed. 1 Thus, where the record was both an information for 
 a charity and a bill, and the whole of the relief specifically prayed was 
 in respect of an alleged interest of the relator in the trust property, 
 which he did not succeed in establishing, although the bill was dis- 
 missed with costs, the information was retained for the purpose of regu- 
 lating the charity. 2 It is, however, necessary that the person joined 
 as plaintiff should have some individual interest in the relief sought ; 
 and where persons were made plaintiffs who asked nothing for them- 
 selves, and did not show that they were individually entitled to any- 
 thing, a demurrer to the whole record was allowed ; but as there 
 appeared to be a case for relief, leave to amend, for the purpose of 
 converting the suit into an information only, was given, and the Court 
 directed that the plaintiffs should remain on the record in the character 
 of relators, in order that they might be answerable for costs. 3 
 
 Although it is the general practice, where the suit immediately 
 concerns the rights of the Crown, to proceed without a relator, yet 
 instances have sometimes occurred where relators have been named. 
 In such cases, however, it has been done through the tenderness of the 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 22; 1 Ves. .Jr. 247. n. See Att.- 6 Att.-Gen. v. Wright, 3 Beav. 447; and see 
 
 Gen. v. Proprietors of the Federal-street Meet- Att.-Gen. v. Haberdashers' Co. 15 Beav. 397; 
 
 in^-house, 3 Gray, 1; Att.-Gen. v. Merrimack Att.-Gen v. Wyggeston's Hospital, 16 Beav 
 
 Manuf. Co. 14 Gray, 580; Att.-Gen. v. Con- 313; Att -Gen. v Sherborne Grammar School, 
 
 sumers' Gas Co. 142 Mass 417. 18 Beav. 256; 18 Jur. 636; Parker v. May, 5 
 
 * Ld. Red. 22; Att.-Gen. v. Vivian, 1 Russ. Cush. 336, 337. 
 226, 236. 7 Att.-Gen. v. Barker. 4M. & C. 262. 
 
 s Parker v. May, 5 Cnsh. 337, per Shaw 1 See Att.-Gen. v. Cockermouth Local 
 
 C. J.; see Commissioners e. Andrews, 10 Rich. Board, L. R. 18 Eq. 172. 
 
 Eq. (S. C.)4; State v. White's Creek Turn- 2 Att.-Gen. v. Vivian, 1 Russ. 226, 233, 
 
 pike Co. 3 Tenn. Ch. 163. As to the reten- 235; 2 Swnnst. 215. 
 
 tion of former procedure under the Sup. Ct. of 3 Att.-Gen. v. East India Co. 11 Sim. 380, 
 
 Jud. Act, see 36 & 37 Vic. c. 66, § 23 ; 38 & 386. 
 39 Vic. c. 77. 
 
 defendant. Harvard College v. Society, 3 General need not be a party when trustees of a 
 Gray, 280; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539, chanty are appointed by the donor. Newberry 
 579. In Illinois it is held that the Attorney- v. Blatchford, 106 111. 584. 
 
 11
 
 12 
 
 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 officers towards the defendant, in order that the Court migh f , award 
 costs against the relator if the suit should appear to have been improp- 
 erly conducted ; it being a prerogative of the Crown, except in 
 *12 certain special cases, not to pay costs to a subject. 4 * The intro- 
 duction of a relator is, however, in such actions, a mere act of 
 favor on the part of the Crown and its officers, which, though usual, may 
 be withheld; and upon the whole it seems that, although in cases of 
 informations for charities the general and almost universal practice is 
 to have a relator for the purpose of answering the costs, yet the rule 
 is not imperative ; and the Attorney-General, as the officer of the Crown, 
 may, in the exercise of his discretion, bring such an action without a 
 relator. 1 (a) 
 
 4 See 3 BI. Com. 400; 2 Mad. Prin. & Pr. 
 Ch. (3d Loud, ed.) 203 and note; 1 Smith Ch. 
 Pr. (2d Am. ed.) 99; Story, Eq. PI. § 8. That 
 oppression may thus arise to defendants if no 
 relator is named, see Att.-Gen. v. Fox, Ld. 
 Red. 23 n. (//), where their expenses almost 
 equalled the value of the property. 
 
 1 See Re Bedford Charity, 2 Swanst. 520; see 
 contra, Att.-Gen. v. Oglender, 1 Ves. Jr. 264; 
 Ld. Red. 99; and see Att.-Gen. v. Smart, 1 
 
 (a) The relator in an information to enforce 
 a charitable trust must pay the costs if his 
 case discloses no merits. Strickland v. Wel- 
 don, 28 Ch. D. 426; Att.-Gen. v. Butler, 123 
 Mass. 504; Burbank v. Burbank, 152 Mass. 
 254; post, p. 15. If there is no case for the 
 public, the relator cannot have the informa- 
 tion retained as a bill. Att -Gen. v. Evart 
 Booming Co. 34 Mich. 462; Wilson v. Shively, 
 10 Oregon, 267, 276. See Thompson v. Thomp- 
 son, 6 Houst. (Del.) 225. Conversely, if there 
 is no private right or special damage, the 
 sanction of the Attorney-General is necessary, 
 and the suit must be treated as in the nature 
 of an information. Wallasey Local Board v. 
 Gracey, 36 Ch. D. 593; London Association 
 v. London & India Docks Joint Committee 
 (1892), 3 Ch. 242. The Attorney-General, 
 after assenting to the use of the State's name 
 in an information in which the relator's interest 
 preponderates, does not control the suit and 
 cannot withdraw such assent to the relator's 
 prejudice during its pendency. People v. 
 North San Francisco Homestead Ass. 38 Cal. 
 564; People v. Clark, 72 Cal. 289; People v. 
 Jacob (Cal.), 12 Pac. 222. See Hesing v. 
 Att.-Gen. 104 III. 292; People v. Purviance, 
 12 Brad. (111.), 216. In Att.-Gen. v. William- 
 son, 60 L. T. 930, where, after considerable 
 expense was incurred by the defendant to an 
 information filed without a relator, he was 
 informed that the Attorney-General did not 
 intend to proceed, and moved to dismiss the 
 information with costs, it was held that, as the 
 suit had been determined, the Crown could 
 
 12 
 
 Ves. Sr. 72; Att.-Gen. v. Middleton, 2 Ves. 
 Sr. 327; Att.-Gen. of the Duchy of Lancaster 
 v. Heath, Prac. in Ch. 13. In proceedings 
 under the 59 Geo. III. c 91, and 2 & 3 Will. 
 IV. c. 57 (see ante, p. 9, n. 1), it was not the 
 practice to have a relator. See also " The 
 Charitable Trusts Act, 1853" (16 & 17 Vic. 
 c. 137), §§ 18, 20, 43. See, however Att.-Gen. 
 v. Boucherett, 25 Beav. 116. 
 
 not be ordered to pay the defendant's costs. 
 A defect of parties, where a town is not joined, 
 is not cured by the fact that a committee of 
 the town are relators. Att.-Gen. v. Parker, 
 126 Mass. 216. When proceedings by quo 
 warranto are provided by statute against a 
 private charitable corporation for misappro- 
 priation of its funds, individual members of 
 the association cannot maintain a bill in 
 equity for redress and a receiver, although 
 the Attorney-General refuses to be a plaintiff 
 and is made a defendant. Tyree v. Bingham, 
 100 Mo. 451. See Thompson v. Watson, 48 
 Ohio St. 552. The Attorney-General and re- 
 lator will not be permitted to maintain con 
 flicting views on the same side of the case. 
 Att.-Gen. v. Sherborne Grammar School, 18 
 Beav. 256. But the former may act as counsel 
 for defendants upon an information filed in 
 his name by relators. Shore ft Wilson, 9 
 Ch. & Fin. 355. The objection that there is 
 an adequate remedy at law has been held 
 inapplicable to an information tiled by the 
 Attorney-General. Att.-Gen. v. Mayor of Gal- 
 way, 1 Moll. 95. But see London v. Att.- 
 Gen 1 H. L. Cas. 440. In informations in 
 cases of charity, the general prayer is usually 
 sufficient to obtain any relief adapted to the 
 case. Att. Gen. v. Brooke, 18 Ves. 319. A 
 prayer for the wrong relief will not prevent 
 the granting of proper relief, if the Court 
 decides to act at all. Att.-Gen. v. Smart. 1 
 Ves. 72: Att.-Gen. v. Middleton, 2 Ves 327; 
 Att.-Gen. v. Whiteley, 14 Ves. 241.
 
 THE QUEEN'S ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
 
 13 
 
 With respect to suits by the Attorney -General on behalf of idiots and 
 lunatics, it seems that it is not only necessary that the lunatic should be 
 a party, but also that there should be a relator who may be responsible 
 to the defendant for the costs. Thus where it appeared that the lunatic 
 had been made the relator, the Court, on a motion being made that a 
 responsible relator should be appointed, directed that all further pro- 
 ceedings should be suspended until a proper person should be named as 
 relator in his stead. 2 
 
 * Any person who is not under any of the legal disabilities after *13 
 mentioned may be a relator ; * but a written authority, signed by 
 hiin, permitting his name to be used, must be filed with the information. 2 
 A corporate body may be a relator 8 or a relator and plaintiff. 4 
 
 It has not been deemed necessary that relators should be interested 
 in the charities concerning which they institute proceedings ; 6 and the 
 Court was in the habit, in the times when a much stricter system of 
 practice prevailed than at present, of relaxing several of its rules on 
 behalf of charities. Thus, where the relief sought was erroneous and 
 refused, the Court still took care to make such decree as would best 
 answer the purposes of the charities. 6 (a) 
 
 2 Att.-Gen. v. Tyler, 2 Eden, 230; Ld. Red. 
 29, n. (1); and see S. C. at hearing, 1 Dick. 
 378. 
 
 i Smith Ch. Pr. (2d Am. ed.) 99. 
 
 2 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 11 ; see now R S. C. 
 1883, Ord. XVI. 20. For form of authority, 
 see Vol. III. In an injunction case, the 
 authority was allowed to be filed the day 
 after the information. Att.-Gen. v. Murray, 
 13 W. R. 65, V C. K. Where the solicitor 
 had given the relator an indemnity against 
 the costs, the information was ordered off the 
 file, with costs to be paid by the relator and 
 solicitor. Att.-Gen. v. Skinners' Co. C. P. 
 Coop. 7. The authority may be dispensed 
 with in informations under the 4 Geo. IV. 
 c. 76, § 2 5; Att.-Gen v. Wiltshire, W. N. 
 (1875) 182, V. C. H , and see as to retention 
 of existing procedure, Sup. Ct. of Judic. Act, 
 1873 (36 & 37 Vic. c. 66), § 23, and same of 
 1875 (38 & 39 Vic. c. 77, § 21). 
 
 3 See Att.-Gen. v. Wilson, C. & P. 1; Att.- 
 Gen. v Cambridge Consumers' Gas Co. L. R. 
 6 Eq. 282; L. R. 4 Ch. 71; Att.-Gen. v. Cocker- 
 mouth Local Board, L. R. 18 Eq. 172; Att.- 
 Gen. t'. Colney Hatch Asylum, L. R. 4 Ch. 
 
 149; Att.-Gen. v. Basingstoke, 45 L. J. Ch. 
 726. 
 
 4 See Att -Gen. v. Conservators of the 
 Thames, 1 H. & M. 1 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 1203; 
 Att.-Gen. v. Metropolitan Board of Works, 
 1 H. & M. 298; Att.-Gen. v. Greenhill, 33 
 Beav. 193; 9 Jur. N. S. 1307, Att.-Gen. v. 
 Mayor of Kingston-on-Thames, 11 Jur. N. S. 
 596"; 13 W. R. 880, V. C. W. ; Att.-Gen. v. 
 Richmond, L. R. 2 Eq. 306; 12 Jur. N. S. 544, 
 V. C. W.; Att -Gen. v. Great Eastern Ry. Co., 
 L. R. 6 Ch. 572, L. C. 
 
 o Att.-Gen. v. Vivian, 1 Russ. 226, 236. 
 See, however, Att -Gen. v. Bucknall, 2 Atk. 
 328; South Molton v. Att.-Gen. 5 H. L. Cas. 
 1; Re Poplar & Blackwall Free School, 8 Ch. 
 D. 543. 
 
 6 Att.-Gen. v. Jennes, 1 Atk. 355; Att.- 
 Gen. v. Bucknall, 2 Atk. 328; Att -Gen. v. 
 Whiteley. 11 Ves. 241, 247; Att.-Gen. v. 
 Oglender, 1 Ves. Jr. 246 ; Att.-Gen. v. Middle- 
 ton, 2 Ves. Sr. 327; Att.-Gen. v. Brereton, id. 
 425; Att.-Gen. v. Mayor of Stamford, 2 Swanst. 
 591 ; Att.-Gen. v. Parker, 1 Ves. Sr. 43; 3 Atk. 
 576. 
 
 (a) Re St. Stephens, 39 Ch D 492; Hoare 
 v. Hoare, 56 L. T. 147, Biscoe v. Jackson, 35 
 Ch. I). 460; Re Ovey, Broadbent v. Barrow, 29 
 Ch. D 560; Darcy v. Kelley, 153 Mass. 433. 
 The mode of administration or execution is not 
 strictly of the substance of the gift. Biscoe v. 
 Jackson, 35 Ch. D. 460. The jurisdiction to 
 act on the cy prh doctrine upon the failure of a 
 specific charitable bequest arises whether the 
 residue is given to a charity or not, unless a 
 direction can be implied from the will that the 
 
 bequest, if it fails, should go to the charity. 
 Mayor of Lyons v. Advocate-General of Bengal, 
 1 App. Cas. 91. See Andrews v. McGuffog, 11 
 App Cas. 313; Pocock v. Att -Gen. 3 Ch. 
 P. 342; Biscoe V Jackson. 35 Ch. D. 460; 
 Willoughby v. Storer, 22 L. T. 896. Under 
 this doctrine the Court may order a fund, be- 
 queathed to be expended for a charity abroad, 
 to be paid to a committee resident in the coun- 
 try on their undertaking to apply it to the gen 
 eral purposes of another similar chantv in the 
 
 13
 
 *14 
 
 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 It appears, on reference to the old cases, that where a relator himself 
 
 claims an interest in the subject-matter, of the suit, and proceeds 
 
 *14 by bill as well as by information, making himself both * plaintiff 
 
 and relator, the suit abates by his death. Where, however, the 
 
 suit is merely an information, the proceedings can only abate by the 
 
 death or determination of interest of the defendant. 1 
 
 If there are several relators, who are also plaintiffs, the death of any 
 of them, while there survives one, will not in any degree affect the suit; 
 but if all the relators die, or if there is but one, and that relator dies, the 
 suit is not abated. It is, however, irregular for the solicitors of a relator 
 to proceed in a charity information after the death of the relators or of 
 a sole relator ; and the Court will not permit any further proceedings 
 till an order has been obtained for liberty to insert the name of a new 
 relator, and such name is inserted accordingly ; otherwise there would 
 be no person to pay the costs of the suit, in case the information should 
 be deemed improper, or for any other reason should be dismissed. 2 
 Where a relator dies, the application for leave to name a new relator 
 should be made by the Attorney-General, or with his consent, and 
 not by the defendant ; otherwise the defendant might choose his own 
 prosecutor. 8 
 
 With respect to informations on behalf of idiots and lunatics, it seems 
 that it is not only necessary that the lunatic should be a party, but also 
 that there should be a relator who may be responsible to the defendant 
 for the costs of the suit. Thus, in the case of the Attorney-General v. 
 Tyler, mentioned in the note to Lord Redesdale's Treatise, 4 it appears 
 
 i Waller r. Hanger, 2 Bulst. 134; Ld Red. 1 Jur. N. S. 1062, Att.-Gen. v. Plumtree, 5 
 100. See R. S. C. Ord. L. Mad. 452; 2 Mad. Prin. & Pr. Ch. (3d Lond. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 100, Att.-Gen. v. Haberdashers' 
 Co. 15 Beav. 397, 16 Jur. 717. 
 
 3 Ld. Red 100, n. (e) Att.-Gen. v. Harvey, 
 
 ed.) 203, 204. 
 
 « Ld. Red 29 ; 2 Eden, 230. 
 
 foreign country designated. Re Davis's Trusts, 
 61 L. T. 430 If an institution, to which a 
 charitable bequest is made, comes to an end 
 after the testator's death, and before payment 
 of the legacy, there is no lapse, but the legacy, 
 failing to be administered by the Crown, will 
 usually be applied to charitable purposes. In 
 re Slevin, Slevin v. Hepburn (1891), 2 Ch. 236; 
 64 L. T. 311. See Biscoe v. Jackson, 35 Ch. D. 
 460, 55 L. T. 607; 35 W. R. 152; Pease v. 
 Pattinson, 32 Ch. D. 154. If the object of a 
 charitable bequest is definite and wholly fails, 
 the bequest cannot be carried out cy pros. In 
 re Tavlor, Martin r. Freeman, 58 L T. 538; 
 Re White's Trust. 33 Ch. D. 449. In New 
 York, the doctrine of cy pres, upholding chari- 
 table gifts when no beneficiary is named, is not 
 recognized. Tilden v. Green, 130 N. Y. 29. 
 After a formal application once made for a 
 scheme, under the English Charitable Trust 
 Act of 1860, the jurisdiction of the Charity 
 Commissioners attaches absolutely to the charity 
 and cannot be ousted by withdrawing the ap- 
 plication before the scheme is completed and 
 14 
 
 sealed. In re Poor's Lands Charity (1891), 3 
 Ch. 400. An unauthorized cypres application 
 of charity funds by trustees, though long-con- 
 tinued, is no ground of objection to a new au- 
 thorized application Re Campden Charities, 
 18 Ch 1). 310; 24 id. 218. See Re. Browne's 
 Hospital v. Stamford, 60 L. T. 288 If two 
 charities are administered for the same object, 
 such a- maintaining a school, the funds of one 
 charity may be applied under the Court's sanc- 
 tion to the discharge of a mortgage upon prop- 
 erty belonging to the other charity. Cockburn 
 v. Raphael, W N. (1891) 14. The rule against 
 perpetuities does not apply to a transfer, in a 
 certain event, of property from one charity to 
 another Christ's Hospital r. Grainger. 1 Mac. 
 & G. 460: In re Tyler. Tyler v. Tyler (1891), 
 3 Ch. 252; 65 L. f. 367; In re Randell. Ran- 
 dell v. Dixon, 38 Ch. D. 213. An advowson is 
 not an exception to the general law as to 
 charitable trusts Re St. Stephen's, 39 Ch. D. 
 492. considering the dicta in Att -Gen. v. 
 Parker, supra.
 
 THE QUEEN'S ATTORNEY GENERAL. * 15 
 
 * 
 
 that the lunatic had been made the relator, but that on a motion being 
 made that a responsible relator should be appointed, Lord Northington 
 directed that all further proceedings in the cause should be suspended, 
 until a proper person should be named as relator in his stead. This 
 appears to be the cause reported in Mr. Dickens's Reports, 5 in which, 
 upon the hearing, it was objected that the lunatic was not a party to 
 the suit, although he was named as relator. 
 
 The object in requiring that there should be a relator in informations 
 exhibited on the part of the Attorney-General, is, as we have seen/ 
 that there may be some person answerable for the costs, in case they 
 should have been improperly filed. Thus, where the information was 
 held to have been unnecessary, and in contradiction to the right, 
 the costs were ordered to be paid by the relator. 7 But where * the *15 
 relator insisted upon a particular construction of the will of the 
 person by whom the charity was founded, and in which there was con- 
 siderable ambiguity, although he failed in satisfying the Court that his 
 construction was the right one, and the information was consequently 
 dismissed, the Court did not make him liable to the costs of the defend- 
 ant ; it refused, however, to permit the costs to be paid out of the funds 
 of the charity. 1 And in general, where an information prays a relief 
 which is not granted, but the Court thinks proper to make a decree 
 according to the merits, so that the information is shown to have had a 
 foundation, the relator will not be ordered to pay the costs. 2 
 
 Where relators conduct themselves properly, and their conduct has 
 been beneficial to the charity, they are usually allowed their costs ; 8 and 
 it seems that on the principle that otherwise people would not come 
 forward to institute proceedings on behalf of charities, relators, where 
 there is nothing to impeach the propriety of the suit, will, upon obtain- 
 ing a decree for the charity, be allowed their costs as between solicitor 
 and client, the difference between the amount of such costs and the 
 amount of the costs which may be recovered by the defendants, being 
 charged upon the fund recovered by the information, or on the estate 
 which is the subject of the suit ; 4 and that in special cases the relators 
 may be allowed their charges and expenses, in addition to the costs of 
 the suit as between solicitor and client, but such cases must depend 
 upon their peculiar circumstances, which must be brought forward and 
 established by evidence. 5 But where they incurred expenses without 
 the sanction of the Court or Master, in obtaining information for the 
 purpose of preparing a scheme, they were only allowed their expenses 
 
 5 Ante, p. 9. Ves. 424; see also id. 425; Att.-Gen. v. Carte, 
 
 6 Ante, p. 12. 1 Dick. 113; Reames on Costs, App. No 2. 
 
 7 Att.-Gen. v. Smart, 1 Ves. Sr. 72; Att- 22!); Moggridge V. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 311, 88; 
 Gen. v. Parker, 3 Atk. 570, 576; 1 Ves. Sr. 43. affirmed by H. L., see 13 Ves. 416 ; but see Att - 
 
 1 Att.-Gen. v. Oglender, 1 Ves. Jr. 246. Gen. v. Fishmongers' Co. 1 Keen, 492. where 
 
 2 Att.-Gen. v. Bolton, 3 Anst. 820; see Att.- party and party costs only were allowed For 
 Gen. v. Hartley, 2 J. & W. 353. form of order for costs, see 1 Seton, 554, 555. 
 
 3 Beames on Costs, 14; Att.-Gen. v. Brewers' 5 Att.-Gen. v. Kerr, 4 Beav. 297, 303; Re 
 Co. 1 P. Wins. 376. Dulwich College, L. B. 15 Eq. 294, M. R.; but 
 
 4 Att.-Gen. v. Kerr, 4 Beav. 297, 303; Att.- see Att.-Gen. v. Skinners' Co. Jac. 629; Att.- 
 Gen. v. Taylor, cited in Osborne ». Denne, 7 Gen. v. Manchester, 3 L. J. Ch. 64. 
 
 15
 
 * 16 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 actually out of pocket ; 6 and where a petition would have done, instead 
 
 of an information, the relators were refused their costs. 7 
 *16 * As the principal object in having a relator is, that he may be 
 
 answerable for the costs of the proceedings, in case the informa- 
 tion shall appear to have been improperly instituted or conducted, it 
 follows, as a matter of course, that such relator must be a person of 
 substance ; and if it is made to appear to the Court that the relator is 
 not a responsible person, all further proceedings in the information 
 will be stayed, till a proper person shall be named as relator. 1 
 
 An information by the Attorney-General without a relator cannot be 
 dismissed for want of prosecution; it is his privilege to proceed in what 
 way he thinks proper; but an information in his name by a relator, is 
 subject to be dismissed for want of prosecution with costs. 2 (a) 
 
 It has been said that, as the Sovereign, by reason of his prerogative, 
 does not pay costs to a subject, so it is beneath his dignity to receive 
 them ; but many instances occur, in the course of practice, in which the 
 Attorney-General receives costs. Thus, in the case of successful pro- 
 ceedings with respect to charities, the Attorney-General will usually be 
 allowed his costs as between solicitor and client, 8 and in special cases 
 his charges and expenses in addition; 4 and where collusion is suspected 
 between the defendants and the relators, the Attorney-General attends 
 by a distinct solicitor, and always receives his costs. 5 The Attorney- 
 General also constantly receives costs where he is made a defendant in 
 respect of legacies given to charities ; 6 where he is made a defendant 
 in respect of the immediate rights of the Crown in cases of intestacy; 
 and in charity suits, costs have been frequently awarded to the Attorney- 
 General in interlocutory matters, independently of the relator. 7 And 
 
 s Att-Gen. v. Ironmongers' Co. 10 Beav. 36, 88; affirmed by H L., 13 Ves 416; Mills 
 
 194 196 v. Farmer, 19 Ves. 490; 1 Mer. 104; Att.-Gen. 
 
 7 Att.-Gen. v. Berry, 11 Jur. 114; see Re v. Lord Ashburnham, 1 S. & S. 394. 
 Poplar & Blackwall Free School, 8 Ch. D. 543. 4 Re Dulwich College, L. R 15 Eq. 294, 
 
 i Att.-Gen. v. Tyler, 2 Eden, 230; see also M. R.; and see Att.-Gen. v. Kerr, 4 Beav. 297, 
 
 Att.-Gen. v. Knight", 3 M. & C. 154. It is pre- 303. For form of orders, see 1 Seton, 554, 
 
 sumed that the same rules, for determining Nos. 11, 12. 
 
 who is a " person of substance," apply here as 6 For form of order for costs of Attorney- 
 
 in the case of next friends of married women ; General appearing separately from relators, see 
 
 as to whom, see post, Chap. HI. § 8. There Att.-Gen. v. Wyggeston Hospital, 2 June, 1855, 
 
 is a reported case in which a relator was re- A. 1024; 1 Seton (3d ed.), 351, No. 13. 
 quired to give security for costs, see Att.-Gen. 6 Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36, 88; 
 
 t>. Skinners' Co. C. P. Coop. 1, 5; and see Mills v. Farmer, 19 Ves. 483,490; I Mer. 55, 
 
 Att.-Gen. r. Knight, 3 M. & C. 154. 104 ; Att.-Gen. v. Lewis, 8 Beav. 179. 
 
 2 In the Court of Exchequer the order was 7 See Att.-Gen. v. Lord Ashburnham, 1 S. 
 that the defendant may go without a day, upon & S. 394, 397; See, however, Burney v. Mac- 
 paying his costs to be taxed. 1 Fowler, 104. donald, 15 Sim. 6, 16. 
 
 3 Moggridge v. Thackwell, 1 Ves. 475 ; 7 Ves. 
 
 (a) As to the power of the Attorney-General of the Attorney-General, or with his consent, 
 
 to compromise suits relating to charities, see alter the scheme of a charity as settled by its 
 
 Att.-Gen. v. Boucherett, 25 Beav. 116; Att.- previous decree. Att.-Gen. v. Bishop of Wor- 
 
 Gen. v. Fishmongers' Co. C. P. C. 85; An- cester, 9 Hare, 328; Att.-Gen. v. St. John's 
 
 drews v. Merchant Tailors' Co. 7 Ves. 223; Hospital, L. R. 1 Ch. 92; Re Browne's Hos- 
 
 S. C. nam. Andrews v. Trinity Hall, 9 Ves. pital v. Stamford, 60 L. T 288; Att.-Gen. v. 
 
 525. Upon substantial grounds the Court Stewart, L. R. 14 Eq. 17; see Re Bradford 
 
 may, from time to time, upon the application School of Industry, W. N. (1893) 60. 
 
 16
 
 FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND STATES. 
 
 18 
 
 it would appear that the principle that the Attorney-General never 
 receives or pays costs may be modified in this way, namely, that the 
 Attorney-General never receives costs in a contest in which he could 
 have been called upon to pay them, had he been a private individual. 8 
 Provision was, however, made by the 18 & 19 Vic. c. 90, for the 
 payment of costs by or to the Crown, in proceedings instituted, after 
 the passing of that Act, on its behalf; and by the Customs Inland 
 Revenue and Savings Bank Act, 1877, 9 in all proceedings at the suit 
 of the Crown under the Customs Act, the same rule as to costs is to be 
 observed as in proceedings between subject and subject in matters 
 relating to the revenue. 10 
 
 In an action by the Attorney-General without a relator, costs may be 
 ordered to be paid by one defendant to another defendant; and where 
 in a charity case some of the defendants supported the contention of 
 the Attorney-General, they were allowed their costs as between solici- 
 tor and client, to be taxed and paid out of the fund; such costs as 
 between party and party to be repaid by the defendants who opposed 
 the proceedings. 11 
 
 In a suit by the Crown to restrain the construction of a tramway, 
 the Court refused to grant an interim injunction, except upon the terms 
 of the usual undertaking as to damages being given by the Crown. 12 
 
 ♦Section II. — Foreign Governments and States. 
 
 17 
 
 It is now settled that a foreign sovereign or State can sue in 
 the municipal Courts of Great Britain. 1 * It seems, however, that *18 
 
 8 Att.-Gen. v. London, 2 M'N. & G. 247, 
 269, 271, 273; 12 Beav. 171, M. R., and on 
 demurrer in H. L., 1 H. L. Cas. 471, and Lord 
 Cottenham's comments on this case, 2 M'N. & 
 G. 271; Att.-Gen. v. Drapers' Co. 4 Beav. 305; 
 Ware v. Cumberlege, 20 Beav. 510; Kane v. 
 Maule, 2 Sm. & G. 331, S. C. on appeal, 
 nom. Kane v. Reynolds, 4 De G. M. & G. 565, 
 569 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 148. 
 
 9 40 & 41 Vic. c. 13, § 5. 
 
 w Att.-Gen. v. Hanmer, 4 De G. & J. 205; 
 5 Jur. N. S. 693; Att.-Gen. o. Sittingbourne 
 &C. Ry. Co. 35 Beav. 268, 272 ; L. R. 1 Eq. 
 636, 640; and see Bauer v. Mitford, 9 W. R. 
 135. For form of order see 1 Seton, 556, 
 No. 17; see also 24 & 25 Vic. c. 92, § 1, in 
 cases as to succession duty. 
 
 n Att.-Gen. v. Chester, 14 Beav. 338; Att.- 
 Gen. v. Mercers' Co. 18 W. R. 448, V. C. J. 
 
 i 2 Secretary of State for War v. Chubb, 43 
 L. T. 83, M. R. As to the Attorney-General 
 of the Queen Consort, see 39 & 40 Geo. III. 
 c. 88, §§ 8, 9 ; 1 Bl. Com. 220; Ld. Red. 24, 99; 
 36 & 37 Vic. c. 66, § 23; 38 & 39 Vic. c. 77, 
 § 21. As to a Queen Dowager, see Att.-Gen. 
 v. Tarrington, Hardres, 219. As to the Attor- 
 ney-General to the Prince of Wales, see Att.- 
 Gen. v. St. Aubyn, Wightw. 167; Att.-Gen. 
 
 VOL. I. — 2 
 
 v. Plymouth, id. 134; Att.-Gen. v. Lambe, 11 
 Beav. 213; Att.-Gen. v. Crossman, L. R. 1 Ex. 
 38H 12 Jur. N.S.712. The Princess of Wales 
 may sue, during coverture, by her next friend. 
 Princess of Wales v. Lord Liverpool, 1 Swanst. 
 114. 
 
 1 King of Spain v. Machado, 4 Russ. 225, 
 236; Hullett v. King of Spain, 2 Bligh, N. S. 
 31; S C. 7 Bligh, N. S. 359; 1 CI. & Fin. 
 333; see also City of Berne v. Bank of Eng- 
 land, 9 Ves. 347; Dolder v. Bank of England, 
 10 Ves. 352; Dolder v. Lord Huntingfield, 11 
 Ves. 283 ; King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 
 1 Sim. N. S. 301, 332; 15 Jur. 215; United 
 States v. Prioleau, 2 H. & M. 559; 11 Jur. 
 N. S. 792; United States v. Wagner, L. R. 
 3 Eq. 724; S. C. L. R. 2 Ch. 582; Prioleau v. 
 United States, L. R. 2 Eq. 659; United States 
 v. McRea. L. R. 3 Ch. 79; L. R. 4 Eq. 327. 
 See Barclay v. Russell, 3 Ves. Jr. 424, 431 , 
 see also Nabob of the Carnatic v. East India 
 Co. 1 Ves. Jr 371; 2 id. 56; Duke of Bruns- 
 wick V. King of Hanover, 6 Beav. 1; 2 H. L. 
 Cas. 1; King of Hanover v. Wheatley, 4 Beav. 
 78; Musgrave v. Pulido, 5 App. Cas. 102. 
 
 The doctrine that the sovereign of one State 
 may maintain a suit in the Courts of Equity 
 of another State, is now established in allirm- 
 
 17
 
 18 
 
 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 this right of suit is confined to those cases in which it is sought to 
 enforce the private rights of such sovereign or State, or of the subjects 
 thereof; 1 and that the infringement of his prerogative rights does not 
 constitute a ground of suit. 2 (a) A subordinate officer of a foreign gov- 
 ernment cannot, without its authority, take proceedings in the name of 
 his government, against a superior officer in this country. 3 
 
 To entitle a foreign government to sue in the English Courts, it is 
 
 ance of the right, upon very satisfactory 
 principles. See Story, Eq. PI. § 55; Brown v. 
 Minis, 1 M'Cord, 80. A foreign sovereign 
 State adopting the republican form of govern- 
 ment, and recognized by the English govern- 
 ment, can sue in the English Courts in its own 
 name so recognized. United States v. Wagner, 
 L. R. 2 Ch. 582. If a State were to refuse 
 permission to a foreign sovereign to sue in its 
 Courts, it might become a just cause of war. 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 55; King of Spain r. Mendaz- 
 abel. 5 Sim. 596; Edwards. Parties in Eq. 3:?. 34, 
 35; Calvert on Parties, c, 3, § 27, pp. 310, 311 
 By the U. S. Constitution, foreign States are 
 expressly authorized to sue in the Courts of 
 the United States. Const. U. S. Art. III. § 2. 
 One of the States of the Union may appe;ir 
 as plaintiff in the Supreme Court of the United 
 States, against either another State, or the 
 citizens thereof. Const. U. S- Art. III. § 2; 
 Governor of Georgia v. Aladrago, 1 Peters, 
 110; United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115; 
 United States v. Blight, 3 Hall, Law Journ. 
 197; United States v. Percheman, 7 Peters, 51; 
 New York r. Connecticut, 4 Dallas, 1; New 
 Jersey v. New York, 5 Peters, 284; Rhode 
 
 Island v. Massachusetts, 13 Peters, 23; S. C. 
 14 Peters, 210, 3 Story, Const. U. S- §§ 1675- 
 1683; Nabob of the Carnatic v. East India Co. 
 
 I Sumner's Ves. 371, note («). One State, as 
 a corporation, may sue in the Courts of another 
 State. Delafield "v. Illinois, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 
 159; S. C. 8 Paige, 527; Hines v North Caro- 
 lina, 10 Sm. & M. 529. 
 
 1 King of Spain v Machado, 4 Buss. 225, 
 560, 2 Bligh, N. S. 60; see also Columbian 
 Government v Rothschild, 1 Sim. 94; King of 
 Hanover r. Wheat ley, 4 Beav. 78; Duke of 
 Brunswick v. King of Hanover, 6 Beav. 1; 2 
 H. L. Cas. 1 ; King of the Two Sicilies v. Will- 
 cox, 1 Sim. N. S. 301, and post, Chap. IV. § 4, 
 on the liability of foreign States to be sued. 
 
 2 Emperor of Austria v. Day, 3 De G. F. & 
 J. 217, 251, 252; 7 Jur. N. S. 639, 644, see 
 also United States v Pnoleau, 2 H & M 559: 
 
 II Jur. N. S. 792; 12 id. 724; United States v. 
 Wagner, L. R. 3 Eq 724. V. C. W.; L. R. 2 
 Ch. Ap. 582, L. C. & L. JJ.; United States v. 
 McRae, L. R. 4 Eq. 327, V. C W.; L. R. 3 
 Ch. 79, L. C. 
 
 8 Republic of Liberia v. Imperial Bank, 25 
 L. T. N S. 866. 
 
 (a) A suit lies by a foreign soveieign in 
 either a Federal or State Court to protect the 
 property of his nation; and such suit is not 
 abated by his death or deposition while it is 
 pending. The Sapphire, 11 Wall. 164; King 
 of Prussia v. Kuepper, 23 Mo. 553. A foreign 
 sovereign may be required, as a non-resident 
 plaintiff, to give security for costs when suing 
 upon a commercial transaction. Emperor of 
 Brazil v. Robinson, 5 Dowl. 522 ; King of 
 Greece r. Wright, 6 Dowl. 12; The Beatrice, 
 36 L. J. Adm. 10 ; Republic of Costa Rica v. 
 Erlanger. 3 Ch. D. 62. In New York, a for- 
 eign independent government, which sues as 
 a plaintiff there, may be required to give secur- 
 ity for costs as a non-resident, under the Code 
 of Civil Proc. § 3268. Republic of Honduras 
 v. Soto, 112 N Y 310. 
 
 Municipal Courts have no jurisdiction 
 to enforce engagements between sovereigns 
 founded upon treaties. Doss v. Secretary 
 of State for India, L. R. 19 Eq. 509 ; Rajah 
 Salig Ram v. Same, L. R. Ind. App. 
 Sup. 119, 126. The Court of Chancery may 
 18 
 
 proceed to administer a trust fund in its 
 custody, although a foreign sovereign who 
 is interested in it may not think fit to come 
 before the Court in a suit relating thereto. 
 Morgan r. Lariviere, L. R. 7 H. L. 423; L. R. 
 7 Ch. 550. But the existence of the trust 
 must not be in dispute; for if this is denied 
 with respect to funds in the possession of an 
 agent of the foreign government within the 
 jurisdiction, the suit cannot proceed in the 
 absence of such government. Wright r. Mills, 
 63 L. T. 186. See Gladstone v. Ottoman Bank, 
 1 H & M. 505 ; Twycross v. Dreyfus, 5 Ch 
 D. 605. The negotiation by a government 
 of a loan in a foreign country does not intro- 
 duce into the contract the peculiar laws of 
 such country. Smith r. Wegueliu, L. R. 8 
 Eq. 212 ; Goodwin v. Robarts, 1 App. Cas. 
 476 ; L. R. 10 Ex. 76, 337. A suit cannot be 
 maintained in England upon the bonds of a 
 foreign government. Ibid.; Crouch v. Credit 
 Foncier of England, L. R. 8 Q- B. 374, Twy- 
 cross v. Dreyfus, 5 Ch. D. 605.
 
 FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND STATES. * 19 
 
 necessary that it should have been recognized by the government 
 there; and where the foreign State has been recognized, the recogni- 
 tion is conclusive, and the Court cannot listen to any objections to its 
 title. 4 (b) This point appears to have been first discussed in The City 
 of Berne v. The Bank of England,* which arose from the application 
 of a person describing himself as a member of the common council 
 chamber of the city of Berne, on behalf of himself and of all others 
 the members of the common council chamber and the burghers and 
 citizens of that city, to restrain the Bank of England and South Sea 
 Company from permitting the transfer of certain funds standing in the 
 names of trustees, under a purchase by the old government of Berne 
 before the revolution: the application was opposed on the ground that 
 the existing government of Switzerland, not being acknowledged by 
 the government of this country, could not be noticed by the Court; and 
 Lord Eldon refused to make the order, observing that it was extremely 
 difficult to say that a judicial Court can take notice of a government 
 never recognized by the government of the country in which the Court 
 sits, and that whether the foreign government was recognized or not, 
 was matter of public notoriety. 
 
 The fact of a foreign State having been or not having been recog- 
 nized by the local government must be judicially taken notice * of *19 
 by the Court, even though there is an averment introduced into 
 the pleadings that the government in question has been recognized. 1 
 It has also been held that the Courts in England will not entertain 
 a suit for matters arising out of contracts entered into by individuals 
 with the governments of foreign countries, which have not been 
 acknowledged by the government of that country. 2 
 
 A foreign sovereign or State sues by the name by which he or it has 
 been recognized by the government of this country, and is not bound to 
 sue in the name of any officer of the government, or to join as co-plaintiff 
 any such officer upon whom process may be served, or who may be called 
 upon to give discovery upon a cross-bill; 3 but the proceedings may be 
 
 4 Emperor of Austria v. Day, 2 GifT. 628; the government, or to join as co-plaintiff any 
 7 Jur. N. S. 483; 3 De G. F. & J. 217; 7 Jur. such officer on whom process may be served, 
 N. S- 639. and who may be called upon to give discovery 
 
 5 9 Ves. 347; and see Dolder v. Bank of upon a cross-bill ; reversing the order of Sir W. 
 England, 10 Ves. 353; Dolder v. Lord Hunt- Page Wood (Lord Hatherley) in S. C. L. R. 3 
 ingfield, 11 Ves. 283. Eq 724. In the above case" (L. R. 2 Ch. 589, 
 
 1 Taylor v. Barclay, 2 Sim. 213, 220. 5!)2), Lord Justice Turner said: " In the cases 
 
 2 Thomson v. Powles, 2 Sim. 194, 210. referred to, the form of government was mon- 
 8 In United States v. Wagner, L. R. 2 Ch. archical; and I take it that, in such cases, the 
 
 582, it was held that a foreign sovereign State public property of the State, so far as it is 
 adopting the republican form of government is not by the Constitution of the State otherwise 
 not bound to sue in the name of any officer of destined, vests in the sovereign, subject to a 
 
 (b) If a revolutionary or de facto govern- Ch. D. 348. See Republic of Peru v. Peruvian 
 
 ment is overthrown by the previously existing Guano Co. 36 Ch. D. 489. Probably al=o if 
 
 government after its recognition by a foreign there has been no international recognition, 
 
 State, the restored government cannot repu- property acquired under such contracts can- 
 
 diate contracts made by it with a subject of not be recovered abroad in violation of 
 
 such foreign State, but in litigation thereon such contracts. Ibid.; The Beatrice, 36 L J. 
 
 merely takes the rights of the recognized Adm. 9. 
 government. Republic of Peru v. Drevfus, 38 
 
 19
 
 * 20 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 stayed until the foreign sovereign or State has named a person who can 
 give discovery, and if an order for such discovery be not obeyed, the 
 
 Court has power to dismiss the suit. 4 And where a foreign State 
 *20 comes voluntarily as a suitor-plaintiff into * a Court of Law or 
 
 Equity in England, it becomes subject, as to all matters connected 
 with that suit, to the jurisdiction of the Court. 1 It may therefore be 
 ordered to give security for costs, 2 and a bill filed by it may be dis- 
 missed with costs. 3 An ambassador, or minister plenipotentiary, of a 
 foreign State, does not properly represent that State in a Court of jus- 
 tice, 4 and cannot sue in his own name on behalf of the foreign sovereign 
 or State. 5 
 
 It seems that a colonial government, existing by letters-patent, which 
 is in some degree similar to a corporation possessing rights in England, 
 may sue there, and ought to be regulated by the law of England, under 
 which it has existence ; 6 thus, a decree was made for the specific per- 
 formance of articles executed in England under seal for mutual con- 
 siderations respecting the boundaries of the two provinces of Maryland 
 and Pennsylvania in North America, although the original jurisdiction, 
 in cases relating to boundaries between provinces, was admitted to be 
 in the King in council, the jurisdiction of the Courts being founded 
 upon the articles which were considered to give jurisdiction to the 
 Superior Courts whatever the subject-matter might be. 7 
 
 Section III. — Corporations, Joint- Stock Companies, and Partnerships. 
 
 The- right to sue is not confined to natural persons. The power to 
 sue and be sued in their corporate name is a power inseparably incident 
 to every corporation, whether it be sole or aggregate. 8 
 
 moral obligation on his part to apply it for the * Republic of Liberia v. Imperial Bank, 
 
 benefit of his subjects; and when he sues in L. R. 16 Eq. 179, V. C. M. ; L. R. 9 Ch. 569, 
 
 respect to the public property, he sues, not as L. JJ.; S. C nom. Republic of Liberia v. 
 
 the mere representative of the State, but as the Rove, 1 App. Cas. 139, H. L. (E); Republic 
 
 person in whom the property is vested for the of Costa Rica v Erlanger, 1 Ch. D. 171, C. A. 
 
 benefit of the State. In the case of a republic, See also Republic of Peru v. Weguelin, L. R. 
 
 the public property of a State remains in the 20 Eq. 140, V. C. H.; post, p. 141. 
 
 State, and the State, therefore, and not any J Rothschild v. Queen of Portugal, 3 Y. & 
 
 mere officer of the State, is the proper party to C. Ex. 594; King of Spain v. Hullett, 7 Bligh, 
 
 sue for it." Similar remarks were made by the N. S. 359; 1 CI. & Fin. 333; and cases ante, 
 
 Lord Chancellor and Lord Cairns in the same 17, n 
 
 case. See United States v. Drummond, 33 2 Republic of Costa Rica r. Erlanger, W. N. 
 
 Beav. 449. Wilson v. Church, 9 Ch. D. 552. (1876) 210. 225; 24 W. R. 880, 955. 
 
 But the Court may stay proceedings in the 3 See United States v. McRae, L R. 8 Eq 
 
 original suit until the means of discovery are 69, 77, V. C. L; Queen of Spain v. Parr, 39 L. 
 
 secured in the cross-suit. United States v. J. Ch 73; 18 W. R. 110, 112, V. C. J. 
 
 Wagner, L. R. 2 Ch. Ap. 582, per Lord Chan- 4 Schneider v. Lizardi, 9 Beav. 461, 466; 
 
 cellor and Lord Cairns, L J. ; Republic of Columbian Government v. Rothschild. 1 Sim. 
 
 Peru r. Weguelin, L. R. 20 Eq. 140 ; and may 94. As to confidential agents, see Republic of 
 
 dismiss the suit if its order be not properly Chili v. Rothschild, W. N. (1891) 138. 
 
 obeyed. Republic of Liberia v. Rove, 1 App. 6 Penedo v. Johnson, 29 L. T. N. S. 452; 
 
 Cas. 139. But the complainant will not be 22 W. R. 103. 
 
 allowed to select the officer of the foreign 6 Barclay v. Russell, 3 Ves. 424, 434; and 
 
 government to be made co-defendant with a see Sloman v. New Zealand, 1 C. P. D.563, C A. 
 
 view to discovery, and to stay proceedings 7 Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sr. 444, 
 
 until such person has appeared and answered. 446, 2 L. C in Eq. (4th ed.) 939. 
 
 Republic of Costa Rica c. Erlanger, 1 Ch. D. 171. 8 1 Bla. Com. 475; Hotchkiss v. Trustees, 7 
 
 20
 
 CORPORATIONS AND JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES. * 22 
 
 As corporations must take and grant by the corporate name, so 
 by that name they must, in general, sue and be sued; 9 and they 
 * may sue by their true name of foundation, though they be better *21 
 known by another name. Thus, where the masters and scholars 
 of the Hall of Valens Mary, in Cambridge, brought a writ by that name, 
 which was the name of their foundation, though they were better 
 known by the name of Pembroke Hall, the writ was held good. 1 
 
 When a corporation by prescription has more than one name, it may 
 sue by the one name or the other, alleging that it and its predecessors 
 have from time immemorial been known, and been accustomed to plead, 
 by the one or by the other. 2 
 
 A suit by a corporation aggregate, to recover a thing due to it in its 
 corporate right, must not be brought in the name of its head alone, 
 but in the full corporate name, unless it appear that the Act of Parlia- 
 ment or charter by which it is constituted enables it to sue in the name 
 of its head; and though it appear that the head of a corporation is 
 enabled to sue in his own name for anything to which the corpora- 
 tion is entitled, it will not be precluded from suing by its name of 
 incorporation. 3 
 
 Where an Act of Parliament grants anything to a corporation, 
 the grant shall take effect, though the * true corporate name be *22 
 not used, provided the name actually used be a sufficient descrip- 
 tion of the corporation ; though it may be doubtful whether, in suing 
 
 John. 356; Sharon Canal Co. v. Fulton Bank, 
 7 Wend. 412; Chambers v. Bap. Educ. Soc. 1 
 B. Mon. 216; Le Grand v. Hampden Sidney- 
 College, 5 Munf. 324; Trustees of Lexington v. 
 M'Connell, 3 A. K. Marsh. 224 ; Central Manuf. 
 Co. v. Hartshorne, 3 Conn. 199; Bank of Or- 
 leans v. Skinner, 9 Paige, 305. In England, 
 partners may now sue and be sued in their firm 
 name. R. S. C. (1883) Ord. XVL 14, 15; Ord. 
 VII. 2; Ex parte Blain, 12 Ch. D. 522, 533; 
 Leathley v. McAndrew, W. N. (1875) 259; 
 Pike v. Keene, W. N. (1876) 36; 24 W. R. 
 322; Republic of Liberia v. Rove, 1 App. Cas. 
 139. 
 
 9 A corporation can be called upon to answer 
 only by its proper name. Biriney's case, 2 
 Bland, 99. So a corporation can sue only by 
 the name and style given to it by law. Porter 
 v. Neckervis, 4 Rand. 359. See Minot v. Curtis, 
 7 Mass. 444. In Winnipiseogee Lake Co. v. 
 Young, 40 N. H. 428, Bell C. J. said: "The 
 practice, we think, is nearly universal, that a 
 corporation is described in its bill by its cor- 
 porate name, with the addition of the fact that 
 it is a corporation duly established by law in 
 such a state, and having its place of business at 
 such a place; and a corporation defendant is 
 described in the same way. In the case of 
 public corporations created by public laws the 
 Court is officially to take notice of the cor- 
 porate character." See Withers v. Warner, 1 
 
 Str. 309. A law creating a bank, with author- 
 ity to issue circulating notes intended to con- 
 stitute the currency of the country, is a public 
 law, and need not be given in evidence. Wil- 
 liams i'. Union Bank, 2 Hum. 339. " But in the 
 case of private corporations, created by charters 
 or private Acts, the Court is not merely not 
 bound to take notice of the corporate names as 
 such, but they cannot officially take such notice. 
 The party is bound to allege it, as a fact to be 
 proved, if he would avail himself of it.'' See 
 also Union Fire Ins. Co. v Osgood, I Duer, 
 707; State v. Mead, 27 Vt. 722; State v. Cen- 
 tral Railroad Co. 28 Vt. 584; State v. Same, 28 
 Vt. 583; Camden &<\ v. Rower, 4 Barb. 127; 
 Bank v. Simonton, 2 Texas, 531. 
 
 A corporation may acquire a name by usage, 
 as by retaining its original name after a legisla- 
 tive change, and an adjudication in bankruptcy 
 made against it by the name so acquired is 
 valid. Alexander v. Berney, 28 N. J. Eq. 90. 
 
 1 44 Ed. HI. 35; 1 Kvd'on Corp. 253; and 
 see, as to title by which municipal corporations 
 must sue and be sued, Rochester v. Lee. 15 
 Sim. 376; Att.-Gen. r. Worcester, 2 Phil. 3; 1 
 Coop. temp. Cott. 18. 
 
 » See 9 Ed. IV. 21: 13 Hen. VII. 14: 16 
 Hen. VII. 1; and 21 Hen. VI. 4, which last 
 seems contra. 
 a 2 Salk. 451. 
 
 21
 
 * 23 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 to enforce its claim under that Act, it can use the name therein 
 mentioned. 1 
 
 A corporation, being a body whose identity is continuous, may 
 impeach transactions carried into effect in its own name by its 
 former governing body ; for the members of the governing body of the 
 corporation, as its agents, are bound to exercise its functions for the 
 purposes for which they were given, and to protect its interests and 
 property; and if such agents exercise those functions for the purpose 
 of injuring its interests, and alienating its property, the corporation is 
 not estopped from complaining, although the act done was ostensibly 
 an act of the corporation. 2 
 
 A corporation aggregate, whicli has a head, cannot sue or be sued 
 without it, because without it the corporation is incomplete. 3 It is 
 not, however, necessary to mention the name of the head; 4 nor is it 
 necessary, in the case of corporations aggregate, to name any of the 
 
 individual members by their proper Christian and surnames. 5 
 *23 *A corporation sole, suing for a corporate right, having two 
 
 capacities, a natural and a corporate, must always show in 
 what capacity he sues. 1 Thus, a bishop or prebendary, suing for land 
 which he claims in right of his bishopric or prebend, must describe 
 himself as bishop or prebendary; and if a parson sues for anything 
 in right of his parsonage, he ought to describe himself as parson. 
 A sole corporation differs in this respect from a corporation aggre- 
 gate, because the latter having only a corporate capacity, a suit in its 
 corporate name can be only in that capacity. 2 It also differs from 
 corporations aggregate, in that by the death of a corporation sole a suit 
 
 1 10 Mod. 207, 208; 1 Kyd on Corp. 256. A town may sue by the description of A & 
 
 A declaration, upon a promissory note, that it B, and the rest of the inhabitants of such town, 
 
 was made to the Medway Cotton Manufactory, instead of using; the corporate name merely, 
 
 a corporation, &c, by the name of K. 31. & Co., Barkhampstead v. Parsons, 3 Conn. 1. And a 
 
 was held good on demurrer. Medway Cotton county in Tennessee may sue in the name of t 1 e 
 
 Manufactory r. Adams, 10 3Iass. 360. See Justices composing the County Court. 3Iaury 
 
 Charitable Association v. Baldwin, 1 3Iet. 359: County r. Lewis County, ] Swan, 236. 
 Commercial Bank i\ French, 21 Pick. 586. If, 2 Att.-Gen. v. Wilson, C. & P. 1, 21, 24. 
 
 in a contract with a corporation, its name be so 3 2 Bae. Ab. tit. Corp. E. 2. 
 
 given as to distinguish it from other corpora- 4 1 Kyd on Corp 281. 
 
 tions, it is sufficient to support an action in the 5 2 Inst. 666. The corporation's " property 
 
 true corporate name. Hagerstown Turnpike v. is legally vested in itself, and not in its stock- 
 
 Creeger, 5 Har. & J. 122; S. P. Inhabitants of holders. As individuals they cannot, even by 
 
 Alloway Creek r. Strong, 5 Halst. 323; Berks joining together unanimously, convey a title to 
 
 and Dauphin Co. v. 3Iyers, 6 S. & R- 16; Wool- it, or maintain an action at law for its posses- 
 
 wich v. Forrest, Penning. 11: First Parish in sion, or for damages done to if. Nor can they 
 
 Sutton v. Cole. 3 Pick. 232; Mil. and Chil. make a contract that shall bind it, orenforce by 
 
 Turnpike Co. t. Brush, 10 Ohio, 111. action a contract that has been made with it." 
 
 A misnomer of a corporation in a grant or Chapman J. in Peabody v. Flint, 6 Allen, 55, 
 
 obligation will not prevent a recovery in the 56. See Kennebec & Port. R. R. Co. r. Port. & 
 
 true name, the latter being shown by proper Kennebec R. R. Co. 54 3Iaine, 173. Hence, in 
 
 averments. Bank of Tenn. v. Burke, 1 Coldw. Chancery, a suit by members in their corpo- 
 
 623. rate capacity does not become defective by the 
 
 Contracts made by mere servants or agents death of some of them. Blackburn v. Jepson. 
 
 of corporations may be sued in the name of the 3 Swanst 132, 138. 
 
 corporations. Binney v. Plumley. 5 Vt. 500. 1 2 Bac. Ab. tit. Corp. E. 2; Weston r. 
 
 See Proctor v. Webber, 1 Chip." 371; African Hunt, 2 Mass. 500. 
 Society v. Varick, 13 John. 38. 2 Ibid. 
 
 22
 
 CORPORATIONS AND JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES. * 24 
 
 by him, although instituted in his corporate capacity, becomes abated, 3 
 which is not the case, as we have seen, with respect to suits by corpo- 
 rations aggregate. 
 
 It is to be observed, that upon the death of a corporation sole, there 
 is a material distinction with regard to the right to revive. If the 
 plaintiff was entitled to the subject-matter of the suit for his own 
 benefit, his personal representatives are the parties to revive; but if he 
 was only entitled for the benefit of others, his successor is the person 
 who ought to revive. Thus, if the master of a hospital, or any simi- 
 lar corporation, institutes proceedings to recover the payment of an 
 annuity and dies, his successor shall have the arrears, and not his 
 executors, because he is entitled only as a trustee for the benefit of his 
 house; but it is otherwise in the case of a parson; there the executors 
 are entitled, and not the successor, because he was entitled to the 
 annuity for his own benefit. 4 On the same principle, if a rent due to 
 a dean and chapter be in arrear, and the dean dies, the rent belongs to 
 the succeeding dean and chapter ; but if the rent be due to the dean in 
 his sole corporate capacity, it shall go to his executors, and they must 
 revive. 5 
 
 Although corporations aggregate are entitled to sue in their cor- 
 porate capacity, the Court will not permit parties to assume a 
 * corporate character to which they are not entitled; and where *24 
 it appears sufficiently on the bill that the plaintiffs have assumed 
 such a character without being entitled to it, a demurrer will hold. 1 
 Thus, where a bill was filed by some of the members of a lodge of Free- 
 masons against others, for the delivery up of certain specific chattels, 
 in which bill there was great affectation of a corporate character 
 in stating their laws and constitutions, and the original charter by 
 which they were constituted, a demurrer was allowed "because the 
 Court will not permit persons who can only sue as partners, to sue in a 
 corporate character; and, upon principles of policy, the Courts of this 
 country do not sit to determine upon charters granted by persons who 
 have not the prerogative to grant them." 2 
 
 8 But see contra, Polk v. Plummer 2 Humph. Rank v. Simontor., 2 Texas, 531. See Mech- 
 
 500; Felts v. Mayor of Memphis, 2 He:i<l, 650; anics' Bank v. Goodwin, 2 Green, 439. A 
 
 Ezell v. Justices, 3 Head, 586; Anon. 1 Hayw. corporation chartered in one State may sue in 
 
 144. the Courts of another State. Williamson v. 
 
 4 1 Kyd on Corp. 77. Smoot, 7 Martin (La.), 31; Lucas v. Bank of 
 
 5 1 Kyd on Corp. 78. Georgia, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 147; New York Fire 
 
 1 Story, Eq. PI. § 497; see Livingston v. Ins. Co. v. Ely, 5 Conn. 560; Cape Fear Bank 
 Lynch, 4 John. Ch. 573, 596. P. Stinemetz, 1 Hill, 44; Hank of Michigan ''• 
 
 2 Lloyd v. Loaring, 6 Ves. 773; Womersley Williams, 5 Wend. 478; 7 Wend. 53'.i : Ports- 
 v. Merritt, L. R. 4 Eq. 695. A foreign corpo- mouth Livery Co. r. Watson, 10 M;i*s. 91 
 ration may sue in its corporate name in Chan- Taylor t'. Bank of Alexandria, 5 Leigh, 471 
 eery, as well as at Law. Silver Lake Bank v. Bank of Edwardsville v Simpson, 1 Mo. 184 
 North, 4 John. Ch. 372; Story Eq. PL § 55; Lothrop v. Commercial Bank of Scioto, 8 
 Society for Propagating the Gospel v Wheeler, Dana, 114; New Jersey Pro'ection Bank v. 
 2 Gall. 105; Society for Propagating the Thorp, 6 Cowen, 46; Pendleton ?•. Bmk of 
 Gospel v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464; South Kentucky, 1 Monroe, 171; Taylor p. Bank or 
 Carolina Bank »>. Case, 8 B. & C. 427; Bank Illinois, 7 Monroe, 584; Bank of Marietta v. 
 of Scotland v. Kerr, 8 Sim. 246; Collins Co. Pindall, 2 Rand. 465; Reed v. Conococheqne 
 v. Brown, 3 K. & J. 423; 3 Jur. N. S. 929; Bank, 5 Rand. 326; Bank of Augusta V. Earle, 
 Prioleau v. United State, L. R. 2 Eq. 668; The 13 Peters, 519; Stewart v. U. S. Ins. Co. 9 
 
 23
 
 25 
 
 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 A suit may be brought in England by a foreign corporation, in its 
 corporate name and capacity, 8 and in pleading it is not necessary that 
 it should set forth the proper names of the persons who form such cor- 
 poration, or show how it was incorporated; 4 though, if it is denied, iu 
 must prove that by the law of the foreign country it was effectually 
 
 incorporated. 5 
 * 25 * Although corporations aggregate are entitled to sue in their 
 
 corporate capacity, the court will not permit suits to be brought 
 by persons assuming a corporate character to which they are not 
 entitled; 1 when however there are numerous parties having the same 
 interest, one or more may sue as individuals on behalf of themselves 
 and the other persons interested. 2 
 
 By the 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vic. c. 73, the sovereign is empowered to 
 grant letters-patent, establishing companies, and providing that the 
 companies so established shall be able to sue and be sued by their 
 public officer; and many joint-stock companies or associations for 
 insurance, trading, and other purposes, have from time to time been 
 established by special Acts of Parliament, which, although they have 
 not formed them into corporations, have still conferred upon them 
 many privileges, in consequence of which such companies have acquired 
 something of a corporate character; amongst other privileges so con- 
 ferred, may be reckoned that of suing and being sued in the name of 
 their public officer. 3 
 
 Where, however, any members of a company, established under 
 these Acts, wish to sue the directors or others who are members as well 
 
 Watts, 126; Miss. R. Co. v. Gaster, 20 Ark. 
 455; B:ink of Washtenaw v. Montgomery, 2 
 Scam. 422; Guaga Iron Co. v. Dawson, 
 4 Blackf. 202; Mechanics' Bank v. Goodwin, 
 2 Green, 239; Lewis v. Bank of Kentucky, 
 12 Ohio, 132. A State is a corporation, and 
 may sue as such in another State. Delafield v. 
 Illinois, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 159, S. C. 8 Paige, 
 527; Hines v. North Carolina, 10 Sm. & M. 
 529. 
 
 3 See preceding note. 
 
 4 Angell & Ames, Corp. § 632. 
 
 5 Dutch West India Co. v. Van Moyses, 
 2 Ld. Ray. 1535; 1 Strange, 612. As to the 
 necessity of proving the corporate existence of 
 a foreign corporation, see School District r. 
 Blaisdell, 6 N. H. 198; Lord r. Bigelow, 8 Vt. 
 445; Society &c. v. Young, 2 N. H. 310; The 
 Guaga Iron Co. v. Dawson. 4 Blackf. 203; 
 Portsmouth Livery Co. v. Watson, 10 Mass. 
 92; Bank v. Simonton, 2 Texas, 531. 
 
 In case of foreign corporations, the plain- 
 tiffs, under the general issue, are bound to 
 show their corporate capacity, but the Court 
 will take notice, ex officio, of the capacity of 
 corporations created in Ohio to sue in that 
 State. Lewis v. Bank of Kentucky, 12 Ohio, 
 132; see Agnew v. Bank of Gettysburg, 2 Har. 
 & G. 478; Portsmouth Liverv Co. v. Watson, 
 
 24 
 
 10 Mass. 92; Eagle Bank of New Haven v. 
 Chapin, 3 Pick. 180; Carmichael r. Trustees of 
 School Lands, 3 How. (Miss.) 84; Wil iams 
 v. Bank of Michigan, 7 AVend. 539; Bank of 
 Waterville v. W. W. Bk. 13 How. Pr. 270; 
 Zion Church v. St. Peter's Church, 5 W. & 
 S. 215; Winnipiseogee Lake Co. v. Young, 40 
 N. H. 420, 428. 
 
 1 Lloyd v. Loaring, 6 Ves. 779; Womersley 
 v. Merritt, L. R. 4 Eq. 695. 
 
 2 See Chancey v. May, Prec. in Ch. 592; 
 Good v. Blewitt, 13 Ves. 397; Cockburn v. 
 Thompson, 16 Ves. 321, 325 ; Pearce v. Piper, 17 
 Ves. l;BIain v Agar,] Sim. 37, 43; 2 Sim. 289; 
 Gray v. Chaplain, 2 S. & S. 267, 272; 2 Russ. 
 126; Van Samlau r. Moore, 1 Russ. 441; Lund 
 v. Blanchard, 4 Hare, 290, 292; Womersley v. 
 Merritt, L. R. 4 Eq. 695, V. C. M.; and see 
 pout. Chap. V. § 1, Purties; R. S. C. Ord. 
 XVI. 9. 
 
 3 For the history of such companies, and of 
 the provisions regulating them, see Van San- 
 dan r. Moore, 1 Russ. 441, 458. As to abate- 
 ment by death of a public officer, see 7 
 Geo. IV. c. 46. § 9, and Burmester v. Baron 
 von Stenz, 23 Beav. 32. For form of order to 
 substitute a new officer, see Meek v. Burnley, 
 M. R. 12 Jan., 1863, Reg. Lib. B. 6; and 2 
 Seton, 1528, No. 5.
 
 CORPORATIONS AND JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES. 
 
 26 
 
 as themselves, they may maintain such a suit in their own individual 
 capacities, either suing by themselves, and making the rest of 
 the company * defendants, or suing on behalf of themselves and *26 
 the other members of the association. 1 Although the rights and 
 
 1 Hichens v. Congreve, 4 Russ. 562; Wall- 
 worth v. Holt, 4 M. & C. 619, 635; Colman v. 
 Eastern Counties Ry. Co. 10 Beav. 1'; Bag- 
 sliaw v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co. 7 Hare, 114; 
 2 M. N. & G. 389; Heath v. Ellis, 12 Met. 
 601; Allen v. Curtis, 26 Conn. 456; Putnam v. 
 Sweet, 1 Chand. (Wis.) 286; Saekett's Harbor 
 Bank v. Blake, 3 Rich. Eq. 225; Cunliffe v. 
 Manchester and Bolton Canal Co. 1 M. & R. 
 131, note; Manderson v. Commercial Bank, 28 
 Penn. 379; Bait. & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Wheel- 
 ing, 13 Gratt. 40. 
 
 Peabody v- Flint, 6 Allen, 52; Robinson v. 
 
 (a) Lambert v. Neuchatel Asphalt Co. 51 
 L. J. Ch. 882; Pickering v. Stephenson, L. R. 
 14 Eq. 322; Ward v. Sittintfbourne &c. Ry. 
 Co. L. R. 9 Ch. 488; Isle of Wight Ry. Co. v. 
 Tahourdin, 25 Ch. D. 320; Studdert y."Grosve- 
 nor, 33 Ch. D. 528; Sellers v. Phcunix Ins. 
 Co. 13 Fed. Rep. 20. Formerly it was held 
 that a suit in Equity will not be entertained by 
 a shareholder of a public company on behalf 
 of himself and other shareholders, to restrain 
 the directors from acts alleged to be ultra 
 vires, when he really sues by direction of a 
 rival company and to protect its interests. 
 Forrest r. Manchester &c. Ry. Co. 9 W. R. 
 818, affirming 30 Beav. 40; Seaton v. Grant, 
 36 L. J. Ch. 638; L. R. 2 Ch. 465. See Russell 
 v. Wakefield Waterworks Co. L. R. 20 Eq. 
 474. But it has since been held that the share- 
 holder, though chargeable with mala Jides, was 
 entitled to have his right enforced. Bloxom 
 v. Met. Ry. Co. L. R. 3 Ch. 337; Mutter v. 
 Eastern & M. Ry. Co. 38 Ch. D. 92. As to 
 the use of the company's name as plaintiff by 
 a member or the directors, see Pender o. Lush- 
 ington, 6 Ch. D. 70; Duckett v. Gover, id. 82; 
 Mason v. Harris, 11 Ch. I). 97; Harben v. 
 Phillips, 23 Ch. D. 14; Ruston v. Tobin, W N. 
 (1880) 19; post, p. 242: Cape Breton Co. v 
 b'enn, 17 Ch. D. 198. Even when the use of 
 the company's name is unauthorized, it may 
 be stricken out as plaintiff, and liberty given 
 to amend by adding its name as defendant. 
 Silber Light Co. v. Silber, 12 Ch. D. 717; 27 
 W. R. 427. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 
 450; Detroit v. Dean, 106 U. S. 537. A share- 
 holder who sues the company may obtain dis- 
 covery of privileged communications between 
 the company and its legal advisers relating to 
 the subject-matter of the action, if paid for 
 with the funds of the company Gouroud v. 
 Edison & G. Tel. Co. 57 L. J. Ch. 498. 
 
 The directors of a public company are trus- 
 
 Smith, 3 Paige, 222; see Hersey v. Veazie, 24 
 Maine, 9; Smith v. Poor, 40 Maine, 415; 
 Schley v. Dixon, 24 Ga. 273; Kean v. John- 
 son 1 Stockt. 401 ; Binney's case, 3 Bland, 
 142, Revere v. Boston Copper Co. 15 Pick. 
 351, see Durfee v. Old Colony R. Co. 5 Allen, 
 230. Ordinarily, where the act complained of 
 is capable of confirmation by the corporation 
 or company, redress should be first sought 
 through the company, (a) Foss v. Harbottle, 
 2 Hare, 461; Mozley v. Alston, 1 Phil. 790; 
 McDougaU v. Gardiner, 1 Ch. D 14; infra, 
 p. 243. But if the action of the corpora- 
 
 tees of their powers for the shareholders, but 
 not for the creditors. Re Wincham Shipbuild- 
 ing Co. 9 Ch. D. 322. They are not necessarily 
 liable for the representations of co-directors 
 and other officers. Cargill v. Bower, 38 L. T. 
 779. 
 
 A suit cannot be maintained by a corpora- 
 tion organized under a void charter. Doboy & 
 Union Tel Co v De Magathias, 25 Fed. Rep. 
 697. Lack of a corporate existence is plead- 
 able in abatement or bar; lack of capacity to 
 sue in the particular case, in abatement only. 
 Oregonian Ry. Co. v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co. 
 23 Fed Rep. 232. 
 
 Rule 94 of the U. S. Supreme Court (zee post, 
 Vol. III.) requires that a bill by a shareholder 
 against the corporation, founded upon a right 
 which it may assert, shall specify the plaintiffs 
 efforts to obtain its action, and the reasons of 
 his failure. See Leo v Union Pac. Ry. Co. 
 17 Fed. Rep. 273; McHenry v. New York, P. 
 & O. R. Co. 22 id. 130; Ranger v. Champion 
 Cotton-Press Co. 52 id. 611, and see Quincv v. 
 Steel, 120 U. S. 241; Bacon v. Robertson', 18 
 How 480. Hence the bill of one stockholder 
 on behalf of himself and the other stockholders 
 for an accounting must show the use of all 
 proper means on his part to induce the corpo- 
 ration and stockholders to take action in the 
 matter complained of; its financial ability to 
 act, or the offer of proper indemnity for legal 
 proceedings. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 
 450; Huntington v. Palmer, id. 482; Daun- 
 meyer v Coleman, 8 Sawyer, 51 ; 11 Fed Rep. 
 97; Morgan v. Kansas Pac. Ry Co. 15 id 55; 
 Bill v, W. U. Tel. Co. 16 id. 14;"Foote ». Cunard 
 Mining Co. 17 id. 46 ; Foster v. Mansfield &C. R. 
 Co. 36 id. 627: see Hansom Cab Co. v. Verkes, 
 141 III. 320; Alexander v. Searcy, 81 Ga. 536; 
 Knoop v. Bohmrich, 49 N. J. Fq. 82; Hazard r. 
 Durant, 19 Fed. Rep. 471. If the suit is suc- 
 cessful, and the conduct of the corporation is 
 
 25
 
 26 
 
 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 duties of the public officer are chiefly to sue and be sued on behalf of the 
 company, in matters arising between the company on the one hand, 
 
 tion is controlled by stock procured by the 
 fraud complained of, the bill by one share- 
 holder on behalf of himself and all other 
 shareholders will be sustained. Atwool v. 
 Merryweather, L. R. 5 Eq. 464, note. And 
 see Hodges v. New England Screw Co. 1 R. I. 
 312; March v. Eastern R. Co. 40 N. H. 567. 
 So if the act complained of is ultra vires of 
 the corporate powers, Clinch v. Financial 
 Corporation, L. R. 5 Eq. 450; S. C. 4 Ch. 
 117; Gray v. Lewis, L. R. 8 Eq. 526; and see 
 infra, 243, note. Or if the act is intended to 
 prevent the shareholder from exercising his 
 legal right to vote, Cannon v. Trask, L. R. 
 20 Eq. 669; Pender v. Lushington,6 Ch. D. 70. 
 Or where the majority of an incorporated 
 company propose to benefit themselves at the 
 expense of the minority, Menier v. Hooper's 
 Telegraph Works, L." R. 9 Ch. 350. Or 
 where the directors so act as to prevent a 
 
 condemned, such stockholder is entitled to be 
 reimbursed from the corporate funds, his actual 
 expenditures and attorney's fees. Meeker v. 
 Winthrop Iron Co. 17 Fed. Rep. 48. Those 
 acting in a transaction which violates the rights 
 of a minority of the stockholders are proper 
 parties to a suit in equity by the minority, 
 although the transaction has been ratified by 
 the majority. Ervin r. Oregon Ry. & Nav. 
 Co. 27 Fed. Rep. 625. An assignee of railroad 
 stock, who has not registered it, or been rec- 
 ognized as a stockholder, cannot sue in behalf 
 of himself and other stockholders to restrain 
 ultra vires acts. Brown v. Duluth &c. R. Co. 
 53 Fed. Rep. 889. And even a stockholder 
 must act promptly in such case. Rabe v. 
 Dunlap (N. J.), 25 Atl. Rep. 959. 
 
 The corporation is a necessary party where 
 its transactions with others are sought to be set 
 aside by such a bill. Bell v. Donohue, 17 Fed. 
 Rep. 710. As to non-resident corporations, see 
 Walser v. Seligman, 13 Fed. Rep. 415. In 
 general, the corporation is a necessary party to 
 any suit in Equity which involves its property 
 or business interests. See, under different cir- 
 cumstances, Swan Land & Cattle Co. v. Frank, 
 148 U. S. 603; 39 Fed. Rep. 456; St. Louis&c. 
 Ry. Co. v. Wilson, 114 U. S. 60; Sully i\ 
 Drennan, 113 U. S. 287; Davenport v. Dows, 
 18 Wall. 626; Dewing v. Perdicaries, 96 U. S. 
 193; Wellman v. Howland O. & I. Works, 19 
 Fed. Rep. 51; Walsh v. Memphis &c. R. Co 
 id. 152; 6 id. 797; Mayer v. Denver &c R. Co. 
 41 id. 723; Flour City Nat. Bank v. Wechsel- 
 berg, 45 id. 547, Rogers v. Van Nortwick, id. 
 513 ; Vinal v. Continental C. & I. Co. 35 id. 
 673; 136 U. S. 653; Hazard v. Durant, 11 R. 
 1. 195, 207; Price v Minot, 107 Mass. 49; Dear- 
 
 26 
 
 majority of the members from exercising a 
 proper control over the affairs of the company. 
 McDougall v. Gardiner, L. R. 20 Eq. 383 ;1 
 Ch D. 13, L. R. 10 Ch. 606. Where the object 
 of the suit is to recover damages from an officer 
 of a corporation for a fraudulent misappropria- 
 tion or conversion of the corporate property, 
 the action can only be brought by a stockholder 
 after application to and refusal by the corpora- 
 tion to sue. Greaves v. Gouge, 69 N. Y. 154; 
 Black v. Huggins, 2 Tenn. Ch. 780. And so 
 where the suit is against a third person for a 
 wrong to the detriment of the corpora'ion, one 
 stockholder may sue for himself and others 
 where he has first rmde an application to the 
 directors of the company to institute the suit, 
 and they have refused. Duckett v. Gover, 6 
 Ch. D. 82; Memphis v. Dean, 8 Wall. 73, 
 Bronson v. La Crosse R. Co. 2 Wall. 28 5; 
 Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Memphis 
 
 field v. Nims, 110 Mass. 115; Lyman i\ Bonney, 
 101 Mass. 562; Pope v. Leonard, 115 Mass 286. 
 See Bogardus v. Rosendale Manuf. Co. 7 N. Y. 
 147, 151 : Patterson v. Lynde, 112 III. 196 ; 
 Turner V. Alabama Mining Co. 25 111. App. 
 144; Atlanta Real Estate Co. v. Atlanta Na- 
 tional Bank, 75 Ga. 40; Dixon v. Sumner 
 County Com'rs, 25 Kansas, 519; Fiery v. Em- 
 mert, 36 Md. 464; Hurst v. Coe, 30 W. Ya. 
 158; Camp o. Taylor (N. J.), 19 Atl. 968; Allen 
 i'. Turner, 11 Gray, 436; Samis r. King, 40 
 Conn. 298. The corporation has been held not 
 to be a necessary party to a suit to require its 
 officers to register a transfer of its stock. Gould 
 v. Head, 41 Fed. Rep. 240. So, upon a bill 
 which prays for the reconveyance of shares of 
 stock in a bank obtained by conspiracy and 
 fraud, and an injunction against their transfer, 
 the bank is not a proper parly, if no charges are 
 made against it. Dennis r. Perry, 12 R. I. 540. 
 See Alexander v. Katte, 10 Abb. N. Cas. 443; 
 63 How. Pr. 262. 
 
 In a suit for deceit or fraud against the di- 
 rectors of a company, proof of a false statement 
 made by them carelessly and without reason- 
 able ground for believing it true, does not 
 establish fraud, although it may be evidence of 
 fraud. Deny v. Peck, 14 App Cas. 337; 61 
 L. T. 265; 37" Ch. D. 541; Glazier v. Roll< No. 
 1, 42 Ch. D. 436. See Bishop v. Balkis Cons. 
 Co. 25 Q. B. D. 77, 512; Low v. Bouverie, 
 [1891] 3Ch 82; 65 L T. 533; Angus v Clif- 
 ford, [1891] 2 Ch. 449; 63 L. T. 684; Scholes 
 v. Brook, 63 L. T 837; Knox v. Hayman, 67 
 L. T. 137; Tomkinson v. Balkis Cons. Co. 
 [1891] 2 Q. B. 614; 64 L. T. 816; Cann w. 
 Willson, 39 Ch. D. 39.
 
 CORPORATIONS AND JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES. 
 
 26 
 
 and strangers or persons who are not partners on the other, yet it 
 seems that the public officer may also institute proceedings against 
 certain of the directors, in respect to past transactions, to compel 
 them to refund sums alleged to be due from them to the partnership. 2 
 
 The Statute 7 & 8 Vic. c. 110 was, from the year 1844 until the 
 passing of "The Joint-Stock Companies' Act, 1856," 3 the statute which 
 regulated the constitution and management of almost all joint-stock 
 companies; 4 and questions may still occur with reference to companies 
 constituted under it; 5 but it was repealed, as to all future companies, 
 by § 107 of the last-mentioned Act; and that section was repealed and 
 re-enacted by the 20 & 21 Vic. c. 14, § 23. The Act of 1856, as modi- 
 fied by the Joint-Stock Companies' Acts of 1857 and 1858, regulated 
 the constitution and management of joint-stock companies uutil the 
 passing of "The Companies' Act, 1862, " 6 which repealed these Acts, 
 but consolidated and re-enacted them; and this last-mentioned Act has 
 been amended by "The Companies' Acts, 1867, 1877, 1879, and 1880. 7 
 For the present purpose, however, it is sufficient to observe, that all 
 companies constituted under these Acts became and still become, upon 
 certificate of incorporation, a body corporate, by the name prescribed 
 in the memorandum of association. 8 
 
 Gayoso Gas Co. v. Williamson, 9 Heisk. 314 ; 
 Cogswell v. Bull, 29 Gal. 320; Charleston Ins. 
 & Tr. Co. V. Sebrig, 5 Rich. Eq. 342 ; Bayless 
 v. Orne, 1 Freem. Ch. 173. Sec also, for cases 
 in which bills by shareholders have been sus- 
 tained under exceptional circumstances, many 
 of the cases cited in the first part of this note, 
 and Gray v. Lewis, L. R. 8 Ch 1035; L. R. 8 
 Eq. 526; Hazard v. Durant, 11 R. I. 195. In 
 this last case, the English authorities are 
 reviewed, and it is held that a general allega- 
 tion of " often requested " is a sufficient aver- 
 ment of a request of the corporation to sue, as 
 a matter of pleading, and that a request made 
 to an executive committee of aboard of man- 
 agers, to whom the authority of the corporation 
 had been delegated, sustained the averment. 
 And if the bill shows a state of facts from 
 which it appears that a request would be una- 
 vailing, no request, it seems, is necessary. 
 Brewer v Boston Theatre, 104 Mass. 378, 389. 
 And see Speering's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 1. And 
 when the same persons were directors in two 
 corporations, one of which was indebted to the 
 other, and, being more largely interested in the 
 debtor corporation, were about to discontinue 
 an action on the demand, then barred by the 
 Statute of Limitations, a receiver was appointed, 
 at the instance of a stockholder of the creditor 
 company, to carry on the suit. Hazzard r. 
 Credit Mobilier, 7 Rep. 360, U. S. C. C. Pa. 
 
 2 See Harrison r. Rrown, 5 De G. & S. 728; 
 and see Sedden v. Connell, 10 Sim. 58, 76. 
 
 8 19 & 20 Vic. c. 47. 
 
 4 This Act did not apply to banking and 
 insurance companies. See § 2. 
 
 s See Womerslev v. Merritt, L. R. 4 Eq. 
 695. 
 
 6 25 & 26 Vic. c. 89. 
 
 ' 30 & 31 Vic. c. 131: 40 & 41 Vic. c. 26; 
 42 & 43 Vic. c. 76: 43 Vic. c. 19. 
 
 8 By 25 & 26 Vic. c. 89, § 69. where there is 
 reason to believe that the assets of a limited 
 company, suing in Equity, may be insufficient 
 for payment of costs, the company mav lie re- 
 quired to give security for costs. See Australian 
 Steam Co. o Fleming, 4 K. & J. 407; Caillaud's 
 Co. v. Caillaud, 26 Beav. 427: 5 .Tur. N. S.259; 
 Southampton &c. Co. v. Rawlins. 2 N. R. 544, 
 M. R.; 9 Jur. N S. 887; Southampton &c. Co. 
 v. Pinnock, 11 W. R. 978. M. R.; Washoe 
 Mining Co. v. Ferguson, L. R. 2 Eq. 371, 
 V. C. W. The security must be given where, 
 the company being in a course of winding-up, 
 the suit is by the official liquidator. Freehold 
 Land & Brickmaking Co. v. Spargo, W. N. 
 (1868) 94, M. R .; and it may be required 
 where the company is plaintiff in a cross-suit. 
 City of Moscow Gas Co. v. Int'l Financial 
 Society, L. R. 7 Ch. 225; 20 W. R. 196; Acci- 
 dental & Marine Ins. Co. i\ Mercati, L. R. 3 
 Eq. 200, V. C. W. The security is not con- 
 fined to £100, I ut is in the judge's discretion, 
 and must usually be for an amount equal to 
 the probable amount of costs payable. Imperial 
 Bank of India o. Bank of Hindustan, L. R 1 
 Ch. 437: 12 Jur. N. S. 493, L. J.I., overruling 
 Australian Steam Company t\ Fleming, ubi 
 supra ; and see pott, p. 33. See R. S. ('. I,V. 2 
 (Ord. Feb., 1876, n. 7); Western of Canada 
 Oil Lands & Works Co. v. Walker, L. R. 10 
 Ch.628; W. N. (1875) 209, T.C. M.; Brockle- 
 
 27
 
 27 
 
 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 * 27 * Section IV. — Persons residing out of the Jurisdiction. 
 
 The rule that all persons, not lying under the disabilities after 
 pointed out, are entitled to maintain a suit as plaintiffs in the Court of 
 Chancery, is not affected by the circumstance of their being resident 
 out of the jurisdiction of the Court, unless they be alien enemies, or 
 are resident in the territory of an enemy without a license or authority 
 from the government here. 1 
 
 In order, however, to prevent the defendant or respondent, in the 
 case of a petition, from being defeated of his right to costs, it is a rule, 
 that if the plaintiff ' 2 or his next friend, 3 or the petitioner 4 (a) if he is not 
 
 bank r. King's Lynn Steamship Co. 3 C P. 
 D. 365; costs already incurred, Rhodes v. 
 Dawson, 16 Q. B. D. 548. On an application 
 for an injunction by a limited company, the 
 Court will require an undertaking as to dam- 
 ages by some responsible person. Anglo-Dan u- 
 bian Co. v. Rogerson, 10 Jur. N. S. 87, M. R. ; 
 Pacific Steamship Co. v. Gibbs, 14 W. R. 218, 
 V. C. W. In England, as to discovery from a 
 corporation or company, see R. S. C. Ord. XXI. 
 4 ; Massey v. Allen, W. N. (1878) 246, V. C. 
 H. Partners may now sue there in the firm 
 name, their names and residences being sup- 
 plied upon demand. R. S. C. Ord. VII. 2 ; 
 Ord. XVI. 10, 11; Ord. XXXI. 21; Ord. XLII. 
 5, 20. See Ex parte Blain, In re Sawyer, 12 
 Ch 522, 533; Leathley v. McAndrew, W. N. 
 (1875) 259; Republic of Liberia i". Rove, 1 
 A pp. Cas. 139 ; Pike v. Keene, W. N. (1876) 
 36 ; 24 W. R. 322. As to suits by official man- 
 agers under the Winding-up Acts, see 25 & 26 
 Vic. c. 89, §§ 95, 133 (7); and see §§ 87, 151, 
 195, 202; Turquand v. Kirby, L. R. 4 Eq 123, 
 M. R.; Turquand v. Marshall, L. R. 6 Eq. 112, 
 
 (ti) A petit'oner in a winding-up petition, 
 who was resident abroad, and who had obtained 
 judgment in an undefended action against a 
 company, was not required to give security for 
 costs upon the company's application. In re 
 Contract and Agency Co. 57 L. J. Ch. 5. See 
 Re Sturiris, M. P. Syndicate, 53 L. T. 715; 34 
 W. R. 163 Where it appeared that the plain- 
 tiff in a suit had sufficient property in Eneland 
 to pay the costs in case he should fail, the Court 
 on appeal discharged the order for security. Re 
 Howe Sewing Machine, 41 Ch. D. 118. See In 
 re Apollinaris Co.'s Trade Marks (1891), 1 Ch. 
 1. See also Hamburger r. Poetting, 30 W. R. 
 769. So if the defendant has in his possession 
 money of the plaintiff, or has delayed unreason- 
 ably in making his application, and the plaintiff 
 has meanwhile incurred expense, an order for 
 security for costs will not be made. Duffy v. 
 Joyce, 25 L. R. Ir. 42. The right to demand 
 security for costs may be lost by laches. See 
 28 
 
 M. R.; L. R. 4 Ch. 376, 382, L. C; 11 & 
 12 Vic. c. 45, §§ 50, 52. 53, 60; Ernest ». 
 Weiss, 2 Dr. & Sm. 561; 9 Jur. N. S. 145; 
 Stringer's case, id. 475; Leeds Estate &c. 
 Co. v. Shepherd, 36 Ch D. 787; Overend & 
 Gurney Co. v. Gibb, L. R. 5 H. L. 480, L. R. 
 4 Ch. 701 ; Mason v. La Soctete' des Metaux, 37 
 W. R. 735 (foreign company's property); 1 
 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) p. 310. As to 
 suits by liquidators, see 19 & 20 Vic. c 47, 
 §§ 90, 102 (7) ; 21 & 22 Vic. c. 60, § 6; Massey 
 v. Allen, W. N. (1878) 246, V. C. H. ' 
 i Story Eq. PI. §§ 51-54. 
 
 2 Though suing as executor or administrator, 
 Knight v. De Blaquiere, Sau. & S. 648 ; Mur- 
 free v. Leeper, 1 Overt. 1. 
 
 3 Kerr v. Gillespie, 7 Beav. 269. 
 
 4 Drever v. Maudesley, 5 Russ. 11 ; Ex 
 parte Seidler, 12 Sim. 106; Re Norman, 11 
 Beav. 401; Atkins v. Cooke, 3 Drew. 694; 
 Partington v. Reynolds, 6 W. R. 307 ; Re 
 Llangynog Lead "Mining Co. 23 W. R. 587; 
 Re Home Assurance Ass. L. R. 12 Eq. 112. 
 
 Ibid.; Sims v. Bonner, 16 N. Y. S- 800; Fagan 
 v. Strong, 11 id. 766; International & G. N. 
 Ry. Co. v. Williams, 82 Texas, 342. By 
 applying for security for costs a defendant 
 waives any objection as to service. Lhoneux 
 v. Hong Kong & S. Banking Co. 33 Ch. D. 
 446. 
 
 Other recent English cases upon security 
 for costs, by a company, or upon a petition 
 for winding up a company, are: Northampton 
 Coal Co. v. Midland Waggon Co. 7 Ch. D. 
 500; Re Aberavon Tin Plate Co. 59 L T. 498; 
 Lydney & Wigpool Iron Ore Co. v. Bird, 23 
 Ch. D. 358; Pure Spirit Co. v. Fowler, 25 
 Q. B. D. 235 ; Leeds Estate Co. v. Shepherd, 36 
 Ch. D. 787; Re Howe Sewing Machine Co. 
 41 Ch. D. 118; Re Criterion Gold M. Co. id. 
 146; Re Paper Bottle Co. 40 Ch. D. 52; Re 
 Equestrian & P. B Co. 1 Meg. 166; Ryan 
 v. Ring, 25 L. R. Ir. 186.
 
 PERSONS RESIDING OUT OF THE JURISDICTION. 
 
 *28 
 
 a party to the cause, 5 is resident abroad, the Court will, on the appli- 
 cation of the defendant, or respondent, order him to give security for 
 the costs of the suit or petition, and in the mean time direct all pro- 
 ceedings to be stayed; 6 and such an order may be made where a 
 foreign government is the plaintiff. 7 *A plaintiff resident in *28 
 Ireland 1 or Scotland may, it seems, be ordered to give security 
 for costs. 2 (a) 
 
 Where there is a co-plaintiff resident in England, the Court will not 
 make an order that a plaintiff who is abroad shall give security for 
 costs ; 3 and where the plaintiff is abroad as a land or sea officer in the 
 
 6 Cochrane v. Fearon, 18 Jur. 568. 
 
 6 Fox v. Blew, 5 Mad. 147; Lillie v. Lillie, 
 2 M. & K. 404; Lautour v. Holcombe, 1 Phil. 
 202, 204; Newman v. Landrine, 14 N. J. Eq. 
 291 ; Barker v. Lidwell, 1 Jones & Lat. 703. 
 And it lias been h»ld that in default of the 
 plaintiff giving security for costs when ordered, 
 his bill should be dismissed. Carnac v. Grant, 
 1 Sim. 348; Massey v. Gillelan, 1 Paige, 644; 
 Breeding v. Finley, 1 Dam, 477; Bridges v. 
 Canfield, 2 Edw. Ch. 217. But if the non- 
 resident plaintiff sues as executor or adminis- 
 trator, it has been held, that the defendant 
 cannot compel security for costs. Goodrich v. 
 Pendleton, 3 John. Ch. 520: Catchcart v. Hew- 
 son, 1 Hayes, 173. Especially after plea, 3 
 John. Ch. 520. As to giving security where all 
 the plaintiffs are out of, but the next friend is 
 within, the jurisdiction, see Lander v. Parr, 16 
 L. J. Ch. 269, L. C. 
 
 7 Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger, 3 Ch. 
 D. 62. Where a plaintiff appears to have no 
 permanent residence, he will be made to give 
 security for costs. Bailey v. Gundry, 1 Keen, 
 53; Flayer v. Anderson, 15 Sim. 104; 10 Jur. 
 169 ; and see Calvert v. Day, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 
 217 ; Sibbering v. Earl of Balcarras, 1 De G. & 
 S. 683; 12 Jur. 108; Hurst v. Padwick, 12 
 Jur. 21; Liimley v. Hughes, 2 W R. 112; 
 Manby v. Bewicke, 8 De G. M. & G. 468 ; 2 
 
 (a) A foreigner who usually resides abroad, 
 but resides temporarily in England in order 
 to enforce a claim by action, cannot be required 
 to give security for costs. Redondo v. Chaytor, 
 4 Q. B. D. 453. And in Ebrard v. Gassier, 28 
 Ch. D. 232, following this decision, it was held 
 that, where one of the plaintiffs, who were 
 par ners, came to England after an order 
 was made, although for a temporary purpose, 
 the defendants were not entitled to security for 
 costs. See also Hamburger v. Poetting, 47 
 L. T. 249; Re Cornwall, 15 L. R. Ir 144. The 
 Order LXIII. r. 15, was made for the purpose 
 of overruling Redondo v. Chaytor. See Re 
 Apollinaris Co.'s Trade Marks (i891), 1 Ch. 1 ; 
 63 L. T. 502, which also holds that, where 
 an appellant resides abroad, and it is clear that 
 
 Jur. N. S. 671; Oldale v. Whitcher, 5 Jur. 
 N S. 84, V. C. K., Knight v. Cory. 9 id. 491, 
 V. C. W.; Dick v. Munder, 11 id. 819; 13 W. 
 R. 1013, M. R. The rule extends to the next 
 friend of a plaintiff. See Kerr v. Gillespie, 7 
 Beav. 269 ; Watts v. Kelly, 6 W. R. 206. 
 
 1 Hill v. Reardon, 6 Mad. 46; Moloney r. 
 Smith, 1 M'Cl. & Y. 213; and see, as to plain- 
 tiff resident in Ireland suing here in other cases, 
 Craig v. Bolton, 2 Bro. C. C. 609. See also 
 Mullett v. Christmas, 2 Ball & B. 422; Stack- 
 poole «. Callaghan, 1 Ball & B. 566. 
 
 2 Kerr r. Duchess of Minister, Bunb. 35; Ex 
 parte Latta, 3 De G. & S. 186. See 31 & 
 32 Vic c. 54, § 5; Raeburn v. Andrews, L. R. 
 9 Q. B. 118; Re East Llangvnog Lead Mining 
 Co. W. N. (1875) 81 ; 23 W. R. 587, M. R. See 
 also R. S. C. Ord. LV.; Garnett v. Bradlev, 3 
 App. Cas. 944; 2 Ex. D. 349. 
 
 8 Winthrop v. Royal Exch. Ass. Co. 1 Dick. 
 282; Walker v. Easterby, 6 Ves. 612; Green 
 v. Charnock, 1 Sumner's Ves. 396, and note 
 (a); D'Hormusgee v. Grey, 10 Q. B. D. 13; 
 Orr v. Bowles, 1 Hodges, 23: Doe v. Roe, id. 
 315; Gilbert v. Gilbert, 2 Paige, 603; Burgess 
 v. Gregory, 1 Edw. Ch. 439. This rule does not 
 apply where a husband, who has no substantial 
 interest, is co-plaintiff with his wife. Smith v. 
 Etches, 1 H. & M. 711; 10 Jur. N. S. 124. 
 No indorser is required in Massachusetts, where 
 
 the respondent will find within the jurisdiction 
 ample assets on which he can levy execution, 
 security for costs will not be ordered. As to 
 security for costs upon a motion for a new trial, 
 see Hecksher v Crosley (1891), Q. B. 224: 39 
 W. R. 211 ; Walklin v. Johns, 7 T. L. R. 181. 
 See generally, Michiels v. The Empire Palace, 
 60 L. T. 132; Howard v. Howard. 30 L. R. Ir. 
 340; Thannhauser v. Cortes Co. 9 Fed. Rep. 
 225; Hugunin v. Thatcher, 18 id. 105. A plain- 
 tiff who gives a false statement of his residence, 
 will be required to give security for costs, 
 as he is thus guilty of a fraud upon the Court. 
 Frazer o. Palmer, 3 Y. & C Ex. 279. As to a 
 foreign claimant coming in, see Apollinaris Co. 
 v. Wilson, 31 Ch. D. 632. 
 
 29
 
 * 29 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 service of her Majesty he will not be ordered to give security ; 4 and so 
 where he is resident abroad upon public service, as an ambassador or 
 consul, he cannot -be called upon to give security. 5 Peers of the realm, 
 although they are privileged from personal arrest, must, if they reside 
 abroad, give security for costs; for, although such costs cannot be 
 recovered by personal process, they may by other process, if the plain- 
 tiff becomes a resident in this county. 6 And it may be stated gener- 
 ally that, wherever a plaintiff is out of the jurisdiction, the defendant 
 is entitled to security for costs, unless it is distinctly shown that the 
 plaintiff is exempted from his liability. 7 
 
 As a general rule, the plaintiff in a cross-suit cannot be called upon 
 
 to give security for costs to the plaintiff in the original suit, on the 
 
 principle that a cross-bill is, in reality, a portion of the defence 
 
 * 29 * to the original bill ; x but his co-defendants to the cross-bill may 
 
 move for such security against their plaintiff; 2 and it has been 
 held, that a bill to restrain an action at Common Law is so far a defen- 
 sive proceeding as to exempt the plaintiff in Equity from the liabil- 
 ity to give security for costs; 3 but on the other hand, a defendant in 
 an interpleader suit, being out of the jurisdiction, was looked upon as 
 plaintiff, and ordered to give security for costs ; 4 and so also, a defend- 
 ant who had obtained the. conduct of the cause has been required to 
 give security. 5 And where the right to require security for costs from 
 a plaintiff out of the jurisdiction had been waived, such waiver did not 
 preclude the defendant from requiring security from the representative 
 of the original plaintiff, by whom on his death the suit was revived, 
 and who was also out of the jurisdiction, 6 or from the plaintiff on 
 his amending the bill and stating thereby that he was out of the 
 jurisdiction. 7 
 
 A plaintiff cannot be compelled to give security for costs, unless he 
 himself states upon his bill that he is resident out of the jurisdiction, 
 or unless the fact is established by affidavit; and the mere circumstance 
 of his having gone abroad will not be a sufficient ground on which to 
 compel him to give security, unless it is stated by the plaintiff himself, 
 
 one of two or more plaintiffs is an inhabitant of v. Shaw, 2 De G & S. 360; Sloggett v. Viant, 
 
 the State. Pub. Stats, c. 161, § 24. 13 Sim. 187; Wild v. Murray, 18 Jur. 892; 
 
 * Evelyn v. Chippendale, 9 Sim. 497; Clark Tynte v. Hodge, 2 J. & H. 692; 8 Jur. N. S. 
 
 v. Fergusson, 1 Giff. 184; 5 Jur. N. S. 1155; 1226; Washoe Mining Co. v. Ferguson, L. R. 2 
 
 Fisher v. Bunbury, Sau. & S. 625; Wright v. Eq. 371. 
 Evcrard, Sau. & S. 651. 2 Sloggett r. Viant, 13 Sim. 187; see post, 
 
 5 Colebrook v. Jones, 1 Dick. 154; Beames p. 154, note («). 
 
 on Costs, 123. As to ambassadors resident here 3 Watteeu v. Billam, 3 De G. & S 516; 14 
 
 and their servants, seepost, p 141. The Court Jur. 165; Wilkinson v. Lewis, 3 Giff. 394; 8 
 
 of Queen's Bench has required a Judge in the Jur. N. S. 908. 
 
 East India Company's service to give security. 4 Smith r. Hammond, 6 Sim. 10, 15. But see 
 
 Plowden v. Campbell, 18 Jur. 910, Q. B. ; see Belmonte ». Aynard, 4 C. P. D. 221, 352; 
 
 Powell r. Bernhard, 1 Hogan, 144. Rhodes v. Dawson, 16 id. 548. 
 
 6 Lord Aldborough v. Burton, 2 M. & K. 5 Mynn v. Hart, 9 Jur. 860, V. C. K. B. 
 401, 403. 6 Jackson v. Davenport, 29 Beav. 212; 7 
 
 1 Lillie v. Lillie, 2 M. & K. 404. As to secu- Jur. N. S 1224. 
 rity by a limited company, see ante, p. 26, 7 Wyllie v. Ellice, 11 Beav. 99; 12 Jur 711; 
 
 n. (8). and see Stewart v. Stewart, 30 Beav. 322. 
 
 l Vincent v. Hunter, 5 Hare, 320; M'Gregor 
 
 30
 
 PERSONS RESIDING OUT OF THE JURISDICTION. 
 
 30 
 
 or shown upon affidavit, that he is gone abroad for the purpose of 
 residing there. 8 
 
 Whenever security is asked for, the question arises whether the 
 party is resident abroad or not within the meaning of the rale. Thus, 
 if a plaintiff went abroad, under circumstances rendering it likely that 
 he will remain abroad for such a length of time that there is no reason- 
 able probability of his being forthcoming, when the defendant might be 
 entitled to call upon him to pay costs in the suit, that was held 
 sufficient; 9 and where * a plaintiff, domiciled in Scotland, took *30 
 furnished lodgings in London, and then filed his bill, it was held 
 that he must give security for costs; 1 and so, where the plaintiff went 
 out of the jurisdiction on matters connected with the suit, he was 
 ordered to give security ; but on his return the order was discharged. 2 (a) 
 
 In order to entitle a defendant to require security for costs from a 
 plaintiff, he must make his application at the earliest possible time 
 after the fact has come to his knowledge, and before he takes any 
 further step in the cause; (b) therefore, where the fact of the plaintiff 
 being resident abroad appears upon the bill, he must apply before he 
 puts in his answer, or applies for time to do so: either of which acts 
 will be considered as a waiver of his right to the security. 8 Filing a 
 
 8 Green v. Charnock, 3 Bro. C. C. 371 ; 2 
 Cox, 284; 1 Ves. Jr. 39G; Hoby v. Hitchcock, 
 5 Ves. 699; Edwardes v. Burke, 9 L. T. N. S. 
 406. 
 
 a Blakeney v. Dufaur, 16 Beav. 292; 2 De 
 G M. & G. 771 ; 17 Jur. 98 ; and see Kennaway 
 v. Tripp, 11 Beav. 588: Drunimond v. Tilling- 
 hurst, 15 Jur. 384, Q. B. ; Stewart v Stewart, 
 20 Keav. 322; Wyllie v. Ellice, 11 Beav. 99; 12 
 Jur. 711; White v. Greathead, 15 Ves. 2; 1 
 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 200; Ford v. Boucher, 1 Hodges, 
 58. It is well settled that, to constitute one a 
 resident, his residence must be of a fixed and 
 permanent, and not of a mere temporary, char- 
 acter. Graham Prac. 505. An absence of 
 eighteen months will not be regarded as merely 
 temporary, Foss v. Wagner, 2 Dowl. P. C. 
 499 ; even though it is sworn that the party is 
 soon expected. Wright v. Black, 2 Wend. 
 258; Gilbert v. Gilbert, 2 Paige, 603. 
 
 1 Ainsley v. Sims, 17 Beav. 57; 17 Jur. 657; 
 and see Cambottie v. Inngate, 1 W. R. 533, V. 
 C. W.; Swanzy v. Swanzy, 4 K. & J. 237; 4 
 Jur. N. S. 1013". 
 
 2 O'Connor v. Sierra Nevada Co. 24 Beav. 
 435. 
 
 (a) In Martin v. Russell, 21 L. R. Ir. 196, 
 the plaintiff, who had no fixed residence and 
 was a sea-faring man, but who resided with his 
 family in the jurisdiction on his return from 
 abroad, was ordered to give security for the 
 costs of his suit. 
 
 (6) Under the present English practice, it 
 seems that the judge has a judicial discretion to 
 direct security for costs to be given at any time. 
 
 3 Meliorucchy v. Meliorucchy, 2 Ves. S 24; 
 
 1 Dick. 147; Craig v. Bolton, 2 Bro. C. C. 609; 
 Anon., 10 Ves. 287 ; and see Swanzy v. Swanzy, 
 4 K. & J. 237; 4 Jur. N. S. 1013*; Murrow v. 
 Wilson, 12 Beav. 497; Cooper v. Purton, 8 \V\ 
 R. 702; and see Long v. Tottenham, 1 Ir. Ch. 
 Rep. 127; Atkins v. Cooke, 3 Drew. 694: 3 
 Jur. N. S. 283; Newman v. Landrine, 14 N. J. 
 Eq 291; Long v. Tardy, 1 John. Ch. 202; 
 Goodrich v. Pendleton, 3 John. Ch. 520. In 
 Massachusetts, though a writ sued out by the 
 plaintiff, who is not an inhabitant of the State, 
 is not indorsed as is required by Gen. Stats, c. 
 123, §20; Pub Stats, c. 161, §24; yet the defend- 
 ant must make the objection at the first term, 
 or he will be held to have waived it. Carpenter 
 v. Aldrich, 3 Met. 58; see Whiting v. Hollister, 
 
 2 Mass. 102; Gilbert v. Nantucket Bank, 5 
 Mass. 98; Clapp v. Balch, 3 Greenl. 216. The 
 practice in New York, under the Act of that 
 State authorizing the defendant to require secu- 
 rity for costs, allows the application to be made 
 at any stage of the cause, if the plaintiff was a 
 non-resident at the commencement of the suit, 
 and continues so. Burgess v. Gregory, 1 Edw. 
 Ch. 449. 
 
 Martanot'. Mann, 14 Ch. D. 419, where security 
 was required from a next friend; and see Ex 
 parte Mercers' Co. 10 Ch. D. 481; Arkwright 
 r. Newbold, W. N. (1880) 59. "The case of 
 Garnett v. Bradley, 3 App. Cas. 944, decides 
 that all Acts of Parliament dealing with costs, 
 which are inconsistent with Ord. LV., are gone 
 unless they are specially preserved." Tenant 
 v. Ellis. 6 Q. B. D. 46. 
 
 01
 
 31 
 
 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 demurrer has, however, been held not to be a waiver; 4 and where the 
 plaintiff amended his bill, and stated thereby that he was out of the 
 jurisdiction, the defendant was held not to be precluded from requiring 
 security for costs, although he had some notice of the plaintiff being 
 resident abroad previously to the date of the amendment. 6 
 
 If the plaintiff is not described in the bill as resident abroad, and 
 the defendant does not become apprised of that fact before he puts in 
 his answer, he may make the application after answer; if, however, he 
 takes any material step in the cause after he has notice, he can- 
 *31 not *then apply. 1 Where in a petition under an Act of Parlia- 
 ment, authorizing the Court to make an order in a summary 
 manner upon petition, the petitioner was out of the jurisdiction of the 
 Court, and the respondent answered the affidavits in support of the 
 petition, it was held 2 that he had not thereby lost his right to require 
 the petitioner to give security for costs, but that he might make the 
 application on the petition coming on to be heard. 3 
 
 If a plaintiff, after filing a bill, leaves the kingdom for the purpose 
 of settling, and does actually take up his residence in foreign parts, it 
 is, in any stage of the cause, ground for an order that he shall give 
 security for costs. 4 The application for the order should be made as 
 early as possible after the defendant has become apprised of the fact; 
 and it is not enough to support such an application to swear that the 
 
 * Watteeu v. Billam, 3 De G. & S. 516; 14 
 Jur. 165; Goodrich v. Pendleton, 3 John. Ch. 
 520; Priors v. White, 2 Moll. 361; Eardy v. 
 Headford, 4 Moll. 464. 
 
 5 Wyllie v. Ellice, 11 Beav. 99; 12 Jur. 
 911; and see Stewart v. Stewart, 20 Beav. 
 322. 
 
 1 Where the plaintiff was described in the 
 original bill as late of the West Indies, but 
 then of the city of London, and the defendant, 
 having answered, filed a cross-bill against the 
 plaintiff, but, exceptions having been taken to 
 the answer, put in a further answer, and then 
 applied to the Court that the plaintiff in the 
 original bill might give security for costs, alle- 
 ging in his affidavit, that upon applying to the 
 plaintiff's solicitor in the original suit to appear 
 for him to the cross-bill, he discovered, for the 
 first time, that the plaintiff did not reside in 
 London, as alleged in the bill, but in Ireland, — 
 it w:is held, that as the defendant had. in his 
 cross-bill, stated the plaintiff to be resident in 
 Ireland, and after that had answered the excep- 
 tions to his answer to the original bill, he had 
 thereby taken a step in the cause after it was 
 evident that he had notice of the plaintiff's 
 being out of the jurisdiction, and had thereby 
 precluded himself from asking for security for 
 costs, and the motion was therefore refused. 
 Mason v. Gardner, 2 Bro. C. C. ed. Belt, 609, 
 notes; and see Wyllie v. Ellice, 11 Beav. 99; 
 Smith v. Castles, 1 Gray, 108. 
 
 2 Ex parte Seidler, 12 Sim. 106. See also 
 Re Home Assurance Ass. L. R. 12 Eq. 112, V. 
 
 32 
 
 C. M.; Re Norman, 11 Beav. 401; Re Chepstow 
 Bobbin Mills Co. 36 Ch. D. 563. 
 
 3 See, however, Atkins v. Cook, 3 Drew. 
 694; 3 Jur. N. S. 283. Where the defendant 
 had sworn to his answer before he had notice of 
 the fact of the plaintiff being resident abroad, 
 but, in consequence of some delay in the Six 
 Clerks' Office, the answer was not filed till 
 after the defendant had been informed of the 
 plaintiff's residence, a motion that the plaintiff 
 might give security for costs was considered too 
 late, although the defendant himself was not 
 privy to, or aware of, the delay which had taken 
 place in filing his answer. Dyott v. Dyott, 1 
 Mad. 187; and as to laches, see Wyllie v. 
 Ellice, 11 Beav. 99; 12 Jur. 711: Swanzy v. 
 Swanzy, 4 K. & J. 237; 4 Jur. N. S. 1013; 
 Murrow v. Wilson, 12 Beav. 497. 
 
 4 Anon. 2 Dick. 775; Hoby v. Hitchcock, 5 
 Ves. 699; Weeks v. Cole, 14 Ves. 518; Busk v. 
 Beetham, 2 Beav. 537; Kerr v. Gillespie, 7 Beav. 
 269; Kennaway v. Tripp, 11 Beav. 588; Stewart 
 o. Stewart, 20 Beav. 323 ; Edwardes v. Burke, 
 9 L. T. N. S. 406, V. C. K. See also Busk v. 
 Beetham, 2 Beav. 537; Blakeney v. Dufaur, 2 
 De G. M. & G 771 ; 17 Jur. 98. In Massa- 
 chusetts, if a plaintiff in a process at Law or in 
 Equity, after its commencement removes from 
 the State, the Court where the suit is pending 
 shall, on the motion of any other party, require 
 the plaintiff to procure a sufficient indorser. 
 Gen. Stats, c. 129, § 29; Pub. Stats, c. 167, 
 § 30 ; Smith v. Castles, 1 Gray, 108.
 
 PERSONS RESIDING OUT OF THE JURISDICTION. 
 
 *32 
 
 plaintiff has merely gone abroad, but the evidence should go on to show 
 that he is gone to settle abroad. 5 
 
 * To entitle a defendant to an order that the plaintiff may give * 32 
 security for costs, it is necessary that the plaintiff should abso- 
 lutely be gone abroad: the mere intention to go will not be sufficient. 1 
 In a case, however, where the plaintiff, who was an alien enemy, was 
 under confinement preparatory to his removal out of the country, upon 
 a warrant by the Secretary of State under an Alien Act, the proceed- 
 ings were stayed until he gave security for costs, although he was not 
 actually gone out of the country. 2 (a) 
 
 From analogy to the course adopted where the plaintiff is resident 
 out of the jurisdiction, the Court will, upon application, restrain an 
 ambassador's servant, whose person is privileged from arrest by the 
 7 Anne, c. 12, from proceeding with his suit until he has given security 
 for costs. 8 
 
 « Ibid.; White v. Greathead, 15 Ves. 2. The 
 affidavit should also show clearly that the de- 
 fendant did not know of the plaintiff's removal 
 before taking the last step in the cause, or the 
 application will be denied. Newman v. Land- 
 rine, 14 N. J. Eq. 291. 
 
 i Adams v. Colthurst, 2 Anst. 552 ; Willis 
 v. Garbutt, 1 Y. & J. 511; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr. 103; 
 Hoby v. Hitchcock, 5 Ves. 699. 
 
 (o) In case of the plaintiff's bankruptcy, 
 security for costs is not confined to future 
 costs, but if promptly applied for, may include 
 costs already incurred. Brockiebank & Co. v. 
 King's Lynn Steamship Co. 3 C. P. D. 365, 
 overruling Oxenden v. Cropper, 4 Dowl. 574; 
 Massey v. Allen, 12 Ch. D. 807. See Rhodes 
 v. Dawson, 16 Q. B. D. 548; Re Carta Para 
 Mining Co. 19 Ch. D. 457. In England the 
 amount of the reasonable security to which the 
 defendant is entitled, and the time, manner, 
 and form in which it should be given, are in 
 the judge's discretion. It may be increased 
 while the proceedings are pending. Republic 
 of Costa Rica v. Erlanger, 3 Ch. D. 62; Sturla 
 v. Freccia, W. N. (1877) 188; W. N. (1878) 
 161; Paxton». Bell, 24 W. R. 1013; W. N. 
 (1876) 221, 249. The English rule now is that, 
 poverty being no bar to a litigant, security for 
 costs may be required from a nominal plaintiff 
 for the benefit of some one else, but not from a 
 plaintiff trustee in bankruptcy, even though he 
 is insolvent in fact. Ibid.;Cowell v. Taylor, 
 31 Ch D. 34. In the case of an appeal, "an 
 insolvent party is not excluded from the Court, 
 but only prevented, if he cannot find security, 
 from dragging his opponent from one Court to 
 another." Bowen L. J. in Cowell v. Taylor, 
 supra; Swain v. Follows, 18 Q. B. D. 585; 
 Drennan v. Andrew, L. R. 1 Ch. 300; Nixon v. 
 Sheldon, 53 L. J. Ch. 624. As to security for 
 costs of appeal, see also Pooley's Trustee v. 
 
 VOL. I. 3 
 
 2 Seilaz v. Hanson, 5 Ves. 261. As to secur- 
 ity for costs from persons under sentence of 
 transportation, see Baddeley v. Harding, 6 
 Mad. 214; Harvey v. Jacob,! B. & Aid. 159; 
 Barrett v. Power, 9 Exch. 338 ; 18 Jur. 156 ; 
 Dunn v. M'Evoy, 1 Hogan, 355. 
 
 3 Anon. Mos. 175; Goodwin v. Archer, 2 P. 
 Wms. 452; Adderly v. Smith, 1 Dick. 355. 
 
 Wetham, 33 Ch. D. 76; 28 id. 38; Re Clough, 
 35 Ch. D. 7; Ellis v. Stewart, id. 459; Farrer 
 v. Lacy, 28 Ch. D. 482; Washburn & Moen 
 Manuf. Co. v. Patterson, 29 Ch. D. 48; Smith 
 v. Badham, 66 L. T. 822; The Hesketh, [1891] 
 A. C. 628; Thomas v. Dougty, W. N. (1887) 
 51; Wilniot v. Freehold H. P. Co. W. N. 
 (1885) 65. As to " visible means " under 30 
 & 31 Vict. c. 142, § 10, see Lea v. Parker, 13 
 Q. B. D. 835. A corporation, as plaintiff, can- 
 not be required to give security for costs 
 because a receiver of its property has been 
 appointed. Dartmouth Harbour Com'rs r. 
 Dartmouth, L. J. 55 Q. B. 483. The rule that 
 a defendant cannot be required to give security 
 for costs does not apply to a sheriff's inter- 
 pleader, where both the plaintiff and the de- 
 fendant in the issue are really in the position 
 of plaintiffs in an ordinary suit. Williams v. 
 Crosling, 3 C. B. 957; Tomlinson v. Land and 
 Finance Co. 14 Q. B. D. 539; see Belmonte v. 
 Aynard, 4 C. P. D. 221, 352. But in the 
 absence of statute, a third person who is 
 substituted as defendant in interpleader pro- 
 ceedings, and who is a non-resident and 
 irresponsible, will not be ordered to give 
 security for costs as a condition of being per- 
 mitted to prosecute his claim. McHugh v. 
 Astrophe, 20 N. Y. S. 877. As to increase at 
 chambers, see Bentsen v. Taylor, [18D3] 2 Q. B. 
 193. 
 
 33
 
 * 33 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 By the old practice, £40 was the amount of security required to 
 answer costs by any plaintiff who was out of the jurisdiction 
 
 * 33 * of the Court, but this sum has been increased to £100.^ Where 
 
 a person out of the jurisdiction of the Court presents a petition 
 to have his solicitor's bills taxed, it seems that he must give security 
 for the costs of the petition, and also for the balance that may be found 
 due from him on the taxation. 2 
 
 Where it appears on the bill 8 that the plaintiff is resident out of the 
 jurisdiction, an order that he give security for costs is obtained on 
 motion of course, or more usually on petition of course, 4 presented to 
 the Master of the Rolls, on production of the stamped copy of the bill 
 served on the defendant, or other authenticated copy thereof. 
 
 In other cases, a special application by motion or summons 5 must be 
 made. The notice of motion, or the summons, 6 must be served on the 
 plaintiff's solicitor, and the application must be supported by evidence 
 of the facts entitling the applicant to the order. 
 
 The order directs the plaintiff to procure some sufficient person on 
 his behalf to give security, according to the course of the Court, by 
 bond to the Record and Writ Clerk in whose division the cause or 
 matter is, 7 in the penalty of £100, conditioned to answer costs, in case 
 any shall be awarded to be paid by the plaintiff; and it restrains 
 proceedings in the mean time. 8 
 
 When an order of course has been obtained, it must be served on the 
 plaintiff or his solicitor; service of a special order, made on notice to 
 him, is unnecessary. 
 
 The security is given in one of the following modes: (1) The 
 plaintiff's solicitor prepares a bond in the terms of the order, 9 
 
 l Gage v. Ladv Stafford, 2 Ves. 557; Cons. * Wyllie v. Ellice, 11 Beav. 99; 12 Jur. 711. 
 
 Ord. XL. 6. See R. S. C. LV. 2 (Ord. Feb., s Tynte v. Hodge, 2 J. & H. 692. 
 
 1876, r. 7); and 2 Seton, 1643, for forms. The 6 For forms of notice and summons, see 
 
 order applies to the case of a plaintiff, with- Vol. III. 
 
 in the jurisdiction, ordered to give security. " See Cons. Ord. I. 38. As to the form of 
 
 Bailey v. Gundry, 1 Keen, 53. The Court re- the order for security and service, see 2 Seton, 
 
 fused to increase, upon an interlocutory appli- 1269; Tilsley's Digest, 218; 1 Smith's Pr. 866; 
 
 cation, the amount of security; Barry v. Jen- Braithwaite's Pr. 534. 
 
 kins, 19 L. T. N. S. 276, V. C. M. It seems, » For forms of orders, see Seton, 1269, 1270. 
 however, that in the case of a petition, the 9 The bond is in the following form : — 
 amount is still only £40. Atkins v. Cooke, 3 " Know all men by these presents, that we, 
 Jur. N. S. 283, V. C. K.; Partington v. Rey- A B, of the city of London, merchant, and 
 nolds, 6 W. R. 307, V. C. K. In New C D, of the same place, merchant, are held 
 York, the penalty of the bond was required to and firmly bound to , Esq., 
 be at least $250 ; but the Court in a proper in the penal sum of , for 
 case might enlarge it, and might either fix the which payment to be well and faithfully made ; 
 amount itself or refer it to a Master. 2 Rev. we bind ourselves and each of us, our, and each 
 Stats. N. Y. 620, § 4; Fulton v. Rosevelt, 1 of our heirs, executors, and administrators, firm- 
 Paige, 179; Massey v. Gillelan, 1 Paige, 644; ly by these presents. Sealed with our seals, &c. 
 Gilbert v. Gilbert, 2 Paige, 603. " Whereas L R, plaintiff, has lately ex- 
 
 2 Ibid.; Ogilvie v. Hearne, 11 Ves. 599; hibited his bill of complaint in her Majesty's 
 Anon. 12 Sim. 262; see also Re Passmore, 1 High Court of Chancery against R S, defend- 
 Beav. 94; Re Dolman, 11 Jur. 1095, M. R. ant, touching the matter therein contained: 
 
 3 What is stated in the text as to a bill suit Now the condition of this obligation is such, 
 will apply, mutatis mutandis, to a summons that if the above bounden A B and C D, or 
 suit, petition, or other proceeding in which either of them, their heirs, executors, or admin- 
 security is directed to be given. istrators, do and shall well and truly pay, or 
 
 34
 
 PERSONS RESIDING OUT OP THE JURISDICTION. * 35 
 
 * engrosses it on paper bearing a 2s. 6d. inland revenue stamp, 1 *34 
 procures it to be executed by the obligor or obligors, lodges it 
 with the Record and Writ Clerk, 2 and on the same day serves notice 
 thereof 3 on the solicitor of the defendant who obtained the order; it is 
 also advisable to serve the notice on the solicitor of any co-defendants 
 who have not applied for security; 4 and the security is deemed to have 
 been given on the day the bond is lodged. 5 (2) The plaintiff, instead 
 of giving the bond in the first instance, may serve the defendant's 
 solicitor with a notice 6 of the name, address, and description of the 
 proposed obligor or obligors; and if no objection be made by him within 
 two days thereafter, the bond may be prepared, executed, lodged, and 
 notified as above explained. 7 (3) The plaintiff may apply by special 
 motion 8 or summons, 9 that, in lieu of giving a bond, he may pay a sum 
 of money into Court, to a separate account, to answer the costs; the 
 amount should be sufficient to cover the sum mentioned in the order 
 directing the security to be given, and the costs of bringing it into 
 Court and getting it out. 10 The usual amount is £120; n no evidence in 
 support of the application is necessary, beyond the production of the 
 former order; the costs of the application are made costs in the cause. 
 The order is drawn up and passed by the Registrar, and entered, and 
 the money is paid into Court in the manner hereafter explained. 
 
 One obligor is sufficient, but it is prudent to have two or more; as 
 on the death or bankruptcy 12 of the sole, or sole surviving, obligor, the 
 defendant is entitled to apply by special motion, 13 or summons, 14 that a 
 new security may be given, and for a stay of proceedings in the mean 
 time. 
 
 Where one or more of several defendants have obtained an order for 
 security, it is advisable to extend the bond to the costs of all the 
 defendants, as otherwise the defendants who have not obtained the 
 order may afterwards apply for a further bond as to their costs ; 
 and it is presumed that, where a bond embracing the * costs of * 35 
 all the defendants is lodged with the Record and Writ Clerk, and 
 notified to them, he will hold the bond on behalf of all the defendants ; x 
 
 cause to be paid, all such costs as the Law Fellows v. Deere, 3 Beav. 353; Re Norman, 11 
 
 Court shall think fit to award to the defendant Beav. 401. 
 
 on the hearing of the said cause or otherwise, 9 Jarvis v. Shflnd, V. C. W. at Chambers, 
 
 then this obligation to be void, or else to re- 30 Jan., 1804; Reff. Lib. A. 164; Merlin v. 
 
 main in full force and virtue. Sealed and de- Blagrave, Seton, 1270. For forms of notice of 
 
 livered, &c." motion and summons, see Vol, III. 
 
 1 If the bond is for a larger sum than £100, 1° Cliffe v. Wilkinson, 4 Sim. 123. 
 
 an increased stamp of Is. 3d. for each additional » See Cliffe n, Wilkinson, ubi supra ; Austra- 
 
 £50 is payable ; see Tilsley's Digest, 218. lian Co. v. Fleming, 4K.& J. 407. In the case 
 
 2 The bond should be indorsed with the of a petition it is presumed £60 would be suffi- 
 short title of the cause or matter, the words cient. 
 
 "Bond for Security for Costs," and the name, * 2 Transatlantic Co. V. Pietroni, cited Seton, 
 
 &c, of the solicitor leaving it. 1269; Cliffe v. Wilkinson, 4 Sim. 122. 
 
 3 For form of notice see Vol. III. 13 Latour v. Holcombe, 1 Phil. 262; and see 
 
 4 Braithwaite's Pr. 534. Veifch v. Irving, 11 Sim. 122. 
 
 5 Ibid - 14 Tynte v. Hodge, 2 J. & H. 602. For forms 
 
 6 For form of notice, see Vol. III. of notice of motion and summons, see Vol. III. 
 
 7 Braithwaite's Pr. 533. l See Lowndes v. Robertson, 4 Mad. 465; 
 
 8 Cliffe v. Wilkinson, 4 Sim. 122; and see and see Ord. I. 38. 
 
 35
 
 * 36 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 and that a separate bond or bonds cannot afterwards be required. 2 
 Whatever number of bonds, however, may be given, they all form a 
 security for one sum only. 8 A solicitor should not be surety for his 
 client. 4 The bond of an incorporated society has been held sufficient. 5 
 
 The defendant, on receiving notice that a bond has been lodged in 
 the hrst instance, may, if dissatisfied with the bond, apply by special 
 motion, 6 or summons, 7 that in lieu of, or in addition to, such bond, the 
 plaintiff may be ordered, within a limited time, to give security for 
 costs, according to the course of the Court, or in default thereof, that 
 the bill may be dismissed with costs, and that in the mean time all 
 proceedings may be stayed. 8 The application should be supported by 
 affidavit showing that the obligor is not a solvent person; and may be 
 opposed by his own affidavit, 9 justifying in double the amount named 
 in the bond, 10 and by other evidence that he is a person of substance. 
 The costs of inquiring into the circumstances of the proposed surety 
 have been allowed. 11 
 
 Where the plaintiff in the first instance submits, for approval, the 
 name of the proposed obligor, the defendant, if he objects to the person 
 proposed, must notify his objection to the plaintiff's solicitor within a 
 reasonable time : 12 otherwise, the plaintiff may complete and lodge the 
 bond. The plaintiff, on receiving notice of the defendant's objection, 
 must either propose another person, or the person already offered must 
 justify by affidavit 13 in double the sum for which he is to be bound; " 
 and in the latter case it is presumed the plaintiff should file the affi- 
 davit, and lodge the bond, and give notice thereof to the defendant. 15 
 
 If the plaintiff fails to comply with the order to give security, the 
 defendant may apply by special motion, or summons, 16 that the plain- 
 tiff give security within a limited time, or, in default, that his 
 
 * 36 * bill may be dismissed with costs ; and that proceedings may, in 
 
 the mean time, be stayed. 1 
 
 2 See, however, 1 Smith's Pr. 866: Braith- in lieu of, or in addition to, the persons pro- 
 waite's Pr. 532. posed. It is conceived, however, that the usual 
 
 3 Lowndes v. Rohertson, 4 Mad. 465. practice is, as stated in the text, to notify the 
 
 4 Panton v. Labertouche, 1 Phil. 265; 7 Jur. objection to the plaintiff before applying to the 
 589. Court. For form of notice of objection, see Vol. 
 
 5 Plestow v. Johnson, 1 Sm. & G. App. 20; of Forms. 
 
 2 W. R. 3. 13 For form, see Vol. III. 
 
 6 Panton v. I/tbertouche, 1 Phil. 265; 7 Jur. M See 1 Turn. & Ven. 764; 1 Grant, 444. 
 589. I 5 The bond was formerly put in suit in the 
 
 7 For forms of notice of motion and sum- Petty Bag Office, the procedure in which was 
 mons. see Vol. III. regulated by 12 & 13 Vic. c. 109. 
 
 8 Giddings 0. Giddings, 10 Beav. 29, and 16 For forms of notice of motion and sum- 
 the cases collected, ib. 31; and see Denny v. mons. see Vol. III. 
 
 Mars, Seton, 1279, where the order is given; 1 Cooper v. Purton, 1 N. R. 468, V. C. W.; 
 
 Payne v. Little, 14 Beav. 647; O'Connor v. and see Giddings v. Giddings, 10 Beav. 20, 
 
 Sierra Nevada Co. 23 Beav. 608. and cases collected 10 Beav. 31; Knight v. 
 
 9 See form in Vol. III. De Blaquiere, Sail. & S. 648; Payne v. Little, 
 1° See 1 Turn. & Ven. 764; 1 Grant, 444. 14 Beav. 647; O'Connor v. Sierra Nevada Co. 
 U Bainbrigge v. Moss, 3 Jur. N. S. 107, 23 Beav. 608; Kennedy v. Edwards, 11 Jur. 
 
 V. C. \V. N. S. 153, V. C W.; see also Camac v. Grant, 
 
 12 See, however, Cliffe v. Wilkinson, 4 Sim. 1 Sim. 348; 2 Sim. 570; White r. Bromige, 26 
 
 122, where the defendant moved on notice that W. R. 312. Charras v. Pickering, 39 L. J. Ch. 
 
 the plaintiff might be ordered to give security 190, Le Grange v. McAndrew, 4 Q. B. D. 210- 
 
 36
 
 PAUPERS. * 37 
 
 The day on which an order that the plaintiff do give security for 
 costs is served, and the time thenceforward until, and including, the 
 day on which such security is given, is not reckoned in the computation 
 of time allowed a defendant to make his defence to the suit. 2 If it 
 becomes necessary for the defendant to put the bond in suit, he must 
 obtain an order, 8 on special motion or summons, that he may be at 
 liberty to do so, and may have the bond delivered out to him for that 
 purpose, and may use the name of the Record and Writ Clerk, the 
 obligee, on giving him an indemnity, — such indemnity to be settled by 
 the Judge, if the parties differ. The notice of motion or summons 4 
 must be served on the plaintiff's solicitor; and the application must be 
 supported by production of evidence of the costs having been directed 
 to be paid, and of the amount and non-payment thereof. The order on 
 such application is drawn up by the Registrar; a plain copy of it is 
 lodged with the Record and Writ Clerk, together with a receipt for the 
 bond, and an undertaking to indemnify him against the costs of any 
 proceedings to be taken thereon in his name; and, if satisfied there- 
 with, he will deliver out the bond. The receipt and undertaking are 
 required to be signed by the defendant applying, and also by his solici- 
 tor, and are usually written at the foot of the copy of the order. 5 
 
 Where money has been paid into Court as security for costs, in lieu 
 of a bond, an application may be made at chambers, by summons, 6 for 
 payment thereout of any costs ordered to be paid by the plaintiff to the 
 defendant. The summons must be served on the plaintiff, and on any 
 co-defendants interested in the fund, and must be supported by evi- 
 dence of such payment having been directed, and of the amount paya- 
 ble, and by production of the Accountant-General's certificate of the 
 fund being in Court. 
 
 If, subsequently to the order directing security for costs to be given, 
 the plaintiff becomes resident within the jurisdiction, he may apply, 
 on special motion or summons, 7 that the order may be discharged; but 
 he must pay the costs of the application. 8 
 
 * Section V. — Paupers. * 37 
 
 It has been before stated * to be a general rule, subject to very few 
 exceptions, that there is no sort or condition of persons who may not 
 
 For circumstances under which the time to give 5 Braithwaite's Pr. 535. 536. For forms of 
 
 security was extended, see Grant v. Ingram, 20 receipt and undertaking, see Vol. III. 
 
 L. T. N. S. 70, V. C. M. For form of order, see 6 For form of summons, see Vol. III. 
 
 2 Seton, 1541, No. 4. 7 For forms of notice of motion and sum- 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 14; see Henderson mons, see Vol. III. 
 v. Atkins, 7 W. R. 318, V. C. K.; Drinan v. 8 O'Connor v. Sierra Nevada Co. 24 Beav. 
 
 Mannix, 3 Dr. & \V. 154. For the time al 435; Mathews v. Chichester, 30 Beav. 135. 
 
 lowed for making the defence, see R. S. C. For more on the subject of security for costs, 
 
 Ord. XXII. 1-3. see post, Chap. III. § 2. Alien; Chap. VI. § 5, 
 
 8 Robinson v. Brutton, 6 Beav. 147; Bain- The Bill; Ogilvie v. Hearn, 11 Ves. 600; Wor- 
 brigge v. Mo<s, 3 Jur. N. S. 107, V. C. W.; Reg. rail v. White, 3 Jo. & Lat. 513; Hind r. Whit- 
 Lib. 1857, A. 283. more, 2 K. & J. 458, 462; Drinan v. Mannix, 
 
 4 For forms of notice and summons, see 3 Dr. & W. 154. 
 Vol. III. l Ante, p. 5. 
 
 37
 
 37 
 
 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 sue in the Court of Chancery. Amongst the exceptions to this rule, 
 those who are in indigent circumstances are not included, and any per- 
 son, however poor he may be, being in other respects competent, has 
 the same right as another to commence proceedings in the Court of 
 Chancery for the assertion of his claims; and that, without being 
 required to give any security for the payment of costs to the opposite 
 party, in case he fails in his suit. 2 This liberality is extended to the 
 case of the next friends of infants ; 3 indeed, any other rule would 
 amount to a denial of justice to the children of poor persons, who might 
 become entitled to property, and yet be precluded from asserting their 
 rights, by reason of their inability to procure substantial persons to be 
 their next friends. 4 With regard to the next friend of a, feme covert, 
 the rule is different, for it has been held, that the next friend of a 
 married woman must be a person of substance ; 6 because a married 
 
 2 Such is the law of Massachusetts, Feneley 
 v. Mahoney, 21 Pick. 212; and Tennessee, 
 Dudley v. Baleh, 4 Hay. 192, Code of Tenn. 
 § 3192. This right must not be abused; see 
 Burke v. Lidwell, 1 Jo. & Lat. 703, where a 
 pauper plaintiff was required to give security, 
 the person really interested having nominally 
 assigned to the pauper, in order to avoid lia- 
 bility to costs; see, however, Worrall r. White, 
 3 Jo. & Lat. 513, 515. See as to requiring secu- 
 rity for costs from insolvent plaintiff in a class 
 suit, Tredwell v. Byrch, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 476. 
 
 3 The next friend of a minor plaintiff can- 
 not be compelled to give security for costs. 
 St. John v. Earl of Besborough, 1 Hogan, 41 , 
 Fellows v. Barrett, 1 Keen, 119; Murrell i'. 
 Clapham, 8 Sim. 74. Nor would the Court 
 enter into any inquiry as to the circumstances 
 of a proposed next friend of an infant in place 
 of another whom it became important to exam- 
 ine as a witness. Davenport v. Davenport, 1 
 S. & S. 101. 
 
 The early English cases are, however, uni- 
 form that the next friend of an infant should 
 be a person of substance, otherwise he may be 
 ruled to security. Wale v. Salter, Mos. 47, 
 citing Webster v. Guy, decided by the Lord 
 Chancellor on the previous day; Anon. Mos. 
 86; Anon. 1 Atk. 570; Turner v. Turner, 2 
 P. W. 297; see Anon. 1 Ves. 410: Squirrel v. 
 Squirrel, 2 Dick. 765. In view of these authori- 
 ties, Chancellor Walworth required the insol- 
 vent next friend of an infant to give security 
 in Fulton v. Kosevelt, 1 Paige, 178. See Dal- 
 rymple v. Lamb, 3 Wend. 424; Wice t\ Com- 
 mercial Fire Ins. Co. 2 Abb. N. Cas. 325. And 
 where a party is enabled, by rule of court, such 
 as the 98th rule of Lord Bacon (Beames's Or- 
 ders, 44), or by statute, to prosecute a suit as a 
 pauper, upon taking a prescribed oath of pov- 
 erty, the next friend of an infant cannot sue 
 in forma pauperis, the privilege being consid- 
 ered as personal. Wilkinson v. Belsher, 2 Bro. 
 
 38 
 
 C. C. 272; Anon. 1 Ves. Jr. 409; Green v. Har- 
 rison, 3 Sneed, 131; Cohen v. Shyer, 1 Tenn. 
 Ch. 192. Nor can the next friend of a married 
 ■woman. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 3 Paige, 287. 
 Nor the informer in a qui tarn action. Johnson 
 v. Hunter, 1 Leg. Rep. 168. An executor or 
 administrator cannot sue in forma pauperis. 
 Paradice v. Sheppard. 1 Dick. 136; McCoy v. 
 Broderick, 3 Sneed, 203; infra, 38, n. 3. 
 
 But the Court may, upon being satisfied by 
 the report of the Master that there is probable 
 cause for proceeding, authorize an infant to sue 
 by next friend in forma pauperis, Fulton v. 
 Rosevelt, 1 Paige, 178. Though the affidavit of 
 the infant alone will not sustain the order, Lind- 
 say v. Tyrrell, 2 De G. & J. 7. And may, in 
 like manner, permit a wife to file a bill against 
 the husband In forma pauperis, Robertson v. 
 Robertson, 3 Paige, 387. But see contra, Ward 
 v. Ward, 2 Dev. Eq. 553. 
 
 The next friend of a married woman may 
 be charged with the costs in a proper case, 
 Re Wells, 12 W. R. 97. So may the next 
 friend of an infant. Haggard v. Benson, 3 
 Tenn. Ch. 268, 279; see infra, 79, note. But, 
 ordinarily, if the suit be prosecuted in good 
 faith, the costs will be paid out of the infant's 
 estate. Staines v. Maddox, Mos. 319; Caley 
 v. Caley, 25 W. R. 528; Taner v. Fire, 2 Ves. 
 466; Smith v. Floyd, 1 Pick. 275; Feneley v. 
 Mahoney, 21 Pick. 212; Bradford v. French, 
 110 Mass. 365; Bouche v. Ryan, 3 Blackf. 472; 
 Yourie v. NeLon, 1 Tenn. Ch 614. In Massa- 
 chusetts, upon a construction of their statutes, 
 it has been held that the next friend of an in- 
 fant is not chargeable with costs Crandall v. 
 Slaid, 11 Met. 288. 
 
 4 See Anon. 1 Ves. Jr. p. 410; Squirrel v. 
 Squirrel, 2 Dick. 765; 2 P. Wms. 297, n.; Dav- 
 enport v. Davenport, IS & S. 101; Murrell v. 
 Clapham, 8 Sim. 74; Fellows t\ Bairett, 1 Keen, 
 119. See preceding note. 
 
 5 Anon. 1 Atk. 570; Pennington v. Alvin,
 
 PAUPERS. * 38 
 
 woman and an infant are differently circumstanced, as the infant can- 
 not select his own next friend, but must rely upon the good offices of 
 those who are nearest to him in connection, or otherwise his rights 
 might go unasserted, but the married woman has the power of select- 
 ing: she is, therefore, if she sues by a next friend, required to select a 
 person who, if her claim should turn out to be unfounded, can pay to 
 the defendant the costs of the proceeding. 
 
 In consequence of the provisions of Stat. 11 Hen. VII. c. 12, 6 
 *the Courts of Law admitted all persons to sue in forma pauperis * 38 
 who could swear that they were not worth £5, except their 
 wearing-apparel, and the subject-matter of the suit. This practice of 
 the Courts of Law was followed by Courts of Equity, although persons 
 suing in these Courts do not come within the provisions of the Act of 
 Parliament above referred to, 1 and they extended the relief to the case 
 of defendants. 2 
 
 The privilege is not extended to a plaintiff or a defendant suing or 
 being sued in a representative character, as executor or administrator; 8 
 but the case of a person sustaining the mixed character of executor and 
 beneficiary is an exception to the general rule; although in order to 
 prevent any undue practice in suing in forma pauperis, and under color 
 of that privilege obtaining dives costs, a special order is necessary. 4 
 An exception to the strict application of the rule has, however, been 
 made, by allowing an executor to proceed in forma pauperis, for the 
 single purpose of clearing a contempt incurred in the cause. 5 
 
 It is said, that a person filling the character of next friend cannot 
 sue in forma pauperis, 6 although, as we have seen before, the poverty 
 of a next friend of an infant is no ground for dismissing him; and 
 formerly there was some uncertainty as to the practice, when a married 
 woman could not obtain a substantial next friend to sue on her behalf ; 7 
 
 1 S. & S. 264; Jones v. Fawcett, 2 Phil. 278; Part IV. 22-31. The Act 11 Hen. VII. c. 12, 
 
 Stevens v. Williams, 1 Sim. N. S. 545; Wilton was repealed by 4G & 47 Vic. c. 49, § 4 Sched. 
 v. Hill, 2 De G. M. & G. 807-809; Hind v. 3 Paradice v. Sheppard, 1 Dick. 136 ; 
 
 Whitmore,2K. & J.458; Re Wills,9 Jur. N. S. Beames on Costs, 79 App. No. 21; Oldlield 
 
 1225; 12 W. R. 97, V. C. S.; Elliott v. Ince, 7 v. Cobbett, 1 Phil. 613 ; 2 Beav. 446 ; 3 Bear. 
 
 De G. M. & G. 475; 3 Jur. N. S. 597; Smith 432 ; 10 Jur. 2 ; Fowler v. Davies, 16 Sim. 
 
 v. Etches, 1 H. & M. 711; 10 Jur. N. S. 124; 182; 12 Jur. 321 ; St. Victor v. Devereux, 6 
 
 Re Payne, 23 Ch. D. 288; and see post, Femes Beav. 584 ; 8 Jur. 26. 
 Covert Plaintiffs. 4 Thompson v. Thompson, H. T. 1824, 
 
 Where the same person was the next friend cited 1 Turn. & Ven. 513 ,- and see Rogers v. 
 of an infant plaintiff and of a married woman Hooper, 1 W. R. 474, V. C. K. ; Everson r. 
 plaintiff, Lord St. Leonards stayed the proceed- Matthews, 3 W. R. 159, V. C. W. ; Parkin- 
 ings in the cause until the next friend of the son v. Chambers, lb. 34, V. C. W. As to the 
 feme plaintiff was changed or gave security for affidavit in such a case, see Martin v. Whit- 
 costs. Drinan v. Mannix, 2 Dru. & War. 154. more, W. N\ (1869) 42 ; 17 W. R. 809, L. C. 
 
 6 Beames on Costs, 72. 6 Oldfield v Cobbett, 1 Coll. 169. 
 
 1 See Story, Eq. PI. §50; 1 Harr. Ch. Pr. by 6 Anon. 1 Ves. Jr. 410. The reason is, 
 Newl. 389, 390; 1 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 67, et seq. ; that the privilege of suing in forma pauperis 
 Isnard v. Cazeaux, 1 Paige, 39. is personal Williamson v. Belsher, 2 Bro. 
 
 2 See post, Chap. IV. § 7, P'tuper Defend- C. C. 272 ; Robertson v. Robertson, 3 Paige, 
 ants. In England this practice has been adopted 387 So of the next friend of a married 
 in the Chancery Division of the High Court of woman. Lawrence v Lawrence, 3 Paige, 267. 
 Justice. Sup. Ct. of Jud. Act, 1873 (36 & 37 See ante, 37, n 3. 
 
 Vic. c. 66), § 23; id. of 1876 (38 & 39 Vic. 7 See Dowden v. Hook, 8 Beav. 299. 
 
 c. 77), § 21. See R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XVI. 
 
 39
 
 39 
 
 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 but now she may, on an ex parte motion, 8 supported by affidavit that 
 
 she is unable to procure any substantial person to act as her next 
 
 friend, 9 obtain an order authorizing her to institute and prosecute 
 
 *39 a suit; 10 * to carry on proceedings alter decree; * or to appeal 2 
 
 without a next friend, in forma pauperis. 
 
 It seems also that, in a proper case, an infant will be permitted to 
 sue by a next friend in forma pauperis, on an ex parte motion, sup- 
 ported by affidavit that the infant cannot procure any substantial person 
 to act as next friend. 8 (a) 
 
 A husband and wife may obtain an order of course to sue in forma 
 pauperis, in respect of the wife's reversionary interest; 4 and where a 
 woman was ordered to be examined pro interesse suo, respecting a claim 
 set up by her to some lands taken under a sequestration, but was unable 
 from poverty to make out or support her right, liberty was given to her 
 to do so in forma pauperis. h 
 
 Proceedings under the Trustee Relief Act 6 and presumably the 
 Infant Custody Act 7 may be prosecuted in forma pauperis ; and so 
 also may claims in a suit by persons who are not parties; 8 but in these 
 cases, the order is made on application by an ex parte motion, 9 sup- 
 ported by affidavit, and is not of course. 
 
 A plaintiff may be admitted to sue as a pauper upon the usual 
 affidavit, at any time after the bill has been filed, or summons issued , 10 
 
 8 For form of motion paper, see Vol. III. 
 
 9 For form of affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 
 1° Re Foster, 18 Beav. 525 ; Wellesley v. 
 Wellesley, 16 Sim. 1 ; 1 De G M. & G. 501 ; 
 Wellesley v. Mornington, 18 Jur. 552, V. C. 
 K. ; Re Lancaster, 18 Jur. 229, L. C. & L. JJ.; 
 Crouch v. Waller, 4 De G. & J. 43 ; 5 Jur. 
 N. S. 326 ; Re Barnes, 10 W. R. 464, V. C. S. ; 
 Smith v. Etches, 1 H. & M. 711 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 
 124 ; 3 N. R. 457 ; Adamson v. Adamson, 2 
 Seton, 655 ; and see Ex parte Hakewill, 3 De 
 G. M. & G. 116. The decision in Page v. 
 Page, 16 Beav. 588, where such an order was 
 discharged, is overruled by these cases; but see 
 Caldicott v. Baker, 13 W. R 449, V. C. K. 
 The order is not as of course, Coulsting v. 
 Coulsting, 8 Beav. 463 , 9 Jur. 587 ; and has 
 been held not to be allowable where the suit is 
 against the husband. Ward v. Ward, 2 Dev. 
 Eq. 553. It has also been held that a wife can- 
 not sue her husband by her trustee, but only 
 by a next friend. Hunt v Booth, 1 Freem. Ch. 
 215. Under the construction of the divorce 
 statutes in Tennessee, the wife has been per- 
 mitted to sue without a next friend, and in 
 forma pauperis. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 4 Sneed, 
 105. Upon a proper application, a wife may 
 be permitted to file a bill against her husband, 
 for a separation, in forma pauperis. But this 
 will not be done until the Court has ascertained 
 by the report of a Master, that she has probable 
 
 cause for filing such a bill. Robertson v. 
 Robertson, 3 Paige, 387. 
 
 i D'Oechsner v. Scott, 24 Beav. 239 ; see 
 M'Cann v. Borradaile, 37 L. J. Ch. 124 ; Re 
 Ganvill, 31 Ch D. 532. 
 
 2 Crouch v. Waller, 4 De G. & J. 43 ; 5 
 Jur. N. S 326 ; and see Martin v. Whitmore, 
 W. N. (1869) 42; 17 W. R. 809, L. C. ; R. S. 
 C. Ord. XVI. 8. 
 
 3 Lindsay v. Tyrrell, 2 De G. & J. 7; 24 
 Beav. 124 ; *3 Jur. N. S 1014. 
 
 4 Pitt v. Pitt, 1 Sm. & G. App. 14 ; 17 Jur. 
 571. 
 
 5 James v. Dore, 2 Dick 788. 
 
 6 Re Money, 13 Beav. 109, the Act is 10 & 
 11 Vic. c. 96. 
 
 7 See Re Hakewill, 3 De G. M. & G. 116; 
 the Act is 2 & 3 Vic. c. 54 (repealed by 36 & 
 37 Vic. c. 12) ; and see post, Vol. II., Infant 
 Custody Act. 
 
 8 See Re Shard, Partington v. Reynolds, 
 cited 2 Seton, 1646, No. 2, where the order is 
 given ; and see in other cases Ex parte Hake- 
 will, 3 De G. M. & G. 116 ; Ex parte Fry, 1 
 Dr. & S. 318. 
 
 9 Not by petition, see 2 Seton, 1646; for 
 form of motion paper, see Vol. III. 
 
 10 See Parkinson v. Chambers, 3 W. R. 34, 
 V. C. W. ; Braithwaite's Pr 562 ; but a mar- 
 ried woman may apply before bill, if the draft 
 bill has been settled and signed bj r counsel, 
 
 (a) In the Federal Courts infants may sue or defend in forma pauperis. Ferguson v. Dent, 
 15 Fed. Rep. 771; see infra, p. 42, n. (a). For those courts, see 27 U. S. Stat, at L. 252. 
 
 40
 
 PAUPERS. 
 
 40 
 
 but he will be liable to all the costs incurred before his admission, 11 
 and to costs previously ordered to be paid, without being first 
 dispaupered. 12 
 
 It seems doubtful whether, after a dismissal of a former suit, a 
 plaintiff will be permitted to sue again for the same matter in forma 
 pauperis, without paying the costs of the first suit; 13 (b) but the circum- 
 stance that the suit is a second suit for the same matter as a former 
 suit, in which the plaintiff had likewise sued as a pauper, is no ground 
 of objection to the second suit, unless it can be justly characterized as 
 very vexatious. 14 
 
 * A pauper may appeal, 1 (a) and where a party has, in any stage * 40 
 of the suit, obtained the common order for his admission as a 
 pauper, no special order is required to enable him to appeal ; 2 but 
 where he has not been already admitted as a pauper, an order which 
 can only be made by the Court of Appeal, authorizing the appeal in 
 forma pauperis, is necessary; s and it seems that a certificate of coun- 
 sel that there are special and strong grounds for the appeal may be 
 required. 4 
 
 In order to be permitted to sue in forma pauperis, the plaintiff must 
 
 Wellesley v. Mornington, 18 Jur. 552 ; Re 
 Barnes, 1*0 W. K. 464, V. C. S 
 
 n Mos. 68 ; and see Ballard v. Catling, 2 
 Keen. 606 ; Church v. Marsh, 2 Hare, 652 ; 8 
 Jur. 54 ; Smith v. Pawson, 2 De G. & S. 490 ; 
 Prince Albert v. Strange, id. 652, 718 ; 13 Jur. 
 507. 
 
 12 Davenport v. Davenport, 1 Phil. 124 ; 
 Brown v. Story, 1 Paige, 588. See, however, 
 Bennett v. Chudleigh, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 164 ; 
 Snowball v. Dixon, 5 De G. & S. 9. 
 
 13 Corbett v. Corbett, 16 Ves. 407, 410, 412 ; 
 Brook v. Alcock, 20 March, 1834, V. C. E., 
 cited 1 Smith's Ch. Pr. 555; but see Fitton 
 v. Earl Macclesfield, 1 Vern. 264; and see Chit- 
 ty's Arch. 1292 ; Hawes v. Johnson, 1 Y. & 
 J 30. 
 
 " Wild v. Hobson, 2 V. & B. 105. 112 ; see 
 Brook v. Alcock, and Elsam v. Alcock, cited 1 
 
 (b) In such case a Judge, in his discretion, 
 may properly refuse leave to the plaintiff to sue 
 in forma pauperis. McCabe v. Bank of Ireland, 
 14 App. Cas. 413 ; Martin v. Beauchamp, 25 Ch. 
 D. 12. Courts of Equity, unlike the Law Courts, 
 will not always require a plaintiff who can show 
 a valid excuse, to pay the costs of his first suit 
 before prosecuting a second suit for the same 
 cause. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Mertes (Neb.), 
 52 N. W. 1099. But, in general, a motion in 
 an Equity suit, which has been refused with 
 costs, cannot be renewed until those costs are 
 paid. See Bellchamber v. Giani, 3 Madd 550; 
 Oldfield v. Cobbett, 12 Beav. 91 ; see Re Neal, 
 Weston v. Neal, 31 Ch D. 437 ; Re Youngs, 
 Doggett v. Revett (No. 2). id. 239: Henderson 
 v. Underwriting & A. Ass. 65 L. T. 616, 732; 
 
 Smith's Ch. Pr. 874. As to married women, 
 see Kiff v Roberts (No. 2), 33 Ch. D. 265. 
 
 i Bland v. Lamb, 2 J. & W. 402 ; contra, 
 Taylor v. Bouchier, 2 Dick. 504 ; Bolton v. 
 Gardner, 3 Paige, 273 ; and see post, 1482. 
 
 2 Drennanu. Andrew, L. R. 1 Ch. 300, L C.j 
 and see cases cited, ib. 301, n. (7). 
 
 3 2 Seton, 1646 ; see also Clarke i\ Wyburn, 
 12 Jur. 167, L. C. ; Heaps v. Commissioners of 
 Churches, ib. n. ; L. R. 1 Ch. 301, n. (7); 
 Brad berry v. Brooke, 25 L. J. Ch. 576 ; 4 W. 
 R 699, L. JJ. ; Crouch v. Waller, 4 De G. & J. 
 43 ; 5 Jur N. S. 326 ; Grimwood v. Shave, 5 
 W. R. 482, L. C. For form of order, see 2 
 Seton, 1646, No 3. See Bowie v. Ailsa, 13 App. 
 Cas. 371. The order is obtainable on ex parte 
 motion. 
 
 * Grimwood v. Shave, 5 W. R. 482, L. C ; 
 and see L. R. 1 Ch. 301, n (7). 
 
 Hall v. Paulet, 66 L. T. 645 ; White v Bromige, 
 26 W. R. 312 ; Peters v. Lilly, 11 P. D. 145. 
 The same rule is acted upon by the Law Courts. 
 Hoare v. Dickson, 7 C. B. 164 ; Morton v. 
 Palmer, 9 Q. B. D. 891; see Ex parte Mackin- 
 tosh. 13 Q. B. D. 235. As to ordering security 
 for costs, instead of dismissing the suit for want 
 of prosecution, see Wilmott v. Freehold H. F. 
 Co. 52 L. T. 743. If the order is obtained by 
 the defendant, with stay until given, he may 
 still move to dismiss the suit for want of prose- 
 cution. London Road Car Co v. Kelly, 18 L. R. 
 Ir. 43. 
 
 (a) As to a pauper appellant's costs on a 
 successful appeal to the House of Lords, see 
 Johnson v. Lindsay No. 2, [1892] A. C. 210. 
 
 41
 
 * 41 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 lay a case before counsel for his opinion whether or not he has reason- 
 able ground for suing, 6 and must present a petition to the Master of 
 the Rolls, 6 containing a short statement of his case, and of the pro- 
 ceedings, if any, which have been had in the cause, and praying to be 
 admitted to sue in forma pauperis, and that a counsel and a solicitor 
 may be assigned him if not an infant. 7 
 
 This petition must be accompanied by the case laid before counsel 8 
 for his opinion, and his opinion thereon with an affidavit of the party 
 or his solicitor, that the case contains a full and true statement of all 
 the material facts to the best of his knowledge and belief, 9 and must be 
 supported by an affidavit, sworn by the plaintiff, that he is not worth 
 the sum of £25, his wearing-apparel and the subject-matter of the suit 
 only excepted. 10 The meaning of the affidavit is, that the plaintiff has 
 not £25 in the world available for the prosecution of the suit-, and if 
 he can make an affidavit with truth in that sense, the omission to set 
 forth the details of his means, and the circumstances which render 
 them unavailable, is not such an omission of material facts as will 
 induce the Court, on that ground alone, to discharge the order. 11 
 
 This affidavit must be sworn by the party himself; and in a case in 
 which it afterwards appeared that the affidavit had been sworn by a 
 third person, the party was dispaupered. 1 " 2 
 
 The petition and case for the opinion of counsel, and an office 
 
 * 41 copy of the plaintiff's * affidavit, and usually also a copy of the 
 
 bill, are now lodged at the Chancery Register's office, where, if 
 no cause to the contrary is seen, an order is drawn up and entered, by 
 which the petitioner is admitted to sue in forma pauperis, and a counsel 
 and solicitor are assigned to act on his behalf. 1 (a) 
 
 The order should be served upon the opposite party as soon as possi- 
 
 5 R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XVI. 23. debts of the plaintiff, as appears at one time 
 
 6 Now to the High Court of Justice. to have been allowed per Sir J. L Knight 
 
 7 But a plaintiff feme covert cannot obtain Bruce, V. C, in Perry v. Walke-, 1 Coll 233; 
 the order as of course, and it must therefore Beanies on Costs, 80, and see fomi of affidavit, 
 be applied for on an ex parte motion in the Vol. III. 
 
 Court to which the cause is attached. Coul- U Dresser v. Morton, 2 Phil. 286; and see, 
 
 sting v Counting, 8 Beav. 463; Be Lancaster, as to the poverty which entitles a person to 
 
 18 Jur. 229, L. C. & L. JJ.; Re Foster, 18 sue in forma pauperis, Allen v. McPherson, 5 
 
 Beav. 525. Now, the order seems to be as of Beav. 469, 485; Boddington v. Woodley, id. 
 
 course in the case of a married woman. See 555; Goldsmith i>. Goldsmith, 5 Hare, 125; 
 
 45 & 46 Vic. c. 75, §1; R. S C. 1883, Ord. Perry v. Walker, 1 Coll. 233, 236. 
 
 XVI. 16. For form of motion paper, see 12 Wilkinson r. Belsher. 2 Bro C. C. 2T2. 
 
 Vol. III. 1 For form of order, see 2 Seton, 1271. Where 
 
 8 As to the duty of counsel for a pauper, an order had been obtained on an ex parte 
 see lies v Flower, 6 L. T. N. S. 843, L. C. application that the plaintiff be permitted to 
 
 9 Cons. Ord VII. 8; R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XVI. prosecute in forma pauperis, the same was 
 24. see Re Atkinson, 23 L R. Ir. 509. For forms vacated with costs. Isnard v. Cazeaux, 1 
 of petition, certificate, and affidavit, see Vol. III. Paige, 39 
 
 10 The affidavit must not except the just 
 
 (a) The rules of R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XVI. to obtaining leave by summons in Chambers, 
 
 do not oblige a party having leave to sue in see Re Lewin. 33 W R 128. A non-resident 
 
 forma pauperis to "have counsel or solicitor plaintiff may be allowed to sue in forma pav- 
 
 assigned to him; and where they are not as- peris in a proper case. Heckmani'. Mackey. 32 
 
 •igned, he may appear in person. Tucker v. Fed. Rep 574; Harris v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. 
 
 Collinson, 16 Q. B. D. 562, 54 L. T. 128, 263. As 13 N. Y. S. 718. 
 42
 
 PAUPERS. * 42 
 
 ble; for a plaintiff admitted to sue in forma pauperis has been ordered 
 to pay dives costs to the defendant, in respect of a step in the cause 
 taken before service of the order; ~ it seems, however, that there is a 
 discretion in the Court in such cases, and that the order to sue in 
 forma pauperis is not necessarily inoperative in all cases until service. 8 
 The order should also be lodged with the Record and Writ Clerk, for 
 entry in his books ; 4 and must be produced to the officers of the Court 
 whenever required by them. 
 
 If an order has been obtained as of course upon a suppression of 
 material facts, it will be discharged on an application by motion on 
 notice. 5 
 
 After admittance, no fee, profit, or reward is to be taken of the 
 pauper by any counsel or solicitor, for the despatch of his business, 
 whilst it depends in Court, and he continues in forma pauperis ; nor is 
 any agreement to be made for any recompense or reward afterwards; 
 and any person offending is to be deemed guilty of a contempt of Court; 
 and the party admitted giving any such fee, or making any such agree- 
 ment, is to be thenceforth dispaupered, and not be admitted again in 
 that suit to sue in forma pauperis. 6 
 
 The counsel or solicitor assigned by the Court to assist a person 
 admitted in forma pauperis, either to sue or defend, may not refuse so 
 to do, unless he satisfies the Judge who granted the admittance with 
 some good reason for his refusal. 7 
 
 When a pauper has had counsel assigned to him, he cannot be heard 
 in person. 8 
 
 No process of contempt will be issued, at the instance of any person 
 suing or defending in forma pauperis, until it be signed by his solicitor 
 in the suit-, and all notices of motion served, or petitions presented, on 
 behalf of any person admitted to sue or defend in forma pauperis 
 (except for the discharge of his solicitor) must be signed by his solici- 
 tor; and such solicitor should take care that no such process be taken 
 out, and that no such notice or petition be served, needlessly, or for 
 vexation, but upon just and good grounds. 9 If the solicitor of the 
 pauper does not prosecute the suit properly, he will be discharged and 
 ordered to deliver up all the papers in the suit to the new solicitor of 
 the pauper, subject to his lien for the money which on taxation may be 
 found due to him for costs. 10 
 
 * A pauper may move to dismiss his bill without costs, 1 but *42 
 
 2 Ballard v Catling, 2 Keen. 606; see also 655; 4 Beav. 452; and see Cons. Ord. III. 10; 
 Smith v. Pawson. 2 De G. & S. 490. Brown r. Dawson, 2 HoL'an, 76, as to the lia- 
 
 3 Church v. Marsh, 2 Hare, 652: 8 Jur. 54. bilities of a pauper"* solicitor. 
 
 4 Braithwaite's Pr. 563. The ord :r is now m Hannaford v. Hanna, W. N. (1871) 37; 
 lodged at the Central Office of the Court. 19 W. K. 429, V. C. S. For form of order, see 
 
 6 See Nowell v. Whitaker, 6 Beav. 407. 1 Seton, 637, No. 2. 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. VII. 9. 10; See now R. S. C. 1 Although in Pearson v. Belsher, 3 Bro. 
 1883, Ord. XXVI.-XXVIII. C. C. 87, it is stated that the dismissal is 
 
 7 Ibid. only to be made on payment of costs, the order 
 
 8 Parkinson v. Hanbury, 4 De G. M. & G. was drawn up without costs; see Reg. Lib. 
 508. 1789, B. 524, entered Pearson v. Wolfe; 3 Bro. 
 
 9 Cons. Ord. VII. 11 ; R. S. C. 1883, Ord. C. C. 87, ed. Belt, n. 1; Beames on Costs, 88. 
 XVI. 29, 30; Perry v. Walker, 2 Y. & C.C.C. 
 
 43
 
 * 43 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 the motion must not be made ex parte; 2 and a pauper cannot amend 
 his bill by striking out defendants, except on payment of their costs. 8 
 If a cause goes against a pauper at the hearing, he is not ordered to 
 pay costs to the defendant; it is said, however, that he may be pun- 
 ished personally, although the practice of inflicting such punishment 
 appears to be now obsolete. 4 
 
 It seems to have been formerly considered, that where a plaintiff 
 sues in forma pauperis, and has a decree in his favor with costs, he 
 will only be entitled to such costs as he has been actually out of 
 pocket; 8 but it is now settled, that the costs of a successful pauper are 
 in the discretion of the Court; 6 (a) and where costs are ordered to be 
 paid to a party suing or defending in forma pauperis, such costs are to 
 be taxed as in other cases, unless the Court or a Judge otherwise 
 directs. 7 Where an appeal against a decree in favor of a person suing 
 in forma pauperis was dismissed without costs, the deposit was ordered 
 to be paid out to the pauper. 8 
 
 A pauper may be ordered to pay the costs occasioned by scandalous 
 matter inserted by him in the proceedings. 9 
 
 If, at any time, it is made to appear to the Court that he is of such 
 ability that he ought not to be allowed to sue or to continue to sue 
 in forma pauperis, the Court will dispauper him; 10 therefore, where it 
 was shown that a pauper was in possession of the property in question, 
 he was ordered to be dispaupered, though the defendant had a 
 *43 verdict at Law, and might *take a writ of possession at any 
 time; * so also where a plaintiff had offered by her bill to redeem a 
 
 2 Parkinson v. Hanbury, 4 De G. M. & G. order, Wellesley v. Wellesley, 1 De G. M. & 
 508; and see Wilkinson v. Belsher, 2 Bro. C. G. 501; Mornington v. Keen, 3 W. R. 429 ; 24 
 C. 272. L. J. Ch. 400, V. C W.; Phillips v. Phillips, 
 
 3 Wilkinson v. Belsher, 2 Bro. C. C. 272. 4 De G. F. & J. 208, 220; 8 Jar. N. S. 145, 
 
 4 Har. 391. L. C. If a party, suing in forma pauperis, 
 
 5 Angell r. Smith, Prec. Cha. 220; see amends his bill after answer under the common 
 Williams v. Wilkins, 3 John. Ch. 65. order, it must be upon the payment of costs, as 
 
 6 Scatchmer ?>. Foulkard, 1 Eq. Cas. Ab. inordinary suits; and if he has a meritorious 
 125, pi. 3; Hautton r. Hager, cited in Angell claim to amend without costs, he must apply 
 v. Smith, Prec. Cha. 220; Wallop v. War- to the Court by special motion upon affidavit 
 burton, 2 Cox, 409; Rattray v. George, 16 Ves. and notice to the adverse party. Richardson 
 233; Church v. Marsh. 2 Hare, 655; 8 Jur. 54; v. Richardson, 5 Paige, 58. 
 
 Roberts v. Lloyd, 2 Beav. 376; Stafford v. 8 Phillips v. Phillips, 4 De G. F. & J. 208, 
 
 Hig S inbotham,"2 Keen, 147. And see R. S. C. 220; 8 Jur. N. S. 145, L. C. 
 
 Ord. I.V.; Garnett v. Bradley, 3 App. Cas. 944, 9 Per Lord Eldon, in Rattray v. George, 16 
 
 H. L.; Ex parte Mercers' Co. 10 Ch. D. 481, Ves. 234; Tothill, 237. 
 
 M. R. A plaintiff suing in forma pauperis, and ln Romillv v. Grint, 2 Beav. 186; Mather 
 recovering a legacy against executors, when v. Shelmerdine, 7 Beav. 267; Butler v. Gar- 
 there was no unreasonable delav on their part, dener, 12 Beav. 525; Ferry v. Walker, 1 Coll. 
 ought not to recover dives costs, but only the 229, 236; 8 Jur. 680; Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 
 actual expenses of the suit, to be paid by the 5 Hare, 125; Daintree v. Haynes, 12 Jur. 594, 
 executors out of the assets. Williams v. Wil- V. C. E. 
 kins, 3 John. Ch. 65. > Wyatt's P. R. 321 . See Spencer v. Bryant, 
 
 7 Cons. Ord. XL. 5 ; R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XVI. 11 Ves." 49 : see also Taprell v. Taylor, 9 Beav. 
 31; see Beames on Costs, 77; forcases since the 493; Butler v. Gardener, 12 Beav. 525. 
 
 (a) Under the English S. C. Rules of 1883 tion to his solicitor or fees of counsel. Carson 
 
 a successful plaintiff in an action in forma pan- v, Pickersgill, 14 Q. B. D. 859. See post, p. 155, 
 
 pen's tried before a Judge and jury is entitled to n. (a). As to appeals by infant paupers, see 
 
 costs out of pocket onlv, and not to remunera- Fuller v. Montague, 53 Fed. Rep. 206. 
 
 44
 
 PAUPERS. * 44 
 
 mortgage if anything should be found due on it, she was ordered to 
 be dispaupered; 2 and an officer upon half pay (which is not alienable) 
 was not permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, notwithstanding he 
 had taken the benefit of the Insolvent Act. 8 The application to dis- 
 pauper is made by special motion on notice, 4 and should be made 
 without delay. 5 
 
 At Common Law, if a pauper act vexatiously or improperly in the 
 conduct of the action, the Court will order him to be dispaupered; 6 and 
 in like manner, in Courts of Equity, if a party who is admitted to sue 
 in forma pauperis be guilty of vexatious conduct in the suit, 7 or of vexa- 
 tious delays, or make improper motions, he will be dispaupered, though 
 the Court always proceeds very tenderly in such points ; 8 and it has 
 been said that a pauper is liable to be committed if he files an improper 
 bill, as otherwise he might be guilty of great oppression. 9 The fact 
 that the pauper has been supplied with money by a charitable subscrip- 
 tion for the purpose of assisting him in the conduct of the suit, although 
 it may afford ground for impeachment as maintenance, is no ground 
 upon which he can be deprived of his right to sue as a pauper. 10 
 
 Where an issue is directed in a pauper's suit, he must be admitted as 
 a pauper in the Court in which the issue is to be tried, or otherwise he 
 cannot proceed in it, in forma pauperis. 11 In a case, however, where 
 the plaintiff, a pauper, claimed as heir-at-law, and the defendant 
 claimed under a will and deed, which were disputed, the bill was 
 retained with liberty to the plaintiff to bring an action; and the tenants 
 were ordered to pay the plaintiff £150 to enable him to go to trial. 12 
 
 An order admitting a party to sue or defend in forma pauperis, while 
 in force, 18 exempts the pauper from the payment of any fees 
 * in the offices of the Court, except for office copies made therein; * 44 
 for such copies, a charge of one penny-halfpenny per folio is 
 made. 1 Copies of documents which the pauper may himself make will 
 be marked as office copies, without charge. 2 The charges for copies of 
 pleadings and other proceedings and documents delivered, pursuant to 
 the General Orders, by the solicitors of parties to the suit, 8 to a person 
 
 2 Fowler v. Davis, 16 Sim. 182; 12 Jur. 321. son v. Richardson, 5 Paige, 58. A pauper's 
 
 8 Boddington v. Woodley, 5 Beav. 555. solicitor may be made to pay the costs of any 
 
 4 For form of notice, see Vol. III. irregular proceeding. Brown v. Dawson, 2 
 
 6 See St. Victor v. Devereux, 9 Jur. 519, L. Hogan, 76. 
 
 C. ; Parkinson v. Hanbury, 4 De G. M. & G. 9 Pearson v. Belchier, 4 Ves. 627, 630. 
 
 508. 10 Corbett v. Corbett, 16 Ves. 407, 412. 
 
 « 2 Chitty's Arch. 1280. n Gibson v. McCarty, Cas. temp. Hardwicke, 
 
 1 Wagner v. Mears, 3 Sim. 127; and see 311. 
 
 Perry v. Walker. 1 Coll. 229; 8 Jur. 680. 12 Perishal v. Squire, 1 Dick. 31; Beanies 
 
 8 Whitelocke v. Baker, 13 Ves. 511; Wag- on Costs, 76; App. 22; but see Nye v. Maule, 
 
 ner v. Mears, 3 Sim. 127 ; Daintree v. Haynes, 4 M. & C. 342, 345. 
 
 12 Jur. 594, V. C. E.; and see Perry v. Walker, " See Thomas v. Ellis, 8 Ch. D 518, C A., 
 
 1 Coll. 229. 8 Jur. 680; Burry Port Co. v. as to fees already due when order obtained. 
 
 Bowser, 5 VV. R. 325, V. C. K.; Steele v. > Braithwaite's Pr. 563; and see Wyatt's P. 
 
 Mott, 20 Wend. 679. A party suing as a poor R. 320; Beames's Orders. 216, n. (143); see 
 
 person is chargeable with the costs of setting now R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XVI. 25. 
 
 aside his proceedings for irregularity, or of a 2 Braithwaite's Pr. 563; and see Wyatt's P. 
 
 contempt (Murphy v. Oldis, 2 Moll. 475), or of R. 320; Beames's Orders, 216, n. (143); Order 
 
 expunging impertinent or scandalous matter, in as to Court Fees, 28 Oct., 1875, r. 5. 
 
 the same manner as other suitors. Richard- 8 Rules 3, 4, and 5 of the 36th Gen Order 
 
 45
 
 * 44 PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 admitted to sue or defend in forma pauperis, or to his solicitor, by or 
 on behalf of any other party, are to be at the rate of one penny-half- 
 penny per folio; but if such person shall become entitled to receive 
 dives costs, the charges for such copies are to be at the rate of four- 
 pence per folio; and nothing is to be allowed, on taxation, in respect of 
 such charges, until such person, or his solicitor, shall have paid or 
 tendered to the solicitor or party by whom such copies were delivered, 
 the additional twopence-halfpenny per folio. But this proviso is not 
 to apply to any copy which shall have been furnished by the party 
 himself who is directed to pay the costs, and not by his solicitor. 4 
 
 The charges for copies delivered by a person admitted to sue or 
 defend in forma pauperis, other than those delivered by his solicitor, 
 are to be at the rate of one penny-halfpenny per folio. 5 
 
 relate to copies of documents not made or de- 4 Regul. to Ord. Part IV. 2. 
 
 livered by the officers of the Court, but by the 5 Regul. to Ord. Part IV. 2, 3. For more on 
 
 solicitors of other parties in the cause. the subject of Paupers, see post, Chap. IV. § 7. 
 
 46
 
 * CHAPTER III. *45 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 Section. I. — Generally. 
 
 The disabilities by which a person may be prevented from suing may 
 be divided into two sorts, — namely, such as are absolute, and, during 
 the time they last, effectually deprive the party of the right to assert 
 his claim ; and such as are qualified, and merely deprive him of the 
 power of suing without the assistance of some other party to maintain 
 the suit on his behalf. Of the first sort are the disabilities which arise 
 from Alienage, Outlawry, 1 Attainder, Conviction of Felony, and Bank- 
 ruptcy ; of the second sort are those which arise from Infancy, Cover- 
 ture, Idiocy, and Lunacy. 
 
 Section II. — Aliens. 
 
 By the old law no alien, whether friend or enemy, could sue in the 
 Queen's Courts ; but the necessity of trade gradually did away with the 
 too rigorous restraints and discouragements which formerly existed, and 
 it is now clear that, for a mere personal demand, an alien born, provided 
 he be not an alien enemy, may sue in the Courts of this coun- 
 try. 2 (a) It was at one time doubtful to what extent the * copy- *46 
 
 1 Outlawry in civil proceedings was abol- cited, and Evans v. Cassidy, 11 Irish Eq.243; 
 
 ished by 42 & 43 Vic. c. 59, § 3. The disabili- Blake v. Blake, 4 Irish Eq. 349. 
 
 tiesof outlawry and excommunication are either 2 Ramkissenseat v. Barker, 1 Atk. 51; see 
 
 wholly unknown in America, or, if known at also Pisani v. Lawson, 6 Bing. N. C. 90; 
 
 all, are of very limited local existence. Story, Story, Eq. PI. §§ 51, 52. An alien friend is 
 
 Eq. PI. § 51. See Roosevelt v Urommelin, 18 entitled to the benefit, and subject to the 
 
 John. 253; Dilman v. Schultz, 5 S. &R 36. It action, of the insolvent laws of the State 
 
 has lately been held in England, that a nun is where he resides. Judd v. Lawrence, 1 Cush. 
 
 neither civilly dead, nor under any disability 3. In the Courts of the United States he is 
 
 arising from duress or undue influence. Re entitled to claim the same protection of his 
 
 Metcalfe, 2 De G. J. & S. 122; 10 Jur. N. S. rights as a citizen is. Taylor v. Carpenter, 3 
 
 287, L. JJ.; ib. 224, M. R.; and see as to civil Story, 453; S. C. 2 Wood". & M. 1 ; Coats v. 
 
 death, and the status of a nun, the cases there Holbrook, 2 Sandf. Ch. 586; Byam v. Stevens, 
 
 (a) In the United States, one alien may sue Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217. Under the Act of 
 
 another in a State Court, when both are tran- Congress of Aug. 13, 1888 (25 Stat, at Large, 
 
 siently present, upon a contract made abroad. 434), a U. S. Circuit Court has no jurisdiction 
 
 Roberts v. Knights, 7 Allen, 449; Johnston v. of a suit by a citizen of the district against an 
 
 Trade Ins. Co. 132 Mass. 432. So an absent alien who is temporarily in the district. Meyer 
 
 foreigner may there maintain a transitory action v. Herrera, 41 Fed. Rep 65. A foreign consul 
 
 against a citizen of another State, although is not presumed to be an alien. Bors v. Preston, 
 
 service of process was made on a foreign mail- 111 U. S. 252. 
 steamer before reaching her dock. Peabodj' v. 
 
 47
 
 47 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 right of a foreigner would be protected ; * but it was decided that 
 where a foreign author owes a temporary allegiance by residence in 
 England, 2 or any part of the British dominions, 8 at the time of his first 
 publication of the work, and has not previously published it elsewhere, 
 he is an author within the protection of the Copyright Acts. By sev- 
 eral recent Acts, a system of international copyright has now been 
 established. 4 
 
 The right of an alien to sue in the English Courts was, at Common 
 
 Law, confined to cases arising from personal demands ; for although an 
 
 alien might trade, and therefore maintain personal actions, he could not 
 
 maintain either real or mixed actions, 5 because, though in amity, 
 
 *47 he was incapable of holding real property. 6 * Now, by the 
 
 " Naturalization Act, 1870," 1 real and personal property of every 
 
 4 Edw. Ch. 119. An alien does not lose his 
 right to sue in the Courts of the United States, 
 by residing in one of the States of the Union. 
 Breedlove v. Nicolet, 7 Peters, 413. 
 i Delondre v Shaw, 2 Sim. 237. 
 
 2 Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 815; 1 
 Jur. N. S* 615, overruling S. C. 4 Exch. 145; 
 in Exch Ch. 6 Exch 580. 
 
 3 Low v. Routledge, L. R. 1 Ch. 42, 11 Jur 
 N S. 939 ; affirmed, nom. Routledge v. Low, 
 L. R. 3 H. L. 100; Low v. Ward, L. R. 6 Eq. 
 415, V. C. G. 
 
 4 7 & 8 Vic. c. 12. and 15 & 16 Vic c. 12 , 25 
 & 2G Vic. c 68; 26 U. S Stats, at Large, 1110, 
 § 13, Buxton v. James, 5 De G. &S. 80; 16 Jur. 
 15 ; Ollendorff v. Black, 4 De G. & S. 209, 14 Jur. 
 1080; Cassell v. Stiff, 2 K. & J. 279; Wood v. 
 Boosey, L. R. 2 Q. B. 340 , affirmed, L. R. 3 Q 
 B. 223, Exch. Ch. ; Wood v. Chart, Wood v. 
 Wood, W. N. (1870) 118, L. R. 10 Eq. 193: 
 Boosey w. Fairlie, 7 Ch . D. 301 ; and see as to an 
 alien's copyright in designs, 24 & 25 Vic. c. 73, 
 which was repealed, after Dec. 31, 1883, by 
 46 & 47 Vic. c'57, § 113, Sched. 3; see 49 & 
 50 Vic. c. 33; Lauri v. Renad (1892), 3 Ch. 402. 
 
 6 Co. Litt. 129 b. 
 
 6 Co. Litt. 2 b. The title of an alien friend 
 to land purchased by, or devised to him, is good 
 against everybody but the State, and can only 
 be divested by office found, or by some act done 
 by the State to acquire possession. M'Creery 
 v. Allender, 4 Har. & M'H. 409; Groves v. 
 Gordon, 1 Conn. Ill; Marshall v. Conrad, 5 
 Call, 364; University v. Miller, 3 Dev 191; 
 Doe v. Homib)ea, 2 Hayw. 37; Buchanan v. 
 Deshon, 1 Har. & G. 280, Scanlan v. Wright, 
 13 Pick. 523; Jenkins v. Noel, 3 Stew 60; Doe 
 v. Robertson, 11 Wheat. 322; Dudley v. Gray- 
 s n, 6 Monroe, 260; Jackson v. Adams, 7 
 Wend. 367; Bradstreet v Supervisors &c. 13 
 Wend. 546; Wilbur v. Tob^y. 16 Pick. 179; 
 Foss v. Crisp, 20 Pick. 124, Waugh v Riley, 8 
 Met. 295; People v. Conklm, 2 Hill, 67; Hal- 
 stead v. Commissioners of Lake, 56 Ind. 363. 
 An alien will be protected in the possession of 
 
 48 
 
 public lands against trespassers. Courtney v. 
 Turner, 12 Nev. 345. But not against one who 
 connects himself with the government title. 
 Golden Fleece Co. v. Cable &c Co 12 Nev. 312 
 The disability of aliens to hold real estate has 
 been partially removed in some States, and 
 wholly in others. See 2 Kent, 53, 54, note; 
 Mass" Gen. Stats, c. 90. § 38; (Pub. Stats, c. 
 126, § 1), Rouche v. Williamson, 3 Ired. (N. C.) 
 146, Duke of Richmond v. Miln, 17 L. 312. 
 In States where an alien cannot hold real 
 estate, of course he cannot maintain ejectment; 
 but if he is in possession of real property, he 
 may maintain trespass, quart clausum /regit. 
 Bayes v. Hogg, 1 Hayw. 485. But an alien's 
 right to sustain an action for the recovery of 
 land in case of an intrusion by an individual was 
 maintained in M'Creery v. Allender, 4 Har. & 
 M'H. 409. Bradstreet v. Supervisors &c. 13 
 Wend. 546; Waugh v. Riley, 8 Met. 295; see 
 also Scanlan v. Wright. 13 Pick. 523, Jackson 
 v. Britton, 4 Wend- 507; Jackson ex dem. 
 Culverhouse v. Beach, 1 John. Cas. 399, Ganse- 
 voort v. Lunn, 3 id 109; Orser v Hoag, 3 Hill, 
 79. See Lareau v. Davignon, 1 Buff. N. Y. 
 Sup. Ct. 128. An alien who holds land under 
 a special law of a State may maintain a suit in 
 the Circuit Court of the United States relating 
 to such land. Bonaparte v. Camden &c. Rail- 
 road Co. 1 Bald. 316; see Commonwealth v. 
 Andre, 3 Pick. 224. 
 
 i 33 & 34 Vic c. 14, § 2; by § 16 of which Act 
 power is given to the legislatures of British pos- 
 sessions to give the privileges of naturalization 
 within their own limits; by § 12 regulations 
 are made as to evidence under the Act; and 
 bv § 18 the former Alien Acts (7 & 8 Vic c 66, 
 and 10 & 11 Vic c. 83) are repealed. See as to 
 the rights of descendants of British subjects 
 who had settled abroad before the Act, Fitch v. 
 Weber, 6 Hare, 51. See also Count De Wall's 
 case, 6 Moore P. C 216; 12 Jur 145; Barrow v. 
 Wadkin, 24 Beav. 327; Rittson v. Stordy, 3 Sm. 
 & G. 230; 1 Jur N. S 771 ; 2 id 410; De Geer 
 v. Stone, 22 Ch. D 243.
 
 ALIENS. * 48 
 
 description may be taken, acquired, held, and disposed of by an alien in 
 the same manner in all respects as by a natural-born British subject : 
 and a title to real and personal property of every description may be 
 derived through, from, or in succession to an alien, in the same manner 
 in all respects as through, from, or in succession to a natural-born 
 British subject : subject to the proviso that the enactment (1) shall 
 not confer any right on an alien to hold real property situate out of 
 the United Kingdom, and shall not qualify an alien for any office or for 
 any municipal, parliamentary, or other franchise ; (2) shall not enti- 
 tle an alien to any right or privilege as a British subject, except such 
 rights and privileges in respect of property as are thereby expressly 
 given to him ; (3) shall not qualify an alien to be the owner of a 
 British ship ; (4) shall not affect any estate or interest in real or per- 
 sonal property to which any person has or may become entitled, 
 either mediately * or immediately, in possession or expectancy, in *48 
 pursuance of any disposition made before the passing of the Act, 1 
 or in pursuance of any devolution by law on the death of any person 
 dying before the passing of this Act. 2 
 
 If one alien sues another upon a contract entered into in a foreign 
 country, it would be contrary to all the principles which guide the 
 Courts of one country in deciding upon contracts made in another, to 
 give a greater effect to the contract than it would have by the laws of 
 the country where it took place : therefore a French emigrant resident 
 in England was not permitted to enforce securities obtained by duress 
 from another French emigrant, for the payment of a demand alleged to 
 be due from him under an obligation entered into in France as security 
 for another, and for which, according to the laws of France, his person 
 could not be affected ; 8 and upon the same principle a writ ne exeat 
 
 i This was the 12th of Ma}', 1870. Story Conf. Laws, § 270. et seq. ; De La Vega 
 
 2 This section is not retrospective. Sharp v. Vianna, 1 B. & Ad. 284; Liverpool Marine 
 
 t. St. Sauveur, L. R. 7 Ch. 343, L. C. Credit Co. v. Hunter, L. R. 3 Ch. 479; In re 
 
 8 Talleyrand v. Boulanger, 3 Ves. 447, 450. Kloebe, 28 Ch. D. 175. But the remedy will 
 
 Suits are maintainable, and are constantly be applied according to the law of the place 
 
 maintained, between foreigners where either where it is pursued. A controversy between 
 
 of them is within the territory of the State in two foreigners, who are private citizens, is not 
 
 which the suit is brought, both in England and cognizable in the Courts of the United States 
 
 America. Story Conf. Laws, § 542. under the Constitution. See Barrell v. Benja- 
 
 In Bnnley v. Avery, Kirby, 25, it was held min, 15 Mass. 357. 
 that a plea in abatement that both parties are In De La Vega v. Vianna, 1 B. & Ad. 284, 
 
 aliens, and that the contract declared on was it was held that one foreigner may arrest an- 
 
 made in a foreign country, and was to have other in England for a debt which accrued in 
 
 been performed there, is good ; and in Dumous- Portugal while both resided there, though the 
 
 say v. Delevit, 3 Har. & J. 151, an action of Portuguese law does not allow of arrest for 
 
 replevin was held abatable, on a plea that both debt; and Lord Tenterden C. J. remarked, that 
 
 parties were aliens, and the Court therefore had a person suing in England must take the law 
 
 not jurisdiction. But in Barrell v. Benjamin, as he finds it,- he cannot, by virtue of any regu- 
 
 15 Mass. 354, the Court were inclined to the lation in his own country, enjoy greater advan- 
 
 opinion that one foreigner may sue another, tages than other suitors in England, and he 
 
 who is transiently within the jurisdiction of ought not, therefore, to be deprived of any 
 
 the Courts of a State, upon a contract made superior advantage which the law of this coun- 
 
 between them in a foreign country. And see try may confer. He is to have the same rights 
 
 Roberts v. Knight, 7 Allen, 449. In construing which all British subjects are entitled to. The 
 
 such contracts, the law of the place where the}' remedy upon contracts is governed by the law 
 
 are made will be administered. lb. p. 357; of the place where the parties pursue it. See 
 vol. i. — 4 49
 
 * 50 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 regno was not granted, where it appeared that the transactions between 
 
 the parties were entered into upon the faith of having justice 
 *49 in the place where they respectively resided. 4 If, * however, one 
 
 of the parties is an Englishman, and they were both resident in 
 different countries at the time the contract was entered into, the Court 
 will not discharge a ne exeat obtained by the party resident in Eng- 
 land, against the other who had casually come there, on the ground 
 that, by the law of the country of which the other was a native, he would 
 be exempt from arrest for a debt of the same nature. 1 
 
 With respect to alien enemies, it is clear that an alien enemy not resi- 
 dent here, or resident here without the permission of the government, 
 cannot institute any suit whatever in this country, either for real or per- 
 sonal property, until both nations be at peace ; 2 and it is said that the 
 question whether he is in amity or not, should be tried by the record, 
 namely, by the production of the proclamation of war. 8 It is to be 
 observed that by the proclamation of war subjects of the enemy resident 
 here are usually permitted to continue so, so long as they peaceably 
 demean themselves, so that such persons are to be deemed in effect alien 
 friends ; 4 therefore, where an alien enemy has lived here peaceably a 
 long time, or has come here for refuge and protection, the Court will 
 discountenance a plea of alienage against him. 5 It seems, also, that a 
 prisoner of war may sue upon a contract entered into by him during the 
 
 time of his captivity. 6 
 *50 * The mere circumstance of residing in a foreign country, the 
 
 government of which is at war with this country, and of carry- 
 ing on trade there, is sufficient to constitute any person an alien enemy, 
 even though he would not otherwise be considered in that character. 1 
 
 also Whittemore v. Adams 2 Cowen, 626; Will- Exch. 135, 141, note ; Dean v Nelson, 10 Wall. 
 
 mg v. Consequa, 1 Peters C. C. 317; Contois 158; 10 Am. Law Reg. N S. 221, and note. 
 
 v. Carpentier, 1 Wash. C. C. 376; Wyman v. 3 Co. Litt. by Harg. & But. 129 b. n. 2. 
 
 Southward, 10 Wheat. 1; Don v. Lippman, 5 4 Co. Litt. by Harg. & But. 129 b n 3. 
 
 CI. & Fin. 1; Hinkley v. Moreau, 3 Mason, 5 Wyatt's P. R. 327; Story, Eq. PI. § 52, 
 
 88; Titus v. Hobart, 5 Mason, 378, Atwater Bradwell v. Weeks. 1 John. Ch. 208; Russell v. 
 
 v. Townsend. 4 Conn. 47; Story, Conf. Laws, Skipwith, 6 Binn. 241. 
 
 §§ 568-571. The same doctrine was maintained 6 Sparenburgh v. Bannatyne, 1 Bos. & P- 
 
 in Smith v. Spinolla, 2 John. 198. See also 163; Maria ». Hall, 2 Bos. & P. 236; 1 Taunt. 
 
 Peck v. Hozier, 14 John. 346; Sicard v. Whale, 33; Crawford v. The William Penn, 3 Wash. 
 
 11 John. 194; Talleyrand v. Boulanger, 3 Sum- C. C. 484. 
 
 ner's Ves. 447 note (t). In many cases an alien enemy is entitled 
 
 4 Robertson v. Wilkie, Amb. 177; and see even to sue for his own rights; as when he 
 
 De Carriere v. De Calonne, 4 Ves 590, as to is permitted to remain in the country, or is 
 
 granting a writ of ne exeat regno against for- brought here as a prisoner of war. He is rec- 
 
 eigners. ognized in our Courts in his character as execu- 
 
 i Flack v. Holm, 1 J. & W. 405, 413, 418. tor; and in all cases his property is protected 
 
 2 Co. Litt. 129 b.; 6 T. R. 23; 1 Bos. & P. and held in trust for him until the return of 
 
 163; 3 Bos. & P. 113; Alcinous v. Nigren, 4 El. peace. Bradwell V. Weeks, 1 John. Ch 208, 
 
 & Bl. 217; S. C. nom. Alcenius v. Nygren, 1 Bell v. Chapman, 10 John. 183; Clark <c. Morey, 
 
 Jur. N. S. 16; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 51-54 ; Mum- 10 John. 69; Hutchinson v. Brock, 11 Mass. 
 
 ford v. Mumford, 1 Gall. 366; Bradwell v. 119; Parkinson v. Wentworth, 11 Mass. 26; 
 
 Weeks, 1 John. Ch. 208; Crawford v. Wm. Russell v. Skipwith. 6 Binn. 241. 
 
 Penn, 1 Peters C. C. 106; Wilcox v. Henry, 1 i 1 Kent, 76, et seq. ; Case of the Sloop 
 
 Dall. 69: Bell r. Chapman, 10 John. 183; Hep- Chester, 2 Dallas, 41; Murray v. Schooner 
 
 burn's case, 3 Bland, 95; Griswold v. Wadding- Betsey, 2 Cranch, 64; Maley v. Shattuck, 3 
 
 ton, 16 John. 438; Clemonston v. Blessig, 11 Cranch, 488; Livingston v. Maryland Ins. Co. 
 
 50
 
 ALIENS. * 51 
 
 Thus, a subject of a neutral State, resident in a hostile State in the 
 character of consul of the neutral State, will, if he carry on trade in the 
 hostile country, be considered as an alien enemy, and disqualified from 
 suing in the Courts of this country ; although, had he merely resided 
 there in his diplomatic character, he would not have been disqualified. 2 
 And even if a British subject, residing in a foreign State which is at war 
 with this country, carries on trade there without a license from the gov- 
 ernment of this country, his trading will be considered such an adherence 
 to the enemy as to incapacitate him from maintaining a suit here ; 8 
 and although he be an ambassador, or other representative of the Crown 
 residing in a hostile State, yet if he carries on trade in such State with- 
 out a license, he will deprive himself of the right to sue in the municipal 
 courts of this country, because he is lending himself to the purposes 
 of the enemy by furnishing him with resources : 4 but if a subject of 
 this country, residing in a hostile country, has a license from this gov- 
 ernment to trade, he will not incur any disability so long as he confines 
 himself to the trade authorized by such license. 6 
 
 The disability to maintain a suit on account of alienage extends to 
 all cases in which an alien enemy is interested, although his name does 
 not appear in the transaction ; 6 thus, it has been held, that an action at 
 Law cannot be maintained upon a policy of insurance upon the property 
 of an alien enemy, even though the action is brought in the name of an 
 English agent, 7 and though it is alleged that the alien is indebted 
 to the agent in more money * than the value covered by the *51 
 policy. 1 Where, however, a certain trading of an alien enemy 
 (namely, for specie and goods to be brought from the enemy's country in 
 his ships into our colonial ports) was licensed, it was held, that an insur- 
 ance on the enemy's ship, as well as on the cargo, was in furtherance of 
 the same policy, which allowed the granting of the licenses to authorize 
 the trade ; and that an action by an English agent to recover the amount 
 of the insurance on the ship, might be maintained, notwithstanding the 
 ship belonged to an enemy ; but it was held that the principal could 
 not sue in his own name. 2 
 
 The disability to sue under which an alien enemy lies is personal, and 
 therefore he cannot, it seems, institute a suit for the purpose of obtain- 
 ing a discovery, although he seeks no further relief. 8 
 
 7 Cranch, 506; The Venus, 8 Cranch, 253; The specified articles to this country, were to use 
 Francis, 8 Cranch, 363; Society v. Wheeler, 2 such license beyond its expression, for the pur- 
 Gall. 105. pose of dealing in articles to which it has no 
 
 2 Albrecht v. Sussman, 2 V. & B. 323. relation, he cannot maintain that such dealing 
 
 8 M'Connell v. Hector, 3 Bos. & P. 113; is not an enemy's dealing. Ex parte Bagle- 
 
 O'Mealey v. Wilson, 1 Camp. 482. But he hole, 18 Ves. 529. 
 
 may lawfully provide for the necessities of 6 Crawford v. The William Penn, 1 Peters 
 
 Englishmen detained abroad, and may, on the C C. 106. It is no objection, after the war, 
 
 return of peace, enforce contracts made for that the suit was originally brought by the 
 
 such purposes. Antoine v. Morshead, 6 Taunt, plaintiff as trustee for an alien enemy. Haiu- 
 
 237; Duhammel v. Pickering, 2 Stark. 92. ersiey v. Lambert, 2 John. Ch. 508. 
 
 * Ex parte Baglehole, 18 Ves. 525, 528. * Bristow v. Towers, 6 T. R. 35. 
 
 6 Ex parte Baglehole, 18 Ves. 529 ; see l Brandon v. Nesbitt. 6 T. R. 23. 
 
 Crawford v. The William Penn, 3 Wash. C. C. 2 Kensington 8. Inglis, 8 East, 273. 
 
 48-1. If a person having a license to reside in 8 Daubigny v. Davallon, 2 Anst. 462; but 
 
 a hostile country, and to export com or other see Albrecht v. Sussman, 2 V. & B. 324, 326, 
 
 51
 
 52 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 It is to be observed that the right of an alien to maintain a suit relat- 
 ing to a contract is only suspended by war if the contract was entered 
 into previously to the commencement of the war, and it may be enforced 
 upon the restoration of peace. 4 Upon this principle, in bankruptcy, the 
 proof of a debt due to an alien enemy, upon a contract made before the 
 war broke out, was admitted, reserving the dividend. 8 But no suit can 
 be sustained to enforce an obligation arising upon a contract entered into 
 
 with an alien enemy during war, such contract being absolutely 
 *52 void. 6 And where a policy of insurance, * on behalf of French 
 
 subjects was entered into just before the commencement of the 
 war, upon which a loss was sustained in consequence of capture by a 
 British ship, after hostilities had commenced, the proof of a debt arising 
 from such policy, which had been admitted by the commissioner in bank- 
 ruptcy, was ordered to be expunged. 1 
 
 A defence on the ground that the plaintiff is an alien enemy, should 
 be made by plea before answer. Thus, where a bill was filed by a 
 plaintiff residing in a foreign country at war with this, for a commission 
 to examine witnesses there, and the defendant put in an answer, an 
 application for an order for the commission was granted ; though it was 
 objected that the Court ought not to grant a commission to an enemy's 
 
 327. An alien friend mav maintain a bill for Courts held that the contract was merely sus- 
 
 discovery in aid of a suit in a foreign country, 
 2 Story," Eq. Jur. § 1495; Mitchell v. Smith, 1 
 Paige, 287; Story, Eq. PI. § 53 in note. But 
 see Reimer v. Salisbury, 2 Ch. D. 378. Infra, 
 1556, note. 
 
 4 Alcinous v. Nigren, 4 El. & Bl. 217 ; S. C. 
 nom. Alcenius v. Nygren, 1 Jur. N. S. 16; 
 Flindt t\ Waters, 15 East, 280; Hamilton v. 
 Eaton, 2 Marsh. C. C. 1; Buchanan v. Curry, 
 19 John. 137; Clemontson v. Blessig, 11 Exch. 
 135, 141, note; Hamersley v. Lambert, 2 John. 
 Ch. 508; Bradwell v. Weeks, 1 John. Ch. 
 206. And in Massachusetts the statutes of 
 limitation of personal actions are expressly 
 suspended in favor of an alien during war. 
 Gen. Stats, c. 155, § 8; Pub. Stats, c. 197, § 10. 
 See Hopkirk v. Bell, 3 Cranch, 454. A plea 
 that the plaintiff was an alien enemy is suf- 
 ficiently answered by a treaty of peace, made 
 after the plea was filed. Johnson ;*. Harrison, 
 6 Litt. 226. The Court will take notice of the 
 fact, though the plaintiff do not reply to it. Ibid. 
 Treaties with foreign nations are part of the 
 law of the land, of which the Courts are bound 
 to take notice. Baby v. Dubois, 1 Blackf. 255. 
 The effect of the late Civil War upon con- 
 tracts of life insurance came frequently before 
 the Courts, and resulted in conflicting decisions. 
 Some of the Courts held that the contracts 
 between citizens of the rebellious States and 
 insurance companies of the loyal States were 
 annulled by the war. Dillard v. Manhattan 
 Life Ins. Co. 44 Ga. 171; Tait v. N. Y. 
 Life Ins. Co. 1 Flippin, 288; 4 Rig. Cas. 
 479; Worthington v. Charter Oak Life 
 Ins. Co. 41 Conn. 372. A majority of the 
 
 52 
 
 pended by the war. Robinson v. International 
 Life Ins. Co. 42 N. Y. 54; Cohen v. Mutual 
 Life Ins. Co. 50 N. Y. 610; Manhattan Life 
 Ins. Co. v. Warwick, 20 Graft. 614; N. Y. Life 
 Ins. Co. v, Clopton, 7 Bush, 174; Hilliard v. 
 Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. 37 N. J. L. 
 444. In Smith v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. 1 
 Cent. L. J. 76 (Mo.), and Hancock v. N. Y. Life 
 Ins. Co. 13 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 103; 4 Big. Cas. 
 488 (Va.), the assured were allowed the value 
 of the policy, at the outbreak of the war, 
 subsequent premiums having been tendered to 
 an agent in the Confederate States. In New 
 York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U. S. 24, the 
 U. S. Supreme Court held that the contract was 
 terminated by the war, but gave the assured 
 the equitable value of the policy at that 
 date. In Crawford v. ./Etna Life Ins. Co. (5 
 Cent. L. J. 100, and note) the Supreme Court 
 of Tennessee allowed the assured the value of a 
 paid-up policy on the day of the involuntary 
 cessation of payments. 
 
 5 Ex parte Boussmaker, 13 Ves. 71. 
 
 6 Ibid.; see Exposito v. Bowden, in Ex. Ch. 
 7 El. & Bl. 779; 5 W R. 732, as to the dissolu- 
 tion of contracts by a declaration of war. 
 
 i Ex parte Lee, 13 Ves. 64. The principle 
 upon which this case was decided is fully 
 stated by Lord Ellenborough in Brandon v. 
 Curling, 4 East, 410, where it is laid down as a 
 rule that every insurance on alien property by 
 a British subject is with this implied exception, 
 ''that it shall not extend to cover any loss hap- 
 pening during the existence of hostilities be- 
 tween the respective countries of the assured 
 and assurer."
 
 ALIENS. * 53 
 
 country, the Court being, as it seems, of opinion that the objection had 
 come too late. 2 
 
 It does not appear what would be the effect of a war breaking out 
 between the country of the plaintiff and this country, after the com- 
 mencement of the suit ; but, from analogy to what was formerly the 
 practice of the Court with regard to outlawry, namely, that if it is not 
 pleaded it may be shown to the Court on the hearing, as a peremptory 
 matter against the plaintiff's demands, because it shows the right to the 
 thing to be in the Queen, 3 it is probable that, under such circumstances, 
 the proceedings would be stayed. 4 (a) 
 
 It appears to be the essence of a plea that the plaintiff is an alien 
 enemy, to state that the plaintiff was born out of the liegance of the 
 Queen, and within the liegance of a State at war with us ; and that a 
 defence containing words which amount in substance to an allegation of 
 these facts, will be sufficient, although they are not averred with 
 the same strictness that is required by the rules of * law. 1 *53 
 
 It is to be observed that the Courts here take notice, without 
 proof, of a war in which this country is engaged ; but a war between 
 foreign countries must be proved. 2 
 
 In all cases where a person is permitted to sue in Equity, if he states 
 himself in his bill to be resident abroad, or if it comes to the knowledge 
 of the defendant that he is actually so, the defendant may obtain an 
 order of the Court that the plaintiff shall give security to answer to the 
 defendant the costs of the suit. 8 The practice with respect to this rule 
 has been before stated, 4 and is applicable to aliens and foreigners as well 
 as to natural born subjects. 5 It seems that an alien resident in this coun- 
 try will not be required to give security for costs, although his residence 
 here is merely temporary, and for the purpose of carrying on the suit. 6 
 
 3 ?!;"* ' S p Phe S ^ VeS ' 335< 8fter jUdsment ' the Co » rt ™" n^ on motion, 
 
 Gilb. For. Bom 53 stay or set aside the execution. Buckley v. 
 
 « Story Eq. PI. § 54. If the pla.nt.ff be- Lyttle, 10 John. 117. See Owens v. Haniiev, 
 
 comes an alien enemy after the commencement 9 Cranch 180 " 
 
 of the suit, the defendant may plead it. Bell 1 Dau'bigny v. Davallon, 2 Anst. 462, 468. 
 
 £ Chapman, 10 John. 18-3. But as the d.sa- 2 DoIder „ Lord Hunt ; n ' gfield> „ y^ 20 ,. 
 
 bility is merely temporary, if the suit is not and Bee Alcinoua r. Ni-ren 4 El & Bl 217- 
 
 abated during the war it is no objection S . C. nam. Alcenius v. Nvgren. 1 Jn'r. N. S. 17.' 
 afte. the war that the plaintiff was an alien 8 Meliorucchvr. Meliorucchv 2 Ves Sr 24 ; 
 
 enemy when the suit was brought. Ham- Green ,. Charnock, 1 Ves. Jr. 396: Hobv • 
 
 ereleyr. Lambert, 2 John. Ch. 508. The effect Hitchcock H V- mo. Q -i w "°'\\'- 
 
 „f n,„ „i „ t 1: • j r niuncock, & Ves. 699 Seilaz v. Hanson, lb. 
 
 of the plea of alien enemy ,s not to defeat the 261 . Drever , MaiulpsIev & Ruga n 
 process , entirely, but to suspend it. Hutchin- 4 S ee ante, pp. 27-37." 
 
 son v. Brock, 11 Mass. 119; Parkinson v. Went- 5p .„, m ' . , ,. ... .. 
 
 w-nrth 11 Mo «, o« t„ ■ t 1 ''°r m'Te as to trading with alien enemies, 
 
 worth. 11 Ma-^s. 26 Levine v. Tavlor, 12 Mass. co „ ti,« n™~ t. a . t % ■»* t -,- 
 
 o 11 1 1 ui .. a. t- l Vv, see "'e Hoop, ludor s L. C. Merc. Law, 787- 
 
 8; llamersleyt'. Lambert, 2 John. Ch. 508. g 13 ■ ' 
 
 Where the plaintiff becomes an alien enemy 6 Cambottie ?•. Inngate, 1 W. R. 533 V. C. 
 
 {(i) In such case, the proceedings should be Howard, 18 Wall. 99; McNair r Toler 21 
 
 continued, and not dismissed. Ex parte Bouss- Minn. 175. He mav be bound, like' other non- 
 
 "T 1 " ^f 8 ' U > Faulkland v. Stanion, 12 residents, hv notice bv publication. University 
 
 Mod. 400; Elgee v. Lovell, 1 Woolw. 102; v. Finch, 18 Wall. 'l06; Lee v Rogers 2 
 
 Levine o.Taylor, 12 Mass. 8 ; Kershaw v. Kelsey, Sawyer, 549 ; Sevmour v. Railev, 06 111 288 ; 
 
 100 Mass. 561, 563 ; Bishop r. Jones. 28 Texas, Selden v. Preston, 1 1 Bush. 191 j see Ludlow v. 
 
 294; cmtra, Howes v. Chester, 33 Ga. 89. An Ramsey, 11 Wall. 581; Horsey v. Thompson, 
 
 al.en enemy may be sued, and is entitled to all 37 Md 25 He cannot defend; on the pround 
 
 he usual means of defence. McVeigh v. that he is an alien enemv. Horsey v. Kyle, 30 
 
 united States, 11 Wall. 259; Masterson v. Md. 512; see Herbert v. Rowles. id. 271." 
 
 53
 
 * 54 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 Section III. — Persons attainted or convicted. 
 
 Formerly, after judgment of outlawry, or of death, in a prosecution 
 for treason or felony, the criminal was said to be attainted, attinctus, or 
 blackened, 7 and became incapable of maintaining a suit in any Court of 
 justice, either civil or criminal, 8 unless for the purpose of procuring 
 a reversal of his attainder. 9 He also incurred a forfeiture of all his 
 property, real and personal, and was disqualified from holding any 
 which he might in future acquire, either by descent, purchase, or con- 
 tract ; 10 but since July 4, 1870, 11 no confession, verdict, inquest, 
 *54 conviction, or judgment, * of or for any treason or felony, or felo 
 de se, causes any attainder or corruption of blood, or any forfei- 
 ture or escheat ; the law of forfeiture consequent upon outlawry is, 
 however, not affected. 1 No suit for the recovery of any property, 
 debt, or damage whatsoever can be brought by any convict 2 against any 
 person while he is subject to the operation of the Act, 8 and every con* 
 vict is incapable, during such time, of alienating or charging any prop- 
 erty, or of making any contract ; but these disabilities are suspended 
 whilst he may be lawfully at large under any license. 4 
 
 With respect to the forfeiture of real estates by attainder, there was 
 a distinction between attainders for treason and for felony. By 
 attainder for treason, a man forfeited all estates of inheritance, whether 
 fee-simple or fee-tail, and all rights of entry on lands or tenements 
 which he had at the time of the offence committed, or at any time after- 
 wards, and also the profits of all lands and tenements which he had in 
 his own right, for life or years, so long as such interest subsisted ; 6 but 
 
 \V. ; Redondo v. Chaytor, 4 Q. B. D. 453, son, W. N. (1871) 161; 25 W. R. 768, 
 
 C. A.; and see Ainsley v. Sims, 17 Beav. 57; V. C H. 
 
 17 Jur. 657; Swanzy v. Swanzy, 4 K.& J. 237; in Bullock v. Dodds, 2 B. & Aid. 277. 
 
 4 Juv. N. S. 1013. u The date on which ttie 33 & 34 Vic. c. 23 
 
 ' 4 Bla. Com. 381. received the royal assent. 
 
 8 See as to pleading convictions, Ld. Red. l 33 & 34 Vic. c. 23, § 1. 
 
 229 ; Buck v. Brown, 2 Atk. 399; Fall r. , 2 The word "convict" means any person 
 
 May, 1782, Ld. Red. 233. against whom, after the passing of the Act 
 
 9 Ex parte Bullock, 14 Ves. 452. 464. A (i. e., 4th July, 1870). judgment of death, or of 
 person attainted under the Act of New York, penal servitude, has been pronounced or re- 
 1799, is considered as civiliter mortuus. Jack- corded by any Court of competent jurisdiction 
 son r. Catlin, 2 John. 248. One attainted un- in England, Wales, or Ireland, upon any charge 
 der the Act cannot sustain an action for rent of treason or felony. 33 & 34 Vic c. 23, § 6. 
 due to him previous to the passing of the Act, 8 The convict ceases to be subject to the 
 or make it a set-off in an action by his lessee, operation of the Act when he dies or becomes 
 Sleglit v. Kade, 2 John. 236. bankrupt, or has suffered any punishment to 
 
 A plea of attainder is of rare occurrence, and which sentence of death pronounced or re- 
 a plea of this sort in Equity would probably corded against him has been lawfully com- 
 be construed with the same strictness as the muted, or has undergone the full term of penal 
 like plea is at Law. Story, Eq. PI. § 723. In servitude for which judgment has been pro- 
 England, he was not disqualified from holding nounced or recorded against him, or such other 
 such land, stock, or choses in action as he holds punishment as may have been duly substituted 
 as a trustee or mortgagee; see 13 & 14 Vic. for such full term, or has received a pardon for 
 c. 60, § 46; and see, before the Act, Ex parte the treason or felony of which he has been con- 
 Tyson, 1 Jur. 472 ; nor lands of which he victed. 33 & 34 V.c. c. 23, § 7. 
 is' only equitable owner. Att.-Gen. v. Sands, * 33 & 34 Vic. c. 23, §§ 8, 30. 
 Hardres. 488; Tudor, R. Prop. 760-796. A 6 4 Bla. Com. 381. Descent maybe traced 
 power of revocation imperfectly executed by through a person attainted since 1833; see 3& 
 a felon has been aided Mainprice v Pear- 4 Will. IV. c. 106. § 10. 
 
 54
 
 PERSONS ATTAINTED OR CONVICTED. * 55 
 
 with respect to the attainder for felony, the 54 Geo. III. c. 145 enacted 
 that, except in cases of high treason, petit treason, and murder or abetting 
 the same, no attainder should extend to the disinheriting any heir, or 
 to the prejudice of the right or title of any person, except the offender 
 during his life only ; and upon the death of the offender, every person to 
 whom the right or interest of any lands or tenements should or might, 
 after the death of such offender, have appertained, if no such attainder 
 had been, might enter thereupon. 6 
 
 The forfeiture of real estate, consequent upon attainder of treason or 
 felony, related backwards to the time of the treason or felony com- 
 mitted, so as to avoid all intermediate sales or incumbrances, but not 
 those before the fact. 7 The forfeiture of goods and chattels 
 * had, however, no relation backwards; so that those only which *55 
 a man had at the time of conviction were forfeited. 1 But by attain- 
 der, not only all the personal property and rights of action which a man 
 actually had were forfeited, but all personal property and rights of action 
 which accrued to the offender after attainder were forfeited and vested 
 in the Crown, without office found ; 2 so that attainder might be well 
 pleaded in bar to an action on a bill of exchange indorsed to the plaintiff 
 after his attainder. 8 Lands also were forfeited upon attainder, and not 
 before ; but goods and chattels were forfeited upon conviction. 4 In out- 
 lawries for treason or felony, lands were forfeited only by judgment, but 
 goods and chattels were forfeited by a man's being put in the exigent. 5 (a) 
 
 If a party claiming a title to property under an attainted person were 
 to institute proceedings in a Court of justice relating to that property, 
 his claim might be met by pleading the attainder of the person from 
 whom his claim was derived ; 6 and in such case the time when the for- 
 feiture accrued might be an important point for consideration. 
 
 With respect to such felonies as were not punishable with death, the 
 felon on conviction forfeited his civil rights ; but the punishment endured 
 had the like effect and consequences as a pardon under the Great Seal, 7 
 and restored the offender to his civil rights, on the determination of the 
 period of punishment. 8 
 
 « 54 Geo. III. c. 14a. All copyhold estates Dodds, 2 B. & Aid. 258; Chowne v. Baylis, 31 
 
 were forfeited to the lord, and not to the Crown, Beav. 351; Saunders v. Warton, 9 Jur. N. S. 
 
 unless there was an Act of Parliament or an 570, V. C. S. 
 
 express custom to the contrary, 1 Watk. on 2 Office found was aholished hy 22 & 23 Vic. 
 
 Copy. 326, 1 Cruise's Dig 307; and the for- c. 21, § 25. 
 
 feiture in such case did not accrue upon mere 8 Bullock p. Dodds, 2 B. & Aid. 258. 
 
 conviction, but only on complete attainder, * 4 Bla. Com. 387; Perkins v. Bradley, 1 
 
 3 B. & Aid. 510, 2 Vent. 38; unless by special Hare, 219. 
 
 custom to the contrary. 5 4 Bla. Com. 387; see also 33 & 34 Vic. c. 
 
 7 4 Bla. Com. 381-6; Tudor, R. Prop. 792. 23, § 1. 
 
 1 4 Bla. Com. 387; Perkins P. Bradley, 1 6 Ld. Red. 232. 
 
 Hare, 219, 228. But a colorable alienation to 7 9 Geo. IV. c. 32, § 3. 
 
 avoid a forfeiture would be void as against the 8 See Williams, Pers. Prop. 44; and post, 
 
 Crown. S. C. 1 Hare, 227; and see Bullock v. p. 58. 
 
 (a) A conviction in New South Wales causes a forfeiture of the felon's property in England. 
 Re Bateman's Trust, L. R. 15 Eq. 355. 
 
 5o
 
 57 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 Forfeiture of land only arose on attainder ; 9 and therefore, in the case 
 of a felony not capital, the offender, though convicted, might convey or 
 
 create a valid trust of his real estate, 10 and might dispose thereof 
 *56 by will. 11 But all the personal property possessed by * him at the 
 
 time of his conviction, 1 or which afterwards accrued to him, before 
 the term of punishment expired, was forfeited to the Crown, 2 including 
 personal property held in trust for him, 3 and a vested interest, in remain- 
 der, in the proceeds of land actually converted ; 4 but not a contingent 
 legacy, where the event on which the contingency depended did not hap- 
 pen till after the punishment had been endured ; 5 nor a vested interest, 
 in remainder, in land directed to be, but not actually converted. 6 
 
 An administrator of the property of any convict may be appointed by 
 the Crown. The appointment is revocable, and upon his death, or revo- 
 cation of his appointment, a new administrator may be appointed, who 
 will be the successor in Law of the former administrator ; and all prop- 
 erty vested in, and powers given to, the former administrator devolve 
 upon and vest in the new administrator, who is bound by all the acts of 
 the former administrator. 7 
 
 Upon the appointment of the administrator, all the real and personal 
 property, including choses in action, to which the convict is, at the time 
 of his conviction, or becomes, whilst subject to the Act, entitled (except 
 property acquired by him while at large under any license s ), vests in 
 the administrator, 9 who has absolute power to deal therewith. 10 The 
 convict, or any person claiming an interest in the property, cannot call 
 in question any acts bona fide done by the administrator; 11 and, subject 
 to the powers and provisions of the Act, the property is to be preserved 
 and held in trust by the administrator, and on the convict ceasing to 
 be subject to the Act, is to revert to him, his heirs, executors, or 
 administrators. 12 If no administrator is appointed, an interim curator, 
 
 who has in general the same power as the administrator, may be 
 *57 appointed, *and from time to time removed j 1 and all judgments 
 
 and orders for payment of money may be executed against the 
 
 9 See Re Harrap, 3 Drew. 726. 
 
 10 Lewin on Trusts, 27. 
 
 n 1 Jarm. Wills, 33, 2 Prideaux, Conv. 268. 
 i No forfeiture, however, followed conviction 
 under the 10 & 11 Vic. c. 82, § 12; 13 & 14 
 Vic. c. 37; or 18 & 19 Vie. c. 126. By 6 & 7 
 Vic. c. 7, § 3, convicts holding tickets of leave 
 are enabled to hold personal property, and to 
 maintain actions in respect thereof, while their 
 tickets remain unrevoked. 
 
 2 4 Bla. Com. 387; Roberts v. Walker, 1 R. 
 & M. 752. 
 
 3 Lewin on Trusts, 695. 
 
 4 Re Thompson, 22 Beav. 506. 
 
 5 Stokes v. Holden, 1 Keen, 145, 153: Re 
 Davis's Trusts, 27 L. T. 477. 
 
 6 Re Thompson, 22 Beav. 506, where land 
 having been taken under the powers of a local 
 Act, it was held that the felon was entitled to 
 the fund representing it as realty. 
 
 56 
 
 7 33 & 34 Vic. c. 23, § 9. 
 
 8 33 & 34 Vic. c. 23, § 30. 
 
 9 33 & 34 Vic. c 23, § 10. 
 
 1° 33 & 34 Vic. c. 23, § 12. The administra- 
 tor may pay out of the property the costs of 
 the prosecution and of executing the Act 
 (§ 13), and the debts and liabilities of the con- 
 vict, and may deliver any property coming to 
 his hands to any person entitled to it (§ 13) ; and 
 may out of the property make compensation to 
 any person defrauded by the criminal or fraudu- 
 lent acts of the convict (§ 15). 
 
 11 33 & 34 Vic. c. 23, § 17. 
 
 12 33 & 34 Vic. c. 23, § 18. Unless other- 
 wise ordered, the costs as between solicitor and 
 client, and the charges and expenses of the 
 administrator incurred in reference to the prop- 
 erty, are a first charge thereon ; 33 & 34 Vic. c- 
 23," §20. 
 
 i 33 & 34 Vic. c. 23, §§ 21-26.
 
 PERSONS ATTAINTED OR CONVICTED. * 58 
 
 property in the hands of the interim curator, or of any person who may 
 have, without legal authority, taken possession of the property of the 
 convict; 2 and all judgments or orders may be executed by writ of scire 
 facias or otherwise against property vested in the administrator. 8 
 
 Proceedings may be taken by summons to make any administrator 
 or interim curator account, before the property reverts to the convict ; * 
 and, subject to the provisions of the Act, the administrator or interim 
 curator is liable, when the convict ceases to be subject to the Act, to 
 account for all property received by him. 5 
 
 Conviction is taken advantage of by plea, and it seems that such a 
 plea would be judged with the same strictness as if it were a plea at 
 Law. 6 
 
 In order to bar a plaintiff's suit on the ground of an offence committed, 
 it is not always necessary to show an attainder or conviction ; for if a 
 plea goes to show that, in consequence of an offence committed, no title 
 ever vested in the plaintiff, conviction of the offence is not essential to 
 the plea. 7 
 
 Where a judgment, pronounced upon a conviction for treason or felony, 
 is falsified or reversed, all former proceedings are absolutely set aside ; 
 and the party stands as if he had never been accused ; 8 he may, there- 
 fore, sue in a Court of Equity, in the same manner that he might have 
 done if no conviction had taken place. 
 
 The disqualification arising from a conviction may also be obviated 
 by the Queen's pardon ; or by enduring the punishment imposed. 9 A 
 pardon formerly could only have been granted under the Great Seal ; 
 but now, a warrant under the Royal sign manual, countersigned by one 
 of the Principal Secretaries of State, granting a free pardon and the 
 prisoner's discharge under it, or a conditional pardon, and the perform- 
 ance of such condition, is as effectual as a pardon under the Great 
 Seal. 10 
 
 There is a great difference between the effect of a pardon and of a 
 reversal. In the case of a reversal, the party is, as we have seen, in all 
 respects replaced in the same condition that he was in before the com- 
 mencement of the proceedings ; but a pardon has not that effect. 11 Thus, 
 a person who has been convicted and pardoned cannot sue upon any 
 right accrued to him before his pardon, although he may for a right 
 accrued afterwards. 12 
 
 *Where a pardon is conditional, the effect of the conviction is *58 
 not removed until the condition has" been performed ; and a felon 
 
 2 As to enforcing decrees and orders, see case of a capital felony, enduring the punish- 
 post. Chap. XXVI. ment did not have the effect of a pardon ; see 
 
 3 33 & 34 Vic. c. 23, § 27. See 2 Chitty's 9 Geo. IV. c. 32, § 3. See, as to effect of 
 Arch. 934, 935. pardon, Armstrong's Foundry, 6 Wall. 766; 
 
 i 33 & 34 Vic. c. 23, § 28. Lapeyra v. United States, 17 Wall. 191 ; Car- 
 
 5 33 & 34 Vic. c. 23, § 29. lisle v. United States, 16 Wall. 147. Pardon 
 
 6 Ld. Red. 229 ; and see Burk v. Brown, 2 may be conditional. Ex parte Wells, 18 How. 
 Atk. 397. 307*. 
 
 7 Fall v. , May, 1782, Ld. Red. 233. i° 6 Geo. IV. c. 25, § 1 ; 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 
 
 8 4 Bla. Com. 393." 28, § 13. 
 
 9 33 & 34 Vic. c. 23, § 7 ; see Leyman v. « 4 Bla. Com. 402. 
 
 Latimer, 3 Ex. D. 15, 352. Formerly in the 12 1 Com. Dig. Abatement, E. 3. 
 
 57
 
 *58 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 who had been sentenced to transportation 1 was not restored to his civil 
 rights until the term of his transportation had expired, 2 and therefore it 
 was held that personal property which did not belong to a felon at the 
 time of his conviction, but which accrued to him afterwards during the 
 time of his transportation, was forfeited to the Crown. 3 
 
 Sectiox IV. — Bankrupts and Liquidating and Compounding Debtors. 
 
 The disability to maintain a suit on account of bankruptcy arises from 
 a bankrupt not being capable of holding the property which is the object 
 of the suit, or rather from the fact that, by the bankruptcy, all the bank- 
 rupt's property, whether in possession or action, is vested in the trustee 
 of his property ; 4 and a bankrupt, even though undischarged, is not per- 
 sonally disqualified from suing, and may, in many cases, sustain suits 
 either at Law or in Equity, 5 (a) — as, for instance, to restrain a nuisance, 
 
 i Under 8 Geo. III. c. 15. 
 
 2 Bullock v. Dodds, 2 B. & Aid. 258 ; and 
 9ee 4 Bla. Com. 400; Gully's case, Leach's 
 Crown Law, 99. As to the remission of trans- 
 portation, see 5 Geo. IV. c. 84, § 26 ; Gough v. 
 Davies, 2 K. & J. 623 ; and as to remission by 
 colonial governors, see now 6 & 7 Vic. c. 7. 
 
 s Roberts v. Walker, 1 R. & M. 752, 766. 
 Transportation is abolished by 20 & 21 Vic. c. 
 3, and penal servitude substituted by 16 & 17 
 Vic. c. 99 ; and see 27 & 28 Vic. c. 47. 
 
 * By the Bankrupt Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vic. 
 c. 71), § 17, the property of the bankrupt is, 
 immediately upon the adjudication, to vest in 
 the Registrar, and is, on the appointment of a 
 trustee, forthwith to pass to and vest in the 
 trustee. A9 to the appointment of trustee, see 
 § 14. As to release of trustee, see §§ 51-53 ; 
 as to death and removal of trustee and suits by 
 and against him, see § 83. As to liquidation 
 by arrangement, see § 125. As to composition 
 with creditors, see §§ 126, 127. See also the 
 Liquidation Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vic. c. 68) ; see 
 now 46 & 47 Vic. c. 52. As to entering, under 
 former Bankrupt Law, a suggestion on the 
 death or removal of an assignee plaintiff, see 
 Lloyd ». Waring, 1 Coll. 536; Man v. Ricketts, 
 7 Beav. 484 ; 9 Jur. 1103; 1 Phil. 617 ; and see 
 16 Beav. 440. As to when the Court of Bank- 
 
 (a) In Motion v. Moojen, L. R. 14 Eq. 202, 
 Bacon V. C. held that an uncertified bankrupt 
 is incapable of suing in Equity, though the bill 
 charges fraud against all the defendants, in- 
 cluding the creditors' assignee. See Smith v. 
 Mnffatt, L. R. 1 Eq. 397 ; Payne v. Dicker, L. R. 
 6 Ch. 578 ; Bailey v. Smith, 10 R I. 29. A 
 compounding debtor is usually entitled to the 
 control of his property. Ex parte Jones, L. R. 
 10 Ch. 663. See Ex parte Postmaster-General, 
 He Bonham, 10 Ch. D. 595. As to his recovery 
 58 
 
 ruptcy is the proper tribunal for determining 
 the assignee's claims, see Ex parte Brown, 11 
 Ch. D. 148 ; Ex parte Pannell, 6 Ch. D. 335 ; 
 Ex parte Dickens, 8 Ch. D. 377 ; Waddell v. 
 Toleman, 9 Ch. D. 212 ; Ex parte Fletcher, id. 
 381. 
 
 6 See Herbert v. Saver, 5 Q. B. 965, 978 ; 
 Calvert on Parties, 199, et seq. ; Story, Eq. PI. 
 §§ 495, 726; Elderkin v. Elderkin, 1 Root, 139; 
 Hilliard, B. & I. 384. For instances in which 
 bankrupts have been allowed to sue at law, see 
 Perkin v. Proctor, 2 Wils. 382 ; Summersett v. 
 Jarvis, 6 Moore, 56; 3 B. & B. 2; Coles v. 
 Barrow, 4 Taunt. 754 ; Chippendall v. Tomlin- 
 son, 4 Doug. 318 ; 1 Cooke's B. L. 428; Silk v. 
 Osborne, 2 Esp. 140 ; see Selwyn, N. P. Sup 
 323 ; Evans v. Brown, 1 Esp. 170 ; Fowler v. 
 Down, 1 Bos. & P. 44 ; Laroche v. Wakeman, 
 Peake, 190; Webb v. Ward, 7 T. R. 296; Webb 
 v. Fox, 7 T. R. 391 ; Clarke v. Calvert, 3 Moore 
 96 . Jameson v. Brick & Stone Co. L. R. 4 Q. 
 B. D. 208; Cook v. Whellock, 24 id. 658; Cohen 
 v. Mitchell, 25 id. 262; dimming v. Roebuck, 1 
 Holt, N. P. 172 ; Lincoln v. Bassett, 9 Gray, 
 355 ; Merrick's Estate, 5 Watts & S. 1. A 
 bankrupt can in his own name maintain a suit 
 brought before he was declared a bankrupt, for 
 a wrong done, unless his assignee should inter- 
 pose an objection. Sawtelle v. Rollins, 23 
 
 for personal labor, see In re Downing. 4 Ch. D. 
 689 The fact that the plaintiff is an undis- 
 charged bankrupt is not alone sufficient ground 
 for requiring him to give security for costs. 
 Cook v. Whellock, 24 Q. B. D. 658 ; see 34 Sol. 
 J. 521. Nor will security for costs be always 
 granted on the ground of the impecuniosity of 
 the defendant making application in the suit. 
 He Barber, Burgess v. Vinnicoine (No. 2), 55 L. 
 J. Ch. 624; 54 L. T. 728. 
 
 1
 
 BANKRUPTS. * 59 
 
 or the infliction of any injury of a private or particular nature, without 
 making his assignees parties ; 6 or to recover damages for any per- 
 sonal wrong ; 7 and where sued at Law upon * a bond or note, he has *59 
 been allowed to tile a bill of discovery, in order to obtain proof 
 that such bond or note was fraudulently procured. The specific relief 
 prayed is, however, material in determining whether the assignee is a 
 necessary party to the bill ; for where it prayed that the instrument 
 upon which an insolvent debtor was sued at Law might be delivered up, 
 the assignee was considered a necessary party. 1 Where, also, persons claim- 
 ing to be creditors of bankrupts, instead of seeking relief in the bank- 
 ruptcy, brought an action against the bankrupts, and the bankrupts filed a 
 bill seeking a discovery in aid of their defence to the action, and praying 
 that the accounts between them and the plaintiffs at Law might be taken, 
 and that the plaintiffs at Law might pay the balance, a plea of bankruptcy 
 was overruled; the Court being of opinion that the bankrupts were 
 entitled to the discovery and account, although they were not entitled to 
 that part of the prayer which sought the payment to them of the balance. 2 
 An undischarged bankrupt may maintain an action to recover dam- 
 ages for breach of a contract which was entered into by him after adju- 
 dication, subject, however, to the right of the trustee to interfere,— which 
 he may do even after the commencement of the suit, and may claim to 
 be added as a plaintiff to such suit. 8 In general, however, a bankrupt, 
 although entitled to the surplus of his estate which remains after pay- 
 ment of his debts, 4 cannot sue for any property which is vested in 
 the trustee under the. bankruptcy, even though there may be collusion 
 between him and the persons possessed of the property. 6 Thus, where 
 a bill was filed by a bankrupt to recover property due to his estate, 
 stating that the commission against him was invalid, and that there was 
 a combination between his assignees and the debtor, to which a demurrer 
 
 Maine, 106 ; Tunno v. Edwards, 3 Brev. 510 ; 2 Lowndes v. Taylor, 1 Mad. 423. This 
 
 Kirwan v. Latour, 5 H. & John. 289 ; Hayllar decision was afterwards affirmed on appeal. 
 
 v. Sherwood, 2 Nev. & M. 401. The bankrupt 1 Mad. 425; 2 Rose, 432; and see Govet v. 
 
 has the exclusive right to sue for a trespass Armitage, 2 Anst. 412; Kaye v. Fosbrooke, 8 
 
 upon exempt property committed prior to the Sim. 28. 
 
 proceedings in bankruptcy. Seiling v. Gunder- 8 Emden r. Carte, 17 Ch. D. 169, Fry J ; 
 
 man, 35 Texas, 545. And see, where the plain- ib. 708, C. A., q. v. also (pp. 11, 172, 173) for 
 
 tiff has been declared a bankrupt after the the distinction between a cause of action ac- 
 
 commencement of suit, Woodall v. Holliday, cruing before and one accruing after bank- 
 
 44 Ga. 18. A claim for an injury done to a ruptcv. 
 
 party by the negligence of another did not pass 4 f he Bankruptcy Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vic. 
 
 by an assignment of his estate under the insol- c. 71), § 45. The Bankruptcy Repeal and In- 
 
 vency laws of Massachusetts before the recovery solvent Courts Act of 1869 (32 & 33 Vic. c. 83, 
 
 of judgment. Stone v. Boston and Maine Rail- § 20) was repealed by 46 & 47 Vic. c. 39, § 1, 
 
 road, 7 Gray, 539. Dut without reviving the former practice. 
 
 « Semple v. London & Birmingham Ry. Co. 6 Tarleton v. Hornby, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 172. An 
 
 » >. im. 209. assignment under a commission of bankruptcy 
 
 7 Ex parte Vine, In re Wilson, 8 Ch. D. does not pass property belonging to the bank- 
 
 364, C. A.; Dence v. Mason, W. N. (1879) nipt as factor, executor, or trustee. Vide Co k's 
 
 177, C. A. As to earnings of personal labor of B. L. c. 8, §§ 15, 16, 17; 1 Deacon's B. L. c. 9, 
 
 bankrupt, see Re Downing, Ex parte Banks, 4 §§ 10. 222; Archhold's Bankruptcy, 328-333 ; 32 
 
 Ch. D. 689. & 33 Vice. 71, §15; .£z parte Ellis, 1 Atk.101; 
 
 1 Balls v. Strutt, 1 Hare, 146 ; Meddowcroft Bennet v. Davis, 2 P. Wins. 816; Ex parte 
 
 v. Campbell, 13 Beav. 184. Butler, Amb. 74; Ex parte Chion. 3 P. Wms. 
 
 59
 
 *60 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 was put in, Sir John Leach, V. C, allowed the demurrer, saying that if 
 it had been true that the commission was invalid, the plaintiff ought to 
 have tried its validity by an action, and could not by bill impeach the 
 commission, and that if there were a combination between the debtor 
 and his assignees, his proper course was to apply by petition to have 
 the assignees removed and new assignees appointed. 6 It also appears 
 that the creditors of a bankrupt cannot under such circumstances sue ; 
 and further, that there is no distinction in this respect between bank- 
 rupts themselves and their creditors, or persons claiming under them, 7 
 and that the Court will not in general give relief where it can 
 *60 be obtained in * bankruptcy ; 1 (a) and that if the bankrupt has 
 
 187, n. (a) ; Godfrey v. Furzo, ib. 185 ; Harris v. 
 Truman, 7 Q. B. D. 340, 356; Pennell v. Deffell, 
 4 De G. M. & G. 372, 379; Lyell v. Kennedy, 
 14 App. Cas. 437, 459 ; 18 Q. B. D. 796 ; and see 
 Lewin on Trusts, 218-223; 12 & 13 Vic. c. 106, 
 § 130. 
 
 s Hammond v. Attwood, 3 Mad. 158; see 
 also Yewens v. Robinson, 11 Sim. 105, 120; 
 Payne v. Dicken, L. R. 6 Ch. 578 ; lie Lead- 
 bitter, 10 Ch. D. 388. The bankrupt may, in a 
 clear case, obtain leave to suit in the name of 
 the assignee. See Spagg v. Binkes, 5 Ves. 583, 
 589; Benfield v. Solomons. 9 Ves. 77, 82; Smith 
 v. Moffatt, L. R. 1 Eq. 397; 12 Jur. N. S. 22, 
 
 V. c. w. 
 
 • Heath v. Chadwick, 2 Phil. 649; and see 
 Major v. Auckland, 3 Hare, 77; Goldsmith 
 v. Russell, 5 De G. M & G. 547 ; Reese 
 River S. M. Co. V. Atwell, L. R. 7 Eq. 347; 
 Tudway v. Jones, 1 K. & J. 691; Rochfort v. 
 Battersbv, 2 H. L. Cas. 403, 409 ; Davis v. Snell, 
 28 Beav. 321; 6 Jur. N. S. 1134; 2 De G. F. 
 
 (a) The established rule now is that the 
 jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery is not 
 ousted by a bankruptcy act without express 
 words in the statute which provides the new 
 jurisdiction. Stone v. Thomas, L. R. 5 Ch. 219, 
 224: Pike v. Dickinson, L. R. 7 Ch. 61 ; Ellis v. 
 Silber, L. R. 8 Ch. 83; Jenneya. Bell. 2 Ch. D. 
 547; Ex pnrte Musgrave, 10 Ch. D. 94; West- 
 moreland Co. i'. Fielden, [1891] 3 Ch. 15, 27; 
 see Ex parte Reynolds, 15 Q. B. D. 169; Sharp 
 v. McHenry, 55 L. T. 747; Curry v. McCau- 
 Iey, 20 Fed. Rep. 583. And in general, 
 without such express words, a Court of Equity 
 is not divested of any matter of equitable 
 cognizance by a statute giving to a Court of 
 Law power over the same matter. Schroeder 
 v. Loeber (Md.), 24 Atl. Rep. 226 ; Fidelity 
 Trust Co. v. Gill Car Co. 25 Fed. Rep. 737; 
 Austin v. Rutland R. Co. 17 id. 446: Hess v. 
 Vose, 52 111. 472; Phipps v. Kelly, 12 Oregon, 
 213; Kinnan v. 42d St. &c. R. Co. 21 N. Y. S. 
 789. See Dehon r. Foster, 4 Allen (Mass.), 
 545: Wood v. Hudson (Ala.), 11 So. Rep. 530. 
 
 New remedies created by State statutes 
 
 60 
 
 & J. 463. See Stoever v. Stoever, 9 Serg. & R. 
 434; Griswold v. McMillan, 11 111. 590; Allen 
 v. Montgomery, 48 Miss. 101. 
 
 i See Riches v. Owen, W. N. (18G8) 158, 
 V. C. G. ; L. R. 3 Ch. 820, L. JJ.; Bell v. Bird, 
 L. R. 6 Eq. 635, V. C. G. ; Martin v. Powning, 
 L. R. 4 Ch. 356, L. JJ. ; Stone v. Thomas, L. R. 
 5 Ch. 219, L. C. ; Phillips ». Furber, 18 W. R. 
 479, M. R. ; L. R. 5 Ch. 746; see also Forshaw 
 v. Mottram, W. N. (1867) 191, V. C. S.; Gra- 
 ham v. Winterson, L. R. 16 Eq. 243; Saxton 
 r. Davis, 18 Ves. 72, 79; Tarleton v. Hornby, 1 
 Y. & C. Ex. 172, 188; Smith v. Moffatt, L. R. 
 1 Eq. 397; 12 Jur. N. S. 22, V. C. W.; see 
 Lincoln v. Bassett, 9 Gray, 355. For special 
 circumstances under which relief was given, 
 see Preston v. Wilson, 5 Hare, 185; Wear- 
 ing ». Ellis, 6 De G. M. & G. 596 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 
 204, 1149 ; Luddy's Trustee v. Peard, 33 Ch. 
 D. 500. It has been held that an insolvent 
 debtor, who has made a general assignment, 
 may on proof of his paying all debts due at the 
 
 enlarging equitable rights may be enforced in 
 the Equity Courts of the United States. Gold- 
 smith v. Gilliland, 22 Fed. Rep. 865; Wells, 
 Fargo & Co. v. Miner, 25 id. 533; A. & W. 
 Sprague Manuf. Co. v. Hoyt, 29 id. 421. But 
 rights enforceable in the State Courts will not 
 be followed in the Federal Courts when con- 
 fusion or conflict of interests may result. 
 Hence the same receiver appointed in the for- 
 mer Court will not necessarily be re-appointed 
 in the latter. Young v. Aronson, 27 Fed. Rep. 
 241. And the right to setoff a judgment or 
 decree of one of these Courts in the other is 
 restricted. Lauderdale Co. v. Foster, 23 Fed. 
 Rep. 516. A provision in a State Code which 
 permits a defendant to demand from the plain» 
 tiff more certain and definite statements in his 
 complaint does not apply to the Federal Circuit 
 Court sitting in equity. Phelps v. Elliott, 26 
 Fed. Rep. 881. But supplementary proceed- 
 ings allowed by State law for discovery of the 
 debtor's property at Law or in Equity, may 
 be enforced in the Federal Courts. Senter v. 
 Mitchell, 16 Fed. Rep. 206.
 
 BANKRUPTS. 
 
 62 
 
 property in a foreign country, where the bankrupt laws of England 
 
 do not prevail, still he cannot bring an action with reference to it 
 
 in * England. 1 *61 
 
 The trustee in bankruptcy does not stand in the position of a 
 trustee for the bankrupt. 2 
 
 The rules with regard to bankrupts applied, by analogy, to persons 
 who had taken the benefit of the Insolvent Debtors' Acts, who were 
 equally considered as being divested of all right to maintain a suit in 
 respect of any surplus to which they might eventually be entitled ; 3 but 
 these provisions are no longer in force. 4 A liquidating debtor is not 
 deprived of the control of his property until the passing of the creditors' 
 resolution, and the appointment of a trustee. 6 A compounding debtor is 
 not generally deprived of control over his property. 6 
 
 * The disability of a bankrupt to maintain a suit does not apply *G2 
 to a bankrupt who has obtained his order of discharge, where he 
 is suing in respect of property acquired after the close of the bank- 
 ruptcy, even though the bankrupt has not obtained an order of discharge, 1 
 or after the passing of a resolution granting the bankrupt his discharge, 
 even though the bankruptcy is not closed. 2 A bankrupt may, as we have 
 seen, after his order of discharge has taken effect, become entitled to 
 property in the same manner that he might before his bankruptcy ; 3 but 
 in the case of an insolvent debtor, his future property was made liable 
 to the payment of his debts contracted before his discharge. 
 
 time of his discharge, bring ejectment in his 
 own name, for lands assigned by him, without 
 any formal reassignment. Power v. Holman, 
 2 Watts, 218. As to disclaimer by the assign- 
 ees in a foreclosure suit, see Ford v. White, 
 
 16 Beav. 120. 
 
 1 Sill v. Worswick, 1 H. Bl. 665; Hunter v. 
 Potts, 4 T. R. 182 ; Phillips v. Hunter, 2 H. Bl. 
 402; Bentield v. Solomons, 9 Ves. 77, and see 
 Re Blithman, L. R. 2 Eq. 23, M. R.; 35 Beav. 
 219; Re Davidson, L. R. 15 Eq. 383. 
 
 * Re Leadbitter, 10 Ch. D. 388. 
 
 8 Gill v. Fleming, 1 Ridg. P. C. 431; Spragg 
 v. Biukes, 5 Ves. 583; Dyson v. Hornby, 7 De 
 G. M. & G. 1; Cook v. Sturgis, 3 De G. & J. 
 506, 5 Jur. N. S. 475; Troup v. Ricardo, 10 Jur. 
 N. S. 859, 1161 ; 12 W. R. 1135, M. R. ; 13 W. 
 R. 147; 4 De G. J. & S. 489, L. C. ; Smith v. 
 Moffatt, L. R 1 Eq. 397; 12 Jur. N. S. 22, V. 
 
 C. W.; Roberts v. More ton, W. N. (1869)28; 
 
 17 W. R. 397, V. C. J. As to insolvents under 
 5 & 6 Vic. c. 116, see Wearing v. Ellis, 6 De 
 G. M. & G. 596; 2 Jur. N. S. 204, 1149. A 
 suit for administration of a deceased insolvent's 
 estate may be instituted by a scheduled credi- 
 tor. Galsworthy v. Durrant, 2 De G. F. & J. 
 466; 7 Jur. N. S. 113; 29 Beav. 277; 6 Jur. N. 
 S. 743; see Smith v. Moffatt, L. R. 1 Eq. 397; 
 12 Jur. N. S. 22, V. C. W.; Re Smith, 24 Ch. 
 
 D. 672. As to suits by assignees of the surplus, 
 see Spragg v. Binkes, 5 Ves. 583, 589. Cook v. 
 Sturgis, 3 DeG. & J 506 , 5 Jur. N. S. 475; 
 see Re Gamier, L. R 13 Eq. 532. 
 
 4 The Bankruptcy Repeal and Insolvent 
 Courts Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vice. 83), § 20, and 
 schedule. All persons, whether traders or non- 
 traders, were made subject to the Bankrupt 
 Laws by 32 & 33 Vic. c. 71, § 6; c. 83, § 20. 
 
 5 The Bankruptcy Act, 1869, 32 & 33 Vic. c. 
 76, § 125 (5) & (6); Ex parte Postmaster Gen- 
 eral, Re Bonham, 10 Ch. D. 595. 
 
 6 Ex parte Jones, Re Jones, L. R. 10 Ch. 
 663, 665; Re Lewis, 3 Ch. D. 113; Re Kearlev, 
 7 Ch. D. 615. 
 
 i 32 & 33 Vic. c. 71. §§ 15, 47; In re Petit 's 
 Estate, 1 Ch. D. 478, V. C. B. 
 
 2 32 & 33 Vic. c. 71, §§ 48, 49; Ebbs r. Boul- 
 nois, L. R. 10 Ch. 479, L. JJ.; In re Bennetts 
 Trusts, id. 490; Ex parte Hemming, 13 Ch. D. 
 163; Re Smith, 24 Ch. D. 672. 
 
 3 Under the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, since 
 repealed by the 32 & 33 Vic. c. 83, § 20, and 
 schedule, the Court might, however, grant the 
 order of discharge, subject to any condition 
 touching after-acquired property of the bank- 
 rupt; see 24 & 25 Vic. c. 134, § 159, rule 3; and 
 see Ex parte Griffiths, 10 Jur. N. S. 785, 787, 
 L. C. Property coming to the bankrupt, be- 
 tween the time of pronouncing the order of 
 discharge and the time allowed for appealing 
 therefrom, belongs to the bankrupt, when the 
 order is not recalled or suspended on appeal - 
 Re Laforest, 9 Jur. N. S. 851; 11 W. R. 738, 
 L. C. 
 
 61
 
 * 63 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 Where the bankruptcy of the plaintiff has occurred previously to the 
 filing of the bill, and the fact appears upon the bill, it may be taken 
 advantage of by demurrer ; 4 and if the fact does not so appear, it should 
 be pleaded by way of defence. 5 In the case of a plea to a bill by an 
 insolvent debtor against his assignees and a debtor to the estate, the 
 facts stated in the plea appeared upon the face of the bill, and yet the 
 plea was held good; 6 and it has been held, that as at law any matter 
 which arises between the declaration and the plea may be pleaded, so 
 bankruptcy or other matters arising between the bill and plea may be 
 pleaded in equity. 7 
 
 In pleading bankruptcy it was the rule that all the facts should be 
 stated successively and distinctly, and it was not sufficient to say that a 
 commission or fiat of bankruptcy was duly issued against the plaintiff, 
 under which he was duly found and declared a bankrupt, and that all 
 his estates and effects have been thereupon duly transferred to or become 
 vested in the assignees ; 8 a plea of bankruptcy must have stated distinctly 
 the trading, the contracting debts, the petitioning creditor's debt, the act 
 of bankruptcy, the commission or fiat, and that the plaintiff had been 
 found bankrupt ; but it may be doubted how far this rule would now be 
 
 strictly enforced. 9 
 *63 * With respect to the bankruptcy of the plaintiff after the com- 
 
 mencement of a suit, or after plea and answer put in, it seems 
 that the bankruptcy of a sole plaintiff does not strictly cause an abate- 
 ment, but renders the suit defective ; 1 or, according to Lord Eldon, 2 
 " this Court, without saying whether bankruptcy is or is not strictly an 
 abatement, has said that, according to the course of the Court, the suit 
 is become as defective as if it was abated." 8 Hence, if the assignees of 
 a bankrupt, sole plaintiff, desire to prosecute the suit, they must obtain, 
 on motion or petition of course, 4 an order enabling them so to do. 5 
 And if they elect not to continue the suit, such election is not a bar to a 
 subsequent action by them for the same cause of action. 6 Upon the 
 non-prosecution of a suit in which the plaintiff has become bankrupt, 
 
 * Benfieldr. Solomons, 9 Ves. 77, 82: Story, 1 Lee v. Lee, 1 Hare, 621; see Hobbs v. 
 
 Eq. PI. § 495. The plea need not be put in Dane Manuf. Co. 5 Allen, 581: Northman v. 
 
 under oath. Dearden v. Villiers, 16 W. R. 479, Insurance Companies, 1 Tenn. Ch. 312, 319; 
 
 S. C. nom. Dierden v. Villiers, 37 L. J. Ch. Swepson v. Rouse, 65 N. C. 34. 
 
 482, overruling Joseph v. Tuckev, 2 Cox, 44. 2 Randall v. Mumford, 18 Ves. 427. 
 
 See Ebbs v. Boulnois, L. R. 10 Ch. 479. 3 Jackson v. North Eastern Ry. Co. 5 Ch. D. 
 
 5 In England it mav be pleaded, although it 844; Eldridge o. Burgess, 7 Ch. D. 441. But 
 takes place between the delivery of the state- the bankrupt may appeal against a personal 
 ment of claim and the statement of defence. order. Dence v. Mason, W. N. (1879) 177. 
 
 6 Bowser v. Hughes, 1 Anst. 101. See Sawtelle v. Rollins, 23 Maine, 196; Hilliard, 
 1 Turner v. Robinson, 1 S. & S. 3; Sergrove B. & I. 397, et seq. 
 
 v Mavhew, 2 M'N. & G. 97; Lane t>. Smith, 14 * The latter seems preferable. See 2 Seton, 
 
 Beav.*49; Payne v. Beech, 2 Tenn. Ch. 708. 1530; Roffey v. Miller, 24 W. R. 109; Walker 
 
 And see infra, p. 606, 607. v. Blakeman, W. N. (1876) 112. 
 
 8 Carleton v. Leighton, 3 Mer. 667, 671; 5 See note 3 above; R S. C. Ord. L. 3, 4; 
 Lane v. Smith. 14 Beav. 49. Seear v. Lawson, 16 Ch. D. 121; Jackson v. 
 
 9 See Pepper v. Henzell. 2 H. & M. 486: and Riga Railway. 28 Beav. 75; for forms of mo- 
 the Bankruptcy Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vic. c. 71), tion paper and petition, see Vol. III. 
 
 § 10; post, p. 69; but see Lane v. Smith, 14 6 Bennett v. Gamgee, 2 Ex. D. 11; W. JS. 
 
 Beav. 49; see Lacy v. Rockett, 11 Ala. 100; (1877) 20; 25 W. R. 293. 
 Seaman v. Stoughton. 3 Barb. Ch. 344; Stone 
 v. Par^ 1 Chand. 60. 
 
 62
 
 BANKRUPTS. 
 
 64 
 
 the defendant, if he wishes to get rid of the suit entirely, must adopt 
 a course of proceeding analogous to that pursued where the plaintiff 
 obtains an injunction and dies, — in which case the defendant may move 
 that the injunction be dissolved, unless the representatives of the de- 
 ceased plaintiff revive within a certain time ; s he must move that the 
 trustee may, within a specified time (usually three weeks) after notice 
 of the order, take proper supplemental proceedings for the purpose of 
 prosecuting the suit against him, or in default thereof that the plain- 
 tiff's bill may stand dismissed. 6 Where the bankruptcy has taken place 
 after decree, the motion should be that the trustee may, within a limited 
 time, elect whether he will prosecute the suit, or that in default all fur- 
 ther proceedings should be stayed. 7 
 
 This is, however, not a motion of course, and the trustee must be 
 served with the notice of it. 8 It should also be supported by 
 * an affidavit of the facts; 1 and the dismissal will be without *64 
 costs, as a bankrupt cannot be made to pay costs. 2 (a) Where, 
 however, the bankruptcy takes place between the hearing and judgment, 
 the Court will not, before giving judgment, compel the assignees to 
 revive. 8 After the bankruptcy of the plaintiff, the defendant cannot 
 make the ordinary motion to dismiss. 4 
 
 7 Whitmore v. Oxborrow, 1 Coll. 91 ; Clarke 
 V. Tipping, 16 Beav. 12. 
 
 8 The plaintiff need not be served. Brown 
 v. Rogers, 22 July, 1869, Reg. Lib. 2168, V. C. 
 J., where the order was directed to be drawn up 
 without notice to the plaintiff; and see form of 
 order, Seton, 1278, No. 6. See contra, Vestris 
 v. Hooper, 8 Sim. 570; see abo Randall v. 
 Mumford, 18 Ves. 424, 428 ; Wheeler v. Malins, 4 
 Mad. 171. As to the proper time for making the 
 application, see Sharp v. Hullett, 2 S. & S. 496. 
 
 i Porter v. Cox, 5 Mad. 80. 
 
 2 Wheeler v. Malins, 4 Mad. 171; Lee v. 
 Lee, 1 Hare, 621; Meiklam v. Elmore, 4 De 
 G. & J. 208; 5 Jur. N. S. 904; Boucicault v. 
 Delafield, supra. 
 
 s Boucicault v. Delafield, 12 W". R. 8, V. 
 C. W. 
 
 4 Lord Thurlow held that such an order, 
 pending the bankruptcy of the plaintiff, was a 
 nullity, and therefore refused to discharge one 
 obtained under such circumstances. Sellas v. 
 Dawson, 2 Anst. 458, n. ; S. C. nom. Sellers v. 
 Dawson, 2 Dick. 738; Robinson v. Norton, 10 
 Beav. 484. The motion cannot be made after 
 the execution by the plaintiff of a trust deed 
 under the Bankruptcy Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vic. 
 c. 134) ; Price v. Rickards, L. R. 9 Eq. 35, V. 
 C.J. 
 
 5 Wheeler v. Malins, 4 Mad. 171; Lord 
 Huntingtower v. Sherborn, 5 Beav. 380; Robin- 
 son v. Norton, 10 Beav. 484; Fisher v. Fisher, 
 6 Hare, 628; 2 Phil. 236; Meiklam v. Elmore, 
 4 De G. & J. 208; 5 Jur. N. S. 904; Jackson v. 
 Riga Railway, 28 Beav. 75; Boucicault v. Dela- 
 field, 10 Jur. N. S. 937; 12 W. R. 1025, V. C. 
 W.; 10 Jur. N. S. 1063; 13 W. R. 64, L. JJ.; 
 Simpson v. Bathurst, L. R. 5 Ch. 193, L. C. 
 
 6 See Story, Eq. PI. § 349, and note; Sedg- 
 wick v. Cleveland, 7 Paige, 287, 290; Garr v. 
 Gower, 9 Wend. 649; 2 Barb. Ch. Pr. 65, 66. 
 This is the course before decree; after decree, 
 the motion should ask to stay all further pro- 
 ceedings; Clarke v. Tipping, 16 Beav. 12 ; and 
 see Whitmore v. Oxborrow, 1 Coll. 91; and 
 an application by the defendant for an order 
 to revive under 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 52, after 
 decree, was refused, Maw v. Pearson, 12 W. R. 
 701, M. R. ; where the bankruptcy has occurred 
 in a foreign country, see Bourbaud v. Bourbaud, 
 12 W. R. 1024, V. C. W. ; Clement v. Langthorn, 
 W. N. (1868) 181, 186, V. C. G. For forms of 
 notice of motion, see Vol. III.; and for an order 
 in like case, see Seton, 1278. The same practice 
 should be followed where the plaintiff has exe- 
 cuted a trust deed under the Bankruptcy Act, 
 1861 (24 & 25 Vic. c. 134); Price v. Rickards, 
 L. R. 9 Eq. 35, V. C. J. 
 
 (a) In Ex parte Castle Mail Co. 35 W. R. 
 83, it was held that costs may be given against 
 an undischarged bankrupt. As to requiring 
 security for costs upon proof of a party's in- 
 solvency or bankruptcy, see United Telephone 
 Co. v. Bassano, 31 Ch. D. 630; Re Strong (No. 
 2), id. 273; Pooley's Trustee v. Whetham (No. 
 
 2), 33 Ch. D. 76; Smith v. Badham, 66 L. T. 
 822. Security for costs will not be required 
 from a trustee in liquidation suing for the bene- 
 fit of the estate, even though he is insolvent. 
 Denston v. Ashton, L. R. 4 Q. B. 590; Cowell 
 v. Taylor, 31 Ch. D. 34. 
 
 63
 
 * 65 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 The rule of practice, by which a defendant is required to give notice 
 to the trustee in the case of the bankruptcy of a plaintiff, is confined to 
 the case of a sole plaintiff, who, becoming bankrupt, is supposed to be 
 negligent of what is sought by the bill, and the Court, to prevent sur- 
 prise and save expense, requires notice to be given to the trustee ; but 
 there is no instance where the Court has taken upon itself to interpose 
 the rule where there are two plaintiffs, one of whom is solvent and the 
 other insolvent ; for it is as competent to the solvent plaintiff as it is to 
 the trustee, to rectify the suit. 6 
 
 In the case of an injunction granted at the suit of a plaintiff who after- 
 wards becomes bankrupt, the practice which has been adopted is to 
 require the bankrupt to bring the trustee before the Court; and the 
 Court will make an order to dissolve the injunction and dismiss the bill, 
 unless the trustee shall be brought before it within a reasonable time; 
 which order, it seems, may be served upon the bankrupt alone, as it is 
 supposed that the bankrupt will find the means of giving the trustee 
 notice. 6 Such an order will also be without costs. 
 
 "When the trustee elects to continue the suit and obtains a supple- 
 mental order authorizing him to prosecute it, he becomes liable to the 
 costs of the suit from the commencement; 7 and where the plaintiff had, 
 previously to his bankruptcy and the supplemental order, been ordered 
 to pay the costs of a proceeding, the proceedings in the suit were stayed 
 
 until the payment of such costs. 8 
 *65 * A suit does not abate by the death or change of the trustee 
 
 plaintiff, but the Court may, upon the suggestion of such death 
 or change, allow the suit to be prosecuted in the name of the surviving 
 or new trustee. 1 An order is necessary for this purpose, which may be 
 obtained on motion or petition of course. 2 
 
 It was formerly necessary, in all actions where the assignees, either 
 as plaintiffs or defendants, claimed property under the bankrupt, to 
 prove strictly the three requisites to support the commission, namely, the 
 trading, the act of bankruptcy, and the petitioning creditor's debt, as 
 well as that the commission was regularly issued, and the assignment 
 duly executed to the assignees. Upon failure of proving any one of 
 these matters (the proof of which added considerably to the costs of an 
 action, and was often difficult to be established by strict rules of evi- 
 dence), the assignees were nonsuited, and thus frequently prevented 
 
 6 Caddick v. Masson, 1 Sim. 501 ; Latham v. ton, Re Nathan, 10 Ch. D. 586. Dismissing 
 
 Kenrick, 1 Sim. 502; Kelminster v. Pratt, 1 Bills and Slaying Proceedings. 
 
 Hare, 632; but see Ward v. Ward, 8 Bea%\ 379 ; > 12 & 13 Vic. c. 106, § 157. This section 
 
 11 Beav. 159; 12 Jur. 592. applies only to the case of trustees suing as 
 
 6 Randall v. Mumford, 16 Ves. 424, 428; plaintiffs, see Gordon v. Jesson, 16 Beav. 440; 
 Wheeler v. Malins, 4 Mad. 171. It would seem the practice with respect to trustees as defend- 
 that under the present practice the trustee ants will be stated in the next chapter; and see 
 should be served with notice of the motion. Man c. Rickets, 1 Phil. 617; Mendham v. Robin- 
 
 » Poole v. Franks, 1 Moll. 78. See Boynton son, 1 M. & K. 217, Lloyd v. Waring, 1 Coll. 
 
 v. Boynton, 9 Ch. D. 250; 4 App. Cas. 733; Pitts 536. 
 
 r. La Fontaine, 6 App. Cas. 482. 2 For forms of motion paper and petition, 
 
 8 Cook v. Hathway, L. R. 8 Eq. 612, V. C. see Vol. III. 
 M. ; and see Chap. XIX. § 1. Ex parte Staple- 
 
 64
 
 INFANTS. * 67 
 
 from recovering a just debt due to the bankrupt's estate. To provide in 
 some measure for this evil, it was enacted, 3 that if the bankrupt do not 
 dispute the fiat or petition within certain limited periods, the " London 
 Gazette," containing a copy of the order of the Court of Bankruptcy 
 adjudging the debtor to be a bankrupt, shall be conclusive evidence of 
 the bankruptcy and of the date of the adjudication, as against the bank- 
 rupt, and against all persons whom the bankrupt might have sued if not 
 adjudged bankrupt ; and even the circumstance that the bankrupt is an 
 infant will be held not to prevent the " Gazette " being conclusive. 4 
 
 It was held under the old law, that where the defendants to a suit, 
 brought by the assignees of a bankrupt, were infants, they would be 
 entitled to dispute the validity of the bankruptcy, without giving 
 the notice required by the * Act. 1 . The words of the present *66 
 statute seem to be sufficient to meet such a case, and render it 
 clear that, even as against infant defendants, the " Gazette " shall be con- 
 clusive evidence of the bankruptcy. 2 
 
 Where a plaintiff, suing under the former practice as assignee in 
 bankruptcy, had not been actually appointed assignee at the time of 
 filing the bill, but before the hearing he was so appointed as from a 
 date antecedent to the filing of the bill, it was held that he was entitled 
 to maintain the suit. 3 
 
 Section V. — Infants. 
 
 In consequence of their incapacity, persons under disability are unable 
 to compromise their rights or claims : but where these rights and claims 
 are merely equitable, the Court of Chancery may, in general, order the 
 trust property to be dealt with in whatever mode it may consider 
 to be for the benefit of cestuis que trust who * are under disability ; *67 
 and therefore has power to compromise such rights or claims. 1 
 
 8 12 & 13 Vic. c. 108, § 233; Taylor on J This was decided by Sir John Leach 
 
 Evid. §§ 1477, 1556. V. C. in the case of Bell v. Tinney, 4 Mad ;J7-'. 
 
 * In re West, 3 De G. M. & G. 198. By in which a bill was riled by the assignees of 
 
 12 & 13 Vic. c. 106, §§ 234, 235, it was also a bankrupt to set aside a settlement which had 
 
 enacted, that in any action or suit, other than been made by the bankrupt upon his wife and 
 
 an action or suit brought by the assignees for children. 
 
 any debt or demand for which the bankrupt - And it is now provided that the pro- 
 might have sustained an action had he not been duction of a copy of the " London Gazette," 
 adjudged bankrupt, and whether at the suit of containing a copy of the order of the Court of 
 or against the assignees, no proof shall be Bankruptcy adjudging the debtor to be a bank- 
 required of the petitioning creditor's debt, or nipt, is conclusive evidence in all legal pro- 
 of the tea ling, or act of bankruptcy, respect- ceedings of the debtor having been duly 
 ively, unless notice be given that these matters adjudged a bankrupt and of the date of the 
 will be disputed. See Taylor on Evid. §§ 1556, adjudication. The Bankruptcy Act, 1809 (32 & 
 A. 1559; l'ennell v. Home, 3 Drew. 337 ; and 33 Vic. c. 71). § 10. See Bevel! v. Blake, 
 see Lee v. Dennistoun, -21) Beav. 465, where Sir L. R. 7 C. P. 300; 8 id. 533; Ex parte French, 
 John Rom illy fid. K. held the provisions to be 52 L. J. Ch. 48. 
 
 inapplicable to the present practice in Chan- 3 Barnard v. Ford, Carrick v. Ford, L. R. 4 
 
 eery; but, in exercise of the general jurisdic- Ch. 247, L. JJ. 
 
 tion which the Court possesses over pleadings, J Brooke v. Lord Mostyn, 2 Pe G. J. & S. 
 
 gave the defendants ten days from the date of 373, 415; 10 Jur N. S. 1114, 1116: and see 
 
 the application, within which to give notice of Wilton t. Hill, 25 L. J. Ch. 156. V. C. K.; 
 
 the intention to d Bpute. Wall v. Rogers, L. R. 9 Eq. 58. M. R. 
 
 vol. i. — 5 bj
 
 68 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 The laws and customs of every country have fixed upon particular 
 periods, at which persons are presumed to be capable of acting with 
 reason and discretion. According to the English law, a person is styled 
 an infant until he attains the age of twenty-one years, which is termed 
 his full age. 2 
 
 An infant attains his full age on the completion of the day which pre- 
 cedes the twenty-first anniversary of his birth ; but, as the law will make 
 no fraction of a day, he may do any act which he is entitled to do at full 
 age, during any part of such day. Thus, the will of a man born on the 
 1st of February, at eleven at night, if made on the last day of Jan- 
 uary, in the twenty-first year of his age, at one in the morning, is a 
 good will. 8 
 
 Although, for many purposes, an infant is under certain legal inca- 
 pacities and disabilities, a suit may be sustained in any Court, either 
 of Law or of Equity, for the assertion of his rights, or for the security 
 of his property; and for this purpose a child has been considered to 
 have commenced, his existence as soon as he is conceived in the 
 womb. 4 Under such circumstances, it is termed in law an infant en 
 ventre sa mere, and a suit may be sustained on its behalf ; and the Court 
 will, upon application in such suit, grant an injunction to restrain waste 
 from being committed on his property. 5 In Robinson v. Litton, 6 Lord 
 Hardwicke seems to have considered that the point that a Court of 
 Equity would grant an injunction to stay waste at the suit of an infant 
 en ventre sa mere, though it had often been said arguendo, had never 
 been decided ; but it seems that, though Lord Hardwicke was not aware 
 of the circumstance, such an injunction was actually granted by Lord 
 Keeper Bridgman. 7 But an infant can do nothing which can bind 
 *68 himself to the performance * of any act; and therefore where 
 from the nature of the claim made by the infant it would follow 
 that, if the relief sought were granted, the rules of mutuality would 
 require something to be done on his part, the suit cannot be maintained. 
 Thus, an infant cannot sustain a suit for the specific performance of a 
 contract; because, in such cases, it is a general principle of Courts of 
 Equity to interpose only where the remedy is mutual, and if specific 
 performance were ordered at the suit of the infant, there would be no 
 power in the Court to compel him to perform it on his part, either by 
 paying the money or executing a conveyance. 1 
 
 2 Jacob's Law Diet. tit. Infant. The age of 
 majority of females is fixed by the Constitution 
 of Vermont at eighteen years. Young v. 
 Davis, Brayt. 124; Sparhawk ». Duel, 9 Vt. 41. 
 
 8 Salk. 44, 025 ; Sir R. Rowland's case, 
 id. 265; 1 Ld. Ray. 480; 2 id. 1096; 1 Bla. 
 Com. 463; 1 Jarman on Wills, 29; Herbert v. 
 Torball, 1 Sid. 142; S. C. Raym. 84; State v. 
 Clark, 3 Harring. 557; Hamlin v. Stephenson, 
 4 Dana, 597. As to fractions of a day, and 
 when they will and will not be regarded in 
 the law, see D'Obree, Ex parte, 8 Sumner's 
 Ves. 83, note (a); Lester v. Garland, 15 id. 248; 
 note (3) ; Ee Railwav Sleepers Supply Co. 29 
 
 66 
 
 Ch. D. 204; Murfree v. Carmack, 4 Yer. 270; 
 Berry v. Clements, 9 Hum. 312; S C. on 
 appeal, 11 How. 398, Plowman v. Williams, 3 
 Tenn. Ch. 181. 
 
 4 See Wallis v. Hodson, 2 Atk. 117. 
 
 6 See Musgrave v. Parry, 2 Vern. 710; Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 59, note. 
 
 6 3 Atk. 209, 211; see also Wallis v. Hod- 
 son, 2 Atk. 117. 
 
 i Lutterel's case cited Prec Ch. 50. 
 
 J Flight V. Bolland, 4 Russ. 298; Hargrave 
 v. Hargrave. 12 Boa v. 408; but Bee Allen v. 
 Davidson, 16 Ind. 416.
 
 INFANTS. 
 
 68 
 
 On account of an infant's supposed want of discretion, and his inabil- 
 ity to bind himself and make himself liable to the costs, he is incapable 
 of bringing a suit without the assistance of some other person, who may 
 be responsible to the Court for the propriety of the suit in its institution 
 and progress. 2 Such person is called the next friend of the infant ; (a) 
 
 2 R. S. C. Ord. XVI. 8: Hoyt v. Hi'ton, 2 
 Edw. Ch. 202. There must be a next friend 
 for everv application on behalf of an infant, 
 Cox v. Wright, 9 Jur. N. S. 981; 11 W. K. 
 870, V. C. K. ; see also Stuart v. Moore, 9 
 II. L. Cas. 440; 4 Maeq. H. L. 1, 36, n. ; 7 Jur. 
 N. S. 1129; R. S. C. Ord. XVI. 8. In Ex parte 
 Brocklebank, 6 Ch. D. 358, it was held that an 
 infant creditor may issue a debtor's summons 
 in bankruptcy in his own name without a next 
 friend. An infant, by being made party to a 
 suit, becomes thereby a ward of Court. Gynn 
 v. Gilbard, 1 Dr. &*S 356; 7 Jur N. S.91; 
 and see Stuart v. Moore, 9 H. L. Cas. 440; 
 4 Macq. H. L. 1, 30, n.; 7 Jur. N. S. 1129; Re 
 Hodge's Trust, 3 K. & J. 213; 3 Jur. N. S. 
 860. Where a plaintiff tiles a bill as an hi/an', 
 infancy is a material allegation, and must be 
 proved, or admitted by the answer. Boyd v. 
 
 (a) " Every prochein ami is to be considered 
 as an officer of the Court, specially appointed 
 by them to look after the interests of the infant." 
 Parke B. in Morgan v. Thorne, 7 M. & W. 
 400. An infant's next friend may prosecute 
 the suit without previous authority from the 
 Court. Judson v. Blanchard, 3 Conn. 579 ; 
 Klaus v. State, 54 Miss. 644 ; Bcthea v. Call, 3 
 Ala. 449. As his power commences with the 
 suit, he cannot make a special previous demand 
 necessary for its prosecution. Miles r. Boyden, 
 3 Rick. 213. A next friend can institute a suit 
 on behalf of a married woman only by her 
 authority. Schjott v. Schjott, 45 L. T. 333. 
 An infant married woman, whose adult husband 
 is joined as a co-plaintiff with her, need not sue 
 by next friend. Welch r. Bunce, 83 Ind. 382. 
 In McDonald v, Weir, 76 Mich. 243, a co-plain- 
 tiff was at the trial appointed next friend of a 
 plaintiff then discovered to be an infant. A 
 defendant should not be next friend of an infant 
 plaintiff. Re Burgess, Burgess v. Bottomley, 
 W. N. (1883) 177 ; see Lewis v. Nobbs, 8 Ch. 
 D. 591. A father has the first and best right 
 to represent his child as next friend. Woolf p. 
 Pemberton, C Ch. D. 19 ; Rue v. Meirs, 43 N. 
 
 J. Eq. 377; see Re G , [1892] l Ch. 292 ; 
 
 49 & 50 Vic. c. 27 ; Re McGrath, [1892] 2 Ch. 
 496 ; Wilson v. Me-ue-chas, 40 Kansas, 648. 
 Where a father, after authorizing a stranger to 
 art as next friend to his infant children, died, 
 and his will appointed his wife, their mother, 
 guardian of the children, the mother was held 
 to have the right to be substituted as next 
 friend. Hutchinson v. Norwood, 31 Ch. D. 
 
 Boyd, 6 Gill & J- 25 ; see Shirley v. Hagar, 3 
 Blackf. 228 and note ; Hanly v. Levin, 5 Ham. 
 227. 
 
 As to the time for appointing a prochein ami, 
 see Wilder v. Ember, 12 Wend. 191; Matter of 
 Frits, 2 Paige, 374 ; Fitch v. Fitch, 18 Wend. 
 513; Haines v. Oatman, 2 Doug. 430. In 
 Massachusetts the next friend will be admitted 
 by the Court without any other record than the 
 recital in the count. Miles v. Boyden, 3 Pick. 
 213. See also T revet v. Creath, Breese, 12; 
 Judson v. Blanchard, 3 Conn 579. 
 
 "The law knows no distinction between 
 infants of tender and of mature years, and 
 as no special authority to sue is requisite 
 in the case of an infant just born, so none is 
 requisite from an infant on the very eve of 
 attaining his majority." Parke B. in Morgan 
 v. Thorne, 7 M. & W. 400, 408. 
 
 237. In England it is held that a married 
 woman cannot be a next friend. Ibid.; Re 
 Somerset, 34 Ch. D. 465. But in this country 
 it has been held that a married woman can be 
 an infant's next friend when a judgment for 
 the costs of the suit can be collected from her. 
 Budd v. Rutherford (Ind.), 30 N. E. 1111. As 
 to an illegitimate child, see Barnardo r. Me- 
 Hugh, [1891] A.C 388. The next friend must 
 have no personal interest, however remote or 
 indirect. Re Burgess, 25 Ch. D. 243 ; Re Cor- 
 sellis, 50 L. T. 703. Without a guardian ad 
 litem, there can be no recovery against an infant. 
 Thorp v. Minor (N. C), 13 S. E. Rep. 702. 
 The appointment of a next friend and his ac- 
 ceptance should usually appear of record ; but a 
 natural guardian, whose authority does not so 
 appear, may be shown by parol to possess it. 
 Simmons v. Baynard, 30 Fed. Rep. 532; Stin- 
 son v. Pickering, 70 Maine, 273; Fuller v. 
 Smith, 49 Vt. 253 ; Clark v. Piatt, 30 Conn. 
 282 ; Price v. Winter, 15 Fla. G6 ; Treiber v. 
 Shafer, 18 Iowa, 29; Rhoads v. Rhoads. 43 III. 
 239 ; Myers r. Myers, 6 W. Va. 369; Daniel I). 
 Hanagan, 5 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 48. As to a 
 widowed mother's authority, see Re Lemon, 
 19 L. R. Ir. 575. If there is a general guardian 
 and he does not appear, or has an adverse in- 
 terest, a guardian ad litem takes his place in 
 the suit. Mansur v. Pratt, 101 Mass. (id : 
 Stiison V. Pickering, 70 Maine. 273 : Wells r. 
 Smith. 44 Miss. 290 ; Miller v. Cabell. 81 Ky. 
 178 ; Wead V. Cantwell. 3b Hun, 528 ; Peter- 
 son v. liailiif (Minn.), 54 N. W. Rep. 185 An 
 infant cannot sue without a next friend or 
 
 67
 
 68 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 and if a bill is filed on behalf of an infant without a next friend, the 
 defendant may move to have it dismissed with costs, to be paid by the 
 
 guardian, even when emancipated by his 
 parents. Hoskins v. White (Mont ), 32 Pac 
 Rep. 163. Van Pelt v. Chattanooga K. Co. 
 (Ga,) 15 S. E. Rep. 622. The fact that infant 
 defendants are represented by a general guar- 
 dian, instead of a next friend, as is warranted 
 by the practice of a State Court, does n<t affect 
 the conclusiveness of its judgment in a Federal 
 Court. Colt v. Colt, 111 U. S 566. The lower 
 Court of Bankruptcy, from which an appeal is 
 taken, is, it seems, the proper tribunal to ap- 
 point the guardian ad litem. Re Lowndes, 3 M 
 B. R. 216. 
 
 While undue facility should not be given to 
 mere volunteers, yet no discouragement will be 
 placed in the way of persons suing in good 
 faith as next friends. Nalder v. Hawkins, 2 
 Myl. & K. 243. An adult defendant may, it 
 seems, waive the benefit of a next friend to an 
 infant plaintiff as security for costs. Ex parte 
 Brocklebank, 6 Ch. D. 358, 360. No appoint- 
 ment or subsequent confirmation by the infant 
 party is requisite, whether he is of tender age 
 or of years of discretion ; and it is immate- 
 rial whether he is cognizant of the proceedings, 
 or whether he is in the country or abroad. 
 Middleditch ?;. Williams, 47 N. J Eq.585. See 
 Simpson on Infants (2d-ed.), 468; Schouler, 
 Dom. Rel. (4th ed.) § 449. If an infant on 
 coming of age repudiates a Suit brought in his 
 name, his name should be stricken out as plain- 
 tiff and added as a defendant. Silber Light 
 Co. v Silber, 12 Ch. D. 717, 724. 
 
 The power of a next friend extends to all 
 matters properly relating to the conduct and 
 prosecution of the suit, and he may therefore 
 arrange for hearings, the taking of depositions, 
 &c. Higginson v. Hall, 10 Ch. D. 235; Knack- 
 bull v. Fowle, 1 Ch. D. 604 ; Dupuy v. Wels- 
 ford, 42 L. T. 730 ; Kingsbury v. Buckner, 134 
 U. S. 650 ; Beddinger v. Smith (Ark.), 13 S. 
 W. 734 ; Walker v. Ferrin, 4 Vt. 53 ; Pollock 
 v. Buie, 43 Miss. 140; Biddinger v. Wiland, 67 
 Md. 359 ; Walker r. Ferrin, 4 Vt. 523. He may 
 employ an attorney at law for the suit, and if 
 there is no general guardian, he has authority 
 to receive payment of the judgment recovered, 
 receipt for it and enter satisfaction thereof. 
 Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Fitzpatrick. 36 
 Md. 619. He is not a " party to the action " 
 within the English rules of 1875, so as to be 
 ■compellable to make a discovery of documents. 
 Dyke v Stephens, 30 Ch. D. 189; Scott v. Con3. 
 iBank, W. N. (1893) 56; Gray v. Parke, 155 
 Mass 433. And he is not in strictness a party 
 to the suit for any purpose. Ibid ; Sinclair v. 
 Sinclair, 13 M.&W. 646; Ruckman v Palisade 
 Land Co. 1 Fed. Rep. 367; Brown v. Hull, 16 
 Vt. 673 ; Brvant v. Livermore, 20 Minn. 313, 
 68 
 
 342, McDonald v. McDonald, 24 Ind. 68 The 
 suit is not abated if the next friend dies, or the 
 minors reach their majority while it is pending; 
 but they may then appear and prosecute the 
 suit as adults. Tucker v. Wilson, 68 Miss. 693. 
 The answer should properly neither admit nor 
 deny the plaintiff's charges, but submit the 
 matter to the Court's judgment and protection. 
 Dow v. Jewell, 21 N. H. 470 ; Bush v. Linthi- 
 cum, 59 Md. 344; pod, p. 169. The answer, if 
 made and sworn to by next friend, is not evi- 
 dence in the suit in the infant's favor. Bulk lev 
 v. Van Wyck, 5 Paige, 536 ; Stephenson v. 
 Stephenson, 6 Paige, 353; or against the in- 
 fant in other suits. Hiatt v. Brooks, 11 Ind. 
 508. See Coffin v. Heath, 6 Met. (Mass ) 76 ; 
 Benson v. Wright, 4 Md. Ch. 278. But the 
 next friend cannot, without the Court's ap- 
 proval, vitally affect or impair the infant's 
 interests by waivers, admissions, omissions, or 
 stipulations. Morgan v Thome, 7 M. & W. 
 400; Holden v. Heani, 1 Beav. 445 -, Mills v. 
 Dennis, 3 John. Ch. 367: Bowers v. Smith, 10 
 Paige, 193; Bryant v. Tracy, 27 Abb. N. Cas. 
 183, and note ; Walsh v. Walsh, 116 Mass. 
 377 ; Tripp v. Gifford, 155 Mass. 108 , Claxton 
 v. Claxton, 56 Mich. 557 ; Cartwnght v. Wise, 
 14 111. 417 ; Simpson v. Alexander, 6 Cold. 
 (Tenn.) 630 ; McClure v Farthing, 51 Mo 109; 
 Henly v. Gore, 4 Dana (Ky.), 133 ; Ingersoll 
 v. Ingersoll, 42 Miss. 155 ; Johnson v. McCabe, 
 id. 255. 
 
 The next friend cannot, of his own motion, 
 submit the cause to arbitration. Tucker r. 
 Dabbs, 12 Heisk. (Tenn.) 18; Jones v. Payne, 
 41 Ga. 23 ; Fort v. Battle, 13 S. & M. (Miss.) 
 133. Or bind the infant's estate for attor- 
 ney's fees, although an all wance therefor may 
 be made by the Court. M. E. Church 0. 
 Jacques, 3 John. (N. Y.) 1 ; Houck v. Brid- 
 well, 28 Mo. App. 644. The attorney acting 
 for an infant plaintiff is the attorney of the next 
 friend. Almack v. Moore, 2 It. L. R. 90. 
 Nor can he, without the express sanction of the 
 Court, compromise the suit. Cuthbert v. Chau- 
 vet,136N. Y. 332; 32 N. E. Rep. 1088; Edsall 
 v. Vandemark, 39 Barb. 589 : Tripp v. Gifford, 
 155 Mass. 108 , Miles v. Kaigler, 10 Yerg. 
 (Tenn.) 10 ; Crotty v. Eagle (W. Va.), 13 S. 
 E Rep. 59 ; Isaacs v Boyd, 5 Porter (Ala.), 
 388 ; Holker v Parker, 7 Cranch, 496 ; Clark 
 v. (rout (S. C), 13 S. E. Rep. 602; see Walsh 
 »■ Walsh. 116 Mass. 377; Brooke v. Mostyn, 2 
 DeG. J. & S 373, 415; Wilton v- Hill, 25 
 L. J. Ch. 156 ; Wall v. Rogers, L. R. 6 Eq. 58. 
 Hence an agreement that, if there is no appeal 
 from a judgment of non-suit against an infant 
 plaintiff, the defendant will not ask for costs, 
 though fairly made, is for the next friend's
 
 INFANTS. 
 
 69 
 
 solicitor. In a case, however, where a bill was filed by the plantiff as 
 an adult, and it was after wards' discovered that he was an infant at the 
 time of tiling the bill, and still continued so, it was, at the hearing of a 
 motion by the defendant that the bill be dismissed, with costs to be paid 
 by the plaintiff's solicitor, ordered that the plaintiff should be at liberty 
 to amend, by inserting a next friend. 3 
 
 When an infant claims a right, or suffers an injury, on account of 
 winch it is necessary to resort to the Court of Chancery, his near- 
 est relation is supposed to be the person who will take him * under *69 
 his protection, and institute a suit to assert his rights • * and it 
 is for this reason that the person who institutes a suit on behalf of an 
 infant is termed his next friend. But, as it frequently happens that 
 the nearest relation of the infant is the person who invades his rights, 
 or at least neglects to give that protection to the infant which his con- 
 sanguinity or affinity calls upon him to give, the Court, in favor of in- 
 fants, will permit any person to institute suits on their behalf: 2 and 
 whoever thus acts the part which the nearest relation ought to take, is 
 
 3 Flight v. Bolland, 4 Russ 298. 
 i See Bank of the United States v. Ritchie, 
 8 Peters, 128. 
 
 2 Andrews v Cradock, Prec.Ch. 376, Anon. 
 1 Atk. 570; Story, Eq. PI, § 58, note. See 
 Cross v. Cross, 8 Beav 455. A defendant, 
 however, may not be a plaintiffs next friend, 
 Payne v. Little, 13 Beav. 114; Anon. 11 Jur. 
 
 258, V. C. E.; unless he is wholly without 
 interest in the subject-matter. He Taylor, W. 
 X. (1881) 51, M. R. But when the husband 
 was a defendant in right of his wife, and next 
 friend of the infant plaintiff, his name was 
 stricken out as defendant, and the wife given 
 liberty to defend separately. Lewis o. Nobbs, 
 8 Ch. D. 591. 
 
 benefit, and not for the infant's, if the latter is 
 without property, and is not binding upon the 
 infant. Rhodes v. Swithenbank, 22 Q. B. D. 
 577. If the next friend acts in good faith and 
 with reasonable care, the taxed costs in a suit 
 in which he is unsuccessful will be reimbursed 
 to him. Voorhees v. Polhemus, 30 N. J. Eq. 
 456, and note. See Walters v. Woodbridge, 7 
 Ch. D. 504. He is liable for his negligent 
 management causing injury to the infant. 
 Knickerbocker v. De Freest, 2 Paige, 304. And 
 if he officiously procured his appointment, or 
 lias mismanaged the case or shown bad faith, 
 lie may be taxed with costs, though not strictly 
 a party to the suit. lit Blake, 29 Ch. D. 913 ; 
 Smith v. Smith, 108 N % . C. 365. A guardian 
 is not responsible for a loss sustained by his 
 ward from his failure to resort to a new and ex- 
 traordinary remedy, the scope and effect of 
 which are doubtful. White v. Robinson, 64 
 N. < '. 698. A guardian, having no title or in- 
 terest in his ward's estate, cannot maintain a 
 bill in Equity in his own name to avoid the 
 ward's conveyance of his property. Lombard 
 v. Morse, 155 Mass. 136. Even when another 
 Court has ordinarily exclusive jurisdiction of 
 infants' property rights, a purchase on credit by 
 a guardian for his ward, which does not directly 
 relate to the latter's estate, is cognizable in 
 Equity. Corker v Jones, 110 U. S. 317. 
 The Court will always interpose to protect thu 
 
 infant against the next friend's misconduct or 
 his collusion with the adverse party. The Etna, 
 Ware, 462 ; Crittenden v. Cantield, 87 Mich. 
 152; Newland v. Gentry, 18 B Mon. (Ky. ) 
 666; Barrett v. Oliver, 7 Gill & J. (Md.j 191 ; 
 Fowlet v. Lewis, 36 W. Va. 112 ; Eidam v. 
 Finnegan, 48 Minn. 53 ; 16 L. R. A. 507. It 
 may make a reference to a Master to determine 
 whether a suit instituted by next friend is for 
 the infant's benefit, Garr v. Drake, 2 John. 
 Ch. 542 ; and it may at any time substitute 
 another person m place of the next friend. 
 Walker v. Hull, 35 Mich. 488 ; Benly V. (lore, 
 supra. It may remove the next friend for other 
 causes than misconduct, — such as a refusal to 
 appeal. Dupuy v. Welsford, 28 W. R. 762 ; 
 42 L. T. 730. It will use great care in sanction- 
 ing a compromise of the infant's interests. 
 King v. King, 15 III. 187. It cannot, it seems, 
 sanction such compromise against the wishes of 
 the guardian ail litem, acting under counsel's 
 advice. See Re Birchall, Wilson v. Birchall, 
 10 Ch. I). 41 ; Wilton ». Hill, 25 L. .1. Ch 156, 
 V. C K. : Brooke o lord Mostyn, 2 De G. J. 
 & S. 373, 415: Fadelle v. Bernard. 19 W. R. 
 555: Re Cockcroft, Broadbent v Groves, 24 Ch 
 D 94;Coakst>. Boswell.ll A pp. Cas. 232, over- 
 ruling Boswell v. Conks. 27 Ch. 1). 4:24: ante, 
 p. 66. As to the form of a judgment or decree 
 in the infant's favor see Texas Cent. Ky. CO. v. 
 Stewart (Texas), 20 S. W. Rep 962. 
 
 69
 
 TO 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 also styled the next friend of the infant, and is named as such in the 
 bill. 8 And although an infant has had a guardian assigned him by the 
 Court, or appointed by will, yet, where the infant is plaintiff, the course 
 is not to call the guardian by that name, but to call him the next friend. 
 But where the infant is defendant, the guardian is so called; and if 
 the guardian be so called where the infant is plaintiff, it is no cause of 
 demurrer. 4 
 
 Before the name of any person is used as the next friend of an infant, 
 he must sign a written authority to the solicitor for that purpose, which 
 authority is filed with the bill. 5 
 
 It frequently occurs that two or more suits for the same purpose are 
 instituted in his name, by different persons, each acting as his next 
 friend; in such cases the Court will, where no decree has been made in 
 any of the suits, direct an inquiry to be made at chambers as to which 
 suit is most for his benefit, and when that point is ascertained will 
 stay the proceedings in the other suits. 6 Where no decree has been 
 made in any of the suits, 7 and they are all attached to the same branch 
 of the Court, and none of them are in the paper for hearing, such 
 inquiry will be directed on an ex parte motion; 8 the Court being sat- 
 isfied, in the first instance, with the allegation that the suits are for 
 the same purpose. 9 Where the suits are attached to different 
 * 70 branches of the Court, an order * must be obtained, in the first 
 instance, for the transfer of one of the suits, so that they may 
 both be before the same Judge ; 1 and the order for the inquiry is 
 obtained on special motion, of which notice must be given to the other 
 parties to the suits. 2 
 
 The order for the inquiry should be made in both suits, and does not 
 
 3 Ld Red. 25 ; see Snow r. Hole, 15 Sim. 
 161; Green v. Badley, 7 Beav. 271. 
 
 •> Toth. 173; Wyatt's P. R. 221; see Holmes 
 V. Field, 12 III. 421. An infant may sue by 1 i is 
 next friend, notwithstanding he have a guard- 
 ian, if the guardian do not dissent. Thomas c. 
 Dike, 11 Vt. 273; see Trask r. Stone, 7 Mass. 
 241. The general guardian of infants cannot 
 file a hill in his own name to obtain possession 
 of the property of his wards. But he must 
 file it in the name of the infants as their next 
 friend. Bradley v. Amidon, 10 Paige, 235. 
 Ami if he sues in their name as their general 
 guardian, he will be treated as a next friend. 
 Simpson v. Alexander, 6 Coldw. 619. The 
 Court never appoints a guardian to prosecute 
 for, but only to defend, an infant party. Priest 
 v- Hamilton, 2 Tyler, 44. 
 
 5 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86. § 11; see R. S C. 
 1883. Ord XVI 20; 46 & 47 Vic. c. 49, § 4, 
 Sched.; Cox v. James, 19 Ch T>. 55; as to his 
 liability, see Re Flower, 19 W. II. 578, and as 
 to costs, see post, p. 79 In an injunction case 
 the authority was permitted to be tiled the day 
 after an information. Att.-Gen. v Murray, 13 
 W R. 65, V C. K. For form of authority, 
 see Vol. Ill 
 
 70 
 
 6 Ld. Red. 27; Mortimer*. West, 1 Swanst. 
 358; Virtue v. Miller, 19 W. R. 406 ; Story, Eq. 
 PI. § 60. For forms of the orders, see 2 Seton, 
 707, Nos. 8, 9. 
 
 " Rundle v. Rundle, 11 Beav. 33. 
 
 8 For forms of motion paper, and notice of 
 special motion, see Vol. III. 
 
 9 Sullivan v. Sullivan, 2 Mer 40. 
 
 1 This was the course pursued in Knight v. 
 Knight, L. J.T., and M. R., 29 June, 1859, and 
 V. C. Stuart, 29 June, 1859, and 9 Nov., 1859. 
 Compare Duff or t r. Arrowsmith, 5 De. G. M. 
 & G. 434. The order fur transfer is made by 
 the L. C. or L. JJ , and the M. R. if transferred 
 from or to the M. R. (5 Vic. c. 5, § 30), and by 
 the L. C. or L. JJ. alone in other cases; but 
 the order will not be made unless the consent 
 of the Judges from and to whom the cause is 
 transferred is first obtained. Such consent is 
 usually signified, as of course, on the matter 
 being mentioned by the counsel of the party 
 moving. Formerly, it would seem that the 
 order for inquiry might be made by either 
 Court, without either of the causes being trans- 
 ferred. Starten r. Bartholomew, 5 Beav. 372. 
 
 2 See Bi>nd v. Barnes, 2 De (i F. & J. 387. 
 For form of notice of motion, see Vol III.
 
 BANKRUPTS. * 71 
 
 of itself stay the proceedings in the suits ; 3 and the amendment of one 
 of the bills, pending the inquiry, does not stay the inquiry. 4 When 
 the result of the inquiry has been certified, any application that may 
 be necessary is made by motion, on notice. Under special circum- 
 stances, the Court may, upon motion, on notice, make an order staying 
 the suits, without directing an inquiry. 5 
 
 If upon the inquiry it appears that, although it would be beneficial 
 to the infant to prosecute the first, yet it will be more beneficial to him 
 to prosecute a subsequent suit, the Court will stay the first suit, and 
 give the next friend his- costs. 6 Where a decree has been made in 
 any of the suits it is not usual to direct an inquiry; 7 but the other 
 suits will be stayed, liberty being given to each of the next friends in 
 the stayed suits to apply for the conduct of the suit in which the decree 
 was made. 8 When another next friend takes upon himself to file a 
 second bill, it is incumbent upon him to show some defect in the first 
 suit, or a decided preference in the second; if their merits are only 
 equal, the priority must prevail. 9 
 
 As a check to the general license to institute suits on behalf of 
 infants, the Court will, upon the application of the defendant, or of 
 any person acting as next friend of the plaintiff for the purpose of the 
 application, 10 where a strong case is shown that a suit preferred in the 
 name of an infant is not for the infant's benefit, or is instituted from 
 improper motives, direct an inquiry concerning the propriety of the 
 suit; 11 but an objection at the hearing to the propriety of the 
 suit was held too late. 12 («) If, upon such inquiry, it * appears * 71 
 that the suit is not for the benefit of the infant, either the pro- 
 ceedings will be stayed, 1 or else, if there is no excuse for the fact of the 
 
 3 Westby v. Westby, 1 De G. & S. 410; 11 9 Per Lord (Tottenham, Campbell v. Camp- 
 Jur. 704. bell, 2 M. & C 30; and see Harris r. Harris, 
 
 4 Goodale v. Gawthorne, 1 M'N. & G. 319, 10 W. R. 31, V. C. K. 
 
 323; but it is irregular, in such a case, to obtain 10 Guy v. Guy, 2 Beav. 460. 
 
 an orderof course to amend. Fletcher v. Moore, n Stevens v. Stevens, 6 Mad. 97; Lyons v. 
 
 11 Beav 617; 13 Jur. 1063. Blenkin, Jac. 245,259; Smallwood ». Butter, 
 
 5 Staniland v. Staniland, M. R., 21 Jan., 9 Hare, 24. For form of notice of motion, see 
 1864; 2 Seton, 708, No. 10; and see Frost v. Vol. III. For form of order, see 2 Seton, 
 Ward, 12 W. R. 285, L. J.J.; 2 De G. J. & S. 707, No. 7. 
 
 70; Harvey v. Coxwell, 32 L. T. N. S. 52. 12 Lacy v. Burchnall, 3 N. R. 293. 
 
 6 Starten v. Bartholomew, 6 Beav. 143. 1 LA. Red. 27; see also Da Costa v. Da 
 » Taylor v. Oldham, Jac. 527; but see Har- Costa, 3 P. W. 140; Richardson v. Miller. 1 
 
 risv. Harris, 10 VV. R. 31, V. C. K. Sim. 133; Fulton v. Rosevelt, 1 Paige, 178; 
 
 s Kenvon v. Kenyon, 35 Beav. 300 ; and see Bowel) v. Idle}', 1 Edw. Ch. 148 ; Story, Eq. PI. 
 
 Frosty. Ward, 2 De G. J. & S. 70; Harris p. §60. In Da Costa v. Da Costa, the inquiry 
 
 Harris, 10 W. R. 31, V. C. K. was directed upon a petition; but the modern 
 
 (a) A child being by birth subject to its drews v. Salt, L. R. 8Ch. 622; Re Clarke, 21 
 
 father, " it is for the general interest of fami- Ch. D. 817; Re Scanlan, 40 Ch. D. 200; Re 
 
 lies, and for the general interest of children, Plomley, 47 L. T. 283. The father has. there- 
 
 and really for the interest of the particular in- fore, the strongest risiht to be his child's next 
 
 fant, that the Court should not, except in very friend. Woolf v. Pemberton, 6 Ch. D. 19; 
 
 extreme cases, interfere with the discretion of ante, p. 68, note. As to custody, see Re 
 
 the father, but leave him to the responsibility Elderton, 25 Ch. D 220; Re Brown, 13 Q. B. 
 
 of exercising that power which nature has D. 614. As to advances and maintenance, see 
 
 given him by the birth of the child." In re Re Tanner, 53 L. J. Ch. 1108; Re Evans, 26 
 
 Agar-Elhs, 24 Ch. D. 317, 334. See also An- Ch. D. 58. 
 
 71
 
 72 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 suit having been instituted, the bill will be dismissed with costs, to be 
 paid by the next friend; 2 and where it appeared clearly upon affidavits 
 that the suit was commenced by the next friend to promote his own 
 views, and not for the benefit of the infant, such an order was made 
 summarily, and without an inquiry. 3 Where an application was 
 made on behalf of the defendants, that the next friend of the infant 
 plaintiff be restrained from further proceeding with the suit, and that 
 a new next friend might be appointed to conduct it in his stead, — 
 which application was supported by strong affidavits to show that the 
 suit had in fact been instituted from improper motives, for the purpose 
 of benefiting the solicitor, at whose request the person named as next 
 friend (who was a stranger to the family, and had lately held the situa- 
 tion of farm servant or bailiff at monthly wages) had consented to act 
 as such, — the Master was directed to inquire, not only whether the suit 
 was for the benefit of the infant, but whether the next friend was a 
 fit and proper person to be continued in that character, and who would 
 be the proper person to conduct the suit in case the next friend was 
 removed. 4 Where a decree is made in the suit, it is irregular to direct 
 an inquiry whether any benefit has accrued to the infant from the suit 
 in such a form as to make the answer to that inquiry depend on the 
 result of the accounts directed by the decree. 5 
 
 The result of the cases seems to be that the Court exercises a very 
 careful discretion 6 on the one hand, in order to facilitate the proper 
 exercise of the right which is given to all persons to file a bill on behalf 
 of infants; and on the other, to prevent any abuse of that right and 
 any wanton expense to the prejudice of infants. 7 
 
 No inquiry, however, as to the propriety of the suit, will be 
 *72 * ordered at the instigation of the next friend himself; because 
 the Court considers, that in commencing a suit, the next friend 
 undertakes, on his own part, that the suit he has so commenced is for 
 the benefit of the infant. 1 This rule, nevertheless, applies only to 
 cases where an application is made for such an inquiry in the cause 
 itself; if there is another cause pending by which the infant's property 
 is subject to the control and disposition of the Court, such an inquiry 
 is not only permitted, but is highly proper, when fairly and bona fide 
 made, and may have the effect of entitling the next friend to repayment 
 
 practice is to apply to the Court upon motion, of 
 which notice is given to the next friend. See, 
 however, Anderton v. Yates, 5 De G- & S. 202. 
 
 2 Fox i\ Suwerkrop, 1 Beav. 58:5 ; Re Elsorn, 
 Thomas v. Elsom, W. N. (1877) 177. 
 
 8 Sale v. Sale, 1 Beav. 586 ; see also Guy v. 
 Guy, 2 Beav. 460; Staniland v. Staniland, ante, 
 p. 70. 
 
 ■J Naldert'. Hawkins, 2 M. & K. 243: Tow- 
 sey v. Groves, 9 Jur. N. S. 194; 11 W. R. 252, 
 V C. K.; see also Clayton v. Clarke, 2 Giff. 
 575; 7 Jur. N. S. 562, 9 W. R. 718, L. JJ. ; 
 Raven v. Kerl, 2 Phil 632; Gravatt v. Tann, 
 15 W. R. 38:3, M. R.; W, N. (18G6) 327, 405, 
 L. JJ. 
 
 72 
 
 5 Clayton v. Clarke, 3 De G. F. & J. 682; 
 7 Jur. N. S. 562; 2 Giff. 575; 7 Jur. N. S. 252. 
 
 6 Per Lord Langdale M. R. in Starten v. 
 Bartholomew, 6 Beav. 144; and see Clayton v. 
 Clarke, mpra. 
 
 7 See Matter of Frits, 2 Paige, 374; Waring 
 v. Crane, 2 Paige, 79 
 
 1 Jones v. Powell, 2 Mer. 141. But a refer- 
 ence will be directed, as to the propriety of the 
 suit, upon the petition and affidavit of the infant 
 that the suit was commenced without his knowl- 
 edge, and that he believed it to be groundless 
 Garr v. Drake, 2 Johu. Ch. 542.
 
 INFANTS. * 73 
 
 of his costs out of the infant's estate, even though the suit should turn 
 out unfortunate, and the bill be dismissed with costs. 2 
 
 If an infant is made a co-plaintiff with others in a bill, and it appears 
 that it will be more for his benefit that he should be made a defendant, 
 an order to strike his name out as plaintiff, and to make him a defend- 
 ant, may be obtained upon motion or summons, on notice in either 
 case; 3 and an infant heir-at-law, out of whose estate a charge is sought 
 to be raised, ought to be made a defendant, and not a plaintiff, although 
 he is interested in the charge when raised; and where an infant heir 
 had, under such circumstances, been made a co-plaintiff, the cause was 
 ordered to stand over, with liberty for the plaintiffs to amend, by mak- 
 ing the heir-at-law a defendant instead of plaintiff, and thereupon to 
 prove the settlement anew against him as a defendant. 4 The reason 
 given for this practice is, because an infant defendant, where his 
 inheritance is concerned, has in general a day given him, after attain- 
 ing twenty-one, to show cause, if he can, against the decree, and is in 
 some other respects privileged beyond an adult; but an infant plaintiff 
 has no such privilege, and is as much bound as one of full age. 5 In 
 amicable suits, however, it is often an advantage to make an infant the 
 plaintiff; because he may have such relief as he is entitled to, though 
 not prayed for. 6 
 
 An infant is usually bound by a decree in a cause in which he him- 
 self is plaintiff, yet there is no instance of the Court binding the inheri- 
 tance of an infant by any discretionary act; and from this 
 principle it follows, that where an infant * heir is plaintiff, it is * 73 
 not the practice to establish the will, or to declare it well 
 proved, 1 although, if there be no question raised concerning its validity, 
 the Court will in many respects act upon it. 2 
 
 In general, where decrees are made in suits by infant plaintiffs, it is 
 not usual to give the infant a day to show cause. 3 (a) When a day is 
 
 2 Taner v. Ivie, 2 Ves. Sr. 466. It is for the ants; see post, Chap IV. § 10; and see Seton, 
 Judge's discretion whether the inquiry shall he 419, 686-689, and cases there cited. 
 
 granted. Penroth v. Penroth, W. N. (1874) * See post, p. 73. A decree against an adult 
 
 68; 22 W. R. 461, L. JJ. as if an infant, will not hind him. Snow v. 
 
 3 Tappen v. Norman, 11 Ves. 563; see Le Hole, 15 Sim. 161, Green v. Badlev, 7 Beav. 
 Fort v. Delafield, 3 Edw. Ch. 32. For forms of 271, 273. 
 
 notice of motion and summons, see Vol. III. 1 Hills v. Hills, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 327; Taylor 
 
 4 l'lunket v. Joice, 2 Sch. & Let 159. v. Philips, 2 Ves. Sr. 23; Belt's Sup. to Ves. 
 6 Lord Brook v. Lord Hertford, 2 P. Wms. Sr. 259. 
 
 518; Gregory v. Molesworth, 3 Atk. 626; see 2 The Court has now power, under the 
 
 also Morison v. Morison, 4 M. & C. 216; Trustee Act, to declare the infant a trustee, 
 
 Davidson v. Bowden, 5 Sneed, 129; Simpson and to vest the lands. Bowra v. Wright, 4 Ue 
 
 v. Alexander, 6 Coldw. 619. The practice of G. & S. 265; see Seton, 571 ; et seq., and post, 
 
 giving infants a day to show cause is now Chap. XXVIII. § 1. 
 
 nearly obsolete; but the present state of the 3 Gregory v. Molesworth, 3 Atk. 626; but 
 
 law on this subject will be more suitably stated see Lady Effingham v. Sir John Napier, 4 Bro. 
 
 in the future chapter concerning infant defend- P. C. ed. Touil. 340; Sir J. Napier v. Lady 
 
 (a) See Mellor v. Porter, 25 Ch. D. 158; day to show cause, McClellan v. McCIellan, 65 
 
 Younge v. Cocker, 32 W. K. 359; Gray v. Bell, Maine, 500; contra, when the infant is simply 
 
 46 L. T. 521; post, p. 165. An infant trustee, a trustee, although the trust arises by implica- 
 
 who possesses an interest in the trust estate, tion of law. Walsh v. Walsh, 116 Mass. 377. 
 and also holds the legal title, is entitled to such 
 
 73
 
 * 74 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 given to an infant plaintiff to show cause against a decree after he 
 comes of age, the proper course appears to be to have the cause reheard ; 
 for which purpose he must, within the period appointed by the decree, 
 present a petition of rehearing. 4 
 
 An infant is usually bound by the effect of any suit or proceedings 
 instituted on his behalf, and for his benefit; yet if there has been any 
 mistake in the form of such suit, or the proceedings under it, or in 
 the conduct of them, the Court will, upon application, permit such 
 mistake to be rectified. 5 Thus, an infant plaintiff may have a decree 
 upon any matter arising from the state of his case, though he 
 
 * 74 has not particularly mentioned and insisted upon it, * and prayed 
 
 it by his bill. 1 (a) And where the persons acting on behalf of an 
 infant plaintiff, by mistake make submissions or offers on behalf of the 
 infant, which the infant ought not to have been called upon to make, 
 the Court will not suffer the infant to be prejudiced thereby. 2 (b) But 
 in general, in matters of practice, infants are as much bound by the con- 
 duct of the solicitor acting bona fide in their behalf as adults; 3 although 
 it seems that the next friend should, before he consents to any departure 
 from the ordinary course of practice, obtain the sanction of the Court, 
 or of a Judge in chambers. 4 The application at chambers is made by 
 summons., 5 
 
 It seems to have been the opinion of Lord Eldou, that facts could not 
 be stated in a case for the opinion of a Court of Law so as to bind 
 infants; 6 but this is not now of any practical importance, as the Court 
 is now prohibited from directing a case to be stated for the opinion of 
 any Court of Law. 7 
 
 It has been before stated 8 that any person, who may be willing to 
 undertake the Office, may be the next friend of an infant; and it seems 
 that even a person who has been outlawed in a civil action may fill 
 that character. 9 Though formerly doubted, 10 yet the next friend of an 
 
 Effingham, 2 P. Wins. 401; Mos. 67, for an II. 60); but see Knatchbull v. Fowle, 1 Ch. D. 
 
 exception to this rule, under very peculiar 604; Fryer v. Wiseman, W. N. (1876) 3; 24 W. 
 
 circumstances. R. 205. 
 
 4 Wyatt's P. R. 225; see ante, p. 72, n. 5 For form of summons, see Vol. III. 
 
 5 Story, Eq. PI. § 59. 6 Hawkins v. Luscombe, 2 Swanst. 392. 
 
 i Stapilton v. Stapilton, 1 Atk. 2, 6; 2 Wh. » 15 & 16 Vic. c 86, § 61. By Sir George 
 
 & T. L. Cas. (6th ed.) 920; see also De Mamie- Turner's Act, infants are enabled to concur in a 
 
 ville v. De Manneville, 10 Ves. 52, 59; Walker special case. 13 & 14 Vic. c. 35, §§ 4, 6. 
 
 v. Taylor, 8 Jur. N. S. 681, H. L. » Ante, pp. 37, 69. 
 
 2 Serle v. St. Eloy, 2 P. Wms. 386. » Gilb. For. Rom. 54. 
 
 3 Tillotson v. Hargrave, 3 Mad. 494; Wall w Ld. Red. 26; Turner v. Turner, 1 Stra. 
 v. Bushby, 1 Bro. C. C. 484, 487; Knatchbull 708, 2 P. Wms. 297; 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 238, pi. 
 v. Fowle, 1 Ch. D. 604. 18. See ante, p. 37, note 3. 
 
 4 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 24 (7 Jur. N. S. Pt. 
 
 (a) In Pisani v. Attorney-General, L. R. 5 case of a cestui que trust. Dodd v. Ghiselin, 
 
 P. C. 516, it was held that a party who knows 27 Fed. Rep. 405; Wiggins v. Bethune, 29 id. 
 
 that other parties to the suit are infants, and 51; Ruckman v. Palisad-e Land Co 1 id 367 
 
 consents to a certain course, cannot afterwards (case of a married woman); see Re McClean, 
 
 repudiate his consent because of their inability 26 id. 49, Woolridge v. McKenna, 8 id. 650. 
 to approve. In the Federal Courts the citizen- (&) An infant plaintiff cannot be ordered to 
 
 ship of a minor, who sues by his guardian, deter- make discovery of documents. Curtis v. Mundy, 
 
 mines the Court's jurisdiction, contrary to the [1892] 2 Q. B. 178. 
 
 74 

 
 INFANTS. * 75 
 
 infant need not be a person of substance ; u and * apparently an * 75 
 infant may sue by his next friend in forma pauperis, on a special 
 case being made. 1 
 
 If the next friend of an infant does not do his duty, or if any other 
 sufficient ground be made out, the Court will, on motion or summons, 
 on notice, 2 order him to be removed. 3 Thus, he will be removed if 
 he will not proceed with the cause, 4 or will not, when the infant so 
 desires, appeal from an order therein; 5 and he may also be removed, 
 if, although not actually guilty of any impropriety or misconduct, he 
 is connected with the defendants in the cause in such a manner as to 
 render it improbable that the interest of the plaintiff will be properly 
 supported. 6 
 
 In Peyton v. Bond, 1 it appeared that the solicitor for the infants 
 acted for the father also, and had been for ten years his confidential 
 solicitor, and Sir Anthony Hart V. G. said that, although by high 
 authority it was proper in family suits that the same solicitor should 
 be employed for all parties, yet the Court will watch with great jealousy 
 a solicitor who takes upon himself a double responsibility, and decided 
 that the solicitor of the father ought not to continue in the character 
 of solicitor of the next friend. 
 
 The next friend of an infant cannot be receiver in the cause; for it is 
 the duty of the next friend to watch the accounts and conduct of the 
 receiver, and be a control over him; and the two characters are incom- 
 patible, and cannot be united. 8 (a) 
 
 If the next friend of an infant takes any proceeding in the 
 
 11 Anon. 1 Ves. Jr. 410; Squirrel v. Squirrel, writ, or to procure a sufficient Endorser, or to 
 
 2 Dick. 765; Fellows v. Barrett, 1 Keen, 119; become nonsuit. But see Feneley v. Mahonv 
 
 Davenports. Davenport, 1 S. & S. 101; Murrell 21 Pick. 212, 214. 
 
 v. Clapham, 8 Sim. 74; and see Hind v. Whit- 1 Lindsey v. Tyrrell, 24 Beav. 124; 3 Jur. 
 more, 2 K. & J. 458 ; Ex parte Claxton, L. R. N. S. 1014; 2 De G. & J. 7 ; ante, p. 39. 
 7 Ch. 532. In Smith v. Floyd, 1 Pick. 275, it 2 For forms of notice of motion and sum- 
 was held that an infant plaintiff, who sues by mons, see Vol. III. 
 
 prochein ami, is under the statutes of Massa- 8 Russell v. Sharp, 1 Jac. & W. 482; Lander 
 
 chusetts, liable for costs; and in Crandall v. v. Ingersoll, 4 Hare, 596. 
 Slaid, 11 Met. 288, it was held that a prochein * Ward t\ Ward, 3 Mer. 706. 
 
 ami, as such, is not liable for costs; although it 5 Dupuy v. Welsford, W. N. (1880) 121; 28 
 
 was suggested in the latter case by Wilde J. W. R. 762 V. C. B. 
 
 that this Beems to be contrary to the English 8 Peyton r. Bond, 1 Sim. 390; Bedwin r. 
 
 practice. See also Bouche v. Ryan, 3 Blackf. Asprey. 11 Sim. 530; Towscv v. Groves, 9 Jur.' 
 
 472. But where a person who prosecutes a N. S. 194; 11 W. R. 252, V. C. K. ; and see 
 
 suit in the name of an infant, as his next Gee v. Gee. 12 W. R. 187, L. J.T.; Sandford v. 
 
 friend, is insolvent, he will be compelled, on Sandford, 9 Jur. N. S. 398; 11 W. R. 336 V. 
 
 the application of the defendant, to give seen- C. K.; Lloyd v. Davies, 10 Jur. N.S. 1011. ' M. 
 
 rity for costs. Fulton v. Rosevelt, 1 Paige, R. : Prffard v. B-ebve. W. N. (18661 268;' 14 
 
 178; Dalrymple v. Lamb, 3 Wend. 424. In W. R 948, V. C. K. ; Walker v. Crowde'r 2 
 
 Crandall v. Slaid, 11 Met. 288, 290, it was said Ir.-d. Ch. 478. 
 by Wilde ,1. that in all cases, if the defendant " 1 Sim. 391. 
 
 doubts the ability of the infant to pay costs, the 8 Stone r. Wishart, 2 Mad. 64. See also 
 
 prochein ami may be compelled to indorse the In re Lloyd, Allen r. Lloyd, 12 Ch. D. 447. 
 
 (a) A next friend, if removed on the ground he acted for the infant's benefit. Meldrum v 
 of expediency, may recover his costs, includ- Hayes, 21 W. R. 746, V. C. B. 
 ing an unsuccessful motion for a receiver, if 
 
 75
 
 * 77 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 * 7G * cause which is incompatible with the advancement of the suit, 
 
 such as moving to discharge an attachment issued by the solicitor 
 in the regular progress of the cause, the Court will direct an inquiry 
 whether it is fit that such next friend should continue in that capacity 
 any longer. 1 But so long as the next friend continues such on the 
 record, he is considered by the Court to be responsible for the conduct 
 of the cause. 2 
 
 The next friend of an infant plaintiff was formerly considered so far 
 interested in the event of the suit that neither he nor his wife could be 
 examined as a witness; 3 but this disability has been removed by the 
 statutes for improving the law of evidence. 4 
 
 In general, a next friend will not be allowed to retire, at his own 
 request, without giving security for the costs already incurred; 5 and 
 although any person may commence an action as next friend of an 
 infant, yet when once before the Court in that character, he will not, it 
 seems, be removed on his own application unless the Court is informed 
 of the circumstances and respectability of the person proposed to be 
 substituted in his place, and that such person is not interested in 
 
 * 77 the subject of the action. 6 * The application to substitute a next 
 
 friend, in lieu of one desirous to retire, is made by summons, on 
 notice to the defendants. 1 
 
 When, in consequence of the death, incapacity, 2 or removal of the 
 next friend of an infant, pending the suit, it becomes necessary to appoint 
 a new next friend, the proper course of proceeding is for the solicitor of 
 the plaintiff to apply for an order appointing a new next friend in his 
 stead, 3 whose fitness need not be proved; 4 and after such appointment, 
 the name of the new next friend should be made use of in all subse- 
 quent proceedings where the former one would have been named. 
 Before the defendant has appeared, the name of the new next friend 
 may be introduced into the record, under an order as of course to 
 amend; and after appearance the same may be done, where the new 
 
 1 Ward v. Ward, 3 Mer. 700. friend shall give security, to be approved of by 
 
 2 Russell v. Sharp, 1 .lac. & W. 482. the Judge if the parties differ, to answer the 
 
 3 Head r. Head, 3 Atk. 511. But it has defendant's costs to that time, in case any shall 
 been held that a person who is made a prochein be awarded. See 2 Seton, 705, No. 2. The 
 ami to an infant without his knowledge or con- security usually given is a recognizance. 
 
 sent is not disqualified from being a witness. 6 Harrison v. Harrison, 5 Beav. 130; Melling 
 
 Harwell v. Corbin, 1 Rand. 131; see Lupton ». v Melling, 4 Mad. 261; and see Talbot v. Talbot, 
 
 Lupton, 2 John. Ch. 614. In a case where it L R. 17 Eq. 347, M. R.; Lander v. Ingersoll, 4 
 
 appeared that the next friend of an infant pla : n- Hare, 596. 
 
 tiff was a material witness, the Court allowed 1 For form of summons, see Vol. III. 
 
 another person to be substituted in his place, 2 A female next friend will, on marriage, 
 
 upon his giving security for the costs previously become incapacitated to act further as such. 
 
 incurred. Colden v. Haskins, 2 Edw. Ch. 311; 3 Westby v. We.-tby, 2 C. P. Coop. temp. 
 
 Helms v. Franciscus, 2 Bland, 544; Davenport Cott. 211. 
 
 v. Davenport, 1 S. & S. 101. * Talbot v. Talbot, L. R. 17 Eq. 347, M. 
 
 * 6& 7 Vic. c. 85; 14 & 15 Vic. c. 99, § 2; R.; Davenport r. Davenport, 1 S. &. S. 101; 
 
 16 & 17 Vic. c. 83. Harrison v. Harrison, 5 Beav. 130. It seems 
 
 5 Ld.Red. 27, note (y) ; Davenport v. Daven- that the fitness of the new next friend need be 
 
 port, 1 S. & S. 101 ; Colden v. Haskins, 3 Edw. proved only when the application is by the old 
 
 Ch. 311. It is sometimes made a term of the next friend to be discharged. See Talbot v. 
 
 order to substitute, that the substituted next Talbot, supra. 
 
 6
 
 INFANTS. * I 8 
 
 next friend is appointed in the place of a deceased next friend, 5 if the 
 application for the order is made by the solicitor who acted in the suit 
 for the deceased next friend : if not so made, an order to change solici- 
 tors must be obtained before the application to appoint the new next 
 friend. In other cases the order may be obtained on the plaintiff's 
 petition, as of course, if the defendant's solicitors subscribe their con- 
 sent thereto; if not, by motion or summons, on notice. 6 If the plain- 
 tiff's solicitor omits to take this step within a reasonable time, the 
 defendant may apply to the Court by motion on notice, 7 for an order 
 directing the appointment of a new next friend, and for the insertion 
 of his name as such in the proceedings. 8 In Large v. De Ferre? 
 the new next friend was appointed by the Chief Clerk's certificate, 
 without further order. 
 
 The order appointing the next friend must, in every case, be 
 * served on the solicitors of the defendants in the cause, and be * 78 
 left for entry in the cause books kept by the Clerks of Records 
 and Writs. 1 
 
 Before appointing a new next friend, the Court or Judge requires to 
 be satisfied of his willingness to act; and an authority signed by such 
 next friend should be produced and filed. 2 
 
 On any application on behalf of an infant plaintiff, which is not 
 made by his next friend, a next friend must be named for the purposes 
 of the application. 3 
 
 Where a bill has been filed in the name of an infant, his coming of 
 age is no abatement of the suit; but he may elect whether he will pro- 
 ceed with it or not. 4 If he goes on with the cause, all future proceed- 
 ings may be carried on in his own name, and the record need not be 
 amended or altered; 5 he will also be liable to all the costs of the suit, 
 in the same manner as he would have been had he been of age when the 
 bill was originally filed. 6 If he chooses to abandon the suit, he may 
 obtain an order, on motion of course, or on petition of course, to dis- 
 miss it on payment of costs by himself, 7 or he may refrain from taking 
 any step in it; but he cannot compel the next friend to pay the costs, 
 
 5 For forms of motion paper and petition, tado, 6 Jur. 227, and see Guy V. Guy. 2 Reav. 
 see "Vol. III.; and for the order on motion, see 4G0. A notice of motion should be given by 
 2 Seton, 705, No. 2. the infant by his next friend, and not merely 
 
 6 For forms of notice of motion and sum- by the next friend. Pidduck v. Boultbee, 2 
 mons, see Vol. III.; and for the order, see 2 Sim. N. S. 223. 
 
 Seton, 705, No. 2. 4 Wyatt's P. R. 225. As to what amounts 
 
 7 For form of notice of motion, see Vol. III. to an adoption of the suit, see Raile r Baile, 
 
 8 As to the former practice, where the order L. R. 13 Eq. 497, V. C. W. 
 
 was obtained on ex parte motion, see Lan- 6 Wyatt's P. R. 225; 1 Fowl. Ex. Prac. 421. 
 
 caster v. Thornton, Amb. 308; Ludolph v. The title of the suit in such case, however, is 
 
 Saxby, ibid.; 12 Sim. 351; Countess of She!- corrected, to read thenceforth thus: "A B, 
 
 burnev. Lord Inchiqnin, Amb. 898, n.; 12 Sim. late an infant, by C D, his next friend, but 
 
 352: Rracey r. Sandiford, 3 Mad. 468; Glover now of full age, plaintiff." 
 i'. Webber, 12 Sim. 351. For form of motion « Coop. Eq. PI. 29; Waring v. Crane, 2 
 
 paper, see Vol. III. Paige, 79; Story, Eq PL § 59. 
 
 9 Braithwaite's Pr. 558. 7 Where a decree has been made, the appli 
 
 1 Ibid. cation should be a special motion to stay pro 
 
 2 For form, see Vol. III. ceedings. For form of motion paper, see Vol. 
 8 Cox v. Wright, 9 Jur. N. S. 981 ; 11 W. III. 
 
 R. 870, V. C. K. explaining Furtado v. Fur- 
 
 11
 
 * 79 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 unless it be established that the bill was improperly filed. 8 Therefore, 
 where an infant, on attaining twenty-one, moved to dismiss a bill filed 
 on his behalf, with costs to be paid by the next friend, the Court refused 
 to make the order, but directed the bill to be dismissed, on the late 
 infant plaintiff giving an undertaking to pay the costs, and the costs of 
 the next friend. 9 
 
 If the infant refrains from taking any step in the suit, he cannot be 
 made liable to costs; thus, where the next friend of an infant died 
 during the minority of the plaintiff, who, after he came of age, took no 
 step in the cause, and the defendant brought the cause on again, and 
 procured the bill to be dismissed, such dismissal was without costs; 
 because the plaintiff, not having been liable to costs during his infancy, 
 and never having made himself liable by taking any step in the cause 
 after attaining twenty-one, and there being no next friend to be respon- 
 sible for them, there was no person against whom the Court could make 
 an order for payment of costs. 10 (a) In that case the next friend, if 
 
 living, would; of course, have been liable to the payment of the 
 * 79 costs to the * defendant, the general rule being, that the next 
 
 friend shall pay the defendant's costs of dismissing the plain- 
 tiff's bill; and so, if a motion is made on behalf of an infant plaintiff 
 which is refused with costs, such costs must be paid by the next friend. 1 
 When directed to pay the costs, the next friend will not, in the absence 
 of a reservation in the order directing the payment, be allowed such 
 costs out of the estate. 2 
 
 Where an infant, on coming of age, repudiates the suit, that repudia- 
 tion relates back to the commencement of the suit, overriding all that 
 has been done in it. 8 An infant co-plaintiff, on coming of age, and 
 desiring to repudiate the suit, if he takes any step, must move, on 
 notice, not to dismiss the bill, but to have his name struck out as co- 
 plaintiff; 4 and if the next friend requires it, the late infant's name 
 must be introduced in the future proceedings as a co-defendant. 6 After 
 an infant sole plaintiff comes of age, his next friend ought not to take 
 any proceedings in the cause in the name of the plaintiff, even though 
 they are consequential on former proceedings. 6 An infant co-plaintiff, 
 on coming of age, will not be allowed to appear by another solicitor or 
 counsel, unless he has duly changed his solicitor. 7 
 
 8 If the bill was improperly filed, the infant 2 Caley v. Caley, W. N. (1877) 89; 25 
 may abandon the suit, and the costs will be W. R. 528, V. C. H. 
 
 charged upon the next friend. Waring v. s Dunn v. Dunn, 7 De G. M. & G. 29 ; Uur. 
 
 Crane, 2 Paige, 79. N. S 123, per L. J. Turner. 
 
 9 Anon. 4 Mad. 461; see Damant v. Hen- 4 Acres v. Little, 7 Sim. 138; Guy V. Guy, 
 nell 33 Ch. D. 224. 2 Beav. 460; Cooke v. Fryer, 4 Beav. 13. 
 
 10 Turner v. Turner. 1 Stra. 708; 2 P. Wms. For form of notice of motion, see Vol. III.; 
 
 297; Ld. Red. 26, n. (t); and see Dunn v. Dunn, and for form of order, see Seton, 1253, 
 
 7 De G. M. & G. 25 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 122; 3 Drew. No. 8. 
 17- 18 Jur. 1068. 5 Bicknell v. Bicknell, 32 Beav. 381; 9 Jur. 
 
 i Bucklev v. Puckeridge, 1 Dick. 395. N. S. 633. 
 Costs must* be paid by the next friend in 6 Brown v. Weatherhead, 4 Hare, 122; 
 
 every instance where there is no foundation Brown v. Brown, 11 Beav. 562. 
 for the suit. Stephenson v. Stephenson. 3 7 Swift v. Grazebrook, 13 Sim. 185. See 
 
 Hayw. 123; Story, Eq. PI. § 59. But see Ballard v. White, 2 Hare, 158; R. S. C. 1883, 
 
 Crandall v. Slaid, 11 Met. 288. Ante, 37, n. 3. Ord. VII. 3. 
 
 (a) See Vivian v. Kennelly, 63 L. T. 778; White v. Duvernay, [1891] P. 290. 
 78
 
 INFANTS. * 81 
 
 The rule above referred to, that a next friend is liable to the costs 
 of dismissing a bill, or of an unsuccessful motion, is applicable only 
 as between the next friend and the defendant in the cause; for the 
 Court is extremely anxious to encourage, to every possible extent, those 
 who will stand forward in the character of next friend on behalf of 
 infants, 8 and will, wherever it can be done, allow the next friend the 
 costs out of the infant's estate of any proceeding instituted by him on 
 behalf of the infant, even though unsuccessful, 9 provided he appears 
 to have acted bona fide for the benefit of the infant. 10 
 
 * An inquiry may be directed whether it is for the benefit of * 80 
 the infant to proceed with a suit. 1 It seems, however, that such 
 an inquiry will not be directed, on the application of the next friend, 
 in the suit respecting which the reference is sought, 2 but that the next 
 friend must carry it on at his own risk; which appears to be a proper 
 restraint to prevent suits of this description from being rashly under- 
 taken; for as, on the one hand, the next friend, in case a fund should 
 be recovered by means of the suit, has, through his solicitor's lien for 
 his costs upon that fund, 3 an adequate protection from losing the charge 
 he may have been put to by means of the suit, so the risks which he 
 runs of losing those costs, in case the suit should be unsuccessful, teuds 
 to make persons cautious in undertaking proceedings of this nature on 
 behalf of infants, without having very good reason for anticipating a 
 successful result. 
 
 If it should appear that the next friend has acted from improper 
 motives, and has not instituted the suit for the benefit of the infant, he 
 will not be allowed his costs ; 4 and if the next friend has not used due 
 diligence to acquire a proper knowledge of the facts of the case, and 
 the bill should be dismissed, or an order discharged, upon facts which, 
 though not known when the bill was filed, or the motion made, might 
 have been known if proper inquiry had been made, the next friend 
 will not be allowed the costs out of the infant's * estate. 1 *81 
 
 A solicitor, conducting a cause on the part of an infant, has the 
 same lien upon the money recovered in the suit by his means, and at 
 his expense, as he has in the case of an adult; 2 and therefore, if the 
 suit is successful, the next friend is, in general, secure from being put 
 to any charges on the infant's behalf. But it seems that a solicitor 
 who obtains possession of papers, as solicitor to the next friend, has 
 not any lien upon them by virtue of such possession. 8 
 
 8 Whittaker v. Marlar, ] Cox, 286. Clarke, 3 De G. F. & J. 682; 7 Jiir. N. S. 
 
 9 See Palmer v. Jones, 22 W. R. 009, M. R.; 562. 
 
 Pritehard v. Roberts, L. R. 17Eq.222, V. C. H. 1 Pearce v. Pearce, 9 Ves. 548; Roddam r. 
 
 10 Staines i>. Maddox, Mos. 319; Taner v. Hetlierington, 5 Ves. 91, 95; and see Caley 
 
 Ivie, 2 Ves. Sr. 466; Cross v. Cross, 8 Beav. v. Caley, W. N. (1877) 89; 25 W. R. 528, 
 
 455; Anderton v. Yates, 5 De G. & S. 202 ; V. C. H. 
 
 Meldrmn v. Hayes, 21 \V. R. 746, V. C.B; see 2 Staines v. Maddox, Mos. 319; Pritehard 
 
 He Jones, W". N. (1883) 14; 31 W. R. 399. i\ Roberts, L. R. 17 Eq. 222, V. C. H. ; and see 
 
 1 Taner v. Ivie, 2 Ves. Sr. 469. Bnnser v. Bradshaw, 7 Jur. N. S. 231 ; 9 id. 
 
 2 Jones v. Powell, 2 Mer. 141; ante, p. 72. 1048; 9 W. R. 229; 10 W. R. 481; 4 Giff. 260; 
 8 Staines v. Maddox, Mos. 319. Baile v. Baile, L. R 13 Eq. 497, V C. W. 
 
 4 Whittaker r. Marlar, 1 Cox, 286; and 8 Montagu on Liens, 53; and see Turner 
 
 see Cross v. Cross, 8 Beav. 455; Clayton v. v. Letts, 20 Beav. 185; 7 De G. M. & G. 243; 
 
 79
 
 * 83 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 It is said, that where a legacy is given to an infant, the testator 
 makes it necessary to come into this Court for directions how to lay it 
 out; and that, therefore, such an application ought to be considered as 
 incumbrance on the estate, and the costs must be paid out of the assets. 4 
 But under the Legacy Duty Act, 36 Geo. III. c. 52, § 32, the executor 
 may pay the infant's legacy into Court, and is then discharged; and 
 the infant, when he comes of age, may apply for it. 5 Before that Act, 
 an executor could not safely pay an infant's legacy without a decree. 
 
 It is presumed that the rule above laid down will not apply, so as to 
 prevent an infant legatee from receiving his costs, in case he is obliged 
 to institute proceedings in consequence of the executor's omitting to 
 avail himself of the Act by paying the money into Court, since there is 
 power given by the Act by which the executor can be compelled to 
 pay the legacy without a suit; and that where the executors, though 
 admitting assets, have refused or neglected to pay the legacy into 
 Court, they would be decreed to pay the costs. 
 
 * 82 * Section VI. — Idiots, Lunatics, and Persoixs of Unsound or 
 
 Weak Mind. 
 
 Although, as before observed, 1 in certain cases suits on behalf of 
 
 idiots or lunatics may be instituted in the form of informations by the 
 
 Attorney-General, yet the proper course of proceeding to assert their 
 
 rights in Equity is by a suit 2 in the name of the lunatic: which, as he 
 
 is a person incapable in Law of taking any step on his own 
 
 * 83 account, is brought by the committee of his estate, if *any; or if 
 
 none, by his next friend, who is responsible for the conduct of 
 the suit. 1 (a) The lunatic, if suing by his committee, must be named a 
 
 1 Jur. N. S- 487, 1057; Dunn v. Dunn, 7 De G- might apply for it by summons, where the fund 
 
 M. & G. 25, 29; 1 Jur. N. S. 122; 3 Drew. 17; or stock does not exceed £300, under Cons. 
 
 18 Jur. 1068. The cases of Osborne v. Denne, Ord. XXXV. 1 (2). 
 
 7 Ves. 424, and Fearns v. Young, 10 Ves. 184, l Ante, p. 9. 
 
 conflict as to a next friend's right to costs 2 Or, where applicable, hy administration 
 
 beyond taxed costs. For more as to costs summons, under 15 & 16 Yic. c. 86, §§ 45-47; 
 
 of infants' suits, see Beames on Costs. 69-71, see post, Chap. XXIX. 
 
 83-87. l R. S. C. Ord. XVIII. "The law of the 
 
 4 Anon. Mos. 5. Court of Chancery undoubtedly is that, in cer- 
 
 5 Whopham v. Wing-field, 4 Ves. 630. He tain cases where there is a person of unsound 
 
 (a) Actions regarding property, real or per- 61 L. J. Ch. 89; 65 L. T. 672; Cardwell o. 
 
 sonal, including partition suits, may be brought Tomlinson, 54 L.J. Ch. 957; lie Bullock, 35 
 
 by a person of unsound mind, not so found, by W. R. 109; 55 L. T. 722. In England, if a 
 
 a next friend. Porter r. Porter, 37 Ch. D person of unsound mind, not so found, suing as 
 
 420: [Watt v. Leach, 26 W. E. 475 ; overruling plaintiff by next friend, becomes a lunatic 
 
 Halfhide ». Robinson, supra; Waterhouse ?'. pending the suit, and a committee is appointed, 
 
 Worsnop, 59 L. T. 140; see Denny r. Denny. the committee may obtain an order for leave to 
 
 8 Allen. 311; Dudgeon o. Watson. 23 Fed. continue the suit under Ord. L. rule 4. Re 
 
 Rep. 161. If the alleged lunatic is of sound Green, Green v. Pratt, 48 L. -T. Ch. 681. An 
 
 mind, the Court msy direct an inquiry and dis- inspection by the official solicitor of documents 
 
 miss the suit on his application, and the next and securities deposited by a lunatic with a 
 
 friend will be ordered to pay the costs. Palmer company for safe custody, may be ordered 
 
 v. Walesbv, L. R. 3 Ch 732, Howell v. Lewis, before the appointment of a committee of the 
 
 ' 80
 
 LUNATICS. 
 
 83 
 
 co-plaintiff with the committee, as well in a bill as in an information, 
 on his behalf; 2 (b) where, however, the object of the suit is to avoid 
 some transaction entered into by the lunatic on the ground of his inca- 
 pacity at the time, it has been held that a lunatic ought not to be a 
 
 mind, not found so by inquisition, and there- 
 fore incapable of invoking tiie protection of the 
 Court, that protection may, in proper cases, 
 and if and so far as it may be necessary and 
 proper, be invoked on his behalf by any person 
 as his next friend." Per Sir VV. M. James 
 L. J. in Beall «. Smith, L. R. 9 Cli. 85, 91 ; where 
 the proceedings in such a suit were held good 
 up to the appointment of a receiver, but the 
 proceedings after the finding of an inquisition 
 were treated as irregular and void. In Half- 
 hide r. Robinson, L. R. 9 Ch. 373, a bill for the 
 partition of land in which a lunatic was one of 
 the tenants in common, filed by the lunatic, by 
 her uncle as next friend, was held by the 
 same eminent Lord Justice to be " altogether 
 irregular." " I wish it to be understood," he 
 added, " that a bill cannot be filed by a next 
 friend on behalf of a person of unsound mind 
 not so found by inquisition, for dealing with 
 his real estate." Afterwards, in Jones t'. Lloyd, 
 L. R. 18 Eq. 205, which was a bill by a Lunatic 
 partner by next friend for a dissolution, settle- 
 ment, and receiver, Sir G. Jessel, Master of the 
 Rolls, thought it clear, both upon reason and 
 authority, that an equity on the part of a 
 lunatic may be asserted by next friend, in the 
 absence of a committee. In addition to Beall 
 v. Smith, L. R. 9 Ch. 85, he cites, as authority, 
 Light v. Light, 25 Beav. 248; Fisher ». Melles, 
 L. R. 18 Eq. 2(58, and the books of practice, in 
 which, he says, " I find the proposition so laid 
 down in the widest sense." See also Vane v. 
 
 lunatic's estate. In re Campbell, 13 Ch. D. 
 323. The Court has power to bind the equi- 
 table interests of lunatics, not so found by 
 inquisition, by making an election on their 
 behalf. Wilder v. Pigott, 22 Ch. D. 263; and 
 it may order income paid to a lunatic's wife for 
 his maintenance. Re Silva, 58 L. T. 46. The 
 Chancery Court has, however, no jurisdiction 
 to apply the property of a lunatic (not so found) 
 to his maintenance, unless he has money in 
 Court, or the Court has control over his prop- 
 erty by reason of some pending suit or proceed- 
 ing relating thereto. Re Grimmett's Trusts, 
 56 L. J. Ch. 411); W. N. (1887) 37. The bus- 
 band of a female lunatic has no absolute right 
 to be appointed the committee of her person. 
 Re Davy, [1892] 3 Ch. 38. As to applications 
 for examination of alleged lunatics, see Re 
 Bathe, [1891] 3 Ch. 274; 65 L. T. 205. Pend- 
 ing an application for inquisition, the Court 
 may appoint an interim receiver of the lunatic's 
 estate, and in case of urgency it may do this 
 VOL. I. — 6 
 
 Vane, 2 Ch. D. 124: and Higginson v. Hall, 10 
 Ch. D. 235, where it was held that a defendant 
 was entitled to an affidavit of documents from 
 the next friend of a lunatic plaintiff. See also 
 Stephens v. Porter, 11 Heisk 348; Norcom v. 
 lingers, 16 N.J. Eq. 484. On the other hand, 
 in Dorsheiiner v. Roorback, 18 N. J. Eq. 440, 
 Ch. Zabriskie, on motion for that purpose, 
 ordered a bill filed in the name of an idiot, by 
 next friend, to be taken from the file, saving, 
 " I find no case or authority in which it is held 
 that the}' (idiots and lunatics) may sue by a 
 next friend, either a volunteer or appointed." 
 
 A liquidation petition in bankruptcy can- 
 not be filed by a next friend in the name of the 
 lunatic. Ex parte Cahen, 10 Ch. D. 183. 
 
 In some of the United States, Courts of 
 Equity are authorized to appoint committees 
 of idiots and lunatics, while in other States the 
 appointment of guardians is intrusted to other 
 Court*, usually the County or Probate Courts, 
 Story, Eq. Pl."§ G5. See" Matter of Wendell, 
 
 1 John. Ch. 600; Brasher v. Van Cortlandt, 
 
 2 John. Ch. 242, 246. In Massachusetts, the 
 Courts of Probate have the exclusive authority 
 to appoint guardians of insane persons. Gen. 
 Stats, c. 109, § 8: Pub Stats, c. 139, § 7. For 
 Virginia, see Boiling v. Turner, 6 Rand. 584, 
 Vermont, see Smith v. Burnham, 1 Aik. 84; 
 New Jersev, Dorsheiiner v. Roorback, 18 N. J. 
 Eq. 438. 
 
 2 Story, Eq. PL § 64 and note; see Gorham 
 v. Gorham, 3 Barb. Ch. 24. 
 
 upon an ex parte application. In re Poun- 
 tain, 37 Ch. D. 609. See 52 & 53 Vic. c. 41, 
 §§ 26, 52; 47 & 48.Vic. c. 64, § 10 (3); 53 & 54 
 Vic. c. 5, §§ 123, 299, 300, as to the application 
 of a lunatic's property to his support or that of 
 his family. See also 54 & 55 Vic. c. 65, as to 
 the removal of an alien lunatic to his own coun- 
 try. See 52 & 53 Vic. c. 41, § 44. The guar- 
 dian of an insane person, having no title or 
 interest in his ward's estate, cannot maintain a 
 bill in his own name to set aside a conveyance 
 by the ward. Lombard v. Mors*, 155 Mas-. 
 136. As to the appointment of a p»rson to con- 
 vey, under the Trustee Act, 1850, the interest 
 of a mortgagee who is of unsound mind, see Re 
 Jones, 33 Ch. D. 414; Re Nicholson, 34 Ch. D. 
 663; Re Martin, id. 618; Re Peel, 55 L. T. 
 554. 
 
 (b) See Warfield v. Fisk, 136 Mass. 219; 
 Richmond ». Adams Nat. Bank, 152 Mass. 359; 
 Bird v. Bird, 21 Gratt. 712. 
 
 81
 
 * 84 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 co-plaintiff, 3 because it is a principle of Law that no man can be heard 
 to stultify himself. 4 This distinction was recognized and adopted in 
 some early cases, 5 but it would scarcely be considered important in 
 modern times; and where a bill was brought by a lunatic and his com- 
 mittee, to avoid an act of the lunatic's on the ground of insanity, a 
 demurrer, on the ground that a lunatic could not be allowed to stultify 
 himself, was disallowed: 6 the Lord Chancellor observing, that 
 * 84 the rule * that a lunatic should not be admitted to excuse himself, 
 on pretence of lunacy, was to be understood of acts done by the 
 lunatic to the prejudice of others, but not of acts done by him to the 
 prejudice of himself. 
 
 An idiot is not, it seems, a necessary party to a suit instituted on his 
 behalf. 1 But neither an idiot nor a lunatic can institute a suit, nor can 
 one be instituted on his behalf, without the committee, if any, of his 
 estate being a party, either as a co-plaintiff or as a defendant;' 2 and 
 therefore where the committee of a lunatic filed a bill on behalf of the 
 lunatic, without making himself a co-plaintiff, the case was directed to 
 stand over, with liberty to amend, by making the committee a co- 
 plaintiff; 3 and in Bishop of London v. Nichols,* a bill for tithes by 
 the bishop and sequestrator, during the incapacity of the incumbent, 
 was dismissed, because neither the incumbent nor his committee was a 
 party. 
 
 If a person exhibiting a bill appear upon the face of it to be either 
 an idiot or a lunatic, and therefore incapable of instituting a suit alone, 
 and no next friend or committee is named in the bill, the defen I.uit 
 may demur ; 5 but if the incapacity does not appear on the face of the 
 bill, the defendant must take advantage of it by plea. 6 The objection 
 arising from lunacy extends to the whole bill, and advantage may be 
 taken of it, as well in the case of a bill for discovery merely, as in the 
 case of a bill for relief; for the defendant in a bill of discovery, being 
 entitled to costs, after a full answer, as a matter of course, would be 
 materially injured by being compelled to answer such a bill by a person 
 
 3 A lunatic is not a necessary party plaintiff interfere to set aside the contracts and other 
 
 with his committee, on a bill to set aside an act acts, however solemn, of persons who are idiots, 
 
 done by the lunatic under mental imbecility, lunatics, and otherwise wore compotes mentis, is 
 
 Ortley r. Messere, 7 John. Ch. 139. See infra, fraud. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 227. Alston v. Boyd, 
 
 175, n. 9 6 Humph, 504. 
 
 * In America this maxim has seldom, if 6 Att.-Gen. v. Woolrich, 1 Ch. Cas. 153; 
 
 ever, been recognized in any of the Courts of Att.-Gen. r. Parkhust, id. 112. 
 Common Law. Mitchell v. Kingman, 5 Pick. 6 Ridler v. Ridler, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 279, pi. 0; 
 
 431; Webster v. Woodford, 3 Day, 90; Grant and see Tothill, 130, Story, Eq. Jur. § 226. 
 V. Thompson, 4 Conn. 203; Lang v. Whiddon, * Att.-Gen. v. Woolrich, 1 Ch. Cas. 153; 
 
 2 X. H. 435; Seaver v. Phelps, 11 Pick. 304; Att.-Gen. v. Parkhust, id. 112. 
 McReight v. Aitken, 1 Rice, 56; Rice v. Peet, 2 Fuller v. Lance, 1 Ch. Cas. 19; Story, Eq. 
 
 15 John. 503. It is justly denounced by Mr. PI. § 64, and note. 
 
 Justice Story, 1 Eq. Jur." § 225. In modern 3 Woolfryes v. Wool f ryes, Rolls, Feb. 17, 
 
 times it is abandoned in Equity, and the 1824, MSS. 
 English Courts of Law seem inclined as far as 4 Bunb. 141. 
 
 possible to escape from the maxim. Baxter v. 5 Ld. Red. 153; Norcom v. Rogers, 16 N. J. 
 
 Earl of Portsmouth, 5 B. & C. 170; Ball r. Eq. 484. 
 Mannin, 3 Bligh, N. S. 1. 6 Ld. Red. 153, 229; see Story, Eq. PI 
 
 The ground on which Courts of Equity now § 725; Ex parte Brocklebank, 6 Ch. D. 358. 
 82
 
 LUNATICS. * 85 
 
 whose property is not in las own disposal, and who is therefore incapa- 
 ble of paying the cost. 7 
 
 If the plaintiff became a lunatic after the institution of a suit, 
 it * was formerly requisite that a supplemental bill should be *85 
 hied, in the joint names of the lunatic and of the committee of 
 his estate, which answered the same purpose as a bill of revivor in 
 procuring the benefit of former proceedings; * and if the committee of a 
 lunatic's or idiot's estate died, after a suit had been instituted by him 
 for the benefit of the idiot or lunatic, and a new committee was 
 appointed, the proper way of continuing the suit was by a supplemen- 
 tal bill filed by the idiot or lunatic and the new committee : but under 
 the present practice of the Court the suit would be continued, in either 
 of these cases, by a supplemental order or order of revivor. 2 After a 
 decree, and pending proceedings under an inquiry, the Court will stay 
 the cause till the result of the proceedings in lunacy concerning the 
 plaintiff is known. 3 
 
 A committee, previously to instituting a suit on behalf of an idiot or 
 lunatic, should obtain the sanction of the Lord Chancellor or Lords 
 Justices of Appeal, who, by virtue of the Queen's sign manual, are 
 intrusted with the care of lunatics. In order to obtain such sanction, 
 a statement of facts showing the propriety of the suit should be laid 
 before the Master in Lunacy, and a report obtained from him approv- 
 ing the suit; which report must be confirmed by the Lord Chancellor or 
 Lords Justices. 4 
 
 Contracts entered into and completed by a lunatic, without fraud in 
 the parties dealing with him, will not be set aside as a matter of course, 
 even where such contracts are overreached by the inquisition taken in 
 lunacy, and may be void at law; 5 but the interference of the Court 
 will depend very much upon the circumstances of each particular case; 
 and where it is impossible to exercise the jurisdiction in favor of the 
 lunatic so as to do justice to the other party, the Court may refuse 
 relief, and leave the lunatic to his remedy, if any, at law. 6 ((f) It 
 
 ' Ld. Red. 153, 229. of new next friends of idiots, lunatics, or 
 
 1 See Brown v. Clark, 3 Wooddeson, Lect. persons of weak mind is the same, mutatis 
 378, nutis, where the form of such a bill is mutandis, as in the case of infants; see ante, 
 stated. pp. 75, 76 See 1 5 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 11. 
 
 2 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 52, and Ord. XXXII. 3 Hartley v. Gilbert. 13 Sim. 596. 
 
 R. S. C, Ord. L 3, 4. See 2 Seton, 1527; Dan- 4 i 6 & 17 Vic c. 70, §§ 70-73, 91-97; and 
 
 gar v. Stewart, 9 W. R. 266, V. C. K. ; Thewlia 14th Ord. in Lun. of 7th Nov., 1853, 17 Jur. 
 
 v. Farrar, cited, Seton, 1166; Timpson v. London Pt. II. 445, see Elmer's Prac. 42. 
 
 & N. W. Ry. Co. 11 W. R. 558; Harland v. 6 i> nce v . Berrlngton, 3 M'N. & G. 486, 
 
 Garbutt, \V. N. (1881) 8, V. C. B.; and see 490; Yauger v. Skinner, 14 N. J. Eq. 389 
 
 pott, Chap. XXXIII., Revivor and Supplement. c Shelf on Lun. 551; Niell v. Morley, 9 
 
 Lor forms of motion paper and petitions, see Ves. 478, 481, 482. 
 Vol. III. The practice as to the appointment 
 
 (a) See Wiltshire v. Marshall, 14 L. T. N. S. Q. B. D. 264. Equity Courts may give direc- 
 
 396. The law implies an obligation on the part tions for a lunatic's maintenance out of his 
 
 of a lunatic to pay, out of his own property, property, either income or capital, under its 
 
 for necessaries supplied to him and suitable to control, but have no jurisdiction to appoint a 
 
 his position in life. In re Rhodes, Rhodes v. guardian of his person. Re Bligh, 12 Oh. I>. 
 
 Rhodes, 44 Ch. I). 94. A charging order must 364; He Brandon's Trusts, 13 Ch. D. 77:>; Re 
 
 be definite in amount. Home v. Fountain, 23 Gihnmett's Trusts, 56 L. J. Ch. 419; Re Silva, 
 
 83
 
 8G 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 seems also, that although a contract is entered into by a lunatic subse- 
 quent to the date from which he is found by the inquisition to have 
 become lunatic, yet, if the fact of his being a lunatic at the time of the 
 contract is denied by the defendant, the establishment of that fact is 
 indispensably necessary; and formerly when the Court had any doubt 
 
 upon it, it directed an issue to try it. 7 
 *86 * Persons of full age, but who are incapable of acting for 
 
 themselves, though neither idiots nor lunatics, have been per- 
 mitted to sue by their next friend, without the intervention of the 
 Attorney-General; l and it seems that if a bill has been hied in the 
 name of a plaintiff, who at the time of filing it is in a state of mental 
 incapacity, it may, on motion, be taken off the file. 2 If, however, a 
 suit has been properly instituted, and the plaintiff subsequently 
 becomes imbecile, that circumstance will not be a sufficient ground for 
 taking the bill off the file. 3 
 
 The committee of a lunatic, and the next friend of a person of 
 unsound mind, before he consents to any departure from the ordinary 
 mode of taking evidence, or of any other procedure in the suit, should 
 first obtain the sanction of the Court or Judge; 4 and the committee 
 
 i Niell v. Morley, 9 Yes. 47S 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 30 cites Elizabeth Liney, a 
 person deaf ami dumb, by her next friend, 
 against Witherly and others, in Ch.: Decree, 
 1 Dec, 1760; ditto on Supplem. Bill, 4 March, 
 1779. See Fisher v. Melles, L. R. 18 Eq: 208, 
 n. 7. If a person have religious scruples 
 against being a party to a suit, he may sue 
 by his next friend. Malin v. Malin, 2 John. 
 Ch 2-'i8. A person in dotage, or an imbecile 
 adult, may sue by next friend. C. D. Owing's 
 case, 1 Bland, 373; Bothwell v. Bonshell, 1 
 Blind, 373; see Story, Eq. PL §66. As to 
 the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery with 
 regard to the property of a lunatic not so 
 found by inquisition, see. Nelson v. Duncombe, 
 9 Bear. 211, 216, 219; 10 Jur. 399; Edwards 
 r. Abrey, 2 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 177; Peters 
 v. Grote, id. 192; 7 Sim. 238, Re Burke, 2 
 De G. F. & J. 124; Re Taylor, ib 125; Re 
 M'Farlane, 2 J. & IL 073; 8 Jur. N, S. 208; 
 Light v Light, 25 Bear. 248; Williams v. 
 Alien, 33 Bear. 241; 9 Jur. N S. 1219; Star- 
 buck o. Mitchell, 1 W. N. 253, M. R. : Re 
 Coleman, 1 W. N. 209, V. C. S. ; Re Law, 7 
 Jur. N S 410, Y. C. W.; Johnson v. Turner, 
 W. N. (1868) 305, V. C. M.; Re Baker, L. R. 
 13 Eq 108; Re Gamier, id. 532; Morris v. 
 Morns W. N. (1872) 107; Re Philps, 28 L. T. 
 X. S. 530, Y. C. M.; Re Perry, W. N. (is:;,) 
 17; 23 W. R. 334; Vane v. Yan'e, 2 Ch. D. 124; 
 
 Re Whitby, W. N. (1877) 208; Bligh v. O'Con- 
 nell, 26 W. R. 311; Re Hoskins, W. N. (1880) 
 62; and see 2 Set n, 709, No. 11, and ante, p. 9. 
 By the 25 & 26 Vic. c. 80, a summary jurisdic- 
 tion is conferred in lunacy over the property 
 of an alleged insane person, for his benefit, 
 where of small amount, without inquisition or 
 issue; and see Ord. in lunacj' thereunder of 
 7 Nov., 1862, in Elmer's Prac. 363; 8 Jur. 
 N. S. Pt. II. 513. See Ex parte Adams, 4 
 De G. J. & S. 182; 10 Jur. N. S. 137, L. C; 
 Re Stables, 4 De G. J. & S. 257; 10 Jur. N. S. 
 245; Re Gibson, L. R. 7 Ch. 52; Re Faircloth, 
 13 Ch. D. 307. In the case of a bill on behalf 
 of a person of weak mind, as in the case of 
 infants and married women, a written authority 
 to use the name of the next friend must be 
 filed with the bill, 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 11. 
 For form see Vol. III. And see Att.-Gen. v. 
 Murray, 13 W. R. 65, V. C. K., ante, pp. 13, 
 n. (4),' 69, n. (6); R. S. C. Ord. XVIII. The 
 next friend of a person of weak mind is, in 
 every respect, in the same position as the next 
 friend of an infant. 
 
 2 Wartnaby v. Wartnaby, Jac 377; Blake 
 v. Smith, Younge, 596 ; Palmer v. Walesby, 
 L. R 3 Ch. 732, L. JJ. , Nurse v. Durnford, 13 
 Ch. D. 764 ; Norcom v. Rogers, 16 N. J. Eq. 48 L 
 
 s Wartnaby r. Wartnaby, Jac. 377 ; Story, 
 Eq. PI. §66 " 
 
 4 For form of summons, see Vol. III. 
 
 57 id. 281; Re Tuer's Will Trusts, 32 Ch. D. 
 39 See Re Darling, 39 Ch. D.208: R< W'hit- 
 aker, 42 Ch. D 119. Where an Englishman 
 resident in France was there found to be of 
 unsound mind, Malius V. C. held that his 
 
 84 
 
 French committee, who applied for transfer to 
 him of a fund in Court belonging to the lunatic, 
 was entitled to receive the dividends only. Re 
 Gamier, 20 W. R. 288.
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. 
 
 87 
 
 should also obtain that of the Lord Chancellor or Lords Justices of 
 Appeal sitting in Lunacy. 5 
 
 * Section VII. — Married Women. 
 
 87 
 
 By marriage, the husband and wife become as one person in law; 
 and upon this union depend all the legal and equitable rights and dis- 
 abilities which either of them acquires or incurs by the intermarriage. 
 One of the consequences of this unity of existence and interest between 
 the husband and wife is, that at Common Law a married woman «an- 
 not, except in the cases mentioned below, during the continuance of her 
 coverture, institute a suit alone; therefore, whenever it is necessary to 
 apply to a judicial tribunal respecting her rights, the proceeding must 
 be commenced and carried on in their joint names. 1 The exceptions to 
 this rule are, when the husband can be considered civiliter mortuus, 
 and when the wife is judicially separated from her husband, or has 
 obtained a protection order; 2 in which cases the wife is looked upon 
 
 5 Ord. 5th Feb., 18G1, r. 24 (7 Jur. N. S. 
 Pt. II. GO); Knatchbull v. Fowle, 1 Cli. D. 004, 
 M R. ; Fryer v. Wiseman, W. N. (187G) 3 ; 24 
 W. R. 205," V. C. H. 
 
 i See Hilton v. Lothrop, 46 Maine, 297 ; 
 Williams v. Coward, 1 Grant (Penn.), 21 ; 
 Bradley v. Emerson, 7 Vt. 369. In Massachu- 
 setts, a married woman may sue and be sued in 
 all matters having relation to her separate 
 property, business, trade, services, labor, and 
 earnings, in the same manner as if she were sole. 
 Pub Stats, c. 147, § 7 ; Conant v. Warren, 6 
 Gray, 5G2. If property belongs to the wife 
 alone, as her sole and separate property, an 
 action respecting it should be in her name alone, 
 and her husband should not be joined. Hen- 
 nessey o White, 2 Allen, 48,49 In Kentucky, 
 a wife may sue alone in an action relating to 
 her separate property. Petty v. Malier, 14 B. 
 Mon. 24G. So in New Hampshire : Jordan v. 
 Cummings, 43 N. II. 134-136, under recent 
 statutes. So by the Code of Procedure in New 
 York ; and when the action is between herself 
 and husband, she may sue or be sued alone. 
 In no case need she prosecute by a guardian or 
 next friend. 2 Kent (11th ed.), 154, note. 
 Under the New York Acts of I860 and 18G2 a 
 married woman, trading on her own account, 
 may be sued alone on a note given by her in 
 the course of her trading. Barton v. Beer, 35 
 Barb. (X. Y.) 7S. Having a perfect capacity 
 to sue, she will be held responsible for the acts 
 of her attorney or solicitor, and for the want of 
 ordinary diligence on her part. Cayce v. 
 Powell. 20 TVxas, 7G7. In Louisiana, in a bill 
 by a wife to be relieved from a mortgage made 
 
 by her, on the ground of her disability to con- 
 tract, her husband may properly be joined with 
 her as prochein ami. Bein v. Heath, G How 
 U. S. 228. A married woman, entitled by law 
 to sue in her own name, may declare without 
 alluding to her husband. Jordan v. Cummings, 
 43 N. H. 134; see Wheaton v. Phillips, 12 N. J. 
 Eq. 221. 
 
 2 20 & 21 Vic. c. 85, §§ 21, 25, 26, 45 ; 21 
 & 22 Vic. c. 108, §§ G-8 ; 27 & 28 Vic. c. 44 , 
 and see 22 & 23 Vie. c. 61, §§ 4, 5 ; 23 & 24 
 Vic. c. 144, § 6; 33 & 34 Vic. c 93; Re Rains- 
 don's Trusts, 4 Drew. 446 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 55 ; 
 Re Kingsley, 26 Beav. 84 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 1010; 
 Cooke v. Fuller, 26 Beav. 99 ; Rudge v. 
 Weedon, 4 De G. & J. 216; 5 Jur. N. S. 380, 
 723; Bathe v. Bank of England, 4 K. & J. 564; 
 4 Jur. N. S. 505 ; Re Whittingham's Trusts, 
 10 Jur. N. S. 818 ; 12 W. R. 775, V. C. W. ; 
 Caldicott b. Baker, 13 W. R. 449, V. C. K. ; 
 Sealey v. Gaston, ib. 577, V. C. W ; Wells v. 
 Malbon, 31 Beav. 48 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 249; Heath 
 v. Lewis, 10 Jur. N. S. 1093: 13 W. R. 128; 
 Prole p. Soady, L. R. 3 Ch. 220 ; Re Insole, 35 
 Beav. 92 : L. R. 1 Eq. 470 ; Pratt v Tenner, 
 L. R. 1 Ch. 493; 12 Jur. N. S. 557; Wilkson r>. 
 Gibson, L R. 4 Eq. 162 ; Botten v. Codd, W. 
 N. (1869) 199 ; Re Coward & Adams, L. R. 
 20 Eq. 179 ; Ewart ». Chubb, id 454 : Rams- 
 d.ii a. Brearley. L. R. 10 Q. B. 147. Nicholson 
 v Drury Estate Buildings Co. 7 Ch D 18; see 
 now Hill r. Cooper, W. N. (1893) 88; [18931 
 2 (}. B. 85. As to what is the wife's separate 
 property, see 33 & 34 Vic. c. 93, §§ 1-5. 7. 8. 
 10 ; Summers v. City Bank. L R. 9 C. P. 580; 
 Morris v. Robinson, 27 W. R. 312. 
 
 85
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 
 as restored to her rights and capacity as a feme sole, and may Sue 
 alone, (a) 
 
 With respect to what is called a civil death in law, Lord Coke says 
 that a deportation forever into a foreign land, like to a profession, 8 is 
 a civil death, and that in such cases the wife may bring an action, or 
 may be impleaded during the natural life of her husband; and so, if by 
 an Act of Parliament the husband be attainted of treason or felony, 
 and is banished forever, this is a civil death, and the wife may sue as 
 
 a feme sole; but if the husband have judgment to be exiled but 
 *88 for a time, which some call a relegation, *this is no civil death. 1 
 
 At Law, also, every person who is attainted by ordinary process 
 of treason or felony, is disabled to bring any action, for he is extra 
 legem positus, and is accounted in law civiliter mortuus; 2 and where 
 the husband is an alien, and has left this kingdom, or has never been 
 
 3 The profession of a person as a nun is 
 no longer a civil death, and does not prevent 
 such person from dealing with property, if 
 otherwise sui juris. Metcalfe's Trusts, 2 De 
 G. J. & S. 122 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 22+, 287 ; Evans 
 v. Cassidy, 11 Irish Eq. 243; Blake v. Blake, 4 
 Irish Eq.*349. 
 
 i Co. Litt. 133 a.; Story, Eq. PI. § 61; 
 Wright v. Wright, 2 Desaus. 244 ; Cornwall v. 
 Hoyt, 7 Conn. 420; Troughton v. Hill, 2 Hayw. 
 406 ; Robinson v. Reynolds, 1 Aiken, 174. 
 
 Mr. Chancellor Kent, 2 Kent (11th ed.), 154, 
 155, in reference to this point, remarks that 
 " Lord Coke seems to put the capacity of the 
 wife to sue as a feme sole upon the ground 
 that the abjuration or banishment of the hus- 
 band amounted to a civil death. But if the 
 husband be banished for a limited time only, 
 
 (a) Under the Married Women's Property 
 Act, 1882 (45 & 4G Vic. c. 75), a married woman 
 may hold her own property separately, and sue 
 and defend like a feme sole, without a next 
 friend, and without joinder of the husband. See 
 also R. S- C. 1883, Ord. XVI. 16; Lowe r. Fox, 
 15 Q. B. D. 667 ; Weldon t\ Winslow, 13 id. 
 784; Conolan v. Leyland, 27 Ch. D. 632 ; Wel- 
 don v. Riviere, 53 L. J. Q. B. 448. This statute 
 is limited to suits relating to herself personally, 
 and does not abrogate the general rule that 
 a married woman cannot act as a next friend 
 or guardian ad litem. Re Duke of Somerset, 
 Thynne v. St. Maur, 34 Ch. D. 465 ; London & 
 County Banking Co. v. Bray, W. N. (1893) 130. 
 As to the effect of a dissolution of marriage on 
 the husband's right to the wife's property, see 
 Bullmore v. Wynter, 22 Ch. D. 619. A divorce 
 decree rusi does not change the wife's status. 
 "Ellis r. Ellis, 8 P. D. 188; Stanhope v. Stanhope, 
 11 P. D. 103 ; Moors r. Moors. 121 Mass 232. 
 As to costs, see Re Peace & Waller, 24 Ch. I). 
 405. As to making the husband a defendant to 
 a suit against his wife, see also Roberts v. Evans, 
 
 86 
 
 though it be no civil death, the better opinion 
 is that the consequences, as to the wife, are the 
 same, and she can sue and be sued as a feme 
 sole." See also Ex parte Franks, 1 M. & Scott, 
 1. In Robinson v. Reynolds, 1 Aiken, 174, this 
 point was considered and the English cases ably 
 reviewed ; but the question was, by this case, 
 still left unsettled, whether transportation or 
 banishment of the husband by law, for a limited 
 time only, would be sufficient to give the wife 
 the capacity to sue and be sued as a feme sole. 
 It seems, however, from the case of Foster v. 
 Everard, Craw. & Dix, 135, that a feme 
 covert, whose husband has been transported for 
 a limited term of years, will not be allowed to 
 sue in Equity as &feme sole. 
 
 2 2 B. &"p. 231 ,• 4 Esp. 27 ; Bac. Ab. tit. 
 Bar. and Feme (M) ; 9 East, 472. 
 
 7 Ch. D. 830 ; Re Thompson, 38 Ch. D. 317. To 
 a suit to foreclose a mortgage made to a married 
 woman, her husband, in whose possession the 
 mortgage is, though he is non-resident and out 
 of the jurisdiction, should be a party. Ruckman 
 v Stephens, 11 Fed. Rep. 793. A husband who 
 joins his wife in an answer to a foreclosure suit, 
 though not made a party, will be bound by the 
 decree. Anderson v. Watts, 138 U. S. 094. In 
 Massachusetts a husband who has no personal 
 interest need not be a party to a bill by his 
 wife relating to her separate estate. Forbes v. 
 Tuckerman, 115 Mass 115; Stat, of 1874, c. 184, 
 § 3. See Mosier r. Beale, 43 Fed. Rep. 358. In 
 California, the husband may properly join as 
 co-plaintiff in a suit to establish a water right 
 belonging to his wife, Spargur v. Heanl, 90 
 Cal. 221. The Federal Courts are not controlled 
 by a State statute which permits a married 
 woman to sue in Equity in her own name. Wills 
 v. Pauly. 51 Fed. Rep. 257. In those Courts, 
 when the wife's separate estate is charged, tho 
 husband is a proper party. United States v. 
 Pratt Coal Co. 18 Fed. Rep. 708.
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. 
 
 89 
 
 in this country, the wife may, during such absence, sue alone, 8 
 although in ordinary cases the absence * of the husband affords * 89 
 no ground for the wife's proceeding separately. 1 
 
 In these respects, Courts of Equity follow the rules of Law. 2 In 
 Equity, however, as well as at Law, the general rule, which requires 
 the husband to be joined in a suit respecting the rights of his wife, 
 prevails, except under particular circumstances, which will be hereafter 
 pointed out: but at Law there exists a distinction between actions for 
 property which has accrued to the wife before marriage, and actions 
 for property which has come to her afterwards, — which distinction does 
 not prevail in Equity; for with respect to such debts and other choses 
 in action as belong to the wife and continue unaltered, since the husband 
 cannot disagree to her interest in them, and as he has only a qualified 
 right to possess them, by reducing them into possession during her life, 
 he is unable to maintain an action for such property without making 
 his wife a party; 3 but for all personal estate which accrues to the wife, 
 
 8 2 Esp. 554, 587 ; 1 B. & P. 357 ; 2 B. & husband was never within the Commonwealth, 
 
 P. 226; 1 Bos. & P. N. R. 80 ; 11 East. 301; 
 3 CamD. 123 ; 5 T. R. 679, G82 ; 8 T. R. 545 ; 
 Stephenson v. Strutt, W. N. (1872) 137, 20 
 W. R. 745 ; see Norman v. Villars, 2 Ex. D. 
 359; Munt v. Glynes, 20 W R.823; Gregorys. 
 Paul, 15 Mass. 31; Jordan v. Cummings, 43 N. 
 H. 134. Where the husband had never been 
 in the United States, and had deserted his wife 
 in a foreign country, and she came here and 
 maintained herself as a. feme sole, she was held 
 entitled to sue and be sued as a feme sole. 
 Gregory v. Paul, 15 Mass. 31, 35, n. a, and 
 cases cited. So where the husband, a citizen of 
 and a resident in another of the United States, 
 compelled his wife to leave him without pro- 
 viding any means for her support, and she 
 came into Massachusetts and maintained her- 
 self there, for more than twenty years, as a 
 single woman, sh* was held entitled to sue as 
 a feme sole. Abbot v. Bayley, 6 Pick. 89. 
 The principle of the above decisions has been 
 extended still further by the Gen. Stats, of 
 Mass c. 108, § 29 and c.'l09, §§ 31, 32 ; Pub. 
 Stats, c. 147, §§ 7, 29. See Story, Eq. PI. § 61, 
 and note to this point ; 2 Kent, 155. In Beane 
 v. Morgan, 4 M'Cord, 148, S. C. 1 Hill, 8, it 
 was held that if the husband leave the State, 
 without the intention of returning, the wife is 
 competent to contract, to sue and be sued, as if 
 she were a fern e sole. See Valentine v. Ford, 
 2 Browne, 193 ; Robinson r. Reynolds, 1 
 Aiken, 174 ; Troughton v. Hill, 2 Ilayw. 406 ; 
 Rhea v. Rhenner, 1 Peters, 105 ; Edwards v. 
 Davies, 16 John. 286 ; Moore v. Stevenson, 27 
 Conn. 14 ; Yeatman v. Bellmain, 1 Tenn. Ch. 
 589. In Gregory v Pierce, 4 Met. 478. Shaw 
 C. J. observed that " the principle is now to 
 be considered as established in this State, as 
 a necessary exception to the rule of the Common 
 Law placing a married woman under disability 
 to contract or maintain a suit, that where the 
 
 or has gone beyond its jurisdiction, has wholly 
 renounced his marital rights and duties, and 
 deserted his wife, she may make and take con- 
 tracts, and sue and be sued in her own name as 
 a feme sole. It is an application of an old rule 
 of the Common Law, which took away the dis- 
 ability of coverture when the husband was ex- 
 iled or had abjured the realm. Gregory v. 
 Paul, 15 Mass. 31 ; Abbot r. Bayley, 6 Pick. 
 89. In the latter case, it was held, that, in this 
 respect, the residence of the husband in another 
 State of these United States, was equivalent to 
 a residence in any foreign State ; he being 
 equally beyond the operation of the laws of the 
 Commonwealth and the jurisdiction of its 
 Courts. But to accomplish this change in the 
 civil relations of the wife, the desertion by the 
 husband must be absolute and complete ; it 
 must be a voluntary separation from and aban- 
 donment of the wife, embracing both the fact 
 and the intent of the husband to renounce de 
 facto, and as far as he can do it, the marital 
 relation, and leave his wife to act as a feme sole. 
 Such is the renunciation, coupled with a con- 
 tinued absence in a foreign State or country, 
 which is held to operate as an abjuration of the 
 realm." 
 
 A wife, who is divorced a mensa et thoro, 
 may sue as ajeme sole on causes of action aris- 
 ing after the divorce. Dean v. Richmond, 5 
 Pick. 461 ; Pierce v. Burnham, 4 Met. 303; see 
 2 Kent. 156. 
 
 i 11 East, 301; Du Wahl v. Braunc, 1 IT. & 
 M. 178; 4 W. R. 646. 
 
 2 See Ld. Red. 28; Story, Eq. PI. § 61 . Poop. 
 Eq. PI. 30; Calvert on Parties, 414; Countess 
 of Portland v. Prodgers, 2 Vein. 104; I Eq. < 'as. 
 Ab. 171, pi. 1; Newsome v. Bowyer, 3 1'. Wins. 
 37. 
 
 8 1 Bright, H. & W. 63, and the cases there 
 cited, notis. In Clapp v. Stoughton, 10 Pick. 
 
 87
 
 90 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 or to the husband and wife jointly, during marriage, and for all cove- 
 nants made or entered into with them during that period, the husband 
 may, at Law, commence proceedings in his own name; because the 
 right of action having accrued after marriage, the husband may dis- 
 agree as to his wife's interest, and make his own absolute : an intention 
 to do which he manifests in bringing an action in his own name, when 
 it might have been commenced in the name of both of them; 4 and in 
 such case it has been held, that if the husband recover a judgment for 
 a debt due to the wife, and die before execution, his personal represen- 
 tative will be entitled to the benefit of it, and not the wife. 5 
 * 90 * The distinction above pointed out does not, however, a*s has 
 been stated, exist in Courts of Equity, where it seems necessary 
 that in all cases in which the husband seeks to recover the property of 
 the wife, he should make her a party co-plaintiff with himself, whether 
 the right to the property accrued before or after marriage. 1 («) 
 
 Where a married woman sues as personal representative, the husband 
 ought to be joined as co-plaintiff with her; and if the objection is not 
 made until the hearing, the Court will allow the bill to be amended by 
 making husband and wife co-plaintiffs. 2 
 
 4", it was remarked by Mr. Justice AVilde: "I 
 think the true rule is, that in all cases where 
 the cause of action survives to the wife the 
 husband and wife must join, and he cannot sue 
 alone. This rule will go farther than any 
 other to reconcile all the cases. In all actions 
 for choses in action due to the wife before mar- 
 riage, the husband and wife must join; and 
 among all the conflicting cases, I apprehend 
 not one can be found in which it was held that 
 the husband could sue alone, where the cause 
 of action would clearly survive to the wife." 
 See Morse v. Earl, 13 Wend. 271; Bryant 
 v. Puckett, 3 Hayw. 252 
 
 4 Ibid. 62; and see Add. Cont. 7G1. 
 
 5 Oglanderp. Baston, 1 Vern. 396; Garforth 
 r. Bradley, 2 Yes. Sr. 675, 677. See Fleet v. 
 Pernns, L. R. 4 Q. B. 500; 3 id. 536. 
 
 1 See Cherry v. Belcher, 5 S'ew. & P. 133; 
 Tribble r. Tribble, 5 J. J. Marsh. 180; Brad- 
 ley v. Emerson, 7 Yt. 369. Thus, where a 
 legacy was given to a woman whilst she was 
 covert, and the husband, without her, exhibited 
 a bill for it, to which the defendant demurred, 
 on the ground that the wife ought to have been 
 joined in the suit, the demurrer was allowed. 
 Clearke v. Lord Angier, Freeman, 160; S. C 
 nom. Gierke v. Lord Anglesey, Nels. 78; see 
 also Blount v. Bestland, 5 Ves. 515; Anon. 1 
 Atk. 491; Meales v. Meales, 5 Yes. 517, n.; 
 Carr v. Taylor, 10 Yes. 574, 579; Chase v. 
 Palmer, 25 Maine, 348. In such case the hus- 
 
 (a) When a husband is indebted to a testator 
 whose will bequeaths property to his wife, the 
 wife's equity to a settlement is prior to the 
 right of retainer bv the executors for the hus- 
 
 88 
 
 ban! and wife are necessary parties. Schuyler 
 v. Hoyle, 5 John. Ch. 196;" Oldham v. Collins, 
 4 J. J. Marsh. 50; Foster v. Hall, 2 id. 546; 
 Griffith v. Coleman. 5 id. 600; Pyle r. Cravens, 
 4 Litt. 18. In the case of Goddard r. Johnson, 
 14 Pick. 352, at Law, it was decided that a hus- 
 band may sue in his own right, after the death 
 of his wife, for a legacy accruing to the wife 
 during the coverture. In this case the Court 
 said : " We think the husband might have sued 
 alone, had the wife been still living, and con- 
 sequently that this action may be sustained. It 
 is a well settled principle that a chose in action 
 accruing to the wife during coverture vests 
 absolutely in the husband." In Hapgood v. 
 Houghton, 22 Pick. 480, the Court cm firmed 
 the above decision. See Sawyer r. Baldwin, 
 20 Pick. 378; Davis v. Newton, 6 Met. 543-545; 
 Allen 17. Wilkins, 3 Allen, 322, 323, Stevens v. 
 Beals. 10 Ciish. 291, Albee v. Carpenter, 12 
 Cush 382; Jones v Richardson, 5 .Met. 249, 
 per Shaw C. J. 
 
 The subject of the husband's right to a legacy 
 bequeathed to his wife, or to a distributive share 
 in an estate in which she is interested, is fully 
 considered, and the authorities collected, in 
 Blount v. Bestland, 5 Sumner's Yes. 515, Per- 
 kins's note (a); Carr v. Taylor, 10 id 574, 
 Perkins's note (c). 
 
 2 Burdick v. Garrick, L. R. 5 Ch. 233. But 
 see now the Married Women's Property Act, 
 1882 (45 & 46 Vic c. 75, § 18). 
 
 band's debt. In re Briant, Poulter r Shackel, 
 39 Ch. D 471, following Carr v. Taylor, supra; 
 In re Batchelor, L. R. 16 Eq. 481.
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. 
 
 90 
 
 The ground upon which Courts of Equity require the wife to be 
 joined as co-plaintiff with her husband in suits relating to her own 
 property, is the parental care which such Courts exercise over those 
 individuals who are not in a situation to take care of their own rights; 
 and as it is presumed that a father would not marry his daughter with- 
 out insisting upon some settlement upon her, so those Courts, standing 
 in loco //ore i/f is, will not suffer the husband to take a wife's portion, 
 until he has agreed to make a reasonable provision for her, 3 or until 
 
 3 Per Lord Hardwicke, in Jewson r. Moul- 
 son, 2 Atk. 41!t. This point is very fully con- 
 sidered in 2 Kent, 138, et seq. If Ihe husband 
 wants the aid of Chancery to get possession of 
 his wife's property, or if her property be within 
 the reach of the Court, he must do what is equi- 
 table by making a reasonable provision out of 
 it for the maintenance of her and her children. 
 Whether the suit for the wife's debt, legacy, or 
 portion, be by the husband or his assignees, the 
 result is the same, and a proper settlement on 
 the wife must first be made of a proportion of 
 the property. Ibid. ; Howard v. Moffatt, 2 John. 
 Ch. 206; Duvall V. Farmers' Bank, 4 Gill & J. 
 282; Whitesides v. Dorris, 7 Dana, 106 ; Dumond 
 r. Magee, 4 John. Ch. -318; Kenney v. Udall, 
 5 John. Ch. 404; Haviland v. Bloom, 6 John. 
 Ch. 178; Mumford v. Murray, 1 Paige, 620; 
 Fabre v. Colden, 1 Paige, 166; Tucker v. An- 
 drews, 13 Maine, 124; Glen v. Fisher, 6 John. 
 Ch. 33: Cape v. Adams, 1 Desaus. 567; Heath 
 V. Heath, 2 Hill, Ch. 104; Rees v. Waters, 9 
 Watts, 90; Myers v. Myers, 1 Bailey, Eq. 24; 
 Helm v. Franciscus, 2 Bland, 545; Tevis v. 
 Richardson, 7 Monroe, 660; Poindexter v. Jeff- 
 ries, 15 Gratt. 363. It has, at length, become 
 the settled rule of the Courts of Equity in New 
 York, that they will interfere, and restrain a 
 husband from recovering at Law his wife's 
 property, until he makes a provision for her. 
 Fry v. Fry. 7 Paige, 462; Martin v. Martin, 1 
 Hoff. Ch.462; Udall v. Kenney, 3 Cowen, 500. 
 Chancery will interfere in such case, on a bill 
 filed by or on behalf of the wife, Van Epps v. 
 Van Deusen, 4 Paige, 64; or on a petition, 
 Davis v. Newton, 6 Met. 543. 
 
 The result of the cases seems to be, that 
 whenever the interests of a married woman are 
 brought before the Court, in opposition to the 
 claims of her husband, they will be attended 
 to, whoever the person applying to the Court 
 may be. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1414; Van Duzen 
 V. Van Duzen, 6 Paige, 360; Davis v. Newton, 
 
 Met. 543, 544. Sec a discussion on this sub- 
 ject of sett! ■ 1 1 1 . • 1 1 1 in such ca^es, in Parsons V. 
 Par- ons, 9 X. II. 300. 320, et seq. 
 
 In some of the States the power of afford- 
 ing such protection to the wife does not exist. 
 Parsons v. Parsons, 9 N. H. 309, 320, et seq.; 
 Yoke v. Barnet, 1 Binney, 358; Matter of Miller, 
 
 1 Ash. 323. In Sawyer v. Baldwin, 20 Pick. 
 387, in reference to securing a provision for the 
 
 wife in such cases, the Court remark, that the 
 " practice prevails to some extent in New York, 
 but is repudiated in other States. It would 
 seem to be repugnant to what we deem the 
 legal rights of the husband, and would never 
 be carried so far here as it has been in Eng- 
 land." But in Davis v. Newton, 6 Met. 543, 
 speaking of the wife's right to a suitable allow- 
 ance in such cases, the Court remark, that it 
 " is an equity which Courts will uphold in all 
 cases where the husband, his creditors, or his 
 assignees have occasion to come into Court to 
 obtain possession of the property, and wherever 
 a Court of Equity can, in any form, exercise 
 jurisdiction over the subject." "The authority 
 of the Court to make such allowance is a well- 
 established principle of Equity, and has been 
 recognized by this Court." Per Shaw C. J. in 
 Gardner v. Hooper, 3 Gray, 398, 404; see Gas- 
 sett v. Grout, 4 Met. 488. 
 
 Mr. Chancellor Kent, 2 Kent, 141, 142, re- 
 marks that, "though such a protection cannot 
 be afforded to the wife in Pennsylvania, where 
 there is no Court of Chancery, nor in New 
 Hampshire, where Equity powers, to a specific 
 extent only, are conferred by Statute upon the 
 Supreme Court of Common-Law jurisdiction; 
 yet I presume that it exists in must of the other 
 States where Courts are established with dis- 
 tinct Equity powers, according to the English 
 system, or with legal and equitable powers 
 united, according to the more general prevail- 
 ing practice in the L T nited States. It exists in 
 Georgia, Maryland, and Tennessee, anil in the 
 latter State protection is even afforded in their 
 Courts of Law. Corley v. Corley, 22 Ga. 178; 
 M'EIhattan v. Howell, 4 Ilayw. 10: Phillips v. 
 Hassell, 10 Humph. 107; Duvall v. Farmer.-' 
 Bank of Maryland. 4 Gill & J. 282." So in 
 Maine. Tucker v. Andrews, 13 Maine, 124. 
 For other States, see Heath v. Heath, 2 Hill, Ch. 
 104; Myers v. Myers, 1 Bailey, Eq. 24; Helm v. 
 Franciscus, 2 Bland, 545; Tevis v. Richardson, 
 7 Monroe, 660; Durr v. Bowyer, 2 M'Cord, 368; 
 Argenbright v Campbell, 3 Hen. & M. 144- 
 In North Carolina, if the aid of a Court of 
 Equity is required by the husband to enable 
 him to take possession of his wife's property. 
 he must make reasonable provision for her. 
 But in that State the wife cannot, by a suit in 
 Equity, stop him, though he be insolvent, from 
 taking possession, unless her claim be founded 
 
 89
 
 *92 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 * 91 they have given the wife an * opportunity of making her election, 
 whether the property shall go to her husband, or shall be made 
 the subject of a settlement upon her and her children. 
 
 This right of a wife is termed her equity to a settlement; and it 
 attaches whenever proceedings are pending in the Court of Chancery, 1 
 with reference to her personal property, 2 or her equitable interest 
 in real estate, 3 except as against the particular assignee of 
 *92 * her life-estate, 1 or her own creditors at the time of her mar- 
 riage. 2 She may herself institute proceedings for the purpose 
 of raising her equity; 8 and it may be enforced as soon as the property to 
 which she is entitled is actually in possession, though not actually dis- 
 tributable. 4 The right attaches to the wife's life-interest, subject to 
 the above-mentioned exception ; 6 but not to the arrears of the income of 
 real or leasehold property which her husband has assigned to a particu- 
 lar assignee. 6 It does not attach to property in which the wife and 
 husband have a joint interest, 7 or to property which he takes as an 
 executor and not by virtue of his marital right, though the wife takes 
 a share of the residue under the will. 8 
 
 The right of a married woman to have a settlement made upon her- 
 self and her children is totally distinct from her right by survivorship 
 to such of her choses in action as have not been reduced into possession 
 during the joint lives of herself and husband. The right by survivor- 
 ship is a legal right, applying equally to her legal and equitable inter- 
 
 
 upon a marriage settlement. Bryan v. Bryan, 
 1 Dtv. Eq. 47; Allen v. Allen, 6 Ired. Eq. 293. 
 The wife's equity extends as well to real as 
 to personal property. Moore v. Moore, 14 B. 
 Mon. 259. In this last case it was allowed to 
 her out of the proceeds of lands which de- 
 scended to her during coverture; and she was 
 permitted to assert this right by original bill. 
 Where a wife joined her husband in the con- 
 veyance of lands, and the husband became in- 
 solvent before the price was paid, a suitable 
 settlement was decreed to her out of the price. 
 Lav v. Brown, 13 B. Mon. 295. 
 
 1 See Sup. Ct. of Jud. Act, 1873 (36 & 37 
 Vic. c. 66, § 24). 
 
 2 Even where the fund is not in Court, see 
 Henry v. Ogle, 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 447. 
 
 3 Sturgis v. Champneys, 5 M. & C. 97 ; 
 Hanson v. Keating, 4 Hare, 1; Wortham v. 
 Pcmberton, 1 De G. & S. 644; Barnes v. Rob- 
 inson, 9 Jur. N. S. 245; 11 W. R. 276, V. C. S.; 
 but see Gleaves v. Payne, 1 De G. J. & S. 87. 
 In Smith v. Matthews, 3 De G. F. & J. 139, it 
 was hell that the possible estate by curtesy of 
 the husband cnuld not be interfered with. 
 
 i Tidd r. Lister, 3 De G. M. & G. 857, 861, 
 869; 10 Hare, 140; 18 Jur. 543: and see Dur- 
 ham v. Crackles, 8 Jur. N. S. 1174, V. C. W. 
 
 2 Barnard v. Ford, Carrick r. Ford, L. R. 
 4 Ch. 247. 
 
 3 Ladv Elibank v. Montolieu, 5 Ves. 737; 
 1 Wh. & T. L. Cas. (6th ed.) 486; and cases 
 
 90 
 
 collected in Bosvil v. Brander, 1 P. Wms. 459; 
 Duncombe v. Greenacre, 2 De G. F. & J. 509; 
 7 Jur. N. S. 175; Postgate v. Barnes, 9 Jur. 
 N. S. 456; 11 W. R 356, V. C. S.; Barnes v. 
 Robinson, 9 Jur. N. S. 245; 11 W. R. 276, V. 
 C. S.; Sotheran v. Smear, W. N. (1858) 296; 
 Ruffles o. Alston, L. R. 19 Eq. 539, V. C. M.; 
 and see Giacometti v. Prodgers, L. R. 14 Eq. 
 253, V. C. M. L. R.; Nicholson v. Carline, 22 
 W. R. 819; 8Ch. 338. 
 
 * Re Robinson, Robinson v. Robinson, 12 
 Ch. D. 188, V. C. H.; and see Jewson v. Moul- 
 son, 2 Atk. 419; De La Garde v. Lempriere, 6 
 Beav. 344; Osborne v. Morgan, 9 Hare, 432; 
 Wallace v. Auldjo, 1 Dr. & Sm. 216; 9 Jur. 
 N. S. 687; 2 N. R. 567, L. JJ. ; 1 De G. J. & 
 S. 643. 
 
 5 Sturgis v. Champneys, 5 M. & C. 97; Wil- 
 kinson v. Charlesworth, 10 Beav. 324. See 
 Taunton v. Morris, 8 Ch. D. 453; 11 id. 779, 
 where the rule was applied, and the whole estate 
 was settled on the wife. But see Shillito v. 
 Collett, 7 Jur. N. S. 385, where V. C. Kinders- 
 ley held that an annuity given to a married 
 woman by will might be paid to her husband 
 without her consent in Court. 
 
 6 Re Carr, L. R. 12 Eq. 609. V. C M. 
 
 i Ward b. Ward, 14 Ch. D. 506, M. R. ; Re 
 Brvan, Godfrey r. Bryan, id. 516, V. C. M. 
 
 "s Knight v. Knight, L. R. 18 Eq. 487, V. C. 
 H. See In re Briant, Poulter v. Shackel, 39 
 Ch. D. 471, 481.
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. * 93 
 
 est; but her right to a settlement depends upon the peculiar rule of 
 Courts of Equity before alluded to, which, standing in loco parentis 
 with regard to a feme covert, will not suffer the husband to take the 
 wife's portion until he has agreed to make a reasonable provision for 
 her and her children, unless they are satisfied that it is with her free 
 consent that it is paid over to him. 9 This rule of Equity has been 
 recognized and acted upon from a very early period, 10 and was acknowl- 
 edged and followed, even where a wife has had a demand in her own 
 right, and application was made to a Court of Equity to enforce it. 11 
 Where, however, the demand is not one which accrues to the husband 
 in right of his wife, although he may be entitled to it under a contract 
 made upon his marriage, yet if he alone has the right to sue for it, the 
 equity of the wife to a settlement will not attach; 12 and when she has 
 been guilty of a fraud, she will not be permitted to set up her equity 
 to a settlement as against a purchaser. 13 
 
 *In order to ascertain whether the married woman waives her *93 
 equity to a settlement, and consents to her husband taking the 
 property, the practice of the Court is, when she is resident in London, 
 or is willing to attend, for the Judge to examine her apart from her 
 husband, at the time of pronouncing the decree or order disposing of 
 the fund ; 1 in which case a note of the examination is made by the 
 Registrar in Court, and is embodied in the decree or order. If the 
 married woman is unable or unwilling to attend the Court, owing to 
 her residence in the country or other cause, her examination may be 
 taken by commissioners, under an order specially appointing them for 
 this purpose. 2 Such order may be made in various forms, and at dif- 
 ferent stages of the proceedings. Thus, where, on pronouncing the 
 decree or order dealing with the fund, it is suggested by counsel that 
 an immediate examination of the wife by commissioners is intended, 
 the Court, to save expense, will sometimes direct the fund to be carried 
 over to the separate account of the wife, and by the same order appoint 
 the commissioners, reserving liberty to apply; in which case, on com- 
 pletion of the examination, an application for payment out of the fund 
 may be made by petition, 8 or, in cases where there is jurisdiction at 
 chambers, by summons. 4 Or the Court will direct the drawing up of the 
 decree or order to be suspended for a few days, to afford an opportunity 
 of taking the examination in the interval : in the latter case, an ex 
 parte summons 5 is thereupon taken out for an order to appoint the 
 
 9 Jewson v. Moulson, 2 Atk. 410. row v. Manning, W. N. (1878) 122, V. C. II.; 
 
 1° Tanfield v. Davenport, Tothill, 114; and Cahill v. Cahill, 8 App. Cas. 420. 
 see 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 581, 596. i On this subject sec 2 Seton, 661-680; 1 
 
 11 .lewson v. Moulson, 2 Atk. 419; Milner v. Bright's II. & W. 88 ; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1418, 
 Colmer, 2 P. Wras. 641; Adams v. Peirce, 3 P. and cases cited; Ward v. Amory, 1 Curtis, 419, 
 Wins. 11; Brown v. Elton, Lb. 202; Harrison ?•. 432; Campbell v. Harding, 6 Sim. 283 ; Sperl- 
 Buckie, 1 Stra. 239; Winch v. Page, P.unb. 86; ing v. Rochfort, 8 Sumner's Yes. 175, note; 
 Middlecome v. Marlow, 2 Atk. 519. Binford ». Bawden, 1 id. 512, and note (a) and 
 
 12 Brooke v. Hiekes, 12 W. R. 703, V. C. S.; cases cited ; 2 id. 38. 
 
 and see Brett v. Forcer, 3 Atk, 403. For case 2 See form, Seton, 658, No. 4. 
 
 of a legacy given to husband and wife jointly, 8 For form, see Vol. HI. 
 
 see Atcheson v. Atcheson, 11 Bcav. 485, 488. 4 Ibid. 
 
 18 Me Lush's Trusts, L. R. 4 Ch. 691: Bar- 6 ibid. 
 
 91
 
 * 94 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 commissioners; and when the examination has been completed, the 
 matter is mentioned again to the Court, and the decree or order is 
 directed to be drawn up, embodying therein the result of the 
 examination. 
 
 Where, in any case, a fund has been carried over to the wife's sepa- 
 rate account, an application to deal with it may be made by petition; ° 
 or, where there is jurisdiction at chambers, by summons. 7 When made 
 by petition, the usual course is to get the petition answered for a day 
 sufficiently distant to allow of the examination being taken in 
 
 * 94 the mean time; on the petition being thus answered, * an ex parte 
 
 summons 1 is taken out at chambers for an order to appoint the 
 commissioners, and the examination is taken thereon before the peti- 
 tion is heard. If the petition, in any case, is brought on before the 
 wife is examined, an order to examine her will be made, and the peti- 
 tion will be ordered to stand over till the return thereto; 2 after such 
 return, the petition will be placed in the paper and disposed of. 
 
 If the application for payment out is made by summons, evidence 
 of the title to the fund should be adduced on the hearing, and the sum- 
 mons will be adjourned till after the examination; to procure which, a 
 summons 3 is next taken out for an order to appoint commissioners; 
 and when the examination has been perfected, the summons to pay out 
 is brought on again, and an order made. The married woman may, 
 however, attend for examination by the judge at chambers, on the sum- 
 mons to pay out the fund, so as to save the expense of an examination 
 by commissioners. 4 
 
 It is usual, but not essential, to appoint professional persons as com- 
 missioners; and they must not be concerned for the husband in the 
 matter to which the examination relates, and an affidavit as to this fact 
 is required; but it does not appear to be the practice to require an 
 affidavit of their fitness, unless, perhaps, where they are to act abroad, 
 and do not seem, by their descriptions, to be legal practitioners or public 
 functionaries. Three or four persons are ordinarily appointed, two of 
 whom may, and usually do, act without the rest. An examination by 
 one commissioner only is not deemed sufficient. 
 
 The married woman, on attending the commissioners, is examined by 
 them secretly and apart from her husband, 5 to whom, in what manner, 
 and for what purpose she is willing and desirous that the fund should 
 be disposed of; they read over to her the order under which the exami- 
 nation is taken, and explain to her its purport; the examination is 
 taken in writing, and is signed by her; a certificate of the examination, 
 written at the foot thereof, is then signed by the commissioners; an 
 
 6 For form, see Vol. III. nation of married women in cases occurring 
 
 1 Ibid. Sometimes liberty to apply at cham- in the Judge's chambers. For form of order, 
 
 bers is expressly given by the order directing where the examination is taken at chambers, 
 
 the carrying over of the fund; Re Flotchkiss, see 2 Seton, 601, No. 3. 
 
 L. R. 8 Eq. 043,650, V. C. J. 5 The husband, or his solicitor, or any per- 
 
 1 For form, see Vol. III. son connected with them, should not be present 
 
 2 See form of order, 2 Seton, 662, No. 4. at this examination; see Re Bendyshe, 3 Jur. 
 
 3 For form, see Vol. III. N. S. 727; 5 W. R. 816, V. C. K.; Re Lewis, 
 * The Chief Clerks have been authorized by 24 W. R. 103, V. C. H. 
 
 the Judges to take, and do take, the exami- 
 
 92
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. * 95 
 
 aclffiavit verifying all the signatures is made; and the examination, 
 certificate, and affidavit 6 are filed at the Record and Writ Clerks' 
 Office, 7 whence office copies are procured. 
 
 Where the married woman is abroad, an order will be made 
 * appointing commissioners resident there; 1 and the mode of *95 
 taking and authenticating an examination out of the British 
 dominions is exemplified by the following case. In Minet v. J/ ;/</<■,- 
 the order was, that she should appear before some of the plaintiffs, and 
 a magistrate of Leyden, to be privately examined as to her consent; 
 such examination to be in writing, in the French or German language, 
 and to be signed by her, and attested by notaries public, whose cer- 
 tificate thereof was also to be in writing, either in the French or Ger- 
 man language. It was also ordered, that such signing and certificate 
 should be verified by the affidavit of some credible witnesses, either in 
 the German or French language, before a proper magistrate of Leyden; 
 and that the examination, certificate, and affidavit should be translated 
 into English by certain notaries public, sworn to the truth of their 
 translation. 8 
 
 Where, however, the wife is domiciled abroad, and in a country by 
 the law of which there is no equity to a settlement, but the whole is 
 payable to the husband, her consent is not necessary; 4 but that the law 
 is so, must be proved as a fact in each case. 5 Where a married woman 
 was resident abroad, a sum exceeding £200, to which she was entitled, 
 was ordered to be paid to her attorney, who was authorized under a 
 power executed by her and her husband to receive it for her separate 
 use. 6 
 
 Before a fund belonging to a married woman will be paid out of 
 Court, 7 an affidavit is required to be made by the husband and wife, 
 that no settlement, or agreement for a settlement, has been made; or, 
 if there is any settlement or agreement, then an affidavit by them 
 identifying the instrument, and stating that there is no other; 8 and 
 
 6 For forms, see Vol. III.; and see Re Tas- and the Court will direct a settlement. In re 
 burgh, 1 V. & 13. 507. Tweedale'a Settlement, John. 109. 
 
 7 Now, at the Central Office of the Supreme 5 M'Cormick v. Garnett, ubi supra. In 
 Court of Judicature. Sutherland v. Young, 5 L. T. N. S. 738, M. R , 
 
 1 Parsons o. Dunne, 2 Ves. Sr. 60; Bourdil- legacies of £250 each to a Frenchman's daugb- 
 lon f. Adair, 3 Bro. C. C. 237 ; Gibbons v. ters, married to French subjects, were ordered 
 Kibbey, 7 Jur. N. S. 1298; 10 W. R. 55, V. to be paid to the wives. 
 
 C. K.; Wedderburn v. Wedderburn, M. R. in 6 Alien v. Forbes, 4 L. J. Ch. 530, M. R. 
 
 Chamb. 5 Aug., 186-1; Ireland v. Trembath, 13 7 See Hough v. Kyley, 2 Cox, 157; Elring- 
 
 L. T. N. S. 626, V. C. S. ton v. Elrington, 4 Drew". 545. 
 
 2 2 Bro. C. C. 663. 8 For forms see Vol. III. ; Britten v. Briiten, 
 
 8 2 Bro. C. C. ed. Belt, p. 662, n. 1 ; see also 9 Beav. 143. When the joint affidavit cannot be 
 Parsons v. Dunne, Belt's Sup. to Ves. Sr. 276. obtained, as where both husband and wife 
 
 4 Campbell v. French, 3 Ves. 321; Dues v. refused to join in an affidavit in favor of an 
 
 Smith, Jac. 544; Anstruther v. Adair, 2 M. assignee, the Court has been satisfied with other 
 
 & K. 513; Hitchcock v. Clendinen, 12 Beav. evidence. Rowland v. Oakley. 14 Jur. 845, 
 
 534: M'Cormick v. Garnett, 5 De G. M. & G. V. C. K. B.: Anon 3 Jur. X. S. 839, V. ('. W. 
 
 278; 18 Jur. 412; Re Swift, W. N. (1872) 192, The fund will be paid out upon affidavit of the 
 
 V. CM, where the married woman was domi- wife alone, and other affidavits showing that 
 
 ciled in Australia; see, however, Schwabacher the husband is resident abroad and refused to 
 
 v. Becker, 2 Sm. & G. App. 4; but if the feme join, or that there was difficulty in procuring 
 
 covert is a ward of Court, the case is different, the usual joint affidavit. Elliott v. Remington, 
 
 93
 
 *96 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 the instrument must be produced. 9 Where produced in Court, the 
 counsel of the husband and wife certifies that he has carefully perused 
 it, and that the fund in question is not affected thereby ; 10 but where 
 produced in chambers, an affidavit by their solicitor to the like effect is 
 required. 11 On an application for an order to examine the wife, unless 
 the affidavit of no settlement be produced, the order will direct 
 *96 that it be made before the * examination is taken: 1 in which 
 case it is usual to swear the affidavit before one of the com- 
 missioners appointed by the order, if he is competent to administer an 
 oath. Where the marriage is not otherwise proved, the affidavit should 
 state the time and place of the marriage, and a certificate thereof should 
 be exhibited. 2 
 
 As a general rule, the examination of the wife will not be taken by 
 the Court until the amount of the fund is clearly ascertained, 3 except 
 where it is subject only to a deduction for costs; 4 but her consent has 
 been taken as to the part ascertained from time to time. 5 Formerly it 
 was not the practice of the Court to direct a fund belonging to a married 
 woman to be paid out of Court at the hearing of the cause; 6 but it was 
 directed to be transferred to a separate account, usually entitled the 
 account of the husband and wife; and after such transfer, a petition 
 was presented for payment out of Court of the money so transferred. 7 
 Later, by statute, where the wife appeared in Court and consented, the 
 fund might be directed to be paid out at the hearing of the cause, or 
 on further consideration. 8 
 
 If the wife be not of full age, she is incapable of giving her consent; 
 in that case, therefore, the Court will not examine her, but will require 
 the husband, in case he applies to the Court for her equitable property, 
 to make a proper settlement upon her. 9 If the wife is of age, and per- 
 sists in giving her consent, and waiving her equity to a settlement, it 
 appears that the Court cannot refuse to act in accordance with her 
 
 9 Sim. 502; Wilkinson v. Schneider, L. R. 9 
 Eq. 423. See Whiting v. Bassett, L. R. 14 Eq. 
 70, V. C. W.; Woodward v. Pratt, L. R. 16 
 Eq. 127, V. C. M. As to the affidavit required 
 where the wife was dead, and an affidavit of no 
 settlement could not be obtained, see Clarke v. 
 Woodward, 25 Beav. 455. Where the settle- 
 ment was Scotch, the Court required the affi- 
 davit of a Scotch advocate that it did not affect 
 the fund. Re Todd, Shand v. Kidd, 19 Beav. 
 582. The affidavit has been dispensed with 
 where the sum was under £10. Veal v- Veal, 
 L. R. 4 Eq. 115, M. R. 
 
 9 Rose v. Rolls, 1 Beav. 270. 
 
 io Britten v. Britten, 9 Beav. 143, 144; and 
 see Hamilton v. Arrowsmith, W. N. (1877) 
 261, V. C. H. 
 
 11 For form, see Vol. III. 
 i See form of order, 2 Seton, 662, No. 4. 
 The V. C. Kindersley requires the affidavit to 
 be produced before the order to examine is 
 made. Seton, 663. 
 
 2 See form of affidavit in Vol. III. 
 
 94 
 
 3 Sperling v. Rochfort, 8 Ves 164, 178; 
 Woollands v. Crowther. 12 Ves. 174, 178; 
 Jernegan v. Baxter, 6 Mad 32 ; Moss v. Dunlop, 
 8 W. R. 39, V. C. W.; S. C. nom. Anon. 
 5 Jur. N. S. 1124. 
 
 4 Packer v. Packer, 1 Coll. 92 ; Musgrove v. 
 Flood. 1 Jur. N. S. 1086, V. C. W. ; Roberts 
 v. Collett, 1 Sm. & G 138. 
 
 s Powell v. Merrett, 2 Seton, 668. 
 
 6 Campbell v. Harding, 6 Sim. 283. 
 
 7 Ibid 
 
 8 13 & 14 Vic. c 35, § 28 ; and see ante, p. 93. 
 
 9 Stubbs v. Sargon, 2 Beav. 496; Abraham 
 v. Newcombe, 12 Sim. 566; In re D'Angibau, 
 Andrews v. Andrews, 15 Ch. 228; Re Cardross, 
 7 Ch. D. 728 ; Postell v. Skirving, 1 Des. 158; 
 Cheathem v. Huff, 2 Tenn. Ch. 616. As to 
 the course where the wife is non compos, see 
 Caldecott v. Harrison, 2 Seton, 670. In Ship- 
 way v. Ball, 16 Ch. D 376, V. C. M., the 
 income was ordered to be paid to the infant 
 married woman on her separate receipt until 
 further order.
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. * 97 
 
 wish. 10 In Ex parte Higham, 11 however, Lord Hardwicke considered 
 himself entitled to object to the whole fund being paid over to the hus- 
 band, who was in trade, even though the wife consented; but in the 
 previous case of Willats v. Cay, 12 where the wife had appeared in 
 Court, and being examined desired that the whole money might be paid 
 to her husband, the Master of the Rolls, although the parties had mar- 
 ried without the consent of the wife's relations, and the husband 
 appeared to be insolvent, refused to refer it to the Master to 
 * consider a scheme for securing a provision for the wife, — observ- * 97 
 ing, that it was never done unless circumstances of fraud, or of 
 compulsion on the part of the husband appeared, and that a wife might 
 as well dispose of her personal estate, over which she has an absolute 
 control, as of real estate, which she might do by joining in a fine with 
 her husband. 1 
 
 It would seem that, as long as the money remains in Court, the wife 
 may claim a settlement out of it, although she has consented to its 
 being paid to her husband; or that, at any rate, this is so where she 
 was not aware of material circumstances at the time of giving her 
 consent. 2 (a) 
 
 It seems that, where a wife's consent has been already given upon 
 her examination before another competent tribunal, she need not be 
 again examined. 3 And so it has been held, that where a married 
 woman is entitled to a share of money arising from the sale or mort- 
 gage of an estate which has been sold or mortgaged, and in order to 
 effect such sale or mortgage she has joined in levying a fine of her 
 share, and for that purpose has undergone the usual examination in 
 the Court where such fine has been levied, she will be barred, by the 
 fine, of her equity for a settlement. 4 
 
 The right of a married woman to have a settlement made of, or out 
 of, a fund in Court, arises, however small the fund may be; but if it is 
 
 10 See 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1418, note; Mur- Wright v. Rutter, 2 Ves. Jr. 673; Minet v. 
 
 ray v. Lord Elibank, 10 Ves. 84, and note; S. C. Hyde, 2 Bro. C. C. 663; Dimmoch v. Atkinson, 
 
 1 Wh. & T. L. Cas. (6th ed.) 493, 501; Ward v. 3 Bro. C. C. 195; Ellis v. Atkinson, ib. 565; 
 
 Amory, 1 Curtis, 419, 432 ; Sawyer v. Baldwin, Hood v. Burlton, 4 Bro. C. C. 121. 
 20 Pick. 378, 388. 2 Watson v. Marshall, 17 Beav. 363; Pen- 
 
 11 2 Ves. Sr. 579; the ground of decision fold v. Mould, L. R. 4 Eq. 562, V. C. M. 
 appears to have been that the lady had been 3 Campbell v. French, 3 Ves. 321, 323. 
 
 a ward of Court; see also Biddies v. Jackson, 4 May v. Roper, 4 Sim. 360. The wife may 
 
 26 Beav. 282; 3 De G. & J. 544; 4 Jur. N. S. waive her right by permitting the conveyance : 
 
 1069; 5 id. 901; Longbottom v. Pearce, 3 De G. Wright v. Arnold, 14 B. Mon. 638; so by join- 
 
 & J. 545, n. ((j); White v. Herrick, L. R. 4 Ch. ing in a receipt for the price: Geddes ex parte, 
 
 345. 4 Rich. Eq. 301; or it may be voluntarily 
 
 12 2 Atk. 67. waived: Ward v. Amory. 1 Curtis, 419; see 
 1 SeeMilner v. Colmer, 2 P. Wms. 639, 642; now 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74, § 77, substituting 
 
 Lanoyu. Athol, 2 Atk. 444, 448; Oldham v. an acknowledged deed for a fine: Shelford, 
 
 Hughes, ib. 452; Hearle v. Greenbank, 3 Atk. R. P. Stat. 369, 370. See now as to her ac- 
 
 695, 709; Parsons v. Dunne, 2 Ves. Sr. 60; knowledgment, 45 & 46 Vic. c. 39, § 7. 
 
 (a) In Pemberton v. Marriott, 47 L. T. 332, upon her and her infant children, was held 
 
 a married woman, having obtained a decree entitled to the property absolutely as against 
 
 declaring that, subject to a certain inquiry and her children, her husband having died before 
 
 a certain direction, property should be settled the decree was carried into effect. 
 
 95
 
 * 98 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 under £200, or is likely to be reduced thereto by costs, 5 or produces 
 less than £10 a year, 6 she may waive her equity to a settlement without 
 being separately examined. 7 
 
 When the payment, transfer, or delivery out of Court of any 
 
 money or securities to an unmarried woman is directed, and she 
 
 marries before payment, transfer, or delivery, and the sum does not 
 
 exceed £200, or £10 a year, the same will be paid, transferred or 
 
 * 98 delivered * to the woman and her husband, upon proof of the 
 
 marriage, and such affidavit of no settlement as has been men- 
 tioned above; 1 or, in case there has been a settlement, upon the affi- 
 davit of the solicitor that in his judgment the settlement does not 
 affect the fund. 2 But where the fund in Court exceeds the limit just 
 mentioned, a special order for payment is necessary: which can be 
 obtained at chambers, on ex parte summons, 3 supported by the produc- 
 tion of the order under which the fund was directed to be paid to the 
 woman, the certificate of the fund, and an affidavit by her and her hus- 
 band of the marriage, and of no settlement; 4 or by petition, 5 on the 
 like evidence, where there is no jurisdiction at chambers. 
 
 The Court will not, in general, dispense with the separate examina- 
 tion of the married woman, in cases where it is proposed to pay to 
 her on her separate receipt a fund which is not settled to her separate 
 use; as that would be, in effect, the same as payment to the husband. 6 
 
 The equity to a settlement attaches upon the husband's legal right to 
 present possession; and the principle has no application to a remainder 
 or reversion, which can only be passed to the husband when it falls 
 into possession. 7 With respect to an interest of this description, it 
 has been stated generally, that the Court will not allow the wife, by 
 any act of hers during coverture, to bind her future rights. Without 
 her consent, the Court will not deal with it or dispose of it at all; and 
 her consent the Court will refuse to take. 8 Thus, a petition which 
 had for its object the payment to the husband of a sum of money, to 
 
 5 Roberts v. Collett, 1 Sm. & G. 138; but 14 W. R. 449, V. C. S., where, husband con- 
 see Sporle v. Barnabv, 10 Jur. N. S. 1142, V. senting, fund was paid on separate receipt of 
 C. S. wife. As to separate examination, see Elliott 
 
 6 See 2 Seton, 660; Cons. Ord. I. 1. v. Hooper, W. N. (1874) 57; Re Morton, id. 
 
 7 Re Kincaid, 1 Drew. 326. The case of 181 ; 31 L. T. N. S". 82; Frith v. Lewis, W. N. 
 Foden v. Finney, 4 Russ. 428, is not now (1881) 145; Clark v. Clark, W. N. (1866) 106; 
 binding. Re Cutler, 14 Beav. 220; and see 14 W. R. 449; Anon. 3 Jur. N. S. 839; Re 
 Doodv v. Higgins, 2 Jur. N. S. 1068, V. Pope, W. N. (1873) 79; 21 W. R. 646; Re 
 C. W. Crump, 34 Beav. 570; Re Stanley, 61 L. T. 
 
 1 Ante, p. 95. 169; Deignan v. Deignan, 13 L. R. Ir. 278; 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. I. 1-3. See Chan. Funds Con- Riddell r. Errington, 26 Ch. D. 220; Re Harris, 
 sol. Rules, 1874. r. 52 (L. R. 9 Ch. 1); Clayton 28 Ch. D. 171 ; Re Arabin, 52 L. T. 728. 
 
 v. Gresham, 10 Ves. 288. ' Pickard v. Roberts, 3 Mad. 385. 
 
 3 See form in Vol. III. 8 Per Lord Cottenham, in Frank v. Frank, 
 
 4 [bid. 3 M. & C. 178; Woollands v. Crowcher, 12 
 
 5 ibid. Sumner's Ves. 174, Perkins's note («) and cases 
 
 6 Mawe v. Heaviside, 7 Jur. N. S. 817; 9 cited; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1413, and notes and 
 W. R. 649, V. C. K.; Gibbons v. Kibbey, 7 cases cited; Wilks v. Fitzpatrick, 1 Humph. 
 Jur. N. S. 1298; 10 W. R. 55. V. C. K. ; White 54. She may. however, now release her equity, 
 v. Herrick, L. R. 4 Ch. 345; and see 2 Seton, under the provisions of the 20 and 21 Vic. 
 666; but see Clark v. Clark, 1 W. N. 106; c. 57. 
 
 96
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. 
 
 *100 
 
 which the wife was entitled in reversion after the death of her mother, 
 was refused. 9 
 
 * Where the fund has arisen from the sale of land, and the *99 
 married woman can elect whether she will take it as land or 
 money, the Court will take her separate examination in order to enable 
 her to make her election, and will, on her consent, pay the fund to her 
 husband ; 1 but if the land was subject to an entail, it seems that a dis- 
 entailing assurance must be executed by her. 2 
 
 A married woman, entitled under settlement to a reversionary inter- 
 est in a fund in Court, cannot, by obtaining assignments of all the 
 interests in the fund previous to that settled upon herself, make herself 
 absolutely entitled to the whole fund, so as to have it paid out of Court 
 to her nominee. 8 
 
 * Where property is settled to the separate use of a married * 100 
 woman, her separate examination is not necessary in order to 
 
 pass her interest to a purchaser; as to that property, she is & feme sole, 
 and as such has, unless she is restrained from anticipation, 1 (a) a dispos- 
 
 9 Pickard r. Roberts, 3 Mad. 384; see Stifle 
 v. Everitt, 1 M. & C. 37, 41; Richards v. Cham- 
 bers, 10 Ves. 580; Ritchie v. Broadbent, 2 J. 
 & W. 456; Osborne v. Morgan, 9 Hare, 434; 
 and post, p. 117, et seq. But see Macarmick v. 
 Buller, 1 Cox, 357. 
 
 i Standering v. Hall, 11 Ch. D. 652; Re 
 Robins, 27 W. R. 705. See Re Silcock, 3 Russ. 
 369; Binford v. Bawden, 1 Ves. Jr. 512; 2 id. 38; 
 Rt Silcock, 3 Russ. 369, under the repealed 
 Act; Ex parte Ellison, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 528; Re 
 Tyler, 8 W. R. 540, V. C. W. ; Re Hayes, 9 
 W. R. 769, V. C. K. ; Re Worthington, ib. n. ; 
 Re Belt, W. N. (1877) 201; 25 W. R. 901, V. 
 
 C. B.; 2 Seton, 665, 666. 
 
 2 Re Tylden, 9 Jur. N. S. 942, V. C. K. ; Re 
 Butler, L. R. 16 Eq. 479; Re Broadwood, 1 Ch. 
 
 D. 438; Re Reynolds, 3 Ch. D. 61; see Sowrv 
 t\ Sown-, 8 Jur. N. S. 890, V. C. S.; Re South 
 Eastern Railway, 30 Beav. 215; Re Holden, 1 
 H. & M. 445; Re Holden, 10 Jur. N. S. 308, 
 V. C. S.; Re Watson, ib. 1011, L. JJ.; Notley 
 v. Palmer, L. R. 1 Eq. 241; 11 Jur. N. S. 968, 
 V. C. K. ; Re Row, L. R. 17 Eq. 300, V. C. M. ; 
 Re Wood, L. R. 20 Eq. 372, V. C. M. Such an 
 order was refused by V. C. K. in Re Tylden, 9 
 Jur. N. S. 942; but see Re Watson, ubi supra. 
 For order for payment to the husband, on the 
 wife's election to take money as land, see Seton, 
 
 (a) A gift to a married woman's separate 
 use is not to be implied merely from the exist- 
 ence of a restraint on anticipation. Baggett 
 v. Meux, 1 Coll. 138; 1 Phil. 627; Stogden v. 
 Lee, [1891] 1 Q. B. 661; 64 L. T. 494. A 
 restraint on anticipation is equivalent to a 
 restraint on alienation. Re Currey, Gibson v. 
 Way, 32 Ch. D. 361; Re Andrews, Ed wards v. 
 Dewar, 30 Ch. D. 159; Re Spencer, Thomas v. 
 Spencer, id. 183. A clause restraining antici- 
 
 VOL. I. — 7 
 
 660; and after a disentailing assurance and her 
 examination, ibid. Where the fund was small, 
 not exceeding £30, her examination was dis- 
 pensed with, Re Clark, 5 N. R. 32, V. C. S.; 
 S. C. nam. Pollock v. Birmingham, Wolver- 
 hampton, and Stour Valley Railway Co., Re 
 Clarke, 11 Jur. N. S. 7; 13 W. R."401. So 
 where the fund was under £50. Knapping v. 
 Tomlinson, W. N. (1870) 107; 18 W. R. 684, 
 V. C. M. As to the formalities required by the 
 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74, in the case of a married 
 woman, see Shelford, R. P. Stat. 402, et seq., 
 and 717, etseq.; and for precedents of disentail- 
 ing deeds, ib. Appx. ; 2 Prideaux, Conv. 431, 
 et seq.; 3 Davidson, Conv. 1284, 1315. 
 
 3 Whittle v. Henning, 2 Phil. 731; 11 Beav. 
 222; Story v. Tonge, 7 Beav. 91; Hale v. Shel- 
 drake, 60 L. T. 292; In re Onslow, 39 Ch. D. 
 622. Nor, a fortiori, will the purchase by the 
 husband of the life-estate entitle the wife to the 
 property absolutely. Caplinger v. Sullivan, 2 
 Humph. 547. Or the surrender to him of such 
 life-interest. Goodwin v. Moore, 4 Humph. 221. 
 And see infra, 119, note 3. 
 
 1 See Symonds «. Wilkes, 12 W. R. 541, M.R.; 
 Re Ellis, "L. R. 17 Eq. 409, M. R. : Re (^rough- 
 ton, 8 Ch. D. 460, V. C. B.; Re Bown, 27 Ch. 
 D. 411. 
 
 pation may apply to gifts of capital or income. 
 Ibid.; fleGrey, 34 Ch. D. 712. In Re Var- 
 non's Trusts. 31 Ch. D. 275, where a fund for 
 an infant wife's separate use for life, with re- 
 straint on anticipation, was settled by a mar- 
 riage settlement, which contained a covenant 
 by her to settle future property, the wife was 
 not required to elect between after-acquired 
 property and her interest in the settled fund, 
 but was held entitled to both. As to restraint 
 
 97
 
 100 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 ing power over it, 2 whether it is in reversion or possession. 3 Upon the 
 same principle, where a married woman to whom an annuity was 
 bequeathed for her separate use, joined with her husband in assigning 
 part of it for a valuable consideration, and she, the husband, and the 
 purchaser, afterwards filed a bill against the executors of the testator 
 under whom the annuity was claimed, a doubt having occurred 
 whether, in such a case, a decree could be taken by consent, Sir J. 
 Leach M. R. was of opinion that it could, and directed the decree to be 
 drawn up accordingly. 4 
 
 The rule that the Court will give effect to a married woman's aliena- 
 tion of such property, does not extend to transactions with her husband, 
 which are looked upon by the Court with jealousy ; so much so, that 
 the Court has refused to pay the separate money of the wife to the hus- 
 band, without the examination of the wife in Court. 5 Although, in 
 general, a wife may not dispose of her separate property to her hus- 
 band, unless by consent in Court, or before commissioners, yet several 
 instances have occurred where wives, by acts in pais, have parted with 
 separate property to their husbands. 6 But such gifts are never to be 
 inferred without very clear evidence.' (b) 
 
 If a married woman, upon being examined apart from her hus- 
 
 2 Sug. Powers, 173, 217; Taylor v. Meads, 
 4 De G. J. & S. 597; 11 Jur. N. S. 166; Pride 
 v. Budd, L. R. 7Ch. 64; Bishop v. Wall, 3 Ch. 
 D. 194; Cooper v. Macdonald, L. R. 7 Ch. 288. 
 
 3 Sturgis v. Corp, 13 Ves. 190; and see Keene 
 v. Johnston, 1 Jones & Car. 255 ; see Sperling 
 v. Rochfort, 8 Sumner's Ves. 175, and note (a) 
 and cases cited ; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1413 and 
 notes. 
 
 4 Stinson v. Ashley, 5 Russ. 4; but it would 
 seem that there must be an affidavit of no set- 
 tlement, Anon. 3 Jur. N. S. 839, V. C. W. 
 
 5 2 Bright, H. & W. 257 ; Gullan r. Trim- 
 bey, 2 J. & W. 457, n.; Wordsworth v. Day- 
 rell, 2 Jur. N. S. 631, V. C. K. ; see Milnes v. 
 Busk, 2 Ves. Jr. 498; Anon. 3 Jur. N. S. 839; 
 Lechmere v. Brotheridge, 32 Beav. 353, 360; 9 
 Jur. N. S. 705. See White v. Herrick, L. R. 4 
 Ch. 345. As to the mode by which the husband 
 
 on anticipation, see also Stevens v. Trevor- 
 Garrick, [1893] 2 Ch. 307; Re Milner's Settle- 
 ment, [1891] 3 Ch. 547; Hamilton r. Hamilton, 
 [1892] 1 Ch. 396; Re Holmes, 67 L. T. 355; 
 Kraunstein v. Lewis, 64 L. T. 285; 65 id. 449; 
 Pelton v. Harrison, [1891] 2 Q. B. 422; 65 
 L. T. 514: Re Wood, 63 L. T. 197; Oxford v. 
 Reid, 22 Q. B D. 548 ; Everett v. Paxton, 65 
 L. T. 383; Michell v. Michell, [1891] P. 208; 
 64 L. T. 607; Re Hutchings, 58 L. T. 6; Re 
 Smith, 51 L. T. 501; London Chartered Bank 
 n. Lempriere, L. R. 4 P. C. 572; Thomas v. 
 Price, 46 L. J. Ch. 761 : Re Queade, 54 id. 
 786; Re Warren, 52 id. 928; Smith v. Spence, 
 27 Ch. D. 606; O'Halloran v. King, id. 411, 
 98 
 
 can be excluded, where the wife is entitled to 
 stock for her separate use, see 2 Seton, 662. 
 But see Re Crump, 34 Beav. 570, where a fund 
 settled to the separate use of a married wo- 
 man was ordered to be transferred into the joint 
 names of herself and her husband. 
 
 6 Pawlet v. Delaval, 2 Ves. Sr. 663; see 
 Sherman v. Elder, 1 Hilton (N. Y.) 7 178, 476. 
 
 7 Rich v. Cockell, 9 Ves. 369; Harvey v. 
 Ashley, cited 2 Ves. Sr. 671; 3 Atk. 607; Co. 
 Litt. by Harg. 3 a. n. A wife may bestow 
 her separate property upon her husband, by 
 appointment or otherwise, as well as upon a 
 stranger. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 1395, 1396; 
 Methodist Epis. Church v. Jaques, 3 John. Ch. 
 86-114; Bradish v. Gibbs, id. 523; see Smith 
 v. Sweet, 1 Cush. 470-473. See, as to income 
 of separate estate, infra, 186, n. 2. 
 
 Re Thompson, W. N. (18S4) 28; Re Wright, 
 15 L. R. Ir. 331 ; Myles v. Burton, 14 id. 258. 
 The power given to the Court by the English 
 Conveyancing and Property Act of 1881, § 39, 
 to dispense with a restraint on anticipation, is a 
 discretionary power, and is exercised only with 
 caution. Re Little, Harrison v. Harrison, 40 
 Ch. D. 418. A married woman's separate estate 
 is equitable. Barlow v. Devany, 36 Fed. Rep. 
 577; 40 id. 97. 
 
 (b) See Carnegie v. Carnegie, 30 L. T. 460; 
 Re Blake; Blake v. Power, 60 L. T. 663; Re 
 De Burgh Lawson, 55 L. J. Ch. 46; Edward v. 
 Cheyne (No. 2), 13 App. Cas. 385.
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. * 102 
 
 band, * refuses to give her consent to the money being paid to * 101 
 him, the consequence of such refusal is, that the Court directs a 
 proper settlement to be made, generally determining at once 1 the 
 amount to be settled, and referring it to chambers to approve of the 
 necessary deed; and the proceedings are usually completed there, with- 
 out further mention to the Court. 2 If the fund is small, it is usual, for 
 the purpose of saving the expense of a deed, to settle the fund at once 
 by the order. 8 
 
 Although the Court will, in general, oblige the husband to make a 
 settlement upon his wife and children of any property which he may 
 be entitled to in right of his wife, for the recovery of which it is neces- 
 sary to resort to a Court of Equity, yet, where there is no suit pending, 
 the husband is authorized to lay hold of his wife's property, wherever 
 he can find it. 4 
 
 If no suit is pending with reference thereto, a trustee who is in pos- 
 session of the wife's property, real or personal, may pay the rents of 
 the real estate to the husband, or may hand over to him the personal 
 estate; 5 and the Court will not, upon bill filed, recall it. 6 But the 
 trustee may equally refuse to pay the husband till compelled by the 
 filing of a bill, in order that the wife may obtain the full benefit of 
 the protection afforded her by a Court of Equity; and the circumstance 
 that the wife joined the husband in making the demand is of no weight 
 whatever. 7 Where, however, a bill has already been filed, a trustee's 
 discretion is gone; as the bill makes the Court the trustee, and takes 
 away from the actual trustee his right of dealing with the property, 
 without its sanction. 
 
 With respect to the nature of the settlement made by the Court, and 
 the interest given to the wife, no certain rule can be laid down, the 
 amount being entirely in the discretion of the Court, and depend- 
 ing upon the particular circmnstances of *each case. 1 If the * 102 
 
 1 Coster v. Coster, 9 Sim. 597,605; Napier and notes; see Van Epps v. Van Deusen 4 
 r. Napier, 1 Dr. & War. 407. Paise, 64; Fry v. Fry, 7 Paige, 462, Wiles' v. 
 
 2 For forms of orders, see 2 Seton, 672, 673; Wiles, 3 Md. 1; Pool v. Morns,' 2!) Ga. -374. 
 and for the practice at chambers, see post, 6 Murray v. Lord Elibank, 10 Ves. 90; S. C. 
 Chap. XXIX. 1 Wh. & f. L. Cas. (6th ed.) 49-3, 501. 
 
 3 2 Seton, 673; Re Cutler, 14 B»av. 220; 6 Glaister v. Hewer, 8 Ves. 206: Macaulay 
 Bagshaw ». W T inter, 5 De G. & S. 466; Wat- v. Philips, 4 Ves. 15; Murray v. Elibank, 10 
 son v. Marshall, 17 Beav. 363; and see abstract Ves. 90; 2 Story, Eq. Jur § 1410. 
 
 of order, ib. p. 365; Re Kincaid, 1 Drew. 326; 1 He Swan's Settlement, 12 W. R. 738, V. 
 
 Wright v. King, 18 Beav. 461: Duncombe v. C. W.; 2 II. & M. 34;. but see Beaumont i\ 
 
 Greenacre No. 2, 29 Beav.' 578; for form of Carty, 32 Beav. 586; May v. Armstrong, W. N. 
 
 summons for the settlement of a fund, see (1866) 233, V. C. S. ; Re Roberts, W. X. 
 
 Vol. III. Where the husband refused to exe- (1869) 88; 17 W. R. 639, V. C. M. 
 
 cute the settlement, and the trustees declined 1 Re Suggitt, L R. 3 Ch. 215; Giacometti 
 
 t" art, the fund was ordered to remain in Court v. Prodgers, L. R. u Eq. 253; L. R. 8 Ch. 338; 
 
 assettled, and the interest to be paid to the wife Aguilar v. Aguilar, 5 Mad. 414: Kenny v. 
 
 for her separate use for life, Re Butt, cited, Udall, 5 John. Ch. 464: 2 Kent (11th ed.). 140, 
 
 Seton 671. 141 , This equity of the wife stands upon the 
 
 m , ,71 «" ^ oulson ' 2 Atk - 419 ' 2 Kent peculiar practice of the Court, and not on any 
 
 lor t! U ' "? Vard "■ M ° ffat ' 2 John " Ch - K eneral reasoning. Kennv r Udall, supra; 2 
 
 mLToTr 8 '■ w ep ,r\ 2 T T Cord ; Ch - 36; Story - =*■ Jur - § 1407 ; 2 Keiu < llth ^ li0 > 
 
 Matter of Hume Walker, 1 Llovd & G. 159, 141. 
 cases temp. Plunket; 2 Story, Eq. Jur § 1403^ 
 
 99
 
 102 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 husband is living with her, and maintaining her and her children, 
 he will, in the absence of any special crcumstances, be allowed the 
 interest on the whole, so long as he maintains her. 2 When the hus- 
 band is not living with the wife and maintaining her and her children, 
 as when he has become bankrupt or insolvent, or has deserted her, the 
 whole, or some portion of the fund will be settled, immediately, upon 
 the wife and children. The amount which will be settled depends upon 
 all the circumstances of each particular case ; 3 but the whole fund has 
 been settled where the husband was bankrupt, and had received large 
 advances from the wife's father; 4 where the husband deserted his wife, 
 and contributed nothing to her support; 5 where the husband was bank- 
 rupt and had received large sums in right of his wife; 6 and where the 
 husband was bankrupt, and had deserted his wife; 7 and in the recent 
 reports, numerous cases will be found in which, under the circum- 
 stances, the whole fund was settled. 8 (a) 
 
 
 2 Bullock v. Menzies, 4 Ves. 798; Sleech v. 
 Thorington, 2 Ves. Sr. 560. Where the hus- 
 band lives with his wife, and maintains her, 
 and lias not misbehaved, the course is to allow 
 him to receive the interest and dividends on 
 all property. Kenny v. Udall, 5 John. Ch. 464. 
 
 3 The Court may, in its discretion, give the 
 whole, or part only, of the property to the wife, 
 according to the circumstances of the case. 
 Kenny v. Udall, 5 John. Ch. 464; Haviland v. 
 Bloom 6 id. 178. 180, 181. The amount of 
 such provision must depend on circumstances, 
 amongst which the amount of the property, the 
 age, health, and condition of the wife, the num- 
 ber, age, sex. and health of her children, if 
 any, would be fit subjects of consideration. In 
 this respect, in a case directly before the Court, 
 it would be proper for the Court to avail itself 
 of the aid of a Master, to inquire into and 
 report the circumstances, and to report what 
 ■would be a suitable provision for the wife. 
 Cases may be supposed, in which, if the prop- 
 erty were small, and had been kept entirely 
 distinct from that of the husband, and where 
 
 . the exigencies of the family were such as to 
 require it, it would be proper to appropriate the 
 whole of such property to the use of the wife 
 and her children. Davis v. Newton, 6 Met. 
 544. "The Court may, in its discretion, give 
 the whole, or part only, of the property to the 
 wife, according to the circumstances of the 
 case." 2 Kent (11 ed.), 140, 141; Haviland v. 
 Bloom, 6 John. Ch. 178, 180, 181. 
 
 * Gardner v. Marshall, 14 Sim. 575. 584. 
 
 6 Gilchrist ». Cator, 1 De G & S. 188. Re 
 
 Ford. 32 Beav. 621; 9 Jur.N. S. 740, tfeTutin, 
 W. N. (1809) 141, V. C. S. See 49 & 50 Vic. 
 c. 52. In Kernick v Kernick, 4 N. R. 533, V. 
 C. W., where the husband had deserted the 
 wife, but maintained their children, the whole 
 fund was settled on her for life: but leave was 
 reserved to him to apply, on her death, in 
 respect of the payment to him of any part of 
 the income during his life. 
 
 6 Conington v. Gilliat, W. N. (1876) 275; 
 25 W R. 69, Y. C H.; Scott v. Spashett, 3 
 M'N. & G. 599. 
 
 v Dunkley ». Dunkley, 2 De G. M. & G. 390, 
 396. 
 
 8 Re Cutler, 14 Beav. 220; Marshall v. 
 Fowler, 16 Beav. 249; Re Kincaid, 1 Drew. 
 326 ; Watson r. Marshall, 17 Beav. 362; Francis 
 v. Brooking, 19 Beav. 347; Barrow v. Barrow, 
 5 De G. M & G. 782; Gent v. Harris, 10 Hare, 
 384; Re Wilson, 1 Jur. N. S. 569. V. C. S.; 
 Koeber r. Sturgis, 22 Beav. 588; Re Disney, 2 
 Jur. N. S. 206, V. C. W.; Re Welchman, 1 
 Giff. 31; 5 Jur. N. S. 866; Smith v. Smith, 3 
 Giff. 121; Ward r. Yates, 1 Dr. & S. 80; Dun- 
 combe «?. Greenacre, 29 Beav. 578; 7 Jur. N. S. 
 650; Re Tubbs. 8 W. R. 270, V. C. K.; and see 
 Re Grove, 3 Giff. 575; 9 Jur. N. S. 38; Re 
 Merriman, 10 W. R. 334; Kernick v. Kernick, 
 4 N. R. 533, V. C. W.; Taunton v. Morn's, 8 
 Ch D. 453; 11 id. 779 (life estate); Bowyer v. 
 Woodman, W. N. (1867) 13; Re Smith, id. 
 283; Miller ». Campbell, W. N. (1871) 210; 
 Re Cordwell, L. R. 20 Eq. 644; Nicholson V. 
 Carline, W. N. (1874) 151; 22 W. R. 820; Re 
 Craddock, W N. (1875)187. 
 
 (a) In Reid v. Reid, 33 Ch. D. 220, 223, 
 the husband's disregard of an order of Court 
 for restitution of conjugal rights, and his state- 
 men* that they should not live together again, 
 were treated as aggravated misconduct, and 
 the whole fund to which the wife was entitled 
 was settled upon the wife and children. But 
 
 100 
 
 where a husband, being an undischarged bank- 
 rupt, was living with his wife and contributed 
 something to her support from his earning. 
 only two thirds of the wife's fund was directed 
 to be settled upon her. Callow v. Callow, 55 
 L T. 154.
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. * 104 
 
 In other cases the fund has been divided; 9 and in the older 
 cases one half has been frequently settled ; 10 but the rule that * one * 103 
 half is generally the proportion settled, which is often referred 
 to in the older reports, is, it would seem, not much regarded in the 
 more recent cases. Where, however, the fund is under £200, it is the 
 usual practice not to divide it. 1 
 
 The Court will not, however, permit the equity of the wife to main- 
 tenance out of her own fortune, to be defeated by any trick or contriv- 
 ance for that purpose on the part of her husband. If, therefore, as in 
 Colmer v. Colmer, 2 he, with an intention to desert her (which he after- 
 wards carries into effect), makes a fraudulent conveyance of his and 
 her property, upon trust to pay his own debts, the transaction will not 
 prejudice her right to maintenance; but the Court will follow her prop- 
 erty into the hands of the trustees, and order an allowance for her, 
 suitable to her fortune and the circumstances of her husband, although 
 it may be necessary, in order to effect that purpose, to resort to part of 
 his own property so vested in trust. 
 
 The Court will, as has been shown, not only appropriate the interest 
 of a wife's equitable property, for her support, in cases where she has 
 been deserted by her husband, or obliged to leave him in consequence 
 of his improper conduct toward her, but it will, under similar circum- 
 stances, if a stranger has advanced to the wife money for her mainte- 
 nance, order it to be repaid to him by the husband, 8 or direct the 
 amount advanced with her sanction to be repaid out of her estate. 4 
 
 * If a husband is willing, and offers to maintain his wife, and * 101 
 she, without sufficient reason, refuses to reside with him, upon 
 his application for the interest of her fortune, the Court will order 
 payment of it to him, even though he declines to make a settlement 
 upon her. 1 And when she has been guilty of gross misconduct and has 
 eloped from her husband without a sufficient reason, the Court will not, 
 in general, interfere to allow her a maintenance out of her equitable 
 property. 2 
 
 9 Napier v. Napier, 1 Dru. & War. 407; C. S.; Sotheran v. Smear, W. N. (1868) 296, 
 Coster v. Coster, 9 Sim. 597; Ex parte Pugh, 1 V. C. S. 
 
 Drew. 202; Bagshaw v. Winter, 5 De G. & S. 2 Mos. 118, 121; see also Athertonr.Nowell, 
 
 466; Walker v. Drury, 17 Beav. 482; Re Sug- 1 Cox, 229. 
 
 gitt, L. R. 3 Ch. 215." 3 Jenner v. Morris, 1 Dr. & Sm. 218; affd. 3 
 
 10 Jewson v. Moulson, 2 Atk. 417, 423; Wor- De G. F. & J. 45; 7 Jur. N. S. 375; Deare v. 
 rail v. Marlar, 1 Cox, 153; 2 Dick. 647; Brown Soutten, L. R.9Eq. 151. See 49 & 50 Vic. c. 52. 
 i). Clark, 3 Ves. 166; Pringle v. Hodgson, ib. * i Bright, II. & W. 258; Guy v. Peakes, 
 617, 620; Steinmetz v. Halthin, 1 Glyn & J. 64; 18 Ves. 196; and see Re Ford, 32 Beav. 621 ; 9 
 Ex parte O'Ferrall, ib. 347; Archer v. Gardner, Jur. N. S. 740. It will, moreover, enforce it as 
 C. P. Coop, 340; Spirett v. Willows, 12 W. R. a debt against the husband. Harris v. Lee, 1 
 734, V. C. S.; affirmed by L. C, L. R. 1 Ch. P. W. 482: Deare v. Soutten, L. R. 9 Eq. 151 ; 
 520; 12 Jur. N. S. 538 In Spirett v. Willows, Jenner v. Morris, 3 De G. F. & J. 45. the last 
 L. R. 4 Ch. 407, the settlement made was of expressly overruling May r. Skey, 16 Sim. 588. 
 three fourths of the fund. ! Bullock v. Menzies, 4 Ves. 798: see, how- 
 
 1 Re Kincaid, 1 Drew. 326; Ward v. Yates, ever, Eedes v. Eedes, 11 Sim. 569; see Gia- 
 
 1 Dr. & S. 80; Archer v. Gardner, C. P. Coop, cometti v. Prodgers, L. R. 14 Eq. 253; L. R 8 
 
 340; Spirett v. Willows, 12 W. R. 734; Re Ch. 338; Aguilar r. Aguilar, 5 Mad. 414; Fry 
 
 Tubbs, 8 W. R. 270, V. C K.; Re Suggitt, L. v. Fry, 7 Paige, 462 ; Martin v. Martin, 1 Hoff. 
 
 R. 3 Ch. 215; but see Re Grove, 3 Giff. 575 ; 9 Ch. 462; 2 Kent (11th ed.), 140. 
 
 Jur. N. S. 38; Re Grant, 14 W. R. 191, V. 2 i Bright, H & W. 249, et seq.: Watkyns 
 
 101
 
 * 105 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 The question whether, in the case of a particular assignee claiming 
 by purchase from the husband for a valuable consideration, the Court 
 would or would not impose upon him the condition of making a settle- 
 ment, was long considered doubtful ; 3 it is now settled, however, that 
 such an assignee of a capital fund is bound to make a provision, out of 
 the fund, for the wife and her children; 4 but the assignment for value 
 by a husband, of his wife's life estate, will prevail against her, 5 though 
 he afterwards deserts her, or leaves her destitute, 6 during their joint 
 lives, but not after his death. 7 On principle, however, it seems diffi- 
 cult to distinguish between the case of a capital fund and a life 
 interest. 8 
 
 Although, in general, the Court allows the husband, whilst he main- 
 tains his wife, the income of her property, yet it must not be sup- 
 posed that this is an absolute right on his part, or that, upon 
 
 * 105 * the death of the husband, his representative is entitled to the 
 
 arrears of income accrued during his life. As a general rule, 
 the wife surviving is entitled to all property of her own not reduced 
 into possession during the coverture; and this applies to the arrears of 
 life income which accrued, but were not received, during the coverture. 1 
 
 Under the Marriage Acts, 2 in the case of a marriage solemnized 
 between parties under age, by false oath or fraud, the guilty party is 
 to forfeit all property accruing from the marriage; but such property 
 may, by order of the Court, made upon information filed by the Attorney- 
 General, be secured for the benefit of the innocent party, or the issue 
 of the marriage, as the Court shall think fit, so as to prevent the offend- 
 ing party from deriving any interest in any estate, or pecuniary bene- 
 fit from the marriage. Under the Act, 4 Geo. IV. c. 76, it has been 
 held, that the Court has no discretion to mitigate the penalty, but m 
 the case of the property being that of the wife, is bound to settle and 
 secure all such property, past, present, and future, for the benefit of 
 herself, or the issue of the marriage. 8 
 
 It appears formerly to have been considered, that if the husband had 
 made a settlement upon his wife upon their marriage, the wife would 
 be debarred of her right to a further provision out of any property 
 then unsettled, or which might subsequently accrue to her. 4 This is 
 
 v. Watkyns, 2 Atk. 97; Ball v. Montgomery, 2 s Elliott v. Cordell, 5 Mad. 149; Stanton v. 
 
 Ves. Jr." 191; Duncan v. Campbell, 12 Sim. Hall, 2 R. & M. 175. 
 
 616: Carr v. Eastabrooke, 4 Ves. 146, Barrow 6 Tidd v. Lister, 3 De G. M. & G. 587; 18 
 
 v. Barrow, 5 De G. M. & G. 795 ; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. 543. 
 
 Jur. §§ 1419, 1426; but see Re Lewin's Trusts, "' Stiffe v. Everitt, 1 M. & C. 37. 
 
 20 Beav. 378; Kernick v. Kernick, 4 N. R. 8 Re Duffy, 28 Beav. 386 ; see Taunton 0. 
 
 353, V. C.W. ; Greedy v. Lavender, 13 Beav. 62. Morris. 8 Ch. D. 453 ; 11 Ch. D. 779. 
 
 3 Like V. Beresford, 3 Ves. 506, 511; Pryor 1 Wilkinson v. Charleswortb, 10 Beav. 324. 
 r Hill, 4 Bro. C. C. 139; Macaulay v. Philips, 2 4 Geo. IV. c. 76, § 23, and 19 & 20 Vic. c. 
 4 Ves. 19. 119. § 19. See ante, p. 10. 
 
 4 Macaulay v. Philips, 4 Ves. 19; Franco v. 8 Att.-Gen. t> Mullay, 4 Russ. 329; 7 Beav. 
 Franco, 4 Ves. 515, 530; Johnson v. Johnson, 1 351; Att.-Gen. v. Lucas, 2 Hare, 566; 2 Phil 
 J.& W. 472; Carter v. Tapsart. 5 De G. & S. 753; Att.-Gen. v. Severne, 1 Coll. 313. 
 
 49, 1 De G. M. & G. 286; Tidd v. Lister, 3 id. 4 Lanoy v. Duke of Athol, 2 Atk. 448; see 
 
 857; 10 Hare, 140; 18 Jur. 543; Wilks v. Fitz- Poindexter v. Jeffries, 15 Gratt. 363. 
 patrick, 1 Humph. 54. 
 
 102
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. 
 
 *10G 
 
 not now the rule, 5 but in such cases it depends upon the terms of the 
 settlement; and if it appears, either by express words or by fair infer- 
 ence, that it was the intention of the parties that the husband should 
 be the purchaser of the future as well as the present property of the 
 wife, the Court will not require an additional settlement to be 
 made. 6 But in * determining the amount to be settled, any pre- * 106 
 vious settlement is always taken into consideration ; l as is also 
 the amount of property received by the husband in right of his wife. 2 
 
 The wife's equity to a settlement out of a capital fund is not for her 
 benefit only, but for that of herself and children ; 8 and though, as has 
 been before stated, 4 she may, upon her examination, waive it, she can- 
 not take the benefit of it for herself, and relinquish it on behalf of her 
 children. The equity does not, however, survive to the children, after 
 her death ; 5 but in such case, the whole fund will go to the husband by 
 survivorship, 6 and the children have no equity after the death of the 
 mother unless there has been a contract, or an order for a settlement, 
 in her lifetime. 7 Where there has been an order, it would appear that 
 the children should carry on the suit by an order to continue the 
 proceedings. 8 
 
 The wife may, at any time before the settlement has been finally 
 ordered, waive her right, so as altogether to defeat her children. 9 
 
 « March p. Head, 3 Atk. 720 ; Thompkyns 
 v. Ladbroke, 2 Ves. Sr. 591,595; Burdon v. 
 Dean, 2 Ves. Jr. 607; Stack pole v. Beaumont, 3 
 Ves. 89,98; Lady Elibank v. Montolieu, 5 Ves. 
 737 ; 1 Wh. & T. L. C. 486; Barrow v. Barrow, 
 18 Beav. 529; 5 De G. M. & G. 782; Spirett v. 
 Willows, 3 De G. J. & S. 293; 11 Jur. N. S. 
 70; 5 Girt. 49. 
 
 6 Brooke r. Hickes, 12 W. R. 703, V. C S. 
 In Haviland v. Bloom, 6 John. Ch. 178, the 
 rule in Equity was considered as settled, that 
 the wife's equity to a suitable provision for the 
 maintenance of herself and her children, out of 
 her separate estate, lying in action, was a valid 
 right, and extended, not only to property which 
 she owned dum sola, but to property descended 
 or devised to her during coverture. A new 
 equity arises to the wife upon property newly 
 acquired, and attaches upon it equally as upon 
 that which she brought with her upon mar- 
 riage. In Ex parte Beresford, 1 Desaus. 263, 
 the Court, after a full discussion, ordered a new 
 settlement in favor of the wife on a new acces- 
 sion of fortune. See Carr v. Taylor, 10 Ves. 574. 
 
 1 Lady Elibank v. Montolieu, 5 Ves. 737; 
 Freeman v. Fairlie, 11 Jur. 447, V. C. E. ; Re 
 Erskine, 1 K. & J. 302; Aguilar v. Aguilar, 5 
 Mad. 414; see also Giacometti r. Prodgers, , 
 L. R. 14 Eq. 253, V. CM.; L. R. 8 Ch. 338. 
 The settlement, for this purpose, must either 
 express it to be in consideration of the wife's 
 fortune, or the contents of it, altogether, must 
 import it, and plainly import it, as much as if 
 it were expressed. Per Lord Eldon, in Druce 
 v. Denison, 6 Ves. 395. 
 
 2 Green v. Otte, 1 S. & S, 250, 254 ; Napier 
 v. Napier, 1 Dr. & War. 407. 
 
 8 Murray V. Lord Elibank, 10 Ves. 84 ; 
 Lloyd v. Williams, 1 Mad. 450, 459 ; Re 
 Walker, L. & G. temp. Sug. 299; Hodgens v. 
 Hodgens, 4 CI. & F. 323; 11 Bli. 62; 2 Kent, 
 140. Johnson v Johnson, 1 J, & W. 472, 
 contra, would not now, it is apprehended, be 
 followed. 
 
 * Ante, p. 92. 
 
 5 Scnven v. Tapley, 2 Eden, 337; Amb. 509; 
 Fenner v. Taylor, 2R.& M. 190; De la Garde 
 v. Lempriere, 6 Beav. 344; Baker v. Bayldon, 8 
 Hare, 210; Lovett v. Lovett, John. 118, Wal- 
 lace v. Auldjo, 2 N. R. 567, L. J J. ; 2 Dr. & 
 Sm. 216; 9 Jur. N. S. 687; 1 De G. J. & S. 
 643; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1417 and note. 
 
 6 Wallace v. Auldjo. ubi supra. 
 
 1 Murray v. Lord Elibank, 10 Ves. 84, 92; 
 Lloyd v. Williams, 1 Mad. 450, 404, 467; and 
 see Lloyd V. Mason, 5 Hare, 149, 152: Cockel 
 v. Phipps. 1 Dick. 391; Groves v. Clarke, 1 
 Keen, 132, 136; S C. sub nom. Groves v. Per- 
 kins, 6 Sim. 576, 584; but see Vaughan v. Parr, 
 20 Ark. 600. 
 
 8 See R. S. C. Ord. L. r. 4; and for the 
 practice under which a supplemental suit was 
 necessary, see Murray v. Lord Elibank, 10 
 Ves. 84." 
 
 9 Barrow v. Barrow, 4 K. & J 409, 424 ; and 
 see Kowe v. Jackson, 2 Dick. 604; Murray V. 
 Lord Elibank, 10 Ves. 84; Martin v. Mitchell, 
 cited ib. 89; Steinmetz v. Hahhin, 1 Glyn & 
 J. 64. 
 
 103
 
 * 108 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 * 107 She cannot, however, * after insisting upon her right to a settle- 
 
 ment as against her husband's assignees in bankruptcy, subse- 
 quently waive her equity, and defeat her children's interests, except it 
 be in favor of the assignees. 1 After a contract entered into on the part 
 of the husband to make a settlement, it would seem that the wife can 
 waive it as far as her own interest is concerned, but not for her 
 children. 2 
 
 The rights of the husband are concluded by the order directing a 
 settlement to be made ; so that the death of the wife after such order 
 will not prevent the order from being carried into effect for the benefit 
 of the children. 3 But the rights of the wife are not concluded until a 
 further order approving of the particular settlement has been made; so 
 that if the husband should die before that has been done, she will be at 
 liberty to repudiate the settlement, and to insist on her rights by 
 survivorship. 4 
 
 If the husband is willing, and offers to maintain his wife, and she, 
 without sufficient reason, refuses to reside with him, payment to him of 
 the interest of her fortune may be ordered, though he declines to make 
 a settlement upon her; and when she has been guilty of gross miscon- 
 duct, and has eloped from him without sufficient reason, the Court will 
 not in general interfere to allow her a maintenance out of her equita- 
 ble property. 8 In some cases, however, under special circumstances, a 
 settlement in her favor has been made, though she was living in adul- 
 tery; 6 and if she is not an adulteress, the mere fact of her living apart 
 from her husband is no bar to her equity. 7 In cases of this description, 
 the fact of the husband living apart from his wife, and not supporting 
 her, is a reason against the fund, or the income, being paid to him; 8 
 
 but, nevertheless, in some cases, this has been done. 9 
 * 108 Where female wards of Court are married without its * con- 
 sent, although they afterwards live in adultery, the Court will 
 enforce a settlement; 1 because, the marriage being a contempt, the 
 Court thereby obtained jurisdiction to commit the husband, in conse- 
 quence of his misconduct, until he should make a proper settlement, 
 and will not part with that power until that act be done, whatever may 
 be the irregularity of the wife's conduct: which may be attributed, in 
 
 i Whittem v. Sawyer, 1 Beav. 593; Barker Atk. 97; Duncan v. Campbell, 12 Sim. 616; and 
 
 v. Lea, 6 Mad. 330. see judgment of L. J. Turner in Barrow v. Bar- 
 
 2 Anon. 2 Ves. Sr. 671; and Fenner v. Tay- row, 5 De G. M. & G. 795. 
 
 lor, 2 R. & M. 190, reversing S. C. 1 Sim. 169; 6 Greedy v. Lavender, 13 Beav. 62; Re 
 
 Lovett i'. Lovett, John. 118. Lewin's Trust, 20 Beav. 378. 
 
 a Murray p. Lord Elibank, 10 "Ves. 84; Wal- " Eedes v. Eedes, 11 Sim. 569; and see Ker- 
 
 laee v. Auldjo, 2 Dr. & Sm. 223. nick v. Kernick, 4 N. R. 533, V. C. W. 
 
 * Macaulay v. Philips, 4 Ves. 19; Baldwin 8 Carr r. Eastabrooke, 4 Ves. 146. 
 
 v. Baldwin, 5 De G. & S. 319; and see Heath . 9 Ball v. Montgomery, 2 Ves. Jr. 191 ; Dun- 
 
 v. Lewis, 10 Jur. N. S. 1093; 13 W. R. 129; can v. Campbell, 12 Sim. 616. 635, 638. 
 
 4 Giff. 665, where the wife, being subsequently 1 Ball v. Coutts, 1 V. & B. 292, 301, 304; ffe 
 
 divorced, was allowed to repudiate the settle- Walker, L. & G. temp. Sug. 299; and see, gen- 
 
 m ent. e/ally. as to the mode in which the Court deals 
 
 6 1 Bright, H. & W. 252; Carr v. Easta- with the property of a female ward marrying 
 
 brooke, 4 Ves. 146; Ball v. Montgomery, 2 without consent, Field v. Moore 7 De G. M. 
 
 Ves. Jr. 191, 199; Watkyns v. Watkyns, 2 & G. 691; 2 Jur. N. S. 145; 19 Beav. 176. 
 104
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. 
 
 108 
 
 some degree, to her husband's conduct in procuring such a clandestine 
 marriage, (a) 
 
 With reference to the form of the settlement, the principle on which 
 the Court acts is to let in the equity of the wife and children, and to 
 that extent to exclude the husband's marital right, but as soon as that 
 equity is satisfied, the provisions of the settlement ought to end, and 
 the marital right ought to return ; 2 and the practice is to settle the 
 property in trust for the wife, for her separate use, for life, without 
 power of anticipation, with a power of appointment by deed or will 
 among her children by her present, future, or a former marriage accord- 
 ing as she may appoint, and in default of appointment amongst such 
 children equally, 8 and in default of children, in trust for her hus- 
 band or his assignees, 4 whether he does or does not survive her or her 
 children. 5 Where the right to a settlement is established, the usual 
 provision for the children follows as a matter of course wholly irre- 
 spective of any fortune they may have. 6 
 
 2 Per Ld. Cairns, then L. J., Re Suggitr, L. 
 R. 3 Ch. 215, 218; Re Noake, W. N. (1880) 
 107; 28 W. R. 762, V. C. B. ; and see, as to 
 form of settlement, Spirett v. Willows, L. R. 4 
 Ch. 407, L. JJ.; Walsh v. Wason, L. R. 8 
 Ch. 482, L. C. & L. J. M. 
 
 3 See Spirett v. Willows, L. R. 4 Ch. 407. 
 410, and 2 Seton, 677; Oliver v. Oliver, 10 Ch. 
 D. 765, Fry J.; and see Re Gowan, Gowan v. 
 Gowan, 17 Ch. D. 778, M. R.; Re Barnard, 
 Barnard v. White, 56 L. T. 9; Re Parrott, 
 Walter v. Parrott, 33 Ch. D. 274. 
 
 4 Spirett v. Willows, L. R. 1 Ch. 520; 12 
 Jur. N. S 538, L. C. ; L. R. 4 Ch. 407, L. JJ. ; 
 and see Carter v. Taggart, 1 De G. M. & G. 
 
 (a) Re Bolton, [1891] 3 Ch. 270; 40 W. R. 
 145; In re Leigh, Leigh v. Leigh, 40 Ch. D. 
 290; Re Grays, 27 L. R. Ir. 609. Such wards 
 should not become postulants or novices in a 
 convent without the consent of the Lord Chan- 
 cellor. Re Gills, 27 L. R. Ir. 129. Cases re- 
 lating to lunatics and wards of Court may be 
 heard in private. Nagle-Gilman v. Christopher, 
 4 Ch. D. 173. The jurisdiction over infant 
 wards is not affected by their mental or phy- 
 sical disability, but the Court will direct their 
 treatment. Re Edwards, 10 Ch. D. 605. A 
 father, who having made his children wards 
 of Court, makes application for assistance in 
 directing their religious education, does not 
 necessarily abdicate his parental authority. 
 In re Agar-EIlis, 10 Ch. D. 49; 24 id. 317; 
 Stourton o. Stourton, 8 De G. M. & G. 768. See 
 Rt Scanlan, 40 Ch. D. 213; Hawksworth v. 
 Hawksworth, L. R. 6 Ch. 539; Hunt v. Hunt 
 (No. 1), 28 Ch. D. 606. In directing a ward's 
 religious education, the Court will regard the 
 father's religious views, if not dangerous or 
 immoral. In re Newberry, L. R. 1 Eq. 431; 
 L. R. 1 Ch. 263; Andrews" v. Salt, L. R. 8 Ch. 
 622; In re G , [1892] 1 Ch. 292; Re Walsh, 
 
 280; Bagshaw v. Winter, 5 De G. & S. 466; 
 Gent v. Harris, 10 Hare, 383; Ward v. Yates, 
 1 Dr. & S. 80; Re Smith, W. N. (1867) 283, 
 V. C. W.; Re Suggitt, L. R. 3 Ch. 215, L. J J. ; 
 Croxton ». May, L. R. 9 Eq. 404, V. C. J.; 
 and for order, see id. 409; Re Noake, W. N. 
 (1880) 107; 28 W. R. 762; 2 Seton, 676, et seq.; 
 and see form of order, where fund was settled 
 by the order, Watson v. Marshall, 17 Beav. 
 365; Duncombe v. Greenacre No. 2, 29 Beav. 
 578; Re Tubbs, 8 W. R. 270, V. C. K.; 2 
 Seton, 673, No. 5, 675, No. 6. 
 
 5 Walsh v. Wason. L. R. 8 Ch. 482. 
 
 6 Covington v. Gilliat, W. N. (1876) 275; 
 25 W. R. 69, V. C. H. 
 
 13 L. R. Ir. 269. The Court may direct what 
 religion infants should be brought up in, though 
 they are not wards of Court. Re McGrath, 
 [1892] 2 Ch. 496; [1893] 1 Ch. 143. As to con- 
 trol of education, see also Whalen v. Olmstead 
 (Conn.), 15 L. R. A. 593 The Court of ( 'han- 
 cery has no jurisdiction to compel a ward of 
 Court to make a settlement of his or her prop- 
 erty. Biu'kmaster v. Buckmaster, 35 Ch. I). 
 21 ; 33 id. 482; affirmed nam. Seaton v. Seaton, 
 13 App. Cas. 61 ; Mills v. Fox, 37 Ch. D. 153; 
 Re Leigh, 40 Ch. D. 290. But where a female 
 infant married under seventeen years of age, a 
 settlement of her property was direc'ed after 
 she attained that age. Re Phillips. 34 Ch. D. 
 467. The costs of a settlement of the property 
 of a female ward of Court, made upon her mar- 
 riage with the Court's sanction, may be ordered 
 paid out of the corpus of the settled property. 
 De Stacpoole v. De Stacpoole, 37 Ch. D. 139; 
 see Re Sampson & Wall, 25 Ch. D. 482. Car- 
 rying a fund to the separate account of an alien, 
 non-resident infant, who is not a party to the 
 suit, does not make such infant a ward of 
 Court. Brown v. Collins, 25 Ch. D. 56. 
 
 105
 
 *109 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 Having now treated of the subject of a married woman's equity to a 
 settlement, into which we have been led in considering the ground on 
 which the Court of Chancery requires a wife to be joined as co-plaintiff 
 with her husband in suits relating to her own property, we may return 
 to the subject of suits by femes covert generally. 7 It is now settled, 
 that all cases in which the husband and wife sue as co-plaintiffs together, 
 or in which the husband sues as next friend of his wife, are regarded 
 as suits of the husband alone. 8 And upon this principle, where a mar- 
 ried woman, having a separate interest, joins as a co-plaintiff with her 
 husband, instead of suing by her next friend, the suit will not prejudice 
 
 a future claim by the wife in respect of her separate interest. 9 
 * 109 * In general, therefore, where the suit relates to the separate 
 
 property of the wife, (a) it is necessary that the bill should be 
 filed in her name, by her next friend, J otherwise, the defendant may de- 
 
 7 A wife may, in a Court of Equity, sue her 
 husband, and be sued by him. 2 Story, Eq. 
 Jur. §§ 1363, 1414; Van Duzen v. Van Duzen, 
 6 Paige, 3C6; Story, Eq. PI. § 61, and note, and 
 cases cited to this point; Long v. White, 5 J. J. 
 Marsh. 230; Dowell v. Covenhoven, 5 l'aige, 
 581; Bennett v. Winfield, 4 Heisk. 440. A 
 husband, who lias received the rents and profits 
 of real estate, held in trust for the separate use 
 of the wife, who has separated from him, is 
 rightly joined as a defendant in a bill by her 
 against the trustees to enforce the trust. Aver 
 v. Aver, 16 Pick. 327. 
 
 8 Wake v. Parker, 2 Keen, 59, 70; Davis v. 
 Prout, 7 Beav. 288, 290 ; Johnson v. Vail, 14 
 N. J. Eq. 423. A fortiori, if the wife be in- 
 sane, the bill being in the joint name of hus- 
 b-.ind and wife for partition and sale of her 
 land. Stephens v. Porter, 11 Heisk. 341. And 
 see Kerchner v. Kenipton, 47 Md. 568. In 
 Tennessee, the husband, it seems, in matters of 
 business, represents the wife. Kindell o. Titus, 
 9 Heisk. 727; Stephens v. Porter, 11 Heisk. 348. 
 A plea of insolvency of the husband was dis- 
 allowed to a bill by him and his wife for pay- 
 ment of an annuity bequeathed for the benefit 
 of the latter, which had fallen into possession 
 after the insolvency, the assignees declining to 
 interfere. Glover v. Weedon, 3 Jur. N. S. 903, 
 V. C. S. And as to course pursued where a 
 married woman had, in ignorance, been made 
 a plaintiff as a feme snle, see Sherratt v. Sher- 
 ratt, W. N. (1873) 104, 21 W. R. 572. 
 
 9 Hughes v. Evans, 1 S. & S 185; Turner v. 
 Turner, 2 De G. M. & G. 28. 37; Johnson v. 
 Vail, 14 N. J. Eq. 423, 426, and cases there 
 
 (n) No particular form of words is necessary 
 in order to vest property in a married woman 
 for her separate use. Re Peacock, 10 Ch. D. 
 490; Bland v. Dawes, 17 Ch. 1). 794. But if 
 the property is not actually settled to her sepa- 
 rate use, the husband cannot make his wife deal 
 with it as if it were separate property. Cahill 
 
 106 
 
 cited to this point. And see Beardmore v. 
 Gregory, 2 H. & M. 491; 11 Jur. N. S. 363. 
 It has been decided, that a suit by a husband 
 and wife against the trustees of the wife's 
 separate property, cannot be pleaded in bar to 
 a subsequent suit by her by her next friend 
 against the trustees and her husband, although 
 the relief prayed in both suits is the same. 
 Reeve v. Dalby, 2 S. & S. 464. On this prin- 
 ciple, a plea of release by the husband, to a bill 
 by the husband and wife for property limited 
 to her separate use, was held good. Stooke v. 
 Vincent, 1 Coll. 527. 
 
 1 Griffith v. Hood, 2 Ves. Sr. 452; Roberts v. 
 Evans, 7 Ch. D. 830, Fry J.; and see Mac- 
 bryde v. Eykyn, W. N. (1867) 367, V. C. M. 
 Where the bill is filed to rectify a marriage 
 settlement, the wife ought to be a party inde- 
 pendently of her husband. McGilldowney v. 
 Pemberton, 10 L. T. N. S. 292, V. C. w". (6) 
 As to the right of a married woman to sue for 
 an injunction to prevent injury to her separate 
 estate, see White v. Cohen, 1 Drew. 312; 
 Green v. Green, 5 Hare, 400, n. ; Wood e. 
 Wood, 19 W. R. 1049, V. C. M. See also, 
 generally, Hunt v. Booth, 1 Freem. Ch. 215 ; 
 Bridges v. MeKenna, 14 Md. 258: Knight v. 
 Knight, 2 Hayw. 101; Grant v. Van Schoon- 
 hoven, 9 Paige, 255; Sherman v. Burnhani, 6 
 Barb. S. C. 403; Heck v. Vollmer, 29 Md. 507, 
 511. In Bein v. Heath, 6 How. U. S. 228, Mr. 
 Justice McLean said, " Where the wife com- 
 plains of the husband, and asks relief Hgainst 
 him, she must use the name of some other per- 
 son in prosecuting the suit; but where the acts 
 of the husband are not complained of, he would 
 
 v. Cahill, 8 App. Cas. 420, Butler v. Butler, 16 
 Q. B. D. 374, 378. 
 
 (//) Her heirs are necessarv parties to a suit 
 to set aside a married woman's will and to in- 
 validate a marriage settlement in her favor. 
 McDonnell v Eaton, 18 Fed. Rep. 710.
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. 
 
 *109 
 
 mur 2 upon the ground that the wife might at any future time institute a 
 new suit for the same matter, and that, upon such new suit being insti- 
 tuted, a decree in a cause over which her husband had the exclusive 
 control and authority would not operate as a valid bar against her sub- 
 sequent claim. 8 Where, however, the suit is for a chose in action of the 
 wife, not settled to her separate use, the defendant cannot object to 
 the husband's suing jointly with her as co-plaintiff; nor will her right 
 to a settlement be prejudiced by the fact of her husband being so 
 joined. 
 
 Where the wife sues by her next friend, the husband must still be a 
 party, and it is usual to make him a defendant; 4 but a husband having 
 no adverse interest to his wife, may be made a co-plaintiff, 6 or a co- 
 petitioner. 6 (r) 
 
 As a wife may sue her husband in respect of her separate property, 7 
 
 seem to be the most suitable person to unite 
 with her in the suit. This is a matter of prac- 
 tice within the discretion of the Court." 
 
 2 See Johnson v. Vail, 14 N. J. Eq. 423; 
 Barrett v. Doughty, 25 N. J. Eq. 379. But 
 if the objection be only raised on final hearing, 
 an amendment will be permitted. Paulison v. 
 Van Iderstein, 28 N. J. Eq. 306; Roberts v. 
 Evans, 7 Ch. D. 830. And see Doherty v. 
 Stevenson, 3 Tenn. Ch. 25. 
 
 3 Wake v. Parker, 2 Keen, 59, 70; Smyth v. 
 Myers, 3 Mad. 474; Owden v. Campbell, 8 Sim. 
 551 ; Story, Eq. PI. § 63 and note; see also War- 
 ren v. Buck, 4 Beav. 95, as to the time when 
 the objection can be taken by the defendant; 
 and see Hope v. Fox, 1J. & H. 456 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 
 186, where the suit related to the execution of 
 a power vested in a married woman ; and see 
 Mendes v Guedalla (No. 2), 10 W. R. 485, V. 
 C. W. If the husband and wife join in a suit 
 as plaintiffs, or in an answer as co-defendants, 
 it will be considered as the suit, or the defence 
 of the husband alone, and it will not prejudice 
 a future claim by the wife in respect of her 
 separate interests, nor will the wife be bound 
 by any of the allegations therein in any future 
 litigation. Johnson v. Vail, 14 N. J. Eq. 423; 
 Bird v. Davis, 14 N. J. Eq. 467, 479. In Eng- 
 land, claims by a husband and wife may now be 
 joined with claims bv either of them separately. 
 R. S. C Ord. XVII. 4. 
 
 i Wake i'. Parker, 2 Keen, 59; England v. 
 Downs, 1 Beav. 96 ; Davis v. Prout, 7 Beav. 288, 
 290; Roberts v. Evans, 7 Ch. D. 830, Pry .1.: 
 and see Hope v. Fox, ubi supra ; Richards v. 
 Millett, 11 W. R. 1035, M. K. ; 9 Jur. N. S. 
 1066. The practice, when the husband improp- 
 erly joins with the wife as plaintiff, is not to 
 dismiss the bill, but to give permission to the 
 wife to amend by adding a next friend, and 
 making the husband a defendant; and when 
 no objection is interposed, to decree the fund 
 to be paid to a trustee for the use of the wife. 
 Johnson v. Vail, 14 N. J. Eq. 423. 
 
 5 Beardinore v. Gregory, 2 H. & M. 491: 11 
 Jur. N. J. 363 ; but see Roberts v. Evans, 7 Ch. 
 D. 830, Fry J., and see Smyth v. Myers, 3 
 Mad. 474; Meddowcroft v. Campbell, 13 Beav. 
 184; Platel v. Craddock, C. P. Coop. 469, 481; 
 Smith ». Etches, 1 H. & M. 558; 9 Jur. N. S. 
 1228; 10 id. 124. 
 
 6 Re Osborne, W. N. (1878) 179, M. R. 
 
 7 See Woodward v. Woodward. 3 De G. J. 
 &S 672; 9 Jur. N. S. 882, L. C; Powell v. 
 Powell, 9 Humph. 477. In a suit by a wife for 
 her separate estate, the husband is a necessary 
 defendant. Johnson v. Vail, 1 N. J. Eq. 423. 
 As to restraining the husband from interfer- 
 ing with and injuring such estate, see Green 
 v. Green, 5 Hare, 400, n. ; Wood v. Wood, 19 
 W. R. 1049, V. C. M. 
 
 (c) So under the Code Procedure, a husband 
 may be joined as plaintiff with his wife in an 
 equitable action relating to her separate prop- 
 erty. Spargur v. Heard, 90 Cal. 221. In Ten- 
 nessee, in such case, the wife may sue by next 
 friend, making her husband a defendant. Key 
 v. Snow, 90 Tenn. 663. But in the Federal 
 Courts, in view of Equity Rule 87, which pro- 
 vides for the appointment of a next friend, 
 
 a State statute providing, like the Cal. Code of 
 Civil Procedure, § 370, that a married woman 
 may sue alone respecting her separate property, 
 does not govern Equity suits, and her bill is 
 demurrable if she does not sue by next friend. 
 Wills i'. Pauly, 51 Fed. Rep. 257. See Arm- 
 strong v. Syracuse Screw Co. 16 Fed. Rep. 
 168; Taylor v. Holmes, 14 id. 498; Douglas v. 
 Butler, 6 id. 228. 
 
 107
 
 110 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 so may a husband in a similar case sue his wife. 8 (d) Such a 
 * 110 * suit, however, can only be in respect of his wife's separate 
 
 estate ; for a husband cannot have a discovery of his own estate 
 against his wife. 1 
 
 Whenever it is necessary that a suit respecting the property of a 
 married woman should be instituted by her next friend, 2 the suit 
 must be brought in her name, by the next friend who is named as such 
 in the bill, as in the case of an infant. 3 A bill, however, cannot, as 
 
 8 Warner v. Warner, 1 Dick. 90; Ainslie 
 v. Medlicott, 13 Ves. 266 ; and making her a 
 defendant is an admission that the suit relates 
 to her separate estate. Earl v. Ferns, 19 Beav. 
 67; Uur. N. S. 5; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1368; 
 Story, Eq. PI. §62; Copeland v. Granger, 3 
 Tenn. Ch. 487. In a suit to set aside a will 
 securing to the testator s daughter, who is a 
 married woman, and to her issue, a share of the 
 testator's property, for her separate use during 
 coverture, the husband and wife should not 
 join as parties plaintiff, their interests being in 
 conflict; but the wife should be made a defend- 
 ant. Alston v. Jones, 3 Barb. Ch. 397. Where 
 a suit is instituted by a wife for the protection 
 of her separate property against creditors of 
 the husband, the husband cannot legally be 
 joined as plaintiff, his interest claimed by the 
 creditors being adverse to that of his wife. 
 Johnson v. Vail, 14 N. J. Eq. 423; Tunnard v. 
 Littell, 23 N. J. Eq. 264. A married man may 
 sue his wife ill her character of executrix, for a 
 debt due to him by the testator. The institution 
 of the suit by the husband will be considered 
 as an authority to her to be sued. Alexander 
 t\ Alexander, 12 La. An. 588. 
 
 1 Brooks v. Brooks, Prec. Ch. 24. 
 
 (d) A wife may undoubtedly become her 
 husband's creditor, and prove against his es- 
 tate in bankruptcy. Re Blandin, 1 Lowell, 
 543; In re Jones. 9 N. B. R. 556. In Wood- 
 ward v. Woodward, 3 De G. J. & S. 672, Lord 
 Westbury L. C. said: " This Court has estab- 
 lished the independent personality of a feme 
 covert with respect to property settled to her 
 separate use. ... It is quite clear that if money, 
 part of the income of her separate estate, be 
 handed over by her to her husband, upon a 
 contract of loan, she may sue her husband upon 
 that contract." See Moore v. Page, 111 U.S. 117; 
 2 Kent Com. 163; Bennett v. VVintield, 4 Heisk. 
 440; Bottoms v. Corley, 5 id. 1; Clark ». Heze- 
 kiah, 24 Fed. Rep. 663; Valensin v. Valensin, 
 28 id. 559. A wife who has power to sue her 
 husband has power also to compromise the suit, 
 or to bind herself to abstain from instituting it. 
 Besant v. Wood, 12 Ch. D. 605; Clark v. Clark, 
 10 P. D. 188, 195. Under the Married Women's 
 Property Act of 1882 (45 & 46 Vic. c. 75), as 
 before, it is competent for a husband to sue 
 his wife, and to charge her separate estate for 
 
 108 
 
 2 Griffith v. Hood, 2 Ves. Sr. 452; Story, 
 Eq. PI. §§ 61, 63 ; Dowell v. Covenhoven, 5 
 Paige. 581 ; Wood v. Wood, 8 Wend. 357 ; Gar- 
 lick v. Strong, 3 Paige, 440. Leave to file bill 
 by a married woman without a next friend 
 refused, although the validity of the marriage 
 was contested. Caldicott v. Baker, 13 W. R. 
 449, V. C. K.; and see Sealey v. Gaston, ib. 
 577, V. C. W. A defendant cannot act as next 
 friend of a married woman plaintiff. Payne v. 
 Little, 13 Beav. 114; but a married woman 
 defendant may appeal by a co-defendant as her 
 next friend. Elliot v. Ince, 7 De G. M. & G. 
 475; 3 Jur. N. S. 597. She cannot, however, 
 present a petition of appeal without a next 
 friend, although another person joins in the 
 petition, and the suit relates to her separate 
 estate. Picard v. Hine, L. R. 5 Ch. 274. 
 
 8 Ld. Red. 28. Where the husband is under 
 any of the disabilities enumerated, ante, p. 87, 
 the wife is considered as a feme sole, and may 
 sue without the intervention of a next friend; 
 and where he is out of the jurisdiction, see 
 Postgate v. Barnes, 9 Jur. N. S. 456; 11 W. R. 
 356, V. C. S. Any objection for wnnt of a 
 next friend should be made as soon as possible. 
 Sealev v. Gaston, 13 W. R. 577, V. C. W. 
 
 money loaned by him to her after their mar- 
 riage* Butler v. Butler, 16 Q. B. D. 374: 14 id. 
 831; Re Jupp, 39 Ch. D. 148; see Re Roper, 39 
 Ch. D. 482; Lombard v. Morse, 155 Mass. 
 136; Nelson v. Ferdinand, 111 Mass. 300. A 
 husband's claim to repayment from hi- wife of 
 money loaned to her may be barred by anal- 
 ogy to the Statute of Limitations. Re Lad\ r 
 Hastings, 35 Ch. D. 94. In certain States, as, 
 e. g., in Massachusetts and California, a married 
 woman may sue alone to recover her separate 
 property. Mass. Pub. Stats, c. 147, § 7; Lom- 
 bard v. Morse, 155 Mass. 136; Evans t". De Lay, 
 81 Cal. 103. In both England and Scotland a 
 wife may make an effectual gift to her husband 
 of her separate income; but in Scotland she 
 has the further right to revoke the gift, even 
 after her husband's death, and to reclaim the 
 donated property so far as it is unconsumed. 
 Edward v. Cheyne (No. 2), 13 App. Cas. 385. 
 By 45 & 46 Vic. c. 75, § 3, 46 & 47 Vic. c. 52, 
 § 152, loans made by a wife to her husband 
 for purposes of trade are part of his assets in 
 bankruptcy.
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. 
 
 Ill 
 
 in the case of an infant, be filed by a next friend on behalf of a married 
 woman, without her consent; 4 and if a suit should be so instituted, 
 upon special motion, supported by evidence of the matter, it will be 
 dismissed with costs to be paid by the next friend, 5 or his solicitor. 6 
 
 As in the case of an infant, a written authority from the next friend 
 to use his name must be filed with the bill. 7 (a) So also, in all applica- 
 tions to the Court, by petition or otherwise, by a married woman with 
 respect to her separate estate, she must apply by her next friend, 8 and 
 if the application is not made by the next friend who has previously 
 acted for her, a next friend for the purpose of the application must be 
 named; if an application is made without a next friend, the solicitor for 
 the applicant may be ordered to pay the costs. 9 
 
 *The next friend of a married woman need not be a relation, 1 * 111 
 but he must be a person of substance, because he is liable to 
 costs : 2 and in this respect there is a material difference between the 
 next friend of a feme covert and of an infant; for any person may file 
 a bill in the name of an infant, but the suit of afevie covert is substan- 
 tially her own suit, and her next friend is selected by her. 8 In the 
 former case, therefore, as we have seen, 4 the Court does not require 
 that the next friend should be a person of substance, because if the 
 
 4 Ld. Red. 28. For form of consent, see 
 Vol. III. If she is an infant, her consent is 
 unnecessary. Wortham v. Pemberton, 1 De 
 G. & S. 644; 9 Jur. 291; but see Re Potter, 
 L. R. 7 Eq. 484, 487, V. C. M. 
 
 6 Andrews v. Craddock, Prec. Ch. 376 ; 
 Gilb. Rep. 36; Cooke v. Fryer, 4 Beav. 13; 
 Kenrick v. Wood. L. R. 9 Eq. 333, V. C. M. 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 61; Randolph v. Dickerson, 5 
 Paige, 751. The objection cannot be taken by 
 a defendant. Schjott r. Schjott, 19 Ch. D. 94; 
 but see Davies v. Whitehead, 1 W. N. 162, 
 M. R. 
 
 6 Schjott v. Schjott, 19 Ch. D. 94. 
 
 M5 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 11 ; see now R. S. C. 
 188!, Ord. XVI. 20, 33-41 ; 46 & 47 Vic. c. 49, 
 § 4, Sched. For form of authority, see Vol. III. 
 In an injunction case, an information was 
 allowed to be filed, on an undertaking to file 
 the authority the following day. Att.-Gen. v. 
 Murray, 13' W. R. 65, V. C. K. Authority 
 from the married woman to the next friend is 
 not now to be filed. Rogers v. Horn, 26 W. R. 
 432, M. R. And see, as to liability of next 
 friend, whose name had been used without his 
 knowledge, previously to this Act, Bligh v. 
 Tredgett, 5 De G. & S. 74. 
 
 8 Re Waugh, 15 Beav. 508; but she may 
 apply without a next friend, where she has 
 obtained a protection order under 20 & 21 
 Vic. c. 85, § 21. Bathe v. Bank of England, 
 
 4 K. &J. 564; 4 Jur. N. S. 505; Re Rains- 
 don, 5 Jur. N. S. 55, V. C. K.: 4 Drew. 446. 
 9 Pearse v. Cole, 16 Jur. 214, V. C. K. 
 Where a writ of summons has been issued on 
 behalf of a married woman by a per«on pur- 
 porting to be her next friend, acting in person 
 and without the employment of a solicitor, it 
 and all subsequent proceedings may be set 
 aside. Swann v. Swann, W. N. (1*880) 191, 
 M. R. 
 
 1 The husband may be joined with his 
 wife, as next friend, in a suit in which he has 
 no interest, in Louisiana. Bein v. Heath. 6 
 How. U. S. 228. See Johnson v. Vail, 14 
 N. J. Eq. 423. 
 
 2 Anon. 1 Atk. 570; Pennington v. Alvin, 
 1 S. & S. 264; Drinan r. Mannix, 3 Dr. & 
 War. 154; Lander v. Parr, 16 L.J. Ch. 269; 
 Beech v. Sleddon, 39 L. J. Ch. 123; Jones v. 
 Fawcett, 2 Phil. 278; Stevens v. Williams, 1 
 Sim. N. S. 545; Wilton v. Hill, 2 De G. M. & 
 G. 807-809; Hind r. Whitmore, 2 K. & .T. 458, 
 where all the cases are reviewed; Re Wills, 9 
 Jur. X. S. 1225 ; 12 W. R. 97, V. C. S. ; Elliott 
 v. Ince, 7 De G. M. & G. 475: 3 Jur. N. S. 597. 
 For form of order, see 2 Seton, 656, No. 3. 
 See also Dowden v. Hook, 8 Beav. 399, 402, 
 which must now be looked upon as overruled. 
 
 8 Gambie r. Atlee. 2 De G. & S. 745: but 
 see, where she is an infant, Wortham v. Pem- 
 berton, 1 De G. & S. 644; 9 Jur. 291. 
 
 4 Ante, p. 74. 
 
 (a) The next friend, when once appointed, 
 so long as his name remains upon the record, 
 continues liable for costs, even of an appeal, 
 
 though the notice of appeal may not purport 
 to be given by him. Re Glanvill, Ellis v. 
 Johnson, 31 Ch! D. 532. 
 
 109
 
 * 112 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 friends of an infant are poor, the infant might, by such a rule, be 
 deprived of the opportunity of asserting his right: but in the case of 
 a feme covert, as the object for which a next friend is required is that 
 he may be answerable for the costs, 5 the Court expects that the person 
 she selects to fill that office should be one who can pay the costs, if it 
 should turn out that the proceeding is ill-founded; and therefore, if the 
 next friend is in insolvent circumstances, it will order the suit to be 
 stayed until he gives security for costs. 6 The application for security 
 for costs may, it seems, be made at any time in a proper case. 7 
 
 It is obvious that cases might arise where the rule, that the next 
 friend of a feme covert must be a person of substance, would be, prac- 
 tically, a denial of justice. In such cases the Court, as we have seen, 8 
 allows her to sue, or continue a suit, without a next friend; and if 
 need be, in forma pauperis; 9 or to present a petition, without a next 
 friend, in a case where the Court has jurisdiction without suit. 10 (a) 
 
 If the next friend of a married woman dies, or becomes incapable of 
 acting, or if for any reason the plaintiff desires to remove her next 
 friend, she may, at any time before any defendant has entered 
 * 112 an appearance to the bill, introduce the * name of a new next 
 friend, under an order as of course to amend. After appearance, 
 the same may be done, where a new next friend is to be named in the 
 place of a deceased next friend, if the application for the order is made 
 by the solicitor 1 who acted in the suit for the deceased next friend; but 
 in other cases, the order to appoint a new next friend is special, and must 
 
 5 See Be Wills, 9 Jur. N. S. 1225; 12 W. R. 
 97. V. C. S. 
 
 6 Smith v. Etches, 1 H. & M. 711 ; 9 Jur. 
 N. S. 1228 ; 10 id. 124. A next friend has been 
 ordered to give security for costs, though the 
 husband, who had, however, no substantial 
 interest, was a co-plaintiff, S. C. ; but see 
 Caldicott v. Baker, 13 W. R. 449, V. C. K. 
 See as to waiver of right to apply for security, 
 M'Cann v. Borradaile, W. N. (1867) 252; i6 
 W. R. 74, 175; 37 L. J. Ch. 124. 
 
 1 Martano v. Mann. 14 Ch. D. 419. 
 
 8 Ante, p. 37; R. S. C. Ord. XVI. 8. 
 
 9 Wellesley v. Wellesley, 16 Sim. 1; 1 De 
 G. M. & G. 501: Wellesley v. Morniugton, 18 
 Jur. 552, V. C. K. ; Be Foster, 18 Beav. 525 ; 
 
 Be Lancaster, 18 Jur. 229, L. C. and L. JJ.; 
 D'Oechsner v. Scott, 24 Beav. 239: Crouch v. 
 W'aller, 4 De G. & J. 43; 5 Jur. N. S. 326 ; Be 
 Barnes, 10 W. R. 464, V. C. S.; Smith v. 
 Etches, ubi sujwa. An order for this purpose is 
 necessary, which may be obtained on special 
 application by ex parte motion, see Coulsting 
 v. Coulsting, 8 Beav. 463. For form of order, 
 see 2 Seton, 655, No. 2. For form of motion 
 paper, see Vol. III. 
 
 w In re Hakewell, 3 De G. M. & G. 116 ; 
 17 Jur. 334. 
 
 1 If not made by him, an order to change 
 solicitors must be obtained before the applica- 
 tion is made, ante, p. 77. 
 
 ('() Although a married woman suing alone 
 cannot be ordered to rind security for costs on 
 the ground of poverty, such security may be 
 ordered when the next friend alone is liable for 
 the costs, and it is too late for the plaintiff, 
 after obtaining judgment by her next friend, to 
 claim to sue alone. In re Thompson, Stevens 
 V. Thompson. 38 Th. D. 317. In Be Payne, 23 
 Ch. D. 288, a distinction was made between in- 
 fants and married women suing by next friend, 
 and it was held that, as a married woman has 
 power to select her next friend, failure of the 
 
 110 
 
 next friend to pay costs in one suit is ground 
 for staying a second suit for the same purpose 
 with another next friend; contra, in the case of 
 infants. See Swain v. Follows, 18 Q. B. D. 585; 
 Weldhen v. Scattergood, W. N. (1887) 69. In 
 Kingsman v. Kingsman. 6 Q. B. D. 122 it was 
 held that the dismissal of the defendant's ap- 
 plication that a married woman's proceedings 
 upon a protection order, obtained but deemed 
 inapplicable, should be stayed until a next 
 friend or security was supplied, amounted to 
 leave to her to sue without a next friend.
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. * 112 
 
 be obtained either ou motion or summons, on notice. 2 Where the appli- 
 cation to appoint a next friend in place of one deceased is not made by 
 the solicitor who acted in the suit for the latter, the solicitors must be 
 changed before the application is made. 
 
 Where, however, a married woman applies for leave to change her 
 next friend, it is in the discretion of the Court to grant or refuse the 
 application; and it will be refused, where there is reason to believe 
 that the defendant's security for costs will be thereby prejudiced; 3 
 if the order be made, the new next friend is usually required to give 
 security to answer the past costs, and to abide by the order of the Court 
 as to future costs; 4 and the retiring next friend has also been required 
 to give security for the costs incurred up to the time of the change. 6 
 
 Upon an application to appoint a new next friend, the Court or Judge 
 usually requires to be satisfied of his willingness to act; this may be 
 evidenced by the production of his written consent. 6 
 
 If the plaintiff neglects or refuses to obtain the order in the case of 
 the next friend's death, the defendant may apply to the Court, by 
 motion upon notice, for an order directing her to name a new next 
 friend within a limited time, or in default that the bill may be dis- 
 missed with costs; 7 and where the next friend becomes bankrupt, an 
 order will, in like manner, be made, discharging the next friend with- 
 out prejudice to his liability for costs previously incurred, and staying 
 the proceedings until a solvent next friend is appointed or the plaintiff 
 has obtained leave to sue without a next friend. 3 
 
 Wherever a new next friend is appointed, the order appointing him 
 must be served on the solicitors of the defendants, and be left for entry 
 in the cause books kept by the Clerks of Records and Writs; 9 and 
 thereupon, in all future proceedings in the cause, the name of the new 
 next friend so appointed will be introduced, in the place and stead of 
 the former next friend. 10 
 
 The next friend of a married woman, before he consents to any 
 departure from the ordinary mode of taking evidence, or of any other 
 procedure in a suit, should obtain the sanction of the Court, or of a 
 
 2 For forms of notice of motion and sum- nex t friend, 2 Seton, 655. A married woman 
 
 mons, see Vol. III.; and for form of order, see wn0 has consented to an order of the Court is 
 
 Seton, 1252. bound thereby so far as it extends, and no 
 
 s Jones v. Fawcett, 2 Phil. 278; and see farther. Thrupp v. Goodrich, 18 W. R. 125, 
 
 Greenaway v. Rotheram, 9 Sim. 88. M. R. 
 
 * Lawley v. Halpen, Bunb. 310 ; Percy v. 7 Barlee v. Barlee, 1 S. & S. 100. For form 
 
 Percy, M. K. in Chamb. 9 Dec, 1863. For form f notice, see Vol. III. 
 
 of order, see Seton, 1252. 8 Wilton v. Hill, 2 De G. M. & G. 807 ; 
 
 5 Payne v. Little, 14 Beav. 647 ; 16 Beav. D'Oechsner «. Scott. 24 Beav. 239; M'Cann v. 
 563: Witts v. Campbell, 12 Ves. 493. Borradaile, W. N. (1867) 283; 37 L. J. Ch 124- 
 
 6 For form of consent, see Vol. III. In 16 W. R. 74, 175, V. C. M.; and see form of 
 England a married woman may, by leave of order, 2 Seton. 656, No. 4; see also Pennington 
 the Court or a Judge, sue without a next friend r. Alv.n, 1 S. & S. 264; Drinan v. Mannix, 3 
 on giving such security (if any) for costs as the Dr. & War. 154; Ex parte Clnxton L. R 7 Ch. 
 Court or a Judge may require, R. S. C. Ord. 532; and see R. S. C. Ord. XVI. 8. For form 
 XVI. 8. For form of order, see 2 Seton 645, of notice of motion, see Vol. III. 
 
 No. 1. The application for leave is made by » Now at the Central Office of the Supreme 
 
 an ex parte motion or summons supported by Court of Judicature, 
 
 affidavits showing the object of the proposed w Braithwaite's Pr. 558. 
 action, and why it is desired to sue without a 
 
 111
 
 113 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 Judge in chambers. 11 The application at chambers is made by 
 
 summons. 12 
 * 113 * If the next friend of a married woman goes to reside out of 
 the jurisdiction, the practice with respect to giving security for 
 costs is the same as if the next friend had been himself the actual 
 plaintiff. 1 
 
 Upon filing a bill in Chancery, either by her next friend or in forma 
 pa uperis, a married woman, in respect of the suit, is held to have taken 
 upon herself the liabilities of a feme sole, and therefore may be 
 attached; 2 her separate estate becomes liable to pay the costs in- 
 curred ; 3 (a) and an undertaking as to damages may be required from 
 her in respect to her separate estate. 4 
 
 If a bill has been filed by a feme sole, and she intermarry pending 
 the suit, the proceedings are thereby abated, and cannot properly be 
 continued without an order of revivor. 5 If, however, a female plaintiff 
 
 " Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 24 (7 Jur. N. S. Pt. 
 II. 60); see, however, Knatchbull v. Fowle, 1 
 Ch. D. 604, M. R.; Fryer v. Wiseman, W. N. 
 (1876) 3; 24 W. R. 205," V. C. H. 
 
 12 For form of summons, see Vol. III. 
 i Alcock v. Alcock, 5 De G. & S. 671, ante, 
 p. 28. 
 
 2 Ottway v. Wing, 12 Sim. 90. 
 
 3 Barlee v. Barlee, 1 S. & S. 100; Murray v. 
 Barlee, 4 Sim. 82, 91; 3 M. & K. 209, 219; see, 
 however, Re Pugh, 17 Beav. 336. And an 
 undertaking as to damages may in such case be 
 required of her. Holden v. Waterlow, 15 W. 
 R. 139. Where a married woman has consented 
 to an order of Court, she is bound by it so far 
 as it extends. Thrupp v. Goodrich, 18 W. R. 
 125. And her consent may be given by counsel 
 of herself and husband. Crookes v. Whitworth, 
 10 Ch. D. 289. As to the liability of the wife's 
 separate estate for her debts and engagements, 
 see Johnson v. Gallagher, 7 Jur. N. S. 273; 9 
 W. R. 506, L. JJ.; 3 De G. F. & J. 494, where 
 
 (a) In re Glanvill, 31 Ch. D. 532 (see also 
 Hyde v. Hyde, 13 P. D. 166), it was held thflt 
 only such part of the separate estate of a 
 married woman suing without a next friend is 
 liable for costs as she was entitled to free from 
 restraint on alienation, when she commenced 
 the proceedings. But under the Married 
 Women's Property Act of 1882 such costs may 
 be collected from such separate estate as she has 
 when the order to pa)' costs is made. Cox v. 
 Bennett (No. 2), [1891] 1 Ch. 617; 64 L. T. 380. 
 A married woman, having visible means of 
 payment, should not, it seems, be required to 
 give security for costs. Brown v. North, 9 Q. 
 B. D. 52; fhrelfall V. Wilson, 8 P. D. 18; Re 
 Isaac, Jacob v. Isaac, 30 Ch. D. 418; In 
 re Robinson, W. N. (1885) 147. In gen- 
 eral, a married woman's contracts can be 
 112 
 
 the cases are reviewed ; Greenough v. Shorrock, 
 4 N. R. 40, L. JJ.; 3 N. R. 599, M. R.; Mac- 
 Henry v. Davies, L. R. 10 Eq. 88 ; Chubb v. 
 Stretch, L. R. 9 Eq. 555; Sharpe v. Foy, L. R. 
 4 Ch. 35. 
 
 * Holden v. Waterlow, 15 W. R. 139, L. JJ. 
 
 5 See Trezevant ». Broughton, 5 W. R. 517; 
 Seton, 1165, 1170, M. R. Where a woman filed 
 her bill as a spinster, and it afterwards appeared 
 she had a husband living, proceedings were 
 stayed, on motion by the defendant, till the 
 appointment of a next friend. Grant v. Mills, 
 29 L. T. 11 ; and see Pyke v. Holcombe, 9 Jur. 
 368, V. C K. B. ; Davey v. Bennett, 3 W. R. 
 353, V. C W. See Sherratt v. Sherratt, W. N. 
 (1873) 104; 21 W. R. 572. In England the suit 
 does not abate by a marriage if the cause of 
 action continues, the husband being made a 
 party by order of course. R. S. C Ord. L 1-4, 
 see Darcy v. Whittaker, W. N. (1876) 17 ; 24 
 W. R 244, V. C. B. See now 45 & 46 Vic c. 
 75, § 1. 
 
 enforced only against property which formed 
 part of her separate estate at the date of the 
 contract. Pike v. Fitzgibbon, 17 Ch. D. 454; 
 14 id. 837; King p. Lucas, 23 Ch. D. 712. See 
 Flower v. Buller, 15 Ch. D. 665. The statement 
 of claim upon her contract must allege that she 
 has separate estate. Tetley v Griffith, 57 L. T. 
 673; 36 W. R. 96. In South Carolina it is held 
 that in a suit upon a wife's contract an allegation 
 that the contract relates to her separate estate is 
 unnecessary when the disability of coverture 
 does not appear upon the complaint. Brice v. 
 Miller 35 S. C. 537. The trustee of a marriage 
 settlement may be heard in opposition to an 
 application to alter such settlpment, but not in 
 support thereof. Corrance v. Corrance, L. R. 
 1 P. & D. 495.
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. * 114 
 
 marries, and afterwards proceeds in the suit, as a feme sole, the mere 
 want of an order of revivor is not an error for which a decree can be 
 reversed, upon a bill of review brought by a defendant ; because, after 
 a decree made in point of right, a matter which may be pleaded in 
 abatement is not an error upon which to ground a bill of review. 6 
 
 It has been determined, that if a female plaintiff marries pending a 
 suit, and afterwards before revivor her husband dies, an order of 
 revivor becomes unnecessary: her incapacity to prosecute the suit being 
 removed; yet the subsequent proceedings ought, however, to be in the 
 name and with the description wbich she has acquired by the marriage. 7 
 
 Where a bill has been filed by a man and his wife touching the per- 
 sonal property of the wife, and the husband dies pending the suit, no 
 abatement of the suit takes place, but the wife becomes entitled to the 
 benefit of the suit by survivorship, 8 unless any act has been done which 
 may have the effect of depriving her of that right; and she may 
 continue the suit without an order of revivor. 9 * If, however, * 114 
 she does not think proper to proceed with the cause, she will not 
 be liable to the costs already incurred: because a woman cannot be 
 made responsible for any act done by her husband during the coverture; 
 but if she takes any step in the cause, subsequent to her husband's 
 death, she will make herself liable to the costs from the beginning. 1 
 
 A different rule, with respect to the right to continue a suit instituted 
 by a husband and wife, prevails when the wife dies in the lifetime of 
 her husband, from that which is acted upon when the husband dies in 
 the lifetime of his wife; for in the former case, although the husband, 
 upon the death of his wife, becomes entitled to all her choses in action, 
 he does not acquire such title by survivorship, but in the character of 
 her personal representative, and before he can continue the suit, he 
 must take out administration to her effects 2 and then obtain an order 
 
 6 Viscountess Cranborne v. Dalmahoy, Nels. 2 See Pattee v. Harrington, 11 Pick. 221; 
 85; 1 Ch. R. 231. So at law, if a woman sues Needles v. Needles, 7 Ohio St. 432; McCasker 
 or is sued as sale, and judgment is against her v. Golden, 1 Bradf. (N. Y.) 64; Williams v. 
 as such, though she was covert, she shall be Carle, 10 N. J. Eq. 543. A right of the husband 
 estopped, and the sheriff shall take advantage to administer on his wife's choses in action, for 
 of the estoppel. 1 Salk. 310; 1 Roll. Abr. 869, his own benefit, is held to be incompatible with 
 pi. 50. See infra, 186. the legislation of Vermont. Holmes r. Holmes, 
 
 7 Ld. Red. 60; and Godkin v. Earl Ferrers, 28 Vt. 765. It has been held in Massachusetts, 
 there referred to. that the administrator of the estate of a married 
 
 8 And it extends to interest accrued during woman may maintain an action upon a note 
 the life of the husband, and not received. given and made payable to her during cover- 
 Wilkinson v. Charlesworth, 10 Beav. 324; 11 ture, if during her life her husband did not 
 Jur. 644. reduce it to possession, or do any act indicating 
 
 9 M'Dowl v. Charles, 6 John. Ch. 132; an intention to take it to himself. Allen »\ 
 Vaughan v. Wilson, 4 Hen. & M. 453. The Wilkins, 3 Allen, 321. Bigelow C. J. said; 
 executor of a deceased husband cannot main- " His right to reduce it to possession was at an 
 tain a suit upon & chose in action which accrued end on the dissolution of the marriage by her 
 during coverture to the wife of the deceased, decease. It was then a chose, in action, and, 
 who survived him, and which was not reduced being a promissory note payable to the order 
 into possession by him. Bond v. Conway, 11 of the wife, no one could sue upon it, unless 
 Md. 512; Snowhill v. Snowhill, 1 Green Ch. he could trace a title to it under the original 
 30. payee," pp. 322, 323. See 2 Kent (11th ed.), 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 59; see also 3 Atk. 726; Bond v. 135, 136; Garforth v. Bradley, 2 Yes. Sr. 675; 
 
 Simmons, ib, 21; Mills v. Barlow, 11 W. R. Richards v. Richards, 2 B. & Ad. 447; Gaters 
 
 351, 3 De G. J. & S. 426, L. JJ. v. Madeley, 6 M. & W. 423; Hart v. Stephens, 
 VOL. i. — 8 113
 
 * 115 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 of revivor. 3 If after the death of the wife, the husband were to die 
 before the termination of the suit, the party to continue the suit is the 
 person to whom administration has been granted. According to the 
 present practice of the Court of Probate, administration is granted to 
 the representatives of the husband, unless the next of kin of the wife 
 are the persons beneficially entitled ; the former practice having been 
 otherwise. 4 
 
 If, however, any act has been done the effect of which would have 
 been to deprive the wife of her right by survivorship, and to vest 
 
 * 115 the property in * the husband absolutely, the husband may, it is 
 
 apprehended, continue the suit in his individual character, with- 
 out taking out administration to his wife. In such case, however, it 
 will be necessary, if such act has taken place subsequently to the insti- 
 tution of the suit, to bring the fact before the Court by means of an 
 amendment or a supplemental statement or bill, unless it appears upon 
 the proceedings which have already taken place in the cause. 
 
 This distinction renders it important to consider what the circum- 
 stances are which will have the effect of so altering the property as to 
 vest the right to the wife's personal property absolutely in the husband, 
 and entitle him to proceed in a suit without assuming the character of 
 her personal representative. 
 
 A mere intention 1 to alter the property will not have such effect; 
 and therefore the mere bringing an action at law, or filing a bill in 
 Equity, will not alter the property, unless there be a judgment or decree 
 for payment to the husband alone. 2 
 
 An appropriation by an executrix of so much of the assets of her 
 testator as is necessary to discharge a legacy bequeathed to a married 
 woman, is not such a change of the property as would vest it in the 
 husband. But it seems, that if a person indebted to a married woman, 
 or holding money belonging to her, bring such money or property into 
 Court, in a cause to which the husband and wife are parties, such bring- 
 ing into Court will be considered as an alteration of the property ; for, 
 as properly it could only have been paid or delivered during coverture 
 to the husband, the circumstance of its having been brought into Court 
 does not alter the rights of the parties, and it is considered as a pay- 
 
 6 Q. B. 937; Scarpellini v. Atcheson, 7 Q. B. 2 See Strong v. Smith, 1 Met. 476. To con- 
 
 864; Jones v. Richardson, 5 Met. 247, 249; stitute a reduction to possession, and a change 
 
 Bryant'. Rooks, 25 Ga. 622; Vaughan v. Parr, of property of the wife's chnses in action, the 
 
 20 Ark. 600. husband must do some positive and unequivo- 
 
 8 R. S. C. Ord. L. 4. For form of order, cal act to reduce them to his own possession, 
 
 where husband, being defendant in wife's suit, Barber v. Slade, 30 Vt. 191; Elms v. Hughes, 
 
 revives as her administrator, see Murray v. 3 Desaus. 155; Hall v. Young. 37 N. H. 134; 
 
 Newbon, Seton, 1164. The order can be ob- Andoverr. Merrimack Co., id. 437; Snowhill r. 
 
 tained on motion or partition of course. See Snowhill, 1 Green Ch. 36, 37; Glann v. Young- 
 
 post, Chap. XXXIII., Revivor and Supplement. love. 27 Barb. 480; Lockhart v. Cameron, 29 
 
 4 Wins, on Executors, 360. See Bryan v. Ala. 355; Walden v. Chambers, 7 Ohio St. 30; 
 
 Rooks, 25 Ga. 622; but see Vaughan r. Parr, Wallace r. Taliaferro, 2 Call, .447. The reduc- 
 
 20 Ark. 600. tion necessary is that into possession, not of 
 
 1 See 1 Bright, H. & W. 48; Forrest v. the thing itself, but of the title to it. Strong 
 
 Warrington, 2 Desaus. 254, 261; Barber v. J. in Tritt ». Caldwell, 31 Penn. St. 233. See 
 
 Slade, 30 Vt. 191. 2 Davidson, Conv. 223-228. 
 
 114
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. 
 
 116 
 
 ment or delivery to him. 3 For the same reason, jewels of the wife, 
 deposited in Court by the husband under an order, were considered as 
 belonging to the husband's executors, and not to the representative of 
 the wife who had survived : because, having been in the possession of 
 the husband, even a tortious act could not devest that property, and turn 
 it into a chose in action; 4 much less could a payment into Court under 
 an order. And so, where a married woman, who was the committee of 
 the estate and person of her lunatic husband, was entitled to stock 
 standing in the name of a trustee for her, and this stock was, by 
 an order, * transferred into the name of the Accountant-General, * 116 
 in the matter of the lunacy, and part of it was afterwards sold 
 out and applied in payment of costs in the lunacy, Lord Lyndhurst 
 held that the mode in which the stock had been dealt with amounted 
 to a reduction into possession by the husband. 1 If, however, a fund in 
 Court be carried over, by order, to the joint account of the husband and 
 wife, the case will be different, and the wife will not be deprived of 
 her right by survivorship, unless something is done by her husband or 
 his incumbrancer to reduce the fund into possession; 2 and it seems, 
 that a mere payment or transfer of money or stock to trustees, for the 
 benefit of the wife, will not give the husband the absolute right to the 
 money, to the exclusion of the wife. 3 
 
 It appears formerly to have been considered that a promissory note 
 given to a wife during coverture became the property of the husband 
 absolutely, as the wife could not acquire property during coverture; 4 
 
 3 Packer v. Wyndham, Prec. Ch. 412. 
 
 4 Ibid. 
 
 i In re Jenkins, 5 Russ. 183, 187. The 
 right of a husband to reduce to his possession 
 the chases in action of the wife, cannot be 
 exercised by a guardian appointed over him 
 as an insane person, but the property continues 
 vested in the wife. Andover v. Merrimack 
 Co. 37 N. H. 437. 
 
 2 Ibid. ; and see Prole v. Soady, L. R. 3 Ch. 
 220- Baldwin v. Baldwin, 5 De G. & S. 319 ; 
 Laprimaudaye v. Teissier, 12 Beav. 20U; 13 Jur. 
 1040. 
 
 8 Pringle v. Pringle, 22 Beav. 631 ; and see 
 Ex parte Norton, 8 De G., M. & G. 258 ; 2 
 Jur. N. S. 479; see, however, Hansen v. Miller, 
 14 Sim. 22, 26; 8 Jur. 209, 352; Cuningham 
 v. Antrobus, 16 Sim. 436, 442; 13 Jur. 28; 
 Burnham v. Bennett, 2 Coll. 254; 9 Jur. 888; 
 Cogan v. Duffield, L. R. 20 Eq. 789. 
 
 4 Lord Hardwicke, in Lightbourne v. Holy- 
 day, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 1, pi. 5; 2 Mad. 135, n . ; 
 Hodges v. Beverley, Bunb. 188; see Yates v. 
 Sherrington, 11 M*. & W. 42, and 12 M. & W. 
 855, as to the effect of bankruptcy of the hus- 
 band upon a promissory note given to the wife 
 dum sola. So it has been held in Massachu- 
 setts, both as to promissory notes and as to 
 legacies and distributive shares in intestate 
 estates, the separate property of the wife; the 
 necessity for a reduction to possession seems 
 
 to have been overlooked. Thus, in Common- 
 wealth v. Manley, 12 Pick. 173, it was deter- 
 mined by the Court that a promissory note 
 given to a feme covert for her separate use, 
 for the consideration of her distributive share 
 in an intestate estate, becomes immediately the 
 property of the husband. This was afterwards 
 confirmed in Stevens v. Beals, 10 Cush. 291. 
 See Shuttleworth v. Noyes, 8 Mass. 229; Tryon 
 v. Sutton, 13 Cal. 490; Holland v. Moody] 12 
 Ind. 170. And in Goddard r. Johnson. 14 Pick. 
 352, it was even decided, that a husband might 
 sue in his own right, after the death of his wife, 
 for a legacy accruing to the wife during the 
 coverture, although he had done nothing to 
 reduce it to possession during her lifetime. 
 The same was maintained in Hapgood v. 
 Houghton, 22 Pick. 480, and in Albee v. 
 Carpenter, 12 Cush. 382, 386. See Strong 
 v. Smith, 1 Met. 476. But the Court seem 
 to have receded from the doctrine in Jones v. 
 Richardson, 5 Met. 247, 249, and admitted that 
 it was "contrary to decided cases." And in 
 Allen v. Wilkin*, 3 Allen, 321, 322, Bigelow 
 C. J. said: " In a certain sense, a chose in 
 action which becomes the property of the wife 
 during coverture may be said to be the abso- 
 lute property of the husband. He has the right 
 to do any act to reduce it into his own posses- 
 sion. So long as he and his wife are butk 
 living, the entire jus disponendi is in him." 
 
 115
 
 118 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 * 117 but it has been held 5 * that a note given to a wife is a chose in action 
 
 of the wife, and survives to her on the death of her husband. 1 
 The circumstance of the husband having received the interest and part 
 of the capital in his lifetime, for which he gave a receipt, does not alter 
 the nature of the property, but the rest of the money still remains a 
 chose in action. 2 In general, however, if the husband, either alone or 
 jointly with his wife, authorizes another person to receive the property 
 of the wife, whether it be money, legacy, or other thing, and such person 
 actually obtains it, such receipt will change the wife's interest in the 
 property, and be a reduction into possession by the husband, 3 and the cir- 
 cumstance that the wife was an administratrix and only entitled to a 
 
 distributive share of the property does not make any difference. 4 
 
 * 118 * The mere proof, in bankruptcy by the husband of a debt due 
 
 to the wife will not alter the property of the debt, and it still 
 remains a chose in action. 1 It seems, however, that an award by an 
 arbitrator giving money to the husband, to which he was entitled in 
 right of his wife, will have the effect of altering the property, and 
 giving it to the husband absolutely. 2 
 
 And it was decided in this case, that the admin- 
 istrator of the estate of a married woman may 
 maintain an action on a note given and made 
 payable to her during coverture, if during her 
 life her husband did not reduce it to possession, 
 or do any act indicating an intention to take it 
 to himself. The Mass. Statutes (Pub Stats, c. 
 147) now provide that a married woman's prop- 
 erty shall continue her own, and that she may 
 acquire property as if she were sole. 
 
 5 Nash v. Nash, 2 Mad. 133. 
 
 1 Allen v. Wilkins, 3 Allen. 321 ; Jones v. 
 Richardson, 5 Met. 247, 249; 2 Kent (11th ed.), 
 135; Barber v. Slade, 30 Vt. 191; Barron v. 
 Barron. 24 Vt. 375; Hall v. Young. 37 N. H. 
 134, 145, 146; Coffin v. Morrill, 22 N. H. 352; 
 Snowhill i\ Snowhill, 1 Green Ch. 30; Dane r. 
 Allen, id. 415; Poindexter v. Blackburn, 1 
 Ired. Ch. 286. 
 
 In Hall r. Young, 37 N. H. 146, it is stated 
 as the settled law of New Hampshire, that the 
 personal property of the wife at the time of the 
 marriage, or accruing to her, in her own right, 
 subsequently, whether it consists in specific 
 chattels, money, or chases in fiction, and how- 
 ever it may fall to her, whether by legacy, gift 
 inter vivos or causa mortis, as her distributive 
 share in the estate of a person deceased, or 
 otherwise, if it accrues independently of her 
 husband, and not upon any consideration mov- 
 ing from or connected with him, it remains 
 hers until he exercises his marital right by 
 reducing it to possession. 
 
 If stock be taken by the husband in the 
 name of himself and wife, the wife will take 
 by survivorship, unless the gift be rebutted 
 bv evidence of a contrary intent. Dummer 
 v. Pitcher, 2 M. & K. 262; S. C. 5 Sim. 35; 
 Fowkes v. Pascoe, L. R. 10 Ch. 343; Lloyd v. 
 
 116 
 
 Pughe, L. R. 14 Eq. 241; L. R. 8 Ch. 88; Re 
 Eykyn, 6 Ch. D. 115; Marshal v. Crutwell, 
 L. R. 20 Eq. 328. So, if a note be taken pay- 
 able to husband and wife on a consideration 
 passing from the husband. Johnson v. Lusk, 
 6 Coldw. 113; S. C. 1 Tenn. Ch.3. So, of the 
 undivided interest of the wife as distributee in 
 chattels, although the chattels be reduced to 
 possession by the husband. Ross v. Wharton, 
 10 Yerg. 190*. 
 
 2 Nash v. Nash, 2 Mad. 133, 139; Scrutton 
 v. Pattillo, L. R. 19 Eq. 369, 373, V. C. M.; 
 Parker v. Lechmere, 12 Ch. D. 256, Fry J.; 
 Hunter v. Hallett, 1 Edw. Ch. 388. The 
 receipt by a husband of dividends accruing 
 from stock standing in his wife's name, is evi- 
 dence of a reduction to possession of the divi- 
 dends, but not of the stock. Burr v. Sherwood, 
 3 Bradf. (N. Y.) 85. See Taggart v. Boldin, 
 10 Md. 104. If the husband takes a new secu- 
 rity in his own name, for a debt due to his wife, 
 while sole, her right by survivorship is thereby 
 destroyed. Searing v. Searing, 9 Paige, 283. 
 
 8 Doswell v. Earle, 12 Ves. 473; see also 
 Burnham r. Bennett, 2 Coll. 254. 9 Jur. 888; 
 Hansen v. Miller, 14 Sim. 22, 26; 8 Jur. 209, 
 352: and Cuningham v. Antrobus, 16 Sim. 
 436, 442; 13 Jur. 28; 2 Kent (11th ed.), 137; 
 Schuyler v. Hoyle, 5 John Ch. 196; Johnston 
 v. Johnston. 1 Grant (Penn.), 468; Scrutton r. 
 Pattillo, L. R. 19 Eq. 369, V. C. M.; Widgery 
 v. Tepper, 5 Ch. D. 516, V. C. M. ; 7 id. 423, 
 C. A.; but see Pringle v. Pringle, 22 Beav. 
 631. 
 
 4 Re Barber. Hardier ?• Chapman, 11 Ch. D. 
 442, Fry J. ; and see Huntley v. Griffith, F. 
 Moore. 452; Goldsborough, 59. 
 
 1 Anon. 2 Vern. 707. 
 
 2 Oglander v. Baston, 1 Vern. 396.
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. * 119 
 
 With respect to the effect of a judgment at Law in altering the prop- 
 erty of a wife's chose in action, much depends, as we have seen, 8 upon 
 whether the wife is or is not named in the proceeding. If the wife be 
 not a party (which she need not be at Law, if the right accrued to her 
 during coverture), 4 a judgment in an action commenced by the husband 
 will vest the property in him; so that, in the event of his death before 
 execution, the wife would be deprived of her right by survivorship. 5 
 This, however, will not be the case if the wife is a party; in which 
 case, if the husband dies after judgment and before execution sued out, 
 the judgment will survive to her. 6 
 
 Decrees in Equity, as we have seen, 7 so far resemble judgments at 
 Law in this respect, that, until the money be ordered to be paid, or 
 declared to belong to the one or the other, the rights of the parties will 
 remain undisturbed; 8 but an order for payment of a sum of money to 
 the husband, in right of his wife, changes the property, and vests it in 
 the husband. 9 And where a decree or order has been made by the 
 Court for the payment of a sum of money to the husband and wife, and 
 either party dies before payment, the money will belong to the 
 survivor. 10 * Upon the same principle, in Forbes v. P/ilpps, 1 * 119 
 where a decree was made that one sixth of the residue to which 
 the wife was entitled should be paid to her and her husband, and the 
 wife died before the money was received, it was held that the husband 
 was entitled to the money, not as administrator to the wife, but as sur- 
 vivor under the decree. 
 
 Where the chose in action is not capable of immediate reduction into 
 possession, as where it is in reversion or expectancy, an assignment of 
 it by the husband will not bar the right which the wife has by sur- 
 vivorship 2 unless it is actually reduced into possession before his 
 death; 3 and where a prior life-interest is assigned to the wife, there 
 will be no equitable merger, so as to enable the husband and wife to 
 
 8 Ante, p. 89. the wife, though her name might not have been 
 
 4 Ibid. necessarily joined in the proceedings. Muse 
 
 5 Oglander v. Baston, ubi supra; see Pierson v. Edgerton, C. W. Dud Eq. 179; Knight r. 
 v. Smith, 9 Ohio St. 554; Needles v. Needles, Brawner, 14 Md. 1. 
 
 7 Ohio St. 432. i 1 Eden, 5<)2; and see Prole i>. Soady, L. 
 
 6 Garforth v. Bradley, 2 Ves. Sr. 676; see R. 3 Ch. 220, where an order for payment to 
 Fleet v. Perrins, L. R. 4 Q. B. 500; 2 Kent the assignee of husband and wife of a fund 
 (11th ed.), 137, 138; McDowl v. Charles, 6 standing to their joint account, made after a 
 John. Ch. 132; Searing v. Searing, 9 Paige, decree nisi for a dissolution of the marriage, 
 283. but before decree absolute, was held not to be 
 
 ' Ante, p. 115. equivalent to a reduction into possession, and 
 
 8 See Heygate v. Annesley, 3 Bro. C. C. not to bar the wife's survivorship. 
 (Perkins's ed.) 362, Mr. Eden's note (a), where 2 Purdew v. Jackson. 1 Kuss. 10: Hornier v. 
 the cases on this subject are cited and consid- Morton, 3 Russ. 65; Watson v. Dennis, id. 90; 
 ered; Knight v. Brawner, 14 Md. 1. Stamper t? Barker. 5 Mad. 157, 164; see also 
 
 9 Heygate v. Annesley, 3 Bro. C. C. 362; Hornsby v. Lee. 2 Mad. 16; Hutchings v. 
 and see Tidd v. Lister, 3 De G. M. & G. 857, Smith, 9 Sim. 137; 2 Jur. 131. 
 
 871: 10 Hare, 140; 18 Jur. 543; Walker v. 8 Ashby v. Ashby. 1 Coll. 553: 8 Jur. 1159: 
 
 Walker, 25 Miss. 367; Walden », Chambers, see also Ellison t>. Elwin, 13 Sim. 309, 315, 
 
 7 Ohio St. 30. S. C. nam. Elwyn v. Williams, 7 Jur. 337 : Box 
 
 10 Nanney v. Martin, 1 Ch. Rep. 234; Coppin v. Jackson, Dru. 42, 83; 2 Con. & L. 605: Le 
 
 v - ) 2 P. Wins. 496. If there be a decree Vasseur ?•. Scratton, 14 Sim 116; Michel more 
 
 in Equity in favor of the husband and wife, r. Mudge, 2 Giff. 183; Prole v. Soady, L. R. 3 
 
 aud the husband dies, the decree will survive to Ch. 223, L. J. Ld. Cairns. 
 
 117
 
 * 120 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 
 deal with the reversion, and bar her right of survivorship unless it is 
 actually reduced into possession. 4 
 
 By the 20 & 21 Vic. c. 57, a husband and wife can now, however, in 
 the manner and subject to the restrictions therein mentioned, effectually 
 assign her reversionary interest in personal estate. 
 
 In the case of assignments by act of Law, no distinction exists between 
 
 assignments of clwses in action capable of immediate reduction 
 
 * 120 into possession, and those which are not so. 5 *Thus, where a 
 
 ■i Whittle v. Henning, 2 Phil. 731, 735; 12 
 Jur. 1079; ib. 298; 11 Beav. 222; 21 Jur. 298; 
 overruling Creed v. Perry, 14 Sim. 592, and 
 Hall v. Hugonin, ib. 595; 10 Jur. 940; and see 
 B.sbopp v. Colebrook, 11 Jur. 793, V. C. E.; 
 Hanchett v. Briscoe, 22 Beav. 496; Shute v. 
 Hogge, 58 L. T. 546; Crittenden v. Posey, 1 
 Head(Tenn.), 311; Duberley v. Day, 16 Beav. 
 33; Rogers v. Aeaster, 14 Beav. 445; Lynn v. 
 Bradley, 1 Met. (Ky.) 232; Hair v. Avery, 28 
 Ala. 267; ante, 99, n. 3. But it is held in Penn- 
 sylvania that a husband may assign for a val- 
 uable consideration the wife's chases in action, 
 whether they be presently reducible, or be rever- 
 sionary interests, or possibilities. Webb's Ap- 
 peal. 21 Penn. 248; Smith's Estate, 22 Penn. 130. 
 
 The, Court, it seems, has the power to bind 
 a married woman, by sanctioning, in a pro- 
 ceeding to which she is a party, the compromise 
 of a suit instituted by her for the recovery of 
 trust funds in which she has a reversionary 
 interest; but she should be a respondent. Wall 
 v. Rogers, L. R. 9 Eq. 58. See 44 & 45 Vic. c. 
 41, §39. 
 
 5 No distinction exists between legal and 
 equitable choses in actum, or between assign- 
 ments of the latter for valuable considera- 
 tion, and voluntary or general assignments. 
 Homsby V. Lee, 2 Mad. 16; Purdew v. Jack- 
 son, 1 Russ. 24, 42, 70; see also Hutchings 
 v. Smith, 9 Sim. 137: 2 Jur. 231; Honner v. 
 Morton, 3 Russ. 65; Watson v. Dennis, ib. 90; 
 Stamper v. Barker, 5 Mad. 157, 164. It is said 
 by Mr. Chancellor Kent, 2 Kent (11th ed.), 137, 
 that a voluntary assignment by the husband of 
 the wife's choses in action, without consideration, 
 will not bind her, if she survives him ; see also 
 to the same effect, Hartman v. Dowdel, 1 Rawle, 
 279 ; Parsons v. Parsons, 9 N. H. 321, 322 ; 
 Saddington v. Kinsman. 1 Bro. C. C. (Perkins's 
 ed.) 51 and notes ; Mitford v. Mitford, 9 Sum- 
 ner's Ves. 87, note (b). The husband may 
 assign, for a valuable consideration, his wife's 
 choses in actln to a creditor, free from the 
 wife's contingent right of survivorship. Such 
 an appropriation of the property is the exerci e 
 of an act of ownership for a valuable purpose, 
 and an actual appropriation of the chattel which 
 the husband had a right to make. Schuyler v. 
 Hovle, 5 John. Ch. 196; Kenny v. Udall, 5 
 John. Ch. 464; Lawry v. Houston, 3 How. 
 118 
 
 (Miss.) 394; Siter v. Jordan, 4 Rawle, 463; 
 Tritt v. Col well, 31 Penn. St. 228. The doc- 
 trine that the husband may assign the wife's 
 choses in action for a valuable consideration, 
 and thereby bar her of her right by survivor- 
 ship in the debt, but subject, nevertheless, to 
 the wife's equity, has been frequently declared, 
 and is understood to be the rule best sustained 
 by authority. 2 Kent (11th ed.), 137; Bryan 
 r. Spruill, 4 Jones, Eq. (N. C.) 27; see Tobin 
 v. Dixon, 2 Met. (Ky.) 422; Sherman v. Rei- 
 gart, 7 W. & S. 169 ; Webb's App. 21 Penn. 
 St. 248; Smilie's Estate, 22 Penn. St. 130. It 
 is held in Alabama, that the husband's assignee 
 for valuable consideration is not entitled as 
 against the wife to her choses in action, unless 
 he reduces them to possession during coverture. 
 George v. Goldsby, 23 Ala. 326; Arrington v. 
 Yarborough, 1 Jones, Eq. 72; but see Tuttle v. 
 Fowler, 22 Conn. 58, and Marion v. Titsworth, 
 18 B. Mon. 582; Hill v. Townsend, 24 Texas, 
 575; 2 Kent (11th ed.). 138, 139, notes; Siter 
 v. Jordan, 4 Rawle, 468; Meriwether v. Booker, 
 5 Litt. 256 ; Pinkard v. Smith, Litt. Sel. ('as. 
 331; Houck v. Camplin, 25 Miss. 378; Needles 
 v. Needles, 7 Ohio St. 432. 
 
 The wife's interest in reversion or remainder 
 in personalty survives to the husband. Dade 
 v. Alexander, 1 Wash. 30 ; Ewing v. Handley, 
 4 Litt. 346; Tune v. Cooper, 4 Sneed, 296; 
 Wade v. Boxly, 5 Leigh, 442. And in such 
 case a previous conveyance by husband and 
 wife will clothe the assignee with a good title. 
 McCaleb v. Crichfield, 5 Heisk. 288. 
 
 A general assignment in bankruptcy, or under 
 insolvent laws, passes the wife's property, and 
 her choses in action, but subject to her right by 
 survivorship; and if the husband dies before 
 the assignees have reduced the property to 
 possession, it will survive to the wife: for the 
 assignees possess the same rights as the hus- 
 band before the bankruptcy, and none other. 
 Van Epps v Van Deusen, 4 Paige, 64 ; Out well 
 v. Van Winkle, 1 Green Ch. 516; Mitford v. 
 Mitford, 9 Sumner's Ves. 87, Perkins's notes («) 
 and (<•) ; Saddington v. Kinsman, 1 Bro. C. C. 
 (Perkins's ed.) 44, notes; Mitchell v. Winslow, 
 2 Story, 630; Moore v. Moore, 14 B. Mon. 259; 
 Poor v. H-izleton, 15 N. H. 564 ; Mann v. Hig- 
 gins, 7 Gill, 265. 

 
 MARRIED WOMEN. 
 
 *122 
 
 married woman had a vested interest in possession in a legacy, and her 
 husband became bankrupt and died, it was decided that the widow, 
 and not the assignee in bankruptcy, was entitled to the money; because, 
 under the bankruptcy, there could not pass to the assignee a larger 
 right, or better title, than the husband himself had, which was a right 
 to reduce the legacy into possession, but which was not done in 
 his lifetime. 1 Of course the whole * interest of the husband, at *122 
 the time of the bankruptcy, in the wife's chose in action, passes 
 under the bankruptcy. 1 (a) 
 
 It follows, therefore, that an assignment by the husband of his wife's 
 equitable chose in action will neither have the effect of depriving the 
 wife of her right to it in the event of her surviving her husband, nor of 
 depriving her of her equitable right to a settlement out of it, should 
 any application for that purpose be made by her during the lifetime of 
 her husband. 2 And even the wife's concurrence in the assignment by 
 her husband during coverture (unless under the powers conferred by 
 the Act above referred to) 3 will not have the effect of rendering such 
 assignment valid against her claim by survivorship, in cases where an 
 assignment by her husband alone would not have had that conse- 
 quence. 4 (b) Where the married woman is an infant, the circumstance 
 
 i Pierce v. Thornely, 2 Sim. 167, 176; and 
 see Gayner v. Wilkinson, 2 Dick. 491 ; 1 Bro. 
 C C. 50, n. ; Mitford v. Mitford, 9 Ves. 87, 95. 
 
 i Ripley v. Woods, 2 Sim. 165 ; Duke v. 
 Palmer, 10 Rich. Eq. 380; Bugg o. Franklin, 4 
 Sneed (Tenn.), 129. 
 
 2 Ante, p. 89 ; Bryan v. Spruill, 4 Jones, Eq. 
 (N. C.) 27. In Kenny v. Udall, 5 John. Oh. 
 464 ; S. C. 3 Cowen, 590, it was held, that the 
 wife's equity attached upon her personal prop- 
 erty, whenever it was subject to the jurisdic- 
 tion of the Court, and was the object of a suit, 
 in any hands to which it might come, or in 
 whatever manner it might have been trans- 
 ferred. It makes no difference whether the 
 application to the Court for the propert^v be by 
 the husband, or his representatives or assignees, 
 or by the wife or her trustee, seeking a provi- 
 sion out of the property. This equity is equally 
 binding, whether the transfer of the property 
 be by operation of Law, under a commission of 
 bankruptcy, or by levy of an execution, or by 
 act of the party to general assignees or to an 
 individual, or whether the particular transfer 
 was voluntary, or made upon a good and valu- 
 able consideration, or in payment of a just debt. 
 Durr t>. Bowyer, 2 M'Cord, Ch. (S. C.) 368; 
 Duvall v Farmers' Bank of Maryland, 4 Gill 
 & J. 282; Earl of Salisbury v. Newton, 1 Eden, 
 370; Bosvil v. Brander, 1 P. Wins. 458; Lynn 
 
 v. Bradley, 1 Met. (Ky.) 232; Bradley v. Mc- 
 Kenna, 14 Md. 258. 
 
 In Davis v. Newton, 6 Met. 537, the Court 
 held, that while an assignee of an insolvent 
 debtor, under the Statute of Massachusetts, 
 1838, c. 163, is proceeding to reduce the chases 
 in aetiun of the debtor's wife to possession, or 
 after he has obtained payment thereof, and be- 
 fore distribution of the debtor's estate, the wife 
 may apply to the Court, by bill or petition, for 
 a suitable provision to be made for her out of 
 the proceeds of such chases in action, and the 
 Court will make such provision according to 
 the circumstances of the case. See also to the 
 same point, Mitford v. Mitford, 9 Ves. 87, Per- 
 kins's notes; Pryor v. Hill, 4 Bro. C. C. (Per- 
 kins's ed.) 143, note (a); Van Epps v. Van 
 Deusen, 4 Paige, 64; Smith v. Kane, 2 Paige, 
 303; Steinmetz v. H;ilthen, 1 Glyn & Jam. 64; 
 Elliot v. Waring, 5 Monroe, 341; Saddington v. 
 Kinsman, 1 Bro. C. C. (Perkins's ed.) 44, and' 
 notes; Perryclear v. Jacobs, 9 Watts, 509; 
 Mum ford o. Murray, 1 Paige, 620; Fry v. Fry, 
 7 Paige, 462; Martin v. Martin, 1 Hoff. Ch. 462; 
 Burden v. Dean, 2 Sumner's Ves. 607, note (a) ; 
 Lumb v. Milnes, 5 Ves. 517, note (b), and cases 
 cited ; Dearin v. Fitzpatrick, 1 Meigs, 551. 
 
 8 20 & 21 Vic. c. 57. 
 
 * See Re Whittingham, 10 Jur. N. S. 818*, 
 12 W. R. 775, V. C. W., as to effect of protec- 
 
 (rt) Marriage does not sever the wife's joint 
 tenancy in a chose in action not reduced into 
 possession by her husband. In re Butler's 
 Trusts, Hughes v. Anderson, 38 Ch. D. 286, 
 disapproving Baillie v. Treharne, 17 Ch. D. 
 
 388. An absolute divorce changes their tenancy 
 bv entireties to a joint tenancy. Thornley v. 
 fhomley, [1893] 2 Ch. 229. 
 
 (b) See Prole v. Soady, L. R. 3 Ch. 220, L. J. 
 Ld. Cairns; Wilkinson v. Gibson, L. R. 4 Eq. lti'2, 
 119
 
 *123 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 of her father being party to the deed will not alter the wife's 
 interest. 5 
 
 With respect to the effect of a release by the husband, in depriving 
 his wife of her right by survivorship to her choses in action, not reduced 
 into possession during the coverture, it appears that he can release 
 debts due to her before marriage; legacies absolutely given to 
 * 123 her; 6 and interests accruing to her under the * Statutes of Dis- 
 tributions, and the like; x and that these acts might be done by 
 him, although he and his wife were divorced a mensa et thoro, because 
 the marriage still subsisted. 2 (a) It seems, also, that where a bond, or a 
 promissory note, is given to secure an annuity to a single woman, and 
 she afterwards marries, her husband may release the bond or note; and 
 if he releases the security, there is an end to the annuity. 3 
 
 Where, however, the interest of the wife in the chose i?i action is 
 reversionary, the release of the husband is as inoperative as his assign- 
 ment, to affect the wife's right by survivorship. 4 It seems also that 
 the assignment or release by the husband during coverture of his wife's 
 annuity, does not prevent her right by survivorship to payments accru- 
 ing after his death; it being considered that each successive payment 
 thereof constitutes a separate reversionary interest. 5 
 
 tion order, in defeating an assignment of rever- 
 sionary interest which fell into possession after 
 the order had been obtained. See, as to the 
 effect of judicial separation, Johnson v. Lander, 
 L. R. 7 Eq. 228; Re Insole, 35 Beav. 92; L. R. 
 1 Eq. 470; 11 Jur. N. S. 1011, M. R. But the 
 wife's fraud will prevent her from claiming 
 her equity to a settlement against a purchaser. 
 In re Lush's Trusts, L. R. 4 Ch. 591. So fraud 
 will give a mortgagee of husband and wife a 
 preference over the wife and others claiming 
 under a marriage settlement. Sharpe v. Foy, 
 L. R. 4 Ch. 35. 
 
 5 Stamper v. Barker, 5 Mad. 157, 164. 
 
 6 Gilb. Eq. 88; 2 Roll. 134; 1 Bright, H. & 
 W. 72. SirL. Shadwell V. C. held, however, in 
 the case of Harrison v. Andrews, 13 Sim. 595, 
 that a receipt was insufficient. 
 
 1 2 Kent Com. 135-137; Commonwealth v. 
 Manley, 12 Pick. 175; Marshall v. Lewis, 4 
 Litt. 141; Tentle v. Money, 2 J. J. Marsh. 82; 
 Schuyler v. Hoyle, 5 John. Ch. 196; Manion v. 
 
 Tits worth. 18 B. Mon. 582; Lowery v. Craig, 
 30 Miss. 19 ; Needles v. Needles, 7 Ohio St. 432. 
 
 2 Stephens v. Totty, Nov, 45; Cro. Eliz. 908; 
 but this cannot be done after a dissolution of 
 marriage, nor after a judicial separation or pro- 
 tection order. Wells v. Malbon, 31 Beav. 48; 
 8 Jur. N. S 249; Heath v. Lewis, 10 Jur. N. S. 
 1093; 13 W. R. 128, V. C. S.; Re Coward and 
 Adams, L. R. 20 Eq. 679, M. R.; Nicholson r. 
 Drury Estate Building Co. 7 Ch. D. 48, Fry J. 
 
 3 Hore v. Becher, 12 Sim. 465; 6 Jur. 93. 
 See Shepard v. Shepard, 7 John. Ch. 57. See 
 Widgery v. Tepper, 5 Ch. D. 516; Fitzgerald v. 
 Fitzgerald, L. R. 2 P. C 83. 
 
 4 Rogers v. Acaster. 14 Beav. 445; see Terry 
 v. Brunson, 1 Rich. Ch. 68. 
 
 s Stiffe v. Everitt, 1 M. & C. 37, 41 ; Thomp- 
 son v. Butler, Moore. 522; Whitmarsh v. Rob- 
 ertson, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 715; 6 Jur. 921; Whittle 
 v. Henning. 2 Phil. 731; 12 Jur. 1076; and see 
 Tidd v. Lister. 3 De G. M. & G. 857, 874; 18 
 Jur. 543; 10 Hare, 140. 
 
 V. C. W.; Codrington v. Lindsay, L. R. 8 Ch. 
 578, £81: S. C- nom. Codrington r. Codrington, 
 L. R. 7 H. L. 854. Respecting election by mar- 
 ried women, see Seaton v. Seaton, 13 App. Cas. 
 61 ; Carter v. Silber, [18911 3 Ch. 553 ; 65 L. T. 
 51 ; Serrell on Election, c. 14; Hamilton v. Ham- 
 ilton, [1892] 1 Ch. 396, holding that if a mar- 
 ried woman elects to avoid a covenant, her 
 interests in other property under the settlement 
 should be impounded to compensate those who 
 lose by her election. See also Re Queade's 
 Trusts," 54 L. J. Ch. 786; Re Wheatley, 27 Ch. 
 
 120 
 
 D. 606; Re Vardon's Trusts, 28 Ch. D. 124; 31 
 Ch. D. 275. An infant's settlement of property 
 on her marriage is voidable at her election, as 
 regards her, but not void. Duncan v. Dixon, 
 44 Ch. D. 211. 
 
 (n) A married woman, afterobtainingadecree 
 of judicial separation, is a feme sole with re- 
 spect to property which she acquires, or which 
 devolves upon her after such decree. Waite v. 
 Morland, 38 Ch. I). 135. See Re Emery's 
 Trusts, 50 L. T. 197; Fitzgerald r. Chapman, 
 1 Ch. D. 563.
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. * 125 
 
 The rules above laid down apply to those interests of the wife which 
 are of a strictly personal nature. In the case of those interests which 
 fall under the description of chattels real, important distinctions exist 
 with respect to the effect of an assignment by a husband, in barring his 
 wife of her right in them by survivorship. 6 
 
 The interest given by the law to the husband in the chattels real 
 which a wife has, or may be possessed of during marriage, is a qualified 
 title, being merely an interest in right of his wife, with a power of 
 alienation during coverture; ' so that, if he does not dispose of his wife's 
 terms for years or other chattels real in his lifetime, her right 
 by survivorship will not be defeated; if, * however, he does not *124 
 alien them, and he survives his wife, the law gives them to him, 
 not as representing the wife, but as a marital right. 1 
 
 These rules equally apply where the interest of the wife in the 
 chattel is only equitable ; thus, if a term of years, determinable upon 
 lives, is assigned to trustees in trust for a woman who marries and 
 dies, the trust of the term survives to the husband and he need not take 
 out administration; 2 and if a man assigns over the trust of a term 
 which he has in right of his wife, this will prevail against the wife, 
 though she survives, 3 subject, however, to her equity to a settlement. 4 
 
 A distinction has been attempted to be drawn 5 between a term in 
 trust to raise money for a woman, and a trust of the term itself for the 
 woman; but the Master of the Rolls determined that no such distinc- 
 tion could be taken. 6 It lias also been held, that if the wife has a 
 judgment, and the judgment debtor's land is extended upon an 
 eleyit, the husband may assign it without consideration. * So, * 125 
 if a judgment be given in trust for a, feme sole who marries, and, 
 by consent of her trustees, is in possession of the land extended, the 
 husband may assign over the extended interest; and by the same rea- 
 son, if she has a decree to hold and enjoy lands until a debt due to her 
 is paid, and she is in possession of the land under this decree and mar- 
 ries, the husband may assign it without any consideration, for it is in 
 the nature of an extent. 1 A husband may, as Ave have seen, assign his 
 wife's mortgage for a term; but if the mortgage be in fee, then it seems 
 clear that the wife's right to the debt by survivorship is not affected by 
 any assignment made by the husband, or by his bankruptcy, unless the 
 debt is reduced into possession in his lifetime. 2 
 
 6 On this subject, see 1 Bright, H. & W. Vern. 7. 18 : 2 Ch. Cas. 73: Marshall v. Lewis, 
 94-111. 4 Liu. hi ; Hunter v. Hallett, 1 FAvr. Ch. 388. 
 
 7 In a marginal abstract, 9 Mod. 104, it is s Packer r. Wyndham, Prec. Ch. 412, 418 ; 
 said that a wife being possessed of a term of Sanders v. Page, 3 Ch. Rep. 223; Pitt v. Hunt, 
 years, and having married an alien, the mar- 1 Vern. 18 ; 2 Ch. Cas. 73 ; Donne v. Hart, 2 
 riage is not a gift in law of the term. R. & M. 360, 364 
 
 1 Pale v. Michell, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 138, pi. 4, * Hanson v. Keating. 4 Hare, 1. 
 
 n. (n)- Earl of Bath v. Abney, 1 Dick. 263, 5 Walter v. Saunders, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 58, 
 
 arg., 2 Kent (11th ed.), 134. The wife's inter- pi. 5. 
 
 est in a chattel real may be as«igned by the « See also Packer v. Wyndham, Prec. Ch. 
 
 husband. Meriwether v. Booker, 5 Litt. 256. 412, 418. 
 
 - Pale v. Michell, ubi supra ; and see Jew- i Lord Carteret v. Paschal!, 3 P. Wins. 200. 
 
 son v. Moulson, 2 Atk. 417, 421; Bates t\ Dandy, 2 Burnett v. Kinnaston, 2 Vern. 401; 
 
 id 207; S. C. 3 Russ. 72, n. ; Incledon r. Mitford v. Mitford. 9 Ves. 87, 95 ; Packer r. 
 
 Nnrthcote, 3 Atk. 430 ; Sir E. Turner's case, 1 Wyndham, ubi supra > Purdew v. Jackson, 1 
 
 121
 
 126 
 
 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 It is an established principle, in deciding upon the effect of mort- 
 gages, whether of the estate of the wife or the estate of tne husband, 
 that if the wife joins in the conveyance, either because the estate 
 belongs to her or because she has a charge by way of jointure or dower 
 out of the estate, and there is a reservation, in the proviso for redemp- 
 tion of the mortgage, which would carry the estate from the person who 
 was owner at the time of executing the mortgage, there is a resulting 
 trust for the benefit of the wife, or for the benefit of the husband, 
 according to the circumstances of the case. 8 (a) 
 
 Although the husband is considered entitled to assign the trust of a 
 term or other real chattel created for the benefit of his wife, yet, where 
 a term or chattel real has been assigned in trust for a wife, with the 
 privity or consent of her husband, then he cannot dispose of it. 4 A 
 fortiori he may not, if he makes a lease or term of years for the benefit 
 of his wife. 5 And where a term was raised out of the wife's inheri- 
 tance, and vested in trustees for purposes which were satisfied, and 
 subject thereto for the benefit of the wife, her executors, administra- 
 tors, and assigns, it was held that the particular purpose being served 
 for which the term was raised, the trust did not go to the husband, who 
 was the administrator of the wife, but followed the inheritance. 6 From 
 this it may be inferred that the assignment of the trust of such 
 * 126 a term by the husband in the * lifetime of the wife would not 
 affect the wife's interest in it by survivorship. 
 It seems that an absolute transfer or assignment by the husband of 
 his wife's term of years, or other chattel real, is not requisite to deprive 
 the wife of her right by survivorship; but that, since an agreement to 
 do an act is considered in equity the same as if the act were done, so, 
 if the husband agrees or covenants to dispose of his wife's term of years, 
 such covenant will be enforced, although he dies in her lifetime. 1 
 
 Russ. 68 ; Hornier v. Morton, 3 Russ. 65 ; Elli- 
 son v. El win, 13 Sim. 309 ; S. C. nom. Elwyn v. 
 Williams, 7 Jur. 337 ; overruling Bosvil v. 
 Brander, 1 P. Wms. 458 ; Bates r. Dandy, 2 
 Atk. 207 ; 3 Russ. 72, n. 
 
 3 Lord Redesdale, in Jackson v. Innes, 1 
 Bligh, 126 ; 16 Ves. 356 ; cited by Sir J. L. 
 Knight Bruce V. C. in Clark v. Burgh, 2 Coll. 
 227 ; 9 Jur. 679 , and see Eddleston v Collins, 
 
 3 De G M. & G. 1, 15 ; Pigott v. Pigott, L. R. 
 
 4 Eq. 549, V. C. W. ; Re Betton, L. R. 12 Eq. 
 553. V. C. W. And see Edinondson v. Harris, 
 2 Tenn. Ch. 434. 
 
 4 Sir E. Turner's case, 1 Vern. 7 ; see also 
 Bosvil ». Brander, 1 P. Wms. 458 ; Pitt v. 
 Hunt, 1 Vern. 18, where Lord Nottingham, 
 however, said, that to prevent a husband) he 
 must be a party to the assignment. 
 
 s Wiche's case, Scacc. Pasc. 8 Jac, cited 1 
 Vern. 7 Ed. Raithbv, notis. 
 
 (a) See Plomley v. Felton, 14 App. Cas. 61, 
 66 , Jones v. Davies, 8 Ch. D. 205 ; Dawson v. 
 122 
 
 6 Best v. Stampford, 2 Freem. 288 ; 2 
 Vern. 520; Prec. Ch. 252. In Anon. 9 Mod. 43, 
 a ft me covert, who was divorced a mensa tt 
 thoro, and had alimony allowed to support her, 
 applied to the Court to restrain her husband 
 from selling a term of years of which she was 
 possessed before her marriage ; the Court at 
 first refused the injunction, because the separa- 
 tion a mensa tt thorn did not destroy the mar- 
 riage ; but afterwards, upon counsel still press- 
 ing Cor an injunction, in order that the merits 
 of the cause might come before the Court, and 
 insisting very much upon the hardship of the 
 case, the Court granted it, on the ground that, 
 though the marriage continues notwithstanding 
 the divorce, yet, under such circumstances, the 
 husband does nothing in his capacity of hus- 
 band, nor the wife in that of wife. This was 
 merely an interlocutory ori'er. 
 
 i Bates v. Dandv, 2 Atk. 207 ; 3 Russ. 72, 
 
 Whitehaven Bank, 4 Ch. D. 639; 6 Ch. D.218; 
 Meek r. Chamberlain, 8 Q B. D. 31.
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. * 127 
 
 The power which the law gives the husband to alien the whole inter- 
 est of his wife in her chattels real, necessarily authorizes him to dispose 
 of it in part; if, therefore, the husband is possessed of a term of years 
 in right of his wife or jointly with her, and demises it for a less term, 
 reserving rent, and dies, such demise or underlease will be good against 
 her, although she survives him: but the residue of the original term 
 will belong to her, as undisposed of by her husband. 2 
 
 So also, if the husband aliens the whole of the term of which he is 
 possessed in right of his wife, upon condition that the grantee pay a 
 sum of money to his executors, and then dies, and the condition is 
 broken, upon which his executors enter upon the lands, this dis- 
 position by the husband will be sufficient to bar the wife of * her * 127 
 interest in the term, it having been wholly disposed of by him 
 during his life, and vested in the grantee. 1 It seems, however, that if 
 the condition had been so framed that it might have been broken in the 
 husband's lifetime, and he had entered for the breach, and had then 
 died before his wife, without making any disposition of the term, she 
 would be entitled to it by survivorship: because the husband, by 
 re-entry for a breach of the condition, was returned to the same right 
 and interest in the term as he was possessed of at the time of the grant; 
 namely, in right of his wife. 2 
 
 In cases of assignments by the husband of his wife's chattels real, 
 the wife will be equally barred of her survivorship, whether the assign- 
 ment be for a valuable consideration, or without any consideration. 3 But 
 there is a distinction where the disposition is of the whole or part of 
 the property, and where it is only a collateral grant of something out 
 of it: for although, if a husband pledges a term of years of his wife for 
 a debt, and either assigns or agrees to assign all or part of such term to 
 the creditor, the transaction will bind the wife; 4 yet, if the transaction 
 be collateral to, and does not change the property in the term, as in 
 the grant of a rent out of it, then, if the wife survives the husband, her 
 right being paramount, and her interest in the chattel not having been 
 displaced, she will be entitled to the term, discharged from the rent. 5 
 
 Moreover, it has been decided, that the husband cannot assign a 
 reversionary interest of his wife's in chattels real, of such a description 
 as that it cannot by possibility vest during the coverture. 6 (a) 
 
 n. ; see also Steed v. Cragh, 9 Mod. 43 ; Shan- 3 Lord Carteret v. Paschal, 3 P. Wins. 197, 
 
 non v. Bradstreet, 1 Seh. & Lef. 52 ; and see 200 ; Mitford v. Mitford, 9 Ves. 99. 
 
 Caldwell v. Fellowes, L. R. 9 Eq. 410, V. C. J. 4 Bates v. Dandy, 2 Atk. 207; 3 Russ. 72, n. 
 
 (a case of joint tenancy) ; Johnson v. Touchet, s Co. Litt. 184 b. 
 
 37 L. J. Ch. 25. 6 Duberley v. Day, 16 Beav. 33 ; 16 Jnr. 
 
 2 Sym's case, Cro. Eliz. 33 ; Co. Litt. 46 b. 581 ; Rogers „. Acaster, 14 Beav. 445 ; and see 
 
 1 Co. Litt. 46 b. Sale v. Saunders, 24 Miss. 24. 
 
 2 See Watts v. Thomas, 2 P. Wms. 364, 366. 
 
 (n) In re Bellamy, Elder v. Pearson, 25 Ch. during the coverture, is no longer treated as a 
 
 D. 620. 624, Kay J. after reviewing the deci- mere possibility which is unassignable, but it is 
 
 sions said : " Accordingly I must take it to like any other chattel real of the wife in this 
 
 be settled that a vested reversionary interest, respect at least, namely, that the husband can 
 
 subject to a life-estate in leasehold property, assign it during the coverture, and while it is 
 
 which might by possibility come into possession still reversionary." 
 
 123
 
 * 128 SUITS BY PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER DISABILITY. 
 
 In regard to the right of the husband's executors, or his surviving 
 wife, to rent reserved upon underleases of her chattels real, and to the 
 arrears of rent due at the husband's death, there is a difference of 
 opinion in the books, which may probably be reconciled by attending to 
 the manner in which the rents were reserved. If the husband alone 
 grant an underlease of his wife's term of years, reserving a rent, that 
 would be a good demise, and bind the wife so long as the sub-demise 
 continued; the husband's executors, therefore, would be entitled not 
 only to the arrears due at his death, but to the subsequently accruing 
 rents; the reversion would, however, be in the wife. 7 And it would 
 seem that the principle of the last case would entitle the executors, to 
 the exclusion of the surviving wife, to subsequent rents and all arrears 
 at the husband's death, although the wife was a party to the 
 
 * 128 underlease, provided the rent were * reserved to the husband 
 
 only ; because the effect of the sub-demise and reservation was 
 an absolute disposition, pro tanto, of the wife's original term, which 
 she could not avoid, and the rent was the sole and absolute property of 
 the husband. 1 But if, in the last case, the rent had been reserved by 
 the husband to himself and wife, then, as their interests in the term 
 granted and the rent reserved were joint and entire, it is conceived that 
 the wife, upon surviving her husband, would be entitled to the future 
 rents, and that she would be equally entitled to the arrears of rent at 
 her husband's death; because they remaining in action, and being due 
 in respect of the joint interest of the husband and wife in the term, 
 would, with their principal the term, survive to the wife. 2 It may 
 lastly be remarked that, by the law of Scotland, the choses in action of 
 the wife become the property of the husband, without any condition on 
 his part of reducing them into possession. If, therefore, an English 
 testator leaves a legacy to a married woman domiciled in Scotland, and 
 her husband dies before payment, the legacy is the property of the hus- 
 band's representatives, and not of the widow. Where, however in 
 such a case, the executors paid the legacy to the widow, in ignorance of 
 the law of Scotland, the payment to her was held to be good. 8 
 
 - 1 Roll. Abr. 344, 345 ; Co. Litt. 46 b. ; 2 tucky, even under Rev. Stats, art. 2, § 1, p. 387, 
 
 Lev. 100 ; 3 Keb. 300 ; 1 Brigbt, H. & W. 43- the wife has not a separate estate in the rents 
 
 47 ; The husband's executors could not distrain: of her lands, though she may have an equity to 
 
 see Bac. Abr. tit. Distress (A) ; v. Cooper, a settlement out of the rents, as against her 
 
 2 Wilson, 375 ; Preece v. Corrie, 5 Bing. 24 ; husband's vendees. Smith v. Long, 1 Met. 
 
 Pascoe v. Pascoe, 3 Bing. N. C. 808. (Kv.) 486. So in Tennessee the rents of the 
 
 1 The rents and profits of a wife's real estate, wife's realty belong to the husband, and may be 
 
 which accrue during coverture, belong abso- subjected by his creditors, although the hus- 
 
 lutely to the husband, and do not survive to the band's interest in the land cannot, by statute, be 
 
 wife after his death. Clapp v. Stoughton, 10 sold during coverture by virtue of any judgment, 
 
 Pick. 463; Bennett v. Bennett, 34 Ala. 53; decree, or execution against him. Lucas v. 
 
 Matthews v. Copeland, 79 N. C. 493. It is Rickerrieh, 2 Memph. L. J. 86. But the law 
 
 otherwise with the rents and profits of land for has been since changed by Statute of 1879. 
 
 which husband and wife are suing in right of 24 Vin. Abr. D. a. 117. 
 
 the wife ; these rents, as well as damages for 3 Leslie V. Baillie, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 91, 95 ; 
 
 waste, upon the husbMnd's death, survive to the 7 Jur. 77. 
 wife. King v. Little, 77 N. C. 138. In Ken- 
 
 124
 
 ♦CHAPTER IV. 
 
 129 
 
 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 Section I. — Generally. 
 
 Having pointed out the persons who are capable of instituting suits 
 in Equity, and considered the peculiarities of practice applicable to each 
 description of parties complainant, we come now to the consideration 
 of the persons against whom suits may be commenced and carried on, 
 and the practice of the Court as applicable to them. 
 
 A bill in Equity may be exhibited against all bodies politic and cor- 
 porate, and all other persons whatsoever who are in any way interested 
 iu the subject-matter in litigation, 1 except only the Sovereign, the Queen- 
 consort, and the Heir-apparent, whose prerogatives prevent their being 
 sued in their own names, though they may in certain cases, as we shall 
 see presently, be sued by their respective Attorneys or Solici- 
 tors General. 2 *But there are some persons whose rights and *130 
 
 i Story, Eq. PI. § 68. 
 
 2 In England the King and Queen, though 
 they may sue, are not liable to be sued; and in 
 America a similar exemption generally belongs 
 to the Government or State. Story, Eq. PI. 
 § 69. This rule applies only where the State is 
 a part}' to the record, and not where the State 
 is only interested in the subject-matter of a suit 
 brought against her officers in their official capa- 
 cit}' in a Court of Chancer}'. Michigan State 
 Bank v. Hastings, 1 Douglass, 225; Osborn v. 
 United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738. 
 
 No direct suit can be maintained against the 
 United States, without the authority of an Act 
 of Congress, nor can any direct judgment be 
 awarded against them for costs. Marshall C. 
 J. in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 411, 412; 
 United States v. Clarke, 8 Peters, 444; United 
 States v. Barney, C. C. Maryland, 3 Hall, L. 
 J. 128; United States v. Wells, 2 Wa*h. C. 
 C. 161. But if an action be brought by the 
 United States to recover money in the hands of 
 a party, he may, by way of defence, set up any 
 legal or equitable claim he has against the 
 United States, and need not in such case be 
 turned round to an application to Congress. 
 Act of Congress, March 3, 1797, c. 74, §§ 3, 
 4; United States v. Wilkins. 6 Wheat. 135, 
 143; Walton v. United States, 9 Wheat. 651; 
 United States v. McDaniel. 7 Peters, 16; United 
 States v. Ringgold, 8 Peters, 163; United States 
 v. Clarke, id. 436; United States v. Robeson, 9 
 Peters, 319 , United States v. Hawkins, 10 Peters, 
 
 125 ; United States v. Bank of the Metropolis, 
 15 Peters, 377. 
 
 Without an Act of Congress, no direct pro- 
 ceedings will lie at the suit of an individual 
 against the United States or its property; and 
 no officer of the Government can waive its 
 privileges in this respect, or lawfully consent 
 that such a suit may be prosecuted so as to bind 
 the Government. Carr n. Uniied States, 98 
 U. S. 433; S. C. 19 A. L. J. 219. The rule is 
 the same in relation to the State and its officers, 
 except in those cases specially provided for by 
 the Constitution of the United States. Ex 
 parte Dunn, 8 S. C. 207; Owen v. State, 7 Neb. 
 108; State v. Hill, 54 Ala. 67; State v. Ward, 
 9 Heisk. 100; State v. Bank of Tennessee, 3 
 Baxter, 395. And, therefore, the Court of Chan- 
 cery cannot entertain a bill by a public creditor 
 against the State to compel a set-off of a de- 
 mand due to him from the State against an 
 independent demand which the State holds 
 against him. Raymond v. State, 54 Miss. 562. 
 
 Formerly one of the United States might be 
 sued by the citizens of another State, or by 
 citizens or subjects of any foreign State. See 
 Chisholm v. State of Georgia, 2 Dallas, 419. 
 The law in this respect was, however, changed 
 by an amendment of the Constitution of the 
 United States, which (Art. XI. of the Amend- 
 ments) declares that the judicial power of the 
 United States shall not be construed to extend 
 to any suit in Law or Equity, commenced or 
 prosecuted against one of the United States by 
 
 125
 
 * 131 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 interests are so mixed up with those of others, that a bill cannot be 
 brought against them, unless such other persons are joined with them 
 as co-defendants ; and there are other persons who, their interests being 
 independent, may be sued alone upon the record, but are incapable, from 
 the want of maturity, or the weakness of their intellectual faculties, of 
 conducting their own defence, and must, therefore, apply for and obtain 
 the assistance of others to do it on their behalf. 
 
 In the first class are included married women, whose husbands were 
 formerly to be joined with them as co-defendants upon the record, — 
 unless they were plaintiffs or exiles, or had abjured the realm, or the 
 wife had been judicially separated, or had obtained a protection order, 1 
 or leave to defend without her husband, 2 — and persons who have been 
 found idiots or lunatics, whose committees must be made co-defendants 
 with the persons whose property is intrusted to their care. 3 
 
 Under the second head are comprised infants, and all persons who, 
 although they have not been found lunatics, are nevertheless of such 
 weak intellect as to be incapable of conducting a defence by themselves ; 
 in both which cases the Court will appoint guardians, for the purpose of 
 conducting the defence on their behalf. 
 
 There is another class of persons, who, although they are under no 
 personal disability which prevents their being made amenable to the 
 jurisdiction of the Court, yet from the circumstances of their property 
 being vested in others, either permanently or temporarily, are not only 
 incapable of being made defendants alone, but so long as the disability 
 under which they labor continues, ought not, as a general rule, to be 
 parties to the record at all. In this class are included bankrupts, out- 
 laws, and persons attainted or convicted of treason or felony. 
 
 Sectiox II. — The Queen's Attorney- General and Solicitor- General. 
 
 In certain cases the Queen's Attorney-General may, as representing 
 the interests of the Crown, be made a defendant to a bill in Ecpuity ; but 
 this is to be understood as only applicable to cases in which the interests 
 
 of the Crown are incidentally concerned ; for where the rights of 
 *131 the Crown are immediately in question, as in cases in * which the 
 
 Queen is in actual possession of the property in dispute, or where 
 any title is vested in her which the suit seeks to divest, a bill will not 
 in general lie, but the party claiming relief must apply to the Queen 
 herself by Petition of Right. 1 
 
 citizens of another State, or by citizens or sub- the Union. See Chisholm v. State of Georgia, 
 
 jects of any foreign State. This inhibition 2 Dallas, 418. See also Ex parte Madrazzo, 
 
 applies only to citizens or subjects, and does 7 Peters, 627; ante, p. 17, note. 
 
 not extend to suits by a State or by foreign J See ante, p. 87. 
 
 States or Powers. The Cherokee Nation v. 2 See R. S. C. XVI. 8, and now 45 & 46 Vic. 
 
 Georgia, 5 Peters, 1 ; New Jersey v. New York, c. 75. 
 
 id. 284. They retain the capacity to sue a 8 Ld. Red. 30. 
 
 State as it was originally granted by the Con- » Reeve v. Att.-Gen. 2 Atk. 223, cited 1 
 
 stitution; and the U. S. Supreme Court has Ves. Sr. 446 ; Ld. Red. 31, 102; Ryes v. Duke 
 
 original jurisdiction in the case of suits by a of Wellington, 9 Beav. 579, 600; see also Fel- 
 
 foreign State against one of the members of kin v. Lord Herbert, 1 Dr. & S. 608; 8 Jur. 
 
 126 

 
 the queen's attorney-general. * 132 
 
 A Petition of Right to the Queen is a document in which the peti- 
 tioner sets out his right, legal or equitable, to that which is demanded 
 by him, and prays the Queen to do him right and justice, and, upon a 
 due and lawful trial of his right and title, to make him restitution. The 
 proceeding by Petition of Right exists only for the purpose of reconcil- 
 ing the dignity of the Crown and the rights of the subject, and to pro- 
 tect the latter against any injury arising from the acts of the former; 
 but it is no part of its object to enlarge or alter those rights. 2 
 
 The law relating to Petitions of Rights, and the procedure therein, is 
 amended and simplified by a recent Act of Parliament, 8 the object of 
 which is to assimilate the proceedings, as nearly as may be, to the 
 practice in actions and suits between subject and subject, and to pro- 
 vide for the recovery of costs, (a) This statute enacts that a Petition of 
 Right may be intituled in any one of the Superior Courts of Common 
 Law or Equity at Westminster, in which the subject-matter, or any 
 material part thereof, would have been cognizable between subject and 
 subject ; shall state the Christian and surname, and usual place of 
 abode, of the suppliant, and of his attorney if any, and set forth, with 
 convenient certainty, the facts entitling him to relief ; be signed by him, 
 his counsel or attorney ; and be then left with the Home Secretary for 
 her Majesty's fiat that right be done. 4 
 
 The Act and the General Order issued in pursuance thereof 5 also pro- 
 vide that, upon such fiat being obtained to a Petition of Right in Chan- 
 cery, the petition and fiat, together with a printed copy thereof, where it 
 is in writing, shall be filed at the Record and Writ Clerk's office, and be 
 marked with the name of the Judge before whom it is intended to be 
 prosecuted ; 6 that printed copies for service shall be sealed in the same 
 manner as bills ; 7 that interrogatories may be filed and marked, and 
 served with the petition, for the examination of the respondents, 
 other than the * Attorney-General ; 1 that a copy of the petition # 132 
 and fiat shall be left at the office of the Solicitor to the Treasury, 
 with an indorsement thereon, praying for a plea or answer on behalf of 
 her Majesty within twenty-eight days ; 2 that a copy of the petition, 
 allowance, and fiat shall be served upon, or left at the last or usual or 
 last known place of abode of the person in the enjoyment of the prop- 
 
 N. S. 90 ; and Story, Eq. PI. § 69, n., where Mr. 2 p er L or( j Cottenham, in Monckton v. Att.- 
 
 Justice Story remarks that, "in America no Gen. 2 M'N. & G. 412. 
 
 such general remedy by Petition of Right exists 3 23 & 24 Vic. c. 34. 
 
 against the Government ; or if it exists at all, it 4 Ibid. §§ 1, 2. For form of petition, see 
 
 is a privilege created by statute in a few States ib. Sched. No. 1, and Vol. III. 
 
 only. In cases where the Government has an 5 Ord.l Feb., 1862; 7Jur. N. S. Pt. 11.283. 
 
 interest in the subject as a matter of public 6 Cons. Ord. rr. 1, 2. 
 
 trust, it is presumed that the Attorney-General ? Cons. Ord. r. 3. 
 
 may be made a defendant, as he may be in l Cons. Ord. r. 4. For form of mterroga- 
 
 England." See Elliot v. Van Voorst. 3 Wall, tories, see Vol. Til. 
 
 Jr. 299; Fifth Natl. Bank v. Long, 9 Chi. Leg. 2 Act, §§ 3-5. For forms of indorsement, 
 
 News, 381, per Blodgett U. S. Dist. J. see ib. Sched. Nos. 2, 3; and Vol. III. 
 
 (") Under this Act, as before, the Crown 310; 14 id. 505. The Act was extended to 
 may plead double to a Petition of Right without Ireland by 36 & 37 Vic. c. 69 ; see now 44 & 45 
 leave of Court. Tobin v. Reg. 16 C. B. N. S. Vic. c. 59, § 6; 47 & 48 Vic. c. 71, § 3, 
 
 127
 
 * 133 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 erty or right, indorsed with a notice requiring him to appear within 
 eight days, and to plead or answer within fourteen days, after service ; 
 that such person, if he intends to contest the petition, must enter an 
 appearance to the same ; 8 that further time to plead or answer, or to 
 demur, may be allowed by the Court or a Judge ; 4 that in default of plea, 
 answer, or demurrer in due time, the Court or Judge may, on the applica- 
 cation of the suppliant, order the petition to be taken as confessed ; 5 
 that a decree may be made thereupon, or upon demurrer, or after hear- 
 ing ; 6 that costs may be recoverable by or against the Crown, the sup- 
 pliant, and any other parties to the proceedings ; 7 that the Judge shall, 
 on the application of the suppliant, certify to the Lords of the Treasury, 
 or to the Treasurer of the Household, any decree entitling the suppliant 
 to relief, and they may thereupon satisfy him the same ; 8 that persons 
 may sue and defend in forma pauperis ; 9 and generally, that the prac- 
 tice and course of proceeding in reference to suits shall be applicable to 
 Petitions of Right, which in this respect are to be considered as bills ; 10 
 but the Act is not to prevent any suppliant proceeding as before the 
 passing thereof. 11 
 
 According to the practice before the passing of the Act, the petition 
 was to be determined in Chancery, and the method was this : the peti- 
 tion was presented to the Queen, who subscribed it with these words : 
 " Soit droit fait al jmrtie" that is, "Let right be done to the party;" 
 and thereupon it was delivered to the Chancellor, in forma juris exe- 
 quend, that is, to be executed according to law ; and directions were given 
 that the Attorney-General should be made a party to the suit ; 12 upon 
 the petition, however, the Court would neither adjudicate upon the 
 merits, nor inquire into the facts. The whole duty of the Court, at that 
 stage of the proceedings, was to permit the party to pursue the usual 
 course of prosecuting his suit, and for that purpose a commis- 
 *133 sion was directed to * issue, to inquire into the allegations of the 
 petition. The order for the commission could not, however, be 
 obtained without direct application to the Court, and notice to the 
 Attorney-General. 1 
 
 The case of Viscount Canterbury v. Attorney-General, 2 was a Petition 
 of Right, in which the petitioner, Viscount Canterbury, claimed compen- 
 sation from the Crown for damages alleged to have been done in the 
 preceding reign, to some property of the petitioner, while Speaker of 
 the House of Commons, by the fire which, in the year 1834, destroyed 
 the two Houses of Parliament. To this petition a general demurrer 
 
 8 For form of appearance, see the Act, 9 Cons. Ord. rr. 5, 6. 
 
 Sched. No. 4; and Vol. III. No time is lim- 10 Act, § 7; Cons. Ord. r. 7; by r. 8, the 
 
 ited for the entry of an appearance on behalf of officers of the Court are to perform similar du- 
 
 the Queen. ties, and the fees and allowances are to be the 
 
 4 Act, §§ 4, 5. For forms of pleas, answers, same as in suits between subjects, 
 
 and demurrers, see Vol. III. H Act, § 18. 
 
 6 Act, § 8. 12 Coop. Eq. PI. 23; Ld. Red. 31; and see 
 
 6 Ibid. §§ 8, 9. Anstey on Petitions of Right. 
 
 7 Ibid. §§ 11, 12. i Re Robson, 2 Phil. 84. 
 
 8 Act. §§ 13, 14. For form of certificate, see 2 1 Phil. 306, 324. 
 ib. Sched. No. 5; and Vol. III. 
 
 128
 
 THE QUEEN S ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
 
 133 
 
 was filed by the Attorney-General, and was allowed by Lord Lyndhurst ; 
 from whose judgment it would appear that the Petition of Right is the 
 remedy which the subject has for an illegal seizure on the part of the 
 Crown, of lands or goods, but that there is no such form of proceeding 
 applicable to a case which, as between subject and subject, would be a 
 claim for unliquidated damages. 3 (a) 
 
 Although, in general, a bill cannot be filed against the Attorney- 
 General for the purpose of enforcing equitable rights against the direct 
 interests of the Crown, yet, in certain cases, bills were entertained on 
 the Equity side of the Court of Exchequer, as a Court of Revenue, 
 against the Attorney-General, as representing the Queen, for the pur- 
 pose of establishing claims against the estates or revenues of the Crown, 
 which in the Court of Chancery or other Courts could not have been 
 instituted without proceeding in the first instance by Petition of Right. 4 
 There is another class of suits against the Attorney-General, which 
 were frequently instituted on the Equity side of the Court of Exchequer, 
 as a Court of Revenue ; namely, suits for the purpose of relieving account- 
 ants to the Crown against the decisions of the Commissioners for Audit- 
 
 3 In addition to the cases above referred to, 
 the following are some of the recently reported 
 cases of Petitions of Right: Re Baron de Bode, 
 and Re Viscount Canterbury, 2 Phil. 85; 1 C. 
 P. Coop. temp. Cott. 143, where the practice was 
 
 De G. & J. 44; Re Holmes, 2 J. & H. 527; 8 
 Jur. N. S. 76; Tobin v. The Queen, 16 C. B. 
 N. S. 310, 315; 10 Jur. N. S. 1039. 
 
 4 Luthwich v. Att.-Gen., referred to in 
 Reeve v. Att.-Gen. 2 Atk. 223; Casberd v. 
 
 fully considered bj' Lord Cotten ham; Re Carl Att.-Gen. 6 Price, 411; and see 5 Vic. c. 5, 
 Von Frantzius, 2 De G. & J. 126; Re Rolt, i ante, p. 5. 
 
 (a) A commission will not be ordered upon 
 a Petition of Right without notice to the Attor- 
 ney-General. Re Robson, 2 Phil. 84. A Peti- 
 tion of Right, when indorsed, generally goes to 
 the Court of Chancery, the other Courts obtain- 
 ing jurisdiction only by a special indorsement. 
 Re Pering, 2 M. & W. 873. The Sovereign 
 cannot be sued by a Petition of Right for a 
 wrong or tort, the only remedy being to sue 
 the servant of the Crown who commits it, 
 Tobin v. Reg. 16 C. B. N. S. 310; 14 id. 505; 
 see Farnell v. Bowman, 12 App. Cas. G43; or 
 for infringement of letters patent by the Admi- 
 ralty. Feather v. Reg. 6 B. & S. 257; see 
 Dixon v. London Small Arms Co. 1 App. Cas. 
 632. A Petition of Right will, however, lie for 
 a breach of contract by the Crown, though 
 resulting in unliquidated damages. The 
 Banker's case, 14 How. St. Tr. 1; Wroth's 
 case, Plow. 452; Macbeth v. Haldemnn, 1 T. R. 
 178; Feather v. Reg. 6 B. & S. 294; Thomas 
 v. Reg. L. R. 10 Q. B. 31 ; see De Bode v. Reg. 
 3 H. L. Cas. 449; 13 Q. B. 380; Re Tufnell, 3 
 Ch. D. 164; Burnand v. Rodocanacbi, 5 C. P. 
 D. 427 ; 7 App. Cas. 333 ; Kirk v. Reg. L. R. 14 
 Eq. 558; Irwin v. Grey, 3 F. & F. 636, n; 
 Churchward v. The Queen, L. R. 1 Q. B. 173; 
 Fnth v. The Queen, L. R. 7 Ex. 365; Tomlme 
 v. The Queen, 4 Ex. D. 252; The Queen r. 
 vol. i. — 9 
 
 Doutre, 9 App. Cas. 745 ; Re Banda, W. N. 
 (1884) 80; 1 Seton on Judgments (5th ed.), 
 348. It is not material whether the breach is 
 caused by the acts or the omissions of the 
 Crown officials. Windsor & Annapolis Ry. Co. 
 v. Reg. 11 App. Cas. 607. In aid of a Petition 
 of Right the Crown may obtain a discovery, but 
 the suppliant cannot. Tomline v. Reg. 4 Ex. 
 D. 252; Thomas v. Reg. L. R. 10 Q. B. 44; 
 Reiner v. Salisbury, 2 Ch. D. 378, 386. The 
 Statute of Limitations cannot be pleaded to a 
 Petition of Right. Rustomjee v. Reg. 1 Q. B. 
 D. 487; 2 id. 69. When, upon such petition, 
 it appears that the Crown has had the benefit 
 of m >ney coming into its hands for a longer or 
 shorter period, in consequence of an intestacy 
 or supposed intestacy, it will be held liable for 
 interest, whether the money came to its nomi- 
 nee as administrator, or under an order declar- 
 ing it beneficially entitled. Edgar v. Reynolds, 
 27 L. J. Ch. 562; Re Gosman, 42 L. T. 804. 
 
 In this country a State is a necessary party 
 to proceedings in Equity in which its property 
 is sought to be applied to payment of its obli- 
 gations, and the suit fails when it cannot be 
 sued. Christian v. Atlantic & N. C. R. Co. 
 133 U. S. 233; State v. Temple, 134 IT. S. 22. 
 As to making the Secretary of War a party, 
 see Hawley v. Steele, 6 Ch. D. 521. 
 
 129
 
 * 135 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 iug the Public Accounts, under the 25 Geo. III. c. 52. It was decided, 
 before the abolition of the equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Ex- 
 chequer, 5 that when public accountants had reason to be dissatisfied 
 with the determination of such Commissioners, either in disallowing 
 their articles of discharge or in imposing surcharges, they might pro- 
 ceed on the Equity side of the Exchequer, against the Attorney-General, 
 and not against the Commissioners ; and that the proper mode of pro- 
 ceeding in such cases was by bill only, and not by motion or 
 *134 petition. 6 It was also held, that the statutes * providing for 
 the relief of accountants to the Crown were not confined to cases 
 where the accountant had actually been sued or impeded ; but that he 
 might proceed immediately, even during the passing of his accounts, by 
 bill in Equity, as it were quia timet. 1 There seems no reason to doubt 
 that accountants to the Crown are now entitled to the same relief; and 
 it also appears that the jurisdiction in all the above cases is still 
 retained by the Court of Exchequer, 2 but that the Court of Chancery 
 has concurrent jurisdiction. 3 
 
 Where an accountant to the Crown seeks relief by means of a bill 
 against the Attorney-General, the Attorney-General cannot, if the 
 accountant is entitled to relief, protect himself by demurrer from mak- 
 ing discovery ; 4 and although it does not appear to have been decided 
 that a bill of discovery can be filed against the Attorney-General, 
 *135 * for a discovery of facts that can be neither in his personal nor 
 in his official knowledge, or that the Crown is bound, through the 
 medium of the Attorney-General, to make that discovery, yet it is the 
 practice for the officers of the Crown to throw no difficulty in the way 
 of any proceeding for the purpose of bringing matters before a court of 
 justice, where any real point that required judicial decision occurs. 
 
 In cases in which the rights of the Crown are not immediately con- 
 cerned, that is, where the Crown is not in possession, or a title vested 
 in it is not sought to be impeached, but its rights are only incidentally 
 involved in the suit, it is the practice to make the Queen's Attorney- 
 General a party in respect of those rights. 1 Indeed, it seems that in 
 
 5 By 5 Vic. c. 5, ante, p. 5. United States, before a replication had been 
 
 « Colebrooke v. Att.-Gen. 7 Price, 146; filed, tor leave to intervene, not technically as 
 
 Crawford v. Att.-Gen. id. 1; Ex parte Cole- a party to the suit, was allowed, and leave was 
 
 brooke, id. 87; Ex parte Durrand, 3 Anst. 743; given him, without becoming a party to the 
 
 Case of York Buildings Co. 2 At k. 56. suit, to tile testimony and be heard on the 
 
 1 Colebrooke v. Att.-Gen. ubi supra. argument, but not to interfere with the plead- 
 
 2 Att.-Gen. v. Hailing, 15 M. & W. 687, ings or evidence on behalf of either of the 
 700: Att.-Gen. v. Hullett, id. 97; 8 Beav. 288, States. Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. U. S. 
 n.; Att.-Gen. v. Kingston, 6 Jur. 155, Ex. 478. This course of procedure was admitted 
 
 3 Att.-Gen. v. London, 8 Beav. 270, 285; 1 to be at variance with the English practice in 
 H. L. <"as. 440; Att.-Gen. r. Edmunds, L. R. 6 cases where the Government have an interest 
 Eq. 381; and see ante, p. 5 ; 36 & 37 Vic. c. in the issue of the suit; but it was adopted to 
 60, § 34. obviate an objection, that seemed to arise, that 
 
 4 Deare v. Att.-Gen. 1 Y. & C. Ex. 197, the United States could not, under the provi- 
 207. sions of the Constitution, become a party ir. 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 30, 102. In a suit pending in the United States Courts, in the legal sense of 
 
 the U. S. Supreme Court, relative to disputed the term, to a suit between two States. The 
 
 boundary between two States, a motion made other States were held to be concerned in the 
 
 by the Attornev-General on behalf of the adjustment of the boundary in dispute, and 
 
 130
 
 THE QUEEN S ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
 
 13G 
 
 all cases of this description, in which any right appears to be in the 
 Crown, or the interest of the Crown may be in any way affected, the 
 Court will refuse to proceed without the Attorney-General,' 2 unless it is 
 clear the result will be for the benefit of the Crown, 3 or at least that it 
 will not be in disaffirmance or derogation of its interests. 4 
 
 Thus, in Balch v. Wastall, 5 and in Hay ward v. Fry, 6 where, in conse- 
 quence of the outlawry of the defendants, it was held that all the defend- 
 ants' interest was forfeited to the Crown, the Court directed the 
 plaintiff to obtain a grant of it from the Exchequer, * and to make *136 
 the Attorney-General a party to the suit. In Burgess v. Wheate, 1 
 Lord Hardwicke directed the case to stand over, in order that the Attor- 
 ney-General might be made a party ; and in Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 2 
 which was a suit for the execution of articles relating to the boundaries 
 of two provinces in America, held under letters-patent from the King, 
 the cause was ordered to stand over for the same purpose. In like man- 
 ner in Hovenden v. Lord Annesley? in which the parties claimed under 
 two distinct grants from the Crown, each reserving a rent, but of dif- 
 ferent amounts, it was held that, inasmuch as the rights of the Crown 
 were concerned, the Attorney-General ought to be before the Court. 4 
 In Barclay v. Russell? Lord Rosslyn dismissed the bill, because a title 
 appeared upon the record to be in the Crown, although no claim had been 
 made on its behalf; and upon the same principle, in Dodder v. Bank 
 of England? Lord Eldon refused to order the dividends of stock pur- 
 chased by the old Government of Switzerland, which had been received 
 
 their interests are represented by the United 
 States. Taney C. J. said: "It. would hardly 
 become this tribunal, intrusted with jurisdic- 
 tion where sovereignties are concerned, and 
 with power to prescribe its own mode of pro- 
 ceeding, to do injustice rather than depart from 
 English precedents. A suit in a Court of jus- 
 tice between such parties, and upon such a 
 question, is without example in the jurispru- 
 dence of any other country. It is a new case, 
 and requires new modes of proceeding. And 
 if, as has been urged in argument, the United 
 States cannot, under the Constitution, become 
 a party to this suit, in the legal sense of that 
 term, and the English mode of proceeding in 
 analogous cases is therefore impracticable,- it 
 furnishes a conclusive argument for adopting 
 the mode proposed. For otherwise there must 
 be a failure of justice." Several of the Judges 
 dissented. 
 
 2 By 5 & G Vic. c. 69, § 2 (repealed by 46 
 & 47 Vic. c. 49, § 4, Sched.; but reproduced 
 by R. S. C. 188:), Ord. XXXVII. 36), the Attor- 
 ney-General is to be made a party defendant 
 in all suits under that Act touching any honor 
 &c. in which the Queen may have any estate 
 or interest. As to the necessity of making the 
 Attorney-General a party in the cases of aliens, 
 felons, no heir-at-law, no next of kin, lunatics 
 and idiots, see ante, Chap. II. § 1; Calvert on 
 
 Parties, 388, et seq. See, where no heir-at-law 
 can be found, Humbertson v. Humbertson, 1 
 P. W. 332. Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden, 177; 
 Smith v. Bicknell, 1 V. & B. 51, 53, note; 
 Miller v. Warmington, 1 J. & W. 484. And 
 where no next of kin can be found, Jones v. 
 Goodchild, 3 P. W. 33; Middleton v. Spicer, 1 
 Bro C. C. 201. Where next of kin of a lunatic 
 are unknown, petition under Trustee Act, 1850, 
 should be served on Attorney-General, and not 
 on Solicitor to the Treasurv. Re Rourke, 2 De 
 G J. & S. 426. 
 
 3 Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, 2 Sch. & 
 Lef. 618. 
 
 , 4 Stafford v. Earl of Anglesev, Hardres, 
 181. 
 
 5 1 P. Wins. 445. 
 
 6 lb. 446; and see Rex r. Fowler, Bunb. 38; 
 
 v. Bromley, 2 P. Wins. 269; Bromley v. 
 
 Smith, 26 Beav. 644, 674. As to felons, see 
 Stokes v. Holden, 1 Keen, 145, 147; Roberts r. 
 Russell, 1 R. & M. 752; lie Davis, 27 L. T. 
 477. 
 
 i 1 Edon, 177, 181. 
 2 1 Ves. Sr. 444. 
 8 2 Sch. & Lef. 607. 
 
 4 Sch. & Lef. 617. 
 
 5 3 Ves. 424, 436. 
 
 6 10 Ves. 352, 354. 
 
 131
 
 137 
 
 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 before the filing of the bill, to be paid into Court by the trustees, on the 
 application of the new Government, which had not been recognized by 
 the Government of this country, until the Attorney-General was made 
 a party to the suit. But although, in cases where a title in the Crown 
 appears upon the record, the Court will not make a decree unless the 
 Attorney-General be a party to the suit, yet it seems that the circum- 
 stance of its appearing by the record that the plaintiff has been con- 
 victed of manslaughter, and that a commission of attainder has been 
 issued, will not support a plea for not making the Attorney-General a 
 party ; because an inquisition of attainder is only to inform, and does 
 not entitle the Crown to any right. 7 It seems, however, that in this 
 respect an inquisition of attainder differs from a commission to inquire 
 whether a person under whom the plaintiff claims was an alien ; the 
 former being only for the sake of informing the Crown, but the latter 
 to entitle. 8 
 
 The necessity of making the Attorney-General a party is not confined 
 to those cases in which the interests of the Crown in its own right are 
 concerned, but it extends also to cases in which the Queen is consid- 
 ered as the protector of the rights of others. Thus, as we have seen, 9 
 the grantee of a chose in action from the Crown may either institute 
 proceedings in the name of the Attorney-General, or in his own name, 
 
 making the Attorney-General a defendant to the suit ; and so, in 
 *137 suits in which the * Crown may be interested in its character of 
 
 protector of the rights of others, the Attorney-General should be 
 made a party. So the Attorney-General is a necessary party to all 
 suits where the subject-matter is, either wholly or in part, money appro- 
 priated for general charitable purposes ; because the Queen, as parens 
 patriot, is supposed to superintend the administration of all charities, 
 and acts in this behalf by her Attorney-General. 1 Where, however, a 
 legacy is given to a charity already established, as where it is given to 
 the trustees of a particular foundation, or to the treasurer or other officer 
 of some charitable institution, to become a part of the general funds of 
 such foundation or institution, the Attorney-General need not be a 
 party, because he can have no interference with the distribution of their 
 general funds. 2 And it seems that there is a distinction where trustees 
 of the charity are appointed by the donor, and where no trustees are 
 appointed, but there is a devise immediately to charitable uses ; in the 
 latter case, there can be no decree unless the Attorney-General be 
 made a party, but it is otherwise where trustees are appointed by the 
 donor. 8 
 
 7 Burk v. Brown, 2 Atk. 397. 
 
 8 Ibid. 
 
 9 Ante, p. 7. 
 
 1 " The duty of maintaining the rights of 
 the public, and of a number of persons too 
 indefinite to vindicate their own, has vested in 
 the Commonwealth, and is exercised in Massa- 
 chusetts, as in England, through the Attorney- 
 General. Going p. Emory, 16 Pick. 119; County 
 Attorney v. May, 5 Cush. 338-340; Gen. Stats. 
 c. 14, § 20, Pub. Stats, c. 17, § 6. It is upon 
 
 132 
 
 this ground that, in a suit instituted by the 
 trustees of a charity to obtain the instructions 
 of the Court, the Attorney-General should be 
 made a party defendant, as he has been by 
 order of the Court in this case." Gray J. in 
 Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539, 579, 580; 
 see Harvard College v. Society for Promoting 
 Theological Education. 3 Gray, 280. 
 
 2 Wellbeloved v. Jones, 1 S. & S. 40, 43; 
 Chitty p. Parker, 4 Bro. C. C 38. 
 
 8 4 Vin. 500, pi. 11, nutis ; 2 Eq. Cas. Abr.
 
 THE QUEEN'S ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
 
 139 
 
 * The rule that, in cases where a legacy is given to the trustees *138 
 of a charity already in existence, for the general purposes of the 
 charity, it is not necessary, in a suit concerning it, to make the Attorney- 
 General a defendant, applies only to those charities which are of a per- 
 manent nature, and whose objects are defined ; for it has been determined 
 that where legacies are given to the officers of a charitable institution, 
 which is not of a permanent nature, or whose objects are not defined, it 
 is necessary to make the Attorney-General a party to a suit relating to 
 them. 1 Even in cases where a legacy is given to the trustees of a charity 
 already in existence, the trusts of which are of a permanent and definite 
 nature, unless it appears, from the terms of the bequest, that the trusts 
 upon which the legacy is given are identical with those upon which the 
 general funds of the corporation are held, it is necessary to make the 
 Attorney-General a party. 2 
 
 The Attorney-General is a necessary * party only where the *139 
 charity is in the nature of a general charity ; and where it is 
 merely a private charity, it will not be necessary to bring him before 
 the Court. Thus, where the suit related to a voluntary society, entered 
 into for the purpose of providing a weekly payment to such of the niem- 
 
 167, pi. 13, n. Therefore where a bill was filed 
 to establish a will and to perform several trusts, 
 some of them relating to charities in which some 
 of the trustees were plaintiffs, and other trus- 
 tees and several of the cestui que trusts were 
 defendants, an objection, because the Attorney- 
 General was not made a defendant, was over- 
 ruled, it being considered that some of the 
 trustees of the charity being defendants, there 
 might be a decree to compel the execution of 
 trusts relating to these charities. Monil v. 
 Lawson, 4 Vin. 500, pi. 11; 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 
 167, pi. 13. It appears from a subsequent part 
 of the case that one of the trustees of the charity 
 was abroad. In that case, it was said that if 
 there should be any collusion between the par- 
 ties relating to the charity, the Attorney-Gen- 
 eral might, notwithstanding a decree, bring an 
 information to establish the charity and set 
 aside the decree, and that he might do the 
 same, though he were made a defendant, in 
 case of collusion between the parties. But it 
 seems that the mere circumstance of the Attor- 
 ney-General not having been made a party to 
 the proceeding will not be a sufficient ground 
 to sustain an information for the purpose of 
 setting aside a decree made in a former suit, 
 unless the decree is impeached upon other 
 grounds. Att.-Gen. v. Warren, 2 Swanst. 291, 
 311. 
 
 1 Thus in Wellbeloved v. Jones, 1 S. & S. 
 40, 43, where a legacy was given to the officers, 
 for the time being, of an academical institution 
 established at York for the education of dis- 
 senting ministers, which officers, with the ad- 
 dition of such other persons as they should 
 choose (in case they should think an additional 
 
 number of trustees necessary), were to stand 
 possessed of the money, upon trust, to apply 
 the interest and dividends for the augmentation 
 of the salaries of dissenting ministers, a prefer- 
 ence being given to those who should have been 
 students in the York institution, and in case 
 such institution should cease, then upon trust 
 that the persons in whose names the fund 
 should be invested, should transfer the same 
 to the principal officers for the time being of 
 such other institution as should succeed the 
 same, or be established upon similar principles, 
 a bill filed by the officers of the institution, 
 praying to have the fund transferred to them, 
 to which the Attorney-General was not a party, 
 was ordered to stand over, with leave to amend 
 by making the Attorney-General a party; the 
 Judge observing that the Court could never 
 permit the legacy to come into the hands of the 
 plaintiffs, who happened to fill particular offices 
 in the society, but would take care to secure 
 the objects of the testator by the creation of a 
 proper and permanent trust, and upon hearing 
 the cause, would send it to the Master for that 
 purpose; and that it would be one of the duties 
 of the Attorney-General to attend the Master 
 upon the subject. 
 
 2 Corporation of the Sons of the Clergy v. 
 Mose, 9 Sim. 610, 613. A bill in Equity for 
 the transfer of a public charity to new trustees 
 may be filed by the present trustees in their 
 own names, making the Attorney-General a 
 defendant. Harvard College v. Society for pro- 
 moting Theological Education, 3 Gray, 280; 
 Governors of Christ's Hospital v. Att -Gen. 5 
 Hare, 257; see Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 
 539. 
 
 133
 
 * 140 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 bers as should become necessitous, and their widows, the objection was 
 overruled that the Attorney-General was not a party : because it was in 
 the nature only of a private charity. 1 
 
 Where the Attorney-General is made a defendant to a suit, it is, it 
 seems, entirely in his discretion whether he will put in a full answer or 
 not. 2 Formerly, he merely stated, by a general answer, that he was a 
 stranger to the matter in question, and that, on behalf of the Crown, he 
 claimed such rights and interests as it should appear to have therein, 
 and prayed that the Court would take care of such rights and interests 
 of the Crown in the same. 8 In cases, however, in which the interests of 
 the Crown, or the purposes of public justice require it, a full answer 
 will, it seems, be put in : 4 as in Craufurd v. The Attorney- General? 
 where the Lords of the Treasury had directed that the question might 
 be brought before the consideration of a Court of justice, and it would, 
 therefore, have been unbecoming in the Attorney-General to urge any 
 matter of form which might prevent the case from being properly sub- 
 mitted to the Court before which it was brought. 6 In Errington v. The 
 Attorney- General,'' the Attorney-General, being one of the defendants to 
 a bill of interpleader, put in the usual general answer, upon which the 
 other defendants moved that the bill might be dismissed, and the injunc- 
 tion dissolved; the Attorney-General opposed the motion, and at the 
 same time prayed that he might be at liberty to withdraw his general 
 answer, and put in another, insisting upon the particular right of the 
 Crown to the money in question : which was granted. 
 
 The answer of the Attorney-General is put in without oath, but is 
 usually signed by him. And it seems that such an answer is not liable 
 to be excepted to, even though it be to a cross-bill filed by the defendant 
 in an information, for the purpose of obtaining a discovery of matters 
 alleged to be material to his defence to the information. We have, 
 however, seen before that where a cross-bill is filed against the Attorney- 
 General, praying relief as well as discovery, he cannot protect himself 
 from answering by means of a demurrer: 8 but whether he could, 
 *140 by such means, protect himself *from answering a mere bill of dis- 
 covery, does not appear to have been decided ; it is most probable 
 that he might, and that the Court would, in such a case, if discovery 
 were wanted from the Crown, leave the party to prefer his Petition of 
 Right. 1 
 
 Under the more recent practice, the usual course was for the Attor- 
 ney-General to put in no answer ; but in cases of the description above 
 mentioned, it is presumed that the proper course is to file interrogatories 
 for his examination, and that he would then put in a full answer. 
 
 The right of the Attorney-General to receive his costs, where he is 
 made a defendant to a suit, has been before noticed. 2 It will suffice, 
 
 1 Anon. 3 Atk. 277. 6 See also Deare v. Att.-Gen. 1 Y. & C. Ex. 
 
 2 Davison v. Att.-Gen. 5 Price, 398, n. See 197. 
 
 Stevens v. Stevens, 24 N. J. Eq. 77, 86. 7 Bunb. 303. 
 
 8 See Bunb. 303; 1 Hare. 223. 8 Deare v. Att.-Gen. ubi supra; ante,p. 134 
 
 * See Colebrooke v. Att.-Gen. 7 Price, 192. * Ibid. 
 
 6 7 Price. 1. 2 Ante, p. 12. 
 
 134
 
 FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS, STATES, AND AMBASSADORS. * 141 
 
 therefore, here to repeat, that he constantly receives his costs, where he 
 is made a defendant in respect of legacies given to charities ; and that in 
 Moggrldge v. Thackwell, 3 costs were given to all parties, including the 
 Attorney-General, as between solicitor and client, out of the fund in 
 Court. It appears also that he frequently receives his costs where he is 
 made a defendant in respect of the rights of the Crown, in cases of 
 intestacy. 4 There is, however, no invariable practice of giving him his 
 costs in all cases out of the fund, the subject-matter of the suit. 5 - 
 
 During the vacancy of the office of Attorney-General, the Solicitor- 
 General may be made a defendant to support the interests of the Crown ; 8 
 and where there has been an information by the Attorney-General, the 
 object of which has been to set up a general claim on behalf of the 
 Crown, at variance with the interests of a public charity, the Solicitor- 
 General has been made defendant, for the purpose of supporting the 
 interests of such charity against the general claim of the Attorney- 
 General. On the other hand, where an information was filed by the 
 Attorney-General, claiming certain property for charitable purposes, 
 inconsistent with the rights of property of the Crown, the Solicitor- 
 General was made a defendant, as the officer on whom the representa- 
 tion of such rights had devolved. 7 
 
 * Section III. — Foreign Sovereigns, States, and Ambassadors. *141 
 
 It has before been stated that a foreign Sovereign or State, recognized 
 by this Government, may sue either at Law or in Equity, in respect of 
 matters not partaking of a political character; * and it has been deter- 
 mined, that if he files a bill, a cross-bill may be filed against him, 
 because, by suing here, he submits himself to the jurisdiction of the 
 Court; and in such a case, if required, he is bound to answer upon oath, 2 
 or, if a body politic, to name some person who can give discovery. 8 (a) 
 
 8 7 Ves. 36, 88, affirmed by H. L.; see 13 and it seems that the Prince of Wales, as 
 
 Ves. 416; Mills v. Farmer, 19 Ves. 483, 490; Duke of Cornwall, has the same prerogative, 
 
 1 Mer. 55, 104; Att.-Gen. v. Lewis, 8 Beav. although no cases appear in the books wherein 
 
 179. that point has been decided or discussed. See 
 
 4 Att.-Gen. v. Earl of Ashburnham, 1 S. & ante, p. 16, n. 12. 
 S. 397 ; ante, p. 12; see now 18 & 19 Vic. c. 90, t Ante, p. 17, and notes. 
 
 § 1, as to costs of Attorney-General in revenue 2 Hulle.tt v. King of Spain, 2 Bligh, N. S. 
 
 suits; and 24 & 25 Vic. c. 92, § 1, in cases as 47; 1 Dow & CI. 169; S. C. 7 Bligh. N. S. 359; 
 
 to succession duty. And see 23 & 24 Vic. c. 1 CI. & Fin. 333; United States v. Wagner, L. 
 
 34, §§ 11, 12; ante, p. 132. R. 2 Ch. 582; Rothschild v. Queen of Portugal, 
 
 6 Perkins v. Bradley, 1 Hare, 219, 234. 3 V. & C. Ex. 594. The Court may stay pro- 
 
 6 Ld. Ked. 102. ceedings in the original suit, until the means 
 
 7 Att.-Gen. v. Dean and Canons of Windsor, of discovery are secured in the cross-suit. See 
 24 Beav. 679; 4 Jur. N. S. 818; 8 H. L. Cas. Columbian'Government v. Rothschild, 1 Sim. 
 369; 6 Jur. N. S. 833; and see Att.-Gen. v. 94; Prioleau v. United States, L. R. 2 F.q. 659; 
 Mayor of Bristol, 2 J. & W. 312; 3 Mad. 319; S. C. nom. United States v. Prioleau, 12 Jur. 
 Att.-Gen. v. Ironmongers' Co. 2 M. & K. 578, n. N. S. 724; United States v. Wagner, L. R. 
 As to obtaining the appearance or answer of 3 F.q. 724. And it may dismiss the suit if its 
 the Attorney-General, see post, Chap. VIII. order be not properly obeyed. Republic of 
 § 4; Chap. X. § 2. The Queen-consort must Liberia v. Rove, 1 App. Cas. 139. Ante, p. 19, 
 be sued by her Attorney or Solicitor General, n. 4; 20, n. 1. 
 
 in the same manner as a King or Queen regnant; 8 Ibid.; Republic of Costa Rica i>. Erlanger, 
 
 (a) In a suit against a foreign government, resident in England, in Smith v. Weguelin, 
 substituted service was directed on its minister W. N. (1867) 273. If a suit is brought against 
 
 135
 
 * 142 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 The question whether a foreign Sovereign, who has not submitted to 
 the jurisdiction, can be sued in the Courts of this country, was raised in 
 Duke of Brunswick v. The King of Hanover,* where the defendant, as a 
 subject of this kingdom, having renewed his allegiance after his acces- 
 sion to the throne of Hanover, and exercised the rights of an English 
 peer, the general object of the suit was to obtain an account of property 
 belonging to the plaintiff, alleged to have been possessed by the defend- 
 ant, under color of an instrument creating a species of guardianship 
 unknown to the law of England. None of the acts complained of took 
 place in this country, or were done by the defendant before he became 
 King of Hanover ; and these acts appeared to be of a political 
 *142 character. *As it did not appear that the alleged acts and trans- 
 actions of the defendant were of such a description as could ren- 
 der him liable to be sued in this country, his demurrer to the bill was 
 allowed. It further appears from this case that as a Sovereign prince is 
 prima facie entitled to special immunities, it ought to appear on the bill 
 that the case is not one to which such special immunities extend. 1 
 
 There have been cases in which, the Court being called upon to dis- 
 tribute a fund in which some foreign Sovereign or State may have had 
 an interest, it has been thought expedient and proper to make such Sov- 
 ereign or State a party. The effect has been to make the suit perfect as 
 to parties, but as to the Sovereign made a defendant, the effect has not 
 been to compel, or attempt to compel, hi in to come in and submit to 
 judgment in the ordinary course, but to give him an opportunity to come 
 in and claim his right, or establish his interest in the subject-matter of 
 the suit. 2 The Court may, however, administer the fund, although he 
 does not come in ; 3 and the agent of a foreign Government may be 
 
 1 Ch. D. 171; Republic of Peru v. Weguelin, 
 L. R. 20 Eq. 140; Hettihewage Shnan Appu 
 v. Queen's Advocate, 9 App. Cas. 571, 588. 
 
 4 6 Beav. 1 ; affirmed 2 H L. Cas. 1 ; and 
 see Wadsworth v. Queen of Spain, 17 Q. B. 
 171; Gladstone v. Musurus Bey, 1 H. & M. 
 495; 9 Jur. N. S. 71; Strousberg v. Republic 
 of Costa Rica, 27 W. R. 125. An English 
 Court has no jurisdiction to enforce the con- 
 tracts of a foreign government in England. 
 Smith v. Weguelin, L. R. 8. Eq. 198. 
 
 i See 6 Bpav. 1, 58. 
 
 2 Ibid. 39. In Gladstone v. Musurus Bey, 
 
 1 H. &. M. 495, 9 Jur. N. S. 71, the Sultan 
 was made a defendant, but did not appear. 
 If the Court cannot give relief against the gov- 
 ernment the suit fails. Gladstone r. Ottoman 
 Bank, 1 H. & M. 505; Lariviere v. Morgan, 
 W. N. (1872) 42, 60; L. R. 7 Ch.550; Foreign 
 Bondholders v. Pastor, 23 W. R. 109; W.N. 
 (1874) 204; Steward v. Bank of England, W. 
 N. (1876)263; Smith v. Weguelin, 15 W. R. 
 558; L. R. 8 Eq. 198; W. N. (1867) 273; 15 
 W. R. 558. 
 
 3 Morgan v. Lariviere, L. R. 7 H. L. 423. 
 
 the agent of a foreign power, and it is admitted 
 as a defendant upon its own application for 
 the purpose of releasing its property from the 
 restraint of an injunction, the privilege of sov- 
 ereignty is not waived. Vavasseur v. Krupp, 
 9 Ch I). 351. The property of a foreign sover- 
 eign cannot be reached by a suit in rem. The 
 Constitution, 4 P. D. 39; TheParlement Beige, 
 5 P. D. 197. As to the right of a consul of a 
 foreign government to intervene and claim a 
 vessel as its property, see The Conserva, 38 
 Fed. Rep. 431. In The Charkieh, L. R. 4 
 Adm. & Ecc. 59, it was said that a sovereign 
 
 136 
 
 who assumes the character of a trader, waives 
 his privilege; but this view will not be taken 
 in the Courts of the government against which 
 the suit is brought. Troy & Greenfield Rail- 
 road v. Commonwealth, 127 Mass. 43; United 
 States v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 436; Curran v. Arkan- 
 sas, 15 How. 304; The Davis, 10 Wall. 15; 
 Carr v. United States, 98 U. S. 433; Long v. 
 The Tampico, 16 Fed. Rep. 491. An assign- 
 ment of a claim against a foreign government, 
 made before it is established, will be upheld in 
 Equity. Peugh v. Porter, 112 U. S. 737.
 
 CORPORATIONS AND JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES. 
 
 143 
 
 restrained from sending out of the jurisdiction securities which it had 
 been agreed should be retained in the country. 4 
 
 The Governor and Government of a colony cannot be sued in England 
 upon a contract made by their agent in the name of the Sovereign. 5 
 
 An Ambassador, authorized and received as such by her Majesty, can- 
 not be sued in the Courts of England, 6 unless he is himself a subject of 
 the Sovereign to whom he is accredited ; in which case it seems he enjoys 
 an immunity from legal process extending only to such things as are 
 connected with his office and ministry. 7 (a) 
 
 * Section IV. — Corporations and Joint-Stock Companies and 
 
 Partnerships. 
 
 *143 
 
 Corporations aggregate are sued by their corporate name, — that is, 
 their name of foundation ; it seems, however, that if a corporation by 
 prescription be known by a particular name, it is sufficient to sue it 
 by that name. 1 But where the commencement of it appears by the 
 record, it cannot be sued by any other name than that under which it 
 has been incorporated. 2 
 
 A corporation aggregate which has a head cannot be sued without it, 3 
 
 4 Foreign Bondholders v. Pastor, 23 W. R. 
 109. 
 
 s Sloman v. New Zealand, 1 C. P. D. 563. 
 
 6 7 Anne, C. 12 ; which Act professes to be, 
 and has frequently been adjudged to be, de- 
 claratory, and in confirmation of the Common 
 Law, 1 B. & C 162. See as to this statute, 
 Service v. Castaneda, 2 Coll. 56; Taylor v. 
 Best, 14 C. B. 487; 18 Jur. 402; See also Glad- 
 stone r. Musurus Bey, ubi supra, in which V. C. 
 Wood held on this statute that a foreign am- 
 bassador cannot be impleaded before an English 
 tribunal. The 5th section of the Act excepts 
 the case of a bankrupt in the service of any 
 ambassador. 
 
 " Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover, 
 6 Beav. 52; 1 Kent, 38, 182. 
 
 («) The privilege of an ambassador also 
 extends to immunity against all civil suits in a 
 friendly country through which he is passing to 
 the place of his diplomatic duties. Holbrook 
 v. Henderson, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 619; Wilson v. 
 Blanco, 4 N. Y Sup. 714. The immunity is 
 not personal, but is the privilege of his gov- 
 ernment; hence his assent to any infringement 
 of that privilege is immaterial. United States 
 v. Benner, Baldw. 234. The privilege extends 
 to the domestic servants and the secretary and 
 attache of the ambassador who perform bona 
 fide and substantial services for him. Hopkins 
 v. De Robeck, 3 T. R. 79 ; Parkinson v. Potter, 
 16 Q. B. D. 152; Ex parte Cabrera, 1 Wash. 
 232; United States v. Lafontaine, 4 Cranch, 
 C. C. 173; United States v. Jeffers, id. 704; 
 
 1 Ante, p. 21; Att.-Gen. v. Worcester, 2 
 Phil. 3; 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 18. 
 
 2 Ibid. See ante, p 21, note. But see Alex- 
 ander v. Berney, N. J. Eq. 90, where an 
 adjudication in bankruptcy against a corpora- 
 tion by its original name, after a legislative 
 change of name, was held valid. 
 
 s 2 Bac. Ab. tit. Corp. (E.), pi. 2. In 
 Daugars v. Rivaz, 28 Beav. 233, 249, 6 Jur. 
 N. S. 854, it was held that the corporation of 
 the French Protestant Church having become 
 divided into separate churches, and there be- 
 ing no public officer at the head of the corpo- 
 ration, the bill was properly tiled against the 
 governing body of the particular church, and 
 not against the corporation by its corporate 
 
 Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 Dallas, 117. 
 In Re Cloete, 65 L. T. 102; 7 T. L. R. 565, a 
 British subject, who was appointed honorary 
 attache of the Persian embassy in London, was 
 held not entitled to use such appointment to 
 shield him from a petition in bankruptcy, or 
 other civil process relating to business carried 
 on in London. But in general a British sub- 
 ject, so accredited by a foreign government, 
 is exempt from the local jurisdiction in the 
 absence of an express condition that such juris- 
 diction is retained. Macartney v. Garbutt, 
 24 Q. B. D. 368. An attache to a foreign am- 
 bassador in England is not liable for rates 
 assessed on his private residence. Parkinson 
 v. Potter, 16 Q. B. D. 152. 
 
 137
 
 * 145 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 but it is not necessary to mention the name of the head. 4 It is not in 
 general proper to make individual members of aggregate corporations 
 parties by their proper Christian aud surnames ; though individual mem- 
 bers and officers of a corporation may be made parties for the purpose 
 of making them answerable for unauthorized 5 or illegal 6 acts which they 
 have done in the name of, or with the sanction of the corporation. 7 
 *144 In * Attorney- General v. Wilson, 1 a corporate body, suing both as 
 plaintiff aud relator, sustained a suit against five persons, formerly 
 members of the corporation, in respect of unauthorized acts done by 
 them in the name of the corporation. 2 
 
 It has been thought that, as a corporation can sue within a foreign 
 jurisdiction, there is no reason why it may not be sued without its juris- 
 diction, in the same manner, and under the same regulations, as domestic 
 corporations ; 8 and accordingly in some States foreign corporations have 
 been held to answer to actions in their Courts. 4 
 
 The practice of making the officers or servants of a corporation par- 
 ties to a suit, for the purpose of eliciting from them a discovery, upon 
 oath, of the matters charged in the bill, has been too frequently acted 
 upon and acknowledged to be now a matter of doubt. 5 The first case 
 which occurs upon the point is an anonymous one, in Vernon, 6 
 *145 where a bill having been filed against a * corporation to discover 
 writings, and the defendants answering under their common seal, 
 and so, not being sworn, would answer nothing to their prejudice, it 
 
 4 3 Salk. 103; 1 Leon. 307; Dummer v. 
 Chippenham, 14 Ves. 245, 254. 
 
 s Att.-Gen. v. Wilson, C. & P. 1, 21. 
 
 6 Betts v. De Vitre, 11 Jur. N. S. 9, 11; 34 
 L. J. Ch. 289. 
 
 t As to obtaining discovery from a corpora- 
 tion, see post, p. 145, note (a), and Chap. XLII. 
 Discovery. 
 
 i C. & P. 1, 21 ; Angell & Ames, Corp. 
 §676. 
 
 2 There are cases in which a bill in Equity 
 will lie against a corporation for diverting or 
 misapplying its funds or credit &c, by one of 
 its members. Cunliffe r. Manchester and Bol- 
 ton Canal Co. 1 My. & K. 131, note. See ante, 
 26, n. 1, and infra, 243, n. 4. The company 
 is a necessary party to a bill by a policy-holder 
 against the officers of a mutual insurance com- 
 pany, who, having funds to pay the plaintiff's 
 loss, neglected to pay it, and fraudulently 
 applied the funds to other purposes. Lyman 
 v. Bonney, 101 Mass. 562. And see, as to 
 the necessity of making corporation a party, 
 Davenport c. Dows, 18 Wall. 626. 
 
 3 Bushel v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. 15 Serg. 
 &R. 176; Angell & Ames, Corp. § 402. 
 
 4 Day v. Essex County Bank, 13 Vt. 97: St. 
 Louis Perpetual Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 9 Mo. 422; 
 Hadley o. Freedman's Sav. & Tr. Co. 2 Tenn. 
 Ch. 122. 
 
 Corporations created by any other State, 
 having property in Massachusetts, shall be 
 
 138 
 
 liable to be sued, and their property shall be 
 subject to attachment, in like maimer as resi- 
 dents of other States having property in that 
 State are liable to be sued and their property 
 to be attached. Mass. Gen. Stats, c. 68, § 15; 
 Pub. Stats, c. 105, § 28; Silloway v. Columbian 
 Ins. Co. 8 Gray, 199; see Libby r. Hodgdon, 9 
 N. H. 394; Moulin v. Ins. Co. 4 Zabrisk. 222; 
 Thomas v. Merchants' Bank, 9 Paige, 215; 
 Nash v. Rector &c. of the Evangelical Luth- 
 eran Church, 1 Miles, 78; Peckham »• North 
 Parish in Haverhill, 16 Pick. 274; Erickson v. 
 Nesmith, 4 Allen. 237. 
 
 But in Willistnn v. Mich. Southern R. R. 
 Co. 13 Allen, 400, it was held that no equitable 
 relief can be granted in Massachusetts against 
 a foreign corporation which has neither officers 
 nor place of business in Massachusetts, for a 
 failure to declare and pay dividends according 
 to the stipulations of their certificates of stock. 
 Service of the writ has been made in ttijs case 
 only by trustee process, attaching funds in the 
 hands of the debtors of the defendants in 
 Massachusetts. See Stephenson v. Davis, 56 
 Maine, 73. 
 
 s Ld. Red. 188, 189. 
 
 6 1 Vern. 117; but the answer cannot be 
 read against the corporation. Wych v. Meal, 3 
 P. Wms. 310, 312 ; Gibbons v. Waterloo Bridge 
 Co. 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 385; W T adeer 
 v. East India Co. 29 Beav. 300; 7 Jur. N. S. 
 350.
 
 CORPORATIONS AND JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES. 
 
 145 
 
 was ordered that the clerk of the company, and such principal members 
 as the plaintiff should think tit, should answer on oath, and that the 
 Master should settle the oath. In Glusscott v. Copper Miners' Com- 
 pany, 1 where the plaintiff was sued at Law by a body corporate, and tiled 
 his bill for discovery only, making the governor, deputy-chairman, one 
 of the directors, and the secretary of the company co-defendants with 
 the company, a demurrer to the bill, objecting that an officer of a cor- 
 poration could not be made a co-defendant to a bill which sought for 
 discovery only, or, at any rate, that individual members could not be 
 joined as defendants with the corporation at large, was overruled. 2 (a) 
 
 Fenton v. Hughes, 7 Sumner's Ves. 287, Per- 
 kins's note («); Brumley v. Westchester Co. 
 Mauuf. Co. 1 John. Ch. 366; Verniilyea v. Ful- 
 ton Bank, 1 Paige, 37; Walker v. Hallett. 1 
 Ala. (N. S.) 379; Kennebec and Portland R. R. 
 Co. v. Portland and Kennebec R. R. Co. 54 
 
 i 11 Sim. 305; see Att.-Gen. v. Mercers' 
 Co. 9 W. R. 83; Att.-Gen. v. East Dereham 
 Corn Exchange, 5 W. R. 486 ; Ranger v. Great 
 Western Ry. Co. 4 De G. & J. 74; 5 Jur. N. S. 
 1191; Harvey v. Beckwith, 2 H. & M. 429; 
 Pepper v. Green, ib. 478; see also Moodaley v. 
 Morton, 1 Bro. C. C. 469. Lord Eldon, in 
 Dummer v. Chippenham, 14 Ves. 254, men- 
 tioned it as his opinion that the case of Stewart 
 v. East India Co. 2 Vern. 380, in which a de- 
 murrer to a bill against the company and one 
 of its servants is reported to have been allowed, 
 is a misprint; and that, instead of st ting that 
 the demurrer was allowed without putting them 
 to answer as to matter of fraud and contrivance, 
 which is nonsense, it should have been that 
 the demurrer was disallowed, with liberty to 
 insist by their answer that they should not be 
 compelled to answer the charges of fraud, &c.; 
 this case, however, appears to be correct^' re- 
 ported. See M'lntosh v. Great Western Ry. 
 Co. 2 De G. & S 770. 
 
 - Officers and members of a corporation may 
 be made parties to a bill so far as the bill seeks 
 for discovery, though they have no individual 
 interest in the suit, and no relief can be had 
 against them. Wright v. Dame, 1 Met. 237; 
 Cartwnght v. Hateley, 1 Sumner's Ves. 293, 
 note (1), Le Texier v. Margrave, 5 Ves. 322; 
 
 (a) See In re Alexandria Palace Co. 16 Ch. 
 D. 58; Amos v. Heme Bay Pavilion Prom- 
 enade Co 54 L. T. 264,- Colgate v. Companie 
 Francaise, 23 Fed. Rep 82, Hibernia Ins. Co. 
 v. St. Louis & N. O. Trans. Co. 10 id. 596; 
 Post v. Toledo &c. Hailroad, 144 Mass. 341; 
 Chase v. Vanderbilt. 62 N. Y. 307; Buckner r. 
 Abrahams, 3 Tenn. Ch. 346 ; McCreerj' v. Cobb, 
 93 Mich. 463; Virginia Manuf. Co. v. Hale, 93 
 Ala. 542. 
 
 An officer of a defendant corporation, who 
 is not himself a party to the suit, cannot, under 
 the Equity Rules of the U. S. Supreme Court, 
 be required to give discovery. French t\ First 
 National Bank, 7 Ben. 488; Kirbv v. Lake 
 Shore Ry. Co 14 Fed. Rep. 261. Nor can he 
 be made a party to a cross-bill for the purpose 
 of obtain ng information which was not re- 
 ceived by him as an officer or stockholder. 
 
 Maine, 173, 184; see Garr v. Bright, 1 Barb. 
 Ch. 157; Masters v. Rossie Galena Lead Mining 
 Co. 2 Sandf. Ch. 301; Mclntyre v. Trustees of 
 Union College, 6 Paige. 229; Many v. Beekman 
 Iron Co. 9 Paige, 188; Governor & Co. of the 
 Copper Mines, 5 Lond. Jur. 264; Bevans v. 
 Dmgman'8 Turnpike, 10 Barr, 174; McKim v. 
 Odom, 3 Bland, 421 ; United States v. Wagner, 
 L. R. 2 Ch. 587, 588. Prioleau v. United 
 States, L. R. 2 Eq 667, 668. The reason for 
 the relaxation of the general rule, that a mere 
 witness cannot be made defendant in the case 
 of a corporation, is that the answer of a cor- 
 poration is not put in under oath, and that 
 hence an answer is required from some person 
 or persons capable of making a full discovery, 
 as the agents or the officers of a corporation. 
 Howell v. Arkmore, 9 N. J. Eq. 92; Lmdsley 
 v. James, 3 Coldw. 485; Smith v. St. Louis 
 Mut. Life Ins. Co. 2 Tenn. Ch. 599. Under the 
 Judicature Act, the officers of a corpora'ion 
 cannot be made defendants. Wilson i\ Church, 
 9 Ch. D. 552. 
 
 McComb v. Chicago, St. Louis &c. R- Co. 19 
 Blatch. 69. Officers of a corporation who make 
 an invalid contract, under which its property is 
 retained by the other party to the contract, are 
 not necessary parties to its bill against that 
 party. Pioneer Cold Mining Co. r. Baker, 20 
 Fed. Rep. 4. Contra, if the officers are guilty of 
 fraud or collusion. Taylor V. Holmes, 14 Fed. 
 Rep. 498. The officers, when joined in a suit 
 against the corporation, are not merely nominal 
 parties. See Doyle v. San Diego Land & Town 
 Co. 43 Fed. Rep. 349 ; Iowa Barb Steel Wire Co 
 v. Southern Barbed Wire Co. 30 id. 123; Sed- 
 don v. Virginia &e. Co. 36 id. 6; Manchester 
 Fire Ass. Co. v. Stockton C. H. & A. Works, 38 
 id. 378, Colonial & U. S. Mortgage Co. v. Hutch- 
 inson Mortgage Co. 44 id. 219. Discovery can, 
 it seems, be obtained from a stockholder only 
 when he has the desired information and there 
 
 139
 
 * 146 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 Where the officer of the corporation from whom the discovery is 
 sought is a mere witness, and the facts he is required to discover are 
 merely such as might be proved by him on his examination, he ought not 
 to be made a party. Thus, where an officer of the Bank of England was 
 made a party, for the purpose of obtaining from him a discovery as to the 
 times when the stock in question in the cause had been transferred, 
 *146 and * he demurred to the bill, the demurrer was allowed on the 
 ground that the officer was in that case merely a witness. 1 
 
 But although it is not an unusual practice to make the clerk or other 
 principal officer of a corporation a party to a suit against such corpora- 
 tion, for the purpose of eliciting from him a discovery of entries or 
 orders in the books of the corporation, yet, where such is not the case, 
 it is still the duty of the corporation, when informed by the bill or 
 information of the nature and extent of the claims made upon it, if 
 required to put in an answer, to cause diligent examination to be made 
 before putting in the answer, of all deeds, papers, and muniments in 
 their possession or power, and to give in their answer all the informa- 
 tion derived from such examination ; and it was said by Sir John 
 Leach M. B. that if a corporation pursue an opposite course, and in 
 their answer allege their ignorance upon the subject, and the informa- 
 tion required is afterwards obtained from the documents scheduled to 
 their answer, the Court will infer a disposition on the part of the cor- 
 poration to obstruct and defeat the course of justice, and on that 
 ground will charge them with the costs of the suit. 2 
 
 Where a suit is instituted against a corporation sole, he must appear 
 and defend, and be proceeded against in the same manner as if he were 
 a private individual. But where corporations aggregate are sued in 
 their corporate capacity, they must appear by attorney, and answer 
 under the common seal of the corporation ; 3 however, those of the cor- 
 poration who are charged as private individuals, must answer upon oath. 
 
 1 How v. Best, 5 Mad. 19. A mere witness Met. 237 ; Post v. Boardman, 10 Paige, 580 ; 
 
 ought not to be made a party to a bill, although Norton v. Woods, 5 Paige, 251. 
 the plaintiff may deem his answer more satis- 2 Att.-Gen. v. Burgesses of East Retford, 2 
 
 factory than his examination. Story, Eq. PI M. & K. 40. 
 
 §ij 234, Slit, and note; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1499; 3 1 Grant Ch. Pr. 120; Brumley v. West- 
 
 Wigram, Discovery (Am. ed.), p. 165, § 235; Chester Manuf. Society, 1 John. Ch. 366; Bait. 
 
 Hare, 65, 68, 73, 76; Newman r. Godfrey, 2 & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Wheeling, 13 Gratt. 40; 
 
 Bro C. C. (Perkins's ed.) 332; Howell V. Ash- Fulton Bank v. New York and Sharon Canal 
 
 more, 9 N. J. Eq. 82; see Wright v. Dame, 1 Co. 1 Paige, 311; Yermilyea v. Fulton Bank, 1 
 
 is no officer to make the discovery. Berkeley v. Fed. Rep. 725; 3 McCrary, 405. The directors 
 
 Standard Discount Co. 13 Ch. D. 97; 9 id. 643. of a corporation may be joined as defendants 
 
 In such case the corporators or stockholders to a bill against it fur infringing a trademark, 
 
 must at least be named in the bill as defendants. Armstrong v. Savannah Soap Works, 53 Fed. 
 
 Beecher v. Anderson, 45 Mich. 543. The fact Rep. 124. Upon allegations that certain de- 
 
 that an action lies at law under a statute to en- fendants are using a defendant corporation as a 
 
 force contribution for corporate obligations from means of infringing the plaintiff's trademark, 
 
 a stockholder does not preclude a bill in Equity and that they are substantially the corporation, 
 
 for a discovery, accounting, and contribution they are properly joined as defendants. Cali- 
 
 against all the resident stockholders, who must fornia Fig Syrup Co. v. Improved Fig Syrup 
 
 themselves look to non-resident stockholders for Co. 51 Fed. Rep. 296. 
 further contribution. Holmes v. Sherwood, 16 
 
 140
 
 CORPORATIONS AND JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES. * 147 
 
 If the majority of the members of a corporation are ready to put in 
 their answer, and the head or other person who has the custody of the 
 common seal refuses to affix it, application must be made to the Court of 
 Queen's Bench for a mandamus' to compel him, and in the mean time the 
 Court of Chancery will stay the process against the corporation. 4 
 
 * It may be here stated, that by the 7 Will. IV. and 1 Vic. c. 73, *147 
 her Majesty is enabled to grant letters-patent constituting com- 
 panies, and providing that the company thereby constituted shall be sued 
 by one of the public officers of the company appointed for that purpose. 1 
 
 By the Companies Act, 1862, every company constituted under that 
 Act is, upon certificate of incorporation, constituted a body corporate, 
 by the name prescribed in the memorandum of association, and capable 
 forthwith of exercising all the functions of an incorporated company, 
 and having perpetual succession and a common seal. 2 (a) 
 
 The Bank of England was formerly a necessary party to a suit relat- 
 ing to any stock standing in its books, either for the purpose of com- 
 pelling or authorizing it to suffer, or of restraining it by injunction from 
 permitting, a transfer of such stock ; but now, the Court has power to 
 make an order to such effect, although the bank is not made a party ; 3 
 and if the bank is made a party in such a case, the plaintiff will be 
 ordered to pay the costs occasioned thereby. 4 Before the Court will 
 make an order on the bank in these cases, a certificate signed by their 
 accountant that the fund in question is standing in the name of the party, 
 or of the person of whom he is the representative, must be produced ; 
 and the bank is required to deliver this certificate to the solicitor of the 
 party applying. 5 
 
 Where money in the public funds, or the stock of any company, is the 
 
 Paige, 37 ; Ransom v. Stonington Savings Bank, 165, V. C. W. ; 11 Jur. N. S. 9 ; and for form of 
 
 13 N. J. Eq. 212; Cooper's Eq. PI. 325; Story, order therein, see ib. 217. As to the process 
 
 Eq. PI. § 874- 3 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 239. They may for compelling the appearance or answer of a 
 
 make and adopt any seal pro hac vice. Ransom corporation, see post, Chap. VIII. § 4, and 
 
 v. Stonington Savings Bank, supi-a ; Mill-dam Chap. X. § 2. 
 
 Foundry v. Hovey, 21 Pick. 417; Hendee v. 3 39 & 40 Geo. III. c. 36. Where the bank 
 
 Pinkerton, 14 Allen, 381. The answer of a has an interest, or discovery from it is sought, it 
 
 corporation should be signed by the president. must be made a party, see § 2; and see Temple 
 
 It is usual for the secretary or cashier to sign v. Bank of Kngland, 6 Ves. 770, 772; Edridge 
 
 it also. 1 Barb. Ch. Pr. 156; L. R. 6 C. B. v. Edridge, 3 Mad. 386; Perkins r. Bradley, 1 
 
 411. Hare, 219,232; Hammond v. Neame, 1 Swanst. 
 
 4 Rex v. Wyndham, Cowp. 377; 2 Bac. Ab. 35, 38; Ross v. Shearer, 5 Mad. 458; Gould r. 
 
 tit Corp. (E.) 2. Kemp, 2 M. & K. 304, 311 ; Gladstone v. Musu- 
 
 1 See ante, p. 25. rus Bey, 1 H. & M. 495; 9 Jur. N. S. 71. 
 
 2 25 & 26 Vic. c. 89, § 18; and see ante, 4 Edridge v. Edridge, ubi supra ; Perkins v. 
 p. 26. As to the personal liability to costs of Bradley, vbimpra. 
 
 the directors of a limited company, sued with « 39 & 40 Geo. HI. c. 36, §§ 1, 2. 
 
 the company, see Betts v. De Vitre, 5 N. R. 
 
 (a) As to suing in England, in the firm ris, 10 Q. B. D. 436; Alden n. Berkley, 25 Q. 
 
 name, members of a firm apparently consisting B. I). 543; Russell v. Cambefort, 23 Q. B. D. 
 
 of two or more persons, and discovery as to such 526. Service on one member of a foreign firm 
 
 firms composition, see R. S. C. Old XVI. 10, within the jurisdiction is good service on all 
 
 14 (Ord. June, 1876, r. 8); id. XXXI. 20, 21; the partners, even when they all reside and 
 
 Piker. Frank, W.N. (1876) 36; 24 W. R.322; are domiciled out of the jurisdiction. Shepherd 
 
 Ex parte Blain, Re Sawers, 12 Ch. D. 522, 533: v. Hirsch, 45 Ch. D. 231. See furth. r, infra, 
 
 Ex parte Young, 19 Ch. D. 124; Davis v. Mor- p. 149, n. (6). 
 
 141
 
 149 
 
 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 subject of dispute between two parties, the bank or company, if they 
 desire to apply to the Court of Chancery for protection, should do so by 
 filing a bill of interpleader. 6 
 
 The Bank of England is not bound to take notice of any trust 
 *148 affecting public stock standing in their * books : all that they have 
 to do is to look to the legal estate ; and therefore, if the person 
 entitled to the legal estate applies for a transfer to himself, the bank 
 must permit the transfer, and are not bound to look further to see 
 whether the stock is trust stock. 1 And the interest of any stockholder 
 dying is transferable by his executors or administrators, notwithstand- 
 ing any specific bequest thereof. 2 There are certain means provided by 
 statute, 8 by which, upon summary application, orders may be obtained 
 restraining, for a limited period, the transfer of stock or the payment of 
 dividends. For the practice on those points the reader is referred to the 
 chapter on Orders in the Nature of Injunctions. 4 
 
 *149 * Section V. — Persons out of the Jurisdiction of the Court. 
 
 Where a suit affects the rights of persons out of the jurisdiction, 
 the Court will in some cases, where there are other parties concerned, 
 proceed against those other parties ; and if the absent persons are merely 
 passive objects of the judgment of the Court, or their rights are inciden- 
 tal to those of the parties before the Court, a complete determination may 
 be obtained without them. 1 Thus, in Attorney-General at the relation 
 
 6 Birch v. Corbin, 1 Cox, 144; Mills v. 
 Townsend, 109 Mass. 115; State Ins. Co. v. 
 Gennett, 2 Tenn. Ch. 82. With respect to the 
 right of the Bank of England to apply to a 
 Court of Equity to restrain any action brought 
 against it by an executor or other person hav- 
 ing a legal right to call for a transfer of funds, 
 see Bank of England v. Lunn, 15 Yes. 569 577, 
 and the cases there cited; Cochrane v. O'Brien, 
 2 Jo. & Lat. 380; Desborough v. Harris, 5 De 
 G. M. & G. 439; 1 Jur. N. S. 986. 
 
 1 See Eisher v. Essex Bank, 5 Gray, 373, 
 377, 378. Memphis Appeal Pub. Co. v. Pike, 
 9 lkisk. 697; State Ins. Co. v. Sax, 2 Tenn. Ch. 
 507. 
 
 '■* The National Debt Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vic. 
 c. 71 ), § 23; Bank of England v. Moffat, 3 Bro. 
 C. C 260; 5 Ves. 668, and note; and see Bank 
 of England v. Parsons, 5 Yes. 665; Hartga v. 
 Bank of England, 3 Ves. 55, 58. By 1 & 2 
 Geo. I. c. 19. § 90. by which the management 
 of the public stocks or annuities was first 
 given to the governor and company of the 
 Bank of England, the stock created by that 
 Act was declared to be personal estate; and it 
 was provided that any person possessed of such 
 stock or annuities might devise the same by 
 will in writing, attested by two or more credible 
 witnesses. These clauses were repeated in all 
 subsequent Acts creating stocks of this nature, 
 
 and gave rise to considerable discussion as to 
 whether the bank were bound to take notice of 
 a specific devise of stock, attested by two wit- 
 nesses, and registered according to the provi- 
 sions of the Acts, and whether they were 
 justified in resisting a claim to such stock set 
 up by the executor. Pearson v. Bank of Eng- 
 land^ 2 Bro. C. C. 529; 2 Cox, 175; Bank of 
 England v. Parsons, ubi supra ; Austin v. Bank 
 of England, 8 Ves. 522; Bank of England v. 
 Lunn, 15 Ves 569 ; Franklin v. Bank of England, 
 1 Russ. 575, 582 ; and see Franklin v. Bank of 
 England, 9 B. & C. 156; Wins. Exors. p. 725. 
 But by the 8 & 9 Vic. c. 97 it is enacted 
 that all shaves of public stock standing in the 
 name of any deceased person may be transferred 
 by the executors, notwithstanding any specific 
 bequest of the stock so to be transferred. 
 
 3 5 Vic. c. 5. §§ 4-6; Cons. Ord. XXVII. j 
 R. S. C. Ord. XLVI. 2a, 3-11 (Ord. Apr., 1880, 
 rr. 21-30). 
 
 4 See post, Chap. XXXVII. 
 
 i Ld. Red. 31. 32; and see Powell v. Wright, 
 7 Beav. 444, 450; Fell v. Brown, 2 Bro. C C. 
 (Perkins's ed.) 276, and notes; Lucas v Bank 
 of Oarien, 2 Stewart, 280; Joy v. Wirtz, 1 
 Wash. C. C. 517; Erickson v. Nesmith, 46 N. 
 H. 371. The general rule is stated in Lawrence 
 v. Rokes, 53 Maine, 110; see Vose v. Pliilbrook, 
 3 Story, 347 ; Van Reimsdyke v Kane, 1 Gall
 
 PERSONS OUT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. 
 
 149 
 
 of the University of Glasgow v. Bal'iol College? which was an informa- 
 tion filed to impeach a decree made in 1699, on a former information 3 
 
 3?1; Bailey r. Inglee, 2 Paige, 278 If the ab- 
 sent party is so concerned in the subject-matter 
 that a decree between the immediate litigants 
 cannot be made without seriouslv affecting his 
 rights, the Court will refrain from proceeding 
 further. Cassidy v. Shimmin, 122 Mass. 406 ; 
 McPike v. Wells, 54 Miss. 136 ; Hill v. Proctor, 
 10 W Va. 59; Mudgett v. Gager, 52 Maine, 
 541. "This ground of exception," says Mr. 
 Justice Story, "is peculiarly applicable to suits 
 in Equity in the Courts of the United States, 
 which suits can be maintained in general only 
 by and against citizens of different States. If, 
 therefore, the rule as to parties were of univer- 
 sal operation, many suits in those Courts would 
 be incapable of being sustained therein, because 
 all the proper and necessary parties might not 
 be citizens of different States; so that the juris- 
 diction of the Court would be ousted by any 
 attempt to join them. On this account it is a 
 general rule in the Courts of the United States 
 to dispense, if consistently with the merits of 
 the case it can possibly be done, with all parties 
 over whom the Court would not possess juris- 
 diction." West v. Randall, 2 Mason, 196; 
 Russell v. Clarke, 7 Cranch, 69, 98; Milligan o. 
 Milledge, 3 Cranch, 220 ; Simms v. Guthrie, 9 
 Cranch, 19,29; Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 
 152 ; Mallow v. Hinde, 12 Wheat. 193; Hard- 
 ing v. Handy, 11 Wheat. 103; Ward v. Arre- 
 dondo, 1 Paine, C. C. 413, 41-1. See the Act of 
 Congress on this subject, passed Feb. 28, 1839, 
 c. 36, § 1, and now Rev. Stats. § 737, et seq., by 
 which an important alteration has been effected. 
 If the person not before the Court be indispen- 
 sable, the jurisdiction fails, notwithstanding the 
 Act of Congress. Coiron v. Millaudon, 19 How. 
 
 (a) See also infra, p. 190, note; Equity Rule 
 47; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425; Robertson v. 
 Carson, 19 Wall. 105; Gregory v. Stetson, 133 
 U. S. 579; affirming Gregory v. Swift, 39 Fed. 
 Rep. 708; Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S. 560; 
 Kendig v. Dean, 97 U. S. 423; Pond v. Sib- 
 Icy. 19 Blatch. 198; Florence S. M. Co. v. 
 Singer Manuf. Co. 8 id. 113; Morgan v. Rail- 
 way Co. 21 id. 134; Brigham v. Luddington, 12 
 ill. 237; Young v. Cushing, 4 Biss. 456; Parsons 
 B Howard, 2 Woods, 1; Black t\ Scott, 9 Fed. 
 Rep. 186; Shainwald v. Lewis, 5 id. 510; Haz- 
 ard v. Durant, 19 id. 471; Carters. New Orleans, 
 id. 659; Goldsmith v. Gilliland, 24 id. 157; Bell 
 v. Donohue, 17 id. 710; Gross v. George W. 
 Scott Manuf. Co. 48 id. 35; Martin v. Mever, 
 45 id. 435. See also U. S. Rev. Stats. § 738; 
 18 Stats, at Large, 470, § 8; 24 id. 552, § 5; 
 American F. L. M. Co. v. Benson, 33 Fed. Rep. 
 456; Carpenter v. Talbot, id. 537; Mercantile 
 
 113; Williams v. Bankhead, 19 Wall. 563. See 
 Ober v. Gallagher, 93 U. S. 199 ; Parsons v. 
 Howard, 2 Woods, 1; Kilgour v. New Orleans 
 Gas Light Co. 2 Woods, 144; Bronson v. 
 Keokuk, 2 Dill 498. (a) 
 
 But a decree cannot be made against a defend- 
 ant personally who has never been an inhabitant 
 of the State, or served with process in it. Moody 
 v. Gay, 15 Gray, 457; Spurr v. Scoville, 3Cush. 
 578. See, now, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714. 
 See also Moore v. Gennett, 2 Tenn. Ch. 375 ; 
 McEwen v. Zimmer, Sup. Crt. Mich. 18 Law 
 Reg 92. 
 
 A bill alleging that three of the four defend- 
 ants were not inhabitants of the State, will, on 
 demurrer, be dismissed as to them, when no 
 service has been made on them. Stephenson 
 v. Davis, 56 Maine, 73. The only service made 
 in this case upon the parties demurring was an 
 attachment of their re;d and personal property. 
 See Spurr v. Scoville, 3 Cush. 578. But the 
 Court will not dismiss a bill on a mere sug- 
 gestion that certain stockholders, who are 
 defendants, are not residents of the State, and 
 therefore the Court has no jurisdiction as to 
 them. Wiswell v Starr, 50 Maine, 381, 384. 
 In Postgate v. Barnes, 9 Jur. N. S. 456, V C. 
 S., a demurrer to the bill of a married woman 
 to enforce her equity' to a settlement, on the 
 ground that her husband was only made a 
 defendant when he should come within the 
 jurisdiction, was overruled; and see Jacksnu v. 
 Norton, 4 Jur. N. S. 1067; 7 W. R. 4, M. R. 
 See infra, p. 190. 
 
 2 Dec. 11, 1744 ; Ld. Red. 32, n. (w). 
 
 3 Reported in 9 Mod. 407. 
 
 Trust Co. v. Portland & O. R. Co. 10 id. 604; 
 Mass. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v Chicago & A. R. Co. 13 
 id. 857; Castello v. Castello, 14 id. 207; Beach 
 v. Musgrove, 16 id. 305; Mellen v. Moline Iron 
 Works, 131 U. S. 352. This statute (U. S. Rev. 
 Stats. § 737), being remedial, is construed liber- 
 ally. McBurney v. Carson, 99 U. S. 567. It 
 is treated as an affirmance of the Equity rule. 
 Shields v. Barrows, 17 How. 130; Barney ». 
 Baltimore, 6 Wall. 285. It does not apply to 
 the removal of causes. Ames v. Chicago &c. 
 Ry. Co. 39 Fed. Rep. 881. Under it a decree 
 cannot, as above stated, be entered in the 
 absence of an indispensable party. Ibid.; Win- 
 chester v. Loud, 108 U. S. 130; Conolly v. 
 Wells, 33 Fed. Rep. 208; Kendig v. Dean. 97 
 U. S. 423; Goodman v Niblack. 102 U. S. 556; 
 Ober r. Gnllagher, 93 U. S. 199 ; Detweiler 
 o. Holderbaum, 42 Fed. Rep. 337; Duchesse 
 D'Auxy v. Porter, 41 id. 68; Wall v. Thomas, 
 113
 
 * 149 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 by the Attorney- General against the trustees of a testator, his heirs-at- 
 law and others, to establish a will and a charity created by it, alleging 
 that the decree was contrary to the will, and that the University of 
 Glasgow had not been made a party to the suit, Lord Hardwicke over- 
 ruled the latter objection, as the University of Glasgow was a corpora- 
 tion out of the reach of the process of the Court, which circumstance 
 warranted the proceedings, without making that body party to the 
 suit, (b) 
 
 id. 620; Smith v. Lyon, 38 id. 53; Hamilton v. 
 Savannah, F. & W. Ry. Co. 49 id. 412; Collins 
 Manuf. Co. r. Ferguson, 54 id. 721; Barry v. 
 Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. 27 id. 1. If four 
 out of rive mortgage trustees are served with 
 process, the fifth, if non-resident, may be dis- 
 pensed with as a party. Stewart v. Chesapeake 
 & O. Canal Co. 1 Fed. Rep. 361. As to ser- 
 vice by publication, see U. S. Stats, of Mch. 
 3, 1875, § 8 (18 Stats, at Large, 470), which Act 
 js construed strictly. Batt v. Proctor, 45 Fed. 
 Rep. 515; Non-magnetic Watch Co. v. Associa- 
 tion Horlogere Suisse, 44 id. 6. A State may 
 provide by statute that in adjudications of 
 titles to real estate, non-residents may be 
 brought in by publication. Arndt V. Griggs, 
 134 U. S. 316. If a non-resident is induced by 
 fraud to enter the State, service there made 
 upon him is void. Toof v. Foley (Iowa), 54 
 N. W. Rep. 59. So of a foreign corporation, 
 when its president, upon whom service is made, 
 is inveigled into the State. Fitzgerald & M. 
 C. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S. 98. Contra, 
 where the nonresident comes voluntarily to 
 attend Court. Baisley t\ Baisley (Mo.), 21 
 S. W. Rep. 29; see Plimpton v. Winslow, 9 
 Fed Rep. 365. 
 
 (6) Drage v. Hartopp, 28 Ch. D. 414. In 
 general, and apart from statute, a foreign cor- 
 poration, which at the commencement of the 
 suit does not do business and has not an office 
 or place of business within the jurisdiction, 
 cannot be made subject to the jurisdiction with- 
 out its consent, and its officers or agents, com- 
 ing within the jurisdiction, do not bring with 
 them their official functions for the purpose of 
 responding to suits. Fitzgerald & M. C. Co. v. 
 Fitzgerald, 137 U. S. 98; Clews v. Woodstock 
 Iron Co. 44 Fed. Rep. 31; Reifsnider v. Ameri- 
 can Imp. P. Co. 45 id. 433; Camden Rolling 
 Mill Co. v. Swede Iron Co. 32 N. J. L. 15; 
 Phillips v. Library Co. 141 Penn. St. 462; Flor- 
 ence Sewing Machine Co. v. Grover & Baker 
 Sewing Machine Co. 110 Mass. 1, 9. See 
 Shickie Iron Co. v. S. L. Wiley C. Co. 61 
 Mich. 226: McConville v. Gilmour, 36 Fed. 
 Rep. 277; Golden v. The Morning News. 42 id. 
 112; Bentlif v. London &c. F. Co. 44 id. 667. 
 When provision is made by local statute for 
 service upon the agent of a foreign corporation, 
 such agent must be one who represents the cor- 
 poration as matter of fact, and not one created 
 
 144 
 
 by implication or construction without regard 
 to the parties' intent. United States v- Amer- 
 ican Bell Telephone Co. 29 Fed. Rep 17; 
 American Bell Telephone Co. v. Pan Electric 
 Tel. Co. 28 id. 625: see Societe Fonciere v- 
 Milliken, 135 U. S. 304; Block v. Atchison, T. & 
 S. R. Co. 21 Fed. Rep. 529; Estes v. Belford, 22 
 id. 275 ; Shampeau v. Connecticut R. L. Co. 37 id. 
 771; Van Dresser v. Oregon R. & N. Co. 48 id. 
 202; FHrmer v. National Life Ass. 50 id. 829; 
 Wilson v. Martin-Wilson A. F. A. Co. 149 Mass. 
 24; Norton v. Berlin Iron Bridge Co. 51 N. J. 
 L. 442; Burgess v. C. Aultman & Co. 80 Wis. 
 292; Shafer Iron Co. v. Iron Circuit Judge, 88 
 Mich. 464. In proceedings in rem, as to fore- 
 close a lien, the Court's jurisdiction is not 
 dependent upon personal service on absent par- 
 ties, and service by publication is sufficient. 
 Oswald ». Kampmann, 28 Fed. Rep. 36; Mar 
 tin r. Fond, 30 id. 15; Palmer v. McCormick, 
 id. 82: 28 id. 541 ; Remer v. Mackay, 35 id. 86; 
 Ellis r. Reynolds, id. 394; Swift t\ Meyers, 
 37 id. 37; Bennett v. Fenton, 41 id. 283; Potter 
 Land & W. Co. v. Baskin, 43 id. 323. A part- 
 nership composed of foreigners resident abroad, 
 but carrying on business within the jurisdiction 
 in England, are not served by service on their 
 manager at their principal place of business 
 within the jurisdiction. Russell v. Cambefort, 
 23 Q. B. D. 526. Where one partner resided 
 within the jurisdiction and the other without, 
 the partnership itself was held not to be " prop- 
 erty within the jurisdiction," so as to affect the 
 absent partner by a decree for dissolution, an 
 account, and a receiver. Eshbach t. Slonaker, 
 1 Penn. Dist. Ct. 32. As to the present practice 
 in England as to service of the writ in a suit 
 against a foreign firm, see Russell v. Cambefort, 
 23 Q. B. D. 526; Western National Bank v. 
 Perez (1891), 1 Q. B. 304; Lysaght, Ltd. v. 
 Clark, id 502; Dobson v. Festi, 2 id. 92; Heine- 
 man v. Hale, id. 83; Indigo Co. v. Ogilvy, 
 [1891] 2 Ch. 31; Appleton v. Donovan, 7 T. L. 
 R. 554; Flower v. Rose, id. 280. 
 
 In a suit to restrain infringement of a trade- 
 mark against a company having its registered 
 office in Scotland, with several branches in Eng- 
 land, leave was given to serve the writ out of 
 the jurisdiction, as an injunction could be en- 
 forced by sequestration against its property in 
 England". In re Burland's Trade-Mark, 41 Ch. 
 D. 542, distinguishing Marshall v. Marshall, 38
 
 PERSONS OUT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. 
 
 150 
 
 * And so, where a bill was filed for the recovery of a joint debt *150 
 against one of two partners, the other being out of the kingdom, 
 the question before the Court was: whether the defendant should pay 
 the whole or only a moiety of the debt ; and Lord Hardwicke was of 
 opinion that he ought to pay the whole. 1 Upon the same principle, a 
 bill may be brought against one factor without his companion, if such 
 companion be beyond sea ; 2 and where there were two executors, one 
 of whom was beyond sea, and a bill was filed by a residuary legatee 
 against the other, to have an account of his own receipts and pay- 
 ments : the Court, upon an objection being taken at the hearing, on 
 the ground of the absence of the co-executor, allowed the cause to go on. 3 
 
 When a person who ought to be a party is out of the jurisdiction of 
 the Court, that fact being stated in the bill, and admitted by the defend- 
 ant, or proved at the hearing, is, in most cases, a sufficient reason for 
 not bringing him before the Court ; and the Court will proceed, without 
 him, against the other parties, as far as circumstances will permit. 4 On 
 this principle, the Court has frequently made decrees without prejudice 
 to the rights (if any) of absent parties, or reserving all questions in which 
 they were interested, and determining only such as did not affect them. 5 
 
 In bills of interpleader, also, a plaintiff may proceed with his suit and 
 
 1 Darwent v. Walton, 2 Atk. 510; Erickson 
 v. Nesmith, 46 N. H. 371. This rule, that the 
 Court can proceed to a decree against those 
 parties, who are within the jurisdiction, must 
 be taken with the qualification that it can be 
 done without manifest injustice to the absent 
 party. Story, Eq. PI. §§78,82; Milligan v. Mil- 
 ledge, 3 Cranch, 220; Towle v. Pierce, 12 Met. 
 329; Lawrence v. Rokes, 53 Maine, 110, 116. 
 
 A bill seeking an adjustment of the accounts 
 between the part-owners of a vessel, some of 
 whom reside without the jurisdiction of the 
 Court, cannot be sustained, unless such non- 
 residents are summoned to answer, or it appears 
 from the allegations in the bill that not only 
 their interests will not be prejudiced by the 
 decree, but also that they were not necessary to 
 the just ascertainment of the merits of the case. 
 Mudgett v. Gager, 52 Maine, 541 ; Fuller v. Ben- 
 
 jamin, 23 Maine, 255. It is not enough for the 
 bill to allege that "the plaintiff does not claim 
 there is any thing due to him from said non- 
 residents; or that he does not seek thereby to 
 recover any thing from them." Mudgett v. 
 Gager, supra. 
 
 2 Cowslad v. Celv, Prec. Ch. 83. 
 
 3 Ibid. 
 
 4 Ld. Red. 164; see also Smith v. Hibernian 
 Mine Company, 1 Sch. & Lef. 238, 240; Rogers 
 v. Linton, Bunb. 200 ; Walley v. Walley, 1 Vern. 
 487 ; Duxbury v. Isherwood, 12 W. R. 821, V. 
 C W.; Erickson v. Nesmith, 46 N. H.371, 376. 
 
 5 Willats v. Busby, 5 Beav. 193,200; Powell 
 v. Wright, 7 Beav. 444, 450 ; Morley v. Ken- 
 noldson, 2 Hare, 570, 585 ; 7 Jur. 938; Mores 
 v. Mores, 6 Hare, 125, 127, 135 ; 12 Jur. 620; 
 see Moody v. Gay, 15 Gray, 457. 
 
 Ch. D. 330. See also Kinahan v. Kinahan, 45 
 Ch. D. 655; Wood v. Anderston Foundry Co. 
 36 W. R.918; Watkins v. Scottish Imperial Ins. 
 Co. 23 Q. B. D. 285; Haggin v. Comptoir d'Es- 
 cnmpte, id. 519. The English Court of Chancery 
 has no jurisdiction to authorize notices of 
 orders and other proceedings in the winding up 
 of a company to be served on non-residents. 
 Be Anglo-African Steamship Co. 32 Ch. D. 
 34*. affirming 54 L. T. 372. And as to service 
 out of the jurisdiction, see Re Nathan Newman 
 & Co. 35 CD. 1 ; Re Liebig's Cocoa Works 
 Limited. 59 L. T. 315; Nelson v. Pastorino, 49 
 L. T. 564; De Penny v. Christie, [1891] 2 Ch. 
 63; Bell v. Antwerp Line, [1891] 1 Q. B. 103; 
 Sea^rove v. Parks, id. 551 ; Wilding v. Bean, 
 id. 100; Re Pearson, [1892] 2 Q. B. 263; James 
 
 VOL. I. — 10 
 
 v. Despott, 14 L. R. Ir. 71 ; Re McLaughlin, 25 
 id. 513; Mayer v. Claretie, 7 T. L. R. 40. As to 
 substituted service, see Fry v. Moore, 23 Q. B. 
 D. 395; Wilding 0. Bean." [1891] 1 Q. B. 100; 
 Milliard v. Smyth. 36 W R. 7. If a plaintiff, 
 having leave to serve a writ of summons out of 
 the jurifdiction, exhausts all means to make 
 such service personally, substituted service by 
 registered letter will be allowed. Seaton r. 
 Clarke, 26 L. R. Ir. 297. The court cannot 
 order service of an originating summons out of 
 the jurisdiction. Re Busfield, 32 Ch. D. 123, 
 Leave will not be given to serve a summons for 
 taxation of costs upon a foreigner out of the 
 jurisdiction. Ex parte Brandon, 54 L. T, 128; 
 34 W. R. 352. 
 
 145
 
 * 151 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 obtain an injunction against a party resident in this country, although 
 the other parties claiming the property are out of the jurisdiction. 6 (a) 
 In such cases, however, the plaintiff is bound to use prompt diligence to 
 get the parties who are absent to come in and interplead with those who 
 are present. If he does not succeed in doing so within a reasonable 
 time, the consequence is, that the party within the jurisdiction 
 *151 must have that which is represented *to be the subject of com- 
 petition, and the plaintiff must be indemnified against any pro- 
 ceeding being afterwards taken on the part of those who are out of the 
 jurisdiction. 1 Upon the same ground, where a party to a bill of inter- 
 pleader, who has been served, will not appear, and stands out all the 
 process of contempt, the bill may be taken pro confesso against him, and 
 he will be decreed to interplead with the other defendants. 2 
 
 Where, however, the person who is out of the jurisdiction is one 
 whose interests are principally affected by the bill, the Court cannot 
 proceed in his absence, even though the parties having the legal estate 
 are before the Court ; 8 thus, where a judgment creditor, who had sued 
 out an elegit upon his judgment, filed a bill for equitable execution 
 against real estates, which were vested in trustees upon certain trusts, 
 the Court would not proceed with the cause, because the equitable ten- 
 ant for life, subject to the trusts, was abroad. 4 Upon the same prin- 
 ciple, bail cannot maintain an injunction against a creditor, who has 
 recovered a verdict, where the principal debtor is out of the jurisdiction. 5 
 In a case where a contract for the sale of an estate in the West Indies 
 had been entered into by a person who resided there, and had got into 
 possession without paying the purchase-money, and a suit was instituted 
 in this country by the vendor against the consignees appointed by the 
 purchaser, Lord Lyndhurst refused to entertain a motion for a receiver 
 of the proceeds of the consignments, on the ground that the purchaser, 
 who was the principal defendant, was abroad, and had never been served 
 with a subpoena. 6 
 
 6 Stevenson v. Anderson, 2 Ves. & B 407, and the decree, ib. 69, n. (c). Where the rights 
 
 411. of a defendant in Equity, who resides out of the 
 
 1 Ibid. For tins purpose, " if the plaintiff State and has had notice of the suit, but does 
 
 can show that he has used all due diligence to not appear and answer, will not be prejudiced 
 
 bring persons out of the jurisdiction to contend by the decree, the bill may be taken pro con- 
 
 with those who are within it, and they will not fesso as to him. Adams v. Stevens, 49 Maine, 
 
 come, the Court, upon that default, and their so 362. 
 
 abstaining from giving him an opportunity of 3 Story, Eq. PI. § 81; Fell v. Brown, 2 Bro. 
 
 relieving himself, would, if they afterwards C. C. (Perkins's ed.) 278, 279, notes; Joy v. 
 
 came here and brought an action, order service Wirtz, 1 Wash. C. C. 517 ; Russell v. Clarke, 
 
 on their attorney to be good service, and enjoin 7 Cranch, 72. Mallow v. Hinde, 12 Wheat. 193; 
 
 that action forever: not permitting those who Lawrence v. Rokes, 53 Maine, 110, 113 ; Spurr 
 
 refused the plaintiff that justice, to commit that v. Scoville, 3 Cush. 578. 
 
 injustice against him." Per Lord Eldon, 2 Ves. 4 Browne v. Blount, 2 R. & M. 83 ; and see 
 
 & B. 412 ; see also Martinius v. Helmuth, G. Kirwan v. Daniel, 7 Hare, 347 ; M'Calmont v. 
 
 Coop. 245, 248: reported also in some copies of Rankin, 8 Hare, 1 ; 14 Jur. 475; Anderson v. 
 
 2 Ves. & B. 412, n. ; East and West India Dock Stather, 2 Coll. 209. 
 
 Co. u. Littledale, 7 Hare, 57. 5 Roveray r, Grayson, 3 Swanst. 145. n. 
 
 * Fairbrother v. Prattent, Dan. Exc. 64; 6 Stratton v. Davidson, 1 R. & M. 484- 
 
 (a) In Credits Gerundeuse v. Van Weede, jurisdiction upon a foreigner who claimed the 
 
 12 Q. B. D. 171, the defendant was given leave goods sued for by the plaintiffs. See also Wet 
 
 to serve an interpleader summons out of the dou v. Gounod, 15 Q. B. D. 622. 
 
 146 

 
 PERSONS OUT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. * 153 
 
 * It has been held, that a receiver of a mortgaged estate may be *152 
 appointed, notwithstanding the absence of the mortgagor. Thus, 
 in Tanfield v. Irvine, 1 an application for a receiver had been made to Sir 
 John Leach, V. C, by the grantee of an annuity, which was secured by 
 an equitable charge upon an estate ; and though the grantor had gone 
 abroad, and had not appeared to the suit, his Honor refused the applica- 
 tion, on the ground that the Court had not jurisdiction to deprive a man, 
 who was not present, of the possession of his estate ; but upon the motion 
 being renewed before Lord Eldon, he made the order for a receiver, but 
 guarding it, however, in such a way as not to prevent any person having 
 a better title to the possession of the estate, from ousting him if they 
 pleased. His Lordship observed, that he did not see why the rights of 
 the equitable mortgagee were to be taken away, by the circumstance that 
 the mortgagor had not entered an appearance, and could not be compelled 
 to do so ; 2 and that a second mortgagee might be delayed to all eternity, 
 if the residence of the mortgagor out of the jurisdiction were to have the 
 effect which the Vice-Chancellor had given it. 
 
 It is usual, in cases where any of the persons who, if resident in this 
 country, would be necessary parties to a suit, are abroad, to make such 
 persons defendants to the bill, stating the fact of their being abroad : 
 which fact, unless they appear, must be proved at the hearing ; 8 and, 
 notwithstanding the observation of Lord Redesdale cited above, it 
 seems that the admission of the parties before the Court is not evidence 
 on which the Court will act. 4 When the proof of this fact at the hear- 
 ing is not such as to satisfy the Court, the usual practice is to direct the 
 cause to stand over for the purpose of supplying the proper evidence. 5 
 In some cases, however, if there are preliminary inquiries or accounts 
 to be taken, they have been directed to be proceeded with in the mean- 
 time ; 6 and in others, an inquiry as to the fact has been directed. 7 
 In P enfold v. Kelly? an application was refused * for leave to *153 
 serve a defendant coming within the jurisdiction after decree, and 
 against whom no specific relief was prayed, with a copy of the bill. 
 
 Where a party who was named as a defendant, but had never been 
 served, appeared by counsel at the hearing, and consented to be bound 
 
 1 2 Russ. 149, 151; see also Coward v. Chad- * Wilkinson v. Real, 4 Mad. 408; Hughes 
 wick, ib. 634, and 150, n. ; Dow1ing». Hudson, 14 v. Eades, 1 Hare, 486, 488 ; 6 Jur. 255 ; Eggin- 
 Beav 423, and cases collected in the note thereto. ton v. Burton, 1 Hare, 488, n.; M'Calmont v. 
 
 2 See Fell v. Brown, 2 Bro. C. C. (Perkins's Rankin, 8 Hare, 1 ; 14 Jur. 475. 
 
 ed.) 278, 279, »nd notes. s Egginton v. Burton, 1 Hare, 488, n.; 
 
 3 Moodie v. Bannister, 1 Drew. 514; see Emith o. Edwards. 16 Jur. 1041, V. C. S. 
 Erickson v. Nesmith, 46 N. H. 371. The party As to necessary evidence, where there is delay 
 sliould not be named as a defendant "when he between the making and drawing up of the 
 shall come within the jurisdiction," but as order, see Anon., 9 L. T. N. S. 674, M. R. 
 being "out of the jurisdiction:' 7 see Jack- 6 Butler*;. Borton, 5 Mad. 40, 42; Hughes 
 son v. Norton, 4 Jur. N. S. 1067; 7 W. R. 4, v. Eades, 1 Hare, 486; 6 Jur. 255. 
 
 M. R. ; Story, Eq. PI. § 80; Munor v. De 7 Mores v. Mores, 6 Hare, 136: 12 Jur. 620; 
 
 Tartel, 1 Beav. 109; Brookes v. Burt, 1 Beav. Eades v. Harris, 1 Y. & C. C. 230, 234; but 
 
 109; Pingree v. Coffin, 12 Gray, 288, 303. 304; see Dibbs r. Goren, 1 Beav. 457. 
 
 Postgate v. Barnes, 9 Jur. N. S. 456; 11 8 i 2 W. R 286, and see Cons. Ord. X. 11, 
 
 W R. 456, V. C. S.: see, however, Merriman 18. 
 
 9. Goodman, 1 W. N. 46, M. R. 
 
 147
 
 * 154 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 by the decree, the defect arising from his not having been served was 
 held to be cured. 1 
 
 In some cases, where a defendant has been abroad during the proceed- 
 ings in a cause, he has been allowed to come in after a decree has been 
 pronounced, and to have the benefit of it, without the process of filing 
 a supplemental bill. 2 
 
 An order for leave for a defendant to come in, after decree, may be 
 obtained by petition, of course, if the plaintiff will consent thereto. If 
 he will not consent, notice of motion, or a summons, must be served on 
 him. 8 The petition, notice of motion, or summons, usually asks that 
 the defendant, on submitting to be bound by the decree and proceedings 
 already had, may be at liberty to enter an appearance to the bill, and 
 may have the like benefit of the decree, and may be at liberty to attend 
 the subsequent proceedings, as if he had appeared at the hearing. A 
 copy of the order, when passed and entered, should be served on the 
 solicitors of the other defendants, and on the plaintiff's solicitor when 
 the order is made on petition. On production of the order to the Record 
 and Writ Clerk, an appearance for the defendant may be entered in the 
 usual way ; and notice thereof must be given, on the same day, to the 
 plaintiff's solicitor ; 4 and the cause thenceforth proceeds against such 
 defendant in the ordinary manner. 
 
 In the case of infants, however, the Court must be satisfied, by inquiry 
 or otherwise, that it is for their benefit to adopt the proceedings. 6 
 *154 * Where a defendant is stated to be abroad, he is not consid- 
 ered a party to the suit, at least not till he has been served with 
 the bill, for the determination of any point of practice arising between 
 the plaintiff and the other defendants ; therefore, an order to amend 
 cannot be obtained, after the usual time, on the ground that a defend- 
 ant abroad has not answered. 1 (a) 
 
 1 Capel v. Butler, 2 S. & S. 457, 462; and ilar order was made by Lord Lyndhurst, 
 see Sapte v Ward. 1 Coll. 24. For form of in- after a cause had been heard upon further 
 troductory part of decree, see Seton, 3, 4; and directions. White v. Hall, 1 R. & M. 332; 
 1 Coll. 25. and see Prendergast v. Lushington, 5 Hare, 
 
 2 Thus, in Banister v. Way, 2 Dick. 686, 177; Potts v. Britton, M. R. in Chamb. 22 
 after a decree, pronounced in a suit by a residu- Dec, 1864. 
 
 ary legatee, establishing a will, and directing 3 Braithwaite's Pr. 323. For form of order, 
 
 the necessary accounts, others of the residuary see Seton, 1250; and for forms of petition, 
 
 legatees, who were abroad, applied to have the notice of motion, and summons, see Vol. III. 
 
 benefit of the decree, submitting to be bound by 4 For forms of pi-cecipe and notice, see Vol. 
 
 it, and an order was made by Lord Thurlow III. 
 
 (they submitting to the decree) that they 6 Copley v. Smithson, 5 De G. & S. 583; 
 
 should be at liberty to enter their appearance, Baillie v. Jackson, 10 Sim. 167; see Finch v. 
 
 and should have the like benefit of the decree Finch, W. N. (1808) 191. 
 
 as if they had put in an answer, and had 1 King of Spain v. Hullett, 3 Sim. 338; 
 
 appeared at the hearing of the cause. A sim- Cassidy v. Shimmin, 122 Mass. 406. 
 
 (n) A defendant, or, in the case of a petition, when the claim and counter-claim arise out of 
 
 a respondent, if non-resident, will not be ordered different matters, but not when both arise from 
 
 to give security for the plaintiff's costs. Re the same transaction. Mapleson v. Massini, 
 
 Perry &c. Iron Mining Co. 2 Ch. D. 531; supra; Winterheld v. Bradnum, 3 Q. B. D. 
 
 Cochrane v. Fearon, 18 Jur. 568; Mapleson v. 324; Sykes v. Sacerdoti, 15 id. 423; Lake v. 
 
 Massini, 5 Q. B. D. 144. If such defendant or Haseltine, 55 L. J. Q. B. 205; see Beddall 
 
 respondent brings a cross-action or counter- v. Maitland, 17 Ch. D. 174; The Julia Fisher, 
 
 claim, he will be ordered to give such security 2 P. D. 115; ante, p. 29. 
 
 148
 
 PAUPERS. * 155 
 
 Under the present practice of the Court, however, such questions as 
 we have been considering, with reference to defendants out of the juris- 
 diction, will be of comparatively rare occurrence ; for the Court can now, 
 in many cases, direct service on persons out of the jurisdiction ; 2 and can 
 also, when the suit is defective for want of parties, and the defendant 
 has not taken the objection by plea or answer, make a decree, if it shall 
 think fit, saving the rights of absent parties. 8 
 
 And it may here be observed that, as a general rule, persons are not 
 now named parties to a suit unless direct relief is sought against them ; 
 and therefore, if they happen to be out of the jurisdiction, it will in 
 general, on the authority of Browne v. Blount 4 and the other cases before 
 referred to, be necessary to serve them. 
 
 Section VI. — Paupers. 
 
 Although the 11 Hen. VII. c. 12, 5 before referred to as the Act under 
 which the practice of admitting parties to sue in forma pauperis origi- 
 nated, 6 did not extend to defendants, and consequently a defendant in 
 an action at Law is never allowed to defend it as a pauper, 7 yet a greater 
 degree of liberality is practised in Courts of Equity ; and a defendant 
 who is in a state of poverty, and, as such, incapable of defending a 
 suit, may obtain an order to defend in forma pauperis, upon making 
 the same affidavit of poverty as that required to be made by a plain- 
 tiff. 8 Indeed, originally, the right of admission in forma pauperis 
 appears to have been confined to defendants. By Lord Bacon's orders 
 it is said, that "any man shall be admitted to defend in forma 
 pauperis *upon oath ; but for plaintiffs, they are ordinarily to be *155 
 referred to the Court of Requests, or to the provincial counsels, if 
 the case arise in the jurisdictions, or to some gentlemen in the country, 
 except it be in some special cases of commiseration, or potency of the 
 adverse party." 1 
 
 It has been before stated, that no person suing in a representative 
 character is allowed the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis. 
 The same rule applies to defendants sued in a representative character, 
 
 2 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 33; 4 & 5 Will. IV. the Act of Assembly extends in terms only to 
 
 c. 82; Cons. Ord. X. 7; R. S. C. Old. VI. 1, 2; plaintiffs. Pickle v. Pickle, Halst. N. J. Dig. 
 
 XI 1; Clarke v. Bradlaugh, 7 Q. B. D. 151; 8 177. It seems to be doubtful, in New York, 
 
 id. 63; 8 App. Cas. 354; Beddington v. Bed- whether, in any case, a party can defend in 
 
 dington, 1 P. D. 426. See post, Chap. VIII. § 1. forma pauperis. The doubt prows out of the 
 
 8 Cons Ord. XXIII. 11; Mayberry v. Brook- peculiar phraseology of the Statute in that 
 
 ing, 7 De G M. & G. 673; 2 Jur. N. S. 76. State. Brown v. Story, 1 Paige, 588. 
 
 * 2 R. & M. 83. ante, p. 151. A party will not be deprived of the privilege 
 
 5 Repealed or superseded by 46 & 47 Vic. of defending himself in forma pauperis on 
 49. § 4. Sched. ; R. S. C. 1883," Ord. XVI. Pt. account of his misconduct. ' Murphv r. Oldis, 1 
 IV. 22-31. Hogan, 219. 
 
 6 Ante, p. 38. i Beames's Ord. 44., Sand. Ord. 122. 
 
 7 2 Chitty's Arch. 1289. This order is abrogated by the Cons. Ord.; 
 
 8 McDonough v. O'Flaherty, 1 Beat. 54. In but see ib. Prel. Ord. r. 5: see also Lord 
 New Jersey the privilege of defending in forma Clarendon's Orders, Beanies. 215-218; Sand. 
 pauperis is granted in a proper case, although Ord. 312; now Cons. Ord. VII. 9-11. 
 
 149
 
 * 156 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 even in cases where they have received no assets of the estate of the 
 testator whom they represent. 2 
 
 The solicitor to the Suitors' Fund, or other officer appointed by the 
 Lord Chancellor, is to visit Whitecross Street Prison 8 quarterly, ex- 
 amine the prisoners confined for contempt, and report his opinion on 
 their cases ; and the Lord Chancellor may thereupon assign a solicitor to 
 defend the prisoner in forma pauperis. A like assignment may also be 
 made, in the case of persons confined for contempt in other prisons, upon 
 the jailer's report, and after investigation by the solicitor to the Suitors' 
 Fund. 4 The assignment is made without an application to the Court. 5 
 
 The order admitting a party to sue or defend in forma pauperis, has 
 not the effect of releasing him from costs ordered to be paid prior to 
 his admission, but the payment of such costs may be enforced in the 
 usual manner; it may, however, be doubtful whether the admission 
 may not have a retrospective effect upon costs incurred before the date 
 of his admission, but concerning which no order for taxation and pay- 
 ment has been made. 6 It appears that where the plaintiff dismissed his 
 bill against a pauper defendant, the practice is to allow the defendant 
 
 dives costs. 7 (a) 
 *156 * To entitle a party to defend as a pauper, he must make an 
 affidavit similar to that required from a plaintiff applying to sue 
 in that character ; and it seems that if he is in possession of the prop- 
 erty in dispute, 1 or of property which he is prevented from dealing with 
 by injunction, 2 he cannot be admitted, or. if admitted, he may, upon 
 the fact being afterwards shown to the Court, be dispaupered. In this 
 and in most other respects, the rules laid down with regard to persons 
 
 2 Oldfield v. Cobbett, 1 Phil. 613; ante, p. 38 discharged, without payment of the costs of the 
 
 3 Substituted, by 25 & 26 Vic. c. 104, for contempt; considering the Court to have power 
 the Queen's prison. to make such an order, either under its general 
 
 4 23 & 24 Vic. c. 149, §§ 2, 5; and see §§ 3, authority independent of the 11 Geo. IV. & 1 
 
 4, 6, and pott, Chap. X. § 2. Will. IV.c36, or.under that statute combined 
 
 5 Layton v. Mortimore, 2 De G. F. & J. with its general authority. Bennett v. Chud- 
 353. leigh, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 164; see, however, 
 
 6 Davenport v. Davenport, 1 Phil. 124; see, Snowball v. Dixon, 2 De G. & S. 9; and Dew 
 however, Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De G. & v. Clark, 16 Jur. 1, L. C; 3 M'N. & G. 357; 
 
 5. 652, 718; 13 Jur. 507, where a defendant, Hall v. Hall, L. R. 11 Eq. 290. 
 
 having been admitted to defend in the course 7 Rubery v. Morris, 1 M'N. & G 413; 16 
 
 of the cause, was ordered, at the hearing, to Sim. 312, 433; 12 Jur. 689. Unless otherwise 
 
 pay the plaintiff's costs up to the time of such directed, costs ordered to be paid to a party 
 
 admission. Where a defendant, being com- suing or defending in forma pauperis, are to 
 
 mitted for not answering, had subsequently be taxed, as dives costs. Cons. Ord XL. 5. 
 
 obtained permission to defend in forma pan- * Spencer v. Bryant, 11 Ves. 49 ; see also 
 
 peris, and thereupon had put in his answer, Sir Wyatt's P. R 321. 
 
 J. L. Knight Bruce V. C. ordered him to be 2 Ridgway v. Edwards, L. R 9 Ch. 143. 
 
 (a) In Carson v. Pickersgill, 14 Q. B. D. did in fact pay to his counsel or solicitor, and 
 
 859, 871, Bowen L. J. considers that the deci- upon proof that he had paid such costs, he was 
 
 sion in Rubery v. Morris, supra, probably led allowed to tax them as against his opponent." 
 
 to Cons. Ord. XL. 5, and says that, down to He concludes that, under the Rules of the Su- 
 
 the Judicature Acts, the costs of the pauper preme Court of 1883, Order XVI., the pauper 
 
 were at common law not in the discretion of is not now to be allowed costs which he was 
 
 the Court, while the Chancery Court had power never obliged to pay, simply because he has 
 
 over them ; that " dives costs appear to be costs chosen to pay them after obtaining judgment 
 which the pauper, although not bound to pav, 
 
 150
 
 BANKRUPTS, AND LIQUIDATING AND COMPOUNDING DEBTORS. * 157 
 
 suing in forma pauperis* are applicable to persons defending in that 
 character ; the only difference being in the form of application for ad- 
 mission; for the petition, in the case of a defendant, is much shorter 
 than in the case of a plaintiff, and is not required to contain any state- 
 ment of the case, or to be accompanied by any certificate of counsel. 4 If, 
 however, there has been a suppression of any material fact in the peti- 
 tion, the order will, on the motion, with notice, of the plaintiff, be 
 discharged. 5 
 
 A person who is not a defendant to a suit cannot be admitted to defend 
 
 in forma pauperis. 6 
 
 Section VII. — Persons attainted or convicted. 
 
 It is said that all persons disabled by law from instituting or maintain- 
 ing a suit may, notwithstanding, be made defendants in a Court of Law, 
 and cannot plead their own disabilities. 7 This rule would appear to be 
 adopted in Courts of Equity, in those cases at least where the suit seeks 
 to establish a pecuniary demand against the person made a defendant. 
 Where, however, the proceeding is in rem, and a person under any of 
 the disabilities alluded to is interested in the subject of the suit, then 
 it would seem, that as the interest of the party is entirely vested in the 
 Crown, the Attorney-General would be the proper defendant. 8 Whether 
 in such case, the party himself should be joined, is a point which does 
 not appear to have been determined ; but it is submitted that the rule, 
 that no person can be made a party to a suit against whom no relief can 
 be prayed, will apply to this case, as well as to that of bankrupts. 
 
 * Section VIII. — Bankrupts, and Liquidating and Com- *157 
 pounding Debtors. 
 
 It follows from general rule that no person can be made a party to a 
 suit against whom no relief can be prayed, 1 that bankrupts, whose inter- 
 ests, whether legal or equitable, have devolved upon their assignees, 
 
 8 Ante, pp. 41, 42. brought against him for debt or trespass. 
 
 * See Cons. Ord. VII. 9-11; XL. 5. Regu- Banyster v. Trussell, Cro. Eliz. 510; Coke's 
 
 lation to Ord. IV. 2. The defendant need not Entries, 246; see also Ward and Prestall's 
 
 enter an appearance before applying for the cases, in 1 Leon. 329; and Vin. Ab. Attainder 
 
 order. Braithwaite's Pr. 563. An application (B) 3. 
 in behalf of an infant defendant for leave to 8 See Balch v. Wastall, 1 P. Wins. 445: 
 
 defend in forma pauperis, will not be enter- Hay ward v. Fry, ib. 446; v. Bromley, 2 
 
 tamed before the appointment of a guardian ad P. Wms. 269, 270; Rex v. Fowler, Bunb. 38; 
 
 litem. Matter of Byrne, 1 Edw. Ch. 41. For Cuddon r. Hubert, 7 Sim. 485; and see Att.- 
 
 forms of petition and affidavit, see Vol. III. Gen. v. Rickards, 8 Beav. 380; Goldsmith v. 
 
 For forms of order, see 2 Seton, 1046, No. 1. Russell, 5 De G. M. & G. 547; Bromley v. 
 
 5 Nowell v. Whittaker, 6 Beav. 407. Smith, 26 Beav. 644; Hancock v. Att.-Gen. 10 
 
 « Holdeno. Holden, W. N. (1808) 180. Jur. N. S. 557; 12 W. R. 569, V. C K. Out- 
 
 7 Treatise on Star Chamber, part 3, § 6 (2 lawrv in a civil action is now abolished 42 
 
 Collect. Jurid. 140). It is said in the above & 43 Vic. c. 59. As to persons convicted of 
 
 Treatise, that persons attainted of treason or treason or felony, see 33 & 34 Vic. c. 23. 
 felony are excepted out of this rule; but it has l Story, Eq. PI. § 231, and cases cited in 
 
 been decided, in many cases, that a defendant notes; Todd v. Stewart, 6 J. J. Marsh. 432. 
 cannot plead his own attainder to an action 
 
 151
 
 * 157 
 
 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 need not be made parties to suits 
 affected by the bankruptcy. 2 (a) 
 
 2 Whitworth v. Davis, 1 Ves. & B. 545, 547 ; 
 DeGolls v. Ward, 3 P. Wms 311, n. : Collins©. 
 Shirley, 1 R. & M. 638; Judgment of Lord 
 Cottenham in Rochfort v. Battersby, 2 H. L. 
 Cas. 408; 2 J. & Lat. 431; and see Davis v. 
 Swell, 28 Beav. 321 ; Story, Eq. PI. § 233 and 
 note; De Wolf v. Johnson, 10 Wheat. 384. So 
 in case of a registered trust deed, the assignor 
 need not be a party. Fenton v. Queen's Ferry 
 Wire Rope Co. L. R. 7 Eq. 267. Counsel for 
 an insolvent appearing separately from his 
 assignees will not be heard. Edmunds v. Waugh, 
 1 W. N. 7, V. C. K.; L. R. 1 Eq. 418. As to 
 bankruptcy generally, see Robson on Bank- 
 ruptcy; Bump on Bankruptcy. As to what 
 property passes to the trustee, see Bankruptcy 
 Act, 1809, c. 71, § 15. As to what property 
 does not so pass, see id ; Re Downing. 4 Ch. 
 D. 689 ; Ex parte Vine, 8Ch. D. 364. As to the 
 reputed ownership clause, see Ex parte Bright, 
 10 Ch. D. 566; Ex parte Wingfield, id. 591. 
 As to choses in action not being such within 
 this clause, see Re Irving, 7 Ch. D. 419; Re 
 Bainbridge, 8 Ch. D. 218; Ex parte Ibbetson, 
 id. 519. As to the effect of an order of dis- 
 charge on the bankrupt's after-acquired prop- 
 erty, see Ebbs v. Boulnois, L. R. 10 Ch. 479; 
 Re Pettit's Estate, 1 Ch. D. 478. As to the 
 effect of a discharge from one set of joint and 
 separate creditors, see Meggy v. Imperial Dis- 
 count Co. 3 Q. B. D. 711. As to the effect of a 
 trustee allowing the debtor to retain some of 
 the property, see id. ; Troughton v. Gilley, 
 Amb. 630: Ex parte Martin, 15 Ves. 115; Ex 
 parte Bourne, 2 Gl. & J. 137 : Nias r. Adamson, 
 3 R. & Aid. 225; Tucker v. Hernaman, 4 De G. 
 M. & G. 395; 1 Sm. & G. 394; Engleback p. 
 Nixon, L. R. 10 C. P. 645; Ex parte Bolland, 
 9 Ch. D. 312. Debts not provable may be 
 
 relative to any property which is 
 
 enforced against the bankrupt, or under a 
 liquidation. See 32 & 33 Vic. c. 71, § 125; Ex 
 parte Baum, L. R. 9Ch.673; Ex parte Brooker, 
 2 Ch. D. 57; Re Meade, 3 Ch D. 119; Ex 
 parte Brooke, id. 494; Ex parte Postm:ister- 
 General, 10 Ch. D. 595; Ex parte Crosbie, 7 
 Ch. D. 123. See Ex parte Blakemore, 5 Ch. 
 D. 372; Ex parte Pearce, 13 Ch. D. 262; Wat- 
 son v. Holliday, 20 Ch. D. 780. As to what 
 claims are provable, see Ibid.; Ex parte Pea- 
 cock, L. R. 8 Ch. 682; Ex parte Coker, L. R. 10 
 Ch. 652 ; Cobham v. Dalton, id. 655 ; Re Deere, 
 id. 658. Upon the effect of the order of dis- 
 charge, see 32 & 33 Vie. c. 71, § 49; c. 62, § 4; 
 Emma Silver Mining Co. v. Grant, 17 Ch. D. 
 122 ; Earl of Lewes v. Barnett, 6 Ch. D. 252; 
 Robson on Bankruptcy. As to making the 
 trustee a co-defendant to an action against the 
 bankrupt, see Gilbert v. Lewis, 1 De G. J. & 
 S. 38; 9 Jur. N. S. 187 ; Ex parte Coker, L. R. 
 10 Ch. 652; Dence v. Mason, W. N. (1879), 177; 
 Metropolitan Bank r. Offord, L. R. 10 Eq. 398; 
 Hale v. Boustead, 8 Q. B. D. 453. Respecting 
 composition with creditors, and suits against 
 compounding debtors; see 32 & 33 Vic. c. 71, 
 §§ 72, 126 ; Pashler v. Vincent, 8 Ch. D. 825; 
 Re Kearley, 7 Ch. D. 615; Re Shiers, id. 416; 
 Ex parte Lopez, 5 Ch. D. 65; Ex parte Wat- 
 son, 2 Ch. D. 63: Ex parte Lang, id. 971 ; Ex 
 parte Lace)', 16 Ch. D. 131; Ex parte McLaren, 
 id. 534; Breslauer v. Brown, 3 App. Cas. 672; 
 Campbell v. Im Thurm, 1 C. P. D. 267; Mel- 
 hado r. Watson, 2 C. P. D. 281; Edwards v. 
 Coombe, L. R. 7 C. P. 519; Re Hatton, L. R. 7 
 Ch. 723; Ex parte Carew, L. R. 10 Ch. 308; 
 Eyre v. Smith, 25 W. R. 871 ; Ex parte Paper 
 Staining Co. L. R. 8 Ch. 595; Re McHenry, 21 
 Q. B. D. 580. See 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. 
 ed.) 170. 
 
 (a) The assignee is not a trustee for the 
 bankrupt. Re Leadbitter, 10 Ch. D. 388. If 
 the debtor, having a general power of appoint- 
 ment by deed or will, dies, his trustee in liqui- 
 dation has no power to appoint the property in 
 his right or place. Nichols to Nixey, 29 Ch. 
 I). 1005; see Ex parte Gilchrist, 17 Q. B. D. 
 521. Until the trustee intervenes a bankrupt's 
 transactions, respecting property acquired after 
 his bankruptcy, with any person dealing with 
 him bona fide and for value, either with or 
 without knowledge of the bankruptcy, are valid 
 against the trustee. Cohen v Mitchell, 25 Q. 
 B. D. 262. Where an injunction was gran-ted 
 restraining the defendants from infringing the 
 plaintiff's patent by making and selling instru- 
 ments, the defendants, having appealed and 
 then become bankrupt, were held to be still 
 interested, as they would still be liable per- 
 sonally for breach of the injunction. United 
 
 152 
 
 Telephone Co. v. Bassano, 31 Ch. D. 630. So in 
 cases ol breach of trust, when there is no ade- 
 quate legal remedy, relief may be had inequity, 
 though the defendant becomes insolvent. Ames 
 Iron- Works v. West, 24 Fed. Rep. 313. Prop- 
 erty acquired by a liquidating debtor after his 
 discharge does not vest in his trustee, although 
 the liquidation is not closed. Ebbs v. Boulnois, 
 L. R. 10 Ch. 479 ; Re Smith, 24 Ch. D. 672. 
 A Court of Bankruptcy will not restrain a suit 
 for fraud, against a debtor in that position, by 
 a creditor who has proved his debt in the liqui- 
 dation. Ex parte Hemming, 13 Ch. D. 163; 
 Ross v. Guttendge, 52 L. J. Ch. 280; 48 L. T. 
 117. A creditor is not bound by a composition 
 when there has been a misstatement as to his 
 debt. Breslauer r. Brown, 3 App. Cas. 672; 
 Ex parte Engelhardt, 23 Ch. D. 706; see Tea 
 Co. v. Jones, 43 L. T. 255.
 
 BANKRUPTS, AND LIQUIDATING AND COMPOUNDING DEBTORS. * 158 
 
 Upon this principle, a demurrer put in by a bankrupt, who was joined 
 as a co-defendant with his assignees, in a bill to enforce the specific per- 
 formance of an agreement entered into by him previously to his bank- 
 ruptcy, was allowed. 8 
 
 It is said b} 7- Lord Redesdale that, although a bankrupt made a party 
 to a bill touching his estate may demur to the relief, all his interest 
 being transferred to his assignees, yet it has been generally understood, 
 that if any discovery is sought of his acts before he became a bank- 
 rupt, he must answer to that part of the bill for the sake of the dis- 
 covery, and to assist the plaintiff in obtaining proof, though his answer 
 cannot be read against his assignee ; otherwise, the bankruptcy might 
 entirely defeat the ends of justice. 4 
 
 * When the bankruptcy of a defendant does not appear on the *158 
 face of the bill, or has occurred subsequently to the tiling of the 
 bill, but before the expiration of the time for putting in his answer, 
 the defendant may take the objection by way of plea. 1 He may also 
 state the bankruptcy of a co-defendant, by way of objection for want of 
 parties, even where it took place after the filing of the bill. 2 
 
 A bankrupt can be made a party to a bill for the mere purpose of dis- 
 covery and injunction ; 8 but there is no doubt that if he is made a party 
 for the purpose of obtaining relief against him, he may demur to the 
 bill, and that in such case his demurrer will protect him from the 
 discovery as well as the relief ; where, however, fraud or collusion is 
 charged between the bankrupt and his assignees, the bankrupt may be 
 made a party, and he cannot demur, although relief be prayed against 
 him. Thus, where a creditor, having obtained execution against the 
 effects of his debtor, filed a bill against the debtor, against whom a com- 
 mission of bankrupt had issued, and the persons claiming as assignees 
 under the commission, charging that the commission was a contrivance 
 to defeat the plaintiff's execution, and that the debtor having, by per- 
 mission of the plaintiff, possessed part of the goods taken in execution 
 
 3 Whitworth v. Davis, 1 Ves. & B. 545; see question. See Gilbert v Lewis, 1 De G. J. & 
 also Griffin v. Archer, 2 Anst. 478; Lloyd v. S. 38; 2 J. & H. 452; 9 Jur. N. S. 187: Weise 
 Lander, 5 Mad. 282, 288; Collet v. Wollaston, v. Wardle, L. R. 19 Eq. 171; Bailey v. Vincent, 
 3 Bro. C. C. 228. 5 Mad. 48; Story, Eq. PI. § 223, n. 
 
 4 Ld. Red. 161; Fopping v. Van Pelt, 1 Hoff. i Turner v. Robinson, 1 S. & S. 3; Lane r. 
 Ch.Pr. 545. This opinion has given rise to Smith, 14 Beav. 49; .Tones v. Binns, 10 Jur. 
 much discussion, and is made the subject of an N. S. 119; 12 W. R. 329, M. R.; 33 Beav. 362; 
 elaborate judgment by Sir Thomas Plumer Peppery. Henzell, 2 H. & M. 486; HJur. N. 
 V. C. in the case of Whitworth v. Davis (1 S. 840; and see Campbell v. Joyce, L. R. 2Eq. 
 Ves. & B. 545;, in the course of which he ob- 377, V. C. W. 
 
 serves that "the case of Fenton v. Hughes (7 2 Sergrove v. Mayhew, 3 M'N. &G. 97. 
 
 Ves. 287; see also Le Texier v. Margravine of 3 p| ea f defendant's bankruptcy overruled; 
 
 Anspach, 15 Ves. 159, 166) lays down a broad be being the manager, secretary, and a member 
 
 principle, namely, that a person who has no in- of the committee of an association; and dis- 
 
 terest, and is a mere witness against whom there covery was required from him in order to 
 
 could be no relief, ought not to be a party; a obtain contribution from the members. Pepper 
 
 bankrupt stands in that situation : a competent v. Henzell. 2 H & M. 486: 11 Jur. N. S. 840, 
 
 witness, having no interest, against whom, which see for form of plea. For plea of tru«t 
 
 therefore, no relief can be had at the hearing; deed registered under the Bankruptcy Act, 1861 
 
 he falls precisely within that general rule." (24 & 25 Vic. c. 134), see Metropolitan Bank v. 
 
 He, however, allowed the demurrer in the case Offord, W. N. (1870) 74. 
 before him, without determining the general 
 
 153
 
 * 1G9 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 for the purpose of sale, instead of paying the produce to the plaintiff had 
 paid it to his assignees : a demurrer by the alleged bankrupt, because he 
 had no interest, and might be examined as a witness, was overruled. 4 
 Upon the same principle, where a man had been fraudulently induced 
 by the drawer to accept bills of exchange without consideration, and the 
 drawer afterwards indorsed them to others : upon a bill filed against the 
 holder and drawer of the bills of exchange, for a delivery up of the bills, 
 and an injunction, the drawer's plea of his bankruptcy, which took 
 place after the bill filed, in bar to the bill, was overruled. 5 
 
 Where a defendant becomes bankrupt after the commencement of the 
 suit, the bankruptcy is no abatement, and the plaintiff has his choice, 
 either to dismiss the bill and go in under the bankruptcy, or to go on 
 with the suit, making the assignees parties. 6 (a) It seems that in Knox 
 v. Brown," 1 Lord Thurlow permitted the plaintiff to dismiss his 
 *159 own bill without costs, because it was by the * act of the defend- 
 ant himself that the object of the suit was gone. In a subsequent 
 case, 1 however, the Court of Exchequer refused to make such an order 
 without costs; and in Monteith v. Taylor, 2 where a motion was made on 
 behalf of the defendant, who had become bankrupt, to dismiss the plain- 
 tiff's bill with costs, for want of prosecution, Lord Eldon, although he at 
 first entertained a doubt whether he could make such an order with 
 costs, afterwards expressed an opinion against the plaintiff upon that 
 point, upon which the plaintiff submitted to give the usual undertaking 
 to speed the cause ; and in Blackmore v. Smith* Lord Cottenham, after 
 referring to the order made in the last-mentioned case, in the Registrar's 
 book, held, that if the bill were dismissed it must be with costs. 
 
 It appears from the two cases last referred to, that a defendant may, 
 notwithstanding he has become bankrupt, move to dismiss the plain- 
 tiff's bill for want of prosecution ; and it is the practice, on such a mo- 
 tion, to dismiss the bill with costs. 4 
 
 Where a party who is a defendant to a suit becomes bankrupt, it will 
 be necessary for the plaintiff, if he proceeds with the suit, to bring the 
 assignees before the Court by amendment or a supplemental order ; 5 (1>) 
 
 4 King v. Martin, 2 Ves. J. 641, cited Ld. Kemball v. Walduck, 1 Sm. & G. App. 27 ; 
 Red. 162; but see Gilbert v. Lewis, 1 De G. J. 18 Jur. 69. 
 
 & S. 38; 2 J. & H. 452; 9 Jur. N. S. 187. 5 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, §§ 52, 53; R. S. C. 
 
 5 Mackworth v. Marshall, 3 Sim. 368. Ord. L. 1-4; Lash v. Miller, 4 De G. M. & G. 
 
 6 Monteith v. Taylor, 9 Ves. 615. 841; 1 Jur. N. S. 457; Storm v. Davenport, 1 
 ' 2 Bro. C. C. 186. Sandf. Ch. 135. It is to be borne in mind, 
 
 1 Rutherford v. Miller, 2 Anst. 458. that there is a difference in reference to this 
 
 2 9 Ves. 615. point between cases of voluntas alienation, 
 
 3 1 M'N. & G. 80. and cases of involuntary alienation, as by 
 
 4 Blackmore e. Smith, ubi sup. ; see also insolvency or bankruptcy of the defendant. 
 Robson v. Earl of Devon, 3 Sm. & G. 227; This distinction is fully discussed in Sedgwick 
 Levi v. Heritage, 26 Beav. 560, which were v. Cleveland, 7 Paige, 290-292; see also note to 
 cases of insolvent debtors; overruling Blan- Story, Eq. PI. § 342. After the assignees have 
 shard v. Drew, 10 Sim. 240; see, however, been made parties, the bankrupt appears to be 
 
 
 (a) See Blanchard v. Cooke, 144 Mass. 207, W. N. (1876), 112; Barter v. Dubeux, 7 
 218. Q. B. D. 413; Esterbrook Steel Pen Manuf. Co. 
 
 (b) See also Provincial Banking Co. v. Til- v. Ahem, 30 N. J. Eq. 341. 
 lett, W. N. (1869) 222; Walker r. Blackmore, 
 
 154
 
 BANKRUPTS, AND LIQUIDATING AND COMPOUNDING DEBTORS. * 160 
 
 and it has been decided, that where the assignee of a bankrupt has 
 been already before the Court as a defendant, and such assignee die 
 or is removed, and a new assignee is appointed in his stead, the suit 
 abates, and an order to carry on the proceedings against such new 
 assignee must be obtained in like manner as against the original 
 assignee. 6 (a) 
 
 Where a bill has been filed against a defendant who afterwards 
 became bankrupt, and a supplemental bill was in consequence filed 
 against his assignees, the evidence taken in the original cause pre- 
 viously to the bankruptcy was allowed to be read at the hearing 
 * against the assignees ; but where it appeared that some of the *160 
 witnesses in the cause had been examined after the commission 
 issued, and before the supplemental cause was at issue, an objection 
 to reading their depositions was allowed ; but the objection was over- 
 ruled in so far as it extended to the witnesses who had been previously 
 examined. 1 
 
 It has been held that, on the death of the assignee of an insolvent's 
 estate, where no new assignee has been appointed, a party having a 
 demand against the insolvent, but not having proved under the insol- 
 vency, may sue the executors of the deceased assignee. 2 
 
 Trustees of bankrupts brought before the Court by order to continue 
 the proceedings may be made liable to the costs of the whole action, 
 where they improperly resist the plaintiff's claim ; 3 and, after some 
 difference of opinion upon the subject, it has been determined, that in 
 foreclosure suits, where assignees are made parties as defendants, in 
 respect of the equity of redemption, they are not entitled to their costs 
 from the plaintiff, even though they may have received no assets of the 
 bankrupt wherewith to pay them. 4 A defendant who has become bank- 
 rupt may appeal from a personal order which has been made against 
 him. 5 
 
 treated as out of the suit; see Robertson v. Younge, 386; Mendham v. Robinson, 1 M.&K. 
 
 Southgate, 5 Hare, 223; Stahlschmidt v. Lett. 217; Man v. Ricketts, 7 Beav. 484; 1 Phil, 
 
 ib. 595; and see Seton, 1166. For forms of sup- 617 (decided on similar clause in former Bank- 
 
 plemental order, see Seton, 1165; Nos. 5, 6; rupt Act), and cases there cited, 
 
 and for forms of motion paper and petition, see * Hichens v. Congreve, 4 Sim. 420. 
 
 Vol. III.; and see ante, p. 64. But see now Doe 2 Fulcher v. Howell, 11 Sim. 100; and see 
 
 v. Childress, 21 Wall. 642; Payne v. Beech, 2 ante, p. 62. 
 
 Tenn. Ch. 711; Eyster v. Graff, 91 U. S. 521 ; 3 Whiteoinb v. Minchin, 5 Mad. 91 ; Cook 
 Esterbrook Steel Pen Man. Co. v. Ahern, 30 v. Hathway, L. R. 8 Eq. 612, 617; but see 
 N. J. Eq. 341, and note. And see Barger Foxwell v. Greatorex, 33 Beav. 345. 
 v. Buckland, 28 Gratt. 850; Parks v. Doty, 13 4 Appleby v. Duke, 1 Phil. 272; Clarke v. 
 Bush, 727. Wilmot, ib. 276; Ford V, White, 16 Beav. 120, 
 6 Gordon v. Jesson, 16 Reav. 440. The and cases there cited; and see Ford v. Chester- 
 157th section of the Bankrupt Act, 12 & 13 field, 16 Beav. 516 ; but see Eglin v. Dry- 
 Vic, c 106, referred to ante, p. 65, applies only, den, 16 W. R. 837; see also post, Chap. XVI. 
 it would seem, to plaintiffs; see Gordon v. Jes- Disclaimers 
 son, u'/i sup.; and see Bainbrigge v. Blair, 6 Dence v. Mason, W. N. (1879) 177. 
 
 (") An assignee in bankruptcy, who has lent conveyance by the bankrupt prior to his 
 been discharged upon his accounts, is not a bankuptcy. Clarkson v. Dunning, 22 Abb 
 necessary party to a suit to set aside a fraudu- N. C- 439. 
 
 155
 
 * 161 
 
 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 Section IX. — Infants. 
 
 Infants as well as adults may, as we have seen, 6 be made defendants 
 to suits in Equity ; and, in such cases, it is not necessary that any other 
 person should be joined with them in the bill ; nor is it usual for the 
 plaintiff to describe them as infants in his bill, unless any question in 
 the suit turns upon the fact of their infancy. (a) 
 
 Infants, on account of their supposed want of capacity, are not them- 
 selves permitted to defend ; and therefore, where a defendant to a suit, 
 or the respondent to a petition, 7 is an infant, a proper person, who ought 
 not to be a mere volunteer, 8 should appear, put in his defence for him, 
 and generally act on his behalf in the conduct and management of the 
 case. 9 This person is called " the guardian of the infant ; " and 
 *161 is generally styled " the guardian ad litem" * to distinguish him 
 from the guardian of the person, or of the estate. 1 
 
 6 Ante, p. 130. 
 
 " Re Barrington, 27 Beav. 272; Re Ward, 
 2 Giff. 122; 6 Jur. N. S. 441; Re Duke of 
 Cleveland's Harte Estates, 1 Dr. & Sm. 46; see 
 Re Cooper, 9 W. R. 631. 
 
 8 Anon. 10 Hare, App. 27; Foster u. Cautley, 
 10 Hare, App. 24; 17 Jur. 370; and see Leese 
 v. Knight, 8 Jur. N. S. 1006; 10 W. R. 711. 
 It is usual to appoint the nearest relative of 
 an infant defendant as his guardian ad litem. 
 Bank of United States v. Ritche, 8 Peters, 
 128 ; Grant v. "Van Schoonhoven, 9 Paige, 255. 
 And see where no one applies, Anon. 2 Ch. Cas. 
 163; 2 Fonbl. 236 ; Conclin «. Hall, 2 Barb. Ch. 
 136; Carter v. Montgomery, 2 Tenn. Ch. 457. 
 
 9 A decree against an adult defendant, as if 
 an infant, was held not to bind him. Snow v. 
 Hole, 15 Sim. 161; Green v. Badley, 7 Beav. 271. 
 
 i In a suit against an infant, process should 
 be served upon him. and a guardian ad litem 
 appointed by the Court. Carrington v. Brents, 
 1 McLean, 17; Walker v. Hallett, 1 Ala. 379; 
 Graham v. Sublett, 6 J. J. Marsh. 45. A guar- 
 dian ad litem need not be appointed, if the 
 infant has a probate or general guardian, unless 
 the interests of the infant and such guardian 
 are in conflict. Mansur V. Pratt. 101 Mass. 60. 
 So in Tennessee the general guardian represents 
 the infant. Britain v. Cowan, 5 Humph. 315; 
 Co wen v. Anderson, 7 Coldw. 291. 
 
 In New York, the appearance of an infant 
 is entered by his guardian ad litem, who is 
 appointed by the Court on petition for that 
 p-irpose. Knickerbocker ». De Freest, 2 Paige, 
 304; Grant v. Van Schoonhoven, 9 Paige, 255; 
 See, in Ala., Cato v. Easly, 2 Stewart, 214 ; Dar- 
 rington v. Borland, 3 Porter, 10. 
 
 Infants above the age of fourteen years 
 should be consulted in the appointment of a 
 guardian ad litem, if that course would not be 
 attended with too much trouble or expense. 
 Walker v. Hallett, 1 Ala. 379. Courts may 
 appoint guardians ad litem to non-resident 
 infants. Walker v. Hallett, 1 Ala. 379; 
 Graham v. Sublett, 6 J. J. Marsh. 45; Smith v. 
 Palmer, 3 Beav. 10; Kilcrease v. Blythe, 5 
 Humph. 378. And they may provide reason- 
 able compensation for such guardians. Walker 
 v. Hallett, 1 Ala. 379; Graham v. Sublett, 6 J. 
 J. Marsh. 45; see Gott v. Cook, 7 Paige, 523. 
 It is error to enter a decree against infant 
 defendants without assigning them a guardian 
 ad litem. Roberts v. Stanton, 2 Munf. 129; 
 Irons v. Crist, 3 A. K. Marsh. 143; St. Clair v. 
 Smith, 3 Ham. 363 ; Crockett v. Drew. 5 Gray, 
 399; Swan v. Horton, 14 Gray, 179; Ewing v. 
 Highbee, 7 Ham. 198; see Darby i'. Richardson, 
 3 J.J. Marsh. 544 ; Beverley v. Miller, 6 Munf. 
 99; Cravens v. Dyer, 1 Litt. 153; Shields v. 
 Bryant, 3 Bibb, 525. The guardian must have 
 accepted the appointment, and that fact should 
 appear of record. Daniel v. Hannagan, 5 J. 
 J. Marsh. 49. 
 
 Where infant defendants had not been served 
 with process, but upon inspection of the record 
 it appeared, that, upon their motion, a guardian 
 ad litem had been appointed, who proceeded in 
 the cause, the Court held, that a decree against 
 the infants was not void, and therefore could 
 not be impeached in a collateral suit. Day v. 
 Kerr, 7 Mo. 426. So, where there is an actual 
 appearance by guardian ad litem, recognized by 
 the Court, although there is no order of record. 
 Hopper v. Fisher, 2 Head, 153 ; Greenlaw v. 
 
 (a) As to dispensing with notice, by the 
 appointment of a guardian ad litem, to an 
 unborn child, see Re Rayner, W. N. (1891) 
 
 156 
 
 152. As to proceedings upon the birth of an 
 infant, who is a necessary party, pending the 
 suit, see Peter v. Thomas-Peter, 26 Ch. D. 181.
 
 INFANTS. 
 
 162 
 
 Formerly it was usual, upon the appointment of a guardian ad litem, 
 for the infant to appear personally in Court. 2 This is no longer 
 necessary, 8 but the order may be obtained upon motion of course, 
 or upon petition of course, presented at the Rolls in the name of the 
 infant ; the application being supported by an affidavit of the infant's 
 solicitor, that the proposed guardian has no interest in the matters in 
 question in the suit, adverse to that of the infant; and it must also 
 be proved by the same affidavit, or by that of some other person, if 
 the solicitor is not sufficiently acquainted with the proposed guardian, 
 that he is a fit and proper person to be appointed. 4 A co-defendant may 
 be the guardian ad litem, if he has no adverse interest ; s but neither the 
 plaintiff, nor a married woman, nor a person out of the jurisdiction, 6 
 can be such guardian. 
 
 * No step in the suit, on behalf of the infant, will be regular, *1G2 
 till a guardian ad litem has appeared for him. 1 If no appearance by 
 a guardian is entered on behalf of the infant, the plaintiff must, before 
 further proceeding with the action against the infant, 2 apply to the Court 
 or a Judge that a solicitor may be appointed his guardian. The applica- 
 tion is made by motion, of which notice 8 must be served upon or left at 
 the dwelling-house of the person with whom, or under whose care, the 
 infant was at the time of serving the bill, 4 and if such person is not 
 the father or guardian, notice must also be served upon the father or 
 guardian. Where the infant's father was dead, service of the notice 
 at the house of the infant's mother and step-father was held sufficient ; 5 
 and where the plaintiff was unable to discover where the parents lived, 
 service was deemed sufficient on the head of a college, of which the 
 
 Kemehan, 4 Sneed, 371; Kindell v. Titus, 9 
 Heisk. 738; Jackson v. Jackson, 2 Tenn. Leg. 
 Rep. 275. It is not necessary to serve a copy of 
 a bill in Equity on a guardian ad litem, after his 
 appointment. Jones v. Drake, 2 Ha}'\v. 237. 
 
 The Court will not appoint a person guardian 
 ad litem for an infant defendant, on the nomina- 
 tion of the plaintiff. Knickerbocker v. De 
 Freest, 2 Paige, 304. 
 
 2 Crabbe v. Moubery, 5 De G. & S. 347; 
 Benison v. Wortley, ib. 648; Tap pen v. Nor- 
 man, 11 Ves. 563. 
 
 3 See Drant v. Vause, 2 Y. & C C. C. 524 ; 
 7 Jur. 637, L. C. ; Egremont v. Egremont, 2 De 
 G. M. & G. 730: 17 Jur 55; Foster v. Cautley, 
 10 Hare, App. 24; 17 Jur. 370; Storr v. Pannell, 
 1 W. R. 209, V. C. S ; Walker v. Hallett, 1 
 Ala. 379; Banta v. Calhoon, 1 A. K. Marsh. 
 107; Carter v. Montgomery, 2 Tenn. Ch. 450. 
 
 4 Braithwaite's Pr. 46, 47; see now R S. C. 
 1883, Old. XVI. 18. For form of order, see 2 
 Seton, 705, No. 3; 706, No. 4; and for forms of 
 motion paper, petition, and affidavit, see Vol. 
 HI. Where the infant is a respondent to a 
 petition, and a guardian ad litem is to be 
 appointed, the application must be supported by 
 an affidavit that the petition has been served on 
 
 the infant. Re Willan, 9 W. R. 689; see In re 
 Jones's Mortgage, 22 W R. 837. As to ser- 
 vice, see R. S. C. Ord. IX. 4 ; 2 Seton, 1624, 
 Nos. 7, 8. 
 
 5 See Bonfield v. Grant, 11 W. R. 275, M. R. ; 
 Newman v. Selfe, ib. 764, M. R. ; Anon. 9 
 Hare, App. 27 
 
 6 Anon. 18 Jur. 770, V. C. W. 
 
 i Lushington v. Sewell, 6 Mad. 28. See Re 
 Goodwin, W. N. (1879) 218; N. v. N. 22 W. R. 
 819. An appearance by the plaintiff's solicitor 
 for an infant defendant is irregular, and of 
 no validity. Cons. Ord. X. 5; Leese v. Knight, 
 8 Jur. N. S. 1006; 10 W. R. 711, V. C. K. 
 
 - If no answer is required from the infant 
 (as is usually the practice), and no voluntary 
 answer is put in, the defendant is considered, 
 after the expiration of the time for answering 
 voluntarily, to be in default. Bentley v. Robin- 
 son, 9 Hare, App. 76. 
 
 3 For form of notice of motion, see Vol. III. 
 
 4 Taylor v. Ansley, 9 Jur. 1055: Christie v. 
 Cameron, 2 Jnr. N. S. 635, V. C W. ; and see 
 Cons. Ord. VII. 3; R. S. C. Ord. XIII. 1. 
 
 s Hitch v. Wells, 8 Beav. 576, and see 
 Thompson v. Jones, 8 Ves. 141; Lane v. Hard- 
 wicke, 5 Beav. 576. 
 
 157
 
 * 163 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 infant was an under-graduate. 6 If, however, an appearance has been 
 entered for the infant, service upon the solicitor is sufficient. 7 (a) Upon 
 the motion, the Court must be satisfied that the bill has been duly 
 served, 8 and that the notice of the application was served after the 
 expiration of the time allowed for appearing or answering, and at least 
 six clear days before the day in such notice named for hearing the appli- 
 cation ; 9 but the Court or Judge, on hearing the application, may dis- 
 pense with service on the father or guardian. 10 The official solicitor n 
 is the person usually appointed. 
 
 If the infant is out of the jurisdiction, the same course must be fol- 
 lowed ; 12 but in such a case where he had no substantial interest, and 
 had been served with the bill, the Court dispensed with service of notice 
 
 of the application. 13 
 *163 * If the guardian dies pending the suit, a new guardian must be 
 appointed in his place; this is done in the same manner as the 
 original guardian was appointed, and upon similar evidence. 1 All orders 
 appointing guardians must be left at the Record and Writ Clerks' Office 
 for entry. 2 
 
 Where the infant is a married woman, it is nevertheless necessary 
 that she should defend by her guardian ; though it appears to be the 
 practice to appoint her husband to be her guardian where he is a defend- 
 ant with her, and they intend to defend jointly. 3 
 
 The duty of the guardian is to properly defend the suit for the infant ; 
 and it seems that he is responsible for the propriety and conduct of the 
 defence ; 4 and if he puts in an answer which is scandalous or imperti- 
 
 6 Christie v. Cameron, ubi supra. son, 1 Giff. 337.: 4 De G. & J. 659; but where 
 
 I Cookson v. Lee, 15 Sim. 302; Bentley V. there is property of the infant's with which the 
 Robinson, 9 Hare, App. 76; Wood v. Logsden, Court can deal, it will, it seems, direct the costs 
 id. 26. t0 be paid out of it. Robinson v. Aston, 9 Jur. 
 
 8 For mode of service, see R. S. C. Ord. 224. V. C. K. B. 
 
 IX. 1. An infant defendant, who cannot be 12 O'Brien v. Maitland, 10 W. R. 275, L. C; 
 
 served, and whose interest is merely reversion- and see Anderson v. Stather, 10 Jur. N. S. 383. 
 
 ary, may be struck out by amendment. Black- 13 Lambert v. Turner, 10 W. H. 335, V. C. 
 
 more p.Howett, 30 L. T." 101. K. ; Turner v. Sowden, 10 Jur. N. S. 1122; 13 
 
 9 Sundays are included. R. S. C. Ord. LVII. W. R. 66, V. C K ; 2 Dr. & Sm. 265, nom. 
 
 2; see Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 11 ; Brewster v. Turner v. Snowdon. 
 
 Thorpe, 11 Jur. 6. For form of affidavit in l Ante, pp. 160, 161. 
 
 support of motion, see Vol. III. 2 Braithwaite's Pr. 47. Now at the Central 
 
 io Cons. Ord. VII. 3; see Leese v. Knight, 8 Office. 
 
 Jur. N. S. 1006; 10 W. R. 711, V. C. K. ; 3 Colman v. Northcote, 2 Hare, 147; 7 Jur. 
 
 McDermott v. Thompson, 29 Fla. 299. For 528, and cases there referred to. A decree in 
 
 form <>f order, see Seton, 1251. Chancery is erroneous which is rendered against 
 
 II To the Suitors' Fee Fund. Thomas v. a woman who is shown by the bill to be bo'b. 
 Thomas, 7 Beav. 47: Sheppard v. Harris, 10 a minor and a feme covert, where no appear- 
 Jur. 24, V. C. K. B. Where he is appointed, ance by or for her has been entered, and no 
 the Court provides for his costs, Cons. Ord. XL. guardian ad litem appointed. OHara v. Mac- 
 4; usually directing the plaintiff to pay them, Connell, 93 U. S. 150. 
 
 and add them to his own. Harris v. Hamlyn, 4 Knickerbacker v. De Freest, 2 Paige, 304. 
 
 3 De G. & S. 470; 14 Jur. 55; Fraser v. Thomp- A guardian ad litem may consent to any mat- 
 
 (a) In Wade P. Keefe, 22 L. R. Ir. 154, a appearance for him. was held not liable for 
 
 solicitor, who in ffood faith, and without knowl- costs subsequeutly incurred by the plaintiff in 
 
 edge of the defendant's infancy, entered an the suit. 
 
 158
 
 INFANTS. 
 
 164 
 
 nent, he is liable for the costs of it ; except, however, in the case of gross 
 misconduct, a guardian ad litem will not be ordered personally to pay 
 the costs of a suit which he has defended unsuccessfully. 5 Sometimes 
 the guardian is ordered or decreed to perform a duty on behalf of the 
 infant ; his refusal or neglect to do which will subject him to the censure 
 of the Court. 6 
 
 If the guardian of an infant defendant, or the next friend of an infant 
 plaintiff, does not do his duty, or other sufficient ground be made out, 
 the Court will remove him. 7 The application should be made by the 
 infant, by his next friend for the purpose of the application. 8 It has 
 been said 9 that infants are as much bound by the conduct of their 
 solicitor as adults ; thus, an issue devlsavlt vel non may, it seems, be 
 waived on the part of the infant. 10 And so, although the Court does not 
 usually, where infants are concerned, make a decree by consent, without 
 an inquiry whether it is for their benefit, 11 yet when once a decree 
 has been pronounced without that * previous step, it is considered *1G4 
 as of the same authority as if such an inquiry had been directed, 
 and a certificate thereupon made that it would be for their benefit ; and 
 in the same manner, an order for maintenance, though usually made 
 after an inquiry, if made without, would be equally binding. 1 
 
 ter relating to the conduct of the cause, such as 
 consenting to take the evidence by affidavit. 
 Knatchbull v. Fowle, 1 Ch. D. 604. It is the 
 special duty of the guardian ad litem to submit 
 to the Court, for its consideration and decision, 
 every question involving the rights of the in- 
 fant affected by the suit. Ibid.; Dow v. Jewell, 
 21 N. H. 486, 487, and to make a vigorous de- 
 fence of the interests of the infant. Sconce v. 
 Whitney, 12 111. 150; Enos v. Capps, 12 111. 
 255. If the guardian ad litem neglects his duty 
 to the infant, whereby such infant sustains an 
 injury, the guardian will not only be punished 
 for his neglect, but he will also be liable to the 
 infant for all the damages he may have sustained 
 thereby. Knickerbacker v. De Freest, supra. 
 
 Where a person consents to act as guardian 
 ad litem, he must put in a pleading; and is 
 not to stop the plaintiff by neglecting it, merely 
 because he thinks bis wards are improper or 
 un necessary parties. Farmers' Loan and Trust 
 Co. v. Reed, 3 Edw. Ch. 414. The infant's 
 answer is generally confined to a mere sub- 
 mission of his rights and interests in the mat- 
 ters in question, to the care and protection of 
 the Court. The answer in such cases generallv 
 is that the infant knows nothing of the matter, 
 ami therefore neither admits nor denies the 
 charges, but leaves the pl.iintiff to prove them 
 as he shall be advised, and throws himself upon 
 the protection of the Court. Dow v. Jewell, 
 21 X. H. 487, per Gilchrist C. J. 
 
 5 Morgan v. Morgan, 11 Jur. N. S. 233. 
 
 6 Hinde. 241. 
 
 7 Russell v. Sharpe, 1 J. & W. 482; Leese 
 r. Knight, 8 Jur. N. S. 1006; 10 W. R. 711. 
 
 The application for this purpose may be made 
 by summons or motion; for forms, see Vol. III. 
 
 8 Ante, p. 71. 
 
 9 Tillotson v. Hargrave, 3 Mad. 494; see 
 Morison v. Morison, 4 M. & C. 216, 226. 
 
 10 Levy v. Levy, 3 Mad. 245. 
 
 11 Dow v. Jewell, 21 N. H. 486, 487; Mills 
 v. Dennis, 3 John. Ch. 368; Mondey v. Mon- 
 dey, 1 V. & B. 223. Neither a default nor a 
 decree pro confesso can be taken against an 
 infant. Enos v. Capps, 12 111. 255; Wells v. 
 Smith, 44 Miss. 296; Mcllvoy v. Alsop, 45 
 Miss. 335. A decree cannot be entered against 
 an infant without proof to sustain the case. 
 Hamilton v. Oilman, 12 111. 260. 
 
 i Wall v.Bushby, 1 Bro. C. C.484, 488: per 
 Gilchrist C. J. in Dow v. Jewell, 21 N. H. 487; 
 and see ante, p. 68, n. (a) ; Brooke v. Mostvn, 
 10 Jur. N.S. 554, M. R. ; id. 1141; L.R.4H.L. 
 304; 33 Beav. 457; 2 De G. & S. 373, 417; 
 Fadelle v. Bernard, 19 W. R. 555; Boswell v. 
 Coaks, 27 Ch. D. 424, 454; Coaks v. Boswell, 11 
 App. Cas. 232; as to compromises with the 
 Court's sanction where infants are interested, 
 see Musgrove v. Lusk, 2 Tenn. Ch. 576. By an 
 order, it was provided that any consent by the 
 guardian to any mode of taking evidence or 
 other procedure, should, if given with the 
 sanction of the Court or Judge in chambers, 
 have the same effect as if the infant were not 
 under disability, and had given such consent. 
 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 24 (1 Jur. N. S. Pt. 
 II. 60). For form of summons to obtain the 
 Judge's sanction, see Vol. III. As to his con- 
 sent to taking evidence by affidavit, see Knatch- 
 bull v. Fowle, 1 Ch. D. 604; Fryer v. Wise- 
 
 159
 
 * 165 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 An infant defendant is as much bound by a decree in Equity as a per- 
 son of full age ; therefore, if there be an absolute decree made against 
 a defendant who is under age, he will not be permitted to dispute it, 
 unless upon the same grounds as an adult might have disputed it ; such 
 as fraud, collusion, or error, (a) 
 
 To impeach a decree on the ground of fraud or collusion, the infant 
 may proceed, either by a bill of review or supplemental bill in the na- 
 ture of a bill of review ; or he may so proceed by original bill. He 
 may also impeach a decree, on the ground of error, by original bill ; 
 and he is not obliged, for that purpose, to wait till he has attained 
 twenty-one. 2 
 
 Among the errors that have been allowed as sufficient grounds on 
 which to impeach a decree against an infant, is the circumstance that, 
 in a suit for the administration of assets against an infant heir, a sale 
 of the real estate has been decreed before a sufficient account has been 
 taken of the personal estate. 3 And so, if an account were to be directed 
 against an infant in respect of his receipts and payments during his 
 minority, such a direction would be erroneous. 4 Another ground of 
 error for which a decree against an infant may be impeached is, that it 
 does not give the infant a day after his coming of age to show cause 
 against it, in cases where he is entitled to such indulgence. 5 
 
 It was an established rule at Common Law, that in all actions for 
 debt against infant heirs by specialty creditors of their ancestors, either 
 party was entitled to pray that the parol might demur ; that is, that the 
 proceedings might be stayed until the heir had attained his full 
 *165 age. 6 This rule was the foundation of a * similar practice in 
 Equity in like cases ; * so that, when any suit was instituted, either 
 by a specialty creditor or by a simple contract creditor, the equity of 
 which depended upon the legal liability of the heir to pay out of de- 
 scended assets the specialty debts of his ancestor, no relief could be 
 obtained against the heir during his minority, but the decree contained 
 a direction for liberty to apply when the heir should have attained 
 his full age; accompanied, in the case of a suit by a simple contract 
 creditor, with a declaration of the right to have the assets marshalled. 
 Courts of Equity did not, however, confine this species of protection to 
 cases precisely similar to those in which the parol could demur at Law ; 
 but, by a kind of analogy, they adopted a second rule, by which, in cases 
 
 man, W. N. (1876) 3; 24 W. R. 205; R. S. C. 6 3 Bla. Com. 300; Plasket v. Beeby, 4East, 
 
 Old. XXXVIII. 485; Com. Dig. Enfant (D) 3; id. Pleas, 2 
 
 2 Richmond v. Tayleur, 1 P. Wms. 737; (E) 3. Where the infant is a trustee. Equity 
 
 Brook v. Mostyn, ubi supra; S. C. sub nam., may direct a sale notwithstanding tlie infancy. 
 
 Mostyn v. Brooke, L. R. 4 H. L. 304; Living- See Hargrave v. Tindal, 1 Bro. C. C. 136, n.; 
 
 ston v. Noe, 1 Lea, 64; McGavock v. Bell, 3 Uvedale v. Uvedale, 3 Atk. 117; Pope v. 
 
 Coldw. 517; Loyd v. Malone, 23 III. 43. Gwyn, 8 Ves. 28, n.; Shiphard v. Lutwidge, 
 
 s Bennett v. Hamill, 2 Sch. & Lef. 566; id. 26; Spencer v. Boyes, 4 Ves. 28, 29, n. 
 Davidson v. Bowden, 5 Sneed, 129. 1 See Powell v. Robins, 7 Ves. 209; 
 
 4 Hindmarsh v. Southgate. 3 Russ. 324 Chaplin v. Chaplin, 3 P. Wms. 368 ; Lechmere 
 
 327 ; see Stott v. Meanock. 10 W. R. 605. v. Brasier, 2 J. & W. 287, 290 ; Scarth v. 
 
 8 Bennett ». Hamill, ubi supra; 2 Kent, 245. Cotton, Cas. temp. Talb. 198. 
 
 (a) See Fanning v. Foley (Cal.), 33 Pac. Rep. 1098. 
 160
 
 INFANTS. 
 
 166 
 
 of foreclosure and partition, and in all cases in which the real estates of 
 an infant were to be sold or conveyed under a decree of the Court, and 
 consequently the execution of the conveyance was necessarily deferred, 
 the infant had an opportunity, after attaining twenty-one, to show cause 
 against the decree. 2 For this purpose a provision was inserted in the 
 decree, 8 giving the infant a day to show cause against it within a certain 
 time after he came of age. 4 The insertion of this clause in a decree for 
 a conveyance by an infant of his estate, was so strictly insisted upon in 
 all cases, that the omission of it has been considered as an error in the 
 decree. 6 (a) 
 
 By the Act 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 47, the parol demurrer was abol- 
 ished, and the cases in which the clause giving the infant a day to show 
 cause ought to be introduced, were materially lessened in number ; 6 for 
 by the 10th section 7 of that statute it is enacted, that from and 
 after the passing of the * Act, where any action, suit, or other *166 
 proceeding for the payment of debts, or any other purpose, shall 
 
 2 See Price v. Carver, 3 M. & C. 162, 163. 
 
 8 See Harris v. Youman, 1 Hoff. Ch. 178; 
 Wilkinson v. Oliver, 4 Hen. & M. 450 ; Shields 
 v. Bryant, 3 Bibb, 525; Dow v. Jewell, 21 
 N. H. 470; Anderson v. Irvine, 11 B. Mon. 
 341; Cole v. Miller, 32 Miss. 89; Guest v. 
 Sims, 1 Tenn. 79. The rule applies where the 
 infant is directed to convey, not where title can 
 be, and is divested by the decree. Sheffield v. 
 Duchess of Buckingham, 1 West, 684; Mills v. 
 Dennis, 3 John. Ch. 146; Winston v. Campbell, 
 4 H. & M. 477; Rogers v. Clark, 4 Sneed, 668; 
 Winchester v. Winchester, 1 Head, 460. See 
 infra, 166, n. 5; 168, n. 4; 997, n. 1; 1276, 
 n. 3. Where a decree against an infant de- 
 fendant permits him to show cause, within a 
 certain time after he comes of age, why the 
 decree should not be enforced, he cannot assail 
 the decree in any manner he may choose, 
 without regard to the course of practice pur- 
 sued by adult defendants, but he must apply 
 to the Court for leave and direction. Field v. 
 Williamson, 4 Sandf. Ch. 613. And the cause 
 must be one which existed at the time the 
 decree was pronounced. Walker v. Page, 21 
 Gratt. 636. 
 
 (a) See ante, p. 73, n. (a); Whitney v. 
 Stearns, 11 Met. (Mass.) 319; Perry v. Perry, 
 65 Maine, 399 ; Smith v. McDonald, 42 Gal. 
 484; Bulow v. Witte, 3 S. C. 308; Davidson v. 
 Bowden, 5 Sneed, 129; Hurt v. Long, 90 Tenn. 
 445; Simmons v. Baynard, 30 Fed. Rep 532. 
 In Mellor v. Porter, 25 Ch. D. 158, upon a 
 review of the authorities, it was held that a 
 direction to convey when the infant is twenty- 
 one years of age would not authorize the Court 
 to declare him a trustee before that age, and in 
 the case of an equitable mortgage, the follow- 
 ing form of direction in the decree — that 
 
 VOL. I. — 11 
 
 4 The words of the decree in such cases 
 were as follows: "And this decree is to be 
 binding on the defendant, the infant, unless 
 he, on being served, after he shall have attained 
 his age of twenty-one years, with subpoena to 
 show cause against this decree, shill, within 
 six months from the service of such svbpienn, 
 show unto this Court good cause to the con- 
 trary." 2 Seton, 685, No. 2; see Dow v. Jewell, 
 21 N. H. 491. 
 
 5 Richmond v. Tayleur, 1 P. Wins. 737. 
 An absolute decree against an infant, without 
 giving him day after he comes of age to show 
 cause against it, will be reversed. Beeler v. 
 Bullitt, 4 Bibb, 11; Passmore v. Moore, 1 J. J. 
 Marsh. 591 : Jones v. Adair, 4 J. J. Marsh. 220; 
 Arnold v. Voorhies, id. 507; Searey v. Mor- 
 gan, 4 Bibb, 96; Wright v. Miller, 4 Barb. 
 (S. C.) 600; Coffin v. Heath, 6 Met. 76. 
 
 6 See 2 Macpherson (Lond. ed. 1842), 360, 
 361, 411. 
 
 7 The repeal of this section by 42 & 43 Vic. 
 c. 59, § 2, Sched. Pt. II., did not revive the 
 practice of parol demurrer. Id. § 4 (4). 
 
 "the infant defendants upon their attaining 
 twenty-one execute a proper conveyance to the 
 plaintiffs to be settled by the Judge in case the 
 parties differ." and giving them a day to show 
 cause — was approved, as in accordance with 
 the practice established by Price v. Carter, 
 sup?-a, and the unreported case of Backhouse 
 v. Hornsey. See also Gray v. Bell, W. X. 
 H882) 78;" 30 W. R. 606. The infant himself 
 should be made a party to a bill affecting his 
 title to real estate. Tucker v. Bean, 65 Maine, 
 352; Wakefield v. Marr, 65 Maine, 341. 
 
 161
 
 167 
 
 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 be commenced or prosecuted by or against any infant under the age of 
 twenty-one years, either alone or together with any other person or per- 
 sons, the parol shall not demur ; but such action, suit, or other proceed- 
 ing shall be prosecuted and carried on in the same manner, and as 
 effectually, as any action or suit could before the passing of the Act be 
 carried on or prosecuted against any infant, where, according to law, the 
 parol did not demur ; and by the 11th section, the Court was enabled, in 
 suits for the payment of the debts of a deceased person, to compel an 
 infant to convey. 1 
 
 One effect of this power was, that in decrees for the sale of estates 
 for the payment of debts, the provision, giving the infant a day to show 
 cause, was omitted. It appears, however, that although the power 
 given by the statute was, as to these particular suits for the payment 
 of debts, considered a sufficient reason for omitting the clause in ques- 
 tion, yet, in all other decrees, where a conveyance was required from 
 an infant, the law remained as before ; and the practice of giving the 
 
 infant a day to show cause, therefore, remained the same. 2 
 * 167 * In the case of a foreclosure, whether the legal estate be J or 
 be not vested in the infant, it is still usual to insert in the 
 decree a clause allowing the infant, six months after he comes of age, 
 to show cause against the decree, 2 unless the infant is a trustee. 3 
 Yet, in cases of foreclosure, the only cause which can be shown by the 
 
 1 Brook v. Smith, 2 R. & M. 73; and the 
 infant may be attached. Thomas r. Gwynne, 
 8 Beav. 312. Subsequent Acts are: 2 & 3 Vic. 
 c. 60; 11 & 12 Vic. c. 87 ; 13 & 14 Vic. c. 60; 
 15 & 16 Vic. c. 55; 16 & 17 Vic. c. 70; 31 & 
 ■12 Vic. c. 40, and see 2 Seton, 712-714; id. 
 1114, No. 4 (for form of order); Foster v. 
 Parker, 8 Ch. D. 147. 
 
 2 Price r. Carver, 3 M. & C. 157, 163: 
 and see Scholefield v. Heafield, 7 Sim. 669 ; 8 
 Sim. 470; Ball r. Harris, 8 Sim. 498; 1 Jur. 
 706 ; Affd. 4 M. & C. 264: 3 Jur. 140; Hutton 
 ?\ Mayne, 3 Jo. & Lat. 586; Jones r. Harris, 
 ■i Ir. Eq. 65. It seems to have been intended 
 by the 30th section of the Trustee Act, 1850, 
 13 & 14 Vic. c. 60, to obviate the necessity 
 of inserting in such decrees the clause giving 
 tlie infant a day to show cause, Headlam's 
 Trustee Acts, p. 59; that section extends to all 
 cases where a decree for the conveyance of 
 lands may be made by a Court of Equity; and 
 with respect to all such cases, it enables the 
 Court to carry its decrees into effect, by orders 
 vesting the estates and interests of infants, 
 and other persons under legal disabilities, in 
 the persons to whom the conveyance is to be 
 made. Accordingly, in a partition suit, Sir 
 J. L. Knight Bruce V. C. made an order, 
 declaring that, after the partition should have 
 been made, an infant defendant would be a 
 trustee within the Trustee Act as to the other 
 parties. The effect of such an order is, that 
 the aggregate estate may be vested according 
 
 162 
 
 to the partition sanctioned by the Court, 
 instead of postponing the conveyances until 
 the infant shall have attained twenty-one, and 
 shall have had opportunity of showing cause 
 against the decree. And it is presumed that, 
 in all cases where a conveyance is required 
 from an infant, the section above referred to 
 will apply, and it will no longer be necessary 
 to insert in the decree the direction giving the 
 infant a day to show cause after he shall have 
 attained twenty-one. Bowra v. Wright, 4 De 
 G. & S. 265; 15 Jur. 981; see also Shepherd 
 v. Churchill, 25 Beav. 21; Re Bloomar, 2 
 De G. & J. 88; Singleton v. Hopkins, 1 Jur. 
 N. S. 1199, V. C. S.; see, however, Hancock 
 v. Hancock, Seton, 577, 822. In cases of 
 election which must be made speedily, and 
 cases of like nature, the Court always assumed 
 jurisdiction to bind infants' realty without 
 giving day. Bingham v. Clanmorris, 2 Mol. 
 393; French v. Scully, cited in note to that 
 case; Taylor v. Phillips. 2 Ves. 23; Calvert v. 
 Godfrey," 6 Beav. 109 ; Re Howarth, L. R. 8 
 Ch. 415 ; Gray v. Barnard, 1 Tenn. Ch. 301. 
 
 1 Booth r. Rich, 1 Vern. 295; Williamson 
 v. Gordon, 19 Ves. 114; Anon. Mos. 66; 
 Bennett r. Edwards, 2 Vern. 392; Price v. 
 Carver, 3 M. & C. 161. 
 
 2 Newbury r. Marten, 15 Jur. 166; Yates v. 
 Crewe, Seton, 685; and see ib. 689; but see 
 Fisher on Mortgages, 631. 
 
 3 See Foster v. Parker, 8 Ch. D. 147.
 
 INFANTS. * 168 
 
 defendant is error in the decree; and it has been held, that he may not 
 unravel the account, nor is he so much as entitled, to redeem the 
 mortgage by paying what is due. 4 
 
 The clause giving the infant a day to show cause against a decree of 
 foreclosure after attaining twenty-one, must be inserted in the order for 
 making the decree absolute, as well as in the original decree; and in 
 Williamson v. Gordon 5 an order was made, upon motion, for varying a 
 decree, in which the clause had been omitted, by directing its insertion. 
 
 It was said by the Court in Booth v. Rich, 5 that where there is an 
 infant defendant to a bill of foreclosure, the proper way is to decree the 
 lands to be sold to pay the debt, and that such a sale would, bind the 
 infant; but in Goodier v. Ashton? Sir William Grant M. R. said that 
 the modern practice was to foreclose infants, and refused to refer it to 
 the Master to inquire whether a sale would be for the benefit of the 
 infant. In a subsequent case, however, Lord Eldon said 8 that it would 
 be too much to let an infant be foreclosed when, if the mortgagee 
 would consent to a sale, a surplus * might be got of perhaps *163 
 £40 JO, considered as real estate for the benefit of the infant. 
 His Lordship accordingly made a decree, by which it was referred to 
 the Master, to inquire and report whether it would be for the benefit of 
 the infant that the estate should be sold. In that case the reference 
 was to be made only in case the mortgagee consented ; and the same 
 appears to have been the order in Pace v. Marsden; x but in Wakeham 
 v. Lome, and Hamond v. Bradley,* like decrees appear to have been 
 made, without its being stated that they were made by consent, or even 
 that a sale was prayed. It is to be observed, also, that in those cases, 
 as well as in Pace v. Marsden, the decree was made for a sale, without 
 a previous reference to inquire whether it would be for the benefit of 
 the infant. In Pace v. Marsden, however, it seems that a sale was 
 prayed by the bill, In Price v. Carver,* Lord Cottenham seems to 
 have suggested that a decree for sale was the proper course, as against 
 an infant defendant; and in the event of such a decree, it would appear 
 that no day to show cause is given. 4 Now, however, in all foreclosure 
 
 4 Mallack v. Galtnn, 3 P. Wms. 352; Lyne have six months after coming of age, to show 
 
 r. Willis, id. n. [B] ; Bishop of Winchester cause against a decree. This must be dona 
 
 v. Beavor, 3 Ves. 314, 317. This, however, whenever the inheritance is bound. The right 
 
 must not be understood as applying to cases of the parol to demur is abolish' d by statute 
 
 where the decree has been obtained by fraud, in New York, in all cases of descent and 
 
 or where the infant claims by a title paramount devise. Harris ». Touman, 1 Hoff. Ch. 178; 
 
 to the mortgage; see post, 172. In decrees of see Field v. Williamson, 4 Sandf. Ch. 613. 
 
 foreclosure against an infant, there is, accord- But the rule giving an infant a day after his 
 
 tag to the old and settled rule of practice in coming of age is still in force. Coffin v. Heath, 
 
 Chancery, a day given when he comes of age, 6 Met. 81. 
 ■anally six months, to show cause against 5 19 Ves. 114. 
 
 the decree, and make a better defence, and 6 1 Vern. 295. 
 
 he is entitled to be called in for that pur- 1 18 Ves. 84. 
 
 pose by process of subpcena. 2 Kent, 245; 8 Mfondey v. Mondey, 1 Ves. & B. 223. 
 
 Jackson v. Turner, 5 Leigh, 119: Mills v. i Seton, 275, 1st ed! 
 
 Dennis, 3 John. Ch. 367; Dow v. Jewell, 2 Ibid. 
 
 21 N. H. 470, 491. Unless the rule is dis- » 3 M. & C. 157, 161. 
 
 pensed with by statute regulations in specific * Scholefield v. Heafleld, 7 Sim. 669. 8 
 
 instances, as in partition and foreclosure, it Sim. 470; Davis v. Dowding, 2 Keen, 245; 
 
 is the rule in New York that an infant is to ante, p. 165, note 3. 
 
 163
 
 169 
 
 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 suits, the Court is empowered, if it thinks fit, to direct a sale, instead 
 of a foreclosure; 5 and where it is for the benefit of the infant, it is the 
 practice to do so. 6 Where the value of the mortgaged property was 
 clearly less than the amount due to the mortgagee, the Court, at the 
 hearing, made an absolute decree for foreclosure against an infant 
 defendant, upon the plaintiff's paying the infant's costs. 7 
 
 Mere irregularities and errors in the proceedings of the Court will 
 not invalidate a sale, or prevent a good title from being made under a 
 decree. 8 It seems, however, that if there is a material error in sub- 
 stance, as well as in words and form, a purchaser may object to the 
 title, and the Court will discharge him from his contract. Thus, 
 where a sale of an infant's estate was ordered, 9 merely because it was 
 beneficial to the infant, and without there being any person who 
 * 169 had a right to call * upon the Court to sell the estate for the sat- 
 isfaction of a claim or debt, Lord Langdale M. R., considering 
 that such an order was not within the jurisdiction of the Court, allowed 
 an objection to the title, made in consequence of the irregularity of the 
 decree. An infant who has acted fraudulently may be ordered to pay 
 the costs of a suit occasioned by his misconduct. 1 
 
 Where an answer is put in on behalf of an infant, it is put in upon 
 the oath of the person appointed his guardian; 2 but the infant is not 
 bound by such answer, and it cannot be read against him: 8 the true 
 
 5 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 48; and see Hurst 
 v. Hurst, 16 Beav. 372; Powell v. Robins, 7 
 Sumner's Ves. 211, note (1), and cases cited; 
 Harris v. Harris, 6 Gill & J. Ill; Garland v. 
 Living, 1 Rand. 396; Coger v. Coger, 2 Dana, 
 270, in reference to the circumstances under 
 which Courts will decree a sale of the lands 
 descended to infants. In Mills ?•. Dennis, 3 
 John. Ch. 367, which was a bill for fore- 
 closure of a mortgage, Mr. Chancellor Kent 
 observed: "The practice with us has been to 
 sell, and not to foreclose, as well where 
 infants as where adults are concerned. I 
 think this course must generally be most 
 beneficial to the infants as well as to the 
 creditors; and there can be no doubt of the 
 authority of the Court to pursue it. - ' In case 
 of a decree for the sale of the mortgaged 
 premises, the decree, it is understood, will 
 bind the infant. Mills v. Dennis, 3 John. 
 Ch. 367, 369. 
 
 6 Mears v. Best, 10 Hare, App. 51; Siffkin 
 v. Davis, Kay, App. 21. 
 
 " Croxon v. Lever. 10 Jur. N. S. 87; 12 
 W. R. 237, M. R., following Billson v. Scott, 
 2 Seton, 712. V. C.W.; see ^Bennett v. Harfoot, 
 W. X (1871) 4; 24 L. T. N. S. 86. 
 
 8 Calvert v. Godfrey, 6 Beav. 97, 107; 
 Baker v. Sowter, 10 Beav. 343, 348; ante, 
 p. 161, note 1. 
 
 9 Calvert v. Godfrey, 6 Beav. 97, 109. See 
 Brown Ex parte, 8 Humph. 200; Gray v. 
 Barnard, 1 Tenn. Ch. 2U8; Huger v. Huger, 3 
 
 164 
 
 Des. 18. As to the Court's statutory power to 
 sell infants' estates, see post, Chap. XLV. 
 § 6; 44 & 45 Vic. c. 41, § 41; 45 & 46 Vic. 
 c. 38, § 59; Be Liddell, Liddell r. Liddell, 31 
 W. R. 238. 
 
 i Chubb v. Griffiths, 35 Beav. 127; and see 
 Cory v. Gertcken, 2 Mad. 10. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 314. The order appointing 
 the guardian must be produced to the person 
 before whom the answer is sworn. Cons. Ord. 
 VII. 4. Where a guardian ad litem has been 
 appointed, an order may be obtained, on a 
 petition of course, by the plaintiff, to file an 
 infant's answer without oath, or without oath 
 or signature of his guardian. For form of 
 petition, see Vol III. 
 
 3 Leggett v. Sellon, 3 Paige, 84; James v. 
 James, 4 Paige, 115 ; Stephenson v. Stephen- 
 son, 6 Paige, 353; Rogers v. Cruger, 7 John. 
 581 ; Bulkley v. Van Wyck, 5 Paige, 536 ; 
 Stewart v. Duvall, 7 Gill & J. 180: Bank of 
 Alexandria v. Patton, 1 Rob. (Va.) 500 ; Crain 
 v. Parker, 1 Ind. 374. It is the duty of the 
 Court to see that the rights of an infant are not 
 prejudiced or abandoned by the answer of his 
 guardian. Barret v. Oliver, 7 Gill & J. 191. 
 An infant is not bound by a guardian's waiver 
 of service of process. Robbins v. Robbins, 2 
 Carter, 74; Lenox v. Netrebe, 1 Hemp. 251. • 
 
 The answer of an infant by his guardian ad 
 litem, is not evidence in his favor, although it is 
 responsive to the bill, and sworn to by the 
 guardian ad litem. Bulkley v. Van Wyck, 5
 
 INFANTS. 
 
 170 
 
 reason of which is, because in reality it is not the answer of the infant, 
 but of the guardian, who is the person sworn, and not the infant; and 
 the infant may know nothing of the contents of the answer put in for 
 him, or may be of such tender years as not to be able to judge of it. 1 
 This being the case, it would be useless, and occasion unnecessary 
 expense, to call upon an infant to put in a full answer to the plaintiff's 
 bill; 5 and it is, therefore, held, that exceptions will not lie to the 
 answer of an infant, for insufficiency. 6 
 
 It is not now the practice to require any answer from an infant. 
 Formerly, when an answer from every defendant was necessary, an 
 infant's answer was generally confined to a mere submission of his 
 rights and interests in the matters in question in the cause to the care and 
 protection of the Court; 7 the infant might, however, state in his answer 
 anything which he meant to prove by way of defence ; 8 and he may 
 now file a voluntary answer for this purpose, 9 whenever it is for his 
 benefit so to do, as in many cases it may be; 10 but whatever admissions 
 there may be in the answer, or whatever points may be tendered 
 thereby in issue, it appears *that the plaintiff is not in any * 170 
 degree exonerated from his duty in proving, as against the 
 infant, the whole case upon which he relies. 1 (a) 
 
 Where an infant defendant, on coining of age, is dissatisfied with the 
 defence put in by his guardian, he may apply to the Court for leave to 
 amend his defence, or to put in a new one, 2 and it seems that this privi- 
 lege applies as well after a decree has been made as before. 8 But an 
 infant wishing to make a new defence, must apply to the Court as early 
 
 Paige, 536; Stephenson v. Stephenson, 6 Paige, 
 353. A plaintiff cannot in any form of plead- 
 ing compel an infant to become a witness 
 against himself. Bulkley v. Van Wyck, ubi 
 supra ; infra, 753, n. 6. 
 
 4 Wrottesley V. Bendish, 3 P. Wins. 236 ; 
 see Hough v. Doyle, 8 Blackf . 300 ; Hough v. 
 Canby, 8 Blackf. "301. 
 
 6 Strudwiek v. Pargiter, Bunb. 338. 
 
 » Copeland v. Wheeler, 4 Bro. C. C. 256; 
 Lucas v.' Lucas, 13 Ves. 274 ; Ld. Red. 315 ; 
 Leggett v. Sellon, 3 Paige, 84; Bulkley v. Van 
 Wyck, 5 Paige, 536. 
 
 "» Mills v. Dennis, 3 John. Ch. 367, 368; 
 Dow o. Jewell, 21 N. H. 470, 486, 487. 
 
 8 Per Richards C B. in Atty.-Gen. v. Lam- 
 birth, 5 Price, 398. 
 
 9 For formal parts of an infant's answer, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 10 Lane v. Hardwicke, 9 Beav. 14S. O d. 
 XIII. 1, empowering the plaintiff to tile a trav- 
 ersing note in default of answer, does not, it 
 
 seems, apply to an infant defendant. Emery v. 
 Newson, 10 Sim. 564. 
 
 i Holden v. Hearn, 1 Beav. 445, 455; 3 Jur. 
 428 ; Mills v. Dennis, 3 John. Ch. 367, 368 ; 2 
 Kent. 245; Winston v. Campbell, 4 Hen. & M. 
 477 ; Massie v. Donaldson, 8 Ohio, 377. 
 
 2 Stephenson v. Stephenson, 6 Paige. 353 ; 
 James r. James, 4 Paige, 115. An infant defend- 
 ant docs not lose his right to object to the jurisdic- 
 tion of the Court at the hearing, upon the ground 
 that the remedy is at law, although his guar- 
 dian ad litem has omitted to raise such objection 
 in his answer. Rowers v. Smith, 10 Paige, 193. 
 
 Where the infant under leave does amend his 
 answer, or puts in a new one, on coming of age, 
 the plaintiff may amend his bill, and may waive 
 an answer under oath by the infant so coming 
 of atfe. Stephenson v. Stephenson. 6 Paige, 353. 
 
 8 Kelsall v. Kelsall, 2 M. & K. 409. 416 ; 
 Snow v. Hole, 15 Sim. 161 ; 10 Jur. 347 ; Cod- 
 rington v. Johnstone, cited 1 Smith Pr. 275 ; 
 Seton, 685. 
 
 (a) In Willis v. Will's, 61 L. T. 610; 38 W. 
 R. 7, infants being interested in a suit for sale 
 of land in lieu of partition, the Court required 
 allegations in the claim, which were admitted 
 in the defendant's pleading, to be verified by 
 
 affidavit. See Clegg v. Clegg, 17 L. R. Ir. 118; 
 Ripley r. Sawyer, 31 Ch. D. 494 ; Fitz water v. 
 Waterbonse, 52 L. J. Ch. 83 ; Gardner r. Tap- 
 ling, 33 W. R. 473. 
 
 165
 
 * 171 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 as possible after attaining twenty -one; for if he is guilty of any laches, 
 his application will be refused. 4 
 
 The same reasons which prevent an infant from being bound by his 
 answer, operate to prevent his being bound by admissions in any other 
 stage of proceeding, unless indeed such admissions are for his benefit. 
 Thus, it was held that, where an infant is concerned, no case could be 
 stated by the Court of Chancery for the opinion of a Court of Law, 
 because an infant would not be bound by the admissions in such case. 5 
 Upon the same principle it has been held, that an infant is not bound 
 by a recital in a deed executed during infancy. 6 Consequently where 
 
 there are infant defendants, the plaintiff must prove the whole 
 *171 case as against the infants. 7 For the same * reason where a will 
 
 relating to real estate is to be established in Chancery, and the 
 heir-at-law is an infant, it is always nceessary to establish the due 
 execution of the will by the examination of witnesses. 
 
 From the report of the cases of Cartwright v. Cartwright and 
 Sleeman v. Sleeman, in Mr. Dickens's Reports, 1 it seems to have been 
 held, that where the heir-at-law in an original suit, being adult, had by 
 his answer admitted the due execution of the will, but died before the 
 cause was brought to a hearing, leaving an infant heir, who was brought 
 before the Court by revivor, the will must be proved per testes against 
 the infant heir. But in Livesey v. Livesey, 2 Sir John Leach M. R. 
 held, that the circumstance of the first heir having admitted the will, 
 rendered it unnecessary to prove it against the infant; and in a subse- 
 quent case, 3 Sir Lancelot Shadwell V. C. expressed himself to be of the 
 same opinion as the Master of the Rolls, and said that he had referred 
 to the entries of the cases of Sleeman v. Sleeman and Cartwright v. 
 Cartwright, in the Registrars' book; and that with respect to the 
 former no such thing as is mentioned by the reporter appears to have 
 taken place, but the original heir having admitted the will, the Court 
 established it; and with respect to the latter, all that was stated was, 
 that on hearing the will and proofs read (not saying what proofs), the 
 Court declared that the will ought to be established. 4 
 
 4 Bennet r. Leigh, 1 Dick. 89. In the case made parties, to be read against them.; but see 
 of Bennet r. Lee, 2 Atk. 48", and 529, referred Baillie r. Jackson, 10 Sim. 167, as to accounts; 
 to in the margin of 1 Dick. 89 as S. C, the and see Jebb v. Tugwell, 20 Beav. 461. In 
 application was made during the infancy, see Mills v. Dennis, 3 John. Ch. 367, which was a 
 post, 174; and see Cecil r. Lord Salisbury, 2 suit for foreclosure, it was held, that there could 
 Vern. 224; Mason v. Debow. 2 Hayw. 178; be no valid decree against an infant, by default, 
 Morris v. Morris, 11 Jur. 260, V. C. K. B.; nor on his answer by guardian : but the plain- 
 Monypenny r. Dering, 4 De G. & J. 175 ; 5 tiff must prove his demand in Court, or before 
 Jur. N. S. 661. a Master, and the infant will have a day in 
 
 5 Hawkins v. Luscombe, 2 Swanst. 392; but Court, after he comes of age, to show error in 
 it was done in Walsh v. Trevannion, 16 Sim. the decree See Massie r. Donaldson, 8 Ohio, 
 178 ; 12 Jur. 547. See R. S. C Ord. XIX. 17. 377 ; Walton r. Coulson, 1 McLean. 125; Chal- 
 
 6 Milner v. Lord Harewood, 18 Ves. 274 ; fant v. Monroe, 3 Dana, 35 ; Dow v. Jewell, 21 
 see Davies v. Davies. L. R. 9 Eq. 468. N. H. 480, 487. 
 
 1 Wilkinson r. Beal, 4 Mad. 408 ; Holden v. * 2 Dick. 545, 787 ; 4 Sim. 133. 
 
 Hearn, 1 Beav. 445, 455 ; National Provincial 2 Cited 4 Sim. 132. 
 
 Bank v. Evans, 30 W. R. 177 ; 51 L. J.Ch.97 ; 3 Lock r. Foote, 4 Sim. 132. See Lewis t. 
 
 Re Fitzwater, 52 id. 83. See also Quantock v. Outlaw, 1 Tenn. 140. 
 
 Bullen, 5 Mad. 81. where the Court refused to 4 See also Robinson v. Cooper, 4 Sim. 131. 
 
 allow evidence, takeu before the infants were Such a statement by an ancestor plaintiff, in a 
 
 166
 
 INFANTS. * 172 
 
 Where an infant has a day given him by the decree to show cause 
 against it, the process served upon him at his coming of age is a writ 
 of subpoena, which is a judicial writ. 5 
 
 The subpoena is prepared by the solicitor, will be sealed upon its 
 mere presentation and without production of the decree or order referred 
 to in it, and need not be served personally. 6 It is served by delivering 
 a copy thereof, and of the indorsement, to the late infant personally, or 
 to his servant, or some member of his family, 7 at his dwelling-house, 
 or usual place of abode, and at the same time producing the original 
 subpoena.* If service cannot be thus effected, an application may be 
 made to the Court, by ex parte motion, 9 supported by affidavit, to direct 
 some other mode of service ; 10 and if the order be made, a copy of it 
 must be served with the subpoena, in the manner prescribed by the 
 order. 
 
 * The service of the subpoena will be of no validity, if not made * 172 
 within twelve weeks after the teste of the writ. 1 
 
 If, after the service of the subpoena to show cause, the party does not 
 appear within the time limited, the decree will be made absolute, with- 
 out entering an appearance for him, 2 upon &nex jiarte motion, supported 
 by an affidavit of service of the subpoena, evidence that the infant is of 
 age, and the Registrar's certificate of no cause shown. 3 
 
 In cases of foreclosure, 4 unless fraud or collusion has been made use 
 of in obtaining the decree, 5 or the title claimed by the infant is para- 
 mount the mortgage, 6 the only cause which can be shown by an infant 
 after attaining twenty-one, against making absolute a judgment for 
 foreclosure, is error in the judgment; and he will not be permitted to 
 unravel the account, or even to redeem the mortgage on paying what 
 is due. 7 The reason of the distinction between the case of a claim by 
 
 bill, is an admission binding on his infant heir, the survivor, had mortgaged the estate, and 
 
 Hollings v. Kirkby, 15 Sim. 183. died, leaving the infant his heir-at-law : upon 
 
 5 2 Kent, 245, and note ; Dow v. Jewell, 21 a bill filed by the mortgagee against the infant 
 N. H. 491. For form of writ, see Ord. Sched. to foreclose, the infant stated in his answer that 
 E. 6; and Vol. III.; for forms of praecipe and the estate had been purchased and paid for by 
 indorsement, see Vol. III. his great-uncle, who devised the same to his 
 
 6 Braithwaite's Pr. 266, 267. grandfather for life, with remainder to his heirs 
 
 7 Such member should be an inmate of the in tail, and so claimed the estate as heir in tail 
 house. Edgson v. Edgson, 3 De G. & S. 629. by a title paramount the mortgage ; but the 
 
 8 See Cons. Ord. X. 1; XXVIII. 6. Court decreed an account, and that the defend- 
 
 9 For form of motion paper, see Vol. III. ant should redeem or be foreclosed, unless he 
 10 See Cons. Ord. X. 2 ; Elcock v. Glegg, 2 showed cause within six months after he came 
 
 Dick. 764. of age, on the ground that the grandfather being 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. XXVIII. 9. by the deed joint-tenant in fee with his brother, 
 
 2 Gilb. For. Rom. 160; Wharam v. Brough- whom he survived, must have appeared to the 
 ton, 1 Ves. Sr. 185. mortgagee to have a good title. The infant, 
 
 3 See 2 Seton, 711, 714 ; Hinde, 436, 440. however, when he came of age, upon being 
 For forms of orders absolute, see 2 Seton, 711, served with a subpnena to show cause, moved 
 No. 2 ; and for forms of motion paper and affi- for leave to amend his defence, by putting in 
 davit, see Vol. III. a new answer, and swore that he believed he 
 
 4 Ante, p. 167. could prove that the mortgagee had notice of 
 
 5 Loyd v. Mansel, 2 P. Wins. 73. the trust for his great-uncle at the time he lent 
 
 6 Thus, in a case where an estate had been the money, which was a point not insisted upon 
 conveyed to the great-uncle and grandfather of in his former answer ; and the Court made the 
 the infant, as joint-tenants in fee, and upon the order. Anon. Mos. 66. 
 
 death of the great-uncle, the grandfather, being ? Cases ante, p. 167, n. 1, 3. 
 
 167
 
 * 174 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 the infant paramount the mortgage, and that of a claim subject to the 
 mortgage, is obvious; for in the latter case, it will be presumed that 
 the Court would not have made the decree had it not been satis- 
 *173 tied *that the mortgage was properly executed, and, therefore, 
 it would not be reasonable to allow a party, claiming subject to 
 that deed, to disturb the title which the mortgagee had acquired under 
 it; but in the former case, the mortgage may have been properly exe- 
 cuted, and the account taken under it may have been perfectly correct, 
 and yet the mortgagor may not have had a title to make the mortgage: 
 in which case it would not be just to preclude the infant from an 
 opportunity of establishing a case which may not have been properly 
 submitted to the decision of the Court at the time the decree was 
 pronounced. 
 
 In ordinary cases, where an infant has a day given him to show cause 
 against making a decree absolute, he may either impeach the decree on 
 the ground of fraud or collusion between the plaintiff and his guardian, 
 or he may show error in the decree. He may also show that he had 
 grounds of defence which were not before the Court, or were not insisted 
 upon at the hearing, or that new matter has subsequently been discovered, 
 upon which the decree may be shown to be wrong. 
 
 If the late infant seeks to controvert the decree on the ground of 
 fraud or collusion, he is not bound to proceed by way of rehearing or by 
 bill of review, but he may impeach the former decree by an original 
 bill, in which it will be enough for him to say, that the decree was 
 obtained by fraud or collusion; he may in like manner impeach the 
 decree by original bill, even though his ground of complaint against it 
 is confined to error. 1 In such cases it is not necessary for the infant to 
 wait till he comes of age before he seeks redress, but application for 
 that purpose may be made at any time. 2 
 
 If the late infant seeks to impeach the decree, by showing that he 
 had grounds of defence which were either not before the Court, or not 
 insisted upon at the original hearing, he might, under the old practice, 
 apply to the Court, either by motion or petition, for leave to put in a 
 new answer; and it seems that such application might be made 
 *174 ex parte, and was a matter of course; 3 but under *the later 
 practice (unless an answer has been put in, or it is thought 
 desirable to put one in, on behalf of the infant), it is conceived the 
 form of the motion or petition will be for leave to make a new defence. 
 
 Although it was a matter of course that an infant defendant to a 
 suit, who had had a day given him to show cause against the decree 
 
 1 See ante, 164, n. 3. In the case of gross mental bill in the nature of a bill of review, 
 
 fraud or collusion used in obtaining a decree, Wortley v. Birkhead, 3 Atk. 809, 811; Galley 
 
 the Court will entertain an original bill for the v. Baker, Gas. temp. Talb. 201. 
 purpose of impeaching it, even though the party 2 Richmond v. Tayleur, 1 P. Wms. 737; 
 
 complaining was not an infant at the time of Carew v. Johnston, 2 Sch. & Lef. 292; see 
 
 the decree pronounced; see Loyd v. Mansel, 2 P. Patch v. Ward, L. R. 3 Ch. 203, 207. 
 Wms. 73; Sheldon v. Fortescue, 3 P. Wms. 111. 3 Fountain v. Caine, 1 P. Wins. 504; Napier 
 
 In general, however, where no fraud is alleged, v. Lady Effingham, 2 P. Wms. 401; Affd. 4 
 
 the proceedings to set aside a decree, if it has Bro. P. C. ed. Toml. 340 ; Bennet v. Leo, 2 Atk. 
 
 been signed and -enrolled, must be by bill of 529, 531; Kelsall v. Kelsall. 2 M. & K. 409, in 
 
 review, or, if not signed and enrolled, by supple- which the cases are reviewed. 
 
 168
 
 INFANTS. * 175 
 
 after attaining twenty-one, might have leave to put in a new answer, 
 yet, if he was plaintiff in a cross-bill, and that suit or any part of it 
 had been dismissed, he was not allowed to amend his cross-bill, or to 
 file a new one for the same matter. 1 He might, however, file a bill of 
 discovery in aid of the case intended to be made by his answer; and it 
 seems that if he did so, the time of six months allowed by the course 
 of the Court for a defendant to show cause why a decree should not be 
 made absolute after he comes of age, was not so sacred but that in par- 
 ticular cases, and where the matter was of consequence, the Court 
 might enlarge it. 2 
 
 Although, where a day is given to an infant to show cause against a 
 decree, he need not, as we have seen, 8 stay till that time, before he 
 seeks to impeach it on the ground of fraud, collusion, or error, 4 yet, if 
 he proceeds on the ground that he is dissatisfied with the defence which 
 has been made, and wishes to make a new defence, he must, in general, 
 wait till he has attained twenty-one before he applies : because, if he 
 should apply before, and there should be a decree against him upon the 
 second hearing, he may with as much reason make similar appli- 
 cations, and so occasion * infinite vexation. 1 *175 
 
 Where an infant defendant on coming of age, having obtained 
 leave to put in a new answer, does so accordingly, he may show that fact 
 for cause why the decree should not be made absolute, and the plaintiff 
 must, it seems, proceed upon the answer according to the rules of the 
 Court in other cases. 2 And consequently, if the defence is replied to, 
 the defendant may examine witnesses anew to prove his defence, which 
 might be different from what it was before. 8 
 
 1 Sir J. Napier v. Lady Effingham, Howard, 3 Ante, p. 173. 
 
 cited Mos. 07, 68. 4 Richmond v. Tayleur, 1 P. Wins. 737. 
 
 2 In Trefusis v. Cotton, Mos. 203, where a 1 This was the opinion original!}' expressed 
 defendant, on attaining twenty-one, and being by Lord Hardwicke, in Bennet v. Lee, 2 Atk. 
 served with a subpama to show cause against a 487, though he afterwards held, in the same 
 decree, Hied a bill against the plaintiffs in the case, that as the facts upon which the infant 
 original suit for discovery, and applied to the wished to rest his new defence were of long 
 Court to have the time for showing cause en- standing, and the witnesses were consequently 
 larged till the defendants to the bill of discovery very old, and might die before he came of age, 
 had put in their answer, Lord King made an the infant might put in a better answer. lb. 
 order, enlarging the time for three months after 532. And so, in Savage v. Carrol, 1 Ball & B. 
 the six months were expired; and on that time 548, leave was given to the infant defendant, 
 being out, and the defendants not having put in upon the same grounds, to put in an amended 
 a full answer, the time was twice enlarged upon answer before attaining twenty-one, but it was 
 motion quousque. (For forms of petition to en- subsequently held in the same case (2 Ball & 
 huge the time for showing cause, see 2 Newl. B. 244), that where an infant, before attaining 
 214; Hinde, 572.) It seems, however, from a twenty-one, obtains leave to put in a new an- 
 subsequent notice of the same case (4 Mos. 308), swer, he will thenceforth be considered as plain- 
 that an infant, after he attains twenty-one, can- tiff, and as such will be bound by the decree, 
 not controvert the original decree by a new bill In proceedings by an infant, on coming of age, 
 praying relief, unless for fraud or collusion, or to set aside a decree, which has been rendered 
 for error (see Richmond v Ta\ leur, 1 P. Wms. against him while under age, he should give 
 737; see Loyd v. Malone, 23 111 43; Regla «>. notice to the other parties to the decree. Ruby 
 Martin, 19 Cal. 463; ante, 164, n. 3), and that v. Strother, 11 Miss. 417. 
 
 if he does so, the original decree may be pleaded 2 Cotton v. Trefusis, Mos. 313. 
 
 in bar to such new bill. See also Bennett v. s Napier v. Lord Effingham, 2 P. Wms. 401, 
 
 Hamill, 2 Sch. & Lef. 566 ; Hindmarsh v. South- 403 ; and see Codrington v. Johnstone, 2 Seton, 
 
 gate, 3 Russ. 324; Stott v. Meanock, 10 W. R. 711; Kelsall v. Kelsall, 2 M. & K. 409, 416. 
 605; Re Hoghton, L. R. 18 Eq. 573. 
 
 169
 
 * 176 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 Section X. — Idiots, Lunatics, and Persons of Unsound or Weak Mind. 
 
 An idiot or lunatic may, as we have seen, 4 be made a defendant to a 
 suit; but then, where he has been found of unsound mind by inquisition, 
 he must defend by the committee of his estate, who, as well as the 
 idiot or lunatic, is a necessary party. 5 No order is required in the suit 
 to entitle the committee to defend; but the committee must obtain the 
 sanction of the Lord Chancellor or Lords Justices in the lunacy, before 
 
 defending, in the same manner as before instituting a suit. 6 
 * 176 * Usually the lunatic and his committee make a joint defence 
 'to the suit; but if the idiot or lunatic has no committee, or the 
 committee is plaintiff, or has an adverse interest, an order should be 
 obtained, on motion or petition of course, supported by affidavit, 1 
 appointing a guardian to defend the suit; 2 and it is the same where he 
 is respondent to a petition. 3 Where, after decree, the committee died, 
 and a new one was appointed, an order was made, on motion, that in 
 all subsequent proceedings the name of the new committee should be 
 substituted for that of the former ; 4 where no decree had been made, 
 such an order was refused ; 5 now, however, in both these cases, an 
 order to carry on and prosecute the suit may be obtained, on motion or 
 petition of course. 6 
 
 Lunatics not so found by inquisition, 7 and persons of weak intellect, 
 or who are by age or infirmity reduced to a second infancy, 8 must 
 defend by guardian, who will be appointed on an application by 
 motion, or on petition of course, in the name of the person of unsound 
 mind; 9 and it is the same in the case of a petition where no suit has 
 been instituted. 10 The application must be supported by affidavits 
 proving the mental incapacity of the defendant, 11 the fitness of the 
 
 4 Ante, p. 130. 
 
 5 Ld. Red. 30, 104; R. S. C. Ord. XVIII.; 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 70; Harrison v. Rowau, 4 Wash. 
 C. C. 202. In Brasher v. Van Cortlandt, 2 
 John. Ch. 242, 245, it was held not necessary, 
 in New York, to make the lunatic himself a 
 party defendant to a bill for payment of his 
 debts, but his committee only, where he had a 
 committee. So in Teal v. Woodworth, 3 Paige, 
 470. See Berry v. Rogers, 2 B. Mon. 308. But 
 in a suit where there are conflicting interests 
 between a lunatic and his committee, which 
 must be settled in the cause, both should be 
 made parties. Teal r. Woodworth, 3 Paige, 470. 
 
 6 Ante. p. 85. As to service, see R. S. C 
 Ord. IX. 5; Thorn v. Smith, W. N. (1879)81; 
 S. C. nom. Than v. Smith, 27 W. R. 617. 
 
 1 For forms of motion paper, petition, and 
 affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 
 2 See R S. O. Ord. XVIII.; T.d. Rpd. 104; 
 Snell v. Hyatt, 1 Dick. 287; Lady Hartland p. 
 Atcherlev, 7 Beav. 53; Worth v. M'Kenzie, 3 
 M'N. & G. 363; Snook v. Watts, 2 Seton 706; 
 New v. New, 6 Paige, 237 ; Hewitt's case, 3 
 Bland, 184 ; Post v. Mackall, id. 486. For form 
 
 170 
 
 of order, see 2 Seton, 706, No. 5. See Emery 
 v. Parrot, 107 Mass. 95, where a guardian ad 
 litem was appointed for a non-resident de- 
 fendant of unsound mind, and afterwards a 
 guardian for the same person was appointed in 
 the State of his residence. 
 
 3 See Be Greaves, 2 W. R. 365; 2 Eq. Rep. 
 616, L. C. & L. JJ. 
 
 « Lyon v. Mercer, 1 S. & ,S. 356; Bryan v. 
 Twigg, 3 Eq. Rep. 62; 3 W. R. 42, V. C. K. 
 
 5 Rudd v. Speare, 3 De G. & S. 374. 
 
 6 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, §52; Seton, 1166, 
 1170; and see post. Chap. XXXIII., Revivor and 
 Supplement; R. S. C. Ord. L. 1-4; Snook »'. 
 Watts, 2 Seton, 706. 
 
 ' Ld. Red. 104; and see Bonfield v. Grant, 
 11 W. R. 275, M. R.; R. S. C. Ord. XVIII. 
 
 8 Ld. Red. 103; and see Newman ?•. Selfe, 
 11 W. R. 764, M. R. ; but see Steel v. Cobb, id. 
 298, M. R. 
 
 9 For forms of motion paper and petition, 
 see Vol. HI. 
 
 i° Re Greaves, 2 W. R. 355 ; 2 Eq. Rep. 516, 
 L C. & L. JJ. 
 
 n Simmons v. Bates, 20 L. T. 272.
 
 LUNATICS. * 177 
 
 proposed guardian, and that he has no adverse interest. 12 A co- 
 defendant may be appointed, if he has no adverse interest ; 18 (a) but not 
 the plaintiff, nor a married woman, nor a person resident out of the 
 jurisdiction. 14 
 
 If the guardian dies, it appears that a similar evidence of mental 
 incapacity is necessary, in support of the application for the appoint- 
 ment of a new guardian, to that required on the original application. 15 
 The death of the guardian, and fitness of the person proposed in his 
 place, must also be proved. The application should be made by motion 
 of course, 16 or petition of course at the Rolls, or by summons. 17 
 
 * Where an application for the appointment of a guardian is * 177 
 intended to be made by, or on behalf of, a defendant of unsound 
 mind, or weak intellect, ■ an appearance should, in the first place, be 
 entered for him at the Record and Writ Clerks' Office; but no subse- 
 quent step can be taken on his behalf, till the order for a guardian has 
 been obtained. 1 (b) If such order is not obtained on his behalf, the 
 plaintiff must apply for the order; and in this case an appearance for 
 the defendant is not necessary, the entry of an appearance on his 
 behalf by the plaintiff being irregular. 2 The plaintiff's solicitor should 
 not on the instructions of his client act for the defendant or enter an 
 appearance for him. 3 
 
 Where the plaintiff applies, he must do so by motion, notice of 
 which must be served upon or left at the dwelling-house of the person 
 with whom, or under whose care, the defendant was living at the time 
 of serving the bill, 4 or, where an appearance has been entered for him, 
 upon the solicitor who entered it. 5 And upon the motion, the Court 
 
 13 Piddocke v. Smith, 9 Hare, 395; HJur. 3 Camps v. Marshall, L. R. 8 Ch. 462. 
 1120; and see Fosters. Cautley, 10 Hare, App. Where a guardian is appointed at the instance 
 24; 17 Jur. 370. For form of affidavits, see of the plaintiff, it is usual to appoint the solici- 
 Vol. III. tor to the Suitors' Fee Fund. Cons. Ord. VII. 
 
 is Bonfield v. Grant, 11 W. R. 275, M. R.; 3; M'Keverakin v. Cort, 7 Beav. 347; Biddulph 
 
 Newman v. Selfe, id. 764, M. R. v. Lord Camoys, 9 Beav. 548; 10 Jur. 485. If 
 
 14 Lady Hartland v. Atcherley. 7 Beav. 53. there is any friend of the defendant who is a tit 
 
 15 See Needham v. Smith, 6 Beav. 130. person, lie will be appointed, in preference to 
 
 16 Ibid. the solicitor to the Suitors' Fee Fund. Ibid.; 
 
 17 According to the present practice, the order Moore v. Platel, 7 Beav. 583; and see Charlton 
 may also be obtained on petition of course at v. West, 3 De G. F.&J. 156; 7 Jur. N. S. 614; 
 the Rolls. For forms of motion paper, petition, Bonlield v. Grant, 11 W. R. 275, M. R. 
 summons, and affidavit, see Vol. III. 4 Cons. Ord. VII. 3; see R. S. C. Ord. 
 
 i See Lushington v. Sewell, 6 Mad. 28; Tay- XIII. 1. 
 lor v. Pede, W N. (1881)74; 29 W. R.627; 5 Cookson v. Lee. 15 Sim. 302; Bentley v. 
 
 Osbaldiston v. Crowther, 1 Sm. & G. App. 12. Robinson, 9 Hare, App. 76. These were cases 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. X. 5; Leese v. Knight, 8 Jur. of infants, but doubtless apply to the case of 
 
 N. S. 1006; 10 W. R. 711, V. C. K. persons of unsound mind. 
 
 (") See ante, p. 83. note (a). The present that the defendant is an infant, it is within the 
 
 English practice permits a guardian adlitem for Court's discretion to determine whether the 
 
 a lunatic defendant to be appointed at the judgment should be set aside. Furnival v. 
 
 instance of a co-defendant when necessary. Re Brooke, 49 L. T. 134. For the present English 
 
 Dawson, Johnston v. Hill, 41 Ch. D. 415. Rules in Lunacy, see W. N. (1893), Orders 
 
 (6) Under R. S. C. Ord. XIII. 1, relating to and Rules, p. 3. A decree or judgment en- 
 defendants who are infants or lunatics not so tered against a lunatic is not void. Withrow 
 found by inquisition, if the plaintiff signs judg- v. Smithson, 37 W. Va. 757; White v. Hiuton 
 meat for default of appearance, not knowing (Wyo.), 17 L. R. A. 66. 
 
 171
 
 178 
 
 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 must be satisfied that the bill has been duly served, 6 and that the notice 
 of the application was served after the expiration of the time allowed 
 for appearing or answering, and at least six clear days before the day 
 in such notice named for hearing the application. 7 It is usual, unless 
 there is some friend of the defendant who is a fit person, and will under- 
 take the defence, to appoint the official solicitor to be the guardian. 8 
 
 The order is made under the jurisdiction in Chancery, and not in 
 Lunacy; 9 and if the fact of the infirmity is disputed, or the order has 
 been irregularly obtained by the defendant, the plaintiff may move, 
 on notice to the defendant, to discharge the order; and, if necessary, 
 the Court will direct an inquiry whether the defendant is competent 
 or not. 10 
 
 The defendant, on his recovery, must apply by motion, on notice to 
 
 the plaintiff and to the guardian, 11 that the order assigning the guardian 
 
 may be discharged. 12 Where the defendant had delayed apply- 
 
 * 178 ing, the motion was * granted, but he was ordered to pay his 
 
 guardian's costs, although having liberty to add them to his own. 1 
 
 The answer of an idiot or lunatic is expressed to be made by his 
 committee as his guardian, or by the person appointed his guardian by 
 the Court to defend the suit. 2 (a) 
 
 6 See R. S. C. Ord. IX. 5. The defendant 
 should, it seems, be served personally. Morgan 
 v. Jones, W. R. 381, V. C. W. ; Anon. 2 Jur. 
 N. S. 324, V. C. W. As to substituted service 
 on the medical officer of an asylum in which the 
 defendant has been placed, although the un- 
 soundness had not been found by inquisition, 
 see Raine v. Wilson, L. R. 16 Eq. 576; see 
 also Than v. Smith, 27 W. R. G17; Speak v. 
 Metcalf, 2Tenn. Ch. 214; infra, 444, n. 6. 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. VII. 3. That Sundays are not 
 included, see ante, p. 162, n. For forms of no- 
 tice of motion and affidavit, see Vol. III. ; a'.d 
 for form of order, see 2 Seton, 706, No. 6. The 
 Court will provide for the costs of the solicitor 
 to the Suitors' Fee Fund where he is appointed 
 guardian, usually by directing the plaintiff to 
 pay them, and add them to his own. See Cons. 
 Ord. XL. 4 ; and Harris v. Hamlyn, 3 De G. & S. 
 470; 14 Jur 55; Fraser v. Thompson, 4 De G. 
 & J. 659; 1 Giff. 337 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 669 ; and see 
 Robinson v. Aston, 9 Jur. 224, V. C. K. B. 
 
 8 M'Keverakin v. Cort, 7 Beav. 347; Moore 
 v. Platel, id. 583; Biddulph v. Lord Camoys, 9 
 Beav. 548; 10 Jur. 485; Biddulph v. Dayrell, 
 15 L. J. Ch. 320 ; and see Charlton v. West, 3 De 
 G. F. & J. 156; 7 Jur. N. S. 614; Bonfield v. 
 Grant. 11 W. R. 275. 
 
 '-» Pidcocke v. Boultbee, 2 De G. M. & G. 
 898. 
 
 1° Lee v. Ryder, 6 Mad. 294; 2 Seton, 1251; 
 Matter of Collins, 18 N. J. Eq. 254; Matter 
 
 (a) Under the present English practice, a 
 guardian ad litem is not a party to the suit 
 within R. S. C. Ord. XXI. 1, and cannot be 
 172 
 
 of Weis, 16 id. 319; In re dimming, 1 De 
 G. M. & G. 537, 550. So, if after inquisition 
 found, it be suggested that he has been restored 
 in mind. Yourie v. Nelson, 1 Ttnn. Ch. 275. 
 
 11 For form of notice of motion, see Vol. 
 III. 
 
 12 See Blyth v. Green, W. N. (1876) 214; 
 Frampton v. Webb, 11 W. R. 1018, V. C. W., 
 where the order made was in fact for a change 
 of solicitors. 
 
 i Ibid. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 315. It was held, in Leving v. 
 Cavt-rly, Prec. Ch. 229, that the answer of a 
 superannuated defendant, put in by his guar- 
 dian, may be read against him; but this prop- 
 osition appears to have been doub'ed, and it is 
 conceived that should the point now arise, 
 it would be decided otherwise. See Mickle- 
 thwaite v. Atkinson, 1 Coll. 173, Percival v. 
 Caney, 4 De G. & S. 610, somewhat fuller 
 reported on this point, 14 Jur. 1062; S. C. nom. 
 Stanton v. Percival, 3 W. R. 391; 24 L. J. Ch. 
 369, H- L. A female defendant, above sixty 
 vears of age, who had been deaf and dumb 
 from her infancy, was admitted to appear and 
 defend by guardian. Markle v. Markle, 4 
 John Ch. 168 ; see Manleverer v. Warren, 2 
 Jones, 47. The answer of an idiot or lunatic 
 is similar to that of an infant, and should be 
 sworn toby his committee, in the same manner 
 as the answer of an infant is verified by his 
 guardian ad litem. 1 Barb. Ch. Pr. 154; see 
 
 compelled to answer interrogatories. Ante, 
 p. 68, note (a); Ingram ?'. Little, 11 Q. B. D. 
 251; lie Corsellis, 48 L. T. 
 
 425.
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. 
 
 179 
 
 Where the infirmity is the result of bad health, the practice is to 
 allow time to file the answer, and not to assign a guardian. 3 
 
 The committee or guardian of a person of unsound mind, whether so 
 found by inquisition or not, before he consents to any departure from 
 the ordinary course of procedure in the suit, should, it seems, first 
 obtain the sanction of the Court, or of the Judge in chambers; and 
 the committee should also obtain that of the Lord Chancellor or Lords 
 Justices sitting in Lunacy. 4 
 
 All orders appointing guardians should be left at the Record and 
 Writ Clerks' Office for entry. 5 
 
 Section XI. — Married Women. 
 
 Where a suit is instituted against a married woman, her husband 
 should also be a party, 6 unless he is an exile, or has abjured the 
 realm, 7 or been banished by Act of Parliament, 8 or been transported 
 under a criminal sentence, 9 or is, it seems, an alien enemy, 10 or there 
 has been a judicial separation, or the wife has obtained a pro- 
 tection * order under the Divorce Acts, 1 or a decree nisi for a *179 
 
 Rothwell v. Benshall, 1 Bland, 373; Coupous 
 v. Kauffman, 3 Edw. Ch. 311. For the formal 
 parts of such answer, see Vol. III. As to the 
 answers of imbecile prisoners confined for con- 
 tempt, see 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 15, 
 r. 0, and post, Chap. X. § 2. 
 
 3 Willyams v. Hodge, 1 M'N. & G. 516; 
 and see Patrick v. Andrews, 22 L. J. Ch. 240, 
 M. R.; Steel v. Cobb, 11 W. R. 298, M. R. ; 
 Newman v. Selfe, ib. 764, M. R. As to ad- 
 missions of facts pleaded, see R. S. C. Ord. 
 XIX. 17. 
 
 * Ord. 5. Feb., 1861, r. 24; Knatchbull p. 
 Fowle. 1 Ch. D. 604; Fryer v. Wiseman, W. N. 
 (1876) 3; 24 W. R. 205. For form of sum- 
 mons, see Vol. III. 
 
 5 Braithwaite's Pr. 47 ; now at the Central 
 Office. As to inspection of documents in the 
 Master's or Register's custody, see Re Smyth, 
 15 Ch. D. 286. 
 
 6 Hancocks v. Lablache, 3 C. P. D. 197 ; 
 Atwood v. Chichester, 3 Q. B. D. 722; and 
 see Holmes v. Penney, 3 K. & J. 90; 3 .lur. 
 N. S. 80; see 2 Story", Eq. Jur. § 1368; Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 71; Williams v. Coward, 1 Grant 
 (Penn.), 21; Hamlin v. Bridge, 24 Maine, 145; 
 McDermott v. French. 15 N. J. Eq. 78; Cal- 
 vert, Parties, 269; and notwithstanding; he is 
 a bankrupt, Beales v. Spencer, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 
 651 ; 8 Jur. 236. Husband and wife may defend 
 a suit in forma pauperis, under an order of 
 course. Pitt v. Pitt, 1 Sm. & G- 14; 17 Jur. 
 571. 
 
 7 Ld. Red. 24, 30, 105. As to a husband's 
 liability for his wife's antenuptial debts, see 
 33 & 34 Vic. c. 93, § 12; 37 & 38 Vic. c. 50. 
 
 8 Countess of Portland v. Prodgers, 2 
 Vern. 104; 2 Kent, 155. 
 
 9 Story, Eq. PI. § 71; Calvert on Parties, 
 414; Broom's Com. 592, and cases cited ib. n. 
 (b). And so when the husband is a resident 
 of another State. Ante, 88, n. 3. 
 
 10 Deerley v. Duchess of Mazarine, Salk.116. 
 i 20 & 21 Vic. c. 85. §§ 21, 25, 26, 45; 21 
 
 & 22 Vic. c. 108, §§ 6-8;' 27 & 28 Vic. c 44; 
 22 & 23 Vic. c. 61, §§ 4, 5; 23 & 24 Vic. c. 144, 
 § 6; Rudge v. Weedon, 4 De G. & J. 216; 5 Jur. 
 N. S. 380, 723; Re Rainsdon's Trusts, 4 Drew. 
 446 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 55; Cooke V. Fuller, 26 
 Beav. 99; and other cases cited ante, p. 90; Re 
 Kingsley, 26 Beav. 84; 4 Jur. N. S. 1010; 
 Pratt ».' .Tenner, L. R. 1 Ch. 493; Bathe v. 
 Bank of England, 4 K & J. 564; 4 Jur. N. S. 
 505; Wells v. Malbon, 31 Beav. 48; 8 Jur. 
 N. S. 249 ; Re Whittingham's Trusts. 10 Jur. 
 N. S. 818; 12 W. R. 775; Caldicott i*. Baker, 
 13 W. R. 449; Sealey v. Gaston, 13 W. R. 
 577; Heath v. Lewis, "id. 128; 10 Jur. N. S. 
 1093; Re Insole, 11 id. 1011; 35 Beav. 92; L. 
 R. 1 Eq. 470; Pratt o. Jenner, L. R. 1 Ch. 
 493; 12 Jur. N. S. 557; Prole t\ Soady, L. R. 
 3 Ch. 220; Wilkinson v. Gibson, L. R. 4 Eq. 
 162; Botten v. Codd, W. N. (1869) 199; 
 Ewart i'. Chubb, L. R. 20 Eq. 454; Norman v. 
 Villain, 2 Ex. D. 359. If the marriage has 
 been dissolved, she is sued in her maiden 
 name. Evans V. Carrington, 1 J. & H. 598; 
 6 Jur. N. S. 268; 7 Jur. N. S. 197 ; 2 De G., 
 F. & J. 481. And where the wife has obtained 
 a protection order, she is usually described in 
 the title as "a married woman, sued as ti/'ems 
 sole:' Tidman v. Trego, M. R. 1863, T. 44. 
 
 173
 
 * 179 
 
 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 dissolution of the marriage; 2 in which cases the wife is consid- 
 ered in all respects as a feme sole, 3 and may be made a defendant, 
 without her husband being joined. 4 In certain cases a husband may, 
 in Equity, make his wife a defendant. 5 Thus, where she has before 
 marriage entered into articles concerning her own estate, she is con- 
 sidered to have made herself a separate person from her husband, and, 
 in such a case, upon a motion by the husband to commit her for not 
 answering interrogatories, she was ordered to answer. 6 A husband, 
 however, cannot make his wife a defendant, in order to have from her a 
 discovery of his own estate. 7 
 
 There are, however, cases in which, although the husband and wife 
 are both named as defendants, the suit may be proceeded with against 
 the wife separately, (a) Thus, if the suit relates to the wife's separate 
 property, and the husband be beyond seas, and not amenable to the 
 process of the Court, the wife may be served with, and compelled to 
 answer the bill. 8 In Dubois v. Hole, 9 a bill was filed against a man 
 and his wife for a demand out of the separate estate of the wife, and, 
 the husband being abroad, the wife was served with a sub])oena, and, 
 upon non-appearance, was arrested upon an attachment; and she hav- 
 ing stood out all the usual process of contempt, the bill was taken pro 
 confesso against her. 10 But, in order to entitle the plaintiff to compel 
 the wife to answer separately, the husband must be actually out of the 
 jurisdiction; and the mere circumstance that he was a prisoner was 
 held not to be a sufficient ground for obtaining an order for a separate 
 answer. 11 
 
 2 Stephenson v. Strutt, W. N. (1872) 137; 20 
 W. R. 745; but see Norman v. Villars, 2 Ex. 
 D. 359. 
 
 3 Countess of Portland v. Prodgers, 2 Vera. 
 
 104. 
 
 * 1 Inst. 132 b.. 133 a.; Robinson v. Rey- 
 nolds, 1 Aiken, 74; Bean v. Morgan, 1 Hill, Ch. 
 8 ; ante, 90, note. 
 
 5 Brooks r. Brooks, Prec. Ch. 24; ante, 
 110. By making her a defendant, he admits 
 that the property in question is her separate 
 estate ; and, therefore, a demurrer was allowed 
 to a bill, by -which he claimed to be entitled to 
 the property himself. Earl r. Ferris, 19 Beav. 
 67 : 1 Jur.'N. S. 5. 
 
 6 Brooks v. Brooks, ubi supra. 
 1 Ibid. 
 
 8 Story, Eq. PI. § 71. An order for leave 
 
 to serve a bill and interrogatories seems, in 
 such case, necessary; Hinde, 85; Nayler v. 
 Byland, Seton, 1240; 9 Sim. 253; Tarlton v. 
 Dyer, id. 253. The order may be obtained 
 on ex parte motion, supported by affidavit. 
 As to service, see R. S. C. 1883, Ord. IX. 3. 
 For form of orders, see 2 Seton, 1623, No. 5; 
 1624, No 6 ; and for forms of motion paper and 
 affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 
 9 2 Vern. 613. 
 
 1(1 2 Vern. 614, in notis ; see also Bell v. 
 Hyde, Prec. Ch. 328, and the cases there 
 cited. 
 
 ii Anon. 2 Ves. Jr. 332. If the wife be 
 absent, the husband may obtain time to issue a 
 commission to obtain the wife's oath to the an- 
 swer; and if she refuse to answer, the bill may 
 be taken pro confesso against her. Leavitt v. 
 
 (a) Section 1, sub-section 2 of the English 
 Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (45 & 
 46 Vic. c. 75), which makes such women having 
 a separate estate liable to be sued " in contract, 
 or in tort, or otherwise," makes them liable to 
 suit on any ground upon which a single woman 
 can be sued. Re Kershaw, Whittaker ?•. Ker- 
 shaw (No. 2), 45 Ch. D. 320 ; see Re Roper, 
 Roper v. Doncaster, 39 Ch. D. 482. By 
 that Act married women may be sued as 
 femes sole, without joinder of their husbands, 
 and may defend personally without obtaining 
 
 174 
 
 an order for that purpose. A married woman 
 who obtains a decree for judicial separation is 
 a feme sole only with respect to property ac- 
 quired by her after the decree. Waite r. 
 MorIand/38 Ch. D. 135; see Fitzgerald v. 
 Chapman, 1 Ch. D. 563; Re Emery's Trusts, 
 50 L. T. 197 ; see ante, p. 87, n. (a). A married 
 woman owning land is a necessary party to a 
 bill to enjoin her husband from removing the 
 lateral support of her soil. Wykes v. Ringle- 
 berg, 49 Mich. 567. _
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. * 181 
 
 * The Court will compel a woman to appear and answer sepa- * 180 
 rately from her husband, where the demand is against her in 
 respect of her separate estate, and the husband is only named for 
 conformity, and cannot be affected by the decree; where there is no 
 separate property belonging to the wife, she cannot be proceeded 
 against without her husband, unless she has obtained an order to 
 answer separately; in which case she will be liable to the usual pro- 
 cess of contempt, if she does not put in her answer in conformity with 
 the order which she herself has obtained. 1 
 
 It maybe observed here that a feme covert executrix or administra- 
 trix is not considered as having a separate property in the assets of her 
 testator or intestate; and upon this ground a writ of ne exeat regno, 
 against a married woman sustaining that character, will not be 
 granted. 2 
 
 A married woman and her husband in general defend an action 
 jointly ; 3 but where a married woman is living separate from her hus- 
 band, and is not under bis influence or control, 4 or, it seems, where 
 she obstinately refuses to concur with him in any act necessary for 
 their joint defence, 5 the Court will, upon the application of the hus- 
 band, give him leave to put in a separate answer. The application is 
 made by motion, of which notice 6 must be given to the plaintiff, 7 and 
 which must be supported by an affidavit of the husband, 8 verifying the 
 circumstances; and proc.ess of contempt will then be stayed against 
 him for want of his wife's answer, and the plaintiff must proceed 
 separately against the wife. 9 
 
 If the separate answer of the husband is received and filed at the 
 Record and Writ Clerks' Office, before an order for him to 
 * answer separately has been obtained, it is an irregular proceed- *181 
 ing; 1 and the plaintiff may move, on notice to the husband, that 
 
 Cruger, 1 Paige, 422. See Halst. Dig. 170-174. acted in Jernegan r. Glasse), he should not have 
 
 The plaintiff may stipulate to receive the joint granted the writ. 
 
 answer, sworn toby the husband alone. Leavitt 3 For form of defence, see Vol. HI. 
 
 r. Cruger, 1 Paige, 422; New York Chem. Co. * See Chambers v. Bull, 1 Anst. 269; Barry 
 
 v. Flowers, 6 Paige, 654. v . Cane, 3 Mad. 472; Garey v. Whittingham, 1 
 
 1 Powell v. Prentice, Ridg. 258. Husband S. & S. 163; Gee v. Cottle, 3 M. & C. 180; 
 and wife may defend a suit in forma pauperis, Nichols v. Ward, 2 M'N. & G. 140. 
 
 and the order for leave to do so is of course. 5 j^, Red. 105-, Pain v. , 1 Ch. Cas. 
 
 Pitt v. Pitt, 17 Jur. 571, V. C. S.; 1 Sm. & G. 296; Murriet v. Lyon, Bunb. 175; Pavie v. 
 
 A PP- l4 - Acourt, 1 Dick. 13." 
 
 2 Pannell v. Taylor, T. & R. 96, 103. In 6 For form of notice, see Vol. III. 
 
 that case, Lord Eldon had originally granted ~ Whether notice should be given to the 
 
 the writ, upon the authority of Moore v. Mey- wife also, qua re ; see 1 S. & S. 163- 2 M'N & 
 
 nell, 1 Dick. 30, and Jernegan v. Glasse, id. G. 143. 
 
 107; 3 Atk. 409; Amb. 62; and T. & R. 97, 8 See Barry v. Cane, 3 Mad. 472. n.; Hope 
 
 ii.(6); but see Moore v. Hudson, 6 Mad. 218 ; v. Carnegie (No. 2), L. R. 7 Eq. 263 ; for form 
 
 i L. P. Loop. temp. Cott. 245. As to the writ of affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 
 of ne exeat, see post, Chap XXXVIII. As to » See Brav v. Akers, 15 Sim. 610; Storv 
 
 R°?h °n SU oa h ( l e J ence ' see Kevan "-Crawford, Eq. PI. § 71; Leavitt v. Cruger, 1 Paige, 
 
 6 Ch. D. 29; Wright v. Chard, 4 Drew. 702. 421. 
 
 But upon further argument, he was of opinion i Gee v. Cottle, 3 M. & C. 180; Nichols v 
 
 that it could not be maintained.-observing, that Ward, 2 M'N. & G. 140; and see Garev v 
 
 it ne had been apprised of the circumstances of Whittingham, 1 S. & S. 163; Lenaghan v. 
 
 tne case of Moore v. Meynell (upon the author- Smith, 2 Phil. 539. 
 
 ity of which Lord Hardwicke appears to have 
 
 175
 
 * 182 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 the answer may be taken off the file for irregularity; 2 or he may sue 
 out an attachment against the husband for want of the joint answer; 3 
 or he may waive the irregularity, and move, on notice to the wife, and 
 an affidavit of the facts, that she may answer separately. 4 The hus. 
 band, if in, custody for not filing the joint answer, cannot clear his 
 contempt by putting in the separate answer of himself; 5 he should 
 move, on notice to the plaintiff, 6 supported by his own affidavit 7 of the 
 facts, for leave to answer and defend separately from her, and that, 
 upon putting in his separate answer, he may be discharged from 
 custody. 8 
 
 Where a married woman claims an adverse interest, 9 or is living 
 separate from her husband, 10 or he is mentally incompetent to 
 answer, 11 or she disapproves of the defence he intends to make, 12 she 
 may, on motion or petition of course, 13 obtain an order to defend sepa- 
 rately; 14 and if a husband insists that his wife shall put in an answer 
 contrary to what she believes to be the fact, and by menaces prevails 
 upon her to do it, this is an abuse of the process of the Court, and he 
 may be punished for the contempt. 15 
 
 If the husband has put in his answer separately from his wife, under 
 
 an order so to do, 16 or without an order and the plaintiff desires to 
 
 waive the irregularity ; 17 or an order has been made exempting the 
 
 husband from process for want of her answer; 18 or if she refuses to join 
 
 with him in answering; 19 or if he is abroad; 20 or if the suit 
 
 * 182 relates to her separate estate, and she is abroad, 21 or *they live 
 
 apart; 1 or if the husband, from mental incapacity, is unable to 
 join with her in answering; 2 or if, after the joint answer is put in, the 
 husband goes abroad, and the bill is amended, and an answer is 
 required thereto; 8 or if the fact of marriage is in dispute between the 
 
 2 Gee v. Cottle, and Nichols v. Ward, ubi practice, usually obtained on petition of course 
 
 supra ; Collard v. Smith, 13 N. J. Eq. 43, 45. at the Rolls ; and it appears from information 
 
 For form of notice, see Vol. III. obtained from the Secretary of the M. R., that 
 
 8 Gee v. Cottle, ubi supra ; Garey v. Whit- the practice is to make the order on the appliea- 
 
 tingham, 1 S. & S. 163; Nichols v. Ward, 2 tion of the wife, whenever she is made a defend- 
 
 M'N. & G. 140. ant in respect of her separate estate, without 
 
 4 Nichols v. Ward, 2 M'N. & G. 143, n. inquiring whether in fact the interests of the 
 For form and notice of affidavit, see Vol. III. husband and wife are adverse. If their inter- 
 
 5 Gee v. Cottle, 3 M. & C. 180. ests are adverse, the order will be made, though 
 
 6 Quare, if the wife should be served, see the suit does not relate to her separate estate. 
 1 S. & S. 163; 2 M'N. & G. 143. 15 Ex parte Halsam, 2 Atk. 50. 
 
 1 Barry v. Cane, 3 Mad. 472, n. 16 Bray v. Akers, 15 Sim. 610; Seton, 1255, 
 
 8 See Nichols v. Ward, 2 M'N. & G. 143; No. 4. 
 
 Seton, 1255, No. 5. For forms of notice of " See Nichols v. Ward, 2 M'N. & G. 140. 
 
 motion and affidavit in support, see Vol. III. 18 Ibid. 143, n. 
 
 9 Ld. Red. 104; Anon. 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 66, 19 Woodward v. Conebear, 8 Jur. 642, V. 
 pi. 2. C. W. 
 
 10 Ld. Red. 104; Rudge v. Weedon, 7 W. 20 Dubois v. Hole, 2 Vern. 613; Bunyan v. 
 R. 368, n., V. C. K. Mortimer, 6 Mild. 278; Lethley v. Taylor, 9 
 
 11 Estcourt v. Ewington, 9 Sim. 252, and Sim. 252. 
 
 cases there referred to; 2 Jur. 414. 21 Nichols v. Ward, 2 M'N. & G. 143, n. 
 
 12 Ld. Red. 104; Ex parte Halsam, 2 Atk. 50. J Wiikens v. Marchioness of Townsend, cited 
 18 For form of order on motion, see 2 Seton, 1 Smith's Pr. 410, n.; Seton, 1256. 
 
 655, No. 1; and for forms of motion paper and 2 Estcourt v. Ewington, 9 Sim. 252; 2 Jur. 
 
 petition, see Vol. IIL 414. 
 
 14 The order is, according to the present 8 Carleton v. M'Euzie, 10 Ves. 442. 
 
 176 

 
 MARRIED WOMEN. * 183 
 
 husband and wife : 4 the plaintiff, where no order for her to answer 
 separately has been obtained by her or her husband, may, on motion, 
 supported by an affidavit of the facts, obtain an order 5 that she may 
 answer separately from her husband. 6 Notice of the motion 7 should 
 be given to the wife ; 8 and if she is abroad, an order for leave to serve 
 her there with the notice is necessary, 9 and may be obtained on an ex 
 parte motion. 10 
 
 Where a woman was made a defendant to a bill filed for the purpose 
 of establishing a will against her, and a man who pretended that he 
 was her husband, but which the woman denied : on her making appli- 
 cation to answer separately, Lord Hardwicke ordered that she should 
 be at liberty to put in a separate answer, but without prejudice to any 
 question as to the validity of the marriage. 11 
 
 In general, the separate answer of a feme covert ought to have an 
 order to warrant it, and if put in without an order, it will be irregular 
 and may be taken off the file. 12 But if a husband brings a bill against 
 his wife, he admits her to be a, feme sole, 13 and she must put in her 
 answer as such, and no order is necessary to warrant her so doing; u 
 and if she does not put in her answer, the husband may obtain an order 
 to compel her to do so. 15 
 
 Although, strictly speaking, the answer of a, feme covert, if separate, 
 ought to be warranted by an order, yet if her answer be put in without 
 such an order, and the same is a fair and honest defence, and 
 deliberately put in with the consent of the husband, and * the * 183 
 plaintiff accepts it and replies to it, the Court will not, on the 
 motion of the wife, or of her executors, set it aside. 1 
 
 The separate answer of a married woman is put in by her in the same 
 manner as if she were a feme sole, without joining any guardian or 
 other person with her; 2 and when put in under an order, she has, it 
 seems, the full time for answering from the date of the order. 8 If, 
 
 * Longworth v. Bellamy, Seton, 1245. filing a replication. Fulton Bank v. Beach, 2 
 
 6 For forms of order, see Seton, 1255, Nos. Paige, 307; S. C. 6 Wend. 36 ; Collard v. Smith, 
 
 4 > 6. 13 N. J. Eq. 45. If the wife apprehend that 
 
 6 See Hope v. Carnegie, L. R. 7 Eq. 254; S. her husband will not make a proper defence for 
 C. ih. 263. her, she may, as of course, obtain leave to an- 
 
 7 For forms of notice of motion and affidavit swer separately. Lingan v. Henderson, 1 Bland, 
 in support, see Vol. III. 270; see Anon. 2 Sumner's Ves. 332, note (a); 
 
 8 Nichols r. Ward, 2 M'N. & G. 143, n. ; Ferguson v. Smith, 2 John. Ch. 139. 
 
 Seton, 1255, 1256; but see Bray r. Akers, 15 « See Earl v. Ferris, 19 Beav. 67; 1 Jur. 
 
 Sim. 610; Hope v Carnegie, I.. R. 7 Eq. 263. N. S. 5 ; ante, p. 109, note 9. 
 
 » See Nichols p. Ward, 2 M'N. & G. 143, n. " Ex parte Strangeways, 3 Atk. 478; Ld. 
 
 10 For form of motion paper, see Vol. III. Red. 105; Higginson v. Wilson, 11 Jur. 1071; 
 
 H Wybourn v. Blount, 1 Dick. 155. Copeland v. Granger, 3 Tenn. Ch 487. 
 
 12 Wyatt's P. R. 53; and see Higginson v. M Ainslie v. Medlicott, 13 Ves. 266. See 
 
 Wilson, 11 Jur. 1071, V. C. K. B.; R. S. C. Ord. R. S. C. Ord. XXIX. 
 
 XVI. 8; Noel p. Noel, 13 Ch. D. 510; Heygate » Duke of Chandos v. Talbot, 2 P. Wms. 
 
 f. Thompson, L. R. 8 Eq. 354. For form of 371, 601. 
 
 order, see 2 Seton, 655, No. 1. An answer of 2 For formal parts of such answer, see Vol. 
 
 a wife, put in separately, without a previous III. 
 
 order, was suppressed for irregularity Perine 3 Jackson v. Haworth, 1 S. & S. 161. When 
 
 v. Swaine, 1 John. Ch. 24; Lenvitt v. Cruger, 1 an order to answer separately has been obtained, 
 
 Paig-, 421 ; Collard p. Smith. 13 N. J. Eq. 43; it should be produced to the Commissioner before 
 
 Bobbins p. Abrahams, 1 Halst. Ch. 16. But whom the answer is sworn, and be referred to 
 
 the irregularity will be waived by the plaintiff in the jurat (for form, see Vol. III.); and the 
 
 vol. i. — 12 177
 
 *184 
 
 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 however, the married woman is an infant, she cannot answer, either 
 separately or jointly, until a guardian has been appointed for her; 4 
 such appointment will be made by order, on motion of course or on 
 petition of course, supported by affidavit of the fitness of the proposed 
 guardian. 5 
 
 A married woman, obtaining an order to answer separately from her 
 husband, renders herself liable to process of contempt, in case she does 
 not put in her answer pursuant to the order; 6 but an order for leave to 
 sue out such process is necessary, and may be obtained by the plaintiff 
 on an ex parte motion. 7 
 
 Where husband and wife are defendants to a bill, the wife will not 
 be compelled to give any discovery which may expose her to a for- 
 feiture ; 8 neither is she compellable to discover whether she has a 
 separate estate, unless the bill is so framed as to seek to charge the 
 property settled to her separate use, and to warrant the Court in 
 
 making a decree against it. 9 
 * 184 * A wife cannot be compelled to make a discovery which may 
 
 expose her husband to a charge of felony; and if called upon to 
 do so, she may demur. 1 In like manner, a married woman cannot be 
 made a party to a suit, for the mere purpose of obtaining discovery 
 from her, to be made use of against her husband. 2 
 
 order must be produced at the office of the 
 Record and Writ Clerks, at the time of filing 
 the answer. Braithwaite's Pr. 45, 397. 
 
 * Colman v. Northcote, 2 Hare, 147; 7 Jur. 
 528; Braithwaite's Pr. 47. 
 
 5 For forms of motion paper and petition, 
 and affidavit in support, see Vol. II [. 
 
 6 Powell v. Prentice, Ridg. P. C. 258; 
 Lenaghan v. Smith, 2 Phil. 537; Bunyan v. 
 Mortimer, 6 Mad. 278; Home v. Patrick, 30 
 Beav. 405; 8 Jur. N. S. 351 ; Bull v. Withey, 
 9 Jur. N. S. 595, V. C. S.; Graham v. Fitch, 
 2 De G. & S. 246 ; 12 Jur. 833. 
 
 ' Taylor v. Taylor, 12 Beav. 271; Thick- 
 nesse v. Acton, 15 Jur. 1052, V. C. T.; Home v. 
 Patrick, Bull r. Withey, ubi supra. As to notice 
 in other cases, see Graham v. Fitch, ubi supra ; 
 Bushell v. Bushell, 1 S. & S. 164 ; M'Kenna v. 
 Everett, Seton, 1256, No. 7. For form of mo- 
 tion paper, see Vol. III. 
 
 8 Wrottesley v. Bendish, 3 P. Wins. 235, 
 238. 
 
 9 Thus, where a bill was filed against a man 
 and his wife, for the purpose of enforcing the 
 specific performance of an agreement alleged 
 to have been entered into by an agent on their 
 behalf for the purchase of an estate from the 
 plaintiff, and in support of the plaintiff's case 
 it was alleged that the wife had septirate moneys 
 and property of her own, and had joined with 
 her husband in authorizing the agent to enter 
 into the agreement, but the bill prayed merely 
 that the husband and wife might be decreed 
 specifically to perform the agreement, and did 
 not seek anv specific relief against her separate 
 
 "178 
 
 estate : the wife having obtained an order to that 
 effect, put in a separate demurrer as to so much 
 of the bill as required from her a discovery 
 ■whether she h:id not separate money and prop- 
 erty of her own, and answered the rest. Upon 
 argument, Sir Thomas Plumer V. C. allowed 
 the demurrer, on the ground that as the decree, 
 in cases where a feme covert was held liable, 
 had been uniformly against the separate estate, 
 and not against the/eme covert herself, and as 
 the bill did not seek any decree against any 
 trustees, or particular fund, but only against 
 the wife, it could not be supported, and the 
 interrogatory, if answered, would consequently 
 be of no use. Francis v. Wigzell, 1 Mad. 258. 
 
 i Cartwright ». Green, 8 Ves. 405, 410; see 
 Story, Eq. PL § 519. 
 
 2*2 Story, Eq Jur. § 1496. Therefore, in 
 Le Texier v. The Margrave of Auspach, 5 Ves. 
 322, 329; and 15 Ves. 159, 164, where a bill 
 was filed against the Margrave to recover a 
 balance due to the plaintiff upon certain con- 
 tracts, to which bill the Margravine was made 
 a partv, as the agent of her husband, for the 
 purpose of eliciting from her a discovery of 
 certain vouchers which were alleged to be in 
 her possessions demurrer by the Margravine 
 separately was allowed by Lord Rosslj'n, and 
 afterwards upon rehearing by Lord Eldon, after 
 the Margrave's death. Upon the same principle, 
 where a bill was filed against a man and his 
 wife for discovery in aid of an action at law, 
 brought against him to recover a debt due 
 from the wife dum sola, a separate demurrer 
 put in by the wife was allowed. Barron v.
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. * 186 
 
 It was supposed that the admission of a will, in the separate 
 answer of a married woman, who was the heiress-at-law of the 
 * testator, was sufficient evidence to enable the Court to declare * 185 
 the will established; * but it has now been decided, that such evi- 
 dence is not sufficient for that purpose, or to bind her inheritance. 2 As a 
 general rule, however, the separate answer of a married woman may 
 be read against her. 3 
 
 Where a husband and wife are made defendants to a suit relating to 
 personal property belonging to the wife, and they put in a joint answer, 
 such answer may be read against them, for the purpose of fixing them 
 with the admissions contained in it; but where the subject-matter 
 relates to the inheritance of the wife, it cannot, 4 and the facts relied 
 upon must be proved against them by other evidence. 5 And it seems 
 that the joint answer of the husband and wife may be read against the 
 wife with reference to her separate estate, as well as her separate 
 answer, on the ground that in such a case she cannot be compelled to 
 answer separately. 6 
 
 In Ward v. Heath'' a bill was exhibited against the husband and 
 wife, concerning the wife's inheritance: the husband stood out all pro- 
 cess of contempt, and upon its being moved that the bill might be 
 taken pro confesso, it was opposed, because the wife, having in the 
 interim obtained an order to that effect, put in an answer, in which 
 she set forth a title in herself; and the Court decreed that the bill 
 should be taken pro confesso, against the husband only, and that 
 he should account for all the profits of the * land which he had * 186 
 received since the coverture, and the profits which should be 
 received during coverture. 
 
 Grillard, 3 V. & B 165; see Metier v. Metier, conduct and affecting only her own interests. 
 
 18 N. J. Eq. 270. In Rutter v. Baldwin, 1 Metier v Metier, 18 N. J. Eq. 270. 
 Eq. Cas. Abr. 227, pi. 15, the Court agreed 4 Evans v. Cogan, 2 P. Wins. 449; Kerch- 
 
 clearly that a wife can never be admitted to ner v Kempton, 47 Md. 508. 
 answer, or otherwise as evidence, to charge 5 In Merest r. Hodgson, 9 Price, 503 (see 
 
 her husband; and that where a man marries also Elston v. Wood, 2 M. & K. 678), the 
 
 a widow executrix, her evidence will not be L. C. B. Alexander refused to permit the joint 
 
 allowed to charge her second husband. See answer of the husband and wife to be read, but 
 
 Cole v. Gray, 2 Vera. 79; 16 & 17 Vic. c. 83. ordered the cause to stand over, to give the 
 
 But iu that case, the wife having held herself plaintiffs an opportunity of proving the facts 
 
 out as a feme sole, and treated with the admitted. 
 
 plaintiff and other parlies to the cause, who 6 Callow v. Howie, 1 De G. & S. 531; 11 Jur. 
 
 were ignorant of her marriage, in that char- 984; Clivev. Carew, 1 J. & H. 199,207; 5 Jur. 
 
 acter, and it having been proved in the N. S. 487, V. C. W. In Eyton v. Eyton, Prec. 
 
 cause that on some occasions the husband Ch. 116, it appears, on first view, as if the sepa- 
 
 had given in to the concealment of the mar- rate answer of a husband had been admitted by 
 
 riage, the Court allowed the answer of the wife the Master of the Rolls to be read as evidence 
 
 to be read as evidence against the husband, against the wife in a matter relating to her 
 
 and decreed accordingly. inheritance; but the reason of the decree in 
 
 1 Codrington v. Earl of Shelburn, 2 Dick, that case appears to be that his Honor' con- 
 475. ce'ived that the counterpart of the settlement, 
 
 2 Brown v. Hayward, 1 Hare, 432; 6 Jur. which appears to have been produced, was 
 847; see R. S. C. Ord. XIX. 17; Comley v. considered to be sufficient evidence of the set- 
 Hendricks, 8 Blackf. 189. tlement : at least this appears to have been the 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 104, 105. The peculiar relations ground upon which the case was decided 
 of husband and wife will not protect her from on the appeal before the Lord Keeper Wright, 
 making a discovery relating solely to her own 7 2 Ch. Cas. 173; 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 65, pi. 4, 
 
 179
 
 186 
 
 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 The Court will not make a personal decree against a feme covert 
 alone. 1 She may pledge her separate property, and make it answerable 
 for her engagements; 2 but where her trustees are not made parties to a 
 bill, and no particular fund is sought to be charged, only au order 
 charging any separate estate to which she may be entitled can be made. 3 
 
 i Hulme v. Tenant, 1 Bio C. C. 16, 21; 
 Francis v. Wigzell, 1 Mad. 258, 263; Aylett 
 v. Ashton, 1 M. & C. 105, 111; see Atwood v. 
 Chichester, 3 Q. B. D. 722, 725; Davis v. 
 Ballenden, 46 L. T. 797; Haigh v. Haigh, 31 
 Ch. D. 478; Hope v. Carnegie (No. 2), L. R. 
 7 Eq. 2G3; see also Jordan v. Jones, 2 Phil. 
 170, 172, where the Court refused to compel 
 a married woman to execute a conveyance 
 of an estate not settled to her separate use ; but 
 in cases of this description, the married wcman 
 can usually be established to be a trustee, and 
 then an order under the Trustee Acts may 
 be obtained. 
 
 The general rule, that Equity will not give a 
 personal decree against a. feme covert, prevails in 
 the United States. Phipps v Sedgwick, 95 U. S. 
 3; Maberry t\ Neely, 5 Humph 337; Chatter- 
 ton t>. Young, 2 Tenn. Ch. 768, 771. Nor will a 
 personal judgment at law sustain a proceeding 
 in Equity to subject the separate estate of a 
 married woman, unless the demand was of a 
 character for which the separate estate would 
 be liable without judgment, where there is any 
 restriction on the power of the feme to charge 
 the property. Swayne v. Lyon, 67 Penn. St. 
 436; Chatterton v. Young, 2 Tenn. Ch. 768. 
 But in California it has been held ttiat on 
 the foreclosure of a mortgage made by a mar- 
 ried woman on her separate estate, a personal 
 judgment may be rendered against her for 
 any unsatisfied balance of debt. Marlow v. 
 Barlow. 7 Rep. 583. And this would seem to be 
 the logical result of enabling a married woman 
 to act as a feme sole touching her separate 
 property. Natl. Bk. v. Garlmghame, 36 How. 
 Pr. 369. The iiuthorities are conflicting upon 
 the point of the validity of a personal judg- 
 ment against a feme covert at law. Freem. 
 on Judgts. §§ 149, 150. In North Carolina 
 and Tennessee the validity of such judgments, 
 as against collateral attack, has been upheld. 
 Green v. Branton, 1 Dev. Eq. 508; Crawford v. 
 Crawford, 1 Tenn. Leg. Rep. 37. While Mr. 
 Justice Field, in an able opinion, has decided 
 that a judgment against a married woman 
 upon a contract not binding upon her is void. 
 Norton v. Meader, 4 Sawyer, 603. So. in 
 Swayne v. Lyon, ubi supra, it was held that 
 every judgment against a married woman 
 which does not show her liability on its face is 
 void. See also Hix v. Gosling, 1 Lea, 572. 
 
 2 See Sperling v. Rochfort, 8 Sumner's Ves. 
 175, 182, Perkins's note (a), and cases cited; 
 Fettiplace v. Gorges, 3 Bro. C. C. (Perkins's ed.) 
 8, 10, and note, and cases cited; Taylor v. 
 
 180 
 
 Meads, 4 De G. J. & S. 597; Robinson v. Pick- 
 ering, 16 Ch. D. 660. 
 
 A wife may, within the power under which 
 she holds separate estate, bestow the property 
 upon her husband, as well as upon a stranger: 
 Meth. Epis. Church v. Jaques, 3 John. Ch. 86; 
 Bradish v. Gibbs, 3 John. Ch. 523; Stephen v. 
 Beall, 22 Wall. 329; or charge it for his debts: 
 Demarest v. Wyncoop, 3 John Ch. 523: Field 
 v. Sowle, 4 Russ. 112 ; Marshman v. Conklin, 
 21 N. J. Eq. 549 ; Hodges v. Williams, Sup. 
 Crt. Tenn. cited 2 Tenn. Ch. 679; and become 
 the debtor of her husband for money borrowed 
 to improve her separate estate: Gardner v. 
 Gardner, 22 Wend. 526; S. C. 7 Paige, 112. 
 And a wife who permits her husband for years 
 to receive and appropriate the income of her 
 separate estate cannot compel him to account to 
 her therefor except from the time permission is 
 revoked. Lyon v. Greenbay Ry. Co. 42 Wis. 
 548; Lishey v. Lishey, 2 tenn. Ch. 5. The 
 wife may charge her separate estate for debt 
 within the power under the instrument of 
 title, but the general rule is that the written 
 contract must on its face show the intent to 
 charge. Yale v. Dederer, 68 N. Y. 329; 
 Maguire v. Maguire, 3 Mo. App. 458; Gozman 
 v. Cruger, 69 N.Y. 87; Chatterton v. Young, 
 2 Tenn. Ch. 768; Shacklett v. Polk. 4 Heisk. 
 104. And if the instrument under which she 
 claims limits the power of disposition either 
 directly or by pointing out the mode, the charge 
 must be within the power. Ross v. Ewer, 3 
 Atk. 156 ; Morgan v. Elam, 4 Yerg. 375; Leay- 
 craft v. Hedden, 3 Green, Ch. 512; Williamson 
 v. Beckham, 8 Leigh, 20. The Court has no 
 power, even with the consent of the feme, to 
 pass her separate estate beyond the power 
 reserved. Richards v. Chambers, 10 Ves. 580; 
 Sturgis v. Corp, 13 Ves. 190; Robinson v. Dart, 
 Dud. Eq. 128. And even where the intent to bind 
 the separate estate is declared, the betteropinion 
 is that the property will not be bound unless 
 the contract inured to the benefit of the feme 
 or the separate estate. Perkins v. Eliott, 23 
 N J. Eq. 526, Kelso v. Tabor, 52 Barb. 125; 
 McCormick v. Hilbrook, 22 Iowa, 487; Coates 
 v. McKee, 26 Ind. 233; Lightfoot v. Bass, 2 
 Tenn. Ch. 677. 
 
 3 Davies v. Jenkins, 6 Ch. D. 728 ; Collett v. 
 Dickenson, 11 Ch. D. 687; Flower v. Buller, 
 15 Ch. D. 665; Re Peace & Waller, 24 Ch. 
 D. 405. For form of the order, see 2 Seton, 
 1671. In Francis v. Wigzell, 1 Mad. 258, 
 where a bill was filed against a husband and 
 wife for the specific performance of an agree-
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. 
 
 187 
 
 If a married woman, having a general power of appointment, by will, 
 over real or personal estate, makes, by her will, her separate property 
 liable to the payment of her debts, 4 a Court of Equity will apply the 
 estate so disposed of in the payment of written engagements 
 entered into by her, and in the discharge of her general * debts; l *187 
 and apply, in the same manner, property settled to the separate 
 use of a married woman for life, with remainder to such persons as she 
 shall by will appoint, and in default of appointment to her children or 
 next of kin and which she in the exercise of the power has appointed. 2 
 But a married woman's separate estate is not liable even for general 
 contracts, which from their nature cannot have reference to her separate 
 estate, and a fortiori it is not liable for general torts. 3 The creditors 
 have no charge upon the separate estate, so that in a creditors' suit for 
 payment, an injunction to restrain the married woman from alienating 
 the separate estate will not be granted before the hearing. 4 
 
 ment for the purchase of an estate, charging 
 that the wife had separate property sufficient to 
 answer the purchase-money, but without pray- 
 ing any specific relief against such separate 
 estate, a demurrer put in by the wife, to so much 
 of the bil as sought discovery from her whether 
 she had a separate estate or not, was allowed. 
 
 4 In Owens v. Dickenson, C. & P. 48, 54, 
 4 Jur. 1151, where a married woman had 
 made her will in pursuance of a power, and 
 thereby charged her real estate with the pay- 
 ment of debts, Lord Cottenham entered into 
 the principles upon which Equity enforces the 
 contracts of married women against their 
 separate estate, and rejected the theory that 
 such contracts are in the nature of executions 
 of a power of appointment, observing: ''The 
 view taken by Lord Thurlow, in Hulme v. 
 Tenant, 1 Bro. C. C. 16, is more correct. 
 According to that view, the separate property 
 of a married woman being a creature of Equity, 
 it follows, that, if she has power to deal with 
 it, she has the other power incident to prop- 
 erty in general; namely, the power of con- 
 tracting debts to be paid out of it ; and inas- 
 much as her creditors have not the means at 
 law of compelling payment of those debts, 
 a Court of Equity takes upon itself to give 
 effect to them, not as personal liabilities, but by 
 laying hold of the separate property, as the 
 only means by which they can be satisfied." 
 Acting upon this principle, Lord Cottenham re- 
 ferred it to the Master.to inquire what debts there 
 were to be paid under the provisions of the will. 
 
 1 See also as to the liability of a. married 
 woman's separate estate, Vaughan v. Vander- 
 stegen, 2 Drew. 165, 363; Hobday v. Peters 
 (No. 2), 28 Beav. 354; 6 Jur. N. S. 794; 
 Wright v. Chard, 4 Drew. 673 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 
 1334 ; 1 De G. F. & J. 567; 6 Jur. N. S. 470; 
 Clive v. Carew, 1 J. & H. 199; 5 Jur. N. S. 
 437; Johnson v. Gallagher, 7 Jur. N. S. 273; 
 9 W. R. 506, L. J J. ; 3 De G. F. & J. 404; 
 
 Bolden v. Nicholay, 3 Jur. N. S. 884 ; V. C. 
 VV.; Greenough v. Shorrock, 3 N. R. 599; 
 Shattock v. Shattock, L. R. 2 Eq. 182, M. R.; 
 Rogers v. Ward, 8 Allen, 387; Picard v. Hine, 
 L. R. 5 Ch. 274; Gardner v. Gardner, 22 
 Wend. 526; Sharpe v. Foy, L. R. 4 Ch. 35; 
 Chubb v. Stretch, L. R. 9 Eq. 555; Ex parte 
 Matthewman, L. R. 3 Eq. 781 ; 12 Jur N. S. 
 982; MacHenry v. Davies, L. R. 6 Eq. 462; 
 S. C. L. R. 10 Eq. 88; Butler r. Cumpston, 
 L. R. 7 Eq. 16; Re Bromley, 21 W. R. 155; 
 Green v. Lyon, id. 830 ; London Chartered Bank 
 of Australia v. Lempriere, L. R. 4 P. C. 572; 
 Wainford v. Heyl, L. R. 20 Eq. 321; Lan- 
 cashire &c. Bank v. Tee, W. N. (1875) 231; 
 Mayd i\ Field, 3 Ch. D. 587 ; National & P. 
 Bank v. Thomas, 24 W. R. 1013; Davies v. 
 Jenkins, 6 Ch. D. 728; London & P. Bank 
 v. Bogle, 7 Ch. D. 773 ; Collett v. Dickenson. 11 
 Ch. D. 687 ; Pike v. Fitzgibbon, 17 Ch. I). 454; 
 Hodgson v. Williamson, 15 Ch. D. 87; Skin- 
 ner v. Todd, W. N. (1881) 166; 30 W. R. 
 267. For forms of judgments against separate 
 use of married women, see 2 Seton, 687-689; 
 Picard v. Hine, L. R 5 Ch. 278. As to costs of 
 trustee of separate estate, see Picard v. Hine, 
 supra ; London & P. Bank v. Bogle, 7 Ch. D. 
 773, 776; Collett v. Dickenson, 11 Ch. D. 687. 
 Where the contract is for the protection of her 
 separate realty, as by the making of a levee. 
 Henry v. Blackburn (Sup. Crt. Ark.), 1 Memph. 
 L. J." 194. 
 
 2 Re Harvey, 13 Ch. D. 216 ; and see 
 Heathley v. Thomas, 15 Ves 596; Hughes v. 
 Wells, 9 Hare, 749, 772; Johnson v. Gallagher, 
 
 3 De G. F. & J. 494 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 273; London 
 Chartered Bank of Australia V. Lempriere. L. R. 
 
 4 P. ('. 572 ; but see Vaughan r. Vanderstegen, 
 2 Drew. 165, 363; Hobday v. Peters (No. 2), 
 28 Beav. 354; 6 Jur. N. S. 794; Shattock v. 
 Shattock, L.R. 2 Eq. 182 ; 35 Beav. 489. 
 
 8 Wainford t\ Heyl, L. R. 20 Eq. 321. 
 4 National & P. Bank v. Thomas, 24 W. 
 181
 
 * 188 PERSONS AGAINST WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
 
 Where a married woman is entitled to a copyright for her separate 
 use, it seems that she can contract not to grant to any person during a 
 definite period a license to publish the work, and that such contract can 
 be enforced against a licensee with notice. 5 
 
 Where the Court thought a married woman defendant ought to pay 
 certain costs, and it did not appear that she had separate estate, the 
 Court gave the plaintiff liberty to apply for payment of these costs, 
 in case of any moneys becoming payable to her separate use. 6 
 
 If the equity of redemption of a mortgaged estate comes to a mar- 
 ried woman, and a bill is brought against her and her husband to fore- 
 close it, upon which a decree of foreclosure is pronounced, the wife is 
 liable to be absolutely foreclosed, notwithstanding coverture, and will 
 not have a day given her to redeem after her husband's death; 7 and 
 where a widow tiled a bill to set aside a decree of foreclosure pro- 
 nounced against her and her husband during coverture, and to be let in 
 to redeem, and the mortgagee pleaded the proceedings and decree in the 
 former cause, the plea was allowed. 8 Where an estate has been sold 
 under a decree of the Court, a feme covert is as much bound by the 
 decree as a, feme sole, although it may be to her prejudice; as it would 
 most ruinously depreciate the value of property sold under a decree in 
 Equity, if, where there is neither fraud nor collusion in the purchaser, 
 his title could be defeated. But a decree obtained by fraud is invalid. 9 
 
 If a married woman defendant desires to appeal, she must do so by 
 her next friend, 10 who may be a co-defendant; 11 or she should obtain 
 
 an order to appeal in forma pauperis without a next friend. 1 ' 2 (a) 
 
 * 188 * Where a suit has been instituted against a man and his wife, 
 
 and the husband dies pending the proceedings, the suit will not be 
 
 abated. 1 When a female defendant marries, no abatement takes place ; but 
 
 the husband's name should be introduced in all subsequent proceedings. 2 
 
 R. 1013; Robinson v. Pickering, 16 Ch. D. 9 Burke v. Oosbie, 1 Ball & B. 489; Ken- 
 
 660. nedy o. Daly, 1 Sell. & Lef. 355. 
 
 6 Warne v. Routledge, L. R. 18 Eq. 497, ">' Elliot v. Ince, 7 De G. M. & G. 475; 3 
 
 M. R. Jur. N. S. 597; Picard v. Hine, L. R. 5 Ch. 274. 
 
 6 Temberton v. M'Gill, 1 Jur. N. S. 1045; « Ibid. 
 
 V. C W. 12 Crouch v. Waller, 4 De G. & J. 43; 5 
 
 7 Mallack v. Galton, 3 P. Wms. 352, but Jur. N. S. 326; ante, pp. 39, 40, 111; and see 
 the decree ought not to be made absolute at R. S. C. Ord. XVI. 8. 
 
 once, even by consent on an affidavit verifying i See Ld Red. 59; Shelberry v. Briggs, 2 
 the amount due. Harrison i>. Kennedy, 10 Vern. 249; 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 1, pi. 4; Durbaine«. 
 Hare. A pp. 51. But see Kerchner r. Kempton, Knight, 1 Vern. 318; 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 126, pi. 7. 
 47 Md. 568, where it was held that such a * Ld. Red. 58; Wharam v. Broughton, 1 
 decree, although consented to by the husband, Ves. Sr. 182; and see Sapte v. Ward, 1 Coll. 25; 
 was not binding on the wife, the husband hav- Re Reeks, W. N. (1881) 168. As to the suppos- 
 ing no authority to employ counsel to represent sion of the marriage, see Thomas v. Finlayson, 
 her in such a litigation without her assent. 19 W. R. 255. For the title of their joint an- 
 
 8 Mallack v. Galton, 3 P. Wms. 352. swer in such case, see Vol. III. 
 
 (a) If a married woman appeals without it was held that costs recovered by the plain- 
 
 a next friend, and has no separate property tiffs in their suit against a married woman, but 
 
 except such as she is restrained from antici- execution for which was limited to her separate 
 
 pating, she will be required to give security for property, could, after she became a widow, be 
 
 the costs of the appeal. In re Kershaw, set off against their liability to her personally 
 
 Whittaker v. Kershaw, 44 Ch. D. 296. In for costs in other proceedings. See Re Glan- 
 
 Pelton v. Harrison (No. 2), [1892] 1 Q. B. 118, vill, Ellis v. Johnson, 31 Ch. D. 532. 
 182
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. 
 
 189 
 
 Where, by the death of the husband, a new interest arises to the 
 wife, it seems that she will not be bound by the former answer. 3 
 Under the later practice, however, it would not, it seems, be held 
 necessary for the plaintiff to take any step in the cause, in order to 
 enable a widow to raise a new defence. 
 
 Where a man *and his wife are defendants to a suit, if the *189 
 wife dies, there will be an abatement of the suit. Thus where, a 
 man having married an administratrix, the plaintiff obtained a decree 
 against him and his wife, after which the wife died, it was held that 
 the suit was abated, and that the new administrator ought to be made 
 a party, before any further proceedings could be had in the cause. 1 
 
 A married woman is not a necessary party to a suit seeking to charge 
 her husband's interest in her real estate. 2 («) 
 
 8 Thus, where a bill was filed by the assignees 
 of a husband to compel the specific perform- 
 ance of a contract for the sale of a part of his 
 estate, to which the wife was made a co-de- 
 fendant in respect of certain terms of years 
 which were vested in her as administratrix of 
 a person to whom the terms had been assigned 
 to protect the inheritance, and she had joined 
 with her husband in putting in an answer, by 
 which she claimed to be dowable out of the 
 property, upon the death of her husband an 
 objecion was taken to the suit being proceeded 
 with till a supplemental bill had been filed 
 against her, in order to give her an opportunity 
 of making another defence in respect of the 
 right of dower which had become vested in her, 
 and Sir Thomas Plumer M. R. said that her 
 former answer could not be pressed against 
 her, because, in the former case, she was made 
 a party as administratrix ; but the right to 
 dower which she then had was not claimed by 
 her as representative, but in her own character, 
 and it was an interest that had devolved upon 
 her since her answer was put in : his Honor, 
 therefore, held the suit to be defective. A 
 supplemental bill was thereupon filed against 
 the widow, in order to enable her to claim, 
 
 (a) Respecting the husband's liability for 
 his wife's ante-nuptial debts, see 37 & 38 Vic. 
 c. 50; 33 & 34 Vic. c. 93; 44 & 45 Vic. c. 
 41, § 39; 45 & 4 f ! Vic. c. 75, §§ 13-15; Bell v. 
 Stoeker.10 Q. B. D. 129; Matthews v Whittle, 
 13 Ch. D. 811; De Greuchy v. Wills, 4 C. P. 
 D. 362 ; Fear v. Castle, 8 Q. B. D. 380. As to 
 the husband's co«ts, see London & I'. Bank 
 v. Bogle, 7 Ch. D. 773. A married woman's 
 separate estate will not, it seems, be charged 
 on the mere ground of her having acquiesced 
 in or approved of a breach of trust. Sawyer 
 v. Sawyer, 28 Ch. D. 595, 605. But in such 
 a case the husband is liable if she has been 
 only negligent and is not chargeable with 
 active misconduct. Bahin v. Hughes, 31 Ch. 
 D. 390 In Beck v. Pierce, 23 Q. B. D. 316, it 
 was held that an unsatisfied judgment at law 
 
 in her separate character, what she had before 
 claimed in her character of wife. Upon hear- 
 ing the cause, however, Lord Eldon, although 
 he recognized the principle laid down by Sir 
 Thomas Plumer, said that he should have been 
 inclined, in that case, to have come to a differ- 
 ent decision, as he thought that it would have 
 been difficult for the widow, in her answer to 
 the supplemental bill, to state her case differ- 
 ently from the way in which it had been stated 
 in her former answer. Mole 0. Smith, Jac. 
 490, 495; 1 J. & W. G65. 
 
 1 Jackson v. Rawlins, 2 Vern. 195; fb. ed. 
 Raithby, n. (2). But her trustee, the trust 
 being active, is a necessary party to a bill 
 seeking to divest her of her own interest. 
 O'Hara v. MacConnell, 93 U. S. 150. As to 
 the plaintiff compelling the appearance and 
 answer of the husband and wife, in those cases 
 in which they answer jointly, and for the pro* 
 cess in those cases in which, according to the 
 above principles, a separate answer, by either 
 the one or the other, ought to be filed, see 
 post, Chap. VIII. § 4; Chap. X. § 2. 
 
 2 Waugh v. Wren, 9 Jur. N. S. 365; 11 
 W. R. 244. 
 
 against a wife's separate estate was not a bar 
 to a suit for the wife's debt contracted before 
 marriage against her husband who had received 
 with her assets sufficient to pay the debt. A 
 judgment against a married woman was, under 
 the circumstances, ordered to be paid by in- 
 stalments out of her separate estate, in John- 
 stone v. Browne, 18 L. R. Ir. 428. Since the 
 Married Women's Property Act. 1882, husband 
 and wife may be sued jointly, or the wife may 
 be sued alone, for her wrongful acts. Seroka 
 v. Kattenburg, 17 Q. B. D. 177. A Court of 
 Equity will not set aside a judgment by de- 
 fault against a married woman upon a note 
 to which she might have pleaded coverture. 
 Evans v. Caiman, 92 Mich. 427; Yeatman v. 
 Bellmain, 74 Tenn. 488. 
 
 183
 
 190 
 
 ♦CHAPTER V. 
 
 OP PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 Section I. — Of Necessary Parties, in respect of the Concurrence 
 of their Interests with that of Plaintiff. 
 
 It is the constant aim of a Court of Equity to do complete justice by- 
 deciding upon and settling the rights of all persons interested in the 
 subject of the suit, so as to make the performance of the order of the 
 Court perfectly safe to those who are compelled to obey it, and to pre- 
 vent future litigation. 1 For this purpose, all persons materially inter- 
 ested in the subject ought generally, either as plaintiffs or defendants, 
 to be made parties to the suit, 2 or ought by service upon them of a copy 
 of the bill, 8 or notice of the decree, 4 to have an opportunity afforded of 
 making themselves active parties in the cause, if they should think 
 fit. 5 (a) 
 
 i Ld. Red. 163; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 72, 76; 
 Caldwell v. Taggart, 4 Peters, 190; Joy v. 
 Wirtz, 1 Wash. C. C. 517; Mandeville v. 
 Riggs, 2 Peters, 482; Cutler v. Tuttle, 19 N. 
 J. Eq. 549, 556; Richardson v. Hastings, 7 
 Beav. 323, 326; Hare v. London and N. W. 
 Ry. Co. 1 J*. & H. 252. It seems, however, 
 that, under the modern English practice, the 
 Court is less unwilling to relax the rule in 
 special cases. Ford v. Tennant, 29 Beav. 452; 
 3 De G. F. & J. 697; 7 Jur. N. S. 615, L. J J. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 164; L. R. 8 St. 349. 
 
 3 Cons. Ord. X. 11, 14, 15. As to the 
 
 present English practice, see 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. 
 (6th Eng. ed.) 194, e t seq. 
 
 4 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42, r. 8. 
 
 5 Orders, August, 1841, 23d and 26th. Gen- 
 erally, all persons interested in the subject of a 
 suit should be made parties, plaintiffs, or de- 
 fendants. Stephenson v. Austin, 3 Met. 474, 
 480; Williams v. Russell, 19 Pick. 162, 165; 
 West v. Randall, 2 Mason, 181 ; Pipe v. Bate- 
 man, 1 Clarke (Iowa), 369; New Braintree v. 
 Southworth, 4 Gray, 304 ; Crocker v. Higgins, 
 7 Conn. 342; Footman v. Pray, R. M. Charlt. 
 291; Watkins v. Washington, 2 Bland, 509; 
 
 (a) See also Scottish Widows' Fund v. 
 Craig, 20 Ch. D. 208; Goodden v. Coles, 59 L. 
 T. N. S. 309; Leduc v. Ward. 5 Asp. M. C. 
 571 ; Gregory v. Stetson, 133 U. S. 579; Wil- 
 liams v. Bankhead, 19 Wall. 571; Barney v. 
 Baltimore City, 6 Wall. 280; Jessup v. Illinois 
 Central R. Co. 36 Fed. Rep. 735; Farmers' 
 Bank v. Hannon, 14 id. 593 ; United States v. 
 Central Pacific R. Co. 11 id. 449; Bland v. Flee- 
 man, 29 id. 669; Gest v. Packwood, 39 id. 
 525; West v. Duncan, 42 id. 430; Van Bok- 
 kelen v. Cook, 5 Sawyer, 587; Smith r. Gage, 
 11 Biss. 137; Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 Minn. 43; 
 Graham v. Minneapolis, 40 Minn. 436; Pettit 
 v. B:tird, 10 Phila. 57; Long v. Dickinson, id. 
 108; Thomas v. Boswell, 14 Phila. 197; Odd 
 Fellows J. S. Ass'n v. Merklin, 65 Md. 579; 
 Bridgman v. St. Johnsbury & L. C. R. Co 58 
 Vt. 198; Moore v. Gentry, 25 S. C 334; Castle- 
 man v. Berrv, 86 Va..604; Hatch v. Calvert, 
 
 184 
 
 15 W. Va. 90; Ruffner v. Hewitt, 14 id. 737; 
 Humberd v. Kerr, 8 Baxter (Tenn.), 291; 
 Browder v. Jackson, 3 Lea (Tenn.), 151; 
 Howell v. Foster, 122 111. 276; Zelle v. Work- 
 ingmen's B. Co. 10 111. App. 335; Watson v. 
 Lion Brewing Co. 61 Mich. 595; Swift v. State 
 Lumber Co. 71 Wis. 476; Hunt v. Rooney, 
 77 Wis. 258; Robinson v. Allison (Ala.), 12 
 So. Rep. 382; Hatcher v. Massey, 71 Ga. 
 793, 796; Dailey v. Kinsler, 31 Neb. 340; 
 Smith v. Atkinson (Col.), 32 Pac. Rep. 425; 
 State r. Turner, 49 Ark. 311; Anthony v. 
 State (Kan.), 30 Pac. Rep. 488. Those, for 
 instance, who seek to set aside judicial decrees, 
 charge trusts, and fasten supposed liens because 
 of joint interests, should all be before the 
 Court that it may be justly determined to what 
 extent and in whose favor a decree should be 
 made. Sahlgaard v. Kennedy, 13 Fed. Rep 
 242. 

 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. * 191 
 
 * The strict application of this rule in many cases creates diffi- * 191 
 culties, which have induced the Court to relax it; and, as we 
 shall see, it has long been the established practice of the Court to allow a 
 
 Hoxie v. Carr, 1 Sumner, 172; Whiting v. 
 Bank of United States, 13 Peters. 6-14; 
 Hopkirk v. Page, 2 Brock. 20; M'Connell v. 
 M'Connell, 11 Vt. 290; Evans v. Cliism, 18 
 Maine, 220; Hussey v. Dole, 24 Maine, 20; 
 Beals v. Cobb, 51 Maine, 348; Pierce v. Faunce, 
 47 Maine, 507; Oliver v. Palmer, 11 Gill & J. 
 426; Willis v. Henderson, 4 Scam. 20; Wells 
 v. Strange, 5 Ga. 22; Turner r. Berry. 3 Gil- 
 man, 541 ; Hicks v. Campbell, 19 N. J. Eq. 183 ; 
 Pence v. Pence, 13 N. J. Eq. 257. The general 
 rule requiring all persons interested to be made 
 parties to the suit is confined to parties to the 
 interest involved in the issue, and who must 
 necessarily be affected by the decree. Michi- 
 gan State Bank v. Gardner, 3 Gray, 308, per 
 Thomas J. It is a ride, which is more or less 
 within the discretion of the Court, and may be 
 dispensed with when it becomes extremely dif- 
 ficult or inconvenient. Wendell v. Van Rens- 
 selaer, 1 John Ch. 349; Hallett v. Hallett, 2 
 Paige, 15; Cullen v. Duke of Queensberry, 1 
 Bro. C. C. 101, and Mr. Belt's notes; Mann v. 
 Butler, 2 Barb. Ch. 362; Birdsong v. Birdsong, 
 2 Head, 289; Tobin v. Walkinshaw, McAll. C. 
 C. 26; United States v. Parrott, id. 271; West 
 v. Randall, 2 Mason, 181; Brasher v. Van Cort- 
 landt, 2 John Ch. 242; Boisgerard v. Wall, 1 
 Sm. & M. Ch. 404; Whitney v. Mayo, 15 111. 
 251; Soc. for Prop, of Gospel v. Hartland, 2 
 Paine, C. C. 536. Where the persons interested 
 are so numerous as to make it impossible, or 
 very inconvenient, to bring them all before the 
 Court, a part of them may file a bill in behalf 
 of themselves, and all others standing in the 
 same situation. Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige, 
 222; per Foster J in Williston v. Michigan 
 S. N. R. R. Co. 13 Allen, 406. See Filer v. 
 Bergling, 3 McArthur, 189. As to infants, 
 see ante, p. 160; Equitable Life Ass. Society 
 v. Patterson, 1 Fed. Rep. 126. 
 
 The Court will proceed against the parties 
 before it, although the suit relates to the rights 
 of persons out of the jurisdiction. Ante, p. 149, 
 and notes. This ground of exception to the 
 general rule was peculiarly applicable to suits 
 in Equity in the Courts of the United States. 
 It was accordingly held that where a decree in 
 relation to the subject-matter of litigation can 
 be made without concluding the rights of a 
 person out of the jurisdiction, that person is 
 not an essential party. Story v. Livingston, 13 
 Pet. 359. To the end of directing the exercise 
 of this exceptional jurisdiction, certain rules, 
 and particularly rules 22 and 47, given infra, 
 2380, 2386, were prescribed. Congress also 
 undertook to legislate on the subject by the Act 
 of Feb. 28, 1839, c. 36, and now bv the Rev. 
 
 Stats. § 737, et seq. If, however, the person not 
 before the Court be indispensable, the jurisdic- 
 tion fails, notwithstanding the rules and the 
 statutes. Williams v. Bankhead, 19 Wall. 563; 
 Coiron v. Millaudon, 19 How. 113 ; Parsons v. 
 Howard, 2 Woods, 1; Kilgour v. New Orleans 
 Gas Light Co. 2 Woods, 144. See also Ober v. 
 Gallagher, 93 U. S. 199; Bronson v. Keokuk, 
 2 Dill 498; Brigham v. Luddington, 12 Blatch. 
 237; ante, p. 149, n. (a). And see where a 
 plea of non-joinder of parties was held bad un- 
 der § 737. Gray v. National Steamship Co. 7 
 Rep. 581, U. S. C. C. N. Y. 
 
 This is also the rule of the State Courts. If 
 the absent party is so concerned in the subject- 
 matter that a decree between the immediate 
 litigants cannot be made without seriously 
 affecting his rights, the Court will proceed no 
 further. Cassidy v. Shimmin, 122 Mass. 406; 
 McPike v. Well*, 54 Miss. 136; Hill v. Proctor, 
 10 W. Va. 59; Mudgett v. Gager, 52 Maine, 
 541. See ante, p. 149, n. 1. 
 
 All persons having the same interest should 
 stand on the same side of the suit; but if any 
 such refuse to appear as plaintiffs, they may be 
 made defendants, their refusal being stated in 
 the bill. Contee v. Dawson, 2 Bland, 264; 
 Pogson v. Owe, 3 Desaus. 31; Cook v. Ilad- 
 ley, Cooke, 465; Morse v. Hovey, 9 Paige, 
 197; Bartlett v. Parks, 1 Cush. 86; Whitney 
 v. Mayo, 15 111. 251; Smith r. Sackett, 5 Gil- 
 man, 534; Lovell v. Farrington, 50 Maine, 239. 
 Parties should not be joined as plaintiffs in a 
 suit without their knowledge or consent; if 
 they are, the bill as to them should be dis- 
 missed. Gravenstine's App. 49 Penn. St. 510. 
 Parties having conflicting interests in the 
 subject of litigation should not be joined as 
 plaintiffs in the suit. Grant v. Van Schoon- 
 hoven, 9 Paige, 255; Turnham v. Turnham, 3 
 B. Mon. 581; Michigan Rank v. Gardner, 3 
 Gray, 308, 309, per Thomas J.; Crook v. 
 Brown, 11 Md. 158; Johnson v. Vail, 14 N. J. 
 Eq. 423, 425. And, therefore, a principal in an 
 alleged breach of trust cannot be joined as a 
 co-plaintiff with the persons alleged to have 
 been thereby injured, in an action against the 
 parties charged with participating in the fraud. 
 Paxton v. Wood, 77 N. C. 11. Where parties 
 have an interest to a certain extent in common, 
 and seek the same relief, they may join in the 
 same bill. Wall v. Fairley, 73 N. C. 464. So 
 defendants may be joined who have an inter- 
 est, though not to the same extent, in the de- 
 mand. Woodward v. Hall, 2 Tenn. Ch. 164. 
 A person may file a bill in a double capacity, 
 as executor and as an individual. Ransom v. 
 Geer, 30 N. J. Eq. 249. 
 
 185
 
 * 192 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 plaintiff to sue on behalf of himself and of all the others of a numerous 
 class of which he is one, and to make one of a numerous class (as the 
 members of a joint-stock company) the only defendant, as represent- 
 ing the others, on the allegation that they are too numerous to be all 
 made parties; 1 and, in addition, the Court was empowered, 2 whenever 
 it thinks tit, to adjudicate upon questions arising between parties, 
 without making other persons who are interested in the property in 
 question, or in other property comprised in the same instrument, par- 
 ties to the suit. 3 When the Court acts on this power, the absent 
 parties are not bound by the decree; 4 whereas, in the cases first alluded 
 to, the absent parties are generally bound. 5 
 
 The application of the general rule above referred to will be con- 
 sidered first with reference to those whose rights are concurrent with 
 the rights of the party instituting the suit, and secondly with refer- 
 ence to those who are interested in resisting the plaintiff's claim. 
 
 With respect to the first class it is to be observed that (subject to 
 the provisions of the late Act above pointed out) it is required in all 
 cases where a party comes to a Court of Equity to seek for 
 *192 *that relief which the principles there acted upon entitle him 
 to receive, that he should bring before the Court all such parties 
 as are necessary to enable it to do complete justice, and that he should 
 so far bind the rights of all persons interested in the subject as to 
 render the performance of the decree which he seeks safe to the party 
 called upon to perform it, by preventing his being sued or molested 
 again respecting the same matter either at Law or in Equity. For this 
 purpose, formerly it was necessary that he should bring regularly 
 before the Court, either as co-plaintiffs with himself or as defendants, 
 all persons so circumstanced that, unless their rights were bound by 
 the decree of the Court, they might have caused future molestation or 
 inconvenience to the party against whom the relief was sought. 
 
 But later a plaintiff was enabled, in many cases, to avoid the expense 
 of making such persons active parties to the cause, by serving them 
 with copies of the bill under the general order, 1 or with notice of the 
 decree under the English Act. 2 The practice arising under these pro- 
 visions will be stated hereafter; for, as it does not affect the principle 
 requiring all persons concurrently interested with the plaintiff to be 
 bound by the decree, but only substitutes, in some cases, an easier mode 
 
 1 The rule which excuses the omission of it has done so. See also Swallow v. Binns, 9 
 parties byname for sufficient cause applies to Hare, App. 47; 17 Jur. 295; Lanham v. Pirie, 
 non-resident parties defendant, made such by 2 Jur. N. S. 1201, V. C. S.; Prentice v. Pren- 
 publication. McCaleb v. Crichfield, 5 Heisk. tice, 10 Hare, App. 22; Re Brown, 29 Beav. 401; 
 288. Goulder v. Camm, 1 De G. F. & J. 146, 150; 
 
 2 See Cons. Ord. III. 5-7; VII. 1, 2; X. 6 Jur. N. S. 113. And see now Supreme Court 
 11-18; XVI. 1-6; XVII; XXIII. 18-20; 31 & of Judicature Act of 1873, L. R. 8 St. 352. 
 
 32 Vic. c. 40, § 9. 4 Doody r. Higgins, 9 Hare, App. 32. 
 
 » 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 51 (repealed by 44 & 6 Barker r. Walters, 8 Beav. 92. 
 
 45 Vice. 59, § 3, Sched.; 46 & 47 Vic. c. 49, § 4, i Cons. Ord. X. 11, 14. 
 
 Sched.; see now R. S. C 1883, Ord. XVI. 33- 2 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42, r. 8 (now super- 
 
 41). The Court acted on this power in the case seded by R. S. C. 1883; 46 & 47 Vic. c 49, 
 
 of Parnell v. Hingston, 3 Sm. & G. 337, which is § 4, Sched.). 
 believed to be the only reported case in which 
 
 186
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. * 193 
 
 of accomplishing that end, it will be convenient, in the first instance, 
 to consider what is the nature of those concurrent rights and interests 
 which render it necessary that the persons possessing them should be 
 made either active or passive parties to the suit. 
 
 In general, where a plaintiff has only an equitable right in the thing 
 demanded, the person having the legal right to demand it should be a 
 party to the suit; 8 for, if he were not, his legal rights would not be 
 bound by the decree, 4 and he might, notwithstanding the success of the 
 plaintiff, have it in his power to annoy the defendant by instituting 
 proceedings to assert his right in an action at Law, to which the decree 
 in Equity being res inter alios acta would be no answer, and the defend- 
 ant would be obliged to resort to another proceeding in a Court of 
 Equity to restrain the plaintiff at Law from proceedings to enforce a de- 
 mand which has been already satisfied under the decree in Equity. This 
 complication of litigation it is against the principles of Equity to per- 
 mit, and it therefore requires that in every suit all the persons who have 
 legal rights in the subjects in dispute, as well as the persons having the 
 equitable right, should be made parties to the proceedings. 5 
 
 * Upon this ground it is, that in all suits by persons claiming * 193 
 under a trust, the trustee or other person in whom the legal 
 estate is vested is required to be a party to the proceeding; l (a) and the 
 
 « See Johnson v. Rankin, 2 Bibb, 184; 
 Neilson v. Churchill, 5 Dana, 341. It is not 
 allowable to file a bill in Chancery by the 
 legal owner "to the use of" the beneficial 
 owner, but the latter should sue. Kitchins 
 v. Harrall, 54 Miss. 474. 
 
 * Ld. Red. 179; see 36 & 37 Vic. c. 66, 
 § 24 (6). 
 
 5 As to appointing a person to represent 
 next of kin or others of a class, see now 
 R. S. C 1883, Ord. XVI. 9 a.; Re Peppitt, 4 
 Ch. D. 230; Re White, 30 W. R. 837. In 
 a suit under a statute which provided that 
 any inhabitant of a town might maintain a 
 suit in Equity, by bill or petition, to restrain 
 the town from a misapplication of money in 
 violation of a statute under which it was 
 received, the plaintiffs averred that they were 
 inhabitants of the town, and men of property, 
 liable to be taxed therein, and that the appli- 
 cation of the money contemplated by the town 
 would be a direct injury to them; it was held 
 that the plaintiffs had such an interest in the 
 money and in its application as would entitle 
 them to maintain such bill, if any qualification 
 of interest were necessarv. But it seems that 
 
 no such Qualification of interest is requisite for 
 this purpose. Simmons r. Hanover, 23 Pick. 188. 
 i Malin B Malin, 2 John. Ch. 238; Fish v. 
 Rowland, 1 Paige, 20; Cassiday v. McDaniel, 
 8 B. Mon. 519; Carter v. Jones, 5 Ired. Eq. 
 196. Where an estate has been limited by a 
 marriage settlement to a trustee and his heirs, 
 upon trust during the lives of the plaintiff and 
 his wife, to apply the profits to their use, with 
 remainder to the children of the marriage, with 
 remainder over, and a bill was brought by the 
 persons interested under that settlement to set 
 aside a former settlement, as obtained by fraud, 
 it was held that the plaintiff could have no 
 decree because the trustee was not a party (9 
 Mod. 80). Where it appeared that a mortgage 
 had been made to a trustee for the plaintiff, 
 it was determined that the trustee was a neces- 
 sary party to a suit to foreclose the Equity of 
 redemption. Wood r. Williams, 4 Mad. 185; 
 Hichens r. Kelly. 2 Sm. & 6. 264; see Boyden 
 p. Partridge, 2 Gray, 190. A deed of land, 
 with power of sale, whether to the creditor 
 or a third person, is, in Equity, a mortgage, 
 if the equity of redemption be reserved. Shil- 
 laber v. Robinson, 97 U. S. 68. 
 
 (a) Peper v. Fordyce, 119 U. S. 469 ; Starne 
 v. Farr, 17 111. App. 491; Harlow v. Mister, 64 
 Miss. 25. Joint trustees should all be made 
 parties in matters of account. Howth v. Owens, 
 29 Fed. Rep. 722; Connelly v. Wells, 33 id. 
 205. Trustees are not debtors and creditors as 
 between themselves with respect to the trust 
 money. Ex parte Taylor, 18 Q. B. D. 295. 
 
 Cestui que trvsts may make the trustee a defend- 
 ant when his interest is adverse. Partee v. 
 Thomas, 11 Fed. Rep. 769; Webb r. Vermont 
 Central R. Co. 9 id. 793; see Gandy v. Gandy, 
 30 Ch. D. 57; Barrett v. Brown, 86" N. C. 556. 
 A cestui que trust, who seeks relief in Equity 
 for a breach of trust by the trustees, may sue 
 any or all of them at his election, the wrong 
 
 187
 
 * 194 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 rule is the same whether the trust be expressed or only implied. Thus, 
 where the executor of a mortgagee riles a bill to foreclose a mortgage of 
 freehold or copyhold estate, he should make the heir-at-law of the 
 mortgagee a party ; 2 because, although according to the principles upon 
 which the Courts of Equity proceed money secured by mortgage is con- 
 sidered as part of the personal estate of the mortgagee, and belongs on 
 his death to his personal representative, yet, as the legal estate is in 
 the heir, he would not, unless he was before the Court when it was 
 pronounced, be bound by the decree. There is another reason why it is 
 necessary to bring the heir before the Court in a bill to foreclose a 
 mortgage, because if the mortgagor should think proper to redeem the 
 estate under the decree, he will be a necessary party to the reconvey- 
 ance. 8 And so important is it considered in such a case that the heir 
 should be a party, that where the mortgagee died without any heir that 
 could be discovered, the Court restrained his executor from proceeding 
 at Law to compel payment of the mortgage money, and ordered the 
 
 money into Court till the heir could be found. 4 
 *194 *If the descent of the legal estate has been diverted, it is 
 
 only necessary to have before the Court the person in whom it is 
 actually vested; * and therefore, where a mortgagee has devised his 
 mortgage in such manner as to pass not only the money secured, but 
 the legal estate in the property mortgaged, the devisee alone may fore- 
 close without making the representatives of the original mortgagee a 
 party. 2 And upon the same principle, where a mortgagee in his life- 
 time actually assigns his whole interest in the mortgage, even though 
 the assignment be made without the privity of the mortgagor, the 
 assignee alone may foreclose without bringing the original mortgagee 
 before the Court; 3 and where there have been several mesne assign- 
 ments of the mortgage, the last assignee, provided the legal estate is 
 vested in him, will be sufficient without its being necessary to bring the 
 intermediate assignees before the Court. 4 The conveyance, however, 
 
 2 Scott v. Nicholl, 3 Russ, 476. ve«t the estate. See post; and see Re Boden's 
 
 3 Wood P.Williams, 4 Mad. 186. Trust, 1 De G. M. & G. 57; 9 Hare, 820; 
 
 4 Schoole v. Sail, 1 Sch. & Lef. 177. The Re Lea's Trust, 6 W. R. 482, V. C. W. ; but 
 result of this case was, that after the cause see Be Hewitt, 27 L. J. Ch. 302, L. C. and 
 had remained some years in Court, it was L. JJ. 
 
 thought worth while to get an Act of Parlia- : See Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Cammet, 2 
 
 ment to revest the estate, on an allegation Edw. Ch. 127. 
 
 that the heir could not be found. See also 2 Williams v. Day, 2 Ch. Cas. 32; Ren- 
 Stoke v. Robson, 19 Ves. 385; 3 V. & B. 54; voize v. Cooper, 6 Mad. 371 ; 1 S. & S. 364. 
 Smith v. Richnell, ib. notis; Schelmardine v. 3 Chambers v. Goldwin, 9 Ves. 209; Story, 
 Harrop, 6 Mad. 39. The difficulty experi- Eq. PI. § 189; Bishop of Winchester v. Beavor, 
 enced in the case referred to is now met by 3 Sumner's Ves. 314, and note (n); Whitney 
 the provisions of the Trustee Act, 1850, § 19, v. M'Kinney, 7 John. Ch 144. 
 which enables the Court, in such a case, to 4 Chambers v. Goldwin, 9 Ves. 269. 
 
 being several as well as joint. Land Credit ton v. Anderson, 40 N. J. Eq. 486. The trustee 
 
 Co v. Fermoy, L. R. 8 Eq. 7; L. R. 5 Ch. 763; under a railroad deed of trust is not a necessary 
 
 Att.-Gen. v. Wilson, 4 .Tur. 1174; Heath v. Erie party to a bondholder's suit to compel perform- 
 
 Ry. Co. 8 Blatch. 347, 411; Boyd v. Gill, 21 id. ance of the railroad's agreements in the deed. 
 
 543; Gilchrist v. Stevenson, 9 Barb. 9; Stock- Spies v. Chicago &c. R. Co. 30 Fed. Rep. 397. 
 188
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. 
 
 195 
 
 must have been absolute, and not by way of sub-mortgage; 5 for if there 
 be several derivative mortgagees, they must all be made parties to a bill 
 of foreclosure by one of them. 6 
 
 The principle that requires a trustee, or other owner of the legal 
 estate, to be brought before the Court in suits relating to trust property, 
 applies equally to all cases where the legal right to sue for the thing 
 demanded is outstanding in a different person from the one claim- 
 ing the beneficial interest. Thus, where a bill is filed for * the * 195 
 specific performance of a covenant under seal with one, for the 
 benefit of another, the covenantee must be a party to a bill by the per- 
 son for whose benefit the covenant was intended, against the covenantor. 1 
 And so upon a bill filed for the specific performance of a covenant for 
 the surrender of a copyhold estate to A, in trust for others, the Court 
 said, that as the effect of a surrender, if decreed, would be to give the 
 legal estate to A, he ought to be a party; otherwise another suit might 
 become necessary against him. 2 
 
 The preceding cases arose upon covenants entered into under seal; 
 the same rule does not, however, apply to less formal instruments, such 
 as ordinary agreements not under seal, where one party contracts as 
 agent for the benefit of another. In such cases it is not necessary to 
 bring the agent before the Court; because, even at Law, it is the right 
 of the principal to interpose, and supersede the right of his agent, by 
 claiming to have the contract performed to himself, although made in 
 the name of his agent. 3 This principle was acted upon where the 
 
 & Story, Eq. PI. § 191; Kittle v. Van 
 Dyck, 1 Sandf. (N. Y.) 76, cited; infra, 260, 
 n." 5. 
 
 *> Thus, where A made a mortgage for a 
 term of years for securing .£350 and interest to 
 B, who had assigned the term to C, redeem^ 
 able by himself on paying .£300 and interest, 
 and B died, and C brought a bill against A 
 to foreclose him without making the represen- 
 tatives of B, the original mortgag e, parties, 
 it was held by the Court thai there was plainly 
 a want of proper parties. Hobart v. Abbot, 2 
 P. Wms. 643; Kittle v. Van Dyck, 1 Sand. 
 (N. Y.) 76; Hunt v. Rooney, 77 Wis. 258. As 
 to chattel mortgages, see Smith v. Moore, 49 
 Ark. 100. The general, although not univer 
 sal, rule, is that all incumbrancers, as well as 
 the mortgagor, should be made parties, being, 
 if not indispensable, at least proper, parties to 
 a bill of foreclosure, whether they are prior or 
 subsequent incumbrancers. Findley v. Bank 
 of United States, 11 Wheat. 304; Haines « 
 Beach, 3 John. Ch 459; Ensworth v. Lam- 
 bert, 4 John. Ch. 605 ; McGown V. Yorks, 
 6 John. Ch. 450; Bishop of Winchester v. 
 Beuvor, 3 Sumner's Ves. 314, note (a); Taite 
 v. Pallas, 1 Hogan, 261; Bodkin v. Fitz- 
 patrick, 1 Hogan, 308; Canby v. Ridgeway. 
 Halst. N. J. Dig. 168; Lyon v. Sandford, 5 
 Conn. 544; Renwick v. Macomb, 1 Hopk. 
 277; Fell v. Brown, 2 Bro. C. C. (Perkins's 
 
 ed.) 278, 279, notes; Maderias v. Cutlett, 7 
 Monroe, 476; Wing v. Davis, 7 Greenl. 31; 
 Poston v. Eubank, 3 J. J. Marsh. 44; Stucker 
 v Stucker, id. 301 ; Cooper v. Martin, 1 Dana, 
 25; Noyes v. Sawyer, 3 Vt. 160; Judson v. 
 Emanuel, 1 Ala. N. S. 598; Miller v. Kershaw, 
 1 Bailev, Eq.479; Bristol v. Morgan, 3 Edw. 
 Ch. 142, Nodine v. Greenfield, 7 Paige, 544; 
 see Piatt v. Squire, 12 Met. 494. See infra, 
 214, notes 5, 7, 8; 277, 279. 
 
 i Cooke v. Cooke, 2 Vern. 36 ; 1 Eq Cas. Abr. 
 73, pi. 8; Story, Eq. PI. § 209. See Re Cooper, 
 Cooper v. Vesey, 20 Ch. D. 611. 
 
 2 Cope t. Parry, 2 J. & W. 588; and see 
 Rolls v. Yate, Yelv. 177; 1 Bulst. 25 b. 
 
 3 Crocker v. Higgins, 7 Conn. 342. The 
 party in interest in a contract, resting in 
 parol may sue upon it. Lapham v. Green, 
 9 Vt. 407; Story, Agency, § 418, el seq. ; Pitts 
 v. Mower, 18 Maine, 361 ; Edmond v. Cald- 
 well, 15 Maine, 340; Higdon v. Thomas, 1 
 Har. & G. 153; White v. Owen, 12 Vt. 361; 
 Dunlap's Paley's Agency, 324. note ; Hogan 
 r. Short. 24 Wend. 461 ; Thorp v. Farquer, 6 
 B. Mon. 3. 
 
 In the case of the United States v. Par- 
 mele, 1 Paine, C. C. 252. it was held that no 
 action will lie in the name of the principal, 
 on a written contract made by his agent in 
 his own name, although the defendant may 
 have known the agent's character. See 
 
 189
 
 196 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 plaintiff, not wishing to appear as purchaser, procured J. S. to bargain 
 for him, who signed the contract (not as agent) and paid the deposit by 
 his own check; yet, inasmuch as it was the plaintiff's money, he was 
 allowed to maintain an action for it without showing any disclaimer by 
 J. S. 4 Upon the same principle, in Equity, if the plaintiff had filed a 
 bill against the vendor, for a specific performance, he would not have 
 been under the necessity of making J. S. a party to the suit, because, 
 if he had succeeded in his object, performance of the contract to the 
 plaintiff might have been shown in answer to an action at Law by J. S., 
 whose title was merely that of agent to the plaintiff, (a) It is, however, 
 frequently the practice to join the auctioneer as co-plaintiff with the 
 vendor in suits for specific performance of contracts entered 
 * 196 * into at auctions ; 1 but that is because he has an interest in the 
 contract, and may maintain an action upon it. He has also an 
 interest in being protected against the legal liability which he may 
 have incurred in an action by the purchaser to recover the deposit. 2 
 
 In order to enable the plaintiff to dispense with the necessity for 
 making the agent entering into a contract for his employer, in his own 
 name, a party to a suit to enforce such contract, he must allege and 
 prove that he was actually an agent in the transaction, as appears to 
 have been done in Bethune v. Far ebr other,* by proving that although 
 the money was paid by the check of the agent, it was in fact the money 
 of the purchaser. If the fact of the person contracting being the agent 
 of the plaintiff does not appear from the contract, and the plaintiff is 
 not able to show the agency, by proving that the money was his own, 
 or some equally conclusive fact, he must make the agent a party, either 
 as co-plaintiff with himself or as a defendant, in order to bind his inter- 
 est; for otherwise such agent would have a right to sue either in 
 
 Clarke v. Wilson, 3 Wash. C C. 560; New- 
 comb v. Clark, 1 Denio, 226; Finney v. Bed- 
 ford Ins. Co. 8 Met. 348. Collyer, Partn. 
 (Perkins's ed.) §§ 412. G53; Dunlap's Paley's 
 Agency, 324, note; Harp v. Osgood, 2 Hill, 
 216; West Boylston Manuf. Co. v. Searle, 15 
 Pick. 225; Hubbard v. Borden, 6 Whart. 79, 
 92. This, however, is not universally true, 
 as appears in the case of factors making 
 written contracts in their own name for the 
 purchase or sale of goods for their principals. 
 So in cases of agents procuring policies of 
 insurance in their own names for the benefit 
 
 (a) Those who have possession of trust funds 
 may be joined as defendants when the trustee 
 is sued for an accounting. McBride v. Mcln- 
 tyre (Mich.), 51 N. W. Rep. 1113. A stake- 
 holder, who still holds the fund in dispute, 
 should be a party to a suit relating to its dis- 
 position. Perrin v. Lepper, 26 Fed. Rep 545. 
 An auctioneer who holds a large deposit, which 
 is involved in the suit, is a proper party defend- 
 ant to a bill for specific performance ; but the 
 
 190 
 
 of their principals, and in other cases com- 
 mented on in Story, Agency, § 161. 
 
 4 Duke of Norfolk v. Worthy, 1 Camp 337; 
 Sugd. V. & P. 237. 
 
 i See Cutts v. Thodey, 13 Sim. 206, 211; 
 and see 7 Ves 289. 
 
 2 But where an auctioneer used fraud to 
 enhance the price of property sold at auction, 
 it was held that in a suit in Equity by a 
 purchaser for relief against the sale, it was not 
 necessary to make the auctioneer a party. 
 Veazie v. Williams, 8 How. U. S. 134. 
 
 3 Cited 5M&S. 385. 
 
 practice of joining, in such a bill, auctioneers 
 who hold but a small deposit, is not favored. 
 Egmont v. Smith, 6 Ch. D. 469. An auctioneer 
 is not a proper party for discover}- only, but is 
 properly made a defendant to a bill to rescind 
 a purchase at auction on the ground of his 
 mock-bidding. Dickson v. Harrison, 9 Ch. D. 
 243 ; Heatley v. Newton, 19 Ch. D. 326; Amos 
 v Heme Bay P. &c. Co. 54 L. T. 264; see 
 Tavenner v. Barrett, 21 W Va. 656, 673.
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. * 197 
 
 Equity for a specific performance of the same contract, or to bring an 
 action at Law for the recovery of the money paid to the defendant; 
 and parol evidence on the part of the defendant would in either case be 
 inadmissible to show, in opposition to the written contract, that the 
 purchase was made on behalf of another. 4 (a) The same rule will apply 
 if the agent contracted as well on his own behalf as in the capacity of 
 agent for another. In that event the bill must be filed in his own 
 name, and in that of the person on whose behalf he acted, or at least 
 such person must be a party. Upon this principle, where a contract 
 was entered into for the purchase of an estate by certain persons in 
 their own names, but in fact on their own account, and also as agents 
 for other parties, a bill to rescind the contract was filed in the names 
 of both of the agents, and of the other parties for whom they 
 contracted. 5 (&) 
 
 With respect to the effect of a sub-contract in rendering it necessary 
 to bring the party concerned in it before the Court in a litigation 
 between the original contracting parties, the following distinction has 
 been made; namely, if A contracts with B to convey to him an estate, 
 and B afterwards contracts with C that he, B, will convey to 
 him the same estate, in that case C is not a necessary * party to * 197 
 a suit between A and B for a specific performance; but if the 
 contract entered into by B with C had been, not that he, B, should 
 convey the estate, but that A, the original vendor, should convey it to 
 C, then C would have been a necessary party to a suit by B against A 
 for a specific performance. 1 
 
 Upon the principle above stated, it is presumed that where a man 
 enters into a contract which is expressed in the instrument itself to 
 have been entered into by him as agent for another, he would not after- 
 wards be allowed to sue for a performance of that contract on his own 
 behalf, on the allegation that he was not authorized to act as agent, 
 without bringing the party, on whose behalf it was expressed to be 
 
 4 Bartlett v. Pickersgill, 1 Cox, 15; 1 Eden, » v. Walford, 4 Russ. 372; see Nel- 
 
 515; see 2 Sudgen, V. & P. (7th Am. ed.) 911, thorpe v. Holgate, 1 Coll. 203, and the cases 
 
 and notes; Botsford v. Burr, 2 John. Ch. 409; there cited; McCreight v. Foster, L. R. 5 Ch. 
 
 Hiifthes ». More, 7 Cranch, 176. 604; W. N. (1870) 157; 18 W. R. 905, L. 
 
 5 Small v. Attwood, Younge, 407, 455; 6 CI. C. aff'd, nom. Shaw v. Foster, L. R. 5 H. L. 
 & F. 232. 321. 
 
 («) The decision in Bartlett v. Pickersgill, Ch. D. 295; 37 W. R. 236, 434. Acts per- 
 
 though impeached in Heard v. Filley, L. R. 4 formed by officers or agents may be alleged in 
 
 Ch. 548, and elsewhere, is still law upon the the complaint, without stating their names, as 
 
 same facts. Hence if an agent, having parol performed by the defendant. Todd v. Minn. & 
 
 authority to purchase property, purchases in his St. L. Ry. Co. 37 Minn. 358; Weide v. Porter, 
 
 own name and with his own money, takes a 22 Minn. 429 An agent cannot make himself 
 
 conveyance to himself, and denies the agency, a trustee against his principal. Wright v. 
 
 section 7 of the Statute of Frauds is a good Mills, 63 L. T. 186. A contractor is not 
 
 defence against the principal. James v. Smith, usually to be joined as a defendant in a suit 
 
 [1891] 1 Ch. 384; 65 L. T. 544; 63 L. T. 524. against his employer for injury, done in carry- 
 
 (b) The principal's right to afterwards ratify ing out the latter's contract. Serff t*. Acton 
 
 and enforce the contract of his agent is not Local Board, 55 L. J. Ch. 569; 54 L. T. 379; 
 
 affected by the fact that the other party has see Marcus Sayre Co. v. Bernz (N. J.), 20 
 
 already repudiated it. Bolton v. Lambert, 41 Atl. Rep. 911. 
 
 191
 
 *197 
 
 OP PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 made, before the Court. 3 At Law it has been held that a plaintiff 
 under such circumstances could maintain an action, by procuring, from 
 the party on whose behalf he appeared to have entertained the contract, 
 a renunciation of his interest. 8 
 
 The ground for making the agent a party is merely the interest 
 which he has in the contract, and wherever he has no interest whatever 
 in the property in litigation, or in the contract, and cannot be sued 
 either at Law or in Equity respecting it, he ought not to be made a 
 party; and if he is made a co-plaintiff in the suit, a demurrer upon that 
 ground will be allowed; 4 though now, in such a case, the Court may 
 grant such relief as the special circumstances of the case require. 5 
 Upon this principle an agent who bids at an auction for an estate, and 
 signs the memorandum in his own name, need not be made a co-defend- 
 ant with his employer in a bill for a specific performance of such 
 agreement. 6 
 
 The assignor of a legal chose in action, or, if he is dead, his 
 personal representative, should be a party; 7 for as an assignment 
 
 2 See Add. Cont. 600, 624. 
 
 8 Bickerton v. Burrell, 5 M. & S. 383. 
 
 * King of Spain v. Machado, 4 Russ. 228, 
 241; vide etiam, Cuff v. Platell, id. 242, and 
 Makepeace v. Hay t home, ib. 244; Jones v. 
 Hart, lHen. & M." 470. 
 
 5 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 49. 
 
 6 Kingsley v. Young, Rolls, July 30, 1807, 
 Coop. Eq. I'l. 42; see also Lissett v. Reave, 2 
 Atk. 394; Newman v. Godfrey, 2 Bro. C. C. 
 332, cited Ld. K'ed. 160; see Avers v. Wright, 
 8 ["red. Eq. 229. 
 
 7 Corbin v. Emerson, 10 Leigh, 663 ; Bell v. 
 Shrock, 2 B. Mon. 29 ; Combs v. Tarlton, id. 
 194; Allen v. Crocket, 4 Bibb, 240; Bromley v. 
 Holland, 7 Sumner's Ves. 3, note (c); Voorhees 
 v. De Myer, 3 Sandf. Ch. 614; The Auditor v. 
 Johnson, 1 Hen. & M. 536; Bradley v. Morgan, 
 2 A. K. Marsh. 369; Elderkin v. Shultz, 2 
 Blackf. 345; Currier v. Howard, 14 Gray, 511, 
 513; Ensign v. Kellogg, 4 Pick. 1; Chaffraix v. 
 Board of Liquidation, 11 Fed. Rep. 638. In 
 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 16, 41, et seq., 
 it was strenuously maintained by Mr. Justice 
 Story that the assignor in a chose in action is 
 not, in Equity, a necessary party, where the 
 suit is by the assignee and the assignment is 
 absolute. Miller v. Henderson, 10 N. J. Eq. 
 320; see Ward v. Van Bokkelin, 2 Paige, 289; 
 Bruen v. Crane, 1 Green, Ch. 347; Everett v. 
 Winn, 1 Sm. & M. Ch. 67; Snelling v. Boyd, 
 2 Monroe, 132; Kennedy v. Davis, 7 Monroe, 
 372; Morey v. Forsyth, Walker, Ch. 465; 
 Beach v. White, id. 495; Dixon v. Buell, 21 
 III. 203; Colerick v. Hooper, 3 Ind. 316; 
 Varney v. Bartlett, 5 Wis. 270; Moor v. Veazie, 
 32 Maine, 343, 355; Whitney v. M'Kinney, 7 
 John. Ch. 144; Brown v. Johnson, 53 Maine, 
 246, 247 ; Pingree v. Coffin, 12 Gray, 302, 303. 
 In Hobart v. Andrews, 21 Pick. 526, 531, 532, 
 
 192 
 
 Mr. Justice Wilde seems inclined to favor the 
 same doctrine. And it was so held in Haskell 
 v. Hilton, 30 Maine, 419; see Anderson v. 
 Wells, 6 B. Mon. 540; Clark v. Smith, 7 B. 
 Mon. 273; Day v. Cummings, 19 Vt. 496. In 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 153, the law on this subject is 
 thus stated: "In general, the person having 
 the legal title in the subject-matter of the bill 
 must be a party, either as plaintiff or as defend- 
 ant, though he has no beneficial interest there- 
 in; so that the legal right may be bound by 
 the decree of the Court. In cases, therefore, 
 where an assignment does not pass the legal 
 title, but only the equitable title, to the prop- 
 erty, as, for example, an assignment of a chose 
 in action, it is usual, if it be not always indis- 
 pensable, to make the assignor, holding the 
 legal title, a part}' to the suit. Indeed, the rule 
 is often laid down far more broadly, and in 
 terms importing that the assignor, as the legal 
 owner, must in all cases be made a party, 
 where the equitable interest only is passed. 
 See Corbin v. Emerson, 10 Leigh, 663; Smith 
 v. Harley, 8 Maine, 559. But it may perhaps 
 be doubted whether the doctrine thus stated is 
 universally true. The true principle would 
 seem to be, that in all cases where the assign- 
 ment is absolute and unconditional, leaving no 
 equitable interest whatever in the assignor, and 
 the extent and validity of the assignment is not 
 doubted or denied, and there is no remaining 
 liability in the assignor to be affected by the 
 decree, it is not necessary to make the latter a 
 party. At most he is merely a nominal or 
 formal party in such a case. It is a very differ- 
 ent question whether he may not properly be 
 made a party, as a legal owner, although no 
 decree is sought against him; for in many cases 
 a person may be made a party, though he is 
 not indispensable. See Thompson v. McDonald,
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. 
 
 198 
 
 * of a chose in action is not recognized in a Court of Law, and * 198 
 is only considered good in Equity, the recovery in Equity by 
 
 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 477, Wilson v. Davidson 
 County, 3 Tenn. Ch. 536. But where the 
 assignment is not absolute and unconditional, 
 or the extent or validity of the assignment is 
 disputed or denied, or there are remaining 
 rights or liabilities of the assignor, which may 
 be affected by the decree, there he is not only a 
 proper, but a necessary party." Montague v. 
 Lobdell, 11 Cush. 114, 115; Beltonu. Williams, 
 4 Fla. 11; see Craig v. Johnson, 3 J. J. Marsh. 
 573; Houghton v. Davis, 23 Maine, 33. The 
 promisee named in a written contract to convey 
 land, who has transferred it by an uncondi- 
 tional verbal assignment, need not be made a 
 party to a suit by his assignee for specific per- 
 formance of the contract. Currier v. Howard, 
 14 Gray, 511. In Field v. Maghee, 5 Paige, 
 539, it was held, that the assignee of a chose in 
 action, which has been absolutely assigned, is 
 not authorized to file a bill for the recovery of 
 the same, in the name of the assignor; see also 
 Miller v. Bear, 3 Paige, 467, 468; Whitney V. 
 M'Kinney, 7 John. Ch. 144; Sedgwick v. 
 Cleveland, 7 Paige, 287; Polk v. Gallant, 2 
 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 395; Snelling v. Boyd, 5 
 Monroe, 172. But if the assignee be a mere 
 nominal holder, without interest in the thing 
 assigned, then the suit should be brought in 
 the name of the party in interest. Rogers v. 
 Traders' Ins. Co. 6 Paige, 583; see Patterson 
 v. Stapler, 7 Fed. Rep. 210. 
 
 It has been recently held in England, in 
 Hammond v. Messenger, 9 Sim. 327, that the 
 assignee of a debt, not in itself negotiable, is 
 not entitled to sue the debtor for it in Equity, 
 unless some circumstances intervene, which 
 show that his remedy at Law is, or may be, 
 obstructed by the assignor. The same doctrine 
 has also been distinctly held in New York and 
 
 (i) This appears to be now the accepted 
 rule. See Hayward v. Andrews, 106 U. S. 672, 
 675; New York Guaranty Co. v. Memphis 
 Water Co. 107 U. S. 205; Hayes v. Hayes, 45 
 N. J. Eq. 461. In Virginia, see Lynchburg 
 Iron Co. v. Tayloe, 79 Va. 671; Fore v. Foster, 
 86 Va. 104; Preston v. Aston, 85 Va. 104. See 
 further, as to parties in cases of assignments, 
 Commercial Wharf Co. v. Winsor, 146 Mass. 
 55'J; Smith v. Payne, 56 N. Y. Super. Ct. 
 451; Mason v. York &c. R. Co. 52 Maine, 
 82; Smith v. Brittenham, 109 111. 540; Cole v. 
 Lake Co. 54 N. II. 242; Marine Ins. Co. v. St. 
 Louis &c. Ry. Co. 41 Fed. Rep 643; Robinson 
 v. Springfield Co 21 Fla. 203, Samainego v. 
 Stiles (Ariz.), 20 Pac. 607. Also where forgery 
 or fraud is an issue, see Dalton v. Midlmd 
 Railway, 12 C. B. 458; Duncan v. Luntlev. 2 
 Ma. N. & Gord 30; s. c. 2 Hall & Twells,"78; 
 VOL I — 13 
 
 other States. Carter v. United Ins. Co. 1 John. 
 Ch. 463; Ontario Bank v. Mumford, 2 Barb. 
 Ch. 596; Adair v. Winchester, 7 Gill & J. 114; 
 Smiley v. Bell, Martin & Yerg. 378; Moseley 
 v. Brush, 4 Rand. 392; see also Rose v. Clark, 
 1 Y. & Col. Ch. 534, 548 ; Motteux v. London 
 Assurance Co. 1 Atk. 545; Dhegetoft v. Lon- 
 don Assurance Co. Moseley, 83. Mr. Justice 
 Story says that "this doctrine is apparently 
 new; and never has been adopted in America. 
 The general principle here established seems to 
 be, that wherever an assignee has an equitable 
 right or interest in a debt, or other property (as 
 the assignee of a debt certainly has), there, a 
 Court of Equity is the proper forum to enforce 
 it, and he is not to be driven to any circuity by 
 instituting a suit at law in the name of the per- 
 son, who is possessed of the right." 2 Story, Eq. 
 Jur. § 1057 a.; Townsend v. Carpenter, 11 Ohio, 
 21. But see Walker v. Brooks, 125 Mass. 241, 
 where the conclusions of Judge Story are re- 
 viewed, and it is held, that Equitj- will not 
 entertain a bill by an assignee of a strictly legal 
 right, unless lie shows that the assignor refuses 
 the use of his name, or that the action at Law 
 would not afford adequate relief, (a) To the 
 same effect are Angell v. Stone, 110 Mass. 54; 
 Hogan v. Buck, 44 Vt. 285. 
 
 In Ontario Bank v. Mumford, above cited, 
 Chancellor Walworth cited with approbation 
 the case of Hammond v. Messenger, and reaf- 
 firmed the doctrine it contains to its full extent. 
 "As a general rule," said he, "this Court will 
 not entertain a suit brought by the assignee of 
 a debt, or of a chose in action, which is a mere 
 legal demand ; but will leave him to his remedy 
 at Law by a suit in the name of the assignor." 
 See also Gover v. Christie, 2 Harr. & J. 67; 
 Winn v. Bowles, 6 Munf. 23. 
 
 Taylor v. Midland Railway, 28 Beav. 287, and 
 8 H. L. Cas. 751; Telegraph Co. v. Davenport, 
 97 U. S. 369; Pratt v. Boston & Albany Rail- 
 road, 126 Mass. 443. See Pratt v. Taunton 
 Copper Co. 123 Mass. 110; Salisbury Mills p. 
 Townsend, 109 Mass. 115; Loring v. Salisbury 
 Mills, 125 Mass. 138. 
 
 In England the assignee of the registered 
 proprietor of a trade-mark may sue to prevent 
 its use, although the assignment has not been 
 registered. Ihlee v. Henshaw, 31 Ch. D. 323; 
 see Jennings v. Johnson, 37 Fed. Rep. 364. As 
 to the assignee of a patent for an invention 
 suing as sole plaintiff for infringement, see 
 Wilson v. Chickering, 14 Fed. Rep. 917: Nellis 
 ?-. Pen nock Manuf. Co. 13 id. 451 ; Gottfried v. 
 Miller, 10 id. 471 , Seibert C. O. Co. v. Phillips 
 L. Co. id. 677; Graham v. Geneva Lake C. M. 
 Co. 11 id. 139; Merriam v. Smith, id. 588; 
 193
 
 199 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 * 199 the * assignee would be no answer to an action at Law by the 
 assignor, in whom the legal right to sue still remains, and who 
 might exercise it to the prejudice of the party liable; 1 in which case 
 the party liable would be obliged to file another bill against the plaintiff 
 at Law, for the purpose of restraining his proceedings. 
 
 Upon this ground, where an obligee had assigned over a bond, and 
 died, and the assignee sued for it in Equity, the cause was directed to 
 stand over, to make the personal representative of the obligee a party; 2 
 and in another case, 8 where the assignor of a bond was dead, and there 
 was not a representative, it was held, on a bill filed by the assignee 
 against the obligor for a ne exeat, that there was a want of parties. In 
 like manner, where a bill was filed by the assignees of a judgment, 
 without the assignor being a party, it was held, that the plaintiffs could 
 not go on with that part of their case which sought payment of the 
 debt. 4 
 
 For the same reason, where a bill was filed against the directors of 
 an unincorporated joint-stock company, by a holder of shares, of which 
 some were original, and some were alleged to be derivative, without 
 stating with respect to the derivation of them, the manner in which he 
 had become possessed of them, or whether they had been transferred to 
 him in the manner in which, according to the regulations of the com- 
 
 1 See the remarks of Thomas J. in Mon- 
 tague v. Lobdell, 11 Cush. Ill, 114, 115; and 
 also the remarks of Wilde J. in Hobart v. 
 Andrews, 21 Pick. 526, 531, 532, upon the 
 above statement by Mr. Daniell. Brown v. 
 Johnson, 53 Maine, 246. And see Jones v. 
 Farrell, 1 De G. & J. 208, where the assignor 
 sued at Law, and the debtor, with notice of 
 the assignment before suit brought, paid 
 him, the debtor was again compelled to pay 
 the assignee on bill filed by such assignee. 
 See also Rolt v. White, 31 Beav. 520, where 
 it was held that the right of set-off by the 
 debtor was the same in Equity as at Law. 
 
 - Brace v. Harrington, 2 Atk 235; Coale 
 
 Goldsmith v. American P. C. Co. 2 id. 239; 
 Still v. Reading, 9 id. 40. An exclusive 
 license, as, for example, to sell under letters- 
 patent, when not coupled with a grant, con- 
 fers no property in the subject-matter, and 
 Kives the licensee no title to sue in his own 
 name. Heap v. Hartley, 42 Ch. D. 461; see 
 Re Apollinaris Co.'s Trade Marks, 63 L. T. 162. 
 A patentee and his licensee, whose license is 
 not exclusive, cannot join as plaintiffs in a 
 suit for infringement. Blair r. Lippincott 
 Glass Co. 52 Fed. Rep. 226. But the licensee 
 of the exclusive right to a territory under a 
 patent may join the owner as co-plaintiff even 
 against his will in a suit against an infringer. 
 Brush Electric Co. v. California Electric Light 
 Co. 52 Fed. Rep. 945; see Huher v. Myers S. 
 Depot, 34 id. 725; Boston Woven Hose Co. v. 
 
 194 
 
 v. Mildred, 3 Harr. & J. 278; see Ensign v. 
 Kellogg, 4 Pick. 1. As to equities where the 
 assignment is absolute, see 36 & 37 Vic. c. 66, 
 § 25 (6) ; Brice v. Banister, 3 Q. B. D. 569; Be 
 Sutton, 12 Ch. D. 175; Ex parte Nichols, 22 
 Ch. D. 782; Percival v. Dunn, 29 Ch. D. 128; 
 Wa'ker v. Bradford Old Bank, 12 Q. B. D. 
 511. 
 
 3 Ray r. Fenwick, 3 Bro. C. C. 25. 
 
 4 Cathcart r. Lewis, 1 Ves. Jr. 463; Part- 
 ington v. Bailey, 6 L. J. Ch. N. S. 179, M. R.; 
 M'Kinnie v. Rutherford, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 
 395; Elliott v. Waring, 5 Monroe, 339; Pem- 
 berton v. Riddle, id. 401 ; Young v. Rodes, id. 
 500; Elderkin v. Shultz, 2 Blackf. 346. 
 
 Star Rubber Co. 40 id. 167 , Clement Manuf. 
 Co. v. Upton & Hart Co. id. 471; Curran v. St. 
 Charles Car Co. 32 id. 835. Predecessors in a 
 pretended title need not be joined in a bill to 
 compel the present holder to release it. Crooks 
 r. Whitford, 40 Mich. 599. Where a half in- 
 terest in a contract has been equitably assigned, 
 the assignor and assignee may, under the 
 Indiana Code, join as co-plaintiffs in a suit 
 thereon. Singleton v. O'Blenis, 125 Tnd. 151; 
 see Wilcox v. Pratt, 125 Ts T . Y. 688. 
 
 An assignee pendente lite is a purchaser with 
 notice, and need not be brought in as a party. 
 Eyster v. Gaff, 91 U. S. 521; Moran v. Pelli- 
 fant. 28 III. App. 278; Checkering v. Fullerton, 
 90 111 520; Zane v. Fink, 18 W. Va. 693; Pond 
 v. Clark, 24 Conn, 370, 384.
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. * 200 
 
 pany, such transfer ought to have been made, Lord Brougham appeared 
 to think that the persons by whom the shares had been assigned to the 
 plaintiffs ought to have been parties to the suit. 5 
 
 The same principle appears to have been acted upon by the Court of 
 Exchequer, in certain cases in which bills have been filed for tithes, by 
 lessees, under parol demises (which, in consequence of tithes being 
 things lying in grant, are void at Law), in which * cases, upon *200 
 demurrers being put in and submitted to, the Court has permitted 
 the plaintiffs to amend their bills, by making the lessors parties to the 
 suit. 1 
 
 Although the assignor of a chose in action is sometimes made a party 
 defendant, yet the more general practice is (especially where the assign- 
 ment contains, as it almost always does, a power of attorney from the 
 assignor to the assignee to sue in his name), to make the assignor a 
 co-plaintiff in the bill; although it seems, that even if the assignment 
 is stated upon the bill, and consequently, that there is an admission 
 of the fact as between the co-plaintiffs, still it is necessary to prove 
 the assignment, in order to show that there is no misjoinder of plain- 
 tiffs ; 2 though now, it is conceived that such proof would certainly not 
 be required. 8 
 
 A creditor or legatee 4 of a person deceased may, in some cases, 
 under peculiar circumstances, such as an allegation of fraud or collu- 
 sion, 5 bring a bill against a debtor to, 6 or creditor of, 7 the estate, (a) Yet 
 
 8 Walburn v. Ingilby, 1 M. & K. 61 ; C. P. 
 Coop temp Brough. 270; see Bagshaw v. East- 
 ern Union Ry. Co. 7 Hare, 114; 13 Jur. 602; 
 affirmed, 2 Mac. & G. 389; 14 Jur. 491, L. C; 
 < n.sslev p. Glasgow Life Ass. Co. 4 Ch. D. 
 421. 
 
 1 Henning v. Willis, 3 Wood, 29; Jackson 
 v. Benson, M'Lel. 62. 
 
 2 Snyer v. Wagstaff, 2 Y. & C 230 ; Chol- 
 mor.deley v. Clinton, 4 Bligh, 123 ; Ryan v. 
 Anderson, 3 Mad. 174 ; Blair v. Bromlej', 5 
 Hare, 554; affirmed. 2 Phil. 354 ; 11 Jur.*115, 
 617; Sammis v. Wightman, 31 Fla. 45. 
 
 3 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 49. If the assignor 
 be made a defendant, and admit the assign- 
 ment, the opposite party is thereby concluded. 
 Burrows p. Stryker, 47 Iowa, 477. 
 
 4 See Yeatman v. Yeatman, 7 Ch. D. 210. 
 
 5 Gregory p. Forrester, 1 M'Cord Ch. 325 ; 
 post, ch. 6, § 4. and cases cited. 
 
 6 Att.-Gen. v. Wynne, Mos. 128; Wilsons. 
 Moore, 1 Myl. & K. 126, 142, 337 ; see also 
 Saunders r. Druce, 3 Drew. 140 ; and this has 
 been done in cases of partnership. Bowsher v. 
 Watkins, 1 R. & M. 277 ; Travis v. Milne, 9 
 Hare. 141 ; and see Stainton v. Carron Co.. 18 
 Beav. 146 ; 18 Jur. 137; Harrison v. Righter, 
 11 N. J. Eq. 389, Morley r. White, L. R.8Ch. 
 731 ; Evans v. Evans. 23 N. J. Eq. 71. 
 
 1 Earl Vane p. Rigden, 18 W. R. 308. V. C. 
 M.; L. R. 5 Ch. 663, see, however, S. C, W. 
 N (1870) 210 ; 18 W. R. 1092, L. C. & L. J. 
 James. 
 
 ('<) A trustee's mere refusal to sue does not 
 entitle a cestui que trust to sue in his own name. 
 Sharpe p. San Paulo Brazilian Ry. Co. L. R. 8 
 Ch. 597. So a mere refusal by a legal personal 
 representative to sue for outstanding assets does 
 not, in the absence of special circumstances, 
 justify a residuary legatee, or next of kin, in 
 suing the legal personal representative and the 
 debtor to the estate. Yeatman p. Yeatman, 7 
 Ch. D. 210. When the circumstances enable a 
 cestui que trust to sue in his own name, all the 
 other cestui que trusts should be made defend- 
 ants in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits. 
 Meldrum ». Scorer, 56 L. T. 471. 
 A cestui que trust is not a necessary party to 
 
 a bill by a trustee to foreclose a mortgage. 
 Dodge r. Tulleys, 144 U. S. 451. In England, 
 see Goldsmid r. Stonehewer, 9 Hare App. 38 ; 
 Francis p. Harrison. 43 Ch. D. 183; Griffith »•. 
 Pound 45 Ch. D. 553; Mills v. Jennings, 13 
 Ch. D. 639. In Wave]] v Mitchell, 64 L. T. 
 560 ; \V. N. (1891) 86, the cestui que trusts were 
 held to ho sufficiently represented, in a foreclo- 
 sure action, bv the trustees, for the purpose of 
 taking the accounts against the mortgagees. In 
 general, the trustee, as plaintiff, sufficiently 
 represents the estate, and the cestui que trusts 
 are not necessary parties when the suit does not 
 involve their relations to each other. Re 
 Frewen, Frewen v. Frewen, 60 L. T. 953 ; Re 
 
 195
 
 201 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 such a suit cannot be maintained without the personal representative 
 being a party, 8 even if he has actually released his interest in the prop- 
 erty. 9 But it seems that a specific legatee, suing trustees for his 
 legacy, need not make the executor a party, if he alleges that he has 
 his assent. 10 And so it has been held, that an administratrix of an 
 intestate, although she had assigned his interest in a partnership con- 
 cern to his next of kin, was the proper person to file a bill against the 
 surviving partners to have the partnership accounts taken. u 
 
 Where a testator, having been resident in India, where all his prop- 
 erty was, died there, having made a will, whereby be bequeathed 
 * 201 the residue of his estate to persons resident in this country,* but 
 appointed persons in India his executors, who proved the will 
 there, and remitted the proceeds to their agent in this country, it was 
 held, that the residuary legatees could not maintain a suit against the 
 agent, without having a representative to the testator in England, before 
 the Court. 1 
 
 Where a claim on property in dispute would vest in the personal 
 representative of a deceased person, and there is no general personal 
 representative of that person, an administration, limited to the subject 
 of the suit, was necessary to enable the Court to proceed to a decision 
 on the claim ; but the Court was empowered, by the forty-fourth section 
 of the Act 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, if it thinks fit, to appoint a person in such 
 cases to represent the estate, or to proceed in the absence of any such 
 representative. 
 
 Where, however, the object of the suit is the general administration 
 
 8 Rumney v. Mead, Rep. temp. Finch, 336 ; 
 Griffith v. Bateman, id. 334 ; Att.-Gen. v. 
 Twisden, id. 336; Conway v. Stroud, 2 Freem. 
 188; West v. Randall, 2 Mason, 181. If, how- 
 ever, the executor is an outlaw and cannot be 
 found, the suit may proceed without him. 
 Heath v Percival. 1 P. Wms. 682, 684 ; 2 Eq. 
 Cas. Abr 167, pi. 14 , 630, pi. 2. 
 
 9 Smithby v. Stinton, 1 Vern. 31. 
 
 ™ Smith v. Brooksbank, 7 Sim. 18, 21; see, 
 however. Moor r. Blagrave, 1 Ch. Cas. 277, and 
 observations on this case in Smith v. Brooks- 
 bank. 
 
 11 Clegg v. Fishwick, 1 M'N. & G. 294, 299; 
 12 Jur 993. And see where the uncollected 
 
 Bnwen, Andrew v. Cooper, 45 Ch. D. 444 ; 
 Rand v. Walker. 117 U. S. 340; Vetterlein v. 
 Barnes, 124 U. S. 169 ; McArthur v. Scott, 113 
 U. S. 340 ; Vetterlein v. Barker, 45 Fed. Rep. 
 741 ; Smith v. Portland, 30 Fed. Rep. 734 ; 
 Hickox v. Elliott, 10 Sawyer, 415 ; Ashton v. 
 Atlantic Bank, 3 Allen, 217 ; Boyden v. Par- 
 tridge, 2 Gray, 190 ; Jewett v Tucker, 139 
 Mass. 566 ; Northampton National Bank v. 
 Crafts, 145 Mass. 444 ; Adams v. Bradley, 12 
 Mich. 346 ; Barrett v. Brown, 86 N. C. 556 ; 
 Warren v. Howard, 99 N. C. 190 ; Waring v. 
 Turton, 44 Md. 535 ; Van Bokkelen v. Tinges, 
 
 196 
 
 debts were divided among the distributees by 
 decree of Court. Pennington v. McWhirter, 8 
 Humph. 130. 
 
 i Logan v. Fairlie, 2 S. & S. 284 ; Christian 
 v. Devereux, 12 Sim. 264 ; Partington v. Att.- 
 Gen., L. R. 4 H. L. 150; Re Commercial Bank 
 Co. L. R. 5 Ch. 314 ; but see Fames v. Hacon, 
 16 Ch. D. 407 ; 18 Ch. D. 347. See Campbell 
 v. Wallace, 10 Gray, 162 ; Campbell v. Sheldon, 
 13 Pick. 8 ; Story, Conf. Laws, § 513, and notes, 
 § 514 b. ; Story, Eq. PI. § 179. Executors re- 
 siding abroad, or who have never acted on the 
 estate, are not necessarily made parties to the 
 suit. Clifton v. Haig, 4 Desaus. 330; Story, Eq. 
 PI § 179. 
 
 58 Md. 53; Newark Savings Inst. v. Jones, 35 
 N. J. Eq. 406; Tyson v. Applegate, 49 id. 305; 
 Brokaw v. Brokaw, 41 id. 215 ; Swift v. Steb- 
 bins, 4 Stew. & Port. 447 ; Collins v. Loftus 
 (10 Leigh, 5), 34 Am. Dec. 719, note; Tucker 
 v. Zimmerman, 61 Ga 599 ; Hill v. Durand, 50 
 Wis. 354 ; Wier v. Simmons, 55 Wis. 637: Biron 
 v Scott, 80 Wis. 206 ; post, p. 223. In a suit 
 to defeat the trust in whole or in part, the trus- 
 tee is the only necessary defendant when the 
 cestui que tr-usts are bound bj r his acts. Ibid.; 
 Kerrison v Stewart, 93 U. S. 155. 
 
 1
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. * 202 
 
 of the estate, a general personal representative is always necessary ; a 
 and the Court will not proceed in such a suit when the estate is only 
 represented by an administrator ad litem; 3 nor appoint a person to 
 represent the estate under the section above referred to, 4 and a general 
 personal representative is a necessary party to a suit against an execu- 
 tor or administrator de son tort. 5 
 
 When the object of the suit is only to bind the estate, it is sufficiently 
 represented by an administrator ad litem ; 6 and, as a general proposi- 
 tion, an administrator ad litem represents the estate to the extent of the 
 authority which the letters of administration purport to confer; 7 and 
 where a limited administration has been granted, and general letters 
 of administration are afterwards granted, the general administrator is 
 bound by the proceedings in a cause in which the estate was 
 represented by a limited administrator. 8 * The Attorney-General * 202 
 does not represent the estate of a deceased illegitimate person, 
 so as to dispense with the necessity of a personal representative. 1 
 
 A person, to whom letters of administration have been granted as 
 attorney for a person abroad, represents the estate of the deceased. 2 (a) 
 
 The power of the Court to appoint a person to represent the estate of 
 a deceased person is only intended to be acted on when there is a diffi- 
 
 2 Penny v. Watts, 2 Phil. 149, 153 ; Donald 
 r. Bather, 16 Beav. 26 ; Barber v. Walker, W. 
 N. (1867) 127; 15 W. K. 728, L. JJ. ; Rowsel 1 
 V. Morris, L. R. 17 Eq. 20 ; Re Lovett, Ambler 
 v. Lindsay, 3 Ch. D. 198; Dowdeswell v. 
 Dowdeswe"ll, 9 Ch. D. 294. 
 
 8 Croft v. Waterton, 13 Sim. 653 ; but see 2 
 Phil. 552 ; Groves v. Levi, or Groves v. Lane, 
 9 Hare App. 47; 16 Jur. 1061 ; and see Wood- 
 house v. Woodhouse, L. R 8 Eq. 514, V. C. S. 
 If necessary for the protection of the estate, a 
 bill praying an injunction and receiver maybe 
 filed, although there is no personal representa- 
 tive. Steer v. Steer, 13 W. R. 235, V. C. K. ; 
 2 Dr. & Sm. 311; but see Spencer v. Shaw. W. 
 N. (1875) 115. A bill filed before administra- 
 tion to protect the assets is demurrable, if it 
 asks an account. Rawlings v. Lambert, 1 J. & 
 H. 458 ; Overington v. Ward, 34 Beav. 175 ; 
 Blaekettv. Blackctt, W. N. (1871)65; 19 W. 
 R. 559. 
 
 4 Groves v. Levi, supra; Silver v. Stein, 1 
 Drew. 295 ; 9 Hare App. 82 ; James v. Aston, 
 2 Jur. N. S. 224 ; see, however, Maclean v. 
 Dawson, 27 Beav. 21, 369 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 1091 ; 
 Williams v. Page, 27 Beav. 373. 
 
 6 Penny v. Watts, 2 Phil. 149, 153; Creasor 
 
 v. Robinson, 14 Beav. 589 ; 15 Jur. 1049 ; 
 Beardmore v. Gregory, 2 H. & M. 491; 11 Jur. 
 N. S. 363 ; Cary v. Hills, L. R. 15 Eq. 79 ; 
 contra, Cleland v. Cleland, Prec. Ch. 64 ; Coote 
 v. Whittington, L. R. 16 Eq. 534 ; and see 
 Cooke v. Gittings, 21 Beav. 497. 
 
 6 Ellice v. Goodson, 2 Coll. 4 ; Davis v. 
 Chanter, 2 Phil. 545, 549 ; Devaynes v. Robin- 
 son, 24 Beav. 97, 98; 3 Jur. N." S. 707, 708 ; 
 Maclean v. Dawson, 27 Beav. 21, 369 ; 5 Jur. 
 N. S. 1091 ; Williams v. Allen, 10 W. R. 512, 
 L. JJ.; 4 De G. F. & J. 71 ; overruling S. C. 
 29 Beav. 292 , 8 Jur. N. S. 276. 
 
 7 Faulkner v. Daniel, 3 Hare, 199, 207 ; 
 Davis v. Chanter, supra ; Williams v. Allen, 
 32 Beav. 650 ; Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, L. K. 
 8 Eq. 514, V. C. S. 
 
 8 Davis v. Chanter, supra ; and Harris v. 
 Milburn, 2 Hagg. 64, referred to, 2 Phil. 552. 
 So, where the revivor was under a statute 
 against the heirs of the decedent. Anderson v. 
 McRoberts, 1 Tenn. Ch. 279. 
 
 i Bell v. Alexander, 6 Hare, 543, 545. 
 
 2 Chambers v. Bicknell, 2 Hare, 536; and 
 see Webb v. Kirby, 7 De G. M. & G. 376 ; 3 
 Jur. N. S. 73. 
 
 (a) The legal personal representative ap- 
 pointed by the forum of a deceased person's 
 domicil is entitled to the deceased's personal 
 estate received through any letters of adminis- 
 tration, and the next of kin cannot make any 
 claim against the estate except through his in- 
 
 tervention. Eames v. Hacon, 16 Cb. D. 407 ; 
 18 id. 347. 
 
 Foreign creditors are entitled to the same 
 dividends with English creditors in the adminis- 
 tration of the English estate of a deceased per- 
 son domiciled abroad. Re Kloebe, 28 Ch. D.175. 
 
 197
 
 203 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 culty, either from insolvency or some other cause, in obtaining repre- 
 sentation to a deceased party; 3 and it is always in the discretion of the 
 Court whether it will act on the power; 4 and where there are real 
 litigating parties before the Court, but it happens that one of the class 
 interested is not represented, if the Court sees that there are other 
 persons present who bona fide represent the interest of those absent, it 
 may allow that interest to be represented; but it will not allow the 
 whole adverse interest to be represented, 5 and a representative of the 
 estate will not be appointed; where the estate of the deceased person is 
 that which is being administered in the suit, where the interest of the 
 deceased person is adverse to that of the plaintiff, or where this represen- 
 tative of the deceased person has active duties to perform. 6 The 
 power of the Court will be acted on where the estate to be represented 
 is sought to be made liable ; 7 and pending proceedings in the Probate 
 Court, a representative has been appointed ; 8 and where the next of kin 
 refused, or after notice neglected, to take out administration; 9 and 
 where the executor, who had proved the will in India, refused to prove 
 it in England; 10 and where it was uncertain whether the person whose 
 estate was to be represented, and who was a necessary party to the suit, 
 and beneficially interested, was dead or alive, 11 and where the dead 
 person was the plaintiff who had died before judgment insolvent, and, 
 as far as could be ascertained, intestate. 12 Where there are other per- 
 sons parties to the suit in the same interest as the deceased party, it is 
 
 conceived that the Court will, generally, permit the suit to pro- 
 *203 ceed without any representative *of the estate of such party; 1 
 
 so, also, when the deceased person was an accounting party, and 
 without any beneficial interest, and died insolvent; 2 and in a partner- 
 
 8 Long v. Storie, Kay App. 12; and see 
 Joint Stock Discount Co. v. Brown, L. R. 8 
 Eq. 376, V. C. J. 
 
 * Tarratt v. Llovd, 2 Jur. N. S. 371, V. 
 C. W. 
 
 5 Gibson v. Wills, 21 Beav. 620; and see 
 Hewitson v. Todhunter, 22 L. J. Ch. 76, V. C. 
 S.; Meades v. Guedalla, 10 W. R. 485, V. C. 
 W. ; Re Joint Stock Discount Co., Fyfe's Case, 
 17 W. R. 870, M. R. 
 
 6 Moore v. Morris, L. R. 13 Eq. 139. 
 
 i Dean and Chapter of Ely v. Gayford, 16 
 Beav. 561 ; Joint Stock Discount Co. v. Brown, 
 L. R. 8 Eq. 376, V. C. J.; and see Re Ranking, 
 L. H. 6 Eq. 601, V. C. G. 
 
 8 Hele v. Lord Bexley, 15 Beav. 340 ; Rob- 
 ertson p, Kimble, W. N."(1867) 305, M. R. 
 
 9 Tarratt v. Lloyd, supra : Ashmall v. Wood, 
 1 Jur. N. S. 1130* V. C. S.; Davies v. Boul- 
 cott, 1 Dr. & Sm. 23 ; see also Swallow v. Binns, 
 9 Hare App. 47; 17 Jur. 295; Haw v. Vickers, 
 1 W. R. 242. 
 
 i° Sutherland v. De Virenne, 2 Jur. N. S. 
 301, V. C. S.; see also Bliss v. Putnsun, 29 
 Beav. 20; 7 Jur. N. S. 12. 
 
 11 Mortimer v. Mortimer, 11 W. R. 740. 
 
 198 
 
 12 Wingrove v. Thompson, 11 Ch. D. 419. 
 
 i Abrev v. Newman, 10 Hare App. 58; 17 
 Jur. 153; Cox v. Tavlor, 22 L. J. Ch. 910, V. 
 C. K.; Kucker v. Scholelield, 7 L. T. N. S. 
 504, V. C. VV.; Twynam v. Porter, VV. N. 
 (1869) 228, V.C.J.; and see Bessant v. No- 
 ble, 26 L. T. Ch. 236, L. C. In Tarratt v. 
 Lloyd, supra, however, the Court appointed a 
 representative. 
 
 2 Chaffers v. Headlam, 9 Hare App. 46; 
 Magnay v. Davidson, id. 82: Band v. Randle, 
 2 W. R. 331, V. C. W.; Rogers v. Jones, 1 
 Sm. & G. 17, 19; 16 Jur. 968; Leycester r. 
 Norris, 10 Jur. N. S. 1173; 13 W. R. 201, 
 V. C. K. ; but see Cox 9. Stephens, 9 Jur. N. S. 
 1144, 1145; 11 W. R. 929, V. C. K See also, 
 Ashmall v. Wood, supra, where in a similar 
 case a person was appointed to represent a 
 deceased party; and see Whittington v. Good- 
 ing, 10 Hare App. 29. In Miles v. Hawkins, 1 
 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 366, which was a simi- 
 lar case before the Act, an objection for want 
 of parties was overruled ; see also Goddard 
 v. Haslam, 1 Jur. N. S. 251, V. C. W.; and 
 Madox v. Jackson, 3 Atk. 406.
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. 
 
 204 
 
 ship suit where the deceased party was the mortgagee of a partner's 
 share, but had been paid off and died insolvent. 3 
 
 The power of the Court to appoint a person to represent the estate, 
 or to proceed without a representative, will not be acted upon when the 
 absent person would have to be active in the execution of the decree 
 which the Court is called upon to make; 4 nor where the whole adverse 
 interest is unrepresented; 5 nor where the general administration of the 
 estate to be represented is sought; 6 nor where the deceased was an 
 accounting party ; 7 nor where there is personal responsibility attached 
 to the position; 8 nor will the Court direct money to be paid to a per- 
 son appointed under this section. 9 
 
 The 44th section of the Act expressly extends to other proceedings, 
 as well as suits ; 10 and it has accordingly been held that it applies 
 to special cases and petitions. 11 The proper person to be 
 * appointed under this section is the person who would be ap- * 204 
 pointed administrator ad litem; 1 but the Court will not appoint 
 a person against his will. 2 It would seem that the plaintiff may apply 
 for, and obtain, an order under the 44th section on motion, without 
 serving the other parties to the cause or proceeding; 3 but notice must 
 be given to the person entitled to take out administration to the 
 deceased party ; 4 the Court, can, however, make the order at the 
 
 8 Williams v. Poole, 21 W. R. 252. See 
 also Hay ward V. Pile, L. R.7 Ch. 634; Colliss 
 v. Hector. L. R. 19 Eq. 334, 337. 341; Hobbs v. 
 Reid, W. N. (1876) 95, Curtius C.Caledonian 
 Ins. Co. 19 Ch. D. 534; Crossley v. Glasgow Life 
 Ass. Co. 4 Ch D. 421 ; Webster v. British Em- 
 pire M. L. Ass. Co. 15 Ch. D. 169. Before the 
 late Act, in some cases, when it has appeared 
 at the hearing of a cause that the personal 
 representative of a deceased person, not a party 
 to the suit, ought to be privy to the proceedings 
 under a decree, but that no question could 
 arise as to the rights of such representative, the 
 Court has, on the hearing, made a decree, 
 directing proceedings before one of the Masters 
 of the Court, without requiring the representa- 
 tive to be made a party by amendment or other- 
 wise, an'l has given leave to the parties in the 
 suit to bring a representative before the Master, 
 on taking the accounts or other proceedings 
 directed by the decree. Ld. Red. 178. 
 
 4 Fowler v Bayldon, 9 Hare App. 78. 
 
 6 Cox v. Stephens, 9 Jur. N. S. 1144, 1145; 
 11 W. R. 929, V. O.K.; Gibson v. Wills, 21 
 Beav. 620 ; and see Vacy v. Vacy, 1 L. T. N. S. 
 267. V. C. W. 
 
 6 Groves v. Levi or Lane, 9 Hare App. 27; 
 10 Jur. 1011; Silver v. Stem, 1 Drew. 295; 9 
 Hare App. 82; James v. Ashton, 2 Jur. N. S. 
 224, V. C. W.; Bruiton ». Birch, 22 L. J. Ch. 
 911, V. C K.; Williams v. Page, 27 Beav. 
 373; Maclean v. Dawson, 27 Beav. 21, 369; 
 5 Jur. N. S. 1091. 
 
 7 Rowland c. Evans, 33 Beav. 202. 
 
 8 Re Joint Stock Discount Co., Fyfe's Case, 
 17 W R. 870, M. R. 
 
 9 Bvain v. Sutton, 19 Beav. 646; Rawli' s 
 V. M'Mahon, 1 Drew. 225; 9 Hare App. 82; 
 Jones v. Foulkes, 10 W. R. 55, V. C. K. 
 
 i° See 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 44. 
 
 11 Swallow v. Binns, 9 Hare App. 47; 17 
 Jur. 295; Ex parte Cramer, 9 Hare App. 47; 
 Hewitson v. Todhunter, 22 L. J. Ch. 76, V. C. 
 S. ; re Ranking, L. R. 6 Eq. 601, V. C. G. ; and 
 see post, Chap. XXXV. § 3; Petitions, and 
 Chap. XVIII., special case. 
 
 i Dean of Ely v. Gayford, 16 Beav. 561 ; 
 and see Hele v. Lord Bexley, 15 Beav. 340; 
 Ashmall v. Wood, 1 Jur. N. S. 1130. V. C S.; 
 Sutherland v. De Virenne, 2 Jur. N. S. 301, 
 V. C. S , where the Court appointed the execu- 
 tor who had not proved; see also Mortimer r. 
 Mortimer, 11 W. R. 740, M. R. ; Shallow v. 
 Binns, 9 Hare App. 47; 17 Jur. 295: Hewitson 
 v. Todhunter. 22 L. J. 76, V C S. ; Robertson 
 v. Kemble, W. N. (1867) 305. M. R. 
 
 2 Prince of Wales Association v. Palmer, 25 
 Beav. 605; Hill v. Bonner, 26 Beav. 372. Long 
 v. Storie, Kay App. 12; Whiteaves v. Melville, 
 
 5 W. R. 676, V. C. W.; Joint Stock' Discount 
 Co. v. Brown, L. R. 8 Eq. 376, 380, V. C. J.; 
 Colliss v. Hector, L. R. 19 Eq. 334. V. C H. 
 
 3 2 Seton, 1534; Davies t>. B uilcott, 1 Dr. 
 
 6 Sm. 23; see, however, contra, Chaffers v. 
 Headhim, 9 Hare App. 46. 
 
 4 Davies v. Boulcott, supra ,• Tarratt v. 
 Lloyd, 2 Jur. N. S. 371, V. C. W. ; Joint 
 Stock Discount Co. v. Brown, L. R. 8 Eq. 376, 
 
 199
 
 * 205 OP PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 hearing. 5 No appearance is required to be entered by the party 
 appointed ; but notice of his appointment, and of the name and address 
 of' the solicitor who will act for him, should be given to the Record and 
 Writ Clerk, 6 for the purpose of service; and the order should be pro- 
 duced to him for entry. 7 
 
 Under the Court of Probate Act, 1857 and 1858, the Court of Probate 
 has power, pending litigation as to the validity of a will, or the right 
 to administration, to appoint an administrator, who has all the powers 
 of a general administrator, except the power of distributing the estate, 
 but who is to act under the direction of the Court of Probate; 8 and the 
 same Statute also enables the Court of Probate, in certain cases, where 
 necessary or convenient, to appoint any person either general or limited 
 administrator to a deceased person. 9 If, at the expiration of twelve 
 calendar months from the death of any testator or intestate, the execu- 
 tor or administrator, to whom probate or administration has been 
 granted, is then residing out of the jurisdiction, the Court of Probate 
 may, upon the application of any creditor, next of kin or legatee, grant 
 a special administration, limited " for the purpose to become and 
 
 * 205 be made a party to a bill or bills to be exhibited against him * in 
 
 any of her Majesty's Courts of Equity, and to carry the decree 
 or decrees of any of the said Courts into effect, and not further or 
 otherwise ; " and it has also been enacted, that the Court of Equity in 
 which such suit shall be depending, may appoint (if it shall be need- 
 ful) any person or persons to collect in any outstanding debts or 
 effects due to such estate, and to give discharges for the same; such 
 persons or person giving security, in the usual manner, duly to account 
 for the same. The Paymaster-General, 1 or the Secretary or Deputy 
 Secretary of the Bank of England, is enabled to transfer, and the Bank 
 is to suffer a transfer to be made, of any stock belonging to the estate of 
 such deceased person, into the name of the Paymaster-General, in trust 
 for such purposes as the Court shall direct in any suit to which the 
 person to whom such administration has been granted is a party; but 
 if the executor or administrator, capable of acting as such, returns 
 to and resides within the jurisdiction of the Court pending such suit, 
 such execut r or administrator is to be made party to such suit; and 
 the costs incurred by granting such administration, and by proceeding 
 against such special administrator, are to be paid by such person or 
 persons, or out of such fund, as the Court directs. Where an infant is 
 
 V C J. Where, after decree, the representa- e. 78). Where a representative is thus ap- 
 
 tion is required for the purpose of accounts or pointed of the estate of a deceased party to the 
 
 inquiries at Chambers, the application for the cause, the title of the cause is corrected by 
 
 order may be made there by ex parte summons. introducing, after the deceased's name, " since 
 
 For forms of orders dispensing with and appoint- deceased, and also A. B. appointed by order, 
 
 ing representatives, see Hele v. Lord Bexley, dated day of 188—, to represent his 
 
 15 Beav. 340 ; 2 Seton, 1531, 1532. For forms, estate." Ibid. 
 
 see Vol. III. 8 20 & 21 Vic. c. 77, § 70; 21 & 22 Vic. 
 
 5 Hewitson v. Todlmnter, 22 L. J. Ch. 76, c. 95, § 22: and see Veret v. Duprez, L. R. 6 
 V. C. S.; Mendes v. Guedalla, 10 W. R. 485, Eq. 329. V . C. M. ; Tichborne v. Tichborne, L. R. 
 V. C. W. 1P.& D. 730. 
 
 6 Now at the Central Office. 9 20 & 21 Vic. c. 77, § 73. 
 i Braithwaite's Prac. 561; (see 42 & 43 Vic. 1 35 & 36 Vic. c. 44, § 4. 
 
 200 

 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. * 20G 
 
 sole executor, administration with the will annexed must be granted to 
 the guardian of such infant, or to such other person as the Court of 
 Probate shall think fit, until such infant shall have attained the full age 
 of twenty-one years; at which period, and not before, probate of the 
 will is to be granted to him. And the person to whom such adminis- 
 tration is granted is to have the same powers vested in him as an 
 administrator has, by virtue of an administration granted to him 
 durante minore cetate of the next of kin. 2 And now, by the "Court of 
 Probate Act, 1858," such limited administration may be granted, 
 whether it be or be not intended to institute proceedings in the Court 
 of Chancery. 8 
 
 In some cases, where the trustee has had no beneficial interest in the 
 property, and was not possessed of a legal estate which he could set up 
 at law to the annoyance of the defendant in Equity, the rule which 
 requires that the trustees, or other persons having the legal estate in 
 the thing demanded, should in all cases be before the Court, has been 
 dispensed with, and the Court has permitted bills to be filed by the 
 cestui que trusts without making such trustee a party, the cestui que 
 trusts undertaking for him that he shall conform to such decree as the 
 Court shall make. 4 
 
 * Where, although new trustees of a settlement had been duly *206 
 appointed, the trust property had not been assigned or trans- 
 ferred to them, they were held necessary parties to a suit for carrying 
 the trusts of the settlement into execution. 1 But, where a bill was 
 filed to carry the trusts of a will into execution, whereby, amongst 
 other things, lands were limited to trustees for a term of years, to raise 
 a sum of money by way of portions for younger children, two of which 
 younger children had assigned their shares of the sum to be raised to a 
 trustee for the benefit of the others, but which last trustee was not 
 before the Court; it was considered that as the trustees of the term who 
 had the legal estate, and all the children who had the beneficial inter- 
 est, were parties, there was no occasion to make the other trustee a 
 party.' 2 And, where a man had executed a deed, providing, in case of 
 his death, for a woman and her children, and had deposited it in the 
 hands of an attorney for the benefit of all parties, but afterwards pro- 
 cured possession of it himself, it was held, on demurrer, that the 
 woman and her children could maintain a suit to compel him to deliver 
 up the deed, without making the attorney with whom it was deposited, 
 and against whom no breach of trust was alleged, a party. 8 ( a) 
 
 2 38 Geo. III. c. 87; 20 & 21 Vic. c. 77, § 74, Re Grant, 1 P. D. 435; Pinney v. Hunt, 6 Ch. 
 and 21 & 22 Vic. c. 95, § 18 ; see 36 & 37 Vic. D. 98 ; Bradford v. Young, 26 Ch. I). 656. 
 
 c. 60; §§ 16, 31, 76; 38 & 39 Vic. c. 77; Collas * Kirk v. Clark, Prec. in Ch. 275. 
 
 v. Hesse, 12 W. R. 565, V. C. K.; Dickens v. 1 Nelson v. Seaman, 1 De G. F. & J. 368; 
 
 Harris, W. N. (1866) 93, V. C. S. 6 Jur. N. S. 258. 
 
 3 21 & 22 Vic. c. 95, § 18. See Re Ruddy, 2 Head v. Ld. Teynham, 1 Cox, 57. 
 L. R 2 P. & D. 330; Re Jenkins, 28 \V. R. 431 ; 3 Knye v. Moore, 1 S. & S. 61, 64. 
 
 (t) A married woman may give a valid charge against her separate estate thus acquired, 
 
 charge on her expectancy as heir or under the the trustees under the will are not necessary 
 
 will of a living person ; and if, after such per- parties thereto. Flower v. Buller, 15 Ch. D. 
 
 sou's death, a suit is brought to enforce such 665. 
 
 201
 
 * 207 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 For the same reason, although, as we have seen, 4 the assignor of a 
 chose in action is a necessary party to a suit by the assignee, yet the 
 assignee of an equitable interest in the nature of a chose in action may 
 maintain a suit for the assertion of that interest without bringing the 
 assignor before the Court; 5 and where such an interest has been settled 
 upon trust, a cestui que trust may sue for its recovery without joining 
 the trustees as co-plaintiffs. 6 
 
 The principle that the person having the legal, as well as the person 
 having the equitable right to sue should be before the Court, applies to 
 all persons who had legal demands against the defendant arising out of 
 the same master; thus, as an assignee of a lease may be sued for non- 
 performance of the covenants both by the lessor and the original lessee 
 from whom he derives title, neither the lessor nor lessee will be per- 
 mitted to institute proceedings against him in respect of his covenants, 
 without having the other before them, in order that the rights of both 
 may be settled at the same time. 7 
 
 * 207 * The rule which requires all persons having a similar right to 
 
 sue with that of the plaintiff to be brought before the Court, does 
 not apphy to a bill filed by the last indorsee of a bill of exchange which 
 has been lost, against the acceptor; in which case it has been held that 
 neither the drawer 1 nor the prior indorsers are necessary parties ; 2 
 because, in such cases, the ground of the application to a Court of 
 Equity is the loss of the instrument; and relief is only given upon the 
 terms of the plaintiff giving the defendant ample security against being 
 called upon again by the drawer or indorsers, in case they should 
 become possessed of the instrument. 8 And it seems also that the 
 drawer is not a necessary party, where a suit is instituted by an acceptor 
 against the holder of a bill of exchange which is forthcoming, for the 
 purpose of having it delivered up. 4 
 
 The principle that persons having co-existent rights with the plain- 
 tiff to sue the defendant must be brought before the Court in all cases 
 where the subject-matter of the right is to be litigated in Equity, 
 
 4 Ante, p. 198. original lessee were not parties, the Lord Chan- 
 
 5 Blake v. Jone«, 3 Anst. 651 ; Cator v. cellor said, that to make the proceedings unex- 
 Croydon Canal Co. 4 Y. & C. Ex. 405, 419; 8 ceptionable, it would be very proper to have 
 Jur. 277, L. C; Padwick v. Piatt, 11 Beav. 503; them before the Court, for that it did not ap- 
 Fulham v. M'Carthy, 1 H L. Cas. 703; Bag- pear to him but that the plaintiff might have 
 shaw v. Eastern Union Ry. Co. 7 Hare. 114; 13 had a satisfaction at law against the executors, 
 Jur. 602; affirmed. 2Mac.&G. 389; 14 Jur. 491; and, if so, the plaintiff's equity will be their 
 Sayles p. Tibbitts, 5 R. I. 79. See New Mexico equity. Sainstry v. Grainmer, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 
 Land Co. v. Elkins, 20 Fed Rep. 545. 165, c 6. The same objection was allowed in 
 
 6 Piggott v. Stewart, W. N. (1875) 69. City of London v. Richmond, 2 Vern. 421; 1 
 
 7 Where a man granted a lease of houses Bro P. C. ed. Toml. 516, which was also the 
 for thirty years to B, who covenanted to keep case of a bill against the assignee of a lease, for 
 them in good repair, and died having be- payment of rent and performance of covenants. 
 queathed the term to his wife, and afterwards ! Davies v. Dodd, 4 Price, 176. 
 
 by mesne assignments the term became vested 2 Macartney r. Graham, 2 Sim. 285. 
 
 in a pauper, but the houses becoming out of 3 Respecting the jurisdiction in cases of 1 'st 
 
 repair and the rent in arrear. a bill was brought notes and bills, see 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 85. 86. 
 
 by the lessor against the assignee for repairs 4 Earle v. Holt, 5 Hare, 180, see, however, 
 
 and an account of the arrears of rent; upon an Penfold v. Nunn, 5 Sim. 405. 
 
 objection being taken, that the executors of the 
 
 202
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. * 208 
 
 applies equally to cases where another person has a right to sue, for 
 the same matter in Equity; in such cases the defendant is equally 
 entitled to insist that the person possessing such right should be 
 brought before the Court before any decree is pronounced, in order that 
 such right may be bound by the decree. 6 Thus, where a bill was filed 
 by a vicar against a sequestrator for an account of the profits of a bene- 
 fice, received during its vacation, it appears to have been thought by 
 the Court that the bishop ought to have been a party to the suit, 
 because the sequestrator * was accountable to him for what he * 208 
 had received; 1 and, on the other hand, where a bill was filed by 
 a bishop and a sequestrator against an occupier for an account of tithes 
 during the lunacy of the incumbent, who had been found a lunatic 
 under a commission, it was held that the incumbent or his committee 
 ought to have been a party. 2 It seems, however, that where a living is 
 under sequestration for debt, the incumbent may maintain a suit for 
 tithes without making the sequestrator or the bishop a party. 8 Upon 
 the same principle, where a suit is instituted on behalf of a lunatic 
 either by the Attorney-General or his committee, the lunatic himself 
 must in general be a co-plaintiff, because he may recover his senses, 
 and would not be bound by the decree. 4 
 
 In the above cases, the person required to be a party had a concur- 
 rent right with the plaintiff in the whole subject of the suit; the same 
 rule, however, applies where he has only a concurrent right in a portion 
 of it; thus, where there are two joint-tenants for life, and one of them 
 exhibits a bill, the other must be a party, unless the bill shows that he 
 is dead, 5 and where a bill is brought for a partition, either by joint- 
 tenants or tenants in common, as mutual conveyances are decreed, all 
 persons necessary to make such conveyances must, except as hereafter 
 stated, be parties to the suit; 6 and where one tenant in common had 
 granted a lease of his share for a long term of years, the lessee was 
 held to be a necessary party to the suit, at the expense, nevertheless, 
 of his lessor, who was to be responsible for his costs. 7 («) Where, how- 
 
 5 See Shields v. Thomas, 18 How. U. S. this rule seems to have been disregarded. Pout, 
 
 253 p. 213, note. Where A, B, and C were joint 
 
 1 Jones v. Barrett, Bunb. 192. lessees under the City of London, and A and 
 
 2 Bishop of London v. Nichols, Bunb. 141. B brought a bill against the lessors to have 
 8 This appears to have been the opinion of certain allowances out of the rent, and it ap- 
 
 Lord Lyndhurst C. B. in Warrington v. Sadler, peared upon the hearing that C. was living, an 
 
 Younge, 283, where a decree was made in a objection, because he was not a party to the bill 
 
 suit by a vicar for tithes, although the vicarage was allowed. Stafford v. City of London, 1 P. 
 
 w:is under sequestration, and the occupiers had Wms. 428; 1 Stra 95. 
 
 actually paid certain alleged mod uses to the 6 Anon., 3 Swan. 139, n. (2); Brasher v. 
 
 sequestrator. Macey, 3 J. J. Marsh. 93 ; see 31 & 32 Vic. c. 40 ; 
 
 4 See ante, pp. 9, 82, Gorhain 0. Gorham, 3 3!) & 40 Vic. c. 17; Braker v. Devereaux, 8 
 Barb. Ch. 24. Paige, 513. Every person interested in land be? 
 
 5 Haycock v. Haycock, 2 Ch. Cas. 124; longing to co-tenants should be made party to a 
 Weston w. Keighley, Rep. temp. Finch, 82. bid for partition. Borah v. Archers, 7 Dana, 176. 
 But see Piatt v. Squire, 12 Met. 494, in which 7 Cornish v Gest, 2 Cox, 27. 
 
 (a) See Borden v. Curtis, 46 N. J. Eq. 468; 33 id. 205. The widow and administratrix of 
 
 Dupuy v. Strong, 37 N. Y. 372; McCrea V. a tenant in common of land i< a proper party 
 
 New York El. R. Co. 13 Daly, 302; Howth V. to a suit against a railroad corporation for injury 
 
 Owens, 29 Fed. Rep. 722; Connolly v. Wells, to the land and an injunction. Shepard V. Mau- 
 
 203
 
 * 210 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 ever, three out of forty -seven tenants in common filed a bill for an 
 injunction to restrain the digging of stone on the common property, a 
 demurrer for want of parties was overruled ; 8 and where a tenant in 
 common had demised his share for a long term of years, it was 
 *209 *held that the termor for years was entitled to file a bill for a 
 partition against the other tenants in common, to endure during 
 the term, without bringing the reversioner of the share demised before 
 the Court; 1 and so, it seems, where one of the parties is only tenant 
 for life, he may maintain a suit for a partition without the party 
 entitled in remainder, who is not in esse. 2. 
 
 Where the object of a suit is to ascertain boundaries, the Court will 
 not entertain it without having the remainder-men and all parties 
 interested before it. 3 
 
 It is not in general necessary, in questions relating to real property, 
 that the occupying tenants under leases should be parties, unless their 
 concurrence is necessary, as in the case above referred to of the lessee 
 of a tenant in common; or unless the object of the suit is to restrain 
 an ejectment brought against them instead of against their landlord; as 
 in Lawletj v. Waldon,* in which Lord Eldon allowed a demurrer for 
 want of parties to a bill by the owner of an estate, to restrain an action 
 of ejectment against his tenant without making him a party, observing, 
 however, that if the plaintiff in Equity had been made a defendant at 
 Law, as he might have been, he should not have thought it necessary 
 to make the tenant a party to the bill, notwithstanding his being a 
 co-defendant; but that, as he was the only defendant at Law, he must 
 be a party to the bill. 5 
 
 If lessees, or other persons having only limited interests in the prop- 
 erty, seek to establish any right respecting such property, it is neces- 
 sary that they should bring the owners of the inheritance before the 
 Court, in order that, in case the suit is unsuccessful, the decree of the 
 Court dismissing the bill may be binding upon them. Thus, if 
 
 * 210 * a leaseholder brings a bill to establish a right of common, he 
 
 8 Ackroyd v. Briggs, 14 W. E. 25, V. C. S. parties who are before the Court, and those 
 
 i Baring v. Nash, 1 Ves. & B. 551 ; Heaton. whom they virtually represent. 1 Story, Eq. 
 
 v. Dearden. 16 Beav. 147. Jur. 656; Gaskell v. Gaskell, 6 Sim. 643; Wot- 
 
 2 Wills v. Slade, 6 Ves. 498; see also Bras- ton v. Copeland, 7 John. Ch. 140; Striker v. 
 
 sey v. Chalmers, 4 De G. M. & G. 528; 16 Mott, 2 Paige, 387, 389; Woodworth v. Camp- 
 
 Beav. 223. It does not constitute any objec- bell, 5 Paige, 518. 
 
 tion in Equity, that the partition may not 3 Rayley v. Best, 1 R & M. 659; see also 
 
 finally conclude the interests of all persons, as, Miller t. Wannington, 1 J. & W. 484; Speer 
 
 where the partition is asked only by or against v. Crawter, 2 Mer. 410; Att.-Gen. v. Stephens, 
 
 a tenant for life, or where there are contingent 1 K. & J. 724, 1 Jur. N. S 1039; 6 De G. M. 
 
 interests to vest in persons not in esse. For the & G. Ill ; 2 Jur. N. S. 51 ; Story, Eq. PI. § 165. 
 
 Court will still proceed to make partition All the tenants in common should be parties to 
 
 between the parties before the Court, who a suit for adjusting land titles. Pope v. Melone, 
 
 possess competent present interests, such as 2 A. K. Marsh. 239. 
 
 a tenant for life or for years. The partition in 4 3 Swan. 142; Poole v. Marsh, 8 Sim. 528 
 
 such cases, however, is binding only upon those 6 See Story, Eq. PI. § 151. 
 
 hattan Ry. Co. 117 N. Y. 442. One of several J. & H. 139. See Schwoerer v. Boylston Market 
 co-owners of a patent may sue alone to recover Association, 99 Mass. 285; Chapman v. Pitts- 
 profits resulting from its use. Sheehan v. Great burg & S. R. Co. 18 W. Va. 184, Saloy v. Block, 
 Eastern Ry. Co. 16 Ch. D. 59; Dent v. Turpin, 2 136 U. S. 338. 
 " 204
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. * 211 
 
 must bring the persons in whom the fee of his estate is vested 
 before the Court; 1 and so, in a suit in Equity to establish a right to 
 fees in an office, although in an action at Law for such fees it is not 
 necessary to make any person a party but the one who has actually 
 received such fees, yet in Equity it is necessary to have all persons 
 before the Court who have any pretence to a right. 2 
 
 Upon the same principle, where a bill was filed by a lessee against a 
 lord of a manor, and the tenant of a particular house, to have the house, 
 which obstructed the plaintiff's way, pulled down, and to be quieted in 
 the possession of the way for the future, an objection for want of par- 
 ties, on the ground that the plaintiff's lessor was not before the Court, 
 was allowed. 8 
 
 These cases all proceed upon the principle before laid down, namely, 
 that of preventing a defendant from being harassed by a multiplicity of 
 suits for the same thing; in consequence of which principle it is held 
 to be a rule of a Court of Equity, that if you withdraw a question from 
 a Court of Law for the purpose of insisting upon a general right, you 
 must have all the parties before the Court who are necessary to make 
 the determination complete, and to quiet the question. 4 
 
 The application of this rule, however, is strictly confined to cases 
 where the lessee seeks to establish a general right; where he only seeks 
 that which is incidental to his situation as tenant, he need not 
 make his landlord a party. 5 Thus, *a tenant may bring a suit *211 
 to restrain a private nuisance without making the lessor a party, 
 and if the nuisance be of a temporary character, the tenant only can 
 sue; and the lessor cannot himself maintain the suit. 1 The tenant and 
 occupier of a house is liable for the continuance of a nuisance on the 
 premises, 2 even though the nuisance existed before he took possession; 3 
 but in the latter case, notice should be given to him to remove the 
 nuisance before the suit is brought. But where the occupier of lands 
 grants a license to another to do certain acts on the land, and the 
 licensee in doing these, commits a nuisance, the occupier may be made a 
 defendant to a suit to restrain the nuisance. 4 And it would appear 
 that such occupier is a necessary party to a suit in which an injunction 
 is sought, where he is the person who can in future authorize or permit 
 the continuance of the nuisance. 6 (a) 
 
 i Poore v. Clark, 2 Atk. 515; Story, Eq. PI. Jur. N. S. 361; Mott v. Shoolbred, L. R.20Eq. 
 
 § 121. 22; Jones v. Chappell, id. 539; Broder v. Sail- 
 
 2 Pawlet v. Bishop of Lincoln, 2 Atk. 296. lard, 2 Ch. D. 692 ; Cooper v. Crabtree. 19 Ch. 
 
 8 Poore v. Clark, 2 Atk. 515. See Shafto D. 193; 20 id. 589; Rust v. Victoria Graving 
 
 v. Bolckow, 34 Ch. D. 725. Dock Co. 36 Ch. D. 113; Gale on Easements 
 
 4 Poore v. Clark, 2 Atk. 515; see Crews v. (5th ed.), 649, et seq. 
 Burcham, 1 Black, U. S 312. 2 Russell v. Shenton, 3 Q. B. 449; Humph- 
 
 6 See Tooth v. Dean & Chapter of Canter- reys p. Cousins, 25 W. R. 371; Broder v. Sail- 
 bury, 3 Sim. 61. In a suit by parol lessee of lard, 2 Ch. D. 692. 
 
 tithes, the lessor must be joined. See Hen- 8 Gale on Easements (5th ed.) 659; Broder 
 
 ning v. Willis, 3 Wood, 29; 2 Guil. 898, Jack- v. Saillard, 2 Ch. D. 692; House Property Co. 
 
 son v. Benson, McLel. 62; 13 Price, 131, and v. H. P. Horse Nail Co. 29 Ch. D. 190. 
 see Williams v. Jones, Younge, 252, 255. 4 White v. Jameson, L. R. 18 Eq. 303. 
 
 1 Simpson v. Savage, 1 C. B. N. S. 347; 3 6 Hawley v. Steele, 6 Ch. D. 521, 526. 
 
 ("1 Where the lessee of a ferrv taken by mine damages on behalf of himself and his 
 eminent domain, claims an arbitration to deter- lessor, and the Act provides onlv for compensa- 
 
 205
 
 * 212 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 The rule that persons claiming joint interests in an estate cannot 
 sue without making their co-owners parties, applies equally whether 
 the subject-matter of the suit be real or personal property; thus, it has 
 been said that where a legacy is given to two jointly, one cannot sue 
 for it alone ; though, where there are several legacies, each may sue for 
 
 his own. 6 And so, where there are several persons interested as 
 *212 * joint-tenants, 1 or tenants in common, 2 in money secured by 
 
 mortgage, they must all be made parties to a bill to foreclose 
 such mortgage. 8 They need not, however, be co-plaintiffs, and any 
 one of them may bring the suit, making the others defendants. 4 
 
 It has, however, been determined that there can be no redemption or 
 foreclosure unless all the parties interested in the mortgage money are 
 before the Court, and on this ground, a bill by a person entitled in 
 severalty to one-sixth of the mortgage money, to foreclose one-sixth of 
 the estate, was dismissed with costs. 5 The rule thus laid down is now 
 modified by the provision of the late Act enabling trustees, in suits 
 relating to real or personal estate vested in them, to represent the per- 
 
 6 Haycock v. Haycock, 2 Ch. Ca=. 124; but 
 see 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42; 46 & 47 Vic. c. 49, 
 § 4, Scbed. So where a legacy is given to A 
 and B in equal moieties, a bill will lie by A 
 for his moiety, without making B a party to 
 the suit. Hughson c. Cookson, 3 V. & C. 578. 
 
 1 This was so decided by Lord Thurlow, in 
 Lowe v. Morgan, 1 Bro. C. C. 368; and see 
 Stansfield v. Hobson, 16 Beav. 190, where a 
 mortgagee had assigned the money secured by 
 the mortgage to three persons as joint-tenants. 
 In that case bis Lordship appears to have laid 
 a stress upon the circumstance of the parties 
 interested in the money being joint-tenants ; 
 from which it has been inferred that a tenant 
 in severalty or in common might foreclose 
 as to his share, without making the other per- 
 sons interested in the money parties; and a 
 decree to this effect was actually made by Lord 
 Alvanley M. R. in a case where trustees of 
 money belonging to several individuals had 
 laid it out on a mortgage, and afterwards one 
 of the persons entitled to part of the mortgage 
 money filed a bill against the mortgagor and 
 the trustees for his share of the mortgage 
 money, or a foreclosure; which was enter- 
 tains d, although the parties interested in the 
 rest of the money were not before the Court. 
 Montgomerie v. Marquis of Bath, 3 Ves. 560. 
 In Mr. Belt's note (1) to Lowe v. Morgan, 1 
 Bro. C. C. (Perkins's ed.) 368, he submits, that 
 
 tion to the lessor, a Court of Equity has no 
 jurisdiction to stay proceedings so taken out of 
 Court, because the use of the lessor's name is 
 unauthorized. London & Blackwall Ry. Co. v. 
 Cro=s, 31 Ch. D. 354, distinguishing North 
 London Ry. Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 11 
 Q. B. D. 30. When two or more persons join 
 206 
 
 the decision in Montgomerie v. M. of B., uhi 
 supra, is wrong. See Story, Eq. PI. § 201. 
 
 2 Palmer v. Lord Carlisle, 1 S. & S. 423; 
 contra, Montgomerie v. Marquis of Bath, 3 
 Ves. 560; see Cochran v. Goodell, 131 Ma-s. 
 464, Tyson v. Applegate, 40 N. J. Eq. 305; 
 Beebe v. Morris, 56 Ala. 525, Bibb r. Hawley, 
 59 Ala. 403; Boyd v. Jones, 44 Ark. 314. 
 
 3 See Stucker v. Stucker, 3 J. J. Marsh. 
 301; Wing v. Davis, 7 Greenl. 31; Palmer v. 
 Eari of Carlisle, IS & S. 423; Noyes v. 
 Sawyer, 3 Vt. 160; Woodward v. Wood, 19 
 Ala. 213. But where one joint tenant has 
 mortgaged his interests, the other tenants are 
 not necessary parties to a hill to foreclose. 
 Stephen v. Beall, 22 Wall. 329. 
 
 4 Davenport v. James, 7 Hare, 249; Luke v. 
 South Kensington Hotel Co. 11 Ch. D. 121 ; 7 
 id. 789; see Palmer v. Mallet, 36 Ch. D. 411; 
 Messchaert c. Kennedy, 4 McCrary, 133. 
 
 5 The assignee of a note secured by mort- 
 gage has an equitable interest in the mortgage, 
 which a Court of Equity will uphold and 
 protect ; and, therefore, when a bill is brought 
 to foreclose or redeem the mortgage the 
 assignee should be made a party to the suit. 
 Stone v. Locke, 46 Maine, 445. A plaintiff m 
 an attachment suit claiming a lien on a mort- 
 gage debt thereby is a necessary party defend- 
 ant to a bill to foreclose the mortgage. Pine 
 v. Shannon, 30 N. J. Eq. 501. 
 
 as plaintiffs in a suit to restrain a nuisance 
 if. one fails in his proof, the other may still 
 proceed. Umfreville ;•. Johnson, L. R. 10 Ch. 
 580. The lessors and lessees of separate build- 
 ings may join as plaintiffs to enjoin a nuisance 
 injuring all the buildings. Snyder t\ Cabell, 
 29 W. Va. 48: see post, p. 303, and note (a).
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. 
 
 213 
 
 sons beneficially entitled, 6 unless the Court requires such persons to be 
 parties; and the Court has, accordingly, in a redemption suit, dispensed 
 with some of the beneficiaries, though it appears that it will not dis- 
 pense with all. 7 In a foreclosure suit, however, the trustees of the 
 debt, under an assignment for the benefit of creditors, were held suffi- 
 ciently to represent all the creditors. 8 (a) A mortgagor cannot redeem 
 the mortgaged estate without making all those having an equal right to 
 redeem with himself parties to the suit. 9 Thus, 10 where two estates are 
 mortgaged to the same person for securing the same sum of money, and 
 afterwards the equity of redemption of one estate becomes vested 
 in a different person from * the other, the owner of one cannot * 213 
 redeem his part separately. The mortgagee is entitled to insist 
 that the whole of the mortgaged estate shall be redeemed together; 
 and, for this purpose, that all the persons interested in the several 
 estates or mortgages shall be made parties to a bill seeking an account 
 and redemption. 1 
 
 The rule has been extended to cases where a mortgage has been of 
 two distinct estates 2 to the same mortgagee for securing different sums 
 of money ; and it has often been decided that a mortgagee of two sepa- 
 rate estates, upon distinct transactions, from the same mortgagor, is 
 
 6 15 & 16 Vic. c. 80, § 42, r. 9. See R. S. 
 C. Ord. XVI. 7, 11. 
 
 1 StansfHd v. Hobson, 16 Beav. 183. See 
 Mills v. Jennings, 13 Ch. D. 639; aff d, num. 
 Jennings v. Jordan, 6 App. Cas. 698. 
 
 8 Morley v. Morley, 25 Beav. 253; pee 
 Thomas v. Dunning, 5 De G. & S. 618; 
 Knight v. Pocock, 24 Beav. 436; 4 Jur. N. S. 
 197. See 257, n. 4. 
 
 9 Chapman r. Hunt, 14 N. J. Eq. 149; 
 Large v. Van Doren, id. 208, Story, Eq. PI. 
 § 201; Mitford's PI. 39, 164; Bigefow v. Cas- 
 sedy, 26 N. J. Eq. 557. All the owners of the 
 equity of redemption should be parties to a bill 
 to redeem. Southard v. Sutler, 68 Maine, 575. 
 
 A mortgagor, filing his bill to redeem, may 
 bring before the Court all parties who might 
 call fur redemption; or he may bring his bill 
 against the last mortgagee, if he choose to 
 incur the risk of a foreclosure by a prior mort- 
 gagee during its pendency. Stone v. Bartlett, 
 46 Maine, 438, 443. In Piatt v. Squire, 12 
 Met. 494, it was held that one of two joint 
 assignees of a second mortgage could maintain 
 a bill, in his individual name, to redeem the 
 prior mortgage, without joining his co-assignee. 
 Dewey J. said: " The plaintiff has a legal 
 
 (a) See Goodden v. Coles, 59 L. T. 309; 
 Griffith v. Pound, 45 Ch. D. 553: Francis v. 
 Harrison, 43 Ch. D. 183; Batterman v. 
 Albright, 122 N. Y. 484; West v. Miller, 125 
 Ind. 70; Foster v. Trowbridge, 44 Minn. 290; 
 McCoy v. Bolev, 21 Fla. 803; Flowers v. Bar- 
 k-r, 7!) Ala. 445; Curtis v. Gooding, 99 In. I. 
 4i; Tinkler v. Swaynie, 71 Ind. 562; Chicago 
 
 interest, as assignee of that mortgage, although 
 not the entire interest. His redemption will 
 inure lo the benefit of his co-tenant. He can 
 only redeem by payment of all claims of the 
 defendant under the prior mortgage to the 
 same extent as wou'd have been paid if the 
 co-assignee were a party to the bill; and there- 
 fore the defendant can sustain no injur'-." 
 See S. C. Piatt v. Squire, 5 Cush. 553. See, 
 as to the requisites of a bill to enforce the right 
 to redeem, Malony v. Rourke. 100 Mass. 190. 
 
 ln Lord Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton, 2 
 Jac. & W. 3, 134; 2 Mer. 171; 4 Bligh, 1. 
 
 1 Bailey v. Myrick, 36 Maine, 50. The 
 same rule prevailed in Palk v. Lord Clinton. 12 
 Ves. 48, which differed from that of Lord 
 Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton, above cited, in 
 the circumstance, only, of its being a bill by 
 a second mortgagee of part of an estate to 
 redeem a rirst mortgage, which embraced 
 the whole property. Where two lots have been 
 sold undera Chancery sale to the same person, 
 who has paid the purchase-money of one l"t 
 and demands title See McGoldrick v. Mc- 
 Goldrick, 2 Tenn. Ch. 541. 
 
 - In England, as to mortgages made since 
 Jan. 1, 1882, see 44 & 45 Vic. c. 41. §§ 1 (1), 17. 
 
 Land Co. r. Peck, 112 111. 408; Re Chickering, 
 56 Vt. 82; Carpenter v. Cincinnati R. Co. ''.J 
 Ohio St. 307; Seibert r. Minneapolis &c R.Co. 
 (Minn.) 20 L. R A. 535. A tenant in posse- 
 sion under the mortgagor is a necessary party 
 defendant to a foreclosure suit. Richardson v. 
 Hadsall, 106 111. 476. 
 
 207
 
 *214 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 entitled to hold both mortgages till the amount due upon both is dis- 
 charged, even against the purchaser of the equity of redemption of one 
 of the mortgaged estates without notice, whose purchase was effected 
 after the creation of the mortgage of the other estate ; 3 so that the 
 mortgages, although for distinct sums, are in effect for one sum. Upon 
 this principle, where the purchaser of the equity of redemption of a 
 mortgaged estate hied his bill against the mortgagee, to redeem, and 
 the defendant, by his answer, stated a subsequent mortgage made to 
 him, by the same mortgagor, of a distinct estate for a distinct debt, it 
 was held that the persons interested in the equity of redemption of the 
 second mortgage were necessary parties to the suit. 4 And this rule 
 prevails although one mortgage be a pledge of personalty and the other 
 a mortgage of realty. 6 It does not, however, hold longer than while 
 both mortgages continue united in the same mortgagee; so that if a 
 mortgagee, having two distinct mortgages on two separate estates, 
 assigns one of the mortgages to a third person, the assignee of the 
 asigned mortgages need not be brought before the Court in a suit to 
 
 redeem the other. 6 A second incumbrancer, filing a bill to redeem 
 * 214 a prior incumbrance, must bring the mortgagor, * as well as the 
 
 prior incumbrancer before the Court; 1 but he may, if he pleases, 
 foreclose the mortgagor and a third mortgagee, without bringing the 
 first mortgagee before the Court, because by so doing he merely puts 
 himself in the place of the mortgagor and subsequent mortgagee, and 
 leaves the first mortgagee in the situation in which he sbood before; 2 
 
 8 See Mills v. Jennings, 13 Ch. D. 639, 
 646, aff'd nom. Jennings v. Jordan, 6 App. Cas. 
 698. See also Crack nail v. Jan son, 11 
 Ch. D. 1; Cummins v. Fletcher, 14 Ch. D. 
 699; Chesworth v. Hunt, 5 C P. D. 266; Be 
 Raggett, Ex parte Williams, 16 Ch. D. 117; 
 Harter v. Colman, 19 Ch. D. 630; Andrews v. 
 City Permanent Benefit Building Society, 44 
 L. T. 641 ; and for earlier cases, see Purefoy v. 
 Purefoy, 1 Vern. 28; Margrave v. Le Hook, 2 
 Vern. 207. 
 
 4 Ireson v. Denn, 2 Cox, 425 ; Mills v. Jen- 
 nings, supra. 
 
 5 Jones v. Smith, 2 Ves. Jr. 372, reversed 
 by House of Lords, see 6 Ves. 229, n.; see 
 also Walts v. Symes, 1 De G. M. & G. 240; 
 16 Sim. 640; fassell v. Smith, 2 De G. & S. 
 713; 4 Jur. N. S. 1090; Vint v. Padget, id. 
 1122; 2 De G. & J. 611; Selby v. Pomfret, 1 
 J. & H. 336; 3 De G. F. & J. 595; 7 Jur. 
 N. S. 835, 860; Beevor v. Luck, L. R. 4 Eq. 
 537; Mills v. Jennings, 13 Ch. D. 639; aff'd 
 nom. Jennings v. Jordan, 6 App. Cas. 698; 
 Harter v. Colman, 19 Ch D. 630: Cummins v. 
 Fletcher, 14 Ch. D. 699; 44 & 45 Vic. c. 41. 
 
 6 Willie v. Lugg, 2 Eden, 78. 
 
 l Thompson v. Baskerville, 3 Ch. Rep. 215; 
 Farmer v. Curtis, 2 Sim. 466 ; and see Hunter 
 
 v. Macklew, 5 Hare, 238; Holt r. Mill, 2 Vern. 
 278; Marsh v. Lee, 2 Vent. 337. The natural 
 decree is, that the second mortgagee shall 
 redeem the first mortgagee, and that the mort- 
 gagor shall redeem him or be foreclosed, (a) 
 Fell v. Brown, 2 Bro. C. C. 276 ; Palk r. Lord 
 Clinton, 12 Ves. 48; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 84, 18G, 
 195; Hallock v. Smith, *4 John. Ch. 649; 4 
 Kent, 186. In a suit for the foreclosure 
 of a mortgage of real estate, claimed as a 
 homestead, the wife, being a necessary party 
 to a full adjustment of the controversy, 
 should be allowed to intervene. Sargent 
 v. Wilson, 5 Cal. 501. So the wife should 
 be made a part}' to a bill to foreclose a 
 mortgage executed by her and her husband. 
 Johns v. Reardon, 3 Md. Ch. 57. In a bill to 
 redeem by a widow, who is entitled to dower 
 in her husband's lands, subject to a mortgage 
 executed in his lifetime, in which she joined to 
 release dower, she may join as a co-defendant 
 to the mortgagee, one who, after the execution 
 of the mortgage, purchased her husband's 
 interest in the land. McCabe v. Bellowes, 1 
 Allen, 269. 
 
 2 Richards v. Cooper, 5 Beav. 304; Lord 
 Hollis's case, cited 3 Ch. Rep. 86; Rose v. 
 Page, 2 Sim. 471 ; Brisco v. Kenrick, 1 C. P. 
 
 (a) In Hallett v. Furze, 31 Ch. D. 312, it 
 was held that, in a suit by a second mortgagee 
 to redeem the first mortgagee and to foreclose 
 
 208 
 
 the mortgagor, the proper form of decree is, 
 that, in default of the plaintiff redeeming, the 
 suit is to stand dismissed with costs.
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. 
 
 214 
 
 and if in such a case he makes the prior mortgagee a party, he must 
 offer to redeem him. 3 For the same reason a third mortgagee, buying 
 in the first, need not make the second mortgagee a party to a bill 
 to foreclose the mortgagor; 4 and similarly it is unnecessary to make 
 annuitants, or other prior incumbrancers, parties to a bill by creditors 
 or incumbrancers for the sale 5 or partition 6 of an estate ; so in a suit 
 for the execution of a trust, by those claiming the ultimate benefit of 
 the trust after the satisfaction of prior charges, it is not necessary to 
 bring before the Court the persons claiming the benefit of such prior 
 charges ; and therefore, to a bill for the application of a surplus after 
 payment of debts or legacies, or other prior incumbrances, the credi- 
 tors, legatees, or incumbrancers need not be parties. 7 (b) 
 
 Coop. temp. Cott. 371 ; and see Arnold v. Bain- 
 brigge, 2 De G. F. & J. 92; Audsley v. 
 Horn, 26 Beav. 195; 1 De G. F. & J. 226; 
 
 4 Jur. N. S. 1267; 6 id. 205; see Moore v. 
 Morton, W. N. (1886) 196; Person v. Merrick, 
 
 5 Wis. 231 ; Wright v. Bundy, 11 Ind. 398. 
 
 3 Gordon v. Horsfall, 5 Moore, 393; 11 Jur. 
 569; see Crenver Mining Co. v. Willyams, 35 
 Beav. 353 ; Australasia Nat. Bank v. United 
 Hand-in-Hand &c. Co. 4 App. Cas. 391. 
 
 4 The rule seems to be that, although prior 
 and subsequent incumbrancers are proper, 
 they are not indispensable parties. Ante, 194, 
 note 6. A second mortgagee may file a bill of 
 foreclosure against the mortgagor and third 
 mortgagee, without making the first mortgagee 
 a party, Rose v. Page, 2 Sim. 471; or against 
 the mortgagor alone, White v. Holman, 32 
 Ark. 753. So a bill may be filed to obtain 
 payment of an annuity charged on land, with- 
 out making the prior annuitants parties. Dela- 
 bere v. Norwood, 3 Swanst. 144, note. So, to 
 a bill of fort-closure, prior judgment creditors 
 are not indispensable parties. Rundell p. 
 Marquis of Donegal, 1 Hogan, 308; Post v. 
 Mackall, 3 B'and, 495; Wakeman v. Grover, 
 4 Paige, 23. Nor, if made parties, are their 
 rights affected where their lien is not assailed 
 in the bill. Farmers' Natl. Bk. v. Lloyd, 30 
 N.J. Eq. 442; Frost v. Koon, 30 N. Y. 428. 
 So of prior encumbrancers upon realty which 
 the bill seeks to subject to the debts of the 
 deceased owner. Parker v. Fuller, 1 R. & M. 
 656. So of subsequent encumbrancers, Need- 
 ier v. Deeble, 1 Ch. Cas. 199; Rosecarrick v. 
 Barton, 1 Ch. Cas. 217; Greshold v. Marsham, 
 2 Ch. Cas. 171 ; Cockes v. Sherman, 2 Freem. 
 13 ; S. C. 3 Ch. Rep. 83 ; Lomax v. Hide, 2 
 Vern. 185; Draper v. Jennings, 2 Vern. 518; 
 Godfrey v. Chadwell, id. 001 ; Morret v. Wes- 
 terne, id. 663; Carroll v. Kershner, 47 Md. 
 262; Leonard v. Groome, id. 499. In view 
 of some of these decisions, which he cites, 
 
 and after commenting on the language of 
 Marshall C. J. in Finley v. Bank of United 
 States, 11 Wheat. 306, Mr. Justice Curtis 
 says: "We consider the true rule to be, 
 that where it is the object of the bill to pro- 
 cure a sale of the land, and the prior encum- 
 brancer holds the legal title, and his debt 
 is payable, it is proper to make him a party 
 in order that a sale ma}' be made of the 
 whole title. In this sense, and for this pur- 
 pose, he may he correctly said to be a neces- 
 sary party, that is, necessary to such a 
 decree. But it is in the power of the Court 
 to order a sale subject to the prior encum- 
 brances. Hagan v. Walker, 14 How. 37. And 
 see Young v. Montgomery & Eufuula R. Co. 2 
 Woods, 606; Western Ins. Co. v. Eagle Fire 
 Ins. Co. 1 Paige, 284. The same rules apply to 
 a bill by a judgment creditor to reach the in- 
 terest of the debtor in the mortgaged property. 
 Hudnit o. Nash, 16 N. J. Eq. 550; Cloud v. 
 Hamilton, 3 Yerg. 81; Stark v. Cheathem, 3 
 Tenn. Ch. 300. On the strength of the early 
 English cases above cited, it has been held in 
 Tennessee that neither the creditors of the 
 mortgagor, nor purchasers from him, nor prior 
 mortgagees, nor subsequent mortgagees, are 
 absolutely necessary parties to a bill of fore- 
 closure by sale of the mortgaged premises, or 
 the enforcement of a vendor's lien. Minis v. 
 Minis, 1 Humph. 425; Rowan v. Mercer, 10 
 Humph. 363; Fletcher v. Coleman, 2 Head, 
 388; Wilkes v. Smith, 4 Heisk. 86. But a prior 
 mortgagee is a proper party where there is sub- 
 stantial doubt as to the amount of the prior 
 mortgage debt, or to have an account of rents if 
 he has been in possession. Jerome r. McCarter, 
 94 U. S. 736; Trulock v. Robey, 15 Sim. 265; 
 Hays v. Cornelius, 3 Tenn. Ch.461. 
 
 5 See Rose v. Page, 2 Sim. 472; Parker v. 
 Fuller, 1 R. & M. 656. 
 
 6 Hixon v. Eastwood, W. N. (1868) 13. 
 
 7 Ld. Red. 175. Upon a bill to foreclose, 
 
 (b) When there is doubt as to the amounts due 
 prior incumbrancers, or as to the property sub- 
 ject to their claims, or when the bill prays for a 
 vol. i. — 14 
 
 sale of the entire estate, they are, it sepm«, 
 necessary parties. See Jerome v. McCarter. 94 
 U. S. 734 ; Wabash &c. Ry. Co. v. Central 
 209
 
 215 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 * 215 * Under the provisions of the late Act above referred to with 
 regard to trustees representing their cestui que trusts, 1 it has been 
 held that when the mortgaged estate was vested in trustees, who also, 
 as executors of a will or otherwise, were the persons who would be in 
 possession of the funds for payment of the mortgage debt, they might 
 properly represent the beneficiaries, 2 but that when this was not the 
 case, the cestui que trusts, or some of them, must be before the Court. 8 (a) 
 When the mortgagor has become bankrupt, he is not a necessary 
 party to a suit for foreclosure, even if the assignees disclaim. 4 (b) 
 
 the mortgagor is ordinarily a necessary party: 
 Kunkel v. Markell, 26 Md. 407; Hallock v. 
 Smith, 4 John. Ch. 449; Farmer v. Curtis, 2 
 Sim. 46G ; Worthington v. Lee, 2 Bland, 678; 
 and his heir, or devisee, if he be dead; McGown 
 r. Yorks, 6 John. Ch. 460. So is the purchaser 
 of the mortgaged lands, if in possession. Noyes 
 v. Hall, 97 U. S. 68. But the mortgagor is not a 
 necessary party, if he has sold and conveyed the 
 mortgaged premises to a third person: Parker 
 v. Small, 58 Ind. 349; Williams v. Smith, 49 
 Maine, 564: nor if his equity of redemption has 
 been sold in invitum ; though, if made a party 
 in such case, he may set up the defence of 
 usury: Andrews v. Stelle, 22 N. J. Eq. 478. 
 And a decree of foreclosure against a mortgagor 
 will not affect. his grantee who is not made a 
 party; but equity will not enforce the right 
 to redeem in favor of the grantee against a 
 superior equity, or where its enforcement would 
 be inequitable. Mulvey v. Gibbons, 87 111. 
 367. After the mortgagor has sold the premises, 
 he cannot maintain a bill to redeem. Phillips v. 
 
 Trust Co. 22 Fed. Rep. 138; Olyphant v. St. 
 Louis Ore & Steel Co. 23 id. 465 ; Holly 
 Mamif. Co. v. New Chester Water Co. 48 id. 
 879 ; Sutherland v. Lake Canal Co. 9 N. B. R. 
 298; Lockman v. Reilly, 95 N. Y. 64; Emigrant 
 Industrial S. Bank v. Goldman, 75 N. Y. 127; 
 Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Tonawanda &c. R. 
 Co. 18 Abb. N. Cas. 368; Harwell v. Lehman, 
 72 Ala. 344: Hinson v. Adrian, 86 N. C. 61 ; 
 Warner v. DeWitt County Bank, 4 III. App. 
 305; Stratton v. Reisdorpn (Neb.), 53 N. W. 
 136; Broward v. Hoeg, 16 Fla. 370; Walter v. 
 Riehl. 38 Md. 211; Harris v. Hooper, 50 Md. 
 537; Warren r. Burton, 9 S. C. 197. A prior 
 mortgagee, thus joined, may by cross-bill 
 protect and enforce his mortgage. White v. 
 Bartlett, 14 Neb. 320; Osb me v. Barge, 30 
 Fed. Rep. 805; First National Bank v. Salem 
 Capitol F. M. Co. 12 Sawyer, 485. Subsequent 
 incumbrancers should be joined. Douthit v. 
 Hipp, 23 S. C. 205; Hensley v. Whiffin, 54 
 Iow:i, 555 ; De Lashmutt v. Sell wood, 10 
 Oregon, 319; Pardee r. Steward, 37 Hun, 259 ; 
 Sichler v. Look, 93 Cal. 600: Allen v. Wood- 
 ruff, 90 111. 11. After the bill is filed, subse- 
 210 
 
 Leavitt, 54 Maine, 405- And see, where the 
 mortgagee has sold, infrn, 260, n. 5, 277. 
 
 1 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42; see 46 & 47 Vic. 
 c. 49, § 4, Sched. 
 
 2 Hanman v. Riley, 9 Hare App. 40; Sale v. 
 Kitson, 3 De G. M. & G. 119; 17 Jur. 170; 10 
 Hare, App. 50; Wilkins v. Reeves, 3 W. R. 
 305; L. R. 3 Eq. 494, V. C. W.; Marriott v. 
 Kirkham, 3 Giff. 536 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 379. So in 
 redemption suits as to trustees in whom the 
 equity of redemption is vested. Mills v. Jen- 
 nings, 13 Ch. D. 639, aff'd, nom. Jennings v. 
 Jordan, 6 App. Cas. 698. Trustees may also 
 represent their cestui que trusts in partition 
 actions. Goodrich v. Marsh, W. N. (1878) 
 186; Simpson v. Denny, 10 Ch. I). 28. 
 
 3 Goldsmith v Stonehewer, 9 Hare, App. 38; 
 17 Jur. 199 ; Young v. Ward, 10 Hare, App. 58; 
 Cropper v. Mellersh, 1 Jur. N. S. 299, V. C. S.; 
 and see Siffken v. Davis, Kay, App. 21 ; Wilkins 
 v. Reeves, supra ; Tuder v. Morris. 1 Sm. & G. 
 503; Watters v. Jones, 6 Jur. N. S. 530, V. C S. 
 
 4 Collins v. Shirley, 1 R. & M. 638; Kerrick 
 
 quent incumbrancers may become parties by 
 petition. Leveridge v. Marsh, 30 N. J. Eq. 
 59. 
 
 {a) See Re Mitchell, Wavell v. Mitchell, 65 
 L. T. 851; W. N. (1892) 11. "An insolvent 
 trustee is not a sufficient party to a suit, so that 
 the cestui que trust may be bound." Per North 
 J. in Aylward v. Lewis, [1891] 2 Ch. 81. Hence 
 a mortgagee who is a trustee and has become 
 bankrupt, cannot, as defendant to a foreclosure 
 suit by a prior mortgagee, properly represent 
 his cestui que trusts, who are necessary parties, 
 under the English practice, notwithstanding 
 rule 8 of R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XVI. Francis v. 
 Harrison, 43 Ch. D. 183. Recovery of money 
 paid by a mortgagor to a trust mortgagee, 
 under a mistake of fact, and by the latter 
 handed over to his cestui que trust, is to be 
 sought from such mortgagee. King v. Stewart, 
 66 L. T. 339. The trustee under a railroad 
 income mortgage is a necessary party to a suit 
 against the railroad for an accounting and 
 injunction. Barry v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. 
 Co. 22 Fed. Rep. 631. 
 
 (b) Such assignees are not necessary parties
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. * 216 
 
 The same principle which calls for the presence of all persons having 
 an interest in the equity of redemption, in the case of bills to redeem a 
 mortgage, requires that where a mortgagee seeks to foreclose the mort- 
 gagor, he should bring before the Court all persons claiming an interest 
 in the mortgage ; 5 therefore a derivative mortgagee must make the 
 original mortgagee, or, if dead, his representative, a party to a bill 
 against the mortgagor for foreclosure. 6 
 
 If, however, a mortgagee has assigned or conveyed away from him- 
 self, not only the money due on the mortgage, but also the mortgaged 
 premises, the assignee may, as we have seen, foreclose without making 
 the original mortgagee a party ; 7 and upon the same principle, 
 * where a mortgagee has devised his interest in the mortgage in * 216 
 such a manner as to pass not only the mortgage money but the 
 estate mortgaged, the devisee alone may foreclose without making the 
 heir-at-law of the original mortgagee a party, 1 unless he claims to have 
 the will established, 2 in which case he must be made a defendant, 
 because it has been held that a devisee and heir cannot join in the same 
 suit, even upon an allegation that they have agreed to divide the matter 
 in question between them. 8 
 
 The rule which requires that all persons having concurrent interests 
 with the plaintiff should be parties to the bill, applies to all cases in 
 which an account is sought against a defendant, (a) One person cannot 
 
 v. Saffery, 7 Sim. 317; see also Cash v. Belcher, 
 
 I Hare," 310; 6 Jur. 190; Ford v. White, 16 
 Beav. 120. But see Singleton v. Cox. 4 Hare, 
 326. 
 
 5 See Story, Eq. PI. § 199; 4 Kent, 186; 
 Western Reserve Bank v. Potter, 1 Clarke, 
 432; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Portland & 0. R. 
 Co. 10 Fed. Rep. 604 ; Ruckman p. Stephens, 
 
 II id. 793 (husband); Dickinson v. Lamoille 
 Co. Nat. Bank, 12 id. 747 (attaching creditor); 
 Chew v. Hyman, 7 id. 7; Cook v. Hilliard, 9 id. 
 4. Where a tenant in common of an equity of 
 redemption has not been made a party to fore- 
 closure proceedings, his subsequent written con- 
 sent to be made and treated as a party, and to 
 execute a release of his interest to the purchaser 
 under the foreclosure, is not equivalent to being 
 actually a party. Walbridge v. English, 28 N. 
 J. Kq. 266. So of the assignee of an interest 
 
 in mortgaged premises. Kelly v. Israel, 11 
 Paige, 147. 
 
 6 Hobart C Abbot, 2 P. Wms. 643. 
 
 1 Miller v. Henderson, 10 N. J. Eq. 320, 
 194. A mortgagee of land who has assigned 
 his interest in the mortgage since the breach of 
 the condition may be included as a defendant in 
 a bill to redeem. Doody v. Pierce, 9 Allen, 141. 
 In a bill to foreclose a mortgage on a railroad 
 by the trustee, and holders of the bonds, who 
 only hold them as collateral security for less 
 than the amount of the bonds, the assignor is a 
 necessary party. Ackerson v. Lodi Branch R. 
 Co. 28 N. J. Eq. 542. 
 
 1 Renvoize v Cooper, 6 Mad. 371; Graham 
 v. Carter, 2 Hen. & M. 6. 
 
 2 Lewis v. Nangle, 2 Ves. 631. 
 
 3 Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 1 T. & R. 104, 
 116. 
 
 to foreclosure proceedings instituted prior to 
 the adjudication in bankruptcy, although, if 
 desired, they may become parties on their own 
 petition. Oliver v. Cunningham, 6 Fed. Rep. 
 60; see Dendel v. Sutton, 20 id. 787. 
 
 (a) Beneficiaries, having separate interests 
 in a trust fund, may join as plaintiffs in a bill 
 against the trustee for an account as to their 
 respective interests. Norrisfl. Hassler, 22 Fed. 
 Rep. 401. So, beneficiaries undera will, having 
 common grounds of relief, though owning in 
 severalty, may join as plaintiffs in a bill for the 
 removal of a trustee. Gart.-ide v. Gartside 
 (Mo.), 20 S. W. Rep. 669. As to joining 
 
 legatees as parties in Equity, see also Me Arthur 
 r. Scott, 113 U. S. 340; Drake v. Delliker, 24 
 Fed. Rep. 527; Union M. E. Church v. Wilkin- 
 son, 36 N. J. Eq. 141 ; Applebee v. Duke, 21 N. 
 Y. S. 890; McNeill v. Masterson, 79 Texas, 670 ; 
 Pennsylvania Ins. Co. v. Bauerle (III.), 33 N. 
 E. Rep. 166; Johnson v. Meyer (Ark.), 16 S. 
 W. Rep. 123. Distributees, who sue to recover 
 assets, instead of the administrator, may main- 
 tain their suit, if answer is filed, and. there 
 being no debts, all the parties in interest are 
 made parties. Smith v. Gooch, 6 Lea (Teiin.), 
 536. As to heirs a* parties, and those claiming 
 under them, see McCauley v. Six, 34 Ark. 379 ; 
 
 211
 
 216 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 exhibit a bill against an accounting party without bringing before the 
 Court all persons who are interested in having the account taken, or in 
 the result of it; otherwise, the defendant might be harassed by as 
 many suits as there are parties interested in the account. 4 Thus, to a 
 suit by the assignee for an account of a share of the profits arising 
 from the working of a patent, the other assignees must be parties ; 5 
 and to a suit for a partnership account, or for a share of a partnership 
 adventure, it is in general necessary that all persons having shares in 
 the same adventure should be parties. 6 A surviving partner may, how- 
 ever, unless there are special circumstances in the case, sue a debtor to 
 the firm for an account without making the personal representatives of 
 the deceased partner parties to the suit; 7 and similarly a residuary 
 legatee, seeking an account and share of the residue, must make par- 
 ties all other persons interested in that residue: 8 either active par- 
 
 4 MeCabe v. Bellowes, 1 Allen, 269, 270; 
 New England &c. Bank. v. Newport Steam 
 Factory, 6 R. I. 154. See Buie v. Mechanics' 
 Building Association, 74 N. C. 117 ; Fisher v. 
 Hubbell. 65 Barb. 74. 
 
 5 Bergmann v. McMillan, W. N. (1881) 39. 
 
 6 Ireton v. Lewis, Rep. temp. Finch, 96 ; Mof- 
 fatt v. Farquharson, 2 Uro. C. C. 338, and Mr. 
 Bell's note ( 1 ). Yet they may, if very numerous, 
 be made quasi parties by the plaintiff suing on 
 behalf of himself and on their behalf. Good v. 
 Blewitt. 13 Ves. 397; and see Hills v. Nash, 1 
 Phil. 594; 10 Jur. 148; R. S. C. Ord. XVI. 9; 
 Cullen v. Duke of Queensberry, 1 Bro. P. C. 
 396; 1 Bro. C. C. 101, and Mr. Belt's note; 
 Dozier v Edwards, 3 Litt. 72; Story, Eq. PI. 
 § 166; Story, Partn. § 449; Collyer, Partu. 
 (Perkins's ed.) § 361; Wells v. Strange, 5 Ga. 
 22; Mudgett ?'. Gager, 52 Maine, 541. See 
 Parsons v. Howard, 2 Woods, 1 ; Pacific R. Co. 
 v. Atlantic & P. R. R. Co. 20 Fed. Rep. 277. 
 When a bill in Equity, brought by one of four 
 partners against one only of the other three, for 
 an account, &c, alleges that the other two are 
 not within the jurisdiction of the Court, that all 
 the others have received their full share of the 
 partnership effects, and that the defendant has 
 received much more than his share, and the 
 plaintiff much less, a demurrer to the bill, for 
 non-joinder of the other partners as defendants, 
 will not be sustained. Towle v. Pierce. 12 Met. 
 329 ; see Story, Eq. PI. § 78 ; Vose F. Philbrook, 
 
 Theurer v. Brogan, 41 Ark. 88; Price v. 
 Sanders, 39 Ark. 306; Tinkler v. Swaynie, 71 
 Ind. 562; Dayton v. Dayton, 7 111. App. 136; 
 Ryder B. Topping, 15 id. 216; Bonny v. Bonny, 
 36 id. 129; Seymour v. Edwards, 31 id. 50; 
 Walters v. Walters, 132 111. 467 ; Hunt v. Van 
 Derveer, 43 N. J. Eq. 414; Lonvall ». Gridley, 
 70 Cal. 507; Weinreich v. Weinreich, 18 Mo. 
 App. 364; Mellen o. Banning, 61 Hun, 627; 
 212 
 
 3 Storv, 335; Lawrence v. Rokes, 53 Mnine, 
 110, 116; Mallow v. Hinde, 12 Wheat. 193; 
 Fuller v. Benjamin, 23 Maine, 255; Mudgett v. 
 Gager, 52 Maine, 541. 
 
 Representatives of a deceased partner should 
 be made parties to a bill to dissolve a partner- 
 ship, and the bill may be amended for that 
 purpose. Buchard v. Boyce, 21 Ga. 6. So 
 the administrator and heirs of a deceased 
 partner are necessary parties to a bill filed by 
 a surviving partner to administer lands bought 
 with partnership funds. Whitney v. Cotton, 
 53 Miss. 689. But the surviving partner may 
 sell and convey firm realty, and the title to 
 the purehaser will be good, whether the sale 
 be required to pay debts or not. Solomon v. 
 Fitzgerald, 7 Heisk. 552. To a claim seeking 
 payment of a partnership debt out of the assets 
 of a deceased partner, the surviving partner is 
 a necessary party. Hills v. M'Rae, 15 Jur. 
 766; 5 Eng. Law & Eq. 233. So the heirs of 
 a deceased partner must be parties when a sale 
 of real estate is sought for the payment of firm 
 debts. Pugh v. Currie, 5 Ala. 446; Lang v. 
 Waring, 25 Ala. 625 ; Andrews v. Brown, 21 
 Ala. 437. 
 
 7 Haig v. Gray, 3 De G. & S. 741. 
 
 8 Parsons v. Neville, 3 Bro. C. C. 365. In 
 Cockburn v. Thompson, 16 Ves. 328, Lord 
 Eldon said, this admits of exception, where it 
 is not necessary or inconvenient. See R. S C 
 Ord. XVI. 9, li. Story, Eq. PI. § 89, and notes, 
 
 Kingsbury v. Flowers, 65 Ala. 479; Gibbs v. 
 Hodge, id. 366; Sawyers v. Baker, 66 Ala. 
 292; Spencer?'. Lee, 19 W. Va. 179; Simmons 
 v. Ingram, 60 Miss. 886; Dwyer v. Olivari 
 (Texas), 16 S. W. Rep. 800; Brundige v. Ruth- 
 erford, 57 Texas, 22; Anderson v. Northrop 
 (Fla.), 12 So. Rep. 318; McDonnell v. Eat'>n, 
 18 Fed. Rep. 710; Reed v. Reed, 31 id. 49; 
 Temple v. Scott, 143 111. 290.
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. 
 
 217 
 
 ties by making them plaintiffs or * defendants to the bill, or *217 
 passive parties by serving them with notice of the decree. 1 (a) 
 And so, where a moiety of a residue was given to one of the defendants 
 for life, and, upon her decease, to such persons as she should appoint, 
 and, in default of appointment, to certain other persons for life, it was 
 held that the other persons, although their interests depended upon 
 such a remote contingency, ought to be before the Court. 2 
 
 Upon the same principle it is, that in suits by next of kin against a 
 personal representative for an account, the Court requires that all the 
 next of kin should be parties to the suit, 8 in the same manner as in 
 the case of residuary legatees; either as plaintiffs or defendants, or by 
 being served with notice of the decree. 4 It is, however, to be observed 
 that in all 5 cases where the parties claim under a general description, 
 
 §§ 203, 204; Pritehard v. Hicks, 1 Paige, 253; 
 Sheppard v. Starke, 3 Mimf. 29; Brown v. 
 Kicketts, 3 John. Ch. 533; Davoue v. Fanning, 
 4 John. Ch. 199; West v. Randall, 2 Mason, 
 181. 190-199; Huson v. MeKenzie, 1 Dev. Eq. 
 463; Arendell v. Blackwell, id. 354; Bethel v. 
 Wilson, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 810. In Brown v. 
 Ricketts, 3 John. Ch. 553, Mr. Chancellor Kent 
 seems to have thought that all the residuary 
 legatees should be technically parties by name. 
 So in Davoue v. Fanning, 4 John. Ch. 199. It 
 has, however, been intimated and maintained 
 in other cases that a residuary legatee might 
 sue in behalf of himself and all others, without 
 making them technically parties. See Kettle 
 v. Crary. 1 Paige, 417, 419, 420, and note; 
 Ross v. Crary, 1 Paige, 416; Hallett v. Hallett, 
 2 Paige, 19, 20; Egbert v. Woods, 3 Paige, 
 517. Hide 1, adopted in 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, 
 provides that "any residuary legatee or next 
 of kin may, without serving the remaining 
 residuary legatees or next of kin, have a de- 
 cree for the administration of the personal 
 estate of a deceased person." 
 
 1 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42, rr. 1, 8. As to 
 effect of a judgment in wilful default, where 
 tenants for life are only served with notice of 
 the decree, see Whitney v. Smith, I.. R. 4 Ch. 
 513. 
 
 2 Sherrit v. Birch, 3 Bro. C. C. 229 (Per- 
 kins's ed. note); Davies v. Davies, 21 L. J. Ch. 
 
 (a) A partnership being terminated by one 
 member's death, that member's executor can 
 in general maintain a bill to recover partner- 
 ship assets only when the surviving partner 
 refuses to sue or to join in the suit. See Kirby 
 v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 8 Fed. Rep. 462; 
 14 id. 261. Partners who have made an assign- 
 ment may join as co-plaintiffs with their as- 
 signee to enforce a trust, when there will be a 
 surplus for distribution among them after the 
 firm liabilities are discharged. McCampbell v. 
 Brown. 48 Fed. Rep. 795. As to joining part- 
 
 (N. S.) 543; 11 Eng. Law & Eq. 199 ; Lennghan 
 v. Smith, 2 Phil. 301; 11 Jur. 503; but not 
 when the share has been ascertained and in- 
 vested. Smith v. Snow, 3 Mad. 10; Hares v. 
 Stringer, 15 Beav. 206; see also Grace v. 
 Terrington, 1 Coll. 3. A contingent interest 
 depending on the event of a suit is not such 
 an interest as to make the person having it a 
 necessary party. Barbour v. Whitlock, 4 Mon- 
 roe, 180; see Reid v. Vanderheyden, 5 Cowen, 
 719; United States v. Gillespie, 8 Fed. Rep. 140. 
 
 3 See Hawkins v. Hawkins, 1 Hare, 543, 
 546; 6 Jur. 638, explaining Caldecott v. Calde- 
 cott, C.& P. 183; 5 Jur. 212; and see Shuttle- 
 worth v. Howarth, C. & P. 230; 5 Jur. 499; 
 Noland v. Turner, 5 J. J. Marsh. 179; West v. 
 Randall, 2 Mason, 181; Kellar v. Beelor, 5 
 Monroe, 573; Oldham v. Collins, 4 J. J. Marsh. 
 50; Story, Eq. PI. § 89, and cases cited; see 
 also rule 1 in preceding note 1. 
 
 4 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42. rr. 1, 8; see now 
 46 & 47 Vic. c. 49, § 4, Sched. 
 
 5 Where one of the next of kin of an in- 
 testate, who died in India, procured letters of 
 administration to his effects here, it was held 
 that he might sue the person who had taken 
 out an Indian administration, and had after- 
 wards come to this country, without making 
 the rest of the next of kin parties. Sandilands 
 i'. Innes, 3 Sim. 264; but see Story, Eq. PI. 
 § 179; Story, Conf. Laws, §§ 513, 514. 
 
 ners or their representatives as parties in Equity, 
 see also BIyth r. Fladgate, 63 L. T. N. S. 546, 
 557; Bower v. Soctfte\ 17 id. 490; Re McRae, 
 25 Ch. D. 19; Re Hodgson, 31 Ch. I). 177; Re 
 Barnard, 33 Ch. D. 447; Kendall v. Hamilton, 
 3C. P. D. 403; Bank v. Carrollton Railroad, 
 11 Wall. 624; Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U. S. 
 505; Robinson v. Hintrager, 36 Fed. Rep. 752; 
 Goldman v. Page, 59 Miss. 404: Fowle v. 
 Torrey, 131 Mass. 289; Mechanics' Bank v. 
 Landauer, 68 Wis. 44; Jenness v. Smith, 58 
 Mich. 280. 
 
 213
 
 * 218 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 or of being some of a class of persons entitled, the Court would not 
 formerly make a decree without being first satisfied that all the indi- 
 viduals of the class, or who came under the general description, were 
 before it. For this purpose the Court, in cases of this description, 
 before directing an account, or other relief prayed by the bill, referred 
 it to one of the Masters to inquire who the individuals of the class, or 
 answering the general description, were; and then, if it turned out that 
 any of them were not before the Court, the plaintiff must file a supple- 
 mental bill, for the purpose of bringing them in before the cause 
 *218 * was finally heard. 1 And according to Sir James Wigram V. C, 
 in an administration suit, in which inquiries are necessary to 
 ascertain who are the parties beneficially interested in the estate, it is 
 irregular to direct the accounts to be taken until after the inquiries 
 have been made, and the Master has made his report. But where the 
 parties interested are the children of a party to the suit, or are persons 
 of a class in such circumstances that the Court may be reasonably sat- 
 isfied, at the hearing, that all parties beneficially interested are parties 
 to the record, the Court may, at the time of directing the inquiries, 
 also order that, if the Master shall find that all the persons beneficially 
 interested are parties to the suit, he do then proceed to take the 
 account; this is, however, an irregularity, and the Court will not make 
 the order in that form, unless it be reasonably clear that all the persons 
 interested are parties. 2 Under the later practice of the Court, how- 
 ever, it being no longer necessary to make all the residuary legatees or 
 next of kin parties for the purpose of the decree, although it is usual 
 still to direct such an inquiry as above mentioned, yet it should not in 
 terms be made preliminary to taking the accounts, in order that the 
 Judge's discretion to proceed in the absence of the parties may not be 
 fettered. 3 
 
 In like manner as in the case of residuary legatees and next of kin, 
 one legatee interested in a legacy charged upon real estate, one of the 
 persons interested in the proceeds of real estate directed to be sold, or 
 one residuary devisee or heir, or one of several cestui que trusts under a 
 deed or instrument may have a decree for the administration of the 
 estate or execution of the trust without making the others of the class 
 parties in the first instance; though they must be served with notice of 
 the decree; 4 and any cestui que trust who has concurred in a breach of 
 
 1 But see Waite v. Templer, 1 S. & S. 319; may sue on behalf of himself and of all persons 
 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 90, and notes. But one of sev- having the same interest." 
 eral of the next of kin of an intestate, entitled 2 Baker v. Harwood, 1 Hare, 327; 6 Jur. 
 
 to distribution, may sue for his distributive 553; see also Hawkins v. Hawkins, id. 638; 
 
 share without making the other distributees 1 Hare, 543: 6 Jur. 638; Say v. Creed, 3 Hare, 
 
 parties, if the latter are unknown, or cannot 455; 8 Jur. 893; Phillipson r. Gatty, 6 Hare, 
 
 he found, and that fact is charged in the bill. 26: 12 Jur. 430. 
 
 Ibid. In such case the bill may properly be filed 3 2 Seton,927; Cons. Ord. XXXV. 18; as to 
 
 on behalf of the plaintiff, and also of all the evidence necessary to support such an inquiry, 
 
 other persons who may be entitled as distribu- see Miller v. Priddon, 1 M'N. & G. 687. 
 tees. Biid. Rule 5, adopted in 15 & 16 Vice. 86, * 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42, rr. 2, 3, 8; R. 
 
 provides that " In all cases of suits for the pro- C. Ord. XVI. 11; Maclpod r. Annesley, 
 
 tection of property pending litigation, and in Beav. 600; James v. James, 9 Hare App. 80. 
 all cases in the nature of trusts, any person 
 
 214
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. * 219 
 
 trust must be a party to a suit to make a trustee liable for the loss 
 occasioned thereby. 5 
 
 The rule that all persons interested in an account should be made 
 parties to a suit against the accounting party, will not apply where it 
 appears that some of the parties interested in such account have been 
 accounted with and paid. Thus, in the case of a bill by an infant 
 cestui que trust coming of age, for his share of a fund, an account will 
 be ordered without requiring the other cestui que trusts, who have 
 come of age * and have received their shares, to be before the * 219 
 Court. 1 In the case of a partnership, where a bill was filed 
 against factors by the persons interested in one moiety of a cargo of 
 tobacco, for a discovery and account as to that moiety, without making 
 the person interested in the other moiety a party, and it appeared that 
 the defendants had distinguished in their accounts between him and the 
 plaintiffs, and had divided the funds, and kept separate accounts, the 
 Court held that the owner of the other moiety was not a necessary 
 party to the suit. 2 And where a partner had agreed to give a moiety 
 of his share in the concern to a third person, it was held that an 
 account might be taken between him and the third person without mak- 
 ing his partners parties. 8 So to a bill by a person entitled to a certain 
 aliquot portion of an ascertained sum in the hands of trustees, the 
 co-cestui que trusts are not necessary parties. 4 In some cases where a 
 party having a joint interest with the plaintiffs in the taking of an 
 account has been abroad, the cause will be allowed to go on without 
 him: 5 thus, in the Exchequer, where a bill was filed by some of the 
 children of a freeman of London, who was dead, for an account and 
 division of his personal estate, and it appeared that one of the children 
 was beyond sea, the Court was moved that they might hear the cause 
 without him, and that if it appeared that he had any right, he might 
 come before the deputy remembrancer on the account; and though no 
 precedent was produced of such an order, the Court gave liberty to hear 
 the case without him. 6 
 
 5 Jesse v. Bennett, 8 De G. M. & G. 609 ; » Brown v. De Tastet, Jac. 284 ; see also 
 
 2 Jur. N. S. 1125; Williams v. Allen, 29 Beav. Bray v. Fromont, 6 Mad. 5; Casselsu. Stewart, 
 
 292. 6 App. Cas. 64. 
 
 i DWolf v. D'Wolf, 4 R. I. 450. So where * Perry v. Knott, 5 Beav. 293; Smith v. 
 
 the division of an estate in pursuance of a will Snow, 3 Mad. 10; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 207, 212; 
 
 is not to be made at one and the same time, but Hares v. Stringer, 15 Beav. 206; Lenaghan r. 
 
 at the several periods when any one or more Smith, 2 Phil. 301; 11 Jur. 503; Hunt p. Pea- 
 
 of the legatees shall separate from the testator's cock, 6 Hare, 361 ; 11 Jur. 555. 
 
 family, it is not necessary that all the legatees 5 Story, Eq. PI. §§ 78-89, and cases cited; 
 
 be made parties to each suit in Chancery for Milligan v. Milledge, 3 Cranch, 220; West v. 
 
 a division; but only those entitled to partici- Randall, 2 Mason, 196; Weymouth v. Boyer, 
 
 pate in the division then in question. Branch 1 Sumner's Ves. 416, note (r), and cases cited; 
 
 v. Booker, 3 Munf. 43. So where it appeared Towle v. Pierce, 12 Met. 329; Story, Eq. PL 
 
 that some of the legatees had obtained decrees, §78; Vose v. Philbrook, 3 Story, 335; ante, 
 
 in another suit, for their portions, it was proper 216, note; Lawrence v. Rokes, 53 Maine, 110; 
 
 to dismiss the bill as to them, they having been Mudgett v. Gager, 52 Maine, 541 ; Palmer v. 
 
 made defendants. Moore v. Beauchamp, 5 Stevens, 100 Mass. 461. 
 
 Dana, 71. 6 Rogers v. Linton, Bunb. 200. 
 
 2 Weymouth v. Boyer, 1 Ves. Jr. 416 ; see 
 also Anon. 2 Eq. Cas.Abr. 166, pi. 7 ; Hills v. 
 Nash, 1 Phil. 594, 597; 10 Jur. 148. 
 
 215
 
 221 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 It seems to be doubtful whether a trustee of an estate can be called 
 upon by a purchaser of a portion of the estate, sold by the beneficiaries 
 to different persons, to convey to him the legal estate in such portion, 
 without bringing all the other persons interested in the same estate 
 
 before the Court. 7 
 * 220 * It is a general rule, arising out of the preceding principles, 
 
 admitting of very few exceptions, that a trustee cannot, under 
 ordinary circumstances, institute proceedings in Equity relating to the 
 trust property, without making the cestui que trusts parties to the pro- 
 ceedings. 1 Thus, where a bill is filed by trustees for sale, against a 
 purchaser, for a specific performance of the contract, the cestui que 
 trusts of the purchase-money must be parties unless there is a clause 
 in the trust deed declaring the receipt of the trustees to be a sufficient 
 discharge, which is considered as a declaration by the author of the 
 
 trust that the receipt of the persons beneficially interested in 
 *221 the produce of the sale shall not be necessary; 2 and * where a 
 
 bill was filed by certain persons, describing themselves as 
 
 7 In Goodson v. Ellison, 3 Russ, 583, 593, 
 596, the persons beneficially interested in an 
 estate vested in trustees had, many years before 
 the commencement of the suit, proceeded to 
 sell the entirety in various lots, one of which 
 was purchased by the plaintiff, and all the per- 
 sons beneficially interested joined in conveying 
 it to him. The trustee, however, did not join, 
 and upon his death the legal estate became 
 vested in the defendants, upon whose refusal 
 to convey without the sanction of the Court, 
 the bill was filed, and a decree for a convey- 
 ance by the defendants was pronounced by 
 Lord Gifford M. R., who directed that they 
 should pay the costs of the suit. Upon appeal, 
 however, to Lord Eldon, his Lordship expressed 
 considerable doubts whether a trustee could be 
 called upon to divest himself of a trust by con- 
 veying different parcels of the trust property 
 at different times, and whether it was not there- 
 fore necessary to have all the other cestui que 
 trusts before the Court; but upon re-argument 
 the Lord Chancellor stated that he thought 
 there were parties enough before the Court to 
 enable him to make a decree, but as it was the 
 ca c e of an old trust, he thought the Court was 
 bound to inquire into the facts, and that the 
 trustees had a right to have the conveyance 
 settled in the Master's office. 
 
 1 Kirk v. Clark, Prec. Ch. 275; Large v. 
 Van Doren, 14 N. J. Eq. 208; Phillipson v. 
 Gatty, 6 Hare, 26 ; 12 Jur. 430 ; see, however, 
 Alexander v. Cana, 1 De G. & S. 415. A mere 
 nominal trustee cannot bring a suit, in his own 
 name, without joining his cestui que trusts with 
 him. Stilwell v. M'Neely, 1 Green, Ch. 205; 
 Schenck v. Ellingwood, 3 Edw. Ch. 175; Helm 
 v. Hardin, 2 B. Mon. 232: Malin v. Malin, 
 2 .John. Ch. 238 ; Fish v. Howland, 1 Paige, 20 ; 
 Bifield v. Tavlor, 1 B^atty, 93 ; Story, Eq. PI. 
 
 216 
 
 §§ 207, 209; Busney v. Spear, 17 Ga. 223; 
 Hall v. Harris, 11 Texas, 300; Woodward v. 
 Wood, 19 Ala. 213; Richards v. Richards, 9 
 Gray, 313. Where a bill in Equity to enforce 
 the specific performance of a contract involves 
 the title of the cestui que trusts to the property 
 in dispute, or where they are interested not 
 only in the fund or estate respecting which 
 the question at issue has arisen, but also in 
 that question itself, they are necessary parties. 
 Van Doren v. Robinson, 16 N. J. Eq. 256. 
 And the cestui que trusts should be joined 
 with the trustee in a suit for the recov- 
 ery of the trust property: Elmer v. Loper, 25 
 N.J. Eq. 475; and are necessary parties to a 
 bill by their trustee for foreclosure: Allen v. 
 Roll, id. 163 ; but the holders of bonds secured 
 are not : Williamson v. New Jersey Southern 
 R. Co. id. 13. Nor is it necessary that all the 
 creditors secured by a trust assignment should 
 be made parties to a suit by the trustee to sell 
 land for the payment of the debts. Robinson 
 v. Robinson, 11 Bush, 174. 
 
 Rule 4, adopted in 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, pro- 
 vided that "any one of several cestui que trusts 
 under any deed or instrument may, without 
 serving any other of such cestui que trusts, 
 have a decree for the execution of the trusts 
 of the deed or instrument ; " see M'Leod 
 v. Annesley, 16 Beav. C07; Jones v. James, 
 9 Hare. App. 80. The cestui que trusts are not 
 necessary parties to a suit in which a mortgage 
 for their benefit is brought in question; their 
 trustees are the proper parties to represent 
 them. New Jersey &c. Co. v. Ames, 12 N. J. 
 Eq. 507; Ashton v. Atlantic Bank, 3 Allen, 
 219, 220; Shaw v. Norfolk County R. R. Co. 5 
 Gray, 170, 171; Wright r. Bundy, 4 Ind. 398. 
 2 Per Sir J. Leach V. C, Calverley v. 
 Phelp, 6 Mad. 232.
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. * 221 
 
 trustees for a society consisting of a great number of persons, for the 
 specific performance of an agreement entered into by themselves for the 
 benefit of the society, and a demurrer was put in because the members 
 of the society were not parties to the suit, upon the argument of which 
 it was insisted that a trustee could not file a bill respecting the trust 
 property without making the cestui que tmst a party, and that, 
 although the members of the society were too numerous to make all of 
 them parties, the bill ought to have been filed by some of them on 
 behalf of themselves and the others, and that it did not appear by the 
 bill that the plaintiffs were even members of the society, the demurrer 
 was upon these grounds allowed. 1 So, if a mortgagee dies, and his 
 heir files a bill of foreclosure, the executor of the mortgagee must be a 
 party, 2 because, although at Law the legal right to the estate is in the 
 heir, yet in Equity he is a trustee for the executor, who is the person 
 entitled to the mortgage money ; 3 and for this reason, where the heir 
 of the mortgagee had foreclosed the mortgagor without making the 
 executor of the mortgagee a party, and a bill was filed by the executor 
 against the heir, the land was decreed to the executor. 4 It seems, 
 however, that although the personal representative is the person 
 entitled to receive the money, the heir has a right to say that he will 
 pay off the mortgage to the executor, and take the benefit of the fore- 
 closure himself; 6 and for this reason, as well as that before stated, the 
 heir of a mortgagee is a necessary party to a bill of foreclosure by the 
 personal representative, 6 unless the mortgagee has devised the mort- 
 gaged estate, in which case, as we have seen, his heir is not a necessary 
 party to a bill by the devisee to foreclose the equity of redemption. 7 
 
 There are, however, instances in which, under peculiar circumstances, 
 trustees are allowed to maintain a suit without their cestui que trusts; 
 as in the case of trustees under a deed, by which estates are vested 
 in them upon trust to sell and to apply the proceeds amongst credi- 
 tors or others, with a clause declaring the receipt of the trustees to 
 
 1 Douglas v. Horsfall, 2 S. & S. 184. 4 Qobe v. Carlisle, cited 2 Vera. 66. 
 
 2 See Graham v. Carter, 2 Hen. & M. 6; 5 Clerkson v. Bowyer, 2 Vera. 66. As to 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 200; Wood v. Holland (Ark.), mortgages made after Jan. 1, 1882, see 44 & 45 
 21 S. W. Rep. 223. A mortgage executed to Vic. c. 41, §§ 1 (1), 30. 
 
 persons in an official capacity may be foreclosed 6 Davis v. Hemingway, 29 Vt. 438. The 
 
 by their successors in office in their own names, heirs of a deceased mortgagee cannot, however, 
 
 as equitable assignees. Iglehart ». Bierce, 86 sustain a bill for foreclosure, but it must be 
 
 '**' l' );i - brought in the name of the executor or admin- 
 
 3 Freake v. Horsey, Nels. 93; 2 Freem. 180, istrator. Roath v. Smith, 5 Conn. 133. And 
 8. C.j 1 Ch. Cas. 51, S. C; 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 77, the heir is a necessary party to a bill filed by 
 S.C. ; Dexter v. Arnold, 1 Sumner, 113; Com. the personal representative* of the vendor to 
 Dig. tit. Chan. 4 A. 9; Demarest v. Wyn- enforce the lien for unpaid purchase-money, if 
 koop, 3 John. Ch. 145; Scott v. Macfarland, the legal title has not been made to the pur- 
 13 Mass. 309; Graces. Hunt, Cooke (Tenn.), chaser. Mott v. Carter, 26 Graft. 127; see 
 344; Jones v. Kirkpatrick, 2 Tenn. Ch. 698 ; McKay v. Wakefield, 63 Ind. 27. So if the 
 Denn v. Spinning, 1 Halst. 471; Marsh v. Aus- bill be to enjoin a sale of land by a trustee, on 
 tin, I Allen, 235; Plummer v. Doughty, 78 the ground that the trust debt was paid by the 
 Maine, 341; Citizen's National Bank v. Day- debtor in his lift time. Stewart v. Jackson, 8 
 ton, 116 111. 257. See White v. Secor, 58 Iowa, W. Va. 29. 
 
 533; Scott v. Streatham, W. N. (1891) 153 ^ Renvoize v. Cooper, 6 Mad. 371. 
 
 217
 
 * 000 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 *222 be a good discharge to the * purchasers. 1 (a) By the 30th Order 
 of August, 1841, in all suits concerning real estate which is 
 vested in trustees by devise, when such trustees are competent to sell 
 and give discharges for the proceeds of the sale, and for the rents and 
 profits of the estate, such trustees shall represent the persons bene- 
 ficially interested in the estate, or the proceeds, or the rents and profits, 
 in the same manner, and to the same extent, as the executors or admin- 
 istrators in suits concerning personal estate represent the persons 
 beneficially interested in such personal estate; and in such cases it 
 shall not be necessary to make the persons beneficially interested in 
 such real estate, or rents and profits, parties to the suit. 2 But the 
 
 1 See Calverly v. Phelp, 6 Mad. 229; as 
 to foreclosure in such cases, see post, S. C. 
 Where it appears on the face of the contract 
 that it was the intent of the parties to exclude 
 the cestui que trust from the necessity of taking 
 any part in the transaction relating to the man- 
 agement of the trust, the cestui que trust is not 
 a necessary party. Bifield v. Taylor, 1 Beatty, 
 91 ; S. C." 1 Moll. 192. So where a bill "is 
 brought by the trustee to obtain possession of 
 the trust propert}', and the cestui que tintst has 
 no interest in the possession. Furguson v. Ap- 
 plenhite, 10 Sm. & M. 301; Ashton v. Atlantic 
 Bank, 3 Allen, 219, 220. A trustee may main- 
 tain a bill to redeem a mortgage, made by him- 
 self, of the trust estate, without making his 
 cestui que trust a party. Boyden v. Partridge, 
 2 Gray, 190. 
 
 Where a mortgage deed of land has been 
 executed to a trustee to secure the payment of 
 debts to sundry persons, the trustee may main- 
 tain a bill to foreclose, without making the 
 cestui que trusts parties. Swift v. Stebbins, 4 
 Stew. & P. 467 ; Shaw v. Norfolk County R. 
 R. Co. 5 Gray, 170, 171. 
 
 A conveyance in trust may be cancelled by a 
 decree in Equity, though the cestui que trusts 
 be not made parties. Campbell r. Watson, 8 
 Ohio, 500. 
 
 In a suit affecting a fund held in trust for a 
 mother for life, and then to go to her children, 
 the trustee and mother sufficiently represent 
 the fund to prevent an objection for want of 
 parties prevailing at the hearing. Sweet v. 
 Parker, 22 N. J. Eq. 453. 
 
 2 This rule has been adopted by the Su- 
 preme Court of the United States. Equity 
 Rule, 49. But it has been abrogated in Eng- 
 land by Cons. Ord., Prel. Ord. r. 1; the cases 
 which it was intended to meet being included 
 in the more comprehensive enactments of 15 & 
 
 (a) When a specific equity of redemption is 
 devised or conve3'ed to a trustee to be con- 
 verted into money at a future day and divided, 
 after paying the incumbrance, between speci- 
 fied persons, they have a vested equitable in- 
 
 218 
 
 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42, r. 9, whereby it is provided 
 that in all suits concerning real or personal 
 estate which is vested in trustees under a will, 
 settlement, or otherwise, such trustees shall rep- 
 resent the persons beneficially interested un- 
 der the trust, in the same manner, and to the 
 same extent, as the executors or administra- 
 tors in suits concerning personal estate repre- 
 sent the persons beneficially interested in such 
 personal estate, and in such cases it shall not 
 be necessary to make the persons beneficially 
 interested under the trust parties to the suit, 
 but the Court may, upon consideration of the 
 matter, on the hearing, if it shall so think fit, 
 order such persons or any of them to be made 
 parties. This rule is retrospective, and applies 
 to all suits, as well as redemption and foreclos- 
 ure suits. Fowler v. Boyldon, 9 Hare App. 78; 
 Goldsmid v. Stonehewer, id. 38; 17 Jur. 199; 
 White v. Chitty, 14 W. R. 366; L. R. 1 Eq. 
 372, V. C. W. "See R. S. C. Ord. XVI. 7, 11; 
 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42, r. 9; R. S. C. Ord. 
 III. 4, and App. A. Pt. II. § 1, VIII. ; Goodrich 
 v. Marsh, W. N. (1878) 186. In an adminis- 
 tration suit the trustees of settled shares suffi- 
 ciently represent their cestui que trusts. Den- 
 sein v. Elworthy, 9 Hare, App. 42. And so, in 
 a suit to obtain a declaration of forfeiture, an 
 unascertained class taking on the forfeiture 
 are sufficiently represented by the trustees. 
 White V- Chitty, supra. So where the suit 
 was for sale and partition by testamentary 
 trustees. Stace v. Gage, 8 Ch. D. 451. See 
 Simpson v. Denny, 10 Ch. D. 28. It has also 
 been held that executors with a power of sale, 
 and also devisees in trust subject to payments 
 of debts, are trustees within the rule. Shaw v. 
 Hardingham, 2 W. R. 657, M. R.; Smith v. 
 Andrews, 4 W. R. 353, V. C. K.; but that an 
 executor with only an implied power of sale 
 is not. Bolton v. Stannard, 4 Jur. N. S. 576, 
 
 terest, and are necessary parties to a suit for 
 the foreclosure of the mortgage. United States 
 Trust Co. v. Roche, 116 N. Y. 120, 130; Kirk- 
 patrick v. Corning, 38 N. J. Eq. 234. 

 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. * 223 
 
 Court may upon consideration of the matter on the hearing, if it shall 
 so think tit, order such persons to be made parties. This order 
 applies, *not only to suits by persons claiming adversely against *223 
 the estate, but also to suits by some of the persons beneficially 
 interested, seeking relief in respect of alleged misconduct of the 
 trustees; and in such cases it renders it unnecessary that persons hav- 
 ing charges on the estate should be parties. 1 It is necessary, however, 
 that the trustees who are empowered to give discharges should them- 
 selves be entitled to the legal estate; otherwise the order does not 
 apply, and the cestui que trusts must be made parties to the suit. 2 
 In cases, also, where the interest of the cestui que trusts is collateral 
 to the rights between the plaintiff and the defendant, a person standing 
 in the place of trustee has been allowed to maintain a suit respecting 
 the trust property, without making the persons for whom he is trustee 
 parties ; thus the pawnee of a chattel or his representative may main- 
 tain a suit for the chattel without making the pawner a party. 8 And 
 so where a bill was brought for an account, and for the delivery of a 
 strong-box, in which were found jewels, and a note in these words: 
 "Jewels belonging to the Duke of Devonshire," in the hands of Mr. 
 Saville, whose representative the plaintiff was, and in whose posses- 
 sion they had been for fifty years, and an objection was taken that the 
 Duke's representative ought to have been a party, it was held that the 
 plaintiff might sustain the suit without him. 4 And upon the same prin- 
 ciple, where one of two trustees had been prevailed upon by his co- 
 trustee to transfer the trust fund into his name alone, and the co-trustee 
 afterwards sold the stock and received the produce, and never replaced 
 it; upon a bill filed by the trustee against his co-trustee to compel him 
 to replace the stock, a demurrer, put in on the ground that the cestui 
 que trusts of the fund were not made parties, was overruled upon 
 
 M. R.; see, however, 22 & 23 Vic. c. 35, §§ 14, on the one hand, and a stranger on the other. 
 
 16. The rule does not apply when the cestui Hamond v. Walker, 3 Jur. N. S. G86, V. C. 
 
 que trusts have concurred in breaches of trust. W. ; Payne t'. Parker, L. R. 1 Cli. 327; 12 Jur. 
 
 Jesse p. Bennett, 6 De G. M. & G. 609; 2 Jur. N. S 221, L. JJ. 
 
 N. S. 1125. And where an estate is sold under J Osborne v. Foreman, 2 Hare, 656 ; 8 Jur. 
 
 a decree of the Court, as a general rule (with 55; Ward v. Rassett, 5 Hare, 179; see also, upon 
 
 a possible exception in some cases of extreme the construction of this order, Cox v. Barnard, 
 
 difficulty) the Court will, in the exercise of its 5 Hare, 253; Lloyd r. Smith, 13 Sim. 457; 7 
 
 discretion, require all the persons interested in Jur. 400; Miller v. Huddlestone, 13 Sim. 4ti7; 
 
 the proceeds to be parties to the suit, or to be 7 Jur. 504; Reeve r. Richer, 1 De G. & S. 624; 
 
 served with notice of the decree, in order to 11 Jur. 960; Jones v. How, 7 Hare. 270; 14 Jur. 
 
 secure a proper and advantageous sale, and 145; Chamberlain r. Thacker, 13 Jur. 785; 14 
 
 protect the title of purchasers from being open Jur. 190. 
 
 to inquiry or impeachment. Doody v. Hig- 2 Turner v. Hind, 12 Sim. 414. It seems 
 
 gins, 9 Hare App. 32 ; 2 K & J. 729; Pigott doubtful whether the order applies to the case 
 
 r. Pigott, 2 N. R. 14, V. C. W. And wherever of a bill of foreclosure of freeholds devised in 
 
 the trustees' personal interest may prevent them trust for sale. Wilton v. Jones, 2 Y. & C. 
 
 from protecting the interest of the cestui que 244. 
 
 trusts, the Court will require the cestui que 3 See rmfe. p. 200, note («). Or by making 
 
 trusts, or some of them, to be made parties. him a defendant. Michigan State Rank v. 
 
 Read r. Prest. 1 K. & J. 183. Trustees cannot, Gardner. 3 Gray, 305. 
 
 however, represent some of the cestui que trusts 4 Saville v. Tancred, 1 Ves. Sr. 101; 3 
 
 in any contention inter se. but only where the Swanst. 141, n. See Story, Eq. PI. § 221. 
 contention is between all the cestui que trusts 
 
 219
 
 * 224 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 argument. 5 And where a trustee filed a bill to foreclose a mort- 
 * 224 gage, it being a breach of trust to have lent the money * upon 
 
 such a security, the cestui que trusts, who had never authorized 
 or adopted the mortgage, were held unnecessary parties. 1 If, however, 
 the cestui que trusts have concurred in the breach of trust, one trustee 
 cannot sue his co-trustee without making them parties. 2 (a) 
 
 The personal representative in all cases represents the personal estate 
 of the deceased, and is entitled to sue for it without making the residu- 
 ary legatees, or any other persons interested in it, parties. 8 In every 
 case an executor, though a bare trustee, and though there be a residu- 
 ary legatee, is entitled to sue for the personal estate in Equity as well 
 as at Law, unless the cestui que trusts will oppose it. 4 Where, however, 
 there has been a great lapse of time since the death of the testator, and 
 it seems doubtful who are the persons beneficially interested under his 
 will, the Court will not, as of course, order payment to a personal 
 representative of funds recovered in the cause, but may direct them to 
 be paid into Court. 5 
 
 5 Franco v. Franco, 3 Ves. 77 ; Bridget v. 
 Hames, 1 Coll. 72; May v. Selby, 1 Y. & C. 
 235; 6 Jur. 52; Horsley «. Fawcett, 11 Beav. 
 565; Peake v. Ledger, 8 Hare, 313; 4 De G. 
 & S. 137 (which was the case of executors); 
 Biynard v. Woolley, 20 Beav. 583; Blyth v. 
 Fladgate, [1891] 1 Ch. 337, 366; see Chancellor 
 v. Morecraft, 11 Beav. 262; and see Bridget ». 
 Hames, 1 Coll. 72; see also Butler v. Butler, 5 
 Ch. D. 554; S. C. on appeal, 7 Ch. D. 116, 
 where ir, was held that one trustee could not 
 maintain a bill against a co-trustee for realizing 
 the trust fund by sale of the property in which 
 it is invested, without bringing the cestui que 
 trusts before the Court. See alsoLuke v. South 
 Kensington Hotel Co. 7 Ch. D. 789; 11 id. 121; 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 213, and a discussion of this 
 subject in the note; Cunningham v. Pell, 5 
 Paige, 607. If the object of the bill of a trustee 
 be to recover the fund with a view to its admin- 
 istration by the Court, the parties interested 
 must be represented. But if it merely seeks to 
 recover the trust moneys, the beneficiaries are 
 not necessary parties. Carey v. Brown, 92 U. 
 S. 171; Adams v. Bradley, 6 Mich 346; Potts 
 r. Thames Haven and Dock Co. 15 Jur. 1004; 7 
 Eng. L. & E. 262. And the objection of the 
 want of parties must be made either by de- 
 murrer or plea. Carey v. Brown, 92 U. S. 173. 
 If a trustee has fraudulently or improperly 
 parted with trust property, the cestui que trust 
 mav proceed against the trustee alone, to com- 
 pel satisfaction for the breach of trust, or he 
 may at his election join the assignee also, if he 
 were a party to the fraud, or if he seeks redress 
 
 against him. Bailey v. Ingles, 2 Paige, 278; 
 West v. Randall, 2 Mason, 197; Franco v. 
 Franco, 3 Sumner's Ves. 75, note (ft). 
 
 1 Allen o. Knight, 5 Hare, 272, 277 ; 10 Jur. 
 943. 
 
 2 Jesse v. Bennett, 6 De G. & G. 609 ; 2 
 Jur. N. S 1125. 
 
 3 See Miles v. Davis, 19 Miss. 408; R. S C. 
 Ord. XVI. 7, 11 ; III. 4; App. A, Pt. II. §§ I., 
 Vin. Where a woman by her will gave all her 
 personal estate to her bastard child, and made 
 B and C her executors, and died; and within 
 a short time after the bastard died intestate ; 
 upon a bill filed by the execu'or against a per- 
 son in whose hands the property of the mother 
 was, praying for an account, the defendant 
 demurred, because the representative of the 
 bastard and the Attorney-General were not par- 
 ties; and the demurrer was overruled, it being 
 held that the executor was legally entitled to 
 the estate of his testatrix; and though this may 
 be in trust for another, yet as the executor has 
 the legal title, he can give a good discharge to 
 the defendant. Jones v. Goodchild, 3 P. Wms. 
 33; see also Peake v. Ledger, 8 Hare, 313; 
 Smith v. Bolden, 33 Beav. 262. 
 
 4 3 P. W. 48. As he has the legal title, his 
 charge to the defendant is valid, though ap- 
 pointed by a foreign Court. Eames v. Hacon, 
 16 Ch. D. 407, where the foreign letters had been 
 resealed in England. See S. C 18 Ch. D. 347, 
 353. 
 
 s Lov v. Duckett, Cr. & Ph. 305 ; Ex parte 
 Ram, 3 M & C. 25 ; 1 Jur. 668 ; Re Malony. 1 
 J. & H. 249; Orrok v. Binney, Jac. 523, Pen- 
 
 (a) There is no liability on the part of the 
 estate of a deceased trustee, who left the trust 
 funds in a proper state of investment at his 
 death, for a breach of trust subsequently com- 
 mitted. Re Palk, 41 W. R. 28; W. N "(1892) 
 220 
 
 112. But a new trustee, who after his appoint- 
 ment participates in the trustees' breach of 
 trust, becomes liable with them. Ricker v. 
 Alsop, 27 Fed. Rep. 251.
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. * 225 
 
 So, also, assignees of bankrupts or insolvent debtors may either 
 maintain or defend suits relating to the estates vested in them as such 
 assignees, without the creditors for whom they are trustees being made 
 parties to the suit. 6 (//) Nor is it necessary, in such case, that the 
 bankrupt or insolvent, though interested in the residue, * should *22o 
 be before the Court, 1 though, from a decision in Vernon's 
 Reports, it appears to have been formerly considered necessary in suits 
 by assignees to have the bankrupt before the Court. 2 Where, however, 
 creditors, instead of seeking relief under the Commission, proceed at 
 Law against the bankrupt, the bankrupt may file a bill of discovery in 
 aid of his defence at Law, and for an injunction; and where there are 
 complicated accounts, he may pray to have them taken, and to have 
 the balance due to him from the defendants set off against the demand 
 of the creditors, without making his assignees parties, 8 but he cannot 
 ray to have the balance paid to him, because that belongs to his assignees. 
 
 The rule that, where the person by law entitled to represent the per- 
 sonal estate is the party suing, legatees or other persons interested in 
 the estate need not be parties, does not extend to the case of a residuary 
 legatee or one of the next of kin suing for his share of the residue, or of 
 one legatee interested in a legacy charged on real estate, or one person 
 interested in the proceeds of real estate directed to be sold, in which 
 case, as we have seen, it is generally necessary that all the members 
 of the class should be made parties to the suit, either as plaintiffs or 
 defendants, or by being served with notice of the decree, 4 although 
 where the number of the class is great, one may be allowed to sue on 
 behalf of the others. 5 And where legacies are charged upon real 
 estates, it will not, in general, be sufficient to bring the executors 
 before the Court, for, except in cases coming within the 30th Order of 
 
 nington v Buckley, 6 Hare, 451, 459 ; 11 Jur. Wire Rope Co. W. N. (1868) 296 ; 17 VV. R. 
 
 468 ; Edwards v. Harvey, 9 Jur. N. S. 453; 11 155, V. C. M. ; L. R. 7 Eq. 267. 
 
 W. R. 330, M. B. ; Peacock v. Saggers, 4 Ue 2 Sliarpe v. Gamon, 2 Vern. 32; 1 Eq. Cas. 
 
 G. F. & J 406; Samson v. Samson, 18 W. R. Abr. 72, pi. 7, S. C. 
 
 530; lie Ashmead, L. R. 8 Ch. 113; and see 3 I.owndes v. Taylor, 1 Mad. 423. 
 
 Adams v. Barry, 2 Coll. 285, where the Court 4 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42, rr. 1.8; and see R. 
 
 required the residuary legatee to be made a S. C. Ord. XVI. 7, 9; post, Chap. VII. § 2, 
 
 party. Proceedinr/s by Service of Notice of the Decree. 
 
 6 Spragg v. Binkes, 5 Ves. 587. An as- 5 Harvey v. Harvey, 4 Beav. 215, 220; see 
 
 signce in bankruptcy may maintain a suit to also Smart c. Bradstock, 7 Beav. 500; Bateman 
 
 set aside a conveyance by the bankrupt in v. Margerison, 6 Hare, 496, 499; but see Jones 
 
 fraud of creditors. Re Gurney, 7 Biss. 414; v. Howe, 7 Hare, 267; 14 Jur. 145; see also 
 
 Cady ?;. Whaling, id. 430; Johnson v. Helm- Doody v. Higgins, 9 Hare App. 32, particularly 
 
 staedter, 30 N. J. Eq. 124. the observations of Sir George Turner V. ('. at 
 
 l De Golls v. Ward, 3 P. Wins. 311. in p. 38, Gould v. Hayes, 19 Ala. 438. All the 
 
 nutis; Kaye v. Fosbrooke, 8 Sim. 28 , Dyson v. distributees are necessary parties to a bill for 
 
 Hornby, 7 De G. M. & G. 1. Similarly the distribution. Hawkins v. Craig, 1 B. Mon. 27; 
 
 debtor is not a necessary party to suits by or Osborne v. Taylor, 12 Grutt. 117; but see Moore 
 
 against trustees of a deed duly registered under v. Gleaton, 23 Ga. 142; Keeler v. Keeler, 11 
 
 former bankrupt law: Fenton v. Queen's Ferry N. J.Eq. 458. 
 
 (6) To a bill by an assignee in bankruptcy of the assigned estate, should be parties, if it is 
 
 against the assignee under a voluntary assign- desired to recover from them. Liuder v. Lewis, 
 
 ment, to set it aside, intervening execution ere- 4 Fed. Rep. 318. 
 ditors, who have received part of the proceeds 
 
 221
 
 226 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 August, 1841, above mentioned, all the other legatees must be parties ; 6 
 it seems, however, that trustees of a real estate for payment of debts 
 have been allowed, before that order, to sue without bringing before the 
 
 Court the creditors or legatees for whom they are trustees; 7 but 
 * 226 * it is apprehended that, in such cases, the Court would now 
 
 generally allow the trustees under the ninth rule above referred 
 to, to represent the creditors. 1 And now one of several cestui que 
 trusts, under any deed or instrument, may be a plaintiff or defendant, 
 as representative of his class, in a suit for the execution of the trusts 
 of the deed or instrument, the others of the class being served with 
 notice of the decree ; 2 but any cestui que trusts who have concurred in 
 the breach of trust must be parties to a suit to make a trustee liable for 
 the loss occasioned thereby. 3 
 
 Although, in ordinary cases, the executor represents the whole per- 
 sonal estate, and no legatee need be a party, the appointees under the 
 will of a feme covert are in a different situation, and must be made 
 parties; 4 therefore, where the administrator with the will annexed of 
 a married woman, filed a bill, praying that the defendants might pay 
 over to him a sum of money, as to which a testamentary appointment 
 had been executed by the testatrix, by virtue of a power in her mar- 
 riage settlement, without making the appointees parties, the case was 
 ordered to stand over, with leave for the plaintiff to amend by bringing 
 the appointees before the Court. 5 It is apprehended, however, that the 
 Court would not now require the cestui que trusts to be parties in such 
 a case. 6 Where the appointees were very numerous, and the bill was 
 filed by some of them on behalf of themselves and the others, the 
 Court dispensed with the general rule which required them all to be 
 
 6 Morse v. Sadler, 1 Cox, 352; Hallett ?;. 
 Hallett. 2 Paige, 15; Todd v. Sterrett, 6 J. J. 
 Marsh. 432; Howland v. Fish, 1 Paige, 20. In 
 this last case the Court remark: "In Morse 
 v. Sadler, 1 Cox, 352, the Master of the Rolls 
 decided that every legatee, whose legacy was 
 charged on the real estate, must be a party to 
 the bill. It is true that case was overruled by 
 Chancellor Kent in Brown v. Ricketts, 3 John. 
 Ch. 553, where it was held that one legatee 
 might file a bill in favor of himself and all 
 others, who might choose to come in under the 
 decree. But even then Chancellor Kent con- 
 siders it necessary that the bill should state 
 the fact that it is filed in behalf of the plaintiff 
 and all others, &c. The reason of the rule 
 seems to be, that the defendants may not be 
 charged with a double defence." 
 
 7 Ld. Red. 174; see, however, Harrison v. 
 Stewardson, 2 Hare, 530; Thomas v. Dunning, 
 5 De G. & S. 618. Executors suing for lega- 
 cies charged upon land after the estate has been 
 settled must join the legatees as complainants 
 with them. Cool v. Higgins, 25 N. J. Eq. 
 117. 
 
 > Morley v. Morley, 25 Beav. 253. In 
 Knight v. Pocock, 24 Beav. 136; 4 Jur. N. S. 
 222 
 
 197, it was held that trustees did not represent 
 creditors who had not acceded to the deed. 
 And see, on this point, Johns v. James, 8 Ch. 
 D. 744; Re Sanders, 47 L. J. Ch 667. 
 
 2 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42, rr. 4, 6; M'Leod 
 v. Annesley, 16 Beav. 600; Jones v. James, 
 9 Hare App. 80 ; and see post, Chap. III. 
 § 2, Proceedings by Service of Notice of the 
 Decree. 
 
 3 Jesse v. Bennett, 6 De G. M. & G. 609; 
 2 Jur. N. S. 1125; Williams v. Allen, 29 Beav. 
 292. One of several cestui que trusts cannot, 
 on an allegation that the trustees refused to 
 take proceedings, maintain a suit against a 
 debtor to the trust. The remedy is by a general 
 bill for the execution of the trust, and the ap- 
 pointment of a receiver to sue. Sharpe e. San 
 Paulo By. G.. L. R 8 Ch 597; Meldrum v. 
 Scorer, 56 L. T 471. 
 
 4 Story, Eq. PI. § 204, and note. 
 
 s Court v. Jeffery, 1 S. & S. 105; but see 
 Owens v. Dickenson, ante, pp. 186, 187. 
 
 6 Musters v. Wright, 2 De G. & S. 777; and 
 see Sewell v. Ashley, 3 De G. M. & G. 933; Re 
 Newberv, Allcroft v. Farnan, 10 W. R. 378, V. 
 C. K. ; Re Hoskins, 5 Ch. D. 229; 6 Ch. D. 281.
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. * 227 
 
 parties. 7 Where a bill was filed by one of four children, who were 
 appointees of their mother, to set aside the appointment on account of 
 the unfairness of the distribution, it was held that all the other children 
 who were appointees need not be parties, because they might go in 
 before the Master. 8 
 
 Where there are more than one executor or administrator, they must 
 all be parties to the suit, though one of them be an infant. 9 Where, 
 however, one executor of several has alone proved, he may 
 *sue without making the other executors parties, although they *227 
 have not renounced. 1 And where a person devises that his 
 executors shall sell his land, and leaves two executors who renounce, 
 and administration is granted to A, who brings a bill against the heir 
 to compel a sale, the renouncing executors, in whom the power of 
 sale collateral to the executorship was vested, ought not, it seems, to be 
 made parties. 2 It is not, however, necessary that the executors or 
 administrators should be all co-plaintiffs; for it is sufficient that all 
 parties interested should be before the Court, either as plaintiffs or 
 defendants; 3 and, therefore, one executor may sue without his co- 
 executor joining, if the co-executor be made a defendant. 4 
 
 The rale that all persons claiming concurrent interests with the 
 plaintiff are necessary parties, equally applies whether the interest be 
 in possession, remainder, or reversion; and upon this principle it is 
 held, that in all cases in which an estate is claimed by a person deriv- 
 ing title under a settlement, made either by deed or will, it is necessary 
 to make all the persons claiming under such settlement parties to the 
 suit, down to the person entitled to the first vested estate of inheri- 
 tance, either in fee or in tail, inclusive. 5 And where A was tenant for 
 years, with remainder to B for life, with remainder to C in fee, and 
 
 1 Manning v. Thesiger, 1 S. & S. 106 ; Story, 77; Vickers v. Bell, 4 De G. J. & S. 271, 283 ; 
 
 Eq. PI. § 217. 10 Jur. N. S. 376; Re Lovett, 3 Ch. D. 198; 
 
 8 Craker v. Parrott, 2 Ch. Cas. 228. , and see 2 Wins. Exors. 1875; Add. Cont. 1050. 
 
 9 Oifley v. Jenney, 3 Ch. Rep. 92 ; 2 Wms. But an executor, though he has not proved the 
 Exors. 1875 ; Cramer v. Morton, 2 Moll. 108; will, is a necessary party defendant to a suit to 
 see Latch v. Latch, L. R. 10 Ch. 461. Rule 6, carry the trusts of the will into execution, 
 adopted in 15 & 16 Vic. c 86, provided that Ferguson v. Ferguson, 1 Hayes & J. 300; Yates 
 "any executor, administrator, or trustee may v. Compton, 2 P. W. 308; Cramer p. Morton, 
 obtain a decree against any legatee, next of 2 Moll. 108; Thompson v. Graham, 1 Paige, 
 kin, or ctstui que trust, for the administration 384; see Judson v. Gibbons, 5 Wend. 224. 
 
 of the estate, or the execution of the trusts." - Yates v. Compton, 2 P. Wms. 308. 
 
 1 Davies v. Williams, I Sim. 5; Dyson v. 3 Wilkins v. Fry, 1 Mer. 244, 262. 
 
 Morris, 1 Hare, 413. Rinehart v. Riuehart. 15 * Blount v. Burrow, 3 Bro C. C. 90; Smith 
 
 N J. Eq 144; Marsh v. Oliver, 14 N. J. Eq. v. Lawreiice.il Paige, 208; Lucas v. Scale, 2 
 
 262. It will be seen on referring to the report Atk. 56; McGregor v. McGregor, 35 N. Y. 218; 
 
 of the case of Davies v. Williams, supra, that Ransom v. Geer, 30 N. J. Eq. 249; see Dane v. 
 
 Sir John Leach V. C is reported to have said: Allen, 1 Green, Ch. 288. It appears to have 
 
 'Where one executor has alone proved, he been at first doubted whether a co-executor 
 
 may sue in Equity, as well as at Law, without refusing to join as co-plaintiff was entitled to 
 
 naming the others as parties;" but in Cum- his costs. 3 Bro. C. C 90. 
 mins o. Cummins, 3 Jo. & Eat. 92, Ld. St. 5 Kinch v. Finch, 2 Ves. Sr. 492; Sohier ». 
 
 Leonards, then Lord Chancellor of Ireland, Williams, 1 Curtis, 479; Story, Eq. PI. § 144, 
 
 speaking of this case, said: " This may he do as note. Where the first tenant in tail was a lunatic, 
 
 to suits in Equity, but certainly it is not the the person entitled to the next estate of inherit- 
 
 case as to actions at Lmw." And see Hensloe's ance was held a proper party. Singleton v. 
 
 Case, 3 Rep. 366; Kilby v. Stanton, 2 Y. & J. Hopkins, 1 Jur. N. S. 1199. 
 
 223
 
 * 228 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 B brought a bill against A for an injunction to restrain his commit- 
 ting waste, it was held that the remaindei-man, or the reversioner in 
 fee, ought to be before the Court. 6 It will be borne in mind, however, 
 that where the property is vested in trustees under a deed or will, the 
 trustees now generally represent all the cestui que trusts." 1 
 
 It is not necessary in such cases to bring before the Court any 
 
 * 228 * person entitled in remainder or reversion after the first vested 
 
 estate of inheritance, because such person is considered sufficient 
 to support all those who are in remainder behind him. 1 And if there 
 be a tenant for life, remainder to his first son in tail, remainder over, 
 and the tenant for life is brought before the Court before he has issue, 
 the contingent remainder-men are bound. 2 All persons entitled to 
 intermediate estates, prior to the first vested estate of inheritance, 
 should, however, be before the Court. Thus, where a marriage settle- 
 ment was made of lands on the husband for life, remainder to the wife 
 for life, with divers remainders over, and a bill was brought by the 
 husband, in order to have the opinion of the Court whether a certain 
 parcel of land was not intended to be included in the settlement, and 
 the wife was not a party, the case was ordered to stand over, in 
 order that she might be made a party, as, if a decree should be made 
 against the husband, it would not bind her. 8 So, where a bill was 
 brought by a son, who was remainder-man in tail under a settlement, 
 against his father, who was tenant for life under the same settlement, 
 to have the title-deeds brought into Court that they might be forthcom- 
 ing for the benefit of all parties interested, and objections were taken 
 for want of parties, one of which was, that a daughter of the defend- 
 ant, who was interested in a trust term for years, prior to the limitation 
 to the plaintiff, was not before the Court, the objection was held good. 4 
 Another objection in this case was, because certain annuitants of the 
 son, upon his reversion after the death of his father, were not parties, 
 and Lord Hardwicke held, that he could not make the order prayed 
 until the annuitants were first heard, and that consequently the objec- 
 tion must be allowed. 5 From this it would seem, that although a 
 remainder-man in tail may maintain a suit without bringing the per- 
 sons entitled to subsequent remainders before the Court, yet if he has 
 charged or incumbered his estate in remainder, the persons interested 
 in such charge or incumbrance must be parties; and it is held, that a 
 person claiming under a limitation by way of executory devise, not 
 
 6 By Lord King, in Mollineux ?•. Powell, v. Barnard. 1 Tenn. Ch. 304; Brevoort v. Bre- 
 
 cited 3 P. Wins. 268, n.; but see 1 Dick. 197, voort, 70 N. Y. 136. And see where the estate 
 
 198, and Eden on Injunctions, 163; Story, Eq. is subject to a contingency, infra, 266, note 4. 
 PI. § 159. 2 Per Lord Kedesdale, in Giffard v. Hort, 1 
 
 1 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42, r. 9. See R S. C. Sch. & Lef. 408 ; and see aiso, as to tenants for 
 
 Ord. XVI. 7. life representing persons contingently entitled 
 
 1 Anon. 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 166, pi. 8; Lloyd v. in remainder, in a suit as to personalty, Fowler 
 
 Johnes, 9 Ves. 37, 55; Beiolev v. Carter, L. R. o. James, 1 C. P. Coop, temp Cott. 290 ; 1 Phil. 
 
 4 Ch. 230; Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Cammet, 2 803; and see Roberts t?. Roberts, 2 Phil. 534; 12 
 
 Edw. Ch. 127; Baker v. Baker, 1 Rich. Eq. 392; Jur. 148; 2 De G. & S. 29. 
 Bofil v. Fisher, 3 Rich Eq. 1; Ex parte Dodd, 8 Herring v. Yeo, 1 Atk. 290. 
 
 Phil. Eq. (N. C.) 97; Freeman v. Freeman, 9 * Pyncent v. Pyncent, 3 Atk. 571. 
 
 Heisk. 306; Parker v. Peters, 6 Rep. 347; Gray 5 Ibid. 
 
 224
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. * 230 
 
 subject to any preceding estate of inheritance by which it may 
 
 be defeated, *inust be a party to a suit in which his rights are *229 
 
 involved; 1 but executory devisees not in esse may be bound by 
 
 a decree against the first estate of inheritance. 
 
 Where the intermediate estate is contingent, and the person to take 
 is not ascertained, it is sufficient to have before the Court the trustees, 
 if any, to support the contingent remainder, together with the first 
 person in esse entitled to the first vested estate of inheritance. 2 
 
 If a person entitled to an interest prior in limitation to any estate 
 of inheritance before the Court, should be born pending the suit, that 
 person must be brought before the Court by supplemental bill ; 3 and if 
 the first tenant in tail is plaintiff and dies without issue before the 
 termination of the suit, the next remainder-man in tail, although he 
 claims by new limitation, and not through the first plaintiff as his 
 issue, is entitled to continue the suit by supplemental bill, and to 
 have the benefit of the evidence and proceedings therein; 4 and so 
 where a tenant in tail who is a defendant dies, 5 or his interest is post- 
 poned by the birth of a tenant in tail entitled under prior limitations, 6 («) 
 the plaintiff is entitled to carry on the proceedings, on bringing the 
 person who has become the first tenant in tail before the Court. 
 
 In all the preceding cases the rights of the several parties to the 
 subject-matter in litigation were consistent with each other, and 
 *were the result of the same state of facts, so that the same *230 
 evidence which would establish those facts would establish the 
 rights of all the parties to maintain the litigation. It is, therefore, 
 required that all the parties so deriving their right of litigation from 
 the same facts, should, subject to the exceptions which we have noticed, 
 
 1 Ld- Red. 174. of litigation was settled upon Baron Clinton for 
 
 2 Lord Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton, 2 J. & life, and, after remainders to his children 
 W. 1, 133; 4 Bligh, 1 ; 2 Mer. 171 ; see Sohier (who were unborn) and their heirs in tail, upon 
 v. Williams, 1 Curtis, 479; Nodine v. Green- the person who should then be entitled to claim 
 field, 7 Paige, 544. Trustees to support con- as Baron Clinton in tail, with ultimate remain- 
 tingent remainders are now no longer neces- der to the existing Lord Clinton in fit-, it was 
 sary; 8 & 9 Vic c. 10G, § 8; 40&41 Vic. c. 33. objected that the person presumptively entitled 
 Lord Hardwicke, in Hopkins v. Hopkins, 1 Atk. to the barony, ought to have been a party; but 
 690 (but as to the report of this case, see 2 J. Sir William Grant M. R. overruled the objec- 
 & W. 18, 192), states the practice upon this point tion upon the ground above stated. 
 
 thus: "If there are ever so many contingent 3 Ld. Red. 174, and see R. S. C. Ord. L. 
 
 limitations of a trust, it is an established rule, 4 Lloyd v. Johnes, 9 Ves. 37, 58. 
 
 that it is sufficient to bring the trustees before 5 Cress well r. Bateman, 6 W. R. 206 220 
 
 the Court, together with him in whom the first V. C. K.; Reg. Lib. 1857, A. 424. 
 
 remainder of the inheritance is vested ; and 6 Egremont v. Thompson, L. R. 4 Ch. 448, 
 
 they that may come after will be hound by L C. See Auster v. Haines. L. R. 4 Ch. 445, 
 
 the decree, though not in esse, unless there be n.; Browne v. Huggins, W. N. (1875) 59; 
 
 fraud or collusion between the trustees and the Occleston » Fullalove, id. 92; 32 L. T. N. S. 
 
 first person in whom the inheritance is vested." 421; Scruby v. Payne, W. N. (1870) 227; 
 
 Tons, in Lord Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton, Capps v. Capps, L. R. 4 Ch. 1, 12. 
 
 supra, in which the estate which was the subject 
 
 (a) See Powell v. Phillips, 24 L. T. N. S. order to revive. Askew v. Rooth, 44 L. J. Ch. 
 128: Scott v Duncombe, L. R. 9 Eq.fi64, over- 200. In England, the infant should now be 
 ruling Grnnwell v. Garner, L. R 8 Eq. 355. brought in by the common order .under R. S. C. 
 In Equity, the infant must be brought in by a 1883, Ord. XVII. . rule 4. Peter v. Thomas- 
 supplemental bill, and not by the common Peter, 20 Ch. D. 181. 
 
 vol. i. — 15 225
 
 *230 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 be brought before the Court, in order that such their rights may be 
 simultaneously disposed of. Where, however, the claims of the several 
 persons to the subject-matter of the suit do not arise out of the same 
 state of circumstances but can only be supported upon grounds which 
 are inconsistent with each other, so that, if the grounds upon which 
 the plaintiff supports his claim be correct, the case relied upon by the 
 other parties claiming the same thing cannot be supported, then such 
 other parties need not be brought before the Court. 1 And according to 
 the original practice of the Court of Chancery, if persons having incon- 
 sistent titles, as, for instance, the devisee and heir-at-law, were joined 
 as co-plaintiffs, there was a misjoinder and no relief could be granted, 
 and the suit had to be dismissed; 2 though afterwards the Court of 
 Chancery was enabled to grant relief notwithstanding such a mis- 
 joinder. 3 Now, according to the practice of the High Court of Justice 
 in England, all persons may be joined as plaintiffs in whom the right 
 to any relief claimed is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or 
 in the alternative, and judgment may be given for such one or more 
 of the plaintiffs as may be found entitled to relief, for such relief as he 
 or they maybe entitled to without any amendment; but the defendant is 
 in every case entitled to any costs occasioned by joining a plaintiff who 
 is found not entitled to relief, 4 and no action will be defeated by rea- 
 son of the misjoinder of parties, and the Court may deal with the 
 matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the 
 parties before it, or may strike out or add parties. 5 
 
 In suits for specific performance, it is a general rule, that none but 
 parties to the contract are necessary parties to the suit; 6 (a) and a mere 
 
 1 For application of this principle to suits 
 for tithes by impropriator or vicar, see William- 
 son v. Lonsdale, Dan. Ex. 171; 9 Price, 187; 
 Williams v. Price, Dan. 13; 4 Price, 15G ; Carte 
 v. Ball, 3 Atk. 500; Petch v. Dalton, Scacc. 
 Jan. 1819, cited 1J. & W. 515; Daws ». Benn, 
 id. 513; Jac. 95; Baily v. Worrall, Bunb. 115; 
 Cook v. Blunt, 2 Sim. 417; Wing v. Morrell, 
 M'Cl. & Y. 625; Tooth v. Dean of Canterbury, 
 3 Sim. 49; Wing v. Morrell, M'Cl. & Y. 625; 
 Pierson v. David, 1 Clarke (Iowa), 23. 
 
 2 Lord Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton, 2 J. 
 & W. 1, 135; 4 Bligh, 1; Sugd. Law Prop. 61, 
 74; S. C. T. & R. 107, 115; see also Att.-Gen. 
 v. Tarrington, Hardres, 219; Fulham v. M'Car- 
 thy, 1 H. L. Cas. 703; 12 Jur. 755; Bill v. 
 Cureton, 2 M. & K. 503, 512; Saumarez v. 
 Saumarez, 4 M. & C. 336; Robertson v. South- 
 gate, 6 Hare, 536 : but see Greggs ?'. Staplee, 2 
 De G. & S. 572, 588; 13 Jur. 29; Jopp v. Wood, 
 2 De G. J. & S. 323; Newcomb r. Horton, 18 
 
 Wis. 566; Crocker v. Craig, 46 Maine, "327; 
 Fletcher v. Holmes, 40 Maine, 364 ; Gates v. 
 Boomer, 17 Wis. 455. So persons liable to 
 account to each other could not be co-plaintiffs. 
 See Jacob v. Lucas, 1 Beav. 436, 443 ; Griffith 
 v. Vanheythuysen, 9 Hare, 85; 15 Jur. 421. 
 The objection for misjoinder appears not to 
 apply to a sole plaintiff uniting in himself two 
 conflicting interests. Miles v. Durnford. 2 De 
 G. M. & G. 641; Carter v. Sanders, 2 Drew. 
 248; Foulkes v. Davies, L. R. 7 Eq. 42. 
 
 3 See p. 234, post. 
 
 i R. S. C. Ord. XVI. 1. Respecting alter- 
 native defences, suits on behalf of corporations, 
 and class suits under the present English prac- 
 tice, see the 6th Eng. ed. of this work, Vol. I. 
 pp. 195-202. 
 
 s R. S. C Ord. XVI. 13. 
 
 6 Tasker v. Small, 3 M. & C. 63, 69 ; 1 Jur. 
 936; Wood v. White, 4 M. & C. 460; Robert- 
 son v. Great Western Ry. Co. 10 Sim. 314; 
 
 (a) See Washburn & Moen Manuf. Co. v. 
 Chicago G. W. F. Co. 109 111. 71; Moulton v. 
 Chaffee, 22 Fed. Rep. 26; Hubbard v. Johnson, 
 77 Maine, 139 ; McKay v. Broad, 70 Ala. 377; 
 Behr r. Willard, 11 Neb. 601. Written instru- 
 ments are reformed in equity only between the 
 original parties and those claiming under them 
 
 226 
 
 in privity, including purchasers from them with 
 notice. Cross v. Bean, 81 Maine, 525. In a 
 suit to reform a declaration of trust as to one of 
 separate interests, those only are necessary par- 
 ties who are concerned in that interest. 
 v. Waterman, 85 Cal. 488. 
 
 Ward
 
 PERSONS HAYING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. * 231 
 
 stranger claiming under an adverse title should not be made a party to 
 such a suit, 7 although a person claiming by virtue of an antecedent 
 agreement is a proper party to a suit by a purchaser for specific per- 
 formance, and to have the right to the purchase-money ascer- 
 tained. 8 Where, however, there are other persons so * inter- *231 
 ested in the subject-matter of the contract that their concurrence 
 is necessary for the completion of the title, it is the duty of the vendor 
 to bring them forward, to assist in giving effect to his contract. 1 As 
 plaintiffs, they have no right to sue; and if such persons are infants, 
 and it were attempted, by making them co-plaintiffs with the vendor, 
 to bind their rights by a decree, the fact of their being so made parties 
 would be a fatal objection to the suit; and whether the point was or 
 was not raised by the other parties the Court would refuse to pronounce 
 a decree. 2 In some cases, where, subsequently to the contract, another 
 person has acquired an interest under the vendor, with notice of the 
 rights of the purchaser, the latter has, in a suit for specific perform- 
 ance, been allowed to join such person with the vendor as a defendant 
 to the suit; 3 and where the vendor has parted with the possession, he 
 must join the lessee of the purchaser as defendant to a suit for specific 
 performance, and a declaration of his lien for unpaid purchase-money. 4 (a) 
 
 Humphreys v. Ho] lis, .lac. 73; Paterson v. 
 Long, 5 Beav. 186; Peacock v. Fenson, 11 Beav. 
 355; 12 .lur. 951; Petre v. Duncombe, 7 Hare, 
 24; De Hoghton v. Money, L R. 2 Ch. 164, 
 170, L. JJ. ; Bishop of Winchester v. Mid Hants 
 Ry. Co. L. R. 5 En,. 17, V. C. S.; Aberaman 
 Iron Works Co. v. Wickens, L. R. 4 Ch. 101, 
 L. C; Fen wick v. Bulman, L. R. 9 Eq. 165, 
 V. C. S.J Lumley v. Timms, 21 W. R. 319, 
 494; W. N. (1873)70; Treleaven v. Brav, 1 
 Ch. D. 176, 45 L. J. Ch. 113; Harry r. Davey, 
 2 Ch. D. 721. See 38 & 30 Vic. c. 87, § 93 ; see, 
 however, Daking v. Whimper, 26 Beav. 588; 
 see Morgan v. Morgan, 2 Wheat. 290; Lord n. 
 Underdunck, 1 Sandf. Ch. 46; Hoover v. Don- 
 ally, 3 Hen. & M. 316; Preston v. Walsh, 10 
 Ved. Rep. 315. Infra, 279, n. 1. 
 
 V Tasker v. Small, 3 M. & C. 03, 69; 1 .Tur. 
 936; De Hoghton v. Money, L. R. 2 Ch. 164, 
 170, L. JJ. But see Carter v. Mills, 30 Miss. 
 432, cited infra. 
 
 8 West Midland Ry. Co. v. Nixon, 1 H. & M. 
 
 176 ; and see Chadwick v. Maden, 9 Hare 188; 
 Burr v. Wimbledon Local Board (No. 1), 56 L. 
 T. 329; 35 W. R. 404. 
 
 i Wood v. White, 4 M. & C. 460, 483; 
 Chadwick v. Maden, 9 Hare, 188. 
 
 2 Wood n. White, 4 M. & C. 460, 483. See 
 Williams v. Leech, 28 Penn. St. SJ; Burger v. 
 Potter, 32 111. 66. 
 
 3 Spence r. Hogg, 1 Coll. 225; Collett r. 
 Hover, 1 Coll. 227; but see Cutts v. Thodey, 13 
 Sim. 206; 6 Jur. 1027; and 1 Coll. 212, n. (a), 
 223 n.; see also Leuty v. Hillas, 2 De G. & 
 J. 110; 4 Jur. N. S. 1106; and see R. S. C. 
 Ord. XVI. 1. In a suit for the specific perform- 
 ance of a contract to convey land, a person 
 nut made a party, who claims a superior title 
 to the land in question under the party of 
 whom performance is sought, may come in and 
 assert his rights; as a decree might affect them 
 injuriously by casting a cloud' upon his title. 
 Carter v. Mills, 30 Miss. 432. 
 
 4 Bishop of Winchester v. Md. Hants Ry. Co. 
 
 (a) So a railway company, which works 
 the line of another company under legislative 
 authority, is a necessary party to a bill for 
 specific performance tiled by an unpaid vendor 
 against the latter company, and must bear its 
 own costs of suit. Goodford v. Stonehouse & 
 N. Ry. Co., 38 L. J. Ch. 307; Marling r. 
 Stonehouse & N. Ry. Co., id. 306. A third 
 person to whom a vendor, after signing a con- 
 tract to convey land, has transferred it, should 
 be a party with the vendor to a bill for a 
 specific execution of the con'ract; and so if 
 the vendor h :s made a new contract to sell. 
 
 Babb r Lindley, 23 Kansas, 478. 4^0. The 
 heirs-at-law of the obligor in a bond for till.' 
 are necessary parties to a bill brought by his 
 personal representative to subject the land to 
 payment of the purchase-money in order that a 
 judicial sale of the land may be effectual. 
 Grubb v. Loekabill, 100 N. C. 267. A unila- 
 teral agreement for land may be enforced in 
 equity by the party who has not signed it. 
 Miller v. Cameron, 45 N. J. Eq. 95; Caskad- 
 don v. Kennedy, 40 id. 259; see Woodruff v. 
 Woodruff, 44 id. 349. 
 
 227
 
 232 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 Formerly it was the invariable practice of Courts of Equity to require 
 the heir-at-law to be a party to a suit in all cases where the trusts of 
 a will of real estate were sought to be executed. This practice arose 
 from the peculiar principle adopted by Courts of Equity in cases of 
 wills relating to real estate; namely, that they would not carry into 
 effect a will of real estate, until the due execution had been either 
 admitted by the heir or proved against him. For this purpose, it was 
 necessary that the heir should be made an adverse party. The case of 
 an heir-at-law was, therefore, an exception to the rule above laid down, 
 that persons claiming under titles inconsistent with those of the plain- 
 tiff, need not be made parties to the suit. This exception has now 
 been in a great measure abolished by the 31st Order of 
 *232 August, 1841. 5 Before this Order, it was necessary in * suits for 
 the administration of real assets under 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 104, 
 that the heir-at-law, as well as the devisee, should be a party ; l and 
 where the suit was brought against the devisee, under the Statute of 
 Fraudulent Devises, 2 the heir-at-law was a necessary party. 3 
 
 Although, however, the heir-at-law was a necessary party to suits 
 instituted for the purpose of making devised estates applicable to the 
 payment of debts, he was not a necessary party to suits instituted by 
 creditors claiming under a deed whereby estates had been conveyed to 
 trustees to sell for payment of debts, unless he was entitled to the 
 surplus of the money arising from the sale. 4 
 
 Even before the last-mentioned Order, there were some cases in 
 which the Court would direct the execution of the trusts of a will, 
 where the heir-at-law was not a party ; thus, where a trustee had been 
 
 L. R. 5 Eq. 17, V. C. S. ; and see Att.-Gen. 
 
 v. Sittingbourne & Sheerness Ry. Co. 35 Beav. 
 2G8, 271; L. R. 1 Eq. 636. 630; Goodford v. 
 Storehouse & Nailsworth Ry. Co. W. N. 
 (1869) 67; 17 W. R. 515, V. C. M.; Marling 
 v. Stonehouse & Nailsworth Ry. Co. W. N. 
 (1869) 60; 17 W. R. 484, V. C. j'. To a bill for 
 the specific execution of a contract for the sale 
 of land made by the complainant as president of 
 a manufacturing company, for the benefit of the 
 company and relating to its hinds, the company 
 is a necessary party. Nichols v. Williams, 22 
 N. .1. Eq. 63. So, to a bill filed by the pur- 
 ■ chaser. at execution sale, of the interest of a 
 •vendee in land, against the original ven lor, for 
 specific performance, the vendee is a necessary 
 'party. Alexander v. Hoffman, 70 111. 114. 
 And to a bill against the vendor to cancel the 
 •contract, a person interested in the subject- 
 matter of sale and entitled to half the pur- 
 chase-money, is a necessary party. Atki ;s r. 
 Billings 72 111. 597. And the assignee in 
 bankruptcy of a claimant of real estate is a 
 necessary pi ry to a bill seeking to affect the 
 title to the realty. Harris v. Cornell, 80 111. 
 54. And see, as to a bill for the enforcement 
 of vendor's lien for purchase-money, infra, 
 1653. note 6. 
 
 5 This Order provided, "that in suits to 
 
 228 
 
 execute the trusts of a will, it shall not be neces- 
 sary to make the heir-at-law a party: but the 
 plaintiff shall be at liberty to make him a party 
 when he desires to have the w 11 established 
 against him." Cons. Ord. VII. 1. This 
 Order has been adopted in the Equity Rules of 
 the United States Supreme Court. Rule 50. 
 
 1 Brown v. Weatherby, 10 Sim. 125: now 
 it is so no longer: Weeks v. Evans, 7 Sim. 
 546; Bridges v. Hinxman, 16 Sim. 71; Good- 
 child v. Terrett, 5 Bea" 398; Burch v. Coney, 
 14 Jur. 1009, V. C. K. 6.; Shakels v. Richard- 
 son, 2 Coll. 31. 
 
 2 3 & 4 W. & M. c. 14. 
 
 3 Story, Eq. PI. § 163. Where the real 
 estate of the deceased party is by statute made 
 assets for the payment of debts, it is unneces- 
 sary to make the heir or devisee of the estate 
 a party to the suit for the administration of 
 the assets. Story, Eq. PI. § 163, and note; 
 Ex parte Rulluff, 1 Mass. 240; Grignon v. 
 Astor, 2 How. U. S. 319, 338; but see Gladson 
 v. Whitney, 9 Iowa, 267; and Frazier v. 
 Pankey, 1 Swan, "5 (where the contrary was 
 held);" Chew v. Hyman, 10 Biss. 240. 
 
 4 To a bill to change a legacy on land of a 
 married woman, she is a necessary party. 
 Lewis v. Darling, 16 Peters, 1.
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. * 234 
 
 dead several years, and freehold lands subject to the trust had been 
 quietly enjoyed under the will, a sale was decreed without the heir being 
 a party. 5 So, where the heir-at-law was abroad, or could not be found, 
 or made default at the hearing, the trusts of a will have been executed 
 in his absence, but without a declaration that the will was well proved ; 6 
 and even upon some occasions the Court has, upon due proof of the 
 execution of the will and of the sanity of the testator, declared the 
 will well proved in the absence of the heir. 7 
 
 As there is no provision in the Order 8 to make evidence of the execu- 
 tion of the will and the sanity of the testator, taken in the absence of 
 the heir-at-law, admissible against him or any one claiming under 
 him, the Court still continues unable, by decree in his absence, to 
 insure the title against his rights. 9 As the Order provides for the 
 execution of the trusts of a will in the absence of the heir, and also 
 gives liberty to make him a party, where it is sought to have the will 
 established against him, it seems scarcely probable that, under 
 any circumstances, the old * practice, of declaring a will well *233 
 proved in the absence of the heir will be continued. 1 It was 
 formerly the practice, where the heir-at-law could not be found, to 
 make the Attorney-General a party to a bill for carrying the trusts of 
 a devise of real estates into execution, on the supposition that the 
 escheat is in the Crown, if the will set up by the bill should be subject 
 to impeachment. If any person should claim the escheat against the 
 Crown, that person may be a necessary party. 2 
 
 * The consequences of a misjoinder of plaintiffs, such as above * 234 
 considered, are no longer the same as formerly, for then the bill 
 would have been dismissed; whereas later, the Court was empowered 
 to grant such relief as the circumstances of the case required, to direct 
 such amendments as it thought fit, and to treat any of the plaintiffs as 
 defendants. 1 
 
 5 Harris v. Ingledew, 3 P. Wins. 92, 94, Vanderpoel v. Van Valkenburgh, 2 Selden 
 
 6 French r. Baron, 1 Dick. 138; 2 Atk. (X. Y.), 190. So all the legatees are indis- 
 120; Stokes v. Taylor, 1 Dick. 349; Cator v. pensable parlies in such a case. MeMaken 
 Butler, 2 Dick. 438; Braithwaite v. Robinson, v. McMaken, 18 Ala. 576. 
 
 ib. 439, n.; Story, Eq. PI. § 87= On a bill by 2 Ld. Red. 172. The objection as to j lining 
 
 an executor against a devisee, of land charged inconsistent claims does not apply where a 
 
 with the payment of debts, for an account of sole plaintiff unites in himself two conflicting 
 
 the trust fund, the creditors are not indispen- interests. Miles v. D urn ford, 2 De G. M. & 
 
 sable parties to the suit. Potter v. Gardner, 12 G. 641; Carter v. Sanders, 2 Drew. 248; 
 
 Wheat. 498. Foulkes v. Davies, L. R. 7 Eq. 42, V. C. G. 
 
 i Banister v. Way, 2 Dick 599; vide ace. But see Coleman i\ Pinkard, 2 Humph. 185; 
 
 Williams v, Whinyates, 2 Bro. C. C. 39:); Moody v. Fry, 3 Humph. 507; Gilliam v. 
 
 Seton, 224, et seq. ; Ld. Red. 173, Spence, G Humph. 163. And it is not permis- 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. VII. 1. sible fur a complainant to unite in his bill two 
 
 9 Ld. Red 172. A will may now be es- inconsistent causes for equitable relief. W.l- 
 tablished in England against the heir in the kinson >: Dobbie, 12 B latch. 2.(8; Boslev v. 
 Probate Court; see 20 & 21 Vic. c. 77, §§ 61, Philips, 3 Tenn. Ch. 649. Infra, 313, li. 8. 
 C2; Seton, 226; see/>o.«/, chap, on Evidence. A bill cannot be filed against the heirs and 
 
 1 All the devisees are held to be necessary devisees jointly, for satisfaction of a debt of 
 
 parties to a bill to set aside a will; the execu- the deceased. Schermerhorn v. Barhydt, 9 
 
 tor, unless he has refused to act, should also Paige, 28. 
 
 be made a party. Vancleave i>. Beam, 2 x 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 49. For cases of 
 
 Dana, 15") ; see Hunt v. Acre, 28 Ala. 580; misjoinder since the Act, see Clements v. 
 
 229
 
 235 
 
 OF r ARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 * f > 
 
 * Persons claiming under different titles may proper!}' he 
 joined as plaintiffs in the same suit, where their titles are not 
 inconsistent with each other. 1 Thus, all the creditors of a deceased 
 debtor, although they claim under distinct titles, may be joined as 
 co-plaintiffs in the same suit, to administer the assets of the debtor, 2 
 although it is not necessary that they should be so joined, as one 
 creditor may sue for his debt against the personal estate, without 
 bringing the other creditors before the Court. 3 The joining of several 
 creditors in the same suit is frequently productive of great incon- 
 venience and delay, and therefore one or more of the creditors are 
 allowed to file a bill on behalf of themselves and the others for an 
 account and application of the estate of a deceased debtor; the decree 
 being made applicable to all the creditors, the others may come in 
 under it and obtain satisfaction for their demands as well as the plain- 
 tiffs; and if they decline to do so, they will be excluded from the benefit 
 of the decree, although bound by acts clone under its authority. 4 It is 
 matter rather of convenience than indulgence, to permit such a suit by 
 a few on behalf of all the creditors, as it tends to prevent several suits 
 by several creditors, which might be highly inconvenient in the admin- 
 istration of assets, as well as burdensome to the fund to be adminis- 
 tered ; for if a bill be brought by a single creditor for his own debt, he 
 may, as at Law, gain a preference by the judgment in his favor over 
 the other creditors in the same degree, who may not have used equal 
 diligence. 5 
 
 Bowes. 1 Drew. 684; Evans v. Coventry, 3 
 Drew. 75; 2 Jur. N. S. 557; 5 De G. M. & 
 G. 911; Beeehing r. Lloyd, 3 Drew. 227; 
 Williams r. Salmond, 2 K. & J. 463; 2 Jur. 
 N. S. 251 ; Stupart v. Arrowsmith, 3 Sm. & 
 G. 170: Barton v. Barton, 3 K. & J. 512; 3 
 Jur. N. S. 838; Carter v. Sanders, 2 Drew. 
 248; Hallows r. Fernie, L. R. 3 Ch. 467; 
 I,. B. 3 Eq. 520, and see post, Chap. V. § 4, 
 Joinder of Ctninteres'ed Parties. 
 
 1 Conro v. Port Henry Iron Co., 12 Barb. 
 27; Merchants' Bank v. Stevenson, 5 Allen, 
 402. 403. 
 
 2 See Crosby v. Wicliffe, 7 B. Mon. 120; 
 Cheshire Iron Works v. Gay, 3 Gray, 534, 
 535. 
 
 a Anon. 3 Atk. 572; Peacock v. Monk, 
 1 Ves. 127, 131. A creditor's bill under 
 Ma—. I'uli. Stats, c. 151, § 2, may lie brought 
 by one creditor for himself alone. Silloway 
 ;-. Columbian Ins. Co. 8 Gray, 199; see 
 Crompton v. Anthony, 13 Allen, 33, 36. 37; 
 Barry v. Abb >tt, 100 Mass. 390. And where 
 new parties come in under a creditor's bill, 
 their names need not be interlined. Hazard 
 r. Durant, 9 R. I. 002. To enable a creditor to 
 question a conveyance of his debtor on the 
 ground of fraud, he must show a lien by judg- 
 ment or otherwise. Davis v. Dean, 20 X. J. 
 Eq. 436; Bi^elow o. Mairee, 27 N. J. Eq. 392; 
 Tennent r. Battey, 18 Kan. 324. And that he 
 
 230 
 
 is a bonnftde creditor. Townsend v. Tuttle, 28 
 N. J. Eq. 449. And the right to file the bill 
 will be lost by the expiration of the lien by 
 efflux of time. Fleming v. Grafton, 54 Miss. 
 79. But the creditors of a deceased debtor, 
 who have exhausted their remedy at Law 
 against the estate, although they have not 
 obtained judgments on their claims, mav file 
 such a bill. Haston i\ Castner, 23 N. J. Eq. 
 536; Shurts v. Howell, 30 id. 418. And the 
 assignee of a demand has an equally good right 
 with the original creditor to maintain a credi- 
 tor's suit. Cook v. Ligon, 54 Miss. 652. And 
 see, for cases in which Chancery entertains a 
 creditor's bill. Fleming v. Grafton, 54 Miss. 79; 
 Morgan v. Coyne, 7 Neb. 429. In Tennessee, 
 by statute, the bill may be filed without the 
 recovery of judgment. Spencer v. Armstrong, 
 12 Heisk. 707. 
 
 * Ld. Red. 100; see 48th of the Equity Rules 
 of the U. S. Courts. 
 
 5 Ld. Red. 100; Ridgely v. Bond, 18 Md. 
 433; see Atr. Gen. v. Cornthwaite, 2 Cox, 45; 
 where it was admitted at the bar that in a sin- 
 gle creditor's suit the Court does not direct a 
 general account of the testator's debts, but only 
 an account of the personal estate ami of that 
 particular debt, which is ordered to be paid in 
 a course of administration; and all debts of a 
 higher or equal nature may be paid by the ex- 
 ecutor, and allowed him in his discharge. See
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. 
 
 236 
 
 In suits by one creditor, on behalf of himself and the others, 
 for * administration of the estate of a deceased debtor, the defend- * 236 
 ant may, at any time before decree, have the bill dismissed on 
 payment of the plaintiff's debt and all the costs of the suit. 1 
 
 In suits of this nature, the plaintiff cannot waive an account against 
 the estate of a deceased administrator of the debtor. 2 
 
 If the debt of the plaintiff be admitted or proved, and the executor 
 or administrator admits assets, the plaintiff is entitled at the hearing 
 to an immediate decree for payment, and not a mere order for an 
 account; 3 but an admission by the executor that he had paid the 
 legacies given by the testator's will, is not an admission of assets for 
 the payment of the plaintiff's debt, so as to entitle him to such an 
 immediate decree. 4 (a) 
 
 One creditor may also sue, where the demand is against the real 
 assets; 5 but although one creditor may file a bill on his own behalf 
 alone, for administration of the personal estate, he cannot have a 
 decree for administration of the real estate, unless he sues on behalf of 
 himself and all the other creditors. 6 (b) 
 
 Gray v. Chiswell, 9 Ves. 123; Story, Eq. PI. 
 §§ 90-102; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 540-550; Brooks 
 v. Reynolds, 1 Bro. C. C. (Perkins's ed.) 18 J, 
 note (2), 180, note (5), and cases cited; Pax- 
 ton v. Douglas, 8 Sumner's Ves. 520; Thomp- 
 son v. Brown, 4 John. Ch. 610; Shephard v. 
 Guernsey, 9 Paige, 3-37; Ram on Assets, c. 21, 
 § 1, p. 2:)2 ; Rush v. Higgs, 4 Sumner's Ves. 
 638, note (a), and cases cited; Hallett v. Hal- 
 lett, 2 Paige, 15; Lloyd r. Loaring, G Sumner's 
 Ves. 773, note («); West v. Randall, 2 Mason, 
 181; Lucas v. Bank of Darien, 2 Stewart, 280; 
 New London Bank v. Lee, 11 Conn. 112; Bal- 
 Jentine o. Beall, 3 Scam. 20G; Coe v. Beckwith, 
 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 339; Hazen v. Durling, 1 
 Green Ch. 133. But single creditor suits are 
 much out of use, 2 Seton, 808. 
 
 1 Pemberton v. Pophain, 1 Beav. 316; 2 Jur. 
 1009; Holden v. Kynaston, 2 Beav. 204; Man- 
 ton v. Roe, 14 Sim. 353; post, Chap. XIX., § 1, 
 Dismissinr/ /Jills. As to costs, see cases above 
 referred to, and Penny v. Beavan, 7 Hare, 133; 
 12 Jur. 93G. 
 
 2 Wadeson t>. Rudge, 1 C. P. Coop. temn. 
 Cott. 369; but see Symes v. Glynn, and Pease v. 
 Cheesbrough, cited 2 Seton, 881, 882; id. 885. 
 See Woodfin v. Anderson, 2 Tenn. Ch. 331. 
 
 3 Woodgate v. Field, 2 Hare, 211: Jur. 
 871; see also Owens v. Dickenson, C. & P. 48, 
 
 (a) With reference to the payment of one 
 legacy being an admission of assets for every 
 other legatee, " the tendency of modern deci- 
 sions has been to deal fairly and justly with 
 these cases, and not by a mere unintentional 
 admission of assets by executors to subject 
 them to liabilities which they have never con- 
 
 56; 4 Jur. 1151; Field v. Titmus, 1 Sim. N. S. 
 218; 15 Jur. 121. For form of decree for pay- 
 ment, see 2 Seton, 803, No. 4, 804, No. 5. 
 
 4 Savage v. Lane, 6 Hare, 32; Field v. Tit- 
 mus, 1 Sim. N. S. 218; 15 Jur. 121; Hutton v. 
 Rossiter, 7 De G. M. & G. 9. 
 
 5 Leigh v. Thomas, 2 Ves. Sr. 312, 313. 
 
 6 Bedford v. Leigh, 2 Dick. 707; Mav v. 
 Selby, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 235; 6 Jur. 52; Blair 
 v. Ormond, 1 De G. & S. 428; 11 Jur. 665; 
 Ponsford v. Hartley, 2 J. & H. 736 ; 2 Seton, 
 806; Johnson v. Compton, 4 Sim. 47. The 
 writ of summons or statement of claim should 
 state or show that the suit is on behalf of the 
 plaintiff and all other creditors. Worraker v. 
 Pryer, 2 Ch. D. 109, overruling Cooper v. Blis- 
 set", 1 Ch. D. 691; Adcock v. Peters, W. N. 
 (1876) 139; Re Royle, 5 Ch. D. 540; Re Vin- 
 cent, W. N. (1877) 249; 26 W. R. 94; Eyre v. 
 Cox, 24 W. R. 317. See form of contingent 
 prayer, in a bill by one creditor, Tomlin v. 
 Tomlin, 1 Hare, 236. In such cases leave to 
 amend will generally be given at the hearing; 
 see cases above cited. After decree in a single 
 creditor's suit, an account was taken of the real 
 estate; the bill being taken as a bill on behalf 
 of all the creditors; Woods P. Sowerbv, 14 W. 
 R. 9, V. C. W.; see Story, Eq. PI. § 161, note. 
 Although one incumbrancer cannot sue without 
 
 templafed or meant to undertake. You have 
 to examine the facts of the case, and to deal 
 with it fairly and properly." Per Hall V. C. 
 in Morewood v. Currey. 28 W. R. 213. 
 
 (b) In an ordinary decree in a creditor's suit 
 the decree is not treated as conclusively estab- 
 lishing the plaintiff's debt. Cardell v. Ilawke, 
 
 231
 
 237 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 *237 * Again in the case of creditors under a trust deed for pay- 
 
 making other incumbrancers parties, yet it has 
 been held that this is cured by a decree direct- 
 ing an account to be taken of all the mortgages 
 and incumbrances affecting the estate. See 
 Viu. Ab. tit. Party (B), ca. 51. Where a bill 
 lias been tiled by a single bond creditor to 
 establish his claim against the real estate of his 
 deceased debtor, the Court has permitted it to 
 be amended by making it a bill "on behalf of 
 himself and of the other specialty creditors." 
 
 L. R. 6 Eq. 464. If other creditors become co- 
 plaintiffs and a receiver is appointed in the case, 
 the creditor who filed the bill cannot afterwards 
 discontinue it without such other creditors' 
 assent. Belmont Nail Co. v. Columbia Iron 
 & Steel Co. 46 Fed. Rep. 336. The plaintiff 
 creditor is not required to give notice of 
 his bill to other creditors, and their assent 
 thereto is not necessary. Thompson v. Lake, 
 19 Nev. 103; Rome Bank v. Haselton, 15 Lea 
 (Tenn.), 216; see Livesay v. Feamster, 21 W. 
 Va 83; Norris v. Bean, 17 id. 605. A creditor 
 who fails to come in seasonably is cut off. 
 Thompson r. Reno Savings Bank, 19 Nev. 291. 
 Properly, the case should be referred to a mas- 
 ter to give to all the creditors an opportunity 
 to come in. Johnson v. Waters, 111 U. S. 640; 
 Bilmyer v. Sherman, 23 W. Va. 656; John-ton 
 v. Markle Paper Co. (Penn.) 25 Atl. Rep. 885. 
 A decree will be made f >r no greater amount 
 than is necessary to satisfy the claims of the 
 creditors who join in the bill, or those inter- 
 vening before final decree. George v. St. 
 Louis Cable & W. Ry. Co. 44 Fed. Rep. 117; 
 Bouton v. Dement, 123 111. 142; Ford v. Rosen- 
 thal. 74 Texas, 28. Preferred creditors are not 
 necessary parties to a bill to set aside a trust 
 deed unless adversely interested. Hancock v. 
 Wooten, 107 N. C. 9; Preston v. Carter, 80 
 Texas, 388; Hudson v. Eisenmayer Milling Co. 
 79 Texas, 401. All the creditors are not neces- 
 sary parties to a bill brought by one creditor 
 to enforce the trust of an assignment. Wil- 
 helin v. Byles 60 Mich. 561. In general, the 
 creditors who have legal claims must first obtain 
 a judgment at law. Smith r. Hurst, 10 Hare, 
 30; M'Dermutt v. Strong, 4 John. Ch. 687; 
 Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 451, 457; Wiggin v. 
 Heywood, 118 Mass. 514; Carver v. Peck, 131 
 Mass. 291; Miller o. Davidson (3 Gilman, 518), 
 44 Am. Dec. 715. note; Massey V. Gorton (12 
 Minn. 145), 90 id. 287, note; see Tower Manuf. 
 Co. r. Thompson, 90 Ala. 129; Gibson v. Trow- 
 bridge "Furniture Co. 93 Ala. 579; Gorrell v. 
 Gates, 79 Iowa. 632; Vicksburg &c. R. Co. v. 
 Phillips. 64 Miss. 108. All the creditors in 
 whose behalf the suit is brought by a judgment 
 creditor need not be judgment creditors. State 
 r. Foot. 27 S. C. 340. See Claflin v. Gordon, 
 39 Hun, 54. A municipal corporation may be 
 
 232 
 
 Johnson v. Compton, vbi supra. Where a 
 judgment creditor files a bill to obtain aid in 
 enforcing the payment of his judgment at Law, 
 it is no ground of demurrer that other creditors, 
 not in equal degree, are not made parties to the 
 bill. Way v. Bragaw, 16 N. J. Eq. 213, 216, 
 217; Edgell r. Haywood, 3 Atk. 357; see Clark- 
 son v. Depeyster, 3 Paige, 320; Parmelee v. 
 Egan, 7 Paige, 610; Grosvenor v. Allen, 9 
 Paige, 74; Farnham v. Campbell, 10 Paige, 5'J8. 
 
 defendant to a creditor's bill. Hinsdale D. G. 
 Co. v. Til ley, 10 Biss. 572. The claims of all 
 the suing creditors need not be absolutely due. 
 Be Hargreaves, 44 Ch. D. 236, 241; M ison v. 
 Pomeroy, 151 Mass. 164, 168. But a plaintiff, 
 suing for himself and all other creditors, must 
 show that he was himself a creditor when the 
 deed, which he seeks to assail, was made. Hor- 
 bach v Hill, 112 U. S. 144. When the bill is 
 filed by one individual of a numerous class in 
 his own right, the Court will generally at the 
 the hearing allow it to be amended so as to 
 make such individual sue on behalf of himself 
 and the rest of the c'ass. Richmond v. Irons, 
 121 U.S. 27, 51; William- v. Jones, 23 Mo. 
 App. 131. As to equitable trustee process, 
 brought by a single creditor for his own ben- 
 efit, as distinguished from a creditor's bill, see 
 Phrenix Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 127 Ma*«. 558 , 
 Chapman v. Banker & Tradesman Pub. Co. 
 128 Mass. 478; Rau v. Von Zedlitz, 132 Mass. 
 164; Maxwell v. Cochran, 136 Mass. 73; Squire 
 v. Lincoln, 137 Mass. 399. As to the transfer 
 of garnishment proceedings to equity, see Lock- 
 ett v. Rumbough. 40 Fed. Rep. 523. As to 
 the statute of limitations, the rights of a cred- 
 itor, who becomes a party to a bill already 
 filed, depend upon the time when the bill was 
 filed, and not the time when he became a party. 
 Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27, reversing 
 S. C. 27 Fed. Rep. 591; Be Chickering, 56 Vt. 
 82. All matters relating to creditors' bill 
 depend in great measure upon local statutes 
 and practice. See, e. g., Flash v. Wilkerson, 
 22 Fed. Rep. 689. Equity takes equal jurisdic- 
 tion of fraudulent transfers of personal and of 
 real property. Sobernheimer r. Wheeler, 45 
 N. J. Eq. 614. A creditor's bill lies in a Fed- 
 eral Court upon a judgment obtained in a differ- 
 ent State from that in which such court is 
 sitting. Stutz v. Handley, 139 U. S. 417; 41 
 Fed. Rep. 537; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Chat- 
 tanooga Construction Co. 53 id. 314. When a 
 plaintiff aims to be subrogated to the rights of 
 creditors, they must be made parties to the 
 suit brought for that purpose. Harris v. Wat- 
 son, 56 Ark. 574. A creditor does not become 
 an executor de son tort by obtaining payment 
 of his claim from an executor de son tort. Hur- 
 sell v. Bird, 65 L. T. 709.
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. 
 
 238 
 
 nient of debts, a few have been permitted to sue on behalf of them- 
 selves and the other creditors named in the deed, for the execution 
 of the trusts, although one creditor could nut, in that case, have sued 
 for his single demand, without bringing the other creditors before the 
 Court. 1 And where the trust fund was to be distributed amongst the 
 joint and separate creditors of the firm, a bill of this description was 
 permitted by a separate creditor only, on behalf of himself and the 
 other joint and separate creditors. 2 («) 
 
 In suits fur marshalling assets, simple-contract creditors must be 
 joined as plaintiffs, as well as creditors by specialty; for, upon a bill 
 by specialty creditors only, the decree would be merely for the payment 
 of the debts out of the personal estate, and, if that should not prove 
 sufficient for the purpose, for the sale and application of the real 
 estate. The right to call for such an arrangement of the property as 
 will throw those who have debts payable out of both descriptions of 
 estate upon the real estate, in order that the personalty may be left 
 clear for those whose demands are only payable out of the personal 
 estate, belongs to the simple-contract creditors, who have an equity 
 either to compel the payment of the specialty debts out of the real 
 estate, or else to stand in the place of the specialty creditors, as 
 against the real estate, for so much of the personal estate as they shall 
 exhaust. It is proper, therefore, in bills of this nature, to file 
 them in the names of a specialty * creditor and of a creditor by * 238 
 
 i Cnrry v. Trist, Ld. Red. 167; Murphy 
 v. Jackson, 5 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 11; see, how- 
 ever, Harrison V. Stewardson, 2 Hare, 538, 
 where Sir J. Wigram V. C. decided that 
 twenty creditors interested in a real estate 
 were not so large a number that the Court 
 would, on the ground of inconvenience alone, 
 allow a few of them to represent the others, 
 and dispense with such ot'iers as parties, in a 
 suit to recover the estate against the whole 
 body of creditors. See Story, Eq. PI. §§ 150, 
 207; Bainbridge v. Burton, 2 Beav. 539, 
 Johnson v. Candage, 31 Maine, 28; Bryant 
 v. Russell, 23 Pick. 508 ; Stevenson v. 
 Austin, 3 Met. 474. In case of an assign- 
 ment for the benefit of creditors, all the cred- 
 itors should be joined in a bill to compel a 
 distribution of the fund, but one creditor 
 alone may maintain a bill for a violation of the 
 trust injurious to himself separately. Dim- 
 mock v. Bixby, 20 Pick. 308. When creditors 
 claim under a deed of trust for the payment 
 of debts, they need not make as parties to their 
 bill those who are in a posterior class to them- 
 
 (a) Where in a suit brought for general ad- 
 ministration by a separate creditor, on behalf 
 of himself and all other creditors of one de- 
 ceased member of a firm of traders, the peneral 
 estate, when realized, proved sufficient to pay 
 his class in full, but insufficient to fully pay the 
 
 selves, but they must make, as parties, all who 
 are in their own class. Patton v. Bencini, 6 
 Ired. Eq. 201. No decree for the distribution 
 of a fund in Court can be made, until all p?r- 
 sons interested are made parties. De La Vergne 
 v. Evertson, 1 Puge, 181; Greene v. Sisson, 2 
 Curtis, C. C. 171. All the distributees are 
 necessary parties to a bill for distribution. 
 Hawkins v. Craig, 1 B. Mon. 27. All persons 
 interested in the trust estate ought to be joined 
 in a suit for its administration. Elam v. Gar- 
 rard, 25 Ga. 557; High v. Worley, 32 Ala. 
 70!*; U'Wolf v. DWolf, 4 R. I. 450; Gould v. 
 Hayes, 19 Ala. 438; Keeler v. Keeler, 11 N. 
 J. Eq. 458. 
 
 Creditors of a testator may intervene by 
 petition, and be made parties to a suit by the 
 legatees and devisee3, brought for the purpose 
 of falsifying the accounts of the executor. 
 Smith I'.Britton, 2 P. & H. (Va.) 124. 
 
 * Weld v. Bonham, 2 S. & S. 91; and see 
 Richardson v. Hastings, 7 Beav. 323 ; Smart v. 
 Bradstock, 7 Beav. 500. 
 
 deceased's joint creditors, the plaintiff was held 
 entitled to costs from the estate as between 
 solicitor and client. Re McRea, Norden v. 
 McRea, 32 Ch. D. 613; see Re Flynn, Guy v. 
 McCarthy, 17 L. R. Ir. 457 
 
 233
 
 *239 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 simple contract, on behalf of themselves and of all others the spe- 
 cialty and simple-contract creditors. 1 
 
 By analogy to the case of creditors, a legatee is permitted to sue on 
 behalf of himself and the other legatees ; because, as he might sue for 
 his own legacy only, a suit by one on behalf of all the legatees has 
 the same tendency to prevent inconvenience and expense, as a suit by 
 one creditor on behalf of all creditors of the same fund. 2 (a) For the 
 same reason, where it has been sought to apply personal estate amongst 
 next of kin, or amongst persons claiming as legatees under a general 
 description, and it may be uncertain who are the persons answering 
 that description, bills have been admitted by one claimant on behalf of 
 himself and of others equally interested. 3 
 
 So, also, in the case of appointees under the will of a married woman, 
 made in pursuance of a power, where they were very numerous, a bill 
 was permitted by some in behalf of all. 4 
 
 The right of a few persons to represent the class is not confined to 
 creditors and legatees; 5 and the necessity of the case has induced the 
 Court, especially of late years, frequently to depart from the general 
 rule in cases where a strict adherence to it would probably amount to 
 a denial of justice, and to allow a few persons to sue on behalf of great 
 numbers having the same interest; 6 thus, some of the proprietors of a 
 trading undertaking, where the shares had been split or divided into 
 eight hundred, were permitted to maintain a suit on behalf of them- 
 selves and others, for an account against some of their co-partners, 
 without bringing the whole before the Court, 7 "because it would have 
 been impracticable to make them all parties by name, and there would 
 be continual abatement by death and otherwise, and no coming at justice, 
 if they were to be made parties ; " and in case of a trade partner- 
 *239 ship of more than twenty-five persons formed * before the 7 & 8 
 Vic. c. 110, and registered under § 58 of that Act, but not other- 
 
 1 By the 32 & 33 Vic. c. 4G, it is enacted 
 that in the administration of the estate of any 
 person dying on or after the 1st Jan. 1870, no 
 debt shah be entitled to preference merely be- 
 cause it is a specialty debt, but all the creditors 
 shall be treated as standing in equal degrees, 
 and be paid accordingly out of the assets, 
 whether leiral or equitable. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 167; Story, Eq. PI. § 104; Brown 
 v. Picketts, 3 John. Ch. 553; Fish v. Howland, 
 1 Paige. 20. 23; Kettle P. Ovary. 1 Paige, 417; 
 note; Hallett v. Hallett, 2 Paige, 20, 21. 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 169; Smith r. Leathart, 20 L. J. 
 Ch. 202. V. C. K. B.; Story, Eq. PI. § 105; see 
 now 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42, r. 1. 
 
 * Manning v. Thesiger, 1 S. & S. 106. 
 
 5 See per Ld. Eldon, in Lloyd r. Loaring, 6 
 Ves. 779. 
 
 6 Ld Red. 169; Story, Eq.Pl. § 94, et seq., 
 
 and the cases cited in notes; West v. Randall, 
 2 Mason, 192-196 ; Wendell v. Van Rensselaer, 
 1 John. Ch. 349 ; Hallett v. Hallett, 2 Paige, 
 18-20; Cullen v. Duke of Queensberry, 1 Bro. 
 C C. (Perkins's ed.) 101, and Mr. Belt's notes; 
 Moffats v Farquharson, 2 id. 338, note (1); 
 Llovd v. Loaring. 6 Sumner's Ves. 773, note 
 (a), and cases cited; Kelner v. Baxter, L. R. 2 
 C. P. 174, 187; Willis v. Henderson, 4 Scam. 
 20; Mann v. Butler, 2 Barb Ch. 362; Per 
 Foster J. in Williston v. Michigan S. & X. R. 
 R. Co. 13 Allen, 406; Peabody v. Flint, 6 
 Allen, 52 ; Mason v York & Cumberland R. 
 R. Co. 52 Maine, 107-109; March r. Eastern 
 R. R. Co. 40 X. H. 566; Smith v. Swormstedt, 
 16 How. U. S. 288: 48th of the Equity Rules 
 of the United States Courts. 
 
 7 Chancev v. May, Prec. Ch. 592. 
 
 (n) Legatees, who claim only their separate 
 legacies, are not necessary parties to a bill by 
 one legatee against the executor and the re- 
 
 234 
 
 ceiver of a bank to reach the testator's property 
 held by the bank. Bellows v. Sowles, 52 Fed. 
 Rep. 528.
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. * 240 
 
 wise registered, some members were allowed to sue on behalf of them- 
 selves and other members to restrain a nuisance; * and, where all the 
 inhabitants of a parish had rights of common under a trust, a suit by 
 one, on behalf of himself and the other inhabitants, was admitted ; 2 and 
 a freeholder and copyholder of a manor may sue on behalf of himself 
 and all other the freehold and copyhold tenants, to have their rights of 
 common ascertained, notwithstanding the rights of each freeholder are 
 separate and distinct from those of the copyholders ; 3 but although one 
 copyholder may sue on behalf of himself and the other copyholders to 
 have the rights of common ascertained, he cannot sue on behalf of him- 
 self alone for that purpose. 4 So, also, one owner of lands in a township 
 has been permitted to sue on behalf of himself and the others to estab- 
 lish a contributory modus for all the lands there. 5 Upon the same 
 principle, a bill was allowed by the captain of a privateer on behalf of 
 himself and of all other the mariners and persons who had signed cer- 
 tain articles of agreement with the owners, for an account and distri- 
 bution of the prizes made by the ship. And in Lloyd v. Louring," 1 Lord 
 Eldon expressed his opinion, that some of the members of a lodge of 
 Freemasons, or of one of the inns of court, or of any other numerous body 
 of persons, might sustain a suit on behalf of themselves and the others, 
 for the delivery up of a chattel in which they were all interested. 
 
 The practice of permitting a few to sue for all similarly interested has 
 also been extended to other cases, chiefly in consecpience of the great 
 increase in the number of Joint-Stock Companies, and trading associa- 
 tions, in which large classes of persons are jointly interested. 8 In 
 Walworth v. Holt, 9 where a bill was filed by the plaintiffs on behalf of 
 themselves and all other shareholders and partners of the Imperial 
 Bank of England, except those who were made defendants, * pray- * 240 
 ing the assistance of the Court in the realization of the assets 
 of the company, and in the payment of its debts, and that for that 
 purpose a receiver might be appointed, and authorized to sue for calls 
 unpaid and other debts due to the company in the name of the regis- 
 tered officer, who was one of the defendants, a demurrer, objecting 1st, 
 
 i Womersley v. Merritt, L. R. 4 Eq. 695, V. 4 Phillips v. Hudson, L. R. 2 Ch. 243, L. C; 
 
 CM. Commissioners of Sewers v. Glasse, L. R. 7 
 
 - Blackham v. Warden and Society of Sut- Ch. 450; 20 W. R. 108. 
 ton Coldrield, 1 Ch. Cas. 269; see Goodman v. 5 Chaytor v. Trinity College, 3 Anst. 841; 
 Saltash, 7 App. Cas. 633; 5 C. P. 1). 446; 7 Q. Story, Eq. Jnr. § 121, and cases cited. 
 B. 1). 100. It has been doubted whether the 6 Good v. Blewitt, 13 Ves. 3'.)7. In that 
 Attorney-General ought not to have been a case the bill was originally filed by the cap- 
 party to the first of these suits. See Ld. Red. tain in his own right, but was allowed to be 
 141); and see Att.-Gen. v. Heelis, 2 S. & S. amended by introducing the words, "on be- 
 67; but see Att-Gen. v. Moses, 2 Mad. -204 ; half of himself," &c., 13 Ves. 398; see West*. 
 Re Christ-Church Inclosure Act, 38 Ch. D. Randall, 2 Mason, 193, 194; Story, Eq PI. §98. 
 520, 531; 35id. 355. As to inhabitants becoming " Ves. 773, 770; see Sumner's ed. note (a). 
 incorporated by a Crown grant and suing as a 8 Beatty v. Kurtz. 2 Peters, 500: Smith v. 
 corporation, see Willingale v Maitland, L. R. 3 Swomestedt, 10 How. U. S. 288; Whitney p. 
 Eq. 103; Chilton v. London, 7 Ch. I). 735. 743. Mayo. 15 III. 251; Putnam v. Sweet, 1 Chanel. 
 
 3 Smith v. Earl Brownlow, L. R. 9 Eq. 241, (Wis.) 2.80; Morgm n. Mew York and Albany 
 
 M. R.; see Warrick v. Queen's College, Ox- R. R. Co. 10 Paige, 200. The practice has also 
 
 ford, L. R. 6 Ch. 710; L. R. 10 Eq. 105; Betts been adopted bv the High Court of Justice. It 
 
 v. Thompson, L. R. 6 Ch. 732, 734, n.; 18 S. C. 1883, Ord\ XVI. 0. 
 
 W. R. 1008; 1 Seton, 217. 8 4 jr. & C. 635. 
 
 235
 
 241 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 That it was not the practice of the Court to interfere between partners, 
 except upon a hill praying a dissolution; and 2dly, That all the parties 
 interested in the concern were necessary parties to the bill, was over- 
 ruled by Lord Cottenham, who observed; 1 "As I have said upon other 
 occasions, 2 I think it the duty of this Court to adapt its practice and 
 course of proceeding to the existing state of society, and not by too 
 strict an adherence to forms and rules, established under different cir- 
 cumstances, to decline to administer justice, and to enforce rights for 
 which there is no other remedy. This has always been the principle 
 of this Court, though not at all times sufficiently attended to. It is 
 the ground upon which the Court has, in many cases, dispensed with 
 the presence of parties who would, according to the general practice, 
 have been necessary parties." 3 
 
 In Mozley v. Alston,* Lord Cottenham said, that this form of suit is 
 "subject to this restriction: that the relief which is prayed must be one 
 in which the parties whom the plaintiff professes to represent, have all 
 of them an interest identical with his own; for if what is asked may 
 by possibility be injurious to any of them, those parties must be made 
 defendants ; because each and every of them may have a case to 
 * 241 make, adverse to the interests of the parties * suing. If, indeed, 
 they are so numerous that it is impossible to make them all 
 defendants, that is a state of things for which no remedy has yet been 
 provided." If, however, such persons are so numerous that it is impos- 
 sible to make them parties, it is apprehended that, according to the 
 present practice, the Court will, in such cases, permit the suit to pro- 
 ceed, upon one or several of such parties having interests not identical 
 with the plaintiff, or of each class of them, if there are several classes, 
 being made defendant to represent the others; unless indeed the object 
 of the suit is to have the partnership or company dissolved. 1 
 
 The fact of a company being incorporated by Act of Parliament does 
 not appear necessarily to prevent individual members of the corporation 
 suing on behalf of themselves and the other members of the company. 
 In Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Sir J. Wigram V. C: observed, "Corporations of 
 
 i Richardson v. Larpent, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 507, 
 514: 7 Jur. 691 ; Pare v. Clegg, 29 Beav. 589, 
 602; 7 Jur. N. S. 1136; Bromley v. Williams. 
 32 Beav. 177 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 240 ; Hoole v. Great 
 Western Ry. Co. L. R. 3 Ch. 202, 273, L. JJ. ; 
 
 559 ; 
 
 i Ibid. 
 
 2 See Mare v. Malachy, 1 M. & C. 
 Taylor v. Salmon, 4 M. &C. 134, 141. 
 
 3 Story, Eq. PI. §§ 76, 96, 115, 115 a, 115 b; 
 West v. Randall, 2 Mason, 181; Colt v. Lesnier. 
 9 Cowen, 320, 330; Deeks v. Stanbope, 14 Sim. 
 57; Collyer Partn. (Perkins's ed.) 361, in note; 
 Taylor v. Salmon, 4 M. & C. 134. 141. Repre- 
 sentatives of a deceased partner should be 
 made parties to a bill to dissolve a partner- 
 ship, and the bill may be amended for that 
 purpose. Buchard v. Boyce, 21 Ga. 6. 
 
 4 1 Phil. 71)0, 708; 11 Jur. 315; Moseley v 
 Cressey's Co. L. R. 1 Eq. 405 ; 12 Jur N. S 46, 
 V. C. W. ; see also Milligan v. Mitchell, 3 M. 
 & C. 72; 1 Jur. 888; Hichens v. Congreve, 4 
 Puss. 562, 574; Gordon v. Pym, 3 Hare, 223, 
 227 ; Apperly v. Page, 1 Phil. 779, 785 ; 1 1 Jur. 
 271 ; Richardson r. Hastings, 7 Heav. 323, 326 ; 
 11 Beav. 17; 8 Jur. 72; Beeching v. Lloyd, 3 
 Drew. 227 ; Moor v. Veazie, 32 Maine, 355. 
 
 23G 
 
 Cramer v. Bird, L. R. 6 Eq. 143, 148; Picker- 
 ing v. Williams, 15 W. R. 218, V. C. S. ; see, 
 however, Carlisle v. South Eastern Ry. Co. 1 
 M'N. & G. 689, 699 ; 14 Jur. 535 ; Fawcett 0. 
 Lawrie, 1 Dr. & S. 192, 203 ; as to making the 
 Corporation a defendant in its corporate char- 
 acter, see Bagshaw v. Eastern Union Ry. Co. 
 7 Hare, 114; 13 Jur. 602; 2 M'N. & G. 389; 
 14 Jur. 491; Simpson v. Westminster Palace 
 Hotel Co. 8 H. L. Cas. 712; 6 Jur. N. S. 985; 
 2 D. F. & J. 141: Russell v. Wakefield Water- 
 works Co. L. R. 20 Eq. 481; ante, p. 26. 
 
 2 2 Hare, 491 ; see also Preston v. Grand 
 Collier Dock Co. 11 Sim. 327, 344; S. C. nnm. 
 Preston v. Guyon, 5 Jur. 146; Bagshaw v 
 Eastern Union Ry. Co. and Carlisle v. South
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. * 242 
 
 this kind are in truth little more than private partnerships; and in 
 cases which may easily be suggested, it would be too much to hold, 
 that a society of private persons associated together in undertakings, 
 which, though certainly beneficial to the public, are nevertheless mat- 
 ters of private property, are to be deprived of their civil rights, inter 
 se, because, in order to make their common objects more attainable, the 
 Crown or the legislature may have conferred upon them the benefit of 
 a corporate character. If a case should arise of injury to a corporation 
 by some of its members, for which no adecpiate remedy remained, 
 except that of a suit by individual corporators in their private charac- 
 ters, and asking in such a character the protection of those rights to 
 which in their corporate capacity they were entitled; I cannot but 
 think that the principle so forcibly laid down by Lord Cottenham in 
 Walworth v. Holt, 3 and other cases, would apply, and the 
 * claims of justice would be found superior to any difficulties *242 
 arising out of technical rules, respecting the mode in which 
 corporations are required to sue." 1 In this case the Vice Chancellor 
 allowed a demurrer, on the ground that, upon the bill, there was noth- 
 ing to prevent the company from obtaining redress in its corporate 
 character, and that, therefore, the plaintiffs could not sue in a form of 
 pleading which assumed the practical dissolution of the corporation. 2 (a) 
 
 Eastern Ry. Co. ubi supra ; Graham v. Birken- 
 head Ry. Co. 2 M'N. & G. 146, 156; U Jur. 
 494; Colman v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co. 10 
 Beav. 1, 12; 11 Jur. 74; Salomons v. Laing, 12 
 Beav. 339; 14 Jur. 279; Fraser v. Whalley, 2 
 H. & M. 10; East Pant Du Co. v. Merry weather, 
 10 Jur. N. S. 1231; 13 W. R. 316, V. C. W. ; 
 2 H & M. 254; Moseley v. Cressey's Co. L. R. 
 1 Eq. 405; 12 Jur. N. S. 46, V. C. W. ; Hoole 
 fl.'Great Western Ry. Co. L. R. 3 Ch. 262, L. 
 JJ.; Bloxam v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. L. R. 3 
 Ch. 337, L. C; Atwool v. Merryweather, L. R. 
 5 Eq. 464. n. (3), V. C. W.; Clinch v. Finan- 
 cial Co. L. R. 5 Eq. 450, V. C. W. ; affirmed, 
 L R, 4 Ch. 117, L. C. & L. JJ.; Cramer «7. 
 Bird, L. R. 6 Eq. 143, M. R.; Kernaghan v. 
 Williams, L. R. 6 Eq. 228, M. R.; Dent v. Lon- 
 don Tramways Co. 16 Ch. I). 344; Mason v. 
 Harris, 11 Ch. I). 97; Salisbury v. Metro- 
 politan Ry. Co. W. N. (1869) 52, \V. N. (1870) 
 70; 18 W. R. 484, V. C. J.; ib., W. N. (1870) 
 74, L.J. G.; id. 182, V.C. J.; 18 W R.974, V. 
 C. J. ; Sweny v. Smith, L. R. 7 Eq. 324, M. R. 
 A suit in the company's name may be ordered 
 to stand over until a meeting of the company 
 determines the use of its name Pender v. 
 Lushington, 6Ch. D.70. See Exeter & Crediton 
 Ry. Co. v. Buller, 5 Rail. Cas. 211 ; East Pant du 
 United L. M. Co. v. Merryweather, 2 H. & M. 
 
 254; 2Lind. Part. 599, 1248; Wandsworth &c. 
 Co. v. Wright, 18 \V. 1!. 728; Oystermouth 
 Ry. & T. Co. v. Morris, W. N. (1876) 129, 192; 
 Harben v. Phillips, 23 Ch. D. 14, 29; Turner v. 
 Moy, 32 L. T. N. S. 56. 
 s 4 M. & C. 035. 
 
 1 One stockholder of a manufacturing cor- 
 poration cannot alone maintain a bill in Equity 
 to compel the execution of a trust, by persons 
 who have taken a conveyance of the company's 
 property in trust to pay its debts, because he 
 stands in the same right with all the other 
 stockholders, who have a common interest with 
 him in enforcing the trust, and all of whom 
 should be made parties, if not too numerous, or, 
 if too numerous, the bill should be brought by- 
 some in bthalf of all, so that the rights of all 
 may be duly adjudicated in the final decree. 
 Heath v. Ellis, 12 Cush. 601; Allen p. Curtis, 
 26 Conn. 450. Where the plaintiff sued on 
 behalf of himself and others, it was held, that 
 the defendant, after answering to the merits of 
 the bill, could not object that the plaintiff had no 
 right to bring his bill in that form. Messervey 
 v. Barelli, 2 Hill Ch. 567 ; see ante, pp. 26, 144, 
 notes. 
 
 2 See also Mozley v. Alston, 1 Phil. 790, 
 797 ; Lord v. Copper Miners' Co. 2 Phil. 740, 
 749; Yetts v. Norfolk Ry. Co. 3 De G. & 
 
 (a) If a shareholder sues the directors in the 
 company's name for misapplication of its funds, 
 and a large majority of the shareholders vote 
 against the use of the company's name, on 
 
 being stricken out as plaintiff, it may bo added 
 as a defendant by amendment. Silber Light 
 Co. v. Silber, 12 Ch. D. 717. 
 
 237
 
 *243 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 In order to enable a plaintiff to sue on behalf of himself and others 
 who stand in the same relation with him to the subject of the suit, it 
 is generally necessary that it should appear that the relief sought by 
 him is beneficial to those whom he undertakes to represent. 8 Where it 
 does not appear that all the persons intended to be represented are 
 necessarily interested in obtaining the relief sought, such a suit cannot 
 be maintained; 4 and a plaintiff cannot sue on behalf of himself and all 
 the other members of a company, and also seek to establish a demand 
 against the company. 5 Where three of the subscribers to a loan of 
 money to a foreign State filed a bill on behalf of themselves and all 
 other subscribers to that loan, to rescind the contracts of subscription, 
 and to have the subscription moneys returned, it was held, that the 
 plaintiffs were not entitled, in that case, to represent all the other 
 subscribers, because it did not necessarily follow that every subscriber 
 should, like them, wish to retire from the speculation, and every indi- 
 vidual must, in that respect, judge for himself. 6 Upon the same prin- 
 ciple, one of the inhabitants of a district, who claims a right to be 
 served with water by a public company, cannot sue on behalf of himself 
 
 and the other inhabitants, to compel that company to supply 
 *243 water *to the district upon particular terms; because, what 
 
 might be reasonable with respect to one, might not be so with 
 regard to the others. 1 This form of suit cannot be adopted where each 
 of the class on behalf of whom it is instituted has a separate demand 
 in Equity : 2 and, therefore, a suit by a shareholder in a joint-stock 
 company, on behalf of himself and the other shareholders, seeking 
 relief from the shares, and the return of the deposits, on the ground of 
 fraud or misrepresentation in the prospectus, cannot be maintained; for 
 the case of each person who has been deceived is peculiar to himself, 
 and must depend upon its own circumstances. 8 Neither can this form 
 of suit be adopted where the act complained of is voidable and capable 
 of confirmation by the members of the company, nor where it is a mere 
 matter of internal regulation, 4 nor, except under special circumstances, 
 
 S. 293 ; 13 Jur. 240 ; Macdougall v. Gardner, 
 1 Ch. D. 14; L. R. 20 Eq. 303; Pender v. 
 Lushington, 6 Ch. D. 70; Duekett v. Gover, 6 
 Ch. D. 82 ; ante, p. 26. 
 
 8 Gray v. Chaplin, 2 S. & S. 207, 272; Att.- 
 Gen. v. Heelis, 2 S. & S. 07, 75 ; Colman v. 
 Eastern Counties Ry. Co. 10 Beav. 1, 13 ; Car- 
 lisle V. South Eastern Ry. Co. 1 M'N. & G.080, 
 698 ; 14 Jur. 535 ; Mullock v. Jenkins, 14 Beav. 
 628; Williams v. Salmond, 2 K. & J. 403; 2 
 Jur. N. S. 251 ; Moseley v. Cressey's Co. L. R. 
 1 Eq. 405 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 46, V. C W. 
 
 4 Van Sandau v. Moore, 1 Russ. 441, 465 ; 
 Lovell v. Andrew, 15 Sim. 581, 584; 11 Jur. 
 485; Bainbridge v. Burton, 2 .Beav. 536. 
 
 s Thomas o. Hobler, 4 De G. F. & J. 199 ; 8 
 Jur. X. S. 125. 
 
 6 Jones r. Garcia Del Rio. T. & R. 297, 300. 
 
 i Weale p. West Middlesex Waterworks, 
 1 J. & W. 358, 370 ; see Beaumont r. Meredith, 
 
 238 
 
 3 V. & B. 181 ; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 120, 123, 
 125. 
 
 2 Jones v. Garcia Del Rio, T. & R. 297, 300; 
 Blain v. Agar, 1 Sim. 37, 43 ; 2 Sim. 289 ; 
 Croskey v. Bank of Wales, 4 Giff. 314; 9 
 Jur. N. S. 595; Hallows r. Fernie, L. R. 3 Ch. 
 407, L. C; Turquand v. Marshall, L. R. 6 Eq. 
 112, M. R. 
 
 3 Croskey v. Bank of Wales, 4 Giff. 314; 
 9 Jur. N. S. 595 ; Hallows v. Fernie, L. R. 
 3 Ch. 407, L. C. 
 
 4 Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare, 461 ; Mozley 
 v. Alston, 1 Phil. 790; 11 Jur. 315; Lord r. 
 Copper Miners' Co. 2 Phil. 740; 12 Jur. 1059 ; 
 Yetts v. Norfolk Ry. Co. 3 De G. & S. 293 ; 13 
 Jur. 249; Browne 0. Monmouthshire Ry. Co. 
 13 Beav. 32 ; Stevens v. South Devon Ry. Co. 
 9 Hare, 313; Macdougall v. Jersey Imperial 
 Hotel Co. 2 H. & M. 528 ; Clinch v. Financial 
 Co. L. R. 5 Eq. 451, 482, affirmed L. R. 4 Ch.
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. 
 
 243 
 
 where a corporate body of which the plaintiff is a member is capable of 
 bringing the action. 5 Where the object sought is such that a suit of 
 this nature may be instituted, it may be maintained, although a majority 
 of the class on behalf of whom it is instituted disapprove of it. 6 (a) 
 
 117 : Lambert v. Northern Ry. of Buenos Ayres, 
 18 W. R. 180; Pickering v. Stephenson, L. R. 
 14 Eq. 322. For exception 1 circumstances un- 
 der which such a bill was permitted, see ante, 
 26, n. 1 ; Atwool v. Merryweather, L. R. 5 Eq. 
 401, n. (3). As to the necessary allegations 
 
 in such a case, see Morris v. Morris, W. N. 
 (1877) G. 
 
 5 See 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 
 pp. 199-201. 
 
 6 Bromley v. Smith, 1 Sim. 8; Small v. 
 Attwood, Youngc, 407, 45G; 6 CI. & F. 232; 
 
 (a) It is within the discretion of the Court to 
 entertain a bill brought by one person on behalf 
 of himself and all others who have a similar 
 interest and may become parties thereto. Com- 
 missioners of Sewers v. Gellatly, 3 Ch. D. 610, 
 Warrick v. Queen's College, L. R. 6 Ch. 716. 
 L. R. 10 Eq. 105; Betts v. Thompson, L. R. 6 Ch. 
 732; Smith v. Brownlow, L. R. 9 Eq. 241; Tur- 
 ner v. Moy, 32 L. T. N. S. 56; Norwich r. 
 Brown, 48 id. 898; Turquand v. Marshall, L R. 
 6 Eq. 112, 134; Russell r. Wakefield Water 
 Works Co. L. R. 20 Eq. 474; Libby v. Norris, 
 142 Mass. 246; Birmingham v. Gallagher, 112 
 Mass. 190; Bengley v. Wheeler, 45 Mich. 493 ; 
 Durburow v. Niehoff, 37 III. App. 403; Railroad 
 Co. v. Orr, T8 Wall. 471; Gibson v. American 
 Loan & T. Co. 58 Hun, 443 ; Carey v. Brown, 
 58 Cal. 180; Manning v. Kle ; n, 11 Penn. Co. 
 Ct. 525. In such case, if the plaintiff's indi- 
 vidual interest is trivial in amount, and it 
 appears that he knows, or can readily ascertain 
 the names and addresses of all the parties 
 in interest, a majority of whom are within the 
 jurisdiction or near at hand, a demurrer for lack 
 of proper parties will be sustained. Smith v. 
 Williams, 116 Mass. 510; Wye Valley Ry. Co. 
 v. Hawes, 16 Ch. D. 489. Representative suits 
 are adopted under the Judicature Acts in Eng- 
 land ; but it is doubtful whether several such 
 suits would be allowed to proceed. McHenry 
 v. Lewis, 21 Ch. D. 202, 207; 22 id. 397. Those 
 on whose behalf the suit is brought are quasi 
 parties, and may be heard to protect their 
 interests. Fidelity T. & S. V. Co. v. Mobile 
 Street Ry. Co. 53 Fed. Rep. 850 ; ante, p. 216, 
 note. In the Federal Courts, Equity Rules 47, 
 48, allowing class suits, expressly reserve the 
 rights of absent parties. See Coann v. Atlanta 
 Cotton Factory Co. 14 Fed. Rep. 4. 
 
 Certain persons of a class are also sometimes 
 authorized by the Court to defend for all having 
 the same interest; but. in such case, the former 
 cannot consent to judgment against the latter; 
 Rees v. Richmond, 02 L. T. 427; and in a fore- 
 closure suit, where two persons had obtained an 
 order in Chambers to defend for all having 
 a like interest in the equity of redemption, it 
 was held that a foreclosure order could only be 
 
 made when all the persons interested in the 
 equity of redemption were parties to the suit. 
 Griffith v. Pound, 45 Ch. D. 553; see May v. 
 Newton, 34 Ch. D. 347. In Fraser v. Cooper, 
 Hall, & Co. 21 Ch. D. 718, in a suit by a bond- 
 holder on behalf cf himself and all other 
 bondholders except the defendant, a dissentii.g 
 bondholder was added as a defendant upon" his 
 own application. 
 
 In bills for instructions some of the parties 
 in interest may likewise represent those of the 
 same class, especially when the rights of the 
 latter are contingent. Hills v. Barnard, 152 
 Mass. 67; Hills v. Putnam, id. 123; see fur- 
 ther, as to parties having vested or uncertain 
 interests, Peacock v. Colling, 54 L. J. Ch. 743 ; 
 Gordon v. Green, 113 Mass. 259; Sears v. 
 Hardy, 120 Mass. 524; Jewett v. Tucker, 139 
 Mass. 566; Yarrington v. Robinson, 141 Mass. 
 450; Lomerson v. Vroom, 42 N. J. Eq. 290; 
 Kirkpatnck v. Corning, 38 N. J. Eq. 234; 
 Houston v. Levy, 44 N. J. Eq. 6; Read v. Pat- 
 terson, id. 211; Deegan v. Capner, id. 339; 
 Gayle v. Johnson, 80 Ala. 395; Fitzgibbon 
 v. Barry, 78 Va. 755. See Romaine v. Hen- 
 drickson. 24 N. J. Eq. 231; Hill v. Smith, 32 
 N. J. Eq. 473; McLennan v. Johnson, 60 111. 
 306; Craig v. Smith, 94 111. 469; Green v. 
 Grant, 143 111. 61; Overly v. Tipton, 08 Ind. 
 410; Norris v. Leman, 28 W. Va. 336. 
 
 Under a bill or petition brought by one on 
 behalf of all of a class, those only can come in 
 and share who could maintain separate suits. 
 Parmelee v. Kgan, 7 I'aLe, 610; Cooke v. 
 Smith, 3 Sandf. Ch. 333; see Pfohl r. Simpson, 
 74 N. Y. 137. As to costs on appeal in these 
 cases, see Cornwall v. Saurin, 17 L. R. Ir. 595. 
 One who sues in Equity for many having 
 a common interest in a trust fund or property 
 will be ordered reimbursed his expenses in the 
 suit from the property or by a proportional con- 
 tribution from those who accept his labors. 
 Davis v. Bay State League (Mass.). 33 N. E. 
 Rep. 591. An allegation at the commencement 
 of a complaint in a creditor's suit that the 
 plaintiffs sue "on behalf of themselves and of .ill 
 other creditors who may be similarly situated ' 
 is sufficient although that allegation does not 
 
 239
 
 214 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 Where the object of the suit is the dissolution of a partnership, all 
 the partners should be parties to the suit, and a suit by one partner on 
 behalf of himself and others cannot, except, it would seem, under 
 special circumstances, be maintained. 7 In cases of joint-stock com- 
 panies, the difficulties attending a suit for winding up their affairs 
 have led to the introduction of a special mode of so doing. 8 
 
 Where the object of the suit is to restrain the commission of acts 
 
 which are ultra vires, or such that they cannot be confirmed by the 
 
 members of a corporation, any one member may sue on behalf of 
 
 * 244 himself and the other members to restrain them ; 9 but it is * not 
 
 necessary for him to adopt that form of suit, and he may sue in 
 
 his own name. 1 
 
 In suits of this nature, the plaintiff, as he acts upon his own mere 
 motion, and at his own expense, retains (as in other cases) the absolute 
 dominion of the suit until decree, and may dismiss the bill at his pleas- 
 ure; after decree, however, he cannot by his conduct deprive other 
 persons of the same class of the benefit of the decree, if they think fit 
 to prosecute it. 2 A director of a company may sue in his own name to 
 restrain his co-directors from wrongfully excluding him from acting as 
 a director. 3 
 
 One of the objections which has been suggested to framing suits in 
 this manner is, that if the bill is dismissed with costs, other members 
 
 and see William v. Salmond, 2 K. & J. 463; 2 
 Jur. N. S. 251; Kernaghan v. Williams, L. R. 
 6 Eq. 228, M. R. 
 
 ' Long v. Yonge, 2 Sim. 369, 385; Beau- 
 mont v. Meredith, 3 V. & B. 180; Abraham 
 v. Hannay, 13 Sim. 581; Deeks v. Stanhope, 
 14 Sim. 57; 8 Jur. 349; Wilson v. Stanhope, 
 2 Coll. 629; 10 Jur. 421; Richardson v. Lar- 
 pent, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 507 ; 7 Jur. 691; Richard- 
 son v. Hastings, 7 Beav. 301; 11 Beav. 17; 
 8 Jur. 72; Van Sandau r. Moore, 1 Russ. 441, 
 456; Cooper v. Webb, 15 Sim. 454, 463; on 
 appeal, 11 Jur. 443; Apperly v. Page, 1 Phil. 
 779, 785; 11 Beav 271; Harvey v. Bignold, 8 
 Beav. 343, 345. But see Lindley, Part. 878, 
 881; Cockburn v. Thompson, 16 Ves. 321, 325. 
 8 The Companies Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vic. 
 c. 89), Part IV. 
 
 9 Hodgkinson v. National Live Stock Ins. Co. 
 26 Beav.' 473; 5 Jur. X. S. 478 ; 4 De G. & J. 422; 
 5 Jur. N. S. 969; Lyde v. Eastern Bengal Ry. 
 Co. 36 Beav. 10; Bloxam v. Metropolitan Ry. 
 Co. L. R. 3 Ch. 337, L. C: Clinch v. Financial 
 Co. L. R. 5 Eq. 450, V. C. W. ; affirmed, L. R. 
 4 Ch. 117, L. C. & L. J.L; Kernaghan v. Wil- 
 liams, L. R. 6 Eq. 228, M. R. ; Gray v. 
 Lewis, L. R. 8 Eq. 526, V. C. M.; ante, 26. n. 
 As to allegations in suits to restrain acts ultra 
 vires, see Mills v. Northern Railway of' Buenos 
 AyresCo. L. R. 5 Ch. 621; Russell r. Wake- 
 field Waterworks Co. L. R. 20 Eq. 474. 
 
 anpear in the title of the complaint. Cochran 
 v. American Opera Co. 20 Abb. X. C. 114. As 
 
 240 
 
 i Hoole v. Great Western Ry. Co. L. R. 3 
 Ch. 262, L. JJ. 
 
 2 See post, Chap. XIX., Dismissing Bills; 
 Handford v. Storie, 2 S. & S. 196; York v. 
 White, 10 Jur. 168, M. R.; Armstrongs. Storer, 
 9 Beav. 277; see also Brown v. Lake, 2 Coll. 
 620; Johnson v. Hammersley, 24 Beav. 498; 
 Whittington v. Edwards, 7 W. R. 72, L. C; 
 Inchley v. Alsop, 7 Jur. X. S. 1181; 9 W. R. 
 649, M. R.; Hubbell t\ Warren, 8 Allen, 173, 
 177; Updike v. Doyle, 7 R. I. 446, 402; Collins 
 v. Taylor, 3 Green Ch. 163. But in Atlas Bank 
 v. Nahant Bank, 33 Pick. 480, 492, Shaw C. J. 
 said: "The plaintiffs having once instituted 
 the proceedings as a statute remedy for them- 
 selves and others, they go on afterwards for the 
 benefit of all parties concerned, and the original 
 plaintiffs have no power to discontinue any 
 more than a petitioning creditor could discon- 
 tinue the proceedings under a commission of 
 bankruptcy." Later it was enacted by statute 
 in Massachusetts that after a suit in Equity to 
 enforce the liability of stockholders or officers 
 of manufacturing corporations, shall have been 
 commenced, it shall not be competent for the 
 plaintiff to dismiss the same without order of 
 Court, and such notice to other creditors as the 
 Court may deem reasonable under the circum- 
 stances. Stat. 1862. c. 218, § 8 (since repealed). 
 
 s Pulbrook v. Richmond Cons. M. Co. 9 
 Ch. O. 610 ; Harben v. Phillips, 23 Ch. D. 14. 
 
 to joinder of plaintiffs in such a bill, see 
 Doherty v. Holiday (Ind.), 32 N. E. Rep. 315.
 
 PERSONS HAVING CONCURRENT INTERESTS WITH PLAINTIFF. * 245 
 
 of the partnership or company may still file another bill for the same 
 object: but it is said, that where a company had authorized some of its 
 members to enter into obligations for it, and they then came to the 
 Court for relief against third parties, in the name and for the benefit of 
 all, and the Court dismissed the suit, the Court would not, it seems, 
 allow other members to prosecute another suit for the same object. 4 
 
 In adopting this form of suit, care should be taken in selecting the 
 plaintiff; for as, on the one hand, a plaintiff, who has a right to com- 
 plain of an act done to a numerous society of which he is a member, is 
 entitled effectually to sue on behalf of himself and all others similarly 
 interested, though no other may wish to sue; so, although there are a 
 hundred who wish to institute a suit and are entitled to sue, still, if 
 they sue by a plaintiff only, who has personally precluded himself from 
 suing, the suit cannot proceed. 5 A plaintiff thus suing must be a bona 
 fide shareholder, and sue bona fide for the benefit of the company; 
 therefore, if a * director in another company takes shares for the * 245 
 purpose of filing a bill, and is indemnified by the other com- 
 pany, the bill will be dismissed. 1 
 
 In all cases of suits for the protection of property pending litigation, 
 and in all cases in the nature of waste, one person may sue on behalf 
 of himself and of all persons having the same interest. 2 
 
 In all cases, where one or a few individuals of a large number insti- 
 tute a suit on behalf of themselves and the others, they must so describe 
 themselves in the bill; otherwise a demurrer or plea for want of par- 
 ties will lie. 8 And the Court is bound to ascertain, by strict proof, 
 that the parties by whom the bill is filed have the interests which they 
 say they have. 4 
 
 4 Barker v. Walters, 8 Beav. 97; 9 Jur. 73. 
 
 5 Per I,. J. Knight Bruce, Burt r. British 
 Nation Life Ass. Assn. 4 De G. & J. 158, 174; 
 Hubbell v. Warren, 8 Allen, 173, 177. See, as 
 to requiring security for costs from a plaintiff 
 in such a suit who is insolvent, Tredwell v. 
 Byrch, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 476. 
 
 1 Forrest v. Manchester, &c. Ry. Co. 30 
 Beav. 40; 7 Jur. N. S. 749; ib. 887; 4 De G. & 
 J. 120; see also, Colman v. Eastern Counties 
 Ry. Co. 10 Beav. 1; 11 Jur. 74; Bloxam v. 
 Metropolitan Ry. Co. L. R. 3 Ch. 337, L. C; 
 Salisbury v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. W. N. (1869) 
 52, V. C. J. See note (a), p. 26, ante. 
 
 a 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42, r. 5; and see 
 Ackroyd v. Briggs, 14 W. R. 25, V. C. S. 
 
 8 March v. Eastern R. R. Co 40 N. H. 566. 
 In a bill m Equity brought by an adminis- 
 trator of an insolvent estate, to obtain a recon- 
 veyance of land alleged to have been conveyed 
 by the intestate., without consideration, to de- 
 fraud his creditors, it must be alleged in the 
 bill that the suit is instituted for the benefit of 
 all the creditors of the estate. Crocker v. Craig, 
 46 Maine, 327; Fletcher v. Holmes, 40 Maine, 
 364 ; Boxy v. McKay, 4 Sneed. 286. Where a 
 
 vol. i. — 16 
 
 part of a ship's crew appointed two of their 
 number to be agents, and a bill was filed by 
 such agents in their own name, and not on be- 
 half of themselves and the others, a demurrer 
 was allowed for not having made the whole 
 crew parties. Leigh v. Thomas, 2 Ves. 312. 
 See now, Worraker v. Pryer, 2 Ch. D. 109; 
 De Hart v. Stevenson. 1 Q. B. D. 313; Eyre v. 
 Cox, 24 W. R. 317; Woods v. Sowerby, 14 W. 
 R. 9: Re Royle, Fryer v. Royle, 5 Ch. D. 540; 
 Adcock v. Peters, W. N. (1876) 139; Re Vin- 
 cent, Parham v. Vincent, W. N. (1877) 249; 26 
 W. R. 94; Richardson v. Leake, W. N. (1879) 
 181. So where a bill was filed by three partners 
 in a numerous trading company, against the 
 members of the committee for managing the 
 trading concerns of the company, it was dis- 
 missed, because it was not filed bj'the plaintiffs 
 "on behalf of themselves and the other parties, 
 not members of the committee." Baldwin v. 
 Lawrence, 2 S. & S. 18; and see Douglass u. 
 Horsfall, 2 S. & S. 184. 
 
 * Clay v. Rufford, 8 Hare, 281, 288; 14 Jur. 
 803; and see Smith v. Leathhart, 20 L.J. Ch. 
 202, V. C. K. B. A suit instituted by a plain- 
 tiff having only a nominal interest on behalf of 
 
 241
 
 *246 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 The Court will generally at the hearing allow a bill, which has origi- 
 nally been hied by one individual of a numerous class in his own right, 
 to be amended, so as to make such individual sue on behalf of himself, 
 and the rest of the class. 6 
 
 * 246 * Section II. — Of Necessary Parties to a Suit, in respect of their 
 Interest in resisting the Demands of the Plaintiff. 1 
 
 A person may be affected by the demands of the plaintiff in a suit, 
 either immediately or consequentially.' 2 Where a person is in the actual 
 enjoyment of the subject-matter, or has an interest in it, either in pos- 
 session or expectancy, which is likely either to be defeated or dimin- 
 ished by the plaintiff's claims, he has an immediate interest in resisting 
 the demand, and all persons who have such immediate interests are 
 necessary parties to the suit; but there may be other persons who, 
 though not immediately interested in resisting the plaintiff's demands, 
 are yet liable to be affected by them consequentially, because the suc- 
 cess of the plaintiff against the defendants who are immediately inter- 
 ested, may give those defendants a right to proceed against them, for the 
 purpose of compelling them to make compensation, either in the whole 
 or in part, for the loss sustained. The persons who are consequentially 
 liable to be affected by the suit, must frequently also be parties to it. 
 The question, therefore, of who are necessary parties to a suit-in respect 
 of their interest in resisting the plaintiff's demands, resolves itself into 
 two; namely, Who are necessary parties, first, in respect of their 
 immediate interest ? and secondly, in respect of their consequential 
 interest ? 
 
 The reader's attention will be first directed to the question, who are 
 necessary parties to a suit, in respect of their immediate interest in 
 resisting the plaintiff's demand. Where parties are thus spoken of as 
 having an interest in the question, it is not intended to confine the 
 definition to those only who are beneficially interested, but it is to be 
 considered as extending to all persons who have any estate, either 
 legal or equitable, in the subject-matter, whether such estate be benefi- 
 cial to themselves or not. 3 
 
 a body of shareholders, not for the benefit 
 of the plaintiff, but for improper purposes, at 
 the instigation of another person, who indem- 
 nities the plaintiff against the costs of the suit, 
 will be treated as an imposition on the Court, 
 and the bill will be ordered to be taken off the 
 file. Robson v. Dodds, L. R. 8 Eq. 301 ; see 
 Seaton v. Grant, L. R. 2 Ch. 459. 
 
 5 Lloyd v. Loaring, 6 Ves. 779 ; see also 
 Milligan v. Mitchell, 1 M. & C. 433 ; Gwatkin 
 v. Campbell, 1 Jur. N. S. 131, V. C. W.; Reese 
 River Silver Mining Co. v. Atwell, L. R. 7 Eq. 
 347, M. R. ; and post, on Amending Bills. If 
 a bill is brought in behalf of the plaintiff and 
 such others having a like interest as may come 
 in to prosecute the suit, and no others come in, 
 the plaintiff has the control of the suit for him- 
 
 242 
 
 self alone, and, in cxler to maintain his bill, he 
 must show that he is himself entitled to equi- 
 table relief. Hubbell v. Warren, 8 Allen, 173. 
 As to the conclusiveness of the decree in these 
 cases, see Att.-Gen. v. Birmingham, 15 Ch. D. 
 423; Robinson ». Dhuleep Singh, 11 Ch. D. 
 798; Watson v. Cave, 17 Ch. D. 19. 
 
 1 See ante, notes to pp. 190, 191, and Equity 
 Rules 22 & 48 of the United States Courts. 
 
 2 A town must be a party to a bill in Equity 
 to restrain its treasurer from paying out money 
 voted at legal meetings of the town for illegal 
 purposes. Allen v. Turner, 11 Gray, 436; see 
 Clark r. Ward well, 55 Maine, 61. 
 
 3 In a suit seeking to reform a deed, the 
 holder of an equity of redemption not barred 
 by lapse of time, under a mortgage not fore-
 
 PERSONS RESISTING PLAINTIFF S DEMANDS. 
 
 248 
 
 * Under this definition are included all persons who fill the * 247 
 character of trustees of the property in dispute. 1 But where the 
 trustee is a mere bare trustee, without any legal estate vested in him, 
 he need not, in general, be made a party. A broker or agent, signing a 
 contract in his own name for the purchase or sale of property, is not 
 a necessary party to a bill for specific performance of such contract 
 against his principal. 2 And so, where a person having no interest in 
 the matter joins with another who has, in a contract for sale, as where 
 a man having gone through a fictitious ceremony of marriage with a 
 woman, joins with her, as her husband, in an agreement to sell her 
 property, he is not a necessary party to a suit to enforce the contract. 3 
 
 Where, however, any estate is vested in a trustee, or, where, although 
 the trustee has no estate, the circumstances are such that in the event 
 of the plaintiff succeeding in his suit, the defendant may have a demand 
 over against him, he is a necessary party. 4 
 
 A trustee, who is named in a will, but has never acted, and has 
 released all his interest to his co-trustee, ought not to be made a party 
 to a bill to set aside the will on the ground of fraud. 5 
 
 Where a trustee has assigned his interest in the trust-estate to an- 
 other, it is necessary to have, not only the trustee who has assigned, 
 but the assignee before the Court. 6 It is improper, however, to 
 make the agent of a trustee a party ; 7 and a person who * had * 248 
 
 close I. is a party in interest, and must be noti- 
 fied; and so also of the grantor and grantee in 
 the d ed sought to be reformed. Pierce v- 
 Faunce, 47 Maine, 507. 
 
 Where A contracts to convey land to B, but 
 actually conveys the land to C, both A and U 
 are proper parties to a bill tiled by B for spe- 
 cific performance. Daily v. Litchfield, 10 Mich. 
 29. In a suit to set aside a deed for fraud 
 against creditors, both the grantor and grantee 
 are necessary parties. Lovejoy v. Irelan, 17 
 Md. 525; ante, p. 231, n. 4. 
 
 If the trustee in an assignment to secure a 
 note dies, the maker of the trust and note is a 
 necessary party to a bill for the appointment of 
 a new trustee. Holden v. Stickney, 2 McAr. 
 141; Maxwell v. Finnie, 6 Coldw. 434; Ed- 
 inondson v. Harris, 2 Tenn. Ch. 437. 
 
 i See 44 & 45 Vic. c. 41, § 30. 
 
 2 Kingsley v. Young, Coop. Eq. PI. 42, see 
 antt , p 196, n.; Story, Eq. PI. § 231 ; Lang v. 
 Brown, 21) Ga. 628 ; see Miller v. Whittaker, 23 
 111. 453. 
 
 8 Sturge v. Starr, 2 M. & K. 195. 
 
 ^ See McKinley v. Irvine, 13 Ala. 681; 
 Cassiday v. McDaniel, 8 B. Mon. 519; Morrow 
 v. Lawrence, 7 Wis. 574. Thus, in Jones v. 
 Jones, 3 Atk. 110, where a plaintiff sought to 
 set aside a lease on. the ground of forgery, 
 without bringing before the Court the trustees 
 who were parties to the lease, and to whom the 
 fraud was imputed, the objection for want of 
 parties was allowed, because if the plaintiff 
 prevailed, the defendant might have a remedy 
 
 over against the trustees. Upon the same piiii- 
 ciplej where the trustees of real estates had 
 conveyed them over to purchasers, it was deter- 
 mined, that on a bill by the cestui que trusts 
 against the purchasers to set aside the con- 
 veyance, the trustees were necessary parties. 
 Harrison v. Pryse, Barnard. 324. Where a bill 
 alleged a fraudulent combination between the 
 maker of a deed of trust and one of the trustees 
 therein named, and it was sought to set aside a 
 preference given to such trustee, it was held 
 that the maker of the deed as well as the trustee 
 should be made a party. Murphy v. Jackson, 
 5 Jones, Eq. (N. C.) 11. 
 
 5 Richardson v. Hiilbert, 1 Anst. 65. 
 
 6 Burt v. Dennett, 2 Bro. C. C. 225, Perkins's 
 ed. note (a); Story, Eq. PI. § 209; Bailey v. 
 Inglee, 2 Paige, 278. If the trustee has as- 
 signed his trust absolutely, the assignee should 
 be made a party in his stead, and the trustee 
 need not be made a party, unless the assignment 
 is a breach of trust. Story, Eq. PL §§ 211, 
 215, 214; Bromley v. Holland, 7 Sumner's Ves. 
 3, and note (c); 5 id. 610; Munch v. Cockerel I, 
 8 Sim. 219. But if the bill is brought to re- 
 move the trustee, and recover from a stranger 
 property improperly sold by the trustee, it is 
 not a case id' misjoinder. Whitman r. A.ber- 
 natby, 33 Ala. 154; see Webber v. Taylor, 5 
 Jones, Eq. (N. C.) 36. And the trustee is, 
 in such case, a necessary party. Cowdry v. 
 Cheshire, 75 N. C. 285. 
 
 1 Att.-Gen.i\ Earl of Chesterfield, 18 Beav. 
 596; 18 Jur. 686; Maw v. Pearson, 28 Beav. 196; 
 
 243
 
 *249 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 assumed to act as a trustee, though not duly appointed, was held to bo 
 an agent for this purpose. 1 
 
 According to the original practice of the Court of Chancery it was 
 generally necessary, where there were more trustees than one, that they 
 should all be parties, if amenable to the process of the Court; 2 but this 
 rule was, in some respects, modified by a General Order of the Court, 3 
 enabling a plaintiff who had a joint and several demand against several 
 persons, to proceed against one or more of the several persons liable, 
 without making the others parties; and even before this order, in some 
 cases where there were merely accounting parties, one might be sued 
 for an account of his own receipts and payments, without bringing the 
 others before the Court. 4 Where a cestui que trust seeks a general 
 account, he must bring all the accounting parties before the Court, 
 
 notwithstanding the order. 5 
 *249 *The rule which requires the trustees of property in litigation 
 
 to be brought before the Court, renders necessary the presence 
 of the committees of the estates of idiots and lunatics in suits against 
 the idiots or lunatics committed to their care; 1 because they are the 
 trustees of such estates. Upon the same ground, the assignees of 
 bankrupts or insolvents are necessary parties to suits relating to the 
 property of such bankrupts or insolvents. 2 
 
 For the like reason, wherever a demand is sought to be satisfied out 
 of the personal estate of a deceased person, it is necessary to make the 
 
 and see Robertson V. Armstrong. 28 Reav. 123; 
 see, however, Att.-Gen. r. Leicester, 7 Reav. 
 176, 170. Rut see Hardy v. Caley, 33 Reav. 365. 
 
 1 Ling v. Colraan, 10 Reav. 373. 
 
 2 16 Vin. Ab. Party, R. 257, PI. 68. 
 
 3 Cons. Ord. VII. 2. See R. S. C. 1883, 
 Ord. XVI. 3. 
 
 4 Lady Selyard v. Executors of Harris, 1 
 Eq. <;is. Ahr. 74, pi. 20; but see Munch r. Cock- 
 erel], 8 Sim. 219 : Story, Eq. PI § 214, note. 
 Thus, where a bill was filed against the repre- 
 sentative of one of several trustees who were 
 dead, for an account of the receipts and pay- 
 ments of his testator, who alone managed the 
 trust, an objection that the representatives of 
 the other trustees were not before the Court, 
 was overruled; because the plaintiff insisted 
 only upon having an account of the receipts 
 and disbursements of the trustee, whose 
 representative was before the Court, and not 
 of any joint receipts or transactions by him 
 with the other trustees. See Story, Eq. PI. 
 $§ -207 a, 212, 213. 214, and notes; Fleming v. 
 (iilmer, 35 Ala. 62. So, where a bill was tiled 
 by a creditor against the representatives of R 
 and C as two trustees of estates conveyed in 
 (rust to pay debts, for an account of the pro- 
 duce of the sales, and payment of their debts; 
 ami the representaiives of R alleged by their 
 answer, that not only C but I) also were 
 trustees, and that I) bad acted in the trust, 
 although they did not know whether he had 
 
 244 
 
 received any of the produce, Lord Kenyon 
 M. R., and afterwards Lord Arden M. R., held 
 D to be an unnecessary party. The reporter 
 of this case adds a query, because at the bar 
 the general opinion was that D's representa- 
 tives ought to have been parties, nor could one 
 creditor suing waive, on behalf of absent 
 parties in joint interest with himself, the 
 benefit or possible benefit of any part of the 
 trust fund. Routh v. Kinder, 3 Swanst. 144, 
 n., from Lord Colchester's MSS.; but see id. 
 145. n. This query seems to be in accordance 
 with the principles laid down in Williams 
 v. Williams 9 Mod. 299; see also Wadeson v. 
 Rudge, 1 0. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 369; but see 
 Masters v. Rarnes, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 616; 7 
 Jur. 1167 ; and Symes v. Glynn, and Pease r. 
 Cheesbrough, cited 2 Seton, 881, 883. 
 
 5 Coppard v. Allen, 10 Jur. N. S. 622; 12 
 W R. 943, L. JJ. ; 2 De G. J. & S. 173. 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 30. It seems that upon a bill 
 for the recovery of a debt, due from a drunk- 
 ard, against his committee, the drunkard is a 
 proper, though not a necessary party. Beach 
 D. Bradley, 8 Paige, 146. 
 
 2 See Storm v. Davenport, 1 Sandf. (N. Y.) 
 Ch. 135; Milliard, Bank. & Ins. 383, 384: 
 Mor.n v. Hays, 1 John. Ch. 339: Sells r. 
 Hubbell, 2 John. Ch. 394; Springer r Van- 
 derpool, 4 Edw. Ch. 362; Rotts v. Patton, 1U 
 B. Mon. 452.
 
 PERSONS RESISTING PLAINTIFF S DEMANDS. 
 
 250 
 
 personal representative a party to the suit, (a) Thus although, as wo 
 have seen, a creditor or a legatee may bring a bill against a debtor to 
 the testator's estate upon the ground of collusion between him and the 
 executor, 3 yet in all cases of this description, the personal representa- 
 tive must be before the Court. 4 80, where to a bill for an account of 
 the estate of a person deceased, and to have the same applied to satisfy 
 a debt alleged to be due from him to the plaintiff, the defendants 
 pleaded that they were not executors or administrators of the party 
 whose estate was sought to be charged, nor so stated by the bill, and 
 demurred, for that the executors or the administrators were the proper 
 parties to contest the debt, who might probably prove that it had been 
 discharged, the Court allowed both the plea and demurrer, but gave the 
 plaintiff leave to amend his bill as he might be advised; 5 but to a suit 
 concerning a specific legacy, the executor is no longer a necessary party 
 after he has assented to the bequest; thus where a bill was filed by the 
 reversioner against the legatee of a term, praying that the lease might 
 be declared void, and the defendant insisted that if the lease was set 
 aside, the plaintiff ought to pay the money expended by the testator in 
 the improvement of the premises, the executor of the testator, who had 
 assented to the bequest, was not considered a necessary party to the 
 suit. 6 And where an executor had been outlawed, and a witness 
 proved that *he had inquired after but could not find him, it was * L'DO 
 thought to be a full answer to the objection, that he was not a 
 party to a suit which had been instituted by a creditor of the deceased 
 testator against the residuary legatee. 1 
 
 Moreover, in some cases, where the fund, the subject of the suit, has 
 been ascertained and appropriated, the Court has dispensed with the 
 appearance of the personal representative of the testator, by whose will 
 
 8 Aft. -Gen. v. Wynne. Mos. 126; See nn'e, 
 p. 195; post, c. 6, § 4, and notes to the point, 
 " Legatee or creditor cannot sue debtor to 
 testator's estate." 
 
 4 See Postlethwaite v. Howes, 3 Clarke 
 (Iowa), 305. lint the heirs need not be made 
 parties to a suit relating exclusively to the 
 personalty. Galphin v. M'Kinncy. 1 McCord, 
 Ch. 280. Hut it is otherwise in regard to a 
 suit respecting real estate. Kennedy r. Ken- 
 nedy, 2 Ala. 571; Smith v. West, 5 Lift. 48; 
 Carr?\ Callaghan, 3 Litt. 305. And to a bill 
 against an administrator, to charge the estate 
 with an annual payment, to preserve the res- 
 idue, the distributees of the estate are neces- 
 
 sary parties. Coheen v. Gordon, 1 Hill, Ch. 
 51. 
 
 5 Griffith v. Bateman, Rep. temp. Finch. 
 334; Rumney v. Mead. id. 303; Att.-Gen. 
 r. Twisden, id. 33G, 337; and see Att.-Gen. v. 
 Wynne, Mos. 126. For a case where under 
 special circumstances the executors of the 
 settlor of a trust fund would be necessary 
 parties to a suit for administering it, see Judg- 
 ment of Sir J. Wigram V. C. in Gaunt v. John- 
 son. 7 Hare. 154, 150; 12 Jur. 1007. 
 
 8 Malpas v. Ackland, 3 Rus«. 273, 277: 
 and see Smith v. Brooksbank, 7 Sim. 18, 21: 
 Moor v. Blagrave, 1 Ch. Cas. 277. 
 
 i Heath v. Percival, 1 P. Wms. 684. 
 
 (") This applies where it is sought to 
 establish a title to the personal estate of a 
 -I'd person. Dowdeswell v. Dowdeswell, 
 !l Ch. D. 294. As to joining executors and 
 administrators, see also Brown v. Walker, 108 
 N. C. 387: Keenan v. Keenan, 58 Hun, 005; 
 Kingsbury v. Flowers. 65 Ala. 470; Bromley 
 v. Mitchell, 155 Mass. 509; Danner v. Danner, 
 
 30 N. J. Eq. 67; Jones v. Smith, 55 Texas 
 383. When a loss results from a breach of 
 tru*t by the ancestor as executor, his heir at 
 law is a proper party to a suit on that ground 
 against the ancestor's legal representative. 
 McCartin V. Trephagen, 43 N. .1. Eq. 323; 
 Dorsheimer r. Rorback, 23 id. 40; see Graves 
 v. Pinchback, 47 Ark. 470. 
 
 245
 
 *250 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 the fund was bequeathed. 2 And where the estate has been distributed 
 under the decree of the Court, 3 or after the issue of advertisements 
 under the 22 & 23 Vic. c. 35, § 29, 4 the personal representative is not a 
 necessary party to a suit to establish a claim against the estate. 
 
 The rule which requires the executor to be before the Court in all 
 cases relating to the personal estate of a testator, extends to an execu- 
 tor durante minore cetate, even though the actual executor has attained 
 twenty -one, and has obtained probate thereon, 8 unless he has received 
 all the testator's personal estate from the hands of the executor durante 
 minore mtate. 
 
 The personal representative required is one appointed in England; 
 and where a testator appointed persons residing in India and Scotland 
 his executors, and the will was not proved in England, but the plain- 
 tiff, a creditor, tiled a bill against the agent of the executors, to whom 
 money had been remitted, praying an account and payment of the 
 money into Court for security, a demurrer, because no personal repre- 
 sentative of the testator resident within the jurisdiction of the Court 
 was a party, was allowed. 6 So, where an executor proved the will of 
 his testator in India, and afterwards came to this country, where a suit 
 was instituted against him for an account of an unadministered part of 
 the testator's estate, which had been remitted to him from India by his 
 co-executor there, it was held necessary that a personal representative 
 should be constituted in England, and made a party to the suit. 7 
 
 2 Arthur v. Hughes, 4 Beav. 500; Beasley 
 v. Kenyon, 5 Beav. 544; Bond v. Graham, 1 
 Hare, 484, 6 Jur. 620; Story, Eq. PI. § 214. 
 See Hunter v. Young, 4 Ex. D. 256. 
 
 3 Farrell v. Smith, 2 B. & R. 3:57; see also 
 Poolev v. Ray, 1 P. Wins. 355; Brooks v. 
 Reynolds, 1 Bro. C. C 182; 2 Dick. COS; 
 Douglas v. Clay, 1 Dick. 393; Kenyon v. 
 Worthington, 2 Dick. 688. 
 
 * Clegg r. Rowland, L. R. 3 Eq. 368, V. C. 
 M.; see 2 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 995; 
 Re Bowden, 45 Ch. D. 444; Re Frewen, 60 L. 
 T. 953. 
 
 5 Glass v. Oxenham, 2 Atk. 121. 
 
 6 Lowe v. Farlie, 2 Mad. 101; see also 
 Logan v. Fairlie, 2 S. & S. 284; Story, Conf. 
 Laws, §§ 513, 514, 514 a. and notes; Story, Eq. 
 PI. § 179, and cases cited; Ashmead v. Colhy, 
 26 Conn. 287; Christian v. Devereux, 12 Sim. 
 264; Partington v. Att.-Gen. L. R. 4 II. L. 
 101; Re Commercial Bank of India and the 
 Tiast, L. R. 5 Ch. 31, and see Eames v. Hacon, 
 16 Ch. D. 407, where the letters had been resealed 
 in England. See S. C. 18 Ch. D. 347. 
 
 7 Bond v. Graham, 1 Hare, 482; Tyler v. 
 "Bell, 2 M. & C. 89, 105; but see Anderson v. 
 'Caunter, 2 M. & K. 763, and see the observa- 
 tion of Lord Cottenham on this case, 2 M. & 
 'C. 110. For the method of obtaining limited 
 
 or special administration where the executor is 
 abroad, see ante, pp. 197, 198. Some of the 
 American Courts have gone so far as to hold, 
 
 246 
 
 that a foreign executor or administrator, com- 
 ing here, having received assets in the foreign 
 country, is liable to be sued here, and to account 
 for such assets, notwithstanding he has taken 
 out no new letters of administration here, nor has 
 the estate been positively settled in the foreign 
 State. Sweanngen v. Pendleton, 4 Serg. & R. 
 389, 392; Evans v. Tatem, 9 Serg. & R. 252, 
 259; Bryan v. McGee, 2 Wash. C. C 337; 
 Campbell v. Tousey, 7 Cowen, 64; see al^o 
 Dowdale's case, 6 Coke, 47; Julian v. Reynolds, 
 8 Ala. 680. He is charged as a trustee who 
 has brought the assets within the jurisdiction 
 of the Court. MeNamara v. Dwyer, 7 Paige, 
 239; Brownlee v. Lockwood, 20 N. J. Eq. 255 ; 
 Tunstall v. Pollard, 11 Leigh, 1; Moore v. 
 Hood, 9 Rich. Eq. 317 ; Allsup v. Allsup, 10 
 Yerg. 283; Patton v. Overton, 8 Hum. 192; 
 Beeler v. Dunn, 3 Head, 90 ; Dillard v. Harris, 
 2 Tenn, Ch. 196. The doctrine of the text is 
 sustained by Whart. Conf. Laws,§ 616; Story, 
 Conf. Laws, § 514 b, and notes; Boston v. 
 Boylston, 2 Mass. 384; Goodwin v. Jones, 3 
 Mass. 514; Davis v. Estey, 8 Pick. 475; 
 Dawes v. Head, 3 Pick. 128; Doolittle v. 
 Lewis 7 John. Ch. 45, 47; McRea ». McRea, 
 11 La. 571; Att.-Gen v. Bouwens, 4 M. & W. 
 171. In Campbell r. Wallace, 10 Gray, 162, 
 it was held, that there was no Equity jurisdic- 
 tion in Massachusetts to enforce a trust arising 
 under the will of a foreigner, which has been 
 proved and allowed in a foreign country only,
 
 PERSONS RESISTING PLAINTIFF'S DEMANDS. 
 
 251 
 
 ♦Where an administration was disputed in the Ecclesiastical *251 
 Court, the Court of Chancery would entertain a suit for a 
 receiver to protect the property till the question in the Ecclesiastical 
 Court was decided, although an administration pendente lite might be 
 obtained in the Ecclesiastical Court. 1 In such cases, the rule requiring 
 a representative to be before the Court must be dispensed with, there 
 being no person sustaining that character in existence. 2 And where a 
 party entitled to administer refuses to take out administration himself, 
 and prevents any one else from doing so, he will not be allowed to 
 object to a suit being proceeded with, because a personal representative 
 is not before the Court. 8 
 
 and no certified copy of which has been filed in 
 the Probate Court of that State. See Campbell 
 v. Sheldon, 13 Pick. 8. In Skitter v. Carroll, 2 
 Sandf. Ch. 573, it was held that, in a case, 
 where there are real assets of the estate of a 
 deceased person within its jurisdiction, although 
 no administration had been taken within the 
 State, a Court of Equity will not hesitate to 
 administer them; and the foreign executors 
 may be made parties to the suit instituted for 
 that purpose. See Scruggs v. Driver, 31 Ala. 
 274. 
 
 1 Atkinson v. Ilenshaw, 2 V. & B. 85 ; Ball 
 v Oliver, ib. 96; see also Watkins v. Brent, 1 
 M. & C. 97, 102; Whitworth v. Whyddon, 2 
 M'N. & G. 52; 14 Jur. 142; dimming v. 
 Fraser, 28 Beav. 614 ; Dimes v. Steinberg, 2 
 Sin. & G. 75. Now, however, it is appre- 
 hended that the Court would require a special 
 case to be made for its interference, pending 
 proceedings in the Probate Court; that Court 
 having power to appoint an administrator pen- 
 dente lite, with full powers, and also to nomi- 
 nate, him receiver of the rents of real estate. 
 20 & 21 Vic. c. 77, §§ 70, 71, 73; Vercy v. 
 Duprez, L. R. 6 Eq. 329, V. C. M.; Tich- 
 borne v. Tichborne, L. R. 1 P. & D. 730; 
 Hitchin v. Burks, W. N. (1870) 190; 18 W. 
 R 1015; lor an instance in Chancery since 
 this Act, see Williams v. Att.-Gen. M. R. 8 
 May. 1801, Seton, 1003. 
 
 2 Story, Eq. PI. § 91. The Court, can, how- 
 ever, appoint a nominee of its own to represent 
 the estate. 15 & 16 Vic. c.86, § 44. 
 
 3 Thus, in D'Aranda v. Whittinghnm, Mos. 
 84 (see, however, Penny v. Watts, 2 Phil. 
 149), where the heir of an obligor demurred to a 
 bill by an obligee, because the administrator of 
 the obligor was not a party, the demurrer was 
 overruled, because it appeared that he would 
 not administer himself, and had opposed the 
 plaintiff in taking out administration as the 
 principal creditor ; and in a case where the per- 
 son entitled by law to administration did not 
 take it out, but acted as if she had, recefc ing 
 and paying away the intestate's property, an 
 objection for want of parties, on the ground 
 
 that there was no administrator before the 
 Court, was overruled. Cleland v. Cleland, 
 Prec. Ch. 64. In Creasor v. Robinson, 14 
 Beav. 589, 15 Jur. 1049, however, the Court 
 declined to follow the case last referred to; 
 and refused to make an order for an account 
 against an administrator de son tort, unless a 
 legal personal representative duly constituted 
 was a party. See also Cooke v. Gettings, 21 
 Beav. 497; Beardmore v. Gregory, 2 H. & M. 
 491 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 363. Where there were 
 four executors, one of whom alone proved 
 and acted, and a bill was brought against that 
 one, and he in his answer confessed that he 
 had alone proved the will and acted in the 
 executorship, and that the others never inter- 
 meddled therein, it was said to be good. 
 Brown v. Pitman, Gilb. Eq. 75; 10 Vin. Ab. 
 tit. Parties, B. PI. 19; Cramer ». Morton, 2 
 Moll. 108; Clifton v. Haig, 4 Desaus. 330. In 
 that case, however, if the executor who had 
 proved had died, it would not have been suffi- 
 cient to have brought his executor before the 
 Court, because he would not have represented 
 the original testator; the other executors would 
 still have had a right to prove, even though 
 they had renounced probate. Arnold v. Blen- 
 cowe, 1 Cox, 420. It may be doubted whether 
 this is now so. See 20 & 21 Vic. c. 77, § 79; 
 and 21 & 22 Vic. c 95, § 16. The record, 
 therefore, would not have been complete with- 
 out a new representative of the original testa- 
 tor. The general order enabling a plaintiff to 
 proceed against one or more persons severally 
 liable (Cons. Ord. VII. 2) does not apply to a 
 general administration suit. Hall 0. Austin, 2 
 Coll. 570; 10 Jur. 452. As to proceedings 
 upon the death of an executor or administrator, 
 see 1 Wins. Exors. 258-260, 47*; Twvford p. 
 Trail, 7 Sim. 02; Barr v. Carter, 2 Cox. 429; 
 A". Gaynor'a Goods, L. R. 1 P. & M. 723; Re 
 (lav and Tetley, 16 Ch. D. 3; Crossley V. 
 Glasgow Life Ass. Society, 4 Ch. D. 421; Re 
 Bayne's Goods, 1 Sw. & Tr. 132; Re Smith's 
 Goods, 3 Curt. 31 ; Arnold r. Blencowe, 1 < !ox, 
 420; Chalon V. Webster, W. N. (1873) 189; 20 
 & 21 Vic. c. 77, § 79; 21 & 22 Vic. c. 95, § 16. 
 
 247
 
 * 253 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 *2o2 * Where there are several executors or administrators, and 
 general administration is sought, or is necessary to the relief 
 claimed, 1 they must all be mafle parties, even though one of them be an 
 infant. 2 This rule may be dispensed with, if any of them are not 
 amenable to the process of the Court, 3 or if they have stood out pro- 
 cess to a sequestration; and if an executor has not proved he need not 
 be a party, 4 unless he has acted as executor. 6 Wherever an executor 
 has actually administered, he must be made a party, although he has 
 released and disclaimed. 6 But where a plaintiff filed a bill against one 
 of two executors, and alleged in his bill that he knew not who was the 
 other executor, and prayed that the defendant might discover who he 
 was and where he lived, a demurrer for want of parties was overruled. 7 
 And where one of two joint executors is abroad, an account may be 
 decreed of his own receipts and payments. 8 
 
 The cases do not seem to afford a very clear answer to the question, 
 under what circumstances, in a suit to administer the assets of a 
 deceased testator or intestate, the plaintiff ought to join, with the 
 existing personal representatives, such parties as fill the position of 
 administrators or executors of a former representative of the origi- 
 *253 nal estate. 9 It is conceived, however, that the practice in *this 
 respect is now settled; namely, to make the personal representa- 
 tives of a deceased executor parties, where he had received assets of 
 the testator for which he has not accounted with the surviving executor, 
 and in respect of which it is sought to charge his estate; but where 
 this is not the case, to introduce into the bill an allegation that the 
 deceased executor fully accounted with the survivor, and that nothing 
 is due from his estate to the estate of the testator, and not to make his 
 
 As to the effect of one executor being also a v. Morris, 1 Hare, 413, 421; 6 Jur. 297; see 
 
 residuary legatee, see Latch v. Latch, L. R. 10 21 & 22 Vic. c. 95, § 16, and supra, p. 251, n. 3. 
 Ch. 464; see R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XVI. 11 ; 15 5 The plaintiff may make him a party, if he 
 
 & 16 Vic. c. 80, § 42. An executor cannot act, has acted as executor. Vickers v. Bell, 4 De G. 
 
 according to the decisions of several of the J. & S. 274; 10 Jur. N. S. 376, L. JJ. Where 
 
 States, until he has qualified according to law. a bill seeks discovery and relief only agaii^t the 
 
 Monroe v. James, 4 Munf. 194; Martin v. Peck, acts of one of the executors of an estate, it is not 
 
 2 Yerg. 298 ; 3 Redf. Wills, 21. necessary to make the other executor a party in 
 
 1 Hall r. Austin, 2 Coll. 570; 10 Jur. 452. the first instance. But, it seems, a co-executor 
 
 2 Scurry v. Morse, 9 Mod. 89; Offley v. may be made a party, during the progress of 
 Jenney, 3 Ch. Rep. 92; Hamp v. Robinson, 3 the suit, if it shall prove to be expedient or 
 Pe G. J. & S. 97. necessary. Footman v. Pray, R. M. Charlt. 
 
 8 Cowslad v. Cely, Prec. Ch. 83 ; but if they 291. See ante, pp. 247, 248. 
 are all out of the jurisdiction, an administrator 6 Smithby v. Hinton, 1 Vern. 31. 
 
 durante absentia must be appointed. Donald "' Bowyer v. Covert, 1 Vern. 95; Story, Eq. 
 
 v. Bather, 16 Beav. 26. Such an administrator PI. § 92; see Willis v. Henderson, 4 Scam. 20. 
 may be sued by the persons interested in the es- 8 Cowslad v. Cely, Prec. in Ch. 83 ; Clifton 
 
 tate. Chambers v. Bicknell, 2 Hare, 536. See v. Haig, 4 Desaus. 330. 
 
 Webb v. Kirby,7 De G. M. & G..376; 3 Jur. 9 William? v. Williams, 9 Mod. 299; Phelps 
 
 N. S. 73. So, also, if the letters are granted to v. Sproule, 4 Sim. 318, 321; Holland v. Prior, 1 
 
 the attorney of the person entitled to the grant. M. & K 237; Masters v. Barnes, 2 Y. & C. C. 
 
 Ibid.; Re Dewell, Edgar v. Reynolds, 4 Drew. C. 616; 7 Jur. 1167; Ling v. Colman, 10 Beav. 
 
 269; 4 Jur. N. S. 399. 370; Clark v. Webb, 16 Sim. 161 ; 12 Jur. 615; 
 
 4 Went. Off. Ex. 95; Brown v. Pitman, Story, Eq. PI. § 170, note, § 382; Quince v. 
 
 Gilb. Eq. R. 75; 16 Vin. Ab. Party B. 251, pi. Quince, 1 Murph. 160; Hagan v. Walker, 14 
 
 19; Stickland v. Stickland, 12 Sim." 463; Dyson How. (C. S.) 29. 
 
 248
 
 PERSONS RESISTING PLAINTIFF'S DEMANDS. * 254 
 
 representatives parties. 1 The fact of such deceased executor having died 
 insolvent, or without having received assets, would in all cases probably 
 prevent his executors being proper parties. 2 
 
 If a bill is filed against a married woman as an executrix or adminis- 
 tratrix, her husband must formerly have been a party, 3 unless he 
 lias abjured the realm; 4 or she has obtained a protection order, or is 
 judicially separated. 5 An injunction has, however, been granted to 
 restrain a wife, executrix, from getting in the assets, her husband being 
 in the West Indies, and not amenable to the process of the Court, on 
 the ground, that if she wasted the assets, or refused to pay, a creditor 
 could have no remedy, inasmuch as her husband must be joined as a 
 party to the suit against her. 6 
 
 Where a bill had been filed for an account of the testator's estate, 
 and it was objected that one of the executors was not a party, he was 
 ordered to be introduced into the decree then made, as a party, and 
 decreed to account before the Master, without putting off the cause to 
 add parties ; 7 but this can only be done where the person appears, and 
 submits to be bound as if originally a party. 8 
 
 Where a power of sale is given, by a will, to executors, and they 
 renounce probate, they will not be considered necessary parties to the 
 suit. Thus, where a testator had devised that his executors should sell 
 his land, and be possessed of the money arising from the sale upon cer- 
 tain trusts mentioned in his will, and made B and C his executors, 
 who renounced; whereupon administration, with the will annexed, was 
 granted to one of the plaintiffs, upon a bill brought by the cestui 
 que trust of the purchase-money, * under the will, against the *254 
 heir, to compel him to join in a sale of the lands; it was objected 
 that there wanted parties, in regard that the executors ought to have 
 been made defendants, for notwithstanding they had renounced, yet the 
 power of sale continued in them, and the objection was overruled, there 
 being only a power and no estate devised to them. 1 The authority of 
 this decision has, however, been doubted on the ground that where a 
 power is given to executors they may exercise it, although they renounce 
 probate of the will ; 2 and it seems that in all such cases the question is, 
 
 1 See Whittington v. Gooding, 10 Hare App. 6 Taylor v. Allen, 2 Atk. 213. 
 
 29; Pease v. Cheesbrough, Seton, 115. Rut see "' Pitt v. Brewster, 1 Dick. 37. It is pre- 
 
 Hamp v. Robinson, 3 De G. J. & S. 97; and see sumed that he appeared, and consented to this 
 
 Montgomery v. Floyd, 18 L. T. N. S. 847, V. order. See Footman v. Fray, R. M. Charlt. 
 
 C. M., where the representatives of a deceased 271, cited in note, ante, p. 252. As to the hus- 
 
 executor were held not to be necessary parties, band of an accounting party, see Sapte v. 
 
 though there was no such allegation. For form Ward, 1 Coll. 24. 
 
 of decree, where plaintiff does not, by his bill, 8 geton, 1116*. 
 
 seek to charge a deceased co-executor's estate, l Yates v. Compton, 2 P. Wms. 308; see 
 
 see 2 Seton, 881, No. 6. Ferebee v. Proctor, 2 Dev. & Bat. 439; S. ('. 2 
 
 2 See Wills v. Dunn, 5 Graft. 384 ; Synies v. Dev. & Bat. Eq. 496 ; Jackson v. Scauber, 7 
 Glynn, 2 Seton, 883. Cowen, 187; Peck v. Henderson, 7 Yerger, 18; 
 
 3 See now 44 & 45 Vic. c. 75, § 18. Champlin v. Parish, 3 Edw. Ch. 581. 
 
 4 Ld. Red. 30. 2 gug. Pow. 118, 880 ; 2 Prest. on Abst. 204; 
 
 5 20 & 21 Vic. c.85, §§ 21, 25. 20; and see 1 Wins. Exors. 290, 291. In Keates v. Bur- 
 Bathe v. Bank of England, 4 K. & J. 564; 4 ton, 14 Yes. 434. 437, referred to by Lord St. 
 Jur. N. S. 505; 21 & 22 Vic. c. 108, § 7. Leonards (which was a case of a discretionary 
 
 249
 
 255 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 whether the confidence is reposed in the persons named, or in the per- 
 sons who, de facto, fill the given office. 8 (a) 
 
 The executor or the administrator of a deceased person being the 
 person constituted by law to represent the personal property of that 
 person, and to answer all demands upon it, it is sufficient, where the 
 object of a suit is to charge such personal estate with a demand, to 
 bring the executor or administrator before the Court; 4 thus, in a bill to 
 be relieved touching a lease for years, or other personal duty against 
 executors, it is not necessary, though the executors be executors in 
 
 trust, to make the cestui que trusts, or the residuary legatees, 
 *255 parties. 5 (b) And so, where a bill was filed * against an executor, 
 
 to compel the transfer of a sum of stock belonging to his testa- 
 trix, and the executor, by his answer, stated that the residuary legatees 
 claimed the stock, an objection for want of parties was held to be 
 untenable. 1 
 
 power given by a testator over the application 
 of the interest of a money fund to his trus- 
 tees and executors, one of whom died, and the 
 other renounced), Sir William Grant M. R. 
 remarked, " that the power is given to the ex- 
 ecutors, but they have not exercised it, and they 
 have renounced the only character in which it 
 was competent to them to exercise it;" see 
 1 Wms. Exors. 156; and in Earl Granville v. 
 M'Xeill, 7 Hare, 156; 13 Jur. 253, where it was 
 held, that the two executors who hr.d proved, 
 could exercise a power of appointment given to 
 their testator, his executors, administrators, and 
 assignees, although a third executor, who had 
 renounced, was also named in the will, Sir 
 James Wigram Y. C. said, " I have referred 
 to Sir Edward Sugden's book on Powers, but 
 find nothing to make me doubt the sufficiency 
 of the appointment." 
 
 3 Ibid. 
 
 * Ld. Red. 165; Micklethwaite v. Winstan- 
 
 ley, 13 W. R. 210, L. JJ. ; Eames v. Hacon, 16 
 Ch. D. 407; 18 Ch. D. 347; see Neale v. Hag- 
 thorp. 3 Bland, 551 ; Wilkinson v. Perrin, 7 
 Munroe, 217 ; Galphin v. M'Kinney, 1 M'Cord 
 Ch. 294; Story, Eq. PI. § 140, and note ; Prichard 
 v. Hicks, 1 Paige. 270; Kinlock v. Meyer, 1 
 Speer, S. C. Eq. 428; Black well v. Blackwell, 
 33 Ala. 57. 
 
 5 Anon. 1 Vern. 261 ; 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 73, pi. 
 13; Lawson v. Barker, 1 Bro. C. C. 303 ; Love 
 v. Jacomb, ibid.; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 104, 140, in 
 notes; Wiser v. Blachly, 1 John. Ch. 437; 
 Dandridge v. Washington, 2 Peters, 377. 
 
 i Brown v. Dowthwaite,l Mad. 446; and 
 
 see Jones v. How, 7 Hare, 267 ; 12 Jur. 227. 
 
 As to adding parties, see R. S. C. Ord.XVI. 
 
 §§ 7, 13. If the defendant executor's duty is 
 
 inconsistent with his duty as such, leave may 
 
 be granted to another to appear in his name. 
 
 Samuel v. Samuel, 12 Ch. D. 152; 26 W. R. 
 
 750. 
 
 (a) In the recent case of Crawford v. Forshaw 
 (1891), 2 Ch. 261, reversing S. C. 43 Ch. D. 
 643. where a testator having appointed three 
 persons executor, and given the residue of his 
 estate to certain charities or others as " my ex- 
 ecutors herein named may select, to be divided 
 in such proportions as the}' may approve of," 
 two of them proved the will, and the third 
 renounced probate, it was held that the latter 
 could not act in selecting the charities and dis- 
 tributing the residue; and that the two who had 
 proved could exercise the power alone. 
 
 (b) The executor is the representative of all 
 persons interested upon a bill which is filed for 
 the recovery of a general legacy, and does not 
 involve the construction of the residuary clause 
 of the will in which residuary legatees are only 
 consequentially interested. Davison v. Rake, 
 45 X. J. Eq. 767. The personal representative 
 is usually a necessary party only when the 
 
 250 
 
 assets in his hands are liable to be affected by 
 the decree. Houston v. Blackman, 66 Ala. 559 ; 
 Coffee v. Norwood, 81 Ala. 512. See Lowry v. 
 Jackson, 27 S. C. 318; Gardner v. Kelso, 80 
 Ala. 407; Cox v. Roome, 36 X. J. Eq. 317: 
 Griffin v. Spence, 69 Ala. 393; see post, p. 319. 
 In general, the refusal of a legal personal repre- 
 sentative to sue for uncollected assets does not 
 authorize a residuary legatee or next of kin to 
 sue him and the debtor to the estate Yeatman 
 t\ Yeatman, 7 Ch. D. 210. But, under special 
 circumstances, a cestui que trust may properly 
 bring suit when the trustee refuses to sue, mak- 
 ing the other cestui que trusts defendants to 
 guard against a multiplicity of suits. Meldrum 
 v. Scorer, 56 L. T. 471. A partnership creditor 
 cannot sue for the administration of a deceased 
 partner's estate without joining the surviving 
 partner as a defendant, even when the latter is 
 insolvent. Re McRae. 25 Ch. D. 19.
 
 PERSONS RESISTING PLAINTIFF S DEMANDS. 
 
 *256 
 
 In like manner, where a testator gave different legacies to three per- 
 sons, and they were to abate or increase according to the amount of the 
 personal estate ; to a bill against the executor by one legatee, the execu- 
 tor pleaded that the other legatees ought to be parties, because the 
 account made with the plaintiff would not conclude them, and he should 
 be put to several accounts and double proof and charge, the plea was 
 overruled. 2 It seems, however, that where a person has a specific lien 
 upon the property in dispute, he must be brought before the Court. 8 
 And so where a husband had specifically disposed of his wife's para- 
 phernalia to other persons; on a bill by the wife against the executor 
 for a delivery of them to her, the specific legatees were considered 
 necessary parties. 4 (a) 
 
 The assignees of a bankrupt or insolvent debtor are also, as has been 
 before stated, the proper parties to represent the estates vested in them 
 under the bankruptcy or insolvency; and therefore, in all cases where 
 claims are sought to be established against the estate of a bankrupt or 
 an insolvent debtor, it is necessary to bring only the assignees before 
 the Court, and the bankrupt or insolvent himself, or his creditors, are 
 improper parties. 5 Thus it has been held, that a bankrupt is not a 
 necessary party to a bill of foreclosure against his assignees. 6 Where, 
 however, fraud and collusion are charged between the bankrupt and his 
 assignees, the bankrupt may be made a party, and he cannot 
 demur, although * relief be prayed against him. Thus, where a *256 
 creditor, having obtained execution against the effects of his 
 debtor, filed a bill against the debtor, against whom a commission of 
 
 2 Haycock v. Haycock, 2 Ch. Cas. 124 ; Jen- 
 nings v. Paterson, 15 Beav. 28. There may, 
 however, be cases where pecuniary legatees are 
 proper parties; as where there is a question of 
 ademption. Marquis of Hertford v. Count de 
 Zichi, 3 Beav. 11, 15. 
 
 3 Upon this ground where a bill was brought 
 by the specific legatee of a mortgagee against 
 the representative of the mortgagor, for fore- 
 closure, and the defendant pleaded a settled 
 account with the executors of the mortgagee, 
 and a release, Lord Hardwicke said, that he 
 could not see how the private account between 
 the executor of the mortgagee and the debtor 
 could discharge the lien on the land. Langley 
 V. Karl of Oxford, Amb. 17 ; but see Serjeant 
 Hill's note of this case, in Blunt's edition of 
 Ambler, App. C. p 795; Reg. Lib. B. 1747, fol. 
 300. The bill in that case was afterwards dis- 
 missed. Reg. Lib. B. 1747, fo. 300. 
 
 4 Northey v. Northey, 2 Atk. 77. So, to a 
 bill by the widow of an intestate against the 
 administrator, to recover her share of the estate, 
 all the distributees of the intestate should be 
 made parties. Chinn r. Caldwell, 4 Bibb. 543. 
 
 5 Collet v. Wollaston, 3 Bro. C. C. 228; 
 Hilliard, Bank & Ins. 383, 384; Sells v. Hub- 
 
 . bell, 2 John. Ch. 394; Springers. Vanderpool, 
 4 Edw. Ch. 3G2. On a bill filed by a receiver 
 for the creditors and stockholders of a corpora- 
 tion, it is not necessary to make the creditors 
 and stockholders parties. Mann v. Bruce, 1 
 Halst. Ch. (N. J.) 413. 
 
 6 Adams v. Holbrooke, Har. Ch. P. 30; 
 Bainbridge v. Pinhorn, 1 Buck, 135; Lloyd v. 
 Lander, 5 Mad. 282, 288; see Dendel v Sutton, 
 20 Fed. Rep. 787; New Orleans N. B. Ass, v. 
 Le Breton, 14 Fed. Rep. 646. 
 
 (n) Upon a bill, under a statute, to contest 
 the validity of a will, all the legatees and devi- 
 sees in the will are necessary parties. Brown 
 r. Riggin, 94 111. 560. So in a suit to enforce a 
 trust created by will, all the beneficiaries were 
 held proper parties, although some of them had 
 no interest in such relief as related to accounting 
 for rents collected. Goodwin v. Goodwin, 69 
 Mo. 617. So where one residuary legatee sues 
 
 for his share of the residue, all the others are ne- 
 cessary parties. Leavy v. Leavy, 22 Hun, 499. 
 Assignees of legatees have also the right to be 
 parties to a creditor's bill against the estate 
 upon the removal of the executor and appoint- 
 ment of a receiver. Fraser v. Charleston. 13 
 S. C 533. As to parties in suits for construc- 
 tion of wills, see Morse v. Lyman, 64 Vt. 167{ 
 Penn Ins. Co. v Bauerle, 143 111. 459. 
 
 251
 
 *256 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 bankrupt had issued, and the persons claiming as assignees under the 
 commission, charging that the commission was a contrivance to defeat 
 the plaintiff's execution, and that the debtor having, by permission of 
 the plaintiff, possessed part of the goods which had been taken in exe- 
 cution for the purpose of sale, instead of paying the produce to the 
 plaintiff, had paid it to his assignees : a demurrer by the alleged bank- 
 rupt, because he had no interest and might be examined as a witness, 
 was overruled. 1 
 
 Subject to certain exceptions and statutory relaxations, 2 the rule 
 formerly was that all cestui que trusts were necessary parties to suits 
 against their trustees, by which their rights were likely to be affected. 8 
 Thus, on a bill for redemption, where the defendant in his answer set 
 forth that he was a trustee for A, an objection was made at the hear- 
 ing, that the cestui que trust should have been made a party; and 
 because it was disclosed in the answer, and the plaintiff might have 
 amended, the bill was dismissed. 4 So in a bill against the heir of a 
 
 1 King v. Martin, 2 Ves. Jr. 641, cited Ld. 
 Red. 102. But the bankrupt is not a necessary 
 party to a bill by his assignee to set aside as 
 fraudulent a conveyance of property made by 
 the bankrupt. Burlington v. Harvey, 95 U. S. 
 99; Weise v. Wardle, L. R. 19 Eq. 171. In a 
 bill to set aside a conveyance as made without 
 consideration, and in fraud of creditors, the 
 alleged fraudulent grantor is a necessary de- 
 fendant in the bill. Gaylords v. Kelshaw. 1 
 Wall. 81. But it has been held that a fraudu- 
 lent grantor, or his representative or heir, is not 
 a necessary party to a creditor's bill to set aside 
 a fraudulent conveyance. Taylor v. Webb, 54 
 Miss. 36, citing Smith v. Grim, 26 Penn. St. 95; 
 Dockray v. Mason, 48 Maine, 178; Merry v. 
 Freemon, 44 Mo. 518; Creed v. Railway, 22 
 Wis. 260. (a) Nor, after execution sale, need 
 he be made a party to a bill by the purchaser to 
 have the title quieted and divested out of the 
 fraudulent grantee. Laughton v. Harden, 68 
 Maine, 208. The reason is, in both cases, that 
 he has no further interest in the property. 
 
 2 See note 4, below. 
 
 3 Story, Eq. PI. §§ 192, 190, 207; Helm v. 
 Hardin, 2 B- Mon. 202; Hewett v. Adams, 50 
 Maine, 271, 281 ; Van Doren v. Robinson, 16 
 N. J. Eq. 256; demons v. Elder, 9 Iowa, 272. 
 
 (a) The weight of authority supports the cited 
 case of Gaylords v. Kelshaw. See Lawrence v. 
 Bank of the Republic, 35 N. Y. 320; Miller v. 
 Hall, 70 N. Y. 250; Hubbell v. Merchants' 
 Bank, 72 Hun, 200; Coffey v. Norwood. 81 Ala. 
 512; Sides v. Scharff, 93 Ala. 106; Dunn v. 
 Wolf, 81 Iowa, 688: Blanc v. Paymaster Min- 
 ing Co. 95 Cal. 524 : Raynorw. Mintzer, 67 Cal. 
 159 : Salter v. Kreuger, 65 Wis. 217; Lovejoy v. 
 Irelan, 17 Md. 525: Black v. Bordelon, 38 La. 
 Ann. 696; .Johnson v. Christian, 128 U. S. 374; 
 Judson v. Courier Co. 25 Fed. Rep. 705; Chaffin 
 V. Hull, 39 id. 887; Pullman v. Stebbins, 51 id. 
 
 In a suit by a trustee to establish and main- 
 tain the title intrusted to him against an adverse 
 claim, by a bill, he must make the cestui que 
 trust a party. Blake v. Allman, 5 Jones Eq. 
 (N. C.) 407*. 
 
 Upon a bill by one cestui que trust against 
 the trustee, showing that the defendant holds 
 a certain sum of money for the plaintiff and 
 another person, and that each is entitled to an 
 aliquot part of the fund, and the trust not denied, 
 the other person is not a necessary party. 
 Hubbard v. Burrell, 41 Wis. 365. 
 
 4 Whistler v. Webb. Bunb. 53; Beals v. 
 Cobb, 51 Maine, 349, 350: Story, Eq. Fl. §207; 
 Davis v. Hemingway, 2D Vt. 438; see Crease v. 
 Babcock, 10 Met. 525; Carpenter v. Robinson, 1 
 Holmes, 67 ; James v. Atlantic D. Co. 3 Cliff. 622. 
 Where mortgaged real property is conveyed in 
 trust for the benefit of children, both those in 
 being and those to be born, all children in esse 
 at the time of filing a bill of foreclosure of the 
 mortgage should be made parties. Otherwise, 
 the decree of foreclosure does not take away 
 their right to redeem. A decree in such a case 
 against the trustee alone does not bind the cestui 
 que trusts. Clark »>. Rej'burn, 8 Wall. 318. In 
 England, in suits concerning real or personal 
 property, which is vested in trustees, such trus- 
 
 10; Chadbourne o. Coe, id. 479; Williamson v. 
 Selden (Minn.), 54 N. W. Rep. 1055, 1056; 
 Paton v. Langley, 50 Mich. 428; Matthews v. 
 Lloyd, 89 Ky. 625 ; Lemmon v. Dunn, 61 Miss. 
 210; Roberts V. Chamberlain, 30 Kansas, 677; 
 Hill v. Lewis, 45 Kansas, 162; Dailey v. Kinsler, 
 31 Neb. 340; Dameron v. Jameson, 71 Mo. 97. 
 In Taylor v. Webb, ubi supra, the proceeding 
 ■was treated as in rem. In Whittemore v. Cowell, 
 7 Allen, 446, a bona fide mortgagee of land from 
 a fraudulent grantee was held to be a proper 
 party to a bill to set aside the mortgagor's title, 
 although the mortgage debt was not yet due.
 
 PERSONS RESISTING PLAINTIFF S DEMANDS. 
 
 * 257 
 
 mortgagee to redeem, the personal representative must be a party, 
 because be is the person entitled to the mortgage money, and the heir 
 is only a trustee of the legal estate for him. 5 
 
 In some cases, however, where the cestui que trusts are very numer- 
 ous, the necessity of bringing them all before the Court has 
 *been dispensed with. 1 Formerly, the general rule, in cases *257 
 where real estates were either devised or settled upon trusts for 
 payment of debts or legacies, was, that if the persons to be benefited 
 by the produce of the estate were either named or sufficiently indicated, 
 then that they must be all parties to any suit affecting the estate; if, 
 however, the bill alleged their great number as a reason for not making 
 them all parties, and if the Court were satisfied that the absentees were 
 sufficiently represented by those who were made parties to the record, 
 the presence of all the persons interested would be dispensed with; 2 and 
 upon the same principle, where the trusts were for the payment of 
 debts or legacies generally, the trustees alone were allowed to sustain 
 the suit, either as plaintiffs or defendants, without bringing before the 
 Court the creditors or legatees for whom they were trustees ; 3 and now 
 it is conceived that the Court would, in such cases, generally allow the 
 suit to proceed without any of the cestui que trusts being made parties, 
 considering their interests to be sufficiently represented by the trustees ; 4 
 
 tees represent the persons beneficially interested, 
 in the same manner, and to the s.uiie extent, as 
 the executors or administrators in suits concern- 
 ing personal estate represent the per ons bene- 
 ficially interested in such personal estate; and 
 in such cases it is not necessary to make the 
 persons beneficially interested parties to the 
 suit ; 1 5 & 10 Vic. c. 86, § 42, r. 9 , see ante, p. 222, 
 note 2; R. S. C. Ord. XVI. 7, 13; Lovesy v. 
 Smith, 15 Ch. D. 655. 
 
 5 See Guthrie r. Morrell, 6 Ired. Eq. 13. 
 
 1 See post, p. 21)0. Thus, where upon a bill 
 brought against an assignee of a lease to compel 
 him to pay the rent, and perform the covenants, 
 it appeared that the assignment was upon trust 
 for such as should buy the shares, the whole 
 being divided into 900 shares; and an objection 
 was taken because the shareholders were not 
 parties; the objection was overrul d, as the 
 assignees, by dividing the shares, had made it 
 impracticable to have them all before the Court. 
 City of London v. Richmond, 9 Vern. 421. 
 N. B. In that case the original lessee was con- 
 sidered a necessary party. Story, Eq. PI. § 1 18. 
 
 2 Holland v. Baker. 3 Hare, 68; 6 Jur. 1011 ; 
 Harrison v. Stewardson, 2 Hare, 530; see Storv, 
 Eq PI. § 150; Johnson©. Candage, 31 Maine, 28. 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 174; see Stevenson v. Austin, 3 
 Met. 474, 480. " Under some circumstances," 
 says Waite C. J., "a trustee may represent his 
 beneficiaries in all things relating to their com- 
 mon interest in the trust property. He may be 
 invested with such powers, and subjected to 
 such obligations, that those for whom he holds 
 will be bound bv what is done bv him. The 
 
 difficulty lies in ascertaining whether he occu- 
 pies such a position, not in determining its 
 effect if he does. If he has been made such a 
 representative, it is well settled that his benefi- 
 ciaries are not necessary parties to a suit by 
 him against a stranger to enforce the trust . 
 Shaw v. Norfolk R. Co. 5 Gray, 171; Bifield v. 
 Taylor, 1 Beat. 91 ; Campbell v. R. R. Co. 1 
 Woods, 376; Ashton r. Atlantic Bank, 3 Allen, 
 220; or to one by a stranger against him to 
 defeat it in whole or in part: Rogers r. Rogers, 
 3 Paige, 379 ; Wakeman v. Grover, 4 Paige, 34; 
 Winslow v. M. & P R. Co. 4 Minn. 317 ; Camp- 
 bell v. Watson, 8 Ohio, 500. In such cases, 
 the trustee is in Court for and on behalf of 
 the beneficiaries; and they, though not parties, 
 are bound by the judgment, unless it is im- 
 peached for fraud or collusion between him and 
 the adverse party.'" Kerrison v. Stewart, 93 
 U. S. 160. In that case, the trust assignment 
 was for the benefit of creditors in the usual 
 form, with power in the trustee, on default of 
 payment of the debts secured, to sell for cash, 
 or on time, and apply the proceeds pro rata in 
 satisfaction of the debts, and it was held that a 
 decree, in a suit by third persons against the 
 trustee, setting aside the trust conveyance as 
 fraudulent, was binding upon the creditors 
 secured, although not parties to the suit in 
 which the decree was rendered. And see 
 Pindall v. Trever, 30 Ark. 249; Ward r. Hol- 
 lins, 14 Md. 158. Ante, 220, note 1. 
 
 * 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42, r. 9, Morley v. 
 Morley, 25 Beav. 253; and see Knight v. Po- 
 cock, 24 Beav. 436.
 
 258 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 except where it might require some of the cestui que trusts to be parties, 
 in order to secure the application of the trust money. 5 Trustees will 
 also represent their cestui que trusts in partition suits. 
 
 We have already seen, that the 30th Order of August, 1841, did not 
 apply to cases where a mortgagee sought to foreclose the equity of 
 redemption of estates vested in trustees, 7 but that under the rule of the 
 late Act above referred to, where the trustees are the persons who 
 would be in possession of funds to redeem, they may properly represent 
 their cestui que trusts; 8 though, when this is not the case, the cestui 
 que trusts, or some of them, ought to be parties. 9 (a) 
 
 Formerly, in such cases, the cestui que trusts were necessary parties; 10 
 
 but to a suit for the execution of a trust by or against those claim - 
 *258 ing the ultimate benefit of such trust, after the satisfaction *of 
 
 prior charges, it was not necessary to bring before the Court the 
 persons claiming the benefit of such prior charges; and, therefore, to a 
 bill for application of a surplus, after payment of debts and legacies, 
 or other incumbrances, the creditors, legatees, or other incumbrancers, 
 need not be made parties. And persons having demands prior to the 
 creation of such a trust, might enforce these demands against the 
 trustees, without bringing before the Court the persons interested under 
 the trust, if the absolute disposition of the property was vested in the 
 trustees. But if the trustees had no such power of disposition, as in 
 the case of trustees to convey to certain uses, the persons claiming the 
 benefit of the trust must also be parties. Persons having specific 
 charges on the trust property were also necessary parties; but this 
 would not extend to a general trust for creditors or others, whose 
 demands were not specified in the creation of the trust, as their num- 
 ber, as well as the difficulty of ascertaining who ma} T answer a general 
 description, might greatly embarrass a prior claim against a trust 
 property. 1 
 
 5 Stansfield v. Hobson, 16 Beav. 189. 
 
 6 Goodrich v. Marsh, W. N. (1878) 186; 
 Simpson v. Denny, 10 Ch. D. 28; Stace v. Gage, 
 8Ch. D. 451. 
 
 7 See Wilton v. Jones, 2 Y. & C 244. 
 
 8 Hanman v. Riley, 9 Hare App. 40; Sale 
 r. Kitson, 3 De G. M. & G. 119; 17 Jur. 170; 
 ante, p. 215. 
 
 9 Goldsmid v. Stonehewer, 17 Jur 199; 9 
 Hare App. 38; Davis v. Hemingway, 29 Vt. 
 438; ante, p. 215. 
 
 i" Osbourn r. Fallows, 1 R. & M. 741 : Cal 
 verley v. Phelp, 6 Mad. 229 ; Faithful v. Hunt, 3 
 Anst. 751; Newton v. Earl of Egmont, 4 Sim. 
 574, 584; 5 Sim. 130, 135, Coles v. Forrest, 10 
 
 (a) By the present English practice, under 
 Order XVI. rule 7, in a suit for redemption, 
 trustees of an equity of redemption sufficiently 
 represent the trust estate, either as plaintiffs or 
 defendants, where no direction to the contrary 
 is made by the Court. Jennings v. Jordon, 6 
 App. Cas. 698: S. C. nom. Mills v. Jennings, 13 
 
 251 
 
 Beav. 552, 557; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 206, 207; ante, 
 p 222. 
 
 i Ld. Red. 175; Story. Eq. PI. § 216. Thus 
 where a plaintiff claiming an annuity charged 
 upon an estate which had subsequently been 
 demised to trustees for the benefit of such of 
 the grantee's creditors as should execute the 
 conveyance, filed a bill, against the grantor 
 and the trustees, and one of the creditors who 
 had executed the deed, and who had obtained 
 a decree in an original suit, instituted by him 
 on behalf of himself and all other the creditors 
 under the trust deed, praying an account of 
 what was due to him, and that the priorities of 
 himself and the other creditors might be ascer- 
 
 Ch. D. 639. If, however, the trustee is bank- 
 rupt, the cestui que trusts are necessary parties. 
 Francis v. Harrison, 43 Ch. D. 183. A trustee 
 who unreasonably delays to sue should be made 
 a defendant to a bill filed by the beneficiaries 
 to accomplish the d'esired result. Billings v. 
 Aspen Mining & S. Co. 52 Fed. Rep. 250.
 
 PERSONS RESISTING PLAINTIFF S DEMANDS. 
 
 259 
 
 Where, however, the demands and names of the creditors, although 
 not actually specified at the time of the creation of the trust, were sub- 
 sequently ascertained by their signing a schedule to the conveyance, 
 they became necessary parties. 2 
 
 Where the money secured by a mortgage was subject to a trust, a 
 mortgagor, or any person claiming under him, seeking to redeem the 
 mortgage, must make all persons claiming an interest in the 
 * mortgage money parties to the suit. 1 And in general it is *259 
 laid down as a rule, that there could be no foreclosure nor 
 redemption unless all the parties entitled to the mortgage money are 
 before the Court. 2 (a) Therefore, where a mortgagee had assigned the 
 mortgage upon certain trusts for the benefit of his family, the mort- 
 gagee, the trustees, and the cestui que trusts, were considered necessary 
 parties to a bill to redeem. 3 And so where a mortgage term had been 
 bequeathed to trustees, upon trust, to sell and apply the produce among 
 the testator's twelve children and a grandchild nominatim ; it was 
 held, that all the cestui que trusts, interested in the produce of the 
 term, were necessary parties, although they were numerous, and the 
 property small, and although the trustees had power to give a discharge 
 to purchasers. 4 Now, however, it has been held, that in a redemption 
 
 tained, and that he might redeem the securities 
 which were prior to his own, and have the 
 benetit of the decree as to that part of the de- 
 mand for which he should not be entitled to 
 priority over the trust deed ; it was held that 
 all the creditors who had executed the trust 
 deed were necessary parties; and that, as it 
 was stated in the bill that several of the credi- 
 tors had executed the deed, and only one was 
 made a part}', the defect appeared sufficiently 
 on the bill to entitle the defendant to take ad- 
 vantage of it by demurrer. Sir L. S 1 adwell, 
 V. C, in Newton v. Earl of Egmont, 4 Sim. 574; 
 5 Sim. 130; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 133, 149. One 
 creditor secured in a deed of trust, cannot 
 maintain a bill for an account of the fund with- 
 out making all creditors who are preferred, and 
 all in the same class with him, parties. Murphy 
 v. Jackson, 5 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 11. 
 
 2 Ibid. 
 
 1 Thus, where it appeared that the parties 
 against whom the redemption was prayed were 
 trustees for a woman and her children, it was 
 held that the cestui que trusts were necessary 
 parties to the suit, although under the peculiar 
 
 circumstances of the case, and to avoid delay 
 and expense, he recommended that a petition 
 should be presented on their behalf, praying 
 that their interests might be protected, and 
 directed the cause to stand over for that pur- 
 pose. Drew v. Harman, 5 Price, 319 ; Story, 
 Eq. PI. §§ 192, 208. Followed in Birdsong v. 
 Birdsong, 2 Head, 289 ; and Saylors v. Saviors, 
 3 Heisk. 533. 
 
 2 Palmer v. Earl of Carlisle, 1 S. & S. 423 ; 
 Story, Eq. PI. 182, et seq.; Large v. Van Doren, 
 14 N.J. Eq. 208; Beals i>. Cobb, 51 Maine, 
 348; Osbourn v. Fallows, 1 R. & M. 741; 
 McCall v. Yard, 9 N. J. Eq. 358; S. C. 11 id. 
 58. And see Gould v. Wheeler, 28 N. J. Eq. 
 541; Beach v. Mosgrove, 16 Fed. Rep. 305. In 
 bills of foreclosure, this ordinarily includes the 
 heir, or devisee, or assignee, and personal rep- 
 resentatives of the mortgagor, and also the 
 tenants for life and the remainder-man, for they 
 all may be interested in the right of redemp- 
 tion, or in taking the accounts. 4 Kent, 185. 
 
 s Wetherell v. Collins, 3 Mad. 255; Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 192. 
 
 4 Osbourn v. Fallows, 1 R. & M. 741. 
 
 (a) A mortgagor who has absolutely con- 
 veyed his equity of redemption, and against 
 whom no personal claim is made, is nota neces- 
 sary party to a bill of foreclosure. See Brown 
 v. Stead, 5 Sim. 535; Giffard v. Hort, 1 Sch. & 
 Lefr. 386 ; Steele v. Maunder, 1 Coll. 535 ; 
 Slade v. Rigg, 3 Hare, 35 ; Blount v. Winter- 
 ton, 1 Harris. Ch, Pr. by Newl. 29 (1808); 
 Adams v. Holbrook, id. 30; Avres v. Wis wall, 
 112 U. S. 137; Shaw v. Hoadley, 8 Blackf. 
 
 105; Swift v. Edson, 5 Conn. 531; Miner v. 
 Smith, 53 Vt. 551; Daugherty v. Deardorf, 107 
 Ind. 527 ; Scarry v. Eldridge, 63 Ind. 44 ; 
 Martin v. Morris, 62 Wis. 418 ; Robbins v. 
 Arnold, 11 111. App. 434; Johnson v. Foster, 
 68 Iowa, 140; Tutwiler v. Dunlap, 71 Ala. 136. 
 Two tenants in common who have made a 
 mortgage, must both be parties to a suit for re- 
 demption. Bolton v. Salmon, [1891] 2 Ch. 48. 
 
 255
 
 *2G0 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 suit, where the mortgage money is vested in trustees, the trustees 
 represent the cestui que trusts sufficiently to protect the mortgagor; 
 but that some of the cestui que trusts ought also to be parties, in order 
 to secure the due application of the trust property. 5 
 
 It was said by Lord Hardwicke, that where a mortgagee, who has a 
 plain redeemable interest, makes several conveyances upon trust, in 
 order to entangle the affair, and to render it difficult for a mortgagor, 
 or his representatives, to redeem, it is not necessary that the plaintiff 
 should trace out all the persons who have an interest in such trust, to 
 make them parties; the persons having the legal state, however, must 
 be before the Court, and where a mortgagee in fee has made an abso- 
 lute conveyance with several limitations and remainders over, the 
 decree cannot be complete without bringing before the Court, at 
 *260 least the first tenant in tail, and those having * intermediate 
 estates. 1 It seems that where a mortgage is forfeited, and the 
 mortgagee exercises the legal rights he has acquired by disposing of, 
 or incumbering the estate, and the mortgagor comes for the redemption, 
 which a Court of Equity gives him, it must be upon the terms of 
 indemnifying the mortgagee from all costs arising out of his legal acts; 
 and upon this principle, 2 - the mortgagor was ordered to pay the costs of 
 the trustees and cestui que trust, who were necessarily brought before 
 the Court in consequence of the assignment of the mortgagee. 
 
 Where there has been an assignment of a mortgage, 8 even though it 
 was made without the previous authority of the mortgagor, or his 
 declaration that so much is due, the assignee is the only necessary 
 party; 4 and he can claim nothing under the assignment but what is 
 
 5 Stansfield v. Hobson, 16 Beav. 189; see, 
 however, Morley v. Morley, 25 Beav. 253; and 
 Emmet v. Tottenham, 10 Jur. N. S. 1090 ; S. 
 C. nom. Tottenham v. Emmet, 13 W. R. 123; 
 14 id. 3, where a person interested in part of 
 the mortgage was held not to be a necessary 
 partv. 
 
 i' Yates v. Hamly, 2 Atk. 238; Story, Eq. 
 Pl.§§ 144-146, 194," 198. 
 
 2* Wetherell v. Collins, 3 Mad. 255. 
 
 3 The assignee of a mortgage, who has 
 parted with all his interest, and has never 
 made himself liable for rents and profits, 
 should not be made a party to a bill to re- 
 deem the premises, unless he is charged with 
 fraud or collusion, or a discovery is sought 
 from him. Williams v. Smith, 49 Maine, 564. 
 But the mortgagee is a necessary party to a 
 suit to reform a mortgage deed, brought by a 
 purchaser at a sale by the mortgagee. Haley 
 v. Bagley, 37 Mo. 363. 
 
 4 Chambers v. Goldwin, 9 Ves. 269. See 
 contra, Anon., in the Duchy, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 
 5!i4, pi. 3. Where a mortgage has been abso- 
 lutely assigned, it is not necessary to make the 
 mortgagee a party to a bill brought by the 
 mortgagor to redeem. Whitney v. M'Kinney, 
 7 John. Ch. 144; Beals v. Cobb, 51 Maine, 
 
 256 
 
 348. But where the mortgagee has merely 
 given to another a quitclaim deed of the mort- 
 gaged premises, without assigning the mortgage 
 debt, he must be made a party to such a bill. 
 Beals v. Cobb, itbi supra. So a mortgagee of 
 land who has assigned his interest in the mort- 
 gage since the breach of the condition, may be 
 included as a defendant in a bill to redeem; 
 especially if it appears that he is interested in 
 the taking of the account. Doody v. Pierce, 9 
 Allen, 141. And a mortgagee who has assigned 
 the mortgage and guaranteed the debt is a 
 proper party in a suit to foreclose the mortgage, 
 and a personal decree may be made against 
 him for any deficiency. Jarman v. Wiswall, 24 
 N. J. Eq. 267. Where a mortgage was as- 
 signed to secure a loan made to the assignor, 
 the assignor was held to be a necessary party 
 in a suit commenced by the assignee, to fore- 
 close the mortgage, although the assignment 
 was absolute in terms, and expressed the pay- 
 ment of a full consideration. Kettle v. Van 
 Dyck, 1 Sandf. (N. Y.)76; Brown v. Johnson, 
 53 Maine, 246; Hobart v. Andrews, 21 Pick. 
 527; ante, 198, note. Where a mortgagor has 
 assigned all his interest in the estate mort- 
 gaged, he is not a necessary party to a bill in 
 Equity to redeem by the assignee. Bailey v.
 
 PERSONS RESISTING PLAINTIFF'S DEMANDS. * 261 
 
 actually due as between the mortgagor and the mortgagee. 5 Where the 
 mortgagor is a party to the assignment, then it is in fact a new mortgage 
 between the mortgagor and the assignee, and of course the original 
 mortgagee is not a necessary party to a bill to redeem. A mortgagor, 
 however, cannot be bound by any transaction which may take place 
 between a mortgagee and his assignee without his privity. If, there- 
 fore, the mortgagee has been in possession before assignment, and has 
 received more on account of the rents and profits than the princi- 
 pal and interest due upon the * mortgage, and a bill is filed by *261 
 the mortgagor against the assignee to have an account of the over- 
 plus, he may make the mortgagee a party to the bill, because he is 
 clearly accountable for the surplus rents and profits received by him- 
 self. 1 It seems, however, 2 that even in that case the assignee only 
 would be sufficient, because, having contracted to stand in the place of 
 the original mortgagee, he has rendered himself liable to have the 
 account taken from beginning to end, and must be answerable for the 
 result. Where there have been several mesne assignments, the person 
 to whom the last has been made is the only necessary party to a 
 redemption suit. 3 
 
 Where, however, there are several derivative mortgages, if the last 
 mortgagee seeks to foreclose the mortgagor, he must make all the 
 intermediate mortgagees parties, because they are all interested in the 
 account. 4 
 
 The rules regulating the practice of the Court as to cestui que trusts 
 being parties to suits relating to trust property, apply also to resulting 
 trusts. Thus, where there is a grant or devise of a real estate, either 
 by deed or will, and the whole equitable interest is not thereby granted 
 or devised, there being a resulting trust for the grantor or his heir, 5 it 
 will be necessary, in a suit relating to that estate, to bring the grantor 
 or his heir before the Court. 
 
 So, in cases of charities, where a private founder has appointed no 
 visitor, his heir-at-law is considered a necessary party to an informa- 
 tion for the regulation of the charity, because in such case the heir-at- 
 law of a private founder is considered as the visitor. But in a case of 
 
 Myrick, 36 Maine, 50; Williams v. Smith, 49 deem, if lie has never received any rents and 
 
 Maine, 564; Hilton v. Lothrop, 46 Maine, 21)7. profits; nor, it seems, if he lias. 
 
 Ante, p. 214, n. 4. - See Chambers v. Goldwin, 9 Ves. 268. 
 
 5 Chambers v. Goldwin, 9 Ves. 265; see '■'■ Chambers v. Goldwin, 9 Ves. 268; Story, 
 
 Matthews t>. Walwyn, 4 Sumner's Ves. 118, Eq. PI. § 189; Bryant v. Erskine, 55 Maine, 
 
 note (»); Mainland v. Upjohn, 41 Ch. D. 153, 158; Lennon v. Porter, 2 Gray, 473; Hill 
 
 126. v. Adams, 2 Atk. 39; Bishop of Winchester V. 
 
 1 Bealsr. Cobb, 51 Maine, 348, 350; Story, Bearor, 3 Ves. 315, 316: ante, p. 194. 
 Eq. PI. §190; Bryant v. Erskine, 55 Maine, 4 Hobart v. Abbot, 2 P. Wms 693; ante, 
 
 153, 158. All persons who have been so con- p. 194, and notes; 210, and notes; Kettle v. 
 
 ncctfcl with the mortgages of a railroad sought Van Dyck, 1 Sandf. (X. V.) 76; Story, Eq. PI. 
 
 to be redeemed, as to render them liable for § 191; Stone v. Bartlett, 46 Maine, 438. 
 income under it, should be made parties de- 5 Ripley e. Waterworth, 7 Sumner's Ves. 
 
 fendant. Kennebec and Portland R. K. Co. v. 42"), Perkins's note (c), and cases cited; 2 
 
 Portland and Kennebec R. R. Co. 54 Maine, Story, Eq. Jur. § 1196, et seq.. and notes ; Scott 
 
 173; but see Lennon v Porter, 2 Gray, 473, v. Fenhoulett, 1 Bro. C. C. (Perkins's ed.) 70, 
 
 where it was held that a mesne assignee of the note (a), 
 mortgage is not a proper party to a bill to re- 
 
 vol. i. — 17 257
 
 * 262 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 this description the Court refused to dismiss the information because 
 of his absence, and directed an inquiry for him to be made by the 
 Master; 6 and so, in the case of a charity, wherever it is doubtful 
 whether the heir is disinherited or not, he must be a party. 7 
 
 In a suit to restrain the continuance of a nuisance on land by a mere 
 
 licensee thereof, the person having control thereof must be made a 
 
 defendant; 8 and where the sole object of the suit is for an injunction to 
 
 restrain future acts and not for damages for past injuries, such person 
 
 is the only necessary party. 9 
 
 * 262 * Wherever a real estate is to be recovered, or a right is sought 
 
 to be established, or a charge raised against real estate, it is 
 necessary that the person or persons entitled to the inheritance should 
 be before the Court. 1 Upon this principle it is, that in a bill by a 
 specialty creditor, to obtain payment of his demand out of the real 
 estate of his debtor, the devisee or heir, as well as the executor, is a 
 necessary party. 2 Where, however, the arrears of an annuity, charged 
 upon real estate, are sought to be recovered, if the arrears are such 
 only as were due in the lifetime of the ancestor, it will be sufficient to 
 make his personal representative a party; but for any arrears after his 
 death, the devisee or heir must be a party. 3 
 
 The same rule applies to all cases where proceedings are instituted 
 in order to establish a right against a person having a limited estate in 
 land or other hereditaments; and it is, in such cases, always held 
 necessary to have the owner of the inheritance before the Court. Thus, 
 where a bill was filed to establish a custom binding the occupiers of 
 certain lands within a parish, it was held that the owners of the inheri- 
 tance must be parties. 4 And so, where a man prefers a bill to establish 
 a modus against a lessee of an impropriator, he must make the owner 
 of the impropriation a party. 5 So, where a bill was filed to establish a 
 modus against an ecclesiastical rector or a dean and chapter, as impro- 
 priators, the ordinary and patron were considered necessary parties. 6 
 
 In order to make the owner of the inheritance a necessary party, the 
 object of the suit must be to bind the inheritance; if that is not the 
 
 6 Att.-Gen. v. Gaunt, 3 Swan«t. 148. n. 2 But where the bill is filed by the creditors 
 
 ' Att.-Gen. r. Green, 2 Bro. C. C. 495; see for the purpose of making their debts out of 
 
 ante, p. 229; Order XXXI. August, 1841; see real estate specifically charged by the testator 
 
 Storv, Eq. PI. § 180. with the payment of them, the heirs-at-Iaw are 
 
 B Whiter. Jameson, L.R. 18 Eq. 303, M.E.; not necessary parties. Smith r. Wycuff, 11 
 
 Broder v. Saillard, 2 Ch. D. 692, M. R. ; Harris Paige, 49. But in such a case, all the creditors, 
 
 v. James, 45 L. J. Q. B. 545; Hawley*. Steele, whose debts are charged upon the land, should 
 
 G Ch. D. 521, M. R.; House Property Co. v. be made parties if they are named in the will, 
 
 H. P. Horse Nail Co. 29 Ch. D. 190; Reinhardt and whose debts are still due. Ibid. 
 r. Mentasti, 42 Ch. D. 685. 3 Weston v. Bowes, 9 Mod. 309; Story, Eq. 
 
 9 Walker v. Brewster, L. R. 5 Eq. 25, V. C, PI. § 181. 
 W. ; see also Saxby v. Manchester & S. Ry. 4 Spendler v. Potter, Bunb. 181. 
 
 Co. L. R. 4 C. P. 198; Adair v. Young, 12 Ch. 5 Glanvil v. Trelawney, Bunb. 70. 
 
 D. 13; Upmann r. Forrester, 24 Ch. D. 231. 6 Gordon r. Simpkinson, 11 Ves. 509; Cook 
 
 i See New England, &c. Bank v. Newport v. Butt, 6 Mad. 53; Hales v. Pomfret, Dan. 
 
 Steam Factory, 6 R. I. 154; Sibley v. Simon- 142; De Whelpdale v. Milburn, 5 Price, 485. 
 ton, 20 Fed. Rep. 784; Chewett v. Moran, 17 
 id. 820 ; Springfield r. Hurst, 15 id. 307. 
 258
 
 PERSONS RESISTING PLAINTIFF'S DEMANDS. * 26-4 
 
 case, and the relief sought is merely against the present incumbent, 
 the owner of the inheritance, if made a party, may demur. 7 
 
 In a suit for a * specific performance of an agreement respect- * 263 
 ing the boundaries of two provinces in America, it was considered 
 unnecessary to make the planters, tenants, or inhabitants within the 
 districts, parties to the suit. 1 
 
 And in general, it may be stated as a rule, that occupying tenants 
 under leases, or other persons claiming under the possession of a party 
 whose title to real property is disputed, are not necessary parties. If, 
 however, the existence of such rights is suggested at the hearing, the 
 decree is expressly made without prejudice to those rights, or otherwise 
 qualified according to circumstances. If, therefore, it is intended to 
 conclude such rights by the same suit, the persons claiming them must 
 be made parties to it; and where the right is of a higher nature, as a 
 mortgage, the person claiming should usually be made a party. 2 And 
 where a tenant in common had demised his undivided share for a long 
 term of years, the lessee was held to be a necessary party to a bill for 
 a partition, because he must join in the conveyance, and his lessor was 
 ordered to pay his costs. 3 
 
 The same principle which renders it necessary that the owner of the 
 inheritance should be before the Court, in all cases in which a right is 
 to be established against the inheritance, requires that, in cases where 
 there is a dispute as to whether land in the occupation of a defendant 
 is freehold or copyhold, the lord of the manor should be a party. 
 Thus, where a plaintiff, by his bill, pretended a title to certain lands 
 as freehold, which lands the defendant claimed to hold by copy of 
 Court roll to him and his heirs, and prayed in aid the lord of the 
 manor, but, nevertheless, the plaintiff * served the defendant *2Gi 
 with process to rejoin, without making the lord of the manor a 
 party; it was ordered, that the plaintiff should proceed no more against 
 the defendant before he should have called the lord in process. 1 
 
 For a similar reason it is held, that where a bill is brought for the 
 surrender of a copyhold for lives, the lord must be made a party; 
 because, when the surrender is made, the estate is in the lord, and he 
 
 " Williamson v. Lord Lonsdale, Dan. Ex. yet, though different, the boundaries of these 
 
 171; Markham v. Smith, 11 Price, 120; and manors may be settled in suits between the lords 
 
 see further, as to suits relating to tithes, Day v. of these manors, without making the tenants 
 
 Drake, 3 Sim. 64, 82; Petch v. Dalton, 8 Price, parties, oj may be settled by agreement, which 
 
 9; Lealhes v. Newit, 8 Price, 562; Rennett v. this Court will decree, without making the ten- 
 
 Skeffington, 4 Price, 143; Tooth r. The Dean ants parties; though in case of fraud, collusion, 
 
 and Chapter of Canterbury, 3 Sim. 49; Cuth- or prejudice to the tenants, they will not b: 
 
 bcrt t>. Westwood, Gill). Eq. Rep. 230 ; 10 Yin. bound." 
 
 Ab. Party, R. 255, PI. 58. 2 Ld. Red. 175. 
 
 i Penn r. Lord Baltimore, 1 Yes. Sr. 444, 3 Cornish v. Gest. 2 Cox, 27. A landlord 
 
 44'J. The object ion taken was upon the ground cannot maintain a bill in Equity to suppress 
 
 that their privileges, and the tenure and law a nuisance caused to his property before lie 
 
 by which they held, might not be altered with- demised it, and continued afterwards, without 
 
 oat their consent; but Lord Hardwicke over- joining his tenant as a co-plaintiff. In Graham 
 
 ruled the objection, saying, ,; Consider to what v. Duniull, 5 Met. 118. 
 
 this objection goes; in lower instances, in the l Cited in Lucas v. Arnold, Cary, Rep. 81; 
 
 case of manors and honors in England, which 16 Yin. Ab. tit. Party, 1$. 253; PI. 46. 
 have different customs and bv-laws frequently, 
 
 259
 
 265 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 is under no obligation to regrant it, but it is otherwise in the case of 
 copyholders of inheritance, there the lord need not be a party. 
 
 The rule, that wherever the inheritance of real estate is the subject- 
 matter of the suit, the first person in being who is entitled to an estate 
 of inheritance in the property, and all others having intermediate 
 interests, must be defendants, prevails equally in the case of adverse 
 interests, as in that of concurrent interests with the plaintiffs. 2 Thus 
 it is necessary, in order to obtain a complete decree of foreclosure, in 
 cases where the equity of redemption is the subject of an entail, that 
 the first tenant in tail of the equity of redemption should be before the 
 Court, 3 and in all cases the person having the first vested estate of 
 inheritance, and all persons having prior interests, must be parties; 4 
 and the same rule applies to all cases where a right is to be established, 
 or a charge raised against real estates which are the subject of settle- 
 ment. A plaintiff, however, has no right to bring persons in the situa- 
 tion of remainder-men before the Court in order to bind their rights, 
 upon a discussion whether a prior remainder-man, under whom he 
 claims, had a title or not, merely to clear his own title as between 
 *265 him and a * purchaser. 1 The owner of the first estate of inherit- 
 ance is sufficient to support the estate, not only of himself, but 
 of everybody in remainder behind him ; 2 therefore, where a tenant in 
 tail is before the Court, all subsequent remainder-men are considered 
 unnecessary parties. This is by analogy to the rule at Law, accord- 
 ing to which a recovery in which a remainder-man in tail was vouched, 
 
 2 See ante, pp. 219, 220, and cases cited. 
 
 3 Reynoldson v. Perkins, Amb. 5G4; Story, 
 Eq. PI." §§ 144, 198; and see Pendleton v. 
 Rooth, 1 Giff. 35; 5 Jur. N. S. 840. 
 
 4 Sntton v. Stone, 2 Atk. 101. It appears 
 to have been held formerly, that a decree of 
 foreclosure against a tenant for life would bar 
 a remainder-man, Roscarrick v. Barton, 1 Ch. 
 Gas. 217; but it may be doubted whether, in 
 this ciise, it was intended to lay down such 
 rule. If the mortgage consists of a reversion 
 
 ■ or remainder, subject to an estate for life, it 
 may be foreclosed ; but the estate of the tenant 
 for life would not be affected, and he would 
 have no interest in the foreclosure. Penniman 
 
 .v. Hollis, 13 Mass. 429. 
 
 1 In Pelham v. Gregory, 1 Eden, 518; 5 Bro. 
 P. C. 435, the question arose on the title to cer- 
 tain leasehold estates, which were limited in 
 remainder, after limitations to the Duke of New- 
 castle and his sons, to the first and other sons 
 of Mr. Henry Pelham in tail, and to which the 
 p'aintiff, Lady Catherine Pelham, claimed to 
 be absolutely entiled on the death of the Duke, 
 
 -as administratrix to Thomas Pelham, the son 
 of Mr. Henry Pelham, the first tenant in tail 
 who had come into being. The plaintiff, in 
 order to have this question decided against 
 Lord Vane and Lord Darlington, who were 
 subsequent remainder-men in tail, contracted 
 •to sell the estate, subject to the Duke's life- 
 
 260 
 
 estate, and to the coniingency of his having 
 sons, to the defendant Gregory, and brought a 
 bill against him for a specific performance, to 
 which she made Lord Vane and Lord Dar- 
 lington parlies. Lord Northington dismissed 
 the bill with respect to Lord Vane and Lord 
 Darlington, upon the ground, as expressed in 
 his decree, "that they being remainder-men 
 after the death of the Duke of Newcastle, if he 
 should die without issue, their claims were not 
 within his cognizance to determine, and the 
 plaintiff had no right to bring them into dis- 
 cusMon in a Court of Equity." From this 
 decree there was an appeal to the House of 
 Lords, and although they decreed Gregory to 
 perform his contract, they affirmed the dis- 
 missal against Lord Vane and Lord Darlington. 
 3 Bro. P. C. ed. Toml. 204. In Devonsher v. 
 Newenham, 2 Sch. & Lef. 210, Lord Redesdale 
 says of this decision, " I take this to be a de- 
 cisive authority, and if the books were searched, 
 I have no doubt many other cases might be 
 found where bills have been dismissed on this 
 ground." 
 
 2 Reynoldson v. Perkins, Amb. 504. This 
 mle does not apply to a Scotch entail. Fordyce 
 v. Bridges, 2 Phil*. 497, 506; 2 C. P. Coop. t. 
 Cott. 326, 334; and as to the effect of a decree 
 against an infant tenant in tail, see S. C. in 
 the Court below. 10 Beav. 101 ; 10 Jur. 1020.
 
 PERSONS RESISTING PLAINTIFF'S DEMANDS. * 266 
 
 might bar all remainders behind. 3 Where it is doubtful whether a 
 particular party has an estate tail or not, the person who lias the first 
 undoubted vested estate of inheritance should be a party; 4 and so, 
 where the first tenant in tail was a lunatic, the remainder-man was held 
 to be a proper party. 5 
 
 It is necessary, however, in cases of this sort, not only that 
 he * who has the first estate of inheritance should be before the * 206 
 Court, but that the intermediate remainder-men for life should 
 be parties. 1 The same rule will, as we have seen before, apply, where 
 the intermediate estate is contingent or executory, provided the person 
 to take is ascertained; although, where the person to take is not ascer- 
 tained, it is sufficient to have before the Court the trustees, if any, to 
 support the contingent remainders, and the person in esse entitled to 
 the first vested estate of inheritance. 2 Executory devises to persons 
 not in being may, in like manner, be bound by a decree against a vested 
 estate of inheritance; but a person claiming under limitations by way 
 of executory devise, not subject to any preceding vested estate of 
 inheritance by which it may be defeated, must be a party to a bill 
 affecting his right; 3 and in general, where a person is seised in fee of 
 an estate, having that seisin liable to be defeated by a shifting use, 
 conditional limitation, or executory devise, the inheritance is not 
 represented merely by the person who has the fee liable to be defeated; 
 but the persons claiming in contingency, upon the defeat of the estate 
 in fee, should also be parties. 4 
 
 If after a cause has proceeded a certain length, an intermediate 
 remainder-man comes into being, he must be brought before the Court 
 by supplemental bill; 5 and so, if the first tenant in tail, who is made a 
 party, dies without issue before the termination of the suit, the next 
 tenant in tail should be made a party by means of a supplemental bill 
 or order. 6 It seems also clear, that if a tenant in tail is plaintiff in a 
 suit, and dies without issue, the next remainder-man in tail, although 
 he claims by new limitation, and not through the first plaintiff as his 
 issue, is entitled to continue the suit of the former tenant in tail by 
 supplemental bill, and to have the benefit of the evidence and pro- 
 ceedings in that suit. 7 
 
 s Per Lord Eldon, in Lloyd v. Johnes, 9 4; Sherrit v. Birch. 3 Bro. C. C. 229; Willi- 
 
 Ves. 64; see also Giffard v. Hort, 1 Sch. & man v. Holmes, 4 Rich. Eq. 476; Jackson v. 
 
 Lef. 386; Story, Eq. PL §§ 144, 145. Ante, Edwards, 7 Paige, 399; Ferrisa v. Lewis. 2 
 
 2>8,n 1. Tenn. Ch. 29:5. And see ante, 228, note 1, 
 
 4 Powell Morf. 975, a. where the remainder is vested. 
 
 5 Singleton v. Hopkins, 1 Jur. N. S. 1199, 5 I.d. Red. 174; per Lord Eldon, in Lloyd 
 V. C. S. v Johnes, 9 Yes. 59; 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86. 
 
 1 Per Lord Eldon, in Gore v. Stacpoole, 1 § 52 ; Fullerton v. Martin, 1 Drew. 239 : Pickford 
 Dow, 18, 32; 4 Kent, 180; Penniman v. llollis, v. Brown, 1 K. & J. 613; Jehhr. Tugwell, 29 
 13 Mass. 429. Beav.4Sl; Egremont >■ Thompson, L. R. 4 Ch. 
 
 2 Lord Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton, 2 448; Williams fl.Llanelly Rail way & Dock Co. 
 J. & W. 7, and 133; Hopkins v. Hopkins. 1 L. R 10 Eq. 401; Askew r. Booth, 44 L. J. Ch. 
 Atk.590. Now trustees to support contingent 200; R.S.C Ord.L.3.4. 
 
 remainders are unnecessary. 8 & 9 Vic. c. 106, ,; I iresswell '•. Bateman. fi W. R. 220, V. O.K. 
 
 § 8; 40 & 41 Vic. c. 33. ' " Lloyd v. Johnes, 9 Ves. 59; Story, Eq. PI 
 
 3 I.d. Red. 174. §§ 144, 146, and notes; Dendy v. bendy, 5 
 
 4 Uoodessv. Williams, 2 Y. & C. 598; 7 Jur. W. R. 221, V. C. W.; Williams r. William--, 
 1123; Pells v. Browne, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 187, pi. 9 W. R. 290, V. C. K. ; Ward v. Shak, -halt, ? 
 
 201
 
 * 267 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 The general rule requiring all persons interested in resisting the 
 plaintiff's demands to be brought before the Court as defendants, in 
 order to give them an opportunity of litigating the claim set up, would 
 render it imperative, wherever more than one person was liable 
 *267 to contribute to the satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim, *that 
 they should all be made parties to the suit. 1 This was, how- 
 ever, materially modified by the 32d Order of August, 1841, 2 which 
 provides that, in all cases in which the plaintiff has a joint and several 
 demand against several persons, either as principals or sureties, it shall 
 not be necessary to bring before the Court, as parties to a suit concern- 
 ing such demand, all the persons liable thereto, but the plaintiff may 
 proceed against one or more of the persons severally liable. 
 
 It is necessary briefly to state the practice previous to this Order, 
 inasmuch as it still applies to cases not brought precisely within its 
 terms. In Madox v. Jackson* Lord Hardwicke said: "The general 
 rule of the Court to be sure is, where a debt is joint and several, the 
 plaintiff must bring each of the debtors before the Court, because they 
 are entitled to the assistance of each other in taking the account. 
 Another reason is, that the debtors are entitled to a contribution, 
 where one pays more than his share of the debt: 4 a further reason is, 
 if there are different funds, as where the debt is a specialty, and he 
 might at Law sue either the heir or executor for satisfaction, he must 
 make both parties, as he may come in the last place upon the real 
 assets ; 5 but there are exceptions to this, and the exception to the first 
 rule is, that if some of the obligors are only sureties, there is no pre- 
 tence for the principal in the bond to saj T , that the creditor ought to 
 bring the surety before the Court, unless lie has paid the debt.' -6 By 
 the terms of the Order, no distinction is made between principals and 
 sureties, so that it would appear that the plaintiff might file his bill 
 against one or more of the sureties, without making the principal a 
 party to the suit. Where, however, one of two sureties who had joined 
 the principal debtor in a bond, hied a bill to set aside the transaction 
 on the ground of fraud, and prayed an account of the payments made in 
 respect of the bond, Lord Langdale M. R. held, that notwithstanding 
 the order, the principal debtor and co-surety were necessary parties. 7 
 And in Tinkus v. Peters, 9 where the plaintiff alleged that he had 
 accepted bills of exchange without consideration, and that he had been 
 sued upon them, and by his bill prayed relief against the drawer and 
 
 .Tnr. X. S. 1227; 10 W. R. 6, V. O. K. : pee, of Berwick, on Tweed V. Murray, 7 De G. 
 
 In v, r. Lowe r. Watson, I Sm. & G. 12'); M. & G. 497; 3 Jur. N. S. 1. 
 
 Jackson r. Ward. 1 Giff. 30; 5 Jur. X. S. 782: 4 Erickson v. Nesmith, 46 N. H. 371. 
 
 Irving v. Pearson, 18 L. T. N. S. 283; Hills v. 5 Story, Eq. PI. § 169. 
 
 Springett, L. R 5 Eq. 123. 6 Ibid.; see Grassmann v. Bonn, 30 N. J. 
 
 1 Jackson v. Rawlins. 2 Ve.fn. 195: Erick- Eq. 490; Dunham r. Ramsey, 37 id. 388. 
 
 son v. Nesmith, 46 N. H. 371; Hartley v. " Allen v. Houlden, 6 Beav. 148; and see 
 
 Russell. 40 X. H. 109: see Ferrer v. Barrett. 4 aNo Lloyd r. Smith, 13 Sim. 457: 7 Jur. 400; 
 
 Eq. (X. C.) 4r..- ): Hart v. Coffee, id. 321; Pierson v. Barclay, 2 De G. & S. 746. One of 
 
 Young v. Lyons, 8 Gill, 102. the makers of a joint and several promissory 
 
 2 Con-. Ord. VII. 2: and see R. S. C. 1883, note might be sued without the others. Mc- 
 Ord.XVI 3.5;Llovdi\T>immark,7Ch. D.398. Intyre v. Connell, 1 Sim. X. S. 225, 241. 
 
 s 3 Atk. 400: Bland r. Winter, 1 S & S. 8 5 Beav. 253, 200: 6 Jur. 431. 
 
 240; Collins v. Criffi'h, 2 I*. Wins. 313; Mayor 
 
 262
 
 PERSONS RESISTING PLAINTIFF'S DEMANDS. * 269 
 
 the holder, without making a person to whom the drawer had 
 indorsed * the bill a party, Lord Langdale held, that as there *268 
 was an allegation that the holder of the bills was a trustee as 
 well for the drawer as also for the indorsee, such intervening indorsee 
 was a necessary party to the suit. . 
 
 Before this order, all trustees implicated in a breach of trust were 
 held necessary parties to a suit complaining of the breach of trust; 1 
 but since the Order it has been held, that where a breach of trust has 
 been committed by several trustees, the cestui que trusts may proceed 
 against one trustee in the absence of the others. 2 But it must not be 
 supposed that, in every case in which a breach of trust has been com- 
 mitted, the cestui que trusts can arbitrarily select any one trustee 
 and charge him as for a breach of trust, whatever the nature of the 
 complaint might be, for " all the trustees are, prima facie, necessary 
 parties to a suit complaining of a breach of trust, although execution 
 might be taken out against one only." 3 
 
 No clear principle is laid down determining when all the trustees are 
 necessary parties, and when one may be proceeded against without the 
 others. The Court appear.s rather to have exercised a discretion, and 
 to have been guided by what, under the circumstances, the justice of 
 the case required. 4 Tt seems, however, that all the trustees should be 
 parties where the general administration of the estate is sought; 5 and 
 where accounts of the trust fund have to be taken ; 6 and it 
 * has been held, that where one trustee files a bill against a co- * 269 
 trustee who has been guilty of a breach of trust in which some 
 of the cestui que trusts have concurred, they are necessary parties not- 
 withstanding the Order. 1 So, also, in a suit for the recovery of a 
 partnership debt, against the executors of a deceased partner, the sur- 
 viving partner is a necessary party. 2 Where the plaintiff has made 
 
 1 Walkers. Symonds, 3 Swanst. 75; C. P. trustee only, I cannot think tliis Order would 
 Coop. 509-512, 574; Munch v. Cockerell, 8 Sim. entitle the plaintiff to sue the trustee who had 
 219, 2:51; C. P. Coop, 78, n. (rf); Perry v. not acted, separately from the other." Citing 
 Knott, 4 Beav. 179, 181. Walker v. Symonds, 3 Swan>t. 75; Munch v. 
 
 2 Perry v. Knott, 5 Beav. 293 ; Kellaway v. Cockerell, 8 Sim. 219, 231 ; C. P. Coop. 78, n., 
 Johnson, *5 Beav. 319; G Jur. 751; Att-Gen. 509,674. 
 
 r. Corp. of Leicester, 7 Beav. 176; Strong v. 4 For cases in which all the trustees were 
 
 Strong, 18 Beav. 408; Att-Gen. v. Pearson, 2 required to be parties, see Shipton 0. Rawlins, 
 
 Coll. 581; 10 Jur. 651; Norria v. Wright, 14 4 Hare, 619 : Fowler e. Reynal, 2 De G. & S. 
 
 Beav. 310; Wilson v. Rhodes, 8 Ch. D. 777; 749: 13 Jur. 650. n. ; and see Reporter's note, 
 
 see also MGachen v. Dew, 15 Beav. 84. As to 24 Beav. 99; Lewin v. Allen, 8 W. R. C03, 
 
 the cestui <jiie trusts' right to join, as parties, V. C. W. 
 
 Btrangers aiding in the breach of trust, see s Hall v. Austin, 2 Coll. 570; 10 Jur. 452; 
 
 Lund d. Blanehard, 4 Hare, 9. Biggs r. Penn, 4 Hare. 469; 9 Jur. 368; Chan- 
 
 3 Sir .lames Wigram V. C. in Shipton v. cellor v. Morecraft, 11 Beav. 262; Penny v. 
 Rawlins, 4 Hare, 623, who also said: "Take Penny, 9 Hare, 39; 15 Jur. 445. 
 
 for example the case of one of two trustees 6 Devaynes v. Robinson, 24 Beav. 86; 3 
 
 acting alone, and receiving the whole trust Jur N S. 707; Coppard v. Allen, 10 Jur. N S. 
 
 moneys, and investing them in his own name; 622; 12 W. R. 943, L. J.T. ; 2 De G. J. & S. 
 
 that might be a breach of trust per se ; for the 173; and see Fletcher v. Gibbon, 23 Beav. 212. 
 
 cestui que trusts had a right to require each ' Jesse v. Bennett, 6 De G. M'N. & G. 
 
 trustee to have a hold upon the trust fund; and, 609; 2 Jur. N. S. 1125 ; Williams v. Allen. 29 
 
 if a loss resulted, the non-acting trustee might Beav. -2'J-2 ; Roberts p. Tunstall, 4 Hare, 261. 
 
 be liable for it. But if the fund were safe, 2 Hills v. M'Rae, 9 Hare, 297 , 15 Jur. 766; 
 
 though irregularly standing in the name of the and see Thorpe v. Jackson, 2 V. >\- < '• Ex. 553; 
 
 'Mo
 
 *269 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 several persons jointly liable parties, lie cannot afterwards waive the 
 relief against some, and take a decree at the hearing against others. 3 
 
 The Order does not apply to any case where the demand is not joint 
 and several; and, therefore, where there is only a joint demand, the 
 old practice continues, and all the persons liable must be made par- 
 ties. 4 Thus, if there be a demand against a partnership firm, all the 
 persons constituting that firm must be before the Court; and if any of 
 them are dead, the representatives of the deceased partners must be 
 likewise made parties. 5 And where a bill was filed by the captain of 
 a ship, against the personal representative of the survivor of two part- 
 ners, who were joint owners of the ship, for an account and satisfaction 
 of his demand, it was held that the suit was defective, because the 
 
 see also Vyse v. Foster, L. R. 8 Ch. 309; L. R. 
 7 H. L, 318; St. Aubyn v. Smart, L. R. 5 Eq. 
 183; L. R. 3 Ch. 646. As to new partners, see 
 Spartali v. Constantionide, 20 W. R. 823. 
 
 3 Fussell v. Elwin, 7 Hare, 29; 13 Jur. 333; 
 London Gaslight Co. v. Spottiswoode, 14 Beav. 
 264. The rule is otherwise where the defend- 
 ants are severally liable. See Lloyd v. Dim- 
 niock, 7 Ch. D. 398. And now, as to joining- 
 all persons jointly liable, see Kendall v. Hamil- 
 ton, 4 App. Cas. 504 ; 28 W. R. 97. (a) 
 
 4 See now R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XVI. 9. 
 
 5 Story, Eq. PI. §§ 166-168; Moffat V. Far- 
 quharson, 2 Bro. C. C. (Perkins's ed.) 338, and 
 notes; Story Parln. § 449; 1 Story, Eq. Jur 
 §406; Cox D.Stephens, 9 Jur. N. S. 1144; 
 11 W. R. 929, V. C. K. ; and see Atkinson v. 
 Mackreth, L. R. 2 Eq. 570, M. R., where a de- 
 faulting partner had absconded. But see 
 
 (a) See Cambefort v. Chapman. 19 Q. B. D. 
 229; White v. Kennedy, 23 W. Va 221. In 
 Hoare v. Niblett, [1891] I Q. B. 781 , 04 L. T. 
 659, the case of Kendall v. Hamilton was 
 distinguished, and it was held that a mar- 
 ried woman contracting in respect of her 
 separate estate is within the rule that a judg- 
 ment against one joint contractor bars an 
 action against the others. See Hammond v. 
 Schofield, [1891] 1 Q. B. 453; 7 T. L. R. 300. 
 An exception to this rule also exists in cases 
 of partnership, a surviving partner, or the 
 estate of a deceased partner, being still liable 
 to partnership creditors. He Hodgson, Beckett 
 r. Ramsdale, 31 Ch. D. 177 ; see Re Barnard, 
 Edwards v. Barnard, 32 Ch. D. 447. The 
 rights of a surety against his principal are not 
 precisely the same as those of a creditor, and 
 the fact that a creditor has recovered judgment 
 against one partner, does not take away the 
 righ's of a surety for one partner as against 
 t e other partner. Badeley v. Consolidated 
 Bank, 34 Ch D. 536; 38 Ch. D. 238. Liability 
 arising from a breach of trust is nut joint 
 merely, but joint and several. Wilson v. 
 
 2G4 
 
 Plumer v. Gregory, L. R. 18 Eq. 621, where it 
 is considered as settled, if the liability be joint 
 and several, that any of the parties may be 
 sued without joining the others, and Atkinson 
 v. Mackreth is held to have proceeded on its 
 special circumstances. In case of a dormant 
 partner, the plaintiff has his election to make 
 him defendant or not. Hawley v. Cramer, 4 
 Cowen, 717; Goble v . Gale, 7 Blackf.218; Coll- 
 yer, Partn. (Perkins's ed.) § 391 in note. 
 Where the sole design of the bill is to have the 
 ind vidual property of one partner, alleged to 
 have been fraudulently conveyed away by him, 
 applied in satisfaction of a judgment against 
 the firm, another partner, from whom no dis- 
 covery is sought, and against whom no relief is 
 prayed, is neither a necessary nor a proper 
 party. Randolph v. Daly, 16 N. J. Eq. 313; 
 see ante, p. 217, note. 
 
 Moore, 1 Myl. & K. 126, 337; Blyth v. Flad- 
 gate, 63 L. T. 546, 553. An "agent," so sign- 
 ing, who has no principal, is alone liable. Kel- 
 ner v. Baxter, L. R. 2 C. P. 174. The liability 
 of stockholders upon unpaid subscriptions for 
 stock, when sued by a creditor of their cor- 
 poration to collect an unsatisfied judgment, is 
 several, and they need not all be defendants. 
 Hatch v. Dana, 101 U. S. 205; Baines v. Bab- 
 cock (Cal.), 30 Pac. 776; Baines v. Babcock 
 (Cal.), 27 id. 674, Baines v. Story, id. 676. So 
 of their costs, Burnap v. Haskins Steam En- 
 gine Co. 127 Mass. 586. For such torts as the 
 violation of a trademark, involving misfeasance, 
 servants are liable jointly and severally with 
 their employers. Estes v. Worthington, 30 
 Fed. Rep. 465; see Gudger v. Western N. C. 
 R. Co. 21 id. 81 As to the liability of officers 
 and agents of a corporation for its infringement 
 of a patent, see United Nickel Co. v. Worth- 
 ington. 13 Fed. Rep. 392; Tyier v. Galloway, 
 id. 477; Seimens v. Sellers, 16 id. 856; Smith 
 v Standard L. M. Co. 19 id. 826; Eagle Mauuf 
 Co c. Miller, 41 id. 351.
 
 PERSONS RESISTING PLAINTIFF'S DEMANDS. * 270 
 
 representatives of the other partner, who might be interested in the 
 account, were not before the Court; although, as the demand would 
 have survived at Law, the case there might have been different. 6 
 
 Although, even before the 32d Order of August, 1841, 7 it was not 
 generally necessary, in a suit against the principal, to make the surety 
 a party, yet, where a person had executed a conveyance, or created a 
 charge upon his own estate, as a collateral security for another, he 
 became a necessary party to a suit against the principal. 
 *Thus, in the case of a mortgage by a principal of one estate *270 
 and by the surety of another, as a collateral security, a bill of 
 foreclosure against the principal cannot be sustained, because the other 
 had a right to redeem, and be present at the account, to prevent the 
 burden ultimately falling upon his own estate, or at least falling upon 
 it to a larger amount than the other estate might be deficient to satisfy. 1 
 Where, however, the surety merely enters into a personal covenant as 
 surety for the principal, but does not convey any estate or interest to 
 the mortgagee, he will not be a necessary party, unless the surety has 
 paid part of the debt; 2 and where a son, having a general power of 
 appointment over an estate, in the event of his surviving his father, 
 joined with two other persons as his sureties, in a covenant to pay an 
 annuity to the plaintiff, and also covenanted that he would create a 
 term in the estate if he survived his father, and upon the death of his 
 father a bill was filed by the plaintiff against the son and other parties 
 interested in the estate, to have the arrears of his annuity raised and 
 paid, it was held upon demurrer that the sureties were not necessary 
 parties. 8 
 
 Upon a bill by one surety against another, for contribution, it was 
 held, that the executor of a third surety who is dead ought to be a 
 party, though he died insolvent. 4 In that case, the principal had given 
 a counter-bond of indemnity to the plaintiff, who had taken him in 
 execution upon it, and he had been discharged by an Insolvent Act; 
 
 6 Pierson v. Robinson, 3 Swanst, 139 n. ; Compton, 2 Y & C. Ex. 457, 461; Gedve v. 
 
 Scholefield v. Heafield, 7 Sim. 667; Story, Eq. Matson. 25 Beav. 310. 
 PI. § 194 ; Wells v. Strange, 5 Ga. 22. So a Gedye v. Matson, 25 Beav. 310. 
 
 where a bill is brought to recover a debt against s Newton v. Karl of Egmont, 4 Sim. 574 581. 
 
 the estate of a deceased partner, the other 4 Hole v. Harrison, Finch, 15. So the pr.n- 
 
 partnera are proper and necessary parties. cipal debtor must be made a partv Trescott 
 
 Vose v. Philbrook, 3 Story, 335. So to a bill „. Smith, 1 M'Cord Ch. 301. AH persons 
 
 seeking relief from the estate of a deceased interested should be made parties in such a 
 
 stockholder, all the living stockholders and case. Moore v. Moberlv. 7 B Mon 295 
 
 representatives of deceased stockholders, liable Those, however, need not be made parties who 
 
 to the debt, must, as interested in the account have removed bevond the jurisdiction of the 
 
 to be taken, be made parties defendant. New Court. McKenna v George, 2 Rich. Eq. 15; 
 
 England &c. Bank v. Newport Steam Factory, ante, 191, 245, and note. Where a surety seeks 
 
 V ' . . , , to nave his debt paid to the creditor out of 
 
 J Nns order has been adopted in the Equity some specified fund, or bv some partv other than 
 
 Rules of the I nited States Supreme Court. himself, such creditor is a necessary partv to 
 
 Equity Rul ■, 51 ; see Genl. Ord. VII. r. 2. the bill. But the creditor is not a necessary 
 
 i Stokes v. Clendon, cited 2 Bro. C. C. 275, partv, where the surety has paid the debt, and 
 
 notis, edit. Belt, 3 Swanst. 150, n., where the is seeking to be reimbursed bv the principal or 
 
 surety had conveyed his own estate by way of c^-suretv. Murphy r. Jackson, 5 .Jones, Eq 
 
 security to the mortgagee ; see also Payne v. (N. C.) 11. 
 
 265
 
 *272 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 and though he appears not to have been made a party, yet no objection 
 was taken ; 5 and it seems from this circumstance, and also from the 
 case of Lawson v. Wright, 6 that if the principal is clearly insolvent, 
 and can be proved to be so (as by his having taken advantage of an 
 Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors) he need not be a party to the 
 
 suit. 7 It will, however, be necessary if the principal be not a 
 *271 * party that the fact of his insolvency should be proved; whereas 
 
 if he be a party to the suit such proof will be unnecessary. 1 
 Where the fact of the insolvency of one of the sureties was clear, and 
 admitted by the answers, Lord Hardwicke held, that there was no 
 necessity to bring his representatives before the Court. 2 It seems, how- 
 ever, that the plaintiff has his election, whether he will bring the 
 insolvent co-obligor or his representative before the Court or not. 3 
 And in all cases coming under the 32d Order, 4 the plaintiff has the 
 option to sue all the persons jointly and severally liable, if he shall 
 think fit. Independently of this order, a plaintiff is allowed, in a case 
 where there are several persons who are each liable to account for his 
 own receipts, to file a bill against one or more of them for an account of 
 their own receipts and payments, without making the others parties. 6 
 
 The same rule has, it appears, been adopted, where there are joint 
 factors, and one of them is out of the jurisdiction. 6 And where it did 
 
 not appear that the parties were out of the jurisdiction, the 
 * 272 Court permitted the representatives of one of several * trustees, 
 
 who were dead, to be sued for an account of the receipts and 
 disbursements of his testator, who alone managed the trust, without 
 
 5 Hole v. Harrison, Finch, 15. 
 
 6 1 Cox, 27G. See Cox v. Stephens, 9 Jur. 
 N. S. 1144; 11 W. R. 929, 
 
 7 Story, Eq. PI. § 169; see 1 Story, Eq. Jur. 
 §§ 494, 490; Long v. Dupuy, 1 Dana, 104; 
 Young v. Lyons, 8 Gill, 162; Montague v. 
 Turpin, 8 Grattan, 453; Watts v. Gayle, 20 Ala. 
 817. It is not sufficient in such a case merely 
 to allege the insolvency of the principal. Roane 
 v. Pickett, 2 Eng. 510. Where one of several 
 judgment debtors is wholly irresponsible and 
 destitute of property, he need not be made a 
 party to a judgment creditor's bill. Williams 
 v. Hubbard, 1 Mich. 44(3. Where a bill in 
 Equity is brought against any of the stock- 
 holders of a corporation to compel them to pay 
 a debt of the corporation for which they are 
 individually liable, the general rule is, that all 
 persons liable to contribute should be made par- 
 ties to the bill. But this is a rule of conveni- 
 ence, and not of necessity ; and where certain 
 of the stockholders within the jurisdiction are 
 insolvent, the plaintiff may have his decree 
 against such as are solvent for his whole debt, 
 each paying such proportion of the whole debt 
 as his stock bears to the whole amount of stock 
 owned by the solvent stockholders, over whom 
 the Court has acquired jurisdiction. Erickson 
 v. Nesmith, 46 N. H. 371. 
 
 1 In Hole v. Harrison, Rep. temp. Finch, 15, 
 
 266 
 
 the insolvency of the principal was apparent 
 from the fact of his having taken advantage of 
 the Insolvent Act; but it is presumed that the 
 insolvency of the co-security was not so capable 
 of proof, and that it was upon that ground held 
 necessary to have his personal representative 
 before the Court, in order to take an account of 
 his estate. 
 
 2 Madox v. Jackson, 3 Atk. 406. 
 
 3 Haywood r. Ovey, 6 Mad. 113; Hitchman 
 v. Stewart, 3 Drew. 271; 1 Jur. N. S. 839; Ex 
 parte Bishop, 15 Ch. D. 400; see Clagett v. 
 Worthmgton, 3 Gill, 83. 
 
 4 Genl. Ord. VII. r. 2; R. S. C. 1883, Ord. 
 XVI. § 3. 
 
 5 Thus, where a residuary legatee brought 
 his bill against one of two executors, without 
 his co-executor, who was abroad, to have an 
 account of his own receipts and payments, the 
 Lord Chancellor said, " The cause shall go on, 
 and if upon the account anything appear diffi- 
 cult, the Court will take care of it; the reason 
 is the same here as in the case of joint factors, 
 and the issuing out of process in this case is 
 purely matter of form." Cowslad v. Cely, Prec. 
 in Ch. 83; 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 73, pi. 18"; 2 Eq. 
 Cas. Abr. 165, pi. 3, S. C. ; but see Devaynes 
 v, Robinson, 24 Beav. 98; 3 Jur. N. S. 707. 
 
 e Ibid.
 
 PERSONS RESISTING PLAINTIFF'S DEMANDS. * 272 
 
 bringing the representatives of the other trustees before the Court. 1 
 Now, under the 32d Order of August, 1841, 2 it is not always necessary 
 to make all the persons committing a breach of trust parties to a suit 
 instituted for redress of the wrong. 3 
 
 The rule, that all the parties liable to a demand should be before the 
 Court, was a rule of convenience, to prevent further suits for a contri- 
 bution, and not a rule of necessity; and therefore might be dispensed 
 with, especially where the parties were many, and the delays might be 
 multiplied and continued. 4 Thus, where there were a great number of 
 obligors, and many of them were dead, some leaving assets and others 
 leaving none, the Court proceeded to a decree, though all of them were 
 not before it. 5 («) 
 
 The general rule, requiring the presence of all parties interested in 
 resisting the plaintiff's demand, has also been dispensed with in a 
 variety of cases, where the parties were numerous, and the ends of jus- 
 tice could be answered by a sufficient number being before the Court 
 to represent the rights of all. 6 Thus, where A agreed with B and C 
 to pave the streets of a parish, and B and C, on behalf of themselves 
 and the rest of the parish, agreed to pay A, and the agreement was 
 lodged in the hands of 1>, it was held, that A should have his remedy 
 against B and C, and that they must resort to the rest of the parish. 7 So 
 where a bill was filed by a tradesman against the committee of a volun- 
 tary society called "The Ladies' Club," for money expended and work 
 done under a contract entered into by the defendants, on behalf of 
 themselves and the other subscribers, and it was objected that all the 
 members who had subscribed should be parties, the objection was over- 
 ruled, and a decree made for the plaintiff. 8 
 
 1 Lady Sclyard i\ Executors of Harris, 1 Eq. 6 The like doctrine applies to cases where 
 
 Cas. Alir. 74, pi, 20. there are many persons defendants, belonging 
 
 - Gen. Or.l. VII. r. 2; R. S. C. 18S3, Ord. to voluntary associations, against whom the 
 
 XVI. 5, 9. suit is brought, as to eases where the hill is 
 
 3 Kellaway v. Johnson, 5 Beav. 319; 6 Jur. brought by some proprietors as plaintiffs on be- 
 7">1 : Perry v. Knott, 5 Beav. 293; and see half of all. Story, Eq. PL 116, et seq. ; Wood v. 
 Shipton ». Rawlins, 4 Hare, 622; Hall v. Austin, Dummer, 3 Mason, 315-319, 321, 322; Stimson 
 
 2 Coll 570; 10 Jur. 452. v. Lewis, 36 Vt. 91, 94; Gorman v. Russell, 14 
 
 4 Darwent v. Walton, 2 Atk. 510; Anon. 2 Cal. 531; see Whitney r. Mayo, J.5 111. 251. 
 Eq. ( 'as. Abr. 166, pi. 97; Story, Eq. Jur. §§78, So where the creditors of an insolvent debtor, 
 82; Erickson v. Nesmith. 40 N. 11. 371, 374- who has assigned his property for the payment 
 377; Stimson v. Lewis, 36 Vt. 91, 93. of his debts, are numerous, and some of them 
 
 5 Lady Cranbourne v. Crispe, Finch, 105; 1 not within the Commonwealth, it is not neces- 
 Eq. Cas. Abr. 70; see 48th Equity Hiileof United sary that they should be made parties to a bill 
 Slate- Supreme Court ; Wilson v. Church, '.» < !h. ill Equity which concerns his assets ; he and his 
 I). :>'y2 ; Commissioners of Sewera o. Gellatly, assignees only need he made parties. Steven- 
 
 3 t'h. 1). 010, 615; Same v. Glasse, L. R. 7 Ch. son v. Austin, 3 Met. 474; Wakeman v. Grover, 
 456; L. R. 19 Eq. 134; Mayor of York v. Pil- 4 Paige, 23; see Dias v. Bouchand, 10 Paige, 
 kinton, 1 Atk. 482; Powell v. Knight, 7 Beav. 445; Johnson v. Candage, 31 Maine, 28; Duval] 
 444, 449; Hervey y. Beckwith, 2 II. & M. 429; D. Speed, 1 Md. Ch. 229. 
 
 Williams v. Dunn, W. N. (1868) 212; Thomas ' Meriel v. Wymondsold, Hard. 205; see 
 
 r. Dunning, 5 De G. & S 618; see cases, ante, also Anon. 2 Eq. ('as. Abr. 166, pi. 7. 
 
 p. 241. « Cullen r. Duke of Queensberry, 1 Bro, 
 
 (a) It is not usual in a representative suit to party and thereby made liable to costs. Cony- 
 allow a person fairly represented to attend sub- beare v. Lewis, 48 L. T. 527. 
 sequent proceedings, unless he is joined as a 
 
 267
 
 * 274 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 The same rule was acted upon by Sir Thomas Plumer M. E., 
 *273 *in a bill for the specific performauce of an agreement for a 
 lease, against the treasurer and directors of a Joint-Stock Com- 
 pany established by Act of Parliament, who had purchased the fee of 
 the premises from the party who had entered into the agreement, 
 although the rest of the proprietors, whose concurrence in the convey- 
 ance would be necessary, were not before the Court. 1 The Master of 
 the Rolls there concluded that although the bill required an act to be 
 done by parties who were absent, yet, as they were so numerous that 
 they could not be brought before the Court, he would go as far as he 
 could to bind their right, and made a decree declaring the plaintiffs 
 entitled to a specific performance, and restraining the treasurer of the 
 company from bringing any action to disturb the plaintiffs in their 
 possession. 2 
 
 In the preceding cases, the decision was upon the ground 
 *274 *that, if the plaintiff succeeded in his demands against the indi- 
 viduals sued, they would not be injured, as they had a remedy 
 over against the others for a contribution, which, under their own 
 regulations, they might enforce, although the enforcement of it, on the 
 part of the plaintiffs against so numerous a body, would be nearly 
 impossible. 1 There are, however, other cases in which suits are per- 
 mitted to proceed against a few, of many individuals of a certain class, 
 without bringing the rest before the Court, although their interests 
 may in some, degree be. affected by the decision, as in the case of bills 
 of peace brought to establish a general legal right against a great many 
 distinct individuals. 2 Thus, for instance, a bill may be brought by a 
 
 C. C. 101 (Perkins's ed.), and notes ; 1 Bio. P. C. the acting members of the committee are all 
 
 396 S. C. on appeal. liable, though some of them may not have been 
 
 i Meux v. Maltbv, 2 Swanst. 277; Parsons v. present at all the meetings which have taken 
 
 Spooner, 5 Hare, 102; 10 Jur. 423; and see place respecting the contract. In that case, the 
 
 Douglass v. Horsfall, 2 S. & S. 184. The fol- defendants were all the acting commissioners, 
 
 lowing cases illustrate the mode of pleading in under a Navigation Act, and the plaintiff had 
 
 actions bv and against Joint-Stock Companies, been employed on their behalf, and it appeared 
 
 and will be useful in framing suits in Equity. that the orders had been given at different 
 
 Stewart v. Dunn. 12 M.&W. 655; Davidson v. meetings by such of the defendants as were 
 
 Coopi r. 11M. &W. 778; Smith »\ Golds worthy, present at these meetings; but none of the 
 
 4 Q. B. 430. In a bill against an unincorpor- defendants were present at all the meetings, or 
 
 ated banking company, the members of which joined in all the orders, but every one of them 
 
 are numerous, and, in" part, unknown, it is not were present at some of the meetings, and 
 
 necessary to bring all the stockholders before joined in making some of the orders; and one 
 
 tin ( lourt, before a decree can be made. Maude- of the questions in the cause was, whether all 
 
 ville V. Rices, 2 Peters, 482; see Van Vechten the acting commissioners were liable on account 
 
 v. Terry, 2 John. Cli. 197; Shaw v. Norfolk of all the orders, or only as to those which they 
 
 County R. R. Co. 5 Gray, 170, 171; Erickson r. had respectively signed. Upon this point the 
 
 Nesmith, 4 Alien, 233; Hartley v. Russell, 40 Court was of opinion that all the acting com- 
 
 jj H.109. m issioners were liable in toto. Every one who 
 
 2 2 Swanst. 286: and see ib. 287. and the comes in afterwards approves the former acts; 
 
 cases there cited; Thornton v. Hightower, 17 and if anyone of the commissioners who had 
 
 Ga. L: but see McBride v. Lindsay, 16 Jur. 535; acted before disapproved the subsequent acts, 
 
 11 Eng. Law & Eq. 249. From the case of he might have gone to a future meeting and 
 
 Horsley o. Bell, cited in the above case of the protested against them. 
 
 Ladies' Club (see Amb. 770, and 1 Bro. C. C. 1 See 48th Equity Rule of United States 
 
 101, n. ; and see Att.-Gen. >• Brown, 1 Swanst. Supreme Court. 
 
 265), it appears that, in cases of this description, 2 It is not a sufficient objection to a bill by 
 
 268
 
 PERSONS RESISTING PLAINTIFF S DEMANDS. 
 
 274 
 
 person having a right at Law to demand service from the individuals of 
 a large district to his mill, for the purpose of establishing that right. 
 And the corporation of London has been allowed to exhibit a bill for 
 the purpose of establishing their right to a duty, and to bring only a 
 few persons before the Court, who dealt in those things on which the 
 duty was claimed. 3 And so bills are frequently entertained by lords of 
 manors against some of the tenants, on a question of common affecting 
 them all; and a parson may maintain a bill for tithes against a few of 
 the occupiers within the parish although they set up a modus to which 
 the whole are jointly liable. 4 
 
 creditors against a corporation and its debtors 
 to compel the collection by the corporation of 
 what is due to it, and the payment of the debt 
 it owes, that all the creditors or stockholders 
 are not joined. If necessary, the Court may, 
 at the suggestion of either party that the cor- 
 poration is insolvent, administer its assets by a 
 receiver, and thus collect all the subscriptions 
 or debts to the corporation. Ogilvie v. Knox 
 Ins. Co. 22 How. U. S. 380; S. C. 2 Black, 
 U. S. 539. And the stockholders who are called 
 upon by such bill to pay the balances due on 
 their several subscriptions to the stock of the 
 company, cannot be allowed to defend them- 
 selves by an allegation that their subscriptions 
 were obtained by fraud and misrepresentation 
 of the agent of the company. Ogilvie v. Knox 
 Ins. Co. 22 How. U. S. 380; Upton v. Tribil- 
 cock, 91 U. S. 45. 
 
 3 City of London v. Perkins, 4 Bro. P. C. 
 158; Sheffield Waterworks v. Yeonians, L. R. 
 2 Ch. 8. 
 
 4 Hardcastle v. Smithson, 3 Atk. 246. The 
 principle upon which the Courts have acted in 
 those cases has been very clearly laid down by 
 Lord Eldon in Adair v. New River Co. 11 Ves. 
 429: see Story, Eq. PL § 116, et seq.; ante, 
 p. 272, 273, note. In that case, a bill was filed 
 by a person entitled, under the Crown, to a 
 rent reserved out of a moiety of the profits of 
 the New River Company, to which moiety the 
 Crown was entitled under the original charter 
 of that company, but had subsequently granted 
 it to Sir John Middleton, the original projector, 
 reserving the rent in question. By a variety 
 of mesne assignments, the King's moiety of the 
 profits had become vested in a hundred per- 
 sons, or upwards; and the bill was filed against 
 the company and eight of those persons for an 
 account, and it charged, that there was not 
 any tangible or corporeal property upon which 
 the plaintiff could distrain, and that the parties 
 were so numerous, and thus liable to so many 
 fluctuations, that it was impossible, if the plain- 
 tiff could discover them, to bring them all 
 before the Court, and that these impediments 
 were not occasioned by the plaintiff or tho a e 
 under whom he claimed, but by the defendants, 
 'lo this bill an objection was taken for want of 
 
 parties, because all the persons interested in the 
 King's share were not before the Court ; but 
 Lord Eldon said, that there was no doubt that it 
 is generally the rule that wherever a rent charge 
 is granted, all persons who have to litigate 
 any title with regard to that rent charge, or 
 with each other, as being liable to pay the 
 whole or to contribute amongst themselves, 
 must be brought before the Court; see 1 Eq. 
 Cas. Abr. 72; but that it was a very different 
 consideration whether it was possible to hold, 
 that the rule should be applied to an extent 
 destroying the very purpose for which it was 
 established, namely, that it should prevail 
 where it is actually impracticable to bring all 
 the parties, or where it is attended with incon- 
 venience almost amounting to that, as well as 
 where it can be brought without inconvenience. 
 It must depend upon the circumstances of each 
 case. His Lordship also said, that there were 
 authorities to show that, where it is impracti- 
 cable, the rule shall not be pressed; and in such 
 a ease as the one before him, the King's share 
 being split into such a number that it was im- 
 practicable to goon with a record attempting 
 to bring all parties having interest in the sub- 
 ject to be charged, he should hesitate to deter- 
 mine, that a person having a demand upon 
 the whole or every part of the moiety, does 
 not do enough if he brings all whom he can 
 bring. His Lordship then goes cm to say, 
 " There is one class of cases very important 
 upon this subject, namely, where a person hav- 
 ing at Law a general right to demand service 
 from the individuals of a large district, to his 
 mill for instance, may sue thus in Equity: his 
 demand is upon every individual not to grind 
 corn for their own subsistence, except at his 
 mill ; to bring actions against any individual 
 for subtracting that service is regarded as per- 
 fectly impracticable; therefore, a bill is filed 
 to establish that right, and it is not necessary 
 to bring all the individuals. Why ? Not that 
 it is inexpedient, but that it is impracticable 
 to bring them all. See 48th Equity Rule of 
 the U. S. Supreme Court. The Court, there- 
 fore, has required so many that it can be justly 
 said they will fairly and honestly try the legal 
 right between themselves, all other persons in- 
 
 269
 
 * 277 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 * 27G * As a general rule, wherever a rent-charge has been granted, 
 
 all persons whose estates are liable must be brought before the 
 Court in a suit to enforce it. 1 This rule, however, is liable to an 
 exception in the case of charities, which are considered entitled to 
 greater indulgence in matters of pleading and practice than ordinary 
 parties, and in such cases it seems that it is not necessary that all the 
 terre-tenants should be brought before the Court, because every part 
 of the land was liable, and the charity ought not to be put to this 
 difficulty. 2 
 
 The rule that one having a general right to demand service from 
 many individuals may proceed against a fair proportion as representa- 
 tives applies only to cases where there is one general right in all the 
 parties concerned ; 3 that is, where the character of all the parties, so far 
 as the right is concerned, is homogeneous, as in the case in suits to 
 establish a modus, or a right of suit to a mill; and, notwithstanding 
 the inconvenience arising from numerous parties, there are some cases 
 in which they cannot be dispensed with, as in the case of a bill filed to 
 have the benefit of a charge on an estate, in which case all persons must 
 be made parties who claim an interest in such estate. Thus, where 
 estates had been conveyed to trustees, in trust for such creditors of the 
 grantor as should execute the conveyance, and one incumbrancer, some 
 of whose incumbrances were prior and some subsequent to the trust 
 deed, filed a bill praying that his rights and interests under his securi- 
 ties might be established, and the priorities of himself and the other 
 incumbrancers declared; and alleging that the deed was executed by 
 thirty creditors of the grantor, and amongst others by two individuals 
 who were named as defendants, and charging that such creditors were 
 too numerous to be all made parties to the suit, and that he was igno- 
 rant of the priorities and interests of such parties and of their residences, 
 and whether they were living or dead, save as to the two who were 
 
 named; a plea by some of the defendants, setting out the names 
 
 * 277 * and residences of the persons who had executed the deed, and 
 
 alleging that they were living, and necessary parties to the suit, 
 was allowed. 1 
 
 tevested, and the plaintiff ; and when the legal it should be established, of a contribution 
 
 right is so established at Law, the remedy in towards its discharge among themselves. Story, 
 
 Equity is very simple: merely a bill stating Eq. PI. §§ 133, 162; Coleman v. Barnes, 5 
 
 that the right has been established in such a Allen, 87-i; Skeel v. Spraker, 8 Paige, 182; 
 
 proceeding; and upon that ground, a Court of Myers r. United Guaranty, &c. Co. 7 De G. 
 
 Equity will give the plaintiff relief against the M. & G. 112. 
 
 defendants in the second suit, only represented 2 Att.-Gen. v. Jackson, 11 Ves. 367; Att- 
 
 by those in the first. I feel a strong inclina- Gen. v. Shelly. 1 Salk. 163; Att.-Gen. v. 
 
 tion that a decree of the same nature may be Wyburgh, 1 P. Wms. 599; and see Att.-Gen. 
 
 made in this case." See ace. Biscoe v. The v. Jackson, 11 Ves. 365; Story, Eq. PI. § 93; 
 
 Undertakers of the Land Bank, cited in Cuth- Att.-Gen. v. Naylor, 1 H. & M. 809; 10 Jur. 
 
 bert v. Westwood, Yin. Ah. tit. Party, B. 255, N. S. 231. 
 PI. 58; see Story, Eq. PI. § 116, et seq. 8 See Story, Eq. PI. §§ 120, 130, et seq. 
 
 1 Adair v. New River Co. supra. All per- 1 Newton v. Earl Egniont, 5 Sim. 130; and 
 
 sons who are affected by a common charge or see Harrison v. Stewardson, 2 Hare, 530; and 
 
 burden must be made parties, not only for the Holland v. Baker, 3 Hare, 68; Story, Eq. PI. 
 
 purpose of ascertaining and contesting the § 130, et seq. 
 right or title to it, but abo for the purpose, if 
 
 270
 
 PERSONS RESISTING PLAINTIFFS DEMANDS. 
 
 278 
 
 In suits for establishing charges upon estates, the general and almost 
 universal practice of the Court is that all persons entitled to incum- 
 brances, subsequent to the plaintiff's charge, should be made parties to 
 the suit. Thus, in the case of a bill to foreclose a mortgage, all per- 
 sons, who have incumbrances upon the estate posterior in point of time 
 to the plaintiff's mortgage, should be made defendants; 2 for although, 
 if some of the incumbrancers are not made parties to a bill of fore- 
 closure, the plaintiff may, notwithstanding, foreclose such of the de- 
 fendants as he has brought before the Court; 8 yet such a decree will 
 not bind the other incumbrancers who are not parties, even though the 
 mortgagee at the time of foreclosure 4 had no notice of the exist- 
 ence of such * incumbrancers. 1 And so, to a suit by a vendor *278 
 
 2 But see Smith v. Chapman, 4 Conn. 344; 
 Wilson v. Hayward, 6 Fla. 171. See ante, 
 p. 214, notes 2 and 4. Judgment creditors since 
 July 29, 1864, who have not issued execution, are 
 not necessary parties. Earl of Cork v. Russell, 
 L. R. 13 Eq. 210; see also Mildred v. Austin, 
 L. R. 8 Eq. 220; Re Bailey, W. N. (1809) 43; 
 17 W. R. 395. As to making judgment credit- 
 ors under 1 & 2 Vic. c. 110, parties, see liolle- 
 stpn v. Morton, 1 Dr. & War. 171 ; Gover- 
 nors of Grey-Coat Hospital v. Westminster 
 Imp. Com'rs, 1 De G. & J. 531; 3 Jur. N S. 
 1188; Knight v. Pocock. 24 Beav. 436; 4 Jur. 
 N. S. 197 ; Harrison v. Pennell, id. 682; and 
 under 23 & 24 Vic. c. 38, see Wallis v. Morris, 
 10 Jur. N. S. 741; 12 W. R. 997. To a bill 
 to foreclose, an adverse claimant is not a neces- 
 sary party, and the bill which should make 
 him a party would be open to the objection 
 of multifariousness and misjoinder. Dial v. 
 Reynolds, 96 U. S. 340; Corning v. Smith, 6 
 N. Y. 82 ; Lange v. Jones, 5 Leigh, 192. 
 Infra, p. 339, note. Neither adverse claimants, 
 nor remainder-men who have not joined in the 
 mortgage, are necessary parties to a bill to 
 foreclose. Wilkins v. Kirkbride, 27 N. J. 
 Eq. 93. 
 
 3 Draper v. Lord Clarendon, 2 Vern. 518 ; 
 Audslcy v. Horn, 26 Beav. 195; 1 De G. F. & 
 J. 226; 4 Jur. N. S. 1267. 
 
 4 Lomax v. Hide, 2 Vern. 185 ; Godfrey v. 
 Chadwell, id. 601; 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 318, pi. 7, 
 S. C. ; Morret v. Westerne, 2 Vern. 663 ; 1 Eq. 
 Cas. Abr. 164, pi. 7, S. C. ; Haines v. Beach, 3 
 John. Ch. 459, Lyon v. Sandford, 5 Conn. 
 544; Renwick v. Macomb, 1 Hopk. 277. 
 
 1 This rule may at first appear inconsistent 
 w th the usual principles of a Court of Equity, 
 but the justice of it is clearly shown in Lord 
 Nottingham's judgment in Sherman v. Cox, 3 
 Ch. Rep. 83 [46] ; S. C. Coekes v Sherman, 
 2 Freem 14, where he says, "Although there 
 be a great mischief on one hand that a mort- 
 gagee, after a decree against the mortgagor to 
 foreclose him of his equity of redemption, shall 
 Dever know when to be at rest, for if there, be 
 
 any other incumbrances, he is still liable to an 
 account, yet the inconvenience is far greater on 
 the other side; for if a mortgagee that is a 
 stranger to this decree should be concluded, lie 
 would be absolutely without remedy, and lose 
 his whole money, when, perhaps, a decree may 
 be huddled up purposely to cheat him, and in 
 the mean time (he being paid his interest) may 
 be lulled asleep and think nothing of it ; 
 whereas, on the other hand, there is no preju- 
 dice but being liable to the trouble of an ac- 
 count, and if so be that were stated bona Jitle 
 between the mortgagor and mortgagee in the 
 suit wherein the decree was obtained, that shall 
 be no more ravelled into, but for so long shall 
 stand untouched." What is here said by the 
 Lord Chancellor on the subject of the account, 
 as well as the case of Needier v. Deeble, 1 ( h. 
 Cas. 209, appears to be at variance with the de- 
 cision in Morret 17. Westerne, supra. It Minis 
 to be in consequence of the rule above laid 
 down, that the practice prevails of introducing 
 an interrogatory into a bill of foreclosure, 
 inquiring whether there arc any and what 
 incumbrances affecting the estate besides that 
 of the 'plaintiff, in order that, if the answer 
 states any, the owners of such incumbrances be 
 made parties. Story, Eq. PL § 193, note. See 
 an/e, 214, notes 5 and 7. Upon the same 
 ground Lord Alvanely M. R., in Bishop of 
 Winchester v. Beavor, 3 Ves. 314, ordered a 
 bill of foreclosure to stand over for the purpose 
 of making a judgment creditor a party. From 
 the marginal note to that case, a doubt appears 
 to arise as to whether the Master of the Rolls 
 intended to adopt the general rule, that all 
 incumbrancers must be parties to a bill of tore- 
 closure; but the decision rests upon the rule 
 of practice already stated, and it cannot, after 
 that decision, be doubted that all incumbran- 
 cers whose liens appear upon the answer, must 
 b ■ made parties, and if that answer be a suffi- 
 cient one and true, it must, according to the 
 practice in drawing bills just stated, appear 
 upon the answer who such incumbrancers are. 
 At all events, it is evident, from the cases of 
 
 271
 
 * 279 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 to establish his lien for unpaid purchase-money, all the persons inter- 
 ested in the property who are subsequent in date to him, and who are to 
 be foreclosed by him, must be made parties. 2 
 
 The rule which requires incumbrancers to be brought before the Court, 
 in suits to establish a charge, extends to cases in which the subject of 
 the litigation has been sold, or charged, subsequently to the date of the 
 plaintiff's claim, whether such sale or charge has been by legal instru- 
 ment, or only by agreement, or whether it extends to the whole or only 
 partial interests. Therefore, where an estate had been sold in lots sub- 
 ject to an equitable charge in favor of the plaintiff, it was held that 
 all the purchasers were necessary parties to a bill by him to realize his 
 security. 3 And where a bill was filed by a lessee, to compel a landlord 
 to give his license to the assignment of a lease to a purchaser, on the 
 ground that he had by certain acts waived the right to withhold it, which 
 had been reserved to him by the original lease, the purchaser was held 
 to be a necessary party. 4 And so, if a man contracts with another for 
 the purchase of an estate, and afterwards, before conveyance, enters into 
 a covenant with a third person, that the vendor shall convey the estate to 
 such third person, the vendor, if he has notice of the subsequent con- 
 tract, cannot with safety convey the estate to the vendee without the 
 concurrence of the third person, who in that case will be a necessary 
 party to a bill by the purchaser against the vendor for a specific per- 
 formance. But if A contracts with B to convey to him an estate, 
 and B enters into a sub-contract with C, that he, B, will convey to 
 him the same estate, then, if B files a bill against A, C will not be 
 
 a necessary party, because A is, in that case, in no manner 
 *279 * affected by the sub-contract, which his conveyance to B would 
 
 rather promote than injure. 1 Where, however, the original pur- 
 chaser has agreed to share with other persons the profits to be made 
 by the resale, such persons, whether necessary or not, are proper par- 
 ties to a suit by the sub-purchaser against the original purchaser to 
 
 Lnmax r. Hide, Godfrey v. Chadwell, Morret 1 v. Walford, 4 Russ. 372; see also 
 
 v. Westerne, just referred to, that if a niort- Alexander v Cana, 1 De G. & S. 415; Chad- 
 
 gagee wishes to obtain an undisputed right to wick v. Maden. 9 Hare, 188; Hacker v. Mid 
 
 an"estate by foreclosure, he must make all in- Kent Ky. Co 11 Jur. X. S. 634, V. C. S, See 
 
 cumbrancers upon the estate, of whose liens Dyer i\ Pulteney, Darn. 160; McCreight v. 
 
 he has notice (whether appearing upon the Foster, L. R. 5 Cli. 604; S- C worn, Shaw v. 
 
 answer or not), parties to his suit. Rolleston Foster, L. R. 5 H. L. 321. Where the owner 
 
 V. Morton, 1 Dr. & W. 171. of land agrees in writing to convey it to an- 
 
 2 Att.-Gen. v. Sittingbourne & Sheerness other, and afterwards conveys it to a different 
 Rv. Co. 35 Beav. 208, 271; L. R. 1 Eq. 036, person, with notice of the prior agreement, the 
 639; Bishop of Winchester v. Mid Hants Ry. latter will hold the title as trustee of the first 
 Co. L. R. 5 Eq. 17; Drax v. Somerset & Dor- purchaser; and in a bill by such first purchaser 
 set Rv. Co. 38 L. J. Ch. 232. to enforce specific performance, the second pur- 
 
 3 peto v. Hammond, 29 Beav. 91. So, if a chaser is a necessary party. Stone v. Buck- 
 sub-vendee die. his personal representative and ner, 12 Sm. &. M. 72. So if the first pur- 
 heirs should be made parties to a bill by the chaser's interest be sold at execution sale, such 
 original vendor to enforce his lien for the pur- first purchaser is a necessary party to a bill by 
 chase-money. Lewis v. Hawkins, 23 Wall. the buyer under the execution against the ori- 
 119. See ante. p. 214. n. 4. filial vendor for specific performance. Alex- 
 
 * Maule r. Duke of Beaufort. 1 Russ. 349 ander v. Hoffman, 70 111. 114. 
 See Sear v. House Property & Inv. Co. 16 Ch. 
 D. 387. 
 
 272
 
 PERSONS RESISTING PLAINTIFF'S DEMANDS. 
 
 279 
 
 rescind the contract and obtain the return of sums paid on account of 
 the purchase-money. 2 (a) And where a bill was filed by creditors to set 
 aside a purchase on the ground of fraud, and it appeared that the pur- 
 chaser had, since his purchase, executed a mortgage of the estate, the 
 mortgagee was considered a necessary party. 3 But where, since his 
 purchase judgments had been entered up against the purchaser, the 
 judgment creditors were held to be unnecessary parties to a bill for 
 specific performance. 4 
 
 The rule which requires all subsequent incumbrancers to be parties 
 extends only to cases in which the subsequent charges or incumbrances 
 are specific; and we have before seen, that in most cases where estates 
 have been conveyed to trustees to pay debts or legacies, the trustees 
 may sustain suits respecting the trust property, without those claiming 
 under the trust being parties to them. 5 It is also unnecessary that per- 
 sons having prior mortgages or incumbrances should be parties, because 
 they have the same lien upon the estate after a decree as they had 
 before; 6 for this reason, in a bill for a partition, a mortgagee upon the 
 whole estate is not a necessary party, though a mortgagee of one of the 
 undivided portions would be. 7 And so, where a bill was brought by a 
 mortgagee against a mortgagor, praying a sale of the mortgaged estate, 
 persons who had annuities prior to the mortgage were held unnecessary 
 parties, and although they appeared at the hearing, and consented to a 
 sale, the bill was dismissed as to them with costs, as the estate must be 
 sold subject to their annuities. 8 Probably upon the same principle, it 
 was held that a third mortgagee buying in the first need not make a 
 second mortgagee a party, 9 otherwise it is not easy to reconcile this case 
 
 2 Aberaman Ironworks v. Wickens, L. R. 
 4 Ch. 101; and see Fcnwick v. Bulman, L. R. 
 9Eq. 165; ante, p. 130. 
 
 3 Copis r. Middleton, 2 Mad. 410. So, if 
 sales have been made, tbe purchasers should be 
 made parties. Free v. Buckingham, 57 N. H. 
 95; Hopkins v. Roseclare Land Co. 72 111. 373. 
 If the bill be to set aside a judicial sale, the 
 persons at whose instance the sale was made 
 are necessary parties. Wilson v. Bellows, 30 
 N. .1. Eq. 282. So where, in such a case, it 
 appears that the debtor charged with the fraud- 
 ulent conveyance is dead, his administrator 
 should be made a party. Coates v. Day, 9 Mo. 
 315. Whether the debtor himself, if living, 
 should be made a party, see Wright v. Cor- 
 nelius, 10 Mo. 174. 
 
 ' lVtiv v. Duncombe. 7 Hare, 24. 
 
 5 Ld. Red. 175. 
 
 6 Rose v. Page, 2 Sim. 471 ; Hogan v. Walker, 
 14 How. U. S. 37 ; Wilson v. Biscoe, 6 Eng. 41. 
 
 (t) In suits for specific performance between 
 vendor and purchaser, the general rule is that 
 they are the only necessary parties to the suit. 
 See ante, i> 231. and n. (a). But a third per- 
 son who holds a part or the whole of the land 
 vol. i. — 18 
 
 1 Swan v. Swan, 8 Price, 518; Whitton v. 
 Whitton, 38 N. H. 134, 135. But in Harwood 
 v. Kirby, 1 Paige, 409, it was held, that an 
 incumbrancer, upon the share of one tenant in 
 common, cannot be made a party to a bill for 
 partition, and the partition does not affect his 
 rights; but his incumbrance continues upon the 
 share setoff to the party who created the lien; 
 see Sebring <•. Mersereau, 1 Hopk. 501; Hall v. 
 Morris 13 Bush, :!±2. And the fact that one 
 tenant in common has mortgaged bis interest 
 to the other will not prevent a partition, no 
 entry or foreclosure having taken place. Green 
 v. Arnold, 11 R. I. 364. The holder of a judg- 
 ment against one tenant in common should be 
 made a party. Metcalf v. Hoopingardner, 45 
 Iowa, 510. 
 
 8 Delabere v. Norwood, 3 Swanst. 144, n.j 
 Hogan v. Walker, 14 How. U. S. 37. 
 
 9 Lord Hollis' case, cited 3 Ch. Rep. 86. 
 
 agreed to be conveyed by an indivisible con- 
 tract may be a necessary party. Barry v. 
 Barry, 64 Miss. 709: Meek o. Spracher, 87 
 Va. 162: Gentry v. Gentry, id. 478. 
 
 273
 
 281 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 with the other principles which have been laid down. It cannot be 
 
 supposed that it was meant to be decided that a third mortgagee 
 
 *280 buying in the first mortgige, could by that * process acquire the 
 
 right to foreclose the second, without bringing him before the 
 
 Court, and giving him an opportunity to redeem. 
 
 Whenever a mortgagee is made a party to a suit by the mortgagor or 
 those claiming under him, he is entitled to be redeemed; * and, there- 
 fore, unless a second mortgagee or other incumbrancer is prepared to 
 redeem him, he will be an improper party to a suit by such mortgagee 
 or incumbrancer, where the object is merely to foreclose the equity of 
 redemption. 2 A second incumbrancer, however, may file a bill to 
 redeem the first, without making a subsequent incumbrancer a party; 
 and if he brings him before the Court for the mere purpose of hav- 
 ing his incumbrance postponed, and not to foreclose him, the bill will 
 be dismissed against him with costs. 3 But a bill for redemption cannot 
 be sustained by a party having a partial interest in the equity of 
 redemption, in the absence of the other parties interested in it. 4 
 
 Incumbrancers or purchasers becoming such after a bill has been filed 
 
 and served, 5 (a) and registered as a lis pendens, 6 will be bound by the 
 
 decree, and need not be made parties, whether the plaintiff has notice 
 
 of them or not; for an alienation pending a suit is void, or 
 
 *281 rather voidable. 7 *If, therefore, after a bill filed by the first 
 
 i Drew r. O'Hara, 2 B. & B. 562, n.; 
 Cholmley v. Countess of Oxford, 2 Atk. 267. 
 
 2 See Story, Eq. PI. § 186, et seq. 
 
 3 Shepherd v. Gwinnett, 3 Swanst. 151, n. ; 
 see Story, Eq. PI. § 193, and notes. 
 
 4 Henley v. Stone, 3 Beav. 355; see Chap- 
 pell v. Rees, 1 De G. M. & G. 393; 16 Jur 
 415; Jennings v. Jordan, 6 App. Cas. 698, 704; 
 Southard o. Sutton, 68 Maine, 575; Rowell v. 
 Jewett, 69 Maine, 293; Williams v. Stewart, 
 25 Minn. 516; Ward 0. Seymour, 51 Vt. 320. 
 An otter to redeem is not necessary in a bill by 
 a judgment creditor against trustees and mort- 
 gagees to establish his charge, and for payment 
 out of rents. Jefferys v. Dickson, L. K. 1 Ch. 
 183; 12 Jur. X. S. 281. 
 
 5 puwell r. Wright, 7 Beav. 444; Humble 
 v. Shore, 3 Hare, 119; Macleod v. Annesley, 16 
 Beav. 600 ; Price t^Price, 35 Ch. D. 297; see, 
 however, Drew v. Earl of Norbury, 3 Jo. & 
 Lat. 267; Sugd.V. & P. 543, 758. 
 
 6 2 & 3 Vie. c. 11, § 7. See f .rther, as to 
 registering the suit as a lis pendens, 18 & 19 
 Vic. c. 15, § 6 ; 23 & 24 Vic. c. 115, § 2; 30 & 
 31 Vic. c. 47, § 2; 42 & 43 Vic. 78, §§ 4-6; 
 Pask's Prac. 12, 80; K. S. C. 1883, Old. LXI. 
 22 (Ord. Dec, 1879, rr. 6, 7; Ord. April, 1880, 
 r. 47) : Clutton v. Lee, 7 Ch. D. 541, n. ; 24 W. R. 
 607; Pooley v. Bosanquet, 7 Ch. D. 541 ; Jervis 
 
 r. Berridge, W. X. (1874) 195; 23 W. R. 43; 
 Plant r. Pearman, W. X. (1872) 15 ; 20 W. R. 
 314; Whitney v. Smith, M. R. April 27, 1870 ; 
 Ecclesiastical Com'rs v. Marshall, M. R. July 
 14, 1870. And as to the doctrine of Us pendens 
 independently of statute, see Sugd. V. & P. 
 758; Shelford's R. P. Acts, 604; Dart, V. & P. 
 852, 863, 872 ; and since the act, 2 & 3 Vic. c. 
 11, see id.; Bellamy v. Sabine, 1 De G. & J. 
 566; 3 Jur. X. S. 943; Tyler v. Thomas, 25 
 Beav. 47 : Xortcliffe v. Warburton, id. 352, 
 824; 4 De G. F. & J. 449; Berry v. Gibbons, 
 L. R. 8 Ch. 747. 
 
 • Walker v. Smalwood, 2 Amb. 676; Gaskell 
 v. Durdin, 2 B. & B. 167; Moore v. McXamara, 
 1 B. & B. 309; Garth v. Ward. 2 Atk. 174; 
 Metcalfe v. Pulvertoft, 2 V. & B. 207; and see 
 Massy v. Batwell, 4 Dr. & War. 68; Long v. 
 Bowring, 10 Jur. X. S. 668; 12 W. R. 972, 
 M. R.; Patch v. Ward, L. R. 3 Ch. 203. Gen- 
 erally speaking, an assignee under a voluntary 
 assignment, pendente lite, need not be made a 
 party to a bill, or be brought before the Court; 
 for every person purchasing pendente lite is 
 treated as a purchaser with notice, and is subject 
 to all the equities of the persons under whom he 
 claims in privity. Story, Eq. PI. §§ 156, 351; 
 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 406; Sedgwick v. Cleve- 
 land, 7 Paige, 287 ; Van Hook v. Throckmorton, 
 
 (a) Lis pendens applies only to suits that appearance. Allison v. Drake, 145 111. 500; see 
 proceed to a final decree, and not to those in cases cited ante, p. 2, note (n). 
 which the bill is dismissed without service or 
 
 274
 
 PERSONS RESISTING PLAINTIFF S DEMANDS. 
 
 281 
 
 mortgagee to foreclose, the mortgagor confesses a judgment, exe- 
 cutes a second mortgage, or assigns the equity of redemption, the plain- 
 tiff need not make the incumbrancer, mortgagee, or assignee parties, 
 for they will be bound by the suit; and can only have the benefit 
 of a title so gained, by filing an original bill in the nature of a cross- 
 bill, to redeem the mortgaged property, 1 and where a purchaser took 
 an exception to a title, because two mortgagees, who became such after 
 the bill was filed, were not parties to the foreclosure, the exception 
 was overruled with costs; 2 and it has been held, that where one of 
 several plaintiffs assigned his equitable interest pendente lite, the suit 
 might be heard as if there had been no such assignment. 3 Where, 
 however, a sole plaintiff assigned all his equitable interest absolutely, 4 
 and where all the adult plaintiffs assigned their equitable interest by 
 
 8 Paige, 33; Cook v. Mancius, 5 John. Ch. 93; 
 Murray v. Ballou, 1 John. Ch. 577, 581, Mur- 
 ray v. Lylburn, 2 John. Ch. 441, 445; 2 Story, 
 Eq. Jur. § 908; Hoxie v. Carr, 1 Sumner. 173; 
 Branden t\ Cahiness, 10 Ala. 155; Lawrence v. 
 Lane, 4 Gilman, 354, Kern v. Hazlerigg, 11 
 Ind. 443; Boulden v. Lanahan, 29 Md. 200. It 
 is, however, otherwise where the assignment is 
 by operation of law, as in cases of bankruptcy, 
 or assignments under the insolvent acts. Sedg- 
 wick i\ Cleveland, 7 Paige, 288; Deas v. 
 Thome, 3 John. 543; Story, Eq. PI. § 342, 
 not-, § 351, note; Storm v. Davenport, 1 
 Sandf. Ch. 135; Williams v. Winans, 20 N. J. 
 Eq 394. And an assignee under a voluntary 
 assignment may be made a party, when 
 desirable, at the election of the plaintiff. 
 Story. Eq. PI. 156, and cases in note; see 
 Longworth v. Taylor, 1 McLean, 395. 
 
 See, as to the general doctrine of lis pendens, 
 among recent cases, Bellamy v Sabine, 1 De G. 
 & J. 50(1, 3 Jur. N. S. 943; Tyler v. Thomas, 
 25 Beav. 47; Nortcliffe v. Warburton, 4 De G. 
 F. & J. 439 ; Edwards v. Banksmith, 35 Ga. 
 213, Dudley v. Witter. 46 Ala. 664 , Wickliffe 
 r Breckenndge, 1 Bush, 427; Sugd. V. & P. 
 759 ; Dart, V. & P. 863, 872 877. The lis /'< nd< ns 
 commences with the service of process after bill 
 filed. Anon. 1 Vern. 319, Harden r Bucklin, 9 
 Paige, 512; Watlington v. Howley, 1 Des. 170, 
 note; Haughwort r. Murphy, 22 N.J. Eq. 531 ; 
 Allen v. Poole, 54 Miss. 323 In Harmon r. 
 Byram, 11 W. Va. 511, 521, where the process 
 was served before the tiling of the bill, the lis 
 pendens was held to begin from, or relate back 
 to, the service of the subpoena. It does not 
 extend beyond the territorial limits of the State 
 in which the suit is pending: Shelton v. John- 
 son. 4 Sneed, 672; and requires for its operation 
 that the property be distinctly identified, and 
 necessarily involved in the litigation: Lewis v. 
 Mew. 1 Strob. Eq. 180; Leitch v. Wells. 4S N 
 Y. 585; Cockrill v. Manev, 2 Tenn. Ch. 49; 
 Allen v. Poole, 54 Miss. 323. It does not apply 
 
 to negotiable securities. County of Warren v. 
 Marcy, 97 U. S. 96. 
 
 The alienation of property pending the liti- 
 gation will, ordinarily, have no effect on the 
 litigation. Kino v. Rudkin, 6 Ch. D. 160; 
 Kami o. Baird, Phil. Eq. (N. C.) 317; Sumner 
 v. Waugh, 50 111. 531; Truitt v. Truitt, 38 Ind. 
 16; Sheridan v. Andrews, 49 N. Y. 478. An 
 assignment by the defendant of his interest in 
 the subject-matter of a pending suit does not 
 defeat the suit, nor in any way affect it, the 
 assignee being bound by what is done against 
 his assignor Williams v. Winans, 20 N. J. 
 Eq. 392. So, of an assignment by the com- 
 plainant. Gheen v. Osborne, 11 Ileisk. 61 ; 
 Wills v. Whitniore, 1 Leg. Rep. 222. So, 
 where a railroad company consolidates pending 
 litigation with a defendant company. Pullau 
 v. Cmn. &c. R. Co. 4 Biss. 35. So, where the 
 creditor of a litigant acquires a lien by attach- 
 ment pending the litigation. Dodge v. Fuller, 
 28 N.J Eq. 578. The assignee may either come 
 in by supplemental bill and assume the burden 
 of litigation in his own name, or act in the 
 name of his assignor. Ex parte Railroad Co. 
 95 U. S. 221; Tilton v. Cofield, 93 U. S. 163. 
 His rights, as distinct from those of his assignor, 
 will date from the tiling of his bill. Trabue v. 
 Bankhead, 2 Tenn. Ch. 412; Glenn v. Doyle, 
 3 Tenn. Ch. 324. And see infra, p. 400, n. ; 
 p. 1516, n. 
 
 A purchaser of land by metes and bounds 
 from a party to a partition suit cannot inter- 
 vene in that suit. Griffin v. Wilson, 39 Texas, 
 213. 
 
 1 Story, Eq. PI. § 351 ; Mitford, Eq. PI. 73; 
 Lambert o. Lambert, 52 Maine, 544. 
 
 - Bishop of Winchester v. Paine, 11 Ves. 
 197. 
 
 3 Fades v. Harris, 1 Y. & C. 230: Story. 
 Eq. Jur. § 156; ante, 199, and note, and cases 
 cited to this point of assignments p> nd( nte lite ; 
 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 908. 
 
 4 Johnson v. Thomas, 11 Beav. 501. 
 
 275
 
 l82 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 way of mortgage, 5 the assignees were held necessary parties. But in 
 casts where a change in the ownership of the legal estate takes place 
 pending the suit, by alienation or otherwise, the new owner must be 
 brought before the Court in some shape or other, in order that he may 
 execute a conveyance of the legal estate. 6 
 
 If a person, pendente lite, takes an assignment of the interest of one 
 of the parties to the suit, he may if he pleases make himself a party to 
 the suit by supplemental bill; 7 but he cannot by petition pray to be 
 admitted to take a part as a party defendant; 8 all that the Court will 
 do is to make an order that the assignor shall not take the property out 
 of Court without notice. 9 (a) 
 
 We now come to the consideration of those cases in which it is neces- 
 sary to make persons defendants, not because their rights may be di- 
 rectly affected by the decree, if obtained, but because, in the event of the 
 plaintiff succeeding in his object against the principal defend- 
 *282 ant, that defendant will thereby acquire *a right to call upon 
 them either to reimburse him the whole or part of the plaintiff's 
 demand, or to do some act towards reinstating the defendant in the sit- 
 uation he would have been in but for the success of the plaintiff's 
 claim. In such cases, in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits, the 
 persons so consequentially liable to be affected by the decree should 
 be before the Court in the first instance, in order that their liabilities 
 may be adjudicated upon and settled by one proceeding. 1 Therefore, 
 
 5 Solomon v. Solomon. 13 Sim. 51G; Vibart 
 v. Vibart, L. II 6 Eq. 251. 
 
 s Daly v. Kelly, 4 Dow, 435; Bishop of 
 Winchester v. Paine, supra; Story, Eq. PI. 
 § 351 . 
 
 ' Story, Eq. PI. § 351; Mitford, Eq. PI. 73; 
 sec Steele v. Taylor, 1 Minn. 274. 
 
 8 See Lawrence v. Lane, 4 Oilman, 354; 
 Cook v. Mancius, 5 John. Ch. 8!). Carow r. 
 Mowatt, 1 Ed. Ch. 9; Steele v. Taylor, 1 Minn. 
 274. But it seems he may be made a party by 
 the express consent of the plaintiff. Steele r. 
 Taylor, supra. A person who has acquired, 
 pending a suit to enforce liens, one or more of 
 those liens, may be heard, on motion or peti- 
 tion, to ask an application of surplus moneys to 
 his claim, provided his title is not disputed, 
 otherwise a bill may be necessary. Thornton 
 v. Fairfax, 20 Gratt, 669. See, more fully on 
 this point, infra, p. 287, n. 2, and p. 1516, n. 
 
 9 Foster v. Deacon, 6 Mad. 59; Story, Eq. 
 PI. § 342, and notes, § 348; Sedgwick v. Cleve- 
 land, 7 Paige, 290; Deas v. Thome, 3 John. 
 544: see, however, Brandon ?>. Brandon, 3 X. R. 
 2X7. V. C. K., where a supplemental order was 
 made to bring before the Court mortgagees of 
 
 shares after decree; and Toosey r. Burchell, 
 Jac. 159, where, on petition, the Court ordered 
 that the purchaser should be at liberty to attend 
 inquiries ill the Master's office, and have notice 
 of all proceedings, on paying the incidental 
 costs. The Court will usually now, on sum- 
 mons, give the purchaser liberty to attend the 
 proceedings at his own expense. 
 
 i Story, Eq. PL § 173, et seq ., § 180 ; Wiser 
 v. Blachly. 1 John. Ch. 437; Erickson v. Nes- 
 mith, 46 N. H. 371, 374; Hadley v. Russell, 
 40 N. H 109; New England. &c. Bank v. 
 Newport Steam Factory. 6 R. I. 154; see 
 Shotwell v. Taliaferro, 25 Miss. 105. They 
 should at least be served witii notice of the 
 defendants' claim to relief as against them. 
 R. S. C. Orel XVI. 17-21 ; post, § 5. In a suit 
 against the representatives of a deceased part- 
 ner to recover a partnership debt, in which the 
 insolvency of the surviving partner is stated, 
 he is. nevertheless, a proper party as to the 
 othei defendants, who cannot demur to the bill 
 for misjoinder, on account of the joinder of 
 such survivor. Butts v. Genung, 5 Paige. 254; 
 ante, p. 269, n. 6. 
 
 (a) See/Jos,, p. 287, note ("): Davis p. Sul- 
 livan. 33 N J. Eq. 569: Sutherland r. Straw. 2 
 led. Rep 277. A covenant by a retiring part- 
 ner not to trad", act, or deal so as to directly or 
 
 270 
 
 indirectly affect the continuing partners i- per- 
 sonal to them, and cannot be sued upon by their 
 assignees. Davies v. Davies, 36 Ch. D. 359.
 
 PERSONS RESISTING PLAINTIFF'S DEMANDS. * 283 
 
 where a defendant in his answer insisted that he was entitled to be 
 reimbursed by A what he might be decreed to pay to the plaintiff, and 
 therefore that A was a necessary party, the Court, at the hearing, 
 directed the cause to stand over, with liberty to the plaintiff to amend 
 by adding parties. 2 And so, where an heir-at-law brought a bill against 
 a widow, to compel her to abide by her election, and to take a legacy 
 in lieu of dower, it was held that the personal representative was a 
 necessary party; because, in the event of the plaintiff's succeeding, she 
 was entitled to satisfaction for her legacy, out of the personal estate; 
 and the plaintiff had leave to amend, by making the executor a party. 3 
 
 Upon the same principle, in suits by specialty creditors for satisfac- 
 tion of their demands out of the real estate of a person deceased, the 
 personal as well as the real representative must be brought before 
 the Court; 4 because the personal estate, being the primary fund for 
 the payment of debts, ought to go in ease of the land, 5 and the heir 
 has a right to insist that it shall be exhausted for that purpose before 
 the realty is charged; so that, if a decree were to be made in the first 
 instance against the heir, he would be entitled to hie a bill against the 
 personal representative to reimburse himself. 6 The Court, therefore, 
 in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits, requires both the executor and 
 heir to be before it, in order that it may, in the first instance, do com- 
 plete justice, by decreeing the executor to pay the debt, as far as the 
 personal assets will extend; the rest to be made good by the heir out 
 of the real assets. 7 Upon this principle it was, that where a 
 man covenanted for himself and his heirs that a * jointure house * 283 
 should remain to the uses in a settlement, and the jointress 
 brought a bill against the heir to compel him to rebuild and finish the 
 jointure house, and to make satisfaction for the damage which she had 
 sustained for want of the use thereof, Lord Talbot allowed a demurrer, 
 on the ground that the executor ought to be a party ; because the Court 
 would not, in the first instance, decree against the heir to perforin his 
 covenant, and then put the heir upon another bill against the personal 
 representative to reimburse himself out of the personal assets. 1 
 
 A bill for the discovery of real assets might, however, it seems, be 
 brought against the heir, in order to preserve a debt, without making 
 the administrator a party, where it is suggested that the representation 
 is contested in the Ecclesiastical Court; 2 and where the heir of an 
 obligor would not himself administer, and had opposed the plaintiff, 
 who was a principal creditor, in taking out administration, a demurrer 
 by him, because the administrator was not a party, was overruled. 8 
 
 Where the nature of the relief prayed is such that the heir-at-law 
 has no remedy over against the personal estate, the personal represen- 
 
 2 Greenwood v. Atkinson, 5 Sim. 419: see ' Knight ?\ Knight, 3 P. Wins. 333: St»ry, 
 also Green r. Poole, 5 Bro. P. C. Ed. Toml. F.q. PI. § 173, el set/. ; see Cosby v. Wickliffe, 
 504. 7 B. Mon. 120; Galton v. Hancock. 2 Atk. 434. 
 
 3 Lesquire r. Lesquire, Rep. t. Finch, 134; » Knight v. Knight, 3 P. Wms. 333; and 
 see also Wilkinson v. Fowkes, 9 Hare, 193. see Bressenden v. Decreets, 2 Ch. Cas. 197. 
 
 •> Madox v. Jackson, 3 Atk. 406. 2 Plunket v. Penson, 2 Atk. 51 ; Story, Eq 
 
 6 Galton p. Hancock, 2 Atk. 434. PL § 91; see ante, p. 252. 
 
 6 Knight v. Knight, 3 1'. Wins. 333. 8 D'Aranda v. Whittingham, Mos. 84. 
 
 L'77
 
 284 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 tative is an unnecessary party: thus, in the case of a bill filed by a 
 mortgagee against the heir of a mortgagor, to foreclose, the executor of 
 the mortgagor is an unnecessary party, because in such a case the mort- 
 gagee has a right to the land pledged, and is not in any way bound to 
 intermeddle with the personal estate, or to run into an account thereof; 
 and if the heir would have the benefit of any payment made by the 
 mortgagor or his executor, he must prove it. 4 And it makes no differ- 
 ence if the mortgage be by demise for a term of years, provided the 
 mortgagor was seized in fee : in such case the executor is an unnecessary 
 party, and if made one, the bill, as against him, will be dismissed with 
 costs. 5 And where a term of a thousand years had been granted, but 
 conditioned to sink and be extinguished upon payment of an annuity 
 for forty-two years, and at the expiration of the time a bill was brought 
 by the heir of the grantor for a surrender of the residue of the term, it 
 was held that the personal representative of the grantor need not be a 
 party. 6 (a) 
 
 Where, however, the mortgagee mixes together his characters 
 *284 of * mortgagee and general creditor, and seeks relief beyond that 
 to which his position of mortgagee by itself would strictly entitle 
 him, then the personal representative of the mortgagor must be a party 
 to the bill, and there must be an account of the personal estate. The 
 doubt which formerly existed whether, when the mortgaged estate is 
 insufficient to satisfy the amount charged upon it, and the personalty 
 is also inadequate to pay all the debts, the mortgagee was entitled to 
 prove against the personalty for the whole of his debt, or only for the 
 residue, after deducting what he has received from his security, 1 has 
 
 4 Duncombe v. Hansley, 3 P. Wins. 333, n.; 
 Fell v. Brown, 2 Bro. C. C. 279; Story, Eq. PI. 
 §§ 196, 200; Gary r. May, 16 Ohio, 66; High 
 v. Batte, 10 Yerg. 188; Edwards r. Edwards, 
 5 Heisk. 123; Harris v. Vaughn, 2 Tenn. Ch. 
 48-1. 
 
 6 Bradshaw v. Outran*, 13 Ves. 234. If 
 the mortgage was of a chattel interest, of 
 course the executor, and not the heir, would 
 
 (a) See Law*. Philby, 56 L. T. 230, 522; 
 Ridings v. -Johnson, 128 U. S. 212; Mendenhall 
 v. Hall, 134 U. S. 559; Avegno v. Schmidt, 113 
 U.S. 293; Shields v. Shiff, 124 U. S. 351; 
 Mercantile Trust Co. v. Missouri &c. Ry. Co. 
 41 Fed. Rep. 8; Hays i\ Humphreys, 37 id. 
 283; Coffin v. Chattanooga W. & P. Co. 44 id. 
 533; Stanley r. Mather, 31 id. 860; Middle- 
 town S. Bank v. Bacharach, 46 Conn. 513; 
 Bayly v. Muehe, 65 Cal. 345; Rcnshaw r. 
 Taylor, 7 Oregon, 315; Van Schaak r. Saun- 
 ders, 32 Hun, 515. When an absolute convey- 
 ance is foreclosed as a mortgage, the proper 
 parties are usually the grantor and grantee 
 and their privies; but a subsequent purchaser 
 at a sale for unpaid taxes may also be made 
 defendant. Lyon v. Powell, 78 Ala. 351. When 
 the estate is liable on the mortgage note for 
 
 278 
 
 be the proper party; and if freehold and lease- 
 hold estates are both comprised in the same 
 mortgage, both the heir and the executor will 
 be necessary parties to a bill of foreclosure. 
 Robins?-. Hodgson, Rolls, 15 Feb., 1794. 
 
 o Baniprield v. Vaughan, Rep. temp. Finch, 
 104. 
 
 i Mason v. Bogg, 2 M. & C. 443; 1 Jur. 330; 
 Greenwood v. Taylor, 1 R. & M. 185; Green- 
 
 a deficiency, after exhausting the mortgaged 
 property, the administrator of the deceased 
 mortgagor is a proper party to a suit for fore- 
 closure. Hodgdon v. Heidman, 68 Iowa, 645. 
 See Munn v. Marsh, 38 N. J. Eq. 410; Love- 
 ring v. King, 97 Ind. 130; Aylward r. Lewis, 
 [1891] 2 Ch. 81; Hill v. Townley, 45 Minn 
 167; United Security Life Ins. Co. v. Vandegrift 
 (N. J.). 26 Atl. Rep 985. The administrator 
 of a deceased heir-at-law of the deceased mort- 
 gagor is not a proper party to a foreclosure suit. 
 Trapier v. Waldo, 16 S. C. 276. An assignee 
 of a prior mechanic's lien is a necessary party. 
 Atkins v. Volmer, 21 Fed. Rep. 697. An ad- 
 ministrator is not a necessary party to a bill 
 filed by an attorney to enforce a specific lien 
 on land for professional services. McCamy v. 
 Key, 3 Lea (Tenn.), 247.
 
 PERSONS RESISTING PLAINTIFF S DEMANDS. 
 
 285 
 
 now been removed by the decision of Lord Cottenham, in Mason v. 
 Bogy,* where it was determined that a mortgagee may prove for the 
 whole debt, and then realize his security, and afterwards take a dividend 
 on the whole debt; provided, of course, that the amount of the dividend 
 is not more than the unpaid balance. 3 In suits of this description, the 
 Court will decree a sale of the estate, 4 and not a foreclosure, which is 
 the relief to which a mortgagee is ordinarily entitled upon a bill 
 filed by him, without * reference to his rights as a general credi- *285 
 tor. 1 Where the bill is filed to redeem a mortgage against the 
 
 wood r. Firth, 2 Hare, 241, n. ; Tipping v. 
 Power, 1 Hare, 405; Dexter v. Arnold, 1 Sum- 
 ner, 109 ; Marshall v. McAravey, 3 Dr. & 
 "War. 232 ; Mersey Steel Co. V. Naylor, 9 
 Q. B. 1). 662. A mortgagee, who has entered 
 for condition broken, may have an action on the 
 bond, and he will recover the difference be- 
 tween the value of the land and the amount 
 of the principal and interest on the bond. 
 Anion- v. Fairbanks, 3 Mass. 562; Newall r. 
 Wright, 3 Mass. 150; 4 Kent (11th ed.), 184; 
 Tooke p. Hartley, 2 Bro. C. C (Perkins's ed.) 
 120. 127, and notes; Perry v. Barker, 8 Sum- 
 ner's Ves. 527, Perkins's note (it), and cases 
 cited; Hatch v. White, 2 Gall. 152; Globe 
 Ins. Co. v. Lansing, 5 Cowen, 380, Omaly 
 t\ Owen, 3 Mason, 474; Lansing v. Goelet, 9 
 Cowen, 346; Lowell v. Leland, 3 Vt. 5S1 ; 
 Callum v. Emanuel, 1 Ala. N. S. 23. The 
 value of the land may be ascertained either 
 by a sale, or by estimate, and proof of the 
 value of the property mortgaged. See 4 Kent 
 (11th ed), 182; Tooke v. Hartley, 2 Bro. C. 
 C. (Perkins's ed.) 126, 127, and notes; Hodge 
 o. Holmes, 10 Pick. 380, 381; Amory v. 
 Fairbanks, 3 Mass. 562; Newall v. Wright, 
 3 Mass. 150; Briggs V. Richmond, 10 Pick. 
 396, West v. Chamberlain, 8 Pick. 336; Hart 
 P. Ten Eyck, 2 John. Ch 62; Wiley v. Angel, 
 1 Clarke, 217; Suffern v. Johnson, 1 Paige, 
 450; Downing v. Palmateer, 1 Monroe, 66; 
 M'Gee v. Davie, 4 J. J. Marsh 70; Bank of 
 Ogdensburg v. Arnold, 5 Paige. 38. 
 
 2 2 M. & C. 443; 1 Jur. 330; Armstrong 
 V. Storer, 14 Beav. 535, 538; Tuckley v. 
 Thompson, 1 J. & H. 126, 130; Rhodes r. 
 Moxhay, 10 W. R. 103, V. C. S.; Dighton 
 v. Withers, 31 Beav. 423; Kellock's case, 
 L. R. 3 Ch. 769. The former rule was abol- 
 ished as to persons dying after Nov. 1, 1875, 
 by 38 & •:'.) Vic c 77, § 10. See 2 Seton, 826. 
 
 8 The rule is settled otherwise in Massa- 
 chusetts, where it is held that the mortgagee 
 could not prove for his whole debt and yet 
 retain his mortgage, and that if he does prove 
 his whole debt, and accept a dividend on his 
 whole debt, he thereby waives his mortgage. 
 Amory v. Francis, 16 Mass. 308; Hooker v. 
 Ohnstead, Pick. 481; Towle v. Bannister, 
 16 Pick. 255; Middlesex Bank v. Minot, 4 
 
 Met. 325; Farnum v. Boutelle, 13 Met. 159. 
 If the mortgagee elects to retain his security, 
 its value must be ascertained and deducted, 
 and he can only prove the remainder. Haver- 
 hill Loan Fund Association v. Cronin, 4 Allen, 
 141, 144. So in Tennessee the mortgagee is 
 entitled to his security and to a pro rata 
 division with other creditors for the balance 
 of debt. Fields v. Wheatley, 1 Sneed, 351. 
 
 4 Daniell p. Skip with, 2 Bro. C. C. 155; see 
 also Christophers v. Sparke, 2 J. & W. 223, 229; 
 King v. Smith, 2 Hare, 239, 242; 7 Jur. 694; 
 2 Seton, 824, No. 4, 825, et seq.; 2 Story, 
 Eq. Jur. §§ 1025-1027. It is not a matter of 
 course, on a bill for foreclosure a d sale, to 
 order the whole of the mortgaged premises to 
 be sold. Under certain circumstances no more 
 will be sold than enough to pay the debt and 
 costs. Delabigarre v. Bush, 2 John. 490; Suf- 
 fern v. Johnson, 1 Paige, 450; Brinkerhoff v. 
 Thalhimer, 2 John. Ch. 486. And see, as to 
 sale when the debt is payable by instalments, 
 or only the interest in arrears, Howell v. West- 
 ern R. Co. 94 U. S. 466; Cod wise v. Taylor, 
 4 Sneed, 346 ; Grattan v. Wiggins, 23 Cal. 16; 
 Mott O. Shreve, 25 N. J. Eq. 438; Cox r. 
 Wheeler, 7 Paige, 248; Huffard v. Gottberg, 
 54 Mo. 271; Olcott v. Bynum, 17 Wall. 45; 
 McLean v. Presley, 56 Ala. 211. The premises 
 may be sold, either together or in parcels, as 
 will be best calculated to produce the highest 
 sum. Suffern i\ Johnson, 1 Paige, 450; Camp- 
 bell v. Macomb, 4 John. Ch. 534. 
 
 1 The cases in which a mortgagee may 
 have a sale instead of a foreclosure, are, — 
 1, where the estate is deficient to pay the 
 incumbrance; 2, where the mortgage is of a 
 dry reversion; 3, where the mortgagee dies 
 and the equity of redemption descends upon 
 an infant ; 4, where the mortgage is of an 
 advowson; 5, where the mortgagor becomes 
 a bankrupt; and 6, where a mortgage is of 
 an estate in Ireland. See 2 Story, Eq. Jur. 
 § 1026. It was enacted by 15 & 16 Vic c. 86, 
 § 48, that "it shall be lawful for the Court 
 in any suit for the foreclosure of the equity 
 of redemption in any mortgaged property, 
 upon the request of the mortgagee, or of 
 any subsequent incumbrancer, or of the 
 mortgagor, or any person claiming under 
 
 279
 
 * 286 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 heir of a mortgagee, 2 the personal representative must also be made 
 a party to the suit, 3 because, although the mortgagee upon paying the 
 principal money and interest has a right to a reconveyance from the 
 heir, yet the heir is not entitled to receive the money; and if it were 
 paid to him, the personal representative would have a right to sue him 
 for it. 4 
 
 Where a man contracts for the purchase of an estate, and dies 
 intestate as to the estate contracted for, before the completion of the 
 contract, the vendor has a right to file a bill against his personal repre- 
 sentative for payment of the purchase-money; but if he does, he must 
 make the heir-at-law a party, because the heir is the person entitled to 
 the estate. For the same reason, where the vendee, after the cause was 
 at issue, died, having devised the estate which was the subject of the 
 suit to infant children, and the plaintiff revived against the personal 
 representatives only, it was held that the infant devisees were neces- 
 sary parties, and the suit was ordered to stand over, in order that they 
 might be brought before the Court. 5 And upon the same principle, if a 
 vendor were to file a bill against the heir or devisee, the heir or devisee 
 would have a right to insist upon the personal representative being 
 brought before the Court, when the purchase-money is, in the first 
 instance, payable out of the personal estate. 6 But where a bill stated 
 that an estate, purchased in the defendant's name, was so purchased in 
 trust for the plaintiff's ancestor who paid the purchase-money, 
 
 * 28G and prayed a reconveyance, * a demurrer, on the ground that the 
 
 executor of the ancestor was not a party, was overruled; because, 
 the purchase-money having been paid, it was quite clear that no decree 
 could have been made against the personal representative. 1 
 
 Upon the same principle, formerly, the Courts in the case of sureties, 
 and of joint obligors in a bond, compelled all who were bound, or 
 their representatives, to be before the Court, in order to avoid the 
 multiplicity of suits which would be occasioned if one or more were to 
 
 them respectively, to direct a sale (see Hurst can v. Wickliffe, 4 Scam. 452; See House v. 
 
 r. Hurst, 16 Beav. 372; Wayn v. Lewis, 1 Dm. Dexter, 9 Mich. 246. 
 
 487) of such property, instead of a foreclosure 6 See Story, Eq. PI § 177: Cocke v. Evans, 
 
 of such equity of redemption, on such terms 9 Yerger, 287. Upon a bill for the rescission 
 
 as the Court mav think fit to direct, and if the of a contract for land, for defect of title in the 
 
 Court should so think fit, without previously vendor, the heirs of the vendee must be made 
 
 determining the priorities of incumbrances, or parties. Huston v. Noble, 4 J. J. Marsh. 136; 
 
 giving the usual or any time to redeem." see Harding v. Handy, 11 Wheat. 104. 
 
 2 As to those dying after Dec. 31, 1881, see * Astley v. Fountain, Rep. temp. Finch, 4. 
 44 & 45 Vic. c. 41,"§§ 1 (1), 25 (2), 30,34. See Roberts v. Marchant, 1 Hare, 547; 1 Phil- 
 
 3 Dexter v. Arnold, 1 Sumner, 109; Hilton 370. As to those dying after Dec. 31, 1881, see 44 
 v. Lothrop, 46 Maine, 297, 299. & 45 Vic. c. 41. The vendor becomes a trustee 
 
 4 Ante, p. 193. ioT the purchaser on the hitter's acceptance of 
 
 5 Townsend v. Champernowne, 9 Price, 130; title. Lysaght v. Edwards, 2 Ch. D. 499 ; He 
 see Cox v. Sprode, 2 Bibb, 376 ; Fisher v. Kay, Thomas, 34 Ch. D. 166. As to the property out of 
 2 Bibb, 434; Huston v. M'Clarty, 3 Litt. 274; which urpaid purchase money is payable, and 
 Morgan v. Morgan, 2 Wheat. 90; Story, Eq. as to vendor's lien, see Mackreth v. Symmons, 
 PI. §§ 160, 177; Champion v. Brown, 6 John. 1 W. & T. L. C. and notes; 17 & 18 Xw. c. 
 Ch. 402. To a bill to enforce specific perform- 113 ; Hood v. Hood. 5 W. R. 747 ; 3 Jur. X. S. 
 anceof a contract for the sale of land made by 684; Solomon v. Solomon. 12 W. R. 540; 10 
 a person who has deceased, all the heirs of such Jur. X. S 331 : 30 & 31 Vic. c. 69 ; Re \\ orms- 
 deceased person should be made parties. Dun- ley, 4 Ch. D. 065; 40 & 41 Vic. c. 34. 
 
 280
 
 OF OBJECTIONS FOR WANT OF PARTIES. 
 
 *28^ 
 
 be sued without the others, and left to seek contribution from their 
 co-sureties, or co-obligors in other proceedings; but we have seen that, 
 in this respect, the 32d Order of August, 1841, has altered the 
 practice. 2 
 
 Section III. — Of Objections for want of Parties. 
 
 Having endeavored in the preceding sections of this chapter to point 
 out who ought to be made parties to a suit, the next step is to show 
 in what manner any defect arising from the omission of proper parties, 
 or the joinder of improper parties, can be remedied or taken advan- 
 tage of. 3 
 
 No persons are considered as parties to a suit, except the plaintiffs 
 and persons against whom the bill prays either the writ of subpceha, or 
 that upon being served with a copy of the bill they may be bound by 
 the proceedings in the cause; 4 but the mere naming a person as a 
 defendant does not make him a party. 5 
 
 * A defect of parties in a suit may be taken advantage of either * 287 
 by demurrer, plea, answer, 1 or at the hearing. 2 (a) 
 
 2 See ante, p. 267 ; Gen. Ord. VII. 2. 
 
 8 See ante, p. 280, note 4. 
 
 4 Story, Eq. PI. § 44; Walker v. Hallett, 1 
 Ala. 379; Lucas v. Bank of Darien, 2 Stewart, 
 280; Lylew. Bradford, 7 Monroe, 113; Huston 
 r. M'Clarty, 3 Litt. 274; De Wolf v. Mallett, 3 
 Dana, 214; Taylor v. Bate, 4 Monroe, 267. In 
 New York parties may be treated as defendants, 
 by a clear statement in the bill to that effect, 
 without praying the subpoena. The reason given 
 is that, in that State, the subpoena is issued of 
 course, and that a formal prayer is unnecessary 
 to entitle the plaintiff to process. Brasher v. 
 Cortlandt, 2 John. Ch. 245; Elmendorf v. De- 
 lancy, 1 Hopk. 555; Verplanck v. Mercant. 
 Ins. Co. 2 Paige, 438. But unless the plaintiff, 
 either in the prayer for process or by allegation 
 in the bill, designates those who are made de- 
 fendants, the omission is fatal, Elmendorf v. 
 Delancy, 1 Hopk. 555; and they only are par- 
 ties defendant against whom process is prayed, 
 or who are specifically named and described as 
 defendants. Talmage v. Pell, 9 Paige, 410; 
 Lucas v. Bank of Darien, 2 Stewart, 280; Green 
 v. McKenney, 6 J. J. Marsh. 193; Moore v. 
 Anderson, 1 Ired. Ch. 411; Harris v. Carter, 3 
 Stewart, 233. Where a minor, a necessary 
 part}', was not named in the bill, he cannot be 
 considered, a defendant, although an answer is 
 filed for him by his guardian ad litem. Dixon 
 v. Donaldson, 6 J. J. Marsh. 575. 
 
 (a) See post, p. 559, notes. A misjoinder of 
 parties, not appearing on the face of a petition 
 or complaint, cannot be raised by a general 
 demurrer to the evidence. Crenshaw v. Ullman 
 (Mo.), 20 S. W. Rep. 1077. In England, any 
 
 s Windsor p. Windsor, 2 Dick. 707; Carey 
 v. Hillhouse, 5 Ga. 251; Cassiday v McDaniel, 
 8 B. Mon. 519. To make him such, process 
 must be issued and served upon him. Bond v. 
 Hendricks, 1 A. Iv. Marsh. 594; Whiter. Park, 
 5 J. J. Marsh. 603; Estill v. Clay, 2 A. K. 
 Marsh. 497; Huston V. M'Clarty, 3 Litt. 274; 
 Archibald v. Means, 5 Ired. Eq. 230. Nor is a 
 person made a party by the bill asking that he 
 be made a defendant in a future contingency. 
 Doherty i\ Stevenson, 1 Tenn. Ch. 518; infra, 
 390, n.3. 
 
 i See Clark v. Long, 4 Rand. 451; Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 236. Where the defect of want of 
 parties is formal, or technical merely, the ob- 
 jection must be made by demurrer, plea, or 
 answer. Post let hwaite v. Howes, 3 Clarke 
 (Iowa), 365; Storj- v. Livingston, 13 Peters, 
 359; Sayles v. Tibbitts, 5 R. I. 79; Kean r. 
 Johnson' 9 N. J. Eq. 401; Smith v. Mitchell, 6 
 Ga. 458. So where a party omits to object, 
 either by demurrer, plea, or answer, for want of 
 parties who are only necessary to protect him- 
 self, the Court may refuse to sustain the objec- 
 tion at the hearing. Dias v. Bouchard, 10 
 Paige, 445; Lorillard v. Coster, 5 Paige, 172; 
 Lainhart v. Reilly, 3 Desaus. 570; Gilbert /•. 
 Sutliff, 3 Ohio St. 129; Cutler v. Tuttle, 19 ST. 
 J. Eq. 549, 556. 
 
 - When it is manifest that a decree will have 
 the effect of depriving third parties of their 
 
 defendant may now apply to have necessary 
 paities added. See Werdermann v. Societe* 
 Generate d' Electricity 19 Ch. D. 246; 30 W. R. 
 33; Sheehan v. Great Eastern Ry. Co. 16 Ch. 
 D. 59; Abouloff v. Oppenheimer," 10 Q. B. D 
 281
 
 287 
 
 OP PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 Whenever the deficiency of parties appears on the face of a bill, the 
 
 legal rights, it is incumbent on the Court to 
 notice the fact at the hearing, and cause them 
 to be brought in ; and the proper course, in such 
 case, is to order the cause to stand over to en- 
 able the plaintiff to bring such necessary par- 
 ties before the Court. Shaver v. Brainard, 29 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 25; Clark v. Long, 4 Rand. 401; 
 Hussey v. Dole, 24 Maine, 20; Cannon v. 
 Norton, 14 Vt. 178; Miller v. M'Crea, 7 Paige, 
 452; Felch v. Hooper, 20 Maine, 159; Nash v. 
 Smith, 6 Conn. 421; Bugbee V. Sargent, 23 
 Maine, 269; Lord v. Underdunck, 1 Sandf. Ch. 
 146; Postlethwaite v. Howes, 3 Clarke (Iowa), 
 365; Prentice v. Kimball, 19 111. 320; Morse v. 
 Machias Water Power Co. 42 Maine, 119 ; Per 
 Wayne J. in Lewis v. Darling, 16 How. U. S. 
 1, 8, 9; Winnipiseogee Lake Co. V. Worster, 29 
 N. H. 433; Miller v. Whittier, 33 Maine, 521; 
 Davis v. Rogers, 33 Maine, 222; Webber v. Tay- 
 lor, 5 Jones, Eq. (N. C.) 36 ; Hoe v. Wilson, 9 
 Wall. 501; Woodward v. Wood, 19 Ala. 213. 
 See Simms v. Richardson, 32 Ark. 297. 
 
 This course will be adopted where it is found 
 that an effectual decree cannot be made, bind- 
 ing upon all persons in interest, for want of 
 proper parties, although the objection has not 
 been raised by either party. O'Brien v. Heeney, 
 2 Edw. Ch. 242; Herrington v. Hubbard, 1 
 Scam. 569; McMaken v. McMaken, 18 Ala. 
 576; Goodman v. Barbour, 16 Ala. 625; Boor- 
 aem v. Wells, 19 N. J. Eq. 87, 95; Brown v. 
 Johnson, 53 Maine, 251; Beals v. Cobb, 51 
 Maine, 348, 351; Pierce v. Faunce, 47 Maine, 
 507, 513; Hoe v. Wilson, ubi supra. A bill 
 should not be dismissed for want of necessary 
 parties, as they can either come in voluntarily, 
 
 295; post, p. 293. But a person cannot be 
 added as a plaintiff without his consent in writ- 
 ing, even though he is indemnified against costs. 
 Tryon v. National Provident Inst. 16 Q. B. D. 
 678. 
 
 In general, a third person cannot be made 
 a defendant on his own application to a bill 
 which seeks relief in personam, or maintain a 
 petition to require the plaintiff to join him as 
 co-plaintiff. Drake v. Goodridge, 6 Blatch. 152 ; 
 Coleman V.Martin, id. 119; Comfort v. McTeer, 
 7 Lea, 652; see Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 
 276. Upon a creditors' bill, which is to some 
 extent in rem, a creditor may be admitted as a 
 party by order of Court on his own application, 
 and, being so admitted, he has such a right of 
 control over the suit, that, as to him, and with- 
 out his consent, the original plaintiff cannot 
 dismiss it. Piedmont tS:e. Ins. Co. v. Maury, 
 75 Va. 508: Taylor v. Webb, 54 Miss. 36. It 
 has, however, been held that an interested per- 
 son, who is not joined, may be made a party 
 by amendment on his own motion or petition. 
 
 282 
 
 or may be summoned in. Potter v. Holden, 31 
 Conn. 385; Thomas v. Adams, 30 111. 37. But 
 if after objection is made for want of necessary 
 parties, the plaintiff neglects or refuses to bring 
 them before the Court, the bill will be dismissed. 
 Singleton v. Gayle, 8 Porter, 270; Hunt v. 
 Wickliffe, 2 Porter, 201; BaileY v. Myrick, 36 
 Maine, 50, 54; see Mass. St. 1802, c. 218, § 9. 
 But sucli dismissal should be without prejudice. 
 Huston v. M'Clarty, 3 Litt. 274; Royce v. Tar- 
 rant, 6 J. J. Marsh. 567; Caldwell v. Hawkins, 
 1 Litt. 212; Hack with v. Damron, 1 Monroe, 
 239; Van Epps v. Van Deusen, 4 Paige, 64; 
 Payne v. Richardson, 7 J. J. Marsh. 240; Har- 
 ris v. Carter, 3 Stewart, 233. So a bill must 
 be dismissed, when persons, who are necessary 
 parties, refuse to appear, and the Court has no 
 power to reach them by its process, and com- 
 pel them to become parties: Picquet v. Swan, 
 5 Mason, 561: but without prejudice. Ibid.; 
 ante, p. 149, n. 1. 
 
 A motion to be admitted as a defendant to a 
 suit is irregular. Harrison v. Morton, 4 Hen. 
 &M. 483; Morris v. Barclay, 2 J. J. Marsh. 
 374; Smith v. Britton, 2 P. & H. (Va.) 124; 
 Phillips v. Wesson, 16 Ga. 137. 
 
 No such practice is known in Equity as 
 making a person a defendant to a suit upon his 
 own application, over the objection of the com- 
 plainant. Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 145; 
 Coleman v. Martin, 6 Blatchf. 119; Drake v. 
 Goodrich, 6 Blatch 151; Stretch v. Stretch, 2 
 Tenn. Ch. 140; Carow v. Mowatt, 1 Edw. Ch. 
 9; Searles v. Jacksonville R. Co. 2 Woods, 
 621 : Anderson v. Jacksonville, R Co. 2 Woods, 
 628. But a person may be made a party de- 
 
 Scott v. Mansfield &c. R. Co. 2 Flippin, 15; 
 Neale v. Utz, 75 Va. 480. But the assignee of 
 an insolvent defendant corporation, which lias 
 been dissolved, cannot without the plaintiff's 
 consent, petition to become a defendant for the 
 sole purpose of having an injunction dissolved; 
 his proper course being to obtain a rule by 
 motion or petition, to have the injunction dis- 
 solved unless the plaintiff shall revive the suit 
 against the assignee within a certain time. 
 Chester v. Life Ass. 4 Fed. Rep. 557. A third 
 person, who has no privity with the plaintiff, is 
 not entitled to intervene because of a contin- 
 gent liability to answer over to the defendant. 
 Omaha S. Ry. Co. v. Beeson (Neb.), 54 N. W. 
 Rep. 557. Leave of Court is always necessary 
 to entitle third persons to intervene. Fowler v. 
 Lewis, 30 W. Va. 112; Smith v. Gale, 144 U. S. 
 509. A suit in Equity does not lie to compel 
 another to bring a suit, Att.-Gen. v. Dorking 
 Guardians, 20 Ch. D. 595; Charles v. Finchley 
 Local Board, 23 Ch. D. 767 ; or for a third per- 
 son's use. Kelhim v. Saver, 30 W. Va. 198.
 
 OF OBJECTIONS FOR WANT OF PARTIES. 
 
 *288 
 
 want of proper parties is a cause of demurrer. 8 There appears to be 
 some doubt whether a demurrer of this nature can be partial, and 
 whether it must not extend to the whole bill. In East India Company 
 v. Coles* Lord Thurlow was inclined to think that there could not 
 be a partial demurrer * for want of parties ; but upon Mr. * 288 
 Mitford mentioning some cases, 1 wherein such partial demurrers 
 had been allowed, the case was ordered to stand over to the next day of 
 demurrers: in the mean time, however, the plaintiff's counsel, thinking 
 it better for his client, amended the bill. 
 
 If a sufficient reason for not bringing a necessary party before the 
 Court is suggested by the bill, 2 — as, if the bill seeks a discovery of the 
 persons interested in the matter in question, for the purpose of making 
 them parties, and charges that they are unknown to the plaintiff, — a 
 demurrer for want of the necessary parties will not hold. 3 Upon the 
 same principle, where it was stated in a bill that the defendant, who 
 was next of kin of an intestate, had refused to take out letters of 
 administration, and that the plaintiff had applied to the Prerogative 
 Court for administration, but having been opposed by the defendant, 
 was denied administration, because he could not prove that the intestate 
 had left bona notabilia ; and that he had afterwards applied to the 
 Consistory Court of Bath and Wells, where he likewise failed, because 
 he could not prove that the intestate had died in the diocese ; and that 
 
 fendant by express consent of the plaintiff. 
 St ( ele w.Taylor, 1 Minn. 274; Hergel » Lajten- 
 berger, 2 Tenn. Ch. 251. It has been done 
 where no objection was made. Galveston R. 
 Co. v. Cowdrey, 11 Wall. 459, 464; Banks v. 
 Banks, 2 Cold w. 548; Wileon v. I'.ihYr, 7 Coldw. 
 33; Myers v. Fenn, 5 Wall. 205. And it has 
 been suggested that where a corporation will 
 not resist a legal demand, the stockholders may 
 be permitted to come in and defend by answer; 
 but it is added, ''The remedy is an extreme 
 one, and should be admitted by the Court with 
 hesitation and caution." Bronson v. La Crosse 
 R. Co. 2 Wall. 302. Where the bill is filed by 
 some of a class for themselves and all others of 
 that class, it is of course to allow the latter to 
 intervene by petition: Ogilvie v. Knox Ins. Co. 
 2 Black, 539; S. C. 22 How. 380; Carter v. 
 New Orleans, 19 Fed. Rep. 659; but with 
 proper restrictions: Forbes v. Memphis &c. R. 
 Co. 2 Woods, 323. And when they are thus 
 made parties, they have the right of appeal. 
 Ex parte Jordan, 94 U. S. 248. In New Jersey, 
 by statute, a person may be made defendant in 
 certain cases by petition. Rev. Ch. § 41, Con- 
 rad v. Mullison, 24 N. J. Eq. 65; Hewitt v. 
 Montclair, 25 id. 100; S. C. 27 id. 479; Dodge 
 V. Fuller, 28 id. 578. See ante, p. 281, n. 8. and 
 infra, p. 1516, n. See also ante, p. 259, n. 1, as 
 to trustees and beneficiaries. 
 
 8 Mitchell v. Lenox, 2 Paige, 281; Robin- 
 son v. Smith, 3 Paige, 222; Crane v. Deming, 
 7 Conn. 387; Story, Eq. PI. § 541; White v. 
 
 Curtis, 2 Gray, 472; Neely v. Anderson, 2 
 Stmbh. Eq. 262. And in such case, if the 
 detect is merely formal the objection should 
 be taken by demurrer. Chapman r. Hamilton, 
 
 19 Ala. 121; Allen v. Turner, 11 Gray, 436; 
 Schwoerer r. Boylston Market Association, 99 
 Mass. 295. 
 
 4 3 Swanst. 142, n. ; see also Lumsden v. 
 Fraser, 1 M. & C. 589, 602. 
 
 1 Astley i'. Fountain, Finch, 4; Attwood v. 
 Hawkins, Finch, 113; Bressenden v. Decreets, 
 2Ch. Cas. 197; Hamp v. Robinson. 3 De G. 
 J. & S. 109; Rowsell V. Morris, L. R. 17 Eq. 
 
 20 M. R. 
 
 - In White V. Curtis, 2 Gray, 467, it was 
 held that the omission to join, as a defendant 
 in a bill, the administrator of fine whose death 
 is alleged in the bill, cannot be taken advan- 
 tage of by demurrer, when it does not appear 
 by the bill that there is any such administrator. 
 It does not appear to have been regarded, in 
 this case, as necessary, that any reason should 
 be stated why the administrator was not ap- 
 pointed. But the Court stated that the neces- 
 sity or propriety of introducing the administrator 
 was not apparent from the averments in the 
 bill. 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 180; Towle v. Pierce, 12 Me!. 
 328; see Gilman v. Cairnes, 1 Breese, 124; Coe 
 r. Beckwith. 31 Barb. 339; Davis r Hooper, 33 
 Miss. 173; De Wolf v. De Wolf, 4 R. I. 450; 
 Bailey v. Morgan, 13 Texas, 342. 
 
 283
 
 * 289 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 the defendant had refused to discover where the intestate had died; a 
 demurrer for want of proper parties, because the personal representa- 
 tive of the intestate was not before the Court, was overruled. 4 
 
 A demurrer for want of parties must show who are the proper par- 
 ties; not indeed by name, for that might be impossible; 5 but in such a 
 manner as to point out to the plaintiff the objection to his bill, so as to 
 enable him to amend by adding the necessary persons. 6 Some doubt 
 has been thrown upon the correctness of this rule by the case of 
 *289 Pyle v. Price, 1 where Lord Eldon said "that * beside the objec- 
 tion which had been mentioned at the bar, to the rule which 
 required the party to be stated, it might appear that the plaintiff knows 
 the party," and then observed, "Perhaps there is not a general rule 
 either way." But this observation appears not to shake the rule as to 
 the necessity of pointing out who the necessary party is, but merely 
 to refer to the observation made at the bar, that there was no rule 
 requiring a demurrer to state the parties, that is, hy name, as it might 
 be out of the power of the defendant to do so; and not to refer to the 
 necessity of calling the plaintiff's attention to the description or char- 
 acter of the party required, in order to enable him to amend his bill, 
 without putting him to the expense of bringing his demurrer on for 
 argument, which he might otherwise be obliged to do, in order to ascer- 
 tain who the party required by the defendant is. 
 
 Where a demurrer for want of parties is allowed, the cause is not 
 considered so much out of Court but that the plaintiff may afterwards 
 have leave to amend, by bringing the necessary parties before the 
 Court. 1 And where the addition of the party would render the bill 
 multifarious, the plaintiff will be allowed to amend generally. 2 And 
 where the demurrer has been ore tenus, such leave will be granted to 
 him without his paying the costs of the demurrer; though, if he seeks, 
 under such circumstances, to amend more extensively than by merely 
 adding parties, he must pay the defendant the cost of the demurrer. 3 
 
 Upon the allowance, however, of a demurrer for want of parties, the 
 plaintiff is not entitled as of course to an order for leave to amend. 
 When it is said that a bill is never dismissed for want of parties, 4 noth- 
 
 •» rVAranda v. Whittingham, Mos. 84. tion of Poole, 4 M. & C. 17, 32; 2 Jur. 034, 
 
 5 Tourton v. Flower, 3 P. Wms. 3GU ; Cham- 1080; Kendall v. Hamilton, -4 App. Cas. 504, 
 bers r. Wright, 52 Ala. 444. 515, 54:2. 
 
 6 Ld. Keel. 181; Att.-Gen. v. Jackson, 11 * Brcssenden v. Decreets, 2 Ch. Cas. 197; 
 Ves. 309; Lund ». Blanshard, 4 Hare, 23; and see also Lloyd v. Loaring, G Ves. 773; Story, 
 see Pratt ». Keith, 10 Jur. N. S. 305; 12 W. It. Eq. PI. § 543, and note, in which is a form of 
 394, V. C. K., where the defendant was al- demurrer for want of necessary parties. Allen 
 lowed, by demurrer ore tenus, to specify the v. Turner, 11 Gray, 436. 
 
 parties. "Story, Eq. PI. § 541, and notes;* Mc- 2 Lumsden v. Eraser, 1 M. & C. 589, 602; 
 
 Elwain v. Willis, 3 Paige, 505; Lindley v. Att.-Gen. ». Merchant Tailors' Co. 1 M. & K. 
 
 Cravens, 2 Blackf. 426; Jamesons. Deshields, 189, 194. 
 
 3 Gratt. 4: Chapman v. Hamilton, 19 Ala. 121; 3 Newton v. Lord Egmont, 4 Sim. 585. 
 
 Hightower v. Mustian, 8 Ga. 506; Neely v. 4 But see ante, 287, note, to this point, and 
 
 Anderson, 2 Strobh. Eq. 202; see Harrison v. Nash v. Smith, 6 Conn. 422. The bill is some- 
 
 Rowan, 4 Wash C. C. 202; Arundell v. Black- times dismissed for want of proper parties, but 
 
 well. Dev. Eq. 354; Greenleaf v. Queen, 1 without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to 
 
 Peters. 138. bring a new suit. Miller v. M'Crea. 7 Paij^e, 
 
 1 6 Ves. 781: and see. Att.-Gen. v. Corpora- 452; Huston v. M'Clarty, 3 Litt. 274; Steele v. 
 284
 
 OF OBJECTIONS FOR WANT OF PARTIES. 
 
 290 
 
 ing more is meant than that a plaintiff, who would be entitled to relief 
 if proper parties were before the Court, shall not have his bill dismissed 
 for want of them, but shall have an opportunity afforded of bringing 
 them before the Court; 5 but if, at the hearing, the Court sees that the 
 plaintiff can have no relief under any circumstances, it is not bound to 
 let the cause stand over that the plaintiff may add parties to such a 
 record. 6 
 
 * If the defect of parties is not apparent upon the face of the * 290 
 bill, the defect may be brought before the Court by plea, which 
 must aver the matter necessary to show it. 1 A plea for want of proper 
 parties is a plea in bar, and goes to the whole bill, as well to the dis- 
 covery as to the relief, where relief is prayed; 2 though the want of 
 parties is no objection to a bill for discovery merely. 8 
 
 Where a sufficient reason to excuse the defect is suggested by the 
 bill, 4 as where a personal representative is a necessary party, and the 
 bill states that the representation is in contest in the Ecclesiastical 
 Court; 5 or where the party is resident out of the jurisdiction of the 
 Court, and the bill charges that fact; 6 or where the bill seeks a dis- 
 covery of the necessary parties, 7 a plea for want of parties will not, 
 any more than a demurrer for the same cause, be allowed, unless the 
 defendant controverts the excuse made by the bill, by pleading matter 
 to show it false. 8 Thus, in the first instance above put, if before the 
 tiling of the bill the contest in the Ecclesiastical Court had been deter- 
 mined, and administration granted, and the defendant had showed this 
 by his plea, the objection for want of parties would not in strictness 
 have been good. 
 
 Upon arguing a plea of this kind, the Court, instead of allowing it, 
 generally gives the plaintiff leave to amend the bill, upon payment of 
 
 Lewis, 1 Monroe, 49; Royse v. Tenant, 6 J. J. 
 Marsh. 567; Story, Eq. PI. § 541 ; post, 293- 
 295, note; ante, note to p. 287. 
 
 5 See Potter v. Holden, 31 Conn. 385 ; 
 Thomas v. Adams, 30 111. 37; ante, 287, no e. 
 
 6 Tvler v. Bell, 2 M. & C. 110; see Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 541, and note; Russell v. Clarke, 7 
 Craneh, 69, 90; Lund v. Blanshard, 4 Hare, 9, 
 23; 1 ('. 1'. Coop. temp. Cott.39; Lister v. Mea- 
 dowcroft, id. 372. 
 
 i I.d. Red. 280; Hamm v. Stevens, 1 Vera. 
 110; 2 Atk.51; Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige, 
 222; Story, Eq. PI. § 230; Gamble v. Johnson, 
 9 Mo. 605. 
 
 - Plunkett v. Penson, 2 Atk.51; Hamm v. 
 Stevens, 1 Vera. 110. 
 
 3 Sangosa v. East India Co. 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 
 171), i>l. 28. 
 
 4 Gil man v. Cairns, Breese, 124. 
 
 5 Plunkett V. Penson, 2 Atk. 51 ; Carey r. 
 Hoxey, 1 1 Ga. 045. But in order to make the 
 pendency of litigation, touching the represen- 
 tation <if a deceased party, a good excuse, the 
 Court must he fully advised of the nature and 
 condition of the litigation, by the allegations in 
 
 the bill or by proofs. Carey ». Hoxey, supra ; 
 see Martin v. McBryde, 3 lied. Ch. 531. 
 
 6 Cowslad v. Cely, Prec. Ch. 81; Darwent 
 r. Walton, 2 Atk. 510: Miliigan v. Milledge, 
 3 Craneh, 220; Martin v. McBryde, 3 [red. Ch. 
 531; Parkman v. Aicardi, 34 Ala. 393; Mallow 
 v. Ilinde, 12 Wheat. 193; Spivey v. Jenkins, 1 
 Ired. Ch. 126: Ashmead v. Colby, 26 Conn. 
 287; Carey v. Hoxey, 11 Ga. 645; West ». 
 Smith, s How. C S. 409; Erickson p.Nesmith, 
 46 N. H. 371; Story, Eq. PI. § 7S : Adams o. 
 Stevens, 49 Maine, 362; see Mdodie r. Ban- 
 nister, 17 Jur. 520, 19 Eng. Law & Eq. 81. 
 But the Court will not proceed to take an 
 account in the absence of a necessary party, 
 though he is out of the jurisdiction. Hogan v. 
 Walker, 14 How. U. S. 46; Wilson B. City 
 Bank, 3 Sumner, 422; Greene v. Sisson, 2 Cur- 
 tis ('. C. 170. 177: see Shields v. Barrow, 17 
 How. U. S. 130: Story, Eq. PL § 78; Towle v. 
 Pierce, 12 Met. 332; ante, 150, 151,216,217, 
 note; 260, note: Lawrence ». Pokes, 53 Maine, 
 110; Mudgett v. Gather, 52 Maine, 511. 
 
 7 Bowyer v. Covert, 1 Vein. 95. 
 
 8 Ld. Red. 281. 
 
 285
 
 * 291 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 costs : a liberty which he may also obtain after allowance of the plea, 
 according to the common course of the Court; for the suit is not deter- 
 mined by the allowance of a plea. 9 
 
 The defendant may also by his answer object that the bill is defective 
 for want of parties, in which case the plaintiff is now, under the 
 
 * 291 39th Order, 10 of August, 1841, within fourteen days after * answer 
 
 filed, at liberty to set down the cause for argument upon that 
 objection alone. If he does so, the objection is argued, the plaintiff 
 commencing. After the argument, the Court makes an order, declaring 
 its opinion upon the record as it then stands ; but the objection cannot 
 finally be disposed of until the hearing, because it is impossible at the 
 beginning of a cause to declare who will be necessary parties at the 
 end. 1 If, on the other hand, the plaintiff does not set down the cause 
 upon the objection for want of parties, he subjects himself to the 
 penalty, that he will not at the hearing be entitled, as of course, to an 
 order to amend by adding parties : he would still, however, be at liberty 
 to make out a special case for the exercise of the discretion of the Court 
 in his favor, and the Court would then have to decide whether his bill 
 should be dismissed for want of parties, or retained with liberty either 
 to amend, 2 or to file a supplemental bill for the purpose of bringing the 
 proper parties before the Court. The Order only allows fourteen days 
 after answer for the plaintiff to set down his cause upon the objection 
 for want of parties ; but the Vice Chancellor of England has decided 
 that this only means that the cause may be set down within this period 
 as a matter of course, but that afterwards the leave of the Court may be 
 obtained. 3 Previously to the Orders of 1841, when an objection for 
 want of parties was taken at the hearing, the rule with respect to costs 
 was, that if the objection for want of parties had been taken by the 
 defendant's answer, or if it arose upon a statement of the bill, then the 
 liberty to amend or file a supplemental bill was not given to the plain- 
 tiff, except upon the terms of his paying to the defendant the costs of 
 the day; but if the objection depended upon a fact within the defend- 
 
 9 T.d. R-d. 281; onte, p. 287, note; Harrison are now no longer so; and secondly, because 
 
 r. Rowan, 4 Wash. C. C. 202; Story, Eq. PI. the Court is now enabled to make a decree be- 
 
 §§ 885, 886, and note, in which is inserted the tween the parties before it, although there are 
 
 rules of the Supreme Court of the United States other parties not before it who are interested in 
 
 on the subject of amendments, adopted January the question to be determined. 15 & 1G Vic. 
 
 term 1842. c. 86, § 51; see also Cons. Ord. XXIII. 11; and 
 
 io This 39th Order is now abolished in Eng- see Meddowcroft v. Campbell, 13 Beav. 184; 
 
 land by the 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 4:5, whereby see also May v. Selby, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 235, 238; 
 
 the practice in existence before 18*41 is restored. 6 Jur. 52; Faulkner v. Daniel, 3 Hare, 199, 213; 
 
 See Moodie v. Bannister, 17 Jur. 520, V. C. K. Daubuz v. Peel, 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Gott. 365; 
 
 No costs are given where the defect arises from Maybery v. Brooking, 7 De G. M. & G. 673; 2 
 
 an event occurring after the cause is at issue. Jur. X. S. 76 ; Feltham v. Clark, 1 De G. & S. 
 
 See Fussell v. Elwin, 7 Hare, 29 ; 13 Jur. 333. 207. Assignees of a bankrupt were directed 
 
 For form of order on cause standing over with to be served with a copy of a decree made in 
 
 leave to amend on payment of costs of the their absence. Dorsett v. Dorsett, 8 Jur. N. S. 
 
 dav, see Seton, 1113, No. 1. Under the present 146, 147. 
 
 practice of the Court in England, objections for > Bradstock r. Whatley, 6 Beav. 451. 
 
 want of parties are of comparatively rare occur- 2 39th Order, Aug., 1841, and S. C; Has- 
 
 rence; in the first place, because in many cases kell v. Hilton, 30 Maine, 421. 
 
 persons who were formerly necessary parties 3 Cockburn v. Thompson, 13 Sim. 188. 
 
 286
 
 OF OBJECTIONS FOR WANT OF PARTIES. * 292 
 
 ant's knowledge, and was not raised by his answer, the order would 
 be made without payment of costs of the day. 4 
 
 * The recent Orders do not appear directly to have affected this * 292 
 rule concerning costs in such cases, but the 40th Order, of August, 
 1841, provides, that if the defendant shall at the hearing of a cause 
 object that a suit is defective for want of parties, not having by plea or 
 answer taken the objection, and therein specified by name or descrip- 
 tion the parties to whom the objection applies, the Court, if it shall 
 think fit, may make a decree saving the rights of the absent parties. 1 
 
 The discretion given to the Court by this Order will only be exer- 
 cised in cases where the rights of the absent party can be protected by 
 the decree as if he were present; or at all events where the rights can- 
 not be prejudiced by a decree made in their absence. 2 Consequently, 
 in a suit for the execution of a trust created for the benefit of creditors, 
 against the trustees, Sir James Wigram V. C. refused to make a decree 
 in the absence of the person who created the trust, or his personal 
 representative. 3 
 
 The Court will not, at the hearing, give leave to the plaintiff to 
 amend by adding parties, if by so doing the nature of the case made by 
 the bill will be changed; 4 an order was however made at the hearing, 
 that the plaintiffs should be at liberty to amend their bill by adding 
 parties, as they should be advised, or by showing why they were unable 
 to bring the proper parties before the Court. 5 
 
 The proper time for taking an objection for want of parties is upon 
 opening the pleadings, and before the merits are discussed: 6 but it fre- 
 quently happens that after a cause has been heard, the Court has felt 
 itself compelled to let it stand over for the purpose of amendment. 7 
 
 4 Mitchell v. Bailey. 3 Mad. 61; Furze v. * Deniston v. Little, 2 Sch. & Lef. 11, n.; 
 
 Sharwood, 5 M. & C.96; Att.-Gen. v. Hill, 3 and see Watts v. Hyde, 2 Phil. 406, 411; 11 
 
 M. & C. 247; Mason v. Franklin, 1 Y. & C. Jur. 979; 2 Coll. 368 ;" see post, p. 404; Bellamy 
 
 242; Kinvan v. Daniel, 7 Hare, 347, 351; Per- v. Sabine, 2 Phil. 425, 427. 
 kin v. Bradley, 1 Hare, 219, where notice of 5 Milligan v. Mitchell, 1 M. & C. 511. 
 
 disclaimer had been given to the objecting de- 6 Jones v. Jones, 3 Atk. Ill ; Alderson v. 
 
 fendant : as to the amount of costs, see 35th Harris, 12 Ala. 580; Van Doren v. Robinson, 
 
 Ord. 1828; Genl. Ord. XL. 22: Seton, 1117; 16 N. J. Eq. 256. 
 
 see Colt v. Lasnier, 3 Cowen, 320; Story, Eq. "i Jones v. Jones, 3 Atk. Ill; ante, p. 287, 
 
 PI. § 541. When the objection is taken by note. An objection for want of parties may be 
 
 demurrer, and sustained, the defendant will be taken on the hearing, and is usually made upon 
 
 entitled to his costs; but when it is taken at the opening the pleadings. Ibid.; Holdsworth r. 
 
 hearing only, the defendant is usually not enti- Holdsworth, 2 Dick. 799; and see Magdalen 
 
 tied to his costs. Story, Eq. PI. § 541. College e. Sibthorp, 1 Ross. 154; see Felch v. 
 
 i Story, Eq. PI. § 236, note. The same rule Eooper, 20 Maine, 163, 164; Hussey r. Dole, 
 
 lias been adopted by the Supreme Court of the 24 Maine, 20 ; New London Bank v. Lee, 11 
 
 United States, 53d Equity Rule of the U. S. Conn. 112: Winnipiseogee Lake Co. r. Wors- 
 
 Supreme Court, January term, 1842. See Cly- ter, 29 N. II. 4:13; Clark o. Long, 4 Rand. 451; 
 
 mer v. James, Halst. Dig. 168; post, 294, 295, Miller v. M'Can, 7 Paige, 452; Cabeen v. Gor- 
 
 note; Greene v. Sisson, 2 Curtis, C. C. 171, 177. don, 1 Hill, Ch. 53; R. Owing's case, 1 Bland, 
 
 2 See Greene v. Sisson, 2 Curtis, C. C. 171, 2.')2; Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige, 222; Mitchell 
 177; Wilson v. City Bank, 3 Sumner, 422; v. Lennox, 2 Paige, 281; Evans v. Chism, 18 
 Hogan o. Walker, 14 How. (U. S.) 36; McCall Maine, 223; Clifton v. Haig, 4 Desaus. 331. 
 v. Yard, 9 N. J. Eq. 358. As to costs in such case, see Cox v. Stephens, 
 
 3 Kimber v. Ensworth, 1 Hare, 293, 295; 6 9 Jur. N. S. 1144; 11 W. R. 929; Rowsell v. 
 Jur. 165; see also May*. Selby, 1 Y. & C. 237; Morris, L. R. 17 Eq. 20; Lydall v. Martinson, 
 and Faulkner v. Daniel, 3 Hare, 199. 5 Ch. D. 780; Dowdeswell v. Dowdeswell, \\ . 
 
 287
 
 *293 
 
 OP PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 * 293 * The objection for want of parties ouglxt to proceed from a 
 defendant; for it has been decided that the plaintiff bringing his 
 cause to a hearing without proper parties, cannot put it off without the 
 consent of the defendant. 1 Cases of exception may occur, where, for 
 instance, the plaintiff was not aware of the existence of persons whose 
 claims could touch the interests of those who were upon the record; 
 but that ought to be clearly established; and the plaintiff ought to 
 apply as soon as he has obtained that knowledge. 2 
 
 A plaintiff may at the hearing obviate an objection for want of a 
 particular party, by waiving the relief he is entitled to against such 
 party; 8 and where the evident consequence of the establishment of the 
 rights asserted by the bill might be the giving to the plaintiff a claim 
 against persons who are not parties, the plaintiff by waiving that claim 
 may avoid the necessity of making those persons parties. 4 This, how- 
 ever, cannot be done to the prejudice of others. 5 
 
 In some cases, the defect of parties has been cured at the hearing by 
 the undertaking of the plaintiff to give full effect to the utmost rights 
 which the absent party could have claimed; those rights being such as 
 could not affect the interest of the defendants. Thus, where a bill was 
 filed to set aside a release which had been executed in pursuance of a 
 family arrangement, in consequence of which a sum of stock was 
 invested in the names of trustees for the benefit of the plaintiff's wife 
 and unborn children, which benefit would be lost if the release was set 
 aside, the trustees of the settlement were held necessary parties, in 
 
 N. (1877) 228. In Ferguson v. Fisk, 28 Conn. 
 511, it was held, that no objection for want of 
 parties could be made after a hearing on the 
 merits, either before the Court or its Commit- 
 tee. See Chipman v. City of Hartford, 21 
 Conn. 48;}; New London Bank r. Lee, 11 
 Conn. 120. The ordinary course in Chancery, 
 where a want of proper parties appears at the 
 hearing, is for the cause to stand over in order 
 that they may be added. Colt v. Lasnier, 3 
 Cowen, 320. When the objection is only made 
 at the hearing, it will not avail, unless the 
 Court is unable to proceed to a decree between 
 the parties. Swan v. Clark. .36 Iowa, 560; 
 Wallace v. Homes, 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 15; Freight 
 Money of Monadnock, 5 Ben. 357; Smith v. 
 Bartholomew, 42 Yt. 356; Vaiden v. Stubble- 
 tield, 28 Gratt. 153. 
 
 1 Lines v. Jackson, 16 Ves. 356; 1 Bligh, 
 104; for the circumstances under which the de- 
 fendant must support his objection by evi- 
 dence, see Campbell ». Dickens, 4 Y. & C. 
 17; Barker v. Rail-on, 11 L. J. N. S. 372. The 
 objection of misjoinder of parties, as defend- 
 ants in a bill, is a mere personal privilege, and 
 consequently those only can demur for that 
 cause who are improperly joined. Gartland v. 
 Nunn, Eng. 720; infra, 302, n. 4. 
 
 - [lines ». Jackson, supra; see Thompson v. 
 Poeble. 6 Dana, 302. 
 
 3 Pawlet r. Bishop of Lincoln, 2 Atk. 296. 
 
 4 Ld. Red. 179; Story, Eq. PL §§ 127, 129, 
 213, 214, 228. So, in some cases, when all the 
 parties are not before the Court, the merits, as 
 between those parties who are before the Court, 
 may be decided at their request. See Wick- 
 liffe v. Clay, 1 Dana, 103. If the Court can 
 make a decree, at the hearing, which will do 
 entire justice to all the parties, and not preju- 
 dice their rights, notwithstanding the non- 
 joinder or misjoinder of some, an objection on 
 that account will not be allowed to prevail. 
 White v. Delschneider, 1 Oregon, 254. 
 
 5 Ld. Red. 180; Dart v. Palmer, 1 Barb.Ch. 
 92. If the case made by the bill entitles the 
 plaintiff to- particular relief against the defend- 
 ant, and would also entitle him to further re- 
 lief were the necessary parties before the Court, 
 and the prayer of the bill specifically asks for 
 the more extended relief, to which the plaintiff 
 is not entitled in consequence of the defect of 
 parties, the defendant may demur to the whole 
 bill for want of parties. Dart v. Palmer, 1 
 Barb. Ch. 92. A Court can make no decree in 
 an Equity suit, in which the interests of a per- 
 son not a party are so involved that complete 
 justice cannot be done between the parties to 
 the suit, without affecting the rights of the 
 person, not a party, whose interests are so in- 
 volved. Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. U. S. 
 130; ante, p. 149, n. 1.
 
 OF OBJECTIONS FOR WANT OF PARTIES. 
 
 294 
 
 order to assert the right of the children ; but upon the plaintiff's 
 counsel undertaking that all the moneys to be recovered * by the * 294 
 suit should be settled upon the same trusts for the benefit of the 
 plaintiff's wife and children, the cause was permitted to proceed with- 
 out the trustees, and ultimately, upon the undertaking of the plaintiff, 
 the plaintiffs were declared not bound by the release. 1 
 
 As a decree made in the absence of proper parties may be reversed, 
 and at all events will not bind those who are absent or those claiming 
 under them, 2 great care should be taken to have the necessary parties 
 before the Court at the hearing; 3 because, as we have seen before, the 
 plaintiff cannot then apply for leave to add parties without the consent 
 of the defendant. 
 
 The most usual way of adding parties is by amendment of the origi- 
 nal bill, though sometimes it is done by supplemental bill or order, 
 and the Court will suffer the plaintiff to amend his bill by adding par- 
 ties at any time before the hearing; but if the amendment is made after 
 the expiration of the time for giving notice for the cross-examination 
 of witnesses, the evidence cannot be read against the new parties. 4 
 
 1 Harvey v. Cooke, 4 Russ. 35; and see 
 Walker v. Jefferies, 1 Hare, 296, and 341, 356 ; 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 220. 
 
 2"Prac. Reg. 299; Story, Eq. PI. § 236; 
 Whiting v. Bank of U. S. 13 Peters, 14; 
 Spring v. Jenkins, 1 Ired. Eq. 128; Shields v. 
 Barrow, 17 How. U. S. 130; Stat. U. S. Feb. 
 28, 1839, 5 Stats, at Urge, 321 ; 47th Equity 
 Rule of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 See ante, p. 191, note, and p 149, n. 1. See 
 also U . S. Rev. Stats. § 737, et seq. 
 
 3 For cases in which the defect of parties 
 has been remedied by the voluntary appearance 
 at the hearing, see ante, 153 ; Joy v. Wirtz, 1 
 Wash. C. C. 517. 
 
 4 Goodwin v. Goodwin, 3 Atk. 370 ; Pratt 
 v. Barker, 1 Sim. 1. See R. S. C. Ord. XVI. 
 16 ; post, p. 405. A person in interest, who has 
 never appeared, or been cited to appear, may, 
 upon motion, and without a supplemental bill, 
 at the hearing upon bill, answer, and proof, be 
 summoned in and made a party. Miller v. 
 Whittier, 32 Maine, 521. Where new parties 
 are added in a case after the testimony is 
 taken, the cause should be heard on bill and 
 answer as to such new defendants. Smith t'. 
 Baldwin, 4 Har. & J. 331. 
 
 Courts of Equity will not dismiss bills abso- 
 lutely for want of proper parties, the plaintiff 
 showing enough to give color to his claim for 
 relief against the parties not before the Court. 
 In such case the Court may properly give the 
 plaintiff leave to amend, and make the proper 
 parties. Allen v. Smith, 1 Leigh, 331; Hutchin- 
 son v. Reed, 1 Hoff. Ch. 316; Hayden v. Mar- 
 maduke, 19 Miss. 403 ; Franklin v. Franklin, 
 2 Swan (Tenn.), 521 ; Potter v. Holden, 31 
 Conn. 385; Thomas v. Adams, 30 111. 37. If 
 
 VOL. I. — 19 
 
 the objection of the want of the proper parties 
 is taken by plea or demurrer, it is a matter of 
 course to dismiss the plaintiff's bill upon the 
 allowance of a plea or demurrer, unless the 
 plaintiff takes issue on the plea, or obtains 
 leave to amend on the usual terms. Van Epps 
 v. Van Deusen, 4 Paige, 64, 76. If the defend- 
 ant makes no objection for want of proper 
 parties, either by plea, answer, or demurrer, 
 and raises that objection for the first time at 
 the hearing, the bill should not be dismissed, 
 where the defect can be remedied by an 
 amendment or a supplemental bill, provided 
 the plaintiff elects to bring the proper parties 
 before the Court within a reasonable time. lb. 
 p. 76; Harder v. Harder, 2 Sandf Ch. 17; 
 Peterson v. Poignard, 6 R. Mon. 570. The 
 only exception to the rule arises where it ap- 
 pears that the necessary parties have been left 
 out of the bill by the fraud or bad faith of the 
 plaintiff. See Rowland v. Gannan, 1 J. J. 
 Marsh. 76; Parberry v. Coram, 3 Bibb, 108; 
 Cabeen v. Gordon, 1 Hill (S. C), Ch. 53; 
 Hutchinson v. Reed, 1 Hoff. Ch. 320; Clifton 
 r. Ilaig, 4 Desaus. 331 ; New London Bank v. 
 Lee, 11 Conn. 112; Malin v. Malin, 2 John.Ch. 
 338 ; Nash r. Smith, 6 Conn. 422 ; Rogers v. 
 Rogers, 1 Hopk. 515: S. C. 1 Paige, 188; S. C. 
 2 Paige, 467; Bland v. Wyatt, 1 Ben. & M. 
 43; Sears v. Powell, 5 John. Ch. 259 ; Bowen 
 v. Idley, 6 Paige, 46; Ensworth v. Lambert, 
 4 John. Ch. 605; Smith v. Turrentine, 8 Ired. 
 Eq. 185. 
 
 If the bill is dismissed for want of the 
 proper parties, it should not, where it has 
 equity, be dismissed absolutely, but without 
 prejudice to the ri^ht of the plaintiff in any 
 future litigation. See Craig v. Barbour, 2 J. 
 
 289
 
 295 
 
 OF PARTIFS TO A SUIT. 
 
 * 295 * An order to amend by adding parties allows of the introduction 
 of apt words to charge them; but it seems that the plaintiff, if 
 it is necessary, should apply for liberty to add allegations applicable to 
 the case of the proposed new parties, as this is not included in the 
 liberty to amend by adding parties; * and under an order giving liberty 
 to add parties by amendment or supplemental bill, a plaintiff may do 
 both. 2 A plaintiff is not obliged, in adding parties by amendment, to 
 make them defendants; he may, if he pleases, apply for leave to make 
 them co-plaintiffs, and he has been permitted to do so by special motion 
 after the defendants have answered the original bill. 3 It is to be 
 observed, however, that after answer, the addition of a co-plaintiff is 
 not a matter of course ; and that, in such case, the granting or refusing 
 of an order to amend by adding parties as plaintiffs, is in the discretion 
 of the Court. 4 
 
 Section IV. — Of the Joinder of Parties who have no Interest 
 
 in the Suit. 
 
 It has been before stated, that no one should be made a party to a 
 suit against whom, if brought to a hearing, there can be no decree; 5 (a) 
 
 J. Marsh. 220 ; Thompson v. Clay, 3 Monroe, 
 361; Van Epps v. Van Deusen, 4 Paige, 76; 
 Miller v. M'Can, 7 Paige, 452 ; Huston v. 
 M'Ciarty, 3 Litt. 274 ; Steele v. Lewis, 1 
 Monroe, 49; Story, Eq. PI. § 236; West v. 
 Randall, 2 Mason, 181; Mechanics' Bank of 
 Alexandria v. Setons, 1 Peters, 306 ; Hunt v. 
 Wickliffe, 8 Peters, 215; Patrick r. White, 6 
 B Mon. 330; ante, 287, note; Jameson v. 
 Deshields, 3 Gratt. 4; Kirkpatrick r. Buford, 
 21 Ark. 268. But if the plaintiff shows no 
 right to relief against the parties before the 
 Court, and his bill is dismissed, the Appellate 
 Court will not reverse the decree to enable him 
 to introduce new parties, and thereby make a 
 new case upon the merits. Jameson v. De- 
 shields, 3 Gratt. 4. Under the present English 
 practice, limiting the number of parties neces- 
 sary to a decree, Rule 7 provides, that in the 
 cases falling within the regulations of the six 
 preceding rules, "the Court, if it shall see fit, 
 may require any other person or persons to be 
 made a part} - or parties to the suit, and may, 
 if it shall see fit, give the conduct of the suit to 
 such person as it may deem proper, and may 
 make such order, in any particular case, as it 
 may deem just for placing the defendant on the 
 record on the same footing, in regard to costs, 
 
 (a) See Saunders r. Saunders, 3 Drew. 387; 
 1 Jur. N. S. 1008. A sheriff is not usually a ne- 
 cessary party to a suit in which his official acts, 
 such as sales upon execution, are in litigation. 
 See North v. Peters, 138 U. S. 271; Sioux City 
 &c. Ry. Co. v. Chicago &c. By. Co. 27 Fed. Rep. 
 290 
 
 as other parties having a common interest with 
 him in the matters in question." 
 
 i Hand. 77: Palk /■. Lord Clinton, 12 Ves. 
 48; Mason v. Franklin, 1 Y. & C. 239, 242; 
 Gibson v. Ingo, 5 Hare, 156 ; Bateman r. Mar- 
 gerison, 6 Hare, 496, 502; and cases referred 
 to, 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 35-37; Barlow v. 
 M' Murray, L. R. 2 Eq. 420. When the plain- 
 tiff is allowed to amend on account of the want 
 of proper parties, he possesses the incidental 
 right to amend by charging all such matters, 
 as constitute the equity of his case, against the 
 new party. Stephens v. Frost, 2 Y. & C. 297. If 
 a necessary party be added to a bill, it is to 
 him as an original bill, and he is entitled to the 
 same time to plead, answer, &c, as an original 
 defendant. Hoxey v. Carey, 12 Ga. 534; Van 
 Leonard v. Stocks, id. 546; see McDougald r. 
 Dougherty, 14 Ga. 674. 
 
 2 Minn r. Stant, 15 Beav. 129 
 
 3 Hichens v. Congreve, 1 Sim. 500; see 
 Milligan v. Mitchell, 1 M. & C. 433, 442, 443; 
 Miller r. M'Can, 7 Paige, 451. 
 
 4 The practice relating to the addition of par- 
 ties by amendment is treated of in the chapter 
 concerning " The Amending of Bills." 
 
 5 De Golls v. Ward. 3 P. Wms. 311, n. 1 ; 
 Todd r. Sterrett, 6 J. J. Marsh. 432. It is a 
 
 770; Meinhard v. Youngblood, 37 S. C. 223; 
 Dodson v. Lomax, 113 Mo. 555; Colorado 
 Manuf. Co. r. McDonald, 15 Col. 516; Butler v. 
 Clark, 21 N. Y. S. 415; National Park Bank v. 
 Goddard, 131 N. Y. 494; Edney v. King, 4 Ired. 
 Eq. 465, Shrader v. Walker, 8 Ala. 244; Jar-
 
 OF THE JOINDER OF PARTIES. 
 
 296 
 
 thus, an agent for the purchase of an estate, is not a * necessary *29G 
 party to a bill 1 against his employer for a specific performance, 
 although he signed the memorandum for the purchase in his own 
 name; 2 and so a residuary legatee need not be made a party to a bill 
 against an executor for a debt or legacy; and for the same reason in a 
 bill brought by or against the assignees of a bankrupt or insolvent in 
 respect of the property vested in them, under the bankruptcy or insol- 
 vency, the bankrupt or insolvent should not be a party; 3 and to a suit 
 to ascertain the property in a certain share in a banking company, liti- 
 gated between two claimants, the company is not a necessary party. 4 
 Upon the same principle, persons who are mere witnesses, and may be 
 examined as such, ought not to be made defendants; s even though the 
 object of the bill is to obtain a discovery in aid of an action at Law in 
 which their discovery would be more effectual than their examination. 6 
 This rule is, however, liable to exceptions; thus, in cases where, 
 under certain circumstances, a discovery upon oath is desirable from 
 individual members of a corporation aggregate, or from the officers of a 
 corporation, such members or officers may be made defendants. 7 
 
 good ground of demurrer to the whole bill, that 
 a person who has no interest in the suit, and 
 has no equity against the defendant, is improp- 
 erly joined as a party plaintiff. Clarkson v. De 
 Peyster, 3 Paige, 336; Little r. Buie, 5 Jones, 
 Eq". (N. C.) 10; King v. Galloway, id. 128; see 
 Wright v. Santa Clara Mining Association, 12 
 Md. 443; Westfall v. Scott, 20 Ga. 233. A bill 
 for contribution by one stockholder of a manu- 
 facturing corporation, who has paid debts of 
 the corporation under legal process, is open to a 
 demurrer, by a defendant who did not appear 
 ever to have been a stockholder in the corpora- 
 tion. Heath v. Ellis, 12 Gush. 601, 604. One 
 defendant cannot object that another defendant, 
 having no interest in the subject-matter of the 
 suit, is improperly made a party. Cherry v. 
 Monro, 2 Barb. Ch. 618: infra, p. 302, n. 4. 
 
 1 Garr v. Bright, 1 Barb. Ch. 157; Lyon v. 
 Tevis, 8 Clarke (Iowa), 79: Avers v. Wright, 
 8 Ired. Eq. 229; see Allin r. Hall, 1 A. K. 
 Marsh. 527; Orkey v. Bend, 3 Edw. Ch. 482; 
 Jones v. Hart, 1 Hen. & M. 470; Davis v. 
 Simpson, 5 Har. & J. 147. If an agent, sell- 
 ing land, binds himself individually, he should 
 be a party to a suit touching the sale. Alex- 
 ander v. Lee, 3 A. K. Marsh. 484. 
 
 A private agent, or a public officer having 
 process in his hands which is sought to be en- 
 joined, or a ministerial officer, such as a clerk 
 of Court, ought not to be made a defendant; 
 and if so made may demur, and no decree can 
 be taken against him even for co=ts. Boyd 
 p. Vanderkemp, 1 Barb. Ch. 273; Holmes v. 
 
 Chester, 26 N. J. Eq. 79; Lackey v. Curtis, 6 
 Ired. Eq. 199; Hext v. Walker, 5 Rich. Eq. 5; 
 Blanton v. Hall. 2 Heisk. 423; Montgomery v. 
 Whitworth, 1 Tenn. Ch. 174; Blooinstein v. 
 Brien, 2 id. 778. It is otherwise where the 
 officer, a clerk, has the legal title to the note in 
 controversy. Rice v. Hunt, 12 Heisk. 344. Or 
 where the officer, a sheriff, has by levy acquired 
 title to the personal property in dispute. Buck- 
 ner v. Abrahams, 3 Tenn. Ch. 346 ; Oil Run 
 Co. v. Gale, 6 W. Va. 525. 
 
 2 Kingley v. Young, Coop. Eq. PI. 42. 
 
 3 See ante, p. 256, n. 1. 
 
 4 Scawin o. Scawin, 1 Y. & C 68. 
 
 5 Plummer v. May, 1 Ves. 426; How v. 
 Best, 5 Mad. 19; Footman v. Pray, R. M. 
 Charlt. 291; Fenton v. Hughes, 7 Sumner's 
 Yes. 287, Perkins's note ("), and cases cited; 
 Newman r. Godfrey, 2 Bro. C. C. (Perkins's 
 ed.) 332; Reeves v. Adams, 2 Dev. Ch. 192; 
 Yates v. Monroe, 13 111. 212. 
 
 6 Fenton v. Hughes, 7 Ves. 288; see next 
 preceding note, and ante, p. 145, note. 
 
 7 See nnte, 145; Fenton v. Hughes, 7 Sum- 
 ner's Ves. 287, Perkins's note ("), and cases 
 cited to this point; Kennebec and Portland 
 R. R. Co. o. Portland and Kennebec R. II. Co. 
 54 Maine, 184. With respect to this exception, 
 Lord Eldon here observed that " the principle 
 upon which the rule has been adopted is very 
 singular; it originated with Lord Talbot (Wych 
 v. Meal. 3 P. Wms. 210; see United Srntes V. 
 Wagner. L. R. 2 Ch. 582, 587; S. C. L. R. '• 
 Eq. 724; Prioleau v. United States, L. R. 2 Eq 
 
 man v. Saunders, 64 N. C. 367; but see Burpee 
 v. Smith, Walk. Ch. 327; Brooks v. Lewis, 13 
 N. J. Eq. 214; Hassell u. Van Houten, 39 id. 
 113 ; Beaird v. Foreman, Breese, 303. The com- 
 
 missioner who sold land under order of Court, 
 and received the purchase money, is not a neces- 
 sary party to a suit to impeach a decree. Gil- 
 bert r. James, 86 N. C. 244. 
 
 291
 
 298 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 * 297 * Other persons are mentioned by Lord Eldon as affording 
 
 exceptions to the rule before laid down, that mere witnesses can- 
 not be made parties to a suit, namely, agents to sell, auctioneers, &c, who 
 have been made defendants without objection: 1 his Lordship, however, 
 appears to have thought that the practice of making such persons par- 
 ties arose originally from their having some interest, such as holding 
 deposits, which might entitle the plaintiff to relief against them; and 
 it has been since held, that an agent who bids at an auction for an 
 estate, and signs the memorandum in his own name for the purchase, 
 need not be made a co-defendant with his employer to a bill for the 
 specific performance of such agreement. 2 In Dummer v. Corporation 
 of Chippenham,* Lord Eldon also mentions, as cases of exception to 
 the general rule above referred to, those of arbitrators and attorneys. 
 With respect to arbitrators, however, it is a rule, that in general an 
 arbitrator cannot be made a party to a bill for the purpose of impeach- 
 ing an award, and that, if he is, he may demur to the bill, as well to 
 the discovery as to the relief. 4 In some cases, nevertheless, where an 
 award has been impeached on the ground of gross misconduct in the 
 arbitrators, and they have been made parties to the suit, the Court has 
 gone so far as to order them to pay the costs. 5 In such cases, Lord 
 Eedesdale considers it probable that a demurrer to the bill would not 
 have been allowed; 6 and in Lord Lonsdale v. Littledale," 1 a demurrer 
 by an arbitrator to a bill of this nature was in fact overruled; though 
 
 not expressly upon the ground of the impropriety of making an 
 
 * 298 arbitrator a party, but because the bill charged certain * specific 
 
 acts which showed combination or collusion between him and 
 one of the parties, and made him the agent for such party, and which 
 the Court therefore thought required an answer. 1 But although arbi- 
 
 659), who reasoned thus upon it : that you can- 
 not have a satisfactory answer from a corpora- 
 tion, therefore, you make the secretary a party, 
 and get from him the discovery you cannot be 
 sure of having from them ; and it is added, that 
 the answer of the secretary may enable you to 
 get better information." "The first of these 
 principles," continues his Lordship, "is ex- 
 tremely questionable, if it were now to be con- 
 sidered for the first time; and as to the latter, 
 it is very singular to make a person a defend- 
 ant in order to enable yourself to deal better, 
 and with more success, with those whom you 
 have a right to put upon the record ; but this 
 practice has so universally obtained without ob- 
 jection, that it must be considered established." 
 A suit, to restrain the misappropriation of a fund 
 held by a corporation in trust, cannot be main- 
 tained against the trustees appointed by the 
 corporation to hold and manage the fund, with- 
 out making the corporation a party. Tibballs 
 v. Bidwell, 1 Gray, 399. To obtain the specific 
 performance of a contract with a corporation for 
 the sale of real estate, the trustee who holds 
 the legal title to the land should be made a co- 
 defendant. Morrow v. Lawrence, 7 Wis. 574. 
 
 292 
 
 i Ibid. ; Gartland v. Nunn, 6 Eng. 720; see 
 ante, p. 193, n. Where one of two partners, 
 after a dissolution, consigned property to an 
 agent for sale, the proceeds to be applied to the 
 payment of a partnership debt, in a bill against 
 the agent by the other partner, the partner by 
 whom the consignment was made, having be- 
 come insolvent, he and his assignee were prop- 
 erly made defendants. Bartlett v. Parks, 1 Cush. 
 82. Wilde J. said that the insolvent partner, 
 " if not interested, may well be made a party for 
 the purpose of discovery, as to all acts done by 
 him before his insolvency, and the assignment 
 of his property," p. 86. 
 
 2 Coop. Eq. PI. 42. 
 
 3 14 Ves. 252. 
 
 * Steward v. East India Co. 2 Vern. 380; 
 Ld. Red. 162; Story, Eq. PL § 231. 
 
 6 Chicot v. Lequesne, 2 "Ves. Sr. 315; Lin- 
 good v. Croueher, 2 Atk. 395, 950; see Hamil- 
 ton o. Bankin. 3 De G. & S. 782; 15 Jur. 70; 
 Story, Eq. PL § 232, and notes. 
 
 « Ld. Red. 162. 
 
 * 2 Ves Jr. 451. 
 
 1 2 Story, Eq Jur. § 1500, and cases cited.
 
 OF THE JOINDER OF PARTIES. 
 
 *298 
 
 trators may be made parties to a bill to set aside their award, they are 
 not bound to answer as to their motives in miking the award, and they 
 may plead to that part of the bill in bar of such discovery; 2 but it is 
 incumbent upon them, if they are charged with corruption and partial- 
 ity, to support their plea by showing themselves incorrupt and impar- 
 tial, or otherwise the Court will give a remedy against them by making 
 them pay costs. 8 
 
 From the preceding cases it may be collected, that arbitrators can 
 only be made parties to a suit where it is intended to fix them with the 
 payment of costs in consequence of their corrupt or fraudulent behavior; 
 and in such cases it is apprehended that the bill ought specifically to 
 pray that relief against them. 
 
 The same rule also applies to the case of attorneys, who can only be 
 made parties to a suit in cases where they have so involved themselves 
 in fraud that a Court of Equity, although it can give no other relief 
 against them, will order them to pay the costs. 4 Thus, where a solici- 
 tor assisted his client in obtaining a fraudulent release from another, 
 he was held to be properly made a party, and liable to costs if his 
 principal was not solvent. 5 (a) 
 
 The same rule applies to any other person acting in the capacity of 
 agent in a fraudulent transaction, as well as to an attorney or solicitor; 6 
 and it was said by Sir James Wigram V. C. in Marshall v. Sladden, 1 that, 
 
 2 Anon. 3 Atk. 644; Padley v. Lincoln 
 Waterworks Co. 2 McN. & G. 68; 14 Jur. 299; 
 Ponsford v. Swaine, 1 J. & H. 433. 
 
 3 Lingood v. Croucher, supra. 
 
 4 Story, Eq. PI. § 232; Lyon v. Tevis, 8 
 Clarke (Iowa), 99; Rice v. Hunt, 12 Heisk. 
 345. 
 
 6 Bowles v. Stewart, 1 Sch. & Lef. 227; 
 and see Baker v. Loader, L. R. 16 Eq. 49. A 
 solicitor who had intermeddled with a trust 
 was held a proper party. Hardy v. Caley, 33 
 Beav. 365. See Harries v. Rees, \V. N. 
 (1867) 251; 16 W. R. 91, as to a solicitor's 
 liability for his client's breach of trust. 
 
 6 Bulkeley v. Dunbar, 1 Anst. 37; Story, Eq. 
 PI. § 838; Gartland v. Nunn, 6 Eng. 720. But 
 
 where a judgment debtor seeks relief against 
 the judgment, in Equity, the attorneys of the 
 plaintiff in the judgment ought not to be made 
 patties, no fraud being charged upon them, or 
 relief sought as to them. Kenan v. Miller, 2 
 Kelly, 325. In a case, however, where a per- 
 son is charged with fraudulently procuring the 
 execution of a will in favor of an infant, such 
 person is a proper part}' to a bill filed for the 
 purpose of setting aside such will, although he 
 has no interest; and he may be liable to costs. 
 Brady v. McCosker, 1 Comst. 214. 
 
 ' 7 Hare, 428, 442; 14 Jur. 106; Reynell v. 
 Sprye, 8 Hare, 222, 271; 1 D. M. & G. 660; 
 Innes v. Mitchell, 4 Drew. 57, 141; 3 Jur. N. S. 
 756; 1 De G. & J. 423. 
 
 («) See Kelly v. Jackson, 13 Ir. Eq. 129. 
 If a solicitor or agent, who is made a co-de- 
 fendant, took no part in the misrepresentation 
 charged, the suit will be dismissed as against 
 him. Mathias v. Yetts, 46 L. T. 497; see 
 Smith t>. Green, 37 Fed. Rep. 424. In Burstall 
 i». Keyfus, 26 Ch. D. 35, it was held vexatious 
 to join, as parties, solicitors or others, who 
 might properly be witnesses, and against whom 
 no relief was sought except payment of costs or 
 discovery. A solicitor whose carelessness in 
 drafting a marringe settlement causes litigation 
 in Equity, will not be required to pay the costs 
 thereof, the remedy being at Law in an action 
 for professional negligence. Clark v. Gird- 
 wood, 7 Ch. D. 9. See also Baker v. Loader, 
 
 L. R. 16 Eq. 49; Phosphate Sewage Co. v. Hart- 
 mont, 5 Ch. D. 394, 443; Re Spencer, 51 L. J. 
 Ch. 271; Amos v. Heme Bay P. Co. 54 L. T. 
 264; Smith v. Green, 37 Fed. Rep. 424; Hopson 
 v. Harrell, 56 Miss. 202. Solicitors cannot be 
 made liable as constructive trustees unless they 
 are brought within the doctrine with reference 
 to other strangers, who are not themselves 
 trustees, but are liable in certain cases to be 
 made to account as if they were trustees. Re 
 Blundell, Blundell v. Blundell, 40 Ch. I). 370, 
 381; Staniar v. Evans, 34 Ch. D. 470, 478; Re 
 Vernon, Ewens, & Co. 33 Ch. D. 402; 32 Ch. 
 D. 165; Re Spencer, 51 L. J. Ch. 271; Moore 
 v. Knight, [1891] 1 Ch. 547. 
 
 293
 
 * 299 OP PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 "as far as his researches had gone, the Court had never made a decree 
 against a mere agent except upon the ground of fraud." (b) If, in such 
 cases, an attorney or agent is made a party, the bill must pray that he 
 may pay the costs, and must distinctly allege the circumstances consti- 
 tuting the fraud, and that the defendant was a party concerned, and had a 
 knowledge of the fraudulent intention; 8 otherwise a demurrer will lie. 
 The practice of making attorneys and agents defendants for the purpose 
 
 of charging them with costs will not however be encouraged. 9 
 ♦299 *In Texierv. The Margravine of Anspach, 1 one of the ques- 
 tions before the Court was, whether a married woman could be 
 made a party to a suit on the allegation, that in certain contracts which 
 were the subject of litigation she had acted as the agent of her hus- 
 band, and that she had vouchers in her possession the discovery of 
 which might assist the plaintiff in his case. The bill, which did not 
 pray any relief against the wife, had been demurred to; and Lord Eldon 
 allowed the demurrer on the ground that she was merely made a defend- 
 ant for the purpose of discovery, and that no relief was prayed against 
 her, saying, " I give no judgment as to what would have been the effect 
 if the bill had prayed a delivery to the plaintiff of those vouchers which 
 are charged to be in the hands of the wife; it is, however, simply, as 
 far as relief goes, a bill against the husband only, and against the wife 
 a bill for discovery only. The consequence is that, independent of her 
 character as wife, the case must be considered as one of those in which 
 the Court does sometimes allow persons to be made parties against 
 whom no relief is prayed, and the only case of that kind is that of the 
 agent of a corporation." 
 
 Generally speaking and prima facie, 2 it is not necessary to make an 
 attorney a party to a bill seeking a discovery and production of title 
 deeds, merely because he has them in his custody; 3 because the posses- 
 sion of the attorney is the possession of his client; but cases may arise 
 to render such a proceeding advisable, as if he withholds the deeds in 
 his possession, and will not deliver them to his client on his applying 
 for them. 4 
 
 8 Kelly v. Rogers, Uur. N. S.514, V.C.W.; » 15 Ves. 164. 
 
 Gilbert v. Lewis. 1 De G. J. & S. 39, 49, 50; 9 2 Fenwiek v. Reed, 1 Mer. 123; see ante, 
 
 Jur. N. S. 187; and see Attwood v. Small, p. 247. 
 
 6 CI. & Fin. 352; Att.-Gen. v. Bermondsey 8 Wakeman v. Bailey, 3 Barb. Ch. 482. 
 
 Vestry, 23 Ch. D. 60; Sugd. Law Prop. 630, * 1 Smith, Ch. Pr. (2d Am. ed.) 677, 678. 
 
 6 ;32_ * Where the plaintiff wishes to obtain the custody 
 
 9 Barnes t\ Addy, L. R. 9 Ch. 244 ; see Re of books and papers in possession of a third per- 
 Lewis 24 Ch. D. 339. son, the proper course is to make such third 
 
 (b) An agent who has committed or threat- also Rollins Inv. Co. v. George, 48 Fed. Rep. 
 
 ened to commit a tort on his principal's behalf 776; Shaver r. Lawrence County, 44 Ark. 314. 
 
 is a proper but not a necessary party to a suit When sued for infringing letters-patent, ofti- 
 
 against his principal, there being no agency in cers of a corporation cannot maintain the plea 
 
 torts. Heugh v. Earl of Abergavenny, W. N. that their acts were solely the acts of the de- 
 
 (1874) 193; Nobel's Explosive Co. V. Jones, 49 fendant corporation, performed by them as its 
 
 L. J. Ch. 726. Water commissioners of a city agents. Ibid ; Cahoone Bamet Manuf. Co. v. 
 
 are not necessarv parties to a suit to remove a Rubber & Celluloid Harness Co. 45 Fed. Kep. 
 
 cloud on title, 'which thev have created by 582; see Lyndon National Bank r. Wells River 
 
 illegal assessment. Carpenter r. Hoboken, 33 Manuf. Co. 7 id. 750: Coe v. Louisville & N. R. 
 
 N. J. Eq. 27. As to agents as parties, see Co. 3 id. 775. 
 
 294
 
 OF THE JOINDER OF PARTIES. * 300 
 
 Where a person who has no interest in the subject-matter of the suit, 
 and against whom no relief is prayed, is made a party to a suit for the 
 mere purpose of discovery, the proper course for him to adopt, if he 
 wishes to avoid the discovery, is to demur.' If, however, the bill 
 states that the defendant has or claims an interest, a demurrer, which 
 admits the bill to be true, will not of course hold, though the defendant 
 has no interest, and he can then only avoid answering the bill by plea 
 or disclaimer. 6 
 
 * The question whether a party who is a mere witness can by * 300 
 answer protect himself from the discovery required, appears to 
 have given rise to some difference of opinion. In Cookson v. Ellison, 1 
 the plaintiff made a person defendant who was merely a witness, and 
 might have been examined as such, and therefore should have demurred 
 to the bill. Instead of demurring, however, the defendant put in an 
 answer, which, not having satisfied the plaintiff as to one interrogatory, 
 an exception was taken, and the Master reported the answer sufficient; 
 but upon the case coining before Lord Thurlow upon exception to the 
 Master's report, his Lordship held, that as the defendant had submitted 
 to answer, he was bound to answer fully. In a subsequent case of 
 Newman v. Godfrey,* however, Lord Kenyon M. R. appears to have 
 entertained a different opinion. In that case the defendant, who was a 
 mere clerk, was alleged in the bill to be a party interested in the prop- 
 erty in litigation, and in support of such allegation various statements 
 were made, showing in what manner his interest arose: he put in an 
 answer denying all the statements upon which the allegation of his 
 being interested was founded, and disclaiming all personal interest in 
 the subject-matter; and to this answer exceptions were taken by the 
 plaintiff, because the defendant had not answered the subsequent parts 
 of the bill, which exceptions were disallowed by the Master; and upon 
 the question coming on before Lord Kenyon, upon exceptions to the 
 Master's reports, he thought the Master was right in disallowing the 
 exceptions, because the defendant had reduced himself to a mere wit- 
 ness by denying his interest and disclaiming, so that, even supposing 
 he had an interest, he could not, having disclaimed, have availed him- 
 self of it. These contradictory decisions have been remarked upon by 
 Lord Eldon in two subsequent cases; 3 and his Lordship's observations 
 in those cases have been considered, as approving of Lord Thurlow's 
 decisions in Cookson v. Ellison.* Nothing, however, can be collected 
 from what Lord Eldon said in either of these cases, as indicating an 
 opinion either one way or the other; and, at the period when they were 
 before him, the doctrine that a party answering must answer fully does 
 
 person a party defendant. Morley v. Green, 11 plaintiff to dismiss the bill against him, and he 
 
 Paige, 240. So if the principal be beyond the may incur censure if he brings the suit to a 
 
 iurisdiction of the Court, and no discovery hearing without doing this. Wright v. Barlow, 
 
 can be compelled from him. Ballin v. Ferst, 15 Jur. 1149; 8 En<*. Law & Eq. 125. 
 
 55 Ga. 546. ' 2 Bro. C. C. 252. 
 
 s Ed. Red. 189. 2 2 Bro. C. C. 332. 
 
 6 Ibid.; Plummer v. May, 1 Ves. 426. 3 p e nton r. Hughes, 7 Ves. 288; Baker V. 
 
 Where a suit becomes useless against a par- Mellish, 11 Ves. 75. 76. 
 
 ticular defendant, it is a laudable course for the 4 2 Bro. C C. 252. 
 
 295
 
 *302 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 not appear to have been so strictly adhered to as it has been subse- 
 quently; 6 but that doctrine is now well established, and, it is conceived, 
 
 includes the case above discussed. 6 
 *301 * When a plaintiff finds that he has made unnecessary parties 
 to his bill, he may either dismiss his bill as against them, or 
 apply to the Court for leave to amend his bill by striking out their 
 names; in either case, however, the order will, if the defendants have 
 appeared, only be made on payment of their costs ; 1 because, by strik- 
 ing them out as defendants, the plaintiff deprives them of the oppor- 
 tunity of applying for their costs at the hearing. 2 
 
 The preceding observations, with regard to the joinder in the suit of 
 persons who have no interest, beneficial or otherwise, in the subject- 
 matter, refer to cases where they are made parties defendants. The 
 rule, however, that persons who have no interest in the litigation, can- 
 not be joined in a suit with those who have, applies equally to prevent 
 their being joined as co-plaintiffs. 3 
 
 Where persons having at the time a joint interest file an original 
 bill, and afterwards one of the co-plaintiffs parts with his interest, such 
 co-plaintiff may afterwards join in a supplemental bill filed for the pur- 
 pose of bringing additional matter before the Court; because, although 
 he may have parted with his interest in the subject-matter, he is still 
 interested in the suit in respect of his liability to costs. 4 
 
 The common case of joining an auctioneer and the vendor in 
 *302 a bill against a purchaser, is no exception * to the rule above re- 
 ferred to, because the auctioneer has an interest in the contract, 
 and may bring an action upon it ; he is also interested in being protected 
 from the legal liability which he has incurred in an action by the 
 
 5 See Dolder v. Lord Hunting-field, 11 Ves. 
 283; Faulder v. Stuart, id. 296; Shaw v. Ching, 
 id. 303, and post, Answer; see a discussion of 
 this subject in Wigram, Discovery, pi. 148, 149, 
 &c. p. 86, 87, et seq. 
 
 6 Lancaster v. Evors, I Phil. 349; 8 Jur. 
 133; Swinborne v. Nelson, 16 Beav. 416; Great- 
 Luxemburg Ky. Co. v. Magnay. 23 Beav. 646; 
 4 Jur. N. S. 839 ; Keade v. Woodroffe, 24 Beav. 
 421. See Elmer v. Creasy, L. R. 9 Ch. 69; 
 Saul v. Browne, id. 364; Great Western Col- 
 liery Co. v. Tucker, L. R. 9 Ch. 376, qualifying 
 while purporting to follow the rule. But see 
 French v. Rainey, 2 Tenn". Ch. 640, where the 
 authorities, pro and con, are cited and reviewed. 
 Infra, p. 720. 
 
 1 Covenhoven v. Shuler, 2 Paige, 122; see 
 Wright v. Barlow, 15 Jur. 1149; 8 Eng. Law 
 & Eq. 125; Manning v. Gloucester, 6 Pick. 6, 
 17, 18; D-.ina v. Valentine, 5 Met. 12, 13. 
 
 2 Wilkinson v. Belsher, 2 Bro. C. C. 272. 
 
 3 Mayor and Aldermen of Colchester v. 
 
 , 1 P. Wms. 595; Troughton v. Gettey, 1 
 
 Dick. 382; Cuff v. Platell, 4 Russ. 242; Make- 
 peace v Haythorne, 4 Russ. 244; King of 
 Spain r. Machado,4 Russ. 225; Page v. Town- 
 send, 5 Sim. 395 ; Glyn v. Soares, 3 M. & K. 
 
 296 
 
 450, 468; Griggs v. Staplee, 2 De G. & S. 572; 
 13 Jur. 29; Griffith v. Vanheythuysen, 9 Hare, 
 85; 15 Jur. 421; Story, Eq." PI. §§ 390, 509, 
 544, 551; Clarkson v. De Peyster, 3 Paige, 
 336 ; Clason v. Lawrence, 3 Ed. Ch. 48. 
 
 4 Thus, where a bill was tiled in the Ex- 
 chequer by certain persons on behalf of them- 
 selves and other members of a Joint-Stock 
 Company, to which an answer was put in and 
 a decree made, setting aside certain contracts 
 between the plaintiffs and the defendant, and 
 directing various accounts and inquiries, and 
 afterwards a supplemental bill was filed in the 
 name of the same plaintiffs against the same 
 defendant, seeking amongst other things a lien 
 on a part of the purchase-money, which had 
 been paid to the defendant, to which a plea was 
 put in by the defendant on the ground that one 
 of the plaintiffs in the supplemental bill had, 
 previously to the filing of it, parted with all his 
 interest in the partnership, &c, Lord Lynd- 
 hurst C. B. overruled the plea, being of opinion 
 that the supplemental bill was nothing more 
 than a continuation of the original bill, and his 
 Lordship's decision was afterwards confirmed 
 by Lord Abinger C. B. upon a rehearing. 
 Small o. Attwood, 1 Y. & C. 39.
 
 OF THE JOINDER OF PARTIES. 
 
 303 
 
 purchaser to recover the deposit. 1 Nor does the circumstance of the 
 assignor and the assignee of a chose in action being capable of suing 
 together constitute an exception, because, although the assignor has 
 parted with his beneficial interest in the subject-matter, he still is 
 interested as the owner of the legal estate. 2 
 
 If the fact of one of the plaintiffs having no interest in the suit ap- 
 pears on the bill, advantage must be taken of it by demurrer. 3 If the 
 fact does not appear upon the bill, it may be brought forward by plea ; 4 
 and where, at the hearing, the claim of one of two co-plaintiffs failed 
 entirely, while that of the other succeeded, the Vice Chancellor of 
 England dismissed the bill as against both plaintiffs, but without preju- 
 dice to the right of the one who had succeeded to file a new bill. 5 
 
 Upon a similar principle, in cases where all the plaintiffs have an 
 interest in the subject of the suit, but their interests are distinct 
 * and several, they will not be allowed to sue together as co- * 303 
 plaintiffs ; * thus, where a bill was filed by five several occupiers 
 
 i See ante, p. 195, note («). But in a suit v. Berry, 3 Tenn. Ch. 154; Gartland v. Nunn, 6 
 
 Equity by a purchaser for relief against a 
 sale at auction, in which the auctioneer used 
 fraud to enhance the price, it was held, that 
 it was not necessary to make the auctioneer 
 a party. Veazie v. Williams, 8 How. (U. S.) 
 134. But if the auctioneer is made a part}' he 
 cannot demur, in such a case, on the ground 
 that he is a mere witness. Schmidt v. Dietericht, 
 
 1 Edw. Ch. 119. 
 
 2 Ryan v. Anderson, 3 Mad. 174; see Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 153, and notes; ante, p. 198, et seq., and 
 notes. 
 
 3 Cuff w. Platell, 4 Russ. 242; King of Spain 
 r. Machado, 4 Russ. 225; l'age v. Townsend, 
 5 Sim. 395; Delondre v. Shaw, 2 Sim. 237; 
 Story. Eq. PI. §§ 541-544; Bowie v. Minter, 2 
 Ala. 406; Talmage v. Pell, 9 Paige, 410; Gos- 
 sett v. Kent, 19 Ark. 602. 
 
 4 Makepeace v. Haythorne, 4 Russ. 244; 
 Doyle v. Muntz, 5 Hare. 509; 10 Jur. 914. In 
 Watertown v. Cowen, 4 Paige, 510, it was held 
 too late to take a mere formal objection of this 
 kind for the first time at the hearing. See 
 Dickinson v. Davis, 2 Leigh, 401; Sheppard v. 
 Starke, 3 Munf. 29; Mayo o. Murchie, id. 358; 
 Story, Fxj. PL §§ 232. 236, 509, 544; Harder v. 
 Harder, 2 Sandf. Ch. 17; Bowman v. Burnley, 
 
 2 McLean, 376; Story v. Livingston, 13 Peters, 
 359; Bowie r. Minter, 2 Ala. 406; Schwoerer, 
 v. Boylston Market Association, 99 Mass. 295, 
 2;(7. If the misjoinder is of parties plaintiffs, 
 all the defendants may demur; such a mis- 
 joinder is a proper ground of objection. Cam- 
 in eyer v. United German Lutheran Churches, 2 
 Sandf. Ch. 186; Christian D.Crocker, 25 Ark. 
 327. If the misjoinder is of parties as defend- 
 ants, those only can demur who are improp- 
 erly joined. Toulmin ». Hamilton, 7 Ala. 362. 
 Cherry v. Monro, 2 Barb. Ch. 618; Great West- 
 ern Compound Co. v. Etna Ins. Co. 40 Wis. 
 373; Christian v. Crocker, 25 Ark. 327; Payne 
 
 Eng. 720; Miller v. Jamison. 24 N. J. Eq. 41; 
 Warthen ?'. Brantley, 34 Miss. 571; infra, 
 337, n. 3. But if a person is improperly joined 
 as a defendant, who is without the jurisdiction, 
 and is therefore a party only by virtue of the 
 usual prayer of process, such misjoinder will 
 not affect the cause; for until he has appeared 
 and acted, no decree can be had against him. 
 And in cases of misjoinder of plaintiffs, the ob- 
 jection ought to be taken by demurrer; for if 
 not so taken, and the Court proceeds to a hear- 
 ing on the merits, it will be disregarded, at 
 least if it does not materially affect the pro- 
 priety of the decree. Story, Eq. PI. § 544, 
 and notes. 
 
 5 Cowley v. Cowley, 9 Sim. 229; Padwick v. 
 Piatt, 11 Beav. 503; Pulham v. McCarthy, 1 
 H L. Cas. 703; see also Blair v. Bromley, 5 
 Hare, 542, 553; 2 Phil. 354, Moore v. Moore, 
 17 Ala. 631. It seems, however, that in gen- 
 eral an objection of this kind, if not raised upon 
 the pleadings, will not be allowed at the hear- 
 ing. Eades v. Harris, 2 Y. & C. 230; Raffety 
 v. King. 1 Keen, 601; Cashell v. Kelly, 2 Dr. 
 & W. 181; Louis v. Meek, 2 Greene (Iowa), 
 55; Murray v. Hay, 1 Barb. Ch. 59. But the 
 Court may in its discretion, and under circum- 
 stances, in such a case, dismiss the bill as to 
 all the plaintiffs, or only as to those who are 
 improperly joined. Myers v. Earrington, 18 
 Ohio, 72. Where a person is made a co-plain- 
 tiff improperly, without his privity or consent, 
 the proper motion is that his name be stricken 
 out, not that the bill be dismissed, even as 
 to him. So. Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Lanier, 5 
 Ela. 110. It seems the objection of misjoinderof 
 plaintiffs cannot be taken on a rehearing. Fow- 
 ler v. Reynal, 3 M'N. & G. 500, 511; 15 Jur. 
 1019, 1021. 
 
 1 Hudson v. Maddison. 12 Sim. 416; 5 Jur. 
 1194; and see Powell v. Cockerell, 4 Hare, 
 
 297
 
 303 
 
 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 of houses in a town, to restrain the erection of a steam-engine, alleging 
 that it would be a nuisance to each of them, the Vice Chancellor of 
 England dissolved an injunction obtained in the suit, 2 upon the ground 
 that each occupier had a distinct right of suit, and therefore that they 
 could not sue as co-plaintiffs. 3 (a) 
 
 557, 562, 10 Jur. 243, where the objection was 
 disallowed ; and Miles v. Dumford, 2 Sim. 
 N. S. 234, 21 L. J. Ch. 6G7, L. JJ., where the 
 plaintiff filed a bill in two characters, in one of 
 which he could not sue. See infra, 313, n. 8. 
 For a case since 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, see Beech- 
 ing v. Lloyd, 3 Drew. 227. See. Merrill v. 
 Lake, 16 Ohio, 373; Ohio r. Ellis, 10 Ohio, 
 456; Poynes v. Creagh, 2 Irish Eq. 190; Beaty 
 v. Judy, 1 Dana, 103; Boyd v. Hoyt, 5 Paige 
 65; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 279," 530, 531*; Yeaton v. 
 Lenox, 8 Peters, 123 ; Harrison v. Hogg, 2 
 Ves. Jr. 323. 328; Brinkerhoff v. Brown, 6 
 John. Ch. 139, 150-153; Clarkson v. De Pey- 
 ster. 3 Paige, 320; Lentilhon v. Moffat, 1 Edw. 
 Ch. 451 ; Hallett v. Hallett, 2 Paige, 15; Egbert 
 v. Woods, 3 Paige, 517; Van Cleef v. Sickles, 
 5 Paige, 505; Baily v. Bruton, 8 Wendell, 
 
 (a) The later decisions follow Murray v. 
 Hay, cited in the note, allowing joinder of 
 plaintiffs to restrain a common nuisance, in 
 preference to Hudson v. Maddisc.n. See Cadi- 
 gan v. Brown, 120 Mass. 493; Smith v. Smith, 
 148 Mass. 1; Nash v. New England Life Ins. 
 Co. 127 Mass. 91; Mitchell v. Thome, 134 
 N. Y. 536: Brady v. Weeks, 3 Barb. 157; 
 Emery v. Erskine, 66 Barb. 9; Peck v. Elder, 
 3 Sandf. 126; Hinchman v. Paterson Railroad 
 Co. 17 N. J. Eq. 75; Morris & Essex Railroad 
 Co. v. Prudden, 20 id. 530; Demarest v. Hard- 
 ham, 34 id. 46; Rowbotham v. Jones, 47 id. 
 337; 48 id. 311; Rafferty v. Central Traction 
 Co. (Penn.) 23 Atl. Rep. 884; 29 W. N. C. 
 542; Sullivan v. Phillips, 110 Ind. 320; Tate 
 v. Ohio & M. R. Co. 10 Ind. 174 ; 71 Am Dec. 
 309, and note; Upington v. Oviatt, 24 Ohio St. 
 232; Pollock v. Lester, 11 Hare, 266, 274: 
 Unifreville v. Johnson, L. R. 10 Ch. 580, note; 
 Robinson v. Baugh, 31 Mich. 290 ; Middleton 
 V. Flat River Co. 27 Mich. 533; Taylor v. Bay 
 City Street Railway Co. 80 Mich. 77; Pettibone 
 v. Hamilton, 40 Wis. 402; Atchison Street Ry. 
 Co. o. Nave, 38 Kansas, 744 ; Keys v. Mathes, id. 
 212; Jeffers v. Forbes, 28 Kansas, 174; Bridger 
 v. Thrasher, 22 Fla. 383; Grant v. Schmidt, 
 22 Minn. 1; Schultz v. Winter, 7 Nev. 130; 
 Fogg v. Nevada C. O. Ry. Co. 20 Nev. 429. 
 
 The following decisions are of interest in 
 this connection. Persons induced to subscribe 
 for stock by fraudulent representations in a 
 prospectus have a common interest and may 
 join, for the benefit of all so deceived, as plain- 
 tiffs in a suit to set aside their subscriptions. 
 Bosher v. Richmond & H. L. Co. (Va.) 16 
 
 298 
 
 339; Kay v. Jones, 7 J. J. Marsh 37; Burlin- 
 game v. Hobbs, 12 Gray, 367, 372; Emans v. 
 Emans, 13 N. J. Eq. 205. 
 
 2 Hudson v. Maddison, 12 Sim. 416. 
 
 3 But it has been held that two or more per- 
 sons, having separate and distinct tenements 
 which are injured or rendered uninhabitable by 
 a common nuisance, or which are rendered less 
 valuable by a private nuisance, which is a com- 
 mon injury to the tenements of both, may join 
 in a suit to restrain such nuisance. Murray v. 
 Hay, 1 Barb. Ch. 59; Putnam v. Sweet, 1 
 Chand. (Wis.) 286; Pettibone v. Hamilton, 40 
 Wis. 402. The Court exercises a sound dis- 
 cretion, without adhering to an inflexible rule, 
 in determining whether there has been a mis- 
 joinder of parties in Equity. 
 
 S. E. Rep. 360. But different depositors in a 
 bank, who are deceived by its managers, can- 
 not join as co-plaintiffs to obtain restitution 
 from them. Chester v. Halliard, 36 N. J. Eq. 
 313; and see Hallows v. Femie. L. R. 3 Ch. 
 467; L. R. 3 Eq. 520; ante, p. 26, note (a). 
 Different tax-payers, complaining of the same 
 illegality, and statinga case for equitable relief, 
 may, it seems, join as plaintiffs when they 
 have the same grounds for relief. Union 
 Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cheyenne, 113 U. S. 516; 
 Cutting i'. Gilbert, 5 Blatch. 259; Kerr v. Lan- 
 sing, 17 Mich. 34; Gallowaj' v. Jenkins, 63 
 N. C. 147; Johnson v. Drummond, 20 Gratt. 
 419; Williams v. Grant County Court, 26 W. 
 Va. 488; 53 Am. Rep. 94; Webster v. Har- 
 winton, 32 Conn. 131. Several mill-owners or 
 riparian proprietors may join as plaintiffs to 
 restrain the diversion or pollution of a water- 
 course. Greene v. Canny, 137 Mass. 64; Ballou 
 v. Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 328; Churchill c. Lauer, 
 84 Cal. 233; Cornwell Manuf. Co. v. Swift, 89 
 Mich. 503; Sullivan v. Phillips, 110 Ind. 320; 
 Reid v. Gifford, Hopk. Ch. 416. In regulating 
 common rights, Equity may in one suit deter- 
 mine and apportion the respective rights of 
 persons entitled to a common use, in order to 
 protect the rights of each. Wright v. Howard, 
 1 Sim. & Stu. 190; Arthur v. Case, 1 Paige, 
 447; Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 John. Ch. 165, 
 Olmstead v. Loomis, 9 N. Y. 423; Mason v. 
 Ho vie, 56 Conn. 255; Burnham v. Kempton, 
 44 N. H. 78; Fuller ». Daniels, 63 N. H. 395; 
 Allan! v. Carleton, 64 N. H. 24; Bemis v. 
 Upham, 13 Pick. 171; Ulbricht v. Eufaula 
 Water Co. 86 Ala. 587; Frey v. Lowden, 70 Cal.
 
 OF THE JOINDER OF PARTIES. 
 
 304 
 
 Later, however, the consequences of a misjoinder were by no means 
 so serious as formerly; for. by the Chancery Amendment Act of 1852, 
 it was provided that " no suit in the said Court shall be dismissed by 
 reason only of the misjoinder of persons as plaintiffs therein, but when- 
 ever it shall appear to the Court that, notwithstanding the conflict of 
 interests in the co-plaintiffs, or the want of interest in some of the 
 plaintiffs, or the existence of some ground of defence affecting some or 
 one of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs, or some or one of them, are or is 
 entitled to relief, the Court shall have power to grant such relief, and to 
 modify its decree, according to the special circumstances of the case, 
 and for that purpose to direct such amendments, if any, as may be 
 necessary, and at the hearing, before such amendments are made, to 
 treat any one or more of the plaintiffs as if he or they was or were a 
 defendant or defendants in the suit, and the remaining or other plaintiff 
 or plaintiffs was or were the only plaintiff or plaintiffs on the record ; 
 and where there is misjoinder of plaintiffs, and the plaintiff having an 
 interest shall have died, leaving a plaintiff on the record without an 
 interest, the Court may, at the hearing of the cause, order the cause to 
 stand revived as may appear just, and proceed to the decision of the 
 cause, if it shall see fit, and give such directions, as to costs or otherwise, 
 as may appear just and expedient." 4 
 
 The provision of the Act is imperative, and does not leave it to the 
 discretion of the Court whether to dismiss the bill or not. 5 
 
 * The Act applies to the case where a plaintiff sues on behalf * 304 
 of himself and the others of a class ; 1 thus, where a bill was filed 
 
 4 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 49. 
 
 5 Clements v. Bowes, 1 Drew. 684; see also, 
 for cases of misjoinder since the Act, Carter 
 v. Sanders, 2 Drew. 248; Upton v. Vanner, 
 10W. R. 99, V. C. K.; Burdick v. Garrick, 
 L. R. 5 Ch. 233. In Barton v. Barton, 3 K. & 
 J. 512, 3 Jur. N. S. 8i>8, the bill was not dis- 
 missed for misjoinder, but for want of interest 
 in the plaintiffs ; and the marginal note in 
 
 550; Patten Paper Co. v. Kaukauna Water 
 Power Co. 70 Wis. 659; Webb v. Portland 
 Manuf. Co. 3 Sumner, 198; McConnaughty v. 
 Pennover, 43 Fed. Rep. 339. So two or more 
 creditors may join as plaintiffs in Equity to set 
 aside a fraudulent conveyance of their common 
 debtor. Tower Manuf. Co. r. Thompson, 90 
 Ala. 129; Gibson r. Trowbridge F. Co. 93 Ala. 
 579; Sheldon » Keokuk N. L. P. Co. 10 Biss. 
 470; Boniar r. Means, 37 S. C. 520; Cohen V. 
 Wolff (Ga.), 17 S. E. Rep. 1029; Sherman v. 
 American Stove Co. 8") Mich. 169. Different 
 creditors having different claims against, but 
 a common interest in, the same property may 
 join as plaintiffs in one suit where there is a 
 common liability on the part of the defendants. 
 Pfohl v. Simpson, 74 N. Y. 137. A single 
 award, made on the joint submission of several 
 
 3 K. & J. 512 appears to be incorrect in this 
 respect. 
 
 1 Clements v. Bowes, 1 Drew. 634; and see 
 Williams v. Page, 24 Beav, 669; 4 Jur. N. S. 
 102; Evans v. Coventry, 5 DeG. M. &, G. 911; 
 2 Jur N. S. 557; see also Stupart v. Arrow- 
 smith, 3 Sin. & G. 176; Williams v. Salmond, 
 2 K. & J. 463; 2 Jur. N. S. 251, Gwatkiu v. 
 Campbell, 1 Jur. N. S. 131, V C. \V. 
 
 fire insurance companies interested in one loss, 
 may be set aside upon their joint bill. Hartford 
 Fire Ins Co. v. Bonner Mercantile Co. 44 Fed. 
 Rep. 151. 
 
 Plaintiffs whose claims nre distinct, antago- 
 nistic, or different in kind, cannot join in one 
 bill. Ward v. Sittincbourne Ry. Co. L. R. 9 
 Ch. 488; McMurray v. Van Gilder, 56 Iowa, 605; 
 Powell v. Dayton &c. R. Co. 13 Oregon, 446 : 
 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Bonner M. Co. 44 
 Fed. Rep. 151; I/ingdon V. Branch, 37 id. 449; 
 Woodruff r. Young. 43 Mich. 548; Barham v. 
 Hostetter, 67 Cal. 272. See Hazard v. Dillon, 
 34 Fed. Ren. 485: Summerlin r. Fronterina S. 
 M. Co. 41 id. 249; Osborne p. Wisconsin Cen- 
 tral R. Co. 43 id. 824: Walker r. Powers, 104 
 U. S. 245; Stebbins v. St. Anne, 116 U. S. 386. 
 
 299
 
 * 304 OF PARTIES TO A SUIT. 
 
 by one member of a company on behalf of himself and all others, ex- 
 cept the defendants, praying an account of the receipts and payments 
 of the defendants on behalf of the company, and payment of what 
 should be found due to the plaintiff, and it appeared that there were 
 circumstances which made the interest of some of the persons purport- 
 ing to be represented by the plaintiff different from his, it was held, 
 that the Court could, under the above-mentioned section, treat the ab- 
 sent plaintiffs as defendants, and determine whether a decree should be 
 made; and, accordingly, the Court decreed an account giving liberty 
 to some of the shareholders whose interest differed from the plaintiff's 
 to attend the proceedings in chambers.' 2 
 
 It has been held, that a misjoinder of plaintiffs is now no objection to 
 a motion for an injunction and receiver, to protect property in danger 
 of being lost pending litigation. 3 
 
 2 Clements v. Bowes, 1 Drew. 634. 
 
 3 Evans v. Coventry, 5 De G. M. & G. 911; 2 Jur. N. S. 557. 
 
 300
 
 * CHAPTER VI. 
 
 *305 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 Section I. — The Different Sorts of Bills. 
 
 A suit in equity is generally commenced, on behalf of a subject, 
 by preferring what is termed a bill ; 1 and that if commenced by the 
 Attorney-General on behalf of the Crown, or of those partaking of its 
 prerogatives, or under its protection, the suit is instituted by informa- 
 tion. 2 The form of this bill and information is now regulated by statute 
 and by the orders of the Court, but the mode of commencing proceedings 
 in Chancery has been by bill since the earliest times. 8 
 
 Bills relating to matters which have not previously been brought be- 
 fore the consideration of the Court, are called original bills, and form 
 the foundation of most of the proceedings before what is termed the 
 extraordinary or equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. 4 The 
 same form of instituting a suit is also in use in all other equitable juris- 
 dictions in the kingdom except the county courts. 
 
 Besides original bills, there are other bills in use in Courts of Equity, 
 which were formerly always, and are still sometimes, necessary to be 
 preferred, for the purpose of supplying any defects which may exist in 
 the form of the original bill, or may have been produced by events sub- 
 sequent to the filing of it. Bills of this description are called 
 bills which are not original. Sometimes a * person, not a * 306 
 party to the original suit, seeks to bring the proceedings and 
 decree in the original suit before the Court, for the purpose either of 
 obtaining the benefit of it, or of procuring the reversal of the decision 
 
 1 Ante, p. 2. Under the Judicature Actand 
 Orders of Court based thereon, the defendant 
 may waive any statement of claim bj r the 
 plaintiff. But, if he fail so to do, the plaintiff 
 must, within the time prescribed, deliver to the 
 defendant a statement of his complaint, and 
 of the relief or remedy to which he claims to 
 be entitled. And the defendant shall, in like 
 manner, deliver to the plaintiff a statement of 
 his defence, set-off or counter-claim, and ihe 
 plaintiff shall deliver a statement of his reply. 
 The rules prescribed for the form of these 
 statements are substantially those which are 
 laid down for correct Chancery pleading, ex- 
 cept in requiring the statements to be divided 
 into paragraphs, numbered consecutively. Mor- 
 gan's Acts and Orders, 487; Cons. Ord. XIX. 
 
 See Belknap v. Stone, 1 Allen, 572. Ante, 
 p. 2, n. 6. The jurisdiction of the Mass. Su- 
 preme Judicial Court is exclusive over all 
 act inns in which relief in Equity is prayed for. 
 The prayer for relief gives jurisdiction of the 
 action, and therefore no affidavit for that pur- 
 pose is necessary. Its character is that of a suit 
 in Equity. Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Cone Iron 
 Works, 99 Mass. 468 ; see Irvine v. Gregory, 13 
 Gray, 215; Stat. Mass. 1865, c. 179. §2. By 
 Statute in Maine a bill in Equity may be 
 inserted in a writ to be served as other writs. 
 Stephenson p. Davis, 56 Maine, 73, 76. 
 
 2 Ante, p. 2. 
 
 s Ld. Red. 8. 
 
 4 Story, Eq. PI. §§ 16, 22. 
 
 301
 
 * 307 THE BILL. 
 
 which has been made in it. The bill which he prefers for this purpose 
 is styled a bill in the nature of an original bill. 1 
 
 Original bills are further divided usually into : (1) Original bills pray- 
 ing relief; and (2) Original bills not praying relief. 2 
 
 Original bills praying relief are again subdivided into three heads : 
 
 (1) Original bills praying the decree of the Court touching some right 
 claimed by the person exhibiting the bill, in opposition to rights claimed 
 by the person against whom the bill is exhibited ; (2) Bills of inter- 
 pleader ; and (3) Certiorari bills. 3 Original bills not praying relief are 
 of two kinds : (1) Bills to perpetuate the testimony of witnesses; and 
 
 (2) Bills of discovery. 4 The simplicity of modern proceedings, however, 
 renders the foregoing subdivision of bills in Chancery comparatively 
 unimportant. 
 
 As original bills of the first kind are those most usually exhibited, 
 the reader's attention will, in this chapter, be principally directed to 
 them. The other descriptions of bills will be more particularly consid- 
 ered when we come to treat of the practice of the Court applicable to 
 the particular suits of which they are the foundation. Bills which are 
 not original, or which are merely in the nature of original bills, will be 
 separately considered in a future part of the work ; but simple and 
 economical modes of supplying the defects of original bills have been 
 provided, which will be stated in the proper place, 5 and which have 
 rendered bills which are not original of rare occurrence. 
 
 Section II. — The Authority to file the Bill. 
 
 The first step to be taken by a party who proposes to institute a suit 
 in Chancery, unless he intends to conduct the suit in person, is to author- 
 ize a solicitor practising in the Court to commence and conduct it on 
 
 his. behalf. It does not seem to be necessary that such authorit} r 
 * 307 should be in writing, 6 * but a solicitor should, before he commences 
 
 a suit, be in possession of some written authority for that purpose, 
 as if he is not, the onus of the proof of authority will be cast on him, 1 
 and in the absence of a written retainer, he may be held to have been 
 acting without authority. 2 The retainer should of course come from 
 
 1 Story, Eq. PI. §§ 16,20, 21, l Pinner v. Knights, 6 Beav. 174; Hood v. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 34, 37, 51; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 17- Phillips, id. 176; Maries v. Maries, 23 L. J. Ch. 
 19. 154, V. C. W. See Wiggins v. Peppin, 2 B,av. 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 34, 37, 48, 50. 403; and see Re Hincks, W. N. (1867) 291, as 
 
 4 Ld. Red. 51, 53, 54. to written evidence of alleged recalling of the 
 
 5 Post, Chap. XXXIII. ; and see 15 and 16 revocation of a retainer. 
 
 Vic. c. 86, §§ 52. 53. - Wright n. Castle. 3 Mer. 12; Crossley v. 
 
 6 Lord r. Kellett, 2 M. & K. 1. As torevo- Crowther, 9 Hare, 384; Bird v. Harris, W. N. 
 ration of the authority, see Freeman v. Fairlie, (1880) 106; 29 W. R. 45; W. N. (1881) 5. As 
 8 L. J. Ch. 44, V. C. E. For the authority re- to retainer by a corporation under its common 
 quired in the case of a bill by a public company, seal, see Arnold v. Mayor of Poole, 4 M. & G. 
 see East Pant Mining Co. r. Merry weather, 10 860; and see Eley v Positive Ass. Co. 1 Ex. 
 Jur. N. S. 1231 ; 13 W. R. 216, V. C. W. ; 2 H. D. 20, 88 ; Faviell v. Eastern Counties By. Co. 
 & M. 254; Exeter & Crediton Ry. Co. v. Bui- 2 Ex. 344; 17 L. J. Ex. 297; Thames Haven 
 ler, 5 Railway Cas. 211. For forms of authority Co. v. Hall, 5 M. & G. 274, 287 ; Reg. v. Cum- 
 to sue or defend, see Vol. III. berland Justices, 5 D. & L. 431, n. ; 17 L. J. (Q. 
 
 302
 
 AUTHORITY TO FILE THE BILL. 
 
 307 
 
 the party to the suit, or from a person duly authorized to give it on his 
 behalf. 8 A retainer to act for a firm should come from each member, 
 except when some of the partners are expressly or impliedly authorized 
 to retain for the others, and in such case a retainer from them would be 
 sufficient. 4 
 
 In order to warrant a solicitor in filing a bill, the authority, be it in 
 writing or by parol, ought to be special ; and it has been held that a 
 general authority to act as solicitor for a person, will not be sufficient 
 to warrant his commencing a suit on his behalf : 5 although, under a gen- 
 eral authority, a solicitor may defend a suit for his client. 6 When a 
 solicitor acts without authority, he will in general be ordered to pay the 
 costs occasioned thereby. 7 (a) 
 
 The rule which requires a solicitor to be specially authorized to com- 
 mence a suit on behalf of his client, applies as well to cases where the 
 party sues as a co-plaintiff, 8 as to cases where he. sues alone; and even 
 to cases where his name is merely made use of pro forma. 9 As we have 
 already seen, before the name of any person is used in any suit as next 
 friend of any infant, married woman, 10 or other party, or as relator in 
 any information, such person must sign a written authority to the 
 solicitor for that purpose, and such authority must be filed with the bill 
 or information. 11 
 
 B.) 102: 25 & 26 Vic. c. 89; 30 & 31 Vic. c. 131, 
 § 37 (2), (3). 
 
 3 Pickford v. Ervington, 4 Dowl. 453. As 
 to cestui que trusts retaining on behalf of their 
 trustee, see Heinrich v. Sutton, L. R. 6 Cli. 
 220. 
 
 4 See Hambridge o. De la Croupe, 3 C. B. 742. 
 See generally Cordery on Solicitors, cc. 3, 5; 
 Pulling on Attorneys, c. 3. 
 
 5 Wilson v. Wilson, 1 J. & W. 457; see 
 also Dundas v. Dutens, 1 Ves. Jr. 196, 200; 2 
 Cox, 235, 241; Bligh v. Tredgett, 5 De G. & 
 S. 74; 15 Jur. 1101; Bewley v. Seymour, 14 
 .Tur. 213, V. C. E.; Re Manby, 3 Jur. N. S. 
 259; S. C. nom. Norton v. Cooper, 3 Sm. & G. 
 375; Fenton v. Queen's Ferry W. R. Co. L. R. 
 7 Eq. 267; Re Gray, 20 L. T. N. S. 730; and 
 see Solley v Wood, 16 Beav. 370, where an 
 authority given to a country solicitor was held 
 sufficient to warrant his town agent in tiling a 
 bill. Seel Chit. Arch. 86. 
 
 « Wright v. Castle, 3 Mer. 12. 
 
 7 Re Savage, 15 Ch. D. 557, M. R. 
 
 8 Where a suit is commenced in the names 
 of several persons by their solicitor, the Court 
 will not inquire whether such suit was author- 
 ized by all, unless some of them object to the 
 proceedings, or the adverse party shows affirm- 
 
 atively that the suit is commenced and carried 
 on in the names of some of the parties without 
 authority. Bank Commissioners v. Bank of 
 Buffalo,*6 Paige, 497. 
 
 9 In Wilson v. Wilson, 1 J. & W. 458, Lord 
 Eldon said :" I cannot agree that making a 
 person a plain! iff is only pro forma, and I am 
 disposed to go a great way in such cases; for 
 it is too much for solicitors to take upon them- 
 selves to make persons parties to suits without 
 a clear authority; there are very great mis- 
 chiefs arising f oni it." 
 
 10 See Rogers v. Hor-n, 26 W. R. 432. 
 
 11 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 11; ante, pp. 13, 68, 
 110 ; see now R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XVI. 20. In 
 a pressing case, an information was allowed to 
 be filed without the authority, on the undertak- 
 ing of the solicitor to tile it the next day. Att.- 
 Gen. v. Murray, 13 W. R. 65, V. C. K. As to 
 the liability of a person whose name is used as 
 next friend without authority, whether origi- 
 nally or in the place of one deceased, see Bligh 
 v. Tredgett, 5 De G. & S. 74; 15 Jur. 1101; 
 Ward v. Ward, 6 Beav. 251. See now New- 
 biggin-by-the-Sea Gas Co. v. Armstrong, 13 
 Ch. D. 310; Swann v. Swann, W. N. (1880) 
 191; R. S. C. Ord. VII. 1. 
 
 («) The mere fact of employing a solicitor 
 does not make him an agent to bind the person 
 employing him, at all times, to anything that 
 he may say, or by receiving notices or informa- 
 tion. Whittingstall v King, 46 L.T. 520; Saf- 
 fron Waldeu S. R. B. Society v. Rayner, 14 Ch. 
 
 D. 406; 10 id. 696. But a solicitor, who is em- 
 ployed as to a particular property or transaction, 
 appears to have a general authority to enter into 
 negotiations on his principal's behalf. See Hes- 
 ter v. Hester, 34 Ch. D. 607, 616; Re Kellock, 
 56 L. T. 887. 
 
 303
 
 * 308 THE BILL. 
 
 If a solicitor files a bill in the name of a person without having a 
 
 proper authority for so doing, such person, if he wishes to get rid of the 
 
 suit, and is the sole plaintiff, should move that the bill may be taken off the 
 
 file 12 or dismissed, 13 or that further proceedings be stayed (b) ; and 
 
 * 308 that the solicitor may be ordered to pay to the defendants * their 
 
 costs of the suit, and may be also ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs 
 of the application, and his incidental expenses, as between solicitor and 
 client. 1 The same course should be pursued where there are several 
 plaintiffs, and all repudiate the suit. But where one or more of sev- 
 eral plaintiffs desire to withdraw from the suit, they should move that 
 their names may be struck out of the bill, and that the solicitor who has 
 iui:iuthorizedly used their names may be ordered to pay their costs of 
 the suit, and the costs of the application. 2 This application can only be 
 made by the persons whose names have been so used. 3 
 
 The motion in either case must be supported by an affidavit of the 
 respective applicants themselves, that the bill has been filed without 
 any authority from them. 4 To avoid the effect of such an application, 
 the solicitor against whom it is made must show distinctly, upon affida- 
 vit, that he had a special authority from the party moving to institute 
 the suit ; and it will not be sufficient to assert generally, in opposition 
 to the plaintiff's affidavit, that authority had been given. 5 Notice of the 
 intended motion must be given to the solicitor who filed the bill ; and 
 where one or more, but not all, of the plaintiffs move, notice must also 
 be served on the co-plaintiffs, and on the defendants, 6 whose costs of 
 appearance are usually ordered to be paid by the solicitor, if the motion 
 succeeds. 7 Where the sole plaintiff applies, service on the defendants is 
 unnecessary, at least before decree ; and in one case their costs of 
 
 12 Jerdein v. Bright, 10 W. R. 380, V. C. W. ; 3 Duckett v. Gover, 25 W. R. 554; W. N. 
 Palmer v. Walesbv, L. R. 3 Ch. 732; Davies v. (1877) 80; but see Schjott v. Schjott, 19 Ch. 
 Davies, 18 L. T. N. S. 701. D. 94. 
 
 13 Wright v. Castle, 3 Mer. 12; Allen v. 4 For form of affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 
 Bone, 4 Beav. 493; Crossley v. Crowther, 9 5 In Wright v. Castle, 3 Mer. 12, the affi- 
 
 Hare, 384; Atkinson v. Abbott, 3 Drew. 251. davit of the plaintiff was met by another on the 
 
 1 Wright v. Castle, 3 Mer. 12 ; Palmer v. part of the solicitor, stating that an action had 
 Walesbv, L. R. 3 Ch. 732; and see the order in been brought by the defendant against the 
 Allen v. Bone, Seton, 852, No. 1. For form of plaintiff, on certain promissory notes: to re- 
 notice of motion, see Vol. III. strain proceedings in which action the bill had 
 
 2 Tabbernor v. Tabbernor, 2 Keen, 679. For been filed, although not by the express direc- 
 the order in that case, see 1 Seton, 635, No. 2; tions of the plaintiff, yet in the course of busi- 
 and see Wilson v. Wilson, 1J. & W. 457; Kep- ness, and by virtue of a general authority, as 
 pell v. Bailey, 2 M. & K. 548; Pinner v. the plaintiff's solicitor; but Lord Eldon did not 
 Knights, 6 Beav. 174; Hood v. Phillips, id. consider such authority sufficient. 
 
 176; see also Malins v. Greenway, 10 Beav. 6 See Newbiggin-by-the-Sea Gas Co. v. 
 
 564; 12 Jur. 66, 319, where a solicitor was Armstrong, 13 Ch. D. 310. 
 
 onhred to pay the costs of unauthorized pro- ~> Tabbernor v. Tabbernor, 2 Keen, 679 ; 
 
 ceedings in the Master's office, on behalf of 1 Seton. 635; Hood v. Phillips, 6 Beav. 176; 
 
 creditors. For form of notice of motion, see Pinner v Knights, id. 174. 
 
 Vol, III. 
 
 (b) In Nurse v. Durnford, 13 Ch. D. 764, the without payment of costs. See also Reynolds 
 
 common-law practice was approved and fol- v Howell, L. R, 8 Q. B. 398; Boswell v. Coaks, 
 
 Laved, by which the plaintiff in such case is 57 L. J. Ch. 101. 
 entitled to an order to stay the proceedings 
 
 304
 
 AUTHORITY TO FILE THE BILL. * 310 
 
 appearing, where improperly served, had to be borne by the plaintiff 
 personally. 8 
 
 The motion should be made as soon as possible after the plaintiff has 
 become acquainted with the fact of the suit having been instituted in 
 his name ; for, although, as between him and the solicitor, the 
 mere fact of the plaintiff having neglected to move that *his * 309 
 name should be struck out from the record will not exonerate 
 the solicitor ; * yet, as between the plaintiff and the other parties, the 
 Court, if there has been delay on his part in making such application, 
 will not generally dismiss the bill, but will so frame the order as not to 
 prejudice any of the parties to the cause. 2 This applies more especially 
 to cases where the person whose name has been used without due author- 
 ity is co-plaintiff with others ; for it can scarcely happen, where he is sole 
 plaintiff, that defendants should have an interest in resisting an applica- 
 tion to dismiss the bill with costs (except indeed after decree) : but where 
 he is co-plaintiff, it frequently happens that dismissing the bill would 
 interfere with the interest of the other plaintiffs, or diminish the security 
 of the defendants for costs ; in such cases the motion will usually be 
 saved to the hearing, and then the solicitor will be ordered to pay all 
 the costs and expenses of the party whose name has been used without 
 authority. 3 The solicitor has further been ordered to pay to the defend- 
 ants the difference between taxed costs and their costs and expenses. 4 
 
 Where a co-plaintiff was not apprised that his name had been made use 
 of without his authority till after the bill had been dismissed with costs, 
 and he was served with a, subpoena to pay them, Lord Eldon, upon motion, 
 ordered the solicitor to pay to the defendant the costs, which had been 
 ordered to be paid by the plaintiffs to the defendant ; and also to pay to 
 the plaintiff who made the application his costs of the application, as 
 between solicitor and client. 5 By the order there made the solicitor was 
 ordered to pay the whole costs to be paid by all the plaintiffs to the 
 defendants ; but he was to be at liberty to make any application as to 
 those costs, as against the other plaintiffs, as he should be advised. 6 
 
 In certain cases it is necessary, before a suit is commenced, to obtain 
 the sanction of the Court to its institution. The cases in which this is 
 most usually done are those in which the suit contemplated 
 * is for the benefit of an estate which is already the subject of a * 310 
 
 8 Jerdein ». Bright, 10 W. R. 380, V. C. W. 5 Wade v. Stanlev, U. & W. 674. 
 
 i Hall v. Laver, 1 Hare, 571; 5 Jur. 241; 6 S. C. Reg. Lib. B. 1819, fol. 1835. For 
 see also Burge v. Brulton, 2 Hare, 373; 7 Jur. other cases where a plaintiff, or a next friend, 
 088, as to the lien of a solicitor upon a fund re- has applied to he relieved from orders for pay- 
 covered in the cause. Delay in making the ment by them of money or costs, without their 
 application may he held evidence of a ratifica- knowledge of the suit, see Hood v. Phillips, G 
 tion of the solicitor's act. See Reynolds v. Beav. 170; Ward r. Ward, id. 251; Bligfa r, 
 Howell, L. R. 8 Q. B. 398. Tredgett, 5 De G. & S. 74 ; 15 Jur. 1101; Re 
 
 2 Titterton v. Osborne, 1 Dick. 350; and see Manby, 3 Jur. N. S. 259; S. C nom. Norton V. 
 Tarbuck v- Tarhuck, 6 Beav. 134; Pinner v. Cooper, 3 Sm. & G. 375. In Hall r. Bennett, 
 Knights, id. 174; Hood v. Phillips, id. 176; 2S.& S. 78, where the bill had been dismissed 
 Bligh v. Tredgett, 5 De G. & S. 74; 15 Jur. w-ith costs for want of prosecution, the plain- 
 1101; and see Re Savage, 15 Ch. D. 557. tiff's solicitor was ordered to pay the defend- 
 
 3 See Dundas v. Dutens, 2 Cox, 235, 241 ; ant's costs, the plaintiff having absconded be- 
 1 Yes. Jr. 196. fore s-uit, and never authorized or sanctioned it. 
 
 * Ibid. 1 Ves. Jr. 200. 
 
 vol. i. —20 305
 
 311 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 proceeding in Court, and the expenses of which are to be paid out of 
 such estate. 1 In these cases the Court would not formerly direct tho 
 institution of such a suit upon motion, although supported by affida- 
 vits, without previously referring it to the Master to inquire whether it 
 would be for the benefit of the parties at whose joint expense it was 
 to be : unless the other parties interested, being of age, and competent 
 to consent, chose to waive such reference. 2 Now, however, the proper 
 mode of application for orders of this description is by summons at 
 Chambers, 3 supported by affidavit or other evidence of the facts from 
 which the Judge can determine whether the proposed suit is proper to 
 be instituted : and the opinion of an Equity barrister, in actual practice, 
 is usually required, that there is a good ground of suit. 
 
 In the same manner, where the property of an infant is the subject of 
 a suit already depending, and it becomes necessary that another suit 
 should be instituted on behalf of the infant, it is usual, before any steps 
 are taken in it, to obtain in Chambers, on summons, 4 an order sanctioning 
 such contemplated proceedings as being for the benefit of the infant. Yet 
 such order can only be made where the property of the infant is already 
 subject to the control and disposition of the Court in another suit ; and 
 that in ordinary cases, where a person commences an original proceeding 
 on behalf of an infant as his next friend, he is considered as taking upon 
 himself the whole responsibility of it ; nor will the Court, either before or 
 after the commencement of the proceeding, direct an inquiry whether 
 it will be for the infant's benefit, at the instance of the next friend 
 himself (unless in cases where there are two or more suits brought 
 * 311 by different next friends for the same object) : although, we * have 
 seen, it will sometimes do so at the instance of other parties. 1 
 
 It has been before stated, that the committee of the estate of an idiot 
 or lunatic ought, previously to instituting a suit on his behalf, to obtain 
 the sanction of the Lord Chancellor or Lords Justices to the proceed- 
 ing ; 2 and that in the case of suits by the assignees of bankrupts, it is 
 necessary, previously to instituting the suit, to procure the sanction of 
 the Court of Bankruptcy. 8 And in like manner, before a suit can be 
 instituted on behalf of a charity, unless by the Attorney-General, the 
 sanction of the Charity Commissioners must be obtained. 4 
 
 In all the above-mentioned cases, in which it is stated to be right, 
 previously to the institution of a suit, to obtain the proper sanction, the 
 omission to obtain such sanction is not a ground upon which a defend- 
 ant to the suit can object to its proceeding. 5 
 
 1 Thus,whe-ethereisasuit pendingfor thead- purpose, application should be made to the 
 
 ministration of assets, and it becomes necessary, 
 in order to pet iti the estate, that a suit should be 
 instituted against adebtor totlie estate, it is usual 
 for the personal representative, previously to 
 tiling a bill, to apply, in the administration suit, 
 for the leave of the Court to exhibit a bill for that 
 purpose. And so where a suit has been instituted 
 for winding up partnership accounts upon a dis- 
 solution, and a receiver has been appointed to col- 
 lect the outstanding effects, if it is necessary, in 
 order to recover a debt due to the partnership, 
 that the receiver should institute a suit for that 
 
 306 
 
 Court, on the part of some of the parties, that 
 the receiver may be at liberty to tile the neces- 
 sary bill in the names of the partners. 
 
 2 Musgrave v. Medex, 3 V. & B. 167. 
 
 3 For forms of summons, see Vol. III. 
 * Ibid. See ante, p. 80. 
 
 i Ante, pp. 71, 80. 
 
 2 Ante, p. 85. 
 
 3 Ante, p. 65. 
 
 4 16 & 17 Vic. c. 137, § 17; see post, Chap. 
 XLV. § 2, Charitable Trusts Acts. 
 
 5 Having regard to the words of the 17th
 
 BY WHOM PREPARED. 
 
 312 
 
 Section III. — By whom Prepared. 
 
 The solicitor being duly authorized, the next step in the institution 
 of a suit is to have the bill properly prepared. The duty of drawing 
 the bill ought, strictly, to be performed by the solicitor, who is allowed 
 a fee for so doing ; 6 but as the rules of Court require that the 
 draft should be signed by counsel, 7 and as * much of the success * 312 
 of the suit may depend upon the manner in which the bill is 
 framed, it has been found more convenient in practice that the bill 
 should be prepared as well as signed by counsel ; and accordingly, 
 except in particular cases, instead of the draft of the bill being pre- 
 pared by the solicitor, and laid before counsel for his perusal and sig- 
 nature, the instructions to prepare the bill are generally, in the first 
 instance, laid before the counsel, who prepares the draft from those 
 instructions, and afterwards affixes his signature to it. 1 If neither the 
 draft of the bill nor the print or engrossment of it be signed by counsel 
 before the bill is filed, or the hand be counterfeit or disowned, the bill 
 
 section of the Charitable Trusts Act above re- 
 ferred to, it would seem doubtful whether the 
 want of sanction would not be an objection 
 which a defendant might take to the suit's pro- 
 ceeding. See Braund v. Earl of Devon, L. R. 
 3 Ch. 800: In re Lister's Hospital, 6 De G. M. 
 & G. 104; Holme v. Guy, 5 Ch. D. 901; Att.- 
 Gen. v. Dean & Canons of Manchester, 28 Ch. 
 D. 590 ; W. N. (1881) 100. See Hodgson v. 
 Forster, \V. N. (1877) 74. 
 
 6 Regul. to Ord. 9d Sched. 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. VIII. 1, 2; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 47, 
 269 ; 1 Smith, Ch. Pr. (2d Am. ed.) 106 ; Ayck- 
 bourn, Ch. Pr. (Loud. ed. 1844) 5,6; Coop. Eq. 
 PI. 18; Davis v. Davis, 19 N. .1. Eq. 180; Wright 
 v. Wright, 4 Halst. Ch. (N. J.) 153; Chancery 
 Rule 1 of New Jersey, 15 N. J. Eq. 513; 
 Hatch v. Eustaphieve, 1 Clarke, 63; see Bel- 
 knap v. Stone, 1 Allen, 572, 574; Burns v. 
 Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. The signing on the back 
 of the bill is sufficient. Dwighte. Humphreys, 
 3 McLean, 104. The 24th Equity Rule of the 
 U. S. Supreme Court expressly requires the 
 signature of c unsel to the bill. Where a cor- 
 poration is plaintiff, the bill, if not a sworn one, 
 is drawn in the name of the corporation, by its 
 chartered title, and signed by counsel. In cases 
 where the bill is to be sworn to, it should be 
 signed by the officer making the oath. 1 Hoff. 
 Ch. Pr. 96; 1 Barbour, Ch. Pr. 44; Dickin- 
 son's Ch. Pr. 103, note. The bill need not be 
 under the corporate seal, but is vouched for by 
 signature of the solicitor, (<i) whose authority 
 need not be exhibited. George's Creek Co. v. 
 Detmold, 1 Md. Ch. 371. A plaintiff who man- 
 ages his cause in person must sign the bill, 
 which need not then be signed by counsel. See 
 
 1 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 97. The rules include informa- 
 tions, see Prel. Ord. 10 (4). The signature of 
 the Attorney-General is required to an infor- 
 mation, and to an amendment of it, in addition 
 to the signature of the counsel who settles the 
 draft. In Attorney-General v. Fellows, 1 J. & 
 W. 254, an amended information was thus 
 ordered to be taken off the file, though the 
 Attorney-General had signed the original in- 
 formation. For forms of notice of motion in 
 such case, see Vol III. 
 
 1 The bill must be signed by counsel. The 
 mere signature of counsel by another person is 
 not a compliance with the rule, either in spirit 
 or letter. Counsel, before annexing his name 
 to a bill, should have perused it, or been in- 
 formed of its contents in such manner as would 
 satisfy him that he might certify that the bill 
 stated a case in which the plaintiff might be 
 entitled to relief, set forth w.th so much regard 
 to the essential rules of pleading, and praying 
 relief in such manner as to entitle it to the con- 
 sideration of the Court. Per Chancellor Za- 
 briskie, in Davis v. Davis, 19 N. J. Eq. 180, 181; 
 but the signature by counsel in the firm name 
 will be good. Hampton v. Coddington. 28 N. 
 J. Eq. 557. And the signing on the back of the 
 bill is sufficient. Dwight B. Humphreys, 2 
 McLean, 104. See Rule 24 of the Equity 
 Rules of the U. S. Supreme Court. In Mich - 
 gan, where all solicitors are also counsel, a bill 
 signed by a solicitor is not demurrable for want 
 of the signature of counsel. Henry v. Gregory, 
 29 Mich. 68. The lawyer who signs pleadings 
 in ( lhancery usually designates himself as solici- 
 tor. 1 Hicks's Man. Ch. Pr. 46 ; see Puterb. 
 Ch. Pr. 59 ; infra, p 732. 
 
 (a) So of a bill brought by a municipal corporation. 
 (W. Va.) 20 L. R. A. 161. 
 
 Moundsville v. Ohio River R. Co. 
 
 307
 
 * 313 THE BILL. 
 
 will be dismissed on the defendant's demurrer or motion. 2 Thus, a 
 demurrer has been allowed to an amended bill, because the name of 
 counsel did not appear to the bill ; 8 and if, upon inspection of the record 
 or an office copy, the name of counsel does not appear subscribed to the 
 bill, the Court will, of its own accord, order it to be taken off the file. 4 (a) 
 The usual course, however, in such a case, appears to be for the 
 defendant to move that the bill may be taken off the file, and that the 
 costs may be paid by the plaintiff. 5 If, upon such a motion, any doubt 
 arises whether the draft of the bill was signed by counsel or not, the 
 Court may direct an inquiry into the fact ; and if it appears that it was 
 not signed by counsel, the bill will be ordered to be taken off the file, 
 and the plaintiff directed to pay the defendant his costs. 6 A motion to 
 take the bill off the file, with costs, may also be made where the draft 
 has been altered after it was signed by counsel. 7 
 
 * 313 * Where the same counsel who signed the draft of the original 
 
 bill amends his former draft, which has his signature, it is not 
 necessary that he should sign the draft again, as the signature will be 
 applied as well to the amendment as to the former draft; nor is it 
 necessary that there should be a second signature to the record. But if 
 the amendments are made by another counsel, then it is necessary that 
 there should be a second signature. 1 The usual practice, however, is for 
 counsel in all cases to re-sign the draft, whenever he amends it. 2 
 
 By one of the orders of the Court, it is ordered that no counsel shall 
 sign any bill, answer, or other pleading, unless it be drawn, or at least 
 perused, by himself, before it is signed; and that counsel shall take 
 care that deeds, writings, or records be not unnecessarily set out therein, 
 in hcec verba; but that so much of them only as is pertinent and material be 
 set out or stated, or the effect and substance of so much of them only as is 
 pertinent and material be given, as counsel may deem advisable, without 
 needless prolixity ; and that no scandalous matter be inserted therein. 3 
 
 2 Davis v. Davis, 19 N. J. Eq. 180 ; Carey » Troup v. Ricardo, 13 W. R. 147, L. C. 
 r. Hatch, 2 Edw. Ch. 190. It cannot be signed Where it appeared that a solicitor had forged a 
 afterwards without an order of Court. Part- counsel's name to a pleading, he was fined £20, 
 ridge v. Jackson, 2 Edw. Ch. 520. The want and committed till the fine was paid; the party 
 of the signature of counsel is a defect which for whom he acted was also fined £100. Whit- 
 requires an amendment. Wright v. Wright, 4 lock v. Harriot, 1 Dick. 16; and see Bull v. 
 Halst. Ch. (N. J.) 153. Griffin, 2Anst. 563. 
 
 a Kirklev v. Burton, 5 Mad. 378. » Webster*. Threlfall, 1 S. & S. 135 ; Braith- 
 
 * French v. Dear, 5 Ves. 547, 550. Where waite's Pr. 304; see, however. Burch v. Rich, 
 
 the plaintiff di- covers, before appearance, that 1 R. & M. 156, 158. 
 
 counsel's name has been omitted to the bill as * Where the amendments proposed to be 
 
 filed, he should obtain an order of course, on made in the bill are merely of clerical errors 
 
 motion or petition, to amend, and then add the in names, dates, or sums, and such errors are 
 
 name to the bill. As to an omission to print specified in the order authorizing the amend- 
 
 the signature, see Coppeard v. Mayhew, 22 ments, the signature of counsel to such amend- 
 
 L. J. Ch. 408 M. R. ments is not required. Braithwaite's Pr. 304. 
 
 ' 5 For form of notice of motion, see Vol. III. 3 Cons. Ord. VIII. 2; Davis v. Davis, 19 N. 
 
 6 Dillon v. Francis, 1 Dick. 68; Pitt v. Mack- J. Eq. 180, 181 ; Hood r. Irwin, 4 John. Ch. 437; 
 
 lew, 1 S. & S. 136, n. 24th. 26th, and 27th Equity Rules of the U. S. 
 
 (a) See Burns v. Lvnde, 6 Allen, 305; Pope 514; Eveland v. Stephenson, 45 Mich. 394; 
 
 r. Salamanca Oil Co. "l 15 Mass. 286; Roach r. Bachman v. Einhorn, 12 Phila. 391. If a bill, 
 
 Hilling, 5 Cranch. O. C. 637; Stinson v. Hil- brought by ten persons, is signed by only two of 
 
 drup, 8 Biss. 376 ; Secor r. Singleton, 9 Fed. them, it is the bill of the latter only. Chap- 
 
 Rep.809 ; Litton v. Arinstead, 9 Baxter (Tenu.), man v. Banker & T. Pub. Co. 128 Mass. 478. 
 308
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. 
 
 313 
 
 Section IV. — The Matter of the Bill. 
 
 An original bill in Chancery is in the nature of a declaration at Com- 
 mon Law, or of a libel and allegation in the Spiritual Courts. 4 (a) It 
 
 Supreme Court, stated post, Vol. III. See, for 
 casesof prolixity, under t lie Judicature Act and 
 the New Rules, Davy v. Garrett, 7 Ch. D. 473 ; 
 
 (n) As to the statement of claim under the 
 present English practice, see 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. 
 (•5th Eng. ed.) 400, 1 Seton on Judgments (5th 
 ed.), 30. 
 
 In America the Code Procedure, which now 
 prevails in a majority of the States, which is 
 largely equitable, and upon which the present 
 English system, established in 1873, and in 
 operation since Nov. 1, 1875, appears to be 
 partly based, abolishes forms of actions, allows 
 the facts to be stated in ordinary and concise 
 language, and legal or equitable relief, or both, 
 to be obtained in the same suit. See Townsend 
 r. Bogert, 126 N. Y. 370; Sternberger v. Mc- 
 Govern, 56 N. Y. 12; Porous Plaster Co. v. Sea- 
 bury, 43 Hun, 611; Sullivan v. Iron Silver M. 
 Co. 109 U. S. 550; Naumberg v. Hyatt, 24 Fed. 
 Rep. 808; Gilpin County Mining Co. v. Drake, 
 8 Col. 586; Home Ins. Co. v. Atchison &c. R. 
 Co. (Col.) 34 Pac. Rep. 281; Rogers v. Duhart, 
 97 Cal. 500 ; Wilcox v. Saunders, 4 Neb. 587 ; 25 
 Am. L. Rev. 523; 19 Albany L. J. 292; 1 So. 
 L. Rev. N. S. 459; 2 N. Y. State Bar Ass. 130, 
 150. As to changing an action at Law into a suit 
 in Equity by amendment in other States, see 
 post, p. 403, note ('/). The vital distinctions be- 
 tween Law and Equity are not thereby affected, 
 and the rules of Equity as to parties, relief, &c. 
 remain unchanged. Basey v. Gallagher, 20 
 Wall 670; Whittenton Manuf. Co. v. Memphis 
 & O. R. P. Co. 19 Fed. Rep. 273; Gudger v : 
 Western N. C. R. Co. 21 id. 81; Reubens v 
 Joel, 13 N. Y. 488, 494; Mowry v. Hill, 11 Wis. 
 146; Truman p. McCollum, 20 Wis 360; Smith 
 r. Rowe, 4 Cal. 6; Schroers v. Fisk, 10 Col. 
 599; Leitendorfer v. King, 7 Col. 436; Brad- 
 bury v. Butler, 1 Col. App. 410. 433 ; Roper 
 Lumber Co. v. Wallace. 93 N. C. 22; Chapman 
 v. Lipscomb, 18 S. C.222; Allen v. Winstandlv, 
 (Ind.), 34 N. E. Rep. 699. 
 
 Under the Code Procedure facts are to be 
 stated according to their legal effect, and a fact 
 re<ulting from other facts, not merely supply- 
 'tig evidence thereof, but being matter of sub- 
 stance, should be stated. Rochester R. Co. r. 
 Robinson, 133 N. Y. 242; Burkett ». Griffith, 
 90 Cal. 532. If the complaint clearly sets out a 
 cause of action, the Court may grant any relief 
 embraced in the issues. Hurlbutt v. N. W. 
 Spaulding Saw Co. 93 Cal. 55. A complaint 
 is not demurrable because the proper form of 
 relief is not demanded. Phenix Nat. Bank v. 
 
 Knowles v. Roberts, 38 Ch. D. 263; Ormerod v 
 Todmorden Mill Co. 8 Q. B. D. 664. 
 4 3 Bl. Com. 442; Gilb. For. Rom. 44. 
 
 Cleveland Co. 34 N. Y. State Rep. 498 ; see 
 Bell v. Gittere, 30 id. 219; Baker v. Mo. Pac. 
 Ry. 34 Mo. App. 98; Neilson v. Fry, 16 Ohio 
 St. 552. Averments should be specific ; but 
 reasonable certainty only is required in any 
 Code pleading, and a valid defence, though 
 pleaded defectively, will not be ignored. 
 Tehama County r. Bryan, 68 Cal. 57; Brown 
 v. Weldon, 71 Cal. 393; Clay r. Edgerton, 19 
 Ohio St. 549; West v. Tylor, 2 Coldw. (Tenn.) 
 96; Nashville &c. R. Co. v. Conk, 11 Ueisk. 
 575 ; Saunders v. Soutter, 126 N. Y. 193. And 
 such a construction will be given as will sus- 
 tain the pleading. Sylvis v. Sylvis, 11 Col. 
 319. If a complaint is not objected to by 
 demurrer on the ground of uncertainty, the 
 objection cannot be urged upon appeal. Sal- 
 lield v. Sutter County Land Imp. Co. 94 Cal. 
 546. The remedy, when the complaint or 
 other pleading is uncertain and indefinite upon 
 its face, is by amendment, which may be 
 required by the Court. N. Y. Code of Civil 
 Proc. § 546; Blake v. Barnes, 30 N. Y. State 
 Rep. 299. In California ambiguity and uncer- 
 tainty are treated as separate grounds of 
 demurrer. White v. Allatt, 87 Cal. 245; Wil- 
 hoit r. Cunningham, id. 453. Mere surplus- 
 age in a complaint does not make it insufficient. 
 Demartin v. Albeit, 68 Cal. 277. A defective 
 complaint may be cured by an answer which 
 supplies the omissions. Schenck v. Hartford 
 Five Ins. Co. 71 Cal. 28: Rogers v. New York 
 & T. Land Co. (N. Y.) 32 N. E. Rep. 27. In 
 Wisconsin a general demurrer lies to a com- 
 plaint which imperfectly states a cause of action 
 in Equity, but alleges facts which, of them- 
 selves, might constitute a cause of action at 
 Law. Denner o. Chicago &c. Ry. Co. 57 Wis. 
 218. And an action upon a legal demand is not 
 in Equity when, in addition to the money judg- 
 ment, the complaint prays for such further 
 relief as may be equitable. Bailey r. /Etna 
 Ins. Co. 77 Wis. 336; see Hagan v. Patterson, 
 10 Rush. 441. 
 
 The D. S. Statute a* to conforming to State 
 practice, and U. S. Rev. Stats. § 914, provid- 
 ing that the forms of pleading in the Federal 
 Courts shall be the same as those employed in 
 the same action in the State Courts, do not 
 apply to Equity suits in the Federal Conn-. 
 which have one uniform system throughout the 
 United States, and do not permit legal and 
 
 309
 
 314 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 was, in its origin, nothing but a petition to the King, which, after being 
 presented, was referred to the Lord Chancellor, as the keeper of his 
 conscience ; 5 and a bill still continues to be framed in the nature and 
 style of a petition ; though it is now, in the first instance, generally ad- 
 dressed to the Lord Chancellor, Lord Keeper, or Lords Commissioners 
 for the custody of the Great Seal. 6 
 
 ■\Yhere a bill prays the decree of the Court, touching rights claimed 
 by the person exhibiting it, in opposition to rights claimed by the per- 
 son against whom it is exhibited, it must contain a statement showing 
 the rights of the plaintiff or person exhibiting the bill, by whom and 
 in what manner he is injured, or in what he wants the assistance 
 * 314 of the Court; 7 and in all cases the bill must * contain, as con- 
 
 5 See 1 Spenee, Eq. Jur. 335, et seq. ; 1 Ld. 
 Camp. Chancellors, Intro, id. 266, 342. 
 
 6 Coop. Eq. PI. 3. 
 
 7 It should contain every averment neces- 
 sary to entitle the plaintiff to be entertained 
 in a Court of Equity Vanbibber v. Beirne, 6 
 W-iVa. 168. See post, "Stating Part,*" in this 
 chapter, infra, p. 360. A bill may be drawn 
 with a double aspect; so that, if one ground 
 fail, the plaintiff may rely upon another. Mc- 
 
 equitahle claims to be joined in the same suit. 
 Livingston v. Story, 9 Pet. 632; Bennett v. 
 Butterworth, 11 How. 669, Fenn v. Holme, 21 
 How. 481 ; Thompson v. Railroad Cos., 6 Wall. 
 134; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Paine, 119 
 U. S. 561; Quincy v. Steel, 120 U. S. 241; 
 Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 430 ; Leighton v. Young, 
 52 Fed. Rep. 439; 18 L. R. A. 266, and note; 
 Gudger v. Western N. C. R. Co. 21 Fed. Rep. 
 81: Nickerson v. Atchison &c. R. Co. 30 id. 85; 
 Fle-cher v. New Orleans R. Co. 20 id. 345; Staf- 
 ford Nat. Bank r. Sprague. 8 id. 377; Doe v. 
 Roe, 31 id. 97; Gamewell Fire Alarm Tel. Co. v. 
 Mayor, id. 312; Union Bank v. Crine, 33 id. 809. 
 The practice of these Courts is regulated by the 
 Acts cf Congress and the Equity rules of 1842, 
 which were made under the authority of an 
 Act of Congress. Gaines v. New Orleans, 27 
 Fed. Rep. 411; United States v. American Bell 
 Tel. Co. 29 id. 17. Where no change has been 
 made by Congress, the test of an adequate 
 remedy at law is that which existed when the 
 Judiciary Act of 1789 was adopted. MeConihay 
 r. Wright, 121 U. S. 201. The Federal Courts 
 retain Equity jurisdiction in States having no 
 Equity Courts. Ridings v. Johnson, 128 U. S. 
 212. Sitting as Courts of Equity, they may 
 administer any right of an equitable nature 
 given by State statutes. Aspen Mining & 
 S. Co. v. Rucker, 28 Fed.' Rep. 220; Jaffrey v. 
 Brown, 29 id. 476; Bernheim v. Bernheim, 
 30 id. 885; Clapp v. Dittman, 21 id. 15; Flash 
 r. Wilkerson, 22 id. 689; Banigan v. Worcester, 
 30 id. 392; Fechheimer v. Baum, 37 id. 167; 
 Borland o. Haven, id. 394. In such cases, they 
 may follow the State practice as near as pos- 
 
 310 
 
 Connell r. McConnell. 11 Vt. 290; Murphy v. 
 Clark, 1 Sm. & M. 221; Baines v. McGee^ id. 
 208; Ligan v. Henderson, 1 Bland, 236; Mills 
 v. Metculf, 1 A. K. Marsh. 477; Barnett v. 
 W r oods, 2 Jones, Eq. (N. C.) 198. A bill framed 
 with a double aspect must be consistent with 
 itself. Hart v. McKeese, AValker, Ch. 417; 
 Wilkinson v. Dobbie, 12 Blatch. 298; Bosley 
 v. Philips, 3 Tenn. Ch. 649; ante, p. 233, n. 2. 
 
 sible, retaining separate forms of actions. 
 Rosenbaum v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co. 37 Fed. 
 Rep. 7. The construction, by the highest 
 State Court, of a State statute from which the 
 Equity jurisdiction of the Federal Court is 
 derived, binds the latter Court. Beebe v. 
 Louisville &c. R. Co. 39 Fed. Rep. 481. See 
 ante, p. 60, n. (a). As to rules of property, see 
 Taylor v. Life Ass'n, 13 Fed. Rep. 493. Except 
 in cases of removal, a U. S. Circuit Court has 
 no revisory power over the State Courts of 
 Equity. Sharp v. Whiteside, 19 Fed. Rep. 156. 
 This uniformity of Equity procedure in the 
 Federal Courts prevails in cases removed from 
 the State Courts. Hunton v. Equitable Life 
 Assurance Society. 45 Fed. Rep. 661. A suit 
 brought in a Code State, if equitable in its 
 nature, is placed upon the Equity side of the 
 Federal Calendar, and governed by the Equity 
 rules. Duncan v. Greenwalt, 10 Fed. Rep. 800; 
 Kenton Furnace R. & M. Co. v. McAlpin, 5 id. 
 737; Stafford Nat. Bank v. Sprague, 8 id. 377. 
 In such cases a recast of the pleadings is neces- 
 sary at times, in order that what is properly a 
 case at Law may be tried upon the Law side, and 
 matters involved in the same suit originally, but 
 requiring equitable relief, may be tried upon 
 the Equity side. See Benedict v. Williams, 
 10 Fed. Rep. 208; Whittendon Manuf. Co. v. 
 Memphis & O. R. P. Co. 19 id. 273; Perkins??. 
 Hendryx, 23 id. 418: Phelps v. Elliott, 26 id. 
 881; Lacroix v. Lyons, 27 id. 403; Schneider 
 v. Foote, id. 581. Thus a cross-bill must, upon 
 removal to the Federal Court, take the place of 
 a counter-claim. Brande v. Gilchrist, 18 Fed. 
 Rep. 815.
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. 
 
 315 
 
 cisely as may be, a narrative of the material facts, matters, and cir- 
 cumstances on which the plaintiff relies, 1 and must pray specifically 
 for the relief the plaintiff may conceive himself entitled to, and also for 
 general relief. 2 This statement and prayer form the substance and 
 essence of every bill ; 3 and before entering more in detail into the con- 
 sideration of the form of a bill, the readers attention should first be 
 drawn to certain general rules and principles by which persons framing 
 bills ought to be guided in the performance of their task. 
 
 Every bill must show clearly that the plaintiff has a right to the thing 
 demanded, or such an interest in the subject-matter 4 as gives him a right 
 to institute a suit concerning it; 6 and if such a right or interest 
 is not shown by the bill, the defendant may demur. 6 (a) * Thus, * 315 
 
 1 Mass. Pub. Stats, c. 151, § 7; Mass. Ch. 
 Pr rule 4 ; Boynton v. Barstow, 38 Maine, 
 577. As to the remedy for verboseness in a 
 bill, see Williams p. Sexton, 19 Wis. 42. 
 
 * 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 10. 
 
 3 An application to the Court for relief in 
 Equity, which does not contain a prayer for 
 process to be served on the defendant, or 
 conclude with a general interrogator}', may 
 be regarded as a bill ; and, if properly 
 amended, relief may be granted upon it. 
 Belknap v. Stone, 1 Allen, 572. 
 
 4 A bill for the foreclosure of a chattel 
 mortgage should show of what the property 
 consists, the mortgagor's title or claim of title 
 to it, and that it is within the jurisdiction of 
 the Court. Chapman v. Hunt, 14 N. J. Eq. 
 149, 152. An assertion by the bill of a claim 
 against the defendant by way of inference 
 arising out of a recital of the finding of the 
 Master under an order of reference on ex parte 
 proceedings by the complainant on petition, is 
 insufficient. Search v. Search, 27 N. J. Eq. 137. 
 See infra, p. 3(30. 
 
 5 l.d. Ked. 154; and see Jerdein v. Bright, 
 2 J. & H. 325; Nokes v. Fish, 3 Drew. 735; 
 Columbine v. Chichester, 2 Phil. 27; 1 C. P. 
 Coop. temp. Cott. 295; 10 Jur. 626; Grand U. 
 Order r. Merklin, 65 Md. 579 ; Kennebec & Port- 
 land K. R. Co. v. Portland & Kennebec R. R. Co. 
 54 Maine, 173, 185;Cruger«. Haliday, 11 Paige, 
 314; Bailey v. Ryder, 10 N. Y. 363; Walthall 
 
 (a) Barr v. Clayton, 29 W. Va. 256; Carter 
 v. Carter, 82 Va. 624; Keyser r. Renner, 87 Va. 
 249: past, p. 556. As to pleading facts estab- 
 lishing a donatio causa mortis, see Townsend r. 
 Paiton, 45 L. T. 755. The fact that the plain- 
 tiff has assigned his interest may be objected to 
 at the hearing. Crocker v. Rogers, 58 Maine, 
 339. The bill is demurrable if it fails to bdow 
 a right to sue in the plaintiff, or the defendant's 
 liability to be sued upon the alleged cause of 
 suit. Car'er v. Carter, 82 Va. 624; Bridger v. 
 Thrasher, 22 Fla. 383 ; Emerson v. Walker Town- 
 ship, 63 Mich. 483 ; Saver v. Devore, 99 Mo. 437 ; 
 
 v. Rives, 34 Ala. 91. It is a fundamental rule 
 in all cases of bills in Equity, that they must 
 state a case within the appropriate jurisdiction of 
 a Court of Equity. Chase v. Palmer, 25 Maine, 
 341 ; May v. Parker, 12 Pick. 34; Stephenson v. 
 Davis, 56 Maine, 73, 74. In all bills in Equity, 
 in the Courts of the United States, the citizen- 
 ship should appear on the face of the bill to 
 entitle the Court to take jurisdiction; otherwise 
 the bill will be dismissed. Dodge v. Perkins, 4 
 Mason, 435; Bingham t. Cabot, 3 Dal I. 382; 
 Jackson p. Ashton, 8 Peters, 148 ; Vose v. Phil- 
 brook, 3 Story, 335; see Louisville and R. R. 
 Co. v. Stetson, 2 How. U. S. 497. 
 
 A party will be precluded from relief in 
 Equity who has made false and fraudulent 
 representations about a part of ihe property in- 
 volved in a transaction, from the consequences 
 of which he sought equitable relief, and it is 
 impossible to separate that part from other prop- 
 erty involved. Kitchen p. Rayburn, 19 Wall. 
 254. So, the Court will not entertain a bill 
 against an agent for the value of a bond placed 
 in his hands for collection, which at the time 
 was known by both parties to have been stolen. 
 Kirk r. Morrow, 6 Heisk. 445. Nor a bill by a 
 pe son who has borrowed money of a bank on 
 a loan forbidden by law to have the securities 
 cancelled, and restraining the bank from nego- 
 tiating them. Elder t\ First National Bank, 12 
 Kansas, 238. 
 
 6 Ld. Red. 154. 
 
 Rough v. Simmons, 65 Cal. 227. Every bill in 
 Equity must be certain, definite, and consistent. 
 See, under different circumstances, these prin- 
 cipl s applied in Metropolitan Bank v. Offord, 
 L. R. 10 Eq. 398; Parley's Park S. M. Co. c. 
 Kerr, 130 U. S. 256; Brooks v. O'Hara, 8 Fed. 
 Rep. 529; Lichtenauer v. Cheney, id. 876; 
 Socola v. Grant, 15 id. 487; Leo v. Union Paci- 
 fic Ry. Co. 19 id. 283; Partee v. Thomas. 11 
 id. 769; Price v. Coleman, 21 id. 357; Hazard 
 v. Griswold, id. 178; Baltimore &c. IJ. Co. v. 
 Adams' Express Co. 22 id. 404; Goldsmith v. 
 Gilliland, id. 865; Brokaw v. Brokaw, 41 N. J. 
 
 311
 
 * 315 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 where a plaintiff claims under a will, and it appears upon the con- 
 struction of the instrument that he has no title, a demurrer will be 
 allowed. 1 It is much to be wished that, in cases of this description, 
 where the right of the plaintiff in the subject-matter of the suit depends 
 upon a simple point, such as that of the construction of a will, the prac- 
 tice of demurring to the bill were more frequently resorted to, as by- 
 such means considerable expense might frequently be saved ; for if it 
 
 1 Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. Sr. 243, 
 2+7; iind see Mortimer v. Hartley, 3 De G. & 
 S. 316; Evans v. Evans, 18 Jur. 666, L. JJ.; 
 Cochrane v. Willis, 10 Jur. N. S. 162, L. JJ. ; 
 Collingwood v. Russell, 10 Jur. N. S. 1062; 13 
 W. K. 63, L. JJ.; Lautour v. Att.-Gen.ll Jur. 
 N. S. 43; 13 W. R. 305, L. JJ. In the tirst case 
 here referred to, Lord Hardwicke is reported to 
 have said, upon the argument of a demurrer, 
 that if the Court had not been satisfied, and 
 had, therefore, been desirous that the matter 
 should be more fully debated at a deliberate 
 
 Eq. 215; Rice v. Merrimack Hosiery Co. 56 
 N. H. 114; Norris v. McLam, 104 N. C. 159; 
 Campbell v. Powers, 139 111. 128; Shea v. 
 Knoxville &c. R. Co. 6 Baxter (Tenn.), 277; 
 Seely v. Hills, 49 Wis. 473; Torrent v. Rogers, 
 39 Mich. 52; Foster v. Hill, 55 Mich. 540; 
 Highstone v. Franks, 93 Mich. 52; Fulwider 
 t». Ingels, 87 Ind. 414; Oliver v. Look, 77 
 Maine, 585; Rowell v. Jewett. 71 Maine, 408; 
 Hyre v. Lambert, 37 \V. Va. 26 ; Nation v. 
 Cameron, 2 Dak. 347. A bill in one jurisdic- 
 tion cannot be made certain by reference to a 
 previous bill in another jurisdiction. Mercan- 
 tile Trust Co. t. Kanawha & O. Ry. Co. 39 
 Fed. Rep. 337; Nalle v. Austin (Texas), 21 S. 
 W. Rep. 375. The sufficiency of a pleading 
 cannot be as effectually questioned by objecting 
 to evidence under it, or after a hearing, as upon 
 demurrer. Citizens' Street Ry. Co. v. Spalir 
 (Ind.), 33 N. E. Rep. 446; Soper v. Manning 
 (Mass.)) id. 516. Upon a bill for infringement 
 of letters patent, want of novelty, or of patent- 
 able invention, may be questioned by demurrer, 
 when obvious upon the bill. Brown r. Piper, 
 91 U. S. 37; Dick v. Oil Well Supplv Co. 25 
 Fed. Rep. 105; Kaolatype Engraving Co. v. 
 Hoke, 30 id. 444; Bottle Seal Co. v. De La 
 Vergne B. & S Co. 47 id. 59; Cornell v. Green, 
 43 id. 105; United States C. S. Co. v. American 
 C. I. Co. 53 id. 818; Goebel v. American Ry. 
 S. Co. 55 id. 825; see Quirolo v. Ardito, 1 id. 
 610. Such want of novelty, when set up in 
 the answer to a bill for infringement, is to be 
 proved by the defendant. Bidder r. Bridges, 
 29 Ch. D". 29, 40; see Grier v. Wilt, 120 U. S. 
 410; Meyers r. Busby, 32 Fed. Rep. 670. In 
 a suit for infringing a patent general averments 
 as to the invention are sufficient, and if profert 
 of the patent is made, its title only need be 
 
 312 
 
 hearing, the demurrer would have been over- 
 rule'!, without prejudice to the defendant's in- 
 sisting on the same matter by way of answer; 
 but in a note to his treatise, Lord Redesdale 
 observes that "perhaps this declaration felt 
 from the Court rather incautiously; as a dry 
 question upon the construction of a will may 
 be as deliberately determined upon argument 
 of a demurrer, as at the hearing of a cause in 
 the ordinary course, and the difference in ex- 
 pense to the parties may be considerable." Ld. 
 Red. 154, n. (/>). 
 
 set ont in the bill. McMillin v. St. Louis & 
 M. V. T. Co. 18 Fed. Rep. 260. In such a 
 bill, the absence of an averment that the in- 
 vention had not been previously patented or 
 described in publications, here or abroad, is a 
 defect of form, to be reached by special de- 
 murrer. Hanlon v. Primrose, 56 Fed. Rep. 600. 
 A bill which alleges infringement generally by 
 several defendants is sufficient without alleging 
 a joint infringement. Indurated Fibre I. Co. 
 v. Grace, 52 Fed. Rep. 124. As to the form and 
 matter of bills relating to letters-patent, see 
 McCoy v. Nelson, 121 U. S. 484; Williams v. 
 Rome, 2 Fed. Rep. 702; Putnam v. Hollender, 
 6 id. 882; Fischer v. O'Shaugnessey, id. 92; 
 Fischer v. Hayes, id. 76; National Manuf. Co. 
 v. Meyers, 7 id. 355; Still v. Reading, 9 id. 40; 
 Atwood v. Portland Co. 10 id. 283; Jones v. 
 Barker, 11 id. 597; Adams v. Meyn.se, 12 id. 
 440; Gamewell Fire-Alarm Tel. Co. v. Brook- 
 lyn, 14 id. 255; Pelham v. Edelmeyer, 15 id. 
 202; Concord v. Norton, 16 id. 477; Allis v. 
 Stowell, id. 783; 15 id. 242; McMillan v. St. 
 Louis &c. Co. 18 id. 280; M'Kay ». Smith, 29 
 id. 295 ; Kaolatype Engraving Co. v. Hoke, 30 
 id. 444; Kittle v. De Graaf, id. 689; Wise v. 
 Grand Ave. R. Co. 33 id. 277; Blessings. John 
 Traseser S. C. Works, 34 id. 753; American 
 BellTel. Co. v. Southern Tel. Co. id. 803; Stirrat 
 v. Excelsior Manuf. Co. 44 id. 122; American 
 R. P. Co. v. Knopp, id. 609; Wirt v. Hicks, 46 
 id. 71 ; Bottle Seal Co. v. De La Vergne B. & 
 S. Co. 47 id. 59; Nathan Manuf. Co. v. Craig, 
 id. 522; Coop v. Dr. Savage P. D. Institute, id. 
 899; Ovennan Wheel Co. v. Elliott Hickory 
 Cycle Co 49 id. 859; American Solid Leather 
 Button Co. *. Empire State Nail Co. 50 id. 929; 
 Electrolibration Co. v. Jackson, 52 id. 773; 
 Krick v. Jansen, id. 823.
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. * 316 
 
 appears at the hearing that the party filing the bill is not right in the 
 construction he puts upon the instrument, the bill must be dismissed, 
 which, if the plaintiff's bill had been demurred to in the first instance, 
 would have been the result, without the additional expense caused by 
 the other proceedings. 2 The bill, or statement of claim, need not, how- 
 ever, contain a specific allegation of the grounds for relief, it being suffi- 
 cient if the grounds can be reasonably deduced from the facts stated. 8 
 
 The rule that a plaintiff should show by his bill an interest in the 
 subject-matter of the suit, applies not to one plaintiff only, but to all 
 the plaintiffs ; and if several persons joined in filing a bill, and it 
 appeared that one of them had no interest, the bill was formerly open 
 to demurrer ; 4 though it appeared that all the other plaintiffs had an 
 interest in the matter, and a right to institute a suit concern- 
 ing it. This, as we have seen, is no longer so ; but * the Court * 316 
 may make such order, on the hearing, as justice requires. 1 It 
 must not, however, be supposed that it is not still important to avoid 
 joining a plaintiff who has no interest in the bill. 
 
 The plaintiff must not only show an interest in the subject-matter, but 
 it must be an actual existing interest ; a mere possibility, or even proba- 
 bility, of a future title will not be sufficient to sustain a bill. 2 Therefore, 
 where a plaintiff, claiming as a devisee in the will of a person who was 
 living, but a lunatic, brought a bill to perpetuate the testimony of 
 witnesses to the will, against the presumptive heir-at-law, 8 and where 
 persons, who would have been entitled to the personal estate of a lunatic, 
 if he had been then dead intestate, as his next of kin, supposing him 
 legitimate, brought a bill in the lifetime of the lunatic to perpetuate the 
 testimony of witnesses to his legitimacy, against the Attorney-General, 
 as supporting the rights of the Crown, 4 demurrers were allowed. 5 Upon 
 the same principle, a bill cannot be sustained by a purchaser from a con- 
 tingent remainderman of his interest in the property, against a tenant 
 
 2 But where the defendant allows the cause 1 15 & 16 Vic c. 86, § 49; R. S. C. Ord. 
 to be brought to a hearing in such a case, the XVI. 13; ante, p. 303. 
 
 practice is to dismiss the bill without costs. 2 Ld. Red. 156; and see observations of Lord 
 
 Hill v. Reardon, 2 S. & S. 431, 439; Jones v. Cottenham, in Finden r. Stephens, 2 Phil. 148; 
 
 Davids, 4 Russ. 278; Hollingsworth v. Shake- 1 C. P. Coop, 329; 10 Jur. 1019; Davis r. Angel,' 
 
 shaft, 14 Beav. 492; Webb v. England, 29 Beav. 31 Beav. 223; 4 De G. F. & J. 524; 8 Jur. x! 
 
 44; 7 Jur. N. S. 153; Ernest r. Wise, 9 Jur. X. S. 709, 1024; Showell v. Winkup, 60 L. T. 389; 
 
 S. 145; 11 W. R. 206, V. C. K.; Nesbitt v. Ber- Richards v. Butler, 62 id. 867. 
 
 ridge, 4 De G. J. & S. 45; 9 Jur. X. S. 1045; 3 Sackvill r. Ayleworth, 1 Vern. 105; 1 Eq. 
 
 11 W. R. 446, M. R.; Godfrey v. Tucker, 3 Cas. Abr. 234, pi. 3 ; see also 2 Prax. Aim. Cur. 
 
 Beav. 280; 9 Jur. X. S. 1188; 12 W. R. 33, M. Can. 500, where the form of demurrer is set out. 
 
 R.; and see Sanders v. Benson, 4 Beav. 350, See also In re Tayleur. 6 Ch. D. 410. 
 
 357 - 4 Smith v. Att.-Gen. cited Ld. Red. 157; 1 
 
 3 See Knox v. Gye, 15 W. R. 628, L. C. Vern. 105, n., ed. Raithby; 6 Ves. 255, 260; 15 
 
 4 Seethe Mayorand Aldermen of Colchester Ves. 136. 
 
 "■ ' ! P - Wms. 595: Troughton v. Gettey, 1 5 The parties in these cases had no interest 
 
 Dick. 382; Cuff v. Platell, 4 Russ. 242; Make- which could be the subject of a suit, and sus- 
 
 peacev. Haythorne, 4 Russ. 244; King of Spain taiued no character under which they could 
 
 v. Machado, 4 Russ. 225; Delondre v. Shaw, 2 afterwards sue; and therefore the evidence, if 
 
 Sim. 237; Page v. Townsend, 5 Sim. 395; St.>ry, taken, would have been wholly nugatorv. See 
 
 Eq. PI. §§ 509, 541, 544; Clarkson v. De Pey- Story, Eq. PI. § 301, and cases cited; 2 Storv, 
 
 ster, 3 Paige, 336; Manning v. Gloucester, 6 Eq. Jur. § 1511; Dursleyr. Berkley, 6 Sumner's 
 
 Pick - 6 - Ves. 251, and notes. 
 
 313
 
 317 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 for life, for inspection of title deeds ; although a bill would lie for that 
 purpose by a person entitled to a vested remainder. 6 So a demurrer for. 
 want of interest to a suit brought by persons claiming to be members of 
 a class, which was to be ascertained on the happening of a future con- 
 tingent event, was allowed. 7 (a). But it must not be supposed that 
 contingent remainder-men can, in no case, be plaintiffs ; for in many 
 cases (such as suits for the administration of, or to secure, the trust prop- 
 erty to which they are contingently entitled), such persons may properly 
 be plaintiffs ; 8 and orders have been made at the suit of such persons, 
 for the payment of trust funds into Court. 9 
 
 A bill tiled by a tenant in tail in remainder, and his children, to 
 perpetuate testimony to the marriage of the tenant in tail, could not be 
 supported, because the father, being tenant in tail in remainder, could 
 have no interest whatever in proving the fact of his own mar- 
 * 317 riage, * the remainder in tail being vested in him ; and the other 
 plaintiffs (the children) are neither tenants in tail nor remainder- 
 men in tail, but the issue of a person who was de facto and dejure tenant 
 in remainder in tail, having the whole interest in him ; and, consequently, 
 the children have no interest in them, in respect of which they can 
 maintain their bill. 1 Upon the same principle, where the dignity of 
 Earl was entailed upon an individual who' died, leaving two sons, the 
 eldest of whom inherited the dignity, a demurrer to a bill filed by his 
 eldest son, in his lifetime, against the second son of the first Earl, and 
 the Attorney-General, to perpetuate testimony as to his father's marriage, 
 was allowed. 2 
 
 Where the plaintiff does not show an existing interest by his bill, the 
 disclaimer or waiver of one defendant in his favor will not sustain the 
 bill against the other defendants. 3 
 
 Where, however, a party has an interest, it is perfectly immaterial 
 how minute the interest may be, 4 or how distant the possibility of the 
 possession of that minute interest, if it is a present interest. 5 A present 
 interest, the enjoyment of which may depend upon the most remote and 
 improbable contingency, is, nevertheless, a present estate ; and, as in 
 
 6 Noel v. Ward, 1 Mad. 322, 329 ; and see 
 Davis v. Earl of Dysart, 20 Beav. 405: 1 Jur. 
 N. S. 743, and cases there cited, for instances 
 of vested remaindermen. 
 
 t Clowes v. Hilliard, 4 Ch. D. 413. 
 
 8 Roberts v. Roberts, 2 De G. & S. 29; 2 
 Phil. 534; 12 Jur. 148. 
 
 9 Bartlett v. Bartlett, 4 Hare, 631 ; Marryatt 
 v. Marryatt, 2 W. R. 576; Governesses' Benevo- 
 lent Institution r. Rusbridger, 18 Beav. 467; 
 Robertson v. Scott, W. N. (1866) 144; 14 L. T. 
 N. S. 187 ; but see Ross v. Ross, 12 Beav. 89 ; 
 
 Bromley v. Kelly, 18 W. R. 374; Pryse v. 
 Pryse, L R. 15 Eq. 86, 92. 
 
 "l Allan v. Allan, 15 Ves. 130, 135. 
 
 2 Earl of Belfast v. Chichester, 2 J. & W. 
 439, 449, 452. 
 
 3 Griffith v. Ricketts, 7 Hare, 305; 14 Jur. 
 166, 325; Hollingsworth v. Shakeshaft, 14 
 Beav. 492. 
 
 * See Seaton v. Grant, L. R. 2 Ch. 459, 463, 
 465. 
 
 5 Story, Eq. PI. § 301. 
 
 (a) See also Fussel v. Downing, 27 Ch. D. 
 237; Re Parsons, Stockley v. Parsons, 45 
 Ch. D. 51. One of a class designated as en- 
 titled to a trust fund upon tlie happening of 
 one or more contingencies can maintain a suit 
 
 314 
 
 to protect the fund, if, at the time, the maxi- 
 mum number of the class is ascertained, although 
 it is still uncertain whether he will ultimately 
 be one of the class. Peacock v. Colling, 54 
 L. J. Ch. 743; 33 W. R. 528.
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. 
 
 318 
 
 the case upon Lord Berkeley's will, 8 though the interest may, with refer- 
 ence to the chance, be worth nothing, yet it is in contemplation of law an 
 estate and interest, upon which a bill may be supported. 7 If, however, 
 the plaintiff's interest is such that it may be barred or defeated by the 
 act of the defendant, he cannot support the bill ; as in the case of a 
 remainderman filing a bill to perpetuate testimony against a tenant in 
 tail ; 8 to such a bill, it seems, the tenant in tail might demur, upon the 
 ground that he may at any time bar the entail, and thus deprive the 
 plaintiff of his interest. 9 
 
 A plaintiff must not only show in his bill an interest in the subject- 
 matter, but he must make it appear that he has a proper title to 
 institute a suit concerning it ; 10 for *a person may have an inter- * 318 
 est in the subject-matter, and yet, for want of compliance with 
 some requisite forms, he may not be entitled to institute a suit relating 
 to it. 1 
 
 Formerly, it was necessary to allege that the will was proved in the 
 proper Ecclesiastical Court, though it was not necessary to mention in 
 what Court ; 2 and this still applies to all wills proved before Jan. 11, 
 1858 : 8 but since that date, it is sufficient simply to allege that the will 
 has been proved, though in practice it is usual to allege that it has been 
 proved in the Court of Probate, or that it has been duly proved. For- 
 merly questions often arose, whether the will had been proved in the 
 proper Court ; 4 whether, for instance, a prerogative probate was neces- 
 sary ; 6 but these questions were removed by the constitution of the 
 Court of Probate, except as to wills proved before Jan. 11, 1858. 6 
 
 If an executor, before probate, files a bill, alleging that he has proved 
 the will, such allegation will obviate a demurrer ; 7 he must, however, 
 
 6 Lord Dursley v. Fitzhardinge, 6 Ves. 
 251. 
 
 7 Per Lord Eldon, in Allan v. Allan, 15 Ves. 
 135; see also Davis v. Angel, 31 Beav. 223; 4 
 De G. F. & J. 524; 8 Jur. N. S. 709, 1U24; 
 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1511. 
 
 8 See Lord Dursley r. Fitzhardinge, 6 Ves. 
 262; see, however, Butcher v. Jackson, 14 Sim. 
 444, 455. 
 
 y It would be a fruitless exercise of power 
 to entertain a bill to perpetuate evidence in such 
 a case. Story, Eq. PI. § 301. 
 
 10 Ld. Red. 155. It is not essential that the 
 plaintiff's title should be explicitly averred. It 
 is sufficient that it may fairly be inferred from 
 the facts stated. Webber v. Gage, 39 N. H. 
 182; Story, Eq. PI. § 730; Clapp v. Shephard, 
 23 Pick. 228. 
 
 1 Thus the executor of a deceased person 
 has an interest in all the personal property- of 
 his tes f ator; but, till he ha* proved the will, he 
 cannot assert his right in a Court of justice; if, 
 therefore, a man files a bill as executor, and 
 does not state in it that he has proved the will, 
 the bill will be liable to demurrer. Humphreys 
 v. Ingledon, 1 P. Wins. 752; Story, Eq. PI. 
 §625; Champion v Parish, 3 Edw. Ch. 581 
 
 It seems, however, that an executor may, pend- 
 ing an application for probate, file a bill to pro- 
 tect the estate, by obtaining an injunction or 
 otherwise; although he alleges in the bill that 
 he has not yet obtained probate. Newton r. 
 Metropolitan Ry. Co. 1 Dr. & Sm. 583; 8 Jur. 
 N. S. 738; see Rawliigs v. Lambert, 1 J. & 
 H.458; Steer v. Steer, 13 W. R. 225, V. C. K.; 
 2 Dr. & Sm. 311; Overington r. Ward, 34 
 Beav. 175; Blackett v. Blackett, W. N. (1871) 
 65; 19 VV. R. 559; but see Spencer v. Shaw, 
 W. N. (1875) 115; and also ptat, Chap. XXXIX. 
 § 1, as to obtaining receivers pending litigation 
 as to probate. 
 
 2 Humphreys r. InRledon, 1 P. Wins. 752. 
 
 3 20 & 21 Vic. c. 77. See 3 Jur. N. S. Pt. 
 II. 479. 
 
 4 Tourton r. Flower, 3 P. Wms. 369, 370; 
 but see Jossaunie v. Abbot, 15 Sim. 127. 
 
 5 Thomas r. Davies, 12 Ves. 417; Challnor 
 r. Murliall, f, Ves. 118; Newman v. Hodgson, 
 7 V.s. 409; Metcalfe r. Metcalfe, 1 Keen, 74, 
 79; McMahon v. Rawlings, 16 Sim. 429. 
 
 c 20 & 21 Vic. c. 77, § 1; Ord. in Council 
 of 2d Dec, 1857; 3 Jur. N. S. Pt. II. 479. 
 7 Humphreys v. Ingledon, 1 P. Wms. 752 
 
 315
 
 319 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 prove the will before the hearing of the cause, and then the probate 
 will be sufficient to support the bill, although it bears date subsequently 
 to the filing of it. 8 (a) In like manner, a plaintiff may file a bill as 
 
 administrator before he has taken out letters of administration, 
 *319 and it will be sufficient to have them at the hearing. 9 * But, 
 
 although an executor or administrator may, before probate or 
 administration granted, file a bill relating to the property of the 
 deceased, and such bill will not, on that account, be demurrable, pro- 
 vided the granting of probate or of letters of administration be alleged 
 in the bill, yet a defendant may, by plea, take advantage of the fact not 
 being as stated in the bill. 1 
 
 Although an executor, filing a bill before probate, must, unless it is 
 filed for protection of the estate, allege in it that he has proved the 
 will, it is not necessary that in a bill against au executor such a state- 
 ment should be made ; for if executors elect to act, they are liable to be 
 sued before probate, and cannot afterwards renounce. 2 It also seems, 
 that if a party entitled by law to take out administration to a deceased 
 person, does not do so, but acts as if he were administrator, and receives 
 and disposes of the property, he will be liable to account as adminis- 
 trator ; but in both cases it is necessary to have a duly constituted legal 
 personal representative before the Court. 3 
 
 If it appears to the Court that the probate, or the letters of adminis- 
 tration, bear a stamp applicable to a less sum than that which is sought 
 to be recovered in the cause, no decree can be obtained until the defect 
 has been remedied, and the party can show that he represents the estate 
 to an amount sufficient to cover his claim. 4 
 
 8 Humphreys v. Humphreys, 3 P. Wins. 
 349. 
 
 9 Fell v. Lutwidge, 2 Atk. 120; Barn. 320 ; 
 Humphreys v. Humphreys, 3 P. Wins. 351; 
 Horner i\ Horner, 23 L.*J. Ch. 10, V. C. K.; 
 see L'all v. Ewing, 1 Blackf. 301; Langdon v. 
 Potter, 11 Mass. 313; Savage v. Merriam, 1 
 Blackf. 176; Caller v. Dade, Minor, 20; Axers 
 v. Musselman, 2 Brown, 115. 
 
 i Thus, in Simons 0. Milman, 2 Sim. 241, 
 where letters of administration had been granted 
 to the defendant under the idea that the de- 
 ceased had died intestate, whereas, in fact, he 
 had made a will and appointed the plaintiff his 
 executor, who, before probate, tiled a bill lor 
 the purpose of recovering part of the assets of 
 the testator from the defendant, alleging that 
 probate of the will had been granted to him, to 
 which bill the defendant put in a plea stating 
 that such was not the fact, Sir Lancelot Shad- 
 well V. C. allowed the plea. See also Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 727; Belloat v. Morse, 2 Hayw. 157; 
 Tempest v. Lord Camovs, 35 Beav. 201 ; 1 W. 
 N. 16 ; 14 W. R. 326, M. R. See also R. S. C. 
 
 Ord. 1883, XIX. 11; Re Lovett, Ambler v. 
 Lindsay, 3 Ch. D. 198; Uowdeswell v. Dowdes- 
 well, 9 Ch. D. 294; Seton,818; and Rowsell v. 
 Morris, L. R. 17 Eq. 20 (dissenting from Rayner 
 v. Koehler, L. R. 14 Eq. 262, and Coote v. 
 Whittington, L. R. 16 Eq. 534); M'Allister v. 
 M'Allister, 11 L. R. Ir. 533. 
 
 2 Blewitt v. Blewitt, Younge, 541; Cleland 
 v. Cleland, Prec. Ch. 64; see Story, Eq. PI. 
 §91. 
 
 3 Creasor v. Robinson, 14 Beav. 589; 15 Jur. 
 1049, and the cases there referred to; Cary v. 
 Hills, L. R. 15 Eq. 79; Beardmore v. Gregory, 
 2 H. & M. 491; 11 Jur. N. S. 363; see also 
 Cooke v. Gittings. 21 Beav. 497; Hill v. Curtis, 
 L. R. 1 Eq. 90; 12 Jur. N. S. 4; and the cases 
 (contra) in notes 1, 2, above. 
 
 4 Jones v. Howells, 2 Hare, 342, 353; Chris- 
 tian v. Devereux, 12 Sim. 264, 273; Howard v. 
 Prince, 10 Beav. 312, 314 ; and see Killock v. 
 Gregg, cited 2 Hare, 346, 354; Harper r. Raven- 
 hill. Taml. 145; Roberts v. Madocks, 16 Sim. 
 55; Smith v. Creagh, Batty, 384; Nail v. Pun- 
 ter, 5 Sim. 563. By 44 & 45 Vic. c. 12, § 30, 
 
 (n) Tn Maughan v. Blake, L. R. 3 Ch. 32, add the legal personal representative as a co- 
 where probate was refused to the plaintiff, who plaintiff, 
 was beneficially interested, she was allowed to 
 
 316
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. 
 
 320 
 
 Where it appears that, in order to complete the plaintiff's title to the 
 subject of the suit or to the relief he seeks, some preliminary act is 
 necessary to be done, the performance of such preliminary act should be 
 averred in the bill, and the mere allegation that the title is com- 
 plete, without such averment, will not be * sufficient. 1 * 320 
 
 When a plaintiff claims as heir-at-law, it was formerly considered 
 that he must state in his bill how his title arose ; a but it is now settled, 
 chat an allegation that he is heir is sufficient. 3 (a) There may, however, be 
 cases where a plaintiff claims by mediate and not by immediate descent, 4 
 or where the facts in the pedigree are facts to be relied on as facts to 
 establish the plaintiff's title, 5 in which the pedigree should be stated in 
 order that the pleading should not be embarrassing, 6 and that surprise 
 may be prevented and those facts stated which will show the case which 
 has to be met. 7 
 
 Where there is a privity existing between the plaintiff and defendant, 
 independently of the plaintiff's title, which gives the plaintiff a right to 
 maintain his suit, it is not necessary to state the plaintiff's title fully. 8 
 
 49 j 
 
 probates and letters of administration are to bear 
 a certificate that the affidavit of property has 
 been did} - stamped. If an administrator durante 
 minore estate brings a suit, he must aver in his 
 bill or statement of claim that the infant is still 
 under age. 1 Wins, on Ex'tors, 491; see Re 
 Cope, Cope v. Cope, 16 Ch. D. 49. 
 
 1 Thus, where a plaintiff claimed as a share- 
 holder by purchase, of certain shares in a Joint- 
 Stock Company or Association, alleging in his 
 bill that he had purchased such shares for a 
 valuable consideration, and had ever since held 
 the same, but it appeared in another part of the 
 bill, that by the rules of the company or asso- 
 ciation, no transfer of shares could be valid in 
 Law or Equity unless the purchaser was ap- 
 proved by a board of directors, and signed an 
 instrument binding him to observe the regula- 
 tions: Lord Brougham allowed a demurrer, on 
 the ground that the performance of the rule 
 above pointed out was a condition precedent, 
 and ought to have been averred upon the bill, 
 and that the allegation of the plaintiff having 
 purchased the shares and being a shareholder, 
 although admitted by the demurrer, was not 
 sufficient to cure the defect. Walburn r. In- 
 gilby, 1 M. & K. CI, 77 ; see also Morris ?■. 
 Kelly, 1 J. & W. 481 ; Colburn v. Duncombe, 
 9 Sim. 151, 154; 2 Jur. 654; Richardson v. 
 Gilbert, 1 Sim. N. S. 336; 15 Jur. 389; Story, 
 Eq. PI. §§ 257, 257 a, 258, and Cassell v. Stiff, 
 2 K. & J. 279, as to the title to be shown to 
 copyright. As to averring performance of con- 
 ditions precedent, see 15 & 16 Vic. c. 76, § 57; 
 
 (a) As to alleging rights in a burial lot with- 
 out averring the intestacy of the plaintiff's an- 
 cestor, see Mitchell v. Thome, 134 N. Y. 536; 
 10 N. Y. Sup. 682. As to personal property, 
 on which the plaintiff has levied, and which he 
 
 36 & 37 Vic. c. 66, § 76; 46 & 47 Vic. 
 R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XIX. 14. 
 
 ' 2 Lord Digby v. Meech, Bunb. 195; Baker 
 v. Harwood, 7 Sim. 373. 
 
 3 Evelyn v. Evelyn, W. N. (1880) 62 ; 28 W. 
 R. 531; Kettlewell v. Barstow, 17 W. R. 276; W. 
 N. (1869) 6; and see Barrs v. Fewkes, 10 Jur. 
 N. S. 466; 12 W. Ii. 666, V. C. W.; Delorne 
 v. Hollingsworth, 1 Cox, 421, 422; Ford v. 
 Peering, 1 Ves. Jr. 72. 
 
 * See Stephens on Pleading (3d ed.) 310. 
 
 5 See Philipps r. Philipps, 4 Q. B. D. 127, 
 134. 
 
 6 See post, p. 347. 
 
 7 See Philipps v. Philipps, 4 Q. B. D. 134, 
 138. 
 
 8 Thus, where a plaintiff's claim against the 
 defendant arises under a deed or other instru- 
 ment, executed by the defendant himself, or by 
 those under whom he claims, which recites, or 
 is necessarily founded upon, the existence, in 
 the plaintiff, of the right which he asserts, it is 
 sufficient to allege the execution of the deed by 
 the parties. In like manner, in the case of a 
 bill, by a mortgagor in fee, against a mortgagee, 
 to redeem the mortgage, it is sufficient merely 
 to state the mortgage deed, without alleging 
 that the mortgagor was seised in fee; or if the 
 mortgagor has only a derivative title, it is not 
 necessary to show the commencement o/ such 
 derivative title, or its continuance; because the 
 right of the plaintiff to redeem, as against the 
 defendant, does not depend upon the title under 
 which he claims, but upon the proviso for re- 
 
 alleges was fraudulently conveyed, the bill is 
 demurrable if it does not aver that the goods 
 levied on and conveyed were the same. Stod- 
 dard v. McLane, 56 Mich. 11. 
 
 317
 
 *321 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 Where a man employs another as his bailiff or agent, to receive his 
 rents, the right to call upon the bailiff or agent for an account does not 
 depend upon the title of the employer to the rents, but to the 
 * 321 privity existing between * him and his bailiff or agent ; the 
 employer may, therefore, maintain a bill for an account, without 
 showing any title to the rents in question. 
 
 Where, however, the plaintiff's right does not depend upon any par- 
 ticular privity between him and the defendant, existing independently 
 of his general title to the thing claimed, there it will be necessary to 
 show his title in the bill. 1 
 
 In like manner, where a plaintiff in a bill for specific performance 
 intends to rely on a waiver of title by the defendant, it is not sufficient 
 to allege upon his pleadings the facts constituting the waiver : he must 
 show how he means to use the facts, by alleging that the title has been 
 waived thereby. 2 
 
 The same precision which is required in stating the case of a plaintiff, 
 is not necessary in showing the interests of the defendant against whom 
 the relief is sought ; 3 because a plaintiff cannot always be supposed to 
 be cognizant of the nature of a defendant's interest, and the bill must 
 frequently proceed with a view to obtain a discovery of it. 4 And even 
 where it is evident, from the nature of the case, that a plaintiff must be 
 cognizant of the defendant's title, and sets out the same informally, yet, 
 if he alleges enough to show that the defendant has an interest, it will 
 be sufficient. 8 
 
 In all cases, however, a bill must show that a defendant is in seme 
 way liable to the plaintiff's demand, 6 or that he has some inter- 
 
 demption in the mortgage deed. Upon the 
 same principle, where a defendant holds under 
 a lease from the plaintiff, the plaintiff need not 
 set out his title to the reversion ; the fact of the 
 defendant having accepted a lease from the 
 plaintiff being sufficient to preclude his disput- 
 ing the title under which he holds. If the 
 plaintiff claims under a derivative title from 
 the mortgagor, or lessor, he must, as in other 
 cases, show how he makes out his title. 
 
 i See Humphreys v. Tate, 4 led. Eq. 220; 
 Smith i\ Turner, id. 433; Peck r. Mallows, 10 
 N. Y. 509; State v. Black River Phosphate Co. 
 27 Ha. 276. Thus, where a bill is tiled by the 
 lessee of a lay impropriator against an occu- 
 pier, for an account of tithes, there the right of 
 the plaintiff to the account depends solely upon 
 his title: he must, therefore, deduce his title 
 regularly, and show not only the existence of 
 the lease, but that the person from whom it is 
 derived had the fee. Penny v. Hoper, Bunb. 
 115; Burwell v. Coates, id. 129. See R. S. C. 
 Ord. XXVII. 1; Philipps v. Philipps, 4 Q. B. 
 D. 127- 
 
 2 Clive v. Beaumont, 1 De G. & S. 397; 13 
 Jur 22fi, pout, p. 372. As to averring a license 
 to a*~ign, in such a suit, see Smith v. Capron, 
 7 Hare, 185: 14 Jur. 686. 
 
 318 
 
 3 Story, Eq. PI. § 255; Morgan v. Smith, 11 
 111. 194. In suits for libel and slander the very 
 words must be alleged. Harris v. VVarre, 4 C. 
 P. D. 125. 
 
 4 Thus, where in a suit by a lessee for years, 
 for a partition, the plaintiff, after stating his own 
 right to one undivided tenth part, with preci- 
 sion, had alleged that the defendant was seised 
 in fee-simple of, or otherwise well entitled to, 
 seven other tenth parts, a demurrer, on the 
 ground that the plaintiff had not set out the 
 defendant's title with sufficient certainty, was 
 overruled. Baring v. Nash, 1 V. & B. 551, 552 ; 
 and see Ponsford v. Hanke}-, 3 De G. F. & J. 
 544; 7 Jur. N. S. 929. 
 
 5 Thus, where in a suit to redeem a mort- 
 gage, the conveyance was so stated that it did 
 not show that any legal estate had passed to the 
 defendant, a demurrer was overruled; because 
 the defendant could not be permitted to dispute 
 his own tille, which was admitted by the plain- 
 tiff to be good. Roberts v. Clayton, 3 Anst. 
 715 And where a defendant was sued as heir- 
 at-law, it was held to be necessary to state how 
 he became heir. Denham v. Stephenson, Salk, 
 355. 
 
 6 Ld. Red. 163.
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. * 323 
 
 est in the subject of the suit : 7 otherwise it will be liable to * 322 
 * demurrer. 1 
 
 Although it is generally necessary to show that the plaintiff has 
 some claim against a defendant, or that a defendant has some interest 
 in the subject matter in litigation, yet there are some exceptional cases 
 in which a bill may be sustained against defendants who have no interest 
 in the subject, and who are not in any manner liable to the demands of 
 the plaintiff. The cases alluded to are those which have been before 
 referred to, of the members or officers of a corporation aggregate, who, 
 as we have seen, may be made parties to a suit against the corporation 
 for the purposes of discovery, and arbitrators, solicitors, or agents : and 
 it will be seen, upon reference to what has been before stated upon this 
 subject, 2 that the right to make them parties is confined to cases where 
 relief is, in fact, prayed against them, namely, where they are impli- 
 cated in fraud or collusion, and it is specifically asked that they may 
 pay the costs ; or where they are the holders of a particular instrument, 
 which the plaintiff is entitled to have delivered up. 3 
 
 A bill must not only show that the defendant is liable to the plain- 
 tiff's demands, or has some interest in the subject-matter, but it must 
 also show that there is such a privity between him and the plaintiff 
 as gives the plaintiff a right to sue him ; 4 (a) for it is frequently 
 the case that a plaintiff has an interest in the subject-matter * of *323 
 the suit which may be in the hands of a defendant, and yet, for 
 want of a proper privity between them, the plaintiff may not be the 
 person entitled to call upon the defendant to answer his demand. Thus, 
 although a principal is entitled to an account against his agent, the 
 persons for whom the principal is a trustee are not so entitled, and 
 where a suit was instituted by them against the trustee and his agent 
 for an account, a demurrer by the agent was allowed. 1 
 
 7 Ld. Red 160; Plumbe v. Plumbe 4 Y. & Story, Eq. PI. §§ 255, 256, 257. Upon the 
 
 C. Ex. 345, 350; Ponsford ». Hankey, 3 De G. same principle, where, in a bill against A and 
 
 F.& J. 544; 7 Jur. N. S. 929; Story, Eq. PI. B, the plaintiff stated a circumstance which 
 
 §262, ttseq.; Humphreys i-.Tate, 4 Ired. Eq.220. was material in order to charge B, not as a 
 
 1 Thus, where a bill was brought by the fact, but as an allegation made by A, a de- 
 obligee in a bond, against the heir of the obligor, murrer by B was allowed. Whiter. Pmale, 22 
 alleging that the heir, havingassets by descent, Bnav. 72; Clark v. Lord Rivers, L. R. 5 Eq. 91, 
 ought to satisfy the bond, a demurrer was al- 95-97. 
 lowed, because the plaintiff had not expressly 2 Ante, pp. 297-299. 
 alleged in the bill that the heir was bound in 3 Avte, p. 298. 
 
 the bond; although it was alleged that the heir * Ld. Red. 158; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 178, 227, 
 
 ought to pay the debt. Crosseing v. Honor, 1 514; Longr. Majestre, 1 John. Ch. 305; Elmslie 
 
 Vein. 180. So, where a bill was brought against v. M'Anlay, 3 Bro. C. C. (Perkins's ed.) 624, 
 
 an assignee, touching a breach of covenant in a note (1), 627, note ("), and cases cited; Eden 
 
 lease, and the covenant, as stated, appeared to Injunct. (2d Am. ed.), 354, and cases in note («)• 
 
 be collateral, and not running with the land, See also Forbes v. Preston, 14 W. R 217; Earle 
 
 and did not, therefore, bind assignees, and was v. Sidebottom, 37 L. J. Ch. 503. As to the 
 
 not stated by the bill expressly to bind assign- privity between first and second mortgagees, 
 
 ees, a demurrer by the assignee was allowed. see Hoole v. Smith, 17 Ch. D. 434 
 
 Lord Uxbridge v. Staveland, 1 Ves. Sr. 56; » Att.-Gen.tf. Earl of Chesterfield, 18 Beav. 
 
 (a) A third person, who is not named as a U. 57: see Clarke v. Birley, 41 Ch. D. 422; nnte, 
 
 partv to the contract, in order to sue either of pp. 192. 287, notes; McClaskev r. O'Brien, 16 
 
 the contracting parties in Equity, must possess W. Va. 791 ; McCoy v. Allen, id. 724; Dunumt 
 
 an actual beneficial right as a cestui que trust, v. Fry, 12 Fed. Rep. 21. 
 
 under the contract. Gaudy v. Gandy, 30 Ch. 
 
 319
 
 324 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 Yet, in cases of collusion between the debtor and executor, or of the 
 insolvency of the executor, bills by creditors or residuary legatees against 
 debtors to a testator's estate, have been entertained ; 2 and in a suit by uni- 
 versal legatees under a will, for an account against a debtor to the testa- 
 tor's estate, an account was under the circumstances directed, 8 although 
 
 collusion was not established between the debtor and the personal 
 * 324 representative, and there was no * evidence of insolvency on the 
 
 part of the personal representative, or of his refusal to sue for 
 the debt, other than his omission to institute proceedings for a con- 
 siderable period. 1 
 
 It seems also, that when persons other than the personal representa- 
 tive of the testator have possessed specific assets of the testator, such 
 persons may be made parties to a suit by a creditor. 2 So also, where 
 it is desirable to have the account of the personal estate entire, a cred- 
 itor may make the surviving partner of a deceased debtor a defendant 
 
 596; 18 Jur. 686; Maw v. Pearson, 28 Beav. 
 196: Seton, 463, 790. See further illustrations 
 in Re Empress Engineering Co. 16 Ch. D. 125; 
 Halifax J. S. Banking Co. v. Sowerby Bridge 
 T. H. Co. W. N. (1881) 65; Re Spencer, id. 
 170; Re Jackson, 40 Ch. D. 495. So, though 
 an unsatisfied legatee has an interest in the 
 estate of his testator, and a right to have it 
 applied in a due course of administration, yet 
 he has no right to institute a suit against the 
 debtors to his testator's estate, for the purpose 
 of compelling them to pay their debts in satis- 
 faction of his legacy; for there is no privity 
 between the legatee and the debtors, who are 
 answerable only to the personal representative 
 of the testator. Bickley v. Dorrington, cited Ld. 
 Red. 158, n. (h)\ Bnrii. 32; 6 Ves. 749; Monk 
 r. Pom fret, cited Ld. Red. 158, n. (h); Walker 
 v. Walker, 20 W. R. 162. Upon the same 
 principle, where a bill was filed by the credi- 
 tors of a person who was one of the residuary 
 legatees of a testator, against the personal 
 representative, for an account of his personal 
 estate, it was held to be impossible to maintain 
 such a bill. Elmslie r. M'Aulay, 3 Bro. C. C 
 624, 626. And so, where a creditor of a tes- 
 tator, who had previously been a bankrupt, 
 and had obtained his certificate, brought a bill 
 against the executor for at: account, and made 
 the assignees under the testator's bankruptcy 
 parties, for the purpose of compelling them to 
 account to the executor for the surplus of the 
 bankrupt's estate, a demurrer by the assignees 
 was allowed. Utterson r. Mair, 4 Bro. C. C. 
 270, 276: 2 Ves. Jr. 95, 97; 6 Ves. 749: Bickley 
 v. Dorrington. cited Ld. Red. 158, n. (h); Barn. 
 32; 6 Ves. 749. 
 
 2 Utterson v. Mair, 4 Bro. C. C. 270. 276; 
 see also Doran v. Simpson, 4 Ves. 651, 665; 
 Alsager v. Rowley, 6 Ves. 748; Troughton r. 
 Binkes, id. 573, 575; BennVld v. Solomons, 9 
 Ves. 86; Burrowes v. Gore, 6 H. L. Cas. 907; 
 
 320 
 
 4 Jur. X. S. 1245; Jerdein v. Bright, 2 J. & H. 
 325, where the bill was filed against the trustee 
 of a creditor's deed, and a purchaser from him. 
 See also Morley v. White, L. R. 8 Ch. 731; 
 Bouck v. Bouck, L. R. 2 Eq. 19; Ld. Red. 158, 
 159; Elmslie v. M'Aulay, 3 Bro. C. C. (.Per- 
 kins's ed.) 627, n. (a); Mason v. Spurlock, 4 
 Baxt. 554. A special case must be made out 
 to authorize a bill by a creditor against an 
 administrator of the deceased debtor, and a 
 third person having assets of the deceased, to 
 subject those assets to the payment of his debt; 
 it is not, however, necessary to charge collusion 
 between the defendants; it is enough that the 
 third person holds all the property of the 
 deceased under a secret trust in fraud of cred- 
 itors; insists on retaining the property to his 
 own use, and that the administrator has not 
 proceeded against him for the space of about 
 two years, and resists the bill by reiving on the 
 Statute of Limitations. Hagan v. Walker, 14 
 How. (U. S ) 29, 34, 35; Long v. Majestre, 1 
 John. Ch. 306; see Harrison v. Righter, 11 
 N. J. Eq. 389; Goble v. Andruss, 1 Green Ch. 
 66. A single creditor of an insolvent estate 
 cannot sustain a bill against a debtor of such 
 estate without joining other parties. Isaacs v. 
 Clark. 13 Vt. 657. 
 
 3 Barker v. Birch, 1 De G. & S. 376; 11 Jur. 
 881. 
 
 i See Bolton v. Powell, 14 Beav. 27fr; 2 De 
 G. M. & G. 1 : 16 Jur. 24; Saunders v. Druce, 
 3 Drew. 140. 
 
 2 Xewland v. Champion, 1 Ves. Sr. 105; 2 
 Coll. 46; and see Consett v. Bell, 1 Y. & 
 C. C. C. 569; 6 Jur. 869. A creditor who has 
 taken possession of the books of account and 
 vouchers of a testator, and has proceeded to 
 collect his debts, would seem to be a proper 
 party to an administration suit. Earl Vane v. 
 Rigdon, 18 W. R. 308; but see S. C. on appeal, 
 18' W. R. 1092.
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. 
 
 324 
 
 to his bill, though no fraud or collusion is alleged ; 8 and it seems that a 
 joint creditor may maintain a suit against the representatives of a 
 deceased partner, for satisfaction of his entire demand out of the 
 assets, although the surviving partner is not alleged to be insolvent, 
 and is made a party to the bill. 4 So also, residuary legatees may sus- 
 tain a bill for an account against the executor and surviving partners of 
 the testator, 5 though collusion between the executor and the surviving 
 partners is neither charged nor proved; 6 but it must be shown that the 
 executors have neglected their duty of themselves suing. 7 A mere re- 
 fusal by a legal personal representative to sue for the recovery of out- 
 standing assets will not, in the absence of special circumstances, justify 
 a residuary legatee or next of kin in suing the legal personal representa- 
 tive and the alleged debtor to the estate. 8 
 
 Where it is necessary to allege fraud or collusion, a general allegation 
 of it in the bill will not be sufficient to shut out a demurrer ; but the facts 
 upon which such allegation is founded must be stated, as there is great 
 inconvenience in joining issue upon such a general charge, without giv- 
 ing the defendant a hint of any fact from which it is to be inferred. 9 (a) 
 
 3 Newland v. Champion, 1 Ves. Sr. 105; 
 see also Gedge v. Traill, 1 R. & M. 281, n.; 
 Long v. Majestre, 1 John. Ch. 305; Harrison v. 
 Righter, 11 N. J. Eq. 389. 
 
 4 Wilkinson v. Henderson, 1 M. & K. 582, 
 588; Hills v. M'Rae, 9 Hare, 297; 15 Jur. 766; 
 Bower v. Soctfte - des AfWteurs, 17 L. T. N. S. 
 490; Re McRae, 25 Ch. D. 16; Story, Eq. PI. 
 §§ 167, 178. 
 
 s Bowsherr. Watkins, 1 R. & M. 277, 283; 
 see also Law v. Law, 2 Coll. 41 ; 9 Jur. 745; on 
 appeal, 11 Jur. 463; Travis v. Milne, 9 Hare, 
 141; Stainton v. Carron Co. 18 Beav. 146; and 
 see Davies v. Davies, 2 Keen, 534. and the 
 observations of Lord Langdale, p. 539, on 
 Bowsher v. Watkins. But see Taylor v. Taylor, 
 W. N. (1873) 58; 28 L. T. N. S.189. 
 
 « See Collyer, Partn. § 366. 
 
 7 Stainton v. Carron Co. and Travis v. Milne, 
 ubi supra. Where an executrix neglected to 
 defend a suit, leave was given to the plaintiff, 
 in a suit for the administration of the estate, to 
 do so in her name. Olding v. Poulter, 23 Beav. 
 143; and see Packington v. Benbow, 5 W. R. 
 670. 
 
 8 Yeatman v. Yeatman, 7 Ch. D. 210. As 
 to privity between purchasers of different parts 
 of an estate, see Muster v. Hansard, 4 Ch. D. 
 718; Renals v. Cowlishaw, 9 Ch. D. 125; 11 
 Ch. D. 866; Taite v. Gosling, id. 273; Gaskin 
 V. Balls, 13 Ch. D. 324; and see Mann r. 
 Stephens, 15 Sim. 377; Coles v. Sims, Kay, 56; 
 5 De G. M. & G. 1; 18 Jur. 683; Western 
 v. Macdermott, L. R. 2 Ch. 72; Keates t> Lyon, 
 L. R. 4 Ch. 218; Chitty e. Bray, W. N. (1883) 
 
 98; Spicer v. Martin, 14 App. Cas. 12; Shep- 
 pard v. Gilmore, 57 L. J. Ch. 6; Clegg v. 
 Hands, 44 Ch. D. 503. 
 
 9 Wallingford v. Mutual Society, 5 App. 
 Cas. 685; Benfield v. Solomons, 9 Ves. 86; 
 Munlay v. Knight, 3 Hare, 497, and cases 
 cited in note, p. 501; 8 Jur. 904; Bothoinley v. 
 Squire, 1 Jur. N. S. 694, V. C. K.; Moss v. 
 Bainbrigge, 3 Jur. N. S. 58, V. C. W. ; Gilbert 
 v. Lewis, 1 De G. J. & S. 38, 49, 50; 9 Jur. 
 N. S. 187; Webster v. Power, L. R. 2 P. C. 69; 
 Ringgold v. Stone, 20 Ark. 526; Bryan v. 
 Spruill, 4 Jones, Eq. (N. C.) 27; Farnam v. 
 Brooks, 9 Pick. 212; Bull v. Bull 2 Root, 476; 
 Elston v. Blanchard, 2 Scam. 420; Moore v. 
 Greene, 19 How. U. S. 69; Small v. Boudinot, 
 Boudinot v. Small, 9 N. J. Eq. 381; De Louis 
 v. Meek, 2 Greene (Iowa), 55 ; Weatherspoon 
 v. Carmichael, 6 Ired. Eq. 143; Frazer v. Hoyt, 
 2 Strobh. Eq. 250; Harding v. Handy, 11 
 Wheat. 103. If fraud is relied upon, it must 
 be substantially charged in the bill. Crocker 
 v. Higgins, 7 Conn. 342 ; Hogan r. Burnett, 37 
 Miss. 617; Howell v. Sebring. 14 N. J. Eq. 84, 
 90; Parsons v. Heston, 11 id. 150; Grove ». 
 Rentch, 26 Md. 367, 377. In Other v. Smurth- 
 waite, L. R. 5 Eq. 437, 441. Sir W. Page Wood 
 V. O. (Lord Hatherley) said.: '• On behalf of 
 the plaintiff it is said that he is not bound 
 to let the defendants know beforehand, or give 
 them any chance of knowing beforehand, what 
 he contemplates proving. But if there be any 
 one tiling more contrary to the course of our 
 proceedings in Equity than another, it is the 
 taking an opponent by surprise. If I were to 
 
 (a) It is also in general required in practice 
 that the material facts of conduct, negligence, 
 
 VOL. I. — 21 
 
 acquiescence, or encouragement should be 
 pleaded. See Evans v. Bicknell, 6 Ves. 174; 
 
 321
 
 325 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 c 325 *With reference to the subject of privity between the plain- 
 tiff and defendant, it is to be observed, that the employment of 
 
 find the defendant taken by surprise, I should 
 certainly direct the case to stand over, in order 
 that he might have an opportunity of meeting 
 the case made against him. Although it is 
 fraud that is charged, fraud must be distinctly 
 charged and properly proved. So far from its 
 being the principle that a defendant is to be 
 allowed to be taken by surprise, and, without 
 any preparation, is to be called upon to meet 
 something which a witness may assert, nothing 
 
 Jackson v. Cator, 5 Ves. 688; Powell v. Thomas, 
 G Hare, 300; Rochdale Canal Co. v. King, 
 2 Sim. N. S. 78; Thornton v. Ramsden, 4 Gift'. 
 519; L. R. 1 H. L. 129; Bankart v. Tennant, 
 L. R. 10 Eq. 141 : Williams v. Earl of Jersey, 
 Cr. & Ph. 91, 98: Willinott v. Barber, 15 Ch. 
 D. 96; R. S. C. Ord. XIX. 4, 18; 15 & 16 Vic. 
 c. 86, § 10. The other part}- ma}' of course 
 administer interrogatories in order to ascertain 
 the material facts as to a general allegation. 
 Saunders v. Jones, 7 Ch. D. 435; Lyon v. 
 Tweddell, 13 Ch. D. 375 ; see Benbow v. Low, 
 16 Ch. D. 93; Bolckow v. Fisher, 10 Q. B. D. 
 161. Under the Code system, however, a gen- 
 eral allegation of negligence is held good 
 against a general demurrer. Gulf Col. & S. F. 
 Ry. Co. v. Washington, 4 IT. S. App. 121, 125. 
 Notice, when necessary to found a right against 
 the defendant, must be charged directly. De 
 Tastet r. Tavernier, 1 Keen, 161; Blair v. St. 
 Louis, H. & K. R. Co. 27 Fed. Rep. 176. No- 
 tice alleged to a vendor may be proved by notice 
 to his authorized agent, though the agency is 
 not pleaded. Marshall v. Gilman (Minn.), 53 
 N. W. Rep. 811. In defending against a charge 
 of laches, a general allegation of ignorance at 
 one time and knowledge at another is of no 
 effect. Credit Co. v. Arkansas Central R. Co. 
 15 Fed. Rep. 46. General allegations in an 
 answer that the pollution of a natural stream 
 is reasonable, natural, and proper, and consistent 
 with the owner's rights, amount only to legal 
 conclusions. Kellogg v. New Britain, 62 Conn. 
 232. Intention, when material, should be al- 
 leged as a fact, and, when so alleged, it must 
 he denied by the answer. Wilcox r. Davis, 4 
 Minn. 197; Riley v. Carter, 76 Md. 581 ; Piatt v. 
 Mead, 9 Fed. Rep. 91. Hence a fraudulent in- 
 tent must be alleged as a fact. Davy v. Garrett, 
 7 Ch. D. 473, 489; Palmer v. Locke, 15 Ch. D. 
 294 ; R. S. C. Ord. XIX. 25. A general allega- 
 tion of unearned profits resulting from a breach 
 of contract, without details, and of a speculative 
 nature, is insufficient upon a general demurrer. 
 Johnson v. Cherokee Land Co. 82 Texas, 338. 
 But insufficient and defective statements in the 
 bill are often cured by the allegations of the 
 answer. Brewis v. Lawson, 76 Va. 36. 
 
 322 
 
 is more settled than the doctrine that when you 
 charge fraud you must state the facts upon 
 which you allege fraud, and prove them 
 strictly." See McLane v. Manning, 2 Wins. 
 (N. C.) No. 1 (Eq.), 60; Webster v. Power, 
 L. R. 2 P. C. 69, 81: Sharpe v. San Paolo 
 Ry. Co. 8 Ch. 597; Fort v. Orndorf, 7 Heisk. 
 167; Winham v. Crutcher, 2 Tenn. Ch. 536; 
 Castle v. Bader, 23 Cal. 75; Symonds v. City 
 Bank, 34 W. R. 364. 
 
 General allegations of fraud are insufficient 
 in both civil and criminal pleading. People v. 
 McKenna, 81 Cal. 158; post, p. 328. The rule 
 is constantly applied in Equity practice. See 
 cases above cited: Wallingford ». Mutual 
 Society, 5 App. Cas. 685 ; Lawrence v. Norreys, 
 15 App. Cas. 210; Bastow v. Bradshaw, 8 
 L. R. Ir. 30; Kingston v. Corker, 29 id. 364; 
 Van Weel v. Winston, 115 U. S. 228; Hazard 
 v. Griswold, 21 Fed. Rep. 178; Lafayette Co. 
 v. Neely, id. 738; Linn v. Green, 17 id. 407; 
 Smith v. Wood, 42 N. J. Eq. 563; Herberts. 
 Herbert (N. J.). 20 Atl. 290; Merrill r. Wash- 
 burn, 83 Maine, 189; Barteau v. Barteau, 45 
 Minn. 132; Nichols r. Rogers, 139 Mass. 146. 
 And also under the Code Procedure : Fast St. 
 Louis C. R. Co. v. People, 119 III. 182; Sals- 
 bury v. Falk, 28 111. App. 297; Clodfelter v. 
 Hulett, 72 Ind. 137; Penny v. Jackson, 85 Ala. 
 67; McHan v. Ord way, 76 Ala. 347; State v. 
 Williams, 39 Kansas, 517; Norris v. Scott 
 (Ind.), 32 N. E. Rep. 103; McMahon v. Rooney, 
 93 Mich. 390; Williams v. First Presby't Soci- 
 ety, 1 Ohio St. 478; Cosgrove v. Fisk, 90 Cal. 
 75; Brooks v. Hamilton, 15 Minn. 26; Jackson 
 v. Reeve, 44 Ark. 496; Aultman v. Steinan, 8 
 Neb. 109, 113; Southern Marble Co. v. Stegall 
 (Ga.), 15 S. E. Rep. 806; Bowden v. Crow 
 (Texas), 21 S. W. Rep. 612; Robinson v. Dolores 
 Land Co. 2 Col. App. 17. Evidence of the al- 
 leged fraud is not admissible when the facts 
 are not pleaded. Symonds v. City Bank, 34 
 W. R. 364; Burris v. Adams, 96 Cal. 664. 
 
 This, being a rule of pleading only, does 
 not prevent discovery so as to enable the plain- 
 tiff to plead the fraud in detail. Leitch v. 
 Abbott, 31 Ch. D. 374. And for the same 
 reason the objection cannot be first raised in 
 the midst of a hearing on the merits. Hubbard 
 v. McNaughton, 43 Mich. 220. A plea, which 
 sets up fraud in defence, must state the facts 
 constituting the fraud. Mobile Savings Bank 
 v. Board of Supervisors, 22 Fed. Rep. 580. 
 An allegation that certain acts, which weie 
 not in themselves wrongful, violated an act of 
 Congress, and were in fraud of the plaintiff, 
 being merely a legal conclusion, is not a 
 sufficient statement of fraud by the defendant:
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. 
 
 326 
 
 agents or brokers in a transaction does not interfere with the privity 
 between the principals, so as to deprive them of their right to sue each 
 other immediately. 1 
 
 A bill must not only show that the plaintiff is entitled to or interested 
 in the subject-matter of the litigation, and is clothed with such a char- 
 acter as entitles him to maintain the suit, and that the defendant is also 
 liable to the relief sought against him, or is in some manner interested 
 in the dispute, and that there is such a privity between him and the 
 plaintiff as gives the plaintiff a title to sue him, but it must also pray 
 the Court to grant the proper relief suited to the case, as made 
 by the bill ; 2 and if, for * any reason founded on the substance * 326 
 
 1 Thus, where a principal transmits goods to 
 a factor, he may sue the person who buys of 
 the factor; and where a bill was brought by 
 some merchants against the defendant, to dis- 
 cover what quantity of straw hats he had pur- 
 chased of their agents, and for payment to them, 
 and not to the agents, a demurrer was over- 
 ruled. Lissett v. Reave. 2 Atk. 394. So, 
 where a merchant, acting upon a del credere 
 commission, became bankrupt, having sold 
 goods of his principals for which he had not 
 paid them, and, shortly before his bankruptcy, 
 drew bills on the vendees, which he delivered 
 to some of his own creditors to discharge their 
 demands, they knowing his insolvency, a suit 
 by the principals against the persons who had 
 received the bills, for an account and payment 
 of the produce, was sustained. Neuman v. 
 Godfrey, cited Ld. Red. 160; S. C. nom. New- 
 man v. Godfrey, 2 Bro. C. C. 332; Leverick v. 
 Meigs, 1 Cowen, 645, 663,664, 665; ante, p. 195, 
 notes. Ordinnrily, the principal cannot avail 
 himself, by suit in his own name, of a written 
 contract, made between his agent and a third 
 person, in the name of the agent; for it is 
 treated as a contract merely between the par- 
 ties named in it, although the agent is known 
 to be acting in that character. United States 
 o. Parmele, 1 Paine, C. C. 252; Clark v. Wil- 
 son, 3 Wash. C. C. 560; Newcomb v. Clark, 1 
 
 Kelly v. Wallace, 14 Minn. 236. So general 
 allegations of feebleness and undue influence 
 are insufficient without the facts. Jackson v. 
 Rowell, 87 Ala. 685. 
 
 It may, however, be sufficient to allege that 
 a specific act was fraudulently done, or that it 
 was fraudulent, without averring how it was 
 done. Zimmerman v. Willard, 114 111. 364; 
 National Union Bank v. Reed, 27 Abb. N. ('as. 
 5. Fraud may be inferred from circumstances, 
 but, when alleged, it must be clearly proved. 
 Gruber v. Baker, 20 Nev. 453; see Davy v. 
 Garrett, 7 Ch. D. 473, 489; Palmer v. Locke, 
 15 Ch. D. 294, 300. In cases of agency, or 
 other confidential relations, the plaintiff may 
 be entitled to discovery upon interrogatories in 
 order to enable him to give particulars and 
 
 Denio, 226; Finney v. Bedford Com. Ins. Co. 
 8 Met. 348, Harp v. Osgood, 2 Hill, 216. There 
 are, however, exceptions to this rule, as well 
 established as the rule itself; as in the case of a 
 written contract by a factor in his own name 
 for the purchase or sale of goods for his princi- 
 pal. So in case of a policy of insurance pro- 
 cured by an agent in his own name for the 
 benefit of his principal, the agent as well as the 
 principal, may sue thereon. Brewster v. Lunt, 
 8 La. 296. 
 
 * Story, Eq. Pi. §§ 40-42. The prayer of a 
 bill in Chancery is always an essential part, 
 and without its insertion no decree can be ren 
 dered for a plaintiff. Driver v. Tatner, 5 
 Porter, 10; see Smith v. Smith, 4 Rand. 95; 
 see also post, " The Prayer for Relief," in 
 this chapter. If the plaintiff prays for relief 
 in a certain capacity, this will be a test of the 
 ground on which he seeks the aid of the Court. 
 Sayles v. Tibbitts, 5 R. I. 79. If the allega- 
 tions of a bill refer to the condition of things 
 at the time the bill is filed, the relief afforded 
 must be limited to that state of facts. Win- 
 nipi^eogee Lake Company r. Young, 40 N. H. 
 420. Under a bill alleging that all of the 
 defendants had an interest in the land sub- 
 ject to the plaintiff's claim, and praying re- 
 lief against all, the bill may be dismissed as 
 to part of the defendants, and relief given 
 
 details of the frauds which he alleges generallv. 
 See Leitchv. Abbott, 31 Ch. D. 374. Altera 
 trial upon a plea or answer which contains 
 a general allegation of fraud, without exception 
 being taken to its sufficiency, or objection made 
 to the evidence introduced under it, it is too late 
 to object that the circumstances arc not stated. 
 King p. Davis, 34 Cal. 106; Reese r. Kinkead, 
 20 Nev. 65. Under the N. Y. Code of Civil 
 Procedure, § 549, subd. 4, providing that a 
 cause of action on contract fraudulently con- 
 tracted, is an action on the case as to pleadings 
 and remedies, having the -ontract as one only 
 of its facts, the allegations showing the fraud, 
 which is a necessary element, cannot be stricken 
 out on motion as redundant and irrelevant. 
 Rowe v. Patterson, 16 Jones & S. (N. Y.) 249. 
 
 323
 
 * 326 THE BILL. 
 
 of the case cas stated in the bill, the plaintiff is not entitled to the re- 
 lief he prays, either in the whole or in part, the defendant may demur. 
 In some of the most ancient bills, as appears by the records, the 
 plaintiff does not expressly ask any relief, nor any process, but prays 
 the Chancellor to send for the defendant and to examine him ; in others, 
 where relief is prayed, the prayer of process is various : sometimes a 
 habeas corpus cum causa, sometimes a subpoena, and sometimes other 
 writs. 1 Afterwards, the bill appears to have assumed a more regular 
 form, and not only to have prayed the subpoena of the Court, but also 
 suitable relief adapted to the case contained in the statement ; 2 which 
 is the general form of all bills in modern use, except that, since the 
 late Act, the prayer for subpoena is omitted. But although it was the 
 general practice, previously to the late Act, in all cases where relief was 
 sought, to specify particularly the nature of such relief, yet it seems 
 that such special prayer was not absolutely necessary, and that praying 
 general relief was sufficient ; 8 and Lord Eldon said 4 that he had seen % 
 bill with a simple prayer that the defendant might answer all the matters 
 aforesaid, and then the general prayer for relief. 
 
 By the Act to amend the practice of the Court of Chancery it was 
 provided, that the plaintiff shall pray specifically for the relief which he 
 may conceive himself entitled to, and also for general relief. 5 
 
 The requisites above set out are necessary in every bill which is filed 
 in the Court of Equity for the purpose of obtaining relief. There are 
 other requisites appertaining to bills adapted to particular purposes, 
 which will be hereafter pointed out, as well as those distinctive prop- 
 erties which belong to bills not filed for the purposes of relief. But 
 besides those points which are generally necessary to be attended to in 
 the frame of all bills, as each case must depend upon its own particular 
 circumstances, matters must be introduced into every bill which will 
 occasion it to differ from others, but which it is impossible to reduce 
 under any general rules, and must be left to the discretion of the drafts- 
 man. Care, however, must be taken in framing the bill that everything 
 which is intended to be proved be stated upon the face of it; other- 
 wise, evidence cannot be admitted to prove it. 6 This is required, in 
 
 against the residue. Brooks v. Carpentier, Farrington, id. 239, 241; Ashton v. Atlantic 
 
 53 Cal. 287. Bank, 3 Allen, 217; Howell v. Sebring, 14 N. J. 
 
 i Jud. Auth. M. R. 91, 92; see 1 Spence, Eq. 84, 90; Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87. No 
 
 Eq. Jur. 368, et seq. facts are properly in issue, unless charged in 
 
 2 Jud. Auth. M. R. 91, 92; see 1 Spence, the bill; and of course no proofs can generally be 
 Eq. Jur. 368, et seq. offered of facts not in the bill; nor can relief be 
 
 3 Cook v. Martyn, 2 Atk. 3; Grimes v. granted for matters not charged, although they 
 French id. 141. may be apparent from other parts of the plead - 
 
 4 Partridge v. Haycraft, 11 Ves. 574. ings and evidence; for the Court pronounces its 
 
 5 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 10. decision secundum allegata et. probata. Story, 
 
 6 Gordon i>. Gordon,' 3 Swanst.472; Philipps Eq. PI. § 257; Crocket v. Lee, 7 Wheat. 522; 
 v. Philipps, 4 Q. B.D. 127; Miller v. Cotten, 5 Jackson v. Ashton, 11 Peters, 229; James v. 
 Ga. 341; Parker v. Beavans, 19 Texas, 406; McKernon, 6 John. 564; Barraque v. Manual. 2 
 B.iilev ». Rvder, 10 N. Y. 363; Rowan v. Eng. 516; Tripp v. Vincent, 2 Barb. Ch. 614 ; 
 Bowles, 21 III. 17; Laud v. Cowan, 19 Ala. 297; Browning v. Pratt, 2 Dev. Eq. 49; Sheratz v. 
 Chaffin v. Kimball, 23 111. 36; Camden and Nicodemus, 7 Yerg. 13; Austin v. Ramsey, 3 
 Amboy R. R. Co. v. Stewart, 19 N. J. Eq. 343; Tenn. Ch. 118. A trustee is not to be held for 
 Hewett r. A(lain«, 50 Maine, 271, 276; Lovell v. any neglect or breach of duty which is not 
 
 324
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. 
 
 328 
 
 ♦order that the defendant may be aware of what the nature *327 
 of the case to be made against him is. 1 Not only will it be im- 
 possible to introduce evidence as to facts which are not put in issue by 
 the bill, but even an inquiry will not be directed, unless ground for such 
 inquiry is laid in the pleadings. 2 
 
 * Where the bill sets up a case of actual fraud, and makes that * 328 
 the ground prayer for relief, the plaintiff is not, in general, en- 
 titled to a decree by establishing some one or more of the facts, quite 
 independent of fraud, but which might of themselves create a case under 
 a distinct head of Equity from that which would be applicable to the case 
 of fraud originally stated. 1 (a) It is not open to the plaintiff, if he 
 
 charged in the bill. Page v. Olcott, 28 Vt. 465. 
 But the plaintiff need not, and indeed should 
 not, state in the bill any matters of which the 
 Court is bound judicially to take notice, or is 
 supposed to possess full knowledge. See Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 24; 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 4, 5, 6. In 
 a bill to restrain an infringement of a patent, 
 an express averment of the novelty of the 
 invention protected by the patent is not neces- 
 sarv. Amory v. Brown, L. R 8 Eq. 663; 
 Harris v. Rothwell, 35 Ch. D. 416, 427. The 
 allegation of the grant and production of the 
 letters-patent throw upon the defendant the onus 
 of disputing the novelty. It is no longer neces- 
 sary to charge the evidence relied on, except 
 for the purpose of procuring admissions. Per 
 Sir W. P. Wood V. C. in Mansell v. Feeney, 2 
 J. & H. 313, 318. Where, however, the ques- 
 tion turns upon a particular fact not specifically 
 alleged in the bill, and which the defendant has 
 not had the opportunity of denying, it seems 
 that the Court will direct an inquiry as to such 
 fact. Weston v. Empire Assurance Co. L. R. 6 
 Eq. 23. A bill should not set out the evidence, 
 whether oral or written, by which the facts are 
 to be proved. Camden and Amboy R. Co. v. 
 Stewart, 19 N. J. Eq 343 ; Winebrenner v. 
 Colder, 43 Penn. St. 244. 
 
 i See Hall v. Maltby, 6 Price, 240, 259; 
 Powys v. Mansfield, 6 Sim. 565; and see Mon- 
 tesquieu v. Sandys, 18 Ves. 302, 314, where a 
 bill was filed to set aside a contract entered into 
 by an attorney for the purchase of a reversion- 
 ary interest from his client, on the ground of 
 fraud and misrepresentation, but the evidence 
 adduced in support of the allegation of fraud 
 was deemed not to substantiate the case as laid 
 in the bill, although it disclosed a transaction 
 which would have raised a question of consider- 
 able importance in favor of the plaintiff, if it had 
 been properly represented upon the pleadings; 
 yet as it had not been stated in the bill, Lord 
 Eldon declined to give relief upon circumstances 
 which were not made a ground of complaint 
 upon the record. As to alleging wilful neglect 
 
 or default on the part of a trustee, see Sleight 
 v. Lawson, 3 K. & J. 293; Massey v. Massey, 2 
 J. & H. 728; Mayer v. Murray, 8 Ch. D. 4*24; 
 and see King r. Corke, 1 Ch. D. 57 ; Mozeley 
 v. Cowie. 47 L. .1. Ch. 271; Barber v. Mackrefl, 
 12 Ch. D. 534; Re Symons, 21 Ch. D. 757; 
 Smith v. Armitage, 24 Ch. D. 727 ; R. S. C. 
 1883, App. C. § 2, No. 2. As to mortgagees 
 and creditors in possession, see 2 Fisher on 
 Mortgages, 943 ; Lord Kensington v. Bouverie, 
 7 Ue G. M. & G. 134, 156; 7 H. L. Cas. 557; 19 
 Beav. 39; Mayer r. Murray, sujyra. 
 
 * Holloway v. Millard, 1 Mad. 414, 421; 
 Scarf v. Soufby, 1 M'N. & G. 364, 375; see, 
 however, Baker v. Bradley, 7 De G. M. & G. 
 597; 2 Sm. & G. 531; 1 Jur. N. S. 489; 2 id. 
 99; and see, for cases where inquiries have been 
 directed on suggestions in answer, M'Mahou 
 v. Burchell, 2 Phil. 127, 132; Barrett v. Stock- 
 ton and Darlington Ry. Co. 1 H. L. Cas. 34; 11 
 CI. & r'. 590. As to pleading a stated or settled 
 account with particulars, see R. S. C. 1883, 
 Ord. XX. 8. Thus, where a bill was filed for 
 a foreclosure, and a motion was made for a 
 reference to the Master, under the 7th Geo. II. 
 c. 20, to inquire into the amount due upon the 
 mortgage, and it was insisted that the Master 
 ought to be directed to take an account of the 
 costs incurred by the plaintiff in certain pro- 
 ceedings in an ejectment at Law which were 
 not alluded to in the bill, the Court held that no 
 such inquiry could be directed, but gave the 
 plaintiff leave to amend his bill in that respect. 
 Millard v. Magor, 3 Mad. 433. 
 
 i Price v. Berrington, 3 M'N. & G. 486 ; 15 Jur. 
 999; Macquire v. O'Reilly, 3 Jo. & Lat. 224; 
 Ferraby r. Hobson, 2 Phil. 235, 258; Glascott v. 
 Lang, id. 310, 322 ; Wilde v. Gibson, 1 H. L. Caa. 
 605 : 2 Y. & C. Ch. 542; Sugd. Law Prop. 632; 
 Baker v. Bradley, ubi supra ; Burdett v. Hay, 4 
 De G. J. & S. 41 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 1260; Archbold v. 
 Commissioners, 2 H. L. Cas. 440. 400; Harrison 
 r. Guest, 8 id. 481 ; 6 De G. M. & G. 424 ; Eyre v. 
 Potter, 15 How. 42; Hoyt ». Hoyt, 27 N. J. Eq. 
 399; Stucky v. Stuck}', 30 id. 546; Tillinghast 
 
 (a) See Thomson v. Eastwood, 2 App. Cas. 
 215; Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Kavanagh, 
 
 [1892] A. C. 473; Fry v. Lane, 40 Ch. D. 312; 
 Tabor v. Cunningham, 24 W. R. 153; Britton 
 
 325
 
 *328 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 fails in making out a case of fraud, to pick out facts which might, if not 
 put forward as proofs of fraud, have warranted him in asking, and the 
 Court in granting, relief. 2 But where after striking out the charge of 
 fraud, there are sufficient grounds for relief stated and proved, and the 
 charge of fraud is only subsidiary, it is only a matter affecting costs. 8 
 Where material allegations of fraud are proved, relief may be granted 
 though other allegations of fraud are not proved. 4 
 
 Independently of the qualities which have been above pointed out as 
 necessary to bills in general, it is requisite that the object for which 
 a bill is brought should not be beneath the dignity of the Court : for 
 the Court of Chancery will not entertain a suit where the subject-mat- 
 ter of the litigation is under the value of £ 10 ; 5 except in cases of 
 
 v. Champlin, 4 R. I. 173; Mount Vernon Bank 
 v. Stone, 2 R. 1. 129 ; Masterson v. Finnegan, id. 
 316. The rule applies only where actual or 
 moral, as distinguished from constructive fraud, 
 is charged; but it is sufficient that such actual 
 or moral fraud is substantially charged, whether 
 the word Iraudulent be used or not. Tilling- 
 hast v. Champlin, ubi supra ; Aldrich v Wil- 
 cox, 10 R. I. 405; see Joliffe v. Baker, 11 Q. B. 
 D. 255; Grove v Rentch, 26 Md. 367, 377. And 
 see for exceptions where other matters are al- 
 leged to give the Court jurisdiction, infra, 
 p. 382, n. The facts and circumstances of the 
 alleged fraud should be set forth. Castle v. 
 Bader, 23 Cal. 75. 
 
 2 Hickson v. Lombard, L. R. 1 H. L. 324. 
 
 3 London Chartered Bank ». Lempriere, 
 L. R. 4 P. C. 572; and see Hilliard v. Eiffe, 
 L. R. 7 H. L. 39. 
 
 * Moxon v. Payne, L. R. 8 Ch. 881. 
 
 6 The true ground of this rule is, that the 
 entertainment of suits of small value has a 
 tendency, not only to promote expensive and 
 mischievous litigation, but also to consume the 
 time of the Court in unimportant and frivolous 
 controversies, to the manifest injury of other 
 suitors, and to the subversion of the public 
 policy of the land. Moore r. Lyttle, 4 John. 
 Ch. 185; Swedesborough Church v. Shivers, 16 
 N. J. Eq. 453, 458. This rule seems to have 
 
 v. Brewster, 2 Fed. Rep. 160; Duff v. First 
 National Bank. 13 id. 65; Babbitt r. Dotten, 
 14 id. 19; Spies v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. 40 
 id. 34. The jurisdiction of Equity in matters 
 of fraud, misrepres' ntation, and concealment, 
 is not dependent on discovery. Jones v. Bolles, 
 9 Wall. 364; Mann v. Appel", 31 Fed. Rep. 378; 
 Lafayette Co. v. Neely, 21 id. 738. General 
 allegations of fraud do not, it seems, bar a 
 right to discovery. Leitch v. Abbott, 31 Ch. 
 D. 374 ; see Sachs v. Speilman, 37 Ch. D. 295. 
 An amendment at the trial is not. as a rule, 
 allowed for the purpose of raising a charge 
 of fraud after the case has been started in- 
 dependentlv of fraud. Hendriks v. Montagu, 
 
 326 
 
 been of great antiquity in the Court of Chan- 
 cery. See Story, Eq. PI. § 501, and cases 
 cited. A similar rule, it is apprehended, pre- 
 vails in the Courts of Equity in America, so 
 far as they have been called upon to express 
 any opinion on the subject. Story, Eq. PI. 
 § 502; see Williams v. Berry, 3 Stew. & P. 
 284. It was formerly held in New York that 
 the Court of Chancery would not take cogni- 
 zance of a case where the amount in controversy 
 was below .£10 sterling. Moore v. Lyttle, 4 
 John. Ch. 185; Fullerton r. Jackson, 5 John. 
 Ch. 276. The amount was afterwards increased 
 in that State by statute to the sum of one 
 hundred dollars; 2 Rev. Stats. New York, 173, 
 § 37; see Vredenburg v. Johnson, 1 Hopk. 112; 
 Mitchell v. Tighe, 1 Hopk. 119; Smets v. Wil- 
 liams, 4 Paige, 364. No such statute exists in 
 Massachusetts, but a similar principle is ap- 
 plied. Cummings v. Barrett, 10 Cush. 190. 
 The value of the matter in dispute should 
 appear by the record. Watson v. Wells, 5 
 Conn. 468. But a bill for the specific perform- 
 ance of a contract to convey land need not 
 contain an averment that the value of the 
 land exceeds $100. Church v. Ide, 1 Clarke, 
 494. The jurisdiction of the Court does not, 
 however, depend upon the amount that may 
 ultimately be found due to the plaintiff, but 
 upon the claim stated by him. Bradt v. Kirk- 
 
 17 Ch. D. 642. If the bill shows fraud and 
 wronjr, and also inadvertence and mistake 
 which alone are proved, the bill may be sus- 
 tained, although the fraud and wrong are not 
 fully established. Williams v. United States, 
 138 U. S. 514. In the Federal Courts the old 
 jurisdiction of the English Chancery in cases 
 of fraud and mistake, which was gradually 
 encroached upon by the Law Courts, is not ex- 
 ercised, and a bill in Equity cannot there be 
 maintained for damages when a like amount 
 can be recovered in an action of tort or for 
 money had and received. Parkersburg v. 
 Brown, 106 U. S. 487; Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 
 U. S. 190 ; Patou v. Majors, 46 Fed. Rep. 210.
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. 
 
 *329 
 
 charities, 6 * or of fraud, 1 or of bills to establish a general right, * 329 
 as in the case of tithes, 2 or other special circumstances. 8 (a) It is 
 said that the Court will not entertain a bill for land under the yearly- 
 value of 40s. ; 4 but instances occur in the books where bills have been 
 entertained for the recovery of ancient quit-rents, though very small, 
 namely, 2s. or 3s. per annum. 5 It seems, that if a bill is brought for a 
 demand which, by the rule of the Court, cannot be sued for, the defend- 
 ant may either demur to it, on the ground that the plaintiff's demand, if 
 true, is not sufficient for the Court to ground a decree upon, 6 or he may 
 (which is the most usual course) move to have the bill dismissed, as 
 below the dignity of the Court. 7 But even if the defendant should take 
 neither of these courses, yet, when the cause comes to a hearing, if it 
 appears that, on account taken, the balance due to the plaintiff will not 
 amount to the sum of £10, the Court will dismiss the bill. 8 
 
 patrick, 7 Paige, 62; Whitecotton v. Simpson, 
 4 J. J. Marsh. 12; Judd v. Bushnell, 7 Conn. 
 205; Skinner v. Bailey, 7 Conn. 496; Wheat 
 v. Griffin, 4 Day, 419; Douw v. Sheldon, 
 2 Paige, 323; Bailey v. Burton, 8 Wend. 395. 
 These provisions seem to apply, however, only 
 to cases of bills for relief, and not to cases of 
 bills for discovery merely. Goldey v. Beeker, 
 1 Edw. Ch. 271; Schroeppel v. Redfield, 5 
 Paige, 245. In New York the limitation to the 
 amount in controversy was abolished by con- 
 struction of the Constitution of 1846, and the 
 Code of Procedure. Sarsfield v. Van Vaughner, 
 15 Abb. Pr. 65. 
 
 6 Parrot v. Paulet, Cary, 103 ; Anon. 1 Eq. 
 Cas. Abr. 75. margin. 
 
 i Bunb. 17, n. 
 
 2 Griffith v. Lewis, 2 Bro. P. C. ed. Toml. 
 407. If a suit have no other object than the 
 mere recovery of a sum of $1.75, the bill will 
 be dismissed; but if it seeks to establish a 
 right of a permanent and valuable nature, it 
 tails within the recognized exceptions to the 
 general principle, and the Court will maintain 
 jurisdiction. Swedesborough Church v. Shiv- 
 ers, 16 N. J. Eq. 453, 458; Story, Eq. PI. 
 §§ 500,501. 
 
 » Cons. Ord. IX. 1. In Seaton v. Grant, 
 
 (a) Allen v. Demarest, 41 N. J. Eq. 162, and 
 note; Wartman v. Swindell, 25 Atl. Rep. 356; 
 Treadwetl v. Patterson, 51 Cal. 637; Lufkin v. 
 Galveston, 73 Texas, 340. The rule and the 
 amount remain unchanged in England. West- 
 bury on-Severn Rural Sanitary Authority v. 
 Meredith, 30 Ch. D. 387; Cooper v. Crabtree, 
 20 Ch. D. 589. The amount in different States, 
 usually $100, though less in some jurisdic- 
 tions, is fixed by statute or thf practice of the 
 Courts. See Cummings v. Barrett, 10 Cush. 
 186; Smith v. Williams, 116 Mas*. 510; Chap- 
 man t». Banker & Tradesman Pub. Co. 128 
 Mass. 478; Gale v. Nickerson, 151 Mass. 428; 
 Mass. St. of 1884, c. 285, § 1; Dix v. Briggs, 9 
 
 L. R. 2 Ch. 459, 463, Lord Justice Turner said : 
 " Another objection that has been taken is the 
 insignificance of the plaintiff's interest in the 
 subject-matter of the suit. He is, however, 
 suing on behalf of himself and the other share- 
 holders of the company, and I am not prepared 
 to say that the ordinary rule as to suits for 
 a subject matter of less value than .£10, applies 
 to a case of this kind." 
 
 4 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 75, margin; Almy v. 
 Pycroft, Cary, 103. 
 
 5 Cocks v. Foley, 1 Vern. 359. 
 
 6 Fox v. Frost, Rep. temp. Finch, 253. 
 
 1 Mos. 47, 356; Bunb. 17; Swedesborough 
 Church v. Shivers, 16 N. J. Eq. 453, 457. 
 
 8 Coop. Eq. PI. 166; Swedesborough Church 
 v. Shivers, 16 N. J. Eq. 453, 457; McNew r. 
 Toby, 6 Humph. 27. Thus, where, upon a bill 
 being brought relating to tithes, it was clearly 
 admitted that the plaintiff had a right to some 
 tithes of the defendant, but the tithe* which 
 were due appeared to be only of the value of 
 £5, Lord Harcourt dismissed the bill at the 
 hearing. Cited 2 Atk. 253. In Brace v. Tay- 
 lor, 2 Atk. 253, a similar objection was taken 
 at the hearing, and allowed. But in Beckett v. 
 Bilbrough,'8 Hare, 188, 14 .Tur. 238, the suit 
 was held to be sustainable, although the sum 
 
 Paige, 595; Newell v. Burbank, 4 Edw. Ch 536; 
 Steinbaeh v. Hill, 25 Mich. 78; Wood 0. Wood, 
 3 Ala. 756; Carr v. Inglehart, 3 Ohio St. 457; 
 Church v. Ide, Clarke Ch. 494. When the 
 whole amount sued for exceeds the limit, but is 
 to be disposed of under separate issues, none of 
 which involves so much, the bill cannot be 
 maintained. Wallace r. Sortor, 52 Mich. 159; 
 Schulenberg-Boeckeler Lumber Co t\ Hay- 
 ward, 20 Fed. Rep. 422; Massa v. Cutting, 30 
 id. 1. In patent suits an injunction may 
 be granted although the infringement is so 
 small that it does not place the plaintiff's busi- 
 ness in serious danger. Carter v. Wollschlager, 
 53 Fed. Rep. 573. 
 
 327
 
 330 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 * 330 * The Court will not permit a bill to be brought for part of a mat- 
 ter only, 1 so as to expose a defendant to be harassed by repeated 
 litigations concerning the same thing ; it, therefore, as a general rule, re- 
 quires that every bill shall be so framed as to afford ground for such a deci- 
 sion upon the whole matter, at one and the same time, as may, as far as 
 possible, prevent future litigation concerning it. It is upon this principle 
 that the Court acts, in requiring in every case, with such exceptions as we 
 have noticed above, the presence, either as plaintiffs or defendants, of all 
 parties interested in the object of the suit. And upon the same princi- 
 ple, it will not allow a plaintiff who has two distinct claims upon the 
 same defendant, or to which the same defendant may eventually prove 
 liable, to bring separate bills for each particular claim, or to bring a bill 
 for one and omit the other, so as to leave the other to be the subject of 
 future litigation. 2 
 
 recovered was only £9, on the ground that 
 the plaintiff, when he tiled his bill, must have 
 been justified in supposing that a larger sum 
 would be recovered ; and the defendant, who 
 knew the amount, had not given any informa- 
 tion respecting it. " If it appears on the face 
 of the bill tl/at the matter in dispute, exclusive 
 of costs, does not exceed the amount to which 
 the jurisdiction of the Court is limited, the 
 defendant may either demur, or move to have 
 the bill dismissed with costs; or if it does not 
 appear on the face of the bill, it may be pleaded 
 in bar of the suit." Smets v. Williams, 4 
 Paige, 364; McElwain v. Willis, 3 Paige, 505; 
 S. C. on appeal, 9 Wend. 548; Schrccppel v. 
 Redfield, 5 Paige. 245; Bradt v. Kirkpatrick, 
 7 Paige, 62. By " exclusive of costs," above, 
 is meant the costs of the suit in Chancery. 
 Van Tyne v. Bunce, 1 Edw. Ch. 583. In 
 Smith v. Matthews, M. R., 2 July, 1859, the 
 usual decree was made to administer real and 
 personal estate on a bill by a creditor, suing 
 on behalf of all the creditors of the deceased 
 debtor; though his individual debt, as alleged 
 in the bill, was under .£5. 
 
 i Ld. Red- 183. Thus, in Purefoy v. Pure- 
 foy, 1 Vern. 29, where an heir, by his bill, 
 prayed an account against a trustee of two 
 several estates, that were conveyed to him for 
 several and distinct debts, and afterwards 
 would have had his bill dismissed as to one of 
 the estates, and have had the account taken as 
 to the other only, the Court decided that an 
 entire account should be taken of both estates; 
 " for that it is allowed as a good cause of de- 
 murrer in this Court, that a bill is brought for 
 part of a matter only, which is proper for one 
 entire account, because the plaintiff shall not 
 split causes and make a multiplicity of suits." 
 And so, where there are two mortgages, and 
 more money has been lent upon one of them 
 than the estate is worth, the heir of the mort- 
 gagor cannot elect to redeem one and leave the 
 heavier mortgage unredeemed, but shall be 
 
 328* 
 
 competled to take both. Ibid. ; Margrave v. Le 
 Hooke, 2 Vern. 207. Upon the same principle 
 it is held, that "where there is a debt secured 
 by mortgage, and also a bond debt, when the 
 heir of the mortgagor comes to redeem, he 
 shall not redeem the mortgage without paying 
 the bond debt too, in case the heir be bound." 
 Shuttleworth v. Laycock, 1 Vern. 245; Anon. 
 2 Ch. Cas. 164; and see Jones v. Smith, 2 Ves. 
 Jr. 376; see also EIvy v. Norwood, 5 De G. 
 & S. 240; 16 Jur. 493; Sinclair v. Jackson, 
 17 Beav. 405; Fisher on Mortgage, 381; 2 
 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1023, note; Jones v. Smith, 
 2 Sumner's Ves. 372, n. (c), and cases cited; 
 Lee ». Stone, 1 Gill & J. 1. The ground of 
 this rule is the prevention of circuity of remedy; 
 for, as the bond of the ancestor, where the heir 
 is bound, becomes, upon the death of such an- 
 cestor, the heir's own debt, and is payable out 
 of the real estate descended, it is but reason- 
 able that, where the heir comes to redeem the 
 estate by payment of the principal money and 
 interest, he should at the same time be called 
 upon to pay off the bond; as, otherwise, the 
 obligee would be driven to Sue him for the re- 
 covery of the bond, which in the result might 
 be payable out of the same pioperty that the 
 heir has redeemed. 
 
 2 Story, Eq. PI. § 287. So, at Law, a 
 plaintiff cannot split an entire cause of action, 
 so as to maintain two suits upon it, without the 
 defendant's consent. If he attempts so to do, 
 a recovery in the first suit, though for less than 
 the whole demand, is a bar to the second. In- 
 graham v. Hall, 11 Serg. & R. 78; Crips v. 
 Talvande, 4 M'Cord, 20; Smith v. Jones, 15 
 John. 229; Willard v. Sperry, 16 John. 121; 
 Avery v. Fitch, 4 Conn. 362; Vance v. Lan- 
 caster, 3 Hayw 130; Colvin v. Corwin, 15 
 Wend. 557; Strike's case, 1 Bland, 95; James 
 v. Lawrence, 7 Har. & J. 73 ; Stevens v. Lock- 
 wood, 13 Wend. 644; see also Guernsey v. 
 Carver, 8 Wend. 492, and the remarks upon it 
 in Badger v. Titcomb, 15 Pick. 415. In this
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. * 333 
 
 * The rule that the Court will not entertain a suit for part of a * 331 
 matter must be understood as subject to this limitation, namely: 
 that the whole matter is capable of being immediately disposed of ; x 
 for if the situation of the property in dispute is such that no immediate 
 decision upon the whole matter can be come to, the Court will frequently 
 lend its assistance to the extent which the actual state of the case, as it 
 exists at the time of filing the bill, will warrant. Upon this principle 
 Courts of Equity permit bills for the preservation of evidence in perpet- 
 uam ret memoriam ; which it does upon the ground that, from the circum- 
 stances of the parties, the case cannot be immediately the subject of 
 judicial investigation : and if it should appear upon the bill that the mat- 
 ter to which the required testimony is alleged to relate can be immediately 
 decided upon, and that the witnesses are resident in England, a demurrer 
 would hold. 2 The Court proceeds upon the same principle when it acts as 
 ancillary to the jurisdiction of other Courts, by permitting suits for the 
 preservation of property pending litigation in such Courts ; or by removing 
 the impediments to a fair litigation before tribunals of ordinary jurisdic- 
 tion. In all these cases, it is no ground of objection to a bill that it 
 embraces only part of the matter, and that the residue is, or may be, the 
 subject of litigation elsewhere. The preservation of the property, or the 
 removal of the impediments, is all that the Court of Equity can effect ; the 
 bill, therefore, in seeking this description of relief, seeks the whole relief 
 which, in such cases, a Court of Equity can give ; but if a bill, pray- 
 ing only this description of relief, should disclose a case in * which * 332 
 a Court of Equity is capable of taking upon itself the whole deci- 
 sion of the question, — in such a case, it is apprehended, the bill would 
 be defective in not seeking the relief which the plaintiff is entitled to. 
 
 With reference to this part of the subject may be noticed the much 
 litigated question, to what extent a person engaged in trade in copartner- 
 ship can have relief in Equity against his partners, without praying a 
 dissolution of the partnership ; upon this point the decisions were 
 very conflicting. 1 * It is conceived that it is now settled that, * 333 
 
 last case it was said that "as the law is, we lution of partnership has not taken place, and 
 
 think it cannot be maintained, that a running is not asked for; although, ordinarily, they are 
 
 account for goods sold and delivered, money not inclined to decree an account, unless under 
 
 loaned, or money had and received, at different special circumstances, if there is not an actual 
 
 times, will constitute an entire demand, unless or contemplated dissolution, so that all the 
 
 there is some agreement to that effect, or some affairs of the partnership may be wound up." 
 
 usage or course of dealing from which such an See also the cases cited in the note at the place 
 
 agreement or understanding may be inferred." above cited, and Waters v. Taylor, 15 Sum- 
 
 1 The principle is well established that a ner's Ves. 10, note (6), and cases cited; Judd v. 
 contract to do several things at several times, Wilson, 6 Vt. 185; I Smith, Ch. Pr. (2d Am. 
 is divisible in its nature; and that an action ed.)89; Collyer, Partn. (Perkins's ed.) §§ 299, 
 will lie for the breach of any one of the stipu- 300, 1128 to 1133. In Forman v. Homfrny, 2 
 lations, each of these stipulations being con- V. & B. 329, and note (and see Marshall v. 
 sidered as a separate contract. Badger v. Colman, 2 J. & W. 266; Lindley, Partn. 752), 
 Titcomb, 15 Pick. 414. Lord Eldon said he did not recollect an in- 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 150; see Story, Eq. PI. § 303, stance of a bill filed by one partner against 
 and note; Moodalay v. Morton, 1 Bro. C. C. another, praying the account merely, and not a 
 (Perkins's ed.) 469, and notes; post, Chap, dissolution, proceeding on the foundation that 
 XXXIV. § 4, Bills to perpetuate Testimony. the partnership was to continue; and observed 
 
 1 In 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 671, Mr. Justice upon the inconvenience that would result if a 
 Story says: ''Courts of Equity may, perhaps, partner could come here for an account merely, 
 interpose and decree an account where a disso- pending the partnership, as there seems to be 
 
 329
 
 333 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 where the general accounts of the partnership are sought, the bill must 
 pray for a dissolution, except in special cases ; but that there are cases 
 in which the Court will interpose, to support as well as to dissolve a 
 partnership : as by appointing a receiver, where the conduct of the 
 defendant is such as to endanger the existence of the partnership con- 
 cern. 2 The Court will not allow an improper advantage to be taken 
 of a rule designed for the advantage of all parties. It will not take the 
 management of a going concern into its own hands ; and if it cannot 
 usefully interfere in any other manner, it will only interfere for the 
 purpose of winding up the concern. 3 («) 
 
 nothing to prevent his coming annually; and 
 in Loseonibe v. Russell, 4 Sim. 8, Sir Lancelot 
 Shadwell V. C. allowed a demurrer to a bill 
 praying the account of a partnership, because 
 it did not pray for a dissolution. In Harrison 
 v. Armitage, 4 Mad. 143, however, a contrary 
 opinion was expressed by Sir John Leach V. 
 C. ; and in Richards v. Davies (2 K. & M. 347; 
 and see Wallworth v. Holt, 4 M. & C. 639, 
 ante, pp. 234, 235), which was a bill by one 
 partner against another, praying for an account 
 of what was due to the plaintiff respecting past 
 partnership transactions, and that the partner- 
 ship might be carried on under the decree of 
 the Court, his Honor decreed an account of 
 past partnership transactions, but said that he 
 could make no order for carrying on the part- 
 nership concerns, unless with a view to a disso- 
 lution. In pronouncing his judgment upon 
 that case, the learned Judge observed, that a 
 partner, during the partnership, has no relief 
 at Law for moneys due to him on partnership 
 account ; and that, if a Court of Equity refuses 
 him relief, he is wholly without remedy: which 
 woidd be contrary to the plain principles of 
 justice, and cannot be the doctrine of Equity. 
 With respect to the objection that the defend- 
 ant might be vexed by a new bill, whenever 
 new profits accrued, his Honor said: "What 
 right has the defendant to complain of such 
 new bill, if he repeats the injustice of with- 
 holding what is due to the plaintiff? Would 
 not the same objection lie in a suit for tithes, 
 which accrue de anno in annum ? " It is to be 
 observed, that in Chappie v. Cadell, 1 Jac. 537, 
 although cited in argument in Richards v. 
 Davies, and referred to by the reporters as 
 authority for the position that a decree may be 
 made for partnership accouuts without the bill 
 
 (a) A suit lies in Equity to restrain the 
 breach of a partnership covenant, although the 
 plaintiff does not pray for a dissolution. Wat- 
 ney v. Trist, 45 L. J.'ch. 412. The rule not to 
 interfere between partners or associates in mat- 
 ters of merely internal regulation or disci- 
 pline is also illustrated in cases of clubs; the 
 only questions entertained in such cases by a 
 Court of Equity being, — first, whether the 
 
 330 
 
 having prayed a dissolution, the principal ob- 
 ject of the suit was to have a declaration as to 
 the effect of a sale of shares in a partnership 
 undertaking (the Globe newspaper); and that 
 the account of the profits which was decreed 
 was merely the consequence of the declaration 
 of the Court upon that point. The same obser- 
 vation applies to Knowlesv. Haughton, 11 Ves. 
 168 (also referred to in Richards v. Davies, 2 
 R. & M. 347), where the bill was filed to estab- 
 lish a partnership in certain transactions, and 
 the sole question in the case was, partnership or 
 no partnership; and the Court, being of opinion 
 that a partnership did exist in part of the trans- 
 actions referred to, as a necessary consequence 
 decreed an account of these transactions. In 
 Roberts v. Eberhardt, Kay, 148, 158, Sir W. 
 P. Wood V. C. said: "It is certainly not the 
 ordinary practice of this Court to direct an ac- 
 count between partners, except upon a bill for 
 the dissolution of the partnership concern. It 
 is true that it is not now necessary to ask for 
 a dissolution in every case in which relief 
 is sought respecting partnership affairs; but I 
 apprehend that when a bill seeks an account, 
 that is one of the cases in which a dissolution 
 must be prayed ; unless some special ground 
 is raised the general accounts cannot be taken, 
 without asking for the dissolution of the firm." 
 
 2 Fairthorne v. Weston, 3 Hare, 387, 391; 
 8 Jur. 353; Hall v. Hall, 3 M'N. & G. 79, 83; 
 15 Jur. 363, and cases cited in note to S. C. 12 
 Beav. 419; Bailey v. Birkenhead Ry. Co. id. 
 433, 440; 6 Rail. Cas. 256; 14 Jur. 119; 
 Featherstone v. Cooke. L. K. 16 Eq 298; 2 
 Seton, 1202; Elmslie v. Beresford, W. N. (1873) 
 152 ; Cropper v. Coburn, 2 Curtis, C. C. 465, 
 473; Williamson v. Haycock, 11 Iowa. 40. 
 
 3 Lind. Part. 895. 
 
 rules of the club have been observed; second, 
 whether anything has been done contrary to 
 natural justice; and, third, whether the de- 
 cision complained of hus been arrived at bona 
 fide. See Baird v. Wells, 44 Ch. D 661, 670 ; 
 Fisher v. Keane, 11 Ch. D. 353 ; Dawkins v. 
 Antrobus, 17 Ch. D. 628; Russell v. Russell, 14 
 Ch. D. 471 ; Lambert v. Addison, 46 L. T. 20.
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. 
 
 *334 
 
 In endeavoring to avoid the error of making a bill not suffi- 
 ciently * extensive to answer the purpose of complete justice, *334 
 care must be taken not to run into the opposite defect, namely, 
 that of attempting to embrace in it too many objects ; for it is a rule in 
 Equity, that two or more distinct subjects cannot be embraced in the 
 same suit. TheToffence against this rule is termed multifariousness, and 
 will render a bill liable to a demurrer. 1 (a) 
 
 1 " By multifariousness in a bill," says Mr. 
 Justice Story, '' is meant the improperly join- 
 ing, in one bill, distinct and independent mat- 
 ters, and thereby confounding them; as, for 
 exainpie, the uniting in one bill of several mat- 
 ters perfectly distinct and unconnected, against 
 one defendant, or the demand of several mat- 
 ters of a distinct and independent nature 
 against several defendants in the same bill." 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 271 ; West i: Randall, 2 Mason, 
 201; Fellows 0. Fellows, 4 Cowen, 082; Brink- 
 enhoffu. Brown, 6 John. Ch. 139; Bedsole t\ 
 Monroe, 5 Ired. Eq. 313; Richardson v M'Kin- 
 son, Litt. Sel. Cas. 320; Jackson v. Forrest, 2 
 Barb. Cli. 576; Ryan v. Shawneetown, 14 111. 
 20; Metcalf v. Cady, 8 Allen, 587; Warren v. 
 Warren, 56 Maine, 360; Newland !?. Rogers, 3 
 Barb. Ch. 432; Kennebec and Portland It. Co. 
 v. Portland & Kennebec It. Co. 54 Maine, 
 173; Crane v. Fairchild, 14 N. J Eq. 76. To 
 render a bill multifarious, it must contain 
 several yood distinct (/rounds of suit in Equity, 
 which cannot properly be joined in one suit. 
 Many v. Beekman Iron Co. 9 Paige, 188; Mc- 
 Cabe v. Bellows, 1 Allen, 269; Varick v. Smith, 
 5 Paige, 137 ; Pleasant v. Glasscock, 1 Sm. & 
 M. Ch. 17; Richards v. Pierce, 52 Main.', 562. 
 A bill asking for an injunction to restrain 
 waste, and also an account for rent due, is de- 
 murrable on the ground of multifariousness. 
 Reed v. Reed, N. J. Eq. 248, 250. If a joint 
 claim against two or more defendants is im- 
 properly joined in the same bill, with a sepa- 
 rate claim against one of the defendants only, 
 in which the other defendants have no interest, 
 and which is wholly unconnected with the 
 claim against them, all or either of the defend- 
 ants may demur to the bill for multifariousness. 
 Swift v. Eckford, 6 Paige, 22; Boyd v. Hoyt, 
 5 Paige, 65; Richards v. Pierce, 52 Maine, 562. 
 But a bill is not multifarious which is filed by 
 a stockholder against the corporation, its direc- 
 tors and treasurer, alleging various fraudulent 
 transactions between the directors as a board, 
 certain directors, and the treasurer, and seek- 
 ing a recovery of the gains thereby made. 
 Lewis v. St. Albans Iron Works, 50 Vt. 477. 
 And see Sturgeon v. Burrall, 1 III. App. 537. 
 A bill against one for a claim against him in 
 
 his individual character, and another claim 
 against him as heir for the debt of his ancestor, 
 may be objected to for multifariousness. Bryan 
 v. Blvthe, 4 Blackf. 249; see Robinson v. Guild, 
 12 Met. 323. So a bill is multifarious which 
 mixes up independent claims made by the 
 plaintiff in his own right, with others made by 
 him as administrator. Carter v. Treadwell, 3 
 Story, 25, 51, 52. A bill tiled by an adminis- 
 trator, in conjunction with the heirs and dis- 
 tributees of the intestate, to recover personal 
 property in the hands of the defendant, and to 
 divide and distribute it, is multifarious. Thur- 
 man v. Shelton, 10 Yerger, 383. 
 
 "The conclusion," says Mr. Justice Story, 
 " to which a close survey of all the authorities 
 will conduct us, seems to be, that there is not 
 any positive, inflexible rule, as to what, in the 
 sense of Courts of Equity, constitutes multifa- 
 riousness, which is fatal to a suit on demurrer." 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 539; Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. 
 U. S. 333, 411, 412 ; Per Wilde J. in Robin- 
 son v. Guild, 12 Met. 323, 328; McLean r. La- 
 fayette Bank, 3 McLean, 415. For a survey of 
 the positions and doctrines held by Courts of 
 Equity on this subject in different cases, see 
 Story, Eq. PI. §§ 271 289, 530, 540; Bugbee v. 
 Sargent, 23 Maine, 269; Robinson v. Cross, 22 
 Conn. 587; Warren p. Warren, 56 Maine, 360; 
 Kennebec and Portland R. Co. v. Portland and 
 Kennebec R. Co. 54 Maine, 173 ; Abbot v. 
 Johnson, 32 N. H. 9; Chase v. Searls, 45 N. H. 
 511, 519; Camp v. Mills, 6 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 
 274. The recent cases show an increasing 
 tendency to consider the objection of multi- 
 fariousness as addressed to the discretion of 
 the Court. Where all the plaintiffs have a 
 common interest in the whole of the matter 
 comprised in the bill, the objection of multi- 
 fariousness set up by defendants who are con- 
 cerned only in a portion of the subject-matter, 
 is a question of discretion to be determined 
 upon considerations of convenience with regard 
 to the circumstances of each particular case. 
 Coates v. Legard, L. R. 19 Eq. 56. And see 
 Pointon v. Pointon, L. R. 12 Eq. 547; House 
 v. Mullen, 22 Wall. 43; Warren v. Warren, 52 
 Maine, 360: Woodward v. Hall, 2 Tenn. Ch. 
 164. So, where a p'aintiff has two causes of 
 
 («) Multifariousness arising from the union by the following decisions: A matter cannot be 
 of distinct matters in the same bill is illustrated joined in the bill in which some of the plaintiffs 
 
 331
 
 *334 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 According to Lord Cottenham, it is impossible, upon the authorities, 
 to lay down any general rule as to what constitutes multifariousness, 
 
 action, each furnishing the foundation of a 
 separate suit, one the natural outgrowth of the 
 other, or growing out of the same subject- 
 matter, where all the defendants have some in- 
 terest in every question raised on the record, 
 and the suit has a single object, they may be 
 properly joined. Ferry v. Laible, 27 N. J. Eq. 
 146. So a bill is net multifarious which asks a 
 declaration of title in favor of plaintiffs as 
 cestui que trusts to half the property and for 
 partition, or because the plaintiff is not entitled 
 to the relief asked against one defendant. 
 Darling v. Hammer, 20 N. J. Eq. 220. So a 
 bill is not multifarious which alleges that two 
 separate patents owned by plaintiff have been 
 infringed by the defendant. Gillespie v. Cum- 
 mings, 3 Sweeny, 259; Hornum Patent Man. 
 Co. v. Brooklyn" City R. Co. 7 Rep. 295, U. S. 
 C. C. N. Y. So, where the bill is filed for the 
 settlement of several commercial partnerships 
 of which the complainants and defendants were 
 members. Miller v. Harris, 1 Tenn. Leg. Rep. 
 157. Nor does the objection lie where there is 
 a common liability in the defendants, and a 
 common, although not co-extensive interest in 
 the plaintiffs. Fiery v. Emmert, 36 Md. 464. 
 Nor where the bill is upon homogeneous mat- 
 ters, and does not pray for multifarious relief, 
 although the case stated might support such a 
 prayer.(6) Dick v. Dick, 1 Hogan, 290; Ar- 
 nold v. Arnold, 9 R. I. 397. And see Judson 
 r. TN.ulmin, 9 Ala. 662; Davis v. Miller, 4 
 Jones Eq. 447. So, a bill by a husband and 
 wife for the same premises, based upon a parol 
 agreement with the husband and a written 
 agreement with the wife, although demurrable 
 perhaps upon the ground of misjoinder, is not 
 subject to the objection of multifariousness. 
 Green v. Richards, 23 N. J. Eq. 32. A credi- 
 tor's bill against the debtor's executor and 
 another, alleging a devastavit, and the insol- 
 vency of the executor, and for an account, is 
 not multifarious because it also seeks to set 
 aside a conveyance by the executor of the 
 debtor's realty to one of the defendants. Rags- 
 dale v. Holmes, 1 S. C. 91. And an alternative 
 prayer does not necessarily make a bill multi- 
 
 farious. Kilgour v. N. O- Gas Light Co. 2 
 Woods, 144. The joinder of several property 
 owners in a bill to restrain a tax assessment 
 does not render it bad for multifariousness. 
 Mount Carbon Coal Co. v. Blanchard, 54 111. 
 240. But see Howell v. City of Buffalo, 2 Abb. 
 App. Dec. 412. Nor does the joinder of sev- 
 eral owners of adjoining tracts of land to 
 restrain separate assessments for the construc- 
 tion of a road. Robbins v. Sand Creek T. Co. 
 34 End. 461. See also Price v. Minot, 107 Mass. 
 63; Eddy v. Caprin, 4 R. I. 397; Taylor r. King, 
 32 Mich. 42; Richardson v. Brooks, 53 Miss. 
 500; Douglas v. Wal bridge, 38 Wis. 179 ; Jones 
 v. Foster, 50 Miss. 47; Winsor r. Bailey, 55 
 N. II. 218; Free v. Buckingham, 57 N. H. 95. 
 When the bill is by an heir for partition, 
 and for an injunction against the executor re- 
 straining him from waste, and also asks that 
 the widow be required to give security for the 
 complainant's share of the fund in her hands, it 
 is open to the objection of multifariousness. 
 Burnett v. Lester, 53 111. 325. And so is a bill 
 which joins several defendants, some of whom 
 are liable to one plaintiff only, some to another, 
 and some of whom are responsible, if at all, for 
 independe t violations of a statute. Sheriff v. 
 Oil Co. 7 Phila. 4. So, where a person is made 
 a defendant upon a case with a large portion of 
 which he has no connection. Waller v. Taylor, 
 42 Ala 297. And see, for further instances of 
 multifariousness, Kinsey v. Howard, 47 Ala. 
 236; Hardin v. Swoope, 47 Ala. 273: Dorsey v. 
 Lake, 46 Miss. 109; Roberts v. Starke, 47 Miss. 
 257. And for a case both of multifariousness 
 and misjoinder, Haines v. Carpenter, 1 Woods, 
 262. 
 
 The objection of multifariousness will not be 
 regarded unless it appear on the face of the 
 bill: Edwards v. Sartor, 1 S. C. 266; nor en- 
 tertained if only made at the hearing : Cousens 
 v. Rose, L. R. 12 Eq. 366 ; Green v. Richards, 23 
 N. J. Eq. 32. Sanborn v. Adair, 27 id. 425. 
 
 In Tennessee it is provided by statute that 
 the uniting in one bill, against one defend- 
 ant, of several matters of Equity, distinct and 
 unconnected, is not multifariousness : Code, 
 
 have no interest. See Hazard v. Dillon. 34 245; Stebbins v. St. Anne, 116 TJ. S. 386; 
 Fed. Rep. 485; Walker v. Powers, 104 U. S. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Bonner M. Co. 44 
 
 (b) See also Waller o. Shannon, 53 Miss. 500; 
 Kennebec Railroad v. Portland Railroad, 54 
 Maine, 173; Free v. Buckingham, 57 N. H. 95; 
 Williams v. Neel, 10 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 338 ; 
 Arnold v. Arnold, 11 W. Va. 455; Hayes's Ap- 
 peal, 123 Penn. St. 110; Reckefus v. Lyon, 69 
 Md. 589; Shafer v. O'Rrien, 31 W. Va. 601; 
 Shaffer v. Fettv, 30 id. 267 ; Yates v. Law, 86 
 
 332 
 
 Va. 117; Thomas v. Sellman, 87 Va. 683; 
 Western Land Co. v. Guinault, 37 Fed. Rep. 
 523: Heyer v. Bromberg, 74 Ala. 524; McEvoy 
 v. Leonard (Ala.), 8 So. 40: Harland v. Per- 
 son, 93 Ala. 542; Williams v. Wheaton, 86 Ga. 
 223: Storrs i\ Wallace, 54 Mich. 112; Deans 
 v. Wilcoxon, 25 Fla. 980.
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. 
 
 *334 
 
 which can be made universally applicable. The cases upon the subject 
 are extremely various ; and the Court, in deciding them, seems to have 
 
 § 4327 ; that the objection is no ground for dis- a decree saving rights, or grant leave to amend : 
 
 missing the bill, unless made by motion to § 4337; and that, if a demurrer on that ground 
 
 dismiss or demurrer: §4325; that if made at is sustained, the Court may direct separate bills 
 
 the hearing, the Court may proceed to render without new process : § 4326. 
 
 Fed. Rep. 151. Or in respect to which the 
 plaintiffs' interests are antagonistic. Walker v. 
 Powers, 104 U. S- 245. If all the plaintiffs have 
 a common interest as a class, and all the de- 
 fendants have a common liability, the rights 
 and liability of the parties on either side need 
 not be the same in extent. Hale v . Nashua & 
 L. R. Co. 60 N. H. 533 ; Graham o. Dahlonega 
 G. M. Co. 71 Ga. 296; City Bank v. Bartlett, 
 id. 797. Even when the necessary parties to 
 the bill are the same in any aspect, it is mul- 
 tifarious if their attitudes and interests are 
 clearly at variance. McDonnell v. Eaton, 18 
 Fed. Rep. 710. 
 
 A stockholder suing for his corporation can- 
 not join causes of action accruing to himself 
 personally with causes belonging to the com- 
 pany. Whitney v. Fairbanks, 54 Fed. Rep. 
 985. As to multifariousness in bills against 
 officers or stockholders of a corporation, see 
 Winsor o. Bailev, 55 N. H. 218; Tutwiler v. 
 Tuskaloosa Coal Co. 89 Ala 391 ; American Re- 
 frigerating &c. Co. v. Linn, 93 Ala. 610; Burns 
 v. Beck Co. 83 Ga. 471; Lewis v. St. Albans 
 Iron Works, 50 Vt. 477; Deaderick v. Wilson, 
 8 Baxter (Tenn.), 108; Brewer v. Boston The- 
 atre, 104 Mass. 378; Cambridge Water Works 
 v. Somerville Dyeing Co. 14 Gray, 193 ; Pope v. 
 Leonard, 115 Mass. 286; Pope v. Salamanca 
 Oil Co. id. 286, 290; Bane National Bank v. 
 Hingham Manuf. Co. 127 Mass. 563. 
 
 The fact that the plaintiff sues as assignee 
 of one of the parties in interest, and as guardian 
 of another, is not necessarily a valid objection 
 upon a bill to reach the funds of an estate. Hen- 
 derson v. Sherman, 47 Mich. 267. A bill for an 
 accounting between partners is not multifarious 
 when it relates to the affairs of different part- 
 nerships of which the parties are the sole mem- 
 bers. Lewis v. Loper, 47 Fed. Rep. 259; Miller 
 V. Harris, 9 Baxter (Tenn.), 101; see Jefferson 
 v. Gaines, 7 id. 368; Sanderson v. Sanderson, 
 17 Fla. 820; Nulton v. Isaacs, 30 Gratt. 726. 
 Infringements upon different correlative patents 
 by a machine which affects them all, may be 
 m ule the subject of a single suit in Equity. Lil- 
 liendahl v. Detwiller, 18 Fed. Rep. 176; Barney 
 v. Peck, 16 id. 413; Nellisr. Pennock Manuf. Co. 
 13 id. 451; see Gamewell Fire Alarm Tel. Co. 
 v. Chillicothe, 7 id. 351; Hayes v. Dayton, 8 
 id. 702; Putnam v. Hollender, 6 id. 882". Such 
 a bill is multifarious, when brought for the in- 
 fringement of several patents, if it does not 
 allege conjoint use or capacity therefor. Shickle 
 
 v. South St. Louis Foundry Co. 21 Fed. Rep. 
 105; Griffith v. Segar, 29 id. 707; Barney v. 
 Peck, 16 id. 413; Lilliendahl v. Detwiller, 18 
 id. 176; Consolidated E. L. Co. v. Brush-Swan 
 E. L. Co. 20 id. 502. See also, as to patents, 
 United States v. American Bell Telephone Co. 
 128 U. S. 315; 32 Fed. Rep. 591; Stonemetz 
 Printers' M. Co. v. Brown Folding M. Co. 46 
 Fed. Rep. 72 ; Thomas Huston El. Co. v. 
 Sperry El. Co. id. 75. 
 
 A bill to foreclose four mortgages of differ- 
 ent dates, made by the same mortgagor and 
 owned by the plaintiff, is not multifarious if 
 personal judgment is asked only against the 
 former, though the mortgages contain different 
 exceptions in favor of different grantees and 
 lessees. In such case, the mortgagor cannot 
 demur for misjoinder of claims, as there is no 
 such misjoinder as against him, the rule here 
 being the same as in the case of defendants 
 misjoined. Torrent v. Hamilton, 95 Mich., 159; 
 54 N. W. Rep. 634. If a bill to set aside fraudu- 
 lent conveyances joins as defendants the fraudu- 
 lent grantees, who claim different parts of the 
 debtor's property, it is not multifarious. Col- 
 lins v. Stix (Ala.), 11 So. 380. See Rinehart 
 v Long, 95 Mo. 396. See Bunford v. Steele, 
 80 Ala. 147; Field v. Holzman, 93 Ind. 205; 
 Bobb v. Bobb, 8 Mo. App. 257. This is the 
 rule also upon a bill in Equity filed in the 
 Federal Courts by an assignee in bankruptcy. 
 Gaines v. Mausseaux, 1 Woods, 118; Jones v. 
 Slauson, 33 Fed. Rep. 632; Dodge v. Briggs, 
 27 id. 160; Potts v. Hahn, 32 id. 660. A bill 
 which prays for the settlement of a disputed 
 legal title to land, and also for a partition 
 thereof, is multifarious. Chapin v. Sears, 18 
 Fed. Rep. 814: Simpson v. Wallace, 83 N. C. 
 477; Bullock v. Knox (Ala.), 11 So. 339; Belt 
 v. Bowie, 65 Md. 350; Hayes's Appeal, 123 
 Penn. St. 110. But a bill for partition of dis- 
 tinct tracts held by different claimants, and for 
 the annulment of forged deeds thereof, is not 
 multifarious. Baird v. Jackson. 98 111. 78. So 
 a bill founded upon an equitable demand is not 
 multifarious when it also contains a demand 
 purely legal. Smith v. Patton, 12 W. Va. 54; 
 see Jones v. Reid, id. 350; Fougeres v. Mur- 
 barger, 44 Fed. Rep. 292. Irrelevant allega- 
 tions as to other suits may be rejected in 
 determining whether separate causes of suit 
 are stated. Wickersham v. Crittenden, 93 
 Cal. 17. Under the Codes, separate statements 
 made in one complaint of different causes of 
 
 333
 
 334 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 considered what was convenient in particular cases, rather than to 
 have attempted to lay down an absolute rule. 2 The only way of recon- 
 
 - See Carroll r. Roosevelt, 4 Edw. Ch. 211; 
 Emans v. Emails, 14 N. J. Eq. 118, 119; Bowers 
 v. Keeseeher, 9 Iowa, 422. The substance of 
 the rules on the subject of multifariousness 
 appears to be, that each case is to be governed 
 by its own circum tances, and must be left in a 
 great measure to the sound discretion of the 
 Court. (r) Clegg o. Varnell, 18 Texas, 294; 
 Gaines r Chew, 2 How. (U. S.) 619; Oliver v. 
 Piatt, 3 id. 333; Butler v. Spann, 27 Miss. 234; 
 
 action which are not complete in themselves, 
 but are confounded together, are bad for du- 
 plicity. N. Y. Code of Civil Proc. § 546; Mc- 
 Kenzie r. Fox, 29 X. Y. St. Rep. 106; New- 
 combe v. Chicago N. W. Ry. Co. 28 id. 716. 
 
 Only one cause of action is stated when 
 relief is sought which is merely auxiliary to 
 the principal relief. Turner v. Conant, 18 Abb. 
 N. Cas. 160. A prayer, in a foreclosure sui% 
 for the reformation of the mortgage is merely 
 incidental and does not create a separable con- 
 troversy within the U. S. Stat, of 1875, c. 137. 
 Winchell v. Coney, 27 Fed. Rep. 482. Such 
 different relief as specific performance of an 
 agreement to convey real estate, and judgment 
 for the balance due in cash, may be granted 
 upon a contract which is an entirety. Mann v. 
 Higgins, 83 Cal. 206; Henry v. McKittrick, 42 
 Kansas, 485. And when breaches of the same 
 instrument may be conveniently considered 
 together, entire relief may be given, though 
 
 (c) See also Graves r. Corbin, 132 U. S 571, 
 586; Walker v. Powers, 104 U. S. 245; Mills r. 
 Hurd, 32 Fed. Rep. 127; Hayes v. Dayton, 8 
 id. 702; Bolles v. Bolles, 44 N. J. Eq. 385; 
 Cocks v. Varney, 42 id. 514; Conover v. Sealy, 
 45 id. 589; Van Houten v. Van Winkle, 46 id. 
 380; Emans v. Emans, 14 id. 114; Sanborn t\ 
 Dwinell, 135 Mass. 236; Lenz v. I'rescott, 144 
 Mass. 505; Keith v. Keith, 143 Mass. 262; 
 Eastman v. Savings Bank, 58 N. H. 421 ; Page 
 v. Whidden, 59 N. H. 507; Patten Paper Co. 
 r. Kaukauna Waterpower Co. 70 W T is. 659; 
 Neal v. Rathell, 70 Md. 592: Comstock v. Rav- 
 ford, 1 S. & M. (Mi's.) 102; 40 Am. Dec. 102, 
 and note; Harland ». Person, 93 Ala. 273; Dew- 
 berry v. Shannon, 59 Ga. 311. 
 
 (d) The prayers of the bill do not themselves 
 make it multifarious, but may be considered in 
 connection with the stating part, and the gen- 
 eral scope and purpose of the bill, in determin- 
 ing this question. Bagot v. Easton, 7 Ch. D. 
 1; Child v. Stenning, id. 413; C'ark v. Rivers, 
 L. R. 5 Eq. 91 ; Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 
 130; Wilkinson v. Dobbie. 12 Blatch. 298; Kil- 
 gour v. New Or'eans G. L. Co. 2 Woods, 144; 
 Beatty v. Hincklev, 1 Fed. Rep. 385; Equitable 
 
 334.' 
 
 Marshall v. Means, 12 Ga. 61; Kennebec and 
 Portland R. Co. v. Portland and Kennebec R. 
 Co. 52 Maine, 173, 182 ; Chase v. Searls, 45 
 N. H. 520; Abbot v. Johnson, 32 N. H. 26; 
 Warren v. Warren, 56 Maine, 368; People v. 
 Morrill, 26 Cal. 336; Bartee v. Tompkins, 4 
 Sneed, 623. To determine whether a bill is 
 multifarious, regard must be had to the stating 
 part of the bill, and not to the prayer alone. (//) 
 Hammond v. Michigan Bank, Walker Ch. 214. 
 
 some of them, taken separately, are not ground 
 for relief in Equity. Pacific R. Co. p. Atlantic 
 & P. R. Co. 20 Fed. Rep. 277. The objection 
 of multifariousness fails if the grounds of suit 
 are not different, or if each ground is insuf- 
 ficient to sustain a bill. Brown v. Guarantee 
 Trust Co. 128 U. S. 403; Bedsole v. Monroe, 5 
 Ired. Eq. 313; Larkins v. Biddle, 21 Ala. 252; 
 Robinson v. Cross, 22 Conn. 171; Nail v. Mob- 
 ley, 9 Ga. 278; Ellis v. No. Pacific R. Co. 77 
 Wis. 114; Dunphy r. Traveller Newspaper 
 Association, 146 Mass. 495; Hurd v. Ascher- 
 man, 117 111. 501; Mahler v. Schmidt, 43 Hun, 
 512. Also when two distinct matters are joined 
 only one of which is well pleaded. Westlake 
 v. Farrow, 34 S. C. 270. Other cases relating 
 to the union of different matters are: Price v, 
 Coleman, 21 Fed. Rep. 357; Norris v. Haggin, 
 28 id. 275; Hyman v. Wheeler, 33 id. 629; 
 Mills r. Hurd, 32 id. 127; Potts r. Hahn, id. 
 660; Gordon v. St. Paul H. Works, 23 id. 147; 
 
 Life Ass. Society v. Patterson, id. 126; Mills v. 
 Hurd, 32 id. 127; Wells v. Partridge, 31 N. J. 
 Eq. 362; Arnold r. Arnold, 9 R. I. 397; Tread- 
 we 1 v. Brown, 44 N. H. 551 ; Canton v. McGraw, 
 67 Md. 583; Lvons v. McCurdy, 90 Ala. 497; 
 Colstrum v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co. 31 
 Minn. 367; McGuffeyr. McCain find.), 30 X. E. 
 Rep. 296; Cleland r. Casgrain. 92 Mich. 139; 
 Collins v. Knight, 3 Tenn. Ch. 183; Micou v. 
 Ashurst, 55 Ala. 607: Fields r. Helms, 70 Ala. 
 460: Korne v. Korne, 30 W. Va. ]; Shaffer v. 
 Petty, id. 248; Carskadon v. Minke, 26 id. 729; 
 Love v. Keowne, 58 Tex. 191. So under the 
 Codes. Cahoon v. Utica Bank, 7 N. Y. 486; 
 Wickersham V. Crittenden, 93 Cal. 17; Guern- 
 sey r. American Ins. Co. 17 Minn. 104; Globe 
 Insr. Co. v. Boyle, 21 Ohio St. 120; Hawse v. 
 Moody. 14 Fla. 59; Turner v. Pierce. 34 Wis. 
 658. Allegations in the bill, which are in- 
 tended to anticipate the defence, do not make 
 the bill multifarions. Munson v. Bowen, 80 
 Cal. 57; Ware v. Curry, 67 Ala. 274. But 
 under the Codes, a complaint anticipating an 
 expected defence is liable to special demurrer. 
 Munson r, Bowen, 80 Cal. 572.
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. 
 
 335 
 
 ciling the * authorities upon the subject is by adverting to the 
 fact that although the books speak generally of demurrers for 
 
 335 
 
 United State? v. Curtner, 26 id. 296; United 
 States v. Pratt Coal Co. 18 id. 708; Lewis v. 
 Loper, 47 id. 259, 681 ; Chase v. Cannon, id. 
 674; First Natl. Bank v. Moore, 48 id. 799; 
 Whitney v. Fairbanks, 54 id. 985; Baltimore 
 & 0. TV1. Co. v. Interstate Tel. Co. id. 50; 
 Fatten v. Glatz, 56 id. 367; Cocks v. Yarney, 
 42 N. J. Eq. 514; Ferry v. Laible, 27 id. 146, 
 150; Vreeland v. Vreeland, 49 id. 822; Cleland 
 v. Casgrain, 92 Mich. 139; Lenz v. Prescott, 144 
 Mass. 505; Dunphy v. Traveller Newspaper 
 Association, 146 Mass. 495; Keith v. Keith, 
 143 Mass. 262 ; White v. Bigelow, 154 Mass. 
 593; Kicker v. Brooks, 155 Mass. 400; Warren 
 v. Warren, 52 Maine, 560; De Wolf v. A. & W. 
 Sprague Manuf. Co. 49 Conn. 282; Rippe v. 
 Stogdill, 61 Wis. 38; Withers v. Sims, 80 Va. 
 651; Lindley v. Kussell, 16 Mo. App. 217; 
 Swepson v. Exchange & D. Bank, 9 Lea 
 (Tenn.), 713; Woodward v. Hall, 2 Teun. Ch. 
 164: Fiery v. Emmert, 36 Md. 464; Belt v. 
 Bowie, 65 Md. 353; Canton v. McGraw, 67 
 Md. 583; Heggie v. Hill, 95 N. C. 303; Winter 
 o. Smith, 45 Ark. 549; Ashley v. Little Rock, 
 56 id. 391; Outland r. Outland (N. C), 18 
 S. E. Rep. 72; Mobile Savings Bank r. Burke, 
 94 Ala. 125; Tipton v. Wortham, 93 Ala. 321; 
 American R. & C. Co. v. Linn, id. 610; East 
 v. East, 80 Ala. 199 ; Bohman v. Lohman, 74 
 Ala. 507; Seals v. Pheiffer, 77 Ala. 278; 
 Bayzor v. Adams, 80 Ala. 239; Dickerson v. 
 Winslow (Ala.), 11 So. Rep. 918; Hutchinson 
 c- Mershon ( Va.), 10 S. E. Rep. 874 ; Wells v. 
 Sewell's Point Guano Co. (Va.) 17 id. 2; Buf- 
 falo v. Pocahontas, 85 Va. 222; Brown v. Buck- 
 ner, 86 Va. 612; Commonwealth v. Drake, 81 
 Va. 305; Stewart v. Stewart, 27 W. Va. 167, 
 Crumlish v. Shenandoah V. R. Co. 28 id. 623; 
 Shaffer v. Fetty, 30 id. 248; Ryder v. Topping, 
 15 111. App. 216; Columbus Ins. Co. v. Hum- 
 phries, 64 Miss. 258; Barry v. Barry, id. 70.) ; 
 Robinson v. Springfield Co. 21 Fla. 203; Wylly 
 A. Trustees v. Sanford, 17 Fla. 162; Smith v. 
 McLain, 11 W. Va. 654; Miller t>. Baltimore 
 C M. Co. 52 Md. 642; Stephens v. White- 
 head, 75 Ga. 294; Austin v. Raiford, 61 Ga. 
 125; Farmer v. Rogers, 88 Ga. 162; Millers. 
 Baltimore C. M. Co. 52 Md. 642; Suber v. 
 Allen, 13 S. C. 317; Taylor v. Smith, 54 
 Miss. 50. In England different causes of suit 
 may now be joined by leave of Court. See 
 Read v. Woiton, [1893]" 2 Ch. 171. 
 
 As to misjoinder of plaintiffs, see ante, 
 p. 303, n. ('(). In general, if two persons join 
 as plaintiffs in a suit in equity, both must be 
 entitled to relief; and if they seek to enforce a 
 joint claim, and also a claim in which one of 
 them has no interest, the bill is multifarious. 
 Mcb.le Savings Bank v. Burke, 94 Ala. 125. 
 
 As to the misjoinder of different defendants 
 upon distinct and independent matters, see 
 Grant v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co. 121 U. S. 105; 
 Central Pacilic R. Co. v. Dyer, 1 Sawyer, 641; 
 Patterson v. Kellogg, 53 Conn. 38; Robinson 
 v. RobiDson, 73 Maine, 170; Metcalf v. Cady, 
 8 Allen, 587; Sapp v. Phelps, 92 111. 588; 
 Johnson v. Parkinson, 62 Ala. 456; Clay v. 
 Gurley, id. 14; Petty e. Fogle, 6 W. Va. 497; 
 Stephens v. Whitehead, 75 Ga. 294; Mackall v. 
 West, 67 Ga. 278; Morgan v. Shepherd, 69 Ga. 
 308; Junkins v. Lovelace, 72 Ala. 303; Cramer 
 r. Watson, 73 Ala. 127. All the defendants 
 must have some interest in the controversy. 
 Marshall v. Gilliard, 14 L. T. N. S.618; Mayer 
 v. Denver &c. R. Co. 38 Fed. Rep. 197; Meyers 
 v. Scott, 50 Hun, 603: Sawyer v. Noble, 55 
 Maine, 227; Oliva v. Bunaforza, 31 N. J. Eq. 
 395 ; Henninger r. Heald (N. J. Ch.). 26 Atl. 
 Rep. 449 ; Brian v. Thomas, 63 Md. 476 ; Kings- 
 bury v. Flowers, 65 Ala. 479; Hill v. Hill, 79 
 Va. 592; Tate v. Ohio & Miss. R. Co. 10 Ind. 
 174; 71 Am. Dec. 309, and note. But each 
 defendant need not have an interest in the 
 whole matter in controversy. State v. Brown, 
 58 Miss. 835; Graves v. Corbin, 132 U. S. 571, 
 586; First Nat. Bank r. Moore, 48 Fed. Rep. 
 799. And if each defendant's interest relates 
 to any relief obtainable by the plaintiff, their 
 several interests need not be harmonious as 
 between themselves. Hyman v. Wheeler, 33 
 Fed. Rep. 629; Sims v. Adams, 78 Ala. 395; 
 Rogers v. Blackwell, 49 Mich. 192. Two per- 
 sons owning in severalty parts of a private 
 burial ground may be joined as defendants in 
 a bill to restrain interments therein as a nui- 
 sance. Kingsbury v. Flowers, 65 Ala. 479. 
 Fraudulent mortgages executed at the same 
 time by t lie debtor to different mortgagees, and 
 his collusive assignment for creditors at an- 
 other time, may form the subject of a single 
 bill, when the single aim is a fraudulent dis- 
 position of his property to defeat the plaintiff's 
 claim. State v. Foot,27 S. C. 340. See Pull- 
 man v. Stebbins, 51 Fed. Rep. 10. Intent or 
 a common purpose may thus be a test of mul- 
 tifariousness. See also No. Pac. R. Co. r. 
 Walker, 47 Fed. Rep 681; Whitfield 0. Evans, 
 56 Miss. 488; Donovan v. Dunning, 69 Mo. 
 436. Porter r. Young, 85 Va. 49; Miller v. 
 Harris, 9 Baxter (Tenn.), 101; Almond v. 
 Wilson, 75 Va. 613; Russell »•. Garrett, 75 
 Ala. 348; Bates v. Plonsky, 62 How. Pr. 429; 
 Bobb f. Bobb, 76 Mo. 419; Baird V. Jackson, 
 98 III. 78. So a common right or a common 
 interest, as in the case of the obstruction or 
 pollution of a stream by different riparian 
 owners, will warrant joining them as defend- 
 ants in Equity. See Bucclengh v. Cowan, 5 
 
 335
 
 *336 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 multifariousness, yet in truth such demurrers may be divided into two 
 distinct kinds. Frequently the objection raised, though termed multifa- 
 riousness, is in fact more properly misjoinder ; 1 that is to say, the cases 
 or claims united in the bill are of so different a character, that the Court 
 will not permit them to be litigated in one record. 2 It may be that the 
 plaintiffs and defendants are parties to the whole of the transactions 
 which form the subject of the suit, and nevertheless those transactions 
 may be so dissimilar that the Court will not allow them to be joined 
 together, but will require distinct records. But what is more familiarly 
 understood by the term multifariousness, as applied to a bill, is where a 
 party is able to say he is brought as a defendant upon a record, with a 
 large portion of which he has no connection whatever. 8 Thus where 
 a bill was exhibited by trustees under a trust for sale, against several 
 persons who were the purchasers of the trust estates, which had been 
 sold to them by auction in different lots, Sir Thomas Plumer V. C. 
 allowed a demurrer, which had been put in by one of the defendants, 
 on the ground that the bill was multifarious. 4 In a subsequent case, 
 where an information and bill were filed for the purpose of setting aside 
 leases, granted by the same trustees at different times to different per- 
 sons, the same learned Judge held, that if the case had been free 
 * 336 from other objections it would have been * liable to the charge of 
 multifariousness. 1 The same principle was afterward acted upon 
 by Lord Eldon in Salvidge v. Hyde, 2 where a bill had been filed for an 
 account of a testator's estate, and also to set aside certain sales which 
 
 i Bv the 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 49, ante, p. 
 303, objections for misjoinder of plaintiffs are 
 abolished; but this section applies to misjoinder 
 of parties, and not to the misjoinder of subjects 
 mentioned in the text. 
 
 2 Emans r. Emans, 14 N. J. Eq. 114, 118. 
 
 3 Campbell v. Mackay, 1 M.&C. 618; Crow 
 v. Cross, 7 Jur. N. S. 1298, V. C. S. ; see Tur- 
 ner v. Baptist Missionary Union, 5 McLean, 
 344; Swayze v Swayze, 9 N. J. Eq. 273; New 
 England &c. Bank v. Newport Steam Factory, 
 6 R. I. 154. 
 
 4 His Honor said: "This Court is always 
 averse to a multiplicity of suits, but certainly 
 a defendant has a right to insist that he is not 
 bound to answer a bill containing several dis- 
 tinct and separate matters, relating to indi- 
 
 Macph. 214; Crossley v. Lightowler, L. R. 3 
 Eq. 279; Thorpe v. Brumfitt, L. R. 8 Ch. 650; 
 Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining 
 Co. 8 Sawyer, 628; 9 id. 441; Chipman v. 
 Palmer, 77 N. Y. 56; Lockwood Co. v. Law- 
 rence, 77 Maine, 297 ; Blaisdell v. Stephens, 14 
 Nev. 17. 
 
 Where distinct matters and charges are 
 joined against a single defendant or the same 
 defendants, the Court may treat the bill as 
 multifarious or not in its discretion. Burstall r. 
 Bey f us, 26 Ch. D. 35; Emans v. Emans, 14 N. J. 
 Eq. 114; Dyer v. Cranston Print Works Co. 
 
 336 
 
 viduals with whom he has no concern." 
 Brookes v. Lord Whitworth, 1 Mad. 86, 89; see 
 also Rayner v. Julian, 2 Dick. 677 ; 5 Mad. 
 144, n. The marginal note to 2 Dick. 677 is 
 wrong; and see Rump v. Greenhill, 20 Beav. 
 512; 1 Jur. N. S. 123; Abervstwith &c. Ry. Co. 
 v. Piercy. 12 W. R. 1000,"v. C. W. ; 2 H. & 
 M. 602; Bent v. Yardley, 4 N. R. 50, V. C W.; 
 Bouck v. Bouck, L. R*. 2 Eq. 19, M. R. ; 35 
 Beav. 643; Crane v. Fairchild, 14 N.J. Eq. 
 76; Metcalf v. Cady, 8 Allen, 587; Robinson v. 
 Cross, 22 Conn. 171. 
 
 i Att.-Gen. v. Moses, 2 Mad. 294. 305. 
 
 2 Jac. 151, 153; and see Lund v. Blanshard, 
 4 Hare, 9, 19; Thomas v. Rees, 1 Jur. N. S. 
 197, M. R.; Norris v. Jackson, 1 J. & H. 319; 
 7 Jur. N. S. 540. 
 
 (R. I.) 24 Atl. Rep. 827 ; Walker v. Powers, 104 
 U.S. 245; Stafford Bank i\ Sprague, 19 Blatch. 
 529; United States v. Cartner, 26 Fed. Rep. 
 296; Singer Manuf. Co. v. Springfield Foundry 
 Co. 34 id. 393 ; Stafford Nat. Bank v. Sprague, 
 8 id. 377; Duff v. First Nat. Bank, 13 id. 65; 
 Johnson v. Powers, 13 id. 315; Burford v. 
 Steele, 80 Ala. 147 ; Clary v. Haines, 61 Ga. 
 520; Goodwin v. Goodwin, 69 Mo. 617; Stuart 
 v. Blair, 8 Baxter (Tenn.), 141; Bauknight v. 
 Sloan, 17 Fla. 284; Hickey v. Chicago & W.I. 
 R. Co. 6 III. App. 172.
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. * 337 
 
 had been made by the executor and trustee to himself and another per- 
 son of the name of Laying. In allowing, on appeal, a demurrer put in 
 by Laying, which had been overruled by Sir John Leach V. C., 3 the 
 Lord Chancellor said that " when there are trustees to sell, and a bill is 
 filed against them, it is not usual to make the purchasers parties, but to 
 state the contracts and pray an inquiry." * His Lordship, however, 
 added that " there may be cases which cannot be delayed till those in- 
 quiries can be made, on account of injury that may be done in the mean 
 time." 
 
 Although the administration of the estates of two different persons 
 cannot, in general, be joined in the same suit, where the parties inter- 
 ested in such estates are different, yet, where the same parties claim the 
 benefit of both estates, and they are so connected that the account of 
 one cannot be taken without the other, the joinder of them in the same 
 suit is not multifarious. 6 
 
 *This observation leads to a distinction, pointed out by Lord * SIT 
 Eldon in Salvidge v. Hyde, 1 and which has perhaps been extended 
 by later cases. The bill in that case was filed by persons interested under 
 a will, and by creditors of a testator, to set aside two contracts, one of 
 which had been entered into by the trustees for sale of an estate to one 
 of their own number, and the other for the sale of another estate to the 
 defendant Laying; and Lord Eldon, although he thought that the object 
 of setting aside the contract entered into with Laying could not be em- 
 braced in a bill to set aside the contract entered into with the trustee, 
 yet held, that if the trustee had purchased for himself, and then Laying 
 had bought the same estate of him, the case would have been different. 2 
 
 From this it may be inferred, that an objection for multifariousness 
 will not be allowed, where the person making the objection has united 
 his case with that of another defendant, against whom the suit is entire 
 
 3 5 Mad. 138, 146. Sir John Leach, in pro- Bouck v. Bouck, L. R. 2 Eq. 19; 35 Beav. (543 ; 
 
 nouncing judgment upon this demurrer, ob- and see Margetts r. Perks, 12 W. R. 517, M. 
 
 served, with reference to multifariousness, R. ; Marshall v. Gilliard, 1 \V. N. 255; 12 Jur. 
 
 that, " in order to determine whether a suit is N. S. 483, V. C. S.; Earle c. Sidebottom, 37 
 
 multifarious, or in other words contains dis- L. J. Ch. 503; Pyrah v. Woodcock, 19 W. R, 
 
 tinct matters, the inquiry is not whether each 463. As to the joinder of distinct causes of 
 
 defendant is connected with every branch of action under the present English practice, see 
 
 the cause, but whether the plaintiff's bill seeks R. S. C. Ord. XVII. 1-9. 
 
 relief in respect of matters which are in their 4 Story, Eq. PI. § 274. 
 
 nature separate and distinct. If the object of 5 Campbell v. Mackay, 1 M. & C. 603, 623; 
 the suit be single, but it happens that different Lewis r. Edmund, 6 Sim. 251, 254; Rump v. 
 persons have separate interests in distinct ques- Greenhill, 20 Beav. 512; 1 Jur. N. S. 123; 
 tions which arise out of that single object, it Att.-Gen. t\ Cradock, 3 M. & C 85, 93; 1 Jur. 
 necessarily follows that such different persons 556; Young r. Hodges, 10 Hare, 158; Carter©, 
 must be brought before the Court, in order that Balfour, 19 Ala. 814. The estates of two per- 
 the suit may conclude the whole subject." sons who are joint debtors may be administered 
 There is no "doubt that, in the above observa- in the same suit. Woods v. Sowerhy, 14 \V. R. 
 tion, the learned Judge stated the principle 9, V. C. W. So, where a bill is riled for a set- 
 correctly; though, in his application of it, he tlement of several commercial partnerships, of 
 went, in the opinion of Lord Eldon, too far. which the complainants and defendants were 
 See Turner i\ Robinson, 1 S. & S. 313, 315; members, the bill is not multifarious. Miller 
 S. C. nnm. Turner v. Doubleday, 6 Mad. 94; v. Harris, 1 Tenn. Leg. Rep. 157. 
 Dunn v. Dunn, 2 Sim. 329; Marcos v. Pebrer, ' Jac. 151. 
 3 Sim. 466; Jerdein v. Bright, 2 J. & H. 325; 2 Salvidge v. Hyde, Jac. 153. 
 vol. i. — 22 337
 
 338 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 and incapable of being separated. 3 And so, where the plaintiffs had 
 appointed A, B, and C their foreign agents, and A had retired, where- 
 upon the plaintiffs had appointed B, C, and D their agents, and then 
 filed a bill for an account of the two agencies, and A, the retiring party, 
 demurred for multifariousness, Lord Langdale M. B., 4 not finding, upon 
 perusal of the bill, such allegations as appeared to render it necessary 
 to continue, as parties to the suit, the different persons parties to 
 the transactions, allowed the demurrer. 6 Where the case against one 
 defendant was so entire as to be incapable of being prosecuted in sev- 
 eral suits, but yet another defendant was a necessary party in respect 
 of a portion only of that case, it was decided, that such other defend- 
 ant could not object to the suit on the ground of multifariousness. 6 
 And in Campbell v. Mackay, 1 Lord Cottenhain held, that where 
 * 338 the plaintiffs * have a common interest against all the defend- 
 ants in a suit as to one or more of the questions raised by it, so 
 as to make them all necessary parties for the purpose of enforcing that 
 common interest, the circumstance of some of the defendants being sub- 
 ject to distinct liabilities, in respect to different branches of the subject- 
 matter, will not render the bill multifarious. 1 
 
 3 Story, Eq. PI. § 278, a, and note. Nor can 
 a defendant demur for multifariousness on the 
 ground of the joinder of another defendant, 
 who does not object. Warthen v. Brantley, 5 
 Ga. 571 ; Whitbeck v. Edgar, 2 Barb. Ch. 106; 
 Miller v. Jamison, 21 N. J. Eq. 41. Ante, p. 
 302,ii.4. 
 
 4 Benson v. Hadfield, 5 Beav. 546, 553. He 
 first said: "I can very well conceive a case 
 properly stated, in which it would be quite 
 necessary, and it may ultimately be quite neces- 
 sary in this case, to continue any person who 
 was a partner in one of those agency firms, a 
 part}- to the cause by which the accounts are 
 to be taken." 
 
 6 See Warthen v. Brantley, 5 Ga. 571. 
 
 6 Att.-Gen. v. Poole, 4 M. & C. 17, 31; 2 
 Jur. 1080; 8 01. & Fin. 409, nom. Parr v. Att.- 
 Gen.; see also Inman v. Wearing, 3 De G. & 
 S. 729, which was a case of foreclosure of three 
 distinct estates, and a prayer to set aside a 
 sale by a prior mortgagee of one of them, as 
 improvident. 
 
 ' 1 M. & C. 603; and see Att.-Gen. v. Cra- 
 dock, 3 M. & C. 85, 95; 1 Jur. 556: Walsham 
 v. Stainton, 9 Jur. N. S. 1261; 12 W. K. 63, 
 L. JJ. ; 1 De G. J. & S. 678. overruling S. C. 
 1 H. & M. 323; Hamp v. Robinson, 3 De G. J. 
 & S. 97. 
 
 1 Where the purpose of the bill was to enable 
 the plaintiff to obtain satisfaction of a judgment 
 at I. aw out of the property of his debtor, one of 
 the defendants, and to this end the plaintiff 
 sought to remove out of his way certain fraud- 
 ulent conveyances and incumbrances, and to 
 bring within the reach of his judgment equi- 
 table interests which were not the subjects of 
 
 338 
 
 execution at Law, it was held to be no objec- 
 tion that one or more of the defendants, to whom 
 parts of the property hud been fraudulently con- 
 veyed, had nothing to do with other fraudulent 
 transactions. Way v. Bragaw, 16 N. J. Eq. 
 213, 216; Randolph v. Daly, id. 313; see Boyd 
 v. Ho}'t, 5 Paige, 78 ; Brinkerhoff v. Brown, 4 
 John. Ch. 671; Fellows v. Fellows, 4 Cowen, 
 682; 15 Am. Dec. 412, and note; Story, Eq. PI. 
 § 271, b ; Hicks v. Campbell, 19 N. j". Eq. 183; 
 Coleman v. Barnes, 5 Allen, 374; Cuyler v. 
 Moreland, 6 Paige, 273; Richards v. Pierce, 52 
 Maine, 560; Chase v. Searls, 45 N. H. 511, 519, 
 et seq. ; Morton v. Weil, 33 Barb. 30; Johnson 
 v. Brown, 2 Humph. 327; Fogg v. Rogers, 2 
 Coldw. 290; Hughes v. Tennison, 3 Tenn. Ch. 
 641. So, where the bill was by four children 
 to set aside six deeds of property made by their 
 father at one time to six other children, on the 
 ground of undue influence and mental incom- 
 petency. Arnold v. Arnold, 11 W. Va. 449. 
 So, where the bill is by children against their 
 father, his judgment creditor, and a purchaser 
 under the judgment, setting up a resulting trust 
 in the property sold. Taylor v. Smith, 54 Miss. 
 50. So, where the bill is to set aside a will as 
 fraudulently procured against a second wife 
 and her children. Winsor v. Pettis, 11 R. I. 
 506. And see Prevost v. Gorrell, 7 Rep. 296, 
 U. S. C. C. Pa. 
 
 The facts in Campbell v. Mackay were as fol- 
 lows : Sir James Campbell, by a deed of settle- 
 ment executed on his marriage with Lady D. L. 
 Campbell, had vested a fund in two trustees, A 
 and B, upon trust for his wife for life, and after 
 her decease in trust for the sons of the marriage 
 who should attain the age of twenty-one years,
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. 
 
 *339 
 
 * Where the right of a person to call upon the Court for spe- * 339 
 cine relief against another is so incumbered that he cannot assert 
 his own right till he has got rid of that incumbrance, he cannot include 
 the object of getting rid of the incumbrance in a suit for the specific re- 
 lief which, but for that incumbrance, he would be entitled to; and if he 
 attempt to do so by the same suit, his bill will be multifarious. Thus, a 
 suit brought for specific performance should not be mixed up with a 
 prayer for relief against other persons claiming an interest in the estate ; 
 and if there is a title in other persons which the plaintiff is bound to get 
 in, he should file a bill for specific performance only, and should fortify 
 the defect in his title by such means as he can, so as to be enabled to 
 complete it by the time when the contract will have to be enforced. 1 
 
 The principle which renders it improper to mix up, in the same bill, 
 demands against different persons arising out of distinct transactions, 
 renders it improper to include in one suit separate infringements of the 
 same patent by different defendants ; 2 and for the same reason, where 
 
 and daughters who should attain twenty-one 
 years or marry ; with a proviso that the persons 
 to be appointed guardians of the children by 
 his will, together with the trustees of the set- 
 tlement, should have authority to apply the 
 interest, and also, in certain cases, part of the 
 capital, of the children's presumptive shares, 
 towards their maintenance and advancement 
 during their respective minorities. By a second 
 deed, executed after marriage, Sir James Camp- 
 bell vested another fund in two other trustees, 
 C and L), but upon similar trusts to those of 
 the firs settlement; and by his will, after 
 making some specific bequests to hi* wife, he 
 bequeathed his property to A, B, and (', upon 
 certain trusts for the benefit of his children, 
 and appointed A, B, and C his executors and 
 guardians ot his infant children, in conjunction 
 with their mother. After the death of Sir James 
 Campbell, Lady D. L. Campbell, the wife, 
 together with the children of the marriage, filed 
 a bill against A, B, C, and D, for the accounts 
 and administration of the property comprised 
 in the two deeds and will, to which bill « joint 
 demurrer was put in by A, B, and C, on the 
 ground of multifariousness. The demurrer was, 
 however, overruled, upon argument, by Sir 
 Lancelot Shadwell V. C, and afterwards by 
 Lord Cottenham upon appeal; his Lordship 
 being of opinion that the result of the prin- 
 ciples to he extracted from the cases was. that 
 where there is a common liability and a com- 
 mon interest, the common liability being in the 
 defendants, and the common interest in the 
 plaintiffs, different grounds of property maybe 
 united in the same record. See 1 M. & C. 623. 
 A bill is not multifarious which unites sev- 
 eral matters distinct in themselves, but which 
 together make up the plaintiff's equity, and are 
 necessary to complete relief; nor, on the ground 
 
 of misjoinder of several plaintiffs, where either 
 of them would not be entitled to proceed sepa- 
 rately for relief without making the others 
 defendants. Hicks v. Campbell, 19 N. J. Eq. 
 183 ; Kennebec and Portland R R. Co. v. Port- 
 land and Kennebec R. R. Co. 54 Maine, 173; 
 see Coleman e. Barnes, 5 Allen, 374 ; Skeel v. 
 Spraker, 8 Paige, 182; Myers v. United Guar- 
 antee &c. Co. 7 De G. M. & G. 112. 
 
 1 Mole i'. Smith, Jac. 494; Mason v. Frank- 
 lin, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 239, 241: see also Whaley 
 v. Dawson, 2 Sch. & Lef. 367 ; and ante, p. 230, 
 231 ; Story, Eq. PI. § 272; Whitten v. Whitten, 
 36 N. H. 326. So a bill by a mortgagee against 
 the mortgagor and an adverse claimant of the 
 land would be multifarious. Banks v. Walker, 
 2 Sandf. Ch. 344; Dial v. Reynolds, 96 U. S. 
 340; Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Lent, 6 Paige, 635; 
 Corning v. Smith, 6 N. Y. 82; Wilkins v. Kirk- 
 bride, 27 N. J. Eq. 93; Farmers' Loan Co. v. 
 San Diego Street Car Co. 40 Fed. Rep. 105; 
 California &c. Co. v. Cheney El. Light Co. 56 id. 
 257: McComb v. Spangler, 71 Cal. 423; Croghan 
 v. Minor, 53 Cal. 15; ante, p. 277, n. 2. A bill 
 alleging that the plaintiff and one of the defend- 
 ants were copartners, and praying for a settle- 
 ment of the copartnership concerns, and alleging 
 a fraudulent sale of all the property of the firm 
 by the said defendant to a third party, who whs 
 the other defendant, and praying that such sale 
 may be declared void, is bad for multifarious- 
 ness. Sawyer v. Noble, 55 Maine, 227. 
 
 2 The plaintiff should not, however, file an 
 unnecessary number of bills; if he does, the 
 Court will consolidate the suits, or make some 
 equivalent order. See Foxwell.t'. Webster. 4 
 De G. J. & S. 77, 83; 10 Jur. N. S. 137; 12 
 W. R. 186, L. C; 2 Dr. & Sm. 250; 9 Jur. N. 
 S. 1189; 1 Seton, 347, No. 8; R. S. C. Ord. LI. 
 4; see infra, p. 797, n. 
 
 339
 
 341 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 a copyright has been infringed, bills must be filed against each book- 
 seller taking spurious copies for sale. 3 And so, joint and sepa- 
 
 * 340 rate demands cannot be united in the same bill ; 4 * and although 
 
 the defendants may be liable in respect of every one of the de- 
 mands made by the bill, yet they may be of so dissimilar a character 
 as to render it improper to include them all in one suit. The objection, 
 in these cases, is more strictly called misjoinder, and has been before 
 
 alluded to. 1 
 
 * 341 * This objection will only apply where a plaintiff claims several 
 
 s Dilly v. Doig, 2 Ves. Jr. 486; Story, Eq. 
 PI. § 277, 278. 
 
 4 Harrison v. Hogg, 2 Ves. Jr. 323 ; Swift v. 
 Eckford, 6 Paige, 22; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 271, 
 279; McLellan v. Osborne, 51 Maine, 118, 120; 
 Enians v. Emans, 13 N. J. Eq. 205. Thus a 
 bill praying for an account of two distinct firms, 
 made up, in part, of the same persons, was held 
 bad for multifariousness. Griffin v. Merrill, 10 
 Md. 264. So where three persons had succes- 
 sively withdrawn from a firm, reducing the 
 number from five to two, a bill praying for an 
 account and settlement of the partnership con- 
 cerns for the whole time, was held to be bad 
 for multifariousness, and was dismissed. White 
 v. White, 5 Gill, 359. So a prayer in a bill by 
 one of several part-owners of a vessel against 
 other part-owners, who became such at several 
 different times, for an account, during that 
 period of time when all were owners, was held 
 correct; if the prayer was not thus limited, the 
 bill would be bad for multifariousness. McLel- 
 lan v. Osborne, 51 Maine, 118; see Latting v. 
 Latting, 4 Sandf. Ch. 31; as to suing co-execu- 
 tors, separately liable, for contribution, see 
 Singleton v. Se'lwyn, 9 Jur. N. S. 1149; 12 W. 
 R. 98, V. 0. W. ; Micklethwait v. Winstanley, 
 13 W. R. 210, L. JJ. 
 
 1 In the quotation from Lord Cottenham's 
 judgment in Campbell v. Mackay. where his 
 Lordship observes that the distinction I etween 
 misjoinder and multifariousness is clearly ex- 
 hibited in the case of Ward v. The Duke of 
 Northumberland, 2 Anst. 469, 476; see Emans 
 v. Enians, 13 N. J. Eq. 205, 207; Boyd v. Hoyt, 
 5 Paige, 79. " In that case,'' said his Lordship, 
 "the plaintiff had been tenant of a colliery 
 under the preceding Duke of Northumberland, 
 and continued also to be tenant under his son 
 and successor, the then Duke: and l>e filed a 
 bill against the then Duke and Lord Beverley, 
 who were the executors of their father, seeking 
 relief against them in respect of transactions, 
 part of which took place in the lifetime of the 
 former Duke, and part between the plaintiff 
 and the then Duke sifter his father's decease. 
 To this bill the defendants put in separate de- 
 murrers, and the forms of the two demurrers, 
 which were very different, clearly illustrate 
 the distinction above adverted to. The Duke 
 
 340 
 
 could not say there was any portion of the bill 
 with which he was not necessarily connected ; 
 because he was interested in one part of it as 
 owner of the mine, in the other as represent- 
 ing his father. But his defence was, that it 
 was improper to join in one record a case 
 against him as representative of his father, and 
 a case against him arising out of transactions 
 in which he was personally concerned. (See 
 Latting i'. Latting, 4 Sandf. Ch. 31; Van Mater 
 v. Sickler, 9 N. J. Eq. 483.) The form of his 
 demurrer was that there was an improper 
 joinder of the subject-matters of the suit. 
 Lord Beverley's demurrer again was totally 
 different: it was in the usual form of a de- 
 murrer for multifariousness, and proceeded 
 on the ground that, by including transactions 
 which occurred between the plaintiff and the 
 other defendant with transactions between the 
 plaintiff and the late Duke (with the latter of 
 which only Lord Beverley could have any con- 
 cern), the bill was drawn to an unnecessary 
 length, and the demurring party exposed to 
 improper and useless expense. (See Turner v. 
 Amer. Bapt. Miss. Union, 5 McLean, 344.) 
 Both demurrers were allowed, and both, it may 
 be said, in a sense, for multifariousness; but 
 it is obvious that the real objection was very 
 different in the two cases. In Harrison v. 
 Hogg, 2 Ves. Jr. 323, 328, which was also 
 more properly a case of misjoinder, the plain- 
 tiffs endeavored to unite in one record a de- 
 mand in which all the plaintiffs jointly had 
 an interest, with a demand in which only one 
 of them had an interest; and the demurrer 
 was allowed upon the ground that the subject- 
 matters were such as, in the opinion of the 
 Court, ought not, according to the rules of 
 pleading, to be included in one suit. (Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 279; Boyd v. Hoyt, 5 Paige, 65; Lar- 
 kins v. Biddle, 21 Ala. 252; Emans v. Emans, 
 13 N. J. Eq. 205.) In Saxton v. Davis (18 Ves. 
 72, 80), the suit prayed an account against the 
 representatives of a bankrupt's assignees, and 
 against Davis, a person who claimed through 
 those assignees, and also against a person who 
 had been his assignee under the Insolvent 
 Debtors' Act; and there also the bill was held 
 to be bad for multifariousness." 1 M. & C. 
 619 j Story, Eq. PL §§ 276, 285, 530.
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. 
 
 342 
 
 matters of different natures by the same bill; and that where one 
 general right only is claimed by the bill, though the defendants have 
 separate and distinct interests, a demurrer will not hold. 1 As where a 
 person, claiming a general right to the sole fishery of a river, files a bill 
 against a number of persons claiming several rights in the fishery, as 
 lords of manors, occupiers of lands or otherwise ; 2 so, in a bill for duties, 
 the city of London was permitted to bring several of the persons before 
 the Court, who dealt in those things whereof the duty was claimed, to 
 establish the plaintiff's right to it; 8 and where the lord of a manor filed 
 a bill against more than thirty tenants of the manor, freeholders, copy- 
 holders, and leaseholders, who owed rents to the lord, but had confused 
 the boundaries of their several tenements, praying a commission to 
 ascertain the boundaries, and it was objected, at a hearing, that 
 the suit was improper, as it brought before the Court * many par- * 342 
 ties having distinct interests, it was answered that the lord 
 claimed one general right, for the assertion of which it was necessary to 
 ascertain the several tenements ; and a decree was made accordingly. 1 
 Upon the same principle it is, that one suit is entertained for tithes 
 against several parishioners. Suits of this kind, however, must all be 
 for objects of the same nature ; and if a bill is filed against several 
 defendants for objects of a different nature, although the plaintiff claims 
 them all in the same character, it will be multifarious ; 2 thus, if a par- 
 son should prefer a bill against several persons, as to some for tithes and 
 as to others for glebe, it would be improper ; and so, if the lord of a 
 manor should prefer one bill against divers tenants for several distinct 
 
 l Ld. Red. 182; Bowers v. Keesecher, 9 Iowa, 
 422; Dimmock v. Bixby, 20 Pick. 368; Sears 
 v. Carrier, 4 Allen, 341; Tucker v. Tucker, 29 
 Miss. 350; Chase v. Searles, 45 N. H. 519; 
 Bugbee v. Sargent, 23 Maine, 269; Warren 
 v. Warren, 56 Maine, 367; Foss v. Haynes, 31 
 Maine, 81; Fellows v. Fellows, 4 Cowen, 682; 
 Richards v. Pierce, 52 Maine, 562; People v. 
 Morrill, 26 Cal. 336; Story, Eq. PI. § 278, note; 
 Murray v. Hay, 1 Barb. Ch. 59; Mix v. Hotch- 
 kiss, 14 Conn. 32; Booth v. Stamper, 10 Ga. 
 109, Nail v. Mobley, 9 Ga. 278; Winslow v. 
 Dousman, 18 Wis. 456; see Watson v. Cox, 1 
 Ired. Eq. 389; Stuart v. Colter, 4 Rand. 74 ; 
 Newland v. Rogers, 3 Barb. Ch. 432; Robert- 
 son v. Stevens, 1 Ired. Ch. 247; Walkup v. 
 Zehring, 13 Iowa, 306 ; Delafield r. Anderson, 
 7 Sm. & M. 630; Allen v. Montgomery R. R. 
 Co. 11 Ala. 437; Scrimeger v. Buchannon, 3 
 A. K. Marsh. 219; Parish v. Sloan, 3 Ired. 
 Ch. 607; Vaun v. Hargett, 2 Dev. & Bat. Ch. 
 31. Nor will the objection of multifariousness 
 prevail where the interests of the several plain- 
 tiffs, though distinct and upon distinct convey- 
 ances, are yet of a similar nature against the 
 same defendants, and in relation to the same 
 subject-matter, and the relief prayed is in 
 character the same to all. Kunkel v. Markell, 
 26 Md. 390, 409 ; see Thomas v. Doub, 8 Gill, 
 7 ; Young v. Lyons, 8 Gill, 166; Williams v. 
 
 West, 2 Md. 198 ; Peters v. Van Lear, 4 Gill, 
 263, 264. But a bill is held bad for multifa- 
 riousness, where it is brought against several 
 defendants, seeking redress for injuries arising 
 out of transactions with them separately, at 
 different times, and relating to different sub- 
 jects. Coe v. Turner, 5 Conn. 86; Marselis v. 
 Morris Canal &c. 1 Saxton (N. ■) .), 31 ; Meacham 
 v. Williams, 9 Ala. 842; Colburn v. B rough ton, 
 9 Ala. 351; Hungerford v. Cashing, 8 Wis. 
 332. Unconnected demands against different 
 estates cannot be united in the same bill, 
 though the defendant is executor of both. 
 Daniel v. Morrison, 6 Dana, 186 ; Kay V. Jones, 
 7 .1. J. Marsh. 37; see McCartney v. Calhoun, 
 11 Ala. 110. 
 
 2 Mayor of York 9. Pilkington, 1 Atk. 282. 
 cited Ld. Red. 182; Smith v. Enrl Hrownlow, 
 L. R. 9 Eq. 241; R. S. C Ord. XVI. 3, 4; 
 Chase v. Searles, 45 N. H. 511, 521. 
 
 3 City of London v. Perkins, 3 Bro. P. C. ed. 
 Toml. 602. 
 
 i Magdalen Coll. v. Athill, cited Ld. Red. 
 183; and see Brown v. Wales, L. R. 15 Eq. 142, 
 V. C. B. 
 
 2 West v. Randall, 2 Mason, 181; Cam 
 bridge Water Works v. Somerville Dyeing 
 &c. Co. 14 Gray, 193; Swift v. Eckford, 6 
 Paige, 22. 
 
 341
 
 343 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 matters and causes, such as common waste, several piscary, &c, this 
 would be wrong : though the foundation of the suit, namely, the mauor, 
 be an entire thing. 3 
 
 Lord Redesdale appears to confine the meaning of multifariousness to 
 cases where a plaintiff demands several matters of different natures of sev- 
 eral defendants by the same bill. 4 Where, however, an informa- 
 * 343 tion 5 against * a company stated that there was a charity for the 
 benefit of young men being free of the Company, and then alleged 
 that divers other bequests had been made to the company for the purpose of 
 mnking loans to young men for their advancement in business or life, and 
 prayed that the first mentioned charity, and all other (if any) like gifts and 
 bequests to the company might be established, and that the due perform- 
 ance of the charitable trusts might be enforced for the future, a demurrer 
 put in to the information, because it was exhibited for several and distinct 
 matters which ought not to be joined together in one information, was 
 allowed. 1 Here, however, there was nothing in the information to show 
 that the character of the bequests was homogeneous, and the judge held 
 that if there had been any allegation to show that they were of that 
 character, although there might be minute differences between the 
 bequests, they might all have been comprised in the same information. 2 
 
 8 Berke v. Harris, Hardres, 337. 
 
 4 Ld. Red. 181. 
 
 5 Att.-Gen v. Goldsmiths' Co. 5 Sim. 670, 
 675. Sir Lancelot Shad well V. C. here said: 
 "I apprehend that, besides what Lord Redes- 
 dale has laid down upon the subject, there is 
 a rule arising out of the constant practice of 
 the Court, that it is not competent, where A is 
 sole plaintiff and B is sole defendant, for A to 
 unite in his bill against B all sorts of matters 
 wherein they may be mutually concerned. (See 
 Story, Eq. PI. 280; Bryan r. Blythe, 4 Blackf. 
 249; White v. Curtis. 2 Gray, 467 ; Davoue v. 
 Fanning. 4 John. Cb. 204; Carnvchael v. Bow- 
 der, 3 How. (Miss.) 252; Robertson r. Stevens, 
 1 Ired. Eq. 247; Story. Eq. PI. § 282; Lynch 
 v. Johnson, 2 Litt. 104.) If such a mode of pro- 
 ceeding were allowed, we should have A filing 
 a bill against B, praying to foreclose one mort- 
 gage, and in Ihe same bill praying to redeem 
 another, and asking many other kinHs of relief 
 with respect to many other subjects of com- 
 plaint." See Att.-Gen. v. Carmarthen, G. Coop. 
 30; Att.-Gen. v. St. Cross Hospital, 17 Beav. 
 435; Hughes v. Cook, 34 Beav. 407; Att.-Gen. 
 v. Karl of Durham. 46 L. T. 16: see Story, Eq. 
 PI. §§ 531, 532, 533; Kent v. Lee.2 Sandf. Ch. 
 105. A bill is multifarious which seeks to re- 
 deem a mortgage of an entire estate, and a 
 subsequent mortgage by one tenant in common 
 of his share in a part of the estate. White v. 
 Curtis, 2 Gray. 467. But a bill is not neces- 
 sarily multifarious, by reason of its seeking to 
 redeem two distinct mortgages of different par- 
 cels of real estate, or by reason of its seeking 
 
 342 
 
 specific performance of distinct contracts relat- 
 ing to different parcels of real estate. Robin- 
 son v. Guild, 12 Met. 323; see Price r. Minot, 
 107 Mass. 63; and Holman v. Bank of Norfolk, 
 12 Ala. 369. Nor where it seeks to foreclose a 
 mortgage of land, and to redeem a prior mort- 
 gage of one of the tracts held by one of the 
 defendants. Bell r. Woodward, 42 N. H. 181. 
 A bill for a general account and settlement of a 
 copartnership may embrace every object neces- 
 sary to the complete adjustment of the concern, 
 without being objectionable for multifarious- 
 ness. Wells v. Strange, 5 Ga. 22; see Kent v. 
 Lee, 2 Sandf. Ch. 105; Tomlinson v. Claywell, 
 4 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 317. Debt and detinue 
 may be joined, and for a similar reason, a claim 
 for a specific tract of land, and for a sum of 
 money, the parties being the same, may be 
 united in the same suit in Chancery. Whitney 
 v. Whitney, 5 Dana. 329. 
 
 i See Story, Eq. PI. §§ 532, 533. 
 
 2 See 5 Sim. 676. Thus, in Att.-Gen. v< 
 Merchant Tailors' Co. 5 Sim. 288, where the 
 information prayed the establishment or regu- 
 lation of a great number of different charitable 
 gifts, which were stated in the information to 
 have been made to the company, by way of 
 bequest or otherwise, on trust to lend out the 
 same to freemen of the company, or upon some 
 other like or corresponding trust, for the benefit 
 and advancement of freemen in trade or busi- 
 ness, the number of charities in respect of 
 which the relief was sought by the information 
 was eight; but as they were to be applied 
 mainly and substantially for the same objects,
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. 
 
 *344 
 
 It thus appears that a plaintiff cannot join in his bill, even against the 
 same defendant, matters of different natures, although arising out of the 
 same transaction ; yet, when the matters are homogeneous in their char- 
 acter, the introduction of them into the same bill will not be 
 multifarious; and * it is to be observed that this distinction will * 344 
 not be affected by the circumstance of the plaintiff claiming the 
 same thing under distinct titles, and that the statement of such different 
 titles in the same bill will not render it multifarious. 1 Thus, where a 
 bill was filed for tithes by the rector of a parish in London, in which the 
 title was laid under a decree made pursuant to the 37th Hen. VIII. c. 12, 
 by which payment of tithes was decreed in London at the rate of 2s. 9d. 
 iu the pound on the rents, with a charge that, in case such decree should 
 not be deemed binding, the plaintiff was entitled to a similar payment, 
 under a previous decree, made in the year 1535, and confirmed by the 
 same Act ; and in case neither of the said decrees were binding, the bill 
 charged that the plaintiff was entitled, by ancient usage and custom from 
 time immemorial, to certain dues and oblations calculated according 
 to rent at 2s. 9d. in the pound : a demurrer for multifariousness was 
 overruled. 2 
 
 As a bill by the same plaintiff against the same defendant for different 
 matters would be considered multifarious, so, a fortiori, would a bill by 
 several plaintiffs, demanding distinct matters, against the same defend- 
 ants. 3 Thus, if an estate is sold in lots to different purchasers, the 
 
 v. Portland and Kennebec R. R. Co. 54 Maine, 
 173. A bill brought by an insurance company, 
 praying that a policy of insurance, which has 
 been obtained from them by fraud, may be de- 
 livered up to be cancelled, and also that a 
 commission may issue for the examination of 
 witnesses, is not multifarious. Commercial 
 Mut, Ins. Co. v. McLoon, 14 Allen, 351. 
 
 2 Owen v. Nodin, M'Lel. 238; 13 Price, 
 478; and see Boyd v. Moyle, 2 Coll. 316, 323; 
 where a bill to restrain two actions relating to 
 the same matter was held not to be multifa- 
 rious: see also Davis v. Cripps, 2 Y.&C. C.C. 
 430, 434. 
 
 3 Jones v. Garcia del Rio, T. & R. 297, 301; 
 see Finley v. Harrison, 5 J. J. Marsh. 158; Kay 
 v. Jones, 7 J. J. Marsh. 37; Allen v. Miller, 4 
 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 146; Mix t>. Hotchkiss, 14 
 Conn. 32; Kennedy v. Kennedy, 2 Ala. 571; 
 Armstrong v. Athens Co. 10 Ohio, 235; Ohio v. 
 Ellis, 10 Ohio, 456; Marshall v. Means, 12 Ga. 
 61 ; Ayers v. Wright, 8 Ired. Eq. 229. But a 
 widow who is administratix of her husband's 
 estate, and brings a bill in Equity to redeem 
 real estate mortgaged by him, does not make 
 the bill multifarious, by therein claiming to 
 maintain her suit in both capacities. Robinson 
 v. Guild, 12 Met. 323; see Fairly v. Priest, 3 
 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 21. One tax-payer of a 
 school district cannot sue in behalf of himself 
 and of the other tax-payers of the district, to 
 restrain the sale of their real estate for the pur- 
 pose of collecting a delinquent tax assessed to 
 
 343 
 
 and it appeared upon the information that, 
 owing to the minuteness of the sums, each of 
 them could not be administered as the donors 
 pointed out, Sir Lancelot Shadwell V. C. 
 thought that the Court ought, at the hear- 
 ing, to deal with them conjointly, and that 
 the information was not multifarious. On 
 appeal, Lord Brougham concurred with this 
 decision, as to seven of the charities, and gave 
 leave to amend the bill by adding parties or 
 waiving relief as to the eighth. 1 M. & K. 
 18:), 192. It is no objection to a bill in Equity 
 praying for the specific performance of an agree- 
 ment to convey land, that it also alleges that 
 the defendant purchased the land as the plain- 
 tiff's agent, and with his money, and therefore 
 holds it in trust for the plaintiff. Gerrish v. 
 Towne, 3 Gray, 82. 
 
 1 Neither is a bill multifarious where its 
 allegations all relate to one transaction, between 
 th^ same parties, to one and the same subject- 
 matter and the same injury, although it may 
 pray for two different methods of relief against 
 that injury. Wells v. Bridgeport &c. Co 30 
 Conn. 316. Nor is a bill multifarious because 
 several grounds are set out to show the plain- 
 tiff's right to the relief sought. Cauleyr. I^aw- 
 son, 5 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 132. 
 
 Where the transactions charged are parts of 
 a series of acts, all tending to defeat the plain- 
 tiff's remedy at law, they may properly be 
 united .in the same bill. Randolph v. Daly, 16 
 N. J. Eq. 313, Kennebec & Portland R. R. Co.
 
 * 346 THE BILL. 
 
 purchasers cannot join in exhibiting one bill against the vendoi for a 
 
 specific performance ; for each party's case would be distinct, and there 
 
 must be a distinct bill upon each contract. 4 Upon the same prin- 
 
 * 345 ciple, where the heir * and next of kin of an intestate, who was 
 
 an infant, was joined with his sister, who was the other next of 
 kin, as plaintiff in a bill against the widow, who had taken out admin- 
 istration to the intestate's effects, and had also taken possession of the 
 real estate, as guardian to the infant heir, for an account both of the 
 real and personal estate, a demurrer for multifariousness was allowed 
 on the ground that the interests in the real and personal estate were 
 distinct from each other. 1 But a bill does not become multifarious 
 because all the plaintiffs are not interested to an equal extent ; thus, 
 where a bill was filed by a woman and her children to compel the 
 delivery up of a deed, by which the defendant had made a provision 
 for the woman (with whom he had cohabited), and her children, and 
 which had been executed in pursuance of an agreement, whereby he 
 was bound, besides the execution of the deed, to pay to the woman an 
 annuity for her life, an account of which was also sought by the bill ; 
 and it was objected, upon demurrer, that the bill was multifarious, 
 because, besides seeking the performance of the agreement under which 
 the mother alone was entitled, it joined to that the claim for the deed, 
 in which she was interested jointly with her children ; it was held that, 
 the whole case of the mother being properly the subject of one bill, the 
 suit did not become multifarious because all the plaintiffs were not 
 interested to an equal extent. 2 
 
 And so, where several persons claim under one general right, they 
 may file one bill for the establishment of that right, without incurring 
 
 the risk of a demurrer for multifariousness, although the title of 
 
 * 346 each plaintiff may be distinct ; 3 thus, 4 * where the freehold ten- 
 pay certain judgments against the district, and cancelled, the notes being all made by the plain- 
 to have the judgments declared void, on the tiff, and payable to the same party, is not multi- 
 ground that they were obtained on illegal and farious, for joining as respondents the several 
 void school orders, &c. Each tax-payer desiring persons holding these notes. Garrett r.Missis- 
 the relief sought, must bring his several action, sippi & Ala. R. R. Co. 1 Freeman Ch. 70; see 
 Newcomb v. Horton, 18 Wis. 566. Sears v. Carrier, 4 Allen, 339; Bailee v. Tomp- 
 
 * Hargreaves v. Wright, 10 Hare App. 56; kins,4Sneed (Tenn.), 623; Halsteadtf. Shepard, 
 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 272, and notes: and see Hudson 23 Ala. 558; Martin v. Martin, 13 Miss. 36. 
 ». Ma'ddison, 12 Sim. 416.418 (ante, p. 303. n. i Dunn v. Dunn, 2 Sim. 329; Maud i>. Aek- 
 
 (n), which was the case of a bill by several per- lorn, id. 331; Exeter College r. Rowland, 6 
 
 sons to restrain a nuisance ; see,however, Pollock Mad. 94; see, however, Sanders v. Kelsey, 10 
 
 p. Lester. 11 Hare, 266, where it was held that, Jur. 833, V. C. E.; Innes v. Mitchell, 4 Drew, 
 
 in a similar case, it was no misjoinder, and 57; 3 Jur. N. S. 756; Thomas v. Rees, 1 Jur. 
 
 wns within the provisions of 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, N. S. 197, M. R.; Allen r. Miller, 4 Jones Eq. 
 
 § 49 But where an administrator has collu- (N. C.) 146. 
 
 sively sold separate lots to separate purchasers 2 Knye v. Moore, 1 S. & S. 61, 64. See 
 
 at the same sale, a bill against all the purchasers observations on this case in Dunn v. Dunn, 2 
 
 is not multifarious. Forniquet v. Forstall, 34 Sim. 331; Commissioners of Sewers r. Glasse, 
 
 Miss. 87; see Coleman v. Barnes, 5 Allen, 374; L. R. 7 Ch. 456; L. R. 19 Eq. 134; 1 Seton, 
 
 Tucker t. Tucker, 29 Miss. 350; Gaines v. 216; Fiery v. Emmert, 36 Md. 464. 
 Chew, 2 How. (U. S) 619; Williams v. Neel, 10 3 Story, Eq. PI. § 279 a; Shields r. Thomas, 
 
 Rich. Eq. 338; Bray r. Thatcher, 28 Miss. 129. 18 How. (U. S.) 253. Where a bill in Equity, 
 
 A bill to have certain notes delivered up and by several plaintiffs, to enjoin a nuisance, con- 
 
 * Powell v. The Earl of Powis, 1 Y. & J. 159; see Cornwell v. Lee, 14 Conn. 524. 
 344
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. 
 
 346 
 
 ants of a lordship having rights of common over certain lands, the 
 lord approved parts of the common lands and granted them to other 
 persons, but the tenants prostrated the fences, upon which actions of 
 trespass were brought against them, and they filed a bill in the Court of 
 Exchequer, in the nature of a bill of peace, against the lord and his 
 grantees, to be quieted in the enjoyment of their commonable rights, a 
 general demurrer was overruled, the Court being of opinion, that the 
 objection that the plaintiffs might each have a right to make a separate 
 defence to the actions at Law, was not valid, as there was one general 
 question to be settled, which pervaded the whole. 
 
 The proper way in which to take advantage of multifariousness in a 
 bill is by demurrer ; 1 and it is too late to object to a suit, on that ground, 
 at the hearing. 2 It seems, however, from the report of the judgment of 
 Sir John Leach M. K. in Greenwood v. Churchill , 8 that the objection may 
 be taken by answer, 4 and that though the defendants are precluded from 
 
 tained also a prayer for an account and com- 
 pensation for the damage to each complainant 
 respectively, it was held, that multifarious re- 
 lief could not be granted as prayed for; but 
 that the objection might be obviated by strik- 
 ing out the prayer for an nccount of the damage 
 to the plaintiffs respectively. Murray v. Hay, 
 1 Barb. Ch. 59 ; Brady v. Weeks, 3 Barb. (S. C.) 
 157. So in other cases, where all the plaintiffs 
 are interested in the principal matter stated in 
 the bill, but the bill states a distinct ground 
 for the interference of Equity, which concerns 
 only one of the plaintiffs, if there is no praver 
 for relief touching this latter matter, the bill is 
 not multifarious. Judson v. Toulmin, 9 Ala. 
 662; Davis v. Miller, 4 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 447; 
 ante, p. 334, n. 1. 
 
 1 For form of demurrer, see Vol. III. Under 
 the present English practice, the objection of 
 uniting too many causes of action in one suit is 
 not taken by demurrer, but by application for 
 separate trials. See Cox v. Barker, 3 Ch. D. 
 359; Bagot v. Easton, 7 Ch. D. 1; Howell v. 
 West, \V. N. (1879) 90; Dessilla v. Schunck, 
 W. N. (1880) 96; R. S. C. Ord. XVII. 8, 9; XX. 
 
 2 Ward v. Cooke, 5 Mad. 122; Wynne ». 
 Callander, 1 Russ. 293, 296; Powell v. Cock- 
 erel 1, 4 Hare, 557, 562; Story, Eq. PI. § 284 a; 
 Green v. Richards, 23 N. J. Eq. 32; Ann in v. 
 Annin, 24 id. 184 ; Sanborn r. Adair, 27 id. 425; 
 Cousens v. Rose, I,. R. 12 Eq. 366. Upon 
 demurrer for multifariousness, a portion of the 
 bill asking relief which it is not in the power of 
 the Court to grant may be disregarded, and the 
 residue of the bill, if unobjectionable, sustained. 
 Snavely v. Harkrader, 29 Gratt. 112. It is 
 held, in the following cases, that advantage 
 must be taken of multifariousness by demurrer. 
 Bryan v. Blythe, 4 Blackf. 249: Grove v. Fresh, 
 9 Gill & J. 281; Thurman v. Shelton, 10 Yer- 
 ger, 383 ; I.uckett v. White, 10 Gill & J. 480 ; 
 Bell v. Woodward, 42 N. H. 181, 189; see 
 
 Avery v. Kellogg, 11 Conn. 562; Moreau v. 
 Saffarans, 3 Sneed (Tenn.), 595; Redmond v. 
 Dana, 3 Bosw. (N. Y.) 615. Filing an answer 
 and going into an examination of testimony as 
 to the merits of the whole matter in contro- 
 versy is a waiver of the objection. Gibbs v. 
 Clagett, 2 Gill & J. 14; but see Murdock v. 
 Ratcliff, 7 Ohio, 119; Nelson v. Hill, 5 How. 
 (U. S.) 127; Wellborn v. Tiller, 10 Ala. 305; 
 Veghte v. Raritan Water Power Co. 19 N. J. 
 Eq. 142, 144, 145. In Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. 
 (U S ) 333, 412, it was held, that the objection 
 of multifariousness cannot, as a matter of right, 
 be taken by the parties except on demurrer, 
 plea, or answer; if not so taken, it must be 
 regarded as waived. Wilson v. Lynt, 30 Barb. 
 (X. Y.) 124; Abbot v. Johnson, "32 N. H. 9. 
 A demurrer to a bill for multifariousness goes 
 to the whole bill. Boyd v. Hoyt, 5 Paige, 65; 
 Mcintosh v. Alexander, 16 Ala. 87; White v. 
 White, 5 Gill, 359. To a bill to foreclose a 
 mortgage of land, and to redeem a prior mort- 
 gage of one of the tracts, held by one of the 
 defendants, a plea was filed that the plaintiff's 
 mortgage did not cover the tract which was 
 sought to be redeemed, and the bill was there- 
 fore multifarious. It was held that the facts, 
 if well pleaded and established by the proof, 
 showed the hill to be defective on the ground 
 of multifariousness. Bell v. Woodward, 42 
 N. H. 181. 
 
 a 1 M. & K. 559. When the objection is pre- 
 sented by answer, the Court has discretionary 
 power on the hearing to sustain or disregard the 
 objection. Labadie v. Hewitt, 85 111. 341. 
 
 * Bell v. Woodward, 42 N. H. 181, 189; 
 Abbot v. Johnson, 32 N. H. 9. To sustain a 
 demurrer to a bill for multifariousness against 
 several defendants, it is not necessary that the 
 defendant demurring should so far answer the 
 bill as to deny the ordinary general charge of 
 combination. Emans v. Emans, 14 N J. Eq. 
 
 345
 
 *347 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 raising the objection at the hearing, the Court itself will take the objec- 
 tion, if it thinks fit to do so, with a view to the order and regularity of 
 
 its proceedings. 6 
 * 347 * Great care must be taken, in framing a bill, that it does not 
 contain statements or charges which are scandalous or imperti- 
 nent; 1 for if it does it may be objected to by the defendant. 2 Any 
 proceeding before the Court may be objected to for scandal or imperti- 
 nence, and the scandalous matter expunged, with costs to the party 
 aggrieved. 8 
 
 Scandal consists in the allegation of anything which is unbecoming 
 the dignity of the Court to hear, or is contrary to good manners, or which 
 charges some person with a crime not necessary to be shown in the 
 cause ; 4 to which may be added, that any unnecessary allegation, bearing 
 cruelly upon the moral character of an individual, is also scandalous. 6 
 
 There are many cases, however, in which the words in the record, 
 though apparently very scandalous, are yet, if material to the matter in 
 dispute, and tending to a discovery of the point in question, not con- 
 sidered as scandalous : 6 for a man may be stated on the record to be 
 
 205, 207; see Brookes v. Whitworth, 1 Mad. 86; 
 Salvidge v. Hyde, 5 Mad. 138. 
 
 5 Greenwood v. Churchill, 1 M & K. 557; 
 Ohio v. Ellis, 10 Ohio, 456. Where the defend- 
 ant omits to demur for multifariousness, the 
 Court may, sun sponte, take the objection and 
 dismiss the bill; but the Court should not in- 
 terfere in this way when the trouble and expense 
 by reason of multifariousness might have been 
 saved by a demurrer. Chew v. Bank of Balti- 
 more, 14 Md. 299; Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. U. S. 
 333, 412; Ohio v. Ellis, 10 Ohio, 456; Hickman 
 v. Cooke, 3 Humph. 640; Swayze v. Swayze, 9 
 N. J. Eq. 273; Rockwell r. Morgan, 13 N. J. 
 Eq. 384, 386; Wales v. Newbould, 9 Mich. 45; 
 Einans v. Emans, 14 N. J. Eq. 114. But, as 
 stated in note above, the objection of multi- 
 fariousness, when apparent on the face of the 
 bill, can, in general, be taken only by demurrer; 
 and in such case is waived by not demurring to 
 the bill; but, if it be not apparent upon the bill, 
 it is open to the defendant on his plea, or his 
 answer made expressly for the purpose of tak- 
 ing advantage of it. Bell ». Woodward, 42 
 N. H. 181; Veghte v. Raritan Water Power 
 Co. 19 N. J. Eq. 142, 145, per Chancellor Zabris- 
 kie; see Wilson v. Lynt, 30 Bart.. (N. T.) 124; 
 Avery v. Kellogg, 11 Conn. 562; Cuyler v. 
 Moreiand, 6 Paige, 273; Luckett v. White, 10 
 Gill & J. 480; Thurman v. Shelton, 10 Yerger, 
 383; Buffalow v. Buffalow, 2 Ired. Ch. 113; 
 Grove v. Fresh, 9 Gill & J. 280; Gibbs v. 
 Cloyett, 2 Gill & J. 14; Bryan v. Blythe, 4 
 Blackf. 249; Veghte v. Raritan Water Power 
 Co. 19 N. J. Eq. 142. And where the bill 
 se's forth two distinct and independent grounds 
 of complaint, the objection of multifarious- 
 ness is obviated by the removal of one of 
 
 346 
 
 those grounds by the defendant after the ril- 
 ing of the bill and before answer. Whitney 
 v. Union Railway Co. 11 Gray, 359; Commer- 
 cial Mut. Ins. Co. v. McLoon, 14 Allen, 351 ; 
 McCabe v. Bellows, 1 Allen, 269. 
 
 i See 26th Equity Rule of United States 
 Courts, post, p. 336, note, Ap. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. VIII. 2; XVI. 21; XXXV. 60; 
 R. S. C. Ord. XXVII. 1; Marriott v. Marriott, 
 26 W. R. 416; W. N. (1878) 57. For form of 
 order, see 2 Seton. 1633, No. 6. 
 
 3 Erskine v. Garthshore, 18 Ves. 114; Ex 
 parte Le Heup, id. 221, 223 ; Harris r. Jenkins, 
 22 Ch. D. 481; Doe v. Green, 2 Paige, 349; 
 Soniers v. Torrey, 5 Paige, 64; Powell r. Kane, 
 5 Paige, 265; Camden and Amboy H. R. Co. v. 
 Stewart, 19 N. J. Eq. 343, 346. But the bill 
 cannot be referred for impertinence after an- 
 swer, nor even after submitting to answer, as 
 by praying time. Anon. 2 Ves. 631 ; Ferrar r. 
 Ferrar, 1 Dick. 173; Anon. 5 Ves. 656; Jones 
 v. Spencer. 2 Tenn. Ch. 776. 
 
 4 Wyatt's P. R. 383. 
 
 5 Per Lord Eldon, in Ex parte Simpson, 15 
 Ves. 476; and see Coffin v. Cooper, 6 Ves. 514; 
 Atwool v. Ferrier, W. N. (1866) 276; 14 W. 
 R. 1014, V. C. W.; Christie v. Christie, L. R. 
 8 Ch. 499. Facts not material to the decision 
 are impertinent, and, if reproachful, are scanda- 
 lous. Woods v. Morrell, 1 John. Ch. 103. 
 
 6 Nothing can be scandalous which is rele- 
 vant. Fisher v. Owen, 8 Ch. D. 645, 653; 
 Cleaves v. Morrow, 2 Tenn. Ch. 592; Goodrich 
 v. Rodney, 1 Minn. 195. Thus a statement in 
 an answer, introduced to show the temper with 
 which a bill is filed, and the oppressive course 
 pursued by the plaintiff, is not scandalous or 
 impertinent, inasmuch us it may have an effect
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. * 348 
 
 guilty of a very notorious fraud, or a very scandalous action, as in the 
 case of a brokerage bond, given before marriage, to draw in a 
 poor woman to marry ; or where a * man falsely represents him- * 348 
 self to have a great estate, when in fact he is a bankrupt; or 
 where one man is personated for another ; or in the case of a common 
 cheat, gamester, or sharper about the town : in these, and many other 
 instances, the allegations may appear to be very scandalous, and not fit 
 to remain on the records of the Court ; and yet, perhaps, without having 
 an answer to them, the party may lose his right ; the Court, therefore, 
 always judges whether, though matter be prima facie scandalous, it is 
 or is not of absolute necessity to state it ; and if it materially tends 
 to the point in question, 1 and is become a necessary part of the cause, 
 and material to the defence of either party, the Court never looks upon 
 this to be scandalous. 2 Were it otherwise, it would be laying down a 
 rule that all charges of fraud are scandalous : which would be danger- 
 ous. 8 If, therefore, a bill is filed by a cestui que trust for the purpose of 
 removing a trustee, it is not scandalous or impertinent to challenge 
 every act of the trustee as misconduct, or to impute to him corrupt or 
 improper motives, in the execution of the trust, or to allege that his 
 conduct is the vindictive consequence of some act on the part of the 
 cestui que trust, or of some change in his situation. 4 In such case, how- 
 ever, it would be impertinent, and might be scandalous, to state any 
 circumstance as evidence of general malice or personal hostility, without 
 connecting such circumstance with the acts of the trustee which are 
 complained of: because the fact of the trustee entertaining general mal- 
 ice or hostility against the plaintiff, affords no necessary or legal infer- 
 ence that his conduct in any particular instance results from such 
 motive. 
 
 Under a general charge of immorality, evidence of particular instances 
 of misconduct may be introduced. 5 Where, therefore, such evidence can 
 be made use of under the general charge, the specific instances should 
 not, if it can be avoided, be introduced into the bill ; thus, it is improper, 
 in a suit which is founded upon the want of chastity in a particular 
 individual, as in cases of bills to set aside securities given turbi con- 
 sideratione, to charge particular instances of levity which might affect 
 the character of strangers, and to till the record with private scandal : 
 
 on the costs. Desplaces v. Goris, 1 Edw. Ch. W. N. (1806) 67, V. C. S ; 12 .Tur. N. S. 
 
 350. So it has been held, that an executor, 156, V C. S ; Rubery v. Grant, L. R. 13 Eq. 
 
 who is called to account, is not subject to an 443; Pearse v. Pearse, W. N. (1873) '202; 22 
 
 exception for scandal and impertinence, for W. R. 69 ; Cracknall r. Janson, 11 Ch. D. 1. 
 saying in his answer that some of the property 2 Gilb. For Rom. 207; see Millington v. 
 
 is withheld from him under a forged deed pos- Lorinir, 6 Q- B. D. 190. 
 sessed by the plaintiff ; for his silence might 8 Fenhoulet r. Pa-savant, 2 Ves. Sr. 24. 
 
 prejudice him afterwards. Jolly v. Carter, 2 4 Farl of Portsmouth v. Fellows, 5 Mad. 
 
 Edw. Ch. 209; see Somers v. Torrev, 5 Paige, 450; and see Anon. 1 M. & C 78; Lord St. 
 
 54; Kees v. Evans. Chancery, N. Y. Jan. 25, John ». Lady St. John, 11 Ves. 526, 539; 
 
 1841, cited 1 Smith, Ch, Pr. (2d Am. ed.) 567, Reeves v. Baker, 13 Beav. 436; see Blake v. 
 
 note (6). Albion Life Ass. Co. 24 W. R. 677. 
 
 i Everett v. Prythergch, 12 Sim. 365, 367; s See Moores v. Moores, 16 N. J. Eq. 275, 
 
 B. v. W. 31 Beav. 342; S. C. nom. A. v. B. 277. As to allegations of fraud, see ante, p. 324. 
 8 Jur. N. S. 1141; Edmunds v. Lord Brougham, 
 
 347
 
 * 319 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 because evidence of those particular instances may be given under the 
 
 general charge. 6 
 *349 *From what has been said before, it may be collected that, 
 
 although nothing relevant can be scandalous, matter in a bill 
 may be impertinent without being scandalous. 1 Impertinences are de- 
 scribed by Lord Chief Baron Gilbert to be, " where the records of the 
 Court are stuffed with long recitals, or with long digressions of matter 
 of fact, which are altogether unnecessary and totally immaterial to the 
 matter in question : as where a deed is unnecessarily set forth in hcec 
 verba." 2 («) 
 
 6 Whaley v. Norton, 1 Vera. 483 ; Clarke v. 
 Periam, 2 Atk. 333, 337; Duncan v. Vereker, 
 W. N. (1876) 64. 
 
 i Fenhoulet v. Passavant, 2 Ves. Sr. 24; 
 Goodrich v. Rodney. 1 Minn. 195; Hood 8. 
 Inman, 4 John. Ch. 437 Impertinence is the 
 introduction of any matters into a bill, answer, 
 or other pleading or proceeding in a suit, which 
 are not properly before the Court for decision 
 at any particular stage of the suit. Wood v. 
 Mann, 1 Sumner, 506, 578. The best test to 
 ascertain whether matter be impertinent, is to 
 try whether the subject of the allegation could 
 be put in issue, and would be matter proper to 
 be given in evidence between the parties. 
 Woods v. Morrell, 1 John. Ch. 103; Spaulding 
 r. Farwell, 62 Maine, 319; Mrzena v. Brucker, 
 3 Tenn. Ch. 161. The Court will not, because 
 there are here and there a few unnecessary 
 words, treat them as impertinent. Hawley v. 
 Wolverton, 5 Paige, 522. Del Pont v. Tastet, 
 1 Turn. & R. 486. So in an answer. Gleaves v. 
 
 Morrow, 2 Tenn. Ch. 592. Infra, p. 759. And 
 the introduction of scandalous and impertinent 
 matter in a bill will not justify similar matter 
 in the answer, though introduced to meet the 
 allegations of the bill. Langdon v. Pickering, 
 19 Maine, 214. But see contra, Mclntyre v. 
 Ogden, 24 N.Y. Supr. Ct. 604. A bill may 
 contain matter which is imper inent, without 
 the matter being scandalous; but if, in a tech- 
 nical sense, it is scandalous, it must be imperti- 
 nent. An exception for impertinence will be 
 overruled if the expunging the matter excepted 
 to will leave the residue of the clause which is 
 not covered by the exception, either false or 
 wholly unintelligible. M'Intyre v. Trustees of 
 Union College, 6 Paige, 239. 
 
 2 Gi'b For. Rom. 209; and see Norway v. 
 Rowe, 1 Mer. 135; Lowe v. Williams, 2 S. & S. 
 574; Bally i>. Williams, 1 M'L. & Y. 334; 
 Slack v. Evans, 7 Price, 278, n.; Gompertz v. 
 Best, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 114, 117 ; Byde v. Master- 
 man, C. & P. 265, 271; Att.-Gen. v. Rickards, 
 
 (a) In case of doubt, the presumption is in 
 favor of the pertinency of the matters alleged. 
 Leslie v. Leslie (N. J.), 24 Atl. 1029. But 
 alternative pleading is not necessarily embar- 
 rassing or multifarious, and a party is at liberty 
 to aver facts of a different nature, which will 
 equally support his case and entitle him to the 
 same relief. Fisher v. Moog, 39 Fed. Rep. 
 665, 668; Story, Eq. PI. § 254; Proskauer v. 
 People's S. Bank, 77 Ala. 257; Rapier v. Gulf 
 City Paper Co. 69 Ala. 476 ; see Be Morgan, 
 35 Ch. D. 492. The test of impertinent matter 
 is whether it can be put in issue, and is admis- 
 sible in evidence. See Woods v. Morrell, 1 
 John. Ch. 103; Miller v. Buchanan, 5 Fed. 
 Rep. 366; Wilkinson v. Dodd, 42 N. J. Eq. 
 234; 40 id. 123; Dodd v. Wilkinson, 42 id. 
 647; 41 id. 566; Kirkpatrick v. Corning, 40 id. 
 241 ; 39 id 22; Christie v. Christie, L. R. 8 Ch. 
 503. Pleadings are not necessarily embarrass- 
 ing because inconsistent. Be Morgan, 35 Ch. 
 D. 492; see Tomkinson r. Southeastern Ry. 57 
 L. T. N. S. 358; Brooking v. Maudslay, 6 Asp. 
 
 348 
 
 M. C 13. Successive acts of fraud averred in 
 the bill, if dependent upon each other, and 
 admissible in evidence, will not be stricken out 
 as irrelevant. Kirkpatrick v. Corning, supra. 
 In general, a pleader is at liberty to set forth 
 additional cumulative facts which do not vary 
 but strengthen and intensify the grounds of 
 relief to which he has already pleaded the 
 facts. Noble i\ Moses. 81 Ala. 530; Tippin v. 
 Coleman, 59 Miss. 641 ; see Merrill v. Merrill, 
 53 Wis. 522. Allegations of the defendant's 
 usual course of conduct may be stricken out, 
 when thev are merely evidence. Blake v 
 Albion Life Ass. Society, 35 L. T. N. S. 269. 
 Nor do merely redundant averments make the 
 bill multifarious. Morris v. Morris, 65 Ala. 
 443; Sample v. Sample, 34 Kansas, 73. Objec- 
 tions to the bill for immateriality and lack of 
 pertinency are to be made by exception, and 
 not by demurrer. Stirrat v. Excelsior Manuf. 
 Co. 44 Fed Rep. 142; Sronemetz P. M. Co. r. 
 Brown F. M. Co. 46 id. 72; Wells v. Oregon 
 Ry. & Nav. Co. 15 id.561 ; 8 Sawyer, 600.
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. 
 
 *350 
 
 It is to be observed that neither scandal nor impertinence, however 
 gross it may be, is a ground of demurrer ; it being a maxim of 
 pleading that utile per Inutile non vitiatur. 3 Where, however, * there * 350 
 is scandal in a bill, the defendant is entitled to have the record 
 purified by expunging the scandalous matter ; and it was formerly the 
 same with reference to impertinent matter. 1 In order that this might 
 be done, the course formerly was for the defendant to move the Court 
 for an order to have the bill referred to a Master to report whether it 
 was scandalous or impertinent. This reference was obtained of course, 
 and being general, without specifying the particular passages objected 
 to, 2 obviously precluded the party whose pleading was alleged to be 
 scandalous and impertinent, from exercising any judgment upon the 
 subject, much less from submitting to have the objectionable passages 
 expunged. To remedy this it was provided, by a General Order of the 
 Court, that no order should be made for referring any pleading, or 
 other matter for scandal or impertinence, uuless exceptions were taken 
 in writing to the particular passages complained of. 8 
 
 6 Bear. 444, 449; 1 Phil. 383, 386; S. C. iwm. 
 Rickards v. Att.-Gen. 12 CI. & F. 30; Allfrey 
 v. Allfrey, 14 Beav. 235; Goodrich v. Rodney, 
 1 Minn. 195; Camden and Amboy R. R. Co. v. 
 Stewart, 19 N. J. Eq. 343. All matters not 
 material to the suit, or if material which are 
 not in issue, or which, if both material and in 
 issue, are set forth with great and unnecessary 
 prolixity, constitute impertinence. A bill in 
 Chancery, like a declaration at Law, should 
 confine its statements to such facts as are 
 proper to show that the plaintiff is entitled to 
 relief, and which, if proved, will entitle him to 
 relief; and should not set out the evidence, 
 whether oral or written, by which the facts are 
 to be proved. Camden and Amboy R. R. Co. 
 v. Stewart, 19 N. J. Eq. 343, 346; 21 id. 
 484, 491. "A prolix setting forth of pertinent 
 matter is itself impertinent." Per Lord Eldon 
 in Slack v. Evans, 1 Price, 278, note. In the 
 U. S. Courts it is required that every bill shall 
 be expressed in as brief and succinct terms as 
 it reasonably can be, and shall contain no un- 
 necessary recitals of deeds, documents, con- 
 tracts, or other instruments, in luec verba, or 
 any other impertinent matter, or any scandal- 
 ous matter not relevant to the suit. If it does, 
 it may on exceptions be referred to a Master 
 by any Judge of the Court for impertinence or 
 scandal, and if so found by him, the matter 
 shall be expunged at the expense of the plain- 
 tiff, anil he shall pay to the defendant all his 
 costs in the suit up to that time, unless the 
 Court or a Judge thereof shall otherwise order. 
 If the Master shall report that the bill is not 
 scandalous or impertinent, the defendant shall 
 be entitled to all costs occasioned by the refer- 
 ence. Equity Rule, 26. 
 
 In New Hampshire "every bill and answer 
 
 shall be expressed as concisely as may be, and 
 no deed, will, agreement, or other writing shall 
 be set forth at length, or annexed to any bill 
 or answer, but so much of either as is material, 
 and no more, shall be inserted." Rule of Chan- 
 cery 4, 38 N. H. 606. " The idle repetitions, 
 ' 3'our orator further complains,' 'your orator 
 further showeth to your Honors,' and the like, 
 in bills; and 'this defendant, further answer- 
 ing, saith,' and the like, in answers, shall be 
 omitted. Where the names of parties are 
 omitted, they shall be referred to as plaintiffs 
 or defendants." Rule of Chancery of N. H. 7. 
 
 3 See Broom's Maxims, 602; Story, Eq. PL 
 §269. 
 
 i See R. S. C. Ord. XXVII. 1, and Costs, 
 Sched., r. 18; Marsh v. Mayor of Pontefract, 
 W. N. (1876) 7; Herring v. Bischoffsheim, id. 
 77; Cashin v. Cradock, 3 Ch. D. 376; Davy v. 
 Garrett, 7 Ch. D. 473. 
 
 2 Harr. by Newl. 43; 1 T. & V. 519. 
 
 3 38th Ord. May, 1845; Sand. Ord. 998, 
 afterwards the 23d Ord., Nov., 1850, was sub- 
 stituted. 12 Beav. xxvii. The ground of this 
 Older is substantially covered by the 27th 
 Equity Rule of the United States Courts. Ex- 
 ceptions for scandal or impertinence must point 
 out the exceptional matter with sufficient cer- 
 tainty to enable the adverse party and the offi- 
 cers of the Court to ascertain what particular 
 parts of the pleading or proceeding are to be 
 stricken out, if the exceptions are allowed. 
 Whitmarsh v. Campbell, 1 Paige, 645: Frank- 
 lin 0. Keeler, 4 Paige, 382; see also German V. 
 Machin, 6 Paige, 288. In Maine, exceptions 
 for scandal and impertinence may be taken 
 within twenty days after service of the bill. 
 Chancery Rule 5. 
 
 349
 
 * 351 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 The practice of excepting to bills, answers, and other proceedings 
 for impertinence has been abolished; 4 the Court may, however, direct 
 the costs occasioned by any impertinent matter introduced into any 
 proceeding to be paid by the party introducing the same, upon appli- 
 cation being made to the Court for that purpose ; 5 such application to 
 be made at the time when the Court disposes of the costs of the cause 
 or matter, and not at any other time. 6 The Court may also, without 
 any application being made, declare that any pleading, petition, or affi- 
 davit, is improper or of unnecessary length, or may direct the taxing 
 master to distinguish what part thereof is improper, or of unnecessary 
 length ; 7 and in like manner the Judge may disallow impertinent 
 * 351 or unnecessary matter in proceedings in Chambers. 8 In * the first 
 case, the Court may deal with the costs as may be just; 1 and in 
 the second, the costs occasioned in respect of the matter so disallowed to 
 the other party are to be paid by the party on whose behalf the proceed- 
 ing was brought in, and his own costs in respect thereof disallowed. 2 
 Exceptions may still be taken to pleadings, and other matters depending 
 before the Court, for scandal ; they must be in writing, and signed by 
 counsel, 3 and describe the particular passages alleged to be scandalous. 4 
 It appears to have been formerly the opinion that, in cases of scandal, 
 " the Court itself was concerned to keep its records clean, and without 
 dirt or scandal appearing thereou." 6 Any party to the cause may file 
 exceptions for scandal ; 6 hence a defendant not served with the bill may 
 appear gratis, and file exceptions for scandal ; 7 and one defendant may 
 file exceptions for scandal in a co-defendant's answer. 8 
 
 4 By the settled practice in New Jersey, 
 exceptions will lie for impertinence in a bill, 
 answer, or other pleading, and in interroga- 
 tories, depositions, or affidavits in any suit. 
 Camden and Amboy R. R- Co. v. Stewart, 19 
 N. J. Eq. 343; 21 id. 484. But the rule to 
 file exceptions and refer them to a Master is 
 for the relief of the Court, and they may be 
 heard at his option directly by the Chancellor. 
 Ibid. So, in Tennessee, exceptions lie for im- 
 pertinence in pleadings and evidence. Code, 
 § 4401 ; Johnson v. Tucker, 2 Tenn. Ch. 244. 
 Objections to evidence for impertinence alone 
 are usually ordered to stand over until the 
 hearing. White v. Fussell, 19 Ves. 113; Os- 
 mond v. Tindall, Jac. 625; Middlemas v. Wil- 
 son, L. R. 10 Ch. 230; Jones v. Spencer, 2 
 Tenn. Ch. 776. 
 
 5 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 17; see Dufour v. 
 Sigell, 4 De G. M. & G. 520, 526. 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. XL. 11. 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. XL. 9. As to this order, see 
 Moore v. Smith, 14 Beav. 396; Mayor of Ber- 
 wick t\ Murray, 7 De G. M. & G. 497; 3 Jur. 
 N. S. 1, 5; Re Farrington, 33 Beav. 346; and 
 for form of Order thereunder, see Seton, 89, 
 No. 17. 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. XL. 10. 
 
 i Cons. Ord. XL. 9. As to this order, see 
 Moore v. Smith. 14 Beav. 396; Mayor of Ber- 
 
 350 
 
 wick v. Murray. 7 De G. M. & G. 497; 3 Jur. 
 N. S. 1, 5. For form of order thereunder, see 
 Seton. 89. No. 17. See now R. S. C. 1883. Ord. 
 XIX. 2, 27; Re Wormsley, W. N. (1878) 193. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XL. 10. 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. XVI. 2 ; and see Ord.VIII. 1, 2. 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. XVI. 2. For form of excep- 
 tions, see Vol. III. 
 
 5 2 P. Wms. 312, Arg.; Campbell v. Taul, 
 3 Yerg. 564. Lord Eldon said that, with refer- 
 ence to the subject of scandal in proceedings, 
 either in causes or in bankruptcy, he did not 
 think that any application by any person was 
 necessary ; and that the Court ought to take 
 care that, either in a suit or in a proceeding in 
 bankruptcy, allegations bearing cruelly upon 
 the moral character of individuals, and not 
 reievant to the subject, should not be put upon 
 the record. Ex parte Simpson, 15 Ves. 476, 
 477; Cracknall v. Janson,. 11 Ch. D. 1; see 
 Finney v. Godfrey, W. N. (1869) 252 ; Rouls- 
 ton v. Ralston, 13 Phila. 175. As to scandal in 
 a proceeding under the summary jurisdiction, 
 see Re Gornall, 1 Beav. 226; Be Wills, 9 Jur. 
 N. S. 1225; 12 W. R. 97. 
 
 6 Coffin v. Cooper, 6 Ves. 514; 13 & 14 Vic. 
 c. 35, § 27; Cons. Ord. XVI. 2. 
 
 7 Fell v. Christ's College, Cambridge, 2 Bro. 
 C. C. 279. 
 
 8 Coffin v. Cooper, 6 Ves. 514.
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. 
 
 352 
 
 There was formerly some doubt whether, under any circumstances, 
 a person not a party to the cause could except to any record for 
 scandal. 9 
 
 * It has been decided, under the former practice, that in the case * 352 
 of exceptions for impertinence, an exception cannot be partially 
 allowed ; and therefore, if part of an exception be good, and the rest 
 bad, the whole exception must be overruled. 1 It has not, it is believed, 
 ever been so held as to exceptions for scandal; and if the question 
 should arise, it is conceived that the practice with reference to excep- 
 tions for impertinence would not be followed. 
 
 Exceptions must be written on paper of the same description and size 
 as that on which bills are printed, 2 and be indorsed with the name and 
 place of business of the solicitor and of his agent, if any, 8 or with the 
 name and place of residence of the party acting in person, 4 by whom 
 they are filed. 5 The exceptions must be filed at the Record and Writ 
 Clerks' Office, 6 and notice of the filing thereof be given, on the same day, 
 to the solicitor for the opposite party, or to the party himself if he acts 
 in person ; 7 but if the notice is not given at the proper time, the party 
 will be relieved from the irregularity on payment of costs. 8 No time is 
 limited within which exceptions for scandal must be filed. The party 
 whose pleading is excepted to takes an office copy of the exceptions. 9 
 
 9 Ibid.: Anon. 4 Mad. 252; see 5 Beav. 86. 
 In Willi mis v. Douglas, 5 Beav. 82, 85; 6 Jur. 
 37'J, the authorities upon the subject were 
 brought before Lord Langdale M. H., who had 
 to decide upon the question whether a person 
 not being a party to the cause, who alleged that 
 the bill contained matter at the same time im- 
 pertinent as between the parties and scandalous 
 as against him, was, of course, and without 
 leave, entitled to file exceptions for scandal with 
 a view to have the scandalous and impertinent 
 matter expunged. (See Story, Eq. PI. § 270.) 
 His Lordship said : "There is but little author- 
 ity on the subject; but from the terms in which 
 Lord Macon's order is expressed, from the dict'i 
 of Lord Eldon, expressed in a manner to ^how 
 that he had considered the subject, and from 
 the apparent necessity of the case, there being, 
 as I conceive, no other way of doing effectual 
 justice to an injured party, it would seem that 
 the Court must have jurisdiction and authority 
 to expunge scandal from t he record, at the in- 
 stance of a person who may not be a party to 
 the cause." His Lordship, however, thought 
 that a person not a party to the record could 
 not adopt this proceeding without special leave; 
 and he therefore discharged the order then in 
 question, on the ground of its having been 
 obtained ex parte. From this case it would 
 appear that a stranger to the suit can, if the 
 circumstances justify it, ob'ain the leave of the 
 Court to except to a record for scandal. 
 
 1 Wagstaff v. Bryan, 1 R. & M. 30; Tench p. 
 Cheese, 1 Beav 571, 575, and reporter's note, 
 
 ibid.; Byde v. Masterman, C. & P. 205, 272 ; 5 
 Jur. 643; Desplaces v. Goris, 1 Edw. Ch. 353. 
 The Court, in cases of impertinence, ought, be- 
 fore expunging the matter alleged to be imperti- 
 nent, to be especially clear that it is such as 
 ought to be struck out of the record, for the 
 reason that the error on one side is irremediable, 
 on the i-ther not. See Davis v. Cripps, 2 Y. & 
 C. (N. R.) 443; Story, Eq. PI. § 267 ; Johnson 
 v. Tucker, 2 Tenn. Ch. 344. 
 
 2 Ord. March 6, 1860, r. 16. The paper 
 must be cream-wove, machine-drawn, foolscap, 
 folio paper, 19 lbs. per mill ream, and have an 
 inner margin about three quarters of an inch 
 wide, and an outer margin about two inches 
 and a half wide. Cons. Ord. IX. 3. 
 
 3 Cons, Ord. III. 2. 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. III. 5. 
 
 5 For form, see Vol. III. 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. XVI. 3. No fee is payable on 
 filing. 
 
 7 Cons. Ord. XVI. 3. The notice must be 
 served before seven o'clock in the evening, ex- 
 cept on Saturday, when it must be served be- 
 fore two in the afternoon ; or the service will be 
 deemed to have been made on the following 
 day, or on Monday, as the case may be. Cons. 
 Ord. XXXVII. 2. For form of notice, see 
 Vol. HI. 
 
 8 Bradstock v. Whatley, 6 Beav. 61 : Lowe 
 v. Williams, 12 Beav. 482; and see Lord Suf- 
 field v. Bond, 10 Beav. 146, 153. 
 
 9 Cons Ord. XXXVI. 1. 
 
 351
 
 * 353 THE BILL. 
 
 Exceptions for scandal must be set down for hearing before the Court, 10 
 within six days after the filing thereof, exclusive of vacations ; u 
 
 * 353 otherwise they will be considered as abandoned, and * the person 
 
 by whom such exceptions were filed must pay to the opposite 
 party such costs as may have been incurred by such party, in respect of 
 such exceptions. 1 It is presumed that, in such case, by analogy to the 
 practice where a demurrer or plea, though filed, is not set down for 
 argument, 2 the opposite party may obtain an order of course, on motion, 
 or on petition at the Rolls, for the taxation of the costs of the exceptions, 
 and for payment thereof by the excepting party. 
 
 The exceptions must be set down to be heard before the Judge to 
 whose Court the cause is attached. 8 The Registrar's Clerk, at the order 
 of course seat, will set down the exceptions, on production to him by the 
 solicitor of the party filing them of the Record and Writ Clerks' certifi- 
 cate of the filing of the exceptions, indorsed by the solicitor with a 
 request for that purpose. 4 The exceptions will then be put in the paper 
 of such Judge, for hearing on an early day, and on the day on which the 
 exceptions are so set down, notice thereof must be served on the party 
 whose pleading or other matter is excepted to ; otherwise the exceptions 
 will be deemed not set down. 6 
 
 Exceptions will not be allowed to stand over to an indefinite period. 6 
 
 As this is the. first occasion upon which it has been necessary to refer 
 to the time allowed in procedure, it will be convenient to state here some 
 general rules concerning the manner in which such periods are to be 
 computed. 
 
 Where any limited time, from or after any date or event, is appointed 
 or allowed for doing any act or taking any proceeding, and such time is 
 not limited by hours, the computation of such limited time is not to 
 include the day of such date, or of the happening of such event, but is to 
 commence at the beginning of the next following day ; and the act or 
 proceeding is to be done or taken at the latest on the last day of such 
 limited time, according to such computation. 7 
 
 Where the time for doing any act or taking any proceeding is limited 
 by months, not expressed to be calendar months, such time is to be 
 computed by lunar months of twenty-eight days each. 8 
 
 1° 13 & 14 Vic. c. 35, § 27. March, 1860, rr. 1, 5. For form of request, see 
 
 11 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 13 (2). Vol. III. 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. XVI. 20. Similar provisions 5 Cons. Ord. XVI. 10. The notice must be 
 are made for securing an earlv decision of ex- given as directed by Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 2; 
 ceptions for scandal or impertinence, in the ante, p. 352, n. 7. For form of notice, see 
 27th Equity Rule of the U. S. Courts. It Vol. III. 
 
 seems that' the partv whose pleading is ex- 6 Cons. Ord. XXI. 13. For further nifor- 
 
 cepted to may, if he desires it, obtain an order mation as to exceptions, see post, Chap. XVII. 
 
 of course to set the exceptions down before the § 4, Exceptions to Answers. 
 
 expiration of the six davs. Coyle v. Alleyne, 7 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 9. When any mat- 
 
 14 Beav. 171. * er °* proceeding or practice is required by 
 
 2 See Cons. Ord. XIV. 14, 15, 17; Seton, statute or rule of Court to be within a certain 
 1257; and post, Chap. XIV. § 4, Demurrers; number of days, the first day, or terminus a 
 and Chap. XV.' § 4. Pleas. For forms of mo- quo, is excluded. Thorne v. Mosher, 20 N. J. 
 tion paper and petition, see Vol. III. Eq. 257. And see Jones v. Planters' Bank, 5 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. VI. 4. Humph. 619; Elder v. Bradley, 2 Sneed, 251. 
 
 * Cons. Ord. XVI. 10; Reg. Regul., 15 « Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 10. 
 
 352
 
 MATTER OF THE BILL. 
 
 *354 
 
 * Where the time for doing any act or taking any proceeding * 354 
 expires on a Sunday or other day on which the offices are closed, 
 and by reason thereof such act or proceeding cannot be done or taken 
 on that day, such act or proceeding is, as far as regards the time of 
 doing or taking the same, to be held to be duly done or taken, if done 
 or taken on the day on which the offices shall next open ; * and where 
 any time limited is less than six days, Sundays and other days on which 
 the offices are closed (except Monday and Tuesday in Easter week) are 
 not to be reckoned. 2 
 
 Exceptions for scandal may be taken at any stage of the proceedings. 8 (a) 
 
 i Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 12. Feuchtwanger 
 v. McCool, 29 N. J. Eq. 151. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 11. 
 
 3 Ellison o. Burgess, 2 P. Wms. 312, n.; 
 Anon. 5 Ves. 656; Fenhoulet v. Passavant, 2 
 Ves. Sr. 24; Anon. id. 631; Barnes v. Saxby, 
 3 Swanst. 232, n.; Everett v. Prythergch, 12 
 Sim. 363; Booth v. Smith, 5 Sim. 639; Anon. 
 5 Sumner's Ves. 656, and cases cited in note. 
 In Lad}- Abergavenny v. Lady Abergavenny, 
 2 P. Wms. 311 (see also Jones v. Langham, 
 
 (a) Useless or impertinent words employed 
 here and there in a pleading may be remedied in 
 the adjustment of costs. United States v. Mc- 
 Laughlin, 24 Fed. Rep. 823. But if the entire suit 
 is improper, frivolous, or vexatious, the Court 
 has an inherent jurisdiction to stay it, as well 
 as to strike out any defence or other pleadings, 
 or the answers to inerrogatories, which have 
 like faults and are an abuse of its procedure. 
 Reichel v. Magrath, 14 App. Cas. 665 ; Metro- 
 politan Bank v. Pooley, 10 id. 210; Lyell v. 
 Kennedy, 33 W. R. 44; 8 App. Cas. 217; Law- 
 ranie v. Norreys, 15 App. Cas. 210; 39 Ch. 
 D. 213; Watson v. Rodwell, 3 Ch. D. 380; 
 Gude r. Mumford, 2 Y. & Col. 445, 448; Hag- 
 gard v. Pelicier Freres, [1892] A. C. 61; Adams 
 P.Adams, [18!»2] 1 Ch. 369; Pearse f. Pearse, 
 29 L. T. N. S. 453; Kellaway v. Bury, 66 L. T. 
 599; Lumb i>. Beaumont, 49 L. T.772; Wil- 
 mott v. Freehold H. P. Co (No. 1), 51 L. T. 
 552; Boddingtonw. Rees, 52 L. T. 209. Fendall 
 v. O'Connell (No. 1), id. 538: Brooking v. 
 Maudslay, 55 L. T. 343 ; Jenkins v. Rees, 33 
 W. R. 929; Batthyany v. Walford, 32 W. R. 
 379; Blair v. Cordner, 36 W. R. 64; William- 
 son v M'Clintock, 30 L. R. Ir. 436; Beatty v. 
 Leacy, 16 id. 132; Kenmare v. Casey, 12 id. 
 374; Bourketf. Nicol, id. 415; Wheeler v. United 
 Kingdom Tel. Co. 13 Q. B. I). 597; Davis v. 
 James, 26 Ch. D. 778 ; Hill v. Hart-Davis, id. 
 470; Shafto v. Bolchow, 34 Ch. D. 725; Mutrie 
 v. Binney, 35 Ch. I). 614; Knowles v. Roberts, 
 38 Ch. D. 263; Mittens v. Foreman, 58 L. J. 
 Q. B. 40 ; Allhusen v. Labouchere, 3 Q. B. D. 
 654; Htinnin^s v. Williamson, 10 id. 459; 
 Willis v. Beatichamp, IIP. D. 59; Oregonian 
 
 VOL. I. — 23 
 
 Bunb. 53), Lord King discharged an order 
 obtained for referring a bill for scandal after 
 answer; intimating that it should be observed 
 as a rule, for the future, not to refer a bill for 
 scandal after the defendant had submitted to 
 answer it; but his Lordship's determination 
 to alter the old practice of the Court in this 
 respect does not appear to have been adhered 
 to. Anon. 2 Ves. Sr. 631; Anon. 5 Ves. 656 ; 
 see also Woodward v. Astley, Bunb. 304; 
 Everett i>. Prythergch, 12 Sim. 363. 
 
 Ry. Co. v. Oregon Ry. &Nav. Co. 22 Fed. Rep. 
 245 ; Ecaubert v. Appeton, 47 Fed. Rep. 893 ; 
 Wehle v. Loewy, 21 N. Y. S. 1027 ; 1 Seton on 
 Judgments (5th ed.), 33. This includes, as an 
 abuse of the Court's process, proceedings in a 
 suit instituted without authority in a third 
 party's name. London & Blackwall Ry. v. 
 Cross, 31 Ch. D. 354. Entries even in a bill of 
 costs, which contain scandalous matter, may be 
 struck out. Rt Miller, 54 L. J. Ch. 205. Plead- 
 ings which are clearly trifling are a contempt 
 of Court. Lord u. Thornton, 2 Bulst. 67; Coxe 
 v. Phillips, Lee, temp. Hardwicke, 237; People 
 v. Berry, 17 Col. 322. Any action may be 
 stayed as vexatious when it is apparent that no 
 relief can be had at the trial. Barrett v. Day, 
 43 Ch. D. 435; see Republic of Peru v. Peru- 
 vian Guano Co. 36 Ch. D. 489. In Grepe r. 
 Loam, 37 Ch. D. 168, after repeated applica- 
 tions to impeach a judgment, the Court of 
 Appeal by order prohibited any further applica- 
 tion without leave of Court. As to taxing the 
 costs of vexatious or unnecessary proceedings, 
 see Garrard v. Edge, 44 Ch. D. 224. Equity has 
 jurisdiction, if payment of costs is vexatiouslv 
 withheld, to stay proceedings until such costs 
 are paid. lie Wickham, 35 Ch. D. 272. The 
 same principles are in general applied under 
 the Code Procedure. Wayland v. Tysen, 45 
 N. Y. 281; Strong v. Sproul, 53 N. Y. 497; 
 Rogers v. Vosburgh, 87 N. Y. 228; Warner ». 
 United States Land Co. 53 Hun, 312; Roomer?. 
 Nicholson, 8 Abb. Pr. N. S. 343; Butterfleld v. 
 Maoomber, 22 How. Pr. 150; Patrick v. Mc- 
 Manus, 4 Col. 65; Walpolef. Cooper, 7 Blackf. 
 100 ; Clark v. Jeffersonville &c. R. Co. 44 Ind. 
 353
 
 355 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 Upon the production of an order allowing exceptions for scandal, it is 
 the duty of the officer, having the custody or charge of the pleading or 
 other matter, to expunge such parts thereof as the Court has held to 
 be scandalous ; 4 and when he has so done, he usually writes a memo- 
 randum in the margin of the document, opposite the expunged pas- 
 sages, to the effect that the same have been expunged pursuant to 
 order, adding its date, and signs the memorandum. If an office copy 
 of the document has been taken at the Record and Writ Clerks' 
 Office, it will be amended, without fee, on being left there for that 
 purpose. 5 
 
 Where a bill had been held scandalous, the Court refused to hear 
 a motion for an injunction until the scandalous matter had been 
 expunged. 6 
 
 Where scandalous matter has been introduced into any proceedings 
 at Chambers, any party wishing to complain of it should take out a 
 summons for the Judge to examine such matter ; and, if scandalous, 
 
 the Judge may cause it to be expunged. 7 
 * 355 * As a general rule, the costs occasioned by scandalous matter, 
 and of the application to have it expunged, follow the decision, 
 but they should be asked for when the application is heard. 1 
 
 * Cons. Ord. XVI. 21. No fee is payable. 
 For cases where scandalous or irrelevant docu- 
 ments have been ordered to be taken off the 
 file, see, by consent, Tremaine v. Tremaine, 
 1 Vera. 189; Jewin v. Taylor, 6 Beav. 120; 
 Walton v. Broadbent, 3 Hare, 33-1; Clifton v. 
 Bentall, 9 Beav. 105; Makepeace v. Komieux, 
 8 W. R. 687, V. C. K.; and without consent, 
 Goddard v. Parr. 24 L. J. Ch. 783; 3 \V. R. 
 633, V. C K.; Kernick v Keinick, 12 W. R. 
 335, V. C. W.; and for costs in such cases, 
 see Ex parte Simpson, 15 Ves. 476. 
 
 248; Lowe v. Thompson, 86 Ind. 503; Martin 
 v. Weil, 8 Wis. 220; Cottrill v. Cramer, 40 Wis. 
 555 ; Crane Bros. Manuf. Co. v. Morse, 49 Wis. 
 368; State v. St. Louis &c. Ry. Co. 29 Mo. 
 App. 301. An allegation, upon information and 
 belief, of matters which should be averred pos- 
 itively, is evasive and frivolous. Milwaukee v. 
 Sullivan, 25 Wis. 666. 
 
 An answer which denies lack of knowledge 
 and information respecting matters of which 
 the defendant has knowledge or can inform 
 himself, as where they appear of record, may 
 be stricken out as frivolous. Lawrence v. Derby, 
 24 How. Pr. 133; Bennett v. Leeds Manuf. 
 Co. 110 N. Y. 150; Webb v. Foster, 45 N. Y. 
 Snpr. Ct. 311; Hathaway r. Baldwin, 17 Wis. 
 616; see People v. McCumber (18 N. Y. 315), 
 72 Am. Dec. 315 and 515. In New Jerse3 T , the 
 general issue, though accompanied by the stat- 
 utory affidavit, may be stricken out as a sham 
 plea! Coykendall r. Robinson, 39 N. J. L. 98. 
 But this will not be done when a prima facie 
 
 354 
 
 5 Braithwaite's Pr. 132. 
 
 6 Davenport v. Davenport, 6 Mad. 251 ; and 
 seeCoyle v. Alleyne, 14 Beav. 171. 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. XXXV. 60. For form of sum- 
 mons, see Vol. III. 
 
 l Muscott v. Halhed, 4 Bro. C. C. 222; Jodd- 
 rell v. Joddrell, 12 Beav. 216. See Hewitson 
 v. Sherwin, L. R. 10 Eq. 53; Kevan r. Craw- 
 ford, 6 Ch. D. 29. The costs are taxed as 
 between party and party. Edmunds v. Lord 
 Brougham, W. N. (1866) 93, V. C. S. 
 
 defence is shown. Clark v. Turnbull, 47 N. J. 
 L. 265. In New York the remedy in such case 
 is by demurrer to the answer. Hubbard v. 
 Gorham, 38 Hun, 162 ; Whitehall Lumber Co. 
 v. Edmans, 4 N. Y. Sup. 721. In that State 
 the denials of a verified answer cannot be 
 stricken out as sham. Fellows v. Muller, 87 
 N. Y. Supr. Ct. 137; Barnes v. West, 16 Hun, 
 68. Nor can the sufficiency of a counter-claim 
 set up in an answer be tried by a summary 
 motion to strike out as irrelevant. Walter 
 v. Fowler, 85 N. Y. 621. Allegations in an 
 answer, giving explanations of or reasons for 
 the facts as alleged by the plaintiff, are not 
 necessarily irrelevant, even though such rea- 
 sons are bad. Tomkinson v. South Eastern 
 Ry. Co. 57 L. T. 358. Matter which requires 
 elaborate argument to show its irrelevancy, 
 should be allowed to stand, so that the evidence 
 may be received or rejected by the trial Court, 
 as it deems best. Gaylord v. Beardsley, 54 N. 
 Y. State Rep. 234.
 
 FORM OP THE BILL. * 356 
 
 Section V. — The Form of the Bill. 
 
 Having thus endeavored to point out the matter of which a bill in 
 Equity ought to consist, it remains to direct the reader's attention to 
 the form. 
 
 The form of an original bill commonly used, previously to the late 
 Act, according to the analysis of Lord Redesdale, 2 consisted of nine 
 parts : some of which, however, were not essential, and might be used 
 or not at the discretion of the person who prepared it. 3 These nine 
 parts were as follows : — 
 
 1. The address to the person or persons holding the Great Seal. 
 
 2. The names and addresses of the parties complainant. 
 
 3. The statement of the plaintiff's case, commonly called the stating 
 part. 
 
 4. The charge that the defendant unlawfully confederated with others 
 to deprive the plaintiff of his right. 
 
 5. The allegation that the defendants intend to set up a particular 
 sort of defence, the reply to which the plaintiff anticipates by alleging 
 certain facts which will defeat such defence. This was usually termed 
 the charging part, from the circumstance that the plaintiff's allegations 
 were usually introduced by way of charge, instead of statement. 
 
 6. The statement that the plaintiff has no remedy without the 
 assistance of a Court of Equity : which was termed the averment of 
 jurisdiction. 
 
 7. The interrogating part, in which the stating and charging part 
 were converted into interrogatories, for the purpose of eliciting from 
 the defendant a circumstantial discovery, upon oath, of the truth or 
 falsehood of the matters stated and charged. 
 
 8. The prayer of relief adapted to the circumstances of the case. 
 
 9. The prayer that process might issue, requiring the defendant 
 
 to appear and answer the bill ; to which sometimes was * added * 356 
 a prayer for a provisional writ, such as an injunction or a ne exeat 
 regno, for the purpose of restraining some proceedings on the part of 
 the defendant, or of preventing his going out of the jurisdiction till he 
 had answered the bill. And as against some of the defendants, this 
 part sometimes contained a prayer that such parties might, upon being 
 served with a copy of the bill, be bound by all the proceedings in the 
 cause. 1 
 
 The form of a bill has, however, been materially altered by the 
 Chancery Amendment Act of 1852, by which, as we have seen, 2 it is 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 42. The character of a pleading Ins. Co. 1 Tenn. Ch. 312; Arnold v. Movers, 
 
 is determined by the averments it contains, 1 Lea, 308. 
 
 and not by the name given it, and therefore 8 Ld. Red. 47. 
 
 a paper styled a "supplemental petition" may i This is still so. Cons. Ord. X. 11 ; see 
 
 be treated as an amended petition. Cincinnati pott, Chap. VII. § 1, Service of a Copy of the 
 
 v. Cameron, 8 Cent. L. J. 17, Sup. Com. Court Bill on Formal Defendants. 
 
 of Ohio; see also Northman v. Liverpool &c. 2 Ante, p. 313. 
 
 355
 
 357 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 enacted that every bill " should contain, as concisely as may be, a nar- 
 rative of the material facts, matters, and circumstances, on which the 
 plaintiff relies : such narrative being divided into paragraphs, numbered 
 consecutively : and each paragraph containing, as nearly as may be, a 
 separate and distinct statement or allegation, 8 and shall pray specifically 
 for the relief which the plaintiff may conceive himself entitled to, and 
 also for general relief." 4 
 
 A bill, as ordinarily framed, may now be said to consist of the first, 
 second, third, and eighth parts above enumerated only ; the charging 
 part is, indeed, still occasionally inserted, but it is rather as part of the 
 narrative than as a separate part, and the allegations are, by most 
 draftsmen, introduced as statements, and not by way of charge ; so that 
 practically this part may now be considered as included in the stating 
 part. 5 The averment of jurisdiction is also still sometimes inserted, but 
 it may also, when inserted, be considered as a portion of the stating 
 part. The fourth part, or charge of confederacy, gradually became 
 disused, and is now universally omitted ; the seventh, or interrogating 
 part, is now omitted by express enactment ; 6 and the ninth part, or 
 prayer for process, is also omitted : the writ of subpoena to appear and 
 answer the bill having been abolished. 7 The prayer for an injunction, 
 or a ne exeat regno, or that certain formal parties may be bound upon 
 being served with a copy of the bill, is inserted when it forms part of the 
 relief adapted to the circumstances of the case; but then it properly 
 
 forms a portion of the eighth part. 8 
 * 357 * The attention of the reader will, therefore, be confined to the 
 
 four parts above enumerated, as the distinct parts of which a bill 
 now consists. 
 
 1. Address of the Bill. 
 
 Every bill must be addressed to the person or persons who have the 
 actual custody of the Great Seal at the time of its being filed ; 1 unless 
 
 8 See Statutes of Iowa, Revision of I860, Pt. 
 3, c. 122, §2875, § 9, p. 510. 
 
 4 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 10; and see form of 
 bill, as given by Cons. Ord. IX. 2, and Sched. 
 A., post, Vol. III. The present form of bill 
 appears to be a return to the more ancient 
 form ; see Partridge v. Haycraft, 11 Ves. 574. 
 The fact that the frame of a bill is unusual, 
 and without a precedent, does not alone consti- 
 tute an objection to the relief sought, if it can 
 be supported upon principle. Yauger v. Skin- 
 ner, H N. J. Eq. 389, 395. 
 
 5 See Mansell v. Feeney, 2 J. & H. 313, 
 318. 
 
 6 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86. § 10; see Wilson r. 
 Hammonds, L. R. 8 Eq. 323. 
 
 1 Ibid. § 2. 
 
 8 Every bill is intituled "in Chancery," 
 
 (a) The Mass. Act of 1883, c. 223, § 10, pro- 
 vides: — "In a suit in Equity in the Supreme 
 
 356 
 
 marked with the name of the Judge before 
 whom it is intended to be set down, and 
 headed with the names of the parties as plain- 
 tiffs and defendants; see post, § 7, Printing 
 and ^filing the Bill. 
 
 i In the United States the address of the 
 bill is to the Court from which it seeks relief, 
 by its appropriate and technical description, 
 and the address must be varied according!}'. 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 26. In the U. S. Circuit 
 Courts bills are addressed, " To the Judges of 
 the Circuit Court of the United States for the 
 District of," &c. U. S. Court Equity Rule 20 ; 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 26; see Sterrick v. Pugsley, 1 
 Flippin, 350. In Massachusetts and Maine the 
 bill is addressed, " To the Honorable the Jus- 
 tices of the Supreme Judicial Court." (a) In 
 New Hampshire, the address is: "R ss. 
 
 Judicial or Superior Court, the bill need not 
 contain any address to the Court, or the usual
 
 FORM OF THE BILL. 
 
 357 
 
 the seals are in the Queen's own hand, in which case the bill must be 
 addressed, " To the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, in her High Court of 
 Chancery" 2 (b) 
 
 If the Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper himself be a party, the bill 
 
 To the Supreme Judicial Court." Chancery 
 Rule 2. In New Jersey', "To the Honorable 
 A Z, Chancellor of the State of New Jer- 
 se}'." In Vermont, "To the Honorable A B, 
 
 Chancellor of the First (or Second, &c.) Judi- 
 cial Circuit." See Code of Tenn. § -4312. 
 
 2 West. Srmb. 194, b. For forms of ad- 
 dress, see Vol. III. 
 
 commencement, or any prayer for an answer, 
 for general relief, or for process, and the an- 
 swer need not contain any saving of exceptions 
 to the bill, or any prayer to be dismissed, or 
 for costs, and a demurrer or plea need not con- 
 tain any protestation or concluding prayer, and 
 the omission thereof shall not affect the rights 
 of the parties respectively. The bill, except 
 when it is actually inserted in a writ, shall be 
 entitled in the proper Court, and with the full 
 title of the cause containing the names and 
 descriptions of all the parties. Bills, answers, 
 petitions, and other pleadings may be signed 
 by the party or his attorney, and shall not re- 
 quire any other signature. An answer to a bill 
 shall not be sworn to or under seal, except in 
 cases of bills filed for discovery only. The 
 forms in the schedule hereto illustrate the ap- 
 plication of the provisions of this section." 
 
 (b) The caption is not properly part of the 
 bill, and facts there alleged, as " to the use 
 of," are not admitted by a demurrer. Jackson 
 v. Ashton, 8 Peters, 148; Spalding v. Dodge, 
 6 Mackey, 289. The complaint itself, and not 
 its caption, determines the capacity in which a 
 partv is sued. Burling v. Tompkins, 77 Cal. 
 257; see Wise v. Williams, 72 Cal. 544. Add- 
 ing'^ corporation" to the defendant's name 
 in the caption of a complaint is not a sufficient 
 averment that it is a corporation. Miller v. 
 Pine Mining Co. (Idaho) 31 Pac. Rep. 803. 
 In the Federal Courts a person cannot be made 
 a defendant by giving him a fictitious name in 
 the introduction of the bill and in the prayer 
 for process. Kentucky S. M. Co. v. Day, 2 
 Sawyer, 468; Carlsbad v. Tibbetts, 51 Fed. 
 Rep. 852; see United States v. Pratt Coal & 
 Coke Co. 18 id. 708. 
 
 In early times applications for redress or 
 assistance, especially against the violence and 
 the "combination and confederacy" of great 
 men, not remediable at law, were addressed to 
 the King alone, or to him in Council or in Par- 
 liament. " Petitions to the King alone, and 
 answered by him, occurred long after the reijen 
 of Richard II.;" and until the end of Wol- 
 sey's chancellorship, the Chancellor, to whom 
 these petitions came to be referred, was 
 usually an ecclesiastic, versed in the civil and 
 the canon law. See Kerb's Equitable Juris- 
 
 diction of the Court of Chancery (Cambridge 
 Prize Essay for 1889), pp. 16, 94; Scrutton's 
 Roman Law in England, 153, 162; 1 Camp- 
 bell's Chancellors (5th ed.), 9, 142; Gilbert's 
 Chancery, 10; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 44, et seq. ; 
 Oman's Byzantine Empire, 112; Conway Rob- 
 inson's Hist, of the High Court of Chancery, 
 vol. i. Introd. Mr. Kerly (pp. 62, 63) cites 
 early bills, of which the following, of the time 
 of Richard II., is, in its address to the Chancel- 
 lor and its prayer, typical, like the maxims 
 of Equity, of the ecclesiastical influence upon 
 Equity in its inception: "To the very honor- 
 able and very reverent Father in God, the 
 Archbishop of York and Chance'lorof England, 
 Robert Briddecote showethand grievously com- 
 plaineth of John Forster. That whereas the 
 said Robert was going," &c. (The facts are 
 then informally recited.) " May it please you 
 for love of the Almighty to examine the said 
 John on this matter, and to investigate his 
 cause, thus to do and moreover to apply remedy 
 and right to the taid suppliant for God and in 
 work of Charity." " Modern Equity " is some- 
 times said to be crystallized and distinct from 
 that which preceded it ; but its doctrines are, 
 in the words of Sir George Jessel M. R. in 
 Knatchbull v. Hallett, 13 Ch. D 696, 710, " pro- 
 gressive, refined, and improved." and the high- 
 est authorities regard its principles as never 
 changing, though capable of new adaptations. 
 Thus, in a recent case in the House of Lords 
 (Ewins v. Orr Ewing, 9 App. Cas. 34, 40), 
 Lord Selborne said: "The Courts of Equity 
 in England are, and always have been, Courts 
 of conscience, operating in personam, and 
 not in rem.'''' So in Thomson v. Eastwood, 
 2 App. Cas. 215, 233, the opinion of Lord 
 Cairns L. C. holds a trustee, not proved to 
 be chargeable with personal fraud, liable for 
 denying, unconscionably and upon untenable 
 grounds, his beneficiary's title to trust money, 
 and thus postponing full payment. The mode 
 of proof in Equity by requiring an adversary's 
 examination under oath for the purpose of ob- 
 taining admissions or confessions, and by the 
 private and written examination of the wit- 
 nesses before trial, evidently originated after 
 the time of Justinian. See Langdell, Eq. PL 
 (2d ed.) § 3. 
 
 357
 
 *357 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 must, in like manner, be addressed to the Queen ; 8 but in all other 
 cases, including a case where the Master of the Rolls is a party, 4 the 
 bill must be directed to the Lord Chancellor, or other person having the 
 custody of the Great Seal. 
 
 Upon every change in the custody of the Great Seal, or alteration in 
 the style of the person holding it, notice of the form in which bills are 
 to be addressed is put up in the Record and Writ Clerks' Office. 
 
 2. Names and Addresses of the Plaintiffs. 
 
 It is not only necessary that the names of the several plaintiffs in a 
 bill should be correctly stated, but the description and place of abode 
 of each plaintiff must be set out, in order that the Court and the de- 
 fendants may know where to resort to compel obedience to any order or 
 process of the Court, and particularly for the payment of any costs 
 which may be awarded against the plaintiffs, or to punish any improper 
 conduct in the course of the suit. 8 
 
 8 4 Yin. Ab. 385; Leg. .Tud. in Ch. 44, 
 258; Jud. Auth. M. K. 179, 182; Ld. Red. 7 ; 
 Coop. Eq. PI. 23. Braithwaite's Pr. 20. In 
 1 Prax. Aim. Cur. Can. 463 is a precedent of 
 a bill b} r Ld. Ch. Jefferies, addressed to the 
 King's Most Excellent Majesty, and praying 
 his Majesty to grant the usual process of sub- 
 poena; and in vol. ii. of the same book, 310, is 
 to be found an answer to the same bill. The 
 final decree in such cases is, " By the Queen's 
 Most Excellent Majesty, in her High Court >f 
 Chancery" and is signed by her. Leg. Jud. 
 in Ch. 254, 256. In Lord Keeper V. Wyld, 1 
 Vern. 139, where Lord Keeper Guilford and 
 others were plaintiffs, the Master of the Rolls 
 and one of the Chief Justices sat to decide the 
 cause. Coop. Eq. PI. 23. 
 
 4 See Leg. Jud. in Ch. 44, where it is stated 
 that in the bundle of Chancery parchments in 
 the To-ver, there is a bill by Moreton, Keeper 
 of the Rolls, directed to the Right Rev. Father 
 in God, Robert, Bishop of Bath and Wells. 
 Coop. Eq. PI. 2-3, note. 
 
 6 Ld. Red. 42: and see as to what is a 
 sufficient description, Griffith v. Ricketts, 5 
 Hare, 195; Sibbering v. Earl of Balcarras, 1 
 De G. & S. 683; 12 Jur. 108. In the United 
 States Courts, even- bill in the introductory 
 part thereof shall contain the names, places 
 of abode, and citizenship, of all the parties, 
 
 (c) In the Federal Courts a corporation is 
 regarded as a citizen of the State by which it is 
 created. It is not sufficient to aver that it is a 
 "citizen." or "is doing business in " a particular 
 State. Lafayette Ins. Co. r. French, 18 How. 404; 
 Lonergan v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 55 Fed. Rep 
 550; Muller v Dows, 94 U. S. 444; National 
 S. S. Co. v. Tugman, 106 U. S. 118 ; Kansas 
 358 
 
 plaintiffs, and defendants, by and against 
 whom the bill is brought. Thus: "A B, 
 
 of , and a citizen of the State of , 
 
 brings this, his bill, against C D, of , 
 
 and a citizen of the State of , and E F, 
 
 of , and a citizen of the State of . 
 
 And," &i. Equity Rule 20. See Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 26; Dodge v. Perkins, 4 Mason, 
 435. It is indispensable, in all cases where 
 the right to bring the suit in the Courts of the 
 United States is founded on the fact that the 
 plaintiffs and defendants are citizens of differ- 
 ent States, to allege that fact distinctly in the 
 bill. See Bingham r. Cabot, 3 Dall. 382; Jack- 
 son v. Ashton, 8 Peters, 148. In New Hamp- 
 shire "every bill in the introductory part shall 
 contain the names, places of abode, and proper 
 description of all the parties, plaintiffs and 
 defendants, by and against whom the bill is 
 brought. The firm in substance shall be as 
 follows: 'A B, of, &c, complains against C D, 
 of, &c, and E F, of, &c, and says,' " &c. 
 Chancery Rule 2, 38 N. H. 605. A demurrer 
 will be sustained to a bill in Equity where one 
 of the parties is stated to be a private corpora- 
 tion, if it is not described in substance as a cor- 
 poration established by law in some State, and 
 transacting its business in some place, but the 
 defect may be amended. Winnipiseogee Lake 
 Co. v. Young, 40 N. H. 420. (c) An objection, 
 
 Pac. Ry. Co. v. Atchison, 112 U. S. 414: Wis- 
 consin r. Pelican Ins Co. 127 U. S. 265; Brock 
 r. North Western Fuel Co. 130 U. S. 341; Ever- 
 hart v. Huntsville College, 120 U. S. 223. Such 
 citizenship is not affected when the corporation 
 does business in different States. Myers v. Mur- 
 ray, 43 Fed. Rep. 695. A consolidated corpora- 
 tion may be a citizen of the various States by
 
 FORM OF THE BILL. 
 
 359 
 
 * It seems that a demurrer will lie to a bill which does not state * 358 
 the place of abode of the plaintiff ; * and that if the bill describes 
 the plaintiff as residing at a wrong place, the fact may be taken advan- 
 tage of by plea : though a defendant cannot put in such a plea, after a 
 demurrer, upon the same ground, has been overruled, without leave f>i 
 the Court. 2 
 
 The modern practice, however, in such cases, is not to demur, or 
 plead to the bill, but to apply by special motion or summons, 8 on notice 
 to the plaintiff, that he may give security for costs, and that in 
 the mean time proceedings in the suit may be stayed. 4 * It is * 359 
 presumed, however, from analogy to the practice where there are 
 several plaintiffs, one only of whom is resident abroad, 1 that the Court 
 would not require such plaintiffs as are not properly described to give 
 security. 
 
 Where a bill is filed on behalf of an infant, or person of unsound 
 mind not so found, it is not necessary or usual to describe the plaintiff 
 by his place of abode ; 2 because an infant or person of unsound mind 
 is not responsible either for costs or for the conduct of the suit ; the 
 description and place of abode of the next friend must, however, be set 
 out. 3 In the case of a married woman suing by her next friend, it is 
 
 raised by demurrer, to a bill filed by a corpora- 
 tion, that it does not aver that the complainant 
 is a corporation, is an objection of form which 
 cannot be raised under a general demurrer for 
 want of equity, and the averment is, moreover, 
 unnecessary. German Reformed Church v. Von 
 Puechelstein, 27 N. J. Eq. 30. 
 
 1 Winnipiseogee Lake Co. v. Worster, 29 
 N. H. 443; Winnipiseogee Lake Co. v. Young, 
 40 N. H. 420. 
 
 2 Rowley v. Eccles, 1 S. & S. 511; Smith v. 
 Smith, Kay App. 22. In Bainbrigge p. Orton, 
 20 Beav. 28, however. Sir John Romilly M. R. 
 appears to have doubted whether such a plea can 
 be maintained; and if such a plea is bad, so, it 
 is apprehended, would a demurrer be, where no 
 address is stated. It is to be observed thai, in 
 Rowley «. Eccles, the demurrer was overruled, 
 and in Smith v. Smith, the plea disallowed. 
 See, however, Sibbering v. Earl of Balcarras, 
 ubi supra. 
 
 3 Tynte v. Hodge, 2 J. & H. 692. 
 
 4 Sandys v. Long, 2 M. & K. 487; see also 
 Bailey v. Gundry, 1 Keen, 53; Campbell v. 
 Andrews, 12 Sim. 578; Bainbrigge v. Orton, 
 20 Beav. 28: Hutchinson v. Swift, 13 W. R. 
 532, L. JJ. ; Howe v. Harvey, 8 Paige, 73. For 
 forms of notice of motion and summons, see 
 Vol. III. In Simpson v. Burton, 1 Beav. 556, 
 Lord Langdale M. R. said: "There can be no 
 
 doubt that it is the duty of a plaintiff to state 
 his place of residence, truly and accurately, at 
 the time he files his bill ; and if, for the pur- 
 pose of avoiding all access to him, he wilfully 
 misrepresents his residence, he will be ordered 
 to give security for costs. I do not think the 
 rule extends to a case where he has done so in- 
 nocently, and from mere error." It is to be 
 observed that, in this case, all the plaintiffs 
 were incorrectly described in the bill; but there 
 does not appear to be any decision upon the 
 point, where there are several plaintiffs, one or 
 more of whom are correctly described, and the 
 rest not so. See also Watts v. Kelly, 6 W. R. 206, 
 V. C. W.; Smith v. Cornfoot, 1 De G. & S. 684 ; 
 12.1ur. 260; Griffith v. Ricketts, 5 Hare, 195; 
 Player v. And rson, 15 Sim. 104: Manby v. 
 Bewicke, 8 De G. M. & G. 468; 2 Jur. N. S. 
 671; Kerr». Gillespie, 7 Beav. 269; Knight v. 
 Corv, 9 Jur. N. S. 491; 11 W. R. 254, V. C. 
 W.; Dick v. Munder, 11 Jur. N. S. 819; 13 
 W. R. 1013, M. R., where the plaintiff was 
 allowed to amend, instead of giving security. 
 
 1 See ante, p. 28. 
 
 2 Braithwaite's Pr. 25; see forms in Vol. III. 
 
 8 This is not altered by the change in prac- 
 tice, which requires a written authority from 
 the next friend to be filed with the bill. Major 
 V. Arnott, 2 Jur. N. S. 80, V. C. K. See ante, 
 pp. 69, 110. 
 
 which the consolidated corporations were char- 
 tered. Fitzgerald v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 45 Fed. Rep. 815; see Cohn v. Louisville, N. O. 
 
 & T. R. Co. 39 id. 227. The latter may still 
 retain their original citizenship. Paul r. Baltic 
 more & O. & C. R. Co. 44 Fed. Rep. 513. 
 359
 
 360 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 usual, but not essential, to set out the address of the married woman, 
 but the address of the next friend must be stated ; 4 and where a married 
 woman sues as a, feme sole, that fact must be stated in this part of the bill. 
 
 The address of a peer of the realm or of a corporate body, suing as 
 plaintiff, need not be stated in the bill. 5 
 
 A plaintiff in a cross-bill is not required to give security for costs on 
 the ground of insufficient description of residence. 6 
 
 The defendant should apply that the plaintiff may give security for 
 costs as soon as he becomes aware of the fact that the plaintiff's address 
 is incorrectly stated in the bill ; and if the defendant takes any active 
 steps in the cause after he becomes so aware, and before applying, it 
 will be a waiver of his right to security. 7 
 
 The Order, 8 by which the penal sum in the bond to be given by the 
 plaintiff by way of security for costs is increased from £40 to £100, only 
 speaks of cases where the plaintiff is out of the jurisdiction. It has, 
 however, been decided that it applies to the case now under considera- 
 tion, and to all other cases where security for costs is required. 9 
 
 Where a plaintiff sues as executor or administrator, it is not necessary 
 so to describe himself in this part of the bill : though, as we have seen 
 before, it is necessary that it should appear in the stating part that 
 he has duly proved the will or obtained administration, as the case 
 
 may be. 10 
 * 360 * Where a plaintiff sues on behalf of himself and of others of a 
 similar class, it should be so stated in this part of the bill ; and 
 the omission of such a statement will, in many cases, render a bill 
 liable to objection for want of parties, 1 and in other cases will deprive 
 the plaintiff of his right to the whole of the relief which he seeks to 
 obtain. Thus, in the case of a single-bond creditor suing for satisfac- 
 tion of his debt out of the personal and real estate of his debtor, and 
 not stating that he sues " on behalf of himself and the other specialty 
 creditors," he can only have a decree for satisfaction out of the personal 
 estate in a due course of administration, and not for satisfaction out of 
 the real estate. 2 
 
 4 Braithwaite's Pr. 21,25. If the next friend 
 of a plaintiff be undescribed in the bill, he may, 
 on special application by motion or summons, 
 be ordered to give security for costs. See Kerr 
 v. Gillespie, and Watts v. Kelly, vbi supra. 
 For forms of notice of motion and summons, 
 see Vol. III. 
 
 5 Braithwaite's Pr. 25. 
 
 6 Wild v. Murray, 18 Jur. 892, V. C. W.; 
 see also Vincent v. Hunter, 5 Hare. 320; Wat- 
 teeu v. Billam, 3 De G. & S. 516; 14 Jur. 165; 
 Sloggett v. Viant, 13 Sim. 187. 
 
 7 Swanzy r. Swanzy, 4 K. & J. 237; 4 Jur. 
 N. S. 1013; see Redondo v. Chaytor, 4 Q. B. 
 D. 453. 456. 
 
 » Cons. Ord. XL. 6. 
 
 9 Bailev v. Gundry, 1 Keen, 53, 57 ; but see 
 Atkins u.'Cook, 3 Jur. N. S. 283, V. C K. ; 
 Partington v. Reynolds, 6 W. R. 307, V. C. K., 
 
 360 
 
 where it was held that, in the case of a peti- 
 tion, £40 is the proper amount. For more 
 on the subject of security for costs, see ante f 
 pp. 27—37. 
 
 m Ante, pp. 318, 319. 
 
 i Ante, p. 237. 
 
 2 Bedford v. Leigh, 2 Dick. 707; May v. 
 Selby. 1 Y. & C. C. C. 235; Connolly v. M'Der- 
 mott, 3 Jo. & Lat. 260; Ponsford v. Hartley, 2 
 J. &H. 736; Johnson v. Compton, 4 Sim. 47; 
 ante, p. 235. If, however, a defect of this de- 
 scription appear at the hearing, the Court will 
 allow the case to stand over, with liberty to 
 the plaintiff to amend, ibid.; Biscoe v. Waring, 
 Rolls, 7 Aug., 1835, MS.; Cosby v. Wickliffe, 
 7 B. Mon. 120. Or the bill may be ordered to be 
 taken as a bill on behalf of the other creditors. 
 Woods v. Sowerby, 14 W. R. 9, V. C. W.
 
 FORM OF THE BILL. 
 
 360 
 
 3. Stating Part. 
 
 With respect to the manner in which the plaintiff's case should be 
 presented to the Court, it is to be observed, that whatever is essential 
 to his rights and is necessarily within his knowledge, ought to be alleged 
 positively as a fact. 3 {a) It is not a sufficient averment of a fact, in a 
 bill, to state that a plaintiff " is so informed," 4 (//) or that one defend- 
 ant alleges, and the plaintiff believes, a statement to be true ; 6 nor is an 
 allegation that the defendant sets up certain pretences, followed by a 
 charge that the contrary of such pretences is the truth, a sufficient alle- 
 gation or averment of facts which make up the counter statement. 6 
 
 The claims of a defendant may be stated in general terms, and if a 
 matter essential to the determination of the plaintiff's claim is charged 
 to rest within the knowledge of a defendant, or must of necessity be 
 within his knowledge, and is consequently the subject of a part of the 
 discovery sought, a precise allegation is not required. 7 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 41; Darthez v. Clemens, 6 Beav. 
 165, 169; Munday v. Knight, 3 Hare, 497, 502; 
 Pad wick v. Hurst, 18 Beav. 575; 18 Jur. 763; 
 Bainbrigge v. Moss, 3 Jur. N. S. 58, V. C. W.; 
 Duckworth v. Duckworth, 35 Ala. 70; Moran 
 v. Palmer, 13 Mich. 367 ; Mclntyre v. Wright, 
 6 Paige, 239; Rice v. Hosiery Co. 56 N. H. 
 114. An assertion of a claim by way of in- 
 ference from a recital of a Master's finding on an 
 ex parte, petition of complainant, is insufficient. 
 Search v. Search, 27 N. J. Eq. 137. A for- 
 tiori, where there is no averment of title at all. 
 Phillips v. Schooley, 27 N. J. Eq. 410. An 
 allegation in a bill that the plaintiff " has been 
 informed and believes, and therefore avers," 
 is a sufficiently positive averment. Wells v. 
 Bridgeport &c. Co. 30 Conn. 316. The pleader 
 should aver the fact on his information and 
 belief, and not his information and belief that 
 the fact exists. Nix v. Winter, 35 Ala. 309. 
 
 4 Lord Uxbridge v. Staveland, I Ves. Sr. 
 56 ; Lucas v. Oliver, 34 Ala. 626 ; Cameron v. 
 Abbott, 30 Ala. 46; Jones v. Cowles, 26 Ala. 
 612. Quinn v. Leake, 1 Tenn. Ch. 71. Such 
 an averment simply puts in issue the com- 
 
 plainant's information and belief, not the truth 
 or falsehood of the facts about which he is 
 informeii. Ex parte Reid, 50 Ala. 439. 
 
 5 Egremont v. Cowell, 5 Beav. 620, 622; 
 Hodgson v. Espinasse, 10 Beav. 473; Nix v. 
 Winter, 35 Ala. 309. 
 
 6 Flint v. Field, 2 Anst. 543: Houghton v. 
 Reynolds, 2 Hare, 267; 7 Jur. 414; see White 
 v. Smale, 22 Beav. 72; Clark v. Lord Rivers, 
 L. R. 5 Eq. 91. 
 
 7 Ld. Red. 42; Philipps v. Philipps, 4 Q B. 
 D. 127; Aikin v. Ballard, Rice Eq. 13; Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 255. It may be stated upon informa- 
 tion and belief followed by the averment that he, 
 therefore, cha ges the fact to be true. Camp- 
 bell v. Paris &c. R. Co. 71 111. 611. A bill in 
 Equity, brought by a partner against his copart- 
 ner, for an account, &c, wherein it is averred 
 that the defendant has all the partnership books 
 and papers in his possession, or under his con- 
 trol, and refuses to permit the plaintiff to ex- 
 amine them, need not contain such certainty 
 and particularity of statement as would be held 
 necessary if the plaintiff had access to those 
 books and papers. Towle v. Pierce, 12 Met. 
 
 (a) The stating part of a bill in Equity 
 should contain even- averment necessary to en- 
 title the plaintiff to the relief asked, as such 
 averment cannot be supplied by inference or 
 by reference to other parts of the bill. Thomp- 
 son's Appeal, 126 I'enn. St. 367. The stating 
 part and the prayer for relief are now generally 
 treated as the essential parts of the bill. See. 
 Comstock v. Herron, 45 Fed. Rep. 660; Clark 
 v. Harwood, 8 How. Pr. 470; McCulla v. 
 Beadleston, 17 R. I. 20, 25; Stevens v. Hayden, 
 129 Mass. 328. 
 
 (b) The allegations of the bill must be direct 
 
 and positive, and not merely upon information 
 and belief, the latter only and not the facts 
 stated being admitted by a demurrer in such 
 case. Lucas v. Oliver, 34 Ala. 626; Cameron v. 
 Abbott, 30 AIm. 416; Ewingv. Duncan, 81 Texas, 
 230; Walton v. Westwood, 73 111. 125; Leaven- 
 worth v. Pepper, 32 Fed. Rep. 718. But aver- 
 ments of fact, "as the plaintiff is informed and 
 believes," or the statement that "the plaintiff 
 has been informed and believes, and therefore 
 avers," are sufficient. Ibid. ; Campbell v. Paris 
 Railroad Co. 71 111. 611. 
 
 361
 
 362 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 * 301 * In general, however, a plaintiff must state upon his bill a case 
 
 upon which, if admitted by the answer, or proved at the hearing, 
 the Court could make a decree ; 1 and therefore, where a bill was filed 
 to restrain a defendant from setting up outstanding terms, in bar of the 
 plaintiff's right at Law, not stating that there were any outstanding 
 terms or estates, but merely alleging that the defendant threatened to set 
 
 up some outstanding term, or other legal estate, a demurrer was 
 
 * 362 allowed on the * ground that the bill ought to have stated what 
 
 the outstanding term or estate was. 1 
 
 329; Crockett v. Lee, 7 Wheat. 522; Knox v. 
 Smith, 4 How. U. S. 298; Capel v. McCollum, 
 27 Ala. 461; Miller »;. Thatcher, 9 Texas, 482; 
 Jones v. Brinker, 20 Miss. 87 ; see Vanner v. 
 Frost, 39 L. J. Ch. 626. 
 
 i See Chilton v. London, 7 Ch. D. 735; Perry 
 v. Carr, 41 N. H. 371. Care must be taken 
 that every averment necessary to entitle the 
 plaintiff to the relief prayed for, should be con- 
 tained in the stating part of the bill. Whiter. 
 Yaw, 7 Vt. 357 ; Kunkel v. Markell, 26 Md. 
 408. This part of the bill should be full and 
 accurate, for if a plea is put in, the validity of 
 the plea will be decided with reference to the 
 stating part of the bill, and not with reference 
 to the interrogatory part if it varies from it. 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 27; see Macnamara v. Sweet- 
 man, 1 Hogan, 29; Mechanics' Bank v. Levy, 
 3 Paige, 606: Coles v. Buchanan, 3 Ired. Ch. 
 374. Where the stating part does not show the 
 equity of the plaintiff's case, the defect cannot 
 be supplied by inference, or by reference to 
 averments in other parts of the bill. Wright 
 v. Dame, 22 Pick. 55; see to the same point, 
 Harrison v. Nixon, 9 Peters, 503; Shepard v. 
 Shepard, 6 Conn. 57; Duckworth v. Duckworth, 
 35 Ala. 70; Mason v. Foster, 3 J. J. Marsh. 
 284; Lecraftu. Dempsey, 15 Wend. 83; Ynncy 
 o. Fenwick, 4 Hen. & M. 423; Mitchell v. Mau- 
 pin, 3 Monroe, 88; Crocker e. Higgins, 7 Conn. 
 342; Hobart v. Frisbie, 5 Conn. 592; Blake v. 
 Hinkle, 10 Yerger, 218; Taliaferro v. Foot, 3 
 Leigh, 58; Hood v. Inman, 4 John. Ch. 437; 
 Chambers v. Chalmers, 4 Gill & J. 420; Estep 
 r. Watkins, 1 Bland, 486; Townshend i\ Dun- 
 can, 2 Bland, 45; Watkins v. Stockett, 6 Harr. 
 & J. 445 ; Timms v. Shannon, 19 Md. 312. The 
 stating part of a bill cannot be enlarged by the 
 terms of the prayer for relief. Bushnell v. 
 Avery, 121 Mass. 148. But a statement in the 
 form of a charge intended as an averment is 
 sufficient on demurrer. Johnson v. Helm- 
 staedter, 30 N. J. Eq. 124. The plaintiff will 
 not be permitted to offer or require evidence of 
 any material fact not distinctly stated in the 
 premises. See Story, Eq. PI. §§ 28, 257; Rowan 
 v. Bowles, 21 III. 17; Sprigg v. Albin, 6 J. J. 
 Marsh. 158; Skinner v. Bailey, 7 Conn. 496. 
 He cannot recover on a case different from 
 that alleged. Sanborn v. Kittredge, 20 Vt. 
 
 362 
 
 632; Gibson v. Carson, 3 Ala. 421; Harding v. 
 Handy, 11 Wheat. 103; Jackson v. Ashton, 11 
 Peters 229. Neither allegations without proof, 
 nor proof without allegations, nor allegations 
 and proof which do not substantially corre- 
 spond, will entitle complainant to relief, unless 
 the defect be remedied by amendment. Alex- 
 ander r. Taylor, 56 Ala. 60. And see Floyd o. 
 Ritter, 56 Ala. 356 ; Meadors v. Askew, id. 584 ; 
 Lehigh &e. R Co. v. McFarlan, 30 N.J. Eq. 
 180; South Park Com'rs v. Kerr, 13 Fed. Rep. 
 502. A general statement or charge, however, 
 of the matter-of-fact, is sufficient; and it is not 
 necessary to charge minutely all the circum- 
 stances which may conduce to prove the general 
 charge ; for these circumstances are properly 
 matters of evidence, which need not be charged 
 in order to let them in as proofs. Nesmith v. 
 Calvert, 1 Wood. & M. 34; Lovell v. Farring- 
 ton, 50 Maine, 239; Rogers v. Ward, 8 Allen, 
 387. On the other hand, the charge may be 
 substantially made by stating the facts from 
 which the fraud or mistake would be necessarily 
 implied. Courts of Equity derive their juris- 
 diction from the facts alleged, not from the 
 terms used in setting them out. Grove v. 
 Rentch, 26 Md. 367, 377; see further to these 
 points Dilly v. Heckrott. 8 Gill & J. 171 ; Morri- 
 son v. Hart, 2 Bibb. 4; Lemaster v. Burkhart, 2 
 Bibb, 26 ; Buck v. McCaughtry, 5 Monroe, 220; 
 Bank of United States v. Shultz, 3 Ohio, 62; 
 Anthony v. Leftwich, 3 Rand. 263 ; Boone ?'. 
 Chiles, 10 Peters, 177; Jackson v. Cartwright, 
 
 5 Munf. 314; Aikin v. Ballard, Rice Eq. 13; 
 Bishop v. Bishop, 13 Ala. 475 ; White v. Yaw, 
 7 Vt. 357 ; Camden and Amboy R. Co. v. 
 Stewart, 19 N. J. Eq. ,343. But where the 
 facts stated in the bill are disproved, or are 
 defectively stated, relief may be granted upon 
 the facts stated in the answer. Maury v. Lewis, 
 10 Yerger, 115; Rose v. Mynatt, 7 Yerger, 30; 
 M'Laughlin v. Daniel, 8 Dana, 184; Dealty v. 
 Murphy, 3 A. K. Marsh. 474; but see Thomas 
 v. Warner, 15 Vt. 110 ; West v. Hall, 3 Harr. 
 
 6 J. 221 ; Edwards v. Massey, 1 Hawks. 359. 
 And see as to variance, post, pp. 860, 861. 
 
 i Stansbury v. Arkwright, 6 Sim. 481, 485; 
 see also Jones v. Jones, 3 Mer. 161, 175 ; Barber 
 v. Hunter, cited id. 170, 173 ; Frietas v. Dos 
 Sandos, 1 Y. & J. 574. If the bill founds the
 
 FORM OF THE BILL. * 363 
 
 Although the rules of pleading in Courts of Equity, especially in the 
 case of bills, are not so strict as those adopted in Courts of Law, yet, in 
 framing pleadings in Equity, the draftsman will do well to adhere as 
 closely as he can to the general rules of Common Law pleadings, when- 
 ever such rules are applicable, 2 since, the stated forms of description 
 and allegation adopted in pleadings at Law having all been duly debated 
 under every possible consideration, settled upon solemn deliberation, and 
 established by long usage, experience has shown them to be preferable 
 to all others for conveying distinct and clear notions of the subject to be 
 submitted to the Court. Hence, as at Law, if a man intends to allege a 
 title in himself to the inheritance or freehold of lands or tenements in 
 possession, he ought regularly to say that he is seised ; or, if he allege 
 possession of a term of years, or other chattel real, that he is possessed ; 3 
 if he allege seisin of things manurable, as of lands, tenements, rents, &c, 
 he should say that he was seised in his demesne, as of fee ; and if of 
 things not manurable, as of an advowson, he should allege that he is 
 seised as of fee and right, omitting the words in his demesne,* so that 
 there seems to be no reason why the same forms of expression should 
 not be equally proper in stating the same estates in Equity. It is, 
 indeed, the general practice, in all well-drawn pleadings, to insert them, 
 although they are frequently accompanied with other words, which are 
 sometimes added by way of enlarging their meaning, and of extending 
 them to other than mere legal estates. Thus, in stating a seisin in fee, 
 the words, "or otherwise well entitled to " are frequently added ; although 
 it would seem that, except in respect of equitable interests, the addition 
 of these words would be incorrect, and might render the allegation too 
 uncertain. 5 
 
 In recommending the use, in pleadings in Equity, of such technical 
 expressions as have been adopted in pleadings at Common 
 * Law, it is not intended to suggest that the use of any particular * 363 
 form of words is absolutely necessary, or that the same thing 
 may not be expressed in any terms which the draftsman may select as 
 proper to convey his meaning, provided they are adequate for that pur- 
 pose. 1 All that is contended for is, that where it is intended to express 
 things for which adequate legal or technical expressions have been 
 adopted in pleadings at Law, the use of such expressions will be desir- 
 able, as best conducing to brevity and clearness. 2 
 
 Thus, it is a rule in pleading, at Common Law, that the nature of a 
 conveyance or alienation should be stated according to its legal effect, 
 
 right against the defendant upon the fact of Heath v. Crealock, L. R. 10 Ch. 22; L. R. 18 
 
 Lis having notice, it should charge such notice Eq. 215; Re Horton, 51 L. T. 420. 
 
 directly; otherwise it is not matter in issue on ! See Kidglv v. Bond, 18 Md. 433; Bolgiano 
 
 wuich the Court can act. Story, Eq. PI. § 203, v. Cooke, 19 Md. 375; Grove v. Rentch, 20 Md. 
 
 and cases in note. 367, 377. 
 
 2 See Camden & Amboy R. Co. v. Stewart, 2 When a common-law liability is limited 
 19 N. J. Eq. 343, 346. by statute, the fact that the case falls within 
 
 3 Stephen on PI. 233, 242; Whitworth Eq. the limitation need not be pleaded. Stephen 
 Prec. 162, n., e t seq. on PI. (7th ed.) 255, 309; Chitty on PI. 378; 
 
 4 Ibid. see Matthew v. Whittle, 13 Ch. D. 811; pout, 
 6 Baring v. Nash, 1 V. & B. 551; and see p. 367. 
 
 363
 
 364 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 rather than its form of words ; 8 and this is in substance enjoined by 
 the General Order, 4 which directs " that deeds, writings, or records be 
 not unnecessarily set out in pleadings in lime verba, but that so much of 
 them only as is pertinent and material be set out or stated, or the effect 
 and substance of so much of these only as is pertinent and material be 
 given, as counsel may deem advisable, without needless prolixitj^." 6 
 
 Cases, however, may arise in which it is convenient to state written 
 documents in their very words. Thus, wherever any question in the 
 cause is likely to turn upon the precise words of the instrument, as 
 where it is sought to establish a particular construction of a will which 
 is informally or inartificially worded, the words which are the subject of 
 the discussion ought to be accurately set out, in order more specifically 
 to point the attention of the Court to them. Indeed, wherever informal 
 instruments are insisted on, upon the construction of which any diffi- 
 culty is likely to arise, as is frequently the case in agreements 
 *364 * reduced to writing by persons who have not been profession- 
 ally educated, or which are insisted on as resulting from a written 
 correspondence, the written instruments relied on, or at least the mate- 
 rial parts of them, should be set out in hcec verba. So also, in bills filed 
 for the purpose of carrying into effect written articles, upon the con- 
 struction of which, although they are formally drawn, questions are 
 likely to arise, such articles, or so much of them as is likely to give rise 
 to questions, should be accurately stated. In many cases, also, the 
 expressions of an instrument or writing are such that any attempt to 
 state their substance, without introducing the very words in which they 
 are expressed, would be ineffectual : in such cases, also, it is best that 
 they should be set forth ; and where an agreement is to be deduced from 
 correspondence, it is often convenient to set out, in their very words, the 
 material parts of the correspondence, so that the question may be deter- 
 mined upon a demurrer, without putting the parties to the expense and 
 delay of a trial. 1 In the case of a document in a foreign language, set 
 out in the pleading, it is not necessary to append a translation of such 
 document. 2 
 
 According to the old practice of the Court, when a plaintiff wished to 
 obtain from a defendant an admission as to a particular deed or instru- 
 ment in his, the plaintiff's own possession, it was usual to leave the deed 
 or other instrument in the hands of the plaintiff's clerk in Court, and, 
 
 3 Stephen on PI. 237; see 1 Chi'ty PL (9th 
 Am. ed.) 305 ; Andrews V. William*, 11 Conn. 
 326: Morris v. Fort, 2 M'Cord, 398; Lent v. 
 Padelford, 10 Mass. 230; Hopkins v. Young, 
 11 Ma«s. 307; Walsh v. Gilmer, 3 Harr. & J. 
 407; Grannis v. Clark, 6 Cowen, 36; Ridgley ». 
 Rig<T», 4 Harr. & J. 363; Silver v. Kendrick, 2 
 N. H. 160; Osborne v. Lawrence, 9 Wend. 135; 
 Crocker v. Whitney, 10 Mass. 320; Goodrich v. 
 Rodney, 1 Minn. 195. 
 
 * Cons. Ord. VIII. 2. See R. S. C. Ord. 
 XIX. 21; Philipps v. Philipps, 4 Q. B. D. 127; 
 Pauneefo-t r. Lord Lincoln, 1 Dick. 362. 
 
 6 See 26th U. S. Equity Rule; Goodrich v. 
 
 364 
 
 Rodney, 1 Minn. 195; Rule 49 of New Jersey 
 Revised Chancery Rules; Camden and Amboy 
 R. Co. v. Stewart, 19 N. J. Eq. 343. 
 
 1 Hussey v. Home Payne, 4 App. Cas. 311, 
 316; see Wylson v. Dunn", 34 Ch. D. 569; Bris- 
 tol &c. Co.V. Maggs, 44 Ch. D. 616; Bellamy 
 v. Debenham, 45 Ch. D. 481: Eadie v. Addison, 
 52 L. J. Ch. 80; Bertel v. Neveux, 39 L. T. 
 257; Wood v. Aylward, 57 L. T. 54; May p. 
 Thomson, 20 Ch. D. 705; Greer v. Laws, 56 
 Texas, 37; post, p. 565. 
 
 2 Cassoux v. Great Luxembourg Ry. Co. 17 
 W. R. 646, V. C. J.
 
 FORM OF THE BILL. 
 
 '365 
 
 having stated that fact in the bill, to pray that the defendant might 
 inspect it, and after inspection answer the interrogatories applicable to 
 the subject. 8 This practice, however, has been for a long time discon- 
 tinued ; and it is now considered sufficient to state upon the bill the date, 
 parties' names, and substance of the deed or instrument relied upon by 
 the plaintiff, and then, by interrogatory, to require the defendant to set 
 forth whether a deed, of the nature of that set forth, was not duly exe- 
 cuted by and between the parties stated, or some, or one, or which of 
 them, and whether the deed does not bear the date, and is not to the pur- 
 port or effect before set out, or of some, and what other date, or to some, 
 and what other purport and effect. This form of statement and inter- 
 rogatory is calculated to draw from the defendant either an admission or 
 denial of the deed, and of all knowledge of it, or of its execution, date, 
 and contents ; or else a statement of the defendant's knowledge or belief 
 of the parties by whom it was executed, and of its date, tenor, and effect. 
 
 It is a rule in pleading, that where the nature of a conveyance 
 is such that it would, at Common Law, * be valid without deed or * 365 
 writing, no deed or writing need be averred, though such docu- 
 ment may in fact exist ; but where the nature of the conveyance requires, 
 at Common Law, a deed or other written instrument, such instrument 
 must be alleged. 1 The same rule has, it would seem, been adopted with 
 respect to pleadings in Equity ; thus, in stating a conveyance by bargain 
 and sale, it is not essential to state that it was enrolled ; for though such 
 a process is rendered necessary by statute, it was not so at Common Law. 2 
 
 In a bill for specific performance of an agreement relating to land, it 
 is, however, necessary to allege that the agreement is in writing ; 8 (a) 
 otherwise the bill will be demurrable : but it is not necessary to allege 
 
 8 Per Lord Eldon, in Princess of Wales v. 
 Earl of Liverpool, 1 Swanst. 123; see Kenned v 
 v. Wakefield, 39 L. J. Ch. 827. Maps, plans, 
 trademarks, &c, may, however, still be de- 
 posited at the Record and Writ Clerks' Office, 
 and referred to in the bill. Braithwaite's 
 Pr. 25. 
 
 1 Stephen on PI. 238, 287, 288; and see 
 Futcher v. Futcher, 29 W. R. 884. 
 
 2 See Harrison v. Hogg, 2 Ves. Jr. 327, 
 where it is alleged that a mortgagee " by his 
 assignment in writing on said deed, sealed 
 with his seal " (date and consideration stated), 
 "conveyed and assigned to the plaintiff all his 
 right, title, and interest, in the same, together 
 with the debt secured thereby, and all his 
 claims in and to the mortgage, all which will 
 more fully appear by said deed and assignment 
 when produced in Court ; " it was held suffi- 
 cient, on demurrer, although there was no alle- 
 gation in the bill that the assignment was 
 
 (a) Although a partnership in land may be 
 proved by parol, yet an agreement for dissolu- 
 tion of such a partnership should be expressed 
 in writing when the party sought to be charged 
 
 acknowledged and recorded. Lovell v. Far- 
 rington, 50 Maine, 239. 
 
 3 Redding v. Wilkes, 3 Bro. C. C. 400; 
 Barkworth v. Young, 4 Drew. 1; Wood v. 
 Midgeley, 5 De G. M. & G. 41; 2 Sm. &. G. 
 115; see Piercy v. Adams, 22 Ga. 109. But 
 the Statute of Frauds did not alter the forms 
 of pleading either at Law or in Equity, and 
 therefore, if the bill do not show that the con- 
 tract is in parol, it will be presumed to be in 
 writing, and a demurrer will not lie; aliter, 
 where the bill shows a contract by parol. Cozine 
 v. Graham, 2 Paige, 177; Champlin v. Parrish, 
 11 Paige, 405; Switzer v. Skiles, 3 Gilman, 529; 
 Dudley p. Bachelder, 53 Maine, 403; Macev 
 v. Childress, 2 Tenn. Ch. 442; infra, p. 561, 
 n. 2; p. 055, n. 9. Part-performance of a con- 
 tract within the Statute of Frauds must, in order 
 to entitle a party to relief, be expressly stated in 
 the bill. See Meach v. Stone, 1 D. Chip. 182. 
 As to the effect of part-performance, and what 
 
 is to assign or part with an interest in land. 
 Gray v. Smith, 43 Ch. D. 208; see Young v. 
 Wheeler, 34 Fed. Rep. 98; Bates v. Babcock, 
 95 Cal. 479. 
 
 365
 
 366 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 that it has been signed ; 4 because, from the statement that it is in writ- 
 ing, it is necessarily to be inferred that it has been signed. 5 
 
 Where an agreement relied upon in a bill is to be collected from the let- 
 ters between the parties, the letters may, as above mentioned, be stated in 
 the bill, either as constituting the alleged agreement, or as evidence of an 
 alleged parol agreement. In the first case, the defendant may insist that 
 they do not make out a concluded agreement, and that no intrinsic evi- 
 dence can be received ; in the latter, he may plead the Statute of Frauds. 6 (6) 
 Upon the same principle, although stamping is, by sundry Acts 
 * 366 of Parliament, rendered necessary to the * validity of a variety of 
 
 will amount to a part-performance, sufficient 
 to take a case out of the statute, see Whit- 
 church o. Beavis, 2 Bro. C. C. (Perkins's ed.) 
 566, note (a), and cases cited ; W r hitebread v. 
 Brockhurst, 1 id. 404, and cases cited in notes; 
 2 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 759-767; Newton v. 
 Swasey, 8 N. H. 9. A trust need not be al- 
 leged to be in writing, but it is sufficient if the 
 trust is proved by writing at the hearing; see 
 Davies v. Otty, 33 Beav. 540 ; 2 De G. J. & S. 
 238 ; and see Forstert'. Hale, 3 Ves. 696; Ran- 
 dall v. Morgan, 12 Ves. 74, and comp. the 4th 
 and 7th sections of Stat, of Frauds. Peasley v. 
 Barney, 1 D. Chip. 333; see Coquillard v. Suy- 
 dam, 8 Blackf. 24. 
 
 4 Rist v. Hobson, 1 S. & S. 543 ; Coles v. 
 
 Boone, 10 Paige, 535 ; Ontario Bank v. Root, 3 
 Paige, 478; Hobart v. Andrews, 21 Pick. 534; 
 Richards v. Richards, 9 Gray, 314; Sterm p. 
 Drinker, 2 E. D. Smith (N.Y.), 401; Nelson 
 v. Dubois, 13 John. 177; Cleaves v. Foss, 4 
 Greenl. 1; Wallis v. Frazier, 2 Nott & McC. 
 180. Where the agreement had been entered 
 into by an agent for the plaintiff, an allegation 
 that the plaintiff has been informed by his 
 agent that a written agreement was executed, 
 followed by statements of the agreement, will 
 be sufficient. Heard v. Pilley, L. R. 4 Ch. 
 548. 
 
 5 Barkworth t>. Young, ubi supra. 
 
 6 Birce v. Bletchley, 6 Mad. 17; Skinner v. 
 M'Douall, 2 De G. & S. 265; ante, p. 364. 
 
 (//) Though the Statute of Frauds must be 
 pleaded, it is not necessary to plead a particu- 
 lar section; but if one section is pleaded by way 
 of defence, the defendant cannot avail himself 
 of another section by amendment. James v. 
 Smith, [1891] 1 Ch. 384; affirmed on the facts, 
 63 L. T. 524. Under § 17 of the Statute of 
 Frauds the note or memorandum of the con- 
 tract, in order to be available in a suit thereon 
 relating to goods, must have been in existence 
 when the suit was commenced. Lucas v. 
 Dixon, 22 Q. B. D. 357. Part acceptance un- 
 der this statute must be with the intention to 
 perform the whole contract. Atherton v. New- 
 hall, 123 Mass. 141. But, as this statute af- 
 fects only the remedy, part acceptance may sat- 
 isfy the statute, though made after the rest of 
 the goods are destroyed by fire in the seller's 
 possession. Townsend U. Hargraves, 118 Mass. 
 325. In England a defence founded on the 
 Statute of Frauds cannot be raised by demurrer, 
 since the Judicature Acts. Catling v. King, 
 5 Ch. D. 660; Morgan v. Worthington, 38 L. 
 T. 443; post, p. 561. Such defence, if clearly 
 appearing upon the face of the bill, may be 
 taken by demurrer; but, as the bill may not 
 show that the statute does not apply, such de- 
 fence is usually raised by plea or answer. See 
 Wood v. Midgley, 5 De G. M. & G. 41; 2 
 Smale & G. 115; Miles v. New Zealand A. E. 
 
 366 
 
 Co. 54 L. J. Ch. 1035; Cozine v. Graham, 2 
 Paige, 177; Walker v. Locke, 5 Cush. 90; 
 Campbell v. Brown, 129 Mass. 23; Ahrend v. 
 Odiorne, 118 Mass. 261; Slater v. Smith, 117 
 Mass. 96 ; Farnham v. Clements, 51 Maine, 
 426; Pohl v. Pontier, 21 N. Y. S. 634; Hunt v. 
 Hayt, 10 Col. 278; Macey v. Childress, 2 Tenn. 
 Ch." 438; Cranston v. Smith, 6 R. I. 231; 
 Switzer v. Skiles, 3 Gilm. (111.) 529. An an- 
 swer which admits an alleged oral contract for 
 the snle of land, must also set up the statute ; 
 but if it denies the agreement, the plaintiff 
 must establish its validity. Barrett r. McAllis- 
 ter, 33 W. Va. 738. A bill is not demurrable 
 because it does not allege that an agreement 
 within the statute is in writing. Speyer v. 
 Desjardins (111.), 32 N. E. Rep. 283; see Stein- 
 berg v. Tyler, 22 N. Y. S. 178; Sanborn v. 
 Rogers, 33 Fed. Rep. 851. But allegations in 
 a bill to enforce an express trust in lands, which 
 clearly imply that the declaration of trust was 
 not in writing, justify a demurrer. Campbell 
 v. Brown, 129 Mass. 23. A verbal agreempnt 
 for an easement may be enforced where there 
 has been part performance, whether it is or 
 is not within § 4 of the Statute of Frauds. 
 McManus v. Cooke, 35 Ch. I). 681. In Eng- 
 land, since the Judicature Acts, in any case 
 where the Statute of Frauds is not a bar, the 
 Court may in the same suit rectify a written
 
 FORM OF THE BILL. * 367 
 
 instruments, it is not necessary, nor is it even usual, in pleadings, to aver 
 that such instruments have been duly stamped. 
 
 It is to be observed, also, that the rule of pleading above referred to 
 applies only to cases in which the necessity for a conveyance or agree- 
 ment being in writing, is superadded by statute to things which at Com- 
 mon Law might have been by parol ; but where a thing is originally 
 created by Act of Parliament, and required to be in writing, it must 
 then be stated, with all the circumstances required by the Act. Thus, 
 it was necessary to allege that a devise of lands (which at Com mem 
 Law is not valid, and was first authorized by the statutes 32 Hen. VIII. 
 c. 1, and 34 Hen. VIII. c. 5.) had been made in writing, which is the 
 only form in which those statutes authorize it to be made. 1 
 
 It seems, however, that it is sufficient, under the Wills Act, 2 to allege 
 that a will has been duly made, or duly made in writing ; and that it is not 
 necessary to allege the signature and attestation, as required by the Act. 3 
 
 Some doubt appears to be entertained whether, in suits under the 
 8 Geo. II. c. 13, and 7 Geo. III. c. 38, 4 by which the property in certain 
 prints was vested in the inventors for a certain number of years from 
 the day of publishing, it is necessary to state that the name of the 
 engraver and date of the print have been engraved on the print as 
 required by the first-mentioned Act. 5 
 
 * It has been before stated that it is a rule in pleading, that when- * 367 
 ever at Common Law a written instrument was not necessary to 
 complete a conveyance, it is not necessary in pleading to aver it, although 
 such an instrument has been rendered necessary by statute, and has been 
 executed. The converse of this is also a rule, so that, whenever a deed 
 in writing is necessary by Common Law, it must be shown in pleading : 
 therefore, if a conveyance by way of grant be pleaded, a deed must be 
 
 1 Stephen on PI. 239. name was not inscribed; observing, that the 
 
 2 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vic. c. 26. interest was vested by the statute, and that the 
 
 3 Hyde v. Edwards, 12 Beav. 160; 13 Jur. 757. Common Law gave the remedy. Roworth v. 
 
 * These Acts are amended and explained Wilkes, 1 Camp. 94. On the other hand, it 
 by 17 Geo. III. c. 57; 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 59, appears to have been taken for granted by the 
 Ir. ; 15 & 16 Vic. c. 12; see Phillips on Copy- Court of King's Bench, in the case of Tliomp- 
 right, c. 8. son v. Symonds (5 T. R. 41), though it became 
 
 5 In Blackwell 8. Harper (2 Atk. 93. 95, unnecessary to decide the point, that both the 
 Barn. 210, 213), Lord Hardwicke was of (.pinion name and the date should appear ; and in Har- 
 that the clause in the Act was only directory, rison v. Hogg (2 Ves. Jr. 327), Lord Alvanley 
 and that the property was vested absolutely M. R. stated that he inclined to differ from 
 in the engraver, so as to entitle him to sue, Lord Hardwicke, and that it was his opinion 
 although the day of publication was not men- that the insertion of the name and date was 
 tioned, and compared it to the clause under the essential to the plaintiff's right. The Copy- 
 Statute of Anne (8 Anne, c. 19, repealed by 5 & right Act of 5 & 6 Vic. c. 45, as to books, has 
 6 Vic. c. 45), which required entry at Stationers' been held to include engravings in books ; so 
 Hall; upon the construction of which it had been that the provisions of 8 Geo. II. c. 13, need 
 determined that the property vests, although not, in such case, be complied with. Bogue 
 the direction had not been complied with. v. Houlston, 5 De G. & S. 267; 16 Jur. 372. 
 Lord Ellenborough also held, at nisi priits Under this Act, however, payment for an 
 (Beckford v. Hood, 7 T. R. 620, and see Buller article written for a periodical must be alleged. 
 >• Walker, cited 2 Atk. 94), that an action Richardson v. Gilbert, 1 Sim. N". S. 336; 15 
 might be maintained, although the proprietor's Jur. 389; but see Phillips on Copyright, 176. 
 
 agreement, upon parol proof of mistake, and cificallv performed. Olley t>. Fisher, 34 Ch. 
 then order such rectified agreement to be spe- D. 367. 
 
 367
 
 368 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 alleged; because matters that "lie in grant," according to the legal 
 phrase, can pass by deed only. 1 
 
 In stating deeds or other written instruments in a bill, it is usual 
 to refer to the instrument itself, in some such words as the follow- 
 ing, namely, "as by the said indenture, when ■produced, will appear." 
 The effect of such a reference is to make the whole document referred to 
 part of the record. It is to be observed, that it does not make it evi- 
 dence : in order to make a document evidence, it must, if not admitted, 
 be proved in the usual way ; but the effect of referring to it is to enable 
 the plaintiff to rely upon every part of the instrument, and to prevent 
 his being precluded from availing himself, at the hearing, 2 of any por- 
 tion, either of its recital or operative part, which may not be inserted in 
 the bill, or which may be inaccurately set out. Thus, it seems that a 
 plaintiff may, by his bill, state simply the date and general purport of 
 
 any particular deed or instrument under which he claims, and 
 * 368 that such statement, provided it is accompanied by * a reference 
 
 to the deed itself, will be sufficient. 1 It is always necessary, in 
 drawing bills, to state the case of the plaintiff clearly, though succinctly, 
 upon the record ; and in doing this, care should be taken to set out pre- 
 cisely those deeds which are relied upon, and those parts of the deeds 
 which are most important to the case. 2 (a) 
 
 Although the same precision of statement is not required in bills in 
 
 Adams, 29 Ark. 346; City of Los Angeles ». 
 Signoret, 50 Cal. 298. But see Howard Man. 
 Co. v. Water Lot Co. 53 Ga. 689. See also 
 Moses v. Brodie, 1 Tenn. Ch. 397. 
 
 1 See Pauncefort v. Lord Lincoln, 1 Dick. 
 
 i Stephen on PI. 239. In Henning v. Willis 
 (3 Wood, 29, 2 E. & Y. 188), where the plaintiff 
 filed a bill for tithes, and set up by way of title 
 a parol demise by the impropriator for one year, 
 the defendant demurred for want of title in the 
 plaintiff, and the plaintiff submitted to the de- 
 murrer. Lpon the same ground, in Jackson v. 
 Benson (M'Clel. 62 ; 13 Price, 131 ), where the bill 
 prayed an account of tithes, and merely stated 
 that the impropriate rector demised the tithes 
 to him, a demurrer, put in by the defendant, 
 was considered to be well founded; and in 
 Williams v. Jones (Younge, 252 ; see ante, 
 p. 211), the same objection was taken at the 
 hearing, and would have prevailed, had it not 
 appeared that the impropriators had originally 
 been made parties to the suit, but had been 
 dismissed in consequence of their having dis- 
 claimed all interest in the tithes in question. 
 
 2 But on the argument of a demurrer, he 
 cannot avail himself of the portion not set out. 
 Harmer ». Gooding, 3 De G. & S. 407, 410; 
 Cuddon ». Tite, 1 Giff. 395; 4 Jur. X. S. 579. 
 
 Exhibits are no part of the pleiding, and a 
 defect in matter of substance cannot be supplied 
 by reference to an exhibit attached to, and 
 made a part of, the complaint. Stilwell v. 
 
 362, where the plaintiff's claims were founded 
 on a variety of deeds, wills, and other instru- 
 ments, but to avoid expense, or for some other 
 purpose, the dates and general purport onlv of 
 such instruments were stated in the bill, with 
 reference to them. This manner of stating the 
 ca-e was not apparently considered as a ground 
 of objection to the bill ; but when the cause was 
 brought to a hearing, Sir Thomas Clarke M. 
 R. referred it to the Master to state the rights 
 claimed by the plaintiff under the several instru- 
 ments mentioned in the bill, and reserved costs 
 and further directions until after the report, and 
 the cause was afterwards heard, and a decree 
 made, on the report, which stated the instru- 
 ments. It is obvious that the method of stating 
 the plaintiff's title adopted in this case was one 
 of great inconvenience; and although it has 
 been referred to here, it is by no means from a 
 wish to recommend its adoption as a precedent. 
 2 Martin v. McBryde, 3 Ired. Eq. 531; King 
 v. Trice, id. 568. 
 
 (n) Questions of variance, as whether a 
 written instrument not annexed to the bill is 
 correctly set out therein, cannot be raised by 
 demurrer. Bromberg v. Heyet, 69 Ala. 22 A 
 po-ition for specific performance should allege 
 the material parts or effect of the contract, and 
 
 368 
 
 not merely refer to it as an exhibit. Guada- 
 lupe County v. Johnston (Texas), 20 S. W. Rep. 
 833. A bill which does not set forth a copy or 
 the terms of a written instrument which is vital 
 to the plaintiff's claim is demurrable. Marshall 
 v. Turnbull, 34 Fed. Rep. 827.
 
 FORM OF THE BILL. 
 
 369 
 
 Equity as in pleadings at Law, yet it is absolutely necessary that such 
 a degree of certainty should be adopted as may serve to give the defend- 
 ant full information of the case which he is called upon to meet. 8 In 
 several cases, demurrers have been allowed to bills on the ground of the 
 vagueness and uncertainty of their statements. 4 Upon the same 
 principle, a mere allegation that the * defendant is a trustee for * 309 
 the plaintiff, not supported by the facts stated, will not prevent a 
 demurrer; * (a) and so a statement that a defendant claimed an interest 
 as purchaser under an alleged agreement, but that such agreement, if 
 an}', had been long since abandoned and waived, was held insufficient to 
 prevent a demurrer by that defendant. 2 However, where in a bill for 
 specific performance of an agreement to take an assignment of a lease, 
 the plaintiff stated a covenant in the lease not to assign without license 
 of the lessor, and did not aver that the plaintiff had or could obtain such 
 
 3 See Kunkel v. Markell, 26 Md. 408; Droul- 
 lard v. Baxter, 1 Scam. 192; Rogers v. Ward, 
 8 Allen, 387; Chapman v. Hunt, 14 N. J. Eq. 
 149; White v. Empire Ass. Co. L. R. 6 Eq. 23; 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 240, etseq. General certainty 
 is sufficient in pleadings in Equity. Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 253; ante, 360-362, notes; Prescott v. 
 Everts, 4 Wis. 314; Paterson & Hud. R. R. 
 Co. v. Jersey City, 9 N. J. Eq. 434; Randolph 
 v. Daly, 16 N. J. Eq. 313, 318; O'Hare v. Down- 
 ing, 130 Mass. 16. Less certainty is required 
 where the object of the bill is the discovery of 
 material facts alleged to be entirely in the de- 
 fendant's knowledge. Watson v. Murray, 23 
 N J. Eq. 257. In Cresset v. Mitton (1 Ves. Jr. 
 450; 3 Bro. C. C. 482; and see Philipps r. 
 Philipps, 4 Q. B. D. 127; R. S. C. Ord. XIX. 4, 
 18; XXVII. 1), Lord Thurlow said, "Special 
 pleading depends upon the good sense of the 
 thing, and so does pleading here ; and though 
 pleadings in this Court run into a great deal of 
 
 («) Wilson v. Polk County, 112 Mo. 126. 
 The statement that one is "owner"' may be a 
 mere general claim, not admitted by a demurrer. 
 O'Keefe c. Cannon, 52 Fed. Rep. 898; Ratcliff 
 v. Stretch, 130 Ind. 282; see Ely v. New Mexico 
 & A. R. Co. 129 U. S. 291. " The ownership 
 should be alleged as existing when the bill was 
 tiled. Krick v. Jansen, 52 Fed. Rep. 823. So, 
 the allegation that one is " heir" is insufficient; 
 the chain of title should be shown. Palmer v. 
 Palmer, [1892] 1 Q. B. 319. 
 
 A general allegation of "irreparable injury" 
 in an injunction bill is insufficient. Cresap v. 
 Kemble, 26 W. Va. 603; Farland t>. Wood, 35 
 id. 458 ; Mead v. Stirling, 62 Conn. 586; Wil- 
 lingham v. King, 23 Fla. 478. Insolvency, as a 
 jurisdictional fact, should not be merely averred, 
 but the facts and circumstances must be alleged. 
 Atlantic'Trust Co. v. Cons. El. Storage Co. 49 
 N. J. Eq. 402; see Dunsback t>. Collar, 95 Mich. 
 611. An allegation in a complaint that a person 
 "agreed" to do a thing, sufficiently imports 
 that lie agreed in writing, if a writing is neces- 
 sary to the validity of the agreement. Jenkin- 
 
 vol l — 24 
 
 unnecessary verbiage, yet there must be some- 
 thing substantial ; " and in Lord Redesdale's 
 Treatise (p. 41) it is said that the rights of the 
 several parties, the injury comphiined of, and 
 every other necessary circumstance, as time, 
 place, niiinner, or other incidents, ought to be 
 plainly, yet succinctly, alleged. 
 
 * Wormald v. De Lisle, 3 Beav. 18; Boyd 
 v. Moyle, 2 Coll. 316, 323; Kelly v. Rogers, 1 
 Jur. N. S. 514, V. C. W.; see also Vernon v. 
 Vernon, 2 M. & C. 145, 171; Reed v. O'Brien, 
 7 Beav. 32, 37, 39 ; Darthez v. Clemens, 6 Beav. 
 165, 169; Parker v. Nickson, 4 Giff. 306; 9 Jur. 
 N. S. 196; Aff'd id. 451 ; 1 De G. J. & S. 177 ; 
 Carew v. Johnston, 2 Sell. & Lef. 280; but see 
 Chouteau v. Rice, 1 Minn. 106. 
 
 i Jackson v. The North Wales Ry. Co. 6 
 Rail. Cas. 112; 13 Jur. 69; Steedman c. Marsh, 
 2 Jur. N. S. 391, V. C W.; Murray v. Lord 
 Clarendon, L. R. 9 Eq. 11. 
 
 2 Hodgson v. Espinasse, 10 Beav. 473, 477. 
 
 son v. Vermillion (S. D.), 52 N. W. Rep. 1066. 
 So a general allegation of performance of an 
 agreement may be insufficient. Short r. Kieffer, 
 142 III. 258. So also "wrongfully " may be a 
 mere legal conclusion. Wallaces. Railroad Co. 
 34 S. C. 62. And so of the words " falsely 
 and fraudulently." Wrights. Bourdon, 50 Vt. 
 494. 
 
 A bill which relies upon inferences and suspi- 
 cions, and is so vague that a decree could not 
 be framed upon it, if it were taken pro confi iso, 
 is demurrable. Huntington v. Saunders, 14 
 Fed. Rep. 907. So if it does not distinctly 
 show a right to equitable relief. Dwight v. 
 Smith. 20 Blatch. 210. Or if the allegations of 
 fact do not accord with the specific relief which 
 is sought. Edson v. Girvan. 29 Hun. 422. A 
 bill which alleges that a certain Court entered 
 a "pretended decree," as to which no evidence 
 is put in, admits a valid decree. Bowman v. 
 Ash, 143 111. 649. Outstanding equities of 
 strangers, which are immaterial as between the 
 parties to the suit, need not be set forth. Hoi* 
 comb v. Mosher, 50 Mich. 252. 
 
 369
 
 370 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 a license, there being no statement of a proviso for re-entry on default, 
 the Court overruled the demurrer, and, at the hearing, directed a refer- 
 ence to inquire whether the plaintiff could make a good title. 3 
 
 Where time is material, 4 it ought to be alleged with such a degree of 
 accuracy as may prevent any possibility of doubt as to the period in- 
 tended to be defined. 6 Thus, in prescribing for a modus in a bill, it is 
 necessary that a time for the payment of it should 'be mentioned; 6 and, 
 formerly, it appears to have been considered, that not only the day of 
 payment should be mentioned, but that laying the day of payment on or 
 about a particular day was too uncertain. 7 In ordinary cases, however, 
 the laying of an event on or about a certain day of a certain month or 
 year, is a sufficient specification of time. In the case of Leigh v. Leigh 8 
 the bill prayed that the defendant might be restrained from setting up a 
 
 term of five hundred years, in bar of an action of ejectment which the 
 * 370 plaintiff had brought against the present * possessor, and alleged 
 
 that the plaintiff's title accrued on the death of an individual 
 named, which happened on or about the 2d July, 1806. The defendant 
 demurred, on the ground that the period alleged in the bill, as the time 
 of the death of the individual named, was more than twenty years (the 
 period required by the Stat. 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, §§ 2, 24, to bar suits) 
 before the filing of the bill, which took place in 1834. When the demur- 
 rer was first argued, Sir Lancelot Shadwell V. C. was of opinion that 
 the words, " on or about the 2d July, 1806," did not fix any precise date, 
 and that it might mean many years before or many years after that 
 time ; and overruled the demurrer. Upon appeal, however, the Lords 
 Commissioner, Pepys and Bosanquet, reversed the decision, being of 
 opinion, that, from the known and accepted use of the expression, " on 
 or about," in all the ordinary transactions of life, it was sufficiently 
 definite for all the purposes of demurrer, and did satisfactorily set out 
 the fact that the person named died in the year 1806. * 
 
 8 Smith v. Capron, 7 Hare, 185. 
 
 4 On the subject of the materiality of time, 
 see Seton v. Slade, 7 Sumner's Ves. 265, Per- 
 kins's note; Marquis of Hertford v. Boore, 5 id. 
 719, note («), and cases cited ; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. 
 § 776, and notes; Richmond v. Gray, 3 Allen, 
 25. 
 
 In Equity, time is often regarded as not of 
 the essence of a contract. Snowman v. Har- 
 ford, 55 Maine, 197 ; Hull v. Noble, 40 Maine, 
 459 ; Rogers v. Saunders, 1G Maine, 92. But 
 where it is of the essence, it will be insisted on 
 as well in Equity as at Law. Merritt v. Brown, 
 19 N. J. Eq. 293. It is of the essence of a con- 
 tract, either when, from the nature or subject- 
 matter of the contract, it is material that it 
 should be performed at the time, or when the 
 contract, by express stipulations, makes it of 
 the essence, and releases the other party upon 
 failure to comply within the time. Fry Specif. 
 Perf. §§ 711, 713; Benedick v. Lynch, 1 John. 
 Ch. 370 ; Wells r. Smith, 7 Paige, 22; Grigg 
 v. Landis, 19 N. J. Eq. 353, 354; Pickering v. 
 Pickering, 38 N. H. 400 ; Pennock v. Ela, 189, 
 
 370 
 
 191. In all cases of an agreement to convey 
 lands, where the value of the property con- 
 cerned has materially changed, or where great 
 financial changes have materially altered the 
 relative value of money and land, time will be 
 considered material, and a party will not be 
 allowed to lie by until the change sets in his 
 favor, and then ask for specific performance. 
 Young v. Rath bone, 16 N. J. Eq. 224. 
 
 5 See Saum v. Stingley, 3 Clarke (Iowa), 
 514. 
 
 6 Goddard v. Keeble, Bunb. 105; Phillips 
 v. Symes, id. 171. 
 
 'Blacket v. Finney, Bunb. 198. 
 
 8 Before the Lords Commissioners, Aug. 6 
 and 8, 1835. 
 
 1 See also Richards v. Evans, 1 Ves. Sr. 
 39; Roberts v. Williams, 12 East, 33; see as to 
 words "shortly after," Baker v. Wetton, 14 
 Sim. 426 ; 9 Jur. 98 ; as to words "soon after," 
 Edsell v. Buchman, 4 Bro. C. C. 254; and as to 
 the words " more or less," see Cross v. Eglice, 
 2 B. & Ad. 106. 
 . With respect to the certainty required in
 
 FORM OF THE BILL. 
 
 371 
 
 * The principle which requires a sufficient degree of certainty in * 371 
 the statement of a bill, is further illustrated in the case of Stans- 
 bunj v. Arkwright, 1 before referred to, where a bill to restrain a defend- 
 ant from setting up outstanding terms, in bar to the plaintiff's claim at 
 Law, was held to be demurrable, on the ground that it did not allege 
 what sort of term or estate was outstanding. 
 
 The rule which requires a plaintiff to employ such a degree of cer- 
 tainty in setting out his case as may enable the defendant to ascertain 
 the precise grounds upon which it is based, applies to all cases in which 
 a person seeks relief upon a general allegation of error, without specify- 
 ing particulars. 2 A plaintiff seeking to surcharge and falsify a settled 
 account must specify in his statement of claim at least one important 
 error, and must also allege generally that there are other errors even 
 though the settlement of the account is expressed to be, " errors excepted," 
 which is the usual form observed in settling accounts. 8 A person seek- 
 ing to open a settled account must specify in his claim either errors of 
 
 setting out the other incidents in the plaintiffs 
 case, the following eases wili serve to show 
 what degree of it is required under the circum- 
 stances to which they refer. In the case of 
 Cresset v. Mitton (3 Bro. C. C. 481 ; 1 Ves. Jr. 
 449), before alluded to, a bill had been filed to 
 perpetuate testimony to a right of common and 
 of way, and it stated " that the tenants, owners, 
 and occupiers of the said lands, messuages, 
 tenements, and hereditaments, in right there- 
 of or otherwise, have, from time whereof the 
 memory of man is not to the contrary, had, 
 and of right ought to have," &c. To this bill a 
 demurrer was put in, one of the grounds for 
 which was, that it was not stated as to what 
 messuages in particular the rights of common 
 and of way were claimed; and, in allowing the 
 demurrer, Lord Thurlow said, "You have not 
 stated whether the right of way and common 
 is appurtenant and appendant to the land, that 
 you hold ; and you state it loosely that you have 
 such right as belonging to your estate, or other- 
 wise, so that your bill is to have a commission 
 to try any right of common and way whatever." 
 The same doctrine appears to have been held 
 by Lord Keeper North, in Gell v. Hay ward, 1 
 Vern. 312, who, upon a bill to perpetuate the 
 testimony of witnesses touching a right of way, 
 held, that in such a bill the way ought to be 
 laid exactly per et trans, as in a declaration at 
 Law. And so, in Ryves v. Ryves, 3 Ves. 343, 
 where a bill was riled for a discovery of title- 
 deeds, relating to lands in the possession of the 
 defendant, and for the delivery of the posses- 
 sion of such lands to the plaintiff, upon a loose 
 allegation that, under some deeds in the custody 
 of the defendants, the plaintiff was entitled to 
 some interest in estates in their possession, but 
 without stating what the deeds were, or what the 
 property was to which they applied, a demurrer 
 was allowed. See Loker v. Rolle, 3 Ves. 4; 
 
 Eiist India Co. v. Henchman, 1 Ves. Jr. 287, 
 290; and see Houghton v. Reynolds, 2 Hare, 
 264; 7 Jur. 414; Munday V. Knight, 3 Hare, 
 497, and Reporter's note, id. 501; S. C. 8 Jur. 
 904; Hawkins v. Hawkins, VV. N. (1872) 153. 
 In modus suits, see Scott v. Allgood, 3 Gwil. 
 1369; 1 Anst. 16; Atkyns v. Lord Willoughby, 
 3 Gwil. 1412; Baker v. Athill, 3 Gwil. 1423; 
 2 Anst. 491. 
 
 1 6 Sim. 481, 485 ; see Hamp v. Robinsr.n, 3 
 De G. J. & S. 97. 
 
 a Taylor v. Haylin, 2 Bro. C. C. 310; 1 Cox, 
 435; Johnson v. Curtis, 3 Bro. C. C. 266; Cock- 
 rell v. Gurley, 26 Ala. 405; Prestidge v. Pendle- 
 ton, 24 Miss. 80; Caton v. Willis, 5 Ired. Eq. 
 335; Prescott v. Everts, 4 Wis. 314; Dennis v. 
 Dennis, 15 Md. 73; Meshaw v. Meshaw, 2 Md. 
 Ch. 12; Walton v. Cody, 1 Wis. 420; Connors 
 v. Connors, 4 Wis. 112; Badger r. Badger, 2 
 Wall. 87 ; Threldkeld r. Dobbins, 45 Ga. 144. 
 
 3 Davies v. Spurling, Tarn. 199, 211; Law- 
 less v. Mansfield, 1 D. & War. 557; Gething o. 
 Keighley, 9 Ch. D. 547, 550; and see Johnson 
 v. Curtis, 3 Bro. C C. 266; Parkinson v. Han- 
 bury, L. R. 2 H. L. 1; 2 De G. J. & S. 450; 
 Cnthbert v. Edinborough, 21 VV. R. 98; Wal- 
 Hngford r. Mutual Society, 5 App. Cas. 685; 
 Whyte v. Ahrens, 26 Ch. D. 717; 1 Story, Eq. 
 Jur.*§§ 523, 527; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 251, 800; 
 Calvit v. Markham, 3 How. (Miss.) 343 ; Mebane 
 v. Mebane, 1 Ind. Eq. 403; De Montmorency 
 v. Devereux, 1 Dru. & W. 119; Leaycraft v. 
 Dempsey, 15 Wend. 83; Baker v. Biddle, 1 
 Bald. 394, 418; Bainbridge v. Wilcocks, id. 
 536, 540; Consequa v. Fanning, 3 John. Ch. 
 587; S. C. 17 John. 511; Taylor v. Haylin, 2 
 Bro. C. C. (Perkins's ed.) 311, note (a), and 
 cases cited ; Brownell v. Brownell, 2 id. 63, 
 note (a) ; Preston v. Stuart, 29 Gratt. 289 ; but 
 see Shugart v. Thompson, 10 Leigh, 434. 
 
 371
 
 *372 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 considerable extent both in number and amount, 4 or at least one impor- 
 tant error of a fraudulent nature. 5 Where a plaintiff files a bill for a 
 general account, and the defendant sets forth a stated one, the plaintiff 
 must either by amendment of his bill, 6 or it seems by his reply, 7 allege 
 grounds for impeaching the account, because a stated account is prima 
 facie a bar till the particular errors in it are assigned. Upon the same 
 ground it has been held, that an award is a bar to a bill brought for any 
 of the matters intended to be bound by it ; and that if a bill is filed to 
 set aside the award as not being final, the specific objections to it must 
 be stated upon the bill. 8 
 
 It is to be remarked, that in most of the cases above cited, 
 * 372 the * question has come before the Court upon demurrer, which 
 seems to be the proper way in which a defendant ought to take 
 the objection that a bill is deficient in certainty; if he neglects to do 
 so, it seems that he cannot avail himself of the objection at the 
 hearing. 1 
 
 Conclusions of law should not in general be averred ; but where cer- 
 tain facts are stated from which it is intended to draw a conclusion of 
 law, the bill ought to be so framed as to give notice to the defendant of 
 the plaintiff's intention to insist on such conclusion ; otherwise, he may 
 not be allowed to do so. Thus, in a bill for specific performance of an 
 agreement to sell a leasehold, the plaintiff was not allowed to insist that 
 the defendant had waived his right to inquire into the landlord's title, 
 because, although he had stated in his bill facts from which the waiver 
 might be inferred, he had not alleged the waiver. 2 (a) 
 
 4. Charge of Confederacy. 
 
 It was formerly customary in almost every bill to introduce a general 
 charge of confederacy against the defendants. 3 There is no such state- 
 
 4 Williamson v. Barbour, 9 Ch.D. 529, M. R. 
 
 5 Taylor v. Haylin, 2 Bro. C. C. 310; Miller 
 v. Craig, 6 Beav* 433; Pitt v. Clay, id. 503; 
 Allfrey v. Allfrey, 1 M'N. & G.87; Coleman v. 
 Mellersh, 2 id. 309; Gething v. Keighley, 9 Ch. 
 D. 547; and as to alleging fraud in such cases, 
 see Wallingford v. Mutual Society, 5 App. Cas. 
 685. 
 
 6 See R. S. C. App. C. No. 9, n.; Hoyt v. 
 Clarkson (Or.), 31 Pac. 198 ; Dawson v. Dawson, 
 1 Atk. 1; Brown v. Vandyke, 4 Halst. Ch. 
 (N. J.) 795; McClelland v. West, 70 Penn. St. 
 183. This rule supposes that an account has 
 been given by the defendant. Vandyke v. 
 Brown, 4 Halst. Ch. (N. J.) 657. As to what 
 is a sufficient allegation of an account stated, 
 McFarland v. Gutter, 1 Mon. T. 383; Bouslog 
 v. Garrett, 39 Ind. 338. And what is an account 
 stated, Stanton v. Jerome, 54 N. Y. 480. As 
 
 (a) A waiver should in general be pleaded, 
 if relied upon; but a waiver of an incidental 
 requirement, not affecting the merits, ma)' be 
 proved, although not pleaded. Pioneer Manuf. 
 
 372 
 
 to what are settled accounts, see Croft v. Gra- 
 ham, 5 Giff. 1 ; 2 De G. J. & S. 155. And see, 
 as to how far stated accounts are binding on 
 the party making them, Schletter v. Smith, 
 34 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 17; White v. Campbell, 21 
 Mich. 463. The defendant in an action on an 
 account stated may plead and prove that the 
 whole claim was founded upon an illegal trans- 
 action. Dunbar v. Johnson, 108 Mass. 119. As 
 to the allegations in a claim against a husband 
 for his wife's antenuptial debts, see Matthews 
 v. Whittle, 13 Ch. D. 811; 37 & 38 Vic. c. 50. 
 
 1 See Hall v. Eve, 4 Ch. D. 341. 
 8 Routh v. Peach, 2 Anst. 519. 
 
 i Carew v. Johnston, 2 Sch. & Lef. 280. 
 
 2 Clive v. Beaumont, 1 De G. & S. 397; 13 
 Jur. 226; Gaston v. Frankum, 2 De G. & S. 
 561; 16 Jur. 507; ante, p. 321. 
 
 3 See Barton, 33, note (1); Cooper, Eq. P). 
 
 Co. v. Phoenix Ass. Co. 110 N. C. 176. Delay 
 or inaction does not constitute a waiver, although 
 it may be evidence thereof. Selwyn v. Garfit, 
 38 Ch. D. 273, 284.
 
 FORM OF THE BILL. * 373 
 
 merit in the model of a bill given by the General Orders, and it is 
 scarcely necessary to say that such a charge would now, except under 
 very special circumstances, be deemed idle and impertinent. 
 
 5. Charging Part} 
 
 It was formerly the practice of pleaders in Equity to state the plain- 
 tiff's case in the bill very concisely, and then if any matter was intro- 
 duced into the defendant's plea or answer which made it necessary 
 for the plaintiff to put in issue, on his part, some additional 
 * fact in avoidance of such new matter, such new fact was placed * 373 
 upon the record by means of a special replication. In order to 
 avoid the inconvenience, delay, and unnecessary length of pleading, aris- 
 ing from this course of proceeding, the practice grew up when the plain- 
 tiff was aware at the time of filing his bill of any defence which might 
 be made to it, and had any matter to allege which might avoid the 
 effect of such defence, to insert an allegation that the defendants pre- 
 tend, or set up such and such allegations by way of defence, and then to 
 aver the matter used to avoid it in the form of charge. This was com- 
 monly called the charging part of the bill, and its introduction into 
 practice, in all probability, led to the discontinuance of special replica- 
 tions, by enabling the plaintiff to state his case, and to bring forward the 
 matter to be alleged in reply to the defence at the same time, and that 
 without making any admission on the part of the plaintiff, of the truth 
 of the defendant's case. Thus, if a bill were filed on any equitable 
 ground, by an heir who apprehended his ancestor had made a will, he 
 might state his title as heir, and alleging the will by way of pretence o:\ 
 the part of the defendants claiming under it, make it a part of his case 
 without admitting it. 
 
 Such was the origin of what was called the charging part in a bill, 
 and there is no doubt that in many cases it is still convenient, and may 
 be made the means of enabling the plaintiff to state his answer to some 
 anticipated defence, or to guard his statement by allegations which 
 
 10; 1 Hoff. Ch Pr. 41. The general charge of defraud the plaintiff. By the 7th Chancery 
 
 fraudulent combination, &c, is not sufficie tto Rule in Massachusetts, it is provided, that the 
 
 charge fraud; there must be a specific allega- common charge of fraud or combination shall 
 
 tion of fraud, stating the facts. Lewis v. Lewis, be omitted, except in cases where it is intended 
 
 9 Mo. 18-J ; but see Farnham v. Brooks, 9 Pick. to charge fraud and combination specifically. 
 
 212,219. Although the charye of confederacy See Adams r. Porter. 1 Ciish. 170. And in 
 
 is now usually, but not invariably, inserted in New Hampshire, it is held that the allegation 
 
 bills, yet it is treated as mere surplusage; so of confederacy is not essential, except where it 
 
 much so, that it is said that the general charge is intended to charge fraud and combination 
 
 of combination need not be (although it usually specifically. Stone v. Anderson, 26 N. H. 506. 
 
 is) denied or responded to in the answer, when And by rule of Court in that State, the charge 
 
 charged in the bill; for it is mere impertinence, of confederacy may be omitted. Ch. Rid.- 3; 
 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 29. By the 21st Equity Rule 38 N. H. 605. Appx. In Maine it must lie 
 
 of the Supreme Court of the United States, omitted. Ch. Rule 1. 37 Maine, 581. 
 
 January term, 1842, it is provided that the 4 The form of such a charge is given in Van 
 
 plaintiff shall be at liberty to omit at his option Heythuysen's Equity Draftsman, p. 5, and in 
 
 the part which is usually called the common Barton, p. 34; Story, Eq. PI §§ 31, 33, and 
 
 confedency clause of the bill, averring a con- notes. As to unconnected charges, see Thomp- 
 
 federacy between the defendants to injure or son v. Moxev, 47 N. J. Eq. 538. 
 
 373
 
 374 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 could not conveniently be inserted in the text. The model of a bill, 1 
 it will be observed, contains no charging part, and such a mode of state- 
 ment can never be said to be absolutely necessary ; 2 but there are 
 cases where it may still be useful, though the comparative simplicity 
 of modern pleading will diminish most materially the occasions for 
 
 its use. 8 
 * 374 * Bills used formerly to contain a precise averment of juris- 
 diction in the Court. This is now obsolete, and was never ab- 
 solutely requisite. 1 
 
 6. Interrogating Part. 
 
 The interrogating part of a bill was an almost invariable accompani- 
 ment to a bill, until the statutes amending the practice of the Court 
 of Chancery, 2 by which it was enacted, "that the bill of complaint shall 
 
 i Vol. ill. 
 
 2 Story, Eq. PI. §§ 32, 32 a, 33, and note. 
 By the Equity Rules of the U. S. Supreme 
 Court the plaintiff is at liberty to omit, at his 
 option, what is commonly called the charging 
 part of the bill, setting forth the matters of ex- 
 cuses which the defendant is supposed to intend 
 to set up, by way of defence to the bill. And 
 the plaintiff may, in the narrative or stating 
 part of his bill, state and avoid, by counter 
 averments, at his option, any matter or thing 
 which he supposes will be insisted upon by the 
 defendant, by way of defence or excuse, to the 
 case made by the plaintiff for relief. Rule 21. 
 So in New Hampshire. Ch. Rule 3, 38 N. H. 
 605. 
 
 Chancery Rule 7 in Massachusetts provides 
 that the plaintiff, when his case requires it, may 
 allege by way of charge, any particular fact, 
 for the purpose of putting it in issue. 
 
 3 See Aiken v. Ballard, Rice, Eq. 13; M'Crea 
 v. Purmort, 16 Wend. 460; Hawley v. Wolver- 
 ton, 5 Paige, 522 ; Mechanics' Bank v. Levy, 
 3 Paige, 606; Stafford v. Brown. 4 Paige. 88; 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 31; Parker v. Carter, 4 Munf. 
 273 ; 1 Hoff. Cli. Pr. 42. If the plaintiff wishes 
 to obtain a discovery of facts to anticipate and 
 rebut the defence which may be set up by the 
 defendant, he should, in the charging part of 
 the bill, state the anticipated defence as a pre- 
 tence of the defendant, and then charge the 
 real facts to lay a foundation for the discov- 
 ery which is sought. Stafford v. Brown, 4 
 Paige, 88. 
 
 "Another very important rule," says Mr. 
 Justice Story, " as to the frame of hills, seems 
 now established in England ; and tint is, if 
 the bill means to rely upon any confessions, 
 conversations, or admissions of the defendant, 
 either written or oral, as proof of any fact 
 charged in the bill (as, for example, of fraud), 
 
 374 
 
 the bill must expressly charge what such con- 
 fessions, conversations, or admissions are, and 
 to whom made ; otherwise no evidence thereof 
 will be admitted at the hearing." "Whether 
 the like rule will be allowed to prevail in 
 America, may be deemed open to much doubt." 
 See Story, Eq. PI. § 265 a, and the cases cited 
 in notes, for a more full statement of the rule 
 and the reasons of it. In Smith v. Burnham, 
 2 Sumner, 612, it was held that the confessions, 
 admissions, and conversations of the defend- 
 ant need not be expressly charged in a bill in 
 Equity, in order to entitle the plaintiff to use 
 them in proof of facts charged, and in issue 
 therein. See Bishop v. Bishop, 13 Ala. 475. 
 
 If the bill is sworn to, it is perjury for the 
 plaintiff knowingly to make a false charge or 
 averment in the charging, as much as if he 
 makes a false statement in the stating part. 
 Smith p. Clark, 4 Paige, 368. 
 
 i See Story, Eq. PI. § 34; Botsford v. Burr, 
 11 Conn. 369." By the 21st Equity Rule of the 
 U. S. Supreme Court, January term, 1842, the 
 plaintiff, in his bill, shall be at liberty to omit, 
 at his option, what is commonly called the juris- 
 diction clause of the bill, viz., "that the acts 
 complained of are contrary to Equity," &c. 
 So in New Hampshire. Ch. Rule 3, 38 N. H. 
 605, Appx. In all bills in Equity in the Courts 
 of the United States, the citizenship should ap- 
 pear on the face of the bill, to entitle the Court 
 to take jurisdiction; otherwise the bill will be 
 dismissed. Dodge v. Perkins, 4 Mason, 435; 
 Bingham v. Cabot, 3 Dall. 382; Jackson v. 
 Ashton, 8 Peters, 148; Vose r. Philbrook, 3 
 Story, 335; see Louisville and N. R. R. Co. v. 
 Stetson, 2 How. (U. S) 497; Winnipiseogee 
 Lake Co. v. Worster, 29 N. H. 433, 443, 444. 
 For a form of the averment of jurisdiction, see 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 34, in note. 
 
 2 A bill which wholly omits the interroga-
 
 FORM OF THE BILL. 
 
 377 
 
 not contain any interrogatories for the examination of the defend- 
 ant." 8 * It was always the rule that the interrogatories must in all * 377 
 
 tory part, is said to be defective in Shedd v. 
 Gartield, 5 Vt. 39. But it is not regarded as 
 absolutely necessary by Mr. Justice Story, Eq. 
 PI. § 38, though often highly useful to sift the 
 conscience of the defendant, and almost uni- 
 versal in practice. Ibid. See also Eberly v. 
 Gross, 21 Penn. 251. By Ch. Rule 7 in Massa- 
 chusetts, the plaintiff, when his case requires 
 it, may propose specific interrogatories. See 
 Belknap v. Stone, 1 Allen, 572. In New Hamp- 
 shire, " the prayer for an answer and for an- 
 swers to interrogatories, except where the 
 plaintiff relies on the discovery of the defend- 
 ant, may be omitted." Ch. Rule 3, 38 N. H. 
 605, Appx. In Maine, "a general interroga- 
 tory only shall be introduced, and it shall be 
 sufficient to require a full answer to all the mat- 
 ters alleged." Rule 1, 37 Maine, 581, Appx. 
 As to what is, or amounts to, the general inter- 
 rogatory, see Ames v. King, 9 Allen, 258. 
 
 Interrogatories appended to the bill, based 
 on the statements therein made, will be re- 
 garded as incorporated in the bill. Romaine v. 
 Hendrickson, 24 N. J. Eq. 231. 
 
 3 Ante, p. 319. By 15 & 16 Vic. c. 80, § 12, 
 it was enacted, that " within a time to be limited 
 by a General Order of the Lord Chancellor in 
 that behalf, the plaintiff in any suit in the said 
 Court commenced by bill may, if he requires 
 an answer from any defendant thereto, rile in 
 the Record Office of the said Court interroga- 
 tories for the examination of the defendant 
 or defendants, or such of them from whom he 
 shall require an answer, and deliver to the de- 
 fendant or defendan's so required to answer, or 
 to his or their solicitor, a copy of such inter- 
 rogatories, or of such of them as shall be appli- 
 cable to the particular defendant or defend- 
 ants; and no defendant shall be called upon or 
 required to put in any answer to a bill unless 
 interrogatories shall have been so filed, and a 
 cop3' thereof delivered to him or his solicitor, 
 within the time so to be limited, or within such 
 further time as the Court shall think fit to di- 
 rect." It is sufficient if the interrogatories are 
 left at the solicitor's office without being deliv- 
 ered to him personally. Bowen v. Price, 2 De 
 G. M. & G. 899. 
 
 By the 15th and following General Orders of 
 the 7th of August, 1852, it was directed that: — 
 
 "The interrogatories for the examination of 
 the defendant to a bill may be in a form simi- 
 lar to the form set out in Schedule (C.) to these 
 Orders, with such variations as the nature 
 and circumstances of each particular case may 
 require. 
 
 " In cases in which the plaintiff requires an 
 answer to any bill from any defendant or de- 
 fendants thereto, the interrogatories for the 
 
 examination of such defendant or defendants 
 are to be filed within eight days after the time 
 limited for the appearance of such defendant or 
 defendants. 
 
 " If the defendant appear in person, or by 
 his own solicitor, within the time limited for 
 that purpose by the rules of the Court, the 
 plaintiff is, within eight days after the time 
 allowed for such appearance, to deliver to the 
 defendant or defendants so required to answer, 
 or to his or their solicitor or solicitors, a copy 
 of the interrogatories so filed as aforesaid, or of 
 such of them as the particular defendant or 
 defendants shall be required to answer. And 
 the copy so to be delivered is to be examined 
 with the original, and the number of folios 
 counted by the Clerks of Records and Writs, 
 who, on finding that such copy is duly stamped 
 and properly written, are to mark the same as 
 an office copy. 
 
 "If any defendant to a suit commenced by 
 bill do not appear in person, or by his own soli- 
 citor, within the time allowed for that purpose 
 by the rules of the Court, and the plaintiff has 
 filed interrogatories for his examination, the 
 plaintiff may deliver a copy of such interroga- 
 tories so examined and marked as aforesaid, 
 to the defendant, at any time after the time 
 allowed to such defendant to appear, and before 
 his appearance in person or by his own solici- 
 tor; or the plaintiff may deliver a copy of such 
 interrogatories, so examined and marked as 
 aforesaid, to the defendant or his solicitor, after 
 the appearance of such defendant in person or 
 by his own solicitor, but within eight days after 
 such appearance. 
 
 " A defendant required to answer a bill must 
 put in his plea, answer, or demurrer thereto, 
 not demurring alone, within fourteen days from 
 the delivery to him or his solicitor of a copy of 
 the interrogatories which he is required to an- 
 swer; but the Court shall have full power to 
 enlarge the time, from time to time, upon ap- 
 plication being made to the Court for that 
 purpose. 
 
 "After the time allowed by Order 16, for 
 filing interrogatories for the examination of any 
 defendant, no interrogatories are to be filed for 
 the examination of such defendant, without 
 special leave of the Court to be applied for 
 upon notice of motion." 
 
 The form of interrogatories referred to in 
 the 15th Order is as follows : — 
 " In Chancery. 
 
 John Lee' Plaintiff. 
 
 James Styles ) 
 
 and >- Defendants. 
 
 Henry Jones ) 
 
 375
 
 377 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 cases be confined to the substantive charge or allegation, and that 
 the plaintiff cannot extend his interrogatories in such a manner as to 
 
 Interrogatories for the Examination of the 
 
 Above-named Defendants in answer to 
 
 the Plaintiff's Bill of Complaint. 
 
 " 1. Does not the defendant Henry Jones 
 claim to have some charge upon the farm and 
 premises comprised in the indenture of mortgage 
 of the first of May, one thousand eight hundred 
 and fifty, in the plaintiff's bill mentioned? 
 
 "2. What are the particulars of such charge, 
 if any ; the date, nature, and short effect of the 
 security, and what is due thereon? 
 
 "3. Are there or is there any other mort- 
 gages or mortgage, charges or charge, incum- 
 brances or incumbrance, in any and what man- 
 ner affecting the aforesaid premises, or any part 
 thereof V 
 
 "4. Set forth the particulars of such mort- 
 gages or mortgage, charges or charge, incum- 
 brances or incumbrance; the date, nature, and 
 short effect of the security; what is now due 
 thereon; and who is or are entitled thereto 
 respectively ; and when and by whom, and in 
 what manner, every such mortgage, charge, or 
 incumbrance was created. 
 
 " The defendant James Styles is required to 
 answer all these interrogatories. 
 
 "The defendant Henry Jones is required to 
 answer the interrogatories numbered 1 and 2. 
 " Y. Y." 
 (name of counsel.) 
 
 The form of interrogatories given is so pre- 
 cise that it is scarcely necessary to refer to the 
 former practice on the subject. Of course a 
 defendant is not bound to answer anything in 
 the bill to which he is not precisely interrogated. 
 Under Massachusetts Ch. Rule 4, when the case 
 requires it, the plaintiff may propose specific 
 interrogatories. Rule 8 provides that the defend- 
 ant shall be required to answer fully, directly, 
 and particularly to every material allegation in 
 the bill, as if he had been thereto particularly 
 interrogated. See Methodist Episcopal Church 
 v. Jaques, 1 John. Ch. 65. The practice in New 
 Hampshire conforms with the above rule in 
 Massachusetts. Miles v. Miles, 27 N. H. 440. 
 And such is understood to be the practice where 
 there is no rule on the subject. Id. 445; see 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 38; Hagthorp v. Hook, 1 Gill 
 & J. 270; Salmon 0. Claggett, 3 Bland, 125. 
 The general interrogatory is in substance as 
 follows; viz.: "That the defendant may full 
 answer make, to all and singular the premises, 
 fully and particularly, as though the same were 
 repeated and he specially interrogated," &c. 
 See Ames p. King, 9 Allen, 258. By the former 
 English practice the interrogatories, which each 
 
 376 
 
 defendant was required to answer, were specified 
 in a note at the toot of the bill, and such is the 
 rule adopted by the U. S. Supreme Court. 41st 
 Equity Rule, Jan. Term, 1842; Story, Eq. PI. 
 § 847, note. The 98th, 41st, 42d, 43d, and 44th 
 of said Equity Rules declare "that it shall not 
 hereafter be necessary to interrogate a defend- 
 ant specially and particularly upon any state- 
 ment in the bill, unless the plaintiff desires to do 
 so to obtain a discovery;" in which case "the 
 interrogatories contained in the interrogating 
 part of the bill shall be divided as conveniently 
 as may be from each other, and numbered con- 
 secutively, 1, 2, 3, &c, and the interrogatories 
 which each defendant is required to answer shall 
 be specified in a note at the foot of the bill, in the 
 form and to the effect following : that is to say, 
 the defendant (A B) is required to answer the 
 interrogatories numbered respectively 1, 2, 3, 
 &c. ; and the office copy of the bill taken by 
 each defendant shall not contain any interrog- 
 atories, except those which such defendant is 
 so required to answer, unless such defendant 
 shall require to be furnished with a copy of the 
 whole bill." — "The note at the foot of the 
 bill, specifying the interrogatories which each 
 defendant is required to answer, shall be con- 
 sidered and treated as part of the bill, and the 
 addition of any such note to the bill, or any 
 alteration in or addition to such note after the 
 bill is filed, shall be considered and treated as 
 an amendment of the bill." — " Instead of the 
 words of the bill now in use, preceding the in- 
 terrogating part thereof, and beginning with the 
 words, 'To the end, therefore,' there shall here- 
 after be used words in the form and to the effect 
 following: 'To the end, therefore, that the said 
 defendants may, if they can, show why 3'our 
 orator (the plaintiff) should not have the relief 
 hereby prayed, and may, upon their several 
 and respective corporal oaths, and according to 
 the best and utmost of their several knowledge, 
 remembrance, information, and belief, full, true, 
 direct, and perfect answer make to such of the 
 several interrogatories hereinafter numbered 
 and set forth, as by the note hereunder written 
 they are respectively required to answer; that 
 is to say, 1. Whether, &c; 2. Whether, &c* " 
 — "A defendant shall be at liberty, by answer, 
 to decline answering any interrogatory or part 
 of an interrogatory, from answering which he 
 might have protected himself by demurrer; and 
 he shall be at liberty so to decline, notwith- 
 standing he shall answer other parts of the bill, 
 from which he might have protected himself by 
 demurrer." These rules are borrowed from the 
 former English Rules in Chancery upon the 
 same subject. Story, Eq. PI. § 847, note.
 
 FORM OF THE BILL. 
 
 378 
 
 compel a discovery of a distinct matter not included in the allegation 
 or charge ; 1 and there is nothing in the present Orders to affect that 
 principle. 
 
 7. The Prayer for Relief. 
 
 The prayer for relief is generally divided into two parts, namely, the 
 prayer for specific relief, and the prayer for general relief.' 2 
 
 * Although there is no doubt but that a mere prayer for general * 378 
 relief was formerly, in most cases, sufficient to enable the plaintiff 
 to obtain such a decree as his case entitled him to, 1 yet it was the usual 
 practice to precede the request for relief generally, by a statement of the 
 specific nature of the decree which the plaintiff considered himself enti- 
 tled to, under the circumstances of his case ; and now, the plaintiff must 
 specifically pray for the relief to which he may conceive himself enti- 
 
 1 James v. M'Kemon, 6 John. 543 ; Wood- 
 cock v. Bennet, 1 Cowen, 734; Mechanics' 
 Bank v. Levy, 3 Paige, 606 ; Consequa v. Fan- 
 ning, 3 John. Ch. 596; Kisor v. Stancifer, 
 Wright, 323. But a variety of questions may 
 be founded on a single charge, if they are rele- 
 vant to it. Story, Eq. PI. § 37. It may be 
 noticed here, that in Att.-Gen. v. Whonvood, 
 
 1 Ves. 524, where interrogatories in a bill were 
 directed to particular facts, which were not 
 charged in the preceding part, and the de- 
 fendant, though not bound to answer them, did 
 so, and the answer was replied to, Lord Hard- 
 wicke held that the informality in the manner 
 of charging was supplied by the answer, and 
 that the facts were properly put in issue; " for 
 a matter may be put in issue by the answer as 
 well as by the bill, and, if replied to, either 
 party may examine as to it." 1 Ves. 538 ; Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 36. 
 
 2 The latter can never be properly and 
 safely omitted ; because, if the plaintiff should 
 mistake the relief to which he is entitled, in 
 his special prayer, the Court may yet afford 
 him the relief to which he has a right, under 
 the prayer of general relief, provided it is such 
 relief as is agreeable to the case made by the 
 bill. Ld. Red. 39, 45; Coop. Eq. PI. 13, 14; 
 English v. Foxall, 2 Peters, 595; Colton v. Ross, 
 
 2 Paige, 396; Driver v. Fortner, 5 Porter, 10; 
 Thoniason v. Smithson, 7 Porter, 144; Peck v. 
 Peck, 9 Yerger, 301 ; Isaacs v. Steel, 3 Scam. 
 104; Strange v. Watson, 11 Ala. 324; Jordan 
 v.Clarke, 16 N. J. Eq. 243; Simplot )•. Sim- 
 plot, 14 Iowa, 449; Wilson r. Horr, 15 Iowa, 
 489; Espinola v. Blasco, 15 La. Ann. 426; 
 Vandant v. Allmon, 23 III. 30; Graham v. 
 Berryman, 19 N. J. Eq. 29, 34; Read v. Cramer, 
 1 Green Ch. 277; Landis v. Olds, 9 Minn. 90; 
 Lee v. Boutwell, 44 Texas, 151. Relief not 
 specifically prayed is within the general relief. 
 Beaumont v. Boultbee, 5 Sumner's Ves. 485. 
 
 If there is no prayer for general relief, then if 
 the plaintiff should mistake the relief to which 
 he is entitled, no other relief can be granted to 
 him, and his suit must fail, — at least unless an 
 amendment of the prayer is obtained. Driver 
 v. Fortner, 5 Porter, 10; Morrison v. Bowman, 
 29 Cal. 337; Thomason r. Smithson, 7 Porter, 
 144; Peck v. Peck, 9 Yerger, 301; Halsted v. 
 Meeker, 18 N. J. Eq. 136, 139. For a form 
 of prayer for relief in a bill, see Story, Eq. 
 PI. § 40, note, 41, note. If a cause is properly 
 brought for relief which Equity can give, the 
 Court will, under the prayer for general relief, 
 grant other relief appropriate to the facts, al- 
 though such relief could be had at Law. Bul- 
 lock v. Adams, 20 N. J. Eq. 367. And the 
 general prayer will enable the Court to grant 
 any specific relief to which the complainant 
 may appear entitled. McGlothlin v. Hemery, 
 44 Mo. 350; Kirksey v. Means, 42 Ala. 426; 
 Moore r. Mitchell, 2 Woods, 483. And if the 
 facts be all stated upon which the right to spe- 
 cific relief arises, that relief will be granted, 
 although the bill be not framed with a view to 
 it. McNairy v. Eastland, 10 Yerger, 310. So, 
 where relief is granted on the statements of the 
 answer. Shannon v. Erwin, 11 Heisk. 337. 
 
 In a bill between partners, a prayer that the 
 defendant may be held to render an account of 
 all moneys and effects of the firm received by 
 him, and of all other matters relating to the 
 concern, is equivalent to a prayer for general 
 relief. Miller V. Lord, 11 Pick. 11. 
 
 In Indiana, the Court will grant any relief 
 called for by the case, and the issue made, with- 
 out regard to the prayer. Hunter v. McCov, 
 14 Ind. 528. 
 
 1 Cook v. Martyn, 2 Atk. 2, 3; Grimes v. 
 French, id. 141; Partridge v. Haycroft, 11 
 Ves. 570, 574; Wilkinson v. Beaf, 4 Mad. 
 408. 
 
 377
 
 378 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 tied, as well as for general relief ; 2 and where he is entitled to no other 
 relief against any defendant, he must pray for costs ; 3 with the one 
 exception, that he may make the servant of a corporation a defendant, 
 for the purpose of discovery. 4 (a) 
 
 This part of the bill, therefore, should contain an accurate specification 
 of the matters to be decreed, and, in complicated cases, the framing of it 
 requires great care and attention : for, although where the prayer does not 
 extend to embrace all the relief to which the plaintiff may at the hearing 
 show a right, the deficient relief may be supplied under the general prayer, 
 
 2 15 & 16 Vic. c. 8G, § 10; see form of bill, 
 Vol. III. 
 
 s Beadles v. Burch, 10 Sim. 332, 337; 4 
 Jur. 189; Bowles v. Stewart, 1 Sch. & Lef. 
 227. 
 
 4 Diimmer v. Chippenham, 14 Ves. 245; Le 
 Texier i\ Margravine of Anspach, 15 Ves. 164; 
 Ld. Red. 188; ante, pp. 142, 143, 296, 322. 
 
 (a) In the absence of a general prayer, the 
 relief specially prayed can alone be granted. 
 Mundy's Landing Co. v. Hardin (Ky.), 20 S. 
 W. Hep. 385; Johnson v. Mantz, 70 Iowa, 710; 
 Laird v. Boyle, 2 Wis. 431. The relief granted 
 under the general prayer must always be con- 
 sistent with the manifest purpose of the bill. 
 Drexel v. Berney, 16 Fed. R*-p. 522; Buerk v. 
 Imhaeuser, 8 id. 457; Dudley v. Congregation, 
 138 N T . Y. 451; Rogers v. N. Y. & T. L. Co. 
 134 N. Y. 197; Moritz v. Splitt, 55 Wis. 441; 
 Walton v. Perkins, 28 Minn. 413; Harder v. 
 Wright, 70 Iowa, 42; American E. Co. v. 
 Fuller, 83 Iowa, 599; Machinists' National 
 Bank v. Field, 126 Mass. 345; Pickens v. 
 Knisely, 29 W. Va. 1; Kornegay v. Carrowav, 
 2 Dev. Eq. 403; Cummings v. Cummings, 75 
 Cal. 434. As to the relief granted under the 
 general prayer in bills for specific performance, 
 see Stevens v. Guppy, 3 Russ. 171, 185; Bul- 
 lock v. Adams, 20 N. J. Eq. 367; Powell v. 
 Young, 45 Md. 494; Kirksey v. Means, 42 Ala. 
 426 ; Hart v. Granger, 1 Conn. 154, 168 ; Shen- 
 andoah Valley R. Co. v. Dunlop, 86 Va. 346. 
 In bills relating to mortgages, see Dayton r. 
 Dayton, 68 Mich. 437; and see Sonsmith ». 
 The J. P. Donaldson, 21 Fed. Rep. 671 ; Patrick 
 v. Isenhart, 20 id. 339; Lindsey v. Western Mu- 
 tual Aid Society (Iowa), 50 N. W. Rep. 29; Lam- 
 s'>n v. Drake, 105 Mass. 564; Nolen v. Woods, 
 12 Lea (Tenn.), 615; Tatum v. Walker, 77 Ala. 
 563. As to this prayer in patent cases, see Wil- 
 limantic Thread Co. v. Clark Thread Co 27 Fed. 
 Rep. 865; Brooks v. Miller, 28 id. 615; Kirk 
 v. Du Bois, id. 460; Emerson v. Sims, 6 Fisher's 
 Pat. Cas. 281. An account of copyright profits 
 may be decreed under the general prayer. Gil- 
 more v. Anderson, 38 Fed. Rep. 846. So, under 
 it, upon a bill to set aside a fraudulent convey- 
 ance of land, a decree may be made that if the 
 amount found due is not paid, the land may 
 be sold by a master. Davidson v. Burke (III.), 
 32 N. E. Rep. 514. So, under this praver and 
 
 378 
 
 without a special prayer therefor, a written in- 
 strument may be cancelled: Roche v. Morgell, 
 2 Sch. & Lef{ 721, 729; Prewit v. Graves, 5 J. 
 J. Marsh. 114, 125; Bolware v. Craig, 6 Lit. 
 (Ky.) 407; see Crow v. Owensboro & N. R. Co. 
 82 Kj\ 134; or a sale be set aside: Raper v. 
 Sanders, 21 Gratt. 60; or an account be ordered: 
 Galloway v. Galloway, 58 Tenn. 328. So, un- 
 der this prayer, and to prevent a multiplicity 
 of suits, upon a bill to restrain a trespass, dam- 
 ages may be awarded for injury from the 
 trespass prior to the injunction. Winslow v. 
 Nayson, 113 Mass. 411; Whipple v. Fair 
 Haven, 63 Vt. 221. Other decisions showing 
 the scope of the prayer for general relief are: 
 Texas v. Hardenberg, 10 Wall. 68; Hay ward 
 v. National Bank, 96 U. S. 611; Jones v. Van 
 Doren, 130 U. S. 684; Mackall v. Casilear, 137 
 U. S. 556, 564; Curry v. Lloyd, 22 Fed. Rep. 
 258; Fisher ». Moog, 39 id 665; Chicago &c. R. 
 Co.??. Macomb, 2 id. 18; Supervisors v. Mineral 
 Point R. Co. 24 Wis. 93; Chalmers v. Cham- 
 bers, 6 H. & J. 29; Morgan v. Meuth, 60 
 Mich. 238; Tarbell V. Durant, 61 Vt. 516; 
 Busby v. Littlefield, 31 N. H. 193 ; Burnett v. 
 Boyd, 60 Miss. 627; Barkwell v. Swan, 69 
 Miss. 907; Phillips v. Royal Niagara Hotel Co. 
 25 Grant Ch. (Can.) 358; Slater v. Canada 
 Central R. W. Co. id. 363; Pingree v. Coffin, 
 12 Gray, 288, 305; Thompson v. Hey wood, 129 
 Mass. 401; Brown v. Miner, 128 111. 148; Cloud 
 v. Whiteman, 2 Del. Ch. 23; 25 Am. L. Reg. 
 253; Carter v. Ingraham, 43 Ala. 78; Gonzales 
 v. Hukil, 49 Ala. 260; Gibson v. McConnick, 
 10 Gill & J. 65; Anderson v. De Soer, 6 Gratt. 
 363; Matthias v. Warrington (Va.), 16 S. E. 
 Rep. 662; Evans v. Schafer, 119 Ind. 49, Dodd 
 v. Benthal, 4 Heisk. 601; Hall v. Pierce, 4 W. 
 Va. 107; Primm v. Raboteau, 56 Mo. 407; 
 Flanders v. Chamberlain, 24 Mich. 305; Rigg 
 v. Hancock, 36 N. J. Eq. 42; Hoppock v. Cray 
 (N. J.), 21 Atl. Rep. 624.
 
 FORM OF THE BILL. 
 
 379 
 
 yet such relief must be consistent with that specifically prayed, as well as 
 with the case made by the bill ; for the Court will not suffer a defendant 
 to be taken by surprise, and permit a plaintiff to neglect and pass over 
 the prayer he has made, and take another decree, even though it be 
 according to the case made by his bill. 5 * Thus, where a bill was * 379 
 filed against a woman to compel her to elect between the provision 
 made for her by a will, and that to which she was entitled under a 
 settlement, and the case made by the bill was solely calculated to call 
 upon her to elect, it was held that a declaration that she had elected, so 
 as to conclude her, could not be maintained under the prayer for general 
 relief, being inconsistent both with the case made by the bill, and with 
 the specific prayer that she should make her election. 1 And so, where a 
 bill 2 was filed by a person in the character of mortgagee, praying a sale 
 under a trust, to which it appeared he was not entitled, he was not 
 permitted, under the general prayer, to take a decree that the defend- 
 ant might redeem or be foreclosed, although it was the relief which 
 properly belonged to his case. 8 And in like manner, where a bill was 
 
 6 Landis v. Olds, 9 Minn. 90; see Arring- 
 ton v. Liscom (34 Cal. 365), 94 Am. Dec. 722. 
 A particular prayer for relief, although very 
 proper and convenient, is not essential, since 
 under a general prayer for relief a plaintiff may 
 pray at the bar a specific relief not particularly 
 prayed for in the bill, if otherwise entitled to 
 the same. Wilkinson v. Beal, 4 Mad. 408; 
 Cook v. Martyn, 2 Atk. 2; Grimes v. French, 2 
 Atk. 141; Colton v. Ross, 2 Paige, 396; Lloyd 
 v. Brewster, 4 Paige, 537 ; Lingan v. Hender- 
 son, 1 Bland, 252; Driver v. Forner, 5 Porter, 
 10; Peck v. Peck, 9 Yerger, 301; Wilkin v. 
 Wilkin, 1 John. Ch. Ill; Cook v. Mancius, 5 
 John. Ch. 89; Brown v. McDonald, 1 Hill, 
 302; Marine and Fire Ins. &c. v. Early, R. M. 
 Charlt. 279 ; Repplier v. Buck, 5 B. Mon. 96, 
 98; Thomas v. Hite, id. 593. The relief given 
 under the general prayer must be agreeable to 
 the case made by the bill. Chalmers v. Cham- 
 bers, 6 Harr. & J. 29; Hobson v. M' Arthur, 16 
 Peters, 182; Read v. Cramer, 1 Green Ch. 277; 
 F -anklin v. Osgood, 14 John. 527 ; English v. 
 Foxall, 2 Peters, 595; Kibler v. Whiteman, 2 
 Har. 401; Pennock v. Ela, 41 N. H 189, 192; 
 Cassady v. Woodbury, 13 Iowa, 113. For the 
 Court will grant such relief only as the c:ise 
 stated will justify, and will not ordinarily be 
 so indulgent as to permit a bill framed for 
 one purpose to answer another, especially if 
 the defendant may be surprised or prejudiced 
 thereby. And where there is no obstruction to 
 the particular relief prayed, the plaintiff can- 
 not abandon that, and ask a different decree 
 under the general prayer. Allen v. Coffman, 
 1 Bibb, 469; Pillow v. Pillow, 5 Yerger, 420; 
 Thomason v. Smithson, 7 Porter, 144; Foster v. 
 Cooke. 1 Hawks, 509 ; Chalmers v. Chambers, 
 6 Har. & J. 29; Gibson v. M'Cormic, 10 Gill 
 & J. 66; Townsend v. Duncan, 2 Bland, 45; 
 
 King v. Rossett, 2 Y. & J. 33 ; see Baily v. 
 Benton, 8 Wend. 339; 1 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 49, and 
 note; Pleasants v. Glasscock, 1 Sm. & M. Ch. 
 17. See Hayward v. National Bank, 96 U. S. 
 615. 
 
 In Treadwell v. Brown, 44 X. H. 551, it was 
 held, that, under the prayer for general relief, 
 the plaintiff may have such relief as he is 
 entitled to, without regard to any defect in the 
 prayer for special relief, 26 Law Rep. 48; 
 Franklin v. Greene, 2 Allen, 519 ; Danforth v. 
 Smith, 23 Vt. 247; provided it does not con- 
 flict with that specifically prayed for. Stone v. 
 Anderson, 26 N. H. 506; Hilleary v. Hurdle, 
 6 Gill, 105. Where the bill sets forth two 
 grounds for relief, and prays for special relief 
 on one ground, and also for general relief, but 
 the parties are not sufficient for any other than 
 the special relief, the bill is not bad for mul- 
 tifariousness, but the special relief will be 
 granted. Mayne v. Griswold, 3 Sandf. (N. Y.) 
 463. 
 
 In a foreclosure suit, if the mortgage is for- 
 feited, and the plaintiff entitled to a decree of 
 foreclosure at the time of the commencement 
 of the suit, a decree for the whole amount due 
 upon the mortgage, whether it becomes due 
 before or after the filing- of the bill, is strictly 
 within the prayer for relief, and such as the 
 case stated will ju^tifv. Jordan r. Clarke, 16 
 N. J. Eq. 243. 
 
 1 Soden v. Soden, cited by Lord Eldon in 
 Hiern v. Mill, 13 Ves. 119. 
 
 2 Palk v. Lord Clinton, 12 Yes. 48, 57; see 
 also Jones v. Jones, 3 Atk. 110. Ill; Chapman 
 v. Chapman, 13 Beav. 308; 15 Jur. 265; John- 
 son »> Fesenmeyer, 25 Beav. 88, 96 ; 3 De G. 
 & J. 13; Story," Eq. PI. § 42. 
 
 3 A bill was filed to have a mortffajje deed 
 recorded, which had been omitted to be re- 
 
 379
 
 380 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 * 380 brought for an * annuity or rent-charge under a will, the plaintiff 
 was not permitted to drop the demand for the annuity, and insist 
 upon the land itself. 1 Upon the same principle, where a vendor filed a 
 bill for a specific performance against a purchaser, who had been in 
 possession, under the contract, for several years, but failed to establish 
 his right in consequence of a defect in his title, the Court refused, under 
 the prayer for general relief, to direct an account of the rents and profits 
 against the purchaser, although he had stated by his answer that he was 
 willing to pay a fair rent. 2 And so, where a bill was filed for the specific 
 performance of a written agreement, and parol evidence was read to 
 prove a variation from it, the bill was dismissed with costs, the plain- 
 tiff not being allowed to resort to the substantial agreement proved on 
 the part of the defendant. 3 (a) 
 
 The rule, with regard to the nature of the relief which a plaintiff may 
 have under the prayer for general relief, was laid down by Lord Eldon, 
 who, in Hiem v. Mill,* said that, as to this point, " the rule is, that if 
 
 corded within six months, in which was a gen- 
 eral prayer for relief. A decree of sale of the 
 mortgaged premises was held not to be within 
 the relief prayed by the bill. Chalmers v. 
 Chambers, 6 Harr. & J. 29 ; see Chambers v. 
 Chalmers, 4 Gill & J. 420. 
 
 i Grimes v. French, 2 Atk. 141. 
 
 2 Williams r. Shaw, 3 Russ. 178 n. 
 
 3 Legal t. Miller, 2 Ves. Sr. 299; see also 
 Mortimer v. Orchard, 2 Ves. Jr. 243 ; Legh r. 
 Haverfield, 5 Ves. 452, 457; Hanbury v. Litch- 
 field, 2 M. & K. 629, 633. Although, in such a 
 case, the plaintiff cannot have a decree for a dif- 
 ferent agreement from that set up by his bill, the 
 defendant may have a decree on the agreement, 
 such as he has proved it to be. Fife v. Clay- 
 
 (n) It depends upon the circumstances of 
 each case whether a parol variation from the 
 terms of a written agreement is to defeat a 
 specific performance. See Mundy v. Jolliffe, 5 
 Myl. & Cr. 167; London & Birmingham Ry. 
 Co. v. Winter, Cr. & Ph. 57. In Smith V. 
 Wheatcroft, 9 Ch. D. 223, where the defendant 
 pleaded, in defence to a suit for specific per- 
 formance, that the document stated by the 
 plaintiff did not contain the true terms of the 
 purchase, but did not state what the true terms 
 were, and produced a written agreement showing 
 different terms from those stated by the plain- 
 tiff, the plaintiff amended his statement of 
 claim, but still claimed specific performance of 
 the contract stated originally. It was held 
 that the plaintiffs request at the trial for spe- 
 cific performance, with a variation according to 
 the terms of the agreement produced by the 
 defendant, should be granted, upon the ground 
 that the defendant did not, in his answer, set 
 forth the terms of the agreement as he claimed 
 it to be, and did not submit to perform such 
 
 380 
 
 ton, 13 Ves. 546; 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 351. 
 The old course required a cross-bill, but the 
 practice now is to decree a specific performance 
 at the instance of the defendant, upon the offer 
 by the plaintiff in his bill to perform the agree- 
 ment specifically on his part. Ibid. See also 
 Gwynn r. Lethbrigge, 14 Ves. 585. In suits 
 for tithes it seems that the plaintiff, though 
 failing in establishing his right to tithes in 
 kind, may yet have a decree for a modus ad- 
 mitted by the defendant's answer. Cart v. 
 Ball, 1 Ves. Sr. 3. 
 
 4 13 Ves. 114; see also Brown v. Sewell, 11 
 Hare, 49, more fully reported on this point, 17 
 Jur 708; Brooks v. Boucher, 3 N. R. 279, M. 
 R., where relief was granted under the general 
 
 agreement. In Jeffery v. Stephens (6 Jur. N. 
 S. 947, 8 W. R. 427), the plaintiff, having 
 always repudiated the terms of the agreement 
 set up by the defendant, was held not entitled 
 to have it specifically performed. See Wil- 
 liams v. Jones, 36 W. R. 573; Thompson v. 
 Hawley, 14 Oregon, 199; Creigh v. Boggs, 19 
 W, R." 240; Hewlett v. Miller, 63 Cal. 185; 
 Boardman v. Davidson, 7 Abb. Pr. N. S. 439. 
 Specific performance of a modified written con- 
 tract may thus be decreed without a cross-bill. 
 See Redtield v. Gleason, 61 Vt. 220. In Buck 
 v. Dowley, 16 Gray, 555, the answer set up an 
 agreement which differed from that stated in 
 the bill, and averred performance of this agree- 
 ment, and it was held that the plaintiff could 
 not avail himself of this agreement without 
 amending his bill so as to state it. As to ob- 
 taining damages, in the alternative, upon a bill 
 for specific performance, see Milkman v. Ord- 
 way, 106 Mass. 232; Eastman v. Simpson, 139 
 Mass. 348. See also Glass V. Hurlbert, 102 
 Mass. 24.
 
 FORM OF THE BTLL. * 381 
 
 the bill contains charges, putting facts in issue that are material, the 
 plaintiff is entitled to the relief which those facts will sustain, under the 
 general prayer ; but he cannot desert specific relief prayed, and under 
 tne general prayer ask specific relief of another description, unless the 
 facts and circumstances charged by the bill will, consistently with the 
 rules of the Court, maintain that relief." 5 In that case, a bill had been 
 filed by an equitable mortgagee against the mortgagor, and a person who 
 had purchased from him with notice of the incumbrance, and it prayed 
 an account, and in default of payment a conveyance of the estate ; and 
 although it charged the purchaser with notice, it did not pray any 
 specific relief against him individually. * Lord Eldon, however, * 381 
 thought that the relief asked against him at the hearing was con- 
 sistent with the case made by the bill, and accordingly decreed an account 
 to be taken of what was due to the plaintiff by the mortgagor ; to be paid 
 by the purchaser, who was to have his election to pay the money and 
 keep the estate. 1 So, where a bill was filed against two trustees, alle- 
 ging that only one of them had acted in the trusts, and praying relief 
 against that trustee only, to which the two trustees put in an answer 
 admitting that they had both acted in the trusts, a decree was made against 
 the two, charging them both with the loss occasioned by the breach of 
 trust. 2 In order to entitle a plaintiff to a decree, under the general 
 prayer, different from that specifically prayed, the allegations relied 
 upon must not only be such as to afford a ground for the relief 
 sought, but they must have been introduced into the bill for the pur- 
 pose of showing a claim to relief, and not for the mere purpose of cor- 
 roborating the plaintiff's right to the specific relief prayed : otherwise, 
 the Court would take the defendant by surprise, which is contrary to its 
 principles. 8 Therefore, where a vendor filed a bill for a specific per- 
 formance, but, owing to his not being able to make out a title to some 
 
 prayer; and Hill v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 there being no specific prayer for that purpose. 
 
 De G. M. & G. 66; 18 Jur. 685, where it was Lord Redesdale, in delivering his opinion in the 
 
 refused. House of Lords upon the point, said: "It has 
 
 5 See Cassady v. Woodbury, 13 Iowa, 113; been objected that the bill does not state the 
 
 Hall v. Fowlkes, 9 Heisk. 745; Lee v. Cone, 4 release, and pray that it may be set aside. It 
 
 Coldw. 392; Miller v. Jamison, 24 N. J. Eq. seems doub'ful whether the release has been 
 
 41; Shannon r. Erwin, 11 Heisk. 337. put in issue by the bill; but whether it is so or 
 
 1 13 Ves. 114, 123. not, if the release appears to be founded on a 
 
 2 Taylor v. Tabrum, 6 Sim. 281. vicious consideration, it is in itself void, and 
 8 See the remarks of Sir W. Page Wood the Court need not set it aside, but may act as 
 
 V. C. (Lord Hatherley) in Other v. Smurth- if it did not exist. The bill prays the general 
 waite, L. R. 5 Eq. 437, 441 , quoted 'intr, p. 307, account, and all the relief necessary for the pur- 
 note; Landis v. Olds, 9 Minn. 90. See also pose of obtaining that account. This prayer is 
 Roche v. Morgell, 2 Sch. & Lef. 721, 729, where sufficient. It never was thought of that a bill 
 the bill stated various dealings between the for an account of fraudulent dealings must 
 plaintiff and defendant, imputing fraud and specially pray that every bond, every instru- 
 unfair dealing, and various usurious charges, ment taken by the defendant without suffi- 
 overcharges, and mistakes, in accounts deliv- cient consideration, should be set aside. The 
 ered, and prayed a discovery of the several prayer for general relief is sufficient for the 
 transactions, and a general account, and al>o purpose; and upon that prayer, the Court may 
 general relief. To this bill the defendant give every relief consistent with the case made 
 pleaded a release made by the plaintiff; and a by the bill, and continually does give relief in 
 question arose, whether, if the release appeared the manner specifically prayed by the bill, and 
 to be founded on a vicious consideration, and sought for only by the prayer for general 
 was in itself void, the Court could set it aside, relief." 
 
 381
 
 382 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 part of the property, was unable to obtain a decree for that purpose, it 
 was held that he could not, under the prayer for general relief, obtain 
 an inquiry into the management of the property during the time it was 
 in the vendee's possession, although the bill did contain charges of 
 mismanagement; which, however, had been introduced, not with the 
 view to obtain compensation, but to establish the fact of acceptance of 
 
 the title by the defendant. 4 
 * 382 * The rule, that the Court will only grant such relief as the plain- 
 tiff is entitled to, upon the case made by the bill, is most strictly 
 enforced in those cases where the plaintiff relies upon fraud. Accord- 
 ingly, where the plaintiff has rested his case in the bill upon imputations 
 of direct personal misrepresentation and fraud, he cannot be permitted 
 to support it upon any other ground ; 1 but if other matters be alleged 
 in the bill, which will give the Court jurisdiction as the foundation of 
 a decree, the proper course is to dismiss only so much of the bill as 
 relates to the case of fraud, and to give so much relief as under the 
 circumstances the plaintiff may be entitled to. 2 If the plaintiff has 
 rested the case for relief solely on the ground of fraud, he cannot, if he 
 fails in establishing fraud, pick out, from the allegations in his plead- 
 ings, facts which might, if not put forward as proofs of fraud, have war- 
 ranted the plaintiff in asking, and the Court in granting, relief. 3 
 
 The Court will not, in general, at the original trial of the suit, decree 
 interest upon a balance, unless where it is specifically asked for by the 
 bill. 4 Where, however, from peculiar circumstances, interest was not 
 properly due at the time the bill was filed, and a right to interest has 
 subsequently accrued, the Court has directed interest to be computed, 
 although there was no prayer to that effect in the bill. 5 Thus, inter- 
 
 4 Stevens v. Guppy, 3 Russ. 171, 185; see 
 also Ferraby v. Hobson, 2 Phil. 255, 257; 
 Chapman v. Chapman, 13 Beav. 308; 15 Jur. 
 2G5. So where a bill was filed for the specific 
 execution of a contract for the purchase of land 
 alleged to be evidenced by a written memoran- 
 dum, and that allegation was not sustained by 
 the proof, it was held that the plaintiff could 
 not, under the prayer for general relief, obtain 
 compensation for improvements upon the lands. 
 Smith v. Smith, 1 Ired. Eq. 83. On a bill to 
 rescind a contract, the Court cannot, decree a 
 specific execution. Rochester v. Anderson, 
 Litt. Sel. Cas. 146. 
 
 i Wilde v. Gibson, 1 H. L. Cas. 605; Glas- 
 cott v. Lang, 2 Phil. 310, 322; Parr v. Jewell, 1 
 K. & J. 671; Luff v. Lord, 11 Jur. N. S. 50, 
 L. C; Eyre v. Potter, 5 How. 342; Hoyt v. 
 Hoyt, 27 N. J. Eq. 399; ante, p. 328, n. 1. The 
 use of the word "fraud" does not bring the 
 case within this rule, unless the case alleged is 
 one of fraud properly so called. Marshall ». 
 Sladden, 7 Hare, 428, 443; 14 Jur. 106, 109; 
 M'Calmont v. Rankin, 8 Hare, 116; 14 Jur. 
 475. See ante, p. 324, n. 9. 
 
 2 Archbold v. Commissioners of Charitable 
 Bequests for Ireland, 2 H. L. Cas. 440, 459; 
 382 
 
 Harrison v. Guest, 6 De G. M & G. 424, 438; 2 
 Jur. N. S. 911 ; see also Traill v. Baring, 4 De G. 
 J. & S. 318; 4 Giff. 485. In Read v. Cramer, 1 
 Green Ch. 277, a bill was filed for relief on the 
 ground of fraud, and relief was granted on the 
 ground of mistake. And see London Chartered 
 Bank of Australia v. Lempriere, L. R. 4 P. C. 
 572; Hilliard v. Eiffe, L. R. 7 H. L. 39; Voor- 
 hees v. Bonesteel, 16 Wall. 16; Martin v. Lutke- 
 witte, 50 Mo. 58. 
 
 3 Hickson v. Lombard, L. R. 1 H. L. 324; 
 Tabor v. Cunningham, 24 W. R. 153. 
 
 4 Weymouth v. Boyer, 1 Ves. Jr. 416, 426. 
 6 Turner v. Turner," 1 J. & W. 39, 53, and 
 
 see Hollingsworth v. Shakeshaft, 14 Beav. 492; 
 Davenport v. Stafford, id. 319, 334; 2 De G M. 
 & G. 901; Johnson v. Prendergast, 28 Beav. 
 480; see also Lloyd v. Jones, 12 Sim. 491; Fry 
 v. Fry, 10 Jur. N. S. 983, V. C. S.; Chugg v. 
 Chugg, W. N. (1874) 185 ; and post, Chap. 
 XXX., Further Consideration. See Smith v. 
 Smith, 4 John. Ch. 448; Benzein v. Robinett, 2 
 Dev. Eq. 67; Smith v. Godbold. 4 Strobh. Eq. 
 186; Lee v. Pindle, 12 Gill & J. 288; Burts v. 
 Beard, 11 Heisk. 472; Shepard v. Akers, 2 
 Tenn. Ch. 627; infra, p. 1368, note.
 
 FORM OF THE BILL. * 384 
 
 est has, by order on * further directions, been directed to be * 383 
 computed upon the balance in executors' hands, although not 
 prayed by the bill : because, at the time the bill was filed, there did not 
 appear to have been any money in their hands, and the bill could not 
 advert to those circumstances which arose subsequently, (a) 
 
 Upon the principle that the Court will not grant a different relief from 
 that prayed by the bill, it has been held that where a bill merely prayed 
 a commission to examine witnesses abroad, in aid of an action at Law, 
 the Court could not grant a motion that the plaintiff might be at liberty 
 to examine one of the witnesses; who had come to this country and was 
 about to go away again, de bene esse, but said that the bill might be 
 amended for that purpose. 1 
 
 But although the Court will not, under the general prayer, grant a 
 different relief from that specifically prayed by the bill, yet, where it 
 appears that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, although it be different 
 from that which he has specifically claimed, it will sometimes allow the 
 cause to stand over, with liberty to the plaintiff to amend his bill, 2 and 
 if it appears that, in order to enable the Court to grant the relief which 
 may properly be given, such as a foreclosure of a mortgage, it is neces- 
 sary to bring an additional party before the Court, the plaintiff may be 
 given leave to amend his bill by adding parties and praying such relief 
 as he may be advised. 8 
 
 The instances, however, in which this will be done are confined to 
 those where it appears, from the case made by the bill, that the plain- 
 tiff is entitled to relief, although different from that sought 
 *by the specific prayer: where the object of the proposed amend- * 384 
 ment is to make a new case, it will not be permitted. Thus, 
 where a bill was filed for the specific performance of an agreement for a 
 lease to the plaintiff alone, and it was stated, by the defendant's answer, 
 that the agreement had been to let to the plaintiff and another person 
 jointly, but the plaintiff nevertheless replied to the answer, and pro- 
 ceeded to establish a case of letting to himself alone, in which he failed, 
 Lord Redesdale, upon application being made to him to let the cause 
 
 1 Atkins v. Palmer, 5 Mad. 19. ground that the answer put in was applicable to 
 
 2 See Pennock v. Ela, 41 N. H. 189. Where the specific relief already prayed; but, after 
 the facts set forth in the bill would not author- much discussion, Lord Rosslyn determined that 
 ize other relief than that specially prayed for, it was competent to the plaintiff to amend by 
 the prayer will not be amended. Hulsted v. adding the additional prayer. Beaumont v. 
 Meeker, 18 N. J. Eq. 136, 139. Where, after Boultbee, 5 Ves. 485, 495; 7 Ves. 599, on a re- 
 publication had passed, the relief prayed for hearing by Lord Eldon; stated on this point, 
 specifically was thought not to be that to which arg. in Palk v. Lord Clinton, 12 Ves. 63; see 
 the plaintiff was entitled, he therefore applied also Cook v. Martyn, 2 Atk. 2. 
 
 for liberty to amend, by adding an additional 8 Palk v. Lord Clinton, 12 Ves. 48, 64, 66. 
 
 prayer for relief, which was resisted upon the 
 
 (<7) Under the Act 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, the prayer for general relief in a bill in Equity, 
 § 28, requiring a demand of interest to be in interest may be decreed against a trustee when 
 writing, a claim of interest first made in the justly allowable. Glenn v. Cockey, 16 Md. 
 writ is not sufficient. Rhvmney Railway ?'. 446; see also Blogg v. Johnson, L. R. 2 Ch. 229. 
 Rhvmney Iron Co. 25 Q. B. D.146. Under 
 
 383
 
 385 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 stand over, with liberty to the plaintiff to amend, by adding the other 
 lessee as a party, said that such a proceeding would be extremely im- 
 proper; it was not like letting a case stand over to add a party against 
 whom a decree in a plain case could be made, but for the purpose of 
 making a new case ; for a new case it would be if founded on a new 
 agreement. 1 In that case, his Lordship stated that the ordinary practice, 
 where a party has mistaken his case, and brings the cause to a hearing 
 under such mistake, is to dismiss the bill, without prejudice to a new 
 bill. 2 
 
 In the case of infants, the rule that the specific relief must be such as 
 the plaintiff is entitled to from the nature of the case made by the bill, 
 is, it seems, relaxed ; and an infant plaintiff may have a decree upon any 
 matter arising upon the state of his case, though he has not particularly 
 mentioned or insisted upon it, or prayed it by his bill. 8 
 
 In cases of charities, likewise, the Court will give the proper direc- 
 tions, without any regard to the propriety or impropriety in the prayer 
 of the information. 4 
 
 It sometimes happens that the plaintiff, or those who advise him, are 
 not certain of his title to the specific relief he wishes to pray for ; and 
 in such case it is not unusual so to frame the prayer that, if one species 
 of relief sought is denied, another may be granted. Bills with a prayer 
 of this description, framed in the alternative, are called bills with 
 * 385 a double aspect. 5 But it seems that the alternative * prayer 
 
 i Deniston v. Little, 2 Sch. & Lef. 11, n.; 
 Watts v. Hyde, 2 Phil. 406; 2 Col. 368; see also 
 Griggs v. Staplee, 2 De G. & S. 572; 13 Jur. 
 29; Phelps v. Prothero. 2 De G. & S. 274; 12 
 Jur. 733. Such leave to amend will not be 
 given under the present English practice. 
 Newby v. Shurp, 8 Ch. D. 39; but see Budding 
 v. Murdock, 1 Ch. D. 42; King v. Corke, id. 57; 
 Roe v. Davies, 2 Ch. D. 729; Mozley v. Cowie, 
 26 W. R. 854; and for order, see S. C. 2 Seton, 
 1523, No. 12; Green v. Sevin, 13 Ch. D. 589, 
 595; Laird v. Briggs, 19 Ch. D. 22; 16 id. 440; 
 Nobel's Explosives Co. v. Jones, 17 Ch. D. 721. 
 
 2 This practice was adopted by the same 
 judge in Lindsay v. Lynch, 2 Sch. & Lef. Land 
 is in accordance with the decree of Sir William 
 Grant M. R. in Woollman v. Hearn,7 Ves. 211, 
 222, and has been subsequently followed by 
 Lord Lyndhurst, in Stevens v. Guppy, 3 Russ. 
 171, 186. 
 
 8 Stapilton v. Stapilton,l Atk. 6; 2 White & 
 T. L. C. 920; see ante, p. 77. 
 
 4 Att.-Gen. v. Jeanes, 1 Atk. 355; see ante, 
 p. 14. 
 
 6 Bennet v. Vade, 2 Atk. 325; Ld. Red. 39; 
 and see Evans v. Buck, W. N. (1876) 305; 25 
 W. R. 392; Bagot v. Easton, 7 Ch. D. 1 ; Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 40. There is no inconsistency in the 
 alternative claim to rescind an agreement nf 
 partnership because of misrepresentation, and if 
 this cannot be done, for a dissolution of the part- 
 nership and settlement thereof. Bagot v. Eas- 
 
 384 
 
 ton, 7 Ch. D. 1. An alternative prayer does not 
 render a bill multifarious. Kilgour v. New 
 Orleans Gas Light Co. 2 Woods, 144. If the 
 plaintiff doubts his title to the relief he wishes 
 to pray, the bill should be framed with a double 
 aspect; so that, if the Court should decide 
 against him in one view of the case, it may yet 
 afford him assistance in another. Colron v. 
 Ross, 2 Paige, 396; Lloyd v. Brewster, 4 Paige, 
 537; Cooper, Eq. PI. 14; M'Connell v. M'Con 
 nell, 11 Vt. 290; Strange v. Watson, 11 Ala. 
 324; Gerrish v. Towne, 3 Gray. 86, 87; Murphy 
 v. Clark, 1 Sm. & M. Ch. 22 1 ; Stein v. Kobert- 
 so, 30 Ala. 286; Walker v. Devereaux, 4 Paige, 
 229; Foster v. Cook, 1 Hawks, 509; Lingan v. 
 Henderson, 1 Bland, 252; Pleasants v. Glass- 
 cock, 1 Sm. & M. 17, 24, 25: Kibler v. White- 
 man, 2 Harr. 401 ; Foulkes v. Davies, L. R. 7 
 Eq. 42. The alternative case stated must, how- 
 ever, be the foundation for precisely the same 
 relief. When the prayer of a bill is that the 
 Court will set aside a contract on the ground of 
 fraud, the plaintiff cannot amend by substitut- 
 ing a prayer that the Court would either set 
 it aside on the ground of fraud, or, if it was 
 valid, would enforce its specific performance. 
 Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. (U. S.) 130; see 
 Pensenneau v. Pensenneau, 22 Miss 27. 
 
 See, as to the limitations which apply to a 
 bill with a double aspect, Lloj'd v. Brewster, 
 4 Paige, 537; Wilkinson v. Dobbie, 12 Blatch. 
 298, 302; Collins v. Knight, 3 Tenn. Ch. 183;
 
 FORM OF THE BILL. 
 
 *385 
 
 must not be founded on inconsistent titles ; thus, a plaintiff cannot 
 assert a will to be invalid, and at the same time claim to take a benefit 
 on the assumption of its validity. 1 
 
 It is a principle of Equity that a person seeking relief must himself 
 do what is equitable ; 2 it is therefore required, in some cases, that a 
 plaintiff should, by his bill, offer to do whatever the Court may consider 
 necessary to be done on his part towards making the decree which he 
 seeks just and equitable with regard to the other parties to the suit. 
 Upon this principle, where a bill is filed to compel the specific perform- 
 ance of a contract by a defendant, the plaintiff ought by his bill to sub- 
 mit to perform the contract on his part ; and it is to be observed, that 
 the effect of such submission will be to entitle a defendant to a decree, 
 even though the plaintiff should not be able to make out his own title to 
 relief, in the form prayed by his bill. 3 (a) 
 
 Terry v. Rosell. 32 Ark. 478, 492; Polhemus v. 
 Emson, 29 N. J. Eq. 583; Micou v. Ashurst, 55 
 Ala. 607. 
 
 A prayer, assigning several reasons for vacat- 
 ing a deed, is considered as so many separate 
 prayers, and if one reason be valid, it is error 
 to reject the whole prayer. American Exchange 
 Bank v. Inloes, 7 Md. 380. In New York, legal 
 redress and equitable relief may be demanded 
 in the same complaint; and either, or both, if 
 the circumstances of the case permit, may be 
 afforded b}' the Court. New York Ice Co. v. 
 N. W. Ins. Co. 23 N. Y. 357; but in order to 
 entitle a party to one or the other, he must ask 
 it specifically in his complaint. Stevenson v. 
 Buxton. 15 Abb. Pr. 355. 
 
 i Wright v. Wilkin, 4 De G. & J. 141; see 
 also Rawlings v. Lambert, 1 J. & H. 458; Marsh 
 v. Keith, 1 Dr. & S. 342; 6 Jur. N. S. 1182; 
 Thomas v. Hobler, 4 De G. F. & J. 199; 8 Jur. 
 
 (a) The usual course is to either grant or 
 refuse the prayer of the bill. See, e.g., Goose 
 v. Bedford, 21 W. K. 449, where Lord Selborne 
 L. C. overruled the Master of the Rolls and fol- 
 lowed the prayer in the bill. See also Wood- 
 ruff v. North Bloomfield G. M. Co. 18 Fed. Rep. 
 753. An offer to restore land exchanged by 
 fraud may be made in the bill, and under the 
 general prayer, if part of the land has passed 
 to an innocent purchaser, the Court may de- 
 cree a partial rescission, payment in money of 
 the price of the land, as estimated in the 
 exchange, anil make such payment, until made, 
 a lien upon the land still held by the defrauding 
 party. Hopkins v. Snedaker, 71 111. 449. The 
 Court has, however, the power, as stated in the 
 text, to require a plaintiff to do equity as con- 
 ditional to granting the desired relief; and fail- 
 ure to show, in a bill or complaint to rescind a 
 contract, an offer by the plaintiff to do equity 
 before suit brought, if it contains an offer to 
 submit to the Court's order in that respect, does 
 
 vol. i. - 25 
 
 N. S. 125, L. C. ; Lett v. Parry. 1 H & M. 517; 
 Onions r. Cohen, 13 W. R. 426, V. C. W.; 
 Davies v. Otty, 2 De G. J. & S. 238 ; Mullins v. 
 Hussey, 15 W. R. 656. Nor file a bill asking 
 the cancellation of a mortgage, or to redeem. 
 Micou ?'. Ashurst, 55 Ala. 607. Alternative 
 relief cannot be prayed against one defendant 
 in case relief cannot be obtained against another 
 defendant. Clark v. Lord Rivers, L. R. 5 Eq. 
 91. But see now, under Judicature Act and 
 Rules of Court of 1875, Child v. Stenning, 7 
 Ch. D. 413 ; 5 Ch. D. 695. 
 
 2 Bates v. Wheeler, 1 Scam. 54 ; Cooper v. 
 Brown, 2 M'Lean, 495; Dougherty v. Hump- 
 son, 2 Blackf. 273. 
 
 3 Fife v. Clayton, 13 Ves. 546; 1 C. P. Coop, 
 temp. Cott. 351 ; Green v. Covillaud, 10 Cal. 317; 
 McKleroy v. Tulane, 34 Ala. 78; Bell v. Thomp- 
 son, id. 633; Oliver v. Palmer, 11 Gill & J. 
 426; Hatcher v. Hatcher, 1 McMullan Ch.311. 
 
 not necessarily make it demurrable. Shuee v. 
 Shuee, 100 Ind. 477. See al'o Jervis v. Ber- 
 ridge, L. R. 8 Ch. 351; Kinney v. Cons'd Va. 
 M. Co. 4 Sawyer, 382: American Wine Co. v. 
 Brasher, 13 Fed. Rep. 595; Des Moines & M. 
 R. Co. v. Alley, 16 id. 732 ; Long v. McGregor, 
 65 Miss. 70 ; American PYeehold L. & M. Co. 
 v. Jefferson, 69 Miss. 770; Hinckley v. l'listtr 
 (Wis.), 53 N. W. Rep. 21 ; Hartley v. Matthews 
 (Ala.) 11 So. 452; New England" M. S. Co. v. 
 Powell (Ala.), 12 So. 55; Mclver v. Clarke. 69 
 Miss. 408; Mortgage Co. v. Jefferson, id. 770. 
 A bill or petition for specific performance is 
 usually sufficient if it offers performance of all 
 conditions, though no legal tender is made. 
 See Pomeroy v. Fullerton (Mo.), 21 S. W. Rep. 
 19; Mankel v. Belscamper (Wis.), 54 N. W. 
 Rep. 500. In Thomas v. Beals, 154 Mass. 51, 
 which was a bill to set aside a collusive sale, 
 Holmes J. said: "A bill in Equity is not like 
 an action at law, brought on the footing of a 
 rescission previously completed ; for instance, to 
 
 385
 
 386 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 Upon the same principle, it was formerly required that a bill for an 
 account should contain an offer on the part of the plaintiff to pay the 
 balance, if found against him ; but it seems that such an offer is not now- 
 considered necessary. 4 And so, where a surety brought an action upon 
 an indemnity bond against his principal, to recover moneys which he 
 had been compelled to pay on his account, and the principal filed a 
 
 bill in Equity for an injunction, and to have the bond delivered 
 * 386 up to be cancelled, suggesting * fraud, but without offering to 
 
 indemnify the defendant, the Court of Exchequer thought that 
 the want of an offer in the bill to make satisfaction was fatal to the 
 bill, and allowed a demurrer, which had been put in by the defendant. 1 
 
 In like manner, a mortgagor cannot make a mortgagee a party to a 
 bill in respect of his mortgage estate, without offering to redeem him ; 2 
 and upon the same ground, where a contract is rendered void by a statute, 
 a bill to set aside such contract should contain an offer on the part of the 
 plaintiff to pay to the defendant what is justly due to him. Thus, where 
 a bill was filed, praying that an instrument or security given for a 
 usurious consideration (and void under the usury laws then in force) 
 might be delivered up to be cancelled, the only terms upon which a 
 Court of Equity would interfere were those of the plaintiff paying to 
 the defendant what was bona fide due to him ; 3 and where the plaintiff 
 
 4 Columbian Government v. Rothschild, 1 
 Sim. 94, 103; Clarke v. Tipping, 4 Beav. 588, 
 593; Barker v. Walters, 8 Beav. 92, 96; Toul- 
 min v. Reid, 14 Beav. 499. 505 ; Inman v. Wear- 
 ing, 3 De G. & S. 729, 733; Wells v. Strange, 
 5 Ga. 22. 
 
 i Godbolt v. Watts, 2 Anst. 543. 
 
 2 Dalton v. Hayter, 7 Beav. 313, 319; Inman 
 v. Wearing, 3 De G. & S. 729; Att.-Gen. v. 
 Hardv, 1 Sim. N. S. 338, 355; 15 Jur. 441; 
 Knebell v. White, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 15, 20. If 
 the bill does not contain an offer to account, 
 
 and the decree does not direct the plaintiff to 
 pay what may be due to the defendant, the 
 Court cannot at the further hearing make such 
 an order. Hollis v. Bulpett, 13 W. R. 492, 
 V. C. K. 
 
 3 It is against conscience that the borrower 
 should have full relief, and at the same time 
 pocket the money, which may have been granted 
 at his own mere solicitation. He who seeks 
 equity at the hands of a Court of Equity, may 
 well be required to do equity. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. 
 § 301. Fonb. Eq. B. 1, c. 1, § 3, note (A); Jordon 
 
 replevy a horse which was obtained by a fraud- 
 ulent exchange, and to which the plaintiff has 
 no right unless he has restored what he has re- 
 ceived. Thayer v. Turner, 8 Met. 550. The 
 foundation of this bill is that the rescission is 
 not complete, and it asks the aid of the Court 
 to make it so. It is objected that at least the 
 bill ought to offer restitution. We are aware 
 that in many cases an offer to do Equity has 
 been held necessary. But in the case at bar 
 the Court has power to impose equitable con- 
 ditions upon the relief granted the plaintiffs. 
 And it is hardly, if at all, conceivable that this 
 decree in any event could be for the relief of 
 the defendant alone against the plaintiffs, as in 
 the case of an account, where, nevertheless, an 
 offer is no longer necessary. Goldthwait v. 
 Day, 149 Mass. 185. The plaintiffs, by seeking 
 to set aside the conveyance, have elected to 
 adopt all the consequences of rescission." See 
 also Nelson v. Ferdinand, 111 Mass. 300; East- 
 
 386 
 
 man v. Plumer, 4G N H. 464; Ewinsr. Gordon, 
 49 N. H. 444; Merriam v. Goodlett (Neb.). 54 
 N. W. Rep. 686; Bateson v. Choate, 85 Texas, 
 239. 
 
 Respecting the rule that the plaintiff must 
 do equity, Wigram V. C. observes that a part\* 
 "does not by becoming plaintiff in Equity 
 give up any of his rights, or submit those rights 
 to the arbitrary disposition of the Court. He 
 submits only to give the defendant his rights 
 in respect of the subject-matter of the suit, 
 on condition of the plaintiff obtaining his 
 own. ... As a general proposition, a plaintiff 
 will never, in that character, be compelled to 
 give a defendant anything but what the defend- 
 ant might, as a plaintiff, enforce, provided a 
 cause of suit arose." Hanson v. Keating, 4 
 Hare, 1. See also Gibson v. Goldsmid, 5 De G. 
 M. & G 757. In a bill for redemption the 
 offer to redeem is essential. Emerson v. Atkin- 
 son (Mass.), 34 N. E. Rep. 516.
 
 FORM OF THE BILL. 
 
 587 
 
 did not offer to do so by his bill, a demurrer was allowed. 4 It seems 
 that there is no difference, in this respect, between a cross-bill and an 
 original bill. 5 The course of proceeding in bankruptcy, however, differs 
 from that in Courts of Equity, for the rule in bankruptcy is that a debt 
 made void by statute is void altogether, and cannot be proved, because 
 the creditor, has no legal remedy by which he can recover ; and unless 
 the assignees and creditors voluntarily consent to the payment of what 
 is really due, neither the Court of Bankruptcy, nor the Lord Chancellor 
 or Lords Justices, have power to order it : and applications of this nature 
 have frequently been refused. 6 Where the plaintiff was unable to fulfil 
 an offer upon which the decree had been founded, the suit was dismissed, 
 but without prejudice to any future proceedings which the plaintiff 
 might think fit to take. 7 
 
 It is a rule in Equity that no person can be compelled to make a 
 discovery which may expose him to a penalty, or to anything 
 *in the nature of a forfeiture. As, however, the plaintiff is, in * 387 
 many cases, himself the only person who would benefit by the 
 penalty or forfeiture, he may, if he pleases to waive that benefit, have the 
 discovery he seeks. 1 The effect of the waiver, in such cases, is to entitle 
 the defendant (in case the plaintiff should proceed, upon the discovery 
 which he has elicited by his bill, to enforce the penalty or forfeiture) 
 to apply for an injunction ; which he could not do without such an ex- 
 press waiver. 2 (a) It is usual to insert this waiver in the prayer of the 
 bill, and if it is omitted the bill will be liable to demurrer. 3 
 
 r. Trumbo, 6 Gill & J. 103; Crawford v. Harvey, 
 1 Biackf. 382; M'Daniells v. Barnum, 5 Vt. 
 279; Fanning v. Dunham, 5 John. Ch. 142, 
 143, 144; Campbell v. Morrison, 7 Paige, 158; 
 J ud d v. Seaver, 8 Paige, 548; Cole v. Savage, 
 1 Clarke, 482. A Court of Equity will not aid 
 a plea of usury, at Law, by compelling a dis- 
 covery, unless the debtor, in his bill, tenders 
 the sum actually borrowed. Tupper v. Powell, 
 1 John. Cb.439; Rogers v. Rathbun, id. 367. 
 So the Court will not allow an answer to be 
 amended for the purpose of setting up the de- 
 fence of usury, unless the defendant consents 
 to pay the amount actually due. Fulton Bank 
 V. Beach, 1 Paige, 429. 
 
 4 Mason v. Gardiner, 4 Bro. C. C. 436; Scott 
 ■r. Nesbit, 2 Bro. C. C. 641, 649; 2 Cox, 183; 
 
 Whitmore v. Francis, 8 Price, 616. 
 
 5 Mason ». Gardiner, 4 Bro. C. C. ed. Belt, 
 438, n.; Story, Eq. PI. § 630. 
 
 6 Ex parte Thompson, 1 Atk. 125; Ex parte 
 Skip, 2 Ves. Sr. 489; Ex parte Mather. 3 Ves. 
 373; Ex parte Scrivener, 3 V. & B. 14; Arch- 
 bold's Bankruptcy, 110. 
 
 i Langton v. Waite, L. R. 4 Ch. 402. And 
 
 (a) A breach of covenant resulting in a for- 
 feiture may be waived by the pleadings. Evans 
 V. Davis, 10 Ch. D. 747. Equity always leans 
 against lessors seeking to enforce a forfeiture of 
 the lease. Henderson v. Carbondale Coal & 
 
 see where the bill is filed after judgment at 
 Law for a reduction of the usury, Chester v. 
 Apperson, 4 Heisk. 639, 653. 
 
 1 Tn Mason v. Lake, 2 Bro. P. C. ed. Toml. 
 495, 497, leave appears to have been given to 
 amend a bill, by waiving penalties and forfei- 
 tures, after a demurrer upon that ground al- 
 lowed. See United States v. McRae, L. R. 
 4 Eq. 327, 333, 338-340; L. R. 3 Ch. 79; King 
 of Two Sicilies v. Wilcox, 1 Sim. N. S. 301; 
 15 Jur. 214; Att.-Gen. r. Vincent, Bunb. 192. 
 
 2 Lord Uxbridge v. S'.aveland, 1 Ve=. Sr. 
 56: and see Sup. Ct. of Jud. Act, 1873 (36 & 
 37 Vic. c. 66), § 24 (5). 
 
 3 Upon this ground, where an information 
 was filed by the Attorney-General to discover 
 copyhold lands, and what timber had been cut 
 down and waste committed, and the defendant 
 demurred, because, although the discovery 
 would have exposed the defendant to a for- 
 feiture of the place wasted and treble damages, 
 the Attorney-General had not waived the for- 
 feitures, the demurrer was allowed. Att-Gen. 
 v. Vincent, Bunb. 182. (b) And so it has been 
 held, that a demurrer will lie to a bill by re- 
 
 Coke Co. 140 U. S. 25. One who seeks to en- 
 force a forfeiture must be free from blame. 
 Wilson v. Bird, 28 N. J. Eq. 352. 
 
 (b) A forfeiture may, it seems, be waived by 
 the Crown as well as bv private individuals, and 
 
 387
 
 388 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 It seems that if a plaintiff has made a gratuitous offer by his bill, he 
 cannot afterwards withdraw it ; 4 but it is in the discretion of the Court 
 whether or not to enforce it. 6 
 
 Where no account, payment, conveyance, or other direct relief is 
 
 sought against a party to a suit, who is not an infant, this por- 
 
 * 388 tion * of the bill may also contain a prayer that such party, upon 
 
 being served with a copy of the bill, may be bound by all the 
 
 proceedings in the cause. 1 
 
 For the purpose of preserving the property in dispute pending a suit, 
 or to prevent evasion of justice, the Court either makes a special order 
 on the subject, or issues a provisional writ, such as the writ of injunc- 
 tion to restrain the defendant from proceeding at Common Law against 
 the plaintiff, or from committing waste, or doing any injurious act ; the 
 writ of ne exeat regno, to restrain the defendant from avoiding the plain- 
 tiff's demands by quitting the kingdom ; or other writ of a similar nature. 
 When a bill seeks to obtain the special order of the Court, or a provi- 
 sional writ for any of these purposes, a prayer for the order or particular 
 writ which the case requires should be inserted, and the bill is then com- 
 monly named from the writ so prayed, — as an injunction bill, or a bill 
 for a writ of ne exeat regno. 2 
 
 As a general rule, the Court will not grant an injunction, unless ex- 
 pressly prayed by the bill. 3 A prayer for general relief will not be 
 sufficient to authorize it : 4 for, as against the general words, the defend- 
 ant might make a different case than he would against a prayer for an 
 injunction. 5 It seems, however, that there are exceptions to this rule, 
 and that, in some cases, the Court will grant an injunction, though not 
 prayed for. 6 (a) 
 
 versioner, for a discovery of an assignment of 
 a lease without license, if it does not expressly 
 waive tlie forfeiture. Lord Uxbridge v. Stavi- 
 land, 1 Ves. Sr. 56. Upon the same principle 
 if a rector or impropriator, or a vicar, file a 
 bill for tithes, he must waive the penalty of the 
 treble value, to which he is entitled by the Stat- 
 ute of 2 & 3 Edward VI. ; otherwise his bill 
 will be liable to demurrer. Ld. Red. 195; Anon. 
 1 Vera. 60. It seems, however, that if the bill 
 pray an account of the single value of the tithes 
 only, such a prayer will amount to an implied 
 waiver of the treble value, and that an injunction 
 may be granted against suing for the penalty 
 of the treble value, as well as upon this im- 
 plied waiver as upon the most express. Wools v. 
 Walley, 1 Anst. 100. It is to be observed, also, 
 that if the executor or administrator of a par- 
 son bring a bill for tithes, he need not offer to 
 accept the single value, as the Statute of Ed- 
 ward VI. does not give to such persons a rij^ht 
 to the treble value. Anon. 1 Vera. 60 ; see 
 also Att.-Gen. v. Vincent, ubi supra. 
 
 4 Pelly v. Wathen, 7 Hare, 371; 14 Jur. 
 9, 13 ; Potter v. Waller, 2 De G. & S. 410, 
 420; Kendall v. Marsters, 2 De G. F. & J. 200 ; 
 see Ba^nall v. Carlton, 6 Ch. D.371, 400. 
 
 5 Knight v. Bowyer, 2 De G. & J. 421, 447; 
 23 Beav. 609. 
 
 i Cons. Ord. X. 11; see post, Chap. VII. § 1. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 46. 
 
 3 Savory v. Dyer, Amb. 70 ; Walker v. 
 Devereaux, 4 Paige, 248; Lewiston Falls 
 Manuf. Co. v. Franklin Co. 54 Maine, 402. 
 
 4 Wright v. Atkyns, 1 V. & B. 313, 314. 
 
 5 Savory v. Dyer, ubi supra. In cases where 
 the writ of injunction is sought, it should not 
 only be included in the prayer for relief, but 
 also in the prayer for process. Wood v. Bra- 
 dell, 3 Sim. 273; Union Bank v. Kerr, 2 Md. 
 Ch. 460. 
 
 6 Blomfield v. Eyre, 8 Beav. 250, 259. And 
 the bill may be amended by adding the neces- 
 sary prayer. Jacob v. Hall, 12 Ves. 458; Wood 
 v. Beadell, 3 Sim. 273. 
 
 such waiver may be proved by similar evidence, 
 as by the continued acceptance of the Crown 
 rent. Lord Midleton v. Power, 19 L. R. Ir. 1. 
 
 388 
 
 (a) The prayer for an injunction should be 
 inserted in the prayer for process as well as in 
 the prayer for relief. Wood v. Beadell, 3 Sim.
 
 FORM OF THE BILL. 
 
 389 
 
 It is to be observed, that the rule not to grant an injunction, unless 
 specially prayed, applies only to cases where it is required, provision- 
 ally, until the hearing ; but that after decree, the court will interpose 
 by injunction, although it is not asked for by the bill. 7 
 
 Where an injunction is sought, not as a provisional remedy merely, 
 but as a continued protection to the rights of the plaintiff, the prayer 
 of the bill must be framed accordingly. 8 
 
 The prayer for ne exeat regno resembles mutatis mutandis, that for an 
 injunction. 9 But, though it is usual, it is not necessary that the 
 bill should pray the writ, as the intention to go abroad may * arise * 389 
 in the progress of the cause : and if, when the bill is filed, the 
 defendant does not intend to leave the kingdom, it would be highly im- 
 proper to pray the writ ; as a groundless suggestion that the defendant 
 means to abscond would press too harshly, and would also operate to 
 create the very mischief which the Court, in permitting the motion for 
 it to be made without notice, means to prevent. 1 (a) Where, however, 
 the plaintiff knew, at the time of the filing of the bill, that the defend- 
 ant was going abroad, Sir Lancelot Shadwell V. C. refused 2 to grant a 
 writ of ne exeat regno, because not prayed for by the bill. 8 
 
 In addition to the particulars already mentioned as necessary parts of 
 a bill, the bill should also, in the heading, be expressed to be between the 
 intended plaintiffs and defendants; the names of the defendants should 
 be repeated at the end, as defendants to the bill ; 4 and a note should be 
 appended of the name and address of the plaintiff's solicitor and agent, 
 or of the plaintiff's name and place of abode, where he sues in person. 5 
 
 7 Wright v. Atkyns, ubi supra ; Paxton V. 
 Douglas, 8 Ves. 520; Jackson v. Leaf, 1 J. & 
 W. 229, 232; Clarke v. Earl of Ormond, .lac. 
 122; Reynell v. Sprye, 1 De G. II. & G. 600, 
 690; and see post, Chap. XXXVI. Injunctions. 
 
 8 Ld. Red. 47; and see post, Chap. XXXVI. 
 § 3. But the omission of the proper prayer 
 is matter of form, and may be amended at the 
 hearing. African Methodist Episcopal Church 
 v. Conover, 27 N. J. Eq. 157. And perhaps a 
 final injunction may be obtained under the 
 prayer for general relief. Walker v. Devereaux, 
 4 Paige, 229, 248. 
 
 9 Upon the same bill, a ne exeat, as well 
 as an injunction, may be granted. Bryson v. 
 Petty, 1 Bland, 182. 
 
 1 Collinson v. , 18 Ves. 353; Moore v. 
 
 Hudson, 6 Mad. 218; Barned v. Laing, 13 Sim. 
 
 255; 6Jur. 1050; 7 Jur. 383; Howkinsu. How- 
 kins, 1 Dr. & S. 75; 6 Jur. N. S. 490. 
 
 2 Sharp v. Taylor, 11 Sim. 50; and see re- 
 marks on that case in Barned v. Laing, ubi supra. 
 
 a Ld. Red. 46, 47; Story, Eq. PI. § 43, and 
 notes ; see Darley v. Nicholson, 1 Dr. & War. 
 66; 2 Dr. & War. 86; 1 Con. & L. 207, for the 
 principles upon which the Court acts in grant- 
 ing writs of ne exeat regno ; and see post, Chap. 
 XXXVIII. Writ of Ne Exeat. 
 
 4 The words " out of the jurisdiction," or 
 " to be bound upon service of a copy of the 
 bill," should be added after the name of a de- 
 fendant who is abroad, or who is merelj' a 
 formal party. 
 
 5 Cons. Ord. IX. 2, and Sched. A.; see also 
 Cons. Ord. III. 2,3, 5, an&post, p. 397. For 
 forms, see Vol. III. 
 
 273 ; Lewiston Falls Manuf . Co. v. Franklin Co. 
 54 Maine, 402; Willett v. Woodbams, 1 111. 
 App. 411; see Union Bunk v. Kerr, 2 Md. Ch. 
 460. Under the prayer for an ad interim in- 
 junction, the Court may at the hearing make 
 such injunction perpetual, when there is clearly 
 to be no further order in the cnse. Wilmington 
 M. Co. v. Allen, 95 III. 288, 297; see Chicago, 
 St. L. & N. O. R. Co. v. Macomb, 2 Fed. Rep. 18. 
 («) The writ of ne exeat regno may be 
 
 granted under the prayer for general relief. 
 Lewis v. Shainwald, 7 Sawyer, 403; Shainwald 
 v. Lewis, 46 Fed. Rep. 839 ; Durham v. Jack- 
 son, 1 Paige, 629. A Court of Equity will re- 
 fuse to issue this writ upon a legal demand. 
 Drover v. Beyer, L. R. 13 Ch. 249. In New 
 Jersey the writ of ne exeat may now be granted 
 on affidavits before suit pending in Court be- 
 tween the parties. Clark v. Clark (N. J.), 26 
 Atl. Rep. 1012. 
 
 389
 
 390 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 The branch of the Court to which the cause is to be attached, must also 
 be marked on the bill, previous to its being filed. 6 
 
 8. Prayer for Process. 1 
 
 The next part of the bill consists of the prayer for process. 8 It has 
 before been stated that where no account, payment, conveyance, or other 
 direct relief is sought against a party to a suit, who is not an infant, the 
 plaintiff is now enabled, if he thinks fit, to pray by his bill that such a 
 party, upon being served with a copy of the bill, may be bound by all 
 the proceedings in the cause : 9 but with respect to all other defendants 
 
 the process prayed, in ordinary cases, is a writ of subpoena ; and 
 * 390 this part of the prayer is * commonly as follows : " May it please 
 
 your Lordship, the premises considered, to grant unto your orator 
 his Majesty's most gracious writ [or writs] of subpcena, to be directed to 
 
 the said , and to the rest of the confederates, when discovered, 
 
 thereby commanding them, and every of them, at a certain day, and 
 under a pain therein to be limited, personally 1 to be and appear before 
 your Lordship in this honorable Court ; and then and there, full, true, 
 direct, and perfect answer make to all and singular the premises ; and 
 further to stand to, perform, and abide such further order, direction, and 
 decree therein, as to your Lordship shall seem meet. And your orator 
 shall ever pray," &c? (a) 
 
 It is to be observed that the above words are not usually inserted in 
 the draft by the draftsman who prepares the bill, although they must 
 be added when the bill is engrossed. The draftsman, however, gener- 
 ally writes a direction, in the margin of the draft, for the insertion of 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. VI. 1; see post, p. 397; and 
 form of bill, Vol. III. 
 
 7 The bill used to conclude in England with 
 an elaborate prayer for process; but all that is 
 now required in the present English practice is, 
 that the names of the defendants should be set 
 forth, and a note appended with the names of 
 the solicitors for the plaintiff. In New Hamp- 
 shire, the prayer for process, unless some spe- 
 cial process or order shall be required, may be 
 omitted. Ch. Rule 3, 38 N. H. 605. The want 
 
 (a) A rule which requires the pra.ver for 
 process to identify the parties does not make 
 a bill fatally defective if it is omitted, when 
 the complaint shows who the defendants are. 
 Sheridan v. Cameron, 65 Mich. 680 ; see Ander- 
 son v. Wilson, 100 Ind. 402: Howe v. Robins, 
 36 N. J. Eq. 19; Alley v. Quinter. 4 McArthur 
 (D. C.)i 390. But in the Federal Courts it is 
 a fatal defect, under Equity Rule 23, to omit 
 from the prayer for process the names of de- 
 fendants {riven in the introductory part of the 
 bill. Goebel v. American Railway Supply Co. 
 55 Fed. Rep. 825; see Carlsbad v. Tibbetts, 51 
 390 
 
 of a prayer for process renders the bill defective 
 in New Jersey. Wright v. Wright, 4 Halst. Ch. 
 (N. J.) 153; see Segee v. Thomas, 3 Blatch. 11. 
 
 8 See Belknap v. Stone, 1 Allen, 572. 
 
 9 Order, 23d August, 1841. 
 
 1 In the case of a corporation a proper form 
 would omit the word "personally," and after 
 the word " appear." in this line, insert " accord- 
 ing to law." 1 Hoff. Ch. 53. 
 
 2 Hinde, 17. 
 
 id. 852. If a person is properly charged as exec- 
 utor, devisee or assignee, in the bill, he need not 
 be so styled in the prayer for process. White 
 v. Davis, 48 N. J. Eq. 22; see Plaut v. Plaut, 
 44 id. 18; Evans v. Evans, 23 id. 71; Ransom 
 v. Geer, 30 id. 249. But the mere recital in a 
 bill again«t a corporation that a certain person 
 is its president does not make him a party. 
 Peters v. Neely, 16 Lea. 275. A person named 
 in the summons and in the prayer of the bill, and 
 served with process, but as to whom the bill con- 
 tains no allegations, is not a party. Chapman 
 v. Pittsburgh & S. R. Co. 18 W. Va. 184.
 
 FORM OF THE BILL. 
 
 *391 
 
 this prayer, specifying the names of the persons against whom process 
 is to be prayed ; and care must be taken in so doing to insert the names 
 of all the persons who are intended to be made defendants ; because it 
 has been held that the mere naming of a party in a bill, without pray- 
 ing process against him as a defendant, is not to be considered as 
 making him a party, 8 even where he is out of the jurisdiction of the 
 Court. 4 
 
 * If the defendant be a peer of the realm, or entitled to the priv- * 391 
 ilege of peerage, he has a right, before a subpoena is issued against 
 him, to be informed, by letter from the Lord Chancellor, of the bill hav- 
 ing been filed ; this letter is called a letter missive, and must be accompa- 
 nied by a copy of the bill. In consequence of this privilege of peerage, 
 the practice is, that in all cases where peers are defendants, the usual 
 prayer for process is preceded by a prayer for a letter missive, in the fol- 
 lowing words : " May it please your Lordship to grant unto your orator 
 
 your Lordship's letter missive, to be directed to the said Earl of , 
 
 directing him to appear and answer your orator's said bill, or in default 
 thereof, his Majesty's most gracious writ of subpoena" &C. 1 
 
 3 Story, Eq. PI. § 44. A person whom the 
 bill prays to be made a party, does not there- 
 by become a party; to make him such, process 
 must be issued and served upon him. Bond v. 
 Hendricks, 1 A. K. Marsh. 594; see Huston v. 
 M'CIarty, 3 Litt. 274; Verplanck v. Merc. Ins. 
 Co. 2 Paige, 438; Lyle v. Bradford, 7 Monroe, 
 113; Windsor v. Windsor, 2 Dick. 707; Fawkes 
 v. Pratt, 1 P. W. 593; Hoyle v. Moore, 4 Ired. 
 Eq. 175; Doherty v. Stevenson, 1 Tenn. Ch. 
 518. And if it is sought to sue a party as an 
 individual and in a representative capacity, the 
 bill should state the facts, and pray process 
 against the defendant in both capacities; other- 
 wise he will be held to be a party only in the 
 character in which process was prayed against 
 him. Carter v. Ingraham, 43 Ala. 78. A de- 
 murrer will lie to a bill containing no prayer 
 for process. Wright v. Wright, 4 Halst. Ch. 
 143. But not a general demurrer. Boon v. 
 Pierpont, 28 N. J. Eq. 7. By the former prac- 
 tice in New York, parties might be treated as 
 defendants, by a clear statement in the bill to 
 that effect, without praying the subpoena. The 
 reason given was, that in that State the subpoena 
 was issued of course, and that a formal prayer 
 was unnecessary to entitle the plaintiff to pro- 
 cess. Brasher v. Van Cortlandt, 2 John. Ch. 
 245; Elmendorf v. Delancy, 1 Hopk. 555; ante, 
 p. 286, notes 4 and 5. 
 
 4 Windsor v. Windsor, 2 Dick. 707. Some 
 doubt appears to have been thrown upon this 
 proposition by the opinion of Sir J. Leach V. 
 C. in Haddoch v. Thomlinson, 2 S. & S. 219, 
 in which his Honor said that where a party 
 interested in the subject of a suit is charged by 
 the Hill to be out of the jurisdiction of the Court, 
 but is not named in the prayer for process, the 
 omission will not render the record defective; 
 
 although it is usual and convenient that process 
 should be prayed against them, in order that if 
 they come within the jurisdiction, process may 
 issue against them without amending the bill. 
 In a subsequent case, however, Sir C. Pepys 
 M. R. — after referring to a manuscript report 
 of another case before Sir J. Leach (Manos v. 
 De Tastet), in which that learned Judge had 
 said that it was not enough to state that per- 
 sons who, in respect of interest, were necessary 
 parties, were out of the jurisdiction, but that 
 the bill must go on to pray process against 
 them — said that he was of opinion that the 
 principle of the manuscript case ought to be 
 followed, and therefore allowed a demurrer 
 which had been taken ore tenus for want of a 
 necessary party, who had been charged to be 
 out of the jurisdiction, but against whom no 
 process had been prayed when he should come 
 within it. Taylor v. Fisher, Roll's Sittings after 
 Hil. Term, 1835, MS. ; see Story, Eq. PI. § 44, 
 and note; Mitford, Eq. PI. by Jeremy, 165; 
 Milligan v. Milledge, 3 Cranch, 220; Lavihart 
 v. Reilly, 3 Desaus. 590. See the 22d and 23d 
 Equity Rule of the U. S. Supreme Court, Jan. 
 term. 1842. stated post, Vol. III. Provision is 
 made for service of notice on defendants resid- 
 ing out of the Commonwealth, in the Mass. Ch. 
 Rules, Rule 5. 
 
 1 Hinde, 18. In the case of corporations ag- 
 gregate, the process of subpoena is the same as 
 in ordinary cases; but the bill sometimes prays, 
 that in case of their default to appear and an- 
 swer the bill, the writ of distringas may issue 
 to compel them to do so. Coop. Eq. PI. 16, 17; 
 Harvey v. East India Co. 2 Vern. 396; London 
 Joint Stock Bank t\ Mayor of London, 1 C P. 
 D. 1, 11; 1 Harris. Ch. Pr. 149; Story, Eq. PL 
 §44. 
 
 391
 
 392 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 When the Attorney-General is made a defendant to a suit, as he is 
 always supposed to be in Court, the bill does not pray any subpoena 
 against him, but merely that, upon being attended with a copy of the 
 bill, he may appear and put in an answer thereto. 2 
 
 *392 * Section VI. 
 
 In what Cases the Bill must be accompanied 
 by an Affidavit. 
 
 There are certain cases in which it is necessary that the bill should be 
 accompanied by an affidavit, to be filed with it, and in which the omis- 
 sion of such accompaniment will render the bill liable to demurrer. 1 (a) 
 Thus, when a bill is filed to obtain the benefit of an instrument upon 
 which an action at Law would lie, upon the ground that it is lost, and 
 that the plaintiff in Equity cannot therefore have any relief at Law, the 
 Court requires that the bill should be accompanied by an affidavit of the 
 loss of the instrument. 2 If, however, the objection is not taken by 
 demurrer, but the cause proceeds to a hearing, and the answer of the 
 defendant admits the loss or destruction of the instrument, then the 
 Court has jurisdiction, and the objection for want of the affidavit will be 
 overruled. 3 So, in suits for the discovery of deeds and writings, and 
 for relief founded upon such instruments, if the relief prayed be such as 
 might be obtained at Law, on the production of deeds or writings, the 
 plaintiff must annex to his bill an affidavit that they are not in his cus- 
 tody or power, and that he knows not where they are, unless they are in 
 the hands of the defendant. 4 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 46. 
 
 1 Where no preliminary order is required it 
 is not generally necessary that bills should be 
 sworn to, although the answer under oath is 
 not waived. Atwater v. Kinman, Harring. Ch. 
 243; Jerome v. Jerome, 5 Conn. 352. A bill in 
 Equity to redeem mortgaged premises need not 
 be verified by affidavit. Hilton v. Lothrop, 46 
 Maine, 297; Dinsmore v. Crossman, 53 Maine, 
 441. A bill need not be sworn to in Massa- 
 chusetts. Burns v. Lynde, 6 Allen, 306. In 
 North Carolina, ''an affidavit of the truth of 
 the matters contained in his bill " was neces- 
 sary to give jurisdiction (o the Court of Equity, 
 under the Statute (Rev. Code, c. 7), and the 
 want of such affidavit was a good ground for a 
 general demurrer. Barringer v. Andrews, 5 
 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 348. There is no rule in the 
 Circuit Court for Massachusetts, requiring an 
 oath to be filed with the bill. Woodworth v. 
 Edwards, 3 Wood. & M. 120. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 124; Walmsley v. Child, 1 Ves. 
 Sr. 341 ; Wright v. Lord Maidstone, 1 K. & J. 
 
 (a) As a rule, a plaintiff is allowed, in a 
 Court of Equity, " to state his case in the first 
 instance without in any way verifying it by 
 oath; and the Court ought to be slow, as I con- 
 ceive, when a plaintiff bonafidt brings forward 
 
 392 
 
 701; 1 Jur. N. S. 1013; Whitchurch v. Golding, 
 2 P. Wms. 541; March v. Davison, 9 Paige, 
 580; Stacy v. Pearson, 3 Rich. Eq. 148; Parson 
 v. Wilson, 2 Tenn.260; Pennington v. Governor, 
 1 Blackf. 78; Taliaferro v. Foote, 3 Leigh, 58; 
 Peart v. Taylor, 2 Bibb, 556; Story, Eq. PL 
 § 288; Ld. Red. 123, 224; Livingston v. Livings- 
 ton, 4 John. Ch. 294; Le Roy v. Veeder, 1 John. 
 Ch. 417; Munday v. Shatzell, Litt. Sel. Cas. 
 373; Lynch v. Willard, 6 John. Ch. 342. 346. 
 For the reason of the rule, see post, pp. 394, -395, 
 notes. In Thornton v. Stewart, 7 Leigh, 128, it 
 was held that, although regularly an affidavit 
 of the loss of the bond, &c, ought to be filed 
 with a bill for relief upon a lost bond, yet if 
 such affidavit is not so filed, but is filed after- 
 wards in the progress of the cause, this is suffi- 
 cient. See Cabell v. Megginson, 6 Munf. 202; 
 Jerome v. Jerome, 5 Conn. 352; Bennett v. 
 Waller, 23 111. 97. 
 
 3 Crosse v. Bedingfieid, 12 Sim. 35; 5 Jur. 
 836; Bennett v. Waller, 23 111. 97. 
 
 4 M'Elwee v. Sutton, 1 Hill Ch. 33; Story, 
 
 a case, in shutting him out from stating it. and 
 from trying it in the manner provided by law." 
 Per Stirling J. in Lawrauce v. Norreys, 39 Ch. 
 D. 213, 225.
 
 WHEN BILL MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY AFFIDAVIT. 
 
 *394 
 
 But a bill for a discovery merely, or which only prays the delivery 
 of deeds or writings, or equitable relief grounded upon them, 
 does * not require such an affidavit. 1 It has been held that an * 393 
 affidavit is also unnecessary in the case of a bill for discovery 
 of an instrument which has been fraudulently cancelled by the defend- 
 ant, and to have another deed executed ; for, in such a case, if the 
 plaintiff had the cancelled instrument in his hands he could make no 
 use of it at Law, and, indeed, the relief prayed is such as a Court of 
 Equity only can give. 2 
 
 Another case, in which it was required that the bill should be accom- 
 panied by an affidavit, was, where a bill was filed under the Stat. 53 
 Geo. III. c. 159, which was passed for the purpose of limiting the 
 responsibility of ship-owners in certain cases. This Act is 
 * expressly repealed by the 17 & 18 Vic. c. 120, § 4 ; and as * 394 
 the Acts now in force x for the above purpose contain no provision 
 similar to that contained in the Act of Geo. III. with reference to an 
 affidavit accompanying the bill, it is to be assumed that such an affidavit 
 is no longer necessary. 
 
 Even in cases in which the legislature has expressly directed that the 
 affidavit should be " annexed to the bill," it is not necessary that the affi- 
 davit should be sworn at the same time as the bill is filed ; but it is the 
 usual practice, in all cases in which an affidavit is necessary, to have it 
 sworn a day or two before the bill is filed. 2 
 
 Eq. PI. §§ 288, 313; Findleyr. Hinde, 1 Peters, 
 244; Livingston v. Livingst >n, 4 John. Ch.294; 
 Campbell v. Sheldon, 13 Pick. 8, 18-20, per 
 Shaw C. J. For form of affidavit, see Vol. III., 
 and for form of demurrer, for want of it, see 
 
 2 Van Hey. 76 . 
 
 i Ld. Red. 54; see 1 Ves. Sr. 341, 344; 
 Whitchurch v. Golding, 2 P. Wins. 541; Anon. 
 
 3 Atk. 17; Dormer v. Fortescue, id. 132; Caton 
 V. Coles, L. R. 1 Eq. 581; M'Elwee v. Sutton, 
 1 Hill Ch. 33; Story, Eq. PI. § 288. Where 
 the subject-matter of the writing is properly 
 cognizable in Equity, an affidavit of the loss is 
 not necessary. Peart v. Taylor, 2 Bibb, 566; 
 Ld Red. 124 ; Laight v. Morgan, 1 Caines's Cas. 
 345; S. C. 1 John. Ch. 9; Campbell v. Sheldon, 
 13 Pick. 18-20. 
 
 2 King v. King, Mos. 192; and see Ld. Red. 
 124. In Root ham v. Dawson, Anst. 859, the 
 authority of King o. King appears to have been 
 questioned, and a different decision come to. 
 In that case, the bill was filed for the discovery 
 of the contents of a bond which had been given 
 to the plaintiffs, as parish officers, as an in- 
 demnification for the expense of a bastard child, 
 and which was alleged in the bill to have been 
 defaced and cancelled by tearing off the signa- 
 ture of the obligor, so that the bond was no 
 longer in force; the bill also prayed an account 
 and payment of what was due on the bond, as 
 well as the execution of a new one for the 
 future indemnification of the trustees. To this 
 bill the defendant demurred: "for that the 
 
 plaintiffs ought, according to the rules of the 
 Court, to have made an affidavit of the bond 
 being defaced and avoided as stated in the bill ; " 
 and the demurrer was allowed. It is to be ob- 
 served, that the L. C. B. Macdonald, in his 
 judgment, appears to have proceeded upon the 
 ground that the plaintiffs had not confined 
 themselves to seeking a discovery and re-exe- 
 cution of the bond, but had gone on to pray 
 for payment of the sum already due; though, 
 certainly, that distinction does not appear to 
 have been recognized by the learned Baron 
 Thompson, who delivered his opinion upon the 
 occasion. It is, however, submitted that the 
 reason given for the decision in King v. King is 
 quite satisfacton - : for, as the ground for the 
 interference of a Court of Equity in such a case 
 is not the loss, but the cancellation of the in- 
 strument, so as to render it impossible to use it 
 at Law, no relief will be granted by the Court 
 until it is satisfied that the cancellation has 
 taken place, by the production of the cancelled 
 instrument; whereas, in the case of the loss of 
 a document, the Court has, in general, no means 
 of satisfying itself that the document has been 
 lost but the assertion of the party himself; 
 which it consequently requires should be made 
 upon oath. 
 
 1 "The Merchant Shipping Act, 1854" (17 
 & 18 Vic. c. 104), Part IX. §§ 504, 514; " The 
 Merchant Shipping Amendment Act, 1862 " 
 (25 & 26 Vic. c. 63), § 64. 
 
 * Walker v. Fletcher, 1 Phil. 115; 12 Sim 
 
 393
 
 *394 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 The other cases, in which bills are required to be accompanied by an 
 affidavit, may be mentioned here, although they do not come within the 
 description of bills which are now the subject of discussion. These are: 
 bills for the purpose of perpetuating the testimony of witnesses, where, 
 from circumstances, such as the age or infirmity of witnesses, or their 
 intention of leaving the country, it is probable the plaintiff would lose 
 the benefit of their testimony : in which case, an affidavit of the circum- 
 stances, by means of which the testimony may probably be lost, must be 
 annexed to the bill ; 3 and bills of interpleader, which also, to avoid a 
 demurrer, must be accompanied by an affidavit by the plaintiff that there 
 is no collusion between him and any of the parties. 4 
 
 420, 422; 6 Jur. 4; but see Francome v. Fran- 
 come, 13 W. R. 355, L. C. ; 11 Jur. N. S. 123. 
 The affidavit is usually, but need not be, at- 
 tached to the bill. Jones v. Shepherd, 29 Beav. 
 293 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 250. Affirmed by L. C, 7 
 Jur. N. S. 228 ; sub nom. Shepherd v. Jones, 
 3 De G. F. & J. 56. It may be made an ex- 
 hibit to the bill. See forms of affidavit in 
 Vol. III. 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 150; Phillips v. Carew, 1 P. 
 Wins. 116; Laight v. Morgan, 1 Caines's Cas- 
 344; S. C. 1 John. Ch. 429; Story, Eq. PI. 
 §§ 3U4, 309. ■ The reason given for requiring 
 the affidavit is, that the proceeding has a tend- 
 ency to change the jurisdiction of the subject- 
 matter from a Court of Law to a Court of 
 Equity. Ld. Red. 150, 151 ; Story, Eq. PI. 309. 
 "This reason," says Mr. Justice Story, "is 
 perhaps not quite satisfactory." — "A better 
 ground would seem to be that the bill has a 
 tendency to create delaj's, and may be used as 
 an instrument unduly to retard the trial; and, 
 therefore, an affidavit, that the bill is well 
 founded, is required. The affidavit should be 
 positive as to the material facts." Story, Eq. 
 PI. § 309; and see post, Chap. XXXIV. § 4, 
 Bills to Perpetuate Testimony. For form of 
 demurrer for want of such affidavit, 2 Van Hey. 
 78. 
 
 4 Ld. Red. 49; Bignold v. Audland, 11 Sim. 
 23; Hamilton v. Marks, 5 De G. & S. 638. In 
 Larabrie v. Brown. 1 De G. & J. 204; 23 Beav. 
 607, leave was given to file an interpleader bill 
 quantum valent, on affidavit of the plaintiffs' 
 solicitor, the plaintiffs being abroad, and time 
 pressing; but the affidavit of the plaintiffs was 
 afterwards, by leave of the Court, fib-d and an- 
 nexed to the bill nunc pro tunc. Braithwaite's 
 Pr. 27. Where there were several plaintiffs 
 residing in distant places, leave was given, on 
 a like affidavit, and an injunction granted for 
 a limited time, on an undertaking to file the 
 usual affidavit. Nelson w. Barter, 10 Jur. N. S. 
 611 ; 12 W. R. 857, V. C. W. ; 2 II. & M. 334; 
 and see post, Chap. XXXIV. § 3, Bills of Inter- 
 pleader ; see Wood v. Lyme, 4 De G. & S. 
 16; Edrington v. Allsbrooks, 21 Texas, 186; 
 Eden Inj. (2d Am. ed. ) 401, 402 ; Shaw v. Coster, 
 
 394 
 
 8 Paige, 339; Tobin v. Wilson, 3 J. J. Marsh. 
 67; Manksv. Holroyd, 1 Cowen, 691; Ld. Red. 
 143. Such an affidavit is not necessary in Con- 
 necticut. Nash v. Smith, 6 Conn. 421 ; see 
 Jerome v. Jerome, 5 Conn. 352. For form of 
 affidavit, see Vol. III. For form of demurrer 
 for want of such an affidavit, Willis, 442; Equity 
 Drafts (2d Am. ed.), 77. 
 
 A bill pra)'ing for an injunction, generally 
 requires a special affidavit to support it. Eden 
 Inj. (2d Am. ed.) 380, 381; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr.43, 
 44,617; 1 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 78; Hatch v. Eustap- 
 hieve, 1 Clarke (N. Y.), 63; Hammersley v. 
 Wyckoff, 8 Paige, 72; Holdrege v. Gwynne, 18 
 N. J. Eq. 26, 32 ; Perkins v. Collins, 2 Green 
 Ch. 482 ; Bogert v. Haight, 9 Paige, 297 ; see 
 Wood worth v. Edwards, 3 Wood. & M. 120. 
 It ma}' be verified by an attorney. Edrington 
 v. Allsbrooks, 21 Texas, 186; Youngblood v. 
 Schamp, 15 N. J. Eq. 42. 
 
 An affidavit of a person other than the plain- 
 tiff, that "each and every allegation contained 
 in the bill are true so far as they are known to 
 him personally, and so far as he has heard he 
 believes them to be true," is insufficient to sus- 
 tain an injunction. Chesapeake &c. R. Co. v. 
 Huse, 5 W. Va. 579. And so is the oath of an 
 attorney that statements " are true when made 
 on his own knowledge, and when made upon 
 information of others he believes them to be 
 true," where it does not appear from the bill or 
 petition that any of the statements were made 
 upon the knowledge of the affiant or information 
 of others. Pullen v. Baker, 41 Texas, 419. And 
 see Smith v. Republic Life Ins. Co. 2 Tenn. 
 Ch. 631. If, however, the bill has been actually 
 sworn to, the injunction will not be dissolved 
 because the Master has omitted to sign the 
 jurat. Capner v. President &c. of Flemington 
 Co. 2 Green Ch. 467. 
 
 In Maine, " bills of discover}', and those 
 praying for an injunction, must be verified 
 by oath." Ch. Rule 1, 37 Maine, 581. This 
 rule relates to the pure and simple bill of dis- 
 covery. Dinsmore v. Crossman, 53 Maine, 441; 
 Hilton v. Lothrop, 46 Maine, 297. , 
 
 Where the facts, on which the claim for an 
 injunction is made, are not within the knowl-
 
 WHEN BILL MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY AFFIDAVIT. 
 
 396 
 
 * It is to be observed that, in cases of this nature, advantage * 395 
 can only be taken of the omission of an affidavit, by demurrer ; 
 and where a plaintiff, instead of demurring on this ground in the first 
 instance, put in a plea to the whole bill, which was overruled, he was 
 not allowed to demur, ore tenus, on the ground that the necessary 
 affidavit was not annexed. 1 
 
 ■* If there are several plaintiffs, all must join in the affidavit, * 396 
 unless a satisfactory explanation be given for their non-joinder. 1 
 If a corporation is plaintiff, the affidavit may be made by the secretary 
 or other responsible officer. The affidavit may be written or printed ; 
 and a copy of it, but not necessarily an office copy, should be sealed at 
 the Record and Writ Clerks' Office, and annexed to each copy of the bill 
 sealed there for service, 2 and served therewith. 
 
 edge of the plaintiff, he should state the facts 
 in his bill as upon his information and belief, 
 and annex the affidavit of the person from 
 whom he obtained the information, or some 
 other person who can swear positively to the 
 truth of the material allegations in the bill. 
 Campbell v. Morrison, 7 Paige, 157; Bank of 
 Orleans v. Skinner, 9 Paige, 305. But in bills 
 charging fraud, and praying a discovery, or 
 in any case, where, in the nature of things, 
 positive proof cannot be expected, the additional 
 verification may be dispensed with, and the 
 injunction may issue on the affidavit of the 
 plaintiff founded on belief alone. Youngblood 
 v. Suhamp, 15 N. J. Eq 42, 43; Att.-Gen. 
 v. Bank of Columbia, 1 Paige, 511; Campbell 
 v. Morrison, 7 Paige, 157. In New Jersey, the 
 affidavits of the plaintiff, made after filing the 
 bill, are not competent to be read upon a motion 
 for an injunction and the appointment of re- 
 ceivers. Such affidavits should be subjoined 
 to the bill, and filed with it. Brandred v. Pat- 
 erson Machine Shop, 3 Green Ch. 21)4, 309. In 
 Delaware, a creditor's bill must contain the 
 averments required by the 109th Rule, and 
 those averments must be sworn to in the jurat. 
 Clark v. Davis, Harring. Ch. 227. 
 
 When a writ of ne exeat regno is asked for, 
 an affidavit is necessary as a foundation for 
 obtaining it. Rice v. Hale, 5 Cush. 238; Porter 
 v. Spencer, 2 John. Ch. 169 ; Seymour v. Hazard, 
 1 John. Ch. 1; Thome v. Halsey, 7 John. Ch. 
 191; Gernoe v. Boecaline, 2 Wash. C. C. 130; 
 Gilbert v. Colt, 1 Hopk. 500; Mattocks .v. Tre- 
 maine, 3 John. Ch. 75. 
 
 When a corporation aggregate is plaintiff, 
 the bill, from the necessity of the case, must lie 
 verified by some officer or agent of the corpora- 
 tion, and the bill should be signed by the officer 
 making the oath. Bank of Orleans v. Skinner, 
 9 Paige, 305; Youngblood v. Schamp, 15 N. J. 
 Eq. 42, 43. See Tulloch v. Belleville P. & S. 
 Works (Col.), 31 Pac. Rep. 229. And the oath of 
 the agent or attorney, verifying the bill, should 
 
 state that the agent has read the bill, or heard it 
 read, and knows the contents thereof, and that 
 the same is true of his own knowledge, except as 
 to the matters which are therein stated to be on 
 the information and belief of the plaintiff, and 
 that as to those matters the deponent believes it 
 to be true. Bank of Orleans v. Skinner, 9 Paige, 
 305; Justices v. Cosby, 5 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 
 254. Where it is necessary that a bill should 
 be sworn to for the purpose of calling for an 
 answer on oath, it is not necessary that the 
 allegations of the bill, verified by oath merely 
 for that purpose, should be sworn to positively. 
 It is sufficient that the person verifying the bill 
 swears to his belief of the charges contained in 
 it. Veeder v. Moritz, 9 Paige, 371 ; Triebert v. 
 Burgess, 11 Md. 452. 
 
 An affidavit to a bill, quia timet, stating 
 that the facts in the bill relating to the plain- 
 tiff's own acts are true, and those relating to 
 others, he believes to be true, is sufficient. Col- 
 lins v. Barksdale, 23 Ga. 602. And generally, 
 in all bills which are to be verified by affidavit, 
 as well as in answers and petitions, the several 
 matters stated, charged, averred, admitted, or 
 denied, are required to be stated positively, or 
 upon information and belief only, according to 
 the fact. Marsh v. Marsh, 16 N. J. Eq. 396, 
 397. 
 
 i Hook v. Dorman, 1 S & S. 227, 231 ; Crosse 
 v. Bedingfield, 12 Sim. 35; 5 Jur. 836 ; Allen V. 
 State Bank, 1 Dev. & Batt. Eq. 6; Findley v. 
 Hind, 1 Peters, 244; Woodworth V. Edwards, 3 
 Wood. & M. 120 For the form of demurrer in 
 such cases, see Willis, 431. The affidavit may 
 be amended by leave of the Court. Hamilton 
 i'. Marks, 5 De G. & S. 638 
 
 1 Braithwaite"s Pr. 27, and Gibbs v. Gibbs, 
 there cited : and for form of affidavit in that 
 case, see Vol. III. 
 
 2 Braithwaite's Pr. 27. No fee is pavable 
 on filing an affidavit with, or annexed to, a 
 bill. Ibid. 
 
 395
 
 *397 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 Section VII. — Printing and Filing the BUI. 
 
 After a bill has been drawn or perused, and signed by counsel, it must 
 (except in the cases mentioned below) be printed on cream- wove, machine- 
 drawn, foolscap folio paper, nineteen pounds per mill ream, in pica type, 
 leaded, with an inner margin about three quarters of an inch wide, and 
 an outer margin about two inches and a half wide. 3 Dates and sums, 
 occurring in the bill, are to be expressed by figures. 4 
 
 Where a bill prays a writ of injunction, 5 or ne exeat regno, or is filed 
 for the purpose of making an infant a ward of Court, but in no other 
 cases, 6 a written bill may be filed, upon the undertaking of the plaintiff, 
 or his solicitor, 7 to file a printed copy within fourteen days. 8 Written 
 bills must be written upon paper of the same description and size as that 
 on which bills are printed; 9 and the costs of a written bill will not be 
 allowed, unless specially directed by the Court in disposing of the costs 
 of the cause. 10 
 
 If the printed bill be not duly filed, the Record and Writ Clerk is to 
 take the written copy off the file ; u and the plaintiff or his solici- 
 * 397 tor, who has personally undertaken to file such printed copy * is 
 to pay to the defendant all his costs of the suit, such costs to be 
 taxed and recoverable without further order ; and the certificate of the 
 Eecord and Writ Clerk of the non-filing of the printed bill is to be suffi- 
 cient authority to the taxing master to tax the costs. 1 
 
 The Court has a discretionary power, in a proper case, to allow the 
 written bill to be restored and a printed bill to be filed after the expira- 
 tion of the fourteen days, 2 on an application, by motion, to the Judge to 
 whose Court the cause is attached. If none of the defendants has 
 entered an appearance, the application may, it is conceived, be made ex 
 parte : otherwise, notice of the motion must be served on such of them 
 
 8 15 &16 Vice. 86, §1, but see §9; Cons. 
 Ord. IX. 3. It is the business of the plaintiff to 
 get the bill printed, by such printer as he may 
 select. The proof of the bill should be very 
 carefully examined and corrected (for which a 
 fee of 2d. per folio is allowed by the Regul. to 
 Ord. 2d Sch ), as no bill will be filed as a 
 printed bill, unless alterations (if any) are made 
 in type. Braithwaite's Pr. 25. But a printed 
 bill with written alterations may be filed as a 
 written bill, where a written bill could be filed. 
 Ibid. Some directions as to the manner in 
 which the proof should be corrected will be 
 found in Vol. III. 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. IX. 3. 
 
 6 Falkland Islands Co. v. Lafone, 3 W. R. 
 561. L. JJ. 
 
 6 Yate v. Lighthead, 16 Jur. 964, V. C. T. 
 
 7 For form of undertaking, see Vol. III. 
 The undertaking may be either indorsed on the 
 copy bill intended to be filed, or be written on 
 a separate paper, to be filed therewith. Braith- 
 waite's Pr. 23. 
 
 s 15 & 16 Vic. c 86, § 6. The printed copy 
 
 396 
 
 must, of course, be a copy of the written bill as 
 it stands at the time the printed copy is filed. 
 Braithwaite's Pr. 24. The written and printed 
 copies will remain together on the file. Ibid. 
 9 Ord. 6 March. 1860, r. 16. 
 
 10 Cons. Ord. XL. 18; see Fit v. Burial Board 
 of Islington. 2 W. R. 584, V. C W. Costs of 
 written bill allowed on subsequent application; 
 direction having been accidentally omitted; but 
 without costs of application. Hewitt v. White, 
 12 Jur. X. S. 46 ; 14 W. R. 220, V. C. K. 
 
 11 The practice of the office is to take the 
 written bill off the file on the fifteenth day, but 
 it is not destroyed. Braithwaite's Pr. 24. 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. IX. 4. When proceedings were 
 stayed, however, the written bill was ordered 
 to be retained on the file. Lord Abingdon v. 
 Thornhill. 3 \V. R. 615, V. C. W". And so 
 where, after an interim order, the suit was ar- 
 ranged. Garland v. Riordan, 33 Beav. 448. 
 
 2 Ferrand v. Bradford, 8 De G. M. & G. 93; 
 2 Jur. N. S. 360 ; affirming 21 Beav. 422; 2 
 Jur. N. S. 175.
 
 PRINTING AND FILING THE BILL. * 398 
 
 as have appeared, 8 and be supported by an affidavit accounting for the 
 delay ; 4 and the defendants will be entitled to their costs of appearing on 
 the motion. 5 
 
 If a printed bill be filed, and there is a discrepancy between it and the 
 written bill, the defendant may move, on notice, that both bills be taken 
 off the file. 6 
 
 The solicitor, or the plaintiff suing in person, must cause to be printed 
 or written upon the bill his name and place of business, or residence, and 
 also, if his place of business (or residence) shall be more than three miles 
 from the Record and Writ Clerks' Office, another proper place, to be 
 called his address for service (which must not be more than three miles 
 from that office), where writs, notices, orders, summonses, and other 
 written communications may be left for him ; and where any such solici- 
 tor shall only be the agent of any other solicitor, he must add to his own 
 name or firm and place of business the name or firm and place of business 
 of the principal solicitor. 7 
 
 Every original bill 8 must, at the .option of the plaintiff, be distinctly 
 marked, at or near the top or upper part thereof, either with the words 
 "Lord Chancellor," or with the words " Master of the Rolls ; " and if 
 with the words "Lord Chancellor," then also with the name of one of 
 the Vice Chancellors, at the plaintiff's option ; and the Record and Writ 
 Clerks are not to file any bill which is not marked as above. 9 
 
 * When the bill has been marked with the name of a Judge, the * 398 
 cause is attached to his Court ; x and except in the case of orders 
 made in vacation, 2 or of orders of course, 3 all further proceedings in the 
 cause, 4 and rehearings otherwise than by way of appeal, must be had 
 before him, unless the cause or proceeding is removed from his Court by 
 any special order of the Lord Chancellor, or the Lords Justices. 6 
 
 An order for the transfer of a cause from one branch of the Court to 
 another will be made, whenever there is a probability of convenience 
 
 8 Moss v. Syers, 9 Jur. N. S. 1219; 11 W. R. 2 Cons. Ord. VI 11 ; see Man o. Rickets, 9 
 
 1047, V. C. K. " Beav. 4 ; Holloway v. Phillips, 17 Jur. 875, 
 
 * For form of order, see Seton, 1242, No. 1. V. C. W. ; Price r. Gardner, 1 Jur. N. S. 975, 
 An indorsement, signed by the Registrar, on V. C. W. ; Bean v. Griffiths, id. 1045, V. C. W. ; 
 the printed bill intended to be filed, is suffi- Warrick v. Queen's College, L. R. 3 Ch. 815. 
 cient. without drawing up a formal order, where 3 Cons. Ord. VI. 9; 13 & 14 Vic. c. 35, § 29; 
 no direction as to costs is given; see Bank Magan v. Magan, 16 Jur. 587, V. C. K. 
 
 of Hindustan v. Hodgson, 1864, H., No. 275; * But see Cons. Ord. XXXV. 59. 
 
 Bank of Hindustan v. Robinson, 1864, H., No. 6 Cons. Ord. VI. 5; see Earl of Shrewsbury 
 
 272. For forms of motion paper, and notice of v. Trappes, 2 De G. F. & J. 172; Fox well v. 
 
 motion, see Vol. III. Bostock, 12 W. R. 723, L. C. Upon any Vice- 
 
 6 Moss v. Syers, ubi supra. Chancellor ceasing to hold office, the cause, 
 
 6 Falkland Islands Co. i\ Lafone, 3 W. R. unless removed by any special order of the 
 561, L. JJ. For form of notice of motion, see Lord Chancellor, or Lords Justices, is thence- 
 Vol. III. forward attached to the Court of his successor. 
 
 7 Cons. Ord. III. 2, 5. For forms, see Cons. Ord. VI. 7. As to the power of a Judge 
 Vol. III. to make an order affecting a fund standing to 
 
 8 The word " bill " includes " information." the credit of a cause attached to another branch 
 Cons. Ord. Prel. Ord. 10 (4). of the Court, see Wright v. Irving, 10 Sim 
 
 9 Cons. Ord. VI. 1. The Judge's name may 625; Bryson r. Warwick Canal Co. 18 Jur. 
 be added in writing to a printed bill, if inad- 893, V. C. W.; Weeding v. Weeding, 1 J. & 
 vertentlv omitted. Braithwaite's Pr. 25. H. 424. 
 
 l Cons. Ord. VI. 1. 
 
 397
 
 399 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 from so doing. 6 The order is made upon motion, 7 with notice ; 8 but the 
 consent of the Judges, from whom and to whom the cause is to be trans- 
 ferred, and the leave of the Lord Chancellor, or the Lords Justices, to 
 give notice of the motion, must be first obtained : the consent and leave 
 are usually given as a matter of course, on the ex parte application of 
 counsel. 3 If leave is given, the motion will be placed in the Court paper 
 for the day appointed for the hearing. 10 If one of the causes is attached 
 to the Rolls Court, the order of transfer must be made by the Master of 
 the Rolls, as well as the Lord Chancellor or the Lords Justices. 11 The 
 order of transfer, when passed and entered, should be left with the 
 Record and Writ Clerk, for entry in his cause book. 12 
 
 The copy of the bill being thus prepared, it is delivered to the Clerk 
 
 of Records and Writs, who thereupon writes thereon the date on which 
 
 it is brought into his office, numbers it, and receives it into his 
 
 * 399 custody. The bill is then said to be filed, and of record ; * but 
 
 before this process is completed it is not of any effect in Court. 1 
 
 If the bill has been inadvertently filed without the signature of coun- 
 sel, an order as of course may be obtained, on motion or petition, giving 
 
 6 Curlewis v. Whidborne, 10 W. R. 261, L. 
 ,TJ.; Sidebottom i>. Sidebottom, 14 W. R. 507, 
 L. JJ.; see ante, p. 70; and post, Chap. XIX. 
 § 1, Dismissing Bills. 
 
 7 For forms of notice of motion, see Vol. 
 III. 
 
 8 Bond v. Barnes, 2 De G. F. & J. 387. 
 
 9 For form of motion paper, see Vol. III. 
 
 10 As to service of the notice of motion and 
 the hearing, see post, Chap. XXXV. § 2, Mo- 
 tions. The party giving the notice must be 
 provided, at the hearing, with copies of it for 
 the use of the Court. 
 
 n See 5 Vic. c. 5, § 30; Seton, 1268; and 
 ante, p. 70, note. For forms of order for the 
 transfer of causes, see Seton, 1268, Nos. 1-4. 
 The retransfer of a cause which has been trans- 
 ferred under a General Order is obtained in the 
 manner above explained. As to such retransfer, 
 see Sidebottom v. Sidebottom, 7 W. R. 104, L. 
 C; Tiffin v. Parker, 12 W. R. 698, L. C; Piatt 
 v. Walter, L. R. 1 Ch. 471, L. JJ.; Pietroni v. 
 Transatlantic Co. 14 W. R. 783, L. C. ; Whit- 
 taker v. Fox, ibid.; Betts v. Rimmel, ibid. 
 Semble, the order is in the nature of an order 
 nisi, and notice of the application need not be 
 given. Wilson v. Gray, ibid. For form of 
 order for retransfer, see Seton, 1269. No. 5. 
 The order in such case can only be made by 
 the Lord Chancellor, or Lords Justices. Ibid. 
 For form of notice of motion, see Vol. III. 
 
 12 Braithwaite's Pr. 566. 
 
 i Cons. Ord. I. 35, 45, 48; Cons. Ord. VIII. 
 3. The fee on filing the bill is 20s. higher 
 scale, and 10s. lower scale; and is paid by 
 Chancery Fee Fund Stamps, affixed to the bill. 
 Where a written bill has been filed, no fee is 
 pavable on filing the printed bill. Jones v. 
 
 398 
 
 Batten, 9 Hare App. 57; 2 De G. M. & G. 111. 
 As to using several stamps, see Brain v. Brain, 
 9 Hare App. 90, and Cons. Ord. XXXIX. 7. 
 As to printing and delivery of pleadings under 
 the present English Practice, see 1 Dan. Ch. 
 Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 389, 390, 435. 
 
 In Massachusetts (Ch. Rule 2) the plaintiff 
 must file his bill before or at the time of taking 
 out the subpoena ; and no injunction or other 
 proceeding shall be ordered until the bill is 
 filed, unless for good cause shown. In Ver- 
 mont, no injunction shall be issued in anj- case 
 until the bill shall have been filed. Gen. Stats. 
 c. 29, §§ 55, 56; Howe v. VVillard, 40 Vt. 654. 
 The cause is, in fact, pending in the Court from 
 the time the Chancellor makes the order for 
 issuing the injunction. Howe t\ Willard, 
 supra. 
 
 A suit in Equity is commenced, it seems, 
 when the bill is filed. McLin v. McNamara, 2 
 Dev. & Bat. Ch. 82; Aston v. Gallowwy, 3 Ired. 
 Ch. 126; ante, p. 2, n. (a). 
 
 By Chancery Rule 40, in New Jersey, the 
 Clerk of the Court of Chancery is required to 
 keep in his office a docket in which he shall 
 enter the titles of all suits brought in the Court, 
 and a memorandum of every paper filed in the 
 same, under the title of the suit, with the time 
 of filing and the name of the solicitor of each 
 party, and also an alphabetical index to the 
 same; and the said docket shall be, at all 
 proper hours, accessible to the bar. By the 
 16th Equity Rule of the U. S. Courts, upon the 
 return of the suhpcena. as served and executed 
 upon any defendant, the clerk shall enter the 
 suit upon his docket as pending in the Court, 
 and shall state the time of the entry.
 
 PRINTING AND FILING THE BILL. * 400 
 
 leave to amend by adding such signature ; 2 but any defendant who has 
 appeared may, before such amendment is made, take advantage of the 
 irregularity by demurrer, or by special motion to take the bill off the 
 file. 3 
 
 The copy of an information intended to be filed must: bear the signa- 
 ture of the Attorney-General. 4 To obtain this, a copy of the draft is left 
 with him, together with a certificate of the counsel who settled it, that 
 it is proper for his sanction, and also a certificate of the solicitor for the 
 relator that he is a proper person to be relator, and is able to pay costs ; 5 
 and if the Attorney-General approves of the draft, he will then, on the 
 copy to be filed being left with him, together with a certificate that it is 
 a true copy of the draft as settled by counsel, 6 affix his signature thereto. 
 The information, so signed, is then filed, in the same manner as a bill. 
 
 The bill being thus filed, the defendant is entitled, after appearance, 
 to demand from the plaintiff any number of printed copies not exceeding 
 ten, 7 on payment for the same at the rate of one half-penny per folio 8 of 
 seventy-two words. 9 
 
 A bill may be ordered to be taken from the files if vexatious ; as where 
 it was filed after four previous bills for substantially the same matter 
 had been successfully demurred to. 10 'So, if it is illusory, the plaintiff 
 being indemnified by, and being the puppet of, some other person 
 who has instituted the suit for the purpose of annoyance and 
 vexation. 11 
 
 * The 2 & 3 Vic. c. 11, § 7, provides that no lis pendens shall * 400 
 bind a purchaser or mortgagee without express notice thereof, 
 unless and until a memorandum or minute 1 containing the name and 
 the usual or last-known place of abode, and the title, trade, or profession 
 of the person whose estate is intended to be affected thereby, and the 
 Court of Equity, and the title of the cause or information, and the day 
 when the bill or information was filed, shall be left with the Senior 
 Master of the Court of Common Pleas ; who is required by the Act 
 forthwith to enter the same in a book, provided for that purpose, in 
 alphabetical order, by the name of the person whose estate is intended to 
 be affected by such lis pendens? 
 
 The memorandum or minute, containing the particulars required by 
 the Act, must, by the regulations of the office, be on parchment, and a 
 
 2 Braithwaite's Pr. 23; and see Coppeard v. ll Robson v. Dodd, L. R. 8 Eq. 301 ; but see 
 
 Mayhew, 22 L. J. Ch. 408, M. R. Fisher v. London Offices Co. \V. N. (1870), 113, 
 
 » Ante, p. 312. M. R. 
 
 4 Braithwaite's Pr. 25. 1 For form of memorandum, see Vol. III. 
 
 5 For forms of these certificates, see Vol. 2 As to the doctrine of lis pendens, inde- 
 III. pendently of the Act, see Sugd. V. & P. 758, 
 
 5 Ibid. • and cases cited; Shelford's R. P. Acts, 534; 
 
 7 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 7; Cons. Ord. IX. 5. and since the Act, ibid.; Bellamy v. Sabine, 1 
 For form of application, see Vol. III. De G. & J. 566; 3 Jur. N. S. 943: Tyler r. 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. XL. 19. Thomas, 25 Beav. 47; Nortcliffe v. Warburton, 
 « ReRul. to Ord. IV. 4. 8 Jur. N. S. 353, V. C S. ; id. 854, L. C. : 4 De 
 
 1° Mortlock v. Mortlock, 20 L. T. N. S. 773, G. F. & J. 449. And see ante, p. 280, notes 
 
 V. C. S. ; but see Seaton v. Grant, L. R. 2 Ch. 5 and 7. 
 459, 464. 
 
 399
 
 401 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 separate memorandum is required for every defendant or other person in 
 whose name the registry is proposed to be made. 3 
 
 The plaintiff's solicitor, or other person leaving this memorandum with 
 the Senior Master, is required to sign an admission of having left it, and 
 to take a receipt for it. 4 
 
 The Act above cited also provides that such lis pendens shall, after the 
 expiration of five years from the date of the entry thereof, be null and 
 void against lands, tenements, and other hereditaments, as to purchasers, 
 mortgagees, or creditors, unless a like memorandum or minute as was 
 required in the first instance is again left with the Senior Master within 
 five years before the execution of the conveyance, settlement, mortgage, 
 lease, or other deed or instrument vesting or transferring the legal or 
 equitable right, title, estate, or interest in or to any purchaser, or mortga- 
 gee for valuable consideration, or, as to creditors, within five years before 
 the right of such creditors accrued; and so toties quotiesat the expira- 
 tion of every succeeding five years ; 5 and the Senior Master is forth- 
 with to re-enter the same, in like manner as the same was originally 
 entered. 6 
 
 Formerly, no provision was made by statute for the discharge 
 *401 of a lis pendens ; 7 but by the 23 & 24 Vic. c. 115, §2, * it was 
 enacted, that the Senior Master, upon the filing with him of an 
 acknowledgment by the plaintiff in the form or to the effect therein 
 mentioned, 1 shall be at liberty to enter a satisfaction or discharge as to 
 any registered pending suit or Us pendens ; and he may issue certificates 
 of the entry of any satisfaction or discharge. 2 The practice which pre- 
 vailed prior to this Act, and which may still be resorted to, for the 
 purpose of getting the registry of a lis pendens discharged, is to obtain 
 an order in the cause, as of course, at the Rolls, on a petition presented 
 by the plaintiff, 3 or by a defendant or other person interested, with the 
 consent of the plaintiff's solicitor subscribed to the petition ; 4 or, where 
 the plaintiff will not consent, by a special petition or summons 6 in the 
 cause, which must be served on the plaintiff's solicitor, and be supported 
 by evidence showing that the purposes for which the suit was registered 
 have been satisfied. This order is filed with the Senior Master ; and the 
 person leaving it is required to sign an admission of having left it, and 
 to take a receipt for it. The officer will thereupon enter on the register 
 
 3 Pack's Pr. 12. 
 
 4 [bid. A fee of 2s. 6rf. is payable for each 
 entry. 2 & .3 Vic. c. 11, § 7. 
 
 5 By the 18 & 19 Vic. c. 15, § 6, it is suffi- 
 cient if the memorandum is left with the Senior 
 Master, for re-registry of judgments, decrees, 
 orders, or rules, within five years before the 
 execution of the conveyance, &c, or, as to 
 creditors, within five years before their rights 
 accrued ; although more than five years have 
 elapsed since the last previous registration 
 before such memorandum is left; and so toties 
 qnoties upon every re-registry. As to whether 
 tni< provision applies ti> a lis pendens, see 2 & 
 3 Vic. c. 11. § 7: Sugd. V. & P. 543. 
 
 400 
 
 6 2 & 3 Vic. c. 11, §§ 4, 7. For each re- 
 entry the fee is Is. ; see §§ 4, 7. For form of 
 memorandum to be used on a re-registry, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 7 Pask's Pr. 117. 
 
 1 For the form of such acknowledgment, 
 see Vol. III. 
 
 2 The fee for entering satisfaclion is 2s. 
 6<f., and for the certificate, Is. 23 & 24 Vic. c. 
 115, § 2. 
 
 8 For form of petition, see Vol. III.; and 
 for form of order, see Pask's Pr. 123. 
 
 4 For form of consent, see Vol. I [I. 
 
 5 Fowler r. Liles, V. C. S., in Chambers, 15 
 June, 1855, Reg. Lib. A. 1037.
 
 AMENDING THE BILL. 
 
 401 
 
 a memorandum of the date of the order, and affix thereto a stamp, bear- 
 ing the word " satisfied." 6 
 
 Section VIII. — Amending the Bill. 
 
 When a plaintiff has preferred his bill, and is advised that the same 
 does not contain such material facts, or make all such persons parties, 
 as are necessary to enable the Court to do complete justice, he may alter 
 it, by inserting new matter, 7 or by adding such persons as shall be 
 deemed necessary parties ; or in case the original bill shall be found to 
 contain matter not relevant, or no longer necessary to the plaintiffs case, 
 or to name as parties persons who may be dispensed with, the same may 
 be struck out: the original bill, thus added to or altered, is termed an 
 amended bill. 8 
 
 6 See Pask's Pr. 117. 
 
 7 If at the time of filing the bill the plaintiff 
 had no title to the relief prayed, he cannot 
 make out a title by introducing by amendment 
 facts which have subsequently occurred. Att.- 
 Gen. p. Portreeve of Avon, 11 W. R. 1051, L. 
 JJ.; see also Godfrey v. Tucker, 33 Beav. 280; 
 9 Jur. N. S. 1188; cases cited, 33 Beav. 285, n.; 
 Beardmore v. Gregory, 2 H. & M. 491; 11 Jur- 
 N. S. 363; Evans v. Bagshaw, L. R. 8 Eq. 
 469; affirmed, L. R. 5 Ch. 340; Ward v. 
 Booth, L. R. 14 Eq. 195. Contra, Talbot v. 
 Lord Radnor, 3 M. & K. 252 ; Dell v. Griffits, 
 16 W. R. 30. 
 
 8 Hinde, 21. A written bill may be thus 
 amended, as well as a printed bill ; see Mc- 
 Dougald r. Williford, 14 Ga. 665; post, pp. 411- 
 413, note, and Rules of the Courts of the United 
 States, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, 
 there stated. Amendments can only be grant- 
 ed where the bill is defective in parties, or in 
 prayer for relief, or in the omission or mistake 
 of a fact or circumstance connected with the sub- 
 stance, but not forming the substance itself, 
 nor repugnant thereto. The latter part of this 
 principle applies to all pleadings in Equity, 
 as well as to bills. Verplanck v. Mercantile 
 Ins. Co. 1 Edw. Ch. 46; Lyon v. Tallmadge, 1 
 John. Ch. 184; Rogers v. Rogers, 1 Paige, 424; 
 Bowen v. Cross, 4 John. Ch. 375; Renwick v. 
 Wilson, 6 John. Ch. 81 ; Belknap v. Stone, 1 
 Allen, 572; Carey v. Smith, 11 Ga. 539; Lar- 
 kins v. Biddle, 21 Ala. 252. Being regarded 
 only with reference to the furtherance of jus- 
 tice, amendments, as a general rule, are in the 
 discretion of the Court, especially in matters 
 of mere form. Smith v. Babcock, 3 Sumner, 
 410; Garlick v. Strong, 3 Paige, 440; McEI- 
 wain v. Willis, id. 505; Howell v. Sebring, 14 
 N. J. Eq. 84. Amendments are, therefore, 
 always allowed with great liberality, until the 
 proofs are closed (Cock v. Evans, 9 Yerger, 287), 
 except where the bill is upon oath. Cock v. 
 Evans, ubi supra ; Cunningham v. Pell, 6 
 
 vol. i. — 26 
 
 Paige, 655. In case the bill is upon oath, there 
 is greater caution exercised in reference to 
 amendments. Ibid.; Verplanck v. Merct. Ins. 
 Co. 1 Edw. Ch. 46; Swift v. Eckford, 6 Paige, 
 22; Lloyd v. Brewster, 4 Paige, 538; Parker v. 
 Grant, 1 John. Ch. 434; Rogers t\ Rogers, 1 
 Paige, 424; Whitmarsh v. Campbell, 2 Paige, 
 67. So where the object of the amendment is 
 to let in new facts or defences, there is greater 
 reluctance on the part of the Court to allow the 
 amendment where it depends upon parol proof, 
 than where it depends on written instruments 
 omitted by accident or mistake. Smith v. 
 Babcock, 3 Sumner, 410; Calloway v. Dobson, 
 
 1 Brock. 119. And the Court will not allow 
 amendments by inserting facts known to the 
 pi i in tiff at the time of filing his bill, unless 
 some excuse is given for the omission. Whit- 
 marsh p. Campbell, 2 Paige, 67; Prescott v. 
 Hubbell, 1 Hill Ch. 217. Nor where the mat- 
 ter of the proposed amendment might with 
 reasonable diligence have been inserted in the 
 Original bill. North Amer. Coal Co. v. Dyett, 
 
 2 Edw. Ch. 115. 
 
 When a plaintiff wishes to amend a sworn 
 bill, he must state the proposed amendments 
 distinctly, so that the Court can see that they 
 are merely in addition to the original hill, and 
 not inconsistent therewith. He must also swear 
 to the truth of the proposed amendments, and 
 render a valid excuse for not incorporating 
 them in the original bill ; and the application to 
 amend must be made as soon as the necessity 
 for such amendment is discovered. Rogers v. 
 Rogers, 1 Paige, 424; Whitmarsh r. Campbell, 
 2 Paige, 67; Verplanck v. Merct. Ins. Co. 1 
 Edw. Ch. 46; Altree v. Horden, 3 Lond. Jurist, 
 81. As to the stage of the cause at which ap- 
 plications for leave to amend should be made 
 and acted upon, see Hewett »:. Adams, 50 Maine, 
 271; Clark v. Society in Keene, 46 N. H. 272, 
 and cases cited; Codington v. Mott, 14 N. J. 
 Eq. 430; infra, p. 424. The Chancery Division 
 in England has now apparently larger power to 
 
 401
 
 402 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 * 402 * But, although it is the practice to call a bill thus altered 
 an amended bill, the amendment is in fact esteemed but as a 
 continuation of the original bill, and as forming part of it ; for both the 
 original and amended bill constitute but one record ; 1 so much so, that 
 where an original bill is fully answered, and amendments are afterwards 
 made, to which the defendant does not answer, the whole record may be 
 taken, pro confesso, generally, 2 and an order to take the bill pro confesso 
 as to the amendments only will be irregular. 3 (a) An amended bill must 
 
 authorize amendments than the former Court of 
 Chancery. See Budding v. Murdoch, 1 Ch. D. 
 42; R. S. C. Ord. XXVIII. 2-7; 1 Dan. Ch. 
 Prac (6th Eng. ed.) 391-400, 4-37-443; but see 
 Re St. Nazaire Co. 12 Ch. D. 88. 92; Newby 
 v. Sliarpe, 8 Ch. D. 39; Laird v. Briggs, 16 Ch. 
 D. 440; 19 id. 22. 
 
 i Verer. Glynn, 2 Dick. 441 ; Hoytfl. Smith, 
 28 Conn. 466; Ilurd v. Everett, 1 Paige, 124; 
 Walsh v. Smyth, 3 Bland, 9, 20; O'Grady v. 
 Barry, 1 Irish Eq. 56; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 332, 
 885; Carey v. Smith, 11 Ga. 539. Equitable 
 Life Assurance Society »>■ Laird, 24 N. J. Eq. 
 319; Wilson v. Beadle, 2 Head, 572; Bradley 
 v. Dibrell, 3 Heisk. 522; Seay v. Ferguson, 1 
 Tenn. Ch. 291; Hix v. Gosling, 1 Lea, 560. 
 
 2 Jopling v. Stuart, 4 Ves. 619. Where the 
 plaintiff amends his bill after answer, if a further 
 
 (a) See Re Taylor's Estate, 22 Ch. D. 495; 
 Bourne v. Coulter, 53 L. J. Ch. 699; Preston 
 Corp. v. Fullwood Local Board, 34 W. R. 200; 
 1 Seton on Judgments (5th ed.), 38; Nellis v. 
 Pennock Manuf. Co. 38 Fed. Rep. 379; Metro- 
 politan Nat. Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co. id. 
 57; Hamilton v. Southern Nevada M. Co. 33 id. 
 562; Phelps v. Elliott, 26 id. 881; Stanford v. 
 Murphy, 63 Ga. 410; Cross v. Bean, 81 Maine, 
 525; Gilpatrick v. Glidden, 82 Maine, 201 ; Rob- 
 inson v. Missisquoi R. Co. 59 Vt. 426; Smith 
 v. Hadley, 64 N. H. 97; New York Fire Ins. 
 Co. v. Tooker, 35 N. J. Eq. 408; Angell v. Penn. 
 R. Co. 37 id. 92; Bolman v. Lohman, 74 Ala. 
 507; Morton v. New Orleans &c. Ry. Co. 79 
 Ala. 590; Conner?;. Smith, 88 Ala. 300; Ward 
 v. Whitfield, 64 Miss. 754; Binkert v. Wabash 
 Ry. Co. 98 III. 205; Bradish v. Grant, 119 111. 
 606; Gage v. Brown, 125 111. 522; Bishop v. 
 Wood, 59 Ind. 253; Frey v. Owens, 27 Neb. 
 862; Crumlish v. Shenandoah Vall-y R. Co. 28 
 W. Va. 623. The allowance of an amended 
 pleading is an adjudication that proper diligence 
 was used in discovering the new facts pleaded. 
 Adams County v. Burlington & M. R. R. Co. 
 55 Iowa, 94. The filing of an amendment 
 waives error of ruling upon the original bill. 
 Bell v. Waudby (Wash.), 31 Pac. R-p. 18. A 
 decree of itself cannot operate to change, elimi- 
 nate, or amend the pleadings; and although the 
 Court may suggest or direct an amendment, the 
 election still remains with the party to amend or 
 
 402 
 
 answer of the amended bill becomes necessary, 
 and is not waived, the defendant must put in a 
 further answer to the amendment; or the plain- 
 tiff will be entitled to an order taking the whole 
 bill, as amended, as confessed. Trust & Fire 
 Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 8 Paige, 589; see Thomas 
 v. Visitors of Frederick Co. School, 7 Gill & J. 
 369; Cowman v. Lovett, 10 Paige, 559; Tedder 
 v. Stiles, 16 Ga. 1. 
 
 3 Bacon v. Griffith, 4 Ves. 619, note; S. C. 
 2 Dick. 473; Lea v. Vanbibber, 6 Humph. 18. 
 But the plaintiff may limit his pro confesso. 
 Abergavenny v. Abergavenny, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 
 178; Weaver v. Livingstone, Hopk. Ch. 493; 
 Smith v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co. 2 Tenn. 
 Ch. 605; and see Landon v. Ready, 1 S. & 
 S. 44. 
 
 not. Caldwell v. King, 76 Ala. 149. Leave 
 may be granted to amend nunc pro tunc, 
 when necessary to accomplish justice. Boren 
 v. Billington, 82 Texas, 137; Owen v. Bank- 
 head, 82 Ala. 399. If the Court did not have 
 jurisdiction when the bill was filed, jurisdiction 
 cannot be conferred by an amendment. Livey 
 v. Winton, 30 W. Va. 554. 
 
 The amendment, when allowed, takes effect 
 as of the filing of the original bill, if no injustice 
 is done thereby to the defendant. White v. Soto, 
 82 Cal. 654; Miller v. Cook, 135 111. 190; Jones 
 v. McPhillips, 82 Ala. 102. If the amendment 
 recasts and restates the original pleading, and 
 is intended as a substitute therefor, the original 
 pleading is to be disregarded, except as evi- 
 dence. Smith q. Wigton, 35 Neb. 460; Shipley 
 v. Reasoner (Iowa), 54 N. W. Rep. 470. The 
 amendment may by reference incorporate the 
 averments of the original pleading, even though 
 such pleading has been stricken from the files 
 prior to the amendment. Mahaska County 
 State Bank v. Christ (Iowa), 54 N. W. Rep. 
 450. 
 
 The allowance of amendments is always 
 discretionary with the Court, and its decision 
 thereon is not reviewable. Chapman v. Barney, 
 129 U. S. 677. As to the considerations influen- 
 cing such discretion, see Tildesley v. Harper, 
 10 Ch. D. 393; Cropper v. Smith, 26 Ch. D. 
 700, 710; Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U. S. 756, 761; 
 Noonau v. Caledonia Gold M. Co. 121 U. S.
 
 AMENDING THE BILL. 
 
 403 
 
 therefore, in all cases, be addressed to the same Lord Chancellor, Lord 
 Keeper, or Lords Commissioners, to whom the original bill was addressed, 
 although a change has taken place in the custody of the Great Seal be- 
 tween the times of filing the original bill and the amendment. 4 Lut so 
 far as the pendency of a suit can affect either the parties to it, or 
 strangers, matter brought into a bill by amendment will not * have * 403 
 relation to the time of filing the original bill, but the suit will be 
 so far considered as pendent only from the time of the amendment. 1 
 
 Where there is a bill and cross-bill, and the plaintiff in the original 
 suit amends his bill before answer, he will lose his priority of suit, and 
 his right to have an answer before he is called upon to answer the cross- 
 bill. 2 
 
 Amendments to a bill are of two sorts : those which relate to parties, 
 and those which affect the substance of the case. 8 Under a common 
 order to amend as the plaintiff may be advised, the plaintiff may, before 
 a defendant has appeared to the bill, strike out the name of such defend- 
 ant, or the name of a co-plaintiff, or add plaintiffs or defendants ; 4 after 
 appearance, the plaintiff, under such an order, may, it seems, before 
 answer, add the names of plaintiffs or defendants, but he cannot strike 
 out the names of plaintiffs or defendants ; and under a common order to 
 amend by adding parties, the plaintiff cannot, after answer, alter his bill, 
 by putting in the names of other persons as co-plaintiffs with himself, 5 
 or after appearance by striking out the names as plaintiffs of any persons 
 filling that character upon the original record ; 6 nor can he introduce any 
 
 4 If the description of the plaintiff, or his 
 next friend, is not the same as when the bill 
 was filed, the new description should appear in 
 the amended bill. Kerr v. Gillespie, 7 Beav. 
 269, 271 ; 8 Jur. 50 ; but the name of his solici- 
 tor cannot be altered, unless an order to change 
 the solicitor has been obtained. Braithwaite's 
 Pr. 299. 
 
 i Ld. Red. 330; Long v. Burton, 2 Atk. 
 218; Lillard v. Porter, 2 Head, 177; Miller v. 
 Taylor, 6 Heisk. 465. 
 
 2 Steward v. Roe, 2 P. Wms. 434; Johnson 
 v. Freer, 2 Cox, 371; Noel v. King, 2 Mad. 392; 
 and see post. Chap. XXXIV. § 1, Cross Bills. 
 But if the plaintiff amends his bill before he 
 knows of the filing of the cross-bill, he does not 
 lose his priority. Gray v. Haig, 13 Beav. 65. 
 The rule stated in the text applies, it is con- 
 ceived, to a concise statement, which, under 15 
 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 19, may be substituted for a 
 cross-bill. See Mertens v. Haigh, 1 J. & H. 
 231; 6 Jur. N. S. 1288. 
 
 393; Richmond v. Irons, id. 27; United States 
 v. American Bell Tel. Co. 39 Fed. Rep. 716; 
 Fearey v. Hayes, 44 N. J. Fq. 425; Perry v. 
 Perry, 65 Maine, 399. An amendment will not 
 be allowed which contradicts the party's own 
 testimony. Chlein v. Kahat, 72 Iowa, 291. 
 (a) In Massachusetts and Maine an action 
 
 8 By statute in Massachusetts, amendments 
 may be allowed by changing suits at Law into 
 proceedings in Equity, or proceedings in Equity 
 into suits at Law, if the same be necessary to 
 enable the plaintiff to sustain his action for 
 the cause for which it was intended to be 
 brought, (a) Stat. 1865, c. 179, § 1 ; see Williston 
 v. Mich. South. & North. Ind. K. R. Co. 13 
 Allen, 400, 406. And the statute was held to 
 apply to a suit pending at its passage. George 
 v. Reed, 101 Mass. 378. 
 
 * See Braithwaite's Pr. 300. 
 
 6 Lock v. Bagley, W. N. (1866) 65, M. R.; 
 but see Hichens v. Congreve, 1 Sim. 500; see 
 also Milligan v. Mitchell, 1 M. & C. 433, 442; 
 see 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 35; Story, Eq. 
 PI. § 541, note; Miller v. McCan, 7 Paige, 451. 
 
 6 Fellowes v. Deere, 3 Beav. 353; Sloggett 
 v. Collins, 13 Sim. 456; 7 Jur. 639 ; see Mason 
 v. York & Cumb. R. R. Co. 52 Maine, 107. 
 
 at Law may now be changed by amendment into 
 a suit in Equity. Mass. Stat, of 1883, c 223; 
 the recent Maine Statute is printed in 47 Alb. 
 L. J. 359. In Wisconsin an action at Law can- 
 not be changed by amendment into one in 
 Equity. Fischer v. Laack, 76 Wis. 313. 
 
 403
 
 404 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 allegation, against the original defendants, which is not necessary to 
 explain the amendment. 7 
 
 In some cases, special orders may, however, be obtained for the pur- 
 pose of altering the co-plaintiffs ; but as a diminution of the number of 
 plaintiffs has the effect of lessening the defendant's security for costs, 
 an order will not be made to strike out the names of plaintiffs without 
 the Court also providing, at the same time, that security for the costs 
 of the suit shall be given, 8 unless such security be waived by the 
 
 defendants. 9 
 * 404 * It must not be considered as a matter of course to obtain an 
 
 order to strike out the name of a person who has once been made 
 a plaintiff in a cause, even upon the terms of giving security for costs. 
 Where an application was made, by a number of relators named in an 
 information, to strike out the names of several of themselves, Lord Cot- 
 tenham, in refusing the motion, observed : 1 "It cannot be justly said, 
 that all that the relators have to establish in support of such an application 
 is, that the defendants will not be prejudiced by such an alteration ; they 
 must show that justice will not be done, or that the suit cannot be 
 so conveniently prosecuted, unless the alteration is made. I cannot give 
 them such an advantage as they ask, and permit them to alter the record, 
 merely because they may have a different wish at one time from that 
 which they may have at another time, which may be the result of 
 
 7 Gibson v. Ingo, 5 Hare, 156; 11 Jur. 555; 
 Barlow v. M'Murray, L. R. 2 Eq. 420; 12 Jur. 
 N. S. 519, V. C. S. 
 
 8 For form of order, see Seton, 1253, No. 7; 
 Sweeny v. Hull, Sausse & S. 662. 
 
 9 In Brown v. Sawer, 3 Beav. 598 ; 5 Jur. 
 500, one of two co-plaintiffs, who had author- 
 ized the institution of the suit, refused to pro- 
 ceed in it ; and a motion was made, on behalf 
 of the other co-plaintiff, that she might be at 
 liberty to amend the bill by striking out the 
 name of the co-plaintiff who had refused to 
 proceed, and by making him a defendant, and 
 that he might be ordered to pay the costs occa- 
 sioned by such amendment, and also the costs of 
 giving any security for costs which the defend- 
 ants or any of them might be declared entitled 
 to in consequence of such amendment, and inci- 
 dental thereto, and also the costs of ar.d incident 
 to that application, to be taxed as betwef n soli- 
 citor and client. Lord Langdale M. R. in giving 
 judgment upon the motion, said: "The suit 
 cannot be prosecuted unless the alteration is 
 made, and therefore justice will not be done 
 unless the alteration is made. I think, there- 
 fore, that this order must be made, but on such 
 terms as will be just towards the defendants, 
 and by securing the costs of suit already in- 
 curred; and the co-plaintiff having, by revoking 
 the authority, made this application necessary, 
 ought therefore to pay the costs." It is within 
 the discretion of the Court to permit a bill to 
 be amended, hy substituting the name of a 
 
 404 
 
 new for the original plaintiff, even after answer 
 filed; but it must be upon the payment of all 
 the costs, up to the time of the amendment, as 
 well as of the amendment itself. Jennings v. 
 Springs, 1 Bailey Eq. 181; Winthrop v. Farrar, 
 11 Allen, 398. So an amendment may be al- 
 lowed even after a hearing on bill, answer, 
 and proofs. Clark v. Society in Keene, 46 N. H. 
 272; Codington v. Mott, 14 N. J. Eq. 430. The 
 Court may impose other conditions of amend- 
 ments besides the payment of costs. Bellows 
 v. Stone, 14 N. H. 175; Be wen t. Idley, 6 Paige, 
 53; Clark r. Society in Keene, 46 N. H. 275. 
 See Motteux v. Mackreth, 1 Ves. Jr. 142 ; Lloyd 
 r. Maheam, 6 Ves. 145; Witts r. Campbell, 12 
 Ves. 493; Holkirk v. Holkirk,4 Mad. 50; Small 
 v. Attwood, Younge, 407; Fellowes r. Deere, 3 
 Beav. 353; Hart v. Tulk, 6 Hare, 611, 613; 
 Bather v. Kearsley, 7 Beav. 545; M'Leod v. 
 Lyttleton, 1 Drew. 36; Drake v. Symes, 7 Jur. 
 N. S. 399, L. JJ. ; 3 De G. F. & J. 491; Hewett 
 v. Adams, 50 Maine, 271. As to the course 
 where, after a decree, the solicitor of the plain- 
 tiffs ceases to practice, and one of them refuses 
 to concur with the rest in appointing a successor, 
 see Butlin v. Arnold, 1H.& M. 715. And for 
 the practice where a co-plaintiff refuses to pro- 
 ceed after cause is at issue, see Miller v. Smith, 
 3 Beav. 598, n. (a). For form of notice of mo- 
 tion in such case, see Vol. III. 
 
 i Att.-Gen. v. Cooper, 3 M. & C. 258, 261; 
 1 Jur. 790.
 
 AMENDING THE BILL. 
 
 405 
 
 mere caprice." Where it appeared 2 that the association * of a cestui * 405 
 que trust and trustee as co-plaintiffs on the record might mate- 
 rially injure the interests of the former, leave was given to amend the 
 record by striking out the name of the trustee as plaintiff, and making 
 him a defendant. 
 
 Leave may also be obtained to amend a bill by the addition of persons 
 as co-plaintiffs. 1 (a) After answer, however, the addition of a co-plaintiff 
 is not a matter of course, but is discretionary in the Court ; and it would 
 appear that where a plaintiff applies, after answer, for leave to amend 
 his bill, by adding a co-plaintiff, he must, in support of his application, 
 show that the person proposed to be added is willing to become a co- 
 plaintiff. 2 An order for leave to amend b} r adding a plaintiff after repli- 
 cation has been refused, where the plaintiff has been guilty of letches* 
 
 A bill of discovery cannot be amended by adding parties as plaintiffs. 
 This was held by Lord Eldon, where a bill had been filed by cestui que 
 trusts, in aid of an ejectment at Law, and the defendant pleaded facts to 
 show that the legal estate was in the trustees. 4 The difficulty in the case 
 was, however, got over by the plaintiffs consenting to the allowance of 
 the plea, and moving to amend by inserting a statement to show that the 
 legal estate was in trustees, and that a count had been introduced in the 
 declaration in ejectment on the demise of the trustees. 
 
 An order made at the hearing for leave to amend, by adding parties, 
 
 2 Hall v. Lack, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 631 ; see also 
 Plunket v. Joice, 2 Sch. & Lef. 159 ;ante, p. 72; 
 Jones v. Rose, 4 Hare, 52 (where leave was 
 given to strike out "on behalf of themselves 
 and all the other shareholders" ); Hartf. Tulk, 
 6 Hare, 612; Drake v. Symes, 7 Jur. N. S. 399, 
 L. JJ.; 3 DeG. F. & J." 491. 
 
 i Maughan v. Blake, L. R. 3 Ch. 32 ; Win- 
 throp v. Farrar, 11 Allen, 398. 
 
 2 Governors of Lucton Free School v. Smith, 
 M'Lel. 17, 19; Loch v. Bagley, W. N. (1866) 
 65, M. R. And the addition of a co-plaintiff, 
 
 (a) As to the addition of plaintiffs under the 
 present English practice, see Clowes v. Hilliard, 
 4 Ch. D. 413; New Westminster Brewery v. 
 Hannah, W. N. (1876)215; W.N. (1877)* 35; 
 Lemon v. Yorkshire Waggon Co. 29 W. R. 467; 
 Ayscough v. Bullar, 41 Ch. D. 341 ; Van Gel- 
 der v. Sowerby Bridge Flour Society, 44 Ch. D. 
 374 ; Emden p. Carte, 17 Ch. D. 169,1 73 ; House 
 Property & Inv. Co. v. H. P. Horse Nail Co. 
 29 Ch. D. 190; Walcott v. Lyons, id. 584; Res- 
 ley v. Besley, 37 Ch. D. 648; Showell v. Win- 
 kup, 60 L. T. 389; In re Colbeck, Hall v. 
 Colbeck, 36 W. R. 259; Jackson r. Kriiger, 54 
 L. J. Q. B. 446 ; Cupples v Strahan, 29 L. R. 
 Ir. 120. A person cannot be added as plaintiff 
 without his written consent, even though he is 
 indemnified against costs. Tryon v. National 
 Prov. Inst. 16 Q. B. D. 678. Suits commenced 
 in the name of a wrong plaintiff or by misjoin- 
 der of plaintiffs, may be amended. R. S. C. 
 
 in such case, will not be allowed when the effect 
 would be to introduce a new plaintiff with a new 
 case. Peek v. Earl Spencer, L. R. 5 Ch. 548; 
 18 W. R. 558. But see De Greiff v. Wilson, 30 
 N. J. Eq. 435, where, after hearing, the cause 
 was directed to stand over, for further proof, 
 with leave to the complainant to amend by 
 making a partner co-complainant. 
 
 3 Milward v. Oldtield, 4 Price, 325. 
 
 4 Lord Cholmondelev v. Lord Clinton, 2 Mer. 
 71, 74. 
 
 Ord. XVI.; Lovesy v. Smith, 15 Ch. D. 655; 
 Emden v. Carte, supra. 
 
 The ward's name may by amendment be 
 substituted as plaintiff in a bill in Equity 
 brought by the guardian. Lombard r. Morse, 
 155 Mass. 136. If the bill shows that the plain- 
 tiff's interest has been assigned, an amended 
 bill cannot be filed in the assignee's name. 
 Keyser v. Renner, 87 Va. 249. 
 
 As to change of pirties, see also 1 Dan. Ch. 
 Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 197; 1 Seton on Judgments 
 (5th ed.), 38 ; Hawkins v. Blake, 108 U. S. 422: 
 Richmond t\ Irons, 121 U. S. 27; Imperial 
 Refining Co. v Wyman, 38 Fed. Rep. 574; 
 Lorwall v. Gridley, 70 Cal. 507. An amend- 
 ment of a complaint which is merely formal 
 does not require service on a defendant who 
 has not appeared in the suit. White r. Hin- 
 ton (Wvnm.), 30 Pac. Rep. 953; see Smith v. 
 Woodfolk, 115 U. S. 143. 
 
 405
 
 * 106 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 will not authorize the introduction of co-plaintiffs ; 5 but the Court will 
 sometimes allow a bill, which has originally been filed by one individual 
 of a numerous class, in his own right, to stand over at the hearing, for the 
 purpose of being amended by the introduction of the words, on behalf of 
 himself, and all others of the class. Thus, where a demurrer was allowed, 
 because the parties affected to sue in a corporate capacity, leave was given 
 to amend, by making them sue in their individual rights as members of 
 a copartnership, on behalf of themselves and others. 6 
 
 It has been said that the Court will, at any time before the hearing, 
 
 suffer parties to be added by amendment, upon a proper case 
 * 406 being shown ; 7 and that even after a decree, and before it * has 
 
 been enrolled, persons interested may, by petition, be made par- 
 ties and let into it, if their right be interwoven with the other plaintiffs, 
 and settled (in general) by the decree ; they paying the plaintiffs a pro- 
 portionable part of the charges of the suit. 1 (a) 
 
 6 Milligan v. Mitchell, 1 M. & C. 433, 442; 
 Miller v. McCan, 7 Paige, 451; see Noyes v. 
 Sawyer, 3 Vt. 160 ; Arendel e. Blackwell, 1 Dev. 
 Ch. 354. 
 
 6 Lloyd v. Loaring, 6 Ves. 773, 778; see 
 also Ait. -Gen. v. Newcombe, -14 Ves. 1, 6; 
 Good v. Blewitt, 13 Ves. 397, 401; and ante, 
 pp. 238, 242; Womersley v. Merritt, L. R. 4Eq. 
 695; Keese River Silver Mining Co. v. Atwell, 
 L. R. 7 Eq. 347; Maughan v. Blake, L. R. 3 
 Ch. 32. 
 
 7 Goodwin v. Goodwin, 3 Atk. 370; see 
 Forbes v. S'evens, 10 Jur. N. S. 861, V. C. W. ; 
 4 N. R. 386, L. JJ.; Story, Eq. PI. § 887; 
 Cooper, Eq. PI. 333; Ld. Red. 325: Hutchin- 
 son v. Reed, 1 Hoff. Ch. 316; Gordon v. Hol- 
 land, 3 Ired. Ch 362; Codington v. Mott, 14 
 N. J. Eq. 430; Park v. Ballentine, 6 Blackf. 
 223. In respect to amendments as to parties, 
 Courts are more liberal than in respect to other 
 amendments. A Court of Equity will not dis- 
 miss a bill absolutely, for want of proper par- 
 ties, if the plaintiff shows enough to give color 
 to his claim for relief against the parties not 
 before the Court. Allen r. Smith, 1 Leigh, 
 331; see ante, p. 294, note; Thorn v Germand, 
 4 John. Ch. 363; Pleasants v. Logan, 4 Hen. & 
 M. 489. Upon a creditor's bill against an 
 insolvent corporation for a receiver, &c, the 
 
 (a) The following authorities illustrate the 
 present English practice. The plaintiff may now 
 obtain leave to amend by striking out the names 
 of defendants improperly joined. R. S. C. 1883; 
 Ord. XVI. 3, 13, 14; 2 Seton, 1520 ; Wymertf. 
 Dodds, 11 Ch. D. 436; Hurst v. Hurst, 21 Ch. D. 
 278, 289; Wilkinson v. Belcher, 2 Bro. C. C. 
 272. Such defendants may also apply by sum- 
 mons to have their names struck out. Wilson 
 v. Church, 9 Ch. D. 552; Vallance v. Birming- 
 ham &c. Inv. Co. 2 Ch. D. 369. See further, 1 
 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 259, § 4. Proper 
 parties defendant may be added at any stage of 
 
 406 
 
 plaintiff may pray a discovery of the stock- 
 holders liable, and having obtained it may 
 amend his bill by making such stockholders 
 parties. Morgan i>. New York & Albany R. 
 Co. 10 Paige, 290; see McDougald v. Dough- 
 erty. 14 Ga. 674 ; Hewett v. Adams, 50 Maine, 
 271; McLellan v. Osborne, 51 Maine, 118. 
 
 1 Wyatt's P. R. 301. And see the proper 
 practice upon allowing a person to come in, 
 on petition, and be made a plaintiff in a pend- 
 ing suit. Aylesworth v. Brown, 31 Ind. 270. 
 But, except fn such cases, there is no prac- 
 tice which will authorize the Court upon the 
 application of persons not parties to a suit, 
 to compel the plaintiffs to make such persons 
 co-plaintiffs. Drake v. Goodridge, 6 Blatch. 
 151. And see ante, p. 287. Mere formal amend- 
 ments, such as the introduction of new parties, 
 or amendments to the prayer of the bill, to meet 
 the exigency of the case, will be made up to, 
 and at, the final hearing. Codington r. Mott, 
 14 N. J. Eq. 430; see Philhower v. Tod, 11 
 N. J. Eq. 54, 312; Buckley v. Cross, Saxton, 
 504; Mavor r. Dry, 2 S. & S. 113; Henry v. 
 Brown, 4 Halst. Ch. 245; Rodgers v. Rodgers, 
 1 Paige, 424; Whitmarsh v. Campbell, 2 Paige, 
 67; Verplanck v. Merct. Ins. Co. 1 Edw. Ch. 
 46; Pratt v. Bacon, 10 Pick. 123. 
 
 the proceedings before final judgment. Att.- 
 Gen. v. Birmingham, 15 Ch. D. 423 ; Att.-Gen. 
 v. Birmingham Drainage Board, 17 Ch. D. 685; 
 Marquis of Londonderry v. Rhoswydol Lead M. 
 Co W. N. (1879) 136; "Edwards v. Lowther, 24 
 W. R 434; 45 L.J. C. P. 417; Byrne v. Brown, 
 22 Q. B. D. 657 ; Pilley v. Robinson, 20 Q. B. 
 D. 155; Proctor v. Cheshire City Council, W.N. 
 (1891) 24; see Edison & S. Electric Light Co. 
 v. Holland, 41 Ch. D. 28; Moser v. Marsden, 
 [1892] 1 Ch. 487 ; Strauss v. Goldschmidt 
 (No. 2), 8 T. L. R. 309, 512. Even though 
 new alternative relief is claimed against the
 
 AMENDING THE BILL. 
 
 407 
 
 If parties are added after the expiration of the time for giving notice 
 of the cross-examination of the witnesses, the evidence of such wit- 
 nesses cannot be read against the parties so added. 2 
 
 It is not within the province of this work to point out the cases in 
 which amendments may become requisite for the purpose of altering 
 the case upon the record as against the defendants already before the 
 Court, or to what extent they may be made. It is to be observed, 
 however, that the rule which formerly existed, that a plaintiff ought not 
 to introduce facts, by amendment, which have occurred since the 
 filing of the original bill, 3 has been abolished; *and the facts *407 
 
 2 Pratt v. Barker, 1 Sim. 1, 5 ; James v. 
 James, 4 Beav. 578 ; Quantock v. Bullen, 5 
 Mad. 81. After the witnesses in a cause have 
 been examined, and the proofs closed, no 
 amendment of the bill is allowed, except in 
 matters of mere form, unless under very special 
 circumstances. Bowen v. Idley, 6 Paige, 407 ; 
 Clark v. Society in Keene, 46 N. H. 272; Tilton 
 v. Tilton, 9 N. H. 394; Bellows v. Stone, 14 
 N. H. 175; Doe v. Doe, 37 N. H. 268; see 
 Wilbur v. Collier, 1 Clark, 315; Shephard v. 
 Merrill, 3 John. Ch. 423 ; Smith v. Burnham, 
 4 Harr. & J. 331; Stewart v. Duvall, 7 Gill & 
 J. 180 ; Ross v. Carpenter, 6 McLean, 382. 
 
 3 See Longworth v. Taylor, 1 McLean, 514. 
 Amendments to a bill are always con-idered as 
 forming a part of the original bill. They refer 
 to the time of filing the bill; and the defendant 
 cannot be required to answer anything which 
 has arisen since that time. Hurd v. Everett, 
 1 Paige, 124; Walsh v. Smyth, 3 Bland, 9, 20; 
 O'Grady v. Barry, 1 Irish Eq. 56. Unless, 
 indeed, the defendant has not put in his answer, 
 in which case the bill may be amended by add- 
 ing supplemental matter. Candler v. Pettit, 
 1 Paige, 168; Ogden v. Gibbons, Halst. (N. J.) 
 
 added defendant. Child v. Stenning, 5 Ch. D. 
 695. After judgment, a fresh suit must be 
 brought against such party, if not previously 
 added. This suit is sometimes in the nature of 
 a supplemental bill. Att.-Gen. v. Birmingham, 
 supra ; Vigers v. Lord Audley, 9 Sim. 72 ; Com- 
 missioners of Sewers v. Gellatley, 3 Ch. D. 
 610. See Long v. Crossley, 13 Ch. I). 388; 
 Broder v. Saillard, 2 Ch. D. 692; Re Mason, 
 W.N. (1883) 147; Heard v. Borgwardt, id. 
 173. As to the manner of now making the 
 application to change defendants, see R. S. C. 
 Ord. XVI. 13-16; Sheehan v. Great Eastern 
 Ry. Co. 16 Ch. D. 59 ; cases supra ; Tildesley 
 v. Harper, 3 Ch. D. 277; Austen v. Bird, W. N. 
 (1881) 129 ; Wilson v. Balcarres B. S. Co , [1893] 
 1 Q. B. 422. As to adding defendants on their 
 own application, see 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th 
 Eng. ed.) 268; Debenture Co. v. De Murrietta, 
 8 T. L. R. 496. As to third party notice under 
 the English practice, see 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th 
 Eng. ed.) 272; R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XVI. 19, 
 
 Dig. 172. Consequently an original bill cannot 
 be amended by incorporating therein anything 
 which arose subsequently to the commencing 
 of the suit. This should be stated in a sup- 
 plemental bill. Stafford v. Howlett, 1 Paige, 
 200; Saunders v. Frost, 5 Pick. 276; see San- 
 born v. Sanborn, 7 Gray, 142. Generally, a 
 mistake in the bill in the statement of a lact 
 should be corrected by an amendment, and not 
 by a right statement of the fact in a supple- 
 mental bill. Strickland v. Strickland, 12 Sim. 
 253; Stafford v. Howlett, 1 Paige, 200. 
 
 When the cause has proceeded so far that 
 an amendment cannot be made, or if material 
 facts have occurred subsequently to the com- 
 mencing of the suit, the Court will give the 
 plaintiff leave to file a supplemental bill. And 
 where such leave is given, the Court will per- 
 mit other matters to be introduced into the 
 supplemental bill, which might have been 
 incorporated in the original bill by way of 
 amendment. Stafford v. Howlett, 1 Paige, 200; 
 see Verplanck w. Merct. Ins. Co. 1 Edw. 4<i ; 
 Pinch v. Anthony, 10 Allen, 470. 
 
 Cases, however, do sometimes occur where 
 the introduction, by amendment, of matters 
 
 52, 53; Re Willson, Att.-Gen. v. Woodhall, 45 
 Ch. D. 266 ; Blore v. Ashby, 42 Ch. D. 682. A 
 person so brought in and appearing may have 
 discovery from the plaintiff. McAllister v. 
 Bishop of Rochester, 5 C. P. D. 194. His costs 
 may be ordered paid by the person bringing 
 him in. Dawson v. Shepherd, 28 W. R. 805; 
 see Yorkshire Waggon Co. v. Newport Coal 
 Co. 5 Q. B. D. 268 ; R. S. C. 1883, XVI. 54. 
 He may also be ordered to pay the plaintiff's 
 costs (Piller v. Roberts, 21 Ch. D. 198), or those 
 of an unsuccessful defendant. Hornby V. < !ard- 
 well, 8 Q. B. D. 329. As to service of such 
 notice out of the jurisdiction, see Dubout v. 
 Macpherson, 23 Q. B. D. 340. The Court in its 
 discretion may decline to give directions for 
 the trial of questions between a defendant and 
 the third party, and in such case the third 
 party should be dismissed. Piller v. Roberts, 
 stipra ; Schneider v. Batt, 30 W. R. 420; Corrie 
 r. Allen. W. N. (1883) 65; Bell v. Von Dadels- 
 zen, id. 208; The Bianca, 8 P. D. 91. 
 407
 
 407 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 and circumstances occurring after the institution of a suit may be 
 introduced into the bill by amendment, if the cause is otherwise in a 
 state in which an amendment may be made/ and if not, they may be 
 added by supplemental statement. 2 (a) 
 
 Where an answer of a defendant states facts which are material to 
 the plaintiff's case, but which have not been stated in the bill, it is not 
 necessary that the plaintiff, in order to avail himself of them at the 
 hearing, should introduce such facts into his bill by amendment, although 
 perhaps the most convenient course would be to do so. 8 Where, there- 
 
 winch have occurred since the date of the 
 original bill will be permitted by the Court ; 
 thus, where the plaintiff has an inchoate right 
 at the time of preparing his original bill, which 
 merely requires some formal act to render his 
 title perfect, and such formal act is not com- 
 pleted until afterwards, the introduction of that 
 fact by amendment will be permitted. The 
 case of an executor filing a bill before probate, 
 and afterwards obtaining probate, is an instance 
 of this kind. Humphreys v. Humphreys, 3 
 IV Wins. -348; Bradford v. Felder, 2 M'Cord 
 Ch. 170; Billout v. Morse, 2 Hayw. 175; Butler 
 v. Butler, 4 Litt. 201; Blackwell v. Blackwell, 
 3:> Ala. 57. A bill was amended so as to charge 
 that an infant defendant had attained her full 
 age, thereby to compel her to answer as an 
 adult. Kipp v. Hanna, 2 Bland, 26. 
 
 i 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, §§ 52, 53; for repeal 
 provisions, see 44 & 45 Vic. c. 59, § 3, Sched. 
 and see pout, pp. 1508, 1530. See Tudway r. 
 Jone*, 1 K. & J. 691 ; Forbes v. Stevens, ubi 
 supra; and see Att.-Gen. v. Portreeve of Avon, 
 3 De G. J. & S. 637 ; 11 W. R. 1050, 1051, 
 L. JJ.; Godfrey v. Tucker, 33 Beav. 280; 9 
 Jur. N. S. 818; Beardmore v. Gregory, 2 
 H. & M. 491; 11 Jur. N. S. 363; and cases 
 cited, 33 Beav. 283, n.; Foulkes v. Davies, 
 L. R. 7 Eq. 42, 46; Att.-Gen. v. Cambridge 
 Consumers' Gas Co. L. Ii. 4 Ch. 71. See also 
 
 O) Nichols p. Rogers, 139 Mass. 146; Kil- 
 linger v. Hartman, 21 Neb. 297. In Reay v. 
 Eaynor, 19 Fed. Rep. 308, 311, for infringing 
 a patent, which expired after the bill was filed, 
 an amendment was allowed, alleging reissue 
 thereof. An amendment in ejectment, which 
 in effect substituted an equitable title for an 
 alleged legal one, was allowed at the trial in 
 Feehan v. Mandeville, 28 L. R. Ir. 90. As to 
 facts introduced by amendment which occurred 
 after the bill was filed, the amended bill is 
 really a supplemental bill. See Jones v. Mc- 
 Phillips, 82 Ala. 102; Luft v. Gossrau, 31 111. 
 App. 530; Reyburn v. Mitchell, 106 Mo. 365; 
 Randall v. Christianson, 84 Iowa, 501; Mer- 
 chants' Bank v. Masonic Hall Trustees, 65 
 Ga. 603. The heirs or executor of a deceased 
 defendant are not properly brought in by 
 amending the bill; vet the amendment being 
 
 408 
 
 Bolton v. Ridsdale, 2 W. R. 488; Evans v. 
 Bagshaw, L. R. 8 Eq. 469; Ward v. Booth, 
 L. R. 14 Eq. 195; Talbot v. Radnor, 3 M. & K. 
 252; Dale v. Griffith, 16 W. R. 30; Heath v. 
 Lewis, 2 W. R 641. 
 
 2 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, §§ 52,53; for repeal 
 provisions, see 44 & 45 Vic. c. 59, § 3, Sched. 
 and see post, pp. 1508, 1530. See Rogers r. 
 Solomons, 17 Ga. 598; Cons. Ord. XXXII. 2; 
 and see post, Chap. XXXIIL, Revivor and 
 Supplement. An abatement cannot be thus 
 remedied. Commerell v. Hall, 2 Drew. 194; 
 S. C. nom. Commerell v. Bell, 18 Jur. 141; 
 Williams v. Jackson, 5 Jur. N. S. 264; 7 W. R. 
 104, V. C. W.; Webbt?. Wardle, 11 Jur. N. S. 
 278, V. C. K. See Joint Stock Discount Co. 
 v. Brown, L. R. 8 Eq. 376. In cases where the 
 Act (15 & 16 Vic. c. 86) did not apply, an- 
 other suit had to be instituted as under the 
 previous practice. Dean & Chapter of Ely v. 
 Edwards, 22 L. J. Ch 629; Hills v. Springett, 
 L. R. 5 Eq. 123; Bates v. Bates, L. R. 13 Eq. 
 138. 
 
 3 Attwood v. , 1 Russ. 353, 361 ; Maury 
 
 v. Lewis, 10 Yerger, 115; Rose v. Mynatt, 7 
 Yerger, 30 ; but see Thomas v. Warner, 15 Vt. 
 110; Duponti v. Massy, 4 Wash. C. C. 128. 
 But where it is important to the plaintiff that 
 facts disclosed in the answer should be further 
 inquired into, or avoided hy some further state- 
 
 served upon them, they may be affected with 
 notice and the cause be treated as revived 
 against them. Floyd v. Ritter, 65 Ala. 501; see 
 Tatum v. Walker, 77 Ala. 563; Maynard v. 
 Tilden, 28 Fed. Rep. 688; Frese v. Bachof, 14 
 Blateh. 432. In Harvey v. Lord, 11 Biss. 144, 
 a pending bill was amended so as to bring it 
 within a statute enacted after the bill was filed 
 and granting enlarged powers to the Court. In 
 DeLacy v. Hurst, 83 Ga. 223, an old bill was 
 amended so as to conform to the new procedure 
 prescribed by statute. In Richmond v. Irons, 
 121 U. S. 27, a judgment creditor's bill against 
 an insolvent national bank was allowed to be 
 amended by joining all its stockholders as 
 defendants and setting up their individual 
 liability under a statute which went into effect 
 after the filing of the original bill.
 
 AMENDING THE BILL. * 408 
 
 fore, it is important to the plaintiff that a fact disclosed in the answer 
 should be further inquired into, or avoided by some further statement, 
 the practice is ofteu resorted to of introducing such fact from the 
 answer of the defendant into the bill ; and where a plaintiff, not being 
 satisfied with the answer, amended his bill, stating, by way of pretence, 
 a quotation from the answer, and negativing it, and insisted that the 
 facts would appear differently if the defendant would look into his 
 accounts, the matter so introduced was held not impertinent. 4 
 
 Great latitude is allowed to a plaintiff in making amendments, 
 * and the Court has even gone to the extent of permitting a bill * 408 
 to be converted into an information ; 1 it has also been held, 
 where a plaintiff filed a bill, stating an agreement, and the defendant 
 by his answer admitted that there was an agreement, but different from 
 that stated by the plaintiff, that the plaintiff might amend his bill, 
 abandoning his first agreement, and praying for a decree according to 
 that admitted by the defendant. 2 In that case, however, the amend- 
 ment was permitted, because the bill in its original form might have 
 been prepared under a mistake or misconception of counsel, 3 and the 
 plaintiff, having afterwards discovered the error, was allowed by the 
 Court to abandon his original case, and insist upon the one alleged by 
 the defendant ; but the Court will not carry its liberality further, and 
 permit a plaintiff to amend his bill, so that he may continue to insist 
 upon the agreement originally stated, and if he fails in that, to get the 
 benefit of the one admitted by the defendant. Upon this principle, 
 where the original bill prayed the specific performance of an agreement, 
 and the defendant denied the agreement as stated in the bill, but admitted 
 a different one, whereupon the plaintiff amended his bill, continuing to 
 insist on the original agreement, and praying in the alternative, if not 
 entitled to that, to have the execution of the admitted agreement, Lord 
 Redesdale dismissed the bill with costs, but without prejudice to any 
 bill the plaintiff might be advised to file, to obtain a performance of the 
 admitted agreement. 4 
 
 ment, such facts may be introduced into the of order in which case, see 2 Seton (4th ed.), 
 
 bill from the answer of the defendant, by way 1529, note. See Ward v. Sheffield, 19 Q. B. D. 
 
 of amendment. Seelye v. Boehm, 2 Mad. 176; 22, 28. 
 
 Spencer v. Van Duzen, 1 Paige. 555. But no 2 Per Ld. Redesdale, Lindsay v. Lynch, 2 
 
 admission in an answer can, under any circum- Sch. & Lef. 9; Harris t>. Knickerbocker, 5 
 
 stances, lay a foundation for relief under any Wend. 638; S. C. 1 Paige, 209. This has 
 
 specific head of Equity, unless it be substan- been allowed, even after a hearing on the bill, 
 
 tially set forth in the bill. Jackson v. Ashton, answer, and evidence. Bellows v. Stone, 14 
 
 11 Peters, 229. The bill should be amended so N. H. 175. 
 
 as to state the contract set up in the answer, if 3 s ee McElwain v. Willis, 3 Paige, 505. 
 
 that is to be relied upon for a decree. Byrne * Lindsay v. Lynch, 2 Sch. & Lef. 1 ; see 
 
 v. Romaine, 2 Edw. Ch. 445. But it is not also Woollam r. Hearn, 7 Ves. 211,222; and 
 
 necessary or proper to amend the bill for the Deniston v. Little, 2 Sch. & Lef. 11, n. (a). 
 
 purpose of traversing defensive averments An amended bill will not be allowed where the 
 
 brought forward by the answer. Lanier r. Hill, relief sought is inconsistent with that of the 
 
 30 Ala. 111. original bill. Lloyd v. Brewster, 4 Paige, 537; 
 
 4 Seelye v. Boehm, 2 Mad. 176, 180. Coleman v. Pinka'rd, 2 Humph. 185; Bosley '". 
 
 1 President of St. Mary Magdalen v. Sib- Phillips. 3 Tenn. Ch. 649; Linn v. Carson* 32 
 
 thorp, 1 Russ. 154. The Attorney-General's Gratt. 170. Repugnancy or inconsistency be- 
 
 consent should be obtained. Caldwell v. Pag- tween original and amended bills, although in 
 
 ham Harbour Rec. Co. 2 Ch. D. 221; for form the alternative, is good ground for not allow- 
 
 409
 
 *409 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 It seems that, as a general rule, the Court will not permit a bill, filed 
 
 for the mere purpose of discovery, to be converted into one for relief, 
 
 by the addition of a prayer for relief, 6 though it has been allowed in 
 
 some cases ; 6 and it seems 7 that a bill for relief cannot be con- 
 
 * 409 verted into a bill for discovery by striking out * the prayer. 1 
 
 Any amendment of a bill, however trivial and unimportant, 
 authorizes a defendant, though not required to answer, to put in an answer, 
 making an entirely new defence, and contradicting his former answer. 2 
 An amendment of the bill does not, however, enable a defendant who has 
 answered the original bill to demur to an amended bill upon any cause 
 of demurrer to which the original bill was open, 8 unless the nature of 
 the case made by the bill has been changed by the amendments. 4 
 
 No alteration can be made in any pleading, or other matter, after it 
 has been filed, and by that means become a record of the Court, with- 
 out the sanction of an Order. 6 Orders for leave to amend bills, may, 
 subject to the rules and regulations hereafter pointed out, be obtained 
 at any period of the cause, previously to the hearing. 6 (a) 
 
 Ray v. Womble, 56 
 
 ing an amended bill. 
 Ala. 32. 
 
 6 Butterworth v. Bailey, 15 Ves. 358, 361; 
 Jackson v. Strong, M'Lel. 245; Parker v. Ford, 
 1 Coll. 506. 
 
 6 Hildyard v. Cressy, 3 Atk. 303; Crow v. 
 Tyrell, 2 Mad 397, 409 ; Lousada v. Templer, 2 
 Russ. 561, 565 ; Severn v. Fletcher, 5 Sim. 457 ; 
 see Lyell v. Kennedy, 8 App. Cas. 225. 
 
 t An application to the Court in Massachu- 
 setts, for relief in Equitj', which does not con- 
 tain a prayer for process to be served on the 
 defendant, or conclude with the general inter- 
 rogatory as required by the Rules for Practice 
 in Chancery in that State, may be regarded as 
 a bill ; and if properly amended, relief may 
 be granted on it. Belknap v. Stone, 1 Allen, 
 572; see Wright v. Wright, 4 Halst. Ch. (N. 
 J.) 143. 
 
 i Thus, in Lord Cholmondeley v. Lord Clin- 
 ton, 2 V. & B. 113, where the defendants, 
 having answered the bill, obtained an order for 
 the plaintiff to elect whether he would proceed 
 at Law or in Equity, whereupon the plaintiff 
 elected to proceed at Law, and moved to dis- 
 miss his bill as far as it sought relief, and to 
 amend the record by striking out the prayer 
 
 in by the defendant after the order was made. 
 2 V. & B. 114, n. (a); see ante, p. 402. note. 
 
 2 Miller v. Whittaker, 33 111. 386; Trust & 
 Fire Insurance Co. v. Jenkins, 8 Paige, 589; 
 Bowen v. Idley, 6 Paige, 46; see Bosanquet v. 
 Marsham, 4 Sim. 573; Richardson v. Richard- 
 son, 5 Paige, 58; Dillon v. Davis, 3 Tenn. Ch. 
 394; Thomas v. Visitors of Frederick Co. School, 
 7 Gill & J. 369, in which case an additional 
 answer to an amended bill was ordered to be 
 taken off the file, because not filed with leave. 
 In Bolton v. Bolton, 29t June, 1831, MSS., 
 ex relatione Beames, Sir Lancelot Shadwell V. 
 C. on the ground stilted in the text, refused, 
 with costs, a motion to take an answer to an 
 amended bill off the file; although it was filed 
 nearly three years after the bill had been 
 amended, and eight years after the original an- 
 swer,and contradicted the original answer, intro- 
 ducing no less than four new issues or defences. 
 
 3 Att.-Gen. v. Cooper, 8 Hare, 166; see also 
 Wyllie v. El lice, 6 Hare, 505. For case prior 
 to 37 Ord. Aug., 1841 (now Ord. XIV. 9). see 
 Ellice v. Goodson, 3 M. & C. 653, 661 ; 2 Jur. 
 249. Nor to put in a plea in the nature of a 
 plea puis darrein continuance, to the effect 
 that since he put in his answer to the original 
 
 for relief, the motion was refused: Lord Eldon .bill he had removed the obstacle, which pre- 
 
 being of opinion that the better course for 
 the plaintiff would be to dismiss his bill, and 
 file another for discovery only; which was ac- 
 cordingly done. 2 Mer. 71. In the above case, 
 Gurish v. Donovan, 2 Atk. 166, was cited in 
 argument in support of the motion; but upon 
 reference to the Registrar's book, it appeared 
 that the order for striking out the prayer was 
 made by consent, and that an answer was put 
 
 vented proceedings at Law, and authorized the 
 filing of the bill. Morley v. White. L. R. 8 
 Ch. 731. The rule is now otherwise under the 
 Judicature Act. Powell v. Jewesbury, 9 Ch. 
 D. 34. See infra, p. 780. 
 
 < Cresy v. Bevan, 13 Sim. 354. 
 
 5 See Thomas v. Visitors of Frederick Co. 
 School, 7 Gill & J. 369. 
 
 6 See Luce v. Graham , 4 John. Ch. 170 ; 
 
 (a) See Brown v. White, 16 Fed. Rep. 900. 
 An amendment regularly made under Equity 
 
 410 
 
 Rule 29 cannot be avoided by a motion to 
 strike fivm the record the order by which it
 
 AMENDING THE BILL. 
 
 411 
 
 An order for leave to amend a bill may be obtained at any time 
 before answer, upon motion or petition without notice ; 7 and for 
 * the purpose of adding parties only, an order for leave to amend * 410 
 may be obtained in like manner at any time before the cause is 
 set down for hearing ; x but, as we have seen, if the order is obtained 
 after the time for giving notice of the cross-examination of the witnesses, 
 the evidence cannot be read against the parties so added. 2 
 
 An order for leave to amend a bill, only for the purpose of rectifying 
 some clerical error in names, dates, or sums may be obtained at any 
 time upon motion or petition without notice. 3 The order should specify 
 the errors which are to be corrected. 
 
 * If a demurrer to the whole bill is not set down for argument * 411 
 within twelve days, or a demurrer to part of the bill within three 
 
 Hunt v. Holland, 3 Paige, 78. A plaintiff who 
 is in contempt may obtain an order to amend 
 his bill. Chatterton v. Thomas, 36 L. J. Ch. 592. 
 
 7 Cons. Oi'd. IX. 8. As many orders as may 
 be required may thus be obtained, and if inter- 
 rogatories have been filed, and it is necessary 
 to amend them, the order may give leave to do 
 so. Braithwaite's Pr. 319 ; see form of order, 
 Seton, 1252, No. 2. See the U. S. Equity Rules, 
 Nos. 28-30 ( post, Vol. III.) ; Story, Eq. PI. 
 § 886, note. 
 
 By the Mass. Ch. Rules the plaintiff may 
 amend his bill at any time before answer, plea, 
 or demurrer, filed, of course, and without pay- 
 ment of costs; but if the defendant's appear- 
 ance shall have been entered, the plaintiff shall, 
 at his own expense, furnish the defendant with 
 a certified copy of the amended bill. No 
 amendment, however, shall be allowed, as of 
 course, to a bill which has been sworn to by 
 the party. If the defendant demurs to the bill 
 for want of parties, or other defect, which does 
 not go to the equity of the whole bill, the plain- 
 tiff may amend at any time before the de- 
 murrer is set down for argument, or within 
 fourteen days after the demurrer is fih'd, and 
 notice thereof given to him, upon the payment 
 of a term fee. Rules 20, 21. And upon the 
 coming in of the answer, if the plaintiff shall 
 find it necessary to amend his bill, in order to 
 meet the case made by the answer, he may do 
 so, by furnishing to the defendant a certified 
 copy of the amendment. Rule 22. See Ger- 
 rish v. Black, 99 Mass. 315. In Maine, see Ch. 
 Rule 3, 37 Maine, 581. 
 
 In New Hampshire, amendments may be 
 made to the bill, answer, or pleadings, in proper 
 cases, upon the order of the Judge in vacation, 
 and upon such terms as he may impose ; the 
 amendments being subject, however, to the 
 order of the Court. Rule 18 of Chancery 
 Practice, 38 N. H. 608. 
 
 In Tennessee the bill may be amended before 
 copy issued, and afterwards in small matters 
 not affecting the merits, without costs, and be- 
 fore defence made in material points, upon pav- 
 ing the costs of a copy of the amendment. In 
 all other cases, amendments can only be made 
 by leave of the Chancellor in open Court. 
 Code, §§ 4332-4335. It is of course to allow 
 the plaintiff to amend his bill upon defence 
 made either by plea or answer; amendments 
 after replication, or the setting of a plea or de- 
 murrer for hearing, will be on terms. Mount 
 Olivet Cemetery v. Budeke, 2 Tenn. Ch. 480. 
 
 1 Ante, pp. 293, 294; Goodwin v. Goodwin, 
 3 Atk. 370; Brattle v. Waterman, 4 Sim. 125; 
 Bryan v. Wastell, Kay App.47; Gill v. Rayner, 
 1 K. & J. 395; see, however, Hitchcock v. 
 Jacques, 9 Beav. 192. 
 
 2 Ante, pp. 293, 294, 405. Quantock v. Bul- 
 len, 5 Mad. 81; Pratt r. Barker, 1 Sim. 1, 5; 
 James v. James, 4 Beav. 578. 
 
 3 Cons. Ord. IX. 9 The signature of coun- 
 sel is not required to an amendment of this de- 
 scription; but such an amendment will render 
 inoperative an order to take a bill pro conftsso ; 
 Weightman v. Powell, 2 De G. & S. 570; see, 
 however, Cheeseborough v. Wright, 28 Beav. 
 173. As to the necessity of reserving the bill 
 after such an amendment, see Barnes v. Uidg- 
 way, 1 Sm. & G. Ap. 18. The defendant may, 
 where he apprehends danger from a clerical 
 mistake, in stating a deed or other instrument, 
 in a bill, have the bill amended so as to iden- 
 tify the instrument on which the suit is brought, 
 and prevent a second suit on the same. Onta- 
 rio Bank v. Sehermerhorn. 10 Paige, 109. A 
 mere clerical error may be amended in a bill, 
 even after final decree. Donnelly v. Ewart, 3 
 Rich. Eq. 18. For forms of motion paper and 
 petition, see Vol. III. 
 
 was permitted. Lichtenauer v. Cheney, 8 Fed. 
 Rep. 876. The U. S. Circuit Court, upon an 
 Equity appeal from the District Court, can al- 
 
 low an amendment of substance. 
 Moody, 9 Fed. Rep. 673. 
 
 411 
 
 Warren a
 
 412 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 weeks, after filing the same, the plaintiff must, within such respective 
 times, serve an order, which ma} 7 " be obtained on motion or petition of 
 course, for leave to amend the bill : otherwise, the demurrer will be 
 held sufficient. 1 (a) 
 
 If a plea to the whole or a part of a bill is not set down for argument 
 within three weeks after the filing thereof, the plaintiff must within that 
 time serve an order, which may be obtained on motion or petition of 
 course, for leave to amend the bill, or undertake in writing to reply to 
 the plea ; otherwise the plea will be held good. 2 
 
 Where a demurrer has been overruled, it is irregular to obtain an 
 order of course to amend pending an appeal ; and in such a case the 
 order was discharged with costs, and the amendments expunged. 3 
 
 In like manner, it is irregular to obtain an order of course to amend, 
 pending an inquiry which of two suits is most for an infant's benefit. 4 
 
 If, at the time the order for amendment is made, none of the defend- 
 ants have appeared, the plaintiff may amend without payment of any 
 costs. 6 If any of the defendants have appeared, but have not answered, 
 or, having answered, the plaintiff requires no further answer from them, 
 the plaintiff may amend without payment of any costs to them ; but 
 the plaintiff must pay 20s. to each defendant, or set of defendants, 
 who have answered, and from whom the plaintiff requires a further 
 answer. 6 
 
 Where no further answer is required, the order should contain a 
 recital to that effect ; otherwise it is irregular. 7 
 
 It is now proposed to consider the circumstances under which a bill 
 may be amended after answer. 8 Where there is a sole defendant, or 
 where, there being several defendants, they all join in the same 
 * 412 answer, the plaintiff may, after answer and before * replication 
 or undertaking to reply, obtain one order of course for leave to 
 amend the bill, at any time within four weeks after the answer is to be 
 deemed or is held to be sufficient ; x and where there are several defend- 
 
 i Cons. Ord. XIV. 14, 15. As to the effect 
 of holding a demurrer sufficient, see post, Chap. 
 XIV. § 5. For forms of motion paper and pe- 
 tition, see Vol. III. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XIV. 17. As to the effect of 
 holding a plea sufficient, see post, Chap. XV. 
 § 5. And see Campbell v. Joyce, L. R. 2 Eq. 
 377, V. C. W. ; Kittlewell v. Barstow, L. R. 10 
 Eq. 210. For forms of motion paper and peti- 
 tion, see Vol. III. 
 
 3 Ainslie v. Sims, 17 Beav. 174. 
 
 * Fletcher v. Moore, 11 Beav. 617; 13 Jur. 
 1063. 
 
 5 Saunders v. Frost, 5 Pick. 259; Droullard 
 V. Baxter, 1 Scam. 191; Rule 20, Mass. Chan- 
 cery, ante, p. 410, note. 
 
 6 Ante. p. 410, note. 
 
 ' Buddington v. Woodley, 9 Sim. 380; 2 
 Jur. 917; Breeze v. English, 2 Hare, 638. 
 
 8 See Droullard v. Baxter, 1 Scam. 191; 
 Rules 29 and 30 of the Equity Rules of the U. S. 
 Supreme Court; Rules 20 and 22 of the Rules 
 for Chancery Practice in Massachusetts, ante, 
 p. 409, n. 7. 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. IX. 10 The four weeks ex- 
 pire at twelve o'clock at night on the last day. 
 Preston v. Collett, 20 L. J. Ch. 228. Before 
 replication, the order to amend is of course. 
 Buckley v. Corse, Saxton, 504; Vernon v. Cue, 
 1 Dick. 358; Jennings v. Pearce, 1 Ves. Jr. 
 447; Renwick v. Wilson, 6 John. Ch. 85; 
 Mount Olivet Cemetery Co. v. Budeke, 2 Tenn. 
 
 (a) Under the Codes, it is within the Court's 
 discretion to refuse to allow a pleading to be 
 amended, after a demurrer thereto is sustained. 
 Daley v. Russ, 86 Cal. 114; Buckley v. Howe, 
 id. 596. In such case, the bill will be dismissed 
 
 412 
 
 if the defect is not amendable or the plaintiff 
 declines to amend. Wheaton v. Atlantic Pow- 
 der Co. 41 Mich. 719; McKay v. McKay, 28 
 W. Va. 514; Mercantile Bank v. Carpenter, 101 
 U. S. 567.
 
 AMENDING THE BILL. * 413 
 
 ants who do not join in the same answer, the plaintiff (if not precluded 
 from amending, or limited as to the time of amending by some former 
 order), may, alter answer, and before replication or undertaking to reply, 
 at any time within four weeks after the last of the answers required to 
 be put in is to be deemed or is held to be sufficient, obtain one order of 
 course, for leave to amend his bill. 2 An order of course cannot, however, 
 be obtained, in either of these cases, after any defendant, being entitled 
 to move, has served a notice of motion to dismiss the bill for want of 
 prosecution. 3 
 
 A voluntary answer is deemed sufficient as soon as it is put in; and 
 therefore, in that case, the period of four weeks commences to run as 
 soon as it is filed. 4 
 
 In computing the period for obtaining orders for leave to amend bills, 
 the times of vacation are not to be reckoned. 5 
 
 It will be convenient here to state the different times of vacation. 
 The vacations observed in the several offices of the Court, except in the 
 office of the Accountant-General, are four in every year : namely, the 
 Easter Vacation, the Whitsun Vacation, the Long Vacation, and the 
 Christmas Vacation. (1) The Easter Vacation commences and termi- 
 nates on such days as the Lord Chancellor every year specially directs. 
 (2) The Whitsun Vacation commences on the third day after Easter 
 Term, and terminates on the second day before Trinity Term in every 
 year. (3) The Long Vacation commences on the 10th day of August and 
 terminates on the 28th day of October in every year. (4) The Christmas 
 Vacation commences on the 24th day of December in every year, and 
 terminates on the 6th day of the following month of January. 6 
 
 The vacations in the office of the Accountant-General are the same 
 as in the other offices, except as to the Long Vacation, which com- 
 mences and terminates on such days as the Lord Chancellor every year 
 directs. 7 
 
 The days of the commencement and termination of each vaca- 
 tion * are included in and reckoned part of such vacation. 1 And * 413 
 the Lord Chancellor may from time to time, by special order, 
 direct any of the vacations to commence and terminate on days different 
 from the fixed days before mentioned. 2 
 
 When the bill has been once amended after answer, under an order 
 of course, the plaintiff is not, except for the purpose of rectifying cler- 
 
 Ch. 480. And without prejudice to an injunc- 6 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 13 (1); and see post, 
 
 tion or other order. Lanning i>. Heath, 25 N. p. 420. 
 
 J. Eq. 425; Harvey v. Hall. L. R. 11 Eq. 31. 6 Cons. Ord. V. 4 (1-4). The duties of the 
 
 And it is also a motion of course to re-amend Vacation Judge commence as each Court rises, 
 
 upon the coming in of the answer to an although the vacation may not have actually 
 
 amended bill. Dunn v. Ferrior, L. R. 8 Eq. 248. commenced. Francis v. Browne, 8 .lur. N. S. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. IX. 11. To avoid a notice to 785; 10 W. R. 811, L.C.; see Cons. Ord. VI. 
 
 dismiss, the order of course under rr. 10, 11, 11, as to power of one Judge to act for another 
 
 must also be served; see Cons. Ord. XXXIII. during vacation. 
 10 (1). Cons. Ord. IX. 11, applies to bills of 7 Cons. Ord. V. 5. 
 
 discovery. Peile v. Stoddart, 11 Beav. 591. 1 Cons. Ord. V. 4 (5). 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. IX. 12 ; nee post, p. 416, n. 4. 2 Cons. Ord. V. 6. 
 
 4 Rogers v Frver, 2 W. R. 67 ; 2 Eq. Rep. 
 253, V. C. K. 
 
 413
 
 414 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 ical errors in names, dates, or sums, 8 or of adding parties, 4 entitled to 
 another order of course, giving him leave to amend his bill ; 5 and this 
 applies, notwithstanding that some of the defendants may answer sub- 
 sequently to the date of the amendment, 6 and that those defendants who 
 have already answered consent to the application for the order. 7 
 
 For the purpose of determining whether an order of course to amend 
 can be obtained, an answer held to be insufficient, or the insufficiency 
 of which is admitted by the defendant, must be considered as no answer ; 
 and, consequently, an order to amend after such insufficient answer, or 
 after a demurrer or plea overruled, 8 is of course, and does not preclude 
 the plaintiff from obtaining a further order of course for the amendment 
 of his bill, after a sufficient answer has been put in. 9 It must, however, 
 be recollected that an answer is deemed sufficient until it has been held 
 insufficient ; 10 and, further, that an amendment of the bill, made previ- 
 ously to the answer being held insufficient, operates as an admission of 
 the sufficiency of the answer; consequently, however insufficient an 
 answer may be in fact, an amendment of the bill before it is held insuffi- 
 cient, will have the effect of preventing any f urthur order to amend from 
 being obtained, as of course. 
 
 After exceptions for insufficiency have been submitted to, or allowed, 
 the plaintiff may obtain an order, as of course, on motion or petition, 11 
 that he may be at liberty to amend his bill, and that the defendant may 
 answer the amendments and exceptions together. 12 If the bill 
 * 414 has been already amended under such * an order, and exceptions 
 are taken to the answer to the amended bill and are submitted 
 to or allowed, the plaintiff may have a further order, as of course to 
 amend, and that the defendant may answer the amendments and excep- 
 tions together. 1 If, however, the defendant can put in his further 
 answer, before he is served with the order to answer the amendments 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. IX. 9; ante, p. 410. 
 
 * Ante, pp. 294, 405, 406, 409. 
 
 s Cons. Ord. IX. 13. 
 
 6 Att.-Gen. v. Nethercoat, 2 M. & C. 604; 1 
 Jur. 635; Duncombe v. Lewis, 10 Beav. 273; 
 Winthrop v. Murray, 7 Hare, 150. See Whar- 
 ton v. Swann, 2 M. & K. 362. 
 
 I Bainbrigge v. Baddeley, 12 Beav, 152; 13 
 Jur 997. 
 
 8 But pending an appeal, an order of course, 
 after a demurrer overruled, is irregular. Ainslie 
 v. Sims, 17 Beav. 174. 
 
 9 Mendizabel v. Hullett, 1 R. & M. 324; 
 Bird r. Hustler, ib. 325; Chase v. Dunham, 1 
 Paige, 572. 
 
 i° See Sibbald v. Lowrie, 2 K. & J. 277, n.; 
 Lafone v. Falkland Islands Co. 2 K. & J. 276. 
 
 II For forms of motion paper and petition, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 12 Mayne v. Hochin, 1 Dick. 255 ; Adney v. 
 Flood, 1 Mad. 449; Dipper v. Durant, 3 Mer. 
 465; see Renwick v. Wilson, 6 John. Ch. 81; 
 M'Mechen v. Story, 1 Bland, 184; Barnes v. 
 Dickinson, Dev. Eq. 326 ; Read v. Consequa, 
 
 414 
 
 4 Wash. C. C. 174. In Massachusetts, upon 
 the coming in of the answer, if the plaintiff 
 shall find it necessary to amend his bill, in 
 order to meet the case made by the answer, he 
 may do so by furnishing to the defendant a cer- 
 tified copy of the amendment ; and the plaintiff 
 may also, at the same time, except to the de- 
 fendant's answer to the bill, as orginally filed. 
 And in such case, if the defendant shall submit 
 to answer further, or shall be ordered to answer 
 further, he shall answer the amendments of the 
 bill, and shall furnish a sufficient answer to the 
 bill as originally filed at the same time. Mass. 
 Ch. Rule 22. See Gerrish v. Black, 99 Mass. 
 315; ante, p. 410, note. Under the general rule 
 allowing the plaintiff to amend, upon an insuf- 
 ficient answer, he cannot amend by leaving out 
 the name of the defendant, and thus discontinue 
 the suit against him, without costs. Chase v. 
 Dunham, 1 Paiffe, 572; see Wilkinson v. Belsher, 
 2 Bro. C. C. 272. 
 
 1 Mendizabel o. Hullett, 1 R. & M. 324; Bird 
 v. Hustler, id. 325.
 
 AMENDING THE BILL. * 415 
 
 and exceptions together, the plaintiff will lose the benefit of such order, 
 and the defendant may move, on notice, to discharge it for irregularity. 2 
 Where the plaintiff did not amend his bill within the period allowed for 
 that purpose, it was held, that a second order of course for leave to 
 amend was irregular. 8 
 
 All the applications to amend hitherto considered are of course, and 
 require no notice. They are usually obtained on a petition of course at 
 the Rolls ; but they may also be made on motion of course, in the Court 
 of the Judge to whose Court the cause is attached. 4 
 
 In all cases, other than those above pointed out in which an order 
 may be obtained as of course, the plaintiff must, if he desires to amend 
 his bill after answer, make a special application to the Judge for leave 
 to do so. This application is made by summons at Chambers. 6 The 
 summons must be served on the solicitors for all the defendants who 
 have appeared to the bill. The Judge, at the time of making the order, 
 usually disposes of the costs of the application. 6 
 
 If this .special application is made within the period of four weeks 
 from the time when the answer, or last of the answers, required to be 
 put in is to be deemed or is held to be sufficient, it will not be granted 
 without an affidavit to the effect, (1) that the draft of the proposed 
 amendments has been settled, approved, and signed by counsel ; and 
 (2), that such amendment is not intended for the purpose of delay or vex- 
 ation, but because the same is considered to be material for the 
 case of the plaintiff. 7 * Such affidavit must be made either by * 415 
 the plaintiff and his solicitor, or by the solicitor alone, in case 
 the plaintiff, from being abroad or otherwise, is unable to join therein. 1 
 The affidavit of the solicitor's clerk is not sufficient, although the facts 
 be within his knowledge ; and where the facts are within his knowledge 
 only, the Court requires an affidavit from him, as well as the solicitor. 2 
 
 In the case of an information, the affidavit may be made by the solicitor 
 of the informant, 8 or by the solicitor of the relators only. 4 So, also, if 
 a corporation is plaintiff, an affidavit by the solicitor of the corporation 
 is sufficient. 6 Where there are several co-plaintiffs, only one need join 
 
 2 Mayne v. Hochin, 1 Dick. 255; Bethune t Cons Orel. IX. 14. This order applies in 
 
 »\ Bateman, id. 296; Knox v. Symmonds. 1 Ves. the case of an application to re-amend, after 
 
 Jr. 87, 88; Paty v. Simpson, 2 Cox, 392; Part- answer, a bill which has been amended after 
 
 ridge v. Haycraft, 11 Ves. 570, 578; Pariente v. answer under an order of course. Masterman 
 
 Bensusan, 13 Sim. 522; 7 Jur. 618; Hemming v . Midland Ry. 20 L. J. Ch. 23; Mcintosh v. 
 
 v. Dingwall, 8 Beav. 102. For form of notice Great Western Ry. Co 20 L. J. Ch. 550; for 
 
 of motion, see Vol. III. form of affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 
 s Dolly r.Challin.U Beav. 61; and see Wat- i Cons Ord. IX. 16; Att.-Gen. v. London, 
 
 son o. Life, 1 M'N. & G. 104; 13 Jur. 479. 13 Beav. 313. As to cross-examination upon 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. VI. 5. And see post, Chap. the affidavit, see Catholic Pub. Co. r. Wyman, 
 XXXV. § 1, Interlocutory Applications and ]1 W. R. 399, V. C. W. 
 
 Orders. For forms of motion paper and peti- 2 Christ's Hospital v. Grainger, 1 Phil. 634, 
 
 tions, see Vol. III. 639 ; 10 Jur. 37. 
 
 5 15 & 16 Vice. 80, §§ 26, 27; Cons. Ord. 8 Att.-Gen. v. London, ubi supra. 
 XXXV. 2. For form of summons, see Vol. III. 4 Att.-Gen. v. Wakeman, 15 Sim. 358; 10 
 
 « See 23 Ord. Dec, 1833 ; Sand. Ord. 781 ; Jur. 559. 
 Beav. Ord. 51; Cons. Ord. XXXV. 61. And 6 Christ's Hospital v. Grainger, ubi supra. 
 
 see as to costs of amendments generally, Cons. 
 Ord. XL. 7, 8. 
 
 415
 
 *416 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 in the affidavit ; and where the sole plaintiff is an infant, the affidavit 
 should be made by the next friend and the solicitor. 
 
 After the plaintiff has filed or undertaken to file replication, or after 
 the expiration of four weeks from the time when the answer, or the last 
 of the answers required to be put in, is to be deemed, or is held to be 
 sufficient, a special order for leave to amend will not be granted without 
 a further affidavit showing that the matter of the proposed amendment 
 is material, and could not, with reasonable diligence, have been sooner 
 introduced into the bill. 6 The affidavit must also show the nature of the 
 proposed amendments, in order that the Judge may decide as to their 
 materiality, 7 and must state the facts, so as to enable the Judge to 
 determine whether reasonable diligence has been used. 8 
 
 If the plaintiff amends his bill after answer by adding parties, the 
 period of four weeks will still be reckoned from the time when the an- 
 swer, or the last of the answers required to be put in to the original 
 
 bill, is to be deemed, or is held to be sufficient. 9 
 * 416 * The rules laid down in the General Orders, as to obtaining 
 
 orders of course to amend, do not appear to have been framed 
 with a view to meet those cases where no answer is required, and none 
 is put in ; consequently, it has been held, that it was not irregular to 
 obtain an order of course to amend after the plaintiff had served a 
 notice of motion for a decree, and the defendant had filed his affidavits 
 in opposition to such motion. 1 It would seem, that if the motion had 
 been set down for hearing, an order of course would have been irreg- 
 ular. 2 It is conceived that, after replication has been filed, or the 
 plaintiff has undertaken to file it, an order of course to amend cannot 
 be obtained, even where no answer has been required or put in ; s and 
 where a defendant, being entitled to move, has served a notice of motion 
 to dismiss for want of prosecution, the plaintiff can in no case obtain an 
 order of course to amend ; 4 but the limits above pointed out appear to 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. IX. 15; Thorn v. Germand, 4 
 John. Ch. 363. If the plaintiff files amplica- 
 tion to the answer after he is apprised of the 
 necessity of an amendment to his bill, he pre- 
 cludes himself from making such amendment. 
 Vermilyea v. Odell, 4 Paige, 121. The applica- 
 tion to amend should be made as soon as the 
 necessity for an amendment is discovered. 
 Rogers v. Rogers, 1 Paige, 424; Piatt v. Squire, 
 5 Cush. 557; Codington »'. Mott, 14 N. J. Eq. 
 430; Howell v. Lebring, id. 84, 90; for form of 
 affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 
 ' Phillips v. Goding, 1 Hare, 40; 5 Jur. 
 1105; Att.-Gen. v. Fishmongers' Co. 4 M. & C. 
 1, 8; C. P. Coop. 385; Stuart v. Lloyd, 3 M'N. 
 &G. 181; 15 Jur. 411; Collett v. Preston, 3 
 M'N. & G. 432, 438; 15 Jur. 975; Brown v. 
 Ricketts, 2 John. Ch. 425. And see as to suf- 
 ficiency of affidavit, Att.-Gen. v. London, 13 
 Beav. 313. In Payne v. Little, 14 Jur. 358, the 
 M. R. held that it was sufficient if some of 
 the proposed amendments were mentioned in 
 the affidavit. Price v. Salusbury, 32 Beav. 446; 
 
 416 
 
 Hemming v. Maddick, L. R. 9 Eq. 175; L. R. 7 
 Ch. 395. 
 
 8 Stuart t;. Lloyd, and Collett v. Preston, ubi 
 supra. Although reasonable diligence cannot 
 be thus shown, the application must be made to 
 the Judge y summons. As to the power of the 
 Court, and Judge at Chambers, to enlarge the 
 time for doing any act, or taking any proceed- 
 ing, see Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 17, 18; Potts v. 
 Whit more, 10 Beav. 179. 
 
 9 Bertolacci e. Johnstone, 2 Hare, 632; 8 
 
 Jur. 751. 
 
 i Gill v. Rayner, 1 K. & J. 395 ; and see 
 
 ante, pp. 411, 412. 
 
 2 Ibid. Goodwin v. Goodwin, 3 Atk. 370. 
 A motion for a decree would for this purpose, 
 it is apprehended, be considered a hearing of 
 the cause. 
 
 3 Cons. Ord. IX. 15. 
 
 * Cons. Ord. IX. 12; but if the notice be with- 
 drawn, matters will be remitted to their former 
 condition. Briggs v. Beale, 12 W. R. 934, V. 
 C. W.
 
 AMENDING THE BILL. * 417 
 
 be the only restraints on the right of the plaintiff to obtain an order of 
 course to amend, where no answer is put in. 
 
 After the evidence is closed, the bill cannot be amended in any other 
 respect than by adding parties ; and no new allegation can be introduced, 
 or material fact put in issue, which was not so before. 6 And where a 
 plaintiff by a false suggestion that the cause was at issue only, had ob- 
 tained an order for liberty to amend his bill, by the addition of a prayer 
 which had been accidentally omitted, the order was discharged, upon the 
 application of the defendant at the opening of the cause, when it came 
 on for hearing. 6 
 
 It is said 7 that, after publication has passed (that is, after the evi- 
 dence is closed), there is no instance of a plaintiff obtaining an order to 
 amend, without withdrawing his replication. The observation, however, 
 appears to be a mere dictum, and it certainly cannot apply to cases where 
 the amendment is merely by adding parties. Lord Thurlow once inti- 
 mated an opinion, 8 that after a decree had been made, passed, and 
 entered, without bringing before the Court a personal representative 
 who had become so after the bill was filed, he might be added by amend- 
 ment, and that a motion for the purpose would be regular, provided 
 it was only for the purpose of making him a witness to * what * 417 
 was done in the Master's office ; but that, if there was anything 
 in the decree affecting him in the way of an order to pay, such an order 
 would be out of the power of the Court. 
 
 Where it is intended to amend a bill, after replication filed, by the 
 addition of new facts or charges, the proper course is to apply for leave 
 to withdraw the replication and amend ; and it seems that an order of 
 this description may be obtained, upon an application in Chambers, sup- 
 ported by the affidavits required by the General Orders above referred 
 to, 1 at any time before the closing of the evidence. 2 (a) The order may 
 be made without prejudice to the evidence already gone into being used. 8 
 
 Sometimes the Court, at the hearing, will order a cause to stand over, 
 with liberty to the plaintiff to perfect his case by amendment, upon his 
 paying the costs of the day. 4 (b) Thus, as we have seen, if, at the hear- 
 
 6 Goodwin v. Goodwin, 3 Atk. 370 ; Milligan Champneys v. Buchan, 3 Drew. 5; see Thorn 
 
 v. Mitchell, 1 M. & C. 433, 442; Thompson v. v. Germand, 4 John. Ch. 363 ; Story. Eq. PI. 
 
 Judge, 2 Drew. 414; Horton v. Brocklehurst, § 887; Blaisdell v. Stevens, 16 Vt. 179; Brown 
 
 29 Beav. 503; Forbes v. Stevens, 10 Jur. v. Ricketts, 2 John. Ch. 425. 
 
 N. S. 861, V. C. W.; but see S. C. 4 N. R. 386, 8 Ricardo v. Cooper, cited Seton, 1253. 
 
 k- JJ- 4 This may be done, when the cause is heard 
 
 « Harding v. Cox, 3 Atk. 583. on motion for decree. Thomas v. Bernard, 7 
 
 "> 1 Atk. 51. W. R. 271, V. C. K. ; Budding v. Murdoch, 1 
 
 8 Habergham v. Vincent, 1 Ves. Jr. 68; see, Ch. D. 42; King v. Corke, id. 57. And see 
 
 however, 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 40, n. where the pleadings are evasive, which are 
 
 1 For form of summons, see Vol. III. sought to be amended, Tildeslev v. Harner, 10 
 
 2 Horton v. Brocklehurst, 29 Beav. 503; Ch. D. 393, overruling S. C. 7 Ch. D. 403. 
 
 (a) Such an order will not be ma^e after the 727; see Mozeley r. Cowie, 47 id. 271. It will 
 evidence is closed. Godbold v. Ellis, 23 W. not be granted when the other party will be 
 **• 333. seriously damnified by the amendment. Til- 
 
 (b) Such liberty to amend does not carry desley v. Harper, 10 Ch. D. 393; Claparede v. 
 with it liberty to go into further evidence. Commercial Union Ass'n, 32 W. R. 151; Traf- 
 Nobel's Explosive Co. r. Jones, 49 L.J. Ch. 726, ford v. Blanc, 53 L. T. 498. The question ot 
 
 vol. i. — 27 417
 
 *418 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 ing, the record appears to be defective for want of proper parties, the 
 Court will allow the cause to stand over, for the plaintiff to amend his 
 bill by adding parties ; 5 or, where the parties are too numerous to be 
 brought before the Court, to alter the form of the bill, by making it a 
 bill by the plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others of the same 
 class. 6 This practice is not confined to amendment, by adding parties : 
 it will be extended to permit the plaintiff to show why he cannot bring 
 the necessary parties before the Court. 7 And if the record is defective 
 by reason of a misjoinder of plaintiffs, the Court may direct such amend- 
 ments as may be necessary, in order to grant such relief as any of the 
 plaintiffs may be entitled to, and at the hearing, before such amendments 
 are made, treat any of the plaintiffs as if he were a defendant. 8 And so, 
 as we have seen, 9 the Court will sometimes, at the hearing, permit the 
 prayer of the bill to be amended, 10 so as to make it more consistent with 
 the case made by the plaintiff than the one he has already introduced. 
 
 And where a plaintiff had amended his bill, and by accident had 
 * 418 omitted to insert in the * amended bill the prayer for relief, 
 
 although it was in the original bill, the Court put off the cause, 
 
 » Ante, pp. 290, 291 ; and see Leyland v. 
 Levland, 10 W. R. 149, V. C. K. ; Story, Eq. 
 PI." §891. 
 
 G Ante, p. 244; and see Gwatkin v. Camp- 
 bell, 1 Jur. N. S. 131, V. C. W. 
 
 t Milligan v. Mitchell, 1 M. & C. 511, 515. 
 Gibson v. Ingo, 5 Hare, 156. 
 
 8 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 49 ; ante, p 303 ; 
 and see Lee v. Blackstone, Seton, 1113, No. 2. 
 
 9 Ante, p. 383. 
 
 10 Clifton v. H:iig, 4 Desaus. 330, cited, post, 
 419, in note; Lyon v. Tallmadge, 1 John. Ch. 
 184. If a formal charge of fraud were neces- 
 
 costs may be reserved, if the plaintiff is not 
 ordered to pay them. Att.-Gen. v. Cambridge 
 Consumers' Gas Co. L. R. 6 Eq. 282, 308 ; L. R. 
 4Ch. 71 ; Breckton v. Russell, 19 L. T. N. S. 81. 
 The Court in its discretion may, at the hearing, 
 or thereafter, permit the plaintiff's case to be 
 perfected by amendment, but it will not then 
 permit him to substitute a new case. See King 
 v. Corke, 1 Ch. D. 57; Att.-Gen. v. Birming- 
 ham, 15 Ch. D. 423; Edevain v. Cohen. 41 Ch. 
 D. 563, aff'd 38 W. R. 177 ; Lowther v. Heaver, 
 id. 248 ; 59 L. T. 631; Riding v. Hawkins, 14 
 P. D. 56; Re Trufort, 34 W. R. 56; Re White 
 Star C. G. M Co. 48 L. T. 815; Underwood v. 
 Gerber, 37 Fed. Rep. 796; Ogden v. Thornton, 
 30 N". J. Eq. 569; Foster v. Knowles, 42 id. 
 226 ; Fearey v. Hayes, 44 id. 425 ; Jones v. 
 Davenport, 45 id. 77 ; Mears v. Dole, 135 Ma9S. 
 508; Jeffries v. Jeffries, 66 Mich. 216; Dodson 
 v. McKelvey, 93 Mich. 263; Steinriede v. Tegge 
 (Ky.), 14 S. W~. Rep. 357; Hibernia S. & L. 
 Society??. Jones. 89 Cal. 507; Link v. Jarvis 
 (Cal.), 33Pac. Rep. 206; Conn. M. Life Ins. 
 Co. v. Smith (Mo.), 22 S. W. Rep. 623; Hen- 
 
 418 
 
 sary, but had been omitted, the Court would 
 grant leave to amend even at the hearing. 
 Wamburzee v. Kennedy, 4 Desaus. 480. But 
 after a defendant has put in his answer on oath, 
 the plaintiff cannot amend his bill and include 
 in such amendment a waiver of the answer of 
 the defendant on oath, so as to deprive him of 
 the benefit of his answer to the amendments, 
 so far as it may be responsive to the bill. Bur- 
 ras v. Loker, 4 Paige, 227; Bingham v. Yeo- 
 mans, 10 Cush. 58; Chace v. Holmes, 2 Gray, 
 314; Ch. Rule 8, of Mass. 
 
 dersnn v. Meyers (La.), 13 So. Rep. 191; Look- 
 out Bank v. Susong, 90 Tenn. 590; Ward v. 
 Parlin, 30 Neb. 376; American Bible Society v. 
 Price, 115 111. 623; Campbell v. Powers, 37 111. 
 App. 308; 139 111.128; Sawyer v. Campbell, 
 130 III. 186; Harrigan v. Bacon, 57 Vt. 644; 
 Smith i'. Sherman, 52 Mich. 637 ; Alexander 
 v. Taylor, 56 Ala. 60 ; Dougherty v. Murphy, 
 10 Phila. 509; Shorthill v. Ferguson, 47 Iowa, 
 284; Clough v. Adams, 71 id. 17; Church v. 
 Holcomb, 45 Mich. 29; Burtons. Schildbach, 
 id. 504; Furman v. North, 4 Baxter, 296; 
 Kelly v. Kershaw (Utah), 14 Pac. Rep. 804 ; 
 Jones v. Wadsworth, 11 Phila. 239; Brown r. 
 Rogers, 20 Neb. 547; Gwynn v. Butler, 17 
 Col. 114. In the Federal Courts, amendments 
 may be made as late as elsewhere, and the 
 Equity Rules on the subject do not apply when 
 the case has been heard. See Neale v. Neales, 
 9 Wall. 1; Battler. Mut. Ins. Co. 10 Blatch. 
 417 ; Lichtenauer v. Cheney, 3 McCrary, 119 ; 
 Collinson r. Jackson, 14 Fed. Rep. 305 ; Mills 
 v. Scott, 43 id. 452; Henry v. Travellers' Ins. 
 Co. 45 id. 299; Claflin v. Bennett, 51 id. 693.
 
 AMENDING THE BILL. 
 
 418 
 
 in order that the plaintiff might have an opportunity to re-amend his bill 
 by inserting it. 1 
 
 Usually, amendments are allowed at the hearing only for the purpose 
 of making the record complete as to parties, or adapting the prayer to 
 the case made by the bill. 2 Upon the question of allowing amendments 
 for other purposes at the hearing, it has been observed : 8 "It is impos- 
 sible to lay down any general rule ; all depends upon the circumstances ; 
 but. speaking generally, I should say that leave should be given where 
 the matters proposed to be introduced are connected with the matters in 
 issue, but should be refused where it is not so." 4 (a) Thus, where a mat- 
 
 1 Harding v. Cox, 3 Atk. 583. 
 
 2 Watts v. Hyde, 2 Phil. 406, 411; 11 Jur. 
 979; and see Bellamy v. Sabine, 2 Phil. 425, 
 447. 
 
 8 Per Sir George Turner L. J. in Lord Darn- 
 ley v. London, Chatham, and Dover Rv. Co. 
 9 Jur. N. S. 452, 453; 11 W. R. 388^ 391; 
 1 De G. J. & S. 204, 219, 220; and see Gossop 
 v. Wright, 9 Jur. N. S. 592; 11 W. R. 632, V. 
 C. K. 
 
 4 In Walker v. Armstrong, 8 De G. M. & 
 G. 531 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 959, however, the L. JJ. 
 allowed a bill to be amended at the hearing, by 
 raising an entirely new case, namely, the recti- 
 fication of a deed. See also Budding p. Mur- 
 doch, 1 Ch. D. 42. See for instances of nmend- 
 
 (a) An amendment will not be allowed to 
 create a new case or ground of suit uncon- 
 nected with the matters in issue, against the 
 same or new parties. See Clark v. Wray, 31 
 Ch. D. 08; Rushbrooke v. Farley, 54 L. J." Ch. 
 1079; Blenkhorn v. Penrose, 43 L. T. 668; 
 Clarke v. Yorke, 47 L. T. 381; Richmond v. 
 Irons, 121 U. S. 27; Jones v. Van Doren. 130 
 U. S. 684; Oglesby v. Attrill, 14 Fed. Rep. 214; 
 Imperial Refining Co. v. Wyman, 38 id. 574; 
 New Mexico Land Co. v. Elkins, 20 id. 545; 
 Nichols V. Scranton Steel Co. 137 N. Y. 471; 
 Pickens v. Knisely, 29 W. Va. 1 ; Seborn v. Beck- 
 with, 30 W.Va. 774; Thompson v. Corrie, 57 Md. 
 197 ; Hart v. Henderson, 66 Ga. 568; De Lacy 
 v. Hurst, 83 Ga. 223; Halcomb v. Kelly, 57 
 Texas, 618; Marshall v. Olds, 86 Ala. 296; 
 Johnson v. Durner, 88 Ala. 580; Seals v. Pheif- 
 fer, 81 Ala. 518; Ward v. Patton, 75 Ala. 207; 
 Alabama Warehouse Co. v. Jones, 62 Ala. 550; 
 Hawkins v. Pearson (Ala.), 11 So. Rep. 304; 
 Jones v. Reese, 65 Ala. 134; Smith v. Coleman, 
 59 Ala. 200; Planters' Ins. Co. v. Selma Sav- 
 ings Bank, 63 Ala. 585; Drew v. Beard, 107 
 Mass. 64; Hogan v. McFarland, 6 Baxter, 104; 
 Tappan v. Western & A. R. Co. 3 Lea (Tenn.), 
 106; Hampton v. Quayle, 12 R. I. 508; National 
 Bank of Commerce v. Smith, 17 R. I. 244; 
 Miles v. Strong, 60 Conn. 393; Livingston v. 
 Hayes, 43 Mich. 129; McMann v. Wescott, 
 47 Mich. 177 ; Clough v. Adams, 71 Iowa, 
 
 ment at the hearing, Neale v. Neales, 9 Wall. 
 1; Armstrong t;. Ross, 20 N. J. Eq. 109; Elmer 
 v. Loper, 25 id. 475; Ogden v. Thornton. 30 N. 
 J. Eq. 569; Hewitt v. Dement, 57 111. 500; 
 Drew v. Beard, 107 Mass. 64 ; Rhea v. Puryear, 
 26 Ark. 344; Perkins v. Hays, Cooke, 189; 
 Coffman v. Langston, 21 Graft. 263. After 
 hearing. Hampton v. Nicholson, 23 N. J. Eq. 
 423. And. in a peculiar case, after decree. The 
 Tremole Patent, 23 Wall. 518. Amendment 
 will be allowed after the trial of an issue. 
 Powell v. Mayo, 26 N. J. Eq. 120. See, how- 
 ever, Clews v. Brunswick R. Co. 50 Ga. 522; 
 Curtis v. Goodenow, 24 Mich. 18 ; Munch v. 
 Shabell, 37 Mich. 166. 
 
 17; Randall v. Christianson (Iowa), 51 N. W. 
 Rep. 253 ; Clements v. Lampkin, 34 Ark. 
 598; Brooks v. Spann, 63 Miss. 198; Hardie 
 ?'. Bulger, 66 Miss. 577; Kennerty v. Etiwau 
 Phosphate Co. 21 S. C. 226. This objection 
 may be waived by filing an answer. Wit- 
 kowski v. Hern, 82 Cal. 604. So there cannot 
 be an entire change of defendants by amend- 
 ment. Hall v. School District No. i, 36 Mo. 
 App. 21; Western Ry. v. McCall, 89 Ala. 375; 
 Howes v. Patterson, 76 Ga. 089. But a bill 
 may be amended by substituting a defendant 
 for the plaintiff when the latter has no interest. 
 Smith v. Hadley, 64 N. H. 97. Under the 
 Codes, the Court may, in its discretion, allow, 
 upon just terms, an amendment which states a 
 different ground of suit, if the original plead- 
 ing shows a good cause of suit. Reagan t>. 
 Evans (Texas), 21 S. W. Rep. 427; Hit in- v. 
 Dayton, 22 N. Y. S. 154. An amendment to a 
 bill which merely anticipates the defence is not 
 demurrable as stating a new and different case. 
 Brooks v. Spann, 63 Miss. 198. 
 
 The proposed amendment must also be con- 
 sistent with the original bill, especially when 
 the bill is required to be sworn to, as in injunc- 
 tion bills. Rogers ?'. Rogers, 1 Paige, 424; Og- 
 den v. Moore, 95 Mich. 290; 54 N. W. Rep. 899; 
 Hill v. Hill, 53 Vt. 578; Shenandoah Valley R. 
 Co. v. Griffith, 76 Va. 913. In Georgia, a sworn 
 bill may be amended in its praver and bv adding 
 
 '419
 
 418 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 ter has not been put in issue with sufficient precision, the Court has, 
 upon hearing the cause, given the plaintiff liberty to amend the bill for 
 the purpose of making the necessary alteration. 5 
 
 Wherever improper submissions have been made in a bill on behalf 
 of infants, the Court will, at the hearing, order that the bill shall be 
 amended, by striking out the submission. 6 Upon the same principle, 
 
 6 Ld. Red. 326; Filkin v. Hill, 4 Bro. P. C. 
 ed. Toml. 640; nam. Hill v. Eyre, 1 De G. J. 
 & S. 217, 218, 220; and see observations of 
 L. J. Turner on this case, in Lord Darnley v. 
 London, Chatham, and Dover Ry. Co. 9 Jur. 
 N. S. 452; 11 W. R. 391; see "also Watts v. 
 Lord Eglinton, 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 423; 
 Knox v. Gye, 9 Jur. N. S. 1277, V. C. W. ; 12 
 W. R. 1125, L. JJ.; Forbes v. Stevens, 10 Jur. 
 N. S. 861, V. C. W".; 4 N. R. 386, L. JJ.; 
 Firth v. Kidley, id. 415, L. JJ.; Hume v. Po- 
 
 a new plaintiff, without swearing to the amend- 
 ment. Livingston v. Marshall, 82 Ga. 281 ; 
 Shannon v. Fechheimer, 76 Ga. 86. If a ma- 
 terial amendment to a complaint is not veri- 
 fied, the complaint may be treated as unverified. 
 Brown v. Rhinehart," 112 N. C. 772, 775. If 
 an amendment is stricken out for inconsist- 
 ency, a second amendment, though inconsistent 
 with the first, may be allowed, if consistent 
 •with the original bill. Seals v. Pheiffer, 81 
 Ala. 518. Amendments will be rejected when 
 it is clear that they will prove ineffectual or 
 immaterial. See Yorkshire Ry. Wagon Co. v. 
 Maclure, 19 Ch. D. 478, 489; Hicks v. Oliver, 
 17 Fed. Rep. 539; Steinhauser v. Spraul (Mo.), 
 21 S. W. Rep, 515; or when they aim to add 
 improper parties. Tyler v. Galloway, 13 Fed. 
 Rep. 477. The right to amend may be lost by 
 laches. Kurtz v. Spence, 36 Ch. D. 770; Jones 
 v Welling, 16 Fed. Rep. 655 ; Dederick v. Farqu- 
 har, 39 id. 346; Bauers's Estate, 13 Phila. 391; 
 Picquet v. Augusta, 64 Ga. 516. Fre«h claims, 
 barred by limitation since the writ was issued, 
 cannot be set up by amendment. Weldon v. 
 Neal, 19 Q. B. D. 394; Steward v. North Met. 
 Tramways Co. 16 id. 178, 556 ; Judson v. Courier 
 Co. 25 Fed. Rep. 705; Sanger v. Newton, 134 
 Mass. 308 ; Bray v. Creekmore, 109 N. C. 49 ; Gar- 
 lington v. Copeland, 32 S. C. 57, 601 ; Winston 
 v. Mitchell, 93 Ala. 554; Adams v. Phillips, 75 
 Ala. 461; Green v. Tippah County Supervisors, 
 58 Miss. 337. Thus, the plaintiff, suing as 
 assignee, cannot amend by adding the assignor 
 as a party to entitle him to sue, thereby taking 
 away from the defendant the defence of the 
 Statute of Limitations by which the remedy 
 was barred between the date of the writ and 
 the application to amend. Hudson v. Ferny- 
 hough, 61 L. T. 722; see also Wood v. Met'n 
 Life Ins. Co. (Mich.) 56 N. W. Rep. 8 ; Par- 
 420 
 
 cock, L. R. 1 Eq. 662; 12 Jur. N. S. 223, V. 
 C. S. ; Trappes v. Meredith, L. R. 9 Eq. 229; 
 L. R. 10 Eq. 604 ; L. R. 7 Ch. 248 ; see Conal- 
 ley v. Peck, 3 Cal. 75; McDougald v. Willi- 
 ford, 14 Ga. 665; Midmer v. Midmer, 26 N. J. 
 Eq. 299. For form of orders to amend at the 
 hearing, see Seton, 1113, Nos. 1, 2; and see id. 
 1114-1116. 
 
 6 Serle v. St. Eloy, 2 P. Wras. 386, ante, 
 p. 77. 
 
 sons Water Co. v. Hill (Kansas). 26 Pac. Rep. 
 412. 
 
 If the amended bill merely varies the allega- 
 tions as to the same matters which are already 
 within the lis pendens, the statute still ceases to 
 run after the time of filing the original bill. 
 Winston v. Mitchell, 93 Ala. 554; see Rich- 
 mond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27. An amendment 
 to a bill for redemption, where the facts author- 
 ized a redemption, though the period therefor 
 had passed, was permitted in Burgess v. Graf- 
 fam, 10 Fed. Rep. 216; see Hibernia Co. v. 
 Jones, 89 Cal. 507. The fact that the amend- 
 ment was not made until the statutory period 
 had expired is not fatal, when the answer recites 
 and admits the facts averred in the amendment 
 which takes the case out of the statute. John- 
 son v. Waters, 111 U. S. 640. 
 
 The addition or striking out of one plaintiff's 
 name does not create a different cause of action. 
 Wyman v. Wilcox, 63 Vt. 487; Metz v. Wood, 
 39 111. App. 131. But a complete change of 
 parties plaintiff has that effect and will not be 
 allowed by amendment. Clements v. Green- 
 well, 40 Mo. App. 589; Liebmann v. McGraw, 
 3 Wash. St. 320; see Murphy v. Gibbs, 107 
 N. C. 303. 
 
 Allegations of an amended bill or complaint 
 are admitted, if not denied by the amended 
 answer. Putnam v. Lyon (Col.), 32 Pac. Rep. 
 492. An amended statement of claim will not 
 be stricken out, when the defendant has al- 
 ready answered to the same cause of action, on 
 the ground that it shows no reasonable cause of 
 suit. Jenkins v. Rees, 33 W. R. 929. A neces- 
 sary but omitted allegation, as to which the 
 hearing is had as if it were not omitted, may, 
 in New York, be amended on appeal without 
 being remanded. Bowland v. Sprauls, 21 N. 
 Y. S. 895.
 
 AMENDING THE BILL. 
 
 *419 
 
 where an infant heir-at-law had been made a co-plaintiff, Lord Redes- 
 dale ordered the cause to stand over, with liberty to the plaintiff to 
 amend his bill, by making the heir-at-law a defendant; 7 and where 
 a matter has not been put, by the bill, properly in issue, to the pre- 
 judice of an infant, the Court has generally ordered the bill to be 
 amended. 8 
 
 The Court has even gone to the extent of allowing the plaintiffs, at 
 the hearing of an appeal, to amend their bill, by converting it from a 
 bill into an information and bill, or information only. 9 
 
 *But, although the Court will sometimes, at the hearing, allow * 419 
 the cause to stand over, with liberty for the plaintiff to amend 
 his bill, the plaintiff ought to be careful, before the cause comes on, to 
 have the record in a proper state, so as to enable the Court to make a 
 complete decree : for the plaintiff himself cannot, when the cause comes 
 on for hearing (unless under particular circumstances, or with the con- 
 sent of the defendant), obtain leave to amend his bill, even upon the 
 usual terms of paying the costs of the day ; * and if a decree were to be 
 obtained upon pleadings which are defective in a material point, it would 
 afterwards be liable to be set aside for error. 2 
 
 It frequently happens that, upon the argument of a demurrer, the 
 Court, where the ground for demurrer can be removed by amendment, 
 has, in order to avoid putting the plaintiff to the expense of filing a new 
 bill instead of deciding upon the demurrer, given the plaintiff liberty 
 to amend his bill, on payment of the costs incurred by the defendant; 3 
 because, after a demurrer allowed to the whole bill, the bill is so com- 
 pletely out of Court that no amendment can take place : 4 and where the 
 
 1 Plunket v. Joice, 2 Sch. & Lef. 159. 
 
 « Ld. Red. 327. 
 
 9 President of St. Mary Magdalen College 
 v. Sibthorp, 1 Russ. 154; ante, p. 12. Leave 
 will be granted to amend in the Court of 
 Appeals, if it there be found necessary, in 
 order to let in the whole merits of the case. 
 Lenoir v. Winn, 4 Desaus. 65; Rodgers v. 
 Jones, 1 M'Cord Ch. 226; MeKim v. Odom, 
 3 Bland, 407 ; Drummond v. Magruder, 9 
 Cranch, 122 ; Lewis v. Darling, 16 Howard, 
 U. S. 1. If the record shows substance by 
 which to amend. Darlington's Appeal, 86 
 Penn. St. 512; Edmund's Appeal, 68 id. 24; 
 Kuhl v. Martin, 29 N. J. Eq 586; Thurmand 
 v. Clark, 47 Ga. 500. But not upon facts out- 
 side of the record, brought forward by affidavit 
 or petition. Fogg v. Union Bank, 4 Baxt. 418. 
 a decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
 recognized and repeated in MiKinlev t». Sherry, 
 at Jackson, in April, 1879. See also Black v. 
 Delaware &c. Canal Co. 24 N. J. Eq. 455, 
 482. A petition in Chancery in Connecticut 
 can be amended after the facts in the case have 
 been found by a committee. Camp v. Waring, 
 25 Conn. 520. 
 
 1 Leave may be granted to amend the 
 prayer of the bill after hearing. Clifton v. 
 
 Haig, 4 Desaus. 330. If a formal charge of 
 fraud were necessary, but had been omitted, 
 the Court would give leave to amend even 
 at the hearing. Wamburzee v. Kennedy, 4 
 Desaus. 480. 
 
 2 Wyatt's P. R. 299. As to obtaining leave 
 to amend at the hearing of an interlocutory 
 application, see Barnett v. Noble, 1 J. & W. 
 227; Pare v. Clegg, 7. Jur. N. S. 1136; 9 
 W. R. 216, M. R. 
 
 8 See Marshall v. Lovelass, Cam. & Nor. 
 239, 264; Benzien v. Lovelass, id. 520; Holli- 
 day v. Riordon, 12 Ga. 417. After a special 
 demurrer to a bill, the plaintiff may have leave 
 to amend, on payment of costs. Rose v. King, 
 4 Hen. & Munf. 475. So where a mere formal 
 objection to a bill was made by demurrer ore 
 tenia, the plaintiff was permitted to amend. 
 Garlick v. Strong, 3 Paige, 440. So also upon 
 the allowance of a demurrer for want of equity, 
 upon the ground of a formal defect in the 
 bill. M'EIwain v. Willis, 3 Paige, 505; Hunt 
 v. Rousmaniere, 2 Mason, 342; Beauchamp v. 
 Gibbs, 1 Bibb, 483. See also Mass. Ch. Rule 
 21. 
 
 * Lord Coningsby v. Jekyll, 2 P. Wms. 300; 
 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 59, pi. 3; Smith v. Barnes, 
 1 Dick. 67; see also Mason t\ Lake. 2 Bro. P. C. 
 
 421
 
 *420 THE BILL. 
 
 demurrer is for want of parties, the Court, in general, annexes to the 
 order allowing the demurrer a direction that the plaintiff shall be at 
 liberty to amend his bill by adding parties thereto. 5 Where, previously 
 to the filing of a general demurrer, a notice of motion for an injunction 
 had been served, leave was given, on allowing the demurrer, to amend 
 within ten days, without prejudice to the notice of motion. 6 
 
 The Court, in allowing a plea, frequently gives leave to amend ; 7 
 * 420 * it must not, however, be understood that this is by any means 
 a matter of course, even where the plea covers only part of the 
 bill. 1 Leave to amend has also been given where a plea was overruled, 
 with leave to plead de novo. 2 ' After the allowance of a plea an order for 
 leave to amend the bill is special ; and, on the application for it, the 
 plaintiff must specify the amendment he intends to make. 8 
 
 It may be observed in this place, that where a plea for want of parties 
 was put in to a bill of discovery, which had been filed in aid of an eject- 
 ment at Law, on the ground that the trustees in whom the legal estate 
 was vested were not co-plaintiffs with the cestui que trusts, and upon 
 argument a case was directed for the opinion of a Court of Law, but the 
 parties not being able to agree upon the case, the plaintiffs moved for 
 leave to amend the bill by adding the trustees as co-plaintiffs, Lord 
 Eldon refused the motion, as being irregular while the judgment on the 
 plea was pending. 4 Afterwards, however, upon the plaintiffs moving 
 that the Vice-Chancellor's order, directing the case to be stated, might 
 be discharged, and that the plaintiffs might be at liberty to amend their 
 bill, by the introduction of facts to show that the legal estate was in the 
 trustees, and that there was a count in the declaration in ejectment on 
 the demise of such trustees, the Lord Chancellor made such an order 
 but upon condition of the plaintiffs consenting to the plea being 
 
 allowed. 5 
 
 It seems that, where a plea has been replied to, the plaintiff may, in 
 some cases, have leave to withdraw his replication and amend, but that 
 such leave is not a matter of course, and can only be obtained on a 
 special application ; 6 and, therefore, where an order to withdraw replica- 
 tion to a plea, and to amend, was obtained on a motion of course, it was 
 
 ed. Toml. 495, 497; Bressenden v. Decreets, without costs, of plea of defendant's bank- 
 
 2 Ch. Cas. 197; Lloyd v. Loaring, 6 Ves. 773, ruptcy. Jones v. Bums, 33 Beav. 362; 10 Jur. 
 
 779. A different rule prevails in Massachu- N. S. 119. 
 
 setts. Merchants' Bank of Newburyport v. » Taylor v. Shaw, 2 S. & S. 12; Neck v. 
 
 Stevenoon 7 Allen, 491 ; see post, note to section, Gains, 1 De G. & S. 223 ; 11 Jur. 763 ; see also 
 
 " Of the Effect of allowing Demurrers." Cons. Ord. XIV. 16; and post, Chap. XV. § 5, 
 
 G And this is the proper decree. Gray v. Pleas. 
 
 Hays. 7 Humph. 588. As to the time allowed 2 Chadwick v. Broadwood, 3 Beav. 316; 5 
 
 to amend, where a demurrer or plea to the Jur. 359. 
 
 whole or part of a bill is not set down, see 3 Taylor v. Shaw. 2 S. & S. 12 ; Neck v. 
 
 Con« Ord XIV. 14, 15. 17; <mte. p. 373. Gains. 1 De G. & S. 223; 11 Jur. 763. 
 
 6 Rawlings v. Lambert, 1 J. & H. 458; * Lord Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton, 2 
 
 Harding v. Tingey, 10 Jur. N. S. 872; 12 W. Mer. 71. 
 
 R. 703 V. C. K. 5 Ibid. 74. 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 281 : Dovle r. Muntz, 5 Hare, 6 Carleton v. L'Estrange, T. & R. 23; Bar- 
 
 509, 518; 10 Jur. 914; Tudway v. Jones, 1 K. nett v. Grafton, 8 Sim. 72; and see Cons. Ord. 
 
 & J. 691; and see Barnett v. Grafton, 8 Sim. XIV. 18. 
 72. Leave to amend given after allowance, 
 422 

 
 AMENDING THE BILL. * 421 
 
 discharged for irregularity, and the amended bill was ordered to be taken 
 off the file. 7 
 
 After the plaintiff has obtained an order to amend, he has, in all cases 
 in which no other time is limited by such order, fourteen days 
 after the date of the order, within which he may amend his * bill. 1 * 421 
 If he does not amend within the time limited, or within the four- 
 teen days, the order becomes void, and the cause, as to dismissal, stands 
 in the same situation as if such order had not been made. 2 The fact of 
 the plaintiff not making his amendment within this period will not, how- 
 ever, preclude him from obtaining another similar order of course to 
 amend, upon the same terms, if the original order was obtained before 
 any answer was put in. 8 
 
 If the plaintiff is unable to amend the bill within the time limited by 
 the order to amend, or, if no time is thereby limited, within the fourteen 
 days, he should apply by summons, before the time has expired, for an 
 enlargement of the time. 4 The summons must be served on all the 
 defendants who have appeared to the bill ; and the order is drawn up 
 at Chambers. 6 
 
 In a proper case, an order may also be obtained, on a summons served 
 in like manner, 6 to enlarge the time allowed by the General Orders of 
 the Court, to obtain an order to amend. 7 The order is drawn up at 
 Chambers. 8 The usual course, however, is to obtain the common order 
 within due time, and then to apply, before the fourteen days have ex- 
 pired, for an extension of time to amend under it. 
 
 In computing the time for amending the bill, the times of vacation are 
 not to be reckoned : 9 if therefore the time would expire in vacation, and 
 it is intended to deprive the plaintiff of this advantage, the order should 
 be so framed as to direct the amendment to be made on or before some 
 specified day. 
 
 When an order to amend has been irregularly made, the defendant 
 may move on notice to discharge it : 10 it will, however, be considered as 
 
 1 Carleton v. L'Estrange, ubi supra ; Metro- ever, where the plaintiff had excepted. Dolly v. 
 
 politan Bank v. Offord, L. R. 10 Eq. 398. It Challin, 11 Beav. 61. The service of an order 
 
 has been held that, as Rule 29 of the U. S. to amend does not prevent the defendant from 
 
 Circuit Court makes no provision for amending filing his answer. Mackerell v. Fisher, 14 Sim. 
 
 a bill after issue joined and depositions taken, 604; 9 Jur. 574. 
 
 it is to be construed as prohibiting it, at least * Cons. Ord. IX. 17, 24; Cons. Ord. 
 
 except under very special circumstances. Ross XXXIII. 11 ; Dolly v. Chtillin, ubi supra ; Bain- 
 
 v. Carpenter, 6 McLean, 382 ; but see ante, p. 418, brigge v. Baddeley, 12 Beav. 152, 154 ; 13 Jur. 
 
 n. 4. 997. For form of summons, see Vol. III. 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. IX. 17. This order applies to 6 For form of order, see Vol. III. 
 all orders to amend, whether of course or 6 Ibid. 
 
 special. See Cridland v. Lord de Mauley, 2 7 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 17, 18; see Potts v. 
 
 De G. & S. 560; 12 Jur. 1015; Armistead v. Whitmore, 10 Beav. 177, 179. 
 
 Durham, 11 Beav. 428; 13 Jur. 330; Bain- 8 For a form, see Vol. III. 
 
 brigge v. Baddeley, 12 Beav. 152 ; 13 Jur. 997. » Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 13 (1); R. S. C. 
 
 These cases were decided on the former orders; LVII. 5. For times of vacation, see ante, 
 
 in the existing orders, the words have been p. 412. 
 
 somewhat altered, apparently to meet this 10 Potts v Whitmore, 10 Beav. 177; Horsley 
 
 question. For a case on the present orders, see v. Fawcett, id. 191; Peile v. Stoddart, 11 id. 
 
 Tampier v. Ingle, 1 N. R. 159, V. C. K. 591; Bainbrigge v. Baddeley, 12 Beav. 152; 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. IX. 24. Bennett V. Honeywood, 1 W. R. 490, V. C. K. 
 
 3 Nicholson v. Peile, 2 Beav. 497; see, how- For form of notice of motion, see Vol. III. 
 
 423
 
 *422 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 valid until it has been discharged ; u and the irregularity will be waived 
 
 if the defendant accept costs under it. 12 
 * 422 * An order to amend, whether of course or special, should be 
 served, without delay, on such of the defendants as have appeared 
 to the bill, either in person or by their solicitors: as the order only 
 operates from the time of service. 1 
 
 If the amendments extend, in any one place, to 180 words, or two 
 folios, 2 or if the bill has been so often amended that the amendment to 
 be inserted cannot be interlined on the record, or is so considerable as 
 to blot or deface it, a reprint of the bill will be necessary. 3 
 
 The draft of the amended bill is settled and signed by counsel ; * and 
 in addition to the signature of counsel, the draft of an amended infor- 
 mation, or the reprint, if there be one, must be signed by the Attorney- 
 General : 5 otherwise, the defendant may move that it be taken off the 
 file. 6 Before signing the amended information, the Attorney-General 
 requires a certificate from the counsel who settled it that the amend- 
 ments are proper for his sanction. 7 The same rules, as regards reprint- 
 ing, apply to informations as to bills. 
 
 If a reprint of the bill is not required, the Kecord and Writ Clerk 
 will insert the amendments in the record, on the draft amended bill, 
 signed by counsel, being left with him, together with the order directing 
 
 n Blake v. Blake, 7 Beav. 514; Chuck v. 
 Cremer, 2 Phil. 113: C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 
 338 ; see R. S. C. LIX. 
 
 12 Tarleton v. Dyer, 1 R. & M. 1, 6; King of 
 Spain v. Hullett, id. 7, n.; see also Kendall v. 
 Beckett, 1 Russ. 152 ; Bramston v. Carter, 
 2 Sim. 458. 
 
 i Price t>. Webb, 2 Hare, 515; Vanderbeck 
 v. Perry, 30 N. J. Eq. 81. 
 
 2 A folio for this purpose is ninety words. 
 Braithwaite's Pr. 305, n. 
 
 3 Cons. Ord. IX. 18 ; Stone v. Davies, 3 
 De G. M. & G. 240; 17 Jur. 585. A bill can- 
 not be amended by partly printed and partly 
 written alterations. Naylor v. Wright, 7 De G. 
 M. & G. 403; 3 Jur. N. S. 95. As to bills 
 filed before 2d November, 1852, the old prac- 
 tice as to amending them continues. Cons. 
 Ord. IX. 23. Reprint required where the 
 amendments, although under two folios in any 
 one place, would have rendered the bill very 
 difficult to read; the Clerks of Records and 
 Writs have a discretion. John v. Lloyd. L. R. 
 
 1 Ch. 64; 11 Jur. N. S. 898. In Pierce v. 
 West, 3 Wash. C. C. 354, it is held, that the 
 amendment should be by a separate bill, and 
 not by interlining the original bill. So in 
 Walsh v. Smyth, 3 Bland, 9, 21. This, however, 
 is not the practice in all cases. See Luce v. 
 Graham, 4 John. Ch. 170; Willis v. Evans, 
 
 2 B. & B. 225 ; State Bank v. Reeder, Halst. 
 N. J. Dig. 172. By these cases it appears that 
 if there be not much new matter to be intro- 
 duced, it is to be done by interpolation; but if 
 much, it is to be done on another engrossment, 
 
 424 
 
 to be annexed to the bill, in order to preserve 
 the record from being defaced. The plaintiff 
 may, however, set forth in the amended bill all 
 the charges of the original bill. Fitzpatrick v. 
 Power, 1 Hogan, 24; but see Walsh r. Smyth, 
 3 Bland. 9, 21; Luce v. Graham, 4 John. Ch. 
 170; Willis v. Evans, 2 B. & B. 225. In Walsh 
 v. Smyth, ubi supra, it was held that the 
 original bill should be recited in the amended 
 bill no further than is necessary to iniroduce 
 the amendments, so as to avoid impertinency. 
 See also Luce v. Graham, ubi supra ; Benning- 
 ton Iron Co v. Campbell, 2 Paige, 159; Pierce 
 r. West, 3 Wash. C. C. 354. When amend- 
 ments are made to a bill, if the plaintiff file or 
 serve an entire new bill, incorporating therein 
 as well the original matter as the amendments, 
 he must distinctly designate the amendments 
 in the new bill. Bennington Iron Co. v. Camp- 
 bell, 2 Paige, 159; See also Hunt v. Holland, 
 3 Paige, 82; Luce v. Graham, 4 John. Ch. 170. 
 Where, after a hearing, a bill was amended, in 
 order to bring in a new party, but no new fact 
 was stated, it was held unnecessary to serve 
 process anew upon the defendant. Longworth 
 v. Taylor, 1 McLean, 514. 
 
 4 Ante, p. 312; Cons. Ord. VIII. 1,2; see 
 Kirkley v. Burton, 5 Mad. 378. The amend- 
 ments should be carefully distinguished. 
 Braithwaite's Pr. 304. 
 
 5 Braithwaite's Pr. 25, 309. 
 
 6 Att.-Gen. v. Fellows, 1 J. & W. 254; 
 for forms of notice of motion, see Vol III. 
 
 1 For form of certificate, see Vol. III.
 
 AMENDING THE BILL. * 423 
 
 the amendments, and a prcecipe ; 8 and the draft and order will be after- 
 wards returned on application. Where a reprint is necessary, 
 the amended bill must be printed and filed * in the manner before * 41'3 
 explained in treating of original bills ; * and a like fee is payable 
 on filing the amended bill. 2 The order to amend must be produced at 
 the time the reprint is filed. 
 
 The record of the bill, when amended, is marked with the date of the 
 order, and the day on which the amendment is made ; 8 an entry of 
 the amendment, and of the date of making it, and of the order, is made 
 in the Kecord and Writ Clerks' book ; and the amended bill is deemed 
 to be filed at and from the date of making the amendment. 4 
 
 The like course is pursued where the bill requires to be re-amended. 5 
 Where the order to amend is made upon payment of costs, or where, 
 by the course of the Court, fixed costs are payable on amendment, 6 such 
 costs should be paid or tendered before any further proceedings are 
 had : 7 (a) otherwise, the defendant may apply to the Court to stay such 
 proceedings until the plaintiff has fulfilled the condition, by making the 
 required payment ; 8 and if default is made in the payment of the costs, 
 the action may be dismissed with costs. 9 The sum of 20s. being 
 frequently very inadequate to remunerate the defendant for the expense 
 incurred by the plaintiff amending his bill, it has been provided by the 
 General Orders of the Court, that where a plaintiff is directed to pay to 
 the defendant the costs of the suit, the costs occasioned to a defendant 
 by any amendment of the bill shall be deemed to be part of such de- 
 fendant's costs in the cause (except as to any amendment which may 
 have been made by special leave of the Court, or which shall appear to 
 have been rendered necessary by the default of such defendant) ; but 
 there shall be deducted from such costs any sum which may have been 
 paid by the plaintiff, according to the course of the Court, at the time of 
 any amendment ; 10 and that where, upon taxation, a plaintiff who has 
 
 8 For a form, see Vol. III. The fee is 10s. « Ante, p. 411. 
 
 Braithwaite's Pr. 305. 7 See Thomas v. Taylor, 14 \V. R. 493, L. JJ. 
 
 1 Ante, p. 396, et seq. ; 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 8. 8 Breeze v. English, 2 Hare, 638. The costs 
 
 2 Hegul. to Ord. Sched. IV.; Braithwaite's of a demurrer prepared, but not filed, at the 
 Pr. 305. time of amending the bill, will be costs in the 
 
 3 Thus: Amended day of ,186 — , cause. Bainbrigge v. Moss, 3 K. & J. 62; 3 
 
 by order dated day of , 186 — . Jur. N. S. 107. The costs are usually paid at 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. IX. 19. the time the order to amend is served. 
 
 3 A plaintiff who has amended his bill by '■> White v. Bromige, 26 W. K. 312; for or- 
 
 special leave may obtain an order of course to ders, see 2 Seton, 1539, 1540, 1542. 
 
 re-amend upon the answer to the amended bill 10 Cons. Ord. XL. 7. 
 coming in. Dunn v. Ferrior, L. K. 8 Eq. 248; 
 ante, p. 412, n. 1. 
 
 (a) By the present English practice, a mo- are paid, is irregular, the proper course being 
 
 tion by a defendant, who wishes to treat an to apply, within eight days, that the amend- 
 
 amendment by the plaintiff as an abandon- ment be disallowed, or allowed upon terms as 
 
 inent of the suit, and the commencement of a to costs, under the Rules of 1883, Ord XXVIII. 
 
 new one, that the plaintiff be ordered to pay Rules 4, 13. Bourne v. Coulter, 53 L. J. Ch. 
 
 his costs to the time of the amendment, and 199, treating Blackmore v. Edwards, W. N. 
 
 that all proceedings be staved until such costs (1879) 175, as superseded by Rule 13. 
 
 425
 
 *424 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 obtained a decree with costs, is not allowed the costs of any amendment 
 of the bill upon the ground of its having been unnecessarily made, the 
 defendant's costs, occasioned by such amendment, shall be taxed, and 
 the amount thereof deducted from the costs to be paid by the defendant 
 to the plaintiff. 11 
 
 If the plaintiff amends his bill after he has obtained an injunction, 
 it is usual, although not indispensable, for the order giving 
 *424 *him liberty to amend, to be expressed to be "without prejudice 
 to the injunction ; " and the order of course to amend may be 
 obtained in this form. 1 Where, however, an injunction had been ob- 
 tained until answer or further order, in a suit by a sole plaintiff, it was 
 held that the injunction was dissolved by adding a co-plaintiff, under an 
 order to amend in which those words were not inserted. 2 
 
 A writ of ne exeat regno is not lost by a subsequent amendment of the 
 bill'; it is, therefore, unnecessary that the order should be expressed to 
 be without prejudice to the writ. 3 
 
 Where a motion for an injunction had been, by arrangement, turned 
 into a motion for decree, times being fixed for the filing of affidavits on 
 both sides, and the defendant undertaking not to do certain specified 
 acts until the hearing, it was held that the plaintiff, by amending his bill 
 after the time fixed for filing his affidavits, broke the terms of the 
 arrangement, and the defendant was accordingly discharged from his 
 undertaking. 4 
 
 If the plaintiff amends his bill after he has given a notice of a motion 
 
 11 Cons. Ord. XL. 8. 
 
 i Mason v. Murray, 2 Dick. 536; Warbur- 
 ton v. London and Blackwall Ry. Co. 2 Beav. 
 253; Woodroffe v. Daniel, 9 Sim. 410; see Ken- 
 nedy v. Lewis, 14 Jur. 166; Seton, 873, V. C. 
 K. B. ; see also Ferrand v. Hamer, 4 M. & C. 
 143, 145; 3 Jur. 236 ; Pratt v. Archer, 1S.&S. 
 433; Pickering v. Hansom, 2 Sim. 488; Ren- 
 wick v. Wilson, 6 John. Ch. 81; Avers v. Val- 
 entine, 2 Edw. Ch. 451; Lanning v. Heath, 25 
 N. J. Eq. 425. An injunction bill will not be 
 amended unless the proposed amendments are 
 distinctly stated to the Court, and verified by 
 the oath of the plaintiff; nor unless a sufficient 
 excuse is rendered for not incorporating them 
 in the original bill. Rogers v. Rogers, 1 Paige, 
 424; Carey v. Smith, 11 Ga. 539; see West v. 
 Coke, 1 Murphy, 191. In Massachusetts, by 
 Ch. Rule 20, " no amendments shall be allowed, 
 as of course, to a bill which has been sworn to 
 by the party." And so, generally, where the 
 bill is upon oath, there is greater caution exer- 
 cised in reference to amendments. Cock v. 
 Evans, 9 Yertrer, 287 ; Verplanck v Merct. Ins. 
 Co. 1 Edw. Ch. 46 ; Swift i>. Eckford, 6 Paige, 
 22; Lloyd v. Brewster, 4 Paige, 538; Parker v. 
 Grant, 1 John. Ch. 434; Rogers r. Rogers, 1 
 Paige, 424; W T hitmarsh v. Campbell, 2 Paige, 
 67. And the Court may require the amend- 
 ments to any sworn bill to be themselves sworn 
 to. Semmes v. Boykin, 27 Ga. 47; see Latham 
 
 426 
 
 v. Wiswall, 2 Ired. Ch. 294 ; McDougald v. 
 Dougherty, 11 Ga. 570. The amendments 
 made to a sworn bill must be consistent with 
 the original bill ; and they must be made with- 
 out striking out any part of the original bill, 
 but by introducing a supplemental statement. 
 Verplanck v. Merct. Ins. Co. 1 Edw. Ch. 46; 
 Carey v. Smith, 11 Ga 539; Rogers v. Rogers, 
 1 Paige, 424; Whitmarsh v. Campbell. 2 Paige, 
 67. An application to strike an allegation from 
 a sworn bill, or to make alterations in it, should 
 be accompanied with affidavits to show how the 
 mistake occurred. North River Bank v. Rogers, 
 8 Paige, 648; Whitmarsh v. Campbell, 1 Paige, 
 67; Everett v. Winn, 1 Sm. & M. 67. And the 
 truth of the matter proposed as an amendment 
 should be sworn to in addition to the jurat upon 
 the petition for leave to amend. Rogers v. De 
 Forest, 3 Edw. Ch. 171. But no alteration 
 should be made in the original bill on file, 
 but the amended bill must be engrossed anew, 
 and annexed to the original. Layton v. Ivans, 
 1 Green Ch. 387; ante, pp. 401, 402, note. 
 
 2 Att.-Gen. v. Marsh, 16 Sim. 572; 13 Jur. 
 317 ; and see Sharp v. Ashton, 3 V. & B. 144; 
 King v. Turner, 6 Mad. 255; and post, Chap. 
 XXXVI. § 2, Injunctions. 
 
 3 Grant v. Grant, 5 Russ. 189; see post, 
 Chap. XXXVIII. § 4, Ne Exeat Regno. 
 
 * Clarke v. Clark, 13 W. R. 133, V. C. W.
 
 AMENDING THE BILL. 
 
 426 
 
 for an injunction, 5 or for a receiver, 6 he thereby waives the notice, 
 and must pay the defendant's costs of the motion. 7 * Where, after * 425 
 notice of motion for an injunction had been served, a general 
 demurrer to the bill was allowed, leave was given to amend, without 
 prejudice to the notice of motion. 1 
 
 Where a defendant is in contempt for want of answer, the plaintiff 
 will, if he amend his bill, be considered to have, by his own act, purged 
 the defendant's contempt ; 2 but where a defendant has been brought to 
 the bar of the Court for his contempt in not answering, and refuses or 
 neglects to answer (not being idiot, lunatic, or of unsound mind), the 
 Court may, upon motion or petition, of which due notice has been given 
 personally to the defendant, authorize the plaintiff to amend his bill, 
 without such amendment operating as a discharge of the contempt, or 
 rendering it necessary to proceed with the process of contempt de novo. z 
 
 The amendment of the bill, even for the purpose of rectifying a cleri- 
 cal error, renders a previous order to take the bill pro confesso inopera- 
 tive, 4 — unless the amendment was made in pursuance of an order 
 obtained under the Act last referred to. 
 
 If the plaintiff takes advantage of an order to amend, so as entirely 
 to change his case, and to make the bill a perfectly new one, 5 or if the 
 amendments introduced into the bill are not, in other respects, warranted 
 by the order to amend, the defendant may move, on notice to the plain- 
 tiff, that the amended bill may be taken off the file, or that the amend- 
 ments may be struck out, and the record restored to its original state ; 
 and that the plaintiff may be ordered to pay the defendant's costs occa- 
 sioned by the amendment, and of and consequent on the applica- 
 tion, or to place * the defendant in the same position with regard * 426 
 
 6 Martin v. Fust, 8 Sim. 199; Gouthwaite 
 
 v. Kippon, 1 Beav. 54 ; Monvpennv v. , 
 
 1 W. K. 99, V. C. K. 
 
 6 Smith v. Dixon, 12 W. R. 934, V. C. S. 
 For the present English practice, see 1 Dan. Ch. 
 Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 327-331. 
 
 7 Monypenny 0. , ubi supra ; London and 
 
 Blackwall Ry. Co. v. Limehouse Board of Works, 
 3 K. & J. 123; Smith v. Dixon, ubi supra. 
 
 1 Rawlings v Lambert, 1 J. & H. 458: and 
 see Harding v. Tingey, 10 Jur. N. S. 872; 12 
 W. R. 703, V. C. K. 
 
 a Ball v. Etches, 1 R. & M. 324; Gray v. 
 Campbell, id. 323. 
 
 3 11 Geo. IV. &1 Will. IV. c. 36, §15, r. 10; 
 and see post, Chap. X., Process to compel, and 
 in Default of A nswer. 
 
 4 Weightman v. Powell, 2 De G. & S. 570; 
 12 Jur 958. The effect of filing an amended 
 and supplemental bill is to vacate a pro confesso, 
 and to admit the defendant to answer also the 
 original bill. Gibson v. Rees, 50 111. 383. And 
 a bill substituted for an original bill must con- 
 tain all the material allegations necessary to 
 justify the relief sought without reference to the 
 original. Klein v. Horine. 47 111. 430. 
 
 5 A party under the privilege of amending, 
 
 shall not introduce matter which would con- 
 stitute a new bill. Verplanck v. Merct. Ins. 
 Co. 1 Edw. Ch. 46 ; Crabb v. Thomas, 25 Ala. 
 212; Lambert v. Jones, 2 P. & H. 144; Shields 
 v. Barrow, 17 How. (U. S.) 130; Fenno v. Coul- 
 ter, 14 Ark. 39: Carey v. Smith, 11 Ga. 539; 
 Snead v. McCoull, 12 How. (U. S ) 407; Hew- 
 ett v. Adams, 50 Maine, 271, 278. After a 
 decision upon a plea to the jurisdiction, that 
 a bill in Equity between members of a manu- 
 facturing corporation cannot be sustained, the 
 Court will not grant the plaintiff leave to amend, 
 by averring that the corporation hnd been dis- 
 solved ; this being in effect to make a new and 
 distinct case. Pratt v. Bacon, 10 Pick. 123. 
 Nor will the Court, where a vendee of land has 
 brought a bill for a rescission of the contract, 
 permit him to change the prayer of his bill and 
 claim a specific execution thereof. Shields V. 
 Barrow, 17 How. (U. S.) 130; Williams v. 
 Starke, 2 B. Mon. 196. 197. A second mortgagee 
 of land brought a bill against the first mort- 
 gagee, to redeem the first mortgage, and the 
 Court postponed the plaintiff's mortgage, on 
 account of misrepresentations made by him, so 
 as to let in and give priority to a subsequent 
 mortgage of a part of the same land to the 
 
 427
 
 427 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 to costs that he would have been in if the plaintiff, instead of amend- 
 ing, bad dismissed his original bill with costs, and filed a new one. 1 
 Thus, where a plaintiff originally filed his bill against the defendant 
 as his bailiff or agent, in respect of certain farms, praying an account 
 against him upon that footing, and afterwards, upon an issue being 
 directed to try whether the plaintiff was or was not a mortgagee of such 
 farms, and the jury finding that he was, the plaintiff amended his bill 
 by stating the mortgage, and converting his former prayer for relief into 
 a prayer for a foreclosure, — upon the defendant's moving that the 
 amended bill might be taken off the file, Lord Eldon held that the de- 
 fendant was entitled to all the costs sustained by him, beyond what he 
 would have been put to if the bill had been originally a bill for a fore- 
 closure, and made an order accordingly ; although, as the amended bill 
 had been set down for hearing, he did not go the length of ordering it to 
 be taken off the file. 2 
 
 Upon the same principle, where a plaintiff takes advantage of an order 
 to amend, to strike out a portion of his bill : though he does not alter 
 the nature of it, yet, if expenses have been occasioned to the defendant 
 by the part which has been struck out, which, in consequence of its 
 having been so struck out, could not be awarded to him at the hearing, 
 the Court will, upon motion, with notice, order such costs to be 
 * 427 taxed and paid to the defendant. 2 * Where, however, a bill was 
 
 defendant; the Court refused to grant leave 
 to the plaintiff to amend his bill for the pur- 
 pose of enabling him to proceed under it for 
 the redemption of such subsequent mortgage. 
 Piatt v. Squire, 5 Cush. 551. See Sanborn 
 v. Sanborn, 7 Gray, 142: Lambert v. Jones, 2 
 P. & H. 144. But in some cases it has been 
 held, that a plaintiff who has filed a bill for 
 specific performance of a contract mav, under 
 circumstances, amend his bill and pray for a 
 rescission of the contract, and for such other 
 relief as he may be entitled to. Parrill v. 
 McKinley, 9 Gratt. 1 ; Codington v. Mott, 14 
 N. J. Eq. 430; Hewett v. Adams, 50 Maine, 
 271. And see ante, p. 418. 
 
 i Bullock v. Perkins, 1 Dick. 110, 112; 
 Dent v. Wardel, id. 339; Smith v. Smith, G. 
 Coop. 141; Mayor v. Dry, 2 S. & S. 113, 116; 
 Att.-Gen. v. Cooper, 3 M. & C. 258, 262; 1 Jur. 
 790; Mounsey v. Burnham, 1 Hare, 15, -22; 
 Allen v. Spring, 22 Beav. 615; Thomas v. Ber- 
 nard, 7 W. R. 271, V. C. K. ; Eagle v. Le Breton, 
 cited Seton, 1254; and see Ainslie v. Sims, 17 
 Beav. 174; Parker v. Nickson, 4 Giff. 311; 9 
 Jur. N. S. 864; Barlow v. M' Murray, L. R. 2 
 Eq. 420. 424; 12 Jur. N. S. 519, V. C." S; Lloyd 
 v. Brewster, 4 Paige, 638; Steele r. Midland 
 Ry. Co. W. N. (1869) 51; R. S. C. Ord. 
 XXVII. 1. For form of order see Seton, 1253, 
 No. 10; and for forms of notice of motion, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 2 Smith v. Smith, ubi supra ; and see Mayor 
 v. Drv, and Parker v. Nickson, ubi supra ; see, 
 
 428 
 
 however, Allen v. Spring, ubi supra, where such 
 a motion was refused; and it seems it will only 
 be granted, where the case made is entirely 
 new. Thomas v. Bernard, ubi supra. The de- 
 fendant should not enter into evidence, as to 
 any charges struck out by amendment. Stew- 
 art v. Stewart. 22 Beav. 393. See Whelan v. 
 Sullivan, 102 Mass. 204, where the plaintiff 
 was not allowed to amend without the pay- 
 ment of such costs as would make the result 
 equivalent to dismissing the bill, and com- 
 mencing de novo, and, therefore, the bill was 
 dismissed without prejudice. 
 
 3 For form of notice of motion, see Vol. III. 
 Where a plaintiff filed a bill which was of great 
 length, and prayed relief in a variety of mat- 
 ters, to which the defendants put in answers, 
 which were also of great length, after which 
 the plaintiff, by virtue of a common order to 
 amend, amended his bill and filed a new en- 
 grossment, which was very short, and confined 
 to one only of the objects of relief prayed by 
 the original bill : upon the defendants moving 
 that the order to amend might be discharge!, 
 and the bill dismissed with costs, or that the 
 plaintiff might pay to them the costs of putting 
 in their answer to so much of the original bill 
 as did not relate to the relief prayed by the 
 amended bill, Lord Northington directed that 
 the order for amending the bill should stand, 
 but that the plaintiff should pay to the defend- 
 ants the further sum of five pounds, beyond 
 the sum of twenty shillings mentioned in the
 
 AMENDING THE BILL. * 427 
 
 filed for a foreclosure of a mortgage and for a transfer of a sum of 
 stock, and, on the answer being filed, disclosures were made which 
 rendered it advisable to amend the bill by striking out all that related 
 to the mortgage, whereby nearly one half of the bill and answer was 
 rendered useless, Sir Lancelot Shadwell V. C. refused to order, on 
 motion, the plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs occasioned by the 
 amendment, as it appeared that the amendment was made under the 
 advice of counsel, and not for the purpose of vexation or oppression. 1 
 
 The fact of an irregular amendment having been made, under a com- 
 mon order to amend, will not be a sufficient reason for ordering the bill 
 to be taken off the file, if the record can be restored to the state in which 
 it was before such irregular amendment was made. 2 
 
 order. Dent v. Wardel, 1 Dick. 339; see Ker- that, at the hearing, the costs of those parts of 
 
 not v. Critchley, W. N. (1807) 252; Finch v. the bill which had been abandoned by the plain- 
 
 Westrope, L. R 12 Eq. 24; R. S. C. 1883, Ord. tiff might be awarded to the defendant. Bul- 
 
 LXV. 27 (31), (32). And where a cause, at the lock v. Perkins, 1 Dick. 110; and see Strickland 
 
 hearing, was ordered to stand over, with liberty v. Strickland, 3 Beav. 242 ; Leather Cloth Co. v. 
 
 to the plaintiff to amend by adding parties, and Bressey, 3 Giff . 474, 494 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 425, 429. 
 the plaintiff took advantage of that order to J Monck v. Earl of Tankerville, 10 Sim. 284; 
 
 strike out several charges which had neces- 3 Jur. 1167; see Blackmore v. Edwards, W. N. 
 
 sarily led the defendant into the examination (1879) 175 ; Att.-Gen. v. Tomline, 5 Ch. D. 
 
 of witnesses, and to add others, the Court, 750, 769. 
 
 upon motion, ordered that part of the amend- 2 Att.-Gen. v. Cooper, 3 M. & C. 258, 262; 
 
 ment to be discharged, and the plaintiff's bill 1 Jur. 790 ; and see Ainslie v. Sims, 17 Beav. 
 
 to be restored to what it was before, — in order 174. 
 
 429
 
 [The proceedings under this chapter are statutory, and according to the former 
 practice in England only.] 
 
 *428 * CHAPTER VII. 
 
 PROCESS BY SERVICE OF A COPY OP THE BILL ON FORMAL DEPENDANTS, 
 AND PROCEEDINGS BY SERVICE OF NOTICE OF THE DECREE. 
 
 Section I. — Process by Service of a Copy of the Bill on Formal 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 As soon as the bill has been filed, the plaintiff may proceed to bring 
 before the Court the proposed defendants to the suit. We have seen, 
 however, that the plaintiff is enabled, as against certain formal parties, 
 to dispense with the ordinary process of the Court, upon serving them 
 with a copy of the bill under the General Order, 1 and, thereupon, in the 
 event of their not voluntarily appearing after such service, to proceed, 
 without further attention to their rights or interests ; and that, in cer- 
 tain other cases, the plaintiff may file his bill, and obtain a decree 
 against some or one of the persons who were formerly necessary parties, 
 upon serving the others with notice of the decree that has been made.'- 
 It will be convenient, therefore, to consider, in the first place, the mode 
 of proceeding where parties are served with copies of the bill under the 
 General Order, or with notice of the decree, and then the ordinary pro- 
 cess against other defendants. 
 
 Where no account, payment, conveyance, or other direct relief is 
 sought against a party to a suit, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to 
 require such party, not being an infant, to appear to the bill ; but the 
 plaintiff may serve such party, not being an infant, with a copy of the 
 bill, whether the same be an original, or amended, or supplemental bill, 3 
 without any indorsement requiring such party to appear thereto ; and 
 such bill, as against such party, must pray that such party, upon being 
 served with a copy of the bill, may be bound by all the proceedings in 
 the cause. 4 But the plaintiff may, nevertheless, require a party against 
 whom no account, payment, conveyance, or other direct relief is 
 * 429 sought, to appear to the bill, * and may prosecute the suit against 
 such party in the ordinary way, if he shall think fit. 1 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. X. 11 ; ante. Chap. V., Parties. * For form of prayer, see Vol. III. 
 
 2 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42: ante. Chap. V., * Cons. Ord. IX. 11. The 54th Equity 
 Parties. As to the present English practice, Rule of the United States Courts is similar. As 
 see 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 269, § 5. to the effect of this order between co-defend- 
 
 « This includes a bill of revivor and sup- ants, see Boyd v. Moyle, 2 Coll. 316. 321, 323. 
 plement. Walcot v. Walcot, 10 Beav. 20. 
 4.30 

 
 SERVICE OF COPY OF BILL ON FORMAL DEFENDANTS. * 430 
 
 This Order does not authorize service of the copy of the bill on a 
 defendant out of the jurisdiction ; a and if a party served die's before the 
 hearing, his personal representative cannot be brought before the Court 
 by order of revivor, but an original bill must be filed against him. 8 
 
 If the bill is amended after service, a copy of the amended bill must 
 also be served ; 4 and if a bill of revivor and supplement, or a supple- 
 mental bill is filed, it must be served also; 6 and so, it is conceived, 
 must a supplemental statement. 
 
 A plaintiff, availing himself of the course of proceeding introduced 
 by this Order, must serve a plain, unstamped, and unsealed copy of the 
 bill, 6 without any indorsement thereon requiring the party to appear 
 thereto, upon each of- the defendants to be served, either personally, or 
 by leaving the same with his servant or some member of his family at 
 his dwelling-house or usual place of abode. 7 
 
 In the case of a husband and wife, where the suit does not relate to 
 the separate estate of the wife, 8 service upon the husband alone is suffi- 
 cient ; 9 but where it relates to her separate estate, or they are living 
 apart, a copy must be served upon or for each. 10 
 
 The service must be within twelve weeks from the filing of the bill, 11 
 unless the Court shall give leave to make such service after that time. 12 
 Such leave must be applied for by motion, without notice, 13 and the 
 application must be supported by affidavits explaining the cause of the 
 delay. 14 It seems that substituted service will not be ordered. 15 
 
 Where a plaintiff serves a defendant with a copy of the bill under 
 this Order, he must cause a memorandum of such service, 16 
 * and of the time when it was effected, to be entered in the * 430 
 Kecord and Writ Clerks' Office. An order authorizing such entry 
 to be made is necessary, and may be obtained on motion, 1 without notice, 
 upon the Court being satisfied of a copy of the bill having been served, 
 and of the time when the service was made. 2 
 
 2 Lorton v. Kingston, 2 M'N. & G. 139. 9 Kent v. Jacobs, 5 Beav. 48. 
 This case was before the 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, but 10 Braithwaite'9 Pr. 516. 
 
 it would appear still to apply; power to serve n Cons. Ord. X. 17. 
 
 the bill out of the jurisdiction being confined to 12 Cons. Ord. X. 17, 18; Horry v. Calder, 7 
 
 the copy served under that Act. See Penlbld v. Beav. 585; Bell v. Hastings, id. 592. The 
 
 Kelly, 12 W. R. 286, V. C. K. defendant need not be served with the order 
 
 3 Hardy v. Hull, 14 Sim. 21; 8 Jur. 609. enlarging the time. Fenton v. Clayton, 15 
 The reason is, that he has not appeared; see Sim. 82. Where a formal defendant came 
 also Crowfoot v. Mander. 9 Sim. 396; Eding- within the jurisdiction after decree, and after 
 ton v. Banham, 2 Coll. 619; Bland v. Davison, the twelve weeks, leave was refused. I'enfold 
 21 Beav. 312. v. Kelly, 12 W. R. 286. V. C. K. 
 
 * Cons. Ord. X. 11; Anon. 1 De G. & S. « Cons. Ord. X. 18. For form of motion 
 
 321; Vincent v. Watts, 3 M'N. & G. 248; paper, see Vol. III. 
 
 Braithwaite's Pr. 515. " See Horry v. Calder, 7 Beav. 585; Bell v. 
 
 5 Cons. Ord. X. 11; Walcot v. Walcot, 10 Hastings, id. 592. 
 
 Beav. 20. is Thomas v. Selby, 9 Beav. 194. 
 
 6 Where a printed bill has been filed, a 18 For form of memorandum, see Vol. III. 
 printed copy will of course be served. 1 For form of motion paper, see Vol. III. 
 
 7 Braithwaite's Pr. 31; Cons. Ord. X. 1; the 2 Cons. Old. X. 12. Memorandum of ser- 
 member of the family should be an inmate of vice ordered to be entered on defendant's ac- 
 the defendant's house. Edgson v. Edgson, 3 knowledgment of having received the bill by 
 De G. & S. 629. post. Burton v. Shaw, 10 L. T. N. S. 292, 
 
 8 Salmon v. Green, 8 Beav. 457. V. C. W. 
 
 431
 
 * 431 FORMAL DEFENDANTS. — NOTICE OF THE DECREE. 
 
 There have been several cases concerning the extent of information 
 demanded by the Court, upon motions of this description : but the result 
 seems to be, that no further proof is absolutely necessary than what is 
 pointed out by the Order itself, namely, proof by affidavit, first, that due 
 service has been effected upon each of the defendants of a copy of the 
 bill, sworn to be a true copy of the bill itself ; secondly, of the time and 
 place when and where such service was made, so that the Court may 
 know that it has been effected within the jurisdiction. 8 Where a party 
 served with a copy of the bill had subsequently appeared, it was con- 
 sidered an admission of due service, and no further evidence was re- 
 quired ; 4 and in such a case, a memorandum of service need not be 
 entered. 5 Proof has, in some cases, been required that the person upon 
 whom such service was made was not an infant, and that the bill did 
 not pray an account, payment, conveyance, or other direct relief against 
 such person ; 6 but the terms of the Order do not seem to render it 
 necessary that these facts should be established upon the motion, and 
 the later cases are against the necessity for giving proof of them. 7 
 
 The plaintiff would seem to take the Order at his own risk ; and if 
 the case be one in which he is not entitled to proceed in this manner, 
 the whole process would be nugatory, and the defendant would not be 
 bound by any of the proceedings in the cause. 8 
 
 Where the defendant, who had been served, was misnamed in the bill, 
 leave was given to enter the memorandum, on production of an affidavit 
 showing that the person served was the same person as the person re- 
 ferred to in the memorandum of service ; 9 and where the copy of the 
 bill had been served after the expiration of the twelve weeks, 
 
 * 431 without an order enlarging the time being obtained, * leave was 
 
 given to enter a memorandum of service, on the defendant served 
 appearing and consenting. 1 
 
 The Order 2 merely confers upon the plaintiff the privilege of adopting 
 this course ; but it is not obligatory upon him, and he may, if he thinks 
 fit, compel such parties to appear, and in other respects prosecute his 
 suit against them in the ordinary manner. The costs occasioned by such 
 a course must, however, be paid by the plaintiff, unless the Court shall 
 otherwise direct. 8 
 
 The question to what parties the Order applies has frequently arisen ; 
 but it is not possible to deduce from the cases any clear rule upon the 
 
 3 Warren v. Postlethwaite, 1 Coll. 171; 8 Hare, 508; 8 Jur. 1024; Jones v. Skipwith, 
 .Tur. 282; and see Haigh v. Dixon, 1 Y. & 8 Beav. 127. There can be no doubt that the 
 C. C. C. 180. For form of affidavit, see Vol. Court would now act, as to the question of the 
 HI. . prayer, on an inspection of a print of the bill; 
 
 4 Maude v. Copeland, 1 Coll. 505. as it appears it would have done on an inspec- 
 
 5 Att.-Gen. v. Donnington Hospital, 12 tion of an office copy in Davis v. Prout, 5 Beav. 
 Beav. 551. 102, if one had been in Court. 
 
 6 Goodwin v. Bell, 1 Y. & C. C. C 181; 8 Marke v. Locke, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 500. 506; 
 Haigh v. Dixon, id. 180; Davis v. Prout, 5 Boreham v. Bignall, 4 Hare. 633 ; 7 Jur. 528. 
 Beav. 102. 9 Witham v. Salvin, 16 Jur. 420, M. R. 
 
 i Sherwood v. Rivers, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 166; » Tugwell v. Hooper, 10 Beav. 19. 
 
 7 Jur. 78; Mawhood v. Labouchere, 12 Sim. 2 Cons. Ord. X. 11. 
 
 362; Anon. 1 Hare, 317, n.; Welch v. Welch, 3 Cons. Ord. XL. 16; Abram v. Ward, 6 
 
 id. 593; 6 Jur. 599; Hudson v. Dungworth, 3 Hare, 165, 170. 
 432
 
 SERVICE OP COPY OF BILL ON FORMAL DEFENDANTS. * 432 
 
 subject ; though it appears that it is not, in general, considered as 
 applicable, where the interest of the defendant is adverse to that of the 
 plaintiff, even though no further relief is sought against the defendant 
 than the binding of his rights by a decree. The alterations in the 
 practice of the Court 4 have rendered proceedings under the Order we 
 are now considering of comparatively rare occurrence, and it is not, 
 therefore, desirable to refer in detail to the cases which have occurred ; 
 but they are collected in the note. 8 It may be mentioned, however, that 
 it has been held, that the Order does not apply to the Attorney-Gen- 
 eral ; 6 and it seems that it does not apply to a person of unsound mind. 7 
 
 If the motion for leave to enter a memorandum of service be granted, 
 the Order made upon the motion must be drawn up, passed, and entered, 
 and should then be left with the Record and Writ Clerk in whose divi- 
 sion the cause is. 8 The memorandum is then entered by him in his 
 cause book, and the Order is returned to the solicitor, with an indorse- 
 ment upon it to show that the memorandum has been entered. 9 The 
 Order should be kept for the purpose of production at the hearing of 
 the cause, 10 and on bespeaking the decree or order, 11 and at any other 
 period of the cause when the regularity of the service and the entry of 
 the memorandum are required to be established. The memorandum 
 must be entered before a certificate to set down the cause can be 
 granted ; 12 and a certificate that no appearance has been entered 
 by the defendant *must be left with the Registrar, on bespeak- *432 
 ing the decree or order made at the hearing, 1 when the defendant 
 has not appeared. 
 
 A party so served with a copy of the bill, may, if he desires the suit to 
 be prosecuted against himself in the ordinary way, enter an appearance 
 for himself in the common form : 2 and in such case the plaintiff must 
 proceed against such defendant in the ordinary way ; but the costs occa- 
 sioned thereby must be paid by the party so appearing, unless the Court 
 shall otherwise direct. 8 A party so served may also, if he is desirous 
 of being served with a notice of the proceedings in the cause, but not of 
 otherwise having the suit prosecuted against himself, enter a special 
 appearance in the following form: "A B appears to the bill for the 
 purpose of being served with notice of all proceedings therein." In this 
 case, he must be served with notice of all proceedings in the cause, and 
 he is entitled to appear upon them, but he will have to pay the costs 
 occasioned thereby, unless the Court shall otherwise direct. 4 The notice 
 
 * Ante, Chap. V. Parties. 6 Christopher v. Cleghorn, 8 Beav. 314. 
 
 5 Marke v. Locke, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 500; 1 Pemberton r. Langmore, id. 166. 
 
 Lloyd v. Lloyd, 1 id. 181; 6 Jur. 162; Dun- 8 For form of order, see Seton, 1244, No. 3. 
 
 combe o. Levy, 5 Hare, 232, 236; 11 Jur. 262; 9 Braithwaite's Pr. 516; no fee is payable, 
 
 Davis v. Davis, 4 Hare, 389,391; Powell «. id. 517. For form of indorsement, see Vol. III. 
 
 Cockerell, id. 557; Abram v. Ward, ubi supra ; w Carter v. Bentall, 12 L. J. Ch. 369, M. R. 
 
 Clarke v. Tipping, 9 Beav. 284, 292; Johnson v. " Reg. Regul. 15 March, 1860, r. 24. 
 
 Tucker, 15 Sim. 485; 11 Jur. 382; Barklay v. 12 Braithwaite's Pr. 516. 
 
 Lord Reay, 2 Hare, 306, 309; Knight v. Caw- i Reg. Regul. 15 March, 1860, r. 24. 
 
 thron, 1 De G. & S. 714; 12 Jur. 33; Adams v. a Sen post. Chap. XIII. Appearance. 
 
 Paynter, 1 Coll. 530, 532; 8 Jur. 1063; Gaunt a Cons. Ord. X. 14. 
 
 v. Johnson, 7 Hare, 154: 12 Jur. 1067; Lew- * Cons. Ord. X. 15. 
 ellin v. Cobbold, 17 Jur. 1111, V. C. S. 
 
 vol. i —28 433
 
 * 433 FORMAL DEPENDANTS. — NOTICE OF THE DECREE. 
 
 to be given under this rule must give the defendant the same length of 
 notice as if he were proceeded against in the ordinary way. 5 
 
 Such common or special appearances may be entered within twelve 
 days after service of a copy of the bill ; but they cannot be entered after- 
 wards without leave of the Court, to be obtained on notice to the plain- 
 tiff ; and terms may be imposed by the Court on such an application. 6 
 
 If the defendant does not enter an appearance within twelve days, 
 the plaintiff may proceed in the cause as if the person served were not 
 a party ; and the defendant will be bound by all the proceedings, in the 
 same manner as if he had appeared and answered ; 7 and if he appears, 
 after the expiration of the twelve days, he will be bound by all pro- 
 ceedings prior to such appearance. 8 An application for leave to enter 
 an appearance, without being bound by prior proceedings, has been 
 refused. 9 
 
 Section II. — Proceedings by Service of Notice of the Decree. 
 
 The practice of serving, with notice of the decree, persons who 
 are not named as parties on the record, was introduced by the 42d 
 
 section of the Chancery Amendment Act of 1852. 10 Under the 
 * 433 * provisions of that section : (1) Any residuary legatee or next 
 
 of kin may, without serving the remaining residuary legatees or 
 next of kin, have a decree for the administration of the personal estate 
 of a deceased person. 1 (2) Any legatee interested in a legacy charged 
 upon real estate, and any person interested in the proceeds of real estate 
 directed to be sold, may, without serving any other legatee or person 
 interested in the proceeds of the estate, have a decree for the adminis- 
 tration of the estate of a deceased person. 2 (3) Any residuary devisee 
 or heir may, without serving any co-residuary devisee or co-heir, have 
 the like decree. 3 (4) Any one of several cestui que trusts under any 
 deed or instrument may, without serving any other of such cestui que 
 trusts, have a decree for the execution of the trusts of the deed or instru- 
 ment. 4 (5) In all cases of suits for the protection of property pending 
 litigation, and in all cases in the nature of waste, one person may sue 
 on behalf of himself and of all persons having the same interest. 5 
 (6) Any executor, administrator, or trustee may obtain a decree against 
 
 5 Wilton v. Rumball, 14 Sim. 56 ; 8 Jur. 236. » 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42, r. 1 ; ante, pp. 217, 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. X. 16; Rigby r. Strangways, 234, 237, 238. Where a residuary legatee, who 
 10 Jur. 998, V. C. E. For form of order in had been served with notice of the decree, set- 
 such case, see Seton, 1249, No. 5 ; and for form tied her interest, the notice was directed to be 
 of notice of motion, see Vol. III. re-served on the trustee. White v. Steward, 35 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. X. 13; Powell v. Cockerell, 4 Beav. 304; W. N. (1866) 83, M. R. See Re 
 
 Hare, 557, 565. Braithwaite, 21 Ch. D. 121 ; Day v. Batty, id. 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. X. 16. 830; Burstall v. Fearon, 24 Ch. D. 126. 
 
 9 Boreham v. Bignall, 4 Hare, 633. 2 Rule 2; ante, pp. 218, 225. 
 1° 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86. The English practice 8 Rule 3; ante, p. 218. 
 
 is now modified by R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XVI. * Rule 4; ante, p. 226. 
 
 11, 33-44; 46 & 47 Vic. c. 49, § 4, Sched. See « Rule 5; ante, p. 244. 
 
 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 275, § 6 ; 2 id. 
 996-1002. 
 
 434
 
 SERVICE OF NOTICE OF THE DECREE. * 434 
 
 any one legatee, next of kin, or cestui que trust for the administration of 
 the estate, or the execution of the trusts. 6 In all the above cases, the 
 persons who, according to the former practice of the Court, were neces- 
 sary parties, may be served with notice of the decree ; and after such 
 notice shall be bound by the proceedings, in the same manner as if they 
 had been originally made parties to the suit. 7 
 
 The notice of the decree must be served personally, unless otherwise 
 directed ; and where a husband and wife have to be served, the notice 
 must be served on each, personally, notwithstanding that the suit does 
 not relate to the wife's separate estate, and that they are residing 
 together; but the Court or Judge will, on a proper case being made, 
 dispense with personal service. 8 
 
 Unlike the course of proceeding by service of a copy of the bill under 
 the General Order, referred to in the preceding section, the process 
 by service of notice of the decree applies to infants, * persons of * 434 
 unsound mind not so found by inquisition, and persons out of the 
 jurisdiction; 1 but in the case of infants, or persons of unsound mind 
 not so found by inquisition, the notice is to be served upon such person 
 and in such manner as the Judge shall direct ; 2 and an order is neces- 
 sary for leave to serve a person out of the jurisdiction. 3 
 
 The application for the direction of the Judge, as to the manner of 
 serving notice of the decree on infants, and persons of unsound mind 
 not so found by inquisition, should be made by summons ex parte;* 
 and must be supported by affidavit showing, as far as the applicant is 
 able, (1) with respect to infants : The ages of the infants ; whether 
 they have any parents or testamentary guardians, or guardians appointed 
 by the Court of Chancery ; where, and under whose care, the infants are 
 residing ; at whose expense they are maintained, and, in case they have 
 no father or guardian, who are their nearest relations ; and that the 
 parents, guardians, relations, or persons on whom it is proposed to serve 
 the notice, have no interest in the matters in question, or, if they have, 
 the nature of such interest, and that it is not adverse to the interest of 
 the infants. (2) With respect to persons of unsound mind not found so 
 by inquisition : Where, and under whose care, such persons are residing, 
 and at whose expense they are maintained ; who are their nearest rela- 
 
 6 Rule 6; ante, p. 226. See Latch v. Latch, notice of the decree on any other persons than 
 L. R. 10 Ch. 464. In all the above cases the those specified in 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42; Colyer 
 Court, if it shall see fit, may require any other v. Colyer, 9 Jur. N. S. 294, V. C. K. ; and see 
 person to be made a party to the suit, and may Knight v. Pocock, 24 Beav. 436 ; 4 Jur N. S. 
 give the conduct of the suit to such person as 197; Foster v. Foster, L. R. 3 Ch. 330; Re 
 it may deem proper, and may make such order Berkeley, L. R. 19 Eq. 467. 
 
 in any particular case as it may deem just for 8 Braithwaite's Pr. 520, 521. 
 
 placing the defendant on the record on the same 1 Chalmers v. Laurie, 10 Hare App. 27; 1 
 
 footing in regard to costs as other parties having W. R. 265; Clarke v. Clarke, 9 Hare App. 13, 
 
 a common interest, with him in the matters in marginal note; 1 W. R. 48; Strong v. Moore, 
 
 question. Rule 7. By Rule 9, trustees repre- 22 L. J. Ch. 917, M. R. 
 
 sent beneficiaries in certain cases; see ante, pp. 2 Cons. Ord. VII. 5. 
 
 212, 222, 228, 256, 257. 8 See Strong v. Moore, ubi supra. 
 
 7 Rule 8; ante, pp. 190, 191, 217, 218, 225 « For forms of summons, see Vol. III. 
 It is improper to serve, under these provisions, 
 
 435
 
 * 435 FORMAL DEFENDANTS. — NOTICE OF THE DECREE. 
 
 tions ; and that such relations, or persons, upon whom it is proposed to 
 serve the notice, have no interest in the matters in question, or, if they 
 have, the nature of such interest, and that it is not adverse to the inter- 
 est of the persons of unsound mind. 6 
 
 The order on the summons is drawn up by the Registrar ; and the 
 service must be effected in strict accordance with the directions con- 
 tained in the order ; and copy of such order must also be served, at the 
 time of serving the notice of the decree. 6 
 
 An order to serve notice of a decree on a person out of the jurisdic- 
 tion may be obtained on an ex parte summons, supported by affidavit 
 showing the nature of his interest in the suit, and the place or country 
 where he is supposed to be residing. 7 
 
 The Judge in Chambers will not, in general, in the first instance, 
 
 direct upon whom the notice of the decree is to be served ; 8 but he will 
 
 entertain an application to dispense with the service upon any person as 
 
 to whom it appears that, from absence, or other sufficient cause, 
 
 * 435 it ought to be dispensed with, or cannot * be made ; x or to sub- 
 
 stitute service, or give notice by advertisement or otherwise, in 
 lieu of such service. 2 The party having the prosecution of the decree 
 should, therefore, in the first place, consider what persons not named 
 on the record ought, under the provisions of the Chancery Amendment 
 Act of 1852, 3 to be served with notice of the decree. On this subject, 
 he is referred to the former part of this treatise. 4 He should then con- 
 sider whether the circumstances of the case, and the nature of their 
 interest in the suit, are such as will justify an application to the Judge 
 to dispense with service on any of them ; or to sanction some special 
 mode of service : as, on one or more for all the members of a class, or 
 by public advertisement, or through the post, or on a substitute. An 
 application of this description to the Judge is usually required to be 
 made by an ex parte summons, 6 supported by evidence of the facts on 
 which it is founded ; and where a special mode of service is directed, 
 an order is ordinarily drawn up by the Registrar, which will contain a 
 direction that a copy of it shall be served with the notice. Where ser- 
 vice is dispensed with, an order to that effect is not usually drawn up ; 6 
 but the fact is stated in the Chief Clerk's certificate of the result of the 
 proceedings. 
 
 If service through the post is sanctioned, and no special directions are 
 given as to the mode of authenticating such service, it seems advisable 
 to enclose the notice in a letter addressed to the person to be served, 7 
 and to request him to acknowledge, through the post, the receipt of the 
 notice ; and it would be well to enclose a form of acknowledgment for 
 
 6 Regul. 8 Aup., 1857, r. 7; for forms of 2 Cons. Ord. XXXV. 18; for form of sum- 
 affidavit, see Vol. III. mons in such cnse, see Vol. III. 
 
 6 Braithwaite's Pr. 523; see Seton, 1212. 3 15 & i 6 Vic. c. 86, § 42, rr. 1-8. 
 
 1 For forms of summons, and affidavit in * See ante, pp. 210-218, 225, 226, 244. 
 
 support, see Vol. III. 5 For a form, see Vol. III. 
 
 8 See, however, De Balinhard v. Bullock. 9 6 But is sometimes,- see Gavin v. Osborne, 
 
 Hare App. 13 ; see Greaves v. Smith, 22 W. R. cited 2 Seton, 1642. 
 388; 2 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 998. 7 For form of letter, see Vol. III. 
 
 1 Ibid.; Cons. Ord. XXXV. 18. 
 
 436
 
 SERVICE OF NOTICE OP THE DECREE. * 436 
 
 signature. 8 The service, in this case, will be deemed to have been 
 effected at the date of the letter of acknowledgment. 9 
 
 The Judge will, usually, proceed to give his directions as to the man- 
 ner in which the decree is to be prosecuted, notwithstanding evidence is 
 not adduced to satisfy him that all proper parties have been served 
 with notice. 10 Indeed, it not unfrequently happens, that the persons to 
 be served cannot be known till some of the inquiries under the decree 
 have been prosecuted at Chambers : as where the members constituting 
 a class of residuary legatees, or next of kin, have to be ascertained ; 
 and by directions being obtained for insertion of advertisements for 
 creditors and other claimants to come in, and for the accounts to be 
 brought in, and the inquiries answered, before these class inqui- 
 ries are entered *upou, much time in prosecuting the decree * 436 
 may be saved, without prejudicing persons who may be subse- 
 quently served with notice of the decree, and obtain orders to attend 
 the proceedings. 
 
 The notice of the decree must be entitled in the cause ; and a memo- 
 randum must be indorsed thereon, giving the person served notice that 
 from the time of service he will be bound by the proceedings in the 
 cause, in the same manner as if he had been originally made a party ; 
 and that he may, by an order of course, have liberty to attend the pro- 
 ceedings, and may, within one month after service, apply to the Court to 
 add to the decree. 1 
 
 Service of a copy of the decree is regarded as service of notice of the 
 decree ; but the copy must be indorsed in like manner as a notice. 2 
 
 When any party has been served with notice of a decree, a memo- 
 randum of service must, upon proof by affidavit that the service has 
 been duly effected, be entered in the office of the Clerks of Records and 
 Writs. 3 
 
 When it appears by the affidavit that the service has not been effected 
 in accordance with the ordinary practice in these cases, and the Record 
 and Writ Clerk refuses, in consequence, to enter a memorandum of ser- 
 vice thereon, the plaintiff may instruct counsel to apply to the Court ex 
 parte, for its sanction to the memorandum being entered; or where direc- 
 tions for the service have been given at Chambers, or the service is 
 required for the purpose of proceedings pending there, the application 
 should be made at Chambers, ex parte, by the solicitor, without sum- 
 mons. The sanction, if given, is evidenced by an indorsement on the 
 affidavit to the following effect : " Let the memorandum of service be 
 entered on this affidavit ; " and such indorsement is signed by the Regis- 
 trar in Court, or by the Chief Clerk at Chambers, as the case may be, 
 
 8 For forms of acknowledgment and affidavit 2 Braithwaite's Pr. 519. 
 
 of service, see Vol. III. For order of service 3 Cons. Ord. XXIII. 19. An office copy of the 
 
 abroad by post, see St. John c. Harrison, Reg. affidavit, together with the prcecipe to enter the 
 
 Lib. B 2269. memorandum, and any exhibits or orders con- 
 
 9 Braithwaite's Pr. 522. nected with the affidavit of service, are required 
 10 See Cons. Ord. XXXV. 16. to be left at the office for examination, but will 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. XXIII. 20; for forms of notice be returned to the solicitor. For forms of pr<x- 
 
 and indorsement, see Vol. III. cipe and affidavits, see Vol. III. 
 
 437
 
 * 437 FORMAL DEFENDANTS. — NOTICE OF THE DECREE. 
 
 and will be acted on by the Record and Writ Clerk, without a formal 
 order being drawn up. 4 
 
 The Record and Writ Clerk will give a certificate of the entry of the 
 memorandum of service ; 6 and a copy of such certificate, certified by 
 the solicitor, is to be left at the Chambers of the Judge to whose Court 
 the cause is attached. 6 
 
 The party served may apply, within one month after service, for 
 leave to add to the decree. 7 Such application is usually made 
 
 * 437 * by summons ; 1 which must be served on the solicitors of all 
 
 parties to the cause, and of all persons who have obtained orders 
 to attend. The party served may also obtain an order of course, 2 upon 
 petition at the Rolls, or on motion, 3 for liberty to attend all proceedings 
 under the decree. 4 
 
 Infants, and persons of unsound mind not so found, attend the pro- 
 ceedings by their guardians ad litem, who are appointed in the same 
 manner as guardians ad litem to answer and defend suits ; 6 and the 
 Judge may, at any time during proceedings in Chambers, under any 
 decree or order, require a guardian ad litem to be appointed for any in- 
 fant, or person of unsound mind not so found by inquisition, who has 
 been served with notice of such decree or order. 6 
 
 Where a person served with notice of the decree obtains an order for 
 leave to attend the proceedings, no other evidence of service of the 
 notice on him will be required ; the Judge must, however, be satisfied of 
 his identity with the person on whom the notice ought to have been served- 
 
 A copy of every order for leave to attend proceedings should be 
 served on the solicitors of all parties in the cause, and of all persons 
 who have leave to attend the proceedings ; and a copy, certified by the 
 solicitor to be a true copy, 7 should be left at the Judge's Chambers. 8 
 
 No appearance is to be entered at the Record and Writ Clerks' Office 
 by a person served with notice of the decree ; nor is it necessary that 
 any order he may obtain to attend the proceedings should be produced 
 or entered there. 9 The practitioner will, therefore, be unable to ascer- 
 tain from the books of that office what parties have, by obtaining orders 
 to attend the proceedings, entitled themselves to be treated as quasi ^v- 
 
 4 See Braithwaite's Pr. 521; and Re New- 1642, No. 4. The solicitor should be author- 
 bold, there cited ; Lloyd v. Cross, W. N. (1871) ized in writing. See Bird v. Harris, 29 W. R. 45. 
 101. 8 For forms of petition and motion paper, 
 
 5 The fee is 4s. Regul. to Order, Sched. 4. see Vol. III. 
 
 For form of certificate, see Vol. III. 4 The order can only be obtained by those 
 
 6 8th Regulation, 8 Aug., 1857. For form of persons who, under the former practice, were 
 certificate see Vol. III. necessary parties to the suit. Colyer t>. Col- 
 
 7 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42, r. 8; Cons. Ord. yer, 9 Jur. N. S. 294; 11 W. R. 355, V. C. K. 
 XXXIII. 18; the month is lunar, Cons. Ord. See Lloyd v. Cross, W. N. (1871) 101; Day 
 XXXVII. 10. Where the party to be served is v. Batty, 21 Ch. D. 830; 2 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th 
 out of the jurisdiction, an enlarged time may be Eng. ed.) 1000. 
 
 given; see Strong r. Moore, 22 L. J. Ch.917, 5 Cons. Ord. VII. 6. See ante, pp. 160, 176; 
 
 M. R. Semble, the Attorney-General may apply and for forms of motion paper and petition, see 
 
 to add to the decree after the month. Johnstone Vol. III. 
 
 v. Hamilton, 3 Giff. 30; 11 Jur. N. S. 777, 6 Cons Ord. VII. 7. 
 
 V. C. S. 7 For form of certificate, see Vol. III. 
 
 1 For form of summons, see Vol. III. 8 Regul. 8 Aug., 1857. r. 8. 
 
 2 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42, r. 8 ; 2 Seton, 9 Braithwaite's Pr. 525. 
 
 438
 
 SERVICE OF NOTICE OF THE DECREE. 
 
 438 
 
 ties to the suit. He must seek this information by search in the books 
 kept at the entering seat in the Registrar's office, at the Report office, and 
 in the Secretary's office at the Rolls, for the entry of orders, and at the 
 Chambers of the Judge : or by inquiring of the parties in the cause, what 
 orders for leave to attend have been served on them. 
 
 If the party served attends, without obtaining an order giving him 
 leave, he will not be allowed his costs of such attendance, 
 * without a special order for that purpose ; 1 and it is to be ob- * 438 
 served, that the order giving a party served with notice of the 
 decree liberty to attend, does not specify at whose costs he is to attend, 
 but his costs are dealt with at the hearing of the cause on further con- 
 sideration ; and it is conceived that, where the Court is of opinion that 
 the interest of the party in question is sufficiently protected by the par- 
 ties named on the record, or who have already obtained leave to attend 
 the proceedings, it will refuse to allow him any costs. 2 
 
 A person who has been served with notice of the decree, and who has 
 obtained leave to attend the proceedings, may, if aggrieved by any order 
 in the suit, present a petition of rehearing in the usual manner, 3 but if 
 he is unable to raise the question on the pleadings, the proper course for 
 him to pursue is to move, on notice, for leave to file a bill, which would 
 be in the nature of a bill of review. 4 
 
 The effect of service of notice of the decree appears to be to put 
 the persons served on the same footing as if they were defendants ; 
 they cannot be treated as co-plaintiffs, and no inquiries can be directed 
 for their benefit, which could not have been directed as between 
 co-defendants. 5 
 
 i Cons. Ord. XL. 28; see Sharp v. Lush, 10 
 Ch. D. 468 ; Re Marshall, W. N. (1879) 12. 
 
 2 See Cons. Ord. XXXV. 20; 2 Seton, 1642; 
 Stevenson v. Abington, 11 W. R. 936, M. R.; 
 Re Taylor, Daubney v. Leake, L. R. 1 Eq. 495, 
 M. R ; 35 Beav. 311 ; Hubbard v. Latham, 35 L. 
 J. Ch. 402; 14 W. R. 553, V. C. K. ; Wragg 
 r. M.-rley, 14 W. R. 949, V. C. \V. ; Bland v. 
 Daniell, W. N. (1867) 169; Bellew v. Bellew, 
 W. N. (1868) 253; Lewis v. Matthews, 17 W. 
 R. 841, as to classes of parties appearing by 
 different solicitors ; and see Bennett v. Wood, 7 
 Sim. 522; Hutchinson v. Freeman, 4 M. & C. 
 490; 3 Jur. 694; Shuttleworth v. Howarth, 4 
 M. & C. 492; 5 Jur. 2 ; C. & P. 228, where 
 persons intervening, who were not made parties 
 
 because they belonged to a very numerous class, 
 were allowed the same costs as if they had been 
 made parties to the suit. 
 
 3 Ellison v. Thomas, 1 De G. J. & S. 13; see 
 post, Chap. XXXII. § 2, Rehearings and Ap- 
 peals In the Cotivt of Chancery. 
 
 * Kidd v. Cheyne, 18 Jur. 348, V. C. W. ; 
 see post, Chap. XXXIV. § 5, Bills of Review; 
 Flower v. Lloyd, 6 Ch. D. 297 ; Laming v. Gee, 
 10 Ch. D. 715; Widgery v. Tepper, 7 Ch. D. 
 423 ; Burstall v. Fearon,24 Ch. D. 126. 
 
 5 Whitney v. Smith, L. R. 4 Ch. 513. See 
 Re Rees, 15 Ch. D. 490 ; Walker v. Seligmann, 
 L. R. 12 Eq. 152; Latch v Latch, L. R. 10 Ch. 
 464. 
 
 439
 
 439 
 
 ♦CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 PROCESS TO COMPEL, AND PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT OP, APPEARANCE. 
 
 Section I. — Service of the Copy of the Bill. 
 
 Formerly, when the bill wg,s filed, the ordinary course of proceeding 
 against the defendants was to sue out and serve a writ of subpoena. 1 
 
 1 The former English practice of compelling 
 the appearance of the defendant by issuing and 
 serving a writ of subpoena is still adhered to in 
 the Circuit Courts of the United States, and in 
 Massachusetts and some other State Courts. 
 Under this practice the first step usually is, to 
 sue out and serve a subpoena, which is a writ 
 issuing out of the Court, and directed to the 
 party himself, commanding him to appear (ac- 
 cording to the old form of the writ), under 
 a certain penalty therein expressed {subpoena 
 centum libravum), and answer to the matters 
 alleged against him. 
 
 It is to be observed, that the writ of subpoena 
 differs from the other writs of process, in being 
 directed to the party himself, whereas the sub- 
 sequent writs or orders are directed, not to the 
 party himself, but to certain ministerial officers, 
 commanding them to take certain proceedings 
 against the defendant, calculated to enforce his 
 obedience. 
 
 It would seem, according to the American 
 practice, that the bill ought in all cases to be 
 tiled before or at the time of issuing the subpoena . 
 1 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 101, note; ante, p. 399, notes; 
 Ch. Rule 2 of Massachusetts; Rule 11 of the 
 Equity Rules of the U. S. Courts; Howe r. 
 Willard, 40 Vt. 654; see ante, p. 280, notes. 
 See also Equity Rules 7 and 12 for the U. S. 
 Courts, past, Vol. III. 
 
 By Chancery Rule 51, in New Jersey, the 
 names of all the defendants in the same cause 
 shall be inserted in one subpoena, unless the 
 defendants reside in different counties, in which 
 case the names of all those who reside in the 
 same county shall be inserted in the same sub- 
 poena ; by Rule 52, copies of tickets served with 
 the subpoena upon the defendants shall be an- 
 nexed to and returned with the subpoena. Dick. 
 Ch. Pr. 13. 
 
 In Massachusetts, the subpoena on bills in 
 Equity shall be issued from the Clerk's office 
 either in term time or in vacation upon a bill 
 there filed, shall bear teste of the first Justice 
 of t.he Court, who is not a party to the suit, and 
 
 440 
 
 shall be under the seal of the Court, and signed 
 by the Clerk. Pub. Stats, c. 161, § 22. The 
 process shall be made returnable at the next 
 succeeding term, or at any intermediate rule 
 day, at the election of the party who takes it 
 out. Ch. Rule 4. 
 
 In Maine, " a subpoena in the form prescribed 
 shall issue on the filing of the bill with the 
 Clerk ; and it may be made returnable on a day 
 certain in or out of term time." Ch. Rule 2. 
 
 In Connecticut, to a bill in Chancery against 
 defendants residing in that State, a citation, 
 signed by a magistrate, must be annexed, which 
 must be served upon the defendants at least 
 twelve days before the sitting of the Court to 
 which the bill is preferred. Central Manuf. 
 Co. r. Hartshorne, 3 Conn. 199. 
 
 In New Hampshire, see Rules 11-13, 15; 38 
 N. H. 607, and form. Ibid. 614. 
 
 In Tennessee, the defendants are brought 
 before the Court by summons and copy bill 
 served by the sheriff by reading them to the 
 defendants, the latter being each entitled to 
 call for a copy of the bill to be taxed in the 
 costs. Code, § 4340, et seq., as modified bv 
 1877, c. 45. 
 
 In Maine, the subpoena is directed to the 
 sheriffs of the counties or their deputies, with a 
 command to summon the defendant to appear 
 according to the directions of the subpoena, to 
 answer to the plaintiff in a bill in Equity, and 
 to enter an appearance thereto by himself or his 
 attorney. The sheriffs are also ordered to make 
 due return of their proceedings. For form, 
 see 37 Maine, 594, 595. When the bill is not 
 inserted in a writ of attachment, a subpana in 
 the form prescribed shall issue on the filing of 
 the bill with the Clerk, and be served by copy, 
 accompanied by a copy of the bill. Rule 2, 37 
 Maine, 581. In Maine, the bill may be inserted 
 in a writ of attachment, and when so inserted, 
 in addition to the service required by law, a 
 copy shall be left with each defendant, or at his 
 last and usual place of abode, or he will not be 
 required to file his answer within sixty days.
 
 SERVICE OF THE COPY OF THE BILL. 
 
 *441 
 
 This has, however, as we have seen, been abolished ; 2 * and, * 440 
 instead, the defendants are to be served with a printed copy of 
 the bill, 1 properly stamped by one of the Clerks of Records * and * 441 
 writs indicating the date of the filing of the bill, 1 and with an 
 indorsement thereon, 2 directing the defendant to cause an appearance 
 to be entered for him within eight days; 3 to which is added the fol- 
 lowing note : " If you fail to comply with the above directions, the 
 plaintiff may enter an appearance for you, and you will be liable to be 
 arrested and imprisoned, and to have a decree made against you in 
 your absence." 4 
 
 The indorsement need not be printed ; 5 and may be partly printed and 
 partly written : 6 and such variations may be made therein as circum- 
 stances may require. 7 Consequently, when the defendant to be served 
 
 Rule 2, 37 Maine, 581 ; see Stephenson v. Davis, 
 56 Maine, 73, 76. 
 
 In Massachusetts, a bill or petition in an 
 Equity suit may be inserted in an original writ 
 of summons, or of summons and attachment, 
 and shall be returnable at the terms of the 
 Court as established in the several counties, or 
 on the rule days established by the Court. Pub. 
 Stats, c. 151, § 5; ante, p. 305, note. See form, 
 Ch. Rule 1. 
 
 When a party is charged in a bill in the capa- 
 city in which he is liable, as executor, &c, it 
 is not ground of demurrer, that the subpcena 
 was issued to him generally, not s f ating the 
 capacity in which he is sued. Walton v. Her- 
 bert, 3 Green Ch. 73. 
 
 On the filing of a bill in Equity in the U. S. 
 Supreme Court by the State of Florida against 
 the State of Georgia, the Court directed that 
 process of subpoena issue against "The State 
 of Georgia. Florida v. Georgia, 11 How. U. S. 
 293. 
 
 The statute prohibiting the service of civil 
 process in the city of New York on the days of 
 charter elections, does not apply to a subpcena 
 and injunction issued out of the Court of 
 Chancery. Wheeler v. Bartlett, 1 Edw. Ch. 
 323. 
 
 The issuing of a subpana, in New Jersey, 
 except in cases to stay waste, before- the filing 
 of the bill, is irregular, and if promptly brought 
 to the notice of the Court, the subpcena, on 
 motion for that purpose, will be set aside as 
 illegally issued; but the irregularity is purely 
 technical, and is waived by an appearance. 
 Crowell v. Botsford, 16 N. J. Eq. 458. And a 
 mistake in antedating a subpcena, when in fact 
 it was not issued before the filing of the bill, 
 may be corrected. Dinsmore v. Westcott, 25 
 N. J. Eq. 302. 
 
 In Vermont it has been held that a failure to 
 have service made of the original subpcena with 
 the bill and injunction, seasonably for the term 
 to which the subpcena was made returnable, 
 does not operate a discontinuance of the pro- 
 
 ceedings, so that the order of the Chancellor, and 
 the injunction issued in pursuance of it, become 
 vacated and void. Suing time having expired 
 before service could be made, the plaintiff had 
 the right to another subpmna returnable to the 
 next term. Howe v. Willard, 40 Vt. 654. See 
 to the same effect, Ford v. Bartlett, 59 Tenn. 
 (3 Baxt.) 20. And where the process issued 
 several years after the bill was filed. Stern v. 
 Ledden,*4 Bibb, 178. 
 
 2 Except as to bills tiled on or before Nov. 
 1, 1452; Cons. Ord. XXVIII. 10. 
 
 i 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 2-5. As to service of 
 writ of summons or of notice under the present 
 English practice, see 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th 
 Eng. ed.) p. 333, § 8; 1 Seton on Judgments 
 (5th ed.). 9. In Yeatman v. Mousley, 2 De G. M. 
 & G. 220; 16 Jur. 1004, a bill was ordered to be 
 filed, although a mistaken transposition of the 
 names of one of the parties had been corrected 
 in ink; and see Barnes v. Ridgway, 1 Sm. & 
 G. App. 18; but now, no bill will be filed, as a 
 printed bill, unless all alterations are made 
 in type. Braithwaite's Pr. 25; ante, p. 396, 
 n. 3. 
 
 1 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 3 (now superseded, see 
 post, p. 904, n.). For a case where the defend- 
 ant was served with an unstamped copy, see 
 Hutton v. Smith, 24 L. J. Ch. 147, V. C. W. 
 As to service of unstamped copies on formal 
 parties, see ante, p. 429. 
 
 2 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 3, and Sched., as 
 varied bv Cons. Ord. IX. 2; and see forms in 
 Vol. HI. 
 
 8 A defendant may, however, appear gra- 
 tis, before service on him of a copy of the bill; 
 see post, Chap. XIII., Appearance. 
 
 4 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, Sched., as varied by 
 Cons. Ord. IX. 2. 
 
 6 Sharpe v. Blondeau, cited 9 Hare App. 
 27. 
 
 6 Braithwaite's Pr. 30. 
 
 ' 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 3; Chatfield v. Berch- 
 toldt, 9 Hare App. 28. 
 
 441
 
 * 442 COMPELLING APPEARANCE. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 is out of the jurisdiction, the time specially fixed by the Court for him 
 to appear should be inserted in the indorsement, instead of " eight 
 days." 8 In such a case, the time fixed for him to plead, answer, or 
 demurr, not demurring alone, should also be inserted in the indorse- 
 ment, if the plaintiff intends to serve him with interrogatories. 9 
 
 When the defendant is a corporation aggregate, the words, " you will be 
 liable to have your lands and tenements, goods and chattels, distrained 
 upon, and other proceedings taken against you," are substituted for the 
 words, " you will be liable to be arrested and imprisoned. 10 
 
 Where the Attorney-General is served with a bill, there should be no 
 indorsement upon it. 11 
 
 * 442 * All peers of the three kingdoms, with or without a seat in 
 
 the Upper House, 1 provided they are not members of the House 
 of Commons, 2 and the widows and dowagers of the temporal lords, 3 are 
 entitled, before they are served with an indorsed copy of the bill, to be 
 informed by a communication from the Lord Chancellor, termed a letter 
 missive, of the fact of the bill having been filed. To obtain this letter 
 missive, a petition for that purpose to the Lord Chancellor must be left 
 with his Lordship's secretary : who will thereupon prepare the letter 
 missive, 4 obtain his Lordship's signature thereto, and deliver it out to 
 the plaintiff's solicitor. 
 
 Where a written bill is filed, a written copy, stamped and indorsed as 
 before explained, may be served on any defendant; and such service will 
 have the same effect as the service of a printed copy. 8 
 
 The indorsement must be tested as of the day on which the copy of 
 the bill is stamped for service ; and at the time it is presented for the 
 purpose of being stamped, a prcecipe must be filled up, and filed with the 
 proper officer. 6 
 
 If the copy of the bill is to be stamped for service in pursuance of any 
 special order, such order must be produced at the same time. The copy 
 of the bill may be altered and re-stamped at any time before service, on 
 another prcecipe being left with the proper officer. 7 
 
 When the copies of the bill have been stamped and indorsed, in the 
 manner above pointed out, the next step is to serve each of the defend- 
 ants with one of such copies. This, unless the Court directs some other 
 mode of service, is effected by serving such copy on each defendant per- 
 
 8 Ibid.; Sharpe v. Blondeau, 9 Hare App. 5 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 6; see R. S. C 1883, 
 27; Baynes »'. Ridge, id.; 1 W. R. 99. Ord. XII. 30. 
 
 9 For forms, see Vol. III. 6 Each copy stamped for service must bear 
 
 10 Braithwaite's Pr. 29, n. As to the form a 5s. Chancery fee fund stamp if on the higher 
 of the indorsement, where the defendant is a scale, and a Is. stamp if on the lower scale, 
 peer, see post, p. 445. Regul. to Ord. Sched. 4. One prcecipe is sufli- 
 
 11 Braithwaite's Pr. 31. cient for any number of copies. For forms of 
 
 1 Robinson v. Lord Rokeby, 8 Ves. 601. prcecipe, see Vol. III. 
 
 2 Ibid. 7 Braithwaite's Pr. 32. No fee is payable 
 8 Harr. by Newl. 101. for restamping the copy, unless, as it would 
 4 A fee of 20s. higher scale, and 5s. lower seem, the application is made after the expira- 
 
 scale, is payable in Chancery fee fund stamps, tion of twelve weeks from the date of the in- 
 
 on each letter missive; Regul. to Ord. Sched. dorsement. Cons. Ord. XXVIII. 5, 9; 15 & 
 
 4. For forms of petition and letter missive, see 16 Vic. c. 86, §§4,5; Braithwaite's Pr. 32; 
 
 Vol. HI. Braithwaite's Manual, 190. 
 
 442
 
 SERVICE OP THE COPY OF THE BILL. 
 
 444 
 
 son ally, or by leaving the same with his servant, or some member of his 
 family, 8 at his dwelling-house or usual place of abode ; and has the same 
 effect as the service of a subpoena formerly had. 9 
 
 When an affidavit has been filed with the bill, a copy of such affidavit, 
 but not necessarily an office copy, should be sealed at the Record and 
 Writ Clerks' Office, and annexed to, and served with, each copy of the 
 bill sealed there for service. 10 . 
 
 * Service on a Sunday is not good service. 1 Service of a copy * 443 
 of the bill is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary service 
 requires no leave from the Court ; extraordinary service requires a special 
 order of the Court to render it valid, and is not used except under spe- 
 cial circumstances, when the ordinary service cannot be effected. 
 
 When the copy is left at the dwelling-house, it is necessary that it 
 should be the place where the defendant actually resides ; 2 and the mere 
 leaving the copy at a defendant's ordinary place of business, if 
 he does not reside there, will not be good service ; 8 and * there- * 444 
 
 8 The member of the family should be an 
 inmate of the house. Edgson v. Edgson, 3 De 
 G. & S. 629. 
 
 9 Cons. Ord. X. 1 ; 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, 
 §§ 4, 5. 
 
 1" Ante, pp. 395, 396. 
 
 1 Macreth v. Nicholson, 19 Ves. 367; see 
 Taylor v. Phillips, 3 East, 155; 1 Chitty's Arch. 
 232 ; 29 Car. II. c. 7, § 6. A subpoena return- 
 able on Sunday is irregular, and will not 
 warrant the issuing of an attachment for diso- 
 bedience thereof, as no Court can be held on 
 that day for any purpose. Gould v. Spencer, 
 5 Paige, 541. 
 
 2 Service on the Deputy-Governor of a 
 prison was held to be due service on a defend- 
 ant, a prisoner there. Newenham p. Pember- 
 ton, 2 Coll. 54; 9 Jur. 637. 
 
 In the U. S. Courts, as to the service of sub- 
 poenas, see Equity Rules 13-15, post, Vol. III. 
 
 In Massachusetts, "if a party shall not be 
 found, a copy of the subpxna may be left at his 
 usual place of abode; and, the truth of the case 
 being returned by the officer, if it shall be made 
 to appear to the Court that the party has actual 
 notice of the suit, no other service shall be re- 
 quired ; otherwise, such notice shall be given 
 as the Court shall order." Rule 4, of the Rules 
 of Practice in Chancery. 
 
 In some States the subpoena may be served 
 by any person; as in Maryland, Hove ». Penn, 
 1 Bland, 29; Taylor v. Go>don, id. 132; so in 
 New Jersey, West v. Smith, 1 Green Ch. 309; 
 but the service, if made by any person other 
 than a legal officer, must be proved. Hoye v. 
 Penn, 1 Bland, 29. 
 
 In Vermont, service of a subpoena cannot be 
 made by an indifferent person not named in it. 
 Allyn v. Davis, 10 Vt. 547; Burlington Bank 
 v. Cottin, 11 Vt. 106. As to Kentucky, see 
 Trabue v. Holt, 2 Bibb, 393 ; Barnett v. "Mont- 
 
 gomery, 6 Mon. 327. In New Hampshire, 
 where a private person may make service of 
 process by copy, he may himself certify and 
 swear to the copy. Stone v. Anderson, 25 
 N. H. 221. 
 
 The service of a subpoena must be within the 
 jurisdiction, otherwise it is irregular. Dunn v. 
 Dunn, 4 Paige, 425; Creed v. Bryne, 1 Hogan, 
 79 ; Johnson v. Nagle, 1 Molloy, 243 ; Haw- 
 kins v. Hale, 1 Beav. 73; Erickson v. Smith, 
 46 N. H. 375. But the defendant may volun- 
 tarily appear or stipulate in writing to accept 
 out of the jurisdiction a service as regular. 
 Dunn v. Dunn, ubi supra ; Picquet v. Swan, 5 
 Mason, 561; see Henderson v. Hopper, Halst. 
 Dig. 170. In Tennessee, where service of a 
 subpoena has been made upon one material de- 
 fendant in the proper district or county, a 
 [counterpart] subpoena may be served upon any 
 other defendant out of t:ie county or district, 
 but within the State. University v. Cambrel- 
 ing, 6 Yerger, 79; Code, § 4306 ; Moore v. Gen- 
 nett, 2 Tenn. Ch. 375. 
 
 In Pratt v. Bank of Windsor, Hairing. Ch. 
 254, it was held, that the service of a subpoena 
 upon a defendant out of the State is irregular,, 
 In Picquet v. Swan, 5 Mason, 561, the plaintiff 
 obtained an order, appointing a commissioner 
 to make service on one of two defendants in 
 Paris, and to take his answer to the bill. See 
 the mode of proceeding, id. p. 562. But the 
 defendant having refused to appear, the cause 
 was, on motion of the other defendants, ordered 
 to stand dismissed, unless the plaintiff pro- 
 cured the appearance and answer of the defend- 
 ant within a given time. Id. 571. See infra, 
 p. 449, n. 6. 
 
 8 See Smith v. Parke, 2 Paige, 298; Dyett 
 
 v. N. A. Coal Co. 20 Wend. 570; Johnston v. 
 
 Macconnell, 3 Bibb, 1. A copy of the subpoena 
 
 left at the residence of a partv domiciled in the 
 
 "443
 
 * 444 COMPELLING APPEARANCE. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 fore, where, under the old practice, a subpoena, returnable immedi- 
 ately, 1 was moved for upon affidavit stating that the defendant lived at 
 Epsom, but that he had chambers in the Temple and resided there, Lord 
 Thurlow said, that as it did not appear that his place of abode was in 
 the Temple, he could not make the order. 2 Where, however, a member 
 of the House of Commons, having a house at Southampton and no town 
 residence, was served with a subpoena, returnable immediately, at a 
 friend's house in London, with whom he was upon a visit, and for 
 default of appearance a sequestration had been awarded, Lord Thurlow 
 refused to set aside the sequestration for irregularity : saying, that he 
 could not suppose that the defendant, a Member of Parliament, during 
 the session of Parliament had no town residence, or that the residence 
 above stated should not be taken as a residence quoad the defendant, 
 whose duty it was to attend, and who actually did attend, the House. 8 
 And so, where a letter missive, and subsequently a subpoena, had been 
 served at the town residence of a peer during the sitting of Parliament, 
 Lord Thurlow appears to have been of opinion that it was good ; 4 and 
 where a letter missive, and afterwards a subpoena, had been served at 
 the town residence of a peer, who at the time was abroad, and afterwards 
 an order nisi for a sequestration was issued, a motion to discharge the 
 order nisi was refused. 5 
 
 Ordinary service upon an infant defendant, or upon a defendant of 
 weak or unsound mind, not so found by inquisition, is effected in the 
 same manner as upon an adult. 6 
 
 State, and temporarily absent therefrom, is 
 sufficient unless it is made to appear that he 
 has been surprised. Southern Steam Packet 
 Co. v. Roger, 1 Cheeves, 48. Where the de- 
 fendant has no family, but boards or makes it 
 his home in the family of another, the subpoena 
 to appear and answer may, in his absence from 
 home, be served upon either of the heads of the 
 family, at such place of his abode, although he 
 has no wife or servant. But to make such 
 service regular, the place of service must be his 
 actual place of residence at the time, and his 
 absence therefrom must be merely temporary. 
 People i'. Craft, 7 Paige, 325 ; see Bickford v. 
 Skewes, 9 Sim. 428; Wagner v. Blanchet, 27 
 N. J. Eq. 387. The personal service of a sub- 
 poena on a defendant, who is confined in the 
 State's prison for a term of years, is regular. 
 Phelps v. Phelps, 7 Paige, 500. So where the 
 service of the subpoena was made on the keeper 
 of the State's prison instead of on the defend- 
 ant, who was confined therein. Johnson v. 
 Johnson, Walker Ch. 309. For service on a 
 defendant under criminal sentence see further, 
 Newenham v. Pemberton, 2 Coll. 54. The 
 return to a subpoena against A and B was as 
 follows: "Executed on A, — B not found;" 
 and this was held insufficient to found a decree. 
 Pegg v. Capp, 9 Blackf. 275. And see where 
 the subpoena was blank as to the return day. 
 Arden v. Waldon, 1 Edw. Ch. 631. In Illi- 
 
 444 
 
 nois, where a summons in Chancery is served 
 by leaving it at the residence of the defend- 
 ant, the return must show that it was left with 
 some person who was a member of the defend- 
 ant's family. Townsend v. Griggs, 2 Scam. 
 365. 
 
 i See Hinde, 78. 
 
 2 v. Shaw, Hinde, 92; see McPherson 
 
 v. Horsel, 13 N. J. Eq. 35. 
 
 3 East India Co. v. Rumbold, Hil. Term 
 1781, cited Hinde, 92. 
 
 4 Att.-Gen. v. Earl of Stamford, 2 Dick. 
 744. 
 
 6 Thomas v. Earl of Jersey, 2 M. & K. 398; 
 and see Davidson v. Marchioness of Hastings, 
 2 Keen, 509, 513. 
 
 6 See Ord. VII. 3; R. S. C. Old. IX. 4, 5; 2 
 Seton, 1624, Nos. 6, 7; Thorn v. Smith, W. N. 
 (1879) 81; 27 W. R. 617; see Fore Street Ware- 
 house Co. v. Durrant, 10 Q. B. D. 471. In 
 Morgan v. Jones, 4 W. R. 381, V. C. W , sub- 
 stituted service on the medical officer or keeper 
 of an asylum in which a lunatic was con- 
 fined, was refused; personal service if practica- 
 ble being held necessary; and see Anon. 2 Jur. 
 N. S. 324, V. C. W. ; Rodgers r. Ellison, Meigs, 
 90. But substituted service has been allowed 
 when shown to be dangerous to the patient. 
 Raine v. Wilson, L. R. 16 Eq. 576; Speak v. 
 Metcalf, 2 Tenn. Ch. 214; ante, p. 177, n. 6. 
 
 Upon a bill against a lunatic in the custody
 
 SERVICE OF THE COPY OF THE BILL. 
 
 445 
 
 * When a husband and wife are both defendants, ordinary * 445 
 service upon the husband alone is sufficient ; * and process of con- 
 tempt may issue against him alone for his wife's default. 2 But if they 
 are living apart, each should be served. 8 If the husband is abroad, or 
 cannot be served, and the subject-matter of the suit arises, in right of 
 the wife, the plaintiff may obtain, on an ex parte motion, supported by 
 affidavit, an order that service upon her may be deemed good service. 4 
 Service on her alone, in the usual manner, will then be sufficient ; 6 but no 
 compulsory process can be issued against her, grounded on such service, 
 without a previous order of the Court. 6 
 
 If a corporation aggregate be a defendant, the copy of the bill may be 
 served upon any one of its members, or, in the case of a public company, 
 upon the public officer appointed to be sued on its behalf, or if there be 
 no such officer, upon the chairman, manager, or secretary, either per- 
 sonally or at the office of the company. 7 (a) Provision is also made, by 
 
 of a committee, service of process upon the 
 committee is sufficient. Cates v. Woodson, 2 
 Dana, 455. 
 
 Process ought to be served personally on 
 infants. Massie v. Donaldson, 8 Ohio, 377; 
 Jones v. Mason, N. C. Term K. J 25. In the 
 presence of, or with notice to, the natural or 
 legal guardian, or other person having the con- 
 trol of the infant. Cooper v. Green, 2 Add. Ec. 
 454; 1 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 107. But service of a 
 subpoena on the father of a minor defendant, if 
 within the jurisdiction, was held sufficient, al- 
 though the minor resided out of the jurisdiction. 
 Kirwan v. Kirwan, 1 Hogan, 264; see 1 Barb. 
 Ch. Pr. 51, 52; Bank of Ontario v. Strong, 2 
 Paige, 301. So on the surviving parent, whether 
 the minor is more or less than fourteen yeais of 
 age. Sanders v. Godley, 23 Ala. 473. But 
 when the parent and child are both parties, a 
 service on the parent alone is not sufficient to 
 bring the infant before the Court. The subpoena 
 should be served on the parent for the infant, 
 and this should appear by the officer's return. 
 Hodges v. Wise, 16 Ala. 509. 
 
 In Tennessee the general guardian of an 
 infant represents the person and estate of his 
 ward, and the infant is well brought before the 
 Court by service of process on such guardian, 
 even where the bill is filed to subject lands 
 descended to the payment of the ancestor's 
 debt. Britain v. Cowen, 5 Humph. 315. And 
 see Cowen v. Anderson, 7 Coldw. 291 ; Scott v. 
 Porter, April Term 1879, at Jackson. 
 
 Where a bill has been served on an infant, 
 there is no necessity for serving the same again 
 on the guardian ad litem after he is appointed. 
 Jones v. Drake, 2 Hayw. 237. 
 
 1 See R. S. C. Ord. IX. 3; Leavitt v. Cruger, 
 1 Paige, 421. 
 
 2 Gee v. Cottle, 3 M. & C. 180. The affi- 
 davit of service should state that the service 
 was made on the husband and wife, by serving 
 the husband. Steel v. Parsons, 8 Jur. 641, V. 
 C. K. B. For an order, giving leave to serve 
 husband and wife separately out of the juris- 
 diction, the fact of the marriage being in dis- 
 pute, see Longworth v. Bellamy, cited 2 Seton, 
 1622. 
 
 3 See Whitley v. Honeywell, 24 W. R. 851. 
 
 4 For form of order, see 2 Set'n, 1623, No. 
 5, 1624, No. 6; and for forms of motion paper 
 and affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 
 5 Bell v. Hyde, Prec. Ch. 328; Dubois v. 
 Hole, 2 Vern. 613; Bunyan v. Mortimer, 6 
 Mad. 278; and see Pemberton v. M'Gill, 1 Jur 
 N. S. 1045, V. C. W.; see Dyett N. A. Coal 
 Co. 20 Wend. 570. 
 
 6 Graham v. Fitch. 2 De G. & S. 246; 12 
 Jur. 833; and see ante, p. 183. As to substi- 
 tuted service upon the wife for her husband, see 
 Carwardine v. Wishlade, 15 Jur. 913 (a fore- 
 closure suit); and see Palmer v. Palmer, 2 
 Seton, 1622. Where the plaintiff seeks relief 
 out of the separate estate of the wife, the sub- 
 poena must be served on her personally, and she 
 may put in a separate answer; the husband in 
 such case being considered only a nominal 
 party. Leavitt v. Cruger, 1 Paige. 422 ; Fergu- 
 son v. Smith, 2 John. Ch. 139. In New Jersey, 
 in cases where husband and wife are made de- 
 fendants, and he only is served with process of 
 subpoena, the wife being out of the State, an 
 order of publication shall be taken against her, 
 unless an appearance be entered for her. Chan- 
 cery Rule, 23. 
 
 7 Braithwaite's Pr. 33. A colonial govern- 
 ment is not a corporation for this purpose. 
 Sloman v. Governor of New Zealand, 1 C. P. 
 
 (a) In England, service of a writ of sum- 
 mons on the head officer of a foreign corpora- 
 
 tion at its place of business in that country is 
 now good service on the corporation. Haggin 
 
 445
 
 * 446 COMPELLING APPEARANCE. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 various public Acts, respecting the mode in which documents may be 
 served on a company. 8 
 
 If the defendant be entitled to the privilege of peerage, it has pre- 
 viously been stated that he has a right to a letter missive, before an 
 indorsed copy of the bill is served upon him. 9 This letter mis- 
 * 446 sive, with a copy of the petition for the same, and with * an 
 unindorsed copy of the bill, must be served in the same manner 
 as a copy of the bill in ordinary cases. If the peer does not enter his 
 appearance within eight days, the plaintiff must serve him with a copy 
 of the bill indorsed in the usual form : except that the words, " you will 
 be liable to have your estate sequestered, and other proceedings taken 
 against you," must be substituted for the words, " you will be liable to 
 be arrested and imprisoned." * 
 
 The Attorney-General used not to be served with a subpoena, but with a 
 copy of the bill. 2 Hence, now the practice with respect to the Attorney- 
 General will be the same as with respect to other defendants. 
 
 If the plaintiff amends his bill, he must serve a copy of the amended 
 bill on all the defendants, 3 or, if they have appeared, on their solici- 
 tors ; 4 or, where they have appeared in person, at the place named for 
 service ; 5 and the copy served must be stamped by the Kecord and Writ 
 Clerk, so as to indicate the filing of the amended bill, and the date of 
 
 D. 563. The subpcena, in case of a corporation, 
 is usually served on the president cashier, secre- 
 tary, or other principal officer. I Barb. Ch. 
 Pr. 52. Service on private corporators is no 
 service on the corporation. De Wolf v. Mallett, 
 3 Dana, 214. Where the business of a company 
 had practically ceased, but the company had 
 never been dissolved, service was ordered on 
 the late chairman and secretary. Gaskell v. 
 Chambers, 26 Beav. 252; 5 Jur. N. S. 52. 
 
 s See8&9 Vice. 16, § 135; id. c. 18, §134; 
 id. c 20, § 138; 25 & 26 Vic. c 89, §§ 62. 63; 
 R. S. C. 1883, Ord. IX. 7, 8; see 46 & 47 Vic. 
 c 49. Respecting the present English practice, 
 see 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 335. 
 
 9 Robinson v. Lord Rokeby, 8 Ves. 601; 
 Vigers ». Lord Audley, 9 Sim. 409; ante, p. 442; 
 Braithwaite's Pr. 29, n. 
 
 1 Braithwaite's Pr. 29, n. 
 
 2 Lord Red. 39. Where the United States 
 or a State is interested, the District Attorney or 
 the Attorney-General must be served with a 
 copy of the bill. If he omits to enter an ap- 
 pearance, an order may be obtained on petition, 
 that he appear within a certain time, or the bill 
 be taken as confessed. 1 HofF. Ch. Pr. 108. 
 In Grayson V. Virginia, 3 Dall. 320, it was held 
 that when process at Common Law or in Equity 
 shall issue against a State, the same shall be 
 served upon the Governor or chief executive 
 
 officer, and the Attorney-General of such State. 
 Rules of U. S. Supreme Court, December Term, 
 1858, No. 5. 
 
 In New Jersey v. New York, 3 Peters, 461, 
 it was held that where the bill is brought by 
 one State against another, the subpcena must be 
 served upon the Governor and Attorney-Gen- 
 eral of the defendant State, and a service on 
 the Governor nlone, there being no appearance 
 entered for the defendants, will not authorize 
 the Court to proceed. See Huger v. South 
 Carolina, 3 Dall. 339. 
 
 3 Cons. Ord. IX. 20. See 1 Dan. Ch. Prac 
 (6th Eng. ed.) 336. The copy may be partly 
 printed and partly written, if the amendment 
 is not made by a reprint. Ibid. 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. IX. 21. It is sufficient to 
 serve one copy on each solicitor, notwithstand- 
 ing he may be concerned for several defendants. 
 Where, however, a solicitor is properly con- 
 cerned as solicitor for one defendant, and as 
 agent for another, two copies should be served. 
 Braithwaite's Pr. 308; and id. n. Service on 
 the solicitor is sufficient, although the defendant 
 is outof the jurisdiction. Zulueta v. Vincent, 3 
 McN. & G. 246, overruling Marquis of Hertford 
 v. Suisse, 13 Sim. 489, and Sewell r. Gadden, 
 1 De G. & S. 126. 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. IX. 22. 
 
 v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris, 23 Q. B. D. 
 519. This does not apply to a foreign partner- 
 ship, Russell v. Cambefort, id. 526; although 
 service on one of its members within the juris- 
 
 446 
 
 diction is good service on all the partners. 
 Shepherd v. Hirsh, Pritchard, & Co., 45 Ch. D. 
 231. See Grant v. Auderson, [1892] 1 Q. B. 
 108; 65 L. T. 619.
 
 SERVICE OF THE COPY OP THE BILL. 
 
 447 
 
 the filing. Where the plaintiff requires an answer to the amended bill, 
 the copy served should be indorsed in the same manner as the copy of an 
 original bill : otherwise, the copy served should be without indorsement. 6 
 It is, of course, to be understood, that as to defendants added by amend- 
 ment, the bill is to be treated as an original bill. 
 
 Where the plaintiff is unable to effect ordinary service upon a defend- 
 ant, in the manner above mentioned, the Court will, iu many cases, 
 permit service to be effected upon the defendant himself out of the juris- 
 diction, or to be substituted upon his agent within the jurisdiction. It 
 was expressly enacted by the English statute, that the Court shall be at 
 liberty to direct substituted service of the bill, as it shall think 
 fit; 7 but it seems that this enactment * does not extend the juris- * 447 
 diction previously exercised by the Court in this respect. 1 (a) 
 
 Where a bill is filed to restrain an action at law, and the defendant 
 (the plaintiff in the action) is out of the jurisdiction, or cannot be found, 2 
 the Court will allow substituted service on the attorney employed by him 
 to conduct the proceedings at law, on an affidavit proving those facts. 8 
 
 Substituted service of the copy of a cross-bill, upon the solicitor who 
 filed the original bill, will not be ordered ; but the Court will, in such a 
 case, stay the proceedings in the original cause until the defendants have 
 entered an appearance. 4 
 
 « Barn- v. Croskey, 2 J. & H. 130. 
 
 1 15 & 16 "Vic. c. 86, § 5; and see 4 & 5 
 Will. IV. c. 82, § 2, post, p. 449, n. 8. 
 
 i See Bones v. Angier, 18 Jur. 1050, V. C. 
 W. ; and see Cons. Ord. X. 2. In Hope v. Hope, 
 4 De G. M. & G. 328, 342; 19 Beav. 237, Lord 
 Cranworth C. says, that, where there is an agent 
 in this country managing all the affairs of a 
 defendant who is abroad, and regularly com- 
 municating with him upon his affairs, or where 
 he has an agent here specially managing the 
 particular matter involved in the suit, the 
 Court has felt that it might safely allow service 
 upon the agent to be deemed good service upon 
 the person abroad: because the inference was 
 irresistible, that service so made was service on 
 a person either impliedly authorized to accept 
 that particular service, or who certainly would 
 communicate the process so served to the party 
 who was not in this country to receive it him- 
 self. The object of all service was of course 
 only to give notice to the party on whom it was 
 made, so that he might be made aware of, and 
 able to resist, that which was sought against 
 him; and when that had been substantially 
 done, so that the Court might feel perfectly 
 
 confident that service had reached him, every- 
 thing had been done that was required. See 
 Wolverhampton & Staffordshire Banking Co. v. 
 Bond. W. N. (1881), 6 ; 29 W. R. 599. Where 
 a bill was filed against a firm, one member of 
 which was resident abroad, substituted service 
 on the members in England was directed. Hen- 
 derson v. Campbell, 13 W. R. 704, L. JJ. 
 
 2 Sergison v. Beavan, 9 Hare App. 29, marg. , 
 16 Jur. 1111, V. C. S. ; Hamond v. Walker, 3 
 Jur. N. S. 686, V. C. W.; and see Seton, 877; 
 Anderson v. Lewis, 3 Bro. C. C. 429 ; 5 Sim. 
 505; Baillie v. Blanchet, 10 L. T. N. S. 365, 
 
 V. c. w. 
 
 3 The merits need not now be shown by affi- 
 davit. Sergison v. Beavan, ubi supra. 
 
 * Anderson v. Lewis, ubi supra ; and Gardi- 
 ner v. Mason, 4 Bro. C. C 478; 5 Sim. 506; and 
 see Waterton v. Croft, 5 Sim. 502, 507. But 
 substituted service is permitted in the United 
 States Courts in cross-causes and injunction bills 
 to stay proceedings at law in the same Court. 
 Hitner v. Suckley, 2 Wash. C C. 465; Ward v. 
 Sebring, 4 Wash. C. C. 472; Dunn v. Clarke, 8 
 Pet. 1 ; Schenck v. Peay, 1 Woolw. 175. 
 
 (a) Substituted service duly effected is equiv- 
 alent in all respects to personal service. Watt v. 
 Barnett, 3 Q. B. D. 363 ; Re Urquhart, 24 id. 723. 
 But the Court's jurisdiction is not extended 
 by provisions authorizing service of process 
 abroad, which is not a power inherent in the 
 Court. Cookey v. Anderson, 31 Beav. 452 ; 1 De 
 G. J. & S. 363. Hence there is no jurisdiction to 
 
 give leave to serve notices of orders and other 
 proceedings in the winding-up of a company on 
 persons residing abroad. Re Anglo-African S. 
 S. Co. 32 Ch. D. 348; see Re Nathan Newman 
 & Co. 35 Ch. D. 1. So the Court cannot order 
 service of an originating summons out of the 
 jurisdiction. Re Busfield, 32 Ch. D. 123; Du- 
 bout & Co. v. Macpherson, 23 Q. B. D. 340. 
 
 447
 
 * 448 COMPELLING APPEARANCE. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 In Hobhouse v. Courtney, 5 the cases and authorities upon the subject 
 of substituted service upon an agent were reviewed. There, the defend- 
 ant, who was out of the jurisdiction, had given special authority to a 
 person within the jurisdiction to act as his agent, with respect to 
 *448 the property which was the subject of the * suit; and the Court 
 ordered service on that person to be good service upon the defend- 
 ant. An application of a similar kind made in the case of Webb v. 
 Salmon, 1 was refused upon the ground, that the persons upon whom 
 the substituted service was sought to be effected were not agents in the 
 matter of the suit when the correspondence with the plaintiff's solicitor 
 commenced, and that they refused to accept the agency ; there was not, 
 therefore, that appointment of them as the solicitors or agents of the 
 defendant, which, in the case of Hobhouse v. Courtney, was assumed to be 
 necessary. The Vice-Chancellor also observed, that he was not prepared 
 to go beyond that case. In Cooper v. Wood, 2 substituted service was 
 ordered on a person who had acted as the solicitor of the absent defendant, 
 in the subject of the mortgage to which the suit related, and who, there 
 was reason to believe, was in communication with the defendant. And 
 in Weymouth v. Lambert, 8 substituted service was ordered in a creditors' 
 suit, on one who, acting as the attorney of the executor and general 
 devisee and legatee, resident in India, had obtained administration here, 
 and had entered into receipt of the rents of the real estate ; and where 
 an infant had been taken out of the jurisdiction for the express purpose 
 of preventing his being served personally, it was ordered, that service 
 upon the solicitor and Six Clerk of the parents should be good as against 
 the infant. 4 It is to be observed, however, that the principle, as laid down 
 in Hope v. Hope, 6 seems to go beyond the case of Hobhouse v. Courtney. 
 
 5 12 Sim. 140, 157; 6 Jur. 28; approved and 3 3 Beav. 333; and see Howkins v. Bennett, 
 
 acted on in Murray v. Vipart, 1 Phil. 521; 9 1 Giff. 215; 6 Jur. N. S. 948; and the cases 
 
 Jur. 173; and see Bankier v. Poole, 3 De G. & cited in the note to Skejrg v. Simpson, 2 De G. 
 
 S. 375; 13 Jur. 800; Hurst v. Hurst, 1 De G. & S. 454, 456; and as to service of bill, or order 
 
 & S. 694; 12 Jur. 152; Hornby v. Holmes, 4 of revivor, see Norton v. Hepworth, 1 M'N. & 
 
 Hare, 306; 9 Jur. 225, 796; Bones v. Angier, G. 54; 13 Jur. 244; Hart r. Tulk, 6 Hare, 618; 
 
 18 Jur. 1050; 2 W. R. 609; Dicker v. Clarke, Forster v. Menzies, 16 Beav. 568; 17 Jur. 657; 
 
 9 Jur. N. S. 636; 11 W. R. 635, V. C. K.; S. C. nom. Foster v. Menzies, 10 Hare App. 
 
 Barker v. Piele, 11 W. R. 658, V. C. K.; ^36 n., 71; Watts v. Hughes, 8 W. R. 292. 
 
 Jackson v. Shanks, 13 W. R. 287, V. C. W.; 4 Lane v. Hardwicke, 5 Beav. 222. 
 
 Gauther v. Meinertzhaagen, 1 W. N. 48, V. C. 8 4 De G. M. & G. 328; 19 Beav. 237. And 
 
 W. ; Brown v. Crowe, ib. 80, V. C. W. ; Jones v. see, in case of partners, Carrington v. Cantillon, 
 
 Cargill, 11 L. T. N. S. 566; but see Rickcord i>. Bunb. 107; Coles v. Gurney, 1 Mad. 187; 
 
 Nedriff. 2 Mer. 458. Kinder v. Forbes, 1 Beav. 503; Atkinson v. 
 
 1 3 Hare, 251, 255; nnd see Asiatic Banking Mackreth, W. N. (1867) 41. In a suit against 
 Co. v. Anderson, 13 L. T. N. S. 272; Furber v. a foreign State. Smith v. Weguelin, W. N. 
 King (No. 1), 23 W. R. 535. (1867) 273. As to substituted service in the 
 
 2 5 Beav. 391; and see Heald v. Hay, 9 VV. case of absconding defendants, see Cook v. 
 R. 369, V. C. S.; Hope v. Carnegie, L. R. 1 Dey, 2 Ch. D. 218; Crane v. Jullion, ib. 220; 
 Eq. 126, V. C. S.; Kees v. Braidley, 22 L.T.N. Whitehaven Bank v. Thompson, W. N. (1877) 
 S. 470; Ridsdale Allanlee v. Great Western Ry. 45, and 2 Seton, 1623; Wolverhampton & 
 Co. W. N. (1869), 269; 2 Seton, 1622. No. 2; Staffordshire Banking Co. v. Bond, W. N. 
 Dymond t>. Croft, 3 Ch. D. 512. Substituted (1881) 6; 29 W. R 599; Mullows v. Bannister, 
 service has also been ordered on the defendants' W. N. (1882), 183; S. C. nom. Mellows v. 
 London agent and solicitor in another suit which Bannister, 31 W. R. 238; Coulburn v. Carshaw, 
 was ended. Anderson v. Lewis, 3 Bro. C. C. 32 W. R. 33; Hamilton v. Davies, W. N. 
 505; Gardiner v. Mason, 4 id. 478; 5 Sim. 506; (1880), 82; R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XI. 
 
 and see Waterton v. Croft, 5 Sim. 502, 507. 
 448
 
 SERVICE OF THE COPY OF THE BILL. * 449 
 
 The Court, in the exercise of its discretion, has by special order per- 
 mitted various other modes of substituted service to be adopted. Thus, 
 service at the last place of abode of the defendant's wife has been or- 
 dered to be good service. 6 So, service by sending the document under 
 cover to the person to whom the defendant had directed his letters to be 
 sent, has been permitted. 7 Again, in the case of infants, substituted ser- 
 vice upon the mother, in one case, 8 and upon the father-in-law in another, 9 
 was ordered to be good service ; and where the infant was taken out of 
 the jurisdiction by his parents in order to prevent personal service, 
 service on the parents' solicitor was directed to be good service on the 
 infant. 10 
 
 * Whenever an order is made for substituted service, such order * 449 
 must be served at the same time that the bill is served, and it 
 must be stated in the order that it is to be served ; * care must also be 
 taken that the service is effected in strict accordance with the terms of 
 the order, and it will then have the same effect as ordinary service. 2 The 
 application for the order is made by an ex parte motion, or summons ; 3 
 and must be supported by an affidavit showing what efforts have been 
 made to serve the defendant, that all practicable means of doing so have 
 been exhausted, 4 that no appearance has been entered, and how the 
 substituted service is proposed to be effected. 5 
 
 It would seem that the Court had no authority, under its original 
 jurisdiction, to serve process upon any defendant, whether a natural 
 born subject or not, who was residing out of the territorial limits of its 
 jurisdiction, unless, indeed, the defendant was shown to have absconded 
 to avoid such service. 6 Such power has, however, been conferred on it 
 
 « Pulteney v. Shelton, 5 Ves. 147; and see 11 W. R. 868, M. R. ; but see Dicker v. Clarke, 
 
 Manchester "and Stafford Ry. Co. v. How. 17 11 W. R. 765, V. C. K. 
 
 Jur. 617, V. C \V. ; 15 &16 Vic. c. 86, § 5, 8 Reed v. Barton, 4 W. R. 793, V. C. W. ; 
 
 ante, p. 445. Re Boyer, 3 Jur. N. S. 930; see 1 Dan. Ch! 
 
 7 Hunt v. Lever, 5 Ves. 147; but see Gather- Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 339. For form of motion 
 cole v. Wilkinson, 1 De G. & S. 681; 11 Jur. paper, see Vol. III. 
 
 1096. As to service by advertisement, see 2 4 Firth v. Bush, 9 Jur. N. S. 431; 11 W. R. 
 
 Seton, 1623; Capes v. Brewer, W. N. (1875) 611, V. C. K.; and see Barker v. Piele, ll 
 
 193; 24 W. R. 40; Waters v. Waters, 24 W. R. W. R. 658, V. C. K.; Brooker v. Smith, 4 L. T. 
 
 90; Whitley v. Honeywell, id. 851; Raphael v. N. S. 545 ; R. S. C. Ord. X. 
 
 Ongley. 34 L. T. 124; O'Sheehy v. O'Sheehy, 5 For form of affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 
 31 L. T. 367; 2 Seton, 1622, No. 2; R. S. C. 6 Per Lord Westbury, L. C, Cookney v. 
 
 Ord. 1880, Sch. H. 19. Anderson, 1 De G. J. &S. 365, 382; 31 Beav. 
 
 8 Baker v. Holmes, 1 Dick. 18; and see Gar- 452; and see Foley v. Maillardet, 1 De G. J. 
 num v. Marshal, ib. 77; S. C. nom. Smith v. & S. 389; 10 Jur. N. S. 161; Samuel v. Rogers, 
 Marshall, 2 Atk. 70; Clark v. Waters, V. C S. 1 De G. J. & S. 396; Norris v. Cotterill, 5 
 cited, 1 Smith'3 Pr. 378; Hope v. Carnegie, N. R. 215, V. C. W. See now R. S. C. Ord. 
 L. R. 1 Eq. 126, V. C. S.; and see in case of XL 4, 6; Bree v. Marescaux, 7 Q. B. D. 434 ; 
 petitions, Re Blackwood, W. N. (1867), 114. Re E'ger, Eager V, Johnstone, 22 Ch. D. 86; 
 
 9 Thompson v. Jones, 8 Ves. 141. See ante, Lenders v. Anderson, 12 Q. B. D. 50 ; Speller 
 444, n. 6. v. Bristol Steam Nav. Co. 13 id. 96; Shearman 
 
 10 Lane v. Hurdwicke, 5 Beav. 222; see Hope v. Findley, 22 W. R. 122. Where leave was 
 
 v. Hope, supra. given to serve process out of the jurisdiction, 
 
 1 Jones v. Brandon, 2 Jur. N. S. 437, the service was useless urless the defendant 
 V. C. W. For form, see 2 Seton, 1622, Nos. entered an appearance, for no subsequent pro- 
 1-3, No. 4. ceeding could be based upon it. Cookney v. 
 
 2 Wilcoxon v. Wilkins, 9 Jur. N. S. 742; Anderson, 31 Beav. 452, 468; 1 De G. J. & S. 
 
 vol. i. — 29 449
 
 * 449 COMPELLING APPEARANCE. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 by statute, in all cases in which a suit has been instituted concerning 
 lands, tenements, or hereditaments situate in England or Wales, or 
 concerning any charge, lien, judgment, or incumbrance thereon, or con- 
 cerning any money vested in any Government or other public stock, 
 or public shares in public companies or concerns, 7 or the dividends or 
 produce thereof. 8 
 
 363; and see note to Shaw v. Lindsay, 18 Ves. 
 (2d ed.) 490; Fernandez v. Corbin, 2 Sim. 544; 
 Davidson v. Marchioness of Hastings, 2 Keen, 
 509, 616; Whitmore v. Ryan, 4 Hare, 612, 615; 
 10 Jur. 368. 
 
 See Flower v. Baker, 3 Mason, 251; Wil- 
 son v. Graham, 4 Wash. C. C. 53; Dunn v. 
 Dunn, 4 Paige, 425; Moore v. Gennett, 2 Tenn. 
 Ch. 375. Ante, 443, n. 2. 
 
 7 See Official Manager of the National 
 Association v. Carstairs, 9 Jur. N. S. 955; 11 
 W. R. 866, M. R. See R..yal Mail Packet Co. 
 v. Braham, 2 App. Cas. 381; Ingate v. Lloyd 
 Austriaco, 4 C. B. N. S. 704; Scott v. Royal 
 Wax Candle Co. 1 Q. B. D. 404. 
 
 8 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 33, § 1; 4 & 5 Will. 
 IV. c. 82, § 1. By the statutes it is enacted : 
 First, that in any such suit, upon special 
 motion, the Court may order and direct that 
 service in any part of Great Britain, or Ireland, 
 or in the Isle of Man, shall be deemed good 
 service upon the defendants, on such terms, in 
 such manner, and at such time as to the Court 
 shall seem reasonable. 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 33, 
 § 1. This Act extends to Scotland. Cameron 
 v. Cameron, 2 M. & K. 289, 292; limes v. 
 Mitchell, 4 Drew. 141; 1 De G. & J. 423; 
 Maclean v. Dawson, 4 De G. & J. 150; 5 Jur. 
 N. S. 063; and see, for cases under this Act, 
 Hasluck v. Stewart, 6 Sim. 321 ; Anderson v. 
 Stather, 10 Jur. 383, L. C. ; Turner t. Sowden, 
 12 W. R. 522, V. C. K., where service on an 
 infant was allowed. Suits commenced by 
 summons are within the Acts. Cohen v. Alcan, 
 1 De G. J. & S. 398 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 531, over- 
 ruling Lester v. Bond, 1 Dr. & S. 392; 7 Jur. 
 N. S. 538. Secondly, that in any such suit of 
 the same description, in case the defendant or 
 defendants shall appear by affidavit to be 
 resident in any specified place out of the 
 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, 
 the Court may, upon open motion of any of 
 the complainants in any such suit, founded 
 upon an affidavit or affidavits, and such other 
 documents as may be applicable for the pur- 
 pose of ascertaining the residence of the party, 
 and the particulars material to identify such 
 part}' and his residence, and also specifying the 
 means whereby such service may be authenti- 
 cated, and especially whether there are any 
 British officers, civil or military, appointed by 
 or serving under her Majesty, residing at or 
 near such place, order that service of the bill 
 upon the partv, in manner by the order directed, 
 
 450 
 
 or in case where the Court ma}' deem fit, upon 
 the receiver, steward, or other person receiving 
 'or remitting the rents of the lands or premises, 
 if any, in the suit mentioned, returnable at 
 such time as the said Court shall direct, shall 
 be deemed good service upon such party. 4 & 5 
 Will. IV. c. 82, § 2 ; see, for cases under this 
 Act, Godson v. Cook, 7 Sim. 519 ; Parker r. 
 Lloyd, 5 Sim. 508, 510; Dodd v. Webber, 2 
 Beav. 502; Green v. Pledyer, 3 Hare, 165, 163; 
 Cox v. Bannister, 8 W. R". 206, M. R.; Official 
 Manager v. Carstairs, 9 Jur. N. S. 955 ; 11 
 W. R. 866, M. R. The Acts provided for the 
 service of the subpoena to appear to and answer 
 the bill; but now, a properly stamped and 
 indorsed copy of the bill must be served. 15 
 & 16 Vic. c. 86 § 3, ante, pp. 439-441. Thirdly, 
 that if it shall be made to appear by affidavit 
 that any defendant, in any such suit, cannot 
 by reasonable diligence be personally served 
 with the bill, or that, upon inquiry, at his 
 usual place of abode, he could not be found, so 
 as to be served with such process, and that 
 there is just ground for believing that such 
 defendant secretes or withdraws himself, so as 
 to avoid being served with the process of the 
 Court, then and in all such cases, the Court 
 may order that the service of the bill shall be 
 substituted in such manner as the Court shall 
 think reasonable, and direct by such order. 
 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 82, § 2 ; and see 15 & 16 
 Vic. c. 86, § 5; ante, p. 446 ; 11 Geo. IV. & 1 
 Will. IV. c. 36, §§ 3, 9; Cons. Ord. X.6; post, 
 pp. 456-459. -There is also a General Order of 
 the Court which provides, that where a defend- 
 ant in any suit is out of the jurisdiction, the 
 Court may, upon application, supported by such 
 evidence as shall satisfy the Court in what 
 place or country such defendant is or nfty 
 probably be found, order that a copy of the bill 
 under the stat. 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 3, and, if 
 an answer is required, a copy of the interroga- 
 tories may be served on such defendant in 
 such place or country, or within such limits, as 
 the Court shall think fit to direct; and that 
 such order shall limit a time after such service 
 within which such defendant is to appear to the 
 bill: such time to depend on the place or 
 country within which the copy of the bill is to 
 be served ; and where an answer is required 
 such order shall also limit a time within which 
 such defendant is to plead, answer, or demur, 
 or obtain from the Court further time to make 
 his defence to the bill ; and that at the time
 
 SERVICE OF THE COPY OF THE BILL. 
 
 452 
 
 ♦Where it is sought to serve the bill out of the jurisdiction, *451 
 it is usual, and in most cases desirable, to apply for leave to 
 serve interrogatories to the bill at the same time ; x indeed, if it should be 
 necessary to take the bill pro confesso against the defendant out of the 
 jurisdiction, it cannot be done unless interrogatories have been served. 2 
 
 The application for leave to effect service out of the jurisdiction, is 
 made by an ex parte motion, or by summons at Chambers. 8 The affidavits 
 in support must show the place of residence at the time the application 
 is made, or as near thereto as is practicable ; 4 and an affidavit showing 
 that the defendant was resident at Calais, seven weeks previously to the 
 application, was held insufficient; 5 but the affidavit need not, it seems, 
 show more than the country in which the defendant resides. 6 
 
 * It is not necessary to show, by affidavit, that the circumstances *452 
 are such as to warrant the order. 1 The Court may look at the 
 pleadings for that purpose ; 2 and, if necessary, may go into the merits of 
 the case ; it being always in the discretion of the Court whether to grant or 
 refuse the application ; 3 but it acts on & prima facie case being made out. 4 
 
 2 Post, Chap. XI. Taking Bills pro confesso. 
 
 3 For form of order, see 2 Seton, 1623, No. 
 4; and for forms of motion paper and sum- 
 mons, see Vol. HI. Leave of Court or a Judge, 
 is necessary. R. S. C. Ord. XI. 2. 
 
 4 Preston v. Dickinson, 9 Jur. 919; 7 Beav. 
 582, n. 
 
 * Fieske v. Buller, 7 Beav. 581. 
 
 6 Blenkinsopp v. Blenkinsopp, 8 Beav. 612; 
 2 Phil. 1 : C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 20; Preston v. 
 Dickinson, ubi supra; Biddulph v. Lord Camovs, 
 7 Beav. 580; 10 Jur. 485. For form of affidavits, 
 see Vol. III. 
 
 1 See now 2 Seton, 1621; R. S. C. Ord. 
 XI. 1 a; Great Australian Gold M. Co. v. 
 Martin, 5 Ch. D. 1: Woods v. M'Innes, 4 
 
 C. P. D. 67 ; Casey v. Arnott, 1 id. 24 ; Fowler 
 v. Barstow, 20 Ch. D. 240; Harris v. Fleming, 
 13 Ch. D. 208; 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. 
 ed.) 341. 
 
 2 Blenkinsopp v. Blenkinsopp, ubi supra ; 
 Maclean v. Dawson, 4 De G. & J. 150; 5 Jur. 
 N. S. 663; Official Manager of National As- 
 sociation v. Carstairs, 9 Jur. N. S.955; 11 W. 
 R. 866, M. R.; Steele v. Stuart, 1 II. & M. 
 793; 10 Jur. N. S. 15; Foley V. Maillardet, 
 1 De G. J. & S. 389; 10 Jur. N. S. 161 ; Ha- 
 warden r. Dun lop, 2 Dr. & S. 155; Norris v. 
 Cotterill, 5 N. R. 215, V. C. W. 
 
 3 Lewis o. Baldwin, 11 Beav. 153, 158; 
 Whitmore v. Ryan, 4 Hare, 612, 617; 10 Jur. 
 368; Innes v. Mitchell, 4 Drew. 141; 3 Jur. 
 N. S. 991; 1 De G. & J. 423; Cook v. Wood, 7 
 W. R. 424, V. C. K. ; Maclean v. Dawson, 27 
 Beav. 25: 4 De G. & J. 150; 5 Jur. N. S. 663; 
 Societe G£ne>ale v. Dreyfus Brothers, 29 Ch. 
 
 D. 239. 
 
 4 Maclean v. Dawson, ubi supra ; Meiklan v. 
 Campbell, 24 Beav. 100. The plaintiff takes 
 the order at his own risk. Brooks v. Morison, 
 32 Beav. 652. 
 
 451 
 
 when such copy of the bill shall be served, the 
 plaintiff shall also cause the defendant to be 
 served with a copy of the order giving the 
 plaintiff leave to serve such copy of the bill. 
 Cons. Ord. X. 7 (1), (2), (3). The "above Acts of 
 Parliament apply to suits of a particular kind, 
 and fetter the exercise of the privilege by 
 certain restrictions; but the language of the 
 above General Order applies to suits of all 
 descriptions, and in some respects dispenses 
 ■with the provisions which the Legislature had 
 required. It was formerly considered, that the 
 General Order enabled the Court to direct 
 service on a defendant who had neither a 
 domicile nor property within the jurisdiction, 
 and in any suit whatever. This interpretation 
 of the General Order was acted upon for a 
 long series of years; Whitmore v. Ryan, 4 Hare, 
 612,617; 10Jur.368; Blenkinsopp* v. Blenkin- 
 sopp, 2 Phil. 1 ; 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 20; 
 8 Beav. 612; Steele v. Stuart, 1 H. & M. 713, 
 796; 10 Jur. N. S. 15; Curtiss v. Grant, 9 Jur. 
 N. S. 766, M. R.; but later it was overruled, on 
 the ground that the General Order only applies 
 to the cases within the Acts above referred to; 
 and it has been held, that the statutes 3 & 4 
 Vic. c. 94; 5 Vic. c. 6, § 29; 15 & 16 Vic. 
 c. 86, § 63, enabling the Court to make altera- 
 tions in forms and mode of proceeding, do not 
 empower the Court to sanction the service 
 of the bill out of the jurisdiction, except in 
 cases within the Acts. Cooknev v. Anderson, 
 1 DeG. J. &S. 365; 9 Jur. N.S. 736; Foley 
 t\ Maillardet, 1 De G. J. & S. 389; 10 Jur. 
 N. S. 161; Samuel v. Rogers, 1 De G. J. & S. 
 396; Norris v. Cotterill, 5 N. R. 215. V. C. W.; 
 but see contra, Drummond v. Drummond. L. 
 R. 2 Eq. 335; affirmed, L. R. 2 Ch. 32; Cory 
 v. Jacobsen, W. N. (1866) 290, V. C. K. 
 
 1 Leaman v. Brown, 7 W. R. 322, V. C. K.; 
 see post, Chap. IX., Interrogatories.
 
 * 453 COMPELLING APPEARANCE. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 Leave may be granted to serve infants, 5 and persons of unsound mind. 6 
 out of the jurisdiction ; and upon such service, guardians ad litem will 
 be appointed ; and a husband out of the jurisdiction may be served for 
 himself and his wife. 7 Where the fact of the marriage is in dispute, 
 leave will be granted to serve them separately. 8 Where a father and his 
 infant children were living together out of the jurisdiction, it was held, 
 that a separate copy must be served on each. 9 
 
 The order giving leave to make the service out of the jurisdiction must 
 be served with the copy of the bill ; 10 and this requirement is expressed 
 in the order itself. 11 If no directions to the contrary are given by the 
 order, the service should be effected by serving the copy of the bill and 
 a copy of the order on the defendant personally, or by leaving the same 
 with his servant, or some member of his family, at his dwelling-house or 
 usual place of abode, 12 within the limits defined by the order. The order 
 fixes the times after service of the bill within which the defendant is to 
 appear, and also, if an answer is required, the time after service of the 
 interrogatories within which the defendant is to plead, answer, or demur, 
 not demurring alone, or obtain from the Court further time to make his 
 defence to the bill ; 13 but it is not necessary to fix any time for his 
 demurring alone ; such time being the same as in cases where the 
 defendant is served within the jurisdiction. 14 
 
 These times are fixed by the Registrar ; and, as a general rule, 
 *453 * twice the time it ordinarily takes to reach the place where the 
 defendant is residing is allowed for appearing, and twice that 
 time for answering. 1 The times so fixed should be inserted in the 
 indorsement on the bill, instead of the time inserted there when the 
 bill is to be served within the jurisdiction. 2 
 
 Where a defendant has been served out of the jurisdiction under this 
 order, he cannot be attached for want of appearance, upon his coming 
 within the jurisdiction. 3 
 
 A defendant, on being served with the bill, may enter an appearance 
 at the Record and Writ Clerks' Office, 4 whereupon the suit will be pros- 
 ecuted against him in the ordinary way ; or he may move, on notice to 
 the plaintiff, to set aside such service for irregularity. 6 Before, however, 
 
 5 Anderson v. Stather, 10 Jur. 383; L. C. " Brown v. Stanton, 7 Beav. 582; Preston 
 Turner v. Sowden, 12 W. R. 522; 13 W. R. v. Dickinson, ib. n. ; Blenkinsopp t>. Blenkin- 
 66; 10 Jur. N. S. 1122, V. C. K.; S. C. nom. sopp, 8 Beav. 612; Griining v. Prioleau, 10 
 Turner v. Snowden, 2 Dr. & Sm. 256. Jur. N. S. 60; 12 W. R. 141, M. R. ; 33 Beav. 
 
 6 Biddulph v. Lord Camoys, 7 Beav. 580; 10 221. 
 
 Jur. 485. l Seton, 1245; Chatfield v. Berchtoldt, 9 
 
 1 Jones v. Geddes, 9 Jur. 1002, V. C. E. ; Hare App. 28. 
 Steele v. Plomer, 2 Phil. 782, n. ; 1 MN. & G. 2 Baynes v. Ridge, 9 Hare App. 27; 1 W. R. 
 
 83. 99 ; Chatfield v. Berchtoldt, ubi supra ; Sharpe 
 
 8 Longworth v. Bellamy, M. R. cited Seton, v. Blondeau, 1 W. R. 100, V. C. K., cited 9 
 1245. Hare App. 27. For form of indorsement, see 
 
 9 Jones j>. Geddes, ubi supra. Vol. III. 
 
 1° Cons. Ord. X. 7 (3); R. S. C. Ord. XL 4. s Hackwood v. Lockerby, 7 De G. M. & G. 
 
 M For form, see 2 Seton, 1623. 238; and see Penfold v. Kelly, 12 W. R. 286, 
 
 12 Cons. Ord. X. 1; Braithwaite's Pr. 33. V. C. K. 
 
 18 Ibid. ; Ord. X. 7 (2). The interrogatories * See post, Chap. XIIL, Appearance. 
 
 mav be served with the bill. Leaman v. Brown, 6 Maclean v. Dawson, 27 Beav. 25; 4'De 
 
 7 W. R. 322. V. C. K. G. & J. 150; 5 Jur. N. S. 663; Official Man- 
 452 

 
 SERVICE OF THE COPY OF THE BILL. * 454 
 
 he can so move, he must enter what is called a conditional appearance, 
 with the Registrar. 6 
 
 Where the plaintiff has introduced into the bill statements, as to the 
 subject-matter of the suit, that bring it within the Acts authorizing ser- 
 vice out of the jurisdiction, the defendant may, on the motion to discharge 
 the order, read affidavits disproving such statements. 7 
 
 All orders, writs, and other proceedings upon which process of con- 
 tempt may afterwards be issued, require, in general, what is called 
 personal service. 8 The same strictness is not, however, necessary for 
 the service of notice of ordinary proceedings in the cause ; and it will 
 be convenient here to state the manner in which service of such pro- 
 ceedings is effected. 
 
 Every solicitor of a party suing or defending by a solicitor must cause 
 to be written or printed upon every writ or summons which he sues out, 
 and upon every bill, 9 demurrer, plea, answer, or other pleading 
 or proceeding, and all exceptions which he may leave * with the * 454 
 Clerks of Record and Writs to be filed, and upon all instructions 
 which he may give to them for any appearance or other purpose, his name 
 or firm, and place of business, and also (if his place of business shall be 
 more than three miles from the Record and Writ Clerks' Office) another 
 proper place (to be called his address for service), which shall not be 
 more than three miles from that office, where writs, notices, orders, 
 summonses, warrants, and other documents, proceedings, and written 
 communications may be left for him. And where any such solicitor 
 shall only be the agent of any other solicitor, he must add to his own 
 name or firm, and place of business, the name or firm, and place of busi- 
 ness, of the principal solicitor. 1 
 
 A party suing or defending by a solicitor is not at liberty to change 
 his solicitor, in any cause or matter, without an order of the Court for 
 that purpose ; which may be obtained by motion or petition as of course ; 2 
 and until such order is obtained and served, and notice thereof given to 
 
 ager of National Association v. Carstairs, 9 see Index, Appearance ; for form of order and 
 
 Jur. N. S. 955; 11 W. K. 866, M. R. ; Foley appearance, see Seton, 1249, No. 6; and for 
 
 v. Maillardet, 10 Jur. N. S. 34; id. 161 ; 1 De form of motion paper, see Vol. III. 
 G. J. & S- 389 ; Steele v. Smart, 1 H. & M. ^ Foley v. Maillardet, 1 De G. J. & S. 389 ; 
 
 793; 10 Jur. N. S. 15; see Braithwaite's Pr. 10 Jur. N. S. 161; and see Official Manager of 
 
 321, and for forms of notice of motion, and affi- National Association v. Carstairs, 9 Jur. N. S. 
 
 davit in support, see Vol. III. For the present 955, 11 W. R. 866, M. R. 
 
 English practice, see 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th 8 In such cases, personal service is, however, 
 
 Eng. ed.) 342, 344. sometimes dispensed with. Rider v. Kidder, 12 
 
 6 Mackreth v. Nicholson, 19 Ves. 367; Ves. 202 ; De Manneville v. De Manneville, id. 
 
 Davidson v. Marchioness of Hastings, 2 Keen, 203; see post, p. 1685. 
 
 509; Johnson v. Barnes, 1 De G. & S. 129; 9 This includes an information. Prel. Ord. 
 
 Lewis v. Baldwin, 11 Beav. 153, 154; Maclean X. (4). 
 
 v. Dawson, ubi supi-a ; Foley v. Maillardet, ubi l Cons. Ord. III. 2; and see ante, p. 397. 
 
 supra ; but see Betts v. Barton, 3 Jur. N. S. 154, 2 The application is almost invariably made 
 
 V. C. W. The appearance is entered under an by petition; see post, Chap. XLIV., Solicitors. 
 
 order, which is obtained on an ex parte motion, The application should not be made as of course ( 
 
 or on petition of course at the Rolls. By the when the plaintiff in a creditor's suit, whose 
 
 order the defendant must, by his counsel, sub- debt is small, sells his debt after decree. Top- 
 
 mit to any process which the Court may direct ping v. Searson, 2 H. & M. 205. For forms of 
 
 to issue against him on the appearance. For motion paper and petition, see Vol. III. 
 the mode of entering a conditional appearance, 
 
 453
 
 * 455 COMPELLING APPEARANCE. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 the Clerk of Records and Writs, the former solicitor is considered the 
 solicitor of the party. 8 
 
 Where a party sues or defends by a solicitor, and no address for 
 service of such solicitor has been written or printed, pursuant to the 
 directions of the General Order, 4 all writs, notices, orders, summonses, 
 warrants, and other documents, proceedings, and written communica- 
 tions, not requiring personal service upon the party to be affected 
 thereby, are, unless the Court shall otherwise direct, to be deemed 
 sufficiently served upon the party, if served upon his solicitor, at his 
 place of business; but if an address for service of such solicitor shall 
 have been written or printed as aforesaid, then all such writs, notices, 
 orders, summonses, warrants, and other documents, proceedings, and 
 written communications, are to be deemed sufficiently served upon such 
 party, if left for his solicitor, at such address for service. 5 
 
 Every party suing or defending in person, must cause to be writ- 
 
 * 455 ten or printed upon every writ which he sues out, and upon * every 
 
 bill, 1 demurrer, plea, answer, or other pleading or proceeding, and 
 all exceptions, which he may leave with the Clerks of Records and Writs 
 to be filed, and upon all instructions which he may give to them for any 
 appearance or other purpose, his name and place of residence, and also 
 (if his place of residence shall be more than three miles from the Record 
 and Writ Clerks' Office), another proper place (to be called his address 
 for service), which shall not be more than three miles from that office, 
 where writs, notices, orders, summonses, warrants, and other documents, 
 proceedings, and written communications may be left for him. 2 
 
 Where a party sues or defends in person, and no address for service 
 of such party has been written or printed, pursuant to the direction of 
 the General Order, 8 or where a party has ceased to have a solicitor, all 
 writs, notices, orders, summonses, warrants, and other documents, pro- 
 ceedings, and written communications, not requiring personal service 
 upon the party to be affected thereby, are, unless the Court shall other- 
 wise direct, to be deemed to be sufficiently served upon such party, if 
 served upon him personally or at his place of residence ; but if an 
 
 s Cons. Orel. III. 3; Davidson v. Leslie, 9 5 Cons. Ord. III. 4. Service, in a supple- 
 
 Beav. 104; Wright v. King, ib. 161. This or- mental suit, upon the solicitor in the original 
 
 <ler was held not to apply where the suit was suit, has been held good service. Scott v. 
 
 at an end, and a petition was presented by a Wheeler, 13 Beav. 239; see also Hart v. Tulk, 
 
 new solicitor for payment out of a fund carried 6 Hare, 618; Norton v. Hempworth, 1 M'N. & 
 
 to a separate account. Waddilove v. Taylor, G. 54; 13 Jur. 244; Bligh v. Tredgett, 5 De G. 
 
 12 Jur. 598, V. C. W. Where there has been & S. 74; 15 Jur. 1101. 
 
 any special contract as to employment of solici- J This includes an information. Prel. Ord. 
 
 tor, the order to chmge is not of course. Jen- X. (4). 
 
 kins v. Bryant, 3 Drew. 70; Richards v. Scar- 2 Cons. Ord. III. 5; see Price v. Webb, 2 
 
 borough Market Co. 17 Beav. 83. And see, Hare, 511, 513; Johnson v. Barnes, 1 De G. & S. 
 
 as to this order, Ward v. Swift, 6 Hare, 309, 129; 11 Jur. 261. Where the solicitor for any 
 
 311. Service of notice of motion at solicitor's party, or any party suing or defending in person, 
 
 address for service held sufficient, although the changes his residence or address for service, 
 
 office was untenanted ; the solicitor having ab- notice thereof should be given to the Clerk of 
 
 sconded, and the party being out of the juris- Records and Writs, and also to each solicitor 
 
 diction. Reuben v. Thompson, 16 Jur. 1008, concerned in the cause. Braithwaite's Pr. 10. 
 
 V. C. T. For form of notice, see Vol. III. 
 
 * Cons. Ord. III. 2. 8 Cons. Ord. III. 5. 
 
 454
 
 WHERE NO SERVICE OF COPY OF BILL CAN BE EFFECTED. * 456 
 
 address for service of such party shall have been written or printed as 
 aforesaid, then all such writs, notices, orders, summonses, warrants, and 
 other documents, proceedings, and written communications, shall be 
 deemed sufficiently served upon such party, if left for him at such address 
 for service. 4 
 
 Where the solicitor of a party dies, the other side may sue out a sub- 
 poena against him to name a new solicitor ; 5 and it seems that substituted 
 service of this subpoena will be ordered, in a proper case. 6 
 
 Service of all writs, notices, summonses, orders, warrants, documents, 
 and other proceedings, not requiring personal service 7 upon the party 
 to be affected thereby, is to be made before seven o'clock in the evening; 
 except on. Saturday, when it is to be made before two o'clock in the 
 afternoon ; and if made after seven o'clock in the evening on any day 
 except Saturday, the service is to be deemed as made on the fol- 
 lowing day ; and if made after two * o'clock in the afternoon on * 456 
 Saturday, the service is to be deemed as made on the following 
 Monday. 1 
 
 Where a person who is not a party appears in any proceeding, either 
 before the Court or in Chambers, service upon the solicitor in London, 
 by whom such party appears, whether such solicitor act as principal or 
 agent, is to be deemed good service, except in matters of contempt 
 requiring personal service. 2 
 
 The plaintiff is, without special leave of the Court, at liberty to serve 
 any notice of motion, or other notice, or any petition or summons, per- 
 sonally, or at the dwelling-house or office of any defendant, who, having 
 been duly served with a copy of the bill, has not caused an appearance 
 to be entered within the time limited for that purpose ; 8 but such service 
 cannot be made out of the jurisdiction without special leave. 4 
 
 Section II. — Proceedings where no Service of a Copy of the Bill can 
 
 be effected. 
 
 In the event of the plaintiff not being able, by any of the means pre- 
 viously mentioned, to effect a due service of the copy of the bill upon 
 the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to have the bill taken pro eonfesso, 
 without either appearance by, or service of the copy of the bill upon, the 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. III. 6. language to a person serving the process or 
 
 5 Katcliff v. Roper, 1 P. Wins. 420; Gibson orders of the Court, or used scandalous or con- 
 v. Ingo, 2 Phil. 402: 12 Jur. 105; Ward v. temptuous words against the Court or the pro- 
 Swift, 6 Hare, 309, 311; Wyatt's Pr. 411; Ord. cess thereof, was liable to be committed, upon 
 III. (1); Braithwaite's Pr. 264, 265; and see motion, on notice to the person so offending. 
 Butlin v. Arnold, 1 H. & M. 715. For form of See Price v. Hutchison, L. R. 9 Eq. 534. 
 subpcena, see Ord. Sched. E., No. 5; and Vol. 2 Cons. Ord. III. 7; Jennings v. Devey, 4 
 HI. Jur. 858, V. C. E. With respect to the service 
 
 6 Gibson v. Ingo, ubi supra; Dean v. Leth- of a summons, zee post, Chap. XXIX., Procetd- 
 bridge, 26 Beav. 397. ings at Chambers. 
 
 7 Documents requiring personal service may 8 Cons. Ord. III. 8. 
 
 be served at any hour of the day (on weekdays), * Green v. Pledger, 3 Hare, 165, 168. As 
 
 and at any place within the jurisdiction of the to serving notices out of the jurisdiction, see 
 
 Court. Braithwaite's Pr. 12. Davidson v. Marchioness of Hastings, 2 Keen, 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 2. By Cons. Ord. 509, 516; Hawarden v. Dunlop, 2 Dr. & Sm, 
 
 XLII. 2, any one who used violence or abusive 155; Kavenagh v. Wall, 18 L. T. N. S. 18. 
 
 455
 
 * 457 COMPELLING APPEARANCE. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 defendant. In order that the plaintiff may pursue this course, he must 
 be able to satisfy the Court by affidavit, that the defendant is beyond 
 the seas, or that upon inquiry at his usual place of abode he could not 
 be found, so as to be served with process ; and there is just ground to 
 believe that he is gone out of the realm, or otherwise absconded, to 
 avoid being served with the process of the Court. 5 And if the affidavit 
 shows the defendant to be beyond the seas, the plaintiff must also prove, 
 by affidavit, that the defendant has been in England within two years 
 next before the bill was filed. 6 
 
 Upon ex parte motion supported by such affidavit, 7 the Court may 
 make an order, directing and appointing such defendant to appear 
 
 * 457 at a certain day therein to be named ; and a copy of such * order 
 
 must within fourteen days after it was made, be inserted in the 
 " London Gazette," * and affixed to the door of the parish church of the 
 parish where such defendant made his usual abode within thirty days 
 next before such his absenting; and a copy of such order must also, 
 within the time aforesaid, be posted up in some public place at the 
 Koyal Exchange, in London ; and if the defendant do not appear within 
 the time limited by such order, or within such further time as the Court 
 shall appoint, then, on proof made of such publication of such order as 
 aforesaid, the Court, being satisfied of the truth thereof, may order the 
 plaintiff's bill to be taken pro eo?ifesso. 2 
 
 5 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 3. See 
 now 1 Seton on Judgments (5th ed.), 11, 17. 
 
 6 Ibid. § 9; and see 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, 
 §4. 
 
 1 For forms of motion paper and affidavit, 
 see Vol. III. 
 
 i 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vic. c. 45, § 2; Braith- 
 waite's Pr. 292. 293. 
 
 2 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 3. For 
 forms of orders under this Act, see Kingsford 
 v. Poile, cited Seton, 1249. 
 
 In Massachusetts, as to defendants residing 
 out of the Commonwealth, see Ch. Rule 5, 
 104 Mass. 500. 
 
 In Vermont, when the defendant is out of 
 the State, so that a subpoena cannot be served 
 upon him, the plaintiff may file his bill in the 
 office of the clerk of the Court, and obtain an 
 order of publication. Genl. Stats, of Vt. c. 29, 
 § 21; Howe v. Willard, 40 Vt. 654,659. 
 
 There are, undoubtedly, provisions made in 
 other States for giving notice to non-resident 
 defendants, and taking bills as confessed 
 against them upon their non-appearance. In 
 New York, see 1 Barb.Ch. Pr. 92-96; Jermain 
 v. Langdon, 8 Paige, 41; Everts v. Beeker, id. 
 506; Corning v Baxter, 6 Paige, 178 ; see Con- 
 necticut Central Manuf. Co. v. Hartshorne, 3 
 Conn. 198 ; Code of Tennessee, §§ 4311, 4352. 
 
 Non-resident infants defendants must have 
 notice given them of the pendency of a suit 
 against them by publication, as in the case of 
 adults. Walker i>. Hallet, 1 Ala. 379 ; Dun- 
 
 456 
 
 ning v. Stanton, 9 Porter, 513; Coster v. Bank 
 of Georgia, 24 Ala. 37; Sturges v. Longworth, 
 1 Ohio St. 544. 
 
 In New York, where there is an infant ab- 
 sentee, the course under the statute must be 
 pursued ; and on the expiration of the time 
 fixed for his appearance, if no one applies in 
 his behalf, the plaintiff may move, as in ordi- 
 nary cases, for a guardian ad litem. Ontario 
 Bank v. Strong, 2 Paige, 301. Proceedings 
 may also be had under the statute by publica- 
 tion, where the infant is concealed. Mortimer 
 v. Copsey, 1 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 194. And the Court 
 has directed the same course to be pursued 
 where the defendant wa's a resident of another 
 State, and a lunatic. Otis v. Wells, id. 194. 
 
 The statutes authorizing proceedings against 
 absent defendants and unknown heirs, upon 
 constructive notice of publication, must be 
 strictly pursued. Brown v. Wood, 6 J. J. 
 Marsh. 11, 14 ; Hunt v. Wickliffe, 2 Peters, 201 ; 
 Lingan v. Henderson, 1 Bland, 236; Miller v. 
 Hall, 3 Monroe, 242; Tevis v. Richardson, 7 
 Monroe, 654; see Karr v. Karr, 19 N. J. Eq. 
 427; Oram v. Dennison, 13 id. 438; Boswell v. 
 Otis, 9 How. 336; Ferriss v. Lewis, 2 Tenn. 
 Ch. 291. 
 
 Where the statute directs an order o ( pub- 
 lication to be certified by the printer in whose 
 paper the order has been published, a certificate 
 must be made by the printer or proprietor, and 
 not by a mere editor. Brown v. Wood, 6 J. J. 
 Marsh. 11, 19; Butler v. Cooper, id. 27, 30;
 
 WHERE NO SERVICE OF COPY OF BILL CAN BE EFFECTED. 
 
 459 
 
 *The 6th rule of the 10th Order applied to the same circum- *458 
 stances as the provisions of the Act last stated ; the affidavits 
 which the *order requires are very nearly the same as those * 459 
 
 Brodie v. Skelton, 6 Eng. 120; Sprague v. 
 Sprague, 7 J. J. Marsh. 331. A certificate of 
 publication must show when, and in what 
 paper the order was published. Hopkins v. 
 Claybrook, 5 J. J. Marsh. 234; see Swift v. 
 Stebbins, 4 Stew. & Port. 84. Where an order 
 of publication has not been returned, an entry 
 on the record that it was proved to have been 
 duly executed, is insufficient evidence of publi- 
 cation to authorize the rendition of a decree. 
 Green v. M'Kinney, 6 J. J. Marsh. 193, 197; 
 but see contra, Swift v. Stebbins, 4 Stew. & 
 Port. 447. It is not sufficient that an order of 
 publication is had in a Chancery cause ; proof 
 of the publication must also be made. Moore 
 v. Wright, 4 Stew. & Port. 84. The proceed- 
 ing by publication on the ground that the de- 
 fendant does not reside in the State, does not 
 apply to those, such as mariners, who are tem- 
 porarily absent in their vocation. M'Kim v. 
 Odom, 3 Bland, 407; Wash v. Heard, 27 Miss. 
 400. Publication of notice, as in the case of a 
 non-resident defendant, is of no effect what- 
 ever , if the defendant in fact be not a non- 
 resident. Snowden v. Snowden, 1 Bland, 550; 
 see' Jermain v. Langdon, 8 Paige, 41; Everts v. 
 Beeker, 8 Paige, 506. 
 
 In Alabama, notice to absent defendants 
 must be published on the court-house door as 
 well as in the newspaper. Batre v. Auze, 5 
 Ala. 173. So in Virginia, Myrick v. Adams, 
 4 Munf. 366. So in Mississippi, Zecharie v. 
 Bowers, 3 Smedes & M. 641. 
 
 In Kentucky, by Act of Feb. 2, 1837, a warn- 
 ing order and traverse were substituted for 
 publication of notice against non-resident de- 
 fendants. Stump v. Beatty, 8 Dana, 14. A 
 warning order is constructive notice to a non- 
 resident of the pendency of the suit. Chiles v. 
 Boon, 3 B. Mon. 82. 
 
 In New Jersey, where any of the defend- 
 ants reside in the State, and are served with 
 process, it is not necessary, unless under special 
 circumstances, that the order for the appear- 
 ance of absent defendants should be published 
 in any newspaper out of the State. Foreign 
 publication is required only where all of the 
 defendants reside out of the State. Wetmore 
 t\ Dyer, 1 Green Ch. 386; Oram v. Dennison, 
 13 N.J. Eq. 438. See where substituted ser- 
 vice by publication was held good, although 
 the defendant was a resident of the State, 
 Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Laird, 24 
 N. J. Eq. 319. 
 
 A decree against non-resident defendants 
 upon whom process has not been served, or 
 proof of publication made, is erroneous. Gale 
 v. Clark, 4 Bibb, 415. But a decree regularly 
 
 made against absent defendants will not be 
 set aside of course, on their coming in and an- 
 swering, nor unless the justice of the case 
 requires it. Dunlap v. M'Elvoy, 3 Litt. 269; 
 see Pile o. McBratney, 15 111. 314. 
 
 In New York, where a defendant is pro- 
 ceeded against as an absentee, he is entitled of 
 course without an affidavit of merits, at any 
 time before a sale under the decree, to come 
 in and make his defence, if he has any, upon 
 payment of such cost as the Court may deem 
 reasonable. Jermain v. Langdon, 8 Paige, 41; 
 Evarts v. Beeker, 8 Paige, 506. 
 
 In such a case it is not necessary to vacate 
 the decree in the first instance; the decree may 
 be permitted to stand until the validity of the 
 defendant's defence is ascertained, and pro- 
 ceedings for this purpose may be had in the 
 same manner as if the decree had been opened 
 or vacated. Jermain v. Langdon, ubi supra. 
 
 Where a defendant, who has a fixed and 
 notorious domicile within the State, is pro- 
 ceeded against as an absentee, it is irregular, 
 and if he applies the first opportunity after he 
 has notice of the proceedings against him and 
 before a sa'e under the decree, he will be let in 
 to defend of course, and without costs. Jer- 
 main v. Langdon, 8 Paige, 41; Evarts v. Beeker, 
 id. 506. 
 
 In order to obtain a decree against a non- 
 resident defendant who does not appear, and 
 who has not been personally served with pro- 
 cess, the report of a Master as to the truth of 
 the allegations contained in the bill is neces- 
 sary. Corning v. Baxter, 6 Paige, 178. 
 
 In Erickson v. Nesmith, 46 N. H. 371, 377, 
 Sargent J. said: "Where no attachment of 
 property has been made within the jurisdiction, 
 and where the Court can make no actual ser- 
 vice of process, and where the party residing 
 in another State refuses to submit to the juris- 
 diction of the Court, we know of no way to ac- 
 quire such jurisdiction over the person. A 
 statute could not give it any more than a rule 
 of Court. The legislature have no more juris- 
 diction to make laws for tl»e inhabitants of other 
 States, while remHining there, than the Court 
 has to execute them upon such inhabitants." 
 See Jermain v. Langdon, 8 Paige, 41 ; Evarts v. 
 Beeker, 8 Paige, 506; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 
 468; Rangley v. Webster, 11 N. H. 299, and 
 cases cited. This subject was considered by 
 the U. S. Supreme Court in Baldwin v. Hale, 
 1 Wall. 232, and Baldwin v. Bank of Newbury, 
 id. 234; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714; and 
 see Bank v. Butler, 45 N. H. 236, 239; Ste- 
 phenson v. Davis, 56 Maine, 75, 76; Spurr v. 
 Scoville, 3Cush. 578; ante, p. 149, note. 
 
 457
 
 * 460 COMPELLING APPEARANCE. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 necessary under the Act; but the order only enables the plaintiff to 
 obtain an appearance to be entered for the defendant, and does not, 
 like the Act, authorize the bill to be taken pro confesso at once. The 
 order, however, dispenses with the necessity of having the notice 
 posted up at the Royal Exchange, or affixed to the door of the parish 
 church. It is as follows : " Where the Court is satisfied, by sufficient 
 evidence, that any defendant has been within the jurisdiction of the 
 Court, at some time, not more than two years * before the bill was filed, 
 and that such defendant is beyond the seas, or that upon inquiry at his 
 usual place of abode (if he had any), or at any other place or places 
 where, at the time when the bill was filed, he might probably have been 
 met with, he could not be found, so as to be served with a copy of the 
 bill under the statute 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 3, and that, in either case, 
 there is just ground to believe that such defendant has gone out of the 
 realm, 2 or otherwise absconded to avoid being served with such copy 
 of the bill or with other process, 3 the Court may order that such defend- 
 ant do appear at a certain day, to be named in the order ; and a copy 
 of such order, together with a notice to the effect set forth at the end of 
 this rule, may, within fourteen days after such order made, be inserted 
 in the ' London Gazette,' and be otherwise published as the Court shall 
 direct ; and where the defendant does not appear within the time limited 
 by such order, or within such further time as the Court may appoint, 
 there, on proof made of such publication of the said order, the Court 
 may order an appearance to be entered for the defendant, on the appli- 
 cation of the plaintiff." 
 
 The notice referred to in the rule is in the following terms : Notice. 
 "A. B., take notice, that if you do not appear pursuant to the above 
 order, the plaintiff may enter an appearance for you, and the Court 
 may afterwards grant to the plaintiff such relief as he may appear to 
 be entitled to on his own showing." 4 
 
 Application under the General Order is made by an ex parte motion, 6 
 supported by an affidavit or affidavits, which should follow the language 
 of the General Order as far as possible. 6 One calendar month from the 
 date of the order is generally limited as the time for appearance ; the 
 limitation of time within which the advertisements of the order in any 
 newspapers, other than the " London Gazette," are to be inserted, 
 
 * 460 is optional ; and they all may be *directed to be inserted within 
 
 fourteen days. 1 The subsequent order is also made upon an ex 
 parte motion, 2 supported by the production of the Gazette, and any 
 
 1 Thiirlow v. Treeby, 27 Beav. 624. 5 For form of motion paper, see Vol. III. 
 
 2 It is not necessary to show that he has 6 for form of affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 absconded to avoid service in the particular x Seton, 1248, 1249. If the advertisements 
 suit. Barton v. Whitcombe, 16 Beav. 205; 17 cannot be inserted within fourteen days, the 
 Jur. 81; Allen v. Loder, 15 Jur. 420, V. C. Court will extend the time. Dicker v. Clarke, 
 Ld. C. 11 W. R. 870, V. C. K. As to the propriety of 
 
 3 Cope ». Russell, 2 Phil. 404; 12 Jur. 105; limiting, by the order, a time to answer, see 
 and see Crosse v. Crosse, 6 Jur. N. S. 366; Braithwaite's Pr. 3:16, n. 
 
 8 W. R. 338, V. C. K. 2 Hawkins v. Gathercole, 3d Nov. 1851, 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. X. 6. For form of order, see cited 1 Smith's Pr. 380. For form of motion 
 Seton, 1248, No. 3. paper, see Vol. III. 
 
 458
 
 WHERE THE COPY OP THE BILL HAS BEEN SERVED. * 4G1 
 
 newspapers in which the former order has been inserted, and of the 
 Eecord and Writ Clerk's certificate that no appearance has been 
 entered. 
 
 Section III. — Proceedings by the Plaintiff, where service of the Copy 
 of the Bill has been effected. 
 
 If the defendant (not being an infant, or a person of unsound mind) 
 neglects to appear, within the time mentioned in the indorsement 
 thereon, to a bill which has been duly served on him within the juris- 
 diction of the Court, an appearance may be entered for him on the 
 application of the plaintiff; 3 or the plaintiff may (though this is now 
 an unusual course) 4 compel him, by attachment or other process, to 
 appear. 
 
 Where the bill has been served out of the jurisdiction, and the 
 defendant has not entered an appearance within the time allowed by 
 the special order under which the service was effected, an ex parte 
 application, by motion for leave to enter an appearance for him, must 
 be made by the plaintiff. 5 The application must be supported by an 
 affidavit of due service of the copy of the bill and copy of the order, 
 and by the Eecord and Writ Clerk's certificate of no appearance having 
 been entered by the defendant ; 6 and the Court may proceed on such 
 service as if duly made within the jurisdiction. 7 
 
 If the bill has been served within the jurisdiction, it is provided by 
 the General Order, 8 that where any defendant, not appearing to be an 
 infant or a person of weak or unsound mind unable of himself to defend 
 the suit, 9 is, when within the jurisdiction of the Court, duly served with 
 a copy of the bill under the statute 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 3, and refuses 
 or neglects to appear thereto within eight days after such service, the 
 plaintiff may, after the expiration of such eight days, 10 and within 
 three weeks n from the time of such * service, apply to the * 461 
 Kecord and Writ Clerk to enter an appearance for such defend- 
 ant; and no appearance having been entered, the Eecord and Writ 
 Clerk is to enter such appearance accordingly, upon being satisfied, by 
 affidavit, that the copy of the bill was duly served. And after the expi- 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. X. 3,4. As to proceedings in see Seton, 1248, No. 2: and for form of affi- 
 
 default of appearance under the present English davit, see Vol. III. 
 
 practice, see 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (Gth Eng. ed.) M&5 Will. IV. c. 82, § 1. 
 
 356, Sect. II. A formal entry of appearance 8 Cons. Ord. X. 4. 
 
 has. throughout the United States, ceased to be 9 An appearance by the plaintiff for a per- 
 
 important, because service on a defendant of sen thus incapacitated is irregular and of no 
 
 notice to appear is made equivalent to actual validity. Cons. Ord. X. 5; Leese v. Knight, 8 
 
 appearance. Sweeny v. Coffin, 1 Dill. 75; Jur. N. S. 1006; 10 W. R. 711, V. C. K. 
 
 Fowlkes v. Webber, 8 Humph. 530; Pugsley v. ln The day of service is excluded in the 
 
 Freedman's Sav. & Tr. Co. 2 Tenn. Ch. 138. computation of the eight days and three 
 
 See infra, p. 536. weeks. 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, Sched.; Cons. 
 
 * Hackwood v. Lockerby, 7 De G. M. & G. Ord. XXXVII. 9. 
 
 238; and see post, p. 462. u Where the plaintiff accidentally omitted 
 
 5 For form of motion paper, see Vol. III. to enter the appearance, the Court extended 
 
 6 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 82, § 1 ; Cons. Ord. X. the time. Clarkson r. Eldridge, 8 W. R. 466, 
 7 (4). For form of order to enter appearance, V. C. K. 
 
 459
 
 * 462 COMPELLING APPEARANCE. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 ration of such three weeks, or after the time allowed to such defendant 
 for appearing has expired, in any case in which the Record and Writ 
 Clerk is not thereby required to enter such appearance, the plaintiff 
 may apply to the Court for leave to enter such appearance for such 
 defendant ; and the Court, being satisfied that the copy of the bill was 
 duly served, and that no appearance has been entered for such defend- 
 ant, may, if it so thinks fit, order the same accordingly. 
 
 Service of an amended bill, on the solicitor of a defendant, who has. 
 appeared to the original bill, 1 is due service within the meaning of the 
 General Order above referred to, whether the defendant, at the time of 
 such service is, or is not, within the jurisdiction; 2 and the order applies 
 where an order to revive has been served on a new defendant ; 3 it also 
 applies where substituted service has been effected, under an order 
 obtained for that purpose. 4 
 
 An application for leave to enter an appearance, where the three 
 weeks have expired, or the bill has not in the opinion of the Eecord 
 and Writ Clerk been duly served, may be made by ex parte motion to 
 the Court, or by ex parte summons at Chambers, supported, in either 
 case, by an affidavit of service, 5 and by the Record and Writ Clerk's 
 certificate that no appearance has been entered by the defendant; this 
 certificate should bear even date with the application, but should be 
 bespoken the day before. 6 The order is drawn up by the Registrar. 7 
 If any delay in making the application is not satisfactorily explained, 
 the Court or Judge may require notice of the motion to be given to the 
 defendant, or the bill to be re-served ; 8 and in such a case, an order has 
 been made giving leave to enter an appearance at the expiration 
 
 * 462 of ten days unless the defendant * appeared in the mean time, on 
 
 the plaintiff undertaking to serve the defendant with the order 
 within six days. 1 
 
 Where a bill was filed against an officer of the Crown, who refused to 
 enter an appearance, on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction 
 to entertain the suit, leave was given to enter an appearance for him. 2 
 
 An appearance by the plaintiff for the defendant is entered by fill- 
 
 1 Under Cons. Ord. IX. 21; seeare^f, p. 447. 6 Braithwaite's Pr. 334. A fee of is., by a 
 
 2 Zulueta v. Vinent, 3 M'N. & G. 246; 15 Chai eery fee fund stamp, is payable; Regul. 
 Jur. 277, overruling Marquis of Hertford v. to Ord. Sched. 4. 
 
 Suisse, 13 Sim. 489; 9 Jur. 1001; Sewell v. 1 For form, see Seton. 1247, No. 1. 
 
 Godden, 1 De G. & S. 126; 11 Jur. 260; and « Radford v. Roberts, 2 Hare. 96: 6 Jur. 
 
 see Steele v. Gordon, 3 W. R. 158, V. C. K. 1080; Morgan v. Morgan, 1 Col. 228; Edmonds 
 
 As to appearance to an amended bill, see v. Nichol, 6 Beav. 334; Bradstock v. Whatly, 7 
 
 Index, Appearance; and Chap. XIII. Ap- Beav. 346; Totty v. Ingleby, id. 591; Walker 
 
 ptarance; and also Braithwaite's Manual. 159. v. Hurst, 13 Sim. 490; 9 Jur. 1002; Devenish v. 
 
 3 Forster v. Menzies, 16 Beav. 568; 17 Jur. Devenish, 7 Jur. 841, L. C; Bointon v. Parkin- 
 657; Cross v. Thomas, 16 Beav. 592; 17 Jur. son, id. 367, V. C. K. B.; and see Burton r. 
 336. It is not, however, usual, in practice, for Tebbutt, 1 W. N. 208, V. C. S. 
 
 the plaintiff to enter an appearance, by default, 1 Husham v. Dixon, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 203; 
 
 in such a case. and see cases, id. n. 
 
 4 Wilcoxon v. Wilkins, 9 Jur. N. S. 742; 11 2 Felkin v. Lord Herbert, 1 Dr. & S. 608; 8 
 W. R 868, M. R.; but see Dicker v. Clarke, 11 Jur. 8 N. S. 90. 
 
 W. R. 765, V. C. K. 
 
 5 For forms of motion paper, summons, and 
 affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 
 460
 
 WHERE THE COPY OF THE BILL HAS BEEN SERVED. * 463 
 
 ing up a prcecipe, 3 and leaving the same with the Kecord and Writ 
 Clerk, together with an office copy of the affidavit of service, 4 or, if 
 special leave has been obtained, the order authorizing the appearance 
 to be entered. Any number of defendants may be included in one 
 prcecipe. 6 The plaintiff need not give notice of having entered the 
 appearance. 6 
 
 If, however, the plaintiff does not choose himself to enter an appear- 
 ance for the defendant, it was formerly competent for him to proceed, 
 as of course, to compel the defendant, by attachment, to appear ; T but 
 this cannot now be done without a special order of the Court, 8 and the 
 practice is virtually abolished. 9 
 
 As, however, the practice of compelling appearance by attachment is 
 not absolutely abolished, it will be convenient here to state the mode of 
 prosecuting a contempt. A suitor prosecuting a contempt must use 
 his best endeavor to procure each process to be duly served and exe- 
 cuted upon the party prosecuted ; otherwise he will lose the benefit of 
 the process returned, and have to pay the costs : 10 he must not make 
 out process into a county in which he knows that the party prosecuted 
 is not ; u but he may abandon any unexecuted process he has issued, 
 and issue fresh process, if otherwise in a position so to do. 12 
 
 * It seems that in ordinary cases a plaintiff may, at the same * 463 
 time, sue out two or more attachments against the same defend- 
 ant into different counties, but only one of them must be executed ; 
 otherwise the party would be liable to an action. Thus, where a defend- 
 ant being in contempt, the plaintiff sued an attachment into Kent, and 
 another into London, and arrested the defendant upon each : upon 
 this being shown to the Court, costs were ordered to be taxed by the 
 Master, for the irregularity and vexation ; but, in regard that the plain- 
 tiff was poor, the Court, upon his motion, ordered the costs to be paid 
 the defendant, out of a sum of £600 decreed to the plaintiff, and resting 
 in Court, and the defendant was set at liberty, without entering his 
 
 8 For form, see Vol. III. orders of the Court is by attachment. Matter 
 
 * For form, see Vol. III. As to the costs of of O'Reillys, 2 Hogan, 20. It always rests in 
 such appearance, see Cons. Ord. XL. 15; and as the sound discretion of the Court, whether the 
 to a subsequent appearance by the defendant, rule for an attachment shall be absolute or nisi, 
 see Cons. Ord. X. 9, post, p. 479. though the latter is the usual and safer course. 
 
 5 Braithwaite's Pr. 325. The following fees Matter of Vanderbilt, 4 John. Ch. 58. 
 
 are payable, in Chancery fee fund stamps, on 8 Cons. Ord. X. 10. The application will 
 
 entering appearances: if not more than three be refused, unless the plaintiff can show a suffi- 
 
 defendants, 7*.,- if more than three, and not cient reason for adopting this course of proceed- 
 
 exceeding six defendants, 14s. ,• and the same ing. Hackwood v. Lockerby, 7 De G. M. & G. 
 
 proportion for every like number of defendants. 238. 
 
 Regul. to Ord. Sched. 4. In this computation, 9 Per V. C. Kindersley, Felkin V. Lord 
 
 husband nnd wife are regarded as one person. Herbert, 1 Dr. & S. 608; 8 Jur. N. S. 90. 
 
 Braithwaite's Pr. 325. lf) Cons. Ord. XXX. 1. 
 
 6 Braithwaite's Pr. 337. If the appearance » Boschetti v. Power, 8 Beav. 180, 184; 
 is, by mistake, entered by the plaintiff's solici- Zulueta v. Vinent, 15 Beav. 273; 16 Jur. 631; 
 tor, as if concerned for the defendant, it may see, however, Hodgson v. Hodgson. 23 Beav. 
 be withdrawn and entered as by the plaintiff. 604. 
 
 See ibid.; and post, Chap. XIII. Appearance. 12 Andrews v. Walton, 1 Phil. 619; Braith- 
 
 1 Mussina v. Bartlett, 8 Porter, 277. The waite's Pr. 147. 
 general mode of compelling obedience to the 
 
 461
 
 464 
 
 COMPELLING APPEARANCE. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 appearance with the Registrar, — for the Court said, none should take 
 advantage of his wrong. 1 
 
 An attachment should be directed to the sheriff or other officer of 
 the county or jurisdiction wherein the party, against whom the writ is 
 issued, is likely to be found. 2 If the defendant resides in the county 
 palatine of Lancaster or of Durham, the attachment must be directed to 
 the Chancellor of the county palatine, or his deputy, commanding him 
 to issue his mandamus to the sheriff of the county to attach the party ; 8 
 and to enforce obedience, it is necessary to obtain an order upon the 
 Chancellor to return the writ, and afterwards an order upon the sheriff 
 to return the mandamus. 4 Where the defendant is in a city or town 
 that is a county in itself, the writ must be directed to the sheriff of the 
 county of the city or town ; 5 and if the party is already in prison, the 
 writ must, nevertheless, be directed to the sheriff, who will lodge it 
 
 with the keeper or jailer, as a detainer against such party. 6 
 * 464 * A writ of attachment is made out by the solicitor or party 
 
 prosecuting the contempt, 1 who must indorse the name and place 
 
 1 Wyatt's Pr. 48. 
 
 2 Braithwaite's Pr. 158. In London, where 
 there are two sheriffs, if one of them is an inter- 
 ested party, the writ should be directed to the 
 other; and where both, or the sole sheriff in 
 other cases, are interested, it should be directed 
 to the coroner. Ibid. 151. For forms of direc- 
 tions of writs, see Vol. III. 
 
 3 Braithwaite's Pr. 159 ; and see form in 
 Vol. III. 
 
 * See past, p. 470. 
 
 5 Since the 18 & 19 Vic. c. 48, such process 
 as would otherwise have been directed to the 
 Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, is directed 
 to the Sheriff of Kent. 
 
 6 Trotter v. Trotter, Jac. 533: and zee post, 
 p. 466. For forms of directions of writs, see 
 Vol. III. According to the old practice of the 
 Court, an attachment, as well as all other pro- 
 cess of contempt, must have been made return- 
 able in term time ; and it was also requisite, 
 where it was intended to proceed to a sequestra- 
 tion, or to take a bill pro confesso, that there 
 should be fifteen days between the teste (or 
 date) and the return of the writ; unless the 
 defendant lived within ten miles of London, in 
 which case an order might be obtained, by 
 motion or petition of course, to make the sev- 
 eral processes returnable immediately. Hinde, 
 100. With the view, however, to save the ex- 
 pense of the order for a writ returnable imme- 
 diately, in n town cause, and also to get rid of 
 the delay in the process occasioned by that 
 proceeding, it is provided by the 11 Geo. IV. 
 & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 15, Rule 3, "that the 
 party prosecuting any contempt shall be at lib- 
 erty, without order, to sue forth the several writs 
 in process of contempt, returnable immediately, 
 in case the party in contempt resides or is in 
 London, or within twenty miles thereof; and 
 
 462 
 
 that, in other cases, the party prosecuting a 
 contempt shall be at liberty, without order, to 
 sue forth such several writs, returnable in vaca- 
 tion, provided that there be fifteen days be- 
 tween the teste and the return of each of such 
 writs." Braithwaite's Manual, 199; VVroe v. 
 Clayton, 16 Sim. 183; 12 Jur. 321 ; Seton, 1231. 
 The effect of this provision is to extend the 
 pnwerof issuing attachments, and other process, 
 returnable in vacation, to all cases; with the 
 restriction, that where the party resides above 
 twenty miles from London, there shall be fif- 
 teen days between the teste and the return ; and 
 to permit such process to be issued without a 
 previous order to that effect. Where an attach- 
 ment is issued not returnable immediately, but 
 of which the return must take place in term 
 time, it must still, as before, be made return- 
 able on a general return day; thus, when the 
 last of the fifteen days required by the above 
 rule of the 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will* IV. c. 36, 
 falls in term time, the attachment must be 
 mad-' returnable on one of the general return 
 days of the term occurring after the expiration 
 of the fifteen days. Seton, 1231 ; Braithwaite's 
 Pr. 153. For list of general return days, see 
 Vol. III. It was formerly considered that an 
 attachment could not have a longer return than 
 the last return of the term following that in 
 which it was tested ; if made returnable " imme- 
 diately," it was only in force until such last 
 return of the following term; and if executed 
 afterwards, its execution was liable to be dis- 
 charged for irregularity; but it appears that 
 there is now no such rule in practice. Wroev. 
 Clayton. 16 Sim. 183; 12 Jur. 331. 
 
 i Cons. Ord. III. 1. This writ must be 
 either written or printed on parchment; and 
 should have a left-hand margin of sufficient 
 width to admit of the stamp, and the official
 
 WHERE THE COPY OF THE BILL HAS BEEN SERVED. * 465 
 
 of business or residence, and address for service, if any, thereon, as in 
 the case of other proceedings. 2 (a) 
 
 The form of the writ is in all cases the same ; but it must bear an 
 indorsement, stating the particular nature of the contempt in respect of 
 which it is issued. 3 The names of three, but not more, persons can 
 be inserted in one writ. The writ must be tested on the day on 
 which it is issued ; it is sealed at the Record and Writ * Clerks' * 465 
 Office ; and the seal will be affixed, on the Clerk of Records and 
 Writs being satisfied that the writ is correct in form, and that the per- 
 son presenting the same is, according to the course and practice of the 
 Court, entitled to sue out the same. 1 The attachment is considered as 
 sealed the first moment of the day on which it issues. 2 
 
 Before the writ will be sealed, a prcecipe, stating the nature of the 
 contempt in respect of which it is issued, must be entered with the 
 Registrar, and left at the Record and Writ Clerks' Office. In order to 
 enter the prcecipe, two copies of it are prepared ; and upon one being 
 left with the Clerk at the entering seat, in the Registrar's Office, the 
 other will be marked by him as entered; and the latter copy must be 
 filed with the Record and Writ Clerk at the time the writ is sealed. 8 
 
 The manner in which both original and amended bills are filed has 
 before been stated ; 4 and under no circumstances can an attachment be 
 issued for want of appearance or answer, unless the bill be regularly 
 filed. 6 
 
 A writ of attachment, for want of appearance, is indorsed, " By the 
 Court : For not appearing at the suit of A B, complainant," or as the 
 case may be ; 6 and it will be sealed at the Record and Writ Clerks' 
 Office, upon production of the order authorizing the issue of the writ ; 7 if 
 it appears to the Clerk of Records and Writs that no appearance has been 
 entered for the defendant. 8 Before the writ is sealed, a prcecipe must 
 be entered with the Registrar, and left in the manner before explained. 9 
 
 It is particularly requisite that the rule, that a suitor prosecuting a 
 contempt, shall use his best endeavor to procure process to be duly 
 served, 10 should be attended to in cases where it is intended to proceed 
 to take a bill pro confesso, against a defendant in contempt for want of 
 an answer : for, by the General Orders, it is necessary that the plaintiff 
 should have exerted due diligence to procure the execution of the writ 
 of attachment, in order that he may proceed, under these Orders, against 
 
 seal ; the writ must be stamped with a Chancery * Ante, pp. 398, 399, 422. 
 
 fee fund stamp of 5s. Regul. toOrd. Sehed. 4; 5 Leman v. Newnham, 1 Ves. Sr. 51,53; 
 
 Braithwaite's Pr. 133. Belt's Sup. 42; Adamson v. Blackslock, 1 S. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. III. 2. 5; ante, pp. 453-455. & S. 118. 
 
 3 Braithwaite's Pr. 159. For forms of in- 6 For forms of indorsements, see Vol. III. 
 dorsements, see Vol. III. 7 Cons. Ord. X. 10; ante, p. 462. 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. I. 37. 8 Braithwaite's Pr. 161. 
 
 2 Stephens v. Neale, 1 Mad. 550. « Smith v. Thompson, 4 Mad. 179, ante, 
 8 Smith v. Thompson, 4 Mad. 179; Cons. p. 465. For form of prcecipe, see Vol. III. 
 
 Ord. I. 18; Braithwaite's Pr. 161. For forms 1° Cons. Ord. XXX. 1. 
 
 of prcecipe, see Vol. III. 
 
 (a). An application for leave to issue a writ that an order leading to imprisonment must be 
 of attachment may be made in Chambers, and made by the Judge personallv. Davis v. Gal- 
 may be dealt with by the Chief Clerk, except move, 40 Ch. D. 355; 39 id. 322. 
 
 4G3
 
 * 466 COMPELLING APPEARANCE. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 the defendant as having absconded. 11 And if the plaintiff does not 
 
 proceed under the last-mentioned Orders, then, for the purpose of 
 
 obtaining a writ of sequestration, immediately upon the return 
 
 * 466 by the sheriff of non * est inventus to the attachment, an affidavit 
 
 must be made, that " due diligence was used to ascertain where 
 such defendant was at the time of issuing the writ, and in endeavoring 
 to apprehend him under the same, and that the person suing forth such 
 writ verily believed, at the time of suing forth the same, that such 
 defendant was in the county into which such writ was issued." l 
 
 The first thing to be done, after an attachment has been issued, is to 
 deliver it to the sheriff or other officer to whom it is directed ; and 
 although it is directed to the sheriff, it may be delivered to the under- 
 sheriff, by whom all the duties of the sheriff which do not require his 
 personal presence are usually executed, or to the deputy-sheriff. 2 The 
 sheriff or other officer to whom any writ is directed or delivered ought, 
 with all speed and secrecy, to execute such writ ; 8 and neither he nor his 
 officers can dispute the authority of the Court out of which it issues ; 
 but he or his officers are, at their peril, to execute the same, according to 
 the command of such writ. 4 
 
 If the defendant is already in custody, either upon a criminal sen- 
 tence or civil process, no further arrest is necessary; but the sheriff 
 must give notice of the attachment to the keeper or jailer in whose 
 custody the defendant is. 5 
 
 Although all writs and processes are ordinarily directed to the sheriffs, 
 yet they never execute the same themselves, but the under-sheriffs 
 usually make out their warrants to their bailiffs or officers for the execu- 
 tion of such writs ; 6 and it is the duty of such bailiffs or other officers 
 to execute such warrants according to their directions. These warrants 
 must be made according to the nature of the writ, and contain the sub- 
 stance thereof, and be made out in the high sheriff's name, and under 
 the seal of office. 7 
 
 The warrant must be had before the arrest; or the arrest will be 
 illegal, and the party aggrieved may have his action for false imprison- 
 ment, and the Court will direct the bail-bond to be cancelled. 8 The war- 
 rant must be : " So that I may have his body before the Queen, in her 
 Court of Chancery." 
 
 n Cons. Ord. XXII. 2. Where the defend- Sheriffs of London, is left at the Secondary's 
 
 ant is out of the jurisdiction the attachment Office, Basinghall Street; and if to the Sheriff 
 
 need not be issued; see Butler v. Matthews, 19 of Middlesex, it is left at his office in Red Lion 
 
 Beav. 549 ; Hodgson v. Hodgson, 23 Beav. 604. Square. 
 In other cases an affidavit of due diligence to 8 Impey, Off. Sheriff, 45. 
 
 execute the attachment must be made. 4 Ibid. 33. 
 
 i Cons. Ord. XII. 6. 5 See ante, p. 463. 
 
 2 Impey, Off. Sheriff, 36. By 3 & 4 Will. 6 Impey, Off. Sheriff, 59; Chitty's Arch. 
 
 IV. c. 42, § 20, the sheriff of each county is 609. For form of warrant, see Chitty's Forms, 
 
 required to name a deputy in London for the 350. 
 
 receipt of writs, granting warrants, making re- 7 Impey, Off. Sheriff, 59. As to special 
 
 turns, and accepting of rules and orders touch- bailiffs, see Chitty's Arch. 16, 609. 
 ing the execution of process. A delivery of a 8 4 Bac. Abr. 500 ; Hall v. Roche, 8 T. R. 
 
 writ to this deputy is a delivery to the sheriff. 187; Chitty's Arch. 610. 
 Chitty's Arch. 16. A writ, if directed to the 
 
 464
 
 WHERE THE COPY OF THE BILL HAS BEEN SERVED. * 468 
 
 The bailiff or officer to whom the warrant is directed and 
 delivered ought, with all speed and secrecy, to execute the same * ac- * 467 
 cording as it commands him ; and he is bound to pursue the effect 
 of his warrant. 1 The bailiff of a hundred may execute a writ out of 
 the hundred where he is bailiff ; for he is bailiff all the county over : 2 
 it must, however, be within the county ; for the sheriff's bailiwick extends 
 no further. 3 It seems that an arrest may be by the authority of the 
 bailiff, though his be not the hand that arrests, nor in sight, nor within 
 any precise distance of the defendant : it is sufficient that he is arrested. 4 
 
 An arrest on a Sunday is absolutely void. 6 If, however, a defendant 
 arrested on a Saturday escapes, he may be retaken on a Sunday ; for that 
 is not in execution of the process, but a continuance of the former im- 
 prisonment. 6 And it is said that a person may be arrested on a Sunday 
 on the Lord Chancellor's warrant, or an order of commitment for 
 contempt ; for he is considered as in custody from the time of making 
 the order, and the warrant is directed to the jailer as in the nature of 
 an escape warrant, 7 under which it has been held that a defendant may 
 be retaken on the Lord's-day. 8 
 
 The bailiff or other person to whom the execution of the process has 
 been intrusted must, as soon as he has executed the warrant, return it, 
 together with his answer to the same, to the sheriff ; so that he may be 
 ready to certify to the Court how, and in what manner, the warrant has 
 been executed, when called upon. 9 
 
 No arrest can take place under an attachment after the day of the 
 return of the writ ; 10 and if the return is allowed to expire before any- 
 thing is done upon the writ, the plaintiff must sue out another attach- 
 ment, but will, in such case, be allowed the costs of only one writ. 11 
 This, however, must be understood as applying only to cases where the 
 first writ has not been delivered to the sheriff ; for after delivery to the 
 sheriff, the duty of executing it lies upon him, and he must make his 
 return to the Court accordingly. 
 
 A sheriff or other officer employed to make an arrest under an 
 * attachment cannot justify breaking doors in executing the pro- *468 
 cess ; x and although the arrest is by a bailiff or other officer, it is 
 considered as the act of the sheriff, who makes his return accordingly. 
 
 i Impey, Off. Sheriff, 45. 8 Impey, Off. Sheriff, 61. 
 
 2 Ibid. 46. 9 Impey, Off. Sheriff, 46. 
 
 3 Hammond v. Taylor, 3 B. & Aid. 408; 1° Ibid. 59. 
 
 Chitty's Arch. 612. u Harr. by Newl. 118. If the sheriff does 
 
 4 Watch v. Archer, Cowp. 65; Chittv's not receive the attachment in time to arrest the 
 Arch. 610. defendant and bring him into the Court on the 
 
 5 29 Car. II. c. 7, § 6; Chittv's Arch. 611. return day, at the place where the attachment 
 
 6 Impey, Off. Sheriff. 61; Chitty's Arch. is returnable, he should not arrest him thereon, 
 611, n. (d); id. 691. but should return the process tanle. Stafford 
 
 7 Ex parte Whitchurch, 1 Atk. 55; see v. Brown, 4 Paige, 360. Where the sheriff 
 1 Anne, Stat. 2, c. 6, § 1 ; and 5 Anne, c. 9, § 3, neglected to serve an attachment, until it was 
 which enables the Judge of any Court out of too late for the defendant to appear at the time 
 which process has issued, by virtue of which a and place where it was returnable, the Court 
 party has been committed to prison and escapes set aside the arrest of the defendant thereon, 
 therefrom, to issue a warrant for his reappre- Ibid. 
 
 hension; and see Bac. Ab. tit. Escape, E. 3; * See Chitty's Arch. 613. 
 
 Chitty's Arch. 608, etseq. 
 
 vol. i. —30 465
 
 * 469 COMPELLING APPEARANCE. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 If the defendant is taken on an attachment for want of appearance or 
 answer, he must either go to prison for safe custody, or put in bail to 
 the sheriff ; for the intent of the arrest being only to compel an appear- 
 ance in Court at the return of the writ, or an answer to the interrogatories, 
 that purpose is equally answered, whether the sheriff detains his person, 
 or takes sufficient security for his appearance or answer. 2 The sheriff 
 may, however, if he pleases, let the defendant go at large without any 
 sureties : but that is at his own peril ; for, after once taking him, the 
 sheriff is bound to keep him safely, so as to be forthcoming in Court. 8 
 
 The method of putting in bail to the sheriff is by entering into a bond 
 or obligation, with one or more sureties, to insure the defendant's 
 appearance at the return of the writ : which obligation is called a bail- 
 bond. 4 The Statute 23 Hen. VI. c. 9, having prescribed in what cases 
 the sheriff may take a bail-bond in actions emanating from Courts of 
 Law, and prohibited the taking a bond in all other cases, a doubt 
 appears to have been raised whether the sheriff has or has not a right to 
 take a bail-bond upon attachments issuing out of the Court of Chancery. 
 But this question has been set at rest by a decision 6 which determines 
 that a sheriff may take a bail-bond on an attachment out of Chancery, 
 but that he is not compellable to do so ; and that whether a bail-bond 
 shall be taken or not is in the discretion of the sheriff, as regulated by 
 the practice of that Court. The consequence is, that an action at law 
 will not lie against the sheriff, under the above-mentioned statute, for 
 refusing to take bail from a defendant, arrested under an attachment 
 issuing out of the Court of Chancery. 6 
 
 The practice of the Court, however, seems to be, that where a party 
 
 is taken upon an attachment for a contempt, he may, when the contempt 
 
 is of a bailable nature, on payment of the costs, which are 13s. 8d., 
 
 * 4G9 be admitted to bail, by entering into a bail-bond * to the plaintiff, 
 
 to the amount of £40 himself, with two sureties in £20 each, to 
 appear or answer, as the case may be, at the return of the writ. 1 
 
 It is to be observed, however, that a contempt in not paying costs, or in 
 not obeying a decree or order, is not of a bailable nature ; and that the 
 sheriff cannot take bail to an attachment issued on that account. 2 
 
 2 3 Bla. Com. 290. writ, and that he will not depart thence without 
 
 8 Ibid. leave of the Court. Chancery Rule 133. 
 
 * Ibid. Where an attachment is in the In Tennessee, the proceedings by attachment 
 
 nature of mesne process, the sheriff may take to compel an answer are regulated by statute, 
 
 bail for the party's appearance; and on a re- Code, § 4360, et seq. ; Ch. Rule 7. 
 
 turn cepi, the sheriff may be ordered to bring 5 Morris v. Hayward, 6 Taunt. 569; and see 
 
 in the body; or he may sue on the bail-bond. Lewis r. Morland, 2 B. & Aid. 56; Chitty's 
 
 Binney's case, 2 Bland, 99 ; Deakins's case, id. Arch. 1709. 
 
 39g. 6 Studd v. Acton, 1 H. Bla. 468. 
 
 In New Jersey, when an attachment for a 1 Hinde, 106. 
 
 contempt shall be served, the defendant shall 2 Anon. Prec. Ch. 331 ; Cowdray v. Cross, 
 
 be retained in custody thereon, to answer the 24 Beav. 445. The liability of the sheriff for 
 
 exigency of the writ, until the return day an escape is the loss actually sustained; and 
 
 thereof, unless he shall, with one sufficient the Court of Chancery will ascertain the 
 
 suretv, at least, give bond, in the penal sum of amount. Moore v. Moore, 25 Beav. 8; 4 Jur. 
 
 five hundred dollars to the plaintiff, conditioned N. S. 250; see also Sugden v. Hull, 28 Beav. 
 
 for his appearance on the return-day of the 263. 
 attachment, according to the command of such 
 
 466
 
 WHERE THE COPY OF THE BILL HAS BEEN SERVED. * 470 
 
 Where a sheriff, having taken a defendant into custody upon an 
 attachment, takes bail for his appearance, he may assign the bail-bond to 
 the plaintiff; 3 who, if the defendant neglects to appear, or to put in an 
 answer, may put the bail-bond in suit against him. If the attachment 
 be for not answering, the plaintiff may also have a messenger into the 
 county where the defendant lives, to arrest the defendant, and bring up 
 his person to the Court, — which is the more effectual way of proceed- 
 ing. 4 This, however, will not preclude him from bringing an action, at 
 the same time, upon the bail-bond, against the defendant and his sure- 
 ties : otherwise, the giving a bail-bond would be quite useless ; 5 and it is 
 to be observed, that if an action is brought on the bail-bond, the defend- 
 ant cannot obtain an order to restrain the plaintiff from proceeding in it, 
 without first clearing his contempt. 6 
 
 All processes against any person, directed to the sheriff, ought to be 
 duly and truly executed, and returned into the Courts out of which they 
 issued ; 7 and all returns, although made by the under-sheriff, yet must 
 be made in the name of the high-sheriff, and his name must be put 
 thereto, or the return is void. 8 The sheriff must also return truly, and 
 not contrary to the record ; if he does, he falsifies all his proceedings. 9 
 If the sheriff takes the party to jail, he should lose no time in so doing ; 
 as otherwise the time may expire within which the plaintiff is bound to 
 bring up the defendant to answer his contempt. 10 
 
 The return ought to be made before or upon the day of return named 
 in the writ, if a day certain is named ; but if the writ be returnable on 
 a return day not certain, the sheriff need not return it till the quarto 
 post. 11 An attachment returnable "immediately" should be returned as 
 soon as it is executed ; but it is in force till the last return of 
 the term following the teste. 1 ' 2 If executed after * that time, it is * 470 
 liable to be discharged for irregularity. The party prosecuting 
 the contempt, however, is at liberty to call upon the sheriff, by an order, 
 for his return to an attachment returnable immediately, on the fifth day 
 after it is put into the sheriff's hands. 1 
 
 If the sheriff or other officer does not make his return of the writ 
 directed to him, the Court may amerce him. 2 The amercements are com- 
 monly £5, and are to be levied by being estreated into the Exchequer, 
 •or by process, out of the Petty Bag, to the succeeding sheriff, to levy and 
 pay them into the Hanaper ; but it is usual to give the sheriff a day for 
 that purpose ; and if he do not by that time return the writ, the Court 
 will set the amercement. 8 
 
 The general course of proceeding, however, to obtain or compel the 
 
 8 Anon. 2 Atk. 507. in Chancery may be impeached. Leftwick v. 
 
 4 Ibid.; Cowdray v. Cross, 24 Beav. 445. Hamilton. 9 Heisk. 310. 
 
 This cannot be done where the attachment is to 10 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 15, r. 4; 
 
 compel appearance. Cons. Ord. X. 10. Ord. XII. 3. 
 
 6 Beddall v. Page, 2 Sim. 224. " Makepeice v. Dillon, Fort. 363; Impey, 
 
 6 1 Turn. & Ven. 115. Off. Sheriff, 333; Braithwaite's Pr. 289. 
 
 7 Impey, Off. Sheriff. 333. W Seton, 1231; Braithwaite's Manual, 199. 
 
 8 Impey, Off. Sheriff, 334; Chitty's Arch. i Braithwaite's Pr. 289. 
 619. 2 Gj]b. Form. Rom. 70. 
 
 9 Ibid. An officer's return in a proceeding 8 Harr. by Newl. 118. 
 
 467
 
 * 471 COMPELLING APPEARANCE. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 sheriff to return an attachment is as follows : The party prosecuting the 
 contempt applies, in the first instance, to the under-sheriff, or deputy- 
 sheriff, 4 to make a return to the writ, and either to file it at the Record 
 and Writ Clerks' Office, or to hand it to the applicant. 5 If the return is 
 not made, the party obtains an order of course, on motion, or petition at 
 the Rolls, directing the sheriff forthwith to make the return. 6 This 
 order is served on either the sheriff, under-sheriff, or deputy-sheriff ; 7 
 and if it be not obeyed, the party obtains, on ex parte motion, an order 
 nisi, that the sheriff do, in six days after personal notice of the order, 
 return the writ, or, in default, stand committed. 6 This order is served 
 personally on the sheriff; and should the return still be withheld, an 
 order absolute may be obtained, on ex parte motion, supported by affi- 
 davit of service of the order nisi, and of no return. 6 Where, however, 
 the first order limits a time for the sheriff to return the writ upon per- 
 sonal service of the order, it seems that he may be attached : in which 
 case two subsequent orders are unnecessary. 8 
 
 Where an attachment has been issued to the Chancellor of the county 
 
 palatine of Lancaster or Durham, and he omits to return the writ, a 
 
 peremptory order, which is obtainable on motion or petition of course, 
 
 must be made upon him 9 to return it within a certain number of 
 
 * 471 days after service of the order : upon which, if * he returns " that 
 
 he hath sent his mandate to the sheriff, who hath not returned the 
 same," another peremptory order may be obtained, in like manner, to 
 the sheriff, commanding him, within a certain number of days after ser- 
 vice of the order upon his under-sheriff, to return the mandate. 1 
 
 Upon an attachment, there are three ordinary returns: (1) If the 
 defendant cannot be arrested, the sheriff returns : " The within-named 
 A B is not found in my bailiwick ; " 2 this is termed a non est inventus, 
 and upon this return, further process of contempt is grounded. (2) If 
 the defendant is arrested, but the sheriff either accepts bail for his ap- 
 pearance or keeps him in his own custody, he returns : " I have attached 
 the within-named A B, as within I am commanded, whose body I have 
 ready ; " this is called a cepi corpus} (3) If the sheriff arrests the de- 
 fendant, and lodges him in jail, or, finding him there, lodges a detainer 
 against him, he returns : " I have attached the within-named A B, 
 whose body remains in Her Majesty's jail for my county of , under* 
 
 4 Ante, p. 466. day. People v. Wheeler, 7 Paige, 433. For 
 
 5 Braithw:ijte's Pr. 289. forms of order, see Seton, 1230, Nos. 1-3; and 
 « Seton, 1231. In New York, the officer for forms of motion paper, petition, and affi- 
 
 executinfj the attachment must return the same davit, see Vol. III. 
 
 by the return day specified therein, without 7 Ante, p. 466, n. 2. 
 
 any previous order for the purpose. In case of 8 Seton, 1231; Cons. Ord. XXIII. 10. 
 
 default, an attachment may forthwith issue 9 But where the order was erroneously made 
 
 against the officer; which will not be bailable, on the sheriff, it was held that the sheriff must 
 
 People v. Elmer, 3 Paige, 85. Rut he may obey or move to discharge it; Sugden v. Hull, 
 
 return the same at any time during the actual 28 Beav. 263. 
 
 sitting of the Court on the return day thereof, 2 Clough v. Cross, 2 Dick. 555, 558. 
 
 unless he is specially directed by the" Court to 2 A return that a defendant is not to be 
 
 return it immediately. It is therefore irregu- found, is bad. 5 Dowl. 451. 
 
 lar to take out an attachment against him ex 8 Braithwaite's Pr. 272. 
 
 parte during the sittings of the Court on that 
 
 468
 
 WHERE THE COPY OP THE BILL HAS BEEN SERVED. * 472 
 
 my custody " (or as the case may be). 4 Either of the two last- mentioned 
 returns, when made, puts an end to all the ordinary process ; 5 unless the 
 defendant afterwards escapes or absconds, — for in that case the sergeant- 
 at-arms may be sent, for the purpose of grounding a sequestration. 6 
 
 If the writ is directed to the Chancellor of Lancaster, commanding 
 him to issue his mandate to his sheriff to attach the party, the return is, 
 that he has issued his mandate according to the terms of the writ, and 
 that the sheriff has made the return to him of non est inventus, or as the 
 case may be. 
 
 The costs of an attachment issued, but not executed, are lis. 2d. ; if 
 executed, 13s. 8d. ; and if issued against more than one party, 2s. 6d. is 
 payable for each additional party. 7 
 
 When the sheriff returns non est inventus, the plaintiff may, after the 
 return day named in the attachment already issued, issue other attach- 
 ments, for the purpose of obtaining the arrest of the defendant ; but as 
 he cannot obtain an order for a messenger, or for the sergeant-at-arms, 3 
 and consequently cannot have a writ of sequestration, to compel appear- 
 ance, there does not seem to be any case in which it will be for the 
 plaintiff's interest to continue a compulsory process, after a return of 
 non est inventus. 
 
 When the sheriff attached the party, and took bail for him, the 
 old practice was for the plaintiff to move for a messenger to bring 
 * up the defendant ; but now,, a messenger cannot be obtained to * 472 
 compel appearance ; a and it would consequently seem that, upon 
 such return, the plaintiff has no other course open to him, except to 
 enter an appearance for the defendant. 2 
 
 When the sheriff actually arrests the defendant, and sends him to 
 prison for want of appearance, the plaintiff cannot bring him to the bar 
 of the Court ; and the only course that appears to be open to him is to 
 enter an appearance for the defendant under the General Order ; 8 the 
 provisions of the Act of 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV., 4 enabling the plaintiff 
 to enter an appearance for the defendant, in such a case, being obsolete 
 in practice, though not expressly repealed. 5 
 
 The result, therefore, in every case where the plaintiff prosecutes the 
 contempt for not appearing against the defendant, seems to be, that, if 
 the defendant does not appear, the plaintiff has no other course than to 
 enter an appearance for him : and as the defendant cannot be brought 
 to the bar of the Court, he will, if arrested, be entitled to claim and 
 obtain his discharge at the expiration of thirty days from the time of 
 his being actually in custody or detained ; or, if the last of thirty days 
 shall happen out of term, then, at the expiration of the first four days 
 of the ensuing term ; and the plaintiff must bear the costs of the pro- 
 
 « Ibid. 281. 2 Cons. Ord. X. 4; Braithwaite's Pr. 161. 
 
 6 Frederick v. David, 1 Vern. 344; Hinde, » Cons. Ord. X. 4; and see Cons. Ord. X. 
 
 100. 10; Braithwaite's Pr. 280, 284; and ante, p. 460. 
 
 6 See Hook v. Ross, 1 Hen. & M. 319, 320. * Cap. 36, § 11; and § 15, r. 13. 
 
 7 Brown v. Lee, 11 Bear. 379; Braithwaite's 6 Braithwaite's Pr. 279; and see Fortescue 
 Pr- 154. v. Hallett, 3 Jur. N. S. 806, V. C. K. 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. X. 10. 
 l Ibid. 
 
 469
 
 *473 COMPELLING APPEARANCE. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 cess of contempt. 6 The consequence is, that, in practice, an attachment 
 for want of appearance is very seldom issued, — the plaintiff, almost in- 
 variably, on the time for the defendant appearing having elapsed, at 
 once taking the course of entering an appearance for him, under the 
 General Order. 7 
 
 Section IV. — Against Particular Defendants. 
 
 Having now considered the mode of compelling the appearance of a 
 defendant upon whom service has been effected, and who is not entitled 
 to any particular privilege, or under any peculiar disability, the next 
 point is, in what manner the appearance of persons so privileged or dis- 
 abled can be obtained. 
 
 In the first place, if the Attorney-General, upon being served with a 
 copy of the bill, does not appear, no personal process issues against him 
 to compel him so to do ; but if he will not appear, it seems that it would 
 
 be considered as a nihil dicit. 8 
 * 473 * If the defendant claim the privilege of peerage, and do not 
 enter an appearance upon being served, in the manner before ex- 
 plained, with a letter missive and copies of the petition and bill, 1 he 
 must be served with an indorsed copy of the bill ; and if he do not then 
 appear, an appearance may be entered for him, as in the case of an ordi- 
 nary defendant, on an affidavit of both such services ; 2 and the same 
 may be done for a member of Parliament who has been served with a 
 copy of the bill, and has neglected to appear himself. 3 
 
 The mode of proceeding in these cases was formerly by sequestra- 
 tion; 4 and it seems that this course is still open to the plaintiff, if he 
 thinks fit to adopt it. 
 
 In order to obtain a sequestration against a peer of the realm, or 
 bishOp, an affidavit must be made of the service of the letter missive, 
 and of the copy of the petition upon which it has issued, and also of the 
 service of a plain and of an indorsed copy of the bill. 5 Where the pro- 
 cess is required against a member of the Commons' House of Parliament, 
 the affidavit need only verify the service of the copy of the bill. 6 An ex 
 parte motion 7 must then be made for a sequestration against the defend- 
 ant's real and personal estate, — which the Court orders nisi, that is, 
 unless the defendant shall, within eight days after personal service of 
 the order, show unto the Court good cause to the contrary. 8 The de- 
 fendant must be served personally with this order, and if he persist in 
 refusing to appear, then an affidavit of service must be made, and coun- 
 
 6 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 15, r. 5; 4 Formerly, if a peer of the realm appeared 
 Braithwaite's Pr. 279, 280. and did not answer, an attachment lay; but 
 
 7 Cons. Ord. X. 4. now, by order of Parliament, no process lies 
 
 8 Barclay v. Russell, 2 Dick. 729. As to the but a sequestration. Hinde, 131. 
 course, where he neglects to answer, see post, 5 For form of affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 Chap. X. § 2. 6 Ibid. 
 
 1 Ante, p. 440. 1 For form of motion paper, see Vol. III. 
 
 2 For form of affidavit, see Vol. III. 8 Hinde, 81. 
 « Braithwaite's Pr. 29, n., 337; Cons. Ord. 
 
 X. 4; ante, pp. 444, 460, 461. 
 470
 
 AGAINST PARTICULAR DEFENDANTS. * 474 
 
 sel instructed to move to make the order absolute. 9 It is to be observed, 
 that where an order nisi for a sequestration against a peer or member of 
 the House of Commons, for want of an answer, has been obtained, it is 
 good cause to show against making such order nisi absolute, that the an- 
 swer has been put in ; but if exceptions have been taken to the answer, 
 the time for showing cause will be enlarged, until it shall appear whether 
 the answer is insufficient or not. 10 
 
 Personal service of the order nisi may be dispensed with in cases 
 where the privileged defendant keeps within his own house, or is 
 * surrounded by his servants to avoid service, or where the party * 474 
 serving the process is denied access, and it is very difficult and 
 almost impossible to serve the order personally. But to dispense with 
 personal service, it is necessary to apply to the Court for leave to sub- 
 stitute a service in lieu of it, — grounding such application upon a proper 
 affidavit of the particular circumstances of the case ; and the Court will, 
 on such application, exercise a discretion, and make the order, if the 
 facts stated in the affidavit are strong enough to warrant such a pro- 
 ceeding. 1 Thus, where a peer defendant avoided the service of an order 
 nisi for a sequestration, the Court of Exchequer made an order that 
 service thereof upon his clerk in Court, and at his dwelling-house, or, if 
 no person should be met with there, by fixing a copy of the order on the 
 door, should be good service. 2 
 
 It seems that the same course of proceeding in suing out and issuing 
 the sequestration is observed, where it is sought against an officer of 
 the Court, as in the case of peers ; 8 with the exception, that the affida- 
 vit upon which the order nisi is applied for must be confined to the 
 service of the bill, there being no letter missive, as in the case of a peer. 
 
 The form of the sequestration issued against peers and other privi- 
 leged persons is nearly the same as that issued in cases of contempt by 
 ordinary persons, with the exception that it recites the order nisi, and 
 the order for making it absolute. 4 
 
 9 Hinde, 81. For form of affidavit of service, against Lord Jersey; upon which a letter mis- 
 and motion paper, see Vol. III. sive, with a copy of the bill, was served on the 
 
 10 Butler v. Kashfield, 3 Atk. 740. From the defendant, by leaving it with one of his female 
 observation of the reporter, appended to this servants at his residence in Berkeley-square, 
 case, it may be inferred that upon the authority His Lordship was then abroad. On his neglect- 
 of what the Registrar had said in Lord Clif- ing to appear to the letter missive, a subpcena 
 ford's case, 2 P. Wms. 385, Lord Hardwicke was served in the same way ; and upon his 
 had allowed the cause shown, as being the non-appearance to that, an order nisi for a 
 course of the Court; but upon reference to the sequestration was issued: when, upon inquiry 
 Registrar's book, where the order is entered at his lordship's house, it appeared that he was 
 under the title of Butler v. Rashleigh, it ap- still abroad. Thereupon, on an affidavit being 
 pears that the time for showing cause was en- made of these facts, Sir Lancelot Shadwell 
 larged till the next seal. Reg. Lib. 1750, A. V. C. directed that service of the sequestration 
 495, (o). nisi at his Lordship's town house should be 
 
 1 Hinde, 81. For form of motion paper, see good service; and upon a motion to discharge 
 Vol. III. the V. C.'s orders, Lord Brougham refused the 
 
 2 Mackenzie v. Marquis of Powis, 19 May, motion. See Att.-Gen. v. Earl of Stamford, 
 1739; 1 Fowl. Ex. Pr. 173. In Thomas v. Lord 2 Dick. 744. 
 
 Jersey, 2 M. & K. 398 (and see Sheffield v. 3 Corbyn v. Birch. 2 Dick. 635. 
 
 Duchess of Buckingham, Reg. Lib. 1740, fol. 4 For form of writ, see Vol. III. 
 15, 26; 2 De G. & S. 456, n.), a bill was filed 
 
 471
 
 * 475 COMPELLING APPEARANCE. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 When the order for making the sequestration absolute is drawn up, 
 
 passed, and entered, the plaintiff's solicitor must make out the writ of 
 
 sequestration. 5 The Court will not discharge the writ till the 
 
 * 475 party has appeared, and paid the costs of the process ; when * he 
 
 has done so, he may move to discharge the sequestration, upon 
 notice to the adverse party if it be executed. 1 
 
 Upon the return of the sequestration against a defendant having 
 privilege of Parliament, the Court may, on the motion or other applica- 
 tion of the plaintiff, give him leave to enter an appearance for the 
 defendant under the Stat. 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. ; 2 and such pro- 
 ceedings may thereupon be had as if the defendant had actually ap- 
 peared ; 3 but this course of proceeding is, in practice, superseded by the 
 General Order. 4 
 
 In the case of infants and persons of unsound mind not so found by 
 iuquisition, it is provided by the General Order, that " where, upon 
 default made by a defendant in not appearing to or not answering a 
 bill, it appears to the Court that such defendant is an infant, or a per- 
 son of weak or unsound mind not so found by inquisition, so that he 
 is unable of himself to defend the suit, the Court may, upon the ap- 
 plication of the plaintiff, order that one of the solicitors of the Court be 
 assigned guardian of such defendant, by whom he may appear to and 
 answer, or may appear to or answer the bill and defend the suit. 5 But 
 no such order shall be made unless it appears to the Court, on the 
 hearing of such application, that a copy of the bill was duly served in 
 manner provided by the Stat. 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, and that notice of 
 such application was, after the expiration of the time allowed for ap- 
 pearing to or for answering the bill, and at least six clear days 6 before 
 the day in such notice named for hearing the application, served upon 
 or left at the dwelling-house of the person with whom or under whose 
 care such defendant was at the time of serving such copy of the bill, 
 and also (in the case of such defendant being an infant not residing 
 with or under the care of his father or guardian) served upon or left at 
 the dwelling-house of the father or guardian of such infant; 7 unless 
 the Court, at the time of hearing such application, shall dispense with 
 such last-mentioned service." 8 The plaintiff may, however, obtain an 
 order, appointing a guardian of an infant, although no default has been 
 made in appearing or answering. 9 
 
 With reference to the service of the notice in the case of infants, it 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. III. 1. *70 J ** ^ UT - ^ 5 ' Frazer v. Thompson, 1 Gfff. 
 
 1 Hinde, 80; and see post, Chap. XXVI- 337; 4 De G. & J. 659; Robinson r. Aston, 9 
 § 7, Enforcing Decrees and Orders. J«r. 224, V. C. K. B.; and see ante, p. 162, 
 
 2 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 12. n. 10. 
 
 3 ibid. 6 Sundays are included; see Cons. Ord. 
 * Cons'. Ord. X. 4. XXXVII. 11; and see Brewster v. Thorpe, 11 
 5 It has been usual to order the solicitor Jur. 6, V. C. E. 
 
 to the Suitors' Fund to act upon occasions of ' For form of affidavit of service, see Vol. 
 
 this kind ; see Thomas v. Thomas, 7 Beav. 47 ; III. 
 
 Sheprard v. Harris, 10 Jur. 24, V. C. K. B. ; 8 Cons. Ord. VII. 3. For form of order, see 
 
 ante, p. 162. As to the costs of the solicitor to Seton, 1251; and for form of notice of motion, 
 
 the Suitors' Fund, where so appointed, see Ord. see Vol. III. 
 
 XL. 4; and Harris r. Hamlvn, 3 De G. & S. » Bentley v. Robinson, 9 Hare App. 76. 
 
 472
 
 AGAINST PARTICULAR DEFENDANTS. * 476 
 
 has been held that, where the infants' father was dead, service 
 *at the house of their mother and step-father was sufficient ; 1 so * 476 
 also, service on the head of a college, of which the infant was an 
 undergraduate, was held sufficient, where the plaintiff could not learn 
 where the infant's parents lived ; 2 and the general rule is, that notice 
 should be served at the dwelling-house of the person in whose care the 
 infant is. 8 
 
 Where the infant has appeared, service on the solicitor who entered 
 the appearance is sufficient. 4 
 
 In the case of persons of unsound mind not so found by inquisition, 
 the Court requires to be satisfied that no relative will undertake his 
 defence, before appointing the solicitor to the Suitors' Fee Fund ; 5 
 and where the defendant's family concur in applying for the appoint- 
 ment of some other person, whose fitness is shown by affidavit, the 
 Court will appoint him. 6 
 
 Any appearance entered at the instance of the plaintiff, for a defend- 
 ant, who, at the time of the entry thereof, is an infant or a person of 
 weak or unsound mind, unable of himself to defend the suit, is irregu- 
 lar and of no validity. 7 
 
 If a married woman is made defendant jointly with her husband, and 
 no appearance for her Is duly entered by him or her, 8 the plaintiff may, 
 within three weeks after service, enter an appearance for her, as of 
 course upon an affidavit of service of the bill on the husband; 9 or where 
 no order has been obtained by her to defend separately, 10 the plaintiff 
 may apply to the Court, on notice to the husband, for leave to issue an 
 attachment against him; 11 and where the husband is plaintiff in the 
 suit, he may, if no appearance has been duly entered for her. enter such 
 appearance, as of course, within three weeks after service of the bill 
 on her, on an affidavit of such service ; 9 or he may apply to the Court, 
 by motion, on notice to her, for leave to issue an attachment against her. 11 
 
 1 Hitch v. Wells, 8 Beav. 576; and see v. Lord Camoys, 9 Beav. 548; McKeverakin v. 
 Lane v. Hardwicke, 5 Beav. 222; Thompson v. Cort, 7 Beav. 347; Biddulph v. Dayrell, 15 L.J. 
 Jones. 8 Ves. 141. (N. S.) Ch. 320. 
 
 2 Christie v. Cameron, 2 Jur. N. S. 635, 6 Charlton v. West, 3 De G. F. & J. 156; 7 
 v - C. W. Jur. N. S. 614; Bonfield v. Grant, 11 W. R. 
 
 3 Taylor v. Ansley, 9 Jur. 1055, V. C. K. 275, M. R. 
 
 B.; and an affidavit not showing that this t Cons. Ord. X. 5; see Leese v. Knight, 8 
 
 had been done was held insufficient, S. C. ; Jur. N. S. 1006 ; 10 W. R. 711, V. C. K. As 
 
 O'Brien v. Maitland, 10 W. R. 275, L. C. ; to appointing guardians ad litem of infants 
 
 Lambert v. Turner, id. 335, V. C. K.; Turner and persons of unsound mind, see ante, pp. 160, 
 
 v. Sowdon, 10 Jur. N. S. 1122; 13 W. R. 161,176. 
 
 66, V. C. K. ; S. C. nom. Turner v. Snowdon, 8 Cons. Ord. X. 3; Steele v. Plomer, 1 
 
 2 Dr. & Sm. 265; see as to service of notice, M'N. & G. 83; 2 Phil. 782, n.; 13 Jur. 177; 
 
 where infant out of the jurisdiction, aw<e, pp. 162, Travers v. Buckley, 1 Ves. Sr. 384, 386; 
 
 452. Where service could not be effected on 1 Dick. 138; Braithwaite's Pr. 321, and see 
 
 an infant whose interest was mer ly rever- ante, pp. 179-182. 
 
 sionary, the bill was ordered to be amended by 9 Cons. Ord. X. 4; Steele v. Plomer, ubi 
 
 striking out his name as a defendant. Black- supra ; Braithwaite's Pr. 337. For the practice, 
 
 more v. Howett, 30 L. J. 101. and as to applications where the three weeks 
 
 4 Cookson v. Lee, 15 Sim. 302; Bentley v. have expired, see ante, pp. 460-462; and for 
 Robinson, 9 Hare App. 76; Ward v. Longsden, forms of affidavit and prcecipe, see Vol. III. 
 id. 26. And the same rule doubtless applies to 10 Ante, p. 181. 
 
 persons of unsound mind not so found. " Ante, p. 182; Cons. Ord. X. 10; see Leavitt 
 
 5 Moore v. Platel, 7 Beav. 583, Biddulph v. Cruger, 1 Paige, 421. For the practice, sea 
 
 473
 
 477 
 
 COMPELLING APPEARANCE. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 * 477 * If a corporation aggregate is defendant, and due service of 
 the bill has been effected upon it, then, upon affidavit of such 
 service, an appearance may be entered for the defendant by the plain- 
 tiff; 1 or a writ of distringas, 2 instead of the writ of attachment, may, 
 by leave of the Court, be issued 8 by the plaintiff, directed to the sheriff, 
 or other officer having jurisdiction in the district of the corporation, 
 commanding him to distrain the lands and tenements, goods and chat- 
 tels, of the corporation, so that it may not possess them till the Court 
 shall make other order to the contrary, and that in the mean time he 
 (the sheriff) do answer for what he so distrains : so that the defendant 
 may be compelled to appear in Chancery, on the return of the writ, and 
 answer the contempt. 4 (ii) If to this writ the sheriff returns nulla bona, 
 an alias distringas, which is a writ commanding the sheriff again to dis- 
 train the lands and tenements, goods and chattels, of the corporation, 
 may be sued out ; and if he returns nulla bona to this also, a pluries dis- 
 tringas, to the like purport, may be issued. 5 
 
 Each such writ must be prepared by the solicitor ; a praecipe in dupli- 
 cate must be produced to the entering clerk in the Registrar's office, — 
 who will retain one copy, and mark the other as entered as before 
 explained ; 6 and the writ will thereupon be sealed by the Record and 
 Writ Clerk, upon the entered praecipe being filed with him. 7 Upon 
 sealing the alias or pluries writ, the previous writ, with the sheriff's 
 return, must be filed or produced to the Record and Writ Clerk. 8 
 
 The return days to be inserted in these writs are the same as in the 
 case of an attachment. 9 
 
 If the sheriff returns " issues " 10 to the first n or second distringas, 
 or " issues " or nulla bona to the third, an order nisi for a commission 
 of sequestration may be obtained against the corporation, on an ex parte 
 motion by the plaintiff ; and upon proof of due service of such order, 
 and of continued default, such order will be made absolute, on a like 
 motion. 12 
 
 ante, pp. 462. 564; and for forms of notice of 
 motion, praecipe, attachment, and indorsement, 
 see Vol. Ill 
 
 i Cons. Ord. X. 4; Braithwaite's Pr. 337. 
 For forms of affidavit and praecipe, see Vol. 
 III. 
 
 2 McKim v. Odom, 3 Bland, 407, 426; 
 An^ell & Ames Corp. § 667, el seq. In Jones 
 i\ Boston Mill Corp. 4 Pick. 511, it was said 
 by Parker C. J. that the Supreme Court of 
 Massachusetts, as a Court of Equity, had au- 
 thority to issue such processes against cor- 
 porations as may be issued by the English 
 Chancery Court, as distringas, sequestration, 
 &c. And see Holland v. Cruft, 20 Pick. 321 ; 
 Grew o. Breed, 12 Met. 363. 
 
 3 It is conceived that the writ would not 
 
 now be issued without special order; and see 
 Cons. Ord. X. 10. 
 * Hinde, 140, 142. 
 
 5 Seton, 1227, 1261 ; Braithwaite's Pr. 194- 
 
 6 Ante, p. 465. 
 
 7 A fee of 5s. is payable on sealing each 
 writ. Regul. to Ord. Sched. 4. For forms of 
 these writs and praecipe, see Vol. III. 
 
 8 Braithwaite's Pr. 194. 
 
 9 Ante, p. 464. 
 
 10 If the corporation has property, the sheriff 
 usually levies 40s. under the first writ, £4 
 under the second, and the whole property of 
 the corporation under the third. Hinde, 140. 
 
 11 See Lowton v. Mayor &c. of Colchester, 
 3 Mer. 546, n.; Seton, 1227. 
 
 12 Seton, 1227; Braithwaite's Manual, 61; 
 
 (a) A distringas " does not act as an injunc- 
 tion, but he (the person interested) has to have 
 notice if any one wishes to transfer the fund, 
 and unless he then moves within a certain time, 
 
 474 
 
 the distringas is gone." Hence a legatee, who 
 puts a distringas on shares of stock, does not 
 accept the shares so that he cannot afterwards 
 disclaim. Hobbs r. Wayet, 36 Ch. D. 256.
 
 AGAINST PARTICULAR DEFENDANTS. * 479 
 
 * The commission is usually directed to four or more persons, 1 * 478 
 named by the plaintiff, directing them, or any three or two of 
 them, to sequester the rents and profits of the real estate, and the goods 
 and chattels and personal estate of the corporation, until they shall 
 appear to the plaintiff's bill, or the Court make further order to the con- 
 trary. The commission is prepared by the plaintiff's solicitor, and will 
 be issued by the Eecord and Writ Clerk, upon filing with him a praecipe, 
 and producing the order directing the commission to issue. 2 
 
 The return to a writ of sequestration is indorsed thereon ; 8 and upon 
 such return being made, the party prosecuting the contempt, if he 
 wishes to have another sequestration, or any further or other remedy, 
 must apply, specially, to the Court. 4 It is not the practice to file the 
 return. 5 
 
 A sequestration cannot be discharged till the corporation have per- 
 formed what they are enjoined to do, and paid the costs of the several 
 writs of distringas, and of the sequestration, including the commissioner's 
 fees ; but upon their doing this, they may, upon motion, get the seques- 
 tration discharged. 6 
 
 By one or other of these forms of process, appearance may, in almost 
 all cases, be compelled, after service of the copy of the bill has been 
 effected ; but as the plaintiff can himself enter an appearance for the 
 defendant, that, as has been already observed, 7 is the course which is 
 usually adopted in practice ; and it is rarely found desirable to carry 
 out process of compelling appearance. 
 
 Moreover, the plaintiff may proceed in the suit, by delivering a 
 copy of his interrogatories to a defendant who has made default in 
 appearing. 8 
 
 The affidavits filed for the purpose of proving the service of a copy 
 of a bill upon any defendant must state when, where, and how the 
 same was served, and by whom such service was effected. 9 
 
 The plaintiff having duly caused an appearance to be entered for any 
 defendant, is entitled, as against the same defendant, to the costs of 
 and incident to entering such appearance, whatever may be the event 
 of the suit; and such costs are to be added to any costs which the 
 plaintiff may be entitled to receive from such defendant, or be 
 set off against any costs which he may be ordered * to pay to * 479 
 such dfifendant ; but payment thereof is not to be otherwise 
 enforced without the leave of the Court. 1 
 
 for form of order, see Seton, 1261, No. 7; and see * Braithwaite's Pr. 291. 
 
 post, Chap. XXVI. § 7, Enforcing Decrees and 6 Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 5 Hare, 123, 
 
 Orders. For forms of motion paper, see Vol. III. 129; lO.Iur. 561. 
 
 1 It is not essential that the commissioners 6 H arr . Dv Newl. 150; Hinde, 143. 
 should be professional persons. 7 Ante, pp. 460, 472. ' 
 
 2 Braithwaite's Pr. 240. The writ must be 8 Cons. Ord. XI. 5; see post, p. 438. 
 engrossed on parchment, and bear a 20s. stamp. 9 C ons. Ord. X. 8 ; Davis v. Hole, 1 Y. & 
 Regul. to Ord. Sched. 4. For forms of prcecipe, C. C. C. 440; 6 Jur. 335. 
 
 commission, and indorsement, see Vol. III. l Cons. Ord. XL. 15.' 
 
 8 For form of a return nulla bona, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 475
 
 * 479 COMPELLING APPEARANCE. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 The defendant, on the other hand, notwithstanding an appearance 
 may have been entered for him by the plaintiff, may afterwards enter 
 an appearance for himself in the ordinary way ; 2 but such appearance, 
 by such defendant, is not to affect any proceeding duly taken or any 
 right acquired by the plaintiff, under or after the appearance entered 
 by him, or prejudice the plaintiff's right to be allowed the costs of the 
 first appearance. 8 A defendant cannot, however, take any proceeding 
 in a cause until he has himself entered an appearance, notwithstanding 
 the plaintiff has entered one for him. 
 
 2 See post, Chap. XIII. Appearance. * Cons. Ord. X. 9. 
 
 476
 
 * CHAPTER IX. *480 
 
 INTERROGATORIES FOR THE EXAMINATION OP THE DEFENDANTS IN 
 ANSWER TO THE BILL. 
 
 Formerly, as we have already seen, a bill in Chancery contained an 
 interrogating part, preceding the prayer, which consisted of a repeti- 
 tion of the stating and charging parts of the bill, in the form of ques- 
 tions to be answered by the defendants. This, as has been before 
 observed, is by the late Act of Parliament directed to be omitted from 
 the bill ; x but if the plaintiff desires to obtain discovery or admission 
 from any defendant, he may file interrogatories for the examination of 
 such defendant, within eight days from the time limited for the defend- 
 ant's appearance. 2 If the defendant appears within the time limited, 
 the plaintiff must deliver an office copy of the interrogatories to the 
 defendant or his solicitor within eight days after such time ; 8 but if the 
 defendant does not appear within the time allowed, the plaintiff may 
 deliver the interrogatories at any time after the time allowed has ex- 
 pired, but before the appearance of the defendant, or within eight days 
 after his appearance. 4 
 
 The interrogatories must be filed within the time limited by the Gen- 
 eral Orders, notwithstanding that a demurrer may be pending. 5 
 
 If the plaintiff allows the time for filing interrogatories to expire be- 
 fore he has filed them, he cannot tile them without special leave, 
 to be applied for in Court on motion, with notice, or in * Cham- * 481 
 bers on summons. 1 In practice, the application is usually made 
 on summons in Chambers ; 2 and, as a general rule, the plaintiff will 
 
 1 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 10; ante, p. 356. Where, under the old practice, the inter- 
 
 2 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 12; Cons. Ord. XI. rogatories were annexed to the bill, they were 
 2. This order applies to amended, as well as regarded as incorporated in it. Romaine v. 
 original bills. A defendant need not appear Hendrickson, 24 N. J. Eq. 231. 
 
 to an amended bill unless he is required to 8 Cons. Ord. XI. 4. If a copy is left at the 
 
 answer it ; and the intention of the plaintiff to office of the solicitor by whom the defendant has 
 
 call for an answer is indicated by service of a entered an appearance, it is sufficient. Bowen 
 
 duly sealed and indorsed copy of the amended v. Price, 2 I)e G. M. & G. 899, reversing 
 
 bill ; see Braithwaite's Pr. 328; Braithwaite's 1 Drew. 307. The service is effected in the same 
 
 Manual, 159. The interrogatories may be filed manner as that of other documents which do not 
 
 with the bill : Braithwaite's Pr. 38; and a sealed require personal service ; see ante, p. 455. 
 copy may be served at the same time as a copy * Cons. Ord. XI. 5. 
 
 of the bill. Leaman v. Brown, 7 W. R. 322, 5 Harding v. Tingey, 10 Jur. N. S. 873, 
 
 V. C. K. ; but in such case, the full time for V. C. K. 
 
 appearing and for an?werin£, namely, thirty- ! Cons. Ord. XI. 3; see for applications of 
 
 six days, must be allowed to expire before the this sort, Empson v. Bowley.2 S. & G. App. 3; 
 
 attachment for not answering can be sealed. Denis v. Rochussen, 4 Jur. N. S.298, V. C. W.; 
 
 Braithwaite's Manual, 184; and see Cheese- Dakins ». Garratt, id. 579, V. C. K. As to 
 
 borough v. Wright, 28 Beav. 173; see Pub. filing separate sets, see post, p. 485. 
 Stats. Mass. c. 151, §§ 7, 8. 2 Braithwaite's Pr. 36. 
 
 477
 
 * 482 INTERROGATORIES FOR EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANTS. 
 
 have to pay the costs. 8 If the application is made before the time has 
 expired, it should be that the time may be extended. 
 
 In like manner, interrogatories cannot, without a special order, be 
 delivered after the time limited for so doing has expired ; but leave to 
 deliver them after the time has elapsed, or for further time so to do 
 where it has not, may in a proper case be obtained on summons at 
 Chambers. 4 
 
 The notice of motion or summons must be served on the defendants 
 whom it is intended to interrogate, and who have appeared. The 
 order, if made on motion, is drawn up by the Registrar ; if made on 
 summons, it is drawn up in Chambers ; and where it extends the time 
 to file, or gives leave to file interrogatories, it must be produced to the 
 Record and Writ Clerk, at the time the interrogatories are presented 
 for filing. 5 
 
 Where the defendant is out of the jurisdiction, the Court upon ap- 
 plication, supported by such evidence as shall satisfy the Court in 
 what place or country such defendant is, or may probably be found, may 
 order that a copy of the interrogatories may be served on such defend- 
 ant in such place or country, or within such limits, as the Court shall 
 think fit to direct : and such order must limit a time within which the 
 defendant is to plead, answer, or demur, or obtain from the Court 
 further time to make his defence to the bill. 6 The application is made 
 by ex •parte motion or summons, supported by affidavit. 7 The copies of 
 the bill and interrogatories may be served together; 8 and therefore 
 one application embracing both objects is ordinarily made. 9 
 
 If the interrogatories cannot be served on a defendant, within the 
 jurisdiction, in the ordinary way, an ex parte application for leave to 
 substitute service may be made by motion, supported by affidavit, as in 
 the case of an application to substitute service of a copy of the bill. 10 
 
 Where the plaintiff in an original suit had neglected to file his inter- 
 rogatories within the time limited, the plaintiff in a cross-suit, 
 * 482 * by being the first to file interrogatories, was held entitled to 
 have his bill answered first. 1 
 
 The interrogatories are settled and signed by counsel ; 2 and are re- 
 quired to be divided into paragraphs, and numbered in the form given 
 in the General Orders, and the interrogatories which each defendant is 
 required to answer must be specified in a note at the end. 8 
 
 8 Dakins v. Garratt, 4 Jur. N. S. 579, V. i ft Ante, p. 449. For form of motion paper, 
 
 C. K. For forms of notice of motion and sum- see Vol. III. 
 
 mons, see Vol. Ill 1 Garwood v. Curteis, 10 Jur. N. S. 199; 12 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 17; see Garwood v. W. R. 509, V. C. W. 
 
 Curteis, 10 Jur. N. S. 199; 12 W. R. 509, V. C. 2 Interrogatories are not specified in Cons. 
 
 W. ; Bignold v. Cobbold, 11 Jur. N. S. 152, Ord. VIII. 1, among the documents requiring 
 
 V. C. S. For form of order, see Seton, 1243, counsel's signature; but the form of interroga- 
 
 No. 3; and for form of summons, see Vol. III. tories in Ord. Sched. B. assumes that the name 
 
 5 Braithwaite's Pr. 36. of counsel will be attached. As to the Chief 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. X. 7 (1), (2); ante, p. 452. Clerk's power to pass upon the relevancy of in- 
 
 7 For forms of motion paper, summons, and terrogatories, see R. S. C. Ord. XXI. r. 1 ; 
 affidavit, see Vol. III. Swabey v. Dovey, 32 Ch. D. 352; Martin v. 
 
 8 Leaman v. Brown, 7 W. R. 322, V. C. K. Spicer, id. 592. 
 
 » See ante, p. 451. 3 Cons. Ord. XL 1, and Sched. B. For 
 
 478
 
 INTERROGATORIES FOR EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANTS. * 483 
 
 Where a written bill is allowed to be filed, on an undertaking that a 
 printed bill shall be afterwards filed, 4 interrogatories may be filed before 
 the filing of the printed bill. 5 
 
 Interrogatories are filed at the Record and Writ Clerks' Office ; 6 and 
 they must be written on paper of the same description and size as that 
 on which bills are printed ; 7 and be intituled in the cause, so as to be 
 in strict agreement with the names of the parties as they appear in the 
 bill, at the time the interrogatories are filed. 8 
 
 The copies for service are prepared by the plaintiff's solicitor, but 
 must be examined with the original, and the number of folios counted, 
 by the Clerks of Records and Writs, who, if the copies are duly 
 stamped and properly written, will mark them as office copies. 9 The 
 copy for service on any defendant should only contain the interroga- 
 tories which such defendant is required to answer. 10 If the copies are 
 intended to be served before appearance, a copy must be served on 
 each defendant, in like manner as the copy of the bill is required to be 
 served ; u but if served after appearance, it is sufficient to serve one 
 copy on each solicitor by whom an appearance has been entered, not- 
 withstanding he may have appeared for more than one defendant. 12 
 
 The interrogatories to be filed, and each copy for service, must be 
 indorsed with the name and place of business of the plaintiff's solici- 
 tor, and of his agent, if any ; or with the name and place of 
 * residence of the plaintiff, where he acts in person ; and, in * 483 
 either- case, with the address for service, if any. 1 
 
 Under the former practice it was held, that as the object of the inter- 
 rogatories was to compel an answer to such facts only as were material 
 to the plaintiff's case, it was necessary that every interrogatory should 
 be founded upon statements made in the former part of the bill ; there- 
 fore, if there was nothing in the prior part of the bill to warrant an 
 interrogatory, the defendant was not compellable to answer it. 2 This 
 practice was considered necessary for the preservation of form and 
 order in the pleadings, and particularly to keep the answer to the mat- 
 ters put in issue by the bill ; 8 and it is conceived that this practice still 
 continues. But a variety of questions may be founded on a single alle- 
 gation, if they are relevant to it ; thus, if a bill is filed against an 
 
 forms of interrogatories, see Vol. III. and foot- The stamp is impressed on, or affixed to, such 
 
 note. copy. A prcecipe is required to be left; for 
 
 4 See 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 6; ante, p. 396. form, see Vol. III. 
 
 6 Lambert v. Lomas, 9 Hare App. 29; 18 10 Cons. Ord. XI. 4. 
 
 Jur. 1008. u See Cons. Ord. X. 1; ante, p. 442. 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. I. 35. No fee is payable for 12 Braithwaite's Pr. 37; but if he appears as 
 
 filing. Braithwaite's Pr. 35. properly concerned for one defendant, and as 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. 6 March, 1660, r. 16; as to such agent for another, two copies should be served; 
 
 paper, see ante, p 396. Dates and sums may see id. 308, n. Any copy sealed for delivery, 
 
 be expressed by figures. may be re-sealed, at any time before delivery, 
 
 8 Braithwaite's Pr. 35. and without further fee. 
 
 9 Cons. Ord. XI. 4. The copies for service x Cons. Ord. III. 2, 5; ante, pp. 397, 453, 
 are usually written on brief paper. A fee of 454. For form of indorsement, see Vol. III. 
 5s. higher scale, or Is. lower scale, is payable, 2 Att.-Gen. v. Whorwood, 1 Ves. Sr. 534, 
 in Chancery Fee Fund stamps, on marking 538. 
 
 each office copv. Regul. to Ord. Sched. 4. 8 Ld. Red. 45. 
 
 479
 
 *484 INTERROGATORIES FOR EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANTS. 
 
 executor for an account of the personal estate of his testator: upon the 
 single allegation that he has proved the will, may be founded every 
 inquiry which may be necessary to ascertain the amount of the estate, 
 its value, the disposition made of it, the situation of any part remaining 
 undisposed of, the debts of the testator, and any other circumstance 
 leading to the account required. 4 
 
 It is to be observed, however, that the interrogatories must, in all 
 cases, be confined to the substantive case made by the bill, and 
 * 484 that the plaintiff cannot extend his interrogatories in * such a 
 manner as to compel a discovery of a distinct matter, not in- 
 cluded in that case ; and therefore, where a bill prayed a discovery 
 in aid of an action at Law under the Stock Jobbing Act, 1 as to an 
 advance, by the plaintiff to the defendant, of a sum of money without 
 legal consideration, which it was alleged in the bill was advanced as the 
 premium for liberty "to put upon, deliver, or refuse stock," and in 
 consideration of certain contracts relating to stock, which were void 
 under that Act, and the defendant denied, by his answer, that the plain- 
 tiff did advance or pay to the defendant the sum mentioned, or any 
 other sum, as the premium, &c. (as charged in the bill), to which 
 answer an exception was taken, because the defendant had not nega- 
 tived the receipt of the money in every way which had been suggested 
 in the interrogatory, Lord Eldon overruled the exception, because the 
 interrogatory pointed at a case within the fifth and eighth sections of 
 the Act, in respect of which no bill of discovery was given by the Act, 
 whereas the allegations in the bill related to cases within the first section 
 of the Act, in respect of which a right to file a bill of discovery was 
 given by the second section. 2 
 
 In Attorney-General v. Whorwood,* where interrogatories in a bill were 
 directed to particular facts which were not charged in the preceding 
 part, and the defendant, though not bound to answer them, did so, and 
 the answer was replied to, Lord Hardwicke held that the informality 
 in the manner of charging was supplied by the answer, and that the 
 facts were properly put in issue ; " for a matter may be put in issue by 
 the answer as well as by the bill, and, if replied to, either party may 
 examine to it." 4 
 
 Although, upon the authority of the cases above cited, it appears that 
 
 ■» Ld. Red. 45. In Faulder v. Stuart, 11 Ves. general charge enabled you to put all questions 
 
 296, 301 (see also Muckleston t'. Brown, 6 Ves. upon it that are material to make out whether it 
 
 52, 62), a defendant declined, by his answer, was paid; and it is not necessary to load (he 
 
 to set forth the particulars of a certain consid- bill, by adding to the general charge, that it 
 
 eration, which it was alleged in the bill the was not paid, that so it would appear, if the 
 
 defendant pretended was paid by him for the defendant would set forth when, where, &c. 
 
 purchase of a share in a newspaper, which was The old rule was, that making that substantive 
 
 the subject of the litigation. Lord Eldon, upon charge, you may, in the latter part of the bill, 
 
 the question of the sufficiency of the answer being ask all questions that go to prove or disprove 
 
 argued before him, said: " It all depends upon the truth of the fact so stated." 
 this,— whether there is such a charge in the bill, 1 7 Geo. II. c. 8, repealed by 23 & 24 Vic. 
 
 astothe payment of the consideration, asentitles c. 28. 
 
 the plaintiff to an answer, not only whether it 2 Bullock v. Richardson, 11 Ves. 373, 375. 
 
 was paid, but as to all the circumstances, when, 8 1 Ves. Sr. 534. 
 
 where, &c. I have always understood that a 4 Id. 538. 
 
 480
 
 INTERROGATORIES FOR EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANTS. * 485 
 
 a plaintiff might formerly ask all questions necessary to make out a 
 general allegation in the bill, yet, in point of fact, it was the common 
 practice to make the interrogating part an exact echo of the stating and 
 charging part of the bill. Now, however, this practice is not so strictly 
 adhered to ; for modern bills, being so much more concise than bills 
 formerly were, it is often necessary or desirable, in the interrogatories, 
 to inquire after particulars included in a general allegation in the bill. 
 And it would seem that, to some extent at least, the old rule requiring 
 an allegation in the bill, as a foundation of the interrogatories, has been 
 relaxed ; for it has been held, that a defendant may be interrogated 
 as to books and papers in his possession, relating to the matters 
 in * question in the suit, although there is no allegation in the * 485 
 bill that he has any. 1 (a) This, it is conceived, would scarcely 
 have been allowed under the former practice. It has also been deter- 
 mined that, under the new pra ;tice, it is not necessary to introduce in 
 the bill allegations suggesting imaginary facts, in order to found an inter- 
 rogatory ; thus, when a bill alleged the existence of a mortgage, known 
 to the plaintiff, but did not allege that there were others, an interroga- 
 tory whether there were others was allowed. 2 
 
 Interrogatories to an amended bill should, in the case of original 
 defendants from whom an answer is required, be confined to the parts 
 added by the amendment, if the amendment is made after answer, or 
 after the expiration of the time within which the plaintiff might have 
 filed interrogatories to the original bill. 3 Where, however, in such a 
 case, it is desired to interrogate the original defendants beyond the 
 amendments, a special application for leave so to do must be made by 
 motion or summons. 4 In the case of new defendants, added by the 
 amendments, the interrogatories may extend to the whole bill, the bill 
 being, as to them, an original bill ; but a new set of interrogatories 
 must be filed, as the old interrogatories, if any, cannot be amended as 
 
 * Perry v. Turpin, Kay App. 49; 18 Jur. 2 Marsh v. Keith, 1 Dr. & Sm. 342; 6 Jur. 
 
 594; Parkinson v. Chambers, 1 K. & J. 72; N. 8. 1182 ; and see Hudson v. Grenfell, 3 
 
 Mansell v. Feeney, 2 J. & H. 313, 318; but the Giff. 388; 8 Jur. N. S. 878; Piffard v. Beeby, 
 
 Court discourages exceptions to the answer, on L. R. 1 Eq. 623: 12 Jur. N. S. 117, V. C. K." 
 the ground that the interrogatory as to books 3 Wich v. Parker, 22 Beav. 59; 2 Jur. N. S. 
 
 and papers is not sufficiently answered, such 582; Denis v. Rochussen. 4 Jur. N. S. 298, V. 
 
 discovery being now obtainable in Chambers, C. W. ; Drake v. Symes, 2 De G. F. & J. 81; 
 
 under 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 18; see Law v. Southampton Steamboat Co. v. Rawlins, 10 Jur. 
 
 London Indisputable Co. 10 Hare App. 20 ; N. S. 118, M. R.; 12 W. R. 285. 
 Barnard v. Hunter, 1 Jur. N. S 1065, V. C. S. ; * See Denis v. Rochussen, and Southampton 
 
 Rochdale Canal Co. v. King, 9 Hare App. 49, Steamboat Co. v. Rawlins, ubi supra; see also 
 
 note; Kidger v. Worswick, 5 Jur. N. S. 37. Att.-Gen. v. Rees, 12 Beav. 50, 54. 
 Interrogatories as to particular documents must, 
 however, be answered. Catt v. Tourle, 18 W. 
 R. 966. 
 
 (a) A general roving interrogatory as to 307. See Morris v. Edwards, 15 App. Cas. 309; 
 
 documents in his possession cannot be admin- 23 Q. B. D. 287; Nicholl v. Wheeler 17 Q. B. 
 
 istered to a defendant after he has once made a D. 101; Newall v. Telegraph Construction Co. 
 
 sufficient affidavit of documents, when the effect L. R. 2 Eq. 756; M'Garel v. Moon, L. R. 10 
 
 will be to compel him to make a further affidavit Eq. 22. 
 •s to documents. Hall v. Truman, 29 Ch. D. 
 
 vol. i. — 31 481
 
 486 
 
 INTERROGATORIES FOR EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANTS. 
 
 to the new defendants. 5 Where the plaintiff, having amended his bill 
 after answer, filed interrogatories to the whole bill, they were, on the 
 application of the original defendants, ordered to be taken off the file ; 
 but leave was given to file new interrogatories confined to the amend- 
 ments : 6 and where, after a defendant had put in a voluntary answer, 
 the plaintiff amended his bill, it was held that he could only require 
 an answer from such defendant to the amendments. 7 A second set of 
 interrogatories to the same bill may, if the time for filing interrogato- 
 ries has not expired, be filed, without order, as against defendants who 
 were not previously interrogated: for instance, if the plaintiff files 
 interrogatories for the examination of two or more of several 
 *486 defendants, and afterwards desires to interrogate *the other 
 defendants to the same bill, he may file a second set of inter- 
 rogatories for the examination of such other defendants. 1 If the time 
 has expired, an order giving leave to file the second set of interroga- 
 tories is necessary. 
 
 If the interrogatories first filed have not been answered by any defend- 
 ant, the plaintiff may, under an order, amend such interrogatories, so 
 as to require an answer from such other defendants ; but the order to 
 amend must express the object, and the defendant as against whom the 
 interrogatories were first filed, must be served with a copy of the inter- 
 rogatories as amended. 2 And, generally, interrogatories may be amended 
 under an order as of course, to be obtained on motion, or on petition at 
 the Rolls, at any time before an answer is put in. 3 (a) 
 
 If the plaintiff desires to waive an answer from the defendant, for 
 whose examination interrogatories have been filed, but who has not an- 
 swered them, he may, at any time before filing replication, or setting 
 down the cause for hearing, obtain as of course, on motion, or on peti- 
 tion at the Rolls, an order to amend the interrogatories, by striking out. 
 so much of the heading, and of the note at the foot thereof, as requires 
 an answer from such defendant : 4 but if he has been served with a copy 
 of the interrogatories, his consent should be obtained : service of the 
 interrogatories, as so amended, upon co-defendants who have answered 
 is unnecessary. 
 
 When an order for leave to amend the interrogatories cannot, under 
 the ordinary practice, be obtained as of course, the application for it 
 
 5 Braithwaite's Pr. 310. 
 
 6 Drake v. Symes, 2 De G F. & J. 81. For 
 form of notice of motion in such case, see Vol. 
 III. 
 
 t Denis v. Rochussen, 4 Jur. N. S. 298, Y. 
 C. W".; Wich v. Parker, 22 Beav. 59; 2 Jur. 
 N. S. 582; and see post, Chap. XVII. § 4, 
 Exceptions to Answer. 
 
 i Braithwaite's Pr. 35. 
 
 2 Ibid.; Braithwaite's Manual, 183. 
 
 3 Braithwaite's Pr. 309. For form of order 
 
 (a) If the bill is amended after exceptions 
 for insufficiency to an answer are allowed, the 
 plaintiff, on such amendment, may serve the de- 
 
 482 
 
 on motion, see Seton, 1252, No. 2; and for 
 forms of motion paper and petition, see Vol. 
 III. 
 
 * Braithwaite's Pr. 310, 311. Where the 
 interrogatories do not extend to other defend- 
 ants, the application should be to take them 
 off the file. And this application may be ex 
 parte. Stephens v. Louch, W. N. (1868) 144; 
 Hammond v. Hammond, 18 L. T. N. S. 553. 
 For forms of motion paper and petition, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 fendant with amended interrogatories. 
 v. Kilmorey, L. R. 11 Eq. 425. 
 
 Newry
 
 INTERROGATORIES FOR EXAMINATION OP DEFENDANTS. * 487 
 
 must be made on summons at Chambers; if, however, the defendants 
 will consent, it may be obtained on petition of course at the Rolls. 5 
 
 Amendments of interrogatories are settled and signed by counsel ; 
 and the amendment is made in the same manner as in the case of bills. 6 
 Thus, if the amendments exceed two folios of ninety words in any one 
 place, a new engrossment of the interrogatories must be made and filed ; 
 in other cases, the amendments will be made by the Record and Writ 
 Clerk, on the draft, signed by counsel, and the order to amend, being left 
 with him. 7 
 
 An office copy of the interrogatories, as amended, must be served on 
 each defendant who is required to answer them, or on his solici- 
 tor, if he has appeared by one. The service is effected in * the * 487 
 same manner as service of the copy of the original interrogato- 
 ries. A copy of the former interrogatories, which, though stamped for 
 service, has not actually been served when they are amended, may be 
 amended, re-examined, and restamped at the Record and Writ Clerks' 
 Office for service, without further fee, on a 'praecipe, for that purpose 
 being left there. 1 
 
 Where the interrogatories are amended, each defendant previously 
 served has his full time for answering again, from the date of the serv- 
 ice of the copy of the amended interrogatories. 2 
 
 The costs of preparing interrogatories, which have not been filed in 
 consequence of admissions being subsequently entered into between the 
 parties, will be allowed on taxations as between party and party. 8 
 
 5 See Braithwaite's Pr 310. 
 
 6 Ante, p. 422. 
 
 T Braithwaite's Pr. 311. No fee is payable 
 on amending interrogatories. Ibid. 
 
 1 Ibid. For form of praecipe, see Vol. III. 
 
 2 Braithwaite's Pr. 311. As to the time 
 allowed to answer, see post, p. 488. 
 
 3 Davies v. Marshall, 1 Dr. & S. 564; 7 Jur. 
 N. S. 669. 
 
 483
 
 *488 * CHAPTER X. 
 
 PROCESS TO COMPEL, AND PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT OF ANSWER. 
 Section I. — Against Defendants not privileged, nor subject to Disability. 
 
 Where the plaintiff requires the defendant to put in an answer to the 
 bill, whether original or amended, he must, as we have seen, rile inter- 
 rogatories for his examination ; and the defendant must put in his plea, 
 answer, or demurrer, not demurring alone, within twenty-eight days 
 from the delivery to him or his solicitor of a copy of the interrogatories 
 which he is required to answer : 1 but where, using due diligence, he is 
 unable to put in his answer within the time allowed, the Judge, on suffi- 
 cient cause being shown, may enlarge the time, as often as he deems 
 right, on such (if any) terms as to the Judge seem just. 2 
 
 If the defendant does not answer within the time allowed, and 
 procures no enlargement of the time, he is subject to the following 
 liabilities : — 
 
 1. An attachment may be issued against him. 8 
 
 2. He may be committed to prison, and brought to the bar of the 
 Court. 
 
 3. The plaintiff may file a traversing note, or proceed to have the bill 
 
 taken pro confesso agaiust him. 4 
 * 489 * It may be remarked, that if the plaintiff has to give security 
 
 for costs, the day on which the order to give security is served, 
 and the time thenceforward until and including the day on which such 
 security is given, are not to be reckoned in the computation of the time 1 
 allowed the defendant for answering. 
 
 Where the defendant thus becomes liable to be attached, the plain- 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 4. 4 This is the express provision of Art. 13 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XXXVIF. 8. The application of the 16th Order of May, 1845; Sand. Ord. 
 for further time to answer is made on sum- 983; 7 Beav. xxiii.; 1 Phil, lxviii.; but is 
 mons in Chambers; see post, Chap. XVII. § 3, omitted in Cons. Ord. XXXVIII. 4, corre- 
 Ansivers. sponding to that Art., though retained in Ord. 
 
 3 See Matter of Vanderbilt, 4 John. Ch. 58. XXXVII. 6, corresponding to Art. 15 of the 
 If the plaintiff makes oath that a discovery is 16th Ord. This appears to be an acciden'al 
 necessary, he is entitled to an order that the omission; but it is clear that the consequences, 
 defendant answer the bill or be attached; and though not expressed in the General Order, of 
 the Court will not, in that stage of the cause, a defendant msiking default in answering, re- 
 inquire whether a discovery is necessary. Staf- main the same as before; see Cons. Ord. XII., 
 ford v. Brown, 4 Paige, 360. Aj mbpcena return- XIII., and XXII. For table of process for 
 able on Sunday is irregular, and will not warrant want of answer, see Seton, 1267. 
 
 the issuing of an attachment for disobedience * Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 14. 
 
 thereof, as no Court can he held on that day for 
 anv purpose. Gould v. Spencer, 5 Paige, 541. 
 
 484
 
 AGAINST UNPRIVILEGED DEFENDANTS. * 490 
 
 tiff's solicitor may prepare a writ of attachment ; a the indorsement of 
 which states it to be for not answering. 8 To procure the sealing of this 
 writ, an affidavit of the service or delivery of the interrogatories must 
 be produced to the Record and Writ Clerk; 4 and a praecipe must be 
 entered and left in the usual manner. 8 The writ must be directed to 
 the sheriff or other proper officer, and lodged with the under-sheriff, 
 deputy-sheriff, or other proper person, as before explained.s If the 
 defendant is in prison, the writ must be lodged with the keeper as a 
 detainer. 7 
 
 When there is just reason to believe that any defendant means to 
 abscond before answering the bill, the Court may, on the ex parte appli- 
 cation of the plaintiff, at any time after an appearance has been entered 
 for him by the plaintiff, order an attachment for want of answer to 
 issue against him ; and such attachment is to be made returnable at 
 such time as the Court directs. 8 Such application should be made by 
 motion, supported by affidavit of the grounds for believing that the 
 defendant means to abscond before answering, and by the Record and 
 Writ Clerks' certificate of an appearance having been entered by the 
 plaintiff. 9 
 
 It is customary for the plaintiff's solicitor to write to the defendant's 
 solicitor, calling for an answer, before the attachment is issued. The 
 effect of such a letter is, that the plaintiff on whose behalf it is given, 
 precludes himself from issuing the attachment, until the defendant has 
 had a reasonable time, either to put in his answer, or to obtain an 
 order for further time so to do. 10 
 
 An order for further time cannot in strictness be granted after an 
 attachment ; moreover, the writ is considered to issue the first moment 
 of the day on which it is sealed and tested. 11 An attachment 
 * is therefore regular, and not to be set aside, if sealed before an * 490 
 order for further time has been obtained. 1 When an attachment 
 has been issued, but has not been executed at the time an application 
 for further time is heard, the plaintiff may consent to an order for 
 further time being made, on the condition that the attachment is not 
 to be thereby prejudiced; but such condition should appear by the order. 
 
 2 See ante, p. 464. 7 See ante, p. 466. 
 
 8 For forms of attachment and indorsement, 8 Cons. Ord. XII. 1. The difference be- 
 
 see Vol. III. tween the common attachment for failing to 
 
 4 Braithwaite's Pr. 164. An attachment answer, which is here considered, and an ex- 
 will be issued on an affidavit that the defend- traordinary or special attachment for contempt, 
 ant's solicitor has admitted the delivery to him is noted in Hazard v. Durant, 11 R. I. 195. 
 of the interrogatories. Sidebottom v. Adkins, 9 For forms of affidavit and motion paper, 
 4 Jur. N. S. 942, V. C. S. If no appearance see Vol. III. 
 
 has been entered, an affidavit of the service of 10 Barritt v. Barritt, 3 Swanst. 395, 396; 
 
 the bill is also necessary. Braithwaite's Pr. Taylor v. Fisher, 6 Sim. 566. These cases 
 
 165; and if the defendant has obtained an were before the abolition of the Six Clerks; 
 
 order enlarging the time to answer, it should but solicitors have adopted the practice, 
 be shown by the affidavit, or by an office copy :l Stephens v. Neale, 1 Mad. 550; Petty 
 
 of the order, that such time has elapsed. Ibid. v. Lonsdale, 4 M. & C. 545, 548 ; 3 Jur. 1186. 
 164. For form of affidavit, see Vol. III. l Kirkpatrick v. Meers, 2 Sim. 16; Taylor 
 
 6 Ante, p. 465. For form of praecipe, see v. Fisher, 6 Sim. 566. No service of an order 
 
 Vol. III. for time is now necessary. 2 Smith's Pr. 131. 
 
 6 Ante, p. 466. 
 
 485
 
 * 491 COMPELLING ANSWER. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 The sheriff may either return cepi corpus, attached and in prison, or 
 non est inventus ; 2 and it will be convenient to consider, separately, the 
 course to be adopted by the plaintiff, in respect of each one of such 
 returns. 
 
 First: If the sheriff attach the defendant, and, taking bail, return 
 accordingly, 3 the plaintiff is entitled, as of course, to move, upon pro- 
 duction of the sheriff's return, for an order that the messenger attending 
 the Court may apprehend the defendant, and bring him to the bar of 
 the Court. 4 The order, when drawn up, is delivered by the Registrar 
 to the messenger, who thereupon procures the Lord Chancellor's war- 
 rant to apprehend the defendant, and proceed to execute the same. If 
 there is a vacancy in the office of messenger, the Sergeant-at-Arms will 
 be ordered to bring up the defendant. 8 
 
 If the plaintiff adopt this course, and the defendant is taken into 
 custody by the messenger, the plaintiff must take care that the defend- 
 ant be brought to the bar of the Court by the messenger, within ten 
 days after he was so taken into custody, and within thirty days after 
 his arrest by the sheriff : 6 otherwise the defendant is entitled to his dis- 
 charge, without payment of the costs of the contempt, — which, in such 
 case, are to be paid by the plaintiff. 7 But where such defendant does 
 not put in his answer within eight days after such discharge, the plain- 
 tiff may cause a new attachment to be issued against him for want of 
 his answer. 8 
 
 If the messenger finds the defendant in prison, he lodges the order 
 and warrant with the keeper, as a detainer, and makes his return accord- 
 ingly ; whereupon the plaintiff may cause the defendant to be brought 
 to the bar, under a writ of habeas corpus. 9 
 
 Where the messenger is unable to find the defendant, he makes a 
 return to that effect ; and the plaintiff may then obtain an order for the 
 Sergeant-at-arms to apprehend the defendant. 
 
 Secondly : If the sheriff arrest the defendant, and commit him 
 
 * 491 * to prison, or detain him if already in prison, and return accord- 
 
 ingly, 1 the plaintiff is entitled, upon production of the return, 
 to an order for a writ of habeas corpus cum causis directed to the keeper 
 of the prison, or other officer in whose custody the defendant is, com- 
 manding him to bring the defendant to the bar of the Court. 2 This 
 order will be made on petition or motion, as of course. 8 The writ will 
 be sealed at the Record and Writ Clerks' Office, on production of the 
 order, and must be made returnable on a day certain. Usually one of 
 
 2 For an explanation of these several returns, » The practice here stated will also apply to 
 
 see ante, pp. 470, 471 ; and as to enforcing a a case where the keeper of a prison, in which 
 
 return, see id. p. 470. the defendant is confined, certifies that the de- 
 
 8 As to bail, see ante, p. 468. fendant is in his custody. 
 
 * For form of order, see Seton, 1260, No. 2; 2 For form of order, see Seton, 1262, No. 8. 
 
 and for form of motion paper, see Vol. III. The plaintiff, instead of adopting this course, 
 
 5 Macnab v. Mensal, 2 Sim. 16. may serve notice of motion, under Cons. Ord, 
 
 6 See post, p. 491. XXII. r. 1, to take the bill pro confesso, as here- 
 
 7 Cons. Ord. XII. 2. after explained; see post, p. 519. 
 
 8 Ibid. 8 For forms of petition and motion paper, 
 » See post, p. 493. see Vol. III. 
 
 486
 
 AGAINST UNPRIVILEGED DEFENDANTS. * 492 
 
 the days appointed for hearing motions is named ; but if the plaintiff is 
 limited in time, another day may be fixed. 4 
 
 The defendant must be brought to the bar of the Court within thirty 
 days after he is lodged or detained in prison under the attachment, or 
 he will be entitled to his discharge, without paying the costs of con- 
 tempt; which in such case will have to be paid by the plaintiff. 6 But 
 the plaintiff may, at the expiration of eight days after such discharge, 
 issue fresh process, if the answer be not tiled in the mean time. 6 Dur- 
 ing vacation, the prisoner may be brought up to the private house of 
 the Judge. 7 
 
 In either of these cases, whether the defendant be brought to the bar 
 of the Court by the messenger, or upon habeas corpus by the officer in 
 whose custody he is, the defendant, if he persists in his contempt, will, 
 upon motion of course by the plaintiff, be turned over to Whitecross 
 Street Prison ; 8 or remanded to that prison, if already imprisoned or 
 detained there. 9 The plaintiff may then either press for an answer, or 
 proceed to take the bill^»ro confesso against the defendant. 10 
 
 If the plaintiff determines to press for an answer, he should move for 
 an order that the defendant may remain in custody until he has 
 answered the bill. 11 Notice of the motion should be served * on * 492 
 the defendant ; l and the order will be made, if the Court is 
 satisfied that justice cannot be done to the plaintiff without an answer 
 to the interrogatories from the defendant himself ; and the order will 
 not prejudice the plaintiff's rights to take the bill pro confesso. 2 
 
 If the plaintiff determines to proceed to take the bill pro confesso 
 against the defendant, he must obtain an order for a writ of habeas cor- 
 pus, directed to the keeper of the prison, commanding him to bring the 
 defendant to the bar of the Court. This order is made on petition or 
 motion as of course, supported by the order handing over or remand- 
 ing the defendant back to the prison, and the keeper's certificate of his 
 being in custody there. 8 The application for the writ may be made as 
 soon as the defendant is ordered to be committed or remanded back to 
 
 4 Braithwaite's Pr. 224, 225 ; and see post, Court, file an answer in the name of the defend- 
 p. 492, n. 7. When the writ has been duly ant, under 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 15, 
 executed and returned, it should be filed in r. 11; see post, p. 472. But this course is prac- 
 the Record and Writ Clerks' Office. Oldfield tically abolished, as the plaintiff may file a 
 v. Cobbett, 2 Phil. 289. For forms of writ, traversing note ; see post p. 513. 
 indorsement, and prmcipe, see Vol. III. n For form of order, see Seton, 1264, No. 14. 
 
 5 Cons. Ord. XII. 3. 1 Aveling v. Martin, 17 Jur. 271, L. JJ., 
 
 6 Ibid. Vacations will be reckoned in com- overruling Maitland 0. Rodger, 14 Sim. 92; 
 puling the thirty days. Fortescue v. Hallett, 8 Jur. 371. For form of notice of motion, see 
 3 Jur. N. S. 806, V. C. K., where it was held Vol. III. 
 
 that the Stat. 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, 2 n Geo. IV. &1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 15,r.l2; 
 
 § 15, r. 5, which allowed the plaintiff till the Braithwaite's Pr. 270; Maitland v. Rodger, ubi 
 
 fourth day of the ensuing term, if the thirty svprn ; Potts v. Whitmore, 8 Beav. 317. If 
 
 days expire in vacation, is superseded by the the defendant does not appear on the motion, 
 
 General Order; see also Flower v. Bright, 2 J. an affidavit of service of the notice must be 
 
 & H. 590. produced in Court; for form of affidavit, see 
 
 " Clark v. Clark, 1 Phil. 116. Vol III. 
 
 8 For form of order, see Seton, 1262, No. 10. 8 For forms of order, see Seton, 1263, Nos. 
 
 9 Ibid. No. 12. 11 & 12; and for forms of petition and motion, 
 10 The plaintiff may also, with leave of the see Vol. III. 
 
 487
 
 * 493 COMPELLING ANSWER. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. . 
 
 prison ; 4 but there must be at least twenty-eight days between the day 
 on which the defendant was committed or remanded back, and the 
 return of the writ. 5 The writ will be sealed at the Record and Writ 
 Clerks' Office, on production of the order. 6 On the return of the writ, 
 the defendant is brought to the bar of the Court; and if he persists in 
 his contempt, he will be remanded to prison, to remain there till he 
 answer the bill and clear his contempt ; and the bill will be ordered to 
 be taken pro confesso against him at the hearing of the cause. 7 
 
 It should, however, be mentioned here, that although the practice 
 above stated may still be adopted, the General Orders have given the 
 plaintiff an easier mode of obtaining an order to have the bill taken 
 pro confesso, in the event of the attachment being executed upon the 
 defendant. 8 
 
 If the plaintiff resorts to the practice above stated, no time should 
 be lost in these proceedings ; for, unless the plaintiff, within six weeks 
 after the expiration of two calendar months from the time the defend- 
 ant was lodged or detained in prison, under the attachment, 
 
 * 493 obtain the order that the defendant remain * in custody until 
 
 answer or further order, or that the bill be taken pro confesso, 
 the defendant is entitled (upon application to the Court) to be dis- 
 charged, without payment of any costs, unless the Court see good 
 cause to detain him in custody. 1 Where, however, the plaintiff can 
 show that an answer is necessary, the Court may refuse to discharge 
 the defendant, although the plaintiff has neglected to obtain an order 
 to detain him in custody. 2 
 
 If the defendant, upon the return being made to the attachment by 
 the sheriff, be in jail under sentence for a misdemeanor, he may be 
 brought up before the Court by habeas corpus in the manner before 
 explained; 3 and thereupon he will be turned over pro forma to White- 
 cross Street Prison, though actually carried back to the prison from 
 whence he came. Thereupon, a second writ of habeas corpus issues, 
 similar in all respects to that before mentioned, except in being directed 
 to the jailer or keeper of the prison to which the defendant has been 
 carried back. Upon the return thereof, the defendant is brought into 
 Court and remanded to the prison from whence he came, without being 
 turned over again to Whitecross Street Prison ; and the bill may be 
 taken pro confesso, in the same manner in all respects as if the defendant 
 had been all along in the custody of the keeper of the latter prison. 4 
 
 4 Simpson v. Barton, 13 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 79, order directing the former writ to issue. Braith- 
 
 j^j r waite's Pr. 224. 
 
 6 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 15, r. 2. » Cons Old. XXII. 1. As to taking bills 
 
 6 Brai hwaite's Pr. 224, 225. For forms of pro confesso, see post, Chap. XI. 
 
 writ, indorsement, and prmcipe, see Vol. III.; » 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 15, 
 
 and see ante, p. 491. r. 13. The two months and six weeks run in 
 
 - For forms of order, see Seton, 1266, Nos. vacation. Simmons v. Wood, 2 Hare, 644. 
 
 5 & 6. Where, from pressure of business or 2 Potts v. Whitmore, 8 Beav. 317. 
 
 other causes, the matter is not heard, the Court 3 Ante, p. 491. 
 
 mav direct a new writ of habeas corpus to * 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 15 r. 4; 
 
 issue without payment of any fee; see Cons. 5 & 6 Vic. c. 22, § 7; 25 & 26 V 1C . c. 104, § 2; 
 
 Ord. XXX. 3. The direction, in such case, is Braithwaite's Pr. 283. 
 sigued by the Registrar, and indorsed on the 
 488
 
 AGAINST UNPRIVILEGED DEFENDANTS. * 494 
 
 Should it turn out that the defendant is under sentence for felony, 
 there is apparently no power in the Court to order his removal until the 
 expiration of the sentence ; 6 and consequently, in such a case, it seems 
 that, previously to the General Order above referred to, 6 no order to 
 take the bill pro confesso could have been obtained, nor could any answer 
 have been enforced as against a defendant in such a position. 
 
 There seems to have been some difference of opinion among the 
 Judges, whether the 13th rule of the statute confers upon the defendant 
 so absolute a right to his discharge that it cannot be waived by any act 
 done by him either previously or subsequent to the expiration of the 
 period specified. 7 
 
 * Thirdly: If the sheriff is unable to attach the defendant, *494 
 and return accordingly, there are different modes whereby, under 
 different circumstances, the plaintiff may proceed to take the bill pro 
 confesso. 
 
 If an affidavit can be made, that due diligence was used to ascertain 
 where such defendant was at the time of issuing such writ, and in en- 
 deavoring to apprehend him under the same, and that the person suing 
 forth such writ verily believed, at the time of suing forth the same, 
 that such defendant was in the county into which such writ was issued, 
 then, upon ex parte motion, supported by such an affidavit, and the 
 sheriff's return, the plaintiff is entitled to a writ of sequestration. 1 But 
 the affidavit must be precisely in the words, or at least go to the full 
 extent, of the language just mentioned ; and hence it is often impossible, 
 from the conduct of the defendant, to frame an affidavit in the proper 
 terms. 2 
 
 Where such an affidavit can be made, another course for the plaintiff 
 to adopt is, upon the sheriff returning non est inventus, to move, as of 
 course, upon such affidavit, for the Sergeant-at-Arms to apprehend the 
 defendant. 3 If the Sergeant-at-Arms arrest the defendant, he must 
 bring him to the bar of the Court within ten days thereafter. If he find 
 him in prison, he lodges the order and warrant with the keeper as a 
 
 6 Rogers v. Kirkpatrick, 3 Ves. 573. Ball, 4 Beav. 101, a defendant obtaining leave 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. XXII. 1. to answer, subsequent to the period when he 
 
 7 In Williams v. Newlon, 11 Sim. 45, Sir becomes entitled to his discharge, has still a 
 Lancelot Shadwell V. C. decided, that an an- right to the benefit of the statute, — which right 
 swer put in by a prisoner, when entitled to his he has neither power nor capacity to waive. 
 discharge, inasmuch as it prevents the plaintiff 1 Cons. Ord. XII. 6; Braithwaite's Pr. 287; 
 from having the bill taken pro confesso, de- see Seton, 1260, No. 1; and for forms of atfi- 
 prives the defendant of the right conferred davit, motion paper, writ of sequestration, and 
 upon him by the statute, of being discharged pracipe, see Vol. III. A sequestration will 
 without payment of the costs of the contempt; not be issued on an attachment returned before 
 and in Woodward v. Conebeer (2 Hare, 506 ; 8 the return day. Martin r. Kerridge, 3 P. W. 
 Jur. 642), Sir James Wigram V. C. was of opin- 241 ; Re Brown, 16 VV. R. 962. 
 
 ion that an application for time to answer, 2 Storer v. Great Western Ry. Co. 1 Y. &C. 
 
 made by the defendant prior to being entitled C. C. 180. 
 
 to his discharge, and the acceptance of the 8 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 15, r. 1; 
 
 time thereupon given, prevented the operation Braithwaite's Pr. 286 ; but see Seton, 1260, No. 
 
 ot the statute, and placed the defendant in the 1. The order must be delivered to the Sergeant, 
 
 the situation he would have been in had its or his deputy, by the Registrar. Ord. XXX. 2 
 
 provisions never been enacted; whereas, ac- For form of motion paper, see Vol. III. 
 cording to Lord Lanydale M. R. in Haynes v. 
 
 489
 
 *496 
 
 COMPELLING ANSWER. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 detainer, and returns accordingly ; then the same course, with respect to 
 bringing the defendant to the bar of the Court, must be pursued, as if 
 the defendant had been apprehended by the messenger, and within the 
 same time. 4 On the other hand, if the Sergeant-at-Arms return that the 
 defendant cannot be found, so as to be apprehended, then, upon motion 
 of course, supported by production of such return, the plaintiff is entitled 
 to an order for a writ of sequestration. 5 
 
 In either of the above cases, that is, whether the writ of 
 
 * 495 sequestration * is ordered upon motion, supported by the affidavit 
 
 mentioned above, or upon a return of non est inventus by the 
 Sergeant-at-Arms, it would seem that the plaintiff may at once obtain 
 an order to take the bill pro confesso ; which is granted on motion of 
 course. 
 
 According to the old practice of the Court, independent of recent 
 statutes and orders, an order to have the bill taken pro confesso was of 
 course, upon the issuing of the writ of sequestration, even though it was 
 not executed. 1 In consequence of this rule, it does not seem that it ever 
 has been the ordinary practice to execute writs of sequestration upon 
 mesne jjrocess ; and an opinion appears at one time to have prevailed, that 
 such an execution was irregular. 2 
 
 In fact, the practice appears to be that a plaintiff, upon obtaining 
 a sequestration against a defendant for want of an answer, 
 
 * 496 * has an option whether he will proceed to take the bill pro con- 
 
 fesso, or to compel an answer. If the circumstances of the case 
 are such that justice can be obtained by taking the bill pro confesso, he 
 ought not to cause the sequestration to be executed ; but if his case is 
 
 * Storer v. Great Western Ry. Co. 1 Y. & C. 
 C. C. 180; Braithwaite's Pr. 286 ; ante, pp. 491, 
 492. 
 
 5 Braithwaite's Pr. 287. The return is filed 
 at the Report Office. For form of order, see 
 Selon, 1261, No. 4; and for form of motion 
 paper, see Vol. III. 
 
 i Wyatt's Pr. 352; Harr. by Newl. 146. 
 
 2 The opinion seems to have arisen in eon- 
 sequence of what was said by Sir Thomas 
 Clarke M. R. (misprinted " Sewell," in 1 Dick. 
 335) in Heather v. Waterman, 1 Dick. 335, 
 and Vaughan r. Williams, id. 354, where he 
 expressed an opinion that when a bill had 
 been taken pro confesso, on a sequestration for 
 want of an answer, the execution of the seques- 
 tration was unnecessary and improper. These 
 cases appear to have been cited by Mr. Dickens, 
 the Registrar, in the notes handed up by him 
 to the Lords Commissioners of the Great Seal, 
 in Rowley v. Ridley, 2 Dick. 622, in support of 
 the distinction taken by him between seques- 
 tration in mesne process and for a duty, namely, 
 that a sequestration in mesne process ought not 
 to be executed; but upon reference to those 
 cases, it appears that they go no further than 
 to show that, when the plaintiff intends to 
 proceed to have the bill taken pro conftsso 
 
 490 
 
 against the defendant, the execution of the 
 sequestration is unnecessary, and therefore im- 
 proper: because, the object of executing the 
 sequestration being merely to compel an an- 
 swer from the defendant, the same purpose is 
 effected by taking the bill pro conftsso against 
 him (by which process the plaintiff obtains the 
 same decree that he would have been entitled 
 to had the defendant put in his answer and 
 admitted the whole case made by the bill); 
 and this being accomplished, the process drops 
 as a matter of course, and the sequestrators 
 become accountable, not to the plaintiff or the 
 Court, but to the defendant. It appears from 
 the statement of this case by Lord Redes- 
 dale, then the Solicitor-General, in Simmonds 
 v. Lord Kinnaird, 4 Ves. 735, 739, that the 
 case is erroneously reported; and in the note 
 of the same case, in 3 Swanst. 306, n. (6), Lord 
 Thurlow is reported to have said that he could 
 see no foundation, either in the reason of the 
 thing, or in the history of the Court, for sup- 
 posing that a sequestration to compel an appear- 
 ance or answer should not be executed. See 
 also Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 5 Hare, 126, 127; 
 10 Jur. 561, from which case it appears that 
 sequestration will be executed in a proper case.
 
 AGAINST PARTICULAR DEFENDANTS. * 497 
 
 such that an answer from the defendant is necessary, he may. It should 
 be observed, however, that the cases in which a plaintiff can have occasion 
 to compel an answer from a defendant, instead of taking the bill pro 
 confesso against him, are comparatively few, and are in general confined 
 to bills of discovery, where the answer is wanted to be read at Law, or to 
 obtain some admission from him on which to found some application to 
 the Court; and that, unless in such cases, the proper course to adopt 
 is that of taking the bill pro confesso. For these reasons, the writ of 
 sequestration is very rarely executed, upon mesne jtrocess ; and it will be 
 more convenient to treat of the practice upon the execution of a writ 
 of sequestration hereafter, in the section concerning the proceedings to 
 enforce decrees. 1 
 
 If the plaintiff desires to take the bill pro confesso against a defendant 
 who has not been arrested on the attachment, or by the Sergeant-at- 
 Arms, his better course is to proceed as against an absconding defendant, 
 under the General Order on the subject of taking the bills pro confesso : 2 
 which will be considered in the next chapter. 8 
 
 Section II. — Against Particular Defendants. 
 
 The course which has been stated, in the preceding section, is appli- 
 cable to the case of an ordinary defendant, not possessed of any partic- 
 ular privilege, and not subject to any disability. It remains to consider 
 the practice to be adopted, for the purpose of compelling an answer from 
 defendants of particular descriptions. 
 
 First: If the defendant is privileged from arrest, either by right of 
 peerage, or as a member of Parliament, and the bill is for relief : as soon 
 as the time for answering has expired, the plaintiff, instead of issuing 
 an attachment, may move, as of course, for a sequestration nisi, on an 
 affidavit of the delivery of the interrogatories, and the Eecord and Writ 
 Clerk's certificate that no answer thereto has been put in. 4 The order 
 must be served personally upon the defendant ; and at the expiration of 
 the time limited in such order nisi for showing cause, 5 the plaintiff may 
 move, as of course, to make the order absolute, upon proof by 
 affidavit of service of the * order nisi, and by the Kecord and *497 
 Writ Clerk's certificate that no answer lias been filed, and the 
 Eegistrar's certificate that no cause has been shown. 1 
 
 Upon the order for the sequestration being made absolute, the plaintiff 
 is entitled 2 to have the bill taken pro confesso, as in the case of unprivi- 
 leged parties against whom sequestration has issued. 8 
 
 If, however, the bill is for discovery, 4 it is not necessary for the plain- 
 
 1 Pott, Chap. XXVI. § 7. derbilt, 4 John. Ch. 58. For form of order, see 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XXII. Seton, 1261, No. 6; and for forms of motion 
 8 Pott, p. 518, et seq. paper and affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 
 4 For form of order, see Seton, 1261, No. 5; 2 Jones v. Davis, 17 Ves. 368; Logan v. 
 and for forms of motion paper and affidavits, Grant. 1 Mad. 620. 
 
 see Vol. III. 3 See ante, pp. 494, 495; and see Braith- 
 
 5 As to showing cause, seeMagan i>. Magan, waite's Pr. 297. 
 
 16 Jur. 587, V. C. K. * Jones v. Davis, ubi supra; and see post, 
 
 i Braithwaite's Pr. 297; see Matter Van- Chap. XXXIV. § 2, Bills of Discovery. 
 
 491
 
 *498 
 
 COMPELLING ANSWER. 
 
 PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 tiff to obtain a sequestration ; but after the time for answering has 
 expired, and an appearance has been entered by the defendant, or by the 
 plaintiff on his default, 6 the plaintiff may apply at once to have the bill 
 taken pro confesso, 6 and thereupon the Court is empowered to make an 
 order, that the bill be so taken, unless the defendant shall, within eight 
 days after being served with the order, show good cause to the contrary. 7 
 The order is obtained on ex parte motion, supported by an affidavit of 
 the delivery of the interrogatories, and the Record and Writ Clerk's 
 certificate of default ; 8 and the order will be confirmed, in like manner 
 as an order for a sequestration is made absolute. 9 When such order has 
 been pronounced, the bill, or an examined copy thereof, may be taken 
 and read in any Court of Law or Equity as evidence of the same facts, 
 and on behalf of the same parties, as could an answer admitting the 
 contents of the bill. 10 
 
 Where the Attorney-General, being a defendant to a suit, fails to 
 answer within a reasonable time, an order may be obtained that he put 
 in his answer within a week after service thereof; or in default, that, as 
 against him, the bill may be taken pro confesso. 11 
 
 In the case of a corporation aggregate, not answering within the 
 time limited, the plaintiff may issue the same writs of distringas suc- 
 cessively, and in the same manner as it is before stated may be done 
 to compel appearance ; 12 and should the corporation stand out 
 * 498 * process till the order absolute for sequestration issue, then the 
 plaintiff, upon obtaining such order, may move, as of course, to 
 have the bill taken pro confesso. 1 
 
 Upon default made in answering by an infant defendant, or by a de- 
 fendant of weak or unsound mind not so found by inquisition, the Court 
 will, upon the special motion of the plaintiff, order a solicitor to be 
 assigned guardian, by w r hom such defendant may answer the bill and 
 defend the suit. 2 The practice as to this motion, and the affidavit re- 
 quired in support of it, are similar to the practice, before explained, in 
 the case of default in appearance. 8 Even when the infant is a married 
 
 5 Either under 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. 
 c. 36, § 12, or Cons. Ord. X. 4-7, it would seem. 
 Braithwaite's Pr. 298. 
 
 6 See O'Brien v. Manders, 2 Irish Eq. 39; 
 Wilson v. Shawe, Craw. & Dix, 62; Stafford 
 v. Burn, 4 Paige, 560. 
 
 If a defendant, after appearing, will not 
 answer, the bill will be taken pro confesso. 
 Caines v. Fisher, 1 John. Ch. 8. And where 
 the bill is for relief only, and states sufficient 
 ground, the process for contempt to compel an 
 answer is not necessary. Ibid. In New Jersey, 
 a decree pro confesso may be taken at any time, 
 after the time limited for the defendant to plead, 
 answer, or demur, has expired. It may be 
 taken without notice, and of course, unless it 
 appear that some prejudice will thereby accrue 
 to the adverse party. Oakley t\ O'Neill, 1 
 Green Ch. 287; see Nesbit v. St. Patrick's 
 Church, 9 N. J. Eq. 76. So in Tennessee Code, 
 § 4369; Anonymous, 1 Tenn. Ch. 2. 
 492 
 
 7 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 13. 
 
 8 For forms of motion paper and affidavit, 
 see Vol. III. 
 
 9 Ante. pp. 496, 497. 
 
 i° 11 Geo. IV. and 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 14. 
 
 ii Groom v. Att.-Gen. 9 Sim. 325. Now, 
 however, it is unusual to ask for any answer 
 from the Attorney-General. For form of mo- 
 tion paper, see Vol. III. 
 
 i 2 See ante, p. 477; McKim v. Odom, 3 
 Bland, 407. 426. 
 
 i Braithwaite's Pr. 297. Angell & Ames, 
 Corp. § 667, et seq. For form of order, see 
 Seton, 1266, No. 4; and for form of motion 
 paper, see Vol. III. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. VII. 3. 
 
 3 Ante, p. 475. Where the infant had 
 appeared, service of the notice of motion on 
 the solicitor who had entered the appearance 
 was held sufficient. Cookson v. Lee, 15 Sun. 
 302. In Bentley r. Robinson, 9 Hare App. 76,
 
 AGAINST PARTICULAR DEFENDANTS. * 499 
 
 woman, a guardian must be appointed to put in an answer on her behalf. 4 
 As we have seen, however, no answer should now be required from an 
 infant defendant. 
 
 In general, when a husband and wife are made defendants to a cause, 
 and no special order has been made with respect to the plaintiff's right 
 to demand an answer, or affecting the liabilities of either husband or 
 wife for not duly answering, the plaintiff is entitled to have their joint 
 answer, within the ordinary period after service of the interrogatories ; 
 and in default of such joint answer being put in, the husband alone in- 
 curs all the ordinary consequences of contempt. 6 Their respective rights 
 and liabilities are, however, often varied upon the application, either of 
 the plaintiff, or of the husband, or the wife ; aDd the circumstances 
 under which such an application may be made to the Court, and the 
 course of practice in relation thereto, have been fully explained in a 
 former part of this treatise. 6 
 
 When a husband is willing to answer jointly, it must not be supposed 
 that the wife is bound to acquiesce in any answer the husband 
 may please to put in ; nor is the husband justified in * using * 499 
 menaces, to constrain her consent to an answer contrary to her 
 belief: for such conduct, a husband is punishable as for a contempt, and 
 the wife, thus conscientiously dissenting, may, upon application to the 
 Court, obtain an order to answer separately. 1 
 
 The separate answer of a married woman cannot (except where her 
 husband is a plaintiff) 2 be filed without a previous order for that pur- 
 pose ; 8 nor can she be viewed as a substantial party to the suit, until 
 such order be obtained ; and she is entitled to compute the full time 
 for answering from the date of the order allowing her to answer sepa- 
 rately, without regard to any orders for time previously granted to her 
 husband. 4 
 
 Where an order for a married woman to answer separately has been 
 obtained, the plaintiff may proceed to compel an answer by attachment ; 
 and this right would seem to exist in the plaintiff, whatever be the object 
 of the suit, whether relating to the separate estate of the wife or not. 6 
 
 a guardian was appointed for an infant not in 13 N. J. Eq. 45. If the wife be absent, the 
 
 default, on the application of the plaintiff; no husband may obtain time to issue a commission 
 
 answer being required. Where the infant has to obtain the wife's oath to the answer, and if 
 
 already appeared by a guardian ad litem, the she refuse to answer, the bill may be taken 
 
 guardian may be proceeded against in the same pro confesso against her. Leavitt v. Cruger, 
 
 manner as other persons, to compel an answer. 1 Paige, 422; Ferguson v. Smith, 2 J'>hn. Ch. 
 
 See also Wood v. Logsden, 9 Hare App. 26; 139. But in New Jersey, if the husband be 
 
 1 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 182. served, and the wife be out of the State, it is 
 
 4 Coleman v. Northcote, 2 Hare, 147, and necessary to have an order of publication against 
 cases cited, id. 148, n.; 7 Jur. 528; and see her, unless the husband appear for her. Halst. 
 ante, pn. 163, 183. Dig. 170-174; Chancery Rule 23 
 
 5 Gee v. Cottle, 3 M. & C. 180; Steele v. » Ex parte Halsam, 2 Atk. 50; ante, p. 181. 
 Plomer, 2 Phil. 782, n. (a) ; 1 M'N. & G. 83; 2 Ante, p. 182. 
 
 better reported 13 Jur. 177; see Metier v. Met- 8 Garey v. Whittingham, 1 S. & S. 163; but 
 
 ler, 19 N. J. Eq. 457; Bird r. Davis, 14 N. J. no such order is necessary whenever the wife is 
 
 Eq. 477. The plaintiff may stipulate to receive to be considered as a feme sole; ante, p. 178. 
 the joint answer sworn to by the husband alone. 4 Jackson v. Haworth, 1 S. & S. 161, ante, 
 
 Leavitt v. Cruger, 1 Paige, 422. p. 183. 
 
 8 Ante, pp. 180, 181; see Collard v. Smith, 6 Dubois v. Hole, 2 Vern. 613; and see 
 
 493
 
 * 500 COMPELLING ANSWER. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 The attachment will not, however, be issued without an order ; which 
 may be obtained on an ex parte motion, 6 where the order to answer 
 separately has been obtained by the married woman, but where it has 
 been obtained by the plaintiff, or the husband, notice of the motion 
 should, it seems, be given to her. 7 
 
 Where the husband is positively unable to conform to the ordinary 
 practice of putting in a joint answer, an order will be granted, upon his 
 application, for him to answer separately, and he is then exonerated 
 from all liability for his wife's default ; 8 but the motion for this purpose 
 should be made before he is in contempt, as the Court will not, after he 
 has made default, give him an indulgence to the prejudice of the plain- 
 tiff's interests. 9 To support such an application, the husband must 
 show, by his own affidavit, that his wife lives apart, and that he has no 
 influence over her, or otherwise prove his inability to answer for her. 10 
 Notice of the motion should be given to the plaintiff, and also to the 
 wife. 11 It seems, too, that the order ought to direct the wife to 
 
 * 500 answer separately, * as well as the husband : otherwise the plain- 
 
 tiff may have to apply again, before he can bring the wife before 
 the Court. 
 
 In all cases where the husband wishes to answer separately, an order 
 to that effect ought in strictness to be obtained, before his answer is put 
 in. There are cases, however, where he has answered separately with- 
 out order, and then applied to the Court that he might not be liable to 
 process, on account of his wife's default in answering ; and the applica- 
 tion being made before any notice of the irregularity in filing the an- 
 swer, the Court has made the order. 1 But such a course is irregular, 
 and, upon motion of the plaintiff, the separate answer of the husband 
 will be ordered to be taken off the file. 2 
 
 If the impossibility of obtaining a joint answer arises, not from the 
 refusal of the wife, but from the lunacy of the husband, an order for 
 the wife to answer separately will be made, upon a like application of 
 the plaintiff. 8 In such a case, however, as well as in other cases where 
 it appears to the Court that the defendant is a person of weak or un- 
 sound mind, not found such by inquisition, the Court may, upon the 
 application of the plaintiff, appoint one of the solicitors of the Court 
 
 Ottway v. Wing, 12 Sim. 90; Travers v. Braithwaite's Pr. 165; see Leavitt v. Cruger, 
 
 Bucklv, 1 Ves. Sr. 384, 386; 1 Dick. 138; Kipp 1 Paige, 422. 
 
 v. Hanna, 2 Bland, 26. 9 Gee *. Cottle, 3 M. & C. 18C >, 182; ante, 
 
 6 Thicknesse v. Aeton, 15 Jur. 1052, V. C. T. ; p. 498. For form of affidavit, see \ ol. III. 
 Home v. Patrick, 30 Beav. 405; 8 Jur. N. S. lft Barry v. Cane, 3 Mad. 472; ante, pp. 177, 
 351; Bull*. Withev,9Jur. N. S. 595, V. C.S.; 457. 
 
 see Hope v. Carnegie, L. R. 7 Eq. 254, 263. » Banyan 9. Mortimer, 6 Mad 2,8; Garey 
 
 For forms of motion paper and affidavit, see v. Whittingham, ubi supra, ror form of notice 
 
 y j jjj of motion, see Vol. III. 
 
 7 Graham 9. Fitch, 2 De G. & S. 246; 12 '- Barry v. Cane, ubi supra ; Pavie v. Acourt, 
 Jur. 833; contra, Tavlor v. Tavlor, 12 Beav. 1 Dick. 13; ante, p. 180. 
 
 271- and see Bushell 9. Bushell, 1 S. & S. 164; 2 Gee v. Cottle, ubi supra ; and see Nichols 
 
 and cases cited 12 Beav. 271, n. For form of 9. Ward, 2 M'N. & G. 140 ; ante, p. 177. For 
 
 order see Seton, 1256, No. 7; and for forms of form of notice of motion, see Vol. III. 
 
 notice of motion and affidavits, see Vol. III. 8 Estcourt v. Ewington, 9 Sim. 252; 2 Jur. 
 
 8 Garev v. Whittingham, 1 S. & S. 163; 414. 
 
 ' 494
 
 AGAINST PARTICULAR DEFENDANTS. * 501 
 
 guardian of the defendant, by whom he may appear to and answer the 
 bill : 4 but, in such a case, no answer shall be required. 
 
 It now remains to be considered in what manner the Statutes and 
 General Orders protect a defendant unable, from poverty, to put in an 
 answer ; and prevent a party, under such circumstances, being uselessly 
 detained in custody. 
 
 If a defendant is brought up in custody for want of his answer, 5 and 
 makes oath in Court 6 that he is unable, by reason of poverty, to employ 
 a solicitor to put in his answer, the Court, if not satisfied of the truth of 
 that allegation, may direct an inquiry as to the truth thereof ; 7 and may 
 appoint a solicitor to conduct such inquiry on the behalf of such defend- 
 ant ; and if it is ascertained, by means of such inquiry, or if the Court 
 is satisfied without such inquiry, 8 that such defendant is unable, by 
 reason of poverty, to employ a solicitor to put in his answer, the Court 
 may assign a solicitor and counsel for such defendant, to enable 
 him to put in * his answer. 1 It would seem, that the application * 501 
 must be made by the defendant, and not by the plaintiff. 2 
 
 When an inquiry is thus directed, an order to that effect is drawn 
 up ; 3 a certified copy of it is left at the chambers of the Judge to whose 
 Court the cause is attached ; and a summons to proceed on the inquiry 
 is thereupon taken out, 4 and served on the plaintiff's solicitor. On the 
 return of the summons, an affidavit by the defendant of his poverty, or 
 other evidence thereof, is adduced on his behalf ; 6 the plaintiff's counter 
 evidence, if any, is heard ; and the Chief Clerk makes his certificate of 
 the result of the inquiry ; which is afterwards completed in the ordi- 
 nary way. 6 
 
 If the certificate is in favor of the defendant, he may apply, by ex 
 parte motion, that a counsel and a solicitor may be assigned him to put 
 in his answer, and defend the suit, in forma pauperis. 1 The counsel 
 and solicitor to the Suitors' Fund are usually assigned him. The order 
 may also direct a habeas corpus to issue, to bring up the defendant for 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. VII. 3; ante, pp. 176, 475. A Garrod v. Holdeti, 4 Beav. 245. These cases 
 female defendant, unmarried, above sixty years were, however, decided on the 6th Rule of 11 
 of age, who had been deaf and dumb from her Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 15. In Bavly 
 infancy, was admitted to appearand defend by v. Bayly, 11 Beav. 256, it was held, that the 
 guardian. Markle v. Markle, 4 John. Ch. 168. 7th Rule applied to a defendant defending in 
 Where a lunatic has appeared by Committee, a representative character, after a successful 
 the practice to compel an answer by committee inquiry under the 6th. 
 
 is the same as in case of other persons. 1 Hoff. 3 For form of order, see Seton,1273, No. 12; 
 
 Ch. Pr. 182. and for form of order, without inquiry, id. 1272, 
 
 5 Ante, pp. 490, 491. No. 11. 
 
 6 The oath is administered by the Regis- 4 For form of summons, see Vol. III. By 
 trar; see 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, Cons. Ord. XII. 5, notice in writing of the 
 § 15, r. 6. order, and of every summons to proceed thereon, 
 
 7 Pending the inquiry, it seems that time must be served on the solicitor to the Suitors' 
 does not run against the plaintiff. Potts v. Fund. 
 
 Whitmore, 8 Beav. 317, 319. 6 See Williams v. Parkinson, 5 Sim. 74, 75. 
 
 8 Davies v. Nixon, 11 W. R. 62, V. C. K. « See post, Chap. XXIX. Proceedings in the 
 1 Cons Ord. XII. 4; and see 11 Geo. IV. & Judge's Chambers. The solicitor to the Suitors' 
 
 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 15, r. 6; see also 23 & 24 Fund usually conducts the inquiry on behalf of 
 
 Vic. c. 149, § 4, which is in nearly the same the defendant. 
 
 words as Cons. Ord. XII. 4. 7 For form of motion paper, see Vol. III. 
 
 * See Watkin v. Parker, 1 M. & C. 370; 
 
 495
 
 * 502 COMPELLING ANSWER. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 the purpose of taking the bill pro confesso, in the event of the answer 
 not being put in in the mean time. 8 When the answer has been put in, 
 the defendant may apply, on motion, supported by the Record and Writ 
 Clerk's certificate of the answer being filed, that he may be discharged 
 out of custody as to his contempt in not answering, and that the plain- 
 tiff's costs of such contempt may be paid out of the Suitors' Fund. 9 
 
 Where, however, the defendant, though the certificate is in his favor, 
 
 neglects to apply for the assignment of counsel and a solicitor, 10 or 
 
 where the Chief Clerk certifies that the defendant is not too poor to put 
 
 in his answer, or where, by reason of the obstinacy of the defendant in 
 
 withholding information as to his means, the inquiry has failed, 11 
 
 * 502 the plaintiff may move ex parte n * for a habeas corpus to bring 
 
 the defendant to the bar ; x and on his being brought up, may 
 apply to have the bill taken pro confesso; and an order may be made 
 accordingly, in the manner before explained. 2 
 
 In order to prevent the possibility of any prisoner being suffered to 
 remain in neglected imprisonment, without reaping the benefit of the 
 provisions above mentioned, for the relief of defendants whose only 
 reason for non-compliance with the rules of the Court is poverty, it is 
 enacted that, in the last week of each of the months of January, April, 
 July, and October in every year, the solicitor to the Suitors' Fund for 
 the time being, or some other officer of the Court of Chancery to be ap- 
 pointed by the Lord Chancellor from time to time, shall visit White- 
 cross Street Prison, 8 and examine the prisoners confined there for 
 contempt, and shall report his opinion on their respective cases to the 
 Lord Chancellor ; and thereupon the Lord Chancellor may, if he thinks 
 fit, assign a solicitor to any such prisoner, not only for defending him in 
 forma pauperis, but generally for taking such steps on his behalf as the 
 nature of the case may require ; and make all or any such orders as the 
 Lord Chancellor was empowered to make, after the like report of a Mas- 
 ter, under the seventh rule of the 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 15. 4 
 
 It is further enacted, that when any person shall be committed to any 
 prison, other than Whitecross Street Prison, 5 under any writ or order of 
 the Court of Chancery, the jailer or keeper of the prison in which such 
 person is confined shall, within fourteen days after such person shall 
 
 8 Welford v. Daniel], 9 Sim. 652. 8 Substituted for the Queen's Prison, by 25 
 
 9 For form of order, see Seton, 1273, No. 15; & 26 Vic. c. 104, § 2; Holloway Prison lias 
 and for form of motion paper, see Vol. III. By since been substituted, under the same Act, § 12. 
 Cons. Ord. XII. 5, notice in writing of the * 23 & 24 Vic. c. 149, § 2. For form of 
 application must be served oh the solicitor of order, see 2 Seton (3d ed.), 1272, No. 9; and 
 the Suitors' Fund, two clear days at least before see id. 1274, No. 16. The solicitor to the 
 it is intended to be made. Suitors' Fund is usually assigned the solicitor ; 
 
 w Tattershall r. Crampton, cited Seton, 1273. and the counsel to that fund is usually assigned 
 
 ii Williams v. Parkinson, 5 Sim. 74. the defendant's counsel. The order may also 
 
 12 For form of order, see Seton, 1273, No. 14; be made by the Lords Justices. 23 & 24 Vic. 
 
 and for form of motion paper, see Vol. III. c. 149, § 13; and it may be obtained on motion 
 
 i As to the mode of issuing the writ, see of course. Layton v. Mortimore, 2 De G. F. 
 
 ante, p. 491; and for forms of the writ, indorse- & J. 353; and see ante, p. 154. 
 
 ment, and pracipe, see Vol. III. 6 See 23 & 24 Vic. c. 149, § 2. 
 
 2 Bull v. Falkner, 11 Jur. 235, V. C K. B. 
 
 Fnr form of order in such case, see Seton, 1273, 
 
 No. 14; and see ante, p. 492. 
 
 496
 
 AGAINST PARTICULAR DEFENDANTS. * 503 
 
 have been in the custody of such jailer or keeper, make a report to the 
 Lord Chancellor, containing the name and description of such prisoner, 
 with the cause and date of his commitment, and a copy of the writ or 
 order under which he was committed ; and if such prisoner makes oath, 
 before one of the visiting justices of such jail, or a commissioner for 
 taking oaths in the Court of Chancery, that he is unable by reason of 
 poverty to employ a solicitor, the report shall contain a statement to 
 that effect ; and that thereupon the Lord Chancellor may direct the 
 solicitor to the Suitors' Fund to ascertain the truth of such state- 
 ment, and if true to take such * steps, on behalf of any such * 503 
 prisoner, as the nature of the case may require ; and the Lord 
 Chancellor may thereupon, if he shall see fit, make such order or orders 
 as he is empowered to make under the second section of the above Act. 1 
 
 By the seventh rule of the 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 15, the 
 Court is authorized to order that the costs of the contempt of any such 
 prisoner shall be paid out of the Suitors' Fund, 2 and that any such 
 prisoner, having previously done such acts as the Court shall direct, 
 shall be discharged out of custody ; but, if any such defendant become 
 entitled to any funds out of the cause, the same are to be applied, under 
 the direction of the Court, in the first instance to the reimbursement of 
 the Suitors' Fund. 8 Applications to the Court under these provisions 
 must be made to the Lord Chancellor or Lords Justices ; 4 and as they 
 are entirely framed for the relief of defendants, no such order can be 
 made on the application of the plaintiff. 5 
 
 It is also provided, that the solicitor to the Suitors' Fund, or other 
 officer visiting the prison, may examine the prisoners and all other per- 
 sons whom he may think proper, upon oath, and administer an oath or 
 oaths to any such prisoner and other persons accordingly, and cause any 
 officers, clerks, and ministers of any Court of Law or Equity to bring 
 and produce upon oath before him any records, orders, books, papers, or 
 other writings belonging to the said Courts, or to any of the officers 
 within the same, as such officers. 6 
 
 If it appears to the satisfaction of the Court, that any prisoner is an 
 idiot, lunatic, or of unsound mind, the Court may appoint a guardian to 
 put in his answer and discharge the defendant : providing for the costs 
 as shall seem just : and if the Court shall see fit, the defence may be 
 made by such guardian in forma pauperis.'' 
 
 1 23 & 24 Vic. c. 149, § 5. The like order (3d ed.), 1273, Nos. 15. 16. In Ward v. Wood- 
 assigning a solicitor and counsel may be made cock, 5 L. T. N. S. 81f>, L. C, an order for 
 in this case as under § 4, ante, pp. 500, 501; payment of the plaintiff's costs of defendant's 
 and by the Lords Justices, as well as by the contempt, in disobeying an injunction, was 
 Lord Chancellor. 23 & 24 Vic. c. 149, "§ 13. refused. See 32 & 33 Vic. c. 91, § 13. 
 
 For form of order under § 5. see Seton, 1272, 4 23 & 24 Vic. c. 149, § 13. 
 
 No. 10. 5 Watkin v. Parker, 1 M. & C. 370; Garrod 
 
 2 And this may be done when the defendant v. Holden, 4 Beav. 245 ; ante, pp. 500, 501, note, 
 is an executor. Bavlv v. Bayly, 11 Beav. 256. See Hall v. Hall, L. R. 11 Eq. 290. 
 
 8 See also 23 & 24 Vic. c. 149, § 6, which 6 23 & 24 Vic. c. 149, § 3. 
 
 contains similar provisions as to costs, and 7 H Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 15, r. 9. 
 
 provides also that any costs to which the de- As to the appointment of guardians ad litem, 
 
 fendant mav become entitled in the suit or pro- and as to defending in forma pauperiz, see ante, 
 
 r,eedin<js, shall be paid into the Suitors' Fund. pp. 154, 155, 176. 
 lor orders under these sections, see 2 Seton 
 
 vol. i. — 32 497
 
 * 505 COMPELLING ANSWER. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 The above provisions prevent the possibility of a defendant being 
 
 detained in custody in consequence of his not being able, by reason of 
 
 poverty, or of insanity or imbecility of mind, to put in his answer 
 
 * 504 in the ordinary way. But it frequently happens * that a defend- 
 
 ant is obstinate, and refuses either to appear or to put in his 
 answer, although he has not the excuse of poverty or want of intellect 
 to justify his refusal. In such cases the plaintiff may obtain justice in 
 one or other of the modes above pointed out. 
 
 Section III. — Effect of a Contempt upon the Proceedings in the Cause. 
 
 Besides the personal and pecuniary inconvenience to which a party 
 subjects himself by a contempt of the ordinary process of the Court, he 
 places himself in this further predicament ; viz., that of not being in a 
 situation to be heard, in any application which he may be desirous of 
 making to the Court. 1 Lord Chief Baron Gilbert lays it down, that 
 "upon this head it is to be observed, as a general rule, that the con- 
 temnor, who is in contempt, is never to be heard, by motion or otherwise, 
 till he has cleared his contempt, and paid the costs : as, for example, if 
 he comes to move for any thing, or desires any favor of the Court." 2 
 
 But where, after a petition had stood over at the request of the 
 respondent's counsel, for his convenience, the petitioner incurred a 
 contempt, which had not been cleared when the petition came on again, 
 it was held, that the petitioner was, nevertheless, entitled to be 
 *505 heard ; 8 and a party who was in contempt for * non-payment of 
 costs, was not thereby prevented from moving for leave to defend 
 in forma pauperis} 
 
 The rule, that a party in contempt cannot move till he has cleared his 
 contempt, is, in practice, confined to cases where such party comes for- 
 
 1 Where a party is in contempt, the Court party in contempt may move by counsel to set 
 
 will not grant an application in his favor, aside the order against him; for every other 
 
 which is not a matter of strict right, until he purpose he must appear in vinculis. Odell v. 
 
 has purged his contempt. Johnson v. Pinney, Hart, 1 Moll. 492; see Lane v. Ellzey, 4 Hen. 
 
 1 Paige, 466; Rogers v. Paterson, 4 Paige, & M. 504. 
 
 450; Ellingwood v. Stevenson, 4 Sandf. Ch. 2 Gilb. For. Rom. 102; Vowles v. Young, 
 366. He will not be allowed to contradict the 9 Ves. 172, 173. Thus, in Lord Wenman v. 
 allegations in the bill, or bring forward any Osbaldiston, 2 Bro. P. C. ed. Toml. 276; 2 Eq. 
 defence, or allege any new fact. Mussina v. Cas. Abr. 222, pi. 1, where a defendant, being 
 Bartlett, 8 Porter, 277; Savior v. Mockbie, 9 in contempt for not putting in his examination 
 Iowa, 209. Nor is he allowed to appear and pursuant to an order, to avoid a sequestration 
 contest the plaintiff's demand, before the Clerk moved the Court that, upon his undertaking to 
 and Master, to whom the bill may be referred pay in a week's time what should appear to be 
 to take an account; but the inhibition can at due to the plaintiff, all further process of con- 
 any time be removed by filing a full and com- tempt should be stayed, the Court declined 
 plete answer. Mussina v. Bartlett, 8 Porter, making any order upon the motion, but directed 
 277; see Rutherford v. Metcalf, 5 Hayw. 58. the appellant to clear his contempt, and then 
 A defendant, against whom there is prima move; and this determination of the Court 
 facie evidence of being guilty of a breach of was affirmed by the House of Lords, upon 
 an injunction, cannot be heard upon a motion appeal. 
 
 to discharge a ne exeat against him in the same 3 Bristowe v. Needham,2 Phil. 190 ; 1 C. P. 
 
 cause, until he has purged himself of the con- Coop. temp. Cott. 286. 
 tempt. Evans v. Van Hall, 1 Clarke, 223. A l Oldfield v. Cobbett, 1 Phil. 613, 614 
 
 498
 
 EFFECT OF A CONTEMPT UPON PROCEEDINGS IN CAUSE. 
 
 505 
 
 ward voluntarily, and asks for an indulgence ; and, therefore, a defendant 
 cannot object to a cause being heard because the plaintiff is in contempt. 8 
 So a defendant in contempt is entitled to production of documents. 8 
 
 In like manner it has been held that a mortgagor defendant to a bill 
 of foreclosure, who is in contempt, could not move, under the 7 Geo. II. 
 c. 20, for a reference to take an account of the principal and interest due 
 upon the mortgage. 4 And so, where a party in contempt had applied for 
 and obtained the costs of an abandoned motion, under Lord Eldon's 
 order, 5 the order was discharged upon motion. 6 
 
 So also, where a motion had been refused with costs, it was held, that 
 the motion could not be renewed, though on different grounds, until the 
 costs had been paid. 7 (a) 
 
 The rule that a party cannot move till he has cleared his contempt, is 
 confined to proceedings in the same cause ; and a party in contempt for 
 non-obedience to an order in one cause, will not be thereby prevented 
 from making an application to the Court in another cause relating to a 
 distinct matter, although the parties to such other cause may be the 
 same ; 8 and this privilege has been carried to the extent of allowing a 
 defendant, in each of two creditors' suits, for the administration of the 
 same estate, to move in one of them, in which he was not in contempt, to 
 stay proceedings in the other, in which he was. 9 
 
 The general rule of the Court that parties must clear their contempt 
 before they can be heard, must not be understood as preventing their 
 making application to the Court to discharge, on the ground of irregular- 
 ity, the order by their non-obedience to which their contempt has been 
 incurred ; therefore, where a defendant, in custody for a contempt in not 
 
 2 Ricketts v. Mornington, 7 Sim. 200; and 
 see the cases on this subject collected in 1 C. P. 
 Coop. temp. Cott. 208; see also Futvoye v. 
 Kennard, 2 Giff. 110; Fry v. Ernest, 9 Jur. 
 N. S. 1151 ; 12 VV. R. 97, V. C. W.; Story v. 
 Official Manager, 2 N. R. 351, V. C. W.; Howe 
 v. Grey, W. N. (18G7) 141. A plaintiff in con- 
 tempt is entitled to prosecute his suit, and to 
 make use of the process of the Court for that 
 purpose. Wilson v. Bates, 3 M. & C. 197, 204. 
 He mny obtain an order to amend his bill. 
 Chatterton v. Thomas, 36 L. J. Ch. 592. So a 
 defendant in contempt is entitled to take any 
 measure necessary for his defence. Fry v. 
 Ernest, 12 W. R. 97. He is also entitled to 
 appeal. Hazard p. Durant, 11 R. I. 195. 
 
 3 Haldane v. Eckford, L. R. 7 Eq. 425; see 
 also Wilson v. Bates, 3 M. & C. 197, 204; 9 
 Sim. 54; Fry v. Ernest, 9 Jur. N. S. 1151; 12 
 W. R. 97. 
 
 4 Hewitt v. M'C*rtney, 13 Ves. 560. 
 6 Gen. Ord. 5 Aug., i818; Sand. Ord. 706; 
 Beav. Ord. 3, now Cons. Ord. XL. 23. 
 
 6 Ellis v. Walmsley, 4 L. J. Ch. 69; S. C. 
 nom. Ellice v. Walmsley, 1 C. P. Coop. temp. 
 Cott. 207, where the cases are collected as to 
 the proceedings, for his own advantage, which 
 a party in contempt cannot take. 
 
 7 Oldtield v. Cobbett, 12 Beav. 91, 95; and 
 see Foley v. Smith, 12 Beav. 154; Davey v. 
 Durrant, 2 De G. & J. 506; 24 Beav. 411; 4 
 Jur. N. S. 398. 
 
 8 Clark v. Dew, 1 R. & M. 103, 107; Gom- 
 pertz v. Best, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 619; Taylor v. 
 Taylor, 1 M'N. & G. 397, 409; 12 Beav. 220, 
 228; Frv v. Ernest, 9 Jur. N. S. 1151; 12 W". 
 R. 97, V. C. W. 
 
 9 Turner v. Dorgan, 12 Sim. 504; 6 Jur. 356; 
 Morrison t\ Morrison, 4 Hare, 590; 9 Jur. 103; 
 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 215, 217. 
 
 (a) The general rule is that a motion, which 
 has been refused with costs, cannot be renewed 
 until such costs have been paid. Morton v. 
 Palmer, 9 Q. B. D 89; ante, p. 39, n. (b). 
 Further proceedings in the plaintiff's suit mav 
 be stayed until he has complied with an order 
 for the payment of the costs of an interlocutory 
 motion, if his conduct iu withholding them is 
 
 vexatious. Re Wickham, 35 Ch. D. 272. 
 Although imprisonment for non-payment of 
 costs is now abolished in England, a person 
 may, it seems, be none the less in contempt for 
 such non-payment. Ibid. 274. As to ex parte 
 motion for discharge, see Re Evans [1893], 
 W. N. 32. 
 
 499
 
 507 
 
 COMPELLING ANSWER. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 obeying an order to pay in money, applied to the Court to discharge him 
 out of custody, on the ground of irregularity in the order (it having 
 
 * 506 been made pending an abatement of the suit), he * was not only 
 
 heard, but the order for his discharge was made ; though, under the 
 circumstances, without costs. 1 In such cases, in making his application, 
 the party in contempt ought to confine his motion to the object of getting 
 rid of the order of which he complains ; and if he embraces other matters 
 in his notice of motion, he will not be allowed to go into such other mat- 
 ters till he has shown that the order upon which his contempt has been 
 incurred was irregular. 2 
 
 A plaintiff is entitled to sue out an attachment against a defendant 
 for want of answer, although he is himself in custody for a contempt in 
 non-payment of costs to him. 8 
 
 The circumstance of a party being in contempt will not prevent his 
 being heard in opposition to any special application which the other side 
 may make, upon notice duly served upon him. 4 So also, where there is 
 any irregularity in the prosecution of the decree or order obtained under 
 the contempt, a party in contempt may be heard to obtain redress. 6 
 
 Although a party cannot move until he has cleared his contempt, yet 
 he may give notice of his motion before he has done so ; 6 and a party to 
 whom costs are awarded, may proceed in the taxation, notwithstanding 
 he may be in contempt. 7 
 
 Although a defendant, not appearing or answering within the regular 
 time, is frequently said to be in contempt, yet it does not seem that the 
 contempt is actually incurred until the writ enforcing obedience to the 
 orders of the Court has beeu sealed. 8 
 
 * 507 * It seems that a party in contempt can apply for the purpose 
 
 of removing scandal from the records of the Court. 1 Although it 
 
 1 Wilson v. Metcalfe, MSS. In matters of 
 contempt, exceptions may be taken on the ques- 
 tion of jurisdiction, where it is distinctly raised 
 and adjudicated upon as matter of law. An- 
 droscoggin and Kennebec R. Co. v. Andros- 
 coggin R. Co. 49 Maine, 392. 
 
 2 Ibid.; 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 216; 4 
 Hare, 595. 
 
 8 Wilson v. Bates, 9 Sim. 54; 3 M. & C. 
 197, 204; 2 Jur. 107, 319; and see 1 C. P. Coop, 
 temp. Cott. 220, where the cases are collected 
 as to the proceedings, for his own udvantage, 
 which a party in contempt may take. And see 
 Freese v. Swayze, 26 N. J. Eq. 437. See ante, 
 p. 505, n. 2. 
 
 4 Where a plaintiff had obtained, from a 
 Vice-Chancellor, an order for payment of a 
 sum of money into Court, against a defendant 
 who was in contempt, the Lord Chancellor 
 allowed him to move to discharge that order, 
 on the ground that it was a rehearing of the 
 original application. Parker v. Dawson, 5 L. 
 J. Ch. 108; see also Ex parte Chadwick, 15 
 Jur. 597, V. C. K. B. ; Reeve v. Hodson, 10 
 Hare App 41; Bickford v. Skewes, 10 Sim. 
 500 
 
 193, 196; S. C. nom. Bickford v. Skeves, 3 
 Jur. 818; Futvoye v. Kennard, 2 Giff. 110. 
 
 5 King v. Bryant, 3 M. & C. 191, 195; 2 
 Jur. 106. 
 
 6 Chuck v. Cremer, 1 C. P. Coop. temp. 
 Cott. 247. 
 
 7 Newton v. Ricketts, 11 Beav. 67. 
 
 8 Thus, after the regular time for answering 
 has expired, provided no attachment has issued 
 against a defendant, he may file a joint de- 
 murrer and answer: East India Co v. Hench- 
 man, 3 Bro. C. C. 372 ; Sowerby v. Warder, 2 
 Cox, 268, which, had process actually com- 
 menced, might have been taken off the file for 
 irregularity. Curzon v. De la Zouch, 1 Swanst 
 185; 1 Wils. C. C. 469; see also Att.-Gen. v. 
 Shield, 11 Beav. 441, where it was held that 
 taking an office copy of the answer was not a 
 waiver of the objection. But if the plaintiff 
 retain the office copy till the time for excepting 
 to the answer for insufficiency has elapsed, the 
 contempt will be waived. Herrett v. Reynolds, 
 2 Giff. 409 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 880. 
 
 i Everett v. Prythergch, 12 Sim. 363; Cat- 
 tell v. Simons, 5 Beav. 396; Ayck. Ch. Pr. 

 
 HOW CONTEMPTS CLEARED, WAIVED, OR DISCHARGED. * 508 
 
 has been held 2 that a plaintiff in contempt is not precluded from avail- 
 ing himself of the ordinary process to enforce an answer, it appears that 
 the fact of his being in contempt may be made the ground of a special 
 application by the defendant to stay proceedings in the cause, until such 
 contempt has been cleared ; 3 and if he persists in his contempt, his suit 
 may, it seems, be dismissed. 4 And in general, whenever a party in con- 
 tempt is entitled to be heard, there exists a right of appeal, and applica- 
 tions may be made with immediate reference to the motion upon which 
 he is so privileged to be heard, or for the purpose of obtaining evidence 
 in support of it. 8 
 
 Section IV. — In what Manner Contempts in Process may be cleared, 
 waived, or discharged* 
 
 An ordinary contempt in process, as it is a matter merely between 
 the parties, may be cleared by the contemnor doing the act, by the non- 
 performance of which the contempt was incurred, and paying to the 
 other party the costs he has occasioned by his contumacy. 
 
 Where process has been issued against a defendant in contempt for 
 want of appearance or answer, but has not been executed, the defendant 
 should enter his appearance or put in his answer, and pay or tender to 
 the plaintiffs solicitor the costs of the contempt, if the amount of such 
 costs can be liquidated, — as in the case of an attachment; 7 but if the 
 amount of the costs cannot be ascertained, he should tender such a sum 
 as will cover their probable amount. 8 If the plaintiffs solicitor accept 
 the costs so tendered, it will be at the plaintiffs own risk if he after- 
 wards puts the process into execution. If his solicitor refuse to accept 
 the costs when tendered, it is necessary, in order that the defendant may, 
 upon payment or tender of the plaintiff's costs of the contempt, be dis- 
 charged from his contempt, that he should obtain an order for 
 that purpose : * otherwise, the contempt will continue. 1 An order * 508 
 of this nature is made on motion of course, or on petition of course 
 at the Rolls, 2 upon the Record and Writ Clerk's certificate of the defend- 
 ant's appearance or answer. 3 
 
 (Lond. ed. 1844) 197, 198; 1 Smith Ch. Pr. 6 See Lowe v. Blake, 3 Desaus. 2G9; Snell- 
 
 (2d Am. ed) 569, 570; Howard v. Newman, 1 ing v. Watrous, 2 Paige, 314. 
 
 Moll. 221. 7 Wilkin v. Nainby, 4 Hare, 473, 475; 10 
 
 2 By Lord Cottenham, in Wilson v. Bates, Jur. 735. The amount payable to clear a con- 
 
 3 M. & C. 197, 204; 2 Jur. 319 (see also Bick- tempt, on an attachment executed, is 135. 8'/.: 
 
 ford v. Skewes, ubi supra). Brown v. Lee, 11 Beav. 379; if not executed, 
 
 8 Bradbury v. Shawe, 14 Jur. 1042, V. C. lis. 2d.: Braithwaite's Pr. 154; and 2s. 6<i. 
 
 K. B. ; Futvoye v. Kennard, ubi supra. For extra for each additional defendant. Ibid, 
 form of notice of motion in such case, see 3 Wilkin v. Nainby, ubi supra ; Broughton 
 
 Vol- HI- v. Martyn, 4 Bro. C. C. 296. 
 
 4 Republic of Liberia v. Imperial Bank, i Green v. Thomson, 1 S. & S. 121. 
 
 L. R. 16 Eq. 179; L. R. 9 Ch. 569; S. C. nom. 2 y 0T f orms { motion paper and petition, 
 
 Republic of Liberia v. Roye, 1 App. Cas. 139; see Vol. III. 
 
 see also 2 Seton, 1540; but see Gould v. Twine, 3 Green v. Thomson, and Wilkin v. Nainby, 
 
 W. N. (1874) 68 ; 22 W. R. 398. ubi supra. 
 
 5 Cattell v. Simons, ubi supra ; Hazard ». 
 Durant, 11 R. I. 195. 
 
 501
 
 509 
 
 COMPELLING ANSWER. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 Where the process has been carried into effect, and the defendant is in 
 actual custody, he cannot be discharged without an order, which must be 
 obtained in a similar manner, 4 and which will direct the defendant to be 
 discharged, upon payment or tender of the costs of the contempt. 5 These 
 costs are either fixed or taxed costs, 6 according to the stage which the 
 contempt process has reached : thus, if the defendant has merely been 
 arrested on the attachment, the costs, as we have seen, 7 are of a fixed 
 amount ; but if he has been brought up by the messenger, or upon habeas 
 corpus, or by the Sergeant-at-Arms, 8 he is liable to pay taxed costs. 9 (a) 
 If the parties can agree upou the amount, the defendant should pay it ; 
 but if they cannot, he should tender to the plaintiff such a sum as will 
 cover the amount which will probably be allowed on taxation. 
 
 It would appear, moreover, that strictly in all cases of contempt (ex- 
 cept where, the defendant not being in custody, the plaintiff is willing to 
 accept the answer and the costs tendered) the defendant ought, upon 
 filing an answer, to obtain an order for his discharge, on payment or 
 tender of costs ; as, otherwise, the plaintiff may move to have the answer 
 taken off the file for irregularity. 10 
 
 Where process of contempt has been issued against a defendant for 
 want of an answer, he is entitled to be discharged from his contempt 
 immediately upon his putting in an answer, and paying or tendering the 
 costs of his contempt ; and the Court will not detain him in custody till 
 the sufficiency of his answer has been decided upon, 11 unless he has 
 already put in three answers, which have been found insufficient. 12 If, 
 however, the plaintiff takes exceptions to the answer, and the answer is 
 held insufficient, he will be entitled to resume the process of contempt 
 where it left off; 13 and so he will where the defendant submits to 
 answer the exceptions. 14 Nor will the acceptance of costs be con- 
 * 509 sidered * as a waiver of the contempt by the plaintiff ; for where 
 a defendant, in contempt for want of answer, obtains, upon filing 
 his answer, the common order to be discharged as to his contempt, on 
 
 4 Gray v. Campbell, 1 R. & M. 323; Ed- 
 monson v. Heyton, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 3; Symons 
 v. De Barros, M. R.. June 21, 1870, Rolls Lib. 
 Rut a defendant in contempt for want of an- 
 swer, cannot file an answer and demurrer. Cur- 
 zon v. De la Zouch, 1 Swanst. 185, 193; Vigers 
 v. Lord Audley, 2 M. & C. 49, 52 ; 1 Jur. 51 ; 
 Att.-Gen. v. Shield, 11 Beav. 441, 446. For 
 forms of motion paper and petition, see Vol. 
 III. 
 
 5 For form of order, see 2 Seton, 1593, 
 No. 1. 
 
 6 Abud v. Riches, 2 Ch. D. 528; see 1 Dan. 
 Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 901. 
 
 1 Ante, p. 466. n. (m). 
 
 8 Ante, pp. 448, 449, 452. 
 
 9 Wilkin v. Nainbv, 4 Hare, 473, 475; 10 
 
 Jur. 735; Braithwaite's Pr. 154. See Jackson 
 v. Mawby, 1 Ch. D. 86; S. v. L. W. N. (1876) 
 220: S. C. nom. Re M. 46 L. J. Ch. 24. 
 
 W Haynes v. Ball, 5 Beav. 140 ; Wilkin v. 
 Nainby, ubi supra ; Coyle v. Alleyne, 16 Beav. 
 548. 
 
 ii Dupont v. Ward, 1 Dick. 133 ; Child v. 
 Brabson, 2 Ves. Sr. 110; Boehm v. De Tastet, 
 1 V. & B. 324, 327. 
 
 12 Bailey v. Bailey, 11 Ves. 151. 
 
 13 Anon. 2 P. Wms. 481; Wallop v Brown, 
 4 Bro. C. C. 212, 223 ; Bromfield v. Chichester, 
 1 Dick. 379 ; Bailey v. Bailey, and Boehm v. De 
 Tastet, ubi supra ; Coulson v. Graham, 1 V. & 
 B. 331 ; Taylor v. Salmon, 3 M. & C. 109. 
 
 " Waters v. Taylor, 16 Ves. 417. 
 
 (a) Apart from statute, counsel fees cannot 
 be imposed as a punishment upon a person ad- 
 
 502 
 
 judged to be in contempt. O'Rourke v. Cleve- 
 land, 49 N. J. Eq. 577.
 
 HOW CONTEMPTS CLEARED, WAIVED, OR DISCHARGED. * 510 
 
 payment or tender of the costs thereof, or the plaintiff accepts the costs 
 without order, the plaintiff cannot be compelled, in case the answer is 
 insufficient, to recommence the process of contempt against the defend- 
 ant, but is at liberty to take up the process at the point to which he had 
 before proceeded. 1 
 
 But although a plaintiff does not now, by accepting the costs from a 
 defendant upon his putting in an answer, forfeit his right to recommence 
 the process of contempt at the point where it left off, yet if, after answer 
 put in, he accepts the answer, or takes a step in the cause, he waives the 
 contempt and cannot renew the process, or take any other advantage of it. 
 Thus, if a plaintiff reply to the answer, 2 or move upon an admission con- 
 tained in it, 8 he waives the contempt ; and so, where a messenger had been 
 ordered, upon a return of cepi corpus, and in the mean time the defendant 
 filed his answer, which the plaintiff accepted, and then applied for his 
 costs by motion, it was held that the acceptance of the answer precluded 
 him from his right to costs. 4 And where a defendant, who was in con- 
 tempt, put in an answer, without paying or tendering the costs, and the 
 plaintiff replied to the answer, but did not proceed with the cause for 
 three terms, whereupon the defendant moved to dismiss the bill for want 
 of prosecution, upon the plaintiff's objecting that the defendant could 
 not make the motion, in consequence of his being still in contempt, Lord 
 Eldon held that the contempt was gone, and that the defendant was in a 
 situation to make the motion. 5 It has been held, however, that the mere 
 fact of the plaintiff bespeaking a copy of the answer, does not operate as 
 a waiver of the contempt. 6 
 
 Where the plaintiff accepted the answer, without insisting upon the 
 costs of the contempt, Lord Eldon held that the plaintiff had not thereby 
 given up his right to the costs, as costs in the cause, but had only waived 
 his right to enforce them by means of the process of contempt. 7 
 
 And where a defendant, in contempt for want of an answer, had put 
 in three insufficient answers, and, pending a reference of the fourth, put- 
 in a fifth answer, which was accepted by the plaintiff, a motion 
 that the * defendant pay the costs of the contempt, and of the * 510 
 four insufficient answers, was denied. 1 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. XII. 7. taxation as between party and party, the costs 
 
 2 Haynes v. Ball, 5 Beav. 140. of the contempt, even where there is a decree 
 8 Hoskins v. Lloyd, 1 S.& S. 393; Chuck v. for the plaintiff with costs, will not be allowed 
 
 Cremer, 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 247; and see him as costs in the cause. Att.-Gen. v. Lord 
 
 Woodward v. Twinaine, 9 Sim. 301; 14 Jur. Carrington, 6 Beav. 454, 460. In Livingstone 
 
 20; Herrett v. Reynolds, 2 Giff. 409; 6 Jur. V. Cooke, 9 Sim. 468 (but see Symonda v. 
 
 N. S. 880; ante, p. 506, n. 9. Duchess of Cumberland, 2 Cox, 411), Sir Lance- 
 
 * Smith v. Blofield, 2 V. & B. 100. lot Shadwell V. C. decided that a mere order 
 
 5 Anon. 15 Ves. 174 ; and the practice is to amend the bill did not operate as a waiver 
 
 the same, whether the defendant be actually of the contempt: upon the ground that it cre- 
 
 in custody or not. Oldfield v. Cobbett, 1 Phil. ates no obstacle to the defendant putting in his 
 
 557. answer; it was admitted, however, that an 
 
 « Woodward v. Twinaine, and Herrett v. order to amend, and for the defendant to an- 
 
 Reynolds, ubi supra. swer the exceptions at the same time, does 
 
 7 Anon. 15 Ves. 174; see also Smith v. Bio- operate as a waiver of the contempt, as it pre- 
 
 field, ubi supra. vents the defendant from putting in his answer. 
 
 1 Const v. Ebers, 1 Mad. 530, 531. It seems, Where the defendant has been brought to the 
 
 however, that according to the practice, in bar of the Court for his contempt, and refuses 
 
 503
 
 511 
 
 COMPELLING ANSWER. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 Any step taken in the cause must, in order that it may have the effect 
 of a waiver of contempt, be in the cause itself in which the contempt has 
 been incurred; therefore, where a plaintiff was in contempt for non- 
 payment of costs, the filing of a cross-bill by the defendant was held not 
 to be a waiver of the contempt by the defendant, so as to permit the 
 plaintiff to make a motion in his own cause. 2 
 
 Where any of the processes of contempt before referred to have been 
 
 irregularly issued, the defendant should apply to the Court on 
 
 * 511 motion, and notice to the plaintiff, 3 supported by affidavit, to * set 
 
 them aside or discharge them with costs ; and we have seen that 
 
 the circumstance of his being in contempt will not preclude his making 
 
 such an application. 1 
 
 Where a sole plaintiff died, leaving a sole defendant in custody for 
 contempt, he was ordered to be discharged from prison, on his own 
 motion, supported by affidavit proving these facts. 2 
 
 The Court will not permit the regularity of its process to be decided 
 upon by any other tribunal. 3 
 
 to answer, it is provided, by the 11 Geo. IV. & 
 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 15, r. 10, that the Court 
 may, upon motion or petition, of which due 
 notice must be given personally to the defend- 
 ant, authorize the plaintiff to amend his bill, 
 without such amendment operating as a dis- 
 charge of the contempt, or rendering it neces- 
 sary to proceed with the process of contempt de 
 novo : but after such amendment, the plaintiff 
 may proceed to take the amended bill pro con- 
 fesso, in the same manner as if it had not been 
 amended, provided, that if the defendant de- 
 sires to answer the amended bill, the Court shall 
 allow him such time as seems just for that pur- 
 pose; but if he shall not put in a sufficient 
 answer within the time limited, the process for 
 taking the bill pro confesso may be resumed 
 and carried on. See ante, p. 386. It is pre- 
 sumed the application cannot he made by sum- 
 mons, notwithstanding 15 & 16 Vic. c. 80, § 26. 
 For form of notice of motion, see Vol. III. It 
 would appear, that an order to discharge a de- 
 fendant in custody for a contempt, upon the 
 plaintiffs amending his bill, where the amend- 
 ment is not made under the above statute, may 
 he obtained ex parte, and without payment of 
 costs. Gray v. Campbell, 1E.& M. 323; Ball 
 v. Etches, id. 324. 
 
 2 Gompertz r. Best, 1 Y. & C Ex. 619; and 
 see ante, p. 464. 
 
 3 For form of notice of motion, see Vol. III. 
 i Ante, p. 506. 
 
 2 Terrell v. Souch, 4 Hare, 535. 
 
 3 In Frowd v. Lawrence, 1 J. & W. 655, 
 where a defendant, who had been taken into 
 custody upon an attachment which was irregu- 
 larly issued, obtained an order to discharge the 
 attachment with costs, and afterwards com- 
 menced an action against the plaintiff and the 
 
 504 
 
 sheriff, for false imprisonment, and another 
 action against the plaintiff for maliciously suing 
 out the attachment, Lord Eldon, upon the 
 authority of Bailey v. Devereux (1 Vern. 269; 
 
 I J. & W. 660 n ) and May v. Hook (1 J. & 
 W. 663, n. ; cited 2 Dick. 619), made an order 
 for an injunction to restrain the defendant from 
 proceeding with his actions at Law. His Lord- 
 ship, however, held that, by such an injunction, 
 the Court does not intend that the persons con- 
 cerned in issuing the attachment are not to 
 make the party satisfaction, but only that it 
 should not be done by an action at Law; be- 
 cause " it is impossible, from the nature of the 
 thing, that they can try the regularity of an 
 attachment in a Court of Law : " and he there- 
 fore ordered that the injunction should be 
 without prejudice to any application that the 
 defendant might be advised to make for com- 
 pensation, or for the costs at Law. The same 
 principle was afterwards acted upon by Lord 
 Lyndhu' - st, in Ex parte Clarke, 1 R. & M. 
 563, 570; and see Moore v. Moore, 25 Beav. 8; 
 4 Jur. N. S. 250; Walker r. Micklethwait, 1 
 Dr. & S. 49; Arrowsmith v. Hill, 2 Phil. 609, 
 612 ; Ex parte Van Sandau, 1 Phil. 445, 448, 
 n.; 9 Jur. 193; Hutton r. Smith, 3 W. R. 154; 
 24 L. J. Ch. 147; Whitehead v. Lynes, 34 
 Beav. 161; 11 Jur. N. S. 74; on appeal, 12 L. 
 T. N. S. 332; Goucher v. Clayton, 14 id. 494; 
 Fielden v. Northern Ry. of B. A. Co. W. N. 
 (1867) 218. It seems, however, that leave will 
 be given to bring an action for the damages 
 suffered by the irregular process, if the Court 
 considers that the question can be better ad- 
 judicated upon at Law. AVhitehead v. Lynes, 
 
 II Jur. N. S. 74; 13 W. R. 306, M. R.; 34 
 Beav. 161; and on appeal, 12 L. T. N. S. 332, 
 L. C
 
 HOW CONTEMPTS CLEARED, WAIVED, OR DISCHARGED. * 512 
 
 Where the irregularity in the process was occasioned by one of the 
 Registrars of the Court not entering the attachment, although he or his 
 agent had received the usual fee for so doing, the Court ordered 4 the 
 Master to tax the defendant's costs out of pocket, and directed that 
 they should be paid by the plaintiff, who was reported to have been 
 guilty of the irregularity, but that they should be paid over to 
 the plaintiff by the Registrar ; after this the Registrar * died, and * 512 
 the costs having been taxed at £58, the matter came on again 
 upon petition, when the Court being of opinion that, as the Registrar 
 had received his fee, his omitting to enter the attachment was a breach 
 of contract, and not a mere personal neglect, made an order for payment, 
 by the administratrix, out of the Registrar's assets ; and there being no 
 one in Court to admit assets for her, it was ordered that she should be 
 examined as to assets. 
 
 If a party wishes to discharge a process for irregularity, he must 
 make his application before he complies with it : otherwise, he will be 
 considered as waiving the irregularity. 1 Thus, where a defendant has 
 been taken upon process of contempt for non-appearance, he must not 
 enter his appearance in the ordinary way : otherwise, his appearance 
 will cure the defect; he must, however, submit himself to the jurisdic- 
 tion of the Court, in such a manner that, if his objection is held invalid, 
 the plaintiff shall not be deprived of the benefit of his process. 2 The 
 Court, therefore, before the Orders of August, 1841, required the defend- 
 ant, before moving to discharge the attachment, to enter a conditional 
 appearance with the Registrar ; 8 the effect of which was, to enable the 
 plaintiff, in case the Court should decide that the process had been regu- 
 larly issued, to send the Sergeant-at-Arms at once, without any inter- 
 vening proceeding ; but the 7th of those Orders 4 provided, that no 
 order should thereafter be made for the Sergeant-at-Arms to take the 
 body of a defendant, to compel appearance. 
 
 It is to be observed, that a subsequent appearance by a party cannot 
 be construed to have a relation back, so as to bring him into contempt 
 for disobeying a writ or other process issued before his waiver of the 
 informality had made the process valid against him ; and therefore, 
 where an attachment was issued against a defendant for non-appearance 
 to a subpoena, which had been issued against him, and in which he was 
 
 4 James v. Phillips, 2 P. Wms. 657. As to appearance is entered, see post, p. 536; and see 
 
 the responsibility of public officers, see Tobin Seton, 1*2-19. 
 
 v. The Queen, 16 C. B. N. S. 310; 10 Jur. N. 3 Davidson v. Marchioness of Hastings, 2 
 
 S. 1029. Keen, 509. 
 
 i Anon. 3 Atk. 567; Floyd v. Nangle, id. * Later, Cons. Ord. X. 10. In Price v. Webb, 
 569; Bound v. Wells, 3 Mad. 434; Robinson v. 2 Hare, 511 (and see Braithwaite's Pr. 321, and 
 Nash, 1 Anst. 76. post, p. 536), Sir James Wigram V. C. directed 
 In pleading, a positive step on the basis of that the order for liberty to enter the condi- 
 the regularity of a previous pleading, waives tional appearance should be made, upon the 
 any irregularity therein. Seifreid v. People's consent of the defendant to submit to any pro- 
 Bank, 2 Tenn. Ch. 17; Fulton Bank v. Beach, cess which the Court might direct to be issued 
 2 Paige, 307; S. C. 6 Wend. 36; Steele v. against him, for want of appearance, in case the 
 Plomer, 2 Phil. 780 ; Seifreid v. People's Bank, subpoena, should not be set aside for irregularity. 
 1 Baxter, 200. For form of order, see 2 Seton, 1626, No. 1. 
 
 1 For the manner in which a conditional 
 
 505
 
 514 
 
 COMPELLING ANSWER. 
 
 PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 described by a wrong name, it was held, by the Court of Exchequer, 
 that his appearance for the purpose of discharging the attachment 
 would not relate back, so as to cure the defect in the subpoena, and 
 
 bring him into contempt for not appearing in time. 6 
 * 513 * It should be noticed also, that the principle of waiver applies 
 
 only to an irregular, and not to an erroneous order ; and there- 
 fore, where an order had been made that service upon the attorney 
 should be good service, and service was accordingly effected upon the 
 attorney, who thereupon entered an appearance, but it was found, after- 
 wards, that the affidavit upon which the order for substituted service 
 had been made was insufficient, the order and all the subsequent pro- 
 ceedings were, on the defendant's motion, ordered to be set aside, on 
 the ground that the original order was erroneous, and not irregular ; 
 and that, being erroneous, the defect was not cured by the subsequent 
 appearance of the party. 1 
 
 Section V. — Process by filing a Traversing Answer, or Traversing 
 
 Note. 2 
 
 Having considered the various means which the practice of the Court 
 affords for the purpose of compelling an answer from the defendant, 
 it remains to state particular cases in which the plaintiff may himself, 
 if he thinks fit, file an answer for a defaulting defendant, or a " trav- 
 ersing note," which has the effect of an answer. 
 
 Where the defendant is not required to, and does not answer, the 
 plaintiff's bill, he is to be considered to have traversed the case made 
 by the bill ; 8 it is only in those cases, therefore, in which the defendant 
 has been required to answer, and is in default, that the plaintiff can file 
 
 an answer for him, or a traversing note. 4 
 * 514 * The application must be supported by production of the con- 
 tempt orders, the keeper's certificate of the defendant being in 
 
 6 Robinson v. Nash, 1 Anst. 76; see Green- 
 ing v. Greening, 1 Beav. 121; Haynes v. Ball, 4 
 Beav. 101; Needham v. Needham, 1 Phil. 640. 
 
 i Levi v. Ward, 1 S. & S. 334; see Whit- 
 tington v. Edwards, 3 De G. & J. 243. 
 
 2 See Stump ». Beatty, 8 Dana, 14; Chiles 
 v. Boon, 3 B. Mon. 82. 
 
 3 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86. § 26. Issue is to be 
 joined in such case, by filing replication. Cons. 
 Ord. XVII. 1; or the cause maybe set down 
 to be heard on motion for decree, see post, 
 p. 516; but not on bill and answer. Braith- 
 waite's Pr. 70. 
 
 * Heath v. Lewis, 17 Jur.1000, M. R.; Cons. 
 Ord. XVII. 1; and post, Chap. XXI. Replica- 
 tion. By the 11 Geo. IV. and 1 Will. IV. c. 
 36, § 15, rule 11, it is enacted "that in every 
 case where the defendant has been brought to 
 the bar of the Court, to answer his contempt 
 for not answering, and shall refuse or neglect to 
 answer within the next twenty-one days, the 
 506 
 
 plaintiff shall be at liberty, with the leave of 
 the Court, upon ten days' previous notice to the 
 defendant, after the expiration of such twenty- 
 one days, unless good cause be shown to the 
 contrary, instead of proceeding to have the bill 
 taken pro confesso, to put in such an answer to 
 the bill as hereinafter is mentioned, in the name 
 of the defendant, without oath or signature; and 
 thereupon the suit shall proceed, in the same 
 manner as if such answer were really the an- 
 swer of the defendant, with which the plaintiff 
 was satisfied; and the costs of the contempt, 
 and of putting in such answer, may be provided 
 for in like manner as if the defendant himself 
 had put in such answer; and such answer, be- 
 sides the formal parts thereof, shall be to the 
 following effect: that the defendant leaves the 
 plaintiff to make such proofs of the several 
 matters in the bill alleged, as he shall be able, 
 or be advised, and submits his interests to the 
 Court.'' For form of first-mentioned order, see
 
 PROCESS BY TRAVERSING ANSWER, OR TRAVERSING NOTE. * 515 
 
 custody, the Record and Writ Clerk's certificate of no answer having 
 been filed, and an affidavit of service of the notice of motion. 
 
 The practice under this rule is not of so much importance as it was 
 formerly; because the plaintiff has now a remedy of a similar kind, 
 though more generally applicable : for after the expiration of the time 
 allowed to a defendant to plead, answer, or demur (not demurring alone) 
 to any original or supplemental bill, or bill amended before answer, which 
 he has been required to answer, if such defendant has not filed any plea, 
 answer, or demurrer, the plaintiff .may file a note at the Record and 
 Writ Clerk's Office, to the following effect : " The plaintiff intends to 
 proceed with his cause, as if the defendant had filed an answer, travers- 
 ing the case made by the bill." 1 In the case of a bill amended after 
 answer, upon the like default, he may file a note to the following effect: 
 "The plaintiff intends to proceed with his cause, as if the defendant 
 had filed an answer, traversing the allegations introduced into the bill 
 by amendment." 2 And, after the expiration of the time allowed to a 
 defendant to put in his further answer to any bill, the plaintiff (if such 
 defendant shall not have put in any further answer) may file a note to 
 the following effect : "The plaintiff intends to proceed with his cause 
 as if the defendant had filed a further answer, traversing the allegations 
 in the bill whereon the exceptions are founded." 8 
 
 When a copy of the traversing note has been duly served, it has the 
 same effect "as if the defendant against whom such note is filed had 
 filed a full answer or further answer, traversing the whole bill, or those 
 parts of the bill to which the note relates, on the day on which the note 
 was filed." 4 
 
 When a traversing note has been filed, a copy thereof must be 
 served upon the defendant against whom the same is filed, in the 
 manner directed for the service of documents not requiring personal 
 service. 5 
 
 * The rule last referred to applies only to cases where the de- * 515 
 fendant has appeared by a solicitor, or personally ; and not to 
 cases where the plaintiff has entered an appearance for him. 1 It has 
 been held, however, that in such a case the Court can, under its general 
 jurisdiction, make a special order for service of the traversing note on 
 the defendant. 2 
 
 The application should be made ex parte, and be supported by an 
 affidavit of service of the bill and interrogatories, and by the Record 
 and Writ Clerk's certificate that the plaintiff has appeared for the 
 
 Seton, 1264, No. 13; and for form of notice of respect of notice, as an answer, and as within the 
 
 motion under such order, see Vol. III. operation of Cons. Ord. III. 9; so that the copy 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. XIII. 1. should, if possible, be served on the day on 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XIII. 2. which the note is filed. Braithwaite's Manual, 
 8 Cons. Ord. XIII. 3. 144 : Veal's Pr. 24. 
 
 * Cons. Ord. XIII. 6; but it has not the 1 Anon. 11 Jur. 28 L. C; Braithwaite's 
 same effect, for the purpose of evidence, as an Pr. G8. 
 
 answer on oath. Martin v. Norman, 2 Hare, 2 Moss v. Buckley, 2 Phil. 628; 12 Jur. 487; 
 
 596, 598. and for the order in that case, see Seton, 1246, 
 
 5 Cons. Ord. XIII. 5; III. 4, 6; ante, pp.454, No. 10; and see Laurie v. Burn, 6 Hare, 308; 
 
 455. No time is limited within which the note 12 Jur. 598; Horlock v. Wilson, 12 Beav. 545; 
 
 is to be served ; but it is in practice treated, in see also Scott v. Wheeler, 13 Beav. 239. 
 
 50
 
 516 
 
 COMPELLING ANSWER. — PROCEEDINGS IN DEFAULT. 
 
 defendant, and has filed the traversing note. It seems usual, though 
 not essential, to prove by affidavit that the defendant is within the 
 jurisdiction. 8 
 
 In a proper case, the Court will order substituted service of the trav- 
 ersing note, 4 on application by ex parte motion, supported by the affida- 
 vit and certificates above mentioned ; 5 but leave to serve the note on a 
 defendant out of the jurisdiction will not be given. 6 
 
 A traversing note is to be intituled in the cause, 7 and written on paper 
 of the same description and size as that on which bills are printed. 8 It 
 may be underwritten or indorsed with the name and place of business 
 of the plaintiff's solicitor, and of his agent, if any, or with the name 
 and place of residence of the plaintiff, where he acts in person ; and, in 
 either case, with the address for service, if any. 9 The names of several 
 defendants may be included in one traversing note, notwithstanding that 
 they have appeared by separate solicitors. 10 
 
 After service of a copy of the traversing note, the defendant cannot 
 plead, answer, or demur to the bill, or put in any further answer 
 thereto, without the special leave of the Court ; and the cause is to 
 stand in the same situation as if such defendant had filed a full 
 answer or further answer to the bill, on the day on which the note 
 was filed. 11 
 
 Where the plaintiff filed a traversing note, knowing that the de- 
 fendant's answer was sworn, though not filed, the traversing 
 * 516 * note was ordered to be taken off the file, upon payment of 
 costs by the defendant. 1 
 
 Where a defendant wishes to put in a plea, answer, or demurrer, or a 
 further answer, after a traversing note has been filed, he should apply, 
 on motion, with notice to the plaintiff, for leave so to do, and for that 
 purpose that the note may be taken off the file. The order will only 
 be made on payment of costs by the defendant. 2 The application should 
 be supported by an affidavit explaining the delay, and that the defend- 
 ant is advised to put in the proposed defence. 
 
 It seems that a traversing note cannot be filed in the case of an infant 
 defendant ; 8 but inasmuch as it is only necessary to file it, in those cases 
 in which an answer has been required, and none put in, a case could 
 scarcely now arise in practice, in which it could be desired to file a 
 traversing note against an infant defendant : no answer being usually 
 required in such a case. Where a married woman is co-defendant with 
 
 3 For forms of motion paper and affidavit, 
 see Vol. III. 
 
 4 Wallis v. Darby, 6 Hare, 618; Scott v. 
 Wheeler, ubi supra ; Hunt v. Niblett, 25 Beav. 
 124; 4 Jur. N. S. 444. 
 
 5 For forms of motion paper and affidavit, 
 see Vol. III. 
 
 6 Anderson v. Stather, 11 Jur. 96, V. C. K. 
 B. But see, contra, Martigny v. Smith, 18 
 W. R. 108. 
 
 7 For forms of traversing notes, see Vol. 
 III. 
 
 508 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. 6 Mar., 1860, r. 16. As to such 
 paper, see Cons. Ord. IX. 3; ante, p. 361. 
 
 9 Cons. Ord. III. 2, 5; ante, pp. 453, 454. 
 No fee is payable on filing a traversing note. 
 Braithwaite's Pr. 67. 
 
 w Ibid. 
 
 li Cons. Ord. XIII. 7. 
 
 1 Rigby v. Rigby, 6 Beav. 265. 
 
 2 Towne r. Bonnin, 1 De G. & S. 128; 11 
 Jur. 261. For form of notice of motion, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 8 Emery v. Newson, 10 Sim. 564.
 
 PROCESS BY TRAVERSING ANSWER, OR TRAVERSING NOTE. * 516 
 
 her husband, a traversing note cannot be filed against her separately, 
 unless an order for her to answer separately has been obtained. 
 
 Due service of the traversing note must be proved against the defend- 
 ant at the hearing, if he does not appear. 4 
 
 Where a demurrer or plea to the whole bill is overruled, the plaintiff, 
 if he does not require an answer, may immediately file his note, in man- 
 ner above pointed out, as the case may require, and with the same 
 effect ; unless the Court, upon overruling such demurrer or plea, gives 
 time to the defendant to plead, answer, or demur ; and in such case, if 
 the defendant does not file any plea, answer, or demurrer, within the 
 time so allowed by the Court, the plaintiff, if he does not then require 
 an answer, may, on the expiration of such time, file such note. 5 
 
 When a traversing note has once been filed, the plaintiff cannot 
 without notice to the parties affected by it, obtain an order to take it 
 off the file. 6 
 
 The tiling of a traversing note does not prevent a cause being heard 
 on motion for decree ; but, for that purpose, the traversing note is 
 equivalent to an answer. 7 
 
 4 Evans v. Williams, 6 Beav. 118; and see 7 Maniere v. Leicester, 5 De G. M. & G. 75; 
 
 Reg. Regul. 15 March, I860, r. 25. For form 18 Jur. 320. As to motions to dismiss for want 
 of affidavit of service of a traversing note, see of prosecution, where a traversing note has been 
 Vol. III. filed, see Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 10. 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. XIII. 4. 
 
 6 Simmons v. Wood. 5 Beav. 390. For form 
 of notice of motion in such case, see Vol. III. 
 
 509
 
 517 
 
 * CHAPTER XI. 
 
 TAKING BILLS PRO CONFESSO. 
 
 Section I. — Preliminary Order. 
 
 In preceding chapters, the reader's attention has been drawn to the 
 method which the Court adopts to compel a refractory defendant to 
 appear to, and answer the bill. By means of the process there pointed 
 out, the plaintiff may, if the defendant is not a privileged person, take 
 his body as a security for his obedience; or if he be a privileged per- 
 son, or manages to keep out of the way so successfully as to avoid an 
 arrest, the plaintiff may proceed to compel his submission, by taking 
 from him the enjoyment of his property and effects, until he submits. 
 It is obvious, however, that in a Court of Equity, where the nature of 
 the relief to be granted frequently depends upon the discovery to be 
 elicited from a defendant by his answer, the mere taking a party into 
 custody, or sequestrating his property, cannot always answer the object 
 of doing that justice to the plaintiff which it is the business of Equity 
 to secure. The Court has, therefore, adopted a method of rendering its 
 process effectual, by treating the defendant's contumacy as an admission 
 of the plaintiff's case, and by making an order that the facts of the bill 
 shall be considered as true, and decreeing against the defendant accord- 
 ing to the equity arising upon the case stated by the plaintiff, (a) This 
 proceeding is termed taking a bill jaro confesso. 1 
 
 l A rule for an answer where process has not 
 been rightly served, and a decree pro confesso, 
 
 for want of an answer, are irregular, 
 well v. Cleaveland, 3 McLean, 283. 
 
 Tread- 
 
 (n) A decree pro confesso, which admits the 
 truth of the bill, is not a decree as of course 
 according to the prayer of the bill or the plain- 
 tiff's wish, but, at least in the Federal Courts, is 
 to be denned by the Court, according to what 
 should be decreed upon the properly averred 
 allegations of the bill, assumed to be true; and 
 while such decree is unrevoked, the defendant 
 cannot set up anything in opposition thereto 
 either in the Court which made the decree, or on 
 appeal. Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U. S. 104; 
 Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co. id. 439 ; Andrews 
 v. Cole, 20 Fed. Rep. 410; Waue;h v. Schlenk, 
 23 111. App. 433 ; Cramer r. Bode. 24 111. App. 219; 
 see Dotterer v. Freeman, 88 Ga. 479. The Federal 
 Equity Rules, 18, 19, which govern the taking 
 of bills pro confesso, were amended in 1878. 97 
 U. S. viii. : post, p. 2379. Upon a bill which is 
 fatahv defective, even though it contains a 
 
 510 
 
 prayer for general relief, the plaintiff cannot 
 have relief even when the defendant suffers 
 decree pro confesso. Lancaster Mills v. Mer- 
 chants' Cotton-press Co. 89 Tenn. 1 ; McMahon 
 v. Rooney, 93 Mich. 390. When the plaintiff's 
 demand is uncertain, and his allegations are 
 indefinite, proofs must be supplied in order that 
 a proper decree may be made. Welsh v. Solen- 
 berger, 85 Va 441. If such proofs, required by 
 the Court in its discretion, are not supplied, the 
 bill may, it seems, be dismissed. Hoffman v. 
 Schoyer, 143 III. 598. After an order that the 
 bill be taken pro confesso, the defendant, even 
 if he has appeared, need not be notified of an 
 application, made in open Court, for final decree. 
 Austin v. Riley, 55 Fed. Rep. 833. 
 
 The defendant has. however, such an in- 
 terest in the form of the decree, after the bill 
 is taken for confessed, as entitles him to appeal:
 
 PRELIMINARY ORDER. 
 
 518 
 
 It seems that this practice is not of very ancient standing, and that 
 the custom formerly was to put the plaintiff to make proof of the sub- 
 stance of his bill ; 2 but the course of taking the bill pro confesso 
 has now, for some time, been the established practice of *the *518 
 Court. 1 And this practice has been very materially extended 
 and facilitated by Acts of Parliament and General Orders of the Court. 
 Considerable difference formerly existed in the practice of taking bills 
 pro confesso, in cases where the defendant was in custody, and in those 
 where he was not ; but the General Orders have so far assimilated the 
 practice in the two cases, that it will be most convenient to state the 
 general rules applicable to all cases in which a bill is taken pro confesso : 
 remarking any peculiarities resulting from the particular circumstances 
 in which a defendant may be placed. 
 
 Where a decree is intended to be sought against a defendant, by 
 taking the bill pro confesso, an order for that purpose must be obtained 
 upon motion, of which notice must be given ; 2 and then the cause must 
 be set down to be heard ; 8 and it cannot be heard on the same day on 
 which the order to have it taken pro confesso is made. 4 
 
 2 See Rose v. Woodruff, 4 John. Ch. 547, 
 548; post, 526, note; Pierson v. David, 4 Iowa, 
 410; Johnson v. Donnell, 15 III. 97; Corradine 
 v. O'Connor, 21 Ala. 573; Att.-Gen. v. Carver, 
 12 Ired. (N. C.) 231; Smith v. Trimble, 27 111. 
 152; Stephens v. Bichnell, id. 444. The defend- 
 ant may, in such case, without demurring, take 
 advantage of any matter which would be a 
 good cause of demurrer. Wilson v. Waterman, 
 6 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 255. 
 
 i Hawkins v. Crook, 2 P. Wms. 556; John- 
 son v. Desmineere, 1 Vern. 223; Gibson v. 
 Sceven^ton, ib. 247. In New Hampshire, if the 
 delendant, having received due notice, shall 
 neglect to enter his appearance at the return 
 term, or shall neglect to deliver to the plain- 
 tiff's solicitor his plea, answer, or demurrer, 
 within two calendar months after service of the 
 
 bill, the bill may be taken pro confesso, and a 
 decree entered accordingly. Ch. Rule 16, 38 
 N. H. 608. See Rule 18 o"f the Equity Rules of 
 the U. S. Court, post, Vol. III. See infra, p. 525, 
 note. See Code of Tennessee, §§ 436'J, 4371, as 
 to pro confesso orders ; Stone v. Duncan, 1 Head, 
 103. A pro confesso order can only be taken 
 when strictly in accordance with law and the 
 rules of practice. Lanum v. Steel, 10 Humph. 280. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XXII. 1; 11 Geo. IV. & 1 
 Will. IV. c. 36, §§ 3, 15; and see Collins v. 
 Collyer, 3 Beav. 600: Brown v. Home, 8 Beav. 
 607. For forms of order, see Seton, 1265-1267, 
 Nos. 1-7; and for forms of notice of motion, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 3 See Pendleton r. Evans, 4 Wash. C. C. 335; 
 Rose v. Woodruff, 4 John. Ch. 547. An order 
 to take a bill^ro confesso, unless the defendant 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. XXII. 6; Brown v. Home, ubi su])ra. 
 
 Blanchard v. Cooke, 144 Mass. 207, 218; see 
 Garvin v. Watkins, 29 Fla. 151; Non-Magnetic 
 Watch Co. v. Association Horlogere Suisse, 45 
 Fed. Rep. 210. As to third parties intervening 
 after decree pro confesso, see Farmers' Loan & 
 T. Co. v. Texas Western Ry. Co. 32 Fed. Rep. 
 359. After such decree, the defendant is en- 
 titled to notice of a material amendment of the 
 bill. McClenny v. Ward, 80 Ala. 243; Fogg v. 
 Merrill, 74 Maine, 523. See Belt V. Bowie, 65 
 Md. 350; Paine v. Slocum, 56 Vt. 504; Smith v. 
 Brittenham, 88 III. 291. 
 
 An interlocutory decree taken pro confesso, 
 which declares a patent valid, grants an injunc- 
 tion, and makes a reference to a Master for an 
 accounting, is still in the Court's control and is 
 
 not appealable. Roemer v. Neumann, 26 Fed. 
 Rep. 332. Objections which must be raised by 
 demurrer, or promptly, such as an adequate 
 remedy at law or multifariousness, will not avail 
 to reverse a decree pro confesso. Brown v. Lake 
 Superior Iron Co. 134 U. S. 530; Gilmore v. 
 Sapp, 100 111. 297. The omission to enter a 
 formal order that the bill be taken pro confesso 
 does not invalidate the final decree. Linder v. 
 Lewis, 1 Fed. Rep. 378; see Allen v. New York, 
 7 id. 483. A decree entered upon a bill taken 
 pro confesso which recites that all the defend- 
 ants were served with process, is conclusive, if 
 the record shows nothing to the contrary. Moore 
 v Green (Va.), 17 S- E. Rep. 872. See Kopper 
 v. Dyer, 59 Vt. 477; Holly v. Bass, 63 Ala. 337. 
 511
 
 *519 
 
 TAKING BILLS PRO CONFESSO. 
 
 Where the defendant is beyond seas, or has absconded to avoid being 
 served, and it is intended to proceed to have the bill taken pro confesso, 
 without any appearance having been entered by him, or on his behalf, 
 the proceedings must be taken under the Stat. 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. 
 IV. c. 36, § 3. 5 The mode prescribed by that Act must be strictly com- 
 plied with ; 6 and it seems that the Act applies to all cases where a party 
 goes abroad, to avoid process. 7 
 
 It has already been observed, that the General Order, ena- 
 * 519 bling * a plaintiff to enter an appearance for an absconding de- 
 fendant, 1 applies to the same circumstances as those provided for 
 by the Act ; and although it seems that this order has not superseded 
 the Act, 2 it is undoubtedly the usual practice, in all cases where it is 
 intended to take a bill pro confesso against a defendant, to enter an ap- 
 pearance for him, and to proceed under the provisions of the General 
 Order. 
 
 Where any defendant, whether within or not within the jurisdiction 
 of the Court, does not put in his answer in due time after appearance 
 entered by or for him, 8 and the plaintiff is unable, with due diligence, 4 
 to procure a writ of attachment, or any subsequent process for want of 
 answer, to be executed against such defendant, by reason of his being 
 out of the jurisdiction of the Court, or being concealed, or for any other 
 cause, then such defendant is, for the purpose of enabling the plaintiff 
 to obtain an order to take the bill pro confesso, to be deemed to have 
 absconded to avoid, or to have refused to obey, the process of the Court. 6 
 And where any defendant who, under the last mentioned rule, may be 
 deemed to have absconded to avoid, or to have refused to obey, the 
 process of the Court, appears in person or by his own solicitor, the plain- 
 
 
 answers it by a day given, cannot be antici- 
 pated, and a decree pro confesso passed in anti- 
 cipation of such day. Fitzhugh v. McPherson, 
 9 Gill & J. 52. 
 
 It is error to take a bill pro confesso against 
 several defendants, when process has been 
 served only upon one. Robertson v. Crawford, 
 1 A. K. Marsh. 449. As to what service of the 
 subpoena is necessary before a bill can be taken 
 as confessed, see Sawyer v. Sawyer, 3 Paige, 
 263; Sullivant v. Weaver, 10 Ohio, 275; Tread- 
 well v. Cleaveland, 3 McLean, 283. 
 
 6 See ante, pp. 456, 457. 
 
 6 Short v. Downer, 2 Cox, 84 ; see Baker v. 
 Keen, 4 Sim. 498, where the proceedings are 
 set out in detail. 
 
 7 Mawer v. Mawer, 1 Cox, 104; 1 Bro. C. C. 
 388; Henderson v. Meggs, 2 Bro. C. C. 127; 
 James v. Dore, 1 Dick. 63. Mass. Ch. Rule 5 
 provides for notice to defendants in Equity 
 sui's, who reside out of the Commonwealth, and 
 the method to be pursued to entitle the plain- 
 tiff in such cases to obtain an order to have his 
 bill taken for confessed. In Maine, where the 
 rights of a defendant in Equity, who resides 
 out of the State, and has had notice of the suit, 
 
 512 
 
 but does not appear and answer, will not be 
 prejudiced by the decree, the bill may be 
 taken pro confesso as to him. Adams v. 
 Stevens, 49 Maine, 362 ; see Evarts v. Beeker, 
 8 Paige, 506; Christy v. Christy, 6 Paige, 170. 
 i Cons. Ord. X. 6; ante, p. 459. 
 
 2 Wilkin v. Nainby, 4 Hare, 476; 10 Jur. 
 735; Dresser v. Morton, 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 
 376 ; see, however, Fortescue v. Hallett, 3 Jur. 
 N. S. 806; 5 W. R. 747, V. C. K. 
 
 3 Where a defendant had been duly served 
 with the bill and interrogatories, but did not 
 appear or answer, and withdrew himself be- 
 yond the .jurisdiction, the Court ordered notice 
 to be given to him, that unless an answer was 
 put in within fourteen days from the service of 
 the notice, an appearance would be entered for 
 him, and proceedings taken to have the 
 bill taken pro confesso. Grover & Baker Sew- 
 ing Machine Co. v. Millard, 8 Jur. N. S. 713, 
 V. C. W. See Hale v. Continental Life Ins. 
 Co. 20 Fed Rep. 344. 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. XXII. 2. The sheriff's officer 
 mu«t swear that he has used due diligence. 
 Yearslev v. Budgett, 11 Beav. 144. 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. XXII. 2.
 
 PRELIMINARY ORDER. * 520 
 
 tiff may serve upon such defendant or his solicitor a notice, that on a 
 day in such notice named (being not less than fourteen days after the 
 service of such notice), the Court will be moved that the bill may be 
 taken pro confesso against such defendant ; 6 and the plaintiff must, upon 
 the hearing of such motion, satisfy the Court that such defendant ought, 
 under the provisions of the last-mentioned rule, to be deemed to have 
 absconded to avoid, or to have refused to obey, the process of the Court ; 
 and the Court, if so satisfied, and if an answer has not been filed, may, 
 if it so think fit, order the bill to be taken pro confesso against such 
 defendant, either immediately, or at such time, or upon such further 
 notice as, under the circumstances of the case, the Court may think 
 proper. 7 
 
 *The last-mentioned rule gives the Court a discretion as to *520 
 ordering a bill to be taken pro confesso ; and in the exercise of 
 this discretion, the Court refused to make the order, where the defendant 
 had always been resident abroad, and had not absconded, and there was 
 no evidence of his refusal to obey the order of the Court. 1 
 
 Where any defendant who, under the above-mentioned rule, may be 
 deemed to have absconded to avoid, or to have refused to obey, the 
 process of the Court, has had an appearance entered for him by the plain- 
 tiff, 2 and does not afterwards appear in person or by his own solicitor, 
 the plaintiff may cause to be inserted in the London Gazette, a notice, 
 that on a day in such notice named 8 (being not less than four weeks 
 after the first insertion of such notice in the London Gazette), the 
 Court will be moved that the bill may be taken pro confesso against such 
 defendant; and the plaintiff must, upon the hearing of such motion, 
 satisfy the Court that such defendant ought, under the provisions of the 
 above-mentioned rule, to be deemed to have absconded to avoid, or to 
 have refused to obey, the process of the Court ; and that such notice of 
 motion has been inserted in the London Gazette, at least once in every 
 entire week, reckoned from Sunday morning to Saturday evening, which 
 shall have elapsed between the time of the first insertion thereof, and 
 the time for which the notice is given ; and the Court, if so satisfied, and 
 if an answer has not been filed, may, if it so thinks fit, order the bill to 
 
 6 For form of notice, see Vol. III. Short adverse party. Oakley v. O'Neill, 1 Green Ch. 
 
 notice of motion allowed, where a defendant, 287; see Nesbit v. St. Patrick's Church, 9 N. J. 
 
 who had obtained further time, refused to put Eq. 76. For form of order to take the bill pro 
 
 in his answer, and an attachment could not confesso in this case, see Seton, 1265, No. 2. 
 be executed against him. Wedderburne p. J Zulueta V. Vinent, 15 Beav. 272: 16 .Tur. 
 
 Thomas, 10 Jur. N. S. 92. V. C. W. 631 : see, however, Hele v. Ogle, 2 Hare, 623, 
 
 i Cons. Ord. XXII. 3. If a defendant, after under 1st Order of April, 1842, Sand. Old. 196 ; 
 
 appearing, will not answer, the bill will be taken Beav. Ord. 195. 
 
 pro confesso. Caines v. Fisher, 1 John. Ch. 8. 2 Under Cons. Ord. X. 4, 6, or 7; see ante, 
 
 And where the bill is for relief only, and states pp. 459, 460. 
 
 sufficient ground, the process for contempt to 3 Which may be any day in term; but must, 
 
 compel an answer is not necessary. Caines v. it is presumed, be on a seal day out of term. 
 
 Fisher, supra. In New Jersey, a decree pro Chaffers v. Baker, 5 De G. M. &G. 482; 1 Jur. 
 
 confesso may be taken at any time after the N. S. 32 In Millar v. F.lwin, 25 Beav. 674; 4 
 
 time limited for the defendant to plead, an- Jur. N. S. 600, however, it seems that the ad- 
 
 swer, or demur has expired. It may be taken vertisement was for a day out of term, which, 
 
 without notice, and, of course, unless it appear at the time the advertisement was issued, could 
 
 that some prejudice will thereby accrue to the not have been known to be a seal day. 
 
 vol. i. — 33 513
 
 *521 
 
 TAKING BILLS PRO CONFESSO. 
 
 be taken pro confesso against such defendant, either immediately, or at 
 such time, or upon such further notice, as under the circumstances of the 
 case the Court may think proper. 4 
 
 It seems that, where it is intended to take the bill pro confesso under 
 the foregoing rules, interrogatories must have been filed ; 5 but where 
 the defendant has absconded, or cannot be found, the delivery may be 
 
 dispensed with. 6 
 * 521 * Where the defendant is out of the jurisdiction, it is not neces- 
 sary to issue an attachment, in order to take the bill pro confesso 
 against him under these rules. 1 
 
 The plaintiff having advertised, in the Gazette, his notice of motion 
 to take the bill pro confesso, may save it on the day mentioned in the 
 advertisement, until next motion day, without mentioning such saving 
 expressly to the Court. 2 And where the advertisement gave six weeks' 
 notice, instead of four, it was held, that the insertion of the advertise- 
 ment for the first four of the six weeks was sufficient. 3 
 
 Upon the motion, the plaintiff must show, by affidavit, that proper 
 inquiries have been made after the defendant, and the means which the 
 deponent had of knowing the parties, and the facts to which he deposes, 4 
 and that the case is within the rules above referred to. 5 Thus, it must 
 appear by affidavit 6 that interrogatories have been filed, and also deliv- 
 ered where delivery is necessary ; that due diligence has been used to 
 execute the attachment or other process for want of answer, where 
 process has issued ; 7 and that notice of the motion has been served on 
 the defendant or his solicitor ; or, if not so served, the Gazettes contain- 
 ing the notice must be produced. 8 The sheriff's return to the process, if 
 issued, is also required ; and also the Record and Writ Clerk's certificate 
 that the defendant has not put in his answer ; and if the plaintiff has 
 entered an appearance for the defendant, that fact should appear by the 
 certificate. 9 
 
 If the defendant puts in his answer, after service of the notice of 
 
 * Cons. Ord. XXII. 4. For form of order, 
 see Seton, 1205, No. 3. Where the defendant 
 has absconded, it must be shown that he cannot 
 be found at the time of making the application. 
 Wilkinson v. Turner, 14 W. R. 813, M. R. 
 
 5 Buttler v. Mathews, 19 Beav. 549. 
 
 6 Anon., 4 Jur. N. S. 583, V. C. W.; S. C. 
 nrnn. Baker v. Dean, 6 W. R. 719; Buttler v. 
 Mathews, 19 Beav. 549 ; Anthony v. Cowper, 
 11 Jur. N.S.73; 13 W. R. 286, M. R.; 34 Beav. 
 77. Sometimes the filing of the interrogatories 
 h;is been directed to be advertised; see Anon., 
 nbi supra ; but this does not seem to be neces- 
 sarv. Anthony v. Cowper, ubi supra ; Darlow r. 
 Sinnock. 1 YV. N. 154, V. C. K. ; S. C nom. 
 Darlow v. Simlock, 14 W. R. 383. 
 
 1 Buttler v. Mathews, 19 Beav. 549, and 
 cases there referred to; Hodgson v. Hodgson. 
 23 Beav. 604 ; Braithwaite's Pr. 295 ; and see 
 Anon., 9 L. T. N. S. 674, M. R., for practice 
 
 514 
 
 where there is delay between the making and 
 drawing up of the order. 
 
 2 Torr v. Torr, John. 660. Where, for 
 want of business, the Court did not sit on the 
 day in term mentioned in the notice, the motion 
 was permitted to be made on the succeeding 
 dav. Postlethwaite v. Travers, 1 N. R. 354, 
 V. C. S. dub. 
 
 3 Millar v. Elwin, 25 Beav. 674; 4 Jur. N. S. 
 600. 
 
 4 Harrison v. Stewardson, 2 Hare, 533, 534, 
 n.; see also Anstey v. Hobson, 2 W. R. 46, 
 V. C. S.; Robson v. Earl of Devon, ib. 485, 
 V C. S. 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. XXII. 2, 3. 
 
 » For form of affidavit, see Vol. HI. 
 
 7 Yearsley v. Bodgett, 11 Beav. 144; ante, 
 p. 519. n. 4. 
 
 8 See Seton, 1265, Nos. 2, 3. 
 
 9 Ibid.
 
 PRELIMINARY ORDER. * 522 
 
 motion, but before the motion has been brought on, it may be brought 
 on for the purpose of obtaining the costs. 10 
 
 In determining the question, whether the bill should be ordered to be 
 taken pro confesso " immediately," or at some future time, or upon some 
 further notice, the Court is guided by the circumstances of the case ; 
 but, in general, it does not direct the bill to be taken pro confesso imme- 
 diately. 11 
 
 Where a cause had been set down to be heard pro confesso, and had 
 been struck out, in consequence of the absence of counsel, it 
 * was permitted to be restored to the paper, on the application * 522 
 of the plaintiff alone. 1 
 
 It is to be observed, generally, that, in proceeding to take a bill pro 
 confesso, the greatest care must be taken to bring the case strictly within 
 the General Orders ; 2 and all formalities must be scrupulously complied 
 with. Thus, an advertisement in the Gazette, which omitted the defend- 
 ant's name as a party to the cause, although the notice was addressed to 
 him, and stated that application would be made to have the bill taken 
 pro confesso against him, was held insufficient. 8 
 
 And so, after an order to take the bill pro confesso has been obtained, 
 the bill cannot be amended, even to the extent of correcting a clerical 
 error, without vitiating the proceedings, and rendering the order useless. 4 
 If, however, a defendant, who has been brought to the bar of the Court 
 for his contempt in not answering, refuses or neglects to answer (not 
 being idiot, lunatic, or of unsound mind), the Court may, upon motion 
 or petition, of which due notice must be given personally to the defend- 
 ant, authorize the plaintiff to amend his bill without such amendment 
 operating as a discharge of the contempt, or rendering it necessary to 
 proceed with the process of contempt de novo ; and after such amend- 
 ment, the plaintiff may proceed to take the amended bill pro confesso, in 
 the same manner as if it had not been amended. 5 
 
 We have .before seen, that where a defendant is in actual custody for 
 contempt in not putting in his answer, it is incumbent upon the plain- 
 tiff not to detain the defendant in prison beyond a certain limited time, 
 without bringing him to the bar of the Court. 6 If, however, the plain- 
 tiff determines at once to take the bill pro confesso, he need not bring 
 the defendant to the bar ; but may, upon the execution of an attach- 
 ment for want of answer, or at any time within three weeks afterwards, 
 serve the defendant with a notice of motion, to be made on some day 
 not less than three weeks after the day of such service, that the bill may 
 be taken pro confesso against him ; and the Court may thereupon order 
 
 1° Spooner i\ Payne, 2 De G. & S. 439, 4 15 
 12 Jtir. G42. 
 
 i'- Courage v. Wardell, 4 Hare, 481 ; 9 Jur 
 1055. 
 
 i Harvey v. Renon, 12 Jur. 445, V. C. K. B 
 
 2 Buttler v. Mathews, 19 Beav. 549. 
 
 3 Jones v. Brandon, 3 Jur. N. S. 1146, V 
 C. W. 
 
 * Weightman v. Powell, 2 De G. & S. 570; 6 Ante, pp. 490, 491. 
 
 12 Jur. 958. And if a bill is materially amended 
 
 where the defendant has failed to appear, a 
 decree pro confesso taken on the same day, and 
 without serving new process, is irregular, and 
 a sufficient ground for opening the decree 
 founded thereon, and granting a rehearing. 
 Harris t\ Deitrich, 29 Mich. 366. 
 
 6 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 15, 
 10, ante, pp. 425, 510. 
 
 515
 
 *523 
 
 TAKING BILLS PRO CONFESSO. 
 
 the bill to be taken pro confesso against him. 7 The motion must be sup- 
 ported by the sheriff 's return to the attachment, the Record and Writ 
 Clerk's certificate that the defendant has not put in his answer, and an 
 
 affidavit of service of the notice of motion. 8 
 * 523 * As before stated, 1 a sequestration is the first compulsory 
 process which issues against a peer or member of Parliament. 
 Upon the order for the issuing of the writ being made absolute, then, 
 by the original practice of the Court, if the defendant persists in his 
 contempt, an order to have the bill taken pro confesso may be obtained, 
 upon motion of course. 2 In the case, however, of a bill for discovery, 
 upon the expiration of the time for answering, an order nisi to take the 
 bill pro confesso may be obtained at once, where the defendant is in con- 
 tempt for want of answer, without any order for a writ of sequestration ; 
 and such order will be made absolute, unless the defendant shows good 
 cause to the contrary, as before explained. 3 
 
 In like manner, in the case of corporations aggregate, after an order 
 absolute for a sequestration has been made, the plaintiff may obtain, 
 upon motion of course, an order to take the bill pro confesso against the 
 corporation. 4 
 
 Although no compulsory process issues against the Attorne} T -General, 
 we have seen that an order may be obtained, on ex parte motion, for him 
 to put in his answer, within a certain time, or that the bill shall be taken 
 pro confesso. 5 
 
 Where a husband and wife are defendants to a bill, the husband is, 
 as we have seen, 6 liable to process for want of a joint answer, unless he 
 obtains an order to answer separately ; and the bill may be taken pro 
 confesso against him, as against any other defendant. 7 Where the decree 
 sought to be obtained affects the wife's inheritance, and the husband 
 does not answer, it seems doubtful how far such a decree can be had 
 against the wife. 8 
 
 The preliminary order for taking the bill pro confesso, having been 
 obtained by one or other of these means, it remains only to be observed, 
 that the mere putting in an answer by the defendant, will not be a suffi- 
 cient ground for moving to set it aside ; 9 and where, upon that ground, 
 a motion was made to discharge an order for taking a bill pro confesso, 
 it was refused with costs. 10 
 
 t Cons. Ord. XXII. 1. For form of order, 
 see Seton, 1265, No. 1 ; and for form of notice 
 of motion, see Vol. III. The times of vacation 
 are reckoned in the three weeks, at the ex- 
 piration of which the motion may be made. 
 Kitchin v. Hughes, 11 Jur. N. S.'902; 14 W. 
 R. 93, V. C. K. 
 
 8 For form of affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 
 i See ante, pp. 473, 496. 
 
 2 Lord Wellesley v. Earl of Mornington, 
 cited Seton, 1256. For form of order, see id. 
 No. 4; and for form of motion paper, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 a Ante, p. 496; 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. 
 c. 36. §§ 12, 13. For form, see Vol. HI. 
 
 4 Ante, p. 497; Brickwood v. Harvey, 8 Sim. 
 
 516 
 
 201; 2 Jur. 297; Braithwaite's Pr. 297. For 
 form of order, see Seton, 1266, No. 4; and for 
 form of motion paper, see Vol. III. 
 
 5 Ante, p. 497; Peto v. Att.-Gen. 1 Y. & J. 
 509 ; Groom v. Att.-Gen. 9 Sim. 325. For form 
 of notice of motion, see Vol. III. 
 
 6 Ante, pp. 180, 498. 
 
 " Gee v. Cottle, 3 M. & C. 180; and see Bil- 
 ton v. Bennett, 4 Sim. 17. 
 
 8 Ante, p. 185; and see Alexander v. Os- 
 borne, 11 Jur. 444, L. C. 
 
 9 Carter v. Torrance, 11 Ga. 654; Hunter v. 
 Robbins, 21 Ala. 585; James v. Cresswicke, 7 
 Sim. 143. 
 
 i° Williams v. Thompson, 2 Bro. C. C 280; 
 1 Cox, 413. 

 
 PRELIMINARY ORDER. * 525 
 
 Notwithstanding that, at one time, there seems to have been some 
 doubt upon the subject, 11 it is now clearly settled that, for 
 * the purpose of having the bill taken pro confesso, an insufficient * 524 
 answer is to be treated as no answer, and that the whole bill is 
 taken pro confesso, in the same manner as it is where no answer at all 
 has been put in. 1 And so also, where a husband and wife are defend- 
 ants, and the husband puts in an answer without his wife joining in it, 
 and without an order to warrant such a proceeding, the Court treats the 
 answer as a nullity, and will make an order for taking the bill pro con- 
 fesso. 2 It has likewise been held, that where, after a full answer, a bill 
 has been amended, and the amended bill is not answered, the plaintiff 
 is entitled to an order to have the bill taken pro confesso generally : 3 
 and where an order was made for the clerk in Court to attend with the 
 record of the bill, in order to have it taken pro confesso, as to the amend- 
 ments only, Lord Apsley discharged the order : being of opinion, that 
 the original and amended bills were one record, and that the amend- 
 ments not being answered, the record was not answered. 4 
 
 If the plaintiff receives the costs of the contempt, or accepts the an- 
 swer, by taking a copy of it or otherwise, or takes exceptions to it, he 
 will waive the process ; the reason of which is, that he cannot, after an 
 answer is actually filed, have a decree pro confesso without, in the first 
 instance, moving to take the answer off the file, which he cannot do after 
 any of the above-mentioned acts. 5 
 
 But although the mere gratuitously putting in an answer will not be 
 sufficient to discharge the order for taking a bill pro confesso, yet, 
 wherever an order of this nature has been made, and the defendant 
 comes in upon any reasonable ground of indulgence, and pays the costs, 
 the Court will attend to his application, unless the delay has been 
 extravagantly long. 6 (a) It is not, however, a * matter of course *525 
 
 11 Hawkins v. Crooke, 2 P.Wins. 356; 2 Eq. 13 N. J. Eq. 43, 45; Allen v. Smith, id. 45; 
 
 Cas. Abr. 178. pi. 4. ante, p. 182. Where a joint answer by husband 
 
 1 Davis v. Davis, 2 Atk. 24; Turner v. Tur- and wife is put in, it must be sworn to by both, 
 ner, cited 4 Ves. 619; Dangerh'eld t>. Claiborne, If not so sworn to, and no valid defence is set 
 3 Hen. & M. 17; Caines v. Fisher, 1 John. Ch. up therein, it will, on motion, be taken off the 
 8; Clason v. Morris, 10 John. 524; Buckingham tiles for irregularity, and the bill be taken as 
 v. Peddicord, 2 Bland. 447; Mayer v. Tyson, 1 confessed. New York Chem. Co. v. Flowers, 6 
 Bland. 500. A bill, answered in part only, Paige, 654; Collard v. Smith, 13 N. J. Eq. 43. 
 may be taken as confessed in other parts not So where an answer is not signed bv the de- 
 answered. Weaver v. Livingston, Hopk. 493 ; fendant, although an answer on oath is waived. 
 Pegg r. Davis, 2 Blackf. 184; Smith v. St. Dennison v. Bas ; -ford, 7 Paige, 370. 
 
 Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co., 2 Tenn. Ch. 605. 3 Jopling v. Stuart, 4 Ves. 619; Trust & 
 
 The result of the authorities is, as stated in the Fire Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 8 Paige, 589; Turner 
 
 case last cited, that while the plaintiff may take v. Turner, 1 Dick. 316; Lea v. Vanbibber, 6 
 
 the whole bill for confessed, he may also, if he Humph. 18. 
 
 prefers, limit the pro confesso to that part of the * Bacon v. Griffith, 4 Ves. 619, n.; S. C. 2 
 
 bill not answered. Dick. 473. 
 
 2 Bilton v. Bennett, 4 Sim. 17; Leavitt v. 6 Sidgier v. Tyte, 11 Ves. 202; Coyle v. 
 Cruger, 1 Paige, 421 ; see New York Chem. Alleyne, 16 Beav. 548. 
 
 Co. v. Flowers, 6 Paige, 654; Collard v. Smith, 6 Williams v. Thompson, 2 Bro. C. C. 280; 
 
 (a) A decree by confession, regularly ob- and of which he has been deprived through 
 
 tained, may be opened upon petition, even after surprise, accident, or mistake. Mutual Life 
 
 enrolment, to enable a defendant to make a Ins. Co. v. Sturges, 32 N.J. Eq. 678; 33 id. 
 
 meritorious defence, which has not been heard, 328. 
 
 517
 
 525 
 
 TAKING BILLS PRO CONFESSO. 
 
 to discharge the order for taking the bill pro confesso ; and the Court, 
 before doing so, will require to see the answer proposed to be put in, in 
 order that it may form a judgment as to the propriety of it, and will 
 not put the plaintiff to the peril of having just such an answer as the 
 defendant shall think proper to give. 1 
 
 If a defendant is in custody for want of his answer, and is willing to 
 submit to have the bill taken pro confesso against him, he may apply to 
 the Court, upon motion with notice to be served on the plaintiff, 2 to be 
 discharged out of custody ; and thereupon the Court may order the bill 
 to be taken pro confesso against such defendant, and may order him to 
 be discharged out of custody upon such terms as appear to be just : un- 
 less it appears from the nature of the plaintiff's case, or otherwise to 
 the satisfaction of the Court, that justice cannot be done to the plaintiff 
 without discovery, or further discovery, from such defendant. 8 
 
 1 Cox. 413; see Robertson v. Miller, 2 Green 
 Ch. 451, 453, 454 ; Wooster v. Woodhull, 1 
 John. Ch. 541; Parker v. Grant, 1 John. Ch. 
 630; Emery v. Downing, 13 N.J. Eq. 59; Oram 
 v. Dennison, id. 438. But even after a decree 
 pro confesso, order of reference, and report of 
 Master, the decree will be opened, and the 
 defendant let in to answer, if the equity of the 
 case requires such relaxation of the rules of 
 the Court. Williamson v. Sykes, 13 N. J. Eq. 
 382. 
 
 By the practice in New Jersey, the defend- 
 ant's application for this purpose, may be made 
 either by petition properly verified, or upon 
 motion sustained by affidavit. The former 
 mode is more usual and formal, but either may 
 be resorted to. Emery v. Downing, 13 N. J. 
 Eq. 60. 
 
 1 Hearne v. Ogilvie, 11 Ves. 77; Emery v. 
 Downing, 13 N. J. Eq. 59. See Pittman v. 
 McClellan, 55 Miss. 299. A decree pro confesso 
 will not be set aside to allow a plea to be filed. 
 Bank of St. Mary v. St. John, 25 Ala. 566. 
 
 2 For form of notice of motion, see Vol. III. 
 s Cons. Ord. XXII. 5; see also 11 Geo. IV. 
 
 & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 15, r. 12, and the 19th 
 Equity Rule of the U. S. Courts; for a case 
 where the Court thought that justice required 
 that discovery should be obtained from the 
 defendant, see Maitland t> Rodger, 14 Sim. 92; 
 8 Jur. 371. See ante, p. 518, n. 1. 
 
 The bill being taken pro confesso against 
 a defendant does not preclude him from dis- 
 puting the amount of the plaintiff's demand 
 in the Master's office. Clayton r. Chichester, 
 Craw. & Dix, 13; Pendleton v. Evans, 4 Wash 
 C. C. 391. But the plaintiff is not in such case 
 bound to prove the contract stated in the bill. 
 Douglass v. Evans, 1 Tenn. 18. The allega- 
 tions in the bill are thereby impliedly admitted, 
 and the Court may decree thereupon. Baltzel 
 v. Hall, 1 Litt. 98; Att.-Gen. v. Carver, 12 Ired. 
 231 ; Harman v. Campbell, 30 111. 25. But the 
 518 
 
 neglect of a defendant to answer a bill, upon 
 which a decree pro confesso is passed, amounts 
 to an admission only of the allegations in the 
 bill. Robinson v. Townsend, 3 Gill & J. 413. 
 If the charge in the bill be not stated with suffi- 
 cient certainty, the plaintiff cannot, even after 
 a decree pro confesso, have a final decree, unless 
 he establish his demand by satisfactory evi- 
 dence. Pegg v. Davis, 2 Blackf. 281; see Piatt 
 v. Judson, 3 Blackf. 237 : Atkins v. Faulkner, 
 11 Iowa, 326. So upon a bill taken pro con- 
 fesso, and an order of reference thereupon to a 
 Master, such allegations of the bill as are dis- 
 tinct and positive are to be taken as true, 
 without proof. But not such as are indefinite. 
 Williams v. Corwin, Hopk. 471 ; Piatt v. Jud- 
 son, 3 Blackf. 235; Atkins v. Faulkner, ubi 
 supra ; but see Singletons. Gale, 8 Porter, 270; 
 Wilkins v. Wilkins, 4 Porter, 245, where it is 
 said, that before a decree is pronounced on a 
 bill pro confesso, the Court must be satisfied by 
 sufficient evidence, of the justice of the plain- 
 tiff's demand. See also Levert v. Redwood, 9 
 Porter, 80. Infra, p. 531, note. In an anonymous 
 case, 4 Hen. & M. 476, it was held, that on a 
 bill taken pro confesso, a plaintiff cannot obtain 
 a final decree without filing his documents, and 
 proving his case; see, however, the quart upon 
 this point in Coleman v. Lyi e, 4 Rand. 454. In 
 Larkin v. Mann, 2 Paige, 27, it was held, that 
 if a bill be taken pro confesso, the proof of the 
 plaintiff's title may be made before a Master, 
 on reference. But if an issue of fact is joined 
 in the cause, the plaintiff may make the neces- 
 sary proof and produce the abstract of the con- 
 veyances, before the examiner. In Pendleton 
 v. Evans, 4 Wash. C. C. 391, it was held, that 
 if a bill, being for the balance of an account, is 
 taken pro confesso, the amount must be referred 
 to a Master. The decree is always nisi. See 
 Robertson v. Miller, 2 Green Ch. 451 ; post, p. 531, 
 note. 
 
 Where a bill against heirs does not allege
 
 HEARING, DECREE, AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 527 
 
 Section II. — Hearing, Decree, mid Subsequent Proceedings. 
 
 The preliminary order having been obtained, the next subject for in- 
 vestigation is the manner in which the cause is heard, and the decree 
 perfected. 
 
 * A defendant, against whom an order to take a bill pro con- * 526 
 fesso is made, is at liberty to appear at the hearing of the cause ; 
 and if he waives all objection to the order, but not otherwise, he may be 
 heard to argue the case upon the merits, as stated in the bill. 1 
 
 At the hearing of the cause, the Court, upon reading the bill, and 
 taking it to be true, will make such decree as seems just; 2 and in the 
 case of any defendant who has appeared at the hearing, and waived all 
 objection to the order to take the bill pro confesso, or against whom the 
 order has been made after appearance by himself or his own solicitor or 
 upon notice served upon him, or after the execution of a writ of attach- 
 ment against him, the decree is to be absolute. 8 
 
 Formerly, it was necessary that the Record itself should actually be pro- 
 duced and read in Court, and the Clerk of Records and Writs attended 
 in Court with the record for that purpose ; now, however, the bill may be 
 read at the hearing from a printed copy (or, where amended, without a 
 reprint, a partly written and partly printed copy) stamped with a proper 
 stamp, by one of the Clerks of Records and Writs, indicating the date of 
 the tiling of such bill (and of the amendment, when amended), without 
 the attendance of the Clerk of Records aud Writs. 4 
 
 that any estate has descended, taking it pro 
 confesso will not amount to a confession that 
 any has. Carneal v. Day, 2 Litt. 397. 
 
 Where, to a bill against resident and non- 
 resident defendants, the resident defendants 
 answer, denying all the equity of the bill, 
 and it is taken pro confesso against the others, 
 without proof, no decree can be taken, even 
 against the latter. Cunningham v. Steele, 1 
 Litt. 58. Infra, p. 532. note. If a bill is taken 
 pro confesso against a defendant, who is absent 
 from the State, he may, under the statute of 
 New York, come in after thedecree and answer 
 and defend the suit. Davoue v. Fanning, 4 
 John. Ch. 199. A decree is erroneous, if taken 
 against infants, by default, without proof, 
 though there be a guardian adlitmi. Massie 
 v. Donaldson, 8 Ohio, 377 ; see Carneal v. 
 Sthreshley, 1 A. K. Marsh. 471; Chaffin v. 
 Kimball, 23 111. 26. For forms of decree when 
 bill is taken pro confesso, see Brown v. Home, 
 8 Beav. 610; Seton, 1128, No. 1. As to setting 
 down the cause for hearing, see post, Chap. 
 XXIII. 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. XXIT. 7; Greaves r. Greaves, 
 12 Beav. 422; and for form of decree in that 
 case, see Seton, 1128, No. 2; see note above. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XXII. 8. The Court will only 
 
 make such a decree as it would have made, if 
 the defendant had appeared. Brierly v. Ward, 
 15 .lur. 277, V. C. K. B., which wns a fore- 
 closure suit; see Haynes v. Ball, 4 Beav. 103; 
 Stanley v. Bond, 6 Beav. 421; Simmonds v. 
 Palles. 2 Jo. & Lat. 489. The decree on default 
 will only be such as would be authorized by 
 the state of the pleadings, had there been no 
 default. Hardwiek v. Bassett, 25 Mich. 149; 
 McDonald v. Mobile Life Ins. Co. 56 Ala. 468. 
 Infra, p. 531, note. And should not be entered 
 unless the plaintiff, on the face of his bill, is 
 entitled to equitable relief. Hazard v. Durant, 
 11 R. I. 195. 
 
 A pro confsso order will not justify a per- 
 sonal decree, even for costs, against a mere 
 agent. Boyd v. Vanderkemp, 1 Barb. Ch. 287. 
 Nor against an officer merely having process in 
 his hands. McGavock o. Elliott, 3 Yerg. 373. 
 And see ante, p. 298, n. 7. 
 
 3 Cons. Ord. XXII. 8; Grover & Baker 
 Sewing Machine Co. v. Millard, 8 Jur. N. S. 
 713. V. C. W". Notice of an order pro confesso 
 must be given before final decree. Wamplerc. 
 Wolfinger, 13 Md. 337. 
 
 * Cons. Ord. 13 July, 1861. No fee is pay- 
 able, on stamping the copy. 
 
 519
 
 * 528 TAKING BILLS PRO CONFESSO. 
 
 * 527 * A decree, founded on a bill taken pro confesso, is to be passed 
 
 and entered as other decrees ; 1 and thereupon an office copy of it 
 must (unless the Court dispenses with service thereof) be served on the 
 defendant against whom the order to take the bill pro confesso was made, 
 or his solicitor ; and where the decree is not absolute, 2 such defendant, 
 or his solicitor, is to be at the same time served with a notice, to the 
 effect, that if such defeudant desires permission to answer the plain- 
 tiff's bill, and set aside the decree, application for that purpose must be 
 made to the Court within the time specified in the notice, or that, other- 
 wise, such defendant will be absolutely excluded from making any such 
 application. 3 
 
 If such notice is to be served within the jurisdiction of the Court, the 
 time therein specified for such application to be made by the defendant, 
 is three weeks after service of such notice ; but where such notice is to 
 be served out of the jurisdiction of the Court, such time is to be specially 
 appointed by the Court, on the ex parte application of the plaintiff. 4 
 
 In pronouncing the decree, the Court may, either upon the case stated 
 in the bill, or upon that case, and a petition presented by the plaintiff 
 for the purpose, as the case may require, order a receiver of the real and 
 personal estate of the defendant, against whom the bill has been ordered 
 to be taken pro confesso, to be appointed, with the usual directions, or 
 direct a sequestration of such real and personal estate to be issued, and 
 may (if it appears to be just) direct payment to be made out of such 
 real or personal estate of such sum of money, as at the hearing, or any 
 subsequent stage of the cause, the plaintiff appears to be entitled to : 
 provided that, unless the decree be absolute, such payment is not to be 
 directed without security being given by the plaintiff for restitution, 
 in case the Court afterwards thinks fit to order restitution to be made. 5 
 But no proceeding is to be taken, and no receiver appointed under the 
 decree, nor any sequestrator, under any sequestration issued in pursuance 
 thereof, is to take possession of, or in any manner intermeddle with any 
 part of the real or personal estate of a defendant, and no other process 
 is to issue to compel performance of the decree, without leave of the 
 Court, to be obtained on motion, with notice served on such defendant, 
 
 or his solicitor, unless the Court dispenses with such service. 6 
 * 528 * Any defendant, waiving all objection to the order to take the 
 
 bill pro confesso, and submitting to pay such costs as the Court 
 
 i Cons. Ord. XXII. 10. 5 Cons. Ord. XXII. 9; see Lett v. Randall, 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XXII. 8, ubi supra. Decree 7 Jur. 1075; Torr v. Torr, John. 660. 
 against a bare trustee made absolute in the first 6 Cons. Ord. XXII. 13. The motion, of 
 
 instance, and service on him dispensed with, which notice is to be thus given, is not for the 
 
 Leite i\ Vicini. 12 W. R. 897, M. R. appointment of a receiver (which may be done 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. XXII. 11 ; see ante, p. 524, and under the decree, without notice), but that the 
 
 note. For form of notice, see Vol. III. receiver may take possession. Dresser v. Mor- 
 
 < Cons. Ord. XXII. 12. A list of times for ton, 2 Phil. 285; and see Brown v. Home, 10 
 
 the different colonies, and foreign countries, Beav. 400, where leave was given to plaintiff, 
 
 according to their distance from England, is under this rule, to issue process of contempt, 
 
 kept in the Registrar's office; and the proper For forms of order under this rule, see Seton, 
 
 time is inserted by the Registrar in the order, 1131, 1132, Nos. 3, 4, 5 ; and for forms of notice 
 
 in drawing it up. For form of order, see Seton, of motion, see Vol. HI. 
 1130, No. 1; and for forms of motion paper, 
 and affidavit in support, see Vol. III. 
 
 520
 
 HEARING, DECREE, AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS. * 529 
 
 may direct, may, before enrolment of the decree, have the cause reheard, 
 upon the merits stated in the bill : the petition for rehearing being 
 signed by counsel, as other petitions for rehearing. 1 
 
 In cases where a decree is not absolute under Rule 8, the Court may 
 order the same to be made absolute, on the motion of the plaintiff, 
 made, — 
 
 1. After the expiration of three weeks from the service of a copy of 
 the decree on a defendant, where the decree has been served within 
 the jurisdiction. 
 
 2. After the expiration of the time limited by the notice provided for 
 by Rule 11, where the decree has been served without the jurisdiction. 
 
 3. After the expiration of three years from the date of the decree, 
 where a defendant has not been served with a copy thereof. 2 
 
 And such order may be made, either on the first hearing of such 
 motion, or on the expiration of any further time which the Court may, 
 on the hearing of such motion, allow to the defendant for presenting a 
 petition for leave to answer the bill. 3 
 
 Where a defendant was out of the jurisdiction, service of an office 
 copy of the order, limiting the time within which he might apply for 
 leave to answer the bill, and set aside the decree, was held to be a 
 sufficient notice under the rule above referred to. 4 
 
 The application to the Court, to dispense with service of the decree, 
 should be made after the expiration of the three years mentioned in 
 Rule 15. 5 
 
 Where proceedings are to be taken in Chambers under the decree, the 
 defendant must be served with the summons to proceed upon the decree, 
 as well as with the decree ; and no proceedings ought to be taken in 
 Chambers, until the expiration of the time limited for setting aside 
 the decree. 6 
 
 * Where the decree is not absolute under Rule 8, and has not * 529 
 been made absolute under Rule 15, and a defendant has a case 
 upon merits not appearing in the bill, he may apply to the Court by 
 petition, stating such case, and submitting to such terms with respect 
 to costs and otherwise, as the Court may think reasonable, for leave to 
 answer the bill ; and the Court, if satisfied that such case is proper to 
 be submitted to the judgment of the Court, may, if it thinks fit, and 
 upon such terms as seem just, vacate the enrolment (if any) of the 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. XXII. 14. And seepost, Chap. Jar. 770, M. R. : Benbow v. Davies, 12 Beav. 
 XXXII. Rehearinfjs and Appeals. 421 ; and see Brierly v. Ward, 15 Jur. 277, V. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XXII. 15. This period will not C. K. B. These cases are, it is conceived, over- 
 be dispensed with. Darlow v. Sinnock, W. N. ruled bv James v. Rice; and see Thurgood v. 
 (1866) 154, V. C. K. Cane, 1*1 W. R. 297, M. R. 
 
 « For form of order, see Seton, 1130. No. 2; The final decree, it has been held, may be 
 
 and for forms of motion paper, and affidavit in made in a foreclosure suit, although the decree 
 
 support, see Vol. III. has not been served and is not absolute. Lon- 
 
 * Trilly v. Keefe, 16 Beav. 83; 16 Jur. 442. don Monetary Advance Co. v. Bean, 18 L. T. 
 
 5 Vaughan v. Rogers, 11 Beav. 165; James N. S. 52. 
 v. Rice, 5 De G. M. & G. 461; 18 Jur. 818. It 6 Golden v. Newton, Johns, 720: and see 
 
 was dispensed with before the expiration of the King v Bryant, 3 M. & C. 191, 196; 2 Jur. 
 
 three years, however, in Kemp v. Latter, 16 106; Merriman v. Goodman, 15 W. R. 1132. 
 
 521
 
 * 530 TAKING BILLS PRO CONFESSO. 
 
 decree, and permit such defendant to answer the bill ; 1 and if permis- 
 sion be given to put in an answer, leave may be given to file a separate 
 replication to such answer; and issue may be joined, and witnesses 
 examined, and such proceedings had, as if the decree had not been 
 made, and no proceedings against such defendant had been had in the 
 cause. 2 
 
 The rights and liabilities of any plaintiff or defendant, under a decree 
 made upon a bill taken pro confesso, extend to the representatives of any 
 deceased plaintiff or defendant, and to any persons claiming under any 
 person who was plaintiff or defendant at the time when the decree 
 was pronounced ; and with reference to the altered state of parties, and 
 any new interests acquired, the Court may, upon motion or petition, 
 served in such manner, and supported by such evidence as, under the 
 circumstances of the case, the Court deems sufficient, permit any party, 
 or the representative of any party, to file such bill, or adopt such pro- 
 ceedings as the nature and circumstances of the case require, for the pur- 
 pose of having the decree (if absolute) duly executed, or for the purpose 
 of having the matter of the decree (if not absolute) duly considered, and 
 the rights of the parties duly ascertained and determined. 3 
 
 The Act of 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, is not, as has been before 
 
 observed, repealed ; 4 and although the general practice is, in all cases 
 
 where bills are intended to be taken pro confesso, to proceed under the 
 
 General Orders which have been above referred to, yet, special 
 
 * 530 cases may still occur under the Act ; 5 * but they will probably be 
 
 so rare that it is not thought desirable, in the present work, to 
 refer to the provisions of the Act in detail. 
 
 It may be observed that, under the Act, a decree did not become abso- 
 lute against a defendant who was out of the realm, or had absconded, 
 and had never been served with a copy of it, until the expiration of 
 seven years from the date of the decree ; 1 whereas, under the 15th Rule 
 above referred to, the Court may, in the same case, order the decree 
 to become absolute, after the expiration of three years from the date of 
 the decree. 2 
 
 The provisions of the statute applied only to cases where the defend- 
 ant absconded to avoid being served with process. 3 In cases falling 
 
 1 For instances of decrees pro confesso, or craft, 6 W. Va. 36; Scales V, Nichols, 3 Hayw- 
 
 final decrees thereon being set aside, and de- 229. 
 
 fendants let in to answer on proof of surprise, 2 Cons. Ord. XXII. 16. In Inglis v. Camp- 
 see Van Deventer v. Stiger, 25 N. J. Eq. 224; bell, 2 W. R. 396, V. C. K., which was a fore- 
 Miller v. Wright, id. 340; see Woosterv. Wood- closure suit, permission was given under this 
 hull, 1 John. Ch. 539; Parker v. Grant, 1 John, rule, on payment of the costs of the application 
 Ch. 630; Williamson v. Sykes. 13 N. J. Eq. and of the suit. 
 182; Emery v. Downing, id. 59, 60; Oram v. 8 Cons. Ord. XXII. 17. 
 Dennison, id. 438; Robertson v. Miller, 2 Green * Ante, p. 518; Wilkin r. Nainby, 4 Hare, 
 Ch. 451; ante, p. 524, note. 476; 10 Jur. 735. 
 
 Where a bill has been taken for confessed 5 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, §§ 3-8 
 
 and set for hearing, and the defendant, by leave inclusive. 
 
 of Court, files an answer to which the plaintiff * 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, §§ 5, 8. 
 
 replies, the plaintiff is entitled to have the cause 2 Cons. Ord. XXII. 15. 
 
 heard at that term unless the defendant show 8 Ante, p. 518. 
 
 good cause for a continuance. Gardner v. Land- 
 
 522
 
 HEARING, DECREE, AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS. * 531 
 
 within the ordinary course of the Court, unaffected by the statute, a 
 decree made, upon taking a bill pro confesso, was absolute in the first 
 instance, and no day was given for showing cause against it. 4 
 
 The General Order, however, applies, as we have seen, 5 as well to 
 suits where the defendant absconds, as to other cases where the plain- 
 tiff is enabled to have his bill taken pro confesso for want of answer. It 
 introduces, as we have seen, 6 some peculiarities into the manner of pro- 
 ceeding under a decree obtained by the bill being taken pro confesso ; 
 but, in all other respects, a decree pro confesso is executed in the same 
 manner as a decree made upon a regular hearing. 
 
 With respect to bills for discovery, the General Order does not make 
 any distinction between such bills, and bills for relief ; 7 but the Stat. 
 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, gives an additional facility in obtaining 
 the order to take a bill for discovery pro confesso, as against a person 
 having privilege of Parliament : for, in the case of a bill for relief, no 
 order to take the bill pro confesso can be obtained against a privileged 
 defendant, until the writ of sequestration has issued ; but under the 
 13th section of that Act, in the case of a bill for discovery, the Court 
 may,' upon the application of the plaintiff, as soon as the time for 
 answering has expired, although no sequestration has issued, order the 
 bill to be taken pro confesso, unless the defendant shall, within eight 
 days after being served with such order, show good cause to the con- 
 trary. With this exception, there does not seem to be any difference 
 between the case of a bill for discovery and one for relief, so far as 
 regards the practice in obtaining an order to take the bill pro confesso ; (a) 
 but after the preliminary order is obtained, there does not seem 
 to be * any necessity for a further hearing of the cause, unless it * 531 
 is rendered necessary by the General Order. 1 
 
 After the order has been pronounced for taking a bill pro confesso, the 
 bill, or an examined copy thereof, is to be taken and read, in any Court 
 of Law or Equity, as evidence of the facts, matters, and things therein 
 contained, in the same manner as if such facts, matters, and things had 
 been admitted to be true, by the answer of the defendant put in to such 
 
 4 Landon r. Ready, 1 S. & S. 44; Ogilvie v. and that he made an order to take a bill pro 
 
 Hearne, 13 Ves. 563; Knight v. Young, 2 V. confesso, upon this construction of the Act. In 
 
 & B. 184. the case before him, a sequestration had issued, 
 
 6 Ante, p. 518. so that by the ordinary practice of the Court, 
 
 6 Ante, pp. 525-528. independent of the statute, the plaintiff was en- 
 
 7 See Caines v. Fisher, 1 John. Ch. 8. titled to have his bill taken pro confesso (ante, 
 1 Cons. Ord. XXII. 6. In Logan v. Grant, p. 453), consequently there was no occasion for 
 
 1 Mad. 626 ex relatione, Sir Thomas Plumer any decision upon the statute. The words of 
 
 V. C. considered that the 45 Geo. III. c. 124, the 13th section seem clearly applicable only 
 
 § 5 (repealed by 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. to bilN for discovery; and this is the construc- 
 
 c. 36, § 1), which is identical in language with tion which was put, by Lord Eldon, upon the 
 
 the 13th section, just referred to, applied to 5th section of the former Act, above mentioned, 
 
 bills for relief, as well as to those for discovery, Jones v. Davis, 17 Ves. 368. 
 
 (a) The taking of a bill pro confesso is ute, bills of discovery are not taken pro con- 
 operative only in Equity, and a bill for relief fesso, but this does not apply to cross-bills, 
 taken pro confesso cannot be read against the See Langdell, Eq. 1M. (2d ed.) § 180; Cory v. 
 defendant in a court of Law. Apart from stat- Gertck n, 2 Mad. 40, 43, 45. 
 
 523
 
 *531 
 
 TAKING BILLS PRO CONFESSO. 
 
 bill, 2 and such bill, so taken pro confesso, is to be received and taken in 
 evidence of such and the same facts, and on behalf of such and so many 
 persons, as the answer of the defendant to the bill could and might 
 have been read and received in evidence of, in case such answer had 
 been put in by the defendant thereto, and had admitted the same facts, 
 matters, and circumstances, as in such bill stated and set forth ; and 
 in like manner, every other bill of discovery taken pro confesso, under 
 any of the provisions of the Act, is to be taken and read in evidence of 
 the facts, and matters, and things therein contained, to the extent afore- 
 said. 3 It may be observed that this last provision for making the bill 
 evidence is not confined to privileged defendants, but it applies to all 
 cases where the bill is taken pro confesso under the provisions of the 
 Act. It does not seem that there is any direct order or statute by which 
 a bill taken pro confesso, otherwise than under the Act, is made evidence 
 against the defendant. 4 
 
 2 See Stafford v. Brown, 4 Paige, 360; Atkins 
 v. Faulkner, 11 Iowa, 326; ante, p. 526, note. 
 
 3 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 14. 
 
 4 See ante , p. 526, note. But it is discretion- 
 ary with the Court, where a bill is taken as 
 confessed, to require proof of all or any portion 
 of the allegations in the bill; Smith v. Trimble, 
 27 111. 152; Stephens r. Bichnell, id. 444; Forbes 
 v. Memphis &c. R. Co. 2 Woods, 323; Hazard 
 v. Durant, 11 R. I. 195; 1 Memph. L. J. 266; or 
 the Court may take the allegations as confessed, 
 and enter the decree without proof. Harmon 
 v. Campbell, 30 111. 25. But it is open to the 
 defendant on error to show that the averments 
 in the bill do not justify the decree. Gault v. 
 Hoagland. 25 111. 266. A decree pro confesso 
 is an admission only of the facts which are well 
 pleaded, and cannot aid or supplement defec- 
 tive averments, such as the averment of a legal 
 conclusion, not of the facts necessary to sustain 
 the conclusion. McDonald v. Mobile Life Ins. 
 Co. 56 Ala. 468; Winham v. Crutcher, 3 Tenn. 
 Ch. 666; ante, pp. 525, 526, notes. 
 
 In all suits for the foreclosure or satisfaction 
 of a mortgage, in New Jersey, when the plain- 
 tiff's bill shall be ordered to be taken as con- 
 fessed, or the defendant shall make default at 
 the hearing, and the whole amount of the debt 
 intended to be secured by the mortgage shall 
 have become due, no order of reference to a 
 Master to ascertain and report the sum due to 
 the plaintiff shall be necessary, unless specially 
 directed by the Court ; but a report by a Master 
 being made of the amount due upon the mort- 
 gage, the same, if no cause is shown to the 
 contrary, shall be riled of course, and without 
 any motion or rule for that purpose, or for con- 
 firmation, and a decree made accordingly. So, 
 in all cases, where the plaintiff's bill shall be 
 taken as confessed against the mortgagor, and 
 other defendants claiming to be incumbrancers 
 file their answer or answers setting up said 
 incumbrances, if the order of priority shall not 
 
 524 
 
 appear, upon the face of the pleadings, to be 
 disputed by the parties, either plaintiff or de- 
 fendant, and the amounts respectively claimed 
 as due do not appear to be denied, and a report 
 be made upon an order of relerence to a Master, 
 it shall not be necessary to enter a rule nut to 
 confirm the report, or to set the cause down for 
 a hearing upon it; but a decree final maybe 
 entered thereon, as of course, upon the coming 
 in of the Master's report. N. J. Ch. Rules, 
 21, 23. 
 
 A decree pro confesso taken against a defend- 
 ant is an admission of the facts stated in the 
 bill, and entitles the complainant to relief with- 
 out further proof. Jones v. Beverley, 45 Ala. 
 161; Stone v. Duncan, 1 Head, 103; Code of 
 Tenn. § 4371. And the cause stands for hear- 
 ing, in Tennessee, immediately after the pro 
 confesso order. Claybrook v. Wade, 7 Coldw. 
 555. 
 
 A pro confesso decree against one defendant 
 will not justify a final decree against that de- 
 fendant until the case i* disposed of as to the 
 other defendants, and if a co-defendant jointly 
 interested answer and disprove the plaintiff's 
 case, the bill will be dismissed as to all of the 
 defendants. Clason v. Morris, 10 John. 524; 
 Lingan v. Henderson, 1 Bland. 236, 266; Petty 
 v. Hannum,2 Humph. 102; Cherry ». Clements, 
 10 Humph. 552; Hennessee v. Ford, 8 Humph. 
 499; Smith v. Cunningham, 2 Tenn. Ch. 572; 
 Aikin v. Harrington. 7 Eng. 391; Frow v. De 
 La Vega, 15 Wall. 552. 
 
 It is error, it seems, on a pro confesso order, 
 in a suit to enforce a vendor's lien, to render a 
 final decree without a reference to the Master 
 to compute the amount. Freeman v. Ledbetter, 
 43 Miss. 165. But where a decree has been 
 rendered against adults and infants on a pro 
 confesso order without proof, and is reversed 
 for that reason as to the infants, the decree as 
 to the adults will not thereby be set aside. 
 Ingersull v. Ingersoll, 42 Miss. 155.
 
 * CHAPTER XII. *533 
 
 THE DEFENCE TO A SUIT. 
 
 In the preceding chapters, the attention of the reader has been prin- 
 cipally directed to the case on the part of the plaintiff, the method of 
 submitting it to the Court, and the means provided by the practice of 
 the Court for compelling the defendant to submit himself to its jurisdic- 
 tion ; or, in case of his refusal, of depriving him of the benefit of his 
 contumacy, by giving to the plaintiff the relief to which the justice of 
 his case appears to entitle him. The line of conduct to be pursued by 
 a defendant, who is willing to submit himself to the authority of the 
 Court, and to abide its decision upon the matter in litigation, will now 
 be considered. 
 
 The first step to be taken by or on behalf of a defendant who intends 
 to defend the suit, is to enter an appearance within the proper time, at 
 the office of the Clerks of Records and Writs. 1 Unless the suit is de- 
 fended by the defendant in person, this is done by his solicitor. A special 
 authority is not necessary to enable a solicitor to undertake the business ; 
 a general authority to act as solicitor for his client is sufficient : 2 although 
 a solicitor ought not to take upon himself to enter an appearance for a 
 defendant without some authority ; and where a solicitor, without any 
 instruction, had caused an appearance to be entered for an infant defend- 
 ant, the appearance was ordered to be set aside, and the solicitor to pay 
 the costs. 8 The retainer need not be in writing ; 4 but if it is not, and 
 his authority is afterwards challenged, the solicitor runs a risk of hav- 
 ing to pay the costs, if he have only assertion to offer against assertion. 5 
 
 The defendant will know whether or not an appearance is required, 
 by the copy of the bill with which he is served : if it bears an indorse- 
 ment commanding his appearance, he must appear ; but if there is no 
 such indorsement, his appearance is not required. 6 
 
 * The defendant having appeared to the bill, the next point * 534 
 for consideration in the ordinary course of the cause is, the 
 nature of the defence to be put in. 1 It was formerly incumbent upon 
 
 1 Ord. I. 35 ; see infra, p. 536. The entry is * Lord v. Kellett, 2 II. & K. 1. For form of 
 now made at the Central Office. R. S. C. Ord. retainer, see Vol. III. 
 
 XH. 1. For the present English practice, see 6 Wiggins v. Peppin, 2 Beav. 403, 405. 
 
 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.), 443, et seq. 6 See ante, p. 446; post, p. 538. 
 
 2 Wright i>. Castle, 3 Mer. 12; ante, p. 307. 1 In Massachusetts, "a defence in Equity 
 Appearance entered for a defendant, by one shall be made by demurrer, plea, or answer." 
 not a solicitor will be stricken out. Sparling v. Pub. Stats, c. 151, § 10; see Story, Eq. PI. § 433, 
 Brereton, L. R. 12 Eq. 64; 12 Jur. N. S. 330. etseq. In Tennessee, defence is inade by plea in 
 
 3 Richards w. Dadley, Rolls, sittings after abatement, motion to dismiss, demurrer, plea in 
 Trinity Term, 1887 ; and see Leese v. Knight, bar, answer, and cross-bill. Code. § 4384. And 
 8 Jur. N. S. 1006; 10 W. R. 711, V. C. K.; it must be made in the order prescribed, the 
 see Amer. Ins. Co. v. Oakley, 9 Paige, 496. adoption of a different defence being a waiver 
 
 525
 
 * 535 THE DEFENCE TO A SUIT. 
 
 a defendant, unless he pleaded or demurred to the bill, to put in an 
 answer of some description ; but now, since the Chancery Amended Act 
 of 1852, unless interrogatories are filed, and a copy of them duly served 
 on him or his solicitor, the defendant is not obliged to put in an answer. 2 
 He may, however, put one in, if he thinks fit, even though no inter- 
 rogatories are served : 3 the answer in such case being called voluntary. 4 
 The propriety of putting in a voluntary answer depends upon the cir- 
 cumstances of each case ; and, in general, where the defendant relies 
 upon a case which does not appear upon the bill, he should put in a 
 voluntary answer. If he does not do so, he will be considered to have 
 traversed the case made by the bill. 5 The defendant will, therefore, in 
 general have to see whether any answer is called for from him, and if 
 not, whether the circumstances of the case require that he should put 
 in a voluntary answer. 
 
 It may, however, happen from some cause, either apparent upon the 
 face of the bill itself, or capable of being concisely submitted to the 
 Court, that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief or part of the relief 
 which he has prayed : in such cases, the defendant may, according as his 
 objection goes to the whole or to part of the relief, submit the grounds 
 upon which he considers the plaintiff not entitled to what he seeks, in a 
 concise form to the Court, and pray the judgment of the Court whether 
 the plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed by his bill, to which the de- 
 fendant objects. This species of defence, if the objection appears upon 
 the face of the bill itself, is made by Demurrer ; 6 but if it depends upon 
 any matter not in the bill, it must be submitted to the Court in the form 
 of a Plea." 1 If the defence submitted to the Court, in either of the above 
 forms, is admitted, or held upon argument to be good, the effect of it, if 
 it be a demurrer, is to put the bill, or that part of it which has been 
 demurred to, out of Court; or, if it be a plea, to limit the matter in dis- 
 pute to the question whether the point raised by it be true or not : in 
 which case, if the defendant succeeds in establishing the point raised by 
 the plea, by evidence at the hearing, the bill, so far as it is covered by 
 the plea, will be dismissed. If the demurrer or plea be held upon argu- 
 ment to be bad, the effect of the judgment of the Court, in general, is, 
 that the defendant must defend the cause, and put in an answer to 
 
 * 535 the * interrogatories, if any have been served : he may, however, 
 
 if his first defence has been by demurrer, be admitted, under cer- 
 tain circumstances, to dispute the right of the plaintiff to the relief 
 prayed, by means of a plea ; or by demurrer less extensive than 
 the first. 
 
 If the defendant thinks proper to relinquish any claim he may have 
 to the property in question in the suit, he can do so by putting in a 
 species of answer called a Disclaimer ; by which he disclaims all inter- 
 est in the matters in question in the suit. 1 
 
 of those which precede. Cooke v. Richards, 6 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86. § 26. 
 
 11 Heisk. 711. 6 See forms of demurrer, Vol. III. 
 
 2 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86. § 12. 7 See forms of plea, Vol. III. 
 
 3 Ibid. § 13. l See forms of disclaimer, Vol. III. 
 * See forms of answers, Vol. III. 
 
 526
 
 * CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 APPEARANCE. 
 
 536 
 
 Appearance is the process by which a person, against whom a suit 
 has been commenced, submits himself to the jurisdiction of the Court ; 
 and, subject to a few exceptions, 1 he will not be permitted to take any 
 step in the cause until an appearance has been entered on his behalf. 2 
 Even if he desires to object to the regularity of the proceeding by which 
 the plaintiff has sought to compel his appearance, he must first enter 
 what is called a conditional appearance. 3 (a) Where, however, a defend- 
 
 1 Thus, a defendant may before appearance 
 obtain an order for particulars, under r. 20 H. T. 
 1853. See also R. S. C. 1883, Ord. VII. 1. 
 
 2 Even if he denies the jurisdiction of the 
 Court. Felkin v. Lord Herbert, 1 Dr. & Sm. 
 608; 8 Jur. N. S. 90. A person may enter his 
 appearance specially to object to the jurisdiction 
 of the Court. Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 
 807, 811 ; Merrill e. Houghton, 51 N. H. 61. 
 Or to plead in abatement to an attachment. 
 Boon o. Rahl, 1 Heisk. 12. In Maine, each 
 defendant shall enter his appearance on the 
 docket on the return day. And upon proof of 
 neglect, when there has been personal notice, 
 a default may be entered, the bill be taken 
 a' confessed, and a decree be entered accord- 
 ingly. Ch. Rule 4. In Massachusetts, " the 
 day of appearance shall be the return day of 
 the writ or subpoena, when personal service 
 shall be made on the defendant, or he shall 
 have had personal notice of the suit; or the 
 return day of any order issued under the 
 fourth or fifth rule, when no personal service 
 shall be made. And, if the defendant shall 
 not appear and file his answer, plea, or demur- 
 rer, within one month after the day of appear- 
 ance, the plaintiff may enter an order to take 
 his bill for confessed ; and the matter thereof 
 may be decreed accordingly unless good cause 
 be shown to the contrary." Ch. Rule 9. See 
 the 17th Equity Rule of the U. S. Courts, post, 
 Vol. Ill; Heyman v. Uhlman, 34 Fed. Rep. 686. 
 
 A demurrer to the bill, signed by the 
 Attorney-General of a State, is a sufficient 
 appearance by such State, in a suit brought 
 against it. New Jersey v. New York, 6 Peters, 
 323. Where a defendant puts in an answer, 
 which is read in Court, by consent of the 
 opposite counsel, and ordered to be filed, and a 
 
 decretal order is made thereon in favor of the 
 defendants, it is an appearance on the records 
 of the Court Livingston v. Gibbons, 4 John. 
 Ch. 94. 
 
 Filing an answer by counsel is an appear- 
 ance. Proudtit v. Pickett, 7 Coldw. 563. So is 
 the filing of an agreement by solicitor and 
 making an application thereon. Pugsley v. 
 Freedman's Savings & Tr. Co. 2 Tenn. Ch. 
 130. So is the filing of a petition for the 
 removal of a cause from the Stnte to the 
 Federal Court. Sweeny v. Coffin, 1 Dill. 75. 
 Compare Freidlander v. Pollock, 5 Coldw. 490. 
 
 The formal entry of appearance has, 
 throughout the United States, ceased to be 
 important, because service of process on a 
 defendant to appear is made equivalent to 
 actual appearance. Sweeny v. Coffin, 1 Dill. 
 75; Fowlkes v. Webber, 8 Humph. 530. 
 
 8 Ante, pp. 453, 512; Robinson v. Nash, 1 
 Anst. 76; Anon. 3 Atk. 567; Floyd v. Nangle, 
 ib. 569; Mackreth v. Nicholson, 19 Ves. 367; 
 Bound v. Wells, 3 Mad. 434; Davidson r. 
 Marchioness of Hastings, 2 Keen, 509; Price 
 t". Webb, 2 Hure, 511 ; Johnson v. Barnes, 1 
 De G. & S. 129; 11 Jur. 261; Lewis v. Bald- 
 win, 11 Beav. 154: Maclean v. Dawson, 4 De 
 G. & J. 150, 152; 5 Jur. N. S. 663 ; National 
 Assurance Co. v. Carstairs, 9 Jur. N. S. 955, 
 M. R.; Foley v. Maillardet, 1 De G. J. & S. 
 389 ; see Ashley v. Taylor, 10 Ch. D. 768 ; 
 Tottenham v. Barry, 12 Ch. D. 797 ; Harris r. 
 Fleming, 13 Ch. D. 208 ; R. S. C. 1883, Ord. 
 XII. 30; Hinde, 144; Braithwaite's Pr. 321. 
 An appearance entered with the Record and 
 Writ Clerk would waive the irregularity. 
 Braithwaite's Pr. 321; 2 Seton, 1636; and 
 ante, p. 512. For the mode in which a con- 
 ditional appearance is entered, see post, p. 537. 
 
 (a) A defendant who enters a general ap- 
 pearance cannot thereafter assail the service of 
 process. Crabb v. Orth (Ind.), 32 N. E. Rep. 
 
 711; Perkins v. Hendryx, 40 Fed. Rep. 657 ; 
 see Clews p. Woodstock Iron Co. 44 id. 31; 
 Johnson v. Waters, 111 TJ. S. 640. If a non- 
 527
 
 537 
 
 APPEARANCE. 
 
 ant had appeared by counsel at the hearing of a motion, and by the order 
 then made all further proceedings were stayed, he was allowed to apply 
 to the Court for the purpose of having the order carried into effect, with- 
 out having entered any appearance. 4 
 * 537 * An ordinary appearance is entered in the Eecord and Writ 
 Clerks' Office. 1 For this purpose, a prcecipe (forms of which may 
 be obtained in the office) must be filled up with the name of the defend- 
 ant, and underwritten with the name and place of business of his solici- 
 tor, and of the agent of such solicitor, if any, or with the name and 
 place of residence of the defendant where he enters the appearance in 
 person, and, in either case, with the address for service, if any ; 2 and such 
 praecipe must be left at the seat of the Record and Writ Clerk to whose 
 division the cause is attached. 8 An appearance by a defendant served 
 within the jurisdiction should be entered within eight days after service 
 of the bill ; it will, however, be accepted at the Eecord and Writ Clerks' 
 Office at any time ; and, if before decree, without order. 4 
 
 * Betts v. Barton, 3 Jur. N. S. 154, V. C. ant, and defends in person, is concerned for 
 W.; and as to consent in Court by counsel, see co-defendants, the appearance for himself must 
 
 Brighouse v. Margetson, 35 Beav. 303. 
 
 i Cons. Ord. I. 35. By the 17th Equity 
 Rule of the U. S. Courts, the appearance of 
 the defendant, either personally or by his solici- 
 tor, shall be entered in the order book on the 
 day thereof by the clerk. For the present Eng- 
 lish practice, see 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. 
 ed.), 347 ; Phillips v. Kearney, 58 L. J. Ch. 344. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. III. 2, 5; see R. S. C. 1833, 
 Ord. XII. 10. 
 
 3 Any number of defendants may be in- 
 cluded in one prcecipe ; and the names of all 
 the defendants so included must be set forth, 
 notwithstanding the same solicitor appears for 
 all. Where a solicitor who is himself a defend- 
 
 be entered on a separate praecipe, unless he be 
 in the same interest with them. Braithwaite's 
 Pr. 325. The following fees are payable, in 
 Chancery Fee Fund stamps, impressed on or 
 affixed to the prcecipe, on entering an appear- 
 ance. If not more than three defendants, 7*. ; 
 if more than three, and not exceeding six de- 
 fendants, 14s.; and the same proportion for 
 every like number of defendants. Regul. to 
 Ord. Sched. 4. In this computation, husband 
 and wife, when the}' appear jointly, are reck- 
 oned as one person. Braithwaite's Pr. 325. 
 For forms of prcecipe, see Vol. III. 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. X. 3; Braithwaite's Pr. 328; 
 and see Griining v. Prioleau, 10 Jur. N. S. 60 ; 
 
 resident, he thereby admits the jurisdiction of 
 the Court, even though such appearance is for 
 the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction. 
 Lackett v. Rumbauirh, 45 Fed. Rep. 23; State 
 v. District Court (Minn.), 53 N. W. Rep. 714; 
 Yorke v. Yorke (N. D.), 55 id. 1095; Prince v. 
 Gundaway, 157 Mass. 417 ; Pace v. Potter, 85 
 Texas, 473; see Sugg v. Thornton, 132 U. S. 
 524. A motion by the defendant for further 
 time to plead, or the signing and filing of the 
 replevin bond in a replevin suit, may amount 
 to an appearance for all purposes. State v. 
 Horner (N. J.), 25 Atl. Rep. 386; Cheatham v. 
 Morrison, 37 S. C. 187. So a motion to set 
 aside a default (McCormick Harvesting M. Co. 
 v. Schneider (Neb.), 54 N. W. Rep. 257); or 
 for a change of venue (Baisley v. Baisley, 113 
 Mo. 544); or an agreement for a continuance 
 (Ibid.) may amount to a general appearance. 
 
 The proper course is to enter a special ap- 
 pearance limited to the particular purpose 
 intended. See McGillin v. Claflin, 52 Fed. 
 Rep. 657 ; Reifsnider v. American Imp. P. Co. 
 45 id. 433; Whittle v. Artis, 55 id. 919; Mex- 
 528 
 
 ican Central Ry. Co. v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 
 194; Toof v. Foley (Iowa), 54 N. W. Rep. 59; 
 1 Seton on Judgments (5th ed.), 23. In Eng- 
 land, a conditional appearance cannot now be 
 entered in any other form than a regular 
 appearance. Nelson v. Pastorino, 49 L. T. 564. 
 The entry of a decree or judgment raises a 
 prima facie presumption of due service or 
 appearance. Hartley v. Boynton, 17 Fed. Rep. 
 873. The voluntary appearance and answer of 
 a non-resident to a bill in Equity does not 
 affect his status as a non-resident with respect 
 to new and material allegations added in an 
 amended bill afterwards filed. Conrad v. 
 Buck, 21 \V. Va. 396. In the Federal Courts, 
 the acceptance of service, being equivalent only 
 to personal service, does not waive the objection 
 that the defendant does not reside in the dis- 
 trict. United States v. Loughrey, 43 Fed. Rep. 
 449; see Reinstadler v. Reeves, 33 id. 308; 
 Foote v. Mass. Benefit Ass'n, 39 id. 23; Levi v. 
 Evans, 57 id. 677; Boynton v. Kneeseville E. 
 L. Co. 25 N. Y. S. 741.
 
 APPEARANCE. * 528 
 
 A conditional appearance is entered with the Registrar, under an order 
 giving leave to enter the appearance. 5 The order is obtained on an ex 
 parte motion or on petition of course at the Rolls ; 6 but the defendant 
 must, by his counsel, consent to submit to any process which may be 
 issued against him on such appearance. 7 The appearance is entered by 
 the defendant's solicitor attending at the entering seat in the Registrar's 
 office, and signing an entry in the Registrar's Book. The entry will be 
 made by the entering clerk, on the order being produced to him. 8 If the 
 process is discharged for irregularity, the order discharging the process 
 should also discharge the appearance. 9 
 
 When an appearance has been entered, notice of it must be given on 
 the same day to the plaintiff's solicitor, or to the plaintiff if he acts in 
 person, 10 before two o'clock on Saturday, and seven o'clock on any other 
 day : otherwise, the service will stand for Monday in the one case, and 
 in the other for the next day. 11 
 
 Where a husband and wife are defendants, the husband should, 
 * under ordinary circumstances, appear for both ; and he will be * 538 
 liable to process of contempt for the non-appearance of his wife, 
 as well as his own. 1 The wife may, however, in all cases, without any 
 special order, enter an appearance for herself, 2 and, as we have seen, 
 the plaintiff is entitled, in some cases, to treat her as a feme sole in this 
 respect. 3 
 
 Appearances are entered on behalf of infants, and persons of un- 
 sound mind, in their own names, as in the case of ordinary defendants ; 
 but they cannot put in their answers, or take any other step in the 
 cause, until guardians ad litem have been appointed. 4 
 
 12 W. R. Ml, M. R., 33 Beav. 221. For the 4 Braithwaite's Pr. 322; see ante, pp. 162, 
 
 practice as to entering an appearance after 177; and see Cons. Ord. VII. 3; Cons. Ord. X. 
 
 decree, see ante, p. 151; and post, p. 540. 5; Leese v. Knight, 8 Jur. N. S. 1006; 10 \V. 
 
 5 As to the time of entering a conditional R. 711, V. C. K. See R. S. C. 1883, XVI. 18. 
 appearance, see ante, pp. 453, 512, 537. Infants can only appear and answer by their 
 
 6 For form of motion paper, see Vol. III. guardian appointed for that purpose. And it is 
 
 1 See Price c. Webb, 2 Hare, 511. erroneous to proceed against them till such ap- 
 
 8 For forms of order and entry, see 2 Seton, pointment. Irons v. Crist, 3 A. K. Marsh 143; 
 1626, No. 1 ; and see ante, p. 512. Bradwell t\ Weeks. 1 John. Ch. 325. It is 
 
 9 Johnson v. Barnes, 1 De G. & S. 129, 131; irregular, after appointment of a guardian for 
 11 Jur. 261. The application to set aside the an infant, to take the bill pro confessn against 
 process is made by motion. him, for want of an appearance or of answer. 
 
 10 Cons. Ord. III. 9 ; see R. S. C. 1883, Ord. Carneal v. Streshley, 1 A. K. Marsh. 471- A 
 
 XII. 22; an'e, pp.453, 454. For form of decree pro confesso cannot be taken against an 
 
 notice, see Vol. III. j n f anfc We ll s v. Smith, 44 Miss. 296 ; Mcllvoy 
 
 ii Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 2; ante, p. 455. v. Alsop, 45 Miss. 365. See Code of Tennes^ 
 
 i Where a bill is filed against husband and see, §§ 4371, 4372 ; Kilcrease r. Blythe, 6 
 
 wife, the husband is bound to enter a joint Humph. 378, 390. 
 
 appearance, and put in a joint answer for both. A partv who takes a copy of a bill filed 
 
 Leavitt v. Cruger, 1 Paige, 421; see ante, 182, against him as committee of a lunatic, and 
 
 note, 524. note. enters his appearance without his addition of 
 
 2 Braithwaite's Pr. 321; Rudge v. Weedon, committee, &c, cannot afterwards, after suf- 
 7 W. R. 368 (n.). V. C. K. fering the plaintiff to go on to a final decree, 
 
 3 See ante, pp. 179, 181, 445, 476. In the object that the subpmna was against him in- 
 English practice, husband and wife t ow appear dividually, and not as committee^ &c. Brasher 
 separately, no order for the separate appearance v. Cortlandt, 2 John. Ch. 247. 
 
 of the wife being necessary. See R. S. C. 1883, 
 Ord. IX. 3, XVI. 16; 45 & 46 Vic. c. 75, § 1. 
 
 vol. i. — 34 529
 
 539 
 
 APPEARANCE. 
 
 A person intending to defend a suit in forma pauperis, usually enters 
 an appearance, and pays the fee, before he petitions for the order to 
 defend in forma pauperis ; but upon procuring an indorsement, by the 
 proper officer, upon his petition, that the affidavit as to poverty has 
 been filed, he may obtain the order before he enters his appearance : in 
 which case, on production of the order, he may enter his appearance 
 without payment of the fee. 5 
 
 An appearance to a bill not original is subject to the same regulations 
 as an appearance to an original bill. 6 
 
 In the case of a supplemental statement, 7 such proceedings by way 
 of answer, evidence, and otherwise are to be taken upon it as if it were 
 embodied in a supplemental bill ; 8 and, therefore, an indorsement re- 
 quiring appearance must be made on a supplemental statement, and an 
 appearance entered thereto. 9 
 
 No appearance is necessary, in the case of a party served with notice 
 of a decree, under Rule 8 of the 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 42. 10 
 
 Where an order of Revivor or supplemental order has been obtained, 11 
 the practice is to require an appearance by the defendants brought before 
 the Court by such order ; but not to require any new appearance 
 * 539 by the original defendants. 12 This practice seems * scarcely con- 
 sistent with the words of the Act; * and its propriety has been 
 doubted. 2 
 
 Where the plaintiff amends his bill, he must, as we have seen, serve 
 the defendants with a copy of the amended bill ; but the defendants, if 
 they have appeared to the original bill, need not enter any appearance 
 to the amended bill : unless required so to do by the indorsement on 
 the amended bill. 8 
 
 Where a formal defendant is served with a copy of the bill under the 
 General Order, 4 he may appear in common form, at any time within 
 twelve days from the service of the copy of the bill : 5 or he may, within 
 the same time, enter a special appearance, for the purpose of being 
 served with notice of all proceedings in the suit. 6 After the expiration 
 of the twelve days, neither the common nor special appearance can be 
 entered, without an order for that purpose. 7 
 
 5 1 Turn. & Ven. 512; Braithwaite's Pr. 
 322, 563. For form of petition, see Vol. HI. 
 
 6 Braithwaite's Pr. 329. 
 
 7 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86. § 53. 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. XXXIl! 2. 
 
 9 Braithwaite's Pr. 81, 331. 
 1° Ih. 323; ante. p. 437. 
 
 11 Under 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 52; see post, 
 Chap. XXXIII. Revivor, nnd Supplement. 
 
 12 Braithwaite's Pr. 331, 559; Seton, 1171; 
 Cross v. Thomas, 16 Beav. 592; 17 Jnr. 336; 
 Forster v. Menzies, 17 Jur. 657; 10 Hare App. 
 36; 16 Beav 568; Ward v. Cartwright, 10 
 Hare App. 73; 17 Jur. 781. 
 
 1 See 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 25; but see 
 Hanbury v. Ward, 18 Jur. 222, V. C. S.; Hall 
 v. Radcliffe, 2 J. & H. 765. 
 
 2 See 1 Smith's Pr. 805. 
 
 530 
 
 s Cheesborough v. Wright, 28 Beav. 173 ; 
 Barry v. Croskey (No. 2), 2 J. & H. 130; 8 Jur. 
 N. S. 114; Braithwaite's Pr. 328; Braithwaite's 
 Manual, 159 ; and see ante, pp. 446, 533. Where 
 defendants have not answered the original bill, 
 but are called upon by an amended bill simul- 
 taneously to answer both, it is not necessary to 
 issue a new mbpoma. Fitzhugh v. McPherson, 
 9 Gill & J. 1. See Cunningham v. Pell, 6 
 Paige, 655; Longworth v. Taylor, 1 McLean, 
 514. 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. X. 11. 
 
 s Cons. Ord. X. 14, 16; ante, p. 432. 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. X. 15; ante, p. 432. 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. X. 15, 16; and see ante, pp. 
 432, 433, for the practice as to entering a com- 
 mon or special appearance, and obtaining an 
 order for leave so to do.
 
 APPEARANCE. * 540 
 
 A defendant may, if he has been informed of a bill being filed against 
 him, enter an appearance, or cause an appearance to be entered for 
 him, without waiting to be served with the copy of the bill. 8 This is 
 called appearing gratis, and is generally resorted to where the plaintiff 
 has served some only of the defendants with the bill, and a defendant 
 who is not served wishes to make an immediate application to the Court 
 in the cause. 9 
 
 A defendant may, likewise, in certain cases, appear gratis at the hear- 
 ing, and consent to be bound by the decree ; 10 but where a person, not 
 a party to the suit, who was interested in a question, appeared 
 by counsel, and submitted to be bound by the decision, * the Court * 540 
 held, that he could not be heard without the consent of the other 
 defendants. 1 
 
 After decree, an appearance cannot be entered by a defendant except 
 by leave of the Court, on an application by him for liberty to enter such 
 appearance, and attend the proceedings : the defendant submitting to be 
 bound by the decree and proceedings already had. The application may 
 be made by petition of course, if the plaintiff will consent ; and if he 
 will not, by motion or summons, as before explained. 2 
 
 If an appearance has been entered in the name of a defendant by 
 mistake, and no proceeding has been subsequently taken, such appear- 
 ance maj be withdrawn, at the request of the party who entered it, 
 and with the consent of the plaintiff ; but if any proceeding has been 
 taken, a special order, which may be obtained either on motion, with 
 notice, or on summons at Chambers, is necessary. If it is only desired 
 to alter the name of the solicitor who has entered the appearance, the 
 common order to change solicitors is sufficient. 8 
 
 If the defendant does not enter an appearance by himself or his 
 solicitor within the time limited for that purpose, the plaintiff may enter 
 
 8 In Barkley v. Lord Reay, 2 Hare, 309, Sir Sapte v. Ward, 1 Coll. 24; see form of order, 
 James Wigram V. C. decided that a defendant id. 25 (n.); Seton, 3. 
 
 against whom it is prayed that, upon service of l Bozon v. Bolland, 1 R. & M. 69 ; Att.-Gen. 
 
 a copy of the bill, he may be bound by the pro- v. Pearson, 7 Sim. 290; Dyson v. Morris, 1 
 
 ceedings in the cause, is entitled to appear Hare, 413; 6 Jur. 297; Lewis v. Clewes, 10 
 
 gratis, either before or after service. Hare App. 62 ; see also ante, p. 153. 
 
 9 Fell v. Christ's College, 2 Bro. C. C. 279; * Braithwaite's Pr. 323; ante, p. 153. For 
 Hume v. Babington, 1 Hogan, 8. So where the present English practice, see 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. 
 the subpaitui is regularly served, as where it (6th Eng. ed.) 351. In Morgan v. Day, V. C. 
 is served out of the State, the defendant may S. in Chamb. 3 Feb., 1865, a person not a party 
 voluntarily appear. Dunn v. Dunn, 4 Paige, to the suit, but claiming to be interested under 
 425; see Seebor v. Hess, 5 Paige, 85. Wh< re the will of the testator, was, by consent, per- 
 a plaintiff neglects to serve a subpama on a mitted to enter an appearance, find defend the 
 defendant in a bill against whom an injunc- suit, on consenting to be bound by the decree, 
 tion has been granted affecting his rights, and the proceedings had thereunder, as if she 
 such defendant may appear voluntarily, and had originally been made a defendant. For 
 apply to dissolve the injunction, without wait- forms of petition, notice of motion, and sinn- 
 ing for the service of the subpoena. Waffle v. mon«, see Vol. III. 
 
 Vanderheyden, 8 Paige, 45; see Howe v. Wil- s Braithwaite's Pr. 323, 324; Martin v. 
 
 lard, 40 Vt. 654. Or he may demur. Jones v. Patching, id. 338 ; 1 Chit. Arch. 247. For forms 
 
 Fulghum, 3 Tenn. Ch. 193. of request, consent, notice of motion, and sum- 
 
 1° Capel v. Butler, 2 S. & S. 457, 462; mons, see Vol. III. See A. v. B.W.N. (1883)174. 
 
 531
 
 541 
 
 APPEARANCE. 
 
 an appearance for him ; * and as an attachment to compel appearance 
 cannot now be issued without a special order of the Court, and no 
 order will be made for a messenger or Sergeant-at-arms to take the 
 body of a defendant for the purpose of compelling his appearance, 5 it 
 has, as we have seen, 6 become the usual practice for the plaintiff to 
 enter an appearance for the defendant, in default of such appearance 
 being entered by the defendant. 
 
 An appearance which has, by mistake, been entered by the plaintiff, 
 as if concerned for a defendant, may be withdrawn with the consent of 
 the defendant, on the request of the plaintiff's solicitor, if the applica- 
 tion is made before the expiration of three weeks from the service of 
 the copy of the bill ; but if the defendant will not consent, or the 
 application is made after such three weeks, an order, which may be 
 obtained on motion with notice, or on summons at Chambers, is 
 
 necessary. 7 
 * 541 * We have before seen, that a defendant, notwithstanding an 
 
 appearance has been entered for him, may afterwards appear for 
 himself in the ordinary way : but that such appearance is not to affect 
 any proceeding duly taken, or any right acquired by the plaintiff under 
 or after the appearance entered by him, or prejudice the plaintiff's right 
 to be allowed the costs of the first appearance ; 1 and it seems that, in 
 practice, wherever an appearance for a defendant has been entered by 
 the plaintiff, such defendant must, nevertheless, enter an appearance for 
 himself, before he can be allowed to defend the suit. 2 
 
 * Cons. Old. X. 3, 4, ante, pp. 460-462. As 
 to proceedings in default of appearance under 
 the present English practice, see 1 Dan. Ch. 
 Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 356. And as to proceed- 
 ings, after appearance and before pleadings, on 
 the part of the plaintiff or defendant, see Ibid. 
 365, c. 8. 
 
 5 Cons. Ord. X. 10 ; Hackwood v. Lockerby, 
 7 De G. M. & G. 238. 
 
 6 Ante, pp. 460-462. 
 
 7 Braithwaite's Pr. 337, 338 : and Martin v. 
 Patching, there cited. For forms of request, 
 consent, notice of motion and summons, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 532 
 
 i Cons. Ord. X. 9; ante, p. 479. 
 
 2 Ante, p. 479. In Groome v. Sporne, M. 
 R. 1863, G. No. 4, a motion by a defendant, 
 who had not appeared to the bill, and against 
 whom the bill had been taken pro confesso. to 
 set aside the proceedings for irregularity, was 
 permitted to proceed, on his entering a condi- 
 tional appearance with the Registrar, and under- 
 taking, by his counsel, to enter an ordinary 
 appearance; which was afterwards entered ac- 
 cordingly-, upon the Registrar's minute, without 
 any formal order.
 
 ♦CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 *542 
 
 Section - I. — The general Nature of Demurrers. 
 
 Whenever any ground of defence is apparent upon the bill itself, 
 either from the matter contained in it, or from defect in its frame, 
 or in the case made by it, the appropriate mode of defence is by 
 demurrer. 1 (a) 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 107; see Tappan r. Evans, 11 
 N. H. 311; Harris v. Thomas, 1 Hen. & M. 18; 
 Aldersnn v. Biggars, 4 Hen. & M. 470 ; Mitchell 
 v. Lenox, 2 Paige, 280; Brill v. Styles, 35 III. 
 305; Barry v. Abbott, 100 Mass. 398. 
 
 In Equity, a demurrer is only a mode of de- 
 fence to a bill. It is never resorted to for the 
 purpose of settling the validity of a plea or 
 answer. Travers v. Ross, 14 N. J. Eq. 254; 
 
 (") Demurrers are now in form abolished 
 in England. For the present English practice, 
 see 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 449, 525, 
 § 6; R. S. C. Ord. XXV. 1-4; Burstall r. Bey- 
 fus, 26 Ch. D. 35; O'Brien r.Tyssen, 28 Ch. D. 
 372; Republic of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co. 
 36 Ch. D. 489; Re Batthyny, 32 W. R. 379; 
 London, Chatham & Dover Ry . v. South-Eastern 
 Ry. 53 L. T. 109; Grosvenor v. White, 61 L.T. 
 663. The proceeding is now by motion to strike 
 out the pleading. See Att.-Gen. v. London & 
 N. W. Ry. Co., [1892] 3 Ch. 274. A motion to 
 dissolve an injunction for want of equity in the 
 bill cannot operate as a demurrer, but all amend- 
 able defect will be treated as amended. Nathan 
 v. Tompkins, 82 Ala. 437. A motion to dis- 
 miss for want of equity is not equivalent to a 
 demurrer, and does not reach amendable defects 
 in the bill. Glover c. Heinbree, 82 Ala. 324; 
 Harland v. Person, 93 Ala. 273. When the 
 plaintiff does not object, a Federal Court can 
 determine, upon motion to dismiss, a question 
 of jurisdiction or of personal privilege raised 
 by the defendant. Bicycle Stepladder Co. v. 
 Gordon, 57 Fed. Rep. 529; post, p. 551, note (/»): 
 Miller-Magee Co. c. Carpenter, 34 id. 433. Lack 
 of definiteness and certainty may be remedied 
 by motion to make more definite, Crocker v. 
 Collins, 37 S. C. 327; Cheney o. Strauhe, 35 
 Neb. 521 ; First National Bank v. Smith (Neb.), 
 54 N. W. Rep. 254; Evansville R. Co. r. 
 Maddux (Ind.), 34 N. E. Rep. 511; Garard v. 
 Garard (Ind.), id. 442; Conroy v. Oregon Con- 
 
 Raymond v. Simonson, 7 Blackf. 79; Thomas 
 v. Brathear, 4 Monroe, 65; Cooper Eq. PI. 110: 
 Stone v. Moore, 26 111. 165 ; Edwards v. Drake, 
 15 Fla. 66. See infra, 692, n. 11. If, how- 
 ever, the parties have taken no exception to the 
 mode of proceeding, the Court will dispose of 
 the case on its merits. Barry v. Abbott, 100 
 Mass. 398. 
 
 struction Co. 23 Fed. Rep. 71; Johnson v. Wil- 
 cox & Gibbs S M. Co. 25 id. 373; Gause v. 
 Knapp, 1 id. 292; Neis v. Yocum. 16 id. 168, 
 172; Bostwick v. Van Voorhis, 91 N. Y. 353; 
 or for particulars. See Blackie v. Osmaston, 
 28 Ch. D. 119; Re Anstice, 54 L. J. Ch. 1104; 
 N. Y. Code of Civil Proc, § 53L; Rafalsky v. 
 Boehm, 20 N. Y. S. 374. Under the Codes this 
 objection may be made by special demurrer. 
 Ibid. ; Kirsch r. Derby, 96 Cal. 602. A demurrer 
 to evidence in an Equity case has apparently the 
 same effect as in a Law case. Healey v. Simp- 
 son, 113 Mo. 340; Pickel v. Isgrigg, 6 Fed. 
 Rep. 676. 
 
 In Equity, a demurrer lies only to the bill, 
 and not to an answer or plea. See above note; 
 Banks r. Manchester, 128 U. S. 244; Crouch 
 v. Kerr, 38 Fed. Rep. 549; Winters v. Claitor, 
 54 Miss. 341; Travers v. Ross, 14 N. J. Eq. 
 254; Edwards v. Drake, 15 Fla. 666. Thus, a 
 bad plea should be set down for argument and 
 not demurred to. Reynolds v. Crawfordsville 
 Bank, 112 U. S. 405; Wilkinson o. Bauerle, 41 
 N. J. Eq. 635, 646; Rouskulp r. Kershner, 49 
 Md. bW; ]>nsf % p. 694, note. Under the present 
 English practice, the plaintiff may demur or 
 present legal objections to the whole or part 
 of either a statement of defence or a counter- 
 claim. 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 539. 
 The whole or any part of a reply or subsequent 
 pleading may also be demurred to, but such a 
 demurrer can only be delivered by leave of 
 Court, and upon such terms as the Court or 
 
 533
 
 543 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 Demurrers are now of much less frequent occurrence than formerly ; 
 the readiness with which the Court gives the plaintiff leave to amend 
 his bill rendering it inexpedient to demur, in any case, where the defect 
 in the bill can be cured by amendment ; 2 but where the question raised 
 by the bill can be properly determined on demurrer, a defendant, by 
 neglecting to demur, injures his position with respect to the costs of the 
 suit. Thus, bills dismissed at the hearing, have often been dismissed 
 without costs, on the ground that they might have been demurred to ; 3 
 or the defendant has only been allowed the same costs as he would 
 have received if he had demurred. 4 The defendant is not justified in 
 neglecting to demur to the bill, because it contains charges of fraud 
 which he is desirous of answering. 5 
 
 The Court sometimes declines to decide a doubtful question of 
 
 title on demurrer : in which case, the demurrer will be overruled, 
 
 without prejudice to any question. 6 A demurrer may also be 
 
 * 543 * overruled, with liberty to the defendant to insist upon the same 
 
 defence by answer, if the allegations of the bill are such that the 
 
 case ought not to be decided without an answer being put in. 1 
 
 A demurrer has been so termed, because the party demurring demo- 
 ratur, or will go no further : 2 the other party not having shown suffi- 
 cient matter against him ; and it is in substance an allegation by a 
 defendant, which, admitting the matters of fact stated by the bill to be 
 true, shows that, as they are therein set forth they are insufficient for 
 
 2 As to the expediency of demurring, see 
 Wigram on Disc. 158. 
 
 8 .Jones v. Davids, 4 Russ. 277; Hill ». 
 Reardon, 2 S. & S. 431, 439; Hollingsworth v. 
 Shakeshaft, 14 Beav. 492; Webb v. England, 
 29 Beav. 44; 7 Jur. N. S. 153; Ernest D.Weiss, 
 9 Jur. N. S. 145; 11 W. R. 206, V. C. K. ; Nes- 
 bitt v. Berridge, 9 Jur. N. S. 1044; 11 W. R. 
 44fi, M. R.; but see Morocco Co. v. Fry, 11 Jur. 
 N. S. 76, 78; 13 W. R. 310, 312, V. C. S. 
 
 4 Godfrey v. Tucker, 9 Jur. N. S. 1188; 12 
 W. R. 33, M. R.; 33 Beav. 280. 
 
 5 Xesbitt v. Berridge, ubi supra ; but see S. 
 C. before L. C. 10 Jur. N. S. 53; 12 W. R. 
 283. 
 
 6 Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. Sr. 243, 
 247: Mortimer v. Hartley, 3 De G. & S. 316; 
 Evans v. Evans, 18 Jur. 666, L. JJ. ; Cochrane 
 v. Willi*, 10 Jur. N. S. 162, L. JJ.; 4 De G. J. 
 & S. 229; Bloomstein v. Clees, 3 Tenn. Ch. 
 438; Ld. Red. 154, n. (p). 
 
 i Collingwood v. Russell, 13 W. R. 63, L. 
 JJ. ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1062; Lautour v. Att.-Gen. 
 
 11 Jur. N. S. 48; 13 W. R. 305, L. JJ.; Baxen- 
 dale v. Westminturn R. W. Co. 8 Jur. N. S. 
 1163, L. C. 
 
 2 3 Bl. Com. 314; Tomlins & Burrill's Law 
 Diet. Tit. "Demurrer;" Story, Eq. PI. §441. 
 A demurrer is an answer in law to the bill, 
 though not, in a technical sense, an answer 
 according to the common language of practice. 
 New Jersey v. New York, 6 l'eters, 323. There- 
 fore, if, on setting aside an order pro confesso, 
 leave be given to answer, the defendant can 
 neither plead nor demur without special per- 
 mission. Allen v. Baugus, 1 Swan, 444. See 
 the 32d Equity Rule of the U. S. Courts, 
 post, p. 2383, as to demurring to part of a bill, 
 and answering or pleading to the residue. 
 Hayes v. Dayton, 8 Fed Rep. 702; Orendorf v. 
 Budlong, 12 id. 24; Crescent City &c. Co. v. 
 Butchers &c. Co. id. 225; Chicago, St. L. & 
 N. O. R. Co. v. Macomb, 2 id. 18. A similar 
 rule has been adopted in Massachusetts. Ch. 
 Rule 10; post, p. 589, n. 
 
 .Tudpe shall think fit. Ibid.; R. S. C. Ord. 
 XXIV. 2. So, under the Code procedure, a de- 
 murrer to an answer is proper, especial ly when 
 the answer sets up a counter-claim. See Roth- 
 schild v. Whitman, 132 N. Y. 472; Otis r. 
 Shants, 128 N. Y. 45; N. Y. Code of Civil 
 Proc. § 495; Sheward v. Citizens' Water Co. 90 
 Cal. 635; Gilmore v. McClure (Ind.), 33 N. E. 
 534 
 
 Rep. 351; Shealy v. Toole, 64 Ga. 59; Smith v. 
 Danielly, id. 554; Ormsby v. Union Pacific 
 Ry. Co. 4 Fed. Rep. 170. A P^ ea ma }" a ^ s0 ^ e 
 demurred to. Henley v. Henley, 93 Mo. 95; 
 Corpening v. Worthington (Ala.), 12 So. Rep. 
 426. In the Federal Courts demurrers to an- 
 swers in Equity are not sanctioned by the rules. 
 Crouch v. Kerr, 38 Fed. Rep. 549.
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF DEMURRERS. 
 
 544 
 
 the plaintiff to proceed upon, or to oblige the defendant to answer ; or 
 that for some reason apparent on the face of the bill, or because of the 
 omission of some matter which ought to be contained therein, or for 
 want of some circumstance which ought to be attendant thereon, the 
 plaintiff ought not to be allowed to proceed. It, therefore, demands 
 judgment of the Court, whether the defendant shall be compelled to 
 make any further or other answer to the plaintiff 's bill, or that particu- 
 lar part of it to which the demurrer applies. 8 
 
 A demurrer will lie wherever it is clear that, taking the charges in 
 the bill to be true, the bill would be dismissed at the hearing ; 4 but it 
 must be founded on this : that it is an absolute, certain, and clear prop- 
 osition that it would be so ; 5 (a) for if it is a case of circumstances, in 
 which a minute variation between them as stated by the bill, and those 
 established by the evidence, may either incline the Court to modify the 
 relief or to grant no relief at all, the Court, although it sees that the 
 granting the modified relief at the hearing will be attended with con- 
 siderable difficulty, will not support a demurrer. 6 
 
 * As a demurrer proceeds upon the ground that, admitting the * 544 
 facts stated in the bill to be true, the plaintiff is not entitled to the 
 relief he seeks, it is held that, at least for the purpose of argument, all 
 the matters of fact which are stated in the bill are admitted by the de- 
 murrer, 1 and cannot be disputed in arguing the question whether the 
 
 8 Ld. Red. 107. 
 
 4 Utterson v. Mair, 2 Ves. Jr. 95; 4 Bro. C. 
 C. 270; Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, 2 Sch. & 
 Lef. 607, 638 
 
 6 Brooke v. Hewitt, 3 Ves. 253, 255; Morri- 
 son v. Morrison, 4 Drew. 315. 
 
 6 See Story, Eq. PI. §§ 446, 447, 478; Lube\ 
 Eq. PI. 338, 339, 340. A demurrer to a bill 
 must be founded on some strong point of law, 
 which goes to the absolute denial of the relief 
 sought, and not on circumstances in which a 
 minute variation may incline the Court either 
 to grant, modify, or refuse the application. 
 Verplanck v. Caines, 1 John. Ch. 58. Vail v. 
 Central R. Co. 23 N. J. Eq. 466; Drummond i>. 
 Westervelt, 24 id. 30. It should go to the merits 
 and the facts on which the relief is prayed. 
 Roberdeau v. Rous, 1 Ark. 544; Averill v. 
 Taylor, 5 How. Pr. 478; Beale v. Hayes, 5 
 Sandf. 640; Brien v. Buttorff, 2 Tenn. Ch. 523; 
 Payne v. Berry, 3 Tenn. Ch. 154. Where a 
 bill was filed for the specific performance of an 
 agreement, and the case turned upon the point, 
 whether the facts stated amounted to a perfect 
 agreement, Lord Rosslyn thought that, although 
 the circumstances, as stated in the bill, amount- 
 ed more to a treaty than a complete agreement, 
 the question whether it was an agreement or not 
 
 depended much upon the effect of the evidence, 
 and therefore overruled the demurrer. Brooke 
 v. Hewitt, ubi supi-a , Heffield Waterworks v. 
 Yeomans, L. R. 2 Ch. 8; see Reeves v. Green- 
 wich Tanning Co. 2 H. & M. 54. 
 
 i East India Co. v. Henchman, 1 Ves. Jr. 
 289; and see Nesbitt v. Berridge, 9 Jur. N. S. 
 1044; 11 \V. R. 446, M. R.; Story, Eq. PL 
 § 452; Mills v. Brown, 2 Scam. 549; Goble ». 
 Andruss, 1 Green Ch. 66; Niles v. Ander-on, 
 5 How. (Miss.) 365; Green v. Robinson, ib. 80; 
 Smith v. Allen, 1 Saxton (N. J.). 43; Wales 
 v. Bank of Michigan, Harring. Ch. 308. Hut 
 it cannot supply defects in substance, or cure a 
 defective statement of title. Mills o. Brown, 
 and Goble v. Andruss, ubi supra. 
 
 Where a cause is argued upon a demurrer, 
 and plea in bar, the averments in the plea, for 
 the purpose of considering their legal effect, 
 must be taken to be true. York Manuf. Co. v. 
 Cutts, 18 Maine, 204. A demurrer is a denial 
 in form and substance of the plaintiff's right 
 to have his case considered ill a Court of Equity, 
 and an admission of all its allegations that are 
 properly pl>aded. Gritting v. Gibb, 2 Black. 
 (U. S.)*519; Roby v. Cossitt, 78 111. 638; Croft 
 v. Thompson, 51 N. II. 536; Swan v. Castleman, 
 4 Baxt. 257. 
 
 (a) See Robertson v. Howard, 3 C. P. D. 
 280; Fawcusr. Charlton, 10 Q. B. D. 516; Iron 
 Age Pub. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co. 83 
 
 Ala. 498. Thus the objection that a defendant 
 corporation can only contract under seal will 
 
 not be considered upon demurrer to a complaint 
 which does not show that such corporation could 
 not contract by parol. Darrow v. H. R. Home 
 Produce Co. 57 Fed. Pp. 463. 
 
 535
 
 545 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 defence thereby made be good or not ; and such admission extends to 
 the whole manner and form in which it is there stated. 2 
 
 Where a bill professes to set out a deed inaccurately, and alleges, as a 
 reason for so setting it out, that it is in the possession of the defendants, 
 a demurrer to the bill cannot be sustained, although, according to the 
 terms of the deed, as stated by the plaintiff, he can take no title 
 * 545 under it : because * the Court will not, under such circumstances, 
 bind the plaintiff by the statement he has made, which he alleges 
 to be inaccurate, and which the defendant, therefore, by his demurrer ad- 
 mits to be so. In a case of this description, if the defendant means that 
 the Court should at once be called upon to determine the true construc- 
 tion of the deed, he should plead thereto by setting out the deed, or so 
 much thereof as is material. 1 
 
 On a demurrer, ambiguous statements are construed adversely to the 
 pleader - r but a defendant is not entitled to press the principle so far, as 
 to draw any inference of facts he pleases which may happen to be not 
 inconsistent with the averments of the bill. 2 (a) 
 
 But although a demurrer confesses the matters stated in the bill to be 
 true, such confession is confined to those matters which are well pleaded ; 
 i. e., matters of fact. 3 It does not, therefore, admit any matters of law 
 
 2 Thus where a bill mis-stated a deed, by 
 alleging that it contained a proviso which it did 
 not contain, upon the argument of a demurrer to 
 the bill, the defendant's counsel was not allowed 
 to refer to the deed itself, for the purpose of 
 showing the incorrectness of the manner in 
 which it was set out: although the bill con- 
 tained a reference " for greater certainty as to 
 its contents, &c," to the deed, as being in the 
 custody of the defendants. Lord Cottenham 
 here said, that to hold otherwise would be to 
 give the defendants an advantage, depending 
 upon the accident of their having the custody 
 of the document which the bill purported to set 
 out, and would in effect be to decide the ques- 
 tion raised by the demurrer, upon matter which 
 was dehors the record. Campbell v. Maekay, 
 1 M. & C. 603, 613; Cuddon v. Tite. 1 (Jiff. 395. 
 And see where a date was left blank, Watson 
 it. Byrd, 53 Mo. 480. See also Re Stringer, 6 
 Ch. D. 1, 16. In this case, the object of refer- 
 ring to the deed was to contradict a statement 
 in the bill: and where the object is to support, 
 and not contradict, the plaintiff's case, it ap- 
 pears that the Court will stdl refuse to look 
 
 (a) Upon demurrer, the allegations of the 
 hill are construed most strongly against the 
 pleader. Birmingham W. & E. Co. v. Elyton 
 Land Co. 93 Ala. 549; Lewis v. Mohr (Ala.), 
 11 So. 765; Lawrence v. Traner, 136 111. 474; 
 see Arzbacher v. Mayer, 53 Wis. 380; Kent v. 
 Owensboro Bank, 91 Ky. 70; People v. Wong 
 Wang, 92 Cal. 277. As the bill must contain 
 allegations showing Equity jurisdiction, the 
 
 536 
 
 into the document. Harmer v. Gooding, 3 De 
 G. & S. 407, 410, 411 ; 13 Jur. 400, 402; see, 
 however, Weld r. Bonham, 2 S. & S. 91; and 
 as to Acts of Parliament, see Wilson v. Stan- 
 hope, 2 Coll. 629; 10 Jur. 421; Apperlev r. 
 Page, 1 Phil. 779, 785, 11 .Jur. 271; Bailey v. 
 Birkenhead Junction Ry. 12 Beav. 433, 443; 
 14 Jur. 119, 122. 
 
 1 Wright v. Plumptree, 3 Mad. 481, 490. 
 
 2 Simpson v. Fogo, 1 J. & H. 18; 1 H . & 
 M. 195. 
 
 3 Ford r. Peering, 1 Ves. Jr. 72, 78; Com- 
 mercial Bank of Manchester v. Buckner 20 
 How. (U. S.) 108; Mills v. Brown, 2 Scam. 
 549; Goble v. Andruss, 1 Green Ch. 66; Niles 
 r. Anderson, 5 How. (Miss.) 365; Baker r. 
 Booker, 6 Price, 381 ; Redmond v. Dickerson, 
 9 N.J. Eq. 507; Paterson's H. R. R. Co. v. 
 Jersej- City, id. 434 ; Lea v. Robeson, 12 Gray, 
 280. An averment in a bill that the purchase- 
 money of real estate sold by executors was not 
 paid to, or received by them "as executors," 
 and that they "as executors" received no con- 
 sideration for the conveyance, is not equivalent 
 to an averment that no consideration was in 
 
 bill is demurrable, if it fails to show on its face 
 that existing legal remedies are not plain and 
 adequate. Porter v. Frenchman's Bay &c. Co. 
 84 Maine, 195; Naudain v. Ormes, 1 McArthur 
 (D. C.), 1. A bill for the specific performance 
 of a contract to deliver bonds is demurrable if 
 it fails to show the inadequacy of money dam- 
 ages at law. Angus v. Robinson, 62 Vt. 60.
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF DEMURRERS. 
 
 *546 
 
 which are suggested in the bill, or inferred from the facts stated ; 4 for, 
 strictly speaking, arguments, or inferences, or matters of law, ought not 
 to be stated in pleading, 5 although there is sometimes occasion to make 
 mention of them for the convenience or intelligibility of the matter of 
 fact, (b) Thus, if the bill avers a legal inference which the facts stated 
 therein do not authorize, the demurrer, although it is held to confess the 
 facts stated, will not be considered as admitting the inference of law al- 
 leged to have arisen from them. An inference of this nature is called a 
 Repugnancy; and it is a rule in pleading that a demurrer will not admit 
 matters, either of law or of fact, which are repugnant to each 
 other, (c) Thus, * where a record is pleaded, it has been held, that * 546 
 
 fact paid. Barnes r. Trenton Gas Light Co. 
 27 N. J. Eq. 33, referring to the text. 
 
 4 Lea v. Robeson, 12 Gray, 280; Bryan v. 
 Spruill, 4 Jones Eq. 27; Dike v. Greene, 4 
 R. I. 285. Averments as to the meaning of 
 a contract set out by the bill, or exhibited with 
 it, are not admitted by demurrer. Dillon v. 
 Barnard, 21 Wall. 430; Bonnell v. Griswold, 
 68 N. Y. 294. So averments which admit of 
 
 being construed as conclusions of law only, 
 and allegations of parol agreements incom- 
 patible with, and incompetent to vary written 
 instruments set up, do not stand admitted. Dil- 
 lon v. Barnard, Holmes, 386. 
 
 5 Merrill v. Plaintield, 45 N. H. 126; Murch 
 v. Concord Railroad, 29 N. H. 33; Wootten v. 
 Burch, 2 Md. Ch. 190. 
 
 (6) A demurrer does not admit general 
 allegations, or statements or conclusions of law, 
 but averments complained of as conclusions of 
 law may from the context be sufficient as state- 
 ments of fact. Chicot County v. Sherwood, 
 148 U. S. 529; Kent v. Lake' Superior Ship 
 Canal Co. 144 U. S. 75; Pullman Palace Car 
 Co. v. Missouri P. Ry. Co. 11 Fed. Rep. 634; 
 Taylor v. Holmes, 14 id. 498 ; Pettit v. Hope, 
 2 id. 623; Cornell v. Green, 43 id. 105: Latail- 
 lade v. Orena, 91 Cal. 565; Ohm v. San Fran- 
 cisco, 92 Cal. 437; Tompson v. Bank of 
 Redemption, 106 Mass. 128; Pearson v. Tower, 
 55 N. H 36; Partee v. Kortrecht, 54 Miss. 66; 
 Stow v. Russell, 36 111. 18; Funk v. Rentchler 
 (Ind.), 33 N. E. Rep. 364; Curtiss v. Living- 
 ston, 36 Minn. 380; Dickerson v. Winslow 
 (Ala.), 11 So. Rep. 918; Wood v. King Manuf. 
 Co. (Ark.) 21 S. W. Rep. 471; Dillon v. Bar- 
 nard, 21 Wall. 430; Holmes, 386. 
 
 A demurrer does not admit general allega- 
 tions of fraud, but only the facts set forth and 
 all reasonable inferences therefrom. Ante, 
 p. 324, note (a); United States v. Des Moines 
 Nav. Ry.Co. 142 U.S. 510. Nor does it admit the 
 construction of a statute or written instrument 
 as stated in the bill, or that a parol understand- 
 ing, there alleged as varying a written instru- 
 ment, is competent and admissible in evidence. 
 Pennie v. Reis, 132 U. S. 464; Dillon v. Bar- 
 nard, 21 Wall. 430; S. C. 1 Holmes, 386; Inter- 
 state Land Co. v. Maxwell Land Grant Co. 
 139 U. S. 569; Lea v. Robeson, 12 Gray, 280: 
 National Park Bank v. Halle, 30 111. App. 17. 
 Matters of variance, as that a written instru- 
 ment is not correctly set out in the bill, cannot 
 
 be availed of on demurrer. Bromberg v. Heyer, 
 69 Ala. 22. So matters, like statutes, which 
 are judicially noticed, will be held, upon a 
 demurrer, to prevail over facts or conclusions 
 set forth in the bill. Griffith v. Augusta & 
 K. R. Co. 72 Ga. 423. Fraud charged in a bill, 
 if the facts are not set forth, is a conclusion of 
 law, and is not admitted by a demurrer. Fogg 
 v. Blair, 139 U. S. 118; Preston v. Smith, 26 
 Fed. Rep. 884; Flewellen v. Crane, 58 Ala. 
 627. Allegations in the bill upon information 
 and belief are held to be admitted by a demur- 
 rer as to the information and the belief, hut not 
 as to the truth of the information. Walton i>. 
 Westwood, 73 111. 125; see Hyre v. Lambert, 
 37 W. Va. 26; Messer v. Storer, 79 Maine, 512. 
 As a demurrer admits only facts well pleaded, 
 it does not ndmit those not required to be 
 alleged. Sullivan v. Iron S. M. Co. 109 IT. S. 
 550; Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News Co. 139 
 111. 345; People r. Cooper, id. 461. 
 
 (c) If the objection of repugnancy is not 
 raised by demurrer, the plaintiff may have 
 appropriate relief under either aspect of the 
 case. American Freehold L. M. Co. v. Sewell 
 92 Ala. 163, 173; see Caldwell i". Kins:, 76 Ala. 
 149. As to demurrers for repugnancy or incon- 
 sistency, see Friedman v. Fennell, 94 Ala. 570; 
 Wingo v. Hardy, id. 184; Bynum t\ F.wart, 
 90 Tenn. 655; Mayre v. Root, 27 Fla. 453; 
 Lnngell v. Langell, 17 Oregon, 220. Specific 
 allegations, in order to control the general 
 allegations of the same pleading, must be 
 clearly repugnant thereto, and show them to be 
 untrue. Warbritton v. Demorett, 129 Ind 346 
 
 537
 
 *546 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 a demurrer is never a confession of a thing stated in the bill, repug- 
 nant to the record. 1 
 
 There are some facts of which the Court is said to take judicial notice ; 
 and when facts are averred in a bill which are contrary to any fact 
 of which the Court takes judicial notice, the Court will not pay any 
 attention to the averment. The Court takes judicial notice of the recog- 
 nition of foreign States, 2 and will also take judicial or official notice of a 
 war in which this country is engaged ; but not of a war between foreign 
 countries. 3 The Court is also bound to notice the time of the Queen's 
 accession, her proclamations, and privileges ; the time and place of holding 
 Parliaments, the time of sessions and prorogation, and the usual course 
 of proceedings ; the Ecclesiastical, Civil, and Maritime Laws ; the custo- 
 mary course of descent, in Gavelkind and Borough English tenures ; 4 
 the course of the Almanac ; 6 the division of England into counties, 
 provinces, and dioceses ; 6 (a) the meaning of English words 7 and terms of 
 art, even when only local in their use ; legal weights and measures, and 
 
 i Arundel r. Arundel, Cro. Jac. 12; Com. 
 Dig. Pleader, Q. 6 ; Green v. Dodge, 6 Hare, 
 80 ; Mortimer v. Fraser, 30 Jan. 1837, reported 
 upon another point, 2 M. & C. 173. So, where 
 a bill was tiled for a discovery, and for an 
 account and delivery up of the possession of 
 land, on the ground that the plaintiff could not 
 describe the land so as to proceed at law, by 
 reason of the defendants having got possession 
 of the title-deeds and mixed the boundaries, 
 Lord Rosslyn allowed a demurrer, because the 
 bill was a mere ejectment bill ; but he intimated 
 that, even if the bill had been for a discovery 
 onlv, it could not have been sustained: because 
 the averment, that the plaintiff could not 
 ascertain the lands, was contrary to the facts 
 disclosed in the bill, in which the lands were 
 sufficiently described. Loker v. Rolle, 3 Ves. 
 4, 7. A demurrer does not admit the rhetoric. 
 Day v Brownrigg, 10 Ch. D. 294, 303. 
 
 2 Taylor v. Barclay, 2 Sim. 213, 220, ante, 
 pp. 18. 19. 
 
 3 Dolder v. Lord Huntingfield, 11 Ves. 292, 
 ante, p. 54. 
 
 4 Crosby v. Hetherington, 4 Man. & Gr. 
 946. 
 
 5 Mayor of Guildford v. Clark, 2 Vent. 
 247. 
 
 6 Courts ex officio take notice of the civil 
 divisions of the State created by public laws, 
 as counties and towns, and of its great geo- 
 graphical features, as its large lakes, rivers, and 
 mountains. The Winnipiseogee Lake Co. v. 
 Young, 40 X. H. 420. But not the local situa- 
 tion, and the distance of different places in a 
 county from each other. Deybel's case, 4 B. 
 & Aid. 243. See Cooke, App. 1, bottom page 
 385. 
 
 7 Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 
 239. 
 
 (a) See Bidder v. Bridges (No. 2), 54 L. T. 
 529; 1 Greenl. Evid. (15th ed.) §§ 4-6,479, 
 and notes: 12 Am. & Eng. Encl. of Law, 156. 
 Judicial notice is also taken of the geographical 
 positions of, and general names applied to, such 
 a district as St. Lawrence shown on the Admir- 
 alty chart. Birrell v. Dryer. 8 App. Cas. 345. 
 In this country judicial notice is taken, for 
 example, of the boundaries between States; 
 Thorson v. Peterson, 9 Fed. Rep. 517; Lathrop 
 v. Stewart, 5 McLean, 167; and that a city or 
 town is within a particular Stite and county. 
 People v. Wood, 131 N. Y. 617; Com'th v. 
 Desmond. 103 Mass. 445; Smitha v. Flournoy, 
 47 Ala. 345; Cummings v. Stone, 13 Mich. 70. 
 Such notice is also taken of well-known facts 
 of nature, such as the ebb and flow of the tide 
 in the rivers Thames and Mersey; Whitney 
 v. Sauche, 11 La. Ann. 432; of the course and 
 navigability of prominent rivers; Hays v. 
 State, 8 Ind. 425; Neaderhouser i>. State, 28 
 538 
 
 Ind. 257; of the succession of the seasons; 
 Ross r. Boswell, 60 Ind. 235; Tomlinson v. 
 Greenfield, 31 Ark. 557; of the hours of sunrise 
 and sunset; People v. Chee Kee, 61 Cal. 404; 
 59 Am. Dec. 185; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. 
 Hatch, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct 230; and of the week- 
 day on which a specified day of the month 
 falls. First Nat'!. Bank i: Kingsley, 84 Maine, 
 111; Brennan v. Vogt (Ala.1, 11 So". 893. Judi- 
 cial notice is not taken of what is continued in 
 the records of previous suits, but the material 
 facts must be recited in the bill to be available. 
 Ramsey v. Temple. 3 Lea (Tenn.), 252; Ralphs 
 v. Hensler, 97 Cal. 296. The Federal Courts 
 take judicial no'ice of State Statutes and 
 decisions. Lamar v. Micou. 114 U. S. 218; 
 Fourth Nat. Bank r. Franklyn, 120 U. S 747; 
 Chicago & A. R. Ferry Co. v. Wiggins Ferry 
 Co 119 U. S. 615. Foreign Laws must be 
 proved. Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. 129 U. S. 397, 464.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. 
 
 547 
 
 the ordinary measurement of time ; the existence and course of pro- 
 ceeding of the Superior Courts at Westminster, and the other Courts of 
 General Jurisdiction : 8 such as the Courts of the counties palatine, &c. ; 
 and the privileges of its own officers. 9 Whenever a bill avers any fact 
 in opposition to what the Court is so officially bound to notice, such 
 averment will, upon the principle before laid down, in arguing a de- 
 murrer to the bill, be considered as a nullity. 10 
 
 Section II. — The Different Grounds of Demurrer. 
 
 *547 
 
 A demurrer may be either to the relief prayed, or, if discovery is 
 sought, to the discovery only, or to both. If the demurrer is good to the 
 relief, it will be so to the discovery ; a if, therefore, a plaintiff is entitled 
 to the discovery alone, and goes on to pray relief, a general demurrer to 
 the whole bill will be good ; 2 (a) and, for the purposes of a demurrer, 
 
 8 Newell v. Newton, 10 Pick. 470; Hawkes 
 v. Kennebeck, 7 Mass. 461; Ripley v. Warren, 
 
 2 Pick. 592; Despau v. Swindler, 3 Martin 
 (N. S.), 705; Jones v. Gale, 4 Martin, 635; 
 Woods v. Fitz, 10 Martin, 196. 
 
 9 Taylor on Evid. Pt. I. II.; Stephen on PI. 
 269; and see 1 Chitty on PI. 236, et seq., where 
 further information on the subject is to be 
 found : see also 1 Greenl. Evid. §§ 4, 6; Story, 
 Eq PI. § 24. 
 
 10 Courts will not, ex officio, take notice of 
 foreign laws, and consequently they must, when 
 material, be stated in pleading. Campion v. 
 Kille, 14 N. J. Eq. 229. As to matters of com- 
 mon knowledge, see Reg. v. Aspinall, 2 
 Q. B. D. 48, 61. 
 
 i Ld. Red. 183; Loker ». Rollo, 3 Ves. 4, 7; 
 Ryves v. Ryves, id. 343, 347; Muckleston v. 
 Brown, 6 Ves. 63; Barker v. Dacie, id. 686; 
 Hodgkin v. Longden, 8 Ves. 3; Williams v. 
 Steward, 3 Mer. 502; Gordon V. Siinpkinson, 
 11 Ves. 509; Speer v. Crawter, 17 Ves. 216; 
 Evan t\ Corporation of Avon, 29 Beav. 144. 
 
 2 Fry v. Penn, 2 Bro. C. C. 280; Price v. 
 James, 2 Bro. C. C. 319; Collis v. Swayne, 
 4 Bro. C. C. 480; Albretcht v. Sussman, 2 
 V. & B. 328; McMish v. Richardson, 12 Price, 
 530: Whyman v. Legh, 6 Price, 88; see Miller 
 «• Ford, 1 Saxton (N. J.), 360; Coombs v. 
 Warren, 17 Maine, 404; Sauza v. Belcher, 
 
 3 Edw. Ch. 117. It is said by Mr. Justice 
 
 (a) The general rule is that a bill brought for 
 both discovery and relief cannot be maintained 
 for discovery alone. Preston v. Smith, 26 Fed. 
 Rep. 884; Buerk v. Imhaeuser, 8 id. 457; Mc- 
 Clanahan v. Davis, 8 How. 170; Emery v. Bid- 
 well, 140 Mass. 271. And if such a bill, when 
 brought substantially for relief, fails for dis- 
 covery, it is not sufficient for relief. Venner v. 
 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 28 Fed. Rep. 581; 
 see Virginia Manuf. Co. v. Hale, 93 Ala. 542. 
 A bill for discovery is usually held to be de- 
 murrable, if it waives an answer under oath. 
 
 Story, in note to Story, Eq. PI. § 412, remark- 
 ing on the rule in the text, that '• the rule 
 formerly adopted in England was different. 
 It was, that if a bill was for discovery and 
 relief, and it was good for discovery only, a 
 general demurrer to the whole bill was bad; 
 for though the party was not entitled to relief, 
 he was not to be prejudiced for having 
 asked too much." To this he cites, Brandon v. 
 Sands, 2 Ves. Jr. 514; Salter v. Scarborough, 
 9 Ves. 75; Att.-Gen.V Brown. 1 Swanst. 294; 
 Mitford, Eq. PI. by Jeremy, 183, 184. "In New 
 York," the same learned author adds, "the old 
 English rule is adhered to; and indeed it has 
 much to commend it." See Laight r. Morgan, 
 1 John. Cas. 429 ; S. C. 2 Caines's Cas. 344 ; 
 Le Roy v. Veeder, 1 John. Cas. 423; Le Roy 
 v. SerVis, 1 Caines's Cas. 1; S. C. 2 id. 175; 
 Kimberly v. Sells, 4 John. Ch. 467 ; Livingston 
 v. Livingston, id. 496; Higginbotham ?•. 
 Burnet, 5 id. 184. The proper course is held, in 
 New York, to be, to demur to the relief and to 
 answer to the discovery. Higginbotham v. 
 Burnet, 5 John. Ch. 184. The same doctrine 
 was affirmed in the Supreme Court of the 
 LTnited States in Livingston v. Story, 9 Peters, 
 632, 658, where Mr. Justice Thompson said, 
 " And if any part of the bill is good, and 
 entitles the plaintiff either to relief or to dis- 
 covery, a demurrer to the whole bill cannot be 
 sustained. It is an established and universal 
 
 Ward v. Peck, 114 Mass. 121; Badger r. Mc- 
 Namara, 123 Mass. 117; Harrington v. Har- 
 rington, 15 R. I. 341; McCulIa v. Beadleston, 
 17 R. I. 20,26; Huntington v. Saunders, 120 
 U. S. 78; Manchester Fire Ass. Co. v. Stock- 
 ton C. H. & A. Works, 38 Fed. Rep. 378. In 
 certain States, as, for instance, in Tennessee, 
 the bill may not be defective in such case. 
 See Payne v. Berry, 3 Tenn. Ch. 154. In Georgia, 
 discovery may be waived by amendment at 
 any time before answer filed. Merchants' Nat. 
 Bank v. Trustees, 65 Ga. 603. 
 
 539
 
 548 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 a prayer for general relief renders the bill a bill for relief. 8 A 
 * 548 prayer will not, however, convert a * bill into one for relief, if it 
 
 merely prays for the equitable assistance of the Court, consequen- 
 tial upon the prayer for discovery: * such as, a writ of injunction, or a 
 commission to examine witnesses abroad, 2 or that the testimony of wit- 
 nesses may be perpetuated, 3 or that defendant may set forth a list of deeds. 4 
 Notwithstanding the general rule, that if the relief prayed is unne- 
 cessary or improper, the defendant may cover himself by a general 
 demurrer, yet this will not preclude the defendant, in cases where, if 
 
 rule of pleading in Chancery, that a defendant the relief prayed for by the bill is proper, the 
 
 may meet the plaintiff's bill by several modes 
 of defence. He may demur, answer, and plead 
 to different parts of the bill; so that if a bill 
 for discovery and relief contains proper matter 
 for the one and not for the other, the defendant 
 should answer the proper, and demur to the 
 improper, matter. But if he demurs to the 
 whole bill, the demurrer must be overruled;" 
 see post, p. 584. So in Wright v. Dame, 1 Met. 
 241, Mr. Justice Putnam, delivering the opinion 
 of the Court, said, "We adopt the old rule 
 of pleading in Equity, that on a general 
 demurrer to the whole bill, if there is an}' part, 
 either as to the relief or discovery, to which 
 the defendant ought to put in an answer, the 
 demurrer, being entire, ought to be overruled." 
 And he cites, 1 Harrison Ch. Pr. (7th ed.) 414; 
 see Higginbntham v. Burnet, 5 John. Ch. 186; 
 Conant r. Warren, 6 Gray, 562; Brockway v. 
 Copp, 3 Paige, 539; Sikes v. Truitt, 4 Jones 
 Eq. (N. C) 361; Atwill v. Ferrett, 2 Blatch. 
 39; Metier v. Metier, 18 N. J. Eq. 270; 
 Metier v. Metier, 19 id. 457; Banta v. Moore, 
 15 id. 97; Miller v. Ford, Saxton (N. J.), 365 ; 
 Holmes v. Holmes, 36 Vt. 525, 537. "The 
 defendant should answer as to the discovery, 
 and demur as to the relief." Laight v. Morgan, 
 1 John. Cas. 434. But where a bill seeks 
 general and special relief, and also discovery, 
 and relief is the principal object, and discovery 
 is sought merely as incidental to the relief, if 
 the plaintiff shows no title to the relief sought, 
 a demurrer lies to the whole bill. Poole v. 
 Lloyd, 5 Met. 525 ; see Mitchell v. Green, 10 
 Met. 101; Walker v. Locke, 5 Cush. 90, 93; 
 but see Holmes v. Holmes, 36 Vt. 525, 537. A 
 defendant cannot plead or answer, and demur 
 both to the whole bill or to the same part of a 
 bill. Clark r. Phelps, 6 John. Ch. 214; Beau- 
 champ v. Gibbs, 1 Bibb, 481: Robertson v. 
 Bingly, 1 M'CordCh. 352; see post, p. 589, note. 
 
 8 Angell v. Westcombe, 6 Sim. 30 ; Ambury 
 r. Jones, Younge, 199 ; James v. Herriott, 6 
 Sim. 428; Rose v. Gannell, 3 Atk. 439; Baker 
 v. Bramah, 7 Sim. 17; Southeastern Ry. Co. 
 v. Submarine Telegraph Co. 18 Beav. 429; 17 
 Jur. 1044; Allan v. Copeland, 8 Price, 522; and 
 see post, Chap. XXXIV. § 2, Bills of Discovery. 
 
 1 A mere bill of discovery cannot properly 
 pray for relief. Where upon the facts stated, 
 
 540 
 
 bill is something more than a mere bill of 
 discovery. Where the bill is for discovery 
 merely, as distinguished from a bill of dis- 
 covery and relief, an injunction to stay pro- 
 ceedings in a suit at Law for which the discovery 
 is sought, must, according to the practice in 
 New Jersey, be dissolved, the Court of Chancery 
 in that State neVer having adopted the prin- 
 ciple, that because its jurisdiction has once 
 rightfully attached, it will retain the cause, as 
 a matter of right, for the purposes of complete 
 relief. Little v. Cooper, 10 N. J. Eq. 273; 
 Brown v. Edsall, 9 id. 256; see Pool v. Lloyd, 
 5 Met. 525. 
 
 And in a bill for relief and discovery, where 
 the subject-matter of the relief prayed is not 
 one which appropriately belongs to Equity 
 jurisdiction, the prayer for discovery in aid of 
 that suit will not give jurisdiction to a Court 
 of Equity. United R. R. Co. v. Hoppock, 28 
 N.J. Eq". 261. 
 
 But in Holmes v. Holmes, 36 Vt. 525, 537, 
 Poland C. J. said, " The rule, as we understand 
 it, is, that when a bill is brought seeking both 
 discovery and relief, and material discovery is 
 elicited, the Court will proceed to grant the 
 proper relief, and will not turn the plaintiff 
 around to seek relief at Law, even if the relief 
 were such as a Court of Law might grant. It 
 may not be universally true that obtaining 
 discovery will give a Court of Equity jurisdic- 
 tion to grant relief, but this is the general rule." 
 And it has often been held, that where a party 
 has a just title to come into Equity for a dis- 
 covery, and obtains it, the Court will go on and 
 give him the proper relief; and not turn him 
 round to the expenses and inconveniences of a 
 doubtful suit at Law. See to same effect, John- 
 son v. Cooper, 2 Yerg. 524; Almony v. Hicks, 
 3 Head, 39. See also 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 64 
 k, et seq. ; see Lancy r. Kandlett, 80 Maine, 
 169. 
 
 2 Brandon v. Sands, 2 Ves. Jr. 514; Noble 
 v. Garland, 19 Ves. 376; Lousada v. Templer, 
 2 Russ. 561; King v. Allen, 4 Mad. 247; see 
 also Duke of Dorset v. Girdler, Prec. in Ch. 532. 
 
 8 Hall v. Hoddesdon, 2 P. W T ms. 162; 
 Vaughan v. Fitzgerald, 1 Sch. & Lef. 316; 
 Rose v. Gannell, 3 Atk. 439. 
 
 * Crow v. Tyrell, 2 Mad. 397, 408.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. * 549 
 
 the bill had been for a discovery only, there would have been a right to 
 such discovery, from demurring to the relief only, and answering as to 
 the discovery, or, in other words, giving the discovery required. 5 
 
 The converse of this proposition, however, will not equally hold : for 
 it has been determined, that where a bill prays relief as well as discov- 
 ery, the defendant cannot demur to the discovery and answer to the 
 relief: for then he does not demur to the thing required, but to the 
 means by which it is to be obtained. 6 
 
 There are, however, some exceptions to the last-mentioned rule : as 
 where the discovery sought would subject the defendant to punishment, 
 or to a penalty, or forfeiture ; or is immaterial to the relief prayed ; or 
 is of matters which have been communicated under the seal of 
 professional confidence ; or which relate entirely * to the defend- * 549 
 ant's title, and not to that of the plaintiff. In cases of this nature, 
 the Court will allow a defendant to protect himself by demurrer from the 
 particular discovery sought ; though it will not protect him from the 
 relief prayed, if the plaintiff's title to it can be established by other means 
 than the discovery of the defendant himself. Thus, in a bill to inquire 
 into the reality of deeds, on a suggestion of forgery, the Court has enter- 
 tained jurisdiction of the cause, though it does not oblige the party to a 
 discovery, and has directed an issue to try whether the deeds were forged 
 or not. 1 
 
 It is proposed now to consider : first, the grounds of demurrer to the 
 relief; and then those of demurrer to the discovery only. 
 
 Demurrers to the relief may be either : To the jurisdiction ; the per- 
 son ; or the matter of the bill, either in its substance or form. 
 
 Demurrers to the jurisdiction are either on the ground : I. That the 
 case made by the bill does not come within the description of cases in 
 which a Court of Equity assumes the power of decision ; or, II. That 
 the subject-matter is within the jurisdiction of some other Court. 2 
 
 I. It would be a task far exceeding the limits of this work, and not 
 strictly within its object, to attempt to point out the cases in which a 
 demurrer will hold to a bill, on the ground that the case made by it does 
 not come within the ordinary cases for relief in a Court of Equity. It is 
 sufficient to direct the reader's attention to Lord Redesdale's Treatise 
 upon Equity Pleading; 8 and to observe, that if the case made by the bill 
 
 « Hodgkin v. Longden, 8 Ves. 2; Todd v. Supreme Court. Equity Rule 38; Storv En. 
 
 Gee, 17 Ves. 273; see Story, Eq. PI. § 312 and PI. § 443. 
 
 cases in note; Brownell v. Curtis, 10 Paige, i Per Lord Hardwicke in Brownsword v. 
 
 2U - Edwards, 2 Ves. Sr. 246; Att.-Gen. v. Sudell, 
 
 6 Morgan v. Harris, 2 Rro. C. C. 121, 124; Prec. in Ch. 214. 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 312, in note, §§ 441, 546 ; 2 a demurrer for want of equitv includes a 
 Brownell v. Curtis, 10 Paige, 214; ante, p. 547, demurrer for want of jurisdiction. " Thompson 
 note. It has been suggested that this rule v. University of London, 33 L.J. Ch. 625; 10 
 may possibly, in some cases, be affected by .Tur. N. S. 669, V. C. K.; see also Barber v. 
 Cons. Ord. XIV. 8; that " no demurrer or plea Barber. 4 Drew. 666; 5 Jur. N. S. 1197; Cook- 
 shall be held bad, and overruled upon argu- ney v. Anderson. 31 Beav. 452; 1 De G. J. & S. 
 ment, only because such demurrer or plea does 365; 8 Jur. N. S. 1220; 9 id. 736. As to the 
 not cover so much of the bill as it might by form of demurrer for want of jurisdiction, see 
 Law have extended to." But see Dell v. Hale, Barber v. Barber, ubi supra. 
 2 Y. & C. C. C. 1; 6 Jur. 986; and post, p. 3 And see Fonb. on Eq.; Coop. Eq. PL; 
 584. This rule has been adopted by the U. S. Story, Eq. Jur. ; Story, Eq. PI. 
 
 541
 
 *550 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 appears to be one on which the jurisdiction of the Court does not arise, 
 a demurrer will hold. 4 A demurrer will hold equally, where the defect 
 arises from the omission of matter which ought to be contained in the 
 bill, or of some circumstance which ought to be attendant thereon 
 * 550 for the * purpose of bringing the case properly within the juris- 
 diction ; as where it appears that the case is such as under no 
 circumstance can be brought within the ordinary scope of a Court of 
 Equity. 1 Thus, where it appears on the face of the bill that the defend- 
 ants were, at the time of the institution of the suit, resident in a foreign 
 country, and that the suit does not relate to any of the subjects in respect 
 of which the Court is warranted in exercising jurisdiction against per- 
 sons so resident, a demurrer for want of equity will be allowed. 2 
 
 II. A demurrer, because the subject-matter of the suit is within the 
 cognizance of some other Court, may be on the ground that it is within 
 the jurisdiction either : 1. Of a Court of Common Law ; 2. Of the Courts 
 of Probate or Divorce ; 3. Of the Court of Admiralty or Commissioners 
 of Prize ; 4. Of the Court of Bankruptcy ; 5. Of some statutory jurisdic- 
 tion ; or, 6. Of some other Court of Equity. 
 
 1. If it appears by the bill that the plaintiff can have as effectual 
 and complete a remedy in a Court of Law as in a Court of Equity, 
 and that such remedy is clear and certain, the defendant may demur. 3 
 
 4 Stephenson r. Davis, 56 Maine, 73, 74. 75; 1 Ld.Red. 103; see Columbine v. Chichester, 2 
 
 Story, Eq. PI. §§ 466, 467;Mitford, Eq. PI. by Phil. 27; 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 295. For forms 
 
 of demurrer for want of equity, seepost, Vol. III. 
 
 2 Cookney v. Anderson, ubi supra ; and see 
 Foley v. Maillardet, 1 De G. J. & S. 389 : Samuel 
 v. Rogers, id. 396; Fisher v. Charter Oak Life 
 Ins. Co. 67 How. Pr. 191; Harwell v. Lehman, 
 72 Ala. 344; and ante, pp. 449-451. 
 
 3 Kemp v. Tucker, L. R. 8 Ch. 369; Ld. Red. 
 123; Coop. Eq. PI. 124; Lynch v. Willard, 6 
 John. Ch. 342: May v. Goodwin, 27 Ga. 352; 
 Reed v. Bank of Newbury, 1 Paige, 215; Bos- 
 ley v. M'Kim, 7 Har.& J* 160; Reed v. Clarke, 
 4 Monroe, 19; N. London Bank v. Lee, 11 
 Conn. 112; Coombs r. Warren, 17 Maine, 404; 
 Caldwell v. Knott, 10 Yerger, 209; Hoare v. 
 Contencin, 1 Bro. C. C. 27, 29, n. (a); Ham- 
 mond v. Messenger, 9 Sim. 327 ; Bottorf v. Con- 
 ner, 1 Blackf. 287; Pierpont v. Fowle, 2 Wood. 
 & M. 23; Smith v. Morehead, 6 Jones Eq. (N. 
 C.) 360. In First Cong. Society in Raynham 
 v. Trustees of the Fund, &c, in Raynham, 23 
 Pick. 148, it was held, that, if a defendant in a 
 suit in Equity answers and submits to the 
 jurisdiction of the Court, it is too late for him 
 to object, that the plaintiff has a plain and 
 adequate remedy at Law. This objection should 
 be taken at the earliest opportunity ; and 
 will come too late at the hearing. Cutting v. 
 Dana, 25 N. J. Eq. 265; Marsh v. Haywood, 6 
 Humph. 210 ; Lishey v Smith, 7 Humph. 
 299. Infra, p. 555, n. 2. The above rule must be 
 taken with the qualification that it is competent 
 for the Court to grant the relief sought, and 
 that it has jurisdiction of the subject-matter: 
 
 Jeremy, 110, et seq. ; Blount v. Garen. 2 Hayw. 
 88; Livingston v. Livingston. 4 John. Ch. 287. 
 Where a bill in Equity sets forth various 
 claims, and the defendant files a general de- 
 murrer, the demurrer will be overruled if any 
 of the claims be proper for the jurisdiction of 
 the Court of Equity. Castleman v. Veitch, 3 
 Rand. 598 ; Kimberfy v. Sells, 3 John. Ch. 467; 
 Graves v. Downey, 3 Monroe, 356; Blount v. 
 Garen, 3 Hayw. 88; Morton v. Grenada Acad- 
 emies, 8 Sm. & M. 773. A demurrer to the 
 whole of a bill containing some matters reliev- 
 able and others not, is bad, unless the bill is 
 multifarious. Dimmock v. Bixby, 20 Pick. 
 368. In order to sustain a demurrer for want 
 of jurisdiction to the whole of a bill, it must 
 appear that no substantial and essential part of 
 the complaint is within the jurisdiction of the 
 Court. Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston & 
 Worcester R. R. 16 Pick. 512. The presump- 
 tion, upon demurrer, is against the pleader, 
 because he is presumed to state his case in the 
 most favorable way for himself, and, therefore, 
 if he has left anything material in doubt, it is 
 assumed to be in favor of the other party. 
 Columbine t\ Chichester, 2 Phil. 28; Foss v. 
 Harbottle, 2 Hare, 502 ; Durham v. Hyde Park, 
 75 III. 371. The rule is otherwise in Tennessee. 
 Lincoln r. Purcell, 2 Head, 154; Gray v. Hays, 
 7 Humph. 590; and now by statute, Hobbs v. 
 Memphis R. Co. 9 Heisk. 873. But not where 
 the complainant's demand is obviously stale. 
 French r. Dickey, 3 Tenn. Ch. 302; Smiley v. 
 Jones, id. 317. 
 
 542
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. 
 
 * 551 
 
 Thus, where a bill was brought by the executrix of an * attorney, * 551 
 for money due from the defendant for business done as an attor- 
 ney, the Court allowed a demurrer to the relief : because the remedy was 
 at Law, and an Act of Parliament had pointed out a summary method of 
 obtaining it. 1 And where the plaintiff had contrived to purchase goods 
 for export to America, and, after the ship had sailed with them, it was 
 discovered that there had been fraud used in the quantity and quality of 
 the goods, but the plaintiff, being threatened with an action, paid the 
 original price under a protest that he would seek relief in Equity, a 
 demurrer was allowed to a bill, when it was afterwards brought for a 
 discovery and account : though it is quite clear that, if the plaintiff had 
 not paid the money, the Court would have granted him relief, by injunc- 
 tion, against the threatened action for the price. 2 Upon the same 
 principle, if a bill is filed for an account, where the subject is matter of 
 set-off, and capable of proof at Law, it may be demurred to. 8 (") And 
 
 Clark v. Flint, 22 Pick. 231; Russell v. Loring, 
 3 Allen, 125. 126; Dearth t> Hide and Leather 
 Natl. Bk. 100 Mass. 540; see also Ludlow v. 
 Simond, 2 Caines's Cas. 40, 56; Underhill v. 
 Van (Jortlandt, 2 John. Ch. 369; McDonald 
 v. Crockett, 2 M'Cord Ch. 135; Grandin v. 
 Leroy, 2 Paige, 509; Kobbi v. Underhill, 3 
 Sandf. Ch. 277; Sperry v. Miller, 2 Barb. Ch. 
 632 : Ohling v. Luitjens, 32 111. 23. The above 
 objection may and should undoubtedly be taken 
 by demurrer, when it appears on the face of 
 the bill; but when a disclosure is sought, " the 
 Court should in no case," said Mr. Justice 
 Woodbury, "send the matter to Law till after 
 the answer and di-closure are completed in 
 Equity." Foster ». Swasey, 2 Wood. & M. 
 221 & 222; see Warner v. Daniels, 1 id. 110, 
 111. In Parker v. Winnipiseogee, &c. Co. 2 
 Black (U. S.), 715, it was held that where the 
 plaintiff has a clear remedy at Law his bill 
 may be dismissed by the Judges of the United 
 States Courts, sua sponte, though its defects are 
 not noticed either in the pleadings or arguments. 
 
 But in New York, under the Code, there is 
 no longer any distinction between suits at 
 Law and in Equity, as arising from the form of 
 the pleadings or the jurisdiction of the Court. 
 General Mutual Ins. Co. v. Benson, 5 Duer 
 (N. Y.), 168. 
 
 And hence, if the sufficiency of a complaint, 
 as not stating facts constituting a cause of ac- 
 
 (n) A bill in Equity for discovery, which 
 discloses a case of equitable cognizance, such 
 as an accounting, is not demurrable on the 
 ground of an adequate legal remedy because 
 the plaintiff may examine the defendant as a 
 witness in a law court. Wood v. Hudson 
 (Ala.), 11 So. 530. A State statute which pro- 
 vides for the examination of the adverse party, 
 as if under cross-examination, is not applicable 
 to suits in Equity in the Federal Courts. Penn. 
 R. Co. v. Allegheny R. Co. 25 Fed. Rep. 115 ; 
 
 tion, is now denied, the only question is, whether, 
 if the facts stated are admitted, the plain- 
 tiff is entitled to the relief he claims, without 
 reference to its nature as legal or equitable. 
 Id.; see also Foster v. Watson, 16 B. Mon. 
 377. In Tennessee, by statute, objections to 
 the jurisdiction must be taken in limine, but 
 this has been held to mean that the defendant 
 thereby waives objection, and the Court will 
 take jurisdiction in all cases not unfit for the 
 investigation of Equity. Stockley V. Rowley, 
 2 Head, 493; Starnes v. Newsom, 1 Term. Ch. 
 245. affirmed on appeal. 
 
 In Frey v. Demarest, 16 N. J. Eq. 236, 238, 
 Chancellor Green said, " The Court of Chan- 
 cery is not deprived of its original jurisdiction 
 in any case, either by the operation of a statute 
 conferring similar jurisdiction upon the com- 
 mon-law Courts, or by the adoption in those 
 Courts of the principles or practice of Courts of 
 Equity." And see to same effect, Hoggat v. 
 McCrory, 1 Tenn. 8. 
 
 i Parry v. Owen, 3 Atk. 740: Amb. 109. 
 For form of the demurrer, see id. ; Beames on 
 Costs, 376; also Maw v. Pearson, 28 Beav. 196. 
 
 2 Kemp v. Pryor, 7 Ves. 237, 251. 
 
 3 Dinwiddie v. Bailey, 6 Ves. 136, 141. It 
 is a difficult question to determine, when there 
 is an account between two persons, consisting 
 of items cognizable at Law, under what cir- 
 cumstances a concurrent jurisdiction in Equity 
 
 Dravo v. Favel, id. 116. The question of want 
 of jurisdiction in a Federal Court, if apparent 
 on the face of a bill or petition, may be raised 
 by demurrer. Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 
 146 U. S. 202. See Carlsbad v. Tibbetts. 51 
 Fed. Rep 852. The objection that the defend- 
 ant is not an inhabitant cf the district may be 
 raised by demurrer or by motion to dismiss. 
 Ibid. Miller-Magee Co. v. Carpenter, 34 Fed. 
 Rep. 433; see ante, p. 542, n. (a). 
 
 543
 
 552 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 so, if a bill is filed for the possession of land, or an Ejectment 
 * 552 * Bill, as it is called, it may be demurred to, even though the bill 
 
 charges the defendants to have got the title-deeds, and to have 
 mixed the boundaries, and prays a discovery, possession, and account : 
 for the plaintiff, though he is entitled to a discovery, has, by praying 
 such relief, rendered his whole bill liable to demurrer. 1 
 
 It is to be recollected that, in many cases, Courts of Equity have 
 assumed a concurrent jurisdiction with Courts of Law, as in cases of 
 
 exists; for cases on the subject, see Foley v. 
 Hill, 1 Phil. 399, 403; North Eastern Ry. Co. 
 v. Martin. 2 Phil. 758. 763 : South Eastern Ry. 
 Co. o. Brogden, 3 M'N. & G. 8,16, 28; Phillips 
 v. Phillips, 9 Hare, 471; Navulshaw v. Brown- 
 rigg, 2 De G. M. & G. 441; Padwick v. Hurst, 
 18Beav. 575; Fluker v. Taylor, 3 Drew. 183; 
 Croskey v. European and Am. Shipping Co. 
 1 J. & H. 108; Barry v. Stevens, 31 Beav. 258; 
 Shepard v. Brown, 4 Giff. 208; 9 Jur. N. S. 
 195; Smith r. Leveaux, 2 De G. J. & S. 1; 
 Hemings v. Pugh, 4 Giff. 456; Makepeace v. 
 Rogers, 13 W. R. 450, V. C. S.; 11 Jur. N. S. 
 215, affirmed by L. JJ.; 4 De G. J. & S. 649; 
 Kernot v. Potter, 3 De G. F. & J. 447 ; Ed- 
 wards-Wood v. Baldwin, 4 Giff. 613 ; Dabbs v. 
 Nugent, 11 Jur. N. S. 943; 14 W. R. 94, V. 
 C. S.; Flockton v. Peake, 10 L. T. N. S. 173, 
 L. JJ.; Hunter v. Belcher, 2 De G. J. & S. 194; 
 Watford, &c. R. Co. v. London, &c. R. Co. L. R. 
 8 Eq. 231; Southampton Co. v. Southampton 
 Board, L. R. 11 Eq. 254; Moxon v. Bright, L. 
 R. 4 Ch. 292; Burdick v. Garrick, L. R. 5 Ch. 
 233. It has been held that the Court of Chan- 
 cery exercises a concurrent jurisdiction with 
 Courts of Law in all matters of account. Dun- 
 can v. Lyon, 3 John. Ch. 351, 361 ; Ludlow v. 
 Simond. 2 Caines's Cas. 1, 38, 52; Post v. Kim- 
 berly, 9 John. 470, 493; Hawley v. Cramer, 4 
 Cowen, 717; Martin v. Spiers, 1 Hayw. 371; 
 Stothart v. Burnet, Cooke, 420; Breckenridge 
 v. Brooks, 2 A. K. Marsh. 338; Fowle v. Law- 
 rason, 5 Peters, 495 ; Cummings v. White, 4 
 Blackf. 356; Power ». Reeder, 9 Dana, 10; 
 King v. Baldwin, 17 John. 384. In Massachu- 
 setts, the jurisdiction in Equity over accounts 
 is limited to those accounts of which the nature 
 is such that they cannot be conveniently and 
 properly adjusted and settled in an action at 
 law. Pub. Stats, c. 151, § 2, cl. 10; see Locke v. 
 Bennett. 7 Cush. 445, 449; Bartlett v. Parks, 1 
 Cush. 82. But a bill will lie for an account by 
 a person interested in the profits, though not a 
 partner. Hallett v. Cumpton, 110 Mass. 32. 
 But to sustain a bill for an account, there must 
 be mutual demands, or a series of transactions 
 on one side, and of payments on the other. 
 Porter o. Spencer, 2 John. Ch. 171. Where all 
 the items of account are on one side, the bill 
 cannot be sustained; Pearl v. Corp. of Nash- 
 ville, 10 Yerger, 179; unless a discovery is 
 sought and obtained in aid of the account. 
 
 544 
 
 See Pleasants v. Glasscock, 1 Sm. & M. 17. 
 In Taylor v. Tomkins, 2 Heisk. 89, it was held 
 that a bill would lie against the executrix of 
 an agent for an account of goods sold on com- 
 mission, if complicated, or if there were em- 
 barrassments in making proof, though the items 
 were all on one side. But in Haywood v. 
 Hutchins, 65 N. C. 574, the Court refused to 
 take jurisdiction where there were independent 
 items on both sides. 
 
 In New Jersey, the concurrent jurisdiction 
 of the Court of Equity with the Prerogative 
 Courts over the administration of the estates of 
 deceased persons, extends to the accounts of 
 executors and administrators, and to the claims 
 of creditors, legatees, and next of kin. Frey v. 
 Demarest, 16 N. J. Eq. 236, 238, 239. But 
 jurisdiction in matters of account is exercised 
 only where some special cause is alleged, as 
 where the accounts are intricate, or discovery is 
 prayed, or some other ground peculiar to Equity 
 exists. Jewett v. Bowman, 29 N. J. Eq. 174; 
 compare Seymour v. Long Dock Co. 20 id. 396. 
 
 1 Loker v. Rolle, 3 Ves. 4, 7; Ryves v. 
 Ryves, id. 343; Vice v. Thoma a , 4 Y. & C. Ex. 
 538; Cooper, Eq. PI. 125; Russell v. Clark, 7 
 Cranch, 69, 89. The Court will not try the \ 
 legal title to realty at the instance of a person 
 out of possession. Pryse v. Pryse, L. R. 15 Eq. 
 86. Nor take jurisdiction of a bill to remove a 
 cloud from the title in favor of a person out of 
 possession. Orton v. Smith, 18 How. 263; j 
 Campbell v. Allen, 61 Mo. 581; Elridge v. 
 Smith, 34 Vt. 484; Peck v. Sexton, 41 Iowa, 
 566 ; Wing v. Sherrer, 77 111. 200. But if there 
 are other grounds of relief, Equity will take 
 jurisdiction, although the defendant be in pos- 
 session. Moore v. Munn, 69 111. 591. Sale v. 
 McLean, 29 Ark. 612. And, in Tennessee, it 
 is enough that there is a cloud upon the title to 
 give Equity jurisdiction, although the defend- 
 ant be in possession. Almony r. Hicks, 3 
 Head, 39. It is the duty of the Court, where a 
 bill is riled to recover possession of land, sun 
 sponte, to refuse jurisdiction, although the ob- 
 jection be not made by demurrer, plea, or 
 answer. Lewis v. Cocks, 23 Wall. 466. There 
 is an exception in favor of an infant, who may 
 treat the intruder as a guardian or trustee, and 
 come into Equity. Howard v. Earl of Shrews- 
 bury, L. R. 17 Eq. 378.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. 
 
 account, partition, and assignment of dower ; 2 and that, where an 
 instrument on which a title is founded is lost, or fraudulently sup- 
 pressed or withheld from the party claiming under it, a Court of Equity 
 will interfere to supply the defect occasioned by the accident or sup- 
 pression, and will give the same remedy which a Court of Common 
 Law would have given, if the instrument had been forthcoming. 3 In 
 all such cases, therefore, a demurrer, because the subject-matter of the 
 suit is within the jurisdiction of a Court of Law, will not hold. 4 
 
 Amongst other cases in which Courts of Equity and Courts of Law 
 entertain a concurrent jurisdiction, are those arising upon frauds ; there- 
 fore, where fraud is made the ground for the interference of this Court, 
 a demurrer will not hold. 5 (a) There is, however, one case in which 
 fraud cannot be relieved against in Equity, though a discovery may be 
 sought : namely, fraud in obtaining a will, which, if of real estate, 
 must be investigated in a Court of Common Law or the Court of Pro- 
 bate ; 6 and if of personal estate, in the last-mentioned Court. 7 
 
 Although the extension of the jurisdiction of the Courts of Common 
 Law has prevented the necessity of resorting to the Courts of Chan- 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 120, 123. 
 
 3 Ed. Red. 113; Bromley v. Holland, 7 Sum- 
 ner's Ves. 3, and n. (d). 
 
 4 Anderson v. Lewis, 1 Freeman, 206. 
 
 5 But Equity will not in all cases take ju- 
 risdiction where there has been fraud, if the 
 remedy at Law is plain and adequate. Miller 
 v. Scammon, 52 N. H. 609. 
 
 6 See 20 & 21 Vic. c. 77, §§ 61-63. 
 
 i Kerrick v. Bransby, 7 Bro. P. C. ed. Toml. 
 437; Webb v. Claverden, 2 Atk. 424; Bennet 
 v. Vade, id. 324; Anon. 3 Atk. 17; Allen v. 
 Macpher^on, 1 Phil. 133, 143; 7 Jar. 49; Affd. 
 llJur. 785, H. L.; Gingell v. Home, 9 Sim. 
 539, 548; Jones v. Gregory, 4 Giff. 408; 2 De G. 
 
 (a) In Massachusetts, it was held, before full 
 equity powers were conferred by the statute of 
 1877, that there is no concurrent jurisdiction in 
 that State in cases of fraud when there is a plain 
 and adequate remedy at law. Jones v. New- 
 hall, 115 Mass. 244; Suter r. Matthews, id. 253; 
 Ahrend v. Odiorne, 118 Mass. 201; see 1 Story, 
 Eq. Jur. (13th ed.) § 33, n. (6); Patton v. 
 Glatz, 56 Fed. Rep. 367 ; Mortland v. Mortland 
 (Pa.), 25 Atl. Rep. 150; Smith v. Griswold, 6 
 Oregon, 440; Youngblood r. Youngblood, 54 
 Ala. 486; Huff v. Ripley, 58 Ga. 11; White v. 
 Boyee, 21 Fed. Rep. 228; Mann ». Appel, 31 
 id. 378; Rogers v. Rogers, 17 R. I. 023. But 
 here, as elsewhere, if a person is induced to 
 become a partner by false representations as to 
 the firm's business, Equity will dissolve the 
 partnership ab initio, ami restrain the use of the 
 firm name to his injury, the legal remedy being 
 an inadequate protection. Smith v. Everett, 
 126 Mass. 304; Oteri v. Scalzo, 145 U. S. 578; 
 Mycock v. Beatson, 13 Ch. D. 384 ; Newbig- 
 ging v. Adam, 34 Ch. D. 582. So even in the 
 
 vol. i. — 35 
 
 J. & S. 83 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 1171; 10 id. 59; 12 W. 
 R. 193, L. JJ.; and see Boyse v. Rossborough, 
 Kay, 71 ; 3 De G. M. & G. 817 ; 18 Jur. 205; 6 
 H. L. Cas.l; 3 Jur.N. S. 373 ; Gaines v. Chew. 2 
 How. U. S. 619 ; Tarver o. Tarver, 9 Peters, 180. 
 A Court of Equity has no jurisdiction to 
 avoid a will, or set aside the probate on the 
 ground of fraud, mistake, or forgery; or to give 
 relief by charging an executor, a legatee, or 
 devisee with a trust in favor of a person alleged 
 to be defrauded. Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 
 504 ; Archer v. Meadows, 31 Wis. 167. See Gaines 
 v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10; Burrow v. Ragland, 
 6 Humph. 481 ; State v. Allen, 1 Tenn. Ch. 42. 
 
 absence of fraud, Equity can restrain the use of 
 a name which may involve the plaintiff in 
 partnership liabilities. Id.; Chatteris r. Isaac- 
 son, 57 L. T. 177; Chappell v. Griffith, 53 
 L.T. 459; Thynne v. Shove, 45 Ch. D. 577; 
 Brass Iron Works Co. »\ Payne (Ohio), 33 N. E. 
 Rep. 88. 
 
 In Massachusetts, it is held, since the above 
 statute of 1877, that the right to bring a real ac- 
 tion does not now exclude the concurrent remedy 
 in Equity to declare void a deed which is void- 
 able because obtained by duress, undue influ- 
 ence, or fraud. Billings r. Mann, 156 Mass. 203, 
 By tlve Mass. Pub. Stats, c. 151, § 3, a concurrent 
 remedy is given in Equity to creditors to reach 
 and apply property fraudulently conveyed. 
 Stratton v. Ilernon, 154 Mass. 310; see also 
 Towle v. Janvrin, 61 N. H. 605. Id Maine, 
 under a similar statute, Equity is held to have 
 jurisdiction, although the property may also be 
 reached by attachment and execution. Brown 
 o. J. Wayland Kimball Co. 84 Maine, 492. 
 
 545
 
 553 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 eery, in many cases in which it was formerly necessary to do so, yet the 
 jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery is not thereby destroyed. 8 
 *553 * 2. That the objection, on account of the jurisdiction, is not 
 confined to cases cognizable in Courts of Law, is evident from 
 the case already put of proceedings instituted to set aside a will of 
 personal estate on the ground of fraud, which can only be done in the 
 Court of Probate : that Court having exclusive jurisdiction, in all 
 cases relating to wills and intestacies of persons dying possessed of 
 personal property, (a) The Court of Divorce has exclusive jurisdiction 
 of the rights and duties arising from the state of marriage ; but it 
 seems that the Court of Chancery will, at the suit of the wife and her 
 trustees, restrain the husband from breaking the covenants of a separa- 
 tion deed. 1 
 
 Formerly it was held, that a bill of discovery could not be filed in the 
 Court of Chancery, in aid of proceedings in the Ecclesiastical Court ; 2 
 but it seems that the Court of Probate does not possess the same powers 
 to obtain discovery as the Ecclesiastical Court did ; and that such a bill 
 may be filed in aid of proceedings in the Probate Court. 3 
 
 8 Kemp v. Pryor, 7 Ves. 237, 2-19; British 
 Empire Shipping Co. v. Somes, 3 K. & J. 433; 
 Athenaeum Life Ass. Society v. Pooley, 3 De 
 G. & J. 294, 299; Oriental Bank v. Nicholson, 
 3 Jur. N. S. 857, V. C. S. ; Croskey v. European 
 and American Steam Shipping Co. 1 J. & H. 
 108; Shepard v. Brown, 4 Giff. 208; Frey v. 
 Demarest, 16 N. J. Eq. 236, 238; Hoggat v. 
 McCrory, 1 Tenn. 8. But where a party has, 
 under the provisions of the Common Law Pro- 
 cedure Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vic. c. 125, §§ 83-86), 
 pleaded equitable matter in the action at Law, 
 he will not be permitted to apply subsequently 
 to the Court of Chancer}' on the same grounds. 
 Terrill v. Higgs, 1 De G. & J. 388; Walker v. 
 
 Micklethwaite, 1 Dr. & Sm. 49; and see Evans 
 v. Bremridge, 2 K. & J. 174, 181; 8 De G. M. 
 & G. 100, 109 ; Stewart v. Great Western Ry. 
 Co. 2 Dr. & Sm. 438; affirmed 2 De G. J. & S. 
 319; Waterlow i\ Bacon, L. R. 2 Eq. 514. 
 
 i Hunt r. Hunt, 4 De G. F. & J. 221; 31 
 Beav. 89; Williams v. Bailey, L. R. 2 Eq. 731; 
 Brown v. Brown, L. R. 7 Eq. 185; see also 
 Wilson v. Wilson, 1 H. L. Cas. 538; 5 id. 40; 
 Evans v. Carrington, 1 J. & H. 598; 2 De G. 
 F. & J. 481. 
 
 2 Dunn v. Coates, 1 Atk. 288; Anon. 2 Ves. 
 Sr. 451. 
 
 3 Fuller v. Ingram, 5 Jur. N. S. 510; 7 W. 
 R. 302, V. C W. But it- seems by a later 
 
 (a) A Probate Court's jurisdiction over the 
 subject-matter is an adequate remedy to exclude 
 the jurisdiction of Equity. Batten v. Gedhye, 
 41 Ch. D. 507 ; Joslin v. Wheeler, 62 N. H. 169; 
 Foster v. Foster, 134 Mass. 120 ; Green v. 
 Creighton, 10 S. & M. (Miss.), 159; 48 Am. 
 Dec. 742, and note. In general, the probate 
 jurisdiction of Equity Courts is special and 
 limited, being in aid of the Probate Courts 
 where their powers are inadequate. Bradford 
 ?'. Young, 26 Ch. D. 676; Priestman v. Thomas, 
 9 P. D. 210 ; Blackett v. Blackett, 51 L. T. 427 ; 
 Wood fin v. Phoebus, 30 Fed. Rep. 289; Rich v. 
 Brav, 37 id. 273; Wanneker v. Hitchcock, 38 
 id. 383; Everhart v. Everhart, 34 id. 82; Ball v. 
 Tompkins, 41 id. 486; Sowles r. First Nat. 
 Bank, 54 id. 564; Blair v. Johnson, 64 Vt. 598 ; 
 Angus v. Robinson, 62 Vt. 60; Whitman v. 
 Fisher, 74 111. 147; Heustis v. Johnson, 84 III. 
 61 ; see Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485. A Court 
 of Equity has no jurisdiction to annul adminis- 
 tration proceedings in a Probate Court on the 
 ground of fraud. Simmons v. Saul, 138 U. S. 
 
 546 
 
 439. But, apart from statute, there is an inher- 
 ent jurisdiction in Courts of Equity to decree a 
 sale of a deceased person's land for payment of 
 his debts upon application by the devisee or 
 personal representative. Smythe v. Henry, 41 
 Fed. Rep. 705; see Means v. Dowd, 128 U. S. 
 273; Bryan v. Kales, 134 U. S. 126. In Eng- 
 land, though the Chancery Division may have 
 jurisdiction to recall probate of a will, it will 
 not usually exercise it even when the testator's 
 estate is in Court in a proceeding before it. 
 Bradford v. Young, 26 Ch. D. 656. But Equity 
 has jurisdiction to declare a legacy a charge 
 upon land, Hogan v. Kavanaugh, 138 N. Y. 
 417 ; or to correct a clear mistake or omission in 
 the description of land as devised by will. 
 Thomson v. Thomson (Mo.), 21 S. W. Rep. 
 1085, 1128. The Equity jurisdiction of the Fed- 
 eral Courts in probate matters is derived from 
 the Federal Constitution and statutes, and is 
 therefore not dependent upon that possessed by 
 the State Courts or created by State statutes. 
 Borer v. Chapman, 119 U. S. 587.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. 
 
 * 554 
 
 3. If the Court of Admiralty, or Court of Prize, is competent to 
 decide upon the subject-matter of the suit, a demurrer will also hold. 
 Upon this principle, the Court of Chancery refused to interfere, by grant- 
 ing a prohibition against a monition to bring in property which had 
 been received as a consignment to a merchant, — Lord Eldon holding that 
 the prize jurisdiction extends to the question whether a person who 
 received and sold the property, received it as consignee for a valuable 
 consideration, or as a prize agent. 4 
 
 4. The Court of Bankruptcy exercises a special jurisdiction defined 
 by statute ; 5 and any bill is liable to demurrer, the subject-matter of 
 which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of that Court. 6 If, however, 
 but for the fact of bankruptcy, the suit would be fit to be entertained in 
 Equity, the jurisdiction is not taken away by reason of anything coming 
 within the bankruptcy laws. 7 
 
 5. Where a new mode of proceeding is provided by statute, and the 
 ordinary mode of proceeding by bill is, either expressly or impliedly, 
 taken away, a demurrer will lie. 8 (b) Thus, a demurrer will lie to a bill 
 to set aside an award made under 9 & 10 Will. III. c. 15, — that 
 statute having excluded any jurisdiction to interfere with * the * 554 
 enforcement of the award, but that which is specially provided 
 
 by the statute. 1 
 
 6. With respect to the objection, that some other Court of Equity has 
 the proper jurisdiction, 2 it is to be observed that the establishment of 
 Courts of Equity has obtained throughout the whole system of our judi- 
 cial polity, and that most of the inferior branches of that system have 
 their peculiar Courts of Equity, — the Court of Chancery assuming a gen- 
 eral jurisdiction, in cases not within the bounds, or beyond the powers, 
 
 decision that the Court of Probate possesses as 
 extensive power to compel discovery as the 
 Court of Chancery. L. R. 1 1*. & D. 476. 
 
 4 Case of the Danish ship Nbysomhed, 7 
 Ves. 593; see also Castelli v. Cook, 7 Hare, 
 89; Jarvis v. Chandler, T. & R. 319; Sablicich 
 v. Russell, L. R. 2 Eq. 441 ; and see 24 & 25 
 Vic. c. 10, Admiralty Court Act, 1801 ; 27 &28 
 Vic. c. 25, Naval Prize Act, 1864. 
 
 5 12 & 13 Vic. c. 106; 17 & 18 Vic. c. 119; 
 24 & 25 Vic. c. 134; 32 & 33 Vic. c. 71. 
 
 6 Saxton v. Davis, 18 Ves. 72, 82; Preston v. 
 Wilson, 5 Hare, 185, 193; Tarleton v. Hornby, 
 1 Y. & C. Ex. 172, 188; Hutchinson v. Has- 
 lam, 25 W. R. 54; Stone v. Thomas, L. R. 5 Ch. 
 219; Tenney v. Bell, 2 Ch. D. 547; see ante, 
 p. 61, et seq. 
 
 7 Ellis v. Silber, L. R. 8 Ch. 83 ; see Eyre v. 
 Smith, 2 C. P. D. 435; ex parte Brown, 11 Ch. 
 D. 148; ex parte Reynolds, 15 Q. B. D. 169; 
 ante, p. 61, note. 
 
 8 See Parry v. Owen, 3 Atk. 740 ; ante, 
 p. 506; Frey v. Demarest, 16 N. J. Eq. 236. 
 
 1 Heming v. Swinnerton, 2 Phil. 79; 1 C. P. 
 Coop. temp. Cott. 388; lOJur. 907; Nicholls v. 
 Roe, 3 M. & K. 431, 442, overruling S. C. 5 Sim. 
 150; Londonderry and Enniskillen Ry. Co. v. 
 Leishinan, 12 Beav. 423,429; Grafham v. Turn- 
 bull, W. N. (1875) 91; 25 W. R. 645; Frick v. 
 Christian County, 1 Fed. Rep. 250. As to 
 awards, see now 17 & 18 Vic. c. 125, §§ 3, 5-17; 
 and as to the jurisdiction of the Court of Chan- 
 cery over awards, see Harding v. Wickham, 2 
 J. & H. 676; Smith v Whitmore, 10 Jur. N. S. 
 65, 1190; 12 W. R. 244, V. C. W.; 13 W. R. 2, 
 L. JJ.; 2 De G. J. & S. 297: Wakefield v. 
 Llanelly Ry. and Dock Co. 3 De G. J. & S. 11 ; 
 11 Jur. N. S 456; 34 Beav. 245; Borneo Co. c. 
 Robinson', W. N. (1868) 26; Parrott v. Shel- 
 land, id. 108; 16 W. R.928; and see Russell on 
 Arbitration; Howe?'. Nickerson, 14 Allen, 400; 
 and post, Chap. XV. § 2, Different Grounds of 
 Pleas; Ch. XLV. Statutory Jurisdiction. 
 
 2 See Story, Eq. PI. §490; Ld. Red. 125, 
 126 ; Mead v. Mcrritt, 2 Paige, 402. 
 
 (l>) If the statute prescribes no form of action, 
 the jurisdiction is concurrent at Law and in 
 Equity, according to the nature of the relief 
 
 appropriate to the circumstances. Marine & 
 R. P. &c. Co. v. Bradley, 13 Fed. Rep. 301; 
 see note, p. 61, ante. 
 
 547
 
 *555 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 of inferior jurisdictions. 3 The principal of the inferior jurisdictions in 
 England which have such cognizance are those of the counties palatine 
 of Lancaster and Durham, 4 (a) the Courts of the two Universities of 
 Oxford and Cambridge, 5 the Courts of the City of London, 6 and the 
 Stannary Courts of Devon and Cornwall, 7 and wherever it appears, on 
 the face of the bill, that any of these Courts has the proper jurisdiction, 
 either immediately or by way of appeal, the defendant may demur to 
 the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. 8 Demurrers of this kind, 
 however, are very rare ; for the want of jurisdiction can hardly be ap- 
 parent upon the face of the bill, at least so conclusively as to de- 
 * 555 prive the Court of Chancery of cognizance of the suit, — it * being 
 a rule that, where a Court is a Superior Court of general jurisdic- 
 tion, the presumption will be that nothing shall be intended to be out of 
 its jurisdiction that is not alleged and shown to be so. 1 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 151. For a Tabular View of all 
 the Courts of Equity in England and Wales, 
 and of the Courts of Appeal therefrom, see 
 Trower on Debtor and Creditor, 474-485, 498. 
 
 4 As to the Court of Chancerv of Lancaster, 
 see 13 & 14 Vic. c. 43; 17 & 18 Vic. c. 82; 36 & 
 37 Vic. c. 66, § 18 (2). By the 6 & 7 Will. IV. 
 c. 19, ante, p 6, the palatine jurisdiction of the 
 county of Durham was separated from the 
 bishopric, and transferred to the Crown; but 
 the jurisdiction of the Courts still remains. See 
 Cox*s Institutes, 584; Trower, 480; and see 21 
 & 22 Vic. c. 45. 
 
 5 See 3 Bla Com. 83: Geldard's Civil Law, 
 153; and the Oxford University Acts, 17 & 18 
 Vic. c. 81; 18 & 19 Vic. c. 36; *19 & 20 Vic. c. 
 31; 20 & 21 Vic. c. 25: 23 & 24 Vic. c. 23; 25 
 & 26 Vic. c 26; and Cambridge University 
 Act, 22 & 23 Vic. c. 34, and Acts cited. 
 
 6 See Pulling's Customs of London, c. 13. 
 Formerly the county palatine of Chester, the 
 principality of Wales, and the Cinque Ports 
 had Courts of equitable jurisdiction. Ld. Red. 
 151 : see mite, p. 7; 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will IV. 
 c. 70, § 14; 18 & 19 Vic. c. 48; 20 & 21 Vic. 
 c. 1. 
 
 7 It was formerly held, that the Stannary 
 Courts were only Courts of Law. and not Courts 
 both of Law and Equity. Trelawney ?•. Wil- 
 liams. 2 Vern. 483; but see now6& 7 Will. IV. 
 c. 106; 2 & 3 Vic. c. 58: 18 & 19 Vic. c. 32; 
 Procedure in the Stannaries, Introd.; Trower, 
 482; Cox's Institutes, 585. 
 
 8 The County Courts have now an equitable 
 jurisdiction. Where, to a bill of appeal and 
 review of a decree in the c unty palatine of 
 Lancaster, the defendant demurred, because 
 on the face of the bill it was apparent the 
 Court of Chancerv had no jurisdiction, and the 
 demurrer was allowed. Jennet i>. Bishopp, 1 
 Vern. 184. Bv 17 & 18 Vic. c. 82, the Lords 
 
 Justices and the Chancellor of the Duchy are 
 created the Court of Appeal in Chancery for 
 the county palatine; and see 13 & 14 Vic. c. 43; 
 Trower, 480; Winstanley's Prac. c. 1. 
 
 1 Per Lord Hardwicke, in Earl of Derby v. 
 Duke of Athol, 1 Ves. Sr. 204. Kilcrease v. 
 Blythe, 6 Humph. 378. The general way of 
 objecting to the jurisdiction of the Court is bj r 
 plea. Ld. Red. 152. Bank of Bellows Falls v. 
 Rut. & Bur. R. R. Co. 28 Vt. 470; Fremont v. 
 Merced Mining Co. 1 McAll. 267. In Rober- 
 deau v. Rous, 1 Atk. 543 (see 1 Dan. Ch. 
 Prac. 6th Eng. ed., 455, 532), in which a bill 
 was filed for delivery of possession of lands in 
 St. Christopher's, Lord Hardwicke held, that 
 the objection that the Court had no jurisdiction 
 over land in that island, although right in prin- 
 ciple, was irregularly and informally taken by 
 demurrer, and should have been pleaded. Lord 
 Redesdale, however, appears to have been of 
 opinion that the rule that an objection to the 
 jurisdict'on should be pleaded, and not be taken 
 by demurrer, can only be considered as refer- 
 ring to cases where circumstances may give the 
 Chancery jurisdiction, and not to cases where 
 no circumstance can have that effect; and that, 
 where all the circumstances which would be 
 requisite in a plea to show that the Court has 
 no jurisdiction are shown in the bill, a demurrer 
 will lie. Ld. Red. 152, 153; and see Edwards 
 v. Warden, L. R. 9 Ch. 495; 1 App. Cas. 251. 
 As to what those circumstances are, see post. 
 Chap. XV. § 2, on Pleas. In Henderson v. 
 Henderson, 3 Hare, 100, 110, 118, a demurrer 
 was allowed on the ground that the whole of the 
 matters were in question between the parties, 
 and might have been the subject of adjudica- 
 tion, in a previous suit before the Supreme 
 Court of Newfoundland. See also Mutrie r. 
 Rinney, 35 Ch. D. 614; Re Henderson, id. 704; 
 Worman v. Worman, 43 Ch. D. 296. 
 
 (a) A Court of Countv Palatine has still the old Chancerv jurisdiction only. 
 ley, 42 Ch. D. 390. 
 
 548 
 
 Proctor v. Bav
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. 
 
 .»> 
 
 If the objection on the ground of jurisdiction is not taken in proper 
 time, namely, either by demurrer or plea, before, the defendant enters 
 into his defence at large, the Court having the general jurisdiction will 
 exercise it, 2 except in cases where no circumstances whatever can give 
 the Court jurisdiction, as in the case before put, of a bill of appeal and 
 review from a decree in a county palatine ; in which case the Court can- 
 not entertain the suit, even though the defendant does not object to its 
 deciding on the subject. 3 
 
 * The objections arising from the personal disability of the * 5oG 
 plaintiff have been already discussed. 1 All, therefore, that need 
 now be said upon the subject is, that if any of these incapacities appear 
 upon the face of the bill, the defendant may demur. If the incapacity 
 is such only as prevents the party from suing alone, as in the case of an 
 infant, an idiot or a lunatic, or a married woman, if no next friend or 
 committee be named in the bill, a demurrer will lie. 2 
 
 2 Livingston v. Livingston, 4 John. Ch. 
 287; Unclerhill v. Van Cortlandt, 2 John. Ch. 
 369; White v. Carpenter, 2 Paige, 217; Bank 
 of Bellows Fails v. Rut. & Bur. R. R. Co. 28 
 Vt. 470. Generally, an objection to the juris- 
 diction cannot be taken at the hearing. Cutting 
 v. Dana, 25 X. J. Eq. 265; Marsh v. Haywood, 
 6 Humph 110; Jones v. Keen, 115 Mass. 170; 
 Wood v. Currey, 49 Cal. 359; Creely v. Bay 
 State Brick Co. 103 Mass. 514; Massachusetts 
 General Hospital r. State Mut. Life Ins. Co. 4 
 Gray. 227. But see where there was equity in 
 the bill but abandoned at trial term Rose v. 
 West, 50 Ga. 474. And where the case is of 
 controverted legal title. Deery r. McClintock, 
 31 Wi«. 195. Where the want of jurisdiction 
 appears on the face of the bill, advantage should 
 be taken of it by demurrer. Nicholson r Pirn, 
 5 Ohio St. 25; Kendrick v. Whitfield, 20 Ga. 
 379; post, p. 630, note (a). 
 
 In Massachusetts there is no jurisdiction in 
 Equity to enforce a trust arising under the will 
 of a foreigner, which has been proved and al- 
 lowed in a foreign country only, and no certi- 
 fied copy of which has been filed in the Probate 
 Court there; and the objection is properly taken 
 by demurrer. Campbell v. Wallace, 10 Gray, 
 162; Campbell P.Sheldon, 13 Pick. 8; May v. 
 Parker, 12 Pick. 34. So in any case where 
 there is no sufficient ground shown for the in- 
 terference of a Court of Equity. Foster o. 
 Swasey, 2 Wood. & M. 217; Pierpont r. Fowle, 
 id. 23; Baker v. Biddle, 1 Bald. C. C. 411, 
 412. 
 
 In Maine it is said that, as the Court has 
 not general but limited jurisdiction in Equity, 
 it is necessary that the bill should show upon 
 its face that the Court has jurisdiction of the 
 subject-matter complained of. This may be in- 
 quired into under a special or general demurrer. 
 Stephenson v. Davis, 56 Maine, 74. 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 153. See Starnes v. Newsom, 1 
 
 Tenn. Ch. 239, affirmed on appeal. In all bills 
 in Equity in the United States Courts, the 
 citizenship should appear on the face of the bill 
 to entitle the Court to take jurisdiction; other- 
 wise the cause will be dismissed. Dodge v. 
 Perkins, 4 Mason, 435. The want of such an 
 averment may be taken advantage of by de- 
 murrer; Story, Eq. PI. §492; and where the 
 want of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of 
 the proceedings, from a defective statement of 
 the citizenship of the different parties, it is 
 fatal at all times, and may be insisted on bv 
 way of motion or otherwise, in any stage of 
 the cause, and even upon appeal Dodge r. 
 Perkins, 4 Mason, 437; Bingham v. Cabot, 3 
 Pall. 382; Jackson v. Ashton. 8 Peters, 148; 
 Hughes v. Jones, 2 Md. Ch. ITS: Niles V. Wil- 
 liams, 24 Conn. 279; Ketch urn v. Driggs, 6 
 McLean, 13. In the United States Courts, if it 
 appear on the hearing that there is no case of 
 equitable cognizance, it is the duty of the Court, 
 sua sponte, to recognize the fact and give it 
 effect, although the objection be not made by 
 demurrer, plea, or answer. Lewis v. Cocks, 23 
 Wall. 466; Hipp V. Babin, 19 How. 278. So in 
 Connecticut. Iline r. New Haven, 40 Conn. 
 478. 
 
 1 Ante, Chap. III. This objection extends 
 to the whole bill (Gilbert r. Lewis, 1 DeG. J. & 
 S. 38), and advantage may be taken of it. as well 
 in the case of a bill for discovery merely, as in 
 the ense of a bill for relief; for the defendant, 
 in a bill for discovery, being always entitled to 
 costs, after a full answer, as a matter of course, 
 would be materially injured by being compelled 
 to answer a bill by persons whose property is 
 not at their own disposal, and who are, there- 
 fore, incapable of paving the costs. See post, 
 Chap. XXXIV. §2. " 
 
 '-2 Ante, Chap. HI. §§ 6, 7, 8. A married 
 woman may. however, under certain circum- 
 stances, sue without a next friend, and an idiot 
 
 549
 
 557 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 Demurrers arising upon objections applying more specifically to the 
 matter of the bill, may be either : I. To the substance ; or, II. To the 
 form in which it is stated. 
 
 I. Demurrers to the substance are : 1. That the plaintiff has no in- 
 terest in the subject ; 2. That although the plaintiff has an interest, 
 yet the defendant is not answerable to him, but to some other person ; 
 3. That the defendant has no interest; 4. That the plaintiff is not en- 
 titled to the relief which he has prayed ; 5. That the value of the. sub- 
 ject-matter is beneath the dignity of the Court ; 6. That the bill does 
 not embrace the whole matter ; 7. That there is a want of proper par- 
 ties ; 8. That the bill is multifarious, and improperly confounds together 
 distinct demands ; 9. That the plaintiff's remedy is barred by length of 
 time ; 10. The Statute of Frauds ; 11. That it appears by the bill that 
 there is another suit depending for the same matter. 8 
 
 1. In a former section, the reader's attention has been directed to 
 
 the necessity of showing that the plaintiff has a claim to the thing 
 * 557 demanded, * or such an interest in the subject as gives him a 
 right to institute a suit concerning it. 1 («) 
 
 2, 3. The same section also exhibits the nature of the privity which 
 it is necessary the bill should aver to be existing between the plaintiff 
 and defendant, and the application of the rule which requires that the 
 bill should show that the defendant has an interest in the subject-matter 
 of the suit. It also points out the exceptions to the rule, in certain cases 
 in which persons, who have no interest in the subject-matter, may be 
 made parties for the purpose of eliciting discovery from them, and in 
 which they are prevented from availing themselves of a demurrer, to 
 avoid answering the bill. 2 
 
 4. It has been before stated 8 as one of the requisites to a bill, that it 
 should pray proper relief: to which may be added, that if for any reason 
 founded upon the substance of the case, as stated in the bill, the plain- 
 tiff is not entitled to the relief he prays, the defendant may demur. 
 Many of the grounds of demurrer, already mentioned, may perhaps be 
 referred to this head ; and in every instance, if the case stated is such 
 that, admitting the whole bill to be true, the Court ought not to give the 
 
 or lunatic by his next friend, without a com- 
 mittee; see ante, pp. 82, 86, 111. A lunatic must 
 be made a party, though his committee is so, or 
 a demurrer lies. Harrison v. Rowan, 4 Wash. 
 C. C 202. But on a demurrer for his omis- 
 sion, leave will be granted to amend. Berry v. 
 Rogers, 2 B. Mon. 308. 
 
 8 See Davis v. Hall, 4 Jones Eq. 403. 
 
 i Ante, p. 314; At will r. Ferrett, 2 Blatch. 
 39; Haskell v. Hilton, 30 Maine, 419.; Ld. Red. 
 
 (a) In Frost v. Spitley, 121 U. S. 552, it was 
 held that a bill to remove a cloud upon the title 
 to real estate, and to quiet possession thereof, 
 can only be maintained upon allegations and 
 proof of both possession and legal title in the 
 plaintiff. See Rediu v. Branhan, 43 Minn. 283, 
 
 550 
 
 154. 158. If, of several plaintiffs, some have 
 an interest in the matter of the suit, and others 
 have no interest in it, but are merely the agents 
 of their co-plaintiffs, a general demurrer to the 
 whole bill is a good defence. King of Spain v. 
 Machado, 4 Russ. 224; and see Cuff v. Platett, 
 id. 242; Clarkson v. De Peyster, 3 Paige, 339; 
 Dias r. Bouchaud, 10 Paige, 445. 
 
 2 Ante, p. 322. 
 
 3 Ante, pp. 325, 377, 378. 
 
 286; Ricks v. Baskett, 68 Miss. 250. In Gage 
 v. Kaufman, 133 U. S. 471. the allegation, in a 
 bill to remove clouds from title, that the plain- 
 tiff was seised in fee-simple, was held sufficient 
 as showing possession.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. 
 
 *558 
 
 plaintiff the relief or assistance he requires, either in the whole or in 
 part, the defect thus appearing on the face of the bill is a sufficient 
 ground of demurrer. 4 
 
 The question upon a demurrer of this nature is, frequently, not 
 whether, upon the case made by the bill, the plaintiff is entitled to all 
 the relief prayed, but whether he may, under the prayer for general 
 relief, be entitled to some relief. 5 The question how far the defects in 
 the relief prayed in the prayer for special relief may be supplied under 
 the prayer for general relief, which forms part of every bill, has been be- 
 fore discussed. 6 Such relief must be consistent with the special prayer, 
 as well as with the case made by the bill. 
 
 * 5. Every bill must be for a matter of sufficient value : other- * 55S 
 wise, it will not be consistent with the dignity of the Court to 
 entertain it. 1 The usual method of taking advantage of an objection of 
 this nature is, as we have seen, 2 by motion to take the bill off the file. 
 There is no doubt, however, that if the objection appears upon the face 
 of the bill, a demurrer, upon the ground of inadequacy of value, will be 
 held good. 3 
 
 6. A bill must also be for the whole matter. 4 All that need be here 
 said is, that if it appears by the bill that the object of the suit does not 
 embrace all the relief which the plaintiff is entitled to have against 
 the defendant, under the same representation of facts, it will be liable 
 to demurrer, unless it comes within any of the exceptions before pointed 
 out. 5 
 
 7. The question who are the proper parties to be brought before the 
 
 4 See Rollins v. Forbes, 10 Cal. 299. A de- 
 murrer for want of equity cannot be sustained 
 unless the Court is satisfied that no discovery 
 or proof properly called for by, or founded 
 upon, the allegations in the bill, can make the 
 subject-matter of the suit a proper case for 
 equitable cognizance. Bleeker ». Bingham, 3 
 Paige, 240; Morton v. Grenada Academies, 8 
 Sin. & M. 773; Clark v. Davis, Hairing. Ch. 
 227; Dike v. Greene, 4 R. I. 285; Sprague v. 
 Rhodes, 4 id. 301. 
 
 By the practice in Alabama, where a defend- 
 ant in his answer has demurred to the bill for 
 want of equity, he has a right to make amotion 
 to dismiss on that ground, at least before the 
 final hearing. Calhoun v. Powell, 42 Ala. 645. 
 And see as to a demurrer in answer by statute. 
 Harding v. Egin, 2 Tenn. Ch. 39. On a motion 
 to dismiss a bill for want of equity, all amend- 
 able defects of form are considered as amended. 
 Cahala v. Monroe, 50 Ala. 303. Such a motion is 
 allowed in Tennessee by statute. Code, § 4388; 
 Quinn v. Leake, 1 Tenn. Ch. 07. 
 
 5 Ante, p. 378; Hartley v. Russell, 2 S. & S. 
 244, 253. A demurrer to the whole bill does 
 not lie merely because the prayer for relief is too 
 broad. Whitbeek v. Edgar, 2 Barb. Ch. 100. 
 Nor does a demurrer lie to a prayer for inci- 
 dental relief. Miller v. Jamison, 24 N. J. Eq. 
 
 41 ; Payne v. Berry, 3 Tenn. Ch. 154. Nor is 
 it a ground for demurrer that the plaintiff does 
 not ask for the proper relief, or asks for incon- 
 sistent relief. Connor v. Board of Education, 
 10 Minn. 439. 
 
 6 Ante, p. 378. 
 
 i Ante, p. 328. 
 
 2 Ante, p. 329. 
 
 3 Carr i\ Inglehart, 3 Ohio St. 457. If it 
 appear on the face of the bill that the matter in 
 dispute, exclusive of costs, does not exceed the 
 amount to which the jurisdiction of the Court 
 is limited, the defendant may either demur, or 
 move to have the bill dismissed with costs; or, 
 if it does not appear on the face of the bill, it 
 may be pleaded in bar of the suit. Smets v. 
 Williams, 4 Paige, 364; McElwain v. Willis, 3 
 Paige, 505; 9 Wend. 548; Schrocppel v. Red- 
 field, 5 Paige, 245; Bradt v. Kirkpatrick, 7 
 Paige, 62. B\ r "exclusive of costs," is meant 
 the costs of the suit in Chancery. Van Tyne 
 v. Bunce, 1 Edw. Ch. 583; see further, Moore 
 v. Lyttle, 4 John. Ch. 183; Fullerton V. Jack- 
 son, 5 id. 276; Douw v. Sheldon, 2 Paige, 303; 
 Vredenburg v. Johnson, 1 Hopk. 112; Mitchell 
 v. Tighe, 1 Hopk. 119. 
 
 4 Ante, p. 330. 
 
 5 Ante, p. 330. 
 
 551
 
 *559 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 Court, for the purpose of enabling a Court of Equity to do complete jus- 
 tice, by deciding upon and settling the rights of all persons interested 
 iu the subject of the suit, so as to make the performance of the order of 
 the Court perfectly safe to those who are compelled to obey it, and to 
 prevent future litigation, has been before fully discussed. 6 Wherever a 
 want of parties appears on the face of a bill, it is a cause of demurrer, 7 
 unless a sufficient reason for not bringing them before the Court is sug- 
 gested, or unless the bill seeks a discovery of the persons in- 
 * 559 terested * in the matter in question, for the purpose of making 
 them parties ; a but it is no answer to a demurrer that the ad- 
 dition of the party would render the bill multifarious. 2 In conse- 
 quence of the alterations in the rules of the Court as to parties, before 
 pointed out. demurrers for want of parties are now of comparatively 
 rare occurrence. 3 (a) 
 
 6 Ante, Chap. V.; Ld. Red. 164, et seq. 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 180; Story, Eq. PL § 541 ; Farn- 
 ham v. Clements, 51 Maine, 426, 429; Elinen- 
 dorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152; Crane v. Dem- 
 ing, 7 Conn. 387 ; Mitchell v. Lenox, 2 Paige, 
 280; Robinson v. Smith, 3 id. 222. A demurrer 
 for want of parties must show who are the proper 
 parties; not indeed byname, — for that might 
 be impossible, — but in such manner as to point 
 out to the plaintiff the objection to his bill, and 
 enable him to amend by adding the proper par- 
 ties. Ld. Red. 180, 181; Att.-Gen. v. Poole, 4 
 M. & C. 17; Story, Eq. PL § 543; ante, p. 288; 
 Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige, 222. 
 
 It has, however, been held, that upon a de- 
 murrer to a bill for want of equity, the objec- 
 tion that the bill is defective for want of par- 
 ties, may well be taken. Vernon v. Vernon, in 
 Chancery (England), Feb., 1837, cited Story, 
 Eq. PL § 543. Aliter, in Georgia, the non- 
 joinder of parties not being a ground for a gen- 
 eral demurrer. Hand v. Dexter, 41 Ga. 454. 
 So the objection may be taken in the same 
 way, if persons are improperly made plaintiffs. 
 Gething v. Vigurs. before the Vice-Chancellor 
 of England, Nov. 1836, cited Story, Eq. PL ubi 
 supra. See Eagle v. Beard, 33 Ark. 497. 
 
 (a) Under the new English procedure a de- 
 murrer does not lie for want of parties. Wer- 
 derman v. Society Ge"ne>ale, 19 Ch. D. 246; 
 see R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XXXIII. ; Pilley v. 
 Robinson, 20 Q. B. D. 155. But the objection 
 must be raised promptly. Sheehan v. Great 
 Eastern Ry. Co. 16 Ch. D. 59. Generally this 
 defect, when apparent on the face of the bill, is 
 ground for demurrer. Wilson t\ Bellows, 30 
 N. J. Eq. 282; see Oliva v. Bunaforza, 31 id. 
 396. But not for a general demurrer. Hughes 
 v. Hughes, 72 Ga. 173. See House v. Mullen, 
 22 Wall. 42; Chapman v. Forbes, 123 N. Y. 
 532; Lusk v. Thatcher, 102 111. 60: Hutchinson 
 v. Ayres, 117 III. 558 ; Craft v. Russell, 07 Ala. 
 552 
 
 i Ld. Red. 180; ante, p. 288. 
 
 2 Lumbsden v. Fraser, 1 M. & C. 589, 602; 
 and as to amending in such cases, see S. C ; 
 Att.-Gen. v. Merchant Tailors' Co. 1 M. & K. 
 189, 191, and ante, p. 289. 
 
 3 For forms of demurrers for want of parties, 
 see 2 Van Hey. 81 ; and jiost, Vol. III. In Way 
 v. Bragaw, 16 N. J. Eq. 213, one ground of 
 demurrer was that the bill should have been 
 for the benefit of all the creditors of the 
 defendant jointly with the plaintiff. The 
 Chancellor said: "The same objection was 
 raised, under similar circumstances, in Edgell 
 v. Haywood, 3 Atk. 357. But Lord Hardwicke 
 said: 'The person who first sues has an advan- 
 tage by his legal diligence in all cases. The 
 plaintiff, by his judgment and execution at Law, 
 and by his diligence in this Court, has obtained 
 a position which entitles him to priority over 
 the other creditors of the debtor. He does not 
 stand in the attitude of a plaintiff in an ordinary 
 creditor's bill. It does not appear that there is 
 any creditor of equal degree with the plain- 
 tiff.' " Clarkson v. De Peyster, 3 Paige, 320; 
 rarmelee ». Egan, 7 Paige, 610; Grosvenor v. 
 Allen, 9 Paige. 74; Farnham v. Campbell, 10 
 Paige, 598. 
 
 9; Waters v. Perkins, G5 Ga. 32 A demurrer 
 for this cause should name or clearly indicate 
 the omitted parties, so that the bill may be 
 properly amended. Robinson v. Dix, 18 W. 
 Va. 528; Schwartz v. Wechler, 20 N. Y. S. 861. 
 A dismissal of the bill for this cause should be 
 without prejudice. Story, Eq. PI. §' 541. De- 
 feet of parties is waived if not objected to by 
 demurrer or answer, except when strictly indis- 
 pensable parties are absent. Smith v. Dorn, 
 96 Cal. 73; Harper v. Hendricks, 49 Kansas, 
 718; Hurd v. Simpson, 47 id. 245; Hicks v. 
 Jackson, 85 Mo. 283; Leucke v. Tredway, 45 
 Mo. App. 507; McFadden v. Schill, 84 Texas, 
 77. Iu the Federal Courts, see United States v.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. 
 
 *559 
 
 8. The subject of multifariousness has been already discussed. 4 A 
 bill is demurrable on this ground. Such a demurrer goes to the whole 
 bill, and it is not necessary to specify the particular parts of the bill 
 which are multifarious. 8 (b) 
 
 9. In determining whether the length of time which has elapsed since 
 the plaintiff's claim arose is a bar to the relief which he asks, Courts of 
 Equity have considered themselves bound by the Statute of Limitations, 
 21 Jac. I. c. 16, as to all legal titles and demands, although suits in 
 Equity are not within the words of that statute ; 6 and as to all equitable 
 titles and demands, they act in analogy to the statute. 7 The modern 
 Statutes of Limitations 8 apply, for most purposes, to suits in Equity, as 
 well as actions at Law. The objection of lapse of time was formerly 
 considered a proper ground for a plea, 9 and not for a demurrer ; 10 
 
 4 Ante, p. 333, et seq. ; see Story, Eq. PI. 
 §§530-540; Sheldon v. Keokuk No. Line P. 
 Co. 8 Fed. Rep. 709; Graves v. Fresh, 9 Gill & 
 J. 280; Bryan v. Blythe, 4 Blackf. 331; Coe v. 
 Turner, 5 Conn. 80; Mulock v. Mulock, 1 Edw. 
 14; Thurman v. Shelton, 10 Yerger, 383; Emans 
 v. Emans, 14 N. J. Eq. 114. A demurrer to a 
 bill for multifariousness should be taken before 
 the ease comes to the Appellate Court. Well- 
 born v. Tiller, 10 Ala. 305. 
 
 5 East India Co. r. Coles, 3 Swanst. 142, n.; 
 see Dimmock v. Bixby, 20 Pick. 368; Gibbs v. 
 Claggett, 2 Gill & J. 14; Boyd v. Hoyt, 5 
 Paige, 65; White v. White, 5 Gill, 359." For 
 forms of demurrers for multifariousness, see 2 
 Van Hey. 79, 80; and post, Vol. III. 
 
 6 Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, 2 Sch. & 
 Lef. 630, 631; Hony v. Hony, l's. & S. 568, 
 580. 
 
 7 See Bond v. Hopkins, 1 Sch. & Lef. 428; 
 Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, ubi supra ; Stack- 
 house v. Barnston, 10 Ves. 466; Ex parte Dewd- 
 ney, 15 Ves. 496; Beckford v. Wade, 17 Ves. 
 
 Gillespie, 6 Fed. Rep. 803; Perry v. Merchants' 
 M. Ins. Co. 11 id. 478 ; Adams" v. Howard, 22 
 id. 656; California Electrical Works v. Finck, 
 47 id. 583. The objection, if not raised by the 
 pleadings, will not be considered on appeal. 
 Melsheimer v. Hommel, 15 Col. 475; Spicer v. 
 Taylor (Texas), 21 S. W. Rep. 314. In North 
 Carolina the joinder of unnecessary parties is 
 surplusage, and not a fatal defect. McMillan 
 v. Baxley, 112 N. C. 578. 
 
 (b) One defendant cannot thus demur be- 
 cause of the joinder of another defendant who 
 makes no objection. Bermes v. Frick, 38 N. J. 
 Eq. 88; Ware v. Curry, 67 Ala. 274; Sweet ». 
 Converse 88 Mich. 1. The objection of multi- 
 fariousness must be specifically indicated, and 
 cannot be urged under a demurrer for want of 
 equity. Ranger r. Champion Cotton-Press Co. 
 52 Fed. Rep. 611 ; Jackson v. Glos, 144 111. 21. 
 This objection, if not raised before the cause 
 goes to a hearing, is deemed waived, unless 
 
 96 ; Lord Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton, 2 J. & 
 W. 1, 161, 192. 
 
 8 3 & 4 Will. IV. cc. 27, 42 ; 7 Will. IV. & 
 1 Vic. c 28; 19 & 20 Vic. c. 97, §§ 9, 10, 11; 
 23 & 24 Vic. c. 38, § 13; see, as to these Acts, 
 Sugd. R. P. Stat. chap. i. 
 
 rj In Gregor v. Molesworth, 2 Ves. Sr. 109 
 (see also Aggas r. Pickerell, 3 Atk. 225; Delo- 
 raine v. Browne, 3 Bro. C. C. 633, 646), Lord 
 Hardwicke refused to allow a demurrer of this 
 nature, alleging as his reason that several ex- 
 ceptions might take it out of the length of time, 
 as infancy, or coverture, which the party should 
 have the advantage of showing, but which can- 
 not be done if demurred to. This, however, can 
 hardly be a sufficient reason for the distinction 
 in this case between a plea and a demurrer, as 
 the plaintiff, if he has any reason to allege to 
 take his case out of the bar, arising from the 
 length of time, should show it by his bill. 
 
 10 If the lapse of the period of limitation 
 appears with certainty on the face of the bill, 
 the objection may be taken by demurrer. 
 
 the Court itself considers it to cause too great 
 complexity; in which case it may dismiss the 
 bill of its own motion. Hendrickson v. Wal- 
 lace, 31 N. J. Eq. 604; Dod v. Paul, 42 id. 154; 
 Tullar v. Baxter, 59 Va. 467; Beall v. Shaull, 
 18 W. Va. 258; Labadie v. Hewitt, 85 111. 341; 
 Thornton v Houtze, 91 111. 199; Heffron r. 
 Gore, 40 111. App. 257; Wade v. Pulsifer, 54 
 Vt. 45; Snook v. Pearsall,95 Mich. 534; Porter 
 v. Sherman County B. Co. (Neb.) 54 N. W. 
 Rep. 424. In the Federal Courts, see Rule 94; 
 Converse v. Michigan Diary Co. 45 Fed. Rep. 
 18; Western Laud & Em. Co. v. Guinault, 37 
 id. 523; Lewarne v. Mexican Int. Imp. Co. 38 
 id. 629 ; Chaffin v. Hull, 39 id. 887. The Court 
 may thus dismiss a bill for multifariousness 
 even after a demurrer thereto is overruled. 
 Wells v. Sewell's Point Guano Co. (Va.) 17 
 S. E. Rep. 2. The party objecting for multi- 
 fariousness must always show that he is thereby 
 injured. Buerk v. Imhaeuser, 8 Fed. Rep. 457- 
 
 553
 
 560 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 * 560 * but it is now clearly the rule of the Court that the Statute 
 of Limitations, or objections in analogy to it, upon the ground of 
 laches, may be taken advantage of by way of demurrer, as well as by 
 plea. 1 (a) 
 
 Deloraine v. Browne, 3 Bro. C. C (Perkins's 
 ed.) 6:53, Mr. Belt's note (1), 436, Mr. Eden's 
 note (7), and cases cited; Wisner v. Barnet, 
 4 Wash. C. C. 631 ; Dunlap v. Gibbs, 4 Yerger, 
 94; Foster r. Hodgson, 19 Ves. 180; Hoare v. 
 Peck, 6 Sim. 51; Hardy v. Reeves, 4 Sumner's 
 Ves. 466, note (b) ; Freak e v. Cranfelt, 3 M. & 
 C. 499; Tyson v. Pole, 3 Y. & C. 266: Hum- 
 bert v. Rector &c. Trinity Church, 7 Paige, 
 195; Van Hook v. Whitlock, id. 373; S. C. 24 
 Wend. 587; Cosier v. Murray, 5 John. Ch. 521; 
 Waller v. Demint, 1 Dana, 92; See M'Dowl v. 
 Charles, 6 John. Ch. 132. 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 212, n.; Saunders V. Hord, 1 
 Ch. Rep. 184 ; Jenner v. Tracey, 3 P. Wins. 
 287, 11.; Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, 2 Sch. 
 & Lef. 607, 637 ; Foster v. Hodgson, 19 Ves. 
 180; Hoare v. Peck, 6 Sim. 51; Bampton v. 
 Birchall, 5 Beav. 67, 76; Prance v. Sympson, 
 Kay, 678, 680; Smith v. Fox, 6 Hare, 386, 391; 
 Rolfe v. Gregory, 8 Jur. N. S. 606; 10 W. R. 711, 
 V. C. K. ; see Sleeinan v. Wilson, L. R. 13 Eq. 36; 
 Hunham v. Llewellyn, 21 W. R. 570,766; W. 
 N. (1873) 136; Marsh v. Oliver, 14 N. J. Eq. 
 259; Acherley v. Roe, 5 Sumner's Ves. 565, Per- 
 kins's note (Ij), and cases cited, 573, note (a), and 
 cases cited; Stockhouse v. Barnston, 10 Sumner's 
 Ves. 453, Perkins's notes (c) and (c7), and cases 
 cited ; Hardy v. Reeves, 4 Sumner's Ves. 465, 
 notes (a) and (b); Pierson v. David, 1 Clarke 
 (Iowa), 23; Sublette v. Timiey, 9 Cal. 428; 
 Bangs v. Hall, 2 Pick. (2d ed!) 372, note (1), 
 and cases cited; Harris v. Mills, 28 111. 44; 
 Henry County v. Winnebago Draining Co. 52 
 111. 454; McClung 0. Sneed, 3 Head, 219; Stout 
 V. Seabrook, 30 N. J. Eq. 187. But see Wak- 
 alee v. Davis, 25 W. R. 60. Even in cases of 
 partnership account, if the statute has run since 
 the dissolution. Noyes v. Crawley, 10 Ch. D. 
 31; Dawkins v. Lord Penrhyn, 6 Ch. D. 318; 
 4 App. Cas. 51 ; Knox v. Gye, L. R. 5 H. L. 
 656. In Massachusetts the Statute of Limita- 
 tions operates, in cases where it applies, ex 
 proprio vigore, in Equity as well as at Law. 
 Farnam v. Brooks, 9 Pick. 243; Johnson v. 
 
 (a) As Equity follows the Law, the Statute of 
 Limitations applies in Equity, in cases free from 
 fraud, not by analogy, but by reason of the 
 obedience which the Equity Courts owe to that 
 statute. Gibbs v. Guild, 9 Q. B. D. 59, 64; 8 
 id. 296 ; Ecclesiastical Com'rs v. North Eastern 
 Ry. Co. 4 Ch. D. 845, 859; see Knox v. Gye, 
 L. R. 5 H. L. 656, 674; Norris v. Haggin, 28 
 Fed. Rep. 275. The Equitj' jurisdiction can 
 never be used as a device to evade the bar of the 
 
 554 
 
 Ames, 11 Pick. 182; Bowman v. Wathen, 1 How. 
 (U. S.) 189. So in Pennsylvania. Bickel's 
 Appeal, 86 Penn. St. 204. In Kentucky the 
 Statute of Limitations is a bar in Equity. 
 M'Dowell v. Heath, 3 A. K. Marsh. 223 ; 
 Beckenridge v. Churchill, 3 J. J. Marsh. 15. 
 It seems, however, that it does not apply in 
 totidem verbis, but has been adopted as reason- 
 able and consistent. Crain v. Prather, 4 J. J. 
 Marsh. 77. The principles of the Statute of 
 Limitations, as applied to suits in Equity, are 
 recognized by the Revised Statutes of New 
 York. Before such recognition, they received 
 the same application. Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 
 John. Ch. 90; Stafford v. Bryan, 1 Paige, 239; 
 Bertine v. Varian, 1 Edw. Ch. 343; see 2 Rev. 
 Stat. N. Y. 301; and Van Hook v. Whitlock, 3 
 Paige, 409. In New York, aside from the 
 Revised Statutes, the bar would seem to oper- 
 ate by the discretion of the Court. Murray v. 
 Coster, 20 John. 583; Arden v. Arden, 1 John. 
 Ch. 316. See the same doctrine held by Elmen- 
 dorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152; Coulson v. Wal- 
 ton, 9 Peters, 82. In Connecticut, where a 
 delay has been such as to be a bar at Law, it 
 will be so in Equity. Banks v. Judah, 8 Conn. 
 145. The same principle exists in the Courts 
 of the United States. Miller v. MTntyre, 6 
 Peters, 61. In Maine the Statute of Limita- 
 tions operates on suits in Equity as well as on 
 actions at Law. Denny v. Gilman, 26 Maine, 
 149, 154; Chapman V. Butler, 22 Maine, 191. 
 Whether this can apply to cases purely of equi- 
 table jurisdiction, see Robinson v. Hook, 4 Ma- 
 son, 150; Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 John. Ch. 90; 
 Bigelow v. Bigelow, 6 Ohio, 97. In case of a 
 direct trust, no length of time bars the claim 
 between the trustee and cestui que trust. Cook 
 v. Williams, 1 Green Ch. 209; Baker v. Whit- 
 ing, 3 Sumner, 476; Armstrong v. Campbell, 
 3 Yerger, 201; Overstreet 0. Bate, 1 J. J. 
 Marsh. 370; Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 
 16, and other cases cited in Perkins's note (b) 
 to Acherley v. Roe, 5 Sumner's Ves. 573. 
 
 Statute of Limitations at Law. Ela v. Ela, 158 
 Mass. 54; Agens v. Agens, 50 N. J. Eq. 566. 
 Mere delay, short of the statutory period, to 
 enforce a purely legal right, is not a defence, 
 even when it would be sufficient if the suit 
 were upon equitable grounds. Three Towns 
 Banking Co. v. Maddever, 27 Ch. D. 523. 
 
 Under the U. S. rules, the cause which pre- 
 vents the Statute of Limitations from running 
 in the particular case must be stated in the bill
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. 
 
 560 
 
 Where there is no positive limitation of time, the question whether 
 the Court will interfere or not depends upon whether, from the facts of 
 
 in order that evidence thereof maybe admitted. 
 Boyd v. Wiley, 18 Fed. Kep. 355; see Duff v. 
 First National Bank, 13 id. 65; Pacitic R. Co. 
 v. Atlantic & P. R. Co. 20 id. 277; also Chris- 
 tian v. Stale (Ind.), 34 N. E. Rep. 825. The 
 rule that State Statutes of Limitation are to be 
 enforced in the Federal Courts does not, by the 
 weight of authority, apply in suits for the in- 
 fiingement of patents. Brickill v. Baltimore, 
 52 Fed. Rep. 737; McGinnis r. Erie Count}', 45 
 id. 91; see Johnston v. Roe, 1 Fed. Rep. 692; 
 Rugan f. Sabin, 53 F. 415. 
 
 In England the defence of the Statute of 
 Limitations, appearing upon the face of the bill, 
 could be raised in Equity by demurrer, certainly 
 with respect to real estate. Dawkins v. Pen- 
 rhyn, 4 App. Cas. 51; 6 Ch. D. 318; Noyes v. 
 Crawley, 10 Ch. D. 31; see Allcard ?». Skinner, 
 36 Ch. D. 145, 186. In America this defence, 
 clearly appearing upon the bill, may be taken 
 by demurrer. Lansdale v. Smith, 106 U. S. 
 391; Retzer v. Wood, 109 U. S. 185; Speidel v. 
 Henrici, 120 U.S. 377; Bryan v. Kales, 134 
 U. S. 126; Underhill v. Mobile Fire D. Ins. Co. 
 67 Ala. 45; Doe v. Sanger, 78 Cal. 150; Foggr. 
 Price, 145 Mass. 513; Caldwell u. Montgomery, 
 8 Ga. 100; Henry County v. Winnebago Drain- 
 age Co. 52 111. 299, 454; Bell v. Johnson, 111 
 111. 374; Wilhelm's Appeal, 79 Penn. St. 120. 
 
 The defence of laches, lapse of time, or ac- 
 quiescence, ma3 r also be taken by demurrer, 
 when appearing upon the bill. Rolfe v. Greg- 
 ory, 31 L. J. Ch. 710; S. C. 10 W. R. 711; 
 Dossee v. Mookerjee, 7 Moo. Ind. App. 4; Wol- 
 lensak v. Reiher, 115 U. S. 96; Hoxsey v. New 
 Jersey M. R. Co. 33 N. J. Eq. 119 ; Furlong v. 
 Riley, 103 111. 628; Thompson v. Phoenix Ins. 
 Co. 25 Fed. Rep. 296; Van Vleet v. Sledge, 45 
 id. 743; Hmchman v. Kelley, 54 id. 63. The 
 Court maj' also raise this objection of its own 
 motion. Taylor v. Holmes, 127 U. S. 489; 
 Norris v. Haggin, 136 U. S. 386; 28 Fed. Rep. 
 275; Marsh v. Whitmore, 21 Wall. 178, 185; 
 Sullivan v. Portland Railroad Co. 94 U. S. 806. 
 When the legal and equitable remedies for the 
 same cause of action are concurrent, if the legal 
 remedy is barred, the equitable remedy is barred 
 also. Smith v. Wood, 42 N.J. Eq. 563; see 
 Arnett v. Finney, 41 id. 147. As to what con- 
 stitutes laches, see Ibid. ; A'e Metropolitan Coal 
 Consumers' Ass'n, [1892] 3 Ch. 1; Dawson v. 
 Lepper, 29 L. R. Ir. 211; Ware v. Galveston 
 City Co. 146 U. S. 102; Johnston v. Standard 
 In. Co. 148 U. S. 360; Young v. Clarendon 
 Township, 132 U. S. 340; Moore v. Crawford, 
 130 U. S. 122; Ruckman v. Cory, 129 U. S. 
 387; United States v. Beebe, 127 U. S. 338; 17 
 Fed. Rep. 36; United States v. Tichenor, 12 id. 
 415; Graham v. Boston, H. & E. R. Co. 14 id. 
 
 753; United States v. Alexandria, 19 id. 609, 
 614; Underwood v. Dugan, 24 id. 74; Pratt v. 
 California Mining Co. id. 869; Billings v. Aspen 
 M. & S. Co. 51 id. 338; Naddo v. Bardon, id. 
 493; Harding v. Durand, 138 111. 515; Herbert 
 v. Herbert, 47 N. J. Eq. 11; Morse v. Hill, 136 
 Mass. 60; Nudd v. Powers, id. 273; Cooker. 
 Barrett, 155 Mass. 413 ; Douglass r. Douglass, 
 72 Mich. 86; Whitridge v. Whitridge, 76 Md. 
 54; 32 Am. Law Reg. 319. Laches may be 
 imputed to either a plaintiff or a defendant in 
 Equity. Brown v. Lake Superior Iron Co. 134 
 U. S. 530. The defence of laches, assigned in a 
 demurrer, is not waived by withdrawing such 
 demurrer. Snow v. Boston Blank Book Manuf. 
 Co. 153 Mass. 456. Laches does not necessarily 
 cease upon the institution of a suit, which must 
 be prosecuted diligently. Johnston v. Standard 
 Min. Co. 148 U. S. 360; Sebring v. Sebring, 43 
 N. J. Eq. 59. It applies against the govern- 
 ment when suing with respect to matters of 
 business. United States v. McElroy, 25 Fed. 
 Rep. 804. The Federal Courts usually follow 
 by analogy State Statutes of Limitation, but 
 they will not permit those statutes to limit their 
 Equity jurisdiction. Tice v. School-district No. 
 18, 17 Fed. Rep. 283; Bisbee v. Evans, id. 
 474. 
 
 In cases of trusts, where the trustee has con- 
 cealed the fa> ts from the cestui que trust, Equity 
 will apply the doctrine of laches. Where, for 
 thirty-six years, a trustee fraudulently con- 
 cealed a trust from the beneficiary, the Litter's 
 delay, during six months after he received the 
 information, to bring suit, was held not to con- 
 stitute laches. Middaugh v. Fox, 135 111. 344; 
 see Re Cross, 20 Ch. D. 109 ; Re Burge, 57 L. T. 
 304; Kennedy v. Winn, 80 Ala. 165. The cestui 
 que trust must, however, set forth in his bill the 
 circumstances and the impediments to an earlier 
 prosecution of his demand. Badger r. Badger, 
 2 Wall. 87; 2 Cliff. 137, 154; Richards V. Mac- 
 kall, 124 U. S. 183 ; Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. 
 S. 135; Teall v. Slaven, 14 Sawyer, 364; Forbes 
 v. Overby, 4 Hughes, 441; Barber r. Houston, 
 14 L. R. Ir. 273; 18 id. 475.' In cases of con- 
 structive trusts, relief must be sought within a 
 reasonable time. Beckford v. Wade, 17 Yes. 
 88; Gwynne v. Gell, 20 L. T. N. S. 508; Small- 
 combe's case, L. R. 3 Eq. 769; Chetham v. 
 Hoare, L. R. 9 Eq. 571; Hendrickson r. Hen- 
 drickson, 42 N. J. Eq. 657; Le Gendre v. 
 Byrnes, 44 id. 372; Gillette v. Wiley, 126 111. 
 310. A cestui que trust is not precluded from 
 asserting his right to the trust fund, when col- 
 lected, bj' delay in enforcing the trustee's per- 
 sonal liability. Ames v. Brooks, 143 Mass. 
 344. The trustee of an express trust cannot set 
 up the defence of laches against the cestui que
 
 *^61 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 tlie case, the Court will infer acquiescence, or confirmation, or a release. 
 
 Such inference is an inference of fact, and not an inference of 
 * 561 law, and cannot be raised on demurrer ; 2 * because a defendant 
 
 has no right to avail himself, by demurrer, of an inference of 
 fact upon matters on which a jury, in a Court of Law, or the Court iu 
 Equity, would collect matter of fact to decide their verdict. 1 
 
 10. The non-compliance with the requirements of the Statute of 
 Frauds may also be a ground of demurrer ; for there can be no doubt 
 but that a bill may contain such statements as to entitle a defendant, 
 by general demurrer, to take advantage of the want of signature to an 
 agreement ; because it might appear clear that the plaintiff was not 
 entitled to the relief he asked. 2 It is, however, more usual to plead 
 
 2 Cuthbert v. Creasy, 6 Mad. 189 ; Re Ruth- 
 erford, 14 Ch. D. 687." 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 213. A demurrer would un- 
 doubtedly lie to a bill for the redemption of a 
 mortgage, after a great length of time had 
 elapsed, if the bill was so framed as to present 
 the objection without any attendant circum- 
 stances to obviate it. Story, Eq. PI. § 503. As 
 to the length of time which will bar a redemp- 
 tion of a mortgage, see Acherley v. Roe, 5 Yes. 
 573, Perkins's note ("), and c~ses cited; Hardy 
 r. Reeves, 4 Ves. 466, note (a); Trash v. White, 
 3 Bro. C. C. (Perkins's ed.) 291, note («), and 
 cases cited; Phillips v. Sinclair, 20 Maine, 209. 
 In reference to the length of time which will 
 bar a bill for an account, see Acherley v. Roe, 
 5 Ves. 565, Perkins's note (b), and cases cited; 
 Stackhouse v. Bamston, 10 id. 453, note (</), 
 and cases cited. 
 
 Laches and neglect are always discounte- 
 nanced in Equity, and will constitute a bar to 
 relief even where there has been fraud. Brown 
 v. County of Buena Vista. 95 U. S. 157, citing 
 Smith v. Clay, Amb. 645. And to let in the 
 defence it is not necessary that a foundation 
 should be laid bv averment in the answer. 
 Sullivan v. Portland &c. R. Co. 94 U. S. 806. 
 Where the lapse of time is sufficient to raise 
 the presumption of the payment of a judgment 
 on which the bill is based, a demurrer will lie. 
 Bird v. Inslee, 18 N. J. Eq. 363; Harris v. 
 Vaughn, 2 Tenn. Ch. 487. And although 
 the defence of the Statute of Limitations may 
 be made by demurrer, plea, or answer, it must 
 be somewhere set up in the pleadings, or it will 
 not avail. Ruckman v. Decker, 23 N. J. Eq. 
 283; Graham v. Nelson, 5 Humph. 605; Merri- 
 man v. Cannovan, 1 Leg. Rep. 94. But if 
 made by demurrer which is overruled, it may 
 
 trust, unless their relation has become adverse 
 and the former has openly denied the right of 
 the cestui que trust. Etting r. Marx, 4 Fed. 
 Rep. 673; Preston v. Walsh, 10 id. 315; Speidel 
 v. Henrici, 15 id. 753; Manaudes ». Mann, 22 
 
 55G 
 
 be again set up by answer, and the Court will 
 sustain it on the final hearing, if of opinion that 
 the defence should have been allowed on de- 
 murrer. Bolton v. Dickens, 2 Cent. L. J. 477, 
 a decision of Chancellor Morgan of Memphis. 
 And the defendant may avail himself of the 
 Statute of Limitations by demurrer, as well 
 where the remedy alone is barred, leaving the 
 right intact, as where the right is itself extin- 
 guished by lapse of time. Wyatt v. Luton, 10 
 Heisk. 458. 
 
 2 Per Lord Langdale in Field v. Hutchin- 
 son, 1 Beav. 600: 3 Jur. 792; see also Howard 
 v. Okeover, 3 Swanst. 421, n.; Barkworth v. 
 Young, 4 Drew. 1 : Wood r. Midgley, 5 De G. 
 M. & G. 41; Middlebrook v. Bromley, 9 Jur. 
 N. S. 614; 11 W. R. 712, Y. C. K. ; Da vies r. 
 Otty, 33 Beav. 540; 2 De G. J. & S. 238; Heard 
 i'. Pilley, L. R. 4 Ch. 548; Dolling v. Evans, 15 
 W. R. 394. A defence founded on the Statute 
 of Frauds could not, under the Rules of Court 
 of 1875, Order 19, Rule 23, be raised by demur- 
 rer, but it was to be set up as an affirmative 
 defence. Catling v. King, 5 Ch. D. 660 ; Clarke 
 v. Callow, 46 L. J. Ch. 53; Futcher v. Callow, 
 50 id. 735 ; Futcher v. Futcher, id. 735; 29 W. 
 K. 884; Shardlow v. Cotterill, W. N. (1881) 2; 
 ante, p. 365, note ; Meach v. Stone, 1 D. Chip. 
 182. In a suit for specific performance of a 
 contract in relation to land, if the agreement 
 appears in the bill to be oral, and no facts are 
 alleged to take the case out of the Statute of 
 Frauds, the defendant may demur to the bill. 
 Cozine v. Graham, 2 Paige, 177 ; Walker v. 
 Locke, 5 Cush. 90, 93; Slack v. Black, 109 
 Mass. 496; Ahrend v. Odiome, 118 Mass. 268; 
 Macey v. Childress, 2 Tenn. Ch. 438. But if 
 the agreement does not appear in the bill to be 
 oral, the proper course to take advantage of the 
 
 Oregon, 525. In England, see the Trustee Acts 
 (37 & 38 Vic. c. 57, § 8; 51 & 52 Vic. c. 59, § 8) ; 
 Re Swain, [1891] 3 Ch. 233; Re Davis, id. 119; 
 Re Barker, [1892] 2 Ch. 491; Re Gurney, Mason 
 v. Mercer, [1893] 1 Ch. 590.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. 
 
 562 
 
 this statute, as it is seldom that the bill discloses everything necessary 
 for the defence. 8 
 
 11. If it appears, by the bill, that another suit is pending relating to 
 the same matter, a defendant may demur. Such a demurrer, however, 
 will not hold, unless it appears, by the bill, that the suit already depend- 
 ing will afford to the plaintiff the same relief as he would have been 
 entitled to under the bill which is the subject of the demurrer. 4 
 
 II. The grounds upon which a bill may be demurred to, by reason of 
 a deficiency in matters of form, are, as we have seen, as follows. 5 
 1. Because the plaintiff's place of abode is not stated. 6 *2. Be- * 5G2 
 cause the facts essential to the plaintiff's right, and within his 
 own knowledge, are not alleged positively. 1 3. Because the bill is 
 deficient in certainty. 2 4. Because the plaintiff does not, by his bill, 
 offer to do equity where the rules of the Court require that he should do 
 so ; 8 or to waive penalties or forfeitures, where the plaintiff is in a 
 situation to make such waiver. 4 To these may be added : 5. The want 
 of counsel's signature to the bill ; 6 and 6. The absence of the proper 
 affidavit, in those cases in which the rules of the Court require that the 
 plaintiff's bill should be accompanied by one. 6 
 
 The grounds of demurrer before pointed out apply to the relief prayed 
 by the bill, and not to the discovery, further than as it is incidental to 
 
 Statute of Frauds is by plea or answer. Cran- 
 ston v. Smith, 6 R. I. 231 ; Dudley v. Bachelder, 
 53 Maine, 403, 406. If it is stated generally in 
 a bill that an agreement or contract was made, 
 the Court will presume it was a legal contract 
 until the contrary appears ; and the defendant 
 must either plead the fact that it was not in 
 writing, or insist upon that defence in his answer. 
 Dudley v. Bachelder, 53 Maine, 403, 406; Farn- 
 ham v. Clements, 51 Maine, 420; ante, p. 305, 
 note; infra, p. 055, note. If it appears that the 
 minds of contracting parties have not met, this 
 objection may be taken by demurrer or at the 
 hearing. Lewis v. Brass, 20 W. R. 152; Crossley 
 v. Maycock, L. R. 18 Eq. 180; Hussey v. Home 
 Payne, 4 App. Cas. 311; 8 Ch. D. 670; 1 Dan. 
 Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 535 ; Williams v. 
 Brisco, 22 Ch. D. 441 ; Beresford v. Batthyany, 
 W. N.(1882) 84, 171. Soabill is demurrableif 
 conditions precedent appear not to be fulfilled 
 in law or fact. Mnckay v. Dick, 6 App. Cas. 
 251; Winn v. Bull, 7Ch. D. 29; Hudson v. 
 Buck, id. 683; Bolton i\ Lambert, 41 Ch. D. 
 295; Harvey v. Barnard's Inn, 29 W. R. 922; 
 W.N. (188*1) 133; Hawkesworth v. Chaffey, 
 55 L. J. Ch. 335; Wood t;. Silcock, 50 L. T. 251. 
 
 3 See ante, p. 365, note. For form of de- 
 murrer, see Vol. III. 
 
 4 Law v. Rigby, 4 Bro. C. C. 60, 63 ; see 
 also Peareth ». Peareth, John. 58; Singleton 
 r. Selwyn, 9 Jur. N. S. 1149; 12 W. R. 98, 
 V. C. W. As to demurrers on the ground of 
 res judicata, see Waine v. Crocker, 10 W. R. 
 204, L. JJ.; 3 De G. F. & J. 421; Knight v. 
 Atkisson,2 Tenn. Ch. 387; Birmingham Estates 
 
 Co. v. Smith, 13 Ch. D. 506: Moss v. Anglo- 
 Egvptian Nav. Co. L. R. 1 Ch. 108; 12 Jur. 
 N. S. 13. 
 
 5 Story, Eq. PI. §§ 528, 529; Ld. Red. 206. 
 A demurrer will not hold to an irregularity of 
 practice in regard to the bringing or tiling of a 
 bill, suggesting matters of fact which do not 
 otherwise appear by the bill. Tallmadge v. 
 Lovett, 3 Edw. Ch. 563. 
 
 6 Ante, p. 357; Winnipiseogee Lake Co. r. 
 Young, 40 N. H. 42; see Howe v. Harvey, 8 
 Paige, 73. It is not a ground of demurrer that 
 the plaintiff omits to state his occupation or 
 addition. Gove v. Pettis, 4 Sandf. Ch. 403. 
 
 1 Ante, p. 630; on this head, see Smith r. 
 Kay, 7 H. L. Cas. 750, which decided that the 
 point must be raised on demurrer. 
 
 2 Ante, pp. 368, 371, 372. 
 
 3 Ante, p. 385. 
 
 * Ante, pp. 386, 387. 
 
 5 Ante, p. 312; see Graham v. Elmore, Har- 
 ring. Ch. 265. But in Gove v. Pettis, 4 Sandf. 
 Ch. 403, it was held that a demurrer could not 
 be taken for an omission of the signature of the 
 solicitor or counsel to the bill, but that it is a fit 
 subject for a motion to take the bill from the 
 files of the Court. 
 
 6 Id. p. 360; Gove v. Pettis, 4 Sandf. Ch. 
 403. The defendant is not bound to look be- 
 yond the copy of the bill, which is served on 
 his solicitor; and if that does not contain the 
 requisite affidavit or verification to give the 
 Court jurisdiction of the case, he may demur 
 to the bill on that ground. Lansing v. Pine, 
 4 Paige, 364. 
 
 557
 
 *5G3 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 the relief. 7 It has, however, been stated 8 that there are cases in which 
 a defendant may demur to the discovery sought by the bill, although 
 such demurrer will not extend to preclude the plaintiff from having the 
 relief prayed, provided he can establish his right to it by other means 
 than a discovery from the defendant himself. 
 
 In consequence of the changes which have taken place in the practice 
 of the Court of Chancery, demurrers to discovery are now of rare occur- 
 rence (the objection being almost always taken by answer) ; 9 but in 
 determining the question whether a party is bound to give the discovery 
 sought by the other side, the Court is guided by the same rules as it 
 formerly acted on in allowing or overruling demurrers to discovery. 
 These rules (which we shall now proceed to consider), therefore, still 
 remain of importance. 
 
 Demurrers to discovery may be arranged under the following heads : 10 
 I. That the discovery may subject the defendant to pains and penalties, 
 or to some forfeiture, or something in the nature of forfeiture. II. 
 That, in conscience, the defendant's right is equal to the plain- 
 * 563 tiff's. III. That the discovery sought is immaterial * to the 
 relief prayed. IV. That the discovery would be a breach of 
 professional confidence. V. That the discovery relates only to the 
 defendant's case. VI. That a third party has an interest in the dis- 
 covery, and ought not to be prejudiced. VII. That the discovery 
 might be injurious to public interests. 
 
 I. We have before seen, that in cases where the plaintiff is the person 
 who is entitled to the advantage of the penalty, or of the forfeiture, to 
 which the defendant would render himself liable by making the dis- 
 covery sought, he may obviate a demurrer by expressly waiving his 
 right to the penalty or forfeiture in his bill : 1 the effect of which waiver 
 is, to enable the defendant, in case the plaintiff should sue him for the 
 penalty, or endeavor to take advantage of the forfeiture, to apply to the 
 Court for an injunction to restrain him from proceeding. 2 But where 
 the forfeiture or penalty is not of such a nature that the plaintiff can, 
 by waiver, relieve the defendant from the consequence of his discovery, 
 a demurrer will hold ; 3 for it is a general rule that no one is bound to 
 answer so as to subject himself to punishment, in whatever manner that 
 punishment may arise, or whatever may be the nature of that punish- 
 ment, whether it arises by the Ecclesiastical Law, or by the law of the 
 land. 4 This rule is not confined to cases in which the discovery must 
 
 7 A demurrer will be allowed to a bill of 
 discovery in aid of the defence to a suit in a 
 foreign Court. Bent v. Young, 9 Sim. 180; 
 but see contra, Mitchell v. Smith, 1 Paige, 287; 
 see post, Bills of Discovery, (a) 
 
 8 Ante. p. 548; see Metier v. Metier, 18 X. J. 
 Eq. 270; 19 id. 457. 
 
 9 Cons. Ord. XV. 4; see post, Chap. XVII., 
 Answers, and see 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, §§ 10, 12. 
 
 1° For form of demurrer to discovery, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 i Ante, pp. 386, 387, and note. 
 
 2 Ante, p. 387. 
 
 3 Story, Eq. PI. § 575; March v. Davison, 
 9 Paige, 580 ; Ld. Red. 194, 195 ; 2 Story, Eq. 
 Juf . § 1494. 
 
 * Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. Sr. 243, 
 245; Harrison v. Southcote, 1 Atk. 528, 539; 
 
 (a) The rule in Bent v. Young has been re- 
 cently reconsidered and upheld in England. 
 Dreyfus v. Peruvian Guano Co. 41 Ch. D. 151; 
 43 Ch. D. 316. In America the general course 
 
 558 
 
 of decision is the other way. Mitchell v. Smith, 
 supra ; Burgess v. Smith. 2 Barb. Ch. 276 ; Post 
 v. Toledo &c. R. Co. 144 Mass. 341.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. 
 
 564 
 
 necessarily subject the defendant to pains and penalties, but it extends 
 to cases where it may do so. 5 If, therefore, a bill alleges anything 
 which, if confessed by the answer, may subject the defendant to a 
 criminal prosecution, 6 or to any particular penalties, as maintenance, 7 
 champerty, 8 (a) simony, 9 or subornation of perjury, 10 the defend- 
 ant may object to the discovery. 11 (6) In the application * of * 5G-L 
 
 see also Parkhurst v. Lowten, 2 Swanst. 214; 
 Hare on Discovery, 131, 132, where the cases 
 are classed; Brownell r. Curtis, 10 Paige, 213; 
 Livingston v. Harris, 3 Paige, 528; Patterson 
 ». Patterson, 1 Hayw. 167; Wolf v. Wolf, 2 
 Har. & G. 382; Lambert v. People, 9 Covven, 
 578; Northupt). Hatch, 6 Conn. 361; Leggettt. 
 Postley, 2 Paige, 599 ; T.'nited States r. Twenty- 
 Eight Packages &c, Gilpin, 306; Butler v. Cat- 
 lin, 1 Root, 310; Leigh v, Everhart, 4 Monroe, 
 381 ; Ocean Ins. Co. v. Field, 2 Story, 59 ; Adams 
 v. Porter, 1 Cush. 170. 
 
 But a party is bound to make discovery, al- 
 though his answer may subject him to the loss 
 of legal interest. Taylor v. Mitchell, 1 How. 
 (Miss.) 596. 
 
 5 Harrison v. Southcote, 1 Atk. 539. 
 
 6 East India Co. v. Campbell, 1 Ves. Sr. 246; 
 Chetwynd v. Lindon, 2 Ves. Sr. 450; Cartwright 
 v. Green, 8 Ves. 405; Claridge v. Hoare, 14 Ves. 
 59, 65; Maccalium v. Turton, 2 Y. & J. 183; 
 Waters v. Earl of Shaftesbury, 12 Jur. N. S. 3; 
 14 W. R. 259, V. C. S. 
 
 7 Penrice v. Parker, Rept. temp. Finch, 75; 
 Sharp v. Carter, 3 P. Wins. 375; Wallis v. Duke 
 of Portland, 3 Ves. 494; affirmed by H. L. id. 
 761; 8 Bro. P. C. 161; Mayor of London v. 
 Ainsley, 1 Anst. 158; Scott v. Miller, John. 
 220, 328; 5 Jur. N. S. 858; Harris v. Brisco, 
 17 Q. B. D. 504. 
 
 8 Hartley v. Russell, 2 S. & S. 244, 252. 
 An agreement to defray the expenses of a suit 
 in which he has no interest is champertous. 
 Hayney v. Coyne, 10 Heisk. 339. But an at- 
 torney's engagement to render services in the 
 
 (a) " An assignment pendente lite of the sub- 
 ject of a suit is not champerty or in any way 
 illegal, even though the assignor gives the as- 
 sign a power of attorney to sue in his name, 
 and agrees that he will not impede, but will 
 assist the assign." James v. Kerr, 40 Ch. D. 
 449, 457. 
 
 (6) Lamb v. Monster, 31 W. R. 117; Hun- 
 nings v. Williamson, 10 Q. B. D. 459; Dennison 
 v. Yost, 61 Md. 139. A witness or party who 
 objects, on this ground, to answering a question 
 which is innocent in form, must satisfy the 
 Court that it is reasonably probable that the 
 answer will criminate him. Ex parte Gilbert, 
 3 M. B. C. 223; Ex parte Reynolds, 20 Ch. D. 
 294; Hayman v. Rugby School, L. R. 18 Eq. 
 28, 69; Queen v. Ashwell, 16 Q. B. D. 190, 197; 
 
 prosecution of a suit, in consideration of receiv- 
 ing a share of the property recovered, is not. 
 Duke v. Harper, 2 Mo. App. 1; S. C. on appeal, 
 66 Mo. 51. And see, for recent rulings on 
 champerty, Coughlin v. N. Y. Cent. &c. R. Co. 
 71 N. Y. 445; Adye v. Hanna, 47 Iowa, 364; 
 Schomp v. Schenk, 40 N. J. L. 195; Kennedy 
 v. Brown, 13 C. B. N. S. 677; McPherson v. 
 Cox, 96 U. S. 404; Coondoou. Mookerjee, 2 App. 
 Cas. 186. 
 
 9 Att.-Gen. v. Sudel, Prec. Ch. 214; Park- 
 hurst v. Lowten, 1 Mer. 391, 401. 
 
 10 Selby».Crew,2Anst.504; Baker r.Priteh- 
 ard, 2 Atk. 389; as to discovering returns made 
 to Income Tax Commissioners, see Mitchell v. 
 Koecker, 11 Beav. 380. 
 
 11 In Livingston v. Tompkins, 3 John. Ch. 
 452, it is said that "there are numerous cases 
 establishing the rule that no one is bound to 
 answer so as to subject himself, either directly 
 or eventually, to a forfeiture or penalty, or any- 
 thing in the nature of a forfeiture or penalty." 
 See the cases there cited; Story, Eq. PI. § 583; 
 Northup v. Hatch, 6 Conn. 361; Skinner v. 
 Judson, 8 Conn. 528; Wolf v. Wolf, 2 Ilarr. & 
 G. 382; Livingston v. Harris, 3 Paige, 528; 
 United States v. Twenty-Eight Packages, Gil- 
 pin, 306. The objection by the defendants, 
 who were officers of a corporation, that a dis- 
 covery of the matters stated in the bill may 
 subject the corporation to a forfeiture of its 
 charter, is not sufficient to support a general 
 demurrer to the relief as well as to the discovery 
 sought by the bill. Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige, 
 222. 
 
 Webb v. East, 5 Ex. D. 23, 108; Harvey v. 
 Lovekin, 10 P. D. 122. There is no exemption 
 if the Statute of Limitations bars a prosecution 
 for the penalty, and it affirmatively appears 
 that no prosecution is then pending. Man- 
 chester & L. R. Co. v. Concord R. Co. (N. II.) 
 9 L. R. A. 689; Southern Ry. News Co. r. Rus- 
 sell (Ga.), 18 S. E. Rep. 40." If the witness is 
 not himself guilty of the offence, he cannot on 
 this ground refuse to produce documents before 
 a grand jury. Be Peasley, 44 Fed. Rep. 271. 
 The judge in his discretion may require an oath 
 that the answer will or may criminate the party. 
 Post, p. 569; Hill v. Campbell, L. R 10 C. P. 
 222, 247; Bowdon v. Allen, 39 L. J. C. P. 217; 
 The Mary, L. R. 2 A. & E. 319. Upon a peti- 
 tion for dissolution of marriage, discovery will 
 
 559
 
 565 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 this principle it has been held, that a married woman will not be com- 
 pelled to answer a bill which would subject her husband to a charge of 
 felony. 1 
 
 It is not necessary to the validity of an objection of this nature, that 
 the facts inquired after should have an immediate tendency to criminate 
 the defendant ; he may equally object to answering the circumstances, 
 though they have not such an immediate tendency. 2 
 
 It results from the principle above laid down, that a defendant is not 
 bound to make any discovery which may tend to show himself to have 
 been guilty of any moral turpitude, which may expose him to ecclesias- 
 tical censure : thus, it has been held, that a defendant is not bound to 
 discover whether a child was born out of lawful wedlock ; 3 nor is an 
 
 unmarried woman bound to discover whether she and the plaintiff 
 * 565 cohabited together. 4 It has been * held, however, that a woman is 
 
 bound to discover where her child was born, though it might tend 
 to show the child to be an alien. 1 It has also been held, that though 
 parties may demur to anything which may expose them to ecclesiastical 
 censure, a defendant cannot protect himself from discovery whether he 
 has or has not a legitimate son ; 2 and the objection to answering upon 
 the ground that the answer might show a defendant to be guilty of moral 
 
 i Cartwright v. Green, 8 Ves. 405, 410 ; ante, 
 p. 184; Story, Eq. PI. § 519. 
 
 2 East India Co. v. Campbell, ubi supra ; see 
 also Lee v. Read", 5 Beav. 381, 386. In Paxtou 
 V. Douglas, 19 Ves. 225, 227, Lord Eldon said: 
 "In no stage of the proceedings in this Court 
 can a party be compelled to answer any ques- 
 tion, accusing himself, or any one in a series of 
 questions that has a tendency to that effect; the 
 rule in these cases being, that he is at liberty 
 to protect himself against answering, not only 
 the direct question, whether he did what was 
 illegal, but also every question fairly appearing 
 to be put with the view of drawing from him 
 an answer containing nothing to affect him, 
 except as it is one link in a chain of proof that 
 is to affect him." See Maccallum V. Turtou, 
 and Claridge v. Hoare, vbi supra ; Thorpe v. 
 Macauley, 5 Mad. 218, 229. A defendant will 
 not be compelled to discover that which, if an- 
 swered, would tend to subject him to a penalty 
 or punishment, or which might lead to a criminal 
 accusation, or to ecclesiastical censure. Thorpe 
 v. Macauley, 5 Mad. 229 : Maccallum v. Turton, 
 2 Y. & J. 138; Leggett v. Postley, 2 Paige, 599; 
 Patterson v. Patterson, 1 Hayw. 168 ; Wolf v. 
 Wolf. 2 Harr. & G. 382; MTntyre v. Mancius, 
 15 John. 592; Sloman v. Kelley, 3 Y. & C 573; 
 Ocean Ins. Co. v. Fields, 2 Story,' 59; Bishop of 
 
 London v. Fythche, 1 Bro. C. C. (Perkins's ed.) 
 96, and note* ; Adams v. Porter, 1 Cush. 170; 
 Marsh v. Marsh, 16 N. J. Eq. 391, 397. 
 
 In case of witnesses, it is said that "many 
 links frequently compose that chain of testi- 
 mony which is necessary to convict an indi- 
 vidual of a crime, but no witness is compellable 
 to furnish any one of them against himself." 
 Marshall C. J., 1 Burr's Trial, 244; The People 
 v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229 ; Southard v. Rexford, 6 
 Cowen, 254; Bellenger v. The People, 8 Wend. 
 595; Story, Eq. PI. § 553; see post, p. 579, n. 5. 
 
 3 Att.-Gen. v. Duplessis, Parker, 163. As 
 to proof of non-access and how far parents can 
 bastardize their issue, see Anon. v. Anon. 22 
 Beav. 481; 23 Be*v. 273; Legge v. Edmonds, 
 25 L. J. Oh. 125, V. C. W.; Plowes v. Bossey, 
 2 Dr. & Sm. 145; 8 Jur.N. S. 352; Be Kideout, 
 L. R. 10 Eq. 41 ; Cannon v. Cannon, 7 Humph. 
 410; Burnaby v. Baillie, 42 Ch. D. 282; and 
 other cases collected in Taylor on Evid § 868. 
 
 4 Franco v. Bolton, 3 Ves. 368, 371.372; see 
 on this subject Benyon v. Nettleford, 3 M'N. & 
 G. 94, and the cases collected in the note, id. 
 100. 
 
 1 Att.-Gen. v. Duplessis, ubi supra ; see 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 586 and note. 
 
 2 Finch v. Finch, 2 Ves. Sr. 491, 493. 
 
 not be required from a party for the purpose of 
 proving such party guilty of adultery. Redfern 
 v. Redfern, [1891] P. 139; 64 L. T. 68; 7 T. L. 
 R. 157; Branford v. Branford, 4 P. D. 72. The 
 objection that an accounting sought by the bill 
 
 560 
 
 may produce evidence for a criminal accusation 
 does not prevent the trial of the issues in Equity 
 under the rules of evidence in civil cases. War- 
 ren v. Holbrook, 95 Mich. 185.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. 
 
 * 566 
 
 turpitude, appears to be confined to those cases where the moral tur- 
 pitude is of such a nature as would lay the party open to proceedings in 
 the Ecclesiastical or other Courts. In other cases, a defendant is bound 
 to answer fully, notwithstanding his answer may cast a very great degree 
 of reflection on his moral character, 3 or may render him liable for 
 fraudulent dealings. 4 
 
 Where the discovery might subject a defendant to penalties to which 
 the plaintiff is not entitled, and which he consequently cannot waive, 
 yet, if the defendant has expressly covenanted not to plead or demur 
 to the discovery sought, he will be compelled to answer. 5 (a) And where 
 a person, by his own agreement, subjects himself to a payment, in the 
 nature of a penalty, if he does a particular act, a demurrer to a discovery 
 of that act will not hold. 6 
 
 * Upon the principle that the Court will not allow a man to * 566 
 contradict what he has, either by his actions or express words, 
 asserted, it has been held, that a person who represents himself to be a 
 broker of the city of London, and is employed in that character, cannot 
 afterwards protect himself from discovery on the ground that he was not 
 licensed to act as broker, and that, by answering, he may expose himself 
 to penalties. 1 
 
 It would appear, that where a defendant is entitled to the protec- 
 tion of the Court against a discovery, tending to establish a criminal 
 charge, he cannot deprive himself of the benefit of it by any agreement 
 whatever. 2 
 
 3 Per Lord Eldon, in Parkhurst v. Lowten, 
 1 Mer. 400. A party may be compelled to 
 make discovery of any act of moral turpitude, 
 which does not amount to a public offence or 
 an indictable crime. Story, Eq. PI. §§ 595, 
 506; Hare, Discov. 142; Macauley v. Shackwell, 
 1 Bligh, N. S. 121; S. C. 2 Russ. 550, note; 
 Glynn v. Houston, 1 Keen, 229. 
 
 4 Gartside v. Outran^ 3 Jur. N. S. 39, V. C. 
 W. Therefore, where a defendant demurred 
 to such part of the bill as sought a discovery 
 from her as to a conspiracy or attempt to set 
 up a bastard child, which she pretended to have 
 by a person who kept her, and was desirous to 
 have a child by her, the demurrer was over- 
 ruled, because the conspiracy, or attempt to set 
 up the bastard, not being alleged to have been 
 for the purpose of defeating the heir, was not of 
 itself an offence. Chetwynd v. Lindon, 2 Ves. 
 Sr. 450. 
 
 5 South Sea Co. v. Bumsted, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 
 77, pi. 16; East India Co. v. Atkins, cited id.; 
 1 Stra. 168; Paxton v. Douglas, 16 Ves. 239. 
 
 6 Ld. Red. 195; Morse v. Buckworth, 2 Vem. 
 443; East India Co. r. Neave, 5 Ves. 173, 185. 
 Thus, where a lessee covenanted not to dig 
 loam, with a proviso that, if he did, he should 
 pay to the lessor 205. a cart load, and he after- 
 wards dug great quantities: upon a bill being 
 filed by the lessor for a discovery of the quanti- 
 ties, waiving any possible forfeiture, a demurrer 
 by the lessee, because the discovery might sub- 
 ject him to a payment by way of penalty, was 
 overruled. Ld. Red. 195. Upon the same 
 principle, where servants to a company bind 
 themselves to pay a specified sum, in case of a 
 breach of the regulations of their service, they 
 cannot protect themselves from answering, as to 
 breaches, because they would be subject to a 
 penalty. African Co. v. Parish, 2 Vern. 244; 
 East India Co. v. Neave, ubimpra. 
 
 1 Green v. Weaver, 1 Sim. 404, 432; Robin- 
 son v. Kitchin, 21 Beav. 365; 2 Jur. N. S. 57; 
 id. 294; 8 De G. M. & G. 88; see Storv, Eq. 
 PI. § 589; State v. Maury, 2 Del. Ch. 141. 
 
 2 Lea v. Reed, 5 Beav. 381, 385. This ap- 
 
 («) See Hukill v. Guffey, 37 W. Va. 425. A 
 Court of Equity never inflicts a penalty, al- 
 though it often relieves therefrom. Fletcher v. 
 New Orleans R. Co. 20 Fed. Rep. 345; Trow 
 City D. Co. v. Curtin, 36 id. 829; Mactier v. 
 Osborn, 146 Mass. 399. Bills of foreclosure, 
 and bills for an account of property retained to 
 
 vol. i. — 36 
 
 secure the purchase money, do not seek to 
 enforce a forfeiture. Field v. Ashley, 79 Mich. 
 231. As forfeitures are not favored, covenants 
 in a lease are construed against the party who 
 seeks the forfeiture. Faylor v. Brice (Ind.), 34 
 N. E. Rep. 833. Forfeitures will not be declared 
 upon implication. Waterman v. Clark,58 Vt. 601. 
 
 561
 
 *5G7 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 The rule that a defendant is not bound to answer, in cases which may 
 subject him to punishment or penalties, appears to be liable to modifi- 
 cation, in some cases, where the facts charged in the bill would amount 
 to conspiracy : 3 and also, in certain cases where the defendants would 
 appear to be guilty of fraud, or of publishing a libel which might be the 
 subject of indictment, 4 as in the cases which have frequently occurred 
 in the Court of Exchequer, in which it was the practice of underwriters, 
 where policies of insurance were found to be affected with gross frauds 
 to bring the parties into Court, and compel them to answer, by stating in 
 their bills frauds which would have been indictable.? 
 
 The Legislature has, in some cases, expressly provided that parties 
 to transactions rendered illegal by statute, shall be compelled to answer 
 bills in Equity for the discovery of such transactions ; in such cases, 
 of course, the defendant cannot protect himself from the discovery 
 required, on the ground that it will render him liable to the penalties 
 imposed by the statute itself. 6 Thus, trustees and other persons 
 * 567 who are * liable to a criminal prosecution for the fraudulent mis- 
 application of moneys intrusted to them, are, nevertheless, bound 
 to give discovery, in answer to a bill in Equity. 1 So, also, a person in 
 fringing a trade-mark, though liable to prosecution, must give discovery 
 in Equity. 2 (a) 
 
 If a party be liable to a penalty or forfeiture, provided he is sued 
 within a limited time, and the suit is not commenced till after the limi- 
 tation has expired, the defendant will be bound to answer fully, even 
 though, by so doing, he may expose his character and conduct to reflec- 
 tion ; 3 and it seems, that the plaintiff is entitled to an answer, if the 
 
 pears to be confined to criminal cases, see 
 observation of Sir J. Romilly M. R. in Robinson 
 v. Kitchin, 21 Beav. 3G5, 370. 
 
 3 Dnmmer v. Chippenham, 14 Yes. 245. 251 ; 
 see also Lord Eldon's observation in Mayor of 
 London v. Levy, 8 Ves. 404: and Hare on Disc. 
 143. 
 
 •» See Wilmot v. Maceabe, 4 Sim. 2G3; Story, 
 Eq. PI § 597. In March v. Davidson, 9 Paige, 
 580, Mr. Chancellor Walworth held, that in the 
 case of libel, the defendant could not be com- 
 pelled in a bill of discovery to discover anything 
 which would make him liable to an indictment 
 criminally; but he was compellable to discover 
 other facts in support of the action, which 
 would not subject him to a criminal prosecu- 
 tion, or to a penalty or forfeiture. 
 
 5 See Macaulav v. Shackell, 1 Bligh, N. 
 S. 96. 
 
 6 See post, p. 579, n. 4. The New York 
 
 (a) See now 4G & 47 Yic. c. 57, § 58; Saun- 
 ders r. Wiel, [1892] 2 Q. B. 18, 321: Adams v. 
 Batley, 18 Q. B. D. 625. Upon a bill for in- 
 fringing the plaintiff's copyright, a demurrer 
 lies to an allegation in the bill, requiring an 
 
 562 
 
 Revised Statutes, and a statute passed since, 
 have provisions which compel a defendant to 
 make a discovery in many cases where criminal 
 prosecutions and penalties can take place and 
 be executed. Thus the defendant must answer 
 to a gaming transaction at the suit of the loser 
 or any other person. 1 Rev. Stat. 664, § 19. 
 As to money illegally received for brokerage, 
 id. 709, § 4. As to money and things taken 
 usurious!}', id. 772, § 6. And also in all cases 
 where the defendant is charged with being a 
 party to a fraudulent conveyance. New York 
 Laws of 1833, p. 17. In all these cases, how- 
 ever, the effect of the discovery is specially 
 limited, by statute, to the object of the civil 
 proceedings, in regard to which it is sought. 
 Graham on Jurisdiction 493. 
 
 i 24 & 25 Vic. c. 96, §§ 75-86. 
 
 2 25 & 26 Vic. c. 88, § 11. 
 
 s Parkhurst r. Lowten, 1 Mer. 400; Story, 
 
 answer, as to the number of copies sold and on 
 hand of the pirated work. Chapman V. Ferry, 
 12 Fed. Rep. 693; see Adams v. Batley, 56 L. T. 
 770. 
 
 1
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. * 568 
 
 liability ceases after the defence has been put in, and before it is heard, 
 even though there was a liability at the time of putting in his defence. 
 This has been decided upon a plea, 4 and upon exceptions to an answer ; 5 
 and there is no doubt that the same decision would be come to upon 
 demurrer. 
 
 It has been before stated, that if the executor or administrator of a 
 parson bring a bill for tithes, he need not offer to accept the single 
 value : 6 the reason of which rule is, that the treble value is not given, 
 by the statute, to the representatives ; and there can be no doubt that the 
 same reason will be valid against allowing a demurrer, in all cases where 
 the penalty is personal, and does not survive to the representatives of 
 the person entitled to sue for it. 7 
 
 A defendant cannot refuse to give discovery on the ground that it will 
 expose him to penalties in a foreign country. 8 
 
 Some of the cases in which a demurrer will lie to a bill, on the ground 
 that the discovery required will expose the defendant to a forfeiture, 
 have been before referred to, 9 for the purpose of illustrating the prin- 
 ciple, that where it is in the power of a plaintiff to waive such forfeiture, 
 his omission to do so may be taken advantage of by demurrer. 10 The 
 bill, however, will be equally liable to this species of objection, in cases 
 where the plaintiff has no power to waive the effects of the discovery, 
 as in those where he has such power, and omits to exercise it ; there- 
 fore, where the discovery sought by an information would have 
 subjected the * defendants to a quo icarranto, a demurrer was * 568 
 allowed. 1 
 
 The principle, that a defendant is not bound to give discovery which 
 will expose him to a forfeiture, applies equally, whether the forfeiture is 
 enforceable in Equity or at Law. a 
 
 The rule applies only to cases where a forfeiture, or something in the 
 nature of a forfeiture, may be incurred: where the discovery sought 
 merely extends to the performance of a condition upon failure in which 
 
 F.q. PI. § 598; Skinner v. Judson, 8 Conn. 528; had taken place, in which it was alle-ed <he 
 
 but see Northup v. Hatch, Conn. 361; Lam- had married without consent : Lord Hardwicke 
 
 bert v. People, 9 Cowen, 528. allowed the demurrer, as she could not answer 
 
 4 Trinity House r. Burge, 2 Sim. 411. to the marriage without showing, at the same 
 
 & Williams v. Farrington, 3 Bro. C. C. 38. time, that it was against consent. Chancey v. 
 
 6 Ante ' P- 387 - Fenhoulet, 2 Ves. Sr. 265 , S. C. nom. Chauncev 
 
 7 See Hare 011 Disc - 148 - V. Tahourden, 2 Atk. 392; see also Hambrook 
 
 8 King of the Two Sicilies v. Wilcox, 1 Sim. v. Smith, 17 Sim. 209; 16 Jur. 144; Cooke r. 
 N. S. 301; 15 Jur. 214; distinguished in United Turner, 14 Sim. 218; 8 Jur. 703. In a case of 
 States r. M'Rea, L. Ii. 4 Eq. 327; L. B. 3 Ch. this nature, where the husband and wife put in 
 79. See Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus, 38 Ch. separate answers, under an order for that pur- 
 
 ■ 348- pose, and the husband, by his answer, admitted 
 
 a te ' PP ' 38G ' :587 ' the marria ge without consent, but the wife 
 
 Story, Eq. PI. §§ 580, 581; Lansing v. omitted to do so, Lord Talbot, upon exceptions 
 
 Pine, 4 Paige, 309; ante, p. 387. being taken to her answer, said, that be could 
 
 i Att.-Gen. o. Reynolds, 1 Eq.Cas. Abr. 131, not reconcile himself to compelling a wife to 
 
 pi. 10. In like manner, where a legacy was confess that by which she might forfeit all she 
 
 given to a woman, on her marriage, with a con- had in the world, and beld the answer to be 
 
 dition, that if she married without the consent sufficient. Wrotteslev v. Bendish, 3 P. Wins. 
 
 of the trustees under the will, the legacy was 236, 239; ante, p. 180*. 
 
 to be forfeited, and a bill was filed against the 2 Att.-Gen. r. Lucas, 2 Hare, 566. 
 
 legatee for a discovery whether any marriage 
 
 563
 
 in 
 
 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 a limitation over is to take effect, the defendant cannot protect himself 
 from the discovery. 8 A demurrer, also, will not prevail where the dis- 
 covery is of a matter which shows the defendant disqualified from 
 having any interest or title : as whether a person claiming a real estate, 
 under a devise, be an alien, and consequently incapable of taking by 
 purchase. 4 A distinction, however, appears to exist, in this respect, 
 between incapacities which are the result of general principles of Law, 
 and those which are imposed by the Legislature, by way of penalty or 
 
 forfeiture ; thus, before the repeal of the statutes imposing dis- 
 * 569 abilities upon * persons professing the Popish religion, 1 it was 
 
 held, that a defendant was not obliged to discover whether he 
 was a Papist or not. 2 Upon the same principle, it has been held, that 
 where a bill sought a discovery whether a clergyman had been pre- 
 sented to a second living which avoided the first, under the statute 
 21 Hen. VIII. , a demurrer to the discovery of that fact would lie : 
 because the incapacity of holding the first living, incurred by the accept- 
 ance of the second, was in the nature of a penalty imposed by the 
 statute. 3 
 
 A defendant, in order to protect himself from answering, on the 
 ground that the discovery of the matters inquired after would expose, or 
 tend to expose him to penalties, must state upon oath his belief that 
 such would be the case : a submission of the question to the Court is 
 not sufficient. 4 
 
 II. If a defendant has, in conscience, a right equal to that claimed 
 by a person filing a bill against him, though not clothed with a perfect 
 legal title, a Court of Equity will not compel him to make any discovery 
 which may hazard his title, 5 and if the matter appear clearly on the 
 face of the bill, a demurrer will hold. 6 The most obvious case is that 
 
 of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice of the 
 *570 plaintiff's claim. 7 («) * Upon the same ground, a jointress may, 
 
 3 Thus, where a husband, by will, gave sin 
 estate to his wife, whilst she continued his 
 widow, with a limitation over in case of her se- 
 cond marriage, and the remainder-man brought 
 a bill against her, in which he sought a discov- 
 ery of her second marriage: upon the defendant 
 demurring to the discovery, as subjecting her 
 to a forfeiture, Lord Talbot overruled the de- 
 murrer. Cited, Chauncey v. Tahourden, 2 Atk. 
 393; Chancey t\ Fenhoulet, 2 Ves. Sr. 265; 
 Lucas v. Evans, 3 Atk. 260; Hambrook r. Smith, 
 ubi siiprn ; see contra, Monnins v. Monnins, 2 
 Ch. Rep. 68; Story, Eq. PI. § 579, note. 
 
 4 Att.-Gen. v. Duplessis, Parker, 144. 
 
 1 11 & 12 Will. III. c, 4, § 4. 
 
 2 Smith v. Read, 1 Atk. 526; Harrison v. 
 Southcote, ib. 528; 2 Ves. Sr. 389, 395. 
 
 3 Boteler v. Allington, 3 Atk. 453, 458. 
 
 * Scott v. Miller (No. 2), John. 328; 5 Jur. 
 N. S. 858; ante, p. 563, note (b). 
 
 5 Story, Eq. PI. §§ 603, 604 a; Howell v. Ash- 
 more, 9 N. J. Eq. 82. 
 
 6 Ld. Red. 199; see Glegg v. Legh, 4 Mad. 
 193, 207. 
 
 7 Ld. Red. 199 ; Jerrard v. Saunders, 2 Ves. 
 Jr. 458 ; see Sweet v. Southcote, 2 Bro. C. C. 
 66. The protection which Equity throws 
 around an innocent purchaser, applies not only 
 
 (a) See Weeks v. Milwaukee &c. R. Co. 
 78 Wis. 501, 525 ; Shropshire v Lyle, 31 Fed. 
 Rep. 694; Swett v. Stark, id. 858. The de- 
 fence of purchase for value without notice 
 may be raised by demurrer when it appears 
 upon the bill ; otherwise, the defence, being 
 affirmative, must be raised by plea or answer. 
 Greaves V. Atkinson, 68 Miss. 598. One who 
 
 564: 
 
 takes a conveyance for a previously existing 
 debt, is not a purchaser for value. People's 
 Savings Bank v. Bates, 120 U. S. 556; Gest v. 
 Packwood, 34 Fed. Rep. 368. As to quit-claim 
 deeds, see post, p. 675, note (a). Mere rumors 
 of defects in title are not notice demanding in- 
 vestigation. Satterfield v. Malone, 35 Fed. Rep. 
 445.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. 
 
 570 
 
 in many cases, demur to a bill filed against her for a discovery of her 
 jointure deed, if the plaintiff is not capable of confirming, or the bill 
 does not offer to confirm, her jointure, and the facts appear sufficiently 
 upon the face of the bill : though, ordinarily, advantage is taken of this 
 defence by plea. 1 
 
 III. A defendant is not compellable to discover any thing immaterial 
 to the relief prayed by the bill. 2 Upon this ground, upon a bill filed by 
 
 to bills of relief, but also to bills of discovery. 
 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1502. Equity will not take 
 the least step against him and will allow him to 
 take every advantage which the law gives him; 
 for there is nothing which can attach itself 
 upon his conscience, in such a case, in favor of 
 an adverse claim. Id. § 1505; 1 id. § 410 ; 
 Wood v. Mann, 1 Sumner, 507; McNeil v. 
 Magee, 5 Mason, 269; Vattier v. Hinde, 7 
 Peters, 252 ; Fitzsimmons v. Ogden, 7 Cranch, 
 2; Boone v. Chile*, 10 Peters, 177; Payne 
 v. Compton, 2 Y. & C. 457; Story, Eq. PI. 
 § 603; Howell v. Ashmore, 9 N. J. Eq. 82. 
 And so a purchaser, with notice from an 
 innocent purchaser without notice, is entitled 
 to the like protection. For otherwise, it would 
 happen that the title of such a bona fide 
 purchaser would become unmarketable in his 
 hands. 2 Story, Eq. PI. Jur. § 150:3 a: 1 id. 
 410, and cases cited; Varick v. Briggs, G Paige, 
 323; Bennett v. Walker, 1 West, 130; Jackson 
 v. McChesney, 7 Cowen, 360 ; Jackson v. 
 Henry, 10 John. 185; Jackson v. Ewer, 8 John. 
 573; Demarest v. Wyncoop, 3 John. 147. But 
 where a bill is brought for discovery and to set 
 aside a mortgage, which the plaintiff alleges 
 was taken by the defendant with intent to 
 defraud the plaintiff, the defendant cannot, by 
 demurring to the bill, avoid answering and dis- 
 closing the time when his mortgage was exe- 
 cuted, or whether he claims to hold the. land by 
 virtue of it ; or from disclosing, and, if in his 
 power, producing the note which the mortgage 
 purports to secure; or from stating when, where, 
 and in whose presence, and for what, the note 
 was given ; or from whom the consideration was 
 received, and to whom paid. Burns p. Hobbs, 
 29 Maine, 273; sen post, pp. 579, 580. 
 
 In Howell v. Ashmore, 9 N. J. Eq. 82, 
 it was held that when the defendant is charged 
 with a fraud, and that he has procured a 
 title fraudulently, and is fraudulently setting 
 it up to defeat the plaintiff, the Court of Chan- 
 cery may compel such fraud-doer to disclose 
 the fact alleged as a fraud, and all the circum- 
 stances attending it, in order that the Court 
 may determine whether those circumstances 
 establish the fraud. And it is a proper object 
 of a bill of discovery to ascertain, in a case 
 where the defendant's title can prevail only 
 upon the ground of his being a bona fide pur- 
 chaser, without notice of the plaintiff's title, 
 
 whether he had such notice, and to call upon 
 him to disclose all the circumstances which 
 may go to probe his conscience upon that point. 
 Howell v. Ashmore, 9 N. J. Eq. 82; see post, 
 p. 531, note. 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 199; Chamberlain v. Knapp, 1 
 Atk. 52; Senhouse v. Earl, 2 Yes. Sr. 450; see 
 also Leech v. Trollop, id. 662, from which it 
 appears, that a widow is not bound to discover 
 her jointure deed, by her answer (even where 
 the bill offers to confirm it) till the confirmation 
 has been effected; see post, Chap. XLII., Pro- 
 duction of Documents. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 191; Desborough v. Curlewis, 3 
 Y. & Coll. 175; AVood v. Hitchings, 3 Beav. 
 504; Kay v. Hargreaves, 14 L. T. N. S. 281. 
 The plaintiff in a bill must show the materiality 
 of the discovery sought. It is the language of 
 some of the reported cases, that a party seeking 
 a discovery even in aid of a suit at Law must 
 show affirmatively, in his bill, that the right 
 which he seeks to enforce at Law cannot be 
 established without the discovery sought. 
 Whitesides v. Lafferty, 9 Hump. 27; Vaughan 
 v. Central Pac. R. Co., 4 Sawyer, 280. But the 
 weight of authority is clearly otherwise, and 
 limits the requirement to bills which seek to 
 give jurisdiction to the Court to grant relief 
 because of the discovery. March r. Davison, 
 9 Paige, 580; Metier v. Metier, 19 N. J. Eq. 
 457; Peck v. Ashley, 12 Met. 478; Continental 
 Ins. Co. v. Webb, 54 Ala. 697. And in the 
 latter class of cases, where jurisdiction to give 
 relief depends on discovery, it has been held 
 that the bill will not lie against a corporation, 
 which answers only under its corporate seal. 
 Vaughan v. Central Pac. R. Co., 4 Sawyer, 
 280. The contrary was held by Brown, U. S. 
 Dist. J. in Vaughan v. East Tenn. and Va. R. 
 Co. 9 Chi. Leg. News, 255. The fact, in such 
 cases, that the plaintiff is entitled to the dis- 
 covery does not, necessarily, entitle him also to 
 an account; but where the case is complicated, 
 or where, from other circumstances, the remedy 
 at Law will not give adequate relief, a Court of 
 Equity will take jurisdiction. Magic Ruffle Co. 
 v. Elm City Co., 14 Blatch. 109. Where the 
 bill seeks relief which the Court has no power 
 to grant, and also seeks a discovery, the defend- 
 ant may demur to the whole hill, if it do not 
 aver that a suit at Law is pending, or is about 
 to be brought, in which a discovery may be 
 
 566
 
 571 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 a mortgagor against a mortgagee to redeem, and seeking a discovery 
 whether the mortgagee was a trustee, a demurrer to the discovery was 
 allowed : for, as there was no trust declared upon the mortgage deed, 
 it was immaterial to the plaintiff whether there was any trust reposed 
 in the defendant or not. 3 But in general, if it can be supposed that 
 
 the discovery may in any way be material to the plaintiff, for 
 * 571 * the purposes of the suit, the defendant will be compelled to 
 
 make it ; * thus, where a bill called for a discovery of cases laid 
 before counsel, and their opinion, Lord Eldon held, that the plaintiff had 
 no right to a discovery of the opinions of counsel, but only of the cases. 2 
 And now, the cases, if prepared subsequently to, or in contemplation of, 
 the litigation, are also protected. 3 
 
 IV. The last case brings us to the consideration of those causes of 
 demurrer to discovery, which are the consequence of the privilege 
 resulting from professional confidence. 4 The privilege conferred by this 
 species of confidence applies, though in a different degree, to both the 
 adviser and the client. 5 The application of the rule, with regard to pro- 
 fessional confidence, to discovery required from the client, is exemplified 
 in a case above referred to, 6 in which Lord Eldon, as we have seen, 
 held, that if the demurrer had been confined to the discovery of the 
 opinions, it would have been good; and the rule has since been extended 
 to exempt a defendant from the discovery of the case itself, and to all 
 confidential communications which have passed in the progress of the 
 cause itself, and with reference to it before it was instituted ; 7 and also 
 to letters written by a defendant to his solicitor, after a dispute between 
 him and the plaintiff had arisen, with the view to taking the 'opinion of 
 counsel upon the matter in question, and which afterwards became the 
 
 material. Mitchell v. Green, 10 Met. 101; 
 Pease v. Pease, 8 Met. 395. 
 
 The objection of immateriality may be to 
 the whole bill, or to a part of the bill, or to a 
 part only of the interrogatories, or to a parti- 
 cular defendant only. Story, Eq. PI. § 5G8; 
 Hare on Diseov. 159-1 01. For form of a de- 
 murrer for immaterality, see Story, Eq. PI. 
 § 567 ; Willis, 475. 
 
 3 Harvey v. Morris, Rep. temp. Finch, 21-1. So, 
 where a bill was filed by the lord of a borough, 
 praying a discovery whether a person applying 
 to be admitted a tenant was a trustee or not, a 
 demurrer was allowed: Lord Montague v. Dud- 
 man, 2 Yes. Sr. 39G, 398; and where a bill was 
 brought for real estate, and sought discovery 
 of proceedings in the Ecclesiastical Court upon 
 a grant of administration, the defendant de- 
 murred, successfully, to that discovery. Baker 
 v. Pritchard, 2 Atk. 388. In like manner, 
 where a bill was filed to establish an agreement 
 entered into before marriage, by which a sepa- 
 rate estate was secured to the defendant's wife, 
 and praying a discover}'- of several unkind- 
 nesses and hardships which the defendant, as it 
 was pretended, had used towards his wife, to 
 make her recede from the agreement, and the 
 
 5G6 
 
 defendant demurred to the discovery, the de- 
 murrer was allowed. Hincks r. Xelthorpe, 1 
 Vern. 204. 
 
 i Ld. Red. 193. 
 
 2 Richards r. Jackson, 18 Yes. 472. 
 
 3 Post, p. 573. 
 
 4 Story, Eq. PI. §§ 599-602 ; 1 Greenl. Ev. 
 § 535 et seq., and cases in notes; Gresley Eq. ' 
 Ev. 278-284; Brown r. Pay son, 6 X. H. 443; 
 Foster v. Hall, 12 Pick. 89; Wright v. Mayo, 
 Sumner's Yes. 280 a, and notes; Aiken v. Kil- 
 burne, 27 Maine, 251; Brazier r. Fortune, 10 
 Ala. 51G ; Beeson v. Beeson, 9 Barr, 279. 
 
 5 See also, on this subject, post, Chap. XLII., 
 Production of Documents. And it is quite 
 possible that the client may be compelled to 
 disclose the facts when his professional adviser 
 would be bound to withhold them. Preston r. 
 Carr, 1 Y. & J. 175, 179; Hare, Discov. 174, 
 175; Greenlaw p. King, 1 Beav. 137. 
 
 6 Richards V. Jackson, supra. 
 
 7 Garland v. Scott, 3 Sim. 396; Bolton v. 
 Liverpool, id. 4S7 T 487; 1 M. & K. 88, 93; 
 Hughes v. Biddulph, 4 Russ. 190; Woods r. 
 Woods, 4 Hare, 83, 86; Jenkyns p. Bushby. L. 
 R. 2 Eq. 547 ; 12 Jur. X. S. 558; 35 L. J." Ch. 
 400, V. C. K.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. 
 
 0V4 
 
 subject of the suit. 8 The rule also extends to all observations, notes, 
 and remarks made by counsel upon their briefs, but the briefs them- 
 selves, so far as they are copies of matter otherwise publici juris, and 
 counsel's indorsement, or note of any order made by the Court, 10 (a) are 
 not privileged. 
 
 The rule has been adopted out of regard to the interests of justice, 
 -which cannot be upholden, and to the administration of justice, which 
 cannot go on, without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in the 
 practice of the Courts, and in those matters affecting rights and obli- 
 gations which form the subject of all judicial proceedings. If the 
 privilege did not exist at all, * every one would be thrown upon * 572 
 his own legal resources ; deprived of all professional assistance, 
 a man would not venture to consult any skilful person, or would only 
 dare to tell his counsellor half his case. 1 Unless, however, the com- 
 munication has a direct reference to the subject of the dispute, the party 
 himself has no privilege : he is, in other respects, bound to disclose 
 all he knows and believes and thinks respecting his own case ; and he 
 must disclose the cases he has laid before counsel for their opinion, 
 unconnected with the suit itself. 2 
 
 8 Vent v. Pacey, 4 Russ. 193; Greenough v. 
 Gaskell, 1 M. & K. 98, 101. 
 
 9 Walsham v. Stainton, 2 H. & M. 1; see 
 re Brown. 42 L. T. 501 ; Lyell v. Kennedy, 27 
 Ch. D. 1.26; 9 App. Cas. 81. 
 
 M Nicholl v. Jones, 13 W. R. 451. V. C. W., 
 2 II. & M. 588, which also holds that the notes 
 of a shorthand writer by one of the parties are 
 not privileged so far as they merely describe 
 what took place in Court, but all notes or 
 observation thereon, and all parts thereof which 
 do not relate to the proceedings in Court, are 
 privileged. 
 
 1 Per Lord Brougham, in Greenough v. 
 Gaskell, 1 M. & K. 103. The client as well as 
 the attorney may refuse to testify to what was 
 said between them in professional confidence. 
 State o. White, 19 Kan. 445. 
 
 2 1 M. & K. 100, 101. Sir James Wigram, 
 V. C, thus states the history of the law upon 
 this subject : " The first point decided upon 
 this subject was, that communications between 
 solicitor and client pending litigation, and with 
 reference to such litigation, were privileged; 
 upon this there is not at this day any question. 
 The next contest was upon communications 
 made before litigation, but in contemplation of, 
 and with reference to, litigation which was 
 expected and afterwards arose; and it was held, 
 that the privilege extended to these cases also. 
 A third question then arose, with regard to 
 communications after the dispute between the 
 parties, followed by litigation, but not in con- 
 templation of. or with reference to, that litiga- 
 
 tion; and these communications were also pro- 
 tected. Bolton r. Liverpool, 3 Sim. 4G7, 487; 1 
 M. & K. 88, 93; Hughes v. Biddulph, 4 Russ. 
 190; Vent v. Pacey, id. 193; Clagett v. Phillips, 
 2 Y. & C. C. C. 82, 86; 7 Jur. 31; 1 Greenl. Ev. 
 § 240; Story. Eq.Pl. § 600 ; Beltzhoover v. Black- 
 stock, 3 Watts, 20; Foster v. Hall, 12 Pick. 89, 
 92, 98, 99. A fourth point which appears to have 
 called for decision, was the title of a defendant 
 to protect from discovery, in the suit of one 
 party, cases or statements of fact made on his 
 behalf by or for his solicitor or legal adviser, 
 on the subject-matter in question, after litiga- 
 tion commenced or in contemplation of litiga- 
 tion, on the same subject, with other persons, with 
 the view of asserting the same right. This was 
 the case of Combe v. London, 1 Y. & C. Ch. 
 631, 650; 4 H. L. Cas. 1089; see also Holmes 
 v. Baddeley, 1 Phil. 476, 480; 6 Beav. 521. 
 The question in suit was the right of the cor- 
 poration to certain nietage dues, and the answer 
 stated that other persons had disputed the right 
 of the corporation to metage, and that they had 
 in their possession cases which had been pre- 
 pared with a view to the assertion of their rights 
 against each other parties, in contemplation of 
 litigation, or after it had actually commenced; 
 Sir J. L. Knight Bruce held that those cases, 
 relating to the same question, but having re- 
 ference to disputes with other persons, were 
 within the privilege; and I perfectly concur 
 with that decision." Lord Walsingham v. 
 Goodricke, 3 Hare, 122. 
 The case before Sir James Wigram was 
 
 (a) What passes in open Court is not privi- 
 leged, and therefore a transcript of shorthand 
 notes of proceedings there is not privileged. 
 
 Rawstone v. Preston Corporation, 30 Ch. D. 
 116: re Worswick, 38 Ch. D. 370; see Learoyd 
 v. Halifax Joint Stock B. Co. [1893] 1 Ch. 686. 
 
 567
 
 574 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 * 573 * The privilege arising from professional confidence, as it respects 
 
 the legal advisers, is of a more extended nature : " As regards them, 
 it does not appear that the protection is qualified by any reference 
 
 * 574 to proceedings pending or in contemplation. 1 (a) If, touching * mat- 
 
 a bill for specific performance by a purchaser, 
 and during the treaty for the sale and pur- 
 chase of the estate, but before any dispute 
 had arisen, the defendant, the vendor, from 
 time to time consulted his solicitor on the 
 subject, and written communications passed be- 
 tween them. A question arose, upon a motion 
 for the production of documents, whether 
 these communications were privileged, regard 
 being had to the circumstance that they 
 took place before any dispute arose, though 
 with reference to the very subject in respect of 
 which that dispute had since arisen; and his 
 Honor decided, chiefly upon the authority of 
 Radcliffe v. Fursman, 2 Bro. P. C. ed. Toml. 
 514 (and see Mornington v. Mornington, 2 J. & 
 H. 697), that such communications were privi- 
 leged, so far only as they might be proved to 
 contain legal advice or opinions, but not other- 
 wise. See observations of V. C. Wood on 
 Lord Walsingham v. Goodricke, in Manser v. 
 Dix, 1 K. & J. 451, 453. Radcliffe v. Fursman 
 is commonly referred to as a leading case, upon 
 the extent to which the privilege applies, in 
 protecting cases laid before counsel for their 
 opinion. The defendant, in that cause, de- 
 murred to so much of the bill as required him 
 to discover an alleged case, the name of the 
 counsel, and the opinion given upon it. The 
 demurrer was overruled as to the first point, 
 but allowed as to the second and third, by Lord 
 King, and the decision was affirmed in the 
 House of Lords. This decision has been fre- 
 quently mentioned with disapprobation ; but 
 having been made by the House of Lords, its 
 authority is recognized, though only to the 
 extent to which it strictly applies. Lord 
 Brougham, in commenting upon it, observed: 
 " Even by the report, and certainly by the 
 
 (a) See also Lyell v. Kennedy, 9 App. Cas. 
 81; 8 id. 217; 23 Ch. D. 387;' 27 Ch. D. 1 ; 
 Mayor of Bristol v. Cox, 20 Ch. D. 078; 
 Roberts v. Oppenheim, id. 732; Lowden v. 
 Blakey, 23 Q. B. D. 332; Re Holloway, 12 
 P. D. 107; Turton v. Barber, L. R. 17 Eq. 329; 
 Wilson v. Northampton Ry. Co. L. R. 14 Eq. 
 477. See Foster v. Hall," 12 Pick. 89. So 
 communications to a solicitor with reference 
 to anticipated litigation made through inter- 
 mediate agents, verbally or by letter, as well as 
 communications between the client and unpro- 
 fessional agents whom he employs under the 
 advice of the solicitor for the purposes of the 
 litigation, are privileged. Anderson v. Bank 
 
 568 
 
 printed cases, which I have examined, together 
 with my noble and learned predecessor, it ap- 
 pears plain, that the record did not show any 
 suit to have been instituted, or even threatened, 
 at time the case was stated for the opinion 
 of counsel; and the decision being upon the 
 demurrer, the Court had no right to know any 
 thing which the record did not disclose." " So 
 far this decision rules, that a case laid before 
 counsel is not protected; that it must be dis- 
 closed. But the decision does not rule that 
 disclosure must be made of a case laid before 
 counsel in reference to, or in contemplation of, 
 or pending the suit or action, for the purposes 
 of which the production is sought." See Bol- 
 ton v. Liverpool, 1 M. & K. 95, 96; C. P. O op. 
 temp. Brough. 24, 25; see Nias v. Northern 
 and Eastern Rj-. Co. 3 M. & C. 355. 
 
 1 Foster v. Hall, 12 Pick. 89, 93 et set].; 
 Wilson v. Troup, 7 John. Ch. 25, 38, 39; 
 Beltzhoover v. Blackstock, 3 Watts, 20 ; March 
 v. Ludlum, 3 Sand. Ch. 35; Moore v. Bray, 10 
 Penn. St. 519; Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
 Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457; Bigler v. Reyher, 43 
 Ind. 112; Carnes v. Piatt, 36 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 
 360; Lockhardv. Brodie, lTenn. Ch. 384. So, 
 as to confidential correspondence between a 
 party, or his predecessor in title, and their re- 
 spective solicitors. Minet v. Morgan, L. R. 
 8 Ch. 361. And a bill prepared by the attorney 
 on his client's statements, sworn to but never 
 filed, is privileged. Burnham v. Roberts, 70 
 111. 19; see Pearce t\ Foster, 15 Q. B. D. 111. 
 So the privilege extends to all that passes 
 between client and attorney in the course and 
 for the purpose of the business. Lengsfield v. 
 Richardson, 52 Miss. 443. But not to informa- 
 tion in reference to a criminal act. People v. 
 Mahon, 1 Utah, 205. 
 
 of British Columbia, 2 Ch. D. 644; Ross V. 
 Gibbs, L. R. 8 Eq. 522; Hamilton v. Nott, 
 L. R. 16 Eq. 112; Russell v. Jackson, 9 Hare, 
 387; Wheeler v. Le Marchant, 17 Ch. D. 675; 
 Learoyd v. Halifax Joint S. B. Co., [1893] 
 W. N. 9; Mayor of Bristol v. Cox, 26 Ch. 
 D. 678; Lowden v. Blakey, 23 Q. B. D. 332; 
 Foakes v. Webb, 28 Ch. D. 287; Parr v. Lon- 
 don, Chatham & Dover Ry. Co. 24 L. T. 558; 
 Yetter v. Schreiber, 53 J. P. 39, ])ost, p. 577. 
 In the Law Courts, see Fenner v. London 
 & South Eastern Ry. Co. L. R. 7 Q. B. 767; 
 English v. Tottie, 1 Q. B. D. 141; Bullock v. 
 Corry, 3 id. 356; Pearce v. Foster, 15 id. 114; 
 Norden v. Defries, 8 id. 511; Bursill v. Tanner,
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. 
 
 * 5 
 
 10 
 
 ters that come within the ordinary scope of professional employment, 
 they receive a communication in their professional capacity, from a client, 
 and for his benefit, in the transaction of las business, or, which amounts 
 to the same thing, if they commit to paper, in the course of their employ- 
 ment on his behalf, matters which they know only through their profes- 
 sional relation to the client, they are not only justified in withholding 
 such matters, but bound to withhold them ; and will not be compelled to 
 disclose the information, or produce the papers, in any Court of Law or 
 Equity, either as party or as witness. If this protection were confined 
 to cases where proceedings had commenced, the rule would exclude the 
 most confidential, and, it may be, the most important, of all communica- 
 tions : those made with a view of being prepared either for instituting 
 or defending a suit, up to the instant that the process of the Court 
 issued." x 
 
 Communications to a solicitor made, not by his client, but by third 
 parties, and information acquired by such solicitor from collateral 
 sources, are not privileged from disclosure, even though such communi- 
 cations are made to, and information acquired by, him in his character of 
 solicitor, and solely by reason of his filling that character. 2 
 
 * Although the general rule is, as laid down in the above case, * 575 
 that a counsel or solicitor cannot be compelled, at the instance of 
 a third party, to disclose matters which have come to his knowledge in the 
 conduct of professional business for a client, even though such business 
 
 1 Per Lord Brougham, in Greenough v. 
 Gaskell, 1 M. & K. 101; C. P. Coop. temp. 
 Brough. 98; who further said: "The protection 
 would be insufficient if it only included com- 
 munications more or less connected with judicial 
 proceedings : for a person oftentimes requires 
 the aid of professional advice, upon the sub- 
 ject of his rights and liabilities, with no refer- 
 ence to any particular litigation, and without 
 any other reference to litigation generally than 
 all human affairs have, in so far as every trans- 
 action may, by possibility, become the subject 
 of judicial inquiry. It would be most mis- 
 chievous, said the learned Judges in the Com- 
 mon Pl^as, in Cromack v. Heathcote, 2 Brod. & 
 Bing. 6, if it could be doubted whether or not 
 an attorney, consulted upon a man's title to an 
 estate, was at liberty to divulge a flaw." In 
 Herring v. Clobery, 1 Phil. 91 ; G Jur. 202, a 
 solicitor being examined as a witness, Lord 
 Lyndhurst said: "Where an attorney is em- 
 ployed by a client professionally, to transact 
 professional business, all the communications 
 that pass between the client and the attorney 
 
 in the cause, and for the purpose of that busi- 
 ness, are privileged communications : and the 
 privilege is the privilege of the client, and not 
 of the attorney." See also Carpmael v. Fowis, 
 1 Phil. 087, 692; and that it is the privilege of 
 the client, see Re Cameron's Coalbrook, &c. 
 Ry. Co. 25 Beav. 1, 4. See Story, Eq. Fl. § 000, 
 and note. The attorney is not bound to pro- 
 duce title-deeds, or other documents, left with 
 him by his client for professional advice. Dover 
 v. Harrell, 58 Ga. 572. Though he may be 
 examined to the fact of their existence, in 
 order to let in secondary evidence of their con- 
 tents, which must be from some other source 
 than himself. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 2-41 ; Wright v. 
 Mayer, 6 Ves. 280, note (n) ; Bank of Utica 
 v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 528. 
 
 2 Ford v. Tennant, .32 Beav. 102; and see 
 Gore v. Bowser, 5 De G. & S. 30, 33 ; S. C. 
 nom. Gore v. Harris, 15 Jur. 1108; Rundle v. 
 Foster, 13 Tenn. Ch. 658 ; Perkins v. Guy, 55 
 Miss. 153; Hebbard v. Haughian, 70 N. Y. 54; 
 State v. Mewherter, 4G Iowa, 88. 
 
 1G Q. B. D. 1; Woolley v. North London Ry. 
 Co. L. R. 4 C. P. 602; Cossey v. London & 
 Brighton Ry. Co. L. R. 5 C. P. 146; Mahony 
 V. ' Widows' Assurance Fund, L. R. 6 C. P. 
 252; M'Corquodale v. Bell, 1 C. P. D. 471; 
 Swansea v. Quirk, 5 C. P. D. 106; Skinner 
 v. Great Northern Ry. Co. L. R. 9 Ex. 298; 
 
 London &c. Ry. Co. v. Kirk, 51 L. T. 599 : 
 Worthington v. Dublin &c. Ry. Co. 22 L. R. 
 Ir. 310; Hawes v. State, 88 Ala. 37; see 1 Seton 
 on Judgments (5th ed.), 82. Equity has no 
 jurisdiction to restrain a mercantile agency 
 from supplying information. Raymond v. Rus- 
 sell, 143 Mass. 295. 
 
 569
 
 *576 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 had no reference to legal proceedings, either existing or in contemplation ; 
 there is no doubt that the privilege will be excluded, where the communi- 
 cation is not made or received professionally, and in the usual course of 
 business, 1 and during the existence of the professional relation. 2 In all such 
 cases, the matters to be disclosed cannot be said to be matters which the 
 professional adviser has learnt by communication with his client, or on 
 his client's behalf, or as matters which were committed to him in his 
 capacity of attorney, or which, in that capacity alone, he came to know. 3 
 And so, where an attorney is, as it were, a party to the original trans- 
 action, as if he be the attesting witness to a deed, he may be called upon 
 to disclose facts relating to its execution, or as to an erasure made by 
 himself in a deed or will ; 4 if, also, he was present when his client was 
 sworn to an answer in Chancery, he may be called upon to disclose the 
 fact; 5 and if he has been employed as the agent of a party, and does not 
 gain his knowledge of the facts, as to which the discovery is required, 
 merely in his relation of attorney to his client, the rule will not apply ; 
 for, in such cases, there was no professional confidence, and he stands in 
 
 the same situation as any other person. 6 
 * 576 * The privilege will also be excluded, with regard to communi- 
 cations to members of other professions than the Law : it has, 
 therefore, been held not to extend to clergymen ; 1 nor to physicians or 
 
 i Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 M. & K. 98, 104; 
 Walker v. Wildman, 6 Mad. 47; see also Des- 
 borough v. Rawlins, 3 M. & C. 515; 2 Jur. 125; 
 Smith v. Daniell, L. R. 18 Eq. 649; Minet v. 
 Morgan, L. R. 8 Ch. 361. And the privilege 
 is destroyed if the information is subsequently 
 communicated to the solicitor from another 
 source. Lewis v. Pennington, 6 Jur. N. S. 
 478: 8 W. R. 465, M. R. 
 
 2 Thus, a communication made to an 
 attorney or solicitor, in the character of steward, 
 either before the attorney or solicitor was 
 employed as such, Cutts v. Pickering, 1 Vent. 
 197; or after his employment has ceased, will 
 not be protected from disclosure. Wilson v. 
 Rastall, 4 T. R. 753; Story, Eq. PI. § 602; 1 
 Greenl. Ev. § 244; and so, where an attorney 
 had been consulted by a friend, because he was 
 an attorney, yet refused to act as such, and 
 was, therefore, applied to only as friend, or 
 where the matter communicated was not in its 
 nature private, and could in no sense be termed 
 the subject of a confidential disclosure. Rex 
 v. Watkinson, 2 Stra. 1122. If a party has been 
 requested to act as solicitor, and the communi- 
 cation has been made, under the impression 
 that the request has been acceded to, it is 
 privileged. Smith v. Yell, 2 Curtis, 667. 
 
 3 Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 M. & K. 98, 104. 
 
 4 Sandford v. Remington, 2 Ves. Jr. 189; 
 Tavlor on Evid. §§ 857, 858; 1 Phil, on Evid. 
 128. 
 
 5 Doe v. Andrews, 2 Cowp. 846. 
 
 6 Morgan v. Shaw, 4 Mad. 54, 56, 57; see 
 
 570 
 
 also Desborough v. Rawlins, 3 M. & C. 515; 
 Williams v. Young, 4 Iowa, 140. 
 
 The person, called as a witness, or made 
 defendant to a bill, must have learned the 
 matter in question only as counsel, or attorney, 
 or solicitor, and not in any other way. If, 
 therefore, he were a party to the transaction, 
 and, especially, if he were a party to a fraud 
 (and the case may be put of his becoming an 
 informer, after being engaged in a conspiracy), 
 that is, if he were acting for himself, although 
 he might be employed for another, he would 
 not be protected from the discover}'; for in such 
 case his knowledge would not be acquired solely 
 by his being employed professionally. Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 601. 
 
 An attorney may be compelled to disclose 
 the name of the person by whom he was 
 retained; the character in which his client em- 
 ployed him; the time when an instrument was 
 executed, or put into iiis hands, but not its 
 condition and appearance at that time; his 
 client's handwriting; and various other mat- 
 ters, for an enumeration of which, see 1 Greenl. 
 Ev. § 245. 
 
 So if an attorney put his name to an in- 
 strument as a witness, his signature binds him 
 to disclose all that passed at the time, respecting 
 the execution of the instrument. Bank of Utica 
 r. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 528; 2 Sugd. V. & P. 
 (7th Am. ed.) 1063. 
 
 1 Taylor on Evid. § 838; 1 Greenl. Ev. 
 § 247; Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. 161.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. 
 
 576 
 
 medical advisers ; 2 (a) nor will it extend to mere agents or stewards ; 3 
 it, however, applies to scriveners ; 4 and also to counsel. 5 It has, how- 
 ever, been held that it does not extend to communications made to per- 
 sons acting as conveyancers, who are neither counsel nor solicitors. 6 It 
 
 2 Duchess of Kingston's case, 11 Harg. St. 
 Tr. 212; S. C. 20 How. St. Tr. 572; Greenough 
 o. Gaskell, ubi supra; 1 Greenl. § 248, note; 
 Hewitt v. Prime, 21 Wend. 79. 
 
 3 Vaillant v. Dodemead, 2 Atk. 521; "Wil- 
 son v. Rastall, 4 T. R. 753. As to bankers and 
 clerks, see Loyd v. Freshfield, 2 Car. & P. 325. 
 
 4 Harvey v. Clayton, 2 Swanst. 221, n. (a). 
 
 5 Roth well v. King, 2 Swanst. 221, n. (a); 
 Spencer v. Luttrell, and Stanhope v. Nott, id. 
 
 The privilege of clients to have their com- 
 munications to counsel kept secret extends in 
 New Hampshire not only to communications 
 made to professional men, but to those made to 
 
 (n) The Code of Civil Procedure of Cali- 
 fornia, § 1881 (and see same of New York, 
 § 834; Mo. Rev. St. § 4017, &c), extends the 
 privilege to statements made to clergymen, 
 priests, and physicians in the course of their 
 professional duties. See Freel v. Market St. 
 Cable Ry. Co. (Cal.), 31 Pac. Rep. 730; People 
 v. Harris, 137 N. Y. 423; People v. Sliney, 
 id. 570. In New York, a client may expressly 
 waive the privilege, and his request to an 
 attorney to draw his will, and sign it as an at- 
 testing witness, amounts to such waiver, but for 
 probate purposes only. Code, § 836; Re Cole- 
 man, 111 N. Y. 220; Loder v. Whelplev, id. 
 239; Re McCarthy, 20 N. Y. S. 581 ; Re Gagan, 
 
 21 id. 350; Mitchell's ca<e, 12 Abb. Prac. 
 259; Adreveno v. Mutual Reserve F. L. Ass. 
 34 Fed. Rep. 870. The privilege is personal to 
 the client and cannot be claimed by his adver- 
 sary. Smith v. Wilson (Texas), 20 S. W. Rep. 
 1119. Under the U. S. Rev. Stats. § 721, the 
 above New York statute binds the Federal 
 Courts sitting within the State in Law cases. 
 Connecticut Mut. L. I. Co. v. Union Trust Co. 
 112 U. S. 250. 
 
 The person consulted must be actually an 
 attorney-at-law, consulted as such, and not as a 
 friend. The privilege does not extend to a clerk 
 or an attorney in fact, even though supposed to 
 be an attorney-at-law. Goltra r. Wolcott, 
 14 111. 89; McLaughlin y. Gilmore, 1 111. App. 
 563; Tyler v. Tyler, 126 111. 525; Sample v. 
 Frost, 10 Iowa, 200; Barnes v. Harris, 7 Cush. 
 576; Knight v. Sampson, 99 Muss. 30; Patten 
 v. Moor, 29 N. H. 163; Holman r. Kimball, 
 
 22 Vt. 555; Schubkagel ?•. Dierstein, 131 Penn. 
 St. 46. The privilege does not extend to a 
 solicitor of patents, if not an attorney-at-law. 
 Brungger v. Smith, 49 Fed. Rep. 124; see 
 Moseley v. Victoria Rubber Co. (No. 1), 55 
 L. T. 482. When an attorney acts for two 
 persons, he may be required by either to testify 
 
 any other person employed to manage a cause 
 as counsel. Bean v. Quimby, 5 N. II. 94. 
 
 An attorney, who in his professional char- 
 acter has received from the owner of property 
 confidential communications on the subject of 
 a transfer of it, which is subsequently made, 
 cannot be examined, against the consent of the 
 grantee, in relation to such communication. 
 Fosters. Hall, 12 Pick. 89. 
 
 6 Thus, in the South Sea Company v. Dolliffe, 
 referred to in Vaillant v. Dodemead, 2 Atk. 
 525, a Mr. Gambier, who had settled certain 
 articles, is reported to have demurred to the 
 discovery sought from him as to the alterations 
 
 against the other, though their communications 
 to him are privileged wjth respect to strangers. 
 Re Bauer, 79 Cal. 304; Hanlon v. Doherty, 
 109 Ind. 37; see Re Postlethwaite, 35 Ch. D. 
 722; see also W r arde v. Warde, 3 M'N. & G. 
 365; 1 Sim. N. S. 18; Scranton v. Stewart, 52 
 Ind. 68 (as to husbTud and wife). The attorney 
 cannot testify as to a privileged communication 
 made in the presence of a third person. Blount 
 v. Kimpton, 155 Mass. 378. Information ob- 
 tained from documents submitted for counsel's 
 inspection or custody is privileged. Matthews 
 v. Hoagland, 48 N." J. Eq. 455. See Todd v. 
 Munson, 53 Conn. 580 ; Hicks v. Blanchard, 60 
 Vt. 073. A client's address, communicated to a 
 solicitor when application is made to him for ad- 
 vice, may be a privileged communication. Ex 
 parte Official Receiver, 60 L. T. 109; S. C. 37 
 W. R. 223; see Bursill v. Tanner, 16 Q. B. D. 1 ; 
 Marriott v. Chamberlain, 17 id. 154; Proctor v. 
 Smiles, 55 L. J. Q. B. 407, 527; and see gen- 
 erally, Moseley v. Victoria Rubber Co. 55 
 L. T. 482. The privilege extends to communi- 
 cations to an attorney in anticipation of em- 
 ploying him, but before he is actually employed. 
 See Young v. State, 65 Ga. 525; Nelson v. 
 Becker (Minn.), 48 N. W. Rep. 962; Samnion 
 v. Bennett, 8 T. L. R. 235. Advice by an 
 attorney-at-law, for which no compensation is 
 expected or received, or mere conversation 
 with others in his presence, are not privileged 
 communications. Re Monroe's Will, 20 N. Y. S. 
 82; Hanson v. Bean (Minn.), 53 N. W. Rep. 
 871; see Peek v. Boone (Ga), 36 Cent. L. J. 
 411, and note; Hurlburt v. Hurlburt, 128 N. Y. 
 420; Hughes v. Boone, 102 N. C. 137. In the 
 Federal Courts privileged communications be- 
 tween attorney and client do not depend upon 
 State statutes. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
 v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457; Liggett v. Glenn, 51 
 Fed. Rep. 381. 
 
 571
 
 577 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 has also been held that the privilege will not apply to one who has been 
 consulted confidentially as an attorney, when in fact he was not one. 7 
 
 A person who acts as an interpreter, 8 or agent, 9 between an attorney 
 and his client, stands in the same situation as the attorney ; and the rule 
 has also been held to apply to the clerk of the counsel or solicitor con- 
 sulted ; 10 and the privilege extends to the representatives of the 
 * 577 party as against third persons, but not as * between different claim- 
 ants under him. 1 The privilege extends to communications with 
 an unprofessional agent, employed to collect evidence ; 2 and also to com- 
 munications with a Scotch solicitor and law agent resident in England. 3 
 
 The privilege does not cease upon the solicitor afterwards becoming 
 interested in the matters in question in the suit; 4 nor upon his being 
 struck off the rolls. 5 
 
 in those articles, on the ground that he was 
 counsel for the com pan}'; and it is stated that 
 the demurrer was overruled : " for that what he 
 knew was as the conveyancer only." 2 Atk. 
 525; and see Turquand v. Knight, 2 M. & W. 
 100, as to certificated conveyancers. 
 
 7 Fountain v. Young, 6 Esp. 113 ; but see 
 Calley v. Richards, 19 Beav. 401, 404. The 
 privilege applies only to licensed attorneys. 
 McLaughlin v. Gilmore, 1 111. App. 563. 
 
 8 Du Barre v. Livette, Peake, N. P. C. 77, 
 78, explained 4 T. R. 756; see Jackson v. 
 French, 3 Wend. 337; Andrews v. Solomon, 
 1 Peters C. C. 323; Parker v. Carter, 4 Munf. 
 273. 
 
 9 Parkins V. Hawkshaw, 2 Stark. N. P. 
 239; Reid v. Langlois, 1 M'N. & G. 627, 638; 
 14 Jur. 4G7, 470; Russell v. Jackson, 9 Hare, 
 387; 15 Jur. 1117; Goodall r. Little, 1 Sim. 
 N. S. 155; 15 Jur. 303; Hooper v. Gumm, 2 
 J. & H. 602. 
 
 " Taylor v. Foster, 2 Car. & P. 195 ; Foote 
 v. Hayne, 1 Car. & P. 545; 1 Ry. & M. 165; 
 Foster v. Hall, 12 Pick. 93; Jackson v. French, 
 3 Wend. 337. 
 
 1 Wigram on Disc. 82; see also Parkhurst 
 v. Lowten, 1 Mer. 391, 402; Russell ». Jackson, 
 ubi supra ; Gresley v. Mousley, 2 K. & J. 288 ; 
 Tugwell v. Hooper, 10 Beav. 348, 350; see 
 1 Greenl. Ev. § 239. 
 
 2 Steele v. Stewart, 1 Phil. 471, 475; 9 Jur. 
 121; Lafone v. Falkland Island Co. 4 K. & J. 
 34; Walsham v. Stainton, 2 H. & M. 1; see 
 also Kerr v. Gillespie, 7 Beav. 572 ; Simpson 
 v. Brown, 33 Beav. 482. In Ross v. Gibbs, 
 L. R. 8 Eq. 522, it was held generally that 
 communications with an unprofessional agent 
 in anticipation of litigation, and with a view 
 to the prosecution of. or defence to, a claim to 
 the matter in dispute, are privileged. See ante, 
 p. 573, n. (a). 
 
 3 Lawrence v. Campbell, 4 Drew. 485; see 
 also Bunbury v. Bunbury, 2 Beav. 173. 176, 
 whore the question was ns to an opinion by 
 a Dutch counsel. The privilege extends to all 
 
 572 
 
 letters and communications between the solici- 
 tors and other persons written or made for the 
 purposes of the suit. Churton v. Frewen, 2 
 Dr. & Sm. 390. But see Page v. Page, 17 
 W. R. 435. 
 
 4 Chant v. Brown, 7 Hare, 79. 
 
 6 Lord Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton, 19 
 Ves. 268. The propriety of the distinction 
 which has been made between the extent of the 
 privilege, as it affects the client and as it affects 
 the solicitor, has been doubted, ante, p. 571, 
 n. L T pon this point, Sir J. L. Knight Bruce 
 V. C. said: "I confess myself at a loss to 
 perceive any substantial reason, in point of 
 difference, or principle, or convenience, between 
 the liability of the client, and that of his 
 counsel, or solicitor, to disclose the client's 
 communications made in confidence profession- 
 ally to either." Pearse v. Pearse, 1 De G. & S. 
 12, 2G. And upon the same point, Sir R. T. 
 Kindersley V. C. observed: "If I could, upon 
 authority, determine the abstract point which 
 has been argued, — namely, whether the privilege 
 of the client is as extensive as that of the 
 solicitor, — I should be glad to remove the anom- 
 aly by which it seems that where the solicitor 
 is interrogated, and objects, because it would 
 be calling on him to divulge matters which 
 passed in the relation of solicitor and client, 
 then there is a privilege without more: whether 
 such matters. relate to an actual orcontemplated 
 litigation or not; and yet, if the same ques- 
 tions are put to the client, then when his 
 privilege is in question, he is to be told that he 
 has a less privilege than he would have through 
 his solicitor, if the latter were questioned. So 
 great an anomaly, so inconsistent and absurd a 
 rule, I should be glad to take on myself to say 
 is not the rule of this Court, and that there is 
 no such distinction. When Reid v. Langlois 
 (1 M'N. & G. 627, 638) was cited to me, it did 
 appear, at first sight, that it estab'ished the 
 broad proposition contended for; and I should 
 certainly have followed that case if it did so; 
 but on further examination, though that case
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. 
 
 5 
 
 I 5 
 
 *The more recent cases upon the privilege, as it affects the *578 
 client, are very numerous; and although it is difficult, if not im- 
 possible, to extract any clear rules from them as to the extent of the 
 privilege, it may be said' that their tendency is to make the rules the 
 same, whether the discovery is sought from the solicitor or client ; 1 and 
 in matters of title, this seems to have been decided. 2 
 
 There does not seem to be any difference, in principle, between cases 
 stated for opinion, and other communications of matters of fact, between 
 a client and his professional advisers. 8 
 
 The privilege is, however, confined to legal advisers : for it has been 
 held, that although a defendant in a suit cannot be compelled to dis- 
 cover or produce letters between himself and his solicitor, subsequently 
 to the institution of the suit, and in relation thereto, yet, where there 
 are more defendants than one, they are bound to discover letters, and 
 copies of letters, which have passed between them with reference to their 
 defences. 4 
 
 Where a solicitor is party to a fraud, the privilege does not attach to 
 the communications with him upon the subject: because the contriving 
 of a fraud is not part of his duty as solicitor ; 5 and ib seems that it is 
 the same where the communications are with a view to effecting any 
 illegal purpose. 6 (a) In order, however, to prevent the privilege attach- 
 
 does not establish the contrary, yet I think it 
 was not the intention of Lord Cottenham to 
 lay down the general proposition: that point he 
 did not decide; nor do the cases of Pearse v. 
 Pearse, 1 De G & S. 12, 11 Jur. 52, and Fol- 
 lett v. Jefferyes, 1 Sim. N. S. 1, 15 Jur. 118, 
 B'J lay it down as to enable me to say I can 
 follow them. If that point is to be decided, it 
 must be by a higher authority than mine." 
 Thompson v. Falk, 1 Drew. 21, 25. 
 
 1 The following are some of the more recent 
 decisions: Nias v. Northern and Eastern Ry. Co. 
 3 M. & C. 355, 357: 2 Jur. 21)5; Bunbury v. 
 Piimbury, 2 Beav. 173; Flight v. Robinson, 8 
 Beav. 22, 33: 8 Jur. 888; Maden v. Veevers, 7 
 Beav. 489 ; Woods ?>. Woods, 4 Hare, 83; Reece 
 v. Trye, 9 Beav. 310; Pearse v. Pearse, ubi supra; 
 Tugwell v. Hooper, 10 Beav. 348; Penruddock 
 i\ Hammond, 11 Beav. 59; Beadon v. King, 17 
 Sim. 34: Reid v. Langlois, and Follett v. Jef- 
 feryes, ubi supra ; Warde r. Warde.3 M'N. & (1. 
 365; 15 Jur. 759; Balguy v. Broadhurst, 1 Sim. 
 N. S. Ill; 14 Jur. 1105; Hawkins v. Gather- 
 
 cole, 1 Sim. N. S. 150; 15 Jur. 186; Goodall v. 
 Little, 1 Sim. N. S. 155; 15 Jur. 309; Thompson 
 v. Falk, ubi supra ; Bluck v. Galsworthy, 2 Giff. 
 453; Ford v. Tennant, 32 Beav. 1G2; ante, pp. 
 570, 571, notes. 
 
 2 Manser v. Dix, 1 K. & J. 451; 1 Jur. N. S. 
 466; Pearse v. Pearse, ubi supra. 
 
 3 Lord Walsingham o. Goodricke, 3 Hare, 
 122, 129 ; Wilson v. Northampton Ry. Co. L. 
 R. 14 Eq. 477; McFarlan v. Rolt, L. R. 14 Eq. 
 580. 
 
 4 Whitbread ». Gurney, Younge, 541 : Good- 
 all v. Little, ubi supra ; Glvn v. Caulfield, 3 M'N. 
 & G. 463, 474; 15 Jur. 807; Betts v. Menzies, 3 
 Jur. N. S. 885; 5 W. R. 767, V. C. W.; see 
 also Reynolds v. Godlee, 4 K. & J. 88; Kears- 
 ley v. Phillips, 10 Q. B. D. 36. 
 
 ' s Follett v. Jefferyes, 1 Sim. N. S. 1; 15 Jur. 
 118; Russell v. Jackson, 9 Hare, 387; 15 Jur. 
 1117; Gilbert ». Lewis, 1 De G. J. & S. 38, 49, 
 50; 9 Jur. N. S. 187; Feaver v. Williams, 11 
 Jur. X. S. 902. V. C. S. 
 
 6 Russell v. Jackson, ubi supra. 
 
 (a) In Reg. v. Cox, 14 Q. B. D. 153; 15 Cox 
 C. C. 611, it was held that communications by 
 a client to his solicitor before the commission 
 of a crime, for the purpose of being guided or 
 aided therein, are not privileged. In Alexander 
 v. United States, 138 U. S. 353, this rule was 
 limited to cases where the party is tried for the 
 crime in furtherance of which the communica- 
 tion is made. See People v. Harris, 136 N. Y. 
 423 ; Matthews v. Hoagland, 48 N. J. Eq. 455. 
 
 In equity, when the relief claimed is grounded 
 on fraud participated in by the solicitor who 
 gave advice, the act complained of must, on 
 the face of the bill, appear to be a fraud. Rey- 
 nelU. Sprye, 10 B av. 51 ; 11 id. 618; Re Postle- 
 thwaite, 35 Ch. D. 722; see Litchfield v. Jones 
 (No. 2), 54 L. J. Ch. 207; 51 L. T. 572; Foakes 
 v. Webb, 28 Ch. D. 287 ; Jones v. Richards, 15 Q. 
 B. D. 439. A defendant, deceived by counsel 
 as to her rights, but testifying as to them, can- 
 
 573
 
 579 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 ing, the bill must contain allegations specifically connecting the solicitor 
 with the fraud or illegal act. 7 Questions concerning privileged com- 
 munications arise more frequently upon applications for the production 
 of documents than upon demurrers to discovery; and the subject is, 
 
 therefore, more fully considered under that title. 8 
 * 579 *V. The necessity that the bill should show that a certain 
 
 degree of privity exists between the plaintiff and defendant, in 
 order to entitle him to maintain his suit, has been before pointed out ; 1 
 and it has been stated, that the want of such privity will afford a ground 
 for demurrer to the relief prayed. It may sometimes, however, happen 
 that a plaintiff may, by his bill, show that, supposing the facts he states 
 are true (and which, as we have seen, are admitted by every demurrer), 
 he has a right to the relief he prays, and yet may not show such a privity 
 as will entitle him to the discovery which he asks for : for it is a rule of 
 the Court that, where the title of the defendant is not in privity, but 
 inconsistent with the title made by the plaintiff, the defendant is not 
 bound to discover the evidence of the title under which he claims. 2 
 
 The principle upon which these cases proceed is : 3 that the right of a 
 
 t Mornington v. Mornington, 2 J. & H.697; the defendant's answer, or on application to 
 
 Charlton v. Coombes, 4 Gift 372, 382; 9 Jur. produce documents in the defendant's posses- 
 
 N. S. 534. s ' on - For instances in which this rule has been 
 
 8 See post, Chap. XLII. Production of acted upon where the objection has been taken 
 
 Documents. 
 
 i Ante, p. 322. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 190; Stroud v. Deacon, 1 Ves. 
 Sr. 37; Buden v. Dore, 2 Ves. Sr. 445; Samp- 
 son v. Swettenham, 5 Mad. 16; Tyler v. 
 Drayton, 2 S. & S. 309; see also Stainton v. 
 Chadwick, 3 M'N. & G. 575, 582. Thus, where 
 a bill was filed by a person claiming to be lord 
 of a manor, against another person also claim- 
 ing to be lord of the same manor, and praying, 
 amongst other things, a discovery how the 
 defendant derived title to the manor, and the 
 defendant demurred, because the plaintiff had 
 shown no right to the discovery, the demurrer 
 was allowed. Ld. Red. 190. So, where a bill 
 ■was filed by one claiming to be the heir, ex parte 
 malerna, against another claiming to be heir, ex 
 parte paterna, and the bill sought a discovery 
 in what manner the claim ex parte paterna was 
 made out, and the particulars of the pedigree, a 
 demurrer to that discovery was allowed. Ivy 
 v. Kekewick, 2 Ves. Jr. 679. 
 
 3 This principle is recognized by Lord 
 Brougham, in Bolton v. Liverpool, 1 M. & K. 
 88, 91 ; see also Art. -Gen. v. London, 2 M'N. & 
 G. 247, 256, and bv Lord Abinger, in Bellwood 
 r. Wetherell, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 211, 215. It is 
 true that in those cases the question did not 
 come before the Court upon demurrer, but the 
 rule is the same in whatever way the question 
 may be raised: on demurrer, on exceptions to 
 
 by demurrer, see Stroud v. Deacon, 1 Ves. Sr. 
 37; Ivy v. Kekewick, 2 Ves. Jr. 679; Glegg r. 
 Legh, 4 Mad. 193; Compton v. Earl Grey, 1 Y. 
 & J. 154; Wilson v. Forster, Younge, 280; Tooth 
 v. Dean and Chapter of Canterbury, 3 Sim. 49. 
 61. On Application to Produce: Princess of 
 Wales v. Earl of Liverpool, 1 Swanst. 114, 121; 
 Micklethwait v. Moore, 3 Mer. 292; Bligh v. 
 Benson, 7 Price, 205; Tyler v. Drayton, 2 S. & 
 S. 309; Sampson v. Swettenham, 5 Mad. 16; 2 
 M. & K. 754, n. (6); Firkins v. Low, 13 Pri. 
 193; Wilfon v. Forster, M'Lel. & Y. 274; Tom- 
 lmson v. Lymer, 2 Sim. 489; Shaftsbury v. Ar- 
 rowsmith, 4 Ves. 66, 70; Aston v. Lord Exeter, 
 6 Ves. 288; Worsley v. Watson, cited id. 289; 
 Bolton v. Liverpool, 1M.&K 88 ; Wasney v. 
 Tempest, 9 Beav. 407; Att.-Gen. v. Thompson, 
 8 Hare, 106; Manby v. Bewicke (No. 3), 8 De 
 G. M. & G. 476 ; Rumbold r. Forteath (Xo. 2), 
 3 K. & J. 748; Hunt v. Elmes, 27 Beav. 62; 5 
 Jur. N. S. 645; Ferrier v. Atwool, 12 Jur. N. 
 S. 365; 14 W. R. 597, L.JJ.; id. 582, V. C. W.; 
 Kennedy v. Wakefield, 39 L. J. Ch. 827; Col- 
 lins v. Gresley, 2 Y. & J. 490. On Exceptions 
 to Answers : Buden v. Dore, 2 Ves. Sr. 445 ; 
 Stainton v. Chadwick, 3 M'N. & G. 375; 15 
 Jur. 1139; Ingilby v. Shafto, ubi supra; Bethell 
 v. Casson, 1 H. & M. 806; Bovill r. Smith, L. 
 R. 2 Eq. 459, V. C. W. ; Crossley v. Tomey, 2 
 Ch. D. 533. 
 
 not object to such couns'l's testifying thereof. 
 Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U. S. 464. A party 
 cannot protect unprivileged documents by de- 
 
 574 
 
 livering them to counsel. Edison Electric Light 
 Co. v. United States Electric Lighting Co. 44 
 Fed. Rep. 294.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. 
 
 *580 
 
 plaintiff in Equity to the benefit of a defendant's oath is limited to a 
 discovery of such material facts as relate to the plaintiff's case, and does 
 not extend to a discovery of the manner in which, or of the evidence by 
 means of which, the defendant's case is to be established. 4 (b) 
 
 * This rule will not extend to defeat the plaintiff of his right to * 580 
 discovery from the defendant, where he makes a case in his bill 
 which, if admitted, would disprove the truth of, or otherwise invalidate the 
 
 4 Wigram on Disc. 261; Ingilby v. Shafto, 
 33 B-av. 31 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 1141; Daw v. Eley, 2 
 II. & M. 725; Hoffman v. Postill, L. R. 4 Ch. 
 
 673. So where the discovery is such as might 
 be used prejudicially to the defendant irrespec- 
 tive of the suit. Carver v. Leite, L. R. 7 Ch. 
 90; Moore v. Craven, L. R. 7 Ch. 94, n. 
 
 The rule of the English Courts of Equity, 
 that the plaintiff in a bill of discovery "shall 
 only have a discovery of what is necessary to 
 his own title, and shall not pry into the title of 
 the defendant" (Coop. Eq. PI. 58), is held not 
 to be applicable in Massachusetts. Adams v. 
 Porter, 1 Cush. 170, 175, 176. "Our whole 
 system of inquiry," says Mr. Justice Dewey in 
 the above case, " by the instrumentality of a 
 legal proceeding, has been that of full inquiry as 
 to any and all facts that may impeach the right 
 of property in the party of whom the inquiry is 
 made." Instances are adduced of interroga- 
 
 (b) So a defendant's interrogatories will in 
 general be disallowed if they inquire into the 
 evidence of the plaintiffs title. Garland v. 
 Oram, 7 T. L. R. 80; see Leslie v. Cave (No. 2), 
 50 L. T. 332; 35 W. R. 515 ; Nicholl v. Wheeler, 
 17 Q. B. D. 101; McLean v. Jones, 66 L. T. 
 653; 8 T. L. R. 243, 314; Eyre v. Rogers, 40 
 W. R. 137 ; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Postal 
 Tel. Cable Co. 88 Va. 932. In Eade v. Jacobs, 
 3 Ex. D. 335, Cotton L. J. said : " I think the 
 plaintiff is entitled to a discovery of the facts 
 upon which the defendant relies to establish his 
 case, but not of the evidence which it is pro- 
 posed to adduce." In Bidder v. Bridges, 29 
 Ch. D. 29, 37, Kay J. said that he disap- 
 proved of this statement as a general proposi- 
 tion. See Saunders v. Jones, 7 Ch. D. 435; 
 Fisher v. Owen, 8 Ch. D. 645 ; Benbow v. Low, 
 10 Ch. D. 93; Lyon r. Tweddell, 13 Ch. D. 
 375; Johns v. James, id. 370; Marriott V. 
 Chamberlain, 17 Q. B. D. 154; Budden V. 
 Wilkinson, 41 XV. R. 657; Downier. Nettleton, 
 61 Conn. 593; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Postal 
 Tel. Cable Co. 88 Va. 932. Under the N. Y. 
 Code of Civil Proc. § 803, the plaintiff may have 
 discovery and inspection of a document set up 
 in the answer, though pertaining to the defence 
 and not a part of the plaintiff's case. Seligman 
 V. Real Estate Trust Co. 20 Abb. N. Cas. 210. 
 
 In a suit for the recovery of land the plain- 
 tiff is entitled to discovery as to all matters 
 
 tories to supposed trustees in trustee processes; 
 to persons charged with embezzling the property 
 of deceased persons ; and to persons charged 
 with having fraudulently received the property 
 of an insolvent debtor. But see Wilson v. 
 W T ebber, 2 Gray, 558, in which the English rule 
 is distinctly recognized; and the case of Adams 
 v. Porter is not referred to ; see also Haskell v. 
 Haskell, 3 Cush. 540, 542, 543; Bellows v. 
 Stone, 18 N. H. 405, 483, 484; Story, Eq. PI. 
 §§ 572-574, c ; Shaftsbury v. Arrowsmith, 4 
 Yes. 72, Mr. Hovenden's note (1); Cullison v. 
 Bossom, 1 Md. Ch. 95; Howell v. Ashmore, 9 
 N. J. Eq. 87, 88. The plaintiff must state the 
 facts which he expects to establish by the de- 
 fendant's answer, otherwise he cannot have a 
 discovery, merely to enable him to judge 
 whether he can prevail in a suit at Law. Deas 
 v. Harvie, 2 Barb. Ch. 448. 
 
 relevant to his own and not to the defendant's 
 case. Lyell v. Kennedy, 8 App. Cas. 217; see 
 Morris v. Edwards, 15 App. Cas. 309; 23 Q. B. 
 D. 287. This rule holds good under the Code 
 system. Shoe & Leather Rep. Ass'n ». Bailey, 
 17 Jones & S. 385. A discovery, useless to the 
 plaintiff for a hearing, should not be required, 
 if it may be injurious to the defendant in case 
 the plaintiff fails at the hearing. Heugh v. 
 Garrett, 44 L. J.Ch. 305. So discovery will be 
 refused when it is not relevant, or is not re- 
 quired bonajtde for the purpose of the particular 
 suit. Meek v. Witherington, 67 L. T. 122; 
 Robinson v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 28 Fed. 
 Rep. 340; Roberts v. Walley, 14 id. 167; post, 
 p. 720, notes. Discovery may be had in order 
 to enable a party to prepare for trial. Congdon 
 v. Aylesworth, 10 R. I. 281; Arnold v. Paw- 
 tuxet V. W. Co. 19 L. R. A. 602. 
 
 The lights of a defendant who files inter- 
 rogatories for the examination of the plain- 
 tiff, are, it seems, somewhat different, since the 
 plaintiff, in answering such interrogatories, is 
 not only bound to answer fully, but may be 
 required to answer further as to all matters 
 which, tend to destroy his own case, though not 
 with respect to matters which tend to support 
 it. See id.; Hoffmann v. Postill, I.. B. 1 Ch. 
 673; Commissioners of Sewers v. Glasse, L. R. 
 15 Eq. 302. 
 
 575
 
 581 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 defence made, to the bill ; in such cases, he is entitled to discovery from 
 the defendant of all which may enable him to impeach the defendant's 
 case ; for the plaintiff does not rest on a mere negative of the defend- 
 ant's case, but insists upon some positive ground entitling him to the 
 assistance of the Court, such as fraud, or other circumstances of equi- 
 table cognizance, to a discovery of which no objection of this kind can 
 be raised. 1 • 
 
 If a plaintiff is entitled to a discovery of deeds or other documents 
 for the purpose of establishing his own case, his right to such discov- 
 ery will not be affected by the circumstance that the same documents 
 are evidence of the defendant's case also ; 2 and if a defendant, bound 
 to keep distinct accounts for another party, improperly mixes them 
 with his own, so that they cannot be separated, he must discover the 
 
 whole. 3 
 *581 * VI. The circumstance that a party not before the Court has 
 
 an interest in a document which a defendant, so far as his own 
 interest is concerned, is bound to produce, will, in some cases, deprive 
 the plaintiff of his right to call for its production, at least in the absence 
 of the third party, as in the instance of a person being a trustee only for 
 others. Upon this principle, a mortgagee cannot be compelled to show 
 the title of his mortgagor, unless such mortgagor is before the Court ; 1 
 in such cases, however, a demurrer, for want of proper parties, would 
 be the proper form in which to raise the objection, where the bill is for 
 relief as well as for discovery. 2 (a) 
 
 VII. Communications which come within a certain class of official 
 correspondence are privileged upon the ground that they could not be 
 made the subject of discovery in a Court of Justice without injury to 
 the public interest. 8 Where the question was whether correspondence, 
 between the Court of Directors of the East India Company and the Board 
 of Control, came within the limits of this privilege, it was decided that it 
 
 1 Hare on Disc. 201; Bellows v. Stone, 18 
 N. H. 465, 483-485 ; Daw v. Eley, 2 H. & M. 
 725. And in answering interrogatories filed by 
 a defendant for tlie examination of the plaintiff, 
 under the English practice, the general rule 
 sipplies, that he who is bound to answer must 
 answer fully. Such interrogatories are on a 
 different footing from those for the examination 
 of a defendant in this respect, that a plaintiff is 
 not entitled to a discovery of the defendant's 
 case, but a defendant may ask any questions 
 tending to destroy the plaintiff's claim. Hoff- 
 mann v. Postill, L. R. 4 Ch. 673. 
 
 2 Burrell v. Nicholson, 1 M. & K. 680; 
 Wigram on Disc. 244; Smith v. Beaufort, 1 
 Hare, 507, 518; 1 Phil. 209, 218; 7 Jur. 1095; 
 
 Combe v. London, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 631, 650; 
 Earp v. Lloyd, 3 K. & J. 549. 
 
 3 Freeman v. Fairlie, 3 Mer. 43; Earl of 
 Salisbury v. Cecil, 1 Cox, 277; Wigram on 
 Disc. 244; Hare on Disc. 245; and see post, 
 Chap. XLIL, Production of Documents. 
 
 1 Lambert v. Rogers, 2 Mer. 489; see, how- 
 ever, Balls v. Margrave, 3 Beav. 448; 4 Beav. 
 119; Few v. Guppy, 13 Beav. 457; Gough r. 
 Offley, 5 De G. & S. 653 ; Hercy v. Ferrers, 4 
 Beav. 97; and post, Chap. XLIL, Production 
 of Documents. 
 
 2 See ante, pp. 278, 558. 
 
 8 See 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 250, 251 ; Bellows v. 
 Stone, 18 N. H. 465, 485. 
 
 (a) So there is no jurisdiction to make an 
 order which amounts to requiring the produc- 
 tion of documen's against persons not parties 
 to the suit, and not strictly ancillarv to the 
 
 576 
 
 examination of a witness, as under 6 & 7 Vic. 
 c. 82, § 5. Burchard v. Macfarlaiie, [1891] 2 
 Q. B. 241.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. 
 
 582 
 
 could not be subject to be communicated, without infringing the policy of 
 the Act of Parliament, 4 and without injury to the public interests. 5 (h) 
 
 The above are the principal grounds upon which a defendant may 
 demur to the discovery sought by a bill ; although the plaintiff may be 
 entitled to the relief prayed, in case he could establish his right to it by 
 other means than discovery from the defendant, on those points as to 
 which the defendant is entitled to defend himself from making discov- 
 ery. In all other cases, a plaintiff, if entitled to relief, is entitled to 
 call upon the defendant to make a full discovery of all matters upon 
 which his title to relief is founded. It does not, however, very often 
 happen that these grounds affect the whole of the discovery sought ; 
 in such cases, the defendant must, if interrogated, answer all those 
 parts of the bill, the answer to which will not expose him, or have a 
 tendency to expose him, to the inconveniences before enumerated. A 
 demurrer, under such circumstances, should precisely distinguish each 
 part of the bill demurred to, and if it does not do so, it will be over- 
 ruled. 6 
 
 If a defendant objects to a particular part of the discovery, 
 and * the grounds upon which he may demur appear clearly on * 582 
 the face of the bill, and the defendant does not demur to the dis- 
 covery, but, answering to the rest of the bill, declines answering to so 
 much, the Court will not compel him to make the discovery ; but, in 
 general, unless it clearly appears by the bill that the plaintiff is not 
 entitled to the discovery he requires, or that the defendant ought not to 
 be compelled to make it, a demurrer to the discovery will not hold, and 
 the defendant, unless he can protect himself by plea, must answer. 1 
 
 Any irregularity in the frame of a bill may be taken advantage of 
 by demurrer. 2 Thus, if a bill is brought contrary to the usual course of 
 the Court, a demurrer will hold. 3 
 
 4 3&4 Will. IV. c. 85. 
 
 5 Smith v. East India Co. 1 Phil. 50, 55; 6 
 Jur. 1 ; see also Wadeer v. East India Co. 8 
 De G. M. & G. 182; 29 Beav. 300. 
 
 6 Chetwynd v. Lindon, 2 Ves. Sr. 450; 
 Devonsher v. Newenham, 2 Sch. & Lef. 199; 
 Robinson v. Thompson, 2 V. & B. 118 : Weather- 
 head v. Blackburn, id. 121, 124; infra, p. 589, 
 n. 8. 
 
 i Ld. Red. 200; Cons. Ord. XV. 4; post, 
 p. 583. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 206; Bainbrigge v. Bnddeley, 9 
 Beav. 538; Ranger v. Great Western Rv. Co. 
 
 (b) Hennessy v. Wright, 21 Q. B. D. 509 : 
 Marks v. Bcyfus, 25 id. 494; TheBellerophon. 44 
 L. J. Adm. 6; Humphrey v. Archibald, 28 Can. 
 L.J. 57; seel Seton on Judgments (5th ed.), 
 83. This rule applies also in a suit against the 
 agent of a colonial government, which is not a 
 party to the suit, when production is sought of 
 documents which are its property. Wright r. 
 Mills, 62 L. T. 558; 63 id. 180. So. a defend- 
 ant cannot be required, without the consent of 
 
 vol. I. — 37 
 
 13 Sim. 368; 7 Jur. 935; Henderson v. Cook, 
 4 Drew. 306. 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 206; Story, Eq. PI. § 643. As 
 where, after a decree directing incumbrances to 
 be paid according to priority, a creditor ob- 
 tained an assignment of an old mortgage, and 
 filed a bill to have the advantage it would give 
 him, by way of priority, over the demands of 
 some of the defendants, a demurrer was al- 
 lowed (Wortley v. Birkhead, 3 Atk. 809): it 
 being, in effect, a bill to vary a decree, and yet 
 neither a bill of review, nor a bill in the nature 
 of a hill of review, which are the only kinds of 
 
 the government, to answer, upon a bill in eqnitv 
 or by interrogatories at law, respecting com- 
 munications made by him to the government. 
 as to frauds by the plaintiff upon the revenue. 
 Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487. Com- 
 munications as to unissued patents between the 
 patent office and applicants are not privileged. 
 Edison Electric Light Co. v. United States Elec- 
 tric Lighting Co. 44 Fed. Rep. 294. 
 
 577
 
 583 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 If the plaintiff neglects to take advantage of the irregularity by 
 demurrer, he will be held to have waived the objection, 4 unless he has 
 claimed the benefit of it by answer. 5 
 
 An amended bill is liable to have the same objections taken to it, by 
 demurrer, as an original bill ; and even where a demurrer to the origi- 
 nal bill has been overruled, a demurrer to an amended bill has been 
 allowed; 6 and the circumstance of the amendment being of the most 
 trifling extent will not, it seems, make any difference ; and even where 
 the bill was amended by the addition of a party only, the demurrer was 
 held to be regular. 7 Where the defence first put in is a plea, and 
 * 583 the bill is afterwards amended, the amended * bill may still be 
 demurred to. 1 A defendant, however, cannot, in general, after 
 he has answered the original bill, put in a general demurrer to the 
 amended bill : because the answer to the original bill, being still on the 
 record, will, in fact, overrule the demurrer. 2 The defendant must, in 
 such case, confine his demurrer to the matters introduced by amend- 
 ment. But where a substantially new case is made by the amended bill, 
 a general demurrer will lie. 3 
 
 A defendant may demur to part only of the relief or discovery : in 
 which case it is called a partial demurrer. 4 Under the former practice, 
 a defendant demurring to part of the bill was bound to answer the 
 rest; and when interrogatories have been served, a defendant may still 
 answer such of the interrogatories as are not covered by the demurrer ; 
 but where no interrogatories have been served, he may file the partial 
 demurrer without coupling any answer with it. 5 It is not, however, 
 
 bills which can be brought to effect or alter a 
 decree, unless the decree has been obtained by 
 fraud. Ld. Red. 20G ; Lady Granville v. Rams- 
 den, Bunb. 56. Where, however, a supplemen- 
 tal bill was filed, in a case in which, according to 
 the former practice of the Court, a supplemental 
 bill was the proper course, but bj r more recent 
 practice the same object had been accomplished 
 by petition, Sir John Leach V. C held, that 
 the supplemental bill was not rendered irregu- 
 lar, although the circumstances would be taken 
 into consideration upon the question of costs. 
 Davies v. Williams, 1 Sim. 5. 
 
 4 Archbishop of York v. Stapleton, 2 Atk. 
 136; Banger v. Great Western Ry. Co. ubi 
 tupra. An irregularity in pleading is waived 
 by going to issue upon the merits, as where, 
 pending a suit for the infringement of a patent, 
 the patent was surrendered and a new patent 
 taken out, and the complainant filed a supple- 
 mental, instead of an original bill. Ready v. 
 Scott. 23 Wall. 352, 365. So where the answer 
 was filed as a cross-bill without any warrant of 
 law. Hubbard r. Turner, 2 M'Lean, 539. So 
 where the answer was filed as a cross-bill when 
 an original bill was alone proper. Odom v. 
 Owen, 2 Baxt. 446; Campbell v. Foster, 2 Tenn. 
 Ch. 402. So, where a pre-requisite to the filing 
 of an answer as a cross-bill is omitted. Hull 
 r Fowlkes, 9 Heisk. 753. 
 578 
 
 5 Milligan v. Mitchell, 1 M. & C. 433, 542. 
 
 6 Bancroft v. Wardour, 2 Bro. C. C. 66 ; 2 
 Dick. 672; 1 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 216, 217; Moore v. 
 Armstrong, 9 Porter, 697. A demurrer will 
 lie where the title alleged in an amended bill 
 is inconsistent with that presented by the origi- 
 nal bill. Winter v. Quarles, 43 Ala. 692. 
 
 ' Bosanquet v. Marsha'm, 4 Sim. 573; Ilorton 
 v. Thompson, 3 Tenn. Ch. 575. Infra, p. 601, 
 n. 6. 
 
 1 Robertson v. Lord Londonderry, 5 Sim. 
 226. 
 
 2 Atkinson v. Hanway, 1 Cox, 360; see 
 Ellice v. Goodson, 3 M. & C. 653, 658; 2 Jur. 
 249; Salkeld v. Phillips, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 580; 
 and see ante, p. 409. 
 
 3 Cresy v. Bevan, 13 Sim. 354; see Powell p. 
 Jewesbury, 9 Ch. D. 34; also Powell r. Cock- 
 erel!, 4 Hare, 565, 569; Wyllie v. Ellice. 6 Ha.c, 
 505. 510; Att.-Gen. v. Cooper, 8 Hare, 166; 
 ante, p. 409. 
 
 4 See Emans v. Emans, 14 N. J. Eq. 114. 
 
 s Burton r. Robertson, 1J. & H. 38; 6 Jur. 
 N. S. 10U. See now R. S. C. Ord. XXVIII. 
 4, 10; Watson r. Hawkins, 24 W. R. 884. The 
 defendant must, however, wait till the expira- 
 ration of the time for filing interrogatories. 
 Rowe v. Tonkin, L. R. 1 Eq. 9; 11 Jur. N. S. 
 849, 11. R.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. 
 
 584 
 
 necessary that the defendant should adopt the form of a partial 
 demurrer, for the purpose of protecting himself from giving discovery 
 to which the plaintiff is not entitled : for a defendant may decline 
 answering any interrogatory, or part of one, from answering which he 
 might have protected himself by demurrer, notwithstanding he answers 
 other parts of such interrogatory or interrogatories from which lie might 
 have protected himself by demurrer, or other part of the bill as to which 
 he was not interrogated. 6 In cases in which it is still thought expedient 
 to adopt the defence of a partial demurrer against discovery, this rule 
 does not. seem to affect the practice; but the rule which directs that 
 no demurrer or plea shall be held bad, and overruled upon argument, 
 only because the answer of the defendant extends to some part of 
 the same matter as is covered by such demurrer or plea, 7 is important. 
 And we have before "seen, that now no demurrer or plea will be held 
 bad, and overruled upon argument, only because such demurrer or 
 plea does not cover so much of the bill as it might by law have 
 extended to. 8 
 
 A demurrer cannot- be good in part and bad in part; 9 so that 
 * if a demurrer is general to the whole bill, and there is any part, * 584 
 either as to the relief or the discovery, to which the defend- 
 ant ought to put in an answer, the demurrer, being entire, must be 
 overruled. 1 
 
 Instances are certainly mentioned by Lord Redesdale, 2 in which 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. XV. 4 ; see post, Chap. XVII. 
 § 1, on Answers. 
 
 7 Cons. Ord. XIV. 9; Att.-Gen. v. Cooper, 
 ubi supra. This order has been adopted in the 
 Equity Rules of the U. S. Courts, Rule 37. 
 
 8 Ante, p. 546, n. 6; post, p. 617; Cons. Ord. 
 XIV. 8. 
 
 9 In this respect there is a difference be- 
 tween a plea and a demurrer. Mayor, &c, of 
 London v. Levy, 8 Yes. 40'} ; Baker v. Mellish, 
 11 Ves. 70. 
 
 1 IVr Lord Hardwicke in Met calf v. Hervev, 
 1 Ves. Sr. 218; Earl of Suff ,1k v. Green, 1 Atk. 
 450; Todd v. Gee, 17 Ves. 273, 277: Att.-Gen. 
 v. Brown, 1 Swanst. 304. A demurrer bad in 
 part is void intoto, Verplanck v. Caines, 1 John. 
 Ch. 57; Forbes v. Whitlock, 3 Edw.' Ch. 44!; 
 Fay v. Jones, 1 Head (Tenn ), 442; Shed v. 
 Garfield, 5 Vt. 39; Castleman v. Weitch, 3 
 Rand. 598; Kimberley v. Sells. 3 John. Ch. 
 467; Graves v. Downey, 3 Monroe, 356; Chase's 
 case, 1 Bland, 217; Blount v. Garen, 3 Havw. 
 88; Treadwell v. Brown, 44 N. II. 551 ; Metier 
 v. Metier, 18 N. J. Eq. 273; 19 id. 457; Banta 
 v. Moore, 15 N. J. Eq. 97; Mitchell r. Green, 
 10 Met. 101 ; ante. p. 547, n.; but see Pope r. 
 Stan-bury, 2 Bibb, 484, contra. It is a general 
 rule that a demurrer cannot be good as to a part, 
 which it covers, and bad as to the rest; and 
 therefore it must stand or fall altogether. Hig- 
 ginbotham v. Burnet, 5 John. Ch. 184; Burns 
 v. Hobdt, 29 Maine. 272, 277; Marye v. Dyche, 
 42 Miss. 347; Reid v. Beall, id. 472. 
 
 But in Tennessee, which authorizes an appeal 
 from the decree of the Chancelloron a demurrer, 
 the Supreme Court has sometimes departed from 
 this rule with a view to narrow the subsequent 
 litigation. Fitzgerald v. Cummings, 1 Lea, 
 232; Riddle v. Mottley, 1 Lea, 468. 
 
 A demurrer to the whole of a bill, containing 
 some matters relievable and others not, is had, 
 unless the bill is multifarious. Dimmock v. 
 Bixby, 20 Rick. 368; McLaren v. Steapp, 1 
 Kelly, 376; Beach v. Beach, 11 Paige, 161; 
 Stuyvesant v. Mayor, &c, of New York, id. 
 414; Robinson v. Guild, 12 Me;. 323. Where 
 a demurrer to a bill is overruled, because it 
 covers too much, the defendant may, on excep- 
 tion to his answer, raise the question of the 
 materiality of the discovery. Kuypers v. lief. 
 Dutch Church, 6 Paige, 570. If the ground of 
 demurrer assigned as to all of the plaintiffs be 
 bad as to one, the demurrer must be overruled. 
 Gibson o. Jayne, 37 Miss. 164. If the demurrer 
 be to the whole bill fur want of proper parties, 
 and there are sufficient parties to the proper 
 part of the bill, which is independent of another 
 pari faulty for want of parties, the demurrer 
 will be had. Laughton v. Harden, 08 Maine, 
 208. 
 
 a Ld. Red. 214; Rolt v. Lord Somerville, 2 
 Eq. Cas. Ab. 759, pi. 8; Radcliffe v. Fursman, 
 2 Bro. P. C. ed. Toml. 514. 
 
 579
 
 * 585 DEMURRERS. 
 
 demurrers have been allowed in part ; but whatever may have formerly 
 been done, the practice appears to be now more strict : though some- 
 times the Court has, upon overruling a demurrer, given the defendant 
 leave to put in a less extended demurrer, or to amend and narrow the 
 demurrer already filed. 3 In the latter case, however, the application 
 to amend ought to be made before the judgment upon the demurrer, as 
 it stands, has been pronounced : though, even where that has been 
 omitted, the Court has, after the demurrer has been overruled, upon a 
 proper case being shown, given the defendant leave, upon motion, to put 
 in a less extended demurrer and answer. 4 
 
 A defendant may also put in separate demurrers to separate and 
 distinct parts of a bill, for separate and distinct causes: 5 for the same 
 grounds of demurrer frequently will not apply to diffei'ent parts of a 
 bill, though the whole may be liable to demurrer ; and in this case, one 
 demurrer may be overruled upon argument and another allowed. 6 
 
 Although a demurrer cannot be good in part and bad in part, it may 
 be good as to one of the defendants demurring, and bad as to others. 7 
 
 * 585 * Section III. — The Form of Demurrers. 
 
 A demurrer must be entitled in the cause, and is headed "The 
 demurrer of A B (or, of A B and C D), one, &c, of the above-named 
 defendants, to the bill of complaint of the above-named plaintiff.'' 1 If 
 it be accompanied by a plea, or by an answer, it should be called in the 
 title " the demurrer and plea," or " demurrer and answer. 1 ' Where it is to 
 an amended bill, it need not be expressed, in the title, to be a demurrer 
 to the original and amended bill ; but a demurrer to the amended bill 
 will be sufficient. 2 
 
 As a demurrer confesses the matters of fact to be true, as stated by 
 the opposite party, it is always preceded by a general protestation 
 against the truth of the matters contained in the bill ; 3 a practice bor- 
 rowed from the Common Law, and probably intended to avoid conclu- 
 sion in another suit, 4 or in the suit in which the demurrer is put in, in 
 case the demurrer should be overruled. 
 
 After the protestation, the demurrer, if it is a partial demurrer and 
 
 3 . Baker v. Mellish, 11 Ves. 68; Glegg v. one, against whom a good cause of action is 
 
 Lo^h, 4 Mad. 193, 207; Thorpe v. Macaulay, 5 stated, cannot on this ground demur. N. Y. & 
 
 Mad. 218. N. H. R. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 17 N. Y. 592, 
 
 4 Baker v. Mellish, 11 Ves. 72, 76. J For the present English practice, see 1 
 
 5 North v. Earl of Strafford, 3 P. Wms. Dan. Ch. Prac (6th Eng. ed.) 538; R. S. C. 
 148; Roberdeau r. Rous, 1 Atk. 544. Ord. XIX. 6; XXL 1. 
 
 6 North r. Earl of Strafford, ubi supra; 2 Smith v. Bryon, 3 Mad. 428: Osborn v. 
 Little v. Archer, 1 Hogan, 55. Jullion, 3 Drew. 552; and see Granville v. Betts, 
 
 7 London r. Levy, ubi supra; Barstow v. 17 Sim. 58. For forms of demurrer, see 2 Van 
 Smith, Walk. Ch. 394: but not unless it is in Hey. 74-92; and post. Vol. III. 
 
 form a "joint and several demurrer;" per Sir 3 Story, Eq. PI. §§ 452, 457; 1 Smith Ch. 
 L. Shadwell V. C. in Glascottt". Copper Miners' Pr. (2d Am. ed.) 209. Protestations in demur- 
 Co. 11 Sim. 305, 310 : 5 Jur. 264 ; Dzialynski v. rers are required, in New Hampshire, to be 
 Jacksonville Bank, 23 Fla. 346. If too many omitted by Ch. Rule 6; 38 N. H. 606. 
 persons are joined as defendants in a bill in 4 Ld. Red. 212. 
 Equity, there being no misjoinder of subjects, 
 
 580
 
 FORM OF DEMURRERS. 
 
 * 580 
 
 not to the whole bill, must proceed distinctly to point out the parts of 
 the bill to which it is intended to apply. 5 
 
 Although a demurrer, in the form above stated, namely, " to all the 
 rest of the bill which is not answered," would, for the reasons stated 
 by Lord Redesdale, be a bad form of demurrer, a demurrer 
 * to all the bill, except as to a particular specified part, would * 586 
 not be open to the same objection ; and where the exception ap- 
 plies to a very small part only of the bill, it has been held to be the 
 proper way of demurring. 1 In framing such a demurrer, however, care 
 must be taken that it should appear distinctly, by the demurrer itself, 
 what part of the bill is to be included in the exception : otherwise, the 
 demurrer will be bad. 2 
 
 The above rule also applies to cases where there are two or more dis- 
 tinct demurrers to different portions of the bill ; in such cases, the differ- 
 ent portions of the bill to be covered by each demurrer must be distinctly 
 pointed out. And where a demurrer is put in to such parts of an amended 
 bill as have been introduced by the amendments, it will not be sufficient 
 to say it is a demurrer to the amendments, but the parts must be specifi- 
 cally pointed out, and a demurrer to so much of the amended bill, as has 
 not been answered by the answer to the original bill, will be bad. 3 
 
 A demurrer will not be good if it merely says, generally, that the de- 
 fendant demurs to the bill; 4 it must express some cause of demurrer, 
 either general or specific. 5 A defendant is said to demur generally, 
 
 5 The rule, as to this, is laid down by Lord 
 Redesdalc in Devonsher v. Newenha n, 2 Sell. 
 & Lef. 199, 205: ''that where a defendant demurs 
 to part, and answers to p'irt of a bill, the Court 
 is not to be put to the trouble of looking into 
 the bill or answer, to see what is covered by the 
 demurrer, but it ought to be expressed, in clear 
 and precise terms, what it is the party refuses 
 to answer (see Atwill v. Ferrett, 2 Blatch. 39) ; 
 and I cannot agree that it is a proper way of 
 demurring to say that the defendant answers 
 to such a particular fact, and demurs to all the 
 Test of a bill : the defendant ought to demur to 
 a particular part of the bill, specifying it pre- 
 cisely." See Chetwynd v. Lindon, 2 Vis. Sr. 
 450; Salkeld v. Science, id. 107 ; Ban es v. Tay- 
 lor, 4 W. R. 577, V. C. K.; Johnston v. John- 
 ston, 2 Moll. 414: Story, Eq. PI. §§ 457,458, and 
 notes; Nash v Smith. Conn. 421; Clancy v. 
 Craine, 2 I lev. Eq. 363. In New Hampshire 
 the form of a demurrer is required in substance 
 to be: "The defendant says the plaintiff is 
 not entitled upon such bill to the relief (or dis- 
 covery) prayed for, because,' 1 &c. Ch. Rule 10, 
 38 N. H. 10. 
 
 1 Hicks v. Raincock, 1 Cox, 40; Howe r. 
 Puppa, 1 V. & B. 511. 
 
 2 Robinson v. Thompson, 2 V. & B. 118; 
 Weatherhead v. Blackburn, id. 121; Burch v. 
 Coney, 14 Jur. 1009, V. C. K. B.; Osborn v. 
 Jullion, 3 Drew. 552; Barnes r. Taylor, 4 \Y. 
 R. 577. V. C. K.; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 457,458; 
 and see Burton v. Robertson, 1 J. & H. 38; 6 
 
 Jur. N. S. 1014, for case where no answer had 
 been required. 
 
 3 Mvnd v. Francis, 1 Anst. 5. 
 
 4 Duffield v. Greaves. Carey, 87; Offeley r. 
 Morgan, id. 107; Peachie v. Twyecrosse, id. 
 113. 
 
 5 Nash v. Smith, 6 Conn. 422; see Johnston 
 v Johnston, 2 Moll. 414; Holland v. Kenosha 
 County, 19 Wis. 247; see Bidder v. McLean, 
 20 Ch. D. 512. He may, however, in cases 
 where he demurs either to the jurisdiction or to 
 the substance, state specially the particular 
 grounds upon which he founds his objection. 
 And, indeed, some of the grounds of demurrer, 
 which go to the substance of the bill, require 
 rather a particular statement; thus, a demurrer 
 for want of parties must, as has been before 
 slated, show who are the necessary parties, in 
 such a manner as to point out to the plaintiff 
 the objection to his bill, so as to enable him 
 tn amend by adding proper parties (see ante, 
 p. JTSj; and in the ca*e o' a demurrer tor multi- 
 fariousness, a mere allegation " that the bill is 
 multifarious" will lie informal: it should state, 
 as the ground of demurrer, that the bill mutes 
 distinct matters upon one record, and show the 
 inconvenience of so doing. Rayner V. Julian, 
 2 I lick. 077; 5 Mad 144, n. (b): Barber r. 
 Barber. 4 Drew. 666; 5 Jur. N. S. 1197. A 
 general demurrer, without any special cause 
 assigned, has the effect only to turn the inquiry 
 upon the equities of the bill. Wellborn v. Tiller, 
 10 Ala. 305. 
 
 5S1
 
 *587 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 when he demurs to the jurisdiction, or to the substance of the bill; or 
 specially, when he demurs on the ground of a defect in form, (a) 
 
 Some objections, which appear to be merely upon matters of form, 
 
 may be taken advantage of under general demurrers, for 
 * 587 * want of equity : * thus, it has been before stated 2 that some 
 
 bills may be demurred to on the ground that they are not accom- 
 panied by an affidavit ; that objection, however, is in fact an objection 
 to the equity, because the cases in which an affidavit is required are 
 those in which the Court has no jurisdiction, unless upon the supposi- 
 
 i In Marsh v. Marsh, 16 N. J. Eq. 391, 397, 
 it is said that, under a general demurrer for 
 want of equity, no objection for want of form 
 can properly be raised. And this is repeated in 
 Miller v. Jamison, 24 N. J. Eq. 41. Such a 
 demurrer is too general to be entitled to notice 
 
 under the Ala. Rev. Code § 3350. Erwin v. 
 Reese, 54 Ala. 589. 
 
 2 Ante, p. 394. A demurrer for want of 
 equity need not refer to the allegations of the 
 bill. " Middlebrook v. Bromley, 9 Jur. N. S. 
 614, 615; 11 W. R. 712, V. C. K. 
 
 (a) A defect of form will not be considered 
 under a general demurrer for want of equity; 
 objections to form must be special, and point out 
 the defect clearly and certainly. See Wilson v. 
 Hill, 46 N. J. Eq. 367; Essex Paper Co. v. 
 Greacen, 45 id. 504; Reading v. Stover, 32 id. 
 32G; Bidder v. McLean, 20 Ch. D. 512; Stewart 
 r. Flint, 57 Vt. 216; Billings v. Mann, 156 
 Mass. 203; Eagle v. Beard, 33 Ark. 497; Ward 
 r. Clay, 82 Cal. 502; McCoy v. Boley, 21 Fla. 
 803; Rice v. Yakima & P. C. R. Co. 4 Wash. 
 St. 724; Reese v. Reese, 89 Ga. 645; Print-up 
 v. Kome Land Co. 90 Ga. ISO; James v. Atlanta 
 Street R. Co. id. 695. Thus the omission of the 
 defendants' names from the introductory part of 
 the bill, or from the praver for answer, cannot 
 be taken advantage of by general demurrer. 
 Boon r. Pierpont,. 28 N. J. Eq. 7; McCoy v. 
 Boley, 21 Fla. 803. If any ground for equi- 
 table relief is shown by the bill, it is sufficient 
 upon a general demurrer. Socola r. Grant, 15 
 Fed. Rep. 487; Merriam v. Hnlloway Pub. Co. 
 43 id. 450; United States v. Southern l'acific 
 R. Co. 40 id. 611; Northern Pacific R. Co. 
 r. Roberts, 42 id. 734; Stephens v. Overstolz, 
 43 id. 465; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Rhode 
 Island II. T. Co. 36 id. 863; Perry v. Little- 
 field, 17 Blatch.272; Shaw v. Chase, 77 Mich. 
 436: Darrah v. Boyce. 62 id. 480; Quitman 
 County v. Stritze, 69 Miss. 460; Cartee v. 
 Spence, 24 S. C. 550; Lindsley v. Personette, 
 35 X. J. Eq. 355; Brewster v. Hatch. 10 Abb. 
 X. Cas. 400; 1'hcenix Ins. Co. ». Day, 4 Lea 
 (I'cnn), 247: Anderson v. Mullenix, 5 id. 287; 
 Pinkum v. Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 3,01; Elam ». 
 Barnes, 110 X.- C 73: Marks v. Murphy, 76 
 Ind. 534; Shotts r. Boyd. 77 Ind. 223: El 
 Modello C M. Co. v. Gato, 25 Fla. 880. This 
 includes relief under an alternative prayer. 
 Gaunt v. Froelich,24 111. App. 303; Gooch v. 
 Green, 102 111. 507; Tillman v. Thomas. 87 Ala. 
 321; Lowe v. Burke, 79 Ga. 164; Erie Tel. Co. 
 
 582 
 
 v. Grimes, 82 Tex. 89. A special demurrer to 
 part of the bill must clearly indicate such part. 
 Chicago St. L. & N. O. R. Co. v. Macomb, 2 
 Fed. Rep. 18. A demurrer on the ground that 
 a bill does not state facts sufficient to constitute 
 a cause of suit is unknown to Equity practice, 
 amounting at most to a general demurrer for 
 want of equity, which does not lie to a bill 
 not deficient in substance. Nicholas r. Murray, 
 5 Sawyer, 320: see Martin V. Martin, 74 Ind. 
 207 ; Denver R. L. &C. Co. r. Union Pacific Ry. 
 Co. 34 Fed. Rep. 386. A motion to dismiss for 
 want of equity admits the facts alleged in bill, 
 and should be granted only when the bill can- 
 not be made good by amendment. Grimes v. 
 Grimes, 143 111. 550. A bill clearly framed on 
 one insufficient theory is bad on demurrer, 
 though the facts averred may be sufficient on a 
 different theory. Cottrell v. .Etna Life Ins. 
 Co. 97 Ind. 311 ; see American F. L. M. Co. v. 
 Sewell, 92 Ala. 163. But a special prayer for 
 wrong relief does not necessarily have this effect 
 where the bill also contains a prayer for gen- 
 eral relief. Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Hogle, 25 
 III. App 543; Holden v. Holden, 24 111. App. 
 106; Silberberg v. Pearson, 75 Texas, 287. 
 
 On written demurrer, the ground assigned is 
 alone considered, and demurring for a wrong 
 reason waives all others. Turner Coal Co. r. 
 Glover (Ala.), 13 So. Rep. 478. A demurrer, 
 though assigning various causes, is an entirety, 
 and as such is to be sustained or overruled. 
 Canton Warehouse Co. v. Potts, 68 Miss. 637. 
 A joint and several demurrer by husband and 
 wife may be sustained as to one of their, and 
 overruled as to the other. Dzialynski v. Bank 
 of Jacksonville, 23 Fla. 346. So a joint de- 
 murrer will not be sustained as to all the defend- 
 ants, if the bill is good as to some of them. 
 Lancaster v. Roberts, 144 111.213; see Illinois 
 Land Co. v. Speyer, 138 111. 137; Asevado v. 
 Orr (Cal.), 34 Pac. Rep. 777.
 
 FORM OP DEMURRERS. * 588 
 
 tion that the fact stated in the affidavit is true ; and the Court requires 
 the annexation of the affidavit to the bill, for the purpose of verifying 
 that fact. In these cases, the objection may be made either in the 
 form of a special demurrer, or of general demurrer for want of equity ; 
 because the plaintiff, by his bill, does not bring his case within the 
 description of cases over which the Court exercises jurisdiction. Upon 
 the same principle, a defendant may take advantage, by general de- 
 murrer, of the omission to offer to do equity, in cases where such an 
 offer ought to be made. 3 The objection for want of sufficient positive- 
 ness in the plaintiff's statement of facts within his own knowledge, may 
 also be taken by general demurrer ; 4 but where a defendant to a bill 
 praying relief, demurs to the discovery only, he cannot do so under a 
 general demurrer for want of equity : he must make it the subject of 
 special demurrer ; 5 and so, a general demurrer does not include a de- 
 murrer on the ground that the bill (being a bill of review) does not 
 state on the face of it that it is by leave of the Court ; but that ground 
 may be taken ore tenus. 6 
 
 Care must be taken, in framing a demurrer, that it is made to rely 
 only upon the facts stated in the bill ; otherwise it will be what is 
 termed a speaking demurrer, and will be overruled. 7 A demur- 
 rer for that it appeared * on the bill that the agreement, therein * 588 
 alleged to have been entered into, is not in writing signed by the 
 defendant, is not a speaking demurrer. 1 It is material to notice that, 
 in order to constitute a speaking demurrer, the fact or averment intro- 
 duced must be one which is necessary to support the demurrer, and is 
 not found in the bill : 2 the introduction of immaterial facts, or aver- 
 
 3 Ante, p. 385 ; Inman v. Wearing, 3 De G. 375, that " the case of Edsell v. Buchanan, 2 
 & S. 729. Ves. Jr. 83, has been frequently misunderstood. 
 
 4 Ante, pp. 360, 560. The demurrer in that case was not overruled as 
 
 5 Whittiugham v. Burgoyne, 3 Anst. 900, a speaking demurrer merely on account of a 
 904; Marsh v. Marsh, 16 N. J. Eq. 391, 397. modest suggestion that the time, stated by the 
 And the demurrer may be to a particular inter- complainant, 'about the year 1770,' was up- 
 rogatorv, as where, in a bill for divorce, the wards of twenty years before the filing of the 
 defendant is called upon to discover whether, bill; but it was because that suggestion, from 
 since the marriage, she has committed adultery. the manner in which it was introduced into the 
 Black t\ Black, 20 N. J. Eq. 431. demurrer, was in the nature of an averment 
 
 G Henderson v. Cook. 4 Drew. 306. that the defendant had been in possession of 
 
 " Brownaword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. Sr. 245; the mortgaged premises for more than twenty 
 
 Henderson v. Cook, 4 Drew. 306, 315. Thus, years. And the fact of such possession was 
 
 where a bill was filed to redeem a mortgage, necessary to sustain the defence set up on the 
 
 alleging that the plaintiff's ancestor had died in argument of the demurrer: which defence was, 
 
 1770, and that, soon after, the defendant took that the plaintiff's right to redeem was barred 
 
 possession, &c; and the defendant demurred, by the lapse of time. The precise time, at 
 
 and for cause of demurrer showed, that it ap- which the defendant's possession commenced, 
 
 peared upon the face of the bill, that from the not appearing from the bill itself, the averment 
 
 year 1770, which is upwards of twenty years that the heir of the mortgagee had been in pos- 
 
 before the filing of the bill, the defendant has session 'upwards of twenty years before the 
 
 been in possesion, &c., Lord Rosslyn overruled bill filed,' should have been brought forward by 
 
 the demurrer, because the language of the bill plea, or answer, and not by demurrer.'' 
 
 did not show that the defendant took possession ' Wood i\ Midgley, 5 De G. M. & G. 41; 2 
 
 in the year 1770, but, that he did so, could only Sm. & G. 115; see also Jones v. Charlemont, 
 
 be collected from the averment in the demurrer. 12 Jur. 532; V. C. E. 
 
 Edsell v. Buchanan, 4 Bro. C. C. 254; 2 Ves. 2 Brooks v. Gibbons, 4 Paige, 374: see Kuy- 
 
 Jr. 83. It is said in Brooks v. Gibbons, 4 Paige, pers v. Reformed Dutch Church, 6 Paige, 570; 
 
 583
 
 589 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 merits, or of arguments, is improper ; but it is mere surplusage, and 
 will not vitiate the demurrer. 8 
 
 A defendant is not limited to show one cause of demurrer only ; he 
 may assign as many causes of demurrer as he pleases, either to the 
 whole bill, or to each part of the bill demurred to, but they must be 
 stated as distinct and separate causes of demurrer ; 4 and if any one of 
 the causes of demurrer assigned hold good, the demurrer will be allowed. 5 
 Where, however, two or more causes of demurrer are shown to the whole 
 bill, the Court will treat it as one demurrer ; and if one of the causes be 
 considered sufficient, the order will be drawn up, as upon a complete 
 allowance of the demurrer. 6 A defendant may also, at the hearing of 
 his demurrer, orally assign another cause of demurrer, different from, or 
 in addition to, those assigned upon the record : 7 which, if valid, will 
 support the demurrer, although the causes of demurrer stated in the 
 demurrer itself are held to be invalid. This oral statement of a cause 
 of demurrer is called demurring " ore tenus" 8 (a) A defendant cannot 
 demur ore tenus, unless there is a demurrer on the record ; and upon 
 this ground, where a defendant had pleaded, and, upon the plea being 
 overruled, offered to demur ore tenus, for want of parties, he was not 
 permitted to do so ; 9 neither can a defendant demur ore tenus 
 * 589 for the same cause that has been expressed in the * demurrer on 
 record, and overruled -, 1 nor can he, after a demurrer to the whole 
 
 M'Comb v. Armstrong, 2 Moll. 295 ; Story, Eq. 
 PI. § 448; Pendlebury v. Walker, 4 Y. & C. 
 424; 1 Smith Ch. Pr. (2d Am. ed.) 206; Tall- 
 madge v. Lovett, 3 Edw. Ch. 554; Saxon v. 
 Barksdalc, 4 Desaus. 522. 
 
 3 Cawthorn v. Chalie, 2 S. & S. 127; Davies 
 v. Williams, 1 Sim. 5, 8. 
 
 4 Barber v. Barber, 4 Drew. 666 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 
 1197. 
 
 6 Harrison v. Hogg, 2 Ves. Jr. 323; Jones 
 v. Frost, 3 Mad. 1, 9; Jac. 466; Coopers. Earl 
 Powis, 3 De G. & S. 688. 
 
 6 Wellesley v. Wellesley, 4 M. & C. 554, 
 558; 4 Jur. 2; see also Watts v Lord Eglinton, 
 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott.25, 27; Gay v. Skeen 
 (W. Va ), 15 S. E. Rep. 64. 
 
 ' See now R. S. C. Ord. XXVIII. 2. 
 
 8 Brinkerhoff v. Brown, 6 John. Ch. 149; 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 464; Wright v. Dame, 1 Met. 
 237;*M'Dermot v. B ois, R. M. Charlt. 281; 
 
 (a) Want of equity in the substance of the 
 bill may be thus assigned. Hastings v. Belden, 
 55 Vt. 273. So, under the Code- system, the 
 defendant may, on a demurrer ore tenus to a 
 complaint which is clearly intended as a com- 
 plaint in Equity, object that there is an ade- 
 quate legal remedy. Stein v. Benedict, 83 
 Wis. 003. A demurrer ore tenus must be co- 
 extensive with the bill. Equitable Life Ass. 
 Society v. Patterson, 1 Fed. Rep. 126 J Barrett 
 
 584 
 
 Daly v. Kirwan, 1 Ir. Eq. 157; see Garlick v. 
 Strong, 3 Paige, 440; Ch:ise v. Searle, 45 N. H. 
 512 ; Sherry v. Smith, 72 Wis. 339. 
 
 Under a general demurrer for want of equity, 
 a demurrer for want of parties may be made 
 ore tenus. Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige, 231 ; 
 Garlick v. Strong, 3 Paige, 452; Still well v. 
 M'Neely, 1 Green Ch. 305; see Pyle v. Price, 6 
 Sumner's Ves. 781; Mr. Hovenden's note (2); 
 Ld. Red. 217. 
 
 9 DurdantD. Redman, 1 Vera. 78; Hook v. 
 Dorman, 1 S. & S. 227, 231; Story, Eq. PL 
 § 464. 
 
 1 Bowman v. Lygon, 1 Anst. 1; but see 
 Pratt v. Keith, 10 Jur. N. S. 305, V. C. K.; 12 
 W. R. 394, where a demurrer on the record, 
 that there were not proper parties, having been 
 overruled, a demurrer ore tenus, describing the 
 necessary parties, was allowed. 
 
 v. Doughty, 25 N. J. Eq. 379. An objection for 
 laches, which was not taken in the demurrer 
 filed, nor assigned ore tenus before a single 
 Judge, is not open at the argument before the 
 full Court. Somerbyv. Buntin, 118 Mass. 279. 
 A demurrer ore tenus does not waive any ques- 
 tion raised by a formal demurrer, especially 
 when it cannot properly raise such question. 
 Stein v. Benedict, 83 Wis. 603.
 
 FORM OP DEMURRERS. 
 
 *589 
 
 bill, demur ore tenus as to part. 2 It seems, however, that after a demur- 
 rer to part of the bill has been overruled, the defendant may demur ore 
 tenus to the same part. 3 
 
 It is to be noticed that, although a defendant may, either upon the 
 record, or ore tenus, assign as many causes of demurrer as he pleases, 
 such causes of demurrer must be co-extensive with the demurrer upon 
 the record : therefore, causes of demurrer, which apply to part of the 
 bill only, cannot be joined with causes of demurrer which go to the 
 whole bill ; * for, as we have seen before, a demurrer cannot be good in 
 part and bad in part ; which would be the case if a demurrer, professing 
 to go to the whole bill, could be supported by the allegation of a ground 
 of demurrer which applies to part only. 
 
 The consequence of demurring ore tenus, as regards costs, will be dis- 
 cussed in a future section. 5 
 
 The demurrer, having assigned the cause or causes of demurrer, then 
 proceeds to demand judgment of the Court, whether the defendant 
 ought to be compelled to put in any further or other answer to the bill, 
 or to such part thereof as is specified as being the subject of demurrer ; 
 and concludes with a prayer, that the defendant may be dismissed with 
 his reasonable costs in that behalf sustained. 6 
 
 If a demurrer is to part of the bill only, the answer, if any, to the 
 remainder usually follows the statement of the causes of demurrer, and 
 the submission to the judgment of the Court of the plaintiff's right to 
 call upon the defendant to make further or other answer. 7 
 
 It was formerly an invariable rule, that an answer to any part 
 of a bill demurred to would overrule the demurrer, 8 even though 
 
 2 Shepherd v. Lloyd, 2 Y. & J. 490; Harr. 
 Ch. 227; Barrett v. Doughty, 25 N. J. Eq. 380. 
 
 3 Crouch v. Hiekin, 1 Keen, 385, 389; see 
 contra, Shepherd v. Lloyd, ubi supra. 
 
 4 Pitts v. Short, 17 Ves. 213, 216; Metcalfe 
 v. Brown, 5 Price, 560; Rump v. Greenhill, 20 
 Beav. 512; 1 Jur. N. S. 123; Henderson v. 
 Cook, 4 Drew. 306; Gilbert v. Lewis, 1 De 
 G. J. & S. 38; Thompson v. University of 
 London, 10 Jur. N. S. 669, 671; 33 L. J.'ch. 
 625, V. C. K. 
 
 5 See post, p. 549. 
 
 6 See form in Vol. III. 
 
 7 See ante, pp. 581, 584, 585. 
 
 8 Tidd v. Clare, 2 Dick. 712; Hester v. 
 Weston, 1 Vern. 463; Roberts v. Clayton. 3 
 Anst. 715; see Varick i\ Smith, 5 Paige, 137; 
 Red Jacket Tribe v. Hoff, 33 N. J. Eq. 441. A 
 demurrer may be to the whole bill or to a part 
 only of the bill; and the defendant may there- 
 fore demur as to one part, plead as to another 
 part, and answer to the rest of the bill. Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 442; Newton v. Thayer, 17 Pick. 132, 
 133; Pierpont v. Fowle, 2 Wood. & M. 23. But 
 a defendant cannot plead or answer, and demur 
 also, to the whole bill or to the same part of a 
 bill. Clark v. Phelps, 6 John. Ch. 214; Beau- 
 champ v. Gibbs, 1 Bibb, 481; Robinson v. 
 
 Bingley, 1 M'Cord Ch. 352; Barbey's Appeal, 
 119 Penn. St. 413. If the defendant demur to 
 the whole bill, an answer to a part thereof is 
 inconsistent; and the demurrer will be over- 
 ruled. Pieri v. Shieldsboro', 42 Miss. 493. For 
 the same reason, if there be a demurrer to a 
 part of the bill, there cannot be a plea or an- 
 swer to the same part, without overruling the 
 demurrer. Clark v. Phelps, 6 John. Ch. 214; 
 Souzer ». De Meyer, 2 Paige, 574; H. K. Chase's 
 case, 1 Bland, 217; Leacraft v. Dempsev, 4 
 Paige, 124; Spofford v. Manning, Paige, 383; 
 Miller v. Fasse, 1 Bailey Eq. 187; Jarvis v. 
 Palmer, 11 Paige, 650; Kuypers v. Reformed 
 Dutch Church, 6 Paige, 570; Chase's case. 1 
 Bland, 206; Saxon v. Barksdale, 4 Desaus. 522; 
 Bull 8. Bell, 4 Wis. 54; see ante, p. 547. n. 2. 
 
 In Massachusetts, " the defendant, instead 
 of filing a formal plea or demurrer, may insist 
 on any special matter in his answer, and have 
 the same benefit therefrom as if he had pleaded 
 the same or demurred to the bill." Ch. Rule 
 14; see Lovett v. Longmire, 14 Ark. 339. The 
 same rule (No. 10) exists in New Hampshire, 
 38 N. H. 607. 
 
 By the rules in Chancery cases in Maine, 
 defendants may severally demur and answer 
 to the merits of the bill at the same time. Rule 
 
 585
 
 *590 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 *590 * the part answered was immaterial. 1 And this rule was carried 
 so far, that where the demurrer did not in form extend to the part 
 answered, yet, if the principle upon which the demurrer depended was 
 such that it ought to have extended to the whole bill, then the answer to 
 such part overruled the demurrer. 2 This is still the rule of the Court, 
 but it has been modified to this extent : that the Court will not overrule 
 a demurrer, merely on the ground that, by some slip or mistake, a small 
 or im material part of the bill is covered by the answer or plea as well as 
 the demurrer. 3 (a) 
 
 For information as to the nature of the answer (if any) to be put in 
 to those parts of the bill to which the defendant does not demur, the 
 reader is referred to the chapter on Answers. 4 If the plaintiff conceives 
 such answer to be insufficient, he may except to it, but he must not do 
 so before the demurrer has been argued : 5 otherwise, he will admit the 
 demurrer to be good. 6 It is said, however, that if the defendant demurs 
 to the relief only, and answers the rest of the bill, the plaintiff may 
 take exceptions to the answer before the demurrer is argued. 7 . 
 
 A demurrer is prepared, and must be signed, by counsel ; 8 but it is 
 put in without oath, as it asserts no facts, and relies merely upon matter 
 
 6, 37 Maine, 582; Hartshorn v. Eames, 31 
 Maine, 97; Smith v. Kelley, 56 Maine, 64, 65. 
 So in Tennessee. Code. § 4319 ; Harding v. 
 Egin, 2 Tenn. Ch. 39. 
 
 1 Ruspini v. Vickery, cited Ld. Red. 211; 
 Savage v. Smalebroke, 1 Vern. 90. 
 
 2 Dawson v. Sadler, 1 S. & S. 542; Sher- 
 wood v. Clark, 9 Price, 259; Hester v. Weston, 
 1 Vern. 463. 
 
 s Cons. Ord. XIV. 9; ante, p. 583; Lowndes 
 v. Gnrnett & Moseley Gold Mining Co. 1 J. 
 & H. 282; Mansell ». Feeney, id. 313; Gilbert 
 v. Lewis, 1 De G. J. & S. 38; 9 Jur. N. S. 187; 
 see also Jones v. Earl of Strafford, 3 P. Wms. 
 81. 
 
 4 Post, Chap. XVII. 
 
 5 London Assurance v. East India Co. 3 P. 
 Wms. 326. 
 
 6 Ld. Red. 317 ; Boyd v. Mills, 13 Ves. 85, 
 86. If necessary, the plaintiff may obtain an 
 extension of the time to file exceptions; see 
 post, Chap. XVII. § 4. 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 317; 3 P. Wms. 327, n. (c). 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. VIII. 1; Story, Eq. PL § 461; 
 Secor v. Singleton, 9 Fed. Rep. 809. Where a 
 solicitor has appeared in a cause, and a de- 
 murrer is filed, signed by solicitors who have 
 not appeared, the demurrer may be treated as 
 without signature, and as a nullity. Graham 
 v. Elmore, Hairing. Ch. 265. In Ernest v. 
 Partridge, 11 W. R. 715, V. C. W., the costs of 
 advising with counsel as to demurring were 
 allowed, on a party and party taxation, the 
 solicitor having thereby spared counsel much 
 trouble, and been able to give him a more 
 moderate fee on his brief. 
 
 (a) In jurisdictions where it is permitted 
 to incorporate a demurrer in the answer, the 
 former should usually be first heard, in order 
 that it may not be treated as waived. See 
 Wade v. Pulsifer, 54 Vt. 45 ; Holt v. Daniel, 
 61 Vt. 89; Murphy r. Lincoln, 63 Vt. 278, post, 
 p. 787; Adams v. Howard, 9 Fed. Rep. 347; 
 La Croix v. May, 15 id. 236; Newman v. 
 Moody, 19 id. 858; Higgins v. Hoppock, 20 X. 
 T. S. 380; see Reed v. Cumberland Mutual 
 Fire Ins. Co. 30 X. J. Eq. 140. In Michigan, a 
 separate hearing is not allowed on a demurrer 
 clause in the answer. Zabel r. Harshman, 68 
 Mich. 270. A plea which is accompanied by a 
 demurrer for want of parties, and which does 
 not set forth such parties' names, but simply 
 
 586 
 
 alleges that they are known to and ascertain- 
 able by the plaintiff and not by the defendant, 
 is bad. Dwight v. Central Vermont R. Co. 20 
 Blatch. 200; see Patrick v. Isenhart, 20 Fed. 
 Rep. 339. One defendant's demurrer is not 
 overruled by a co-defendant's plea. Dakin v. 
 Union Pacific Ry. Co. 5 Fed. Rep. 665. A de- 
 murrer may be accompanied by a plea to a bill 
 of review which does not fairly state the origi- 
 nal decree. Enochs v. Harrelson, 57 Miss. 465. 
 A demurrer cannot be filed after answer, unless 
 the latter is first withdrawn. Hall v. Turner, 
 111 X. C. 180, 182; Heller v. Royal Ins. Co. 
 151 Penn. St. 101 ; Newman v. Moody, 19 Fed. 
 Rep. 858.
 
 FILING, SETTING DOWN, AND HEARING DEMURRERS. 
 
 591 
 
 apparent upon the face of the bill ; 9 and it need not be signed by the 
 defendant. (/>) 
 
 *A mere clerical error in a demurrer may be amended ou an * 591 
 ex parte order, before the twelve days have expired, 1 or at the 
 hearing. 2 
 
 Section IV. — Filing, setting down, and hearing Demurrers. 
 
 After the draft of the demurrer has been settled and signed, it is 
 copied on paper of the same description and size as that on which bills 
 are printed, 3 and counsel's signature is copied at the foot ; the demurrer 
 is then filed at the Record and Writ Clerks' Office. 4 The name and 
 place of business of the plaintiff's solicitor, and of his agent, if any, or 
 the name and place of residence of the plaintiff, where he acts in per- 
 son, and, in either case, the address for service, if any, must be indorsed, 
 as upon other pleadings. 5 
 
 A separate demurrer, by a married woman, must have an order to 
 warrant it ; such a demurrer ought not, therefore, to be filed till an order 
 to that effect has been procured. 6 A demurrer cannot be filed on behalf 
 of an infant, or a person of unsound mind not so found by inquisition, 
 until a guardian ad litem has been appointed ; and it is the same in the 
 case of a lunatic, when his committee has an adverse interest. The order 
 appointing the guardian must be produced when the demurrer is presented 
 for filing. 7 
 
 A defendant, demurring alone to any bill, 8 may do so within twelve 
 days after his appearance, but not afterwards ; 9 the day of his appear- 
 ance does not count. 10 When he does not demur alone, he has the 
 
 9 Ed. Red. 208. See the 31st Equity Rule 
 of the U. S. Courts, post, p. 2383; Chicago, St. 
 L. & N. O. R. Co. v. Macomb, 2 Fed. Rep. 18. 
 
 In Massachusetts, "a demurrer shall be 
 accompanied with a certificate that it is not 
 in'ended for delay." Pub. Sts. c. 151. § 10. 
 But this provision does not apply to a statement 
 in the nature of a demurrer for want of equity, 
 contained in an answer to a bill in Equity. 
 Mill River Loan Fund Ass. v. Claflin, 9 Allen, 
 101. For forms of demurrer, see Vol. III. 
 
 1 Richardson r. Hastings, 7 Beav. 58. 
 
 2 Osborne v. Jullion, 3 Drew. 552. For 
 form of notice, see R. S. C. Ord. April, 1880, 
 Sched. B. No. 18. 
 
 3 Ord. March, 1800, r. 16; and Cons. Ord. 
 IX. 3, ante, p. 301. A joint demurrer and an- 
 swer must be printed in the same manner as an 
 answer, see post, Chap. XVII. § 3, Printing 
 Answers. 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. I. 35. No fee is payable on 
 filing. 
 
 (b) In the Federal Courts a demurrer is de- 
 fective and ineffectual if it lacks the affidavit 
 of the defendant and the certificate of counsel 
 
 5 Cons. Ord. III. 2. 5; ante, pp. 453, 454. 
 
 6 Barron v. Grillard, 3 V. & B. 105; Braith- 
 waite's Pr. 58; except, it is presumed, in those 
 cases where a married woman is entitled to 
 defend as a feme sole; see ante, pp. 178, 179 ; 
 post, p. 031. 
 
 7 Braithwaite's Pr. 58. 
 
 8 Whether original, amended, or supple- 
 mental. Braithwaite's Manual, 175. 
 
 9 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 3 ; 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, 
 § 13; see Sanderson v. Sanderson, 17 Fla. 820, 
 834. In the case of a defendant served abroad, 
 this rule so far overrules Cons. Ord. X. 7 (2), 
 as to limit its provisions to pleading, answer- 
 ing, or demurring, not demurring alone. Grti- 
 ning v. Prioleau, 10 Jur. N. S. 60; 12 W. K. 
 111. M I!.: 33 Beav. 221. Demurrer to part of 
 the bill, without answering or pleading to the 
 rest, cannot be tiled before expiration of the 
 time fur tiling interrogatories. Rowe v. Ton- 
 kin, I.. R. 1 Eq. 9:11 Jur. N. S. 84'.), M. R. 
 
 W Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 9. 
 
 required by Equity Pule 31. Sheffield Furnace 
 Co. v. Witherow, 149 U. S. 574. 
 
 587
 
 *592 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 same time as he has for answering. 11 Time for demurring runs in 
 vacation. 12 
 
 Where, after appearance to the original bill, a defendant is 
 * 592 * served with, but is not required to answer, an amended bill, a 
 further appearance by him is unnecessary. 1 
 
 The Court, under the former practice, would, on a special case being 
 made, have allowed a defendant to put in a demurrer to the whole bill, 
 after the time for demurring alone had expired ; 2 and it is presumed 
 that this would be allowed under the present practice, 3 upon the delay 
 being satisfactorily accounted for, and upon a special application being 
 made. 4 
 
 A demurrer will not be received at the Record and Writ Clerks' 
 Office, after twelve days from the entry of the appearance, 5 without a 
 special order enlarging the time, or giving leave to file it ; and if, by 
 inadvertence, it should be received, it will, on the application of the 
 plaintiff, be taken off the file. 6 
 
 A demurrer, to which is annexed an answer to any material part of 
 the bill, is considered an answer and demurrer, and may be filed within 
 the time limited for pleading, answering, or demurring, not demurring 
 alone. 7 (a) 
 
 If an attachment for want of an answer has been issued against a 
 defendant, a demurrer, even though coupled with an answer, will be 
 irregular : and in such case the proper course is to move that the de- 
 murrer and answer be taken off the file, and not that the demurrer be 
 overruled; and taking an office copy does not waive the right. 8 And 
 
 11 Post, Chap. XVII. § 3 ; Cons. Ord. 
 XXX VI I. 4, 5. As the time for demurring 
 alone runs from appearance, and that for an- 
 swering, pleading, or demurring, not demurring 
 alone, from the service of the interrogatories, it 
 seems that, by delaying appearance, the defend- 
 ant may obtain a longer time for demurring 
 alone than for answering, pleading, or demur- 
 ring, not demurring alone. See Gruning v. 
 Prioleau, ubi supra. 
 ia Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 13. 
 
 i See Braithwaite's Manual, 175. No time 
 was fixed for his demurring alone by the Gene- 
 ral Orders; but it is customary, in such case, to 
 file the demurrer within twelve days from the 
 service of the copy of the amended bill. It 
 would seem, however, that he is entitled to de- 
 mur within twelve days after the expiration of 
 the time within which he might have appeared, 
 if required to do so: that is, within twenty days 
 from the service of the amended bill. Chees- 
 boroueb r. Wright, "28 Beav. 173. 
 
 2 Bruce v. Allen, 1 Mad. 556; see also Tay- 
 lor «. Milner. 10 Ves. 444; Holder v. Lord Hunt- 
 ingfield, 11 Ves. 283, 2i)3; see Davenport v. 
 
 Sniffen, 1 Barb. Ch. 223; Lakensu. Fielden, 11 
 Paige, 644; Bedell v. Bedell, 2 Barb. Ch. 99 ; 1 
 Smith Ch. Pr. (2d Am. ed.) 207, 208; Burrall 
 e.'Raineteaux, 2 Paige, 331 ; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 
 (4th Am. ed.) 264, 265; Kenrick v. Clayton, 2 
 Bro. C. C. (Perkins's ed.) 214, note (£), and 
 cases cited. 
 
 3 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 17; see, however, 
 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 3. 
 
 4 For forms of summons in such case, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 5 Braithwaite's Pr. 59. 
 
 6 Dyson v. Benson, G. Coop. 110; Cust v. 
 Boode, 1 S. & S. 21 ; Burrall v. Raineteaux, 
 2 l'ai.ne, 331. 
 
 'i Osborne v. Jullion, 3 Drew. 552; see also 
 Ld. Red. 208, 210; Stephenton v. Gardiner, 
 2 P. Wm«. 286: Tomkin r. Lethbridge, 9 Ves. 
 17S: Taylor v. Milner, 10 Ves. 444, 446; Baker 
 v. Mellish, 11 Ves. 73; White ». Howard. 2 De 
 G. & S 223, Read v. Barton, 3 K. & J. 166. 
 
 s Mellor v. Hall, 2 S. & S. 321; Curzon r. 
 Lord De la Zouch, 1 Swanst. 185, 193; Att.- 
 Gen. v. Shield, 11 Beav. 441; Vigers v. Lord 
 Audley, 2 M. & C. 49, 52; Braithwaite's Pr. 59. 
 
 (a) Under Massachusetts Ch. Rule 22, an may then be heard on the bill and demurrer, 
 
 answer filed with a demurrer to the bill may be without the demurrer being again filed. Hogg 
 
 withdrawn bv leave of the Court, and the case v. Price, 145 Mass. 013. 
 
 588
 
 FILING, SETTING DOWN, AND HEARING DEMURRERS. * 593 
 
 so, where a traversing note has been filed and served, a defendant cannot 
 demur without special leave. 9 
 
 It is right here to advert to the distinction in practice between 
 taking a demurrer and answer off the file, and simply overrul- 
 ing * the demurrer, thereby leaving the answer on the file. The * 593 
 former course appears to be the one adopted, in all cases where 
 there has been an irregularity in the formal parts or the filing of the 
 demurrer, whether it be accompanied by an answer or not. 1 The latter 
 course is adopted, wherever the demurrer has been properly filed, but 
 the Court is of opinion that it is insufficient, or that it has been over- 
 ruled by the answer. 
 
 Where a demurrer' has been taken off the file for irregularity, it 
 ceases to be a record of the Court, and the defendant may, therefore, 
 put in a plea, or another demurrer (if his time for demurring has not 
 expired), as if no demurrer had been filed; but the demurrer is not 
 taken off the file by the mere pronouncing of the order ; it must actually 
 be withdrawn from the file. 2 To effect this, the order, when drawn up, 
 should be carried to the Record and Writ Clerk : who will withdraw the 
 demurrer, annexing the order to it. 8 
 
 Notice of filing the demurrer must be served on the plaintiff, or his 
 solicitor, on the day on which it is filed, before seven o'clock in the 
 evening, or, if on a Saturday, before two o'clock in the afternoon. 4 
 Neglect to do so will not, however, render the demurrer inoperative ; 
 but the time allowed to the opposite party for taking the next step in 
 the cause will be extended, so as to give him the benefit of the time he 
 would otherwise lose by the delay in the service. 6 
 
 Upon the demurrer being filed, the plaintiff should take an office 
 copy 6 and if he apprehends that the demurrer will hold good, he should 
 either obtain an order to dismiss his bill with costs, 7 or if he thinks the 
 defect can be remedied by amendment, he may obtain an order of course, 
 on motion or petition, to amend his bill, in the usual way, upon payment 
 of 20s. costs. 8 This, however, can only be done before the demurrer 
 has been set down ; afterwards the plaintiff must pay the defendant's 
 taxed costs of amending, and of the demurrer ; 9 and must make a 
 special application, by summons, for leave to amend. 10 The 20s. cover 
 
 9 Cons. Ord. XIII. 7; see ante, p. 516. Williams, 12 Beav. 482; Jones v. Jones, 1 Jur. 
 
 1 Leave to amend the title of a joint de- N. S. 863, V. C. S.; Lloyd v. Solicitors and 
 mnrrer and answer has been given on the General Life Ass. Co. 3 W. R. 040; 24 L. J. 
 hearing of a motion to take it off the tile for Ch. 704, V. C. W.; see, however, Matthews v. 
 irregularity. Osborne v. Jullion, 3 Drew. 552, Chichester, 5 Hare, 207, overruled on appeal. 
 554. id. 210. 
 
 An objection to the time of riling a pleading 6 Braithwaite's Pr. 401. 
 
 must be taken by motion to strike from the " See post, Chap. XIX. § 1. 
 
 files, and if not taken in that mode must be 8 See ante, p. 411. For forms of motion 
 
 deemed waived. Holley v. Younge, 27 Ala. paper and petition, see Vol. III. 
 203; Shaw v. Lindsey, 60 Ala. 344. 9 Warburton v. London and Black wall Ry. 
 
 2 Cust v. Boode, 1 S. & S. 21. Co. 2 Beav. 253; Hearn v. Way, fi Beav. 3(58; 
 
 3 Ibid. Hoflick v. Reynolds, 9 W. R. 398, V. C K If 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. Ill 9; Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 2; he neglects to amend within the proper time, 
 ante, pp. 454, 455. For form of notice, see the hill is gone. Id. 431. 
 
 Vol. III. i ft Hoflick r. Reynolds, ubi supra. For form of 
 
 fi Wright v. Angle, 6 Hare, 107; Lowe v. summons, see Vol. III. 
 
 589
 
 * 594 DEMURRERS. 
 
 * 594 * all the costs of the demurrer ; but when the demurrer has been 
 
 prepared, though not actually on the file, before the amendment, 
 the costs will be costs in the cause. 1 
 
 It was formerly necessary, after filing a demurrer, to enter it with 
 the Registrar. This need not now be done ; but upon the filing thereof 
 by the defendant, either party may set the demurrer down for argument 
 immediately.' 2 
 
 Where a demurrer to the whole bill is not set down for argument 
 within twelve days after the filing thereof, and where a demurrer to part 
 of a bill is not set down within three weeks after the filing thereof, and 
 the plaintiff does not within such twelve days or three weeks, as the 
 case may be, serve an order for leave to amend fhe bill, the demurrer 
 will be held sufficient to the same extent, and for the same purposes, and 
 the plaintiff is to pay to the demurring party the same costs, as in the 
 case of a demurrer to the whole, or part of a bill, as the case may be, 
 allowed upon argument. 3 
 
 In order to entitle a plaintiff to be relieved against the consequences 
 of not setting down the demurrer, or obtaining an order to amend, within 
 the periods fixed by the General Orders, he must make out a clear case 
 of accident, mistake, or surprise. 4 
 
 The order for payment of the costs of a demurrer, neglected to be set 
 down, is an order of course, and may be obtained on petition at the 
 Rolls, or on motion. 5 
 
 The times of vacation are not reckoned in the computation of time for 
 setting down demurrers. 6 
 
 As, in the event of a demurrer not being set down for argument 
 within the limited period, the defendant derives the same benefit as by 
 its allowance, the duty is cast upon the plaintiff, if he is desirous that 
 it should be submitted to the judgment of the Court, of having it set 
 clown. 7 
 
 i Bainbrigge i\ Mos«, 3 K. & J. G2; 3 Jur. 5 Jacobs v. Hooper, 1 W. R. 6. For form 
 
 N. S. 107. of order, see Seton, 1257, No. 11 ; and for forms 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XIV. 11. of petition and motion paper, see Vol. III. 
 
 3 Cons. Ord. XIV. 14, 15; Matthews v. Chi- 6 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 13 (3) 
 
 Chester, 5 Hare, 207; on appeal, id. 210; HJur. 7 See the 33d Equity Rule of the U. S. 
 
 4S; lieu,-. Regul. 15 March, 1800, r. 4. Courts, 2)ost, p. 2383. (a) Where a demurrer 
 
 4 Knight v. Marjoribanks, 14 Sim. 108; is riled, and the record does not disclose what 
 decided, however, on the 34th Ord. of Aug., disposition was made of it, and an answer is 
 1841; Sand. Ord. 884; 3 Beav. xxii.; Matthews subsequently filed, upon which the parties 
 v. Chichester, 11 Jur. 49, L. C; deCded proceed to a hearing, it will be presumed on 
 on the 46th Ord. of May, 1845; Sand. Ord. appeal that the demurrer was abandoned. 
 1000; 7 Beav. xli.; 1 Phil, lxxxvi., which was Basey v. Gallagher, 2 Wall. 670. 
 
 similar; overruling S. C. 5 Hare, 207. 
 
 (a) This rule changes, in the Federal Courts, for argument under Equity Rule 38, on the rule 
 
 the general rule as to pleas, that upon issue day when filed, or the next rule day, is not 
 
 taken by replication to a plea, the sufficiency ground for dismissing the bill, where all days 
 
 of the piea is admitted, and the Court may now, in term time are treated as rule days. Electro- 
 
 upon final hearing, do at least what, under the libration Co. v. Jackson, 52 Fed. Rep. 773. As 
 
 the general rule, may be done when the benefit to the term for hearing a demurrer, see Barnett 
 
 of a decree is saved to the hearing. Pearce v. v. People's Bank, 65 Ga. 51; Old Hickory Dis- 
 
 Rice, 142 U. S. 28, 42. tilling Co. v. Bleyer, 74 Ga. 201. 
 
 The plaintiff's failure to set down a demurrer 
 590
 
 FILING, SETTING DOWN, AND HEARING DEMURRERS. * 595 
 
 The party wishing to set down a demurrer for argument must obtain 
 an order for that purpose. Unless specially directed by an order of 
 the Lord Chancellor or Lords Justices, the demurrer must be set 
 down to be heard before the Judge to whose Court the cause* is *595 
 attached. 1 If the cause is attached to the Court of one of the 
 Vice-Chancellors, this order is obtained on a petition of course, to the 
 Lord Chancellor, being left at the order of course seat in the Registrars' 
 Office, and is dated the day the petition is left; and the demurrer is set 
 down by the order of course Clerk the same day. If the cause is 
 attached to the Rolls Court, the order is obtained on a petition of 
 course to the Master of the Rolls, being left with his under-secretary ; 
 the order is then taken by the solicitor to the order of course seat in the 
 Registrars' Office, and the demurrer will be set down by the order of 
 course Clerk on the day the order is left. 2 
 
 The petition must state to what Court the cause is attached, 3 the day 
 when the demurrer was filed, and whether it be to the whole, or part of 
 the bill ; and be subscribed by the solicitor ; and, if presented to the 
 Lord Chancellor, it does not require any fiat or stamp. 4 
 
 If by inadvertence the demurrer is not actually set down on the day 
 the petition or order is left at the Registrars' Office, it will nevertheless 
 be considered to have been set down on that day. 5 
 
 The order directs the demurrer to be set down next after the pleas, 
 demurrers, and exceptions to answers already appointed for hearing; 
 and it must be served upon the solicitor for the opposite party, at least 
 two clear days before the day appointed for hearing. 6 
 
 If the defendant is desirous of withdrawing his demurrer, he may do 
 so, even after it has been set down, on payment of costs. 7 
 
 A demurrer is not usually put in the paper for hearing, in Vice-Chan- 
 cellors' causes, until six clear days, and in Rolls' causes, until two clear 
 days have elapsed since it was set down. 
 
 Before the demurrer is heard, two printed copies of the bill and a 
 copy of the demurrer must be left with the train-bearer of the Vice- 
 Chancellor, or, in a Rolls' cause, with either the under-secretary or train- 
 bearer, for the use of the Court. 8 
 
 In general, the Court will not advance a demurrer ; 9 in cases, 
 however, of bills for injunction, as an injunction will not usually 
 be granted pending a demurrer, the Court will, upon application, 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. VI. 4. obtained on petition of course; for form of pe- 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XXI. 9 ; Reg. Regul. 15 March, tition, see Vol. III. For order, by consent, 
 1860, rr. 1, 2, 3. For form of order, see Seton, directing demurrer to be withdrawn, and 
 1257, No. 10; and for forms of petition, see extending time to answer, see 2 Seton, 1030, 
 Vol. III. No _ 10 _ 
 
 8 Cons - 0rd - XIV - '0. s if , h i s ia neglected, the solicitor may be 
 
 4 Reg. Regul. 15 March, 1800, r. 3. ordered to pay costs. Cons. Ord. XXI. 12. 
 
 5 Egremont v. Cowell, 5 Beav. 017; 7 Jar. Counsel's brief consists of copies of the bill 
 52, and demurrer. In Ernest v Partridge, 11 W. 
 
 6 See now R. S. C. Ord. LVII. 0; Davis R. 715, V. C. W., the charge for observation 
 v. Whiffen, 22 VV. R. 109. was disallowed, on a partv and partv taxation, 
 
 7 Downes r. East India Co. 6 Ves. 586. In see Morgan & Davey, 354. 
 Rolls' causes, the order may, by consent, be 8 Anon. 1 Mad 557. 
 
 591
 
 59" 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 * 596 * where the matter is pressing, order the demurrer to be argued 
 
 immediately, 1 or advanced so as to be argued with the motion on 
 an injunction. 2 
 
 When a demurrer is called on for hearing, and the' defendant omits to 
 appear, the demurrer will, it seems, be struck out of the paper, unless 
 the plaintiff, if he has set down the demurrer, can produce an affidavit of 
 service upon the defendant or his solicitor of the order to set it down; or, 
 if the defendant set down the demurrer, unless the plaintiff can produce 
 an affidavit of service upon himself of the order for setting down the 
 demurrer. 3 If the plaintiff can produce such an affidavit, it is conceived 
 that the demurrer would be overruled, as in the case of a plea. 4 It has 
 been held, however, that in such a case the demurrer is not necessarily 
 overruled, but the plaintiff must be heard in support of the bill. 5 When 
 the defendant appears and the plaintiff does not, the demurrer will also, 
 it seems, be struck out of the paper, unless the defendant can produce 
 an affidavit of service upon himself of the order for setting down the 
 demurrer ; or unless, in the event of the defendant having himself set 
 down the demurrer, he can produce an affidavit of service by him upon 
 the plaintiff or his solicitor. 6 On the production of such an affidavit, in 
 either case, the defendant may have the demurrer allowed with costs. 7 
 
 Where a demurrer has been struck out of the paper, a fresh order 
 must be obtained for setting it down, which may be had upon petition of 
 course as before explained, provided the application is made within the 
 time allowed to set down the demurrer. 8 If otherwise, a special appli- 
 cation for leave to set it down must be made. 
 
 The usual course of proceeding, when the demurrer comes on for hear- 
 ing, and all parties appear, is for the counsel, in support of the demurrer 
 to be first heard, next the plaintiff's counsel, and then the leading counsel 
 for the demurring party replies. In hearing a demurrer, the argument 
 is strictly confined to the case appearing upon the record ; and for the 
 purposes of the argument, the matters of fact stated in the bill are ad- 
 mitted to be true. 9 
 
 Where it has appeared, upon the hearing of a demurrer to the 
 
 * 597 * whole bill, that the defendant is entitled to demur to some part 
 
 only, the Court has permitted the demurrer to be amended, so as 
 to confine it to the parts to which the defendant has a right to demur : 1 
 
 1 Cousins v. Smith. 13 Yes. 164, 167; .Tones 
 v. Taylor, 2 Mad. 181; Const v. Harris, T. & 
 R. 510, n.; London, Chatham, and Dover Ry. 
 Co. v. Imperial Mercantile Credit Association, 
 L. R. 3 Ch. 231 ; and see post, Chap. XXXVI. 
 § 2, Injunctions. Where justice requires it, an 
 injunction will be granted pending a demurrer. 
 Wardle v. Claxton, 9 Sim. 412. ' 
 
 2 See 1 Seton, 175. As to costs, see Anon. 
 v. Bridgewater Canal, 9 Sim. 375. 
 
 3 For form of affidavit of service, see Vol. III. 
 
 4 Mazarredo v. Mai (land, 2 Mad. 38. For 
 form of order overruling demurrer on non- 
 appearance of defendant, see 2 Seton, 1630, 
 No. 11. 
 
 592 
 
 5 Penfold o. Ramsbottom, 1 Swanst. 552; 
 see Memphis & V. R. Co. v. Owens, 60 Miss. 
 227. 
 
 6 On an appeal from an order allowing a 
 demurrer to the whole bill, the plaintiff is 
 entitled to begin. Att.-Gen. v. Aspinall, 2 M. 
 &C 613: 1 Keen, 513. 
 
 7 Jennings v. Pearce, 1 Yes Jr. 447. 
 
 8 Ante, p. 594; Cons. Ord. XIY. 14, 15. 
 See R. S. C. Ord. XXVII. 6. 
 
 9 Ante, p. 543. For form of order on the 
 hearing of a demurrer, see Seton. 1258, No. 12. 
 
 1 Glegg v. Legh, 4 Mad. 193, 207.
 
 EFFECT OF ALLOWING DEMURRERS. 
 
 598 
 
 in such cases, however, the most usual course is to overrule the de- 
 murrer, and to give the defendant leave to put in a new demurrer to such 
 part of the bill as he may be advised. 2 
 
 Where a demurrer is ordered to stand over, it must be for a definite 
 period. 8 
 
 Section V. — The Effect of allowing Demurrers. 
 
 Strictly speaking, upon a demurrer to the whole bill being allowed, 
 the bill is out of Court, and no subsequent proceeding can be taken in 
 the cause. 4 The Court often, however, on hearing the demurrer, gives 
 leave to amend, and there are cases in which it has afterwards permitted 
 an amendment to be made ; 5 and it seems that, even after a bill has been 
 dismissed by order, it has been considered in the discretion of the Court 
 to set the cause on foot again. 6 (b) 
 
 Where the plaintiff, after a demurrer had been allowed, improperly 
 obtained an order to amend his bill, and the defendant demurred, it was 
 held, that by demurring the defendant had waived the irregularity, and 
 that the course he ought to have taken was, to apply to discharge the 
 order to amend for irregularity. 7 
 
 Although the effect of allowing a demurrer to the whole bill is to 
 put the cause out of Court, the allowance of a partial demurrer 
 * is not attended with such a consequence. The bill, or that part of * 598 
 it which was not covered by the demurrer, still remains in Court, 
 and the plaintiff may obtain an order to amend, or adopt any other pro- 
 
 2 Thorpe v. Macauley, 5 Mad. 218, 231. In 
 Marsh v. Marsh, 16 N. J. Eq. 391, 308, the 
 demurrer was overruled, with leave to amend 
 by stating the grounds of demurrer. 
 " 8 Cons. Ord"! XXI. 13. 
 
 4 Smith v. Barnes, 1 Dick. 07 ; Watkina v. 
 Bush, 2 Dick. 701; see Cheuvete v. Mason, 4 
 Greene (Iowa), 231. For forms of orders allow- 
 ing demurrers, see 2 Seton, 1028, Nos. 4, 6. An 
 interlocutory injunction is, ipso facto, dissolved 
 by the sustaining of a demurrer, although 
 leave to amend the bill may have been given. 
 Schneider v. Lizardi, 9 Beav. 468 So is a 
 special injunction by amending the bill by 
 making a new co-plaintiff. Att.-Gen. v. Marsh, 
 16 Sim. 572; 13 Jur. 317; see Commissioners 
 of Sewers v. Glasse, W. N". (1871) 229: 20 W. 
 R. 108. 
 
 6 Lord Coningsby v. Sir J. Jekyll, 2 P. 
 
 Wms. 300; Lloyd v. Loaring, 6 Ves. 773, 779. 
 It is not necessary in Massachusetts, even 
 where a demurrer goes to the equity of the 
 whole bill, that the plaintiff should make a 
 motion to amend, in anticipation of an adverse 
 decision; a motion to amend is not allowed as a 
 matter of right. See Merchant's Bank of Xcw- 
 buryport v. Stevenson, 7 Allen, 489, 491. By 
 the 35th Rule of the U. S. Courts, if a demurrer 
 is allowed, the Court may allow the plaintiff to 
 amend his bill upon reasonable terms. See 
 post, p. 2383; Alexander v. Move, 38 Miss. 
 640. (a) 
 
 6 Per Lord Eldon in Baker v. Mellish, 11 
 Ves. 68, 72. It is conceived that this dictum 
 would not be followed, unless in a very special 
 case. 
 
 7 Watkins v. Bush, 2 Dick. 701; but see id. 
 702, n. 
 
 (a) The Court in its discretion will give such 
 leave to amend only when necessary to do jus- 
 tice in the case. Dowell v. Applegate, 8 Fed. 
 Rep. 698. Such leave to amend the bill does 
 not preclude an appeal. Brasfield v. French, 
 59 Miss. 632. 
 
 ('&) A bill should be dismissed on demurrer 
 only when the defects are not amendable, or 
 
 vol. i. — 38 
 
 the plaintiff declines to amend. Lamb r. 
 .Teffrev, 41 Mich. 719; see Bradford v. Bradford, 
 66 Ala. 252. In Massachusetts, an order which 
 merely sustains a demurrer to the bill, is only 
 an interlocutory decree, and doea not put the 
 case out of court. Parker v. Flagg, 127 Mass. 
 28; see Davis v. Speiden, 3 McArthur (D. C), 
 283. 
 
 593
 
 *598 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 ceedings in the cause, in the same manner that he might have done had 
 there been no demurrer. 1 
 
 On hearing the demurrer, the Court will, where it sees that the defect 
 pointed out by the demurrer can be remedied by amendment, and sub- 
 stantial justice requires it, make a special order at the hearing of the 
 demurrer, adapted to the circumstances of the case ; 2 and where an 
 order was made allowing the demurrer, and giving leave to amend, and 
 no amendment was made within the proper time, it was held that the 
 bill was not out of Court. 3 
 
 When the demurrer is allowed, and leave is given to amend, there is 
 no rule that the defendant is to have his costs ; but they are in the dis- 
 cretion of the Court. 4 
 
 Where, upon allowing the demurrer, leave is given to the plaintiff to 
 amend his bill, (a) he is not thereby prevented from appealing against 
 the order ; 5 but if the defendant is desirous of appealing from such 
 order, he ought to apply to stay the amendment, until the appeal has 
 been disposed of; 6 or, at any rate, he ought not to act upon the order 
 giving the plaintiff leave to amend : as, for instance, by demurring to 
 the amended bill. 
 
 The amendment of a bill, in pursuance of an order made upon the 
 hearing of a demurrer, if made before the defendant answers, will not 
 preclude a plaintiff from making one amendment after answer, upon 
 motion of course. 7 
 
 A demurrer, being frequently on matter of form, is not, in general, a 
 bar to a new bill ; but if the Court, on demurrer, has clearly decided 
 
 i Emans v. Emans, 14 N. J. Eq. 114, 120. 
 The allowance of a demurrer for want of parties 
 will not necessarily prevent the plaintiff from 
 applying to the Court for an injunction or 
 receiver; as where the granting of the injunc- 
 tion and receiver would be for the benefit of the 
 absent parties, Const v. Harris, 1 T. & R. 514; 
 or where the grant would not affect the absent 
 parties. Hamp v. Robinson, 3 De G. J. & S. 
 97, 109. 
 
 2 Wellesley ». Wellesley, 4 M. & C. 554, 
 558; 4 Jur. 2; Schneider v. Lizardi, 9 Beav. 
 461, -108; Rawlings v. Lamhert, 1 J. & H. 458; 
 Huxham ». Llewellyn, W. N. (1873) 136; 21 W. 
 R. 766. Leave to amend is not given as a mat- 
 ter of course. Osborne v. Jullion, 3 Drew. 596; 
 and see Watts v. Lord Eglinton, 1 C. P. Coop, 
 temp. Cott. 29, and the cases there collected; 
 and as to leave to amend given after demurrer 
 for want of parties, see Tyler v. Bell, 2 M. & C. 
 89, 104. 110, and the cases there cited : 1 .Tur. 
 20. See also R. S. C. Ord. XXVIII. 8, 9. 
 For form of order giving leave to amend, see 2 
 Seton, 1520, No. 3; 1628, Nos. 4, 5. 
 
 3 Deeks v. Stanhope, 1 Jur. N. S. 413, V. C. 
 
 K.; see. however, Hoflick v. Reynolds, 9 W. R. 
 431, V. C. K. : and Armistead v. Durham, 11 
 Beav. 428 ; 13 Jur. 330. 
 
 4 Schneider v. Lizardi, ubi supra; Bothomley 
 v. Squires, 1 Jur. N. S. 694; and see Harding 
 v. Tingey, 12 W. R. 703; 10 Jur. N. S. 872. 
 And as to costs in these cases, see also Hodges 
 v. Hodges, 24 W. R. 293; White v. Bromige, 
 W. N. (1878) 28; 26 W. R. 312: Kennedy v. 
 Edwards, 11 Jur. N. S. 153. As to costs upon 
 separate demurrers, see Walters v. Webb. 18 
 W. R. 86, 587: Price v. Mayo, W. N. (1873) 81; 
 21 W. R. 539. In New Jersey, the Court has 
 no discretionary power in such a case. The 
 costs are fixed by the Chancery Act. Hicks v. 
 Campbell. 19 N." J. Eq. 183, 187. 
 
 5 Lidbetter v. Long, 4 M. & C. 286; Davis 
 v. Chanter, 2 Phil. 545, 547. 
 
 6 Wellesley v. Wellesley, 4 M. & C. 554, 556; 
 4 Jur. 2; and see Payne v. Dicker, L. R. 6 Ch. 
 578. 
 
 7 Pesheller r. Hammett, 3 Sim. 389; Bain- 
 brigge v. Baddeley, 12 Beav. 152; 13 Jur. 997; 
 and see Cons. Old. IX. 13. 
 
 (a) If the plaintiff does so amend, he cannot murrer. 
 afterwards question the ruling upon the de- 617. 
 
 594 
 
 Browne v. Browne, 17 Fla. 607,
 
 EFFECT OF ALLOWING DEMURRERS. 
 
 rm 
 
 upon the merits of the question between the parties, the decision may 
 be pleaded in another suit. 8 
 
 Where a demurrer to the whole or part of a bill is allowed upon 
 * argument, the plaintiff, unless the Court otherwise directs, is to * 599 
 pay to the demurring party the costs of the demurrer ; and if the 
 demurrer be to the whole bill, the costs of the suit also, 1 including the 
 costs of a motion for an injunction, or other motion pending in the 
 suit. 2 
 
 Where any grounds of demurrer are urged, on arguing a demurrer, 
 beyond the grounds therein expressed, and those grounds which are so 
 expressed are disallowed, the defendant will have to pay the same costs 
 as if the demurrer were overruled, 3 although the grounds of demurrer 
 so newly urged may be allowed. 4 
 
 In general, however, where the demurrer, ore tenus, has been allowed, 
 and the Court has given the plaintiff leave to amend his bill, the course 
 of the Court appears to be to make him liable to the costs of the demur- 
 rer. 5 The rule however, with respect to costs upon such occasions, is 
 not imperative, and the Court has a discretionary power. 6 
 
 Where a demurrer is put in on two grounds, as to one of which it suc- 
 ceeds, but fails as to the other, no costs will in general be given. 7 
 
 Where a demurrer to a bill is allowed, and afterwards the order al- 
 lowing it is, upon re-argument, reversed, the defendant, if he has received 
 the costs from the plaintiff, will be ordered to refund them, upon appli- 
 cation by the plaintiff; 8 and so. if a demurrer has been overruled, and 
 the order is reversed upon re-hearing, the plaintiff, if he has received 
 costs from the defendant, must refund them. 
 
 One of several defendants who has demurred successfully, is entitled, 
 as of right, to have his name struck out of the record ; and may apply 
 to the Court by motion for this purpose. 9 
 
 mer v. Fraser, 2 M. & C. 173, 174; M'lntyre v. 
 Connell, 1 Sim. N. S. 257, 258; see also Lund 
 v. Blansliard, 4 Hare, 23 ; Brown v. Douglas, 
 11 Sim. 283; Thompson v. University of Lon- 
 don, 10 Jur. N. S. 669, 671; 33 L. J. Ch. 625, 
 639, V. C. K. ; Ward v. Sittingbourne & Sheer- 
 ness i:.v. Co. L. R. 9 Oh. 488, 495. 
 
 5 Newton v. Lord Egmont, 4 Sim. 574, 585. 
 
 ,; ('cms. Ord. XIV. 1, 12. Where Sir Lan- 
 celot Shadwell V. C. upon allowing a demurrer 
 ore tenus, for want of parties, ordered the de- 
 fendant to pay the costs of the demurrer on the 
 record, although he had given the plaintiff 
 leave to amend his hill generally, Lord Cotten- 
 ham refused to interfere. Mortimer v. Fraser, 
 2 M. & ('. 173. 
 
 7 Benson v. Hadlield, 5 Beav. 546, 554; and 
 see Allan v. Houlden,6 Beav. 148, 150; Morgan 
 & Davey, IS. 
 
 8 Oats v. Chapman, 1 Ves. Sr. 542 ; S. C. 2 
 Ves Sr. 100; 1 Dick. 148. 
 
 » Barry v. Croskey, 2 J. & H. 130: 8 Jur. 
 N. S. 10; 2 Seton, 1629. For form of notice of 
 motion, see Vol. III. 
 
 595 
 
 8 Londonderry (Lady) v. Baker, 3 Giff. 128; 
 affirmed, 7 Jur. X. S. 811, L. JJ. ; Oriental 
 Steam Co. v. Briggs, 8 Jur. N. S. 201, 204; 10 
 W. R. 125, L. C. 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. XIV. 13; see Rule 35 of the 
 U, S. Courts. For cases where the Court di- 
 rected otherwise, see Schneider v. Lizardi, 9 
 Beav. 401, 408; Bothomley v. Squires, 1 Jur. 
 N. S. 094, V. C. K.; Merchant Taylors' Co. v. 
 Att.-Gen. L. R. 11 Eq. 35; L. R.6 Ch. 512; 
 Thompson v. Planet Building Society, L. R. 15 
 Eq. 333, 354; Fothergill v. Rowland" 22 W. R, 
 42; Harrison r. Mexican Rv. Co. L. R. 19 Eq. 
 358, 308: Duckett v. Grover. 6 Ch. D. 82; Mor- 
 gan & Davey, 21. For precedent of a bill of 
 costs for preparing and setting down a demur- 
 rer, see id. 463. 
 
 2 Gladstone v. Ottoman Bank, 1 II. & M. 
 505; 9 Jur. N. S. 246; Morgan & Davey, 22. 
 
 3 That is to say, the costs occasioned by the 
 demurrer, unless the Court otherwise directs ; 
 see Cons. Ord. XIV. 12. 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. XIV. 1; Tourton v. Flower, 3 
 P. Wms. 371 ; Wood v. Thompson, 2 Dick. 510; 
 Att.-Gen. v. Brown, 1 Swanst. 265, 288; Morti-
 
 601 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 600 
 
 * Section VI. — The Effect of overruling Demurrers. 
 
 A demurrer, being a mute thing, cannot be ordered to stand for an 
 answer. 1 
 
 After a demurrer to the whole bill has been overruled, a second de- 
 murrer to the same extent cannot be allowed, for it would be in effect 
 to re-hear the case on the first demurrer : as, on argument of a demur- 
 rer, any cause of demurrer, though not shown in the demurrer as filed, 
 may be alleged at the bar, and if good will support the demurrer. 2 A 
 demurrer, however, of a less extensive nature, may, in some cases, be 
 put in ; and where the substance of a demurrer was good, but informally 
 pleaded, liberty was given to take it off the file, and to demur again, on 
 payment of costs ; 3 and a defendant has been allowed to amend his 
 demurrer, so as to make it less extensive. 4 
 
 A second demurrer, however, though less extended than the first, can- 
 not, after the first demurrer has been overruled, be put in without leave 
 of the Court; but the case is different where the first has been taken 
 off the file for irregularity. This leave is generally granted, upon hear- 
 ing the first demurrer ; but it has been permitted upon a subsequent 
 application by motion. 
 
 Although a defendant cannot, after the Court has overruled his de- 
 murrer to the whole bill, again avail himself of the same method of 
 defence, yet, as it sometimes happens that a bill which, if all the parts 
 of the case were disclosed, would be open to a demurrer, is so artfully 
 drawn as to avoid showing upon the face of it any ground for demur- 
 ring, the defendant may, in such case, make the same defence by plea : 
 stating the facts which are necessary to bring the case truly before 
 Court. 5 As it is, however, the rule of the Court not to allow two dila- 
 tories without leave, or, in other words, as the defendant is only per- 
 mitted once to delay his answer by plea or demurrer, without leave of 
 the Court, he must, previously to filing his plea, obtain the leave of the 
 Court to do so : otherwise, his plea may be taken off the file. 6 
 
 From what has been said it results that, after a demurrer to the 
 whole bill has been overruled, the defendant, unless he obtains leave to 
 put in a demurrer of a less extended nature, or a plea either to the 
 whole bill or to some part of it, must, if required, put in a full 
 * 601 answer ; and the Court, on overruling the demurrer, * will, on 
 the application of the defendant, fix a time for his so doing ; if 
 no time is fixed, the defendant must put in his answer within the usual 
 time (if it has not expired), or make a special application, by summons, 
 for further time. 1 (a) 
 
 may be amended, on an ex parte order before 
 the twelve days have expired. Richardson v. 
 Hastings, 7 Beav. 58. 
 
 5 I.d. Red. 216. 
 
 6 Rowlev v. Eccles, 1 S. & S. 511, 512. 
 i Trim v. Baker, 1 S. & S. 469; T. & R. 
 
 i Anon. 3 Atk. 530. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 217. 
 
 3 Devonsher v. Xewenham, 2 Sch. & Lef. 
 199. 
 
 * Gleggr. Legh. 4 Mad. 193, 207; Thorpe v. 
 Macauley, 5 Mad. 218, 231. A clerical error 
 
 (a) Fuller v. Knapp, 24 Fed. Rep. 100. As 
 to overruled demurrers, see Barksdale v. Butler, 
 
 596 
 
 6 Lea (Tenn.), 450; Hitchcock v. Caruthers, 82 
 Cal. 523; Millan v. Hood (Cal.), 30 Pac. Rep.
 
 EFFECT OF OVERRULING DEMURRERS. 
 
 *601 
 
 Where the demurrer is not to the whole bill, and is accompanied by 
 an answer, the plaintiff, after the demurrer is overruled, if he wishes 
 for a further answer, must except to the answer for insufficiency ; and, 
 therefore, the defendant need not put in any further answer until after 
 the plaintiff has taken exceptions to the answer already put in, and such 
 exceptions have been either allowed or submitted to. 2 Generally, the 
 plaintiff should not except to the answer until the demurrer has been 
 decided upon : otherwise he admits the demurrer to be good. 3 Where, 
 however, the defendant demurs to the* relief only, and answers as to the 
 discovery, the plaintiff may, it seems, except to the answer before the 
 demurrer is heard. 4 
 
 Although, generally, where the plaintiff amends otherwise than by 
 adding parties, he loses his right to except to the answer for insuffi- 
 ciency, yet, where a demurrer has been overruled, he is not, by amend- 
 ing generally, precluded from calling for an answer to that part of the 
 interrogatories covered by the demurrer. 5 
 
 Where a demurrer is overruled, and the plaintiff amends his bill, the 
 defendant is not precluded from appealing against the order overruling 
 
 253; Waterton v. Croft, 6 Sim. 431, 438; see 
 Atlantic Ins. Co. v Lemar, 10 Paige, 385; Hen- 
 derson v. Dennison, llixl. 152; Fleece v. Russell, 
 13 [11. 31; Norch Western Bank v. Nelson, 1 
 Graft. 108; Sutton v. Gatewood, 6 Munf. 398; 
 Lafavour v. Justice, 5 Blackf. 336; Puterbaugh 
 v. Elliott, 22 111. 157; Myers v. McGahagan, 26 
 Fla. 303. Where a demurrer to a bill, for want 
 of equity, is overruled, a final decree, without 
 giving the defendant an opportunity to deny 
 the allegations in the bill, is erroneous. Smith 
 v. Ballantyne, 10 Paige, 101; Forrest v. Robin- 
 son, 4 Porter, 44; Bottorf r. Conner, 1 Blackf. 
 287; Cole County v. Angney, 12 Mo. 132; see 
 Stewart v. Flint, 57 Vt. 216; Bailey v. Holden, 
 50 Vt. 14. 
 
 In Maine. Walton J. in Lambert v. Lambert, 
 52 Maine, 544, 545, remarked that the overrul- 
 ing of a demurrer in Equity is never followed 
 bv a decree making a final disposition of the 
 case; the order is that the party demurring an- 
 swer further. And he added: "' The entry in this 
 case should be, 'Demurrer to civss-bill over- 
 ruled — further answer required.' " 
 
 2 Cotes v. Turner, Bunb. 123; and see Att- 
 Gen. v. London. 12 Beav. 217; see Kuypers v. 
 Ref. Dutch Church, 6 Paige. 570. 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 317: London Assurance '•. Fast 
 India Co. 3 P. Wins. 325; Boyd v. Mills, 13 
 Ves. 85. 
 
 •* Ld. Red. 317; 3 P. Wms. 327. n. (S). 
 
 5 Taylor v. Bailey,3M. & C.677; 3 lur.308. 
 
 1107; Terre Haute & L. R. Co. v. Sherwood, 
 132 Ind. 129. The fact that a motion to dis- 
 solve a temporary injunction has been over- 
 ruled does not prevent the defendant from de- 
 murring to the bill on the grounds embraced 
 in the motion. Augusta Nat. Bank v. Printup, 
 63 Ga. 570. But a question raised by an over- 
 ruled demurrer cannot be again raised in the 
 answer. Wilson v. Hall, 67 Ga. 53. If a de- 
 murrer is erroneously overruled, the error is 
 waived by tiling a subsequent pleading. Gulf. 
 Colorado's S. F. Ry. Co v. Washington, 4 U. s. 
 App. 121; Asbach v. Chicago, B. & Q R. Co. 
 (Iowa) 53 N. W. Re]). 00; Spillane >■■ Missouri 
 Pac. Ry. Co. Ill Mo. 555; West v. McMullan, 
 112 Mo. 405; but see Westminster v. Willard 
 (Vt.). 26 Atl. Rep. 952: and see Bates v. Bab- 
 cock, 95 Cal. 479. Under the Code system, 
 where a demurrer lies to an answer, the filing 
 of an amended answer waives a demurrer to 
 the original answer. Sylvester v. Craig (( !ol. I, 
 31 Pac. Rep. 387. In' Hayes v. Dayton, 18 
 
 P.latch. 420. whore the defendant filed together 
 an answer and a demurrer to the wind' 1 bill, it 
 was held that by going to argument upon the 
 latter, he waived the objection that it was 
 waived by the answer, under the U. S- Equity 
 Rules 32, 37. In Bruschke v. Der Nord Chicago 
 Schuetzcn Verein, 145 111. 433. it was held that, 
 on overruling a demurrer, there is no decree, 
 but an order is made requiring the defendant to 
 answer, and, if he does not, directing the bill 
 to be taken as confessed, and that such order is 
 not reviewable. When there is a demurrer to 
 the whole, and also to a part of the bill, and 
 the latter only is sustained, the decree should 
 dismiss so much of the bill as seeks relief as to 
 the matters thus adjudged bad, overrule the 
 demurrer to the residue, and direct the defend- 
 ant to answer thereto. Giant Powder Co. v. 
 California Powder Works, 98 U. S. 126; se 
 Brandon Manuf. Co. v. Prime. 14 Blatch. 371; 
 Canton Warehouse Co V. Potts, 68 Miss. 637. 
 
 597
 
 602 
 
 DEMURRERS. 
 
 the demurrer ; 6 but after the defendant has served the plaintiff with 
 notice of the appeal, an order of course to amend the bill is irregular, 
 
 and will be discharged with costs, and the amendments expunged. 7 
 * 602 * After a demurrer has been overruled, and notice of appeal 
 
 given, the plaintiff cannot obtain an order of course to dismiss 
 his bill, with costs. 1 
 
 The Court will often, although it overrides the demurrer, reserve to 
 the defendant the right of raising the same question at the hearing of 
 the cause ; 2 and where there is a doubtful question on a title, the Court 
 will sometimes overrule the demurrer, without prejudice to any defence 
 the defendant may make by way of answer. 3 
 
 Where any demurrer is overruled, the defendant is to pay to the 
 plaintiff the taxed costs occasioned thereby : unless the Court other- 
 wise directs. 4 
 
 6 Jackson v. North Wales Ry, Co. 13 Jur. 
 69, L. C. After demurrer to a bill was over- 
 ruled, and time given to answer, the defendant 
 was allowed to demur again without leave first 
 obtained, on the plaintiff's amending his bill 
 by joining a new party plaintiff. Moore v. 
 Armstrong, 9 Porter. 697. So where an amend- 
 ment is made to a bill before answer filed, even 
 if it be immaterial and trivial, a defendant may 
 demur, tit novo, to the whole bill; the defend- 
 ant may demur to the amendment at any time. 
 Booth v. Stamper, 10 Ga. 109. But when an 
 answer has been filed, the defendant cannot, 
 after demurrer made and decided, demur again 
 to the whole bill, unless the amendment is ma- 
 terial. Ibid. ; ante, p. 582, n. 10. Tor forms of 
 orders on appeal, see 2 Seton, 1600, Nos. 2, 3. 
 
 ' Ainslie v. Sims, 17 Beav. 174. 
 
 i Lewis v. Cooper, 10 Beav. 32; S. C. nam. 
 'Cooper r. Lewis, 2 Phil. 178, 181. See London 
 &c. Ry. Co. v. Imperial Mercantile Credit As- 
 sociation, L. R. 3 Ch. 231. 
 
 2 Wilson v. Stanhope, 2 Coll. 629 ; Jones v. 
 Sk'pworth, 9 Beav. 237; Norman v. Stiby, id. 
 560, 566; Earl of Shrewsbury v. North Stafford- 
 shire Ry. Co. 9 Jur. N. S. 787; 11 W. R. 742, 
 T. C. K ; Baxendale v. West Midland Ry. Co. 
 8 Jur. N. S. 1163, L. C. 
 
 3 Browmsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. Sr. 243, 
 :247; Mortimer r. Hartley, 3 De G. & S. 316; 
 .Evans to. Evans. 18 Jur. 666, L. J.L; Cochrane 
 p. Willis, 4 De G. J. & S. 229; 10 Jur. N. S. 
 162, L. J.L; Collingwood v. Russell, 10 Jur. 
 N S.1062; 13W.R.63, L. J ,1. : Thomas v. Tyler, 
 3 Y. & Col. 2oa; ante, p. 542. See Lautour v. 
 Att.-Gen. 11 Jur. N.S. 48; 13 W..R.305; Reg. 
 Lib. 1865, B. 135 : Bower r. Society \V. N. (1867) 
 306; W. N. (1868) 188. Where the Court be- 
 low has considered that the question raised by 
 the bill ought not to be decided on demurrer, it 
 seems that the Court of Appeals will not ordi- 
 narily overrule that decision. Sheffield Water- 
 works o. Veomans, L. R. 2 Ch. 8. The order 
 
 598 
 
 is not an interlocutory order as respects the 
 time for appealing. Trowel] r. Shenton. 8 Ch. 
 D. 318, 321. See R. S. C. Ord. LVIII. 15. 
 
 A decree overruling a demurrer is not a final 
 decree, and pending an appeal therefrom the 
 defendant may be ordered to answer. Forbes 
 v. Tuckerman, 115 Mass. 115. 
 
 If upon a critical examination of the facts of 
 a bill there is a possibility that the action may 
 be sustained, though upon a different ground 
 from that assumed, a demurrer to the whole bill 
 will be overruled. Trafford v. Wilkinson, 3 
 Tenn. Ch. 449. After a demurrer has been 
 overruled, the bill amended, and the defendant 
 has answered without taking in his answer the 
 objection raised by the demurrer, the defendant 
 may at the hearing raise the same objection. 
 Johnasson v. Bonhote, 2 Ch. D. 298. And, 
 generally, the Court is not concluded, on final 
 hearing, from looking into the bill upon the 
 points of an overruled demurrer. Dormer v. 
 Fortescue, 2 Atk. 284; Avery v. Holland, 2 
 Overton, 469 ; Bolton v. Dickens, 2 Cent. L. J. 
 477; Cronin v. Watkins, 1 Tenn. Ch. 119. Or 
 of an overruled motion to dismiss the bill for 
 want of equity. Shaw v. Patterson, 2 Tenn. 
 Ch. 171. 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. XIV. 12; see Schneider v. Li- 
 zardi, 9 Beav. 461, 468; Bothomley v. Squires, 
 1 Jur. N. S. 694; V. C. K.; Morgan & Davey, 
 21. As to the costs: where a demurrer ore 
 ttnus is allowed, see Cons. Ord. XIV. 1, ante, 
 p. 599 : and where a defendant succeeds on one 
 ground and fails on another, see mile, p. 599- 
 Costs were refused where the bill did not show 
 that relief must be granted at the hearing. 
 Barber v. Barber, 4 Drew. 666; 5 Jur. N. S. 
 1197. See Robinson v. India Chartered Bank. 
 35 Beav. 79, 86: L. R. 1 Eq. 32; Commins v. 
 Scott, L. R. 20 Eq. 11. For precedent of a bill 
 of costs where demurrer is overruled, see Morgan 
 & Davey, 448. 666-672.
 
 EFFECT OF OVERRULING DEMURRERS. * 602 
 
 Where a demurrer to the whole bill is overruled, the plaintiff, if he 
 does not require an answer, and proposes to file a traversing note, may 
 file such note immediately, unless the Court, upon overruling such de- 
 murrer, gives time to plead, answer, or demur ; and in such case, if the 
 defendant files no plea, answer, or demurrer within the time so allowed 
 by the Court, the plaintiff, if he does not then require an answer, may, 
 on the expiration of such time, file such note. 5 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. XIII. 4; ante, p. 516. 
 
 599
 
 603 
 
 ♦CHAPTER XY. 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 Section I. — The General Nature of Pleas. 
 
 A demurrer has been mentioned to be the proper mode of defence to 
 a bill, when any objection is apparent upon the bill itself, either from 
 matter contained in it, or from defect in its frame, or in the case made 
 by it. 1 When an objection to the bill is not apparent on the bill itself. 
 if the defendant means to take advantage of it, he ought to show to the 
 Court the matter which creates the objection, either by answer or by 
 plea, which has been described as a special answer, showing or relying 
 upon one or more things as a cause why the suit should be either dis- 
 missed, delayed, or barred. 2 («) The object of a plea is to save to the 
 parties the expense of going into evidence at large ; and therefore, where 
 a defendant neglected to raise his defence by plea, the bill has been dis- 
 missed without costs. 3 
 
 The defence proper for a plea is such as reduces the cause, or some 
 
 part of it, to a single point, and from thence creates a bar to the suit, 
 
 or to the part of it to which the plea applies. 4 It is not, however, 
 
 necessary that it should consist of a single fact ; for though a 
 
 * 604 defence offered by way of plea consists of a great variety * of cir- 
 
 1 Ante. v>. 542. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 219; Carroll r. "Waring, 3 Gill & 
 J. 491; Heartt r. Corning, 3 Paige, 566 ; Tappan 
 r. Evans. 11 X. H. 311. If a previous demurrer 
 by the defendant has been overruled, he cannot 
 plead without the leave of the Court. Rowley 
 v. Eccles, 1 S. & S. 511. ante. p. 600. 
 
 3 Sanders v. Benson. 4 Beav. 350, 357; Jack- 
 son r. Ogg, John. 397, 402: Dwight r. Central 
 Vermont R. Co. 20 Blatch. 200. 
 
 4 Ld. Red. 21'.'. 295; Goodrich v. Pendleton, 
 3 John. Ch. 384 ; Story. Eq. PI. § 652; Sims r. 
 Lyle, 4 Wash. C. C. 302. 304. The plea must 
 be perfect in itself, so that if true in fact, it will 
 put an end to the cause. Allen v. Randolph. 4 
 John. Ch. 693: Drogheda v. Malone. Finlay's 
 Dig. 449. If the plea is the only defence, it 
 must allege some fact which is an entire bar to 
 the suit or some substantive part of it; and, if 
 
 (a) In early times pleas were called or con- 
 founded with answers, and they are often re- 
 
 600 
 
 defective in this respect, whether true or false, 
 the plaintiff should move to set it aside for in- 
 sufficiency. Xewton r. Thayer, 17 Pick. 129; 
 Piatt r. Oliver, 1 McLean. 303: Union Branch 
 R. Co. 7-. East Tenn. & Georgia R. R. Co. 14 
 Ga. 327. A demurrer is never resorted to for 
 the purpose of settling the validity of a plea. 
 Travers r. Ross, 14 N. J. Eq. 254 : ante, p. 542, 
 n. 1 : infra, p. 692. 
 
 A mere denial of a substantive fact alleged 
 in the b 11, without setting up new matter, and 
 without answering as to collateral fact* charged 
 a~ evidence, is not a good plea. Evans v. Harris, 
 2 V. & B. 361 : Bailey r. Le Roy. 2 F.dw. Ch. 
 514; Milligan « Milledge, 3 Cranch. 220. Nor 
 is a plea of matter already in the bill rendering 
 it demurrable, as that the agreement is not in 
 writing, when the bill shows it to be in parol. 
 Black r. Black, 15 Ga. 445. 
 
 ferred to as " special answers." See LangdeK, 
 Eq. PI. (2d. ed.). § 92; post, p. 690.
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF PLEAS. 
 
 604 
 
 cumstances, yet if they all tend to one point, the plea may be good ; 1 
 they must, however, be material.' 2 
 
 In general, a plea relies upon matters not apparent on the bill, and, 
 in effect, suggests that the plaintiff has omitted a fact which, if stated, 
 would have rendered the bill demurrable ; 3 and in most cases, where a 
 defendant insists upon matter by plea which is apparent upon the face 
 of the bill, and might be taken advantage of by demurrer, the plea will 
 not hold. 4 (a) This rule, however, as will be seen presently, is in some 
 cases liable to exception. 
 
 Where a plea merely states matter not apparent upon the bill, and 
 relies upon the effect of such matter as a bar to the plaintiff's claim, it 
 is called an affirmative plea. Such pleas usually proceed upon the 
 ground that, admitting the case stated by the bill to be true, the -matter 
 suggested by the plea affords a sufficient reason why the plaintiff should 
 not have the relief he prays, or the discovery which he seeks ; and when 
 they are put in, the Court, in order to save expense to the parties, or 
 to protect the defendant from a discovery which he ought not to make, 
 instantly decides upon the validity of the defence, taking the plea, and 
 the bill so far as it is not contradicted by the plea, to be true. 5 
 
 Although pleas generally consist of the averment of some new fact, 
 or chain of facts, not apparent upon the face of the bill, the effect of 
 which is, not to deny the facts of the bill, but admitting them pro hoc 
 vice to be true, to destroy their effect, there are cases in which the plea, 
 instead of introducing new facts, merely relies upon a denial of the 
 truth of some matter stated in the bill, upon which the plaintiff's right 
 depends. A plea of this sort is called a negative plea. 6 It seems, for- 
 merly, to have been made a question how far a negative plea could be 
 good ; 7 and where a bill was filed by an individual claiming as heir to a 
 
 i Fox i'. Yates, 24 Beav. 271 ; Campbell v. 
 Beaufoy, Johns. 320; Saunders v. Druce, 3 
 Drew. 140, 156; and for the plea in that case, 
 see Drew. Eq. PI. 140, and id. 147, n.; Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 652; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 
 14 Peters, 21 1. But it is otherwise where the 
 defence consists of a threat variety of facts and 
 circumstances, rendering it necessary to go into 
 the examination of witnesses at large. Loud 
 t;. Sergeant, 1 Edw. Ch. 104; Story, Eq. PL 
 §§ 053, 054. 
 
 2 Andrews v. Lockwond, 2 Phil. 398; 15 Sim. 
 153; Bowyer r. Beamish, 2 Jo. & Lat. 228. 
 
 8 Wigram on l>i-c 22, n. (e); see Andrews 
 v. Lockwond. ubi supra. 
 
 4 Billing v. Flight, 1 Mad. 230, 236; Black 
 
 (a) A plea which avers a conclusion of law 
 without setting forth the facts leading to that 
 conclusion, is had. Farley v. Kittson, 120 
 U. S. 303; McCloskey v. Barr, 38 Fed. Rep. 
 165; Larimore v. Wells, 29 Ohio St. 13. Every 
 plea must be specific, distinct, and complete in 
 itself. United States v. California Land Co. 
 148 U. S. 31; 7 U. S. App. 128, 177; Gage v. 
 
 v. Rlaek, 15 Ga. 445; Phelps v. Garrow. 3 Edw. 
 Ch. 139; Varick v. Dodge, 9 Paige, 149. 
 
 5 Ld. Red. 295. 
 
 6 Story, Eq. PI. § 551, note, § 057, et seq. ; 
 Wigram. Discov. (2d ed.) pp. 110-118. This 
 class of picas has two peculiarities: in the first 
 place it relics wholly upon matters stated in the 
 bill, negativing such facts as are material to 
 the rights of the plaintiff; and in the next place 
 it requires an answer to be filed, which is sub- 
 sidiary tn the piirpo«es of the plea. Story, Eq. 
 PI. § 070: sec also Cosine ». Graham, 2 Paige, 
 177: Robinson v. Smith. 3 Paige, 222: Mitchell 
 7-. Lenox, 2 Paige, 280 ; Smets v. Williams, 4 
 Paige, 304. 
 
 ? Ld. Red. 230. 
 
 Harbert, 145 111. 530: Gage v. Smith. 142 III. 
 191. Under the Codes, an affirmative defence 
 
 set up in the answer is treated as a separate 
 plea. Douglass v. Phenix Ins. Co. 138 N. Y. 
 209. A defendant who files a plea to the entire 
 bill need not answer; if he pleads to a part 
 only, he must answer to the remainder. Graves 
 v. Blondell, 70 Maine, 190. 
 
 G01
 
 605 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 person deceased, and the defendant pleaded that another person was 
 heir, and that the plaintiff was not heir to the deceased, Lord 
 * 605 Thnrlow overruled * the plea, on the ground that it was a nega- 
 tive plea; 1 but this decision was afterwards doubted, by the 
 learned Judge himself,' 2 when pressed by the necessary consequence, 
 that any person falsely alleging a title in himself, might compel any 
 other person to make a discovery, which that title, if true, would enable 
 him to require, however injurious to the person thus improperly brought 
 into Court : so that any person might, by alleging a title, however false, 
 sustain a bill in Equity against any person for anything, so far as to 
 compel an answer. 3 Since that time, frequent instances have occurred 
 in which negative pleas have been allowed. Thus, where to a bill 
 praying that the defendant might redeem a mortgage or be foreclosed, 
 the defendant pleaded that there was no mortgage, Lord Eldon allowed 
 the plea (a) ; 4 and so, where a bill prayed that the defendant might be 
 restrained from setting up outstanding terms of years in defence to an 
 action of ejectment, and the defendant pleaded that there were no out- 
 standing terms, the plea was held good ; 5 and where a bill prayed an 
 account of partnership transactions, a negative plea that there was no 
 partnership was allowed. 6 It has also been held that negative matter 
 ought to be pleaded negatively. 7 
 
 It is proper here to mention another species of plea which often 
 occurs in the books, and is not, strictly speaking, either a plea affirm- 
 ing new matter, or negativing the plaintiff's title as alleged in the bill, 
 but one which re-asserts some fact stated in the bill, and which the bill 
 seeks to impeach, and denies all the circumstances which the plaintiff 
 relies upon as the ground upon which he seeks to impeach the fact 
 so set up. {b) Thus where a bill is brought to impeach a decree, on 
 the ground of fraud used in obtaining it, the decree may be pleaded in 
 bar of the suit, with averments negativing the charges of fraud. 8 Of 
 the same nature are pleas setting up the award itself, to a bill filed for 
 the purpose of impeaching it on the ground of partiality or fraud in the 
 arbitrators ; 9 or setting up stated accounts or releases, where bills have 
 
 1 Newman v. Wallace, 2 Bro. C. C. 143, 
 146; Gunn v. Prior, 2 Dick. 657; 1 Cox, 197; 
 Kinneslev v. Simpson, Forrest. 85. 
 
 2 Hall v. Noyes, 3 Bro. C. C. 483, 489. 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 231; Jones v. Davis, 16 Ves. 262, 
 264. 
 
 4 Hitchens v. Lander, G. Coop. 34, 38. 
 
 8 Armitager. Wadsworth, 1 Mad. 189, 195; 
 Dawson v. Pilling, 16 Sim. 203, 209; 12 Jur. 
 388. 
 
 (n) One who, when purchasing land, agrees 
 to assume and pay a mortgage thereon, cannot 
 afterwards question its validity. Alt v. Ban- 
 holzer, 36 Minn. 57. 
 
 (b) See Garrett v. New York Transit Co. 29 
 Fed. Rep. 129. So a plea may be good which, 
 adding other facts to those stated in the bill, 
 arranges them together as one complete defence. 
 
 602 
 
 6 Drew v. Drew, 2 V. & B. 159, 161 ; Sanders 
 v. King, 6 Mad. 61; 2 S. & S. 277; Yorke v. 
 Fry, 6 Mad. 65; Thring v. Edgar, 2 S. & S. 
 274, 281; Arnold v. Heaford, 1 M'Lel. & Y. 
 330. 
 
 i Roberts v. Madocks, 16 Sim. 55, 57; 11 
 Jur. 938. 
 
 8 Ld. Red. 239. 
 
 9 Ibid. 260 ; Tittenson v. Peat, 3 Atk 529. 
 
 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. 
 50 Fed. Rep. 151 ; Providence Institution v. Barr, 
 17 R. I. 131. But it is not sufficient for a plea 
 to merely allege a fact which contradicts an 
 allegation of the bill. McDonald v. Salem 
 Capital F. M. Co. 31 Fed. Rep. 577; see Ar- 
 mengaud v. Coudert, 23 Blatch. 484.
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF PLEAS. * 606 
 
 been filed for the purpose of setting them aside. Pleas of this nature 
 have been objected to, because they are in fact exceptiones ejusdem rei 
 cujus petitur dissolutio ; 10 but the frame of a bill in Equity, in such 
 cases, necessarily produces this mode of pleading : for, in the 
 instance above alluded to of a plea setting up the decree * to a * 606 
 bill seeking to impeach it, it is obvious that, if the bill had stated 
 the title under which the plaintiff claimed, without stating the decree 
 under which the defendant claimed, the defendant might have pleaded 
 the decree alone in bar. If the bill had stated the plaintiff's title, and 
 also stated the decree, and alleged no fact to impeach it, and had yet 
 sought relief on the title concluded by it, the defendant might have 
 demurred ; because, upon the face of the bill, the title of the plaintiff 
 would have appeared to be so concluded. But as, by the forms of 
 pleading in Equity, the bill may set out the title of the plaintiff, and, 
 at the same time, state the decree by which, if not impeached, that title 
 would be concluded, and then avoid the operation of the decree, by 
 alleging that it has been obtained by fraud, if the defendant could not 
 take the judgment of the Court, upon the conclusiveness of the decree, 
 by plea, upon which the matter by which that decree was impeached 
 would alone be in issue, he must enter into the same defence (by evi- 
 dence as well as by answer), as if no decree had been made, and would 
 be involved in all the expense and vexation of a second litigation on the 
 subject of a former suit, which the decree, if unimpeached, had concluded. 
 It is therefore, permitted to him to avoid entering into the general ques- 
 tion of the plaintiff's title, as if it had not been affected by the decree, 
 by meeting the case made by the plaintiff, which can alone give him a 
 right to call for that defence, namely, the fact of fraud in obtaining the 
 decree : which he does, by negative averments in his plea. 1 It seems to 
 have been the opinion of Sir James Wigram that, in these cases, a nega- 
 tive plea, meeting the matter suggested in the bill, to avoid the effect of 
 the bar set up, would alone be sufficient. 2 
 
 Any matter arising between the bill and the plea, may be pleaded. 3 
 It has been before stated that this can be done where the bankruptcy 
 of a plaintiff or of a defendant occurs after the bill has been filed ; 4 and. 
 so where a bill was filed for a discovery and relief, by injunction to 
 restrain the defendant from setting up outstanding terms to defeat a 
 writ of right, and since the filing of the bill, the wj-it of right had 
 been tried and determined against the plaintiff, a plea that it had been 
 so tried and determined was allowed to be a good plea. 6 This rule 
 lias been adopted from analogy to proceedings at Common Law, where 
 any matter which arises between the declaration and the plea may be 
 pleaded in bar. 6 But the analogy, in this respect, between Courts of Law 
 
 1° Pusey v. Desbouvrie, 3 P. Wins. 315. * Ante, p. 63; Turner V. Robinson, 1 S. & S. 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 240, 242; Bailey v. Adams, G 3: see Taileton v. Hornby, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 333, 
 Ves. 580, 597; Lloyd v. Smith, 1 Anst. 258; 336; Lane v. Smith, 14 Beav. 49; 15 Jur. 735. 
 Freeland v. Johnson, id. 276. 6 E a ,.] f Leicester V. Perrv, 1 Bro. C. C. 
 
 2 Wigram on Disc. pp. 185-189. 305; see Ld. Red. 254 
 
 3 Sergrove v. Mayhew, 2 M'N. & G. 97, 99; « Turner v. Robinson, ubi supra. 
 14 Jur. 158; De Minekwitz v. Udney, 16 Ves. 
 
 466, 468; Payne v. Beech, 2 Tenn. Ch. 708. 
 
 603
 
 *608 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 * GOT *and Equity, will not extend further: for at Law, any matter 
 
 which would abate the suit, or operate as a bar, may, until the 
 verdict has been given, be offered to the Court by a plea, termed a plea 
 puis darrein continuance. 1 In Courts of Equity, however, such a plea 
 does not seem admissible, but the effect of it may be obtained by means 
 of a cross-bill. - 
 
 It is essential to observe that, whatever the nature of the plea may 
 be, whether affirmative or negative, or of the anomalous nature above 
 alluded to, the matter pleaded must reduce the issue between the plain- 
 tiff and defendant to a single point. 8 If a plea is double, that is, ten- 
 ders more than one defence as the results of the facts stated, it will be 
 bad. 4 (a) Thus, a plea which stated that the plaintiffs, who claimed as 
 citizens of London, never were resident there, or paid scot and lot, and 
 that they were admitted freemen by fraud for the purpose, of enjoying 
 the exemption claimed, was held bad ; because the facts that the plain- 
 tiffs were not citizens of London, and that they were admitted by fraud 
 were totally inconsistent with each other. 5 
 
 The rule, that a plea must reduce the defence to a single ground, 
 
 must be understood as not interfering with the proposition before laid 
 
 down, 6 that a plea may consist of a variety of facts and circumstances: 
 
 all that it requires is, that those facts and circumstances should 
 
 give, as their result, one clear ground 7 upon which the whole 
 
 * 608 * equity of the bill may be disposed of. 
 
 i 15 & 16 Vic. c. 76, § 69. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 82; see Howe v. Wood, 1J. & W. 
 315, 337; Wood r. Rowe, 2 Bligh, 595; Hayne 
 v. Hayne, 3 Ch. Rep. 19; Nels. 105; Wright 
 r. Meek, 3 Iowa, 472; Miller v. Fenton, 11 
 Paige, 18; Johnson v. Fitzhugh, 3 Barb. Ch. 
 360. 
 
 3 Saltus v. Tobias, 1 John. Ch. 214. 
 
 4 Nobkissen v. Hastings, 2 Ves. Jr. 84, 80; 
 Jones v. Frost, 3 Mad. 1, 8; Van Hook v. 
 Whitlock, 3 Paige, 409. Duplicity in one and 
 the same plea is a vice in pleading in Equity, as 
 well as at Law. Moreton v. Harrison, 1 Bland. 
 496; see Saltus v. Tobias, 7 John. Ch. 214; 
 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 14 Peters, 211; 
 Goodrich v. Pendleton, 3 John. Ch. 336; 
 Ridgeley v. Warfield, 1 Bland, 404; Story, Eq. 
 PI. § 653. A plea is not rendered double by 
 the mere insertion therein of several averments, 
 that are necessary to exclude conclusions arising 
 from allegations which are made in the bill, to 
 anticipate and defeat the liar which might be 
 set up in the plea. Bogardus P. Trinity Church, 
 4 Paige, 178. 
 
 5 London v. Liverpool. 3 Anst. 738, 742. So 
 where a defendant to a bill for the specific per- 
 
 (a) In such case, the proper practice appears 
 to be to allow the defendant to set down the 
 plea as an answer, or to require him to elect 
 between the different points of defence con- 
 
 604 
 
 formance of an agreement, put in a plea, 
 insisting upon the Statute of Frauds, and 
 another defence, Lord Rosslyn would not allow 
 it, as it was a double defence, and directed it to 
 stand over till the hearing. Cooth v. Jackson, 
 6 Ves. 12, 17: Whitbread v. Brockhurst, 1 Bro. 
 C. C. 404, 418. Loon the same principle, where 
 a bill was filed, praying a reconveyance of four 
 estates, and the defendant put in a plea whereby 
 he insisted upon a fine as to one, and averred 
 that the estate comprised in that fine was the 
 only part of the premises in the bill in which 
 he claimed an interest, Sir Lancelot Shadwell 
 V. C. held it to be bad, as a double plea. Wat- 
 kins v. Stone, 2 Sim. 49, 52. 
 
 6 Ante, p. 603. 
 
 7 Ritchie r. Aylwin, 15 Ves. 79, 82; Rowe 
 r. Teed, id. 372; Strickland v. Strickland, 12 
 Sim. 253, 259; Fox v. Vates, 24 Ben v. 271; 
 Campbell v. Beanfoy, Johns. 320; Saunders 
 v. Druce, 3 Drew. 140, 156. The rule upon 
 this subject, and the reasons upon which it lias 
 been established, are thus stated by Lord 
 Thurlow, in Whitbread v. Brockhurst : " 1 
 cannot agree with the defendant's counsel, that 
 any two facts which are not inconsistent may be 
 
 tained in it. See Reissner v. Anness, 3 Ban & 
 Arden, 148; see Emma Silver M. Co. Lim'd r. 
 Emma Silver M. Co. of New York, 7 Fed. 
 Rep. 401.
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF PLEAS. 
 
 009 
 
 Although the general rule of the Court is not to allow of double 
 pleading, there are cases in which the rule will be relaxed : as, where 
 great inconvenience would be sustained by the necessity of setting out 
 long accounts, which could be obviated, if the defendant were to be 
 allowed to plead several matters, (") Cases of this nature may occur 
 where a bill is so framed that, if the principal case made by it 
 cannot be supported, it may be sustained by some * subsidiary * 609 
 matter, which has been introduced for the purpose of maintaining 
 the suit. 1 Thus, where a bill was riled, 2 by simple contract creditors, to 
 charge the real estates of a deceased debtor, alleging, first, that the 
 testator, by his will, subjected the real estates to the payment of his 
 debts ; and, secondly, that if it was not the true construction of his will, 
 then his real estates were liable under the 47 Geo. III. sess..2, e. 74, 3 
 he having been a trader at the time of his death, an order was made, 
 
 pleaded in one plea. I think that various facts 
 can never be pleaded in one plea, unless they 
 are all conducive to a single point, on which 
 the defendant rests his defence. Thus, many 
 deeds may be stated in a plea, if they all tend 
 to establish a single point of title; so in 
 the case of papacy. Harrison v. Southcote, 1 
 Atk. 528, 588. In the present case, the differ- 
 ent matters pleaded do not conduce to one 
 object. The plea of the statute is of itself a bar; 
 but the plea, that the agreement was not per- 
 formed, is quite distinct; because, whether a 
 part-performance take the agreement out of the 
 statute, or be considered merely as a fraud, the 
 point of equity is quite distinct from the agree- 
 ment. It is a plea of two matters, perfectly 
 and clearly distinct; of two things which fur- 
 nish two differ nt pleas to the points made in 
 the bill. The reason why a defendant is not 
 permitted to plead two different pleas in Equity, 
 though he is permitted to plead them at Law, 
 is plain: it i- because at Law a defendant has 
 no opportunity, as he has here, of answering 
 every different matter stated in the bill. The 
 reason of pleading in Equity is, that it tends 
 to the forwarding of justice, and saves great 
 expense, that the matter should be taken up 
 shortly upon a single point; but that end is so 
 far from being attained, if the plea puts as 
 much in issue as the answer could do, that on 
 the contrary it increases the delay and expense. 
 But why, it may be asked, should not the de- 
 
 (a) Double pleas may be allowed by the 
 Court in its discretion, where they do not lead 
 to diverse issues. Gormley v. Bunyan, 138 U.S. 
 B23; Carlyle ». Carlyle Water Co. 140 111. 445; 
 Providence Institution p. liarr, 17 R. I. 131. 
 Leave of Court is necessary to justify separate 
 pleas, or a single plea which sets up distinct 
 matters of defence. McCloskey v. Barr, 38 
 Fed. Rep. 165; United States v. American Bell 
 Telephone Co. 30 id. 523 ; Noyes v. Willard, 
 
 fendant be permitted to bring two points, on 
 which the cause depends, to issue by his plea ? 
 The answer is : because, if two, he may as 
 well bring three points to issue; and so on, till 
 all the matters in the bill are brought to issue 
 upon the plea, — which would be productive of 
 all the delay and inconvenience which plead- 
 ing was intended to remedy." See Sir S. 
 Romilly's note of this judgment, 1 Bro. C. C. 
 416, Belt's ed., cited 2 V. & B. 153, n.; Noyes 
 v. Willard, 1 Woods, 187; Benson v. Jones, 
 1 Tenn. Ch. 498. Where the allegations of a 
 plea, being taken as true, do not make out a 
 full defence, or where the necessary facts are 
 to be gathered by inference alone, the plea 
 cannot be sustained. Meeker v. Marsh, Saxton 
 (N. J.), 198. See Davison v. Johnson, 16 
 N J. Eq. 112. 
 
 1 Story, Eq. PI. § 657, and note: Van Hook 
 v. Whitlock, 3 Paige, 409; Mitford, Eq. PI. by 
 Jeremy, 295, note; Didierr. Davidson, 10 Paige, 
 515. Two distinct pleas in bar, different in 
 their nature, as a plea of the Statute of Limita- 
 tions, and a discharge under the Insolvent Act, 
 cannot be pleaded together, without the previous 
 leave of the Court. Saltus v. Tobias, 7 John. 
 Ch. 214. 
 
 2 Gibson v. Whitehead, 4 Mad. 241, 246; 
 Kay r. Marshall, 1 Keen, 190. 
 
 3 Repealed by 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. 
 c. 47. 
 
 1 Woods, 187. Different facts and circum- 
 stance's, nil tending to a single point, ma)' be 
 included in one plea. Hazard V. Dnrant, 25 
 fed. lop. 26; Harrison r. Farrington, 38 X. J. 
 Eq. 1, 358. In the Federal Courts, a demurrer 
 to the whole bill, and also several pleas, will 
 not usually be permitted at the same time 
 under Equity Rule 32. United States Bell 
 Telephone Co. supra. 
 
 605
 
 * 610 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 upon motion, that the defendant might be at liberty to plead : first, the 
 will of the testator, for the purpose of showing that he did not thereby 
 charge his real estates with the payment of his debts ; and, secondly, 
 that he was not, at the time of his death, a trader within the meaning of 
 the Act. 4 Although, in the above case, the necessity for a double plea 
 arose from the circumstance of there being a sort of double or alternative 
 claim in the bill, this is not the only ground upon which the Court acts 
 in allowing double pleas. The principle upon which the Court proceeds, 
 depends very much upon the extraordinary inconvenience that might 
 arise, if the defendant were not allowed to take this course ; and upon 
 this principle, where a bill was filed to restrain the infringement of a 
 patent, and for an account, and the defendants were desirous of disputing 
 the validity of the patent, on the grounds that, so far as the invention 
 was new, it was useless, and that, so far as it was useful, it was not 
 new, Lord Langdale M. R. gave the defendant leave to plead: first, 
 that the invention was not useful ; secondly, that it was not new ; 5 and 
 the same Judge also permitted the defendant, in an ejectment suit, to 
 plead : first, that the person under whom the plaintiff claimed was not 
 the heir; and, secondly, that even if he were such heir, the plaintiff's 
 right was barred by the Statute of Limitations. 6 
 
 Before a defendant puts in a double plea, he must obtain an order, on 
 motion, with notice, of which he will have to pay the costs, for leave to 
 do so ; 7 and such a plea, if filed without such an order, is irregular, and 
 
 liable to be overruled. 8 
 * 610 * With reference to the subject of multifarious or double plead- 
 ing, it is to be noticed that, where the facts stated in the plea 
 are sufficient to constitute a good plea, the introduction into the plea of a 
 fact which, although it puts in issue a distinct matter, is not important 
 to the validity of the plea itself, will not vitiate the plea, 1 Thus, if a 
 defendant pleads a release, and then avers that it has been acted upon : 
 the release being of itself a bar, whether it has been acted upon or not, 
 the further allegation that it has been acted upon is unimportant, and 
 will be rejected as surplusage. 2 
 
 The rule that a defendant cannot plead several matters, must not be 
 understood as precluding a defendant from putting in several pleas to 
 different parts of the same bill : it merely prohibits his pleading, with- 
 
 4 See also Hardman v. Ellames, 5 Sim. 640, 
 645 ; 2 M. & K. 732; C. P. Coop. temp. Brough. 
 351. 
 
 5 Kay v. Marshall, 1 Keen, 190, 192, 197. 
 
 6 Bampton v. Birchall, 4 Beav. 558; and 
 see observations of Sir John Romillv M. R. in 
 Young v. White, 17 Beav. 5:12, 540; 18 Jur. 
 277. 
 
 " For form of notice of motion, see Vol. TIT. 
 
 8 Kay v. Marshall, ubl supra; Gibson r. 
 Whitehead, 4 Mad. 241. 245; Hardman v. El- 
 lames, uhi supra ; Bampton v. Birchall, ubi 
 supra ; Salt us v. Tobias, 7 John. Ch. 214. 
 
 1 Story, Eq. PI. § 663. 
 
 2 Upon this ground, where a plea stated 
 facts which, connected with the statement in 
 
 606 
 
 the bill, would have amounted to a conspiracy 
 to prevent a prosecution for felony, and then 
 averred that the transactions stated in the bill 
 related to a fraudulent embezzlement by a 
 banker's clerk, and suggested that the dis- 
 covery sought might subject the defendant to 
 pains and penalties, it was objected that the 
 plea was multifarious, because, in addition to 
 the statement of facts amounting to a con- 
 spiracy, it averred that the transactions related 
 to a fraudulent embezzlement; Lord Eldon, 
 however, overruled the objection, saying that 
 he should press a harder rule in Equity than 
 prevails at Law by holding that such an aver- 
 ment made a plea bad, which in other respects 
 was good. Claridge v. Hoare, 14 Ves. 59, G5.
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF PLEAS. * 611 
 
 out previous leave, a double defence to the whole bill, or to the same 
 portion of it. A defendant may plead different matters to separate 
 parts of the same bill, in the same manner that, as we have seen, a 
 defendant may put in different demurrers to different portions of the 
 bill. 3 A defendant may, in like manner, plead and demur, or plead 
 and answer, to different parts of the same bill, provided he points out, 
 distinctly, the different portions of the bill which are intended to be 
 covered by the plea, the demurrer, and the answer ; 4 he must, likewise, 
 where he puts in several pleas to the same bill, point out to what par- 
 ticular part of the bill each plea is applicable. But, although the gene- 
 ral rule is, that in the case of a partial plea, a defendant must specify 
 distinctly what part of the bill he pleads to, the rule which has been 
 stated, as applicable to a demurrer, namely, that it cannot be good in 
 part and bad in part, is not applicable with the same strictness to a 
 plea ; for it has been repeatedly decided, that a plea in Equity 
 may be bad in part and not in the whole, and the * Court will * 611 
 allow it to so much of the bill as it is properly applicable to. 1 
 
 The rule that a plea may be allowed in part only, is to be understood 
 with reference to its extent, that is, to the quality of the bill covered 
 by it, and not to the ground of defence offered by it ; and if any part 
 of the defence made by the plea is bad, the whole must be overruled. 2 
 Thus, if a defendant pleads a fine and non-claim, which is a legal bar, 
 and a purchase for a valuable consideration without notice of the plain- 
 tiff's claim, which is an equitable bar : if either should appear not to be 
 a bar, as if the defendant by answer should admit facts amounting to 
 notice, or if the plea, with respect to either part, should be informal, 
 the whole must be overruled. There 'seems to be no case in which the 
 Court has separated the two matters pleaded, and allowed one as a bar, 
 and disallowed the other. 3 
 
 But, although it is the office of a plea to reduce the defence to a 
 single point, it is necessary, in order to its validity, that all matters 
 which are essential to bring it to that point, should be stated on the 
 face of the plea, so that the Court may at once decide whether the case 
 which the plea presents to the Court is a bar to the case made by the 
 bill, or to that part of it which the plea seeks to cover. 4 Thus, if a 
 bill is brought to recover the possession of an estate, a defendant may, 
 in certain cases, protect himself by a plea : stating that he was the pur- 
 
 8 Emmott v. Mitchell, 14 Sim. 432, 434; 9 of Derby v. Duke of Athol, 1 Ves. Sr. 203, 205; 
 
 Jur. 170; ante, p. 584. 2 id. 337; Bell v. Woodward, 42 N. H. 193; 
 
 4 He may not, therefore, simultaneously Ld. Chelmsford, in United States of America 
 
 plead and demur to the whole bill; Lowndes v. v. McRae, L. R. 3 Ch. 91, 92; Story. Eq. PI. 
 
 Garnett & Moseley Gold Mining Co. 2 J. & II. §§ 692, 003: French v Shotwell, 20 John. 668; 
 
 282; 8 Jur. N. S. 694. S. C. 5 John. Ch. 555; Kirkpatrick v. White, 4 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 295; Coop. Eq. PI. 230; Beames Wash. C. C. 595. 
 on Pleas, 45; Earl of Suffolk v. Green, 1 Atk. 2 Ld Red. 297; Salmon v. Dean. 3 M'N. & 
 
 450; Ouncalf v. Blake, id. 52; Huggina v. York G. 344, 348; 14 Jur. 235; and see Hewitt v. 
 
 Buildings Co. 2 Atk. 44; Dormer v. Fortescue, Hewitt, 11 W. R. 849, V. C. K.; see Mad. 
 
 id. 284; Turner v. Mitchell, 1 Dick. 249; Roche Plank Road Co. v. Wat. Plank Road < !o. r > Wis. 
 
 v. Morgell, 2 Sch. & Lef. 721, 725; Mayor of 173 ; Searight v. Payne, 1 Tenn. Ch. 186. 
 London v. Levy, 8 Ves. 403; Harrison v. South- 3 Ld. Red. 295. 
 
 cote, 1 Atk. 528, 539; 2 Ves. Sr. 389, 397; Earl * Wesling v. Schrass, 33 N. J. Eq. 42. 
 
 607
 
 612 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 chaser of the estate, and that he paid a valuable consideration for it, and 
 that he had not, at the time of the purchase, any notice of the title or 
 claim of the plaintiff to the property. This is called "a plea of pur- 
 chase for valuable consideration, without notice," and is, if true, a good 
 bar to the suit. It will not, however, be sufficient merely to state, by 
 way of plea, that the defendant is a purchaser for a valuable consider- 
 ation, without notice ; he must state upon the plea, that the person 
 from whom he purchased had, or pretended to have, such an interest 
 in the property as entitled him to convey it to the defendant ; that it 
 was conveyed to the defendant by the proper mode of conveyance ; that 
 a valuable consideration was paid for it by the defendant ; and that 
 
 the defendant had no notice of the claim of the plaintiff. For the 
 * 612 coincidence of all these facts is * necessary to constitute a good 
 
 bar in Equity to a suit of the nature alluded to, 1 and the omis- 
 sion of any of them would render the defence invalid ; because the 
 plaintiff has a right, by replying to the plea, to put all the matters con- 
 tained in it in issue, and by that means to compel the defendant to 
 support them, or at least such of them as are affirmatively stated, by 
 evidence. The statements of these necessary facts, in a plea, are 
 called " averments," and the necessity of their introduction points out 
 the general distinction between demurrers and pleas ; for, if the fact 
 necessary to constitute a good plea appears sufficiently upon the bill, 
 so as to exclude the necessity of averments, the bill might, in most 
 cases, be objected to by demurrer. 2 
 
 Another office of averments in a plea is, to exclude intendments, which 
 would otherwise be made against the pleader ; for, if there is any 
 charge in the bill which is an equitable circumstance in favor of the 
 plaintiff's case against the matter pleaded, such as fraud or notice of 
 title, the Court will intend the matters so charged against the pleader, 
 unless they are met by averments in the plea. 3 
 
 1 Id. 275; Jackson v. Rowe, 4 Russ. 514, against a tenant for life, for an account of 
 
 52-3; High v. Batte, 10 Verger, 335; Donnell v. 
 King, 7 Leigh, 393; Griffith v. Griffith, 1 Hoff. 
 Ch. 153; Malony v. Kernan, 2 Dru. & War. 31; 
 Craig v. Leiper, 2 Yerger, 193. Jewett v. Palmer. 
 7 John. Ch. 65; Gallatian v. Cunningham, 8 
 Cowen, 361; Souzer v. De Meyer, 2 Paige, 574; 
 Drogheda v. Malone, Finlay's Dig. 449. A 
 plea, setting up a forfeiture, by breach of a con- 
 dition subsequent for the payment of money, in 
 bar of a suit in Equity for relief, must distinctly 
 aver laches on the part of the plaintiff. Han- 
 cock v. Carlton, 6 Gray, 39. 
 
 2 Bicknell r. Gouch, 3 Atk. 558; Roberts v. 
 Hartley, 1 Bro. C C. 56 ; Billings v. Flight, 1 
 Mad. 230, 236; Steff ». Andrews. 2 Mad. 6, 10. 
 It is unnecessary to negative facts which, if 
 stated in the bill, would have defeated the plea. 
 Ld. Red. 299: Forbes v. Skelton, 8 Sim. 335, 
 345 ; 1 Jur. 117 ; see Story, Eq. PL § 679, et seq., 
 and notes. 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 298; Saunders v. Druce, 3 Drew. 
 140, 161; Drew. Eq. PL 146; id. 147, n. Thus, 
 where a bill was filed by a remainder-man 
 
 608 
 
 timber cut upon the estate, embracing a period 
 of many more than six years previous to the 
 filing of the bill, which was in 1824, and alle- 
 ging that, in answer to certain inquiries which 
 the plaintiff had made as to the timber, the de- 
 fendant had furnished certain accounts, from 
 which it appeared that, since the year 1794 
 down to the year 1821, certain quantities of 
 timber had been cut in each year, amounting to 
 sums mentioned in the bill, and the defendant 
 pleaded the Statute of Limitations in bar, con- 
 fining his averments only to the date of the 
 filing of the bill : the Court overruled the plea, 
 because it held, that the alleged render of the 
 accounts in the bill, bringing the accounts down 
 to the period within six years before the filing 
 of the bill (which was not negatived by any 
 averment in the plea), defeated the operation of 
 the statute. Hony v. Hony, 1 S. & S. 568, 
 580. To have constituted a good plea in that 
 case, there should have been an averment that 
 no such accounts as those alleged in the bill had 
 been rendered.
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF PLEAS. * 614 
 
 * The necessity for the introduction of such averments into a * 613 
 plea is obvious, when we consider that a plea, for the purpose 
 of deciding on the validity of it, like a demurrer, admits all the facts 
 stated in the bill to be true, so far as they are not controverted by 
 the plea; 1 so that, whenever matters of fact are introduced in the bill, 
 which, if true, would destroy the effect of the matter pleaded, the plea will 
 be overruled, unless such matters are controverted by the averments. 
 
 From what has been said above, it will be seen that averments in 
 pleas may naturally be divided into affirmative and negative averments. 
 Affirmative averments are those which are not suggested by any matter 
 upon the face of the bill which is inconsistent with the matter pleaded, 
 but are necessary in order to render the matter pleaded a complete bar. 
 Thus, if a stated account is set up by the plea, the defendant must aver 
 that the account is just and true, to the best of his knowledge and 
 belief ; and so, in the instance above referred to, of a plea of purchase 
 for valuable consideration without notice, it has been stated that the 
 defendant must aver, in his plea, that the person from whom he pur- 
 chased had, or pretended to have, such an interest as entitled him to 
 convey the estate to the defendant ; and that it was conveyed to the 
 defendant in a proper manner ; and that a valuable consideration was 
 paid for it; and that the defendant had no notice of the plaintiff's 
 title : the concurrence of all these matters being requisite to constitute 
 a good equitable bar to the plaintiff's claim. 2 It may be objected that 
 the last matter averred, — namely, the want of notice, — being negative 
 matter, cannot properly be called an affirmative averment ; but it is not 
 the mere fact of averring affirmatively or negatively which constitutes 
 the distinction; but whether the matter be introduced by way of affir- 
 mation of the defendant's plea, or of negation of such of the plaintiff's 
 statements as are inconsistent with the plea. Thus, the very fact of 
 want of notice, in a plea of purchase for a valuable consideration, may 
 be both affirmatively and negatively averred: for, if the bill merely sets 
 out the plaintiff's title, and does not charge the defendant with having 
 any notice of it, the want of notice being one of the circumstances 
 necessary to constitute the equitable bar, must be averred in the plea : 
 in which case, according to the distinction above pointed out, the aver- 
 ment is affirmative. And so, if the bill actually charges the defendant 
 with notice, the notice must be equally denied by averment; in which 
 case the averment will be a negative averment. 
 
 * A negative averment, therefore, is that species of averment * 614 
 which is made use of to contradict any statement or charge in the 
 bill, which, if uncontradicted, would be to do away with the effect of the 
 matter pleaded. The most common case in which this form of averment 
 is used is, where notice or fraud is alleged in the bill, for the pur- 
 pose of obviating some anticipated defence which may be set up by the 
 defendant. 1 
 
 1 Plunket v. Pcnson, 2 Atk. 51; Roche 2 Ante, p. 611; Ld. Red. 275. 
 
 v. Morgell, 2 Sch. & Lef. 721, 727; McEwen o. i See Fish v. Miller, 5 Paige, 20. In Moa- 
 
 Broadhead, 11 N. J. Eq. 131; Davison v. John- dows r. Duchess of Kingston, Ld. Red. '277, 
 
 son, 10 N. J. Eq. 113, 114. n.; Anib. 756, 761, Lord Bathnrst seemed to be 
 vol. i. — 39 GOD
 
 615 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 This brings us to the consideration of the eases, in which it is neces- 
 sary that a plea should be supported by an answer. 2 We have before 
 seen, 8 that wherever a bill, or part of a bill, the substantive case made 
 by which may be met by a plea, brings forward facts which, if true, 
 would destroy the effect of the plea, those facts must be negatived by 
 proper averments in the plea: otherwise, they will be considered as 
 admitted, and so deprive the defendant of the benefit of his defence. A 
 plea, however, cannot be excepted to ; and as it is not necessary that 
 an averment in a plea should do more than generally deny the facts 
 charged in the bill, 4 the plaintiff might, if it were not possible to require 
 an answer from the defendant, in addition to his plea, be deprived of 
 the indefeasible right which he has to examine the defendant upon 
 oath, as to all the matters of fact stated in the bill which are neces- 
 sary to support his case. 5 To obviate this result, the rule under 
 * 615 the *old practice (where an answer was always necessary), was 
 that any statement or charge in the bill affording an equitable, cir- 
 cumstance in favor of the plaintiff's case against the matter pleaded 
 (such as fraud or notice of title), must be denied by way of answer. 1 
 In general, an answer in support of a plea could not be required in those 
 cases where such negative averments as those above stated were not 
 necessary ; where the defence was by a pure plea, — that is, a plea merely 
 suggesting matter in avoidance of the plaintiff's right to sue, as stated 
 in the bill, — an answer in support of the plea was not required. 2 In 
 such a case, the defendant, by his plea, admitted the plaintiff's case, and. 
 
 of opinion that notice and fraud were to be 
 denied, by way of averment in the plea, in 
 cases only where the denial made part of the 
 equitable defence, as in the cases of purchase 
 for valuable consideration, where the want of 
 notice creates the equitable bar: but in Devie 
 v. Chester, Ld. Red. 277, n. (see also Hoare v. 
 Parker, id., 1 Pro. C. C 578, 580, 1 Cox, 
 224, 228), a decree establishing a modus having 
 been pleaded to a bill for tithes, in which the 
 plaintiff stated that the defendant set up the de- 
 cree as a bar to his claim, and to avoid the effect 
 of the decree, charged that it had been obtained 
 by collusion, and stating facts tending to show 
 collusion, the Lord Chancellor was of opinion 
 that the defendants, not having denied the col- 
 lusion by averments in the plea, although they 
 had done so bj' answer in support of the plea, 
 the plea was bad in form, and he overruled it 
 accordingly. 
 
 2 See Story, Eq. PI. § 681, et seq., and 
 notes; Sims r. Lyle, 4 Wash. C. C. 303, 304. 
 In Massachusetts, by Ch. Rule 10, " in any 
 case in which the bill charges fraud or combi- 
 nation, a plea to such part must be accompa- 
 nied with an answer supporting the plea, and 
 explicitly denying the fraud or combination, 
 and the fact on which the charge is founded." 
 So under 32d Equity Rule of the U. S. Courts 
 (post, p. 2383), where a plea is such that an 
 answer is required to support it, it will be over- 
 
 610 
 
 ruled unless such answer is put in. Hagthorp 
 v. Hook, 1 Gill & J. 270. 
 
 3 Ante, p. 612. 
 
 4 Ld. Red 274, 297. 
 
 5 Wigram on Disc. 50. Where the plaintiff 
 waives the necessity of an answer being put in 
 on oath, if the defendant puts in a plea to the 
 bill, he need not support it by answer. Heartt 
 v. Corning, 3 Paige. 50(5. 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 2U8; see, as to answering the 
 statement or charge, Denys v. Locock, 3 M. & 
 C 205, 234; 1 Ju'r. 605; Chad wick v. Broad- 
 wood, 3 Beav. 530, 539; 5 Jur. 350; Piatt v. 
 Oliver, 1 McLean, 205; Bellows r. Stone, 8 X. 
 H. 280. If a bill sets forth matter which may 
 avoid a bar to the suit, it must be particularly 
 and precisely denied in the answer. New Eng. 
 Bank v. Lewis. 8 Pick. 113, 117; Bogr.rdus r. 
 Trinity Church. 4 Paige, 178; Souzer v. De 
 Meyer, 2 Paige, 574. 
 
 A plea in Equity must state facts, not con- 
 clusions; and if it relies on matter in the bill, it 
 must, in addition to the averment of such mat- 
 ter, negative the material facts stated in avoid- 
 ance, and be accompanied by an answer giving 
 the discovery to which the complainant may be 
 entitled in regard to those facts. Greene r. 
 Harris, 11 R.I. 5; Whitthorne v. St. Louis 
 Mut. Life Ins. Co. 3 Tenn. Ch. 147. 
 
 2 See Wheeler v. Piper, 3 Jones Eq. (X. C.J 
 249.
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF PLEAS. * 61 6 
 
 so full and complete was the admission that if, after argument, issue 
 was joined upon the truth of the plea, and the plea found false, there 
 was an end of the dispute, and the plaintiff was entitled to a decree 
 upon the implied admission of his case. 3 Where, however, a plea was 
 in substance negative, though in form affirmative, it was held that it 
 must be accompanied by an answer as to the allegations, which, if true, 
 would have disproved the plea. 4 
 
 The same principle also required that a negative plea should be sup- 
 ported by an answer in those cases only in which the bill stated or 
 charged facts by way of evidence of the plaintiff's right. It was re- 
 quired in those cases, because the plaintiff, having a clear right in 
 equity to a discovery of all matters within the knowledge of a defend- 
 ant which would enable him to support his case, 5 it would have been 
 against that principle if a defendant could, by merely denying the exis- 
 tence of the claim, have deprived the plaintiff of the means of proving 
 its validity. 6 
 
 Under the later practice, if no interrogatories were filed, the defend- 
 ant need only aver the facts necessary to render the plea a complete 
 equitable bar to the case made by the bill, and need not put in any an- 
 swer in support of the plea. If interrogatories were filed, the principles 
 of the old cases, with respect to an answer supporting the plea, still re- 
 mained in force. 
 
 The cases in which it is necessary that a plea should be sup- 
 ported *by an answer, may be very conveniently divided into: *616 
 1. Those where the plaintiff admits the existence of a legal bar, 
 and alleges some equitable circumstances to avoid its effect, and inter- 
 rogates as to these circumstances ; and, 2. Those where the plaintiff 
 does not admit the existence of any legal bar, but states some circum- 
 stances which may be true, and to which there may be a valid ground 
 of plea, together with other circumstances which are inconsistent with 
 the substantial validity of a plea, and interrogates as to such circum- 
 stances. 1 
 
 1. With respect to the first class of cases, the limits to which the plea 
 and answer respectively extend are plainly marked, and create no diffi- 
 culty. The most simple cases of this class are those in which pleas 
 are put in to bills brought to impeach a decree, on the ground of fraud 
 used in obtaining it ; 2 to avoid the effect of a judgment by a Court of 
 ordinary jurisdiction ; 3 to set aside a release ; 4 or an award ; 5 or to 
 open a stated account. 6 In all these cases, and others which fall under 
 
 3 Wigram on Disc. 56; Wood v. Strickland. sufficient It must be supported by an answer. 
 2 V. & B. 158 ; Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. Inncs r. Evans, 3 Edw. Ch. 454; see Everitt 
 Sr. 2-13; Webster v. Webster, 1 Sm. & G. 480; v. Watts, id. 486; Hall v. Noves, 3 Rro. r.c. 
 4 Do G. M. & <;. 437. 4s:;. *88 „.; Scifred v. People's Bank, 1 Baxt 
 
 4 Harland v. Emerson, 8 Bligh, N. S. 02. 200. 
 
 5 Sanders v. King, Mad. 61; 2 S. & S. 277; ' Hare on Disc 30. 
 Yorke >■ Fry, Mad. 65; Thring v. Edijar. 2 S. 2 Ld. Red. 243 
 
 & S. 274, 281 ; Hardman r. Ellamcs, 5 Sim.G40, 3 ] ( \. 255. 
 
 049; 2 M. & K. 732: C. P. Coop. temp. Brough. * Id. 202. 
 
 351 ; see Langdell, Eq. PI. (2d ed.) § 103. 5 Id. 260. 
 
 6 Story. Eq. I>1. §§ 670, 671, 681. A naked 6 Id. 259. 
 negative plea denying a partnership is not 
 
 611
 
 * 617 PLEAS. 
 
 a similar principle, the bill admits the existence of a fa.t which, taken 
 alone, would be conclusive against the plaintiff, and then proceeds to 
 state specific grounds why it should not have that effect ; and the de- 
 fendant, if interrogated, must answer the interrogatories as to these 
 specific grounds. 7 
 
 If the defendant is interrogated as to the equitable circumstances 
 stated as the ground for relief, it makes no difference whether the bill 
 be so framed that the bar be introduced by way of substantive state- 
 ment, and the equitable circumstances averred for the purpose of afford- 
 ing ground for relief, in setting aside the bar ; or whether the bar be 
 merely suggested as a pretence set up by the defendant, and the equi- 
 table matter be introduced to avoid its effect. 8 It sometimes, however, 
 happens that the plaintiff introduces the fact which would constitute 
 the bar, in the form of a pretence, and meets it by naked denial, with- 
 out interrogating as to any circumstances which might disprove it : in 
 such cases it seems that the defendant should merely plead the fact, 
 and that there is no need of any other answer than the averments in 
 the plea. 9 
 
 2. With respect to the second class of cases before referred to, as 
 
 those in which it is necessary that a plea should be accompanied by an 
 
 answer, the limits to which the plea and answer are to extend are not so 
 
 easily defined. It may, however, be laid down, as a general rule, 
 
 * 617 that where no ostensible bar is, by the bill, admitted *to exist, 
 
 and yet the defendant wishes to plead in bar to the bill, he must 
 distinguish those facts which, if true, would not invalidate or disprove 
 his plea, and plead to the relief and discovery sought as to them ; and 
 then, if interrogated as to the facts which, if true, would disprove or in- 
 validate his plea, or to matters which are specially alleged as evidence of 
 such facts, he must answer as to such facts and matters. 1 
 
 In former times, the application of these rules was a matter of very 
 considerable difficulty, in consequence of the Court requiring of a de- 
 fendant the greatest accuracy in the form of a joint plea and answer, 
 and treating any deviation from the strict practice as a fatal objection 
 to the validity of such a defence. In the first place, the defendant had 
 to make it distinctly appear to what part of the bill he pleaded, and to 
 what part he answered. Then, if it appeared to the Court that the 
 plea covered more of the bill than the defendant was entitled to cover 
 by it, it was overruled ; or, on the other hand, if the answer extended to 
 any portion of the bill properly covered by the plea, it was equally liable 
 to be overruled. 2 (a) The result of this extreme strictness was, that 
 
 1 Hare on Disc. 33. 17 Beav. 532: 18 Jur. 277; Bewieke r. Graham, 
 
 8 Roche r. Morgell, 2 Sch. & Lef. 721. 7 Q. R. D. 400; Lyell r. Kennedy, 8 App. Cas. 
 
 9 Hare on Disc." 30. 217. 
 
 i Hare on Disc. 34: and see Hunt v. Pen- - Story, Eq. PI. § 688, and notes. If the 
 
 rice, 17 Beav. 525; 18 Jur. 4; Young v. White, defendant answers to any matters covered by 
 
 (n) The answer overrules the plea when both v. Sadlier, 12 Ir. Eq. 136; Kelly o. Jackson, 13 
 
 cover the same parts of the bill. Cheatham r. id. 120. An answer in support of a plea is not 
 
 Pearce, 89 Tenn. 668 ; see Piaue v. Young, 85 independent thereof as a defence. Hart r. 
 
 Tenn. 263; Noe v. Noe. 32 X. J. Eq. 469 ; Grant Sanderson, 16 Fla. 264. Taylor v. Duncanson, 
 
 v. Phoenix Ins. Co. 121 U. S- 105; Fitzmauriee 20 D. C. 505. 
 612
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF PLEAS. 
 
 618 
 
 sometimes in cases to which a defence by plea and answer was strictly 
 applicable, the bill might have been so framed as to render it practi- 
 cally impossible for the defendant to avail himself of such a form of 
 pleading. 3 
 
 This strict operation of the rules of pleading has, however, been 
 materially modified: for now it is provided no plea is to be held bad 
 and overruled upon argument, only because such plea does not cover so 
 much of the bill as it might have extended to, or because the answer of 
 the defendant extends to some part of the same matter as is covered by 
 the plea. 4 
 
 These provisions were intended to meet the case of some part 
 of * the same ground being accidentally covered by each defence ; * 018 
 and do not justify two distinct defences, by plea and answer ; 1 
 nor do they in any way interfere with the rule which renders it neces- 
 sary that the plea should not cover a greater portion of the bill than that 
 to which the defendant is strictly entitled to apply it. 2 Consequently, 
 it is still incumbent upon the pleader to distinguish accurately between 
 the parts to which he intends to plead, and those to which he intends to 
 answer. 
 
 With respect to affirmative pleas, the difficulty of ascertaining the 
 part of the bill to be answered is not, in general, very great. The most 
 simple cases of this sort are those in which the bill, without expressly 
 admitting or suggesting the existence of a legal or ecpiitable bar, either 
 by direct statement or by way of pretence, introduces and interrogates 
 as to facts which are inconsistent with it, obviously for the purpose of 
 anticipating and avoiding such a defence if set up. As, where a plain- 
 tiff, for the purpose of avoiding the effect of a plea of the Statute of 
 Limitations, without intimating such purpose, states and interrogates as 
 
 his plea, he overrules the plea. Bolton V. Gard- 
 ner, 3 Paige, 273 ; Chase's case, 1 Bland, 217; 
 Ferguson o. O'Harra, 1 Peters C. C. 493; Clark 
 r. Saginaw City Bank, Harring. Ch. 240.; 
 Bangs v. Strong, 10 Paige, 11; The Bank v. 
 Dugan, 2 Bland, 254. When an answer con- 
 tains more than is strictly applicable to the sup- 
 port of the plea, it overrules the plea. Stearns 
 v. Page, 1 Story, 204. If the defendant an- 
 swers as to those matters, which by his plea he 
 has declined to answer, lie overrules the ilea. 
 Souzer v. De Meyer, 2 Paige, 374; see Sims 
 v. Lyle, 4 Wash." C. C. 303; Piatt v. Oliver, 
 1 McLean, 295; Robertston v. Binglev, 1 M'Cord 
 Ch. 352; Joyce v. Gunnels, 2 Rich. Eq. 259; 
 Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Paige, 178. If 
 an answer commences as an answer to the 
 whole bill, it overrules the plea or demurrer to 
 any particular part of the bill, although such 
 part is not in fact answered. Leacraft v. I inn- 
 prey, 4 Paige, 124 ; Summers v. Murray, 2 Edw. 
 Ch. 205. An answer which is broader than the 
 plea, in that it denies allegations not denied bv 
 the plea, overrules the plea. Lewis r. Baird, 3 
 McLean, 56. So when there is a plea and no an- 
 swer is required to support it from any charges 
 
 in the bill requiring a discovery; in such case 
 an answer is impertinent and overrules the 
 plea. Story, Eq. PI. § 088. 
 
 Since the adoption of the rule that a defence 
 which could be made by plea may be made by 
 answer, the answer is, in such case, a plea sup- 
 ported by an answer. Greene v. Harris, 11 
 R. I. 5. 
 
 3 l>enys v. Locock, 3 M. & C. 238; 1 Jur. 
 605. 
 
 * Cons. Ord. XIV. 8, 9. A defendant can- 
 not, under these rules, simultaneously plead 
 and demur to the whole bill. Lowndes v. Gar- 
 netl & Moseley Gold Mining Co. 2 J. & II. 282; 
 S.Iur. X. S. (194. 
 
 1 See Mans, 11 r. Feeney, 2 J. & II. 313, 
 when-, tn a bill for the accounts of an alleged 
 partnership, a plea of no partner-hip, accom- 
 panied by an answer, raising the defences of 
 laches and the Statute of Limitations, was 1:' Id 
 bad for duplicity. See also Lowndes v. Gar- 
 nett & Moseley Cold Mining Co. ubi supra. 
 
 - Salmon v. Dean. 3 M'N. & G. 344. 348; 
 14 Jur. 235; Hewitt v. Hewitt. 11 W. R. 849, 
 V. C. K. 
 
 013
 
 * 619 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 to circumstances which have arisen within the time of limitation, by 
 which his claim has been admitted or revived ; in such cases, a plea of 
 the Statute of Limitations must be accompanied by an answer as to all 
 such circumstances ; 3 otherwise, such circumstances will be considered 
 as admitted, and will have the effect of overruling the plea. And so, 
 where a plaintiff, in order to avoid the effect of a plea of purchase for 
 valuable consideration, without notice, states aud interrogates as to 
 matters, the effect of which would be to show that the defendant had 
 notice of the plaintiff's title, the defendant must accompany his plea by 
 an answer as to such facts, and such facts shall be excepted from the 
 plea. 4 
 
 The same rule applies to all cases of a similar description ; and no 
 distinction appears to exist between cases in which the matter in avoid- 
 ance of the anticipated plea is stated in the bill by way of pretence, and 
 those in which it occurs in the statement. Thus, if a bill be filed for 
 
 the specific performance of an agreement, to which, if not in 
 * 619 writing, the Statute of Frauds would be a bar, it *is usual, in 
 
 order to avoid a demurrer, to state the agreement to be in writ- 
 ing, 1 and to found an interrogatory on such statement, and then it is 
 necessary that a plea of the statute should be supported by an answer 
 denying the agreement to have been in writing. 2 (a) And where sev- 
 eral collateral facts are stated and interrogated to, as evidence of the 
 agreement having been in writing, those collateral facts must also be 
 answered. 3 
 
 It is true that in all the above cases, the bar afforded by the plea 
 appears, to a certain extent, to have been anticipated by the person who 
 framed the bill, and who, therefore, so framed it as to avoid the bar, if 
 set up ; but the rule applies to all cases where the interrogatories are 
 founded on matter stated in the bill, which, if true, would negative the 
 
 3 Bayley v. Adams, 6 Ves. 586, 598. A plea 
 of the Statute of Limitations is bad, unless ac- 
 companied by an answer supporting it, by a 
 particular and precise denial of all the facts and 
 circumstances charged in the bill, and which in 
 Equity may avoid the statute. Goodrich v. 
 Pendleton, 3 John. Ch. 384; Bloodgood v. Kane, 
 8 Cowen, 360 ; Lingan v. Henderson, 1 Bland, 
 28-2; Moreton v. Harrison, id. 393; Bolton v. 
 Gardner, 3 Paige, 273; Foster v. Foster, 51 Vt. 
 210. 
 
 So the answer must deny all the charges in 
 the bill, which may avoid the bar by showing 
 a new promise. Chapin v. Coleman, 11 Pick. 
 331. 
 
 (a) So a plea, which sets up that the debt in 
 suit was a promise to answer for another's debt, 
 must deny that it was hi writing. Hunt v. 
 Johnson (Ala.), 11 So. Rep. 387. A plaintiff, 
 who in his pleadings admits an agreement, can- 
 not object that it is for an interest in land and 
 should be in writing, "regii v. Garrett (Mont.), 
 31 Pac. Rep. 72\; post, p. (J5G. Ttie Statute of 
 
 014 
 
 4 Lord Portarlington v. Soulby, 6 Sim. 356. 
 
 i Whitchurch v. Bevis, 2 Bro. C. 0. 559, 
 566; see Walker v. Locke, 5 Cush. 90; ante, 
 p. 561, n. 2. 
 
 2 Id. 566; see also Morison v. Tumour, 18 
 Ves. 175, 182; Spurrier v. Fitzgerald, 6 Ves. 
 518, 555; see ante, p. 365. n. (b). Where the 
 defendant in a suit for specific performance 
 pleads the Statute of Frauds, and answers, ad- 
 mitting the contract, the answer overrules the 
 plea. Episcopal Church v. Leroy. Riley Ch. 
 156, per Johnson Ch. ; but see Ash v. Daggy, 
 6 Ind. 259. 
 
 a Evans v. Harris, 2 V. & B. 361, 361. 
 
 Frauds must be pleaded specially when the case 
 does not appear by the complaint to be within 
 the statute. Crane v. Powell (N. Y.), 48 Alb. 
 L. J. 425; see ante, p. 365, n. (6). A defendant 
 trustee cannot avail of the statute to cover a 
 fraudulent act. Ilaigh v. Kaye, L. R. 7 Ch. 
 469.
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF PLEAS. * 620 
 
 plea, and whether such matter is stated incidentally, or in anticipation 
 of any expected defence. 4 
 
 The rule that allegations which, if true, would disprove the plea, must 
 be answered, applies to pleas which are negative in substance, if they are 
 affirmative in form. 5 
 
 In the case of negative pleas the rule is, that when a defendant puts 
 in a plea which has the effect of negativing the plaintiff's title, he need 
 not accompany it by an answer, as to any of the facts upon which that 
 title depends, unless discovery is specially sought by the bill, and he is 
 required to answer interrogatories as to such facts. 6 If, however, this is 
 done, the defendant is bound to accompany his plea by an answer as to 
 such facts. 7 The correctness of this rule has been questioned; 8 but it 
 seems to be now established. 
 
 Although a defendant, pleading a negative plea, exonerates himself 
 from answering to any fact to which the plea extends, yet as the plain- 
 tiff is entitled to discovery from the defendant of all matters necessary 
 to support his case, he has, consequently, a right to compel the defend- 
 ant to answer specifically to all the facts stated in his bill, to which he 
 considers it necessary to require an answer, in order to enable him to 
 make out his claim by means of the evidence which may be afforded by 
 the defendant's admission. 9 Thus, if a bill were to be filed, alleg- 
 ing a partnership, and insisting * that the existence of such part- * 620 
 nership was made out by certain documents, or by settlements of 
 accounts and admissions, it would not be sufficient to plead to such a bill 
 a mere denial of the existence of the partnership ; x the defendant must 
 go further, and answer as to all the circumstances insisted upon as evi- 
 dence of the partnership. 2 
 
 In cases where the bill alleges that the defendant has admitted the 
 plaintiff's title, the defendant, if he puts in what is in effect a plea of no 
 title, must, if interrogated, answer as to the admission, although the 
 plaintiff does not require discovery of it "as evidence" of his title. 3 
 
 In the case of Thring v. Edgar* the plea was overruled solely upon 
 the ground that the accompanying answer extended to facts not charged 
 
 4 Crow v. Tyrrell, 2 Mad. 397 409 ; Bailie v. the principle acted upon by Sir John Leach 
 Sibbald, 15 Ves. 185 : Roche v. Morgell, 2 Sch. V. C. in Sanders v. King, 6~Mad. 61 ; 2 S. & S. 
 & Lef. 721 ; Jones v. Davis, 16 Ves. 262, 265; 277 (see also Yorke v. Fry, ubi supra ; Storey v. 
 Hunt v. Penrice, 17 Btav. 525; Young v. White, Lennox, 1 M. & Cr. 525), where his Honor laid 
 id. 532. down the rule, that a plea which negatived the 
 
 5 Harland v. Emerson, 8 Bligh. N. S. 62. plaintiff's title, though it protected a defendant 
 
 6 Thring v. Edgar, 2 S. & S. 274, 281. generally from answer and discovery as to the 
 
 7 Sanders v. King, 6 Mad. 61 ; 2 S. & S. subject of the suit, did not protect him from 
 277; Yorke v. Fry, 6 Mad. 65. answer and discovery as to such matters as 
 
 8 See cases cited, Wigram on Disc. 142. were specially charged as evidence of the plain- 
 
 9 For a case where it was held that defend- tiff's title. He afterwards repeated the same 
 ant need not, under the new practice, answer as rule, in Thring v. Edgar, 2 S. & S. 281, and it 
 to certain facts, because they cuild not be made was acted upon both by Lord Brougham and 
 use of as evidence, see Young v. White, 17 Sir Lancelot Shadwell V. C. in Hardman r. 
 Beav. 532 ; 18 Jnr. 4, 277. Ellames, 5 Sim. 640, 650; 2 M. & K. 732, 744; 
 
 i Evans v. Harris, 2 V. & B. 361, 364; Har- C. P Coop. temp. Brough. 351, 360; see Wilson 
 
 ris v. Harris, 3 Hare, 450, 453; 8 Jur. 978; v. Hammond, L. R. 8 Eq. 323. 
 Mansell v. Feeney, 2 J. & H. 313. a Harland v Emerson, 8 Bligh. N. S. 62. 
 
 2 See Innes v. Evans, 3 Edw. Ch. 454; 4 2 S. & S. 281. 
 
 Everitt v. Watts, 3 Edw. Ch. 486. This was 
 
 615
 
 * 621 PLEAS. 
 
 as evidence to rebut the matter of the plea ; but it appears that it was 
 also objectionable, in that the plea excepted from the bill the only alle- 
 gation which constituted the title itself, and which it was the object of 
 the plea to traverse. This objection was not adverted to by Sir John 
 Leach V. C. in his judgment on the case, but has since been made the 
 subject of comment by Lord Cottenham, where he held that a similar 
 
 objection was fatal to the validity of a negative plea. 5 
 *621 * The rule in Thring v. Edgar is applicable only to those facts 
 
 which are covered by the plea ; and with respect to collateral 
 facts, or facts which are stated in the bill, as occurring since the title of 
 the plaintiff is alleged to have arisen, the defendant is bound to answer, 
 if interrogated, as to them. In this respect, there is no distinction be- 
 tween negative pleas and pleas of any other description. 
 
 We now come to the consideration of the cases in which it is neces- 
 sary that a plea should be accompanied by an answer, as to deeds, papers, 
 and other documents in the defendant's possession, custody, or power. 1 
 This question is not of so much importance as it formerly was : because 
 it is no longer necessary to file interrogatories, in order to obtain a dis- 
 covery of such documents ; 2 and the Court has expressed its determina- 
 tion to discourage, as much as possible, exceptions for insufficiency in 
 answering them. 3 The necessity for such an answer must generally 
 depend upon the nature of the individual case ; so far, however, as the 
 subject is susceptible of a reduction into rules, the following are those by 
 which it is regulated. 
 
 Where a bill states a case for the plaintiff, and interrogatories are filed, 
 asking whether the defendant has in his possession documents whereby 
 the matters stated in the bill would appear, and the defendant pleads a 
 pure affirmative plea, not denying any part of the plaintiff's case, he will 
 not be required, indeed ought not, to answer, as to the possession of the 
 documents : because the documents, being only charged in the bill to be 
 of importance, as proving the plaintiff's case, which the defendant by his 
 
 5 Denys v. Locock, 3 M. & C. 205, 233, 235; is a mode of proceeding which leaves the record 
 1 Jnr. 605. The equity of the bill, in that case, in a state which renders it impossible for the 
 depended upon an alleged promise: the object Court afterwards to deal with it." "Now, in 
 of the negative plea was to deny the fact that point of tact, the bill to which the plea pleads, 
 this alleged promise was ever made. Upon contains no allegation of promise at all; and the 
 this Lord Cottenham said: " The plea negatives only way of trying how that would operate, is 
 the allegation of the promise. What I particu- to suppose issue to be taken on the plea; how 
 larly observe upon is, that, first, it takes out of would it be to be tried? It would be an issue 
 the bill the allegation of the promise, and then taken on the traverse only; on the negative of 
 denies it. Now I apprehend tliatisnot correct, that which nobody has affirmed." See Lang- 
 and that no such plea can be supported. A dell, Eq. PI. (2d ed.), § 103. 
 negative plea is a mere traverse; it differs from 1 See Story, Eq. PI. § 683. 
 an ordinary plea, inasmuch as the ordinary plea 2 Such discovery may be obtained on sum- 
 admits the truth of the bill, but states some mons at, Chambers; see 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, 
 matter dehors, which destroys the effect of the § 18; and see post, Chap. XLII., Production oj 
 allegation, and which, assuming Ihe allegation Documents. 
 
 to be true, would be a defence." " A negative 8 Kidger v. Worswick, 5 Jur. N. S. 37, V. 
 
 plea, however, is a mere traverse of that which C. W. : Barnard V. Hunter. 1 Jur. N. S. 1065, 
 
 constitutes the plaintiff's title. Now, to tra- V. C. \V. ; Law v. London Indisputable Society, 
 
 verse that which is not alleged on the face of 10 Hare App. 20; see also Eeade v. Woodrooffe, 
 
 the bill, — to take out of the bill an allegation, 24 Beav. 421. 
 and then by plea to negative the allegation, — 
 
 616
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF PLEAS. 
 
 623 
 
 plea does not controvert, the production of the documents would 
 
 be * unnecessary. 1 * 622 
 
 Although the general rule is that an interrogatory asking whether 
 the defendant has documents in his possession from * which the * 623 
 matters stated in the bill would appear, must be answered, when- 
 ever there are facts stated in the bill which are inconsistent with the 
 plea, yet it does not apply to those cases where the bill mis-states 
 the effect of deeds which form the substance of the plea, and are stated 
 in it. 1 
 
 Perhaps the best course which a pleader can pursue in cases of this 
 description is, in general, to consider how far any part of the matter 
 alleged in the bill partakes of the nature of a special replication.- If the 
 matter charged amounts only to a general denial of the facts pleaded, the 
 discovery is not necessary : because then the documents sought form 
 part of the defendant's case only, and when the cause comes to be heard 
 
 1 Thus, where defendants pleaded the Stat- 
 ute of Limitations, but did not answer an al- 
 legation in the bill, "that they had in their 
 possession books and documents relating to 
 the matters aforesaid, or some of them," Sir 
 Lancelot Shadwell V. C. held that an objec- 
 tion to the plea, on the ground of the omission 
 of such an answer, could not be sustained; 
 he thought that unless the allegation in the 
 bill had gone further, and had averred 
 that by the documents, or some of them, it 
 would appear that a promise had been given 
 within six years, the mere allegation that the 
 defendants had in their possession papers relat- 
 ing to the matters aforesaid, and from which, if 
 produced, the matters aforesaid would appear, 
 was immaterial, there not being an}' allegation 
 in the bill of any promise having been made 
 within six years; and that, consequently, it was 
 not necessary for the defendants to negative 
 such an allegation, either by averments in their 
 plea, or by answer in support of it. Macgregor 
 v. East India Co. 2 Sim. 452, 455. It is evi- 
 dent, from this case, that if the bill had con- 
 tained an}- allegation of a promise within six 
 years, the Vice-Chancellor would have held, 
 that the charge as to the documents ought to 
 have been answered ; and it may be laid down as 
 a rule, that wherever the bill states any facts 
 which are inconsistent with the defendant's plea, 
 or which would take the plaintiff's case out of 
 the operation of it, and interrogatories are filed 
 asking whether the defendant basin his posses- 
 sion documents relating to the subject-matter of 
 the suit, it will then be necessary to accompany 
 the plea by a discovery of the documents in the 
 defendant's possession : for, as the introduction 
 of such matter in the bill renders it imperative 
 on the defendant to accompany his piea b_y an 
 answer as to those facts, that answer, to be com- 
 plete, must extend to the documents inquired 
 after: because, as they are alleged to relate to 
 
 the matters before mentioned, and the facts which 
 go to negative the defendant's plea are amongst 
 those matters, it may happen that the docu- 
 ments in the possession of the defendant will 
 afford important evidence, to enable the plain- 
 tiff to avoid the effect of the plea. Thus, where 
 a bill was tiled by persons claiming an estate, 
 as heirs of A, ex jjurte mater?ia, and the de- 
 fendant pleaded that another person was the 
 heir of A, ex parte paterna, the Court over- 
 ruled the plea, because it did not answer as to 
 a correspondence, by which it was charged in 
 the bill that the defendant had admitted the 
 plaintiff's title. Emerson v. Harland, 3 Sim. 
 490, 492; see als > Hardman v. Ellames, 5 Sim. 
 640. 650; 2 M. & K. 7:52, 744; Harris v. Harris, 
 3 Hare, 450, 455; 8 Jur. 978. 
 
 1 Thus, where a plaintiff claimed as heiress- 
 at-law of a person who had devised real estates 
 to various persons in tail, with ultimate remain- 
 der to his own right heirs, and alleged, by her 
 bill, that the several estates tail had been de- 
 termined by failure of issue, and that no valid 
 recovery had been suffered, or, if it had, that 
 the property had been so settled that she, the 
 plaintiff, was still entitled as right heir of the 
 original testator, and that it would so appear if 
 the defendant would produce the deeds creating 
 the tenant to the pracipe, and leading or de- 
 claring the uses of the recovery ; and the 
 defendant pleaded the recovery, and set forth 
 the substance of the deeds making the tenant 
 to the prcecipe, and leading the uses of the 
 recovery, under which it was apparent that the 
 plaintiff had no title: the plea was held to be 
 good, although not supported by an answer as 
 to the deeds, which was held to be unnecessary, 
 as the plea was, in fact, a direct denial of the 
 averment that the estate was so settled that the 
 plaintiff was entitled to it. Plunkett v. Caven- 
 dish, 1 R. & M. 713, 718. 
 
 617
 
 * 624 PLEAS. 
 
 on the truth of the case, as put in issue by the plea, the plaintiff (his 
 case being admitted by the plea) will not require the assistance of the 
 documents in the defendant's possession to establish his right ; and the 
 defendant will derive no benefit from his plea, unless he can prove it to 
 be true. If, on the contrary, the charge amounts to a special replication, 
 that is, to a statement of facts, which, admitting the plea to be true, goes 
 to do away with its effect, there the documents required may be important 
 to assist the plaintiff in making out his own case, namely, the facts 
 alleged in derogation of the plea : in such cases, therefore, there must be 
 a discovery as to those documents, if required by the plaintiff. 
 
 With respect to negative pleas, the rule may be stated to be in confor- 
 mity with the principles before adverted to : namely, that if a plaintiff 
 indicates, by his interrogatories, that he requires an answer as to 
 
 * 624 documents alleged to be in the defendant's possession, * in proof 
 
 of his title t the defendant must make the discovery ; thus, if the 
 interrogatories ask whether the defendant has in his possession documents 
 from which the truth of the matters stated in the bill would appear, he 
 must, if he negatives the plaintiff's title by his plea, accompany his plea 
 by an answer as to those documents. 1 The plaintiff is entitled to a dis- 
 covery of them, in order to enable him, in the language of Lord Brougham, 
 " to negative the negative plea." 2 When, on the other hand, the inter- 
 rogatories ask whether the documents are in the possession of the defend- 
 ant, but do not ask whether from such documents the truth of the matters 
 in the bill would appear, then it is presumed that, according to the rule 
 in Thring v. Edgar? they ought not to be answered. 4 
 
 It may be collected from the preceding observations, that an answer in 
 support of a plea is no part of the defence. 5 The defence is the matter 
 set up by the plea ; the answer is that evidence which the plaintiff has a 
 right to require and to use, to invalidate the defence made by the plea ; 
 and the plaintiff is entitled to make use of it, not only upon the hearing 
 of the cause, upon the issue raised by the plea, after the plea shall have 
 been decided to be a good bar upon argument, but upon the argument of 
 the plea itself, before any evidence can be given, 6 for the purpose of 
 counterproving the plea, by reading from it any facts or admissions which 
 may negative the matters pleaded or averred in the plea. 7 The answer, 
 then, being no part of the defence, but only what the plaintiff has a right 
 to require to enable him to avoid that defence, it follows that it must be 
 full and clear, otherwise it will not support the plea ; for the Court will 
 intend all matters alleged in the bill, to which the plaintiff is entitled to 
 require an answer, to be against the pleader, unless they are fully and 
 clearly denied. 8 Thus, if a bill is filed to set aside a decree, or other 
 instrument, on the ground of fraud, and the defendant pleads the decree 
 
 i Mansell v. Feeney, 2 J. & H. 313. 6 Ld. Red. 244, n. 
 
 2 Hardman v. Ellames. 2 M. & K. 744; C ' Hildyard v. Cressy, 3 Atk. 303; Hony v. 
 P. Coop. temp. Drouth. 360. Hony, 1 S. & S. 5(58, 580. 
 
 3 2 S. & S. 274, 281. 8 Ld. Red. 298; Hildyard v. Cressy, ubi 
 
 4 See, however, Rigby v. Rigby, 15 Sim. 90; supra; Gordon v. Shaw, 14 Sim. 393. 
 10 Jur. 126. 
 
 5 Ld. Red. 244, n.; Greene v. Harris, 11 
 R. I. 5. 
 
 618
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF PLEAS. * G25 
 
 or instrument sought to be set aside, in bar, the defendant must answer 
 the facts of fraud alleged, so fully as to leave no doubt on the mind of 
 the Court that, upon that answer, if not controverted by evidence on the 
 part of the plaintiff, the fact of fraud cannot be established. If the 
 answer should not be full in all material points, the Court will presume 
 that the fact of fraud may be capable of proof in the point not fully 
 answered, and will, therefore, not deem the answer sufficient to support 
 the plea, and upon that ground will overrule the plea. 9 
 
 Although an answer in support of a plea is required to be full 
 *and clear, yet, if the equitable matters charged are fully and * 625 
 clearly denied, it may be sufficient to support the plea, although 
 all the circumstances charged in the bill may not be precisely answered. 1 
 In such cases, however, the plaintiff is not precluded, by the circumstance 
 of the Court having held, upon the argument of the plea, that the charges 
 in the bill are sufficiently denied to exclude intendment against the pleader, 
 from afterwards excepting to the sufficiency of the answer, in any point 
 in which he may think it defective. 2 He may also obtain leave to amend 
 his bill, and thereby obtain an answer to any matter which may not have 
 been so extensively stated or interrogated to as the case would warrant, 
 or to which he may apprehend that the answer, though full in terms, may 
 have been, in effect, evasive. 3 
 
 The cases above referred to, as those in which the plea must be accom- 
 panied by an answer, are those only in which some fact or matter is 
 stated or charged by the bill, which, if true, would have the effect of 
 overruling the plea. There are cases, however, in which, even though 
 no equitable circumstances are alleged in the bill, to defeat the bar offered 
 by the plea, when, in fact, a pure plea may be pleaded, yet the defendant 
 may support his plea by an answer, touching matters not charged in the 
 bill. 4 Thus, in the case of a plea of purchase for valuable consideration, 
 a defendant may deny notice in his answer, as well as in his plea, because, 
 by so doing, he does not put anything in issue which he would cover by 
 his plea from being put in issue. 5 A defendant may also, by this means, 
 put upon the record any fact which tends to corroborate his plea, so as 
 to enable him afterwards to prove it. An answer of this sort is termed 
 an answer in aid or in subsidium of the plea ; 6 and differs from what is 
 usually termed an answer in support of a plea, in being an answer which 
 the defendant is not obliged to put in, for the purpose of avoiding the 
 effect of any equitable ground which may be alleged in the bill, for avoid- 
 ing the bar offered by the plea. 
 
 9 Ld. Red. 244. claim of the plaintiff for relief. Bogardus v. 
 
 1 Ibid. -2!!!); Walter v. Glanville, 5 Bro. P. C. Trinity Church, 4 Paige, 178, 197. 
 
 ed. Toml. 555; S. C. nam. Waters v. Glanville, - Ld. Red. 299. 
 
 Gilb. Rep. 184. The only way of testing the 8 Ld. Red. 245. 
 
 sufficiency of an answer in support of a plea is 4 lb. 299; Beanies on Pleas, 37; Forbes v. 
 
 to consider every allegation in the bill, which is Skelton, 8 Sim. 335, 345 ; 1 Jur. 117. 
 
 not sufficiently denied by the answer, as true; 6 For. Rom. 58. 
 
 and then to inquire, whether these facts being 6 Ibid, 
 admitted, the plea is a sufficient bar to the 
 
 G19
 
 627 PLEAS. 
 
 Section II. — The Different Grounds of Pleas. 
 
 A. plea may be either to the relief, or to the discovery, or to both. 
 If it is a good plea to the relief, it will be also good to the 
 
 * 626 * discovery, 1 in the same manner that a demurrer which is valid 
 
 as to the relief prayed, is, as -has been already mentioned, good 
 to the discovery sought by the bill. 2 Where the question was raised 3 
 whether a defendant, pleading to the relief, could nevertheless give the 
 discovery sought by the bill, without overruling his plea, Sir John 
 Leach V. C. said : " Admitting that a defendant may, at his pleasure, 
 answer the whole bill, though he pleads to the relief, it does not follow 
 from thence that he may plead to the relief aud part of the discovery 
 only, and, at his pleasure, answer the rest of the bill: such a partial 
 answer can serve no useful purpose, and the rule applies here, that he 
 who submits to answer at all, must answer fully ; " unless in those cases 
 in which, as will be hereafter shown, he may protect himself from such 
 discovery by plea to the discovery. 
 
 Pleas in Equity, to the relief prayed by the bill, have usually been 
 ranged under the heads of pleas : To the jurisdiction ; To the person 
 of the plaintiff or defendant; and, In bar of the suit. This arrange- 
 ment is the one recognized by Lord Eedesdale and Sir George Cooper ; 4 
 but the learned author of the " Treatise on the Elements of Pleas in 
 Equity " has added another head of plea to those before enumerated ; 
 namely, Pleas to the bill. It appears to be the opinion of Mr. Beanies, 
 that pleas in Equity are primarily divisible into pleas in abatement, 
 and pleas in bar. He observes, that, " in a work on pleading at Law, 
 pleas are thus described: 'Pleas are 'of two sorts, — in abatement and 
 in bar : the former question the propriety of the remedy, or legal suffi- 
 ciency of the process, rather than deny the cause of action ; the latter 
 dispute the very cause of action itself ; ' and that it is impossible to read 
 this passage without perceiving how perfectly applicable it is to pleas 
 in Equity, and how strongly appropriate, as marking the distinction 
 between pleas to the jurisdiction, to the person, and the bill, and pleas 
 in bar. The three former classes, while they question the propriety of 
 the particular remedy or of the suit, tacitly concede the existence of a 
 cause of suit ; but the latter dispute the very cause of suit itself.' 1 5 It 
 is, however, to be observed, that it nowhere appears that any practi- 
 cal consequence results, in Equity, from the distinction between 
 
 * 627 pleas in abatement and pleas in bar. 6 * In the following observa- 
 
 1 See Story, Eq. PI. § 312; Chapin v. Cole- terms confined to the relief. King v. Heming, 
 man, 11 Pick. 331. A plea maybe bad as to 9 Sim. 59. 
 
 the relief, but good as to the discovery. United s James v. Sadgrove, 1 S. & S. 4, 6. 
 
 States v. McRae, L. R. 3 Ch. 79: Where the * Ld. Red. 219 ; Coop Eq. PI. 23G. 
 
 defendant wishes to avoid a full discovery, on 5 Rcames on Pleas. . r i8. 
 
 the ground that there is a fact which defeats 6 it is stated in Merrewether v. Hellish, 13 
 
 the plaintiff's equity, he must allege such fact Ves. 435, 437, that Lord Thtirlow said he did 
 
 by plea. Weisman v. Heron Mining Co. 4 not know what a p'ea in abatement in Equity 
 
 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 112. was. This observation, however, must have 
 
 2 Ante, p. 548; but in order that a plea may been made by his Lordship with reference to 
 be good to the discovery, it must not be in the practical results of such a distinction; for 
 
 620
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. * 627 
 
 tions, therefore, the distinction of pleas into pleas in abatement and 
 pleas in bar will not be further noticed, but the different grounds of 
 pleas will be offered to the consideration of the reader according to the 
 above-mentioned arrangement. 1 Before we proceed, however, to a more 
 minute discussion of pleas, according to the above distribution, it will 
 assist the reader to point out in what respect pleas of each class differ 
 from those of the other classes, and this will be done as briefly as pos- 
 sible, in the words of the learned writer himself : — 
 
 I. Those pleas which are commonly termed pleas to the jurisdiction, 
 do not proceed to the length of disputing the right of the plaintiff in the 
 subject of the suit, or allege any disability on the part of the plaintiff 
 to prosecute the suit ; but simply assert that the Court of Chancery is 
 not the proper Court to take cognizance of those rights. 2 
 
 II. Fleas to the person do not dispute the validity of the rights 
 which are made the subject of the suit, or deny that the Court has 
 jurisdiction over them ; 8 but they assert that the plaintiff is incapa- 
 citated to sue, or that the defendant is not the person who ought to be sued. 
 
 III. Those pleas in Equity, also, which Mr. Beames distinguishes as 
 pleas to the bill, "do not dispute the validity of the right made the 
 subject of the suit," nor contend that generally the Court has not juris- 
 diction over it, nor do they allege that the plaintiff is under any disa- 
 bility to sue, or that the defendant ought not to be sued; but they 
 assert that the suit, as it appears on the record, is defective to answer 
 the purpose of complete justice, or ought not, for some other reason, to 
 proceed.' 1 (a) 
 
 IV. Pleas in bar may be distinguished from all other pleas, as they 
 admit the jurisdiction of the Court, and do not dispute the ability of 
 the plaintiff to sue, and the liability of the defendant to be sued, and 
 tacitly concede that there are none of those objections to the suit which 
 constitute the grounds of pleas to the bill ; but yet they allege matter, 
 which, if true, destroys the claim made by the suit, and by showing 
 that the right made the subject of the suit has no existence, or that 
 it is vested in the defendant, they put an end to all litigation respect- 
 ing it. 5 
 
 the use of the term "plea in abatement," as l And see Story, Eq. PI. § 705. 
 
 distinguished from a plea in bar, occurs in the 2 Bennies on Pleas, 55; Story, Eq. l'l. 
 Practical Register, 326, ed. Wyatt, and many § 706. 
 
 other books, and has been repeatedly used in 3 Heames, 56; Story, Eq. PI. § 706. 
 
 the same manner by Lord Thurlow himself; see 4 Beames, 59. 60; Story, Eq. l'l. § 706. 
 
 Newman v. Wallfe. 2 Bro. C. C. 143; Gun v. 6 Beam»s, 62; Story, Eq. PL § 706. 
 Prior, 1 Cox, 108; 2 Dick. 657; see also Beames 
 on Pleas, 58, notis. 
 
 (a) Where there is a defect of parties, the inson, 20 Q. B. D. 155; Kendall r. Hamilton, 4 
 
 plea should show the proper parties, by name App. Cas 504; Goldsmith v. Gilliland, 24 Fed. 
 
 or description, especially when the information Rep. 154. If an injunction cannot properly be 
 
 is peculiarly within the "defendant's knowledge. granted without the addition of parties defend- 
 
 Att.-Gen. i>. Jackson, 11 Ves. 367, 369; Att.- ant, the Court, even in the absence of proper 
 
 Gen. v. Wyburgh, 1 P. Wins. 599; Story, Eq. pleading's, will take notice of the fact, and 
 
 PI. § 745;Case r Minot, 158 Mass. 577; ante, direct the cause to stand over, in order that the 
 
 pp.288, 558. This plea is a plea in bar. Howth necessary parties may be added. Case v. Minot, 
 
 v. Owens, 29 Fed. Rep. 722. See Pilley v. Rob- 158 Mass. 577. 
 
 621
 
 * 628 PLEAS. 
 
 Having thus stated the leading distinctions between the different 
 classes of pleas above pointed out, we shall proceed to consider the 
 
 particular pleas to relief under each head. 
 *628 *I. Pleas to the jurisdiction, as we have seen, do not dispute 
 
 the rights of the plaintiff in the subject of the suit, but simply 
 assert, either : (1) That they are nut tit objects of cognizance in a Court 
 of Equity ; or, (2) That the Court of Chancery is not the proper Court 
 to take cognizance of those rights. That these are the only grounds of 
 plea which can be put in to the jurisdiction seems to be generally ad- 
 mitted : for it is clear, that a plea that the subject of the suit is not cog- 
 nizable in any municipal Court of justice whatever, could not prevail; 
 because such a plea would amount to nothing more than that the subject 
 of the suit is one upon which no action or suit can be maintained, which 
 is, in effect, a plea in bar — not a plea to the jurisdiction of a particular 
 Court, but of all Courts : which would be absurd, and repugnant in 
 terms. 1 
 
 (1) The generality of cases in which a Court of Equity has no jurisdic- 
 tion, cannot easily be so disguised in a bill as to avoid a demurrer ; but 
 there may be instances to the contrary ; and in such cases, a plea of the 
 matter necessary to show that a Court of Equity has no jurisdiction, will 
 hold. 2 Thus, where a bill was filed to restrain the setting up outstand- 
 ing terms in bar to an action of ejectment, a plea that there were no 
 outstanding terms was allowed ; 3 and so, it is presumed, if the jurisdic- 
 tion were attempted to be founded on the loss of an instrument, a plea 
 showing the existence of the instrument, and that it is in the power of 
 the plaintiff to obtain the production of it, would be admissible. 4 
 
 (2) A plea that the Court of Chancery is not the proper Court to have 
 cognizance of the plaintiff's case, arises principally where the suit is 
 for land within a county palatine ; 5 or where the defendant claims the 
 privileges of a university ; 6 or other particular jurisdiction, such as 
 that of the Benchers of the Inns of Court. 7 Of this description, also, 
 
 i Nabob of Arcnt v. East India to. 3 Bro. PI. § 721 ; Livingston r. Story, 11 Peters, 351, 
 
 C. C. 292, 301; S.C. nom Nabob of the Carna- 393; Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. 328; Dodge o. 
 
 tic v. East India Co. 1 Ves. Jr. 371, 388; 2 Perkins. 4 Mason, 435: see Bank of Bellows 
 
 id. 56; Musfrrave v. Pulido, 5 App Cas 102, Falls v. Rut. & Bur. R. R. Co. 28 Vt. 470. 
 
 Story, Yj\ PI § 711. In case of a bill brought 2 Ed. Red. 222. 
 
 in a Court of Equitv of a limited jurisdiction, 3 Armitage v. Wadsworth, 1 Mad. 18!), 195. 
 
 as i,, persons, or as to subject-matter, if the bill Dawson v. Pilling, 16 Sim. 203, 209; 12 Jur. 
 
 should nlleire all the necessary facts to establish 388. 
 
 and support that jurisdiction, the defendant may 
 
 Ed. Red. 222. See R. S. C. Ord. XL; 
 
 also negative the existence of those facts bv a Preston r. Lamont, 1 Ex. D. 361; Great Austra- 
 
 plea to the jurisdiction. Storv. Eq PI. § 720 lian G. M. Co. v. Martin, 5 Ch. D. 1; Cresswell 
 
 If. in the Courts of the United States, there are v. Parker. 11 id. 601; Tottenham r. Barry, 12 
 
 distinct averments of the citizenship of the id. 797; Fowler r. Barstow, 20 id. 240. 
 
 plaintiff, and of that of the defendant, upon 5 lb. 223: see ante, p. 554. 
 
 the record, so that upon the face of the bill the 6 Ld. Red. 224; see Temple r. Foster, Cary, 
 
 jurisdiction attaches, the defendant, if he means 65; Cotton >•. Manering, id. 73; Draper v. 
 
 t.» contest the alleged citizenship, must do it by Crowther, 2 Vent. 362; Stephens r. Berry, 1 
 
 a plea to the jurisdiction: for he is not at liberty Tern. 212: Pratt v. Taylor. 1 Ch. Cas^. 237; 
 
 to put the citizenship in issue by a general an- Anon. id. 258; Ginnett r. Wbittingham, Id Q. 
 
 swer; as such an answer admits the jurisdiction B. D. 761. 
 
 of the Court to inquire into the general merits 7 Cunningham v. We^, 2 Bro. C C 241 ; 
 
 of the suit, and put them in issue. Story, Eq. Neate v. Denman, L. R. 8 Eq. 127; Manisty v. 
 
 622
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. 
 
 629 
 
 is a plea that the defendant * is an officer of another Court of * 629 
 competent jurisdiction, and therefore not to be drawn from his 
 duties in that Court for the purpose of defending a suit in another. 1 
 
 It is a rule that, the Court of Chancery being a superior Court of gen- 
 eral jurisdiction, nothing shall be intended to be out of its jurisdiction 
 which is not shown to be so. 2 It is requisite, therefore, in a plea to the 
 jurisdiction of the Court, both to allege that the Court has not jurisdic- 
 tion, and to show by what means it is deprived of it. 3 It is likewise 
 necessary to show what Court has jurisdiction ; * and if the plea omits 
 to set forth these particulars, it is bad in point of form. 5 
 
 It is also a rule, that a plea to the jurisdiction must show that the 
 particular jurisdiction, alleged to be entitled to the exclusive cognizance 
 of the suit, is able to give a complete remedy. 6 A plea, therefore, of 
 privilege of the University of Oxford, to a bill for specific performance 
 of an agreement, touching lands in Middlesex, was overruled : because 
 the university could not give complete relief. 7 It is to be observed 
 also, that if a suit be instituted against different persons, some of whom 
 are privileged and some not, 8 or if one or more of the defendants are 
 not amenable to the particular jurisdiction, 9 a plea will not hold ; 10 and 
 so, if there is a particular jurisdiction, and yet the parties to litigate any 
 question are both resident within the jurisdiction of the Court of Chan- 
 cery, — as upon a bill concerning a mortgage of the Isle of Sark, both 
 mortgagee and mortgagor residing in England, — the Court of Chancery 
 will hold jurisdiction of the cause: for a Court of Equity agit in per- 
 sonam,, and may give effect to its decree by constraining the person or 
 property of the defendant till he perform it. 11 (a) 
 
 Kenealy, W. N. (187G) 216; 24 W. R. 918. 
 For the plea in that case, see Beames on Pleas, 
 324. 
 
 1 See Gibson r. Whitacre. 2 Vern. 83. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 224: Earl of Derbv v. Duke of 
 Athol, 1 Ves. Sr. 204; 2 Ves. Sr. 357. 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 224; Nabob of Arcot o. East 
 India Co. 3 Bro. C. C. 292. 301 ; S. C. nom. 
 Nabob of the Carnatic v. East India Co. 1 Ves. 
 Jr. 371, 388. 
 
 4 Ld. Red. 224; Strode v. Little, 1 Vern. 59; 
 Earl of Derby v. Duke~of Athol, 1 Ves. Sr. 
 203; 1 Dick. 123: and see Moor v. Somerset, 
 Nels. 51; Hendrick v. Wood, 9 W R. 588; 
 Maunder v. Lloyd, 2 J. & II. 7 IS; Buenos 
 Ayres Ry. Co. v. Northern Rv. Co. 2 Q. B. D. 
 210. 
 
 5 Ld. Red. 224; Foster v. Vassal!, 3 Atk. 587; 
 Nabob of Arcot v. East India Co. ubi supra. 
 
 6 Ld. Red. 224: Newdigate v. Johnson, 2 
 Ch. Cas. 170; Wilkiis v. Shalcroft, 22 Vin. 
 
 (n) A plea to the jurisdiction on the ground 
 of want of jurisdiction generally in the domestic 
 Courts need nut allege the existence ofacompe- 
 tent Court abroad. Companhia de Mozambique 
 V. British South Africa Co.. [1892] 2 Q. B. 358, 
 holding also that a suit will not lie in the High 
 
 Abr. 10; Green v. Rutherforth. 1 Ves. Sr. 403, 
 471 ; see 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th*F.n ff . ed.) 455. 
 
 7 Draper v. Crowther, 2 Vent. 362; Stephens 
 v. Berry, 1 Vern. 212. 
 
 8 White v. Lowfrher, Cary, 55 ; 22 Vin. Abr. 
 9; Fanshaw v. Fanshaw, 1 Vern. 246. 
 
 9 Grigg's case. Hutton, 59; 4 Inst. 213; 
 Hilton ». Lawson, Cary, 48. 
 
 1(1 Ld. Red. 225: Hendrick v. Wood, 9 W. R. 
 588, V. C. W. ; Central Georgian I.'. Co. v. Mit- 
 chell. 13 W. R. 428, V. C. W. ; 2 II. & M. 452 ; 
 11 Jar. N. S. j:,s. 
 
 11 Ld. Red. 225: Toller p. Carteret, 2 Vern. 
 494; see also Earl of Derby v. Duke of Athol, 
 ubi supra ; Lord Cranstown v. Johnston, :: Ves. 
 170. 182: ami see Xorris v. Chambres, 29 Beav. 
 246 : 7 Jur. N S. 59 ; id. 689, L. C. ; 3 De. G. 
 F. & J. 583: Paget v. Kde. L. R. is Eq. lis. 
 See Norton r. Florence Land Co. 7 Ch. D. 332; 
 1 Dan. Ch. Prac (6th Eng. ed.) 452. 
 
 Court to decide directly the title to land abroad. 
 but that, as local venue was abolished by the 
 Judicature Acts, damages may be recovered for 
 a trespass upon land abroad, if the defendant is 
 within the jurisdiction. See Mercantile Ins. &c. 
 Co. v. River Plate &c. Co., [1892] 2 Ch. 303; Re 
 
 623
 
 630 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 It is said, that one plea only will be admitted to the jurisdiction, and 
 that, therefore, if the defendant plead such a plea as is not sufficient 
 in its nature, or plead the matter insufficiently, he will be put to 
 
 answer. 12 
 * 630 * We have before seen that an objection on the ground of juris- 
 diction must be taken either by demurrer or plea, before answer : 
 otherwise, the Court will entertain the suit, although the defendant may 
 object to it at the hearing, unless it is in a case in which no circumstance 
 whatever can give the Court jurisdiction. 1 (a) 
 
 12 Wyatt's P. R. 325. 
 1 Ante, p. 555. The plea may s'uow more 
 
 th:in one reason why the Court has not jurisdic- 
 tion. Blake v. Blake, 18 W. R. 941. 
 
 Hawthorne, Graham v. Massey, 23 Ch. D. 743; 
 Whitaker v. Forbes, L. R.~ 10 C. P. 583. 
 Later, in British South Africa Co. v. Companhia 
 de Mozambique, [1893] A. C. 602; [1893] W. 
 N. 148, it was held that the Supreme Court of 
 Judicature has no jurisdiction to entertain an 
 action to recover damages for trespass to land 
 situate abroad. 
 
 In England the rule has always been that 
 a suit does not lie to recover land in a foreign 
 countn' or colony. Re Holmes, 2 J. & H. 527; 
 8 Jur. N. S. 76;" Blake v. Blake, 18 W. R. 944 ; 
 W. N. (1870) 174; Whitaker v. Forbes, 1 C. 
 P. D. 51 ; Norton v. Florence Land Co. 7 
 Ch. D. 332; Moor v. Anglo-Italian Bank, 10 
 Ch. D. 681 ; Jenney v. Mackintosh, 33 Ch. D. 
 595 ; see Ewing v. Orr Ewing, 9 App. Cas. 34, 
 40. And where it appeared that the defendant 
 could be sued in India for the recovery of land 
 there, the English Court refused to grant in- 
 spection of documents in the defendant's posses- 
 sion in England in aid of such proceedings 
 Reiner v. Salisbury, 2 Ch. D. 378; post, p. 1556. 
 
 In general a suit will not lie between for- 
 eigners transiently in the country as to property 
 abroad. Matthaei v. Galitzin, L. R. 18 Eq. 
 340: Doss v. Secretary, L. Pi. 19 Eq. 509. See 
 Lorway v. Lousada, 1 Lowell, 77; Roberts v. 
 Knights, 7 Allen, 449 ; 7 Am. Law Rev. 417. 
 The Federal Constitution does not prohibit the 
 Equity Courts of one State from controlling, in 
 proper ease=, persons within their jurisdiction 
 in the prosecution of suits in other States. 
 Cole ». Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107; Pennoyer 
 V. Neff, 95 F. S. 714; Dehon V. Foster. 4 Allen, 
 545; Phelps v. McDonald, 99 U. S 298, 308; 
 Carver v. Peck, 131 Mass 291; Cunningham 
 r. Butler, 142 Mass. 47; Proctor v. National 
 Bank of the Republic. 152 Mass. 223 The 
 Courts of one State will not decree specific per- 
 formance of a contract, by which a domestic 
 corporation is to keep open ditches, and to con- 
 struct cattle guards on the plaintiffs land in 
 another State. Port Royal Railroad Co. P. 
 Hammond, 58 Ga. 523: see Joy v. St. Louis, 
 138 U. S. 1, 47; Union Pacific Ry. Co. P. Chi- 
 cago &c. Rv. Co. 51 Fed. Rep." 309; Topp p. 
 624 
 
 White, 12 Heisk. 165; Monnett v. Turpie, 132 
 Ind. 482. A suit for the specific performance 
 of a contract for land may be brought in a State 
 or country other than that in which the land 
 lies; Davis v. Parker. 14 Allen, 94; Brown v. 
 Desmond, 100 Mass. 267 ; 2 Kent Com. (12th 
 ed.) 463, n. (d) ; see Potter v. Hollister, 45 N. 
 J. Eq. 508; Cloud r. Greasley, 125 III. 313; 
 Gibson v. Burgess, 82 Va. 650: Seixas v. King, 
 39 La. Ann. 510. Specific performance of a con- 
 tract for land within the jurisdiction of the 
 Court will not be decreed against an absent 
 non-resident. Spurr r. Scoville, 3 Cush. 578. 
 See Felch v. Hooper, 119 Mass. 52; Walling 
 v. Beers, 120 Mass. 548; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. 
 (11th ed.) § 744, and notes. A preliminary 
 injunction may he granted in a clear case to 
 restrain the defendant from injury to land 
 abroad. See Marshall r. Turnbull, 32 Fed. 
 Rep. 124; 34 id. 827. A defendant who has 
 appeared and has been enjoined from manu- 
 facturing or selling articles which infringe the 
 plaintiff's patent, violates the injunction by a 
 sale of such articles outside the jurisdiction of 
 the Court. Macauley v. White Sewing Ma- 
 chine Co. 9 Fed. Rep." 698. 
 
 (a) This qualification is illustrated by Ex 
 parte Swinhanks, 11 Ch. D. 525, where the 
 Court of Bankruptcy had ample jurisdiction if 
 it chose to exercise it, and by Ex parte Eatough 
 & Co. Lim'd, 42 L. T. 95, where the Court of 
 Bankruptcy had no jurisdiction whatever. See 
 al>o Ex parte Butters, 14 Ch. D. 265; Gordon 
 v. James. 30 Ch. D. 249. 
 
 In general, when a Court of Equity has juris- 
 diction of the subject-matter,the defendant, after 
 the plea or answer is riled, cannot raise, as a 
 new defence, the objection that the legal remedy 
 is plain, adequate, and complete. This defence 
 should be taken by demurrer, when apparent on 
 the bill. KilbournV Sunderland, 130 U. S. 505; 
 Dederick r. Fox, 56 Fed. Rep. 714: Levi r. 
 Evans, 57 id. 677; Ostrander r. Webber, 114 
 N. Y. 95 ; Baron v. Korn, 127 N". Y. 224; Buffalo 
 Stone Co. r. Delaware &c. R. Co 130 N. Y. 152; 
 Watts v. Adler, id. 646; Clark v. Flint, 22 
 Pick. 231 ; Raynham Congregational Society
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. 
 
 650 
 
 II. Pleas to the person, like pleas to the jurisdiction, do not necessa- 
 rily dispute the validity of the rights which are made the subject of the 
 
 v. Raynham Fund, 23 Pick. 148; Massachu- 
 setts General Hospital v. State Assurance Co. 
 4 Gray, 227; Russell v. Loring, 3 Allen, 121 : 
 Dearth v. Hide & Leather National Bank, 100 
 Mass. 540; Page v. Young, 106 Mass. 313; 
 Jones v. Keen, 115 Mass. 170; Crocker ». 
 Dillon, 133 Mass. 01; Parker v. Nickerson, 137 
 Mass. 487; Payson v. Lamson, 134 Mass. 593; 
 Pittsburgh Co.'s Appeal. 123 Penn. St. 250; 
 Evans H.Goodwin, 132 id. 136; Kelley y.Kelley, 
 80 Wis. 486; Newton v. Newton, 46 Minn. 33; 
 Crump v. Ingersoll, 47 Minn. 17'J ; Kitcher^ide 
 v. Myers, 10 Oregon, 21, Snowden v. Tyler. 21 
 Neb. 199. This objection cannot be raised be- 
 fore a Master, but only by a pleading filed in 
 Court. Smith v. Rock, 59 Vt. 232. In order 
 to avail for this purpose, the legal remedy must 
 be neither obscure nor doubtful. Essex Free- 
 holders v. Newark City Nat'l Bank, 48 N. J. 
 Eq. 51. See Stone v. Thomas, L. R. 5 Ch. 
 219. The bill will not be dismissed, but will be 
 retained fur the assessment of damages, when 
 the plaintiff claims equitable relief to which he 
 shows himself entitled, and a reason for deny- 
 ing such relief arises pending the suit. Case 
 v. Minot, 158 Mass. 577. But the defendant, 
 after filing his answer, cannot insert a plea in 
 the nature of a plea puis darrein continuance 
 to the effect that, after answering, he removed 
 the obstacle which necessitated resort to Equity. 
 Morley v. White, L. R. 8 Ch. 731. An ade- 
 quate remedy at Law, excluding the jurisdiction 
 of Equity, is found in any of the forms of 
 actions or proceedings in the Law Courts. See 
 Gaines v. Miller, 111 U. S. 395; Root v. Lake 
 Shore Ry. Co. 105 U. S. 207; Smith v. Bourbon 
 County, 127 U. S. 105; Smyth v. N. O. C. & B. 
 Co. 141 U. S.656 ; Sultan v. Providence Tool Co. 
 21 Blaich. 437; Dumont v. Fry, 12 Fed. Rep. 
 21 ; Hausineister v Porter, 21 id. 355; Jenkins v. 
 Haiinan, 26 id. 657; United Lines Tel. Co. v. 
 Grant, 137 N. Y. 7; Sheppard v. Nixon, 43 
 N.J. Eq. 627; Elizabethtown Gas Light Co. 
 v. Green, 4G id. 118; Russell v. Barstow, 144 
 Mass. 130; Squire v. Hewlett. 141 Mass 597; 
 Evans v. Lewis, 121 111. 478; Bodman v. Lake 
 Fork Drainage District, 132 111.439; Burton 
 v. Gleason, 56 111.25; McClanahan v. West, 
 100 Mo. 309; Gay v. Gilmore, 76 C.a. 725; 
 Duff v. Duff, 71 Cal.513; Pixley v. Roanoke 
 Nav. Co. 75 Va. 320; McDonald v. Reiner, 22 
 Fla. 198. Also in the Probate Court'. Batten 
 v. Gedhye, 41 Ch. D. 507; Foster v. Foster, 134 
 Mass. 120; Joslin v. Wheeler, 62 X II. 169; 
 Green v. Creighton, 10 S. & M. (Miss.) 159; 48 
 Am. Dec. 742, and note. See ante, p. 553, note 
 ('<); post, p. 659. note (b). Also in remedies es- 
 tablished by statute, but not in new statutory 
 remedies where the Equity jurisdiction is already 
 
 VOL I. — 40 
 
 settled upon the same topic. See ante, p. 60, 
 note (a): Union Passenger Ry. Co. v. Baltimore, 
 71 Md. 238; Witters ». Sowles, 32 Fed. Rep. 
 767; Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen, 547; 7 id. 17; 
 Wood v. Westborough, 140 Mass. 403; Sweeny 
 v. Williams, 36 N. J. Eq. 627. 
 
 In jurisdictions where Law and Equity are 
 distinct, parties cannot by stipulation con- 
 vert a suit in Equity into an action at Law 
 or vice versa. Indianapolis Land Trust v. 
 Hoffman, 57 Fed. Rep. 333; Jinks v. Banner 
 Lodge, 139 Penn. St. 414. Under the Code 
 Procedure, where legal and equitable relief is 
 granted under one complaint, the plaintiff, in 
 order to obtain equitable relief, is not required 
 to show that there is no adequate remedy at 
 Law. Ely v. New Mexico & A. R. Co. 129 
 U S. 291. The 21st Rule in Equity dispenses 
 with the allegation in the bill that the plaintiff 
 has no adequate remedy at Law. Gage r. 
 Kaufman, 133 U. S. 471. If there is not an 
 adequate remedy on the Law side of the Federal 
 Courts, suit may be brought on the Equity side, 
 although the law of the State furnishes a com- 
 plete remedy in the State Courts. New Orleans 
 Nat. Bank v. Bohne, 4 Woods, 74. The U. S. 
 Rev. Stats. § 723, providing that suits in Equity 
 shall not be sustained in the Federal Courts in 
 any case where a plain, adequate, and complete 
 remedy may be had at Law, is declaratory, 
 and deprives these Courts of equitable rente- 
 die*, because of the defendant's constitutional 
 right to a jury trial at Law, only where the legal 
 remedy is as complete and efficacious as that in 
 Equity. Boyce V Grundy, 3 Pet. 210; Hipp 
 v. Babin, 19 How. 271; Lewis v. Cocks, 23 
 Wall. 407; Root v. Ry. Co. 105 U. S. 212; 
 New York Co. v. Water Co. 107 U. S. 214: Kil- 
 lian ». Ebbmghaus, 110 U. S. 573; Buzard o. 
 Houston, 119 U. S. 351; Ridings v. Johnson, 
 128 U. S 212 ; Payne ». Kansas &c. Ry. Co. 
 40 Fed. Rep. 546; Dahlman r. Jacobs, 15 id. 
 863 ; Dow v. Berry, 18 id. 121. The test of an 
 adequate remedy at Law is that which existed 
 when the Judiciary Act of 1789 was adopted, 
 when not since changed by Congress. Mis- 
 sissippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S. 202; Missouri, 
 K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Elliott, 56 Fed. Rep. 772. 
 
 If the suit is dismissed for want of jurisdic- 
 tion, costs are disallowed, at least in the Federal 
 Courts, because of lack of power. Inglee v. 
 Coolidge. 2 Wheat. 363; MTver r. Wattles. 9 
 id. 650; Strader v. Graham. 18 How. 602; 
 Mayor r. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247; Mead v. Piatt, 
 21 Blatch. 435; Agnew v. Dorman, Taner, 
 386: United States v. Treadwell, 15 Fed. Repi 
 532; Cooper v New Haven Steamboat Co. 18 
 id. 588; Abbey v. The R L. Steven-. 22 How. 
 Pr. 78. The U. S. Rev. Stats. §§ 823, 983, 
 
 625
 
 *630 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 suit, but object to the plaintiff's ability to sue, or the defendant's liability 
 to be sued, respecting them. 2 They are generally divided into such as 
 regard the person of the plaintiff, and such as regard the person of the 
 defendant, (b) 
 
 1. Of the former kind are pleas of: Alienage; 3 Outlawry; 4 Attain- 
 der ; 5 Infancy ; Coverture ; Idiocy or lunacy ; Bankruptcy ; 6 to which 
 ma} T be added, Pleas that the plaintiff does not sustain the character he 
 assumes. 7 All the above grounds of objection to the person of the 
 plaintiff, except the last, have been before discussed. 8 With respect to 
 the last, it is to be observed, that the plea may either deny the existence 
 of the person in whose behalf the bill has been exhibited, or of the 
 character in which the plaintiff affects to sue ; or it may show that, for 
 some reason not disclosed in the bill, the title under which the plaintiff 
 claims never vested in him. 9 Thus, a plea may show, that the alleged 
 
 ' 2 Beames on Pleas, 99. 
 
 3 A plea of "alien enemy" is sufficiently 
 answered by a treaty of peace made after it was 
 filed; and there is no need fur the plaintiff to 
 reply that fact; the Court is bound to notice it 
 ex officio. Johnson v. Harrison, Litt. Sel. Cas. 
 226. 
 
 4 As to the plea of outlawry, see Aft. -Gen. 
 v. Kickards, 8 Beav. 380; Taylor v. Wemyss, 
 L. K. 8 Eq. 512. 
 
 5 33 & 34 Vic. c. 23, § 6, makes a person 
 convicted of treason or felony incapable of 
 suing in Equity until he has undergone his 
 punishment or is pardoned. 
 
 6 See 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.), 457. 
 
 have not changed this rule. Pentlars-e v. 
 Kirby, 20 Fed. Rep. 898 If the defendant 
 does not raise the objection until the final hear- 
 ing on pleadings and proof, the bill may be 
 dismissed without costs to him. Gray v. Beck, 
 6 Fed. Rep. 595. 
 
 When at the trial the evidence discloses a 
 plain and adequate remedy at Law, though not 
 apparent upon the bill, the Court should decline 
 further to proceed in Equity. Dowell v. Mitch- 
 ell, 105 U. S. 430; Denison Paper Manuf. 
 Co. v. Robinson Manuf. Co. 74 Maine, 116; 
 Gamage r. Harris, 79 Maine, 531. The Court 
 may raise the objection of its own motion, 
 though not raised by the pleadings or suggested 
 by counsel. Ante, p. 555, note; Parker v. 
 Winnipiseogee Lake Co. 2 Black, 545; Thomp- 
 son v. Railroad Co. 6 Wall. 134; Oelrichs v. 
 Spain, 15 Wall. 211: Sullivan v. Portland 
 Railroad Co. 94 U. S. 806; Tyler v. Savage, 143 
 U. S. 79. 97; Franklin Telegraph Co. v. Har- 
 rison. 145 U. S. 459. 474; Preteca t>. Maxwell 
 Land Grant Co. 4 O. S. App. 326, 331; Mills 
 v. Knapp, 39 Fed. Rep. 592: Vannerson v. 
 Leverett, 31 id. 376 ; Curry v. McCauley, 20 id. 
 583; Spring v. Domestic S. M. Co. 13 id. 446; 
 Woodman v. Freeman, 25 Maine 561; Xiles r. 
 Williams, 24 Conn. 279 ; Hine v. New Haven, 
 
 G2G 
 
 The objection that the plaintiff is bankrupt, and 
 his assignee not a p.irty, should be taken in 
 limine by way of plea, and cannot be insisted 
 on to avoid exceptions taken by the plaintiff to 
 the answer. Kittredge v. Claremont Bank, 3 
 Story, 591. 
 
 7*Story, Eq. PL § 722, et seq. 
 
 8 Ante, Chap. TIT. Suits by Persons under 
 Disability. For forms of pleas of alien enemy, 
 see Beanies on Fleas, 329; 2 Van Hey. 94 ; and 
 of outlawry, and bankruptcy, and of plaintiff 
 not sustaining his assumed character, id. 96, 
 104, 106. 
 
 9 Story, Eq. PI. § 727. 
 
 40 Conn. 478; Edgett v. Douglass, 144 Penn. 
 St. 95; Derry v. Ross, 5 Col. 295; Stout v. 
 Cook, 41 111. 447; M<gee v. Mugee, 51 111. 
 500; Remington v. Foster, 42 Wis. 608; Den- 
 ner v. Chicago &c. Ry. Co. 57 Wis. 218; Tubb 
 v. Fort, 58 Ala. 277; Hart o. Mallet, 2 Hayw. 
 136; Charleston Ins. Co. v. Potter, 3 Desaus. 
 6; Drury v. Conner, 1 Har. & G. 220; Dun- 
 nock i». Dunnock, 3 Md. Ch. 140; Gough r. 
 Crane, id. 119; Cummins v. White. 4 Blackf. 
 356; Woodman v. Freeman, 25 Maiie. 531; 
 Humphreys (-.Atlantic MillingCo. 98 Mo. 542. 
 (b) The defence of disability should be 
 raised by demurrer or plea, and not by answer. 
 Hoyt r. Hoyt, 58 Vt. 538; Chicago v. Cam- 
 eron, 22 HI. App. 91; see Spillane v. Missouri 
 Pacific Ry. Co. (Mo.) 20 S. W. Rep. 293; 
 Bush v. Linthicum, 59 Md. 344; Oregonian 
 Ry. Co. V. Oregon Ry. Co. 10 Sawyer, 464 
 The plea of insanity should allege inquisi- 
 tion found, or the appointment of a committee. 
 Dudgeon r. Watson, 23 Fed. Rep. 161; see 
 Bateman v. Snoddy (Ind.), 32 N. E. Rep. 327. 
 A plea that the plaintiff is not a corporation 
 or citizen, as alleged in the complaint, is ground 
 for a separate plea, and is waived if other de- 
 fences are also pleaded. Oregonian Ry. Co. V. 
 Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co. 27 Fed. Rep. 277.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. 
 
 *631 
 
 plaintiff, or one of several plaintiffs, is a fictitious person ; 10 or was dead 
 at the time of commencing the suit. 11 So, if a plaintiff files a bill stat- 
 ing himself to sue as administrator or executor, a plea that he is not 
 administrator or executor will be good. 1 - Where a plaintiff entitled 
 himself as administrator, and the defendant pleaded that the supposed 
 intestate was living, the plea was allowed. 13 A plea that the plaintiff 
 is not heir to the person under whom he claims as heir, has also, 
 as we have seen, been considered a good plea. 14 * In like manner, *631 
 a plea that the plaintiff is not a partner, has been allowed to a bill 
 filed by a person claiming in that character. 1 Upon the same principle, 
 if, from any circumstance not stated in the bill, it can be shown that 
 nothing ever vested in the plaintiff, or that the title which the plaintiff 
 had has been transferred to another, the defendant may show the cir- 
 cumstance by way of plea. 
 
 2. Pleas to the person of the defendant are more limited than those 
 to the person of the plaintiff; for it is a rule at Law, that persons who 
 are disabled to sue, cannot plead their own disabilities, when they are 
 themselves sued, in any case where it is sought to compel the perform- 
 ance of a duty by the defendant.' 2 
 
 This rule will not, however, apply to cases where the proceeding is in 
 rem, and the disability is of such a nature that, besides the personal dis- 
 qualification which it imposes, the interest in the defendant's property 
 which is the subject of the suit has become vested in another. 3 Upon 
 this principle, it is presumed that persons outlawed or attainted of treason 
 or ftdony may state their outlawry or attainder to the Court by way of 
 plea, for the purpose of showing that whatever interest they had in the 
 property is vested in the Crown ; 4 in the same manner that bankrupts 
 may, if sued respecting property which has become vested in their 
 assignees, plead their bankruptcy, whether it happened before or after 
 the bill was filed, in abatement of the suit. 5 In fact, such a plea 
 
 1° Coop. Eq. PI. 249; Com. Dig. Abatement, 
 E. 16; Bac. Ab. Abatement, F. ; 1 Wils. 302; 
 Gilb. C. P. 248. 
 
 11 Coop. Eq. PI. 24!); Bac. Ab. Abatement, 
 L.: Com. Dig. Abatement, E. 17. 
 
 12 Winn v. Fletcher, 1 Vern. 473; Simons r. 
 Milman, 2 Sim. 241; Fry v. Richardson, 10 
 Sim. 475. Such a plea, however, is untenable, 
 if the plaintiff take out letters of administration 
 before the hearing. Horner ». Horner, 23 L. J. 
 Ch. 10, V. C. K.; see also ante, p. 318. 
 
 13 ()nl v. Huddleston, 2 Dick. 510, 512, cited 
 1 Cox, 198. 
 
 " Am, , pp. 604, 009; see Bourke v. Kelly, 1 
 Hogan, 172; Glnason v. Cook, 1 Hogan, 297; 
 Story, Eq. I'!. §727. Formerly, it was doubted 
 whether it was not necessary, in such cases, to 
 state in the plea who was the heir-at-law ; but 
 now it seems that such a statement is unneces- 
 sary. Jones v. Davis, 10 Ves. 202. 204, 265. 
 As to a plea that the plaintiff is not the son of 
 defendant, see Wilson »;. Hammonds, L. R. 8 
 Eq. 323. 
 
 1 Ante, pp. 005, 620. 
 
 2 Beanies on Pleas, 122. 
 
 3 Turner v. Robinson, 1 S. & S. 3. 
 
 4 Ante, p. 156. 
 
 5 Turner v. Robinson, ubi supra; see also 
 Turner v. Nieholls, 10 Sim. 505: Lane v. Smith, 
 14 Beav. 49; ante, p. 158. A similar rule 
 applied, in the case of insolvent debtors ; see 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 732. For form of plea, see 
 Pepper r. Henzell. 2 II. & M. 486. For plea of 
 execution of trust deed registered under the 
 Bankruptcy Act of 1801 (24 & 25 Vic. c. 134), 
 see Metropolitan Hank v. Offord, L. R. 10 Eq. 
 398. An adjudication in a foreign country may 
 be pleaded to an action brought here in respect 
 of a cause of action arising in such country, see 
 Smith r. Buchanan. 1 East, 0: Potter v. Brown, 
 5 East, 124: Phillips r. Allen. 8 B & C. 477: 
 Lewis p. Owen, 4 B. & Aid. 654. For form of 
 plea, see Sidaw y v. Hay. 3 B & C. 12; Frith 
 v. Wollaston, 7 Ex. 194. As to 'he necessity 
 of the parties being domiciled in the foreign 
 country, see Bartley v. Hodges, 1 B. & S. 375, 
 
 027
 
 632 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 amounts to no more than a plea of want of interest in the subject-matter 
 of the bill. 
 
 The rule, that a person who is under disability cannot plead his own 
 disqualification, will not extend to cases where the disqualification is 
 only partial ; thus, it seems that a woman, sued as a feme sole, may 
 plead that she is covert, 6 and that her husband is not joined as a party. 7 
 
 A defendant may also plead that he is not the person he is alleged to 
 be, or does not sustain the character he is stated to bear, such as heir, 
 executor, or administrator. 8 He may likewise show that he is not sole 
 heir, executor, or administrator, and that others are joined with him in 
 that capacity ; 9 such a plea, however, partakes more of the nature 
 * 632 of a plea for want of parties than * of a plea to a person. He 
 may also plead the disability of a co-defendant. 
 
 If a defendant has not that interest in the subject of a suit which can 
 make him liable to the demands of the plaintiff, and the bill, alleging 
 that he has or claims an interest, avoids a demurrer, he may plead the 
 matter necessary to show that he has no interest. 2 Thus, where a wit- 
 ness to a will was made a defendant to a bill, brought by an heir-at-law 
 to discover the circumstances attending the execution, and the bill con- 
 tained a charge of pretence of interest by the defendant : though a de- 
 murrer for want of interest was overruled, because it admitted the truth 
 of the charge to the contrary in the bill, yet the Court expressed an 
 opinion that the defence might have been made by plea. 3 
 
 It is to be observed, that a plea of want of interest in the defendant 
 is proper only where the case is such that he cannot satisfy the suit by 
 general disclaimer.'* 
 
 III. It has been already stated, 5 that the object of pleas to the bill 
 is to show that, although the plaintiff may be entitled to the relief he 
 asks against the defendant, he is not entitled to have it in that suit ; or 
 that the bill as framed is insufficient to answer the object. 6 
 
 S. C. nam. Bartlett v. Hodges 8 Jur. X. S. 
 52. An assignee's rights under a foreign adju- 
 dication are recognized in the English Courts as 
 well against creditors of the debtor as against 
 the debtor himself. See Solomon v. Ross, 1 H. 
 Bl 131, n.: Phillips v. Hunter. 2 H. Bl. 402; 
 Alivon v. Fmnival, 3 L. J. Ex. 241: lit Blith- 
 man. L. R 2 Eq. 23: He Davidson. L. P.. 15 
 Eq. 383: Semphill r. Queensland Sheep In\ . 
 • ... 39 I.. T. 737; Levi v. Avers, 3 App. Cas. 
 • 
 
 6 Beames on Pleas, 130: Story. Eq. PI. § 732. 
 But an order is. it seems, necessary to ennMe 
 her to put in the plea separate from her hus- 
 band. Hevgate r. Thompson. L. R. 8 Eq. 355; 
 Higjrjnson'fl. Wilson. 17 L. J. Ch. 22. 
 
 " Hancocks v. Lahlache, 3 C. P. D. 197. 
 
 8 Ibid.; Ld. Red. 234; Cooke v. Gittings, 21 
 
 Beav. 497: and see Jones r. Williams. 10 Jur. 
 X. S. 1068; 13 W. R. 1, V. C. S.; Hinde v. 
 Skelton, 2 H. & M. 690; Tempest v. Lord 
 Camnvs, W. X. (1866) 16: 14 W. R. 327, M. 
 R. ; Story. Eq. PI. § 732. For forms of such 
 plea, see 2 Van Hey. 95. 
 
 s Beames on Pleas, 130. 
 
 i Sergrove >•. Mayhew, 2 MX. & G. 97, 99; 
 14 Jur. 158; Taylor r. Wemyss, L. R. 8 Eq. 
 512. 
 
 •- Ld. Red. 235. 
 
 3 Plummer v. May. 1 Ves. Sr. 426: Xutting 
 r. Hehdin. 14 Beav. 11: see also Cartwright v. 
 Hat.lv. 3 Bro. C. C. 238; 1 Ves. Jr. 292; Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 734. 
 
 * Ld. Red. 235; zee post, Chap. XVI. 
 
 s Ante, p. 627. 
 
 6 See Story, Eq. PI. § 735. 
 
 (a) As to the effect of a r oreign discharcr in r. La Soci'ete Industrielle, 25 Q. B. D. 399; 
 bankruptcv upon a dome-tic contract, see Gibbs Elli* r. M' Henry, I,. R. 6 C P 228, 234. 
 
 " 628
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. 
 
 633 
 
 1. Where a bill seeks relief, a defendant may plead that there is 
 another suit already depending, in this or in another Court of Equity, 
 for the same matter. 7 This plea corresponds with the exceptio litis pen- 
 dentis of the civilians, and is analogous to the plea, at Common Law, 
 that there is another action depending. 8 
 
 But, although it is necessary that the first suit should be for the same 
 matter as the second, the second suit need not be for the whole 
 matter embraced by the first; 9 it is, however, requisite * that the * C33 
 whole effect of the second suit should be attainable in the first ; 1 
 and if it appears upon the face of the plea that this is not the case, the 
 Court will at once overrule it. 2 It sometimes, however, happens that 
 the second bill embraces the whole subject in dispute more completely 
 than the first : in such cases, the practice appears to be to dismiss the 
 first bill with costs and to direct the defendants in the second cause to 
 answer, upon being paid the costs of a plea allowed, which puts the case 
 upon the second bill in the same situation that it would have been in if 
 the first bill had been dismissed before the filing of the second. 3 
 
 A plea of another suit depending will be good, whether the other suit 
 be in this or any other Court of Equity in England. 4 It will not,. how- 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 246; Coop. Eq. PI. 272; Beanies 
 on Pleas, 134; Cons. Orel. XIV. 6, 7; see also 
 Long v. Stone, 9 Hare, 542; Way v. Bragaw, 
 16 X.J. Eq. 213; see Johnson v. Bower, 4 Hen. 
 & M. 487; Curd v. Lewis, 1 Dana, 302; Cum- 
 mins v. Benuet, 8 Paige, 79; Story, Eq. PI. 
 § 737; Matthews v. Roberts, 1 Green Ch. 338; 
 Cleveland &c. R. R. Co. v. City of Erie, 27 
 Penn. St. 380; Price v. Mallett, 2 Hayw. 244. 
 It is a former bill brought by the same plain- 
 tiff, or some person in the same right, which is 
 thus pleadable. Dumford v. Dumford, Rep. 
 temp. Finch, 179; Simpson v. Brewster, 9 Paige, 
 245. The defendant may content himself with 
 stating the pendency aud object of the former 
 suit, and averring that the present suit was 
 brought for the same matters; Beameson Pleas, 
 330; Eq. Drafts. Sb&;post, Vol. III.; or he may 
 omit the averment that the suits are for the 
 same subject-matter, provided he sta'es facts 
 sufficient to show that they are so. Flagg v. 
 Bonnel, 10 X. J. Eq. 82; Davison v. Johnson, 
 18 X. J. Eq. 114. A plea of another suit pend- 
 ing should be taken before the hearing, and it 
 can only be a good obj°ction, when the first 
 suit is between all the same parties, and a full 
 decree can be therein had. Kartell r. Van 
 Buren, 3 Edw. Ch. 20: see post, p. 635. For 
 form of such pleas, see 2 Van Hey. 117; Beanies 
 on Pleas, 330. 
 
 As to plea on the ground of splitting of 
 causes, see Ld. Red. 221; Dear v. Webster. !•"> 
 W. R. 395; W. X. (1867) 43 ; ante, p. 330, 
 note. 
 
 8 Beames on Pleas, 134. 
 
 8 Moor r. Welr.li Copper Co. 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 
 
 39, pi. 14; Saunders v. Frost, 5 Pick. 275y276. 
 See Mann v. Richardson. 21 Pick. 259. 
 
 i Law v. Rigby, 4 Bro. C. C. 60, 63; iFiekford 
 r. Hunter, 5 Sim. 122. 129; Way v. Btogaw, lti 
 X J. Eq. 213, 218. The former suit need not 
 be between the same parties. Green, v. Xeal, 
 2 Heisk. 217. But its equity and effect should 
 be the same. Macey v. Childress, 2 Tenn. 
 Ch. 24. 
 
 - Pickford o. Hunter, ubl supra. 
 
 3 Crofts v. Wortley, 1 Ch Cas. 241 ; Ld. Red. 
 248. 
 
 4 Cons. O d. XIV. 0. 7; Ld. Red. 246; 
 Behrens v. Sieveking, 2 M. & C. 602. Upon 
 issue taken to the pica of a former-suit pending 
 in another Chancery Court of the same State, 
 the plea was held to be sustained to the extent 
 that the two suits were for the same matter and 
 the same object, but the dismissal of the bill to 
 that extent was made without prejudice, and 
 with leave, if the former suit should be discon- 
 tinued before decree (the position of the parties 
 being reversed in the two suits), to the com- 
 plainant to tile a supplemental bill to bring the 
 fact before the Court, and for the same relief. 
 And query, whether the plea is good, where the 
 complainants are not the same in both suits, 
 unless it shows that the former suit has pro- 
 ceeded to a decree. Moore v. Holt, 3 Tenn. Ch. 
 141. See' infra, p. • ;•'!■">. n. 8. Where two Courts 
 have concurrent jurisdiction, the fact that an 
 appeal lies from one to the other will not 
 authorize a proceeding in the appellate Court, 
 pending an action for the same cause in the 
 Court below. Cleveland &c. R. R. Co. v. City 
 of Erie 27 Penn. St. 380. 
 
 629
 
 633 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 ever, be a good plea, if it is depending in a Court in another coun- 
 try ; 8 («) therefore, such a plea will not prevail where the suit already- 
 pending is in Ireland, 6 or in the colonies. 7 Where the original suit has 
 been commenced in a Court of inferior jurisdiction, the plea will not be 
 good if the defendant has avoided the effect of the suit, by going out of 
 the jurisdiction of that Court. 8 
 
 A suit depending must, to afford a good ground for a plea in Equity, 
 be a suit in a Court of Equity ; 9 and therefore, where an infant legatee 
 sued an executor in the Ecclesiastical Court, and afterwards in Chan- 
 cery, it was held that the suit depending in the Ecclesiastical Court 
 
 5 The mere pendency of a suit in a foreign 
 Court, or in a Court of the United States, can- 
 not be pleaded in abatement or in bar to a suit 
 for the same cause in a State Court. Mitchell 
 v. Bunce, 2 Paige, 606; Salmon v. Wooton, 9 
 Dana, 423; Hatch v. Spofford, 22 Conn. 495; 
 overruling Hart v. Granger, 1 Conn. 154; see 
 Low v. Mussey, 41 Vt. 393; Brown v. Lexing- 
 ton & Danville R. R. Co. 13 N. J. Eq. 191. 
 
 The pendency of a suit at Law in another 
 State for the identical object and purpose is no 
 defence to a bill in Equity, and, a fortiori, if 
 the suit be by the defendant against the plain- 
 tiff in Equitv. Fulton r. Golden, 25 N. J. Eq. 
 353. And in Tennessee, an attachment bill by 
 a creditor may be prosecuted, although the 
 plaintiff is at the same time prosecuting a suit 
 in the Chancery Court of another State for the 
 purpose of subjecting property of the debtor to 
 the satisfaction of the same debt. Lockwood v. 
 Nye, 2 Swan, 515. 
 
 The pendency of a prior suit at Law in a 
 State Court is not a bar to a suit in a Circuit 
 Court of the United States, or in the Supreme 
 Court of the District of Columbia, by the same 
 plaintiff against the same defendant for the 
 same -cause of action. Stanton v. Embrey, 93 
 U. S. 548. Nor is the pendency of a prior suit in 
 Equity (Insurance Co. v. Brune, 96 U. S. 588); 
 when the suit is on the same claim. Grider v. 
 Appcrson, 32 Ark. 332. See also Loring r. 
 Marsh. 2 Cliff. 522; Smith v. Lathrop, 44 Penn. 
 St. 328; Davis v. Morton, 4 Bush, 444. And 
 the pendency of a general creditor's bill in the 
 State Court does not preclude a creditor, who 
 :is no party thereto, from bringing an action 
 
 («) The cited case of Lord Dillon v. A ha- 
 res is not a reliable authority under the 
 present English practice, the rule now being 
 that, as the forms of procedure and remedies 
 may differ in the two countries, there is no 
 presumption that more than one suit is vex- 
 atious, and a special case must be made out, 
 especially in suits in personam, and before de- 
 cree, to induce the Court to interfere. See 
 McHenry v. Lewis, 22 Ch. D. 397; 21 id. 202; 
 Peruvian Guano Co. v. Bockwoldt, 23 Ch. D. 
 225; Mutrie v. Binney, 35 id. 614; The Rein- 
 G30 
 
 in a United States Court to recover judgment 
 on his demands. Parsons v. Greenville Stc. R. 
 Co. 1 Hughes, 279. But the pendency of a 
 suit in a State Court of another State, in which 
 property enough to satisfy the demand has 
 been attached, is ground for the abatement of a 
 suit in the Circuit Court of the United States. 
 Lawnnce v. Remington, 6 Biss. 44. The pend- 
 ency of a suit against the defendant in another 
 State cannot be pleaded in bar or in abatement 
 of an action in the Courts of Illinois, even if be- 
 tween the same parties, and for the same cause 
 of action. Allen v Watt, 69 III. 655. See also 
 Grider r. Apperson, 32 Ark. 332; Cole v. F. it- 
 craft, 47 Md. 312. The defence is only avail- 
 able in the last suit, not in the first. Ratzer v. 
 Ratzer, 2 Abb. N. Cas. 461. It is a plea in 
 abatement, not in bar. Sullings v. Goodyear 
 Dental Vulcanite Co. 36 Mich. 313. And see 
 Phosphate Sewage Co. v. Molleson, 1 App. Cas. 
 780, where a stay of proceedings in Scotland 
 was refused because of the pendency of a suit 
 for the same matter in England. 
 
 Lord Dillon v. Alvares, 4 Ves. 357, 359. 
 
 1 Fo.-ter ». Vassall, 3 Atk. 587, 589; see also 
 Bavlev v. Edwards, 3 Swanst. 703, 710. See 
 now The Mali Ivo, L. R. 2 A. & E. 356; The 
 Catterina Chiazzare, 1 P. D. 368; The Delta, 
 25 W. R. 46; Norton v. Florence Land Co. 7 
 Ch. D. 332; Wilson v. Ferrand, L. R. 13 Eq. 
 362; Cox v. Mitchell, 7 C. B. N. S. 55; Alex- 
 ander i*. Adams, 16 L. T. 384. 
 
 8 Ld. Red. 246. 
 
 9 See Way v. Bragaw, 16 N. J. Eq. 213; 
 Fulton v. Golden, 25 id. 353. 
 
 beck, 60 L. T. 209 ; The Christiansborg, 10 
 P. D. 141; Armstrong v. Armstrong. [1892] 
 P. 98; Hyman v. Helm, 24 Ch. D. 531. See 
 Lynch v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 17 Fed. Rep. 
 627: Harper v. O'Brien, 24 id. 145; Scott v. 
 Rand, 118 Mass. 215; Cole v. Flitcraft, 47 Md. 
 312; Paine v. Schenectady Ins. Co. 11 R. I. 
 411. After an unsuccessful plea to the jurisdic- 
 tion, the defendant may, it seems, answer to 
 the merits. Battelle r. Yo^ngstown Rolling 
 Mill Co. 10 Lea, 355.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. 
 
 * 634 
 
 could not be pleaded to the suit in Chancery : because there was not the 
 same security for an infant's advantage in the Ecclesiastical Court, as in 
 Chancery. 10 
 
 * It appears to have been held formerly, that if, after a suit * 634 
 commenced at Commom Law, a bill should be exhibited in this 
 Court, to be relieved for the same matter, the dependency of the action 
 at Law might be admitted as a good plea, and the defendant would not 
 be put to a motion for an election or dismission. 1 The practice in this 
 respect, has, however, undergone a material alteration ; and now, if a 
 plaintiff sues a defendant at the same time and for the same cause at 
 Common Law and in Equity, the defendant may, after full answer put 
 in, or, in case no answer is required, after the expiration of the time for 
 the service of interrogatories, obtain, as of course, on motion or petition, 2 
 an order that the plaintiff may take his election in which Court he will 
 proceed ; and he cannot plead the pendency of the suit at Common Law, 
 in bar of the suit in Equity. 3 
 
 It is stated in an anonymous case in Moseley, 4 that the objection that 
 another suit is depending for the same matter, may, in the Court of 
 Chancery, be taken by motion, instead of plea ; but Lord Eldon has said, 
 that, according to the practice, the regular way of obtaining this refer- 
 ence is by plea. 5 (a) There are cases, however, in which the Court will 
 
 w Howell v. Waldron, 2 Ch. Cas. 85. 
 i Beames's Orders, 177; Ld. Red. 249. 
 
 2 See post, Chap. XIX. § 4, Election. For 
 forms of motion paper and petition, see Vol. III. 
 
 3 See post, Chap. XIX. §4, Election; Ld. 
 Red. 249; Cons. Old. XLII. 5, G, 7; see Story, 
 Eq. PI. §§ 741, 742 ; Livingston v. Kane, 3 John. 
 Ch. 224; Sanger v. Wood, id. 416; Rogers v. 
 Vosburg, 4 id. 84; Gibbs v. Parkinson, 4 Hen. 
 & M. 415. Where a suit is pending for the 
 same cause in a Court of Law, all that the de- 
 fendant can ask is an order putting the plain- 
 tiff to his election whether he will proceed at 
 Law or in Equity. But the plaintiff will not be 
 put to his election, unless the suit at Law is for 
 the same cause, and the remedy afforded co-ex- 
 tensive and equally beneficial with the remedy 
 
 in Equity. Way v. Bragaw, 16 N. J. Eq. 213; 
 see Conover v. Conover, Saxton (N. J.), 409; 
 Rogers v. Vosburg, 4 John. Ch. 84; 1 Hoff. Ch. 
 Pr. 342; Story, Eq. PL § 742. Where the 
 remedies at Law and in Equity are inconsist- 
 ent, any decisive act of the party, with the 
 knowledge of his rights and of the facts, deter- 
 mines his election. Sanger v. Wood. 3 John. 
 Ch. 416, 421. So if he neglects to make his 
 election in proper time. Conover v. Conover, 
 1 Saxton (N. J.), 403, 409; Rogers v. Vosburg, 
 4 John. Ch. 84. He need not make his election 
 until after the defendant has answered. Con- 
 over r. Conover, supra. 
 
 4 P. 268. 
 
 5 Murray v. Shadwell, 17 Ves. 353. 
 
 (a) This defence should be taken by plea 
 and not by answer. Battell i>. Matot, 58 Vt. 
 271 ; Pierce v. Feagans, 39 Fed. Rep. 587. See 
 Phosphate Sewage Co. r. Molleson, 1 App. Cas. 
 780; Stephens r. Monongahela Nat. Bank, 111 
 U. S. 197 ; Riley v. Lyons, 11 Hefck. 246; Eaton 
 v. Eaton, 08 Mich. 158; Cole v. ITitcraft. 47 Md. 
 312. The plea is usually referred forthwith, on 
 motion, to a Master to determine whether both 
 suits are fur the same matter. Battell V. Ma- 
 tot, 58 Vt. 271. In a suit in Equity, brought Cur 
 infringing a patent, against two defendants, a 
 plea of another suit pending between the same 
 plaintiff and one of these defendants, which 
 avers that the other is only that defendant's 
 agent, does not make the alleged principal the 
 
 only true defendant, and is bad. Estes r. 
 Worthington, 24 Blatcb. 343; 30 Fed. Rep. 465. 
 The prior suit is not a bar when the later suit 
 is broader as to parties and subject-matter. 
 Massachusetts Mutual L. Ins. Co. ». Chicago 
 & A. R. Co. 13 Fed. Rep. 857; Merchants" Int'l 
 S. II. Co. o. Lyon, 12 id. 63. The plea of pen- 
 dency of another suit should be overruled when 
 the defendant necessitates the bringing of the 
 second suit, and to avoid the law of the Statute 
 of Limitations, the plaintiff institutes the second 
 before dismissing the first. N. & W. R. Co. P. 
 Nunnally, 88 Va. 546. So the act of a mort- 
 gagee in receiving new rents opens and super- 
 sedes a former order of redemption. Tetrault 
 r. Labbe\ 155 Mass. 497. If the plaintiff in a 
 631
 
 GSl 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 interfere to restrain a second suit brought against the defendant, for the 
 game matter, upon motion, without requiring him to plead the pendency 
 of the former suit ; as in the case of two or more suits, instituted en 
 behalf of an infant for the same matter : in such case, the Court will, 
 as we have seen, upon representation of the fact, immediately direct 
 an inquiry which suit is most for the infant's benefit, without requiring 
 the defendant to plead the pendency of another suit. 6 It is to be 
 observed, however, that in the case of suits instituted on behalf of in- 
 fants, the reference is not to inquire into the fact of two or more suits 
 having been instituted, but which of them is most for the benefit of 
 
 the infant. 
 * C35 * In the case, also, of creditors suing an executor or administra- 
 tor, after a decree for an account at the suit of other creditors, 
 the Court will, upon motion by the defendant, stay the proceedings in 
 the second cause, without requiring him to plead the pendency of the 
 first suit ; J but both courses are open to him, and, in some cases, that of 
 a plea may be more advantageous. 2 
 
 It is not necessary to the sufficiency of a plea of this nature, that the 
 former suit should be precisely between the same parties as the latter, 3 
 for, if a man institutes a suit, and afterwards sells part of the property 
 
 6 Ante, p. 69. 
 
 1 Post, Chap. XIX. § 1, Dismissing Bills 
 and staying Proceedings. 
 
 2 Pickford v. Hunter, 5 Sim. 122; see Miers 
 
 v. Zanesville & Maysville Turnpike Co. 11 
 Ohio, 273. 
 
 s See Hartell v. Van Buren, 3 Edw. Ch. 20; 
 Green v. Neal, 2 Heisk. 217. 
 
 second bill in Equity does not seek relief, if the 
 first hill is dismissed, then, on the first bill being 
 dismissed, the second is rightly dismissed also, 
 (lark r. Patterson, 158 Mass. 388. It is valid 
 defence that the plaintiff in the second suit, 
 as defendant in a pending suit against him 
 brought by the present defendant, has there 
 pleaded the same claim in set-off. Pennsyl- 
 vania R. Co. v. Davenport (Penn.), 25 Atl. 
 Rep. 890. A pending action at Law for the 
 same cause excludes the jurisdiction of Equity 
 if complete. Chase v. Chase (N. J.), 21 Atl. 
 914. The pendency of a suit in Equity is not 
 in general ground for a plea in abatement to an 
 action at Law. Mattel v. Conant, 150 Mass. 418. 
 The question whether a Court of Equity should 
 exercise jurisdiction, or leave the case to another 
 tribunal, may be raised by demurrer when the 
 facts appear sufficiently by the bill. Martin r. 
 Powning, L. R. 4 Ch. 356; Sears v. Carrier, 4 
 Allen, 339; Hurst v. Everett, 21 Fed. Rep. 218; 
 Curtis V. Piedmont Co. 109 N. C. 401; see Or- 
 rell r. Busch, L. R. 5 Ch. 467; Lucas v. Sig- 
 gers, L. R. 7 Ch. 517. The plaintiff will not be 
 required to elect between suits at Law and in 
 Equity when the suit at Law is not for the same 
 cause, and the remedy at Law co-extensive and 
 equally beneficial with the remedy in Equity. 
 Way r. Bragaw, 16 N. J. Eq. 213. See Tansey 
 v. McDonnell, 142 Mass. 220. 
 632 
 
 A suit at Law in the Federal Courts does not 
 preclude a suit in Equity between the same par- 
 ties and in the same Court, for the same cause 
 of action, if the controversy is of equitable cog- 
 nizance. Thorne v. Towanda Tanning Co. 15 
 Fed. Rep. 289. It is now settled that the pen- 
 dency of a prior suit in a State Court is not a bar 
 to a suit in a Circuit Court of the United States, 
 by the same plaintiff against the same defendant 
 for the same cause of action. See Stanton v. Em- 
 brey, 93 U. S. 548; Brooks r. Mills County, 4 Dil- 
 lon! 524 ; Loring v. Marsh, 2 Cliff. 311, 322 ; Pierce 
 r. Feagans, 39 Fed. Rep. 587; Radford r. Fol- 
 som, 14 Fed. Rep. 97; Latham v. Chafee, 7 id. 
 520; Logan v. Greenlaw, 12 id. 10; Crescent 
 City L. S. Co. o. Butchers' U. L. S. Co. id. 225; 
 Currie v. Lewiston, 15 id. 377 ; Weaver v. 
 Field, 10 id. 22; Martin r. Baldwin. 19 id. 340; 
 Sharon r. Hill, 26 id. 337; 22 id. 28; Hurst v. 
 Everett, 21 id. 218: Liggett v. Glenn, 4 U. S. 
 App. 438; 51 Fed. Rep. 381 ; Dwight v. Central 
 Vermont R. Co. 20 Blatcb. 200; Griswold r. 
 Central Vermont R. Co. id. 212; Oneida County 
 Bank v. Bonnev, 101 N. Y. 173; Hollister v. 
 Stewart, 111 N. Y. 644; Ruegger v. Indianapo- 
 lis R. Co. 103 111. 449; Villavaso v. Barthet, 39 
 La. Ann. 247; State v. New Orleans &c R. Co. 
 42 La. Ann. 11 ; Gay v. Brierfield Coal & I. Co. 
 94 Ala. 303.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. * 63 J 
 
 to another, who files an original bill touching the part so purchased by 
 him, a plea of the former suit depending touching the whole property 
 will hold, although filed by a different plaintiff. 4 So, where one part- 
 owner of a ship filed a bill against the ship's husband for an account, 
 and afterwards the same part-owner and the rest of the owners filed 
 another bill for the same purpose, the pendency of the first suit was held 
 a good plea to the last ; 5 for, although the first bill was insufficient for 
 want of parties, yet, by the second bill, the defendant was doubly vexed 
 for the same cause. And where a decree has been made, upon a bill 
 brought by a creditor on behalf of himself and all other creditors, and 
 another creditor comes in, to take the benefit of the decree and prove his 
 debt, and then files a bill on behalf of himself and all other creditors, 
 the defendant may plead the pendency of the former suit : for a person 
 coming in under a decree is quasi a party. 6 (a) The proper way for a 
 creditor to proceed, if the plaintiff in such original suit is dilatory, is by 
 application to the Court for liberty to conduct the cause himself. 7 
 
 It has been said 8 that the pendency of another suit for the same object, 
 in a Court of concurrent jurisdiction, could not be pleaded in bar, before 
 a decree in such other suit ; this observation, however, can only be appli- 
 cable to creditors' suits, where, as in the case last put, the plaintiff in 
 the second suit will not have become quasi a party to the first till after 
 the decree. In other cases, all that seems to be necesssary to a plea of 
 this nature is, that there should be a suit actually pending : for which 
 purpose, there need not have been more than either an appearance, or 
 process requiring appearance. 9 That one or other of such steps, at least, 
 should have been taken, is, however, absolutely necessary. 10 
 
 * A cross-bill, although between the same parties as an original * 636 
 suit, cannot be met by a plea of this nature; 1 thus it has been 
 held that, after a bill brought in the Exchequer to foreclose a mortgage, 
 the defendant may bring a bill in the Court of Chancery to redeem, and 
 the pendency of the former suit is not pleadable. 2 And it seems that 
 such a plea will not lie, in any case where the second bill was not 
 brought on the same right as the first : so that a decree, dismissing the 
 original suit, would not be a bar to a new proceeding ; 3 We have seen, 
 
 4 Ld. Red. 248; Moor v. Welsh Copper Co. 141; Maccy v. Childress, 2 id. 20; Mortimer v. 
 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 39, pi. 14; Story, Eq. PI. West, 1 Swanst. 359; Gage v. Lord Stafford. 1 
 § 740. Yes. 544 ; Venning v. Loyd, 1 De 6. F. & J. 
 
 5 Durand v. Hutchinson, Ld. Red. 248. 207. And see where the former bill is by the 
 
 6 Neve v. Weston, 3 Atk. 557; see Ewing v. defendant in the new suit. Neafie 0. Neafie, 7 
 Maury, 3 Lea (Tenn.), 381. John. Ch. 4; Fulton v Golden, 25 N. J. Eq. 
 
 7 Ld. Red. 249. 154. 
 
 8 Per Sir John Leach V. C. in IToulditch ?•. 9 Ld. Red. 246; Anon. 1 Vern. 318. 
 Marquis of Donnegal, 1 S. & S. 491. 492. If m Moor v. Welsh Copper Co. 1 Eq. Cas. 
 the bill is by the same person, the plea would Abr. 39, pi. 14. 
 
 be good. Aliter, if by a different person, for ! See Story, Eq. Pi. § 400. 
 
 the suit might not be brought to a decree. " Lend Newbury v. Wren, 1 Vern. 220; 
 
 Rogers v. King, 8 Paige, 210; Innes v. Lan- Brandon Man. Co. v. Prime, 14 Blatchf. 371. 
 
 sing, 7 Paige, 583; Moore v. Holt, 3 Tenn. Ch. 3 Thus, where a plaintiff mistook his right, 
 
 (<-/) The decision upon the questions at issue enjoin the same agreement, if there was no 
 
 in a stockholder's suit to prevent his corpora- fraud or collusion in the first suit. Willoughbv 
 
 tion from consummating an agreement is con- r. Chicago Junction Railways &c. Co. 50 N. J. 
 
 slusive of a bill by another stockholder to Eq. 656. 
 
 633
 
 *637 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 that a suit by a husband and wife, against the trustees of the wife's 
 separate property, cannot be pleaded in bar to a subsequent suit by her 
 and her next friend against the trustees and her husband, although 
 the relief prayed in both suits is the same : because the first suit is con- 
 sidered as the suit of the husband alone, and a decree of dismission in it 
 would be no bar to the wife. 4 
 
 From what has been before said, it is obvious that it is necessary to 
 the validity of a plea of a former suit depending, that it should contain 
 a distinct averment that the second suit is for the same matter as the 
 first ; and, therefore, a plea which did not expressly aver this, though 
 it stated matter tending to show it, was considered as bad in point of 
 form, and was overruled upon argument. 5 The plea must also aver, 
 that there have been proceedings in the suit: as appearance, or process 
 requiring appearance at the least. 6 It seems likewise regular to aver, 
 that the suit is still depending : 7 though it has been held that a posi 
 tive averment of that fact is not necessary. 8 It is, however, necessary 
 
 that the time when the suit was instituted should be distinctly 
 * 637 * averred ; and where a plea merely stated that in or about such 
 
 a year the plaintiff filed his bill,' praying the like account, and 
 the same relief with the present, Lord Hardwicke held the plea to be 
 defective in form. 1 
 
 A plea of a former suit depending, being clearly a good plea, if true, 
 the plaintiff, if he dispute the truth thereof, should not set it down for 
 argument, but the plaintiff should, on motion or petition of course, 2 
 obtain an order for an inquiry as to the truth thereof. 8 If such order, 
 and a certificate in pursuance thereof, are not obtained within one month 
 after the filing of the plea, the defendant may obtain, as of course, an 
 order to dismiss the bill with costs. 4 If, instead of taking this course, 
 
 and being the executor of an administrator, 
 conceived himself to be the personal representa- 
 tive of a deceased person, and filed a bill in 
 that capacity, but afterwards, finding that he 
 did not properly sustain the character he had 
 assumed, obtained letters of administration r/e 
 bonis non, and filed a new bill, a plea of the 
 former suit depending was overruled by Lord 
 Hardwicke. Huggius v. York Buildings Co. 
 2Atk. 44; Story, Eq. PI. § 739. 
 
 4 Ante, p. 108; Reeve v. Dalby, 2 S. & S. 
 464; see also Stooke v. Vincent, I Coll. 527, 
 529 ; 9 Jur. 99. 
 
 5 Ld. Red. 246; Devie r. Lord Brownlow, 2 
 Dick. 611. But in McEwen v. Broadhead, 11 
 N. J. Eq. 131, 132. the Chancellor, in giving 
 judgment, said: "But, if the facts slated in 
 the plea plainly show that the second suit is 
 for the same subject-matter as the first, I can 
 see no reason why it should be held necessary 
 that there should be an express averment to 
 that effect. It. would be accurate and correct 
 pleading to make the averment, but accuracy 
 may demand what is not required as absolutely 
 necessary. The Courts are not as much in- 
 
 034 
 
 clined to regard mere technicality in pleading 
 as they were three quarters of a century ago." 
 And he held that a plea of another suit pending 
 might be good, though it did not contain that 
 averment. 
 
 6 Ld. Red. 247. 
 
 "i Ld. Red. 247. 
 
 8 Urlin v. Hudson, 1 Vern. 332; see the 
 forms of such a plea, 2 Van Hey. 117; 
 Beanies on Pleas, 330. 
 
 1 Foster v. Vassall, 3 Atk. 587. A plea of 
 proceedings in another Court must also show 
 that the object is the same, and that the Court 
 has competent jurisdiction, and that the result 
 of the proceedings therein would be conclusive, 
 so as to bind every other Court. Behrens v. 
 Sieveking, 2 M. & C. 602, 603. 
 
 2 For forms of motion paper and petition, see 
 Vol. III.; and see Leigh v. Turner, 14 W. R. 
 361, M. R. 
 
 3 "The correct practice is a reference to a 
 Master." McEwen v. Broadhead, 11 N. J. Eq. 
 132. 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. XIV. 6, 7. If the defendant 
 takes the objection by answer, instead of plea,
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF, PLEAS. 
 
 638 
 
 the plaintiff set down the plea for argument, it is considered that he 
 admits the fact that a former suit for the same matter is depending, and 
 the plea must, therefore, be allowed, unless it is defective in form. 5 If, 
 however, the plaintiff considers the plea defective in form, he may 
 set it down for argument. 6 Where, however, a plaintiff, after a plea 
 of another suit depending to part of the bill, and an answer to the 
 rest, without moving for the usual reference, replied generally to the 
 answer, without noticing the plea, and witnesses were examined on both 
 sides, and the cause heard and decided in favor of the plaintiff, the 
 defendant, who petitioned for a rehearing, was held to have waived 
 his plea, and was not allowed to avail himself of the objection arising 
 from the plaintiff's irregularity. 7 
 
 If the result of an inquiry into the truth of the plea is, that 
 * both suits are for the same matter, the plea will then be allowed ; * 638 
 but if otherwise, the plea will be overruled. Where, however, it 
 appeared that the second suit embraced more objects than the first, a 
 special order was, as we have seen, made, dismissing the first bill with 
 costs, and directing the defendant to answer the second, upon being paid 
 his costs, as upon plea allowed. 1 
 
 As the pendency of a former suit, unless admitted by the plaintiff, is 
 made the immediate subject of inquiry, a plea of this kind is not put in 
 upon oath. 2 
 
 2. A plea which offers any matter tending to show that the bill, as 
 framed, is insufficient to answer the purposes of complete justice, must, 
 it is evident, be ranked amongst pleas to the bill ; for it does not, in 
 general, dispute the right of the plaintiff, as stated in the record, but 
 
 it seems that he will not be allowed his costs. 
 although the inquiry lie answered in his favor. 
 Long i'. Storie, 9 Hare. 542; Hi Jur. 349. 
 
 5 Ld. Red. 247. The practice mentioned in 
 the text is based upon a rule of Lord Claren- 
 don. Beames's Orders, 176 ; Jones v. Segueira, 
 1 Phil. 83. That rule has not been followed in 
 the United States. In New York, the practice 
 was regulated by an order of Court. 1 Hoff. 
 Ch. Pr. 225. In New Jersey, by statute. Mc- 
 Ewen o. Broad head, 11 N. J. Eq. 132; Matthews 
 v. Roberts, 1 Green Ch. 338. In Tennessee, by 
 the Code, §4393; Olwell v Montgomery, 1 
 Tenn. Ch. 183; Green v. N.-al, 2 Heisk. 217; 
 Macey v. Childress, 2 Tenn. Ch. 23; Allen r. 
 Allen", 3 Tenn. Ch. 145. 
 
 6 Tarleton v. Barnes, 2 Keen. (132. 636. In 
 Jones r. Segueira, 1 Phil. 82; 6 Jur. 183, where 
 the plaintiff, instead of obtaining an inquiry as 
 to the truth of a plea of this kind, tiled a repli- 
 cation; whereupon, the defendant, after the 
 expiration of a month from the filing of the 
 plea, moved upon notice, that the bill might be 
 dismissed with costs, an order to that effect was 
 made by Lord Lyndhurst on appeal, who, more 
 over was of opinion, that the application ought 
 to have been made by a motion of course. 
 
 Where, upon such plea, the defendant ob- 
 
 tains the Master's report in favor of the truth of 
 the plea, he cannot have an order to dismiss the 
 plaintiff's bill on motion. But he must bring 
 the case on to be heard upon the plea and the 
 Master's report, to enable the Court to decide 
 upon the validity of the plea. Hart v. Phillips, 
 9 Paige, 293. 
 
 " Lucas r. Holder, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 41, pi. 3. 
 
 1 Crofts v. Wortley, 1 Ch Cas. 241 : ante, 
 pp. 632-634; and see Leigh v. Turner, 14 W. R. 
 361, M. R. 
 
 2 Urlin v. Hudson, 1 Vern. 332; Ld. Red. 
 247. It is not very distinctly stated in the 
 books whether the rule that a p'ea of this na- 
 ture need not be upon oath, will apply where 
 the suit already pending is in another Court. 
 The reason for its adoption in cases where the 
 suit is in the Court itself, is sufficiently evident 
 when we consider that the pendency of it must 
 be apparent from its own proceedings, of which 
 the Court always takes notice, without further 
 evidence; but with respect to proceedings in 
 another Court (unless they are in the state of 
 perfect records, which can hardly be the case 
 when the suit is still pending), the fact of the 
 pendency of the suit must be established by 
 evidence upon oath in the usual manner. See 
 post, § 3, Form of Pleas. 
 
 635
 
 * 639 PLEAS. 
 
 merely offers a reason why the suit should not proceed as framed. The 
 only reported cases of pleas of this description are, where the objection 
 arises from want of sufficient parties to the bill. There can be no doubt, 
 however, that if it can be shown to the Court that with the parties 
 already before it, the suit has been so framed as to be insufficient to 
 answer the purpose of complete justice, a plea suggesting the facts 
 necessary to make such a case would prevail. 
 
 The question of necessary parties to a suit has been before so fully 
 discussed, that it is unnecessary to enter any further into it in this 
 place. 3 It is merely requisite to remind the reader, that when the 
 defect is not apparent upon the face of the bill, it may be pointed out 
 to the Court by plea : the peculiarities arising from which course of 
 proceeding have been before made the subject of inquiry. 4 
 
 IV. Whatever shows that there is no right which can be made the 
 subject of suit, or whatever is a complete and perpetual bar to the right 
 sued for, may constitute the subject of a plea in bar ; or, as it is 
 expressed in a work on Pleadings at Law, " Whatever destroys the 
 plaintiff's suit, and disables him forever from recovering, may be 
 pleaded in bar." 5 
 
 Pleas in bar are usually ranked under the heads of : 1. Pleas of 
 Acts of Parliaments ; 2. Pleas of Matters of Eecord, or as of 
 
 * 639 * Record, in the Court itself, or some other Court; and 3. Pleas 
 
 of Matters in pats. 1 
 
 1. Any statute, public or private, which may be a bar to the demands 
 of the plaintiff, may be pleaded, with the averments necessary to bring 
 the case of the defendant within the statute, and to avoid any equity 
 which may be set up against the bar created by the statute. 2 
 
 Amongst other statutes which may be thus set up in bar of the plain- 
 tiff's demands, may be mentioned the various statutes which have, from 
 time to time, been passed for the limitation of the time within which 
 actions or suits at Law may be commenced, (a) Pleas of this description 
 
 3 Ante, Chap. V. Parties to a Suit. - Ld Red 274. Semble, defendant may 
 
 4 Ante, p. 290. have the benefit of a statute extinguishing a 
 
 5 Beameson Pleas, 160, citing Lnw on PI. 40. right, without pleading it. De Beauvoir v. 
 l Beames on Pleas, 160; Coop. Eq. PI. 251; Owen. 5 Exch. 166; 16 M. & W. 547; Dawkins 
 
 Story, Eq. PI. §749. The arrangement adopted o. Penrhyn, 6 Ch. D. 318; 4 App. Cas. 51. 
 by Lord Redesdale is somewhat different; see 
 Ld. Red. 236. For form of a plea in bar, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 (a) A plea in Equity of the Statute of Limita- 405. The Statute of Limitations may be set up 
 tions is a pure plea, and is to be accompanied by answer as well as by demurrer in foreclosure 
 by an answer only when the defence is antici- suits. Highstone v. Franks, 93 Mich. 52; see 
 pated and met by the bill. West Portland H. ante, p. 559, notes. This plea is personal. 
 Asfn v. Lownsdale, 17 Fed. Rep. 205. In Sanger v. Nightingale, 122 U. S. 176. 
 Equity the Court may permit a plea of this A plea or answer which sets up usury as a 
 statute to be put in after an answer on the defence must show specifically in what the usury 
 merits. See Bartles v. Gibson, 17 Fed. Rep. consists. Hoskins v. Cole, 34 111. App. 541 : see 
 293. But it is only in an extreme case that post, p. 657, note. A general allegation of usury 
 such plea will be allowed after the Master's set up in defence is insufficient. Ibid.; Good- 
 report is in, the objection not being raised by win r. Bishop, 145 111. 421. In the Federal 
 demurrer or answer. Webb v. Fuller, 83 Maine, Courts, if the plaintiff relies upon a State statute 
 
 636
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. 
 
 *639 
 
 are called Pleas of the Statute of Limitations ; and the statute which, 
 until recent enactments, afforded the most ordinary grounds for pleas 
 of this sort, was the 21 Jac. I. c. 1G. 3 By that Act, § 1, it is enacted 
 that all writs of formedon must be sued out, and all entries into lands 
 by persons having a right of entry must be made, within twenty years 
 next after the title to the person suing out the writ or making the entry 
 accrued; and, by § 3, that all actions upon the case (otherwise than 
 for slander), or for account (other than such accounts as concern the 
 trade of merchandise, between merchants and merchants, their factors 
 or servants), and all actions for trespass, debt, detinue, replevin, &c, 
 and the action of trespass quare clausum f regit, must be commenced 
 within six years next after the cause of such action or suit, and not 
 after. This statute, although its provisions apply only to actions or 
 suits at Law, has, nevertheless, been considered as available as a bar 
 to suits in Equity for analogous purposes, in cases where they were not 
 commenced within the period limited by the Act. 4 
 
 s See also 9 Geo. IV. c. 14, post, p. 645. 
 For forms of pleas under this statute, see 2 Van 
 Hey. 113, 114. As to the application of the 
 statute to cases of mining trespass, see Trotter 
 v. Maclean, 13 Ch. P. 574. 
 
 * See Ld. Red. 273, n. (2); Coop. Eq. PI. 
 251; Beanies on Pleas, 161; Story, Eq. PL 
 § 751. The rule in Courts of Equity now is, 
 that they will take notice of the Statute of 
 Limitations, and apply it in the same manner as 
 Courts of Law. Conoveru. Conover, 1 Saxton 
 (N. J.), 403; see ante, p. 559, 560, and notes; 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 751, et seq. ; Miller v. Mclntire, 
 G Peters, 61; Stackhouse v. Barnston, 10 Sum- 
 ner's Ves. 453, note (e), and cases cited ; Towns- 
 hend v. Townshend, 1 Bro. C. C. (Perkins's 
 ed.) 555, note ('/), and American cases cited; 
 Watkins v. Harwood, 2 Gill & J. 307; Carroll 
 v. Waring, 3 id. 401 ; Harris v. Mills, 28 III. 
 44 ; Cameron v. San Francisco, 68 Cal. 390. 
 Where a plaintiff's right to 1 inds had accrued 
 thirty years before the tiling (if the bill, the 
 Court allowed a plea of the Statute of Limita- 
 tions to prevail, the plaintiff having been so 
 circumstanced that, although he could not bring 
 an ejectment, he might have brought a bill in 
 Equity. And so it has been held, that the 
 statute may be pleaded to a bill to redeem a 
 mortgage, if the mortgagee had been in posses- 
 sion twenty years. Ld. Red. 271, 272; Coop. 
 Eq. PI. 251; Beames on Pleas, 162; Story. Eq. 
 PI. 757. Now, however, the statutes properly 
 applicable to lands, rents, redemption of mort- 
 gages, &c, are the 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27; 7 
 Will. IV. & 1 Vic. c. 28; and see post, p. 598; 
 Hardy v. Reeves, 4 Sumner's Ves 466, note 
 (6), and cases cited; Story. Eq. PI. § 757: 
 Acherley v. Roe, 5 Sumner's Ves. 573. Per- 
 
 kins's note (a), and cases cited; Trash v. White, 
 3 Bro. C. C. (Perkins's ed.) 291, notes. If the 
 mortgagee gets into possession, and continues 
 in possession twenty years without any acknowl- 
 edgment of the mortgage title, the mortgagor is 
 barred of his redemption. Gates v. Jacob, 1 B. 
 Mon. 308; Hatfield v. Montgomery, 2 Porter, 
 58; Phillips v. Sinclair, 20 Maine, 269; De- 
 marest ». Wynkoop, 3 John. Ch. 129. So when 
 the statutory period necessary to bar a recovery 
 at Law has passed, a foreclosure in Equity will 
 be barred. Harris v. Mills, 28 III. 44. But an 
 acknowledgment of the mortgage title within 
 twenty years before filing the bill for redemp- 
 tion or for foreclosure, maintains the equity of 
 redemption, or the right to foreclosure. Hodle 
 v. Healey, 6 Mad 181; Rayner v. Castlee, id. 
 274; Cheever V. Perley, 11 Allen, 584. As 
 where the mortgagee has treated it as a mort- 
 gage by keeping accounts, and in other ways. 
 See Glee v. Manhattan Co. 1 Paige, 48; Fenwick 
 v. Macey, 1 Dana, 279; Hughes v. Kd wards, 9 
 Wheat. 489; Dexter v. Arnold, 3 Sumner. 152; 
 Edsell v. Buchanan, 3 Bro. C. C. (Perkins's 
 ed.) 254, 256. The time is to be computed from 
 the last period at which the parties treated the 
 transaction as a mortgage. Shepperd v. Mur- 
 dock, 3 Murph. 218. The statute may also be 
 pleaded to a bill to prevent the setting up of an 
 outstanding term, and for discovery (Jeremy 
 V. Rest. 1 Sim. 373, 375); and to a bill for dis- 
 covery only (Beames on Pleas, 275: Gait '•. 
 Osbaldeston, 1 Russ. 158; Mendizabel v. Ma- 
 chado, 1 Sim. 68, 77; Macgregor v. East India 
 Co. 2 Sun. 452. 455; Scott V. Broadwood, 2 
 Coll. 447. 456: 10 Jur. 214; Wigram on Disc. 
 35: see also Ld. Red. 269 ; Dean of Westminster 
 v. Cross, Bunb. 60; Baillie v. Sibbard, 15 Ves. 
 
 making a prima facie case for relief, he Kenzie, 90 Tenn. 167, it was held that forgery 
 should plead or answer, and not demur, (irif- may be pleaded to a suit upon a written instru- 
 fing v. Gibb, 2 Black, 519. In Powers v. Mc- menl without a formal plea of nan est factum. 
 
 637
 
 * 641 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 * 640 * The statute may be pleaded to a bill which seeks the payment 
 
 of a debt, provided such debt be due upon simple contract, and 
 operates as a bar to discovery as to when the debt was due. 1 If, 
 however, the bill alleges that if the defendant would discover books and 
 papers in his possession, the plaintiff would thereby be enabled to show 
 that the debt became due, or was acknowledged since the period limited 
 by the statute, the defendant must, if interrogated, give discovery as to 
 such documents. 2 
 
 The Statute 21 Jac. I. c. 16 may also be pleaded to all bills for account, 
 
 except where the account relates to the trade of merchandise between 
 
 merchants : which species of account is, as we have seen, expressly 
 
 * 641 excepted out of the statute. 3 Thus, where one had * received the 
 
 profits of an infant's estate, (a) and, after six years had elapsed 
 from his coming of age, the infant brought a bill for an account, it was 
 held that this statute was a bar to such suit, as it would be to an action 
 at Common Law for the same purpose. 1 It has been held that this 
 statute would operate as a bar, where the accounts ceased six years 
 before the filing of the bill. 2 (b) 
 
 185, and post, Chap. XXXIV. § 2, Bills of 
 Discovery); though it was formerly considered 
 that the latter could not be done. Hindman v. 
 Taylor, 2 Bro. C. C.7, 10; Scott v. Broadwood, 
 2 Coll. 4-17; Hamilton v. Wood, 3 Edw. Ch. 106; 
 see the remarks upon the case of Hindman p. 
 Taylor, cited in support of the text, in Wigram 
 on Discov. (1st Am. ed.) pi. 66, et seq., p. 33, 
 et seq., where the learned author expresses his 
 dissent from the judgment of Lord Thurlow in 
 that case, and cites the authorities which refer 
 to and notice it. See Mendizabel v. Machado, 
 
 1 Sim. 68; Macgregor v. East India Co. 2 Sim. 
 452; Cork v. Willock, 5 Mad. 331; Story, Eq. 
 PI. §821, and notes, in which the author remarks 
 that the reasoning of Mr. Wigram, dissenting 
 from Lord Thurlow, is very able. 
 
 i Ld. Red. 269. 
 
 2 Ante, p. 618; see Bailey v. Adams, 6 Ves. 
 586, 598. 
 
 3 The accounts must be " such as concern 
 the trade of merchandise," " between merchant 
 and merchant, their factors and servants.'' See 
 W. W. Story, Contracts, 702: Blair v. Drew, 6 
 N. H. 235; Codman v. Rodgers, 10 Pick. 118; 
 Spring v. Gray, 5 Mason, 528; S. C. 6 Peters, 
 151; Coster i>. Murray, 5 John. Ch. 522, 583, 
 592, 599 ; Price v. Upshaw, 2 Humph. 142. 
 Unliquidated accounts between merchants in the 
 capacity of principal and factor have been held 
 to be within the exception. Stiles v. Donaldson, 
 
 2 Dall. 264 ; S. C. 2 Yates, 105. The exception 
 of merchants' accounts does not apply to stated 
 accounts. Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300. 
 
 1 Lockey ». Lockey, Prec. in Ch. 518. See 
 Knox v. Gye, L. R. 5 H. L. 656. Long acqui- 
 escence and lapse of time are, by analogy, or in 
 obedience to the Statute of Limitations, a bar 
 to a bill for an account. Acherley v. Roe, 5 
 Yes. 565; Baker v. Biddle, 1 Bald. 394.418; 
 Graham v. Torrance, 1 Ired. Eq. 210; Parks v. 
 Rucker, 5 Leigh, 149; Ravner v. Pearsall, 3 
 John. Ch. 578; Burton *•. Dickenson, 3 Yerger, 
 112; Drummond v. Duke of St. Albans, 5 Ves. 
 439, note (3) ; Andrew v. Wrigley, 4 Bro. C. C. 
 (Perkins's ed.) 125, 138, and notes; Spring v. 
 Gray, 5 Mason, 527, 528; Sherwood v. Sutton, 
 5 Mason, 143: Lewis v. Marshall, 1 McLean, 
 17; Raymond v. Simonson, 4 Blackf. 83; George 
 v. Johnson, 45 N. H. 456; Atwater r. Fowler, 1 
 Edw. Ch. 417; see also Randolph v. Randolph, 1 
 Hen.&M. 180; Botifearw. W.ynian, 1 M'Cord 
 Ch. 161: Cave v. Saunders, 2 A. K. Marsh. 64; 
 Love v. White, 4 Hayw. 211; Kingsland r. 
 Roberts. 2 Paige, 193 ; Mooers v. White, 6 
 John. Oh. 360; Ives v. Sumner, 1 Dev. Eq. 
 338; Bertien v. Varian, 1 Edw. 343; Farnum 
 v. Brooks, 9 Pick. 213. Between partners. 
 Cowart v. Perrine, 18 N. J. Eq. 454; George v. 
 Johnson, 45 N. H. 456. 
 
 Delay in suing, which results in loss of evi- 
 dence, and places the defendant at a disadvan- 
 tage, will operate to bar relief, although the 
 time allowed by the Statute of Limitations has 
 not yet elapsed. Lawrence v. Rokes, 61 Maine, 
 38; Harrison v. Gibson, 23 Graft. 212. 
 
 2 Welford » Liddel, 2 Yes. Sr. 400 ; Craw- 
 ford v. Liddel, cited 6 Ves. 582; Jolliffe v. Pitt, 
 
 (a) The same rule was recently applied in 
 Ela v. Ela. 158 Mass. 54, upon a bill in Equity 
 for an account of an infant's property which 
 states a case showing a habilitv in trover, but 
 barred bv the Statute of Limitations. A Court 
 
 638 
 
 of Equity is bound to set up the Statute of 
 Limitations in favor of an infant defendant 
 when clearly applicable. Ailing v. Allmg 
 (N. J.), 27 Atl. Rep. 655. 
 
 (b) As between partners seeking an account
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. 
 
 642 
 
 It has been doubted whether transactions between principal and agent 
 came within the exception in favor of merchants' accounts. 8 (c) It has 
 been decided that transactions with a foreign prince and his govern- 
 ment do not concern the trade of merchandise within this statute ; 4 
 and also that a letter of attorney from a merchant to authorize the 
 getting in of debts will not constitute the person thereby deputed a 
 merchant, within the meaning of the exception, 5 which has been con- 
 sidered as applying only to merchants trading beyond sea, and not to 
 inland merchants. 6 The clause relating to merchants' accounts, also, is 
 only applicable to cases where there are mutual accounts and reciprocal 
 demands between two persons, and is inapplicable to accounts between a 
 tradesman and his customer; and it has been determined that, in 
 such accounts, and in all * others where the items are all on one * G42 
 side, the circumstance of the. last item happening to be within six 
 years, does not draw after it those which are of a longer standing. 1 In 
 such cases, the proper course is to plead the statute as to all the items 
 which are within the statute, and answer as to the rest. 
 
 The Statute of Limitations, 21 Jac. I. c. 16, cannot be pleaded in bar 
 to a trust ; 2 and upon this ground it was held that a demand upon 
 the separate estate of a married woman was not barred : because all the 
 separate estate of a, feme covert is a trust. 3 (a) Upon the same principle, 
 
 2 Vera. 694; Bridges v. Mitchell, Gilb. 224; 
 Bunb. 217; Barber v. Barber, 18 Ves. 286; Cos- 
 ter v. Murray, 5 John. Ch. 522, 531 ; Spring v. 
 Gray, 528; S. C. 6 Peters, 151; Union Bank v. 
 Knapp, 3 Pick. 36. 
 
 But in Bass v. Bass, 6 Pick. 362, it was held 
 that the Statute of Limitations conld not be 
 pleaded to an account "concerning the trade in 
 merchandise between merchant and merchant," 
 although none of the items came within six 
 years. See also S. C. 8 Pick. 187; Mandeville 
 v. Wilson, 5 Cranch, 15; Davis v. Smith, 4 
 Greenl. 339; M'Lellan v. Crofton, 6 Greenl. 308; 
 Hancock v. Hancock, 18 Pick. 30. 
 
 3 Jones v. Pengree, 6 Ves. 580, 582. 
 
 4 Start v. Mellish, 2 Atk. 612. 
 
 5 Ibid. 613. 
 
 6 Sherman v. Withers, 1 Ch. Cas. 152; but 
 see Farrindon v. Lee, 1 Mod. 269; 2 Mod. 311; 
 and see now The Mercantile Law Amendment 
 Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vic. c. 97, § 9). 
 
 1 Coop. Eq. PI. 253 ; Coster v. Murray, 5 
 
 John. Ch. 522; Buntin v. Lagow, 1 Blackf. 
 375; Kimball v. Brown, 7 Wend. 322; Ingram 
 v. Sherard, 17 Serg. & R. 347; Gold v. Whit- 
 comb, 14 Pick. 188; Spring v. Gray, 6 Pet. 151; 
 Price v. Upshaw, 2 Humph. 142; Craighead v. 
 Bank, 7 Yerg. 399. 
 
 2 Hollis's case, 2 Ventr. 345 ; Sheldon v. 
 W.Idman, 1 Ch. Cas. 26; Freem. 156. The 
 Statute of Limitations applies to all that class 
 of trusts that become such by matter of evi- 
 dence, but not to express trusts or trusts over 
 which Equity has exclusive jurisdiction. 
 Shelby v. Shelby, Cooke, 179; Merriman v. 
 Cannovan, 1 Tenn. Leg. Rep. 94. A receiver 
 is a trustee for all parties, Seagram v. Tuck, 
 18 Ch. D. 296; as a mortgagee is not always 
 as to surplus moneys on a sale. Banner u, 
 Berridge, 18 Ch. I). 254: see Dooby v. Watson, 
 39 Ch. I). 178; Firth v. Slingsby, 58 L. T. 481; 
 Re Gregson, 36 Ch. D. 223. 
 
 3 Norton v. Turvill, 2 P. Wins, 144. 
 
 and settlement of the firm's affairs, in the ab- 
 sence of an express contract, or of conduct of 
 the parties working an extension of the time 
 for bringing a suit, the statute begins to run at 
 tlie dissolution of the firm. See Knox v. Gye, 
 L. R. 5 H. L. 656; Noyes v. Crawlev, 10 Ch l>. 
 31: Riddle v. Whitehall, 135 U. S. 621, 636; 
 Zed's Appeal, 126 Penn. St. 329; Currier v. 
 Studley, 159 Mass. 17. 
 
 (c) It is now settled that an agent, who 
 stands in a fiduciary relation to his principal, 
 cannot set up the Statute of Limitations in bar 
 
 of a suit for an account by the latter. Burdick 
 v. Garri.k, L. R. 5 Ch. 233; Re Bell, Lake v. 
 Bell, 34 Ch. I). 462. 
 
 ('/) The decision cited for this statement 
 (Norton v. Turvill) is explained in Re Lady 
 Hastings, Hallett v. Hastings, 35 Ch. D. 94, 
 where it was held that the Statute of Limita- 
 tions applies to a married woman's debts pay- 
 able nut of her separate estate. Sealso Hodgson 
 i'. Williamson, 15 Ch. D. 87; Beck ». Pierce, 
 23 Q. B. D. 316, 322. 
 
 639
 
 * 643 PLEAS. 
 
 it is held that where a debtor creates, by his will, a trust or charge for 
 the payment of his debts out of real estate, such a trust will prevent 
 the statute from operating upon a debt not barred at the time of the 
 creation of the trust. 4 The rule does not apply to a trust for the pay- 
 ment of debts out of personal estate ; 6 and it seems that a devise for 
 the payment of debts will not have the effect of reviving debts barred 
 by the statute, upon the death of the devisor. 6 
 
 It has been held, that although, if a man has a debt due to him, and 
 has made no demand of it for six years, he is barred by the Statute of 
 Limitations, yet if the debtor, after the six years, publishes an advertise- 
 ment in the Gazette, or any other newspaper, that if all persons, who 
 have any debts owing to them from him, will apply to such a place, they 
 will be paid, the operation of the statute will be defeated ; 7 and it seems 
 that such a notice, by a personal representative, would have the same 
 effect, although it would appear that an advertisement requesting all 
 persons, having claims on the estate, to send in the statements of their 
 demands prior to their being laid before a particular person, by whom 
 the persons claiming were to submit them to be examined, would not take 
 a debt, previously barred, out of the operation of the statute. 8 (b) 
 
 * 643 It may here be mentioned, * that where a debt had become barred 
 
 by the statute after the death of the creditor, it was held to be 
 revived b} r the debtor proving the creditor's will. 1 
 
 The principle of the rule, that the creation of a trust for the benefit 
 of creditors will prevent the application of the Statute of Limitations, 
 extends to proceedings in bankruptcy ; and, therefore, it was deter- 
 mined that, after a commission had issued, the Statute of Limitations 
 did not f)revail against the creditor of a bankrupt.' 2 It was also held, 
 that where a man had taken advantage of the Act for the relief of insol- 
 vent debtors, the statute did not apply ; and that, where a person who 
 had taken the benefit of the Act twice had died, leaving assets more than 
 
 4 Burke v. Jones, 2 V. & B. 275; Hughes 6 Burke v. Jones, 2 V. & B. 275, 291; see 
 r. Wynne, T. & R 307, 309; Hargreaves v. also Executors of Fergus v. Gore, 1 Sen. & Lef. 
 Michell, 6 Mad. 326 ; Rendell v. Carpenter, 107; Stackhouse v. Bamston, 10 Ves. 453, 469; 
 2 Y. & J. 484; Scott v. Jones, 4 CI. & Fin. 382; Ex parte Roffey, 19 Ves. 468, 470; Stanton v. 
 S. C. Jones v. Scott, 1 R. & M. 255; see also Knight, 1 Sim. 482. See Poole v. Poole, L. R. 
 Freake v. Cranefeldt, 3 M. & C. 499; 2 Jur. 7 Ch. 17; Thomson v. Eastwood, 2 App. Cas. 
 1080. See next note. 215; and see now 36 & 37 Vic. c. 66; 37 & 38 
 
 5 Jones v. Scott, ubi supra ; Lyon v. Col- Vic. c. 57, § 10. 
 
 ville, 1 Coll. 449; Evans v. Tweedy, 1 Beav. 55, "' Andrews v. Brown, Prec. in Ch. 385. 
 
 58. The reason is. that the personal estate is 8 Jones r. Scott, 1 R. & M. 255; 4 CI. & Fin. 
 
 already liable by law for the payment of debts. 382. In that case, however, the Court did not 
 
 And, for the same reason, where, as in the come to any express decision upon the point: 
 
 United States, the realty is already liable for though Lord Brougham appears to have inti- 
 
 debts, a devise for the payment of debts will mated an opinion that it would. 1 R. & M. 
 
 not create a trust which will prevent the run- 270; but see 3 M. & C 502. 
 
 ning of the statute. Gardner v. Gardner, 3 * Ingle v. Richards (No. 2), 28 Beav. 366; 
 
 Mason, 178; Mines v. Spruill, 1 D. & B. Eq. 6 Jur. N. S. 1178. 
 
 101 : Hubbard v. Epps, 1 Tenn. Les. Rep. 320; 2 Ex parte Koss, 2 Glyn & J. 46. 
 
 Glenn v. Maguire, 3 Tenn. Ch. 698; Perry on 
 
 Trusts, § 560. 
 
 (b) The sending in of his claim by a creditor is not equivalent to bringing suit. Re Ste- 
 phens, 43 Ch. D. 39. 
 640
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. 
 
 643 
 
 sufficient to pay all the debts contracted after his second insolvency, 
 the debts scheduled under his first insolvency were not barred by the 
 statute. 3 
 
 A decree for the payment of debts, under a creditor's bill for the 
 administration of assets, is also considered as a trust for the benefit of 
 creditors, and will, in like manner, prevent the statute from barring the 
 demand of any creditor coming in under the decree : 4 the creditor's de- 
 mand, however, must not have been barred at the time when the suit was 
 instituted ; for, if the creditor's demand would have been barred by the 
 statute before the commencement of the bill, the statute may be set up. 8 
 It has been held that it was the decree only which created the trust, 
 and that the mere circumstance of the bill having been filed, although it 
 might have been pending six years, would not take the case out of the 
 statute ; 6 but according to the later decisions, it seems that the filin°- of 
 the bill will operate by itself to save the bar of the statute, though the 
 plaintiff, by delay in prosecuting the suit, may disentitle himself to 
 relief. 7 (a) And the dismissal of the bill will not prevent the defendant, 
 in a new suit, from taking the benefit of the statute. 8 The Statute of 
 Limitations is a provision of the Lex Fori, and a foreign creditor may 
 bring his suit within the period prescribed by the local statute, although 
 barred in the foreign Courts. 9 
 
 It may be here noticed that in the administration of assets under a 
 creditor's bill, executors are not bound to plead the Statute of Limita- 
 tions ; 10 and that the executor is entitled, in such a suit, to retain his 
 own debt though barred by the statute. 11 (b) If the statute has not 
 
 3 Barton v. Tattersall, 1 R. & M. 237; see 
 Re Smith, 24 Ch. D. 72. 
 
 * Sterndale v. Hankinson, 1 Sim. 393, 398; 
 Foster v. M'Kenzie, 17 Beav. 414 ; see Re 
 Greaves, 18 Ch. D. 551; King v. Malcott, 9 
 Hare, 692. 
 
 6 Shewen v. Vanderhorst, 1 R. & M. 347, 
 352; 2 id. 75; Updike v. Doyle, 7 R. I. 446, 
 460. 
 
 6 Laker. Hayes, 1 Atk. 281 ; Anon. 2 Atk. 1. 
 
 1 Coppin r. Gray, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 205 207; 
 6 Jur. 312; Purcel] v. Blennerliassett, 3 Jo. & 
 Lat. 24, 45; Forsterr. Thompson, 4 Dr. & War. 
 303, 318; HeJe v. Lord Bexley, 20 Beav. 127; 
 Manby r. Manby, 3 Ch. D. 101; see Re 
 Greaves, 18 Ch. D. 551. 
 
 8 Sterndale v. Hankinson, ubi supra. 
 
 9 Harris v. Quine, L. R. 4 Q. B. 653; Finch 
 v. Finch, W. N. (1876)241; see Mostyn v. Fab- 
 rigas, 1 Smith, L. C. 652, and notes. 
 
 10 Ex parte Dewdney, 15 Ves. 498: Alston 
 v. Trollope, L. R. 2 Eq. 205, M. R.; 35 Beav. 
 466; Adams v. Waller, 35 L. J. Ch. 727; Lord 
 
 (a) If there is unreasonable delav in taking 
 out or serving the subpoena after the bill is filed, 
 the bill may be ordered taken from the files. 
 See cases in note 7 above; Boyd v. Higginson, 
 
 VOL. I. 41 
 
 Castleton v. Lord Fanshaw, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 305, 
 pi. 13, Prec. in Ch. 99; see now Re Wenham, 
 Hunt?'. Wenham, [1892] 3 Ch. 59. 
 
 11 Stahlschmidt v. Lett, 1 Sm.&G.415; Hill 
 v. Walker, 4 K. & J. 166. In Scott v. Han- 
 cock, 13 Mass. 164, it is said to be settled that 
 an administrator is not bound to plead the gen- 
 eral Statute of Limitations in bar to an action 
 on a debt of his intestate. So in Tennessee, 
 although the heir may, to protect realty des- 
 cended. Pea v. Waggoner, 5 Havw. 1; Brown 
 v. Porter, 7 Humph. 372. And if there are 
 several heirs, one may plead the statute in pro- 
 tection of his share, while the others do not. 
 Woodfin V. Anderson, 2 Tenn. Ch. 331. And 
 see Briffffs v. Wilson, 5 De G. M. & G. 12. 
 note; Ritter's Appeal. 23 Penn. St. 95; Miller 
 v. Dorsey, 9 Md. 317. But see contra, Pa'ter- 
 son v. Cohb, 4 Fla. 481. See also West r. 
 Smi-h. 8 How. (IT. S.) 402, 412. See also 
 Smith's Estate, 1 Ashmead, 352; but see the 
 remarks of Rayley J. in McCullock v. Dawes, 
 9 Dowl. & Ryl. 40, on this point. 
 
 Flan. & Kel. 603; Bancroft v. Sawin, 143 Mass. 
 144. 
 
 (b) The rule that an executor cannot be com- 
 pelled to set up the Statute of Limitations 
 
 641
 
 * 644 PLEAS. 
 
 * 644 been taken advantage of * by the executors, and a decree for 
 
 an account of debts has been pronounced, the statute may be set 
 up in the course of the proceedings, as well by a creditor or legatee 
 as by a personal representative, 1 against all the creditors except the 
 plaintiff. 2 
 
 The rule, that trusts are not within the Statute of Limitations, applies 
 only between trustees and cestui que trusts, 5 not between trustees or 
 cestui que trusts and third persons ; and, therefore, it has been held, that 
 where an executor, or administrator, or trustee for an infant, neglects 
 to sue within the time, the Statute of Limitations will bind the infant, 
 and prevent his suing the debtor, 4 although it would not prevent the 
 infant from suing his trustee for a breach of trust; and so it has been 
 determined, that the Statute of Limitations will bar a bill for an account 
 of rent of land held of trustees. 5 The rule also will not hold, where 
 the claim is made against a trustee by implication ; more especially 
 where such implication is raised upon a doubtful point. 6 The rule, in 
 fact, can only be taken to apply to those cases where the possession of 
 the trustee cannot be considered as adverse to that of the cestui que 
 trust : if the possession of the trustee is adverse, the statute may be 
 pleaded ; 7 ( thus, it was held, that in the case of parceners and joint- 
 tenants, they are accountable to each other, without regard to the 
 length of time, because the possession of one being the possession of 
 all, there is a mutual possession between them ; but it is otherwise in 
 the case of tenants in common, where the possession of one may be 
 adverse to that of the other. 8 (a) Where the trustee could not have set 
 up the analogy of the statute, his representative cannot do so. 9 
 
 1 Shewen v. Vanderhorst, ubi supra; Moo- Ivey, 1 Yerger, 297; Turners. Debell. 2 A. K. 
 die v. Bannister, 4 Drew. 432; 5 Jur. N. S. Marsh. 384; Bigelow v. Bigelow, 6 Ham. 97; 
 402; Fuller v. Redman, 26 Beav. 614. Kane r. Bloodgood, 7 John. Ch. 90; Farnum r. 
 
 2 Briggs v. Wilson, 5 De G. M. & G. 12; Brooks, 9 Pick. 242-244; Williams v. Watkins, 
 Fuller v. Redman, ubi supra; Adams v. Wal- 3 Peters, 51, 52; Cowart v. Pernne, 18 N. J. 
 ler, W. N. (1866) 200; 14 W. R. 783; Phillips Eq. 454, 457; Conover t. Conover, Saxton, 403; 
 r. Beal, 32 Beav. 26. And as to the Court tak- Wanmaker v. Van Buskirk, id. 685; Allen v. 
 ing the objection, see Alston r. Trollope, 35 Woolley, 1 Green Ch. 209; Stark v. Hunton, 
 Beav 466 ; L. R. 2 Eq. 205. 2 Green Ch. 311. See now, Supreme Court of 
 
 3 In case of a direct trust, no length of Judicature Act, 1873, L. R. 8 Stat. 319. 
 
 time bars the claim between trustee and cestui 4 Wych v. East India Co. 3 P. Wms. 309; 
 
 que trust. Cook p. Williams, 1 Green Ch. 209. see Ewing v. Shannahan (Mo), 20 S. W. Rep. 
 
 Baker v. Whiting, 3 Sumner, 476; Armstrong 1065. 
 
 v. Campbell, 3 Yerger, 201; Overstreet v. Bate, 5 Hercy v. Ballard, 4 Bro. C. C. 468. 
 
 1 J. J. Marsh. 370; Coster r. Murray, 5 John. 6 Townshend r. Townshend, 1 Cox, 28; 
 
 Ch. 224 ; Gist v. Cattel, 2 Desaus. 53*; Thomas 1 Bro. C. C. 550, 554; Warner v. Jacob, 20 Ch. 
 
 r. White, 3 Litt. 177; Pinkerton v. Walker, D. 220. As to directors of a company, see Be 
 
 3 Hayw. 221; Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, Exchange Banking Co. 21 Ch. D. 519. 
 
 16; Terrill v. Marry, 4 Yerger, 104; Wisner 7 Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, 2 Sch. & 
 
 v. Barnet, 4 Wash. C. C. 631; Bryant v. Puck- Lef. 633. 
 
 ett, 3 Hayw. 252; Fisher v. Tucker, 1 M'Cord 8 Prince v. Heylin, 1 Atk. 493; Cox p. 
 
 Ch. 169; Van Rhyn p. Vincent, id. 314: De- Dolman, 2 De G. M. & G. 592, 597. 
 
 couche v. Savetier, 3 John. Ch. 216; Warn- 9 Brittlebank v. Goodwin, L. R. 5 Eq. 545 ; 
 
 burzee p. Kennedy, 4 Desaus. 474; Pinson v. Re Burge, 57 L. T. 364. 
 
 against just deb f s applies both at Law and in such a debt, he commits a devastavit, and he 
 
 Equity; but an executor or administrator can- cannot retain such debt if due to himself. Re 
 
 not thus deal with a debt which cannot be en- Rownson, Field v. White, 29 Ch. D. 358. 
 forced under the Statute of Frauds. If he pavs (a) In cases of partnership any claim on 
 
 642
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. 
 
 645 
 
 * Although it is a rule in Equity that no length of time will bar * 645 
 a fraud, yet a transaction cannot be impeached on the ground of 
 fraud, where the fact of its having been committed has been within the 
 knowledge of the party for many years ; l if, therefore, the bill states 
 circumstances of fraud, and that the plaintiff did not become apprised of 
 them till after the period limited by the statute had expired, a plea of 
 the Statute of Limitations will not prevail, unless the defendant meets 
 such statement by an averment and answer, negativing the fraud, 2 or the 
 fact of the discovery within the time specified in the bill. 3 The same 
 rules which are applied by Courts of Equity to cases of fraud, will also 
 be applied to cases of mistake ; and it has been held, where there has 
 been a mistake, that the statute will not operate till after the expiration 
 of six years from the discovery of it. 4 (a) The principle upon which this 
 rule is founded is, that the statute runs from every new right of action 
 or suit which accrues to the plaintiff, and that the discovery of the fraud 
 gives to the plaintiff a new right ; but if he does not proceed within the 
 time limited by the statute from such discovery, he will be barred. 5 This 
 
 i Gould r. Gould, 3 Story, 516. 
 
 2 See Goodrich p. Pendleton, 2 John. Ch. 
 384. 
 
 3 Hovenden p. Lord Annesley, ubi supra ; 
 Blennerhassett v. Day, 2 Ball & B. 118; Whal- 
 ley v. Whalley, 3 Bligh, 1, 12; 1 Mer. 430; 
 Blair p. Bromley, 2 Phil. 354, 360; 11 Jur. 
 617; 5 Hare, 542; Beaden p. King, 9 Hare, 
 4D9; see Moore p. Knight, [1891] 1 Ch. 547: 
 Gibbs p. Guild, 8 Q. B. D. 296; 9 id. 59; Arm- 
 strong v. Milburn, 54 L. T. 247, 723; Barber v. 
 Houston, 18 L. R. Ir. 475; 14 id. 273. 
 
 In cases of fraud the Statute of Limitations 
 begins to run from the time of the discovery of 
 the fraud. See Homer v. Fish, 1 Pick. 438; 
 Wells p. Fish, 3 Pick. 74, 76 (2d ed.); Jones v. 
 Conoway, 4 Yeates, 109; Sherwood P.Sutton, 
 5 Mason, 143; Harsell p. Kelley. 2 M'Cord, 
 426; Bishop p. Little, 3 Greenl. 405; Moreton 
 r. Chandler, 8 Greenl. 9; Hamilton p. Shep- 
 pard, 2 Murph. 115; Payne v. Hathaway, 3 Vt. 
 212; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 1521, 1521 a ; Shelby 
 >: Shelby, Cooke, 183; Pugh p. Bell, 1 J. J. 
 Marsh. 401; Crane v. Prather, 4 id. 77; Croft 
 v. Arthur, 3 Desaus. 323; Wamburze p. Ken- 
 nedy, 4 id. 474; Hadix v. Davison, 3 Mon. 
 40; Cole p. M'Glathry, 9 Greenl. 131; Shield 
 v. Anderson, 3 Leigh, 729 ; Eigleburger p. 
 
 simple contract by one partner against the 
 others, after dissolution, is prima facie barred 
 at the end of the statutory period; but while the 
 partnership continues, claims between the part- 
 ners are not affected by the statute. See Bar- 
 ton p. North Staffordshire Ry. Co. 38 Ch. D. 
 458; ante, p. 641, note (6). 
 
 (a) Parties may, however, be estopped by 
 their conduct in case of mistake. Thus, after 
 money is paid under a decree based on a 
 
 Kibler, 1 Hill Ch. 121; Haywood B. Marsh, 6 
 Yerger, 60; Lafferty v. Turley, 3 Sneed, 170; 
 Pennock p. Freeman, 1 Watts, 401; Bertine v. 
 Varian, 1 Edw. Ch. 342; Hunter v. Spotswood, 
 1 Wash. 146 ; Warner e Daniels, 1 Wood. & 
 M. 90; Radcliff p. Rowley, 2 Barb. Ch. 23; 
 Baker «. Grundy, 1 Duvall (Ky.), 281; Gibson 
 p. Fifer, 21 Texas, 260; Myers c. Hanlon, 12 
 Rich. (S. C.) Eq. 196; Martin p. Martin, 35 
 Ala. 560; Longworth p. Hunt, 11 Ohio St. 194; 
 Smith p. Fly, 24 Texas, 345: Smith p. Drake, 
 23 N. J. Eq. 302. But the bar created by the 
 Statute of Limitations is not avoided by mere 
 constructive fraud. Farnam p. Brooks, 9 Pick. 
 212. Nor is the bar avoided by a fraud which 
 the party has the full means of discover- 
 ing. Farnam p. Brooks, 9 Pick. 212; Cole p. 
 M*Glathry, 9 Greenl. 131; Dodge p. Fssex 
 Ins. Co. 12 Gray, 65, 71; Haynie r. Hall, 5 
 Humph. 290. 
 
 4 Brooksbank p. Smith, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 58, 
 60: Dodge p. Essex Ins. Co. 12 Gray, 05. 71; 
 Hough p. Richardson, 3 Story, 659; Thomas 
 p. Marshall, 30 Ala. 504: Gibson p. Filer, 21 
 Texas, 200; Smith c. Fly. 24 Texas, 345. 
 
 5 Hovenden p. Lord Annesley, 2 Sch. & Lef. 
 636; South Sea Co. p. Wymondseil, 3 P. Wins. 
 143. 
 
 certain construction of an agreement, a suit 
 cannot be maintained to rectify the agree- 
 ment on the ground that such construction was 
 contrary to the intention of nil parties. Caird 
 v. Moss, 33 Ch. 1). 22. In Onward Building 
 Society p. Smithson, [1893] 1 Ch. 1, it was 
 questioned whether a plea of fraud by a de- 
 fendant against whom an estate has been cre- 
 ated by estoppel, is well answered by the reply 
 of purchase for value without notice. 
 
 643
 
 646 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 rule, which appears to have been the one relied upon by the Courts under 
 the old Statute of Limitations, 21 Jac. I. c. 16, has been distinctly em- 
 bodied in the Act of 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, § 26. 6 
 * 646 * Acting upon the principle above laid down, that the period 
 when every new right of action or suit accrues to the party 
 should be the period from which to date the operation of the statute, 
 the Courts have held that where any new promise or any acknowledg- 
 ment has been given by the debtor to the creditor or his agent, 1 it con- 
 fers a new right of action upon the creditor ; and that, therefore, the 
 time within which the creditor's remedy would be barred must be reck- 
 oned from the time of such acknowledgment or promise beiug given. 2 
 Upon this principle the Courts have held that payment of any part of 
 the principal or interest, within the period limited, is a sufficient ac- 
 knowledgment to take the case out of the statute. 3 So they have held 
 the rendering an account, or an offer to account, to be sufficient to pre- 
 vent the bar. 4 
 
 Formerly, the Courts acted with very considerable laxity in their 
 decisions upon the nature of the acknowledgment which, in the case 
 of demands arising upon simple contracts, would be sufficient to take 
 them out of the Statute of Limitations, which laxity gave rise to 
 various questions as to the proof and effect of acknowledgments and 
 promises, offered in evidence, for the purpose of taking the case out 
 of the operation of the statute. These questions have now, however, 
 in a great measure, been set at rest ; for, by Lord Tenterden's Act, 
 it has been declared, that, in actions of debt or upon the case, grounded 
 on any simple contract, no acknowledgment or promise by words 
 only shall be deemed sufficient evidence of a new or continuing con- 
 tract, whereby to take any case out of the operation of the statute, 
 21 Jac. I. c. 16, or to deprive any party of the benefit thereof, unless 
 such acknowledgment or promise shall be made or contained by or in 
 some writing, to be signed by the party chargeable thereby ; 5 and by 
 
 
 6 So in Massachusetts, where the fraud is 
 concealed by the person liable to the action. 
 Pub. Stats, c. 197, § 14. In Maine there must 
 be proof of actual fraud and concealment by 
 the party sought to be charged. Cole v. 
 M'Glathry, 9 Greenl. 131. 
 
 i Fuller v. Redman, 26 Beav. 614; Bach- 
 man r. Roller. 1 Leg. Rep. 337. 
 
 2 See Bangs v. Hall, 2 Pick. 378; Exeter 
 Bank v. Sullivan, 6 N. H. 135; Whitney v. 
 BL'elow, 4 Pick. 110; Porter v. Hill, 4 Green]. 
 41 ; Deshon v. Eaton, 4 Greenl. 413; Russell v. 
 Copp, 5 X. H. 154; Bailey v. Crane, 21 Pick. 
 324: Illsley v. Jewett, 2 Met. -168. Upon this 
 subject of the revival of the remedy by an 
 acknowledgment of and a new promise to pay 
 the debt, see Ex parte Dewdnev, 15 Sumner's 
 Ves. 479, note ('/), and cases cited; Baillie v. 
 Sibbald, id. 185, note (a). 
 
 3 Hony v. Hony, 1 S. & S. 568, 580; Briggs 
 v. Wilson, 17 Beav. 330; and see Maber v. 
 Maber, L. R. 2 Ex. 153. The weight of au- 
 
 644 
 
 thority seems to be that a payment before 
 the bar of the statute has attached will take 
 the case out of the statute, but not a payment 
 afterwards without more. Steel v. Matthews, 
 7 Yerg. 313; Ellicott U.Nichols, 7 Gill, 80; 
 Schindel r. Gates, 6 Rep. 112; 6 Rich. 28; 6 
 Ired. 341 ; 18 B. Mon. 643. But in Lock v. Wil- 
 son, 9 Heisk. 784, it was held that a payment 
 before the statute had run would, of itself, be 
 no more efficacious than a payment afterwards. 
 
 4 Earl Pomfret v. Lord Windsor, 2 Ves. Sr. 
 485; and see Briggs r. Wilson, 5 De G. M. 
 &G. 12. 
 
 5 9 Geo. IV. c. 14, § 1. As to what is a 
 sufficient acknowledgment, see Lee r. Wilmot 
 L. R. 1 Ex. 364; In re River Steamer Co. 
 L. R. 6 Ch. 822; Bourdin v. Greenwood, L. R. 
 13 Eq. 281; Quincy v. Sharpe, 1 Ex. D. 72; 
 Skeet v. Lindsay, 2 Ex. D. 314; Curwen r. 
 Milburn, 42 Ch. D. 424; Green v. Humphreys, 
 26 Ch. I). 474; Firth v. Slingsby, 58 L. T. 481. 
 It is also declared, by the same section, that
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. * 647 
 
 the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, 6 an acknowledgment or 
 promise by writing, signed by the duly authorized agent of the party 
 chargeable thereby, has, with reference to the provisions of Lord Ten- 
 terden's Act, the same effect as if such writing had been signed by the 
 party himself. 
 
 * Lord Tenterden's Act does not, however, alter or take away * 647 
 or lessen the effect of any paymeut of any principal or interest 
 made by any person whatever ; so that the payment of any interest, or 
 any part of the principal, within the period limited by the 21 Jac. I. 
 c. 16, § 3, will still have the effect of taking the case out of the statute ; 
 but by the 14th section of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, 
 it is enacted that no co-contractor or co-debtor, executor, or adminis- 
 trator of any contractor shall lose the benefit of the 21 Jac. I. c. 16, § 3, 
 so as to be chargeable in respect, or by reason only, of payment of any 
 principal, interest, or other money, by any other or others of such co- 
 contractors or co-debtors, executors, or administrators. 1 
 
 It is to be observed, that the operation of Lord Tenterden's Act is 
 confined to cases of demands arising upon simple contracts : in which 
 cases only it was held, before the passing of the Act, that parol promises 
 or undertakings would destroy the operation of the Statute 21 Jac. I. 
 c. 16. Where the cause of action was a tort, subsequent acknowledg- 
 ments were held nugatory ; 2 and in actions arising upon specialty, the 
 statute did not apply. 
 
 The Statute 21 Jac. I. c. 16 provides, by § 2, that if any person entitled 
 to the writs therein named, or who shall have a right of entry, shall be 
 under the age of twenty-one years, feme covert, non compos mentis, 
 imprisoned, or beyond the seas, 3 such person or his heirs may, not- 
 withstanding the twenty years, by the preceding section limited as the 
 period within which such writs might be sued out or entries made, 
 bring his action or make his entry, as he might have done before the 
 Act, so that such action or entry was brought or made within ten years 
 after his disqualification ceased ; and by § 7, that persons under any of 
 such disqualifications may bring the several actions enumerated in the 
 third section, 4 so that the same be brought within the time before lim- 
 ited for bringing the same after the termination of the disqualification ; 
 
 where there shall be two or more joint contract- 2 Arguendo, Hony v. Hony, 1 S. & S. 568, 
 
 ors, or executors or administrators of any con- 578. 
 
 tractor, no such joint contractors, executor, or 3 It is held in Ohio that the term "beyond 
 
 administrator shall lose the benefit of the 21 Jac. seas," in their statute of 1804, is equivalent to 
 
 I. c. 16, so as to be chargeable in respect or by "without the limits of the State." Richardson 
 
 reason only of any written acknowledgment or *>• Richardson, 6 Ohio, 125. As to the construc- 
 
 promise made and signed by any other or others tion ■ f this term in the statutes of other States, 
 
 of them. To the same effect, see Pub. Stats. see 2 Stark. Ev. (5th Am. ed.) 485, note (3), 
 
 Mass. c. 197, § 18, et seq. tit. Limitations. In Massachusetts it has been 
 
 6 19 & 20 Vic. c. 97, § 13. decided that a citizen of another State, who 
 
 1 See Seager v. Aston, 3 Jur. N. S. 481, has never been in that Commonwealth, is not 
 
 V. C. S. Section 14 is not retrospective. a person "beyond seas, without any of the 
 
 Jackson v. Woolley, 8 El. & Bl. 778; 4 Jur. United States," and therefore not within the 
 
 N. S. 656; and see Thompson r. Waithman, 3 saving clause in the Statute of Limitations. 
 
 Drew. 628; 2 Jur. N. S. 1080; Cockrill v. Stat. 1786, c 52. §4; see Pub. Stats. Mass. c. 
 
 Sparke, 3 F. & F. 150:9 Jur. N. S. 307; 197, §§9, 11 ; Whitney r. Goddard, 20 Pick. 304, 
 
 Watson v. Woodman, L. R. 20 Eq. 721. * Ante, p. 639. 
 
 645
 
 * 648 PLEAS. 
 
 but now, the absence beyond the seas, or the imprisonment of a creditor, 
 does not entitle him to any time within which to bring his action or suit 
 beyond the time fixed by 21 Jac. I. c. 16, § 3. 5 
 
 * 648 * Although the 7th section of the 21 Jac. I. c. 16, provided, as 
 
 above mentioned, for the statute not attaching where the plaintiff 
 was under any of the disabilities therein mentioned, no provision was 
 made to prevent its operating as a bar, during the time the debtor might 
 be out of the jurisdiction. The 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16, § 19, has, however, 
 remedied that defect, and the creditor has under it the same privilege, 
 where the debtor is beyond the seas, as he had by the Statute of James, 
 where he was beyond the seas himself; * but no part of the United King- 
 dom of Great Britain and Ireland, nor the Islands of Man, Guernsey, 
 Jersey, Alderney, and Sark, nor any islands adjacent to any of them, 
 being part of the Queen's dominions, is to be deemed to be beyond seas 
 within the meaning of the last-mentioned Act. 2 
 
 It is right to notice here, that it has been considered that the 21 Jac. I. 
 c. 16 will not be a good plea in a suit against an executor or adminis- 
 trator, where he has not proved the will, or administered ; because 
 no laches can be imputed to a plaintiff for not suing, while there is 
 no executor or administrator against whom he can bring his action : 3 
 but where the allegation of the bill, upon a fair construction, was, that 
 the defendant had possessed the personal estate, and therefore might 
 have been sued as executor de son tort, a plea of the Statute of Limita- 
 tions, by an executor who had not taken out probate till some years 
 after the testator's death, was allowed. 4 And it may be laid down as 
 a general rule, that, wherever a party takes by assignment, from 
 another, the assignee will not be in a better position than the assignor : 
 and therefore, where the Statute of Limitations might have been pleaded 
 against the assignor, it may be equally so against the assignee, whether 
 such assignment be by act between the parties, or by act of law. 5 
 
 It is to be remarked, that previously to the passing of the Statute 
 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, 6 neither the 21 Jac. I. c. 16, nor any of the other 
 statutes for the limitation of actions, applied specifically to Courts of 
 Equity ; though those Courts have, in all cases where legal titles and 
 demands were the subject of litigation, held themselves bound by them, 
 and, in respect of equitable titles and demands, have been influenced in 
 
 s Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856 8 Jolliffe v. Pitt, 2 Vern. 694; 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 
 
 (19 & 20 Vic. c. 97), § 10. This section is re- 305, pi 11; see also Lord Eldon's observations 
 
 trospective. Cornell v. Hudson, 8 EI. & Bl. in Webster v. Webster, 10 Ves. 93. 
 429; 3 Jur. N. S. 1257; Pardo v. Bingham, * Webster v. Webster, ubi supra ; Boat wright 
 
 L. R. 4 Ch. 735. v. Boatwright. L. R. 17 Eq. 71 ; Story, Eq. PI. 
 
 i Sturt v. Mellish, 2 Atk. 612. In Gen. §753: Burditt v. Gew, 8 Pick. 108. 
 Stats. Mass. c. 155, § 9, there are provisions on 6 South Sea Co. v. Wymondsell, 3 P. Wms. 
 
 this subject, (a) 143. 
 
 ' 2 Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856 (19 6 Amended by 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vic. c. 28. 
 
 & 20 Vic. c. 97). § 12. This section is not 
 retrospective. Flood v. Patterson, 29 Beav. 
 295; 7 Jur. N. S. 324. 
 
 {n) Now Pub. Stats, c. 197, §11: see Whitton Mass. 574; 128 Mass. 219; Converse v. John- 
 v. Wass, 109 Mass. 40; Mooar v. Harvey, 125 son, 146 Mass. 20. 
 
 646
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. * C49 
 
 their determination by analogy to them. 7 The first-mentioned 
 statute specifically mentions * suits in Equity amongst the actions * 649 
 and suits to be limited by its operation: it does not, however, 
 apply to any suits but those relating to real property, and moneys charged 
 upon land, and legacies. 1 These provisions have since been extended by 
 the 23 & 24 Vic. c. 38 2 to the case of claims on the personal estates of 
 intestates, and further provisions have been made by the Real Property 
 Limitation Act, 1874. 8 The Statute 21 Jac. I. c. 16 may therefore still 
 be insisted upon, by way of defence in all cases not included in the 3 & 4 
 Will. IV. c. 27, 23 & 24 Vic. c. 38, and 37 & 38 Vic. c. 57, in which it might 
 before have been pleaded. 4 (a) 
 
 It may be useful, in this place, to point out the cases in which the 
 Statute of Limitations of the 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27 operates as a bar to 
 suits in Equity. By the 24th section, all suits in Equity are barred, as 
 against persons claiming any land or rent (within the meaning of the 
 definitions contained in the first section of the Act), unless within the 
 period during which, by virtue of the provisions thereinbefore contained, 
 they might have made an entry or distress, or brought an action to 
 recover the same respectively, if they had been entitled at Law to such 
 estate, interest, or right, as they claim in Equity. This right, however, 
 in the case of an express trust, it is declared, by the 25th section, shall 
 be deemed not to have accrued against the trustee, or those claiming 
 through him, until the actual conveyance to a purchaser for valuable 
 consideration. It is also decreed, that it is only against such purchaser, 
 and any one claiming through him, that the right shall then be deemed 
 to have accrued : so that, as between the trustee and the cestui que trust, 
 the law remains the same as it did before the statute. 5 
 
 It is also declared, by the 26th section, that, in every case of con- 
 cealed fraud, the right to bring a suit in Equity for the recovery of any 
 land or rent, shall be deemed to have accrued at, and not before, the 
 time at which such fraud has, or with reasonable diligence might have 
 
 7 See ante, p. 559; see Langdell, Eq. PI. Yardley v. Holland, L. R. 20 Eq. 428; Fowke 
 
 (2.1 ed.) § 127. v. Draycott, 29 Ch. D. 996; Re Lake's Trusts. 
 
 1 See § 40. For the cases on this section, 63 L. T. 416. In cases of equitable waste, see 
 see Shelford R. P. Acts, 248-262; Sugd. R. P. Dukeof Leeds v. Earl Amherst, 2 Phil. 117, 125; 
 Acts, 120, et seq. 14 Lind. 357; 10 Jur. 956; Duke of Northum- 
 
 2 See § 13. berland v. Bowman, 56 L. T. 773. And as to the 
 
 3 37 & 38 Vic. c. 57. Act generally, Dixon r. Gay fere No. 1, 17 
 
 4 For a collection of cases on the 21 Jac. I. Beav. 421; Sugd. R. P. Acts, 105; see Farnam 
 c. 16, and 9 Geo. IV. c. 14, see Shelford R. P. v. Brooks, 9 Pick. 212; Cole v. M'Glathry, 9 
 Acts, 265-292. Greenl. 131 ; ante, p. 643, note. See now the 
 
 5 For the cases on §§ 24, 25, see Shelford R. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873 (36 & 
 P. Acts, 211, 214, 222: Sugd. R. P. Acts, 93, et 37 Vic. c. 66), §§ 25 (2), 34; Heath v. Pugh, 6 
 seq. ; Dickenson v. Teasdale, 1 De G. J. & S. Q. B. D. 345; afl'd, nom. Pugh v. Heath, 7 
 52; 9 Jur. N. S. 237; Walters v. Webb, L. R. App. Cas. 235: Sands v. Thompson, 22 Ch. D, 
 9 Eq. 83; L. R. 5Ch.531; Pyrah v. Woodcock, 614. As to the statute applying to land not 
 19 W. R. 463; Locking v. Parker, L. R. 8 Ch. superflous, see Bobbett v. South Eastern Ry. 
 30; Browne v. Radford, W. N. (1874) 124; Co. 9 Q. B. D. 424. 
 
 (a) A mere constructive trust will not pre- to be applicable to a suit against a surety ns 
 vent § 8 of this statute from being a bar. Re well as to one against the mortgagor. Re 
 Davis, [1891] 3 Ch. 119. That section appears Frisby, Allison v. Fnsby, 43 Ch. D. 106. 
 
 647
 
 * 650 PLEAS. 
 
 been known or discovered. 6 It also provides, that nothing in that sec- 
 tion shall enable any owner of lands or rents to have a suit in Equity 
 for the recovery of such lands or rents, or for setting aside any convey- 
 ance of such lands or rents, on account of fraud, against any bona fide 
 purchaser for valuable consideration who has not assisted in the com- 
 mission of such fraud, and who, at the time that he made the 
 
 * 650 purchase, did not know, * and had no reason to believe, that any 
 
 such fraud had been committed ; and the 27th section saves the 
 jurisdiction of Courts of Equity on the ground of acquiescence. 1 
 
 Previously to the passing of the Acts now under consideration, a plea 
 of the Statute of Limitations, 21 Jac. I. c. 16 was held to be a good bar 
 to a bill for the redemption of a mortgage, if the mortgagee had been 
 in possession of the mortgaged premises upwards of twenty years ; 2 and, 
 indeed, as we have already seen, demurrers upon that ground have been 
 allowed. 8 The Courts, however, permitted the redemption of mortgages, 
 if, at any time within the period of twenty years, the mortgagee had 
 acknowledged that the estate was redeemable property. For this pur- 
 pose, a positive acknowledgment of the mortgage was not required ; but 
 any act on the part of the mortgagee, or of any one claiming under him, 
 tending to show that he considered the mortgage as still subsisting (such 
 as the keeping of accounts), was considered as sufficient to keep alive 
 the interest of the mortgagor ; 4 nor was it necessary that the acknowl- 
 edgment should have been made to the mortgagor, or to one claiming 
 under him : any act by which the existence of the mortgage was admitted, 
 even in transactions with a third party, was held sufficient ; 5 and so has 
 a recital in a will, or any other deliberate instrument ; 6 and even a parol 
 acknowledgment, provided it was clear and unimpeachable, and made 
 within twenty years, has been permitted to take the case out of the bar 
 created by the statute. 7 The statute 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, § 28, however, 
 made a considerable alteration in the law, in this respect, by enacting, 
 that where a mortgagee shall have obtained the possession or receipt of 
 the profits of any land, or the receipt of any rent comprised in his mort- 
 gage, the mortgagor, or any person claiming through him, shall not bring 
 a suit to redeem the mortgage, but within twelve years next after the 
 time at which the mortgagee obtained such possession or receipt ; unless, 
 in the mean time, an acknowledgment of the title of the mortgagor, or 
 
 6 Cole v. McGlathry, 9 Greenl. 131 ; Ecclesi- Sutton v. Sutton, 22 Ch. D. 511; Fearnside v. 
 
 astical Commissioners v. North Eastern Ry. Co. Hint, id. 579 ; see Be Lake's Trusts, 63 L. T. 
 
 4 Ch. D. 845; Knox v. Gye, L. R. 5 H. L. 656; 416. 
 Gibbs v Guild, 8 Q. B. D. 296; 9 id. 59; ante, 3 Ante, p. 560. 
 
 p. 645, note. * Edsell v. Buchanan, 4 Bro. C. C. 254, 256; 
 
 i For the cases on §§ 26, 27, see Shelford, R. 2 Ves. Jr. 84. 
 P. Acts, 209-212; Sugd. R. P. Acts, 98; Chet- 5 Hardy v. Reeves, 4 Ves. 466, 479; Smart 
 
 ham v. Hoare, L. R. 9 Eq. 571: Vane ». Vane, v. Hunt, cited id 478. 
 
 L. R. 8 Ch. 383; W. N. (1876) 271; Browne v. 6 Ord v. Smith, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 600, pi. 27; 
 
 Radford. W. N. (1874) 124; Willis v. Earl Howe, Perry n. Marston, 2 Rro. C. C. 397, 399; Han- 
 
 W. N. (1880) 165 ; 29 W. R. 70. sard v. Hardy, 18 Ves. 455,469; Price*. Copner, 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 271; Coop. Eq. PI. 254; Beames 1 S. & S 347, 355. 
 on Pleas, 162; Story, Eq. PI. § 757. When a " Rayner v. Oastler. 6 Mad. 274; Whiting v. 
 
 mortgagor's remedy against the land is barred, White, 2 Cox, 290, 295; Perry v. Marston, 2 
 
 the remedy on the covenant is also barred. Bro. C. C. 397, 399. 
 
 648
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. * 651 
 
 of his right of redemption, shall have been given to the mortgagor, or 
 some person claiming his estate, or to the agent of such mortgagor 
 or person, in writing, signed by the mortgagee or the person claiming 
 through him; and in such case, no such suit shall be brought but 
 within twelve years * next after the time at which such acknowl- * 651 
 edgment, or the last of such acknowledgments, if more than one, 
 was given. 1 So that, according to this enactment, no acknowledgment 
 will take a suit for the redemption of a mortgage out of the operation 
 of the Act, unless it is in writing, signed by the mortgagee, or the per- 
 son claiming through him, and given to the mortgagor himself, or to the 
 person claiming the estate, or the agent of such mortgagor or person. 2 
 
 The same section further enacts, that when there shall be more than one 
 mortgagor, or more than one person claiming through the mortgagor or 
 mortgagors, the acknowledgment, if given to any of such mortgagors or 
 persons or his or their agent, shall be as effectual as if the same had been 
 given to all of them ; but where there shall be more than one mortgagee, or 
 more than one person claiming the estate and interest of the mortgagee or 
 mortgagees, such acknowledgment, signed by one or more of such mort- 
 gagees or persons, shall be effectual only as against the party or parties 
 signing as aforesaid, and the person or persons claiming any part of the 
 mortgage money, or land, or rent, by, from, or under him or them, and 
 any person or persons entitled to any estate or estates, interest or 
 interests, to take effect after or in defeasance of his or their estate 
 or estates, interest or interests ; 8 and shall not operate to give to a 
 mortgagor or mortgagors a right to redeem the mortgage, as against the 
 person or persons entitled to any other undivided or divided part of the 
 money, or land, or rent, and where such of the mortgagees or persons as 
 shall have given an acknowledgment shall be entitled to a divided part 
 of the land or rent comprised in the mortgage, or some estate or interest 
 therein, and not to any ascertained part of the mortgage money, the 
 mortgagor or mortgagors shall be entitled to redeem the same divided 
 part of the land or rent, on payment, with interest, of the part of the 
 mortgage money which shall bear the same proportion to the whole of 
 the mortgage money as the value of such divided part of the land or 
 rent shall bear to the value of the whole of the land or rent comprised 
 in the mortgage. 4 
 
 1 See 37 & 38 Vic. c. 57 § 7. 8 The above clause renders the acknowledg- 
 
 2 It was held that the acknowledgment ment valid after twenty vears, not only against 
 need not be given within the twentv years the person signing the same, and those claiming 
 named in the Act (now repealed) of 3&4 Will. under, or in privitv with him, but against all 
 IV. c. 27, § 28, after the mortgagee has entered others, whether claiming bv descent or pur- 
 into possession. Stansfield v. Hobson, 3 De G. chase, in remainder or reversion ; and that there 
 M. & G. 620, 62(5; 16 Beav. 236; since overruled is no saving clause in the Act in favor of per- 
 by Sanders v. Sanders, 19 Ch. D. 373; see also sons under disabilities, such as infancy cover- 
 Pendleton v. Rooth, 1 Giff. 35 ; 5 Jur. N. S. ture &c " ' 
 
 r : /p D « G ; F - V - 8l! 6 Jur - N - S 182; 4<37 i 38 Vic - c - 57 - § 7 - For the cases on 
 
 »uga. K. P. Acts, 113, as to effect of acknowl- § 28, see Shelford. R. P. Acts 212-218- Sugd 
 
 edgment by tenant in tail and heir of the mort- R. P. Acts, 111-118: Richardson v lounge L 
 
 f^!' r, See f " rther Markwick * Hardingham, R. 10 Eq. 275; L. R. 6 Ch. 478: Locking r. 
 
 15 Ch. D. 339; Re Hobbs, Hobbs v. Wade. 36 Parker, L. R. 8 Ch. 30; Lvall v. Fluker W X 
 
 Ch D. 553. For form of plea of the statute, (1873) 208. There is no 'saving as to disabili- 
 
 see Lucas v. Dennison, 13 Sim. 584. ties . Forster v. Patterson, 17 Ch. I). 132; and the 
 
 649
 
 *652 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 * 652 * A bill of foreclosure is a suit for the recovery of the estate, 
 and not of the money, although it may lead to the payment 
 thereof ; and that, therefore, § 40 l of the above statute cannot be 
 pleaded in bar to such a suit. 2 
 
 Before the passing of the 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, it had been repeatedly 
 held, that the Statute of Limitations could not be pleaded to fcu.ts for 
 the recovery of legacies : although the Court, after the lapse of a great 
 time, would, under certain circumstances, presume payment. 8 It was, 
 however, provided, by § 42, 4 that no interest in respect of any legacy 
 
 mortgagor's possession of part does not prevent 
 the statute running in respect of the other part. 
 Kinsman r. Rouse, 17 Ch. D. 104. See also 
 Topham v. Booth, 35 Ch. D. 607; Badeley v. 
 Consolidated Bank, 34 Ch. D. 536, 549 ; 38 id. 
 238. 
 
 1 Sect. 40 of the above Act limits the right of 
 the mortgagee, or other person entitled to any 
 money secured by mortgage, judgment, or lien, 
 or otherwise charged upon or payable out of 
 any land or rent, at Law or in Equity, or to any 
 legacy, bringing any action, suit, or other pro- 
 ceeding to recover such money, but within 
 twenty years next after a present right to 
 receive the same shall have accrued to some 
 person capable of giving a discharge for or 
 release of the same: unless, in the mean time, 
 some part of the principal money, or some 
 interest thereon, shall have been paid, or some 
 acknowledgment of the right thereto shall have 
 been given in writing, signed by the person by 
 whom the same shall be payable or his agent, 
 to the person entitled thereto or his agent; in 
 which case, no such action, suit, or proceeding 
 can be brought but within twenty years after 
 such payment or acknowledgment, or the last 
 of such payments or acknowledgments, if more 
 than one was given. See Cheever v. Perley, 
 11 Allen, 584. Absence beyond the seas, and 
 imprisonment are no longer disabilities within 
 this section; see 19 & 20 Vic. c. 97, § 10, which 
 is retrospective. Cornil! v. Hudson, 8 El. & Bl. 
 429 ; Pardo v. Bingham, L. R. 4 Ch. 735. By the 
 23 & 24 Vic. c. 38, § 13, a provision similar to 
 § 40 is enacted with respect to the case of claims 
 on the personal estate of intestates, the limita- 
 tion being twenty years. For the cases on 
 § 40, see Shelford, R. P. Acts, 248-262 ; Sugd. R. 
 P. Acts, 119-151. See also Cadbury v. Smith, 
 L. R. 9 Eq. 37; Pearse v. Laing, L. R. 12 Eq. 
 41 ; Harlock v. Ashberry, 18 Ch. D. 229; 19 id. 
 539; Newbould v. Smith, 29 Ch. D. 882; Hugill 
 v. Wilkinson, 38 Ch. D. 480; Lewin v. Wilson, 
 11 App. Cas. 639. As to the application of the 
 statute to surplus moneys held by a mortgagee 
 after sale, see Be Alison, Johnson v. Mounsey, 
 11 Ch. D. 284, 298; Mayer v. Murray, 8 Ch. D. 
 424; Talbot r. Frere, 9* Ch. D. 568; Warner v. 
 Jacob, 20 Ch. D. 220; and to trusts for sale, see 
 [bid.; Locking r. Parker, siiprn ; Chapman v. 
 Corpe, 27 W. R. 781; 41 L. T. 22. 
 650 
 
 2 Wrixon v. Vize, 3 Dr. & War. 104, 120, 
 121; Harlock v. Ashberry, supra; Sugd. R. 
 P. Acts, 121, 122; see cuntva, Dearman i\W T yche, 
 9 Sim. 570, 582; see also Searle v. Colt, 1 Y. 
 
 6 C. C. C. 36; Du Vigier «. Lee, 2 Hare, 326, 
 334; 7 Jur. 299; Sinclair v. Jackson, 17 Beav. 
 405; Heath v. Pugh, 6 Q. B. D. 345; 7 App. 
 Cas. 238. The weight of American authority is 
 in accord with the text. Bank of the Metropolis 
 v. Guttschlick, 14 Pet. 19, 32; Heyer v. Pruyn, 
 
 7 Paige, 465; Thayer v. Mann, 19 Pick. 535; 
 Barned v. Barned, 21 N. J. Eq. 245; Terry v. 
 Rosell, 32 Ark. 478; Harris v. Vaughn, 2 Tenn. 
 Ch. 483. In some of the States, a mortgage is 
 treated as a chose in action, a mere security for 
 the debt, and the debt being barred, the lien is 
 also. Anderson r. Baxter, 4 Oreg. 107; With- 
 erell r. Wiberg, 4 Sawyer, 232; Newman v. De 
 Lorimer, 19 Iowa, 244; McMillan v. Richards, 
 9 Cal. 409; Bludworth v. Take, 33 Cal. 264; 
 Moon v. Trask, 7 Wis. 512; Russel v. Ely, 2 
 Black, 576. And it seems, an action on the 
 mortgage may be barred although the debt oe 
 not. Eubanks v. Leveridge, 4 Sawyer, 274. 
 
 3 Anon. Freeman. 22, pi. 20; Parker v. Ash, 
 1 Vern. 256; Fotherby v. Hartridge, 2 Vera. 
 21 ; Wood v. Briant, 2 Atk. 521; Jones v. Tur- 
 berville, 2 Ves. Jr. 11, 13; 4 Bro. C. C. 115; 
 cited 2 Ves. Jr. 280; Higgins v. Crawfurd, id. 
 571; Sauzer v. De Meyer, 2 Paige. 574; Kane 
 v. Bloodgood, 7 John. Ch. 90; Andrews r. 
 Sparkhawk, 13 Pick. 393. Though the Stat- 
 ute of Limitations is no bar to a legacy, yet the 
 Court, in regard to very stale demands, will 
 adopt the provisions of the statute, in the exer- 
 cise of their discretion. Arden v. Arden, 1 
 John. Ch. 313; see Inby r.-M'Crea, 4 Desaus. 
 422: Wilson v. Kilcannon, 4 Hayw. 185; Lind- 
 sav r. Lindsay, 1 Desaus. 151. Or disallow 
 interest. Thomson v. Eas-twood, 2 App. Cas. 
 215; Laura Jane v. Hagen. 10 Humph. 332. 
 As to the application of the English Act to 
 legacies and reversionary interests, see Vincent 
 v. Going, 1 J. & L. 697; Phillipo v. Munnings. 
 2 M. & C. 309; Wheeler v. Howell, 3 K. & J. 
 198; Smith v. Hill, 9 Ch. D. 143; Hickman t. 
 Upsall, 4 Ch. D. 144 (hs to account for past 
 rents); and see Re Stead. 2 Ch. D. 713; Mel- 
 lersh r. Brown, 45 Ch. D. 225. 
 
 < See now 37 & 38 Vic. c. 57, § 8.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. 
 
 653 
 
 shall be recovered but within six years next after the same shall have 
 become due, or next after an acknowledgment of the same shall have 
 been given to the person entitled thereto, or his agent, signed by 
 the person by whom the same was payable, or his * agent. 1 (a) * 653 
 
 The Act also provides, that no arrears of dower, or any damages 
 on account of such arrears, shall be recovered or obtained by any action 
 or suit, for a longer period than six years before the commencement of 
 such action or suit, and that no arrears of rent or of interest in respect 
 of any sum of money charged upon or payable out of any land or rent, 
 or in respect of any legacy, or any damages in respect of such arrears of 
 rent or interest, shall be recovered by any distress, action, or suit, but 
 within six years next after the same respectively shall have become 
 due, or next after an acknowledgment of the same in writing shall have 
 been given to the person entitled thereto, or his agent, by the person by 
 whom the same was payable or his agent. 2 It is, however, provided, 
 that where any prior mortgagee, or other incumbrancer, shall have been 
 in possession of any land, or in receipt of the profits thereof, within one 
 year next before an action or suit shall be brought by any person 
 entitled to a subsequent mortgage or other incumbrance on the same 
 land, the person entitled to such subsequent mortgage or incumbrance 
 may recover, in such action or suit, the arrears of interest which shall 
 have become due during the whole time that such prior mortgagee or 
 incumbrancer was in such possession or receipt as aforesaid, although 
 such time may have exceeded the term of six years. 8 It has been 
 decided, that § 42 does not apply to a case where the relation of trustee 
 and cestui que trust has existed, between the person in possession of 
 the land, and the parties entitled to the legacies and annuities. 4 A 
 
 1 In Phillipo v, Munnings, 2 M. & C. 309, 
 Lord Cottenham considered it clear that a sum 
 of money, which had been bequeathed by a 
 testator, upon certain trusts, and which was 
 severed from the personal estate by the exec- 
 utor, for the purpose of those trusts, ceased to 
 bear the character of a legacy, and assumed 
 that of a trust fund, as soon as it was severed 
 from the general estate; consequently, he de- 
 cided, that the statute did not bar a suit to 
 recover the fund from the executor; it was 
 doubted whether the Act, in any case, ex- 
 tended to legacies not charged upon land. See 
 S uzer r. De Meyer, 2 Paige, 574. But it was 
 held to apply to legacies payable out of per- 
 sonal estate. Sheppard v. Duke. 9 Sim. 567, 
 569; 3 Jur. 168; and see Paget v. Foley. 2 
 Bing. N. C. 679; Re Smith, 42 Ch. D. 302; 
 Eaines v. Lumley, 16 W. R. 674. 
 
 2 3 & 4 Will." IV. c. 27, §§ 41, 42. Absence 
 beyond the seas or imprisonment is no longer a 
 
 disability within these sections. 19 & 20 Vic. 
 c. 97, § 10; ante, p. 652. 
 
 3 On this section, see Sinclair v. Jackson, 
 17 Beav. 405; Elvy v. Norwood, 5 De G. & 
 Sm 240; 16 Jur. 493; Greenway v. Bromfield, 
 9 Hare, 201; Bolding v. Lane, 3 Gift". 561; 8 
 Jur. N. S. 407; Re Ashwell, John. 112; Pound 
 v. Bell, 30 Beav. 121; 7 Jur. N. S. 1183; 
 Mason v. Broadbent, 33 Beav. 296; Marshall 
 v. Smith, 5 Giff. 37 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1174, V. C. 
 S. ; Edmunds v. Waugh, L. R. i Eq. 418; 12 
 Jur. N. S. 326, V. C. K. ; Bowyer v. Wood- 
 man, L. R.3 Eq. 313; Re Stead, 2 Ch. D. 713 : 
 Re Marshfield, 34 Ch. D. 721; and see Shel- 
 ford, R. P. Acts, 247-258; Sugd. R. P. Acts, 119, 
 125, 136-151; Smith v. Hill, 9 Ch. D. 143. 
 
 4 Young v. Lord Waterpark. 13 Sim. 204: 
 6 Jur. 656 ; on app. 10 Jur. 1 ; Ward v. Arch, 
 12 Sim. 472. 475; Cox v. Dolman, 2 De G. M. 
 &G. 592, 597: Hunter v. Nockolds, 1 M'N. & 
 G. 640-650; Snow v. Booth, 8 De G. M. & G. 
 
 (a) Section 42 does not affect the riffht of a six years' arrears of interest. Re Marshfield, 
 mortgagee, who has sold under his power of 34 Ch. D. 721; Rt Hancock, 67 L. J. Ch. 793. 
 sale, to retain out of the proceeds more than 
 
 651
 
 * 654 PLEAS. 
 
 * 654 testator, * by charging his estate with the payment of an annuity, 
 
 does not make the devisee a trustee for the annuitant, so as to 
 prevent the operation of the statute. 1 
 
 Care must be taken, in framing a plea of a Statute of Limitations, to 
 set up the proper statute. 2 Thus, in all cases where the suit relates to 
 a debt or money due upon simple contract, or an account, the statute 
 of 21 Jac. I. 16, should be pleaded ; where the subject-matter of the suit 
 is land or rent, or the redemption of a mortgage, or where it relates to 
 the recovery of the principal money secured on mortgage, judgment, or 
 lien, or otherwise charged upon or payable out of land or rent, at Law 
 or in Equity, or to the payment of a legacy, the 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, 
 and the Real Property Limitation Act, 1874, 8 must be pleaded. And 
 these statutes must also be the ones pleaded, where the suit is for the 
 recovery of the arrears of dower, or for the arrears of rent, or interest 
 accrued in respect of any charges upon land or rent, or in respect of 
 any legacy. 4 
 
 The statute of 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27 also contains provisions for the 
 limitation of demands by ecclesiastical or eleemosynary corporations 
 sole, 5 and of suits for enforcing the right of presentation to any church, 
 vicarage, or other ecclesiastical benefice ; 6 in all these cases, the Act 
 must be pleaded. 
 
 A plea of a Statute of Limitations must contain sufficient affirmative 
 averments to bring the case within the statute pleaded. 7 Thus, a plea 
 of the statute 21 Jac. I. c. 16, to a bill for a debt, must aver, besides 
 reciting the statute, that the debt accrued more than six years before 
 the filing of the bill ; and so, where a demand is of anything executory, 
 as a note for the payment of an annuity, or of money at a distant period, 
 or by instalments, the defendant must aver that the cause of action has 
 not accrued within six years : because the statute bars only what was 
 actually due six years before the action brought. 8 It does not appear, 
 
 69; 2 K. & J. 132; Lewis v Duncombe, 29 the case within the operation of the statute; and 
 
 Beav. 175; 7 Jur. N. S. 695; Shaw v. John- to insist that upon these facts the plaintiff's 
 
 son, 1 Dr. & Sm. 412; 7 Jur. N. S. 1005; see right or remedy is at an end. The Court will 
 
 Balfour v. Cooper, 23 Ch. D. 472. then judicially take notice of the existence of 
 
 1 Francis v. Grover, 5 Hare, 39, 49; 10 Jur. the statute and declare its legal effect upon the 
 280; and see Hargreaves v. Michell, 6 Mad. case as made by the pleadings. Bogardus r. 
 326; Jacquet v. Jacquet, 27 Beav. 332; Thorn- Trinity Church, 4 Paige, 148, 197; see Salter 
 son v. Eastwood, 2 App. Cas. 215; Cunning- v. Tobias. 3 Paige, 338. 
 
 ham v. Foot, 3 id. 974. 3 37 & 38 Vic. c. 57. 
 
 2 Graham v. Nelson. 5 Humph. 605. See the 4 As to suits in respect of an intestate's per- 
 form of such a plea, Willis, 562; 2 Eq. Drafts. sonal estate, see 23 & 24 Vic. c. 38, § 13. («) 
 113, 114. In setting up a defence under a pub- 5 Sect 29. 
 
 lie statute, it is not necessary, either in a Court 6 See's. 30-33. For the cases on §§ 29-33, 
 
 of Chancery or in a Court of Law, that the see Shelford, R. P. Acts, 219-222; Sugd. R. P. 
 
 pleader should set forth the statute in his Acts, 152-154. 
 
 plea, or that he should allege the existence 7 See Andrews v. Huckabee. 30 Ala. 143. 
 
 of a statute of which the Court is judicially For forms of such plea, see 2 Van Hey. 113, 
 
 bound to take notice. It is sufficient for him 114. 
 
 to state the facts which are necessary to bring 8 Ld. Red. 271. 
 
 (a) The operation of this statute is retrospec- Re Johnson, Sly v. Blake, 29 Ch. D. 964; ante, 
 tive, as well as that of 19 & 20 Vic. c. 97, § 10. p. 652, note. 
 
 652
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. 
 
 655 
 
 however, that a particular form of words is necessary in such aver- 
 ments, provided, those made use of are sufficient to bring the case 
 within the statute; therefore, where the plea, instead of averring 
 that * the money in question was not received within the last six * 655 
 years, averred that no cause of action accrued within that time, 
 it was held sufficient. 1 
 
 Whenever any matters are stated in the bill which are calculated to 
 take the case out of the statute, these must be met by negative aver- 
 ments. 2 Thus, if the bill charges fraud, the plea must deny the fraud, 8 
 or aver that the fraud, if any, was discovered about six years before 
 the filing of the bill. 4 So, if the bill alleges that the fraud was not 
 discovered till within six years before the bill was filed, the plea must 
 aver that the fraud, if any, was discovered before that time. 5 If, more- 
 over, the defendant is interrogated as to any statements in the bill 
 which allege matter ancillary to, or afford evidence of facts directly 
 negatived by the plea, such statements ought to be met by an answer in 
 support of the plea. 6 Where no answer is required, the defendant has 
 been allowed to plead the statute orally at the hearing. 7 
 
 The Statute of Frauds 8 may be pleaded in bar to a suit to which 
 the provisions of that Act apply. 9 Thus, to a bill for a discovery and 
 execution of a trust, the statute, with an averment that there was no 
 declaration of the trust in writing, may be pleaded : 10 though, in the 
 case cited, the plea was overruled by an answer admitting in effect the 
 trust. 11 To a bill for the specific performance of an agreement, the same 
 statute, with an averment that there was no agreement in writing signed 
 by the parties, has also been pleaded. 12 The Statute of Frauds may also 
 
 1 Sutton v. Lord Scarborough, 9 Ves. 71, 
 75; but see Pull°n v. Snelus, 27 W. R. 534. 
 
 2 Ante, pp. 605, 614. 
 
 3 Bicknell v. Gough, 3 Atk. 558. 
 
 * Ld. Red. 269 ; South Sea Co. v. Wymond- 
 sell, 3 P. Wms. 143. 
 
 5 Ibid.; Ld. Red. 269; Sutton v. Lord Scar- 
 borough, 9 Ves. 71, 75. 
 
 6 Dearman v. Wyche, 9 Sim. 570, 582; 
 Foley v. Hill, 3 M. & C. 475, 480; 2 Jur. 440 ; 
 see Somerset County Bank v. Veghte, 42 N. J. 
 Eq. 39. But where the plea sets up the Stat- 
 ute of Limitations in defence, it is not necessary 
 in such plea to deny a new promise within six 
 years, unless the bill alleges such promise ; 
 but if so denied in the plea it will be mere sur- 
 plusage. Davison v. Schermerhorn, 1 Barb. 
 Ch. 480. 
 
 7 Lincoln t'. Wright, 4 De G. & J. 16 ; 5 Jur. 
 N. S. 1142; Green v. Snead, 30 Beav. 231 ; S. C. 
 nam. Snead v. Green, 8 Jur. N. S 4, M. R.; 
 but see Holding v. Barton, 1 Sm. & G. App. 25. 
 
 8 29 Car. II. c. 3. 
 
 9 Ld. Red. 265; Story, Eq. PI. § 761, etseq.; 
 Booth v. Turle, L. R. 16 Eq. 182 ; Rossiter v. 
 Miller, 3 App. Cas. 1124; Oliver v. Hunting, 44 
 Ch. D. 205; Cozine v. Graham, 2 Paige, 177; 
 Meach v. Perry, D. Chip. 182; Thornton v. 
 
 Henry, 2 Scam. 219: Kinzie v. Penrose, id. 
 520. The defence of this statute must be in- 
 sisted on by answer, or the defendant must seft 
 it up byway of plea; he cannot, by demurrer to 
 the bill, rely on the Statute of Frauds, unless it 
 clearly appears, on the face of the bill, that the 
 agreement is within the statute. Switzer v. 
 Skiles, 3 Gilman, 529. But when it does so 
 appear the objection may be taken by demur- 
 rer. Walker v. Locke, 5 Cush. 90; see Dudley 
 v. Bachelder, 53 Maine, 403, 406 ; Farnham v. 
 Clements, 51 Maine, 426; Cranston p. Smith, 
 6 R. I. 231; ante, p. 561, n. 2, 365. n. 3. See 
 as to the duty of a personal representative to 
 set up the statute, Re Garratt, W. N. (1870) 
 106; 18 W. R. 684. For forms of such plea, 
 see 2 Van Hey. 107, 112. 
 
 i° Cottington v. Fletcher, 2 Atk. 155; Ld. 
 Red. 265. 
 
 ii Ld. Red. 265, see Dean v. Dean, 9 N. J. 
 Eq. 425. If the Court can execute the trust from 
 the admissions made by the answer, so that the 
 plaintiff is not under the necessity of resorting 
 to parol proof of the trust, to entitle him to 
 relief, such admissions will exclude the defend- 
 ant from the benefit of the statute, if not insisted 
 on in the answer. Dean v. Dean, ubi supra. 
 
 12 Ibid. 266 ; Mussell v. Cooke, Prec. in Ch. 
 
 653
 
 ' e 657 PLEAS. 
 
 be pleaded to a bill to enforce a parol variation of a written 
 * 606 contract, unless * the variation is such as amounts to a mere 
 waiver of a term in the agreement : such as the time for the 
 commencement of a lease. 1 
 
 A plea of this sort must contain an averment that there was no 
 declaration of trust or agreement in writing, duly signed ; 2 and where 
 there are any equitable facts alleged, which may have the effect of 
 taking the case out of the operation of the statute, they must be met 
 by negative averments in the plea, 3 and must also, if interrogated to, be 
 denied, by answer in support of the plea. 4 This proposition appears 
 to be strictly in conformity with the principles before laid down, 5 as 
 well as with the existing authorities. 6 
 
 With respect to bills relating to trusts, where there is no declaration 
 of trust in writing, it seems that there is some doubt whether the rule 
 which has been applied to parol agreements, namely, that, although the 
 defendant confesses them by his answer, yet, if he insists on the pro- 
 tection of the statute, no decree can be made merely on the ground of 
 that confession, will be extended to the confession of a trust by answer. 
 In such cases, therefore, the safest course will be to meet the case 
 made by the bill by a plea of the statute, negativing any matter charged 
 by the bill which may avoid the bar : generally by way of averment in 
 the plea, and particularly and precisely by way of answer in support of 
 the plea, if discovery is required as to such matter. 7 
 
 It should be added, that if a defendant, in an answer, admits the 
 agreement, and does not claim the benefit of the statute, he will be con- 
 sidered to have waived it, and he cannot afterwards be allowed to in- 
 sist upon it, although he claims it by answer to the bill, when 
 *657 amended. 8 Where no answer was required, *the defendant has 
 
 533; Child v. Godolphin, 1 Dick. 39, 42; S. C. dered it impossible now to sustain ; and it cannot 
 
 nom. Child v. Comber, 3 Swanst. 423, n.; Hawk- be denied that the point is one of considerable 
 
 i'is v. Holmes, 1 P. Wms. 770; Clerk v. Wright, difficulty; and as it is now placed beyond all 
 
 1 Atk. 12; Story, Eq. PI. § 671; Stevens v. doubt that the benefit of the statute may be had, 
 
 Cooper, 1 John. Ch. 425; see Maddison v. if insisted on by answer, although a parol agree- 
 
 Alderson, 8 App. Cas. 467. For form of such ment be admitted, there can be little use in 
 
 plea, see 2 Van Hey. 112. pleading it in bar: at least to bills seeking the 
 
 1 Jordan v. Sawkins, 1 Ves. Jr. 402. That specific performance of a contract. See Ld. 
 the absolute beneficial owner under a trust is Red. 267; Moore 0. Edwards, 4 Ves. 23; Cooth 
 entitled to declare it under § 7 of the statute, v. Jackson, 6 Ves. 17; Blagden v. Bradbear, 12 
 see Kronheim v. Johnson, 7 Ch. D. 60. Ves. 466, 471; Rowe v. Teed, 15 Ves. 375; 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 266. Jackson v. Oglander, 2 H. & M. 465. As to 
 
 3 As to negative averments, see ante, pp. 605, the mode of insisting on the statute by answer, 
 614; Pullen v. Snelus, 27 VV. R. 534. see Skinner v. M'Douall, 2 De G. & Sm. 265; 
 
 4 Coop. Eq. PI. 256; Beames on Pleas, 172; 12 Jur. 741. 
 
 and for form of such plea, see 2 Van Hey. 107; " Ld. Rd. 268; see Beames on Pleas, 179, 
 
 see also Denys v. Locock, 3 M. & C. 205, 234 ; et seq. 
 
 1 Jur. 605; Dearman v. Wyche, 9 Sim. 570, 8 Beames on Pleas, 178. and notes; Skin- 
 
 582. ner r. M'Douall, 2 De G. & Sm. 265; 12 Jur. 
 
 5 Ante, pp. 613, 614. 741; Baskett v. Cafe, 4 De G. & Sm. 388; 
 
 6 Yet in Lord Redesdale's treatise (Ld. Red. Ridgway r. Wharton, 3 De G. M. & G. 677, 
 268) his Lordship mentions it as a position 691; 6 H. L. Cas. 238; Jackson v. Oglander, 
 which was formerly considered to be well 2 H. & M. 465. It is now settled that a party 
 founded, but which the decision of the Court, who admits a parol agreement by answer, may 
 in one case (Whi'bread v. Bmrkhurst. 1 Bro. nevertheless have the benefit of the statute, if 
 C. C. 404, 416; 2 V. & B. 153, n ) had ren- he, bv his answer, pravs the benefit of it. If 
 
 654
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. * 658 
 
 been allowed to plead the statute orally at the hearing ; ' and if the 
 defendant denies, or does not admit, the agreement, the plaintiff must 
 prove that it can be enforced. 2 
 
 Before quitting the subject of the Statute of Frauds, it should be 
 observed that the Court will not allow a party to avail himself of the 
 Statute of Frauds for the purpose of committing a fraud ; 3 and, there- 
 fore, where a mere mortgage was contemplated, and an absolute convey- 
 ance was made by one, with the intention of a defeasance being executed 
 by another, which was never carried into effect, the Court refused to 
 allow a defendant to avail himself of the Statute of Frauds, to protect 
 him in the enjoyment of the estate under the conveyance. 4 And so, 
 where an heir-at-law filed a bill against a devisee, alleging that the 
 devise was upon a secret trust, for a charitable purpose, contrary to the 
 Statute 9 Geo. II. c. 36, a plea of the Statute of Frauds was overruled. 5 
 And the Court will never permit a party to protect himself, by a plea 
 of the statute, from discovering whether a devise was obtained or pre- 
 vented by the undertaking of the devisee or heir to do certain acts in 
 favor of individuals. 6 
 
 It is to be observed here, that sales conducted under a decree or order 
 of the Court, are not within the Statute of Frauds. 7 
 
 The above statutes, namely, those for the limitation of actions and 
 suits, and for the prevention of frauds and perjuries, have been the sub- 
 ject of particular attention in the preceding pages, because they are 
 those which are most frequently pleaded ; but any other public statute, 
 which may be a bar to the demands of the plaintiff, may be taken advan- 
 tage of by a plea, containing the averments necessary to bring the case of 
 the defendant within the statute, and' to avoid any equity which 
 may be set up against the bar which the statute creates. 8 * Thus, * 658 
 
 he does not thus insist on the benefit of the Bullen & Leake, 467. As to the present Eng- 
 
 statute, he must be taken to renounce it. lish Practice, see R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XIX. 33. 
 Woods v. Dike, 11 Ohio, 455; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. 3 Story, Eq. PI. § 767. 
 
 §§755-758; Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sumner, 528, * Dixon v. Parker, 2 Ves. Sr. 219, 224: and 
 
 529; May v. Sloan, 101 U. S. 231; Billingslea see Davies v. Otty, 35 Beav. 208; Haight v. 
 
 v. Ward, 33 Md. 48; Newton v. Swasey, 8 N. Kaye, L. R. 7 Ch". 469 ; Booth v. Turle, L. R. 
 
 H. 9; Thompson v. Todd, 1 Peters, C. C. 388; 16 Eq. 182. 
 
 Talbot v. Bowen, 1 Marsh. 437; Rowton v. 5 Stickland t\ Aldridge, 9 Ves. 516. 
 
 Rowton, 1 Hen. & M. 91; Stearns v. Hubbard, 6 id. 519; story, Eq. PI. § 768; Chamber- 
 
 8 Greenl. 320; Story, Eq; PI. § 763; Ontario lain v. Ager, 2 V. & B. 259; see also Burrow v. 
 
 Bank r. Root, 3 Paige, 478; Cozine r. Graham, Greenough, 3 Sumner's Ves. 152, note (a); 1 
 
 2 Paige, 177; Thornton v. Henry, 2 Scam. 219; Story, Eq. .lur. § 256; 2 id. § 781; Gaullaher 
 
 Moore v. Edwards, 4 Sumner's Ves. 23, note v. Gaullaher, 5 Watts, 200. 
 (i); Whitchurch v. Bevis, 2 Bro. C. C. (Per- 7 Att.-Gen. v. Day, 1 Ves. Sr. 218, 221; 
 
 kins's ed.) 566, 567, note (e); Vanduyne v. Blagden v. Bradbear, 12 Ves. 466, 472. So of 
 
 Vreeland, 12 N. J. Eq, 142; S. C. 11 N. J. Eq. execution sales. Nichol v. Ridley, 5 Yerg. 63. 
 
 370; Dean v. Dean, 9 id. 425; Ashmore v. And see Dromgoole v. Spence, 1 Memph. L. 
 
 Evans, 11 id. 151. J. 159. 
 
 1 Lincoln v. Wright, 4 De G. & J. 16; 5 8 Ld, R e d. 274. Of this nature are 2 & 3 
 Jur. N. S. 1142; Snead v. Green, 8 Jur. N. S. Will. IV. c. 71; 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42; as to § 5 
 4, M. R ; S. C. nom. Green v. Snead, 30 Beav. of which last Act, see Moodie v. Bannister, 4 
 231; but see Holding v. Barton, 1 Sm. & G. Drew. 432, 5 Jur. N. S. 402; Roddam r. 
 App. 25; Heys v. Ashley, 4 De G. J. & S. 34; Morley, 1 De G. & J. 1; 3 Jur. N. S. 449; 2 
 ante p. 619, n. (a). id. 805; 2 K. & J. 336, and cases collected in 
 
 2 Ridgway v. Wharton, ubi supra ; Fulcher Shelford, R. P. Acts, 262-264: Sugd. R. P. 
 v. Fulcher, 29 W. R. 884; S. P. at Law, see Acts, 149; Dickinson v. Teasdale, 1 De G. J. 
 
 655
 
 659 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 the Statute 32 Hen. VIII. c. 9, against buying and selling pretended 
 titles, may be pleaded. 1 So, where a bill was filed against a bank- 
 rupt, in respect of a demand occurring before his bankruptcy, the 5 Geo. 
 II. c. 30 2 was pleaded, and the plea was allowed. 8 
 
 A private or local statute may also be pleaded in the same manner ; 
 thus, to a bill impeaching a sale of land in the fens, by the conservators 
 under the statute for draining the fens, the defendant pleaded the stat- 
 ute, and that the sale was made within and according to the statute, 
 and the plea was allowed. 4 It is to be observed, that a plea of a pri- 
 vate Act of Parliament must state the Act, or at least so much of it as 
 relates to the matter insisted upon ; and it seems that, although an Act, 
 which is in its nature private or local, contains a clause directing that 
 it shall be recognized in Courts as a public Act, such a clause will not 
 dispense with the necessity of setting the Act out. 6 
 
 A plea of a statute must be put in upon oath ; for, although the stat- 
 ute itself is matter of record, the averments necessary to bring the case 
 within it are matters in pais, which must be supported by the oath of 
 the party. 6 
 
 2. We come now to the consideration of those pleas in bar which 
 consist of matters recorded, or as of record in the Court itself, or some 
 
 other Court. 7 
 *659 *A decree or order of the Court, by which the rights of the 
 parties have been determined, or another bill for the same matter 
 dismissed, may be pleaded to a new bill for the same matter; 1 and this, 
 
 & S. 52 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 239; Coope v. Cresswell, 
 L. R. 2 Ch. 112; L. R. 2 Eq. 121; Pears v. 
 Laing. L. R. 12 Eq. 41; Ashlin v. Lee, 23 W. 
 R. 458; W. N. (1875) 42. In regard to the plea 
 of Usury, see New Orleans, G. L & B. Co. v. 
 lHidlev, 8 Paige, 452; Dyer v. Lincoln, 11 Vt. 
 300; Lane v. Ellzey, 4 Hen. & M. 504; S. C. 6 
 Rand. 661; Chambers v. Chambers, 4 Gill & 
 J. 420; Shed v. Garfield, 5 Vt. 39; Vroom v. 
 Ditmas, 4 Paige, 526; New Jersey Patent Tan- 
 ning Co. v. Turner, 14 N. J. Eq. 226, 229 ; Cur- 
 tis v. Ma-ter, 11 Paige, 15; Rowe v. Phillips, 
 2 Sandf. Ch. 14; ante, p. 639, note (a). 
 
 i Hitchins v. Lander, G. Coop. 34, 38; see 
 also Wall v. Stubbs, 2 V. & B. 354, 357. For 
 form of plea under this statute, see Beames on 
 Pleas, 333. 
 
 2 Repealed by 6 Geo. IV. c. 16; see now 12 
 & 13 Vic. c. 106; 24 & 25 Vic. c. 134. 
 
 3 De Tastet v. Sharpe, 3 Mad. 51, 60. For 
 form of plea of Bankruptcy, see 2 Van Hey. 
 96: and as to such a plea, see ante, p. 631. It 
 ha* also been held, that where a mortgagee 
 of an advowson appears and presents to the 
 Church, which he is not entitled to do before 
 foreclosure, a bill by the mortgagor, seeking to 
 compel a resignation, must be brought within 
 six months after the death of the late incum- 
 bent, — being the period within which, by the 
 Statute of Westminster 2 (13 Edw. I. c. 5), a 
 qnare impedit must be brought. Gardiner v. 
 
 656 
 
 Griffith, 2 P. Wms. 404; cited Atk. 559; see 
 Jenkins v. Jones, 9 Q. B. D. 12S; Kennedy v. 
 Lyell. 15 id. 491. 
 " •» Brown v. Hammond, 2 Ch. Cas. 249. 
 
 5 Nabob of Arcot v. East India Co. 3 Bro. 
 C. C. 292, 308 ; Nabob of the Carnatic v. East In- 
 dia Co. 1 Ves. Jr. 371, 393; Bailey v. Birken- 
 head Ry. Co. 12 Beav. 433, 443; 14 Jur. 119; 
 see 13 & 14 Vic. c. 21. 
 
 6 Wall v. Stubbs, 2 V. & B. 354, 357 ; 1 
 Smith, Ch. Pr. (2d Am. ed.) 232. 
 
 7 Ld. Red. 236, 237. If a former decree is 
 relied upon, it must be duly pleaded. Gallo- 
 way v. Hamilton, 1 Dana, 575; Ferguson v. 
 Miller, 5 Ohio, 459. Or it may be set up in 
 the answer. White v. Bank of United States, 
 
 6 Ohio, 528; S. P. Strader v. Byrd, 7 Ohio, 
 184. 
 
 i Barker v. Belknap, 39 Vt. 168. A bill 
 regularly dismissed upon the merits, where the 
 matter has been passed upon, and the dismissal 
 is not without prejudice, may be pleaded in 
 bar of a new bill for the same matter. Perine 
 r. Dunn, 4 John. Ch. 142; see Neafie v. Neafie, 
 
 7 John. Ch. 1 ; Story, Fq. PL § 793; Wilcox v. 
 Badger, 6 Ohio. 406; French v. French, 8 Ohio, 
 214; Jenkins v. Eldredge, 3 Story, 299; Davis 
 v. Hall. 4 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 301; Mickles v. 
 Thayer, 14 A'len, 121, 122; Foote v. Gibbs, 1 
 Gr:iy, 412; post, " General Nature of Decrees 
 and Orders." And such a dismissal on the 

 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. 
 
 659 
 
 even if the party bringing the new bill were an infant at the time of the 
 former decree : for a decree enrolled can only be altered upon a bill of 
 review. 2 
 
 By the original practice of the Court, a decree or order dismissing a 
 former bill for the same matter could only be pleaded in bar to a new 
 bill, where the dismission had been upon the hearing : 3 for a dismissal 
 was a bar only, where the Court had determined that the plaintiff had no 
 title to the relief sought by his bill, (a) It was not, however, necessary, 
 in order to entitle a defendant to plead a former suit and decree of dis- 
 missal, that the decree should have been made upon discussion of the 
 merits : if the dismissal had been merely for want of evidence, the 
 decree would have been equally a bar to another suit. 4 Under the later 
 practice, if the plaintiff, after the cause is set down to be heard, causes 
 the bill to be dismissed on his own application, or if the cause is called 
 on to be heard in Court, and the plaintiff makes default, and by reason 
 thereof the bill is dismissed, such dismissal, unless the Court otherwise 
 orders, is equivalent to a dismissal on the merits, and may be pleaded 
 in bar to another suit for the same matter. 5 Under the old practice, an 
 order dismissing a bill upon an election by the plaintiff to proceed at 
 Law, 6 or for want of prosecution, 7 was not a bar to another bill : and it 
 does not seem that, in these cases, the Order above stated has affected 
 the practice, (b) 
 
 merits may be taken advantage of on demurrer, 
 if the fact appear on the face of the bill. 
 Knight v. Atkisson, 2 Tenn. Ch. 384. Such a 
 decree is conclusive against a new bill, though 
 rendered in another State. Low v. Mussey, 41 
 Vt. 393; see Brown v. Lexington and Danville 
 R. R. Co. 13 N. J. Eq. 191. For how far the 
 dismissal of a bill, by a plaintiff suing on be- 
 half of himself and others, is a bar to another 
 suit by persons having the same interest, see 
 Banker v. Walters, 8 Beav. 92, 97 ; 9 Jur. 73; 
 and ante, pp. 239, 240. One assignee of a 
 bankrupt may plead the allowance of a demur- 
 rer by one of his co-assignees to the same bill. 
 Tarleton v. Hornby, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 333, 336. 
 A decree in favor of the validity of a convey- 
 ance, made in a suit between the grantor and 
 grantee, will not bind the assignee in bank- 
 
 fa) In Thrifts v. Fritz, 101 111. 457, it was 
 held that the objection that the substance of an 
 answer was adjudicated at a former term of the 
 same Court should not be made by exception, 
 but by replication or plea. 
 
 (6) See Edevain v. Cohen, 43 Ch. D. 187; 
 Magnus v. National Bank, 58 L. T. 617; Durant 
 
 0. Essex Co. 7 Wall. 107; House v. Mullen, 22 
 Wall. 42; Badger v. Badger, 1 Cliff. 237; Foote 
 «. (Jibbs, 1 Gray, 412; Sayles v. Tibbitts, 5 R. 
 
 1. 79. The dismissal of a bill in Equity for a 
 cause not involving an adjudication upon the 
 merits, as for want of jurisdiction, or of prosecu- 
 tion, or that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy 
 
 vol. i. — 42 
 
 ruptcy of the grantor, upon a bill filed by him 
 to set aside the conveyance for fraud. Humes 
 v. Scruggs, 94 U. S. 22. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 237. 
 
 3 Id. 238. 
 
 4 Jones v. Nixon, Younge, 359; ante, p. 632. 
 
 5 Cons. Old. XXIH. 13. See Cummins v. 
 Bennet, 8 Paige, 79; Sears v. Jackson, 11 N. 
 J. Eq 45; Burnbly v. Stainton. 24 Ala. 712. 
 
 6 Countess of Plymouth v. Bladon, 2 Vern. 
 32; ante, p. 633: post, Chap. XIX. § 4, 
 Election. 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 238; Brandlyn v. Ord, 1 Atk. 571. 
 As to pleading allowance of a demurrer to a suit 
 for the same matter, see Marchioness of Lon- 
 donderry v. Baker, 3 De G. F. & J. 701 ; 7 Jur. 
 N. S. 652,811; 3 Giff. 128. 
 
 at Law, is not a bar to a subsequent suit. Smith 
 v. McNeal, 109 U. S. 426; Steam Gauge & L. 
 Co. r. Meyrose, 27 Fed. Rep. 213; Webster 
 v. Armstrong, 54 L. J. Q. B. 236: Hall r. Hall, 
 48 L. J. P. D. & Adm. 57; Loeb r. Willis. 
 100 N. Y. 231, 235; Reynolds v. Hennessy, 17 
 R. I. 169 ; Foote o. Gibbs, 1 Gray, 412 ; Kempton 
 v. Burgess, 136 Mass. 192: Bardwell o. Baird. 60 
 Miss. ^ r A; Gage v. Ewing, 114 111. 15; Pendle- 
 ton v. Dalton, 92 N. C. 185 ; Hallack v. Loft 
 (Col.), 34 Pac. Rep. 568; The decision upon a 
 demurrer is not conclusive for this purpose. 
 Jourolmon r. Mas^encill. 86 Tenn. 81 ; Battle 
 v. Street, 85 Tenn. 282; Dowell v. Mitchell, 105 
 
 657
 
 660 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 A decree cannot be pleaded in bar of a new bill, unless it is for the 
 same matter as the bill to which it is pleaded ; 8 therefore, a decree in a 
 
 former suit, for an account of tithes, could not have been pleaded 
 * 660 to a bill for the tithes of any subsequent year. 9 It * must also be 
 
 conclusive of the rights of the plaintiffs in the bill to which it is 
 pleaded, or of those under whom they claim ; therefore, a decree against 
 a mortgagor and order of foreclosure enrolled, will not be deemed a bar 
 to a bill by intervening incumbrancers to redeem, although the mort- 
 gagee had no notice of their incumbrancers. 1 It must also be as bene- 
 ficial to the plaintiff as that which might be obtained in the second suit. 2 
 
 8 See Neafie v. Neafie, 7 John. Ch. 1; Lyon 
 v. Tallmadge, 14 John. 501; Menude v. Delaire, 
 3 Desaus. 43. 
 
 9 Minor Canons of St. Paul's v. Crickett, 
 Wrightw. 30. So where the suit was upon a 
 similar, but not the same demand, the first suit 
 being on coupons of county bonds, and the sec- 
 ond upon different coupons of the same bonds. 
 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351. 
 And see Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606; Stark 
 
 U. S. 430. In Wisconsin, a reviewable order of 
 a lower Court upon a demurrer is not conclusive, 
 while a decision thereon by the Supreme Court 
 is conclusive. Ellis v. Northern Pacific R. Co. 
 80 Wis. 459. So the dismissal of a bill on the 
 ground of laches, or because the Statute of Lim- 
 itations applies, is not a trial upon the merits so 
 as to bar a second bill stating facts which take 
 the case out of the statute. Gilmer v. Morris, 
 30 Fed. Rep. 476. In England, an order dis- 
 missing, for want of prosecution, a suit in which 
 notice of trial has not been given, is not a bar 
 to another suit. Be Orrell General Colliery &c. 
 Co.l2Ch.D. 681; seel Seton on Judgments (5th 
 ed.) 118. A person's right to use force to remove 
 an obstruction is not an adequate legal remedy, 
 excluding relief in Equity by injunction, Stam- 
 ford v. Stamford Horse R. Co. 56 Conn. 381; 
 nor is his right to apply to town authorities to 
 perform their statutory duty to remove nui- 
 sances. Wheeler v. Bedford, 54 Conn. 244. 
 An objection to the admission of any evidence 
 under a creditor's bill does not raise the ques- 
 tion of an adequate remedy at Law. Pierstoff v. 
 Jorges (Wis), 56 N. W. Rep. 735. 
 
 In the Federal Courts, under Equity Rule 38, 
 a decree dismissing a bill is only conclusive 
 when there has been a hearing upon the merits; 
 and even then the former decree is an estoppel 
 only as to the matters directly in dispute. 
 Keller v. Stolzenback, 20 Fed. Rep. 47; Oglesby 
 v. Attrill, id. 570; Radford v. Folsom, 3 id. 199*; 
 Oliver v. Cunningham, 7 id. 689; Hayner v. 
 Stanly, 13 id. 217; Clark v. Blair. 14 id. 812; 
 Spitley v. Frost, 15 id. 299 ; Bartels v. Schnell, 
 16 id. 341; Tilton v. Barrel], 17 id. 59; see 
 Brooks v. 0"Hara, 8 id. 529; First Nat. Bank 
 658 
 
 v. Starr, 94 U. S. 645; Boyd r. Alabama, 94 
 U. S. 645. 
 
 1 Morret v. Westerne, 2 Vera. 663; see ante, 
 p. 277 ; Ld. Red. 238; and see Att.-Gen. r. 
 Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, 34 Bcav. 
 654 ; Davis p. Angel, 4 De G. F. & J. 531; 31 
 Beav. 223. 
 
 2 Pickl'ord v. Hunter, 5 Sim. 122, 129; Rat- 
 tenbury v. Fenton, C. P. Coop. temp. Brough. 
 60. 
 
 v. Bohne, id. 115. As to the conclusiveness of 
 proceedings at Law upon a subsequent suit in 
 Equity, see First Nat. Bank v. Bohne, supra ; 
 Price v. Dewey, 11 id. 104. 
 
 The doctrine of res adjudicata applies only 
 where there is a record. Re House, 28 Ch. D. 
 518. In order to determine whether the same 
 questions were at issue, the Court may look at 
 the pleadings in the first suit, though not set 
 forth. Houstoun v. Sligo, 29 Ch. D. 448. So 
 much of the former proceedings 89 show the 
 identity of the issues should be pleaded. Jourol- 
 mon ??. Massengill, 86 Tenn. 81. See Tekait 
 Doorga Persad Singh v. Tekaitni Doorga Kon- 
 wari. L. R. 5Ind. App. 149; Chicago v Cameron, 
 22 III. App. 91; Cheney v. Patton, 134 III. 422; 
 Aliny p. Daniels, 15 R.I. 312. If the record does 
 not show the cause for which the bill was dis- 
 missed, it may be shown by parol evidence. 
 Worman v. Worman, 43 Ch. D. 296; Munro r. 
 Meech, 94 Mich. 596; Foye v. Patch, 132 Mass. 
 105; Jordan v. Seifert, 126 Mass. 25; Butchers' 
 Slaughtering Ass'n v. Boston, 137 Mnss. 186. 
 See Leary r. Long, 131 U. S. App'x. 218; Oyster 
 v. Oyster, 28 Fed. Rep. 909; Reilly v. Reilly, 
 139 111. 180; Henningerr. Heald (N. J.). 26 Atl. 
 Rep. 449; Rosenthal r. McMann, 93 Cal. 505; 
 Horton «. Bassett, 17 R. I. 129; Stewart v. 
 Chesapeake & O. C. Co. 1 Fed. Rep. 361; 
 Crandall v. Dare, 11 id. 902; German-American 
 Title & T. Co. v Shallcross, 147 Penn. St. 485; 
 Flanders ». Hall, 159 Mass. 95. But it is only 
 in cases of ambiguity that an opinion accom- 
 panying the former decree will govern. New 
 Orleans M. & C. R. Co. v. New Orleans, 14 
 Fed. Rep. 373.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. * 661 
 
 The decree must also be in its nature final, or afterwards made so by 
 order, or it will not be a bar ; 3 therefore, a decree for an account of 
 principal and interest due on a mortgage, and for a foreclosure in case 
 of non-payment, cannot be pleaded to a bill to redeem, unless there has 
 been a final order of foreclosure. 4 (a) 
 
 A plea of a decree founded on a particular deed, which it is the 
 object of the second suit to set aside, on the ground of fraud discovered 
 since the decree made, would not be good. 5 If, however, a bill is 
 brought to impeach a decree, on the ground of fraud used in obtaining 
 it (which may be done without the previous leave of the Court), the 
 decree may be pleaded in bar of the suit, with averments, negativing 
 the charges of fraud, and (if interrogated) supported by an answer fully 
 denying them. 6 It is presumed also, that, even in the case last put, of 
 a bill to impeach the deed upon which a decree has been founded, a 
 plea of the decree supported by similar averments and answers, would 
 be good. 
 
 A decree must be signed and enrolled, or it cannot be taken advan- 
 tage of by plea: 7 though it may be insisted upon by way of answer. 8 
 Although a decree not signed and enrolled cannot be pleaded directly 
 in bar of the suit, it seems that it may be pleaded to show that the bill 
 has been exhibited contrary to the usual course of the Court, and ought 
 not, therefore, to be proceeded upon ; 9 for if the decree had appeared 
 upon the face of the bill, the defendant might have demurred; 10 a 
 decree not signed and enrolled being to be altered only upon rehear- 
 ing, as a decree signed and enrolled can be altered only upon a bill of 
 review. 11 
 
 *As a plea of this kind proceeds upon the ground that the *661 
 same matter was in issue in the former suit, and as every plea 
 that is set up as a bar must be ad idem, 1 the plea should set forth so 
 much of the former bill and answer as will suffice to show that the 
 same point was then in issue, and should aver that the allegations as to 
 the title to relief were the same in the second bill as in the first ; 2 and, 
 therefore, where the defendant pleaded only that a bill was brought for 
 an account and a decree made, Lord Hardwicke considered the plea as 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 2-37 ; see Neafie v. Neafie, 7 John. may be made a part of the cause, does not pre- 
 Ch. 1; Story, Eq. PI. § 791. sent the decree ; and although it be copied in 
 
 4 Senhouse v. Earl, 2 Ves. Sr. 450. the transcript, it will not be regarded. Gallo- 
 
 5 Wing v. Wing, 2 Eq. Gas. Abr. 71, pi. 13. way r. Hamilton, 1 Dana. 576. 
 
 « Ld. Red. 239 ; Story, Eq. PI. § 794. » Ld. Red. 239; Kinsey v. Kinsev, 2 Ves. 
 
 T Anon. 3 Atk. 809; S. C. nom. Kinsey v. Sr. 577, n. 
 
 Kinsey, 2 Ves. Sr. 577; but see Pearse v. Dob- 10 Wortley v. Birkhead, .3 Atk. 809: 2 Ves. 
 
 inson, L. R. 1 Eq. 241 ; L. R. .3 Ch. 1. Sr. 571 ; Lady Granville v. Ramsden, Bunb. 56. 
 
 8 Ibid.; Charles v. Rowley, 2 Bro. P. C. ed. " Ld. Red. 239. 
 
 Tumi. 485; Story, Eq. PI. § 790; Davoue v. > Per Lord Hardwicke, in Child v. Gibson, 2 
 
 Fanning, 4 John. Ch. 199. It will no be Atk. 603 ; and see Moss v. Anglo-Egyptian Nav. 
 
 allowed on the hearing unless set up in the Co. L. R. 1 Ch. 108; 12 Jur. N. S. 13, L. C. 
 
 answer, or (if enrolled) pleaded. Lyon p. Tall- 2 Marchioness of Londonderry v. Baker, 3 
 
 madge, 14 John. 501. A prayer in the answer Giff. 128; 7 Jur. N. S. 652, 811 ; 3 De G. F. & 
 
 that the pleadings and proofs, in a former suit, J. 701. 
 
 (a) The remedy for error in a decree for sought in the Court which made the decree, 
 foreclosure or sale under a mongage must be Kent v. Lake Superior Canal Co. 144 U. S. 75. 
 
 6o9
 
 * 662 PLEAS. 
 
 defective. 8 Where the bill seeks to impeach the decree on the ground 
 of fraud, the alleged fraud must, as we have seen, be negatived by- 
 averments in the plea, supported by an answer fully denying the cir- 
 cumstances of fraud as to which the defendant is interrogated. 4 But 
 as the averments negativing the charges of fraud are used merely to put 
 the fact of fraud, as alleged by the bill, in issue by the plea, they may be 
 expressed in the most general terms, provided such terms are sufficient 
 to put the allegations of the bill fully in issue. The answer, however, 
 must be so full as to leave no doubt on the mind of the Court that, if not 
 controverted by evidence on the part of the plaintiff, the fact of fraud 
 could not be established. 5 
 
 In the case of a plea of a former decree, the plaintiff should obtain 
 an order, on motion or petition of course for an inquiry as to the truth 
 thereof ; 6 and if the fact is certified to be true, the bill will be dis- 
 missed, unless the Court should otherwise order. 7 The plaintiff may, 
 however, apply to vary the certificate, and thus bring on the matter to 
 be argued before the Court. 8 He may also, if he conceives the plea to 
 be defective in point of form or otherwise, independently of the mere 
 truth of the fact pleaded, set the plea down to be argued, as in the case 
 of pleas in general. 9 
 
 As the ground of defence by plea of a decree signed and enrolled is, 
 that the matter has been already decided, a decree of any Court of 
 Equity, in its nature final, or made so by subsequent order, may be 
 
 pleaded in bar of a new suit. 10 
 * 662 *A plea in bar of matters of record, or matters in the na- 
 ture of matters of record in some Court, not being a Court of 
 Equity, may be : (1) Fine ; (2) Recovery ; (3) Judgment at Law, or 
 Sentence of some other Court. 
 
 (1) A fine is a record of the Court in which it has been levied, and 
 if levied on or before the 31st of December, 1833, 1 is equally good as 
 a bar in Equity as it is at Common Law, provided it be pleaded with 
 proper averments. 2 In a plea in Equity of a fine and non-claim, the 
 same strictness is required as at Law ; therefore, where a defendant, 
 instead of averring positively that the party levying the fine was actu- 
 
 8 Child ?-. Gib«on,nbi supra; Bank of Michi- 8 Ld. Red. 305. 
 
 gan v. Williams, Hairing. Ch. 219; Gates v. 9 Ibid. See ante, p. 637, n. 5. 
 
 Loftns, 4 Monroe, 439. lft Ld. Red. 245 ; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 
 
 * Ld. Red. 239. 5 Bio. P. C. ed. Toml. 567; see also Jones v. 
 
 6 Ld. Red. 239 ; see ante, p. 660. Where a Nixon, Younge, 359 ; and see Cons. Old. XIV. 
 
 bill charged misrepresentation, coercion, and 7, and ante, p. 632, as to plea of pending 
 
 fraud in procuring the release of a debt, and a suit in another Court of Equity. See Ferguson 
 
 defendant put in a plea and answer, find in his v. Miller, 5 Ham. 460; Hughes v. Blake, 6 
 
 plea insisted on the release in bar, without Wheat. 453. 
 
 noticing the allegation of fraud, though in the 1 See 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74, § 2. 
 
 answer it was fully met and denied, it was held 2 Ld. Red. 251; Thynne v. Gary, W. Jones, 
 
 that the plea was bad. Allen v. Randolph, 4 416; Salisbury?). Batrgot, 1 Ch. Gas. 278; 2 
 
 John. Ch. 693. Swanst. 603, 610; Watkins v. Stone, 2 S. & S. 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. XIV. 6. For forms of motion 560, 573 ; Story v. Lord Windsor, 2 Atk. 630, 
 and petition, see Vol. III. 632; see Story, Eq. PI. § 771, et seq. For form 
 
 7 Ld. Red. 305; and see Jones v. Segueira, of such plea, see 2 Vau Hey. 100. 
 1 Phil. 82, 84; 6 Jur. 183: Tarleton v. Barnes, 2 
 Keen, 632, 635; Morgan v. Morgan, 1 Atk. 53. 
 
 660
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. * 663 
 
 ally seised, averred that he was seised, or pretended to be seised, the 
 plea was held to be bad. 3 A plea of a fine and non-claim can now only 
 be made use of where the fine has been levied on or before the 31st of 
 December, 1833: the 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74, having abolished that species 
 of assurance from that date, and substituted, in its stead, a more simple 
 form, by deed enrolled in the High Court of Chancery, within six 
 months from the date thereof; and such deed and enrolment may now 
 be pleaded, instead of a fine. 
 
 (2) A common recovery duly suffered, like a fine, is a record of the 
 Court in which it has been suffered ; and if it has been suffered on or 
 previously to the 31st of December, 1833, such recovery may be pleaded 
 in Equity, as well as at Law, if the estate limited to the plaintiff, or 
 under which he claims, is thereby barred. 4 Since the Statute 3 & 4 
 Will. IV. c. 74, common recoveries can be no longer suffered ; but where 
 an estate tail has been barred, by the execution of a deed enrolled in 
 the Court of Chancery, according to the provisions of that Act, such deed 
 and enrolment may be shown to the Court by plea, instead of a recovery. 
 The form of a plea of a recovery appears to be nearly the same in Equity 
 as at Law. 5 
 
 (3) The judgment of a Court of ordinary jurisdiction, is also a matter 
 of record, which may, in general, be pleaded in bar to a suit in Chancery, 
 provided such judgment has finally determined the rights of the 
 parties. 6 Thus, a judgment of a Court of Common* Fleas in a *663 
 writ of right, 1 or a verdict and judgment entered thereon in a 
 Court of Common Law, have been held to be a good bar in a Court of 
 Equity for the same matter. 2 So it seems, that a plea of a nonsuit, of 
 an action of trover, has been allowed as a good plea. 3 
 
 The sentence of any Court may be a proper defence by way of plea. 
 
 3 Story v. Lord Windsor, 2 Atk. 630, 632; Elliot, Rep. temp Finch, 13; Pitt v. Hill. id. 
 Dobson v. Leadbeater, 13 Ves. 230. 70; Temple v. Lady Baltinglass, id. 275; Wil- 
 
 4 Ld. Red. 253; Att.-Gen. v. Sutton, 1 P. Iiams v. Lee, 3 Atk. 223; and for the plea in 
 Wins. 753. that case, see Beanies on Pleas, 337. For the 
 
 5 In Att.-Gen. v. Sutton, 1 P. Wms. 754; .3 effect of a judgment at Law, when given in evi- 
 Bro. P. C. ed. Toml. 75 (see Plunkett v. Caven- dence in a suit in Equitv, see Pearce t\ Grav 2 
 dish, 1 R. & M. 713, 718), the suffering of the Y. & C. C. C. 322, 326': Protheroe r. Forman, 
 recovery appears to have been averred in the 2 Swanst. 227,231; Harrison v. Nettleship, 2 
 following form: "That Thomas Sutton, the M. & K. 423, 425. 
 
 testator's nephew, being tenant in tail by the 3 Wilcox v. Sturt, 1 Vern. 77. In Behrens 
 
 will, had suffered a common recovery, and v. Pauli, 1 Keen, 456, 463, a plea that a verdict 
 
 thereby barred the charities." and judgment in the Lord Mayor's Court had 
 
 6 Ld. Red. 253; see Cammann r. Traphagan, been obtained by the defendant against the 
 Saxton (N.J.) 28; Story, Eq. PI. § 778, and plaintiff, on the same matter in respect of which 
 note; Standish v. Parker, 2 Pick. (2d ed ) 22, relief was sought by the bill, was allowed by 
 and notes, 1-3, and cases cited; Van Wyeh Lord Langdale M. R. on the ground that the 
 v. Seward, 1 Edw. 327. A judgment on the Lord Mayor's Court was a Court of competent 
 merits, which will bar any other suit at Law on jurisdiction to decide the case: and. although 
 the same cause of action, will also bar a suit in the decision of the Master of the Rolls was 
 Chancery on the same cause of action. Hunt afterwards overruled by Lord Cottenham. in 
 v. Terril, 7 J. J. Marsh. 68, 70. A judgment Behrens v. Sieveking, 2 M. & C. 602. it was 
 on either a special verdict or on demurrer to merely upon the ground of an informality 
 evidence has this effect. Ibid. See ante, p. 659, in the plea, in not showing that the subject- 
 n - 9 - matter of the suit, in the Lord Mayor's Court, 
 
 1 Sidney v. Perry, cited Ld. Red. 254. was the same, and that the proceedings were 
 
 2 Wilcox v. Sturt, 1 Vern. 77; Bluck v. taken for the same purpose. 
 
 661
 
 * 6Q1 PLEAS. 
 
 Thus, it seems that a sentence of a Court of Admiralty will, if properly 
 pleaded, be a good plea. 4 And so may a sentence of a Court of Probate ; 
 therefore, a will and probate, even in the common form, may be pleaded 
 to a bill by persons claiming as next of kin to a person supposed to have 
 died intestate. 6 (a) If fraud in obtaining the will is alleged, that is not 
 a sufficient equitable ground to impeach a probate : for the parties may 
 resort to the Court of Probate, which is competent to determine the ques- 
 tion of fraud, 6 unless indeed the case be one in which the fraud has not 
 gone to the whole will, but only to some particular clause, or in which it 
 has been practised to obtain the consent of the next of kin to the 
 
 * 664 probate : in which * cases the Court has laid hold of these circum- 
 
 stances to declare the executor a trustee for the next of kin. 1 
 Where there are no such circumstances in the case, the probate of the 
 will is a clear bar to a demand of personal estate. 2 And where a testa- 
 tor died in a foreign country, and left no goods in any other country, 
 probate of his will, according to the law of that country, was determined 
 to be a sufficient defence against an administrator appointed in Eng- 
 land : 3 but such foreign probate will not do, if there are any goods in 
 England : for in that case the will must be proved there. 4 So also a de- 
 cree of the Court of Chancery in Ireland, after a verdict upon an issue 
 devisavit vel non, does not determine the validity or invalidity of the 
 will, so far as it relates to lands in England, and cannot be pleaded in 
 bar to a suit here. 6 It is not, indeed, necessary in every case, that the 
 Court whose sentence is pleaded should be an English Court : the sen- 
 tence of a foreign Court may be a proper defence by way of plea ; but 
 the plea must show that the Court pronouncing the sentence had full 
 jurisdiction to determine the rights of the parties ; 6 that the subjects in 
 question, and the issue, were the same : that the cause was decided on 
 
 4 Parkinson v. Leeras, cited Ld. Red. 257. Gingell V. Home, 9 Sim. 539, 548; Hindson v. 
 
 5 Jauncy v. Sealey, 1 Vera. 397; Ld. Red. Weatherell, 5 De G. M. & G. 301; 18 Jur. 499; 
 257; see also Penvill v. Luscombe, 2 J. & W. 1 Sm. & G. 604; Dimes v. Steinberg, 2 Sm. & 
 201, 203: Barrs v. Jackson, 1 Phil. 582; 9 Jur. G. 75. 
 
 609; 1 Y. & C. C. C. 585, 596; 7 Jur. 54. 2 Ld. Red. 258. 
 
 6 Ld. Red. 257; Archer v. Mosse, 2 Vern. 8; 3 Jauncy v. Sealej-, 1 Vern. 397. 
 
 Nelson v. Oldfield, id. 76; Att.-Gen. p. Ryder, 4 As to when English probate is necessary, 
 
 2 Ch. Cas. 178; Plume i\ Beale, 1 P. Wins. 388; see Re Commercial Bank Co. L. R. 5 Ch.314. 
 Stephenton r. Gardiner, 2 P. Wms. 286; Bennet 5 Boyse v. Colclough, 1 K. & J. 124. 
 
 »••. Vade, 2 Atk. 324; Kerrick v. Bransby, 7 6 Ld. Red. 255; Newland v. Horseman, I 
 
 Bro. P. C. ed. Toml. 437; Meadows v. Duchess Vern. 21 ; 2 Ch. Cas. 74; Burrows v. Jemineau, 
 
 of Kingston. Amb. 756,761; Griffiths v. Hamil- Sel. Cas. in Ch.69; 1 Dick. 48; Gage v. Bulke- 
 
 ton, 12 Ves. 298, 307; Story. Eq. PI. § 782. ley, 3 Atk. 215; White v. Hall, 12 Ves. 321, 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 257; Barnesly v. Powel, 1 Ves. 324; see also Henderson v. Henderson, 3 Hare, 
 
 Sr. 284, 287; Marriot v. Harriot, 1 Stra. 666; 100, 115; Farquharson v. Seton, 5 Russ. 45. 63; 
 
 Meadows v. Duchess of Kingston, Amb. 762, Marquis of Breadalbane v. Chandos, 2 M. & C. 
 
 763; Allen v. Macpherson, 1 Phil. 133. 143; 711, 732; Story, Confl. Laws, 584-618. 
 
 (a) See ante, p. 553, note (a). A Court of general rule, recall the probate, even when the 
 
 Equity accepts the probate of a will as conclu- testator's estate is in Court in a proceeding be- 
 
 sive with respect to personal property, and re- fore it. Bradford v. Young, 26 Ch. D. 656; 
 
 sort should be had to the Probate Court to recall see Pinney v. Hunt, 6 Ch. D. 98; Meluish 
 
 the probate, if desired. Smart v. Tranter, 40 Milton, 3 id. 27; ante, pp. 553, 630, notes. 
 Ch. D. 165. The Equity Court will not, as a 
 
 662
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. 
 
 665 
 
 the merits ; and that the sentence pleaded was final, and not an inter- 
 locutory proceeding. 7 
 
 Although a final judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction, 
 whether in this or any other country, will, as we have seen, operate as 
 a bar to a claim for the same matter in a Court of Equity, yet if, from 
 any circumstance, such as fraud, mistake, or surprise, it is against con- 
 science that the defendant should avail himself of such a bar, the Court 
 of Equity will not allow it to prevail. 8 Where, however, a bill for that 
 purpose is filed, the defendant may plead the judgment in bar, negativ- 
 ing by averments, and (if interrogated as to them) denying by answer, 
 the equitable circumstances alleged in the bill, upon which the judgment 
 is sought to be impeached, (a) 
 
 It is to be observed, that where a bill itself states a sentence of 
 another Court, without alleging any equitable matter to avoid it, 
 * a plea of that sentence will not hold ; because it brings for- * 665 
 ward no new matter, and the defendant ought to have demurred. 1 
 Where a bill was filed by an executor, who had assented to a specific 
 bequest, to set aside a verdict and judgment in trover, obtained by the 
 specific legatee, on the ground that trover would not lie for a legacy, 
 and that the damages given by the jury were excessive, and the de- 
 fendant pleaded the verdict and judgment in bar, the plea was allowed ; 2 
 but it may be doubted whether the defence ought not to have been by 
 demurrer, as there was no allegation in the bill requiring averment in 
 support of the plea. 3 Upon this principle, where the probate of a will 
 
 7 Gareias v. Ricardo, 14 Sim. 265, 271; 8 
 Jur. 1037; S. C. on appeal, nom. Ricardo v. 
 Gareias, 12 CI. & Fin. 368; 9 Jur. 1019; Samuda 
 t). Furtado, 3 Bro. C. C. 70, 72; Ostell v. LePage, 
 2 De G. M. & G. 892, 895 ; 5 De G. & S. 95; 16 
 Jur. 404; Hunter v. Stewart, 4 De G. F. & J. 
 168 : 8 Jur. N. S. 317 ; see also Reimers v. 
 Druce, 23 Beav. 145: 3 Jur. N. S. 147. 
 
 8 As to the circumstances which will be 
 sufficient to impeach a verdict and judgment 
 in Equity, see Williams v. Lee, 3 Atk. 223; 
 Samuda v. Furtado, ubi supra. In Oehsenbein 
 v. Papelier, L. R. 8 Ch. 695, it was held that 
 fraud was a good defence to a suit at Law on a 
 foreign judgment, and, therefore, Equity would 
 not interfere by injunction with the suit. See 
 London & Prov. Ins. Co. v. Seymour, L. R. 
 
 (a) See Concha v. Concha, 11 A pp. Cas. 541 ; 
 29 Ch. D. 268; 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 
 416, 499 ; Mutrie v. Binney, 35 Ch. D. 614 ; Grant 
 v. Easton, 32 VV. R. 124; Trefz v. Knickerbocker 
 Life Ins. Co. 8 Fed. Rep. 177; Moch v. Virginia 
 Fire Ins. Co. 10 id. 696; McMullen v. Richie, 41 
 id. 502; Hilton v. Guyot, 42 id. 249. The Eng- 
 lish Courts do not sit to hear appeals from 
 foreign tribunals, even when their decisions 
 proceed on a mistake as to English law, but 
 recourse must be had to the mode of appeal 
 provided in the foreign country. See Rt Tru- 
 
 17 Eq. 85. In Davis v. Headley, 22 N. J. Eq. 
 115, ttie decree of another State, sought to be 
 enforced, was held void for fraud. See also 
 Winchester v. Jackson, Cooke, 420; S. C. 3 
 Hayw. 305. And see, as to the extent to which 
 judgments of foreign Courts can be examined 
 or enforced in England, Reimers v. Druce, 23 
 Beav. 145; Cammell v. Sewell, 3 H. & N. 617; 
 5 H. & N. 728; Simpson v. Fogo, 1 J. & H. 18; 
 1 H. & M. 195; Castrique v. Imri, 8 C. B. 
 N. S. 1, 405; Griffin v. Brady, 18 W. R. 130; 
 Duchess of Kingston's case, 1 Smith L. C. 
 754, 912. 
 
 i LI. Red. 255; Knight v. Atkisson, 2 Tenn. 
 Ch. 384. 
 
 2 Williams r. Lee, 3 Atk. 223. 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 255. 
 
 fort, 36 Ch. D. 600. In a suit upon a foreign 
 judgment, fraud in obtaining it is a good de- 
 fence, even when such fraud cannot be proved 
 without re-trying the questions adjudicated 
 upon by the foreign Court. Vadala v. Lawes, 
 25 Q. B. D. 310; and even though it has 
 been decided in the foreign Court that no fraud 
 existed. Abouloff v. Oppenheimer, 10 Q. B. D. 
 295; Re Henderson, 35 Ch. D. 704. As to 
 foreign confessed judgments, see Grover & 
 Baker S. M. Co. v. Radcliffe (U. S.), 30 Am. 
 L. Reg. 280, and note. 
 
 663
 
 6Q6 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 is impeached on the ground of fraud used in obtaining it, the defence 
 should be by demurrer : because fraud not being a sufficient equitable 
 ground to impeach the probate, 4 the mere setting up of a probate, 
 which appears upon the bill, is not a sufficient averment of a new fact to 
 support a plea. 
 
 3. Fleas in bar of matter in pais only are, principally : (1) A stated 
 account ; (2) A release ; (3) An award ; (4) An agreement ; (5) A 
 title founded, either on adverse possession, or on a will, or conveyance, 
 or other instrument affecting the right of the parties ; (6) A purchase 
 for valuable consideration, without notice of the plaintiff's title. 
 
 (1) A plea of a stated account is a good bar to a bill for an ac- 
 count ; 5 for there is no rule more strictly adhered to in this Court than 
 that, when a defendant sets forth a stated account, he shall not be obliged 
 to go upon a general one. 6 
 
 In order to support a plea of a stated account, it must be shown to 
 have been final ; it is not sufficient to allege that there has been a divi- 
 dend made between the parties, which implied a settlement; for a 
 dividend may be made upon a supposition that the estate will amount 
 to so much, but may be still subject to an account being stated after- 
 wards. 7 A plea of a stated account must show that it was in writing, 
 and likewise the balance in writing, or at least set forth what the bal- 
 ance was. 8 It does not, however, seem to be necessary to aver, 
 * 666 that the account was settled between the * parties upon a minute 
 investigation of items : a general agreement or composition will 
 be sufficient; 1 nor will the circumstance of the account appearing to 
 have been settled, errors excepted, be a sufficient ground to open a set- 
 tled account, unless specific errors are pointed out in the bill. 2 
 
 A stated account will not operate as a bar to discovery, where the 
 plaintiff is entitled to such discovery, not for the purpose of any pro- 
 ceeding between him and the defendant, but to enable him to protect 
 himself from claims by other people. 3 (a) A general release of all de- 
 mands, not under seal, may be pleaded as a stated account. 4 
 
 * Ante, p. 612. 
 
 5 Ld. Red. 259; Dawson v. Dawson, 1 Atk. 
 1 ; Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 4 Cranch, 306; 
 see the form of a plea of a stated account, 
 Willis, 550. What will constitute a stated 
 account in the sense of a Court of Equity, is in 
 some measure dependent on the circumstances 
 of the case. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 526. A stated 
 account properly exists only where the accounts 
 have been examined, and the balance admitted 
 as the true balance between the parties, without 
 having been paid. When the balance thus 
 admitted is paid, the account is deemed a settled 
 account. Endo v. Caleham, Younge, .306 : Capon 
 v Miles, 13 Price, 767; Weedtf. Small, 7 Paige, 
 5T3 ; 1 Story. Eq. PI. § 798. 
 
 (a) The rule is that specific errors must be 
 stated in order to open a settled account ; and if 
 
 664 
 
 6 Sumner v. Thorpe, 2 Atk. 1 ; Coop. Eq. 
 PI. 277; see also Carmichael v. Carmichael, 2 
 Phil. 101, 104; 10 Jur. 908; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. 
 §^27. 
 
 7 Dawson v. Dawson, 1 Atk. 1. 
 
 8 Burk v. Brown, 2 Atk. 399. 
 
 1 Sewell v. Bridge, 1 Ves. Sr. 297; Greene v. 
 Harris, 11 R. I. 5. 
 
 2 Taylor v. H -ylin, 2 Bro. C. C. 310; 1 Cox, 
 435; Johnson v. Curtis, 3 Bro. C. C.266; Ready 
 v. Munday, 1 Tenn. Ch. 458. 
 
 3 Clarke v. Earl of Ormonde, Jac. 116. 
 * Gilb. For. Rom. 57. 
 
 allegations of fraud in the pleadings are insuffi- 
 cient to entitle the plaintiff to open a settled
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. 
 
 667 
 
 It is not essential, in order to the validity of a stated account as a 
 bar, that it should have been signed by the parties ; 5 it will be sufficient 
 if an account has been delivered and acquiesced in for a considerable 
 length of time. 6 The mere delivery of an account will not constitute 
 a stated account, without some evidence of acquiescence which may 
 afford sufficient legal presumption of a settlement. 7 
 
 It has been said that a defendant, pleading a stated account, must, 
 whether error or fraud be charged or not, aver that the stated account is 
 just and true, to the best of his knowledge and belief ; 8 but it is not 
 necessary that the account should be annexed by way of schedule : for 
 the plea is sufficient, in case it be a fair account between the 
 parties. 9 * Where, however, a bill impeaches the account, and * 667 
 alleges that the plaintiff has no counterpart of it, and it is re- 
 quired to be set forth, the defendant must annex a copy of the account 
 to his answer by way of schedule, so that, if there are errors upon the 
 face of it the plaintiff may have an opportunity of pointing them out. 1 
 
 The delivery up of vouchers is an affirmation that the account be- 
 tween the parties was a stated one ; and where such a transaction has 
 taken place, it should be averred in the plea. 2 
 
 The effect of pleading a stated account to a mere bill for an account, is 
 to compel the plaintiff to amend his bill, and to charge either fraud or 
 particular errors ; 3 if specific errors or frauds are charged in the bill, for 
 the purpose of impeaching the account, they must be denied by aver- 
 
 5 Story, Eq. Jur. § 526. 
 
 6 Thus, where there have been mutual deal- 
 ings between a merchant in England and a 
 merchant beyond sea, and an account is trans- 
 mitted by one to the other, if the person to 
 whom it is sent keeps it by him for a length of 
 time without making any objection, it will bind 
 him, and prevent him opening the account 
 afterwards. Willis v. Jernegan, 2 Atk. 252; 
 see Powell v. Pacific R. R. 65 Mo. 658; Murray 
 v. Toland, 3 John. Ch. 569 ; Freeland v. Heron, 
 7 Cranch, 147 ; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 526 ; Conse- 
 qua v. Fanning, 3 John. Ch. 587 ; Wilde v. 
 Jenkins, 4 Paige, 481. In regard to acquies- 
 cence in stated accounts, although it amounts to 
 an admission or presumption of their correct- 
 ness, it b}' no means establishes the fact of their 
 having been settled, even though the acquies- 
 cence has been for a considerable time. There 
 must be other ingredients in the case to justify 
 the conclusion of a settlement. 1 Story, Eq. 
 Jur. § 528 ; Ld Clancarty v. Latouche, 1 B. & 
 Beat. 428 ; Irvine v. Young, 1 S. & S. 333. 
 
 ? Irvine v. Young, 1 S. & S. 333. It has 
 been said that, among merchants, it is looked 
 upon as an allowance of an account current, if 
 the merchant who receives it does not object to 
 
 account, discovery will be refused until such 
 allegations are made sufficient. See Parkinson 
 v. Hanbury, L. R. 2 H. L. 1; Whyte v. Ahrens, 
 
 it in a second or a third post (Sherman v. Sher- 
 man, 2 Vern. 276); but inTickel v. Short, 2 Ves. 
 Sr. 239, Lord Hardwicke said, that if one mer- 
 chant sends an account to another in a dif- 
 ferent country, on which a balance is made 
 due to himself, and the other keeps it by him 
 about two years without objection, the rule of 
 this Court, as well as of merchants, is, that it is 
 considered as a stated account. 
 
 8 Anon. 3 Atk. 70; Daniels v. Taggart, 1 
 Gill & J. 311; Schwarz v. Wendell, Harring. 
 Ch. 395. 
 
 s Hankey v. Simpson, 3 Atk. 303. See now 
 R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XXXI. 14 ; and see Greene 
 v. Harris, 11 R. I. 5. 
 
 1 Hankey v. Simpson, 3 Atk. 303. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 260; Willis v. Jernegan, 2 Atk. 
 252 ; Clarke v. Earl of Ormonde, Jac. 1 16. But 
 the delivering up of vouchers on a settlement of 
 accounts, is not necessary. Meeker v. Marsh, 
 Saxton (N. J.). 198. 
 
 3 Ante, p. 371; Weed v. Smull, 7 Paige, 
 573; Brown v. Van Dyke, 4 Halst. Ch. (N.J.) 
 795. In England it seems that he may now 
 allege fraud or particular error in his reply. 
 See 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 484. 
 
 26 Ch. D. 717 ; Leitch v. Abbott, 31 Ch. D. 374; 
 Sachs v. Speilman, 37 Ch. D. 295; Taylor v. 
 Duncanson, 20 D. C. 505. 
 
 665
 
 668 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 meats in the plea, as well as by the answer in support of the plea, if the 
 defendant is interrogated as to them. 4 
 
 It may be observed here, that when fraud is proved to have taken 
 place in a settlement of account, or it is shown that the account contains 
 errors of a considerable extent, both in number and amount, whether 
 caused by mistake or fraud, it will be a sufficient ground to open the 
 whole account ; and if a fiduciary relation existed between the parties, 
 the Court will make a similar order if such account is shown to contain 
 a less number of errors. 5 An account has been opened for fraud, though 
 the account had been settled for twenty-three years, and the party who 
 was guilty of the fraud was dead. 6 (a) 
 
 Upon the same principle, where an account has been settled between 
 an attorney and his client, and it appears upon the face of the account 
 that the attorney has not given that credit, and produced to his client 
 that state of his affairs which he was entitled to have, the Court will 
 not permit such an account to stand. 7 The same rule will apply to cases 
 
 of accounts settled between principal and agent, 8 guardian and 
 * 668 ward, 9 and trustee and cestui que trust.™ * In some cases where 
 
 errors or mistakes only are shown to exist in the account, the 
 account will not be opened, but the party will be permitted merely to 
 surcharge and falsify it. 1 And where in a partnership suit one error 
 
 * See Ld. Red. 261 ; Phelps v. Sproule, 1 M. 
 & K. 231, 236; Parker v. Alcock, 1 Y. & J. 
 432; Chad wick v. Broad wood, 3 Beav. 530, 540; 
 
 5 Jur. 359; Greene v. Harris, 4 R. I. 401 ; S. C. 
 11 R. I. 5, where the authorities are fully con- 
 sidered. 
 
 5 See Williamson v. Barbour, 9 Ch. D. 529; 
 Barrow v. Rhinelander, 1 John. Ch. 550; Baker 
 v. Biddle, 1 Bald. 394; Bainbridge v. Wilcocks, 
 id. 536, 540. A running account closed by a 
 bond may be opened by a Court of Equity on 
 the ground of fraud. Gray v. Washington, 
 Cook, 321. If in a bill of Equity to open a 
 settled account, the facts alleged and proved 
 should show fraud actual or constructive, in the 
 settlement, the plaintiff will be entitled to re- 
 lief, notwithstanding the bill contains no direct 
 averment of fraud. Farnam v. Brooks, 9 Pick. 
 212; Bankhead v. Alloway, 6 Coldw. 56. 
 
 6 Vernon v. Vawdry, 2 Atk. 119; Botifeur 
 v. Weyman, 1 M'CordCh. 161. 
 
 " Matthews v. Wallwyn, 4 Ves. 118, 125; 
 Middleditch v. Sharland, 5 Sumner's Ves. 87, 
 Perkins's note (<;), and cases cited; Hickson 
 v. Aylward, 3 Moll. 1 ; Farnam v. Brooks, 
 9 Pick. 212; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 462, and 
 notes; Pickering v. Pickering, 2 Beav. 31; 
 Graham v. Davidson, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 
 155 : De Montmorency v. Devereux, Dru. 
 
 6 W. 119. 
 
 8 Beaumont v. Boultbee, 5 Ves. 485, 494; 
 
 7 Ves. 599, 601; 11 Ves. 358; Clarke v. Tip- 
 ping, 9 Beav. 284, 287, where the fact appeared 
 from admissions in the answer. 
 
 9 Allfrey v. Allfrey, 10 Beav. 353, 357; 
 11 Jur. 981; 1 M'N. "& G. 87, 93; 13 Jur. 
 269; Coleman v. Mellersh, 2 M'N. & G. 309, 
 315; and see Brownell r. Brownell, 2 Bro. 
 C. C. 62. 
 
 10 Clarke v. Earl of Ormonde, Jac. 116. 
 As between trustee and cestui que trust, the 
 trustee cannot protect himself from discovery 
 of the vouchers, S. C. 
 
 1 Vernon v. Vawdry, 2 Atk. 119; Brown 
 v. Van Dyke, 4 Halst. Ch. (N. J.) 795. The 
 burden of showing errors is on him who re- 
 ceives an account without objection. Baker 
 v. Biddle, 1 Bald. 394; Bainbridge v. Wil- 
 cocks, id. 536, 540; Lock v. Armstrong, 2 
 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 147; Wilde v. Jenkins, 4 
 Paige, 481; Murray v. Poland, 3 John. Ch. 
 569; Honore v. Cohnesnel, 1 J. J. Marsh. 417; 
 Troup v. Haight, 1 Hopk. 239. In the case 
 of transactions between trustee and cestui que 
 trust, or guardian and ward (Brownell v. 
 Brownell, 2 Bro. C. C. 62), or between solicitor 
 and client (Matthews v. Wallwyn, 4 Ves. 125), 
 the Court allows a greater latitude. As to 
 opening for mistake settled accounts between 
 mortgagor and mortgagee, see Daniel v. Sin- 
 clair, 6 App. Cas. 181. 
 
 (n) In re Garnett, Gandy v. Macaulay 
 (No. 1), 33 Ch. D. 1, a release to a trustee was 
 set aside after more than twenty years, and 
 after the trustee's death, upon the plaintiff's 
 
 666 
 
 evidence of error supported by the terms of 
 the deed; and it was held unnecessary to prove 
 fraud.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. * 669 
 
 of £950 was established in an account long settled, the Court refused to 
 open the whole account, there being no fraud, but gave liberty to sur- 
 charge and falsify. 2 This is an important distinction : because, where 
 an account is opened, the whole of it may be unravelled, and the 
 parties will not be bound by deductions agreed upon between them on 
 taking the former account ; 8 but where a party has liberty to surcharge 
 and falsify, the onus proband i is always on the party having the liberty : 
 for the Court takes it as a stated account and establishes it ; but if the 
 party can show an omission for which there ought to be credit, it will be 
 added (which is a surcharge), or if any wrong charge is inserted it will 
 be deducted (which is a falsification). 4 This, however, must be done by 
 proof on his side. 5 In some cases, where the circumstances would justify 
 opening the account, the Court will only give leave to surcharge and 
 falsify, if it is satisfied that it will in that manner best do justice 
 between the parties. 6 
 
 Although a party, seeking to open a settled account, must specify the 
 errors he insists upon, 7 it is not necessary that he should, at the hearing, 
 prove all the errors specified in his bill. 8 If he proves some of them, or 
 even one important error, he entitles himself to a decree, giving him 
 liberty to surcharge and falsify. 9 
 
 When parties are at liberty to surcharge and falsify, they are not con- 
 fined to mere errors of fact, but they may take advantage of errors in 
 Law ; 10 and where one party is allowed to surcharge and falsify, the 
 other may do so too. 11 
 
 * It is to be remarked, however, that although an admission by * 6G9 
 the defendant in the answer accompanying his plea, of an error 
 in the stated account, may be sufficient evidence to induce the Court to 
 open the account, the mere circumstance that the defendant, after the 
 
 2 Gething v. Keighley, 9 Ch. D. 547, 550, 576; Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 4 Cranch, 
 holding also that actual knowledge of antece- 306; Bullock v. Boyd, 2 Edw. Ch.293; Phillips 
 dent fraud, by an agent who is sued, on the v. Belden, 2 Edw. Ch. 1; Stoughton t\ Lynch, 
 part of one who subsequently became a mem- 2 John. Ch. 509. 
 
 ber of the plaintiff's (principal's) firm, is not a Where no fiduciary relation exists between the 
 
 good plea in bar of the claim. parties, nor any great inequality in their mental 
 
 3 Osborne v. Williams, 18 Ves. 379, 382. or business capacity, formal settlements closed 
 
 4 Pit v. Cholmondeley, 2 Ves. Sr. 565; by receipt or note will not be opened except for 
 Heighington v. Grant, 1 Phil. 600. For an fraud, or errors clearly established, especially 
 explanation of the terms surcharge and falsify, after the destruction of vouchers by consent, 
 see 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 525. Patton r. Cone, 1 Lea, 14 ; S. C. 2 Tenn. Leg. 
 
 5 Ibid. Rep. 171. An action to open a settlement can- 
 
 6 Allfrey v. Allfrey, 1 M'N. & G. 87, 94; not be maintained if it appear that the plaintiff 
 13 Jur. 269; Gething v. Keighley, 9 Ch. D. was aware, at the time he made the settlement, 
 547. of the facts on which he bases his claim to 
 
 1 Ante, p. 371. A general charge is not relief. Quinlan v. Reiser, 66 Mo. 603. And 
 
 sufficient; specific errors must be pointed out. see Gage v. Parmele, 87 111. 329. 
 
 Calvit v. Markham, 3 How. (Miss.) 343; 8 Anon. 2 Freern. 62; Chambers v. Gold- 
 
 Mebane v. Mebane, 1 Ired. Eq. 403; Oe Mont- win, 5 Ves. 834, 837; D.iwson v. Dawson, 
 
 morency v. Devereux, 1 Dm. & W. 119; Leay- 1 Atk. 1; Drew r. Power, 1 Sch. & Lef. 192. 
 
 craft v. Dempsey, 15 Wend. 83; Baker v. 9 Twogood r. Swanston, 6 Ves. 485; Geth- 
 
 Biddle, 1 Bald. 394, 418; Bainbridge v. Wil- ing v. Keighley, 9 Ch. D. 547. 
 
 cox, id. 536,540; Consequa v. Fanning, 3 John. i» Roberts v. Kuffin, 2 Atk. 112. 
 
 Ch. 587; S. C. 17 John. 511; Weed v. Small, U l Mad. Ch. 144. 
 7 Paige, 573; Hobart v. Andrews, 21 Pick. 
 
 667
 
 * 669 PLEAS. 
 
 account was settled, confessed that there was an error in the account, 
 and before suit corrected it and paid over the amount, is not a ground 
 upon which the Court will make such a decree. 1 
 
 (2) If the plaintiff, or a person under whom he claims, has released 
 the subject of his demands, the defendant may plead the release in bar 
 of the bill, 2 whether executed before or after the filing of the bill ; 8 and 
 this will apply to a bill praying that the release may be set aside : 4 
 in which case, the defendant must deny the equitable circumstances 
 charged for the purpose of impeaching the release, by averments in 
 the plea, and also by the answer in support of the plea, if interrogated 
 as to them. 5 
 
 A release, however, to be an effectual bar to an account, must be 
 under seal : otherwise it ought to be pleaded as a stated account only. 6 
 But although it is necessary that a release, when insisted upon as such, 
 should have been sealed and delivered, 7 there is no authority for saying 
 that it must have been signed. 8 It seems, that where a person taken in 
 execution on a judgment has been discharged by his creditor's express 
 order, such discharge, being a release of the debt, may be pleaded in bar 
 to a bill to have satisfaction of the judgment. 9 (a) 
 
 In a plea of release, the defendant must set out the consideration 
 upon which it was made ; for every release must be founded on some 
 consideration : otherwise fraud will be presumed. 10 A plea of a release, 
 therefore, cannot extend to the discovery of the consideration; and 
 if that is impeached by the bill, the plea must be assisted by aver- 
 ments, covering the ground upon which the consideration is so im- 
 
 i Davis v. Spurting, 1E.& M. 64, 67. 6 Ld. Red. 263. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 2(51; Bower v. Swadlin, 1 Atk. 1 The plea should state that the release was 
 
 294; Taunton r. Pcpler, 6 Mad. 166; Clarke under seal; but this does not seem to be indis- 
 
 v. Earl of Ormonde, Jac. 116; Roche v. Mor- pensable. Phelps v. Sproule, 1 M. & K. 231, 
 
 gell, 2 Sch. & Lef. 721. 236. 
 
 s Sergrove v. Mayhew, 2 M'N. & G. 97, 99; 8 Taunton v. Pepler, 6 Mad. 166. 
 
 14 Jur. 158. 9 Beames on Pleas, 221 ; Beatniff v. Gard- 
 
 4 Ld. Red. 263. ner, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 73, pi. 20. But not to a bill 
 
 5 Lloyd v. Smith, 1 Anst. 258; Freeland v. to enforce a mortgage made to secure the debt. 
 Johnsonj id. 276; Walter v. Glanville, 5 Bro. Davis v. Battine, 4 Russ. & M. 76. 
 
 P. C. ed. Toml. 555; Roche v. Morgell, 2 Sch. 10 Roche v. Morgell, ubi supra. A plea of 
 
 & Lef. 727; Sanders v. King, 6 Mad. 61, 64, release to a bill for an account is insufficient, 
 
 cited 2 S. & S. 277; see also Parker v. Alcock, unless it sets out by way of averment the ac- 
 
 1 Y. & J. 432. See McClane v. Shepherd, 21 counts which form its consideration. Brooks v. 
 
 N. J. Eq. 76. Sutton, L. R. 5 Eq. 361. 
 
 (a) A plea of release to a bill for an account, it is not a defence. Steeds v. Steeds, 22 Q. B. 
 being held insufficient for not setting out the D. 537. Pleas which set up an affirmative de- 
 accounts, was ordered to stand for an answer, fence, such as payment, must, upon the trial, 
 with liberty to except, in Brooks v. Sutton, be supported by a preponderance of evidence. 
 L. R. 5 Eq. 361. As to the plea of accord Perot v. Cooper, 17 Col. 80. The plea of pay- 
 and satisfaction, see Barclay v. Bank of New ment is new matter, which the plaintiff is 
 South Wales. 5 App. Cas. 374; Re Branksea required to answer in his replication or reply, 
 Island Co. 1 Meg. 12. Accord and satisfaction and cannot anticipate by averring in his bill 
 is a valid plea to a suit for a specialty debt; or complaint that no payments have been made, 
 but if made with only one of two obligees of a Benicia Agr. Works v. Creighton, 21 Oregon, 
 bond (who are treated prima facie, in Equity, 495. 
 as tenants in common and not as joint tenants), 
 
 668
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. 
 
 671 
 
 peached : u therefore, where there was a bill for * an account and * 670 
 a discovery of dealings between the parties, to which a release 
 was pleaded, and it appeared that the release was founded on an account 
 of those dealings made up, Lord Hardwicke held it to be bad ; because 
 it extended to a discovery of those dealings, and of the account so 
 made up. 1 
 
 (3) An award may be pleaded in bar to a bill, which seeks to dis- 
 turb the matter submitted to arbitration. 2 It may likewise be pleaded 
 to a bill to set aside the award and open the account ; and it is not only 
 a good defence to the merits of the case, but likewise to the discovery 
 sought by the bill. 3 
 
 It seems doubtful whether an award, made under an agreement, entered 
 into after the bill has been filed, to refer the matter of the suit to arbi- 
 tration, can be set up in bar to the bill by a plea, in the nature of a plea 
 puis darrein, continuance at Law; the object in view can, however, be 
 much more effectually obtained by an application to stay proceedings 
 in the cause. 4 
 
 Although an award duly made will be a good plea in bar to a bill, for 
 the matters concluded by it, a covenant or agreement to refer disputes 
 to arbitration, («) as it cannot be made the subject of a bill for a 
 specific performance, 5 cannot be pleaded in bar to a bill * brought * 671 
 
 ii Ed. Red. 261, 262. Story. Eq. PI. §§ 796, 
 797. Where the consideration for a release is 
 the general settlement of accounts, and such 
 settlement is impeached in the bill, this must 
 be met by a plea, and be supported by an an- 
 swer denying the imputations charged in the 
 bill. Parker v. Alcock, 1 Y. & J. 432; Fish v. 
 Miller, 5 Paige. 26 ; Allen v. Randolph, 4 John. 
 Ch. 693; Bolton v. Gardner, 3 Paige, 273; Peck 
 v. Burgess, Walk. Ch. 485. 
 
 1 Salkeld v. Science, 2 Ves. Sr. 107, 108; 
 Roche v. M'Tgell. ubi supra. In Brown v. 
 Perkins (1 Hare, 564, 569; 6 Jur. 727), to a bill 
 by the executors of a deceased partner, for an 
 account of the dealings and transactions of a 
 partnership, the defendant pleaded a parol 
 agreement between himself and the testator, 
 to the effect that all accounts between them 
 should be waived. Sir James Wigram V. C. 
 seemed to be of opinion, that such a plea 
 might be a good defence to a bill for an ac- 
 count : but he was of opinion, upon the con- 
 struction of the agreement in the ease before 
 him, that it must be understood as importing 
 that the defendant took upon himself the 
 liabilities of the partnership; and he held 
 the plea bad, because it was not supported by 
 negative averments, showing that the plain- 
 tiff's testator's estate was discharged from all 
 liability in respect of the partnership. 
 
 2 Tittenson v. Peat, 3 Atk. 529; Farrington 
 v. Chute, 1 Vem. 72. As to the jurisdiction of 
 the Court over awards, see Harding v. Wick- 
 ham, 2 J. & H. 676; Smith v. Whitmore, 10 
 Jur. N. S. 65, 1190; 1 H. & M. 576; 2 De G. 
 J. & S. 297; Wakefield o. Llanelly Ry. & Dock 
 Co. 3 De G. J. & S. 11 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 456; 
 Borneo Co. v. Robinson, W. N". (1868)26; Par- 
 rott v. Shellard, id. 186; 16 W. R. 928; ante, 
 p. 605; and see Rumbold V. Cow], W. N. (1873) 
 202; Grafham v. Turnbull, 44 L J. Ch. 538. 
 An award constitutes no valid defence unless it 
 clearly appears that the subject-matter of the 
 suit was within the award. Davison v. John- 
 son, 16 N. J. Eq. 112. 
 
 3 Ed. Red. 260; Tittenson V. Peat, ubi supra. 
 * Rowe v. Wood, 1 J. & W. 315, 334, 337; 
 
 2 Bligh, 505; see also Drvden v. Robinson, 2 
 S. & S. 529, the marginal note of which case is 
 incorrect. 
 
 5 Price v. Williams, cited 6 Ves. 818; Agar 
 v. Mack lew, 2 S. & S. 418; Earl of Mexbor- 
 ough i'. Bower, 7 Beav. 127; Tattersall v. 
 Groote, 2 B. & P. 131; Copper v. Wells. Sax- 
 ton (N. J.), 10: Darbey v. Whitaker, 4 Drew. 
 134: March v. Eastern Railroad. 40 N. H. 571; 
 Smith v. Boston, C. & M. R. R. 36 N. H. 487; 
 King v. Howard, 27 Miss. 21. No mere agree- 
 ment to refer a controversy to arbitration can 
 oust the proper Courts of justice of their juris- 
 
 (a) Such a covenant or agreement was for- 
 merly disfavored as an attempt to oust the juris- 
 diction of the Superior Courts. See Scott v. 
 
 Avery, 5 H. L. Ca«. 811; 8 Ex. 487; Collins v. 
 Locke, 4 App. Cas. 674. 
 
 669
 
 671 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 in consequence of such differences ; 1 and where a bill is filed in respect 
 of matters agreed to be referred to arbitration, the proper course is for 
 the defendant, after appearance, but before plea or answer, to apply 
 to the Court to stay the proceedings in the suit. 2 (b) 
 
 If the award is impeached upon grounds of fraud, corruption, or 
 mistake, or for any other reason, such statements must be denied by 
 averments in the plea, and (if interrogated to) by answer in support 
 of it. 3 
 
 We have already had occasion to observe that arbitrators may be. 
 made parties to a bill to set aside an award which is impeached on the 
 ground of gross misconduct on their parts. 4 In such a case, they may 
 plead the award in bar of all that part of the bill which seeks a discov- 
 ery of their motives in making the award ; but they must, if charged 
 with corruption or partiality, support the plea by averments, denying 
 
 diction of the case. Contee v. Dawson, 2 Bland, 
 264; see also Allegre v. Maryland Ins. Co. 6 
 Har. & J. 408; Randall v. Chesapeake &c. 
 Canal Co. 1 Harring. 234; Gray v. Wilson, 4 
 Watts, 39; Miles v. Stanley, 1 Miles, 418; 
 Stone v. Dennis, 3 Porter, 231; Tobey v. 
 County of Bristol, 3 Story, 800. See Milnes 
 V. Gery, 14 Ves. 400; Greason v. Keteltas, 17 
 N. Y. 491; Hopkins v. Gilman, 22 Wis. 476; 
 Dawson v. Fitzgerald, L. R.9 Ex. 7; 1 Ex. D. 
 257; Tscheider r. Biddle, 4 Dill. 55, and note, 
 p. 64. See also, under the Common Law Pro- 
 cedure Act, Cooke o. Cooke, L. R. 4 Eq. 77; 
 Willesford v. Watson, L. R. 8 Ch. 473; Law v. 
 Garrett, 8 Ch. D. 26. 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 264; Wellington v. Mackintosh, 
 2 Atk. 569, 570; Michell v. Harris, 4 Bro. C. C. 
 311, 315; 2 Ves. Jr. 129, 136; Satterley v. 
 Robinson, cited 4 Bro. C. C. 316, n.; Street v. 
 Rigby, 6 Ves. 815, 817, overruling Halfhide 
 v. Kenning, 2 Bro. C. C. 336; and see Ranger 
 v. Great Western Ry. Co. 5 H. L. Cas. 72 ; 18 
 Jur. 795; Scott v. Avery, 5 H. L. Cas. 811 ; 2 
 Jur. N. S. 815; Scott v. Liverpool, 1 Giff. 215; 
 
 4 Jur. N. S. 402; 2 De G. & J 324; 5 Jur. 
 N. S. 105; Roper v. Lendon, 1 E. & E. 825; 5 
 Jur. N. S. 491 ; Horton v. Saver, 4 H. & N. 643 ; 
 
 5 Jur. N S. 989; Wood v. Robson, W.N. (1867) 
 66; 15 W. R. 756 ; Cooke v. Cooke, L. R. 4 Eq. 
 87; Henrick v. Blair, 1 John. Ch. 101 ; Shepard 
 
 17. Merrill, 2 John. Ch. 276; Underbill v. Van 
 Cortlandt, 2 John. Ch. 339; Bouck v. Wilber, 
 4 John. Ch. 405; Tappin v. Heath, 1 Paige, 
 293; Campbell v. Western, 3 id. 124; Fitzpat- 
 rick v Smith, 1 Desaus. 245; Atwyn v. Perk- 
 ins, 3 Desaus. 297; Sherman v. Beale, 1 Wash. 
 11 ; Pleasants v. Ross, 1 Wash. 156 ; Morris v. 
 Ross, 2 Hen. & M. 171, 408 ; Mitchell v. Harris, 
 2 Sumner's Ves. 129, notes (e) and (</), and 
 cases cited; Tobey v. County of Bristol, 3 
 Story, 800. 819, et seq. As to agreements to 
 refer under the Railway Companies Arbitra- 
 tion Act, 1859 (22 & 23 Vic. c. 59), see Wat- 
 ford & R. Ry. Co. 0. London & N. W. Ry. Co. 
 L. R. 8 Eq. 231; Wolverhampton &c. Ry. Co. 
 v. London & N. W. Ry. Co. L. R. 16 Eq. 433; 
 Llanelly Ry. Co. v. London & N. W. Ry. Co. 
 20 W. R. 898. (a) 
 
 2 Common Law Procedure Act, 1854 (17 & 
 18 Vic. 125), § 11; see Russell v. Russell, 14 
 Ch. D. 471; post, Chap. XLV. Statutory Juris- 
 diction. For fcrm of notice of motion, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 261; Coop. Eq. PL 280; Story, 
 Eq. PL § 803 ; and see ante, p. 614. 
 
 4 Ante, p. 297; Padley v. Lincoln Water- 
 works Co. 2'M'N. & G.*68, 71; 14 Jur. 299; 
 Ponsford v. Swaine, 1 J. & H. 433; Malmes- 
 bury Ry. Co. v. Budd, 2 Ch. D. 113. 
 
 (n) Where railway companies agree to sub- 
 mit matters in dispute to arbitration, under 
 §§ 4, 26, of this Act, the Court must give effect 
 to the agreement to refer if insisted on by 
 either party, but it is not deprived of its juris- 
 diction to determine the matters in dispute if 
 neither party insists on an arbitration. Lon- 
 don, Chatham, & Dover Ry. Co. v. South- 
 Eastern Ry. Co 40 Ch. D. 100. 
 
 (b) See Compagnie du Senegal v. Woods, 
 53 L. J. Ch. 166; Minifie o. Railway Passen- 
 gers Ass. Co. 44 L. T. 552 ; Viney v. Bignold, 
 
 670 
 
 20 Q. B. D. 172. The Court will not exercise 
 its jurisdiction to restrain a party from proceed- 
 ing to arbitration, where it sees that the result 
 of the arbitration will be merely futile and pro- 
 ductive of no injury to the party complaining. 
 Farrar v. Cooper, 44 Ch. D. 323. It has no 
 jurisdiction to enjoin a person from proceeding 
 with an arbitration in a matter beyond the 
 arbitration agreement, although the proceedings 
 are vexatious. Wood v. Lillies, 61 L. J. Ch. 
 158; North London Ry. Co. v. Great Northern 
 Ry. Co. 11 Q. B. D. 30.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. * 673 
 
 such charges, and showing themselves incorrupt and impartial, and (if 
 interrogated) they must also deny them by answer. 5 
 
 (4) An executory agreement is a cause of action only, and cannot be 
 pleaded in bar to another cause of action. 6 Where an agreement is final, 
 and settles the whole matter, the case is different, and it may be 
 
 * pleaded. 1 An agreement to put an end to a suit must not be * 672 
 final only as between the parties to the bill to which it is pleaded, 
 
 but it must be final as to all the parties to the suit compromised by it. 
 If, therefore, an agreement be made subsequent to the filing of a bill, 
 between the parties to the suit and other parties, for the purpose of 
 putting an end to the proceedings in the suit, and for other purposes, it 
 cannot be pleaded in bar to the bill b} r one of the parties only ; at all 
 events, if it is so pleaded, it must contain averments that all the con- 
 ditions of the agreement have been performed, or from circumstances 
 could not be performed, and that the other parties not joining in the 
 plea are ready to perform the agreement ; indeed, all the circumstances 
 by which such an agreement is affected should be noticed in the aver- 
 ments. And where an agreement of this sort, which has been entered 
 into for the purpose of putting an end to a suit, contains a great many 
 stipulations and clauses which are executory, it can scarcely be consid- 
 ered a fit subject for a plea.' 2 
 
 (5) If the defendant's title be paramount to the plaintiff's, he may 
 plead it in bar. 8 A plea of this nature is called a plea of title ; and a 
 title so pleaded will, generally speaking, be founded either on a long 
 peaceable possession by the defendant, and those under whom he claims ; 
 on a will ; or on a conveyance. 4 
 
 Length of time raises a presumption against claims otherwise most 
 clearly made out, and therefore an undisturbed possession of sixty years 
 or more is a good subject of plea. 5 If a title is so stated in a bill, that 
 there appears to have been a possession adverse to it of about twenty 
 years, without any allegation of disability, the defendant may demur ; 
 but, if the title is not so stated, the defendant must plead the facts 
 necessary to show the existence of the adverse possession. 6 A mere 
 general allegation that there have been disabilities arising from infancy 
 or coverture, will not be sufficient. 7 
 
 In a plea of adverse possession, if the possession is derivative, 
 
 * and has not, during the whole time covered by the plea, been * 673 
 in the defendant himself, the plea must show in whom the posses- 
 sion was, at the time when the plea sets it up, and how the defendant 
 deduces his possession from such person ; and if the adverse possession 
 is to be inferred from circumstances which do not appear upon the 
 
 Ante, p. 297. 2 Wood v. Rowe, Rowe v. Wood, vbl supra. 
 
 6 Rowe v. Wood, 1J. & W. 315, 344 ; Wood 8 Wvatt's P. R. 328; Storv, Eq. PI. § 811. 
 
 v. Rowe, 2 Bligh, 595. 4 Reames on Pleas. 247; Story, Eq. Pi". § 811. 
 
 1 Where an administratrix, who was a de- s Wyatt's P. R. 328. 
 
 fendant in a bill for an account and distribution, 6 Lord Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton, T. & 
 
 pleaded an inventory duly taken and approved, R. 107, 118. 
 
 and an agreement founded thereon, the plea » Rlewit v. Thomas, 2 Ves. Jr. 669, 671; 
 
 was allowed. Cocking v. Pratt, 1 Ves>. Sr.400; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 814, 815. 
 
 see Belt's Sup. to Ves. 187. 
 
 671
 
 674 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 bill, the defendant must state clearly, upon the face of his plea, the 
 circumstances on which he means to rely as constituting the adverse 
 possession. 1 
 
 A will may also be pleaded in bar to a bill brought, on a ground of 
 equity, by an heir-at-law against a devisee, to turn the devisee out of 
 possession. 2 
 
 In like manner, upon a bill filed by an heir against the person claim- 
 ing under a conveyance from the ancestor, the defendant may plead the 
 conveyance, in bar of the suit ; 8 and so, where a bill was filed by per- 
 sons claiming under a will, to set aside a conveyance made by the 
 testator,. on the ground of fraud, and the defendant pleaded a convey- 
 ance by the testator, before the date of his will, of the estate which the 
 plaintiffs claimed, the plea was allowed. 4 
 
 In all pleas of title, whether derived under a will or a deed, if the 
 defendant is not the person taking immediately under the will or deed, 
 but derives his title through others, the title of the defendant must be 
 deduced from the person immediately taking, by proper averments in 
 the plea. And in all cases it is necessary, whether the title be derived 
 from adverse possession, or from a will or conveyance, to show 
 * 674 that it had a commencement anterior to * that of the plaintiff's 
 title, as shown by the bill : a title posterior to that of the plain- 
 tiff will not avail as a plea, unless it be some way connected with the 
 plaintiff's title. 1 
 
 (6) Where a conveyance is insisted upon by plea, as an adverse title, 
 it must bear a date anterior to the commencement of the plaintiff's title, 
 
 i Hardman v. Ellames, 2 M. & K. 732, 739, 
 744; C. P. Coop. temp. Brough. 351, 354; see 
 Jerard v. Stnders, 2 Ves. Jr. 187. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 263. Thus, where a bill was 
 brought to set aside a will on account of fraud, 
 on a suggestion that the testator was rendered 
 incapable of making it, by being perpetually 
 in Ii((Uor, and particularly when he executed 
 the will, and likewise for a receiver to be ap- 
 pointed, and the defendant pleaded the will, 
 and that it was duly executed: Lord Hardwicke 
 allowed the plea, so far as it applied to that 
 part of the bill which sought to set the will 
 aside, because "you cannot, in this Court, set 
 aside a will for fraud;" but he would not 
 allow it as to the receiver, for he would not tie 
 up the hands of the Court, in case it should be 
 necessarv, in the progress of the suit at Law. to 
 have a receiver appointed. Anon. 3 Atk. 17 ; 
 Storv, Eq. PL § 812. For form of such a plea, 
 see Vol. III. Willis, 559. A will, however, 
 cannot be pleaded to a bill by an heir-at-law, 
 praving for production of documents, and an 
 injunction to restrain the defendants from 
 setting up legal impediments, in an action of 
 ejectment commenced by him against them. 
 Rumbold v. Forteath, 2 Jur. N. S. 686, V. C. W. 
 
 s Ld. Red. 263. 
 
 * Howe v. Duppa, 1V.&B. 511, 513; Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 812. 
 
 672 
 
 1 Thus, where a bill was filed by one claim- 
 ing, either as heir ex parte materna of the per- 
 son last seised, or as a remainder-man under 
 the limitations of a prior settlement, charging 
 that the person last seised had only a life- 
 interest in the property, and that it would so 
 appear if the contents of a certain deed, executed 
 in 1730, and within the power of the defendant, 
 were set forth ; and the defendant pleaded that, 
 in the year 1766, the person last seised, being 
 tenant in tail in possession, had duly suffered a 
 recovery of the estates in question, to the use 
 of himself in fee, and had subsequently devised 
 them to the defendant, the plea was overruled : 
 because the defendant, relying upon a subse- 
 quent title which he had not connected in any 
 way with the ground of the title upon which 
 the plaintiff stood, had not denied that title or 
 any substantial part of it, or the possession or 
 existence of the deed of 1730. Hungate v. Gas- 
 coigne, 1 R. & M. 698 : see also Jackson v. Rowe, 
 4 Russ. 514, 523. See now R. S. C. 1883. Ord. 
 XIX. 15; Danford v. McAnulty, 6 Q. B. D. 
 645; 8 App Cas. 456. See also as to estoppel 
 and priority, Johnstone v. Cox, 19 Ch. D. 17; 
 Harpham v. Shacklock. id. 207; Re Cooper, 
 Cooper v. Vesey, 20 Ch. D. 611; Symons v. 
 Mulkem, W. N. (1882) 94; 30 W. R. 875; 
 Taylor v. Russell, 59 L. J. Ch. 756.
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. 
 
 675 
 
 as shown by the bill : though there are cases in which a conveyance 
 may be insisted upon, posterior, in point of date, to the plaintiff's title. 2 
 In such cases, however, it is necessary to the validity of the plea, that 
 the conveyance should have been for a valuable consideration ; and that, 
 at the time it was perfected, the defendant, or the person to whom it 
 was made, should not have had notice of the plaintiff's right. 3 A plea 
 of this sort is called " a plea of purchase for a valuable consideration, 
 without notice ; " and it is founded on this principle of equity, namely, 
 that where the defendant has an equal claim to the protection of a 
 Court of Equity to defend his possession, as the plaintiff has to the 
 assistance of the Court to assert his right, the Court will not interpose 
 on either side. 4 (a) 
 
 A purchaser with notice, from a purchaser without notice, may 
 shelter himself under the first purchaser ; 6 but notice, whether 
 actual or constructive, 6 to an agent * is notice to the princi- * G75 
 
 2 For an elaborate review of the cases in 
 which this defence can be raised, see the judg- 
 ment of Lord Westbury L. C. in Phillips v. 
 Phillips, 4 De G. F. & J." 208; 8 Jur, N. S. 145. 
 
 3 If the defendant has not used reasonable 
 diligence in the investigation of the title, the 
 plea is no defence. Jackson v. Rowe, 2 S. & 
 S. 472, 475. 
 
 4 I.d. Red. 274. Upon this principle it has 
 been held, that a purchase for valuable con- 
 sideration, though a good defence, is not good 
 as a ground for filing a cross-bill. Patterson v. 
 Slaughter, Amb.293 ; High v. Batte, 10 Yerger, 
 335 ; Donnell v. King, 7 Leigh, 393 ; Story, Eq. 
 PI. § 805; Jewett v. Palmer, 7 John. Ch. 65; 
 Gallatian v. Cunningham, 8 Cowen, 361; Souzer 
 v. I)e Meyer, 2 Paige, 574; see the remarks of 
 Lord Chancellor Lifford upon this plea, in Lord 
 Drogheda v. Malone, Finlay's Dig. 449, cited in 
 Mitford. Eq. PI. (5th Am. ed.) 277, note (1). 
 This defence must be raised on the pleadings. 
 Phillips v. Phillips. 3 Giff. 200; 7 Jur. N.'s. 
 1094; 8 id. 145; 10 W. R. 236, L. C. As to the 
 distinction between this plea and purchase for 
 value as protected by statute, as, e.g., the 13 
 Eliz. c. 5. relating to fraudulent conveyances, 
 see 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 490-494. 
 
 s Ld. Red. 278; Brandlyn v. Ord, 1 Atk. 
 571; Lowtherw. Carlton, 2 Atk. 139, 242; Cas. 
 temp. Talbot, 187; Sweet v. Southeote. 2 Bro. 
 C. C. 66; M'Queen v. Farquhar, 11 Ves. 478; 
 
 (a) See Manners t>. Mew, 29 Ch D. 725; 
 Heath v. Crealock, L. R. 18 Eq. 215; Ortigosa 
 ». Brown, 47 L. J. Ch. 168; Taylor v. Russell, 
 59 L. J Ch. 756; United States r. California 
 Land Co. 148 U. S. 31; Hamilton v. Willi- 
 ford, 90 Ga. 210; Bowman o. Griffith, 35 Neb. 
 361. Such a purchaser, if his title is im- 
 pugned, may get in any outstanding legal 
 estate, and set it up in defence to any eject- 
 ment that may be brought against him. Gole- 
 born v. Alcock, 2 Sim. 552. 559. A re.'tw q>ie 
 trust, being justified in reposing confidence in 
 vol. i. — 43 
 
 Hiern v. Mill, 13 Ves. 120; and see Harrison v. 
 Forth, Prec. in Chan. 51; Story, Eq. PI. § 808; 
 Varick v. Briggs, 6 Paige, 329; Bennett v. 
 Walker, West, 130; Jackson v. McChesney, 7 
 Cowen, 360; Bumpus v. Platner, 1 John. Ch. 
 213; Demarest v. Wyukoop, 3 John. Ch. 147; 
 Jackson v. Henry, 10 John. 185; Jackson v. 
 Given, 8 John. 573; Alexander v. Pendleton, 8 
 Cranch, 462; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 409, 410, aud 
 notes; Hagthorp v. Hook, 1 Gill & J. 263; 
 Curtis v. Lunn, 6 Munf. 42; Griffith v. Griffith, 
 1 Hoff. Ch. 163; Lacy v. Wilson, 4 Munf. 313': 
 Lindsay v. Rankin, 4 Bibb, 482; McNitt v. 
 Logan, Lift. Sel. Cas. 69. But if he would 
 avail himself of the want of notice in his ven- 
 dor, he must expressly aver that ignorance 
 in pleading. Galatian v. Erwin, Hopk. 48; 
 S. C- on appeal, 8 Cowen, 361 ; Griffith v. 
 Griffith, 1 Hoff. Ch. 163; Cummings v. Cole- 
 man, 7 Rich. Eq. (S. C) 509. A purchaser 
 without notice from one who has fraudulently 
 purchased, is not affected by the fraud. Bum- 
 pus v. Platner, 1 John. Ch. 213; Jackson v 
 Henry, 10 John. 185. 
 
 6 As to constructive notice, see Allen v. 
 Seckham, 11 Ch. D. 790; Saffron W. S. B. B. 
 Society?;. Rayner, 14 Ch. D. 406; 10 id. 696; 
 Patman v. garland, 17 Ch. D. 353; Maxfield v. 
 Burton, L. R. 17 Eq. 15 ; Re Morgan, 18 Ch. I). 
 93 : Thornewell r. Johnson. 29 W. R. 077 ; 
 W.N. (1881) 77; Bozon >'. Williams, 3 V. & J. 
 
 his trustee and in leaving deeds and other 
 proofs of property in his possession, will not 
 on that account be postponed to a purchaser 
 for value without nofce of the trust. Shrop- 
 shire U. R. & C. Co. v. Resr- L. R. 7 H. L. 
 496; Bradley v. Riches, 9 Ch. D. 189; Re Ver- 
 non, 33 Ch. D. 402; Carritt v. Real & P. A. Co. 
 42 Ch. D. 263; Re Richards, 45 Ch. I). 589. 
 See Cave v. Cave, 15 Ch. D. 639; Kettlewell v. 
 Watson, 21 Ch. D. 685; 26 id. 501. 
 
 Although a lien may be kept alive, under 
 some circumstances, in favor of one who has 
 
 673
 
 *675 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 pal ; l and where a person having notice, purchased in the name of another 
 who had no notice, and knew nothing of the purchase, but afterwards 
 approved it, and without notice paid the purchase-money and procured 
 a conveyance, the person first contracting was considered, from the 
 beginning, as the agent of the actual purchaser, who was therefore held 
 affected with notice. 2 
 
 A settlement, in consideration of marriage, is equivalent to a pur- 
 chase for a valuable consideration, and may be pleaded in the same 
 manner. 8 If a settlement is made after marriage, in pursuance of an 
 agreement before marriage, the agreement as well as the settlement 
 must be shown. 4 A widow, defendant to a suit brought by any person 
 claiming under her husband, to discover her title to lands of which she 
 is in possession as her jointure, may plead her settlement in bar to any 
 discovery, unless the plaintiff offers, and is able to confirm her jointure ; 
 but a plea of this nature must set forth the settlement, and the lands 
 comprised in it, with sufficient certainty. 5 (a) 
 
 150; Hewitt v. Loosemore, 9 Hare, 449; Na- 
 tional Provincial Bank v. Jackson, 33 Ch. D. 1 ; 
 Hester v. Hester, 34 Ch. D. 607; Northern 
 Counties Ins. Co. v. Whipp, 26 Ch. D. 482; 
 Union Bank v. Kent, 39 Ch. D. 238 ; Farrand v. 
 Yorkshire Banking Co. 40 Ch. D. 182. 
 
 i Ld. Red. 278 ; Brotherton v. Hatt, 2 Vern. 
 574; Le Neve r. Le Neve, 3 Atk. 646, 655; 
 Maddox v. Maddox, 1 Ves. Sr. 62; Ashley v. 
 Baillie, 2 Ves. Sr. 370; Hiern r. Mill, ubi supra ; 
 Mountford v. Scott, 3 Mad. 34, 39; Kennedy v. 
 Green, 3 M. & K. 699; Atterbury v. Wallis, 8 
 De G. M. & G. 454; 2 Jur. N. S. 343; Espin v 
 Pemberton, 3 De G. & J. 547 ; 4 Drew. 333 : 5 
 •J in-. N. S. 55, 157 ; Lloyd v. Attwood, 3 De G. 
 
 & J. 614; 5 Jur. N. S. 1322; Story, Eq. PI. 
 § 808; Griffith v. Griffith, 1 Hoff. Ch. 153. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 278 ; Jennings v. Moore, 2 Vern. 
 609; Blenkarne v. Jennens, 2 Bro. P. C. ed. 
 Toml. 278; see Molony v. Kernan, 2 Dr. & 
 War. 31. As to notice of a non-registered 
 annuity, see Greaves v. Tofield, 14 Ch. D. 
 563. 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 278; Harding v. Hardrett, Rep. 
 temp. Finch, 9 ; Jackson v. Rowe, ubi supra . 
 Even to the extent of the husband's whole 
 estate. Herring v. Wickliam, 29 Gratt. 628. 
 
 4 Ld. Red. 279 ; Lord Keeper v. Wyld, 1 
 Vern. 139. 
 
 5 Ld. Red. 279 ; Petre v. Petre, 3 Atk. 511 ; 
 
 paid the lien-holder, even when the latter has 
 satisfied and discharged it of record, yet this 
 will not be done to the prejudice of a subse- 
 quent buna fide purchaser where the Equity is 
 a latent one. Richards v. Griffith, 92 Cal. 493; 
 see Patty v. Middleton, 82 Texas, 586. The re- 
 ceipt of a quit-claim deed does not of itself pre- 
 vent one from becoming a bonnjide purchaser. 
 Moelle v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 21 ; United States 
 v. California &c. Land Co. id. 31 ; see Dunn v. 
 Rarnum, 51 Fed. Rep. 355. 361; Rosenbaum v. 
 Foss (S. D.), 56 N. W. Rep. 114. 
 
 In Ltd, Coope & Co. v. Emmerson, 12 A. C. 
 300, 306 (S. C. 33 Ch. D. 323), the Earl of 
 Selborne said: "There is no instance of any 
 suit competently brought in the Court of Chan- 
 cery, for relief as well as discovery, in which 
 the defence of purchaser for value without 
 notice has been held available against discov- 
 ery incident to the relief, and not against the 
 relief itself. That defence was never admitted 
 as an objection to particular discovery; it went 
 to all or none." 
 
 674 
 
 The defence of a purchase for value may be 
 raised by demurrer where the facts appear in 
 the bill; if they do not so appear, the defence 
 being affirmative, must be raised by plea or 
 answer. Greaves v. Atkinson, 68 Miss. 598. 
 It cannot be raised by a general denial, but 
 must be affirmatively pleaded, and the pleader 
 has the burden of proof. Holdsworth v. Shan- 
 non, 113 Mo. 508; Bowman v. Griffith, 35 Neb. 
 361. The defendant's pleading must deny notice, 
 although not alleged by the plaintiff. Dailey v. 
 Kinsler, 35 Neb. 835. A plea oji this ground 
 must state the amount paid in traversable form. 
 Secombe v. Campbell, 18 Blatch. 108. A defend- 
 ant may insist upon a bona fide purchase for value 
 as against a co-defendant without pleading it 
 specially in his answer. Norwood r. Norwood, 
 36 S. a 331. 
 
 (a) Sect. 5 of 13 Eliz. c. 5 protects a pur- 
 chaser for value, without notice, of any interest, 
 either legal or equitable, under the deed im- 
 peached. Halifax Joint Stock B. Co. v. Gled- 
 hill, [1891] 1 Ch. 31. 
 
 I
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. 
 
 * 676 
 
 Some doubt was entertained, whether a plea of purchase for valu- 
 able consideration will avail against a legal title, 6 but it seems now 
 to be settled that there are cases in which this defence may be so 
 pleaded/ (b) 
 
 * The rules for the guidance of a pleader in framing pleas of * 676 
 this description are thus clearly and succinctly laid down by Lord 
 St. Leonards, namely : * — 
 
 " The plea must state the deeds of purchase, setting forth the dates, 
 parties, and contents briefly, and the time of their execution : 2 for that 
 is the peremptory matter in bar. 3 
 
 " It must aver that the vendor was seised, or pretended to be seised, 
 
 Pyncent v. Pyncent, id. 571 ; Senhouse v. Earl, 
 2 Ves. Sr. 450 ; Leech B. Trollop, id. 662. 
 
 6 See Sudden on Vendors and Purchasers 
 (11th Eng. ed.), pp. 1067-1072; (7th Am. ed.) 
 vol. ii. 572-578. 
 
 7 See judgment of Lord Westbury L. C. in 
 Phillips v. Phillips, 4 De G. F. & J. 208 ; 8 Jur. 
 N. S. 143; Lord St. Leonards, V. & P. 791, 796, 
 where this case is reviewed ; Bowen v. Evans, 
 1 Jo. & Lat. 178, 263: 2 H. L. Cas. 257 ; Joyce 
 v. De Moleyns, 2 Jo. & Lat. 374; Penny v. 
 Watts, 1 M'N. & G. 150; 2 De G. & S. 501; 
 Att.-Gen. v. Wilkins, 17 Beav. 285; 17 Jur. 
 885; Lane r. Jackson, 20 Beav. 535; Colyer v. 
 Finch, 5 H. L. Cas. 920 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 25 ; S. C. 
 nom. Finch v. Shaw, 19 Beav. 500, 507; 18 Jur. 
 935; Greenslade v. Dare, 17 Beav. 502; 20 
 Beav. 284; 1 Jur. N. S. 294; Stackhouse v. 
 Countess Jersey, 1 J. & H. 721; 7 Jur. N. S. 
 353; Gorara v. Parrott, 3 Jur. N. S. 1150; Dart's 
 V. & P. 832; Wood e. Mann, 2 Sumner, 507. 
 "The point of doubt," says Mr. Justice Story, 
 " has been, whether the defence ought to apply 
 to a case where the plaintiff founds his bill 
 upon a legal title, seeking to support it by a 
 discovery, and the defendant relies solely on 
 an equitable title to protect himself from the 
 discovery. Upon this point the authorities are 
 at variance; but upon principle, it would seem 
 difficult to resist the reasoning by which the 
 doctrine, that the purchaser is, in such a case, 
 entitled to protection, is supported." Story, 
 Eq. PL § 604 a; see 3 Sugden V. & P. (7th 
 Am ed.) 1067, et seq. Snelgrove r. Snelgrove, 
 4 Desaus. 288, where this point is fully exam- 
 ined, and the Chancellor (Desaussure) remarks: 
 ;i It should be remembered, that the plea pro- 
 
 (b) Prior to the Judicature Act of 1873 
 (36 & 37 Vic. c. 66) this plea was not available 
 against either discovery or relief claimed in 
 those cases in which the Court of Chancery had 
 concurrent jurisdiction with the Law Courts upon 
 legil titles, and § 24, sub-sect. 2 of that Act 
 does not protect a defendant who objects to 
 producing documents of title alleged to be ma- 
 
 tects, by the Court refusing to aid the plaintiff 
 in setting up a title. Now, when the title at- 
 tempted to be set up is an equitable one, it 
 seems very reasonable that the Court should 
 forbear to give its assistance in setting up such 
 equitable title against another title set up by a 
 fair purchaser. But when the plaintiff comes 
 with a legal title, I do not see how he can be 
 refused the aid of the Court." See also Larrowe 
 v. Beame, 10 Ohio, 498. 
 
 i V. & P. 788-790. This subject is fully- 
 discussed in Snelgrove v. Snelgrove, 4 Desaus. 
 286; Cardwell v. Cheatham, 2 Head (Teim.), 
 14. The same explicitness has been held not to 
 be necessary in setting up the defence of bona 
 Jide purchase for a valuable consideration with- 
 out notice, when made in an answer as in a plea. 
 Servis v. Beatty, 32 Miss. 52. Aliter, in Ten- 
 nessee, Rhea v. Allison, 3 Head, 177. 
 
 a Qucere this, as the plaintiff might thereby 
 be enabled to proceed against the defendant at 
 law; see Anon. 2 Ch. Cas. 161. In Day v. 
 Arundel, Hardre's. 510, it was expressly held, 
 that the time of the purchase need not be stated 
 in the [ilea. 
 
 3 See Gilb. For. Rom. 58; Aston r. Aston, 
 3 Atk. 302; Salkeld v. Science. 2 Ves. Sr. 107; 
 Harrison v. Southcott, id. 389, 396; and see 
 Wallwyn p. Lee, 9 Ves. 24, and the plea in that 
 case, Beanies on Pleas, 341. It seems that the 
 practice formerly was to extend the plea to the 
 discovery even of the purchase deeds; and in 
 Watkins e. Hatchet, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 36, pi. 3, 
 although the purchaser improvidentlv offered to 
 produce his purchase deeds, yet the Court would 
 not bind him to do so. See Hare on Dis. 67; 
 R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XXI. 14. 
 
 terial to the plaintiff's claim, as the Court n whas, 
 in England, complete jurisdiction over the whole 
 suit. Iud, Coope & Co. v. Emmerson, 12 App. 
 Cas. 300 ; 33 Ch. D. 326. In Hunter r. Walters, 
 L. R. 11 Eq. 292, it was held that this plea is as 
 available to the purchaser of an equitable as of 
 a legal estate. 
 
 675
 
 077 
 
 PLE.VS. 
 
 at the time he executed the conveyance. 4 In Carter v. Pritchard 6 it 
 was held that the plea of a purchase without notice must aver the de- 
 fendant's belief that the person from whom he purchased was seised in 
 fee. If it be charged in the bill that the vendor was only tenant for 
 life, or tenant in tail, and a discovery of the title be prayed, such a 
 discovery cannot be covered, unless a seisin is sworn in the manner 
 already mentioned, or that such fines and recoveries were levied and 
 suffered as would bar an entail if the vendor Was tenant in tail ; for if a 
 purchase by lease and release should be set forth, which would 
 * 677 pass no more from *the tenant in tail than it lawfully may pass, 
 and that is only an estate for the life of the tenant in tail, 1 then 
 there is no bar against the issue. 2 Where, however, a fine was pleaded, 
 the plea must have averred an actual seisin of a freehold in the vendor, 
 and not that he was seised, or pretended to be seised. 3 
 
 " If the conveyance pleaded be of an estate in possession, the plea 
 must aver that the vendor was in possession at the time of the execu- 
 tion of the conveyance. 4 And if it be of a particular estate, and not in 
 possession, it must set out how the vendor became entitled to the re- 
 version. 5 But, although a bill be brought by an heir, the plea need 
 not, on that account, aver the purchase to be from the plaintiff's an- 
 cestor. 6 
 
 " The plea must also distinctly aver that the consideration money 
 mentioned in the deed was bona fide and truly paid, 7 independently of 
 the recital of the purchase deed : 8 for if the money be not paid, the plea 
 will be overruled, 9 as the purchaser is entitled to relief against payment 
 of it. The particular consideration must, it should seem, be stated, 10 
 although this point has been decided otherwise. 11 There can, however, 
 be no objection to state the consideration : as, if it be valuable, the plea 
 
 * Story v. Lord Windsor, 2 Atk. 630: Head 
 v. Egerton, 3 P. Wms. 279, 281; and see Att- 
 Gen. v. Backhouse, 17 Ves. 2'JO ; Jackson v. 
 Rowe, 4 Russ 514, 523; Beames on Pleas, 342; 
 Craig r. Leiper, 2 Yerger, 193; Lanesborough v. 
 Kilmaine, 2 Moll. 403; Snelgrove v. Snelgrove, 
 4 Desaus. 287. 
 
 s Michaelmas Term, 12 Geo. II. 1739, 2 
 Vivian's MS. Kep. 90, in Lincoln's Inn Library; 
 see Jackson r. Rowe, 4 Russ 514, 519. 
 
 1 This is the doctrine of Littleton, with which, 
 it seems, Gilbert agreed; but since Littleton's 
 time it has been held, that the releasee has a 
 ba^e fee, determinable by the entry or action of 
 the issue; see Butler's n. 1, to Co. Litt. 331 a, 
 stnd the authorities there referred to. But now 
 estates tail may be barred by deed. 3 & 4 
 Will. IV. c. 74." 
 
 2 Gilb. For. Rom. 57. 
 
 3 Story v. Lord Windsor, 2 Atk. 630; and 
 see Page r. Lever, 2 Yes. Jr. 450 ; Dobson v. 
 Leadbeater, 13 Ves. 230, 233. 
 
 4 Trevanian v. Mosse, 1 Vern. 246; Strode 
 v. Blackhurne, 3 Ves. 222, 226 ; Wallwyn v. 
 Lee, 9 Ves. 32; Beames on Pleas, 342; see also 
 
 C76 
 
 Jackson r. Rowe, 4 Russ. 514, 519 ; Ladj- 
 Lanesborough v. Lord Kilmaine, 2 Moll. 403; 
 Ogilvie v. Jeaffreson, 2 Giff. 353; 6 Jur. N. S. 
 970. 
 
 5 Hughes e. Garth, Amb. 421. 
 
 6 Seymer v. Noswortln', Freem. 128; 3 Ch. 
 Rep. 40*; Nels. Rep. 135. 
 
 7 More v. Mayhow,! Ch. Cas. 34; Brereton 
 v. Gamul, 2 Atk. 241 ; Molony r. Kernan, 2 Dr. 
 
 6 War. 31 ; Beames on Pleas, 344; Story, Eq. 
 PL § 805; Jewett v. Palmer, 7 John. Ch. 65; 
 High v. Batte, 10 Yerger, 335; Donnell v. King, 
 
 7 Leigh, 393 ; Snelgrove v. Snelgrove, 4 Desaus. 
 286. 
 
 8 Maitland r. Wilson, 3 Atk. 814; 2 Sugden 
 V. & P. (7th Am. ed.) 1069. 
 
 9 Hardingham v. Nichols, 3 Atk. 304 ; as to 
 necessity of proof, see Molony v. Kernan, ubi 
 supra ; Beames on Pleas, 344. 
 
 10 Millard's case, Freem. 43; Snag's case, 
 cited ibid.; and see Wagstaff v. Read, 2 Ch. 
 Cas. 156; High v. Batte, 10 Yerger, 335; Donnell 
 v. King, 7 Leigh, 393. 
 
 11 More v. Mayhow, ubi supra ; Day v 
 Arundel, Hardres, 510.
 
 DIFFERENT GRuUNDS OF PLEAS. 
 
 678 
 
 will not be invalidated by mere inadequacy. 12 The question is, not 
 whether the consideration is adequate, but whether it is valuable : for if 
 it be such a consideration as will not be deemed fraudulent within the 
 Statute 27th Elizabeth, or is not merely nominal, 13 or the purchase is 
 such a one as would hinder a puisne purchaser from overturning it, it 
 ought not to be impeached in Equity. 
 
 " The plea must also deny notice of the plaintiff's title or claim, 14 
 previously to the execution of the deed and payment of the 
 * purchase-money ; 1 for, till then, the transaction is not com- * 678 
 plete ; and, therefore, if the purchaser have notice previously to 
 that time, he will be bound by it. And the notice so denied must be 
 notice of the existence of the plaintiff's title, and not merely notice of 
 the existence of a person who would claim under that title. 2 But a 
 denial of notice, at the time of making the purchase and paying the 
 purchase-money, is good ; 8 and notice before the purchase need not be 
 denied : because notice before is notice at the time of the purchase ; 4 
 and the party will, in such case, on its being made to appear that he 
 had notice before, be liable to be convicted of perjury. 5 
 
 " The notice must be positively, and not evasively, denied, 6 and must 
 be denied whether it be or be not charged by the bill/ If particular 
 instances of notice, or circumstances of fraud, are charged, the facts 
 from which they are inferred must be denied as specially and particu- 
 larly as charged. 8 So, if the bill charges that the purchaser has in his 
 possession certain papers and documents, whence it will appear that his 
 
 12 Basset v. Nosworthy, Rep. temp. Finch, 
 102, cited Amb. 766; 2 White & T. L. C. 1; 
 Mildinay v. Mildmay, cited ibid. ; Bullock v. 
 Sadlier.'id. 763, 767. 
 
 M See More t\ Mnyhow, 1 Ch. Cas. 34; 
 Wagstaff v. Read. 2 Ch. Cas. 156. 
 
 14 Lady Bodmin v. Vandenbendy, 1 Vern. 
 179; Anon. 2 Ventr. 361, No. 2; Cummings v. 
 Coleman, 7 Rich. Eq. (S. C. ) 509. 
 
 1 More v. Mayhow, ubi supra ; Story v. 
 Lord Windsor, 2 Atk. 630; Att.-Gen. v. Gower, 
 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 685, pi. 11; Beanies on Pleas, 
 344; Aiken v. Smith, 1 Sneed (Tenn.). 304; 
 Wilson v. Hillyer, Saxton (N. J.), 63; Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 806; Jewett t>. Palmer, 7 John. Ch. 
 65; Gordon v. Rockafellow, Halst. Dig. 169; 
 Pillow v. Shannon, 3 Yerger, 508; Murray ». 
 Ballou, 1 John. Ch. 566; Frost v. Beekman, id. 
 288; Heatley v. Finster, 2 John. Ch. 158; 
 Murray v. Finster, id. 155 ; M'Gahee e. Sneed, 
 1 Dev". & Bat. 333; De Mott v. Starkey, 3 
 Barb. Ch. 403; Boone v. Chiles, 10 Peters, 
 177, 211, 212; Williams v. Hollingsworth. 1 
 Strobh. Eq. 103; Ellis v. Woods, 9 Rich. Eq. 
 (S C.) 19. 
 
 2 Kelsall v. Bennet, 1 Atk. 522, which has 
 overruled Brampton v. Barker, cited 2 Vern. 
 159. 
 
 3 See Snelgrove v. Snelgrove, 4 Desaus. 
 287; Murray v. Finster, 2 John. Ch. 155, 
 157. 
 
 4 To make the plea of bona fide purchaser 
 without notice available, the notice before the 
 whole of the purchase-money was paid and 
 conveyance received, must he denied. Natz v. 
 M'Pherson, 7 Monroe, 599; Frost v. Beekman, 
 
 1 John. Ch. 298, 303; Jewett v. Palmer, 7 
 John. 65; High v. Batte, 10 Yerger, 385. 
 
 5 Jones ». Thomas, 3 P. Wms. 243. 
 
 6 Cason v. Round, Prec. in Ch. 226; and 
 see 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 682 (D.) n. (b). 
 
 7 Aston v. Curzon, and Weston v. Berke- 
 ley, 3 P. Wms. 244, n. (F); and see the 6th 
 resolution in Brace v. Duchess of Marlborough, 
 
 2 P. Wms. 495; Hughes v. Garner, 2 Y. & 
 C. Ex. 328, 335; Lowry v. Tew, 3 Barb. Ch. 
 407. 
 
 8 Meder r. Birt, Gilb. Eq. Rep. 185; Rad- 
 ford v. Wilson, 3 Atk. 815; and see Jerard v. 
 Sanders. 2 Ves. Jr. 187: 4 Bro. C. C. 322, 325; 
 6 Dow, 2:i0; Folev v. Hill, 3 M. & C. 475. 4S1; 
 2 Jur. 440; see R. S. C. (1883) Ord. XIX. 22; 
 Wilson v. Hillyer, Saxton (N. J.), 63; Den- 
 ning v. Smith, 3 John Ch. 345; Balcolm v. 
 N. Y. Life Ins. and Trust Co. 11 Paige, 454; 
 Lowry v. Tew, 3 Barb. Ch. 407; Manhattan 
 Co. p. Evertson, 6 Paige, 457; Galatian v. Er- 
 win, Hopk. 48; Pillow v. Shannon, 3 Yerger, 
 508. 
 
 677
 
 * 679 PLEAS. 
 
 was not a purchase without notice, the defendant is bound to support his 
 plea by an answer to that charge. 9 
 
 " But he need only by his plea deny notice generally, unless where 
 facts are specially charged in the bill as evidence of notice. 10 
 
 " Notice must also be denied by answer ; 10 for that is matter of 
 fraud and cannot be covered by the plea ; u because the plaintiff 
 
 * 679 * must have an opportunity to except to its sufficiency if he think 
 
 fit ; * but it must also be denied by the plea : because, otherwise, 
 there is not a complete plea in Court on which the plaintiff may take 
 issue. 2 Although a purchaser omit to deny notice by answer, he will be 
 allowed to put in the point of notice by way of answer, 8 and the omis- 
 sion will not invalidate his plea, if it is denied by that. 4 If notice is 
 omitted to be denied by the plea, and the plaintiff reply to it, the de- 
 fendant has then only to prove his purchase ; and it is not material if 
 the plaintiff do prove notice, as he has waived setting down the plea for 
 argument ; in which case it would have been overuled. 5 If, however, 
 a bill is exhibited against a purchaser, and he plead his purchase, and 
 the bill is therefore dismissed, a new bill will lie charging notice, if the 
 point of notice was not charged in the former bill, or examined to ; and 
 the former proceedings cannot be pleaded in bar. 6 But if notice is 
 neither alleged by the bill nor proved, and the defendant by his answer 
 deny notice, an inquiry will not be granted for the purpose of affecting 
 him with notice. 7 
 
 " A plea of a purchase for valuable consideration without notice, will 
 not be allowed where the purchaser might, by due diligence, have ascer- 
 tained the real state of the title. 8 
 
 "If a purchaser's plea of valuable consideration without notice, be 
 
 9 Hardman v. Ellames, 5 Sim. 640, 650; 2 » Anon. 2 Ch. Cas. 161 ; Price v. Price, 1 
 
 M. & K. 732; C. P. Coop. temp. Brough. 351; Vern. 185; Foley v. Hill, 3 M. & C. 475, 481; 
 
 and see Gordon v. Shaw, 14 Sim. 393. 2 Jur. 440; now the defendant need only sup- 
 
 "• Pennington v. Beechey, 2 S. & S 282; port his plea by answer, if interrogatories are 
 
 Thring v. Edgar, id. 274, 281; Beames on filed; see ante, p. 615. 
 
 Pleas, 348; Griffith v. Griffith, 1 Hoff. Ch. 163. 2 Harris v. Ingledew, 3 P. Wms. 91, 94; 
 
 This rule will not, however, apply to an answer Meadows v. Duchess of Kingston, Ld. Red. 
 
 in support of a plea, unless the plea is nega- 376, n. (s); Amb. 766; Jones v. Jones, 3 Mer. 
 
 live; and now the defendant need only answer 161, 171. 
 those facts to which he is interrogated; see 8 Anon. 2 Ch. Cas. 161. 
 
 ante, pp. 534, 615. 4 Coke v. Wilcocks, Mos. 73. 
 
 11 Care must be taken in case of a plea of a 5 Harris v. Ingledew, vbi supra; Eyre v. 
 
 purchase for a valuable consideration without Dolphin, 2 Ball & B. 302. 
 notice, not to make an answer to any state- 6 Williams v. Williams, 1 Ch. Cas. 252. 
 
 ments in the bill actually and p'operly covered 7 Hardy r. Reeves, 5 Ves. 426, 432. 
 
 by the plea; for notwithstanding some doubts 8 Jackson v. Rowe. 2 S. & S. 472, 475; 4 
 
 formerly entertained, it seems now established, Russ. 514, 523; Hamilton v. Lvster, 7 Ir. Eq. 
 
 that, in such a case, if the defendant answer at R. 560; Maxfield r. Burton. L. R. 17 Eq. 15. 
 
 all to the matters covered by the plea, he must If a party means to defend himself, on the 
 
 answer fully; and if he puts in a general ground, that he was a bonajide purchaser for a 
 
 answer, he cannot protect himself by such a valuable consideration without notice, he must 
 
 defence in his answer from answering fully, deny the fact of notice, and of every circum- 
 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 606. and note, and cases cited, stance from which it can be inferred. Murray 
 
 § 810, note. The 39th Equity Rule of the U. S. v. Rallou, 1 John. Ch. 575 ; Balcolm v. N. Y. 
 
 Courts gives to such a person the right to pro- Life Ins. & Trust Co. 11 Paige, 454. 
 tect himself by answer, as he might by plea. 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 847 note, § 846, note. 
 678
 
 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF PLEAS. * 680 
 
 falsified by a verdict at Law, and thereupon a decree is made against 
 the purchaser, and he then carries an appeal to the House of Lords, it 
 will be dismissed, and the decree affirmed without further inquiry." 9 
 
 A plea of purchase for a valuable consideration without notice pro- 
 tects a defendant from meeting the title set up by the plaintiff ; but a 
 plea of bare title only, without setting forth a consideration, is not suf- 
 ficient for that purpose. 10 It also protects the defendant from 
 the discovery of deeds and writings, except of the purchase * deed * 680 
 which is pleaded. 1 If the defendant has the opportunity of rais- 
 ing this defence by his answer, and does not do so, he cannot plead it 
 orally at the hearing. 2 
 
 There are also certain cases in which defects in the form of the bill 
 maybe taken advantage of by plea; such as a misdescription of the 
 plaintiff's residence, 8 or of his name. 4 In these cases, as we have seen, 8 
 the present practice is to move that the plaintiff may give security for 
 costs ; and the Court will not encourage pleas of this nature. 6 
 
 All the grounds of pleas above enumerated go to the relief prayed by 
 the bill ; and, as we have seen, if they are sufficient to protect the de- 
 fendant from the relief prayed, they will also serve to protect him from 
 the discovery sought, except so far as such discovery is material to enable 
 the plaintiff to avoid the effect of the matter pleaded. There are, how- 
 ever, as has been already stated, certain cases in which, though the 
 plaintiff may be entitled to relief, the defendant will be protected from 
 making, either the whole, or some part of the discovery sought by the 
 bill ; because the situation in which he is placed renders it improper for 
 a Court of Equity to compel discovery, either because the discovery may 
 subject him to pains and penalties, or to forfeiture, or something in the 
 nature of a forfeiture ; 7 or because it would betray the confidence reposed 
 in him as a legal adviser, or as an arbitrator. The cases in which these 
 exemptions from discovery can be insisted upon have been before pointed 
 out, and the principles upon which they rest discussed, in treating of de- 
 murrers ; 8 all that need, therefore, be now said in addition is, that if the 
 facts upon which the defendant rests his claim to exemption from the 
 discovery sought do not appear upon the bill, they may be presented to 
 the Court by plea. The same principles apply in the case of bills for 
 discovery only. 9 
 
 It has been already stated, that a defendant may not only answer an 
 amended bill, but may also defend himself from the effect of the amend- 
 
 9 Lewis v. Fielding, Colles' P. C. 361. 6 Bainbritr-re v. Orton, nhi supra. As to 
 
 i" Brereton v. Gamul, 2 Atk. 241. pleading illegality or impossibility under the 
 
 » Salkeld v. Science, 2 Ves. Sr. 107; Story, present English Practice, see 1 Dan. Ob; Prac. 
 
 Eq. PI. § 809; see 1 Story. Eq. Jur. § 410, and (6th Eng. ed.) 503. As to pleas in abatement, 
 
 note; Lube" Eq. PI. 245, 246. see id . 505 . As to j oinder of defences, see id. 
 
 2 Phillips v. Phillips, 4 De G. F. & J. 208; 506. 
 8 Jur. N. S. 145; 10 W. R. 236, L. C.; 3 Gift. 1 United States v. M'Rae, L. R. 4 Eq. 327; 
 
 200 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 1094. S . C . L. R. 3 Ch. 79 
 
 « Rowley v. Eccles, 1 S. & S. 511; Smith v. 8 Ante, pp. 562, 570. 
 
 Smith, Kay Ap. 22; Bainbrigge v. Orton, 20 9 Balls v. Margrave, 3 Beav. 448. For form 
 
 Ilea v. is. f pj ea tnat discovery would subject defendant 
 
 4 Cust v. Southee, 13 Beav. 435. to penalty, see Beames on Pleas, 339. 
 
 5 Ante, p. 358. 
 
 679
 
 * 682 PLEAS. 
 
 merits by a demurrer or plea. 10 Pleas to amended bills may be put in 
 
 upon the same grounds as pleas to original bills ; but it is to be observed 
 
 that, if a defendant has answered the original bill, his answer may be 
 
 read to counterplead his plea to the amended bill ; and that if, 
 
 * 681 upon so reading it, it should appear * that the facts stated upon 
 
 the answer to the original bill would operate to avoid the defence 
 made by the plea to the amended bill, the plea will be overruled. 1 If the 
 defendant answer the original bill, and the amendments do not vary the 
 case made by it, he cannot plead to the amended bill. 2 The mere fact, 
 however, that the answer comprises matters retained in the amended 
 bill, does not prevent the defendant from pleading to the latter ; 8 and 
 where the objection for want of parties arose again, in consequence 
 of an amendment of the bill, a second plea on that ground has been 
 allowed. 4 
 
 Section III. — Form of Pleas. 
 
 A plea is intituled in the cause, and is headed as follows : " The plea 
 of the above-named defendant (or of A B, one of the above-named 
 defendants) to the bill of complaint of the above-named plaintiff (or 
 plaintiffs)." When put in by more than one defendant, the heading 
 runs as follows: "The joint and several plea of the above-named de- 
 fendants (or of A B and C D, two of the above-named defendants)," 
 &c, &c. 5 Where it is the plea of a man and his wife, the words " and 
 several " should not be inserted ; but where an objection was taken to 
 a plea by husband and wife, on the ground that those words were in- 
 serted, Sir John Leach V. C. considered the terra " several " as meaning 
 nothing, and that, being mere surplusage, it did not vitiate the plea. 6 It 
 may be observed, that where a plea was prepared as a joint plea of a 
 husband and wife, but the wife refused to swear to it, whereupon the 
 husband put in the plea, and applied that it should stand for himself, 
 it was so ordered. 7 The title of the plea must agree with that of the 
 cause at the time when the bill is filed. 
 
 A defendant is not allowed to correct or alter the name of a plaintiff, 
 or a co-defendant ; and if his own name is misspelt in the bill, the title 
 of his plea must, nevertheless, agree with that of the bill. The correc- 
 tion should be made in the heading, thus : "The plea of the above- 
 named defendant, John Jones (in the bill by mistake called William 
 Jones)." 8 If a female defendant marries subsequently to the 
 ♦682 filing of the bill, but before pleading, the plea * should, unless 
 
 in Ante, p. 582. * Henley p. Stone, 4 Beav. 389, 391. 
 
 i Ld. Red. 299: Hyliard v. White, ibid., 5 Braithwaite's Pr. 61. For forms of pleas, 
 
 Noel v. Ward, 1 Mad. 322, 330; Hildyard v. see Vol. III. For the present English Practice, 
 
 Cressy, 3 Atk. 303. As to form of pleas to see 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 508. 
 
 amended bills, see Havnes v. Barton, 13 Jur. 6 Fitch v. Chapman, 2 S. & S 31 
 
 480. V. 0. E. 7 Pa'" v. , 1 Ch. Cas. 296; S. C nom. 
 
 2 Esdaile v. Molineux, 2 Coll. 636, 639; 10 Pavie v. Acourt, 1 Dick. 13; see ante, pp. 180, 
 Jur 852. 499 
 
 3 Wyllie v. Ellice, 6 Hare. 505, 515 ; Ellice 8 Braithwaite's Pr. 44, 62. 
 v. Roupell (No. 1), 32 Beav. 299 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 
 
 530, 533. 
 
 680
 
 FORM OP PLEAS. * 683 
 
 she has obtained an order to defend the suit by herself, be headed thus : 
 " The plea of A. B. and G. his wife, lately, and in the bill called C. D., 
 spinster (or, widow, as the case may be), to the bill of complaint of the 
 above-named plaintiff." 1 
 
 Where a plea is accompanied by an answer, it must be headed " The 
 plea and answer," or, " The joint plea and answer," or, "The joint and 
 several plea and answer," according to the circumstances. 
 
 A plea, like a demurrer, is introduced by a protestation against the con- 
 fession of the truth of any matter contained in the bill. 2 
 
 The extent of the plea, that is, whether it is intended to cover the 
 whole bill or a part of it only, and what part in particular, is usually 
 stated in the next place ; and this, as before observed, must be clearly 
 and distinctly shown. 8 Formerly, a plea, like a demurrer, was liable to 
 be overruled, if the answer accompanying it extended to any part of the 
 bill covered by the plea ; and the same, if not a greater degree of accur- 
 acy, was required of the pleader in applying this rule. Now, as we have 
 seen, 4 this strict practice is so far modified, that a plea is no longer 
 liable to be overruled only because it does not cover so much of the bill 
 as it might by law have extended to, or only because the answer of the 
 defendant extends to some part of the same matter as is covered by the 
 plea. 5 
 
 The matter relied upon as an objection to the suit or bill generally 
 follows, 6 accompanied by such averments as are necessary to support it ; 7 
 and where a plea is of matter which shows an imperfection in the frame 
 of the suit, it should point out in what that imperfection consists. Where, 
 for instance, a plea is for want of parties, it must not only show that 
 there is a deficiency of parties, but should point out who the 
 parties are that are required. 8 * A plea, denying a negative * 683 
 allegation in a bill, has also been held to be informal. 1 
 
 The general requisites of a plea have already been discussed at con- 
 
 i Braithwaite's Pr. 46, 62. 5 (Jons. Ord. XIV. 8, 9; see ante, p 540, 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 300. The reasons for the intro- note. 
 
 duction of this form have been before alluded 6 The particular facts on which the defend- 
 to, ante, p. 581. At Common Law, pro- ant intends to rely must be clearly stated, so 
 testation in pleading is now unnecessary. that the plaintiff may know what case he has 
 Protestations in pleas are not allowed in New to meet. Hardman v. Ellames, 2 M. & K. 
 Hampshire. Rule 6 of Ch. Pr. 38 N. H. 606. 732, 739; Coop. temp. Brough. 351, 355; Whit- 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 294, 300; M it ford Eq. PI. by thome v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co. 3 Tenn. 
 Jeremy (5th Am. ed.), 300, note (1), in which Ch. 147. 
 
 the editor has given the opinion of Chancellor ' M, Red. 300; Story, Eq. PL § 694; 
 Walworth upon this point, as pronounced in Mount v. Manhattan Co. 41 N. J. Eq. 21 1. 
 Leacraft v. Demprey, 4 Paige, 124. If an 8 Thus, in Merrewether v. Mellish, 13 Ves. 
 answer commences as an answer to the whole 435, 438, where a defendant pleaded a settle- 
 bill, it overrules a plea and demurrer to any ment, for the purpose of showing that there 
 particular part of the bill, although such part were certain parties not before the Court who 
 is not in fact answered. Ibid. ; Summers v. Mur- were interested in the suit, but did not aver 
 ray, 2 Kdw. Ch. 205. A defendant may plead, that there was a deficiency of parties, or that 
 answer, and demur to the same bill; but these the persons appearing by the settlement to be 
 several defences must each refer to, and in interested were necessary parties, the plea was 
 terms be put in as a defence to, a separate and held to be informal, and leave was given to 
 distinct part of the bill. Leaycraft r. Dempsey, amend it. 
 4 Paige, 124 ; ante, pp. 610, 616. i Lakeman v. Agua Fria Gold Mining Co, 
 
 4 Ante, p. 617. 22 Beav. 76. 
 
 681
 
 *684 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 siderable length ; it is unnecessary, therefore, now to allude to them 
 further than to remind the reader, that the plea must be founded upon 
 matter not apparent upon the face of the bill ; 2 must reduce the case to 
 a single point, 8 except where leave has been obtained to plead double ; 4 
 and must be supported by proper averments. 5 
 
 In addition to the above requisites it may be added, that a plea must be 
 certain ; it must tender issuable matter, the truth or falsehood of which 
 may be replied to or put in issue ; and that, not in the form of general 
 propositions, but specifically and distinctly. 6 
 
 A plea must also cover the whole case made by the bill, or by that 
 part of it which the plea affects to cover (a) ; otherwise it Avill be over- 
 ruled. 7 Thus, where a bill was filed for a foreclosure of a messuage and 
 forty acres of land, and the defendant pleaded an absolute title in him- 
 self to certain property mentioned in the deeds by which he deduced his 
 title, consisting of a messuage and tenement, averring that they were the 
 same which were meant by the bill, the Court of Exchequer thought the 
 plea could not be considered as relating to the forty acres of land men- 
 tioned in the bill, and overruled it. 8 
 * 684 * With respect to the language of pleas, the reader's attention 
 is recalled to the observations made in another part of this work ; * 
 in which, in the framing even of bills, the propriety of adhering to the 
 known technical language of the Courts, in all cases where such language 
 is applicable to the case, has been discussed. It only remains to add, 
 that if such an adherence to the ancient recognized forms of pleading is 
 desirable in the case of bills, it is still more so in the case of pleas, in 
 which, as has been before stated, there must, in general, be the same 
 strictness, at least in matters of substance, as in pleas at Law. 2 It may, 
 
 2 Ante, p. 603. 
 
 3 Ante, pp. 603, 607. 
 
 4 Ante, pp. 608, 609. 
 
 5 Ante, p. 611. 
 
 6 Ld. Red. 297, 298. Where a plea was put 
 in by the East India Company, to a bill filed by 
 the Nabob of Arcot, in which they stated, that 
 by charters, confirmed by Acts of Parliament, 
 they had certain powers under which particular 
 acts were done, the plea was overruled, because 
 it did not set forth the contents of those char- 
 ters and Acts of Parliament. Nabob of Arcot 
 v. East India Co. 3 Bro. C. C. 292, 308. A plea 
 of former adjudication in Chancery should spe- 
 cify the issue and the equities decreed upon, 
 and not aver a mere legal conclusion. Riley 
 v. Lyons, 11 Heisk. 246. 
 
 "Ld. Red. 294; Story, Eq. PI. § 693. If 
 there is any matter of equity in the bill to 
 which the plea does not set up a bar, and 
 which is not denied by way of answer, the plea 
 must be set aside. Piatt v. Oliver, 1 McLean, 
 303. If the plea is to the whole bill, but does 
 not extend to or cover the wh'de, the plea is 
 bad. Bell v. Woodward, 42 N. H. 192, 193. 
 
 8 Wedlake i». Hutton, 3 Anst. 633. So 
 where, to a bill praying a reconveyance of four 
 estates, the defendant put in a plea of a fine 
 and non-claim as to one, averring that the 
 estate comprised in the fine was the only part of 
 the estates comprised in the bill to which he 
 had claimed a right, the plea was, in like man- 
 ner, overruled. Watkins v. Stone, 2 Sim. 49, 
 52. So, also, where a bill prayed an account of 
 rents and profits, and that the defendant might 
 be restrained from setting up outstanding 
 terms, and the defendant pleaded that there 
 were no outstanding terms, the plea was held 
 bad, because it left part of the case untouched. 
 Barker v. Ray, 5 Mad. 64; see also Hook 
 i'. Dorman, 1 S. & S. 227, 230; Hoare r. 
 Parker, 1 Cox, 224, 228; 1 Bro. C. C. 578, 580; 
 Ld. Red. 277. n. (s). 
 
 i Ante, p. 362. 
 
 2 See Marselis v. Morris Canal, &c. Sax- 
 ton (N. J.), 31 ; Story, Eq. PI. § 658. In plead- 
 ing matters of substance the same strictness is 
 required in Equity as at Law. Burditt v. Grew, 
 8 Pick. 108. 
 
 (n) A plea to only part of the bill must clearly show to what part it relates. 
 Counselman, 136 111. 191. 
 
 682 
 
 Snow v.
 
 FORM OF PLEAS. * 685 
 
 however, be repeated here, that although the use in pleadings in Equity 
 of such technical expressions as have been adopted in pleadings at Com- 
 mon Law is desirable, it is not absolutely necessary ; and that the same 
 thing may be expressed in any terms which the pleader may select 
 as proper to convey his meaning, provided they are adequate to the 
 purpose. 8 
 
 All the facts, however, which are necessary to render the plea a com- 
 plete equitable bar to the case made by the bill, so far as the plea extends, 
 must be clearly and distinctly averred, in order that the plaintiff may 
 take issue upon it ; 4 and averments in general ought to be positive. 5 In 
 some cases, indeed, a defendant has been permitted to aver according to 
 the best of his knowledge and belief : as that an account is just and 
 true ; 6 and in all cases of negative averments, and of averments of facts 
 not within the immediate knowledge of the defendant, it may seem im- 
 proper to require a positive assertion. 7 It is, however, the opinion of 
 Lord Redesdale, that unless the averment is positive, the matter in issue 
 appears to be, not the fact itself, but the defendant's belief of it ; and 
 that, in all cases, therefore, averments should be positive, as the 
 conscience of the defendant is saved by the nature of the oath * ad- * 685 
 miuistered : which is, that so much of the plea as relates to his 
 own acts is true, and that so much as relates to the acts of others he be- 
 lieves to be true. 1 
 
 The plea, having stated the facts upon which it is founded, commonly 
 concludes with a repetition, that the matters so offered are relied upon 
 as an objection or bar to the suit, or to so much of it as the plea extends 
 to ; and then prays the judgment of the Court whether the defendant 
 ought to be compelled further to answer the bill, or such part as is 
 pleaded to. 2 It does not appear that any particular form of conclusion 
 is necessary, in pleas in Equity. Some of the old forms of pleas to the 
 jurisdiction conclude by praying the judgment of the Court, "whether 
 it will hold plea upon, and enforce the defendant to answer the bill, for 
 the cause aforesaid ; " whilst other precedents, with less precision, de- 
 mand judgment of the Court, "whether the defendant shall be com- 
 pelled to make further or other answer." * The forms of pleas in Equity 
 to the person are tolerably uniform in concluding, by praying judgment 
 of the Court, whether the defendant shall be compelled to make any 
 further answer during the existence of the disability pleaded. 4 The 
 
 3 Ante, pp. 362, 363. 5 Foster v. Vassall, 3 Atk. 5S7; Story, Eq. 
 
 * Ld. Red. 298: see Newman v. Hutton, 3 PI. § 662. 
 Beav. 114, 117; Overton t\ Banister, 4 Beav. 6 Anon. 3 Atk. 70. 
 
 205, 208. The plea should state so distinctly to 1 Drew t\ Drew, 2 V. & B. 159, 162; Kirk- 
 
 what part of the bill it is intended to apply, man v. Andrews, 4 Beav. 554, 557; 6 Jur. 139; 
 
 that the Court can determine, on examination see also Small v. Attwood, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 39. 
 of the bill, what parts are covered by it. Davi- 1 Ld. Red. 298; Story, Eq. PL §§ 662, 664; 
 
 son v. Schermerborn, 1 Barb. Ch. 480. Where Bolton v. Gardner, 3 Paige, 273; Heartt v. 
 
 the plea does not go to the whole bill, it must Corning, id. 566; see form in Vol. III. 
 clearly point to the part of discover}' or relief 2 Ld. Red. 300. 
 
 intended to be covered by it, but, if overruled 8 Beames on Pleas, 49. 
 
 for a defect in this particular, the defendant 4 Ibid, 
 
 will not thereby be precluded from insisting 
 upon the same matter in his answer as a defence 
 pro tanto. Jarvis v . Palmer, 11 Paige, 650. 
 
 683
 
 * 686 PLEAS. 
 
 precedents of pleas in bar, generally, conclude with pleading the matter 
 set up, in bar of the discovery and relief, or of the discovery (as the case 
 may be), and demand judgment of the Court, whether the defendant shall 
 be compelled to make further or other answer to the bill, praying to 
 be dismissed with costs : a prayer that is sometimes added and some- 
 times omitted. They do not, however, always state that the matter is 
 pleaded in bar. 6 
 
 Where a plea is accompanied by an answer, the answer must follow 
 the conclusion of the plea. If the answer is merely to support the plea, 
 it is stated to be made for that purpose, " not waiving the plea." 6 If 
 the plea is to part of the bill only, and there is an answer to the rest, 
 it is expressed to be an answer to so much of the bill as is not before 
 pleaded to, and is preceded by the same protestation against waiver of 
 the plea. 7 
 
 A plea must be signed by counsel ; 8 and no counsel is to sign any plea, 
 
 unless he has drawn, or at least perused the same : and he is to take care 
 
 that documents be not unnecessarily set out therein in hcec verba ; 
 
 * 686 and that no scandalous matter be inserted * therein. 1 The signa- 
 
 ture of counsel is usually attached to the draft of the plea, and 
 copied by the solicitor onto the engrossment. If a plea has been inad- 
 vertently filed without counsel's name, it is conceived that, as in the 
 case of an answer, an order of course may be obtained to add the 
 same to the engrossment. 2 
 
 If the plea contain any impertinent matter, 8 or is of an improper or 
 unnecessary length, the defendant putting it in may be ordered to pay 
 the costs occasioned thereby. 4 (a) The application for the costs of such 
 impertinent matter is to be made at the time when the Court disposes of 
 the costs of the cause, and not at any other time. 5 
 
 If the plea contain any scandalous matter, 6 exceptions should be 
 taken to such matter. The practice on such exceptions is the same as 
 in the case of exceptions to a bill for scandal, and has been already 
 described. 7 
 
 Where the matter of the plea appears upon record, the plea is put in 
 without oath ; but where the matter of the plea does not so appear it 
 must be upon oath. 8 
 
 5 Beames on Pleas, 49. 8 As to impertinence, see ante, p. 349. 
 
 6 Ld. Red. 300. A question not raised by 4 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 17 ; Cons. Ord. XL. 9. 
 the plea cannot be raised by an answer in sup- 5 Cons. Ord. XL. 11. For the old practice, 
 port of the plea. Such an answer forms no part in case of impertinence in a plea, see Dixon v. 
 of the defence, but is that evidence which the Olmius, 1 Cox, 412. 
 
 plaintiff has a right to require, and to use to 6 As to scandal, see ante, p. 347. 
 
 invalidate the defence made by the plea. Such 7 Cons. Ord. XVI. 2, 3, 10; ante, pp. 349- 
 
 answer can be used only to support or disprove 354. 
 
 the plea. Andrews v. Brown, 3 Cush. 133; Ld. 8 Cons. Ord. XIV. 2. In the U. S. Courts 
 
 Red. 199. no plea shall be allowed to be filed to a bill, un- 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 300: Story, Eq. PI. § 695. less upon a certificate of counsel, that in his 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. VIII. 1. opinion it is well founded in point of law, and 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. VIII. 2: ante, p. 313. supported by the affidavit of the defendant, that 
 
 2 Braithwaite's Pr. 48; post, p. 677. it is not interposed for delay, and that it is true 
 
 (a) A plea is bad which pleads mntters of terial fact as distinguished from evidence, 
 evidence, and the rule that fraud must be spe- Provincial Bank v. Brocklebank, 26 L. R. Ir. 
 daily pleaded applies only where it is a ma- 572, 580. 
 
 6S4
 
 FORM OF PLEAS. * 687 
 
 In consequence of this rule, if the matter pleaded is purely matter of 
 record, or, in other words, which may be proved by the record, the oath 
 of the party is not necessary ; but if any fact in pais is introduced which 
 would require to be proved at the hearing, the plea must be upon oath. 9 
 Thus, pleas of a Statute of Limitations, or of any other statute which 
 requires averments to bring the defendant's case within its operation, 
 must be upon oath. It seems, however, that a mere averment of 
 identity will * not render it necessary that a plea of matter of * 687 
 record should be put in upon oath ; therefore, where a plea of the 
 plaintiffs conviction for forgery was put in without oath, Lord Eldon 
 held it sufficient, although there was an averment of the identity of the 
 plaintiff; ' and so the circumstances of a plea of outlawry, containing 
 such an averment, will not render it necessary that it should be upon 
 oath. 2 
 
 To entitle a defendant to plead any matter without oath, because it is 
 matter of record, it must have been properly enrolled, or made a complete 
 record in the Court out of which it comes. Records are complete for this 
 purpose as soon as they are delivered into the Court, and there fixed as 
 the rolls of the Court ; but before they are so fixed, and do not constitute 
 a perfect record, they are said to be as of record ; and although they may 
 be sufficient in the Courts themselves to which they belong, as ground for 
 ulterior proceedings, they have not assumed that permanent form which 
 gives them the character of records. 3 Thus, a judgment at Law, signed 
 by the proper officer of the Court by which it is made, is a sufficient 
 foundation for the issue of execution by the same. Court ; but as it is 
 merely the instruction for a future judgment, and the judgment is no 
 record until it is actually made up, it is not a complete record, and is not 
 admissible as evidence in another Court. 4 So, also, in the Court of 
 Chancery, a bill or other pleading, which has been duly filed, or even a 
 decree, though passed and entered, is not a record of the Court, of which 
 a copy can be admissible as evidence in another Court. A proceeding 
 or decree does not become a record till it has been signed and enrolled. 
 When, therefore, it is said, that pleas of matters of record may be put 
 
 in point of fact. U. S. Equity Rule, 31 ; see Salisbury Manuf. Co. 43 N. H. 251 ; Sfnrv. Eq. 
 
 Central National Bank v. Connecticut M. L. PI. § 696; post, p. 689, note (a). A plea, if not 
 
 Ins. Co. 104 U. S. 54; Wild v. Gladstone, 3 De on oath, will be set aside on motion. Bassett v. 
 
 G. & Sm. 740. The rule is inflexible in Salisbury Manuf. Co. 43 N. H. 249. 
 Chancery proceedings, that a plea of matters in B Where a defendant pleaded the statute 32 
 
 pais, and pleas in bar of matters in pais, must Henry VIII. c. 9, against selling pretended 
 
 be filed on oath. Dunn v. Keegin, 3 Scam, titles, with the necessary averments of want of 
 
 297. A plea must be verified by oath, although possession, &c, and did not put the plea in upon 
 
 the plaintiff has expressly waived an answer oath, it was ordered to be taken off the file, be- 
 
 from the defendant on oath. Heartt v. Corning, cause the plea, although it set out a statute, was. 
 
 3 Paige, 566; Bassett v. Company, 43 N. II. in substance, m-itter nt pais. Wall v. Stubbs, 2 
 
 251. A plea is not evidence in behalf of the V. & B. 354, 357. 
 
 defendant, as to the facts stated in it, so as to J v. Pavies. 19 Ves. 81, 83. 
 
 require the testimony of more than one witness 2 Aiite. p. 56; and see Prat v. Tavlor, 1 Ph. 
 
 to contradict it; even where it negatives a ma- Cas. 237, as to plea of privilege of defendant, as 
 
 terial averment in the bill. Heartt v. Coming, scholar of the University of Oxford. 
 
 3 Paige, 569; see Sadler r. Gh.ver, 1 B.Mon. 8 2 Phillips on Evid. 2; Taylor on Evid 
 
 53; 1 Smith Ch. Pr. (2d Am. ed.) 231, 232; §§ 1378-1391,1407-1409. 
 
 Carroll v. Waring, 3 Gill & J. 491; Bassett v. * Taylor on Evid. § 1407. 
 
 685
 
 * 688 PLEAS. 
 
 in without oath, it must be understood as confined to those matters which 
 are of record, strictly so speaking, and which require no other evidence 
 to prove them than what the Courts are in the habit of recognizing upon 
 inspection ; 5 such as exemplifications under the Great Seal of the Court 
 of Chancery, or of the Court out of which it comes. Upon this principle 
 it is, that a decree of dismissal, signed and enrolled, may be pleaded 
 without oath. Upon the same principle, a plea of outlawry, or of ex- 
 communication, may be put in without oath ; and so may a plea of con- 
 viction of felony. 6 
 
 Matters not so recorded may be capable of proof aliunde ; but if 
 
 pleaded, the plea must be accompanied by the oath of the party : unless, 
 
 indeed, they consist of transactions in the Court itself, which, 
 
 * 688 * although they have not been solemnly and formally enrolled, 
 
 are quasi of record. Pleas of such matters, as well as matters 
 of record, may be put in without oath : for, as the Court is in the habit 
 of noticing its own proceedings, they are capable of proof without any 
 other evidence than the production of the proceeding itself, or an office 
 copy of it, signed by the proper officer. Upon this principle it is, that, 
 when a plea of a suit already depending in the Court of Chancery is 
 put in, the Court does not require that it should be upon oath, but im- 
 mediately directs an inquiry into the existence of such a suit. 1 
 
 In the case of a plea of outlawry, the record must be pleaded sub 
 pede sigilli ; 2 and it was formerly usual, as well at Law as in Equity, to 
 annex to the plea a copy of the whole record of outlawry, duly authen- 
 ticated by the seal of the Court from which it issued, in order that the 
 Court might judge immediately of the truth of the plea ; 8 but it was 
 afterwards the practice to annex the capias utlagatum onl}', under the 
 seal of the Court, 4 or of the proper office, which is, in fact, the seal of 
 the Court. And where, instead of a copy of the capias utlagatum, duly 
 authenticated, the defendant annexed a certificate, under the seal of 
 the Clerk of the Outlawries, the plea was held bad. 5 But it seems that 
 since the 14 & 15 Vic. c. 99, a copy, certified by the proper officer, of 
 the sheriff's return to the writ of exigi facias, is sufficient evidence of 
 the outlawry. 6 
 
 In all cases where a plea is accompanied by an answer, it must be 
 put in upon oath. 7 A plea by a peer, or a person having privilege 
 of peerage, must, in those cases where an oath would be required from 
 persons not enjoying the privilege, be put in upon attestation of honor. 
 In the case of a corporation aggregate, it must be under the common 
 seal ; and it is advisable, though not indispensable, that the affixing of 
 the seal should be attested by some officer of the corporation. 8 
 
 5 See Wall v. Stubbs, 2 V. & B. 354, 357. defect arose from the mistake of the Clerk of 
 
 6 v. Davies, 19 Ves. 81, 83. the Outlawries, and not of the defendant. See 
 
 i Cons. Ord. XIV. 6, 7; Urlin v. Hudson, 1 Taylor v. Wemyss, L. R. 8 Eq. 512. 
 
 Vern. 332, nnte, p. 661. G Anstruther r. Roberts, 4 W. R. 349; V. C. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XIV. 4. K.; and see Wmthrop v. Elderton, 15 Jur. 1028, 
 
 3 Co. Litt. 128 b. V. C. K. : nnte, p. 55. As to outlawries, see 
 
 4 6 Bac. Ab. 67; and see Fox v. Yates, 24 Chitty's Arch. 1295-1305. 
 
 Beav. 271. ? Jefferson v. Dawson, 2 Ch. Cas. 208. 
 
 5 Waters v. Mayhew, 1 S. & S. 220. Leave 8 Braithwaite's Pr. 53. For form of attests* 
 was, however, given to amend the plea, as the tion, see Vol. III. 
 
 686 

 
 SWEARING, FILING, SETTING DOWN, AND ARGUING PLEAS. * 689 
 
 Where a plea which ought to be upon oath is put in without one, the 
 irregularity is not one which can be waived by the plaintiff's taking 
 any proceeding upon it ; 9 and in such a case, the plaintiff should move, 
 upon notice, that the plea may be taken off the file. 10 Where, 
 however, a joint and several plea had been * sworn to by all the * 689 
 defendants, except one who had died, the Court refused to order 
 it to be taken off the file. 1 
 
 Section IV. — Swearing, Filing, Setting Down, and Arguing Pleas. 
 
 A plea, being drawn or perused and settled by counsel, must be 
 written upon paper of the same description and size as that on which 
 bills are printed ; 2 and the Record and Writ Clerks may refuse to file 
 any plea in which there is any knife erasure, or which is so blotted as 
 to obliterate any word, or is improperly written, or so altered as to cause 
 any material disfigurement; or in which there is any interlineation: 
 unless the person before whom the same was sworn duly authenticate 
 such interlineation with his initials, in such manner as to show that such 
 interlineation was made before the plea was sworn, and so as to mark 
 the extent of such interlineation. 3 A joint plea and answer must be 
 printed in the same manner as answers are printed. 4 
 
 Where a defendant puts in a plea on oath, or attestation of honor, it 
 must be signed by him, and the signature be affixed or acknowledged in 
 the presence of the person before whom the plea is sworn. 5 Pleas are 
 sworn and taken in the same manner as answers. 6 (a) 
 
 A plea which does not require to be put in on oath, need only be 
 signed by counsel; 7 and in other cases, if the plaintiff will consent, an 
 order may be obtained as of course, on petition at the Rolls, to file the 
 plea without oath or signature, or without oath only. 8 If the order 
 dispenses with the oath only, the defendant must sign the plea, and his 
 signature must be attested by some person competent to be a witness. 
 The order must be produced at the time of filing the plea. 9 
 
 The plea must be indorsed with the name, place of business or resi- 
 dence, and address for service, if any, of the solicitor or party filing it, 
 
 9 Wall v. Stubbs, 2 V. & B. 354, 358. 495 ; see also Cope v. Parry, 1 Mad. 83 ; Cooke 
 
 l« Wild v. Gladstone, 3 De G. & S. 740; v. Westell, id 265; Doner. Read, 2 V. & B. 
 
 15 Jur. 713. If a plea is not verified by the 310. 
 
 oath of the defendant, the plaintiff may apply 2 Ord. 16 March, 1860, r. 16; Cons. Ord. 
 
 for an order to set it aside, or to have it taken IX. 3 ; ante, p. 396. 
 
 off the files of the Court; but he cannot make 8 Cons. Ord. I. 36. 
 
 the objection upon the argument of the plea. 4 See post, pp. 755,756. 
 
 Heartt v. Corning, 3 Paige, 566; Bassett v. 6 Cons. Ord. XIV. 3. 
 
 Salisbury Manuf. Co. 43 N. H. 251; 1 New 6 See post, pp. 743, et seq. 
 
 Ch. P. 1*17. For form of notice of motion, see * Cons. Ord. VIII. 1; XIV. 3. 
 
 Vol. III. 8 For form of petition, see Vol. III. 
 
 1 Att.-Gen. v. Cradock, 8 Sim. 466; 1 Jur. 9 Braithwaite's Pr. 62,63. 
 
 (a) See Toledo Tie & L. Co. v. Thomas, 33 ment of the bill. Farley v. Kittson, 120 TJ. S. 
 W. Va. 566. A sworn plea is not evidence for 303. Seeante, p. 686, n. 8; Lilienthal t\ Wash- 
 the defendant though it denies a material aver- burn, 4 Woods, 65. 
 
 687
 
 * 691 PLEAS. 
 
 in the same manner as other pleadings ; 10 and it is filed in the Record 
 
 and Writ Clerks' Office, 11 without any other formality than that required 
 
 for filing an affidavit. 12 Notice of the filing thereof should be 
 
 * 690 given to the solicitor for the plaiutiff, or to the * plaintiff himself 
 
 if he sues in person, before seven o'clock in the evening of the 
 day on which the plea is filed, or, if filed on a Saturday, before two 
 o'clock in the afternoon of that day. 1 Neglect to give the notice in due 
 time will not render the plea inoperative ; but the time allowed to the 
 plaintiff for taking the next step in the cause will be extended, so as 
 to give him the benefit of the time he would otherwise lose by the delay 
 in the service. 2 
 
 A defendant is allowed the same time for pleading as for answering ; 
 and any extension of the time must be applied for in the same manner 
 as in the case of answers ; and, generally, the rules regulating the 
 swearing, and the reception and filing of pleas at the Record and Writ 
 Clerks' Office, are the same as those which regulate the swearing, 
 reception, and filing of answers. 8 
 
 Some doubt at one time existed, whether, when the order allowing 
 further time in terms gave the defendant further time to answer only, 
 he was entitled to plead. 4 There have, however, been several cases in 
 which it has been decided, that a plea was an answer within the mean- 
 ing of an order for time to answer ; 5 and it has been held that if it is 
 intended to limit the defendant to an answer, the order must expressly 
 declare that intention. 6 
 
 * 691 * If the defendant does not obtain an order for further time, 
 
 but allows an attachment to issue, there does not seem to be any 
 
 10 Cons. Ord. III. 2, 5; ante, pp. 453, 454. terwards, the defendant filed a plea under the 
 
 11 Cons. Ord. I. 35; VIII. 3. order so altered: but he stated that his judg- 
 
 12 15 & 16 Vic. c. 8>, § 21. ment proceeded entirely on the circumstances 
 i Cons. Ord. III. 9; XXXVII. 2; ante, of the individual case. 
 
 pp. 454, 455. For form of notice, see Vol. III. 5 Kay v. Marshall, 1 Keen, 190; Anon., 2 
 2 Wright v. Angle, 6 Hare, 107, 109; Lowe P. Wms. 4G4 ; Jones v. Earl of Strafford, 3 
 v. Williams, 12 Beav. 482; .Jones r. Jones, P.. Wms. 79, 81; Roberts v. Hartley, 1 Bro. 
 Uur. X S.Wj. V. C. S. ; Llovd v. Solicitors, C C. 56 ; De Minckwitz v. Udney, 16 Ves. 
 and General Life Assurance Co. 3 W. R. 640; 355; Phillips v. Gibbons, 1 V. & B. 184; Xew- 
 24 L. J. Ch. 704, V. C. W. ; see, however, Mat- man v. Wh te, 16 Beav. 4; Heartt v. Corning, 
 thews v. Chichester, 5 Hare, 207, overruled on 3 Paige. 566. The filing of an answer, plea, or 
 appeal, id. 210; 11 Jur. 49, demurrer, is said to be a compliance with the 
 a See post, Chap. XVII. § 3, Answers. In rule to answer, in Bracken e. Kennedy, 3 Scam. 
 Massachusetts, "the defendant may at any 564. If further time is given to answer, it is 
 time before the bill is taken for confessed, or improper to file a demurrer without leave of 
 afterwards, bv leave of tl.e Court, demur, ple^d, the Court. Ibid. Demurrer to part is not a 
 or answer to "the bill." Ch. Rule 10. compliance with an order to answer. Kenrick 
 4 Brooks v. Purton, 1 Y. & C. C. 278 (see r. Clayton. 2 Bro. C.C. (Perkins's ed.)214. and 
 also Taylor v. Milner. 10 Ves. 444; Newman notes; S. C. 2 Dick. 685; Lansdown r. Eldir- 
 v. White, 16 Beav. 4) where the defendant's ton, 8 Sumner's Ves. 526, note (1), and cases 
 application to the Master and the affidavits in cited. Plea under an order for time to answer 
 supp rt of it had reference onlv to answering, is regular, 8 Sumner's Ves. 526, note (1). 
 Sir J. L. Knight Bruce V. C. was of opinion <* Per Lord Cottenham in Hunter v. Nock- 
 that an order giving leave to answer, plead, or olds, 2 Phil. 540, 544; 12 Jur. 149, reversing 
 demur, not demurring alone, was irregular, S. C, 6 Hare, 12; 11 Jur. 1006; see also New- 
 and he ordered the words in italics to be struck man v. White, 16 Beav. 4; Hodges v. Hodges, 
 out from the order; whereupon his Honor 2 Ch. D. 112. 
 directed the plea to be taken off the file : after- 
 
 688
 
 SWEARING, FILING, SETTING DOWN, AND ARGUING PLEAS. * 692 
 
 objection to his filing a plea ; further than that he must, as in the case 
 of an answer, first tender the costs of the contempt. 1 If, however, the 
 defendant is in contempt for want of an answer, and an order has 
 issued for the Sergeant-at-Arras, it is considered irregular to file a plea. 2 
 After service of a traversing note, a defendant cannot plead to the bill, 
 without the special leave of the Court. 3 
 
 An office copy of the plea is taken by the plaintiff ; 4 and as a general 
 rule, he can take no step in the cause until the plea has been disposed of. 
 Thus, except under very special circumstances, there can be no motion 
 for an injunction till the plea has been argued. The Court will, how- 
 ever, at the instance of the plaintiff, in such a case, expedite the hearing 
 of the plea, and will give the plaintiff leave to move on the same day 
 that it comes on, if the plea should be overruled upon argument, that an 
 injunction may issue. 6 
 
 So, also, if a defendant pleads to part, and answers to the residue of 
 the bill, the plaintiff cannot except to the answer till the plea has been 
 argued : 6 unless in cases where the plea is confined to the relief prayed, 
 and the defendant professes to answer as to the whole discovery re- 
 quired ; in such cases, it seems the Court will not require the plaintiff 
 to set down the plea before he excepts to the answer for insufficiency. 7 
 
 The rule which requires a plea to be disposed of upon argument, 
 before any further proceedings are had in the cause, applies to cases 
 where the defendant, as well as to cases where the plaintiff, seeks to 
 move in the cause. Thus, if a defendant plead in bar, he cannot obtain 
 an order for the plaintiff to make his election, till the plea has been 
 argued : for the plea, by insisting that the plaintiff is not entitled to sue 
 in Equity, denies that he has an election ; 8 and an order for the plaintiff 
 to make his election, made under such circumstances, will, on motion, be 
 discharged ; 9 as will also be an order to elect, made where the defend 
 ant has pleaded to part, and answered to the remainder of the bill. 10 
 
 The plaintiff may, within three weeks after the filing of the 
 * plea, 1 obtain, on motion or petition as of course, 2 an order to * 692 
 amend his bill. The petition and order should state whether the 
 plea has or has not been set down for argument : 3 in the former case, 
 
 i Waters v. Chambers, 1 S. & S. 225; San- » Pigot v. Stace, 2 Dick. 496; Sidney v. 
 
 ders v. Murney, ibid.; Hamilton v. Hibbert, Perry, id. 602. 
 
 2 S. & S. 225; Mellor v. Hall, id. 321, 322; 8 Anon. Mos. 304; and see post, Chap. 
 
 Foulkes v. Jones, 2 Beav. 274. XIX. § 4, Election. 
 
 2 Braithwaite's Pr. 63. 9 Vaughan o. Welsh, Mos. 210. 
 
 3 Cons. Ord. XIII. 7; ante, p. 515. 10 Fisher v. Mee, 3 Mer. 45. 47. 
 
 * Braithwaite's Pr. 491. 1 Cons. Ord XIV. 17. The vacations are not 
 
 6 Humphreys v. Humphreys, 3 P. Wms. reckoned, Ord. XXXVII. 13 (3); ante, p. 641. 
 
 395, 397; Thompson v. Selby, 12 Sim. 100. 2 Ante, p. 480. For forms of motion paper 
 
 6 Darnell v. Reyny, 1 Vern. 344; Braith- and petition, see Vol. III. But after the plea 
 
 waite's Pr. 127, 128. Where the plaintiff ex- is set down, the application to amend must be 
 
 cepts to the answer accompanying a plea, be- by special summons. See ante, p. 593. n. For 
 
 fore the argument of the plea, the truth of the a form, see Vol. III. Any irregularity in the 
 
 plea is admitted. Brownell v. Curtis, 10 Paige, order to amend will be waived by moving to 
 
 210; and see Buchanan v. Hodgson, 11 Beav. dismiss for want of prosecution. Kettlewcll r. 
 
 368, as to moving for production of documents, Barstow, L. R. 10 Eq. 210. 
 
 after joint plea and answer. 8 Jennings v. Pearce, 1 Ves. Jr. 448; Thorn v. 
 
 VOL. I. 
 
 44 689
 
 * 693 PLEAS. 
 
 the order is made on payment of the taxed costs, and in the latter, of 
 20s. costs. 4 This course should, however, only be adopted when the 
 plaintiff considers the plea to be good ; for such an amendment of the 
 bill is as much an admission of the validity of the plea, as if the same 
 had been allowed on argument. 5 
 
 If the plaintiff dispute the validity of the plea, he should set it down 
 for argument. There are, however, certain pleas which are not usually 
 set down for argument ; these are : (1) Pleas of Outlawry ; (2) Of a 
 former suit depending ; (3) Of a Decree signed or enrolled. The first 
 are pleaded sub sigillof so that the truth of the fact is ascertained by 
 the form of pleading ; and the suit is consequently delayed until the 
 disability is removed : and when removed, the defendant must, on re- 
 ceiving his costs, answer the bill as if the outlawry had not existed. 7 
 Where, however, the plaintiff conceives such a plea, through misplead- 
 ing or otherwise, to be insufficient, he may set it down for argument. 8 
 In the case of the two latter kinds of pleas, an inquiry will, on motion 
 or petition of course, be directed into the truth of them. 9 The order 
 for this inquiry ought to be obtained by the plaintiff ; 10 unless he con- 
 ceives the plea to be deficient in form, in which case he may set it down 
 for argument. 11 
 
 Formerly, after the filing of a plea, it was necessary to enter it with 
 the Kegistrar, but now this need not be done ; and upon the filing 
 thereof, either party is at liberty to set the same down for argument 
 immediately; 12 and it is irregular to set the same down after three 
 weeks from the date of the filing thereof ; but the times of vacation are 
 not to be reckoned. 13 
 
 * 693 * The party wishing to set a plea down for argument must, 
 
 where the cause is attached to one of the Vice-Chancellors' Courts, 
 present a petition to the Lord Chancellor, or, where it is attached to the 
 Rolls' Court, to the Master of the Eolls, praying that the plea may be 
 set down. 1 The petition which, if the cause is attached to one of the 
 Vice-Chancellors' Courts, does not require any fiat from the Lord Chan- 
 cellor, nor any stamp, 2 is left with the Registrar, or the Secretary of the 
 Master of the Rolls, as the case may be, 8 and must state the name of 
 
 Germand, 4 John. Ch. 363; Brown r. Ricketts, Simonson, 4 Blackf. 70; nor by demurrer: 
 
 2 John. Ch. 425, Travers v. Ross, 14 N. J. Eq. 254; Stone v. 
 
 4 Jones v. Wattier, 4 Sim. 128; Parker v. Moore, 26 111. 165. See ante, p. 542, n. 1. But a 
 Alcock, 1 Y. & J. 195. demurrer to a plea, where no objection has been 
 
 5 See Spencer v. Bryan, 9 Ves. 231. made, will be treated as a mode of setting the 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. XIV. 4; ante, p. 688. plea for hearing in its sufficiency. Witt r. 
 » Cons. Ord. XIV. 5. Ellis, 2 Coldw. 40; Klepper v. Powell, 6 Hei.sk. 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. XIV. 5; Ld. Red. 305; see 506. In one instance, a demurrer to a plea was 
 also Hunter v. Ayre, 23 Beav. 15: Hunter v. held to reach a defect in the bill. Beard v. 
 Nockolds, 6 Hare, 459, 462 ; Fox v. Yates, Bowler, 2 Bond, 13. 
 
 24 Beav. 271. and see ante, p. 56. i 2 Cons. Ord. XIV. 11. 
 
 9 Ante, pp. 637, 661. For form of order, see is Neck v. Gains, 1 De G. & S. 223; 11 Jur. 
 Seton, 1259, No. 16; and for forms of motion 763; Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 13 (3). 
 
 paper and petition, see Vol. III. * Cons. Ord. XXI. 9. 
 
 10 Cons. Ord. XIV. 6; ante, pp. 637, 661. 2 Reg. Regul. 15 March, 1860, r. 3. 
 
 11 Ante, p. 637, n. 6; Ld. Red. 305; Thomas « Cons. Ord. XXI. 9. For form of order, 
 v. Brasher, 4 Monroe, 67. The sufficiency of see Seton. 1257, No. 10; and for form of peti- 
 a plea is not tested by exceptions: Raymond v. f.ion, see Vol. III. 
 
 690
 
 SWEARING, FILING, SETTING DOWN, AND ARGUING PLEAS. * 694 
 
 the Judge to whose Court the cause is attached, 4 the day when the plea 
 was filed, aud whether it is to the whole or part of the bill, and must 
 be subscribed by the solicitor, and state for what party he acts, and be 
 dated the day it is left. 5 The order for hearing the plea, which is as of 
 course, is drawn up by the Registrar, or by the Secretary at the Rolls, 
 as the case may be. 6 The order should then be taken to the Registrar's 
 Clerk at the order of course seat, and he will set the plea down at once ; 7 
 and a copy of the order should also be served, as soon as possible, on 
 the solicitor of the opposite party. 8 
 
 Unless specially directed by the Lord Chancellor, or the Lords Jus- 
 tices, the plea must be set down before, and heard by the Judge to 
 whose Court the cause is attached. 3 Previously to the hearing, two 
 co> *ies of the bill and a copy of the plea must be left with the under 
 secretary or the train bearer at the Rolls, or with the train bearer of 
 the Vice-Chancellor, as the case may be, for the use of the Court. 10 
 If the cause is attached to the Rolls' Court, the plea will not be put 
 in the paper until two clear days : if to one of the Vice-Chancellors' 
 Courts, until six clear days after it has been set down. 
 
 If the defendant does not think he will be able to maintain his plea 
 on argument, he should, before it comes on for hearing, obtain an order 
 for leave to withdraw it. 11 The order will be granted on payment of the 
 costs occasioned by the plea. 
 
 The parties should be provided with office copies of the affidavits of 
 service of, and of being served with, the order to set down the plea. 
 If the plea has been set down by the plaintiff, and the defendant 
 makes default at the hearing, the plea will be overruled, * if the * 694 
 plaintiff can produce an affidavit of service on the defendant of 
 the order to set down the plea ; 1 if he cannot produce such an affidavit, 
 it will be struck out of the paper. If the plaintiff himself makes default, 
 the plea will be allowed, if the defendant can produce an affidavit of 
 having been served with the order ; or will be struck out of the paper, 
 if he cannot. 2 Similar rules, mutatis mutandis, apply to the case of pleas 
 set down by the defendant. 3 
 
 On the argument of the plea, where all parties appear, counsel for the 
 defendant are first heard; then the counsel for the plaintiff; and lastly, 
 the leading counsel for the defendant is entitled to reply. 4 
 
 If, when the plea is called on for hearing, the plaintiff declines argu- 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. XIV. 10. n for form of order to withdraw a plea, see 
 
 6 Reg. Regal. 15 March, 1860. r. 3. Seton, 1259, No. 15; and for form of petition 
 
 « Cons. Ord. XXI. 9. for that purpose, see Vol. III. 
 
 T Reg. Regul. 15 March, 1860, r. 1. 1 For form of order in such case, see 
 
 8 Braithwaite's Pr. 65. Seton, 1258, No. 13; and for form of affidavit, 
 
 3 Cons. Ord. VI. 4. see Vol. III. 
 
 19 If these directions as to papers are neg- 2 Where, in either case, the plea is struck 
 
 lected, and in consequence thereof the plea out, a fresh order must be obtained for setting 
 
 cannot be heard, the solicitor may be ordered it down, as in the case of a demurrer; see ante, 
 
 to pa3' such costs as the Court thinks fit. Cons. p. 596. 
 
 Ord. XXI. 12. The M. R. requires the papers 3 Mazarredo ». Maitland, 2 Mad. 38. 
 
 to be left two clear days, at least, before the 4 Counsel's brief consists of copies of the bill 
 
 plea comes on for hearing. and plea. 
 
 691
 
 695 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 ing it, and applies for leave to amend, he will, in general, be allowed 
 to do so, on payment of the costs. 5 
 
 A plea, when set down, will not be allowed to stand over for an 
 indefinite period. 6 
 
 It may be observed here, that on the argument of a plea, the allega- 
 tions in the bill may be taken less strongly against the plaintiff than 
 th^y would be on a demurrer. 7 
 
 If a plea is supported by an answer, upon the argument of the plea 
 the answer may be read to counterprove the plea; and if the defendant 
 appears not to have sufficiently supported his plea by his answer, the 
 plea must be overruled, or ordered to stand for an answer only. 8 Where 
 a defendant had answered to an original bill, which was afterwards 
 amended, whereupon the defendant put in a plea to the amended bill, 
 the plaintiff was permitted to read the answer to the original bill, to 
 counterprove the plea to the amended bill. 9 
 
 Upon the argument of a plea, every fact stated in the bill, and not 
 denied by the averments in the plea and by the answer in support of 
 the plea, must be taken as true. 10 If a plea be set down for argument 
 by the plaintiff, without replying to it, the matter contained in it must 
 
 be considered as true. 11 (a) 
 * 695 * A plea upon argument may be either allowed simply, or with 
 leave to amend, or the benefit of it may be saved to the hearing, 
 or it may be ordered to stand for an answer, or it may be overruled. 1 
 The consequence of each of such judgments will be considered in the 
 ensuing sections. 
 
 If the plaintiff conceives the plea to be good, though not true, he 
 should reply thereto, and take issue upon it, as in the case of an answer.* 
 
 5»See Jones v. Wattier, 4 Sim. 128; see also 
 ante, p. 420. 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. XXI. 13. 
 
 1 Rumbold v. Forteath, 2 Jur. N. S. 686, 
 
 V. c. w. 
 
 8 Ld. Red. 303; see Kirby v. Taylor, 6 John. 
 Ch. 242; Souzer v. De Meyer, 2 Paige, 574; 
 Bogardus v. Trinity Church. 4 Paige, 178 ; 
 Leaycraft v. Dempsey, id. 124, 126; Kuypers 
 v. Dutch Ref. Church, 6 Paige. 570; Story, Eq. 
 PI. § 69!). If a plea accompanied by an an- 
 swer is allowed, the answer may be read at the 
 hearing of the cause to counterprove the plea. 
 Souzer v. De Meyer, 2 Paige, 574; Bogardus v. 
 
 Trinity Church, 4 Paige, 178; Story, Eq. PI. 
 §§ 690, 699. 
 
 9 Hildyard v. Cressy, 3 Atk. 303 ; ante, 
 p. 680. 
 
 10 Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Paige, 178; 
 Lawrence v. Pool, 2 Sandf. S. C. 540. 
 
 ii Galhigher v. Roberts, 1 Wash. C. C. 320; 
 Rowley v. Williams, 5 Wis. 151; Davison v. 
 Johnson, 16 N. J. Eq. 112. 
 
 i Ld. Red. 301. For forms of orders in such 
 cases, see Seton, 1258. Nos. 12, 14. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 301. In New Jersev, Chancellor 
 Green, in Davison v. Johnson, 16 N. J. Eq. 112, 
 113, remarked that, when the cause is heard 
 
 (a) If the plaintiff replies, instead of setting 
 the plea down for argument, he admits its va- 
 liditv, the only question then being as to the 
 truth of the facts alleged in the plea. Tomp- 
 kins v. Anthon, 4 Sandf. Ch. 97; Little r. Ste- 
 phens, 82 Mich. 596: Beals v. Illinois &c. R. 
 Co. 1.33 U. S. 290; Bean v. Clark, 24 Blatch. 
 264; Cottle ». Krementz, 25 Fed. Rep. 494; 
 Wilson v. Wilson. 5 Ir. Eq. 514. In the Fed- 
 eral Courts, the general rule that a replication 
 to a plea admits its sufficiency, is changed by 
 Equitv Rule 33 ; and the facts, if proved, now 
 692 
 
 avail the defendant only so far as in Law and 
 Equitv thev ought to avail him. Pearce v. 
 Rice. 142 U. S 28. 42. If he sets it down for 
 argument, he admits, the truth of the facts 
 pleaded therein, and objections cannot be made 
 to its regularity. Wooster v. Muser, 20 Fed. 
 Rep. 162 ; Birdseye v. Heilner, 26 id. 147: 27 id. 
 289 ; Bu- rell v. Hackley, 35 id. 833 ; Kellner V. 
 Mutual Life Ins. Co. 43 id. 623: Rouskulp r, 
 Kershner, 49 Md. 516 ; Foster v. Foster, 51 Vt. 
 216; Newton v. Thayer, 17 Pick. 129.
 
 SWEARING, FILING, SETTING DOWN, AND ARGUING PLEAS. * 696 
 
 He should not, however, reply to a plea of the dependency of a former 
 suit for the same matter. 8 
 
 If the plaintiff reply to the plea, he thereby makes as full an admis- 
 sion of its validity as if it had been allowed upon argument ; so that 
 if the defendant, at the hearing, proves his plea to be true, the bill 
 must be dismissed. 4 Therefore, where a defendant, in a plea of pur- 
 chase for a valuable consideration, omitted to deny notice, and the 
 plaintiff replied to it, and the defendant, at the hearing, proved the 
 purchase for valuable consideration, it was held that the bill ought to be 
 dismissed ; for it was the plaintiff's own fault that he had not set the 
 plea down for argument, when it would have been overruled. 5 And it 
 seems that in such case it will make no difference if the plaintiff should 
 prove notice ; for all that is required of a defendant, in such a case, is 
 to prove his plea, which he does by proving the purchase, and the 
 payment of the consideration. 5 
 
 If a plea to the whole or part of a bill is not set down for argument 
 within three weeks after the filing thereof (exclusive of vacations), and 
 the plaintiff does not within such three weeks serve an order for 
 leave to amend the bill, or by notice in writing * undertake to * 696 
 reply to the plea, the plea is to be held good to the same extent, 
 and for the same purposes, as in the case of a plea to the whole or part 
 of a bill allowed upon argument ; l and the defendant may obtain an 
 order as of course for the plaintiff to pay the costs of the plea, and, if 
 the plea is to the whole bill, the costs of the suit. 
 
 Where the plea is to the whole bill, the defendant by whom it was 
 filed may at any time after the expiration of the three weeks obtain, 
 as of course, an order to dismiss the bill. 1 A plea to the whole of the 
 
 upon a plea, " the question is not strictly Michael, 2 Paige, 345 ; 6 Paige, 139. Upon a 
 
 whether the plea is in proper form, but whether, replication to a plea, nothing is in issue except 
 
 in the language of the statute, the plea be good; what is distinctly averred in the plea; and if 
 
 that is, whether upon the face of the plea it that is established at the hearing, the pica is a 
 
 presents, if true, a valid defence to the action. bar to so much of the bill as it professes to 
 
 The inquiry, when the cause is heard upon cover. Fish v. Miller, 5 Pai"-e, 26; Cook v. 
 
 the plea, is substantially as if the plaintiff had Mancius, 4 John. Ch. 166. The replication is 
 
 demurred to the plea. The question is not, an admission of the sufficiency of the facts 
 
 whether the plea is true, but whether, if true, pleaded, as a bar, if true. Hughes r. Blake 6 
 
 it is a good defence. This is the obvious Wheat. 472; Bogaidus v. Trinity Church, 4 
 
 meaning of the statute. If the plaintiff deems Paige, 178; Gernon o. Boccaline, 2 Wash. C. C. 
 
 the plea bad, the case goes to hearing upon the 199; Fish v. Miller, 5 Paige, 26 ; Rhode Island 
 
 plea. If he conceives the plea to be good, r. Massachusetts, 14 Peters, 210, 257; Gallagher 
 
 though not true, he takes issue upon it, and v. Roberts, 1 Wash. C.C. 320. And this with- 
 
 proceeds, as in case of an answer." " The sub- out reference to any equity arising from other 
 
 ject of inquiry is not the mere technical form facts stated in the bill. Mvers v. Dorr, 13 
 
 of the plea, but the sufficiency of its averments Blatchf. 22; Moore r. Holt, 3 Tenn. Ch. 141. 
 to sustain the defence; whether it is good both 5 Harris v. Ingledew, 3 P. Wins. 94. 
 
 in form and in substance; whether, namely, 1 Cons Ord XIV. 17; Roberts v. Jones, 7 
 
 assuming all the facts properly set out in the Beav. 57. As to an irregular amendment after 
 
 plea to be true, it represents a valid defence." the above time, see Campbell v. Joyce, L. R. 2 
 
 See McEwen t>. Broadhead, 11 N. J. Eq. 129. Eq. 377, V. C. W. See the 38th Equity Rule 
 
 3 Jones v. Segueira, 1 Phil. 82, 84; 6 Jur. of the U. S. Courts, post, p. 2384. In Massa- 
 183; Cons. Ord. XIV. 6, 7; ante, pp. 637, 692. chusetts, "the plaintiff may set down the plea 
 
 4 Daniels v. Taggart, 1 Gill & J. 311; to be argued, or take issue on the plea, within 
 Meeker v. Marsh, Saxton (N. J.), 198; Ken- fifteen days from the time when the same is 
 nedy v. Creswell, 101 U. S. 641; Dows v. Mc- filed; and if he fail to do so, a decree dismiss- 
 
 693
 
 * 697 PLEAS. 
 
 relief, but only to a part of the discovery, is not a plea to the whole bill 
 within the meaning of this rule. 2 
 
 If the plaintiff undertakes to reply to a plea to the whole bill, he is 
 not, without the special leave of the Court, to take any proceeding 
 against the defendant by whom the plea was filed till after replication ; 8 
 and if he does not file his replication within four weeks after the date 
 of his undertaking, the defendant may move, upon notice, to dismiss 
 the bill for want of prosecution. 4 
 
 The times of vacation are not reckoned in the computation of the 
 time for setting down pleas : 6 and if the time expires on a day on which 
 the offices are closed, the plea may be set down on the day on which 
 they next open. 6 
 
 Section V. — Allowing Pleas. 
 
 If a plea is allowed simply, it is thereby determined to be a full bar 
 to so much of the bill as it covers, if the matter pleaded, with the aver- 
 ments necessary to support it, be true. 7 If, therefore, a plea is allowed 
 upon argument, or the plaintiff without argument thinks it, though good 
 in form and substance, not true in point of fact, he may take issue upon 
 
 it, and proceed to disprove the facts upon which it is endeav- 
 ♦697 ored to be supported. 8 This he does *by filing a replication, in 
 
 the same manner that he would do if the defendant had simply 
 put in an answer to the bill, in the usual way. 1 
 
 Where the defendant pleads the pendency of another suit, the plain- 
 tiff ought not to reply to the plea, even if he disputes the fact, but he 
 should, on motion or petition of course, obtain an order for an inquiry 
 into the truth thereof' 2 This order, and a certificate in pursuance 
 thereof, should be obtained within one month from the filing of the 
 plea : otherwise, the defendant may obtain, on motion or petition of 
 course, an order to dismiss the bill with costs. 3 
 
 When the plaintiff has replied to a plea, its validity can never be 
 questioned, but only its truth : 4 in fact, nothing but the matters con- 
 tained in the plea, as to so much of the bill as the plea covers, is in 
 
 ing the bill, with costs, may be entered upon 8 Ld. Red. 301; Bassett v. Salisbury Manuf. 
 
 motion, unless good cause appear to the con- Co. 43 N. H. 253. 
 
 trary." Equity Rule 11. 1 See post, Chap. XXI. Replication ; United 
 
 2" Neck v. Gains, 1 De G. & S. 223; HJur. States r. Dalles Military Road Co. 140 U. S. 
 
 763. For forms of motion paper and petition, 599, 617. 
 
 see Vol. III. 2 For forms of motion paper and petition, 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. XIV. 18. see Vol. III. But see ante, p. 637, note. 
 
 * Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 10 (2). For form of 3 Cons. Ord. XIV, 6, 7; ante, pp. 637, 692; 
 
 notice of motion, see Vol. III. Baker r. Bird, 2 Ves. Jr. 672; Jones v. Segueira, 
 
 5 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 13 (3). 1 Phil. 82; 6 Jur. 183; Leigh v. Turner, 14 W. 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 12. R- 361, M. R. For forms of motion paper and 
 " Story, Eq. PI. § 697; Bassett v. Salisbury petition, see Vol. III. 
 
 Manuf. Co. 43 N. H. 253. A plea may be good 4 Parker v. Blythmore, Prec. in Ch. 58; 
 
 in part and bad in part. Lord Chelmsford in 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 70, pi. 6 ; Punsany v. Shaw, 
 
 United States ». McRae, L. R. 3 Ch. 79, 91; 5 Bro. P. C. ed. Toml. 262. 267; McEwen v. 
 
 ante, p. 611, and cases in note. Broadhead, 11 N. J. Eq. 131. 
 
 694
 
 ALLOWING PLEAS. * 698 
 
 issue between the parties. 5 If, therefore, issue is thus taken upon the 
 plea, the defendant must prove the facts which it suggests : 6 if he fails 
 in this proof, so that, at the hearing, the plea is held to be no bar, and 
 the plea extends to the discovery sought by the bill, the plaintiff is 
 not to lose the benefit of that discovery, but the Court will order the 
 defendant to answer the interrogatories ; 7 but if the defendant proves 
 the truth of the matter pleaded, the suit, so far as the plea extends, 
 is barred, even though the plea is not good, either in point of form or 
 substance. 8 
 
 Although, when a plea has been replied to, the matter in issue is the 
 truth of the plea only, which must be proved by the defendant, this 
 will not prevent the plaintiff, if he chooses, from entering into evidence 
 to prove the whole case made by his bill. 9 It can scarcely, however, 
 be imagined, that a case should ever arise, in which such a course of 
 proceeding, on the part of the plaintiff, would be advisable, especially 
 as this Court will not, as we have seen, in the event of the plea 
 being found false, deprive the * plaintiff of any advantage which * 698 
 he might have had from a discovery by the defendant, if an 
 answer had been originally put in. 
 
 The plaintiff may, however, if he pleases, go into evidence to dis- 
 prove the plea ; and if he has, in his bill, alleged any matter which, if 
 true, may have the effect of avoiding the plea, such as notice of fraud, 
 he may, after replying to the plea, enter into evidence in support of his 
 allegation. And where the plea introduces matter of a negative nature, 
 such as denial of notice, or fraud, it will be necessary for him, in case 
 sufficient to show the existence of the notice or fraud, is not admitted 
 by the answer in support of the plea, to go into evidence in support of 
 the affirmative of the proposition.- 
 
 When a plea is allowed, it is C' sidered as a full answer ; and an 
 injunction obtained till answer will be dissolved, upon application, as a 
 matter of course. 2 
 
 Where a plea to the whole or part of a bill is allowed, upon argu- 
 ment, the plaintiff, unless he undertakes to reply to the plea, or the 
 Court otherwise directs, is to pay to the party by whom the plea is filed 
 the costs of the plea, and, if the plea is to the whole bill, the costs of 
 the suit also ; and in such last-mentioned case the order allowing the 
 plea is to direct the dismissal of the bill. 3 Formerly, upon the allow- 
 
 6 Ld. Red. 302; Fish v. Miller, 5 Paige, 26. Fish v. Miller. 5 Paige, 20; Bogardus v. Trin- 
 
 6 Where a plea contains several distinct ity Church. 4 Paige. 178; Peay r. Duncan, 20 
 averments or allegations of fact, all the allega- Ark. 85; Flagg v. Bonnel. 10 N. J. Eq. 82; 
 tions must be supported by the proofs, or the Dowstf. McMichael, 6 Paige, 144; ante, p. 695, 
 plea will be overruled as false. Dnws r. Mc- n. 4. 
 
 Michael, 6 Paige, 1.19. Upon the hearing on 9 Ord o. Huddleston, 2 Dick. 510, 512. 
 
 the defendant's plea, evidence previously taken > Eyre r. Dolphin, 2 Ball & B. 303; Saun- 
 
 bj' the defendant cannot be considered by the ders v. Leslie, id. 515. 
 
 Court. Hancock v. Carlton, 6 Gray, 39. 2 Phillips v. Langhorn, 1 Dick. 148. But the 
 
 7 Ld. Red. 302 ; Brownsword p. Edwards. allowance of the plea does not ip*o facto oper- 
 2 Ves- Sr. 247 ; Wood v. Strickland, 2 V. & B. ate as a dissolution of the injunction. Ferrand 
 158. v. Hamer, 4 M. & C. 143. 
 
 8 Ld. Red. 302; Harris v. Ingledew, 3 P. 3 Cons. Ord. XIV. 16. Plea allowed with- 
 Wms. 94; Daniels v. Taggart, Gill & J. 311; out costs, and with liberty to amf-nd bill. Jones 
 
 695
 
 * 699 PLEAS. 
 
 aiice of a plea to .the whole bill, if the plaintiff undertook to reply to it, 
 he had to pay the costs of the plea, but the other costs of the suit were 
 reserved ; 4 now, it would appear that, in the same circumstances, both 
 the costs of the plea and the costs of the suit will be reserved, unless 
 the Court makes a special order. 5 
 
 A solicitor will not be allowed to act oppressively, by putting in two 
 pleas of the same nature for two defendants ; and where a solicitor set 
 down two pleas for want of parties, on behalf of different defendants, 
 he was allowed the costs of one only. 6 
 
 If a plea is allowed, it is not uncommon to give leave to the plaintiff 
 to amend his bill ; especially in the case of a plea for want of parties. 7 
 It must not be understood that this is a matter of course ; 8 it will, how- 
 ever, probably be done more frequently now than formerly : because, 
 under the present practice, a plaintiff may introduce facts or circum- 
 stances which have occurred after the institution of the suit, by 
 
 * 699 way of amendment, into his bill, if * the cause is otherwise in 
 
 such a state as to allow of amendment being made therein. 1 
 After the allowance of a plea, an order for leave to amend the bill is 
 special ; and on the application for it, the plaintiff must specify the 
 amendments he intends to make. 2 
 
 Where the plea went to the plaintiff's right to sue, and was allowed 
 leave to amend the bill was given, on payment of the costs of plea; 8 
 but where it was for want of parties, the costs were reserved to the 
 hearing of the cause. 4 
 
 Section VI. — Saving the Benefit of a Plea to the Hearing. 
 
 It sometimes happens that, upon the argument of a plea, the Court 
 considers that although, as far as then appears, it may be a good 
 defence, yet there may be matter disclosed in evidence which, suppos- 
 ing the matter pleaded to be strictly true, would avoid it ; in such case, 
 the Court, in order that it may not preclude the question by allowing the 
 plea, directs that the benefit of it shall be saved to the defendant at 
 the hearing. 5 The effect of such an order is to give the plaintiff an 
 opportunity of replying, and going into evidence, without overruling 
 the plea. 6 When the benefit of the plea is reserved to the hearing, the 
 
 v. Binns, 33 Beav. 362; 10 Jur. N. S. 119; 3 Tudway r. Jones, vbi mpra. 
 
 Metropolitan Bank r. Offord, I.. R. 10 Eq. 398. * Doyle v. Muntz, 5 Hare, 509, 518; 10 
 
 4 Fry r. Richardson, 10 Sim. 475. Jur. 914. 
 
 5 Young v. White, 17 Beav. 532; 18 Jur. 5 Ld. Red. 303. Thus in Heartt t. Corning, 
 277. 3 Paige, 572. a plea of settled partnership ac- 
 
 6 Tarbuck v. Woodcock, 3 Beav. 289. count was held to be well pleaded ; but as facts 
 
 7 Ld. Red. 281. For form of order in snch might be disclosed justifying a decree to sur- 
 case, see Seton, 1258, Xo. 12. charge and falsify, the benefit of it was saved 
 
 8 Ante, pp. 290. 419. until the hearing. To have allowed it, simply, 
 
 1 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 53; see Tudway v. would have made it a conclusive bar. 
 
 Jones, 1 K. & J. 691, where snch an order "was 6 See Cooth v. Jackson, 6 Ves. 12, 18. When 
 
 made. the plea covers the whole bill, the effect of the 
 
 2 Taylor r. Shaw, 2 S. & S. 12: Neck v. order, that the plea stand over till the hearing, 
 Gains, i De G. & S. 223; 11 Jur. 763; post, saving to the defendant the benefit thereof, is 
 p. 730, see Tompkins v. Hollister, 60 Mich. 470. that the defendant shall not be deprived of the 
 
 696
 
 ORDERING A PLEA TO STAND FOR AN ANSWER. 
 
 700 
 
 interrogatories to such part of the bill as is covered by the plea need not 
 be answered. 7 
 
 Unless anything is said in the order in such cases with respect to the 
 costs of the plea, they must abide the result of the hearing ; the order 
 saving the benefit of the plea to the hearing being, in fact, nothing more 
 than an order for the adjournment of the discussion. 8 
 
 * Section VII. — Ordering a Plea to stand for an Answer. * 700 
 
 If, upon argument, the Court considers that the matter offered by 
 way of plea may be a defence, or part of a defence, but that it has been 
 informally pleaded, or is not properly supported by the answer, so that 
 the truth is doubtful, it will, in such case, instead of overruling the plea, 
 direct it to stand for an answer. 1 
 
 If a plea is ordered to stand for an answer, it is allowed to be a suf- 
 ficient answer to so much of the bill as it covers, unless, by the order, 
 liberty is given to the plaintiff to except ; 2 («) and where a defendant 
 pleaded to the whole bill, and, on arguing the plea, it was ordered to 
 stand for an answer, without saying, one way or the other, whether the 
 plaintiff might except, the plaintiff was not allowed to except : because, 
 by the terms " for an answer," in the order, a sufficient answer is 
 meant, an insufficient answer being no answer. 3 It is to be observed, 
 that if a plea is to part only of the bill, and is accompanied by an 
 answer to the rest, an order that it may stand for an answer, without 
 
 benefit of his plea, but that the plaintiff shall 
 be at liberty to file a replication, and proceed 
 to the proof of the facts in reply to the plea; and 
 on such hearing, the plea is to be taken, prima 
 facie, a good bar to the suit; but as there may 
 possibly be circumstances, which, in Equity, 
 ought to preclude the defendant from relying 
 upon such plea, the question is left open un- 
 til such hearing. Hancock v. Carlton, 6 Gray, 
 54: Astley v. Fountaine, Cas. temp. Finch, 4 ; 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 698; 1 Barb. Ch. I'r. 121, 
 122; Bassett v. Salisbury Manuf. Co. 43 N. H. 
 253, 254. Neither party recovers costs on the 
 argument of a plea where the benefit of it is 
 saved to the defendant until the hearing. Heartt 
 v. Corning, 3 Paige, 5G6. 
 
 1 Gilb. For. Rom. 64. 
 
 8 As to this, Chief Baron Gilbert observes: 
 " But if the words are to save the benefit of the 
 plea till the hearing, no other use could ever 
 be found by these words, but that in truth it 
 saves the defendant paying costs for the over- 
 ruling his plea; and, therefore, though the 
 Court often makes use of these words, yet, 
 when the plea is very faulty, or naught, though 
 the Court often saves the benefit thereof till the 
 
 hearing, yet the}' declare it shall not avoid the 
 payment of costs." Gilb. For. Rom. 94. 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 303 ; Tempest v. Lord Camoys, 
 W. N. (1866) 16; 14 W. R. 326, M. R. ; Pearse 
 v. Dobinson, L. R. 1 Eq. 241. V. C. K. ; Rob- 
 erts v. Le Hir, 29 L. T N. S. 873; Mills v. 
 Bally, W. N. (1866) 348; 15 W. R. 86, V. C. 
 W.; Orcutt v. Orms, 3 Paige, 461; French v. 
 Shotwell, 5 John. Ch. 555; Bell v. Woodward, 
 42 N. H. 193, 196; Jarvis v. Palmer, 11 Paige, 
 650; Souzer v. De Meyer, 2 Paige, 574; Leay- 
 craft v. Dempsey, 4 Paige, 129; Brooks r. Sut- 
 ton, L. R. 5 Eq. 361; S. C. 3 Ch. 1. If the 
 plea is ordered to stand for an answer, it is 
 allowed to be a sufficient answer to so much of 
 the bill as it covers, unless by the order liberty 
 is given to the plaintiff to except. Kirby v. 
 Taylor, 6 John. Ch. 242; Orcutt v. Onus, 3 
 Paige, 459; Goodrich v. Pendleton, 3 John. 
 Ch. 394; Meeker r. Marsh, Saxton (N. J.), 
 198. In Orcutt v Orms, it was said, by Chan- 
 cellor Walworth, that the answer will be con- 
 sidered as a fidl answer, though not necessarily 
 a perfect defence. 
 
 2 Ibid. 304. 
 8 Sellon v. Lewen, 3 P. Wms. 239. 
 
 (a) By the U. S. Equity Rule 34, the de- 
 fendant is to have leave to answer when his 
 plea or demurrer is overruled. See Dalzell v. 
 Dueber W. C. M. Co. 149 U. S. 315; Matthews 
 
 v. Lalance Manuf. Co. 18 Blatch. 84 ; Wooster v. 
 Blake. 7 Fed. Rep. 816; Phelps v. Elliott, 30 
 id. 396. 
 
 697
 
 * 701 PLEAS. 
 
 giving the plaintiff liberty to except, will not preclude the plaintiff from 
 excepting to the answer to that part of the bill which is not covered by 
 the plea. 4 
 
 The order for the plea to stand for an answer is, however, frequently 
 
 accompanied with a direction that the plaintiff shall be at liberty to 
 
 except ; 5 but the liberty is sometimes qualified, so as to protect the 
 
 defendant from any particular discovery which he ought not to be called 
 
 upon to make. 6 
 
 * 701 * When a plea has been ordered to stand for an answer, with 
 
 liberty to except, the plaintiff must, if the Court does not fix a 
 time within which he is to except, file his exceptions within six weeks 
 from the date of the order : otherwise the answer will be deemed suffi- 
 cient. 1 The proceedings upon the exceptions are the same as those 
 upon exceptions to answers in general. 2 
 
 When a plea is ordered to stand for an answer, the question of costs 
 ought to be decided at the time the order is made, and a subsequent 
 application for them has been refused. 8 It seems that, generally, the 
 defendant is ordered to pay the costs of the plea : 4 though they have 
 been made costs in the cause. 5 
 
 Section VIII. — Overruling Pleas. 
 
 If th°, Court, upon argument, is of opinion that the plea cannot, under 
 any circumstances, be made use of as a defence, it is simply overruled, 
 and the defendant is to pay to the plaintiff the taxed costs occasioned 
 thereby, unless the Court otherwise directs. 6 The plaintiff may also, if 
 the plea has been to the whole bill, and the defendant's time for answer- 
 ing the bill has expired, issue an attachment for want of an answer, 7 
 
 4 Coke v. Wilcocks, Mos. 73; Ld. Red. 304. 2 For the practice, see post, Chap. XVII. § 4, 
 
 8 See Glover v. Weedon, 3 Jur. N. S. 903, Exceptions to Answers. 
 
 V. C. S., where leave to amend was also given; 3 Yarnall v. Rose, 2 Keen. 326. 
 
 and see Seton, 1258, No. 14. 4 Howling v. Butler, 2 Mad. 245; Thomp- 
 
 In Dear v. Webster, 15 W. R. 395, where son ?•. Wild, 5 Mad. 82, 83; Mansell v. Feeney, 
 
 the plaintiff did not desire to except, leave to ubi supra. 
 
 put in a further answer was given to the de- 5 Hunt v. Penrice, 17 Beav. 525; 18 
 
 fendant. And see Brien v. Jordan, 1 Tenn. Ch. Jur. 4. 
 
 625, where leave was given to both parties to 6 Cons. Ord. XIV. 12. See Hubbell v. De 
 
 apply, the one to make further answer, the Land, 11 Biss. 382. 
 
 other to except. 7 Hinde, 224. As to overruling plea as 
 
 6 Ld. Red. 304; Alardes r. Campbel, Bunb. frivolous, see Bowman v. Marshall, 9 Paige, 
 265; Brereton v. Gamul, 2 Atk. 241; Pusey v. 78; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr. 123. In Massachusetts, " if 
 Desbouvrie, 3 P. Wins. 315, 322; King v. Hoi- a plea is overruled, no other plea shall be re- 
 combe, 4 Bro. C. C. 439, 440 ; Bayley v. Adams, ceived, but the defendant shall proceed to answer 
 6 Ves. 586, 599 ; Pearse v. Dobinson, L. R. 1 the plaintiff's bill ; and if he shall fail to do so 
 Eq. 241 ; L. R. 3 Ch. 1: Sellon v. Lewen, 3 P. within one month, the plaintiff may enter an 
 Wms. 239 ; McCormick v. Chamberlin, 11 order that the same, or so much thereof as is 
 Paisje, 543-, Bassett v. Salisbury Manuf. Co. covered by the plea, be taken for confessed; and 
 43 N. H. 254; Bell v. Woodward, 42 N. H. the matter thereof may be decreed accordingly, 
 195 196. unless good cause appear to the contrary." 
 
 i Cons. Ord. XVI. 6; see Esdaile V. Moly- Equity Rule 12. In Rule 13, it is provided, 
 
 neux, 2 Coll. 641. A less time is frequently that "upon a plea being overruled, oradjudged 
 
 fixed; see Mansell v. Feeney, 2 J. & H. 313, good, the party prevailing upon the question 
 
 where one week only was given. shall recover full costs from the time of filing 
 
 698
 
 OVERRULING PLEAS. * 702 
 
 unless the defendant has obtained, either from the Court at the hear- 
 ing, or from the Judge at Chambers, an extension of time to answer : in 
 which case, the attachment must not be issued till the extended time for 
 answering has expired. The plaintiff may also, if he does not require 
 an answer, immediately file a traversing note, unless the Court has 
 given time to the defendant to answer : in which case, if the defendant 
 does not file his answer within the time allowed, the plaintiff may file 
 the note at the expiration of the time. 8 
 
 The effect of overruling a plea is to impose upon the defendant 
 the necessity of making a new defence. This he may do, * either * 702 
 by a new plea, or by an answer ; and the proceedings upon the 
 new defence will be the same as if it had been originally made. 1 (a) 
 
 It is said, in some of the books of practice, that after a plea has been 
 overruled, a new defence may be made by demurrer ; and such a de- 
 murrer (which was upon the ground that the discovery would subject 
 the defendant to pains and penalties) has been permitted. 2 This oc- 
 curred under the old practice, under which, provided a defendant was 
 not in contempt, or had not obtained an order for time, he might have 
 put in a demurrer at any time ; but, under the present practice, this 
 would be nearly impossible, unless by special leave of the Court : since 
 twelve days only, from appearance, are allowed to a defendant to demur 
 alone to any bill. 3 A demurrer to part of the bill may, however, still be 
 put in, in cases where the whole time allowed by the orders to plead, 
 answer, or demur, not demurring alone, 4 has not elapsed at the time of 
 the plea being overruled ; or where an order for additional time for the 
 same purpose has been obtained. But under an order for time to answer 
 alone, such a defence cannot, it is apprehended, be put in. 5 
 
 We have seen before that, after a plea has been overruled, a defendant 
 cannot demur ore tenns. 6 
 
 The rule with regard to pleading again, must be understood with this 
 qualification, namely, that the second plea must not be upon the same 
 ground as the first ; 7 therefore, it is held that only one plea to the juris- 
 diction can be allowed. 8 
 
 such plen, unless the Court shall otherwise spe- Hunter v. NnckolcU, 2 Phil. 540, 544; 12 Jur. 
 
 cially order." 149; Ante, p. 690. 
 8 Cons. Ord. XIII. 4; ante, p. 515. 6 Ante, p. 588. 
 
 1 On overruling a plea, leave was given to 7 Where a plea has been overruled on the 
 the defendant to plead de novo, and to plain- merits, the same matter cannot be set up in the 
 tiff to amend his bill. Chadwick v. Broadwood, answer, as a bar to the suit, without the special 
 3 Beav. 316. permission of the Court. Townshend r. Towns- 
 
 By the Code of Tennessee, § 4395, upon a hend, 3 Paige, 413; see Goodrich v. Pendleton, 
 
 plea or demurrer overruled, no other plea or 4 John. Ch. 549; Coster v. Murray, 7 John. Ch. 
 
 demurrer shall be received, but the defendant 167; Robertson v. Lubbock, 4 Sim 161; Bush 
 
 shall answer the allegations of the bill. v. Bush, 1 Strobh. 377; Piatt v. Oliver, 1 Mc- 
 
 2 East India Co. v. Campbell, 1 Ves. Sr. Lean, 295; Ringgold v. Stone, 20 Ark. 526. 
 246. Pentlarge v. Pentlarge, 22 Fed. Rep. 412. 
 
 3 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 3; ante, p. 591. « Wyatfs P. R. 325. It is said, in the same 
 * Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 4, 5. work, p. 330, that if outlawry or other matter 
 5 Brooks v. Purton, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 278; be pleaded, and the plea is overruled, no other 
 
 (a) The defendant should be allowed a rea- ment has been overruled, appear to be a waiver 
 
 sonable time to answer. Cunningham r. Camp- of the plea. Wilson v. Scruggs, 7 Lea (Tenn.), 
 
 bell, 3 Tenn. Ch. 488. Filing an answer and 635. 
 defending upon the merits, after a plea in abate- 
 
 699
 
 703 
 
 PLEAS. 
 
 * 703 * Section IX. — Amending Pleas, and Pleading de novo. 
 
 It sometimes happens, that where there is a material ground of de- 
 fence disclosed in the plea, but owing to some evident slip or mistake, 
 the plea has not been correctly framed, the Court, in this respect fol- 
 lowing the Courts of Law, will exercise a discretion in allowing the plea 
 to be amended. 1 Thus where a plea, which in substance showed a de- 
 fect of parties, instead of stating that additional parties were necessary 
 and naming them, prayed judgment whether the defendant ought to be 
 called upon for further answer, Lord Erskine, upon the argument, in- 
 stead of overruling the plea, on the ground of informality, gave the 
 defendant leave to amend it. 2 And so, where an error in a plea of out- 
 lawry was occasioned by the Clerk of the Outlawries, who, instead of a 
 copy of the record of the outlawry, or of the capias utlagatnm, gave a 
 certificate of the outlawry, which was annexed to the plea, the Court 
 allowed the defendant to amend his plea, by annexing to it a copy of 
 the exigent, or record of the outlawry. 3 And so, where the Court of 
 Exchequer thought that the negative averments in a plea were too special 
 and precise, the same matter being also denied by the answer in support 
 of the plea, they gave the defendant leave to amend his plea by striking 
 out the special averments. 4 It has, however, been held, that leave to 
 amend a plea should not be given when it is supported by an answer. 5 
 A short time is generally limited, within which the amendment must be 
 made, (a) 
 
 plea shall be after pleaded : but the defendant 
 must answer. This, however, mu't be meant 
 to apply to other pleas of the same matter; see 
 Rowley v. Eccles, 1 S. & S. 511, 513, where Sir 
 John L°ach V. C. appears to have held, that 
 after a plea is overruled, a defendant cannot 
 put in a second plea without leave of the Court. 
 Where, to a bill to set aside an agreement and 
 release, stating circumstances of fraud and du- 
 ress, the defendant pleaded the agreement and 
 release to the whole bill, without denying the 
 fraud and duress, and the plea was, upon that 
 ground, overruled, whereupon the defendant 
 put in Another plea, insisting upon the same 
 release as a bar to the relief, and also to so 
 much of the discovery as related to transactions 
 prior to the agreement, accompanied by an an- 
 swer as to the circumstances of fraud and duress, 
 this was held to be irregular. Freeland r. John- 
 son, 1 Anst. 276; 2 Anst. 407. 
 
 "There is no rule more firmly settled than 
 that a defendant having put in one plea, and 
 that plea having been overruled, cannot put 
 in another plea without special leave of the 
 Court." Per Malins V. C, who ordered a second 
 plea coupled with an answer to be taken from 
 the file, with costs. McKewan v. Sanderson, 
 L. R. 16 Eq. 316. 
 
 1 Clayton v. Meadows, 2 Hare, 26; Cooker. 
 Cooke, L. R. 4 Eq. 77; Beanies on Pleas, 321; 
 see Meeker v. Marsh, Saxton (N. J.), 198; 
 Newl. Ch. Pr. 121; Leaycraft i\ Dempsey, 4 
 Paige, 126; Bell v. Woodward, 42 N. H. 181, 
 196; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 894-896; Smith r. Bab- 
 cock, 3 Sumner, 583 ; Newman v. Wallis, 2 Bro. 
 C. C. (Perkins's ed.) 147, note (c), and cases 
 cited. Amendments are in the discretion of 
 the Court, Smith v. Babcock, 3 Sumner, 583 ; 
 but their discretion, in this respect, is regulated 
 by rules known in the Courts. Jefferson v. 
 Cullis, 4 Dana, 467. 
 
 2 Merrewether t\ Mellish, 13 Ves. 435; Ser- 
 grove v. Mayhew, 2 M. & G. 97, 99. As to 
 amendment of the statement of defence under 
 the present English practice, see 1 Dan. Ch. 
 Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 510. 
 
 3 Waters v. Mayhew, 1 S. & S. 220, 224; 
 ante, p. 688. 
 
 4 Pope v. Bish, 1 Anst. 59 ; see Edmundt-on 
 v. Hartley, id. 97. 
 
 5 Thompson v. Wild, 5 Mad. 82. But see 
 Greene v. Harris, 11 R. I. 5, where the exact 
 extent of the decision is stated, and several 
 authorities are cited to show that the plea and 
 answer, one or both, have frequently been al- 
 lowed to be amended. 
 
 (a) As the plea must be confined to a sinrle different issues will not usually be allowed, 
 
 issue unless special leave is obtained to pi<ad especially after long delay. Giant Powder Co. 
 
 double, an amendment of a plea so as to raise t'. Safety Nitro Powder Co. 19 Fed. Rep. 509. 
 700
 
 AMENDING PLEAS, AND PLEADING DE NOVO. 
 
 705 
 
 It has also happened, that where a plea has offered a substantial de- 
 fence, but has been so informally pleaded that it would be difficult or 
 impossible to amend it, the Court, instead of allowing the defendant to 
 amend his plea, has given him leave to withdraw it altogether, and plead 
 de novo within a given time. 6 
 
 * Liberty to amend, or to plead de novo, however, will only be * 704 
 granted in cases where there is an apparent good ground of de- 
 fence disclosed by the plea, but owing to some accident or mistake, it 
 has been informally pleaded : where a substantial ground of defence has 
 been omitted, such permission will not be given. 1 
 
 Although, where the error is very palpable, the Court will give the 
 defendant leave to amend at the argument of the plea, the most usual 
 course is for the defendant to move subsequently for leave to amend his 
 plea. This form of proceeding is rendered necessary by the circum- 
 stance, that the Court always requires to be told precisely what the 
 amendment is to be, and how the slip happened, before it will allow the 
 amendment to take place ; and this must, in general, be done by affidavit 
 in support of the motion. 2 
 
 With respect to the costs to be paid by the plaintiff, upon the 
 * allowance of an amended plea, 1 it has been decided that the de- * 705 
 fendant is not entitled to the costs of correcting his own mistake, 
 but he is entitled to the costs which he would have had, if the plea 
 which was allowed had been the plea which was first filed. 
 
 6 Nobkissen v. Hastings, 2 Ves. Jr 84, 87; 
 4 Bro. C. C 253; Watkins v. Stone, 2 S. & S. 
 560, 573. On overruling a plea, leave was given 
 to defendant to plead de novo, and plaintiff to 
 amend his bill. Chadwick v. Broudwood, 3 
 Beav. 316. A defendant in a bill of revivor 
 cannot plead to the original bill a plea which 
 has been pleaded by the original defendant and 
 overruled. Dows V. McMichael, 2 Paige, 245; 
 Souzer v. De Meyer, id. 574; but if a plea has 
 been put in, and the original defendant has died 
 before argument, the defendant to a bill of revi- 
 vor may plead the same matter de novo. 1 Barb. 
 Ch. Pr* 125; 1 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 389; 1 Smith Ch. 
 Pr..(2d Am. ed.)229. 
 
 1 Thus, where the bill sought to set aside an 
 agreement and release, stating circumstances of 
 imposition and equitable duress in obtaining 
 them, and the defendant put in a plea of the 
 agreement and release to the whole bill, without 
 denying the fraud or duress, either by aver- 
 ments or by answer, the Court of Exchequer 
 refused to give the defendant leave to amend. 
 Freeland v. Johnson, 1 Anst. 276: 2 Anst. 407, 
 411; and see Hewitt v. Hewitt, 11 VV. R. 849, 
 V. C. K. 
 
 2 Newman v. Wallis, 2 Bro. C. C. 143, 147; 
 
 Wyatt's P. R. 340; Wood v. Strickland, 2 V. 
 & B. 150, 157; Jackson v. Rowe, 4 Russ. 514, 
 524. In Nabob of Arcot v. East India Company 
 (3 Bro. C. C. 292. 300 ; S. C. nom. Nabob of the 
 Carnatic v. East India Co. 1 Ves. Jr. 371,388; 
 2 id. 56), Lord Thurlow refused to entertain the 
 question, whether the plea might be amended 
 or nut upon the argument, because no motion 
 had been made on the subject; and he said that 
 he should expect that, whenever such a motion 
 should be made, the form of the plea intended 
 to be put in should be laid before the Court : for 
 amendments, when moved, ought to be stated, 
 that the Court may see whether it is material 
 that the cause should be delayed for the purpose 
 of admitting them. It is to be remarked, that at 
 a subsequent period, after the plea in the above 
 case had been overruled, the defendants applied 
 by motion for leave to amend the plea, or to 
 plead anew, but that the Lord Chancellor re- 
 fused the motion on the ground as appears from 
 the marginal note of one of the reporters, that 
 the plea had been amended before. 1 Ves. Jr. 
 372, 393. 
 
 1 Per Sir James Wigram V. C. in Clayton v. 
 Meadows, 2 Hare, 26, 33. 
 
 701
 
 *706 * CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 DISCLAIMERS. 
 
 A disclaimer is, where a defendant denies that he has or claims any- 
 right to the thing in demand by the plaintiff's bill, and disclaims, that 
 is renounces, all claim thereto. 1 
 
 It has been before stated, that where a person who has no interest in 
 the subject-matter of the suit, and against whom no relief is prayed, is 
 made a party, the proper course for him to adopt, if he wishes to avoid 
 the discovery, is to demur, unless the bill states that he has or claims 
 an interest : in which case, as a demurrer, which admits the allegations 
 in the bill to be true, will not of course hold, he should, except in cases 
 of partial discovery (to which, as will be presently shown, he may 
 object by answer), avoid putting in a full answer, by plea or disclaimer. 2 
 Therefore, where, instead of disclaiming he supported the plaintiff's case, 
 but was held not entitled to any part of the relief given to the plaintiff, 
 he was left to bear his own costs. 3 . 
 
 A disclaimer, however, cannot often be put in alone ; for although, 
 if a plaintiff, from a mistake, makes a person a party to a suit who is in 
 no way interested in or liable to be sued touching the matters in question, 
 a simple disclaimer by such person might be good, yet, as it is possible 
 that the defendant may have had an interest which he may have parted 
 with, the plaintiff has a right to require an answer, sufficient to ascertain 
 whether that is the fact or not ; and if a defendant has had an interest 
 which he has parted with, an answer may also be necessary to enable the 
 plaintiff to make the proper person a party, instead of the defendant. 4 
 
 A defendant cannot shelter himself from answering, by alleging that 
 
 he has no interest in the matter of the suit, in cases where, though 
 
 * 707 he may have no interest, others may have an interest in it * against 
 
 him ; he cannot disclaim his liability; l (a) therefore, a party to.an 
 
 1 Wyatt's P. R. 175; Story, Eq. PI. § 838, under the statutory jurisdiction, divest himself 
 et seq.; Bentley v. Cowman, 6 Gill & J. 162. of an estate in lands; see Re Ellison, 2 Jur. 
 
 A disclaimer can only extend to matters in N. S. 62, V. C. W.; Foster v. Dawber, 1 Dr. 
 
 issue in the suit, and where it was filed in a & Sm. 172. 
 
 foreclosure suit ; it was held that it did not 3 Rackham v. Siddall, 1 M'N. & G. 607, 
 
 operate so as to enlarge the estate of the plain- 625. 
 
 tiff. Burrell v. Smith, L. R. 7 Eq. 399. 4 I-d. Red. 318; Oxenham V. Esdaile, M'L. 
 
 2 Ante, p. 284. A defendant may also, in a & Y. 540 ; Walters v. Northern Coal M. Co. 
 suit, disclaim by his counsel at the bar. Teed 1 W. R. 383. 
 
 t7. Carruthers, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 31, 38; 6 Jur. l A defendant cannot by disclaiming de- 
 
 987. It seems doubtful whether he can by prive the plaintiff of the right to require a full 
 such a disclaimer, in the case of a petition answer from him, unless it is evident that the 
 
 (a) His disclaimer will be ordered to be answer. Isham v. Miller, 44 N. J. Eq. 61; 
 taken from his files, where it is his duty to Bromberg v. Heyer, 69 Ala. 22. 
 702
 
 DISCLAIMERS. * 708 
 
 account cannot, by disclaiming an interest in the account, protect him- 
 self, by such disclaimer, from setting out the account.' 2 Nor, when the 
 bill seeks to charge the defendant with the costs of the cause, can he, by 
 disclaiming all interest in the subject of the suit, evade giving a discovery 
 of those facts by which the plaintiff seeks to substantiate his charge. 3 
 So, if fraud is charged against the defendant seeking to disclaim, and 
 interrogatories have been filed, a disclaimer alone is insufficient, and an 
 answer must be given to the imputed fraud ; 4 and it seems that, in such 
 a case, although no personal decree can in general be made against a 
 married woman, still she must answer fully ; though it does not seem 
 clear how far her answer can ultimately be used as evidence against 
 her. 5 
 
 It is to be observed also, that a disclaimer by one defendant cannot, 
 in any case, be permitted to prejudice the plaintiff's right as against the 
 others ; and, therefore, where a bill was filed against the lessees of tithes, 
 under a parol demise, for an account, and the lessor, who was made a 
 defendant thereto, disclaimed, the disclaimer of the lessor was not per- 
 mitted to prejudice the rights of the plaintiff against the lessees, and a 
 decree was made against them ; although the plaintiff had, upon the 
 disclaimer coming in, himself dismissed the bill against the lessor 
 with costs. 6 Where a defendant claims any rights against his co-de- 
 fendants, though not against the plaintiff, he should reserve such 
 rights by his disclaimer; for if his disclaimer is absolute, the Court 
 will only determine the rights and interests of the other parties ; and 
 will not consider any question which may arise between him and his 
 co-defendants. 7 
 
 Though a disclaimer is, in substance, distinct from an answer, yet 
 it is, in point of form, an answer, containing simply an assertion that 
 the defendant disclaims all right and title to the matter in demand ; (b) 
 and in order to entitle the defendant to be dismissed with costs, the 
 disclaimer should state that the defendant "does not and never did 
 claim, and that he disclaims, all right and title in the subject- 
 matter of the suit." 8 Lord Redesdale observes, * that in some * 708 
 instances, from the nature of the case, a simple disclaimer may 
 
 defendant should not, after the disclaimer, be 6 Williams v. Jones, Younge, 252, 255. 
 
 continued a party to the suit. Ellsworth v. 7 Jolly v. Arbuthnot, 4 De G. & J. 224; 5 
 
 Curtis, 10 Paige, 105. Jur. N. S. 680; 26 Reav. 283 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 80. 
 
 2 Glassington v. Thwaites, 2 Russ. 458, 462; 8 Vale v. Merideth, 18 Jur. 992, V. C. W. 
 De Beauvoir v. Rhodes, cited 3 M. & C. 643; A defendant having the same interest as the 
 Dobree v. Nicholson, 22 L. T. N. S. 775. plaintiff, should, if he disapprove of the suit, 
 
 3 Graham v. Coape, 3 M. & C. 638, 643 ; distinctly repudiate it : otherwise, the bill may 
 9 Sim. 93, 103. be dismissed as against him, without costs, 
 
 * Bulkeley v. Dunbar, 1 Anst. 37. and with costs as against the other defond- 
 
 5 Whiting v. Rush, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 546, 552; ants. Winthrop v. Murray, 14 Jur. 302, V. C. 
 
 Pemberton v. M'Gill, 1 Jur. N. S. 1045, V. C. Wigram. 
 
 W.; and see Silcock v. Roynon, 2 Y. & C. C. 
 
 C. 376; 7 Jur. 548; and ante, p. 185. 
 
 (6) A disclaimer may be an "answer" plaintiff's right, and a denial of any assertion 
 
 within the meaning of an order of court. of title on the defendant's part, a disclaimer is 
 
 Anon. 3 L. J. Ch. 94. But in general, being not regarded as an answer or defensive plea, 
 
 merely an admission upon the record of the Herring v. Swain, 84 Texas, 523. 
 
 703
 
 * 709 DISCLAIMERS. 
 
 perhaps be sufficient, but that the forms given in the books of practice 
 are all of an answer and disclaimer. 1 
 
 A disclaimer may, by order, be filed without oath, but not without 
 oath and signature. The order is obtained on motion or petition of 
 course. 2 If the defendant applies by motion, the consent of counsel for 
 the plaintiff is necessary ; and if the defendant petitions, the written 
 consent of the plaintiff must be subscribed thereto. 3 Where the plaintiff 
 applies, whether by motion or petition, no consent by the defendant is 
 required. 4 The application by a defendant is usually, if not invariably, 
 made by petition. Where the disclaimer is put in without oath, the 
 signature of the defendant must be attested by some person competent 
 to be a witness. 6 
 
 The disclaimer must be signed by counsel ; 6 and it must be sworn, 
 filed, and printed, and an office copy taken in the same manner, and 
 within the same time, as an answer. 7 
 
 If a defendant puts in a disclaimer where he ought to answer, or 
 accompanies his disclaimer by an answer which is considered insufficient, 
 the plaintiff may take the opinion of the Court upon its sufficiency, by 
 taking exceptions to it, in the same manner as to an answer. 8 If, how- 
 ever, instead of applying in the first instance to the Court, by motion, 
 to take the disclaimer off the file, the plaintiff delivers exceptions, he 
 will be precluded from afterwards moving for that purpose. 9 
 
 Where a defendant puts in a general disclaimer to the whole bill, the 
 plaintiff ought not to reply to it ; 10 for then the defendant may go into 
 evidence in support of it. 11 In a case where the plaintiff replied, the 
 defendant was allowed to have his costs taxed against the plaintiff for 
 vexation. 12 It is otherwise, however, where the disclaimer is to part, 
 and there is an answer or plea to another part of the same bill ; in such 
 cases there may be a replication to such plea or answer. 13 
 
 * 709 * The course to be pursued by the plaintiff, after a disclaimer 
 
 to the whole bill has been filed, is either to dismiss the bill as 
 against the party disclaiming with costs, or to amend it ; or, if he 
 thinks the defendant is not entitled to his costs, he may set the cause 
 down upon the answer and disclaimer, and bring the defendant to a 
 hearing. 1 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 319; see forms in Vol. III. A must move to take the disclaimer off the tiles, 
 disclaimer should be full and explicit in all re- and he cannot except; but if the disclaimer is 
 spects. Worthington v. Lee, 2 Bland, 678. accompanied by an insufficient answer, the plain- 
 
 2 For form of order on motion, see Pawson tiff should except to the answer. Ellsworth v. 
 v. Smith, cited Seton, 1254. Curtis. 10 Paige, 105. 
 
 8 Braithwaite's Pr. 47, 57. For forms of 9 Glassington v. Thwaites, ubi supra, 461. 
 
 motion paper and petition, see Vol. III. ln Spofford v. Manning, 2 Edw. Ch. 350. 
 
 4 Braithwaite's Pr. 47, 57. n See the observations of Sir John Romilly 
 
 5 Id. 48. For form of attestation, see Vol III. M. R. in Ford v. Lord Chesterfield, 16 Beav. 520. 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. VIII. 1. 12 Williams v. Longfellow, 3 Atk. 582. 
 
 7 See post, Chap. XVII. § 3, Answers; 13 Ibid. 
 
 Braithwaite's Pr. 57, 491. • Cash v. Belcher, 1 Hare, 310, 313; Bailey 
 
 8 Glassington v. Thwaites, 2 Russ. 458. 463; v. Lambert, 5 Hare, 178; 10 Jur. 109; Wigging- 
 Bulkeley v. Dunbar, 1 Anst. 37; Graham v. ton v. Pateman, 12 Jur. 89. V. C. E.; Wyatt's 
 Coape, 3 M. & C. 638; 9 Sim. 96, 103. But it P. R., 176; Hinde, 209. Where the defendant 
 has been held that where a simple disclaimer is disclaims all interest in the subject-matter of 
 filed, a plaintiff who is entitled to an answer controversy, any statements made by him not 
 
 704
 
 DISCLAIMERS. * 710 
 
 Where a defendant had occasioned the suit, in consequence of a claim 
 to the fund set up by himself, which he refused to release or to verily, 
 and afterwards put in a disclaimer, stating in his answer the facts upon 
 which he had supposed himself to be entitled, as a ground for his not 
 being ordered to pay the costs of the suit, which were prayed against 
 him, in consequence of which the plaintiff examined a great number of 
 witnesses to falsify such statement, but no witnesses were examined 
 by the defendant, he was ordered to pay the whole costs of the suit, as 
 well the plaintiff's costs as the costs which the plaintiff was ordered to 
 pay to the co-defendants. 2 
 
 It is to be remarked, that a defendant cannot, by answer, claim that 
 to which, by his disclaimer, he admits he has no right ; and if a dis- 
 claimer and answer are inconsistent, the matter will be taken most 
 strongly against the defendant on the disclaimer. 3 
 
 If a defendant puts in a disclaimer, and afterwards discovers that he 
 had an interest, which he was not apprised of at the time he disclaimed, 
 the Court will, upon the ground of ignorance or mistake, permit him to 
 make his claim. It will not, however, allow a defendant to do so at the 
 hearing of the cause ; he must, in order to get rid of the effect of his dis- 
 claimer, make a distinct application, supported by affidavit, setting forth 
 the facts in detail on which he founds his claim to such an indulgence ; * 
 and it seems that the Court will expect a strong case to be made out, 
 before it will grant the application. 5 
 
 If the defendant takes no steps to get rid of the effect of the dis- 
 claimer, he will be forever barred ; because it is matter of record. 6 (a) 
 
 Questions of some nicety arise in suits for foreclosure, and in other 
 suits of a similar description, for establishing equitable claims or de- 
 mands against real or personal estate, as to the right to costs of 
 persons made defendants in consequence of rights or interests which 
 they might have in the estate, subject to those of the plaintiff, so 
 that his title cannot be complete without their co-operation, *but *710 
 which rights or interests they absolutely disclaim. When a de- 
 fendant states in his disclaimer that he never had, and never claimed, 
 any right or interest in the subject-matter of the suit at or after the 
 filing of the bill, he is entitled to be dismissed with costs. 1 
 
 responsive to the bill are irrelevant and imper- 1080, M. R. ; Gabriel v Sturgis, 5 Hare, 07, 100 ; 
 
 tinent. Saltmarsh v. Hockett, 1 Lea, 215. 10 Jur. 215; Teed v. Carruthors, 2 Y. & C. C. 
 
 2 Deacon v. Deacon, 7 Sim. 378, 382; see C. 31, 41; 6 Jur. 987; Benbow v. Da vies, 11 
 
 Hutchinson v. Reed, 1 Hoff. Ch. 315. Beav. 309; Glover v. Rogers, 11 Jur. 1000, M. 
 
 a Ld. Red. 320. R. ; Hipgins v. Frankis, 15 Jur. 277, V C. K. 
 
 4 Sidden v. Lediard, 1 R. & M. 110; see B. ; Vale v. Merideth, 18 Jur. 992, V. C. W.; 
 Ladbroke v. Bleaden, 16 Jur. 630. Ford v. Lord Chesterfield, 16 Beav 516, 520; 
 
 5 Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265, 267. see ennh-a, Buchanan v. Green way, 11 Beav. 
 
 6 Wood v. Taylor, 3 W. R. 321; 3 Eq. Rep. 58. Where disclaiming defendant, a satisfied 
 513, V. C. K. judgment creditor, had not entered up satisfac- 
 
 1 Silcock v. Roynon, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 376; tion, he was not allowed his costs. Thompson 
 7 Jur. 548; Hiorns v. Holtom, 16 Jur. 1077, v. Hudson, 34 Beav. 107. For forms of decree 
 
 (a) Hence he cannot make any claim in v. Campbell, 130 111. 186. So he is afterwards 
 
 the suit, though remaining a party. Wood i\ estopped from setting up title to property which 
 
 Taylor, supra ; Colclough v. Bolger, 2 Molloy, he has disclaimed. Hansell v. Hansell, 44 La. 
 
 455; Hickson v. Mobley, £0 Ga. 314: Sawyer Ann. 548. 
 
 vol. i.— 45 705
 
 710 
 
 DISCLAIMERS. 
 
 Where a defendant simply states that he does not claim any right or 
 interest, he will be dismissed without costs ; 2 but if, before bill filed, 
 he offers to release his claim, or, after bill filed, to release his claim, 
 and consent to the bill being dismissed, as against him, without costs, 
 he will, if the offer be refused, and the plaintiff still retain him as a 
 party to the record, be entitled to be dismissed with his costs, incurred 
 subsequently to the offer. 3 (a) And it seems that the plaintiff is bound 
 to bear the expense of the release. 4 
 
 Where the plaintiff stated in his bill that, before the institution of 
 the suit, he had applied to the defendant to release his claim, but the 
 defendant refused to do so, and the defendant disclaimed and denied 
 that any such application was made to him, and stated that if it had 
 been made, he would have released his interest, he was held entitled 
 to his costs. 5 (b) 
 
 It may be here observed, that in questions of this description, there 
 is no difference between the right of an assignee in bankruptcy and 
 that of the party whose interest he represents. 6 
 
 against disclaiming defendants, in foreclosure 
 suits, see Seton, 395. 
 
 2 Cash v. Belcher, 1 Hare, 310, 312; Tip- 
 ping v. Power, id. 405; Grigg p. Sturgis, 5 
 Hare, 93, 96; 10 Jur. 133; Ohrly v. Jenkins, 
 
 1 De G. & S. 543; 11 Jur. 1001; Gibson v. 
 Nicol, 9 Beav. 403,406; 10 Jur. 419; Ford 
 v. Lord Chesterfield, ubi suprn; Appleton v. 
 Sturgis, 10 W. R. 312, V. C. S. ; Vale v. 
 Merideth, ubi supra ; Furber p. Furber, 30 Beav. 
 523 ; Durham v. Crackles, 8 Jur. N. S. 1174, 
 V. C W. ; Roberts v. Hughes, L. R. 6 Eq. 20. 
 Where the defendant was not content simply 
 to disclaim, but put in an answer and appeared 
 for the purpose of claiming his costs, it was 
 held that he was not entitled to any costs. Max- 
 well v. Wightwick, L. R. 3 Eq. 210. 
 
 3 Ford v. Lord Chesterfield, ubi supra ; Lock 
 v. Lomas, 15 Jur. 162, V. O. K. B.; Talbot v. 
 Kemshead, 4K.& J. 93; Bellamy r. Bricken- 
 den, id. 670; Bradley v. Borlase, 7 W. R. 125, 
 V. C. K.; Ward r.Shakeshaft, 1 Dr. & Sm. 
 269: Dillon v. Ashwin, 10 Jur. N. S. 119; 12 
 W. R. 366, V. C. K.; Ridgway v. Kynnersley, 
 
 2 H. & M. 565; Howkins v. Bennet, id. 567, n.; 
 
 (n) See Day v. Gudgen, 2 Ch. D. 209 ; Lewin 
 v. Jones, 53 L. J. Ch. 1011 ; Clarke v. Toleman, 
 42 id. 23. 
 
 (b) A disclaimer, operating as a release, must 
 be signed by the defendant like a release. It 
 
 706 
 
 Fagg v. James, id. 568, n.: Clarke r. Rawlins, 
 W. N. (1866) 332, V. C. W. ; Maxwell r. 
 Wightwick, id. 379, V. C. W.; but seeGowing 
 r. Mowberry, 9 Jur. N. S. 844; 11 W. R. 851, 
 V. C. S.; Davis v. Whitmore, 28 Beav. 617; 
 6 Jur. N. S. 880. 
 
 < Furber v. Furber, 30 Beav. 523, 525. 
 
 5 Gurney v. Jackson, 1 Sm. & G. 97; 17 
 Jur. 204; see, however, observations of the 
 M. R. on this case, in Ford r. Lord Chester- 
 field, ubi supra. 
 
 6 Grigtc v. Sturgis, 5 Hare, 93, 96; 10 Jur. 
 133; see also Cash v. Belcher. 1 Hare, 310, 312 ; 
 Appleby v. Duke, 1 Phil. 272, 275; 7 Jur. 985; 
 Clarke v. Wilmot, 1 Phil. 276; Staff urth v. 
 Pott, 2 De G. & S. 571. A disclaiming heir- 
 at-law is in the same position as any other 
 disclaiming defendant. Gray v. Adamson, 35 
 Beav. 383. Where the defendant dies after 
 disclaimer, the plaintiff cannot revive on a 
 question of disputed costs. Ridgway t. Kyn- 
 nersley, 2 H. & M. 565. And see as to costs 
 of a disclaiming defendant paid by plaintiff in 
 an administration suit, Jones v. Pickslay, W. 
 N. (1888) 26. 
 
 need not be under oath, or signed by counsel. 
 Dickerson v. Hodges, 43 N. J. Eq. 45. As to 
 treating a disclaimer as a plea, see Edelin v. 
 Lyon (D. C), 21 Wash. L. Rep. 605.
 
 * CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 711 
 
 ANSWERS. 
 
 Section I. — General Nature of Answers. 
 
 The answer of a defendant consists of such statements, material to 
 his case, as he may think it necessary or advisable to set forth [as de- 
 fences to the plaintiff's demand] ; 1 and of his answers to [the discovery 
 sought by the bill] ; 2 or, if he has put in a demurrer or plea, to such 
 discovery as relates to the parts of the bill not covered by the demurrer 
 or plea.* If no interrogatories were filed, the answer was called a volun- 
 tary answer under the new system. 
 
 This twofold character of an answer is peculiar to pleadings in 
 Equity, and is not found even in those that are formed on the same 
 model in the Civil and Ecclesiastical Courts ; the answer which the de- 
 fendant is required to make, upon oath, to the allegation and articles 
 being, in those Courts, a wholly distinct instrument from the responsive 
 allegation which contains the defence. 4 
 
 * Although an answer has, in general, the twofold property * 712 
 above stated, it is seldom possible, in framing one, to keep the 
 
 i See now 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 14, which 
 confines discovery to the interrogatories filed. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 15, 16. An answer, where relief 
 is sought, properly consists of two parts: first 
 of the defence of the defendant to the case 
 made by the bill; and, secondly, of the ex- 
 amination of the defendant on oath as to the 
 facts charged in the bill of which discovery is 
 sought. It combines, therefore, two proceed- 
 ings which, in the Civil Law and Ecclesiastical 
 Courts, were completely separated. In the 
 Civil Law, the pleadings were made up before 
 the Praetor, who afterwards assigned to the 
 parties judices, and it was before these lat- 
 ter that the actor (plaintiff) propounded his 
 positions in the Ubellus articulattts, to which 
 the defendant was required to put in an 
 answer, in the nature of a discovery, Gilb. 
 For. Rom. 90. In the Ecclesiastical Courts also, 
 the answer to the interrogatories for discovery 
 was a wholly distinct instrument from the 
 responsive allegation to the libel embodying 
 the defence. Hare on Disc. 22-3. In a bill in 
 Equity, both of these distinct parts are united 
 in one instrument. And this ambiguity in the 
 woid" answer," importing, as it does, a double 
 sense and office, has sometimes, says Judge 
 Story, led to erroneous decisions, and to no 
 small confusion of language. Story, Eq. PI. 
 
 § 850; Smith v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co. 2 
 Tenn. Ch. 600; Beech v. Haynes, 1 Tenn. Ch. 
 574. 
 
 3 An answer is the most usual method of 
 defence to a bill in Chancery. It may be put 
 in to the whole bill, or to such parts of it as 
 are not covered by plea or demurrer. As it 
 is capable of embracing more circumstances 
 than a plea, it may for t' is reason be used with 
 much greater propriety in cases where the de- 
 fendant is not anxious to prevent a discovery, 
 although the plea might be a complete bar. 
 But where, by introducing additional circum- 
 stances, he has a good opportunity of exhibit- 
 ing his case in a more favorable light, the 
 answer is the best modo of defence. 1 Barb. 
 Ch. Pr. 130; see Youle v. Richards, Saxton 
 (N. J.), 534. When a defendant makes his 
 defence by answer, he must set up all the 
 various grounds of defence upon which lie in- 
 tends to rely. Warren v. Warren, 30 Vt. 530. 
 
 For forms of answer, see Vol. III. 
 
 4 Hare on Disc. 223 ; 3 Bla. Com. 100. A 
 defendant cannot pray anything in his answer 
 but to be dismissed the Court. Millar r. Greg- 
 ory, 16 X. J. Eq. 274; infra, p. 1550. As to 
 counterclaim and set-off under the present Eng- 
 lish practice, tee post, p. 1548, n. 
 
 707
 
 * 713 .ANSWERS. 
 
 parts separate from each other ; though, when it is practicable to do so, 
 such a course is generally desirable. It is, however, of great impor- 
 tance to the pleader, in preparing an answer, to bear in mind that, 
 besides answering the plaintiff's case as made by the bill, he should 
 state to the Court, upon the answer, all the circumstances of which 
 the defendant intends to avail himself by way of defence ; for a de- 
 fendant ought to apprise the plaintiff, by his answer, of the nature 
 of the case he intends to set up, and that, too, in a clear, unambig- 
 uous manner ; and, in strictness, he cannot avail himself of any matter 
 in defence which is not stated in his answer, even though it should 
 appear in his evidence. 1 (a) The last-mentioned rule was formerly, 
 when an answer was required in every case, strictly enforced. Under 
 the present practice, however, by which, if the defendant has not been 
 required to answer, and has not answered, he will be considered to 
 have traversed the case made by the bill, 2 the rule has been much 
 relaxed in cases where no answer has been required, and none has 
 been put in. 
 
 In such a case, the defendant has been permitted to set up the 
 Statutes of Frauds, 3 and of Limitations, 4 by his evidence, and orally 
 at the hearing, and not been compelled to put in a voluntary answer 
 for that purpose. Where, however, he had been interrogated, it was 
 held, that he ought to have set up the defence of being a purchaser 
 for valuable consideration without notice, by his answer, and he was 
 not allowed to raise it at the hearing. 5 Where the facts were put in 
 issue and proved, a defence was allowed, although it was not distinctly 
 raised on the pleadings. 6 
 
 A defendant is not bound to state, upon his answer, the conclusions 
 in Law which he intends to deduce from the facts he has set out ; 7 that, 
 as has been before stated, 8 would be contrary to the principles of good 
 pleading. Indeed, the most correct method of pleading is, merely to 
 state the facts intended to be proved, and to leave the inference of Law 
 to be drawn from them upon the argument of the case ; but the estab- 
 lished rule is, that if the defendant states upon his answer certain facts 
 as evidence of a particular case, which he represents to be the con- 
 * 713 sequence of those * facts, and upon which he rests his defence, 
 he will not be permitted afterwards to make use of the same facts, 
 
 1 Stanley v. Robinson. 1 R. & M. 527, 529; Snead v. Green, 8 Jur. N. S. 4; contra, Holding 
 Harrison v. Borwell, 10 Sim. 382; 4 Jur. 245 ; v. Barton. 1 Sm. & G. App. 25. 
 
 Hodgson v. Thornton. 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 228, pi. 5 Phillips v. Phillips, 3 Giff. 200; 7 Jur. 
 
 5; Burnham v. Dallin<r, 18 N. J. Eq. 132 ; N. S. 1094; 8 id. 145; 10 W. R. 236, L. C. 
 Moors v. Moors, 17 N. H. 481. 6 Ormes v. Beadel, 2 De G. F. & J. 333 ; 6 
 
 2 15 & 16 Vic. e. 86, § 26. Jur. N. S. 1103, 1104. 
 
 3 Lincoln o. Wright, 4 De G. & J. 16; 5 Jur. » Ibid. 
 
 N. S. 1142; Jackson v. Oglander, 2 H. & M. 8 Ante, p. 371. So of denials of legal con- 
 
 465, elusions. Gainer v. Russ, 20 Fla. 157. 
 
 < Green v. Snead, 30 Beav. 231 ; S. C. nom. 
 
 (a) The rule that objection for want of juris- v. Central Bank. 7 111. App. 426; or where an 
 
 diction cannot be made after answer d"es not adequate le^al remedy is insisted upon after an 
 
 apply where the jurisdiction depends on dis- an«wer is withdrawn by leave. Hindman v. 
 
 coven', and this fails. United States Ins. Co. Aledo, 6 111. App. 436. 
 708 

 
 GENERAL NATURE OF ANSWERS. * 713 
 
 for the purpose of establishing a different defence from that to which, 
 by his answer, he has drawn the plaintiff's attention. 1 
 
 A defendant may, by his answer, set up any number of defences, as 
 the consequence of the same state of facts, which his case will allow, 2 
 or the ingenuity of his legal advisers may suggest ; thus, in setting up 
 an immemorial payment in lieu of tithes, a defendant has been allowed 
 to rely upon it, either as a modus, or as a composition real existing from 
 time immemorial, or as a composition undetermined by notice. 8 In none 
 of these cases were any facts stated in the answers which were incon- 
 sistent with any of the defences set up, and the evidence to prove them 
 was, in either case, the same. 
 
 Although a defendant may be permitted to set up, by his answer, 
 several defences as the consequence of the same state of facts, or of 
 facts which are consistent with each other, a defendant cannot insist 
 upon two defences which are inconsistent with each other, or are the 
 consequence of inconsistent facts. 4 (a) And, in the application of this 
 rule, it makes no difference whether the inconsistent defences are each 
 substantially relied upon, or are set up in the alternative ; " that answer 
 is bad which either contains inconsistent defences, or an alternative of 
 inconsistent defences." 5 Thus, although a defendant, in a tithe suit, 
 might set up a payment, either as a modus, or as a composition real 
 existing from time immemorial, he could not set up the same payment, 
 either as a modus or as a composition real not alleged to be immemorial. 6 
 
 From the cases just cited it is to be collected, that where a defendant 
 sets up, by his answer, two inconsistent defences, the result will be to 
 deprive him of the benefit of either, and to entitle the plaintiff to a de- 
 cree. 7 Sometimes, indeed, the Court will, where, from redundant expres- 
 sions or other verbal inaccuracy, a defence has been rendered inconsistent, 
 
 1 Bennett v. Neale, Wightw. 324. the bill, and set up distinct defences, so they 
 
 2 Story, Eq. PI, § 851. The defendant may be not wholly inconsistent with such denial, 
 set up, in his answer, matters which have Hopper v. Hopper, 11 Paige, 46. 
 
 occurred since the filing of the bill. Lyons v. 5 Per Alderson B. in 1 Y. & C. Ex. 160. 
 
 Brooks. 2 Edw. Ch. 110. 6 j esU s College r. Gibhs, 1 Y. & C. Ex 145, 
 
 3 Atkyns v. Lord Willoughby de Brooke, 2 160 ; and see Leech v. Bailey, 6 Price, 504. 
 Anst. 397 ; Atkins v. Hatton, id. 386 ; Wolley * But see Nagle v. Edwards, 3 Anst. 702, 
 t'. Brownhill, M'Lel. 317; Bishop v. Chichester, and the observations upon that case, in Jesus 
 3 Gwill. 1316. College v. Gibbs, 1Y.&C Ex. 163. 
 
 4 A defendant may both den}' the charges in 
 
 ('() Ozark Land Co. v. Leonard, 24 Fed. Rep. raque v. Siter, 4 English, 545; Brown v. Brown, 
 660; Stone v. Moore, 26 111. 105; Scanlan v. 10 Yerger, 84; Stevens v. Post, 12 N. J. Eq. 
 Scanlan, 134 111.630; Crowder v. Searcy, 103 408. Soof an answer under oath respecting mat- 
 Mo. 97. Under Texas Rev. Stats. § 1262, al- ters of which the defendant, it is evident, could 
 lowing a defendant to plead as many distinct not know personally. Fryrear v. Lawrence, 5 
 matters of law or fact as he thinks necessary, his Gilman, 325; Lawrence v. Lawrence, 21 N.J. 
 answer may embrace a general demurrer. Alii- Eq. 317; Riegel v. American Life Ins. Co. 153 
 ance Milling Co. v. Eaton, 23 S.W. Rep. 455. An Penn. St. 134; Garrow v. Carpenter, 1 Porter, 
 iinswer in Equity, which is contradictory or im- 359. If no exception is taken on account of 
 probable in itself, does not require two witnesses inconsistent defences, one of which is established 
 to overcome it, when made under oath. Post, and the other found to be untrue, a decree will 
 p 846, note; East India Co v. Donald, 9 Ves. not be reversed. Scanlan v. Scanlan, 134 III 
 275 ; Cunningham v. Freeborn, 3 Paige, 557 ; Bar- 630. 
 
 709
 
 * 714 ANSWERS. 
 
 though evidently not intended to be so, either reject the redun- 
 
 * 714 dant expressions as surplusage, 8 or direct * them to be struck 
 
 out ; * such indulgence, however, is confined to cases of verbal 
 inaccuracy only, which would not have embarrassed the plaintiff in the 
 conduct of his case. 
 
 Although a defendant cannot, by his answer, set up, in opposition to 
 the plaintiff's title, two inconsistent defences in the alternative, he will 
 not be precluded from denying the plaintiff's general title, and also insist- 
 ing that, in case the plaintiff establishes his title, he is precluded from 
 recovering by some other circumstance which would equally serve to 
 preclude him, or any other person in whom the title might be actually 
 vested. Thus, in a tithe suit, the defendant might have denied the 
 plaintiff's title as rector or vicar, and at the same time have set up a 
 modus. 2 
 
 In stating a defendant's case, it is only necessary to use such a degree 
 of certainty as will inform the plaintiff of the nature of the case to be 
 made against him ; 8 it is not requisite that the same degree of accuracy 
 should be observed in an answer as is required in a bill. 
 
 If the defence which can be made to a bill consists of a variety of 
 circumstances, so that it is not proper to be offered by way of plea, or 
 if it is doubtful whether a plea will hold, the defendant may set forth 
 the whole by way of answer, and pray the same benefit of so much as 
 goes in bar, as if it had been pleaded to the bill. 4 Thus, a defendant 
 insisting upon the benefit of the Statute of Limitations by way of 
 answer, may, at the hearing, have the like benefit of the statute as if he 
 had pleaded it. 5 (a) So also, if a defendant can offer a matter of plea 
 which would be a complete bar, but has no reason to protect himself 
 from any discovery sought by the bill, and can offer circumstances 
 which he conceives to be favorable to his case, and which he could not 
 offer together with a plea, he may set forth the whole matter in the 
 same manner. 6 Thus, if a purchaser, for a valuable consideration, clear 
 of all charges of fraud or notice, can offer additional circumstances in 
 
 8 Ellis v. Saul, 1 Anst. 332, 341 ; .Tenkinson answer, but it is otherwise with the defence that 
 
 v. Royston. 5 Price, 495; see also Uhthoff v. the claim is stale, which may be insisted ou 
 
 Lord Huntingfield 1 Price, 237. without a foundation by averment in the an- 
 
 » Jesus College' v. Gibbs, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 145, swer. Sullivan v. Portland &c. R. Co. 94 U. S. 
 
 ig-r 806. And see as to effect of answer insisting 
 
 2 Carte r Ball, 3 Atk. 496, 499. on the Statute of Frauds, Jackson v. Oglander, 
 
 8 See Cummings v. Coleman, 7 Rich. Eq. 2 H. & M. 465. 
 
 (S. C.) 509. 6 But it is said by Mr. Justice Story, that 
 
 * Ld Red. 308. " it is very far from being generally true, as is 
 
 5 Norton v. Turvill, 2 P. Wins. 144; Ruck- sometimes alleged in the books, that a defend- 
 
 man v. Decker, 23 N. J. Eq. 283. The same ant may, by answer, avail himself of, and in- 
 
 strictness is not requisite in an answer to a bill sist upon, every ground of defence, which he 
 
 in Equity, where the Statute of Limitations is could use by way of demurrer, or of plea, to 
 
 relied on as a defence, as in a plea. Maury the bill." Story, Eq. PI. § 847, and notes; 
 
 r. Mason, 8 Porter, 213. The defence of the Portarlington v. Soulby, 7 Sim. 28. 
 Statute of Limitations must be made by plea or 
 
 (a) See Pierce ».McClellan, 93 111. 245. The Co. 153 Mass. 456; or at the hearing Credit 
 
 defence of laches is not waived by withdrawing Co. v. Arkansas &c. R. Co. 15 Fed. Rep. 46; 
 
 a demurrer, but may be afterwards set up in the see Green v. Terwilliger, 56 id. 384. 
 answer, Snow r. Boston Blank-Book Manuf. 
 
 710
 
 GENERAL NATURE OP ANSWERS. * 715 
 
 his favor which he cannot set forth by way of plea, or of answer to 
 support a plea, as the expending a considerable sum of money in improve- 
 ments with the knowledge of the plaintiff, it may be more prudeut to 
 set out the whole by way of answer, than to rely on the single 
 defence * by way of plea ; unless it is material to prevent dis- * 715 
 closure of any circumstance attending his title. 1 
 
 Where the same benefit has been claimed, by answer, that the defend- 
 ant would have been entitled to if he had demurred to the bill, or 
 pleaded the matter, alleged in his answer, in bar, it is only at the hear- 
 ing of the cause that any such benefit can be insisted upon 5 and then 
 the defendant will, in general, be entitled to all the same advantage 
 of this mode of defence that he would have had if he had adopted 
 the more concise mode of defence, by demurring or pleading. 2 In the 
 case, however, of multifariousness, if the defendant does not take the 
 objection in limine, the Court, considering the mischief as already 
 incurred, will not, except in a special case, allow it to prevail at the 
 hearing : although it may protect the defendant from the costs incurred, 
 if it should appear that he had been improperly subjected to them. 3 (a) 
 
 We now come to the consideration of the manner in which the inter- 
 rogatories (if any) must be answered. 
 
 Under the old practice of the Court, it was necessary that the defend- 
 ant should answer all the statements and charges in the bill, whether 
 specially interrogated thereto or not ; but he was not bound to answer 
 any interrogatories which were not founded upon the statements or 
 charges contained in the bill: 4 though, if he did so, he thereby put 
 
 1 Ld. Red. 309. See Fuller v. Kuapp, 24 same. Mechanics' Bank v. Levy, 3 Paige, 60G; 
 Fed. Rep. 100. A party setting up a legal Newhall v. Hobbs, 3 Cush. 274, 277. The gen- 
 right, in his answer to a bill in Equity, is not eral interrogatory or request in a bill "that the 
 bound to deny notice of a subsequent lien or defendant may full answer make, to all and 
 interes', unless the bill alleges notice. King singular the premises, fully and particularly, 
 v. McVickar, 3 Sandf. Ch. l!)2. as though the same were repeated, and he spe- 
 
 2 Wray c. Hutchinson, 2 M. & K. 235, 238, cially interrogated," &c., is sufficient to entitle 
 242; see also Milligan r. Mitchell, 1 M. & C. the plaintiff to a full disclosure of the whole 
 433, 447; Mulloy v. Paul, 2 Tenn. Ch. 155; subject-matter of the bill, equally as if he had 
 Hume v Commercial Bank, 1 Lea, 220; Water- specially interrogate'! the defendant to every 
 man v. Buck, 63 Vt. 544. fact stated in the bill, with all the material cir- 
 
 8 Benson v. Hadtield, 4 Hare, 32, 39; Cashell cumstancps. Method. Epis. Church r. Jaque«, 
 
 v. Kelley, 2 Dr. & War. 181; Raffety r. King, 1 John. Ch. 65, 75, 76; 17 John. 548; Neale v. 
 
 1 Keen, 601, 609; and see ante, p. 346. Hagthorp, 3 Bland, 551. Special interrogatories 
 
 4 Jerrard v. Saunders, 2 Ves. Jr. 454, 458; in a bill seem not to be absolutely necessary. 
 
 Blaisdell v. Bowers, 40 Vt. 126.130; Miller v. Story, Eq. PI. §38; Meth. Epis. Church v. 
 
 Saunders, 17 Ga. 92; Grim v. Wheeler, 3 Edw. Jaques, 1 John. Ch. 65; Gleaves v. Morrow, 2 
 
 Ch. 334; Mechanics' Bank v. Levy, 3 Paige, Tenn. Ch. 597. See the 40th Equity Rule ol 
 
 606; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 36, 37. It is sufficient, the U. S. Courts (since repealed), post. Vol. Ill : 
 
 however, if the interrogatory is founded upon " A defendant shall not be bound to answer any 
 
 a statement in the bill, which is inserted there- statement or charge in the bill, unless specially 
 
 in merel}' as evidence in support of the main and particularly interrogated thereto, ami a 
 
 charges. Mechanics' Bank v. Lew, 3 Paifje, defendant shall not be bound to answer any 
 
 606. Where a fact is stated in a bill bv way interrogatory in the bill, except those interrcg- 
 
 of recital merely, without any interrogatory atones which such defendant is required to 
 
 calling for an answer, as to that fact, the defend- answer," &c. 
 ant is not bound either to admit or to denv the 
 
 (a) The interrogatories of the bill must be cannot orally assign reasons for not answering 
 met by the defendant's pleading; his counsel them. Slater v. Banwell, 50 Fed. Rep. 150. 
 
 711
 
 * 716 ANSWERS. 
 
 them in issue. Under the later practice, a defendant might be required 
 to answer any interrogatories which were pertinent to the case made by 
 
 the bill, although not founded on specific charges or statements 
 *716 in the * bill ; 1 but he was not bound to answer any statement or 
 
 charge in the bill, unless specially and particularly interrogated 
 thereto; nor was he bound to answer any of the interrogatories except 
 those which he was required to answer. 2 A defendant is not, however, 
 prohibited from answering any statement, charge, or interrogatory which 
 he may consider it necessary to his defence to answer ; and he is left 
 at complete liberty, in this respect, to act in such manner as may be 
 thought advisable : subject to the restriction that if he answer any state- 
 ment or charge in the bill to which he is not interrogated, only by 
 stating his ignorance of the matter so stated or charged, such answer 
 will be deemed impertinent. 3 
 
 The plaintiff's right to discovery is not extended, by the present 
 practice; so that all the objections which could formerly have been 
 urged by the defendant, to protect himself from a discovery of any por- 
 tion of the matter of the bill, can now be urged against a discovery of 
 that concerning which the defendant is specially interrogated ; and 
 there have always existed certain special reasons upon which the 
 defendant might object to the discovery sought by the plaintiff : either 
 because the discovery might subject him to pains and penalties, or to a 
 forfeiture, or to something in the nature of a forfeiture ; 4 or because 
 it was immaterial to the relief prayed ; 5 or because it might lead to a 
 disclosure of matter, the subject of professional confidence ; 6 or of the 
 defendant's own title, in cases where there is not a sufficient privity 
 between him and the plaintiff to warrant the latter in requiring a dis- 
 closure of it. 7 In all these cases, although, as we have seen, the defend- 
 ant may protect himself from discovery by plea or demurrer, yet he 
 has always been permitted to decline, by his answer, giving the objec- 
 tionable discovery, and to state, in that form, the grounds upon which 
 he claims protection ; and he still retains the same privilege. 8 He 
 
 1 Ante, p. 483; Perry t. Turpin, Kay App. 6 Ante, p. 570. 
 
 49; Mansellr. Feeney, 2 J. & H. 313, 318; Law 1 Ante, p. 579; and see Cooke v. Turner, 14 
 
 v. London Indisputable Society, 10 Hare App. Sim. 218, 221 ; 8 Jur. 703. The plaintiff is not 
 
 20; Barnard v. Hunter, 1 Jur. N. S. 10(55, V. entitled to discovery of the defendant's case; 
 
 C. S.; Marsh v. Keith, 1 Dr. & Sm. 342; Hud- ante, pp. 579, 580, notes; Hoffman v. Postil), 
 
 son v. Grenfell, 3 Giff. 388; 8 Jur. N. S. 878; L. R. 4 Ch. 673. Allegations of fraud in a bill 
 
 McGarrel r. Moon, L. R. 10 Eq. 22. must be answered, and a demurrer to a bill, con- 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XV. 3. tainit'g such allegations and strong circum- 
 8 Cons. Ord. XV. 3; see Tread well r. Cleave- stances of equity, must be overruled. Burnley v. 
 
 land, McLean, 283. The above order has been Jeffersonville, 3 McLean, 336. Such allegations 
 
 adopted by the Supreme Court of the United must be denied in the plea as well as in the an- 
 
 States. See 20th Equity Rule of the United swer. Lewis v. Baird, 3 McLean, 56. 
 
 States Courts, January Term, 1842. 8 A defendant may in some cases answer in 
 
 4 Ante, p. 562. But the defendant cannot part, and by his answer state reasons why lie 
 
 object to answer, if the period fixed by law should not be compelled to make further an- 
 
 within which he could be prosecuted for the swer. Hunt r. Gookin, 6 Vt. 462; Adams v. 
 
 offence or the forfeiture has elapsed before the Fisher, 3 M. & C. 526; Cuyler v. Bogi:rt, 3 
 
 answer is filed. Dwinal v. Smith, 25 Maine, Paige, 168; see Weisman .r. Minine Co. 4 Jones 
 
 379; Story, Eq. PI. § 589; ante, pp. 584, 595, Eq. 112. 
 
 and notes. But if a defendant rest himself upon a fact, 
 
 * Ante, p. 570. as an objection to further discovery, it ought to 
 
 712
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF ANSWERS. * 717 
 
 must, however, swear to his belief in the validity * of such * 717 
 grounds ; 1 and the Court must be satisfied, from the circum- 
 stances of the case, and the nature of the discovery which he is called 
 upon to give, that the case falls within the above-mentioned grounds 
 of objection. 2 (a) 
 
 The principle upon which the Court proceeds, in exempting a defend- 
 ant from a discovery under any of the above circumstances, has been 
 fully discussed, in considering the grounds upon which a defendant, 
 although he does not object to the relief, provided the plaintiff makes 
 out a case which may entitle him to it, may demur to the discovery 
 sought ; it is only necessary, therefore, to repeat in this place what has 
 been before stated, — that if a defendant objects to any particular dis- 
 covery, upon any of the grounds above stated, he may, even though the 
 grounds upon which he may object appear upon the bill, decline making 
 such discovery, by submission in his answer. 3 
 
 It may be observed here, that the only difference occasioned by this 
 method of objecting to the discovery is, that if the objection be taken 
 by demurrer or plea, the validity of it is at once decided by the Court, 
 upon argument of the plea or demurrer; whereas, if the objection be 
 taken by answer, the validity of it can only come before the Court in 
 the form of exceptions to the answer, which is certainly a more cir- 
 cuitous and expensive mode of trying the question than that afforded 
 by demurring. It has, however, been held, that where the ground of 
 objection is, that the discovery would render the defendant liable to 
 pains and penalties, the proper course is to submit the point by answer: 
 because, by demurring, the defendant admits the facts to be true. 4 
 
 It is a general rule, that the defendant is only required to answer to 
 those points which are necessary to enable the Court to make a decree 
 against him ; 5 and the objection arising from want of materiality is one 
 that the defendant has always been allowed to raise by answer. 6 
 
 be such a fact, as, if true, would at once be a 12 W. R. 561, L. J.T. ; Ex parte Reynolds, 20 
 
 clear, decided, and inevitable bar to the plain- Ch. D. 294; Lamb v. Munster, 10 Q. B. D. 110; 
 
 tiff's demand. Me hod. Epis. Church v. Jaques, Taylor on Evid. § 1311. 
 
 1 John. Ch. 65. If it clearly appears that the » Ante, p. 582; Ld. Red. 200, 307. 
 
 case is not of Equity cognizance, the answer, 4 Honey wood v. Sel win, 3 Atk. 276; see Att.- 
 
 required only for the purposes of the particular Gen. v. Lucas, 2 Hare, 566, 569; 7 Jur. 1080; 
 
 suit, would avail nothing, and is not necessary. Earl of Lichfield v. Bond, 6 Beav. 88, 93; 7 Jur. 
 
 Morton v. Grenada Academies, 8 Sin. & M. 209. 
 
 773. 5 Per Sir Thomas Plumer V. C. in Agar v. 
 
 i Scott v. Miller (No 2), John. 328; 5 Jur. Regent's Canal Co. G. Coop. 212, 2U: see also 
 
 N. S. 858; see Balguy v. Broadhurst, 1 Sim. Wood v. Hitchings, 3 Beav. 504, 510; Moore 
 
 N. S. Ill; The Mary, L. R. 2 A. & E. 319; v. Craven, W. N. (1870) 13. 
 Kennedy v. Lyell, 23 Ch. D. 387; 27 Ch. D. 1. 6 The defendant is not bound to answer any 
 
 2 Sidebottom v. Adkins, 3 Jur. N. S. 631; 5 allegations in the plaintiff's bill, which are not 
 
 W. K. 743, V. C. S.; see also Reg. v. Boyes. 1 material to be answered. Utica Ins. Co. v. 
 
 B. & S. 311; 7 Jur. N. S. 1158; Bunn v. Bunn, Lynch, 3 Paige, 210; Butler v. Cotting, 1 Root, 
 
 (a) It is not the practice of the Court of he is not a party to the suit. See ante, p. 68, 
 
 Chancery to allow interrogatories to be admin- note (a). A corporation, though not compell- 
 
 istered to infant plaintiffs or defendants. Mayor ahle to answer under oath, must answer fully. 
 
 v. Collins, 24 Q. B. D. 361; Redfern v. Redfern, Gamewell Fire-Alarm Tel. Co. v. Mayor, 31 
 
 [1891] P. 139. The guardian ad litem of an Fed. Rep. 312. 
 infant cannot be required to give discovery, as 
 
 713
 
 * 719 ANSWERS. 
 
 * 718 * The application of this rule has been before discussed, 
 
 in treating of demurrers to discovery, on the ground of want 
 of materiality. 1 It may not be useless, however, in addition to the 
 instances already referred to, to mention one or two cases where the 
 defendant's right to exempt himself from answering to such parts 
 of the bill has been recognized by the Court, upon exceptions. Where 
 a bill was filed by a person claiming under the limitations of a set- 
 tlement, to set aside an appointment, by which his title was defeated, 
 on the ground of fraud, and upon an answer being put in deny- 
 ing the fraud, the plaintiff amended his bill, by inserting certain 
 inquiries as to the manner in which the appointment was attested, 
 in order to show that it was not executed in the manner required by the 
 settlement, which inquiries the defendant, by his answer, declined an- 
 swering, upon the question coming before the Court, it was held that 
 the defendant was not bound to answer the interrogatories in the 
 amended bill ; because the plaintiff, having by his bill set up a case of 
 fraud, the fact, whether the appointment was executed in conformity 
 with the power or not, was immaterial to the case so set up. 2 Upon the 
 same principle, the Court holds that, where a bill is filed by a creditor 
 or legatee, or other person claiming a definite sum out of the personal 
 estate of a deceased person, against an executor or administrator, if the 
 defendant admits assets in his hands sufficient to answer the plaintiff's 
 demands, he need not set out an account of the estate, 8 or set out a 
 schedule of the documents in his possession relating to the estate ; 4 
 because the admission by the defendant that he has assets in his hands 
 to answer the plaintiff's demands, is sufficient to give the plaintiff all the 
 relief he can require, and any discovery would be useless and irrelevant. 5 
 So, also, the Court refused to compel discovery, where the execu- 
 * 719 tor of an executor admitted assets of the original * testator came 
 to the hands of his testator ; * and so, discovery was not enforced 
 where, in a suit by the holder of a policy, the directors of an insurance 
 society admitted assets sufficient to pay the claims on the policy. 2 
 
 The Court will not, in general, allow the circumstance of a plaintiff 
 having a claim upon a defendant, to be used for the purpose of enabling 
 
 310; Davis r. Mapes, 2 Paige, 105 ; Hagthorp of the parties. A certain latitude must always 
 
 r Hook 1 Gill & J. 270; Mechanics' Bank v. be allowed in seeking discovery." Sir C. J. 
 
 Lew, 3 Paige, 656; Hardeman v. Harris. 7 How. Selwyn L. J. in Hoffmann v. Postill, L R. 4 Ch. 
 
 (U.*S.) 726; Hoffmann e. Postill, L. R. 4 Ch. 673, 678. See Bidder v. Bridges, 29 Ch. D. 29. 
 
 673. But see Hogencamp v. Ackerman, 10 N. 1 Ante, p. 570. 
 
 J En. 267 ; Wootten v. Burch, 2 Md. Ch. Dec. 2 Codrington v. Codrington, 3 Sim. 519, 524. 
 
 190. A defendant cannot be called upon to an- a Agar r. Regent's Canal Co. ubi supra. 
 
 sweramere arithmetical proposition. Mclntyre * Forbes v. Tanner, 9 Jur. N. S. 45o; 11 W. 
 
 V. Trustees of Union College, 6 Paige, 239. As R. 414, V. C. K. M m i •„ 
 
 to this point of materiality and the tests of it, 5 Pullen v. Smith, 5 Ves. 21, 23. To a bill 
 
 see Story Eq. PI. §§ 853. 853 a, 853 6, 853 c; for discovery of assets and relief, an answer 
 
 Kuvpers v. Reformed Dutch Church, 6 Paige, controverting the claim, without answering as 
 
 570 * to the assets, is insufficient. Carneal v. v\ ilsor, 
 
 "It must be borne in mind that it is almost 3 Litt. 80. 
 
 impossible for the Court, in a preliminary stage » Lander r. Weston, 13 Jur. 877, V. C. E. 
 
 of the proceedings, to determine what proposi- 2 Prichard v. Murray, 12 Jur. 616, V. C E. 
 tions will be material to the case of one or other 
 
 714
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF ANSWERS. * 720 
 
 the plaintiff to investigate all the private affairs of the defendant ; 8 
 thus, a vendor, in a bill for specific performance, cannot interrogate the 
 vendee as to his property, 4 even though the bill should charge that the 
 defendant was insolvent. 5 In order to entitle a plaintiff to an answer 
 to such an inquiry, he must show some specific lien upon the defend- 
 ant's property, and pray some relief respecting it ; 6 and the Court will 
 not, even then, compel the defendant to make such discovery, where the 
 interest which the plaintiff may have in it is very remote in its bearings 
 upon the real point in issue, and would be an oppressive inquisition. 7 
 
 The above cases, and those before cited, point out in what instances 
 the defendant may decline to make a particular discovery, when it is 
 irrelevant to the general scope and object of the bill. A discovery may, 
 however, be material to the plaintiff's general case, if made by one of 
 the defendants, which would be wholly irrelevant if made by another : 
 in such cases, the defendant from whom the discovery would be imma- 
 terial, is not obliged to make it ; and, in general, a defendant is only 
 obliged to answer such of the interrogatories as are necessary to en- 
 able the plaintiff to obtain a complete decree against him individually. 
 Where, however, the defendant is involved in the whole case, and in 
 that sense relief is asked against him, he must answer, though the 
 interrogatory might seem to be immaterial to the relief asked against 
 him. 8 
 
 With reference to the objection of immateriality, it must be under- 
 stood that the defendant is only required to answer as to matters which 
 are well pleaded ; that is, to the facts stated and charged. To matters 
 of law, or inferences of law drawn from the facts, he need not 
 answer. 9 Thus, a defendant must answer * whether a will, exe- * 720 
 cuted before the Wills Act, 1 was published by the testator in the 
 presence of three witnesses : but he need not answer to an interrogatory 
 requiring him to say whether the publication was such as by law is re- 
 quired to pass freeholds by devise. Sometimes a defendant, instead of 
 answering such interrogatories, submits the point to the judgment of the 
 Court : but it is not necessary to do so. 
 
 All the objections to discovery that have hitherto been considered, 
 are of a kind that the defendant has always been allowed to raise by 
 answer, upon the principle that the Court does not oblige a defendant 
 to answer such questions, even when the right to relief is admitted ; but 
 where these objections do not apply, it must be remembered that 
 ,l there is no principle more clearly established in the Court than this, — 
 
 3 See Mayer v. Galluchat. 6 Rich. Eq. (S. 8 Marsh v. Keith, 1 Dr. & Sm. 342; 6 .Ttir. 
 
 Q\ i. N. S. 1182. On the subject of immateriality, 
 
 * Francis v. Wigzell, 1 Mad. 258, 260. see also Bleckley v. Rvmer. 4 Drew. 248; New- 
 
 5 See Small v. Attwood, as reported ill Wig- ton ?•. Dimes, 3 Jur. N. S. 583, V. C. W. 
 
 ram on Disc. 168. 9 Story, Eq. PI. § 846. In determining 
 
 6 Francis v. Wigze'l, ubi supra ; Verdier v. whether a question is one of fact, and, tliere- 
 Foster, 4 Rich. Eq. 227; Creswell v. Smith, 2 fore, to be answered, it makes no difference 
 Tenn. Oh. 416. t' ,at ■' ' s as ^ed with reference to a written 
 
 7 Wieram on Disc. 165 ; Dos Santos v. document. Hoffmann v. Postill, L. R. 4 Ch. 
 Frietas, cited ibid.; Webster v. Threlfall, 2 S. 673. 
 
 & S 190, 193; see also Janson v. Solarte, 2 Y. U Will. IV. & 1 Vic. c. 26. 
 
 & C. Kx. 132, 136. 
 
 715
 
 * 720 
 
 ANSWERS. 
 
 that, when. a party answers, he is bound to answer fully ; " "and for this, 
 among other reasons, that if the defence which a party sets up by his an- 
 swer should be decided against him, it is of the utmost importance that 
 all consequential matters which are material for the purpose of the de- 
 cree, should receive an answer." 2 (a) 
 
 This rule is applicable to all cases where the defence intended to be 
 set up by the defendant extends to the entire subject of the suit : such, 
 for instance, as that the plaintiff has no right to equitable relief — or 
 
 2 Per Lord Lvndhurst, in Lancaster v. Evors, 
 1 Phil. 351, 352; 8 Jur. 133; Hare on Disc. 255, 
 256; Thorpe v. Macauley, 5 Mad. 218, 229; 
 Faulder»>. Stuart, 11 Ves. 2U6, 301 ; Mazarredo 
 v. Maitland, 3 Mad. 66, TO; Swinbome v. Nel- 
 son, 16 Beav. 416; Potter v. Waller, 2 DeG. & 
 S. 410; Ambler, ed. Blunt, 353, (n); Reade v. 
 Woodrooffe, 21 Beav. 421; Leigh v. Birch, 32 
 Beav. 399 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 1265; Swabey v. Sutton, 
 1 H. & M. 514; 9 Jur. N. S. 1321 ; Phillips v. 
 Prevost, 4 John. Ch. 205; Whitney v. Belden, 1 
 Edw. Ch. 386; Ogden r. Ogden/l Bland, 288; 
 Kuypers v. Ref. Dutch Church, 6 Paige, 570; 
 Salmon v. Claggett, 3 Bland, 125; Cuyler v. 
 Bogert, 3 Paige, 386; Hagthorp v. Hook, 1 Gill 
 & J. 270; Murray v. Coster, 4 Cowen, 640; 
 Newhall v. Hobbs, 3 Cush. 274, 277 ; Hill v. 
 Crary, 2 English, 536; Utica Ins Co. v. Lynch, 
 3 Paige, 210 ; Mansfield v. Gambril, 1 Gill & J. 
 503. The party submitting to answer, must 
 answer the whole of the statements and charges 
 in the bill, and all the interrogatories properly 
 founded upon them, at least, so far as they are 
 necessary to enable the plaintiff to have a com- 
 plete decree against him in case he succeeds in 
 
 (a) See Armstrong v. Crocker. 10 Gray, 269; 
 Pace v. Bartles, 45 N. J. Eq. 371; Anderson 
 v. Kissam 28 Fed. Rep. 900; Langdell, Eq. PI. 
 (2d ed.) § 70. When the discovery sought is 
 vexatiously minute, exceptions to the answer 
 for insufficiency will be discouraged. Elmer v. 
 Creasy, L. R. 9 Ch. 69 ; West of England Bank 
 v. Nickolls, 6Ch. D. 613; Grumbrecht v. Parry, 
 49 L. T. 570; Dixon v. Frazer, L. R.2 Eq. 497; 
 Shropshire Union Ry. Co. 24 Ch. D. 1 10. Full 
 accounts of an extensive business or partner- 
 ship will not be required, whpn clearly oppres- 
 sive or irrelevant. Wier v. Tucker, L. R. 14 
 Eq. 25; Heugh r. Garrett, 44 L.J. Ch. 305; 
 Ashworth v. Roberts, 45 Ch. D. 623. An 
 answer was held sufficient where a further and 
 better answer could not be given without dis- 
 closing the contents of privileged reports from 
 the defendants' servants which the defendants 
 were not bound to disclose. London, Tilbury & 
 S. Ry. Co. v. Kirk, 51 L. T. 599 ; see Bolckowfl. 
 Fisher. 10 Q. B. D. 161; Rasbotham v. Shrop- 
 shire Union Rv. Co. 24 Ch. D 110; Cayley v. 
 Sandycroft Brick Co. 33 W. R. 577. So the dis- 
 closure of hook* or correspondence to rivals in 
 trade will be carefully guarded. Att.-Gen. v. 
 
 716 
 
 the suit. Bank of Utica v. Messereau, 7 Paige, 
 517 ; Perkinson t'. Trousdale, 3 Scam. 380; Bat- 
 terson v. Ferguson, 1 Barb. 490; Langdon v. 
 Goddard. 3 Story, 13. The above is the gen- 
 eral rule, subject, however, to the exceptions 
 named in the text and in the notes below. 
 
 The latest decisions on this difficult point of 
 Chancery practice are Elmer v. Creasy, L. R. 9 
 Ch. 73; Saull v. Browne, L. R. 9 Ch. 364; Great 
 Western Colliery Co. v. Tucker. L. R. 9 Ch. 
 376; French v. Rainey, 2 Tenn. Ch. 640; Pace 
 v. Bartles, 45 N. J. Eq. 371. In the case last 
 cited the authorities are reviewed, and the con- 
 clusion reached, that the operation of the denial 
 by answer of the plaintiffs right of suit is to 
 protect the defendant from the discovery sought 
 so far as it is consequential to the final relief 
 sought, but not from the discovery necessary 
 to enable the plaintiff to prosecute his suit. 
 Ante, p. 300, n. 6. 
 
 In answering interrogatories filed by a de- 
 fendant for the examination of the plaintiff, 
 the general rule applies that he who is boui.d 
 to answer must answer full}'. Hoffmann v. 
 Postill, L. R. 4 Ch. 673. 
 
 North Met. Tramways Co. 67 L. T. 283 ; Alex- 
 ander v. Mortgage Co. 47 Fed. Rep. 131; Rig- 
 don v. Conley, 31 III. App. 630; Com'th v. 
 Perkins, 124 Penn. St. 36; see ante, p. 579, 
 notes. In g. neral, as stated in the text, con- 
 sequential matters must be disclosed, when there 
 is no unnecessary hardship. Cases in note 2 
 above; Thompson v. Dunn, L. R. 5 Ch. 573; 
 Saunders r. Jones, 7 Ch. D. 435 ; Lyon v. Twed- 
 dell, 13 Ch. D. 375 ; Benbow v. Low, 16 Ch. D. 
 93; Re North Australian Territory Co. 45 Ch. 
 D. 87. reversing 62 L. T. 556 ; Re Sutcliffe, 50 
 L. J. Ch. 574. But the materiality of the dis- 
 covery will always be considered where the 
 discovery is such as the plaintiff, though fail- 
 ing at the hearing, may afterwards use in a way 
 prejudicial to the defendant Ibid. ; Lea v. Sax- 
 by, 32 L. T. N. S. 723. It is within the Court's 
 discretion to postpone the desired discovery 
 until such a stage of the proceedings as will de- 
 termine the necessity of requiring it. See Fen- 
 nessy v. Clark, 37 Ch. D. 184 ; Millar v. Harper, 
 38 Ch. D. 110; Edelston v. Russell, 57 L. T. 
 927. Respecting the vexatious introduction of 
 interrogatories into particulars, see Lister v. 
 Thompson, 7 T. L. R. 107.
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF ANSWERS. 
 
 *721 
 
 has no interest in the subject — or that the defendant himself has no 
 interest in the subject — or that he is a purchaser for a valuable con- 
 sideration 8 — that the bill does not declare a purpose for which Equity 
 will assume jurisdiction to compel discovery — or that the plaintiff is 
 under some personal disability, by which he is incapacitated from 
 suing. 4 In all these * cases, a defendant who does not avail him- * 721 
 self of the objection to answering, either by demurrer or plea, 
 but submits to answer, must answer fully. 1 Nor is a denial of the 
 plaintiff's title a reason for refusing to set out accounts required by 
 the interrogatories ; 2 nor a denial of fraud a reason for refusing to dis- 
 cover the facts which are alleged to show it. 3 In some cases, however, 
 where it has appeared that the discovery was not necessary to enable 
 the plaintiff to obtain a decree, and where the information could be 
 
 s See Cuyleri\Bogert, 3 Paige, 188; Method. 
 Epis. Church v. Jaques, 1 John. Ch. 65. 
 
 * Gilbert v. Lewis, 1 De G. J. & S. 38; 9 
 Jur. N. S. 187. 
 
 1 Hare on Disc. 256 : Howe v. M'Kernan, 30 
 Beav. 547; Newhall v. Hobbs, 3 Cusli. 274, 277. 
 The general rule of pleading in Chancery is, 
 that the defendant cannot by answer excuse 
 himself from answering. Bank of Utica v. 
 Messereau, 7 Paige, 517. It is said by Mr. 
 Justice Story to be far from universally true, as 
 is sometimes alleged, that a defendant answer- 
 ing can take every ground of defence, which he 
 might insist on by way of demurrer or plea to 
 the bill. Story, Eq. PL § 847. Thus, although 
 it was formerly thought otherwise,. it is now 
 settled, that a defendant to a bill for discovery 
 and relief must avail himself of the protection 
 of being a bona fide purchaser for a valuable 
 consideration without notice, by way of plea, 
 — and that he cannot make this defence by an- 
 swer, for, if he answers at all, he must answer 
 fully. Ibid, and note; Portarlington v. Soulby, 
 7 Sim. 28; see, however, the countervailing 
 rule of the U. S. Supreme Court, stated in note 
 to ante, p. 715. 
 
 There are, however, a few admitted excep- 
 tions to the above rule that a defendant can- 
 not by answer excuse himself from answering 
 which furnish special grounds for objecting by 
 answer to the discovery sought. Some of these 
 exceptions will be found in the text. As, 
 where an answer would tend to criminate the 
 defendant, or subject him to a penalty, forfei- 
 ture, or punishment. Rrockway r. Copp, 3 
 Paige, 53!); Skinner c. Judson, 8 Conn. 528; 
 Livingston v. Harris, 3 Paige, 528; Leggett v. 
 Postley, 2 Paige, 599. So. where an answer 
 would involve a violation of professional con- 
 fidence. Ante, p. 570, et seq., and notes, p. 715, 
 and notes. The defendant may by answer refuse 
 to make discovery on the ground of immateri- 
 ality of the fact of which the discovery is sought. 
 Kuypers v. Ref. Dutch Church, 6 Paige, 570 ; 
 
 Davis v. Mapes, 2 Paige, 105. So, the defend- 
 ant is not bound to answer matters which are 
 purely scandalous, or impertinent, or irrelevant. 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 846. The Statute of Limita- 
 tions and lapse of time may be relied upon as a 
 defence by answer, as well as by plea and de- 
 murrer. Id. § 751; Van Hook v. Whitlock, 7 
 Paige, 373; Maury /'. Mason, 8 Porter, 213. l-'or 
 other cases in which exceptions to the above 
 rule have been taken and sustained, a. d the 
 grounds of such exceptions, the learned reader 
 is referred to the authorities, in which they are 
 stated and explained. French v. Shotwell, 6 
 John. Ch. 235 ; Murray v. Coster, 4 Cowen, 641; 
 Phillips v. Prevost, 4 John. Ch. 205; McDowl 
 v. Charles, 6 John. Ch. 132; Smith v. Fisher, 2 
 Desaus. 275; Morris v. Parker, 3 John. Ch. 297; 
 Hunt v. Gookin, 16 Vt. 462; Desplaces v. Goris, 
 1 Edw. Ch. 352, 353; Drew o. Drew, 2 V. & B. 
 159. The plaintiff is entitled to an answer to 
 every fact charged in the bill, the admission or 
 proof of which is material to the relief sought, 
 or is necessary to substantiate his proceedings 
 and make them regular. Davis v. Mapes, 2 
 Paige, 105. 
 
 Where suspicious cirenmstances, gross fraud, 
 and collusion are charged in a bill, a defendant 
 will be held to a strict rule in answering. Not 
 only his motives, but bis secret designs, his 
 " unuttered thoughts," must be exposed. Me- 
 chanics' Bank r. Levy, 1 Edw. Ch. 316. 
 
 2 Dott v. Hoyes, 15 Sim. 372; 10 Jur. 628; 
 Great Luxembourg Ry. Co. t>. Magnay, 23 
 Beav. 646; Brookes v. Boucher, 8 Jur. N. S. 
 639 ; 10 W. R. 708, V. C. W. ; Leigh r. Birch, 
 and Swabey v. Sutton, ubi eupra; Robson v. 
 Flight, 33 Beav. 268; Thompson v. Dunn, L. R. 
 5 Ch. 573 ; see Jacobs v. Goodman, 2 Cox. 282; 
 Donegal v. Stewart, 3 Ves. 446; Randal v. Head, 
 Hardres, 188. 
 
 8 Padley V. Lincoln Water Works Co. 2 
 
 M'N. &G.68, 72; 14 Jur. 299; v. Harrison, 
 
 4 Mad. 252. 
 
 717
 
 23 
 
 ANSWERS. 
 
 * 722 * obtained in the proceedings under the decree, a full answer has 
 
 not been enforced. 1 
 A defendant may, however, as we have seen, 2 by answer decline an- 
 swering any interrogatory, or part of an interrogatory, from answering 
 which he might formerly have protected himself by demurrer ; and he 
 may so decline, notwithstanding he answers other parts of such inter- 
 rogatory, or other interrogatories from which he might have protected 
 himself by demurrer, or other parts of the bill as to which he is not in- 
 terrogated ; 3 but he cannot decline answering a particular interrogatory 
 on the ground that the whole bill is demurrable ; 4 nor can he protect 
 himself from discovery by raising by answer a defence which he might 
 have pleaded. 5 (a) 
 
 A defendant must answer as to his knowledge, remembrance, in- 
 
 * 723 formation, or belief. 6 Where, however, a special cause is shown, * so 
 
 1 De la Rue v. Dickinson, 3 K. & J. 388; 
 Swinburne v. Nelson, refd. to id. 389; 16 Beav. 
 416; Clegg v. Edmonson, 3 Jur. N. S. 299, 
 L. JJ. ; Great Western Colliery Co. v. Tucker, 
 L. R. 9 Ch. 364; French v. Rai'ney, 2 Tenn. Ch. 
 640. Ante, p. 720, n. 2. A full answer has also 
 been dispensed with where the discovery is not 
 relevant to the relief sought, as where the bill 
 ■wns for a partnership account, and called for a 
 discovery as to an item recognized in the articles 
 of partnership. Wier v. Tucker, L. R. 14 Eq. 
 25. Or where the bill is for alternative relief, 
 and the discovery relates to the second alterna- 
 tive. Lett v. Parry, 1 H. & M. 517. And see 
 Lockett v. Lockett, L. R. 4 Ch. 336. But a 
 defendant cannot excuse himself from answer- 
 ing fully on the ground that the giving the 
 discovery sought would anticipate the decree, 
 such discovery being the same as that which 
 would be ordered at the hearing if the plaintiff 
 obtained a decree. Chichester v. Marquis of 
 Donegal, L. R. 4 Ch. 416. 
 
 2 Ante, p. 583. 
 
 3 Cons. Old. XV. 4; Padley v. Lincoln 
 "Water Works Co. 2 M'N. & G. 68, 71 ; 14 Jur. 
 299; Baddeley v. Curwen, 2 Coll. 151, 155; 
 Fairthorne v. Western, 3 Hare, 387, 391, 393; 
 8 Jur. 353 ; Molesworth v. Howard, 2 Coll. 145, 
 151; see, however, Tipping v. Clarke. 2 Hare, 
 383, 392 ; Drake v. Drake, id. 647 ; 8 Jur. 642; 
 Kaye v. Wall, 4 Hare, 127 ; Ingilby v. Shafto, 
 33 Beav. 31; 9 Jur. N. S. 114L The 44th 
 Equity Rule of the United States Courts adopts 
 in terms this English order, and the 39t!i Equity 
 Rule of the United States Courts proceeds fur- 
 ther. See those rules infra, pp.2384. 2385, and 
 Gaines ». Agnelly, 1 Woods, 238; Samples v. 
 Bank, id. 523. 
 
 ■» Mason v. W r akeman, 2 Phil. 516; Fisher v. 
 Price, 11 Beav. 194, 199; Marsh v. Keith, 1 Dr. 
 
 & Sm. 342, 350; 6 Jur. N. S. 1182; Bates v. 
 Christ's College, Cambridge, 8 De G. M. & G. 
 726; 3 Jur. N. S. 348, L. JJ.; Leigh v. Birch, 
 32 Beav. 399; 9 Jur. N. S 1265. 
 
 5 Lancaster r. Evors, 1 Phil. 349, 351; 8 Jur. 
 p. 133; Swabeyt>. Sutton, 1 H. & M. 514; 9 Jur. 
 N. S. 1321, V. C. W.; ante, p. 720, note. 
 
 6 Tradesmen's Bank v. Hyatt, 2 Edw. Ch. 
 195; Bailey v. Wilson, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 187; 
 Norton v. Warner, 3 Edw. Ch. 106; see to this 
 point, Story, Eq. PI. § 854, et seq. ; Miles v. 
 Miles, 27 N. H. 447; see Hall v. Wood, 1 Paige, 
 404; Sloan r. Little, 3 Paige, 103; Pierson v. 
 Meaux, 3 A. K. Marsh 6; Woods v. Morrell, 1 
 John. Ch. 103; Devereaux r. Cooper, 11 Vt. 
 103; Pitts v. Hooper, 16 Ga. 442; Dinsmore r. 
 Hazelton, 22 N. H. 535; Kittredge v. Clare- 
 mont Bank, 3 Story, 590 ; Cleaves v. Morrow, 
 2 Tenn. Ch. 596 ; Colburn v. Barrett, 21 Oregont 
 27. On a bill filed charging usury, an answer 
 that the defendant does not remember the terms 
 on which the money was lent, will be considered 
 evasive, and tantamount to an admission of 
 usury. Scotts v. Hume, Litt. Sel. Cas. 379. 
 So, where the bill directly charged upon the 
 defendant that he had m de and entered into a 
 certain agreement, it was he'd that a simple 
 denial by the defendant in his answer "accord- 
 ing to his recollection and belief," was insuffi- 
 cient and ought to be treated as a mere evasion. 
 Taylor v. Luther, 2 Sumner, 228. But where 
 the facts are such that it is probable that 
 the defendant cannot recollect them so as to 
 answer more positively, a denial of the facts 
 according to his knowledge, recollection, and 
 belief, will be sufficient. Hall v. Wood. 1 
 Paige, 404; see also Utica Ins. Co. v. Lynch, 3 
 Paige, 210; Brooks v. Byam, 1 Story, 29G. 
 Whether the facts are charged in a bill as be- 
 ing the acts of the defendant, or within his own 
 
 (a) In England, since the Judicature Acts, 
 the right to discovery is regulated by the rules 
 previously existing in the Court of Chancery. 
 
 718 
 
 Anderson v. Bank of British Columbia, 2 Ch. D 
 644.
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF ANSWERS. 
 
 724 
 
 positive an answer may be dispensed with : 1 and in Hall v. Bodley, 2 
 it is said, that the defendant having sworn in his answer that he 
 had received no more than a certain sum to his remembrance, it was 
 allowed to be a good answer. As to facts which have not happened 
 within his own knowledge, the defendant must answer as to his infor- 
 mation and belief, and not as to his information merely, without stat- 
 ing any belief either the one way or the other. 8 It is not, however, 
 necessary to make use of the precise words, " as to his information 
 and belief: " the defendant may make use of any expressions which are 
 tantamount to them ; thus, to say that the defendant cannot answer to 
 facts inquired after, as to his belief or otherwise, is generally consid- 
 ered a sufficient denial ; 4 for, though the word " information " is not 
 used, the expression " belief or otherwise " is held to include it. 5 
 
 * Where defendants have in their power the means of acquiring * 724 
 the information necessary to enable them to give the discovery 
 called for, they are bound to make use of such means, whatever pains 
 or trouble it may cost them ; x therefore, where defendants, filling the 
 
 personal knowledge, he is bound to admit or 
 deny the facts charged, either positively or ac- 
 cording to his belief, whether they occurred 
 within seven years, or at a greater distance of 
 time. Sloan v. Little, 3 Paige, 103; Hall v. 
 Wood, 1 Paige, 404. 
 i Wyatt's P. R. 13. 
 
 2 1 Vern. 470; and see Nelson v. Ponsford, 
 4 Beav. 41, 43. 
 
 3 Coop. Fq. PI. 314 ; The Holladay Case, 
 27 Fed. Rep. 830. 
 
 4 See Hall V. Wood, 1 Paige, 404 ; Sloan v. 
 Little, 3 Paige, 103; Woods v. Morrell, 1 John. 
 Ch. 103; Bolton v. Gardner, 3 Paige, 273; 
 Brooks v. Byam, 1 Story, 296; Kittredge v. 
 Claremont Bank, 3 Story, 590; Kittredge v. 
 Claremont Bank, 1 Wood. & M. 244; King 
 v. Ray, 11 Paige, 235. If the defendant an- 
 swers that he has not any knowledge or infor- 
 mation of a fact charged in the bill, he is not 
 bound to declare his belief one way or the 
 other. Morris u. Parker, 3 John. Ch. 297. If 
 he denies all knowledge of a fact charged in 
 the bill, but admits his belief as to the fact 
 charged, it is not necessary for him to deny 
 any information on the subject. Davis v. 
 Mapes, 2 Paige, 105. But if he has any infor- 
 mation other than such as is derived from the 
 bill, he must answer as to such information, 
 and as to his belief or disbelief of the facts 
 charged. Utica Ins. Co. v. Lynch, 3 Paige, 
 210; Devereaux v. Cooper, 11 Vt. 103. It is 
 not sufficient to answer to certain specific facts 
 charged in the bill, "that they may be true, 
 &c, but the defendant lias no knowledge of, 
 but is a stringer to the foregoing facts, and 
 leaves the plaintiff to prove the same." Smith 
 v. Lasher, 5 John. Ch. 247. Nor is it sufficient 
 to say that "the defendant has not any knowl- 
 edge of the foregoing facts, but from the state- 
 
 ment thereof in the bill." Ibid. Nor is a 
 denial by a defendant "according to his rec- 
 ollection and belief " sufficient, where the fact 
 is directly charged, as within his knowledge. 
 Taylor v~ Luther, 2 Sumner, 228. But an alle- 
 gation of utter and entire ignorance as to the 
 fact is sufficient. Morris v. Parker, 3 John. 
 Ch. 297; Norton v. Warner, 3 Edw. Ch. 105; 
 see Allen v. O' Donald, 28 Fed. Rep. 17; Berry 
 v. Sawyer, 19 id. 286; Collins v. North Side 
 Pub Co. 20 N. Y. S. 892. 
 
 5 So where an answer was in this form: 
 "And this defendant further answering saith, 
 it may be true for anything he knows to the 
 contrary that," and after going through the 
 several statements, it concluded thus: "but 
 this defend int is an utter stranger to all and 
 every such matters, and cannot form any belief 
 concerning the same," Sir John Leach V. C. 
 was of opinion, that the defendant, in stating 
 himself to be an utter stranger to all and every 
 the matters in question, did answer as to his 
 information, and did, in effect, deny that he 
 had any information respecting them. Am- 
 hurst v. King, 2 S. & S. 183; see Utica Ins. 
 Co. v. Lynch, 3 Paige, 210. It may be col- 
 lected from this case that a defendant cannot, 
 by merely saying "that a matter may be true 
 for anything he knows to the contrary," avoid 
 stating what his recollection, information, or be- 
 lief with reference to it is, or saying that he has 
 no recollection or information, or that he can- 
 not form any belief at all concerning it; either 
 in these words or in equivalent expressions. 
 
 i See Taylor r. Rundell, Cr. & P. 104, 113; 
 5 Jur 1129; Earl of Glengall r. Frazer, 2 Hare, 
 99,103; 6 Jur. 1081; Stuart r. Lord Bute, 12 Sim. 
 460; Att.-Gen. v. Rees, 12 Beav. 50, 54; M'ln- 
 tosh v. Great Western Ky. 4 De G. & Sm. 502; 
 Inglessi v. Spartali, 29 Beav. 564; Att.-Gen. v. 
 
 719
 
 * 725 ANSWERS. 
 
 character of trustees, are called upon to set out an account, they cannot 
 frame their answer so as merely to give a sufficient ground for an ac- 
 count ; they are bound to give the best account they can by their answer : 
 not in an oppressive way, but by referring to books, &c, sufficiently 
 to make them parts of their answer, and to afford the plaintiff an oppor- 
 tunity of inspection, in order that he may be able to ascertain whether 
 that is the best account the defendants can give. 2 
 
 Where, however, the defendant has, since the filing of the bill, lost his 
 interest in the suit, and has no longer access to the documents, he will 
 not be required to refer to them. 3 
 
 Where defendants are required to set out accounts, they may, for the 
 purpose of rendering their schedules less burdensome, instead of going 
 too much into particulars, refer to the original accounts in their posses- 
 sion in the manner above stated ; 4 but when it is said that a defendant 
 may refer to accounts in his possession, it must not be understood as 
 authorizing him to refer, by his answer, to accounts made out by him- 
 self for the purposes of the case, but only to accounts previously in 
 existence. 6 
 
 * 725 * To such of the interrogatories as it is necessary and mate- 
 
 rial for the defendant to answer, he must speak directly and 
 without evasion ; * and any interrogatory not intended to be admitted, 
 ought to be traversed with accuracy. 2 Where a fact is alleged, with 
 divers circumstances, the defendant must not deny or traverse it lit- 
 erally, as it is alleged in the bill ; but must answer the point of sub- 
 stance, positively and certainly. 8 The reference in the answer must 
 
 Burgesses of East Retford. 2 M. & K. 35, 40 ; 4 White v. Barker, 5 De G. & S. 746; 17 
 
 Whistler v. Wigney, 8 Price, 1; and see post, Jur. 174 ; Major v. Arnott, 2 Jur. N. S. 387, 
 
 Chap. XLII. Production of Documents ; Story, V. C. K.; Drake r. Symes, Johns. 647; Telford 
 
 Eq. PI. §856. note; Davis v. Mapes, 2 Paige, v. Ruskin, 1 Dr. & Sm. 148; Christian v. Taylor, 
 
 105; Swift v. Swift, 13 Ga. 140; Cleaves v. 11 Sim. 401; Bally v. Kenrick, 13 Price, 291 ; 
 
 Morrow, 2 Tenn. Ch. 577. But a defendant Lockett v. Lockett, L. R. 4 Ch. 336. 
 ought not to be required to obtain information 5 Telford v. Ruskin, 1 Dr. & Sm. 148; 
 
 so as to meet the plaintiff's wishes, and thereby arguendo Alsager v. Johnson, 4 Ves. 224 If 
 
 become his agent to procure testimony. Morris the bill requires the defendant to state an ac- 
 
 v. Parker, 3 John. Ch. 301. In Kittredge v. count between the parties, the account so stated 
 
 Claremont Bank, 1 Wood. & M. 244, Wood- is responsive to the bill. Bellows r. Stone, 18 
 
 bury J. said, that the officers, answering for N. H. 465. Where a defendant, having stated 
 
 the bank sued, if they are not the same persons an account in his answer, dies during the pend- 
 
 who were in office at the time of the transaction ency of the suit, and the matters involved in the 
 
 inquired about, ought to go not only to the account are of long standing, if there is evidence 
 
 records, books, and files, for information, but tending to support the account, the Court may 
 
 to the former officers, if living, and ascertain, direct that the account be taken as prima facie 
 
 as near as may be, the truth of the matters evidence, irrespective of the question whether 
 
 about which they are interrogated. it is responsive to the bill. Bellows r. Stone, 
 
 2 White V. Williams, 8 Ves. 193, 194. A ubi supra ; Chalmert'. Bradley, 1 J. & W. 65. 
 partner bound to account must give a clear, * Ed. Red. 309. 
 
 distinct, and intelligible statement of the results 2 Patrick v. Blackwell, 17 Jur. 803, V. C. 
 of the business, referring also to particular bonks, W.; Earp p. Lloyd, 4 K. & J. 58. 
 and to the page, if necessary, so that a party 3 Cons. Ord. XV. 2; Ld. Red. 309; Bally v. 
 entitled thereto may inquire into and investi- Kenrick, 13 Price, 291; Tipping v. Clarke, 2 
 gate its correctness. A reference to the books Hare, 383, 390. Thus, if a defendant is inter- 
 of the concern, generally, and to former ac- rogated whether he has in his possession, dis- 
 counts, is not sufficient. Gordon v. Hammell, tody, or power, books, papers, or writings, a 
 19 N. J. Eq. 216. statement in his answer that there are certain 
 
 3 Ellwand v. M'Donnell, 8 Beav. 14. books, papers, or writings in the West Indies, 
 
 720
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF ANSWERS. 
 
 726 
 
 describe the books or documents with such accuracy as to enable the 
 plaintiff to move for their production : otherwise, the answer will be 
 open to exceptions for insufficiency. 4 
 
 Where a defendant stated in his answer that he had not certain books, 
 papers, and writings in his possession, custody, or power, because they 
 were coming over to this country, Lord Eldon held that they were in 
 bis power, and that the defendant ought to have so stated in his answer. 6 
 Where books, papers, or writings are in the custody or hands of the de- 
 fendant's solicitor, they are considered to be in the defendant's own cus- 
 tody or power, and should be stated to be so in his answer. 
 
 If a defendant is called upon to set out a deed or other instrument, 
 in the words and figures thereof, he should do so, or give some reason 
 for not complying with the requisition: 6 he may, however, avoid this 
 by admitting that he has the deed or instrument in his possession, and 
 offering to give the plaintiff a copy of it. 7 Where a defendant sets out 
 any deed or other instrument in his answer, whether in hcec verba or by 
 way of recital, it is always a proper precaution to crave leave 
 to refer to it : as, by so doing, * the defendant makes it a part * 726 
 of his answer, and relieves himself from any charge in ease it 
 should be erroneously set out. 1 
 
 If the defendant deny a fact, he must traverse or deny it directly, 
 and not by way of negative pregnant 2 as, for example, where he is 
 interrogated whether he has received a sum of money, he must deny or 
 traverse that he has received that sum or any part thereof, or else set 
 forth what part he has received. 3 (b) 
 
 the particulars of which he is unable to set forth, 
 without any answer as to the fact whether they 
 are in the defendant's possession, custody, or 
 power, will be insufficient: for if the defendant 
 admits the books and writings to be in his 
 possession, custody, or power, the plaintiff may 
 call upon the defendant to produce them ; which 
 the Court will order within a reasonable time. 
 Farqubarson v. Balfour, T. & R. 190; Smith v. 
 Northumberland, 1 Cox, 363. 
 
 4 Ionian 0. Whitley, 4 Beav. 548; Phelps v. 
 Olive, id. 549, n., where Lord (Tottenham M. R. 
 refused to order production of documents de- 
 scribed as "a bundle of papers marked G." 
 
 5 Farqubarson v. Balfour, ubi supra. 
 
 6 Wyatt's P. R. 204. As to the cases in which 
 it may be prudent to set out documents in htzc 
 verba, see ante, p. 363. 
 
 1 Hair, by Newl. 185. 
 i See New r. Barne, 3 Sandf. Ch. 191. 
 
 2 High p. Batte, 10 Yerger, 385; Robinson v. 
 
 Woodgate, 3 Edw. Ch. 422: King e. Ray, 11 
 Paige, 235; Walker b. Walker, 3 Kelly," 302; 
 Woods r. Morrell, 1 John. Ch. 103; Morris v. 
 Barker, 3 John, Ch. 297; Smith c. Lasher, 5 
 John. Ch. 247; Pettit v. Candler, 3 Wend. 
 618; Thompson v. Mills, 4 Ired. Eq. 390. An 
 answer to an interrogator} - must be positive 
 and direct, and not argumentative. New Eng- 
 land Bank v. Lewis, 8 Pick. 113, 119; Maiming 
 v. Manning, 8 Ala. 138. 
 
 A denial in an answer that defendant "de- 
 livered" a specified deed goes for nothing if 
 the answer admit facts and circumstances 
 which do in law constitute delivery. Adams v.. 
 Adams, 21 Wall. 185. (a) So, of an averment 
 in a bill that :i deed was not delivered to and 
 accepted by a married woman, the bill showing 
 on its face that the married woman had in fact 
 acted under the deed. Nichol v. County of 
 Davidson, 3 Tenn. Ch. 547. 
 
 3 Cons. Ord. XV. 2. 
 
 (a) So a denial in a sworn answer of actual 
 intent to defraud will not avoid the conse- 
 quences of an act which in effect is fraudu- 
 lent. Newlove v. Callaghan, 86 Mich. 301; 
 Hoboken Savings Bank v. Beckman, 33 N. J. 
 Eq. 53. 
 
 (6) If the bill avers an account stated, and 
 fraud therein in anticipation of the defence, the 
 vol. i. — 46 
 
 answer should deny the fraud as well as state the 
 account in order to present a complete defence. 
 Harrison r. Farrington, 38 N. J. Eq. 1,358. An 
 account stated, to be availed of, must be pleaded 
 as such. Oregon Ry. & N. Co. r. Swinburne, 22 
 Oregon, 574. A general denial, in place of the 
 specific denial which should be made, may be 
 treated as an admission, in the present English 
 
 721
 
 727 
 
 ANSWERS. 
 
 Where the defendant is interrogated as to particular circumstances, 
 a general denial must be accompanied by an answer as to such circum- 
 stances : 4 for although it is true that the general answer may include 
 in it an answer to the particular inquiry, yet such a mode of answering 
 might, in some cases, be resorted to, in order to escape from a material 
 discovery ; 5 and, therefore, a general denial is not enough, but there 
 must be an answer to sifting inquiries upon the general question. 6 (e) But, 
 although the Court requires that all the particular inquiries should be 
 answered, as well as the general question, it will be no objection to the 
 
 answer to the particular interrogatory, that the defendant has 
 * 727 not answered it so particularly * as to meet it in all its terms, 
 
 provided it is, with reference to the object of the bill, fairly and 
 substantially answered. 1 
 
 It is, however, the general practice, where the defendant is required 
 to set forth a general account, or to answer as to moneys received, or 
 documents in his possession, to set forth the account or list of the 
 sums or documents, in one or more schedules annexed to the answer, 
 which the defendant prays may be taken as part of his answer ; and 
 such practice is very convenient, and in many cases indispensable. 
 The defendant must, however, be careful to avoid any inconsistency 
 between the body of the answer and the schedule ; for if there is any, 
 the answer will be insufficient, and the defendant may be required to put 
 in a further answer. 2 The defendant may also resort to a schedule for 
 
 * Story, Eq. PI. § 852, note. But a general 
 answer of denial to a general allegation in a bill, 
 without specifying the tacts upon which it is 
 founded, is sufficient. Cowles v. Carter, 4 Ired. 
 Eq. (N. C.)105. 
 
 5 Wharton v. Wharton, 1 S. & S. 235; Tip- 
 ping v. Clarke, 2 Hare, 383, 389; Duke of 
 Brunswick v. Duke of Cambridge, 12 Beav. 
 281; Jodrell t'. Slaney, 10 Beav. 225; Patrick 
 v. Blackwell, 17 Jur" 803, V. C. W. ; Earp v. 
 Lloyd, 4 K. & J. 58; see also Anon. 2 Y. & C. 
 Ex. 310; Bridgewater v. De Winton, 9 Jur. N. 
 S. 1270; 12 W. R. 40, V. C. K. 
 
 6 Per Lord Eldon. in Mountford v. Taylor, 
 6 Ves. 792; see St. George v. St. George, 19 L. 
 R. Ir. 225. In Hibbert v. Durant (cited in Prout 
 v. Underwood, 2 Cox, 135; Hepburn r. Durand, 
 1 Bro. C. C. 503; Ld. Red. 310), the defendant 
 was interrogated whether he had not received 
 certain sums of money, specified in the bill, 
 in the character of a ship's husband; in his an- 
 
 practice. See 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 
 381. 
 
 (c) Reed v. Cumberland Iff. F. Ins. Co. 36 
 N. J. Eq. 146; Place v. Providence, 12 R. I. 1. 
 In Massachusetts, since the Stat, of 1883, Ch. 
 223, § 10, an answer to a creditor's bill, which 
 asks relief, cannot be sworn to, and discovery 
 can only be had by interrogatories to the de- 
 fendant, as in an acton at Law. Amy v. Man- 
 ning, 149 Muss. 487. An answer is sufficient 
 
 722 
 
 swer, he swore that he had not received any 
 sums of money whatever, except those set forth 
 in the schedule to his answer, in which schedule 
 the sums specified in the bill were not comprised, 
 but he did not otherwise answer the interroga- 
 tory. On the question of the sufficiency of the 
 answer, Lord Thurlow said that a man could 
 not deny, generally, particular charges which 
 tended to falsify such general denial, and 
 therefore held the answer insufficient ; and it 
 appears by a note of the reporter, that it turned 
 out in point of fact, that the defendant after- 
 wards recollected the receipt of the particular 
 sums, and admitted them by his further 
 answer. 
 
 i Bally v. Kenrick, 13 Price, 291 ; see also 
 Reade v. Woodrooffe, 24 Beav. 421 ; Lockett v. 
 Lockett. L. R. 4 Ch. 336. 
 
 2 Bridgewater v. De Wmton, 9 Jur. N. S. 
 1270 ; 12 W. R. 40, V. C. K. 
 
 which is as specific as the stating part of the 
 bill. Buerk v. Imhaeuser, 20 Blatch. 274; 
 Halsey r. Ball, 36 N. J. Eq. 161 ; Wingo v. 
 Hardy, 94 Ala. 184, 191. The omission of 
 material facts in the bill is waived by an an- 
 swer which sets forth those ficts. Cavender v. 
 Cavender, 114 U. S. 464. The question whether 
 the answer is sufficient to admit evidence under 
 it cannot be first raised on appeal. Upham v. 
 Draper, 157 Mass. 292.
 
 GENERAL NATURE OP ANSWERS. * 728 
 
 the purpose of showing the nature of his own case, or of strengthening 
 it : even though there is nothing in the interrogatories which may ren- 
 der a schedule necessary. 3 
 
 In general, a defendant must be careful not to frame his schedule in 
 a manner which may be burdensome and oppressive to the plaintiff : 
 otherwise, it will be considered impertinent. 4 Thus, where a bill was 
 filed for an account, containing the following interrogatory, " whether 
 any and what sum of money was due from the house of A to the house 
 of B, and how the defendant made out the same ? " and the defendant, 
 by his answer, set forth a long schedule, containing an account of all 
 dealings and transactions between the two houses, the answer was 
 held to be impertinent, and the Court said the defendant ought merely 
 to have answered that such a sum was due, and that it was due upon 
 the balance of an account. 5 In the last case, although there was an 
 inquiry how the defendant made out that there was a balance, there 
 were no particular inquiries in the bill as to the items, constituting the 
 account, from which the defendant made out that there was a balance 
 due to him ; and even where there has been such an inquiry, the Court 
 has gone the length of saying, that a schedule containing such items 
 will be impertinent, if the items are set out with a minuteness not called 
 for by the nature of the case. Thus, where the bill called upon a de- 
 fendant to set forth an account of all and every the quantities of ore, 
 metals, and minerals dug in particular mines, and the full value thereof, 
 and the costs and expenses of working the mines, and the clear prof- 
 its made thereby, and the defendant put in a schedule to his 
 * answer, comprising 3431 folios, wherein were set forth all the * 728 
 particular items of every tradesman's bill connected with the 
 mines, the Court held the schedule to be impertinent. 1 In like man- 
 ner, it seems that in the case of an executor called upon to account for 
 his disbursements, it is not necessary to set out every separate item. 2 
 It is difficult, however, to point out any precise rules with regard to 
 what will be considered impertinent in a schedule ; much must depend 
 upon the nature of each case, and the purposes for which the dis- 
 covery is required. The cases above referred to, and the others which 
 may be found in the books, show, however, that even though the 
 plaintiff, by the minuteness of his inquiries, in some measure affords an 
 excuse for the defendant setting forth a long and burdensome schedule, 
 the Court will not, unless in instances in which, from the nature of the 
 case, great minuteness is required, permit a defendant to load the 
 
 8 Parker v. Fairlie, T. & R. 362; 1 S. & S. may deposit them in Court, and then make 
 
 295; Lowe v. Williams, 2 S. & S. 574,576; them part of his answer as so deposited. Att.- 
 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 856, and notes. As to the pro- Gen. v. Edmunds, 15 W. R. 138. 
 duction of documents and papers, and the proper * As to impertinence, see ante, p. 326. 
 
 mode of discovery as to them, see Story, Eq. 6 French v. Jacko, 1 Mer. 357, n. 
 
 PI. §§ 858-860, a. ' Norway v. Rowe, 1 Mer. 3-17, 356; see also 
 
 If the answer does not refer to the schedule M' Morris v. Elliot, 8 Price, 674; Slack v. Evans, 
 
 as forming part of it, it will he insufficient. 7 Price, 278, n. ; Alsager v. Johnson, 4 Vea. 
 
 Bolders v. Saunders, 3 N. R. 59. A defendant 217. 225; Byde v. Masterman, C. & P. 265, 272; 
 
 will not, however, be permitted to refer to 5 .lur. 643; Marshall v. Mcllersh, 6 Beav. 558; 
 
 printed books of account, and parliamentary Tench v. Cheese, 1 Beav. 571, 574; 3 Jur. 768. 
 blue books, as schedules to his answer; but he 2 Norway v. Rowe, ubi supra. 
 
 723
 
 728 
 
 ANSWERS. 
 
 record with useless and impertinent matter, even though the introduc- 
 tion of such matter might be justified by the terms of the interroga- 
 tories. On the other hand, it is to be observed, that the Court will not, 
 where the defendant, in complying with the requisitions in the bill, has 
 bona fide given the information required, though in a manner rather 
 more prolix than might perhaps be necessary, consider the answer as 
 impertinent ; for, although prolixity sometimes amounts to imperti- 
 nence, 3 whether the Court will deal with it as such depends very much 
 upon the degree in which it occurs. 4 (a) 
 
 3 Slack v. Evans, ubi supra. 
 
 * Gompertz v. Best, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 114, 117. 
 As to impertinence in an answer, see Story, Eq. 
 PI. § 863. Impertinence in pleading consists in 
 setting forth what is not iiecessary to be set 
 forth; as stuffing the pleadings with useless 
 recitals and long digressions about immaterial 
 matters. Hood v. Inman, 4 John. Ch. 437. It 
 was said by Mr. Chancellor Kent, in Woods v. 
 Morrell. 1 John. Ch. 103, that, perhaps the best 
 rule to ascertain whether matter be impertinent, 
 is to see whether the subject of the allegation 
 could be put in issue, or be give?i in evidence 
 between the parties. See Spauldingv. Farwell, 
 62 Maine, 319, where the rule was applied to an 
 averment in an answer of a counter-claim not 
 connected with the transaction set forth in the 
 bill, which was by tenants in common for an 
 account of the earnings of a vessel. See also 
 Mrzena v. Brucker, 3 Tenn. Ch. 161. Where 
 in the answer to a bill in Equity, an allega- 
 tion was made impeaching the bvnn fidts, and 
 validity of a codicil to a will, which had been 
 already approved and allowed by a Couit hav- 
 ing competent and exclusive jurisdiction over 
 the probate thereof, it was ordered that the alle- 
 gitimi be expunged as being impertinent and 
 immaterial. Langdon v. Goddard, 3 Story, 13. 
 In reference to the above allegation, Mr. Justice 
 Story said, "It is not a matter which can be 
 filed in controversy, or admitted to proof." 
 Id. 23. If the matter of an answer is relevant, 
 that is, if it can have any influence whatever in 
 the decision of the suit, either as to the subject- 
 matter of the controversy, the particular relief 
 to be given, or as to the cost, it is not imperti- 
 nent. Van Rensselaer v. Brice, 4 Paige, 174; 
 Wood v. Mann, 1 Sumner, 579; Price v. Tyson, 
 3 Bland, 392. Long recitals, stories, conversa- 
 tions, and insinuations tending to scandal, are 
 impertinent. Woods v. Morrell, 1 John. Ch. 
 103; Langdon r>. Goddard, 3 Story. 13. A short 
 sentence is said not to be impertinent, although 
 
 (o) Under the Codes, an objection that the de- 
 nials of an answer are imperfect, and do not con- 
 form to the statute, cannot be first raised in the 
 appellate Court. People r. Swift (Cal.), 31 Pac. 
 Rep. 16. The presumption is iu favor of the 
 pertinency of the allegations of an answer. 
 
 724 
 
 it contains no fact or material matter, and may 
 be inserted in an answer only from abundant 
 caution. A statement in an answer introduced to 
 show the temper with which a bill is filed, and the 
 offensive course pursued by the plaintiff, is not 
 impertinent; it may have an effect on the costs. 
 Whatever is called for by the bill or will be 
 material to the defence, with reference to the 
 order or decree that may be made, is proper to be 
 retained in an answer. Desplaces v. Goris, 1 
 Edw. Ch. 350; Monroy v. Monroy, id. 382; Bally 
 v. Williams, 1 M'Clel. & Y. 334. 
 
 An exception to an answer for impertinence 
 will be overruled, if the expunging of the mat- 
 ter excepted to will leave the residue of the 
 clause, which is not covered by the exception, 
 either false or wholly unintelligible. M'Intyre 
 r. Trustees of Union College, 6 Paige, 240. 
 The plaintiff cannot except to a part of the de- 
 fendant's answer as impertinent, which refers to 
 and explains the meaning of a schedule annexed 
 to such answer, without also excepting to the 
 schedule itself as impertinent. Ibid. If a bill 
 against executors calls specifically and particu- 
 larly for accounts in all their various details, a 
 very voluminous schedule, containing a copy 
 from the books of account, specifying each item 
 of debt and credit, will not be impertinent. 
 Scudder v. Bogert, 1 Edw. Ch. 372. If the 
 pi .int iff put impertinent questions, he must take 
 the answer to them, though it be impertinent. 
 Woods v. Morrell, 1 John. Ch. 103. So of mat- 
 ter responsive to irrelevant matter in the com- 
 plaint. Mclntyre v. Ogden, 24 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 
 604. See, however, Langdon v. Pickering, 19 
 Maine, 214. Copies of receipts taken by the 
 defendant for moneys paid and charged in ac- 
 count and making an immense schedule to an 
 answer, are impertinent. Scudder r. Bogert, 1 
 Edw. Ch. 372. An executor in setting forth in 
 his answer the account and inventory of the 
 estate which came to his hands, should not add 
 copies of the appraiser's and executor's oaths, 
 
 Leslie v. Leslie 50 N. J. Eq. 155. Hence mat- 
 ter, which is not clearly irrelevant, will not be 
 ordered expunged from an answer. Bush v. 
 Adams, 22 Fla. 177; see Reichel v. Magrath, 
 14 App. Cas. 665; Crammer v. Atlantic City, 
 39 N. J. Eq. 76. 
 

 
 FORM OP ANSWERS. * 7o0 
 
 * In answering an amended bill, the defendant, if he has an- * 729 
 swered the original bill, should answer those matters only which 
 have been introduced by the amendments. In fact, the answer to an 
 amended bill constitutes, together with the answer to the original bill, 
 but one record, 1 in the same manner as an original and an amended 
 bill ; hence, it is impertinent to repeat, in the answer to the amended 
 bill, what appears upon the answer to the original bill, unless by the 
 repetition the defence is materially varied. 3 
 
 Section II. — Form of Answers. 
 
 Two or more persons may join in the same answer ; and where their 
 interests are the same, and they appear by the same solicitor, they ought 
 to do so. 8 The Court will not, however, before the hearing, and at a 
 time when it cannot be known how the defence should be conducted, 
 visit the defendants with costs as a penalty for not joining in their 
 answer ; and it is only at the hearing, when all danger of preju- 
 dice to the parties is over,' that the Court * will make any order * 730 
 upon the subject. 1 Where the same solicitor has been employed 
 for two or more defendants, and separate answers have been filed, or 
 other proceedings had by or for two or more of such defendants sepa- 
 rately, the Taxing Master will consider, in the taxation of such solici- 
 tor's bill of costs either between party and party, or between solicitor 
 and client, whether such separate answers or other proceedings were 
 necessary or proper ; and if he is of opinion that any part of the costs 
 occasioned thereby has been unnecessarily or improperly incurred, the 
 same will be disallowed. 2 No general rule can be laid down, determin- 
 ing when defendants, appearing by the same solicitor, may sever in their 
 
 and of the surrogate's certificate. Such matter x Ld. Red. 318; Hildyard v. Cressy, 3 Atk. 
 
 will be impertinent. Jolly v. Carter, 2 Edw. 303. 
 
 Ch. 209. 2 Smith v. Serle, 14 Ves. 415. 
 
 An exception for impertinence must be sup- 3 Where two defendants answer jointly, and 
 
 ported in tola, or it will fail altogether. Wag- one speaks positively for himself, the othtr may, 
 
 staff v. Bryan, 1 R. & M. 30; Tench v. Cheese, in cases where he is not charged with anything 
 
 1 Beav. 571; Van Rensselaer v. Brice, 4 Paige, upon his own knowledge, say that he permed 
 
 174. the answer and believes it to be true; but it is 
 
 When an exception was taken to the juris- Otherwise where the defendant answers sepa- 
 
 diction, in the answer, it was properly struck rately. 1 liar. 185, ed. Newl. A defendant 
 
 out, on reference to a Master, for impertinence. may sufficiently answer by adopting the answer 
 
 Wood v. Mann, 1 Sumner, 579; but see Teague of his co-defe dant. Binney's case, 2 Bland, 
 
 v. Dendy, 2 M'Cord Ch. 207, 210. As to im- 99; Warfield v. Banks, 11 Gill & J. 98. Hut an 
 
 pertinence, see further, Story, Eq. PI. § 883; answer simply averring that the facts stated in 
 
 Jolly v. Carter, 2 Edw. Ch. 209; Somers v. a paper, purporting to be the answer of another 
 
 Torrey, 5 Paige, 54. As to scand d in an an- defendant in the cause, "are substantially cor- 
 
 swer, see Storj-, Eq. PI. §§ 801, 862. As in a rect as far as these defendants are concerned," 
 
 bill, so in an answer, nothing relevant can is formally and substantially defective. Carr 
 
 be deemed scandalous. Sto«-y, Eq. PI. § 802; v. Weld, 18 N. J. Eq. 41. 
 
 Jolly v. Carter, 2 Edw. Ch. 209. Separate ex- 1 Van Sandau v. Moore, 1 Russ. 441. 454: 2 
 
 ceptions to the same answer, one for scandal a' d S. & S. 509, 512; and see Woods v. Woods, 5 
 
 the other for impertinence, will not be allowed. Hare, 230: Story, Eq. PI. § 869. 
 
 as nothing in a pleading can be considered as 2 Cons. Ord. XL. 12; Woods ». Woods, 5 
 
 scandalous which is not also impertinent. M'ln- Hare, 229,231. See the 62d Equity Rule of 
 
 tyre «. Trustees of Union College, 6 Paige, the U. S. Courts, post, p. 2389. 
 240. See infra, p. 759.
 
 731 
 
 ANSWERS. 
 
 defence ; 8 practically, the Taxing Master has to exercise his discretion 
 in each particular case. 
 
 Where defendants have a joint interest only, they will not, in general, 
 be allowed to sever in their defence ; and there are many cases where 
 only one set of costs has been allowed by the Court to two defendants, 
 whose interest was so far joint as to have made a severance of their 
 defence unnecessary. Thus, trustees will not, in general, be allowed 
 costs consequent upon their separate defences, unless some of them 
 have a beneficial interest, or there is some special reason for their sev- 
 erance. 4 So, trustees and cestui que trusts, if they have no conflicting 
 interests, will, in general, be only allowed one set of costs. 5 The same 
 principle applies, as between a husband and his wife, 6 a bankrupt and 
 his assignees, 6 and, in an administration suit, between an assignor and 
 his assignee. 7 (a) The severance will, however, be justifiable where the 
 suit is against two trustees, one of whom only is charged with a breach 
 of trust ; 8 and, in some cases, where they reside at a distance from 
 each other. 9 
 
 Where only one set of costs is allowed, the Court does not, gener- 
 ally, declare to whom it is to be given ; 10 but where one trustee 
 * 731 * only, in obedience to an order, paid a sum of money into Court, 
 he was held entitled to the whole of the costs. 1 
 
 If the defendants are permitted to sever, they will be allowed the 
 costs of Separate counsel, though they take the same line of defence. 2 (b) 
 
 An answer must now be divided into paragraphs, numbered consecu- 
 tively, each paragraph containing, as nearly as may be, a separate and 
 distinct statement or allegation. 3 It must not refer to another docu- 
 ment, not on the files of the Court, as containing the statement of the 
 defendant's case. 4 
 
 3 Greedy v. Lavender, 11 Beav. 417, 420; 
 Remnant v. Hood (No. 2). 27 Beav. 613. 
 
 4 Gaunt v. Taylor, 2 Beav 346; 4 Jur. 166; 
 Dudceon v. Corky, 4 Dr. & War. 158; Tarbuck 
 v. Woodcock. 3 Beav. 289; Hodson v. Cash, 1 
 Jur. N. S. 864, V. C. W.; Course v. Humphrey, 
 
 26 Beav. 402; 5 Jur. N. S. 615 ; Prince v. Hine, 
 
 27 Beav. 345; Att.-Gen. v. Wyville, 28 Beav. 
 464; and see Morgan v. Davey, 87; and post, 
 Chap. XXXI. § 2, Costs. 
 
 6 Woods v. Woods, ubi supra ; Farr v. She- 
 rtffe, 4 Hare, 528; 10 Jur. 630; Remnant v. 
 Hood, uhi supra. 
 
 6 Garey v. Whittingham, 5 Beav. 268, 270; 
 6 Jur. 545. 
 
 1 Remnant v. Hood (No. 2), 27 Beav. 613; 
 Greedy v. Lavender, 11 Beav. 417, 420. 
 
 « Webb v. Webb, 16 Sim. 55. 
 
 (a) In partition suits there is no fixed rule, 
 as there is in administration suits, that only 
 one set of costs will be allowed in respect of 
 each share of the property. Belcher v. Wil- 
 liams, 45 Ch. D. 510. 
 
 (6) The question whether the defences are 
 
 726 
 
 9 Aldridge r. Westbrook, 4 Beav. 212; Wiles 
 v. Cooper, 9 Beav. 298; Commins v. Brown- 
 field, 3 Jur. N. S 657, V. C. W. 
 
 i° Course v. Humphrey, 26 Beav. 402; 5 Jur. 
 N. S. 615; Att.-Gen. v. Wyville, 28 Beav. 464. 
 
 1 Prince v. Hine, 27 Beav. 345; and see 
 Morgan & Davey, 87, 88. 
 
 2 Bainbrigge v. Moss, 3 Jur. N. S. 107, V. 
 C W. 
 
 3 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 14 ; Cons. Ord. XV. 1; 
 see forms of answers in Vol. III. 
 
 < Falkland Islands Co. v. Lafone, 3 K. & J. 
 267; Wells v Stratton, 1 Tenn. Ch. 328. Docu- 
 ments previously deposited in Court in the 
 cause may, however, be made part of the an- 
 swer bv referring to them as so deposited. Att.- 
 Gen. v. Edmunds, 15 W. R. 138. 
 
 sufficiently different to justify appearance by 
 separate counsel is not one for the Taxing 
 Master's discretion, and if the Court is of 
 opinion that the difference of defences is ma- 
 terial, it may remit the certificate to him. Aget 
 r. Blaeklock& Co. 56 L. T 890.
 
 FORM OP ANSWERS. * 732 
 
 An answer must be intituled in the cause, so as to agree with the 
 names of the parties as they appear in the bill, at the time the answer 
 is filed. 5 A defendant may not correct or alter the names of the parties 
 as they appear in the bill ; if there is a mistake in his own name, he 
 must correct it in the part following the title of the cause, thus : 
 " The answer of John Jones (in the bill by mistake called William 
 Jones)." 6 
 
 An answer is headed ; " The answer of A B, one of the above-named 
 defendants, to the bill of complaint of the above-named plaintiff." If 
 the bill has been amended after answer, the heading states that the an- 
 swer is " to the amended bill of complaint of the above-named plain- 
 tiff." 7 If two or more defendants join in the same answer, it is headed, 
 " The joint and several answer ; " but if it be the answer of a man and 
 his wife, it is headed, " The joint answer." If a female defendant has 
 married since the filing of the bill, but before answering, she must either 
 obtain an order for leave to answer separately, or answer jointly with 
 her husband, who, although not named on the record as a defendant, 
 may join in the answer : in which case, the answer should be headed : 
 " The answer of A B, and C his wife, lately and in the bill called C D, 
 spinster " (or widow, as the case may be). 8 The answer of an infant, or 
 other person answering by guardian, or of an idiot or lunatic answering 
 by his committee, is so headed. 9 
 
 Any defect occurring in the heading of an answer, so that it does not 
 appear distinctly whose answer it is, or to what bill it is an answer, is 
 a ground for taking it off the file for irregularity. Thus, where an 
 answer was intituled "the joint and several answer of A B and C D, 
 defendants, E F and G H, complainants," omitting the words, 
 "to the bill of complaint of," it was, on motion, * ordered to be * 732 
 taken off the file for irregularity. 1 So also, where the plaintiff 
 was misnamed in the heading, an order was made to take the answer 
 off the file, and for process of contempt to issue ; 2 and so, where 
 the bill was filed by six persons, and the document filed purported to be 
 an answer to the bill of five only, the answer was ordered to be taken 
 off the file. 3 If, however, it is clear to whose bill it is intended to be 
 an answer, this course will not now be followed. 4 The notice of motion, 
 in such a case, should not describe the document as the answer of 
 A B, &c, but as a certain paper writing, purporting to be the answer. 5 
 An answer with a defect of this sort in the title is, in fact, a nullity, 
 and may be treated as such ; and although a defendant may, if he 
 pleases, apply to the Court for leave to take the answer off the file and 
 
 6 Braithwaite's Pr. 44. tel, 5 Jur. 1104; Upton v. Sowten, 12 Sim. 45; 
 
 6 Ibid. ; Att.-Gen. v. Worcester Corporation, S. C. rami. Upton v. Lowten, 5 Jur. 818. 
 
 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 18. 8 Cope v. Parry, 1 Mad 8-3. As to scandal 
 
 7 Rigby v. Rigby, 9 Beav. 311, 313; see and impertinence in the heading of an answer, 
 forms in Vol. III. see Peck r. Peck, Mos. 45. 
 
 » Braithwaite's Pr. 46. 4 Rabbeth v. Squire, 10 Hare App. 3. See 
 
 9 For forms of headings of answers, see Bowes v. Farrar, L. R. 14 Eq. 71, where cer- 
 
 Vol. III. tain words of the prescribed form were omitted, 
 
 i Pieters v. Thompson, G. Coop. 249. 5 s ee 11 Ves. 64. For form of notice of 
 
 2 GriflUhs v. Wood, 11 Ves. 62; Fry v. motion, see Vol. III. 
 
 Mantell, 4 Beav. 485 ; S. C. nom. Fry v. Mar- 
 
 727
 
 * 733 ANSWERS. 
 
 re-swear it, it is not necessary that he should do so, but he may leave 
 the answer upon the file, and put in another. 6 
 
 Where an answer has been prepared for five defendants, it cannot be 
 received as the answer of two only ; 7 and where such an answer had 
 been filed, it was, upon the motion of the plaintiff, ordered to be taken 
 off the file.* In an earlier case, however, before the same Judge, where 
 a joint and several answer included in the title the names of persons 
 who refused to join in it, the answer was ordered to be received as the 
 answer of those defendants who had sworn to it, without striking out 
 the names of those who had not. 9 And an answer, which had been 
 prepared as the answer of several defendants, but only sworn to by 
 some of them, may, by special order, be directed to be filed as the 
 answer of those defendants only who have sworn to it ; and an order 
 may be subsequently made, that a defendant who has not sworn to it 
 (he being out of the jurisdiction when the answer was filed) be sworn to 
 it by the Record and Writ Clerk, without the answer being taken off the 
 file, and that such answer, when so sworn, be treated as the joint answer 
 of all the defendants whose answer it purports to be. 10 
 
 An answer must be signed by counsel ; u and no counsel is to sign 
 any answer unless he has perused it; and he must take care 
 *733 *that the documents are not unnecessarily set out therein in hcec 
 verba ; but that so much of them only as is pertinent and mate- 
 rial is set out or stated, or that the substance of so much of them only 
 as is pertinent and material be given, as counsel may deem advisable ; 
 and that no scandalous matter 1 be inserted therein. 2 
 
 The signature of counsel is usually put to the draft of the answer, 
 and thence copied on to the engrossment or print ; and if not affixed 
 either to one or the other, the plaintiff may apply, by motion, with 
 notice to the defendant, that the answer may be taken off the file ; 3 but 
 
 « Griffiths r. Wood, ubi supra. ants. The signature mar be m the firm name 
 
 7 Harris v. James, 3 Bro. C. C 399; Bin- of counsel. Hampton v. Coddington, 28 N. J. 
 nev's case, 2 Bland, 99; Cook v. Dew?, 2 Tenn. Eq. 557. And the signature of a solicitor is 
 Ch. 496. sufficient in New Jersey. Freehold Mutual 
 
 8 Cooke v. Westall, 1 Mad. 265; Bailey Loan Association v. Brown, 28 N. J. Eq. 42. 
 Washing Machine Co. v. Young, 12 Blatchf. In Michigan. Henry v. Gregory, 29 Mich. 68. 
 199, but with leave to the defendants who had In Tennessee. 1 Hicks' Man. Ch. Pr. 46, 133; 
 signed to erase the names of the others, and Stadler v. Hertz, 13 Lea, 315. In Illinois, 
 file the answer as their own only. Puterb. Ch. Pr. 59, 601. And see Hatch v. 
 
 9 Done r. Read, 2 V. & B. 310; see also Eustaphieve, Clarke, 63; ante, p. 312, n. 1. 
 Young v. Clarksville Man. Co.27N. J. Eq. 67. 1 As to scandal, see ante, p. 346. 
 
 m Lyons t. Read, 4 and 15 Nov. 1856, cited 2 Cons Ord. VIII. 2. 
 
 Braithwaite's Pr. 51, 52; and see Hayward v. 3 See Wall v. Stubbs, ubi supra. A party 
 
 Roberts (1857, H. 152), 6 March, 1858, and has a right to suppose that the pleading serve I 
 
 Lane r. London Bank of Scotland (1864, L. on him is a correct copy of that filed; and 
 
 1-28), 16 March, 1865, in which like orders were where the copy of an answer contains neith. r 
 
 made; the latter on petition of course, by con- the signature of solicitor or counsel, nor has a 
 
 sent of the plaintiff. jwrut, the plaintiff may apply to take the 
 
 ii Cons. Ord. VIII. 1; Wall v. Stubbs, 2 V. answer off the files for irregularity. Littlejohn 
 
 & B. 358; Brown v. Bruce, 2 Mer. 1; Bishop v. Munn, 3 Paige, 280. Where the answer was 
 
 v. Willis, 5 Beav. 83, n.; out see Sears v. Hyer, put in without the defendant's signature, it was 
 
 1 Paige, 483; see Barley u.Pearson, 3 Atk. ordered to be taken off the files for irregularity. 
 
 439. There is no objection to the same conn- Denison v. Bassford, 7 Paige, 370. For form 
 
 sel signing the separate answers of co-defend- of notice of motion, see Vol. III. 
 
 728
 
 FORM OP ANSWERS. * 734 
 
 the Court will not direct such a course to be adopted where the interest 
 of the plaintiff may be prejudiced by the proceeding. 4 Where, by in- 
 advertence, an answer has been sworn or hied without the name of 
 counsel being put to it, and the plaintiff has not served a notice of mo- 
 tion to take the answer off the file for irregularity, an order may be 
 obtained, on motion of course, or on petition of course at the liolls, to 
 amend the answer by adding the name. 5 
 
 An answer must, also, be signed by the defendant or defendants put- 
 ting it in, 6 unless an order has been obtained to take it without sig- 
 nature. 7 Where an answer is put in by guardian or committee, the 
 signature of such guardian or committee is alone required ; and if such 
 guardian is also a defendant, and puts in an answer in that character 
 as well as in that of guardian, he need only affix his signature to the 
 answer once. 8 It is prudent, though not essential, to sign each sheet 
 of the answer. Where there are any schedules, each schedule 
 should be signed also. 9 If the answer is put in upon *oath, the *734 
 signature must be affixed, or acknowledged, in the presence of the 
 person before whom it is sworn ; * and he also must sign each schedule, 
 as well as the jurat. 2 
 
 Sometimes the Court has, under special circumstances, directed an 
 answer to be received, though it has not been signed by the defendant ; 
 as, where a defendant went abroad, forgetting, or not having had time, 
 to put in his answer ; 3 and where a defendant had gone or was resident 
 abroad, and had given a general power of attorney to defend suits. 4 
 Where an answer was put in under the authority of a power of attorney, 
 the Court thought it better to take the answer without any signature, 
 than that the person to whom the power is given should sign it in the 
 
 4 Bull v. Griffin, 2 Anst. 563. Defendants may answer jointly, or jointly 
 
 5 Braithwaite's Pr. 48; and see H;irrison v. and severally, or separately, but in either case 
 Delmont, 1 Price, 103. each defendant must swear to his answer, or 
 
 6 Ordo curia, 2 Atk. 290 ; Cook v. Dews, 2 it will be no answer as to him. Binney's case, 2 
 Tenn. Ch. 496; Denison v. Bassford, 7 Paige, Bland, 99; Cook v. Dews, 2 Tenn. Ch". 496. 
 370; Cons. Ord. XV. 5; see Ch. Rule 7 of " Fulton Bank v Beach, 2 Paige, 306. 
 Maine, 37 Maine, 583. The answer must be The answer of a corporation should be 
 signed by the defendant, though the oath be signed by the principal officer. A secretary, or 
 waived. Denison o. Bassford, 7 Paige, 370; cashier, in case of a bank, frequently signs it 
 Kimball v. Ward, Walk. Ch. 439. But it is also. 1 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 239 ; Supervisors &c. v. 
 not ne essary in all cases that an individual Mississippi &c. R. R. Co. 21 III. 338. If the 
 defendant should write his own name to an name of the corporation is written to the 
 answer. Supervisors &c. v. Mississippi &c. answer, and there is nothing to show that it is 
 R. R. Co. 21 111. 338; Hatch v. Eustaphieve, unauthorized, it will be sufficient. Lorrison v. 
 Clarke, 63. And the signature may be waived Peoria &c. R. Co. 77 111. 11. 
 
 b}- the plaintiff; and the filing of a replication 8 Anon. 2 J. & W. 553. 
 
 is evidence of such waiver of the signature. 9 Braithwaite's Pr. 45, 342, n. 
 
 Fulton Bank v. Peach, 2 Paige, 306; Collard 1 Cons. Ord. XV. 5. 
 
 v. Smith, 13 N. J. Eq. 43, 45. "■ Braithwaite's Pr. 342, n.; and see post, 
 
 On a bill against husband and wif", the hus- p. 746, n. 
 
 band is bound to enter a joint appearance, and 8 v. Lake, 6 Ves. 171; v. Gwillim, 
 
 put in a joint answer, unless for sufficient id. 285; 10 Ves. 442; Dumond v. Magee, 2 
 
 reason, as that the wife refuses to join or to John. Ch. 240. 
 
 swear to a plea, he is permitted by the Court to * Bayley v. De Walkiers, 10 Ves. 441; 
 
 answer separately. Leavitt v. Cruger, 1 Paige, Harding t\ Harding, 12 Ves. 159. 
 
 421 , Collard v. Smith, 13 N. J. Eq. 43, 44. 
 
 729
 
 735 
 
 ANSWERS. 
 
 name of the defendant ; the power of attorney should be recited in any 
 order authorizing the answer to be put in under it. 5 
 
 The signature of the defendant must be affixed to the engrossment or 
 print, and not to the draft : the object in requiring it being to identify 
 the instrument, to which the defendant has given the sanction of his 
 oath, for the purpose of rendering a conviction for perjury more easy. 6 
 
 Unless the Court otherwise directs, the answers of all persons (except 
 persons entitled to the privilege of peerage, or corporations aggregate) 
 must be put in upon the oath of the parties putting in the same, 7 
 * 735 where they are not exempted from taking an oath by * any statute 
 in that behalf. 1 Persons entitled to the privilege of peerage an- 
 swer upon protestation of honor ; and corporations aggregate put in their 
 answer under their common seal. 2 The Secretary of State for India, 
 
 5 Bayley ». De Walkiers, ubi supra. 
 
 6 Harr.'by New]. 170. 
 
 7 An answer should be regularly signed and 
 sworn to. Fulton Bank v. Beach, 2 Paige, 
 307; S. C. 6 Wend. 36; Trumbull v. Gibbons, 
 Halst. Dig. 172; Salmon v. Claggett, 3 Bland, 
 125; Rogers v. Cruger, 7 John. Ch. 557; Van 
 Valtenburg v. Al berry, 10 Iowa, 264; Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 874; Ch. Rule 7 of Maine. This rule 
 in .Maine gives the substance of the oath to 
 be administered; and it provides that the cer- 
 tificate of the magistrate must state the oath 
 administered. 37 Maine, 583. 
 
 "Answers," in New Hampshire, "unless 
 required by the bill to be under oath, need not 
 be sworn to, and they will then be regarded 
 only as pleadings, and no exception for in- 
 sufficiency can be taken thereto." Rule 9 of 
 Chancery Practice. See Dorn v. Bayer, 16 Md. 
 144; Mahaney v. Lozier, 16 Md. 69; Shepard 
 v. Ford, 10 Iowa, 502; Blakemore v. Allen, id. 
 550. 
 
 A defendant has a right to put in his answer 
 under oath, although not required by the plain- 
 tiff. White r. Hampton, 9 Iowa, 181. 
 
 See 59th Equity Rule of the U. S. Courts, 
 post, p. 2389. 
 
 In New Jersey an answer must be sworn to 
 before a Master of the Court or before a com- 
 missioner authorized for that purpose; and an 
 answer sworn to before a notary public, of the 
 State of Connecticut, was considered irregular, 
 as filed without oath. Trumbull v. Gibbons, 
 supra. In Maryland, an answer sworn to be- 
 fore a justice of the peace, in another State or 
 in the District of Columbia, who is certified to 
 be a justice of the peace at the time, is received 
 as sufficient. Chapline v. Beatty, 1 Bland, 
 197; Lingan v. Henderson, id. 240; Gibson v. 
 Tilton, id. 352. As to New York, see 1 Barb. 
 Ch. Pr. 145, 146. As to New Hampshire, see 
 Chancery Rule 30, 38 N. H. 611. 
 
 A defendant prepared an answer admitting 
 the allegations of the plaintiff's bill, and it was 
 certified as sworn to; but the person certifying 
 
 730 
 
 did not style himself in the certificate a justice 
 of the peace, nor was he otherwise proved to 
 be a magistrate empowered to administer 
 oaths; the defendant died, and this paper so 
 certified was afterwards filed in the clerk's 
 office, and it was held not to be the answer of 
 the party, nor evidence in the cause. Sitling- 
 ton v. Brown, 7 Leigh. 271. 
 
 i See Stat. 7 & 8 Will. III. c. 34, § 1 ; 8 Geo. 
 I. c. 6, § 1; 22 Geo. II. c. 30, § 1; id. c. 46, 
 § 36; 9 Geo. IV. c. 32, § 1; 3& 4 Will. IV. 
 c. 49; id. c. 82; 1 & 2 Vic. c. 77; and see id. 
 c. 105. Parties if conscientiously scrupulous 
 of taking an oath, may, in lieu thereof, make 
 solemn affirmation to the truth of the facts 
 stated by them in the U. S. Courts. Equity 
 Rule 91. So in Massachusetts, and other 
 States, either by statute or rule of Court. It 
 is to be observed that an affirmation cannot be 
 taken under a commission authorizing the 
 commissioners to take an answer upon oath. 
 Parke v. Christy, 1 Y. & J. 533. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XV. 6. The answer of a cor- 
 poration is put in without oath, under the cor- 
 porate seal. 1 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 239; see Vermil- 
 yea v. Fulton Bank, 1 Paige, 37; Fulton Bank 
 v. N. Y. & Sharon Canal Co. id. 311; Balti- 
 more & Ohio R R. Co. v. City of Wheeling, 
 13 Gratt. 40; Haight v. Prop, of Morris Aque- 
 duct, 4 Wash. C. C. 601; Champlin v. New 
 York, 3 Paige, 573. An answer of a corpora- 
 tion, put in without their seal, was suppressed 
 as irregular, in Ransom v. Stonington Savings 
 Bank, 13 N. J. Eq. 212. But it was held in the 
 same case that the corporation may adopt and 
 use any seal, — as a bit of paper attached by a 
 waifer, — pro line vice. Ibid.; Mill D:im Foun- 
 dry v. Hovey, 21 Pick. 417. If the seal is 
 dispensed with, it should be by leave of the 
 Court previously obtained and for good cause 
 shown. Ransom v. Stonington Savings Bank, 
 uhi suprn. The plaintiff cannot compel the 
 officers, even those who have signed it, to 
 swear to it. 1 Hcff. Ch. Pr. 239; Brumly v. 
 Westchester Manuf . So. 1 John. Ch. 366 ; see
 
 FORM OF ANSWERS. 
 
 736 
 
 and the Attorney-General, respectively sign, but do not swear to their 
 answers ; and such answers are received and filed without an order dis- 
 pensing with the oath. 8 
 
 The oath, when administered to a person professing the Christian re- 
 ligion, is upon the Holy Evangelists. 4 But persons who do not believe 
 the Christian oath must, out of necessity, be put to swear according to 
 their own notion of an oath : 5 therefore a Jew may be sworn 
 upon the Pentateuch with his hat on ; 6 and a heathen * may be * 736 
 sworn in the manner most binding on his conscience. 1 
 
 Sometimes an answer is put in without oath, or without oath or sig- 
 nature, and this practice is frequently resorted to in amicable suits ; 2 
 such an answer, however, cannot be received, unless an order to that 
 effect has first been obtained. This order may be obtained upon 
 motion, 3 or upon petition of course at the Rolls ; 4 the application is 
 usually made by petition. If the answer is to be put in without oath, 
 and the plaintiff applies for the order, no consent is necessary ; but if 
 the defendant applies, the plaintiff's solicitor must instruct counsel to 
 
 Kittre Ige v. Claremont Bank, 1 Wood & M. 
 244. But where it is the object of the corpora- 
 tion to obtain the dissolution of a:i injunction, 
 it is necessary to have the answer verified by 
 the oath of some of the corporators, or officers 
 of the corporation, who are acquainted with the 
 facts; as the injunction cannot be dissolved upon 
 an answer without oath, denying the equity of 
 the bill. Fulton Bank v. New York and Sharon 
 Canal Co. 1 Paige, 311; see Hale v. Continental 
 Life Ins. Co. 16 Fed. Rep. 718. 
 
 Individual members of a corporation may be 
 called upon to answer to a bill of disi-overy 
 under oath; but in that case the individuals 
 must be named as defendants in the bill. 
 Brumly c. Weschester Manuf. So. 1 John. Ch. 
 366; Buford v. Rucker, 4 J. J. Marsh. 551; 
 Vermilvea v. Fulton Bank, 1 Paige, 37. As to 
 making officers and members of corporations 
 parties for discovery, see ante, p. 135, notes. The 
 answer of a corporation, under its seal, is nothing 
 more than a pleading; and although it negatives 
 the bill, will not warrant the dissolution of an 
 injunction. Griffin v. State Bank, 17 Ala. 258, 
 overruling Hogan v. Branch Bank of Decatur, 
 10 Ala. 485. A foreign corporation cannot be 
 compelled to file an answer; and the want of 
 an answer where it was not needed for the pur- 
 poses of discovery, was held no good objection 
 on a motion to dissolve an injunction. Bait. & 
 Ohio R. R. Co. v Wheeling, 13 Gratt. 40. 
 
 It is desirable, though not essential, that the 
 affixing of the seal should be attested by some 
 official of the corporation. Braithwaite's Pr. 
 53. For forms of oath, affirmation, and attes- 
 tation, see Vol. III. Coale v. Chase, 1 Bland, 
 137; Gibson v. Tilton, 1 Bland, 355. 
 
 8 For form of special attestation to th» signa- 
 ture of the Secretary of State, see Vol. III. 
 
 4 Except in cases within the Stat. 1 & 2, 
 
 Vic. c. 105, post, p. 746. Where that Act is in- 
 applicable, a Christian, in making oath, holds 
 the book in his right hand, the hand being un- 
 covered, and, in the case of a male person, the 
 head being uncovered also. Braithwaite's Pr. 
 343; same on oaths, 45. 
 
 5 Omvchund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 21, 46; see 
 Att.-Gen. v. Bradlaugh, 14 Q. B. D. 667. 
 
 6 Hinde, 228: see Tryatt v. Lindo, 3 Edw. 
 Ch. 239. But, though the head be covered, the 
 right hand in which the book is held must 
 be uncovered. A Jew may, if he pleases, be 
 sworn while his head is uncovered. Braith- 
 waite's Pr. 343. 
 
 1 In Ramkissenseat v. Barker, 1 Atk. 19, 
 where the defendant to a cross-bill was resi- 
 dent in the East Indies, and professed the 
 Gentoo religion, the Court directed a com- 
 mission to the East Indies, and empowered the 
 commissioners to administer the oath in the 
 most solemn manner as in their discretion 
 should seem meet, and, if they administered 
 any other oath than the Christian, to certify to 
 the Court what was done by them. For form 
 of jurat in the case of a Hindoo, see Braith- 
 waite's Oaths, 64, 65. 
 
 2 An answer may by consent of the plaintiff 
 be received without being sworn to. Contee v. 
 Dawson, 2 Bland, 264; Billingslea v. Gilbert, 1 
 Bland, 567; see Reed P. Warner, 5 Paige, 650. 
 And in New York the filing of a replication is 
 evidence of such consent. Fulton Bank v. 
 Beach, 2 Paige, 307. But it is otherwise in 
 New Jersey; Trumbull v. Gibbons, HaNt. Dig. 
 172; and in Maryland, Nesbitt v. Del'am, 7 
 Gill & J. 494. 
 
 8 Hinde, 228. 
 
 * Braithwaite's Pr. 47. For form of order on 
 motion, see Seton, 1254, No. 2; and for forms of 
 motion paper and petition, see Vol. III. 
 
 731
 
 *737 
 
 ANSWERS. 
 
 consent to the motion, or must subscribe his own consent to the 
 petition, as the case may be. 5 If * the answer is to be put in 
 without oath or signature, the consent of the party not applying 
 
 5 Where the parties agree that the answer 
 mav be received without oath or signature, it 
 is of course for the Court so to order. Fulton 
 Bank r. Beach. 2 Paige, 307; S C. 6 Wend. 36; 
 Trumbull r. Gibbons, Halst. Dig. 172; Bill- 
 ingslea c. Gilbert, 1 Bland, 507. 
 
 And an answer without oah merely puts the 
 cause at issue, and is of no more weight as evi- 
 dence than the bill. Guthrie v. Quinn, 43 Ala. 
 561. 
 
 In Massachusetts, the rule of Court is that, 
 " when a bill shall be filed other than for dis- 
 covery only, the plaintiff may waive the neces- 
 sity of the answer being made on the oath of 
 the defendant, and, in such cases, the answer 
 may be made without oath, and shall have no 
 other or greater force as evidence than the bill. 
 No exception for insufficiency can be taken to 
 such answer." Rule 8. (a) Answers in New 
 Hampshire need not be sworn to unless an oath 
 is required by the bill; if not sworn to they will 
 be regarded only as pleadings, and no excep- 
 tion f'>r insufficiency can be taken thereto. Rule 
 9 of Chancery Practice; 38 N. H. 606. This 
 provision, authorizing the plaintiff to waive an 
 answer on oath from the defendant, introduced 
 a new principle, and was intended to leave it 
 optional with the plaintiff to compel a discovery 
 from the defendant in aid of the suit, or to waive 
 the oath of the defendant, if the plaintiff was un- 
 willing to rely upon his honesty, and chose to 
 establish his claim by other evidence alone. 
 He must waive an answer on oath as to every 
 point of the bill, or to no part thereof. And 
 after the defendant has put in an answer on 
 oath as to the whole or any part of the bill, it 
 is too late for the plaintiff to get rid of the con- 
 sequences of a denial upon oath of all or any of 
 the matters of the bill. An amendment in that 
 stage of the suit, waiving an answer on oath, is 
 irregular, and cannot be allowed. If the plain- 
 tiff is unwilling to rely upon an answer on oath 
 to the amendments, his only remedy is to dis- 
 miss the bill and commence a new suit, in which 
 suit he can waive an answer on oath. Bunas r. 
 Looker. 4 Paige, 227: 1 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 234, 235; 
 Rinsrham ». Yeomans, 10 Cush. 58; Chace v. 
 Holmes, 2 Gray, 431. 
 
 A motion to dismiss a bill for want of equity 
 on its face is not the proper mode of testing the 
 question whether the plaintiff can call upon the 
 defendant to answer a part of the bill under 
 oath, and waive the oath as to another part. 
 Henderson v. Mathews, 1 Lea, 34; S. C 2 Leg. 
 Rep. 181- 
 
 The plaintiff who has waived an answer on 
 oath, cannot apply to have the answer taken 
 off the file on the ground that the defendant 
 knows it to be wholly untrue. Denison v. 
 Bassford, 7 Paige, 370. All material allega- 
 tions of the bill may be proved as if they had 
 been distinctly put in issue by the answer; and, 
 if no replication is filed, the matters of defence 
 set up will be considered as admitted by the 
 plaintiff, as in the case of a sworn answer. 1 
 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 235. Although the plaintiff in 
 an injunction bill waive an answer on oath, the 
 defendant may file it on oath for the purpose of 
 moving to dissolve the injunction, or discharge 
 a we exeat. Dougrey v. Topping, 4 Paige, 94; 
 Mahaney v. Lazier, 16 Md. 69. In such case, 
 the unsworn answer is no evidence on which 
 to dissolve an injunction. Rainey v. Rainey, 
 35 Ala. 282; Mahaney v. Lazier, ubi sujna. 
 Where the defendants are not jointly interested 
 in respect to the claim made against them by 
 the bill, the plaintiff may waive an answer on 
 oath as to some of them and not as to the others. 
 Bulkley v. Van Wyck, 5 Paige, 536; Morse v. 
 Uovey", 1 Barb. Ch. 404; S. C. 1 Sandf. Ch. 
 187; see Stephenson v. Stephenson, 6 Paige, 
 353. 
 
 The defendant has been held entitled to an- 
 swer under oath, although the bill waived a 
 sworn answer. White v. Hampton, 10 Iowa, 
 238; S. C. 9 Iowa, 181. 
 
 Although where an answer on oath is waived, 
 it is not evidence in favor of the defendant for 
 any purpose at the hearing, even when actually 
 sworn to, yet, as a pleading, the plaintiff may 
 avail himself of admissions and allegations 
 made therein, which establish the case mnde 
 by his bill; Bartlett v. Gale, 4 Paige, 504; 
 Moore v. Hunter, 1 Gilman, 317; Miller r 
 Avery, 2 Barb. Ch. 582; Wilson v. Towle, 36 
 N. H. 129 ; and for the purpose of ascertaining 
 what points are at issue. Dorn v. Bayer, 16 Md. 
 144; Durfee v. McClurg, 6 Mich. 223 ; Smith 
 v. Potter, 3 Wis. 432 ; Union Bank of George- 
 town v. Geary, 5 Peters, 99, 110, 112. An 
 answer sworn to where the oath is waived will 
 be treated as if it were not Stevens v Post, 12 
 N. J. Eq. 408; Hyer v. Little, 20 N. J. Eq. 443; 
 Sweet v. Parker, 22 id. 453. The oath in such 
 case is not evidence at the hearing. Walker v. 
 Hill, 21 N. J. Eq. 191. But any admissions 
 made are operative against defendant. Hyer 
 v. Little, 20 N. J. Eq. 443 ; Symmes v. Strong, 
 28 N. J. Eq. 131. 
 
 (a) See now Stat, of 1883, c. 223, § 10, stated ante, p. 357, note (a). 
 
 732
 
 FORM OF ANSWERS. 
 
 '37 
 
 is requisite. 1 (a) It is usual for the plaintiff's solicitor to require to see 
 the draft or a copy of the proposed answer, before he applies or consents 
 to the defendant's application, in order that he may be satisfied that it 
 is sufficient : a as no exceptions can be taken to an answer put in without 
 oath or signature, or attestation of honor. 3 (b) 
 
 If the answer is put in by a guardian ad litem, or committee, the 
 order should express that the answer is to be put in without the oath or 
 signature of such guardian or committee ; and the order will not be 
 acted upon, if it bears date antecedently to the order appointing the 
 guardian. 4 So, likewise, an order to file the separate answer of a 
 married woman, without oath or signature, will not be acted on, if 
 dated previously to the date of the order giving her leave to answer 
 separately. 5 
 
 The Court will not permit the answer of a defendant, represented 
 to be in a state of incapacity, to be received without oath or 
 signature, though a mere trustee and without interest : the proper 
 
 1 Braithwaite's Pr. 47; and see v. Lake, 
 
 6 Ves 171; v. Gwillim, id. 285; Bavley v. 
 
 De Walkiers, 10 Ves. 441: Codner v. Hersey, 
 18 Ves. 468. It seems that if the plaintiff 
 chooses to dispense with the oath, the Court, 
 upon his motion, will require the defendant to 
 answer without oath, even without the consent 
 of the defendant. Cooper, Eq. PI. 325; Story, 
 Ff|. PI. § 874. But in all such cases the dispen- 
 sation is supposed to be made for the conven- 
 ience of the defendant, and upon his expressed 
 or presumed consent. The application nun- be 
 made on the part of the plaintiff or of the de- 
 
 (a) Waiver in the bill of an answer under 
 oath has no effec , if not accepted by the defend- 
 ant, anil does not deprive an answer upon oath 
 of its ordinary effect as evidence. Clements v. 
 Moore, 6 Wall. 299; Anmry v. Lawrence, :j 
 Cliff. 523,537; Woodruff p. Dubuque &c. K. 
 Co. 30 Fed. Rep. 91; Armstrong v. Scott, 3 G. 
 Greene, 433; Brown v Bulkley, 14 N. J. Eq. 
 21)4. 300. In some of the States, as, for in- 
 stance, in New York and New Jersey, a change 
 has been made by statute. See Congdon v. 
 Aylsworth, 16 R. 1.281; Huntington v. Saun- 
 ders, 120 U. S. 78 Palton v. J. M. Brunswick 
 & Balke Co. 23 Fla. 283: Hall v. Claggett, 48 
 Md. 223; Major v. Ficklin, 85 Va. 732 ; Ball 
 t'. Sawyer, 02 Vt. 307; Throckmorton v. Throck- 
 morton, 80 Va. 708; Fisher v. Moog, 3!) Fed. 
 Rep. 005; Bartlett v. Gale, 4 Paige. 503; Moore 
 v. Hunter, 1 Gihnan, 317; Babcock r. Smith, 
 22 Pick. 61. In New Hampshire and Maine, 
 when the bill does not call for an answer under 
 oath, the answer, though upon oath, is mere 
 pleading, and not evidence. Winsor p. Bailey, 
 55 N. H. 218; Ayer v. Messer, 59 N. H. 279; 
 Clay v. Towle, 78 Maine, 80. The plaintiff can- 
 not by amendment of his bill waive an answer 
 under oath, so as to lessen the force of such an 
 
 fendant, but the order will only be made where 
 both parties consent, and not against the will of 
 either. Brown v. Bulkley, 14 N. J. Eq. 306; 
 Hinde, 228; Codner v Hersey, ubi supra. 
 
 2 Braithwaite's Pr. 48. 
 
 3 Hill v. Earl of Bute, 2 Fowl. Ex. Pr. 10 
 McCormick v. Chamberlain, 11 Paige, 548 
 Wallace v. Wallace, Halst. N. J. Dig. 173 
 Sheppard v. Akers, 1 Tenn. Ch. 326; Smith v 
 St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co. 2 Tenn. Ch. 599 
 See infra, p. 760. 
 
 4 B -aithwaite's Pr. 47. 
 *> Ibid. 
 
 answer already filed, so far as it is responsive 
 to the amendment. Walker v. Campbell, 5 Lea 
 (Tenn.), 354. The oath of one defendant is 
 usually treated as sufficient when the bill is 
 sworn to by only one of many plaintiffs. Ar- 
 nold o. Slaughter, 30 W. Va. 589. 
 
 In the Federal Courts, when a bill for an 
 injunction waives an answer under oath, the 
 answer made under oath and denying all the 
 equities of the bill, will, under Equity Rule 41, 
 as amended, have at the hearing only the force 
 of an affidavit. United States v. Workingmen's 
 A. Council, 54 Fed. Rep. 994; see Dravo r. 
 Fabel, 132 D. S. 487; Conley r. Nailer, 118 
 U. S. 127, 134; Treadwell v. Lennig, 50 Fed. 
 Rep. 872. Admissions in an answer, the oath 
 to which is waived, are evidence against the 
 defendant. Uhlmann v. Arnholt & S. B. Co. 
 41 Fed. Rep. 369. Under the Codes a sworn 
 answer may operate as an affidavit of merits. 
 Fulweiler p. Hog's Back Cons. M. Co. 83 Cal. 
 120. 
 
 • (6) Although the defendant's failure to sign 
 his answer is fatal on a motion to strike it from 
 the tile, yet this defect is waived by filing a 
 replication. Howes v. Downing, 72 Mich. 43. 
 
 733
 
 * 739 ANSWERS. 
 
 * 738 * course, in such case, being for the Court to appoint a guardian 
 
 by whom the defendant may answer. 1 
 
 The method of dispensing with the attestation of honor of a peer or 
 peeress putting in an answer, is, mutatis mutandis, the same as the 
 method adopted for dispensing with the oath of a commoner. 2 
 
 The signature to an answer taken without oath must be attested by 
 the defendant's solicitor, or by some person competent to be a witness : 
 otherwise, the answer cannot be filed. The attestation is written on the 
 left-hand side of the signature. 3 
 
 An answer put in without oath or attestation of honor or signature, 
 and accepted without either of those sanctions, gives the same author- 
 ity to the Court to look to the circumstances denied or admitted in the 
 answer so put in, for the purpose of administering civil justice between 
 the parties, as if it was put in upon attestation of honor or upon oath. 4 
 No exceptions, however, as we have seen, can be taken to an answer so 
 put in. 5 
 
 Section III. — Swearing, Filing, and Printing Answers. 
 
 A defendant required to answer a bill, whether original or amended, 
 must put in his plea, answer, or demurrer thereto, not demurring alone, 
 within twenty-eight days from the delivery to him, or his solicitor, of a 
 copy of the interrogatories which he is required to answer. 6 If the 
 plaintiff amends his bill, after interrogatories to the original bill have 
 been served, but before answer, the twenty-eight days will be computed 
 from the service of the amended or new interrogatories ; or if no such 
 interrogatories are served, then from the service of a copy of the 
 amended bill. 7 Where a defendant is required to answer amendments 
 and exceptions together, 8 he must put in his further answer, and his 
 answer to the amendments of the bill, within fourteen days after he 
 shall have been served with interrogatories for his examination, in 
 answer to the amended bill. 9 If he does not, and procures no en- 
 largement of the time allowed, he will be subject to the following 
 
 liabilities : — 
 *739 * 1. An attachment may be issued against him. 1 
 
 2. He may be committed to prison, and brought to the bar of 
 the Court. 1 
 
 3. The plaintiff may file a traversing note ; or proceed to take the bill 
 pro confesso against him. 2 
 
 1 Wilson v. Grace, 14 Ves. 172; Matter of 1 Braithwaite's Manual, 156. W r here the 
 Barber, 2 John. Ch. 235; and see Cons. Ord. defendant is served abroad, the times are regu- 
 VII. 3: ante, p 176. lated by the special order directing such service. 
 
 2 Hinde, 228. A?ite, p. 452. 
 
 8 Braithwaite's Pr. 47, 48. For form of 8 Ante, p. 413 
 
 attestation, see Vol. III. » Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 6. 
 
 4 Per Lord Eldon, in Curling v. Marquis of 1 Ante, Chap. X. § 1. If the defendant is a 
 Townshend, 19 Ves. 628, 630. peer, M. P., corporation aggregate, or non com- 
 
 5 Hill v. Earl of Bute, 2 Fowl. Ex. Pr. 10. pos, or the Attorney-General, the process is of 
 
 6 Cons. Ord XXXVII. 4; 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86; a different kind;«n<e. Chap. X. §2. 
 
 § 13: ante, p. 485. 2 Ibid.; see ante, pp. 514, 518. In Mas- 
 
 734 

 
 SWEARING, FILING, AND PRINTING ANSWERS. * 740 
 
 If the defendant, not being in contempt, submits to exceptions to his 
 answer for insufficiency before they are set down for hearing, he has 
 fourteen days from the date of the submission within which he must put 
 in his further answer. 3 If, not being in contempt, he submits to the 
 exceptions after they are set down for hearing, or the Court holds his 
 first or second answer to be insufficient, he must put in his further 
 answer within such time as the Court may appoint. 4 If he does not 
 answer within the above periods, or obtain further time and answer 
 within such further time, the plaintiff may sue out process of contempt 
 against him. 5 
 
 If a defendant is not required to answer a bill, he may put in a plea, 
 answer, or demurrer, not demurring alone, within fourteen days after 
 the expiration of the time within which he might have been served with 
 interrogatories for his examination, in answer to such bill ; 6 but not 
 afterwards, without leave of the Court. 7 It follows from these rules, 
 that if a defendant, served within the jurisdiction of the Court, appears 
 within the time limited, he has thirty days from the service of the bill; 8 
 or, if he does not appear within the time limited, twenty-two days from 
 the time of his actual appearance, 9 within which he may put in a volun- 
 tary answer. 
 
 If the plaintiff amends his bill, without requiring an answer to 
 *the amendments, a defendant who has answered, or has not * 740 
 been required to answer the original bill, but desires to answer 
 the amended bill, must put in his answer thereto within fourteen days 
 after the expiration of the time within which, if an answer had been 
 required, he might have been served with interrogatories for his exami- 
 nation in answer to such amended bill, or within such further time as 
 the Judge may allow ; in this case, therefore, the defendant has thirty 
 days, from the service of the amended bill, within which he must put in 
 his voluntary answer. 1 
 
 sachusetts, " if the defendant shall not appear plaintiff, until the notice is regularly disposed 
 
 and tile his answer, plea, or demurrer, within of by the Court. Ormsby v. Palmer, 1 Hogan, 
 
 one month after the day of appearance, the 191; see Burrall v. Raineteaux, 2 Paige, 331; 
 
 plaintiff may enter an order to take his bill tor Hunt v. Wallis, 6 Paige, 371; Hurd r. Haines, 
 
 confessed, and the matter thereof shall be de- 9 Paige, 604. After an order, allowing further 
 
 creed accordingly, unless good cause shall time to answer, it is irregular for the defendant 
 
 appear to the contrary." Ch. Rule 9. to demur. Davenport v Sniffen, 1 Barb. 223 ; 
 
 As to the course of practice in the Court of Lakens v. Fielden, 11 Paige, 644; Bedell v. 
 
 Chancer}-, heretofore existing in New York, in Bedell, 2 Barb. Ch. 99. 
 regard to the time of filing answers, and appli- 3 Cons. Ord. XVI. 9. 
 
 cations for the extension of time, see 1 Hoff. Ch. 4 Cons. Ord. XVI. 14. If the defendant is 
 
 Pr. 228; 1 Barb. Ch. I'r. 146, 147. A defendant in contempt, on the allowance of exceptions, he 
 
 may, on moiion, obtain further time to answer. cannot apply for further time. Wheat v. Gra- 
 
 Carroll v. Parsons, 1 Bland, 125. After a de- ham, 5 Sim. 570. 
 muiTir overruled, an order for further time to 6 Cons. Ord. XVI. 15. 
 
 answer merely, can be obtained only by a spe- 6 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 5 
 
 cial application. Trim v. Barker, f. & R. 253. * 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 13. 
 
 After a plea overruled, an order for further time 8 Cons. Ord. X. 3; XI. 5; XXXVII. 5. 
 
 to answer, obtained as of course, is irregular. 9 Ibid. ; Braithwaite's Manual, 156. 
 
 Ferrand v. Pelham, T. & R. 404. A notice of an i Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 7; Cheeseborough v. 
 
 application for time to answer, and an affidavit Wright, 28 Beav. 173; Braithwaite's Manual, 
 
 tiled in support of it, according to the Irish 156; see post, p. 777, n. 
 practice, prevent all further proceedings by the 
 
 735
 
 741 
 
 ANSWERS. 
 
 Where an attachment for want of answer has been executed against a 
 defendant, but he has been discharged from prison or from the custody 
 of the Sergeant-at-Arms, or messenger, because he was not brought up to 
 the bar of the Court within the proper time, 2 he must put in his answer 
 within eight days after such discharge ; and if he does not do so, a new 
 attachment for want of answer may be issued against him. 8 
 
 After a traversing note has been filed and served, a defendant cannot 
 put in his answer without special leave of the Court. 4 In such a case, 
 the defendant should move to take the traversing note off the file, with 
 leave to put in an answer. 5 
 
 A married woman answering separately, under an order, has the full 
 time from the date of the order to do so. 6 
 
 The day on which an order that the plaintiff do give security for costs 
 is served, and the time thenceforward, until and including the day on 
 which such security is given, are not reckoned in the computation of 
 time allowed a defendant to plead, answer, or demur, or otherwise make 
 his defence to the suit. 7 
 
 If a defendant, using due diligence, is unable to put in his answer to 
 a bill within the time allowed, the Judge, on sufficient cause being 
 shown, may, as often as he shall deem right, allow to such defendant 
 such further time, and on such, if any, terms as to the Judge shall 
 seem just. 8 (a) 
 
 Applications for further time to answer are made by summons 
 * 741 at * Chambers ; 1 and should be supported by affidavit, that due 
 diligence has been used, and that further time is necessary. 2 
 
 2 See ante, pp. 490, 494. 
 8 Cons. Ord. XII. 2, 3. 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. XIII. 7; ante, p. 515. 
 
 5 Towne v. Bonnin, 1 De G. & S. 128; ante, 
 p. 516. For form of notice of motion, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 6 Ante, p. 183; Braithwaite's Manual, 11, 
 12; Jackson ». Haworth, 1 S. & S. 161. 
 
 7 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 14. 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 8; 15 & 16 Vic. c. 
 86, § 13. Time may be given, where the de- 
 fendant is interrogated as to a document in the 
 plaintiff's possession, until a limited time after 
 the document is produced. Princess of Wales v. 
 Lord Liverpool. 1 Swanst. 114, 123, 580; Jones 
 v. Lewis, 2 S. & S. 242; Taylor v. Heming, 4 
 Beav. 235. So, time will be granted for an- 
 swering a cross-bill until the defendant in the 
 original bill has complied with an order for the 
 production of documents. Holmes v. Baddeley, 
 7 Beav. 69. So, in a cross-suit, the defendant 
 may, on motion of course, obtain an order en- 
 larging the time to answer for a limited period 
 after the defendant to the original suit has 
 put in his answer. Harris v. Harris. T. & 
 R 165; Noel v. King, 3 Mad. 183: WMterton v. 
 Croft, 5 Sim. 502. A defendant has the whole 
 
 (a) In such case, cause must be shown for 
 the delay in answering, if excessive. Central 
 Trust Co. v. Texas & St. Louis Ry. Co. 23 Fed. 
 
 736 
 
 of the last day specified in the order to answer, 
 in which to serve his answer. Hoxie v. Scott, 
 Clarke, 457. And after the time of answering 
 has expired, the defendant may serve an an- 
 swer at any time before an order to take the bill 
 as confessed is actually entered with the clerk. 
 Ibid. But the Court may, in its discretion, re- 
 ceive or reject an answer tiled after the regular 
 time for answering has passed, and the motion 
 for leave to file it and the decision should 
 appear in the record. Lindsey v. Stevens, 5 
 Dana, 185; see Scales v. Nichols, 3 Hayw. 230; 
 Fisher v. Fisher, 4 Hen. & M. 484; Daly v. 
 Duggan. 1 Ir. Eq. 315; Vassarr. Hill, 1 Hayes, 
 355 ; see Kehoe v. Carville (Iowa), 51 N. W. 
 Rep. 166. 
 
 After pro confesso taken, leave to file an 
 answer will only be granted upon good cause 
 shown. Anonymous, 1 Tenn. Ch. 2. And a 
 sufficient answer. Emery v. Downing, 13 N.J. 
 Eq. 59; Lewis v. Simonton, 8 Humph. 185. 
 
 i 15 & 16 Vic. c. 8\ § 26. Under some 
 special circumstances the application should be 
 made to the Court. Manchester and Sheffield 
 Ry. Co. v. Worksop Board of Health, 2 K. & 
 J. 25. For forms of summons, see Vol. III. 
 
 2 Brown v. Lee, 11 Beav. 162 ; 12 Jur. 687; 
 
 R^p. 846 ; 24 id. 151; Mayes v. Hendry, 33 Ark. 
 240.
 
 SWEARING, FILING, AND PRINTING ANSWERS. * 742 
 
 If the defendant has not been interrogated, he or his solicitor must 
 also swear that he is advised aiid believes that it is necessary, for the 
 purposes of his defence, that he should put in an answer, and that the 
 application is not made for the purpose of delay. 8 
 
 The summons must be served on the solicitor for the plaintiff two days 
 before the return thereof, exclusive of Sunday, 4 unless a shorter return 
 be granted, by special leave, on issuing the summons; and a printed copy 
 of the bill, and the interrogatories, if any, to be answered, must be pro- 
 duced at the hearing of the application. 5 An affidavit in opposition to 
 the application may be filed, and either party may use any affidavit pre- 
 viously filed. Notice of the intention to use an affidavit must, however, 
 be given. 6 If the plaintiff's solicitor is not in attendance when the 
 summons is called on, an order may be made in his absence, on a case 
 for further time being shown, and subject to the production of the office 
 copy of an affidavit of service on him of the summons. 7 This affidavit 
 should, in strictness, be produced to the Chief or Junior Clerk, before 
 the Chambers close on the day the application is heard. 
 
 The order on the summons is drawn up in Chambers, and must be 
 entered at the entering seat in the Registrar's Office. 8 
 
 The written consent of the plaintiff's solicitor to further time being 
 given will be acted on at Chambers, without his attendance; but care 
 should be taken, in drawing up an order thereon, that the terms of the 
 consent are strictly pursued ; thus, a consent to further time " to an- 
 swer " will not justify an order being drawn up for time " to plead, an- 
 swer, or demur." 9 
 
 The Judge is expressly empowered to impose terms on an application 
 for further time : 10 and, as a general rule, the costs of the first applica- 
 tion will be made costs in the cause, but those of subsequent applications 
 will be ordered to be paid by the defendant. It may also be here 
 observed, that if any person who has obtained * any decree or * 7-42 
 order upon condition, does not perform or comply with such con- 
 dition, he will be considered to have waived or abandoned such order, 
 so far as the same is beneficial to himself ; and any other person inter- 
 ested in the matter may, on breach or non-performance of the condition, 
 take either such proceedings as the order may in such case warrant, or 
 such proceedings as might have been taken if no such order had been 
 made, unless the Court otherwise directs. 1 Under the old practice, 
 when a defendant obtained further time, or permission for any other 
 thing upon a condition, if he neglected to perforin the condition, he lost 
 
 in practice, however, further time is usually 8 Cons. Ord. XXXV. 32: Ord. I. 18. No 
 
 granted, on the first application, without an service of an order for time is now necessary, 
 
 affidavit. For form of affidavit, see Vol. III. 2 Smith's Pr. 181. 
 
 3 For form of affidavit, see Vol. III. 9 Ante, p. 690; Newman v. White, 10 Beav. 
 
 * Cons. Ord. XXXV. 7; XXXVII. 11. The 4; nnd see Hunter v. Nockolds, 2 Phil. 540; 6 
 
 summons must be served before two o'clock on Hare, 12; 12 Jur. 149. 
 
 a Saturday, and before seven o'clock on any ln Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 8 See on this point, 
 
 other day. Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 2. Zulueta v. Vinenr, 15 Beav. 575; see also, Lee 
 
 5 Regulations, 8 Aug. 1857, r. 2. v. Read, 5 Beav. 381, 386: 6 Jur. 1026; 23 Ord. 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. XXXV. 27. For form of Dec. 1833; Sand. Ord. 781 ; Beav. Ord. 51 ; 
 notice, see Vol. III. Cons. Ord. XXXV. 61. 
 
 1 For form of affidavit, see Vol. III. i Cons. Ord. XXIII. 22. 
 
 vol. l. — 47 737
 
 * 743 ANSWERS. 
 
 all benefit of the permission ; but the Court could not compulsorily 
 direct the performance of the condition. 2 
 
 Where the application for further time came on in open Court, and 
 counsel certified that he required further time, it was given. 8 The 
 necessity of the defendant being enabled to state his own defence, as 
 well as give the discovery required by the plaintiff, will be taken into 
 consideration. 4 
 
 The summons for further time to put in the answer should be made 
 returnable before the expiration of the time which the defendant already 
 has for that purpose : 5 for, if returnable after such time, an attachment 
 may be issued, even though the summons has been served. 6 An attach- 
 ment, however, which has been issued after the hearing of an application 
 for further time, and pending the decision upon it, is irregular, and will 
 be discharged. 7 
 
 The defendant cannot, in strictness, apply for further time after an 
 attachment has actually been issued against him, for he is then in con- 
 tempt ; 8 but where an application in such case is entertained, and an 
 extension of time is granted, it should appear by the order that it is 
 made " without prejudice to the attachment issued against the said de- 
 fendant for want of answer." 
 
 If the Court grants any further time to any defendant for pleading, 
 answering, or demurring to the bill, the plaintiff's right to move for a 
 decree is, in the mean time, suspended. 9 
 
 The answer having been drawn, or perused and settled by counsel, 
 
 must be written bookwise, 10 or printed, 11 on paper of the same size 
 
 and description as that on which bills are printed. 12 Any 
 
 * 743 * schedules or documents annexed to the answer must be written 
 
 on paper of the same kind as the answer itself. 1 Dates and 
 sums occurring in the answer should be expressed by figures, instead of 
 words. 2 
 
 The Clerk of Eecords and Writs may refuse to file an answer in which 
 there is any knife erasure, or which is blotted so as to obliterate any 
 word, or which is improperly written, or so altered as to cause any 
 material disfigurement ; or in which there is any interlineation : unless 
 the person before whom the answer is sworn duly authenticates such 
 interlineation with his initials, in such manner as to show that it was 
 
 2 Henley v. Stone, 4 Beav. 392, 394; Judd v. 10 Ord. 6 March, 1860, r. 1. 
 
 Wartnabv, -2 M. & K. 813, 816. n Ibid. r. 5; as to printing answers, see post, 
 
 3 Byn'g v. Clark, 13 Beav. 92. pp. 755, 756. 
 
 4 York and North Midland Ry. Co. v. Hud- 18 As to such paper, see Cons. Ord. IX. 3, 
 son. 13 Beav. 69. ante, p. 361; but an answer not so written has 
 
 5 See Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 18. been allowed to be filed under special cir- 
 
 6 Braithwaite's Pr. 56. cumstances; the application in such case must 
 1 Davis v. Tollemache, 2 Jur. N. S. 564, V. always be made to the Court. Harvey v. 
 
 C. S.; see also Taylor v. Fisher, 6 Sim. 566; Bradley, 10 W. R. 705, M. R. ; Whale v. 
 Barritt v. Barritt, 3 Swanst. 395, 397. Griffiths, id. 571, L. JJ.; Morris v. Honey- 
 
 8 Wheat v. Graham, 5 Sim. 570, decided on combe, 2 N. R. 16, V. C. W. 
 
 the 8th Ord. of 3 April, 1828; Sand. Ord. 714; > Whale v. Griffiths, ubi supra; under special 
 
 Beav. Ord. 7. circumstances, schedules not so written were 
 
 9 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 13 ; seepost, Chap. XX. allowed to be filed : S. C 
 
 Motion for Decree. 2 Ord. 6 March, 1860 r. 3; Cons. Ord. IX. 3. 
 
 738
 
 SWEARING, FILING, AND PRINTING ANSWERS. * 744 
 
 made before the answer was sworn, and so to mark the extent of such 
 interlineation. 3 Where the answer is sworn before one of the Clerks of 
 Records and Writs, and is thereupon left in his custody, he does not 
 usually authenticate the interlineations ; 4 and where, in the case of a 
 joint answer, it is intended to have it sworn by some of the defendants 
 at the Record and Writ Clerks' Office, and by others elsewhere, it is the 
 practice to have it sworn by such other defendants first : if this is not 
 done, and the answer is taken away from the Record and Writ Clerks' 
 Office before it is filed, it must be resworn by the defendants who were 
 sworn to it at that office. 5 
 
 If, after the answer has been sworn, there is discovered any defect 
 in the formal parts, such as the title or jurat, or any unauthenticated 
 alteration or interlineation, the answer must be resworn, unless the 
 plaintiff will consent that the answer be filed notwithstanding such 
 defect. 6 The consent may be indorsed by the plaintiff or his solicitor 
 on the answer itself ; or an order of course may, with his consent, be 
 obtained at the Rolls, on a petition of course allowing the answer to 
 be filed ; but the defect must be specified in the consent or order. 7 
 The giving such consent will not waive the right to except to the answer 
 for scandal or insufficiency; but as it might affect an indictment for 
 perjury, the plaintiff's solicitor should, as a general rule, see the answer 
 before the consent is given. 8 
 
 The answer must, as has been before stated, 9 unless an order has 
 been obtained to file it without oath, or without oath or signature, be 
 signed and sworn by the defendant. 10 Under the old practice, 
 * it was necessary, where the answer was upon oath, and was in- * 744 
 tended to be sworn beyond twenty miles from London, that a 
 commission should issue for the purpose of taking it. Noav, however, 
 the practice of issuing commissions to take pleas, answers, and disclaim- 
 ers, in causes pending in the Court, has been abolished with respect to 
 pleas, answers, and disclaimers taken within the jurisdiction of the 
 Court ; and any such plea, answer, or disclaimer may be filed without 
 any further or other formality than is required in the swearing and filing 
 of an affidavit. 1 (a) 
 
 Where the answer is sworn within the jurisdiction, it must, if taken 
 in London, or within ten miles of Lincoln's Inn Hall, be sworn before a 
 Clerk of Records and Writs, 2 the Clerk of Enrolments in Chancery, 2 or 
 
 3 Cons. Ord. I. 36; 15 & 16 Vic. c. 8G, § 25. o Ante, p. 734. 
 
 * Braithwaite's Pr. 52. i« Ante, pp. 734, 735, and notes. For New 
 
 5 Ibid.; Att.-Gen. v. Hudson, 9 Hare App. Hampshire, see 38 N. H. 611, Ch. Ride 30. 
 63; 17 Jur. 205. See Equity Rule 59 of the U. S. Courts, post, 
 
 6 See Sittington v. Brown, 7 Leigh, 271; p. 2389. 
 
 ante, p. 734, n. 1 15 & 16 Vice. 86. § 21. The form of oath 
 
 7 Braithwaite's Pr. 48; but see Pilkington v. to be administered to the defendant is not 
 Himsworth, 1 Y & C. Ex. 612. For forms of altered by this enactment. Att.-Gen. v. Hud- 
 consent and petition, see Vol. III. son, 9 Hare App. 63; 17 Jur. 205. 
 
 8 Braithwaite's Pr. 48. 2 Cons. Ord. I. 39. 
 
 (a) By 52 & 53 Vic. c. 10, the enactments oaths being appointed by the Lord Chancellor, 
 relating to the administration of oaths are See al.-o 54 & 55 Vic. c. 50. 
 amended and consolidated, commissioners of 
 
 739
 
 * 745 ANSWERS. 
 
 a London Commissioner to administer oaths in Chancery ; 8 and, if 
 taken in any place in England or Wales, ten miles or more from Lin- 
 coln's Inn Hall, before a Commissioner to administer oaths in Chancery 
 in England. 4 The Commissioners to administer oaths in Chancery in 
 London and England are appointed by the Lord Chancellor, and are, in 
 practice, solicitors of ten years' standing. 5 The London Commissioners 
 have power to administer oaths at any place within ten miles of Lin- 
 coln's Inn Hall, 6 and the Country Commissioners at all other places in 
 England and Wales. 7 
 
 Where the answer is taken in Scotland, Ireland, the Channel Islands, 
 the Isle of Man, 8 or in any place in foreign parts under the dominion of 
 her Majesty, 9 it may be sworn before any Judge, Court, notary public, 
 or person legally authorized to administer oaths in such country or place 
 respectively; and the Court of Chancery will take judicial notice of the 
 seal or signature of such Judge, Court, notary public, or person attached 
 or subscribed to the answer. 10 In the case of an answer taken 
 
 * 745 in the Channel * Islands, or the Isle of Man, 1 or in Scotland or 
 
 Ireland, 2 it may also be sworn before Commissioners appointed 
 by the Lord Chancellor to act in such places, respectively. 
 
 Where the answer is taken in any place out of the dominions of her 
 Majesty, it may be sworn before any British ambassador, envoy, minis- 
 ter, charge d'affaires, or secretary of legation or of embassy, exercising 
 his functions in any foreign country, or before any British consul-general, 
 or consul, vice-consul, 8 acting consul, pro-consul, or consular agent ex- 
 ercising his functions in any foreign place, 4 whose seal or signature, 
 affixed, impressed, or subscribed on or to the answer, is admissible in 
 evidence, without proof of such seal or signature being the seal or signa- 
 ture of the person whose seal or signature it purports to be, or of the 
 official character of such person. 6 
 
 An answer may also be sworn abroad before Commissioners specially 
 appointed for that purpose, according to the former practice of the 
 Court, as hereafter explained. 6 
 . If the defendant is an invalid, and resident at any place within ten 
 
 3 10 & 17 Vic. c. 78, § 2; see Reg. v. Lord 7 16 & 17 Vic. c. 78, §§ 1, 5; Cons. Ord. IV. 
 Truro, 56 L. J. Q. B. 657. 8 See 16 & 17 Vic. c. 78, § 6. 
 
 4 Id. § 1: Cons. Ord. IV. The following 9 For a list of these places, see Braithwaite's 
 fees are parable to the person taking an answer : Oaths, 18-20; and post, Vol. III. 
 
 before an officer of the Court, 1*. 6^., payable in 10 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86. § 22. This section is 
 
 stamps, but nothing for marking exhibits; retrospective ; Bateman v. Cook, 3 De G. M. & 
 
 before a London commissioner. 1*. 6r7., and Is. G. 39; and see Haggett v. Iniff, 5 De G. M. & 
 
 for marking each exhibit; and before a country G. 910; 1 Jur. N. S. 49; Cooke ». Wilby, 25 
 
 commissioner, 2s. fid., and 1.?. for each exhibit ; Ch. D. 769. 
 
 16 & 17 Vic. c. 78, § 2; Regul. to Ord. Sched. 1 16 & 17 Vic. c. 78, §§ 3, 6. 
 
 2, 4. 2 6 & 7 Vic. c. 82, § 1. 
 
 6 16 & 17 Vic. c 78. See Ward v. Gamgee, 8 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 22. 
 
 65 L. T. 610 ; 7 T. L. R. 752; Shrapnel r. 4 6 Geo. IV. c. 87, § 20; 18 & 19 Vic. c. 42, 
 
 Gamgee, 8 id. 9. For the course of procedure § 1. These Acts do not mention answers, 
 
 to obtain such appointment, see Braithwaite's but there can. it is conceived, be no doubt that 
 
 Oaths, 4-11. they apply to them. 
 
 6 16 & 17 Vic. c. 78. § 2: Re Record and 5 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 22; 18 & 19 Vic. c. 
 
 Writ Clerks. 3 De G. M. & G. 723; 18 Jur. 499; 42. § 3. 
 
 Hill v. Tollit. 3 De G. M. & G. 725, n. « See post, pp. 747-752. 
 
 740
 
 SWEARING, FILING, AND PRINTING ANSWERS. * 746 
 
 miles from Lincoln's Inn Hall, one of the Clerks of Eecords and Writs 
 will, upon a memorandum in writing bespeaking his attendance being 
 left with him, and upon his necessary expenses being paid, attend upon 
 such defendant, for the purpose of taking his answer. 7 It is, however, 
 now more usual to procure the attendance of a London commissioner. 8 
 
 In order to relieve persons in prison from the expense of procuring 
 the attendance of a commissioner to take their answer or affidavit, the 
 Lord Chancellor may appoint the Warden, Keeper, or other chief officer 
 of every prison within the city of London or the bills of mortality, and 
 their deputies, to be commissioners, for the purpose of takiug and 
 receiving such affidavits and answers as. any person or persons, within 
 any such prison, shall be willing and desirous to make, and for no other 
 purpose. 9 
 
 The jurat to an answer should be written, either at the end of the 
 answer or of the schedule thereto ; 10 it is usually placed at the right- 
 hand corner of the end of the answer. 11 It may be written 
 * on either side of the page, or on the margin ; but not on a page * 746 
 upon which no part of the statements in the answer appears. If 
 there are many defendants who are sworn together, one jurat is suffi- 
 cient. If the defendants are sworn at different times, there must be 
 separate jurats for each defendant, or each set of defendants swearing. 
 The jurat must correctly express the time when, and the place where, 
 the answer is sworn. 1 The defendant must sign his name, or put his 
 mark, at the side of the jurat — not underneath it; 2 and the person 
 before whom the answer is sworn must sign his name at the foot thereof; 
 to which must be added his full official character and description 3 — not, 
 necessarily, however, in his own handwriting. Any schedule should be 
 signed, both by the defendant and the person before whom the answer 
 is sworn 3 The oath must be administered in a reverent manner, 4 and, 
 if not administered in the usual form, the authority for the form in 
 which it is administered should appear in the jurat. 5 
 
 The answer of a person entitled to the privilege of peerage is taken 
 
 7 Braithwaite's Pr. 514. The memorandum 2 Anderson v. Stather, 9 Jur. 1085. When 
 must bear a 10s. fee fund stamp ; Regul. to Ord. the verification of an answer is in the form of 
 Sched. 4. Reasonable payment for travelling an affidavit, the name of the respondent must be 
 expenses will be allowed; Braithwaite's Oaths, subscribed at the foot of the affidavit; when 
 27. For form of memorandum, see Vol. III. in the form of a certificate of the officer who 
 
 8 If a commissioner attends elsewhere than administered the oath, the name of the re- 
 at his own office to administer an oath, he is spondent should be subscribed to the answer, 
 entitled to reasonable payment for his travel- Pincers v. Robertson, 24 N. J. Eq. 348; Hath- 
 ling expenses; but there is no fixed fee for his away v. Scott, 11 Paige, 173. 
 
 attendance. Braithwaite's Pr. 34'J. 3 Braithwaite's Pr. 342. This has been held 
 
 9 1 Will. IV. c. 36, § 15, r. 20; 16 & 17 Vic. to be unnecessary, where the answer is sworn 
 c. 78, §§ 1, 5; and see 23 & 24 Vic. c. 14!), § 3; before the Clerk cf Enrolments; Wilton ». Clif- 
 25 & 26 Vic. c. 104; and ante, pp. 501, 502. ton, 2 Hare, 535; 7 Jur. 215; and is omitted by 
 
 10 Braithwaite's Pr. 342, n. (a). the Record and Writ Clerks, where answers 
 
 11 See Wlielpley v. Van Epps, 9 Paige, 332. are sworn before them. 
 
 i Ibid. ; 18 & 19 Vic. c. 134, § 15; Ord. IV. * Cons. Ord. XIX. 14. 
 
 The jurat to a bill is not rendered defective by 5 1 & 2 Vic. c. 105; see Braithwaite's Oaths 
 
 the absence of a statement of the county where in Chan. 25; and forms, post, Vol. III. 
 the bill was sworn to. Barnard ?•. Darling, 1 
 Barb. Ch. 218; see Smith, Ch. Pr. (3d ed.) 352. 
 
 741
 
 * 747 ANSWERS. 
 
 upon his protestation of honor; 6 that of a corporation aggregate, under 
 their common seal ; 7 that of a quaker, Moravian, ex-Quaker, ex-Mora- 
 vian, or Separatist, upon his solemn affirmation. 8 
 
 If the defendant be blind or a marksman, the answer must be first 
 truly, distinctly, and audibly read over to him, either by the person 
 before whom it was sworn or some other person : in the first case, it 
 must be expressed in the jurat that the answer was so read over, and 
 that the signature or mark of the defendant was affixed in the presence 
 of the person taking the answer ; in the second case, such other person 
 must attest the signature or mark, and must be first sworn that he has 
 so read over the answer, and that the signature or mark was made in 
 his presence; and this must be expressed in the jurat. 9 
 
 In the case of a foreigner, not sufficiently versed in the English lan- 
 guage to answer in that tongue, and desiring to answer in a foreign lan- 
 guage, an order of course to do so must be obtained, on motion, 
 
 * 747 or on petition at the Rolls. The answer must be * engrossed on 
 
 paper, in the foreign language ; and the defendant, together with 
 an interpreter, must then attend before a person authorized to adminis- 
 ter oaths in Chancery ; the interpreter is first sworn in English that he 
 well understands the foreign language and that he will truly interpret 
 the oath about to be administered to the defendant ; and the ordinary 
 oath is next administered to the latter. 1 The defendant must previously 
 sign his name opposite the jurat ; and the interpreter should do the same. 
 Before the answer can be filed, it is necessary to obtain an order of 
 course, either on motion, or on petition at the Rolls, 2 appointing the in- 
 terpreter or another person to make, and swear to the truth of, a transla- 
 tion thereof, and directing the answer to be filed, with such translation 
 annexed. 3 The translator must then attend with the answer, translation, 
 and order before a person authorized to administer oaths in Chancery, 
 and be sworn to the truth of the translation : 4 after which, the answer 
 and translation will be filed at the Record and Writ Clerks' Office, on 
 production of the order. 5 
 
 A foreigner may also answer in English, although ignorant of that 
 language. 6 No order to do so is necessary; but where the defendant is 
 not sufficiently versed in English to understand the language of the 
 answer, and of the oath, the answer must be interpreted to him by some 
 person skilled in a language understood by both ; after which, both must 
 attend before a person authorized to administer an oath in Chancery. 
 The interpreter must first be sworn that he well understands the foreign 
 language ; that he has truly, distinctly, and audibly interpreted the 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. XV. 6; ante, pp. 734, 735 ; see Wilton r. Clifton. 2 Hare, 535; 7 Jur. 214. For 
 
 form. Vol. IH. forms, see Vol. III. 
 
 " Cor.s. Ord. XV. ; ante, p. 735 and note. 1 For forms of oath and jurat, see Vol. III. 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. XV. 6 ; and statutes cited ante, 2 For forms of motion paper and petition, 
 pp. 734, 735. As to the answer of the Secretary see Vol. III. 
 
 of State for India, or of the Attorney-General, 3 Simmonds v. Du Barn?, 3 Bro. C. C. 263 ; 
 
 see ante, p. 735. For forms, see Vol. III. Lord Belmore v. Anderson, 4 Bro. C. C. 90. 
 
 9 The attestation may be written near the 4 For form of jurat, see Vol. III. 
 jurat. Braithwaite's Pr. 380, 396; and see 5 Braithwaite's Pr. 45. 
 
 6 Hayes r. Leguin, 1 Hogan, 274. 
 
 742 

 
 SWEARING, FILING, AND PRINTING ANSWERS. * 748 
 
 contents of the answer to the defendant ; and that he will truly inter- 
 pret the oath about to be administered to him ; after which, the ordinary 
 oath is administered to the defendant, through the interpreter. 7 The 
 defendant must, and the interpreter should, first sign the answer, oppo- 
 site the jurat. 8 
 
 In all the above cases, the jurat must express that the necessary for- 
 malities have been observed. 9 
 
 Formalities of a similar nature, by which it may appear that the de- 
 fendant fully understands the contents of his answer before he is sworn 
 to it, must be adopted where the defendant is deaf, or deaf and dumb, 
 and in every like case. 10 
 
 * It is a universal principle, in all Courts, that any irregularity * 748 
 m a jurat may, unless expressly waived, be objected to in any 
 stage of a cause. This does not depend upon any objection which the 
 parties in a particular cause may waive, but upon the general rule that 
 the document itself shall not be brought forward at all, if in any respect 
 objectionable with reference to the rules of the Court ; * and therefore a 
 motion to take an answer off the file, on the ground of such an irregu- 
 larity, was allowed, notwithstanding the plaintiff had taken an office 
 copy of the answer. 2 If, by any accident, the jurat is cancelled, the 
 answer must be resworn, and a new jurat added. 3 
 
 As we have seen, the practice of issuing commissions for the purpose 
 of taking answers is now abolished, in all cases where the answer is to 
 be sworn within the jurisdiction of the Court ; 4 and the various enact- 
 ments, under which answers may be sworn out of the jurisdiction, have 
 been considered ; 5 but, if no person can be found who is authorized, 
 under such enactments, to administer the oath, a commission under the 
 old practice is still necessary ; 6 and consequently, the mode of proceed- 
 ing in such case must be stated. 
 
 7 St. Katherine Dock Co. v. Mantzgu, 1 is defective, as where the prothonotary failed 
 Coll. 94; 8 Jur. 237 ; Braithwaite's Pr. 45, 389. to state that he was Clerk of the Court in which 
 For forms of oaths, see Vol. III. the justice presided, the answer will only stand 
 
 8 For forms of jurats, see Vol. III. as unsworn. Chester v. Canfield, 1 Tenn. Leg. 
 
 9 Ibid. Rep. 258. But it is sufficient if the official 
 10 Reynolds v. Jones, Trin. Term, 1818; character of the notary, who administers the 
 
 Braithwaite's Pr. 383, 395; see Vol. III., for oath, is stated in the body of the jurat, without 
 
 forms of jurats. In a case, however, which being annexed to the signature. Feuchtwanger 
 
 occurred iu the 18th Geo. II. (1745), a different v. McCool, 29 N. J. Eq. 151. 
 course appears to have been adopted ; for there 2 Ibid., and see ante, p. 743. 
 
 the Court, on motion (the defendant being deaf, a Att.-Gen. v. Hudson, 9 Hare App. 63 ; S. 
 
 and incapable of giving instructions for his an- C. nom. Att.-Gen. v. Henderson, 17 Jur. 205; 
 
 swer), ordered a commission for taking the and see Att.-Gen. v. Donnington Hospital, 17 
 
 answer to issue in the old way with the bill Jur. 206, V. C. W. 
 
 annexed, in order that the commissioners them- 4 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 21; ante, p. 744 
 
 selves might endeavor to take the answer. 5 Ante, pp. 744, 745 ; and see 6 Geo. IV. c. 
 
 Gregory v. Weaver, 2 Mad. Prac. 363. 87, § 20; 6 & 7 Vic. c 82 ; 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, 
 
 1 Pilkington v. Himsworth, 1 Y. & C. Ex. § 22; 16 & 17 Vic. c. 78, § 6 ; 18 & 19 Vic. c. 
 
 612, 616 ; see Barnard v. Darling, 1 Barb. Ch. 42, § 1. 
 
 218. An answer without authentication of the c When the defendant is absent from the 
 
 jurat by the signature of the proper officer may country,, the osith to his answer may be taken 
 
 be treated as no answer. Westerfield v. Bried, under a commission. Trumbull v. Gibbon, 
 
 26 N. J. Eq. 357. And if the certificate to the Halst. Dig. 225 ; Read v. Consequa. 4 Wash. 
 
 official character of a justice of the peace, by C. C. 335; Stotesbury c. Vail, 13 N. J. Eq. 390, 
 
 whom the oath is administered in another State, 394. An answer by a defendant beyond sea, 
 
 743
 
 749 
 
 ANSWERS. 
 
 A commission to take an answer abroad will only be issued upon an 
 order ; 7 which may be obtained, as of course. 8 on motion or petition. 9 
 After the order has been obtained, the defendant's solicitor must 
 give notice in writing to the plaintiff's solicitor, to furnish him with 
 the names of commissioners to see the answer taken, on the plaintiff's 
 
 part. 10 
 * 749 * The plaintiff's solicitor thereupon, if he intends to join in the 
 commission, should send the names of two or more commissioners 
 to the defendant's solicitor, and inform him to which of them the de- 
 fendant is to give notice of executing the commission. The defendant 
 adds to these commissioners the names of two or more on his own part ; l 
 the names of all of them, or of the four agreed upon, are inserted in the 
 commission : the defendant's commissioners being placed first in order. 2 
 Two on each side are usually named. 3 If the plaintiff's solicitor omits 
 to give his commissioners' names, within a reasonable time, and will 
 not consent to the commission being directed to the defendant's com- 
 missioners only, it seems the defendant should obtain an order of course 
 on motion, or on petition at the Rolls, 4 requiring the plaintiff to name 
 commissioners within two days after notice of the order, or, in default, 
 that the defendant may issue the commission directed to his own com- 
 missioners. 5 The order must be served on the plaintiff's solicitor ; and 
 if, within the time prescribed, the plaintiff does not furnish commis- 
 sioners' names, the commission is made out in favor of the defendant's 
 commissioners only. 
 
 None of the commissioners need be professional men ; and it has been 
 held that the defendant's own solicitor may be a commissioner to take 
 his answer. 6 (a) It is no objection to a commissioner that he is under 
 twenty-one years of age, provided he is of sufficient age to take an 
 oath. 7 
 
 Care must be taken to have the commission, with the answer, returned 
 before the time limited for filing the answer has expired. 8 
 
 must be taken and sworn to before a commis- 
 sioner, under a dedimus issued by the Court in 
 which the case is pending, directing him to 
 administer the oath in the most solemn forms 
 observed by the laws and usages of the country 
 where the answer is taken. Read v. Consequa, 
 4 Wash. C. C. 335. In New York, an answer 
 in Equity must, if made by a person out of the 
 State, be sworn to before a judge of some Court 
 having a seal. A Master extraordinary, in the 
 English Court of Chancery, had not the author- 
 ity to administer such oath. Lahens v. Fielden, 
 1 Barb. 22. 
 
 ' Baron de Feucheres v. Dawes, 5 Beav. 144. 
 
 8 Veal's Pr. 52. 
 
 9 For forms of motion paper and petition, 
 see Vol. III. 
 
 1° For form of notice, see Vol. III. 
 
 i Hinde, 231; 1 Turn. & Ven. 542; Cons. 
 Ord. III. 1. 
 
 2 Veal's Pr. 51. 
 
 8 1 Turn. & Ven. 542; Veal's Pr. 51. 
 
 4 For forms of motion paper, and petition, 
 see Vol. III. 
 
 5 Hinde, 229; Harr. by Newl. 171; 1 Turn. 
 & Ven. 542. 
 
 6 Bird v. Brancker, 2 S. & S. 186; see 
 contra, as to swearing affidavits within the 
 jurisdiction before the deponent's own solici- 
 tor, or his clerk, Re Hogan, 3 Atk. 813; 
 Hopkin v. Hopkin, 10 Hare App. 2 ; Wood v. 
 Harpur, 3 Beav. 290 ; Foster v. Harvey (1), 11 
 W. R. 899, V. C. W. ; 3 N. R. 98, L. JJ. ; post, 
 p. 892. 
 
 1 Wyatt's P. R. 117. 
 
 8 See Hughes v. Williams, 5 Hare, 211. Issu- 
 
 (n) The Court does not accept an affidavit 
 sworn before a solicitor in the cause, nor his 
 clerk, although he may be a commissioner. 
 744 
 
 Duke of Northumberland v. Todd, 7 Ch. D. 
 777, 780 ; Bourke v. Davis, 44 Ch. D. 110, 12G; 
 see post, p. 892.
 
 SWEARING, FILING, AND PRINTING ANSWERS. * 750 
 
 The commission is prepared by the defendant's solicitor, and is sealed 
 by the Clerk of Eecords and Writs, upon a prcecipe being left with 
 him. 9 
 
 Where the defendant is entitled to the privilege of peerage, the 
 words, " upon his protestation of honor," are inserted in the commis- 
 sion, instead of the words, " on his corporal oath upon the Holy Evan- 
 gelists." 10 
 
 Where the defendant is a Quaker, Moravian, Separatist, or 
 other * person exempted from taking an oath by statute, the writ * 750 
 should direct the commissioners to take the answer on his solemn 
 declaration or affirmation. 1 
 
 Where the defendant is a Jew, the words, " upon the Holy Evan- 
 gelists," may be left out of the form of the oath mentioned in the 
 commission. 
 
 And where a defendant was a Gentoo, and the answer was to be 
 taken in Calcutta, the commission was directed to be in a special form, 
 authorizing the commissioners to administer the oath in the most solemn 
 manner, as in their discretion should seem meet ; or, if they should 
 think proper, to administer another oath, certifying to the Court what 
 they did. 2 
 
 The above distinctions in the form of commissions are necessary to be 
 attended to, because a commission to take an answer in one form will 
 not authorize the commissioners'' taking it in another ; thus, commis- 
 sioners will not, under an authority to take an answer upon oath, be 
 empowered to take the affirmation of a Quaker ; and where it appeared 
 by the caption of the answer that they had done so, the answer was 
 ordered to be taken off the file. 3 
 
 The commission may be sent to some professional person in the 
 foreign country, to take care that it is properly executed. Though the 
 foreign country be at war with this country, it must be executed there ; 
 in which respect, a commission to take an answer differs from a com- 
 mission to examine witnesses ; which it seems may be executed at the 
 nearest neutral port. 4 The manner of executing the commission is as 
 follows : When the plaintiff has named commissioners, notice in writ- 
 ing, of the time and place of executing the commission, signed by two 
 of the defendant's commissioners, must be served upon the plaintiff's 
 acting commissioner, six days before the day appointed for executing 
 the commission. 5 If this notice be given on a Sunday, the commission 
 may be executed on the Saturday following. 6 
 
 If the party who has the carriage of the commission gives notice of 
 
 ing the commission does not, per se, extend ln Ilinde, 239, n.. 
 
 the time for answering; and therefore the plain- 1 See statutes cited, ante, pp. 734, 735, n., 
 
 tiff, though he has joined in the commission, and form of commission, Vol. III. 
 
 may issue an attachment for want of answer, - Hamkissenseat r. Barker, 1 Atk. 19, 20; 
 
 before the return of the commission, if the time ante, pp. 735, 7.36. 
 
 for answering has expired. Boschetti v. Power, 8 Parke v. Christy, 1 Y. & J. 533. 
 
 8 Beav. 180: Hughes v. Williams, ubi mi/jra. 4 ?\ Romney, Amb. 02. 
 
 9 Cons. Ord. III. 1 ; Ord. I. 37 ; for forms of 5 For form of notice, see Vol. III. 
 
 prcecipe. commission, and indorsement, see 6 Wyalt's P. R. 115. 
 Veal's Pr. 52, 57 ; and post, Vol. III. 
 
 745
 
 * 751 ANSWERS. 
 
 executing it, but neither countermands it in due time (as three or four 
 days before the time, or as the distance of the place may require), nor 
 executes it at the time, the court, on motion, will order costs to be 
 taxed for the adverse party's attendance. 7 
 
 Where the plaintiff has not named commissioners, no notice need be 
 given, and the commission may be executed by the commissioners 
 named in the writ, ex y arte. % 
 
 * 751 * On the day appointed, the commissioners are to meet, and if 
 
 one only attends on each side it will be sufficient ; but in case 
 none of the plaintiff's commissioners attend, the defendant must have 
 two commissioners present ; because no fewer than two can take his 
 answer and return the writ. 1 
 
 It seems, that where there is a joint commission, and the commis- 
 sioners of one party only attend, the commissioners in attendance 
 may, after waiting till six o'clock in the evening, proceed to take the 
 answer. 2 
 
 When the commissioners are ready to proceed, the answer or plea, 
 properly written, as before explained, 3 is produced to the commissioners, 
 and the defendant attends for the purpose of swearing it ; whereupon 
 one of the commissioners, having opened the commission, interrogates 
 the defendant in the following manner : 4 " Have you heard this your 
 answer read ? and do you exhibit it as your answer to the bill of com- 
 plaint of A B ? " upon which, the defendant answering in the affirma- 
 tive, the commissioner proceeds to administer to him the oath, or 
 affirmation, or attestation of honor (as the case may be), in the same 
 form as when the answer is sworn in England. 5 
 
 It is said that commissioners may refuse to execute the commission, 
 unless they are allowed to read the answer ; 6 and where a commission 
 to take a defendant's answer only has been issued, and the defendant 
 tenders a demurrer to the commissioners, and refuses to answer upon 
 oath, they must return such his refusal, and the reason thereof, together 
 with the demurrer, and leave the same to the consideration of the 
 Court. 7 
 
 Before the defendant is sworn, as above stated, he must sign his 
 answer and each schedule thereto, in the presence of the commission- 
 ers ; 8 and the answer thus taken, together with the schedules (if there 
 are any), are to be annexed to the commission, and the commissioners 
 must then write and sign the caption at the foot of the answer. 9 Any 
 alterations made in the answer or schedules, previous to the taking 
 thereof, must be authenticated by the commissioners, according to the 
 practice in use with respect to affidavits. 10 
 
 7 Wvatt's P. R. 116. • 6 Harr. by New]. 176. 
 
 6 Hinde, 234; 1 Turn. & Ven. 544. " Wvatt's P. R. 118. 
 
 i Wvatt's P. R. 116; Hinde, 235; 1 Turn. 8 Cons. Ord. XV. 5. Where the defendant 
 
 & Ven. 544. is blind, or deaf and dumb, or a foreigner, or a 
 
 2 Wvatt's P. R. 116; see Griggs v. Staplee, marksman, the directions before given in these 
 11 Jur. 020, V. C K. B. respects must of course be attended to, and the 
 
 3 Ante, p. 743. caption varied accord ingh-. 
 
 4 Hinde, 235; 1 Turn. & Ven. 544. 9 For form of caption, see Vol. III. 
 
 5 Ibid. ; ante, p. 688. For forms, see 10 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 25; ante, p. 743. 
 Vol. III. 
 
 746
 
 SWEARING, FILING. AND PRINTING ANSWERS. * 753 
 
 This caption must be varied according to the nature of the case ; 
 thus, in the case of a peer, it must state the answer to have been 
 
 * taken " upon the attestation of honor ; " in the case of a * 752 
 Quaker or Moravian, or other person exempted from taking an 
 
 oath by statute, it must be expressed to have been taken upon the 
 " solemn affirmation ; " and the date when, and the place where, it was 
 taken must also appear in the caption. Care must also be taken to ex- 
 press correctly whether the document be an answer, or an answer coupled 
 with a plea or demurrer. 1 The commissioners should also be particular, 
 when the answer is by two or more defendants, to state that they are all 
 sworn : because, where the caption of the joint and several answer of 
 two defendants expressed only that it was sworn, without stating that 
 the defendants were both sworn, the answer was suppressed. 2 
 
 The answer and schedules, with the caption, being thus annexed to 
 the writ, the return must be indorsed upon the writ, and be signed by 
 two commissioners. 8 All these documents should then be folded to- 
 gether, in a convenient size and form, and bound round with tape or 
 string, — at the crossings of which the seals of the commissioners should 
 be affixed ; they should then sign their names in the vacent spaces, near 
 their respective seals, inclose the whole in an envelope, and direct and 
 return the same to the defendant's solicitor to be filed. The oath of a 
 messenger is not now required. 4 
 
 By the old practice of the Court, no second commission could be 
 granted without the special order of the Court, upon good reason to in- 
 duce the same, or upon the plaintiff's own assent ; 5 and it does not appear 
 that any alteration has been made in this respect. If, therefore, a com- 
 missioner dies, application must be made to the Court for a new com- 
 mission : preparatory to which, it seems that the usual course is for the 
 solicitor to name two more commissioners, one of whom must be struck 
 by the solicitor of the adverse party, and the Court must then be moved 
 for a new commission, with the new commissioner added to those who 
 are living. 5 
 
 If, by the fault of the party who has the carriage of the first commis- 
 sion, the other is put to unnecessary charges, the Court will order his 
 costs to be taxed, and, upon cause shown, direct the party in fault to 
 give security to pay them before he has a second commission ; and if he 
 has the carriage of the second commission, to pay the costs upon that 
 also, if he again fails. 6 
 
 After an answer has been reported insufficient, no new commis- 
 sion will be issued, except by order made on affidavit showing 
 
 * some good reason, and payment of the costs of the insufficient * 753 
 answer. 1 A new commission may, however, be issued, upon the 
 consent of the plaintiff's solicitor, which is seldom, if ever, refused. 
 
 It seems that, if the return of a commission be delayed, it may be 
 hastened by motion. It seems, also, that an attachment and other pro- 
 
 1 Hinde, 236 ; 1 Turn. & Ven. 545. 4 15 & lfi Vic. c. 86, § 25. 
 
 2 Anon. Mos. 2.38. s Wyatt's P. R. 115. 
 8 Hinde, 236; Turn. & Ven. 545. For form <* ibid. 116. 
 
 of return, see Vol. III. ' Beanies's Ord. 183; Harr. by Newl 202. 
 
 747
 
 * 754 ANSWERS. 
 
 cess of contempt may issue against the commissioners, for not returning 
 the commission with the answer. 2 Where, however, it appeared that 
 the omission to make a return arose from the circumstance of one of the 
 plaintiff's commissioners refusing to join with one of the defendant's, 
 to take the answer, the attachment was discharged, upon payment of 
 the ordinary fees, and a new commission was granted to different com- 
 missioners named by the defendant. 3 
 
 Where any irregularity has taken place in the execution of a commis- 
 sion, the proper course appears to be to move, after the return, that 
 the commission and answer may be quashed, or that the answer may 
 be taken off the file. 
 
 Where the friends of an infant wish to defend the suit on his behalf, 
 an order appointing a guardian ad litem may, as we have seen, 4 be ob- 
 tained on motion of course, or on petition of course at the Rolls ; 5 and 
 where the defence of the infant is by an answer or plea requiring to be 
 upon oath, the plea or answer must be sworn to by the guardian, 6 unless 
 an order has been obtained to take it without oath. The guardian, 
 however, only swears to his belief in the truth of the defence of the 
 infant. 7 The order appointing the guardian must be produced at the 
 time the answer is sworn ; and the jurat must express that the answer 
 is sworn pursuant to it. 8 
 
 We have before seen, that a person who has been found a lunatic by 
 inquisition, answers by his committee, and that, in such case, it is not 
 necessary that there should be any order appointing a guardian, unless 
 there be a conflict of interest between the committee and the 
 * 754 lunatic : in which case, a guardian ad litem should be * appointed, 1 
 A person of weak or unsound mind, 2 not so found by inquisition, 
 answers by his guardian, who is appointed in the same manner as the 
 guardian ad litem of an infant defendant ; 8 and, as in the case of in- 
 fants, the guardian only sweai'S to his belief in the truth of the defence, 
 where an oath is required, 4 and the order appointing the guardian must 
 be produced at the time the answer is sworn ; and the jurat must 
 express that the answer is sworn pursuant to it. 5 
 
 With respect to married women, we have before seen, 6 that where a 
 husband and wife are defendants to a bill, neither of them can regu- 
 
 2 Wyatt's P. R. 116. by the guardian ad litem. Bulkley v. Van 
 
 8 Ibid. Wyck, 5 Paige, 536; Stephenson v. Stephenson, 
 
 * Ante, p. 160. 6 Paige, 353. Ante, 169, n. 2. 
 
 5 In the U. S. Courts, see Equity Rule 87> 7 Brakhwaite's Pr. 393; see form of oath, 
 post, p. 2397. Vol. III. 
 
 6 And it is termed his answer, and not that 8 Cons. Ord. VII. 4; Braithwaite's Pr. 393. 
 of the infant. Rogers v. Cruger, 7 John. 581 ; For form of Jurat, see Vol. III. 
 
 arid the infant is not bound by it, if he dissents i Ante, p. 175. 
 
 within a proper time. James v. James, 4 Paige, 2 Superannuated persons, on proof of im- 
 
 115; Prutzman v. Pitesell, 3 Harr. & J. 77; becility, may appear and answer by guardian. 
 
 Mills v. Dennis, 3 John. Ch. 367; Winston v. Matter of Barber, 2 John. Ch. 235; see Murkle 
 
 Campbell, 4 Hen. & M. 777; Mason v. Debow, v. Murkle, 4 John. Ch. 168. 
 
 2 Havw. 178. Such answer cannot be read 3 Ante, p. 176; Braithwaite's Pr. 393, n. 
 
 against the infant. Stephenson v Stephenson, 4 For form of oath, see Vol. III. 
 
 (J Paige, 353. Nor is it evidence in his favor, 5 For form of jurat, see Vol. III. 
 
 though it be responsive to the bill and sworn to 6 Ante, pp. 180, 182. 
 
 748 

 
 SWEARING, FILING, AND PRINTING ANSWERS. * 755 
 
 larly put in an answer without the other, except under an order granted 
 for that purpose. 7 Where, however, the wife is defendant to a bill filed 
 by her husband, 8 or being judicially separated, or having obtained a 
 protection order, is sued as a feme sole, 9 no order is requisite. Where she 
 answers separately, under an order, her time for answering runs from 
 the date of the order. 10 Where the answer is filed under such an order, 
 the jurat should state that the answer is sworn pursuant to the order, 11 
 and the order should be produced at the time the answer is sworn : 
 otherwise, the order must be produced when the answer is presented 
 for filing. 12 
 
 Where a married woman is an infant, her answer cannot be taken, 
 either jointly or separately, until a guardian has been assigned to her. 13 
 
 An answer is filed in the Record and Writ Clerks' Office, in the same 
 manner as an affidavit ; u and is not considered of record until filed. 15 
 The year, letter, and number by which the cause is distinguished in the 
 Record and Writ Clerks' Books, 16 and the date of the filing, must be 
 written or printed on the first page. 17 
 
 The name and place of business or residence, as the case may be, of 
 the solicitor or party filing the answer, and his address for service, 
 if any, must be indorsed thereon, as in the case of other * plead- *755 
 ings and proceedings. 1 If the answer is put in without oath or 
 signature, the order must be produced at the time the answer is pre- 
 sented for filing, and the record is inscribed " Without oath (or, without 
 
 oath or signature, as the case may be), by order dated the day of 
 
 ." 2 Where the answer is put in by a guardian, and the order 
 
 appointing the guardian has not been previously entered at the Record 
 and Writ Clerks' Office, it must also be produced when the answer is 
 presented for filing. 
 
 Unless the plaintiff has taken some step which prevents its reception, 
 an answer will be filed by the Record and Writ Clerk, after the expira- 
 tion of the time for putting it in, where it is put in by a defendant who 
 has been required to answer the bill, whether original or amended, or 
 where, the plaintiff having amended his bill without requiring an answer, 
 it is put in by a defendant who has already answered or pleaded to the 
 bill. 4 In all other cases an answer will not be received, after the expira- 
 
 7 A joint answer of husband and wife must Eq. 43, 45; Smallwood v. Lewin, id. 123, 125; 
 be sworn to by both, unless the plaintiff eon- see Leavitt v. Cruger, 1 Paige, 432; Perine v. 
 sents to receive such answer upon the oath of Swaine, 1 John. Ch. 24. 
 
 the husband only. New York Chemical Co. v. 12 Rraithwaite's Pr. 45. 397, n. 
 
 Flowers, 6 Paige, 654; Leavitt v. Cruger, 1 13 Colman v. Northcote, 2 Hare, 147; 7 Jar. 
 
 Paige, 422. 528. For petition to assign guardian, and affi- 
 
 8 Ante, p. 179; Earl v. Ferris, 19 Beav. 67; davit in support, see Vol. III. 
 
 1 Jur. N. S. 5. 14 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, §§ 21, 25; Cons. Ord 
 
 9 Ante, p. 178. I. 35. 
 
 1° Ante, pp. 183, 740; Jackson v. Haworth, is Cons. Ord. VIII. 3. 
 
 1 S. & S. 161; Rraithwaite's Manual, 11, 12. 16 Cons. Ord. I. 48. 
 
 11 If not so verified, the answer will be sup- if Cons. Ord. I. 45. 
 pressed for irregularity. Rut the irregularity 1 Cons. Ord. III. 2, 5; ante, pp. 453, 454. 
 
 will be waived by the plaintiff's filing a repli- 2 Braithwaite's Pr. 47. 
 
 cation. Fulton Bank v. Beach, 2 Paige, 307; 8 Ibid. 
 
 S. C. 6 Wend. 36; Collard v. Smith, 13 N. J. * Ibid. 55, 
 
 719
 
 * 756 ' ANSWERS. 
 
 tion of the time within which it ought to have been put in, except under 
 the authority of an order ; which must be produced at the time the 
 answer is presented for filing. 5 Such order must be applied for by 
 summons. 6 
 
 As an answer is not strictly reputed such until filed, 7 it ought not to 
 be filed until the costs of contempt for not answering, if incurred, are 
 paid. It is frequently, however, the practice to file the answer before 
 the costs of contempt have been paid, and in such case, the plaintiff 
 must be careful not to take an office copy of the answer, or do any other 
 act which may be construed into an acceptance of the answer ; for, if he 
 does, he wall waive the contempt. 8 The certificate of the Record and 
 Writ Clerk is conclusive evidence as to the time at which the answer 
 was filed. 9 
 
 Notice of the filing of the answer must be served on the solicitor of 
 the plaintiff, or on the plaintiff himself if he acts in person, before seven 
 o'clock in the evening of the same day that the answer is filed ; except 
 on Saturday, when it must be served before two o'clock in the after- 
 noon. 10 The omission to give due notice of having filed the answer will 
 not, however, render the latter inoperative ; thus, it will not deprive the 
 defendant of his right to move to dismiss the bill for want of prosecu- 
 tion, at the expiration of the period allowed for that purpose, from 
 * 756 the date of filing the * answer. 1 It would seem that, in such a 
 case, the time allowed the plaintiff for taking the next step in the 
 cause will, on his motion, be extended, so as to give him the benefit of 
 the time he would otherwise have lost in consequence of the omission. 2 
 If the defendant files a written answer, he must, at the time he does 
 so, leave a copy thereof (without the schedules, if any, of accounts or 
 documents). 8 This copy will then be examined and corrected with the 
 answer filed, and be returned, when so examined, by the Clerks of Rec- 
 ords and Writs, with a certificate thereon that it is correct, and proper to 
 be printed. 4 The certified copy is, generally, ready for the defendant's 
 solicitor the day after the answer is filed ; and the Court will not dis- 
 pense with the printing of the answer merely because the parties to the 
 suit are poor, and to save expense. 5 
 
 5 Braithwaite's Pr. 56. »■ Solicitors' Life Assurance Co. 3 W. R. 6-10, 
 
 6 For form of summons, see Vol. III. V. C. W.; see, however, Matthews v. Chiches- 
 " Cons. Ord. VIII. 3. An answer to a bill ter, 5 Hare, 207, 209; overruled on appeal, 11 
 
 in Equity, complete in every respect, cannot be Jur. 49, L. C. 
 
 treated as an answer, until the party has filed it. 3 Ord. 6 March, I860, r. 2. A copy of a 
 
 Giles v. Eaton, 54 Maine, 186. If the defendant former bill for the same matter may be printed 
 
 dies before tiling his answer, it cannot be filed as a schedule. Wright v. Wilkin, 9 Jur. N. S. 
 
 by his solicitor as an answer. Giles v. Eaton, 195; 11 W. R. 253, V. C. K. In practice, where 
 
 ubi supra. the schedule to an answer is very short, it is not 
 
 8 Ante, p. 509. unfrequently printed with the body of the an- 
 
 9 Beavan v. Burgess, 10 Jur. 63. But see swer; in such case, the fair copy should of 
 Montgomery V. Buck, 6 Humph. 416. course include the schedule. 
 
 10 Cons. Ord. III. 9; XXXVII. 2. 4 Ord. 6 March, 1860, r. 2. For form of 
 
 1 Jones v. Jones, 1 Jur. N. S. 863; 3 W. R. certificate, see Vol. III. 
 
 638, V. C. S.; and see Lowe V. Williams, 12 6 Meux v. Watkins, 7 Jur. N. S. 704; 9 
 
 Beav. 482, 484. W. R. 779, V. C W. ; but the answers of par- 
 
 2 Wright «. Angle, 6 Hare, 107,109; Lord ties suing or defending in forma pauperis are 
 Suffieldtf. Bond, 10 Beav. 146, 153; Lowe v. excluded from the orders as to printing; see 
 Williams, and Jones v. Jones, ubi supra ; Lloyd Ord. 6 March, 1860, r. 15, post, p. 758. 
 
 750 

 
 SWEARING, FILING, AND PRINTING ANSWERS. * 757 
 
 The defendant must then cause his answer to be printed from such 
 certified copy, on paper of the same size and description, and in the same 
 type, style, and manner on and in which bills are required to be printed ; 6 
 and, before the expiration of four days from the filing of his answer, must 
 leave a printed copy thereof with the Clerks of Records and Writs, with 
 a written certificate thereon by the defendant's solicitor, or by the de- 
 fendant if defending in person, 7 that such print is a true copy of the 
 copy of the answer so certified by the Clerk of Records and Writs ; and 
 if such printed copy is not so left, the defendant will be subject to the 
 same liabilities as if no answer had been filed. 8 
 
 Under the former practice, where an answer taken in a foreign lan- 
 guage was filed with a translation annexed, it was only required that an 
 office copy should be taken of the translation. 9 It is presumed, there- 
 fore, that now, a fair copy of the translation only need be left, and that 
 such translation only need be printed. 
 
 * A defendant may, however, if he desires it, swear and file a * 757 
 printed, instead of a written answer ; 1 although this course, in 
 consequence of the inconveniences attending it, is rarely adopted. 
 
 On receiving notice of the filing of the answer, the plaintiff should de- 
 mand in writing, from the defendant's solicitor, or the defendant himself 
 if acting in person, 2 an official and certified printed copy of the answer ; 
 and on receiving such demand, the defendant must get a printed copy 
 of the answer examined by the Clerks of Records and Writs with the 
 answer as filed, and stamp such copy with a Chancery stamp for 5s., and 
 the Clerks of Records and Writs, on finding that such copy is duly 
 stamped and correct, will certify thereon that the same is a correct copy, 
 and mark the same as an office copy, 3 on a prcecipe being left. 4 
 
 The defendant must have this official and certified printed copy of the 
 answer ready for delivery to the plaintiff, at any time after the expira- 
 tion of four days from the filing of the answer, and within forty-eight 
 hours after the receipt of the demand for the same ; 5 and must, on de- 
 mand, deliver it to the plaintiff ; who, on the receipt thereof, is to pay 
 the defendant the amount of the stamp thereon, and at the rate of 4oL 
 per folio for the same. 6 
 
 The Clerks of Records and Writs are not to certify or mark any printed 
 copy of an answer which has any alteration or interlineation in writing. 7 
 Where, however, some very slight typographical errors had been so cor- 
 rected, they were directed to certify the official copy, and to alter the copy 
 left with them, so as to agree with the written answer on the file. 8 
 
 6 Ord. 6 March, I860, r. 3; as to such paper, the whole might, however, be taken, if desired, 
 see Cons. Ord. IX. 3, ante, p. 396; see also, ante, Ibid. 
 
 p. 7-42. l Ord. 6 March, 1800, r. 5. 
 
 7 For form of certificate, see ibid. 2 For form of demand, see Vol. III. 
 
 8 Ord. 6 March, 1860, r. 3; Bloxam v. Chi- 8 Ord. 6 March, 1860, rr. 4, 6. For form of 
 Chester, 11 Jur. N. S. 48; 13 W. R. 285, L. JJ. ; certificate, see Vol. III. 
 
 34 Beav. 76; S. C. nom. Bloxsome v. Chichester, 4 For form ofprwcipe, see Vol. III. 
 
 2 De G. J. & S. 444. An attachment, for not 5 Ord. 6 March, 1860, r. 4. 
 
 leaving the printed copy, is usually issued in 6 Ibid. r. 7. 
 
 such a case. ' Ord. 6 March, 1860, r. 12. 
 
 9 Braithwaite's Pr. 491. An office copy of 8 Lee v. Dawson, 1 J. & H. 37. 
 
 751
 
 * 758 ANSWERS. 
 
 The plaintiff is entitled to demand and receive from the defendant any- 
 additional number (not exceeding ten) of printed copies of the answer, 
 on payment for the same at the rate of one halfpenny per folio ; 9 and 
 after all the defendants who are required to answer have filed their 
 answers, a co-defendant is entitled to demand and receive from any other 
 defendant, any number of printed copies (not exceeding six) of his answer, 
 on payment after the same rate. 10 It may be here mentioned, that before 
 the practice of printing answers was introduced, any defendant might 
 take an office copy of the answer of a co-defendant, as soon as he had 
 filed his own answer, or, if he had not been required to answer, after 
 the expiration of the time within which he might have put in a volun- 
 tary answer ; n but it is presumed the former practice is now 
 
 * 758 * abrogated, and that no defendant can require to be furnished 
 
 with copies of a co-defendant's answer till all the defendants 
 required to answer have answered, and till the time allowed the others 
 to file voluntary answers has expired. 
 
 Office copies of schedules to answers of accounts or documents con- 
 tinue to be made in the Record and Writ Clerks' Office. 1 Where, 
 however, by mistake a printed schedule has been attached to a printed 
 answer, the answer was allowed to be filed, and a printed copy of the 
 answer, with a written office copy of the schedule, to be issued, on the 
 solicitor for the defendant undertaking not to charge his client with 
 the costs of printing the schedule. 2 
 
 Where a plaintiff is required to answer interrogatories, 3 he must file 
 his answer thereto, and get it printed, and furnish printed copies thereof, 
 in the same manner as a defendant is required to do with respect to his 
 answer. 4 
 
 No costs will be allowed, either as between party and party, or as 
 between solicitor and client, for any written brief of an answer, unless 
 the Court directs the allowance thereof. 6 
 
 The orders of the 6th March, 1860, do not apply to answers filed by 
 defendants, or by plaintiffs, defending or suing in forma pauperis, except 
 the first of them, which directs that an answer is to be written on paper, 
 instead of, as formerly, on parchment. 6 
 
 Section IV. — Exceptions to Answers. 
 
 If the plaintiff, upon an examination of the answer, finds that it con- 
 tains scandalous matter, or that it does not sufficiently answer the [bill, 
 
 9 Ord. 6 March, 1860, r. 8; and see Att- Vic. c. 86, § 19, and is a substitute for a cross- 
 Gen, v. Etheridge, 11 W. R. 927, V. C. K. bill of discovery ; zee post, Chap. XXXIV. § 1, 
 
 10 Ord. 6 March, 1860, r. 9. Cross Bills; see post, Evidence, Admissions; 
 
 ii Powysv. Blagrave, 18 Jur. 462, 464; 2 Eq. Pub. Stats. Mass. c. 167 §49 et seq. ; Stat. 
 
 Rep. 475,V. C. W.; and see Braithwaite's Pr. Mass. 1862, c. 40. 
 491. * Ord. 6 March, 1860, r. 11. 
 
 i Ord. 6 March, 1860, r. 10. 6 Ord. 6 March, I860, r. 13. As to the fees 
 
 2 Watt v. Watt, 8 Jur. N. S. 878; 10 W. R. to which solicitors are to be entitled, in the case 
 368, V. C. W. Where, however, the schedule of printed answers, see id. r. 14, and Sched.; 
 is very short, it is often printed with the answer, and Att. -Gen. v. Etheridge, 11 W. R. 927, V. 
 Ante, p. 756, n. C. K. ; see also post, Vol. IN. 
 
 3 This practice was introduced by 15 & 16 6 Ord. 6 March, 1860, r. 15; ante, p. 756. 
 
 752
 
 EXCEPTIONS TO ANSWERS. 
 
 *759 
 
 or, under the later practice, the] interrogatories, he may file ex- 
 ceptions to it. 7 Exceptions * are allegations in writing, stating * 759 
 the particular points or matters with respect to which the plain- 
 tiff considers the answer scandalous, or those interrogatories to which he 
 thinks there is not sufficient answer given. 
 
 Formerly, exceptions could, in like manner, be taken for imperti- 
 nence; 1 but this practice has been abolished, and there is the same 
 remedy for impertinence in answers as for impertinence in bills, and 
 other proceedings. 2 (a) 
 
 1 Gleaves v. Morrow, 2 Term. Ch. 597. No 
 demurrer lies to an answer in Equity. Travers 
 v. Ross, 14 N. J. Eq. 254, 258; Stone v. Moore, 
 26 III. 165; Bany v. Abbot, 100 Mass. 398; 
 ante, p. 542, note. Under the practice in New 
 Hampshire, Massachusetts, and some other 
 States, an answer is open to exceptions which 
 omits to notice material charges in the bill, 
 under the general interrogatory, although no 
 special interrogator)' is thereto directed. Miles 
 v. Miles, 27 N. H. 440; Tucker v. Cheshire R. 
 R. Co. 21 N. H. 29; ante, pp. 376, 377, note; 
 Methodist Epis. Church v. Jaques, 1 John. Ch. 
 65; Hagthorp v. Hook, 1 Gill & J. 270; Salmon 
 v. Claggett, 3 Bland, 125; Bank of Utiea v. 
 Messereau, 7 Paige, 517; Parkinson v. Trous- 
 dale, 3 Scam. 380; Cuyler v. Bogert, 3 Paige, 
 186; see Pitts v. Hooper, 16 Ga. 442; Jordan 
 v. Jordan, id. 446. In Maine, "exceptions to 
 an answer should be drawn and signed by 
 counsel and filed with the clerk, and notice 
 thereof given within thirty days after the an- 
 swer is tiled." Ch. Rule 8, 37 Maine, 583; see 
 Mass. Ch. Rule 17 ; and for the form of such ex- 
 ceptions, see Langdon v. Goddard, 3 Story, 18, 
 19 ; Kittredge v. Claremont Bank, 3 Story, 605- 
 609. 
 
 1 Langdon v. Goddard, 3 Story, 13; Mason 
 
 (a) Exceptions only lie to an insufficient dis- 
 covery, or to scandal or impertinence, and not 
 to new matter in the answer. Adams v. Bridge- 
 water Iron Co. 6 Fed. Rep. 179; Bower Barff R. 
 I. Co. v. Wells R. I. Co. 43 id. 391; Richardson 
 v. Donehoo, 16 W. Va. 685. Exceptions for 
 insufficiency and for impertinence are held to 
 be distinct. The Whistler, 13 Fed. Rep. 295. 
 They do not lie to the answer of a corporation, 
 the Attorney-General, or infants. United States 
 v. McLaughlin, 24 Fed. Rep. 823. They lie in 
 New Jersey for insufficiency to an answer, oath 
 to which has been waived. Reed v. Cumber- 
 land M. F. Ins. Co. 36 N. J. Eq. 393. In 
 Illinois, it is held that exceptions will not lie to 
 an unverified answer. Supervisors v. Miss. & 
 W. R. Co. 21 III. 366; Goodwin v. Bishop (111.), 
 34 N. E. Rep. 47. The rule that exceptions for 
 insufficiency are limited to cases requiring dis- 
 covery from the defendant, and do not lie 
 
 vol. i. — 48 
 
 v. Mason, 4 Hen. & M. 414; Burr v. Burton, 
 18 Ark. 215. And it is impertinent in an an- 
 swer, after stating the facts in response to the 
 bill, to give a summary, occupying several 
 manuscript pages, of supposed errors in pre- 
 vious proceedings, with reasons and authori- 
 ties. Johnson v. Tucker, 2 Tenn. Ch. 244. But 
 the use of a few unnecessary words, although 
 strictly impertinent, will not constitute a suffi- 
 cient ground for exception. Hawley v. Wolver- 
 ton, 5 Paige, 522; Gleaves v. Morrow, 2 Tenn. 
 Ch. 592. It is impertinent to set up in an an- 
 swer an independent counter-claim. Spaulding 
 v. Farwell, 62 Maine, 319; Mrzena v. Brucker, 
 
 3 Tenn. Ch. 161. And the introduction of scan- 
 dalous and impertinent matter in a bill will not 
 justify similar matter in the answer, although 
 introduced to meet the allegations of the bill. 
 Langdon v. Pickering, 19 Maine, 214. See, 
 however, Woods v. Morrell, 1 John. Ch. 103. 
 Matter in an answer which cannot be put in 
 issue, or given in evidence, is impertinent. 
 Spaulding v. Farwell, 62 Maine, 319. And 
 see, as to what is impertinence, ante, p. 349, 728, 
 
 . 729, notes. See also note 6, below. 
 
 2 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 17; Dufaur v. Sigel, 
 
 4 De G. M. & G. 520. 
 
 where the matter of such discovery is of record, 
 does not apply to bills for relief. McCIaskey 
 v. Barr, 40 Fed. Rep. 559. 
 
 Exceptions to an answer must be definite and 
 exact, and cannot be founded on general ob- 
 jections to an answer part of which is clearly 
 good. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cokefair, 41 
 N. J. Eq. 142; Arnold v. Slaughter, 36 W. Va. 
 589. The defendant's failure to answer one or 
 more interrogatories in the bill, or the suffi- 
 ciency of his answer, if made, should be brought 
 up by exceptions to the answer, not by demur- 
 rer or motion. Fuller v. Knapp, 24 Fed. Rep. 
 100; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Macomb, 2 id. 18; 
 Adams r. Bridgcwater Iron Co. 6 id. 179. But 
 after exceptions have been repeatedly allowed 
 for this cause, the plaintiff is entitled to take the 
 bill as confessed as to the questions not an- 
 swered. Hale v. Continental Life Ins. Co. 20 
 Fed. Rep. 344. Each exception to an answer 
 
 753
 
 760 
 
 ANSWERS. 
 
 The nature of scandal and impertinence in pleadings has been, before, 
 so fully gone into, that it is now only necessary to inform the reader 
 that the same rules which are there laid down for distinguishing scandal 
 or impertinence, when comprised in a bill, apply to pleadings in general, 
 and consequently to answers. 8 The practice of the Court, also, with 
 regard to exceptions to answers on account of scandal, is the same, 
 mutatis mutandis, as that already described with respect to exceptions 
 to bills on the same grounds. 4 
 
 It has before been stated, that a bill may be excepted to for scandal 
 at any time. 5 In like manner, it seems that there is no precise limit to 
 the time during which an answer may be excepted to for scan. 
 * 760 dal ; 6 and therefore, where the defendant became bankrupt * after 
 putting in his answer, and the plaintiff, before the assignees were 
 brought before the Court, obtained, under the old practice, an order to 
 refer the answer for scandal and impertinence, the order was held to 
 have been regularly obtained. 1 
 
 If a plaintiff conceives an answer to be insufficient, he should take 
 exceptions to it ; 2 stating such parts as he conceives are not answered, 
 
 3 Ante, pp. 346-349. 
 
 4 Ante, pp. 351-353. 
 
 5 Ante, p. 354. 
 
 6 Booth v. Smith, 5 Sim. 639 ; Campbell v. 
 Taul, 3 Yerger, 563. 
 
 Separate exceptions to the same answer, one 
 for scandal and the other for impertinence, will 
 not be allowed, as nothing in the pleading can 
 be considered as scandalous which is not also 
 impertinent. M'Intyre v. Trustees of Union 
 College, 6 Paige, 240. An exception for imper- 
 tinence will be overruled, if the expunging of 
 the matter excepted to will leave the residue of 
 the clause, which is not covered by the excep- 
 tion, either false or wholly unintelligible. Ibid. ; 
 see Balcom v. New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. 
 11 Paige, 454; Norton v. Woods, 5 Paige, 260; 
 Franklin v. Keeler, 4 Paige. 382 ; Tucker v. 
 Cheshire R. R Co. 21 N. II. 36, 37. The 
 Court, in cases of impertinence, ought, before 
 expunging the matter alleged to be imperti- 
 nent, to be especially clear that it is such 
 as ought to be struck out of the record, for 
 this reason, that the error on one side is 
 irremediable, on the other not. See Davis 
 v. Cripps, 2Y. & C. (N. R.) 443: Woods v. 
 Morrell, 1 John. Ch. 106. See, as to the prac- 
 tice, Johnson v. Tucker, 2 Tenn. Ch. 244. 
 Exceptions for scandal or impertinence must 
 describe the particular passages which are 
 alleged to be scandalous or impertinent. 
 Whitmarsh v. Campbell, 1 Paige, 645; Frank- 
 lin v. Keeler, 4 Paige, 382. An exception for 
 impertinence must be supported in toto, or it 
 
 will fail altogether. Tench v. Cheese, 1 Beav. 
 571. 
 
 If the matter of an answer is relevant, that 
 is, if it can have any influence whatever in the 
 decision of the suit in reference to any point to 
 be considered in it, it is not impertinent. 
 Tucker v. Cheshire K. R. Co. 21 N. H. 38, 39; 
 Van Rensselaer v. Bruce. 4 Paige, 177 ; Hawley 
 v. Wolverton, 5 Paige, 522. 
 
 If a plaintiff wishes to refer an answer 
 for insufficiency as well as for impertinence, 
 he must procure the reference for imperti- 
 nence first; for it has been decided, that a 
 reference for impertinence can never be con- 
 temporaneous with exceptions for insuffi- 
 ciency. Raphael v. Birdwood, 1 Swanst. 
 229; Livingston v. Livingston, 4 Paige, 111- 
 But by the practice under the former New 
 York Chancery System, exceptions for scan- 
 dal or impertinence, and exceptions for in- 
 sufficiency, were to be taken at the same 
 time and in the same manner. Livingston 
 v. Livingston,' 4 Paige, 111; Woods v. Mor- 
 rell, 1 John. Ch. 103. So in Tennessee, John- 
 son v. Tucker, 2 Tenn. Ch. 244. After a refer- 
 ence for insufficiency, or any other step taken 
 in the cause, an answer cannot be referred for 
 
 impertinence. Pellew V. , 6 Ves. 458. arg. ; 
 
 Beavan v. Waterhouse, 2 Beav. 58; Jones v. 
 Spencer, 2 Tenn. Ch. 776: but it may be for 
 scandal. Story, Eq PI. § 876. 
 
 i Booth v. Smith, 5 Sim. 639. 
 
 2 If the answer is evasive, it must be ex- 
 cepted to; all defects in the answer must be 
 
 should be confined to one question, though the 
 interrogatories, as numbered, contain several 
 questions; an exception for insufficiency may 
 
 754 
 
 be allowed as to part and overruled as to part 
 Bennett v. Hamlin, 47 N. J. Eq. 326.
 
 EXCEPTIONS TO ANSWERS. 
 
 760 
 
 and praying that the defendant may, in such respect, put in a full 
 answer. 3 If, however, the answer is one which accompanies a plea, or' 
 a demurrer, to part of the bill, he must, unless he intends to admit 
 the validity of the plea or demurrer, wait till it has been argued : for 
 his exceptions would operate as an admission of its validity. 4 This 
 rule, however, will not, as we have seen, apply to cases where the 
 defendant demurs, or pleads to the relief only, and not to the discovery. 5 
 And where a demurrer and answer to interrogatories were put in, and 
 the plaintiff, mistaking the practice, excepted to the answer before he 
 set down the demurrer for argument, he was permitted, upon payment 
 of costs, to withdraw his exceptions, without prejudice to his filing them 
 again after the argument of the demurrer. 6 
 
 supplied by taking exceptions. Blaisdell v. 
 Stephens, 16 Vt. 179; see Travers v. Ross, 
 N. J. Eq. 254. The Court will not examine 
 whether an answer is sufficient or not, except 
 after a reference for insufficiency. Davis v. 
 Davis, 2 Atk. 24. And, therefore, after excep- 
 tions overruled, the plaintiff cannot take the 
 bill for confessed as to the part not answered. 
 Smith v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co. 2 Tenn. 
 Ch. 604. 
 
 In Massachusetts, when an oath is waived, 
 and in New Hampshire when an oath is not 
 required, to an answer, no exception can be 
 taken to it for insufficiency. Mass. Ch. Rule 8 ; 
 Rule 9 in New Hampshire. 
 
 An answer to which the oath of the defend- 
 ant is waived cannot be excepted to for insuffi- 
 ciency; because such answers are not evidence. 
 1 Barb. Ch. Pr. 177; Bartlett v. Gale, 4 Paige, 
 504; McCormick v. Chamberlin, 11 Paige, 543. 
 Sheppard v Akers, 1 Tenn. Ch. 326; Smith r. 
 St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co. 2 Tenn. Ch. 599. 
 It is otherwise provided in New Jersey by Stat- 
 ute. Rev. Chancer}-, § 23; Dick. Ch. Pr. 98, 
 note. Exceptions will not lie to the answer of 
 an infant for insufficiency. Ante, p. 109, n. 
 Nor to the answer of a corporation, see Wallace 
 )-. Wallace, Halst. Dig. 173. Nor to the an- 
 swer of a peer upon protestation of honor. Hill 
 r. Earl of Bute, 2 Fowl. Ex. Pr. 11. Nor to 
 the answer of the Attorney-General. Davison 
 v. Att.-Gen. 5 Price, 398, note. Ante, p. 737, 
 n. 3. 
 
 3 Where the interrogatories are substan- 
 tially, though not technically, answered, ex- 
 ceptions will not be encouraged. Read v. 
 Wnodrnoffe, 24 Beav. 421. Exceptions should 
 not now be taken for want of answer to the 
 interrogatory as to books and papers. Law 
 V. London Indisputable Society, 10 Hare App. 
 20; Barnard v. Hunter, 1 Jur! N. S. 1065, V. 
 C. S ; Kidger v. Worswick, 5 Jur. N. S. 37, 
 V. C. W. ; Rochdale Canal Co. v. King, 15 
 
 Beav. 11; 9 Hare App. note; Piffard v. Beeby, 
 L. R. 1 Eq. 623; see, however, Hudson v. 
 Grenfell, 3 Giff. 388; 8 Jur. N. S. 878. An 
 interrogator}* as to particular documents must, 
 however, be answered. Catt v. Tourle, 18 W. 
 R. 966. (a) Where, by the rules of Court, the 
 particular statements which a defendant is 
 expected to answer are required to be set forth 
 in writing at the foot of the bill, the omission 
 of the complainant to set them forth will pre- 
 clude him from taking advantage of the failure 
 of the defendant to answer. Sprague v. Tyson, 
 44 Ala. 338. And although the complainant's 
 omission is a good ground of demurrer, yet if 
 the defendant file a full answer with a demurrer 
 for that cause, and go to hearing on the answer 
 and an agreed statement of facts, the error will 
 be waived. Martin r. Hewitt, 44 Ala. 418. If 
 the whole answer to a compound interrogatory 
 is a substantial reply, though each separate 
 question therein may not be separately an- 
 swered, the answer is sufficient. Mott v. Hall, 
 41 Ga. 117. An exception to an answer for 
 insufficiency should state the charges in the bill, 
 the interrogatory applicable thereto, to which 
 the answer is responsive, and the terms of the 
 answer, verbatim, so that the Court may see 
 whether it is sufficient or not. Brooks v. Byam, 
 Story, 296. Exceptions to answers for insuf- 
 ficiency can only be sustained where some ma- 
 terial allegation, charge, or interrogatory in the 
 bill is not fully answered. Where the matter of 
 the bill is fully answered, and the defendant sets 
 up new matter which is irrelevant, and forms 
 no sufficient grounds of defence, the plaintiff 
 may except to the answer for impertinence, but 
 he cannot except to it for insufficiency. Staf- 
 ford v. Brown, 4 Paige, 88. For form of 
 exceptions, see Vol. III. 
 
 4 Ante, pp. 589, 691. 
 
 6 Ante, pp. 590, 691. 
 
 6 Boyd v. Mills, 13 Ves. 85; Story, Eq. PI. 
 § 866. 
 
 (rc) When a sufficient affidavit or answer as allowed to deliver an interrogatory as to some 
 to documents has been made, it is within the specific document or documents. Hall v. Tru- 
 Court's discretion whether the plaintiff will be man, 29 Ch. D. 307. 
 
 755
 
 * 762 ANSWERS. 
 
 * 761 * If a plea or demurrer to the whole bill is overruled, the 
 
 defendant must, if interrogatories have been filed, answer, with- 
 out the plaintiff being driven to except ; but, where a partial plea or 
 demurrer is overruled, the plaintiff must except: because an answer 
 being on the file, the defendant is not bound to answer further till 
 exceptions have been taken. 1 Where the plaintiff had not excepted, 
 and the defendant put in a further answer, leave was given to the 
 plaintiff to file exceptions thereto, although he had filed none to the 
 original answer. 2 
 
 A plaintiff may also, where a partial demurrer is allowed, except to 
 the answer to such of the interrogatories as are not covered by the 
 demurrer ; he must not, however, except to those which are covered 
 by the demurrer. 
 
 In the case also of a plea, which is accompanied by an answer to the 
 interrogatories, the plaintiff may, upon the allowance of the plea, except 
 to the answer, as he may if a partial plea is overruled ; and the rule 
 that a plaintiff must except to the answer as insufficient, applies even 
 where the plea or demurrer is accompanied by an answer as to a single 
 fact. 3 Where a plea is ordered to stand for an answer, with liberty to 
 except, the plaintiff may file exceptions to the answer, or to that part of 
 it to which he is, by the order, permitted to except; but where the plea 
 is ordered to stand for an answer without liberty to except, expressly 
 given by the order, the plaintiff cannot except. 4 
 
 A plaintiff cannot except to an answer to an amended bill, on the 
 ground that the defendant has not answered matters inquired after in 
 the interrogatories to the original bill. 5 Where, after a defendant had 
 answered, the plaintiff amended his bill, by stating an entirely new 
 case, it was held that exceptions would lie, although some of the inter- 
 rogatories embraced in them were contained in the original bill. 6 
 
 * 762 * And so, where the interrogatories to the original bill required 
 
 the defendants to state certain particulars as to some goods 
 alleged to have been purchased by the defendants (such as, the per- 
 sons from whom, and by whom, and at what price, and in whose pres- 
 ence, they were purchased), and the defendants put in an answer in 
 the terras of the interrogatories, whereupon the plaintiff amended the 
 bill, and the defendants availed themselves of the opportunity afforded 
 by their being called upon to answer the amended bill, to state that, 
 since putting in their answer to the original bill, they recollected that a 
 
 1 Ante, pp. 600, 691; see Kuypers v Ref. Master, in considering the exceptions taken by 
 Dutch Church, 6 Paige, 570, 571. the plaintiff to " the thing" called an answer 
 
 2 Att.-Gen. v. London, 12 Beav. 217, 219. and disclaimer to the amended bill, should be 
 8 Cotes v. Turner, Bunb. 123; Story, Eq. PI. at liberty to allow exceptions as to matters, not 
 
 § 866. answered to, contained in the amended bill, 
 
 4 Ante, p. 700. notwithstanding the same matters were stated 
 
 5 Overy v. Leighton, 2 S. & S. 234; Wich v. in the original bill, and no exceptions were 
 Parker, 22 Beav. 59; 2 Jur. N. S 582; Denis v. taken to the answer to the original bill. 
 Rochussen, 4 Jur. N. S. 298, V. C. W. In 6 Mazarredo v. Maitland, 3 Mad. 66, 72; 
 Glassington r. Thwaites, 2 Russ. 458, 464, this Partridge v. Haycraft, 11 Ves. 570, 581 ; see 
 rule appears to have been departed from; but also, Kaye v. Wall, 4 Hare, 128; Duncombe v. 
 the circumstances of that case were peculiar, Davis, 1 Hare, 184, 193. 
 
 and the Court made a special order that the 
 
 756
 
 EXCEPTIONS TO ANSWERS. * 763 
 
 parcel of the goods inquired after had been purchased of an individual 
 not named in the former answer, but without stating from whom, or at 
 what price, or in whose presence, the same had been purchased, and the 
 plaintiff excepted to the answer for insufficiency, in not setting out those 
 circumstances : the Court of Exchequer was of opinion, that the plaintiff 
 ought not to be precluded, by the general rule above stated, from an 
 opportunity of obtaining a sufficient answer as to the point excepted 
 to : but held that, before delivering his exceptions, the plaintiff ought to 
 have made a special application to the Court for leave to do so. 1 
 
 The reason of the rule that a plaintiff, if he does not except to the 
 answer to the original bill, cannot afterwards except to the answer to 
 an amended bill, on the ground that the defendant has not answered 
 matters which were contained in the original bill, is, that, by amending 
 his bill, the plaintiff has admitted the answer to it to be sufficient. 
 Upon the same ground it has been held, that where a plaintiff, after 
 excepting to an answer, amends his bill without waiting for the decision 
 upon the exceptions, he must be considered as having waived his excep- 
 tions. 2 The principle, however, will not be applied to cases in which 
 the amendment of the bill extends only to the addition of another 
 party, requiring no answer from the other defendants : 3 and where a 
 plaintiff, after answer to the original bill, changed his name, and then 
 amended his bill by substituting his new name for his old one, and 
 adding another defendant, and afterwards took exceptions to the answer, 
 a motion to take the exceptions off the file was refused. 4 
 
 Some doubt was formerly entertained, whether a plaintiff did not, by 
 moving, upon admissions in an answer, either for payment of money 
 into Court, or for the production of papers, waive his exceptions, if 
 already taken, or his right to except, if he had not already excepted ; 
 and, in consequence of this doubt, a practice prevailed of making 
 such motions, "without prejudice." In * Lane v. Paul, 1 however, * 703 
 Lord Langdale M. R. decided that the plaintiff's right to except 
 for insufficiency was not waived by his moving for the production of 
 documents, and that it was not material that the notice of motion should 
 be made expressly without prejudice to the right to except. 
 
 Exceptions to an answer for insufficiency must be in writing, 2 and 
 must be signed by counsel ; 3 and if they do not appear to have been 
 so signed, they may be ordered, on motion, with notice to the plaintiff, 
 to be taken off the file, even though the defendant has taken a copy of 
 them, and the plaintiff has set them down for hearing. 4 They must 
 also specify that the answer complained of was an answer to the bill. 5 
 
 1 Irvine v. Viana, M'Clel. & Y. 563. no positive order requiring it. Yates v. Hardy, 
 
 2 De la Torre v. Bernales, 4 Mad. 396. Jac. 223; Story, Kq. PI. § 804; Mitford, Eq. PI. 
 8 Taylor v. Wrench, 9 Ves. 315. by Jeremy, 313; Hitchcock v. Rhodes, 42 N. J. 
 4 Miller v. Wheatley, 1 Sim. 296. Eq. 495. 
 
 1 3 Beav. 66, 69. 4 Yates v. Hardy, Jac. 223. For form of 
 
 2 Beames, 78, 181 ; Woods v. Morrell, 1 John. notice of motion, see Vol. III. 
 
 Ch. 103. 5 Earl of Lichfield v. Bond, 5 Beav. 513, 514, 
 
 3 Cons. Ord XVI. 1. Exceptions for insuf- 6 Jur. 1076. For form of exceptions, see 
 ficiency, as well as those for impertinence, must Vol. III. 
 
 have the signature of counsel, though there is 
 
 757
 
 *764 
 
 ANSWERS. 
 
 They are intituled in the cause, and care must be taken that they are 
 properly described in the heading : otherwise, they may be suppressed 
 or taken off the file for irregularity. Thus, where, exceptions having 
 been allowed to an answer, the plaintiff obtained the usual order, that 
 he might be at liberty to amend his bill, and that the defendant might 
 answer the amendments and exceptions at the same time, and amended 
 his bill, whereupon the defendant put in a second answer, upon which 
 the plaintiff took exceptions to the second answer, and described them 
 as exceptions to the further answer to the original bill, and to the 
 answer to the amended bill, the exceptions were held to be irregularly 
 described, and were ordered to be taken off the file ; because new excep- 
 tions cannot be taken to a further answer to an original bill. 6 The 
 present practice, however, in such a case, appears to be, to allow the 
 plaintiff to amend on payment of costs. 7 
 
 Formerly, exceptions for insufficiency appear to have set forth the 
 tenor or scope of the bill, and the substance of the answer, and then to 
 have proceeded to point out particularly in what respect the answer 
 was considered defective ; 8 but, according to the modern practice, the 
 tenor of the bill and substance of the answer are omitted, and the 
 plaintiff proceeds at once to point out, specifically, the interrogatories 
 or parts of the interrogatories which are unanswered, by sepa- 
 * 764 rate exceptions, applicable to each part. 9 Thus, * where sev- 
 eral questions are comprised in one numbered interrogatory, the 
 unanswered questions only should be included in the exceptions ; * and 
 where a plaintiff complains that a particular interrogatory to his bill 
 has not been answered, he must state the interrogatory in its terms, 
 and not throw upon the Court the trouble of determining whether the 
 expressions of the exceptions are to be reconciled with the interroga- 
 tory. 2 (a) It is not, however necessary that the exception should follow 
 the very words of the interrogatory, 8 provided that it plainly points out 
 the interrogatory to which it refers, 4 and does not vary therefrom in any 
 important particular. 5 
 
 6 Williams v. Davies, 1 S. & S. 426; and 
 see post, pp. 709, 770. 
 
 7 Earl of Lichfield v. Bond, 5 Beav. 513; 6 
 Jur. 1076; Bradstock v. Whntley, 6 Beav. 61. 
 
 8 See 2 Prax. Aim. Curs. Cane. 508, et seq. 
 
 9 On exceptions fur insufficiency, the par- 
 ticular points or matters in the bill which re- 
 main unanswered, or which are imperfectly 
 answered, should be stated in the exceptions. 
 Stafford v. Brown, 4 Paige, 88 : Mitford Eq. PI. 
 by Jeremy, 315; Cooper, Eq. PI. 319; Lube Eq. 
 PI. 87; see Dexter v. Arnold, 2 Sumner, 108. 
 Material and necessary matter must be expli- 
 citly met in an answer; but exceptions, founded 
 on verbal criticisms, slight defects and omis- 
 
 sions of immaterial matter, will be invariably 
 disallowed, and treated as vexatious. Bagtiott 
 v. Henry, 1 Edw. Ch. 7; Gleaves v. Morrow, 2 
 Tenn. Ch. 592. See form in Vol. III. 
 
 i Higginson v. Blockley, 1 Jur. N. S. 1104, 
 V. C. K.; see, however. Hambrook v. Smith, 17 
 Sim. 209, 212; 16 Jur; 144; Hoffmann v. Postill, 
 L. R. 4 Ch. 673, 681. 
 
 2 Hodgson v. Butterfieid, 2 S. & S. 236. 
 
 3 Brown v. Keating, 2 Beav. 581, 583; 4 
 Jur. 477. 
 
 4 Woodroffe v. Daniel, 10 Sim. 243. 
 
 5 Duke of Brunswick v. Duke of Cambridge, 
 12 Beav. 279, 280; Esdaile v. Molyneaux, 1 De 
 G. & S. 218; Brown v. Keating, ubi supra. 
 
 (a) In Zambaco v. Cassavetti, 38 L. J. Ch. an exception to the answer in respect to such an 
 
 503, it was held that the ordinary questions in interrogatory need not specify which of them is 
 
 an interrogatory asking for an account of per- not answered. 
 Bonal estate are not separate ques'ions. and that 
 
 758
 
 EXCEPTIONS TO ANSWERS. * 765 
 
 An exception for insufficiency may be allowed as to part, and overruled 
 as to part. 6 
 
 Care must be taken, in drawing exceptions, that no mistakes happen 
 therein ; for, after they have been delivered, no new exception can reg- 
 ularly be added. 7 Cases, however, have occurred, where the amend- 
 ment of exceptions has been permitted on the ground of mistake ; 8 as 
 where the plaintiff's solicitor, for the purpose of instructing his counsel 
 in drawing the exceptions, sent him by mistake the original draft of 
 the bill, instead of another draft from which the bill was engrossed, 
 which differed materially, and the mistake was not discovered till it was 
 too late to rectify it. 9 
 
 In the case of several defendants answering separately, exceptions 
 must be taken to each answer ; 10 and if a defendant, who has answered 
 jointly with another defendant, dies, exceptions may be taken to the 
 answer, as being that of the survivor only. 11 
 
 The exceptions, after they have been drawn or perused, and signed 
 by counsel, must be written on paper of the same description 
 * and size as that on which bills are printed. 1 The signature of * 765 
 counsel is affixed to the draft, and copied on to the engrossment. 2 
 The exceptions must be indorsed with the name and place of business of 
 the plaintiff's solicitor, 3 or with the name and residence of the plaintiff 
 himself, if suing in person,"* and with the address for service, if any, as 
 in the case of other proceedings to be filed at the Record and Writ Clerks' 
 Office. 5 Formerly, the exceptions were only delivered to the clerk in 
 Court of the opposite party, and were not of record ; but now they must 
 be filed at the Record and Writ Clerks' Office, and notice of the filing 
 thereof must, on the same day, be given by the plaintiff or his solicitor 
 to the defendant's solicitor, or to the defendant himself, where he acts 
 in person. 6 If the plaintiff does not give due notice, the exceptions will 
 not be rendered invalid, but further time will be given for the next step, 
 on the application of either party, on payment of costs by the plaintiff. 7 
 
 The defendant whose answer is excepted to, should take an office 
 copy of the exceptions. 8 
 
 6 Per Lord Hardwicke, in East India Co. v. 10 Sydolph v. Monkston, 2 Dick. 609. 
 
 Campbell, 1 Ves. Sr. 247. An exception bad " Lord Herbert v. Pusey, 1 Dick. 255. 
 
 in part is not necessarily to be overruled. l Ord. 6 March, 1860, r. 16. As to such 
 
 Hoffmann v. Postill, L. R. 4 Ch. 673; see Van paper, see Cons. Ord. IX. 3, ante, p. 396. 
 
 Rensselaer v. Brice, 4 Paige, 174; Tucker v. 2 Ante, p. 312. 
 
 Cheshire R. R. Co. 21 N. H. 37; Mclntyre v. » Cons. Ord. III. 2. 
 
 Union College, 6 Paige, 240; Higginson v. 4 Cons. Ord. III. 5. 
 
 Blockley, 1 Jur. N. S. 1104. 5 Ante, pp. 453, 454. 
 
 ' Partridge-v. Haycraft, 11 Ves. 575. 6 Cons. Ord. XVI. 3. The notice must be 
 
 8 Dolder v. Bank of England, 10 Ves. 284. served before seven o'clock in the evening, ex- 
 Tlie application may be made by summons, cept on Saturday, when it must be served before 
 which must be served on the solicitors of all two o'clock in the afternoon, or the service will 
 the defendants affected by the exceptions. For be deemed to have been made on the following 
 form of summons, see Vol. III. day, or Monday, as the case may be. Cons. 
 
 9 Bancroft v. Wentworth, cited 10 Ves. 285, Ord. XXXVII. 2; ante, p. 455. For form of 
 note. In Northcote v. Northcote, 1 Dick. 22, it notice, see Vol. III. 
 
 is stated that liberty was given to amend excep- " Bradstock v. Whalley, 6 Beav. 61, 62; see 
 
 tions after arguing them, but it does not appear also Lowe v. Williams, 12 Beav. 482, 484. 
 upon what ground such liberty was given. 8 Cons. Ord. XXXVI. 1. 
 
 759
 
 * 766 ANSWERS. 
 
 After the filing of a defendant's answer, the plaintiff has six weeks 
 within which he may file exceptions thereto for insufficiency ; 9 and if he 
 does not file them within six weeks, such answer, on the expiration of the 
 six weeks, will be deemed sufficient. 10 Where the plaintiff desires to 
 except to an answer filed to an amended bill, to which the plaintiff has 
 not required an answer, he must obtain a special order for that purpose 
 within fourteen days after the answer is filed. 11 
 
 By the original practice of the Court the plaintiff might obtain, 
 
 * 766 * as of course, an order to deliver exceptions nunc pro tunc ; but 
 
 this is now expressly prohibited ; : and such an order will not 
 now be made even by consent. If necessary, however, a special order 
 will be made, that the plaintiff may be at liberty to file exceptions, not- 
 withstanding the time for filing them has expired. 2 The application for 
 such order may be made by notice of motion, or by summons ; 3 and 
 the notice or summons should be served on the solicitors of those de- 
 fendants only to whose answers the exceptions are to be filed. By con- 
 sent, such an order may also be made, on petition, as of course, at the 
 Bolls. 4 Further time to file exceptions may also be applied for by sum- 
 mons at Chambers, 5 which must be served on the solicitors of the 
 defendants to whose answers exceptions are in contemplation. 
 
 If a plea and answer, or demurrer and answer, have been filed, and 
 the plea or demurrer is overruled, the time for excepting to the answer 
 for insufficiency is six weeks, reckoned from the day on which the plea 
 or demurrer is overruled. 6 
 
 If a plea is ordered to stand for an answer, with liberty to except, 
 and no time is fixed within which the exceptions are to be filed, the six 
 weeks for filing the exceptions will be reckoned from the date of the 
 order directing the plea to stand for an answer. 7 
 
 The times of vacation are not reckoned in the computation of the time 
 allowed for filing exceptions for insufficiency. 8 No exceptions can be 
 
 9 See the 61st Equity Rule of the U. S. from the filing of the answer, and not from the 
 
 Courts, post, p. 2389. See also the 17th Mass. acceptance of costs of a contempt. Nicklin v. 
 
 Ch. Rule, providing that "the plaintiff shall Patten, 4 Beav. 126; 5 Jur. 547; Coyle v. 
 
 reply, or file exceptions, or set down, the cause Alleyne, 16 Beav. 548; but the times of vacation 
 
 for hearing on the bill and answer, within one are excluded. Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 13 (2). 
 month after the answer is required to be filed; 1 Cons. Ord. XVI. 5. 
 
 or if the answer be tiled before it is required, 2 Biddulph v. Lord Camoys, 9 Beav. 155; 
 
 then within one month after written notice of see American Loan & Trust Co. v. East& West 
 
 such tiling; and if he fail so to do, a decree Ry. Co. 40 Fed. Rep. 384. 
 may be entered for the dismissal of the bill with 3 For forms of notice of motion and sum- 
 
 costs." See for New Hampshire, 38 N H. 609, mons, see Vol. III. 
 Rule 20; for Maine, 37 Maine, 583, Rule 8. 4 For form of petition, see Vol. III. 
 
 In Tennessee, exceptions must be filed with- s Cons. Ord. XXXVTI. 17; and see Nicklin 
 
 in twenty days after notice of answer filed. v. Patten, ubi supra. For form of summons, 
 
 Code, § 4400;' Chancery Rules, rule 1, § 5. see Vol. III. 
 
 i° Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 12 (3). In New 6 Esdaile v. Molyneaux, 2 Coll. 614; 11 Jur. 
 
 Hampshire, exceptions will be deemed waived, 201. 
 
 unless allowed and delivered to the defendant's 7 Ante, p. 701. Every special order for 
 
 solicitor within one month from the delivery of leave to except should specify the time within 
 
 the answer, or unless further time be allowed which the exceptions are to be filed, 
 by the justice. Ch. Rule 20, 38 N. H. 609. 8 Cons. Old. XXXVII. 13 (2); but see, in 
 
 11 Cons Ord. XVI. 6. The time runs strictly cases of election, Cons. Ord. XL1I. 
 
 760 

 
 EXCEPTIONS TO ANSWERS. * 767 
 
 taken to an answer for insufficiency, after replication ; 9 in some cases, 
 however, the Court has, on special application, permitted the replica- 
 tion to be withdrawn, and exceptions to be then filed. 10 If the plaintiff 
 files replication, or serves notice of motion for a decree, he is considered 
 to have admitted the answer to be sufficient, and cannot compel a fur- 
 ther answer, even though the first has been found insufficient. 11 
 
 The defendant may, if he think it advisable, submit to the exceptions ; 
 and where he does so without an order of the Court, the answer will be 
 deemed insufficient from the date of the submission. 12 If he desires to 
 prevent the exceptions being set down for hearing, he must submit to 
 them within eight days after the filing thereof. 13 The submission 
 is made by notice to the plaintiff's * solicitor, and payment of 20*-. * 767 
 costs ; ] and where a defendant, not being in contempt, submits 
 before the exceptions are set down for hearing, he has fourteen days 
 from the date of the submission within which to put in his further 
 answer ; 2 but he may apply for further time, by summons at Chambers, 3 
 which must be served on the plaintiff's solicitor, but not on the solicitor 
 of any co-defendant. If the defendant does not answer within the four- 
 teen days, or obtain further time, and answer within such further time, 
 the plaintiff may sue out process of contempt against him. 4 
 
 Where two or more defendants put in a joint and several answer, 
 which is excepted to for insufficiency, and one or more of them submit 
 to the exceptions, the others may have them argued. 5 
 
 If the defendant does not submit to the exceptions, the plaintiff may 
 set them down for hearing. 6 The exceptions are not, however, to be 
 set down before the expiration of eight days from the filing thereof, 
 unless, in a case of election, the defendant has, by notice in writing, 
 required the plaintiff to set them down within four days from the ser- 
 vice of the notice. 7 The exceptions must be set down within fourteen 
 
 9 Cons. Ord. XVI. 7. 3 Cons. Ord XVI. 15; XXXVII. 17, 18. 
 
 10 Wyatt's P. R. 202. For form of summons, see Vol. III. 
 
 11 Boyse v. Cokell, 18 Jur. 770, V. C. W. 4 Cons. Ord. XVI. 15. In New Hampshire, 
 i 2 Cons. Ord. XVI. 18. " if the defendant, on notice of exceptions to 
 18 Ibid. It is presumed that, in a proper his answer, shall deliver to the plaintiff's solid- 
 case, further time to submit may be obtained tor, before the day appointed for the hearing 
 on summons, to be served on the plaintiff's thereon, a sufficient answer, the same shall be 
 solicitor; see Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 17; and see received without costs. If the exceptions are 
 Mayer v. Frith, 1859, M. 164. For form of sustained, the defendant shall deliver to the 
 summons, see Vol. III. plaintiff's solicitor a full and complete answer 
 
 1 Braithwaite's Pr. 129; Cons. Ord. XL. 13. thereto within one month, and pay such costs 
 For form of submission, see Vol. III. as the justice allowing such exceptions shall 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XVI. 9. See the 63d Equity order ; or the bill shall be taken pro confesso ; 
 Rule of the U. S. Courts, post, p. 2390. In but if the plaintiff so elects, he may move for 
 Tennessee, the exceptions shall be set for hear- process of contempt to compel an answer." 
 ing by the plaintiff within ten days after they Ch. Rule 21, 38 N. H. 609. 
 
 are tiled, and acted on by him immediately. 6 Hinde. 268; Wyatt's Pr. 204. 
 
 Ch. Rules, rule 1, § 5; Code, § 4402. Appeal 6 13 & 14 Vic. c. 35, § 27. 
 
 lies to the Chancellor, from the action of the 7 Cons. Ord. XVI. 11; XLII. 6. 
 
 Master. Code §§ 4402, 4403, 4404: Ch. Rules, 
 
 rule 1, § 4; Johnson r. Tucker, 2 Tenn. Ch. 
 
 246. 
 
 761
 
 * 768 ANSWERS. 
 
 days from the filing thereof ; otherwise, the answer, on the expiration 
 of such fourteen days, will be deemed sufficient. 8 
 
 The Court will, however, on a special case being made, allow excep- 
 tions to be set down for hearing after the expiration of the fourteen 
 days; 9 and, in injunction cases, if the insufficiency of the answer is 
 shown as a cause against dissolving the injunction, the Court will direct 
 the exceptions to be set down and argued instanter. 10 Any objection, 
 on the ground that the exceptions were not set down in proper time, 
 should be taken when they come on for hearing. 
 
 * 7G8 * The times of vacation are not reckoned in the computation of 
 
 the times appointed for setting down exceptions for insufficiency, 
 except where the time has been limited, in a case of election, in conse- 
 quence of the defendant having, by notice in writing, required the plain- 
 tiff to set down the exceptions within four days from the service of the 
 notice. 1 
 
 Exceptions to answers for insufficiency are set down to be heard 
 before the judge to whose Court the cause is attached, 2 on production 
 to the Registrars' clerk, at the order of course seat, by the plaintiff, of 
 a certificate of the Clerk of Records and Writs of the filing of such 
 exceptions, or of the filing of a further answer. The plaintiff's solicitor 
 must indorse the certificate, with a request that the exceptions be set 
 down, which will be done on the same day that the certificate and 
 request are produced to the Registrars' clerk. 8 The exceptions will 
 then be advanced, and put in the paper for hearing on an early day ; and 
 the plaintiff's solicitor must, on the same day on which the exceptions 
 are set down, serve notice thereof on the defendant : otherwise, the ex- 
 ceptions will be deemed not set down. 4 
 
 Before the exceptions come on to be heard, the solicitor for the plain- 
 tiff should leave with the Usher, for the use of the Court, two printed 
 copies of the bill and answer, and a copy of the exceptions, and of the 
 interrogatories to the answers to which the exceptions are taken. 5 
 
 If the defendant does not appear at the hearing, the exceptions will 
 be heard ex parte, on production by the plaintiff of an office copy of an 
 affidavit of service on the defendant of the notice of setting down the 
 exceptions. 6 If the plaintiff does not appear, the exceptions will be 
 overruled, as of course, with costs, on production by the defendant of an 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. XVI. 12 ; but see ante, p. 768, notice of the time and place at which the same 
 n. (13); see 61st Equity Rule of the U. S. will be heard before such justice, being season- 
 Courts, and the 17th Mass. Ch. Rule, ante, ably given to the defendant's solicitor. Ch. 
 p. 765, note. Rule 20. 
 
 9 See Tuck r. Rayment, 9 Beav. 38; Cons. 3 Cons. Ord. XVI. 10; Reg. Regul. 15 March, 
 Ord. XXXVII. 17. I860, rr. 1, 5. For form of request, see Vol. III. 
 
 i" Hughes v. Thomas, 7 Beav. 584. 4 Cons. Ord. XVI. 10. For form of notice, 
 
 i Cpns. Ord. XXXVII. 13 (2); XLII. 6. see Vol. III. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. VI. 4. Exceptions to a de- 6 See Davis t». Ea.l of Dysart, 4 W. R. 
 
 fendant's answer in South Carolina may be 41, M. R.; and Cons. Ord. XXI. 12. Each 
 
 heard and determined by the Court without counsel should be furnished with printed copies 
 
 the intervention of a Master. Satterwhitf v. of the bill and answer, and brief copies of the 
 
 Davenport, 10 Rich. Eq. (S. C) 305. In New exceptions and interrogatories above mentioned. 
 
 Hampshire, exceptions to an answer may be 6 For form of affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 allowed bv a justice, a copv thereof and a 
 
 " 762
 
 EXCEPTIONS TO ANSWERS. * 769 
 
 office copy of an affidavit of having been served with the notice of set- 
 ting down the exceptions. 7 If neither side appear, the exceptions will 
 be struck out of the paper. 
 
 Where both sides appear, the plaintiff's counsel is first heard 
 in * support of the exceptions, then the counsel for the defend- * 7G9 
 ant ; and the plaintiff's counsel is entitled to a reply. The Court 
 will then dispose of the exceptions, by overruling or allowing them, in 
 whole or in part. 1 
 
 No exceptions will be allowed to stand over for an indefinite period ; 2 
 and in deciding on the sufficiency or insufficiency of any answer, the 
 relevancy or materiality of the statement or question referred to is to 
 be taken into consideration. 3 Either party has a right to the judgment 
 of the Court upon each of the exceptions. 4 
 
 If, upon the hearing of the exceptions, the answer is held sufficient, 
 it will be deemed to be so from the date of the order made on the 
 hearing. 5 
 
 If the first or second answer is held to be insufficient, or the defend- 
 ant (not being in contempt) submits to answer the exceptions after 
 they are set down for hearing, the Court may appoint a time within 
 which the defendant must put in his further answer ; 6 and if the defend- 
 ant does not answer within the time so appointed, or obtain further 
 time, 7 and answer within such further time, the plaintiff may sue out 
 process of contempt against him. 8 A defendant, however, who is in 
 contempt for want of a further answer, cannot procure an enlargement 
 of the time for putting in his further answer, 9 unless the plaintiff waives 
 his right to object to the application on that ground. 
 
 If, after the exceptions have been allowed or submitted to, the plain- 
 tiff desires to amend his bill, he may, on petition at the Eolls, 10 obtain 
 an order, as of course, that he may be at liberty to amend his bill, and 
 that the defendant may answer the amendments and exceptions at 
 the same time. 11 The defendant must then, as we have before 
 
 1 Lumley v. Desborough, 17 W. R. 5. For as to objections on the ground of want of ma- 
 form of order, see Seton, 1257, No. 9; and for teriality. 
 
 form of affidavit, see Vol. III. In Latouche r. * Rowe v. Gudgeon, 1 V. & B. 331; Agar 
 
 Sampson, cited Seton, 1257, it was, however, v. Gurney, 2 Mad. 389. 
 held that the exceptions being in the paper, and 5 Cons. Ord. XVI. 18. 
 
 the defendant's presence, were sufficient proof 6 Cons. Ord. XVI. 14; see Manchester, Shef- 
 
 of the notice having been served; so that the field, and Lincolnshire Ry. Co. v. Worksop 
 
 affidavit of service seems to be unnecessary Board of Health, 2 K. & J." 25. 
 where the plaintiff is the defaulter. 7 An application for further time may be 
 
 i For form of order, see Seton, 1256, No. 8. made at Chambers by summons, which must 
 
 As to the effect of the death of the defendant be served on the plaintiff's solicitor. For form, 
 
 pending the exceptions, see Pearse v. Dobinson, see Vol. III. 
 
 L. R. 3 Ch. 8. And where, on argument of 8 Cons. Ord. XIV. 15. See the 64th Equity 
 
 the exceptions, it has been held that the de- Rule of the U. S. Courts, post, p. 2390. 
 fendant is bound to disclose the contents of a « Wheat v. Graham, 5 Sim. 570. 
 
 deed, an order for its production, so far as any ' n For form of petition, see Vol. III. 
 
 interest is given thereby to the plaintiff, is a " The United States Circuit Court may. for 
 
 matter of course. Chichester v. Marquis of the purpose of avoiding unnecessary delays, 
 
 Donegal, 18 W. R. 427. entertain a motion to amend a bill in Equity, 
 
 Cons. Ord. XXI. 13. at the same time that exceptions to the answer 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. XVI. 4; see ante, pp. 715-519, are filed, and may require the defendants to 
 
 763
 
 * 771 ANSWERS. 
 
 * 770 seen, 12 put in his further answer, and his answer * to the amend- 
 
 ments, within fourteen days after service of the interrogatories to 
 the amended bill. 1 The order must be served on the defendant's solici- 
 tor ; and if the defendant can put in his further answer before he is 
 served with the order, he will deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of it, 
 and it will be discharged for irregularity, 2 notwithstanding the defend- 
 ant has notice of the order at the time he files his further answer. 8 
 
 If, after exceptions allowed or submitted to, the defendant puts in a 
 second or third answer which the plaintiff considers insufficient, he may 
 at once set down the old exceptions for hearing, 4 and give notice 
 thereof to the defendant. 5 If the plaintiff does not set down the 
 old exceptions within fourteen days after the further answer has been 
 put in, it will, on the expiration of such fourteen days, be deemed 
 sufficient. 6 
 
 The plaintiff must state, in the notice of setting down the old excep- 
 tions, the particular exception or exceptions to which he requires a fur- 
 ther answer ; 7 and if he does not do so, he may be ordered to pay the 
 costs of the defendant's appearing to object on account of the irregularity 
 of the notice. Leave will, however, be given to the plaintiff, to amend 
 the notice, and set down the exceptions again. 8 
 
 The exceptions so set down come on for argument in Court as before 
 explained ; and previously thereto the Judge should be furnished with a 
 printed copy of the further answer, in addition to the former papers. 
 
 If the defendant submits to the old exceptions, which have been set 
 down after a further answer has been put in, an application for time to 
 put in a further answer should not be made at Chambers : because, by 
 consenting to that course, the plaintiff might be held to have waived 
 the exceptions ; but the exceptions should be allowed to come on for 
 hearing before the Court, and a time will then be fixed within which 
 the defendant must put in his further answer. 9 
 
 No new exceptions can be taken to a second or third answer. Where, 
 however, the bill has been amended, and an answer is subse- 
 
 * 771 quently filed, the plaiutiff may file new exceptions, specifying *the 
 
 interrogatories to the amended bill which he does not think suf- 
 ficiently answered ; but such new exceptions must not extend to any 
 matter which was contained in the interrogatories to the original bill. 1 
 
 answer the amended matter and the exceptions 6 Cons. Ord. XVI. 13, 16. 
 
 together. Kittredge v. Claremont Bank, 3 Storv, 7 Cons. Ord. XVI. 17. See notice in 
 
 590. Vol. III. 
 
 12 j n (e p. 738. 8 Tanner ». Strutton, 15 Jur. 457, V. C. 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 6; see Bennington Ld. C; Thomas v. Hawlings, 28 Beav. 346. 
 Iron Co. v. Campbell, 2 Paige, 160. 9 Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire 
 
 2 Mayne v. Hochin, 1 Dick. 255 ; Bethuen Ry. Co. v. Worksop Board of Health, 2 K. & J. 
 v. Bateman, id. 296; Knox V. Symmonds, 1 Yes. 25. It would seem, however.that the plaintiff and 
 Jr. 87, 88; Paty v. Simpson, 2 Cox, 392; defendant may agree that, to save expense, the 
 Partridge v. Haycraft, 11 Yes. 570, 578; Hem- application shall be made by summor s at Cham- 
 mine v. Dingwall, 8 Beav. 102. bers; in which case the order should state that, 
 
 s Pariente v. Bensusan, 13 Sim. 522; 7 Jur. by consent, the exceptions shall not be deemed 
 
 018. to be waived or prejudiced. 
 
 * Cons. Ord. XVI. 13. l Partridge v. Haycraft, 11 Ves. 570, 581. 
 
 6 For form of notice, see Vol. III. 
 
 764 

 
 EXCEPTIONS TO ANSWERS. * 772 
 
 Where the bill has been amended, the plaintiff must go before the Court 
 upon the old exceptions, as they apply to the original bill, and upon 
 new exceptions as to the new matter introduced by the amendments ; in 
 such case, however, he may have the judgment of the Court upon the 
 answer to the amendments, with reference to such parts of the original 
 bill as apply to them ; and if the original words apply to the amend- 
 ments, the Court, in considering whether the answer is sufficient as to 
 the amendments, will take into consideration everything in the amended 
 bill that gives a construction to the amendments. 2 
 
 The proceedings in Court upon exceptions to a second or third answer 
 for insufficiency are precisely the same as those upon exceptions to a first. 
 The Court, however, in deciding upon the exceptions, will not look at the 
 second or third answer only, but will look at it in connection with the 
 preceding answer. 8 If the Court, upon looking into the answers in the 
 manner above stated, is still of opinion that no sufficient answer is given 
 to the matter originally excepted to, judgment will be given accordingly, 
 and the exceptions will be allowed. 
 
 If a first or second answer is held insufficient, the Court will, as we 
 have seen, appoint a time within which the further answer must be put 
 in ; 4 but in the case of a third insufficient answer, this is unnecessary ; 
 for, in such a case, the Court may order the defendant to be examined 
 upon interrogatories to the point as to which it is held to be insufficient, 
 and to stand committed until he shall have perfectly answered the inter- 
 rogatories ; and the defendant must pay such costs as the Court shall 
 think fit to award. 5 After a third answer has been held insufficient, a 
 fourth answer is irregular, and will be ordered to be taken off the file. 5 
 
 If the defendant is ordered to stand committed, a copy of the order of 
 committal must be delivered to the Tipstaff of the Court, who will 
 proceed to arrest the defendant. If the defendant is * arrested, * 772 
 he should, in strictness, be taken to Whitecross Street Prison ; 1 
 but in Farquharson v. Balfour* the defendant, being a gentleman ad- 
 vanced in years, was, by the order of the Court, allowed to remain at a 
 hotel in the neighborhood of Lincoln's Inn, in the custody of the Tipstaff, 
 till his examination should be completed. 
 
 If a defendant should, after plea overruled, put in two answers which 
 are insufficient, it seems the plea is not treated as an answer, and he will 
 not be liable to the consequences of a third insufficient answer. 8 
 
 If a plaintiff, having obtained the order that the defendant be exam- 
 
 2 Partridge v. Hayeraft, 11 Ves. 581. pean & American Shipping Co. id. 514. But 
 
 3 Farquharson v. Balfour, T. & K. 189. see Danell v. Page, 16 W. R. 1080. By the 
 
 4 Cons. Old. XVI. 14; ante, p. 709. 19th Mass. Ch. Rule upon a second answer 
 8 Cons. Ord. XVI. 19. This order does not being adjudged insufficient, costs shall he 
 
 apply to a third insufficient affidavit as to docu- doubled by the Court : and the defendant may 
 
 ments. Harford v. Lloyd, 2 W. R. 537, V. C. be examined upon interrogatories and coni- 
 
 W.; and as to the practice in the case of an mitted until he shall answer them. 
 
 insufficient answer to interrogatories exhibited 6 Liverpool v. Chippendall, 14 Jur. 301, V. 
 
 in prosecuting a decree at Chambers, see Hay- C. E. 
 
 ■ward v. Hayward, Kay App. 31; see also All- i 25 & 20 Vic. c. 104. § 2. 
 
 frey v. Allfrey, 12 Beav. 620; Rishton v. 2 See T. &: R. 184. l'tl, 193. 
 
 Grissell. 14 W. R. 578, 789; Croskey v. Euro- » Clotworthy v. Mellish, 1 Ch. Cas. 279. 
 
 765
 
 * 773 ANSWERS. 
 
 ined upon interrogatories, means to exhibit interrogatories, he must, if 
 the defendant is in custody, do so immediately. 4 The interrogatories 
 are drawn by counsel, but must be settled by the Judge ; 5 care being 
 taken that they go directly to the points as to which the exceptions are 
 sustained ; and the Judge must determine whether they have a direct 
 reference to those points or not. 6 The subsequent proceedings would 
 seem to be as follows : The interrogatories having been settled by the 
 Judge, a fair copy thereof is made by the plaintiff, on paper of the same 
 description and size as. that on which bills are printed; 7 and the signa- 
 ture of the Judge's Chief Clerk is obtained to a memorandum of allow- 
 ance in the margin thereof. 8 The copy so allowed is left at the Judge's 
 Chambers, and notice thereof is given to the defendant by the plaintiff. 9 
 The defendant may then procure a copy of the interrogatories from the 
 Chambers ; and he should prepare a written answer thereto, 10 and ob- 
 tain at Chambers an appointment to proceed thereon. On attending 
 such appointment, the defendant will be examined on oath by the Judge, 
 who will compare the proposed answer with the interrogatories, and 
 determine whether or not it is sufficient. If the proposed answer, or 
 examination as it is called, is considered insufficient in any respect, the 
 defect will be supplied by the personal examination of the defendant by 
 the Judge, until the Judge is of opinion that the examination is suffi- 
 cient. The examination, when completed, will be authenticated by the 
 signature of the Judge's Chief Clerk ; and he will transmit the inter- 
 rogatories and examination to the Record and Writ Clerks' Office, 
 
 * 773 to be there filed ; u and notice of the filing * thereof must be given 
 
 by the defendant to the plaintiff. 1 The defendant is entitled to be 
 attended b}^ his counsel at his examination, but the plaintiff is not entitled 
 to notice of the defendant's being under examination, and has no right to 
 attend. 2 
 
 The defendant having passed his examination to the satisfaction of 
 the Judge, may apply to be discharged out of custody. He is not, how- 
 ever, entitled to be discharged until the plaintiff has had an opportunity 
 of perusing the examination, in order that he may be satisfied that it is 
 sufficient. 8 The plaintiff has also a right, before the defendant is dis- 
 charged, to see all the documents mentioned in the schedules, or referred 
 to in the examination, if they are so mentioned or referred to that, in 
 the case of an answer, they would have made part of the answer. 4 
 
 The application for the discharge of the defendant from custody is 
 made on motion, notice of which must be given to the plaintiff ; 5 and the 
 
 4 Farquharson v. Balfour, T. & R. 184, 191. u See Cons. Ord. XXXV. 31. The exami- 
 
 5 See 15 & 16 Vic. c. 80, § 26; Haywanl v. nation does not require the signature of counsel: 
 Hayward, Kay App. 31. For form of interrog- Braithwaite's Pr. 45. 
 
 atories, see Vol. III. 1 For form of notice, see Vol. III. 
 
 6 Farquharson v. Balfour, T. & R. 203. 2 Farquharson v. Balfour. T. & R. 202, 203; 
 
 7 Ord. 6 Mar. 1860, r. 16. As to such paper, see Hayward v. Hayward. Kay App. 31. 
 see Cons. Ord. IX. 3; ante, p. 396. 3 Farquharson v. Balfour, T. & R. 201. 
 
 8 For form of memorandum, see Vol. III. 4 Ibid. 202. 
 
 9 For form of notice, see Vol. III. 5 For form of notice, see Vol. III. 
 10 For the formal parts, see Vol. III. 
 
 766
 
 EXCEPTIONS TO ANSWERS. * M 4 
 
 order will be made upon payment of the costs, charges, and expenses 
 occasioned to the plaintiff by the insufficient answer. 6 
 
 Where the defendant submits to exceptions for insufficiency which 
 have not been set down for hearing, he must pay to the plaintiff 20s. 
 costs; and where a plaintiff obtains a decree with costs, the costs 
 occasioned to the plaintiff by the insufficiency of the answer of any 
 defendant, who has submitted to exceptions for insufficiency, will be 
 deemed to be part of the plaintiff's costs in the cause ; such sum being 
 deducted therefrom as shall have been paid by the defendant, upon the 
 exceptions to the said answer being submitted to. 7 It must be recol- 
 lected, however, that this rule will only apply where the question of 
 the extra costs has not been disposed of by the Court in the course 
 of the suit. 8 
 
 Under the old practice of the Court, if the answer was reported 
 insufficient, the defendant was, if it was a first answer, to pay 40s. 
 costs, when the answer was put in by the defendant in person, but if 
 put in by commission, 50s. ; if it was a second answer, the defendant 
 was to pay 60s. costs; upon the third answer, 80s. costs, and upon the 
 fourth answer, £o, 9 with the costs of the contempt, if the plaintiff 
 availed himself of the right of commitment. 10 It seems that the pres- 
 ent practice is to tax the costs of exceptions, an.d they are considered 
 to be in the discretion of the Court. 11 Where, however, the excep- 
 tions are allowed, the costs will, in * general, be ordered to follow * 774 
 the decision ; because the defendant can always prevent the costs, 
 or the greater part of them, by submitting to the exceptions. 1 Where 
 the exceptions are overruled, the costs will also, in general, be directed 
 to follow the decision. 2 If they are partially allowed, and partially over- 
 ruled, the costs of those allowed will be ordered to be set off against 
 those overruled. 3 If no direction as to the costs is given, they will, under 
 the present practice, be costs in the cause. 4 
 
 Application must be made for the costs on the hearing of the excep- 
 tions ; 5 and where the exceptions are allowed, the costs may be ordered 
 to be paid immediately. 6 Where a married woman, living separate from 
 her husband, filed an insufficient separate answer, leave was given to the 
 plaintiff to apply for part of the costs out of any sums which might come 
 to her, on account of her separate estate, as the order could not be per- 
 sonally enforced against her. 7 
 
 6 T. & R. 200. Worham, 32 Beav. 69 ; Bridgewater v. DeWin- 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. XL. 13. ton, 9 Jur. N. S. 1270, 1272; 12 W. R. 40, V. C. 
 
 8 Poole v. Gordon, C. P. Coop. 433; 8 L. J. K.; see order in Seton, 1256, No. 8; see as to 
 N. S. Ch. 265. costs, where several questions were contained in 
 
 9 Beames's Ord. 182, 183. the interrogatory and some answered, Langton 
 i° Ibid.; and Beames on Costs, 227. V. Waite, W. N. (1866) 328; 15 W. R. 53, V. 
 11 13 & 14 Vic. c. 35, § 32; Morgan & Davey, C. K. 
 
 27. * Crossley v. Stewart, 11 W. R. 636, V. 
 
 i Newton v. Dimes, 3 Jnr. N. S. 583, V. C. K. 
 C W. 5 Earp v. Lloyd, 4 K. & J. 58; Crossley v. 
 
 2 Stent v. Wickens, 5 De G. & S. 384; B. v. Stewart, 11 W. R. 636, V. C. K.; Betts v. 
 W. 31 Beav. 342. 346; S. C. nom. A. r. B. 8 Rimell, W. N. (1866) 22, V. C. W. 
 
 Jur. N. S. 1141. See the 65th Equity Rule of 6 Thomas v. Bawling, 27 Beav. 375. 
 
 the U. S. Courts, post, p. 2390. " Pemberton v. M'Gill, 1 Jur. N. S. 1045, 
 
 8 Willis v. Childe, 13 Beav. 454; Dally v. V. C. W. 
 
 7G7
 
 * 775 ANSWERS. 
 
 Where, on a sufficient answer being filed, the plaintiff has been ordered 
 to pay the costs of a bill of discovery, 8 the costs of exceptions which 
 have been allowed to the first answer may be ordered, on the plain- 
 tiffs ex parte application, to be deducted from the costs payable to the 
 defendant. 9 
 
 The costs of insufficient answers are recoverable by the usual process 
 of subpoena and attachment, or by fieri facias, or elegit ; and if a first or 
 second answer is held insufficient, the plaintiff will not, by accepting a 
 further answer, waive his right to the costs already due to him for the 
 insufficiency of the former answer. 10 
 
 An order of the Court, allowing or overruling exceptions, may be 
 appealed from in the usual manner. 11 
 
 * 775 * Section V. — Further Answers — Answers to Amended Bills. 
 
 If a defendant, not being in contempt, submits to exceptions to his 
 answer for insufficiency before they are set down for hearing, he has, 
 as we have seen, 1 fourteen days from the date of the submission within 
 which to put in his further answer; and if he does not answer within 
 such time, or obtain further time and answer within such further time, 2 
 the plaintiff may sue out process of contempt against him. 8 
 
 If the defendant is in contempt, no time is allowed him to put in his 
 further answer, beyond the eight days from the filing of the exceptions ; 
 before the expiration of which time the plaintiff cannot, as we have seen, 
 set them down for hearing : * a defendant may, however, put in a further 
 answer, at any time, pending the exceptions. 6 
 
 If, after the exceptions are set down for hearing, a defendant, not 
 being in contempt, submits to answer, or if the Court holds the first or 
 second answer to be insufficient, the Court may, as we have seen, appoint 
 a time within which he must put in his further answer ; and if he does 
 not put in his further answer within the time so appointed, or obtain 
 further time and answer within such further time, the plaintiff may sue 
 out process of contempt against him. 6 
 
 If the defendant submits to the exceptions after they are set down, it 
 seems that they should be allowed to come on for hearing, and an appli- 
 cation be then made to the Court to appoint a time within which the 
 defendant must put in his further answer. 7 If the exceptions are allowed, 
 the Court will, at the request of the parties, at the time of giving its 
 decision, appoint a time within which the defendant is to put in his 
 further answer. 8 
 
 8 See post, Chap. XXXIV. §2, Bills of 3 Cons. Ord. XVI. 9, 15; ante. p. 767, note. 
 DUcovery. 4 Cons. Ord. XVI. 8, 11; ante, p. 767. 
 
 9 Hughes v. Clerk, 6 Hare, 195; but see 5 Ingham v. Ingham, 9 Sim. 363; 2 Jur. 
 now, Thomas v. Rawling, 27 Beav. 375. 886. 
 
 i° Brotherton v. Chance, Bunb. 34. 6 Cons. Ord. XVI. 14. 15 ; ante, p. 769. 
 
 11 See post, Chap. XXXII. Rehearing and 7 Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire 
 
 Appeals. Ry. Co. v. Worksop Board of Health, 2 K. & 
 
 1 Ante, p. 767. J. 25; but see ante, p. 770, n. (9). 
 
 2 See Ibid. 8 Ante, p. 769. 
 
 76S
 
 FURTHER ANSWERS — ANSWERS TO AMENDED BILLS. * 776 
 
 If, after the exceptions are allowed or submitted to, the defendant 
 desires to amend his bill, he may obtain on petition, as of course, at the 
 Bolls, an order that he may be at liberty to amend his bill, and that 
 the defendant may answer the amendments and exceptions together. 9 
 The defendant must then, as we have seen, 10 put in his further answer 
 and his answer to the amended bill, within fourteen days after 
 service on him of the interrogatories * to the amended bill. 1 If * 776 
 the defendant put in a further answer only, or an answer to the 
 amended bill only, the plaintiff may move to have it taken off the file, 
 unless he is desirous that it should remain there ; in which case he 
 should move for leave to issue an attachment. 2 If the defendant, after 
 exceptions allowed, put in his further answer to the original bill, before 
 the plaintiff serves the order for him to answer the amendments and 
 exceptions at the same time, he will deprive the plaintiff of the benefit 
 of the order. 3 
 
 A further answer, as well as an answer to an amended bill, is in every 
 respect similar to, and is considered as part of, the answer to the original 
 bill; 4 therefore, a further answer should only extend to the interroga- 
 tories which have not been answered already ; and if a defendant, in a 
 further answer, or an answer to an amended bill, repeats anything con- 
 tained in a former answer, the repetition, unless it varies the defence in 
 point of substance, or is otherwise necessary or expedient, will be con- 
 sidered as impertinent ; 5 and the defendant may be ordered to pay the 
 costs occasioned by the introduction of such impertinent matter. 6 
 
 The defendant need not answer any interrogatories to the amended 
 bill which have been, 7 or might have been, 8 put to the original bill, un- 
 less the plaintiff has amended his bill, stating an entirely new case ; for 
 then the defendant must answer that case, even though in so doing he 
 answers some of the interrogatories which were or might have been filed 
 to the original bill. 9 
 
 The form of a further answer and of an answer to an amended bill, is 
 nearly the same as that of an answer to an original bill. If it be an 
 answer to amendments as well as to exceptions, it must be entitled " the 
 further answer of A B, the above-named defendant, to the bill of com- 
 plaint of the above-named plaintiff, and the answer of the same defend- 
 ant to the amended bill of complaint of the said plaintiff." 10 If, after 
 
 9 Ante, p. 769. 6 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 17. For the practice 
 
 10 Ante, pp. 739, 769. as to impertinence, see ante, pp. 349, 350. 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 6. " Wich v. Parker, 22 Beav. 59; 2 Jur. N. S. 
 
 2 De Tastet v. Lopez, 1 Sim. 11. 583 ; ante, p. 729. 
 
 s Mayne v. Hochin, 1 Dick. 255; Bethuen v. « Drake v. Symes, 2 De G. F. & J. 81; 
 
 Bateman, id. 296; Knox v. Symmonds, 1 Ves. Dennis v Rochussen, 4 Jur. N. S. 298, V. C. 
 
 Jr. 87, 88; Paty v. Simpson, 2 Cox, 392; Par- W.| Newry v. Kilmorey, L. R. 11 Eq. 425. 
 
 tridge v. Haycraft, 11 Ves. 570, 578; Hemming V. C. B. 
 
 v. Dingwall, 8 Beav. 102; Pariente v. Bensusan, 9 Mazerredo v. Maitland, 3 Mad. 60, 72. 
 
 13 Sim. 522; 7 Jur. 618. 1° Peacock 0. Duke of Bedford. 1 V. & I'.. 
 
 4 Story, Eq. PI. § 868; Bennington Iron Co. 186; Braithwaite's Pr. 42 ; see Bennington [ron 
 
 v. Campbell, 2 Paige, 160; Mitford, Eq. PI. by Co. v. Campbell, 2 Paige, 160; see forms in 
 
 Jeremy, 318. Vol. III. 
 
 6 Bowen v. Idley, 6 Paige, 46 ; Trust & Fire 
 Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 8 Paige, 590. 
 
 •49 
 
 769
 
 * 777 ANSWERS. 
 
 exceptions to the original bill are allowed, the plaintiff amends his bill, 
 
 and the defendant puts in a further answer to the original bill and an 
 
 answer to the amended bill, and the answer is again held insufficient, 
 
 whereupon the bill is again amended, the answer should be 
 
 * 777 entitled * " the further answer of A B, the above-named defend- 
 
 ant, to the original and first amended bill of complaint of the 
 above-named plaintiff, and the answer of the same defendant to the 
 secondly amended bill of complaint of the said plaintiff." x It is not 
 necessary, in answering a bill which has been amended before answer, to 
 call it an answer to the original and amended bill : the most correct way 
 is to call it the answer to " the amended bill," or to " the secondly (or 
 thirdly) amended bill," only ; as the original bill has become nugatory 
 by the amendment, and the defendant is not bound to notice it, either in 
 an answer or a demurrer. 2 
 
 Further answers, and answers to amended bills, must be prepared, 
 signed, taken, filed, and printed in the same manner as answers to original 
 bills. 3 
 
 If the plaintiff has vexatiously required an answer to the amended bill, 
 and the defendant claims the costs of it in such answer, and asks for them 
 at the hearing, the Court will order them to be paid at once. 4 
 
 .A defendant who is required to answer an amended bill must put in 
 his plea, answer, or demurrer thereto, not demurring alone, within twenty- 
 eight days from the delivery to him or his solicitor of a copy of the inter- 
 rogatories which he is required to answer ; 5 and if an answer is not 
 required to the amended bill, a defendant who has appeared to and 
 answered, or has not been required to answer, the original bill, but de- 
 sires to answer the amended bill, must put in his answer thereto within 
 fourteen days after the expiration of the time within which, if an answer 
 had been required, he might have been served with interrogatories for 
 his examination in answer to such amended bill, or within such further 
 time as the Judge may allow. 6 An application for further time must be 
 made by special summons, in the manner before explained. 7 (a) 
 
 Section VI. — Amending Answers — and Supplemental Answers. 
 
 After an answer has been put in upon oath, the Court will not, 
 for obvious reasons, readily suffer any alteration to be made in it. 8 
 
 1 See Braithwaite's Pr. 42, and forms in 5 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 4; ante, p. 738. 
 y l jjL 6 Cons - 0rd - XXXVII. 7. This gives thirty 
 
 2 Smith v. Bryon, 3 Mad. 428. It may be days from the date of service of the amended 
 called "the answer to the bill of complaint." bill, where the service is effected within the 
 Rigby o. Rigby, Beav. 311, 313. jurisdiction; see ante, p. 740. 
 
 3 *See ante, "§§ 2, 3, of this chapter. 7 Ante, p. 741. 
 
 4 Cocks v. Stanley, 4 Jur. N. S. 942 ; 6 W. 8 See Howe v. Russell, 36 Maine, 115 ; 
 R. 45, V. C. S. 
 
 (a) When no rule day is prescribed by statute A reasonable time should always be allowed 
 
 for answering an amended petition, the time for the defendant to answer a material amendment 
 
 answer is in the Court's discretion, and setting of the bill ; and one hour and three quarters is 
 
 the case down for trial on a certain day amounts not such reasonable time. Davis v. Davis, 62 
 
 to ordering the issue made up by that day. Miss. 818. 
 Neininger v. State (Ohio), 34 N. E. Rep. 633. 
 770
 
 AMENDING ANSWERS — SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS. 
 
 779 
 
 * There are, however, many instances in the books in which * 778 
 it appears that the Court, upon special application, has allowed 
 the defendant to reform his answer. 1 Thus, where, in answer to a 
 tithe bill, the defendant has sworn that a certain close contained nine 
 acres, he was permitted to amend it by stating the close to contain 
 seventeen acres, even though issue had been joined; 2 so where, owing to 
 the mistake of the engrossing clerk, the words " her shares " had been 
 introduced into an answer instead of " ten shares," the answer was 
 allowed to be taken off the file and amended, though a service had been 
 made ; 3 and where there has been a mistake in the title of the answer, 
 an amendment of it has been permitted, 4 even though opposed by the 
 plaintiff. 5 
 
 The Court has also allowed a defendant to amend his answer where 
 new matter has come to his knowledge since it was put in, 6 or in cases 
 of surprise, as where an addition has been made to the draft of the 
 answer, after the defendant has perused it. 7 In like manner, 
 where a plaintiff, having drawn the defendant into an * agree- * 779 
 ment, whereby, for £300, he was to relinquish to the plaintiff all 
 his right and interest in a certain estate which had been left to him, 
 
 American Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Bayard, 
 and Same ?'. Sackett, 3 Barb. Ch. 610; Vander- 
 vere v. Reading, 9 N. J. Eq. 446. But the dis- 
 cretionary power of the inferior Court to refuse 
 leave to file a supplemental answer will be 
 supervised where it deprives the defendant of 
 the opportunity to set up a meritorious defence. 
 Brooks v. Moody, 25 Ark. 452. In Maine, an- 
 swers, pleas, and rules may be amended at any 
 time on the like terms as a bill. Maine Ch. 
 Rule 3; but see Howe v. Russell, 30 Maine, 115. 
 l Campion v. Kille, 14 N. J. Eq. 229. 232. 
 In matters of form, or mistakes of dates, or ver- 
 bal inaccuracies, Courts of Equity are verv 
 indulgent in allowing amendments of answers; 
 but it is only under very special circumstances 
 that a defendant can be allowed to make any 
 material alteration in his answer, after it has 
 been put in. See M'Kim v. Thompson, 1 Bland, 
 162; Bowen v. Cross, 4 John. Ch. 375; 1 Barb. 
 Ch. Pr. 163, 164; Smith t\ Babcock, 3 Sumner, 
 583; Burden V. M'Elmoyle, 1 Bailey Eq. 375; 
 Giles v. Giles, id. 428 ; Western Reserve Hank V. 
 Stryker, 1 Clarke, 380; Cock v. Evans, 9 Ver- 
 ger", 287, 288; Caster v. Wood, 1 Bald. 289; 
 Culloway v. Dobson, 1 Brock. 119; Liggon v. 
 Smith, 4 Hen. & M. 405; Coffman v. Allin, 
 Litt. Sel. Cas. 201; Mason v. Debow, 2 Hayw. 
 178; Flora v. Rogers, 4 Hayw. 202; Jackson v. 
 Cutright, 5 Munf. 308; Beach v. Fulton Bank, 
 3 Wend. 574; Hennings v. Conner, 4 Bibb, 299; 
 Taylor v. Bogert, 5 Paige, 33. This subject is 
 treated at length in Story, Eq. PL §§ 896-901 ; 
 also in Smith ». Babcock, ubi supra ; Williams 
 i'. Savage Manuf. Co. 3 Md. Ch. Dec. 418; Til- 
 linghast v. Champlin, 4 It. I. 128; Howe v. 
 Russell, 30 Maine, 115; Vandervere v. Read- 
 
 ing, 9 N. J. Eq. 446. And see Dearth v. Hide 
 and Leather Nat'I Bk. 100 Mass. 540 : Webster 
 Loom Co. v. Higgins, 13 Blatchf. 349; Huffman 
 v. Hummer, 17 N. J. Eq. 271. 
 
 See the 60th Equity Rule of the U. S. Courts, 
 post, p. 2389. 
 
 An amendment changing the whole ground 
 of defence set up in the tirst answer will not be 
 allowed. Western Reserve Bank v. Stryker, 
 1 Clarke, 380. Where an answer is amended, 
 the old answer must remain on rile as originally 
 put in. Ibid. 
 
 Where the defendant has obtained leave to 
 file an amended answer, he is not to be con- 
 sidered as having put in any answer, until 
 such amended answer has been filed. White 
 r. Hampton, 9 Iowa, 181. 
 
 2 Berney v. Chambers, Bunb. 248: but see 
 
 Montague v. , cited id. n. ; and 2 Gwil. 674, 
 
 n. (b). 
 
 3 Countess of Gainsborough v. Gifford, 2 P. 
 Wms. 424, 427 ; but see Vandervere v. Reading, 
 9 N. J. Eq. 446. 
 
 « White v. Godbold, 1 Mad. 269; Peacock 
 v. Duke of Bedford, 1 V. & B. 180 ; Thatcher 
 v. Lambert, 5 Hare. 228. 
 
 5 Att.-Gen. v. Worcester, 2 Phil. 3 ; 1 C. P. 
 Coop. temp. Cott. 18. 
 
 6 Patterson v. Slaughter, Amb. 292; Wells 
 v. Wood, 10 Ves. 401 ; and see remaiks on Pat- 
 terson r. Slaughter, in F\iIton v. Gilmore. 1 Phil. 
 528; Tillinghast v. Champlin, 4 R. I. 128. 
 
 " Chute v. Lady Dacre, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 29, 
 pi. 4. Especially where the answer has not 
 been sworn to. Taylor v. Dodd, 5 Ind. 
 (Porter) 246. See Morrill v. Morrill, 53 Vt. 74 
 
 771
 
 779 
 
 ANSWERS. 
 
 filed a bill to have the agreement performed, to which the defendant put 
 in an answer confessing the agreement, and submitting to have it per- 
 formed, but, afterwards discovering that the estate was of several thou- 
 sand pounds' value, he applied for leave to take his answer off the file, 
 and to put in another, leave was granted. 1 The Court has also permitted 
 a defendant to amend an answer by limiting the admission of assets con- 
 tained therein, where it was clearly established that such admission had 
 been made by mistake, and through the carelessness of the solicitor's 
 clerk. 2 («) 
 
 The Court, however, has never permitted amendments of this nature 
 where the application has been made merely on the ground that the 
 defendant, at the time he put in his answer, was acting under a mistake 
 in point of law ; and not on the ground of a fact having been incor- 
 
 1 Alpha v. Paj'man, 1 Dick. 33. So where an 
 order, granting to the plaintiff the right to sur- 
 charge and falsify an account, was appealed 
 from, and the Appellate Court remanded the 
 cause for the purpose of having the pleadings 
 amended, and for further proceedings, and 
 extended the right to surcharge and falsify the 
 account to both parties, provided the defend- 
 ant's amended pleadings should warrant such 
 
 (a) In Cross v. Morgan, 6 Fed. Rep. 241 (a 
 suit to foreclose a mortgage), leave was refused 
 to amend an answer by adding a fact which 
 was known to the defendant when he filed it. 
 See also as to amending answers, Cotten v. Fi- 
 delity &c. Co. 41 Fed. Rep. 506; Stewart v. 
 Townsend, id. 121 ; Gardner v. Grossman, 11 
 id. 851; Charlton v. Scoville, 68 Hun, 348; 
 Radam v. Capital M. D. Co. 81 Texas, 122; 
 Newton v. Terry (Ky.), 22 S. W. Rep. 159; 
 Louisville Underwriters v. Pence (Ky.), 19 id. 
 10; Angel r. Penn. R. Co. 37 N. J. Eq. 92; 
 Richardson v. Wallace (S. C), 17 S. E. Rep. 
 725; Woodward V.Williamson, id. 778 ; Mer- 
 chant v. Bowyer (Tex.), 22 S. W. Rep. 763. 
 
 New issues or irrelevant matter in an amend- 
 ed answer will be rejected. Font}' v. Poar, 35 
 W. Va. 70; McKay v. McKay, 33 W. Va. 724; 
 Tracewell v. Boggs, 14 W. Va. 254; Elder v. 
 Harris, 76 Va. 187; McMichael v. Brennan, 31 
 N. J. Eq. 496; Hagar v. Whitmore, 82 Maine, 
 248: Hinton v. Citizens' Mutual Ins. Co. 63 
 Ala. 48S; East St. Louis v. Trustees, 6 111. App. 
 130 ; Hibernia S. & L. Co. v. Jones, 89 Cal. 507; 
 Eckert v. Binkley (Ind.), 33 N. E. Rep. 619. 
 
 After a material amendment of the bill, the 
 defendant is entitled to amend his answer pre- 
 viously filed. Perkins v. Hendryx, 31 Fed. 
 Rep. 522; White v. White, 11 X. Y. S. 575; 
 Russell V. Gregg. 49 Kansas, 89. But allega- 
 tions in an rmswer to an amended bill or petition 
 which are already in issue under the first answer 
 may be stricken out. Work v. McCoy (Iowa), 
 54 N. W. Rep. 140. An amendment will not be 
 allowed for the purpose of setting up a defence 
 770 
 
 extension, it was held that the defendant could 
 amend his answer so as to surcharge and falsify 
 in respect to matters known to him at the time 
 of filing his original answer. Williams v. Sav- 
 age Manuf. Co. 3 Md. Ch. 418. 
 
 2 Dagly v. Crump, 1 Dick. 35; and see 
 Cooper v. Uttoxeter Burial Board, 1 H. & 
 M. 680 ; Hughes v. Bloomer, 9 Paige, 269. 
 
 that will prove ineffectual. Murphy v. Jack- 
 son, 69 Miss. 403. Where payment is the 
 alleged defence until about the time of trial, 
 the Court in its discretion may refuse leave to 
 file a supplemental answer which shows excuses 
 for non-payment. Voak v. National Inv. Co. 
 (Minn.) 53* N- W. Rep. 708. In North Caro- 
 lina, amendments to answers are permitted for 
 the purpose of setting up facts occurring after 
 the suit was begun, which invalidate the plain- 
 tiff's title, or strengthen that of the defendant. 
 Johnson v. Swain, 44 N. C. 335; Taylor v. 
 Gooch, 110 N. C. 387. Amendments will not 
 usually be allowed for the purpose of setting 
 up the Statute of Limitations to defeat a claim 
 otherwise equitable and just. See lie Bear, 8 
 Fed. Rep. 428. It is within the Court's discre- 
 tion to allow an answer to be withdrawn, and 
 to substitute a motion to strike out. Bowman 
 v. Chicago &c. Ry. Co. (Iowa) 53 N. W. Rep. 
 327. 
 
 In the Federal Courts, under U. S. Rev. 
 Stats. § 954, allowing amendments of plead- 
 ings, an answer may be withdrawn, on leave, 
 and a plea substituted, setting up the same de- 
 fence as that contained in a co-defendant's plea. 
 United States v. American Bell Tel. Co. 39 
 Fed. Rep. 716. In a patent suit, the Court, in its 
 discretion, may allow evidence to stand, which 
 was taken under objection before the answer 
 was amended to set up the defence of prior use. 
 Allis o. Buckstaff, 13 Fed. Rep. 879; see Bab- 
 cock & Wilcox Co. v. Pioneer Iron Works, 
 31 id. 338; Seibert C. O. C. Co. r. Newark L. 
 Manuf. Co. 35 id. 509. 

 
 AMENDING ANSWERS — SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS. * 780 
 
 rectly stated. 3 Thus, where a defendant, who was an executor, had 
 admitted himself accountable for the surplus, and it was afterwards 
 found that the circumstances of the case were such that he would have 
 been entitled to it himself, permission to amend was refused. 4 So, 
 where a defendant had, by his answer, admitted the receipt of a sum of 
 money from his father by way of advancement, and refused to bring it 
 into hotchpot, he was not permitted to amend his answer as to the 
 admission, although he swore that he made it under a mistake as to the 
 law of the case. 5 
 
 The Court will also refuse to permit an amendment of an answer, after 
 an indictment for perjury preferred or threatened, even though it con- 
 sider it to be clear that the defendant did not intend to perjure himself, 
 and had no interest in so doing. 6 
 
 From the above cases it appears that it was formerly the general 
 practice of the Court, if it saw a sufficient ground for so doing, to per- 
 mit the defendant to amend his answer. Lord Thurlow, however, 
 as it seems, introduced a better course in cases of mistake ; * not * 780 
 taking the answer off the file, but permitting a sort of supple- 
 mental answer to be filed, and by that course leaving to the parties the 
 effect of what has been sworn before, with the explanation given by the 
 supplemental answer. 1 
 
 This practice has been since adopted, in all cases in which it is 
 wished to correct a mistake in an answer as to a matter of fact ; 2 and 
 it is not confined to cases of mistake only, but has been extended to 
 other analogous cases : as where a defendant, at the time of putting in 
 his original answer, was ignorant of a particular circumstance, he has 
 been permitted to introduce that circumstance by supplemental answer, 3 
 even though the information was obtained by a violation of professional 
 
 3 Branch r. Dawson, 9 Ga. 592. up in the first answer. Ibid. The defendant 
 
 4 Rawlins v. Powel, 1 P. Wins. 298; see, will not be allowed to amend his answer after 
 however, Brown v. Lake, 1 De G. & S. 144. the opinion of the Court, and the testimony 
 
 5 Pearce v. Grove, Anib. 65 ; 3 Atk. 522. have indicated in what respect it may be mod- 
 
 6 Earl Verney v. Macnamara, 1 Bro. C. C. ified so as to effect his purpose. Colloway 
 419; Phelps v. Pro there, 2 De G. & S. 274. v. Dobson, 1 Brock. 119. A defendant is not 
 
 1 Per Lord Eldon, in Dolderv. Bank of Eng- allowed to file a supplemental answer for the 
 
 land, 10 Ves. 285; and see Jennings v. Merton purpose of setting up an important fact, which 
 
 College, 8 Ves. 79; Wells v. Wood, 10 Ves. 401; has arisen since the filing of the original answer. 
 
 Phelps o. Prothero, 2 De G. & S. 274; 12 Jur. He should file a bill in the nature of a supple- 
 
 733; see Bowen v. Cross, 4 John. Ch. 375; Van- mental bill. Taylor v. Titus, 2 Edw. Ch. 13E. 
 dervere v. Reading, 9 N. J. Eq. 446; Howe v. 2 Strange v. Collins, 2 V. & B. 163. 167; 
 
 Russell, 36 Maine, 124; Edwards v. M'Leay, 2 Taylor v. Obee, 3 Price, 83; Ridley v. Ohee, 
 
 V. & B. 256. A supplemental answer, to cor- Wightw. 32; Swallow v. Day, 2 Coll. 133; 9 
 
 rect any error in the original answer, will not Jur. 805; Bell r. Dunmore, 7 Beav. 283, 287; 
 
 be allowed except with great caution, unci Cooper v. Uttoxeter Burial Board, 1 H. & M. 
 
 always on equitable terms as to costs and fur- 680; Mounce v. Byars, 11 Ga. 180; Tillinghast 
 
 Dishing copies gratis. Western Reserve Hank r. Cliamplin, 4 R. I. 128. 
 
 v. Stryker, 1 Clarke, 380. When a supplemen- 3 Jackson v. Parish, 1 Sim. 505, 509 : Tids- 
 
 tal answer is put in, the old answer must remain well v. Bowyer, 7 Sim. 64; see Const v. Barr, 
 
 on file as it was originally put in. Murdock'a 2 Mer. 57, 60; Frankland v. Overend, 9 Sim. 
 
 case, 2 Bland, 261; Western Reserve Bank v. 365; Fulton v. Gilmore, 8 Beav. 154; 9 Jur. 1; 
 
 Stryker, 1 Clarke, 380. An application will 1 Phil. 522, 528; Chadwick v. Turner. 34 L. J. 
 
 not be entertained to file a supplemental an- Ch. 62. M. R. ; Talmage v. Pell, 9 Paige, 410; 
 
 swer to change the whole ground of defence set Suydam v. Truesdale, 6 McLean, 459. 
 
 773
 
 781 
 
 ANSWERS. 
 
 confidence. 4 And where a defendant had wished to state a fact in his 
 original answer, but had been induced to leave it out by the mistaken 
 advice of his solicitor, he was allowed to state it by supplemental 
 answer. 6 Again, where, subsequently to the filing of the answer, events 
 had occurred which the defendant was advised ought, for the purposes 
 of his defence, to appear on the record, he was allowed to state them by 
 means of a supplemental answer. 6 (a) 
 
 Although the Court will, in cases of mistake, or other cases of that 
 description, permit a defendant to correct his answer by supplemental 
 answer, it always does so with great difficulty, where an addition 
 * 781 is to be put upon the record prejudicial to the plaintiff, 7 * though 
 it will be inclined to yield to the application, if the object is to 
 remove out of the plaintiff's way the effect of a denial, or to give him 
 the benefit of a material admission. 1 Therefore, where the application 
 was made for the purpose of enabling the defendant to raise the Stat- 
 ute of Limitations as a defence, leave to file a supplemental answer was 
 refused ; 2 and where the defendant had, by his original answer to a 
 bill for the specific performance of a contract, admitted that he took 
 possession of the whole property in pursuance of the contract, but 
 afterwards applied for leave to put in a supplemental answer to limit 
 the admission to part of the premises only, upon affidavits of mistake, 
 the motion was refused : unless the defendant would state upon oath, 
 that when he swore to the original answer, he meant to swear in the 
 sense in which he, by the application, desired to be permitted to swear 
 to it. 3 
 
 4 Raincock v. Young, 16 Sim. 122. 
 
 5 Nail v. Punter, 4 Sim. 474, 483; Burgin v. 
 Giberson, 23 N. J. Eq. 403. Or where by over- 
 sight of the solicitor the fact was omitted from 
 the answer. Arnaud v. Grigg, 29 N. J. Eq. 1. 
 
 6 Stamps v. Birmingham & Stour Valley 
 Ry. Co. 2 Phil. 673, 677 ; 7 Hare, 251; Southall 
 v. British Mut. Life Ass. Co. 38 L. J. Cli. 711. 
 See ante, p. 409, n. 3; Anon. Hopk. 27; Smith 
 v. Smith, 4 Paige, 132. 
 
 7 Where the purpose of the amendment is 
 not to correct any mistake or misstatement in 
 the original answer, but to set up substantially 
 a new ground of defence at the hearing, it will 
 not be permitted. Campion v. Kille, 14 N. J. 
 Eq. 229, 232. Or an unconscientious defence, as 
 that the plaintiff, a corporation, was acting ulini. 
 viies in making the contract sued on. Third 
 Avenue Sav. Bk. o. Dimock, 24 N. J. Eq. 26. 
 
 i Edwards v. M'Leay, 2 V. & B. 256. Lord 
 Eklon in this case, as well as in Strange v. Col- 
 lins, id. 166, appears to have been of opinion 
 that a supplemental answer ought not to have 
 any effect upon an indictment for perjury upon 
 the original answer; but see King ?•. Carr, 1 
 Sid. 418; 2 Keb. 516; see Phelps v. Prothero, 2 
 De G. & Sm. 278; Swallow v. Day, 2 Coll. 133; 
 Hughes v. Bloomer, 7 Paige, 269. 
 
 2 Percival v. Caney, 14 Jur. 473, V. C. K. 
 B. ; Stall v. Goode, 10 Heisk. 58; Cock r. Evans, 
 9 Yerg. 287. Especially after a decree for an 
 account. McRea v. David, 7 Rich. Eq. 375. 
 So, when the object was to fet up the defence 
 of the Statute of Frauds. Cook v. Bee, 2 Tenn. 
 Ch. 344. 
 
 3 Livesey ». Wilson, 1 V. & B. 149; see also 
 Greenwood V. Atkinson, 4 Sim. 54, 64; Mur- 
 doch's case, 2 Bland, 461 ; Vandervere v. Read- 
 
 (a) Thames & Mersey M Ins. Co. v. Con- 
 tinental Ins. Co. 37 Fed. Rep. 286; McCrady 
 v. Davie, 36 S. C. 136; United States v Morris, 
 7 Mackay, 8; Sylvester v. Jerome (Col.), 34 
 Pac. Rep. 760. A defendant who has ac- 
 quired title to land in controversy after filing 
 his answer, may set it up by amending his 
 answer. Barnegat City Beach Association v. 
 Buzby(N. J.), 20 Atl. 214. A title cannot, 
 after hearing, be set up by supplemental an- 
 
 774 
 
 swer, when it is inconsistent with a right dis- 
 tinctly admitted by the first answer. Mon- 
 tague v. Selb, 106 111. 49. A supplemental 
 answer requires notice and leave of Court. 
 Goodacre v. Skinner, 47 Kansas, 575; Wood v. 
 Brush, 72 Cal. 224. Whether the issues raised 
 by supplemental answers should be tried with 
 the original issues is a matter of convenience. 
 Pearson v. Northern R. Co. 63 N. H. 534.
 
 AMENDING ANSWERS — SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS. * 782 
 
 An application for leave to file a supplemental answer is made upon 
 motion or by summons. 4 The summons or notice of motion must be 
 served on the plaintiff, and must specify the facts intended to be stated 
 in the proposed supplemental answer, and be supported by affidavit 
 verifying the truth of the proposed supplemental answer, specifically 
 stating the facts intended to be placed on the record, 6 and showing a 
 sufficient reason why they were not introduced into the original answer. 6 
 The defendant must also, it seems, produce a full copy of the intended 
 supplemental answer, 7 for the inspection of the plaintiff. 8 
 
 In making an application for leave to file a supplemental answer, the 
 defendant must also make a case showing that justice requires that he 
 should be permitted to alter the defence already on record ; and even 
 where a defendant applied for leave to file a supplemental answer 
 for the purpose of making an admission in * favor of the plaintiff, * 782 
 upon an affidavit that, from certain circumstances which had since 
 occurred, he was satisfied he ought to have admitted a fact which he 
 had denied, 1 Lord Eldon held, that the affidavit ought to have stated 
 that, at the time of putting in the answer, the defendant did not know 
 the circumstances upon which he made the application, or any other cir- 
 cumstances upon which he ought to have stated the fact otherwise. 2 
 
 Where a defendant has obtained permission to file a supplemental 
 answer, for the purpose of correcting a mistake in his original answer, 
 he must confine his supplemental answer strictly to the correction of the 
 mistake sworn to. If he goes beyond that, and makes any other altera- 
 tion in the case than what arises from the correction of such mistake, 
 his supplemental answer will be taken off the file. 8 (a) 
 
 Where a defendant has, at the time of putting in his original answer, 
 mistaken facts, he cannot contravene his own admission in any other 
 way than by moving to correct his answer, either by amendment or sup- 
 plemental answer. He cannot do so by filing a cross-bill. 4 (li) 
 
 ing, 9 N. J. Eq. 446. A defendant will not be mentary evidence, it must be produced. Cliur- 
 
 allowed to file a supplemental answer contra- ton v. Frewen, L. R. 1 Eq. 238, V. C. K. 
 dieting the statements in the first answer. 6 Tennant v. Wilsmore, 2 Anst. 3G2; Scott 
 
 Greenwood v. Atkinson, 4 Sim. 61; see Thomas v. Carter, 1 Y. & J. 452; Podmore v. Skipwith, 
 
 v. Visitors of Frederick Co. School, 7 Gill & J. 2 Sim. 565; Smallwood v. Lewin, 13 N. J. Eq. 
 
 389. 123; Smith v. Babcock, 3 Sumner, 585; Van- 
 
 4 For forms of notice of motion and sum- dervere v. Reading, 9 N. J. Eq. 440. 
 
 mons, see Vol. III.; for order or summons, see 7 Bell v. Punmore, 7 Beav. 283; Fulton v. 
 
 Bovill v. Clark, V. C. W., at Chambers, 23 Gilmore. ubi supra. 
 
 Nov., 1865, Reg. Lib. A. 2221; and see Seton, 8 Fulton v. Gilmore, ubi supra. 
 
 45. It seems, however, from Churton r. Frewen, 1 The motion for leave to file a supplemental 
 
 L. R. 1 Eq. 238, V. C. K., that the application answer must be accompanied with an affidavit. 
 
 should be made by motion only. Thomas v. Doub, 1 Md. 252; McKim v. Thomp- 
 
 5 Curling v. Marquis Townshend, 19 Ves. son, 1 Bland, 150. 
 
 628, 631; Smith v. Hartley, 5 Beav. 432; Has- - Wells v. Wood, 10 Ves. 401. 
 
 lar v. Hollis, 2 Beav. 236;*Fulton v. Gilmore. 8 3 Strange v. Collins, 2 V. & B. 163, 167. 
 
 Beav. 154; 9 Jur. 1; I Phil. 522, 527; 9 Jur. * Berkley v. Ryder, 2 Ves. Sr. 533, 537; 
 
 265. Where the application is founded ondocu- Graham v. Tankersley, 15 Ala. 634. 
 
 (a) See Allis v. Stowell, 5 Fed. Rep. 203 ; the defence by mistake admitted a payment, 
 
 McCrady v. Jones, 36 S. C. 136. leave to amend by withdrawing this admission 
 
 (6) See Andrews v. Gilman, 122 Mass. 471. was given on the terms of the money being 
 
 In Hollis v. Burton, [1892] 3 Ch. 226, where brought into Court. 
 
 775
 
 * 783 ANSWERS.. 
 
 There appears to be no particular limit to the time within which an 
 application for leave to file a supplemental answer, to correct a mistake 
 in an original answer, will be complied with : provided the cause is in 
 such a state that the plaintiff may be placed in the same situation that 
 he would have been in had the answer been correct at first. 5 Accord- 
 ingly, we find several instances in the books in which such applications 
 have been granted after replication, 6 and even after the cause has been 
 set down, and in the paper for hearing. 7 Where, however, the plaintiff 
 cannot be placed in the same situation that he would have been in, had 
 the defence been stated on the record in due time, the Court will not 
 permit a supplemental answer to be filed. Therefore, where, after the 
 cause had been set down for hearing, an application was made for leave 
 to file a supplemental answer, which set up a totally new defence, while 
 it admitted the facts as stated in the original answer to be true, the 
 Court refused the motion with costs. 8 (c) 
 
 But although the rule of practice now is, that, in cases of mistake in 
 the statement or admissions in an answer, or in analogous cases, 
 
 * 783 the defendant will not be permitted to amend his answer, * but 
 
 must apply for leave to file a supplemental answer, for the pur- 
 pose of correcting the mistake, the old course of amending the answer 
 may still be pursued in cases of error or mistake in matters of form. 
 Thus, where the title of an answer was defective, a motion by the 
 defendant to take it off the file and amend and reswear it, was granted ; * 
 and so, where, in the title of an answer, the name of the plaintiff was 
 mistaken, a similar order was made. 2 The addition of the name of a 
 party omitted in the title has also been permitted. 3 Where, however, 
 
 5 Martin v. Atkinson, 5 Ga. 390. But an answer by the addition of material facts known 
 application to amend a sworn answer made to the defendant at the time the original answer 
 more than two years after the discovery of the was sworn to, was not permitted on final hear- 
 alleged mistakeand filing of the answer, with- ing. Marsh v. Mitchell, 26 N. J. Eq. 497. 
 out excuse for the delay, was refused. Wilson Nor, a fortiori, after an agreement to try at a 
 v. Wintermute, 27 N. J. Eq. 63. And see fixed time, on the existing pleadings. Furman 
 where the application was to amend after the v. Edwards, 3 Tenn. Ch. 365. 
 
 hearing in a patent case, with a view to contest 8 Macdougal v. Furrier, 4 Russ. 486 ; see 
 
 the question of infringement before the Master, Smallwood v. Lewin, 13 N. J. Eq. 123. 
 or, at any rate, the extent of infringement, and * White v. Godbold, 1 Mad. 269; the order 
 
 was refused. Ruggles v. Eddy, 11 Blatch. 524. was, however, made by consent in this case. 
 
 6 Jackson v. Parish, 1 Sim. 505, 509; Rain- 2 Feacock v. Duke of Bedford, 1 V. & B. 
 cock v. Young, 16 Sim. 122; Parsons v. Hardy, 186; Woodger v. Crumpter, 1 Fowl. Ex. Pr. 
 21 L. J. Ch. 400, V. C. T. 388; Lloyd v. Mytton, id. 389; Keen v. Stan- 
 
 7 Fulton v. Gilmore, 8 Beav. 154. 158; 9 ley, ibid.; Rabbeth v. Squire, 10 Hare App. 3; 
 Jur. 1 ; 1 Phil. 522, 525, 530; 9 Jur. 265 ; Chad- but see Fry v. Mantell. 4 Beav. 485 ; S. C. nom. 
 wick v. Turner. 34 L. J. Ch. 62, M. R. ; Arnaud Fry v. Martel, 5 Jur. 1194; Att.-Gen. v. Wor- 
 v. Grigg, 29 N. J. Eq. 1; Podmore v. Skipwith, cester. 2 Phil. 3 ; 1 Cooper temp. Cott. 18. 
 
 2 Sim. 565. But an amendment to a sworn 3 Wright v. Campbell, 1 Fowl. Ex. Pr. 389. 
 
 (c) An amendment of the answer may, in the plaintiff. See Laird v. Briggs, 19 Ch. D. 
 
 the Court's discretion, be allowed after it has 22; Arnold v. Chesebrough, 33 Fed Rep. 571; 
 
 decided the cause. Arnett v. Welch, 46 N.J. Whelan v. Sullivan, 102 Mass. 204; Morrison 
 
 Eq. 548; United Railroad & Canal Companies v. Mayer, 63 Mich. 238; Rettig v. Newman, 99 
 
 v. Long Dock Co. 41 id. 407; Sawyer v. Camp- Ind. 424; Depue v. Sergent, 21 W. Va. 326; 
 
 bell, 130 111. 186. Such amendment may also McKay v. McKay, 33 W. Va. 724: Richardson 
 
 be allowed at the hearing, usually with costs to v. Wallace (S. C), 17 S. E. Rep. 725. 
 
 776
 
 TAKING ANSWERS OFF THE FILE. * 784 
 
 an answer had been prepared for certain defendants, but only sworn to 
 by some of them, it was directed to be received as the answer of those who 
 had sworn to it, without striking out the names of those who had not. 4 
 A defendant has, also, been permitted to add the schedules referred to 
 in his answer, where they had been accidentally omitted ; 5 and in several 
 cases, where verbal inaccuracies have crept into answers, they have been 
 ordered, at the hearing, to be struck out. 6 In like manner, where, in 
 filing an answer, one skin had, by accident, been omitted, leave was 
 given to the defendant to take it off the file, for the purpose of rectifying 
 the omission, upon condition, however, of his reswearing it imme- 
 diately. 7 A similar order was made, in a case where the defendant had 
 omitted to sign some of the skins ; 8 and, in general, the Court will not 
 permit such amendments as those above mentioned, without making it 
 part of the order that the answer shall be resworn, or, in case of a peer, 
 again attested upon honor. 9 The Court has also permitted an answer to 
 be amended, by adding to the record the name of the counsel who signed 
 the draft. 10 
 
 An order to amend an answer must state the particular amendment 
 to be made ; and may, by consent, be obtained on petition, as of course, 
 at the Rolls. 11 If the plaintiff will not consent, it seems that a special 
 application must be made by the Court, on motion, of which notice must 
 be given, specifying the proposed amendment. 12 
 
 * The amendment will be made by the Clerk of Records and * 784 
 Writs, on the draft of the answer, as amended and signed by 
 counsel, together with the order to amend, being left with him for that 
 purpose. Any official printed copies of the answer which may have been 
 taken should also be left, in order that they may be altered, so as to 
 agree with the amended answer. 1 
 
 A supplemental answer cannot be excepted to without leave ; so that, 
 for the purpose of determining the time at which the defendant may 
 move to dismiss the bill, a supplemental answer is to be deemed, prima 
 facie, sufficient when it is filed. 2 
 
 Section VII. — Taking Answers off the File. 
 
 If any irregularity has occurred, either in the frame or form of an 
 answer, or in the taking or filing of it, the plaintiff may take advantage 
 of such irregularity, by moving to take the answer off the file. 3 In- 
 
 * Done v. Read, 2 V. & B. 310; and see « Braithwaite's Pr. 312 ; and see Wyatt's P. 
 Lyons v. Read, Braithwaite's Pr. 51; see also R. 19; Hinde, 206. For form of petition, see 
 ante, p. 733. Vol. III. 
 
 6 Bryan v. Truman, 1 Fowl. Ex. Pr. 389. 12 Att.-Gen. v. Worcester, 2 Phil. 3; 1 C. P. 
 
 6 Ellis v- Saul, 1 Anst. 332, 338, 341 ; and see Coop. temp. Cott. 18. For form of notice, see 
 Jesus College v. Gibbs, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 145, 162. Vol. III. 
 
 7 Browning v. Sloman, 6 Law J. N. S. Ex. • Braithwaite's Pr. 312. 
 
 Eq. 48; 1 Jur. 58. 2 Barnes v. Tweddle, 10 Sim. 481, 483. 
 
 8 Lord Moncaster v. Braithwaite, 1 You. 382. 8 See Littlejohn v. Mur.n, 3 Paige, 280; 
 
 9 Peacock v. Duke of Bedford, 1 V. & B. 186. Supervisors &c. v. Mississippi &c. R. R. Co. 
 1° Harrison v. Delmont, 1 Price, 108 ; White- 21 111. 338; Spivey v. Frazee, 7 Ind. 661; 
 
 head v. Cunliffe, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 3 ; ante, p. 733. McLure v. Colclough, 17 Ala. 89. An answer, 
 
 777
 
 785 
 
 ANSWERS. 
 
 stances in which such motions may be made have been before pointed 
 out. 4 If, however, the plaintiff intends to apply to the Court to take 
 an answer off the file for irregularity, he must do so before he accepts 
 the answer : otherwise, he will have waived his right to make the 
 *785 application ; 5 unless in the case of an irregularity * in the jurat, 
 or of an omission of the oath or attestation of honor of the de- 
 fendant, without an order to warrant such omission : in which cases, as 
 we have seen, there must be an express waiver of the irregularity. 1 
 
 The Court has sometimes also, as before stated, 2 allowed an answer 
 to be taken off the file on an application on the part of the defendant, 
 for the purpose of enabling him to correct a mistake in its form ; but it 
 does so only, as we have seen, upon condition that the defendant shall 
 immediately cause the correction to be made, and reswear and file the 
 answer ; and it will never make such an order where the plaintiff can 
 be at all prejudiced by it. 
 
 Where an answer is evidently, on the face of it, evasive, the Court 
 will order it to be taken off the file, and not leave the plaintiff to his 
 remedy by exceptions. 3 (a) 
 
 taken by commission, will be taken off the file, 
 if the jurat does not state where it was sworn. 
 Henry v. Costello, 1 Hogan, 130. The answer 
 of a foreigner, who does not understand English, 
 must be sworn in the language he speaks, and 
 be filed with an English translation ; and if he 
 files an answer in English only, it will be taken 
 off the file. Hayes v. Lequin, 1 Hogan, 274. 
 But a mistake in the English translation of an 
 answer is no ground for taking it off the file. 
 Ibid. An answer was taken off the file for 
 irregularity, one skin only out of six skins 
 having been signed by the defendant. Lord 
 Moneaster v. Braithwaite, Younge, 382; Carter 
 v. Bosanquet, 13 Price, 604; Bailey v. Forbes, 
 M'Clel. & Y. 462. So where the answer has 
 not been signed at all. Denison v. Bassford, 7 
 Paige, 370. A bill amended without leave was 
 ordered to be taken off the file. Thomas v. 
 Frederick Co. School, 7 Gill & J. 369. If the 
 plaintiff waives an answer on oath, he cannot 
 apply to have it taken off the files on the 
 ground that the defendant knows it to be wholly 
 untrue. Denison v. Bassford, 7 Paige, 370. In 
 a suit against husband and wife, the filing of 
 a separate answer by the husband was held 
 irregular, and no act of waiver on the part of 
 the plaintiff appearing, the Court held that it 
 must be taken off the file. Leavitt v. Cruger, 
 et vx. 1 Paige, 422; Collard v. Smith, 13 N. J. 
 Eq. 43; ante, p. 754, n. For other cases where an 
 answer will be taken from the iiles, see Perine 
 v. Swaine, 1 John. Ch. 24; Trumbull v. Gib- 
 bons, Halst. Dig. 172; Nesbitt v. Dallam, 7 Gill 
 & J. 494; Fulton Bank v. Beach, 6 Wend. 36; 
 
 New York Chem. Co. v. Flowers, 6 Paige, 654. 
 An application to take an answer off the file, in 
 order to prosecute for perjury, is made to the 
 discretion of the Court, and will not be granted 
 unless some ground is laid to enable the Court 
 to judge of the propriety of such a proceeding. 
 Daly v. Toole, 1 Ir. Eq."344; S. C. 2 Dru. & 
 Wal. 599. The Court will not allow an answer 
 to be taken off the file for this purpose, if it 
 appears that the alleged perjury is in a part 
 wholly immaterial to the merits of the case. 
 M/Gowan v. Hall, Hayes, 17; see Napier v. 
 Napier, 1 Ir. Eq. 414 ; S. C. 2 Dru. & Wal. 604. 
 4 Ante, pp. 731, 733, 748, 753, 771; and see 
 Fry v. Mantell, 4 Beav. 485 ; S. C. nom. Fry v. 
 Martel, 5 Jur. 1194; Kaistrick v. Elsworth, 12 
 Jar. 782, V. C. K. B. ; Liverpool v. Chippen- 
 dall, 14 Jur. 301, V. C. E. 
 
 5 Taking an office copy of the answer does 
 not seem to be an acceptance for this purpose. 
 Frv v. Mantell, ubi supra ; and see Woodward 
 v. Twinaine, 9 Sim. 301 ; Att.-Gen. v. Shield, 
 11 Beav. 441, 445 ; 13 Jur. 330. In pleading, a 
 positive step on the basis of the regularity of 
 a previous pleading, waives any irregularity 
 therein. Steele v. Plomer, 2 Phil. 780; Fulton 
 Bank v. Beach, 2 Paige, 307; S. C. 6 Wend. 36; 
 Seifreid v. People's Bank, 2 Tenn. Ch. 17; S. C. 
 1 Baxt. 200. 
 
 1 Ante, p. 748; see Trumbull v. Gibbons, 1 
 Halst. Dig. 172; Nesbitt v. Dallam, 7 Gill & J. 
 494; Scott v. Allett, 1 Hogan, 375. 
 
 2 Ante, p. 732. 
 
 s Lynch v. Lecesne, 1 Hare, 626, 631 ; 7 Jur. 
 35 ; Read v. Barton, 3 K. & J. 166 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 
 
 (a) See Thorp v. Holdsworth, 3 Ch. D. 637; 
 Bvrd v. Nunn, 5 Ch. D. 781; 7 id. 284; Harris 
 778 
 
 v. Gamble, 7 Ch. D. 877; Collette v. Goode, id. 
 842 ; Tildesley v. Harper, id. 403 ; 10 id. 393;
 
 FROM WHAT TIME ANSWER DEEMED SUFFICIENT. * 786 
 
 The application to take an evasive answer off the file is made by mo- 
 tion, of which notice must be given to the defendant. 4 The defendant 
 will be ordered to pay the costs of the motion, and the costs of an office 
 copy of the document filed as the answer, and all other costs properly 
 incurred by the plaintiff in consequence of the filing of the evasive 
 answer. 5 The plaintiff cannot apply to take the answer off the file after 
 he has excepted to it for insufficiency. 6 
 
 Lastly, it may be here observed that the Court will, upon the consent 
 of all parties, order pleadings, affidavits, and other documents to be 
 taken off the file, where they contain matter which is scandalous, or 
 which it is desirable should not remain recorded. 7 
 
 * Section VIII. — From what Time Answer deemed sufficient. * 786 
 
 The answer of a defendant is generally treated as being sufficient until 
 it is found to be insufficient ; * and it will be deemed to be sufficient : — 
 
 1. Where no exceptions for insufficiency are filed thereto, within six 
 weeks after the filing of such answer. 2 
 
 2. Where, exceptions being filed, the plaintiff does not set them down 
 for hearing within fourteen days after the filing thereof. 8 
 
 3. Where, within fourteen days after the filing of a further answer, the 
 plaintiff does not set down the old exceptions. 4 
 
 We have before seen that the vacations are not reckoned in the com- 
 putation of the time allowed for filing or setting down exceptions, in 
 cases where the time is not limited by notice given by the defendant in 
 a case of election ; 5 so that, in computing the above-mentioned periods, 
 the vacations are not included. 
 
 263 ; see also Tomkin v. Lethbridge, 9 Ves. 179; N. S. 263; Financial Corporation v. Bristol & 
 Smith v. Serle, 14 Ves. 415; Brooks v. Purton, North Somerset Ry. Co. L. R. 3 Eq. 422. 
 1 Y. & C. C. C. 278; see contra, Marsh o. 6 Glassington r. Thwaites, 2 Russ. 458, 4G2; 
 Hunter, 3 Mad. 437; White v. Howard, 2 De Seaton v. Grant, L. R. 2 Ch. 459. 
 G. & S. 223. If an answer is so evasive that it 7 Tremaine v. Tremaine, 1 Vern. 189; Wal- 
 ls obviously a mere delusion, — if there is no ton v. Broadbent, 3 Hare, 334 ; Jewin v. Taylor, 
 answer to any of the material facts stated in Beav. 120; Clifton v. Bentall, 9 Beav. 105; 
 the bill, and no reason assigned for not answer- Barritt v. Tidswell, 7 W. R. 85, V. C. K.; 
 ing tliem, — it will be considered as no answer, Makepeace v. Romieux, 8 W. R. G87, V. C. 
 and the Court will order it to be taken from tie K. ; see also Goddard v. Parr, 24 L. J. Ch. 783, 
 tile. If, on the other hand, it be an answer, V. C. K. ; Kernick v. Kernick, 12 W. R. 335, 
 however defective, the plaintiff must either V. C. W.; Seaton v. Grant, L. R. 2 Ch. 459. 
 tile exceptions or a replication, or set down the x Sibbald v. Lowrie, 2 K. & J. 277, n.; 
 cause for hearing upon bill and answer. Travers La f one v. Falkland Islands Co. id. 277. 
 v. Ross, 14 N. J. Eq. 254 ; Squier v. Shaw, 24 2 See Equity Rule 61 of the U. S. Courts, 
 N. J. Eq. 74; see Financial Corporation v. and Mass. Ch. Rule 17; ante, p. 765, note. 
 Bristol & North Somerset Ry. Co. L. R. 3 Eq. 3 See Equity Rule 63 of the U. S. Courts. 
 422. * Cons. Ord. XVI. 16. 
 
 * For form of notice, see Vol. III. 6 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 13 (2); XLII. 6; 
 
 5 Read v. Barton, 3 K. & J. 166 ; 3 Jur. ante, p. 768. 
 
 Rutter v. Tregent, 12 Ch. D. 758; Smith v. Metropolitan Tramways Co. 16 Q. B. D. 178. 
 
 Gamlen, W. N. (1881) 110; Benbow v. Low, 13 556; Claparede v. Commercial Union Associa- 
 
 Ch. D. 553; Green v. Sevin, id. 589; Edevain tion, 32 W. R. 151. 
 v. Cohen, 41 Ch. D. 563 ; Steward v. North 
 
 779
 
 * 786 ANSWERS. 
 
 Where, upon the hearing of exceptions, the answer is held sufficient, 
 it will be deemed to be so from the date of the order made on the hear- 
 ing ; and where the defendant submits to answer without an order from 
 the Court, the answer will be deemed insufficient from the date of the 
 submission. 6 
 
 It is important to fix with precision when an answer is to be deemed 
 sufficient, because, as we shall see hereafter, in treating of motions to 
 dismiss, 7 the date of the sufficiency of the answer constitutes the point 
 of time from which is to be reckoned the period, at the expiration of 
 which a motion to dismiss the bill for want of prosecution may be 
 made. 8 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. XVI. 18. 8 For the manner of computing the several 
 
 7 See post, p. 801, et seq. periods, see ante, p. 786. 
 
 780 
 

 
 * CHAPTER XVIII. *787 
 
 THE JOINDER OF SEVERAL DEFENCES. 
 
 All or any of the several modes of defence before enumerated may 
 be joined in the defence to a bill ; * thus, a defendant may demur to 
 one part of the bill, plead to another, answer to another, and disclaim 
 as to another. 2 A defendant may also, as we have seen, put in sepa- 
 rate and distinct demurrers, to separate and distinct parts of the same 
 bill; 3 he may also plead different matters, to separate parts of the 
 same bill. 4 When the species of defence is adopted, the same rules 
 which have been before laid down with reference to each mode of de- 
 fence when adopted singly, must be observed when the same modes of 
 defence are resorted to collectively. Lord Eedesdale lays it down that 
 " all these defences must clearly refer to separate and distinct parts of 
 the bill ; for a defendant cannot plead to that part to which he has 
 already demurred, neither can he answer to any part to which he has 
 either demurred or pleaded, — the demurrer demanding the judgment of 
 the Court whether he shall make any answer, and the plea, whether he 
 shall make any other answer than what is contained in the plea. Nor 
 can the defendant, by answer, claim what, by disclaimer, he has declared 
 he has no right to. A plea or answer 5 will, therefore, overrule 
 a demurrer, 6 and an answer a plea; 7 and *if a disclaimer and * 788 
 
 i Provided each relates to a separate and Furse, 1 Bailey Eq. 187; H. K. Chase's case, 
 
 distinct part of the bill. Mitford, Eq. PI. by 1 Bland, 217; Souzer v. De Meyer, 2 Paige, 
 
 Jeremy, 106, 319; Livingston v. Story, 9 Peters, 574; Robertson v. Ringley, 1 M'Cord Ch. 352 ; 
 
 623; Lube, Eq. PI. 319; Clark v" Phelps, 6 Mass. Ch. Rule 10, and 23d Equity Rule of 
 
 John. Ch. 214; Beauchamp v. Gibbs, 1 Bibb, the U. S. Courts. Ante, pp. 534, 590, notes. 
 
 481; Robertson v. Bingley, 1 M'Cord Ch. 352. ' Bolton v Gardner, 3 Paige, 273; H. K. 
 
 2 Ld. Red. 319; Mass. Ch. Rule 10; Maine Ch:ise's case, 1 Bland, 217; Souzer v. De 
 Ch. Rule 6. See the 32d Equity Rule of the Meyer, 2 Paige, 574; Ferguson v. O'Harra, 
 U. S. Courts, post, p. 2383. The defendant, in 1 Peters, C. C. 493; Leaycraft v. Dempsey, 4 
 Massachusetts, may, instead of filing a formal Paige, 124; Stearns v. Page, 1 Story, 204. In 
 demurrer or plea, insist on any special matter Maine, "demurrers, pleas, and answers will be 
 in his answer, and have the same benefit thereof decided on their own merits, and one will not 
 as if he had pleaded the same, or demurred to be regarded as overruling another." Ch. Rule 
 the bill. Mass. Ch. Rule 14. So in Maine 6. 37 Maine, 583. By the rules in Maine, de- 
 (Ch. Rule 6) the defendant may have the fendants may severally demur and answer to 
 benefit of a plea by inserting its substance in the merits of the bill at the same time. Smith 
 his answer. See 39th Equity Rule of the U. S. v. Kelley, 56 Maine, 64, 65. In this case the 
 Courts; ante, pp. 589, 590, note; Hartshorn v. defendants each put in a demurrer, and at the 
 Fames, 31 Maine, 97; Smith v. Kelley, 58 same time answered to the whole bill, and the 
 Maine, 64, 65; Code of Tenn. § 4318. demurrers were sustained. See also Harts- 
 
 3 Ante, p. 584. horn v. Eames, 31 Maine, 97. 
 
 * Ante, p. 610. By the Tennessee Code, § 4319, the de- 
 
 6 See Bolton v. Gardner, 3 Paige, 273. fendant may have the benefit of a demurrer, 
 
 6 See Spofford v. Manning, 6 Paige, 383; except for the want of jurisdiction of the 
 
 Clark v. Phelps, 6 John. Ch. 214; Miller v. subject-matter or of the person, by relying 
 
 781
 
 * 789 JOINDER OF SEVERAL DEFENCES. 
 
 answer are inconsistent, the matter will be taken most strongly against 
 the defendant upon the disclaimer." 1 
 
 The strict application of these principles has, as we have seen, been 
 relaxed ; and now, no demurrer or plea will be held bad and overruled 
 on argument, only because such demurrer or plea does not cover so 
 much of the bill as it might by law have extended to, or only because 
 the answer of the defendant extends to some part of the same matter as 
 is covered by such demurrer or plea. 2 
 
 In all cases not coming strictly within these rules, the principles above 
 quoted from Lord Redesdale still apply ; and, in addition thereto, it is 
 to be remarked that, where a defendant adopts this mode of defence, not 
 only should each defence in words be applicable to the distinct part of 
 the bill to which it professes to apply, but that it should also, in sub- 
 stance, relate peculiarly to that part of the bill which it professes to 
 cover ; so that a defence in words applicable to part of a bill only, but 
 in reality applicable to the whole bill, is not good, and cannot stand, in 
 conjunction with another distinct defence applicable and applied to 
 another distinct part of the bill. 3 Where, therefore, a defendant put in 
 a joint demurrer and plea, each of which went to the whole bill, the 
 demurrer was overruled ; 4 and where a defendant, as to part of a bill, 
 put in a plea that there was no outstanding term, and a demurrer as to 
 the rest on the ground that the plaintiff had no title, Lord Langdale M. 
 R., although he held the plea to be good, was of opinion that the demur- 
 rer being applicable to the whole bill, and consequently to that part of 
 it which was covered by the plea, was bad. 5 
 
 "When a demurrer is to part only of the bill, and is accompanied by 
 an answer or other defence to the remainder, it should be entitled, " The 
 demurrer of A B, the above-named defendant, to part of the bill, and 
 the answer of the said defendant to the remainder of the bill of com- 
 plaint of the above-named plaintiff/' 6 The same rule is applicable to 
 
 cases where the defence is partly by plea, and partly by answer ; 
 * 789 except in those cases where the answer is * in support of the 
 
 plea ; for then the plea and answer form but one defence, and 
 the title is properly " The Plea and Answer." 1 
 
 Where a defence of this nature has been put in, the first thing is to 
 dispose of the demurrer, and also of the plea, if there is one (unless it 
 is intended to admit that it is a valid defence, if true), and for this pur- 
 
 thereon in his answer; and bv § 4320, either ing Co. 2 J. & H. 282; 8 Jur. N. S. 694; see 
 
 party may set the matters of demurrer for also Mansell v. Feeney, 2 J. & H. 313. 
 hearing at the next term. Harding v. Egin, 5 Crouch v. Hickin, ubi supra. His Lord- 
 
 2 Tenn. Ch. 39. And if the defendant neglects ship, however, allowed a demurrer ore temis, 
 
 to have his demurrer, thus filed, disposed of for want of equity, to that part of the bill 
 
 before the hearing on the merits, he waives the which was not covered by the plea, 
 benefit of it. Kyle v. Riley, 11 Heisk. 230. 6 Tomlinson v. Swinnerton, 1 Keen, 9, 13; 
 
 i Ld. Red. 319. Braithwaite's Pr. 43. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord.XIV. 8, 9; ante, pp. 584, 585, * Ante, p. 682. If an answer commences 
 
 617. These orders have been adopted in the as an answer to the whole bill, it overrules a 
 
 36th and 37th Equity Rules of the U. S. plea or demurrer to any particular part of the 
 
 Supreme Court, January Term, 1842. bill, although such part is not in fact answered. 
 
 s Crouch v. Hickin, 1 Keen, 385,389. Leaycraft v. Pempsey, 4 Paige, 124; Summers 
 
 4 Lowndes v. Garnett & Moseley Gold Min- r. Murray, 2 Edw. Ch. 205. 
 782
 
 JOINDER OF SEVERAL DEFENCES. * 789 
 
 pose the demurrer and plea must be set down for argument in the usual 
 way. 2 The plaintiff must, however, be careful not to amend his bill, or 
 except to the answer for insufficiency, before the demurrer and plea have 
 been disposed of : otherwise, they will be held sufficient. 3 
 
 If, upon the argument, the demurrer and plea are, or either of them 
 is overruled, the plaintiff may deliver exceptions for insufficiency, ex- 
 tending not only to the answer, but to the parts of the bill which were 
 intended to be covered by the demurrer and plea ; but if the demurrer 
 and plea are, or either of them is, allowed, the exceptions must not 
 extend to the parts of the bill covered by them. 4 The proper course to 
 be pursued, where a partial demurrer has been allowed to a bill, appears 
 to be, to amend the bill, either by striking out the part demurred to, or 
 by making such alteration in the bill -as will obviate the ground of de- 
 murrer. Thus, after a partial demurrer, ore temis, for want of parties, 
 has been allowed, the bill may be amended by adding the necessary 
 parties, or stating them to be out of the jurisdiction of the Court ; and 
 it seems that such an amendment will not preclude the plaintiff from 
 excepting to the answer to those parts of the bill which are not covered 
 by the demurrer. 5 
 
 After a plea has been allowed, no amendment of the bill can be made 
 without a special order of the Court ; and in applying for such order, 
 the plaintiff must specify the amendments he intends to make. 6 After 
 the allowance of the plea, the plaintiff must reply to the plea as well as 
 to the answer, and proceed with the case in the usual manner. 
 
 2 Ante, pp. 594, 693. 609, the Court, on allowing a demurrer, re- 
 
 3 Ante, pp. 594, 691, 760. fused leave to amend the bill. 
 
 4 Ante, p. 760. 6 Ante, pp. 419, 699; Taylor v. Shaw, 2 
 
 5 Taylor v. Bailey, 3 M. & C. 677, 683; 3 S. &S. 12; Neck v. Gains. l"De G. & S. 223; 
 Jur. 308; Foster v. Fisher, 4 Law J. N. S. 237, 11 Jur. 763. 
 
 M. R. In Osborne v- Jullion, 3 Drew. 596, 
 
 783
 
 790 
 
 * CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 DISMISSING BILLS, OTHERWISE THAN AT THE HEARING, 
 AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 Section I. — Generally. 
 
 Before a defendant has appeared to the bill, the plaintiff may dis- 
 miss the bill, as against him, without costs, on an order to be obtained 
 upon motion of course, or upon petition of course, at the Eolls. 1 Where 
 however, such an order was obtained in breach of faith of a compromise 
 entered into with the defendant, it was discharged with costs. 2 (a) 
 
 l Thompson v. Thompson, 7 Beav. 350 ; 
 Wyatt's P. R. 60, 61; Braithwaite's Pr. 566. 
 For form of order, see Seton ; 1277, No. 1 ; and 
 
 (a) The general rule is that the plaintiff may 
 dismiss his bill at any time before final or inter- 
 locutory decree when the defendant demands 
 no affirmative relief, but that after decree the 
 consent of the other parties is necessary. West- 
 ern Union Tel. Co. v. American Bell Tel. Co. 
 50 Fed. Rep. 662; Hat-Sweat Manuf. Co. v. 
 Waring, 46 id. 87; Connecticut & P. R. R. Co. 
 v. Hendee, 27 id. 678; Pullman's Palace Car 
 Co. i». Central Trans. Co. 49 id. 261; Moriarty 
 v. Mason, 47 Conn. 436 ; Dawson v. Amey, 
 40 N. J. Eq. 494; Russell V. Lamb, 82 Iowa, 
 558; Hathaway v. Hagan, 64 Vt. 135; Kreider 
 v. Mehaffy, lo"Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 412; Purdy v. 
 Henslee,97 111. 389; Ives ». Ashelby, 26 111. App. 
 244; Adger v. Pringle, 11 S. C.527; Gatewood 
 v. Leak," 99 N. C. 363; Evans v. Sheldon, 69 
 Ga. 100: Waite V. Wingate, 4 Wash. 324. In 
 .Equity, an order of Court is necessary to dis- 
 continue a suit. American Zylonite Co. v. 
 Celluloid Manuf. Co. 32 Fed. Rep. 809 ; New- 
 comb v. White (N. Mex.), 23 Pac. Rep. 671. 
 In the Federal Courts, no docket fee is allowed 
 when the plaintiff discontinues before any final 
 or interlocutory hearing. Consolidated B. A. 
 Co. v. American P. F. Co. 24 Fed. Rep. 658; 
 Mercartney v. Crittenden, id. 401. Defendants 
 who are not prejudiced by a dismissal of the 
 bill as to other defendants, cannot object 
 thereto. Jefferson v. Jefferson, 96 111. 551. If 
 the defendant's cross-bill is dismissed on de- 
 murrer, the plaintiff is then entitled to dis- 
 continue as if no cross-bill had been filed; if 
 the first order is reversed, the other may per- 
 
 784 
 
 for forms of motion paper and petition, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 2 Betts 0. Barton, 3 Jur. N. S. 154, V. C. W. 
 
 haps be vacated. Ogle v. Koerner, 140 111. 
 170. As to the effect, upon the plaintiff's right 
 to discontinue a representative suit, of others 
 intervening who belong to the same class, see 
 ante, pp. 236, and note. Frelinghuysen V. 
 Nugent, 36 Fed. Rep. 229. 
 
 A suit in Equity cannot be dismissed by 
 the plaintiff without the defendant's consent 
 on payment of costs, after issue joined, even 
 though no cross-bill has been filed, when it in- 
 volves the title to real estate: Hershberger v. 
 Blewett, 55 Fed. Rep. 170; or if the defend- 
 ant will be thereby prejudiced. as where he has 
 fully prepared for hearing and has filed a cross- 
 bill: Detroit v. Detroit City Ry. Co. 55 Fed. 
 Rep. 569; or if the plaintiff, upon a bill to fore- 
 close, admits the mortgage, which the defend- 
 ant claims the right to redeem ; such dismissal 
 should be without prejudice to the defendant's 
 right to redeem. McCarren v. Coogan, 50 N. J. 
 Eq. 268, 611. 
 
 Such dismissal is usually " without pre- 
 judice." As to such dismissal and its effect, 
 see Ibid.; Kendig v. Dean, 97 U. S. 423; 
 Lacassagne v. Chapuis, 144 U.S. 119; Kemp- 
 ton v. Burgess, 136 Mass. 192; Forsythe v. 
 McMurty, 59 Iowa, 162; Benscotter v. Green, 
 60 Md. 327; Mabry v. Churchwell, 1 Lea, 416; 
 Sharpe v. Allen. 11 Lea, 518; Harris v. Hines, 
 59 Ga. 427; Brunswick v. Lamb, 60 Ga. 342; 
 Evans ». Sheldon, 69 Ga. 100 ; Sandeford i\ 
 Lewis, 68 Ga. 482; Jennings r. Pierce (Ala.), 
 13 So. Rep. 605; Blair v. Reading, 99 111. 600; 
 Smith v. Brittenham, 98 111. 188; Reilly v.
 
 GENERALLY. 
 
 791 
 
 After appearance, and before decree, the plaintiff may, generally, 
 obtain an order to dismiss the bill, but only upon payment of costs ; 3 
 unless the parties against whom it is dismissed consent to its being dis- 
 missed without costs. 4 The order may be obtained either on petition 
 of course or motion ; 5 and if the defendant's consent is required, it is 
 signified by the appearance of counsel on his behalf on the motion, or 
 by his solicitor subscribing his consent to the prayer of the petition. 
 The application is usually made by petition. 6 Where, however, there 
 has been any proceeding in the cause which has given the defendant a 
 right against the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot dismiss his bill as of 
 course : thus, where a general demurrer had been overruled on argu- 
 ment, Lord Cottenham was of opinion that the plaintiff could not dis- 
 miss his bill as of course, the defendant having a right to appeal 
 against *the order overruling the demurrer, — which right he * 791 
 ought not to be deprived of, on an ex parte application. 1 
 
 It seems once to have been the privilege of the plaintiff to dismiss his 
 bill, when the defendant had answered, upon payment of 20s. costs ; 2 
 but that rule was altered ; 8 and the Statute of Anne has since enacted, 4 
 that, upon the plaintiff's dismissing his own bill, or the defendant's dis- 
 missing the same for want of prosecution, the plaintiff in such suit shall 
 pay to the defendant or defendants his or their full costs, to be taxed 
 by the Master. 5 It seems, formerly, to have been considered, that the 
 
 3 The plaintiff cannot dismiss his bill as to 
 part of the relief prayed, and proceed with the 
 residue; he must apply to amend. The Cam- 
 den & Amboy R. R. Co. v. Stewart, 19 N. J. 
 Eq. 69; see New Jersey Ch. Rule 94. 
 
 4 Dixon v. Parks, 1 Ves. Jr. 402; Wyatt's 
 P. R. 61 ; Braithwaite's Pr. 566. These rules 
 also apply where the plaintiff is suing on be- 
 half of himself and others. Handford v. Storie, 
 2 S. & S. 196, 198; Armstrong v. Storer, 9 
 Beav. 277, 281 ; Seaton v. Grant, 36 L. J. Ch. 
 638; ante, pp. 239, 240. But a bill will not be 
 dismissed " without prejudice," when the plain- 
 tiff has had ample opportunity to obtain his 
 testimony, and prepare his case on the merits. 
 Rumbly v. Stainton, 24 Ala. 712; see Rochester 
 v. Lee, 1 M'N. & G. 467, 469, 470. 
 
 5 But a bill will not be dismissed upon a 
 mere suggestion. Wiswell v. Starr, 50 Maine, 
 381, 384. 
 
 6 For form of order, see Seton, 1277, Nos. 
 
 1, 2; and for forms of motion paper and peti- 
 tion, see Vol. III. 
 
 1 Cooper v. Lewis, 2 Phil. 178, 181 ; and see 
 Ainslie v. Sims, 17 Beav. 174; see also Booth 
 v. Leycester, 1 Keen, 247, 255, where a bill and 
 cross-bill had been set down to be heard to- 
 gether. 
 
 2 Gilb. For. Rom. 110; 2 Atk. 288. 
 
 3 Anon. 1 Vern. 116; Anon. id. 334. 
 
 4 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16, § 23. 
 
 5 The plaintiff seems to have been liable, 
 notwithstanding the statute, to the payment of 
 only 40s. costs where the cause was set down 
 and dismissed on bill and answer; see New- 
 sham v. Gray, 2 Atk. 288; but by General 
 Order of 27th April, 1748, id. 289, Sand. 
 Ord. 628, it is provided, that, in such a case, 
 the Court may dismiss the bill, either with 40*\ 
 costs, or with taxed costs, or without costs. 
 This order appears, in this respect, to be 
 abrogated by the Cons. Ord. 
 
 Reilly, 139 111. 180; Barrett v. Short, 41 111. 
 App." 25; Richards v. Allis, 82 Wis. 509; 
 National Hotel Co. v. Crane Brothers Manuf. 
 Co. 50 Kansas, 49; Ilelmick v. Davidson, 18 
 Oregon, 456 ; Bomar r. Parker, 68 Texas, 435. 
 A dismissal " without prejudice " leaves the 
 parties as if no suit had been instituted. Ma- 
 gill v. Mercantile Trust Co. 81 Ky. 129; Rey- 
 nolds v. Hennessy, 17 R. 1.169, 175; Weighley 
 v. Coffman, 144 Penn. St. 489. The general 
 practice is to dismiss the bill " without pre- 
 judice " when the merits have not been consid- 
 
 VOL. I. — 50 
 
 ered; and the omission of this qualification of 
 the decree may be corrected by the Court on 
 appeal in a proper case. See Durant t'. Essex 
 Co. 7 Wall. 107. After dismissal, the bill still 
 remains a part of the record, and may be 
 used as evidence, when competent. Lyster v. 
 Stickney, 12 Fed. Rep. 609. Upon ordering a 
 dismissal, the Court may impose conditions, as 
 to future use of evidence, &c. See American 
 Zylonite Co. v. Celluloid Manuf. Co. 32 Fed. 
 Rep. 809; McClung v. Steen, 33 id. 373; Blake 
 v. Barnes, 63 Hun, 633. 
 
 • 785
 
 * 792 DISMISSING BILLS, AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 Court had no power to make an order, on the application of the plain- 
 tiff, dismissing the bill without costs, except upon the defendant's con- 
 sent actually given in Court. 6 It has now, however, been decided, that 
 the Court has power to make such an order in a proper case, and such 
 orders have been made : where the defendant surrendered a lease, to 
 obtain an assignment of which the bill was filed, and absconded ; 7 where 
 the bill was filed under a mistake, under which both plaintiffs and de- 
 fendants were at the time ; 8 where the defendants had assigned their 
 interests to co-defendants, after the bill was filed, and had joined in an 
 answer with such other defendants and disclaimed ; 9 where the suit was 
 rendered nugatory by the subsequent passing of an Act of Parliament, 
 or by the reversal of a case on the authority of which the bill was filed, 
 or b} r any subsequent matter ; 10 and where the plaintiff had been misled 
 by the act of the Court. 11 
 
 The application to dismiss, in these cases, is usually made by special 
 motion, of which notice must be served on the defendants, or such of 
 them as are affected by the motion. 1 ' 2 
 
 * 792 * Where, however, the matters in dispute have been disposed of 
 
 by an independent proceeding, but the bill has been dismissed for 
 want of prosecution, with costs, as against some of the defendants, the 
 plaintiff can no longer move to dismiss it, as against the others, without 
 costs ; the Court not being able to adjudicate as to the costs, in the 
 absence of the dismissed parties, who might be prejudiced by the other 
 defendants being entitled to add their costs to their securities, or other- 
 wise. In such a case, the bill can only be dismissed with costs. 1 
 
 Where the plaintiff moved to dismiss the bill with costs against some 
 of the defendants who had disclaimed, without prejudice to the question 
 by whom the costs should ultimately be borne, it was held by Sir James 
 Wigram V. C. that the order might be made without serving the other 
 defendants, as they could not be prejudiced ; 2 but Sir J. L. Knight 
 Bruce V. C. refused to make such an order, unless the other defendants 
 were served. 3 
 
 Where the plaintiff has been admitted to sue in forma pauperis, he 
 
 6 Dixon v. Parks, 1 Ves. Jr. 402; Anon. L. JJ. ; 2 De G. J. & S. 147; Riley v. Croy- 
 id. 140; Fidelle v. Evans, 1 Bro. C. C. 2G7; don, 10 Jur. N. S. 1251; 13 W. R. 223, 
 1 Cox, 27; Fisher v. Quick, 9 N. J. Eq. 312. V. C K. 
 
 7 Knox v. Brown, 2 Bro. C. C. 186; 1 Cox, " Lister v. Leather, 1 De G. & J. 361; 
 359; and see Goodday v. Sleigh, 1 Jur. N. S. 3 Jur. N. S. 848. But not where the ohject of 
 201; 3 W. R. 87, V. C. S.; Wright v. Barlow, the suit has been defeated by the plaintiff's 
 5 De G. & S. 43; 15 Jur. 1149. own act or procurement. Haimnersley v. 
 
 8 Broughton v. Lashmar, 5 M. & C. 136, Barker, 2 Paige, 372. 
 
 144. 12 For form of notice, see Vol. III. 
 
 9 Hawkins v. Gardiner, 17 Jur. 780, V. C. S. 1 Troward v. Attwood, 27 Beav. 85. 
 
 1° Sutton Harbor Co. v. Hitchens, 15 Beav. 2 Baily v. Lambert, 5 Hare, 178; 10 Jur. 
 
 161 ; 1 De G. M. & G. 161, 169; and see id. 16 109; and see Collis v. Col'is, 14 L. J. Ch. 56, 
 
 Beav. 381; Robinson v. Rosher. 1 Y. & C. C. C. V. C. K. B.; Styles v. Shipton, 3 Eq. Rep. 
 
 7,12; 5 Jur. 1006; but see South Staffordshire 224, V. C. W. Similar orders made on ex 
 
 Ry. Co. v. Hall, 16 Jur. 160, V. C. K.; Lan- parte motion in Clements v. Clifford, 11 Jur. 
 
 eashire and Yorkshire Ry. Co. r. Evans, 14 N. S. 851; 14 W. R. 22, V. C K. ; Berndston 
 
 Beav. 529; Ventilation and Sanitary Imp. Co. v. Churchill, W. N. (18G6) 8, V. C. W. 
 v. Edelston, 11 W. R. 613, V. C. S."; Elsey v. 3 Wigginton v. Pateman, 12 Jur. 89. 
 
 Adams, 10 Jur. N. S. 459; 12 W. R. 586, 
 786
 
 GENERALLY. 
 
 793 
 
 may move to dismiss his bill without costs, except in cases in which 
 his admission in forma pauperis has taken place subsequently to the 
 filing of the bill ; 4 but the motion must not be made ex parte. 5 
 
 The course of proceeding to obtain the dismissal of the bill by a 
 plaintiff who disavows the suit, has been before pointed out. 6 Where 
 the suit is not disavowed, one co-plaintiff may, with the consent of the 
 defendant, dismiss a bill with costs, so far as concerns himself, if it will 
 not in any way injure the other plaintiffs : otherwise the Court will 
 refuse the order, unless upon terms so framed as to protect the other 
 plaintiff in the suit from injury. 7 The mere circumstance that the 
 rights of the plaintiff applying to be dismissed are concurrent with 
 those of the plaintiffs who remain, will not be a sufficient reason for 
 refusing the application ; since any defect which his withdrawal may 
 make in the record may be supplied by making him a defendant, by 
 amendment. 8 
 
 A plaintiff may, in general, obtain an order to dismiss his own bill, 
 with costs, as a matter of course, at any time before decree, 
 * and notwithstanding a pending motion which has been ordered * 793 
 to stand over. 1 
 
 4 Ante, p. 42. 
 
 5 Ibid.; Parkinson p. Hanbury, 4 De G. 
 M. & G. 508; and see Wilkinson v. Belsher, 
 2 Bro. C. C. 272. Where an executor or ad- 
 ministrator has commenced a wrong suit by 
 mistake, or has ascertained that it would be 
 useless to proceed, in consequence of facts sub- 
 sequently discovered, he will be permitted to 
 discontinue without payment of costs. Arnoux 
 v Steinbrenner, 1 Paige, 82. 
 
 6 Ante, p. 307. 
 
 7 Holkirk p. Holkirk, 4 Mad. 50 ; Winthrop 
 p. Murray, 7 Hare, 152; 13 Jur. 955 ; and see 
 ante, p. 309; but see Langdale v. Langdale, 13 
 Ves. 167; see Muldrow v. Du Bose, 2 Hill Ch. 
 375, 377; Bank p. Rose, 1 Rich. Ch. 292. 
 
 8 Holkirk p. Holkirk, ubl supra. 
 
 i Markwick v. Pawson, 33 L. J. Ch. 703; 
 4 N. R. 528, L. JJ. Thus, in Curtis P. Lloyd, 
 4 M. & C. 194; 2 Jur. 1058, after a cause had 
 been called on for hearing, and had stood over 
 at the request of counsel, t e plaintiff obtained, 
 as of course, an order to dismiss his bill with 
 costs: the defendant aft' rwards objected to 
 this course; but Lord Cottenham held, th it 
 the plaintiff was entitled to the order, observ- 
 ing that he could not see wli}' a plaintiff 
 should be in a worse situation, because he in- 
 forms die Court that he does not intend to pro- 
 ceed with the hearing of his cause, than if he 
 made default. It is a matter of course to per- 
 mit the plaintiff to dismiss the bill at any time 
 before decree, upon payment of costs, but the 
 order for such leave is conditional, and the suit 
 will not be absolutely discontinued so as to 
 authorize the filing a new bill, till the costs of 
 the first suit are paid. Cummins v. Bennett, 
 
 8 Paige, 79; see Thomas p. Thomas, 3 Lift. 
 9; Bassard p. Lester, 2 M'Cord Ch. 421 ; Smith 
 p. Smith, 2 Blackf. 232; Simpson r. Brewster, 
 
 9 Paige, 245; Elderkin v. Fitch, 2 Ind. 90: 
 Mason v. York & Cumberland R. R. Co. 52 
 Maine, 82, 107. The right of the plaintiff to 
 dismiss is not defeated by the fact that the de- 
 fendant has answered, and given the discovery 
 sought. Kean v. Lathrop, 58 Ga. 355. But is 
 by the commencement of the trial. Wilder p. 
 Boynton, G3 Barb. 547. The right to discon- 
 tinue a suit after testimony taken is not ab- 
 solute, but may be controlled by the Court; 
 as where a witness who had been examined 
 died, the plaintiff was permitted to dismiss only 
 upon the terms of allowing the deposition to 
 be read as evidence in any future suit for the 
 same cause. Young v. Bush, 36 How. Pr. 240. 
 The plaintiff's right to dismiss revives upon the 
 reversal of a decree by the Appellate Court and 
 remand. Mohler r. Wiltberger, 74 111. 163. 
 After a voluntary dismissal of a bill by the plain- 
 tiff, he will not be allowed to reinstate it. Orphan 
 Asylum v. McCartce, 1 Hopk.372. And the re- 
 scinding of an order of dismissal as to certain 
 parties will not bring those parties in again, 
 ami hold them bound by the previous proceed- 
 ings and the decree. Johnson p. Shepard, 35 
 Mich. 115. And it is within the discretion 
 of the Court to refuse to permit a plaintiff 
 to dismiss his bill, if the dismissal would 
 work a prejudice to other parties, as where 
 one defendant had established his claim 
 against a co-defendant. Bank v. Rose, 1 Rich. 
 
 Eq. 292. Or a cross-bill. Booth p. , cited 
 
 in that case. In New Jersey, by Rule of 
 Chancery, when a replication has been filed, 
 
 787
 
 794 
 
 DISMISSING BILLS, AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 If, however, the plaintiff, after the cause is set down to be heard, 
 causes the bill to be dismissed on his own application, such dismissal is, 
 unless the Court otherwise directs, equivalent to a dismissal on the 
 merits, and may be pleaded in bar to another suit for the same 
 matter. 2 
 
 After a decree, or decretal order, 3 however, the Court will not suffer 
 a plaintiff to dismiss his own bill, unless upon consent ; for all parties 
 are interested in a decree, and any party may take such steps as he 
 may be advised to have the effect of it. 4 The proper form of order 
 after decree is not to dismiss the bill, but to stay all further proceed- 
 ings. 5 If, however, the decree merely directs accounts and inquiries, 6 
 in order to enable the Court to determine what is to be done, the bill 
 may be dismissed. 7 And where, upon the hearing of the cause, the 
 Court has merely directed an issue, the plaintiff may, before trial of the 
 issue, obtain an order to dismiss the bill with costs ; because the direct- 
 ing of an issue is only to satisfy the conscience of the Court, prefatory 
 to its giving judgment. If, however, the issue has been tried, 
 * 794 and determined in * favor of the defendant, the plaintiff cannot 
 move to dismiss : because the defendant may have it set down 
 on the Equity reserved, in order to obtain a formal dismissal of the bill 
 so as to enroll it as a final judgment, and thereby make it pleadable. 1 (a) 
 
 After a decree has been made of such a kind that other persons, 
 
 and the taking of proofs begun by either party, 
 the plaintiff shall not be allowed to dismiss his 
 bill, except upon special motion and notice to 
 the defendants. Rule 15; Dick. Prec. 4. 
 
 2 Cons. Old. XXIII. 13. 
 
 3 Post, 806; Anon. 11 Ves. 169; Biscoe v. 
 Brett, 2 V. & B. 377; Bluck v. Colnaghi, 9 
 Sim. 411; Collins v. Greaves, 5 Hare, 596; 
 Gregory v. Spencer, 11 Beav. 143. 
 
 4 Guilbert v. Hawles, 1 Ch. Cas. 40; Car- 
 rington v. Holly, 1 Dick. 280. 
 
 6 Egg v. Devey, 11 Beav. 221 ; see also 
 Lashley v. Hogg," 11 Ves. 602; Bluck v. 
 Colnaghi, 9 Sim. 411; Handford v. Storie, 
 2 S. & S. 196, 198. 
 
 e Bartou v. Barton, 3 K. & J. 512; 3 Jur. 
 N. S. 808. 
 
 (a) After decree the bill will not be dis- 
 missed for want of prosecution, the proper 
 course being to apply to obtain the conduct of 
 the cause. Simons v. Bagnell, 19 W. R. 217. 
 In Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Union Rolling 
 Mill Co. 109 U. S. 702, 713. Mr. Justice Wood 
 thus clearly stated the practice : " It may be con- 
 ceded that, as a general rule, a complainant in 
 an original bill has the right at any time, upon 
 payment of costs, to dismiss his bill, . . . sub- 
 ject to a distinct and well-settled exception, 
 namely, that after a decree, whether final or 
 interlocutory, has been made, by which the 
 rights of a partv defendant have been adjudi- 
 
 788 
 
 7 Anon. 11 Ves. 169 ; Barton v. Barton, nbi 
 supra ; and see post, pp. 810, 811 ; see Clarkson 
 v. Scrogins, 2 Monr. 52. After an order to 
 account, and report made, the plaintiff cannot 
 dismiss on payment of costs. Bethia ?'. M'Kay, 
 Cheves, Ch. Cas. 93; see also Hall v. McPher- 
 son, 3 Bland, 529; but see Bassard v. Lester, 
 2 M'Cord Ch. 421. A bill by trustees to mar- 
 shal assets and call in creditors after a decree 
 made directing money to be paid and creditors' 
 claims established, will not be dismissed at the 
 instance of one of the plaintiffs, his co-plaintiff 
 and the creditors objecting. Muldrow v. Du 
 Bose, 2 Hill Ch. 375,377; see Jones v. Lansing, 
 7 Paige, 583. 
 
 i Carrington v. Holly, 1 Dick. 280. 
 
 cated, or such proceedings have been taken as 
 entitle the defendant to a decree, the com- 
 plainant will not be allowed to dismiss his bill 
 without the consent of the defendant." See also 
 Tanqueray v. Bowles, L. R. 14 Eq. 151 ; 1 Seton 
 on Judgments (5th ed.), 114; Reynolds v. First 
 Nat. Bank, 112 U. S. 213; Stevens v. Railroads, 
 4 Fed. Rep. 97; Connecticut & P. R. Co. v. 
 Hendee, 27 id. 678; American Zylonite Co. v. 
 Celluloid Manuf. Co. 32 id. 809; Electrical 
 Accumulator Co. v. Brush Electric Co. 44 id. 
 602; Kean v. I.athrop, 58 Ga. 355; Frierson r. 
 Alexander, 74 Ga. 666; 'State v. Hemingway, 
 69 Miss. 491; Fisher v. Stovall, 85 Tenn. 316.
 
 GENERALLY. * 795 
 
 besides the parties on the record, are interested in the prosecution of it, 
 neither the plaintiff nor defendant, on the consent of the other, can 
 obtain an order for the dismissal of the bill. 2 Thus, where a plaintiff 
 sues on behalf of himself and all other persons of the same class, al- 
 though he acts upon his own mere motion, and retains the absolute 
 dominion of the suit until the decree, and may dismiss the bill at his 
 pleasure, yet, after a decree, he cannot by his conduct deprive other 
 persons of the same class of the benefit of the decree, if they think fit 
 to prosecute it. " The reason of the distinction is, that, before decree, 
 no other person of the class is bound to rely upon the diligence of him 
 who has first instituted his suit, but may file a bill of his own ; and 
 that, after a decree, no second suit is permitted." 3 
 
 Where a defendant submits to the whole demand of the plaintiff, and 
 to pay the costs, he has a right to apply to the Court to dismiss the bill, 
 or stay all further proceedings. 4 The application is usually made on 
 motion, of which notice must be given. 5 The Court will not, on such an 
 application, go into the merits of the case ; but will only consider the 
 conduct of the parties in conducting the cause. It will not, therefore, 
 entertain such an application, unless the defendant submits to pay the 
 costs, as well as comply with all the plaintiff's demands ; 6 though it has, 
 in some cases, determined the question whether particular costs, incurred 
 in proceedings collateral to the suit, are to be paid by the defendant. 7 
 The costs of suit which the defendant must submit to pay, include the 
 costs of co-defendants, for which the plaintiff is liable. 8 
 
 Where there are several defendants, and the plaintiff claims only 
 part of the relief against one defendant, that defendant may apply, by 
 special motion, to stay all further proceedings, on satisfying the 
 * whole demand made against him, and paying the plaintiff's costs * 795 
 incurred up to the time of making the application. 1 
 
 In a foreclosure or redemption suit, the bill may be dismissed on the 
 special motion of a subsequent incumbrancer, as against all the defend- 
 
 2 Updike v. Doyle, 7 R. I. 446, 402. Cott. 229, 234; 10 Jur. 673; Manton v. Roe, 14 
 
 3 Handford v. Storie, 2 S. & S. 196, 198; Sim. 353; Paynter v. Carew, Kay App. 36; 18 
 York v. White, 10 Jur. 168, M. R. ; ante, p.239; Jur. 417; Orton v. Bainbrigge, 22 L. J. Ch. 
 and see post, p. 795; Updike v. Doyle, 7 R. I. 979; 1 W. R. 487, M. R. 
 
 446, 462; Collins v. Taylor, 3 Green Ch. 163; 5 For form of notice, see Vol. III. 
 
 Williamson v. Wilson, 1 Bland, 418; Waring 6 Wallis v. Wallis, 4 Drew. 458; Rennet v. 
 
 a. Robinson, Hoff. Ch. 524, 529, 530; Muldrow Luard, ubi supra; see, however, Holden v. 
 
 v. Du Bose, 2 Hill Ch. 375, 377; Jones v. Lan- Kynaston, ubi supra. 
 
 sing, 7 Paige, 583; Shewen v. Vanderhorst, 2 V Penny v. Beavan, 7 Hare, 133; 12 Jur. 
 
 R. & M. 75; Atlas Bank v. Nahant Bank, 23 936. 
 
 Pick. 480; Mass. Stat. 1862, c. 218, §8, ante, 8 Pemberton r. Topham, and Paynter v. 
 
 p. 239, and cases in note. Carew, ubi supra. It seems, however, that 
 
 And see Pimbley v. Molyneux, W. N. (1867) where the defendant is willing to comply with 
 
 250, where the conduct of a creditor's suit was the plaintiff's demand, and would have done 
 
 given to a residuary legatee, on his paying the so without suit if he had been asked, he may 
 
 plaintiffs debt and costs. obtain an order staying all proceedings without 
 
 * Per Lord Langdale in Sivell v. Abraham, costs. Wallis r. Wallis, 4 Drew. 458, 463.. 
 
 8 Beav. 598; see also Pemberton v. Topham, 1 Rudd v. Rowe, 18 XV. R. 977. 
 Beav. 316; 2 Jur. 1009; Holden v. Kynaston, 2 l Sawyer v. Mills, 1 M'N. & G. 390, 395; 
 
 Beav. 204, 206 ; Field v. Robinson, 7 Beav. 66 ; 13 Jur. 1061; see also Holden v. Kynaston, 
 
 Hennet v. Luard, 12 Beav. 479; Darner v. Lord ubi supra. For form of notice of motion, see 
 
 Portarlington, 2 Phil. 30,35; C. P. Coop. temp. Vol. III. 
 
 789
 
 796 
 
 DISMISSING BILLS, AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 ants except himself, on his paying into Court, by a specified clay, a sum 
 sufficient to cover the mortgage debt and interest, and the costs of the 
 plaintiff and other defendants. 2 Where discovery is sought from the 
 defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to continue his suit for that purpose; 
 and an application by the defendant before answer to stay proceedings, 
 upon his submission to the plaintiff's demand and payment of the costs 
 of the suit, is premature, and will not be entertained. 3 
 
 The defendant may also, by submitting to pay the plaintiff's demands, 
 and his costs of the suit, obtain an order to stay the proceedings, under 
 a decree in which other persons are interested, as well as the parties to 
 the suit ; but, in such a case, any one of the persons so interested may 
 subsequently, on special motion or summons, 4 with notice to the parties 
 to the cause, obtain an order that the applicant may have either the 
 conduct of the cause, or liberty to carry on the proceedings under the 
 decree, or the prosecution of particular accounts or inquiries. 5 
 
 Orders to stay proceedings, on the ground that the defendant has sub- 
 mitted to the plaintiff's demands, have also been made on the application 
 of the plaintiff, hostilely to the defendant ; 6 but it seems that the defend- 
 ant has a right to have the cause brought to a hearing, for the purpose 
 of determining the question of costs, and that such an application by 
 the plaintiff can, therefore, only be made by consent. 7 Where the ques- 
 tion in dispute has been settled by compromise out of Court, without 
 providing for the costs, the Court will not determine the question of 
 
 costs, either on motion or at the hearing. 8 
 * 796 * By consent, the bill may be dismissed or the proceedings 
 stayed, on motion of course, or petition of course at the Rolls, 
 or on special motion or petition, 1 or on summons, on any terms which 
 may be agreed upon ; 2 and where an agreement to dismiss a bill was 
 entered into at the trial of an action directed to be brought, and made 
 
 2 Jones v. Tinney, Kay App. 45; Cliallie 
 v. Gwynne, id. 46, where the forms of the 
 orders are given; see also Paynter v. Carew, 
 id. 36; 18 Jur. 417; and Paine v. Edwards, 
 8 Jur. N. S. 1200, 1202; 10 W. R. 709, V. C. S., 
 where the motion was refused, the priorities 
 being in dispute; Wainwright v. Sewell, 11 
 W. R. 560, V. C. S. For forms of notice, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 3 Stevens v. Brett, 12 W. R. 572, V. C W. 
 
 4 15 & 16 Vic. c. 80, § 26. For forms of 
 notice of motion and summons, see Vol. III. 
 
 5 See Salter v. Tildesley, 13 W. R. 376, M. 
 ];.; see also ante, pp. 239. 240, 794. 
 
 6 Nichols v. Elford, 5 Jur. N. S. 264, V. C. 
 W.; North v. Great Western Ry. Co. 2 Giff. 
 64; Jur. N. S. 244; Thompson v. Knight, 7 
 Jur. N. S. 704; 9 W. R 780. V. C W.; Brooks- 
 hank v. Higginbottom, 31 Beav. 35; and see 
 Sivell r. Abraham, 8 Beav. 598; Hennet v. 
 Luard, 12 Beav. 479, 480 
 
 7 Langham v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 16 
 Sim. 173; 12 Jur. 574; Burgess r. Hills, 26 
 Beav. 244, 249; 5 Jur. N. S. 233; Burgess v. 
 
 790 
 
 Hatelv, 26 Beav. 249; M'Naughtan v. Hasker, 
 
 12 Jur. 956, V. C. K. B. ; Wilde v. Wilde, 10 
 W. R. 503, L. JJ.; Morgan v. Great Eastern 
 Ry. Co. 1 H. & M. 78; and see Chester v. 
 Metropolitan Ry. Co. 11 Jur. N. S. 214, M. R.; 
 
 13 W. R. 333; Hudson v. Bennett, 12 Jur. 
 N. S. 519; 14 W. R. 911, V. C. S. 
 
 8 Gibson v. Lord Cranky, 6 Mad. 365 ; 
 Roberts v. Roberts, IS. & S. 39; Whalley 
 v. Lord Suffield, 12 Beav. 402; Nichols v. 
 Elford, 5 Jur. N. S. 264, V. C. W. 
 
 1 Where the terms are complicated, orafund 
 in Court is dealt with, the application is usually 
 made on special petition. See Winthrop v. Win- 
 throp, 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 201; Richard- 
 son r. Eyton. 2 De G. M. & G. 79; Harrison v. 
 Lane, 2 Sm. & G. 249; Dawson v. Newsome, 2 
 Giff. 272; 6 Jur. N. S. 625; Pryer v. Gribble, 
 L. R. 10 Ch. 534, 537, note ; post, Chap. XXXV. 
 § 1, Interlocutory Applications; or on summons. 
 
 2 See North r. Great Western Ry. Co. 2 
 Giff. 64; Troward v. Attwood, 27 Beav. 85. 
 For forms of motion paper, notice of motion, 
 petition, and summons, see Vol. III.
 
 GENERALLY. 
 
 '97 
 
 a rule of the Court of Law, the Court of Chancery enforced it against 
 the parties, on motion in the canse. 3 Where any of the parties are not 
 sui juris, or are executors or trustees, the Court must be satisfied of the 
 propriety of the agreement. 4 
 
 Where a plaintiff has made default in payment of the costs of a for- 
 mer suit against the same defendant, or the person whom he represents, 
 for the same purpose, the defendant may obtain an order, on motion, 
 with notice to the plaintiff, staying all further proceedings until the 
 plaintiff has paid such costs ; 5 and where, after great delay, the costs 
 still continue unpaid, the Court will order the plaintiff to pay them 
 within a limited time, or, in default, that the second bill stand dis- 
 missed. 6 Where, however, the two suits are not for the same matter, 
 and the second bill could not be produced by a fair amendment of the 
 first, such an order will be refused ; 7 nor can it be obtained where the 
 plaintiff sues by his next friend ; 8 (a) nor, it seems, where the defendant 
 has taken any step in the new cause, before making the application. 9 
 
 Where the same object may be attained under two different modes of 
 proceeding : if the first is adopted, and then abandoned and the second 
 adopted, the proceedings in the second may be stayed until the costs of 
 the first are paid. 10 It would seem that the amount of the costs should 
 be ascertained by taxation or otherwise, before the application to stay 
 proceedings is made. 11 
 
 * Where a plaintiff is in contempt for non-payment of costs * 797 
 in the suit, an order to stay proceedings until the costs have been 
 paid may be obtained on special motion ; 1 (b) and where he has failed to 
 
 3 Tebbittt v. Potter, 4 Hare, 164; see also 
 Warwick v. Cox, 9 Hare App. 14; Dawson v. 
 Newsome, ubi supra ; see, however, Askew v. 
 Millington, 9 Hare, 65; 15 Jur. 532/ 
 
 4 Warwick v. Cox, ubi supra; and see Lip- 
 piat v. Holley, 1 Beav. 423; Seton, 091. 
 
 5 Pickett v. Loggan, 5 Ves. 706; Altree v. 
 Hordern, 5 Beav. 623, 628; 7 Jur. 247; Lautour 
 v. Holcombe, 10 Beav. 256; Spires r. Sewell, 5 
 Sim. 193; Onge v. Truelock, 2 Moll. 41; Long 
 v. Storie,~13 Jur. 1091, V. C. E. ; Sprye v. Rey- 
 nell, 1 De G. M. & G. 712; Ernest v. Partridge, 
 8 L. T. N". S. 762, V. C. W.; see, however, 
 Wild v. Hobson, 2 V. & B. 105, 108; see Cum- 
 mins v. Bennett, 8 Paige, 79; Rathbone v. Eck- 
 ford, cired 1 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 328, n. (1); Simpson 
 v. Brewster, 9 Paige, 245. The application 
 should not be made until the amount of the 
 costs has been ascertained by taxation. Ernest 
 v. Partridge, ubi supra. For form of notice of 
 motion, see Vol. III. 
 
 Where, after the dismissal of a bill by con- 
 sent, the plaintiff filed a new bill which was, 
 with trifling alterations, a verbatim copy of the 
 
 former bill, all proceedings in the second suit 
 were ordered to be staved. Parker v. Simpson, 
 18 W. R. 204. 
 
 6 Princess of Wales r. Lord Liverpool, 3 
 Swanst. 567; Lautour v. Holcombe, 11 Beav. 
 624; Ernest v. Govett, 2 N. R. 486, V. C. W. 
 For form of notice of motion, see Vol. III. 
 
 " Budge v. Budge, 12 Beav. 385, 387. And 
 where the plaintiff sues in a representative ca- 
 pacity in the second suit. Partington v. Rev- 
 nolds, 6 W. R. 307. 
 
 8 Hind v. Whitmore, 2 K. & J. 458. 
 
 9 Onge v. Truelock, 2 .Moll. 41. 
 
 W Foley r. Smith, 12 Beav. 154; Davey «. 
 Currant, 24 Beav. 411; 4 Jur. X. S. 398, 2 De 
 G. & J. 506: see also Oldfield v. Cobbett. 12 
 Beav. 91, 95. 
 
 11 Ernest v. Partridge, 8 L. T. X. S. 702- 
 V. C W. ; and see Foley r. Smith, 12 Beav. 
 154; Davey v. Durrant, 24 Bp.iv. 411; Altree e. 
 Hordern, 5 Beav. 623, 628: Spires r. Sewell. 5 
 Sim. 193; Long v. Storie, 13 Jur. 1091. V. C. K. 
 
 » Bradbury r. Shawe, 14 Jur. 1042, V. C. 
 K. B. ; Wilson v. Bates, 3 M. & C. 197, 204; 
 
 (a) Where a suit brought by a married wo- 
 man by next friend was dismissed with costs 
 for non-compliance with an order that the next 
 friend give security for costs on the ground of 
 poverty, a second suit by the plaintiff for the 
 
 same purpose by a different next friend was 
 stayed until the costs of the first suit were paid. 
 Be Payne, Randle r. Payne. 23 Ch. D. 288; 
 ante, p. Ill, note (a). 
 
 (b) In re Xeal, Weston v. Neal, 31 Ch. D. 
 
 791
 
 * 797 
 
 DISMISSING BILLS, AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 give security for costs pursuant to an .order, the defendant may obtain, 
 on motion with notice, an order that he give security within a limited 
 time, or the bill be dismissed. 2 
 
 Neither in the Court of Chancery nor in the Court of Exchequer has 
 the practice prevailed of compelling the plaintiff to consolidate his dif- 
 ferent suits against several defendants. 3 
 
 9 Sim. 54; Futvoye v. Kennard. 2 Giff. 533; 
 and see Wild v. Hobson, 4 Mad. 49; cited 3 M. 
 
 6 C. 202. For form of notice of motion, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 2 Kennedy v. Edwards, 11 Jur. N. S. 153. 
 For form of notice, see Vol. III. 
 
 3 Manchester College v. Isherwood, 2 Sim. 
 476. In this case, which was a motion by the 
 defendants to consolidate sixteen bills for tithes 
 against different persons, all of whom made the 
 same defence, the Vice-Chancellor reviewed the 
 authorities, printed and in manuscript, and re- 
 fused the motion with costs. It seems that the 
 practice of consolidating causes was recognized 
 in the Court of Exchequer at one time, but was 
 afterwards disapproved. In Forman v. Blake. 
 
 7 Price, 654, upon the hearing of a similar mo- 
 tion, Chief Baron Richards said: "I never 
 heard of an order, in the course of my expe- 
 rience, for consolidating causes in Equity, nor 
 can I conceive upon what principle it can be 
 done." His refusal to sustain the motion was 
 followed in Foreman v. Southwood, 8 Price, 572, 
 and by Lord Eldon, in the manuscript case of 
 Kynaston v. Perry, cited in 2 Sim. 478. His 
 Lordship had previously intimated his igno- 
 rance of any such practice in Equity, in Keighly 
 v. Brown, 16 Ves. 344. Following these rulings 
 it was held by Chancellor Cooper of Tennessee, 
 in Knight Brothers v. Ogden Brothers, 3 Tenn- 
 Ch. 409, that the Court of Chancery has, ordi- 
 narily, no power to interfere with the rights of 
 parties, in invitum, by an order directing the 
 consolidation of independent suits of purely 
 equitable cognizance, the complainants in one 
 suit seeking to reach the recovery in the other. 
 And it has been repeatedly held by the Supreme 
 Court of that State, that the consolidation of 
 causes, either by consent or by order of Court 
 acquiesced in, will not change the rules of 
 Equity pleading, or the rights of the parties, 
 which rights must still turn on the pleadings, 
 proof, and proceedings in the respective causes. 
 
 437, following Re Youngs, Doggett v. Revett, 
 id. 239; Bacon V. C. at the defendant's in- 
 stance, when the case was called on the trial, 
 staved all further proceedings until the plain- 
 tiff had cleared his contempt in no' paying 
 the costs of an application in the suit. But 
 In re Wickham. Marony v. Taylor, 35 Ch. 272. 
 Cotton L. J. disapproved of this course, say- 
 ing: "The matter ought not to be disposed of 
 
 792 
 
 Brevard v. Suraraar, 2 Heisk. 105 ; Lofland v. 
 Coward, 12 Heisk. 546 ; Masson v. Anderson, 3 
 Baxt. 290. 
 
 In Burnham v. Dalling, 16 N. J. Eq. 310, 
 where three suits by different wards against the 
 same guardian were, after decrees in each, con- 
 solidated by consent, Chancellor Green ex- 
 pressed the opinion that it was within the 
 power of the Court of Equity to consolidate 
 actions with or without the consent of the plain- 
 tiffs. While Chancellor Runyon has suggested 
 that one of several suits between the same 
 parties should be tried, the others to await the 
 result. Lehigh &c. R. Co. v. McFarlan, 30 , 
 N. J. Eq. 144. And this was done by consent, 
 in Andrews v. Speer, 4 Dill. 470. and Amos r. 
 Chadwick, 4 Ch. D. 869; 9 id. 459. In Wilson 
 v. Riddle, 48 Ga. 609, three suits in favor of 
 different parties against the same defendant on 
 the same claim, two of them being for the whole 
 claim, and the third for a large portion thereof, 
 and each involving long and complicated ac- 
 counts, were consolidated. In Beech v. Wood- 
 yard, 5 W. Va. 231, although the motion to con- 
 solidate was refused, the Court considered that 
 the rule for consolidation of suits is alike in 
 Equity and at Law, the matter being in the dis- 
 cretion of the Court. See post, p. 1120, note(«). 
 
 In Foxwell r. Webster, cited ante, p. 339, n. 2, 
 where 134 suits were brought by a patentee 
 against separate defendants for infringements 
 of the patent, Vice-Chancellor Kindersley re- 
 fused an application of seventy-seven of the 
 defendants that the plaintiff be directed to pro- 
 ceed with one suit, either to try all the ques- 
 tions, or at any rate the validity of the pat- 
 ent, the proceedings in the other suits to be 
 stayed in the mean time. 2 Dr. & Sm. 250; 12 
 W." R. 94; 10 Jur. 137. The Vice-Chancellor 
 thought the motion premature before answer 
 by the defendants, and refused it with leave to 
 move again on the coming in of the answers, 
 saying that the Court would "put the matter 
 
 upon an objection taken by counsel at the hear- 
 ing that costs have not been paid; there ought 
 to be an application for the purpose." See ante, 
 p. Ill, n. ('<). The Equity Rule which allows 
 the second suit to proceed when a good excuse 
 for non-payment of costs is shown, prevails in 
 Nebraska, unaffected by the Code. Union 
 Pac. R. Co. v. Mertes, 35 Neb. 204.
 
 GENERALLY. * 798 
 
 But there are several cases in which, where there are two suits relating 
 to the same subject-matter, the Court will, under certain circumstances, 
 make an order staying the proceedings in one of them. 4 Thus, as we 
 have seen, where two or more suits are instituted in the name of an 
 infant by different persons, each acting as his next friend, the Court, 
 on being satisfied by an inquiry, or otherwise, which suit is most for 
 his benefit, will stay the proceedings in the other suit. 5 So, also, 
 where two suits are instituted, for the administration of an estate, 
 when the decree has been obtained in one suit, proceedings will be 
 stayed in the other. 
 
 Where the second suit embraces an object not provided for in the 
 decree pronounced in the first suit, the proceedings in the second suit 
 will not be stayed ; 6 as, for instance, where the decree is made in a 
 creditors' suit, and a bill is filed by a legate. 7 But even in this case, 
 it is often desirable to obtain a transfer and amalgamation of the two 
 suits. 8 Where the second suit prayed additional relief, the Court stayed 
 proceedings in it, on the parties to the first suit undertaking to intro- 
 duce into the decree in that suit the additional relief which might be 
 obtained in the second suit. 9 In another case, the Court stayed 
 proceedings in the second * suit, only so far as the relief sought * 798 
 could be obtained in the first suit ; 1 and recently, the Court, 
 on the parties consenting that an immediate decree should be made in 
 the second suit, ordered the two suits to be consolidated, and decreed the 
 further relief which could be obtained in the second suit ; 2 but where, 
 after a bill had been filed by one executor against his co-executor for 
 administration, and asking special relief, but, before decree, the latter 
 obtained, on summons, an order against the former to administer the 
 same estate, the Court refused to discharge the order. 3 Where a decree 
 
 in a course of decision to save a multiplicity of good, 6 Mad. 374; Pickford o. Hunter, 5 Sim. 
 suits." 12 W. R. 96. Upon appeal, the Lord 122, 129 ; Ladbroke v. Sloane, 3 De G. & S. 
 Chancellor made an order for a trial of the 291 ; Smith v. Guy, ubi supra ; Rump o. Green- 
 validity of the patent as between the plaintiff hill, 20 Beav. 512; Whittington v. Edwards, 3 
 and seventy of the defendants then before the De G. & J. 243; Taylor v. Southgate, 4 M. & 
 Court, the case to be conducted by one or more C. 203, 209; see Ritchie v. Humberstone, 17 
 of the defendants for the rest. 12 W. R. 186; Jur. N. S. 756; Pigott v. Young, 7 W. R. 235; 
 10 Jur. 137. The order seems to have been Colman v. Turner, L. R. 10 Eq. 230; De La 
 made by consent. 2 Dr. & Sin. 250, note at Salle v. Moorat, L. R. 11 Eq. 8. 
 end of case. f Golder v. Golder, 9 Hare, 276 ; Earl of 
 By Order LI. § 4, under the Judicature Portarlington v. Darner, 2 Phil. 262; Plunkett 
 Acts, it is expressly provided: "Actions in ??. Lewis, 11 Sim. 379. 
 
 any division or divisions may be consolidated 8 See Cumming v. Slater, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 
 
 by order of the Court, or a Judge, in the 484; Godfrey v. Maw, id. 485; Pott v. Gallini, 
 
 manner heretofore in use in the Superior 1 S. & S. 206, 209; Budgen v. Sage, 3 M. & C. 
 
 Courts of Common Law." Morgan's Acts and 683, 687. 
 
 Orders, 593. » Gwyer v. Peterson, 26 Beav. 83 ; Matthews 
 
 4 Smith v. Guy, 2 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. v. Palmer, 11 W. R. 610, V. C. K. 
 239, 296; 2 Phil. 159; Rigby v. Strangways, 2 i Dryden v. Foster, 6 Beav. 146. 
 
 Phil. 175, 177; 10 Jur. 998; Underwood v.Jee, 2 Hoskins v. Campbell, 2 H. & M. 43; see 
 
 1 M'N. & G. 276; 17 Sim. 119; 15 Jur. 99; Re Wortley, 4 Ch. D. 180; 2 Seton, 1521. 
 and see Seton, 889. 3 Vanrenen v. Piffard, 13 W. R. 425, V. C. 
 
 5 Ante, pp. 69, 70. S.; sedqu. if the plaintiff in the summons suit 
 
 6 Underwood v. Jee, ubi supra; Menzies v. was entitled so to sue; see 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, 
 Connor, 3 M'N. & G. 648, 652 ; Anson v. Tow- § 45. 
 
 793
 
 *799 
 
 DISMISSING BILLS, AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 has been made in both suits, the Court will direct the administration to 
 proceed in that branch of the Court in which the decree is in the most 
 perfect state, notwithstanding that it may be posterior in point of date. 4 
 
 It is the duty of the personal representative to make the application, 
 as soon as a decree has been made in one suit ; 5 but if he neglects to 
 do so, the plaintiff in the suit in which the decree has been made, 6 or 
 any person interested, 7 may obtain the order : although he is not a party 
 to the other suit. 
 
 Where two suits for the administration of the same estate, one by the 
 executor and the other by the residuary legatee, come on together, the 
 proceedings in the executor's suit will be stayed, and the decree made in 
 the residuary legatee's suit. 8 
 
 Where an administration decree has been obtained in the Court of the 
 Duchy of Lancaster, a suit for the same purpose in the Court of Chancery 
 will be stayed, if the whole subject-matter is within the jurisdiction of 
 the Duchy Court, but not otherwise. 9 
 
 Where the concurrent suits are in different branches of the Court, a 
 difference of opinion prevailed wuth reference to the Judge by whom 
 the order staying proceedings should be made; 10 but the practice now 
 adopted is : to obtain from the Lord Chancellor, or Lords Justices, on 
 special motion, with notice to the other parties to the suits, 11 an order 
 transferring the cause in which it is desired to stay further proceedings, 
 to the Judge who has pronounced the decree ; and then to obtain 
 * 799 from him an order, * entitled in both causes, staying further 
 proceedings in the transferred cause, and providing for the costs. 1 
 The order to stay may be obtained on special motion, or, where the 
 decree is in prosecution at Chambers, on special summons ; and notice 
 of the motion, or the summons, must be served on all parties to each 
 cause. 2 
 
 Where such an order is made, the costs of all parties to the second 
 suit who are parties to the first suit, up to notice of the decree, are 
 usually made costs in that suit, and the costs of any party who is not a 
 party to the first suit, are ordered to be paid by the executor, and 
 added to his own. 3 If the executor has no assets to pay them, liberty 
 
 4 Littlewood ?>. Collins, 11 W. R. 387, L. JJ. 
 
 5 Therry r. Henderson, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 481, 
 483; 6 Jur 380; Stead v. Stead, 2 C. P. Coop, 
 temp. Cott. 311 ; Packwood v. Maddison, 1 S. & 
 S. 232, 234; 2 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 312. 
 
 6 Earl of Portarlingtou v. Darner, 2 Phil. 2G2 ; 
 and see Swale v. Swale, 22 Beav. 401. 
 
 7 Smith v. Guy, 2 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 
 289, 297. 
 
 8 Kelk v. Archer, 16 Jur. 605, M. R. ; and 
 Miller v. Powell, V. C. K. B. 14 July, 1849, 
 there referred to. 
 
 9 Wvnne v. Hughes, 26 Beav. 377; 5 Jur. 
 N. S. 165; and see 26 Beav. 384, n.; 28 L. J. 
 Ch. 485, L. .U. ; see also Seton, 881 ; Bradley e. 
 Stelfox, 1 N. R. 221, L. C; Re Longdendale 
 Cotton Spinning Co. 8 Ch. D. 150. 
 
 1° White o. Johnson, 2 Phil. 689; Ladbrooke 
 794 
 
 v. Bleadon, 15 Beav. 457; 16 Jur. 851; Scotto v. 
 Stone, 17 Jur. 588, V. C. K. 
 
 11 Bond v. Barnes, 2 De G. F. & J. 387; 
 and see ante, pp. 70, n. 398. For form of 
 notice of motion, see Vol. III. 
 
 i Duffort ». Arrowsmitb, 7 De G. M. & G. 
 434; Harris v. Gandy, 1 De G. F. & J. 13"; 
 Swale r. Swale, 22 Beav. 401, and see ante, 
 pp. 70, 398. 
 
 - For form of order, see Seton, 887; and 
 for forms of notice of motion and summons, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 3 Seton, 888; Colder v. Golder, 9 Hare. 276, 
 279; West v. Swinburne, 14 Jur. 360, V. C. K. 
 B.; and see Therry v. Henderson, 1 Y. & C. C 
 C. 481, 483; 6 Jur. 380; F rowel v. Baker, 4 
 Beav. 76, 78 ; Littlewood v. Collins, 11 W. R. 
 387, L. JJ. ; and see form of order, Seton, 887.
 
 GENERALLY. * 800 
 
 will be given such party to go in and prove for them in the first 
 suit. 4 
 
 If the plaintiff in the second suit proceed, after notice of the decree 
 in the first suit, he will not be allowed the costs of such subsequent pro- 
 ceedings ; but he will not be made to pay costs. 5 Where, however, the 
 Court considered that the second suit was improperly instituted, the 
 plaintiff in it was ordered to pay the costs of the order of transfer, and 
 of the motion to stay proceedings. 6 
 
 The rule that when two suits are instituted for the administration of 
 the same estate, that shall be prosecuted in which the earlier decree has 
 been obtained, does not apply when it has not been obtained fairly ; 
 and the Court held this to have been the case where, on the same day 
 on which notice had been given to an executor to appear to an adminis- 
 tration summons, he appeared of his own accord at an earlier hour in 
 the Chambers of another Judge, and consented to an order on a sum- 
 mons then, and not previously, applied for, by another plaintiff. 7 But 
 the Court, by consent, made an immediate decree in a cause not in the 
 paper, for administration of the real and personal estate of an intestate, 
 at the suit of a creditor, after a summons in Chambers for the adminis- 
 tration of the personal estate had been taken out by another creditor, 
 and which was returnable before the first day on which the cause could 
 be heard as a short cause. 8 
 
 Where the suit in which the decree was made was instituted by 
 *two executors against a third, the Court refused to stay the pro- *800 
 ceedings in a suit by a creditor, whose case depended on vouchers 
 and documents in the executors' hands, until they had put in their 
 answer ; and directed the motion to stay proceedings to stand over until 
 that had been done, observing that the Court would then know who 
 ought to have the conduct of the litigation. 1 
 
 When the order staying proceedings is made, if a sufficient reason 
 for so doing appears, the Court will give the conduct of the decree to 
 the plaintiff in the suit in which the proceedings are stayed ; 2 but the 
 mere fact that the plaintiff and defendants, in the suit in which the 
 decree has been made, appear by the same solicitor, is not a sufficient 
 reason for so doing ; and where a creditors' and legatees' suit are amal- 
 gamated, the Court prefers giving the conduct of the cause to the lega- 
 tee, who is interested in reducing the expenses as much as possible, all 
 persons being at libert}^ to attend and assert their claims, — considering 
 
 4 Canham v. Neal", 26 Beav. 266; 5 Jur. 8 Furze v. Hennet, 2 De G. & J. 125; see 
 N. S. 52; Ladbroke v. Sloane, 3 De G. & S. 291 ; Scaffold r. Hampton, 43 L. J. Ch. 137. 
 
 W> st v. Swinburne, ubi supra; see form of l Macrae v. Smith, 2 K. & J. 411; see also 
 
 order, Seton, 887. If there is a fund in Court, Budgen v. Sage, 3 M. & C. 683, 687. 
 
 the costs ma}' be ordered to be paid out of it. 2 See Macrae v. Smith, ubi supra; Norvall 
 
 Jackson v. Leaf, 1 J. & W. 220, 233. r. I'ascoe, 10 W. R. 338, V. C. K.; Hawkes v. 
 
 5 Earl of Portarlington v. Darner, 2 Phil. Barrett, 5 Mad. 17; Kelk v. Archer, 16 Jur. 
 262; and see Seton, 888. 005, M. R.; MHardvr Hitchcock, 12 Jur. 781, 
 
 6 Salter v. Tildesley, 13 W. R. 376, M. R. L. C. ; Smith v. Guy", 2 Phil. 159; 2 C. P. Coop. 
 1 Harris v. Gandv, 1 De G. F. & J. 13; and temp. Cott. 289; Wheclhouse v. Calvert, cited 
 
 see Frost v. Wood. 12 W. R. 285, L. J.T.; S. C. Seton, 888; Frost v. Wood, ubi supra ; Belcher 
 boot. Frost v. Ward, 2 De G. J. & S. 70; v. Belcher, 2 Dr. & Sm. -144, where the other 
 Harvey v. Coxwell, 32 L. T. 52. suit was by the personal representatives. 
 
 795
 
 801 
 
 DISMISSING BILLS, AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 it very important that administration suits should be conducted in a 
 friendly spirit. 8 Where there are no special circumstances giving the 
 preference to either plaintiff, the plaintiff in the first suit in point of 
 time will have the conduct of the proceedings. 4 
 
 Where a decree or judgment has been obtained in a foreign country, 
 in respect of the same matter for which a suit has been commenced in 
 the Court of Chancery, proceedings in such suit will be stayed, if the 
 Court is satisfied that the decree or judgment in the foreign Court does 
 justice, and covers the whole subject of the suit. 5 
 
 A party to a suit in the Court of Chancery, wherein a decree has been 
 made under which he may obtain relief, will be restrained from prosecut- 
 ing a suit in a foreign Court for the same object. 6 
 
 Proceedings in a suit may also be stayed, pending a rehearing or 
 
 appeal. 7 
 
 *801 *It may also be mentioned here, that where an oppressive 
 
 number of bills has been filed, for infringement of the same 
 
 patent, the Court will appoint some of the infringers to represent the 
 
 others, and stay the proceedings in the remaining suits. 1 
 
 Where a suit had been compromised, and the proceedings therein 
 stayed, the Court, on setting aside the compromise as against one of the 
 plaintiffs, gave him permission to proceed with the suit, although it 
 remained stayed as against the other plaintiffs. 2 
 
 3 Per Sir J. Romilly M. R. in Penny ?•. 
 Francis, 7 Jur. N. S. 248 ; 9 W. R. 9 ; see also 
 Kelk i'. Archer, ubi supra ; Harris v. Lightfoot, 
 10 W. R. 31, V. C. K. 
 
 4 Nor vail v. Pascoe, ubi supra ; and see 
 Salter v. Tildesley, 13 W. R. 376, M. R. 
 
 5 Ostell v. Le Page, 2 De G. M. & G. 892, 
 894; 5DeG. & Sm. 95; 16 Jur. 1134, V.C. S.; 
 see abo Stainton v. Carron Co. (No. 3) 21 Beav. 
 500; ante, pp. 658, 659, 664, and note; Wilson 
 v. Ferrand, L. R. 13 Eq. 362 ; Low v. Mussey, 
 41 Vt. 393; Brown v. Lexington & Danville 
 R. R. Co. 13 N.J. Eq. 191. 
 
 6 Harrison v. Gurney, 2 J. & W. 563 ; Bushby 
 »..Munday, 5 Mad. 297; Beauchamp v. Marquis 
 of Huntley, Jac. 546 ; Booth o. Leycester, 1 Keen, 
 579 ; Wedderburn v. Wedderburn, 2 Beav. 208, 
 214; 4 Jur. 66; 4 M. & C. 585, 594, 596; 
 Graham v. Maxwell, 1 M'N. & G. 71 ; 13 Jur. 
 217;.Maclaren o. Stainton, '16 Beav. 279; over- 
 ruled by H. L. 5 H. L. Cas. 416; see also 
 Stainton v. Carron Co. 21 Beav. 152, 500; 2 
 Jur. N. S. 49, L. C. & L. JJ.; Hyman v. Helm, 
 24 Ch. D. 531; Dawkins v. Simonetti, 50 L. J. 
 P. D. & Adm. 30; and upon conflict of jurisdic- 
 tion, generally, see, Yenning v. Loyd, 1 De G. 
 F. & J. 193, 200; 6 Jur. N. S. 81; and Seton, 
 881. 
 
 " See post, Chap. XXXII. § 1, Rehearing* 
 and Appeals. 
 
 796 
 
 i Foxwell B. Webster, 10 Jur. N. S. 137, 
 L. C. ; 2 Dr. & S- 250; 9 Jur. N. S. 1189. 
 
 2 Brooke v. Lord Mostyn, 13 W. R. 248, 
 L. J J. Where a plaintiff, after an order for the 
 production of documents, persists in not filing a 
 sufficient affidavit as to documents, the Court 
 niav fix a time at which the bill shall, in default 
 of a sufficient affidavit, stand dismissed. Re- 
 public of Liberia v. Imperial Bank, L. R. 9 Ch. 
 569. A bill may also be dismissed, on motion 
 of the defendant, or mero motu by the Court, 
 for want of equity on its face. Speidall v. 
 Jervis, 2 Dick. 632; Molesworth v. Lord Ver- 
 ney, 2 Dick. 667; Mayse v. Biggs, 3 Head, 36; 
 Earles v. Earles, 3 Head, 366; Webster v. 
 Thompson, 55 Ga. 546; Hickey v. Stone, 60 
 111. 458. See also Pond v. Vermont Valley R. 
 Co. 12 Blatch. 282; Hine v. New Haven, 40 
 Conn. 478. But a bill ought not to be dismissed 
 by the Court on its own motion because brought 
 in the firm name, without naming the partners, 
 no objection having been taken by the parties 
 to the omission. Alderson v. Henderson. 5 W. 
 Va. 182. Nor where the bill discloses equity, 
 although defectively stated. Thompson v. 
 Paul, 8 Hum. 114; Henderson v. Mathews, 2 
 Tenn. Leg. Rep. 181; Quinn v. Leake, 1 Tenn. 
 Ch. 67.
 
 FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION. * 802 
 
 Section II. — For Want of Prosecution. 
 
 Any defendant may, upon notice, 8 move the Court that the bill may be 
 dismissed with costs, for want of prosecution, and the Court may order 
 accordingly, in the following cases 4 (a) : — 
 
 (1) Where the plaintiff, having obtained no order to enlarge the 
 time, 6 does not within four weeks 6 after the answer, or the last of the 
 answers, required to be put in by such defendant, is held or deemed to 
 be sufficient, 7 or after the filing of a traversing note against such de- 
 fendant, 8 file replication, 9 or set down the cause to be heard on bill and 
 answer, 10 or serve a notice of motion for a decree, 11 or obtain and serve 
 an order for leave to amend the bill ; 12 or 
 
 (2) Where the plaintiff, having undertaken to reply to a plea filed 
 by such defendant to the whole bill, does not file his replication within 
 four weeks after the date of his undertaking ; 13 or 
 
 (3) Where the plaintiff, having obtained no order to enlarge the 
 time, does not set down the cause to be heard, and obtain and serve a 
 subpoena to hear judgment, within four weeks after the evidence has 
 closed. 14 
 
 Where the plaintiff obtains an order for leave to amend his bill, and, 
 having obtained no order to enlarge the time, 15 does not amend 
 * the bill within the time limited by the order to amend, or, if no *802 
 time be so limited, within fourteen days from the date of such 
 order, the order to amend is void, and the cause as to dismissal stands in 
 the same position as if the order to amend had not been made. 1 
 
 Any defendant may, upon notice, move to dismiss the bill with costs 
 
 3 See Hoxey v. Carey, 12 Ga. 534. A rule 9 Post, p. 828, et seq.: see 66th Equity Rule 
 
 to speed the cause should precede a motion to of the U. S. Courts; and Mass. Ch. Rule 17. 
 
 dismiss for want of prosecution. Dixon v. 10 Post, 828, et seq.; and Chap. XXIII. 
 
 Rutherford, 26 Ga. 153. So in Tennessee, a Setting d run Causes; see Mass. Ch. Rule 17. 
 
 rule must be made on the plaintiff to take any U Post, p. 819, et seq. 
 
 step necessary to the progress of the cause, after i 2 Ante, p. 412. 
 
 which the Court may make a peremptory rule, 13 Ante, p 696. 
 
 fixing the time within which the step shall be M Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 10, as varied by Orel, 
 
 taken or the cause be dismissed. Code, § 4389, 22 Nov., 1866, r. 1 ; see Ponsardin v. Stear, 32 
 
 4390; Hicks's Ch. Pr. 126; Kain V. Ross, 1 Beav. 666; 9 Jur. N. S. 885; Ernest i\ Govett, 
 
 Lea, 76. 2 N. R. 486, V. C. W. ; see also Hart v. Roberts, 
 
 * As to default in delivery of pleadings 32 Beav. 231; 7 Jur. N. S. 669; post, Chap, 
 
 under the present English practice, see 1 Dan. XXIH. Setting down Causes; and see Braith- 
 
 Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 554. waite's Manual, 193, n. (135). 
 
 5 Ante, p. 421. 15 Ante, p. 421. 
 
 6 These four weeks expire at 12 o'clock at J Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 11. This order ap- 
 night on the last day. Preston v. Collett, 20 plies to all orders to amend, whether of course 
 L. J. N. S. Ch. 228, V. C. Ld. C. or not; Armistead v. Durham, 11 Beav. 428; 13 
 
 1 Ante, pp. 412, 786; see Leite v. Johnston, Jur. 330 ; Bainbr igge «. Baddeley, 12 Beav. 152; 
 L. R. 5 Eq. 266. 13 Jur. 997 ; Crossley v. Doming, 16 L. T. 698. 
 
 8 Ante, p. 514, et seq. 
 
 (a) See U. S. Equity Rule 69; Bierne v. seven years, Sebring v. Sebring, 43 N. J. Eq. 
 
 Wadsworth, 36 Fed. Rep. 614; Cleaver v. Smith, 59; but not necessarily after one year of in- 
 
 114 111.114. As to the present English practice, action. Wilson V. Rusling, 13 Phila. 48. An 
 
 see Seaar v. Webb, 25 Ch. D. 84; Crick v. order to dismiss for want of prosecution must 
 
 Hewlett, 27 Ch. D. 354. Where the proof is be upon notice giving the plaintiff a reasonable 
 
 chiefly oral, a suit should be dismissed after time to proceed. Kain v. Ross, 1 Lea, 76. 
 
 797
 
 803 
 
 DISMISSING BILLS, AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 for want of prosecution, where the plaintiff, after answer, amends his 
 bill without requiring an answer to the amendments from any of the 
 defendants, 2 and, having obtained no order to enlarge the time, 3 does 
 not file the replication, 4 or set down the cause to be heard on bill and 
 answer, 5 or serve a notice of motion for a decree, 6 within the times fol- 
 lowing, namely : — 
 
 (1) Within one week after the expiration of the time within which 
 the defendant might have put in an answer, 7 in cases where the defend- 
 ant does not desire to answer the amendments. 8 
 
 (2) Within fourteen days after the refusal to allow further time, in 
 cases where the defendant, desiring to answer, has not put in his an- 
 swer within the time allowed for that purpose, and the Judge has 
 refused to allow further time. 
 
 (3) Within fourteen days after the filing of the answer, in cases where 
 the defendant has put in an answer to the amendments, unless the plain- 
 tiff has, within such fourteen days, obtained a special order for leave to 
 except to such answer or to re-amend the bill. 9 
 
 In cases where the defendant puts in an answer to amendments to 
 which the plaintiff has not required an answer, vacations are not reck- 
 oned in computing the times for filing replication, setting down the 
 cause, or setting down a motion for a decree. 10 
 
 If the plaintiff fails to set down a motion for decree within one week 
 after the expiration of the time allowed to him to file his affidavits in 
 reply, in case the defendant has filed any affidavit, or within one week 
 after the expiration of the time allowed to the defendant to file his 
 affidavits in answer, in case the defendant has not filed any affi- 
 * 803 davit, or in case the time allowed for either of the * purposes 
 aforesaid shall be enlarged, then within one week after the ex- 
 piration of such enlarged time, the defendant may move to dismiss the 
 bill for want of prosecution. 1 
 
 If the plaintiff amends his bill, and requires an answer, the defend- 
 ant cannot move to dismiss the bill for want of prosecution until four 
 weeks from the expiration of the time when his answer, or the last of 
 his answers, to the amended bill is held or deemed sufficient, except 
 upon the same contingencies as are mentioned above, with respect to 
 answers to original bills. 2 
 
 2 Brown v. Butter, 21 Beav. 615. This case 
 appears to be inconsistent with Bramston v. 
 Carter, 2 Sim. 458 ; Cooke v. Davies, 1 Russ. 
 153, n. (e); and Raistrick v. Elsworth, 2 De G. 
 & S. 95: 12 Jur. 281, none of which were cited 
 in Brown v. Butter: and see Forbes v. Preston, 
 11 Jur. N. S. 198, V. C. S. 
 
 3 Ante, p. 421. 
 
 4 Post, p. 828. et seq. 
 
 5 Post, p. 828, et seq. ; and Chap. XXIII. 
 Setting down Omses. 
 
 6 Post, p. 819, et seq. 
 
 7 See Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 7, which fixes 
 the time at thirty days from service of the 
 amended bill; and see ante, p. 740. 
 
 798 
 
 8 This applies, although an answer to the 
 amended bill may have been required from 
 another defendant. Forbes v. Preston, ubi 
 supra. 
 
 9 Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 12; as varied by Ord. 
 22 Nov.. 1866, r. 1; ante. p. 765. 
 
 io Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 13 (4). It is as- 
 sumed that the words " setting down causes," 
 in Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 13 (4), include setting 
 down motions for decree. As to the vacations, 
 see ante. p. 412; and Braithwaite's Manual, 
 188, n. (109). 
 
 i Ord. 22 Nov., 1866, rr. 2, 3. 
 
 2 Ante, p. 801.
 
 FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION. * 804 
 
 A defendant to a suit commenced by bill, who has not been required 
 to answer the bill, and has not answered it, may apply for an order to 
 dismiss the bill for want of prosecution, at any time after the expiration 
 of three months from the time of his appearance, unless a notice of 
 motion for a decree has been served in the mean time, or the cause has 
 been set down to be heard ; and the Court may, upon such application, 
 if it shall think fit, make an order dismissing the bill, or make such 
 other order and impose such terms as may appear just and reasonable. 3 
 In computing the three months, vacations are reckoned. 4 
 
 Where, at the expiration of the three months, the evidence had not 
 closed, so that the plaintiff could not set down the cause, the Court, 
 upon a motion to dismiss for want of prosecution, gave the plain- 
 tiff leave to set down the cause after the expiration of the three 
 months. 5 
 
 The right of a defendant to move to dismiss depends in all cases 
 upon the proceedings of the plaintiff relative to the particular defend- 
 ant making the motion, and not to the general proceedings in the 
 cause as to other defendants. 6 The form of order to be made 
 * upon such a motion, is, however, within the discretion of the * 804 
 Court ; which will, of course, be guided by the conduct of the 
 cause relative to all the defendants. 
 
 The plaintiff, by obtaining and serving an order for leave to amend 
 the bill, precludes the defendant from moving to dismiss ; and the 
 order to amend is in time, if drawn up and served before the motion 
 to dismiss is actually made, although after notice of the motion has 
 been served. 1 And if, after service of the notice, the plaintiff files 
 replication, it is also a complete answer to the motion. 2 But in such 
 cases, and in others where a defendant's title to dismiss is intercepted 
 by a step taken by the plaintiff between the notice of motion and its 
 being heard, the plaintiff has to pay the costs of the defendant's 
 application to dismiss the bill. 3 It must be remembered, however, 
 that after service of a notice of motion to dismiss, in a case where the 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 13; as varied by Ord. three months from the date of his appearance, 
 
 22 Nov., 1896, r. 1. A bill was dismissed with and four weeks from the filing of his answer, 
 
 costs under this order, in Haddon v. Pegler, 5 and possibly even after the expiration of the 
 
 Jur. N. S. 1123, V. C. W. four weeks, although the three months have 
 
 4 Bothomley v. Squire, 7 De G. M. & G. not expired. See also Weeks r. Heward, 11 
 
 246; Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 13 (Hth of May, W. R. 79, V. C. W. ; Semple v. Holland, 1 
 
 1845, Sand. Ord. 984) does not apply to this N. R. 504. M. R.; and Nugent v. Jenkinson, 
 
 case. Ibid- Astothe vacations, see ante, p. 412. cited Braithwaite's Pr. 572. 
 
 6 Bates v. Brothers, 2 W. R. 388, V. C. S. 6 See Nicholl v. .Tones, 14 W. R. 79. V. C. 
 
 The orders do not appear to be framed to meet W. : Semmes ». Mott, 27 Ga. 92. A bill can- 
 
 the case of a defendant who files a voluntary not be dismissed for failure to prosecute, if the 
 
 answer ; but it was said by Sir W. P. Wood V. defendants have caused or acquiesced in the 
 
 C. in Bentley v. Mercer," 4 Jur. N. S. 407: 6 delay Dixon r. Rutherford. 26 Ga. 153. 
 W. R. 265, that it must have been intended J Peacock v. Sievier. 5 Sim. 553 ; Jones v. 
 
 that such a defendant should, in some way, be Lord Chailemont, 12 Jur. 389, V. C. E. As to 
 
 able to get rid of a suit, after having put in a orders to amend, see ante, p. 409, et seq. 
 voluntary answer; and it would sc m that a " 2 Story v. Official Manager, 2 N. R. 351, V. 
 
 defendant may. in such a case, move to dismiss C. W. : and see post, p. 805. 
 for want of prosecution, after the expiration of 3 Ibid. ; Waller v. Pedlington, 4 Beav. 124. 
 
 799
 
 * 805 
 
 DISMISSING BILLS, AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 defendant is entitled to move, an order of course to amend cannot be 
 obtained. 4 
 
 An order to amend, if irregularly obtained, has been held to be a 
 nullity, and not, therefore, to stop a motion to dismiss ; 5 but this decision 
 would seem to be overruled, the rule of the Court now being to treat 
 all orders that have been made as valid, until they have been regularly 
 discharged. 6 
 
 If, upon the hearing of a cause, it is ordered to stand over, with lib- 
 erty to the plaintiff to amend his bill by adding parties, in pursuance 
 of which the plaintiff amends, but does not proceed any further, the 
 defendant may move specially to dismiss the bill for want of prosecu- 
 tion, and is not bound to set the cause down again. 7 And where the 
 order directs the cause to stand over for a limited time, within which 
 the plaintiff is to add necessary parties, and that in default thereof the 
 bill is to stand dismissed with costs, without further order, if the plain- 
 tiff does not add the parties within the limited time, no further applica- 
 tion need be made to dismiss the bill, as it is already out of Court ; 8 
 but if the order does not contain a direction for taxation and payment 
 of costs, an ex parte application for an order for such direction must be 
 made. 9 Where the order does not direct the bill to be dismissed 
 * 805 in case * the bill is not amended within the time specified in the 
 order, and the plaintiff omits to amend, the defendant may 
 move, upon notice, that unless the bill be amended within a certain 
 time, it may be dismissed with costs. 1 
 
 Where, at the time of service of the notice upon the plaintiff, the de- 
 fendant had a right to move to dismiss the bill, yet, if the plaintiff files 
 a replication, or serves an order to amend the bill, before the hearing of 
 the motion, the defendant's right is intercepted, and the plaintiff will be 
 allowed to retain his bill. 2 
 
 Where, however, the plaintiff adopts this course, the Court usually 
 orders him to pay the costs of the application for dismissal ; and even 
 though the defendant had .notice that the plaintiff, by taking a step in 
 the cause, had prevented any order being made upon the motion to dis- 
 miss, yet, where the plaintiff had not tendered the costs of preparing 
 and serving the notice of motion, it was held that the defendant had a 
 right to bring his motion before the Court, for the purpose of obtaining 
 his costs : where the plaintiff had tendered the costs of preparing and 
 serving the notice of motion, there seems to have been some difference 
 of opinion as to the right of the defendant to bring on the motion to 
 obtain taxed costs ; 8 but the practice would now seem to be that the 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. IX. 12 ; see Briggs v. Beale, 12 
 W. R. 934. V. C W.; and ante, pp. 412, 410. 
 
 5 Op Geneve v. Hannam, 1 R. & M. 494. 
 
 6 Blake v. Blake, 7 Beav. 514; Petty v. 
 Lonsdale, 4 M. & C. 545; 3 Jur. 1186. revers- 
 ing id. 1070; Chuck v. Cremer, 2 Phil. 113, 115; 
 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 338, 342; and see 
 observations in report last cited; Whittington 
 v. Edwards, 3 De G. & J. 243, 249. 
 
 7 Mitchel v. Lowndes, 2 Cox, 15. 
 
 8 See Stevens v. Praed, 2 Cox, 374. 
 
 800 
 
 9 Dobede v. Edwards, 11 Sim. 454. Qucere, 
 if the application should not be on notice, see 
 Seton, 1116. For form of motion paper, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 1 Emerson v. Emerson, 6 Hare, 442; 12 Jur. 
 973. 
 
 2 Waller v. Pedlington, 4 Beav. 124 ; Corry 
 v. Curlewis, 8 Beav. 606 ; Heanley v. Abraham, 
 5 Hare. 214; Young v. Quincey, 9 Beav. 160; 
 and see ante, p. 804. 
 
 3 Att.-Gen. v. Cooper, 9 Sim. 379 ; 2 Jur.
 
 FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION. * 806 
 
 defendant is entitled to the costs actually incurred, and that he may in 
 all cases, if necessary, bring on his motion for the purpose of obtaining 
 them. 4 It would seem, however, that if the plaintiff tenders the costs 
 which have been incurred, it is improper for the defendant to bring on 
 his motion, and that he would not be allowed subsequent costs. 5 
 
 Where there is an irregularity in the notice of motion to dismiss, the 
 Court will not make the plaintiff pay the costs of the application for 
 dismissal. 6 
 
 An order to dismiss a bill for want of prosecution, operates from the 
 time of its being pronounced ; and it would seem, therefore, that the 
 filing of replication on the same day does not prevent its effect, 7 
 although the contrary has been held, under the old practice, where the 
 order was made ex parte* 
 
 * The defendant is not prevented, by an interlocutory applica- * 806 
 tion, from moving to dismiss for want of prosecution; and even 
 the obtaining an injunction does not prevent the bill being dismissed. 1 
 The same was also held of showing cause, successfully, against dis- 
 solving an injunction ; 2 and an order to dismiss a bill for want of pros- 
 ecution was held to be regular, although made after a notice had been 
 given by the defendant of a motion to dissolve an injunction, but which 
 motion was not made, in consequence of the state of business in the 
 Court. 3 
 
 There is one case, however, in which an order made upon an inter- 
 locutory application is considered as a sufficient proceeding to prevent 
 the dismissal of a bill for want of prosecution ; namely where the bill 
 having been filed for the specific performance of a contract, and the 
 title only being in dispute, a reference is made, upon motion, to inquire 
 into the title. 4 In such case, the order being in the nature of a decree, 
 made upon the hearing of the cause, prevents the dismissal of the bill. 
 The same rule applies to all decretal orders. 5 
 
 It has always been a general rule, that if notice of motion to dismiss 
 
 917; Fiper v. Gittens, 11 Sim. 282; Wright v. proceed against the other parties so that such 
 
 Angle, 6 Hare, 109; 12 Jur. 34; Hughes v. defendant cannot proceed to examine witnesses 
 
 Lewis, John. 696 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 804. and close the proofs, he may move to dismiss 
 
 4 Hughes i\ Lewis, 6 Jur. N. S. 442; John. the plaintiff's bill for want of prosecution. 
 696, 698; and see note by Registrars there set Vermilyea v. Odell, 4 Paige, 121; S. C. 1 Edw. 
 out. Findlay v. Lawrence, 11 Jur. 705, V. C. Ch. 617; Whitney v. Mayor &c. of New York, 
 K. B. 1 Paige, 548 ; Hastings v. Palmer, 1 Clarke, 52. 
 
 5 Newton v. Ricketts, 11 Beav. 164. 1 Day v. Snee, 3 V. & B. 170; James v. Biou, 
 
 6 Steedman v. Poole, 10 Jur. 979; 11 Jur. 3 Swanst. 234, 239; Bliss v. Collins, cited 2 
 555, V. C. W. Mer. 62. 
 
 7 Lorimer v. Lorimer, 1 J. & W. 284, 288; 2 Earl of Warwick v. Duke of Beaufort, 
 and see note of Registrars in Hughes v. Lewis, 1 Cox, 111. 
 
 John. 698. 3 Farquharson v. Pitcher, 3 Russ. 383. Mo- 
 
 8 Reynolds v. Nelson, 5 Mad. 60; Fox v. tion refused where defendant had tiled interrog- 
 Morewood, 2 S. & S. 325. The filing of a atories for the examination of the plaintiff. 
 replication after notice given of a motion to Jackson i'. Ivimey, L. R. 1 Eq. 693, V. C. W. 
 dismiss the bill for want thereof, is good cause 4 Biscoe v. Brett, 2 V. & B. 377; Collins r. 
 against the motion; but it will be allowed only Greaves, 5 Hare, 596; Gregory v. Spencer, 11 
 on payment of costs. Griswold v. Inman, 1 Beav. 143. 
 
 Hopk. 86. Where a cause is at issue as to one 5 Bluck v. Coln.ighi, 9 Sim. 411; ante, 
 
 of the defendants, by filing a replication to his p. 793; post, p. 810 ; Anon. 11 Ves. 169. 
 
 answer, and the plaintiff has neglected to _._ 
 
 VOL. I. — 51 801
 
 807 
 
 DISMISSING BILLS, AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 for want of prosecution be given for too early a clay, the defect is not 
 cured by the motion being accidentally postponed to a day when it 
 might have been regularly made. 6 
 
 It is to be recollected that a defendant who is in contempt for non- 
 payment of the costs of an attachment, for not putting in his answer in 
 due time, will not be in a situation, even after answer, to move to dis- 
 miss the bill for want of prosecution, — unless, indeed, the plaintiff has 
 replied to the answer, or taken any other step amounting to an accept- 
 ance of it. 7 
 
 After an order to stay proceedings until the plaintiff had cleared his 
 contempt, a motion to dismiss was held to be irregular, and was 
 refused. 8 
 
 Where the defendant has obtained an order for security for costs, 
 which has not been complied with, he should not move to dismiss the 
 bill for want of prosecution, but that, unless security is given within a 
 
 limited time, the bill may be dismissed. 9 
 * 807 * A defendant can only have the bill dismissed as against him- 
 self, not as against all the defendants ; x and the notice of motion 
 should be framed accordingly. 
 
 An order to dismiss a bill can only be drawn up on the production of 
 the Record and Writ Clerk's certificate of the proceedings in the cause, 
 for the purpose of showing what proceedings have been had. This 
 certificate ought to be produced in Court at the time of the motion 
 being made, or at all events before the rising of the Court on that day ; 2 
 and the Registrar will not draw up the order until he sees that the cer- 
 tificate has been granted. 3 Sometimes the certificate has been applied 
 for, and obtained, after the order has been pronounced by the Court, 
 so that it was dated subsequently to the order ; which, although drawn 
 up and entered afterwards, is always dated on the day that it is pro- 
 nounced by the Court. 4 This practice would seem to have been irreg- 
 ular, and, if objected to, not now to be permitted. 5 
 
 Where either party does not appear on the motion, an office copy of 
 the affidavit of service of the notice of motion 6 must also be in Court; 
 and where the defendant fails to move, the plaintiff may obtain an order 
 for payment of his costs of the abandoned motion. 7 
 
 Upon hearing the motion, the Court usually either dismisses the bill 
 with costs, or orders the plaintiff to pay the costs of the motion, and to 
 enter into an undertaking to amend the bill, file replication, or set 
 down the cause to be heard on motion for decree, or on bill and answer, 
 
 6 De Geneve v. Hannam, 1 R. & M. 494 ; 
 and. see Ponsardin v. Stear, 32 Beav. GOG; 9 
 Jur. N. S. 885; Ernest v. Govett, 2 N. R. 48G, 
 
 V. c. w. 
 
 7 Anon. 15 Ves. 174; Herrett v. Reynolds, 
 2 Giff. 409; 6 Jur. N. S. 880. 
 
 8 Futvoye v. Kennard, 2 Giff. 533; 7 Jur. 
 N. S. 9r,8. " 
 
 9 Kennedy v. Edwards, 11 Jur. N. S. 153, 
 V. C. W.; ante, pp. 35,36. 
 
 i Ward v. Ward, 11 Beav. 159, 162; 12 Jur. 
 592. 
 
 802 
 
 2 Freeston v. Claydon, 17 Jur. 435, V. C. W. 
 
 s Wills v. Pugh, 10 Ves. 402, 403. 
 
 4 Ibid.; M'Mahon v. Sisson, 12 Ves. 465; 
 Att.-Gen. v. Finch, 1 V. & B. 368; King v. 
 Noel, 5 Mad. 13; Re Risca Coal Co. 10 W. R. 
 701, L. C. 
 
 s Bell v. Bell, 14 Jur. 1129, V. C. Ld. C. ; 
 Freeston v. Claydon, nbi supra. 
 
 6 For forms of affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 
 7 See post, Chap. XXXV. § 2, Motions; Cons. 
 Ord. XL. 23.
 
 FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION. 
 
 808 
 
 within a limited period, according to the state of the suit ; 8 or, as it is 
 usually expressed, to " speed the cause." 
 
 The Court, however, sometimes directs the motion to stand over, in 
 order to give the plaintiff an opportunity of taking a step in the cause, 
 and so preventing the bill being dismissed ; and upon his doing so, makes 
 no other order on the motion than that the plaintiff pay the costs ; 9 or, 
 if satisfied that the plaintiff has used reasonable diligence, it has 
 refused to make any order on * the motion ; 1 and after replica- * 808 
 tion has been filed, the Court will, in a proper case, give the 
 plaintiff further time. 2 
 
 Notwithstanding the enactment that, upon the defendant's dismissing 
 a bill for want of prosecution, the plaintiff shall pay to the defendant his 
 costs, to be taxed by the Master, 3 the Court has a discretion to make 
 such order in respect of costs, as well as in other respects, as it thinks 
 fit : and though, in most cases, where the defendant was in a position to 
 move to dismiss at the time the notice was served, the Court orders the 
 plaintiff to pay the costs, whatever order it may make in other respects, 
 it has refused to make any order upon the motion; 4 has dismissed the 
 bill, without costs ; 5 and has even gone the length of dismissing the 
 motion with costs. 6 
 
 Where the plaintiff becomes bankrupt, 7 or has filed his bill in forma 
 pauperis, 8 the rule is to dismiss the bill without costs. Where the 
 defendant becomes bankrupt, it seems to have been formerly considered 
 that the bill, if dismissed for want of prosecution, ought to be dismissed 
 without costs ; 9 but it has since been held, that the fact of a defendant 
 becoming a bankrupt, is not of itself a sufficient reason for departing from 
 
 8 Stinton v. Taylor, 4 Hare, 008; 10 Jur. 
 386; Earl of Mornington v. Smith, 9 Beav. 
 251; Hardy v. Hardy, 1 C. P. Coop. temp. 
 Cott. 16; Williams v. Rowland, 3 Jur. N. S. 
 G58, V. C. W.; Hancock v. Rollison, 5 Jur. 
 N. S. 1199; 8 W. R. 18, V. C. S. ; Hand r. 
 King, 10 Jur. N. S. 91, V. C. W. ; Jones v. 
 Jones, 10 Jar. N. S. 1167, L. JJ.; Forbes v. 
 Preston, 11 Jur. N. S. 198, V. C S. ; South- 
 ampton &c. Steamboat Co (Limited) v. Raw- 
 lins, 13 W. R. 512, L. JJ. Where several 
 defendants, who appeared separately, moved, 
 the Court, to save costs, made an order for dis- 
 missal on all the motions. Jones v. Perrott, 
 36 L. J. Ch. 488. 
 
 '•> Young w.Quincey, 9 Beav. 160; Stinton r. 
 Taylor, 4 Hare, 608, 609; 10 Jur. 386. See 
 London and Colonial Co. v. Elworthv, 18 W 
 R. 246. 
 
 1 Ingle n. Partridge, 12 W. R 65, M. R. ; 33 
 Beav. 287. 
 
 2 Pollard v. Doyle, 2 W. R. 509, V. C. K. ; 
 and see Forbes v. Preston, 11 Jur. N. S. 198 
 V. C. S. 
 
 8 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16, § 23, ante, p. 791. As 
 to the form of order, where the suit is bv an 
 
 official manager or liquidator, see Grand Trunk 
 Co. v. Brodie, 3 D- G. M. & G. 146; 17 Jur. 
 309; 9 Hare, 823; 17 Jur. 205; Official Manager 
 of Consols Ins. Co. v. Wood, 13 W. R. 492, V. 
 C K.; 2 Dr. & Sm. 353; and see Re Anglo- 
 Moravian H. J. Ry. Co. 1 Ch. D. 130; Morgan 
 & Davey, 226. 
 
 4 Vent v. Pacey, 3 Sim. 382; and see [ngle 
 v. Partridge, ubi supra. 
 
 5 Pinfold v. Pinfold, 9 Hare App. 14; 16 Jur. 
 1081, V. C- T. ; and see South Staffordshire 
 Ry. Co. v. Hall, 10 Jur. 160, V. C. K.; Lan- 
 cashire and Yorkshire Ry. Co. v. Evans 14 
 Beav. 529; Kemball r. Walduck, 1 Sm. & G 
 App. 27; 18 Jur. 69, V. C. S. 
 
 6 Partington v. Raillie, 5 Sim. 667: Wm- 
 throp v. Murray, 7 Hare, 150; 13 Jur. 32; Ingle 
 v. Partridge, 33 Reav. 287. 
 
 ' Ante, p. 64, post, p. 813; Meiklam v. El- 
 more, 4 De G. & J. 208; 5 Jur. N. S. 904; and 
 see post, p. 814. 
 
 8 Ante, p 792; and see p. 42. 
 
 9 Blanchard ?•. Drew, 10 Sim. 240: Monteith 
 v. Taylor, 9 Yes. 615; 1 M'N. & G. 81. n.; 
 Kemball v. Walduck, 1 Sm. & G. App. 27: 18 
 Jur. 69; Findlay v. Lawrence, 2 De G. & S 303. 
 
 803
 
 809 
 
 DISMISSING BILLS, AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 the ordinary rule that, a bill dismissed for want of prosecution, is dis- 
 missed with costs. 10 
 
 The Court will not enter into the merits of the case, for the purpose 
 of determining whether the bill shall be dismissed with or without costs ; 
 but will, for that purpose, only consider the conduct of the parties in the 
 prosecution of the cause. 11 
 
 Where a defendant, knowing that the plaintiff has used due diligence 
 and been unable to get in the answers of other defendants, moves to 
 dismiss the bill for want of prosecution, the motion will be dis- 
 * 809 missed with costs ; u and it is, therefore, prudent on the *part of 
 the plaintiff to give a defendant who is in a position to move to 
 dismiss, notice that the other answers have not been got in, if such is 
 the fact. 1 
 
 Where the plaintiff undertakes to speed the cause, the order ought to 
 go on to provide that, in default of his taking the appointed step within 
 the prescribed period, the bill shall be dismissed with costs, without 
 further notice. 2 
 
 If the plaintiff makes default in taking the next step within the time 
 limited, no further indulgence will in general be granted him. 8 Where, 
 however, the plaintiff considers he has a case entitling him to ask for 
 further indulgence, he should make a special application for further 
 time, by motion or summons, before the expiration of the period lim- 
 ited ; 4 or if the time has expired, the application must be to have the 
 bill restored. 5 It is not, however, the ordinary course of the Court to 
 restore a bill which has once been dismissed ; it must be shown that 
 substantial justice requires that it should be done, and then, upon the 
 particular circumstances, the Court will make the order. 6 The Court 
 will not restore a bill, which has been regularly dismissed, for the mere 
 purpose of agitating the question of costs. 7 
 
 M Blackmore r. Smith. 1 M'N. & G. 80; 13 
 Jur. 218 ; Robson r. Earl of Devon, 3 Sm. & G. 
 227; 2 Jur. N. S. 565; Levi v. Heritage, 26 
 Beav. 560; S. C. nom. Lever v. Heritage, 5 Jur. 
 N. S. 215. 
 
 11 Stagg v. Knowles, 3 Hare, 241, 244: South 
 Staffordshire Ry. Co. v. Hall, 16 Jur. 160, V. 
 C. K.; Wallis v. Wallis, 4 Drew. 458; Waring 
 v. Lockett, 18 W. R. 915. 
 
 12 Partington v. Baillie, 5 Sim. 667 ; Win- 
 throp r. Murray, 7 Hare. 150; 13 Jur. 32; and 
 see Ingle >: Partridge. 12 W. R. 65, M. R.; 33 
 Beav. 287; Nicholl v. Jones, 14 W. R. 79, V. 
 C. W. ; Barker v. Piele. 12 W. R. 460, V. C. K. ; 
 Hurd v. Lupton, W. N. (1869) 28. 
 
 i Adair v. Barrington, 2 W. R. 361; 2 Eq. 
 Rep. 408, V. C. W. 
 
 2 Emerson v. Emerson, 6 Hare, 442; 12 Jur. 
 973; Stephenson v. Mackay, 24 Beav. 252; 
 Pearce v. Wrigton, id. 253; and see Bartlett v. 
 Harton, 17 Beav. 479; 17 Jur. 1019; Stevens 
 v. Praed, 2 Cox, 374; Dobede v. Edwards, 11 
 Sim. 454. For form of order in such case, see 
 Seton, 1278, No. 4. 
 804 
 
 3 La Mert r. Stanhope, 5 De G. & S. 247; 
 Stephenson v. Mackay, ubi supra; Williams v. 
 Page, 24 Beav. 490; Bartlett v. Harton, ubi 
 supra. 
 
 4 La Mert r. Stanhope, ubi supra. In an 
 ordinary case the application should be made 
 by summons. For forms of notice of motion 
 and summons, see Vol. III. 
 
 5 Bartktt r. Harton, 17 Beav. 479 ;- 17 Jur. 
 1019; Jackson r. Purnell, 16 Ves. 204; the ap- 
 plication, in this case, should be made by 
 motion. For form of notice of motion, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 6 See Southampton Steamboat Co. v. Raw- 
 lins, 11 Jur. N. S. 230; 13 W. R. 512, L. JJ., 
 where the delay had been occasioned by a 
 mistake. 
 
 " Hannam r. South London Water Works 
 Co. 2 Mer. 63, 64; Stone v. Locke, 48 Maine, 
 425. Where a bill has been dismissed from the 
 docket for want of prosecution, on motion of 
 the defendant, the suit cannot properly be 
 brought forward at a subsequent term, on mo- 
 tion, to obtain an order for costs. It seems the
 
 FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION. 
 
 810 
 
 It has been held, that it is no answer to a motion to dismiss that the 
 plaintiff has not been able to get in the answers of other defendants ; 8 
 or that the delay of the plaintiff was occasioned by difficulties in draw- 
 ing up an order allowing a demurrer by other defendants, with leave to 
 amend ; 9 or that the plaintiff has applied for the production of docu- 
 ments, unless the application was made without delay ; 10 or that proceed- 
 ings had been stayed, against other defendants, till the plaintiff 
 should pay them certain * costs ; 1 or that the plaintiff had offered * 810 
 to dismiss the bill without costs ; the decision on which it had 
 been filed having been overruled ; 2 or that the defendant has become 
 bankrupt. 3 
 
 Where, however, in consequence of negotiations with the principal de- 
 fendant, the plaintiff did not get in the answers of the other defendants, 
 and the principal defendant, during the absence of the plaintiff abroad, 
 moved to dismiss for want of prosecution, Lord Cottenham gave the 
 plaintiff (on the 7th of July) till the first day of the ensuing Michaelmas 
 term, to file replication. 4 The omission, on the part of the defendant, to 
 give notice of the filing of his answer, 5 does not affect his right to 
 move to dismiss the bill for want of prosecution ; though, of course, 
 it may materially affect the order which the Court will make upon the 
 motion. 6 
 
 A bill may be dismissed for want of prosecution, while the plaintiff is 
 an outlaw. 7 
 
 A defendant is not prevented from moving to dismiss by the suit 
 having abated, through the death of another defendant. 8 
 
 In bills to perpetuate testimony, it does not seem that the defendant 
 has hitherto had, under any circumstances, a right to have the bill dis- 
 missed for want of prosecution. 9 
 
 proper proceeding for the defendant, after dis- 
 missal for want of prosecution, is to apply for 
 an order to discharge the decree dismissing the 
 bill. Stone v. Locke, ubi supra. 
 
 8 Lester v. Archdale, 9 Beav. 156; Earl of 
 Mornington v. Smith, id. 251 ; Baldwin v. 
 Darner, 11 Jur. 723. V. C. E.; Stinton v. Tay- 
 lor, 4 Hare, 608, 609; 10 Jur. 386; Adair v. 
 Barrington, 2 W. R. 361; 2 Eq. Rep. 408, V. 
 C. W. ; Briggs v. Beale, 12 W. R. 934, V. C. 
 W.; but see ante, p. 808. 
 
 9 Jones v. Morgan, 12 Jur. 388, V. C. E.; see 
 also Drioli v. Sedgwick, 15 Jur. 284, V. C. 
 Ld. C. 
 
 10 Franco v. Meyer, 2 H. & M. 42. 
 
 1 Lautour v. Holcombe, 10 Beav. 256. 
 
 2 Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry. Co. t>. Evans, 
 14 Beav. 529 ; the bill was, however, in this 
 case, afterwards dismissed without costs. South 
 Staffordshire Ry. Co. v. Hall, 16 Jur. 160, V. 
 C. K. 
 
 3 Levi v. Heritage, 26 Beav. 560, and cases 
 there cited; S. C. now. Lever v. Heritage, 5 
 Jur. N. S. 215; or that a cross-bill at the suit 
 of another defendant is pending. Windham v. 
 Cooper, 14 W. R. 8, V. C. W. Or that a de- 
 
 fendant, who has made an insufficient affidavit 
 as to documents, has not complied with an 
 order, not served, for a further affidavit. Howe 
 v. Grey, W. N. (1867) 141. 
 
 4 Hardy v. Hardy, 1 C. P. Coop. temp. 
 Cott. 16. 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. III. 9 ; see ante, p. 755. 
 
 6 Jones v. Jones, 1 Jur. N. S. 863 ; 3 W. R. 
 638, V. C. S. 
 
 ' Knowles v. Rhvdydefed Colliery Co. John. 
 630; 6 Jur. N. S. 291. 
 
 8 Williams v. Page, 24 Beav. 490. Nor by 
 the death of a co-plaintiff, if no abatement has 
 been occasioned thereby. Wilson v. Wilson, 
 L. R. 9 Eq. 452. 
 
 9 In Beavan r. Carpenter, 11 Sim. 22, a 
 cause of this kind, a motion to dismiss before 
 replication, was refused; but Sir Lancelot Shad- 
 well V. C. made an order that the plaintiff 
 should file a replication forthwith, and proceed 
 to the examination of his witnesses, as prayed 
 by his bill, and procure such examination to be 
 completed on or before a certain day ; and that, 
 in default thereof, he should pay to the defend- 
 ant his costs of the suit. And a similar older 
 was made, on a like motion after replication. 
 
 805
 
 811 
 
 DISMISSING BILLS, AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 So, in the case of a bill for discovery, the defendant should not move 
 to dismiss for want of prosecution, but should, after the time for 
 excepting to his answer has elapsed, obtain, on petition as of course, 
 an order for the payment of his costs by the plaintiff. 10 And in 
 * 811 a suit for a receiver, pendente lite, the motion * should be for 
 payment of costs, to stay proceedings, and, if necessary, to dis- 
 charge the receiver. 1 
 
 After a decree, or even a decretal order, has been made, a bill cannot 
 be dismissed for want of prosecution. 2 But after a decree merely direct- 
 ing accounts and inquiries, to enable the Court to determine what is to 
 be done, a bill can always be dismissed. 8 
 
 It has been before stated, that an order to dismiss a bill for want of 
 prosecution cannot be pleaded in bar to a new bill for the same matter. 4 
 Where however, after a bill has been so dismissed, the plaintiff files 
 another bill for the same purpose, the Court will suspend the proceed- 
 ings on such new bill till the costs of the former suit have been paid ; 
 and where the defendant, in the suit which had been dismissed, died 
 before he had received his costs, and the plaintiff filed a new bill against 
 his executor for the same object, the proceedings on the new bill were 
 ordered to be stayed, until the plaintiff had paid the executor the costs 
 of the dismissed suit. 5 This rule does not apply, where the plaintiff sues 
 by a next friend. 6 
 
 An order to dismiss a bill for want of prosecution, effectually puts an 
 end to every proceeding in the suit which has been dismissed, and no 
 subsequent step can be taken in it, except such as may be necessary 
 for carrying into effect the order of dismissal. 7 Therefore, where a de- 
 fendant obtains an order to dismiss a bill for want of prosecution, with- 
 
 Wright v. Tatham, 2 Sim. 459 ; and Barham v. 
 Longman, id. 460; see also Brigstocke v. Both, 
 7 Jur. N. S. 63, V. C. S.; and pott, Chap. 
 XXXIV. § 4, Bills to Perpetuate Testimony. 
 
 1" Woodcock v. King, 1 Atk. 286; Att.-Gen. 
 v. Burch, 4 Mad. 178; Rhodes v. Hayne, 9 Jur. 
 175, V. C. K. B.; South Eastern Ry. Co. v. 
 Submarine Telegraph Co. 18 Beav. 429; 17 
 Jur. 1044; Fitzgerald r. Butt, 9 Hare App. 65; 
 see post, Chap. XXXIV. § 2, Bills of Discovery. 
 For form of petition, see post, Vol. III. 
 
 i Edwards v. Edwards, 17 Jur. 826, V. C. 
 W.; Anderson o Guichard, 9 Hare, 275 ; Barton 
 ?■. Rock (No. 2), 22 Beav. 376; see now 20 & 21 
 Vice. 77, §§ 70, 71; but see Williams v. Att.- 
 Gen., Seton, 1003. 
 
 2 Thus, in Bluck v. Colnaghi, 9 Sim. 411, a 
 suit for winding up the affairs of the partner- 
 ship between the plaintiff and defendant, in 
 which an order had been made, by consent on 
 motion, for taking the accounts of the partner- 
 ship, but had not been drawn up. Sir Lancelot 
 Shadwell V. C. said that the order which had 
 been pronounced was a decretal order; and 
 though it had not been drawn up, yet either 
 party was at liberty to draw it up; and that an 
 
 806 
 
 order in the nature of a decree having been 
 made in the cause, the bill could not he dis- 
 missed. See also Egg r. Devey, 11 Beav. 221; 
 ante, pp. 793, 806; and Collins r. Greaves, 5 
 Hare, 596; Gregory v. Spencer, 11 Beav. 143. 
 
 a Anon. 11 Ves. 169; Barton v. Barton, 3 K. 
 & J. 512; 3 Jur. N. S. 808; and see ante, 
 pp. 793, 794, n. 
 
 * Ante, p. 659; Story, Eq. PI. § 793; Mit- 
 ford, Eq. PI. by Jeremy, 238; see Byrne v.' 
 Frese, 2 Moll. 157. When a bill is dismissed 
 for want of prosecution, it operates as a discon- 
 tinuance, and is no more than a nonsuit at law, 
 and does not prevent the bringing of a new 
 bill. McBroom v. Sotnmerville, 2 Stewart, 515: 
 Porter v Vaughan, 26 Vt. 624. The dismissal 
 absolutely of a bill by a Court which had no 
 jurisdiction of the case is no bar to another 
 suit. Lancaster r. Lair, 1 Dana, 109. 
 
 5 Long v. Storie, 13 Jur. 1091, V. C. E.; and 
 see ante, p. 796. 
 
 6 Hind v. Whitmore, 2 K. & J. 458; ante, 
 p 796, n. 
 
 " See Lorimer v. Lorimer, 1 J. & W. 284; 
 Bartlett v. Harton, 17 Jur. 1019, M. R.
 
 WHERE SUIT HAS ABATED, OR BECOME DEFECTIVE. * 813 
 
 out the plaintiff's having made a ^motion of which he has given 
 notice, the defendant cannot * afterwards obtain the costs of the * 812 
 motion, as an abandoned motion. 1 
 
 Where a bill is dismissed with costs, they may be taxed without any 
 order referring them for taxation, unless the Court prohibits the taxa- 
 tion ; and they will be recoverable by subpoena, in the usual manner. 2 
 Where the dismissal takes place before the hearing, only those costs 
 which are costs in the cause are included : 3 therefore, when the costs of 
 a motion or other application in the cause are reserved, they should be 
 made costs in the cause, or reserved " until the hearing or further 
 order," and not simply " until the hearing." 4 
 
 Where a bill was dismissed for want of prosecution, in a suit in which 
 the official manager of a company under process of winding up had, 
 after institution of the suit, been substituted as plaintiff, the order pro- 
 vided that the defendants should be at liberty to prove for their costs 
 in the winding up. 5 
 
 'The order dismissing a bill for want of prosecution, may be enrolled, 
 although the only object in doing so be to prevent an appeal. 6 
 
 Where a plea to the whole bill is not set down for argument within 
 three weeks after the filing, and the plaintiff does not within such three 
 weeks serve an order for leave to amend the bill, or by notice in writing 
 undertake to reply to the plea, the defendant by whom such plea was 
 filed may obtain, as of course, an order to dismiss the bill. 7 
 
 Section III. — Where the Suit has abated, or become otherwise 
 
 defective. 
 
 Where a suit abates by the death of a sole plaintiff, the Court, upon 
 motion of any defendant, made on notice served on the legal represen- 
 tative of the deceased plaintiff, may order that such legal repre- 
 sentative do revive the suit within a limited time, or that the bill 
 be dismissed. 8 
 
 * The words legal representative mean heir, or devisee, or * 813 
 
 1 As to abandoned motions, see post, Chap. ity, to a previous order for the amendment of 
 XXXV. § 2, Motions ; and Cons. Ord. XL. the bill, Kettlewell v. Bristow, L. R. 10 Eq. 
 23. 210. 
 
 2 Cons. Old. XL. 38. 8 Cons. Ord. XXXII. 4. This rule is only 
 
 3 Stevens v. Keating, 1 M'N. & G. 659, 663; applicable to an abatement or defect occurring 
 14 Jur. 157; see Webster v. Manby, L. R. 4 Ch. before decree. As to proceedings in the suit, 
 372. after an abatement, but in ignorance of it, see 
 
 < Rumbold r. Forteath, 4 Jur. N. S. 608, Smith v. Horsfall, 24 Beav. 331; Houston v. 
 
 V. C. W. Briscoe, 7 W. R. 394, V. C. K. In Massachu- 
 
 5 Caldwell v. Ernest (No. 2), 27 Beav. 42; setts, "when the death of any party shall be 
 5 Jur. N. S. 667. suggested in writing, and entered on the docket, 
 
 6 Williams v. Page, 1 De G. & J. 561. the clerk, upon application, may issue process to 
 
 7 Cons. Ord. XIV. 17; ante, p. 695. As to bring into Court the representative of such de- 
 liches in applying, see Campbell v. Joyce, ceased part}-." Ch. Rule 25; see also 50th and 
 L. R. 2 Eq. 337, V. C. W. And see, as to the 57th Equity Rules of the U. S. Courts, post, 
 discharge of the order, on the ground of bad p. 2'388. For form of order under r. 4, see 
 faith, Talbot v. Keay, L. R. 8 Eq. 610; and as Seton, 1278, No. 5; and for form of notice of 
 to the effect of a motion to dismiss for want of motion, see Vol. III. 
 
 prosecution on the right to object for irregular- 
 
 807
 
 * 814 
 
 DISMISSING BILLS, AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 executor, or administrator, according as the suit relates to real or per- 
 sonal estate. 1 
 
 Where the sole plaintiff died after decree, and after an injunction to 
 restrain waste, Lord Langdale M. R,. made an order that all further 
 proceedings should be stayed, and the injunction dissolved, unless the 
 suit were revived within a limited time ; 2 but Sir R. T. Kindersley 
 V. C. declined to follow this case, 3 on the ground that the defendant 
 could himself revive. 4 And where an injunction had been obtained, 
 restraining an action at law, and the sole plaintiff died, Sir John Roni- 
 illy M. R. said he had no jurisdiction to make an order that the suit be 
 revived by the plaintiff's representatives, or the bill be dismissed. 5 If 
 the bill is dismissed, it will be dismissed without costs. 6 
 
 A suit does not abate by the death of a sole plaintiff, who is the pub- 
 lic officer of a joint-stock company: 7 in such a case, therefore, the de- 
 fendant should apply to dismiss the bill in the usual form, and not that 
 it may be revived within a limited time or dismissed. 8 
 
 "Where a suit abates by the death of one of several co-plaintiffs, the 
 defendant may, on motion, 9 obtain an order that the surviving plaintiffs 
 do revive within a limited time, or, in default, that the bill stand dis- 
 missed with costs ; 10 and it is no answer to such an application that 
 there is no personal representative of the deceased plaintiff. 11 No order 
 will be made as to the costs of the motion. 12 
 
 Where a suit abates by the marriage of a female sole plaintiff, a 
 similar order may be obtained against her husband ; 13 and it seems 
 that the order will be made with costs. 14 
 
 Where the abatement is caused by the death of a defendant, his 
 representative may move that the plaintiff do revive the suit 
 * 814 * within a limited time, or, in default, that the bill may be dis- 
 missed as against them ; and the order is, it seems, for the dis- 
 missal without costs. 1 
 
 * See Price v. Berrington, 11 Beav. 90. 
 
 2 Ibid. 
 
 a Mills v. Dudgeon, 1 W. R. 514, V. C. K. 
 
 4 See Devavnes v. Morris, 1 M. & C. 213, 
 225. 
 
 5 Oldfield v. Cobbett, 20 Beav. 563. 
 
 6 Chowick i'. Dimes, 3 Beav. 290, 492, n. ; 
 and cases in id. 294, n. ; Hill v. Gaunt, 7 Jur. 
 N. S. 42; 9 W. R. 68, V. C. W. 
 
 7 See 7 Geo. IV. c. 46, § 9. 
 
 8 Burmester v. Von Stenz, 23 Beav. 32. 
 
 9 For form of notice, see Vol. III. 
 
 1° Adamson v. Hall, T. & R. 258, overruling 
 S. C. nom. Adamson v. Hull, 1 S. & S. 249; 
 Chichester v. Hunter, 3 Beav. 491; Lord Hunt- 
 ingtower v. Sherborn. 5 Beav. 380; Holcombe 
 v. Trotter, 1 Coll. 654; Norton v. White, 2 De 
 G. M. & G. 678; Powell v. Powell, id. n.; 
 Pudge v. Pitt, 3 VV. R. 100, V. C. S.; Pearce 
 v. Wrigton, 24 Beav. 253 ; Hinde v. Morton, 13 
 W. R. 401, V. C. W. See Pells v. Coon, 1 
 Hopk. 450, in which it was held in New York, 
 that upon the abatement of a suit, bv the death 
 
 808 
 
 of one of several co-plaintiffs, it is at the election 
 of the surviving co-plaintiffs whether they will 
 revive the suit. The Court will limit the time 
 within which they shall make that election. 
 And if they do not revive the suit within the 
 time limited, the Court will order that they 
 be precluded from any further prosecution of 
 it. 
 
 11 Saner v. Deaven, 16 Beav. 30. 
 
 12 Hinde ». Morton, ubi supra. According 
 to the report of Hinde v. Morton, in 2 H. & 
 M. 308, the order in the case of the death of a 
 co-plaintiff, one of several residuary legatees, 
 should be that the remaining plaintiffs proceed, 
 or the bill be dismissed with costs, the death of 
 the co-plaintiff being marked on the record. 
 
 3 Johnson v. Horlock, 3 Beav. 294, n.; 
 Wilkinson v. Charlesworth, id. 297, n. 
 
 14 Johnson v. Horlock, ubi supra ; see, how- 
 ever, Wilkinson v. Charlesworth, ubi supra ; 
 contra. 
 
 1 Burnell v. Duke of Wellington, 6 Sim. 
 461; Norton v. White, 2 De G. M. & G. 678;
 
 WHERE SUIT HAS ABATED, OR BECOME DEFECTIVE. * 815 
 
 Where a suit becomes defective by the bankruptcy of a sole plaintiff, 
 the defendant may obtaiu, on special motion, 2 an order that the assignee 
 do within a limited time (usually three weeks) take proper supplemental 
 proceedings for the purpose of prosecuting the suit against the defend- 
 ant, or, in default, that the bill be dismissed, without costs. 8 And where 
 one of several co-plaintiffs becomes bankrupt, a similar order may be 
 obtained against the other co-plaintiffs ; 4 but in this case, the dismissal 
 will be with costs. 5 
 
 If the plaintiff become bankrupt after decree, the Court will, on the 
 motion of the defendant, order that the assignees elect, within a limited 
 time, whether they will prosecute the suit, and, in default, that all 
 further proceedings be stayed. 6 And a similar order has been made, 
 with respect to a trustee under the act to facilitate arrangements with 
 creditors. 7 
 
 The order to dismiss on occasions of abatement, or of the suit becom- 
 ing defective, must not be confounded with an ordinary order to dismiss 
 for want of prosecution. The two orders differ from one another materi- 
 ally, both in the circumstances in which they may be obtained, and the 
 form of the order when it is made. After a suit has abated, or after it 
 has become defective by the bankruptcy of the plaintiff, it is irregular to 
 move for the ordinary order to dismiss the bill for want of prosecution ; 8 
 and such an order, if made, will be discharged for irregularity. 9 
 
 Where a suit becomes defective by the bankruptcy of a defendant, he 
 may, as we have seen, notwithstanding his bankruptcy, obtain the 
 usual order to dismiss the bill for want of prosecution, * with * 815 
 costs; 1 but he cannot obtain an order of a similar kind to that 
 granted on the bankruptcy of a plaintiff. 2 
 
 Powell v. Powell, id. n. ; Cross v. Cross, 11 W. * Ward v. Ward, 8 Beav. 397; 11 Bear. 
 
 R. 797, V. C. S. ; Reeves v. Baker, 13 Beav. 115, 159; 12 Jur. 592 ; Kilminster v. Pratt, 1 Hare, 
 
 is incorrectly reported ; see 2 De G. M. & G. 632; see, however, Caddick v. Masson, 1 Sim. 
 
 679, n. (b). So the survivors upon the death 501. 
 
 of one of several defendants may move that the ° Ward v. Ward, and Kilminster v. Pratt, 
 
 plaintiff revive, or the bill be dismissed. Har- ubi supra. Where the bankruptcy takes place 
 
 rington v. Becker, 2 Barb. Ch. 647. See between the hearing and judgment, the Court 
 
 Thompson v. Hill, 5 Yerger, 418. will not, before giving judgment, compel the 
 
 2 As to serving notice of the motion on the trustee to revive. Boucicault v. Delatield, V2 
 bankrupt, as well as on the assignees, see Ves- W. R. 8. 
 
 tris v. Hooper, 8 Sim. 570. c Whitmore V. Oxborrow, 1 Coll. 91 ; Clarke 
 
 3 Ante, pp. 64, 808; Sharp v. Hullett, 2 S. v. Tipping, 16 Beav. 12. 
 
 &S. 496; Wheeler ». Malins, 4 Mad. 171; Porter ? Hardy v. Dartnell, 4 De G. & S. 568; 
 
 v. Cox, 5 Mad. 80; Lord Huntingtower v. Sher- see 7 & 8 Vic. c. 70; 24 & 25 Vic. c. 134, 
 
 born, ubi supra; Robinson v. Norton, 10 Beav. § 197. 
 
 484 ; Fisher v. Fisher, 6 Hare, 628; 2 Phil. 236; « Robinson v. Norton, 10 Beav. 484. 
 
 Meiklam v. Elmore, 4 De G. & J. 208; 5 Jur. 9 Boddy v. Kent, 1 Mer. 361, 365; Sellers 
 
 N. S. 904; Jackson v. Riga Railway, 28 Beav. v. Dawson, 2 Dick. 738; S. C. nom. Sellas v. 
 
 75; Boucicault v. Delatield, 10 Jur.'N. S. 937; Dawson, 2 Anst. 458, n. 
 
 12 W. R. 1025, V. C. W.; 10 Jur. N. S. 1063; l Blackmore v. Smith, 1 M'N. & G. 80; 13 
 
 13 W. R. 64, L. JJ.; where the bankruptcy has Jur. 218; Robson v. Earl of Devon, 3 Sin. & G. 
 occurred in a foreign country, see Bourbaud v. 227; 2 Jur. N. S. 565; Levi r. Heritage, 26 
 Bourbaud, 12 W. R. 1024, V. C. W. As to the Beav. 560 ; S. C nom. Lever v. Heritage. 5 Jur. 
 effect of a trust deed by the plaintiff, under 24 N. S. 215; but see Kemball v. Walduck, 1 Sin. 
 & 25 Vic. c. 134, see § 197. For form of order, & G. App. 27; 18 Jur. 09, V. C. S., where the 
 see Seton, 1278, No. 6; and for form of notice dismissal was without costs. 
 
 of motion, see Vol. III. 2 Manson v. Burton, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 626. 
 
 809
 
 81i 
 
 DISMISSING BILLS, AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 Section IV. — Cases of Election. 
 
 Where the plaintiff is suing both at Law and in Equity, at the same 
 time, for the same matter, the defendant is entitled to an order that the 
 plaintiff do elect whether he will proceed with the suit in Equity, or with 
 the action at Law. 8 Thus, the Court will generally compel a plaintiff to 
 elect between a suit in Equity for the specific performance of an agree- 
 ment, and an action at Law brought in respect of the same agreement. 4 (<>) 
 So also, as a general rule, a party suing in Equity- will not be allowed to 
 sue at Law for the same debt. The case of a mortgagee is an exception 
 to this rule ; it is frequently said, that he may pursue all his remedies 
 
 3 Ld. Red. 249; Carlisle v. Cooper, 3 C. E. 
 Green (N. J.), 241; Livingston v. Kane, 3 John. 
 Ch. 224, Sanger v. Wood, id. 416 ; Rogers v. 
 Vosburgh, 4 John. Ch. 84; Gibbs v. Perkinson, 
 4 Hen. & M. 415; ante, p. 634, note. Where the 
 remedies at Law and in Equity are inconsistent, 
 any decisive act of the party under either juris- 
 diction, with knowledge of his rights and of the 
 facts, determines his election. Sanger v. Wood, 
 ubi supra ; see Combs v. Tarlton, 2 B. Mon. 194; 
 ante, p. 634, note. For form of order, see 2 
 Seton, Dec. (3d Eng. ed.) 947. 
 
 4 Carrick v. Young, 4 Mad. 437; Ambrose 
 v. Nott, 2 Hare, 649, 651; see also Fennings v. 
 Humphery, 4 Beav. 1; 5 Jur. 455; Faulkner v. 
 Llewellyn, 10 W. R. 506, V. C. K.; Gedye 
 r. Duke of Montrose, 5 W. R. 537; S. C. 26 
 Beav. 45, 47; Kerr v. Campbell, 17 W. R. 155. 
 Where the plaintiff sued at Law and in Equity 
 for the same debt, but the action was dismissed 
 on payment of the debt and costs at Law, the 
 Court ordered the suit to be stayed on payment 
 of costs bv the defendant. Deane v. Hambcr, 
 14 W. R. 167, V. C. S. 
 
 (a) See Terry v. Munger, 121 N. Y. 161; 
 Bach v. Tuch, 126 N. Y. 53; Harrison v. Lynes 
 (S. C), 15 S. E. Rep. 335; Ex parte Alabama 
 Gold Life Ins. Co. 59 Ala. 192; Turners. Davis, 
 48 Conn. 397. In order that an election of 
 remedies may be binding, the party to be bound 
 thereby must have acted advisedly and with 
 knowledge of all the circumstances and of the 
 effect of his act, or the other party must, in 
 consequence thereof, have so changed his posi- 
 tion as to make a recession inequitable. Young 
 v. Young (N. J.), 27 Atl. Rep. 627. 
 
 The doctrine of election does not apply in 
 the case of creditors who assail as fraudu- 
 lent an assignment for their benefit, and then 
 claim a dividend from the estate. Mills r. Park- 
 hurst (N. Y.), 30 Am. L. Reg. 340, and note. A 
 party, electing to rescind and cancel a contract 
 for fraud, must act promptly, especially if it re- 
 lates to property of a speculative and fluctuating 
 value. United States v. Ferguson. 54 Fed. Rep. 
 28. Where the defendants thus failed to elect 
 until the filing of their answer and cross-bill, in 
 a suit for specific performance, their prayer for a 
 rescission was refused. Davis v. Read, 37 Fed. 
 Rep. 418. Under the Code system, it is held 
 in Iowa that commencing a suit for false repre- 
 sentations upon an exchange of land is not such 
 an election as prevents the plaintiff from after- 
 wards substituting, upon finding that the de- 
 fendant did not know their falsity, a petition 
 in Equity for a rescission of the exchange. 
 Smith »." Bricker (Iowa), 53 N. W. Rep. 250. 
 So, in general, a suit begun, but early discon- 
 810 
 
 tinued, does not amount to an election of reme- 
 dies. Bishop 8. McGillis (Wis.), 51 N- W. Rep. 
 1075; Flower v. Blumbach, 131 111. 646; Nyse- 
 wander v. Lowman, 124 Ind. 584. Yet the 
 prosecution of a suit at Law for five years pre- 
 cludes its abandonment in order to substitute a 
 suit in Equity. Angus r. Robinson, 62 Vt. 60. 
 Land owners who apply for an injunction against 
 assessments by a city upon their property, are 
 held to have accepted the legal remedy by filing 
 objections, as allowed by statute, to the city 
 engineer's report as to the expense of the im- 
 provement. De Puy v. Wabash (Ind.), 32 N. 
 E. Rep. 1016. A party who erroneously relies 
 upon two inconsistent rights is not precluded 
 from asserting one by the fact that he has first 
 attempted to rely upon the other, to which he is 
 not entitled. Snow v. Alley, 156 Mass. 193. 
 In admiralty a maritime lien for repairs and 
 supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port 
 may be enforced pending a suit at Law to re- 
 cover their value. The Kalorama, 10 Wall. 
 204. A statutory remedy for a right conferred 
 by the same statute can alone be pursued. 
 James v. Atlantic Delaine Co. 11 Bankr. Reg. 
 390. A party who elects to submit the case on 
 evidence taken by the master, cannot thereafter 
 put in additional testimony. Cox v. Pierce, 
 22 111. App. 43. As to motion to compel an 
 election of remedies, see Stewart v. Huntington, 
 124 N. Y. 127; Weinberg r. Weinberg, 60 Hun, 
 167; Barndt r. Frederick, 78 Wis. 1; Roberts 
 v. Quincy, O. & K. R. Co. 43 Mo. App. 287; 
 Taylor County p. Standley, 79 Iowa, 666.
 
 CASES OF ELECTION. * 816 
 
 concurrently; at any rate, he can proceed on his mortgage in Equity, and 
 on his bond or covenant at Law at the same time. 5 
 
 The principle of election has also been applied where there was one 
 suit in this country, and another for the same matter in a foreign Court 
 of competent jurisdiction. 6 (b) 
 
 It seems that, in a particular case, the plaintiff may be allowed to 
 proceed partially in Equity, and partially at Law, and compelled to 
 enter into a special election. 7 
 
 * If the defendant's answer is not excepted to, or set down for * 816 
 hearing on former exceptions, he may, on an allegation that the 
 plaintiff is prosecuting him in this Court, and also at Law, for the same 
 matter, obtain, at the expiration of eight days after his answer, or further 
 answer is filed, as of course, on motion or petition, the usual order for 
 the plaintiff to make his election in which Court he will proceed. If his 
 answer is excepted to, he may, by notice in writing, require the plaintiff 
 to set down the exceptions, within four days from the service of the 
 notice ; r and if the plaintiff does not set down the exceptions within 
 such four days, or if they are not allowed, the defendant is entitled as 
 of course, on motion or petition, to obtain the usual order for the plain- 
 tiff to make his election in which Court he will proceed. 2 Where the 
 plaintiff has amended his bill, the defendant cannot obtain the order to 
 elect until the time for excepting to his answer to the amendments has 
 expired, notwithstanding the time for excepting to his answer to the 
 original bill has expired. 8 
 
 If the defendant is not required to answer, he may, at the expiration 
 of the time within which he might have been served with interrogatories 
 to the bill, in like manner obtain a similar order to elect. 4 
 
 We have before seen that, for some purposes, a plea is included in the 
 term answer ; 5 but under the old practice it was decided, that neither a 
 
 s Schoole v. Sail, 1 Sch. & Lef. 176; Booth 6 Pieters v. Thompson, G. Coop. 294. 
 
 v. Booth, 2 Atk. 343; Willes v. Levett, 1 De G. "> Barken'. Dumaresque, 2 Atk. 11!); Scton, 
 
 & S. 3',)2; Kinnaird v. Trollope, 39 Ch. D. 636; 949; Anon. 1 Vern. 104; 3 Atk. 129 ; Trimles- 
 
 Dunkley v. Van Buren, 3 John. Ch. 330; Chad- ton v. Kenimis, LI. & Goold. 29; Mills v. Fry, 
 
 well v. Jones, 1 Tenn. Ch. 493. And the mort- G. Coop. 107; 19 Ves. 277; Franklin v. Hersch, 
 
 gagee .may enforce his lien in Equity after 2 Tenn. Ch. 467. For form of the order, see 
 
 judgment at Law and taking the body of the 3 Seton, Dec. (3d Eng. ed.) 948. 
 debtor in execution: Davis v. Battine, 4 R. & 1 For form of notice, see Vol. III. 
 
 M. 76; and after the debtor has been discharged 2 Cons. Ord. XLII. 5, 6; ante, pp. 766, 767; 
 
 of the debt in bankruptcy: Lewis v. Hawkins, Royle v. Wynne, C. & P. 252, 255; 5 Jur. 
 
 23 Wall. 119. And see Harris v. Vaughn, 2 1002: the vacations are not excluded. Cons. 
 
 Tenn. Ch. 483. In Barker i\ Smark, 3 Beav. Ord. XXXVII. 13. For form of order to elect, 
 
 64, Lord L:\ngdale M. R. refused to extend the see Seton, 947, No. 1 : and for forms of motion 
 
 exception to the case of a vendor, who had paper and petition, see Vol. III. 
 commenced an action at Law upon a bond for 8 Leicester v. Leicester, 10 Sim. 87, 89; 
 
 his unpaid purchase-money, and at the same Affd. id. 91, n.; 3 Jur. 308. 
 time was suing in Equity to establish a lien 4 Cons. Ord. XLII. 7; and see Braithwaite's 
 
 upon the estate for the same sum. See also Manual, 156, n. (5). For forms, see Vol. III. 
 Walsh v. Bishop of Lincoln, L. R. 4 Adm. & 5 See ante, p. G90. 
 
 Ecc. 242, 253. 
 
 (6) In the Federal Courts of Equity and the suits, when an adequate remedy may be had 
 
 Admiralty, although a plea of lis alibi pendens is in either. Lynch v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 
 
 not strictly applicable to litigation abroad, yet 17 Fed. Rep. 027; see ante, p. 633, note (a). 
 the plaintiff mav be required to elect between 
 
 811
 
 817 
 
 DISMISSING BILLS, AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 plea nor a joint plea and answer was so far an answer to the bill as to 
 entitle a defendant to move for an order for the plaintiff to elect ; 6 and 
 it does not seem that there is anything in the present practice to affect 
 this decision. 
 
 The order must be served on the plaintiff or his solicitor, and attor- 
 ney-at-law ; and within eight days after such service, the plaintiff must 
 make his election in which Court he will proceed ; 7 and if he elect to 
 proceed in this Court, then his proceedings at Law are thereby stayed by 
 injunction ; but if he elect to proceed at Law, or in default of his making 
 his election within the specified time, then his bill from thenceforth 
 stands dismissed out of this Court, with costs to be taxed by the Taxing 
 Master, without further order ; such costs to be paid by the plain- 
 * 817 tiff to the defendant. 8 It * is not the practice to issue an injunc- 
 tion ; the service of the order being sufficient. 1 
 When the defendant has obtained such an order, the plaintiff may 
 move, on notice to the defendant, to discharge it, either for irregularity 
 or upon the merits confessed in the answer, or proved by affidavit. 2 If, 
 upon such a motion, there should be any doubt as to whether the suit in 
 Equity, and the action at Law, are for the same matter, it is the usual 
 course to direct an inquiry into that fact. 3 In the event of such an 
 inquiry being directed, it seems that all the proceedings in both Courts 
 are stayed in the mean time, 4 unless the plaintiff can show that justice 
 will be better done by permitting proceedings to some extent; in which 
 case, special leave will be given him to proceed. 6 
 
 If the common order cannot, under the circumstances, be obtained, it 
 seems that the Court will, if necessary, make a special order, and grant 
 an injunction in the mean time. 6 
 
 The election must be in writing, and signed by the plaintiff or his 
 solicitor, 7 and be filed at the Report Office ; and notice thereof must 
 be given to the defendant's solicitor ; who thereupon obtains an office 
 copy. 8 
 
 The dismissal of the bill, in consequence of an election by the plaintiff 
 to proceed at Law, cannot be pleaded in bar to another suit for the same 
 matter. 9 
 
 6 Fisher r. Mee, 3 Mer. 45, 47 ; Vaughan v. 
 Welsh, Mos. 210; Soule v. Corning, 11 Paige, 
 412. 
 
 7 The Court will allow the party a reason- 
 able time to make his election. Bracken v. 
 Martin, 3 Yerger, 55; see Houston v. Sadler, 
 4 Stew. & Port. 130; Rogers v. Vosburg, 4 
 John. Ch. 84. 
 
 8 See the order in Seton, 947, No. 1; see 
 also Boyd v. Heinzelman, 1 V. & B. 331 ; Mouse- 
 ley v. Basnett, id. 382, n. ; Jones v. Earl Straf- 
 ford, 3 P. Wras. 90, n. (B.); see Livingston v. 
 Kane, 3 John. Ch. 224; Rogers v. Vosburg, 
 4 John. Ch.84. 
 
 1 Braithwaite's Pr. 229; see Fennings v. 
 Humphery, 4 Beav. 1, 7, 8; 5 Jur. 455. 
 
 2 ConsOrd. XLII. 8. For form of notice of 
 motion, see Vol. III. 
 
 812 
 
 3 Mouseley v. Basnett, 1 V. & B. 382, n.; 
 and for form of order for inquiry, see Seton, 
 948, No. 3. 
 
 4 Mills v. Fry, 3Ves. & B. 9; Anon. 2 Mad. 
 395. 
 
 s Amory v. Brodrick, Jac. 530, 533; Car- 
 wick v. Young, 2 Swanst. 239, 243; Mouseley V. 
 Basnett, ubi supra ; see, however, Fennings 
 v. Humphery, 4 Beav. 1, 8; 5 Jur. 455; Anglo- 
 Danubian Co. v. Rogerson, L. R. 4 Eq. 3. 
 
 6 Hogue v. Curtis, 1 J. & W. 449. 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. III. 1. 
 
 8 For forms of election and notice, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 9 Countess of Plymouth v. Bladon, 2 Vern. 
 32.
 
 CASES OF ELECTION. 
 
 813 
 
 If the plaintiff requires further time to make his election, he must 
 apply to the Court by motion, on notice, to have the time enlarged. 10 
 
 After decree, it is not the practice to make an order to elect (a) ; but 
 the plaintiff will be restrained, on the motion of the defendant, from 
 proceeding in another Court, in respect of the same matter ; even though 
 such proceedings are merely auxiliary to the proceedings in Equity. 11 
 
 If the plaintiff elect to proceed in Equity, the defendant will either 
 be allowed to recover the costs of the action in the Court of 
 * Law, 1 or the plaintiff will be directed by the Court of Chancery * 818 
 to pay them ; 2 and if he elect to proceed at Law, the bill is, as we 
 have seen, by the order dismissed with costs. 3 
 
 10 For form of order enlarging the time, see 
 Seton, 948, No. 2; and for form of notice of 
 motion, see Vol. III. 
 
 " Wilson v. Wetherherd, 2 Mer. 406, 408 ; 
 Frank v. Basnett, 2 M. & K. 618, 620; Wed- 
 derburn v. Wedderbum, 2 Beav. 208,213; 4 
 Jur. 66; 4 M. & C. 585, 596; Phelps v. Pro- 
 thero, 7 De G. M. & G. 722; 2 Jur. N. S. 173. 
 And although the decree in Equity is adverse 
 to the right. Lord Tredegar v. Windus, L. R. 
 19 Eq. 607. Going in under an administration 
 
 decree to prove a debt is not such an election 
 to proceed in Equity as prevents an action at 
 Law. Sexton v. Smith, 3 De G. & S. 694. 
 
 i Simpson v. Sadd, 3 W. R. 191, L. C; see 
 also S. C. 16 C. B. 26; 1 Jur. N. S. 736; and 
 Mortimore v. Soares, 5 Jur. N. S. 574, Q. B. ; 
 S. C. 1 El. & Bl. 390. 
 
 2 See Carwick v. Young, 2 Swanst. 239, 
 242. 
 
 3 Ante, p. 816. 
 
 (n) In Rochester Distilling Co. v. Devendorf, 
 54 N. Y. St. Rep. 871, it was held that a suit 
 for the purchase price was not an election of 
 remedies precluding a suit for fraudulent repre- 
 sentations, unless prosecuted to judgment with 
 knowledge of the fraud. A person fraudulently 
 induced to relea c e property may sue for dam- 
 ages, and is not limited to a suit to set aside 
 the release. Talbot v. Cruger, 25 N. Y. S. 285. 
 
 A plaintiff who insists on appeal that the judg- 
 ment or decree rendered for damages in his 
 favor be sustained, loses his right to the specific 
 performance asked and refused below. Gold- 
 thwait v. Lynch (Utah), 33 Pac. Rep. 699. A 
 suit against an agent does not bar a subsequent 
 suit against his principal. Baltimore & O. Tel. 
 Co. v. Interstate Tel. Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 50. 
 
 813
 
 [The statutory proceedings under this chapter are not applicable to the practice in the 
 
 United States.] 
 
 819 
 
 * CHAPTER XX. 
 
 MOTION FOR A DECREE. 
 
 At any time after the expiration of the time allowed to the defendant 
 for answering, 1 but before replication, the plaintiff may move the Court 
 for such decree or decretal order as he may think himself entitled to.' 2 (a) 
 Of this motion, one month's, or twenty-eight days' notice must be given 
 to the defendant. 3 
 
 If further time is granted to the defendant for pleading, answering, 
 or demurring, the plaintiff cannot move for a decree until such further 
 time has expired ; 4 and where there are several defendants, and the plain- 
 tiff is in a position to serve a notice of motion for a decree, or to file 
 replication, or set down the cause on bill and answer, as to some of them, 
 but the time for so doing as to the others has not arrived, he should, to 
 avoid an application to dismiss the bill for want of prosecution, 5 obtain 
 further time, on special summons, to serve the notice or file the 
 replication. 6 
 
 The filing of a traversing note against a defendant does not preclude 
 the plaintiff from moving for a decree. 7 
 
 Where, at the hearing, a cause was ordered to stand over for the pur- 
 pose of adding parties by amendment, the cause was allowed to be heard 
 on motion for decree against the new defendants ; though replication had 
 been filed against the original defendants. 8 
 
 1 Or, by consent, before the expiration of 
 the time. Braithwaite's Pr. 429. For form of 
 consent, see Vol. III. 
 
 2 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 15. If the plaintiff 
 moves for a decree, replication need not after- 
 wards be filed. Duffield v. Sturges, 9 Hare 
 App. 87; Blake v. Cox, 1 W. R. 124, V. C. W. 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 4; XXXVII. 10. 
 
 4 15 & 16 Vice. 86, § 13. 
 
 5 See ante, p. 801, et seq. 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 17. For form of 
 summons, see Vol. IIT. 
 
 (a) As to motion for judgment under the 
 present English practice, see 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. 
 (6th Eng. ed.) 663; Coke v. Gilbert (No. 2), 
 40 W. R. 682; W. N. (1892) 111, 128, note. 
 The Court does not require evidence upon motion 
 for judgment in default of pleading. Bagley 
 v. Searle, 56 L. T. 306; 35 W. R. 404; see 
 
 814 
 
 "' Maniere v. Leicester, Kay App. 48; 18 
 Jur. 320; 5 De G. M. & G. 75; Jones v. Howell, 
 3 W. R. 559, V. C. W. As to traversing notes, 
 see ante, p. 513, et seq. The causes of Gohegan 
 v. Barlow (1863, G. 132), and Leke v. Vicini 
 (1863, L. 46), were set down on motion for de- 
 cree as to some of the defendants, and on orders 
 to take the bill pro confesso as to others. 
 
 8 Gwvon v. Gwvon, 1 K. & J. 211. 
 
 Charles v. Shepherd, [1892] 2 Q. B. 622. Upon 
 such a motion, in a suit for specific performance, 
 the plaintiff should state in his notice of motion 
 the precise words of the judgment for which he 
 asks, when no minutes of the proposed judg- 
 ment are presented. De Jongh v. Newman, 56 
 L. T. 180; 35 W. R. 403. 

 
 MOTION FOR A DECREE. * 821 
 
 An order of course to amend the bill may be obtained after notice of 
 motion for a decree has been served, but before it has been set down ; 
 although the defendant has filed affidavits in opposition. 9 
 
 * The form of notice of motion for decree commonly adopted is * 820 
 to the effect, that the Court will be moved for a decree, " accord- 
 ing to the prayer of the plaintiff's bill;" and where this form is used 
 the plaintiff is entitled to have the same relief as he might have had if 
 the cause had been brought to a hearing in the ordinary way. 1 
 
 The notice of motion may be served out of the jurisdiction ; but an 
 order allowing this to be done is necessary. 2 Such an order may be 
 obtained on an ex parte motion or summons, supported by an affidavit 
 showing where the defendant is resident, or may probably be found. 3 
 In such a case, the order giving leave to serve the notice out of the juris- 
 diction must specify the time allowed for filing affidavits in answer and 
 reply, and must be drawn up and served with the notice of motion ; 4 
 and the notice of motion must be given for a day sufficiently distant to 
 include the whole time limited for service, and the times limited for the 
 defendant to file affidavits in answer, and the plaintiff to file affidavits 
 in reply, and so as to allow the defendant proper time to obtain copies 
 of the plaintiff's affidavits in support and in reply. These times must, 
 therefore, be regulated by the place where the service is to be effected. 5 
 In some cases the order giving leave to effect the service has directed 
 copies of the plaintiff's affidavits in support of the motion for decree to 
 be served with the notice ; 6 but it seems this cannot be required. 7 
 
 Where an application was made to the Court for leave to advertise in 
 the Gazette a notice of motion for a decree, against an absconding de- 
 fendant, for whom an appearance had been entered, 8 it was refused by 
 Sir John Romilly M. R. : who observed, that the 6th Rule of the 10th 
 Consolidated Order had no application to such a case ; but he gave leave 
 to advertise the filing of replication in the Gazette 9 
 
 By giving notice of motion for a decree, the plaintiff abandons his 
 claim to a further answer ; although the answer has, upon exceptions, 
 been held insufficient. 10 
 
 The plaintiff and defendant respectively are at liberty to file affi- 
 davits in support of, and in opposition to, the motion ; and to 
 * use the same on the hearing thereof. 1 The evidence in chief * 821 
 on such motion is ordinarily taken upon affidavit ; 2 and where 
 
 9 Gill v. Rayner, 1 K. & J. 395. 6 Meek r. Ward, 10 Hare App. 55. 
 
 i Norton v. Steinkopf, Kay, 45; id. App. 10. » Seton, 28, 1247 ; and for form of ordercon- 
 
 For form of notice, see Vol. III. taining such direction, see Seton, 1246, No. 11. 
 
 2 Meek v. Ward, 10 Hare App. 55; 1 W. R. 8 Under Cons. Ord. X. 6. 
 
 504 : and see Middleton v. Chichestor, 1 N. R. 9 Leclimere v. Clapp, 29 Beav. 259 ; see post, 
 
 255, M. R. pp. 831, 832. 
 
 3 For form of order, see Seton, 1246, No. w Royse v. Cokell, 18 Jar. 770, V. C W. 
 11; and see id. 1247; and for forms of motion * 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 15. 
 
 paper, summons, and affidavit, see Vol. III. 2 See post, Chap. XXII. § 10, Affidavits; for 
 
 4 Meek v. Ward, ubi supra ; Seton, 28, 1247; general rules as to the form, and mode of fram- 
 as to evidence of the service, see Mendes r. ing affidavits. See also Coles v. Morris, L. R. 
 Guedalla, 5 L. T. N. S. 308, V. C. W. 2 Ch. 701, 705. 
 
 5 Seton, 28, 1247, where a list of times is 
 given. 
 
 815
 
 822 
 
 MOTION FOR A DECREE. 
 
 motion is made after answer filed, the answer is, for the purposes of the 
 motion, to be treated as an affidavit ; 3 and the plaintiff has been allowed 
 to cross-examine the defendant thereon. 4 
 
 The plaintiff must file his affidavits, in support of the motion for 
 decree, before he serves the notice, and must set forth a list of the affi- 
 davits he intends to use at the foot of the notice. 5 Where an answer 
 has been filed, the plaintiff may read it on the motion against the de- 
 fendant by whom it was filed, without giving any notice of his intention 
 to do so ; but he cannot read it against any other defendants, unless he 
 has included it in the list at the foot of his notice of motion. 6 
 
 The defendant must file his affidavits, in support of his defence, with- 
 in fourteen days after service of the notice of motion, and deliver to the 
 plaintiff or his solicitor a list thereof. 7 
 
 The time for filing the defendant's affidavits will, however, be enlarged, 
 on special application to the Judge in Chambers, by summons, 8 where a. 
 sufficient reason is shown for so doing ; 9 but the desire of the defendant 
 to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses on their affidavits, before filing 
 his own, on the ground that by so doing it might not be necessary for 
 him to file any, is not a sufficient reason. 10 
 
 "Where the defendant is served out of the jurisdiction, the special 
 order allowing such service will, as we have seen, 11 fix the time within 
 which the defendant's affidavits are to be filed ; but further time may, in 
 a proper case, be obtained on special application by summons at Chambers. 
 
 If, after the times allowed for filing affidavits have elapsed, it is 
 desired to file an affidavit, or a further affidavit, an order for leave to 
 do so will be necessary. Such order may be obtained on a special ap- 
 plication by summons, 1 ' 2 supported by an affidavit showing a case for 
 the indulgence ; and the applicant will usually have to pay the costs of 
 
 the application. 
 * 822 * If the defendant desires to read his own, or a co-defendant's 
 anwer in support of his case, he must give notice thereof to the 
 plaintiff ; ! but if the plaintiff reads part of a defendant's answer against 
 him, without notice, the defendant may read the whole of his answer, 
 without notice. 2 
 
 3 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 15. Semble, an an- 
 swer put in bv a deceased defendant cannot be 
 read. Moore" v. Harper, W. N. (1866) 56; 14 
 W. R. 306, V. C. W. 
 
 4 Wightman v. Wheelton. 23 Beav. 397 ; 3 
 Jur. X. S. 124; Rehden v. Wesley, 26 Beav. 
 432; Brumfit v. Hart, 9 Jur. N. s" 12; 11 W. 
 R. 53, V. C. S.; and see post, p. 822. 
 
 5 Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 5, see form of notice, 
 Vol. III. 
 
 6 Cousins v. Vasey, 9 Hare App. 61 ; Paw- 
 kins v. Mortan, 1 J. & H. 339; Stephens v. 
 Heathcote, 1 Dr. & S. 138; 6 Jur. N. S. 312. 
 
 7 Cons. Ord. XXIII. 6. As to the defences 
 which may be set up, where an answer has not 
 been filed, see ante, pp. 656. 712; and Green v. 
 Snead, 30 Beav. 231; S. C. nom. Snead v. 
 Green, 8 Jur. X. S. 4. 
 
 816 
 
 8 For form of summons, see Vol. III. 
 
 9 Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 17, 18; Marchioness 
 of Londonderry v. Bramwell, 3 K. & J. 162. 
 
 io Ibid. 
 
 u Ante, p. 820. 
 
 12 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 17, 18. For form of 
 summons, see Vol. III. 
 
 i Stephens v. Heathcote, 1 Dr. & S. 138; 6 
 Jur. X. S. 312; and see Barrack r. M'Culloch, 
 3 K. & J. 110; Rushout v. Turner, 1 Dr. & S. 
 140, n.; Wightman v. Wheelton, 23 Beav. 397; 
 3 Jur. N. S. 124. For form of notice, see 
 Vol. III. 
 
 2 Stephens v. Heathcote, vbi supra. And 
 see, in an administration suit, the effect of no- 
 tice to read an answer, setting out accounts, 
 Wright v. Edwards, 7 W. R. 193.
 
 MOTION FOR A DECREE. * 823 
 
 The defendant having filed his affidavits, the plaintiff has seven days 
 from the expiration of the fourteen days, or, if the time has been en- 
 larged, from the expiration of such enlarged time, 3 within which he may 
 file affidavits in reply : which affidavits must be confined to matters 
 strictly in reply. The plaintiff must deliver a list of these affidavits to 
 the defendant or his solicitor ; 4 and except so far as such affidavits are 
 in reply, they will not be regarded by the Court, unless, upon the hear- 
 ing of the motion, the Court gives the defendant leave to answer them : 
 in which case, unless the Court otherwise directs, the plaintiff is to pay 
 the costs of such affidavits, and such further affidavits in answer. 5 The 
 time can, however, be enlarged by the Judge in Chambers, on a special 
 application by summons. 6 
 
 Where either the time for the defendant's filing his affidavits, or for 
 the plaintiff's filing his affidavits in reply, is enlarged, notice thereof is 
 to be given to the Clerk of Records and Writs by production of the order 
 for such enlargement. 7 Such notice is ordinarily given by producing to 
 the Order of Course Clerk the order enlarging the time, and he will 
 thereupon make a note of such enlargement, opposite the entry of the 
 notice of motion in the cause list. 
 
 Where either the fourteen days for the defendant's filing his affidavits, 
 or the seven days for the plaintiff's filing his affidavits in reply, expire 
 in the Long Vacation, the time is extended to the fifth day of the ensuing 
 Michaelmas Term, and will expire on that day, unless enlarged by order ; 
 and if the fourteen days are thus extended, the seven days commence to 
 run from the expiration of such extended period. 8 
 
 No further evidence, on either side, will be allowed to be used on 
 the hearing of the motion without leave of the Court, 9 except 
 * the cross-examinations of such witnesses as have been cross- * 823 
 examined. 1 
 
 All witnesses who have made affidavits, either on behalf of the plain- 
 tiff or the defendant, are liable to cross-examination ; 2 and the party 
 desiring to cross-examine any of them, may, at any time before the ex- 
 piration of fourteen days next after the end of the time allowed for the 
 plaintiff to file affidavits in reply, or within such time as the Court or 
 Judge in Chambers may specially appoint, 8 give notice in writing 4 to 
 the party on whose behalf the affidavit is filed, or his solicitor, to pro- 
 
 8 Where the defendant is served out of the Clark v. Malpas, there cited, and see Rraith- 
 
 jurisdiction with the notice, the time to reply waite's Manual, 107, n. (40). 
 will be regulated by the service order; see ante, 9 Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 8. For cases in which 
 
 P- 810. special leave was given, see Watson v. Cleaver. 
 
 < For form of list, see Vol. III. 20 Beav. 137; 1 Jur. N. S. 270; and Richards 
 
 5 Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 7. v. Curlewis, 18 Reav. 402, where it was held, 
 
 6 See Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 17, 18, For form that the application must not be ex parte. 
 
 of summons, see Vol. III. i Redwell v. Prudence, 1 Dr. & S. 221, 223. 
 
 1 Ord. 22 Nov., 1800, r. 5. 2 15 & ]6 V ic. c. 80, § 40; Williams v. Wil- 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 15. A doubt has liams, 17 Beav. 150; 17 Jur. 434. 
 
 arisen whether this rule applies to a case where 8 The application is usually made by sum- 
 
 the fourteen days, or the seven days, are en- mons; for a form, see Vol. III. 
 
 larged before the Long Vacation to a day oc- * For a form, see Vol. III. 
 
 curring in the Vacation; see Morgan, 553, and 
 
 VOL. 1. — 52 817
 
 * 824 MOTION FOR A DECREE. 
 
 cluce the witness for cross-examination before the examiner ; and unless 
 the witness is produced accordingly, the affidavit cannot be used as evi- 
 dence, without special leave of the Court. 5 The plaintiff is entitled to 
 cross-examine any defendant upon his answer ; 6 and where the plaintiff 
 gives notice of his intention to use a defendant's answer against a co- 
 defendant, the co-defendant may cross-examine upon the answer; 7 and 
 where a defendant gives notice to use his or a co-defendant's answer 
 against the plaintiff, he, or the co-defendant, as the case may be, may be 
 cross-examined by the plaintiff : 8 the answer in such cases being treated 
 as an affidavit. And even where the plaintiff had given notice to use the 
 defendant's answers as affidavits, in support of his motion for a decree, 
 he was allowed to cross-examine the defendants on the answers, without 
 prejudice to the right of the other defendants to object to the cross- 
 examination being used against them ; 9 but when no notice is given of 
 the intention to read the answer of the defendant, and it is read as an 
 admission, and not as an affidavit, he cannot be cross-examined upon it. 10 
 
 According to the practice introduced by the Order of 5th February, 
 1861, it seems that all the evidence in chief on motions for decree must 
 be taken by affidavit. 11 The Court has, however, power, it is presumed, 
 in any case, upon special application, to order the evidence of any parti- 
 cular witness or witnesses to be taken viva voce. Such an application could 
 only be made on the part of the defendant, as the plaintiff would, 
 *824 of course, ascertain, before * serving his notice of motion for a 
 decree, whether it was necessary, or desirable, to examine any 
 witness on his behalf orally, and if so, would bring the cause to a hearing 
 in the ordinary way, instead of serving the notice. Before the Order of 
 5th February, 1861, it seems to have been thought that the evidence in 
 support of a motion for decree might be taken orally, by specifying the 
 names of the witnesses to be examined, in the notice of motion, and 
 summoning them before the examiner ; 1 but, whether this could then 
 have been done or not, it is conceived that it cannot be done under the 
 present practice. 
 
 The cross-examination of witnesses on their affidavits must, on mo- 
 tion for decree, be taken before the examiner ; 2 the Court has, however, 
 
 5 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 19. As to the course in See Dawkins v. Morton, 1 J. & H. 339, 
 to be pursued by either party after such notice, 341 ; Cousins v.Vasey, 9 Hare App. 61 ; Stephens 
 see post, Chap". XXII. § 10, Affidavits, and V. Heathcote, 1 Dr. & S. 138; 6 Jur. N. S. 312. 
 Braithwaite's Manual, 178, n. (85). And see u See Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, particularly r. 19; 
 as to the effect of delay in proceeding to cross- and see Smith r. Baker, 4 N. R. 321, V. C. W. ; 
 examine. Bourdillon ». Baddeley, 26 Beav. 2 H. & M. 498. And any depositions taken in 
 255. support of the motion will be irregular, and 
 
 6 Wightman v. Wheelton. 23 Beav. 397; 3 may be ordered to be taken off the file. Coles 
 Jur. N.'s 124; Rehden v. Weslev. 26 Beav. V. Morris, L. R. 2 Ch. 701. 
 
 432; Brumfit v. Hart, 9 Jur. N. S. 12; 11 W. i Pellatt v. Nicholls, 24 B°av. 298; Rehden 
 
 R. 53, V. C. S. r. Wesley, 26 Beav. 432, and see 15 & 16 Vic. 
 
 7 Rehden v. Wesley, and Wightman v. c. 86, § 40; and Williams v. Williams, 17 Beav. 
 Wheelton, vbi supra ; Dawkins v. Mortan, 1 J. 156; 17 Jur. 434. 
 
 & H. 339. 2 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 19; Bodger v. Bod- 
 
 8 See Rehden v. Wesley and Wightman v. ger, 11 W. R. 80, V. C. K. For mode of taking 
 Wheelton, ubi supra, the cross-examination, see post, Chap. XXIL 
 
 9 Rehden v. Wesley, ubi supra. § 10, Affidavits. 
 
 818 
 

 
 MOTION FOR A DECREE. * 8-0 
 
 power to order it to be taken viva voce at the hearing. 3 No time has 
 been limited for the cross-examination, but it must, it seems, take place 
 within a reasonable time. 4 
 
 Where a suit is brought on by motion for decree, and replication has 
 been filed in a cross-suit, and the plaintiff in the original suit has ob- 
 tained an order for leave to use, in the cross-suit, the affidavits filed in 
 the original suit, the plaintiff in the cross-suit may either treat the affi- 
 davits filed in the cross-suit as if they were filed in the original suit, 
 and give notice to cross-examine the witnesses before an examiner, or he 
 may treat them as evidence filed in the cross-suit, and give notice of 
 cross-examination in open Court at the hearing. 5 
 
 A subpoena duces tecum, for the production of a will or other document 
 at the hearing of a motion for a decree, may be issued, 6 and, it seems, as 
 of course. 7 
 
 Motions for decree are set down with the Registrar in the cause-book, 
 with the causes, and come on accordingly, unless the Court otherwise 
 directs. 8 They must be set down within one week after the expiration 
 of the time allowed to the plaintiff for filing his affidavits in reply, in 
 case the defendant has filed any affidavit, or within one week after the 
 expiration of the time allowed to the defendant to file his affidavits in 
 answer, in case the defendant has not filed any affidavit ; but in case 
 the time allowed for either of the purposes aforesaid shall be enlarged, 
 then within one week after the expiration of such enlarged time. 9 
 In order to set down * a motion for decree, the Record and Writ * 825 
 Clerk's certificate that the cause is in a fit state to enable the 
 plaintiff to move for a decree, indorsed by the plaintiff's solicitor with 
 a memorandum of the date when the notice was served, and when it will 
 expire, and, if there be any infant defendant, stating that a guardian ad 
 litem has been appointed, or, if there be not, stating that there is not 
 any infant defendant, must be produced at the order of course seat in 
 the Registrar's office. 1 The certificate is not to be given until after the 
 expiration of the time allowed to the plaintiff to file his affidavits in 
 reply, in case the defendant shall have filed any affidavits, or until after 
 the expiration of the time allowed to the defendant to file his affidavits 
 in answer, in case the defendant has not filed any affidavit; but in case 
 the time allowed for either of the purposes aforesaid shall be enlarged, 
 then not until after the expiration of such enlarged time. 2 After the 
 expiration of the week, the motion will not be set down without the con- 
 
 3 See 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 39. l Reg. Regul. 15th Mar., 1860, r. 6; and see 
 
 4 Bed well v. Prudence, 1 Dr. & S. 221; Boyd v. Jaggar, ubi supra. For forms of cert i- 
 Morey v. Vandenbergh, 1 W. N. 107, V. C. S. ficate and memorandum, see Reg. Regul. 15 
 
 5 Neve v. Pennell, I H. & M. 252. Mar., 1860, r. 6, and Vol. III. The certificate 
 
 6 Wigram v. Rowland, 10 Hare App. 18; of the Record and Writ Clerk will not be 
 Raworth v. Parker, 2 K. & J. 163. For form granted before the expiration of the time for 
 of subpeena, see Vol III. answering, unless a written consent by the de- 
 
 7 Wilhem y. Reynolds, 8 W. R. 625, V. fendant's solicitor is left with him. For a form, 
 C. K. see Vol. II l. 
 
 s Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 9. 2 Ord. 22 Nov., 1866, r. 4. 
 
 9 Ord. 22 Nov., 1866, r. 2.; see Boyd v. 
 Jaggar, 17 Jur, 655; 10 Hare App. 54, L."C. & 
 L. JJ. 
 
 819
 
 * 826 MOTION FOR A DECREE. 
 
 sent in writing of the defendant's solicitor. 3 If the plaintiff fails to set 
 down the motion within the time above limited, the defendant may 
 either move to dismiss the bill with costs, for want of prosecution, or 
 set the motion down at his own request.* 
 
 In a proper case, a motion for decree may be marked, 5 and heard as 
 a short cause ; 6 and it will be so marked, on production of the certificate 
 of the plaintiff's counsel that the motion is fit to be so heard, without 
 the consent of the solicitors of any of the defendants ; but notice of the 
 cause having been so marked, must be given to the defendants ; 7 and the 
 motion will not be heard before the day for which notice is given, except 
 by consent of all parties. 8 
 
 If a motion for injunction is, by consent, turned into a motion for 
 decree, it should be set down " by order," that the month's delay may 
 be saved. 9 
 
 All affidavits and depositions to be used on the hearing of the motion 
 must be printed, under the regulations hereafter explained. 10 
 
 Two printed copies of the bill, and of each of the answers, must 
 also be left with the Train-bearer of the Master of the Rolls, or 
 
 * 826 * of the Vice-Chancellor, as may be, for the use of the Court and 
 
 the Registrar, before the motion comes on for hearing. 1 
 If the plaintiff fails to appear when the motion is called on, the de- 
 fendant's counsel may apply to have the bill dismissed with costs, and 
 need not, it seems, for this purpose produce an affidavit of the defend- 
 ant's having been served with the notice of motion. 2 Where the defend- 
 ant fails to appear, the plaintiff may move for the decree in his absence, 
 subject to the production of an affidavit of service of the notice ; 3 but 
 the Court has, in such case, allowed the decree to be re-opened on mo- 
 tion. 4 The affidavit, in either case, should be filed at the Record and 
 Writ Clerk's Office, and an office copy be produced to the Registrar, at 
 the latest before the rising of the Court on the day on which the appli- 
 cation is made. 5 If neither party appears on the motion, it will be 
 struck out of the paper. 
 
 Where the motion cannot conveniently proceed by reason of the solici- 
 tor for any party neglecting to attend personally, or by some proper 
 
 3 For a form of consent, see Vol. III. 12 The plaintiff's briefs consist of printed 
 
 4 Ord. 22 Nov., 1866, r. 3. copies of the bill, and answers, affidavits in 
 
 5 Ames v. Ames, 10 Hare App. 54; 17 Jur. support, opposition, and reply, and of the depo- 
 664; Drew v. Long, 17 Jur. 173, V. C. K.; see sitions of the witnesses on their cross-examina- 
 post, Chap. XXV. Hearing Causes. tion, and of written copies of such exhibits or 
 
 6 Reg. Regul. 15 Mar. 1860, r. 10. For form other documents as maybe necessary. A de- 
 of certificate, see Vol. III. fendant's briefs are the same, except that copies 
 
 7 Molesworth v. Snead, 11 W. R. 934, V. of only the answer, and of such answers of co- 
 C. W. defendants as the plaintiff has notified his in- 
 
 8 Ibid.; Loinsworth v. Rowley, 10 Hare App. tention to read against him, or as he has signi- 
 55. For form of consent, see Vol. III. tied his intention to read against the plain-tiff 
 
 9 Green v. Low, 22 Beav. 395. The Record or co-defendants, should be furnished. Each 
 and Writ Clerk's certificate will be required in brief should be accompanied with observations, 
 such case. 2 Marter v. Marter, 12 W. R. 34, M. R. 
 
 io Ord. 16 May, 1862; post, Ch. XXII. § 10, 3 For form of affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 
 Affidavits. 4 Hughes t\ Jones, 26 Beav. 24. 
 
 i Reg. Regul. 15 March, 1860, r. 22; Reg. 5 Lord Milltown r. Stuart, 8 Sim. 34; Seton, 
 
 Notice, 23 Nov., 1861; and see Cons. Ord. XXL 29 ; see Seear v. Webb.. 25 Ch. D. 84. 
 820
 
 MOTION FOR A DECREE. * 827 
 
 person on. his behalf, or omitting to deliver any paper necessary for the 
 use of the Court, and which according to its practice ought to have been 
 delivered, such solicitor is personally to pay to all or any of the parties 
 such costs as the Court may award. 6 
 
 Upon hearing a motion for a decree, it is discretionary with the Court 
 to grant or refuse the motion, or to make an order giving such direc- 
 tions with respect to the further prosecution of the suit as the circum- 
 stances of the case may require, and to make such order as to costs as 
 it may think right. 7 The decree or order is drawn up, passed, and 
 entered in the manner hereafter explained, in treating of decrees made 
 on the hearing of the cause. 8 After an unsuccessful motion for a decree, 
 the bill has been allowed to be amended. 9 
 
 Upon an appeal from the whole decree, made on motion for decree, 
 the plaintiff has the right to begin. 10 
 
 * Where a decree, made on a motion for a decree, is appealed * 827 
 from, a petition of appeal must be presented. 1 
 
 By bringing a cause to a hearing on a motion for a decree, considerable 
 delay is saved: it is, therefore, the better course for a plaintiff to follow, 
 where he expects to be able to prove his case by affidavit ; but where he 
 desires to examine witnesses in chief, orally, he should file replication. 2 
 It is also to be observed, that on motions for a decree, the plaintiff's 
 evidence is known to the defendant before he prepares his proofs, the 
 cross-examination of witnesses takes place before the examiner, 3 and the 
 plaintiff has an opportunity of adducing evidence in reply; but that if 
 replication has been filed, both parties have to prepare their proofs 
 before the evidence of the other side is known, the cross-examination of 
 witnesses must take place before the Court itself, 4 and there is no op- 
 portunity of adducing evidence in reply. 
 
 « Cons. Ord. XXI. 12. R. 86, V. C. K. ; Att.-Gen. v. Cambridge Con- 
 
 1 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 16; see Thomas v. Burners' Gas Co. L. R. 6 Eq. 282, 308; 4 Ch. 71. 
 
 Bernard, 5 Jur. N. S. 31 ; 7 W. R. 86, V. C. 10 Birkenhead Docks v. Laird, 4 De G. M. & 
 
 K.; Warde v. Dickson, 5 Jur. N. S. 698 ; 7 W. G. 732. 
 
 K. 148, V C. K.; Raworth ?-. Parker, 2 K. & 1 Cons. Ord. XXXI. 8. For form of petition, 
 
 J. 163: Norton v. Steinkopf, Kay, 45; id. App. see Vol. III.; 31 & 32 Vic. c. 11, § 1, overruling 
 
 10; Robinson v. Lowater, 2 Eq. Rep. 1072, Baxendale ». McMurray, L. R. 2 Ch. 790. 
 
 L. JJ. 2 See ante, p. 823. " 
 
 * See post, Chap. XXVI. § 3, Drawing tip 3 Ord. 2 Feb., 1861, r. 19. 
 
 Decrees. For form of decree on motion, see 4 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 7; with certain ex- 
 
 Seton. 26. captions, for which see Ord. 5 Feb., IStil, rr. 
 
 9 Thomas v. Bernard, 5 Jur. N. S. 31 ; 7 W. 10, 11, 16. 
 
 821
 
 828 
 
 * CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 REPLICATION. 
 
 After the defendant, if required to answer, has fully answered the 
 bill, or, if not required to answer, the time allowed for putting in a vol- 
 untary answer has expired, the plaintiff, if he determines not to move 
 for a decree, or his motion has been refused, must file a replication ; 1 
 unless, where an answer has been filed, he decides to go to a hearing of 
 the cause on bill and answer, (a) 
 
 If, upon the answer alone, without further proof, there is sufficient 
 ground for a final order or decree, the plaintiff must proceed to a hear- 
 ing on bill and answer, without entering into evidence : 2 as where the 
 
 i Cons. Ord. XVII. 1 ; 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, 
 § 26; Duffield v. Sturges, 9 Hare App. 87; Blake 
 r. Cox, 1 W. R. 124, V. C. W. If the plain- 
 tiff wishes to prove any fact on the hearing, not 
 admitted by the answer, he must rile a replica- 
 tion. Mills v. Pitman, 1 Paige, 490. 
 
 In Maine, " within thirty days after the an- 
 swer is filed, unless exceptions are taken, or 
 within fifteen days after it is perfected, the 
 plaintiff's counsel shall file the general replica- 
 tion, and give notice thereof; or give notice of 
 a hearing at the next term on bill and answer." 
 Rule 9 of Ch. Prac. ; see N. Hamp. Ch. Rule 17, 
 38 N. H. 608; Mass. Ch. Rule 17; see Rules 45, 
 66, of IT. S. Courts, posl, pp. 2885, 2390. Under 
 Rule 66 the complainant must reply to the an- 
 swer of each defendant, when sufficient, with- 
 out reference to the state of the cause, or of the 
 pleadings, in regard to any other defendant. 
 Coleman v. Martin, 6 Blatch. 290. A special 
 replication cannot be filed without leave of 
 Court. Storms v. Storms, 1 Edw. Ch. 358. 
 
 A general replication denies every allegation 
 in the answer of the defendant not responsive 
 to the bill, and he must prove matter pleaded 
 in avoidance, or by way of estoppel. Humes 
 v. Scruggs, 94 U. S*. 22." 
 
 In Massachusetts, "the form of the general 
 
 (n) See Ca vender v. Ca vender, 114 IT. S. 
 464; 3 McCrary, 158; 8 Fed. Rep. 641; Adams 
 v. Bridgewater Iron Co. 6 id. 179; O'Hare v. 
 Downing, 130 Mass. 16. As to the reply and 
 subsequent pleadings under the present English 
 practice, see 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 
 520. A general replication does not affect ad- 
 missions in the answer of the allegations of the 
 
 822 
 
 replication shall be that the plaintiff joins issue 
 on the answer. No special replication shall be 
 filed but by leave of the Court." Ch. Rule 16. 
 In New Hampshire, a replication shall be en- 
 titled as an answer, and shall be in substance, 
 "The plaintiff says his bill is true, and the de- 
 fendant's answer, as set forth, is not true, and 
 this he is ready to prove." Ch. Rule 22; see 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 878; Storms ». Storms, 1 Edw. 
 Ch. 358; Dupote v. Massy, Cox's Dig. 146; 
 Brown v. Ricketts, 2 John. Ch. 425 ; Lyon r. Tall- 
 madge, 1 John.Cli. 184; Livingston v Gibbons, 
 4 John. Ch. 94; Thorn v. Germand, id. 363; Pratt 
 v. Bacon, 10 Pick. 123. In Tennessee, no repli- 
 cation or other pleading after answer is allowed ; 
 but the cause is at issue upon the expiration of 
 the time allowed to file exceptions to the an- 
 swer. Code, §§ 4322, 4328, 4401. Matters in 
 avoidance of a plea, which have arisen since the 
 suit began, are properly set up by a supple- 
 mental bill, not by a special replication. Chou- 
 teau v. Rice, 1 Minn. 106. A special replication, 
 denying part of the matter of the plea, and 
 reasserting the substance of the bill, is inad- 
 missible, Newton v. Thayer, 17 Pick. 129; 
 but may be treated as a general replication. 
 Allen v. Allen, 3 Tenn. Ch. 145. 
 2 Cons Ord. XIX. 1. 
 
 bill Cavender v. Cavender, 114 IT. S. 464; 
 3 McCrary, 158. It puts in issue all such parts 
 of the answer as are not responsive to the bill. 
 Humes v. Scruggs, 94 U. S. 22. See Clements 
 v. Moore, 6 Wall. 299. In Tennessee replications 
 are abolished by the Code as to answers, but 
 not as to pleas. Cheatham v. Pearce, 89 Tenn. 
 668. 

 
 REPLICATION. 
 
 829 
 
 plaintiff makes his title by a will or other conveyance in the defendant's 
 hands, and the defendant, by his answer, confesses it, or where a trust 
 is confessed by the answer, and nothing further is required than to have 
 the accounts taken. 3 
 
 A cause is now, however, rarely heard on bill and answer. 
 *The only advantage in doing so, instead of hearing it on motion *820 
 for decree, is, that the month's notice is thereby saved ; but, on 
 the other hand, where a cause is heard upon bill and answer, the answer 
 must be admitted to be true in all points, and no other evidence will be 
 admitted, 1 unless it be matter of record to which the answer refers, 
 and which is provable by the record itself, 2 or documents proved as 
 exhibits at the hearing. 3 It therefore behooves the plaintiff to look 
 attentively into the answer ; and if be finds that the effect of the de- 
 fendant's admissions is avoided by any new matter there introduced, he 
 should serve notice of motion for a decree, 4 or reply to the answer, and 
 proceed to establish his case by proofs. 5 If the plaintiff decides upon 
 having the cause heard upon bill and answer against one or all of the 
 defendants, he must proceed in the manner hereafter pointed out. 6 
 
 A replication must also be put in by the plaintiff where the defendant 
 has pleaded to the bill, whether his plea be accompanied by an answer 
 or not. 7 It is, however, to be recollected, that, if the plaintiff replies to 
 a plea before it has been argued, he admits the plea to be valid, if true ; 8 
 and that he cannot afterwards object to it, on the ground of its invalidity 
 or irregularity. 9 
 
 3 Wyatt's P. R. 374. 
 
 i Contee v. Dawson, 2 Bland, 264; Childs 
 v. Horr, 1 Clarke (Iowa), 432; Rogers v. Mitch- 
 ell, 41 N. H 154; Pierce v. West, 1 Peters, 
 C. C. 351; Pickett v. Chilton, 5 Munf. 467; 
 Scott v. Clarkson, 1 Bibb, 277. But where the 
 cause is set down for heaving on bill, answer, 
 and depositions, the replication is mere form, 
 and the Court will suffer it to be tiled nunc pro 
 tunc.(a) Rodney r. Hare, Mos. 296; Jones v. 
 Brittan, I Woods, 667; Scott v. Clarkson, ubi 
 supra; Demaree v. Driskill, 3 Blackf. 115; 
 Pierce v. West, ubi supra ; Glenn v. Hebb, 12 
 Gill & J. 271; Armistead v. Bozman, 1 lied. 
 Ch. 117; Smith v. West, 3 John. Ch. 363; see 
 Reading v. Ford, 1 Bibb, 338. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XIX. 2; Legard v. Sheffield, 2 
 Atk. 377; see, however, Stanton v. Percival, 
 3 W. R. 391; 24 L. J. Ch. 369, H. L. 
 
 3 Post, p. 874, et seq.; Rowland v. Sturgis, 2 
 
 (a) See Weston v. Empire Assurance Co. 
 L. li. 6 Eq. 23; Clifford v. Coleman, 13 Rlatch. 
 210; Bullinger »>. Mackey, 14 id. 355; Doody 
 v. Pierce, 9 Allen, 141. As to the time allowed 
 in the Federal Courts for filing replications, see 
 Heyman v. Uhlman, 34 Fed. Rep. 686. Under 
 the U. S. Equity Rule 38, a decree which dis- 
 misses a bill because of the plaintiff's failure 
 to reply or set a plea down for argument, is 
 not conclusive. Keller v. Stolzenbach, 20 Fed. 
 Rep. 47. A Federal Court has discretion to order 
 
 Hare, 520; Chalk v. Raine, 7 Hare, 393; 13 
 Jur. 981; Neville v. Fitzgerald, 2 Dr. & War. 
 530; contra, Jones v. Griffith, 14 Sim. 262; 
 8 Jur. 733. 
 
 4 See ante, p. 819. 
 
 5 Wyatt's P. R. 375. 
 
 6 See post, Chap. XXV. Hearing Causes. 
 
 7 Ante, p. 664. A plea may be set down to 
 obtain judgment of its sufficiency and formal- 
 ity, without a replication. Moreton r. Harrison, 
 1 Bland, 491. 
 
 8 Hughes v. Blake, 6 Wheat. 472; S. C. 1 
 Mason, 515; Daniels v. Taggart, 1 Gill & J. 
 312; Brooks v. Mead, Walk. Ch. 389; Bellows 
 v. Stone, 8 N. H. 280; Newton p. Thayer, 17 
 Pick. 129; Hurlburt v. Britain, Walk. 454. 
 Upon a replication to a plea, nothing is in issue 
 except what is distinctly averred in the plea.' 
 Fish v. Miller, 5 Paige, 26. 
 
 9 Ibid. 
 
 a replication to stand nunc pro tunc, and as if 
 filed in time, although it was actually filed after 
 the time prescribed in Equity Rule 66. Fischer 
 v. Hayes, 19 Blatcli. 26; see Allis p. Stowell, 10 
 Biss. 57. But after a cause is set down for 
 hearing on bill and answer, it is too late for a 
 motion to dismiss on the ground that a repli- 
 cation has not been filed within the time limited 
 by Rule 66 Reynolds r. Crawfordsville Dank. 
 112 U. S. 405; Fischer v. Wilson, 16 Blatch. 
 220. 
 
 823
 
 * 830 REPLICATION. 
 
 We have seen before that a replication to a general disclaimer to the 
 whole bill is improper ; although, when a disclaimer to part of the bill 
 is accompanied by a plea or answer to another part, there may be a 
 replication to such plea or answer. 10 (&) 
 
 A replication is the plaintiff's answer or reply to the defendant's plea 
 or answer. By replying to the answer, the plaintiff does not preclude 
 himself from reading any part of the answer he may consider essential 
 to assist his case. 
 
 Only one replication is to be filed in each cause, unless the Court 
 otherwise directs. 11 
 
 The Court will not as of course, or except in cases of necessity, 
 * 830 * give the plaintiff leave to file more than one replication ; 1 but 
 where the replication only applied to some defendants, and as to 
 the others the cause was not at issue, leave was given to file a second 
 replication against such other defendants : 2 and where, upon notice of 
 motion to dismiss for want of prosecution, by one of two defendants, 
 the plaintiff filed replication against such defendant alone, the other de- 
 fendant not having appeared, the Court refused the motion, on the 
 plaintiff undertaking to dismiss the bill against the defendant who had 
 not appeared, but ordered the plaintiff to pay the costs of the motion. 3 
 
 Upon filing the replication, the cause is deemed to be completely at 
 issue, 4 and each defendant may, without any rule or order, proceed to 
 verify his case by evidence ; and the plaintiff may, in like manner, pro- 
 ceed to verify his case by evidence, so soon as notice of the replication 
 being filed has been duly served on all the defendants who have filed an 
 answer or plea, or against whom a traversing note has been filed, or who 
 have not been required to answer and have not answered the bill. 5 
 
 The form of the replication in the General Orders assumes a case 
 where the plaintiff desires to join issue as to one of the defendants ; to 
 hear the cause on bill and answer as to another ; and to take the bill as 
 confessed as against a third. 6 Where, however, the plaintiff does not 
 desire to join issue with any defendant, no replication can be filed. 7 (a) 
 
 10 Ante, p. 708. at issue upon the filing of the replication. This is 
 
 11 Cons. Ord. XVII. 2. the general practice in the Courts of the United 
 i Stinton v. Taylor, 4 Hare, 608, 610; 10 States. Story, Eq. PL § 879, note; 66th Equity 
 
 Jur. 386. Rule of the U. S. Courts. And in New Jersey, 
 
 2 Rogers v. Hooper, 2 Drew. 97. McClane v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 76. 
 
 3 Heanley v. Abraham, 5 Hare, 214. As to 6 Cons. Ord. XVII. 2, where the form of 
 when a second or further replication may be replication is given, which is to be adopted, as 
 filed, without special leave, see Braithwaite's near as circumstances admit and require; and 
 Pr. 73. see form. Vol III. 
 
 4 In America, generally, if not universally, 6 Cons. Ord. XVII. 2. 
 the pleadings terminate with the replication, 7 Braithwaite's Pr. 72. 
 and no rejoinder is filed; and the case is deemed 
 
 (J) A replication to a plea admits its suf- or special (see Story. Eq. PI. § 878); the latter 
 
 ficiency. Farley v. Kittson, 120 U. S. 303; being in reply to and setting up some matter 
 
 Cottle v. Kremeiitz, 25 Fed. Rep. 494; Bean v. in avoidance of new matter introduced in the 
 
 Clark, 30 id. 225; Sharon v. Hill, 22 id. 28; Little defendant's answer or plea. Such replications 
 
 v. Stephens, 82 Mich. 596; ante, p. 694, note (a). have now gone out of use. See, in different 
 
 (a) Formerly replications were either generl jurisdictions, as to replying to new matter set 
 
 824
 
 REPLICATION. 
 
 * 831 
 
 The full title of the cause, as it stands at the time the replication is 
 filed, must be set forth in the heading of the replication, but only the 
 names of such of the defendants as have appeared should be inserted or 
 referred to in the body. If a defendant's name has been misspelled by 
 the plaintiff, and such defendant has corrected the same by his answer, 
 but the plaintiff has not afterwards amended his bill with respect to such 
 name, the correction should be shown in the title of the replication ; 8 
 in the body of the replication, however, the correct name only should 
 be inserted. Where any defendant has died since the bill was hied, 
 the words " since deceased " should follow his name in the title, but 
 his name should be omitted in the body of the replication. If the 
 plaintiff joins issue with all the defendants, their names need not be 
 repeated in the body ; it is sufficient, in such case, to designate 
 * them as " all the defendants : " but if he does not join issue * 831 
 with all, the names of the defendants must be set out in the body. 
 The names of those defendants who are stated in the bill to be out of 
 the jurisdiction, and who have not appeared, must be inserted in the 
 title, but not in the body ; and the names of such formal defendants as 
 have been served with a copy of the bill must be inserted in the title of 
 
 8 Thus: "John Jones (in the bill called William Jones)." 
 
 forth by the defendant, Williamson v. London 
 & N. W. Rv. Co. 12 Ch. D. 787; Mason v. 
 Hartford &c. R. Co. 10 Fed. Rep. 334, 335; 
 Parker v. Concord, 39 id. 718; Burdell v. 
 Denig, 15 id. 397; Blue Ridge Clay Co. v. 
 Floyd-Jones, 269 id. 817; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. 
 r. Brown (Md.), 25 Atl. Rep. 989; Winter v. 
 Mobile Savings Bank, 5-1 Ala. 172; Savage v. 
 Aiken, 21 Neb. 605; Allen v. Allen, 3 Tenn. 
 Ch. 145; Jackson v. Hull, 21 W. Va. 601; Kil- 
 breth v. Roots, 33 id. 600; Elliott v. Trahern, 
 35 id. 640; Newton v. Thayer, 17 Pick. 129; 
 Larsen v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co. 19 Oregon, 
 240. There must be no departure from the bill 
 or complaint by the plaintiff's replication or 
 replv. See Ibid.; Hoover v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. 
 (Mo.) 16 S. W. Rep. 480; Houston v. Sledge, 101 
 N. C. 640; Gibson v. Black (Ky.), 9 S. W. Rep. 
 379; Cobbey v. Knapp, 23 Neb. 579; Turner 
 Coal Co. v. Glover (Ala.), 13 So. Rep. 478. The 
 allegations of a reply cannot enlarge the claim 
 for relief in the complaint. Bell v. Waudby, 4 
 Wash. St. 743. To a plea of release under seal, 
 the proper reply by replication is non est factum, 
 and not fraud. Shampeau v. Connecticut River 
 L. Co. 42 Fed. Rep. 760; see Mullakin v. Mul- 
 lakin (Ky.), 23 S. W. Rep. 352. 
 
 After the close of the evidence in a case 
 tried as if a reply had been filed, the absence 
 of the reply will not be taken as an admission 
 of new matter in the answer. Tighlman r. 
 Proctor, 102 U. S. 707; Washington &c. R. 
 Co. v. Bradleys, 10 Wall. 299; Central Nat. 
 Bank v. Connecticut M. L. Ins. Co. 104 U. S. 
 
 54; Fischer v. Wilson, 16 Blatch. 220; Holt v. 
 Weld, 140 Mass. 578; Snyder v. Martin, 17 
 W. Va. 276; Kepley v. Carter, 49 Kansas, 
 72; Carpenter v. Ritchie, 2 Wash. St. 512; 
 Schreffler v. Nadelhoffer, 133 111. 536; Thomp- 
 son v. Wooldridge, 102 Mo. 505; Camp- 
 bell v. Seeley, 43 Mo. A pp. 23. In such case, 
 the Court in its discretion may permit a reply 
 to be filed even after verdict. Whitney v. 
 Preston, 29 Neb. 243. In New York a reply is 
 not necessary to new matter in the answer 
 averring a foreign adjudication of the questions 
 involved in the suit. New York &c. R. Co. v. 
 Robinson, 25 Abb. N. Cas. 116; Winchester 
 v. Browne, id. 148; Columbus Sec. R. Co. v. 
 Ellis, id. 150. A defendant, by going to 
 trial on an affirmative plea, to which no reply 
 has been filed or demanded, waives its absence, 
 and the case will be treated as if there were a 
 general denial of the plea. Young v. Genlis 
 (Ind.), 32 N. E. Rep. 790; Burrell v. Hackley, 
 35 Fed. Rep. 833. The want of a formal rep- 
 plication cannot be assigned for error on appeal 
 in an Equity case which has been heard upon 
 bill, answer, and proofs. National Bank v. 
 Insurance Co. 104 U. S. 54. 
 
 If the plaintiff waives his replication, and 
 the oause is set down on bill and answer, the 
 answer is to be taken as true. Dascomb r. 
 Marston, 80 Maine, 223. Where a sworn plea 
 irregularly filed to an answer was treated as an 
 affidavit, and an issue was taken thereon, the 
 decree was not reversed. Simmons v. Sim- 
 mons, 33 Gratt. 451. 
 
 825
 
 * 832 REPLICATION. 
 
 the replication, but only such of them as have entered a common appear- 
 ance should be named in the body. 1 
 
 The replication is prepared by the solicitor of the plaintiff ; it must 
 be written on paper of the same description and size as that on which 
 bills are printed, 2 and be underwritten with the name and place of 
 business of the plaintiff's solicitor, and of his agent, if any, or with the 
 name and place of residence of the plaintiff where he acts in person, 
 and, in either case, with the address for service, if any; 8 and the 
 replication must then be filed at the Record and Writ Clerks' Office. 4 
 It does not require the signature of counsel. 
 
 Any error in the replication, except the omission of the names of any 
 defendants, may be corrected by amendment ; but an order to amend is 
 necessary. The order may be obtained on special summons at Cham- 
 bers, or, by consent, on petition of course at the Rolls. 5 Against the 
 defendants whose names have been omitted, another replication must 
 be filed, or leave obtained to withdraw the existing replication and file 
 another ; and an order for leave so to do, in either case, must be obtained 
 in like manner, or upon special motion with notice. 6 
 
 The solicitor must give notice of the filing of the replication to the 
 solicitor of the adverse party, or to the adverse party himself if he acts 
 in person, on the same day on which it is filed. 7 If he neglects to do 
 so, the opposite party should move that the time for him to take the 
 next step may be extended ; 8 not that the replication may be taken off 
 the file. 
 
 The notice must be served before seven o'clock in the evening, except 
 on Saturday, when it must be served before two o'clock in the afternoon. 
 If served after these hours, the service will be considered to have been 
 made on the following day, or Monday, as the case may be. 9 
 
 * 832 * In proper cases, the notice will be allowed to be served out of 
 
 . the jurisdiction, 1 and for this purpose the time for service will 
 be extended; 2 service of the notice may also be substituted, and this 
 has been done by allowing the notice to be advertised in the Gazette, 
 and in two newspapers circulating in the county in which the defendant 
 was last known to have resided. 8 An order for leave to serve notice of 
 the replication, in any of the modes above mentioned, may be obtained 
 
 1 Braithwaite's Pr. 75. their solicitors, who have appeared. Braith- 
 
 2 OH. 6 March, 1800, r. 16; as to such waite's Pr. 79. 
 
 paper, see Cons. Ord. IX. 3, ante, p. 396. s Wright v. Angle, 6 Hare, 107; 11 Jur. 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. III. 2, 5; ante, pp.453, 454. 987: Lloyd v Solicitors' Life Assurance Co. 
 
 For a form, see Vol. HI. Story, Eq. PI. § 878, 3 W. R.*640, V. C. W.; contra, Johnson v. 
 
 note ; Barton Suits in Equity, 144, 145; Chou- Tucker. 15 Sim. 599: 11 Jur. 4G6. For form of 
 
 teau r. Rice, 1 Minn. 106. notice of motion, see Vol. III. 
 
 4 Cons. Ord. I. 35. No fee is payable. 9 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 2; ante, p. 456. 
 
 6 Braithwaite's Pr. 318. For forms of sum- * Lanham v. Pirie, 2 Jur. N. S. 1201, V. 
 mons and petition, see Vol. III. C. S.; Heath v. Lewi-, 2 W. R. 488, M. P. 
 
 « Stinton r. Taylor, 4 Hare, 608, 610; 10 2 Rooper v. Harrison, 2 W. R. 510; 2 Eq. 
 
 Jur. 386; Braithwaite's Pr. 318. For forms of Rep. 1085, V. C. W. 
 
 notice of motion, summons, and petition, see 3 Barton V. Whitcomb, 17 Jur. 81, L. C. & 
 
 Vol. III. L. ,TJ.; 16 Beav. 206, n.; see also Jenkin v. 
 
 7 Cons. Ord. III. 9. In practice, it is usual Vaughan, 3 Drew. 20; Lechmere r. Clamp, 29 
 to serve the notice on all the defendants, or Beav. 259. 
 
 826
 
 REPLICATION. * 833 
 
 on ex parte motion, supported by an affidavit of the facts ; and a copy 
 of the order must be served with the notice. 4 
 
 In giving notice of the filing of replication, the most convenient course 
 is to serve a copy of the replication ; but it is not essential to do so, and 
 if not done, the notice must show the purport of the replication. 6 The 
 time for closing the evidence is computed from the day on which the 
 replication is filed. 
 
 The plaintiff may file replication immediately after the answers have 
 been put in, or a traversing note has been filed and served, or, where no 
 answer is required, immediately after the time allowed for answering 
 has expired; 6 and when he desires to file replication, without waiting 
 till all the answers required by him have been put in, or till the time 
 has expired for defendants to answer voluntarily, he should amend the 
 interrogatories, 7 by striking out so much of the heading and foot-notes 
 as requires an answer from the particular defendants who have not 
 answered, 8 and should obtain the consent of the solicitor of those de- 
 fendants whose time to answer voluntarily has not elapsed, to such 
 replication being filed, notwithstanding the time to file a voluntary 
 answer has not expired. 9 
 
 Where any formal defendants have been served with a copy of the 
 bill, replication may be filed, notwithstanding a memorandum of such 
 service may not have been entered; it being sufficient if such memo- 
 randum is entered before the certificate to set down the cause is 
 granted. 10 
 
 If the plaintiff proposes to take the bill pro confesso against any de- 
 fendant, he cannot file replication until the order to take the bill pro 
 confesso has been obtained ; and such order must be produced to the 
 officer when the replication is presented for filing, unless it 
 * has been previously left for entry, in the cause-book kept by * 833 
 the Clerks of Records and "Writs. 1 
 
 Replication must be filed within the times following : within four 
 weeks after the answer, or the last of the answers required to be put in 
 by a defendant, is held or deemed to be sufficient ; 2 or, where the plain- 
 tiff has undertaken to reply to a plea, within four weeks after the date 
 of his undertaking ; 3 or, where a traversing note has been filed, within 
 four weeks after the filing of the traversing note ; 4 or, where he has 
 amended his bill without requiring an answer, within one week after 
 the expiration of the time within which the defendant might have 
 answered, but does not desire to answer, 5 or within fourteen days after 
 the refusal of further time to put in his answer, 6 or within fourteen da3^s 
 
 4 For forms of motion paper and affidavit, the proposed replication. For form of consent, 
 see Vol. III. see Vol. III. 
 
 5 Braithwaite's Pr. 79. For form of notice, l0 Braithwaite's Pr. 74. 
 see Vol. III. i Ibid. 
 
 6 Braithwaite's Pr. 74, 76; and see Cons. 2 Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 10 (1); ante, p. 828, 
 Ord. XXXIII. 10, 12; ante, p. 828. note. 
 
 1 As to amending interrogatories, see ante, 3 Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 10 (2). 
 
 p. 486. 4 Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 10 (1). 
 
 8 Braithwaite's Pr. 76. 5 Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 12 il); XXXVII. 7 
 
 9 Ibid. The consent should be indorsed on 6 Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 12 (2). 
 
 S2T
 
 834 
 
 REPLICATION. 
 
 after the filing of the answer, — unless the plaintiff has, within such 
 fourteen days, obtained a special order to except to such answer, or to 
 re-amend the bill. 7 
 
 The plaintiff may, however, in all these cases apply by motion, or by 
 summons in Chambers, upon notice to the defendants, for an order to 
 enlarge the time for filing replication. 8 
 
 In computing the fourteen days, 9 within which the plaintiff must file 
 replication, in cases where he has amended his bill, without requiring 
 an answer to the amendments, and the defendant has answered the 
 amendments, vacations are not reckoned ; 10 but in computing the time 
 in all other cases, they are reckoned. 11 
 
 By not filing replication within the time allowed for so doing, the 
 plaintiff subjects himself to an application for the dismissal of his bill 
 for want of prosecution ; 12 but the replication will be received and filed 
 at any time at the Record and Writ Clerks' Office, if it appears by the 
 books of that office that the cause is in a state to admit of its being filed, 
 even after notice of motion to dismiss has been served ; and, indeed, to 
 do so, and tender the costs of the motion, is generally the best way of 
 
 meeting it. 13 
 * 834 * We have seen before, that after a replication has been filed, 
 a plaintiff, if he wishes to withdraw it and amend his bill further 
 than by adding parties, must make a special application by summons 
 for leave to do so ; 1 in which case, in addition to the affidavit ordinarily 
 required upon an application to amend, a further affidavit is necessary, 
 showing that the matter of the proposed amendment is material, and 
 could not, with reasonable diligence, have been sooner introduced into 
 the bill. 2 After the evidence is closed, the application will be refused ; 3 
 but where, during the time for taking the evidence, the plaintiff dis- 
 covered an important mistake of facts in the bill, the Court, thinking 
 that the plaintiff had not shown such want of diligence as to preclude it 
 from giving him leave to amend, gave liberty to withdraw replication, 
 and amend the bill, on the terms of the plaintiff paying the costs of the 
 suit then incurred, including the costs of the application. 4 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 12 (3). As to filing 
 replication in anticipation of some of the an- 
 swers, see Braithwaite's Pr. 74. 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 10, 12; XXXVII. 
 17; see Stinton v. Taylor, 4 Hare, 608, 610; 10 
 Jur. 386 ; Dalton v. Hayter, 9 Jur. 1000, M. R. 
 For form of summons, see Vol. III. 
 
 9 Under Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 12 (3). 
 
 10 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 13 (4). 
 
 11 Stinton o Taylor, ubi supra. 
 
 12 See 66th Equity Rule of the U. S. Courts, 
 post, p. 2390; Rule 17, Mass. Ch. Rules. 
 
 In reference to extending the time to reply, 
 in New York, see the Sea Ins. Co. v. Day, 9 
 Paige, 247; Kane v. Van Vranken, 5 Paige, 63. 
 
 If the plaintiff wishes to amend his bill, and 
 a special application to the Court for leave to 
 do so is necessary, he should not file a replica- 
 tion, but should obtain an order to extend the 
 time for filing the replication, until after the de- 
 
 828 
 
 cision of the Court upon the application to amend. 
 Vermilyea ?•. Odell, 4 Paige, 122. If the plain- 
 tiff files a replication to the answer after he is 
 apprised of the necessity of an amendment of 
 his bill, he precludes himself from making 
 such amendment. Vermilyea v. Odell, ubi 
 supra ; Clifford i\ Coleman,"] 3 Blatch. 210. 
 
 13 Braithwaite's Pr. 78; and see ante, p. 805. 
 
 i Woods v. Woods, 13 L. J. Ch. 98, V. C. E. : 
 Wilson v. Parker, 9 Jur. 769, V. C. K. B.; 
 Cons. Ord. XXXV. 61 ; ante, p. 417. For form 
 of summons, see Vol. III. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. IX. 15. For form of affidavit, 
 see Vol. III. 
 
 a Gascovne v. Chandler, 3 Swanst. 418, 420, 
 n.; Bousfield v. Mould, 1 De G. & S. 347; 11 
 Jur. 902 : Horton v. Brocklehurst (No. 1), 29 
 Beav. 503: Godbold v. Ellis, 23 W R. 333. 
 
 4 Champneys v. Buchan, 3 Drew. 5.
 
 REPLICATION. 
 
 835 
 
 A plaintiff has also been permitted, on motion, to withdraw his repli- 
 cation, and set his cause down for hearing upon bill and answer. 5 
 
 Where replication is withdrawn, after evidence under it has been 
 entered into, the order should provide that the withdrawal is to be with- 
 out prejudice to such evidence. 
 
 It has sometimes happened that, even after witnesses have been 
 examined, it has been discovered that, owing to a mistake, no replication 
 has been tiled ; in such cases, the Court has permitted the replication to 
 be filed nunc pro tunc. 6 And it seems that the Court has permitted this 
 to be done after the cause has come on for hearing, and the reading of 
 the proofs has been commenced. 7 
 
 After replication has been filed, exceptions cannot be taken to the 
 answer for insufficiency. 8 
 
 Replication may be filed to an answer put in to a supplemental 
 statement. 9 
 
 By the Bankruptcy Consolidation Act, it is enacted that, in all suits in 
 Equity, other than a suit brought by the assignees for any debt or de- 
 mand for which the bankrupt might have sustained a suit in Equity 
 had he not been adjudged bankrupt, and whether at the suit of 
 or against the assignees of a bankrupt, no proof * shall be re- * 835 
 quired, at the hearing, of the petitioning creditor's debt, or of 
 the trading or act of bankruptcy respectively, as against any of the 
 parties in such suit, except such parties as shall, within ten days after 
 rejoinder, give notice in writing to the assignees of their intention to 
 dispute some and which of such matters. 1 Rejoinder being abolished 
 in Equity, 2 it seems that the notice must be given within ten days after 
 the filing of replication. 8 
 
 6 Rogers v. Gore, 17 Ves. 130; Brown v. 
 Ricketts, 2 John. Ch. 425. So for the purpose 
 of questioning the sufficiency of a plea, Green 
 v. Harris, 9 R.I. 401. 
 
 6 Wyatt's P. R. 370; Armistead r. Bozman, 
 1 Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 117. See ante, p. 829, n. 1. 
 
 1 Rodney v. Hare, Mos. 290; see also Healey 
 v. Jaggar, 3 Sim. 494, 497. The like permis- 
 sion has also been given after the cause has 
 been set down for hearing on bill and answer, 
 and a reference ordered. Pierce v. West, 1 
 Peters, C. C. 351; Smith v. West, 3 John. Ch. 
 363 ; Doody v. Pierce, 9 Allen,141,143, 144. And 
 
 even where the case has been actually heard, 
 the parties will be considered as having waived 
 the formality of such an issue, and the answer 
 will have no greater effect than if a replication 
 had been filed. Corbus t\ Teed, 69 111. 205. 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. XVI. 7; ante, pp. 695, note. 
 
 9 Braithwaite's Pr. 74. 
 
 i 12 & 13 Vic. c. 106, § 235. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XVII. 2; ante, pp. 829, 830, 
 note. 
 
 3 Pennell ?>. Home, 3 Drew. 337; see, how- 
 ever, Lee v. Donnistoun, 29 Beav. 465. 
 
 829
 
 836 
 
 * CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 Section I. — Admissions. 
 
 The cause being at issue, by the filing of the replication, the next 
 step to be taken by the plaintiff is to prepare his proofs. The defendant 
 also, if he has any case to establish in opposition to that made by the 
 plaintiff, must, in like manner, prepare to substantiate it by evidence. 1 
 For this purpose, both parties must first consider what is necessary to 
 be proved, and then, the manner in which the proof is to be effected ; 
 and, in treating of these subjects, it will be convenient to consider, 
 shortly, the general rules of evidence. 2 With respect to the first point, 
 it may be laid down as an indisputable proposition, that whatever is 
 necessary to support the case of the plaintiff, so as to entitle him to a 
 a decree against the defendant, or of a defendant, to support his own 
 case against that of the plaintiff, must be proved ; 3 unless it is admitted 
 
 by the other party. 4 
 *837 *Our object at present, therefore, must be to consider what 
 
 admissions by the parties will preclude the necessity of proofs ; 
 and it is to be observed that, if evidence is gone into to prove what is 
 
 l Nothing is evidence in the Court of Chan- 
 cery, says Mr. Gresley, that is not read or put in, 
 that is to say, used by the parties at the hear- 
 ing, and entered on the Master's books. Gresl. 
 Eq. Ev. 212, see infra, p. 1003, n. 3; p. 1504, 
 n. 10. In New Hampshire the rules in Chan- 
 cery provide for the trial of the cause on depo- 
 sitions, and prescribe the time within which the 
 evidence of each party must be taken. Special 
 orders may be made by the Court or by a Jus- 
 tice, upon petition and due notice, enlarging or 
 reducing the time of taking testimony of either 
 or both the parties. Rule 21, 38 N. H. 609, 
 610. 
 
 In Maine, " all testimony is to be taken in 
 writing, by virtue of a commission issued on 
 interrogatories filed with the clerk," &c. The 
 formalities to be observed in taking, filing, 
 abstracting, and producing the evidence are 
 minutely pointed out in Ch. Rules 13-18, 37 
 Maine, 585, 586. 
 
 In Massachusetts, the evidence in proceed- 
 ings in Equity is required to be taken in the 
 same manner as in suits at Law, unless the 
 Court for special reasons otherwise directs : but 
 this does not prevent the use of affidavits where 
 they have heretofore been allowed. Pub. Stats. 
 
 830 
 
 c. 169, § 66. The rules in New Jersey provide 
 for the filing of interrogatories to the plaintiff. 
 Ch. Rule 77: Dick. Prec. 20; so in England 
 such interrogatories for the examination of the 
 plaintiff may be filed under 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, 
 § 19. See ante, p. 758, and post, p. 810. 
 
 In Tennessee, the plaintiff may take testi- 
 mony at any time after answer filed, and the 
 defendant after filing a sufficient answer. Code, 
 § 4457. Each party must take his proof in chief 
 in four months, and rebutting proof within two 
 months. Ch. Rule 2, subs. 4; Code, § 4457, a. 
 Failure to take proof within the time prescribed 
 only deprives the party of evidence, but is no 
 ground for dismissing the bill for want of prose- 
 cution. Sargeant v. First Natl. Bank, 7 Rep. 
 231, U. S. C. C. Penn. 
 
 2 As to the present English practice, see 1 
 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 572. As to ad- 
 missions in the pleadings, see id. 548; Hughes 
 v. London &c. Assurance Co. 8 L. T. R. 81. 
 
 3 For what is sufficient to throw upon the 
 defendant the onus of denying the plaintiff's 
 case, see Bell v. Wilson, 11 Jur. N. S. 437, 
 V. C. K. 
 
 4 Nelson v. Pinegar, 30 111. 473.
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 837 
 
 admitted, or at an unnecessary or improper length, the costs of such 
 evidence will be disallowed. 1 
 
 Admissions are either : I. Upon the Record ; or, II. By Agreement 
 between the Parties. 2 
 
 I. Admissions on the llecord may be : Constructive, namely, those 
 which are the necessary consequence of the form of pleading adopted ; or 
 Actual, namely, those which are positively contained in the pleading, (a) 
 
 With respect to constructive admissions, the most ordinary instance 
 of them is, where a plea has been put in by a defendant, either to the 
 whole, or part of the bill ; in that case, as we have seen, 8 the bill, or 
 that part of it which is pleaded to, so far as it is not controverted by the 
 plea, is admitted to be true. 4 A plaintiff, therefore, where he has replied 
 to a plea, may rest satisfied with that admission, and need not go into 
 
 i Cons. Ord. XIX. 1 ; Harvey r. Mount, 8 
 Beav. 439, 453 ; 9 Jur. 741 ; Smith v. Chambers, 
 2 Phil. 221, 226; S. C. nom. Chambers v. Smith, 
 11 Jur. 359 ; Mayor &c. of Berwick v. Murray, 
 7 De G. M. &G."497, 514; 3 Jur. N. S. 1. 5; 
 Att.-Gen. v. Halifax, 18 W. R. 37. As to ad- 
 missions of allegations of Law, see Chilton v. 
 London, 7 Ch. D. 735; see Studdert v. Von 
 Steiglitz, 19 L. R. Ir. 237. 
 
 2 As to admissions generally, see the follow- 
 ing works on evidence: Taylor, § G53, tt scq.; 
 Best, §§ 543, 632; Gresley.Pt. I. chaps. 1, 2; 
 Powell, 151. 
 
 8 Ante, p. 614. 
 
 4 Gresley, Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 9. Where the 
 bill charges a fact to be within the knowledge 
 of the defendant, or which may fairly be pre- 
 sumed to be so, if the answer is silent as to the 
 fact, it will be taken as admitted. McAllister 
 v. Clopton, 51 Miss. 257; Mead v. Day, 54 
 Miss. 58. It is otherwise, where the fact is not 
 within the knowledge of the defendant, nor pre- 
 sumed to be so. Moore v. Lockett, 2 Bibb, 67, 
 69; Mitchell v. Maupin, 3 Monroe, 187; Hardy 
 v. Heard, 15 Ark. 184; Booth v. Booth, 3 Litt. 
 57; Moseley v. Gassett, 1 J. J. Marsh. 212, 
 215; M'Campbell v. Gill, 4 J. J. Marsh. 87, 90; 
 Kennedy v. Meredith, 3 Bibb, 466; Pierson v. 
 Meaux, 3 A. K. Marsh. 6; Wilson v. Carver, 4 
 Hay w. 92; Neal v. Hagthrop, 3 Bland, 551; 
 Bank of Mobile v. Planters and Merchants' 
 Bank, 8 Ala. 772; Smilie v. Siler, 35 Ala. 88. 
 But see Gamble v. Johnson, 9 Mo. 605; Nelson 
 r. Pineaar, 30 111. 473; DeWolf v. Long, 2 Gil- 
 man, 679. Any material matter charged in the 
 bill and neither admitted ivr denied in the an- 
 swer must be proved by the plaintiff. Bagshaw 
 v. Batson, 1 Dick. 113; Young v. Grundy, 6 
 Cranch, 51; Brown v. Pierce, 7 Wall. 211; 
 
 Brockway v. Coff, 3 Paige, 539 ; Cropper v. 
 Burton, 5 Leigh, 425; Lun v. John on, 3 Ired. 
 Eq. 70; Hoyal v. Bryson, 6 Heisk. 142; Smith 
 v. St. Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co. 2 Tenn. Ch. 
 602, where the point is discussed, and the au- 
 thorities reviewed. See also Cowen v. Alsop, 
 51 Miss. 158, and Hardwick v. Bassett, 25 
 Mich. 149. In New Jersey, it has been recently 
 held that a material fact averred in the bill, and 
 not denied or alluded to in the answer, must be 
 taken as admitted. Sanborn v. Adair, 29 N J. 
 Eq. 338; Lee v. Stiger, 30 id. 610. By Ch. 
 Rule 8 in New Hampshire, "all facts well 
 alleged in the bill, and not denied or explained 
 in the answer, will be held to be admitted." 
 Where a fact is admitted by the answer, the 
 defendant cannot question or deny it by the 
 proofs. Lippencott v. Ridgway, UN. J. Eq. 
 526; Weider v. Clark, 27 III. 251. The answer 
 of a defendant in Chancery, being a confession, 
 is always evidence against him, when pertinent, 
 whoever may have been the parties in the cause 
 in which it was interposed. Kiddie v. Debrutz, 
 1 Hayw. 420; Minis v. Minis, 3 J. J. Marsh. 
 103,109, 110; Roberts v Tenaell, 3 Monroe, 
 247,249; Hunter v. Jones, Rand. 541. An 
 answer, admitting the correctness of a copv of 
 a deed made by another person, and to which 
 there was no subscribing witness, is evidence, 
 both of the contents and of the execution of the 
 deed, against the person making such admis- 
 sion. Adams v. Shelby, 10 Ala. 478; see Clarke 
 v. Spears, 7 Blackf. 96. The answer, not under 
 oath, may, in relation to its admissions, be used 
 against the defendant as if it were under oath. 
 Smith v. Potter. 3 Wis. 432. And the plaintiff 
 may avail himself of such admissions without 
 thereby making the denials evidence for the 
 defendant. Ibid. 
 
 (a) As to admissions by notice under the 
 present English practice, see 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. 
 (6th Eng. ed.) 576 ; R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XXXII. 
 
 1-5, App. B. Nos. 12, 13. The notice cannot 
 be set aside. Crawford v. Chorlev, W. N. 
 (1883) 198. 
 
 831
 
 * 838 EVIDENCE. 
 
 evidence as to that part of his case which the plea is intended to cover, 6 — 
 unless the plea is a negative plea ; for in that case it will be necessary 
 for him to prove the matter negatived, for the purpose of disproving the 
 plea, in the same manner as he may enter into evidence, for the purpose 
 of disproving matter which has been pleaded affirmatively. 6 
 
 * 838 * Actual admissions on the record are those which appear, 
 
 either in the bill, or in the answer. 
 The facts alleged in a bill, where they are alleged positively, are ad- 
 missions in favor of the defendant, of the facts so alleged, and, there- 
 fore, need not be proved by other evidence ; for, whether they are true or 
 not, the plaintiff, by introducing them into his bill, and making them 
 part of the record, precludes himself from afterwards disputing their 
 truth. 
 
 The plaintiff, of course, cannot read any part of his own bill as evi- 
 dence in support of his case, unless where it is corroborated by the 
 answer ; i as, where the bill states a deed, or a will, and the defendant, 
 in his answer, admits the deed or will to have been properly executed, 
 and to be to the tenor and effect set forth in the bill : in such case, the 
 plaintiff, having read the admission from the answer, may read his bill, 
 to show the extent of the admission made by the defendant. In strict- 
 ness, however, this can hardly be called reading the bill on the part of 
 the plaintiff, since the reading is only allowed because the defendant, by 
 admitting the statement to be true as set forth in the bill, has, to that 
 extent, made that portion of the bill a part of his answer. 2 
 
 In general, where a defendant refers to a document for greater cer- 
 tainty, he has a right to insist upon the document itself being read ; 8 but 
 the plaintiff need not, on that ground, reply to the answer, but may set 
 the cause down for hearing on bill and answer, and obtain an order to 
 prove the document viva voce or by affidavit at the hearing : 4 provided it 
 be such a document as by the rules of the Court hereafter to be noticed, 
 can be proved in that manner. 5 
 
 With respect to the right of a defendant to make use of the plaintiff's 
 bill as an admission of the facts therein stated, it is to be observed, that, 
 
 5 The plaintiff may, however, as we have 8 Cox v. Allingham, Jac. 337, 339; Lett v. 
 seen, go into evidence as to his whole case; Morris, 4 Sim. 607, 611 ; and see ante, p. 726. 
 ante, p. 614. But the admission by answer that a document 
 
 6 Ante, p. 614. was of the purport stated in the bill, and a 
 
 1 The answer of a party in Chancery is reference to it when produced and proved, will 
 proper evidence against him, and so much of not entitle the plaintiff to read the statement of 
 the bill as is necessary to explain the answer, the contents from the bill; nor will a further 
 McGowen v. Young, 2 Stewart, 276. admission that the document is in the defend- 
 
 2 Where, however, an order has been ob- ant's possession entitle the plaintiff to call for 
 tained to take the bill pro confesso, the bill its production at the hearing. Dowling v. Legh, 
 may be read in evidence, as an answer admit- 3 J. & Lat. 716. See also Owen v. Jones, 2 
 ting the facts. 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. Anst. 505; but see Barnard v. Wieland, W.N. 
 c. 36, § 14; ante, p. 531. So in Tennessee, (1872) 103; 30 W. R. 947. 
 
 except in the case of infant defendants, de- 4 Fielde v. Cage, cited Wyatt's P. R. 219; 
 
 fendants of unsound mind, executors or admin- ante, p. 828. 
 
 istrators, defendants to divorce bills, non-resi- 5 Post, p. 908, et seg. 
 
 dents of the State, and persons who=e names 
 
 and residences are unknown, made defendants 
 
 without attachment of property. Code, § 4371. 
 
 832 
 

 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 *839 
 
 at Common Law, the general rule is, that a bill in Chancery will not be 
 evidence, except to show that such a bill did exist, and that certain facts 
 were in issue between the parties, in order to introduce the answer, or 
 the depositions of witnesses ; and that it cannot be admitted as evidence 
 to prove any facts, either alleged or denied in the bill. 6 (a) In 
 Courts of Equity, however, *a different rule prevails, and the bill * 839 
 may be read as evidence, for the defendant, of any of the matters 
 therein positively averred. 1 
 
 A defendant's right to read the plaintiff's bill as evidence against him 
 is confined to the bill as it stands on the record. If the bill has been 
 amended, the amended bill is the only one upon the record, and the 
 defendant has no right, in that case, to read the original bill in evidence. 2 
 It seems, however, that where the consequence of the amendment has 
 been to alter the effect of the answer to the original bill, or to render it 
 obscure, the defendant has a right to read the original bill, for the pur- 
 pose of explaining the answer ; 3 and in a cause in the Court of Chancery 
 in Ireland, in deciding upon the question of costs, certain charges in the 
 original bill which had been expunged by amendment, were read from 
 the defendant's office copy for the purpose of ascertaining quo animo the 
 bill had been filed. 4 (b) 
 
 A bill may also be read in evidence against a plaintiff, although filed 
 by him in another suit. In such case, however, it will be necessary to 
 prove that it was exhibited by the direction, or with the privity, of the 
 
 6 Boileau v. Rutlin, 2 Exch. 665; 2 Phil, on 
 Evid. 37, 38; Taylor on Evid. § 786; 1 Phil. 
 Ev. (Cowen and Hill's ed. 1839) 358, 359, note 
 640 in 2 id. Cowen and Hill's notes, 923, 
 924; Rankin v. Maxwell, 2 Marsh. (Ky.) 488, 
 489; Belden v. Davies, 2 Hall (N. Y.), 444; 
 Owens v. Dawson, 1 Watts, 149, 150; Rees v. 
 Lawless, 4 Litt. 218; Cooley v. State, 55 Ala. 
 162. 
 
 i Ives v. Medcalfe, 1 Atk. 63, 65. Neither 
 the bill nor the answer is evidence in a techni- 
 cal sense on the hearing, nor is either allowed 
 to be read in extenso under the English prac- 
 
 (rt) Under the present English practice, an 
 admission in the answer or statement of de- 
 fence is not conclusive in other proceedings 
 between the same parties, but on a different 
 issue. Re Walters, Neison v. Walters, 61 L. T. 
 872 ; 63 id. 328. In general, a partj^'s admis- 
 sions in the pleadings of another suit may be 
 explained, as by showing that the admitted 
 fact was not in issue, or that the pleading was 
 not read when signed. Banks v. Klein, 53 
 Fed. Rep. 436 ; see Pope v. Allis, 115 U. S. 363. 
 Admissions in an answer, the oath to which 
 has been waived, are still evidence against the 
 defendant. Uhlmann v. Arnholt & S. B. Co. 
 41 Fed. Rep. 369. And sworn answers to a 
 bill which is dismissed without prejudice may 
 have their full weight in a second suit for sub- 
 
 vol. i. — 53 
 
 tice. The plaintiff only reads such parts of the 
 answer as he relies on to support his case as ad- 
 missions, and the defendant reads such part of 
 the bill as he relies on as admissions. In Amer- 
 ica, the pleadings are usually read in lieu of the 
 preliminary statement of counsel in England, 
 ad hiformandum conscientiam curias. Bartlett 
 v. Gale, 4 Paige, 507; Beech v. Haynes, ITenn. 
 Ch. 576; Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 John. Ch. 91; 
 Lady Ormond v. Hutchinson, 13 Vc\?. 50. 
 2' Hales v. Pomfret, Dan. 141. 
 
 3 Ibid. 
 
 4 Fitzgerald v. O'Flaherty, 1 Moll. 347. 
 
 stantially the same cause, in which the bill 
 waives an answer under oath. Mey v. Gulli- 
 man, 105 111. 272; Throckmorton v. Throck- 
 morton, 86 V~a. 768; see Williams ?•. Cheney, 
 
 3 Gray, 215, 220; Printup v. Patton (Ga.), 18 
 S. E. Rep. 311. 
 
 (6) See Steuart ». Gladstone, 10 Ch. D. 
 626, 644; Smith v. Davidson, 41 Fed. P.ep. 
 172; Hurst p. Jones, 10 Lea, 8: Kankakee &c. 
 R. Co. v. Horan, 131 111. 288: 17 III. App. 
 650; 22 id. 145; 23 id. 259; 30 id. 552; Buzard 
 v. McAnuIty, 77 Texas, 438; Brown r. Pickard, 
 
 4 Utah, 292; Bailey r. O'Bannon, 28 Mo. App. 
 39; Wheeler v. West, 71 Cal. 120; Baxter v. 
 New York, T. & M. Ry. Co. (Texas) 22 S. W. 
 Rep. 1002. 
 
 833
 
 *840 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 party plaintiff in it ; " for any person may file a bill in another person's 
 name.''" 6 
 
 Although a plaintiff, by his replication, denies the truth of the whole 
 of the defendant's answer, he does not thereby preclude himself from 
 reading whatever portion of it he thinks will support his case, — except 
 the answer be that of an infant, which, as we have seen, can never be 
 read to establish a fact which it is against the infant's interest to admit. 6 
 The answer of the person under whom he derives title, may, however, be 
 so read ; and therefore it has been held, that if, in a suit to establish a 
 will against the heir, the heir puts in his answer admitting the wilk and 
 dies before the hearing, the derivative heir, though an infant, will be 
 bound by the admission, and the execution of the will need not, in such 
 case, be proved. 7 Of course, if an infant heir is bound by the admission 
 of his ancestor, such an admission will be equally binding upon an adult. 
 
 Where a plaintiff proposes to read a passage from the defendant's 
 answer as an admission, he must read all the circumstances stated in 
 the passage ; and if the passage contains a reference to any other 
 * 840 passage, that other passage must be read also. 8 But * where a 
 plaintiff, in reading a passage from a defendant's answer, has 
 been obliged to read an allegation which makes against his case, he will 
 be permitted to read evidence to disprove such allegation. 1 
 
 There was formerly a distinction between bills for relief and bills for 
 discovery, in the right of the plaintiff to read the answer of the defend- 
 ant ; but now, where a defendant in Equity files a cross-bill for discovery 
 only against the plaintiff in Equity, or exhibits interrogatories for his 
 examination, the answer to such cross-bill, or interrogatories, may be 
 read and used by the party filing such cross-bill, or exhibiting such inter- 
 rogatories, in the same manner, and under the same restrictions, as the 
 answer to a bill praying relief may be read and used. 2 
 
 5 Wollet r. Roberts, 1 Ch. Cas. 64. 
 
 6 Ante, p. 169. Express admissions by an- 
 swer stand as conclusive, and cannot be dis- 
 puted, unless it is first shown that they were 
 made by mistake. Marsh v. Mitchell, 26 N. J. 
 Eq. 497. 
 
 7 Robinson v. Cooper, 4 Sim. 131; Lock v. 
 Foote, id. 132; ante, p. 172. Lewis v. Outlaw, 
 1 Tenn. 140. And see as to the effect of ad- 
 missions by testamentary trustees in estopping 
 them from proving the contrarv, Coops v. Cress- 
 well, L. R. 2 Ch. 112, 121 ; L. R. 2 Eq. 106. 
 
 8 Bartlett v. Gillard, 3 Russ. 149; see also 
 Lady Ormond V. Hutchinson, 13 Ves. 47, 53; 
 Rude ?•. Whitchurch, 3 Sim. 562; Nurse v. 
 Bunn. 5 Sim. 225: Freeman r. Tatham. 5 Hare, 
 329, 335; 10 .Tur. 685; Beech v. Haynes, 2 
 Tenn. Ch. 571 ; R. S. C. Ord. XXXI. 23. And 
 see Taylor on Evid. § 730; 1 Phil. Ev. (Cowen 
 & Hill's ed. 1839) 359, 360, note 643 in 2 id. 
 926-92S. If on exceptions being taken, a second 
 answer is put in, the defendant may insist upon 
 having that also read, to explain what he swore 
 in his first answer. 1 Phil. Ev. 359, note 644, 
 in 2 id. 928. 
 
 834 
 
 1 Price v. Lytton, 3 Russ. 206. Where an 
 answer admits a fact and insists on a distinct 
 fact by way of discharge or avoidance, the 
 latter, even if part of the same transaction, 
 must be proved by evidence aliunde. Parkes 
 r. Gorton, 3 R. I. 27: Walker v. Berry, 8 Rich. 
 33; Cummins r. Cummins, 15 111. 33 ; Stevens 
 v. Post, 12 N. J. Eq. 408, 410, 411; Hart r. 
 Ten Eyck, 2 John. Ch. 62; Miller v. Wack. 
 Saxt. 209; Beckwith ». Butler, 1 Wash. 224; 
 Thompson v. Lamb, 7 Ves. 587; Clements v. 
 Moore, 6 Wall. 315; Napier v. Elam, 6 Verg. 
 113 : Beech v. Haynes, 1 Tenn. Ch. 569. But if 
 the facts in discharge or avoidance are a direct 
 and proper reply to an express charge or inter- 
 rogatory of the hill, the answer is evidence of 
 those facts. Hart v Ten Eyck, 1 Cow. 744, 
 note; Alexander v. Williams, 10 Yerg. 109; 
 Goss v. Simpson, 4 Coldw. 288; Walter v. Mc- 
 Nabh. 1 Heisk. 703. And this, whether the 
 response be a direct denial or by a statement 
 of acts in avoidance. Hopkins v. Spurlock, 2 
 Heisk. 152; infra, p. 845, note. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XIX. 6.
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 841 
 
 Formerly, when the parties to a cause could not be witnesses, ques- 
 tions as to reading the answer of the defendant frequently arose ; 3 but 
 they are now of no practical importance, the answer being almost 
 invariably made evidence in the cause. 4 
 
 With respect to what will be considered as such an admission by an 
 answer as will dispense with the necessity of other proof, it may be 
 stated, that, besides those expressions which in words admit the fact 
 alleged to be true, a statement by the defendant that " he believes," or 
 thai) he has been " informed and believes," that such fact is true, will be 
 sufficient, unless such statement is coupled by some clause to prevent its 
 being considered as an admission. 5 (a) A mere statement, however, in 
 an answer, that a defendant has been informed that a fact is as stated, 
 without an answer as to his belief concerning it, will not be such an 
 admission as can be read as evidence of the fact. 6 Such an answer is, in 
 effect, insufficient; and if the plaintiff, upon reading the pleadings, finds 
 such a statement as to a fact with respect to which it is important 
 to have the defendant's belief, he should except to the answer for 
 insufficiency. 
 
 * It has been before stated, that the answer of an infant, being * 841 
 in fact the answer of his guardian, cannot be read against him. 1 
 The answer, however, may, it seems, be read against the guardian ; and 
 the answer of an infant, by his mother and guardian in another cause, 
 has been read against the mother in her own capacity. 2 It seems also, 
 that where a defendant, being an infant, answers by guardian, and, at 
 
 3 Davis v. Spurling, 1 R. & M. 64, 68; 
 Miller p. Gow, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 56, 59 ; Connop 
 v. Hay ward, id. 33, 34; Allfrey v. Allfrey, 1 
 M'N. &G. 87,93; 13 Jur. 269. 
 
 4 See post, p. 843, n. 3. 
 
 6 See Potter v. Potter, 1 Ves. Sr. 274; Hill 
 v. Binney, 6 Ves. 738; and see Woodhatch v. 
 Freeland^ 11 W. R. 398, V. C. K.; see also 
 Bird v. Lake, 1 H. & M. 111. See, where the 
 answer admitted the execution of "some such" 
 bonds and mortgages as were set out in the bill, 
 
 (a) Under the Code system, the defendant's 
 denial, upon information and belief, of a ma- 
 terial allegation in the complaint cannot be 
 stricken out as a sham Rnswer: Robert Gere 
 Bank v. Inman, 51 Hun, 97; Zivi v. Kinstein, 
 21 N. Y. S. 583; see Metzger v. Metropolitan 
 El. Rv. Co. id, 676; except, perhaps, where 
 the ignorance is pretended, as in matters of 
 public record. See Zivi v. Einstein, 20 X. Y. 
 S. 893, 894. 
 
 An answer under oath may be made on in- 
 formation and belief, and it may be sufficient 
 as a pleading when it sets up hearsay, though 
 this will deprive it of its weight as evidence. 
 Agnew v. McGill (Ala.), 11 So. Rep. 537; 
 Noyes v. Inland & S. C. Co. 4 Mar Arthur, 1 ; 
 Humble v. McDonough, 25 X. Y. S. 965. In 
 general, an answer upon information and be- 
 
 Wills r. McKinney, 30 N". J. Eq. 465. An 
 answer admitting a verbal agreement alleged 
 in the bill, but insisting on the Statute of 
 Frauds, cannot be read as an admission of the 
 agreement. Jackson r. Oglander, 2 H. & M. 
 465. 
 
 6 1 Phil. Ev. (Cowen & Hill's ed. 1839) 
 360, note. 
 
 1 Ante, p. 169; Gresley, Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 
 323. 
 
 2 Beasley v. Magrath, 2 Sch. & Lef. 34. 
 
 lief does not require two witnesses to overcome 
 it. See Pope v. Allis, 115 U. S. 363; Berry v. 
 Sawyer, 19 Fed. Rep. 286; Allen v. O'Donald, 
 28 id. 17; Robinson v. Mandell, 3 Cliff. 169; 
 Deimel v. Brown, 136 III. 586 ; Atlantic Ins. 
 Co. v. Wilson, 5 R. I. 479 ; Loomis c. Fay, 24 
 Vt. 240; Town v. Needham, 3 Paige, 545 : M<- 
 Guffie v. Planters' Hank, Freem. (Miss.) 383; 
 Carpenter v. Edwards, 64 Miss. 595; Carrick i». 
 Prater, 10 Humph 270; Pierson v. Ryerson, 5 
 N. J. Eq. 196; Miller v. District of Columbia, 
 5 Mackey, 291. Denials in an answer upon 
 information and belief are not sufficient to sup- 
 port a motion to dissolve an injunction. Porter 
 r. Jennings, 89 Cal. 440. Denials so made, 
 when they should be positive, are ineffectual, 
 though some immaterial issues are positively 
 denied. Loveland v. Garner, 74 Cal. 298. 
 835
 
 *842 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 
 full age, neither amends nor makes a new answer, as he may do, but 
 prays a hearing of the cause de novo, his answer is evidence against him. 3 
 The answer of an idiot or lunatic, put in by his committee, may be 
 read against him ; and it has been held that the answer of a person of 
 weak intellect, put in by his guardian, could also be read against him ; 4 
 but it is doubtful if this decision would now be followed. 5 
 
 The plaintiff cannot, of course, read the answer of one defendant 
 against a co-defendant as an admission : 6 and, as a general rule, it 
 
 cannot be read as evidence except on motion for a decree, where 
 * 842 * notice of the intention to read it has been given. 1 Thus, where 
 
 the answer of an executor was offered as evidence against the 
 residuary legatee, who had been made a party to the suit, its reception was 
 refused for any other purpose than that of showing what funds came to 
 the hands of the executors, what debts there were, and the value of the 
 estate. 2 In cases, however, where the right of the plaintiff, as against 
 one defendant, is only prevented from being complete by some question 
 
 8 Hinde, 422. 
 
 4 Leving v. Caverly, Prec. in Ch. 229. 
 
 5 Ante, pp. 177, 178; Micklethwaite v. Atkin- 
 son, 1 Coll. 173 ; Percival v. Cane)-, 4 De G. & 
 S. 610; 14 Jur. 1056, 1062; S. C. nam. Stanton 
 v. Percival, 3 W. K. 391; 24 L. J. Ch. 369, H. 
 L. ; Ingram v. Little, 11 Q. B. D. 251. For the 
 rules of practice with regard to reading the 
 answer of married persons, see ante, pp. 184, 
 185. 
 
 6 Jones v. Turberville, 2 Sumner's Ves. Jr. 
 11, note (b); 4 Bro. C. C. 115, S. C ; Atwood 
 v. Small. 6 CI. & F. 282, 295; 1 Greenl. Ev. 
 § 178: 1 Phil. Ev. (Cowen & Hill's ed. 1839) 
 362, note 650; 2 id. 931; Porter v. Bank of 
 Kutland, 19 Vt. 410; Blodget v. Hobart, 18 Vt. 
 414. It seems to be a well-established general 
 principle that the answer of one defendant can- 
 not be read in evidence against a co-defendant, 
 if there is no joint interest, privity, fraud, collu- 
 sion, or combination between them. Jones v. 
 Jones, 13 Iowa, 276; Rust v. Mansfield, 25 111. 
 336; Williamson v. Haycock, 11 Iowa, 40; 
 Mobley v. Dubuque &c. Co. id. 71 ; Judd v. 
 Seaver, 8 Paige, 548: Hay ward v. Carroll, 4 
 Harr. & J. 518; Singleton v. Gayle, 8 Porter, 
 271; Conner v. Chase, 15 Vt. 764; Thomasson 
 v. Tucker. 2 Blackf. 172; Moseley v. Armstrong, 
 3 Monroe. 389; Robinson v. Sampson, 23 Maine, 
 388; Webb v. Pell, 3 Paige, 368; Collier v. 
 Chapman, 2 Stew. 163; Chambliss v. Smith, 
 30 Ala. 366; Graham v. Sublett, G J. J. Marsh. 
 145; M'Kim v. Thompson, 1 Bland, 160; Cal- 
 well P. Boyer, 8 Gill & J. 136; Dexter v. Arnold, 
 3 Sumner, 152; Felch v. Hooper, 20 Maine, 159; 
 Clarke v. Van Reimsdyk, 9 Cranch, 152, 156; 
 Leeds v. Mar. Ins. Co. of Alex. 2 Wheat. 380, 
 383; Dade v. Madison, 5 Leigh, 401; Daniel V. 
 Boullard, 2 Dana, 296; Field v. Holland, 6 
 Cranch, 8; Fanning v. Pritchett, 6 Monroe, 79, 
 
 836 
 
 80; Roundlett v. Jordan, 3 Greenl. 47; Mills v. 
 Gore, 20 Pick. 34; Wells v. Stratton, 1 Tenn. Ch. 
 328. The answer of one defendant is not evi- 
 dence against the other defendant, though prior 
 to the filing of the answer the former may have 
 transferred to the latter all his interest in the 
 subject-matter of the controversy. Jones v. 
 Hardesty, 10 Gill & J. 404; see also Haworth 
 v. Bostock, 4 Y. & C 1 ; Hoare v. Johnstone, 2 
 Keen, 553; Lewis ». Owen, 1 Ired. Eq. 290; 
 Dickinson r. Railroad Co. 7 W. Va. 390. But 
 the answer of a defendant, which is responsive 
 to the bill, is admissible as evidence in favor of a 
 co-defendant (Davis v. Clayton, 5 Humph. 440); 
 more especially where such co-defendant, being 
 the depositary of a chattel claimed by the plain- 
 tiff, defends himself under the title of the other 
 defendant. Mil's v. Gore, 20 Pick. 28; but see 
 Morris v. Nixon, 1 How. (U. S-) 118; Cannon 
 v. Norton, 14 Vt. 178. The deposition of a 
 party in Chancery, read without objection, is 
 evidence for his co-defendnnt. Fletcher V. 
 Wier, 7 Dana, 354; see AVolley v. Brownhill, 
 13 Price, 500 ; S. C. 1 M'Lel. 317. If a defend- 
 ant in his argument relies on the answer of his 
 co-defendant, he thereby makes it evidence 
 against himself. Chase v. Manhardt, 1 Bland, 
 336. 
 
 i 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 15; Cousins v. Vasey, 
 9 Hare App. 61; Dawkins v. Mortan, 1 J. & H. 
 339; Stephens v. Heatcote, 1 Dr. & S. 138; 6 
 Jur. N. S. 312; ante, p. 821; see Fielden v. 
 Slater, L. R. 7 Eq. 523. 
 
 2 Morse v. Royal, 12 Ves. 355, 361; see also 
 M'Intosh r. Great Western Ry. Co. 4 De G. & 
 S. 544; Wych v. Meal, 3 P. Wms. 310; and 
 Gibbons r.*Waterloo Bridge Co. 1 C. P. Coop, 
 temp. Cott. 385, where the answer of the officer of 
 a corporation was not allowed to be read against 
 the corporation. Taylor on Evid. § 684.
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 843 
 
 between the plaintiff and a second defendant, the plaintiff is permitted 
 to read the answer of such second defendant, for the purpose of complet- 
 ing his claim against the first ; 3 and where several persons are mutually 
 interested as partners, or jointly liable as the co-obligors of a bond, the 
 declarations or answers of one may be admissible against the others. 4 
 
 Cases, moreover, have occurred in which a defendant has, by the form 
 of his answer, made the answer of a co-defendant evidence against 
 himself (a) ; as, where a defendant stated in his answer that he was much 
 in years, and could not remember the matter charged in the bill, but 
 that J. S. was his attorney and transacted the matter, whereupon 
 J. S. was made a defendant, the answer * was allowed to be read * 843 
 against the original defendant, the judge being of opinion that 
 the words in the first answer amounted to a reference to a co-defendant's 
 answer. 1 
 
 Interpleader suits form an exception to this rule; and the answer of 
 
 3 Green v. Pledger, 3 Hare, 165, 170; 8 Jur. 
 801 ; and generally concerning the circumstances 
 in which the Court will try and decide a case 
 between co-defendants, see Cottinghani v. Lord 
 Shrewsbury, 3 Hare, 627, 638; Lord Chamley 
 r. Lord Dunsany, 2 Sch. & Lef. 690, 706, 709, 
 H. L. ; Farquharson v. Seton, 5 Russ. 45, 62; 
 Smith v. Baker, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 223, 228; 
 Fletcher v. Green (No. 2), 33 Beav. 513; Sand- 
 ford v. Morrice, 11 CI. & F. 667, 681; Mount v. 
 Potts, 23 N. J. Eq. 188; Ingram v. Smith, 1 
 Head, 412, 427; Symmes v. Strong, 28 N. J. 
 Eq. 131. 
 
 4 Crosse v. Bedingfield, 12 Sim. 35, 39; 5 
 Jur. 836 ; but the answer of a defendant who 
 has become bankrupt, and ceased to be a part- 
 ner, cannot. Parker v. Morrell, 2 Phil. 453, 463; 
 12 Jur. 253; see 1 Greenl. Ev. § 178; Clarke v. 
 Van Reimsdyk, 9 Cranch, 153, 156; Williams 
 v. Hodgson, 2 Harr. & J. 474, 477; Van Keims- 
 dyk v. Kane, 1 Gall. 630; Hutchins t. Child- 
 less, 4 Stew. & P. 34; Gilmore v. Patterson, 36 
 Maine, 544; Clayton v. Thompson, 13 Ga. 291. 
 Upon a bill in Equity by one partner against 
 his co-partners for an account, the answer of 
 one of the defendants will not be evidence to 
 charge another. Chapin v. Colman, 11 Pick. 
 331. But if it appears that the defendants, as 
 constituting a partnership among themselves, 
 of the one part, were in partnership with the 
 
 (a) The answer of one defendant is evidence 
 against a co-defendant only when the latter 
 adopts it. Hanover Nat. Bank v. Klein, 64 
 Miss. 141. Their relations to each other ina3 r 
 be such, as partners, &c, that the admissions 
 of one are competent evidence against the 
 other. McElroy r. Ludlum, 32 N. J. Eq. 828. 
 But the answer of one defendant, if responsive 
 to the bill, enures to the benefit of his co-defend- 
 ants, and, if established, precludes relief against 
 any of them. Pleasanton v. Raughley, 3 Del. 
 
 plaintiff of the other part, the answer of one of 
 the defendants would be evidence to charge the 
 others. Ibid. ; see also Judd v. Seaver, 8 Paige, 
 548; Van Keimsdyk v. Kane, 1 Gall. 630; Win- 
 chester v. Jackson, 3 Hayw. 310; Rector v. 
 Rector, 3 Gilman, 105. The answer of a wife 
 is not evidence against her husband. The City 
 Bank v. Bangs, 3 Paige, 36. Nor is the answer 
 of an obligee, evidence against his previous as- 
 signee, a party in the same suit. Fanning r. 
 Pritchett, 6 Monroe, 79; Turner v. Holman, 
 5 Monroe, 411. Nor is the answer of a prin- 
 cipal debtor, admitting his insolvency, evidence 
 against his surety, a co-defendant, at the suit of 
 a co-surety for contribution. Daniel v. Ballard, 
 2 Dana, 296. A fortiori, it follows, that the 
 mere silence of one defendant is no evidence 
 against his co-defendant. Timberlake v. Cobbs, 
 2 J. J. Marsh. 136; Blight v. Banks, 6 Monroe, 
 192; Harrison v. Johnson, 3 Litt. 286. 
 
 The rule that the answer of one defendant 
 cannot be read in evidence against his co-defend- 
 ant, does not apply where the latter claims 
 through him whose answer is offered in evi- 
 dence. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 178. Nor where one 
 defendant in his answer refers to the answer of 
 his co-defendant. Anon. 1 P. Wins. 301 ; Dun- 
 ham v. Gates, 3 Barb. Ch. 196; Blakeney v. 
 Ferguson, 14 Ark. 641. 
 
 1 Anon. 1 P. Wins. 301. 
 
 Ch. 124; McElroy v. Ludlum, 32 N. J. Eq. 
 828; Salmon e. Smith, 58 Miss. 399; State v. 
 Columbia, 12 S. C. 370; Hartley v. Matthews 
 (Ala.), 11 So. Rep. 452. A defendant, who 
 has appeared specially to object to the Court's 
 jurisdiction, will be permitted to contest an- 
 other defendant's cross-bill only on condition 
 of entering a full appearance. National Fur- 
 nace Co. v. Moline M. I. Works, 18 Fed. Rep. 
 863. 
 
 837
 
 *843 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 one defendant may be read against a co-defendant, to show that adverse 
 claims are made. 2 
 
 It is to be observed, that where an answer has been replied to gen- 
 erally, it cannot (except by consent) be read as evidence on the part of the 
 defendant himself. 3 In disposing of the question of costs, however, the 
 Court will permit the defendant's answer to be read in his own behalf ; 4 
 and it has been held, that a peer's answer upon protestation of honor 
 may also be read on the question of costs, on behalf of the defendant 
 who has put it in. 5 Moreover, the Court itself will look at the answer, 
 not as evidence, but as what may regulate its discretion with respect to 
 the further investigation of particular facts. 6 
 
 Although a defendant cannot read his own answer as evidence for 
 himself, as to any other point than that of costs, he is entitled to have 
 the benefit of his answer, so far as it amounts to a denial of the plaintiff's 
 case, unless the denial by the answer is contradicted by the evidence 
 of more than one witness ; the rule of Courts of Equity being, that 
 where the defendant, in express terms, negatives the allegations in 
 the bill, and the evidence is that of only one person affirming what 
 has been so negatived, the Court will not make a decree. 7 («) The 
 
 2 Masterman v. Price, 1 C. P. Coop. temp. 
 Cott. 383; Chevet r. Jones, ibid.; 6 Mad. 267; 
 and see post, Chap. XXXIV. § 3, Bills of ' Inter- 
 pleader. 
 
 3 Where a defendant has riled an answer, 
 and it has been replied to, it is now a common 
 practice to file a short affidavit by him, veri- 
 fying the statements of his answer, in order to 
 make it evidence on his own behalf. Barrack 
 v. M'Culloch, 3 K. & J. 110; 3 Jur. N. S. 180; 
 and see Williams v. Williams, 10 Jur. N. S. 
 608- 12 W. R. 603, V. C. K. For forms of 
 affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 
 4 Vancouver v. Bliss, 11 Ves. 458; Howell 
 v. George, 1 Mad. 1, 13; and see M rgan & 
 Davey, 85; and pus/, Chap. XXXI. § 1, Costs. 
 
 5 Dawson r. Ellis, 1 J. & W. 524,526. 
 
 6 Miller v. Gow, 1 Y. & C C. C. 56, 59; 
 Robson v. Flight, 33 Beav. 208, 271; B^ech v. 
 Haynes, 1 Tenn. Ch. 569, 576; ante, p. 839, note. 
 
 1 Peniber v. Mathers, 1 Bro. C. C 52; see 
 also Kingdome r. Boakes, Prec. in Ch. 19; 
 Wakelin v. Walthal, 2 Ch. Cas. 8; Alam v. 
 Jourdan, 1 Vfirn. 161; Christ's Coll. Cam. v. 
 
 Widdrington, 2 Vern. 283; Hine r. Dodd, 2 
 Atk. 270: Glynn v. Bank of England, 2 Ves. 
 Sr. 38; Mortimer v. Orchard, 2 Ves. Jr. 243; 
 Lord Cranstown v. Johnston, 3 Ves. 170: Cooth 
 v. Jackson, Ves. 40; Evans v. Bicknell, id. 
 174, 183: Cooke v. Clay worth, 18 Ves. 12; 
 Holdernesse v. Rankin, 2 De G. F. & J. 258, 
 272; 6 Jur. N. S. 903; and see Williams r. 
 Williams, 10 Jur. N. S. 008; 12 W. R. 663, V. 
 C. K. ; Stearns v. Stearns, 23 X. J. Eq. 107. 
 Where a replication is put in, and the parties 
 proceed to a hearing, all the allegations of the 
 answer which are responsive to the bill shall 
 be taken as true, unle?s they are disproved by 
 evidence of greater weight than the testimony 
 of a single witness. This may result from the 
 testimony of two witnesses, or of one with cor- 
 roborating circumstances; or from corroborat- 
 ing circumstances alone ; or from documentary 
 evidence alone. Pierson r. Cutler, 5 Vt. 272; 
 Dunham v. Gates, 1 Hoff. Ch. 188; Hart r. Ten 
 Eyck, 2 John. Ch. 92; Watkins v. Stockett, 6 
 Hair. & J. 435; Hughes ?•. Blake, 6 Wheat. 468; 
 Pierson v. Clayes, 15 Vt. 93; Gould v. William- 
 
 (") See Parker v. Phetteplace, 1 Wall. 084; 
 Seit/. v. Mitchell, 94 U. S. 58D; American File 
 Co. v. Garrett, 110 U. S. 288; Morrison v. 
 Durr, 122 U. S. 518; Monroe Catt'e Co. v. 
 Becker, 147 U. S. 47; Beals v. III. M. & T. R. 
 Co. 133 U. S. 290; Peeler v. Lathrop, 2 U. S. 
 App. 40 ; Slessinger v. Buckingham, 17 Fed. 
 Rep. 454; Walcott v. Watson, 53 id. 429; 
 Brooks v. Silver, 5 Del. Ch. 7; Hurd v. Ascher- 
 man, 117 111. 501: Deimel v. Brown, 130 III. 
 586; 35 111. App. 303; Nulton^s Appeal, 103 
 Penn. S\ 280; Smith v. Ewing, 151 id. 256; 
 Hand v. Weidner, id. 362; McCullough r. 
 
 838 
 
 Barr, 145 id. 459; Field v. Wilbur, 49 Vt. 157: 
 Thompson v. Clark. 81 Va. 422; Johnson '■. 
 Crippen, 02 Miss. 597; Manatt v. Starr, 72 
 Iowa, 677; Brittin v. Crabtree, 20 Ark. 30J ; 
 Durham r. Taylor, 29 Ga. 166; Pickering v. 
 Day, 3 Houston, 474. The rule which requires 
 two witnesses to overcome a sworn answer is a 
 rule of Equity practice, and does not apply to 
 the Co !e Procedure. Conger v. Cotton, 37 
 Ark. 280. As the plaintiff has the burden to 
 prove his own allegations, the two witnesses 
 are needed to overcome the oath of the answer. 
 Vigel v. Hopp, 104 U. S. 441; Hewitt v.
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 844 
 
 denial, however, by the answer, * must in such cases be posi- * 844 
 
 son, 21 Maine, 273; Johnson v. Richardson, 
 38 X. H. 353; Moors v. Moors, 17 N. H. 483; 
 
 Robinson r. Stewart, 10 N. Y. 189; Miles v. 
 Miles, 32 X. H. 147; Camp v. Simon, 34 Ala. 
 
 Campbell, 109 U. S. 103; Farrington v. Harri- 
 son, 44 N. J. Eq. 232; Smith v. Ewing, 151 
 Penn. St. 256; Morrison v. Stewart, 24 111. 
 24; Veile v. Blodgett, 49 Vt. 270. This rule 
 has no application to a sworn plea. Farley v. 
 ' Kittson, 120 U. S 303. Documentary evidence, 
 such as a sworn statement required by law, 
 may be evidence equal to the testimonj" of one 
 witness in the plaintiff' s favor. Rowley's Ap- 
 peal, 115 Penn. St. 150 ; Jones v. Abraham, 
 75 Va. 466. In order to overcome an answer 
 under oath, previous verbal admissions by the 
 defendant should be proved by two witnesses. 
 See Petty v. Taylor, 5 Dana, 598; Gillett v. 
 Robbins, 12 Wis. 319; Love v. Braxton, 5 
 Call, 537. 
 
 The rule does not apply where the defendant 
 offers himself as a witness. Morris v. White, 
 36 N. J. Eq. 324; Frink v. Adams, id. 485; 
 see Campbell v. Patterson, 95 Penn. St. 447. 
 There is no presumption against a defendant 
 answering under oath because he does not tes- 
 tify as a witness, and submit to cross-examina- 
 tion, at least where the plaintiff has the privi- 
 lege of calling him as a witness. United States 
 v. Budd, 144 U. S. 154. If he testifies as a wit- 
 ness evasively, the fact that his testimony is 
 not in harmony with the rest of the evidence, 
 may suffice to impeach his sworn answer. 
 Deimel v. Brown, 136 111. 586. 
 
 As to new matter, or matter in avoidance and 
 discharge, under this rule, see Banks v. Man- 
 chester, 128 U. S. 244; Reid v. McCallister, 49 
 Fed. Rep. 16 ; Beckhaus v. Ladner, 48 N. J. Eq. 
 152; Ingersoll v. Stiger, 46 id. 511 ; Hazelhurst 
 v. Sea Isle City Hotel Co.(N. J. Eq.) 25 Atl. 201 ; 
 Atkinson r. Foster, 134 III. 472; Harding v. 
 Hawkins, 141 111. 572; Ferris v. Ha d, 135 
 N. Y. 354; Cecil v. Cecil, 19 Md 72; Lewis v. 
 Mason, 84 Va. 731 . Certain at least of the Codes 
 provide that new matter alleged in an answer 
 is to be taken as true unless contradicted bv the 
 reply. See Maxwell v. Johnson, 2 Wash St. 
 482; Hamilton Loan & T. Co. v. Gordon, 32 
 Neb. 663; Pomeroy, Code Rem. (3d ed.) 752. 
 
 As to responsiveness in the answer under this 
 rule, see United States v. Ferguson, 54 Fed. Rep. 
 28; Tread well v. Lennig,50 id. 872; American M. 
 Co. v. O Harra,56 id. 278; Comstoek o. Herron, 
 45 id. 660 ; Peeler v. Lathrop,48 id. 780; 4 U. S. 
 App. 40; 2 id. 40; Bell v. Farmers' Deposit 
 Nat'l Bank, 131 Penn. St. 318; Crammer r. 
 Atlantic City Gas Co. 39 N. J. Eq. 76; Bell v. 
 Moon, 79 Va. 341: Cole v. Shetterlv, 13 111. 
 App. 420; Harding v. Hawkins, 141 111.572; 
 Newaygo County Manuf. Co. v. Stevens, 79 
 Mich. 398; Goodloe v. Dean, 81 Ala. 479; Bar- 
 ton v. Barton, 75 Ala. 400 ; Gass v. Arnold, 6 
 
 Baxter, 329; Collins v. North British & M. 
 Ins. Co. (Teiin.) 19 S. W. Rep. 525. An answer 
 alleging a gift is responsive to a bill averring a 
 loan. Gleghorne v. Gleghorne, 118 Penn. St. 
 383. A responsive denial which sets forth all 
 the facts, but which incidentally introduces new 
 matter, is good as an answer. Fidelity Title & 
 Trust Co. v. Weitzel, 152 Penn. St. 498. The 
 answer must not be evasive; hence, upon a bill 
 charging the respondents with purchasing real 
 estate for certain improper purposes, an answer 
 which denies these purposes, and alleges gener- 
 ally other and proper purposes, is insufficient on 
 exception, as the purposes referred to in the 
 answer should be specifically set forth, and 
 averred to be the real and sole purposes. Place 
 r. Providence, 12 R. I. 1; Seybert v. Robinson, 
 2 Penn. Dist. R. 403. But averments in an an- 
 swer, incompatible with the allegations of the 
 complaint, may be equivalent to a denial. Per- 
 kins v. Brock, 80 Cal. 320. An answer which 
 simply denies indebtedness, and does not replv 
 to the facts of the complaint, fails to raise issues 
 of fact. Swanholm v Reeser (Idaho), 31 Pac. 
 Rep. 804. Tue absence ot a replication does 
 not affect the rule as to responsiveness. See 
 Gunnell v. Bird, 10 Wall. 304; Corbus v. Teed, 
 69 111. 205. A detective answer may be cured 
 by the reply. James v. McPhee, 9 Col. 486; 
 Burns v. Cushing, 96 Cal. 669. But the entire 
 absence of material allegations cannot be cured 
 by verdict. Richards v. Travellers' Ins. Co. 80 
 Cal. 505 ; see Rice v. Merrimack Hosiery Co. 
 56 N. H. 114. 
 
 An infringer of a recorded patent, who in.-ists 
 that he did not know of the existence of the 
 patent, and denies that the patented articles 
 were marked "patented," as required by law, 
 must aver want of knowledge in his answer. 
 Sessions v. Romadka, 145 U. S. 29. A general 
 denial of infringement in an answer without 
 setting forth the facts is not sufficient when the 
 bill interrogates as to the defendant's use of 
 devices which infringe. Coop v. Dr. Savage 
 P. D. Inst. 48 Fed. Rep. 239. As to other de- 
 fences in patent suits available by answer or 
 plea, see Secomb v. Campbell, 2 Fed. Fep. •':.">: ; 
 Matthews v. Lalance & <;. M. Co. id. 232; Car- 
 nick v. McKesson, 8 id. 807; Miller v. Foree, 
 9 id. 603; Blatherwick v. Carey, id. 202; 
 Sharp ». Reissner, id. 445; Shaw r. Co! well 
 Lead Co. 11 id. 711; Searls r. Bouton, 12 id. 
 140; Allis r. Buckstaff. 13 id. 879: Ilubbell r. 
 De Land, 14 id. 471; Pelham v. Edelmayer, 15 
 id. 203: Cottier r. Stimson, 20 id. 906; 18 id. 
 689; Steiger r. He ; delberger, 4 id. 455: While 
 v. Lee, id. 916 ; Lilienthal v. Washburn, 8 id. 
 707. 
 
 839
 
 845 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 845 tive ; (a) otherwise, the rule will not apply ; * as where a 
 
 126; Davis ». Stevens, 3 Clarke, 158; Panton r. 
 Tefft,22 111. 366; Pusey v. Wright, 31 Penn. St. 
 387 ; Spence v Dodd, 19 Ark. 166; Hill v. Bush, 
 19 Ark. 522; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 260; Gresley, Eq. 
 Ev. 4; Clarke v. Van Reimsdyk, 9 Cranch, 160; 
 Hollister v. Barkley, 11 N. H. 501; Langdon v. 
 Goddard, 2 Story, 267; Koherts v. Salisbury, 3 
 Gill & J. 425; Purcell v. Purcell, 4 Hen. & 
 M. 607 ; M'Cowen v. Young, 2 Stew. & P. 161; 
 Alexander v. Wallace, 10 Yerger, 115; Daniel 
 V. Mitchell, 1 Story, 172; Neville v. Demeritt, 
 1 Green Ch. 322; Betty v. Taylor, 5 Dana, 
 598; Gray v. Paris, 7 Yerger, 155; Johnson 
 v. Slawsen, 1 Bailey Eq. 463; Mason v. Peck, 
 7 J. J. Marsh. 301; Stafford v. Bryan, 1 
 Paige, 239; Clark v. Oakley, 4 Ark. 236; 
 Towne r. Smith, 1 Wood. & M. 115; Green v. 
 Tanner, 8 Met. 422; Cushing v. Smith, 3 Story, 
 556; Hough v. Richardson, id. 659, 692; Gould 
 v. Gould, id. 516, 540; Jones v. Belt, 2 Gill, 
 106; Menifee v. Menifee, 3 English, 9; Morgan 
 v. Tifdon, 3 McLean, 339; Appleton v. Horton, 
 25 Maine, 23 ; Eastman v. McAlpice, 1 Kelly, 
 157; Tobey v. Leonard, 2 Wall. 423; O'Ban- 
 non v. Myer, 36 Ala. 551 ; Benson v. Woolver- 
 ton, 15 N. J. Eq. 158; Bird v. Styles, 18 id. 
 297; Hynson v. Voshell, 26 Md. 83, 94; De 
 Hart p. Baud, 19 N. J. Eq. 423; Hughes v. 
 Blackwell; 6 Jones Eq. 73; Hill v. Williams, 
 id. 242: Stephens v. Orman, 10 Fla. 9; Barton 
 v. Moss, 32 111. 50; Dunlap v. Wilson, id. 517; 
 Myers v. Kinzie, 26 111. 36; White v. Hampton, 
 10 Iowa, 238; Gillett v. Bobbins, 12 Wis. 319; 
 Bent v. Smith, 22 N. J. Eq. 560; Beverley r. 
 Walden, 20 Gratt. 147; Powell ». Manson, 22 
 Gratt. 189; Falk v. Turner, 101 Mass. 495; 
 Zane v. Cawley, 21 N. J. Eq. 130; Fulton v. 
 Woodman, 54 Miss. 158. The right of a de- 
 fendant in a bill in Chancery, to have his 
 answer thereto taken in evidence, is co-exten- 
 sive with his obligation to answer. Blaisdell v. 
 Bowers, 40 Vt. 126. The statute of Vermont, 
 providing that parties shall not testify in their 
 own behalf, in certain cases, does not appl}' to 
 an answer to a b 11 in Chancery, but the answer, 
 when responsive, is evidence, and is not affected 
 by that statute. Blaisdell v. Bowers, ubi supra. 
 The plaintiff is not allowed to impeach the char- 
 acter of the defendant, for truth and veracity, 
 but must overcome his answer by stronger evi- 
 dence. Vandegrift v. Herbert. 18 N. J. Eq. 
 469; Brown v. Bulkier, 14 id. 294; Chambers 
 v. Warren, 13 111.321; Butler v. Catling, 1 
 Boot. 310; Salmon v. Clagett, 3 Bland, 165; 
 but see Miller v. Tolleson, 1 Harp. Ch. 145. 
 The operation of the defendant's answer is the 
 same, although the equity of the plaintiff's bill 
 
 is grounded on the allegation of fraud. Dilly 
 v. Barnard, 8 Gill & J. 171; M'Donald v. 
 M'Cleod, 1 Ired. Eq. 226; Lewis v. Owen. id. 
 290; Murray v. Blatchford, 1 Wend. 583; Cun- 
 ningham v. Freeborn, 3 Paige, 557; Graham v. 
 Berryman, 19 N. J. Eq. 29 ; Blanton r. Brack- 
 ett, 5 Coll. 232 ; Green v. Vaughan, 2 Blatkf. 
 324; Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 John. Ch. 92; Wight 
 v. Prescott, 2 Barb. Ch. 196 ; Fant v. Miller, 17 
 Gratt. 187; see Miller v. Tolleson, Harper Eq. 
 145. The defendant is as much bound to an- 
 swer the charging part as the stating part, 
 of the bill; and his answer to the charging 
 part, if responsive thereto, is evidence in his 
 own favor, if an answer on oath has not been 
 waived by the plaintiff. Smith r. Clark, 4 
 Paige, 368; Rich v. Austin, 40 Vt. 416; Adams 
 v. Adams, 22 Vt. 68. Where, however, the 
 answer of the defendant is not responsive to 
 the bill, or sets up affirmative allegations of 
 new matter not stated or inquired of in the bill, 
 in opposition to, or in avoidance of, the plain- 
 tiff's demand, and is replied to, the answer is of 
 no avail in respect to such allegations; and the 
 defendant is as much bound to establish the 
 allegations so made, by independent testimony, 
 as the plaintiff is to sustain his bill. Clemeiits 
 r. Moore, 6 Wall. 315; Seitz v. Mitchell, 94 
 TJ. S. 580: Roberts v. Stigleman, 78 111. 120; 
 Gordon v. Bell, 50 Ala. 213; Roberts r. Birgess, 
 20 N. J. Eq. 139; O'Brien v. Fry, 82 111. 274; 
 Hart v. Carpenter, 36 Mich. 402; Bellows v. 
 Stone, 18 N. H. 465; Wakeman v. Grover, 
 4 Paige, 23; New England Bank v. Lewis, 8 
 Pick. 113; Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 John. Ch. 89; 
 Dickey v. Allen, 1 Green Ch. 406; Bradley v. 
 W'ebb", 53 Maine, 462; O'Brien v. Elliot, 15 
 Maine, 125; Lucas r. Bank of Darien, 2 Stewart, 
 280;Winansf.Winans, 19 N.J. Eq 220;Pierson 
 ». Clayes. 15 Vt. 93; Wells v. Houston, 37 Vt. 
 245; M' Daniel v. Barnam, 5 Vt. 279; Tobin v. 
 Walkinshaw, 1 McAll. C. C. 26; Pusey v. 
 Wright, 31 Penn. St. 387; Garlick c. Mo- 
 Arthur, 6 Wis. 450; Ives v. Hazard, 4 R. I. 14; 
 Dease v. Moody, 31 Miss. 617; Fisler v. Porch, 
 10 N. J. Eq. 243; Voorhees v. Voorhees, 18 id. 
 223; Miles v. Miles, 32 N. H. 147; Busby v. 
 Littlefield, 33 N. H. 76 ; Rogers v. Mitchell, 41 
 N. H. 157; Leach v. Fobes, 11 Gray, 509,- 
 M'Donald v. M'Donald, 16 Vt. 630; Randall v. 
 Phillips, 3 Mason, 378; Gordon v. Sims, 2 
 M'Cord Ch. 156; Clarke v. White, 12 Peters, 
 178; Lampton v. Lampton, 6 Monroe, 620; 
 Purcell v. Purcell, 4 Hen. & M. 511; Hagthorp 
 v. Hook, 1 Gill & J. 272; Alexander v. Wal- 
 lace, 10 Yerger, 105; Cocke v. Trotter, id. 213; 
 Carter v. Sleeper, 5 Dana, 263; Flagg v. Mann, 
 
 (o) See Toulme v. Clark, 64 Miss. 471 ; 
 Morse r. Hill. 136 Mass. 60; Burlew r. Quarrier, 
 16 W. Va. 108; Harris v. Collins, 75 Ga. 97; 
 840 
 
 Saunders v. Allen, 53 Fed. Rep 109 ; Atkinson 
 v. Foster, 134 111. 472.
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 *846 
 
 defendant, by his answer, denies a fact as to his belief * only ; 1 or * 846 
 
 2 Sumner, 487; Gould v. Williamson, 21 Maine, 
 273; Jones v. Jones, 1 Ired. Eq. 332; Johnson 
 v. Pierson, Dev. Eq. 3G4; Miller v. Wack, 
 1 Saxton, 204; Pierce v. Gates, 7 Blackf. 102; 
 Dunn v. Dunn, 8 Ala. 784; Sanborn 17. Kit- 
 tredge, 20 Vt. 632; Fitzhugh c. M'Pherson, 3 
 Gill, 408; Patton v. Ashley, 3 Eng. 290; Brooks 
 v. Gillis, 12 Sin. & M. 538. An answer to 
 statements of the bill not necessary to the com- 
 plainant's case are not evidence for the defend- 
 ant. Brown v. Kahnweiler, 28 N. J. Eq. 311, 
 citing Wanmaker v. Van Buskirk, Saxt. 685; 
 Farnum v. Burnett, 21 N. J. Eq. 87; Day v. 
 Perkins, 2 Sandf. Ch. 359, 365. The bill set 
 out an agreement, and called upon the defend- 
 ant to admit or deny it, but not to state what it 
 was, and the defendant in his answer set forth 
 another agreement; such statement of the lat- 
 ter agreement is not responsive to the bill, and 
 is not evidence for the defendant. Jones v. 
 Beet, 2 Gill, 106. An answer, in stating the 
 particulars of a transaction charged and in- 
 quired into by the bill, is responsive. Merritt 
 v. Brown, 19 N. J. Eq. 286, 289 ; Youle v. Rich- 
 ards, Saxton, 539; Moody v. Metcalf, 51 Ga. 
 128. To a bill for an account between partners, 
 alleging that each partner had an equal inter- 
 est, the answer was held responsive which 
 denied the allegation, and averred that the 
 shares were unequal, specifying them. Eaton's 
 Appeal, 66 Penn. St. 483. If the bill requires 
 the defendant to state an account between the 
 parties, the account so stated is responsive to 
 the bill. Bellows v. Stone, 18 N. H. 465. If 
 the defendant might have full}' answered the 
 plaintiff's bill, and left out an}' particular 
 allegations of new matter in his answer, then 
 those allegations are not responsive; but all 
 allegations are responsive, the absence of 
 which in the answer would furnish just 
 ground for exception. Bellows v. Stone, 18 
 N. H. 465. But when the case is heard upon 
 the bill and answer alone, the answer must be 
 taken as true, whether responsive to the bill or 
 not, because the defendant is precluded from 
 proving it. (b) Lowry v. Armstrong, 2 Stew. 
 & P. 297 ; Cheny v. Belcher, 5 id. 134 ; M'Gowen 
 v.Young, 3 id. 161; Paulling r. Sturgis, id. 
 95; Stone v. Moore, 26 111. 165; Doolittle v. 
 Gooking, 10 Vt. 275; Slason v. Wright, 14 
 Vt. 208; Wright v. Bates, 13 V 7 t. 341; Dale 
 v. M'Evers, 2 Cowen, 118; Reed v. Reed, 16 
 N. J. Eq. 248; Jones v. Mason, 5 Rand. 577; 
 Kennedy v. Baylor, 1 Wash. 162; Copeland V. 
 
 Crane, 9 Pick. 73 ; Tainter v. Clark, 5 Allen, 66 ; 
 Perkins v. Nichols, 11 Allen, 542; Russell v. Mof- 
 fit, 6 How. (Miss.) 303; Trout v. Emmons, 29 111. 
 433; Buntain v. Wood, id. 504; Gaskill c. Sine, 
 13 N. J. Eq. 130; Mason v. McGore, 28 111. 
 322; De Wolf v. Long, 2 Gilman, 679; Rogers v. 
 Mitchell, 41 N. II. 154. Still, general allegations 
 in an answer, containing matters of belief and 
 conclusions from facts not particularly stated, 
 are said by Wilde J. in Copeland v. Crane, 9 
 Pick. 73, 78, to be entitled to little or no weight 
 in a hearing on the bill and answer. See 
 Beford v. Crane, 16 N. J. Eq. 265. Such an 
 answer, however, is sufficient to put the plaintiff 
 to the proof of his case; the Court in such a 
 case will believe what the defendant believes, 
 nothing being found to the contrary. Buttrick 
 v. Holden, 13 Met. 355, 377. And so far as 
 his answer is a mere denial of the plaintiff's 
 case, of course it prevails. It is for the plaintiff 
 to prove the allegations in the bill which are 
 denied by the answer. But when the answer 
 admits the plaintiff's case, and seeks to avoid 
 it, by general allegations of the character above 
 alluded to by Mr. Justice Wilde, then the ques- 
 tion of its effect, as an answer, properly arises, 
 and undoubtedly, in such a case, it would be 
 entitled to but little weight. See Givens v. 
 Tidniore, 8 Ala. 745. An answer which alleges 
 as facts what the defendant could not personally 
 know, though responsive to the bill, merely 
 puts the plaintiff upon the proof of his own 
 allegations. Dugan v. Gittings, 3 Gill, 138; see 
 Drury v. Conner, 6 Harr. & J. 288, 291 ; Law- 
 rence v. Lawrence, 21 N. J. Eq. 317. So of a 
 denial by the defendant upon information and 
 belief, not founded on the personal knowledge 
 of the defendant. Coleman v. Ross, 46 Penn. 
 St. 180; Newman v. James, 12 Ala. 29 : Town- 
 send v. Mcintosh, 14 Ind. 57; Ilartwell v. 
 Whitman, 36 Ala. 712; see Bellows v. Stone, 
 18 N. H. 465, 479. So, an answer on informa- 
 tion simply makes an issue. Wilkins v. May, 
 3 Head, 173. As to the effect of the answer of 
 a corporation being put in, not under oath, but 
 under the common seal of the corporation, see 
 Haight v. Proprietors of Morris Aqueduct, 4 
 Wash. C. C. 601; Lovett v. Steam Saw Mill 
 Ass. 6 Paige, 54; State Bank v. Edwards, 20 
 Ala. 512; Union Bank v. Geary, 5 Peters, 99. 
 Such answer has no other force and effect than 
 that of an individual not under oath. Mary- 
 land and New York Coal & Iron Co. v. Win- 
 gert, 8 Gill, 170. So of an answer sworn to in 
 
 1 Arnot v. Biscoe, 1 Yes. Sr. 95, 97 ; Hughes 
 v. Garner, 2 Y. &C. Ex. 328, 335. The true 
 
 rule in such case is that the answer is to be re- 
 garded as the deposition of one witness, and 
 
 (b) McCully i'. Peel, 42 N. J. Eq. 493; Mar- 
 zet v. Pittsburgh, 137 Penn. St. 548; Ameri- 
 can Carpet Linen Co. v. Chipman, 146 Mass. 
 
 385; Davenport v. Auditor-General, 70 Mich. 
 192; Bierne v. Ray, 37 W. Va. 571. 
 
 841
 
 816 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 where it is a mere constructive denial, by the filing of a traversing note. 2 
 
 another State before an officer not authorized to 
 take an oath to an answer. Freytag v. Hoeland, 
 23 N. J. Eq. 30. As to the effect of an answer, 
 made by one incompetent to give testimony in 
 any case, and incapable of making oath, see Sal- 
 mon r. Clagett, 3 Bland, 105. The oaths, of 
 two plaintiffs in the same cause, made by the 
 statute of New Jersey competent witnesses for 
 themselves, will not be considered as destroy- 
 ing the effect of the responsive denial of the 
 answer, unless they seem to the Court to be 
 entitled to the weight of the oaths of two cred- 
 ible witnesses; and, in considering their weight, 
 the fact of the interest of these witnesses as 
 parties to the suit must be taken into consid- 
 eration. Vandegrift v. Herbert, 18 N. J. Eq. 
 466. It has been stated above, in this note, that 
 the plaintiff will not be allowed to discredit the 
 answer by impeaching the character of the de- 
 fendant for truth and veracity. This subject 
 was very fully examined by Chancellor Green, 
 in Brown v. Bulkley, 14 N. J. Eq. 294, and he 
 entirely sustains this position. 
 
 Under the Practice Act in California, a sworn 
 
 the plaintiffs must produce evidence sufficient to 
 overcome it, and there is no unvarying rule on 
 the subject. Veile v. Blodgett, 49 Vt. 270. Where 
 the answer does not state facts positively, or as 
 within the defendant's own knowledge, or does 
 state them iuferentially merely, or only accord- 
 ing to the defendant's best knowledge and 
 belief, the rule requiring two witnesses, or one 
 witness with corroborating circumstances, to 
 counteract its effect, does not apply. Cunning- 
 ham v. Ferry, 74 111. 426. The only effect of the 
 answer in such case is, to put the plaintiff to the 
 necessity of proving the facts alleged in his bill. 
 Waters v. Creagh, 4 Stew. & P. 410; Hughes 
 v. Garner, 2 Y. & C. 127; Knickerbacker v. 
 Harris, 1 Paige, 209 ; Stevens v. Post, 12 N. J. 
 Eq. 408; Pearce v. Nix, 34 Ala. 183; Watson 
 v. Palmer, 5 Ark. 501, 505, 506; Drury v. 
 Conner, 6 Harr. & J. 288; Phillips v. Richard- 
 son, 4 J. J. Marsh. 213; Copeland v. Crane, 9 
 Pick. 73, 78; Parkman v. Welch, 19 Pick. 231; 
 Norwood v. Norwood, 2 Harr. & J. 328; Pen- 
 nington v. Gittings, 2 Gill & J. 208 ; Bellows v. 
 Stone, 18 N. H. 465; Hunt v. Rousmanier, 3 
 Mason, 294 ; Brown v. Brown, 10 Yerger, 84; 
 Combs v. Buswell, 2 Dana, 474 ; Young v. 
 Hopkins, 6 Monroe, 22; Martin v. Greene, 10 
 Mo. 652. The same is true where the answer is 
 evasive, or so expressed as not to amount to a 
 positive denial. Wilkins v. Woodfin, 5 Munf. 
 183; M'Campbell v. Gill, 4 Monroe, 90 ; Sallee 
 v. Duncan, 7 Monroe, 383; Hutchinson v. Sin- 
 clair, id. 293: Neal v. Ogden, 5 Monroe, 362; 
 Lyon v. Hunt, 11 Ala. 295; Hrirtwell r. Whit- 
 man, 36 Ala. 712; Martin v. Greene, 10 Mo. 
 652. And if the facts are stated in the bill to be 
 
 842 
 
 answer is no evidence for the defendant. Good- 
 win v. Hammond, 13 Cal. 168; Bostic v. Love, 
 16 Cal. 69. And in Missouri the old rule with 
 respect to the weight of an answer in Chancery 
 has been done away with by the new Code. 
 Walton v. Walton, 17 Mo. 376; Cornet v. 
 Bertelsmann. 61 Mo. 118, 126. So in Iowa the 
 rule requiring two witnesses, or one and strong 
 corroborating circumstances, to overcome the 
 answer, does not exist; though such answer 
 throws upon the plaintiff the onus of sus- 
 taining his material charges by competent 
 proof. Graves v. Alden, 13 Iowa, 573; Jones 
 v. Jones, id. 276 ; Culbertson v. Luckey, id. 
 12; Cheuvette v. Mason, 4 Green, 231; White 
 v. Hampton, 10 Iowa, 238 ; Gilbert v. Mosier, 
 11 Iowa, 498. A sworn answer in Chancery, if 
 not demanded, only puts in issue the allegations 
 of the bill. Wilson v. Holcomb, 13 Iowa, 110; 
 Connelly v. Carlin, id. 383. An answer in 
 Chancery without an oath is a mere pleading, 
 and of no effect as evidence. Morris t;. Hoyt, 
 11 Mich. 9. 
 
 in the defendant's personal knowledge, and the 
 defendant merely disclaim personal knowledge 
 and demand strict proof, this will not amount 
 to a denial of the facts and put the complainant 
 on proof of them. McAllister v. Clorton, 51 
 Miss. 257. So where the answer is merely 
 formal to put in issue the allegations of the bill. 
 Reynolds v. Pharr, 9 Ala. 560. Or neither 
 admits nor denies a fact charged by the bill. 
 Ante, p. 837, n. 4. The answei of a corporation, 
 being put in under its common seal only, cannot 
 be used as evidence, but puts in issue the allega- 
 tions to which it responds, and imposes on the 
 plaintiff the burden of proving such allegations. 
 Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Wheeling, 13 Gratt. 
 40. Where an answer on oath is waived, the 
 answer is not evidence in favor of the defend- 
 ant for any purpose : Patterson v. Gaines, 6 
 How. (U. S.) 550; Larsh v. Brown, 3 Ind. 234 ; 
 Moore v. McClintock, 6 Ind. 209 ; Doo:i v. Bayer, 
 16 Md. 144: although in fact put in under 
 oath : Gerrish v. Towne, 3 Gray, 82 ; Armstrong 
 v. Scott, 3 Iowa 433; Wilson v. Holcomb, 13 
 Iowa, 110; Connelly v. Carlin, id. 383; see 
 Patterson v. Scott, 138 111. 100 ; 37 III. App. 520; 
 but as a pleading, the plaintiff may avail him- 
 self of the admissions and allegations contained 
 therein, which establish the case made by the 
 bill. Bartlett r. Gale. 4 Paige, 503; Miller v. 
 Avery. 2 Birb. Ch. 582; Wilson v. Towle, 36 
 N. H. 129; Durfee v. McClurg, 6 Mich. 223; 
 Smith r. Potter, 3 Wis. 432; see also Union 
 Bank of Georgetown v. Geary, 5 Peters, 99, 
 110-112; 'Story, Eq. PI § 875 a, and note; 
 White v. Hampton, 10 Iowa, 238. 
 2 See ante, p. 514. 

 
 ADMISSIONS. * 847 
 
 The reason for the adoption of this rule by the Courts was : because, 
 there being a single deposition only, against the oath of the defendant 
 in his answer, the denial of facts by the answer was equally strong with 
 the affirmation of them by the deposition. 8 Where, therefore, there were 
 any corroborative circumstances in favor of the plaintiff's case, which 
 gave a preponderance in his favor, the Court departed from the rule, 
 and either made a decree, or directed an issue. 4 Thus, where 
 a bill was filed for the specific * performance of an agreement, * 847 
 which the defendant denied by his answer, but the agreement 
 was proved by one witness, and there was also evidence to prove the 
 defendant's confession of it, besides other corroborative circumstances, a 
 decree was made. 1 So, where a defendant had denied notice of a previous 
 mortgage, which, however, was proved by a single witness, and it was also 
 proved, by other evidence, that upon an application being made to the 
 defendant on behalf of the previous mortgagee for an account, he ob- 
 served, "You have no right, for your mortgage is not registered," Lord 
 Redesdale held, that the testimony of the witness, who proved the notice 
 directly, was confirmed by that observation, which showed that the 
 defendant had investigated the subject, and relied on the neglect to 
 register the mortgage. 2 
 
 Upon the same principle, where a parol agreement, with part-perform- 
 ance, is insisted upon in a bill, and the agreement is denied by the answer, 
 yet, if it is proved by one witness, and supported by circumstances of part- 
 performance, such as delivery of possession, the specific performance of 
 the agreement has been decreed. 3 In such cases, however, if the defend- 
 
 3 Walton v. Hobbs, 2 Atk. 19. Eq. 205. Circumstances alone, in the absence 
 
 4 Pember v. Mathers, Walton v. Hobbs, of a positive witness, may be sufficient to over- 
 Hine v. Dodd, ubi supra ; and Janson v. Rany, come the denial of the answer, even of a person 
 2 Atk. 140 ; see also Re Barr's Trust, 4 K. & J. who answers on his own knowledge. Long v. 
 219; Dunn v. Graham, 17 Ark. 60; 1 Greenl. White, 5 J. J. Marsh. 238; Robinson v. Stewart, 
 Ev. § 200; 1 Phil. Ev. (Cowen & Hill's ed.) 10 N. Y. 189; Robinson e. Hardin, 20 Ga. 344; 
 154, 155, and notes referred to; Sturtevant v. Roberts v. Kelly, 2 P. & H. 390; see also Stur- 
 Waterbury, 1 Edw. Ch. 442; Columbia Bank v. tevant v. Waterbury, 1 Edw. 442; Broun v. 
 Black, 2 M'Cord Ch. 344, 350; Smith v. Shane, Brown, 10 Yerger, 84; Dunham v. Gates. 1 Hoff. 
 1 M'Lean, 27; Clark v. Van Reimsdyk, 9 Ch. 188; Cunningham v. Freeborn, 3 Paige, 
 Cranch, 160; Neilson v. Dickinson, 1 Desaus. 564 ; S. C. on appeal, 11 Wend. 251; Gould v. 
 103; Union Bank of Georgetown v. Geary, 5 Williamson, 21 Maine, 276; Preschbaker r. 
 Peters, 99; Clark v. Hunt, 3 J. .1. Marsh. £60; Freeman, 32 III. 475. 
 
 Young v. Hopkins, 6 Monroe, 22; Watson v. The credit due to an answer in Chancery is 
 Stockett, 6 Harr. & J. 435; Roberts v. Salis- no greater than that which i> due to the deposi- 
 bury, 3 Gill & J. 425; McNeil v. Magee, 5 tion of a witness, and, therefore, if that which 
 Mason, 244; Pierson v. Catlin. 3 Vt. 272; Dun- is in favor of respondent be unreasonable in it- 
 ham v. Jackson, Wen 1. 72; Turner v. Holman, self, or be disproved by other witnesses, or be 
 5 Monroe, 410; Hutchinson v. Sinclair, 7 Mon- inconsistent with other facts in the cause, it mav 
 roe, 294; Drury v. Connor, 6 Harr. & J. 288; be rejected, although there may not be two 
 Wilkins ».Woodfin, 5 Munf. 183; Love v. Brax- witnesses contradicting the respondent. Brown 
 ton, 5 Call, 527; Vance v. Vance, 5 Mon. 523; v. Brown, 10 Yerger, 84 ; see Forsvtb v. (lark, 
 Cunningham v. Freeborn, 3 Paige, 557; Kstep 3 Wend. 637; Young v. Hopkins, 6 T. B. Mon. 
 v. Watkins, 1 Bland, 488. The answer that 18 ; Houndtree v. Gordon, 8 Mo. 19. 
 denies, may contain the circumstances to cor- 1 Only v. Walker, 3 Atk. 407, 408. 
 roborate the plaintiff's proof, so as to overcome 2 Biddulph v. St. John. 2 Sch. & I>ef. 532. 
 itself, when taken in connection with that proof. 8 Morphelt v. Jones. I Swanst. '72, 182: see 
 Pierson v. Catlin, 3 Vt. 272; Maury v. Lewis, Maddison v. Alderson, 8 App. Cas. 467, 478; 5 
 10 Yerger, 115 ; Sayre v. Fredericks, 16 N. J. Ex. D. 293; McManus v. Cooke, 35 Ch. D. G81. 
 
 843
 
 848 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 ant, by his answer, denies the agreement set up by the bill, and his 
 denial is confirmed by circumstances, the'Court will not decree a specific 
 performance, although the case made by the bill is corroborated by one 
 witness. 4 And where a particular agreement by parol, namely, an agree- 
 ment to grant a lease for three lives, was stated in the bill, and proved 
 by one witness, and confirmed by acts of part-performance, but the 
 answer admitted an agreement for one life only, and was supported by 
 the testimony of one witness, the Court refused to decree for the plain- 
 tiff, the evidence of part-performance being equally applicable to either 
 agreement. 5 
 
 Sometimes the Court gave the defendant an opportunity of trying 
 the case at Law, when the plaintiff's case was supported by 
 * 848 * the evidence of only one witness and corroborating circum- 
 stances ; 1 and sometimes the Court directed the answer of the 
 defendant to be read as evidence. 2 As the practice of directing an 
 issue, in a case of this description, was intended solely for the satisfac- 
 tion of the defendant, it was by no means compulsory upon the defend- 
 ant to take one ; and if the defendant declined an issue, the Court itself 
 was bound to give judgment upon the question whether the circum- 
 stances outweighed the effect of the rule, so as to authorize a decree 
 against the denial in the answer. 
 
 It must be remembered that the parties to a cause can now be wit- 
 nesses on their own behalf ; 3 so that such questions as we have just 
 been considering are of very rare occurrence in modern practice. 
 
 II. Admissions by agreement between the parties are those which, 
 for the sake of saving expense or preventing delay, the parties, or their 
 solicitors, agree upon between themselves. 4 
 
 Admissions of this description depend entirely upon the circumstances 
 of each case, and little can now be said respecting them beyond drawing 
 to the practitioner's notice the necessity there exists that they should 
 be clear and distinct. In general, they ought to be in writing and signed 
 either by the parties or their solicitors ; aud the signature of the solici- 
 
 4 Pilling v. Armitage, 12 Ves. 78. 79; Money 
 v. Jordan, 2 De G. M. & G. 318; S. C nom. 
 Jorden v. Money, 5 H. L. Cas. 185; Glass v. 
 Hulbert, 102 Mass. 28. 
 
 5 Lindsay ». Lynch, 2 Sch. & Lef. 1, 7. 
 
 i East India Co. v. Donald, 9 Ves. 275, 283, 
 284 ; Ibbottson v. Rhodes, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 229, 
 pi. 13: 2 Vern. 554: Pember r. Mathers, 1 Bro. 
 C. C. 52; Savage v. Brocksopp, 18 Ves. 335 337; 
 post, " Trial of Questions of Fact ; " Lancaster 
 v. Ward, Overton, 430; Smith v. Betty, 11 
 Gratt. 752. 
 
 2 Ibbottson v. Rhodes, ubi supra. The an- 
 swer cannot be read unless an order is made to 
 that effect. Black v. Lamb, 12 X. J. Eq. 108; 
 Gresley, Eq. Ev. 227; see Rule 33 of the Rules 
 of Practice in Chancery in Massachusetts ; 
 Gamble v. Johnson, 9 Mo. 605; Kinsey v. 
 Grimes, 7 Black f. 290. See, as to the effect of 
 the answer, Richmond v. Richmond, 10 Yerger, 
 
 844 
 
 343. In Marston v. Brackett, 9 ST. H. 350, the 
 Court remarked that " the manner of proceed- 
 ing to the trial of issues from Chancery is under 
 the control of the Court. Orders may be made 
 respecting the admission of testimony, and an 
 order may be made for the examination of one 
 or both of the parties; but this may be refused. 
 If the party, after the evidence has been 
 taken for the hearing, moves for a trial by 
 the jury, we are of opinion the case should 
 be tried there upon the same evidence upon 
 which it would have been tried had it taken 
 the usual course of cases in Chancery, and 
 been examined by the Court ; unless the Court, 
 upon cause shown, made an order permitting 
 further evidence to be introduced. Any other 
 course would lead to great abuse," &c. 
 
 3 See 14 & 15 Vic. c. 99, § 2. 
 
 4 Gresley, Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 38, etseq.
 
 THE ONUS PROBANDI. * 849 
 
 tor employed by the party is considered sufficient to bind his principal, 
 the Court inferring that he had authority for that purpose. 5 It does 
 not, however, appear to be necessary that an agreement to admit a par- 
 ticular fact should be in writing. 6 
 
 * It is to be remarked, that although the Courts are disposed * 849 
 to give every encouragement to the practice of parties or their 
 solicitors agreeing upon admissions among themselves, they will not sanc- 
 tion an agreement for an admission by which any of the known principles 
 of Law are evaded ; 1 and, therefore, where the law requires an instrument 
 to be stamped, the Court will not give effect to an agreement between the 
 solicitors to waive the objection arising from its not being stamped. 2 
 
 To save expense, it has been recently enacted, that where all the 
 parties to a suit are competent to make admissions, any party may 
 call on any other, by notice, to admit any document, saving all just 
 exceptions. 3 
 
 All written admissions of evidence, whereon any order is founded, 
 must be indorsed by the Eegistrar, 4 and be then filed at the Report 
 Office, 5 and a note thereof made on the order, by the Clerk of 
 Reports. 6 
 
 Section II. — The Onus Probandi. 
 
 Having ascertained what matters are to be considered as admitted 
 between the parties, either by the pleadings or by agreement, the next 
 step is to consider what proofs are to be adduced in support of those 
 points which are not so admitted. 7 
 
 In considering the question, what matters are to be proved in a 
 
 5 Young v. Wright, 1 Camp. N. P. 139; with regard to husband and wife giving cvi- 
 Gainsford v. Gammer, 2 id. 9; Laing v. Kaine, dence for or against each other, see 16 & 17 Vic. 
 2 Bos. & P. 85. For form of admission, see c. 83; 32 & 33 Vic. c. 68 ; Rt Hideout's Trusts, 
 Vol. III. L. R. 10 Eq. 41; Re Yearwocd's Trusts, 5 Ch. 
 
 6 Thus, where at Law the plaintiff's attorney D. 545; Nottingham Union Guardians v. Tom- 
 swore that he had proposed that the defendant kinson, 4 C. P. D. 343. 
 
 should acknowledge a warrant of attorney, so 2 Owen t\ Thomas, 3 M. & K. 353, 357; 
 
 as to enable the deponent, if it should become Nixon v. Albion Mar. Ins. Co. L. R. 2 Ex. 
 
 necessary, to enter up judgment thereon, and 438; see, however, Orange 0. Pickford, and 
 
 that the defendant had accepted his offer, it was Thompson r. Webster, cited Seton, 16; see 
 
 considered well proved that the defendant had also post, p. 880, and Chap. XXV., Hearing 
 
 agreed to acknowledge the instrument for all Causes. 
 
 purposes, and that the plaintiff was at liberty 3 21 & 22 Vic. c. 27, § 7; see post, p. 879. 
 
 to act upon the instrument without the necessity 4 Reg. Regul. 15 March, 1860, r. 23. For 
 
 of producing the subscribing witness. Mar- form of entering admissions, see Seton, 24. 
 shall v. Cliff, 4 Camp. 133. But it may be 6 Cons. Ord. I. 44. 
 
 doubted whether it is not necessary, in Chan- 6 Cons. Ord. XXIII. 23. 
 
 eery, that all admissions should be in writing. ' The rules of evidence are the same in 
 
 See Ord. III. 11. Courts of Equity as in Courts of Law. Morri- 
 
 l Thus, where a husband was willing that son v. Hart, 2 Bibb, 4; Lemaster v. Burckhart, 
 
 his wife should be examined as a witness, in an id. 28; Dwight v. Poineroy, 17 Mass. 303; Reed 
 
 action against him for a malicious prosecution, p. Clark, 4 Monroe, 20; Stevens v. Cooper, 1 
 
 Lord Hardwicke refused to allow her examina- John. Ch. 425; Baugh v. Ramsey, 4 Monroe, 
 
 tion, because it was against the policy of the 137; Eveleth r. Wilson, 15 Mass. 109. As to 
 
 law to allow a woman to be a witness, either the onus in cases of trusts, see Roberts v. 
 
 for or against her husband. Barker i\ Dixie, Roberts, 12 Jur. N. S. 971. 
 Rep. temp. Hardwicke, 2G4. As to the law 
 
 845
 
 8o0 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 cause. 
 
 850 
 
 Law 
 
 the first point to be ascertained is, upon whom the burden 
 of the proof lies ? And here it may be laid down, as a general 
 * proposition, that the point in issue is to be proved by the party 
 who asserts the affirmative, according to the maxim of the Civil 
 " Ei incumbit pvubatio qui dicit, non qui negate x («) This rule is 
 
 1 On this subject, see the following works 
 on evidence: 1 Phillips, 552; 1 Taylor, §337, 
 et seq. ; Best, § 271 ; Gresley, 388; Starkie, 586 : 
 Powell, 180. This is a rule of convenience, 
 adopted, not because it is impossible to prove a 
 negative, but because a negative does not ad- 
 mit of the direct and simple proof of which the 
 affirmative is capable. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 74; 
 Dranquet v. Prudhomme, 3 La. 83, 86; 1 Phil. 
 Ev. 194-203; 2 Phil. Ev. (Cowen & Hill's notes, 
 ed. 1839) 475, et seq. ; Phelps v. Hartwell, 1 
 Mass. 71; Blaney v. Sargeant, id. 335; Loring 
 v. Steinman, 1 Met. 204, 211; Phillips v. Ford, 
 9 Pick. 39. Regard is to be had in this matter 
 to the substance of the issue rather than to the 
 form of it; for in many cases the party, by 
 making a slight change in his pleading, may 
 give the issue a negative or affirmative form, 
 at his pleasure. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 74. To this 
 general rule, that the burden of proof is on the 
 party holding the affirmative, there are some 
 exceptions. Ibid. § 78. One class of these 
 exceptions will be found to include those cases 
 in which the party grounds his right of action 
 
 (a) All the admissions in a pleading are to 
 be taken together. Spencer v. Fortescue, 1 12 
 N. C. 208. In some jurisdictions it is held that 
 facts well pleaded are admitted if not denied. 
 See Cobbey c. Wright, 34 Neb. 771 . More often, 
 perhaps, it is held that allegations which are 
 neither admitted nor denied by the answer, 
 must be proved. Litch v. Clinch, 136 111. 410; 
 Cushman v. Bonfield, 139 111.219; Randolph i\ 
 GIos, 135 111. 200; Smith v. Ewing, 23 Fed. 
 Rep. 741; Rogers )•. Marshall, 13 id. 59; Mead 
 ?■. Day, 54 Miss. 58. So under the Code of 
 Colorado, material allegations in the complaint, 
 if not denied by the answer, need not be proved. 
 Wall v. Livezay, 6 Col. 465. In Ferris ?>. Hard, 
 135 N. Y. 354," 361, Peckham J. said: "An 
 answer may contain a direct or an implied ad- 
 mission of some fact alleged in the complaint. 
 The admission is implied when the fact alleged 
 in the complaint is not denied in the answer, 
 It is direct when the admission is made in 
 terms. Either form of an admission of an 
 allegation contained in the complaint is conclu- 
 sive upon a defendant so long as it remains in 
 the pleading, and the plaintiff can point to it as 
 conclusive proof of the truth of his allegation. 
 Paige v. Willett, 38 N. Y. 28; Robbins v. Cod- 
 man, 4 E. D. Smith, 315, 325. An allegation 
 contained in an answer setting up an affirmative 
 
 846 
 
 upon a negative allegation, and where of course 
 the establishment of this negative is an essential 
 element of his case. Ibid. Lane v. Crombie, 12 
 Pick. 177; Kerr v. Freeman, 33 Miss. 292. So 
 where the negative allegation involves a charge 
 of criminal neglect of duty, whether official or 
 otherwise; or fraud; or the wrongful violation 
 of actual lawful possession of property, the 
 party making the allegation must prove it. 
 1 Greenl. Ev. § 80. There is no difference in re- 
 spect to the burden of proof, between proceed- 
 ings at Law and in Equity; in both the party 
 maintaining the affirmative of the issue cast 
 upon him. Pusey v. Wright, 31 Penn. St. 387. 
 Upon the party alleging an alteration in a deed 
 rests the burden of proving the alteration. Put- 
 nam r. Clark, 29 N. J. Eq. 412. And upon him 
 who claims under an agreement in writing rests 
 the burden of proving its execution and con- 
 tents, although lost. Swaiue v. Maryott, 28 
 N. J. Eq. 589. So, upon him who has signed a 
 joint and several note, rests the burden of prov- 
 ing that he signed only as surety. Coleman v. 
 Norman, 10 Heisk. 590. A party in Equity, 
 
 defence, which has no reference to and does not 
 admit any allegation of the complaint, is of an 
 entirely different nature. Such allegation is 
 not an admission contained in a pleading which 
 is conclusive, so I ng as it remains in the 
 record." 
 
 Allegations in a complaint which are ad- 
 mitted in the answer absolutely conclude the 
 parties and need not be proved. Northern 
 Pacific R. Co. v. Pain", 119 U. S. 561: United 
 Telephone Co. v. Donohoe, 31 Ch. D. 399; 
 California Electrical Works v. Finck, 47 Fed. 
 Rep. 583: Quinby v. Carbart, 133 N. Y. 579; 
 Deimel r. Brown, 136 111. 586; Stepp v. National 
 Life Association, 37 S. C. 417. If an answer, 
 to which replication is filed, literally denies a 
 material allegation of the bill, this, even though 
 insufficient on exception, is not an admission. 
 United States r. Ferguson, 54 Fed. Rep. 28. 
 The plaintiff's admission in his bill of aeon- 
 tract, which is within the Statute of Frauds, is 
 permanent, and he cannot afterwards set up the 
 statute in his answer to a cross-bill. Battell v. 
 Matot, 58 Vt. 271. In Traver v. Purdy, 25 N. 
 Y. S. 452, it was held that the defendant is re- 
 quired to plead the statute only when he admits 
 or does not deny the contract; not when he 
 denies its existence. See ante, p. 656.
 
 THE ONUS PROBANDI. 
 
 851 
 
 common to Courts of Equity and of Law ; and accordingly, when a 
 defendant insists upon a purchase for a valuable consideration, without 
 notice, the fact of the defendant, or those under whom he claims, having 
 had notice of the plaintiff's title, must be proved by the plaintiff.- So 
 where a feme covert, having a separate property, had joined with her 
 husband in a security for money which it was the object of the bill to 
 recover from her (her husband being dead), and the defendant, by her 
 answer, admitted that she had signed the security, but alleged that she 
 had done so, not of her own free-will, but under the influence of her 
 husband, it was held that it lay upon the wife to repel the effect of her 
 signature, by evidence of undue influence, and not upon the plaintiff to 
 prove a negative. 3 
 
 In general, it may be taken for granted, that wherever a prima facie 
 right is proved, or admitted by the pleadings, the onus probandi is always 
 upon the person calling such right in question. 4 And here it may be ob- 
 served, that a Court will always treat a deed or instrument as being the 
 thing which it purports to be, unless the contrary is shown ; and, there- 
 fore, it is incumbent upon the party impeaching it to show that the deed 
 or instrument in question is not what it purports to be ; 5 thus, where a 
 bond, which was upon the face of it a simple money bond, was impeached 
 as being intended merely as an indemnity bond, it was held, that the 
 burden of proving it to be an indemnity bond, lay on the party 
 * impeaching it. 1 (a) So, if a party claims two legacies under two * 851 
 different instruments, the burden of showing that he is only en- 
 titled to one will lie upon the person attempting to make out that prop- 
 osition : for the Court will assume that the testator, having given the 
 two legacies by different documents, meant to do so, till the contrary is 
 established. 2 
 
 Indeed, in all cases where the presumption of Law is in favor of a 
 
 pleading matter in avoidance, takes upon him- Upsall, L. R. 20 Eq. 1-36. See Robinson v. 
 
 self the burden of proof of the matter so pleaded. Gallier, 2 Woods, 178, and the very able argu- 
 
 Peck ». Hunter, 7 Ind. 295. ment of Mr. Spoffmd in that case. See also 
 
 The party setting up that the consideration Wing t\ Angrave, 8 H. L. C is. 182; Newell v. 
 
 of a mortgage arose out of an illegal contract Nichols, 19 N. Y. Sup. ft 604. 
 
 has the burden of proof upon him. Feldman 2 Eyre v. Dolphin, 2 Ball & B. 303; Saun- 
 
 v. Gamb'e, 20 N. J. Eq. 494. After fraud is ders v. Leslie, id. 515; ante, p. 698. 
 
 proved, the burden is on the other party, who 8 Field v. Sowle, 4 Russ. 112. 
 
 relies on laches, to show when a knowledge of * Banbury Peerage case, 1 S. & S. 153, 155; 
 
 the truth was acquired. Lindsay Petroleum see Hall v. Bvron, 4 Ph. D 667. 
 
 Co. t\ Hurd, L. R. 5 P. C. 221. Those who 5 Vreeland v. Bramhall. 28 N. L Eq. 85. 
 
 found a right upon a person having survived a i Ntcol v. Vaughan, 6 Bligb, N. R. 104; 1 
 
 particular period, as the date of the death of a CI. & F. 49. 
 
 testator, must establish that fact affirmatively 2 Lee v. Pain, 4 Hare, 216; IIoolov r. Hat- 
 by evidence, and this although he may have ton, 2 Dick. 461. Where two legacies are given 
 been heard from only shortly before that period. to the same legatee, by the same instrument. 
 In re Phen^'s Trusts, L. R. 5 Ch. 139; In re the presumption is the other way. Id. 462; see 
 Lewes's Trusts, L. R. 11 Eq. 236 : L. R. 6 Ch. VVhvte v. Whyte, L. R. 17 Eq. 50; Wilson v. 
 356; Re Rhodes, 36 Ch. D. 586; Hickman v. O'Leary, L. R. 7 Ch. 448; L. R. 12 Eq. 525. 
 
 (a) "In Equity a contract to indemnify can tain an action at law." Per Lindley L. J. in 
 be specifically enforced before there has been Johnston v. Salvage Association, 19 Q- B. D. 
 any such breach of the contract as would sus- 458. 
 
 847
 
 *851 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 party, it will be incumbent on the other party to disprove it : 8 though. 
 in so doing he may have to prove a negative, 4 therefore, where the ques- 
 tion turns on the legitimacy of a child, if a legal marriage is proved, the 
 legitimacy is presumed, and the party asserting the illegitimacy ought to 
 prove it, 5 for the presumption of Law is, that a child born of a married 
 woman whose husband is within the four seas, is legitimate, unless there 
 is irresistible evidence against the possibility of sexual intercourse having 
 taken place. 6 (b) 
 
 It is important, in this place, to notice, that in cases where it is sought 
 to impeach a will, or other instrument, on the ground of insanity, the 
 rule as to the onus probandi is : that where a party has ever been subject 
 to a commission, or to any restraint permitted by Law, even a domestic 
 restraint, clearly and plainly imposed upon him in consequence of un- 
 disputed insanity, the proof, showing sanity, is thrown upon him. 7 On 
 the other hand, where insanity has not been imputed by relations or 
 friends, or even by common fame, the proof of insanity, which does 
 not appear to have ever existed, is thrown upon the other side : 8 and 
 
 3 See R. S. C. Ord. XIX. 28. 
 
 4 Whenever there is a presumption that a fact 
 exists, he who makes an allegation to the con- 
 trary must prove it. Higdon v. Higdon, 6 J. 
 J. Marsh. 51. Deeds are presumed to be de- 
 livered on the day of their date. An allegation 
 of another day must be proved. Ibid. 
 
 5 1 Phil, on Evid. 197; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 81. 
 So where infancy is alleged. Ibid. So in case 
 a party once proved to be living is alleged to 
 be dead, the presumption of life not yet being 
 worn out by lapse of time ; the burden of proof 
 is on the party making the allegation, notwith- 
 standing its negative character. Ibid. 
 
 6 Head v. Head, lg.&S. 150; T. & R. 
 138; see also Bury v. Ph-llpot, 2 M. & K. 349, 
 352; Hargrave v. Hargrave, 9 Beav. 552; 10 
 Jur. 957; Plowes v. Bossey, 2 Dr. & S. 145; 8 
 Jur. N. S. 352, V. C. K.; Atchley v. Sprigg, 10 
 Jur. X. S. 144, V. C. K.; and cases cited ante, 
 p. 849, note 2. As to other instances of pre- 
 sumptions of law, see the following works on 
 evidence: 1 Phillips, 467, et seq. ; 1 Taylor, 
 §§97-218; Best, §305, et seq.; Gresley, 473; 
 Powell, 66-98. 
 
 " Where one is under guardianship as non 
 compos, the presumption is that he is incapable 
 of making a will. Breed v. Pratt, 18 Pick. 
 115. Yet this does not prevent his making a 
 will if his mind is actually sound. Ibid. ; Stone 
 
 (6) A mulatto child born of a white married 
 woman, whose husband is white, is not presum- 
 ably legitimate. Bullock v. Knox (Ala.), 11 
 So. Rep. 339. The presumption of legitimacy 
 is now held to be rebuttable. Hawes v. 
 Draeger, 23 Ch. D. 173; Gardner v. Gardner, 
 2 App. Cas. 723; Burnaby r. Baillie, 42 Ch. D. 
 282; Re Walker, 53 L. f . 660; Re Perton, id. 
 848 
 
 v. Damon, 12 Mass. 488; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 690; 
 Crowningshield v. Crowningshield, 2 Gray, 
 531; see Stewart v. Lispenard, 26 Wend. 255. 
 The commission of suicide by the testator is not 
 conclusive evidence of insanity. Brooks v. 
 Barrett, 7 Pick. 94; Duffield r. Robeson, 2 
 Harring. 583; see 2 Greenl. Ev. §§ 689, 690. 
 
 a See 2 Greenl. Ev. §§ 689, 690; Phelps v. 
 Hartwell, 1 Mass. 71; Hubbard v. Hubbard, 
 6 Mass. 397; Breed v. Pratt, 18 Pick. 115; 
 Rogers v. Thomas, 1 B. Monroe, 394; Morse o. 
 Slason, 13 Vt. 296; Jackson v. King, 4 Cowen, 
 207; Stevens v. Van Cleve, 4 Wash. C. C. 262; 
 Burton v. Scott, 3 Rand. 399; Jackson v. Van 
 Dusen, 5 John. 144; Hoge v. Fisher, 1 Peters, 
 C. C. 163; Pettes v. Bingham, 10 N. H. 514; 
 Gerrish v. Mason, 22 Maine, 438; Brooks t'. 
 Barrett, 7 Pick. 94, 99; Commonwealth c. 
 Eddy, 7 Gray, 583; Baxter v. Abbott, id. 71. 
 Under the statutes of Massachusetts, it has been 
 held that the burden of proving the sanity of 
 the testator is upon him who offers the will for 
 probate. Crowningshield v. Crowningshield, 2 
 Gray, 524; see Comstock v. Hadlyme, 8 Conn. 
 261. But in the absence of evidence to the 
 contrary, the legal presumption is in favor of 
 the sanity of the testator. Baxter v. Abbott, 7 
 Grav, 71. The presumption is always in favor 
 of sanity, and insanity cannot be presumed 
 from the mere fact of suicide. Weed v. Mutual 
 
 
 707; Pittsford v. Chittenden, 58 Vt. 49; Her- 
 ring v. Goodson, 43 Miss. 392; Egbert v. Green- 
 wait, 44 Mich. 245; Dean v. State, 29 Ind. 483; 
 Orthwein v. Thomas, 127 111. 554; Vetten r. 
 "Wallace, 39 111. App. 390; Reynolds v. Rey- 
 nolds, 3 Allen, 605; Simon v. State (Texas), 
 20 S. W. Rep. 399, 716; Shuman v. Shuman, 
 83 Wis. 250.
 
 CONFINED TO MATTERS IN ISSUE. * 852 
 
 the insanity is not to be * made out by rambling through the * 852 
 whole life of the party, but must be applied to the particular date 
 of the transaction. 1 
 
 It has also been held, that where general lunacy has been established, 
 , and a party insists upon an act clone during a lucid interval, the proof is 
 thrown upon the party alleging the lucid interval ; and that, in order to 
 establish such an interval, he must prove not merely a cessation of violent 
 symptoms, but a restoration of mind to the party, sufficient to enable 
 him to judge soundly of the act. 2 
 
 It may also be stated, generally, that whenever a person obtains by 
 voluntary donation a benefit from another, the onus probandi is upon the 
 former, if the transaction be questioned, to prove that the transaction 
 was righteous, 3 and that the donor voluntarily and deliberately did the 
 act, knowing its nature and effect. Moreover, where ' the relation of the 
 parties is such that undue influence might have been used, the onus 
 probandi, to show that such influence was not exerted, is upon the person 
 receiving the benefit. 4 
 
 In a patent suit to restrain the sale of a patented article, the onus is 
 on the plaintiff to prove not only the sale, but also that the article sold 
 was not made by himself or his agents. 5 
 
 Section III. — Confined to Matters in Issue. 
 
 It is a fundamental maxim, both in this Court and in Courts of Law, 
 that no proof can be admitted of any matter which is not noticed in 
 
 Benefit Life Ins. Co. 70 N. Y. 561; see An- 7 Ch. 329; Hall v. Hall, L. R. 8 Ch. 430; L. R. 
 derson v. Cramer, 11 W. Va. 562; Mayo v. 14 Eq. 365; Toker v. Toker, 3 De G. J. & S. 
 Jones, 78 N. C. 402. If it is alleged that the 487; Welman v. Welman, 15 Ch. D. 570; Henry 
 testator had no knowledge of the contents of v. Armstrong, 18 Ch. D. 668. 
 the will he has executed, or that he was induced 4 Hoghton v. Hoghton, 15 Beav. 278- Not- 
 to execute it by misrepresentation, the burden tidge v. Prince, 2 Giff. 246; 6 Jur. N. S 1066- 
 of proof is on those who object to the will. Walker v. Smith, 29 Beav. 394; Asliwell y. 
 Pettes v. Bingham, 10 N. H. 514. Lomi, L. R. 2 P. & D. 477; Re Biel, L. R. 16 Eq. 
 i White v. Wilson, 13 Ves. 87,88; and see 577; Taylor v. Johnston, 19 Ch. D. 603. An 
 Att.-Gen. v. Parnther, 3 Bro. C. C. 441, 443; agent or trustee has the onus to show fair deal- 
 Jacobs v. Richards, 18 Beav. 300; 18 Jur. 527; ing. Dunne v. English, L. R. 18 Eq. 524; Pisani 
 Smith v. Tebbitt, L. R. 1 P. & D. 398; Jen- v. Att.-Gen. L. R. 5 P. C. 516; Mcpherson 
 kins v. Morris, 14 Ch. D. 674. v. Watt, 3 App. Cas. 254; Re Worssam, W. 
 
 2 Hall v. Warren, 9 Ves. 605, 611; Clark v. N. (1882) 61; Readdy v. Pendergast, 55 L. T. 
 Fisher, 1 Paige, 171 ; Halley v. Webster, 21 767. See Lyon v. Home, L. R. 6 Eq. 655, 
 Maine, 461; Boyd v. Ebv, 8 Watts, 66; Jack- where the relation was that of spiritual medium 
 son v. Van Dusen, 5 John. 144, 159; Goble v. and follower. See, also, where one of the par- 
 Grant, 2 Green Ch. 629; Whitenach v. Stryker, ties labors under some inequality of condition : 
 1 id. 8; Duffield v. Robeson, 2 Hairing. 375; Kempson v. Ashbee, L. R. 10 Ch. 19; Baker v. 
 Harden u.'Hays, 9 Penn. St. 151; Jencks v. Bradley, 7 De G. M. & G. 621; Connellv v. 
 Probate Court, 2 R. I. 255. The rule does not Fisher, 3 Tenn. Ch. 382; or there is a fiduciary 
 apply to a case of insanity caused by vio- relation between the parties. Malone v. Kelley, 
 lent disease. Hix v. Whittemore, 4 Met. 545; 54 Ala. 532; Leighton v. Orr, 44 Iowa, 679. As 
 Townshend v. Townshend, 7 Gill, 10. to an alleged distinction between a gift inter 
 
 3 Cooke v. Lamotte. 15 Beav. 234; Mitchell v. vivos, and a gift by will, see Partit v. Lawless, 
 Homfray, 8 Q. B. D. 587; Hemberow v. Frost, L. R. 2 P. & D. 462; and see Huguenin v. Base- 
 W. N. (1883) 144; Allcard v. Skinner, 36 Ch. ley, 2 W. & T. 547, and notes. 
 
 D. 145. As to impeaching voluntary donations, 6 Leather Cloth Co. P. Hirschfield, L.R.I 
 
 see Phillips v. Mullings, L. R. 7Ch.244; Coutls Eq. 299. As to presuming a patent valid, see 
 
 i\ Acworth, L. R. 8 Eq. 558; Wallaston v. Halsey v. Brotherhood, 15 Ch. D. 514, 528; 19 
 
 Tribe, L. R. 9 Eq. 44; Turner v. Collins, L. R. Ch. D. 386; 29 W. R. 9. 
 
 VOL. I. — 54 849
 
 *853 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 * 853 the pleadings. 6 (a) This maxim has been adopted, in * order to 
 obviate the great inconvenience to which parties would be exposed, 
 if they were liable to be affected by evidence at the hearing, of the inten- 
 tion to produce which they had received no notice. 1 In certain cases, 
 however, evidence of particular facts may be given under general allega- 
 tions, and, in such cases, therefore, it is not necessary that the particular 
 facts intended to be proved should be stated in the pleadings. 2 The 
 cases in which this exception to the general rule is principally appli- 
 cable, are those where malice, fraudulent intention, knowledge, or other 
 condition of mind, or the character of an individual, or his general 
 behavior, or quality of mind comes in question ; as where, for example, 
 it is alleged that a man is non compos, particular acts of madness may 
 be given in evidence, and not general evidence only that he is insane. 3 
 So, also, where it is' alleged that a man is addicted to drinking, and liable 
 to be imposed upon, the evidence should not be confined to his being a 
 drunkard, but particular instances may be given. 4 In like manner, where 
 
 6 Whaley v. Norton, 1 Vern. 484; Gordon 
 v. Gordon, 3 Swanst. 472; Clarke v. Turton, 11 
 Ves. 240; Williams v. Llewellyn, 2 Y. & J. 68; 
 Hall v. Maltby, 6 Price, 240, 259; Powys v. 
 Mansfield, 6 Sim. 565; Langdon v. Goddard, 2 
 Story, 2G7; James v. M'Keinon, 6 John. 543; 
 Lyon v. Tallmudge, 14 John. 501; Barque 
 Chusan, 2 Story, 456; Barrett v. Sargeant, 18 
 Vt. 365, Pinson" v. Williams, 23 Miss. 64; Kidd 
 v. Manley, 28 Miss. 156; Surget v. Byers, 1 
 Hemp. 715; Craige v. Craige, 6 Ired. Eq. 191; 
 Moores v. Moores, 16 N. J. Eq. 275; Burnham 
 v. Dalling, 18 id. 134; Chandler v. Herriek. 11 
 N. J. Eq 497: see 1 Taylor on Evid. § 298; 
 R. S. C. Ord. XIX. 18, 25, 26; Scott v. Samp- 
 son. 8 Q. B. D. 491. Proofs taken in a cause 
 must be pertinent to the issue in that cause.secun- 
 dum allegata. Underbill v. Van Cortlandt, 2 
 John. Ch. 339 ; Parsons v. Heston, 11 N. J. Eq. 
 155. Evidence relative to matters not stated in the 
 pleadings, nor fairly within their general allega- 
 tions, is impertinent, and cannot be made the 
 foundation of a decree. Vansciver v. Bryan, 
 13 N. J. Eq. 434; and see the following works 
 on evidence: Taylor. § 239, et seq. ; Best. § 253, 
 etseq. ; Gresley, 230; Powell, 220. 
 
 A decree entirely outside of the issue raised 
 
 (a) In general, no evidence will be received 
 of facts not alleged in the bill. Anderson v. 
 Northrop, 30 Fla. 612. But a defendant's ad- 
 mis-ions may be proved in evidence, though not 
 alleged in the bill. Cannon v. Collins, 3 Del. Ch. 
 132; Cleveland Target Co. v. U. S. Pigeon Co. 
 52 Fed. Kep. 385. Evidence set out in a plead- 
 ing need not be denied or admitted. Steinway 
 v. Steinway, 22 N. Y. S. 945. In Runge v. 
 Schleicher (Texas), 21 S. W. Rep. 423, it was 
 held improper, as stating evidence, to allege a 
 custom to deliver deeds containing blanks, with 
 power to the grantee to fill them. 
 
 850 
 
 in the record is coram non judice, and will be 
 so adjudged, even when assailed in a collateral 
 proceeding. Munday v. Vail, 34 N. J. L. 418; 
 Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 283; Dillard r. 
 Harris, 2 Tenn. Ch. 196; Mayo v. Harding. 3 
 id. 237; Easley v. Tarkington, 5 Baxt. 592. 
 See also Marsh v. Mitchell, 26 N. J. Eq. 499. 
 
 1 See ante, pp. 326,711; Smith v. Clarke, 12 
 Ves. 477, 480. From the case of London and 
 Birmingham Ry. Co. v. Winter, Cr. & P. 57, 
 62, it seems that a fact brought to the attention 
 of the Court by the evidence, but not stated 
 upon the answer, will, under some circum- 
 stances, afford a ground for inquiry, before a 
 final decree. 
 
 2 Moores v. Moores, 16 N. J. Eq. 275; Hewett 
 v. Adams, 50 Maine. 271, 276; Gresley, Eq. Ev. 
 161, et seq. ; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 28, 252. 
 
 3 Clarke v. Periam, 2 Atk. 333, 340. 
 
 4 Ibid. So, also, where it was alleged that 
 the defendant had not accounted for divers fees 
 received in the execution of an office, and had 
 taken several fees which were not due, and had 
 concealed instruments and writings relating to 
 the office, evidence of particular instances of 
 such misconduct was permitted. Wheeler v. 
 Trotter, 3 Swanst. 174, n. 
 
 The defendant's admission that a deed be- 
 tween the parties was a mortgage is as binding 
 in a subsequent suit between them as a finding 
 to that effect. Fowler v. Osborne, 111 N. C. 
 404. The defendant's answer in another suit, 
 if intended as an admission, is admissible as 
 such, though never filed in that suit. Matson 
 v. Melchor, 42 Mich. 477. In New York, an 
 attorney's unqualified admission that a paper 
 exhibited to him in order to dispense with for- 
 mal proof thereof, may. if not withdrawn, be 
 relied upon at a subsequent trial. Voisin v. 
 Commercial M. Ins. Co. 22 N. Y. S. 348.
 
 CONFINED TO MATTERS IN ISSUE. * 855 
 
 the' charge in a bill was, that the defendant was a lewd woman, evidence 
 of particular acts of incontinence was allowed to be adduced. 5 In cases 
 of this nature, however, it is necessary, in order to entitle the party to 
 read evidence of particular facts, that they should point directly to the 
 charge ; and therefore it has been held, that an allegation in a bill, that 
 a wife had misbehaved herself, did not imply that she was an adulteress, 
 and that a deposition to prove her one ought not to be read. 6 And so 
 the mere saying that a wife did not behave herself as a virtuous woman 
 will not entitle her husband to prove that she has committed adultery 
 unless there is an express charge of the kind : 7 for the virtue of a woman 
 does not consist merely in her chastity. 8 
 
 * The cases in which evidence of particular facts may be given * 854 
 under a general allegation or charge, are not confined to cases in 
 which the character, or quality of mind, or general behavior of a party 
 comes in issue. The same thing may be done, where the question of 
 notice is raised in the pleadings by a general allegation or charge. 
 Thus, where the defence was a purchase for a valuable consider- 
 ation, without notice of a particular deed, but, in order to meet 
 that case by anticipation, the bill had suggested that the defendant pre- 
 tended that she was a purchaser for a valuable consideration, with- 
 out notice, and simply charged the contrary, * the deposition of * 855 
 a witness, who proved a conversation to have taken place between 
 himself and a third person, who was the solicitor of the defendant, and 
 the consequent production of the deed, was allowed to be read as evi- 
 dence of notice. 1 In such a case, the question whether the party has 
 notice or not, is a fact, which should be put in issue, but the mode in 
 which it is to be proved need not be put upon the record ; for the rule 
 that no evidence will be admitted, in support of any facts but those 
 which are mentioned in the pleadings, requires that the facts only 
 intended to be proved should be put in issue, and not the materials of 
 which the proof of those facts is to consist. 2 Where, however, the party 
 had not any opportunity of disproving a particular act of notice which 
 was proved in evidence, although not alleged in the pleadings, an inquiry 
 was directed whether he had or had not notice. 3 (") 
 
 5 Clarke v. Periam, ubi supra ; and the cases discovery of particular facts under a general 
 there cited. allegation, see Saunders v. Jones, 7 Ch. D. 
 
 6 Ibid.; Sidney ». Sidney. 3 P. Wins. 209, 435; Kuhliger v. Bailey, W. N. (1881) l(i5; 
 276; 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 514, note. Benbow ». Low, 16 Ch. D. 93. 
 
 7 Lord Donerail v. Ladv Donerail, cited 2 2 Blacker v. Phepoe, 1 Moll. 354; see Story, 
 Atk. 338. Eq. PI. §§ '28, 252, 203, 205, n. 
 
 8 Per Lord Hardwicke, in 2 Atk. 339. 3 Weston e. Empire Assurance Co. L. R. 6 
 l 1 Hughes v. Garner, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 328, Eq. 23. 
 
 335; see now R. S. C. Ord. XIX. 20. As to 
 
 (a) Evidence offered respecting a fact which is Co. 77 Ala. 184. Upon a bill for discovery 
 
 admitted by the answer should be refused. Rob- and relief, the answer, including its affirmative 
 
 inson v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 28 Fed. Rep. statements, is evidence of facts which are per- 
 
 577. Thus, previous admissions by a doiendant tinent to the discovery sought. Thompson r. 
 
 of facts admitted in his answer are to be re- Clark, 81 Va. 422. When the case is set down 
 
 jected as cumulative evidence. Morris v. Morris by the plaintiff for hearing on bill, answer, and 
 
 & C. D. Co. 38 Fed. Rep. 776. Co-defendants replication, and the defendant has no opporfu- 
 
 are not affected by admissions in unverified nity to prove his answer, the answer is takpn 
 
 answers. Danner Land Co. v. Stonewall Ins. as true, as if the hearing were on bill and 
 
 851
 
 *856 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 
 It is upon this principle that documentary evidence, or letters them- 
 selves, are not specifically put in issue. 4 Indeed, a party may prove his 
 case by written or parol evidence, indifferently, and is under no more 
 restrictions in one case than in another. It is not necessary to put every 
 written document in issue ; s and documents containing relevant admis- 
 sions may now be made use of as evidence, though they have never been 
 pleaded. 6 (b) Defendants have also been held entitled to put in evidence 
 letters written by the plaintiff to a person not a party to the action, and 
 containing admissions by the plaintiff, material to the questions in issue ; 
 but the plaintiff must have, if he desires it, an opportunity of explain- 
 ing the letters. 7 
 
 If letters and writings in the hands of a party are intended to be used 
 as admissions or confessions of facts by the opposite party, they should 
 be mentioned in the pleadings, 8 in order that the party against whom 
 they are intended to be read may have an opportunity to meet them by 
 evidence or explanation. 9 
 
 This principle is not confined to writings, but applies to every 
 * 856 * case where the admission or confession of a party is to be made 
 use of against him ; thus, it has been held, that evidence of a 
 confession by a party that he was guilty of a fraud, could not be read : 
 because it was not distinctly put in issue. 1 So, also, evidence of alleged 
 conversations between a witness and a party to the suit, in which such 
 
 4 Blacker v. Phepoe. 1 Moll. 354. Letters 
 written without prejudice are not admissible in 
 evidence. Hoghton v. Hoghton, 15 Beav. 278, 
 321; Jones v. Foxall, id. 388, 396; except on 
 behalf of the writer: Williams V. Thomas, 2 
 Dr. & Sm. 29, 37; 8 Jar. N. S. 250, 252; and 
 see Woodard v. Eastern Counties Ky. Co. 1 Jur. 
 N. S. 899. 
 
 5 Per Sir Anthony Hart, in Fitzgerald v. 
 O'Flaherty, 1 Moll. 350; see also Lord Crans- 
 town v. Johnston, 3 Ves. 170, 176; Dey v. 
 Dunham, 2 John. Ch. 188; Pardee v. De Cola, 
 7 Paige, 132; Kellogg v. Wood, 6 Paige, 578. 
 
 6 See Davy v. Garrett, 7 Ch. D. 473; Steuart 
 r. Gladstone, 10 Ch. D. 626, 644; and see R. S. 
 C. Ord. XIX. 4. 
 
 7 Steuart v. Gladstone, 10 Ch. D. 626, 644; 
 
 per Fry J.; Malcolm v. Scott, 3 Hare, 63; S- 
 C. nom. Scott v. Macolm, 8 Jur. 1059. 
 
 8 Houlditch v. Marquis of Donegal, 1 Moll. 
 364; Austin v. Chambers, 6 CI. & F. 1, 39; 
 Whitley v. Martin, 3 Beav. 226. 
 
 9 Blacker v. Phepoe, ubi supra. But, in 
 M'Mahon v. Burchell, 2 Phil. 127, 133 ; 1 C. P. 
 Coop. temp. 475, however, Lord Cottenham al- 
 lowed certain letters to be used as evidence of 
 admissions, though not mentioned in the plead- 
 ings: observing, that "he could not go the 
 length of saying that evidence of an admission 
 was not admissible, merely, because it was not 
 put in issue." 
 
 i Hall v. Maltby, 6 Price, 240 ; Mulholland 
 v. Hendrick, 1 Moll. 359. 
 
 answer alone. Starr's Estate, 13 Phila. 212; 
 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass. 
 58 Fed. Kep. 58. Upon a bill to correct a mis- 
 take in a lease, a statement in the answer that 
 the defendant, if asked, "would have corrected 
 any mistake in said lease," is not equivalent to 
 an admission of the mistake and an offer to cor- 
 rect it. Robinson v. Battle House Co. 74 Ala. 
 499. A defendant who. after evidence is taken, 
 is also made a party as executor and trustee, is 
 bound by the evidence so taken. Canton v. 
 McGraw, 67 Md.583. 
 
 (b) In general the rule that evidence is not 
 to be pleaded applies to admissions. Davy v. 
 Garrett, 7 Ch. D. 473. No estoppel iucon- 
 
 852 
 
 sistent with a document can be raised thereon. 
 Colonial Bank ». Hepworth, 36 Ch. D. 36. But 
 when the defendant states in his sworn answer 
 the provisions of a written instrument presum- 
 ably in his possession, he cannot complain if 
 the Court acts on such admission. Cavender 
 v. Cavender, 114 U. S- 464. When the case is 
 set down for hearing on the pleadings, the plain- 
 tiff cannot put in evidence documents which 
 are not made a part of the bill by reference. 
 Robinson Tobacco Co. v. Phillips, 20 Blatch. 
 569. An estoppel in pais must be pleaded in 
 order to avail a defendant. Prewitt v. Lambert 
 (Col.), 34Pac. Rep. 684.
 
 CONFINED TO MATTERS IN ISSUE. * 857 
 
 party admitted that he had defrauded the other, was rejected ; because 
 such alleged conversations had not been noticed in the pleadings. 2 " Xo 
 man," observes Sir Anthony Hart, " would be safe, if he could be affected 
 by such evidence. Lord Talbot said long ago, that if you are to oust a 
 defendant for fraud alleged against him, and the fraud is proved by the 
 acknowledgment of the defendant that he had no right to the matter 
 in litigation, the plaintiff must charge that on the record, to give him 
 the opportunity to deny or explain and avoid it." 3 
 
 It is only when conversations are to be used as admissions, that the 
 rule which requires them to be stated on the record applies. Where the 
 conversation is in itself the evidence of the fact, it need not be specially 
 alluded to : as, where the notice was communicated to the defendant by 
 a conversation, which was made use of to prove the fact of the conversa- 
 tion having taken place, and not as an admission by the party that he 
 had received notice. 4 
 
 Another rule of evidence, which may be noticed in this place, is, that 
 the substance of the case made by the pleadings must be proved ; that 
 is, all the facts alleged upon the pleadings which are necessary to the 
 case of the party alleging them, and which are not the subject of ad- 
 missions, either in the pleadings or by agreement, must be established 
 by evidence. 5 In the case of a plaintiff, however, it is sufficient to 
 prove so much only of the allegations in the bill as are necessary 
 to entitle him to a decree. 6 Thus, * where the suit is for an ac- * 857 
 count, all the .evidence necessary to be read at the hearing is 
 that which proves the defendant to be an accounting party, and then 
 the decree to account follows of course ; and any evidence as to the 
 particular items of an account, however useful they may be in a subse- 
 quent stage of the cause, would be irrelevant at the original hearing. 1 
 
 2 Farrel v. , 1 Moll. 363; M'Mahon v. 167, et seq. The rule at Law, that the evidence 
 
 Burchell, 2 Phil. 127; 1 C. P. Coop, t -_■ i n j > . Cott. must substantially support the plaintiff's decla- 
 
 475; Langley v. Fisher, 9 Beav. 'JO, 101; Gra- ration, is applicable to bills in Chancery. MoITet 
 
 ham v. Oliver, 3 Beav. 124, 129. But it has v. Claberts, 1 Scam. 384; Mansy », Mason, 8 
 
 been held in the United States by Mr. Justice Porter, 111; Shelby v. Shelby, 1 B. Mon. 278; 
 
 Story, upon full consideration, that the confes- Thompson v. Thompson, 2 B. Mon. 174; Beers 
 
 sions, conversations, and admissions of the do- v. Botsford, 13 Conn. 146; Simplot r. Simplot, 
 
 fendant need not be expressly charged in a bill 14 Iowa, 449; Chaflin v. Kimball, 23 111. 36. 
 
 in Equity, in order to enable the plaintiff to use 6 See, however, Edney V. Jewell, 6 Mad. 165, 
 
 them in proof of facts charged, and in issue where an unnecessary statement was required 
 
 therein. Smith v. Burnham, 2 Sunnier, 012; to be proved. 
 
 Jenkins v. Eldredge, 3 Story, 183, 283, 284; see l Gresley, Eq. Ev. 168; Dubourg de St. 
 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 265, a, and note; Brown v. Colombo v. United States, 7 Peters, 025, 626; 
 
 Chambers, Hayes Exch. 597 ; Malcolm v. Hudson v. Trenton &e. Manuf. Co. 16 N. J. 
 
 Scott, 3 Hare, 39, 63; Brandon r. Cabiness, Eq. 475; Lockett r. Lockett, L. R. 4 Ch. 336. 
 
 10 Ala. 155; Bishop r. Bishop, 13 Ala. 475; The Court should be satisfied that the plaintiff 
 
 Camden & Amboy It. R. Co. r. Stewart, 19 is entitled to have an account taken. If the 
 
 N. J. Eq. 343, 346, 347. Court is satisfied upon that point the practice is 
 
 3 Farrel v. , ubi supra. to refer the case to a Master to state the details 
 
 4 Hughes v. Garner, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 328, 335; of the account, and ascertain the balance. But 
 Graham v. Oliver, ubi supra. the Chancellor may, if he sees fit, take the ac- 
 
 5 See the following works on evidence: 1 count himself. He not only may, however, but 
 Taylor, §§ 221-253, el seq. ; Best, § 280, et seq. ; ought to refuse an account, if he is satisfied upon 
 Powell, 470, et seq.; 1 Phil. Ev. (Cowen & the evidence that nothing is due the plaintiff, or 
 Hill's ed. 1839) 200, et seq. and notes; 1 Greenl. that for any cause an account ought not to 
 Ev. § 56, et seq.; Gresley, Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) be decreed. Campbell v. Campbell, 4 Hal t. 
 
 853
 
 858 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 For this reason, where the suit is against an administrator, or an exec- 
 utor, all that it is necessary to prove, on the part of the plaintiff, is, 
 that the defendant fills and has acted in that character, and that the 
 plaintiff is entitled to maintain the suit. 2 
 
 Where, however,' through inadvertence or negligence, the plaintiff 
 has omitted to prove some particular fact which is necessary to support 
 
 his case, the Court sometimes will permit him to supply the de- 
 * 858 feet, by giving him leave to prove the fact * omitted. 1 This is 
 
 frequently done in the case of wills disposing of real estate, 2 
 where either the plaintiff has relied upon an admission of the will by 
 answer, which the Court thinks not sufficiently full, 3 or where the ab- 
 sence or death of one of the witnesses to the will, 4 or the testator's 
 sanity, 5 has not been proved. 6 The practice of the Court, in this respect, 
 is not confined to cases of wills : a cause has been ordered to stand over, 
 for the purpose of allowing proof of the due execution of a deed, or the 
 
 Ch. (X. J.) 743; see Wright v. McKean, 13 
 N. J. Eq. 259. Where the evidence has been 
 taken on both sides before the hearing, without 
 objection, it may be used by the Court, so far as 
 may be necessary, in giving directions to the 
 Master, as to the manner of taking the account, 
 and the principles by which he should be gov- 
 erned in taking it. The decree must direct to 
 what matters the account shall extend, and in 
 decreeing a general account, special directions 
 will be rendered proper and necessary by the 
 particular circumstances of the case. Hudson 
 v. Trenton &c. Manuf. Co. 16 N. J. Eq. 475, 
 477, 478; Izard v. Bodine, 9 N. J. Eq. 311; 
 Sharp v. Morrow, 6 Monroe, 300; Remsen v. 
 Remsen, 2 John. Ch. 501. In the Federal 
 Courts, see Pulliam v. Pulliam, 10 Fed. Rep. 
 23; Newman v. Moody, 19 id. 858. 
 
 An account should not be ordered until 
 there has been a decree adjudicating the rights 
 of the parties. Carey v. Williams, 1 Lea, 51; 
 S. C. 2 Tenn. Leg. Rep. 192; Patton v. Cone, 
 1 Lea, 14; S. C. 2 Tenn. Leg. Rep. 171. And 
 the Court has no authority, without such decree, 
 except by consent of parlies, to order an account. 
 Smith t'. Earl of Pomfret,2 Dick. 437; McLin p. 
 McXamara, 1 D. & B. Eq. 409; Trimble r. 
 Dodd, 2 Tenn. 500; Wessells v. Wessells, 1 
 Tenn. Ch. 58. 
 
 2 See Law v. Hunter, 1 Russ. 100, 102, where 
 the defendant, who had principally acted as 
 executor of the testator, admitted that he had 
 received personal estate of the testator to the 
 amount of from .£35,000 to £45,000: and the 
 plaintiff, having gone into very voluminous evi- 
 dence to show how much of the personal estate of 
 the testator had come into the defendant's hands, 
 in order to prove that he had received assets to 
 a much larger amount than that admitted by 
 the answer, proposed to enter such evidence as 
 read ; but the Master of the Rolls would not 
 permit it to be done, as the only tendency of 
 
 854 
 
 such evidence was to show the state of the ac- 
 count, which the Court itself could not inquire 
 into, but must refer to the Master as the proper 
 person for taking the account. See Hudson v. 
 Treuton &c. Manuf. Co. 1G X. J. Eq. 475, 477. 
 The same principle was afterwards acted upon, 
 by the same learned Judge, where, upon a bill 
 for an account, the liability to account having 
 been admitted by the defendant, he had entered 
 into evidence to prove itenis of his discharge, 
 but was not suffered to read them at the hear- 
 ing. Walker v. Woodward, 1 Russ. 107, 110, 
 see Smith v. Chambers, 2 Phil. 221, 226 ; S. C. 
 nom. Chambers v. Smith, 2 Coll. 742 ; 11 Jur. 
 359 ; see, however, the observations of Sir J. 
 YVigram V C. in Tomlin v. Tomlin, 1 Hare, 
 241, 245; and see id. 241, n. ; see also Forsyth 
 v. Ellice, 2 M'N. & G 209, 214; Waters v. Earl 
 of Shaftesbury, 14 W. R. 259; 12 Jur. N. S. 3; 
 and in administration suits, Foster ». Foster, 
 L. R. 3 Ch. 330. Production of probate will 
 sustain the allegation of proof of will. Dyson 
 v. Morris, 1 Hare, 413; Moons v. De Bernales, 
 1 Russ. 301. 
 
 1 See Seton, 1118 ; Thexton v. Edmonston, 
 L R. 5 Eq. 373. 
 
 2 Lechmere v. Brasier, 2 J. & W. 288; 
 Chichester v. Chichester, 24 Beav. 289. 
 
 3 Potter v. Potter, 1 Ves. Sr. 274; Belt's 
 Sup. 147; and see Hood v. Pimm, 4 Sim 101, 
 110. 
 
 * Wood v. Stane, 8 Price, 613. 
 
 5 Abrams v. Winshup, 1 Russ. 526; Wallis 
 v. Hodgson, id. 527, n.; 2 Atk, 56. 
 
 6 See Gresley, Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 132-US, 
 where many instances are given of relief in 
 cases of defects or omissions, whether they are 
 brought to light and become material in conse- 
 quence of something which arises unexpectedly 
 in the course of the proceedings, or were caused 
 by accident or inadvertence.
 
 CONFINED TO MATTERS IN ISSUE. * 859 
 
 death of a party, 7 or the fact of trading ; 8 and we have before seen, 9 that 
 where the plaintiff has omitted to give due proof at the hearing of the 
 fact of the defendant being out of the jurisdiction, he has been allowed 
 to prove it. And where the evidence read at the hearing, to prove the 
 loss of a deed, was held not sufficiently strong to entitle the party to 
 read secondary evidence of its contents, the plaintiff was given leave to 
 prove the loss of the deed more strictly. 10 At no period of a cause is it 
 too late to show that confusion and error have arisen from two persons, 
 or two places, or two things, passing by the same name, and more 
 especially to show that through such confusion the Court had been 
 deceived by a misleading experiment performed in its own presence. 11 
 
 In general, orders of this nature are made upon a simple application 
 by counsel at the hearing of the cause : the application may, however, 
 be made before the hearing; 12 in which case it was formerly made on 
 motion, 13 or by petition, 14 and, it is presumed, may now be made 
 either by motion, or by summons in Chambers. 15 Formerly, when the 
 evidence in causes was taken on interrogatories, the plaintiff was per- 
 mitted to exhibit an interrogatory to prove the fact desired ; now, he is 
 permitted to prove it, either viva voce, or by affidavit. 16 
 
 Sometimes the Court, instead of directing an interrogatory 
 to be exhibited to prove the fact omitted, directs 17 an * inquiry * 859 
 into the fact ; and it seems that, in some cases, the deficiency of 
 proof against infants may be supplied in the same manner. 1 It is not, 
 however, the practice to direct inquiries as to any facts which are the 
 foundation of the relief; such as the execution of a will, or the fact of 
 trading. 2 The course, in such case, is to order the cause to stand over, 
 and direct the proofs to be supplied ; in which case, the cause must be 
 again set down. 3 "Where, however, the plaintiffs claimed to be the 
 children of a certain marriage, but did not prove that they were so, 
 an inquiry was directed. 4 
 
 7 .Moons v. De Bernales, 1 Russ. 301. is See 15 & Vic. c. 80, § 26; 15 & 16 Vie. 
 
 8 Lechmere v. Brasier, ubi supra. c. 86, § 38. For forms of notice of motion and 
 
 9 Ante, p. 152 ; Hughes v. Eades, 1 Hare, summons, see Vol. III. 
 
 486, 488; 6 Jar. 455. So, where the plaintiff 16 See 13 & 14 Vic. c. 35, § 28; 15 & 16 Vic. 
 
 had relied upon the admission of facts by the c. 86, §§ 38-41 ; Cons. Ord. XIX. ; Ord. 5 Feb., 
 
 answers, and it was held that, some of the de- 1861. In Smith v. Blackman, cited Seton,1117, 
 
 fendants being married women, the admis- the Court would not allow the testator's will 
 
 sions in their answers would not bind them, the to be proved at the hearing by affidavit; but 
 
 Court of Exchequer allowed the cause to stand gave leave to exhibit an interrogatory for that 
 
 over, with liberty to the plaintiff to supply the purpose. 
 
 requisite proof. Hodgson v. Merest, 9 Price, 1 7 Edney v. Jewell, 6 Mad. 165. 
 
 563. 1 See Quantock v. Bullen, 5 Mad. 81 ; Cox 
 
 1° Cox v. Allingham, Jac. 337, 341, 345. v. Bockett, 35 Beav. 48; Gascoyne v. Lamb, 11 
 
 n Bigsby ji. Dickinson, 4 Ch. D. 24, 28. Jur. 902, V. C. K. B. 
 
 12 Douglas r. Archbutt, 23 Beav. 233. See "- Lechmere v. Brasier, 2 J. & W. 289; Hol- 
 
 Budd v. Davison, W. N. (1880) 191; R. S. C. den v. Hearn, 1 Beav. 445, 456; Chapman r. 
 
 Ord. XXXVII. ; Smith v. Filgrim, 2 Ch. D. Chapman, 13 Beav. 308. See Weston v. Em- 
 
 127 As to further evidence on appeals, see pire Assurance Co. L. R. 6 Eq. 23, where an 
 
 Hastie v. Hastie, 1 Ch. D. 562; Re Chennell, inquiry, whether the defendant had or had net 
 
 Jones v. Chennell, 8 Ch. D. 492, 505; Dicks v. notice of a charge, was directed. See Steuart 
 
 Brooks, 13 Ch. D. 652. v. Gladstone, 10 Ch. D. 626. 
 
 18 Att.-Gen. v. Thurnall, 2 Cox, 2. 3 Lechmere v. Brasier, ubi supra. 
 
 14 Cox v. Allingham, ubi supra. ■> Miller v. Priddon, 1 M'N. & G. 687; and 
 
 855
 
 860 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 In some cases, the Court, instead of ordering the cause to stand over 
 for the purpose of supplying the deficient evidence, will make a decree 
 as to all that part of the case which is in a situation to be decided upon, 
 and give liberty to prove the rest. This has been frequently done in 
 the case of a will, where, although it was not sufficiently proved to 
 affect the real estate, the Court has decreed an account of the personal 
 estate, with liberty to supply the deficiency of proof. 5 In reference to 
 the cases on this subject, Lord Cottenham has said: 6 "It is impossible 
 to reconcile the cases, or to extract any principle upon which any fixed 
 rule can be founded. The Court has exercised a wide discretion in 
 giving or refusing leave to supply the defect of evidence, in doing 
 which, the merits of the case upon the plaintiff's own showing ought 
 to have a leading influence." 7 
 
 
 860 
 
 * Section IV. — Of the Effect of a Variance. 
 
 It is not only necessary that the substance of the case made by each 
 party should be proved, 1 but it must be substantially the same case as 
 that which he has stated upon the record : 2 for the Court will not al- 
 low a party to be taken by surprise, by the other side proving a case 
 different from that set up in the pleadings. 3 (a) Thus, the specific per- 
 
 see observations of Lord Truro in Fowler v. 
 Reynal, 3 M'N. & G. 500, 511; 15 Jur. 1019, 
 1021. 
 
 5 Lechmere v. Brasier, 2 J. &. W. 289 ; Ros- 
 siter v. Pitt, 2 Mad. 165. 
 
 6 Marten v. Whichelo, C. & P. 257, 2G1 ; see 
 also Simmons v. Simmons, 6 Hare, 360; 12 Jur. 
 8, 11 ; Williams v. Knipe, 5 Beav. 273, 276. 
 
 7 This ease was a creditor's suit, where the 
 plaintiff had taken the b\\\ pro confesso against 
 one of the defendants, who was the executor, 
 but had adduced no evidence of his debt as 
 against the other defendants, who were the 
 devisees of the testator's real estate, and who 
 did not sufficiently admit the debt; and his 
 Lordship refused to allow the plaintiff an 
 opportunity of going into new evidence against 
 the devisees, and dismissed the bill with costs 
 against them; as the plaintiff, on her own state- 
 ment, appeared to be a simple contract creditor, 
 suing the devisees of the real estate more than 
 six years after the debt accrued; although the 
 personal representative had received ample 
 assets, and a judgment de bonis testatoris, et, si 
 nnn de bonis propriis, had been obtained against 
 him. hi Davies v. Davies, 3 De G. & S. 698, 
 Sir J. L. Knight Bruce V. C. allowed evidence 
 of the due execution of a will to be supplied; but 
 thought that the defendants were entitled to 
 have the evidence supplied in whatever manner 
 
 thej r might elect; and, in accordance with their 
 desire, directed the plaintiffs to bring an action 
 of ejectment. 
 
 1 See Seton, 1117, where the cases on the 
 subject of supplying defective evidence are 
 collected. 
 
 2 Gresley, Eq. Ev. 170-173; 1 Greenl. Ev. 
 § 63, et sen. ; Hobart v. Andrews, 21 Pick. 526, 
 534; Bellows v. Stone, 14 N. H. 175; Crothers 
 v. Lee, 29 Ala. 337: Bowman v. O'Reilly, 31 
 Miss. 261; Reynolds v. Morris, 7 Ohio St. 
 310; Williams v. Starr, 5 Wis. 534; Gurney v. 
 Ford, 2 Allen, 576 ; Andrews v. Farnham, 10 
 N. J. Eq. 91; McWhorter v. McMahan, 10 
 Paige, 386; Sears v. Barnum, 1 Clark, 139; 
 Simplot v. Simplot, 14 Iowa, 449; Feckham v. 
 Buff urn, 11 Mich. 529; Holman v. Vallejo, 19 
 Cal. 498; Singleton v. Scott, 11 Iowa, 589; 
 Ohling v. Luitjens, 32 111. 23. 
 
 The rule applies as well to the defendant as 
 the plaintiff. Mead v. Coombs, 26 N. J. Eq. 
 173. Although a rigid and technical construc- 
 tion of bills and proceedings in Equity is ex- 
 ploded in favor of substance, yet a party will 
 not be allowed to recover upon a case proved, 
 essentially different from that alleged in the bill. 
 Baugher "v. Eichelberger, 11 W. Va. 217; Pas- 
 man v. Montague, 30 N. J. Eq. 385. 
 
 3 As to variance generally, see the following 
 works on evidence; 1 Phillips, 569, et seq., 1 
 
 (n) The rule as to variance is to be applied 
 fairlv and equitablv, and not rigidly or techni- 
 
 856 " 
 
 callv. Crawford v. Moore, 28 Fed. Rep. 824; 
 130U. S. 122; Tafti>. Taft, 73 Mich. 502 ; Camp-
 
 EFFECT OF A VARIANCE. 
 
 860 
 
 forinance of an agreement, to grant a lease for three lives, cannot be 
 decreed upon what amounts to evidence of an agreement to grant only 
 for one life. 4 In matters of this description the general practice of the 
 Court is to compel parties, who come for the execution of agreements, 
 to state them as they ought to be stated, and not to set up titles which, 
 when the cause comes to a hearing, they cannot support. 5 (7>) 
 
 Taylor, §§ 254-297 ; Best, § 287; Gresley, 242 ; 
 Powell, 478-495. 
 
 Where the bill sought to establish a trust by- 
 virtue of an express agreement, and the evi- 
 dence was of a purely resulting trust in an 
 entirely different person, and at a different time, 
 the variance was held fatal, and the Court 
 refused, under the circumstances, to allow an 
 amendment. Midmer v. Midmer, 26 N. J. Eq. 
 299; affirmed, 27 id. 548. 
 
 bell v. Sloane, 22 ST. Y. S. 81 ; Stearns v. Reidv, 
 135 111. 119; Davis v. Guilford, 55 Conn. 351; 
 Biven v. Bostwick, 70 Cal. 639; Goree v. Cle- 
 ments, 94 Ala. 337. Hence an issue need be 
 established only in substance. Phoenix M. L. 
 Ins. Co. v. Hinesley, 75 Ind. 1. The objection 
 will not prevail if there is a case upon the 
 pleadings and the adverse party is not misled 
 or prejudiced. Pope v. Allis, 115 U. S. 363; 
 Zeininger v. Schnitzler, 48 Kansas, 63, 66; 
 First Nat. Bank <>. Stephenson, 82 Texas, 435; 
 Lawrence v. Hester, 93 N. C. 79. An express 
 contract declared on is not proved by an im- 
 plied one. Smoot v. Strauss, 21 Fla. 611; or 
 by evidence of an agreement with other parties 
 than those alleged. Pendleton v. Dalton, 96 
 N. C. 507; Steward t>. Gordon, 65 Texas, 344; 
 McMillan v. Otis, 74 Ala. 560; Mead v. Ray- 
 mond, 52 Mich. 14; or of an essentially different 
 agreement. Cox v. McLaughlin, 63 Cal. 196; 
 see Moore v. Lake Co. 58 N. H. 254. An 
 alleged written contract is not proved by an 
 oral one. Fleetwood v. Dorsey Machine Co. 
 95 Ind. 491 ; Barrett v. Wheeler, 66 Iowa, 560. 
 In a suit to quiet title, proof cannot be made of 
 breach of a contract or of violation of a trust. 
 Hays v. Carr, 83 Ind. 275. So non-feasance 
 alleged is not supported by proof of malfea- 
 sance, South & North Alabama R. Co. v. 
 Wilson, 78 Ala. 587; and an averment of per- 
 formance is not proved by evidence of a waiver. 
 Safety Fund Bank v. Westlake, 21 Mo. App. 
 565. An allegation of authority to do an act is 
 proved by evidence of a ratification. Janney v. 
 Boyd, 30Minn. 319. 
 
 The character of the suit and the extent of 
 the relief granted by the decree are deter- 
 mined by the pleadings and not by the facts 
 disclosed in evidence. Tinsley V. Penniman, 83 
 Texas, 54; Edichal Bullion Co. v. Columbia 
 G M. Co. 87 Va. 641; Hoffman v. McMorran, 
 52 Mich. 318; Paddock v. Lance, 94 Mo. 283. 
 When the bill justifies relief, and the defend- 
 
 4 Lindsay v. Lynch, 2 Sch. & Lef. 1; see 
 also Mortimer v. Orchard, 2 Ves. Jr. 243; Legh 
 v. Havertield, 5 Ves. 453, 457; Woollain v. 
 Hearn, 7 Ves. 211 ; Deniston v. Little, 2 Sch.& 
 Lef. 11, n. ; Savage v. Carroll, 2 Ball & B. 451 ; 
 Daniels v. Davison, 16 Ves. 249, 256; Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 394, n.; Harris v. Knickerbacker, 5 
 Wend. 638. 
 
 5 Per Lord Redesdale, in Deniston v. Little, 
 2 Sch. & Lef. 11, note. 
 
 ants have not been taken by surprise, a decree 
 will not be reversed, or a new trial granted, be- 
 cause of variance. Moore v. Crawford, 130 
 U. S. 122; see Wallace v Loomis, 97 U. S. 146; 
 Walker v. Duncan, 68 Wis. 624; Webster v. 
 Peet (Mich.), 56 N. W. Rep. 558. The objection 
 of variance, if not raised at the trial, will not be 
 considered on appeal. O'Connor r. Delaney 
 (Minn.), 54 N. W. Rep. 1108. This objection 
 does not present a question of law for the Ap- 
 peal Court when stated only in general terms in 
 a motion for new trial, no objection to the evi- 
 dence having been made at the trial. Libby v. 
 Scherman, 146 111., 540; 34 N. E. Rep. 801. A 
 bill which asks relief under a statute, and dis- 
 closes a case for relief upon the general principles 
 of Equity, will not be dismissed. Adams v. 
 Kehlor Milling Co. 36 Fed. Rep 212. 
 
 Other instructive decisions relating to vari- 
 ance are: Speidel V. Henrici, 120 U. S. 377; 
 Bradley v. Converse, 4 Cliff. 366; Henry v. 
 Suttle, 42 Fed. Rep. 91; Elliott v. Amazon'lns. 
 Co. 49 Mich. 73; Gardner v. Raisbeck, 31 N. J. 
 Eq. 23; O'Neal v. Boone, 82 111. 589; Rabber- 
 man v. House. 89 111. 209; Walsh v. Wright, 
 101 111. 178; Booth v. Wiley, 102 111. 84; Mann 
 v. Edwards, 138 III. 19; Floyd v. Jones, 19 W. 
 Va. 359; Roanoke Gas Co. v. Roanoke, 88 Va. 
 810; Campell v. Bowles, 30 Gratt. 652; Mc- 
 Comb v. Lobdell, 32 Gratt. 185; Meadors v. 
 Askew, 56 Ala. 584; Helmetag v. Frank, 61 
 Ala. G7; Rapier v. Gulf City Paper Co. 64 
 Ala. 330; Munchus v. Harris, 09 Ala. 506; 
 Gilmer v. Wallace, 75 Ala. 220; Webb v. Pob- 
 bins, 77 Ala. 176; Webb v. Crawford, id. 440-, 
 Edwards v. Rogers, 81 Ala. 568; Forrester v. 
 Vason, 71 Ga. 49. 
 
 (6) If a bill for the specific performance of 
 an oral agreement for the sale of land relies 
 upon part performance, it must clearly set forth 
 the acts of part performance relied upon, ami is 
 insufficient if it merely alleges that the vendee 
 entered upon the premises and made valuable 
 
 857
 
 *861 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 "We have seeD, in a former part of this Treatise, that, in bills where 
 the rights asserted are founded on prescription, a considerable degree 
 of certainty is required in setting out the plaintiff's case ; 6 to which 
 may be added, that, in general, the proof must correspond in certainty 
 with the case so set out. 7 Thus, the Court of Exchequer, in deciding 
 upon tithe questions, was in the habit of requiring that the proof of a 
 modus should correspond with the modus as laid in the bill. 8 And so 
 in other cases, where particular customs are prescribed for, the 
 * 8C1 evidence is, * in general, required to be in conformity with the 
 statement in the pleadings. 1 
 
 "We have seen before that, in some cases, where a plaintiff has alleged 
 a different agreement, in his bill, from that which has been admitted by 
 the answer, the Court has permitted the plaintiff to amend his bill, by 
 abandoning the first agreement and insisting upon that stated upon the 
 answer ; 2 and when the defendant sets up a parol variation from the 
 written contract, it will depend on the particular circumstances of each 
 case whether that is to defeat the plaintiff's title to specific perform- 
 ance, or whether the Court will perform the contract : taking care that 
 the subject-matter of this parol agreement or understanding is carried 
 into effect, so that all parties may have the benefit of what they con- 
 tracted for. 3 When, however, there is a material variance in a written 
 agreement, it is the ordinary practice to dismiss the bill with costs, 
 without prejudice to the plaintiff's bringing a new bill. 4 
 
 6 Ante, p. 369. 
 
 7 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 71, 72; ante, p. 361, note 1. 
 
 8 Scott v. Fenwick, 3 Eagle & Y. 1318; 
 Uhthoff v. Lord Huntingfield, 2 id. 649; cited 1 
 Price, 237; Prevost v. Benett, 3 Eagle & Y. 705; 
 1 Price. 236 ; Blake v. Veysie, 3 Dow. 189 ; 2 
 Eagle & Y. 699; Miller "v. Jackson, 1 Y. & 
 J. 65. 
 
 1 But in The Dean and Chapter of Ely v. 
 Warren, 2 Atk. 190, however, Lord Hardwicke 
 said that the Court of Chancery would not put 
 persons to set forth a custom with so much exact- 
 ness as isrequisiteat Law, or with so much nicety 
 as the Court of Exchequer expects. A custom 
 mav be proved bv an instance. Hanmer v. 
 Chance, 4 De G. J. & S. 626; 11 Jur. N. S. 397. 
 
 2 Ante, p. 408; Bellows v. Stone, 14 X. H. 
 17"> : such amendment may be allowed even 
 after a hearing upon bill, answer, and evidence. 
 Ibid. As to amendments in cases of main fides, 
 &c. see Tildesleyr. Harper, 10 Ch. D. 393; King 
 v. Corke, 1 Ch. D. 57; Caldwell v. Pagham Har- 
 bour Co. 2 Ch. D. 221 : Roe r. Davies, 2 id. 729. 
 
 3 London and Birmingham Ry. Co. v. Winter, 
 C. & P. 62; and see Benson v. Glastonbury 
 
 improvements. Fowler r. Sunderland, 68 Cal. 
 414. If the answer to a bill to subject land sold 
 for payment of the purchase money avers and 
 show* that portions of the land are held by 
 third persons named by title paramount, the 
 
 858 
 
 Canal Co. 1 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 350; C P. 
 Coop. 42; Smith v. Wheatcroft, 9 Ch. D. 227. 
 
 4 Lindsay v. Lynch, 2 Sch. & Lef. 1; 
 Woollam v. Hearn, 7 Yes. 211, 222; Deniston 
 v. Little, 2 Sch. & Lef. 11, note. Where, how- 
 ever, the plaintiff prayed the specific perform- 
 ance of an agreement stated in the bill, but 
 proved a parol agreement which was quite 
 different, the Court, although it thought the bill 
 ought to be dismissed, yet, as there had been a 
 partial execution of some agreement between 
 the parties, by the building of a house, directed 
 a reference to the Master, to settle a lease pur- 
 suant to the agreement confessed in the answer. 
 Mortimer v. Orchard, 2 Yes. Jr. 243; see Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 394, and note. Relief may be granted 
 upon the statements made by the answer, al- 
 though the case made by the bill is different and 
 not sustained by the proof. Rose r. Mynatt. 7 
 Yerg. 30; Bailey v. Bailey, 8 Humph. 230. 
 But the whole answer must be taken together, 
 the matter of discharge as well as the matter of 
 charge. Neal v. Robinson, 8 Humph. 435; 
 Mulloy t\ Young, 10 Humph. 298; ante, p. 361, 
 note 1. 
 
 plaintiff must amend his bill by stating the 
 facts within his knowledge respecting such title, 
 or, if he insists upon his own title, he must 
 make such third persons defendants. Heavner 
 v. Morgan, 30 W. 7a. 335.
 
 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH PROVES ITSELF. * 862 
 
 The rules which have just been discussed relate to the general aim 
 or tendency of the proof to be adduced. There are other rules relating 
 to the medium of proof, independently of its tendency, which might 
 properly be introduced in this place, such as the General Rules : that 
 the best evidence which the nature of the case admits, ought to be pro- 
 duced, and that hearsay of a fact is not admissible ; but a discussion of 
 these rules would extend this Treatise beyond all reasonable limits. 
 The reader is, therefore, referred to the Treatises on the Law of 
 Evidence ; 6 and what is laid down in any of those * Treatises as the * 862 
 rule of evidence in Courts of Law will generally be applicable 
 to cases in Courts of Equity. 1 
 
 Section V. — Documentary Evidence which proves itself. 
 
 Having endeavored to direct the practitioner's attention to the matters 
 which it will be necessary for him to prove in the cause, the next thing 
 to be considered is the evidence by which such matters are to be sub- 
 stantiated. This evidence may be either: I. Documentary; or, II. 
 The testimony of witnesses. 
 
 Documentary evidence consists of all those matters which are sub- 
 mitted to the Court in the shape of written documents. It is not, of 
 course, intended to include in this definition the depositions of wit- 
 nesses examined in the cause ; for this evidence, having been given by 
 the witness viva voce to the person by whom he was examined, does not, 
 from the circumstance of its being committed to writing, for more con- 
 venient use before the Judge, lose its p_arol_character. Neither is it 
 intended to include evidence by affidavit ; Avhich is now the most usual 
 form in which the evidence of the witnesses is adduced. Such evidence 
 is, in fact, a simple and easier mode by which the parol evidence of 
 witnesses is communicated to the Court. 
 
 Some descriptions of documentary evidence are admitted by the 
 Court, without the necessity of any proof being gone into to establish 
 their validity ; whilst others require the support of parol testimony, 
 before they can be received. It is proposed, in this section, to consider 
 documentary evidence of the first description ; and, in the next section, 
 to treat of documents which require parol proof. 
 
 All public Acts of Parliament, being judicially noticed, require no 
 
 5 As to hf.st EVIDENCE: see 1 Phillips, 231. Parol testimony which tends to confirm a 
 
 chap, ix.; 1 Taylor, §§ 391-397; Best, §§ 87- written contract is not objectionable: Southern 
 
 107; Gresley, 247. As to hearsay: see 1 Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trear, 29 Gratt. 255; or to 
 
 Phillips, chap. viii. ; 1 Taylor, §§-507-600; Best, a-certain the person intended to be benefited by 
 
 § 497; Hubback, 648-711; Gresley, 304-325; a written guaranty : Hodges v. Bowen, 83 III*. 
 
 Powell, 84-93. Parol evidence is admissible to 161: or trust: Railroad Co. v. Durant, 95 U. S. 
 
 establish the terms of a sale, although a mem- 576. 
 
 orandum of sale has been given. Perrine v. l Manning v. Lechmere, 1 Atk. 453; Glynn 
 
 Cooley, 39 N. J. L. 449. So, although a deed v. Bank of England, 2 Ves. Sr. 41; Morrison v. 
 
 may have been delivered and accepted. Trayer Hart, 2 Bibb. 5 ; Lemaster v. Burckhart, 2 Bibb, 
 
 v. Ruder, 45 Iowa, 272. And see, as to proof 28; Dwight v. Pomeroy, 17 Mass. 303; 1 Greenl. 
 
 of a lost judgment-roll, Marideville r. Reynolds, Ev. § 98, et seq.; Gresley, Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 
 
 68 N. Y. 528; Beveridge V. Chctlain.l 111. App. 218, ct seq. 
 
 859
 
 *863 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 proof ; 2 copies of private Acts of Parliament, purporting to be printed 
 by the Queen's printer, and all copies of the journals of Parlia- 
 ment, and of Royal proclamations, purporting to be printed by the 
 Queen's printer, or by the printers of either House of Parliament, 
 * 863 are admitted as evidence thereof ; 3 and * copies of the statutes 
 of Great Britain and of Ireland respectively, before the Union, 
 are received as conclusive evidence of the several statutes, in the Courts 
 of either kingdom. 1 
 
 Exemplified copies of records in other Courts of Justice under the 
 Great Seal of Great Britain, or under the seals of the Courts them- 
 selves, 2 and the seal of the Queen, and of the superior Courts of Justice, 
 and of the Courts established here by Act of Parliament, are admitted 
 in evidence, without extrinsic proof of their genuineness. 3 
 
 All proclamations, treaties, and other acts of state, of any foreign 
 state, or of any British colony; and all judgments, decrees, orders, and 
 other judicial proceedings of any Court of Justice in any foreign state, 
 or in any British colony, and all affidavits, pleadings, and other legal 
 documents filed or deposited in any such Court, may be proved by 
 examined or authenticated copies : that is to say, in the case of a 
 proclamation, treaty, or other act of state, the authenticated copy must 
 purport to be sealed with the seal of the foreign state or British colony to 
 which the original document belongs ; but if the document sought to be 
 proved be a judgment, decree, order, or other judicial proceeding of 
 
 2 See 2 Taylor, §§ 1523, 1524. 
 
 3 8 & 9 Vic. c. 113, § 3; 13 & 14 Vic. c. 21, 
 § 7; 2 Taylor on Evid. §§ 1527-1529; 2 Phil, 
 on Evid. 135, 194. Private Acts of Parliament, 
 not printed by the Queen's printer, are proved 
 by an examined copy, compared with the ori- 
 ginal in the Parliament Office at Westminster. 
 2 Tiylor, § 1523; Hubback, G13; see 1 Greenl. 
 Ev. §§ 479, 482. 
 
 i 41 Geo. III. c. 90, § 9; 1 Greenl. Ev. 
 § 480; Voung v. Bank of Alexandria, 4 Cranch, 
 388; Biddis r. James, 6 Binney, 321, 326; 
 Gresley, Eq. Ev. (Am. ed) 302-305; 1 Phil. 
 Ev. (Cowen & Hill's ed. 1839) 317, et seq. It is 
 not the duty of Courts to take judicial notice of 
 the execution of a public statute. Canal Co. 
 v. Railroad Co. 4 Gill & J. 7 ; see 1 Greenl. 
 Ev. § 481. In Massachusetts, the printed copies 
 of all statutes, acts, and resolves of the Com- 
 monwealth, whether of a public or private 
 nature, published under the authority of the 
 government, shall be admitted as sufficient evi- 
 dence thereof in all Courts of Law, and on all 
 occasions whatsoever. Pub. Stats, c. 169, § 69. 
 
 As to the proof of foreign laws, of the laws 
 of sister States, of the laws of Congress in the 
 State Courts, and of the laws of the States in 
 the U. S. Courts, see 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 486-490. 
 The Act of Congress prescribing the mode in 
 which public acts, records, &c, shall be authen- 
 ticated as evidence, does not relate to the ad- 
 missibility of such acts, records, &c, of a State 
 
 860 
 
 in its own Courts, or in the Courts of the United 
 States sitting in that State. South Ottawa r. 
 Perkins, 94 U. S. 260- In Massachusetts, printed 
 copies of the statute Laws of any other State 
 and of the United States, or of the territories 
 thereof, if purporting to be published under the 
 authority of their respective governments, or if 
 commonly admitted and read as evidence in 
 their Courts, shall be admitted in all Courts of 
 Law, and on all other occasions, in that State, as 
 prima facie evidence of such laws. Pub. Stats. 
 c. 169, § 71. For the mode of authenticating 
 the records and judicial proceedings of one 
 State to be used in the Courts of other States, 
 see 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 504-506. 
 
 2 See 1 Greenl. Ev § 501. Levisay v. Delp, 
 1 Tenn. Leg. Rep. 275. 
 
 3 2 Phil, on Evid. 197; 2 Taylor, § 1534; 1 
 Greenl. Ev. § 503. As to the proof of British 
 treaties, charters, letters-patent, grants from 
 the Crown, pardons, and commissions, see 2 
 Taylor, § 1526; of the general records of the 
 realm, in the custody of the M:isterof the Rolls, 
 see 1 & 2 Vic. c. 94,'§§ 12, 13 ; 2 Taylor, § 1533; 
 and of documents belonging to the Common 
 Law side of the Court of Chancery, see 12 & 
 13 Vic. c. 109, §§ 11, 13; Taylor, § 1385. See 
 Documentary Evidence Act of 1868, 31 & 32 
 Vic. c. 37; and of 1882 (45 & 46 Vic. c. 9, § 2); 
 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.), 587; R. S. C 
 Ord. LIE A. (Ord. April, 1880, r. 45); 36 & 37 
 Vic. c. GQ, § 61
 
 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH PROVES ITSELF. 
 
 864 
 
 any foreign or colonial Court, or an affidavit, pleading, or other legal 
 document, filed or deposited in any such Court, the authenticated copy, 
 to be admissible, in evidence, must purport either to be sealed with 
 the seal of the foreign or colonial Court, to which the original document 
 belongs, or, in the event of such Court having no seal, to be signed by 
 the Judge, or if there be more than one Judge, by any one of the 
 Judges ; and the Judge must attach to his signature a statement 
 in writing on the said * copy, " that the Court whereof he is * 864 
 a Judge has no seal." And where the authenticated copies 
 purport to be sealed or signed as above mentioned, the same are to 
 be admitted as evidence, in every case in which the original document 
 could have been received in evidence, without any proof of the seal, 
 where a seal is necessary, or of the signature, or of the truth of the 
 statement attached thereto, where such signature and statement are 
 necessary, or of the judicial character of the person appearing to have 
 made such signature and statement. 1 
 
 It may be observed here that questions of foreign law are questions 
 of fact, which must be determined in each case on the evidence adduced 
 in it ; and for this purpose, a decision on a former case, or the evidence 
 then made use of, is not available. It cannot be proved by the produc- 
 tion of a copy of the law, however well authenticated ; but persons 
 skilled in the foreign law must be called to prove its existence and 
 meaning, 2 and the evidence of a person whose only knowledge of the 
 
 1 14 & 15 Vic. c. 99, § 7; Taylor, §§ 10, 
 1372, 1398; see 1 Greenl. Ev. § 514." If the for- 
 eign document sought to be proved by a copy 
 does not fall within the language of § 7, evidence 
 must be given that it is a public writing, de- 
 posited in some registry or place, whence, by 
 the law, or the established usage of the coun- 
 try, it cannot be removed; and the copy must 
 then be shown to have been duly examined. 
 2 Taylor, § 1556. 
 
 - Marl Xelson v. Lord Bridport, 8 Reav. 527, 
 554; M'Cormick v. Garnett, 5 De G. M. & G. 
 278: and see Sussex Peerage Case, 11 CI. & F. 
 85; Di Sma v. I'hillipps, 10 H. L. Cas. 624; 2 
 Taylor, §§ 1423-1425; United States v. M'Rae, 
 L. U. 3 Ch. 85, 86. English Courts may now 
 ascertain what the foreign law is, by sending 
 cases for the opinion of foreign Courts; but, 
 unless they are in countries under the govern- 
 ment of the Queen, a convention must first be 
 entered into with the foreign government. 22 
 & 23 Vic. c. 63; 24 & 25 Vic. c. 11; and see 
 post, Chap. XXVII. Trials of Questions oj 
 Fart. In Massachusetts, the unwritten or com- 
 mon law of any other of the United States, or 
 of the territories thereof, may be proved as 
 facts by parol evidence; and the books of re- 
 ports of cases adjudged in their Courts may 
 also be admitted as evidence of such law. Pub. 
 Stats, c. 169, § 72. The existence, tenor, or 
 effect, of all foreign laws, may be proved as 
 
 facts, by parol evidence ; but if it appears that 
 the law in question is contained in a written 
 statute or code, the Court may in its discretion 
 reject any evidence of such law that is not ac- 
 companied by a copy thereof. Ibid. § 65. 
 
 In Tennessee, the laws of other States may 
 be proved by copies of the statutes purporting 
 to be published by authority of the particular 
 State. Code, § 3800. And under the Code, 
 § 3801, the Supreme Court takes judicial notice 
 of the laws and statutes of sister States. Hobbs 
 r. Memphis &c. R. Co. 9 Heisk. 873; Ander- 
 son v. May, 10 Heisk. 84. 88. 
 
 Where the plaintiff relies upon a contract 
 made in another State, and the defendant 
 claims that it is void by the laws of that 
 State, he must show its validity as well by 
 his pleadings as by his proof. It is not suffi- 
 cient for the defendant to allege in his answer 
 that the contract is void by the laws of the 
 land; because that only draws the attention of 
 the Court to the laws of the State in which the 
 proceedings are pending. Courts will not ex 
 officio take notice of foreign laws. Campion 
 r. Kille, 14 N. J. Eq. 22!) ; Dainese v. Hale, 91 
 U. S. 13; Kline v. Baker, 99 Mass. 253. It is 
 otherwise, where the judgment of a Court of a 
 sister State is impleaded. Paine v. Schenectady 
 Ins. Co. 11 R. I. 411; State of Ohio r. Hinchin, 
 27 Penn. St. 479. Foreign laws and foreign 
 adjudications, to be the basis of decision in 
 
 861
 
 865 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 laws of a foreign country is derived from having studied them, will not 
 be received. 3 (a) 
 
 Documents which are admissible without formal proof in England, 
 are also admissible in Ireland, and vice versa;* and such documents 
 are in like manner admissible in colonial Courts. 5 
 
 Kegisters of British vessels, and certificates of register, purporting 
 to be duly signed, are received in evidence as prima facie proof of all 
 the matters contained or recited in such register, and of all the matters 
 contained or recited in, or indorsed on such certificate of registry, with- 
 out proof of the signature. 6 
 
 Whenever any book or other document is of such a public nature as 
 to be admissible in evidence, on its mere production from the 
 * 865 proper custody, any copy thereof or extract therefrom is * admis- 
 sible in evidence, if it be proved to be an examined copy or 
 extract, or if it purport to be signed, and certified as a true copy or 
 extract, by the officer to whose custody the original is intrusted. 1 Thus, 
 extracts from parish registers, certified by the rector, vicar, or curate to 
 be true extracts, are evidence of the baptism, marriage, or burial referred 
 to ; and it is not necessary to prove that the rector, vicar, or curate is 
 the person entitled to have the custody of the register. 2 
 
 Alabama, must be proved by being given in 
 evidence in the Court below. Varuer v. Young, 
 56 Ala. 265. 
 
 The presumption is that the law of another 
 State is the same as that of the State in which 
 the cause is heard. Paine v. Noelke, 43 N. Y. 
 Sup. Ct. 176; McLear i>. Hunsicker, 29 La. Ann. 
 539. 
 
 For form of case, see Vol. III. 
 
 3 Re Bonelli, 1 P. D. 69; Cartwright v. Cart- 
 wright, 26 W. R. 684. 
 
 *14 & 15 Vic. c. 99, §§ 9, 10; Re Mahon, 9 
 Hare, 459. As to Scotch Bankruptcy proceed- 
 ings, see 19 & 20 Vic. c. 79, §§ 47, 73, 140, 147, 
 174; 2 Taylor, § 1559. 
 
 s 14 & 15 Vic. c. 99, § 11. 
 
 6 14 & 15 Vic. c. 99, § 12; 17 & 18 Vic. c. 
 104, § 107; 2 Taylor, § 1623. 
 
 1 14 & 15 Vic. c. 99, § 14; Dorrett v. Meux, 
 15 C. B. 142; Scott v. Walker. 2 E. & B. 
 555; Prosser v. Bank of England. L. R. 13 Eq. 
 611. Section 14 also provides that the officers 
 shall furnish certified copies or extracts, on pay- 
 ment of not more than 4'/. per folio of ninety 
 words: see, for cases under this section, Reg. v. 
 Main waring, 1 Dears. & B. 132; 2 Jur. N. S. 
 1236; Reeve v. Hodson, 10 Hare App. 19. For 
 a list of public books and documents, the con- 
 tents of which are now provable, either by ex- 
 amined or by certified copies, under 14 & 15 
 Vic. c. 99, § 14, see 2 Taylor, § 1600. For a list 
 
 of the principal public registers and documents, 
 certified copies of which are receivable in evi- 
 dence by virtue of some enactment having spe- 
 cial reference to them, see id. §§ 1602-1609. As 
 to the statutable methods of proof of records or 
 other proceedings of particular tribunals, or . f 
 public records and documents, see id. §§ 1547- 
 1580; and as to the proof of certificates, under 
 statutes having special reference to them, see 
 id. §§ 1610-1659: see Genl. Stats. Mass. c. 21, 
 §6; St. Mass. 1867. c. 213; and seethe Naturali- 
 zation Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vic. c. 14), § 12. as 
 to proofs thereunder. Proof of a record is irrel- 
 evant without proof of some regulation mak- 
 ing a record obligatory, or giving it some effect. 
 Golden Fleece Gold &c. ('<>. ». (able &c. Co. 
 12 Nev. 312. And see Butler t>. St. Louis Life 
 Ins. Co. 45 Iowa, 93; Fraser v. Charleston, 8 
 S. C. 318. 
 
 2 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 483-485, 493, 498. 507, 
 508; Re Neddy Hall's Estate, 17 Jur. 29, L. JJ., 
 which appears to be incorrectly reported in 
 2 De G. M. & G. 748; see Re Porter's Trusts, 
 2 Jur. N. S. 349, V. C. W. ; Reg. v. Weaver, 
 L.R. 2C. C. R. 85; 1 Seton, 25. The certificate 
 should express that the person signing it is the 
 rector, &c., of the parish or place; see Re Neddy 
 Hall's Estate, 2 De G. M. & G. 749; Sugd. V. 
 & P. 420, note. As to burials in cemeteries, see 
 10 & 11 Vic. c. 65, §§ 32, 33; 27 & 28 Vic. c. 
 97. A stamp duty of one penny is imposed, by 
 
 (a) Counsel may make a binding admission cannot be proved by an attorney's ex parte 
 of foreign law as a fact. Urquhart v. Butter- affidavit. State v. Cross, 68 Iowa, 180. 
 field (No. 1), 37 Ch. D. 357. But foreign law 
 862
 
 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENX'E WHICH PROVES ITSELF. * 866 
 
 Certified copies of entries, purporting to be sealed or stamped with 
 the seal of the General Register Office, are evidence of the birth, death, 
 or marriage to which the same relate, without any further proof of such 
 entry ; but no certified copy, purporting to be given in the office, is of 
 any force or effect, unless it is so sealed or stamped. 3 
 
 Copies or extracts, certified and sealed with the seal of the commis- 
 sioners of letters-patent, of or from specifications, disclaimers, and 
 memoranda of alterations, and all other documents recorded and filed 
 in the Commissioners' office, or in the office of the Court of Chancery 
 appointed for the filing of specifications, are to be received in evidence 
 in all proceedings relating to letters-patent for inventions, without 
 further proof or production of the originals. 4 
 
 Whenever, by any Act now in force, or hereafter to be in force, any 
 certificate, official or public document, or document or proceeding 
 of any corporation or joint-stock or other company, or any * certi- *8G6 
 fied copy of any document, by-law, entry in any register or other 
 book, or of any other proceeding, are receivable in evidence of any 
 particular fact in any Court of Justice, or in any judicial proceeding, 
 the same are respectively to be admitted in evidence, provided they 
 respectively purport to be sealed or impressed with a stamp, or sealed 
 and signed, or signed alone, as required, or impressed with a stamp and 
 signed, as directed by the respective Acts, made, or to be hereafter 
 made, without any proof of the seal or stamp, where a seal or stamp 
 is necessary, or of the signature, or of the official character, of the person 
 appearing to have signed the same, and without any further proof 
 thereof, in every case in which the original record could have been 
 received in evidence. 1 
 
 All Courts, Judges, and other judicial officers, are bound to take 
 judicial notice of the signature of any of the Equity or Common Law 
 Judges of the Superior Courts at Westminster, where such signature is 
 attached, or appended to any decree, order, certificate, or other judicial 
 
 23 & 24 Vic. c. 15, §§ 1, 2, and Sched.; 33 & generally admitted: ibid.; Reg. v. Weaver, L. 
 
 34 Vic. c. 97, §§ 3, 80, & Sched. on every certi- R. 2 C. C. R. 85; Reg. r. Mainwaring, 1 Dears, 
 
 ficate of birth, baptism, marriage, death, or & B. 132; 2 Jur. N. S. 1136; and see 6 & 7 
 
 burial; it is payable by the party requiring Will. IV. c. 86. § 36; not, however, it seems, 
 
 the certificate, and is to be denoted by an im- at the Rolls. As to the stamp dutv on the 
 
 pressed or adhesive stamp, to be cancelled by certificate, see supra. As to extracts from 
 
 the person who giants the certificate. For form non-parochial registers, deposited with the Reg- 
 
 <>f certificate see Vol. III. istrar-General, under the 3 & 4 Vic. c. 92, see 
 
 s 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 86, § 38. See the Births §§ 9-15; 2 Phil, on Evid. 145; 2 Taylor, § 1503. 
 
 and Deaths Registration Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Vic. Probate or letters of administration are not 
 
 c. 88), § 38. The identity of the person named evidence of death, but show who represents the 
 
 in the certificate must, of course, be proved. Par- deceased. lSeton, 25; Hubback on Succession, 
 
 kinson v. Francis, 15 Sim. 160; 1 Seton,24. As 161 ; Thompson r. Donaldson, 3 Esp. 63; Moons 
 
 tn certificates of death, see Riseley v. Sheppard, v. De Beruales, 1 Russ. 301. 
 W. N. (1870) 150; 21 W. R. 782; and of birth, * 16 & 17 Vic. c. 115, § 4; see now 46 & 47 
 
 see Re Wintle, L. R. 9 Eq. 373. Extracts from Vic. c. 57, § 113, Sched. 
 
 the district registries were not formerly received l 8 & 9 Vic. c. 113, § 1; see Reg. v. Parson3, 
 
 as evidence by the Court, but they are now L. R. 1 C. C. R. 24; 12 Jur. N. S. 436. 
 
 863
 
 *867 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 or official document, 2 and also of the seals of certain offices and 
 registries. 3 
 
 Amongst the records of other Courts of Justice, copies of which the 
 Court of Chancery is in the habit of receiving as evidence, may be 
 ranked the depositions of witnesses, and proceedings taken in causes 
 in other Courts of Equity of concurrent jurisdiction. The rules by 
 which the Court is governed, in receiving evidence of this description, 
 are the same as those adopted by it in cases where depositions taken 
 in the Court of Chancery in one cause are offered to be read in another ; 4 
 but no depositions taken in any other Court are to be read, unless by 
 order. 5 
 
 The method of proving depositions taken in one Court of Equity, 
 upon the hearing of a cause in another, is, by producing a certified copy 
 of the bill and answer, if one has been put in ; unless the depositions 
 are so ancient that no bill and answer can be forthcoming, or unless the 
 defendant has been in contempt, or has had an opportunity of cross- 
 examining, which he chose to forego: in which case the depositions 
 may be read after proving the bill only. 6 Where the depositions have 
 been taken on interrogatories, under a commission issuing out of an- 
 other Court, they are not admissible without the production of the com- 
 mission, under the authority of which they were taken ; unless the 
 depositions are of long standing, so that the commission may be pre- 
 sumed to have been lost. 7 It is to be noticed, however, that depositions 
 may be used as evidence against a party to the suit, or for the 
 * 867 purpose of contradicting * the witness, without proof of the bill 
 and answer, although some proof of the identity of the person 
 will be required. 1 Decrees in other courts, 2 and office-copy proceedings 
 in other courts, and, it seems, depositions taken in other courts, 3 may 
 be read without an order. 
 
 The Court of Chancery takes notice of its own proceedings, although 
 they are not actually recorded : 4 and all the proceedings of the Court 
 
 2 8 & 9 Vic. c. 113, § 2. As to Treasury 
 Solicitor's Documents, see 39 & 40 Vic. c. 18 
 § 1; as to documents relating to Industrial and 
 Provident Societies, see 39 & 40 Vic. c. 45, 
 §§ 3, 24; as to documents deposited under Life 
 Assurance Companies Act, 1870, see 33 <& 34 
 Vic. c. 61, § 17. As to documents filed with the 
 Register of Joint Stock Companies, see 40 & 
 41 Vic. c. 26, §6; and see the Bankers' Book 
 Evidence Act, 1879, 42 & 43 Vic. c. 11 ; Hard- 
 ing v. Williams, 14 Ch. D. 197; Arnott v. 
 Hayes, 36 Ch. D. 731. 
 
 8 See Ibid. ; 16 & 17 Vic. c. 70, §§ 100, 101; 
 26 & 27 Vic. c. 86, § 29 ; c. 89, § 125; R. S. C. 
 1883, Ord. XXXVII. 4; Ord. LX. A. 5 (Old. 
 April, 1880, r. 45) ; 36 & 37 Vic. c. 66, § 61. 
 
 4 See post, p. 867. 
 
 5 Cons. Ord. XIX. 4; see, however, Good- 
 enough v. Alway, 2 S. & S. 481; Williams v. 
 Broadhead, 1 Sim. 151; Manby v. Bewicke, 3 
 Jur. N. S. 685, V. C. W. In Lake v. Peisley, 
 
 864, 
 
 L. R. 1 Eq. 173 (11 Jur. N. S. 1012, M. R.) an 
 order to read depositions taken in bankruptcy 
 was made on an exparte motion ; and in Stephen- 
 son v. Biney, L. R. 2 Eq. 303 (12 Jur. N. S. 
 428, V. C. W.), an order of course to read depo- 
 sitions taken in the Palatine Court of Lancaster 
 was discharged as irregular. See Allen v. 
 Bonnett. L. R. 6 Eq. 522. 
 
 6 2 Phil, on Evid. 210, 211; 2 Taylor, 
 §§ 1576, 1577; Goodenough v. Alway, ubi 
 supra. 
 
 7 2 Phil, on Evid. 210, 211; 2 Taylor, 
 § 1577; 1 Greenl. Ev. §517. 
 
 i 2 Phil, on Evid. 210, 211 ; 2 Taylor, 
 §1576; see Davison v. Robinson, 3 Jur. N. S. 
 791, V. C. W. ; 6 W. R. 673, L. C. ; 1 Greenl. 
 Ev. § 156; Bell v. Johnson, 1 J. & H. 682. 
 
 2 See Manby v. Bewicke, 3 Jur. N. S. 685; 
 White v. Cox, 2 Ch. D. 387, 397. 
 
 3 See sttpra, p. 866, n. 5. 
 
 4 Ante, p. 688. The final decree of a Court
 
 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH PROVES ITSELF. * 863 
 
 in the cause, which are required as evidence, may be used as such, with- 
 out further testimony to establish them than the production of the pro- 
 ceeding itself, or of an office copy of it, signed by the officer in whose 
 custody such proceeding properly is, according to the practice of the 
 Court. 5 
 
 According to the former practice of the Court, it was necessary, when 
 any proceedings in one cause were to be given in evidence in another, 
 that the foundation for the production of them should be laid, by prov- 
 ing the bill and answer in the cause in which they were taken. Gradu- 
 ally, however, this rule was relaxed ; and the Court will now dispense 
 with the strict proof of the bill and answer, 6 and make an order, that 
 the party shall be at liberty, at the hearing, to read the proceedings in 
 the former cause. Such an order is not, however, necessary to entitle 
 a party to read a decree or order. 7 
 
 A decree or order of the Court of Chancery, determining a matter of 
 right, is good evidence as to that right, not only against the party 
 against whom the decree was made, but against all those claiming under 
 him ; 8 but a verdict on issues in a suit between predecessors in title does 
 not in itself create an estoppel, and the decree and pleadings must be 
 taken into consideration. 9 Although a decree between other parties can- 
 not be read as evidence, yet it may be read as a precedent. 10 And it 
 is not in any case necessary, in order that it should be admissible as 
 evidence, that the parties to it should have filled the relative situations 
 of plaintiff and defendant: if the present plaintiff and the defendant 
 were co-defendants in the former cause, the decree in that cause may be 
 read, though not as conclusive evidence. 11 "It frequently happens," 
 observes Lord Hardwicke, "that there are several defendants, all claim- 
 ing against the plaintiff, and having also different rights and claims 
 among one another : the Court then makes a decree, settling the 
 rights of all the parties ; * but a declaration for that purpose * 868 
 could not be made, if this objection, (namely, to receiving the decree 
 
 of Equity may be given in evidence in another Phil. Ev. (Cowen & Hill's ed. 1839) 358, note, 
 suit, although such decree has not been for- 639 in 2 id. 915, et seq. For the mode of prov- 
 nially enrolled. Bates v. Delavan, I Paige, 299. ing decrees and answers in Chancery, see 1 
 A Court will take judicial notice of its own Greenl. Ev. §§ 511, 512. A decree in Chan- 
 records, and the book of records of its judg- eery, being the act of a Court of a sifter State, 
 ments proves itself when offered in evidence in must be authenticated according to the U. S. 
 that Court. Robinson v. Brown, 82 111. 279. Statute, 1790, May 20, 1 U. S. Stat, at Large, 
 So of the entire record of a cause. Nichol v. 122 (1 Greenl. Ev. § 504), to be admissible in 
 Ridley, 5 Yerg. 03. And see Natl. Bank v. evidence. Barbour v. Watts, 2 A. K. Marsh. 
 Bryant, 13 Bush, 419. 290. The printed report of a decision of the 
 
 "5 See R. S. C Ord. LX. A. r. 5 (Ord. April, Supreme Court, though issued by authority of 
 
 1880, r. 45), R. S. C. 1883, XXXIII. 1; 36 & law, is secondary evidence, and inadmissible as 
 
 37 Vic. c. 66, § 61. evidence of the judgment, unless the original 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. XIX. 4; Seton, 980, et seq. ; record be lost or destroyed. Donellan ?•. Hardy. 
 
 Taylor, § 1413. 57 Ind. 393; Taylor v. Commonwealth, 21 
 
 'v Cons. Ord. XIX 4; Brooks V. Taylor, Mos. Gratt. 780. And see Mason V. Pelletier, 77 
 
 188; see Green v. Green, 5 Ohio, 278." N. C. 52. 
 
 8 Borough r. Whichcote, 3 Bro. P. C. ed. 9 Robinson v. Duleep Singh, 11 Ch. D. 798 
 
 Toml. 595; Maule v. Bruce, 2 C. P. Coop. temp. 10 Austen r. Nicholas, 7 Bro. P. C. 9. 
 
 Cott. 215; see Re Defries, W. N. (1883) 87; 31 « Askew r. Poulterers' Co. 2 Ves. Sr. 89; 
 
 W. R. 720; 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 522, 523, 536; 1 Belt's Sup. 299. 
 
 vol. 1. -55 865
 
 868 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 as evidence, because made between co-defendants) holds : which would 
 be very fatal, as it would occasion the splitting one cause into several." 1 
 The depositions of witnesses, which have been taken in another cause, 
 may, as well as other proceedings, be read at the hearing, under an 
 order to be obtained for that purpose, 2 if the two suits are between the 
 same parties or their privies, and the issue is the same ; 8 and such 
 depositions are admissible in evidence in the former cause. 4 Thus, evi- 
 dence which has been taken in a cross-cause may, by order, be read at 
 the hearing of the original cause, 5 and vice versa, provided the point in 
 issue is the same in each case. Where the matter in issue is not the 
 same, the depositions taken in one cause cannot be read in the other ; 6 
 and even where two suits related substantially to the same matters, one 
 suit being instituted by the first tenant for life in remainder, and the 
 other by the first tenant in tail in remainder, the Court refused to allow 
 the evidence taken in one suit to be used in the other. 7 Where the 
 person against whom the evidence is offered was neither a party to the 
 other cause, nor privy to a person who was a party, the depositions 
 taken in that cause cannot be read : thus, where a father is tenant for 
 life only, depositions taken in a cause to which he was a party cannot 
 be read against his son who claims as tenant in tail. 8 The rule with 
 regard to reading depositions in another suit appears to be the same as 
 that with respect to reading verdicts at Common Law, namely, "that 
 nobody can take a benefit by it who had not been prejudiced by it, had 
 it gone contrary." 9 Thus, it has been held, that if A prefers his bill 
 against B, and B exhibits his bill against A and C, in relation to the 
 
 1 Ibid.; see also, Chamley v. Lord Dunsany, 
 2 Sch. & Lef. 710, H. L.; Farquharson i\ Seton, 
 5 Russ. 45,0-3. 
 
 2 See post, p. 871; Leviston v. French, 45 
 N. H. 21. 
 
 3 Maekworth v. Penrose, 1 Dick. 50; Fade v. 
 Lingood, 1 Atk. 203; Humphreys r. Pensam, 
 
 1 M. & C. 580, 586 ; Hope v. Liddell (No. 2), 
 21 Beav. 180; Williams v. Williams, 10 Jur. N. 
 S. 608; 12 W. R. 663, V. C. K.; Llanover v. 
 Homfray, 19 Ch. D. 224, 230; Maule v. Bruce, 
 
 2 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 215; Brooks v. Can- 
 non, 2 A. K. Marsh. 525; Leviston v. French, 
 45 N. H. 21; Gresley, Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 185, 
 180; 1 Phil. Ev. (Cowen & Hill's ed. 1839), 
 364, and notes in 2 id. 934, 935; Harrington v. 
 Harrington, 2 How. 701; Payne v. Coles, 1 
 Munf. 373; Dale v. Rosevelt, 1 Paige, 36; Rob- 
 erts v. Anderson. 3 John. Ch. 376; see Lake v. 
 Peisley, L. R. 1 Eq. 173; 11 Jur. N. S. 1012, 
 M. R '; Stephenson v. Binev, L. R. 2 Eq. 303; 
 12 Jur. N. S. 428, V. C. w". ; see Allen v. Bon- 
 nett, L. R. 6 Eq. 522 ; Hill v. Hibbit, L. R. 7 Eq. 
 421; Laurence v. Maule, 4 Drew. 472; Ernest 
 r. Weiss, 1 N. R. 6. And where the chief mat- 
 ter of controversy in two suits was the same, 
 the Court, on motion, ordered that the testi- 
 money taken in either suit' should be read in 
 the other, and that the hearing on both should 
 
 866 
 
 come on together. Evans v. Evans, 23 N. J. 
 Eq. 180. In a suit in Chancery to quiet title, 
 and restrain an action of ejectment, the deposi- 
 tion of a witness who has since died, taken in 
 that action, is competent evidence. Wanner v. 
 Sisson, 29 N. J. Eq. 141. 
 
 4 Williams v. Williams, 10 Jur. N. S. 608; 
 12 W. R. 663, V. C. K. 
 
 5 Lubiere v. Genou, 2 Ves. Sr. 579, in which 
 case the cross-bill had been dismissed. Hol- 
 combe v. HnUombe, 10 N. J. Eq. 284; see post, 
 Chap. XXXIV. § 1, Cross Bills. For form of 
 order, see Seton, 1275, No. 2. The order does 
 not extend to an answer not put in evidence. 
 Moore v. Harper, W. N. (1866) 56; 14 W. R. 
 306. V. C W. 
 
 6 Christian v. Wrenn, Bunb. 321; Republic 
 of Peru v. Ruzo, W. N. (1875)72; 23 W. R. 
 546; see Re Wontner, Brown V. White, W. N. 
 (1876) 116; 24 W. R. 450; Re Woolley's Trusts, 
 24 W. R. 783. 
 
 " Blagrave v. Blagrave, 1 De G. & S. 2-V2, 
 259; 11 Jur. 744; and see Hope v. Liddell (No. 
 2), 21 Beav. 180. 
 
 8 Peterborough v. Norfolk, Prec. in Ch. 212; 
 Coke v. Fountain, 1 Vern. 413; and see Rhodes 
 v. Rhodes, 14 W. R. 515, V. C. W. 
 
 9 Gilb. on Evid. 28; Buller, N. P. 229; 2 
 Phil. r. n Evid. 8.
 
 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH PROVES ITSELF. * 870 
 
 same matter, and a trial at Law is directed, C cannot give in 
 
 * evidence the depositions in the cause between A and B, but the * SG9 
 
 trial must be entirely as of a new cause. 1 
 
 This rule appears to be somewhat at variance with what has been 
 stated to be a common one, namely, that where one legatee has brought 
 his bill against an executor, and proved assets, and afterwards another 
 legatee brings his bill, the last-named legatee should have the benefit of 
 the depositions in the former suit, though he was not a party to it ; 2 but 
 it is to be observed, that the case of the legatee is different from the 
 case of a plaintiff in ordinary circumstances ; for although the legatee 
 was not actually a party to the original suit, yet he was so virtually, 
 his interest in the first suit having been represented by the executor. 
 In fact, in the case of the legatee, the suit is in pari materia; and, with 
 respect to the subject in dispute, the plaintiff in the second suit stands 
 in the same situation, with regard to the defendant, as the plaintiff in 
 the first. 
 
 The same principle appears to have been acted upon in other cases 
 besides those of legatees. Thus where the same matters were under ex- 
 amination and in issue, depositions taken in an old cause were permitted 
 to be read, although the plaintiff and those under whom he claimed 
 were not parties to the former cause : inasmuch as the terre tewuits of 
 the same lands were then parties.' 5 In like manner, depositions which 
 had been taken in a suit by one tenant in common against another were 
 admitted in evidence, in a suit by another tenant in common, against 
 the same defendant. 4 In such cases, however, it must be proved that 
 the depositions are touching the same land. 5 
 
 It seems not to be important what character the individual, against 
 whom the depositions in the former suit are offered, filled in that suit, 
 whether that of plaintiff or defendant, provided he had, in such char- 
 acter, an opportunity of cross-examining the witness. If he was a 
 party to the first suit as a co-defendant, and becomes a plain- 
 tiff in the second suit, making his co-defendant in * the first suit * 870 
 a defendant, he may, if such co-defendant sets up the same de- 
 fence that he did in the original suit, read the evidence taken in that 
 suit against such co-defendant. Thus, where the creditors of a testator 
 filed their bill against the residuary legatees, and also against a pur- 
 chaser from the testator, praying to have their debts paid, and the con- 
 veyances, alleged to have been executed by the testator to the purchaser, 
 set aside for fraud, and obtained a decree accordingly, and afterwards 
 the residuary legatees filed another bill against the purchaser, praying 
 for an account of the residue, and to set aside the conveyances, it was 
 held, that as there was the same question and the same defence in both 
 
 1 Rushworth v. Countess of Pembroke, see also Travis v. Challenor, 3 Gwill. 1237; 
 
 Hardres, 472. For the reason why a verdict Ashhy v. Power, id. 1239; Benson v. Olive, 2 
 
 is not evidence for or against a person who was Gwill. 701 ; Earl of Sussex v. Temple, 1 Lord 
 
 not a party to it, see 2 Phil. Evid. 8. See R. S. Raym. 310. 
 C. 1833, Ord. XXXVII. 3. 4 Byrne v. Frere, 2 Moll. 157; and see 
 
 * Coke v. Fountain, 1 Vern. 413. Bishop of Lincoln v. Ellis, Bunb. 110. 
 
 3 Terwit v. Greshnm, 1 Ch. Cas. 73; and 5 Benson v. Olive, Bunb. 284. 
 
 see Lady Dartmouth r. Roberts. 1G East, 334; 
 
 8G7
 
 * 871 EVIDENCE. 
 
 the causes, the depositions taken in the former cause, as to the fraud 
 in obtaining the conveyances, could be read in the second cause, on be- 
 half of the legatees against the purchasers, who were co-defendants in 
 the former cause. 1 
 
 Where a cause had been set down for hearing on motion for a decree, 
 the Court allowed the plaintiff to use the examination of the defendant, 
 taken in another cause ; but gave leave to the defendant to file affidavits 
 in explanation, subject to the right of cross-examination. 2 
 
 Where the depositions of witnesses in another suit are offered to be 
 read at the hearing, against persons who were parties to such other suit, 
 or those claiming under them, it does not appear to be necessary that 
 the witnesses, whose depositions are offered to be read, should be proved 
 to be dead. 8 
 
 Some doubt seems to have been, at one time, entertained whether 
 the depositions of witnesses, taken in a cause which had been subse- 
 quently dismissed, could be read at the hearing of another cause ; 
 * 871 and the rule appears to have been laid down, that if the * dis- 
 missal was upon merits, evidence of the facts which have been 
 proved in the cause may be used as evidence of the same facts in 
 another cause between the same parties ; * but where a cause has been 
 dismissed, not upon merits, but upon the ground of irregularity (as, 
 for instance, because it comes on by revivor, where it ought to have 
 come on by original bill), so that regularly there was no cause in Court, 
 and consequently no proofs properly taken, such proofs cannot be used. 2 
 If a suit to perpetuate testimony should be set down for hearing, and 
 dismissed because it ought not to have been set down, the plaintiff may, 
 notwithstanding the dismissal, have the benefit of the depositions. 3 
 
 An order for leave to read, at the hearing, the depositions or pro- 
 ceedings in a cross cause, is granted upon motion of course, or on 
 petition of course at the Rolls, 4 and must be served upon the adverse 
 party; who may, if there is any irregularity in it, or in the mode in which 
 it has been obtained, apply by motion to discharge it. A.s, however, 
 it is possible that the irregularity of such an order may not appear 
 till it is acted upon at the hearing, when it would be too late to dis- 
 charge it, the order is always made "saving all just exceptions:" 5 
 the effect of which is, to leave it open to the party against whom the 
 evidence is offered, to make any objection to the reading of evidence 
 
 1 Nevil v. Johnson, 2 Vem. 447: and see * Lubiere v. Genou, 2 Ves. Sr. 579; M'Intosh 
 Askew v. Poulterers' Co. 2 Ves. Sr. 89, 90. v. Great Western Ry. Co. 7 De G. M. & G. 
 
 2 Watson v. Cleaver, 20 Beav. 137 ; 1 Jur. 737. 
 
 N. S. 270. 2 Backhouse v. Middleton, 1 Ch. Cas. 173- 
 
 3 London v. Perkins, 3 Bro. P. C. ed. Toml. 175; 3 Ch. Rep. 22;Gresley, Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 
 602; Williams v. Broadhead, 1 Sim. 151; Car- 187; Hopkins r. Strump, 2 Harr. & J 301. 
 rington o. Cornock, 2 Sim. 567; and see Bla- 3 Hall v. Hoddesdon, 2 P. Wms. 162; see 
 grave v. Blagrave, 1 De G. & S. 252; 11 Jur. also Vaughan v. Fitzgerald, 1 Seh. & Lef. 316. 
 744; Lawrence v. Maule, 4 Drew. 472. 480; 4 See now R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XXXVII. 3. 
 Williams r. Williams, 10 Jur. N. S. 608; 12 For forms of order on motion, see Seton, 1275, 
 W. R. 663; Llanover v. Homfray, 19 Ch. D. Nos. 1, 2; and for forms of motion paper and 
 224. 230. The practice of the Common Law petition, see Vol. III. 
 
 Courts was different. See 2 Phil. Evid 124; 5 Hand, 114, 115; see form of order, Seton, 
 
 1 l'aylor, §§ 470-472. 1275, Nos. 1, 2. 
 
 SG8 
 

 
 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH PROVES ITSELF. 
 
 * S7-? 
 
 under it which the nature of the case will admit, in the same manner 
 that he might have done had no such order been made. 6 
 
 Where either party, plaintiff or defendant, obtains leave to use the 
 depositions of witnesses taken in another cause, the opposite party may 
 likewise use the same without leave ; unless, upon special reason shown 
 to the Court by the party obtaining such leave, the opposite party be 
 prohibited from so doing. 7 
 
 When proceedings or depositions in another cause, in the Court of 
 Chancery, are ordered to be read as evidence at the hearing, it will be 
 sufficient to produce the office copies of them. Such office copies, how- 
 ever, must be signed by the proper officer or properly sealed : 8 other- 
 wise, they cannot be read ; 9 and if at the hearing of a cause it is 
 found * that the office copy of a proceeding, which one party relied * 872 
 upon as evidence, has not been properly signed or sealed, the 
 Court will allow the cause to stand over for the purpose of procuring 
 the proper signature or seal. 1 
 
 No person may take out of the office of the Clerks of Records and 
 Writs any record or document filed there, except by direction of the 
 Court. 2 Where any record or other document, filed or deposited in 
 that office, is required to be produced in the Court of Chancery, or in 
 any of its offices, a memorandum bespeaking an attendance therewith 
 should be left with the Record and Writ Clerk, and the proper fee be 
 paid, or arranged to be paid ; an attendance in Court with records, 
 however, is made only at the request of the Judge. 3 
 
 Where a record or other document, in the custody of the Record and 
 Writ Clerks, is required to be produced out of the Court of Chancery 
 or its offices, an order authorizing such production must be obtained, 
 on motion of course, or on petition of course at the Rolls, 4 supported by 
 an affidavit to the effect that such production is necessary as evidence ; 5 
 but, as a rule, no such order will be made for production of original 
 documents, if certified or examined copies will answer the purpose. 6 
 No subpoena need be issued ; but the officer will attend, on the order, 
 
 6 The order does not extend to an answer 2 Cons. Ord. I. 42. 
 
 not made evidence in the cause. Moore r. 3 Braithwaite'a Pr. 512. A fee of £1 in 
 
 Harper, W. N. (1806) 56; W. R. 306. stamps, is payable upon every application for 
 
 7 Cons. Ord. XIX. 5. the officer's attendance in a Court, ami for his 
 
 8 See R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XXXVIII. 4, attendance, per diem. Ord. as to Court fees, 
 LXI. 7; R. S. C. Ord. LX. 5 (Ord. April, 1880, Oct. 28, 1875, Sched.; Ord. April 22, 1876, 
 r. 45); Cons. Ord. I. 42; 36 & 37 Vic. c. 60. Sched.-, Regal, to Ord. Schcd. 4. For form oi 
 
 9 Att.-Gen. r. Mil ward, 1 Cox, 437. Since 18 memorandum bespeaking the attendance, see 
 & 19 Vic. c. 134, § 6, office copies of decrees Vol. III. 
 
 and orders from the Registrars' books are to be 4 Now at the Order of Course Office, 
 
 certified by the Clerks of Records and Writs, 5 Braithwaite'a Pr. 514, Greslev, 192; R. S. 
 
 Seton, 16. " The office copy of an order, or of a C. Ord. LX. A. 11 (Ord. April, 188'". r. 51). For 
 
 report confirmed by tiat, signed by the Regis- forms of motion paper, petition, and affidavit, 
 
 trar in Lunacy, and sealed or stamped with the see Vol. III. 
 
 seal of his office is admissible as evidence of 6 Braithwaite's Pr. 514; Att.-Gen. r. Ray, 6 
 
 such order or report, without further proof. 16 Beav. 335 ; 3 Hare, 335; 2 Hare. 518; Anon. 
 
 & 17 Vic. c. 70, § 100; and see id. § 101; and 13 Reav. 420; Biddulph r. Lord Camoys. 19 
 
 25 & 26 Vic. c.81, § 29. Beav. 467; and see Jervis t\ White, 8 Ves 
 
 1 Att.-Gen. v. Mil ward, ubi supra. 313. 
 
 869
 
 873 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 and a memorandum bespeaking his attendance, being left with him, and 
 on the office fees, and his reasonable expenses (if any) being paid. 7 
 
 'With respect to the production of proceedings in Chanceiy, upon 
 trials in Common Law Courts, it may here be observed, that there is a 
 difference between criminal and civil cases : in the former, it is neces- 
 sary that the original record should be procured ; 8 in the' latter, a copy 
 signed and certified by the officer to whose custody the original is 
 intrusted, 9 or proved by the person putting it in, to have been 
 *873 examined with the original record, is * sufficient; 1 and for this 
 reason, an application for production of the original depositions, 
 at the trial of a civil action, was refused. 2 
 
 The documents which have been before enumerated as requiring no 
 evidence to prove them, are all, either in a greater or less degree, public 
 documents. Private documents which are thirty years old from the 
 time of their date, also prove themselves. 3 This rule applies, generally, 
 to deeds concerning lands, and to bonds, receipts, letters, and all other 
 writings : the execution of which need not be proved, provided they 
 have been so acted upon, or are brought from such a place, as to afford a 
 reasonable presumption that they were honestly and fairly obtained and 
 preserved for use, and are free from suspicion of dishonesty. 4 Lord 
 Chief Baron Gilbert, however, upon this point, says, that "if posses- 
 sion hath not gone along with a deed, some account ought to be given 
 of the deed, because the presumption fails where there is no posses- 
 sion : " 5 and he adds a caution, that " if there is any blemish in an 
 ancient deed, it ought to be regularly proved ; or where it imports a 
 fraud, as, where a man conveys a reversion to one, and afterwards 
 conveys it to another." 6 
 
 7 Braithwaite's Pr. 513, 514. A fee of £1 is 
 payable on ever}' application for the officer's 
 attendance in Courts of Law, per diem, and for 
 his attendance, besides his reasonable expenses. 
 Reg. to Ord Sched. 4, and orders supra. These 
 expenses are one guinea per day, and travel- 
 ling expenses (first class), if the attendance is 
 in the country ; and half a guinea per day, 
 •without travelling expenses, if the attendance 
 is in a Court of Law in London or Middlesex. 
 Braithwaite's Pr. 513, 514. The office fees are 
 paid in stamps ; the officer's fees are paid to 
 him in money ; ibid. ; and he may require the 
 solicitor or party desiring his attendance to 
 deposit with him a sufficient sum to cover his 
 just fees, charges, and expenses, and undertake 
 to pay any further fees, &c.,not fully answered 
 thereby. Cons. Ord. I. 43. For form of mem- 
 orandum bespeaking attendance, see Vol. III. 
 
 8 See Jervis v. White, 8 Ves. 313. 
 
 9 14 & 15 Vic. c. 99, § 14; Reeve v. Hodson, 
 10 Hare App. 19 ; ante, p. 865. 
 
 i 2 Phil, on Evid. 208, 209; 2 Taylor, 
 § 1545. 
 
 2 Att.-Gen. v. Ray, 6 Beav. 335: see 3 Hare, 
 335. In Smith v. Earl Brownlow, L. R. 9 F.q. 
 241. an old survev was admitted in evidence to 
 
 870' 
 
 establish rights of common. See also Commis- 
 sioners of Sewers v. Glasse, L. R. 19 Eq. 134. 
 
 3 2 Phil, on Evid. 245 ; 1 Taylor, § 87; see 
 37 & 38 Vic. c. 78, § 2. 
 
 4 2 Phil, on Evid. 246; 1 Taylor. § 87; see 
 also, as to letters, Fenwick v. Reed, 6 Mad. 7, 
 8; Att.-Gen. v. Stephens, 6 De G. M. & G. 
 Ill; 2Jur. N. S.51. 
 
 5 Gilb. on Evid. 89 : and see 1 Taylor, §§ 87, 
 658; Gresley. Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 124, 125; 1 
 Phil. Ev. (Cowen & Hill's ed. 1839) 477, note 
 903, in 2 id. 1310, et seq., and cases cited; 1 
 Greenl. Fv. §§ 21, 570, and cases cited; M'Ke- 
 nire v. Fraser, 9 Sumner's Ves. 5, note (a). It 
 is not necessary to call the subscribing wit- 
 nesses, though they be living. Jackson r. 
 Christman, 4 Wend." 277, 282, 283; Fetherly v. 
 Waggoner, 11 Wend. 603 ; 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 21, 
 570; Jackson v. Blanshan, 3 John. 292; Winn 
 v. Patterson, 9 Peters, 674, 675; Bennet v. 
 Runyon, 4 Dana, 422, 424; Cook v. Torton, 6 
 Dana. 110; Thurston v. Masterton, 9 Dana, 
 233; Hinde v. Vattier, 1 M'Lean, 115; Northop 
 r. Wright, 24 Wend. 221; 1 Phil. Ev. (Cowen 
 & Hill's ed. 1839)478. 
 
 15 Gilb. on Evid. 8"»: and see 1 Taylor, § 87; 
 1 Phil. Ev. (Cowen & Hill's ed. 1819)478, note
 
 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH DOES NOT PROVE ITSELF. 
 
 The rule of computing the thirty years from the date of a deed, is 
 equally applicable to a will, 7 although some doubt was formerly enter- 
 tained on this point, on the ground that deeds take effect from their 
 execution, but wills from the death of the testator. 8 
 
 * It has been doubted, whether the seal of a Court or Corporation * 874 
 is within the rule as to thirty years ; 1 because, although the wit- 
 nesses to a private deed, or persons acquainted with a private seal, 
 may be supposed to be dead, or not capable of being accounted for, 
 after such a lapse of time, yet the seals of Courts and of corporations, 
 being of a permanent character, may be proved by persons at any 
 distance of time from the date of the instrument to which they are 
 affixed. 2 
 
 Section VI. — Documentary Evidence which does not •prove itself. 
 
 Having pointed out the species of documentary proofs which may be 
 used in Courts of Equity, without the aid of any other evidence to 
 authenticate them, or which, in other words, "prove themselves," the 
 next subject for consideration is the nature of the proofs requisite, to 
 enable a party to make use of documents which do not come under the 
 same description. The rules upon this subject are, in general, the 
 same in Equity as at Common Law, and will be found more fully set 
 forth in treatises upon the Law of Evidence. 3 
 
 With respect to the cases in which different rules prevail in Courts of 
 Equity, from those which are adopted at Law, the most important are 
 those of wills devising real' estates. 4 (a) At Law, it is sufficient tu 
 
 906, in 3 id. 1317, 1318; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 21, 570; 
 Gresley, Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 12-1, 125. 
 
 7 Man v. Ricketts, 7 Beav. 93, 101 ; Orange 
 r. Pickford, 4 Jur. N. S. 649, V. C. K.; Doe 
 v. Burdett, 4 Ad. & El. 1; Doe v. Woliev, 8 B. 
 & C. 22. 
 
 8 2 Phil, on Evid. 246; M'Kenire v. Fraser, 
 9 Ves. 5. In Rancliffe v. Parkyns, 6 Dow, 202, 
 Lord Eldon observes that, in a Court of Law, 
 "a will thirty years old, if the possession has 
 gone under it, and sometimes without the pos- 
 session, but always with possession, if the sign- 
 ing is sufficiently recorded, proves itself. But 
 if the signing is not sufficiently recorded, it 
 would be a question whether the age proves its 
 validity; and then, possession under the will, 
 and claiming and dealing with the property 
 as if it had passed under the will, would be 
 cogent evidence to prove the due signing of the 
 will, though it should not be recorded." See 
 
 1 Phil. Ev. (Cowen & Hill's ed. 1839) 503; 1 
 Greenl. Ev. § 21, and cases in notes, § 570, and 
 note; Jackson v. Blanshnn, 3 John. 392; Doe 
 v. Deakin, 3 C. & P. 402; Doe v. Wolley, 8 B. 
 & C 22. 
 
 1 Per Lord Tenterden in Rex i>. Barthwick, 
 
 2 B. & Ad. 648. 
 
 2 2 Phil, on Evid. 247; 1 Taylor, § 87; 1 
 Greenl. Ev. § 570. 
 
 3 2 Phil, on Evid. 242, et s<q. ; Taylor, 
 §§ 1368-1472, 1660-1679; Best, §§ 245-250; 
 Gresley, 173, et seq. 
 
 4 Probate is evidence of the validity of a 
 will only as to personal estate. See generally, 
 as to probate jurisdiction in England, 1 Dan. 
 Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.), 602. The Courts of 
 Probate in Massachusetts have complete juris- 
 diction over the probate of wills, of both real 
 and personal estate, and their decrees are con- 
 clusive upon all parties, and not re-examinable 
 in any other Court. Tompkins v. Tompkins, 1 
 Story, 547; see Osgood ». Breed, 12 Mass. 525, 
 53:!, 534; Laughtou v. Atkins, 1 Pick. 535, 
 547-549. So in Connecticut. Bush v. Sheldon, 
 1 Day, 170; Brown v. Lannan, 1 Conn. 476. 
 So in Rhode Island. Tompkins r. Tompkins, 1 
 Story, 547. So in New Hampshire. Poplin v. 
 Hawke. 8 N. H. 124. So in Ohio. Bailey v. 
 Bailey, 8 Ohio, 239. See as to Kentucky. Rob- 
 ertson i'. Barbour, 6 Mon. 527; Case of Wells's 
 Will, 5 Litt. 273. In North Carolina, said to 
 be prima facie evidence, Stanley v. Ke*n, 
 Taylor, 73. Illinois, see Robertson r Barbour, 
 6 Monr. 527, 528. Alabama, see Tarver v. Tar- 
 
 (a) As to the probate jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, see ante, p. 553, note (a). 
 
 871
 
 875 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 * 875 examine one witness to prove a will, if he can prove * the due 
 execution of it, unless it is impeached; 1 but, in Equity, in 
 order to establish the will against the heir, all the witnesses must be 
 examined. 2 
 
 This rule, although general, admits of necessary exceptions, and per- 
 haps does not apply where the will is not wholly, but only partially, in 
 question. 8 The rule also does not apply, in cases where one of the wit- 
 nesses is dead, or is abroad : 4 in which cases, proof of his handwrit- 
 ing has been held sufficient. 5 It seems, however, that in such a case, the 
 more regular course is not to declare the will proved, but to enter 
 the evidence of the witnesses as read, and then to direct the trusts of 
 the will to be carried into execution. 6 Where a witness has become 
 insane, 7 or has not been heard of for many years, and cannot be found, 
 his evidence has been dispensed with. 8 It is also necessary, in Equity, 
 where the object of the suit is to establish a will against the heir, to 
 prove the sanity of the testator. 9 
 
 We have seen before, 10 that in some cases, where the proof of a will 
 is defective, leave will be given to supply the defect at the hearing ; u 
 and we have also seen, that it is the common practice of the Court to 
 
 ver, 9 Peters, 174. It is not necessary in Vir- 
 ginia that a will should be proved in a Court of 
 Probate in order to give it validity as a will at 
 Law. Bogwell v. Elliot, 2 Rand. 19G. As to 
 New York, see Dubois v. Dubois, 6 Cowen, 494; 
 
 2 Rev. Stat. 57, § 7, id. 58, § 15. In Tennes- 
 see, see Code, § 2197, 2198, and Trafford v. 
 Young, 3 Tenn. Cli. 500. 
 
 1 Seton, 227, citing Peake's Evid. 401: 2 
 Greenl. Ev. § G94; Jackson v. La Grange, 19 
 John. 386; Dan v. Brown, 4 Cowen, 483; Jack- 
 son v. Betts, 6 Cowen, 377 ; Turnipseed v. 
 Hawkins, 1 M'Cord, 272. In Pennsylvania, 
 two witnesses are required in proof of every 
 testamentary writing, whether in the general 
 probate, before the Register of Wills, or upon 
 the trial of an issue at Common Law; and each 
 witness must separately depose to all the facts 
 necessary to complete the chain of evidence, so 
 that no link may depend upon the credibility 
 of but one. Lewis v. Maris, 1 Dall. 278; Hock 
 v. Hock, 4 Serg. & R. 47. And if there are 
 three witnesses, and the proof is fully made by 
 two only, it is enough without calling the third. 
 Jackson v. Vandyke, 1 Cox,' 28; Fox v. Evans, 
 
 3 Yeates, 506. But if one or both witnesses are 
 dead, the will may be proved by the usual sec- 
 ondarv evidence. Miller v. Caruthers, 1 Serg. 
 & R. 205. 
 
 2 Bootle v. Blundell, 19 Ves. 505; G. Coop. 
 136, 137; see also Ogle v. Cook, 1 Ves. Sr. 177; 
 Townshend v. Ives, 1 Wils. 216; Bullen v. 
 Michel, 2 Price, 491; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 694, and 
 note. Any person interested in the estate of 
 the testator, may insist upon the production of 
 all the subscribing witnesses to a will, at the 
 
 872 
 
 probate thereof, if they are living, and subject 
 to the process of the Court. Chase v. Lincoln, 
 3 Mass. 236. If it be impossible to procure 
 any one of the witnesses, or he has become in- 
 competent, the Court will proceed without him 
 ex necessitate ret, and resort to the next best 
 evidence of which the case will admit. Ibid. ; 
 Sears v. Bellingham, 12 Mass. 358; Brown v. 
 Wood, 17 Mass. 68; see Swift r. Wiley, 1 B. 
 Mon. 116; Brown v. Chambers, Hayes, Exch. 
 597; Powell v. Cleaver, 2 Bro. C. C. (Perkins's 
 ed.) 504, note (6); Lord Carrington v. Payne, 5 
 Sumner's Ves. 404, Perkins's note (a), and 
 cases cited. 
 
 3 Per Lord Eldon, in Bootle v. Blundell, 
 ubi supra. 
 
 4 Ibid. 
 
 5 Lord Carrington v. Payne, 5 Ves. 404, 411; 
 see also Billing v. Brooksbank, cited 19 Ves. 
 505; Fitzherbert v. Fitzherbert, 4 Bro. C. C. 
 231; and Grayson v. Atkinson, 2 Ves. Sr. 454, 
 where it was held that a commission should 
 have been sent to examine the witness abroad ; 
 but the rule in Lord Carrington v. Payne seems 
 to be the one now acted upon. Seton, 227. 
 
 6 Hare v. Hare, 5 Beav. 529, 630; 7 Jur. 336. 
 1 Bernett v. Taylor, 9 Ves. 381. 
 
 8 James v. Parnell, T. & R. 417; M'Kenire 
 v. Fraser, 9 Ves. 5. 
 
 9 Harris v. Ingledew, 3 P. Wins. 93 ; Wallis 
 v. Hodgeson, 1 Atk. 56 ; Seton, 228. 
 
 10 Ante, p. 858. 
 
 11 Chichester v. Chichester, 24 Beav. 289, 
 where the will was allowed to be proved viva 
 voce at the hearing; see, however, Seton, 228, 
 and Smith v. Blackman, ante, p. 858, n.
 
 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH DOES NOT PROVE ITSELF. * 87T 
 
 carry the trusts of a will into execution, without declaring the will 
 
 well proved. 12 Where the heir admits the will, * the Court will * 876 
 
 establish it, without declaring it well proved ; x but the admission 
 
 of a will in the separate answer of a married woman, who was the heir- 
 
 ess-at-law, has been held insufficient to enable the Court to declare the 
 
 will established. 2 
 
 The Court of Chancery will establish a will made and proved in the 
 colonies, on the production of a duly authenticated copy of it ; provided 
 the due execution and attestation of the original are proved by the attest- 
 ting witnesses. 3 
 
 The rule that, where a will is to be established against an heir, it 
 must be proved by all the witnesses, or by producing evidence of their 
 death and handwriting, does not apply when proof of the will is required 
 for other purposes : in such cases, one witness to prove it is sufficient. 4 
 
 The rule, that all the witnesses must be examined, extends also to 
 the trial of an issue declsavit vel non before a jury. 5 
 
 Formerly, whenever the heir-at-law was a party to the suit, he was 
 entitled, as a general rule, to an issue devisavit vel non; 6 but under the 
 later practice, the Court of Chancery had power, 7 and it would seem was 
 bound, 8 to determine the question itself, either with or without a jury, 
 as it might think fit : 9 though it might direct the question to be tried 
 at the assizes, or at a sitting in London or Middlesex, where it appeared 
 to the Court that the question might be more conveniently so tried. 10 
 
 With respect to wills of copyhold estates, it seems that it is not 
 the practice to establish them against the heir-at-law ; but what 
 * will be a sufficient proof to induce the Court to act upon them * 877 
 when their validity is not admitted by the heir-at-law, does not 
 seem quite clear. 1 
 
 12 See ante, p. 232; Cons. Old. VII. 1; 6 See post, Chap. XXVII. § 1, Trials of 
 
 Seton, 228; Binfield v. Lambert, 1 Dick. 337; Questions of Fact; and see Man ». Ricketts, 7 
 
 Bird v. Butler, id. n.; Fitzhevbert v. Fitzherbert, Beav. 93, 102 ; 8 Jur. 159; S. C. nom. Ricketts 
 
 4 Bro. C. C. 231; Wood v. Stane, 8 Price, 613; v. Turquand, 1 H. L. Cas. 472. 
 Boyse o. Rossborongh, Kay, 71; 3 De G. M. & "> 21 & 22 Vic c. 27, §§ 3, 4 ; and see Ord. 
 
 G. 817; 18 Jur. 205; S. C. nom. Colclough ». XLI. 2G, 52; and post, Chap. XXVII. § 1, 
 
 Boyse, 6 H. L. Cas. 1 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 373. Trials of Questions of Fact. 
 
 "i Seton, 228. For form of decree in such 8 05 & 26 Vic. c. 42, § 1 : post. Chap. XXVII. 
 
 case, see id. 224, No. 2. § 1, Trials of Questions of Fact; Baylis v. 
 
 2 Brown v. Hayward, 1 Hare, 432; ante, pp. Watkins, 8 Jur. N. S. 1165, L. JJ.; Egmont P. 
 184, 185. Darell, 1 H. & M. 563; Eaden v. Firth, id. 573; 
 
 3 Kandv.Macmahon, 12 Sim. 553; 6 Jur. 450. Young v. Fernie, 1 De G.J. & S. 353; 10 Jur. 
 
 4 Concannon v. Cruise, 2 Moll. 332. N. S. 58; Re Catholic Publishing Co. 10 Jur. 
 
 5 Femberton r. Pemberton, 11 Ves. 53; N. S. 192, M. R. ; Williams v. Williams, 12 W. 
 Bootle v. Blundell, 19 Ves. 505; G. Coop. 137. R. 140, M. R. ; 33 Beav. 306; and see Curlewis 
 Where, howevor, the bill was not filed by the v. Carter, 9 Jur. N. S. 1148; 12 W. R. 97, 
 devisee to establish the will, but by the heir to V. C. S. 
 
 s^t it aside, the defendant called one witness, 9 21 & 22 Vic. c. 27, § 5; and 25 & 26 Vic. 
 
 and produced the other two, offering them to c. 42, § 3. 
 
 the plaintiff to call and examine them, which 10 25 & 26 Vic. c. 42, § 2. 
 
 he declined, not wishing to make them his own 1 Archer v. Slater, 10 Sim. 624; 11 Sim. 
 
 witnesses; upon a motion for a new trial, the 507; Jervoise v. Duke of Northumberland, 1 
 
 cause was held to have been sufficiently tried. J. & W. 570. 
 
 Tatham v. Wright, 2 R. & M. 1, 17; see 
 Gresley, Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 123, 124; 2 Greenl. 
 Ev. 5 693. 
 
 873
 
 * 878 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 The Ecclesiastical Courts had no jurisdiction to determine the validity 
 of wills of real estate ; and the production of probate was, therefore, no 
 evidence of the validity of the will as to real estate. 2 But the Court of 
 Probate has such jurisdiction conferred upon it; 3 and when probate of 
 a will, not confined to personalty, has been granted in solemn form, the 
 probate is conclusive evidence, in all Courts, of the validity of the will 
 as to real, as well as to personal estate. 4 And when the will is not 
 proved in solemn form, if ten days' notice of the intention to read the 
 probate of the will, or copy thereof, stamped with any seal of the Court 
 of Probate, 5 as evidence, is given, it will be conclusive evidence against 
 the person to whom notice is given, unless such person, within four 
 days after receiving such notice, gives notice that he disputes the valid- 
 ity of the devise. 6 The consequence of the above-mentioned alterations 
 in the law is, that the practice of establishing a will in Chancery is of 
 comparatively rare occurrence. 7 
 
 Where an original will is required to be produced in the Court of 
 Chancery, the attendance with it of the proper officer, in whose custody 
 it is deposited, 8 may be procured in the same manner as in the other 
 cases where the production of an original record, or instrument in the 
 
 nature of a record, is required. 9 
 * 878 * There are several cases in which a Court of Equity has es- 
 tablished a will, without the production of the original, where the 
 
 2 2 Taylor on Evid. § 1578; 1 Wins. Exors. 
 569. 
 
 3 20 & 21 Vic. c. 77, §§ 61-05; Dodd & 
 Brooke, 595, 641 ; see also 21 & 22 Vic. c. 95 ; 
 see now 36 & 37 Vic. c. 66, §§ 16, 34, 76; 
 Pinney v. Hunt, 6 Ch. D. 98; Waite v. Bingley, 
 21 Ch. D. 674. As to wills of personal estate, 
 the Court of Chancery has looked at the original, 
 for the purpose of determining the construction, 
 in Phillips v. Chamberlaine, 4 Ves. 57; Comp- 
 lain v. Bloxham, 2 Coll. 201, 204; Oppenheim 
 v. Martin, 9 Hare, 802, n.; Manning v. Purcell, 
 7 De G. M. & G. 55; see, however. Gann v. 
 Gregory, 3 De G. M. & G. 777, 780; 18 Jur. 
 1003. 
 
 4 20 & 21 Vic. c. 77, § 62. As to the ad- 
 vantage of proving a will in solemn form, see 
 Dodd & Brooke, 641, note («); and for the prac- 
 tice, id. 641-652. 
 
 5 The stamp is only required for the copy. 
 Rippon v. Priest, 3 F. & F. 644. 
 
 6 20 & 21 Vic. c. 77, § 64; see Danby v. 
 Poole, 10 \V. R. 515, V. C. S.; Barraclough v. 
 Greenhough, W. N. (1866) 319; 15 VV. R. 21, 
 Q. B. Office copies of wills are not collated 
 with the original, unless specially required; 
 even- copy so required to be examined will be 
 certified under the hand of one of the principal 
 Registrars to be an examined copy; and the 
 seal of the Court is not to be affixed to an 
 office copy unless the same has been so certified. 
 Court of Probate Rules, 30 July, 1862, rr. 80, 
 81; Dodd & Brooke, 1076. An office copy not 
 so certified and sealed is not, therefore, usually 
 
 874 
 
 received in evidence. An extra fee of 7*. 6'/. is 
 charged for a certified office copy; and see 20 & 
 21 Vic. c. 77, § 69. For forms of notice, under 
 section 64, see Vol. III. 
 
 » See now 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 
 602. 
 
 8 A subpoena duces tecum will be issued for 
 this purpose. Wigan v. Rowland, 10 Hare App. 
 18, 19; 17 Jur. 816. For the fees payable to 
 the officer of the Court of Probate attending 
 with the will, see Court of Probate Rules, 30 
 July, 1862; Dodd & Brooke, 1151, 1230; 8 Jur. 
 N. S. Pt. 2, 392, 397. 
 
 9 Formerly the practice was for the Court to 
 make an order upon the officer of the Eccle- 
 siastical Court to deliver the original will to 
 the solicitor in the cause, upon his giving secur- 
 ity (to be approved by the Judge of that Court) 
 to return it safe and undefaced within a par- 
 ticular time. Morse v. Roach, 2 Strange, 961; 
 1 Dick 65; Frederick v. Aynscombe, 1 Atk. 
 627: Peirce v. Watkin, 2 Dick. 485; Lake v. 
 Causfield, 3 Bro. C. C. 263 ; Forder v. Wade, 
 
 4 id 476; Hodson v. , 6 Ves. 135; Ford r. 
 
 , id. 802; see also Seton, 226; and for forms 
 
 of order, see 2 Van Hey. 361, 302. In Fauquier 
 v. Tynte, 7 Ves. 292 (and see 6 Ves. 135 ; id. 
 802), Lord Eldon seemed at a loss to account for 
 this deviation from the ordinary course, which 
 he thought might be inoperative if the officer 
 of the Ecclesiastical Court refused to obey the 
 order; and he declined to extend it to any other 
 case than that of a will. 

 
 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH DOES NOT PROVE ITSELF. * 879 
 
 fact of the will having been proved and retained abroad, or otlior cir- 
 cumstances, 1 have rendered it impossible to bring the original before the 
 Court; 2 but it seems that, in such cases, strict proof of the execution 
 and attestation must be given, unless they are admitted, or unless the 
 will is old enough to prove itself. 8 The contents of the will must be 
 proved to the satisfaction of the Court ; 4 and, in the absence of the 
 original, there are various means of secondary evidence applicable for 
 this purpose. 5 
 
 Secondary evidence of the contents of written documents is admitted, 
 both at Law and in Equity, when the party has not the means of pro- 
 ducing them, because they are either lost or destroyed, or in the posses- 
 sion or power of the adverse party. At Law, where it is not known 
 till the time of trial what evidence will be offered on either side, a party, 
 in order to entitle himself to give secondary evidence of the contents of 
 a written document, on the ground of its being in the possession of his 
 adversary, ought to give him notice to produce it ; for otherwise, non 
 constat that the best evidence might not be had. 6 But even at Law, 
 when, from the nature of the proceeding, the party must know that tbe 
 contents of a written instrument in his possession will come into ques- 
 tion, it is not necessary to give any notice for its production ; and, 
 therefore, in an action of trover for a deed, 7 or upon an indictment for 
 stealing a bill of exchange, 8 it has been held, that, without pre- 
 vious notice, parol evidence may be given of the * contents of the * 879 
 instrument which is the foundation of the proceeding. 1 
 
 The same exception to the general rule appears to be equally applica- 
 ble in Courts of Equity ; for there it is held, that when, either from the 
 pleadings or depositions, a party is apprised that it is the intention of 
 the opposite party to make use of secondary evidence of the contents 
 of a document in his possession, such secondary evidence may be used 
 at the hearing, without serving the party in whose possession it is with 
 notice to produce it. 2 Thus, 3 where a witness, who had been examined 
 on the part of the defendant, deposed to the contents of a certain letter 
 
 i Ellis v. Medlicott, cited 4 Beav. 144. Eq. 238; and see Heath v. Crealock, L. R. 10 
 
 2 A codicil destroyed without the testator's Ch. 22. For form of notice to produce, see R. 
 consent was established in Clark v. Wright, 3 S. C. 1883: Ord. XXXII. 8 App. B. No. 14. 
 Pick. 07 (2d ed.) 69, note (1), and cases cited. 7 How v. Hall, 14 East, 274. 
 
 3 Rand v. Macmahon, 12 Sim. 553, 550; 8 Aiekles's case, 1 Leach, 294. 
 
 Jur. 450. l See 1 Taylor on Evid. §§ 378, 379 ; 1 Greenl. 
 
 4 The evidence of the entire contents of the Eq. § 501. Photographic copies of instru- 
 will must, in such cases, be most clear and ments are, like press copies, secondary evidence. 
 satisfactory. Davis v. Sigourney, 8 Met. 487; Eborn v. Zimpelinan, 47 Texas, 503. And see, 
 Durfee v. Durfee, id. 490, note; Huble v. Clark, as to photographs, Locke v. Sioux &c. Ry. Co. 
 1 Hagg. Eccl. 115. 40 Iowa, 109. Blair v. Pelham. 1 18 Mass. 420; 
 
 5 In Pullan v. Rawlins, 4 Beav. 142, suffi- Udderzook r. Commonwealth, 70 Penn. St. 340. 
 cicnt secondary evidence was given, by means Copy of a telegram held admissible on proof 
 of a copy admitted to probate in this country, of the destruction of the original. State v. 
 certified by the Registrar of the place where Hopkins, 50 Vt. 316. 
 
 the original was deposited. 2 See Greslev, Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 118; 1 
 
 6 1 Phil. Ev. (Cowen & Hill's ed. 1839)439, Taylor, § 452. 
 
 et seq. ; 3 id. 1182, note, 834, and cases cited; 1 3 Wood v. Strickland, 2 Mer. 404, 405; and 
 
 Greenl. Ev. § 500. As to secondary evidence see Lyne v. Lock wood, 2 Moll. 321; Davison v. 
 of a mortgage, see Waldy v. Gray, L. R. 20 Robinson, 6 W. R. 673, L. C. 
 
 875
 
 * 880 EVIDENCE. 
 
 which had been written by the plaintiff to the witness, and which the 
 witness stated that he had himself subsequently returned to the plaintiff, 
 who immediately threw it into the fire and destroyed it, an objection 
 which was taken at the hearing, on the part of the plaintiff, to the 
 admissibility of this evidence, on the ground that there was no proof of 
 the letter being lost or destroyed, or of any notice given to the plaintiff 
 to produce it, was overruled because the plaintiff must have seen, by the 
 depositions, that the evidence of the case, set up as a defence to the 
 bill, consisted of certain written communications which had taken place 
 on the subject of the suit, and that it was impossible, therefore, that he 
 could have been taken by surprise, or could not be prepared to produce 
 any letter that might be in his possession. 4 
 
 Where a defendant admits a deed to be in his possession, but declines 
 to produce it, on the ground that it might convict him of simony, or 
 any other criminal offence, it seems that secondary evidence of its 
 coutents may be received. 5 
 
 Where written documents are not admitted, and do not prove 
 *880 * themselves, they must be proved by the same evidence as at 
 Law, 1 the evidence, however, being taken according to the 
 practice of the Court of Chancery. 
 
 Where an instrument, to the validity of which attestation is not 
 requisite, has been attested, such instrument may be proved by admis- 
 sion, or otherwise, as if there had been no attesting witness thereto ; 2 
 and it is not requisite to prove it by the attesting witness, except in the 
 case of ex parte applications: on which. the evidence of the attesting 
 witness will still be required, 3 unless it can be shown that there is a 
 difficulty in procuring it. 4 It would seem that proof by the attesting 
 witness is necessary, where the validity of the instrument, and payment 
 of the consideration, are contested by a person not a party to it. 5 
 
 To avoid unnecessary expense in the proof of documents, it has been 
 enacted that, where all parties to a suit are competent to make admis- 
 sions, any party may call on any other party, by notice, to admit any 
 document saving all just exceptions ; and that in case of refusal or 
 neglect to admit, the cost of proving the document shall be paid by the 
 party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the cause may 
 
 4 In Hawkesworth v. Dewsnap, cited 5 Sim. 2 17 & 18 Vic. c. 125, § 26; See Homer v. 
 400, Sir Lancelot Shadwell V. C. came to a de- Wallis, 11 Mass. 309. As to notice of admis- 
 cision which was contrary to that in Wood v. sions, see R. S. C. Ord. XXXII. 1-4, and App. 
 Strickland, 2 Mer. 400, and in Stulz ». Stulz, B. No. 12; Watson r. Rodwell, 11 Ch. D. 150. 
 5 Sim. 400, he referred with approbation to 3 R e R ea y, 1 Jur. N S. 222: 3 W. R. 312, 
 his own decision in Hawkesworth v. Dewsnap, V. C. K. ; Pedder v. Pedder, cited Seton, 16. 
 though he expressed himself willing to have the 4 Re Dierdon, 10 Jur. N. S. 673; 12 W. R. 
 point again argued, in order that the practice 978, V. C. W. ; Jearrard v. Tracy, 11 W. R. 
 might be settled. The point, however, was not 97, V. C. K. In Re Hall, 9 W. R. 776, V. C. 
 argued, the objection having been waived. K., where no solemnities were required for the 
 
 5 Parkhurst v. Lowten, 2 Swanst. 213; 1 execution of a power, a fund was directed to be 
 Taylor, §§ 409, 428; see Webb v. East, 5 Ex. paid out of Court, without the evidence of the 
 D. 108. attesting witness; and >*>e Taylor, § 1640. 
 
 1 See ante, p. 874, and note ; 1 Greenl. Ev. 5 Leigh v. Boyd, 35 Beav. 455. 
 
 § 589, et ser/. and note; Gresley, Eq. Ev. (Am 
 ed.) 118, 119, etseq. 
 876
 
 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH DOES NOT PROVE ITSELF. 
 
 881 
 
 be, unless the Court shall certify that the refusal to admit was reason- 
 able ; and that no costs of proving any document shall be allowed, 
 unless such notice be given : except in cases where the omission to 
 give the notice is, in the opinion of the Taxing Master, a saving of 
 expense. 6 
 
 Any document requiring to be stamped will not be received in evi- 
 dence, until it has been stamped, 7 except for a collateral purpose ; 8 and 
 upon the production of any document (except such as cannot be stamped 
 after execution, on payment of the duty and a penalty 9 ) as evidence at 
 the trial of any cause, it is the duty of the officer of the Court, whose 
 duty it is to read such document, to call the attention of the Judge to 
 any omission or insufficiency of the stamp; and the document, if 
 unstamped, or not sufficiently stamped, will not be received in evidence 
 until the whole, or the deficiency of the stamp duty, and the penalty 
 required by statute, together with the additional penalty of one pound, 
 has been paid; and thereupon such document is admissible in 
 evidence, saving all * just exceptions on other grounds. 1 No new * 881 
 trial will be granted by reason of the ruling of any Judge that 
 the stamp upon any document is sufficient, or that the document does 
 not require a stamp. 2 (a) 
 
 6 Ante, p. 819 ; 21 & 22 Vic. c. 27, § 7 ; Cons. 
 Ord. XLI. 39, and Sched. N. No. 6; Taylor, 
 § 707 A. Under these provisions, a bankrupt 
 and a married woman are competent to admit 
 documents. Churchill v. Collier, 1 N. R. 82. 
 Section 7 is, in terms, generally applicable, 
 and has been so acted upon; Seton, 21; it is 
 framed on the Common Law Procedure Act, 
 1852 (15 & 16 Vic. c. 76), § 117; and see Com- 
 mon Law Rules of II. T. 1853, r. 30; 17 Jur. 
 Pt. 2, 9 ; Taj lor, § 703. For the cases at Law 
 on the construction to be put on § 117, and the 
 practice thereunder, see Taylor on Evid. §§ 704- 
 707; Chitty's Arch. 319-323; Chitty's Forms, 
 140-145. For forms of notice, admission there- 
 under, and affidavit of service, see Vol. III. 
 
 ' Smith v. Henley, 1 Phil. 391, 396; 8 Jur. 
 434; Hart v. Hart, 1 Hare, 1, 5; and see the 
 Stamp Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vic. c. 97), § 17. 
 
 8 Blair v. Bromley, 11 Jur. 617, L. C, and 
 cases there cited; Ponsford v. Walton, L. R. 3 
 C. P. 167; Exparte Squire, Re Gouldwell, L. R. 
 4 Ch. 47. 
 
 9 See 1 Seton, 26. 
 
 l The Stamp Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vic. c. 97), 
 § 16, on and after Jan. 1, 1871. The 17 & 18 
 Vic. c. 125, §§ 28, 29, is repealed on and from 
 that date, by 33 & 34 Vic. c. 99. It seems there 
 is no officer of the Court, strictly answering the 
 description in § 16; the Registrar clearly does 
 not. 1 Seton, 26. The practice in the Court of 
 Chancery is to direct the cause to stand over, or 
 
 to allow it to proceed on the undertaking of the 
 solicitor to procure the document to be properly 
 stamped; see 1 Seton, 26; and see ante, pp. 
 848, 849; Owen v. Thomas, 3 M. & K. 353; 
 Coles p. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 234, 239; Carring- 
 ton v. Pell, 2 De G. & S. 512; Browne v. Savage, 
 5 Jur. N. S. 1020, V. C. K.; see also Nixon v. 
 Albion Marine Ins. Co. L. R. 2 Exch. 338. 
 Receipts for payments not duly stamped, and 
 which could not be stamped either with or with- 
 out a penalty, were received in evidence by 
 consent, in Orange v. Pickford, and Thompson 
 v. Webster, cited 1 Seton, 26. 
 
 2 17 & 18 Vic. c. 125, § 31. In Carpenters. 
 Snelling, 97 Mass. 452, it was held that the 
 provision of the U. S. Stat. 1866, c. 184, § 9, that 
 no instrument or document not duly stamped, 
 as required by the internal revenue laws of 
 the United States, shall be admitted or used as 
 evidence in any Court until the requisite stamps 
 shall have been affixed thereto, applies only to 
 the Courts of the United States. BigelowC. J. 
 in this case said : " We entertain grave doubts 
 whether it is within the constitutional authority 
 of Congress to enact rules regulating the compe- 
 tency of evidence on the trial of cases in the 
 Courts of the several States which shall be 
 obligatory upon them." See also Lynch v. 
 Morse, 97 Mass. 458, in note; Disbrow r. John- 
 son, 18 N. J. Eq. 36; Woodward v. Roberts, 58 
 N. H. 503; Davy v. Morgan, 56 Barb. 218 ; 
 Sporrer v. Eifler, 1 Heisk. 633. 
 
 (a) When secondary evidence of a written 
 instrument is admissible, the original is pre- 
 sumed to have been duly stamped in the ab- 
 sence of evidence; but such presumption wholly 
 
 ceases upon evidence that at a particular time 
 the instrument was unstamped. Marine Inv, 
 Co. v. Haviside, L. R. 5 H. L. 624. 
 
 877
 
 882 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 Section VII. — Proving Exhibits at the Hearing, under an Order. 
 
 Written documents, essential to the justice of the cause, may in 
 certain cases be proved at the hearing as exhibits, viva voce or by affi- 
 davit. 3 (b) This course may be adopted, where the cause is heard on 
 bill and answer, 4 or where the documents have not been proved before 
 the evidence in the cause is closed. 
 
 Amongst the documents which may be thus proved, may be classed : 
 li all ancient records of endowments and institutions, whether they are 
 offered to be proved as original instruments, or as they are found 
 collected and recorded in register books of great antiquity, depos- 
 *882 ited in the registries of the archbishops and bishops, * or of the 
 deans and chapters of collegiate churches, or of the Ecclesiasti- 
 cal Courts, bulls of the Popes, records from the Bodleian, Harleian, 
 and Museum libraries, or from any of the public libraries belonging to 
 the two universities, or from the library at Lambeth : all or any of 
 which ancient documents must be produced by those persons in whose 
 immediate custody they are, who must be sworn to identify the particu- 
 lar record produced in his custody, before the same can be read." x 
 
 So in like manner may be proved, as exhibits, office copies of records 2 
 
 3 The practice of proving such documents by 
 affidavit was introduced by the 43d Order of 
 August. 1841 (Sand. Ord. 886; 3 Beav. XXV.), 
 which directed that, " in cases in which any 
 exhibit may, by the present practice of the 
 Court, be proved viva voce at the hearing of a 
 cause, the same may be proved by the affidavit 
 of the witness who would be competent to prove 
 the same viva wee at the hearing." This order 
 is not included in the Consolidated Orders; but 
 the Prel. Ord. r. 5, which preserves any estab- 
 lished practice originated in, or sanctioned by, 
 the Orders thereby abrogated, would, it is con- 
 ceived, authorize the adoption of the practice, 
 where necessary; seel Seton, 23; see also 13 
 & 14 Vic. c 35*, § 28 ; and orders to prove ex- 
 hibit viva voce or by affidavits are frequently 
 made; for recent instances, see Jegon v. Vivian, 
 M. R.. 17 Dec, 1869, Rolls' Lib.: Feltham 
 v. Turner, M. R-, 2 July, 1870, Rolls' Lib. 
 Courts of Chancery have always had the power 
 to examine witnesses viva voce, for the purpose 
 of proving certain written instruments. Levert 
 v. Redwood, 9 Porter, 80; Hughes v. Phelps, 
 3 Bibb, 199; Gresley, Eq. Ev. 126; Latting V. 
 Hall, 9 Paige, 483; Dana v. Nelson. 1 Aiken, 
 254; see De Peyster v. Golden, 1 Edw. Ch. 63; 
 
 Nesmith v Calvert, 1 Wood. & M. 34: Gafney 
 v. Reeves, 6 lud. 71; Morton v. White, 5 [nd. 
 338. 
 
 It was provided that the change in the mode 
 of taking evidence in Equity in Massachusetts 
 shall not prevent the use of affidavits where 
 they have heretofore been allowed. Genl. 
 Stats, c. 131, § 60 ; Pub. Stats, c. 169, § 36. 
 
 By Chancery Rule 95 of New Jersey, no 
 documentary evidence, which is not made an 
 exhibit before the Master, shall be read at the 
 hearing of the cause. Dick. Prec. 25. 
 
 4 Ante, p. 828; Rowland v. Sturgis, 2 Hare, 
 520; Chalk r. Raine, 7 Hare. 393; 13 Jur. 981 ; 
 Neville v. Fitzgerald, 2 Dr. & War. 530; 
 Wvatt's P. R. 219; contra, Jones v. Griffith, 
 14Siin. 262 ; 8 Jur. 733; see now 38 & 39 Vic. 
 c. 77, § 21; R. S. C. Ord. XXXVIII. 1. 
 
 i 2 Fowl. Ex. Pr. 157. 
 
 2 The office copies here mentioned are the 
 copies of those records of which it is the duty 
 of proper officers, appointed by the law, to fur- 
 nish copies for general use, and are not those 
 copies which it is the duty of the officer of the 
 Court to make for the convenience of suitors in 
 that Court, such as the ordinary office copies of 
 pleadings and depositions in the Court of Chan- 
 
 (6) A.n exhibit filed with a pleading is not a 
 part thereof. State v. Samuels. 28 Mo. App. 
 649 ; Poulson r. Collier, 18 id. 583. Where by 
 the modern practice a document is referred to 
 and relied upon in a pleading, but is not an- 
 nexed thereto as an exhibit, there is an implied 
 undertaking toalhw the opposite party to iu- 
 
 878 
 
 spect it and take a copy. Hunter v. Dublin 
 &c. Ry. Co. 28 L. R. Ir. 489, 493. In a suit 
 for infringing a copyright in a painting, proof 
 of a copy thereof produced in Court may be 
 made by the evidence of persons who have 
 seen the original, without producing it in Court 
 Lucas v. William-, 11892] 2 Q. B. 113.
 
 PROVING EXHIBITS AT THE HEARING, UNDER AN ORDER. * 883 
 
 from any of the Courts at Westminster, or of grants or enrolments 
 from the rolls or other records deposited in the Public Record Offices, 
 or of records or proceedings from Courts of inferior jurisdiction in 
 England : as those of the counties palatine of Chester, Lancaster, or 
 Durham, or of the Courts of Great Session in Wales or of the Courts 
 of the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, or of the City of London, 
 or of the Cinque Ports. 3 ' 
 
 Deeds, bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, letters, or receipts, 
 of which proof must be made of the handwriting of the persons writing 
 or executing the same, are all considered as exhibits, and may be proved 
 at the hearing. 4 
 
 With the exception of documents coming out of the custody of a 
 public officer having the care of such documents (which are proved by 
 the mere examination of the officer to that fact), no exhibit can thus be 
 proved that requires more than the proof of the execution, or of hand- 
 writing, to substantiate it : 5 if it be anything that admits of cross- 
 examination, or that requires any evidence besides that of handwriting, 
 it cannot be received. 6 This rule is strictly adhered to; and in many 
 cases, where an instrument which, prima facie, appears to be an exhibit, 
 requires more formal proof, it cannot be received as one. 7 Thus 
 the Court refused * to admit certain receipts to be proved viva * 883 
 voce, although ordinarily they might be taken as exhibits, because, 
 in order to make them evidence of the fact they were intended to 
 substantiate, a further fact must have been proved, which the other 
 side would have had a right to controvert and to cross-examine upon. 1 
 So also, where a power was required to be exercised by a deed executed 
 in the presence of, and attested by witnesses, it was held that the deed 
 by which the power was exercised could not be proved viva voce at the 
 hearing of the cause ; 2 and where a book, in which the collector of a 
 former rector had kept accounts of the receipt of tithes, was offered 
 to be proved viva voce, it was rejected, because, besides proving the 
 handwriting, it would be necessary to prove that it came out of the 
 proper custody, and that the writer was the collector of the tithes. 3 
 
 eery; which, although the} 1 " are admissible in that the examination is restricted to three or 
 
 the Courts to which the officer belongs, may not four very simple points, such as the custody 
 
 be admissible in other Courts without further and identity of an ancient document produced 
 
 proof of their accuracy. 2 Phil, on Evid. 197; by a librarian or registrar, the accuracy of an 
 
 2 Taylor, § 1540. office copy produced by the proper officer, the 
 
 3 2 Fowl. Ex. Pr. 158. execution of a deed where the examinant is the 
 
 * 2 Fowl. Ex. Pr. 158; Hinde, 370. attesting witness, the handwriting of a letter, or 
 
 6 See Ellis v. Deane, 3 Moll. 62; Emerson receipt, or promissory note, &c, &c. Gresley, 
 
 v. Berkley, 4 Hen. & M. 441. Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 126. 
 
 6 Lake v. Skinner, 1 J. & W. 9, 15; Bowser Where a minor is a party, the Court will not 
 v. Colby, 1 Hare, 109, 132. It seems, however, permit a witness to be examined viva voce at 
 that the Court will, upon the suggestion of the hearing of the cause, to prove a deed or 
 counsel, put questions to the witness; see Tur- exhibit, which must be proved at the office, by 
 ner v. Burleigh, 17 Ves. 354. an examination of the witness upon interroga- 
 
 7 Bloxton v. Drewit, Prec. in Ch. 64; Ellis r. tories. White v. Baker, 1 Ir. Eq. 282. 
 Deane, 3 Moll. 63 ; Emerson v. Berkley, 4 Hen. » Earl Pomfret v. Lord Windsor, 2 Ves. Sr. 
 & M. 441: Gresley, Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 132 472, 479; and see Bloxton v. Drewit, Prec. in 
 [199]. It is said not to be, strictly speaking, Ch. G4. 
 
 correct to say, that no questions, which will ad- 2 B ace v. Blick, 7 Sim. 619. 
 
 ittit of a cross-examination, may be asked a 8 Lake v. Skinner, 1J. & W. 9, 15. 
 
 witness thus proving exhibits; but the fact is, 
 
 879
 
 884 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 For the same reason, a will of real estate cannot be proved as an 
 exhibit at the hearing : because the heir has a right to cross-examine 
 the witnesses. 4 Under the later practice, however, a will was allowed to 
 be proved at the hearing, with liberty to the heir to cross-examine the 
 witnesses. 5 
 
 If a document is impeached by the answer of a defendant, it cannot 
 be proved viva voce, on the part of the plaintiff, against such defendant. 
 Thus, where the answer of one of the defendants in a cause insisted 
 that a covenant was fraudulently inserted in a deed, the Court refused 
 to admit such deed to be proved viva voce against that defendant : 
 although it was held, that it might have been so proved against the 
 other defendant, who had not impeached its authenticity. 6 So, where 
 a bill was filed for the payment of an annuity, the circumstances under 
 which the annuity deed was executed being disputed by the parties, the 
 plaintiff was not allowed to prove the deed viva voce as an exhibit ; 
 but leave was given to file interrogatories for that purpose. 7 
 
 It is only, however, where the execution or the authenticity of a deed 
 is impeached, that it cannot be proved as an exhibit : if the validity of 
 it only is disputed, it may be so proved ; 8 and upon this principle, the 
 plaintiff, in a foreclosure suit, was allowed to prove by affidavit the 
 mortgage deed under which he claimed, where it was neither admitted 
 nor denied by the defendant. 9 
 
 It is, however, necessary, in order to authorize the proving 
 * 884 of * an exhibit at the hearing of a cause, that the party intend- 
 ing to make use of the exhibit should previously obtain an order 
 for that purpose. 1 This order may be obtained, by the party requiring 
 it, on motion of course, or on petition of course, 2 and it may be granted 
 during the hearing of the cause ': 3 in which case, the cause will either 
 be ordered to stand over for the purpose of enabling the order to be 
 served and acted upon, or, if the witness is in Court, it may be acted 
 upon immediately ; 4 but the Court has a discretion whether it will allow 
 documents to be proved at the hearing under an order of course for the 
 purpose. 6 
 
 The order when drawn up, must describe minutely the exhibit? to 
 be proved; 6 and it is always made, as of course, "saving all just 
 exceptions." 7 
 
 4 Harris v. Ingledew, 3 P. Wms. 93; Niblett 
 V. Daniel, Bunb. 310; 2 Fowl. Ex. Pr. 158; 
 ante, pp. 874, 875. 
 
 5 Chichester v. Chichester, 24 Beav. 289 ; see 
 also Hope v. Liddell, 20 Beav. 438. 
 
 6 Barfield v. Kelly, 4 Russ. 355, 357; Joly v. 
 Swift, 3 Jo. & Eat. 126; Hitchcock v. Carew, 
 Kay App 14. 
 
 1 Maber v. Hobbs, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 585, 586. 
 
 8 Att.-Gen. v. Pearson, 7 Sim. 309. 
 
 9 Rowland v. Sturgis, 2 Hare, 520; contra, 
 Jones v. Griffith, 14 Sim. 262; 8 Jur. 733; and 
 see Chalk v. Baine, 7 Hare, 393; 13 Jur. 981. 
 
 i Hinde, 370; Clare v. Wood, 1 Hare, 314; 
 
 see Emerson v. Berkley, 4 Hen. & M. 441 ; Bar- 
 row v. Rliinelander, 1 John. Ch. 559; Gresley, 
 Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 131 [188]. The order may 
 be obtained after the affidavit in proof of the 
 exhibits is made. Clare v. Wood, supra. 
 
 2 See Graves v. Budgel, 1 Atk. 444. For 
 form of order, see Seton, 1237, No. 3. 
 
 3 Bank v. Farques, Amb. 145. 
 
 4 But see Bird v. Lake, 1 H. & M. 111. 
 
 5 Wilson v. Thornbury, L. R. 10 Ch. 239. 
 
 6 As, if a deed, the date and parties' names; 
 if a letter, the date, and the names of the per- 
 sons by whom it was written, and to whom it 
 was addressed. Gresley, Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 131 
 
 7 Hinde, 370. 
 
 880
 
 PROVING EXHIBITS AT THE HEARING, UNDER AN ORDER. * 885 
 
 The order, being drawn up, passed, and entered, a copy thereof must 
 be served, in the usual manner, upon the adverse solicitor, two days 
 previous to the hearing of the cause. 8 
 
 When the cause is called on, the original order, the exhibit described 
 therein, and the witness to prove the same, must be produced in Court ; 
 and the Registrar then administers the oath and examines the witness ; 9 
 or, if proved by affidavit, the order and exhibit must be produced with 
 the affidavit. 10 
 
 No documents but those mentioned or described in the order can be 
 thus proved at the hearing ; u and as the order saves just exceptions, 
 all objections which can be taken to the admissibility of the document 
 as evidence may then be urged by the opposing party. 
 
 The attendance of an unwilling witness, to prove an exhibit at the 
 hearing, may be enforced by subpoena, 12 and, unless an order to prove 
 viva voce at the hearing has been obtained, an order for leave to issue 
 the subpoena appears to be necessary, and may be obtained on ex parte 
 motion. 13 The subpoena is prepared and issued in the manner 
 hereafter explained, 14 and is made returnable * at the time and * 885 
 place specified in an accompanying notice ; being usually the day 
 on which the cause will be in the paper for hearing, and the Court of 
 the Judge who is to hear it. 1 The order to prove vica voce, or to issue 
 the subpoena, as the case may be, must be produced at the time the 
 subpoena is sealed. Personal service is necessary, and a tender of 
 expenses, as in the case of an ordinary subpoena ad testificandum. 2 
 
 The adverse party has no right, in the absence of special circum- 
 stances, to compel the production, before the hearing, of an exhibit, 
 however it has been proved, 3 unless, perhaps, where the deposition 
 proving it sets it out verbatim ; 4 nor even to inspect it, for he is not, 
 before the hearing, to " see the strength of the cause, or any deed to 
 pick holes in it." 5 (a) 
 
 [188]. To authorize a party to produce, at the 12 Hinde, 371. 
 
 hearing, documentary evidence which is not 13 Hinde, 371; Gresley, 191; 1 Seton, 23; 
 
 made an exhibit before the Examiner, nor dis- but see Holden v. Holden, 5 W. R 217, V. C. K. ; 
 
 tinctly referred to in the pleadings, the notice 7 De G. M. & G. 397; Vorley v. Jerram, 6 W. 
 
 of intention to make use of such evidence should R. 734. No formal order is drawn up; a note 
 
 state sufficient of the substance of the document signed by the Registrar of the direction of the 
 
 intended to be produced to enable the adverse Court being sufficient. Raymond v. Brown, 4 
 
 party to see that it is evidence of some fact DeG. &J. 530. 
 
 against him. Miller v. Avery, 2 Barb. Ch. 582. 14 See post, pp. 905, et seq. 
 
 8 Hinde, 370; Gresley, 188; Cons. Ord. III. 1. 1 Sched. to Ord. E. No. 2. 
 
 9 Hinde, 371; Bowser p. Colby, 1 Hare, 2 See post, p. 906. 
 
 132, n. (a). A witness may be examined to 8 Forrester v. Helme, M'Cl. 558; Lord v. 
 
 prove exhibits, though examined before in the Colvin, 2 Drew. 205; 5 De G. M. & G. 47; 18 
 
 cause. Neep v. Abbot, C. P. Coop. 191. For Jur. 253. See now K. S. C. Ord. XXXI. 14; 
 
 form of oath, see Vol. III. App. B. No. 10, Ord. April, 1880, Sched. B. 10 
 
 10 The order should be entered as read in the A. ; Webster v. Whewall, 15 Ch. D. 120; Re 
 decree. 1 Seton, 23, 36, No. 23. The Registrar Credit Co. 11 Ch. D. 256. 
 
 will indorse each exhibit produced in evidence; 4 Hodson v. Earl of Warrington, 3 P. Wins. 34. 
 
 for a form, see 1 Seton, 37, No. 30. 6 Gresley, 192, citing Davers v. Davers, 2 P. 
 
 11 Hinde, 371; Wyatt's P. R. 186. Wins. 410;* 2 Str. 764; Wiley v. Pistor. 7 Ves. 
 
 (tt)In Quilterr. Heatly, 23 Ch. D. 42, produc- hearing and before the statement of defence 
 
 tion of document*, referred to in the plaintiff's was delivered. See Smith v. Harris, 18 L. T. 
 
 statement of claim, was ordered before the 809; Elder v. Carter, 25 Q. B. D. 11)4. 
 
 vol. I. — 56 881
 
 *885 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 Section VIII. — Testimony of Witnesses. 
 
 Formerly, persons interested in the matters in question in the 
 suit, or parties thereto, 6 or who had been found guilty of certain 
 
 411; Fencott v. Clarke, 6 Sim. 8; Lord v. Col- 
 vin, ubi supra; and see post, p. 896; Bell v. 
 Johnson, 1 J. & H. 682. 
 
 6 In Chancery, parties to the record were 
 always subject to examination, as witnesses, 
 much more freely than at Law. A plaintiff 
 might obtain an order as of course, to examine 
 a defendant, and a defendant a co-defendant, 
 as a witness, upon affidavit that he was a mate- 
 rial witness, and was not interested on the side 
 of the applicant, in the matter to which it was 
 proposed to examine him; the order being made 
 subject to all just exceptions. If the answer of 
 the defendant had been replied to, the replica- 
 tion must be withdrawn before the plaintiff 
 could examine him. but a plaintiff could not 
 be examined by a defendant, except by consent, 
 unless he was merely a trustee, or had no bene- 
 ficial interest in the matter in question. Nor 
 could a co-plaintiff be examined by a plaintiff, 
 without the consent of the defendant. The 
 course in the latter of such cases was to strike 
 out his name as plaintiff, and make him a 
 defendant, and in the former to file a cross-bill. 
 lGreenl. Ev. § 361; 1 Smith, Ch. Pr. 343, 344; 
 Eckford v. Dekay, 6 Paige, 565; see Hill t>. 
 Hill, 9 Gill & J." 81; DeWolf V. Johnson, 10 
 Wheat. 367; Gresley. Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 242, 
 et seq. ;' Second Cong. Society in Hopkinton v. 
 First Cong. Society, 14 N. H. 315. Where one 
 part}' was examined as a witness against an- 
 other part}- in the same cause, he might be 
 cross-examined like any other witness by the 
 party against whom he was called, and his evi- 
 dence could not be used in his own favor. 
 Benson v. Leroy, 1 Paige, 122. And his evi- 
 dence must, as against the party introducing 
 him, be taken as true, unless disproved. Pow- 
 den v. Johnson, 7 Rep. 294, U. S. C. Penn. But 
 where a party was examined before a Master 
 in relation to his own rights, and the examina- 
 tion was in the nature of a bill of discovery, 
 he could not be cross-examined by his own 
 counsel, nor could he give evidence in his own 
 favor, any further than his answers were re- 
 sponsive to the questions put to him. Ibid. 
 He must, however, accompany his answer by 
 explanations responsive to the interrogatory, 
 which might be necessary to rebut any im- 
 proper inference arising from such answer. 
 Ibid.; see Armsby v Wood, 1 Hopk. 229. 
 
 If there were more defendants than on», an 
 examination of a defendant might be had, and 
 a decree obtained against another defendant 
 upon the facts elicited by such examination; 
 
 882 
 
 but a decree could not be had against the party 
 examined, embracing such facts. Palmer v. 
 Van Doren, 2 Edw. Ch. 192 ; Bradley v. Root, 
 5 Paige, 633; Lingan v. Henderson, 1 Bland, 
 268; Mann v. Ward, 2 Atk. 288; Weymouth 
 v. Boyer, 1 Ves. Jr. 416. And if the examina- 
 tion release a person primarily liable, it releases 
 those secondarily liable also. Thompson v. 
 Harrison, 1 Cox, 344. And see, as to the effect 
 on the liability of persons jointly bound, Mead- 
 bury v. Isdall, 9 Mod. 438; Goold v. O'Keeffc, 
 1 Beat. 356; Massy v. Massy, 1 Beat. 353; Ber- 
 nall v. Lord Donegal, 3 Dow. P. C. 133; Hul- 
 ton v. Sandys, Younge, 602. The reason of the 
 rule is that plaintiff shall not compel a defend- 
 ant to assist, and to act against him. But it is 
 not for the sake of the defendant that the rule 
 has been established, for he might protect him- 
 self by demurring to the interrogatory. It is for 
 the sake of the other defendants, and they alone 
 can make the objection. Nightingale v. Dodd, 
 Amb. 584. Under the present law of evidence, 
 the rule itself is, perhaps, obsolete. Jenkins v. 
 Greenwald, 1 Bond, 134. Where a defendant 
 had been exaniimd under the usual order, as a 
 witness, a plaintiff might have a decree against 
 him upon other matters, to which he was not 
 examined. Palmer v. Van Doren, 2 Edw. Ch. 
 192. The rule that a plaintiff could not have a 
 decree against a defendant, whom he had ex- 
 amined as a witness in the cause, did not apply 
 to the case of a mere formal defendant, as an 
 executor or trustee, against whom no personal 
 decree was sought, and who had no personal 
 interest in the question, as to which he was ex- 
 amined as a witness against his co-defendants; 
 nor to the case of a defendant, who, by his an- 
 swer, admitted his own liability, or who suffered 
 the bill to be taken as confessed against him. 
 Bradley v. Root, 5 Paige, 633; Pingree v. 
 Coffin, 12 Gray, 288. Nor when there is 
 nothing to show that the defendant was ex- 
 amined at the suggestion, or request, or with 
 the knowledge of the plaintiff; nor in any case 
 in the U. S. Courts on their Equity side since 
 the adopt ; on of the 77th Rule by the Supreme 
 Court, which Rule authorizes the examination 
 of parties by the Master on a reference. Jen- 
 kins v. Greenwald, 1 Bond, 134. Where a de- 
 fendant admitted that he was primarily liable 
 to the plaintiff for the payment of the demand, 
 for which the suit was brought, he might be 
 examined either by the plaintiff or by his co- 
 defendants, as a witness in the cause. "Bradley 
 v. Root, 5 Pai^e, 633 ; see Ragan v. Echols, 5
 
 WHO MAY BE WITNESSES. 
 
 886 
 
 * crimes * were incompetent to give evidence ; but these restric- * 88G 
 tions have been removed. 2 
 
 The witnesses should be sworn in such form, and with such ceremo- 
 nies, as they may declare to be binding on their consciences 3 ; and any 
 person competent to be a witness may, if he objects to take an oath, or 
 is objected to as incompetent to take an oath, and the presiding Judge 4 
 is satisfied that the taking of an oath would have no binding effect 
 on his conscience, give evidence upon his promise and declaration. 5 
 
 Ga. 71; Palmer v. Van Doren, 2 Edw. Ch. 192; 
 Fulton Bank v. Sharon Canal Co. 4 Paige, 127; 
 Ormsby v. Bakewell, 7 Ohio, 98. 
 
 An order allowing a defendant to examine 
 his co-defendant as a witness would always be 
 granted upon a suggestion that the party to 
 be examined had no interest in the cause, leav- 
 ing the question of interest to be settled at the 
 hearing, upon the proofs. Nevill «?. Demeritt, 
 1 Green Ch. -321 ; Ch. Rule of New Jersey, 78; 
 15 N. J. Eq. 523 ; see Harrison v. Johnson, 18 
 id. 420; Graham v. Berryman, 19 id. 29. The 
 adverse party might at the hearing object to the 
 competency of a defendant's examination, and 
 if he appeared to lie interested in the matters to 
 which he was examined, the objection might be 
 taken at the hearing, though it had not been 
 made before. Mohawk. Bank v. Atwater, 2 
 Paige, 54. 
 
 The evidence of a co-defendant is not ren- 
 dered incompe'ent by the fact that no order 
 was made for his examination. Since the 
 New Jersey Act removing the disqualification 
 of interest in a witness, as a party or otherwise, 
 no order for his examination is necessary in 
 that State. Giveans p. McMurtry, 16 N. J. Eq. 
 468. Nor is it any objection to the competency 
 of a co-defendant to testify that he has not an- 
 swered the bill, but has suffered a decree pro 
 confesso against him. The plaintiff may, at 
 his discretion, require him to answer. But if 
 he do not, the defendant, by failing to answer, 
 cannot deprive his co-defendant of his testi- 
 mony, or disqualify him as a witness in the 
 cause. Giveans v. McMurtry, ubi supra. 
 
 1 As to persons laboring under defect of un- 
 derstanding, see 1 Greenl. Ev. §365; Gresley, 
 Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 237; 1 Phil. Ev. (Cowen "& 
 Hill's ed. 1839) 18, 19, notes (47). (48). As to 
 the competency of deaf and dumb persons, see 1 
 Greenl. Ev. § 366 ; State v. DeWolf, 8 Conn. 93 ; 
 Commonwealth v. Hill, 14 Mass. 207 ; 1 Phil. 
 Ev. (Cowen & Hill's ed. 1839) 19, and note (49). 
 As to the competency of children, 1 Greenl. Ev. 
 § 367; Gresley, Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 237; 1 Phil. 
 Ev. (Cowen & Hill's ed. 1839) 19,20, notes (50), 
 (51), (52). As to the present mode of taking 
 evidence in England, see 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th 
 Eng. ed.) 612. 
 
 2 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, §§ 26, 27 : 6 & 7 Vic. 
 c. 85; 14 & 15 Vic. c. 99; 16 & 17 Vic. c. 83; 
 
 see 2 Taylor, §§ 1342-1393; Best, 188-273. As 
 to the competency of witnesses, see Taylor, 
 §§ 1210-1257; Best, 187-271; Powell, 25, et stq. 
 By a statute of Massachusetts, no person of 
 sufficient understanding shall be excluded from 
 giving evidence as a witness, in any civil pro- 
 ceeding, in Court or before a person having 
 authority to receive evidence, — subject to the 
 qualification that neither husband nor wife 
 shall be allowed to testify as to private con- 
 versations with each other; and the conviction 
 of a witness of any crime may be shown to affecf 
 his credibility. A party to a cause who shall 
 call the adverse party as a witness, shall be 
 allowed the same liberty in the. examination of 
 such witness as is now allowed upon cross- 
 examination. St. Mass. 1870, c. 393, §§ 1, 3, 4; 
 see Metier v. Metier, 18 N. J. Eq. 270, 276 ; 
 S. C. 19 id. 457; Harrison v. Johnson, 18 id. 
 420; Bird v. Davis, 14 id. 467; Marlott v. War- 
 wick, 18 id. 108; Doody v. Pierce, 9 Allen, 
 141; Bailey v. Myrick. 52 Maine, 132. 
 
 In New Jersey, the competency of a witness 
 in an Equity suit depends upon his qualifica- 
 tion at the time he is examined. Williams r. 
 Vreeland, 3 Stew. Eq. 576. In Tennessee, 
 when the evidence is offered. Oliver v. Moore, 
 12 Heisk. 482; Beaty v. McCorkle, 11 Heisk. 
 593. 
 
 » 1 & 2 Vic. c. 105. Such is the law by 
 statute of Massachusetts. Pub. Stats, c. 169, 
 § 17. In this State, the oath is ordinarily 
 administered with the ceremony of holding 
 up the hand. Pub. Stats, c. 169, § 13. As to 
 peculiar modes of swearing, see Commonwealth 
 v. Buzzell, 16 Pick. 153: Pub. Stats, c. 169, 
 § 14: St. 1873, c. 212, § 2. 
 
 4 This expression includes any person or 
 persons having by law authority to adminis- 
 ter an oath for the taking of evidence; see 
 The Evidence Amendment Act, 1870 (33 & 34 
 Vic. c. 49), § 1. 
 
 5 The Evidence Further Amendment Act, 
 1869 (32 & 33 Vic. c. 68), § 4; and see before 
 this Act, 7 & 8 Will. III. c. 34, § 1; 8 Geo. I. 
 c. 6. § 1 ; 22 Geo. II. c. 30, § 1 ; i.l. c. 46. § 36; 
 9 Geo. IV c. 32, § 1 ; 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 4'.'; id. 
 c. 82; 1 & 2 Vic. c. 77; id. c. 105; 17 & 18 Vic. 
 C 125, § 20; 2 Taylor, §§ 1160-1163; Clarke r. 
 Bradlaug'i, 7 Q. B. D. 38; 8 id. 63; Att.-Gen. v. 
 Bradiaugh, 14 i.l. 667. In Massachusetts, every 
 
 8S3
 
 887 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 * 887 A peer, although privileged to * put in his answer upon his attes- 
 tation of honor, must, when called upon to give evidence as a 
 witness, do so upon oath. 1 («) 
 
 It is a contempt of Court to publish, while a cause is pending, com- 
 ments upon the evidence which, being calculated to injure the litigants' 
 cases, or to create ill feeling against the witnesses, may tend to hinder 
 the course of justice. 2 (b.) 
 
 
 Section IX. — Maimer of , and Time for, taking Evidence. 
 
 Formerly, the general mode of examining witnesses in Equity was 
 by interrogatories in writing, exhibited by the party, plaintiff or defend- 
 ant, or directed by the Court to be proposed to or asked of the witnesses 
 
 person who declares that he has conscientious 
 scruples against taking an oath, shall, when 
 called upon for that purpose, he permitted to 
 affirm in the manner prescribed for Quakers, if 
 the Court or magistrate on inquiry is satisfied 
 of the truth of sucli declaration. Pub. Stats. 
 c. 109, §§ 15, 16. Conscientious scruples fur- 
 nish ground for substituting an affirmation for 
 an oath in the U. S. Courts. Rule 91 of the 
 Equity Rules for U. S. Courts. As to the 
 effect of a want of religious belief, see Maden 
 v. Catanach, 7 H. & N. 300; 7 Jur. N. S. 1107; 
 Gresley, Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 237, 238; 1 Greenl. 
 Ev. §§ 368-370, and notes and cases cited ; 
 1 Phil. Ev. (Cowen & Hill's ed. 1839) 20-27, 
 and notes; Smith v. Coffin, 18 Maine, 157. 
 
 (a) A non-resident, who goes to attend Court 
 in another State in relation to a suit, and testi- 
 fies therein, is privileged from service of a writ 
 of summons in another suit. Capwell v. Sipe 
 (R. I.), 23 Atl. 14; Wilson v. Donaldson, 117 
 Ind. 356; see Parker v. Marco, 136 N. Y. 585; 
 Mulhearn v. Press Pub. Co. 53 N. J. L. 150 ; 
 Re Healey, 53 Vt. 694; ante, p. 10, note (a). 
 But a witness or party is not thus exempt from 
 service of process in a State through which he 
 is passing to attend Court in a different juris- 
 diction. Holvoke v. South Hadley Falls Ice 
 Co. 55 Fed. Rep. 593. A witness in a Court of 
 Justice is absolutely privileged as to anything 
 he may say, as a witness, having reference to 
 the inquiry on which he is called as a witness. 
 Seaman v. Netherclift, 2 C. P. D. 53; see Gof- 
 fin v. Donnelly, 6 Q. B. D. 307; Minister v. 
 Lamb, 11 id. 588, 594. 
 
 (b) See post, p. 1071, note (a); Re Crown 
 Bank, 44 Ch. D. 649 ; Re American Exchange, 
 58 L. J. Ch 706: Welby v. Still. 66 L. T. 523; 
 Bromilow v. Phillip*. 40 W. R. 220. In Hunt 
 v. Clarke. 58 L. .1. Q. B. 490 ; 61 L. T. 343, it 
 was held that such a publication, though tech- 
 
 884 
 
 In Massachusetts, everj' person not a be- 
 liever in any religion shall be required to 
 testify truly, under the pains and penalties of 
 perjury ; and the evidence of such person's dis- 
 belief in the existence of God may be received 
 to affect his credibility as a witness. Pub. 
 Stats, c. 169, § 17; see" 19 Am. Law Rev. 347, 
 433. 
 
 i 2 Taylor, § 1380. 
 
 2 Anon. 2 Atk. 469; S. C. nom. Roach v. 
 Garvan, 2 Dick. 794; Littler v. Thomson, 2 
 Beav. 129; Felkin v. Lord Herbert, 10 Jur. 
 N. S. 62; 12 W. R. 241, V. C. K. ; Tichborne v. 
 Mostyn, L. R. 7 Eq. 55, note; 15 W. R. 1072, 
 V. C. W. 
 
 nically a contempt, will be punished by a com- 
 mittal only when the offence is likely to cause 
 substantial prejudice to the parties litigant. In 
 America, such publications are unlawful only 
 when they tend to interfere with proceedings 
 before the Court. See Re Shortridge (Cal.), 
 34 Pac. Rep. 227; 32 Am. Law Reg. 1046; 37 
 Central L. J. 276, 294; State v. Frew, 24 W. 
 Va. 416; Hollingsworth v. Duane, Wall. C. C. 
 77. In Plating Co. v. Farquharson, 17 Ch.D. 49, 
 it was held upon a motion to commit the pub- 
 lisher of a newspaper for contempt, to be un- 
 objectionable, where an injunction had been 
 granted against infringing a patent for nickel- 
 plating, for the defendants to advertise inviting 
 the trade to subscribe towards the expenses of 
 an appeal, or to publish a reward for documen- 
 tary evidence that nickel-plating was done be- 
 fore a certain year. In Kitcat v. Sharp, 52 L. 
 J. Ch. 134, an injunction was granted upon mo- 
 tion, in a suit for false representations in a sale 
 of stock, to restrain the defendant from a 
 threatened publication of circulars abusive of 
 the plaintiff and tending to prejudice a fair trial 
 of the suit. 

 
 MANNER OF, AND TIME FOR, TAKING EVIDENCE. 
 
 in a cause. 3 This practice has been abolished, and a new system sub- 
 stituted in its place. 4 The Court may, however, if it shall think fit, 
 order any particular witness, either within or out of the jurisdiction, to 
 be examined upon interrogatories ; and with respect to such witness or 
 witnesses, the former practice of the Court in relation to the examina- 
 tion of witnesses continues in full force, save only so far as the same 
 may be varied by any General Order of the Lord Chancellor in 
 that behalf, or by any * order of the Court with reference to any * 888 
 particular case. 1 The Court has rarely, if ever, availed itself of 
 this power to resort to the former practice in the examination of par- 
 ticular witnesses. 2 It is, therefore, thought undesirable to state the 
 former practice in detail. 
 
 The evidence on interlocutory applications, in causes and matters de- 
 pending in the Court, is usually taken by affidavit ; but it may be taken 
 by oral examination before an Examiner. 3 («) And after a decree in a 
 
 3 Ante, p. 836, note; Coffin v. Murphy, 02 
 Miss. 542. 
 
 4 In Massachusetts, " in proceedings in 
 Equity, the evidence shall be taken in the same 
 manner as in suits at Law, unless the Court for 
 special reasons otherwise directs; but this shall 
 not prevent the use of affidavits where they 
 have heretofore been allowed." Pub. Stats, c. 
 169, § 66. " This statute necessarily supersedes 
 the rules of Court, as to the taking and filing of 
 depositions in Chancer}'." In a suit in Equity, 
 where a commission was applied for to take the 
 testimony of a witness residing out of the Com- 
 monwealth, after the time lixed by the rules of 
 Court for setting the cause down for hearing, 
 the Court said: " The plaintiff is, therefore, en- 
 titled to have a commission issue, as he would 
 have been according to the established rule and 
 
 (a) Hammerschlag Manuf. Co. v. Judd, 26 
 Fed. Rep. 292; Shapleigh v. Chester Electric 
 Light & P. Co. 47 id. 848. [Jpon motion to 
 appoint an examiner, the testimony will not be 
 ordered to be restricted to a single issue of 
 fraud raised by plea. United States v. Ameri- 
 can Bell Tel. Co. 39 Fed. Rep. 230. Evidence 
 objected to and rejected by an examiner, in- 
 cluding privileged letters, especially when they 
 are primary evidence of a fact in issue, should 
 be made a part of the record by him. in order 
 that the Court may judge of the correctness of 
 his ruling. Lloyd v. Pennie, 50 Fed. Rep. 4. 
 Under the U. S. Equity Rule 67 (now super- 
 seded, see 144 U. S. 689), the Court could not, 
 it seems, appoint examiners to take oral deposi- 
 tions outside of or within its territorial juris- 
 diction. Arnold v. Chesebrough, 35 Fed. Rep. 
 16; Celluloid Manuf. Co. v. Russell, id. 17. 
 Under Rule 78 the oral examination of wit- 
 nesses at the trial is onlv permitted to verify a 
 document or to establish a fact of a formal 
 character. North Carolina R. Co. r. Drew, 3 
 
 practice at Law, where testimony is to be taken 
 out of the jurisdiction of the Court." Per Shaw 
 C. J. in Pingree v. Coffin, 12 Cush. 600, 601. 
 
 In Wisconsin, each party to a suit in Equity 
 has a right to have his witnesses examined in 
 open Court, subject to the occasional exceptions 
 provided for in cases at Law. Noonan v. Oiton, 
 
 5 Wis. 60; Brown v. Runals, 14 Wis. 693. 
 
 1 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 28. So under the 
 amendment of the 67th Equity Rule of the 
 U. S. Supreme Court. 
 
 a See London Bank of Mexico v. Hart, L. R. 
 
 6 Eq. 467, V. C. G., where a commission ac- 
 cording to former practice was refused. 
 
 3 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 40; Ord.5 Feb., 1861, 
 r. 22; see post, p. 905, and note; ante, p. 821, 
 note. 
 
 Woods, 691. Upon a commission, issued on 
 the plaintiff's application, for his examination 
 on written interrogatories, the defendant was 
 permitted to cross-examine the plaintiff orally, 
 in Biscboffshein v. Taaks, 20 Blatch. 229; see 
 Coates v. Merrick Thread Co. 41 Fed. Rep. 23. 
 A master may be substituted for an examiner 
 upon motion and proof by affidavit that much 
 irrelevant testimony is being taken, which the 
 latter is not authorized to exclude. Hepworth 
 v. Henshall, 11 Penn. Co. Ct. Rep. 251; see 
 Surr r. Walmsley, L. R. 2 Eq. 439; Howell's 
 Estate, 14 Phila.329; Re Allis, 44 Fed. Rep. 
 210. Depositions taken before an examiner 
 not appointed by the Court, but agreed upon 
 by the parties, were to be filed of record under 
 U. S. Equity Rule 67 (now superseded), the 
 same as if the examiner were regularly ap- 
 pointed. J L. Mott Iron Works r. Standard 
 Manuf. Co 48 Fed. Rep. 345. See further on, 
 Rule 07, Bischoffsheim o. Baltzer, 10 Fed. Rep. 
 1; Re Allis, 44 id. 210; Eiffert v. Craps, id. 
 164; Ballard v. McCluskev, 52 id. 677. In 
 885
 
 889 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 cause, the evidence may be taken, either by affidavit, or by oral exami- 
 nation before an Examiner, or Chief Clerk of the Judge. 4 
 
 We have already seen 5 that a cause may be brought to a hearing on 
 motion for decree, instead of replication being filed in the ordinary way. 
 If this is done, the evidence is adduced by affidavit, 6 and in such case 
 an answer, if one has been filed, may be treated as an affidavit. 7 
 
 Jf the cause is brought to a hearing by filing replication, the evidence 
 is taken by affidavit, or by ex parte examination before an Examiner, 
 except as to any facts or issues ordered to be proved by evidence taken 
 viva voce, at the hearing ; 8 the parties having the advantage, which 
 they have not on motion for decree, that they may thus have an ex parte 
 oral examination of a witness who refuses to make an affidavit. 9 
 
 Unless an order to take his evidence cle bene esse 10 has been obtained, 
 it is irregular to examine a witness for the purposes of the hearing, 
 previously to serving a notice of motion for a decree or the filing of 
 replication ; u and the power to examine a witness for the purpose of 
 using his evidence on any claim, motion, petition, or other proceeding 
 before the Court, 12 is confined to those cases in which the evidence is to 
 be used on a claim, motion, petition, or proceeding which is actually 
 pending. 13 
 
 Witnesses who have made affidavits, or been examined ex parte be- 
 fore the Examiner, are liable to cross-examination at the hearing; 14 
 and where a party has given notice to read an affidavit, he will not 
 be allowed to withdraw the affidavit, and so prevent the 
 * 889 * witness from being cross-examined upon it. 1 (a) There can be 
 no cross-examination, however, upon an affidavit of documents. 2 (b) 
 
 4 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 41; 15 & 16 Vic. c. 
 80, § 30; Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 15. 
 
 5 Ante, pp. 819, et seq.; 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, 
 
 §§ 15, 16. 
 
 6 Coles v. Morris, L. R. 2 Ch. 701, 705, 
 L. C. Where the parties agree that the evidence 
 shall be taken by affidavit, it is equivalent to 
 an agreement to try the case before the Judge 
 without a jury, although the case be a proper 
 one for a jury. Brooke t'. Wigg, 8 Ch. D. 510. 
 See Ruston r. Tobin, 10 Ch. D. 558. 
 
 7 Ante, p. 821; 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 15; 
 Cons. Ord. XXXIII. 5-7. 
 
 8 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 4- By consent, under 
 r. 10, the examination, or cross-examination, of 
 any particular witness may be taken in manner 
 provided by 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86; see pott, p. 904. 
 
 9 Coles v. Morris, L. R. 2 Ch. 701, 704, L. C. 
 
 10 As to taking evidence cle bene esse, see post, 
 pp. 932 941. 
 
 i 1 Kendle v. Metropolitan Provincial Bank, 
 W. N. (1867)239; 15 W. R. 1068, V. C S. 
 
 12 See 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 40. 
 
 is Coles v. Morris, L. R. 2 Ch. 701, 704. 
 
 " 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 38; Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, 
 rr. 7, 19; and see Fielden v. Goschen, 18 W. R. 
 85, V. C. S. 
 
 i Clarke v. Law, 2 K. & J. 28; 2 Jur. N. S. 
 221 ; National Insurance Association v. Carstairs, 
 9 Jur. N. S. 955, M. R. 
 
 2 Manby v. Bewicke (No. 2), 8 De G. M. & 
 G. 470: 2 Jur. N. S. 672; overruling Kay v. 
 Smith, 20 Beav. 566. 
 
 England, other persons than the examiners of 
 the Court are not appointed to conduct exami- 
 nations except in very special cases. Badde'.ey 
 v. Bailey, [1893] W.N. 56; Marquess of Bute 
 v. James, 33 Ch. D. 157. 
 
 (n) The fact that a cross-examination on an 
 affidavit is not concluded does not prevent the 
 Court from looking at the affidavit. Lewis V. 
 James, 54 L. T. 260. 
 
 (b) After a sufficient affidavit of documents 
 
 886 
 
 the Court may, in some cases, permit the plain- 
 tiff to deliver an interrogatory as to some spe- 
 cific document or documents, but not a general 
 roving interrogatory; it is within the Judge's 
 discretion whether such specific interrogatory 
 shall be allowed, and his order thereon, though 
 app'alable, will not he readily reversed. Hall r. 
 Truman. 21 Ch. P. 307; see Nicholl v. Wheeler 
 17 Q B. P. 101; Morris v. Edwards, 23 id. 
 287; 15 A. C. 309.
 
 MANNER OF, AND TIME FOR, TAKING EVIDENCE. * 800 
 
 No affidavit or deposition filed or made before issue joined in any 
 cause will, without special leave of the Court, be received at the hearing 
 thereof, unless within one month after issue joined, or within such 
 longer time as may be allowed by special leave of the Court, notice in 
 writing has been given by the party intending to use the same, to the 
 opposite party, of his intention in that behalf. 3 An application to en- 
 large the month may be made by summons, 4 which must be served on 
 the other parties with whom issue is joined. Where the affidavit has 
 been sworn before, but filed after issue was joined, it was allowed to be 
 used, though the notice had not been given. 5 Where, in consequence of 
 the opposite party having absconded, the notice could not be served 
 upon him, leave was given to advertise it. 6 
 
 The evidence in chief on both sides, in any cause in which issue is 
 joined, in respect of facts and issues not included in any order for tak- 
 ing evidence in chief viva voce at the hearing, whether taken by affidavit 
 or before an Examiner (and including the cross-examination and re- 
 examination of any witness or other person), must be closed within 
 eight weeks after issue joined, unless the time be enlarged b} 7 any 
 special order. 7 And no further evidence, except the cross-examination 
 and re-examination of a witness who has made an affidavit, or been 
 examined ex parte before the Examiner, will be received, without special 
 leave of the Court, previously obtained for that purpose. 8 
 
 Where the eight weeks expire in the long vacation, the time for clos- 
 ing evidence is extended by a General Order to the fifth day of the 
 ensuing Michaelmas Term. 9 
 
 As a general rule new evidence is only allowed to be received after 
 the evidence is closed, in the following cases : where the party who 
 desires to file an affidavit has not had an opportunity of seeing the evi- 
 dence on the other side ; where, though he has seen the evidence he 
 finds that it raises a new issue, not raised by the pleadings, and which 
 is material to the decision of the case ; 10 where an affidavit has been 
 filed impeaching the character of a witness, in which case the 
 person whose character is assailed is entitled to * adduce evi- * 890 
 deuce to meet the charges ; and where new facts material to the 
 issue have arisen after the closing of the evidence. 1 Where, by inad- 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. XIX. 12. Md. 290; Bonner v. Young:, 68 Ala. 35. That 
 
 4 See Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 17. a subpoena for a witness may issue at any stage 
 
 5 Nicholi v. Jones, 36 L. J. Ch. 554, V. C. W. of the suit without leave of Court, see Raymond 
 
 6 Murphy v. Vincent, W. N. (1870) 217, v. Tapson, 22 Ch. D. 430. 
 
 V. C. B. Cons. Onl. XXXVII. 15; and it seems the 
 
 7 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 5; see post, p. 890. rule applies where the eight weeks have been 
 Where the time is enlarged, after the cause lias enlarged, and the enlarged time expires in the 
 been set down for hearing, the order should be long vacation ; see Clark r. Mai pas, cited 
 produced to the Order of Course Clerk in the Morgan, 553; and see Braithwaite's Manual, 
 Registrars' office, who will make a note thereof 167, n. (46). 
 
 in the cause-book kept there; see Reg. Regul. ln Leech v. Bolland, L. R. 10 Ch. 362. 
 
 21Jan., 1861. i Thexton v. Edmonston, L. R. 5 Eq. 373, 
 
 « 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 38; Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, 375, M. R.; and see Scott v. Mayor of Liver-' 
 
 rr. 5, 19; see Thexton r. Edmonston, L. R. 5 pool, 1 De G. & J. 369; 3 Jur. N. S. 533. 832; 
 
 Eq. 373; Re Quartz Hill &c. Co., Ex parte Poupard v. Fardell, W. N. (1869) 236; 18 
 
 Young, 21 Ch D. 642; Swartz v. Checkering, 58 W. R. 37, 59, V. C. M.; Philips v. Warde, 2 
 
 887
 
 890 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 vertence, an affidavit, though prepared, was not filed until nine days 
 after the time for taking evidence was closed, the Court, on motion, gave 
 leave to use it, on payment, of the costs of the motion ; 2 and it is con- 
 ceived that the Court will grant such special leave, in all cases where, 
 under the circumstances, it thinks that justice requires it. 3 Such special 
 leave was refused where the application was made on the ground that 
 a material witness had been discovered, whose evidence the applicant 
 had no means of previously knowing to be obtainable. 4 
 
 The Court has also power, if it thinks fit, to allow further evidence to 
 be used at the hearing, although no special leave has been previously 
 obtained ; 5 and it has allowed a motion for this purpose to be brought 
 on with the cause. 6 (a) 
 
 The application for leave to use affidavits, filed after the evidence is 
 closed, may be made in Chambers by summons, or in Court by motion ; 
 it has, however, been usually made in Court. The summons, or notice 
 of the motion, should be served on all parties. 7 
 
 The application to enlarge the time for taking evidence is made in 
 Chambers by summons, 8 supported by affidavit, showing the grounds of 
 the application. The costs of the application should be disposed of at 
 the time it is heard ; and will in general be made costs in the cause. 
 The summons, whether taken out by the plaintiff or by a defendant, 
 must be served by the applicant upon all the other parties to the cause 
 with whom issue is joined. 
 
 The fact that the evidence of the other party was filed at the last 
 moment allowed for so doing, is no ground for enlarging the time for 
 
 Jur. N. S. 608, V. C. S; United States v. 
 Gunning, 23 Fed. Rep. 6G8; Peterson v. Simp- 
 kins, 25 id. 486. 
 
 2 Douglas v. Archbutt, 23 Beav. 293. 
 
 3 Scott v. Mayor of Liverpool, 1 De G. & J. 
 369; 3 Jur. N. S. 832, L. JJ. ; Philips v. Warde, 
 2 Jur. N. S 608, V. C. S.; Watson v. Cleaver, 
 20 Beav. 137 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 270 ; Hope v. Threl- 
 fall, 1 Sm. & G. App. 21; 17 Jur. 1021; 
 McLachlan v. Lord, 14 L. T. N. S. 98, V. C. S.; 
 Hodges v. Doulton, 18 W. R. 58, V. C. M. 
 See Boon v. Pierpont, 32 N. J. Eq. 217; 
 Wendell v. Highstone, 52 Mich. 552; Summers 
 v. Darne, 31 Gratt. 791. 
 
 (a) The other part}' must have an oppor- 
 tunity to answer such evidence, and leave to 
 remi it must be applied for before the hearing; 
 it is not sufficient to deliver a copy of the evi- 
 dence to the other party in time for him to 
 answer it. Smith r. Pilgrim, 2 Ch. D. 127; 
 see Roe v. Davies, id. 729. The Judge, in order 
 to determine a disputed fact, may, in his dis- 
 cretion, permit or order additional testimony to 
 be taken after publica'ion passed. Dixon v. 
 Higgins, 82 Ala. 284. And if the testimony is 
 not duly taken, it may, for good cause shown, 
 be ordered to be taken and filed nunc pro tunc. 
 Coon v. Abbott, 37 Fed. Rep. 98; see Wooster^ 
 888 
 
 4 Thexton v. Edmonston, L. R. 5 Eq. 373, 
 M. R. See 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 
 617, as to evidence respecting costs, &c. 
 
 5 Boyse v. Colclough, 1 K. & J. 124, 144 ; 
 Bayley v. Cass, 10 W. R. 370, where V. C. 
 Stuart said that this is the proper time. See 
 also Poupard v. Fardell, W. N. (1869) 236; 18 
 W. R. 37, 59, V. C. M. 
 
 « Hope v. Threlfall, 1 Sm. & G. App. 21 ; 
 17 Jur. 1021. 
 
 i See Richards B. Curlewis, 18 Beav. 462. 
 8 15 & 16 Vic. c. 80, § 26. 
 
 v. Clark, 9 id. 854; Fischers. Hayes, 6 id. 76. 
 Under U. S. Equity Rule 69, allowing three 
 months for testimony after the cause is at issue, 
 a deposition not taken within the three months 
 will be stricken from the files if there is 
 no motion to file it nunc pro tunc, and no ex- 
 tenuating circumstances appear. Wenham v. 
 Switzer, 48 Fed. Rep. 612; see Irwin v. Mey- 
 rose, 2 McCrary, 244; Magbee v. Kennedy, 26 
 Fla. 158. If there is no statute or order limit- 
 ing the time for taking the evidence, it may be 
 taken until and at the hearing. Tillotson v. 
 Mitchell, 111 111. 518.
 
 AFFIDAVITS AND EX-PARTE EXAMINATIONS BEFORE EXAMINER. * 891 
 
 taking evidence, if it is confined to matters distinctly put in issue by 
 the pleadings. 9 
 
 Whenever any party desires to cross-examine any witness who has 
 made an affidavit, or been examined ex parte before the Examiner, he 
 must give notice, within certain limited times, to the party by whom 
 the affidavit was filed or the witness examined, to produce the witness 
 for cross-examination; 10 or he may serve the witness with a 
 subpoena, requiring him to attend for the same * purpose. 1 For * 891 
 the details of the practice on the subject of cross-examination, 
 the reader is referred to the section on viva voce evidence. 2 
 
 A plaintiff cannot, without giving notice, use the evidence adduced 
 on behalf of a defendant against a co-defendant. 3 
 
 Section X. —Affidavits and Ex-parte Examinations before an 
 
 Examiner. 
 
 An affidavit is a statement in writing sworn to, or affirmed, 4 before 
 some person having authority to administer oaths. 5 It must, except in 
 the case of a bill which is required to be accompanied with an affida- 
 vit, 6 be made in some cause or matter actually pending at the time it is 
 sworn : otherwise it cannot be received. 7 An affidavit will be received, 
 although the deponent has died since it was sworn ; but the Court will 
 not attach so much weight to it as it would have done if an oppor- 
 tunity for the cross-examination of the deponent thereon had been 
 afforded. 8 
 
 9 Thompson v. Partridge, 4 De G. M. & G. 
 794; 17 Jur. 1108; see Scott v. Mayor of Liver- 
 pool, 1 De G. & J. 371; 3 Jur. N. S. 832; and 
 S. C. before V. C. Stuart, 3 Jur. N. S. 533. 
 For the practice in adducing further evidence 
 on appeals, see Re Coal E. Gas Co., Gover's 
 case, 24 W. R. 36; Hastie v. Hastie, 1 Ch. D. 
 562; Re Chennell, Jones v. Chennell, 8 Ch. D. 
 492, 504; Dicks v. Brooks, 13 Ch. D. 652. 
 
 io Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 19. 
 
 1 Singer's Sewing Machine Manuf. Co. v. 
 Wilson, 2 H. & M. 584 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 58, V. 
 C. \V. ; and see Cox v. Stephens, 9 Jur. N. S. 
 1144; 11 W. R. 929, V. C. K. 
 
 2 Post, pp. 837, et seq. 
 
 8 Fielden v. Slater, L. R 7 Eq. 523, 529, V. 
 C- J.; but see Lord v. Colvin, 3 Drew. 222; 
 Sturgis V. Morse (No. 2), 26 Beav. 562. 
 
 4 17 & 18 Vic. c. 125, § 20 ; and ante, p. 887. 
 As to the oath when the defendant is not a 
 Christian, see 1 & 2 Vic. c. 105; Hinde, 228; 
 Braithwaite's Oaths, 45, 64; Ramkissenseat v. 
 Barker, 1 Atk. 19; Omychund v. Barker, id. 
 21, 46. 
 
 6 In Haight v. Morris Aqueduct, 4 Wash. 
 C. C. 601, it was held that an affidavit in 
 Chancery, not sworn before a Judge of the 
 Court, or a commissioner appointed to ad- 
 minister an oath, could not be received in 
 evidence. An affidavit in New York may be 
 
 sworn to before a State senator, he being ex 
 officio a Judge of the Court for the Correction 
 of Errors, which is a Court of record. Craii, r v. 
 Briggs, 4 Paige, 548. An affidavit taken before 
 a commissioner of deeds de facto, for a city, 
 who is exercising such office under color of an 
 appointment by the Governor and Senate, may 
 be read in a suit between other persons; and 
 the Court will not inquire collaterally into the 
 legality of such appointment. Parker v. Baker, 
 8 Paige, 428. Oaths are to be administered in 
 a reverent manner. Cons. Ord. XIX. 14. There 
 can be no such thing as an unwritten affidavit. 
 Windley v. Broadway, 77 N. C. 333. Nor can 
 the Court be required to act upon an oral state- 
 ment, where the affidavit is waived. Hart v. 
 Scruggs, 1 Tenn. Ch. 1. 
 
 6 Ante, pp. 392-396. 
 
 7 Francome v. Franeome, 11 Jur. N. S. 123; 
 13 W. R. 355, L. C; overruling Fennall >\ 
 Brown, 18 Jur. 1051, V. C. W. Affidavits filed 
 after payment in of a fund, but before presen- 
 tation of a petition for payment out, were 
 received. Re Varley, 14 W. R. 98, V. C. K.; 
 and see Re Western Benefit Building Society, 
 83 Beav. 368. 
 
 8 Abfldom v. Abadom, 24 Beav. 243; Wil- 
 liams v. Williams, 10 Jur. N. S. 60,"; 12 W. R. 
 663. V C. K.; Davies r. Otty, 13 W. R. 4St. 
 M. R.; 35 Beav. 208; Ridlcv v. Ridley, 34 
 
 889
 
 892 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 Affidavits may be sworn before any of the persons authorized to take 
 answers in Chancery. Who these persons are, and the nature and extent 
 of their authority, has been already stated. 9 
 
 The commissioner before whom the affidavit is sworn must not be a 
 solicitor in the cause. 10 Where the affidavits, in support of a petition, 
 had been sworn before the petitioner's solicitor, the petition was dis- 
 missed, and the costs were directed to come out of the solicitor's 
 * 892 pocket: 11 and affidavits have been rejected 12 because * they had 
 been sworn before a solicitor who acted as clerk to the plaintiff's 
 solicitor ; but an affidavit may be sworn before a commissioner acting as 
 a clerk to the plaintiff, in the cause, where the plaintiff, though a solici- 
 tor, does not act as such in the cause. 1 («) It is not irregular to swear 
 an affidavit before a solicitor, to whom it has been sent for the pur- 
 pose of getting it sworn by the solicitor of the applicant, and who is 
 the agent of the latter for that purpose only. 2 
 
 The Court of Chancery is also in the habit of receiving affidavits made 
 by parties resident out of the jurisdiction, though not sworn to before 
 any of the functionaries before referred to, provided it is shown that the 
 persons before whom they are sworn are persons who, by the law of 
 the country in which the affidavit is sworn, are authorized to administer 
 an oath, and the signature of such person is properly verified. 8 Thus, 
 the Court has ordered an affidavit to be sworn before a notary public in 
 Amsterdam, with the intervention of a proper magistrate, if necessary, 
 by the law of Holland, to the administration of the oath. 4 The Court 
 
 Beav. 329 ; and see Morley P. Morley, 5 De G. 
 M. & G. 610, 613, 614; 1 Jur. N. S. 1097, 1098; 
 see i.lso Tanswell v. Scurrah, 11 L. T. N. S. 
 761, M. R.: Moore v. Harper, W. N. (18G6) 
 56; 14 W. R. 306, V. C. W.; Braithwaite r. 
 Kearns, 34 Beav. 202; Scott v. McCann, 76 
 Md. 47. 
 
 9 Ante, pp. 743, 744; and see 1 Dan. Ch. 
 Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 621. 
 
 i° But this rule is confined in New York to 
 the solicitor on record. An affidavit may be 
 sworn to before any proper officer, although he 
 is counsel for one of the parties, or is a partner 
 of the solicitor in the cause. The People v. 
 Spalding. 2 Paige, 326; M'Laren v. Charrier, 5 
 Paige, 530. 
 
 u In re Hogan, 3 Atk. 812; but see ante, 
 p. 749. 
 
 12 Wood v. Harpur, 3 Beav. 290; Hopkin r. 
 
 Hopkin, 10 Hare App. 2; 17 Jur. 343; and see 
 
 cases collected, 2 C. P. Coop. temp. Cott. 174, n. 
 
 i Per Turner L. J. in Foster v. Harvev, 3 
 
 N. R. 98; 4 De G. J. & S. 59; affirming S. C. 11 
 W. R. 899, V. C. W.; diss. Knight Bruce L. J. 
 a Re Gregg, Re Prance, L. R. 9 Eq. 137, 
 M. R.; see ante, p. 749, note. 
 
 3 An affidavit taken before a Master of the 
 Court of Chancery in New Jersey, at a place 
 out of the State, will not be allowed to be read 
 in that Court; the Master has no authority to 
 take an affidavit out of the State. Lambert v. 
 Maris, Halst. Dig. 173. But an affidavit sworn 
 to before a Master in Chancer}" in another State, 
 who was not a commissioner appointed by the 
 State where the affidavit was offered, was held 
 regular, in Allen v. State Bank, 1 Dev. & Bat. 
 7; in Ramy v. Kirk, 9 Dana, 267, an affidavit 
 made out of the State was held not admissible. 
 
 4 Chicot v. Lequesne, 1 Dick. 150: see also 
 Warren v. Swinburne, 9 Jur. 510, Bail Court ; 
 Pinkerton v. Barnsley Canal Co. 3 Y. & J. 277, 
 n.; Hutcheon v. Mannington, 6 Ves. 823; 
 Garvev r. Hibbert, 1 J. & W. 180; see Re 
 Prince" Henry, 28 W. R. 398; De Leon v. Hub- 
 
 (n) In England, the security of an inde- 
 pendent commissioner to take the witness's 
 oath is required, and he must satisfy himself 
 that the witness thoroughly understands what 
 he is going to swear to. Bourke r. Davis, 44 
 Ch. D. 110, 126: see Duke of Northumberland 
 v. Todd, 7 Ch. D. 777. In Massachusetts, at- 
 tornevs mnv administer, as justices of the peace, 
 
 890 
 
 the oath of voluntary affidavits to their clients. 
 McDonald r. Willis, 143 Mass. 452; see also 
 Smith v. Ponath, 17 Mo. App. 262; Burton r. 
 Galveston &C, Ry. Co. 61 Texas, 526; Gary r. 
 Burnett, 16 S. C. 632. In general, pleadings 
 are allowed to be verified by attorneys only in 
 ca-es provided for by statute. Hammerslaugh 
 v. Farrior, 95 N. C. 135.
 
 AFFIDAVITS AND EX-PARTE EXAMINATIONS BEFORE EXAMINER. 
 
 893 
 
 has also admitted affidavits sworn in Belgium before officials having only 
 a limited jurisdiction, and power only to administer oaths for certain 
 purposes. 5 
 
 Although the Court will, in cases of this description, give credit to the 
 fact, as certified under the seal or signature of a notary public or other 
 person authorized to administer an oath, 6 it will require some evidence 
 that the person whose seal or signature is affixed actually fills the 
 character he assumes. This may be effected, either by the production 
 of an affidavit by some person resident in this country who can depose 
 to the fact of his filling that character, or by the certificate of some 
 British minister or consular agent, or of some public officer of the 
 country in which the transaction took place, competent to give such 
 certificate ; and in the latter case, the certificate must be verified by the 
 certificate of some British minister, or consular agent, or by the affidavit 
 of some impartial person, cognizant of the fact that such public officer 
 is what he assumes to be. 7 (b) 
 
 * An affidavit must be correctly intituled in the cause or matter * 893 
 in which it is made ; J it will, however, be sufficient, if it was cor- 
 
 bard, W. N. (1883) 197. If there is a difficulty 
 in taking the affidavit before the foreign author- 
 ity, the Court will, it seems, appoint a special 
 Examiner, and the evidence must be taken as a 
 deposition. Drevon v. Drevon, 12 W. R. 06, 
 V. C. K. As to the mode of taking evidence 
 before an Examiner, see post, pp. 904, el seq. 
 
 6 Kevan v. Crawford, 45 L. J. Ch. 658. 
 
 6 Elutcheon r. Mannington, 6 Ves. 823; see 
 Raney v. Kirk, 9 Dana, 267, as to an affidavit 
 sworn to before a Justice of the Peace of another 
 State. In Tennessee, the statement, in the cap- 
 tion and certificate of a deposition, that the 
 person taking it sustains the necessary char- 
 acter, is sufficient evidence of the fact, and the 
 Court will give credence to all he certifies in the 
 line of his duty. Wilson v. Smith, 5 Yerg. 
 379. Hoover v. Rawlings, 1 Sneed, 287; Carter 
 v. Ewing, 1 Tenn. Ch. 212. And see Hay v. 
 State, 58 Ind. 337. 
 
 ' Haggitt v. Iniff, 5 De G. M. & G. 910; 1 
 Jur. N. S. 49; Re Earl's Trust, 4K.&J. 300; 
 1 Seton, 20 ; see Re Davis, L. R. 8 Eq. 98 ; Mayne 
 v. Butler, 13 W. R. 128. Thus, in I'urkis v. 
 Date, M. R. in Chambers, 6 May, 1804, an affi- 
 davit was received and filed, which had been 
 sworn before H, the clerk of the Circuit Court 
 of Burton County, in the State of Indiana, 
 America; who had subscribed his name to the 
 jurat, and affixed thereto the seal of that < !ourl ; 
 to which was appended a certificate under the 
 hand of A, as Secretary of that State, and the 
 seal thereof, that II was such clerk, and was 
 authorized to administer oaths ; and a certificate, 
 
 under the hand and seal of office of the British 
 acting consul at Chicago, that A was such 
 Secretary, and that his signature and the State 
 seal were genuine. In Mayne v. Butler, 13 W. 
 R. 128, V. C. K., the verification of the signa- 
 ture of a foreign notary was dispensed with, 
 the fund being small, and the solicitor personally 
 undertaking to apply it ; see also Smith v. Davies, 
 W. N. (1868) 269; 17 W. R. 69, V.C. M., where 
 the verification was dispensed with; see also 
 Lvle v. Ellwood, L. R. 15 Eq. 67; Belli'. Turner, 
 L. R. 17 Eq. 439; 22 W. R. 391; Re Lane, 22 
 W. H. 39 (by consent). In Levitt v. Levitt, 2 
 H. & M. 626, a certificate by the clerk and 
 under the seal of the Supreme Court of the city 
 and county of New York, America, was received 
 as sufficient evidence that the official had power 
 to administer an oath. See also Alexander v. 
 Nurse, W. N. (1871) 249. In Re Scriven, 17 
 L. T. N. S. 641, V. C. M., an affidavit under 
 the great spal of one of the United States of 
 America, and attested by the governor of the 
 State, was received. In Lees v. Lees, W. N. 
 (1868) 268, M. R., it appearing that the official 
 was named in the list of judicial officers of 
 tli.' United States, the affidavit was received. 
 Where the affidavit is sworn within the domin- 
 ions of the Crown, no verification of the seal or 
 signature of the official is required. Havward 
 v. Stephens, W. N. (1866) 318, V. C. S. ; Re 
 Goss, Liddall v. Nicholson, W. N. (1866) 256; 
 12. Jur. N. S. 595, V.C. W. 
 
 i 1 May v. Prinsep, 11 Jur. 1032, V. C. K. 
 B. ; Mackenzie v. Mackenzie, 5 De G. & S. 338; 
 
 (6) Affidavits sworn before foreign notaries 
 public, who are authorized by law to administer 
 oaths in any law proceedings in their own 
 country, may still, it seems, be filed under the 
 
 new procedure in England. See Cooke v. 
 Wilby, 25 Ch. D. 709 ; see Brittlebank r. Smith, 
 50 L. T. 491. As to taking testimony abroad, 
 see Ross v. Woodford, [1891] 1 Ch. 38. 
 
 891
 
 *894 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 rectly entitled when it was sworn, although the title of the cause may 
 have been subsequently altered by amendment. 2 Where a mistake 
 occurred in the title of affidavits, by omitting the name of one of the 
 defendants, they were received on its being shown by affidavit that there 
 was no other suit pending to which they could relate ; 3 and where the 
 names of the plaintiffs and defendants were reversed, 4 and the plaintiff's 
 name had been wrongly spelt, 5 the Court allowed the affidavits to be 
 taken off the file and re-sworn, and then filed without affixing fresh 
 stamps. 4 In another case, 6 the affidavits were allowed to be made exhibits 
 to an affidavit properly intituled. 
 
 An affidavit made in one cause or matter cannot be used to obtain an 
 order in another cause or matter. The Court will, however, in some 
 cases, give leave for this to be done : thus, where affidavits have been 
 filed in a cause proving a pedigree, they were allowed to be used on the 
 hearing of a petition under the Trustee Act, 1850 ; 7 and in another case 
 office copies of affidavits which had proved a death in other proceedings, 
 were admitted as evidence of the same death. 8 
 
 After an affidavit has been read at the hearing by any party, it cannot 
 be withdrawn without the consent of the other parties. 9 
 
 In all affidavits, the true place of residence, description, and addition 
 of every person swearing the same must be inserted. 10 This rule, 
 * 894 however, will not apply to affidavits by parties in the * cause : 
 who may describe themselves, in the affidavit, as the above-named 
 plaintiff, or defendant, without specifying any residence, or addition, or 
 other description; and even where a plaintiff so described himself in an 
 affidavit, and it appeared, upon inspecting the office copy of the bill, 
 that no addition had been given to him in the bill, the affidavit was con- 
 sidered sufficient. 1 
 
 All affidavits are to be taken and expressed in the first person of the 
 
 as to waiver of the irregularity, see Blackmore 
 v. Glamorganshire Canal Co. 5 Rus<=. 151; 
 although, in ordinary cases, the Court will 
 disregard the misentitling of a paper, which 
 could not have misled the opposite party, it is 
 otherwise as respects affidavits, because the 
 misentitling of an affidavit will exempt the de- 
 fendant from the punishment of perjury, al- 
 though his oath is false. Hawley v. Donnelly, 8 
 Paige, 415; see Stafford v. Brown, 4 Paige, 360. 
 Where there are several defendants and there is 
 but one suit pending between the plaintiff and 
 the defendant first named therein with others, 
 it is sufficient in the entitling of an affidavit, to 
 entitle it in the name of the plaintiff against the 
 first defendant and others, without setting forth 
 the names of all the defendants at length. 
 White v. Hess, 8 Paige, 544. Under special 
 circumstances affidavits may be ordered to be 
 filed though not intituled in any cause. Sal- 
 vidge v. Fulton, 20 L. T. N. S. 300, V. C. M. 
 See also Whiting r. Bassett, L. R. 14 Eq. 70. 
 
 2 Hawes r. Bamford, 9 Sim. 653. 
 
 3 Fisher ». Coffev, 1 Jur. N. S. 956, V. C. 
 
 892 
 
 W. ; and see Re Harris, 8 Jur. N. S. 166, 
 V. C. K. 
 
 4 Pearson v. Wilcox, 10 Hare App. 35. 
 
 5 Underdown v. Stannard, W. N. (1871) 
 171. 
 
 6 lie Varteg Chapel, 10 Hare App. 37. 
 
 7 Re Pickance, 10 Hare App. 35; Jones v. 
 Tumbull, In re Turnbull, 17 Jur. 851, V. C. 
 W., which is apparently the same case, under a 
 different name. 
 
 8 Re Wool ley's Trusts, 24 W. R. 783. 
 
 9 Prole v. Soady, L. R. 3 Ch. 220, L. C. 
 
 i" Hinde, 451; Wyatt's P. R. 9; Hyde v. 
 Hyde, 59 L. T. 523. " 
 
 i Crockett v. Bishton, 2 Mad. 446; and see 
 Boddineton r. Woodley, 12 L. J. Ch. 15. M. R. 
 In the first case, also, there were several plain- 
 tiffs, and the plaintiff making the affidavit 
 described himself as " the above-named plain- 
 tiff;" whereas, it was objected, that he ought 
 to have called himself " one of the above-named 
 plaintiffs;" but the objection was overruled.
 
 AFFIDAVITS AND EX-PARTE EXAMINATIONS BEFORE EXAMINER. * 894 
 
 deponent ; 2 otherwise the solicitor, party, or person filing the affidavit, 
 is not to be allowed the costs of preparing and filing the same. 3 
 
 The affidavit must commence by stating that the party " makes oath 
 and says ; " for even though the jurat express that the party was sworn, 
 it will not be sufficient, unless the affidavit also state that the party 
 makes oath. 4 (a) 
 
 Every affidavit must be divided into paragraphs, and every paragraph 
 numbered consecutively, and, as nearly as may be, confined to a distinct 
 portion of the subject ; 5 and each statement in an affidavit must show 
 the means of knowledge of the person making such statement. 6 
 
 An affidavit must be pertinent and material. 7 Scandalous and irrele- 
 vant matter should be carefully avoided, and, if any is inserted, the 
 affidavit may be ordered to be taken off the file ; 8 or if the affidavit is 
 intended to be used before the Court, the scandalous matter may be 
 expunged, by the same process as scandal in a bill or other pleading ; 9 
 
 2 Cons. Orel. XVIII. 1; see New Jersey Rule 
 in Chancery, 90. 
 
 3 Cons. "Ord. XVIII. 2; see R. S. C. Ord. 
 XXXVII. 3 a, b (Ord. April, 1880, rr. 12, 13), 
 Ord. XXXVIII. 2, LVI. 3. In Re Husband, 
 12 L. T. N. S. 303, V. C. W., affidavits sworn 
 in America were received, though expressed in 
 the third person. 
 
 4 Phillips v. Prentice, 2 Hare, 542; Re New- 
 ton, 2 De G. F.& J. 3; Allen v. Taylor, L. R. 
 10 Eq. 52, V. C. J. ; Ex parte Torkington, L. R. 
 9 Ch. 298. In the case of an affirmation, the 
 words, " do solemnly, sincerely, and truly 
 affirm and declare," are usually substituted 
 for " make oath and say." 
 
 5 15 & 16 Vic. c. 80, § 37. 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 23; and see 
 Woodhatch v. Freeland, 11 W. R. 398, V. C. 
 
 (a) See Allen v. Taylor, L. R. 10 Eq. 52; 
 Eddowes v. Argentine Loan Co. (No. 1), 59 L. 
 J. Ch. 392. The description of the deponent's 
 occupation and residence, when these are re- 
 quired to be slated, may be in the introductory 
 part of the affidavit only, if the body of the 
 affidavit incorporates them by reference. Blai- 
 berg v. Parke, 10 Q. B. D. 90. A description 
 of the deponent as "gentleman" was held suf- 
 ficient in Re Dodsworth, Spence v. Dodsworth, 
 [1891] 1 Ch. 657; but this is not sufficient if 
 the deponent has a trade or profession. Re 
 Horwood, 55 L. T. 373; Spaddacini v. Treaty, 
 21 L. R. Ir. 553. A stockbroker's abode is not 
 properly described as "Stock Exchange, stock- 
 broker." Re Levy, Levin v. Levin, 60 L. T. 
 317. In Stoddard v. Sloan, 65 Iowa, 680, it was 
 held that the affidavit and jurat in a civil action 
 may be construed together for the purpose of 
 determining the deponent's identity. In Ex 
 parte Johnson, 20 Ch. D. 338, where the com- 
 missioner merely signed his jurat without his 
 
 K. ; Meach v. Chappell, 8 Paige, 135; Sea Ins. 
 Co. r. Stebbins, 8 Paige, 563. 
 
 7 See Meach v. Chappell, 8 Paige, 135. 
 
 8 Goddard v. Parr, 24 L. J. Ch. 783; 3. W. 
 R. 633, V. C. K. ; Kernick v. Kernick, 12 W. R. 
 335, V. C. W. ; see also Owens v. Emmens, W. 
 N. (1875) 210, 234; Taylor v. Keily, W. N. 
 (1876) 139; Osmaston v. Land Financiers, W. 
 N. (1878) 101; Bruff v. Cobbold, 20 W. R. 734; 
 Middlemas v. Wilson, L. R. 10 Ch. 230; Crack- 
 nall v. Janson, 11 Ch. D. 1; Walker v. Poole, 
 21 Ch. D. 835; Fox v. Bearblock, W. N. 
 (1882)9. 
 
 9 See ante, pp. 347, 354; R. S. C. 1883, Ord. 
 XXXVIII. 11. It is competent for the Court, 
 upon the mere examination of an affidavit or 
 other paper read before it, on amotion, to order 
 scandalous or impertinent matter contained in 
 
 title as commissioner, the affidavit was held 
 sufficient. In Alford v. McCormac, 90 N. C. 
 151, it was held that an affidavit annexed to a 
 pleading must be subscribed by the affiant only 
 when the statute so directs. The certificate 
 must show in whose writing the deposition is. 
 R,' Thomas, 35 Fed. Rep. 822. 
 
 In the Federal Courts the mode of taking a 
 deposition may be that defined by either Fed- 
 eral or State laws. McLennan v. Kansas City 
 &c. R. Co. 22 Fed. Rep. 198. The testimony 
 of a witness competent when his deposition was 
 taken and filed remains competent. Sheidley 
 v. Aultman, 18 Fed. Rep. 666; Kingi>. Pratt, 13 
 R. I. 132; but see Seabright v. Seabright, 28 W. 
 Va. 412. When the pleadings are so amended 
 as substantially to change the issues, a deposi- 
 tion previously taken cannot be read in evi- 
 dence, if objection is made. State v. Nashville 
 Savings Bank, 16 Lea, 111; Anthony v. Sav- 
 age, 3 Utah, 277. 
 
 893
 
 *895 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 or if it is intended to be used in Chambers, a summons may be taken out 
 to have the matter examined and expunged. 10 
 
 If an affidavit contain impertinent matter, or be of improper length, 
 the Court may, when it is used in Court, at once disallow 
 * 895 * the costs of the improper part, or may disallow the costs of the 
 part which the Taxing Master may distinguish as being im- 
 proper ; * and where it is used in Chambers, the Judge may at once disallow 
 all unnecessary matter ; and the part disallowed is to be distinguished 
 by the initials of the Chief Clerk in the margin. 2 
 
 The application for the costs of impertinent matter in an affidavit 
 should be made when the affidavit is used. 3 The Court generally leaves 
 it to the Taxing Master to determine what part of the affidavit is unne- 
 cessary, merely expressing an opinion that it is of improper length. 4 
 
 Affidavits ought to be fairly written upon foolscap paper bookwise ; 5 
 but the Clerks of Eecords and Writs may receive and file affidavits 
 written otherwise, if in their opinion it is, under the circumstances, 
 desirable or necessary. 6 The Clerks of Records and Writs may refuse 
 to file any affidavit in which there is any knife erasure, or which is 
 blotted so as to obliterate any word, or which is improperly written, or 
 so altered as to cause any material disfigurement ; or in which there is 
 any interlineation, unless the person before whom it is sworn authen- 
 ticate such interlineation with his initials, so as to show that it was 
 made before the affidavit was sworn, and to mark the extent of the 
 interlineation. 7 
 
 An affidavit in which there are interlineations or alterations, not so 
 marked, may, however, be filed with the consent of the solicitors of all 
 parties against whom it is intended to be used; such consent being 
 
 it to be expunged without reference to a Mas- 
 ter, and to charge the proper party with the 
 costs. Powell v. Kane, 5 Paige, 265. A party 
 who makes an affidavit to oppose a motion is 
 only authorized to state the facts; and it is 
 scandalous and impertinent to draw inferences 
 or state arguments in the affidavit, reflecting on 
 the character or impeaching the motives of the 
 adverse party or his solicitor. Powell v. Kane, 
 5 Paige, 2<>o". 
 
 I" Cons. Ord. XXXV. 60; ante, p. 354. 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. XL. 9 ; as to this order, see Moure 
 r. Smith, 14 Keav. 393, 396; Maj-or of Berwick 
 V. Murray, 7 De G. M. & G. 497, 514, 515 ; 3 
 Jur. N. S. 1, 5; Hanslip v. Kitton, 8 Jur. N. S. 
 835,841, V. C S.; id. 1113, L. C; Re Far- 
 ington, 33 Beav. 346; Guest v. Smythe, L. R. 
 5 Ch. 551. 558. L. J. G. ; Re Skidniore, 1 Jur. 
 N. S. 696; 3 W. R. 584. V. C. S. ; Scottish 
 Union Ins. Co. v. Steele, 9 L. T. N. S. 677, V. 
 C. W. ; Cracknall v. Janson, 11 Ch. D. 1; Hill 
 v. Hart-Davis, 26 Ch. D. 470; Hirst v. Procter, 
 W. X. (1882)12: R. S. C (costs) Sched. r. 18; 
 see ante, p. 350; Rea v. Rea, 53 Mich 40. If 
 a solicitor is compelk-d-to pay <he cost- of ex- 
 punging scandalous or impertinent matter, he 
 
 894 
 
 has no legal or equitable claim upon his client 
 to refund the amount. Powell v. Kane, 5 Paige, 
 265. For form of order, see 1 Seton, 89, 120, 
 121, Nos. 24-26. 
 
 2 Cons Ord. XL. 10. 
 
 3 See Cons. Ord. XL. 9 ; Horner v. Wheel- 
 wright, 2 Jur. X. S. 367, V. C. S.; see Re 
 Wormsley, Baines v. Wormsley, W. N. (1878) 
 193; 27 W. R. 36. 
 
 4 Moore v. Smith, 14 Beav. 393, 396; Re 
 Radcliffe, Seton. 89, No. 17 ; Rt Skidmore, 1 
 Jur. N S. 696, V. C. S.; Hanslip v. Kitton, 8 
 Jur. N. S. 835, 841, V. C. S. ; on appeal, id. 
 1113; Scottish Union Ins. Co. v. Steele, ubi 
 supra ; Guest v. Smythe, L. R. 5 Ch. 551, 558, 
 L.J. G. 
 
 5 As to the paper now used, and confining the 
 affidavit to facts within the witness's knowledge, 
 see 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. ed.) 625, 626; 
 R. S. C. XXXVII. 3; Gilbert v. Endean, 9 
 Ch. D. 259. 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. 6 March, 1860, r. 16; Braith- 
 waite's Oaths in Chan. 42. 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. I. 36; and see 15 & 16 Vic. c 
 86, §2o; W. N. (1882) Pt. II. 81.
 
 AFFIDAVITS AND EX-PARTE EXAMINATIONS BEFORE EXAMINER. * 896 
 
 indorsed on the affidavit and signed by the solicitors. 8 And where two 
 affidavits, by A and B, were written on the same paper, and there 
 were unauthenticated alterations in the affidavit of A, the docu- 
 ment was allowed to be filed as the affidavit of B, — that of A being 
 rejected. 9 
 
 Dates and sums may be written, either in words or in figures ; 10 but 
 every quotation should be placed between inverted commas. 11 
 
 Schedules referred to in an affidavit as "hereunder written," 
 * should be placed after the jurat; and the commissioner, or * 896 
 other person before whom the affidavit is sworn, must sign his 
 name at the end of each schedule. If a schedule is placed before the 
 jurat, it should not be referred to as "hereunder written," but as "the 
 schedule (or, first, &c, schedule) set forth in this my affidavit.*' 
 The schedules may also be embodied in the affidavit. 1 
 
 Alterations in schedules, or in accounts made exhibits to affidavits, 
 should be authenticated in the same manner as in the body of the 
 affidavits. 2 
 
 A document may be referred to in an affidavit, either as an exhibit, 
 thus, — " produced and shown to me at the time of swearing this my 
 affidavit, and marked with the letter A;" or as ''hereunto annexed." 
 If "produced and shown," the document is not filed with the affidavit; 
 if "hereunto annexed," the affidavit cannot properly be filed without 
 it; and it is therefore generally more convenient not to refer to it as 
 " hereunto annexed ; " 3 and if intended to be used in Chambers, it must 
 not be so referred to. 4 
 
 Any document referred to must be distinguished by some mark 
 placed upon it, and signed by the person before whom the affidavit is 
 sworn. 5 
 
 It is the usual practice, in all cases, to write the short title of the 
 cause or matter on the exhibit; and this must be done in the case of 
 documents made exhibits, and intended to be used in Chambers. 6 
 
 Where a document is referred to as being produced and shown to the 
 deponent, the person before whom the affidavit is sworn must inquire 
 whether the deponent has seen the document, and is aware of the con- 
 tents thereof ; but this need not be done where the document is referred 
 to as hereunto annexed, the document being annexed at the time the 
 affidavit is sworn. 7 
 
 Where one party has proved written documents in a cause, the other 
 
 8 Braithwaite's Pr. 340. See now R. S. C. Crook, 1 .Tur. N. S. 654, V. C. S.; Braith- 
 Ord. XXXVII. 3 e. (Ord. April, 1880, r. 10); waite's Pr. 340. 
 
 Re Cloake, 61 L. J. Ch. 69. But an irregu- n Braithwaite's Oaths, 79. 
 
 larity in the jurat cannot be waived, see post, i Braithwaite's Pr. 341. 
 
 P- 897. 2 s ee R egllI . 8 Auff . ( 1857) r 10 _ 
 
 9 Gill '. Gilbard, 9 Hare App. 16. 3 Braithwaite's Pr. 341. 
 
 10 The present practice in the Record and 4 Regul. 8 Aug., 1857, r. 11; and see Cons. 
 
 Writ Clerks' Office of allowing affidavits to be Ord. XXIV. 3. 
 
 filed, notwithstanding that dates and sums are 5 Hewetson v. Todhunter, 2 Sin. & Giff. 
 
 written therein in figures, instead of in words, App. 2. 
 
 was adopted with the sanction of Lord Chan- G Regul. 8 Aug., 1857. r. 12 (3 Jur. N. S. 
 
 cellor Campbell. A previous usage in the office Pt. II.). 
 to the contrary was recognized in Crook v. ' Braithwaite's Pr. 341. 
 
 895
 
 *897 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 side has no right, upon that ground, and in the absence of special 
 circumstances, 8 to require them to be produced before the hearing; 
 unless, perhaps, where the affidavit proving them sets them out verba- 
 tim : 9 for a party can have no right to see the strength of his adver- 
 sary's case, or the evidence of his title, before the hearing. 10 The 
 documents may, however, be ordered to be produced, in order that the 
 other side may cross-examine upon them. 11 (a) 
 
 The jurat should be written at the end of the affidavit, and is usually 
 placed at the right-hand corner ; it may, however, be written 
 * 897 * on either side of the page, or, if necessary, in the margin ; but 
 not on a page upon which no part of the statements in the 
 affidavit appears. 1 It must also correctly express the time when, and 
 the place where, the affidavit is sworn, including the name of the city, 
 borough, or county. 2 
 
 The deponent must sign his name, or make his mark, at the side of 
 the jurat, not underneath it. 3 The person before whom the affidavit 
 is sworn must sign his name at the foot of the jurat; to which must be 
 added his full official character and description, not necessarily, how- 
 ever, in his own handwriting. 4 
 
 If the deponent be a marksman or blind, the affidavit must be first 
 truly, distinctly, and audibly read over to him, 6 either by the person 
 before whom the affidavit was sworn, or by some other person. In the 
 first case, it must be expressed in the jurat that the affidavit was so read 
 over, and that the mark or signature was affixed in the presence of the 
 person taking the affidavit ; in the second case, such other person must 
 attest the mark or signature, and must be first sworn that he has so 
 read over the affidavit, and that the mark or signature was made in his 
 presence, and this must be expressed in the jurat. 6 
 
 8 Lord v. Colvin, 2 Drew. 205; 5 De G. M. 
 & G. 47; 18 Jur. 253; see also Forrester v. 
 Helme, M'Clel. 558. 
 
 9 Hodson v. Earl of Warrington, 3 P. Wins. 
 34. 
 
 1° Davers v. Davers, 2 P. Wms. 410; Hodson 
 v. Earl of Warrington, ubi supra ; Wiley v. 
 Pistor, 7 Ves. 411 ; Fencott v. Clarke, 6 Sim. 8; 
 Lord v. Colvin, ubi supra; Gresley, 192; ante, 
 p. 885. 
 
 u Bell v. Johnson, 1 J. & H. 682; see now 
 R. S. C. Ord. XXXI. 14, 15; A pp. B. No. 
 10, Ord. April, 1880, Sched. B. 10 A; Re Credit 
 Co. 11 Ch. D. 256; Webster v. Whewall, 15 
 Ch. D. 120. 
 
 i Braithwaite's Pr. 342. 
 
 2 Ibid.; 18 & 19 Vic. c. 134, § 15; Cons. 
 Ord. IV. ; but see Gates v. Buckland, 13 W. K. 
 67, V. C. S. 
 
 3 Anderson v. Stather, 9 Jur. 1085, V. C. K. 
 B ; and see Down v. Yearley, W. N. (1874) 
 158. 
 
 4 Braithwaite's Pr. 342; but see Gates v. 
 Buckland, 13 W. R. 67, V. C. S. The words 
 "before me" must precede the commissioner's 
 signature. See Graham v. Ingleby, 5 Dowl. & 
 L. 757; 1 Ex.651; cited Braithwaite's Oaths, 
 46. The failure of the officer to sign the jurat 
 is fatal, and, it seems, cannot be cured by the 
 officer afterwards signing it in open Court, in 
 the case of a warrant of committal in bank- 
 ruptcy. Ex parte Heyman, L. R. 7 Ch. 488. 
 But see infra, p. 911, n. 1. In Bewley v. Ottin- 
 ger, 1 Heisk. 354, the action of the Court below 
 was sustained in permitting the commissioner, 
 who took a deposition, to amend the caption and 
 certificate to which exception had been filed. 
 But the ruling was based upon the liberal stat- 
 utes of jeofail. 
 
 5 As to illiterate affiants, see R. S. C. Ord. 
 XXXVII. 3 f. (Ord. April, 1880, r. 17). 
 
 6 If the deponent is blind, the officer should 
 certify in the jurat that the affidavit whs carefully 
 and correctly read over to him, in the presence 
 
 (a) Production of books or documents, when 
 ordered, is usually with liberty to seal up the 
 parts not referred to in the pleadings or directly 
 
 896 
 
 material to the examination. See Burgess v. 
 Bennett, 20 W. R. 720 ; Quilter v. Heatly, 23 
 Ch. D. 42; Pamell v. Wood, [1892] P. 137.
 
 AFFIDAVITS AND EX-PARTE EXAMINATIONS BEFORE EXAMINER. * 808 
 
 If the deponent be a foreigner, the contents of the affidavit must be 
 interpreted to him; and the interpreter must be sworn that lie has 
 truly, distinctly, and audibly done so, and that he will truly interpret 
 the oath about to be administered, and then the deponent may be sworn ; 
 and that these formalities have been complied with, must be expressed 
 in the jurat. 7 
 
 Formalities of a similar kind, by which it may appear that the depo- 
 nent has fully understood the contents of his affidavit, before he is 
 sworn, must be adopted in the case of a deaf, or deaf and dumb person, 
 or in other similar cases. 8 
 
 * The oath must be administered in a reverent manner ; 1 and, * 898 
 if not administered in the usual form, the authority for administer- 
 ing it should appear in the jurat. 2 
 
 Quakers, Moravians, and Separatists give their evidence on their 
 solemn affirmation ; 3 and any person who objects, from conscientious 
 motives, to be sworn, may now give his evidence upon his solemn 
 affirmation ; 4 but the person qualified to take the affirmation must be 
 satisfied of the sincerity of the objection, and this must appear in the 
 affirm at. 6 
 
 It is a universal principle in all Courts, that jurats and affidavits, 
 when contrary to practice, are open to objection in any stage of a cause. 
 This does not depend upon any objection which the parties in a particu- 
 lar cause may waive, but upon the general rule that the document itself 
 shall not be brought forward at all if in any respect objectionable with 
 reference to the rule of the Court. Where, therefore, there was an 
 irregularity in the jurat of an answer, a motion by the plaintiff to take 
 it off the file, on the ground of such irregularity, was allowed, notwith- 
 standing that he had taken an office copy of the answer. 6 Where, how- 
 
 of such officer, before he swore to the same. Mat- 8 Reynolds v. Jones, Trin. Term, 1818; 
 
 terof Christie, 5 Paige, 242. So where fche affiant Braithwaite's Pr. 383. For forms, see Vol. III. 
 
 has been found by the inquisition of a jury to As to insane persons, see Spittle v. Walton, 
 
 be a lunatic, the officer before whom the af- L. R. 11 Eq. 42. 
 
 fidavit is sworn should state in the jurat that * Ord. XIX. 14; ante, p. 887, note. 
 
 he has examined the deponent for the purpose 2 1 & 2 Vic. c. 105; see Braithwaite's Pr. 
 
 of ascertaining the state of his mind, and that 383, 384. For forms, see Vol. III. 
 
 he was apparently of sound mind, and capable 8 7 & 8 Will. III. c. 34, §1:8 Geo. I. c. 6, 
 
 of understanding the nature and contents of § 1 ; 22 Geo. II. c. 30, § 1; id. c. 4f? § 30 : 9 
 
 the affidavit. Matter of Christie, 5 Paige, 242. Geo. IV. c. 32, § 1 ; 3 & 4 "Will. IV. c. 49; id. 
 
 The attestation should be written near the c. 82; 1& 2 Vic. c. 77; and see id. 105. For 
 
 jurat. Wilson v. Clifton, 2 Hare, 535; 7 Jur. forms of affirmation in these cases, see Vol. III. 
 
 215; Braithwaite's Pr. 380; and Oaths, 61, 69, * Ante, p. 887, note. 
 
 70. Where a marksman signed an affidavit 5 17 & 18 Vic. c. 125, § 20; see 32 & 33 Vic. 
 
 with his name at length, his hand having been c. 68 ; 33 & 34 Vic. c. 49. Where the affidavit 
 
 guided on the occasion, it was ordered to be is on affirmation, and the person taking it does 
 
 taken off the file. 0. Christopher, 11 Sim. not certify that the affirmant is a Quaker or other 
 
 409. For forms of special jurats, see Vol. III. person allowed by law to make affirmation, the 
 
 As to several affidavits, see Fernyhough v. affidavit can be of no avail. Ringgold v. Jones, 
 
 Naylor, W. N. (1875) 22; 23 W. R. 228; and 1 Bland, 90. For forms, see Vol. ITT. 
 
 as to several deponents, see R. S. C. Ord. 6 Pilkington V. Himsworth, 1 Y. & C Ex. 
 
 XXXVII. 3 c. (Ord. April, 1880, r. 14). G12, 010; but see Braithwaite's Pr. 18. and 
 
 1 Braithwaite's Oa'hs, 35. For forms, see ante, pp. 743, 895. The Court may order an 
 
 Vol. III. affidavit to be filed, notwithstanding an irrcgu- 
 
 •57 
 
 897
 
 899 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 ever, in the case of an affidavit sworn abroad, before a notary, the place 
 where it was sworn was omitted in the jurat, it was ordered to be filed, 
 the Vice-Chancellor observing, that he thought the Court must assume 
 that the notary was acting in pursuance of his duty, and that he would 
 not perform a notarial act out of the jurisdiction in which alone he 
 had authority. 7 
 
 Every affidavit of service of writs, or of orders, upon which process 
 of contempt is to be founded, must truly and fully prove good service ; 
 and if the plaintiff's name, the Court, the return of the writ, or anything 
 material, be omitted, no attachment can be thereupon regularly issued ; 
 for, until a due service be shown, no contempt appears to the Court. 8 
 
 Before any affidavit is used for any purpose, it must have been filed 
 
 in the office of the Clerks of Eecords and Writs, and an office 
 
 * 899 copy be produced. 9 Sometimes, in vacation, however, when * the 
 
 matter was pressing, the Court has taken affidavits into its own 
 
 hands, and then considered them as filed. 1 
 
 No affidavit, filed on or after the first day of Easter Term, 1861, is 
 to be used as evidence, on any proceeding in any cause or matter, unless 
 there be written at the foot thereof, at the time of filing the same, a 
 memorandum stating by whom the same is filed, which memorandum is 
 to be in the form following, or as near thereto as circumstances will 
 admit (that is to say) : " This affidavit is filed on the part and behalf 
 of the plaintiffs " (or, " of the defendants M and N "). 2 
 
 Sometimes, when expedition is required, the solicitor filing the affida- 
 vit, instead of waiting until an office copy is made by the Clerk of Rec- 
 ords and Writs, takes a copy of the affidavit to the office, at the same 
 time that he takes the original affidavit to be filed, and then the Clerk 
 of Records and Writs examines and marks the copy as an office copy, 
 at the same time that he files the original. 3 
 
 Where affidavits are filed in support of interlocutory applications, or. 
 to be used in proceedings under decrees, there is no particular time 
 fixed for filing them ; but they should be filed in time enough, before 
 the application or proceeding on which they are intended to be used is 
 brought on, to enable the adverse party to obtain copies : otherwise, 
 the application or proceeding will generally be directed to stand over ; 
 and where it is intended to make use of affidavits filed before the par- 
 ticular petition, notice of motion, or summons, was presented, served, 
 or issued, express notice of such intention should be given in due time 
 
 larity in the jurat. R. S. C. 1883, Ord. 
 XXXVIII. 14; Ord. LII. 14; Glover v. Green- 
 back Alkali Co. W. N. (1876) 157. 
 
 7 Meek v. Ward, 10 Hare App. 1; Gates v. 
 Backland, 13 W. R. 67, V. C S. 
 
 8 Hinde, 453; Cons. Ord. XXVIII. 8; see 
 Re Holt, 11 Ch. D. 168. 
 
 9 Cons. Ord. XVIII. 5; R. S. C. 1883, Ord. 
 XXXVIII. 19; Jackson v. Cassidy, 10 Sim. 
 326; Darley v. Nicholson, 1 Dr. & War. 66, 70; 
 Elsey v. Adams, 4 Giff. 398 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 788 ; 
 see Bloodgood v. Clark, 4 Paige, 574, 576. 
 
 898 
 
 1 Per Lord Langdale in Att.-Gen. v. Lewis, 
 8 Heav. 179. See Mercers' Co. v. Great North- 
 ern Ry. Co 14 Beav. 20; Niemann v. Harris, 
 W. N" (1870) 6; Carr ». Morice, L. R. 16 Eq. 
 125; Campana v. Webb, 22 W. R. 622; Farrer 
 v. Svkes, 43 L. J. Ch. 392; Watts v. Watts, 
 45 "id. 658; R. S. C Ord. XXXV. 16; 
 XXXVII. 3 g. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 18. 
 
 3 Braithwaite's Pr. 494.
 
 AFFIDAVITS AND EX-PARTE EXAMINATIONS BEFORE EXAMINER. * 900 
 
 to the opposite party, as he is not bound to search for affidavits filed 
 before those respective periods. 4 
 
 The party filing an affidavit should, in all cases, take an office copy 
 of it, except in the case of an affidavit filed by a claimant coining in 
 pursuant to advertisement, under a decree : in which case, the office 
 copy is to be taken by the party prosecuting the cause, unless the Judge 
 otherwise directs. 5 Upon filing an affidavit, it is the usual practice of 
 solicitors in all cases to give notice of the tiling to the adverse party ; 
 and such notice must be given by a claimant in the exceptional case 
 just referred to. 6 
 
 Formerly, any party who required a copy of an affidavit, had to obtain 
 an office copy at the Record and Writ Clerks' office ; but now, where 
 any party requires a copy of an affidavit filed by the adverse 
 party, he is to make written application to the party by * whom * 900 
 the copy ought to be delivered, or his solicitor, with an undertak- 
 ing to pay the proper charges : 1 and thereupon such party, or his soli- 
 citor, is to make such copy, 2 and deliver the same on demand within 
 forty-eight hours, 3 and is to produce the office copy in Court, or in 
 Chambers, when required. 4 In cases of ex parte applications for injunc- 
 tion, or writs of ne exeat regno, the copies must be delivered immedi- 
 ately upon the receipt of the request, or within such time as may be 
 specified therein, or may have been directed by the Court. 5 
 
 All copies to be delivered by parties or their solicitors, 6 are to be 
 written on paper of a convenient size, with a sufficient margin, 7 and 
 in a neat and legible manner, similar to that which is usually adopted 
 by law stationers ; and, unless so written, the parties or solicitors de- 
 livering them will not be entitled to be paid for the same. 8 The folios 
 of all copies are to be numbered consecutively in the margin, and the 
 name and address of the party or solicitor, by whom the same are made, 
 are to be indorsed thereon, in like manner as upon the proceedings in 
 the Court ; 9 and such party or solicitor is to be answerable for the same 
 being true copies of the originals, or of the office copies, of which they 
 purport to be copies. 10 
 
 Where any party or solicitor who is required to deliver any such copy 
 either refuses or does not deliver the same within the period allowed 
 for that purpose, the person making such application may procure a 
 
 * See Cons. Orel. XXXV. 27; R. S. C. 1883, 2 Cons. Ord. XXXVT. 5. 
 
 Ord. XXXVIII. 18; Clements t\ Griffith, C. 8 Cons. Ord. XXXVI. 6. 
 
 P. Coop. 470; zndpost. Chap. XXIX. Proceed- 4 Cons. Ord. XXXVI. 10. 
 
 ings in Chambers; Chap. XXXV. § 2, }fotions; 5 Cons. Ord. XXXVI. 9. 
 
 § 3, Petitions. 6 See 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th. Eng. ed.) 633, 
 
 5 Cons. Ord. XXXVI. 1 ; Ord. XXXV. 39; 034. 
 
 R. S. C. 1883, Ord. LXV. 27 (53); LV. 27 (54). 7 Foolscap paper, with a quarter margin, is 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. XXXV. 38. For form of ordinarily used. 
 
 notice, see Vol. III. and as to what is sufficient 8 Cons. Ord. XXXVI. 11. 
 
 notice, Bloxam v. Metropolitan Rv. Co. 16 » See ante, pp. 453, 454; Cons. Ord. III. 
 
 VV. R. 490, 492, note. 2, 5. 
 
 1 Cons. Ord. XXXVI. 4. The ordinary w Cons. Ord. XXXVI. 8. Each copy de- 
 charges are l£r/. per folio to a pauper, and 4'/. livered should include a copy of the jurat, and 
 per folio to other persons. Regul. to Ord. should state the day on which the original 
 Sched. 4. For forms of application and under- affidavit wa« filed. 
 taking, see Vol III. 
 
 899
 
 * 901 EVIDENCE. 
 
 copy from the office in which the original has been filed, in the same 
 way as if no such application had been made to the party or solicitor ; 
 and, in such case, no costs will be due or payable to the party or 
 solicitor so making default, in respect of the copy so applied for. 11 
 
 If a party or solicitor by whom any copy ought to be delivered, re- 
 fuses, or does not deliver the same, within forty -eight hours, an addi- 
 tion of two clear days is to be made to the period within which any 
 proceeding which may have to be taken after obtaining such copy ought 
 to be taken ; so that the person requiring such copy may be as little 
 prejudiced as possible by the neglect of the party or solicitor to deliver 
 such copy. 1 ' 2 
 
 The Taxing Master is not to allow any costs in respect of any copy 
 so taken, unless it shall appear to him to have been requisite, 
 
 * 901 * and to have been made with due care, both as regards the con- 
 
 tents and the writing thereof. 1 
 
 Parties requiring copies of affidavits should proceed in the manner 
 above pointed out , but office copies of affidavits will, nevertheless, be 
 made by the Clerks of Eecords and Writs, at any time, for any person, 
 whether party to the cause or matter or not, who may prefer that 
 course, at the risk of such copies being disallowed on taxation. 2 
 
 Expenses incurred, in consequence of affidavits being prepared or 
 settled by counsel, are to be allowed only when the Taxing Master, in 
 his discretion, and on consideration of the special circumstances of each 
 case, thinks such expenses properly incurred; and in such case he is 
 to be at liberty to allow the same, or such parts thereof as he may con- 
 sider just and reasonable, whether the taxation be between solicitor 
 and client or between party and party. 3 
 
 Where a witness, of whose evidence a party desires to avail himself 
 on the hearing of a cause in which issue has been joined, 4 refuses to 
 make an affidavit, the party may examine him ex parte? before an 
 Examiner. 6 The attendance of the witness is procured, and his exam- 
 
 n Cons. Ord. XXXVI. 12; R. S. C. (Costs) 5 Cons. Ord. 5 Feb., 1881, rr. 4, 6. 
 
 Ord. V. 14. 6 See Gresley, Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 50, et seq. 
 
 12 Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 16. Under the practice heretofore existing in New 
 
 1 Cons. Ord XXXVI. 13. York, each party had aright to select his own 
 
 2 See Braithwaite's Pr. 494. Examiner, and the Court would nor, on ran- 
 
 3 Cons. Ord XL. 17. Costs of settling an tion of the opposite party, interfere with that 
 affidavit (which was an echo of the bill) by right. But a direct examination might be had 
 counsel were allowed in Davies v. Marshall before one Examiner, and a cross-examination 
 (No. 2). 1 Dr. & S. 564; 7 Jur. N. S. 669. See before another. Troup v. Haight,6 John. Ch. 
 Rr Knight, 24 Ch. D. 606; 25 id. 297; Back- 335. 
 
 house v. Alcock, 28 Ch. D. 669; Mansel V. The U. S. Circuit Courts have power to ap- 
 
 Clanricarde, 54 L. J. Ch. 982. point Examiners in suits in Equity, and it is a 
 
 4 An ex parte examination cannot, in strict- matter of discretion whether they be standing 
 ness, be had where a notice of motion for decree Examiners, or be designated as the occasion 
 has been given. Ante, pp. 823, 824. In Smith arises for their services in any cause. Van 
 v. Raker, 4 N. R. 321, V. C. W". (2 H. & M. Hook o. Pendleton, 2 Blatch. 85; 78th of the 
 498), however, it was allowed to be used, on U. S Equity Rules. But in these Courts an oral 
 terms as to cross-examination thereon. See examination of witnesses before an Examiner, 
 Raymond v. Tapson, 22 Ch. D. 430; Fenton v. previous to the amendment of the 67th Rule in 
 Cumberlege. W. N. (1883) 116; 1 Dan. Ch. March, 1862, was irregular, unless there was 
 Prac. (6th Eng. ed.)637. 
 
 900
 
 AFFIDAVITS AND EX-PARTE EXAMINATIONS BEFORE EXAMINER. * 902 
 
 ination conducted, in the same manner as in the case of other examina- 
 tions before the Examiner ; 7 but no party has a right to be present at 
 such examination, except the party producing the witness, his counsel,' 
 solicitor, and agents. 8 When the examination is concluded, the Exam- 
 iner transmits it to the office of the Clerks of the Records and Writs, 
 having marked it as taken ex parte ; and it will be deemed and dealt 
 with by them as an affidavit. 9 The party requiring the attendance of 
 the witness, whether a party or not, must give to the opposite party 
 forty-eight hours' notice at least of his intention to examine such 
 * witness ; and such notice must contain the name and descrip- * 902 
 tion of the witness, and the time and place of the examination, 
 unless the Court thinks fit to dispense with such notice. 1 
 
 All affidavits and depositions to be used on the hearing of any cause, 
 or motion for a decree, must be printed, 2 except such as have been filed 
 for the purpose of any interlocutory application, and of which office 
 copies have been taken. 3 
 
 Such affidavits and depositions are printed under the direction and 
 superintendence of the Clerks of Records and Writs, upon paper of the 
 kind and dimensions, and with the type prescribed for the printing of 
 bills, and in all other respects in such form and manner as the Clerks 
 of Records and Writs deem most convenient. 4 
 
 Solicitors and parties, on filing affidavits required to be printed, must 
 leave with the Clerks of Records and Writs a fair copy of each affidavit 
 filed, written on draft paper, on one side only, and certified by the solici- 
 tor or party to be a correct copy. 5 
 
 In a cause in which issue is joined, the Clerks of Records and Writs 
 will, upon the application of any party to the suit, cause, such affidavits 
 and depositions (other than depositions taken on the oral cross-exam- 
 ination of witnesses who have made such affidavits) to be printed after 
 the expiration of the time fixed for closing the evidence; and such last- 
 mentioned depositions, after the expiration of the time allowed for the 
 oral cross-examination of such witnesses. 6 
 
 In a cause in which a notice of motion for a decree has been given,, 
 the Clerks of Records and Writs will, upon the application of any party 
 to the suit, cause the affidavits filed on behalf of the plaintiffs, the affi- 
 davits filed on behalf of the defendants, and the affidavits of the plain- 
 tiffs in reply, to be printed after the times respectively allowed for filing 
 
 an agreement between the parties to waive writ- of motion for decree served, since the 18th 
 
 ten interrogatories; and such agreement ought June, 1802. See R- S. C. Ord. XXXVIII. 1-0, 
 
 to be in writing. Van Hook v. Pendleton, 2 and (costs), Ord. I.-V. 
 Blatch. 85. See ante, p. 888, note (a). 3 Ord. 16 May, 1802, r. 9. 
 
 1 As to examinations before an Examiner, 4 Ord. 16 May, 1862, r. 2. 
 
 see. post, p. 903, et seq. 5 Old. 1G May, 1862, r. 3. The copy should 
 
 8 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 6. have the usual margin on the left-hand side of 
 
 9 ibid. each page. R. & W. Clerks" Suggestions, No. 7. 
 i Ord. 5 Feb, 1861, r. 22; and see Ford v. The certificate should be written on the left- 
 
 Tennant. 11 W. R. 275, M. R., where it was hand margin of the first page of each copy, be- 
 held that this rule applies to e x parte examina- fore being left at the office. Id. No. 8. lor 
 tions. form of certificate, see Vol. III. 
 
 2 Ord. 16 May, 1862, r. 1. This orderapplies G Ord. 16 May, 1862, r. i. 
 to cases where issue has been joined, or notice 
 
 901
 
 * 903 EVIDENCE. 
 
 each set of such affidavits, and the depositions taken on the oral cross- 
 examination of the witnesses who have made such affidavits, after such 
 depositions have been filed. 7 
 
 It is desirable that the affidavits to be thus printed should be all pre- 
 sented for filing together at one time, and, if possible, on the last day 
 of the time allowed for filing the same, that is to say, — where 
 
 * 903 issue has been joined, on the last day of the time fixed for * clos- 
 
 ing the evidence ; and where notice of motion for a decree has 
 been served, on the last day of each of the respective times allowed to 
 the plaintiff and defendant for filing the affidavits ; and that the fair 
 copies left with such affidavits should be numbered consecutively (at 
 the top of the first page) in the order in which it is desired that they 
 should be printed. 1 Where the foregoing suggestion is complied with, 
 the application to have the evidence printed may be made at the time 
 the evidence is filed. 2 The application to have any evidence printed, 
 which has been taken orally, may be made at any time after such evi- 
 dence is filed ; except that, in cases where a time for taking any oral 
 examination has been specially fixed, and also in cases where issue has 
 been joined, the application is not to be made until the time fixed for 
 taking the examination, or for closing the evidence, has expired. 3 A 
 written or printed application to have the evidence printed, must be 
 made ; 4 and it is desirable that the number of printed copies of the evi- 
 dence which may be required for general use in the cause should be 
 stated in such application. 5 
 
 Every party who files an affidavit, or causes depositions to be taken, 
 must take from the Clerks of Records and Writs a printed copy of every 
 affidavit filed by him and of all such depositions : for which he is to 
 pay, in stamps, at the rate of twopence per folio ; and unless such copy 
 is taken, he is not to be allowed anything in the taxation of costs, in 
 respect of such affidavit or depositions. 6 As a rule, such printed copy 
 will be ready for delivery within forty-eight hours after the application 
 to have the evidence printed is made. 7 
 
 All parties are to be at liberty to take from the Clerks of Records 
 and Writs as many other printed copies of their own and of their oppo- 
 nents' affidavits and depositions as they may require, on paying for the 
 same, in stamps, at the rate of one penny per folio. 8 These copies may 
 be had at the same time as the official copy. 9 
 
 1 Orel. 16 May. 1862, r. 5. 5 E.& W. Clerks' Suggestions, No. 5. 
 i R. & W. Cl'erks' Suggestions, No. 2. 6 Ord. 16 May, 1862, r. 6. 
 
 2 Ibid. No. 3. 7 K. & W. Clerks' Suggestions, No. 6. 
 
 8 Ibid. No. 4. 8 Ord. 16 May, 1862, r.7. As to the allow- 
 
 4 Printed copies of the form of application ances to solicitors, see r. 8. 
 
 may be had, on application at the divisional 9 R. & W. Clerks' Suggestions, No. 6. 
 
 seat, in the Record and Writ Clerks' Office. 
 
 Id. No. 9. For such form, see Vol. III. 
 
 902
 
 VIVA VOCE EVIDENCE. * 904 
 
 Section XI. — Of Viva Voce Evidence. 
 
 The viva voce examination of witnesses may take place, either before 
 the Court, the Judge, or his Chief Clerk, in Chambers, or an Examiner 
 of the Court, or an Examiner specially appointed. 10 
 
 * Where the issue has been joined, there can be no viva voce * 904 
 examination of witnesses in chief for the purposes of the hearing 
 except the ex parte examination before the Examiner, in manner before 
 pointed out, 1 and except the evidence as to particular facts or issues, if 
 so -directed by special order ; 2 and all cross-examinations of witnesses 
 must take place before the Court itself at the hearing. 3 The parties 
 may, however, by consent in writing, which must be filed in the Record 
 and Writ Clerks' Office, agree to take the examination or cross-exami- 
 nation of any witness, in manner provided by the 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86 ; 4 
 and further, the Court, or Judge in Chambers, may direct that the 
 examination or cross-examination of any witness shall be taken in this 
 manner, where by reason of the age, infirmity, or absence out of the 
 jurisdiction of the witness, or for any other sufficient cause, it is expe- 
 dient that such direction should be given. Such direction may be ob- 
 tained on application to the Court, or the Judge in Chambers, on 
 notice. 5 
 
 According to the Act above referred to, all witnesses to be examined 
 orally are to be so examined by or before one of the Examiners of the 
 Court, or by or before an Examiner to be specially appointed by the 
 Court, 6 the Examiner being furnished by the plaintiff with a copy of 
 the bill, and of the answer, if any, in the cause ; and such examination 
 is to take place in the presence of the parties, their counsel, solicitors, 
 or agents ; and the witnesses so examined orally are to be subject to 
 cross-examination and re-examination ; and such examination, cross- 
 examination, and re-examination, are to be conducted, as nearly as may 
 be, in the mode in use in Courts of Common Law, with respect to a 
 witness about to go abroad, and not expected to be present at the trial 
 of a cause. 7 
 
 The depositions so taken are to be taken down in writing by the 
 Examiner, not ordinarily by question and answer, but in the form of a 
 
 i» See 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Eng. erf.) 639; 6 The rules of Chancery in New Jersey pro- 
 
 R. S. C. 1883, Orel. XXXVII. The Court of vide that every person who shall he appointed 
 
 the Examiner is not a puhlic Court, and no one an Examiner of the Court of Chancery shall, 
 
 has a right to be present. In re Western of before he enters upon the execution of his office, 
 
 Canada Oil Lands Co. 6 Ch. D. 109. take, before the Chancellor or Clerk, an oath or 
 
 1 'Ante, p. 901. affirmation impartially and justly to perform 
 
 2 Ord. 5 Feb., 18G1, r. 3. all the duties of the office, according to the best 
 
 3 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 7; Bodger v. Bodger, of his abilities and understanding. Rule 42; 
 11 W. R. 80, V.C. K. Infirm witnesses (r. 11), see State i\ Levy, 3 Har. & McH. 591. 
 
 and suits to perpetuate testimony (r. 16), are 1 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 31 (now superseded 
 
 excepted from this rule. by 46 & 47 Vic. c. 49, § 4, Sched. and R S. C. 
 
 4 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 10 (7 Jur. N. S. Pt. 1883). For the mode in use at Law, sec 1 Chilly's 
 11.59). See R. S. C. Ord. XXXVII. 1, 4. For Arch. 329-336. For form of witness's oath, 
 form of consent, see Vol. III. see Braithwaite's Oaths, 95. 
 
 5 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 11. For forms of 
 notice of motion and summons, see Vol. III. 
 
 903
 
 ' 
 
 * 90G EVIDENCE. 
 
 narrative, 8 and when completed are to be read over to the wit- 
 
 * 905 ness, and signed by him 9 in the presence of the parties, or * such 
 
 of them as may think fit to attend ; but if the witness refuses to 
 sign, then the Examiner is to sign the depositions ; and the Examiner 
 may, upon all examinations, state any special matter to the Court, as 
 he shall think fit. It is in the discretion of the Examiner to put down 
 any particular question or answer, if there should appear any special 
 reason for doing so ; and any question or questions which may be ob- 
 jected to are to be noticed or referred to by the Examiner in the deposi- 
 tions, and he is to state his opinion thereon to the counsel, solicitors, 
 or parties, and to refer to such statement on the face of the depositions ; 
 but he is not to have power to decide upon the materiality or relevancy 
 of any question or questions. The Court deals with the costs of imma- 
 terial or irrelevant depositions as may be just. 1 
 
 There are two Examiners of the Court 2 before whom the examination 
 of witnesses is usually taken ; but where, on account of the distance 
 from London at which the witnesses reside, 3 the pressure of business, 4 
 or other sufficient reason, 6 the examination cannot be conveniently taken 
 before one of the Examiners of the Court, a Special Examiner may be 
 appointed ; but the Court is unwilling to appoint a Special Examiner, 
 except in cases of absolute necessity. 6 Any fit person may be a Special 
 Examiner ; but a barrister, or solicitor, is usually appointed. 7 There 
 was formerly a rule, that witnesses residing more than twenty miles 
 from London could not be compelled to attend before an Examiner in 
 London ; but this rule no longer exists. 8 
 
 The application for the appointment of a Special Examiner may 
 * 906 * be made in Chambers by summons, or in Court by motion on 
 
 8 See New Jersey Rule 71 of Chancery 2 Appointed under 16 & 17 Vic. c. 22; see 
 Practice. ante, p. 901, note. As to Examiners' fees, see 
 
 9 The rule was the same as to depositions. Ord. as to Court Fees, 1875, Sched. Wright 
 Copeland v. Stanton, 1 P. W. 414. But see^os«, ». Larmuth, L. R. 10 Eq. 139. 
 
 pp. 918, note, and 930, n. 2. 3 Re Foster's Trusts, 2 W. R. 679, V. C. K.; 
 
 i 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 32; Suit v. Walms- Ogilby v. Gregory, 4 W. R. 67, V. C. W.; and 
 
 ley, L. R. 2Eq. 439, V. C. W. The Rules of see Rawlins v. Wickham, 4 Jur. N. S. 990, 
 
 Practice for the U. S. Courts of Equity pre- V. C. S. 
 
 scribe that either party may give notice to the 4 Brennan v. Preston, 10 Hare App. 17; 
 
 other that he desires the evidence to be adduced Jones v. "Wood Street Warehouse Co. W. N. 
 
 in the cause to be taken orally, and thereupon (1873) 39. 
 
 substantially the same course of proceeding is 5 Pillan v. Thompson, 10 Hare App. 76. 
 
 to be pursued as that directed by 15 & 16 Vic. 6 Brocas v. Lloyd, 21 Beav. 519; 2 Jur. N. S. 
 
 c. 86, §§ 31. 32, stated in the text. Rule 95, 555; Altree v. Sherwin, 2 De G. & J. 92; Town- 
 
 amending Rule 67, see Vol. III. App'x. By the send v. Williams, 6 W. R. 734, V. C. W. As 
 
 same rule it is prescribed that "notice shall be to special examiners in winding up, see Re 
 
 given by the respective counsel or solicitors to Smith, Knight & Co. L. R. 8 Eq. 23; see Re 
 
 the opposite counsel or solicitors or parties, of Lisbon Steam Tramways Co. 2 Ch. D. 575. 
 
 the time and place of the examination, for such " Henderson v. Phillipson, 17 Jur. 615, V. C. 
 
 reasonable time as the Examiner may fix by W. ; Reed v Prest, Kay App. 14; and see 16 
 
 order in each cause." Under this rule also & 17 Vic. c. 22, § 2. His fees are 5 guineas 
 
 " testimonv may be taken on commission, in a day, and 5s. for his clerk. Regul. to Ord. 
 
 the usual way, by written interrogatories and Sched. 1; Payne v. Little, 21 Beav. 65. 
 
 cross-interrogatories, on motion to the Court, in 8 Altree r. Sherwin, and Brocas v. Lloyd, 
 
 term time, or to a Judge in vacation, for special ubi supra, overruling Reed v. Prest, ubi supra ; 
 
 reason; satisfactory to the Court or Judge." and see Townsend r. Williams, ubi sujira. 
 For formal parts of depositions, see Vol. III. 
 
 904 

 
 VIVA VOCE EVIDENCE. 
 
 90G 
 
 notice; 1 and should, except, perhaps, where the parties consent, be 
 supported by an affidavit of his fitness, and that he has no adverse 
 interest. 2 
 
 The whole of the depositions of the witnesses must be written by the 
 Examiner, with his own hand. 8 
 
 The Examiner is a mere ministerial officer, and has no power to lay 
 down rules as to the most convenient time of taking examinations ; 4 he 
 has, however, it seems, a discretion to allow a witness to be treated as 
 hostile by the party calling him ; 5 or to determine the relevancy of 
 the evidence. 6 Such questions must be determined by the Court; and 
 for that purpose the Examiner should take down the questions and 
 answers in writing. 7 The Examiner has power to admit or exclude the 
 public, as he thinks fit. 8 
 
 Where it is intended to examine witnesses before an Examiner, an 
 appointment must be obtained from him, 3 and notice thereof given to 
 the witness 10 ; and where there is reason to suppose a witness will not 
 voluntarily attend to be examined, recourse must be had to the compul- 
 sory process of a writ of subpoena ad testificandum, which commands 
 the witness to whom it is directed to appear before the Examiner, to 
 testify on behalf of the party requiring his testimony. 11 In case the 
 
 1 Reed v. Prest, ubi supra; Williams v. 
 Williams, 10 Hare App. 45; 17 Beav. 150; 17 
 Jur. 434. 
 
 2 See Ongley v. Hill, W. N. (1874) 157; 22 
 W. R. 817. Where the examination was to be 
 taken ex parte, the Judge said that if the parties 
 could not agree upon an Examiner, he would 
 name one. Davenport v. Goldberg, 2 H. & M. 
 280. For forms of summons, notice of motion, 
 and affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 
 3 Stobart v. Todd, 18 Jur. 018, V. C. K. ; 
 see Bolton v. Bolton, 2 Ch. D. 217; Cooper v. 
 Macdonald, W. N. (1807) 41. A witness should 
 go before the Examiner, free to answer all inter- 
 rogatories, and not with a deposition already 
 prepared. Underbill v. Van Cortlandt, 2 John. 
 Ch. 339. A deposition, prepared and written 
 by the party for whom it is taken, cannot be 
 received as evidence. Amory v. Fellows, 5 
 Mass. 219; see Kay v. Walton, 2 A. K. Marsh. 
 71. Although it is copied by a third person. 
 Griswold v. Griswold, 1 Root, 259. The deposi- 
 tion is equally inadmissible if drawn by the 
 agent of the party. Smith ». Huntington, 1 
 Root, 220; Allen v. Rand, 5 Conn. 322; Ratter- 
 son v. Patterson, 2 Penn. 200; Addleman v. 
 Masterson, 1 id. 454; see United States v. 
 Smith, 4 Day, 121 ; Logan v. Steele, 3 Bibb, 
 230. The practice of having the questions 
 shown to the witness, and his answers prepared 
 beforehand, and reduced to writing and ex- 
 amined by counsel before coming before the 
 Master to testify, was severely reprehended in 
 Hickok v. Fanners and Mechanics' Bank, 35 
 Vt. 470, 490. 
 
 4 Meacham r. Cooper, L. R. 10 Eq. 102. 
 
 5 Ohlsen v. Terrero, L. R. 10 Ch. 127, 129; 
 see Wright v. Wilkin, 4 Jur. N. S. 804; 
 W. R. 043, V. C. K. 
 
 o See 15 & 10 Vice. 80, §32. As to objecting 
 at the hearing in Court, see Kelsey v. Snyder, 
 118 111. 544. 
 
 " Buckley v. Cooke, 1 K. & J. 29; see form 
 in Vol. III. 
 
 8 Wright v. Wilkin, ubi supra; see Re 
 Western of Canada Oil Lands Co. Ch. D. 
 109. 
 
 9 Ante, pp. 904, 905, n. 
 
 10 When the examination takes place before 
 an Examiner of the Court, £3 must be de- 
 posited with the Examiner's clerk, by the party 
 obtaining the appointment. This is returned 
 to him if he duly attends ; but if he does not, 
 and was not prevented by death, illness, or ' 
 unavoidable accident, it is paid to the opposite 
 party ; or if the opposite party also fails to 
 attend, or the examination was to have been 
 ex parte, the .£3 is paid to the suitors' fee fund. 
 Ord. 1 Jan., 1802. See now R. S. C. Ord. as 
 to Court Fees, Oct. 1875, Sched. The order 
 does not apply to a plaintiff suing in forma 
 /imi/it ris. Skeats v. Hurst, 1 N. R 50, V. < '. W. 
 For form of notice to the witness, see Vol. III. 
 
 " Hinde, 230. See 78th Equity Rule of the 
 U. S. Courts, post, p. 2395. The compulsory 
 attendance of witnesses before the Examiner is 
 provided for in Xew Jersey, by Chancery Rule 
 94. For form of writ, see Cons. Ord. Sched. F. 
 No. 3; R. S. C. Ord. April, 1880, Sched. G. 
 Nos. 1, 3, and post, Vol. III. 
 
 905
 
 * 907 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 * 907 witness is required to bring * with him any written document in 
 his possession, then the writ must be a subpoena duces tecum. 1 
 
 Every subpoena, other than a subpoena duces tecum, is to contain three 
 names, where necessary or required ; 2 and no more than three persons 
 are to be included in one subpoena duces tecum ; but the party suing out 
 the same is at liberty to sue out a Subpoena for each person, if it is 
 deemed necessary or desirable to do so. 8 In a subpoena of this nature, 
 a husband and his wife are considered as two distinct persons, and her 
 Christian and surname must be inserted accordingly. 4 
 
 The subpoena must be indorsed with the name or firm, and place of 
 business, of the solicitor issuing the same, and of his ageut, if any, or 
 with the name and place of residence of the party issuing the same, 
 when he acts in person ; and, in either case, with the address for ser- 
 vice, if any. 5 
 
 On presenting a subpoena to be sealed, a praecipe, in the usual form, 
 must be filed at the Record and Writ Clerks' Office. 6 
 
 The service of any subpoena, except a subpoena for costs, is to be of 
 no validity if not made within twelve weeks after the teste of the writ ; 7 
 and in the interval between the suing out and service of any subpoena, 
 the party suing out the same may correct any error in the names of 
 parties or witnesses, and may have the writ resealed, upon leaving a 
 
 1 As to the degree of particularity with 
 which the documents must be described, see Att.- 
 Gen. v. Wilson, 9 Sim. 526. For form of writ, 
 see Cons. Ord. Sched. E. No. 3; R. S. C. Ord. 
 April, 1880, Sched. G. Nos. 1, 3, and post Vol. 
 III. When served with a subpoena duces tecum, 
 the witness must attend before the Examiner 
 and produce the instrument required, unless he 
 has some legal or reasonable excuse for with- 
 holding it. Upon trials in Courts of Law, the 
 Court and not the witness is the judge of the 
 validity of the objection. Amey v. Long, 9 
 East, 473; Bull v. Loveland, 10 Pick. 9. In 
 Courts of Equity, the validity of the objec- 
 tion is considered, upon the witness being 
 brought up, on an attachment for refusing to 
 produce the instrument. Bradshaw v. Brad- 
 shaw, 3 Sim. 285; see M'Pherson v. Rathbone, 
 7 Wend. 216; Jackson v. Denison, 4 Wend. 
 558; Newland v. Steer, 11 Jur. N. S. 596 ; 13 
 W. R. 1014, V. C. K.; Lee v. Angus, L. R. 2 
 Eq. 59, V. C. W. A party cannot, by a sub- 
 piena duces tecum, procure the production of 
 documents; the proper course is to apply for an 
 order for that purpose. Newland v. Steer, ubi 
 supra ; Crowther v. Appleby, L. R. 9 C. P. 23 : 
 see also Cliff v. Bull, W. N. (1869) 182 ; 17 
 W. R. 1120. 
 
 A party to a cause who may be compelled to 
 testify may also be required, by a subpcena 
 duces tecum, to produce books and documents 
 pertinent to the issues, unless he has a lawful 
 excuse to be judged of by the Court. Murray 
 v. Elston, 21 N. J. Eq. 212. The highest 
 official is bound to appear and testify when 
 
 906 
 
 required by proper process, unless he has a law- 
 ful excuse; but will not be compelled to pro- 
 duce a paper or document if, in his opinion, his 
 official duty requires him to withhold it; and 
 the Court will not entertain proceedings to 
 compel the President of the United States, or 
 the Governor of a State, to testify, by adjudg- 
 ing him in contempt. 1 Burr's Trial, 182; Gray 
 v. Pentland, 2 S. & R. 23 ; Thompson v. German 
 A'alley R. Co. 22 N. J. Eq. 111. A subpcena 
 duces tecum has been granted directed to the 
 local manager of a Telegraph Company for the 
 original telegraphic despatches on file. Ince's 
 case, 20 L. T. N. S. 421 ; Natl. Bank v. Natl. 
 Bank, 7 W. Va. 544; Heinsler v. Friedman, 2 
 Pars. Eq. Cas. 274 ; see also ex parte Brown, 8 
 Cent. L. J. 378 (St. Louis Crt. of App.); Com- 
 monwealth v. Jeffries, 7 Allen, 548 ; State v. 
 Litchfield, 58 Maine, 267; United States v. 
 Babcock, 3 Dill. 567. See also Am. Law Reg. 
 for February, 1879, p. 65, an article by Judge 
 Coolev. 
 
 2 Cons. Ord. XXVIII. 3 ; R. S. C. Ord. 
 April, 1880, Sched. G. Nos. 1-6. In New 
 Jersey, the names of any number of witnesses 
 may be inserted in the same subpcena. Rule 94. 
 
 3 Cons. Ord. XXVIII. 4. 
 
 4 Hinde, 327 ; Braithwaite's Pr. 264, n. 
 
 5 Cons. Ord. III. 2, 5 ; ante, pp. 453, 454. 
 For form of indorsement, see Vol. III. 
 
 6 Cons. Ord. XXVIII. 1. Now at the Cen- 
 tral Office. For form of pracipe, see R. S. C. 
 Ord. April, 1880, Sched. E. 20, and Vol. III. 
 
 ~> Cons. Ord. XXVIII. 9. 

 
 VIVA VOCE EVIDENCE. * 908 
 
 corrected prcecipe of such subpoena, marked, " altered and resealed," and 
 signed with the name and address of the solicitor or solicitors suing 
 out the same. 8 
 
 The service of this subpoena must, in all cases, be personal ; 9 and is 
 effected by delivering a copy of the writ and of the indorsement thereon 
 to the witness, and at the same time producing the original writ. 10 At 
 the time he is served with the writ, the witness should be served with 
 a notice in writing, specifying the time when he is to attend the 
 Examiner in pursuance of it. 11 
 
 *No witness is bound to attend unless his reasonable expenses * 908 
 are paid or tendered to him ; nor, if he appears, is he bound to 
 give evidence until such charges are actually paid him ; 1 and the rule is 
 the same where the witness is a party to the cause. 2 
 
 If the witness whose attendance is required is a married woman, the 
 subpoena should be served upon her personally, and the tender of the 
 expenses made to her, and not to her husband. 8 
 
 If the witness, upon being duly served with the subpoena and notice, 
 neglects or refuses to attend to be examined, a certificate of his non- 
 attendance must be procured from the Examiner, and filed in the Record 
 and Writ Clerks' Office ; 4 and an application made to the Court that the 
 witness may be ordered to attend and be sworn and examined, at such 
 time and place as the Examiner may appoint. 5 This application is made 
 by motion, which may be either ex parte, or on notice to the witness. 6 The 
 application must be supported by an affidavit of due service of the sub- 
 poena and notice, 7 and by production of the Examiner's certificate of 
 non-attendance, or an office copy thereof. 8 When the order is made 
 
 8 Cons. Ord. XXVIII. 5. W. For scale of allowances, see Vol. III. 
 
 9 Spicer v. Dawson, 22 Beav. 282. Solici- Now the Taxing Master decides. R. S. C. 
 tors of an absconding witness cannot be coin- Ord. (costs), Sehed. r. 8; Turnbull v. Janson, 
 pelled to disclose his address. Heath v. Crea- 3 C. P. D.2G4; Thomas v. Parrv, W. N. (1880) 
 lock, L. R. 15 Eq. 257. 184. 
 
 1° Cons. Ord. XXVIII. 0. 2 Dave}- v. Durrant, 24 Beav. 403; 4 Jur. 
 
 11 Where the examination is adjourned, the N. S. 230, a case of cross-examination on 
 
 witness is bound to attend the adjournment, affidavit. 
 
 without being served with a new subpoena; but 3 2 Phil, on Evid. 428; 2 Taylor on Evid. 
 
 he should be served with notice of the ad- § 1240. 
 
 journed time; and see Lawson v. Stoddart, 10 4 Seton, 1234; but see Cast v. Poyser, 3 Sm. 
 
 Jur. N. S. 33; 12 W. R. 286, V. C. K. For & G. 369, where an attachment was "held regu- 
 
 forms of notice, see Vol. III. lar, though the certificate had not been filed. 
 
 It is not irregular to issue the subpoena against The filing is now at the Central Office. See, as 
 
 persons who are residents out of the jurisdiction, to how long a witness must wait before, in 
 
 and it may be enforced against them when they consequence of the absence of the examining 
 
 come within the jurisdiction. Campbell v. Att.- partv, he may leave, Perks v. Stottart, 1 N. 
 
 Gen. L. R. 2 Ch. 571. R. 563. 
 
 1 The amount payable is according to the 5 Braithwaite's Pr 144. See 78th Equity 
 
 scale fixed by the Common Law Judges; see Rule of the IT. S. Courts, post, p. 2395. For 
 
 Directions to Masters, Hilary Term, 1853; 17 forms of orders nisi and absolute, see Seton, 
 
 Jur. Pt. II. 41 ; 2 Taylor on Evid. § 1246 ; Chitty's 1233, 1234. 
 
 Arch. 1765; see also Clark v. Gill, 1 K. & J. 6 Wisden v. Wisden, 6 Hare, 549, 550. For 
 
 19 ; Nokcs v. Gibbon, 3 Jur. N. S. 282, V. C. forms of motion paper and notice of motion, see 
 
 K.; Brocas v. Lloyd, 23 Beav. 120; 2 Jur. N. Vol. III. 
 
 S. 555; Turner v. Turner, 5 Jur. N. S. 839; 7 1 For form of affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 
 W. R. 573, V. C. K.; Morgan & Davey, 29; 8 Seton, 1234. 
 
 Wiltshire v. Marshall, W. N. (1866) 80,*V. C. 
 
 907
 
 * 909 EVIDENCE. 
 
 ex parte, it contains a clause that in default of attendance the witness 
 do stand committed to Whitecross Street Prison, 9 and should not direct 
 him to pay the costs of the application. 10 A further appointment must 
 next be obtained from the Examiner, and notice thereof, and a copy of 
 the order, duly served on the witness. 11 If the witness still neglects or 
 refuses to attend, a further certificate of non-attendance must be obtained 
 from the Examiner, and filed, as before explained. An attach- 
 
 * 909 ment may then, if the order has been made * on notice, be issued 
 
 against him on production to the Record and Writ Clerk of an 
 affidavit 1 of due service of the order and notice, and the Examiner's 
 certificate of non-attendance, or an office copy thereof. 2 If the order 
 has been obtained ex parte, an order for the committal of the witness to 
 prison will be made, on an ex parte application by motion, supported by 
 the same evidence. 3 This order, when drawn up, passed, and entered, 
 must be delivered to the tipstaff attending the Court, who will procure 
 a warrant from the Lord Chancellor, and will then apprehend and lodge 
 the witness in prison, where he must remain in custody, not only till 
 he has been examined, but also until payment of taxed costs to the 
 party requiring his testimony, and likewise the tipstaff's and keeper's 
 fees for taking and detaining him. 4 (a) 
 
 After the witness has been examined, he will, upon his motion or 
 petition, and production of the Examiner's certificate of his examination 
 being complete, be ordered to be discharged by the Court, on paying or 
 tendering the costs of his contempt; or he may be discharged by the 
 party at whose instance he was committed, if the jailer can be prevailed 
 upon to take such discharge. 5 
 
 The method is, mutatis mutandis, the same where a witness, having 
 attended in obedience to the subpwna, refuses to be sworn, or, it would 
 seem, to wait till his examination can be taken. 6 
 
 If a witness, attending upon a subpoe?ia duces tecum, refuses, without 
 sufficient cause, to produce the document mentioned in the writ, when 
 required, he may be ordered, upon special motion, to attend again and 
 
 9 Selon, 1234. Now to Holloway Prison. 2 Cons. Ord. XXIX. 3; see R. S. C. Old. 
 
 As to waiver of expenses by witness, see Lawton XLIV. 2; Seton, 1234. For further informa- 
 
 v. Price, W. N. (1867) 266 ; 16 W. R. 73; W. N. tion as to attachments, see ante, p. 403, et seq., 
 
 (1808) 110. and post, Chap. XXVI. § 7, Enforcing Decrees 
 
 w Nokes v. Gibbon, 3 Jur. N. S. 282, V. C. and Orders. 
 K ; Brook v. Biddall, 2 Eq. Rep. 637 ; 2 W. R. 3 For form of order, see Setnn, 1234; and for 
 
 443, V. C. K. form of motion paper, see Vol. III. 
 
 n The copy of the order must be indorsed 4 Hinde, 329. 
 
 according to the provisions of Cons. Ord. 5 Ibid. 330; Seton, 1237; Walter v. Rutter, 
 
 XXIII. 10, as varied by Ord. 7 Jan., 1870, r. 18 L. T. N. S. 788. 
 
 1 (L. R. 5 Ch. xxxiii.), and served in the same 6 Hennegal v. Evance, 12 Ves. 201; see 
 
 manner as in other cases; see post, Chap. amendment of Rule 67, of the Equity Rules of 
 
 XXVI. § 7, Enforcing Decrees and Orders. the U. S. Courts, for the method of proceeding 
 
 For form of indorsement, see Vol. III. in such case. 
 1 For form, see Vol. III. 
 
 (a) In the Federal Courts, any Judge having out a hearing, his arrest and removal back to 
 jurisdiction in the district to which a witness the latter district. Be Ellerbe, 13 Fed. Rep. 530. 
 has removed, after failure to obey a subpoena Depositions may now be there taken accord- 
 duly served in another district, may order, with- ing to State practice. 27 U. S. Stat, at L. 7. 
 
 908
 
 VIVA VOCE EVIDENCE. * 910 
 
 produce it, and to pay the plaintiff all the costs occasioned by his 
 refusal. 7 
 
 If a witness is in prison, under a common-law process, 8 he may be 
 brought up under a writ of habeas co)'jnis ad testificandum? Formerly, 
 the practice was for the Examiner to attend at the prison, if within twenty 
 miles of London ; 10 and this practice may, it is presumed, still be fol- 
 lowed, though it would probably be the more expensive course. The 
 writ of habeas corpus is never issued without an order : the order may be 
 obtained upon motion of course, or on petition of course, at the 
 Rolls, supported by an * affidavit of the facts, and must be produced * 910 
 at the time the writ is sealed. 1 
 
 The Court, or the Judge in Chambers, may direct that the oral exami- 
 nation and cross-examination of any witness (whether a party or not), 
 or the cross-examination of any person who has been examined ex parte 
 before an Examiner, or made an affidavit, shall be taken before an 
 Examiner of the Court or a Special Examiner, in the manner prescribed 
 by the 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, 2 in case it shall appear to the Judge that 
 owing to the age, infirmity, or absence out of the jurisdiction of such 
 witness or person, 3 or for any other cause which to the Judge shall 
 appear sufficient, it is expedient that such direction should be given. 
 Such direction may be obtained on application to the Court or the Judge 
 in Chambers, on notice. 4 And in case the examination or cross-exami- 
 nation of any person in England or Wales is so directed, the party re- 
 quiring such examination or cross-examination may apply to the Court 
 or the Judge in Chambers for an order that one of the Examiners of the 
 Court may attend, for the purpose of such examination or cross-exami- 
 nation, at any place or places in England or Wales to be named in such 
 order. 5 
 
 When the examination of witnesses before the Examiner has been 
 concluded, the original depositions, authenticated by his signature, are 
 
 7 Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 1 R. & M. 358; see Seton, 1275, No. 3; and for forms of motion 
 Hope v. Liddell, 20 Beav. 4-38; 7 De G. M. & paper, petition, and affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 
 G. 331; Re Cameron's Coldbrook By. Co. 25 2 Ante, p. 904. 
 
 Beav. 1; and see Cliff v. Bull, W. N. (1869) 3 For mo ^ e f taking evidence when the 
 
 182; 17 W. R. 1120; Re Emma Silver Mining witness is out of the jurisdiction, see post, 
 
 Co. L. R. 10 Ch. 194. And see, as to the inter- p. 848. 
 
 rogation of the witness touching documents 4 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 11; ante, p. 904. 
 
 before he is sworn, or before trial, Griffith v. For form of notice of motion and summons, 
 
 Ricketts, 7 Hare, 299; Lee v. Angas, L. R. 2 see Vol. III. 
 
 Eq. 59; Steele v. Savory, \V. N. (1891) 195; 5 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 12. The Examiner 
 
 Re Smith, Williams v. Frere, [1891] 1 Ch. 323. is entitled, on production to him of the order, 
 
 8 As to criminal process, see 16 & 17 Vic. c. to one guinea a day for his expenses, and Is. 6<f. 
 30, § 9; 36 & 37 Vic. c. GO, §76; 2 Seton, 1634, per mile for travelling expenses. Those sums 
 No. 2. are to be paid him by the party obtaining the 
 
 9 Buckeridge v. Whalley, 6 W. R. 180, V. order, and, subject to any direction of the Court 
 C. K., where the officer was ordered to attend or Judge to the contrary, will be costs in the 
 with the witness de die in diem. See 2 Seton, cause. Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r, 13. Formerly the 
 1574; R. S. C. 1883, Ord. LII. 14. For form Examiner did not attend at any place farther 
 of writ, see Vol. III. ; R. S. C. Ord. April. 1880, than twenty miles from London". Hinde. 331 ; 
 Scheds. E. No. 15, G. No. 12. and the application was made ex parte; Anon. 
 
 1( » Hinde, 331. 4 Mad. 463: Pillan V. Thompson, 10 Hare App. 
 
 1 Braithwaite's Fr. 224. For form of order, 76; Watkins v. Atchison, id. 46. 
 
 909
 
 * 911 EVIDENCE. 
 
 transmitted by him to the Kecord and Writ Clerks' Office, 6 to be there 
 tiled ; and any party to the suit may have a copy of the whole, or any 
 part. 7 
 
 If the Examiner dies before signing the depositions, they must be 
 signed by his successor. 8 Where the Examiner omits to sign 
 *911 * the depositions, the Court has power, if it thinks fit, to order 
 them to be filed. 1 An Examiner, before whom witnesses who 
 have made affidavits are being cross-examined, for the purpose of obtain- 
 ing evidence upon an interlocutory motion, may return part of these 
 depositions at a time ; but if the evidence is being taken for the hearing 
 of the cause, it seems that he cannot return any until the examination 
 is closed. 2 (a) 
 
 The depositions are to be written on foolscap paper, bookwise or 
 brief wise, as the Examiner thinks fit ; but depositions otherwise writ- 
 ten may be received and filed, if the circumstances of the case render 
 such reception and filing desirable or necessary. 8 
 
 Where issue has been joined, if either party desires the evidence as 
 to any facts or issues to be taken viva voce at the hearing, he may, at any 
 time within fourteen daj's after issue joined, apply to the Judge in 
 Chambers, by summons, 4 to be served on the opposite party, for an order 
 that the evidence in chief as to any facts or issues (such facts and issues 
 to be distinctly and concisely specified in the summons) may be taken 
 viva voce at the hearing of the cause ; and the Judge may make an order 
 that the evidence in chief as to such facts and issues, or any of them, be 
 taken viva voce at the hearing accordingly ; and the facts and issues as to 
 which any such order directs the evidence in chief to be taken viva voce 
 at the hearing, must be distinctly and concisely specified in such order; 
 but in case the Judge is satisfied that such application is unreasonable, 
 or made for the purpose of delay, oppression, or vexation, he may refuse 
 to make any such order ; and where any such order has been made, the 
 examination in chief, as well as the cross-examination, and re-examina- 
 tion, will be taken before the Court at the hearing, as to the facts and 
 
 6 Now at the Central Office. 8 Bryson »>. Warwick and Birmingham Canal 
 
 1 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 34. All interlinea- Co. W. R. (1886), 124, V. C. S.; Felthouse v. 
 
 tions or alterations in the depositions should be Bailey, 14 W. R. 827, M. R. 
 
 authenticated by the initials of the Examiner, 1 Stephens r. Wanklin, 19 Beav. 585. See 
 
 and if the depositions are not left by him per- ante, 897, n. 4. As to what error in the title 
 
 sonally at the Record and Writ Clerks' Office, will invalidate depositions, see Harford v. 
 
 now at the Central Office, they should be sent Reeves, 9 Hare App. 68, and the case there 
 
 there under a sealed cover. Braithwaite's Pr. referred to. See also Prince Albert v. Strange, 
 
 126. For the fees payable, see Regul. to Ord. 2 De G. & S. 652, 709. 
 
 Scheds. 1, 4. See the*U. S. Equity Rule 67, as 2 Clark v. Gill, 1 K. & J. 19. For formal 
 
 amended, post, p. 2391 . The duty of Examiners parts of depositions, see Vol. III. 
 
 to transmit depositions and examinations to the 3 Ord. 6 March, 1860, r. 16. 
 
 Clerk of the Court is fixed by the same Pule. 4 jr or f orra f summons, see Vol. III. 
 
 (a) As to the order in which the witnesses right to demand compensation for his los3 of 
 
 should be cross-examined, see Re Dore Gallery, time before being sworn, and, though sworn, 
 
 62 L. T. 758; 38 W. R. 491. As to death of may refuse to answer until thus compensated, 
 
 the witness before cross-examination, see Cel- Re Working-men's Mutual Society, 21 Ch. D. 
 
 luloid Manuf. Co. v. Arlington Manuf. Co. 47 831. 
 Fed. Rep. 4. A professional witness has the 
 
 910
 
 VIVA VOCE EVIDENCE. 
 
 912 
 
 issues specified in such order ; and no affidavit or evidence taken before 
 an Examiner will be admissible at the hearing of any such cause, in 
 respect of any fact or issue included in any such order. 5 
 
 Where an order for the taking of the evidence as to any fact or issue 
 viva voce at the hearing has been made, the Clerk of Records and Writs 
 makes, in the certificate that the cause is ready for hearing, an entry 
 showing that such an order has been made ; and the Registrar, in set- 
 ting down the cause for hearing in the cause-book of the Judge to whose 
 Court the same is attached, marks the same, so as to indicate that 
 the taking of evidence in chief viva * voce at the hearing has * 912 
 been ordered ; and the cause will not be allowed to come on to be 
 heard without a special direction of the Court, which may be obtained 
 upon an application to the Court, by either party upon notice, or to the 
 Judge in Chambers, by summons, upon notice, 1 to fix a day for the hear- 
 ing. 2 No order is drawn up on this application ; but the Registrar, or 
 the Chief Clerk, as the case may be, will deliver a note of the result of 
 the application to the applicant's solicitor ; and on production thereof 
 to the Order of Course Clerk in the Registrars' Office, he will mark 
 against the entry of the cause, in the cause-book, the day fixed for the 
 hearing. 
 
 Where any such order has been made, each party is at liberty to sue 
 out, at the Record and Writ Clerks' Office, subpoenas ad testificandum 
 and sxibpa?nas duces tecum, to compel the attendance, at the hearing, of 
 witnesses whom he may desire to produce, on any issue or matter of 
 fact included in such order. 8 
 
 Upon any appeal, rehearing, or further proceedings, the Judges' notes 
 of the viva voce evidence will, prima facie, be deemed to be a sufficient 
 note thereof. 4 
 
 6 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 3; Edmunds v. 
 Brougham, 12 Jut. N. S. 934; 15 W. R. 34, 
 V. C. S. See also Bovill v. Bird, W. N. 
 (1867) 96; Other v. Smurthwaite, L. R. 5 Eq. 
 437; Re Underbill, 18 Q. B. D. 115. 
 
 1 For forms of notice of motion and sum- 
 mons, see Vol. III. 
 
 2 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 8; Boyd v. Potrie, 
 W. N. (1869) 138. 
 
 3 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 9; see also post, Chap. 
 XXVII. § 2, Trials of Questions of Fact. For 
 forms of subpoena, see Vol. III. 
 
 * Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 14. By consent, a 
 short-hand writer is often employed to take 
 down the evidence; and his notes are then 
 used, instead of the Judge's, (a) The costs of 
 such notes will be allowed on taxations as be- 
 tween party and part}*, if taken at the sugges- 
 tion of the Judge. Clark v. Malpas (No. 2), 
 31 Beav. 554; 9 Jur. N. S. 612; and see Flock- 
 
 on v. Peake, 12 W. R. 1023, V. C. W., and 
 Morgan & Davey. 356. By Rule of Chancery 
 in Massachusetts, when a case is heard before a 
 single justice of the Court upon any interlocu- 
 tory question, or for a final decree, the evidence 
 shall not be reported to the full Court, unless 
 one of the parties, before any evidence is offered, 
 shall request that the same be so reported; or 
 the justice shall, for special reasons, so direct; 
 and the justice will appoint a suitable disinter- 
 ested person to take the evidence. The expense 
 of taking the evidence shall be paid by the 
 party requesting the taking of the same, to be 
 allowed in the taxation of costs, if costs are de- 
 creed to him. The allowance to the person 
 appointed to take the evidence shall be fixed 
 by the Court, and shall not exceed ten dollars a 
 day. Rule 35. See Granger v. Bassett, 98 
 Mass. 462. 
 
 (a) Where, under U. S. Equity Rule 67, a 
 deposition was by agreement of counsel taken 
 down at the office of one of them by a type- 
 writer in the Examiner's absence, but under his 
 constructive direction, upon the abandonment of 
 
 such examination by one of the counsel without 
 sufficient cause, the testimony of the witness 
 was ordered to be closed. Ballard v. McCI us- 
 key, 52 Fed. Rep. 677; sec Re Thomas, 35 id. 
 822. 
 
 911
 
 * 913 EVIDENCE. 
 
 Upon the hearing of any cause, the Court, if it sees fit, may require 
 the production and oral examination before itself of any witness or party 
 in the cause ; and may direct the costs of and attending the production 
 and examination of such witness or party, to be paid by such of the 
 parties to the suit, or in such manner, as it may think fit. 6 This power 
 will only be exercised by the Court at the hearing ; 6 and it seems doubt- 
 ful whether the mode of exercising it is by an order directing the 
 
 * 913 attendance of the witness, 7 * or by directing a subpoena to issue. 1 
 
 The power is analogous to that of a Judge at nisi prius to recall 
 a witness, 2 and is confined to witnesses who have been examined in the 
 cause. 3 The Court of Appeal may examine orally before it a witness 
 who has not been orally examined before the Court below. 4 
 
 All witnesses who have made an affidavit or been examined ex parte 
 before the Examiner are, as has been before stated, liable to cross-ex- 
 amination. 5 If the affidavit is to be used at the hearing of a cause in 
 which issue has been joined, the cross-examination takes place before 
 the Court at the hearing ; 6 in other cases, before the Examiner, 7 except 
 that, after decree, the cross-examination on an affidavit used in Chambers 
 may be before the Chief Clerk. 8 
 
 An ex parte examination before an Examiner can, as we have seen, 9 
 only take place in causes where issue has been joined, and the cross- 
 examination upon it takes place at the hearing ; 10 but in other cases, as 
 we have seen, where witnesses are examined before the Examiner, the 
 cross-examination follows immediately upon the examination in chief. 11 
 
 Where in any cause or matter a party has filed an affidavit, or where 
 in any cause in which issue has been joined a party has examined a 
 witness ex parte before the Examiner, any opposite party, desiring to 
 cross-examine the deponent or witness, is not obliged to procure the 
 attendance of such deponent or witness for cross-examination, either 
 before the Examiner or before the Court ; but any such opposite party 
 may serve upon the party by whom such affidavit has been filed, or 
 witness examined, or his solicitor, a notice in writing 12 requiring the 
 
 5 15 & 16 Yic. c. 86, § 39. For cases on this 2 See Chitty's Arch. 395; Taylor on Evid. 
 section, besides the cases mentioned below, see § 1331. 
 
 Oliver v. Wright, 1 Sm. & G. App. 16 ; Wilkin- 3 East Anglian Ry. Co. v. Goodwin, 6 W. R. 
 
 son v. Stringer, 9 Hare App. 23; 16 Jur. 1033; 564, V.C. W. 
 
 Deaville v. Deaville, 9 Hare App. 22; Chi- * Hope v. Threlfall, 23 L. J. Ch. 631; 2 Eq. 
 
 Chester v. Chichester. 24 Beav. 589; Ferguson Rep. 307, L. JJ.; Langford v. May, 22 L.J. Ch. 
 
 V. Wilson, W. N. (1866) 324 ; 15 W. R. 27, 978; 1 VV. R. 484, L.JJ.; and see Hind son r. 
 
 L. JJ. Weatherwill,5DeG. M. &G. 301,312: 18 Jur. 
 
 6 Raymond v. Brown, 4 De G. & J. 350; 5 499; Martin v. Pycroft, 2 De G. M. & G. 785, 
 Jur. N. S. 1046; May v. Biggenden, 1 Sm.& 797; 16 Jur. 1125. 
 
 G. 133; 17 Jur. 252;"and see Hope v. Liddell, 6 15 & ]6 Vic c. 86, §§ 38, 40: Ord. 5 Feb. 
 
 20 Beav. 438; East Anglian Ry. Co. v. Good- 1861, r. 6; ante, p. 888. 
 
 win, 6 W. R. 564, V. C W. ; but see ante, 6 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 7. 
 
 p. 820. 7 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, rr. 7, 15. 
 
 7 Mav v. Biggenden. ubi supra ; Nichols v. 8 15 & 16 Vic. c. 80, § 30. 
 
 Ibbetson, 7 W. R. 430, V. C. W. 9 Ante, pp 824. 901 ; Smith r. Baker, 4 N. R. 
 
 1 Braithwaite's Pr. 254. A note or memo- 321, V. C. W.; 2 H. & M. 498. 
 
 randuin, signed by the Registrar, is evidence of 10 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 7. 
 
 the direction of the Court on which the Record u Ante. p. 904. 
 
 and Writ Clerk will act. 12 For form of notice, see Vol. III. 
 012 

 
 VIVA VOCE EVIDENCE. * 914 
 
 production of such deponent or witness for cross-examination before 
 the Examiner, or before the Court, as the case may be, such notice to 
 be served within the time mentioned below, or within such time as, in 
 any case, the Court or the Judge in Chambers may specially appoint 18 
 (that is to say) : where such cross-examination is to be taken 
 before the * Court at the hearing of a cause in which issue is * 914 
 joined, then at any time before the expiration of fourteen days 
 next after the closing of the evidence ; and where such cross-examina- 
 tion is to be taken before the Examiner in a cause in which a notice of 
 motion for a decree or decretal order has been served, and to be used at the 
 hearing of such motion, then at any time before the expiration of fourteen 
 days next after the end of the time allowed for the plaintiff to file affida- 
 vits in reply ; and in every other case, within fourteen days next after 
 the filing of the affidavit or examination upon which such deponent or 
 witness is to be cross-examined ; l and unless such deponent or witness 
 be produced accordingly, such affidavit or examination cannot be used as 
 evidence, unless by the special leave of the Court. 2 The party produ- 
 cing such deponent or witness is entitled to demand the expenses thereof 
 in the first instance from the party requiring such production ; but such 
 expenses will ultimately be borne as the Court shall direct. 3 
 
 It has been held that the foregoing rule does not prohibit the party 
 desiring to cross-examine from taking the course provided by the Act ; 4 
 and that, therefore, a deponent served with a subpoena, under the Act, 
 is bound to submit himself for cross-examination on his affidavit in op- 
 position to a motion for an injunction, notwithstanding the lapse of 
 fourteen days from the time when it was filed. 5 
 
 An enlargement of the fourteen days, in any of the above cases, may, 
 on sufficient reason being shown, be obtained on an application at Cham- 
 bers, by summons : the summons must be served on the opposite 
 parties. 6 
 
 1 3 Where an affidavit, which had been used being withdrawn, or the cause standing over, 
 in Court, was subsequently used in Chambers, Nason v. Clamp, 12 W. R. 973, M. R. ; but see 
 the Court specially appointed a time within Tanswell v. Scurrah, 11 L. T. N. S. 761, M. R. 
 which the cross-examination was to take place. Affidavit allowed to be read, though no cross- 
 Spittle v. Hughes, 11 Jur. N. S. 151, V. C. K. ; examination. Simpson v. Malherbe, 13 W. R. 
 S. C. nam. Hughes v. Spittal, 13 W. R. 251. 887, V. C S.; Braithwaite v. Kearns, 34 Beav. 
 Where the cross-examination of a witness was 202. Leave given to use affidavits, but order 
 proceeded with, without giving notice of it to made saving all just exceptions. Ridley v. 
 the party who had given notice to read the Ridley, 34 Beav. 329. 
 
 affidavit, it was held void. Pennell v. Davison, 3 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 19. As to whether 
 
 14 W. R. 174, V. C. W. the costs of cross-examination are costs in the 
 
 1 Where a petition came on for hearing be- cause, see Hunt v. Pullen, 34 Beav. 301. If it 
 fore the expiration of the fourteen days, and appear that the witness is kept back by the 
 the affidavit was withdrawn, it was held that party, the latter will be ordered to produce him. 
 the opposite party could not require the hear- Catholic Pub. Co. v. Wyman, 1 N. R. 512. 
 
 ing to be postponed, because the deponent was 4 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 40. 
 
 not produced for cross-examination. A'e Sykes' 6 Singer Sewing Machine Manuf. Co. p. 
 
 Trusts, 2 J. & H. 415; see Concha v. Concha, Wilson, 11 Jur. N. S 58, V. C. W. ; 2 II. & II. 
 
 11 A. C. 541. 584; and see Cox v. Stephens, 9 Jur. X. S. 
 
 2 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861. r. 19. Where the wit- 1144; 11 W. R. 929. V. C K. 
 
 ness was unable from illness to attend on the 6 See Cons. Ord. XXXVII. 17. For forms 
 
 day fixed for the hearing of a cause, it was held of summons, see Vol. III. 
 that the defendant might insist on the affidavit 
 
 vol. I. — 58 913
 
 * 915 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 Where the notice to produce a witness is given, the party to whom 
 it is given is entitled to compel the attendance of the deponent or wit- 
 ness for cross-examination before the Court at the hearing of the cause, 
 or before the Examiner, as the case may be, in the same way as he 
 might compel the attendance of a witness to be examined, if an 
 * 915 order had been made for taking evidence * viva voce at the hear- 
 ing ; 1 and if the notice is given for the production of any depo- 
 nent or witness, for cross-examination at the hearing of a cause in which 
 issue is joined, either party may, upon notice, apply to the Court, or to 
 the Judge in Chambers, to fix a day for the hearing of the cause. 2 
 
 Any party to any cause or matter, requiring the attendance of any 
 witness, whether a party or not, before the Court, or before one of the 
 Examiners of the Court, or a Special Examiner, for the purpose of 
 being examined, or of being cross-examined, must give to the opposite 
 party forty-eight hours' notice, at least, of his intention to examine or 
 cross-examine such witness, such notice to contain the name and de- 
 scription of the witness, and the time and place of the examination or 
 cross-examination, unless the Court in any case thinks fit to dispense 
 with such notice. 8 So far, however, as the witness himself is concerned, 
 the notice to be given must be according to circumstances ; and if he 
 resides in London, or has his office there, twenty-four hours' notice is 
 ample. 4 
 
 "Where a witness is out of the jurisdiction, a commission, as we have 
 seen, may still be issued, 5 under an order, which may be obtained on 
 special motion or summons, supported by affidavit ; 6 but the ordinary 
 and more convenient course is to appoint a Special Examiner. 7 
 
 Where a commission is directed to issue, it is prepared by the 
 applicant's solicitor; and will be sealed at the Eecord and Writ 
 
 i Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 20; ante, p. 911. A 
 witness will not be compelled to attend, if, from 
 the matter being disposed of, or other cause, his 
 cross-examination would be useless. Hooper v. 
 Campbell, 13 W. R. 1003, L. C. 
 
 2 Ord. 5 Feb., 1801, r. 21 ; see ante, p. 911. 
 
 3 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 22 (7 Jur. N. S. Pt. II. 
 60); Braithwaite's Manual, 178, n. (85). For 
 form of notice, see Vol. III. 
 
 4 Re North Wheal Exmouth Mining Co. 31 
 Beav. 628; 8 Jur. N. S. 1168. As to Special 
 Examiners out of the jurisdiction, see De Brito v. 
 Hillel, L. R. 15 Eq. 213. As to costs, see R. S. C. 
 (Costs), Sched. r. 18; Hallows v. Fernie, W. N. 
 (1867) 294 ; 16 W. R. 175 ; Smith v. Buller, L. R. 
 19 Eq. 473. 
 
 s 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 28 ; see ante, p. 888; 
 R. S. C. Ord. XXXVII. 1, 4; 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. 
 (6th Eng. ed.) 647; Nadin v. Bassett, 25 Ch. D. 
 21 ; see Armour v. Walker, 32 W. R. 214; Re 
 Boyse, Crofton v. Crofton, 20 Ch. D. 760 ; Lan- 
 gen v. Tate, 24 Ch. D. 522. In reference to the 
 taking of depositions either at home or abroad, 
 many cases will be found collected in note (42) 
 to Phil. Ev. (Cowen & Hill's notes) pp. 32-41; 
 914 
 
 see also 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 320-325. To entitle 
 depositions to be read in evidence, the rules of 
 Court and statutes respecting them must be 
 strictly complied with. Wallace v. Mease, 4 
 Yeates, 520; Bel! v. Morrison, 1 Peters, 351; 
 Winooski Turnp. Co. v. Ridley, 8 Vt. 404; 
 Bradstreet r. Baldwin, 11 Mass. 229; The Argo, 
 2 Wheat. 287; Evans v. Eaton, 7 Wheat. 356; 
 Sanders v. Howe, 1 Chip. 363; Burroughs v. 
 Booth, id. 106; Collins v. Elliot, 1 Harr. & J. 1; 
 Den v. Farley, 1 South. 124 ; Hendricks v. Craig, 
 2 id. 567; Worsham v. Gove, 4 Porter, 441; 
 Wiggins v. Pryor, 3 Porter, 430; Shepherd v. 
 Thompson, 4 N. H. 213; Welles v. Fish, 3 
 Pick. 74. 
 
 6 Hinde, 304. See the 67th Equity Rule of 
 the U. S. Courts, post, p. 2391. For forms of 
 notice of motion and summons, see Vol. III. 
 
 1 Crofts v. Middleton, 9 Hare App. 18 ; and 
 for form of order in that case, see id. 75; Rawlins 
 v. Wickham, 4 Jur. N. S. 990, V. C S. ; Edwards 
 v. Spaight, 2 J. & H. 617 ; London Bank v. Hart, 
 L. R. 6 Eq. 467; and for form of order in that 
 case, see id.; and see Drevon v. Drevon, 12 
 W. R. 66, V. C. K.
 
 VIVA VOCE EVIDENCE. 
 
 917 
 
 * Clerks' Office, on production of the order under which it is * 91G 
 issued, and on aprcecijje being left there. 1 
 
 The commission is directed to not less than four commissioners, 2 and 
 commands them, any two or more of them, to summon the witnesses and 
 examine them upon interrogatories, on their oaths, upon the Holy Evan- 
 gelists, or in such other solemn manner as is most binding on their con- 
 sciences ; and to take their examinations and reduce them into writing 
 in the English language ; and to send the same to the Court of Chancery 
 without delay, or by the return day, if any, named in the order, closed 
 up under their seals, or the seals of any three or two of them, together 
 with the interrogatories and the commission, and a certificate in what 
 manner the oath is administered to such witnesses as cannot speak or 
 understand the English language. The commissioners are further com- 
 manded that, before any oue of them acts in, or is present at, the swear- 
 ing or examining of any witness, they severally take the oath first spe- 
 cified in the schedule to the commission ; 3 and which they, any three 
 or two of them, are empowered to administer to the rest or any other of 
 them, upon the Holy Evangelists; and all clerks employed in taking, 
 writing, transcribing, or engrossing the depositions of the witnesses 
 are, before they act, required to take the oath last specified in the 
 schedule, 4 to be administered by the commissioners or any * one * 917 
 of them. The commissioners are lastly commanded, if necessary, 
 to swear an interpreter or interpreters, to interpret the oaths and inter- 
 rogatories to those witnesses who do not understand English, into the 
 
 1 Braithwaite's Pr. 186. The commission 
 must be stamped with a £1 Chancery fee fund 
 stamp. Eegul. to Ord. Sched. 4. For forms 
 of commission, indorsement, praecipe, and oaths 
 of the commissioners and their clerk, see Vol. 
 III. 
 
 2 See the 67th Equity Rule of the U. S. 
 Courts, post, p. 2391. 
 
 For cases touching the competency of persons 
 to act as commissioners, see Heacock r. Stod- 
 dard, 1 Tyler, 344; and Chandler v. Brainard, 
 14 Pick. 285. 
 
 Under the provision that no person interested 
 shall draw up a deposition to be used in a cause, 
 &c, a son-in-law of a party was held not dis- 
 qualified, in Heacock v. Stoddard, 1 Tyler, 344. 
 But a deposition taken before the uncle of a 
 party to a suit was held inadmissible in New 
 Hampshire. Bean v. Quimby, 5 N. II. 94; see 
 Smith v. Smith, 2 Greenl. 408; Coffin v. Jones, 
 13 Pick. 441; Wood r. Cole, id. 279. 
 
 In Pennsylvania, a commission was issued 
 to four commissioners, jointly, to take the 
 depositions of witnesses in England. It was 
 executed and returned by three of the com- 
 missioners only; two of whom, however, were 
 of the defendant's nomination, and it was held 
 inadmissible in evidence. Guppy r. Brown, 
 4 Dall. 410; see Marshall v. Frisbic, 1 Munf. 
 247. But depositions taken under a joint 
 and several commission were held admissible, 
 
 though the defendant's commissioners did not 
 attend. Penncock v. Freeman, 1 Watts, 401. 
 Where a commission was directed to live per- 
 sons, or any one of them, and the examination 
 was taken in conjunction with another per- 
 son, not named in the commission, the depo- 
 sition was held inadmissible. Wi lings v. 
 Consequa, 1 Peters, C. C. 301; see further as to 
 commissions, Cage v. Courts, 1 Harr. & M'H. 
 239. A commission to take depositions, issued 
 in blank as to the persons to whom directed, is 
 inadmissible. Worsham r. (loar, 4 Porter, 441. 
 In Tennessee, the commission might be issued 
 in blank, but was required to be filled up with 
 the name of the commissioner at or before the 
 taking of the deposition. Oliver v. Bank of 
 Tennessee, 11 Humph. 74. And now deposi- 
 tions may be taken without commission. Code, 
 § 3847. 
 
 8 Fur form of oath, see Vol. III. A single 
 commissioner may be authorized to administer 
 the oath to himself. Wilson v. De Coulon, 22 
 Ch. D. 841. 
 
 4 It is not necessary, in the United States, 
 that there should be a clerk to the commission. 
 Beard v. Heide, 2 Harr. & .!. 442. The com- 
 missioner should himself examine the witness, 
 and not leave so weighty an iffair to his clerk 
 or others. Prac. Peg. 124: Hinde, 348; Cap- 
 peau v. Baker, 1 Harr. & J. 154. 
 
 915
 
 * 917 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 language of the witnesses, and also to interpret the depositions out of 
 the language of the witnesses into the English language, and to keep 
 such depositions secret. 1 
 
 As a commission for the examination of witnesses is rarely, if ever, 
 resorted to under the present practice of the Court, it has not been 
 thought necessary to set out the practice relative to the execution of 
 such commission. The reader will, however, find such practice fully 
 detailed in the second edition of this treatise. 2 
 
 1 See form of commission in Braithwaite's 
 Pr. 183. 
 
 2 See pp. 872-908; 3d Am. ed. pp. 924-953. 
 The practice in Chancery in the several States 
 in relation to the issuing, execution, and return 
 of commissions, is in general regulated by 
 statute or by local rules, which could not use- 
 fully be set out in these notes. Many of the 
 cases and rules will be found referred to in 2 
 Phil. Ev. (Coweu & Hill's notes) pp. 32-41, in 
 note (42); see also 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 320-325; 1 
 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 363, 474 ; Hunter v. Fletcher, 5 
 Rand. 126 ; Edgell v. Lowell, 4 Yt. 412. Depo- 
 sitions in a foreign country must be taken by 
 commission. Stein v. Bowman, 13 Peters, 209. 
 
 In New Jersey, see Ch. Rules 96-98; Dick. 
 Prec. 25 ; and see Barrett v. Pardow, 1 Edw. 
 Ch. 11. 
 
 In Massachusetts, where the testimony of 
 witnesses, residing out of the jurisdiction of the 
 Court, is to be taken, the plaintiff is entitled 
 to have a commission for that purpose; and all 
 the Rules of Law as to the time and manner of 
 taking and tiling depositions at Law will apply 
 in Equity. Pingree v. Coffin, 12 Cush. 600. 
 
 No notice of the time and place of executing 
 a commission out of the State is necessary to be 
 given to the opposite party in Maryland. Ow- 
 ings v. Norwood, 2 Harr. & J. 96. But time 
 should be giver, to allow the opposite party to 
 exhibit interrogatories. Ibid. The services of 
 copies of the interrogatories, which accompany 
 a commission, on the adverse party, a sufficient 
 time before the issuing of the commission, to 
 enable him to file cross-interrogatories, is suffi- 
 cient notice of the issuing of the commission, 
 and of the time and place of executing it. Law 
 v. Scott, 5 Harr. & J. 438. 
 
 Under the New York Act of 17th of April, 
 1823, parties and their counsel have a right to 
 be present at the examination of witnesses, and 
 to cross-examine in all cases; and this as well 
 npon commissions issued to examine witnesses 
 out of the State as in other cases. Steer v. 
 Steer, Hopk. 362. So in Tennessee. And, 
 therefore, if the notice designate the day on 
 which the deposition is to be taken, without 
 more, the commissioner has no power to adjourn 
 until the next day, even for want of time to 
 complete the deposition. Brandon v. Mullinix, 
 11 Heisk. 446. But see Parker v. Hayes, 23 
 N. J. Eq. 186, where it was held that, although 
 
 916 
 
 the commissioner had no power to adjourn the 
 examination, yet he might continue it, when- 
 ever commenced, from day to day, while actu- 
 ally proceeding with the examination. For the 
 practice in New Hampshire on this subject, see 
 Marston v. Brackett, 9 N. H. 345, 346. 
 
 It is not necessary in Alabama, that, pre- 
 vious to the issuing of a commission to take 
 the deposition of a non-resident witness, the 
 interrogatories should be filed in the Clerk's 
 Office. The party may examine the witness 
 before the commissioners. Wiggins v. Pryor, 
 3 Porter, 430. 
 
 In New Jersey, the deposition must be signed 
 by the witness. Flavell v. Flavell, 20 N. J. 
 Eq. 211. 
 
 In Pennsylvania, a deposition taken under a 
 commission need not be subscribed by the wit- 
 ness. Moulson v. Hargrave, 1 Serg. & R. 201. 
 In Kentucky, it is no objection to a deposition 
 that the witness omitted to subscribe his name. 
 Motley v. Hamit, 1 A. K. Marsh. 590. So in 
 North Carolina. Rutherford v. Nelson, 1 Hayw. 
 105; Murphy v. Work. id. So in Virginia. 
 Barrett v. Watson, 1 Wash. 372. So in Ala- 
 bama. Wiggins v. Pryor, 3 Porter, 430. A 
 deposition taken under a commission to take 
 the deposition of John Priestly, may be read 
 in evidence, though signed " JohnG. Priestly." 
 Brooks b. M'Kean, Cooke, 162; see Breyfogle 
 v. Beckley, 16 Serg. & R. 264; ante, p. 904, n. 9. 
 
 A deposition, to which the witness is not 
 sworn till his testimony is reduced to writing, 
 is irregular. Armstrong v. Burrows, 6 Watts, 
 266. 
 
 The magistrate who takes a deposition is to 
 judge of the mental capacity of the witness. 
 Hough v. Lawrence, 5 Vt. 299. 
 
 It will be presumed that commissioners have 
 done their duty in keeping and forwarding 
 depositions, unless the contrary appear. Glover 
 v. Millings, 3 Stew. & P. 28. Commissioners 
 to take depositions should certify, in their re- 
 turn, that they caused the witness to be exam- 
 ined on oath upon the interrogatories annexed, 
 and that they caused the examination to be re- 
 duced to writing; otherwise the depositions 
 cannot be read. Bailis v. Cochran, 2 John. 
 417; see Glover v. Millings, ubi supra; Petti- 
 bone v. Derringer, 4 Wash. C. C. 215. It is 
 sufficient that the commissioners certify, in their 
 return, that the oath has been duly taken by
 
 VIVA VOCE EVIDENCE. * 919 
 
 The commissioners have power, in Scotland and Ireland, to 
 * call in the aid of the Courts of those countries to compel the at- * 918 
 tendance of any witness who may neglect to obey their notice to 
 attend ; 1 and it is conceived that Special Examiners have the same 
 power. 2 
 
 Where the witness is resident at any place in her Majesty's domin- 
 ions, the commissioners, or Special Examiner, may obtain an order from 
 the Court having jurisdiction in such place, that the examination may 
 proceed in accordance with the order of the Court of Chancery ; and 
 may obtain from such first-mentioned Court such further orders as may 
 be necessary, for the purpose of compelling the attendance of the 
 witness. 3 
 
 Where the Examiner has to examine witnesses who cannot speak 
 English, the usual and proper course is to take down the depositions 
 from an interpreter in English. 4 This, however, does not appear to be 
 absolutely necessary, since, in some cases, examinations taken down in 
 a foreign language have been recognized by the Court. If the deposi- 
 tions are taken down in the language of the witness, they must 
 afterwards * be translated out of that language into English, by * 919 
 a person appointed by an order of the Court, who must be sworn 
 to the truth of his translation, 1 and must either make such translation 
 before the depositions are filed, or afterwards attend at the Record and 
 Writ Clerks' Office for that purpose ; for the Court will not make an 
 order for the record of the deposition to be delivered out, in order that 
 they may be translated. 2 
 
 The translation, after the truth thereof has been sworn to, is annexed 
 to the depositions, and an office copy made of it; which will be per- 
 mitted to be read at the hearing, saving all just exceptions, when, as is 
 usually the case, the order so directs. The order for the appointment 
 of a translator of the depositions, and for leave to use them at the hear- 
 ing, is obtained by motion of course, or by petition of course. 3 Where 
 a witness disputed the correctness of an alleged translation of letters in 
 a foreign language, on which translation he was being cross-examined 
 before an Examiner, but as to the correctness of which there was no 
 evidence, it was held that the witness should be cross-examined at the 
 
 them. Wilson v. Mitchell, 3 Harr. & J. 91; witness. Maccuhbin v. Matthews, 2 Bland, 250; 
 
 Glover v. Millings, ubi supra. see 78th Equity Rule of the U. S. Courts, post, 
 
 As to objections to the deposition, see Strike p. 2395. See New Jersey Ch. Rule 94. 
 v. M'Donald, 2 Harr. & J. 29, 192. 4 j^ n \ Belmore v. Anderson, 4 Bro. C. C. 
 
 10 & 7 Vic. c. 82, §5; Taylor on Evid. 90. In Gilpins V. Consequa, 1 Peters, C. C. 85, 
 
 §§ 1183, 1183 A. For the practice at Law under it was held no objection that the deposition was 
 
 this Act, see Chitty's Arch. 341-344. in English, though taken before Dutchmen, 
 
 2 See 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 35 (superseded who did not appear to have been assisted by a 
 by 46 & 47 Vic. c. 49, § 4, Sched., and R. S. sworn interpreter. See Amory v. Fellows, "> 
 C. 1883). Mass. 219. 
 
 3 22 Vic. c. 20, § 1; Taylor on Evid. § 1183, i 1 Newl. 439. For form of affidavit, see 
 B. Commissioners may summon a witness to Vol. III. 
 
 attend before them; and the Court will compel - Fauquier v. Tynte, 7 Ves. 292; see Gilpins 
 
 the witness to do so; but a commission should v. Consequa, 1 Peters, C. C. 85. 
 be issued so as to have the examination at a 3 For forms of motion paper and petition, 
 
 reasonable distance from the residence of the see Vol. III. 
 
 91
 
 * 920 EVIDENCE. 
 
 hearing in open Court, and if any difficulties then arose, the Court 
 would, if necessary, consider how to dispose of them. 4 
 
 It seems that an examination of witnesses abroad will not be effected 
 by an abatement of the suit ; and that the depositions (provided neither 
 the Examiner nor the witnesses have received notice of the abatement) 
 will be good evidence. 5 The same principle has been applied to an 
 abatement, pending an examination of witnesses in this country. 6 
 
 In all cases whatever, the re-examination of a witness is to follow 
 immediately upon his cross-examination. 7 
 
 The evidence, when taken, whether by affidavit or otherwise, and 
 whether in chief or on cross-examination, is open to all parties ; 8 and a 
 defendant has, consequently, a right to cross-examine his co-defendant's 
 witnesses. 9 
 
 The costs of a commission, or Special Examiner, to take evidence 
 abroad, will be taxed in this country, but on the scale allowed in the 
 country where the evidence was taken. 10 The costs of the solicitor here, 
 of attending the examination abroad, will not be allowed. 11 
 
 * 920 * Section XII. — Of Interrogatories. 
 
 The general mode of examining witnesses in Equity formerly was by 
 interrogatories in writing, exhibited by the party, plaintiff or defendant, 
 or directed by the Court to be proposed to or asked of the witness in a 
 cause touching the merits thereof or some incident therein. The prac- 
 tice is now, however, almost entirely abolished ; but, as it may still be 
 resorted to with respect to any particular witness within the jurisdic- 
 tion of the Court, and with respect to all witnesses in the cause out of 
 the jurisdiction of the Court, 1 and as it continues to prevail in some 
 Courts in the United States, 2 it is proper here to consider and state the 
 rules by which it is governed. These interrogatories are questions in 
 writing, adapted to sustain the case made by the party exhibiting them, 
 and are administered to the witnesses either by the regular Examiners 
 of the Court, or through the medium of commissioners specially ap- 
 pointed for the purpose. 3 (a) They are termed original when exhibited on 
 
 4 Foster v. Gladstone, 12 W. R. 525, V. C. W. 9 Lordi-. Colvin, ubi supra ; Feilden v. Slater, 
 
 An objection for irregularity should be taken at L. R. 7 Eq. 523, 529. 
 
 the hearing. De Brito v. Hillel, L. R. 15 Eq'. w Wentworth v. Lloyd, 13 W. R. 486, M. R. ; 
 
 213; Rickardsw. Hough. 30 W. R. 676; Mey- 34 Beav 455; see 2 Seton, 1638, and as to 
 
 rick r. Jairttes, W. X. (1877) 120; 46 L. J. Ch. costs of perusing the depositions, S. C. L. R. 2 
 
 519. Objections to evidence, when copies only Eq. 609 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 581, M. R. 
 
 are produced, should be taken before the com- n Hammond r. Wordsworth, 1 Dick. 381. 
 
 missioners. Robinson r. Davies, 5 Q B. D. 26. 1 Ante, pp. 887, 888. 
 
 s Thompson's case, 3 P. Wins. 195; Winter 2 See 37 Maine, 585, Ch. Rule 14 ; Eq. Rule 
 
 v. Dancie, Tothill, 99. of U. S. Courts, 67; Code of Tenn. § 3855. 
 
 6 Curtis v. Fulbrook. 8 Hare, 29. 3 Hinde, 317. 
 
 ' Cons. Ord. XIX. 8. 
 
 8 Lord v. Colvin, 3 Drew. 222; Sturgis v. 
 Morse (No. 2), 26 Beav. 562. 
 
 (a) There is no right to require answers to Van Walters v. Marion County Board, 132 Ind. 
 interrogatories when there is no cause of suit. 567. 
 
 918
 
 INTERROGATORIES. 
 
 921 
 
 the part of the person who produces the witness ; or cross-interrogato- 
 ries, if filed on behalf of the adverse party, to examine a witness pro- 
 duced on the other side. 4 
 
 Interrogatories should be short and pertinent, and necessarily they 
 must not be leading. 5 (b) If they are leading, the deposition taken 
 thereon will be suppressed ; and so it will be where the interrogatories 
 are too particular, and point to one side of the question more than the 
 other. 6 
 
 * Leading questions are such as instruct a witness how to * 921 
 answer on material points, such as, " Did you not see or do such 
 a thing ? " 1 or which, embodying a material fact, admit of an answer by 
 a simple negative or affirmative, though the question does not suggest 
 which. 2 
 
 4 Hinde, 317. 
 
 6 As to the forms of interrogatories, see 
 Gresley, Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 44—18. Leading 
 questions are those which suggest to the wit- 
 ness the answer desired. See 1 Greenl. Ev. 
 §§ 434, 435; 1 Stark. Ev. 149; 1 Phil. Ev. 
 (Cowen & Hill's ed. 1839)268-272, and notes 
 referred to; Parkin ?>. Moore, 7 C. & P. 408. 
 In some cases leading questions are permitted, 
 even in a direct examination; namely, where 
 the witness appears to be hostile to the party 
 producing him, or in the interest of the other 
 party, or unwilling to give evidence; or where 
 an omission in his testimony is evidently caused 
 by want of recollection, which a suggestion 
 ma}' assist. Thus where the witness stated 
 that he could not recollect the names of the 
 component members of a firm, so as to repeat 
 them, without suggestion, but thought he might 
 possibly recollect them if suggested to him, this 
 was permitted to be done. So where the trans- 
 action involves numerous items or dates. So 
 where, from the nature of the case, the mind of 
 the witness cannot be directed to the subject of 
 inquiry, without a particular specification of it. 
 So where a witness is called to contradict an- 
 other, who has testified to particular expres- 
 sions, the contradicting witness may be asked 
 
 (h) The objection that the interrogatories 
 are leading cannot be first made at the trial. 
 Marx v. Heidenheimer, 63 Texas, 304. In 
 modern practice, a defendant who refuses to 
 answer a relevant interrogator}' in the bill, 
 must state his reason: if he answers it in part, 
 he must answer the whole. Gray v. Bateman, 
 21 W. R. 137; see Zunkel v. Litchfield, 21 Fed. 
 Rep. 196; Todd v. Bishop, 136 Mass. 386. But 
 part of a party's deposition may be read to 
 prove an admission. Van Horn v. Smith, 59 
 Iowa, 142; Converse v. Meyer, 14 Neb. 190. 
 Irresponsive answers in a deposition taken by 
 an adversary may be omitted in reading it in 
 evidence. Fountain r. Ware, 56 Ala 558 ; see 
 
 whether such expressions were used. When 
 and under what circumstances a leading ques- 
 tion may be put is a matter resting in the 
 sound discretion of the Court, arid not a matter 
 which can be assigned for error. 1 Greenl. Ev. 
 § 435; Clarke v. Saffery, Ry. & M. 126, per 
 Best C. J.; Price v. Manning, 42 Ch. D. 372; 
 Regina v. Chapman, 8 C. & P. 558; Acerro v. 
 Petroni, 1 Stark. 100; 2 Phil. Ev. 404, 405; 
 Moody v. Rowell, 17 Pick. 498. 
 
 6 1 Harr. ed. Newl. 259. Objections to in- 
 terrogatories, filed before the issuing of a 
 commission to take a deposition, should specify 
 the ground of the objection, in order that the 
 adverse party may have an opportunity to vary 
 the interrogatories. Allen v. Babcock, 15 Pick. 
 56; see Craddock r. Craddock, 3Litt. 77; Jones 
 v. Lucas, 1 Rand. 268. A leading interrogatory 
 in a deposition, taken when both parties are 
 present, must be objected to at the time it is put 
 to the witness, if at all. Woodman v. Cool- 
 broth, 7 Greenl. 181; Sheeler v. Speer, 3 Binn. 
 130; see Anon. 2 Pick. 165. 
 
 1 See Craddock v. Craddock, 3 Lift. 77. 
 
 2 1 Harr. Ed. Newl. 259 ; see Lincoln p. 
 Wright, 4 Beav. 166. " Such questions, as will 
 as those which fall more directly under the 
 denomination of leading questions, are objec- 
 
 Chase v. Kenniston, 76 Maine, 209. The rule, 
 in jurisdictions where it is so provided by 
 statute, that an interrogatory which the de- 
 ponent refused to answer shall be taken as 
 confessed, applies only to pertinent interroga- 
 tories. Barnard p. Blum, 69 Texas, 608. Upon 
 a refusal to produce documents merely because 
 they are too voluminous, the deposition may be 
 suppressed on motion. Coleman r. Colgate, 
 6!) Texas, 88. The deponent cannot be re- 
 quired to attach to his deposition more than a 
 transcript of a merchant's books of account. 
 Petersburg Savings Co. v. Manhattan Fire Ins. 
 Co. 66 Ga. 446. 
 
 919
 
 922 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 In order to render an interrogatory objectionable, on the ground of its 
 being leading, it must relate to some material poiut in the cause. 8 
 
 It is difficult, however, to suggest any rules, in the abstract, with 
 regard to what will or will not be considered as a leading question, as 
 much, in every case, must depend upon the peculiar circumstances attend- 
 ing it ; nevertheless, the avoiding such questions as may be considered 
 leading is a point very important to be attended to in the framing of 
 interrogatories, as the consequences of them may be a motion to suppress 
 the evidence taken upon them, whereby the party will, in all probabil- 
 ity, be deprived of an important part of the evidence upon which 
 * 922 he intends to rely. * Indeed, it seems that, where interrogatories 
 are obviously leading, the Court will, without any motion being 
 made to suppress the deposition, think it a good ground to reject the 
 evidence taken upon it at the hearing. 1 Where, however, depositions 
 are offered in evidence in a trial at Law, they may be read notwithstand- 
 ing the interrogatories on which they were taken are leading ; — the other 
 side ought to have applied to the Court in which they were taken to 
 have them suppressed. 2 
 
 Cross-interrogatories are not subject to the same objections, on account 
 of their leading the witness, as interrogatories for examination in chief ; 
 care must be taken, however, in framing them, not to' adapt them to the 
 proof of new facts which it is not likely the party examining in chief will 
 attempt to substantiate by his evidence ; for, although the adverse party 
 may cross-examine as to the points upon which a witness has been ex- 
 amined in chief, he cannot make use of the same process to prove a 
 different fact. 8 
 
 tionable, because the evidence elicited by them 
 is presented to the Court, which is to judge of 
 the effect of it, not as it would be if it were the 
 unassisted testimony of the witness, but in the 
 form, and with the coloring, that are prompted 
 by professional skill and a previous knowledge 
 of the case which it is desired to prove. If 
 such a mode of proof were admitted, there 
 would not be the same probability that a wit- 
 ness would state the whole transaction, and 
 part only might be elicited; the chance, too, of 
 detecting discrepancies in perjured or mistaken 
 testimony would be diminished; nor are those 
 objections removed by the power of cross- 
 examination, which, as it often must be con- 
 ducted without previous knowledge of the 
 answers which the witnesses will give, is not a 
 counterbalance to the facility afforded of pre- 
 senting a selected portion of the evidence in 
 chief." Phil. & Amos, 887. 
 
 3 " Questions which are intended merely as 
 introductory, and which, whether answered in 
 the affirmative or negative, would not be con- 
 clusive on any of the points in the cause, are 
 not liable to the objection of leading. If it 
 were not allowed to approach the points in issue 
 by such questions, the examination of witnesses 
 would run to an immoderate length. For ex- 
 
 920 
 
 ■ample, if two defendants are charged as part- 
 ners, a witness may be properly asked whether 
 the one defendant has interfered in the busi- 
 ness of the other." Phil. & Amos, 887. 
 
 1 Delves v. Lord Bagot, 2 Fowl. Ex. Pr. 
 129. 
 
 2 4 M. & S. 497. 
 
 3 Dean and Chapter of Ely v. Stewart, 2 
 Atk. 44. If, therefore, there should be any 
 parts of a case which can only be proved by a 
 witness examined on behalf of the adverse 
 party, the proper course is, not to endeavor to 
 establish them by cross-examining that wit- 
 ness, but to exhibit original interrogatories for 
 the examination of such witness in chief; 
 otherwise there will be a risk that the evidence 
 of the witness, as to these points, will be lost; 
 for, if the reading of the deposition of the wit- 
 ness to the cross-interrogatory be objected to at 
 the hearing as involving new points, the other 
 party may also prevent the reading of the 
 cross-deposition by refusing to read the ex- 
 examination in chief. Smith v. Biggs, 5 Sim. 
 392; see 1 Greenl. Ev. § 445, et seq. ; 1 Phil. Ev. 
 (Cowen & Hill's ed. 1839) 272, et seq. and notes 
 referred to; Gresley, Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 49. But 
 see infra, p. 950, n. 8.
 
 INTERROGATORIES. * 923 
 
 Interrogatories, like all other proceedings in the Court, may be the 
 subject of a reference for scandal. 4 It seems, however, that they caunot 
 be referred for impertinence alone. 5 If the witness himself objects to 
 the interrogatory upon this ground, he should do so by demurrer, before 
 he answers it. 
 
 Interrogatories for the examination of witnesses in a cause are entitled : 
 "Interrogatories to be exhibited to witnesses to be produced, sworn, and 
 examined in a certain cause now depending and at issue in the High 
 Court of Chancery, wherein A B is plaintiff, and C D is defendant, on 
 the part and behalf of the above-named plaintiff " (or defendant, as the 
 case may be). Care must be taken, in framing the interrogatories, 
 that the title of the cause 7 * is properly set out ; as any mistake * 923 
 in this particular may be fatal to the depositions. 1 The reason of 
 requiring this particularity, in the title, is the impossibility there would 
 be of maintaining an indictment for perjury, if such variance between 
 the title of the cause and that of the interrogatories should appear. 
 
 It is usual to prefix, to all interrogatories, a general inquiry "as to the 
 witness's knowledge of the parties, and the time when the witness first 
 became acquainted with each," &c. Orders appear to have formerly 
 been promulgated by the Court to restrict this practice, by which it is 
 directed " that the articles which are usually thrust into the beginning 
 of every schedule of interrogatories, as it were of form, or course, 
 touching the witness's knowledge of the parties, plaintiffs or defendants, 
 of the lands, towns, and places in the pleadings, and the like, be not so 
 needlessly used as they are ; " 2 but, notwithstanding this order, the 
 practice of introducing a general inquiry of this nature is almost invari- 
 ably resorted to. 3 
 
 The interrogatories are broken into distinct interrogatories, according 
 to the subject-matter or the witnesses to be examined, but each inter- 
 rogatory concludes with the following words : " Declare the truth of the 
 several matters in this interrogatory inquired after, according to the 
 best of your knowledge, remembrance, and belief." These words, how- 
 ever, are mere matter of form, and are not generally inserted in the 
 draft, but are supplied in the engrossment. 
 
 It has frequently happened, that, in framing the interrogatories, some 
 point to which it is important that a witness should depose has been 
 omitted ; or else it has been found that a witness is capable of deposing 
 as to some matter as to which it was not, at the time, known that any 
 witness could speak, in consequence of which, evidence which would be 
 important to the party would be omitted, from the circumstance of no 
 question being addressed to the witness calculated to elicit it ; it there- 
 
 4 Cox v. Worthington, 2 Atk. 236. 1 Thus, where the plaintiff's Christian name 
 
 5 White v. Fussell, 19 Ves. 113; see Pynccnt was mistaken in the title of the interrogatories, 
 v. Pyncent, 3 Atk. 557. the depositions could not be read, nor would the 
 
 6 Jeffris v. Whittuck, 2 Price, 486; but see Court permit the title to be amended, though 
 Ashton v. Ashton, 1 Vera. 165; 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. most of the witnesses had, since their cxamina- 
 41, S. C tion, gone to sea. White v. Taj-lor, 2 Vern. 
 
 7 Jones v. Smith, 2 Y. & C. 42; Lincoln v. 435. 
 
 Wright, 4 Beav. 166; Pritchard v. Foulkes, 2 2 Beames's Ord. 71. 
 
 Beav. 133. 3 Greslev, Eq. Ev. (Am. ed.) 48, 49. 
 
 921
 
 * 924 EVIDENCE. 
 
 fore became the practice to add to eacli set of interrogatories a general 
 interrogatory calling upon the witness to state whether he knew or 
 could set forth any matter or thing which might in anywise tend to the 
 benefit or advantage of the party for whom he appeared, other than 
 what he had been interrogated to ? And the witness, being ex- 
 
 * 924 amined upon * this interrogatory, then stated whatever matter he 
 
 had to prove, to which no special interrogatory had been addressed. 
 This form has, however, been altered ; and now, by the 32d Order, of 
 December, 1833, it has been directed " that the last interrogatory now 
 commonly in use be in future altered, and shall stand and be in the 
 words or to the effect following: Do you know or can you set forth 
 any other matter or thing which may be of benefit or advantage to 
 the parties at issue in this cause, or either of them, or that may be mate- 
 rial to the subject of this your examination, or to the matters in question 
 in this cause ? If yea, set forth the same fully and at large in your 
 answer." 1 
 
 But although the order directs where a general interrogatory of the 
 nature of that formerly used as the last, is made use of, the form shall 
 be that prescribed, it does not compel a party to use it. 2 So that it is 
 optional with the draftsman to insert a general interrogatory or not. 
 Where, however, he does insert one, it must be in the form prescribed 
 by the 32d Order, otherwise the deposition taken upon it may be sup- 
 pressed upon motion. 3 
 
 The interrogatories being drawn and signed by counsel, must be 
 copied upon parchment, and, if intended for the examination of wit- 
 nesses in London, or within twenty miles of it, they must be left with 
 one of the Examiners of the Court, which is termed filing interroga- 
 tories ; 4 but if any of the witnesses are to be examined by commission, 
 the plaintiff should file, with the Examiner, such interrogatories only 
 as apply to witnesses resident within the jurisdiction of the Examiner's 
 
 office. 5 
 
 The practice is, to draw all the original interrogatories exhibited on 
 behalf of one party in one set or schedule, leaving the selection of 
 such as are proper for the particular witnesses to the solicitor, 6 and 
 where some of the witnesses of a party reside in London, and some in 
 the country, it is necessary to have one set of interrogatories only drawn 
 by counsel ; and the solicitor, in procuring the same to be engrossed, 
 distinguishes and copies those intended for the examination of town 
 witnesses, separately from those intended for country witnesses. 
 
 If the interrogatories are to be exhibited in the Examiner's office, 
 and witnesses are examined thereon, either party may, without appli- 
 cation to the Court or order for that purpose, exhibit one or more inter- 
 
 i Tins last interrogatory is the same as that 2 Gover r. Lucas, 8 Sim. 200. 
 
 adopted by the U. S. Supreme Court in the 71st 3 Ibid. 
 
 Equity Rule. See post, p. 2393; Gresley, Eq. M T. & V. 191. 
 
 Ev. (Am. ed.) 49. It is a fatal defect if this 5 Ibid.; Hinde, 320, n. 
 
 general interrogatory does not appear to be an- 6 See Beames's Ord. 71. 
 swered. Richardson f. Golden. 3 Wash. C. C. 
 103; Dodge v. Israel, i Wash. C. C 323. 
 
 922 

 
 EXAMINATION BY EXAMINER ON INTERROGATORIES. 
 
 *926 
 
 rogatories, or a new set of interrogatories for the further* exami- * 925 
 nation of the same or other witnesses. 1 But when a commission 
 is taken out, the practice has been different. 2 
 
 Under the former practice, where additional interrogatories were re- 
 quired to be exhibited after the commission had been opened, an order for 
 that purpose must have been obtained. 3 
 
 Yet, although a commission has been issued, and the parties have 
 joined in it, and witnesses have been examined, new interrogatories may 
 be exhibited into Court (i. e. before the Examiner), for the examination 
 of new witnesses at any time before publication ; 4 but if a witness has 
 been examined by commissioners in the country, he cannot be examined 
 again before the Examiner, without a special order. 5 
 
 Interrogatories for the cross-examination of witnesses differ very 
 little in form from original interrogatories ; they may be filed * with * 926 
 the Examiner who examines in chief. 1 formerly this could not be 
 done without a special order. 2 
 
 Section XIII. — Of the Examination of Witnesses by the Examiner on 
 
 Interrogator ies. z 
 
 Witnesses in Chancery are examined either by an Examiner or by 
 commissioners specially appointed for that purpose by commission under 
 the Great Seal. 4 
 
 The first thing to be done by the party intending to examine witnesses 
 
 i Smith, Ch. Pr. (ed. 1838) •'354. 
 
 2 In Campbell v. Scongal, 19 Ves. 552, it was 
 represented at the bar, that the practice in 
 country causes is to feed the commissioners 
 from time to time with interrogatories for the 
 examination, as they can be presented either 
 for original or cross-examination, until the com- 
 missioners find that the supply of witnesses is 
 exhausted; and although Lord EI don observes 
 that there was no doubt that, of late, interroga- 
 tories had been sent down into the country, 
 from time to time, as often as prudence required, 
 and were returned, and that the Court had acted 
 upon examination so taken and returned, yet 
 his Lordship said the practice was not so for- 
 merly, and that lie had frequently, when at the 
 bar, drawn interrogatories guessing at what any 
 witness to be examined to any fact in issue, 
 could possibly represent, and that the interrog- 
 atories, both for the cross-examination and for 
 the original examination of the defendants' 
 witnesses, were prepared before the commis- 
 sion was opened : and, notwithstanding the rep- 
 resentation made at the bar, the practice of 
 the Court appears to have been in conformity 
 with his Lordship's recollection. Indeed it ob- 
 viously must have been so, from the nature of 
 the oath which was administered to the com- 
 missioners, which was limited to the examina- 
 
 tion of witnesses upon the interrogatories — 
 "now (i. e., at the time of administering the 
 oath) produced and left with you." This 
 word li now" has been left out of the oath 
 hereafter to be administered to the commis- 
 sioners, under the 104th Order of May, 1845; 
 whether, therefore, hereafter new interroga- 
 tories may be exhibited before a commission, 
 remains to be seen. 
 
 3 Carter v. Draper, 2 Sim. 53; King of 
 Hanover v. Wheatley, 4 Beav. 78. 
 
 4 Lewis r. Owen, 1 Dick. 6 ; Beames's Ord. 
 96, S. C. : Hinde, 333. 
 
 5 Hinde, 333. 
 
 i Ord. 26, 1833. 
 
 2 Turner v. Burleigh, 17 Ves. 354. 
 
 3 By the 78th Chancery Rnle in New Jersey, 
 when any cause shall be at issue, &c, it shall 
 be the duty of the parties to proceed and ex- 
 amine their witnesses within a reasonable time 
 thereafter; and on a notice for the examination 
 of witnesses given by either party, both parties 
 may produce and examine their witnesses ; but 
 the Examiner, if required so to do, shall first 
 examine the witnesses of the party who first 
 gave notice. 
 
 4 In the U. S. Courts the commissioner or 
 commissioners shall be named by the Court or 
 a Judge thereof in all cases. Equity Rule 67. 
 
 923
 
 * 927 EVIDENCE. 
 
 before the Examiner is to file his interrogatories, or such of them as 
 apply to the witnesses to be examined, in the manner before pointed 
 out. 5 He must then procure the attendance of his witnesses at the 
 Examiner's office ; for which purpose he ought to fix a day with the 
 Examiner, when he will be able to examine them, and to give notice of 
 such day to the witnesses. 6 
 
 If the witness be in prison, his situation must be represented to the 
 Examiner, who will fix a day for attending at the prison to swear and 
 examine the witness. The Examiner (with whom the interrogatories for 
 the examination of such witness should have been previously left) will 
 then proceed to the prison, taking the interrogatories with him, and, the 
 witness being sworn thereto in the common form, the examination is 
 taken in the usual manner, and the depositions and interrogatories are 
 returned by the examiner to the office, to be kept, as in ordinary cases, 
 until publication pass in the cause. 7 
 
 In like manner, if a witness be incapable, by reason of sickness, of 
 
 attending at the Examiner's office to be examined, and it is not thought 
 
 necessary to sue out a commission to take his examination, the 
 
 * 927 Examiner may go to the place of the witness's residence *and 
 
 administer the oath and take the deposition of the witness. 1 In 
 either of the above cases notice must be given in the usual manner to the 
 other party of the time and place of examination. 
 
 The form of the oath administered to witnesses in Chancery is as 
 follows : — 
 
 ''You shall true answer make to all such questions as shall be asked 
 of you on these interrogatories, without favor or affection to either party, 
 and therein you shall speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
 the truth. So help you God." 
 
 After the witness has been sworn to the interrogatories, & jurat stating 
 the producing and swearing of the witness to the interrogatories, with his 
 name, and the day and year when sworn, is inscribed upon the interroga- 
 tories, and signed by the Examiner. 2 If, after the witness has been 
 sworn, any alteration is made in the title, or any part of the interroga- 
 tories, they must be re-sworn, but not re-produced. 3 
 
 "When new interrogatories are added, the witness must be sworn to 
 them in the same form. 
 
 Before the witnesses are examined, the Examiner ought to be, and 
 generally is, furnished with instructions as to which of the interroga- 
 tories each witness is to be examined upon. The solicitor also supplies 
 
 6 Supra, p. 914. was necessary that the Master should go to the 
 
 6 Notice that witnesses will be examined at a prison, as well as the Examiner, for the purpose 
 
 particular tavern in a city named in the notice, of administering the oath. Hinde, 330. 
 without naming the Christian name of the * An order for this purpose seems to be 
 
 tavern-keeper, is good, unless it is shown that necessary. See Anon. 4 Mad. 463. Sed quart, 
 
 there were in the same city two tavern-keepers if the Examiner is willing to go without an 
 
 of the same surname. Overstreet v. Thompson, order. 
 1 Litt. 120. An irregularity in the service of - Hinde, 322. 
 
 notice of examination will be considered as 3 See Mr. Plumer's return of the duties of 
 
 waived by a neglect to complain of it in due Examiners to the Chancery Commission, Chan, 
 
 season. Skinner v. Dayton, 5 John. Ch. 191. Rep. Appx. B. No. 22, p. 542. 
 1 Before the Stat. 3*& 4 Will. IV. c. 94, it 
 
 924
 
 EXAMINATION BY EXAMINER ON INTERROGATORIES. * 928 
 
 a minute of the evidence he expects his witness to give ; but of such 
 minute no use can be made in the examination. 4 
 
 After the examination is begun, the Examiner ought not to confer with 
 either party touching the examination, or take new instructions respect- 
 ing the same. 5 
 
 With respect to the method of examining a witness, 6 Lord Clarendon's 
 orders, which have been before referred to, direct, that " the Examiner 
 is to examine the deponent to the interrogatories directed seriatim, and 
 not to permit him to read over, or hear read, any other interrogatories, 
 until that in hand be fully finished ; much less is he to suffer the depo- 
 nent to have the interrogatories, and pen his own depositions, or depart 
 after he hath heard an interrogatory read over, until he hath perfected his 
 examination thereunto. And if any witness shall refuse so to conform 
 himself, the Examiner is thereof to give notice to the clerk of the 
 other * side, and to proceed no further in his examination without * 928 
 the consent of the said clerk, or order made in Court to warrant 
 his so doing." l The same Orders afterwards direct that " the Examiners, 
 in whom the Court reposeth much confidence, are themselves in person 
 to be diligent in examination of witnesses, and not to intrust the same 
 to mean and inferior clerks, and are to take care and hold the witness to 
 the point interrogated, and not to run into extravagances and matters not 
 pertinent to the question." 2 Moreover, they are not to " use any idle 
 repetitions, or needless circumstances, nor set down any answer to a ques- 
 tion to which the examinant cannot depose other than thus, — ' To such an 
 interrogatory this examinant cannot depose ; ' and in case such imperti- 
 nencies be observed by the Court, the Examiner is to recompence the 
 charge thereof to the party grieved, as the Court shall award." 3 
 
 " The Examiner is not strictly bound to the letter of the interrogatories, 
 but ought to explain every matter or thing which ariseth necessarily 
 thereupon ; 4 and forasmuch as the witness, by his oath, which is so 
 sacred, calleth Almighty God (who is truth itself, and cannot be deceived, 
 and hath knowledge of the secrets of the heart) to witness that which he 
 shall depose, it is the duty of the Examiner gravely, temperately, and 
 leisurely to take the depositions of witnesses, without any menace, dis- 
 turbance, or interruption of them in hinderance of the truth." 5 
 
 The Examiner, having read an interrogatory to the witness, takes down 
 the answer in writing upon paper, concluding the answer to each inter- 
 rogatory before the following one is put. 
 
 A witness may be permitted to use such short notes as he brings with 
 him to refresh his memory, but not the substance of his depositions ; nor 
 
 4 Mr. Plumer's statement, ubi suprn. i Beames's Ord. 187; see Hickok v. Farmers 
 
 6 Hinde, .325; 4 Inst. 278. and Mechanics' Bank, 35 Vt. 476. 
 6 In the U. S. Courts, these examinations 2 Ibid. 188. 
 
 may now be conducted orally, and the testimony 3 Ibid. 190. 
 
 taken down in writing by the Examiner, the 4 Hinde, 325; 4 Inst. 278; see also Peacock's 
 
 examination and cross-examination to be con- case, 9 Rep. 70. 
 
 ducted in the mode pursued in Common Law 6 Hinde, 325 ; 4 Inst. 278. 
 
 Courts. Ante, p. 905, note; IJ. S. Courts, Equity 
 
 Rule 67, post p. 2391. In Massachusetts, see 
 
 Pingree v. Coffin, 12 Cush. 600. 
 
 925
 
 
 * 930 EVIDENCE. 
 
 may he transcribe such notes verbatim* The rule at Law is, in this 
 respect, the same. 7 
 
 * 929 * In order to secure the statement of the evidence upon the depo- 
 
 sitions in the very words of the witness, the Stat. 3 & 4 Will. IV. 
 c. 94, § 27, has enacted that all depositions of witnesses examined in the 
 High Court of Chancery are to be taken in the first person ; formerly the 
 practice was to take them in the third person. 1 
 
 If a witness to be examined does not understand English, an order 
 should be obtained to appoint an interpreter to interpret the interroga- 
 tories and depositions. 2 The person so appointed must be sworn to 
 interpret truly, and the depositions of the witnesses are to be taken 
 down by the Examiner, from the interpretation, in English. 3 It was 
 Lord Nottingham who established the rule that "no alien should be ex- 
 amined as a witness without a motion first made in Court to swear an 
 interpreter, that the other side might know him, and take exceptions to 
 the interpreter." 4 
 
 When all the interrogatories, upon which the Examiner has been in- 
 structed to examine the witness, have been gone through, the Examiner 
 carefully reads over the whole deposition to the witness, who, if he be 
 satisfied with it, signs each sheet of it in the presence of the Examiner. 
 
 If the witness wishes to vary his testimony, or to make any alteration 
 in or addition to it, he must do so before signing the deposition ; for, by 
 an order of the Court, when witnesses are examined in Court, they are 
 to perfect and subscribe their depositions to such interrogatories as they 
 have answered, before they depart from the Examiner or his deputy ; 
 and they are not to be permitted to make any alteration thereof 
 
 * 930 at any time thereafter * without leave of the Court, unless it be 
 
 in some circumstance of time or the like, or for making perfect 
 
 6 Curs. Cane. 260; ante, p. 906, note. it; and that it was, therefore, no more than an 
 
 7 In an anonymous case in Ambler's Reports, affidavit. See Phil. & Amos, 891 ; see Hickok 
 p. 252, Lord Hardwicke said "that, at Law, a v. Farmers and Mechanics' Bank, 35 Vt. 476; 
 witness is allowed to refresh his memory by see also Shaw v. Lindsey, 15 Ves. 380; Ferry 
 notes as to dates and names, because there is v. Fisher, cited id. 382; Phil. & Amos, 896: St. 
 nothing to guide the memory as to them; but Catherine Dock Co. v. Mahtzgu, 1 Col. 94; see 
 he never knew a Court of Law admit the whole Hickok v. Farmers and Mechanics' Dank, 35 
 evidence to be given from writing. There is no Vt. 476; ante, p. 906, note. 
 
 certain rule how far evidence may be given 1 By Chancery Rule 92, in New Jersey, the 
 from notes; some Judges had thought, and he Examiner shall number each page of the ex- 
 was (he said) inclined the same way, that the animation taken by him, and also every tenth 
 witness might speak from notes which were line of the same, leaving sufficient margin for 
 taken at the time of the transaction in question, the purpose; and where more than one witness 
 but not if they were written afterwards." is examined, he shall annex a separate leaf to 
 In that case, a motion was made to suppress the examination, containing a list of the names 
 a deposition taken before commissioners, be- of the witnesses, and a reference to the pages 
 cause the attorney for the plaintiff had written on which their examination respectively corn- 
 down the whole in the exact form of the depo- mences; and no costs are to be taxed for any 
 sition before it was taken; and, though it ap- examination where this rule is not strictly com- 
 peared that the witness had told him the facts plied with. 
 
 and circumstances mentioned in it, yet his 2 See Gilpins v. Consequa, 1 Peters, C. C. 
 
 Lordship said it would be of dangerous tend- 85; A mory v. Fellows, 5 Mass. 219. 
 ency to permit it to be read; for in deposi- 3 Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 1 Dick. 103; see 
 
 tions it is natural to state the evidence as given also Lord Belmore v. Anderson, 2 Cox, 288, 
 
 by the witnesses, but that, in the case in ques- and 4 Bro. C. C. 90, S. C. 
 tion, the attorney had methodized and worded 4 2 Swanst. 201, n. 
 
 926
 
 EXAMINATION BY EXAMINER ON INTERROGATORIES. 
 
 *930 
 
 of a sum upon view of any deed, book, or writing, which the witness 
 shall show to the Examiner before he permits such alteration. 1 
 
 It is to be noticed, that the signature of a witness to his examination 
 is absolutely necessary, and that if a witness should die after his exam- 
 ination is completed, but before it is signed, the deposition cannot be 
 made use of. 2 It seems, however, that if a witness, having signed his 
 examination in chief, dies before he is cross-examined, his depositions 
 may be read as evidence ; the Court, however, bearing in mind the fact 
 that the cross-examination has not taken effect, especially if it should 
 appear that the party had lost any material fact which was within the 
 knowledge of the witness, and could not have been proved by other 
 means. 3 
 
 If a witness refuses to be cross-examined, his deposition cannot be read. 4 
 By the 26th of the Orders of 1828, 5 the Examiner who takes the ex- 
 amination in chief is at liberty to take his cross-examination also ; before 
 that time, the cross-examination of a witness was taken before a differ- 
 ent Examiner from the one who examined him in chief; 6 a practice 
 which appears to have been sanctioned by the Stat. 50 Geo. III. c. 8, by 
 which it was directed that, the witnesses on different sides of the same 
 cause should (if the same was practicable) be examined by different 
 Examiners. 7 
 
 1 Beames's Ord. 74. A witness may ex- 
 plain or correct a mistake made by him at any- 
 time before his examination is finally closed; 
 but no part of his testimony, previously reduced 
 to writing, can be erased or altered. 1 Hoff. 
 Ch. Pr. 463. Under the former practice in 
 Chancery in New York, amendments of testi- 
 mony were allowed in open Court, after publi- 
 cation and at the hearing, on an allegation of 
 mistake in taking down the testimony. Denton 
 v. Jackson. 1 John. Ch. 526. So a re-examina- 
 tion has been allowed on the affidavit of the 
 witness that his testimony in material parts was 
 not truly taken down. Kingston v. Tappen, 
 1 John. Ch. 368. The existence of the mistake 
 ought to be made out to the perfect satisfaction 
 of the Chancellor. Gray V. Murray, 4 John. 
 Ch. 413; see Hallock v. Smith, 4 John. Ch. 649; 
 Newman v. Kendall, 2 A. K. Marsh. 236. A 
 witness examined while incompetent, by reason 
 of interest, may be re-examined after his com- 
 petency is restored. Haddix v . Haddix, 5 Litt. 
 202; see Dunham v. Winans, 2 Paige, 24. 
 
 2 Copeland v. Stanton, 1 P. Wms. 414; 
 Flavell v. Flavell, 20 N. J. Eq. 211. The signa- 
 ture of the witness seems not to be held neces- 
 sary to a deposition in many of the States; see 
 Moulson v. Hargrave, 1 Serg. & R. 201 ; Mobley 
 v. Hamit, 1 A. K. Marsh. 590; Rutherford v. 
 Nelson, 1 Hayw. 105; Barnett v. Watson, 1 
 Wash. 372; Wiggins v. Pryor, 3 Porter, 430; 
 ante, p. 904, n. 9; p. 918, note. 
 
 3 O'Callaghan v. Murphy, 2 S. & L. 158; 
 Arundel v. Arundel, 1 Rep. Ch. 90; Nolan v. 
 Shannon, 1 Molloy, 157. A witness became 
 
 interested by a death while under examination. 
 The death occurred during his cross, but before 
 further direct, examination. The Court allowed 
 the deposition to stand so as to embrace the 
 direct and cross-examination, but struck out 
 the further direct. Fream v. Dickinson, 3 Edw. 
 Ch. 300. 
 
 i Prac. Reg. The testimony of the witness 
 is complete, so far as the party calling him is 
 concerned, when the direct examination is 
 finished and signed by the witness; but the 
 party calling him is bound to keep the witness 
 before the Examiner a sufficient length of time 
 afterwards to enable the adverse party to com- 
 plete the examination, or the deposition may 
 be suppressed. Watertown v. Cowen, 5 Paige, 
 510. 
 
 In Courtenay v. Hoskins, 2 Russ. 253, Lord 
 Eldon held that if the witness appeared for 
 cross-examination and refused to answer, his 
 direct examination should not be suppressed, 
 because it was in the power of the party wishing 
 to cross-examine to compel him to answer. 
 And see Goss V. Stinson, 3 Sumn. 98, where 
 there was great delay in cross-examining, and 
 the examination in chief was heard although 
 the witness had in the mean time died. See 
 also Flavell v. Flavell, 20 N.J. Eq. 211. But if 
 the witness secrete himself, the deposition may 
 be suppressed. Flowerday v. Collet, 1 Dick. 
 288. 
 
 6 Ord. 1828. 
 
 6 See Troup v. Haight, 6 John. Ch. 335. 
 
 7 Turner v. Burleigh, 17 Yes. 354. 
 
 927
 
 * 932 EVIDENCE. 
 
 We have seen before, that, previously to the examination of a 
 witness, a notice in writing of the name and description of the 
 
 * 931 * witness is to be served upon the adverse solicitor. The object 
 
 of this notice is, that in case the adverse party shall have occasion 
 to cross-examine the witness, he may have an opportunity of doing so. 
 The cross-interrogatories ought to be filed before the examination in chief 
 is completed ; and if they are so filed, the party producing the witness is 
 obliged to procure him to stay or return to be examined. 1 
 
 Where the interrogatories for cross-examining a witness are not filed, 
 or the witness is not required to be cross-examined whilst he is under 
 original examination, but is allowed to depart about his business, the 
 party who intends to cross-examine that witness must procure his ex- 
 amination in the best manner he can : the adverse party is not bound to 
 produce him again ; but as it is usual after the witness is sworn, if he be 
 resident in London, for the Examiner to appoint some other day for 
 him to attend to be examined, 2 the party intending to cross-examine has 
 generally sufficient opportunity to prepare and file his interrogatories. 
 In the mean time, however, to prevent the examination being taken 
 without the cross-examination, a note in writing may be stuck up in the 
 Examiner's office, that if such a person comes to be examined in such a 
 cause, let him be cross-examined. 8 
 
 If a witness refuses to attend to be cross-examined, an application 
 may be made to the Court (it is presumed in the same manner already 
 pointed out in the case of a witness refusing to be examined in chief), 4 
 which will compel the witness to do what the party has a right to require 
 of him. 5 
 
 Some doubt appears to exist whether a subpoena will lie to compel a 
 witness to attend for the purpose of being cross-examined. 
 
 If a party examining a witness does not allow a sufficient time for 
 cross-examination before the time for passing publication expires, and 
 cross-interrogatories are left, such party must either enlarge publication, 
 or the deposition will be suppressed. 6 
 
 * 932 * A witness who is cross-examined must be sworn to the cross- 
 
 interrogatories as well as to the original interrogatories. 
 Under the practice, before the Orders of May, 1845, came into opera- 
 tion, where the Examiner was served with a copy of a rule to pass pub- 
 lication, he could not, after the day fixed by such rule for passing pub- 
 lication, examine any more witnesses, even though the witnesses had 
 been already sworn, 1 unless he was served with an order to enlarge 
 
 1 Hinde, 323. time appointed to the witness, and also to the 
 
 2 Hinde. 323. The depositions, however, solicitor of the party producing the witness." 
 always bear date the day of the swearing. It appears from this case, that if the party intend- 
 
 3 Hinde, 323. In Keymer v. Pering, 10 ing to cross-examine neglects to make the ap- 
 Sim. 179, it is stated that " the practice of the pointment, he loses the right to cross-examine. 
 Examiner's office is, that where a party pro- 4 Ante, p. 926. 
 
 duces a witness to be examined by one of the 6 Courtenay v. Hoskins, 2 Russ. 253. 
 
 Examiners, the opposite party having notice, 6 1 Smith's Ch. Pr. (3d ed.) 476; and see 
 
 and intending to cross-examine the witness, Keymer v. Pering, 10 Sim. 179; ante, p. 931, 
 
 makes an appointment with the other Examiner note, 
 
 for that purpose, and then gives notice of the 1 Beames's Ord. 73, 186. 
 
 928
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES DE BENE ESSE. * 933 
 
 publication ; in which case either party might examine his witnesses as 
 long as the publication continued enlarged. 2 Where, however, a wit- 
 ness was examined, by mistake, two days after publication had passed, 
 and was cross-examined by the defendant, the Court would not suppress 
 the deposition. 8 Now, as we have seen, publication passes without rule 
 at the expiration of two months after the filing of the replication, unless 
 such time expires in the long vacation, or is enlarged by order. It is 
 presumed, that, under the present practice, any examination of witnesses 
 after the time for publication has arrived, will be irregular, whether notice 
 be served upon the Examiner or not. 4 
 
 Section XIV. — Examination of Witnesses de bene esse. 
 
 The Court of Chancery, in its original institution, participated much 
 in the practice adopted by the Courts of Civil Law. The civilians had 
 a manner of examining witness, in perpetuam rei memoriam, which 
 was twofold, — either the common examination, or in 'meliori forma. The 
 common examination was where the witnesses were very old and infirm, 
 sick, in danger of death, or were going into distant countries. In this 
 case it was usual to file a libel, and, without staying for the litis con- 
 testation the plaintiff examined his witnesses, immediately giving notice 
 if it were possible to the other side of the time and place of the ex- 
 amination, that that party might come and cross-examine such witnesses, 
 if he thought fit; and these depositions stood good in case the witnesses 
 died, or went abroad ; but the plaintiff was obliged edere actionem within a 
 year : otherwise, these depositions went for nothing. If the witnesses 
 lived, or did not go abroad into distant countries, then they were to be 
 examined post litem contestatam. 5 The examination in perpetuam 
 rei memoriam in meliori forma was ad transumenda * instrumenta : # 933 
 and in that case there must have been a litis contestatio before the 
 examination ; because there was no need of so much celerity in proving 
 the instruments as there was where the witnesses were likely to die, or 
 were going into remote parts. In these cases, the plaintiff was not 
 bound to proceed in any action upon those instruments within the year. 
 But in both cases it seems that publicatio testium took place, when the 
 judgment was begun before the ordinary Judge, or, which is the same 
 thing, when there was a litis contestatio. 1 The examination, in perpetuam 
 rei memoriam in meliori forma, has been adopted by the Court of Chan- 
 cery ; and the practice with regard to it will be considered when we 
 treat of suits instituted for the purpose of perpetuating the testimony 
 of witnesses. 2 The common examination in perpetuam rei memoriam 
 has likewise been adopted by Courts of Equity, in their practice of 
 
 2 Anon. 1 Vern. 253. Examiner, if necessary, after the expiration of 
 
 3 Hamond V. , 1 Dick. 50. such time, and until an order to close the proofs 
 
 4 In the case of Green v. Wheeler, decided is actually entered. 
 
 in New York Chancery, Aug. 16, 1842,Ch. Wal- 6 Gilb. For. Rom. 118, 119 ; Hinde. 365. 
 
 worth held, that where an examination of wit- ' Gilb. For. Rom. 118: Hinde, 365. 
 
 nesses is commenced before the time for taking 2 See7?o^, Chap. XXXIV. § 4, Bills to Per- 
 
 testimony expires, it may be continued by the petuate Testimony. 
 
 vol. i. -59 929
 
 ♦934 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 examining witnesses de bene esse ; 3 which forms the subject of the 
 present section, (a) 
 
 The examination of a witness de bene esse ordinarily takes place : 
 where there is clanger of losing the testimony of an important witness 
 from death, by reason of age, as where the witness is seventy years old 
 and upwards ; 4 (b) or dangerous illness ; 5 or where he is about to go 
 abroad : 6 or where he is the only witness to an important fact. 7 In 
 such cases the Court, to prevent the party from being deprived of the 
 benefit of his evidence, will permit his depositions to be taken before the 
 cause is at issue, in order that, if the witness die, or be not forthcoming 
 to be examined after issue joined, the depositions so taken may be used 
 at the hearing. 8 (c) 
 
 The examination of a witness de bene esse may be incidental to 
 * 934 * every suit ; whereas the examination for the purpose of per- 
 petuating the testimony is the fruit of a suit instituted for that 
 
 3 Hinde, 368. 
 
 4 Rowe v. , 13 Ves. 261 ; Forbes v. 
 
 Forbes, 9 Hare, 461, where the witness was a 
 party to the cause. Lingan v. Henderson, 1 
 Bland, 238; Ails v. Subiit, 3 Bibb, 204. 
 
 s Bellamy v. Jones, 8 Ves. 31 ; see Clark v. 
 Dibble, 16 Wend. 601. 
 
 6 Bown v. Child, 3 Sim. 457; Grove v. 
 Young, 3 De G. & S. 397 : 13 Jur. 847 ; MTntosh 
 ». Great Western Ry. Co. 1 Hare, 328. Where 
 a witness is about to depart from the State, to 
 reside abroad, the Court, on petition, verified 
 by affidavit and motion for the purpose, will 
 order him to be examined de bene esse, without 
 previous notice of the motion. Rockwell v. 
 Folsom, 4 John. Ch. 165. In South Carolina, 
 an attorney, prevented from being a witness by 
 
 (a) The Federal Courts are governed in this 
 matter by U. S. Rev. Stats. §§ 863-866. See 
 Richter v. Union Trust Co. 115 U. S. 55 ; 25 
 Fed. Rep. 679 ; Gormley v. Bunyan, 138 U. S. 
 623; United States v. Pings, 4 Fed. Rep. 714; 
 New York & B. C. P. Co. v. New York C. P. 
 Co. 9 id. 578 : Bischoffsheim r. Baltzer, 10 id. 1 ; 
 United States v. Wilder, 14 id. 393; United 
 States r. Cameron, 15 id. 794; Re Rindskopf, 
 24 id. 542; Stegner v. Blake, 36 id. 183; The 
 Normandie, 40 id. 590; Uhle v. Burnham, 44 
 id. 729; Re Allis, id. 216; First Nat. Bank v. 
 Forest, id. 246: United States v. Horn Hing, 
 
 48 id. 635; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Reese, 56 id. 
 288; see also Danforth v. Bangor, 85 Maine, 
 423; Matthews v. Herdtfelder, 60 Hun, 521; 
 United States r. Tilden, 10 Ben. 566; Meyer v. 
 Campbell, 20 N. Y. S. 705; Redding r. Wright, 
 
 49 Minn. 322; Grace v. Nesbit, 109 Mo. 9; 
 Roberts v. Kendall, 3 Ind. App. 399. If the 
 deponent attends the trial and is able to testify, 
 though living at a distance, such deposition 
 cannot be read at the trial. Whitford v. Clark 
 Count v, 119 U. S. 522; see Ihl v. St. Joseph 
 
 930 
 
 duties in another Court, may be examined de 
 bene esse, by commission. Huffman r. Bark- 
 ley, 1 Bailey, 34. So if the witness is going 
 from one State to another. Story, Eq. PI. § 308. 
 
 7 Shirley v. Earl Ferrers, 3 P. Wins. 77; 
 Pearson v. Ward, 2 Dick. 648; Hankin v. Mid- 
 dleditch, 2 Bro. C. C. 641 ; Brydges v. Hatch, 1 
 Cox, 423. In Earl of Cholmondely v. Earl of 
 Orford, 4 Bro. C. C. 157, two witnesses were 
 ordered to be examined de bene esse ; being the 
 only persons who knew the material facts. 
 
 8 Hinde, 368; Gilb. For. Rom. 140; 2 Phil. 
 Ev. (Cowen & Hill's notes) n. (42), pp. 38 and 
 39, and cases cited; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 1513- 
 1510 ; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 307, 310. See now R. 
 S. C. Ord. XXXVII. 4. See the 70th U. S. 
 Equity Rule, post, p. 2393. 
 
 Bank, 26 Mo. App. 129; McLaurin v. Wilson, 
 16 S. C. 402: Earnhardt v. Smith, 86 N. C. 
 473; Light v. Governor, 58 L. T. 25. Deposi- 
 tions of witnesses in a foreign country are to be 
 taken, not under § 863, but by commission. 
 Cortes Co. v. Tannhauser, 21 Blatch. 552; 18 
 Fed. Rep. 667. 
 
 (b) Though such age is generally good 
 prima facie ground for ordering the witness's 
 examination de bene esse, this will not neces- 
 sarily be done in an extraordinary case, as for 
 the examination of thirty witnesses. Bidder v. 
 Bridges, 26 Ch. D. 1. 
 
 (c) At the trial, before the deposition of a 
 witness who was dangerously ill can be used in 
 evidence, it must be proved that the witness is 
 not then capable of being examined. Barton v. 
 North Staffordshire Ry. Co. 56 L. T. 601, 
 where Kay J. disapproved the form of order in 
 Seton on Decrees (4th ed.). 1635. See Richter 
 v. Jerome, 25 Fed. Rep. 679; Johnson v. Arn- 
 wine, 42 X. J. Eq. 451 ; Sax v. Davis, 71 Iowa, 
 406 ; Hall v. Stout, 4 Del. Ch. 269.
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES DE BENE ESSE * 935 
 
 particular purpose. It may even be incidental to a suit to perpetuate 
 testimony, where there is danger of the evidence of the witnesses, whose 
 testimony is intended to be perpetuated, being lost before the suit for 
 perpetuating is ripe for a regular examination. 1 
 
 In general, the Court will not allow the examination of a witness de 
 bene esse after the closing of the evidence ; 2 and, therefore, where upon 
 a hearing, an issue had been directed, and an order made that the depo- 
 sitions of the plaintiff's witnesses might be read at the trial, in case 
 such witnesses, or either of them, should be dead, an application which 
 was afterwards made that the trial should be postponed, and that the 
 plaintiff should be at liberty to examine another witness de bene esse, was 
 refused. 3 It seems, however, that where a witness, who has not been 
 before examined in this Court, has been produced at a trial at Law, and 
 another trial of the same matter is to be had, the Court will entertain a 
 motion for the examination of such witness de bene esse, with a view to 
 such second trial. 4 And so, after the trial of an issue in the cause, an 
 application on the part of the plaintiff, for liberty to examine a witness, 
 who was above seventy years old, de bene esse, for the purpose of secur- 
 ing his testimony in case of his death, upon the ground that it was 
 intended to move for a new trial, was granted. 5 
 
 Sometimes it is required to examine a witness de bene esse, either in 
 support of, or in defence to, an action at Law ; in such case, it was 
 formerly necessary that a bill should be filed in this Court, with the 
 proper affidavit annexed to it, praying specifically that the witness might 
 be examined de bene esse; 6 and this may still be done, although the 
 Courts of Law have now power themselves to take such evidence. 7 An 
 order of this nature in aid of a proceeding at Law cannot be obtained 
 upon a bill filed for any other purpose ; and where a bill was filed 
 for a commission to examine witnesses abroad in aid of a trial at Law, 
 and a commission had been sent out accordingly, but, before 
 * it reached its destination, one of the witnesses returned to Eng- * ( J.'5.j 
 land, whereupon an application was made for leave to examine 
 him de bene esse, upon the ground that he was about to leave the country 
 again before the trial could be had, the motion was refused, the Court 
 observing that this was a different relief, and that the bill must be 
 amended. 1 
 
 The cases in which an order will be made for the examination of wit- 
 nesses de bene esse are not confined to those of age or sickness, or in 
 which the witness is the only person who can speak to the fact intended 
 to be proved. The Court will give permission for such an examination 
 of witnesses in other cases which come within the same principle ; indeed 
 it will do so, wherever the justice of the case appears to require it. 2 The 
 
 1 Frere v. Green, 19 Ves. 310 ; Campbell 116; Andrews t'. Palmer, 1 V. & B. 21.23; 1 
 ?'. Att.-Gen. 11 Jnr. N. S. 922; 14 W. R. 45, Newl. 450 ; ante, p. 304 : post, Chap. XXXIV. 
 V. C. S. § 4, Bills to Perpetuate Testimony. 
 
 2 R. S. C. Ord XXXVIII. * i Will. IV. c. 22, § 4; see 1 Taylor, 4. 72, 
 8 Palmer v. Lord Aylesbury, 15 Ves. 209. et seq. ; Chitty's Arch. 329, 1 1 seq. 
 
 4 Anon, cited by Lord Eldon, 15 Ves. 300. ' Atkins r. Palmer, 5 Mad. 19. 
 
 5 Anon. 6 Ves. 573. 2 Thus, where an application was made to 
 
 6 Ld. Red. 150 ; Philips v. Carew, 1 P. Wins. examine the surviving witness to a will dt btnt 
 
 931
 
 * 936 EVIDENCE. 
 
 Court, however, will not permit the examination of witnesses de bene esse, 
 on the ground of their being about to go abroad, where it is in the power 
 of the party applying to detain them till they have been examined in the 
 ordinary course. 3 (") 
 
 It seems also, that, in a question of pedigree, where the case depends 
 upon a chain of distinct circumstances in the knowledge of different 
 individuals, the death of one of whom would destroy the whole chain, 
 the Court will permit the examination of such individuals de bene 
 *936 esse, although none of them come within the description *of wit- 
 nesses whose testimony is in danger of being lost, either from age 
 or serious illness. 1 
 
 The rule, however, that the examination of a witness de bene esse will 
 be permitted where the individual proposed to be examined is the only 
 witness, will not be extended to cases whe.re there is more than one 
 witness to the same fact, unless upon the ground of the age or infirmity 
 of the witness ; therefore where an application was made for leave to 
 examine de bene esse one of two surviving witnesses to a will, who was 
 neither of the age of seventy nor in a state of dangerous illness, on the 
 ground that he was a prisoner charged with a capital felony, no order 
 was made. 2 
 
 From an observation which appears to have been once made by Lord 
 Eldon, 3 it may be inferred that an order of this nature cannot be obtained 
 before appearance, unless the defendant is in contempt ; but the practice 
 is not so, and an order to examine a witness de bene esse, upon either of 
 the grounds above stated, will be granted, upon an affidavit of the facts, 
 immediately after the filing of the bill, without waiting either for the 
 defendant's appearance, or for his being in contempt for non-appearance. 4 
 There seems, however, to be no doubt that the contempt of a defendant, 
 
 esse, on the ground that the parties concerned esse. Brown v. Child, 3 Sim. 457; M'Intosh v. 
 
 all lived in America, and that the surviving wit- Great Western Ry. Co. 1 Hare. 32S; M'Kenna 
 
 ness was greatly afflicted with the gravel, the v. Everitt, 2 Beav. 188; Grove v. Young, 3 De 
 
 order was made, although the witness was G. & S. 397; 13 Jur. 847. 
 
 merely stated to be "upwards of sixty years 8 Upon this ground, the Court of Exchequer 
 
 old." Fitzhugh v. Lee, Amb. 65. (But in refused to make an order, on the application of 
 
 such cases, an ex parte order is irregular; see the East India Company, for the examination 
 
 M'Kenna o. Everitt, 2 Beav. 188; Hope t'. of witnesses de bene esse, who were going to 
 
 Hope, 3 Beav. 317, 323; id. n.) So, also, where the East Indies: because they were the Com- 
 
 the age of the witness was not stated, but the pany's servants, and they might have kept 
 
 affidavit, upon which the application was made, them at home. East India Co. r. Naish, Bunb. 
 
 alleged onlv that the witness was subject to 320. 
 
 violent attacks of the gout, and from these 1 Shelly v. ,13 Ves. 56, 58; Shirley v. 
 
 attacks was under the apprehension of dying, Earl Ferrers, 3 P. Wins. 77; Hope v. Hope, 3 
 
 and that he was a material witness, his tes- Beav. 317, 323. 
 
 timony being required to prove the draft of a 2 Anon. 19 Ves. 321. 
 
 bond which he hail prepared, but which was 8 Frere v. Green, 19 Ves. 320. 
 
 lost, the Court of Exchequer made an order for 4 See Dew v. Clarke, 1 S. & S. 108, 115; 
 
 his examination de bene e sse. Jepson v. Green- Fort v. Ragusin, 2 John. Ch. 146; see Wilson 
 
 away, 2 Fowl. Ex. Pr. 103. In like manner, v. Wilson, cited 1 Newl. Ch. Pr. 287; Allen v. 
 
 where a witness is about to go abroad, an order Annesley, 2 Jones Exch. 260. 
 
 may be obtained for his examination de bene 
 
 (a) A commission to examine a material Q. B. D. 1, 178; Semmens v. Walters, 55 Wis. 
 witness abroad is not a matter of ri^ht. but of 675. 
 judicial discretion. Coch v. Allcock & Co. 21 
 
 932
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES DE BENE ESSE. 
 
 937 
 
 in not appearing, would at any time be a reason for giving permission to 
 a plaintiff to examine his witnesses de bene esse, where a proper ground 
 is laid for it, even where the case does not come within any of the three 
 instances above mentioned. 5 The defendant is, equally with the plain- 
 tiff, entitled to examine witnesses de bene esse ; 6 and, on special applica- 
 tion, the order may be made before answer filed. 7 
 
 An order for leave to examine a witness de bene esse, upon the ground 
 of the witness being above seventy years of age, or dangerously ill, or 
 about to go abroad, may be obtained either by motion in Court, without 
 notice, or upon petition of course at the Eolls ; 8 but where the applica- 
 tion is not made on the ground of the age or dangerous illness of the 
 witness, or that he is about to go abroad, the Court will not make an 
 order for his examination de bene esse, as of course ; so that, if a party 
 wishes to examine a witness de bene esse, upon a ground which cannot 
 be arranged under either of those classes, he must apply by 
 motion in Court, of which notice * must be given to the other * 937 
 side. 1 
 
 It seems, however, that, where a defendant is in contempt for non- 
 appearance, such an order may be obtained without notice, and this even 
 where the defendants are infants. 2 
 
 Although, in the instances above mentioned, an order to examine a 
 witness de bene esse may be obtained upon motion or petition without 
 notice, notice of the examination of the witness must, in all cases, be 
 given, in order that the other side may have the power of cross-exami- 
 nation. 3 
 
 The application for leave to examine a witness de bene esse must, in 
 every instance, whether made by a petition at the Eolls or by motion 
 
 5 Coveny v. Athil!, 1 Dick. 355; Prichard v. 
 Gee, 5 Mad. 3G4. 
 
 6 Williams v. Williams, 1 Dick. 92; Grove 
 v. Young, 3 De G & S. 397. 
 
 7 Bown v. Child, 3 Sim. 457. 
 
 8 Bellamy v. Jones, 8 Ves. 31; Tomkins )'. 
 Harrison, 6 Mad. 315; M'Kenna v. Everitt, 2 
 Beav. 188; M' In tosh v. Great Western Ry. Co. 1 
 Hare, 328, 330; Grove v. Young, 3 De G & S. 
 397; 13 Jur. 847. For forms of motion paper 
 and petition, see Vol. III. 
 
 1 Bellamy v. Jones, 8 Ves. 31. For form of 
 notice of motion, see Vol. III. In Hope o. Hope, 
 3 Beav. 317, 323, n. (and see Pearson r. Ward, 
 1 Cox, 177), Lord Langdale M. R. had to con- 
 sider whether an order for the examination de 
 bene esse of a person alleged to be the sole 
 witness to a material fact, could be regularly 
 obtained ex parte, and he came to the con- 
 clusion, that, in such a case, the application 
 should be made on notice ; and it seems that 
 the affidavit, in support of such an application, 
 ought to show the facts as to which it is pro- 
 posed to examine the witness. If the order has 
 been obtained as of course, in a case where a 
 special application for it should have been 
 made, the adverse party may move, on notice, 
 
 to discharge it. See M'Kenna v. Everitt, ubl 
 supra ; Hope v. Hope, 3 Beav. 317; for form of 
 notice of motion, see Vol. III. 
 
 2 Thus, in Frere v. Green, 19 Ves. 319, 320 
 
 (see also Shelley v. , 13 Ves. 50), where 
 
 the defendants were infants and in contempt, 
 and it appeared by the messenger's return that 
 they had absconded and were not to be found, 
 Lord Eldon, upon the usual affidavit of the 
 materiality of the evidence of the witnesses, 
 and the plaintiffs' undertaking to proceed with 
 all due diligence, and with as much expedition 
 as the course and practice of the Court and the 
 contempt of the defendants would admit, to 
 bring the cause to an issue, and examine their 
 witnesses in chief, made an order that the 
 plaintiffs should be at liberty to examine them 
 de bene esse; but he provided, by the order, 
 that, before publication of the depositions of 
 such witnesses should be allowed to pass, 
 proper evidence should be produced to satisfy 
 the Court that the plaintiffs had complied with 
 the above undertaking. 
 
 8 Loveden v. Milford, 4 Bro. C. C. 540; Ord. 
 5 Feb. 1861, r. 22; ante, pp. 901, 915; for form 
 of notice, see Vol. III. 
 
 933
 
 * 938 EVIDENCE. 
 
 to the Court, 4 with notice or without, be supported by an affidavit of 
 
 the facts which form the ground of the application, such as, the age 
 
 of the witness, and that he is a material witness for the party 
 
 * 938 making the application ; 5 and also by the Record * and Writ 
 
 Clerk's certificate that the bill has been filed, where the defend- 
 ant has not appeared, or of such appearance, where an appearance has 
 been entered by him. Where an application is made for an order to 
 examine a witness on the ground that he is the only person who knows 
 the fact, the affidavit should state the particular points to which his 
 evidence is meant to apply, 1 and should show the ground which the 
 person who makes it has for believing that the witness is the only 
 person. 2 
 
 The order to examine witnesses de bene esse names the witnesses to be 
 examined, and only authorizes the examination of the persons named 
 therein. Where the order is obtained without notice, after appearance, 
 it must be served upon the solicitor on the other side ; but where it has 
 been obtained before appearance, so that there is no adverse solicitor 
 upon whom it can be served, the order usually directs that notice of the 
 order be given to the defendant, or that a copy thereof be left at his 
 dwelling-house, or usual place of abode, with his servant, agent, or other 
 person residing there, a specified number of days before the examination 
 of the witnesses. 3 This is done in order to afford the adverse party 
 an opportunity for cross-examination of the witnesses. 
 
 The examination of witnesses de bene esse is taken before an Examiner 
 of the Court, or a Special Examiner, in the manner prescribed by the 
 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86 ; 4 and the depositions are transmitted by him to 
 the Record and Writ Clerks' Office, 5 to be there filed. 6 
 
 Formerly, it was necessary to give three days' notice of the time and 
 place of the examination to the other side. 7 Xow, it is presumed, forty- 
 eight hours will be sufficient; but the notice must also state the name 
 and description of the witness to be examined, and the time and place 
 of examination. 8 
 
 4 Now it seems by summons at Chambers. its averments; and without an order to that 
 See Bolton v. Bolton, 2 Ch. D. 217. For form effect, he may proceed to take his depositions 
 of order, see 2 Seton, 1635, No. 7. de bene esse. Should the necessity for such 
 
 5 Grove v. Young, 3 De G. & S. 397; 13 depositions be superseded by the answer, the 
 Jur. 847; see Rockwell v. Kolsoin, 4 John. Ch. party who takes them must pay the costs. 
 165; Story, Eq. PI. § 309. For form of af- Doyle r. Wiley, 15 111. 576. 
 
 fidavit see Vol. III. The affidavit should give 4 Sects. 31, 32; see ante, pp. 903, 904; and 
 
 the place of residence and description of 'he see Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 11; Cook v. Hall, 9 
 
 witnesses whom it is sought to have examined Hare App. 20. 
 
 de bene esse. O'Farrel v. O'Farrel, 1 Moll. 5 Now to the Central Office. 
 
 364. 6 Office copies of the depositions may be 
 
 1 Pearson v. Ward. 1 Cox, 177; 2 Dick. obtained at that office, as soon as they are filed. 
 648; Hope P. Hope, 3 Beav. 317, 322. Braithwaite's Pr. 122. As to publication of 
 
 2 Rowe v. , 13 Ves. 261. evidence taken de bene esse in an ancient suit, 
 
 8 See orders in Hope r. Hope, 3 Beav. 317; see Moggridge r. Hall, 13 Ch. D. 380. 
 
 Soffe v. Prince,M. R. 26 Mar., 1870, Rolls' Lib.; 7 Tomkins v. Harrison, 6 Mad. 315; M'ln- 
 
 but see form of o:der in Seton, 1236. Xo. 2, tosh v. Great Western Ry. Co. 1 Hare, 328. 
 which differs as to the notice. The statute of 8 Ord. 5 Feb., 1861, r. 22 (7 Jur. X. S 
 
 Illinois authorizes a person filing a bill, before Pt. II. 60); for forms of notice, see Vol. III. 
 issue joined, to take depositions substantiating 
 
 934
 
 EXAMINATION OP WITNESSES DE BENE ESSE. * 040 
 
 As the examination of witnesses de bene esse is only a provisional 
 measure, to guard against the loss of important evidence before the 
 cause is in a state in which a regular examination can take place, it is 
 the duty of the party examining to take the earliest opportunity to 
 examine in the ordinary course, and if he is guilty of any laches 
 in so doing, the benefit of the examination * de bene esse will be * 939 
 forfeited. 1 
 
 Depositions taken de bene esse cannot be made use of without an order. 
 The ordinary course of the Court is not to allow of their use unless the 
 witness dies before issue is joined in the cause, so that there has been 
 no opportunity to examine him in the ordinary course ; or unless he is 
 at a great distance, so that it is impossible to have him examined again. 
 These, however, although the usual, are not the only cases in which the 
 Court will order depositions taken de bene esse to be used. It is in the 
 discretion of the Court to determine whether the order shall be made or 
 not ; and whenever it can be established, to the satisfaction of the Court, 
 that there is a moral impossibility in the examination of witnesses in chief 
 taking place, it will make the order. Therefore where a commission was 
 sent to Sweden, to examine witnesses there, which the government of 
 Sweden refused to permit, the Court allowed the depositions of those 
 witnesses who had been examined de bene esse to be read at the hearing ; 2 
 because it was impossible to have them examined in chief. So also the 
 Court has permitted depositions taken de bene esse to be read, although 
 there has been no strict proof of the death of the witnesses ; because 
 the length of time which has elapsed since the depositions were taken 
 has afforded a just ground for presuming them to be dead. 3 
 
 Sometimes the Court will allow depositions taken de bene esse to be 
 made use of upon a trial at Law, on the ground that the witness, though 
 alive, will be unable, from age or sickness, or other infirmity, to attend 
 at the trial. 4 In such cases, however, the more usual course is (especially 
 where there is any doubt whether the grounds upon which the 
 application is to be made are such as will be sufficient, * in a Court * 940 
 of Law, to authorize the admission of the evidence) to make an 
 order that the officer, in whose possession the original deposition is, shall 
 attend with it at the trial, in order that, if it should be proved to the 
 satisfaction of the Court of Law that the witness is unable to attend, the 
 
 1 See Forsyth v. Ellice, 2 M'N. & G. 209, non-appearance, Lord Eldon made the order, 
 
 213; overruling S. C. 7 Hare, 290. In the Duke upon the plaintiffs' expressly undertaking to 
 
 of Hamilton v. Meynal, 2 Dick. 788 (S. C. nom. proceed with all due diligence to bring the 
 
 Anon. 2 Ves. Sr. 497), however, Lord Hard- cause to issue, and to examine the witnesses in 
 
 wicke made an order for the publication of chief. 
 
 depositions taken de bene esse, although ihe ori- 2 Gason r. Wordsworth, 2 Ves. Sr. 325, 336; 
 
 ginal bill was filed, and the examination taken, Amb. 108; see also Biddulph r. Lord Camoys, 
 
 above thirty years before the cause was brought 19 Bcav. 467. 
 
 to an issue; but it seems that this was done 3 Anon. 2 Ves. Sr. 497; S. C. now. Duke of 
 
 under particular circumstances, and that the Hamilton v. Meynal, 2 Dick. 788; Marsden v. 
 
 delay was accounted for. We have seen before, Bound, 1 Vern. 331; see also M' In tosh i\ Great 
 
 ante, p. 937 (Frere r. Green, 19 Ves. 319), that Western Ry. Co. 7 De G. M. & G. 737. See 
 
 in the instance of an application to examine 2 Seton, 1635, No. 7. 
 
 witnesses de bene esse, to prove a case against 4 Bradley v. Crackenthorp, 1 Dick. 182. 
 infant defendants who were in contempt for 
 
 935
 
 * 941 EVIDENCE. 
 
 depositions should be tendered to be read ; 1 it being the province of the 
 Judge who tries the cause at Law, and not of this Court, to decide on 
 the admissibility of the evidence, upon the facts as they appear before 
 him. 2 Upon this ground the Court has frequently refused to make an 
 order that the depositions, taken de bene esse, of a witness who was alive, 
 though sworn by affidavit to be unable to attend at the trial of an issue 
 at Law, should be read at the trial. 3 (a) 
 
 Depositions of a witness, examined de bene esse, can only be used for 
 the purpose of supplying the want of an examination in chief. Appli- 
 cations for leave to use them, for other purposes, have been refused. 4 
 
 An order for leave to use a deposition, taken de bene esse, of a witness 
 dying before he could be examined in chief, may be obtained on special 
 motion with notice, supported by evidence proving his death, in the 
 ordinary way. 5 
 
 Where the application is made upon the ground that a witness is gone 
 to parts beyond sea, or upon any other grounds, it must be supported by 
 an affidavit of the facts relied upon as the foundation of the application. 
 
 The proper stage of the suit wherein this application should be made, 
 seems to be after the closing of the evidence, 6 unless it is in a suit the 
 sole object of which is the examination of a witness de bene esse, for the 
 purpose of using his depositions on a trial at Law ; in which case, 
 the application should be made before the trial of the action. The 
 * 941 party moving should be prepared with an affidavit * of service of 
 the notice of motion, in order that, if the other side does not 
 attend, the order may, notwithstanding, be obtained. 1 
 
 If any irregularity is discovered, or the adverse party is advised of 
 any ground of objection to the reading of the depositions, he should 
 give notice in writing to the adverse solicitor, and move to discharge 
 
 1 Andrews v. Palmer, 1 V. & B. 21; see also from the strict practice, if it were possible in 
 Corbett v. Corbett, id. 335; Palmer v. Lord any case to dispense with it, Lord Tluirlow at 
 Aylesbury, 15 Ves. 176; Att.-Gen. v. Ray, first made the order, but upon further con- 
 2 Hare, 518, and form of order, id. 519, n.; sideration, and before the order was delivered 
 Gompertz v. Ansdell, 1 Smith's Pr. 876. out, he altered his opinion, and refused it. 
 
 2 Jones v. Jones, 1 Cox, 184. Pegge v. Burnell, cited, Hinde, 391 ; Pasch. 1781. 
 8 Hinde, 390. Evidence taken de bene esse in one ad- 
 * Cann v. Cann, 1 P. Wms. 567. Therefore, ministration suit was not allowed to be read 
 
 where an application was made to the Court to in another administration suit previously corn- 
 allow a deposition de bene esse to be read at menced. Hill v. Hibbit, L. li. 7 Eq. 421. And 
 Law, in order to confront the witness and in- it seems doubtful whether such evidence taken 
 validate his testimony vivn voce, upon a new in a suit can be used after an amendment by 
 trial, on the ground that on his examination, adding a co-plaintiff. Peek e. Earl Spencer, 
 at the first trial, his evidence differed materially 18 W. R. 558. 
 
 from what he had before uniformly declared 5 Hinde, 388; for forms of notice of motion 
 
 the fact to be, and as the case made in support and affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 of the motion was a very strong one, and 6 Hinde, 388. 
 
 abundantly sufficient to justify a departure * For form of affidavit, see Vol. III. 
 
 
 (a) The record of evidence taken at a former vale Mills Co. 75 Maine, 156; Sewall v. Rob- 
 trial is only admissible upon notice, with proof bins, 139 Mass. 164; Cunningham v. Hall, 4 
 that the same evidence cannot now be obtained. Allen, 268; Seerle v. Richardson, 67 Iowa, 170; 
 Case v. Blood, 71 Iowa, 632; Mott v. Ramsey, Brooch v. Kelly, 71 Ga. 698; Murphy v. New 
 92 N. C. 152. As to the admission in evidence York Central R. Co. 31 Hun, 358; Turnley v 
 of depositions taken in other proceedings be- Hanna, 82 Ala. 139. 
 tween the same parties, see Chase v. Spring- 
 
 936
 
 DEMURRERS BY WITNESSES. * 942 
 
 the order immediately upon the service of it, or on the earliest oppor- 
 tunity ; for it seems that although depositions taken de bene esse are irreg- 
 ular, yet it is too late to object to them, on the ground of irregularity, 
 at the hearing of the cause ; 2 and on this accouut, when the time between 
 the closing of the evidence and the hearing of the cause is short, the 
 Court will extend it, for the purpose of allowing the party an oppor- 
 tunity of examining whether the depositions are regularly taken or not. 3 
 And so, where depositions taken de bene esse are read at the hearing of 
 the cause, it is a matter of course, if an issue is directed, to order them 
 to be read at the trial of the issue, notwithstanding an irregularity in 
 the examination. 4 
 
 With respect to the costs of examinations de bene esse, no specific rule 
 appears to have been laid down, which makes any distinction between 
 them and the costs of examinations under ordinary circumstances ; ex- 
 cept, indeed, in the case of bills filed for the purpose of having witnesses 
 examined de bene esse, in order to render their evidence available on a 
 trial at Law. In such cases, it is presumed, the costs must be regulated 
 by the rule of the Court with regard to bills of a similar description, 
 namely, bills to examine witnesses in perpetuam rei memoriam ; in which 
 case a defendant is entitled to apply for his costs immediately after the 
 examination of the witnesses has been perfected, upon the simple allega- 
 tion that he did not examine any witnesses himself. 5 
 
 * Section XV. — Demurrers by Witnesses. *942 
 
 A witness examined before an Examiner may protect himself, by de- 
 murrer, from answering any question to which he has a legal objection. 1 
 The word " demurrer," however, is not, in this instance, used in a very 
 appropriate sense ; since it here signifies merely the witness's tender of 
 reasons why he should not answer the question, 2 and is not, like a 
 demurrer in pleading, confined to the facts appearing upon the record, 
 
 2 Dean and Chapter of Ely v. Warren, 2 assigning cause, demur to the questions pro- 
 Atk. 189; Hinde, 289. pounded to him; upon which the examination 
 
 3 Gordon v. Gordon, 1 Swanst. 171. must be suspended until the Court decides. 
 
 4 Ibid. 166. Winder v. Diffenderffer, 2 Bland, 166. Counsel 
 
 5 Foulds v. Midgley, 1 V. & B. 138; post, have no right to advise a witness that he is not 
 Chap. XXXIV. § 4, Bills to Perpetuate Tes- bound to answer a particular interrogatory. It 
 timony ; Morgan & Davey, 53, 149. In Dew is the duty of the examiner to inform a witness 
 v. Clarke, 1 S. & S. 108, 115, where the plain- of his legal rights. Taylor v. Wood, 2 Edw. 
 tiff had filed a bill for the purpose of obtaining Ch. 94; 1 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 466. A witness who 
 the examination of witnesses de bene esse in aid demurs to a question is not the proper person 
 of a proceeding at Law, and obtained an order, to bring it before the Court. If the part}' put- 
 ex parte, for the examination of such witnesses, ting the question does not ask for an attach- 
 but afterwards the bill was demurred to, and ment, nor in an}' way bring the point before 
 the demurrer allowed, the Court, besides the the Court, no one else can. The question "ill 
 usual costs of the demurrer, allowed the de- be considered as waived, or the demurrer well 
 fendant his costs of the examination, but not taken, unless he who puts the question persists 
 those occasioned by his cross-examination of in it, and takes measures to have the demurrer 
 the witnesses. disposed of. Mowatt r. Graham, 1 Edw. Ch. 
 
 1 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 33 (now superseded, 13; onte, p. 574. 
 see ante, p. 904, n. 7). A witness may, on 2 Parkhurst v. Lowten, 2 Swanst. 194, 203. 
 
 937
 
 * 943 EVIDENCE. 
 
 but states the facts upon which, the witness relies as the ground of his 
 objection. 
 
 The grounds upon which a witness may protect himself from answer- 
 ing are, principally : (1) That the answer may subject him to pains and 
 penalties, or to a forfeiture, or something in the nature of a forfeiture ; 
 (2) That he cannot answer the question without a breach of professional 
 confidence. A witness also cannot be required to answer any question 
 affecting his interest or showing his liability in respect of another action 
 in which he is a defendant. 3 
 
 1. With respect to the first ground of objection, namely, that the 
 answer may expose the witness to pains and penalties, or to a forfeiture, 
 or something in the nature of a forfeiture, the reader is referred to a 
 former part of this Treatise, 4 where the privilege of a defendant to be 
 protected on this ground from making the discovery required by the bill 
 is discussed. Jt will be there fouud that the privilege in such cases 
 arises from an acknowledged principle of Law, that no man is bound to 
 answer, so as to subject himself to punishment ; and as this principle is 
 applicable as well to witnesses as to defendants, the rules which are 
 there found laid down with regard to its application to the latter case 
 are equally applicable to the former. 5 (a) 
 
 2. The rules of exemption from discovery, on the ground of profes- 
 sional confidence, proceed upon the same principles as are applica- 
 ble to the case of defendants ; and the reader is, therefore, 
 
 * 943 * referred for information upon this head to a former portion of 
 
 this Treatise, where these rules have been discussed with refer- 
 ence to the protection of a defendant from answering the bill. 1 It may, 
 however, be noticed here, that the refusal of a client to allow his solicitor 
 to disclose professional communications is not a reason for treating him 
 as if he had kept a material witness out of the way, or refused or pre- 
 vented the production of a document in his possession. 2 
 
 3 Venables v. Schweitzer, L. R. 1G Eq. 76. ! Ante, pp. 571, et seq., 715, 716; see also 
 But see Re Western of Canada Oil Lauds & Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 M. & K. 08, 101 ; C. 
 Works Co. 26 W. R. 909; Massey v. Allen, id. P. Coop. temp. Brougli. 96; Lord Walsingham 
 908; Re Metropolitan Bank, 15 Ch. D. 139; Re v. Goodricke, 3 Hare, 122, 130; Gore v. Bowser, 
 North Australian Territory Co. 45 Ch. D. 87; 5 De G. & S. 30; S. C. nom. Gore v. Harris, 15 
 Re London & Lancashire Paper Mills Co. 57 L. Jur. 1168; Carpmael v. Powis, 1 Phil. 087; 9 
 J. Ch. 766. Beav. 16; Thomas v. Rawlings, 27 Boav. 140; 5 
 
 4 Ante, p. 562. Jur. N. S. 667; Marsh v. Keith, 1 Dr. & S. 342; 
 6 See 2 Phil, on Evid. 487, et seq.; Tay- 6 Jur. N. S. 1182; Ford v. Tennnnt, 32 Beav. 
 
 lor on Evid. §§ 458, 1453; Best on Evid. 162; 9 Jur. N. S. 292; Charlton v. Coombes, 4 
 
 §126; Gresley on Evid. 80, et seq.; Osborne Giff. 372; 9 Jur. N. S. 534, V. C. S ; Re Land 
 
 v. London Dock Co. 10 Exch. 698, 701; 1 Jur. Credit Society, 15 W. R. 703. 
 N. S. 93; Sidebottom v. Adkins, 3 Jur. N. S. 2 Wentworth v. Lloyd, 10 H. L. Cas. 589; 
 
 631; 5 W. R. 743, V. C. S.; Reg.».Boyes, IB. & 10 Jur. N. S. 961; and see Taylor on Evid. 
 
 S. 311; 7 Jur. N. S. 1158; Re Aston, 27 Beav. § 101; Bolton v. Liverpool, 1 M. & K. 88, 94, 
 
 474; 5 Jur. N. S. 615; 4 De G. & J 320; 5 95; Kennedy?;. Lyell, 23 Ch. D. 387. 
 Jur. N. S. 779; Ex parte Fernandez, 10 C. B. 
 N. S. 3, 39, 40; 7 Jur. N. S. 571. 
 
 (a) The Court must be satisfied that the Ex parte Reynolds, 20 Ch. D 294; ante t 
 witness has reasonable ground to apprehend p. 563, note (b). 
 danger from his being compelled to answer. 
 
 938
 
 DEMURRERS BY WITNESSES. * 944 
 
 "Where the witness is served with a subpoena duces tecum to produce a 
 deed or other document, and, upon being asked to produce it, objects to 
 do so, either upon the ground of his having an interest in the deed, 
 or upon any other ground, 8 he may refuse, without a formal demurrer. 
 The course to be adopted by the party seeking production, in such case, 
 is to move, on notice to the witness, that he do attend and produce the 
 deed, and pay the costs occasioned by his previous refusal ; upon the 
 hearing of which motion, the Court will decide whether the reasons 
 alleged by the witness for his refusal are satisfactory or not. 4 
 
 The question or questions put, and the demurrer or objection of the 
 witness thereto, must be taken down by the Examiner, 5 on paper, separate 
 and distinct from the evidence ; but there does not seem ever to have 
 been any particular form for a demurrer by a witness. 6 The witness 
 should state clearly the grounds of his refusal to auswer ; thus, a witness, 
 demurring on the ground that his answer would violate the confidence 
 reposed in him as a solicitor, must name the party to whom he was 
 solicitor. 7 He must also swear that the facts, from the discovery of 
 which he desires to be protected, came to his knowledge in his capacity 
 of solicitor to a particular person ; for a solicitor, like any other witness, 
 is bound to discover all secrets of his client which he did not come to 
 the knowledge of in his relation of solicitor to his client. 8 It must also 
 appear that the knowledge came to him in the character of a professional 
 adviser, and in such character only : and, therefore, where a demurrer 
 stated that the witness was the attorney or agent for a person, it 
 * was considered not to be sufficiently precise ; for an agent may * 944 
 be only a steward or servant. 1 
 
 In taking down a demurrer, the Examiner ought to take the witness's 
 statement upon oath ; and it was held, under the former practice, that 
 where this was not done, the demurrer must be supported by affidavit; 
 for the Court should, in some way or other, have the sanction of an oath 
 to the facts on which the objection is founded. 2 
 
 3 Such as, that the production of it may Rundle v. Foster, 3 Term. Ch. G58; see ante, 
 
 prove him to be guilty of a crime. See Park- p. 574, note (a). 
 
 hurst v. Lowten, 2 Swanst. 214; but see Webb i Vaillant v. Dodemead, 2 Atk. 524; and 
 
 v. East, 5 Ex. D. 108. As to the objection that see Reid v. Langlois, 1 M'N. & G. 627, 037; 
 
 persons not before the Court are interested in 14 Jur. 407. The protection does not extend 
 
 the document, see Bovill v. Cowan, W. N. to facts as distinguished from matters of confi- 
 
 (107) 115; 15 W. R. 008. dential communication. Sawyer V. Birchmore, 
 
 * Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 1 R. & M. 358; 3 M. & K. 572; Desborough i>. Rawlins, 3 M. 
 
 Hope v. Liddell, 20 Beav. 438, 439; 1 Jur. N. & C. 515; Brandt v. Klein, 17 Johns. 335; 
 
 S. 665; 7 De G. M. & G. 331. For form of Driggs v. Rockwell, 11 Wend. 504; Rundle v. 
 
 notice see Vol. III.; ante, p. 007, n. 1. Foster, 3 Tenn. Ch. 658. 
 
 6 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 33 (now superseded, • 2 Parkhurst v. Lowten. 2 Swanst. 201 ; Mor- 
 
 see note p. 904, n. 7). For the former practice, pan v. Shaw, 4 Mad. 54; Bowman v. Rodwell, 
 
 sec Tippins v. Coates, 6 Hare, 16; 11 Jur. 1 Mad. 266; Davis v. Reid, 5 Sim. 443; Goodale 
 
 1075; and tor formal parts of the demurrer, see v. Gawthorn, 4 De G. & S. 97. As to the course 
 
 Vol. III. where a witness summoned before a Chief Clerk 
 
 6 Morris v. Williams, 2 Moll. 342. refuses to be sworn, see Electric Telegraph Co. 
 
 7 Parkhurst v. Lowten, 2 Swanst. 201. Bur- of Ireland, Ex parte Bunn, 24 Beav. 137; 3 
 sill v. Tanner, 16 Q. B. D. 1. Jur. N. S. 1013; Vcnablcs v. Schweitzer, L. R 
 
 8 Morgan v. Shaw, 4 Mad. 54, 58; Thomas 16 Eq. 76. 
 v. Rawlings, 27 Beav. 140; 5 Jur. N. S. 667; 
 
 939
 
 * 945 EVIDENCE. 
 
 The demurrer is transmitted by the Examiner to the Kecord and Writ 
 Clerks' Office, and there filed ; 3 and an office copy should be taken by 
 the party to the cause who put the question objected to. 4 The demurrer 
 may then be set down for hearing, under an order of course, to be obtained 
 on petition, in like manner as demurrers to bills; 5 and the validity of 
 the demurrer will be decided by the Court. 6 The order to set down the 
 demurrer need only be served on the witness demurring, 7 except where 
 the witness, being the solicitor of the party in the cause, claims privilege 
 on behalf of his client ; in which case, it would seem, the client should 
 also be served with the order. 8 
 
 If the Court, upon argument, considers the demurrer to be bad, it will 
 overrule it ; in which case, an order will be made that the witness attend 
 the Examiner, and be examined, or stand committed. 9 
 
 Sometimes, however, where the ground for overruling the demurrer has 
 been its informality, and the Court has considered that the witness may 
 have a good reason to be excused from answering, it has ordered the 
 demurrer to be overruled, without prejudice to the witness, upon his 
 re-examination, objecting or demurring to the question, as he may 
 be advised, upon such grounds as he shall state in such objection or 
 demurrer. 10 
 
 Sometimes the Court will allow a demurrer partially ; thus, where a 
 
 demurrer was put in to two interrogatories, it was allowed as to one, and 
 
 part of the other ; and it was directed that half the costs should 
 
 *945 be paid by the witness, 11 in analogy to the practice when * two 
 
 exceptions are taken, one of which succeeds and the other fails. 
 
 Instead of settiug down the demurrer for hearing, the party who asked 
 the question objected to may move that the witness may attend the 
 Examiner at his own expense, and be further examined. Xotice of this 
 motion must be served upon the witness. 1 Upon hearing this motion, 
 the Court either allows the objection, 2 or directs the witness to attend 
 before the Examiner at his own expense. 3 
 
 The costs of and occasioned by the demurrer, or objection, are in the 
 discretion of the Court ; 4 and will be disposed of at the hearing of 
 
 3 15 & 16 Vice. 86, § 33 (now superseded, Hindustan, L. R. 10 Eq. 675; State v. Lons- 
 6ee ante, p. 904, n. 7). dale, 48 Wis. 348. 
 
 4 Braithwaite's Pr. 539. 10 Morgan v. Shaw, and Parkburst v. Low- 
 
 5 Braithwaite's Pr. 539; ante, p. 594. For ten, ubi supra. 
 
 form of order to set down, see Seton, 1257, No. n Davis v. Reid, 5 Sim. 443, 448. 
 
 10; and for form of petition, see Vol. III. » Re Aston, 27 B-av. 474; 4 De G. & J. 320; 
 
 6 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 33. 5 Jur. N. S. 615, 779; Marriott v. Anchor Re- 
 
 7 Braithwaite's Pr. 539; 6 Hare, 22, 24. versionary Co. (Limited) 3 Giff. 304; 8 Jur. 
 
 8 Marriott v. Anchor Reversionary Co. N. S. 51. As to service, where the witness is a 
 (Limited) 3 Giff. 304; 8 Jur. N. S. 51; and solicitor claiming privilege for his client, see 
 see Tippins v. Coates, 6 Hare, 16, 23; 11 Jur. ibid.; ante, p. 944. For form of notice, see 
 1075. Vol. III. 
 
 9 Parkhurst r. Lowten, 2 Swanst. 205, 206; 2 Marriott v. Anchor Reversionary Co. 
 see Re Aston, 27 Beav. 474; 4 De G. & J. 320; (Limited) ubi supra. 
 
 5 Jur. N. S. 615, 779; Rendle v. Metropolitan 3 Re Aston, ubi supra. 
 
 6 Provincial Bank, W. N. (1867) 239; 15 W. 4 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, § 33 (now superseded, 
 R. 1068 ; Lawton v. Price, W. N. (1867) 266; 10 see ante, p. 904, n. 7); and see Sawyer v. Birch- 
 W. R. 73; W. N. (1868) 110; Re Bank of more, 3 M. & K. 572; Langley v. Fisher, 5 
 
 940
 
 PUBLICATION. * 946 
 
 the demurrer or motion ; the general rule being, that they follow the 
 result. 5 
 
 Section XVI. — Publication. 
 
 Publication, in a legal sense, is the open showing of depositions, and 
 giving copies of them to the parties, by the Clerks or Examiners in whose 
 custody they are. 6 
 
 By the Orders of the Court the depositions of witnesses are not to be 
 disclosed by any of the persons before whom they were taken or by their 
 clerks, but are to be closely kept, if taken in town, by the Examiners at 
 their office ; if by commissioners in the country, by the sworn clerk to 
 whom the commission, after its execution, was delivered, until publication 
 passes. 
 
 We have seen that now, under the Orders of May, 1845, publication 
 is to pass without rule or order on the expiration of two months after 
 the filing of the replication, unless such time expires in the long 
 vacation or is enlarged by order ; 7 and that if the * two months * 946 
 after the filing of the replication expire in the long vacation, pub- 
 lication is to pass on the second day of the ensuing Michaelmas Term, 
 unless the time is enlarged by order ; 1 and that, " if the time is en- 
 larged by order, publication is to pass without rule or order, on the 
 expiration of the enlarged time, unless the enlarged time expires in the 
 long vacation, in which case publication is to pass without rule or order 
 on the second day of the ensuing Michaelmas Term, unless the time is 
 further enlarged by order." 2 
 
 As these Orders fix precisely the time at which publication is in all 
 cases hereafter to pass, it will not be necessary to enter at length into 
 the details of the practice by which the time of publication has hitherto 
 been determined. 
 
 It is desirable, however, to state that before these Orders came into 
 operation publication passed either by consent or rule. 
 
 A rule to pass publication was in the nature of an order of the Court, 
 
 Beav. 443; 7 Jur. 164; 14 L. J. Ch. N. S. 614; Woosterp. Clark, 9 id. 854; Gilbert*. Van 
 
 302, L. C. Annan, 1 Flippin, 421. A commission may be 
 
 6 Wright v. Wilkin, 4 Jur. N. S. 527, V. C. opened by a Judge in vacation in New Jersey. 
 
 K.; Lee v. Hammerton, 12 W. R. 975, V. C. K.; Den v. Wood, 5 Halst. 62. It is a fatal objection 
 
 Re Newgong Tea Co. 16 L. T. N. S. 47; see to a deposition taken under the Judiciary Act of 
 
 Stebbingr. Atlee, 2 Jur. N. S. 1161; Anon. 23 1798, c. 20, § 30, that it was opened out of Court. 
 
 L. J. Ch. 24. Beale v. Thompson, 8 Cranch, 70. A deposi- 
 
 6 Prac. Reg. 353. tion opened by mistake out of Court may be 
 
 7 11th Ord. May, 1845. In Massachusetts, received and filed in Maine on affidavit of the 
 the opening and filing, in the Clerk's Office, a fact. Law v. Law, 4 Greenl. 167. In Massa- 
 deposition taken in a suit in Chancery, is equiva- chusetts, a deposition taken under a commis- 
 lent to a publication in the English practice. A sion, so opened, may be used in the discretion 
 particular rule for publication is not necessary. of the Court, notwithstanding the rule, that 
 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. "all depositions shall be opened and filed with 
 344. In Man-land there is no publication of the Clerk." Burrell v. Andrews, 16 Pick. 551; 
 depositions, but all objections are open, and Goff v. Goff, 1 Pick. 475. 
 
 may be taken at the hearing. Strike's case, i 112th Ord. May, 1845. 
 
 1 Bland. 96. See U. S. Equity Rule 69, pott, 2 ngth Ord. May, 1845; Moody v. Payne, 3 
 
 p. 2392; Beinic r. Wadsworth, 36 Fed. Rep. John. Ch. 294. 
 
 941
 
 * 947 EVIDENCE. 
 
 directing that publication should pass unless cause was shown by the 
 other side. Before a rule to pass publication could be entered, it was 
 necessary, in most cases, that there should have been a previous order 
 or rule, called a rule to produce witnesses. This rule, which was in fact 
 a notice given by one side to the other to proceed with the examination 
 of his witnesses, was sometimes called the ordinary rule. 
 
 When the prescribed period from the date of the rule to pass publi- 
 cation expired, publication passed as of course, unless the Examiner or 
 the clerk in whose custody the depositions were had been served with 
 an order to enlarge publication ; or unless a commission had been issued 
 at the instance of a defendant, under the provisions of the 17th Order, 
 for the examination of witnesses in the country, the time allowed for 
 the return of which had not expired, in which case publication was 
 directed by the 17th Order, to stand enlarged until the commission was 
 returnable. 
 
 The Orders of May, 1845, apparently made no alteration in the prac- 
 tice according to which applications of this kind were thereafter to be 
 made ; but care was necessary in every case that the application to 
 enlarge publication be made before the expiration of two months 
 
 * 947 from the filing of the * replication. 1 If this period had expired 
 
 it would appear, from the old practice, that the Master had no 
 longer jurisdiction to allow any further examination of witnesses, as any 
 subsequent application, although, in form, one to enlarge publication, is 
 in effect one for leave to examine witnesses notwithstanding publication 
 has passed. 2 
 
 It has before been stated that the Master has no jurisdiction to allow 
 of the further examination of witnesses after the period has arrived at 
 which publication, according to the general Order, passes. 8 (a) 
 
 The Orders of May, 1845, have now, as we have seen, changed the 
 manner in which publication passes, and it remains to be seen whether 
 
 1 To enlarge publication is to stay or post- 3 In New Jersey, if either party cannot 
 pone the rule for passing publication, and a complete his testimony within the prescribed 
 motion for that purpose may be granted, on period, his time may be enlarged upon motion, 
 reasonable cause shown; but this is very differ- on notice served before the expiration of said 
 ent from a motion to examine witnesses after time, for reasons verified by proof satisfactory 
 publication has actually passed. Hamersley v. to the Chancellor. The time limited for tak:ng 
 Lambert. 2 John. Ch. 432; post, p. 948, note, testimony shall not be extended, except by 
 It is not of course to enlarge the rule to pass written consent, or by order of the Court, made 
 publication, and it will be refused where there upon notice. Rules 85, 86. 
 
 has been great delay. Underhill v. Van Cort- In Tennessee, the time may be enlarged by 
 
 landt, 1 John. Ch. 500. the Chancellor or Master on sufficient cause 
 
 2 Carr v. Appleyard, 2 M. & C. 476, Anon, shown. Ch. Rule 2, § 4. 
 5 Beav. 92; Strickland v. Strickland, 4 Beav. 
 
 146. 
 
 (a) In Eillert v. Craps, 44 Fed. Rep. 792, it published before the defendant open9 his case, 
 
 was held that as the defendant is entitled to with due precautions on the plaintiff's behalf, 
 
 know whether the plaintiff has made out his ar.d subject to the exception, if made, that 
 
 whole case in chief upon testimony taken by further testimony cannot be taken after an 
 
 commission, the evidence mav be ordered to be order of publication. 
 
 942
 
 PUBLICATION. * 948 
 
 hereafter any terms or conditions will be"annexed to the order to enlarge 
 publication. 
 
 Hitherto in most cases publication would have been enlarged, and a 
 party have had an opportunity given him of examining witnesses, even 
 though publication had been enlarged by a precedent order, if any ground 
 for doing it was shown and verified by affidavit ; 4 as where witnesses 
 resided in parts of the kingdom at any distance from each other, or 
 where the party applying had not been able to examine all his witnesses 
 under a joint commission, executed in the cause, by reason of some of 
 the witnesses residing at a great distance from the party, and others at 
 a great distance from the place of executing the commission ; or where 
 witnesses have refused or neglected to attend before the commissioners ; 
 or by any accident have not been examined at the execution of the 
 commission. 5 
 
 Under the practice before the Orders of 1845 came into operation, 
 when any of the parties were desirous of obtaining a commission return- 
 able at a period subsequent to that at which publication would have 
 passed, the proper course seems to have been first to apply to 
 the Master to enlarge publication, and then * an order might * 948 
 have been obtained from the Court for the commission. 1 The 
 same practice appears to continue, except that now the Master has juris- 
 diction to hear applications for additional commissions, and to determine 
 questions relating thereto. 
 
 Where a cross-bill has been filed before the orginal suit has been 
 proceeded in, and the defendant to the cross-suit (who is the plaintiff in 
 the original suit) has not put in an answer to the cross-bill, the plaintiff 
 in the cross-suit may have publication enlarged in the original suit till 
 a fortnight after the answer to the cross-bill shall have come in, as the 
 discovery afforded by such answer may be of service to him in framing 
 his interrogatories. 2 But we have before seen that if publication has 
 been allowed to pass in the original suit, witnesses can no longer 
 be examined in the cross-cause concerning matters in issue in the 
 original one. 8 
 
 It seems, however, that after proceedings have been taken in the 
 original cause, publication can only be enlarged where the defendant in 
 the cross-cause is in contempt, unless a special case is made. Where the 
 cross-bill was not filed till after a rule to pass publication had been en- 
 tered in the original suit, and the defendant in the cross-suit was not in 
 contempt, a motion by the plaintiff in the cross-suit to enlarge publica- 
 tion, 4 which was not founded upon any special grounds, was refused with 
 costs. 5 
 
 It may be mentioned here that the Court of Exchequer has deter- 
 
 * Hinde, 383; Mooch' v. Learning, 1 Mad. 85. 2 Creswick v. Creswick, 1 Atk. 291 ; see also 
 
 5 Hinde, 383. In Barnes v. Abrain, 3 Mad. Ranikissenseat v. Barker, 1 Atk. 19. 
 
 103, publication, though often enlarged before, 8 Pascall v. Scott, 1 Phil. 110. 
 
 was enlarged again in order to enable the de- 4 Cook v. Broomhcad, 16 Yes. 133. 
 
 fendant in a tithe cause to search for records in 6 See Underbill v. Van Cortlandt, 1 Jobru 
 
 the Vatican upon affidavit as to the probability Ch. 500; Governeur v. Klmendorf, 4 John. Cli. 
 
 of success there. 357; Field v. Schieffelin, 7 John. Ch. 250. 
 
 1 Maund v. Allies, 4 M. & C. 503. 
 
 943
 
 * 949 EVIDENCE. 
 
 mined that an order to enlarge publication till the coming-in of the 
 answer in a cross-cause shall not be granted, unless upon affidavit of the 
 truth of the facts stated in the cross-bill, and that the answer may furnish 
 a good defence to the original bill. 6 It is not necessary, however, that 
 such affidavit should be made by the party himself ; but if made by his 
 solicitor, it will be sufficient. 7 
 
 Sometimes, when, by accident or surprise, publication passes before a 
 party has examined his witnesses, and there has been no blamable 
 
 * 949 negligence, publication will be enlarged 8 even after the * deposi- 
 
 tions have been delivered out, upon affidavit that they have not 
 been read. Such an order, however, cannot be made 1 except upon 
 application to the Court itself, 2 nor unless some cause is shown why the 
 witness was not examined before. And it is a rule of the Court, that 
 the party, as well as his solicitor, must make oath that they have never 
 seen, read, nor been informed of the contents of the depositions taken 
 in the cause, nor will they, &c, till publication is duly passed. 3 
 
 An instance is mentioned in the books, having occurred in Lord 
 Somers's time, in which the Court granted an order to enlarge publication 
 after it had actually passed, although the rule of the Court above stated 
 could not be complied w r ith ; but in that case the solicitor on the other 
 side, being an artful man, having procured copies of his client's deposi- 
 tions, immediately went with them to the adverse solicitor, and showed 
 him the depositions, and read them over to him : the solicitor being 
 ignorant of the rule, told him he must, notwithstanding, have an oppor- 
 tunity of examining his witnesses, and soon after took his witnesses to 
 the Examiner's office, where he was told they could not be examined, 
 because publication was passed and the depositions delivered out. The 
 solicitor, surprised at this, went to his clerk in Court to know what he 
 was to do, and told him the whole story, which being held before the 
 Court, it enlarged publication, and gave the party an opportunity to 
 
 6 Edwards v. Morgan, 11 Price, 939. landt. 2 John. Ch. 339. The Court, by extreme 
 
 ' Lowe v. Firkins, M'Clel. 10; 13 Price, 21, rigor, endeavors to guard against the abuse of 
 
 g, c. introducing testimony to meet that which has 
 
 8 The time for publication will be enlarged, been produced; and accordingly it has been 
 
 or more properly the time for taking testi- held, that if, after publication has passed, the 
 
 mony will be enlarged, after publication passed, substance of the testimony taken on a material 
 
 though not in fact made according to the rules point, upon which further testimony is sought, 
 
 of the Court, provided some good cause is has been disclosed to the party applying, it is 
 
 shown therefor upon affidavit, as surprise, acci- too late to move to open or enlarge the rule on 
 
 dent, or other circumstances, which repels the affidavit. Moody v. Payne, 3 John. Ch. 294. 
 
 presumption of laches. The affidavit is indis- See this subject discussed in Wood v. Mann, 2 
 
 pensal'le except in cases of fraud practised by Sumner, 31fi. 
 
 the other party. Wood t\ Mann, 2 Sumner, 1 1 Harr. (ed. Newl.) 289. 
 
 311. In Hamersley v. Lambert, 2 John. Ch. 2 Anon. 5 Beav. 92; Maund v. Allies, 4 M. 
 
 432, it was held, that after publication, witnesses & C. 503. 
 
 cannot be examined unless under verv special 3 Ibid. ;' but see Lawrell v. Titchbome, 2 
 
 circumstance. See also Hamersley v. Brown, Cox, 289; Hamersley v. Lambert, 2 John. Ch. 
 
 2 John. Ch. 428. The deposition of a witness, 432, 433, where the Chancellor remarks that 
 
 whose examination was not closed until after " such an oath ought not to be much encouraged, 
 
 publication had passed, was allowed to be read, It is partly promissory; it may be difficult to 
 
 he having been cross-examined by the opposite be strictly kept, and is of dangerous and suspi- 
 
 party, and no actual abuse appearing; but such cious tendency," 
 practice is irregular. Underbill V. Van Cort- 
 
 944
 
 PUBLICATION. * 950 
 
 examine his witnesses, and the adverse party narrowly escaped commit- 
 ment for his misconduct. 4 ■ 
 
 Where a defendant obtained an order to enlarge publication upon an 
 allegation that it had not passed, which was untrue, the order was held 
 to be informal, and an application, upon the usual affidavit, that publica- 
 tion might be again enlarged, or the evidence taken under the informal 
 order, read at the hearing of the cause, was dismissed with costs. 5 
 
 It seems that the Court will not only enlarge publication, upon the 
 proper affidavits, after publication has actually passed, but it will, if a 
 proper case is made, even grant a second commission to examine 
 witnesses, upon being satisfied, by affidavit, that the * party ap- * 950 
 plying, and his solicitor, are ignorant of the contents of the 
 depositions. 1 
 
 The order for enlarging publication 2 is signed and entered by the 
 Master, and a copy of it must then be served, not only upon the other 
 side, but upon the Examiner who took the depositions, and the Clerk 
 of Records and Writs in whose custody the depositions, if taken by 
 commission, are, on or before the day on which publication actually 
 passes. 3 
 
 This is necessary, as well to authorize the giving out copies of the 
 depositions, and to preclude further examination after the period to 
 which publication has been enlarged, as to authorize the examination of 
 further witnesses. 4 
 
 It is a fixed rule of the Court, that if one of the parties, after publica- 
 tion has passed, obtains an order to enlarge publication, upon the usual 
 affidavit, the other party may not only cross-examine, but may examine 
 at large, even though he has seen and read the former depositions. 5 
 
 Where a cause has been set down for hearing, and publication is en- 
 larged beyond the day on which the same is set down to be heard, the 
 proper course, if the cause is likely to come on before the depositions 
 are ready, is to apply to the Court for an order to adjourn the hearing 
 for a certain time. An application for this purpose must be made to 
 the Court 6 upon motion, of which notice has been duly served, and the 
 order made thereon should be served, in the usual manner, upon the 
 adverse solicitor, before the day on which the cause is to be heard; 
 otherwise the cause, when called on, will be struck out of the paper. 7 
 
 Publication being passed, the Examiner or Clerk of Records and 
 Writs, in whose custody the depositions are, is at liberty to permit them 
 to be examined, and to deliver copies of them to the parties. 
 
 When an office copy of the depositions taken on behalf of an adverse 
 party is delivered out, a copy of the interrogatories whereon such deposi- 
 tions were taken is always annexed. 8 
 
 4 1 Harr. (ed. Newl.) 289. * Ibid. 
 
 & Conethard v. Halted, 3 Mad. 429. 6 Anon. 1 Vern. 253. 
 
 1 Turbot v. , 8 Ves. 315; see also Din- 6 1 Smith's Cb. Pr, 388. 
 
 gle v. Rowe, Wightw. 99; Cutler v. Cre- < Hinde, 385, 38G. 
 
 mer, 6 Mad. 25-1; but see Mineve v. Kow, 8 Hinde, 395. If the party taking and filing 
 
 1 Dick. 18. a deposition does not, before trial, obtain leave 
 
 2 24th Ord. 1833. to withdraw it, and fails to read it on the trial, 
 8 Hinde, 381. the opposite party may introduce it. Adams 
 
 vol. i. — 60 l J45
 
 951 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 Section XVII. — Suppression of Depositions. 
 
 The ground upon which the Court suppressed depositions has 
 been either that the interrogatories upon which they were taken were 
 leading ; or that the interrogatories and the depositions taken 
 *951 *upon them, or the depositions alone, were scandalous ; or else 
 that some irregularity has occurred in relation to them. 1 A dep- 
 osition may also be suppressed because a witness has disclosed some 
 matter which has come to his knowledge as solicitor or attorney for the 
 party applying. 2 
 
 v. Russell, 85 111. 284 ; Brandon o. Mullenix, 11 
 Heisk. 446. 
 
 1 In such cases the depositions are suppressed 
 prior to the hearing, and the witness will be 
 permitted to be re-examined. Brown v. Bulk- 
 ley, 14 N. J. Eq. 294, 307, 308: Van Namee v. 
 Groot, 40 Vt. 74, 80; Underhill v. Van Cort- 
 landt, 2 John. Ch. 345; Stubbs v. Burwell, 2 
 Hen. & M. 536; Pillow r. Shannon, 3 Yerger, 
 508; Ringgold v. Jones, 1 Bland, 90; Perine v. 
 Swaine, 2 John. Ch. 475; Hemphill v. Miller, 16 
 Ark. 271. It is a fatal defect if the general in- 
 terrogatory, " Do you know anything further," 
 &c, does not appear to be answered. Richard- 
 son v. Golden, 3 Wash. C. C. 109 ; ante, p. 924, 
 note. So if the deposition is taken before per- 
 sons not named in the commission. Banert v. 
 Day, 3 Wash. C. C. 243. So if all proper inter- 
 rogatories do not appear to have been answered, 
 on each side, substantially. Bell r. Davidson, 
 id. 328 ; Nelson v. United* States, 1 Peters, C. C. 
 235. A deposition was rejected because a wit- 
 ness refused to answer a proper question ; also 
 because it w r as in the handwriting of the plain- 
 tiff's attorney. Mosely v. Mosely, Cam. & Nor. 
 522. In Fulton v. Golden, 28 N. J. Eq. 37, a 
 deposition of the defendant, taken by the plain- 
 tiff, was suppressed on motion of the latter, for 
 the refusal of the witness to answer proper 
 questions, and to produce papers and books, and 
 for the introduction of matter in his favor not 
 responsive, and for scandal. Depositions taken 
 without notice will be rejected. Honore v. 
 Colmesnil, 1 J. J. Marsh. 525. And notice 
 cannot be supplied by the commissioner's ad- 
 journment to a day fixed. Parker v. Hayes, 23 
 N. J. Eq. 186. So a deposition taken after 
 argument of the cause, without special order, 
 will be suppressed. Dangerfield v. Claiborne, 
 4 Hen. & M. 397. Evidence of a fact not in 
 issue may, upon motion, before the hearing, 
 be suppressed, or it may be rejected at the hear- 
 ing. Trumbull v. Gibbons, Halst. Dig. 174; see 
 Butman v. Ritchie, 6 Paige, 390. According to 
 the practice pursued in New York by Chancellor 
 Kent, motions to suppress depositions, although 
 permitted to be made before the hearing, usu- 
 ally resulted, unless the point was verv clear, 
 
 946 
 
 in permitting the evidence to stand de bene esse 
 and reserving the question. 1 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 
 495. It is not in accordance with the practice 
 of the Court to suppress testimony as incom- 
 petent, before the hearing : Williamson v. More, 
 
 1 Barb. S. C. 229; Brown v. Bulkley, 14 N. J. 
 Eq. 307; nor for impertinence: Pyncent v. 
 Pyncent, 3 Atk. 557; White v. Fusseil, 19 Ves. 
 113; Osmond v. Tindall, Jac. 625; Jones v. 
 Spencer, 2 Tenn. Ch. 776; Williams v. Vreehmd, 
 30 N. J. Eq. 576. " The question whether the 
 deposition shall be suppressed," it was remarked 
 by the Chancellor in Underhill v. Van Cort- 
 landt, 2 John. Ch. 345, "is a matter of discre- 
 tion; and in Hamond's case, 1 Dick. 50, and in 
 Debrox's case, cited in 1 P. Wms. 414, the dep- 
 osition of a witness examined after publica- 
 tion was admitted in the one case, because the 
 opposite party had cross-examined, and in the 
 other, because the testimony would otherwise 
 have been lost forever." A deposition having 
 been taken after a cause was set down for hear- 
 ing in the Superior Court of Chancery, and no 
 objection having been made in that Court, the 
 Court of Appeals will presume that good cause 
 was shown for admitting it. Stubbs v. Burwell, 
 
 2 Hen. & M. 536; Pillow v. Shannon, 3 Yerger, 
 508. Exceptions to the reading of depositions 
 taken by virtue of commissions issued after the 
 cause for which they may be required is set down 
 for hearing, may be made at any time before 
 the cause is gone into, when called ; after which 
 such exceptions would come too late. Foster 
 v. Sutton, 4 Hen. & M. 401; see further as to 
 irregularities in taking, &c, depositions, and 
 when they will or will not cause their rejection, 
 Greslev, Eq. Ev. 147-154; Cravens v. Hani- 
 son, 3 Lift. 92; Clarke v. Tinsley, 4 Rand. 250. 
 A party is too late to move to suppress a depo- 
 sition for irregularity after having exhibited 
 articles to discredit the witness. Malone v. 
 Morris, 2 Moll. 324. A motion to suppress depo- 
 sitions for irregularity in the notarial certi- 
 ficate comes too late after they have been on file 
 for three years. Bank of Danville v. Travers, 
 4 Biss. 507. And see Tedrowe v. Esher, 56 
 Ind. 443. 
 
 2 Sandford v. Remington, 2 Ves. Jr. 189;
 
 RE-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. * 952 
 
 The objection that the interrogatories are leading can scarcely now be 
 taken,, as the Examiner himself either puts the questions, or controls 
 those by whom the witnesses are examined. 
 
 Formerly, when any valid objection could be taken to the depositions, 
 it was the practice to move for a reference to the Master, and upon his 
 report to move to suppress the depositions. Now that the Master's 
 office is abolished, the proper course would be to move the Court at once, 
 if any objection could be taken, for an order to suppress the depositions. 
 
 * Section XVIII. — He-examination of Witnesses. * 952 
 
 The Court is always desirous that the examination of witnesses should 
 be completed, as much as possible, uno actu, and that, whenever it can be 
 accomplished, no opportunity should be afforded, after a witness has 
 once signed his deposition, 1 and " turned his back upon the Examiner," 2 
 of tampering with him, and inducing him to retract or contradict or ex- 
 plain away what he has stated in his first examination upon a sen mm!; 
 but, notwithstanding this unwillingness to allow a second examination 
 of the same witness, there are cases in which, if justice requires that a 
 second examination of the same witnesses should take place, an order 
 will be made to permit it. 3 
 
 Thus where the whole depositions of the witnesses in a cause are sup- 
 pressed, on account of some irregularity in the conduct of the cause or 
 in the examination of the witnesses, the Court will, when it is satis- 
 fied that the irregularity has been accidental and unintentional, direct 
 the witnesses to be re-examined and cross-examined upon the origi- 
 nal interrogatories. 4 
 
 The cases, however, in which the Court will permit the re-examination 
 of the same witnesses after publication, are not confined to those in 
 which the original depositions have been suppressed for irregularity ; 
 it has, as we have seen, permitted it to be done in a special case, where 
 the depositions had been suppressed, because the interrogatories upon 
 which they were taken were leading. 5 
 
 Bernard c. Papineau, 3 De G. & Sm. 498; Att.- testimony taken on his examination in chief, 
 
 Gen. o. Dew, 3 De G. & Sm. 493. and read it at the hearing, unless under very 
 
 1 Beames's Ord. 74. special circumstances. Gray v. Murray, 4 John. 
 
 2 Lord Abergavenny v. Powell. 1 Mer. 130. Ch. 412; Hallock v. Smith, id. 649; Sterry c. 
 
 3 The re-examination of a witness in Chan- Arden, 1 id. 62; Newman v. Kendall, 2 A. K. 
 eery rests in discretion, and though granted Marsh. 236. 
 
 under peculiar circumstances, is against the 4 Fresh interrogatories and re-examination 
 
 ordinary practice of that Court. Beach v. have heen permitted after publication, where 
 
 Fulton Bank, 3 Wend. 573 ; Phillips v. Tbomp- depositions have been suppressed from the in- 
 
 snn, 1 John. Ch. 140. A witness, examined terrogatories being leading, or fur irrt gularity, 
 
 while incompetent by reason of interest, may or where it has heen discovered that a proper 
 
 be re-examined after hia competency is restored, release has not been given, to make a witness 
 
 Iladdix o. Haddix, S l.itt. 202. But a party competent. Wood v, Mann, 2 Sumner, 316; see 
 
 will not be allowed to re-examine a witness FJealey r. Jagger, 3 Sim. 494; Chameau v. 
 
 whose memory has been refreshed since his ex- Riley, G Beav. 419; Shaw v. Mndsey, 
 
 animation closed, except as to documentary 380; Att.-Gen. r. Nethercote, 9 Sim. 311. 
 evidence. Noel i>. Fitzgerald, 1 Hogan, 135; 6 See Spence r. Allen. Prec. in Chan. 493; 
 
 see Byrne v. Frere, 1 Moll. 396. Nor can a 1 Eq. ('as. Abr. 2:12: Lord Arundel v. Pitt, 
 
 witness, after a hearing and final decree in a Amb. 585; Ilinde, 398. 
 cause, be re-examined to explain or correct his 
 
 947
 
 * 954 EVIDENCE. 
 
 But, even where the original depositions have not been suppressed, 
 the Court has frequently made an order, after publication, for the 
 
 * 953 re-examination of witnesses, for the purpose of proving * some 
 
 fact which has been omitted to be proved upon the original deposi- 
 tion. This is frequently done upon inquiries in the Master's office, under 
 decrees ; J and even before the cause has been heard, the Court will 
 entertain applications for the purpose of allowing fresh interrogatories 
 to be administered to witnesses who have been already examined in the 
 cause. 2 
 
 The Court will not only entertain an application for this purpose, after 
 publication has taken place in the cause, but will even at the hearing, 
 where the defect in the evidence of a particular witness has not been 
 discovered before, permit the cause to stand over, to enable the party 
 to make an application to the Court for permission to re-examine the 
 witness. 3 
 
 Sometimes in cases of this nature, the Court, instead of having the 
 witness re-examined, will, if the mistake involves only a verbal altera- 
 tion, permit the original deposition to be amended. 4 
 
 But before the Court makes an order, either for the re-examination of 
 a witness or for amending a deposition after publication, it will examine 
 very strictly into the circumstances of the case; and if, upon such 
 examination, it is not satisfied that the error has been wholly accidental, 
 or the effect of mistake or omission either on the part of the witness or 
 of the Examiner, it will refuse the application. 5 And, in general, before 
 making an order for the amending of the deposition, it will, unless the 
 case is very clear, examine both the witness and the Examiner. 6 
 
 In all the cases where a correction has been permitted in the deposition 
 itself, a direction that the witness should re-swear his deposition after 
 
 the alteration, has formed part of the order. 7 
 
 * 954 * An order to re-examine a witness, for the purpose of supplying 
 
 a defect in his former examination, will not in general be made 
 
 before publication has passed in the cause ; the reason of which is the 
 
 difficulty the Court, without seeing the depositions, would have in com- 
 
 i See post, "Proceedings in Master's office." was allowed to be amended on examination of 
 
 2 Cox v. Allingham, Jac. 337; Turner v. the witness by the Court, he being aged and 
 Trelawny, 9 Sim. 453; Byrne r. Frere. 1 Moll. very deaf, and a mistake made in taking down 
 396; Potts v. Turts, Younge, 343: Bridge v. his testimony by the Examiner. Denton v. 
 Bridge, G Sim. 352. In Kirk v. Kirk, 13 Ves. Jackson. 1 John. Ch. 526. 
 
 286, before Lord Erskine, an order was made, s Ingram r. Mitchell, 5 Ves. 299. 
 
 on the application of the witness himself, after 6 Ibid. ; Griells v. Gansell, 2 P. Wras. 646; 
 
 publication, for his re-examination as to a point Darling v. Staniford, 1 Dick. 358; Penderil v. 
 
 upon which it appeared, by his affidavit, he h^d Penderil, Kel. 25. 
 
 mad.' a mistake. The order, however, was con- ' It was stated by Lord Hardwicke, in 
 
 fined to permit his re-examination as to that Bishop r. Church, 2 Ves. Sr. 100, that the Court 
 
 particular point only, and it directed that the had sometimes directed a witness to attend per- 
 
 other side should have an opportunitv of cross- sonally when it had a doubt; but in that case 
 
 examining him. the witness having spoken so generally in his 
 
 3 Cox ;•. Allingham, Jac. 337. depositions as to leave a doubt in his mind upon 
 
 4 Rowlev v. Ridley, 1 Cox. 2S1 : 2 Dick. 687, a particular point, he refused to proceed in the 
 S. C; Griells v. G'ansell, 2 I'. Wins. 646. cause till the witness had been examined upon 
 After' publication passed and the cause set interrogatories before the Master. 
 
 down for hearing, the deposition of a witness 
 
 948
 
 REEXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. * 955 
 
 ing to a correct conclusion as to the propriety of granting or refusing 
 the application. 1 
 
 The reader is reminded here, that where the examination of a witness is 
 hefore an Examiner, either party may, up to the period of publication, 
 exhibit new interrogatories for the further examination of the same or 
 of other witnesses there, without an order to warrant it; but that when 
 a commission is taken out, the practice has hitherto been different.' 2 It 
 is, however, to be here observed, that the power of exhibiting additional 
 interrogatories for the further examination of a witness already examined 
 before the Examiner is confined to the period of a witness being under 
 examination. If the examination of the witness has been closed, and 
 he has perfected and signed his deposition (although he may be per- 
 mitted to perfect his deposition in some circumstances of time or the like, 
 or by correcting a sum upon view of any deed, book, or writing, to be 
 shown to the Examiner), 3 he cannot be again examined on behalf of the 
 party producing him without an order of the Court; and it seems that 
 such order cannot be obtained, unless upon affidavit that the witness, if 
 he has been cross-examined, has not communicated the effect of his cross- 
 examination to the party examining in chief. 4 Nor will such an order be 
 made, at least before publication, for the purpose of permitting a witness 
 to alter or explain what he has stated upon his first examination, although 
 he may be re-examined as to different matter. 5 
 
 But although a witness, after he has closed his examination, cannot 
 be re-examined, on behalf of the party producing him, without an order, 
 he may, if he has been examined before the Examiner, be examined 
 again by the adverse party without an order. 6 He is, in fact, in such 
 case, a new witness for the other party proposing to re-examine him, 
 and may not only be examined by such party, but may be cross-examined 
 by the party originally producing him. The same rule will also apply 
 to examinations under a commission, where a witness who has 
 been examined by one party may afterwards * be examined by the * 955 
 other party, in chief, as his witness, without an order, provided 
 such examination be upon interrogatories which have been produced 
 before the commissioners were sworn. When it is necessary to examine 
 him upon fresh interrogatories, an order to that effect must, as we have 
 seen, be first obtained. 1 Thus, where a motion was made on the part of 
 the defendant, that he might be at liberty to exhibit fresh interrogatories 
 for the examination of the plaintiff's witnesses in the suit, on the ground 
 that, after the witnesses had been examined, it was discovered that they 
 were interested, the order was made, 2 which was afterwards continued 
 on appeal. 3 
 
 1 Lord Abergavenny v. Powell, 1 Mer. 131; * Cockerell v. Cholmeley, 3 Sim. 313. 
 Batt r. Birch, 5 Mad. 66; Asbee v. Shipley, id. 5 Turner v. Trelawny, 9 Sim. 453. 
 467; Randall r. Ricbford, 1 Ch. Cas. 25; but r > Vaughan v. Wbrrall, 2 Mad. 322. 
 see Kirk r. Kirk, 13 Ves. 280; Stanney v. 1 Ante, pp. 924, 925. 
 
 Walmsley, 1 M. & C. 361. - Vaughan v. Worrall, ubi supra. 
 
 2 Ante, pp. 924, 925; see also Andrews v. 3 o Swanst. 395; and see Selway e. Chap- 
 Brown, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 929. pell, 12 Sim. 1052. 
 
 * Ante, p. 929. 
 
 949
 
 * 956 EVIDENCE. 
 
 It is to be observed, also, that in the above case, a new commission 
 was necessary for the purpose of taking the examination of the witnesses 
 to the interrogatory. But even if no new commission had been required, 
 it would have been necessary to have obtained an order for the exhibi- 
 tion of the interrogatory before the Examiner; for, as we have seen 
 In- lore, the rule of the Court is, that if a witness has been examined by 
 commissioners in the country, he cannot be examined again, before the 
 Examiner, without a special order. 4 
 
 It is to be mentioned here,. that where the Court makes an order for 
 permitting the re-examination of witnesses, it is always coupled with a 
 direction that the other side shall have liberty to cross-examine them, 5 
 and that the proceedings upon such re-examination are subject to the 
 same rules as those upon ordinary examination. 6 
 
 Section XIX. — Examination of Witnesses after Publication. 
 
 After the depositions of witnesses have been published and read by 
 the parties, a new witness cannot be examined without an order 
 
 * 956 of the Court, which will not be granted unless warranted by * spe- 
 
 cial circumstances, 1 except for the purpose of proving an exhibit 
 viva voce at the hearing; in which case, as we have seen, an order for 
 the examination of the witness may be obtained on motion or petition 
 of course. 2 
 
 An order for the examination of a fresh witness after publication, 
 except it be for the purpose of discrediting a witness already examined, 
 is not obtained without great difficulty. 3 Cases, however, do frequently 
 occur, in which the Courts will allow the examination of witnesses after 
 the depositions have been seen ; and even at the hearing of the cause, 
 leave has been given to the parties to examine witnesses to facts which 
 have been omitted to be proved in the ordinary course. This, as we 
 have seen, has been frequently done in the case of wills disposing of 
 real estates ; 4 but the practice is not confined to those cases, and other 
 cases have already been mentioned in which the Court has permitted 
 such examinations as to different points, either by order made at the 
 hearing, or upon petition or motion, supported by proper affidavits. 5 In 
 
 4 See Pearson v. Rowland, 3 Swanst. 266, n. to facts and conversations occurring after the 
 
 5 See order in Cox v. Allingham, Jac. 345; original cause is at issue, and publication has 
 Stanney v. Walmsley, 1 M. & C. -361. passed. The Court may. in the exercise of a 
 
 6 In Bridge v. Bridge. 6 Sim. 352, however, sound discretion, allow the introduction of newly 
 the V. C of England, upon making an order discovered evidence of witnesses to facts in issue 
 for re-examination of a witness to part of an in the cause after publication and knowledge of 
 interrogatory (his deposition as to which the the former testimony, and even after the near- 
 Examiner had omitted to take down), made it ing. But it will not exercise this discretion to 
 part of the order, " that publication should pass let in merely corroborative testimony. Wood 
 immediately after the examination or cross- v. Mann, 2 Sumner, 316. 
 
 examination (if any) should be concluded, and 2 Ante, p. 881; see Wood v. Mann, 2 Sumner, 
 
 that the cause should be adjourned, with liberty 31G. 
 
 to the plaintiffs to apply to have it restored to the 3 Willan V. Willan, ubi sujira. 
 
 paper when the publication should have passed." 4 Ante, p. 858. 
 
 i Willan r. Willan, 1!' Ves. 590-592; Hamers- 5 Ante, p. 858; Clarke v. Jennings, 1 Anst. 
 
 ley v. Lambert, 2 John. Ch. 432. It seems that 173; Gage '•. Hunter, 1 Dick. 49; Mulock v. 
 
 new testimony may be taken after publication, Mulock, 28 X. J. Eq. 15. 
 
 950 *
 
 EXAMINATION OP WITNESSES AFTER PUBLICATION. * 957 
 
 addition to which it may be stated, that an order for this purpose may 
 be obtained, even where the same point has been examined to before. 6 
 
 It is to be observed, that, in general, if leave is given to examine 
 a witness after publication, and before hearing, a Master is sometimes 
 ordered to settle the interrogatories, that they may be confined to such 
 points only as were omitted before, and as are now ordered to be 
 examined unto. 7 This, however, is not always done ; and when the 
 object is merely to prove an exhibit, and the interrogatory was before 
 filed, it is unnecessary. 
 
 Though, by the orders of the Court, the parties are to make their 
 proof before publication and hearing of the cause, yet after 
 * hearing, if there be a reference to the Master for stating an *957 
 account or such like matter, and he shall find any particular points 
 or circumstances needful to ground his report upon, which were not fully 
 proved, nor could be properly examined to before the Master, he may 
 direct the parties to draw interrogatories to such points or circumstances 
 only, and the witnesses are usually examined before the Master upon 
 such interrogatories, if the witness be or reside within twenty miles of 
 London, but, if further off, and the parties desire it, he may by certifi- 
 cate direct a commission into the country. 1 
 
 The most usual cases in which witnesses are required to be examined 
 after publication are those in which their testimony is required for the 
 purpose of showing that a witness already examined is unworthy of 
 credit. 2 An examination for this purpose is not, however, a matter of 
 course ; it must have the sanction of an order, the leading step towards 
 obtaining which is the preparing or filing of objections, or " articles " in 
 the Examiner's office (if the depositions impeached be taken in town), 
 or in the Record and Writ Clerks' office (where the depositions have 
 been taken by commission). 3 
 
 6 Coley v. Coley, 2 Y. & J. 44; Greenwood material to the merits of the case. Wood v. 
 
 v. Parsons, 2 Sim." 229. In Newland v. Horse- Mann, 2 Sumner, 316; Gresley, Eq. Ev. (Am. 
 
 man, 2 Ch. Cas. 74, an order was made for the ed.) 139-144; Jenkins v. Eldredge, 3 Story, 312, 
 
 examination of witnesses abroad, upon new 313; Troup V. Sherwood, 3 John. Ch. 558. 
 
 matter stated at the hearing, and not in issue •'• Hinde, 374. These articles may be in the 
 
 before, upon terms of not delaying an action following form, viz.: "Articles exhibited by 
 
 directed to be tried at Law; and in Gage v. A B, complainant in a certain cause, now 
 
 Hunter, 1 Dick. 49, leave was given after pub- depending and at issue in the High Court of 
 
 lication to examine a witness as to a particular Chancery, wherein the said A B is plaintiff, 
 
 fact viva voce, the defendant being at liberty to and C D defendant ; to discredit the testimony 
 
 cross-examine. See Holies v. Carr, 3 Swanst. of E V, <1 H, and .1 K. three witnesses examined 
 
 638, where a similar order appears to have been [before Thomas Hall Plumer, Esquire, one of 
 
 made upon consent. Hi" Examiner., of the Court], on the part and 
 
 7 1 Harr. (ed. Newl.) 274. behalf of the 3aid defendant. (If the wil 
 
 i iijid. have been examined by commission, the follow- 
 
 2 Although the usual time for examining as ing words are to be substituted for those within 
 
 to the credit of a witness is after publication, brackets: ' by virtue of a commission, issued 
 
 it seems that it may be done before, provided out of the said Court, to X Y and others, di- 
 
 an order for that purpose be obtained. Mill v. rected for the examination <>f witnesses in the 
 
 Mill, 12 Yes. 406. A witness maybe examined as said cause upon certain interrogatories exhibited 
 
 to the mere credit of the other witnesses, whose before them, for thai purpose, and which said 
 
 depositions have been already taken and pub- witnesses were examined in the said cause.' 
 
 lished in the cause, but he will not be allowed Hinde. 375.) 1st The said \ B doth charge 
 
 to be examined to prove or disprove any fact and allege that the said E V hath, since his 
 
 951
 
 * 959 EVIDENCE. 
 
 * 958 * The exhibition of these articles is rendered necessary by one 
 
 of Lord Clarendon's Orders, 1 which directs that the Examiner 
 shall not examine any witnesses to invalidate the credit of other 
 witnesses, but by special order of the Court, which is sparingly to be 
 granted, and upon exceptions first put into writing, and filed with the 
 Examiner, without fee, and notice thereof given to the adverse party or 
 his clerk, together with a true copy of the said exceptions, at the charge 
 of the party so examining. 
 
 The object for which these articles are required is to give notice to 
 the party whose witnesses are to be objected to, of the ground of the 
 objection, in order that he may be prepared to meet it. Without some 
 notice of this description, it would be impossible for the other party to 
 cross-examine the witnesses to be adduced, for the purpose of discredit- 
 ing the character of his witness ; for as the rule of the Court is that you 
 cannot examine to any points not put in issue by the pleadings, and as 
 the character of a witness could not by that means be put in issue, it 
 would be impossible that the party should know that the witnesses 
 examined by his adversary were for the purpose of discrediting his own. 
 For this reason, the Court not only requires notice to be given of an 
 intention to discredit a witness, in the form of articles as above stated, 
 but it considers all examinations, as to the character of witnesses, with- 
 out the previous exhibition of such articles, as impertinent, and will 
 order them, and the interrogatories upon which they are taken, to be 
 suppressed. 2 
 
 The articles having been filed, a certificate thereof must be procured 
 from the Examiner, or from the Record and Writ Clerk with whom they 
 are filed, and an application must be made to the Court, grounded upon 
 the certificate, for leave to the party applying to examine witnesses 
 thereon, and if necessary for a commission to take their depositions in 
 the country. 3 
 
 Although by Lord Clarendon's Order, above referred to, 4 an order for 
 
 leave to examine witnesses to credit is termed a special order, it is usually 
 
 granted as a matter of course, 5 and may be obtained either by 
 
 * 959 motion, or by petition at the Rolls, without * affidavit, upon the 
 
 certificate of articles being filed. 1 It seems, however, that if made 
 by motion, it should be upon notice, 2 and that if the application is 
 made after considerable delay, and the hearing of the cause will thereby 
 
 examination in the said cause, owned and ac- so to be; and that the said G H and J K are 
 
 knowledged that he is to receive or be paid, persons who have no regard for the nature and 
 
 and also that he doth expect a considerable consequences of an oath ; and that they are 
 
 reward, gratuity, recompense, or allowance, persons whose testimony is not to be credited 
 
 from the said defendant, in case the said de- or believed." Hinde, 376. 
 
 fendant recovers in the said cause, or the said 1 Beames's Ord. 187. 
 
 cause be determined in his favor, and that the " Mill v. Mill, 12 Ves. 406. 
 
 said E F is to gain or lose by the event of the 3 Hinde, 377. 
 
 said cause. 4 Beames's Ord. 187. 
 
 "2d. The said A B doth charge and allege b Russell v. Atkinson, 2 Dick. 532. 
 
 that the said G H and J K are persons of bad 1 Hinde, 377; Watmore v. Dickson, 2 V. & 
 
 morals, and of evil fame and character, and B. 267. 
 that they are generally reputed and esteemed 2 Ibid. 
 
 952 

 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES AFTER PUBLICATION. * 960 
 
 be deferred, the Court will refuse the order, or qualify it, by directing 
 that it shall not delay the hearing of the cause. 8 There is, however, 
 no precise time within which the application must be made. 4 
 
 Where a commission is required, it has generally been directed to the 
 same commissioners as were named in the former commission ; 5 but a 
 commission will not be directed for the purpose of examining witnesses 
 abroad, for which purpose Ireland is considered as a foreign part, unless 
 in case of great emergency, and where it is sworn that no person in 
 England can prove anything as to the witness's credit. 6 If a party, who 
 has obtained a commission to examine a witness as to credit, delays the 
 execution of it till after the decree, he will be made to pay the costs. 7 
 The method of proceeding under an order of this nature, whether before 
 the Examiner or under a commission, is precisely similar to that pointed 
 out in ordinary cases. 
 
 The order usually directs that the party applying be at liberty to ex- 
 amine witnesses, "as to credit, and as to such particular facts only as are 
 not material to what is in issue in the cause ; " 8 and under it the party 
 is at liberty to examine witnesses, not only to the general character of 
 the witness whose credit is impeached, but also for the purpose of con- 
 tradicting particular facts sworn to by the witness, 9 provided such facts 
 are not material to the issue in the cause. 10 
 
 * It seems, also, that Avitnesses may be examined to discredit * 960 
 other witnesses, by proving that, previously to their examination, 
 they had made declarations contrary to their depositions. 1 
 
 But, although the order permits the examination of witnesses to par- 
 ticular facts as well as to general credit, for the purpose of contradicting 
 a witness previously examined, such facts must be strictly confined to 
 those not in issue in the cause ; 2 and you can only, in examining as to 
 the credit of the witness, put geneial questions, as "whether you would 
 
 8 White v. Fussell, 19 Ves. 127. as his milkmaid in 1775, she did not live with 
 
 4 Piggott v. Croxhall, 1 S. & S. 467. him in that nrany other capacity till 1786, and 
 
 6 Wood v. Hammerton, 9 Ves. 145. that she had confessed to that effect, and that 
 
 6 Callaghan v. Rochfort, 3 Atk. G43. she had been prevailed upon so to depose at the 
 
 7 White b. Fussell, 1 V. & B. 151. instigation of the plaintiff's tithing-man, who 
 
 8 Purcell v. M'Namara, 8 Ves. 324; Wood r. wrs another witness for the plaintiff, and fora 
 Hammerton, 9 Ves. 145; Piggott v. Croxhall, reward. In Ambrosio v. Francia, cited ibid. 
 1 S. & S. 467. 5th of August, 1746, the articles charged that 
 
 9 This proceeding may, ordinarily, be taken one of the witnesses who had been examined 
 after publication and before hearing, but the for a defendant, to nine out of seventeen inter- 
 interrogatories must be so shaped as to prevent rogatories, by the description of Mary White, 
 the party, under color of an examination as to widow, was the wife of the defendant, and 
 credit, from procuring testimony to overcome known to be such at the time of the examina- 
 that already taken and published in the cause. don, suggested that if she was not his wife, 
 (lass b. Stinson, 2 Sumner, 605 ; Wood v. Mann, she lived with him, and an improper intimacy 
 id. :ilil; Troup v. Sherwood, 3 John. Ch. 558. subsisted between them, and the order was that 
 
 10 See Purcell v. M'Namara (8Ves. 324), where the plaintiff should be at liberty to examine to 
 
 the matter to be examined to was, whether the that fact, and also to the competence and credit 
 
 witness had not been a woollen-draper and in- of the witness. 
 
 solvent, which, upon his cross-examination, he l Piggott r. Croxhall. 4 S. & S. 477. 
 
 had denied; and Chivers v. Bax, Scacc, cited 2 Anon. 3 V. & B. 94: see Troup v. Sher- 
 
 8 Ves. 324, where the articles charged that wood, 3 John. Ch. 558, and next note above; 
 
 though the witness, in her deposition for the Jenkins v. Eldredge, 3 Story, 312, 313; Wood 
 
 plaintiff, had deposed that she lived with him v. Mann, 2 Sumner, 316. 
 
 953
 
 * 961 EVIDENCE. 
 
 believe the witness upon his oath." 3 It is not competent, even at Law, 
 to ask the ground of that opinion, but only the general question is per- 
 mitted. 4 The regular mode of examining into general character is to 
 inquire of the witnesses whether they have the means of knowing the 
 former witness's general character, and whether upon such knowledge 
 they would believe him upon his oath. 5 
 
 It is to be noticed, that although articles may be exhibited as to the 
 credit of witnesses after publication, they are never allowed as to their 
 competency, because it is said this might have been examined to and in- 
 quired into upon the examination ; 6 and it is for this purpose that a 
 notice of the witness's name and place of abode is left with the 
 
 * 961 solicitor of the opposite party before examination ; * and that, 
 
 under the old practice, the witness himself was produced. 1 
 Interrogatories adapted to the inquiry intended must be drawn and 
 filed in the same manner as upon examination in chief, and the wit- 
 nesses examined thereon, either by commission or at the Examiner's 
 office. The other party may cross-examine those witnesses, as to their 
 means of knowledge and the grounds of their opinion, or may attack 
 their general character, and, by fresh evidence, support the character of 
 his own witness. 2 
 
 The rules as to passing publication, &c, are the same, mutatis mutan- 
 dis, as those to be observed in ordinary cases. 
 
 Where an objection is established to the competency of a witness, his 
 deposition cannot be read; 3 but, where the objection is only to his credit, 
 it must be read and left to the consideration of the Court on the whole 
 evidence of the case. 4 
 
 3 Anon. 3 V. & B. 94. Upon such examina- among his neighbors; and what that reputation 
 tion, the rule of evidence, as to impeaching the is, whether it is good or whether it is bad. In 
 credit of witnesses, is the same in Equity as at the English Courts the course is further to 
 Law. The inquiry must be general as to the inquire whether, from such knowledge, the 
 general character of the witness for veracity. witness would believe that person upon his 
 Troup v. Sherwood, 3 John. Ch. 558. The oath. In the American Courts the same course 
 practice in reference to the extent of the has been pursued. Ford v. Ford, 7 Humph. 92; 
 inquiry that may be made respecting the char- but its propriety has been questioned, and per- 
 acter of the witness to impeach his credit, and haps the weight of authority is now against 
 the questions that may be put, is not uniform permitting the witness to testify to his own 
 in the American States. See 1 Greenl. Ev. opinion. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 461; Gass v. Stinson, 
 §401; Anon. 1 Hill (S. C), 251, 258, 259; 2 Sumner, 610; Kimmel v. Kimmel, 3 Serg. & 
 Hume v. Scott, 3 A. K. Marsh. 261, 262; State R. 337, 338; Phillips v. Kingfield, 19 Maine, 
 v. Boswell, 2 Dev. Law, 209, 210; People v. 375. 
 
 Mather, 4 Wend. 257, 258; Phillips v. King- 6 Callaghan v. Rochfort, 3 Atk. 643. 
 
 field, 19 Maine, 375; Gass v. Stinson, 2 Sumner, * Hinde, 375. 
 
 610; Wike v. Lightner, 11 Serg. & R. 198; 1 2 Hinde, 375, 377. If the witness be im- 
 
 Phil. Ev. (Cowen & Hill's ed. 1839)291-293, peached, evidence of his general good character 
 
 notes (530), (531); 2 id. (Cowen & Hill's notes) has been held admissible. Richmond v. Rich- 
 
 p. 763-770. mond, 10 Yerger, 343; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 461; see 
 
 4 Carlos v. Brook, 10 Ves. 49, 50. People v. Davis, 21 Wend. 309. 
 
 6 Phil. & Amos, 925. The regular mode of 3 The deposition of a disinterested person, 
 
 examining into the general reputation is to who afterwards becomes interested, may be 
 
 inquire of the witness whether he knows the read. Hitchcock v. Skinner, 1 Hoff. Ch. 21. 
 general reputation of the person in question, 4 Dixon v. Parker, 2 Ves. 219, 220. 
 
 954 
 
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