1543 
 
 .5 
 
 S5 
 
 SBERT 
 
 MILITARY FEATURES OF 
 THE PANAMA CANAL 
 
 BANCROFT 
 UBRAftY 
 
University of California Berkeley 
 
Some of the Military 
 
 Features of the 
 
 Panama Canal 
 
 MILITARY LECTURE 
 
 BY 
 
 BRIGADIER GENERAL WM. L. SIBERT 
 U. S. ARMY 
 
 Eighth in Seriti of Lecturel on Military Tofict 
 
 PALACE HOTEL 
 
 Friday, March 17, 1916 
 
 SAN FRANCISCO 
 1916 
 

Some of the Military Features 
 or the Panama Canal 
 
SOME OF THE MILITARY FEATURES OF THE 
 PANAMA CANAL 
 
 WHILE we all hope and expect that peace will 
 be the rule and war the exception and that 
 consequently the commercial use of the Panama 
 Canal will engage our attention most of the time, still 
 in my opinion it was n military need for such a water- 
 way that concentrated public thought to such an 
 extent as to force the t'on-ress of the United States 
 to embark upon this gigantic undertaking, fraught 
 with many physical difficulties and with many latent 
 but probable foreign complications. It was a re- 
 enforcement of the Atlantic Fleet by a ship from the 
 Pacific in the Spanish-American \Yar that brought the 
 question to a vote. 
 
 When the United States undertook to connect the 
 Atlantic and Pacific by a canal through a foreign soil, 
 it embarked upon an enterprise in which the world had 
 a legitimate interest because it is just as much every 
 nation's duty to see that its people have an equal op- 
 portunity in the trade of the \vorld as it is to repel a 
 foreign foe. This interest of the world was finally 
 acknowledged in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, which 
 
document placed upon tho United States alone the 
 . duty of maintaining the neutrality of this Canal. Any- 
 thing, therefore, that affects our existence and power 
 as a nation affects our ability to perform that duty. 
 That duty carries with it automatically the right to 
 create any instrumentalities that would facilitate its 
 performance. Under this theory we have fortified the 
 entrance to this canal and will in time of war so con- 
 trol and use this waterway as to best assure our 
 national strength unimpaired. 
 
 This canal is practically our Southern border and 
 is a short route between the two great parts of our 
 country, the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, and it will 
 ultimately divide by more than two the former freight 
 rates between the two sections, which means that 
 many industries yet unborn on the Pacific Coast will 
 spring into existence, due to the fact that the reduced 
 transportation charges will enable the products from 
 such industries for the first time to stand transporta- 
 tion costs and to enter the markets of eastern United 
 States and of the world and compete. It also means a 
 quick way of concentrating naval forces in either 
 ocean and means some reduction in the naval needs of 
 the United States but not the reduction that many 
 seem to think. The navy in either ocean should always 
 be big enough to make it unsafe for an enemy to 
 attempt to transport a large expeditionary force across 
 
the ocean in the earlier stages of a war. Without 
 tin- Canal the protection of our interests in each ocean 
 would be practically a separate problem throughout. 
 
 This Canal is, therefore, of great strategic impor- 
 tance, both from a commercial and military stand- 
 point, and like all strategically important points or 
 lines will naturally be one of the first objectives of an 
 enemy, especially of an enemy that has a naval superi- 
 ority in the ocean immediately involved and which 
 superiority would disappear when available naval re- 
 i-iifnrcemcnts were passed through the canal. Such an 
 enemy would take unusual risks in the attempt to 
 accomplish a purpose so vital as blocking the canal. 
 In consequence of this the sound of guns coxering the 
 landing of troops on the Isthmus of Panama may be 
 '!) actual declaration of war and history is certain to 
 record naval lores of this Isth- 
 
 mus and the clashing of arms in its jungles. If the 
 I "nited States has an outlying possession that must be 
 held it is the Canal at Panama. Holding it may deprive 
 an enemy of his only chance to inflict heavy damage 
 upon one of our coasts, and it is hoped that history 
 will never re-cord the fact that the pride of this nation 
 has been lowered by the loss of this Canal. It would 
 be a much coveted part of an indemnity imposed at 
 tlie end of a losing war. If engaged with a combina- 
 tion of enemies that controlled both oceans, the defense 
 
of the Canal would fail unless the United States had 
 effective railroad facilities through Mexico and Central 
 America that could be used for the transportation of 
 troops even with this its defense would be most 
 difficult. 
 
 Great facilities and great strategic appliances can 
 only be made and maintained through great effort, 
 prizes only come when earned, and when a nation 
 ceases to strive it ceases to grow, especially in its 
 virile elements. 
 
 As previously stated, we have constructed sea- 
 coast fortifications at both ends of the Canal and may 
 build more, but seacoast defense is only one cog in 
 the wheel, one element of the great machine neces- 
 sary for war. These defenses within themselves, 
 wherever they are, in this country or Panama, only 
 deny the enemy the immediate use of the most impor- 
 tant harbors, the immediate privilege of using the 
 docks and railroad systems radiating therefrom for 
 advances to the interior, and the immediate opportu- 
 nity of collecting a heavy indemnity from the wealth 
 of industries segregated at such harbors. Their mili- 
 tary function, therefore, is to force the enemy, if he 
 lands, to land at more difficult places where transpor- 
 tation and other facilities are meager or lacking, and 
 where the mobile force stands a better chance to force 
 him back to his ships or delay him until re-enforce- 
 
nuMits can pre\ r ent him from capturing the coveted 
 harbors by land operations. 
 
 The defense of the country is made through a 
 great machine in which each branch in proper propor- 
 tion is necessary. Each element may think itself the 
 most important but no element can succeed without 
 the assistance of the others, and our people must not 
 be blind to this and think that because their particular 
 harbor is protected from immediate occupancy that 
 the country is safe and that no great mobile force is 
 necessary. 
 
 In continental l/nited States the largest part of 
 the necessary mobile force must be some form of citi- 
 zen soldiery or volunteers, but in Panama the initial 
 blow, the strongest blow, the one most difficult to 
 meet, must be met by a complete and efficient war 
 machine of sufficient si/.e on the ground at the out- 
 break of war, and consequently must be composed of 
 regular troops of all arms. A force that has studied 
 the problems, knows the terrain, and has made all 
 possible preparations as to strategical and tactical 
 lines of operation and communication so that it can 
 quickly occupy and hold the best positions for the 
 accomplishment of the task presented. A force ready 
 to strike advantageously the enemy wherever he lands 
 and big enough to overcome him or hold him until 
 re-enforcements can surclv come. 
 
We can always ivst assured that the enemy is at 
 least as alive to the salient points of a military situa- 
 tion as \ve are. If we leave undone those things that 
 should be done, where our dereliction is greatest the 
 punishment will be the most severe. Jf an enemy 
 should have undisputed possession of the locks at 
 either end of the Canal for a few hours only our water- 
 way across the continents could be placed out of com- 
 mission for the war and our naval strength in -either 
 ocean could only be augmented after the long" iournc\ 
 around the Horn. Whether one of the coasts in a 
 republic such as ours could or would prevent in time 
 of war a transfer of its naval protection by way of the 
 Horn to the other coast, especially if a mysterious 
 appearance of an enemy's cruiser or two were reported 
 at times, you can guess as well as I. We all remember, 
 however, the number of phantom Spanish Fleets that 
 continued and continued to appear off many places on 
 our eastern coast in the Spanish-American War, until 
 Ccvera was actually located in Santiago Harbor, and 
 we all remember the force brought to bear to have 
 each city especially guarded. 
 
 Being the most remote and younger half of the 
 Republic, the Pacific Coast is the greater beneficiary 
 of the Panama Canal and is more vitally concerned 
 than the East in such steps being taken as will cer- 
 tainly assure its existence and maintenance during 
 war. 
 
 10 
 
Jn continental United States it matters very little 
 whether our regular army is 150 or 175 thousand men; 
 some more comprehensive scheme for training larger 
 numbers of our citizens must be decided upon ; its 
 increase, however, to the extent necessary to provide 
 and keep garrisons at war strength at all times in 
 outlying posses-ions that are of great strategic 
 importance, which especially includes Panama and 
 Hawaii, is an imperative national need. The existence 
 and manning of the seacoast defenses at Panama 
 means that the enemy must land out of reach of those 
 seacoast guns and must resort to land operations to 
 take t'ne '.anal, and the existence of no obstruction 
 except the lire of a well-drilled body of mobile troops 
 >f vi'fficient si/.c can deter him or prevent him from 
 accomplishing his purpose. A jungle is no defense. 
 It is only a screen to the enemy's movements and may 
 be an advantage to him. And with modern appliances 
 that and any other inanimate obstacles can be quickly 
 overcome. 
 
 There is no military movement more effective 
 than one that results in the permanent division of the 
 enemy's forces, and the capture of the Canal would 
 certainly do that so far as our Xavy is concerned and 
 probably leave one of our oceans and one of our coasts 
 at the mercy of the enemy. 
 
 The policy adopted by the United States with its 
 working force on the Canal has often been referred to 
 
 11 
 
as an example of applied Socialism. The Government 
 fed, housed and doctored the employees, did their 
 laundry and baking and furnished all other supplies 
 for them and their families. All this was not Socialism 
 but was simply an application of Army methods to a 
 great construction job on which all needed money was 
 available, which enabled those methods to be thor- 
 oughly tried, with the result that there was created on 
 this Canal one of the most efficient and contented 
 organizations that ever existed, which organization 
 was provided with the most effective machines that 
 money could buy. If those charged with the construc- 
 tion of the Canal, under such circumstances, did not 
 accomplish large quantities of work quickly and eco- 
 nomically it would certainly have been the fault of the 
 management. All that the Army asks is a machine of 
 proper capacity, time within which to bring the vari- 
 ous parts of this machine to bearing, and time within 
 which by extended and frequent maneuvers to train 
 the higher ranking officers in the art of command. The 
 world has produced fewer really great military com- 
 manders than the really great in any other profession, 
 in many cases the failure to measure up to the stand- 
 ard was due to lack of support in creating the machine. 
 Imagine the problem if it was necessary to move 
 the inhabitants of this city ten or fifteen miles every 
 day, supply them with food, water and ammunition, 
 
 12 
 
keep their temporary abode in hygienic condition and 
 at the same time to so maneuver them as to force an 
 engagement with an enemy with the chance of win- 
 ning on your side, and to do all this with an equal 
 force trying to block each element of the proceedings. 
 You get, in this way, a slight idea of the duties of a 
 commander of troops and appreciate to some extent 
 the need not only of thoroughly training each part of 
 an army but of developing team work by maneuvers 
 on a large scale so as to give practice to all in the art 
 of war. 
 
 \\"e have been in existence as a nation for more 
 than a century and neither in our organization or sub- 
 sequent changes in the instruments of government 
 ha\ e we been moved by a patriotic impulse sufficiently 
 strong to force a proper solution of our military prob- 
 lems and we never will until each man under forty-five 
 years of age is ready to do his part in the defense of 
 the nation and to prepare himself for the efficient 
 performance of that duty. 
 
 13