1543 .5 S5 SBERT MILITARY FEATURES OF THE PANAMA CANAL BANCROFT UBRAftY University of California Berkeley Some of the Military Features of the Panama Canal MILITARY LECTURE BY BRIGADIER GENERAL WM. L. SIBERT U. S. ARMY Eighth in Seriti of Lecturel on Military Tofict PALACE HOTEL Friday, March 17, 1916 SAN FRANCISCO 1916 Some of the Military Features or the Panama Canal SOME OF THE MILITARY FEATURES OF THE PANAMA CANAL WHILE we all hope and expect that peace will be the rule and war the exception and that consequently the commercial use of the Panama Canal will engage our attention most of the time, still in my opinion it was n military need for such a water- way that concentrated public thought to such an extent as to force the t'on-ress of the United States to embark upon this gigantic undertaking, fraught with many physical difficulties and with many latent but probable foreign complications. It was a re- enforcement of the Atlantic Fleet by a ship from the Pacific in the Spanish-American \Yar that brought the question to a vote. When the United States undertook to connect the Atlantic and Pacific by a canal through a foreign soil, it embarked upon an enterprise in which the world had a legitimate interest because it is just as much every nation's duty to see that its people have an equal op- portunity in the trade of the \vorld as it is to repel a foreign foe. This interest of the world was finally acknowledged in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, which document placed upon tho United States alone the . duty of maintaining the neutrality of this Canal. Any- thing, therefore, that affects our existence and power as a nation affects our ability to perform that duty. That duty carries with it automatically the right to create any instrumentalities that would facilitate its performance. Under this theory we have fortified the entrance to this canal and will in time of war so con- trol and use this waterway as to best assure our national strength unimpaired. This canal is practically our Southern border and is a short route between the two great parts of our country, the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, and it will ultimately divide by more than two the former freight rates between the two sections, which means that many industries yet unborn on the Pacific Coast will spring into existence, due to the fact that the reduced transportation charges will enable the products from such industries for the first time to stand transporta- tion costs and to enter the markets of eastern United States and of the world and compete. It also means a quick way of concentrating naval forces in either ocean and means some reduction in the naval needs of the United States but not the reduction that many seem to think. The navy in either ocean should always be big enough to make it unsafe for an enemy to attempt to transport a large expeditionary force across the ocean in the earlier stages of a war. Without tin- Canal the protection of our interests in each ocean would be practically a separate problem throughout. This Canal is, therefore, of great strategic impor- tance, both from a commercial and military stand- point, and like all strategically important points or lines will naturally be one of the first objectives of an enemy, especially of an enemy that has a naval superi- ority in the ocean immediately involved and which superiority would disappear when available naval re- i-iifnrcemcnts were passed through the canal. Such an enemy would take unusual risks in the attempt to accomplish a purpose so vital as blocking the canal. In consequence of this the sound of guns coxering the landing of troops on the Isthmus of Panama may be '!) actual declaration of war and history is certain to record naval lores of this Isth- mus and the clashing of arms in its jungles. If the I "nited States has an outlying possession that must be held it is the Canal at Panama. Holding it may deprive an enemy of his only chance to inflict heavy damage upon one of our coasts, and it is hoped that history will never re-cord the fact that the pride of this nation has been lowered by the loss of this Canal. It would be a much coveted part of an indemnity imposed at tlie end of a losing war. If engaged with a combina- tion of enemies that controlled both oceans, the defense of the Canal would fail unless the United States had effective railroad facilities through Mexico and Central America that could be used for the transportation of troops even with this its defense would be most difficult. Great facilities and great strategic appliances can only be made and maintained through great effort, prizes only come when earned, and when a nation ceases to strive it ceases to grow, especially in its virile elements. As previously stated, we have constructed sea- coast fortifications at both ends of the Canal and may build more, but seacoast defense is only one cog in the wheel, one element of the great machine neces- sary for war. These defenses within themselves, wherever they are, in this country or Panama, only deny the enemy the immediate use of the most impor- tant harbors, the immediate privilege of using the docks and railroad systems radiating therefrom for advances to the interior, and the immediate opportu- nity of collecting a heavy indemnity from the wealth of industries segregated at such harbors. Their mili- tary function, therefore, is to force the enemy, if he lands, to land at more difficult places where transpor- tation and other facilities are meager or lacking, and where the mobile force stands a better chance to force him back to his ships or delay him until re-enforce- nuMits can pre\ r ent him from capturing the coveted harbors by land operations. The defense of the country is made through a great machine in which each branch in proper propor- tion is necessary. Each element may think itself the most important but no element can succeed without the assistance of the others, and our people must not be blind to this and think that because their particular harbor is protected from immediate occupancy that the country is safe and that no great mobile force is necessary. In continental l/nited States the largest part of the necessary mobile force must be some form of citi- zen soldiery or volunteers, but in Panama the initial blow, the strongest blow, the one most difficult to meet, must be met by a complete and efficient war machine of sufficient si/.e on the ground at the out- break of war, and consequently must be composed of regular troops of all arms. A force that has studied the problems, knows the terrain, and has made all possible preparations as to strategical and tactical lines of operation and communication so that it can quickly occupy and hold the best positions for the accomplishment of the task presented. A force ready to strike advantageously the enemy wherever he lands and big enough to overcome him or hold him until re-enforcements can surclv come. We can always ivst assured that the enemy is at least as alive to the salient points of a military situa- tion as \ve are. If we leave undone those things that should be done, where our dereliction is greatest the punishment will be the most severe. Jf an enemy should have undisputed possession of the locks at either end of the Canal for a few hours only our water- way across the continents could be placed out of com- mission for the war and our naval strength in -either ocean could only be augmented after the long" iournc\ around the Horn. Whether one of the coasts in a republic such as ours could or would prevent in time of war a transfer of its naval protection by way of the Horn to the other coast, especially if a mysterious appearance of an enemy's cruiser or two were reported at times, you can guess as well as I. We all remember, however, the number of phantom Spanish Fleets that continued and continued to appear off many places on our eastern coast in the Spanish-American War, until Ccvera was actually located in Santiago Harbor, and we all remember the force brought to bear to have each city especially guarded. Being the most remote and younger half of the Republic, the Pacific Coast is the greater beneficiary of the Panama Canal and is more vitally concerned than the East in such steps being taken as will cer- tainly assure its existence and maintenance during war. 10 Jn continental United States it matters very little whether our regular army is 150 or 175 thousand men; some more comprehensive scheme for training larger numbers of our citizens must be decided upon ; its increase, however, to the extent necessary to provide and keep garrisons at war strength at all times in outlying posses-ions that are of great strategic importance, which especially includes Panama and Hawaii, is an imperative national need. The existence and manning of the seacoast defenses at Panama means that the enemy must land out of reach of those seacoast guns and must resort to land operations to take t'ne '.anal, and the existence of no obstruction except the lire of a well-drilled body of mobile troops >f vi'fficient si/.c can deter him or prevent him from accomplishing his purpose. A jungle is no defense. It is only a screen to the enemy's movements and may be an advantage to him. And with modern appliances that and any other inanimate obstacles can be quickly overcome. There is no military movement more effective than one that results in the permanent division of the enemy's forces, and the capture of the Canal would certainly do that so far as our Xavy is concerned and probably leave one of our oceans and one of our coasts at the mercy of the enemy. The policy adopted by the United States with its working force on the Canal has often been referred to 11 as an example of applied Socialism. The Government fed, housed and doctored the employees, did their laundry and baking and furnished all other supplies for them and their families. All this was not Socialism but was simply an application of Army methods to a great construction job on which all needed money was available, which enabled those methods to be thor- oughly tried, with the result that there was created on this Canal one of the most efficient and contented organizations that ever existed, which organization was provided with the most effective machines that money could buy. If those charged with the construc- tion of the Canal, under such circumstances, did not accomplish large quantities of work quickly and eco- nomically it would certainly have been the fault of the management. All that the Army asks is a machine of proper capacity, time within which to bring the vari- ous parts of this machine to bearing, and time within which by extended and frequent maneuvers to train the higher ranking officers in the art of command. The world has produced fewer really great military com- manders than the really great in any other profession, in many cases the failure to measure up to the stand- ard was due to lack of support in creating the machine. Imagine the problem if it was necessary to move the inhabitants of this city ten or fifteen miles every day, supply them with food, water and ammunition, 12 keep their temporary abode in hygienic condition and at the same time to so maneuver them as to force an engagement with an enemy with the chance of win- ning on your side, and to do all this with an equal force trying to block each element of the proceedings. You get, in this way, a slight idea of the duties of a commander of troops and appreciate to some extent the need not only of thoroughly training each part of an army but of developing team work by maneuvers on a large scale so as to give practice to all in the art of war. \\"e have been in existence as a nation for more than a century and neither in our organization or sub- sequent changes in the instruments of government ha\ e we been moved by a patriotic impulse sufficiently strong to force a proper solution of our military prob- lems and we never will until each man under forty-five years of age is ready to do his part in the defense of the nation and to prepare himself for the efficient performance of that duty. 13