UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA! 
 AT LOS ANGELES 
 
 EX LIBRIS
 
 , '.
 
 LOG 1C 
 
 OR, THE 
 
 ART 
 
 THINKING 
 
 IN WHICH 
 
 Be/ides tlie Common, are contain'd maii 
 
 Excellent New fyles, very profitable for directing 
 oftya/on, and acquiring of Judgment, in things as 
 well relating to the Inftruion of a Mans felf y as 
 of other). 
 
 In Four Pahs. 
 
 I. Confiding of fyfleftions upon Ideas, or upon the 
 firft Operation of the Mind, which is called ////>rc- 
 henfion, &c. 
 
 Il.Of Conjiderations of Aden about Proper Judgment s^c, 
 
 III. Of the N4ftt/r and various 4*W. of f^afomng^ &c. 
 
 IV. Treats of the croft profitable Method for te- 
 monftrating or Ittuftrating any Tr?&, 6tC. 
 
 TO WHICH 
 Is added an 7N> A" to the whole B O %.. 
 
 For the Excellency of the Matter, Printed many times In French 
 and Latin, and now for Publick Good Tranilarcd into En- 
 gltjk by Several Hands. 
 
 L O N D O N, 
 
 Printed by T. B. for John Taj tor at the $//> in St. 
 Church-Tard, MDCXC1II.
 
 fl 
 
 j nr T I 
 , i - .-*-
 
 4 ANA 
 
 Advertifemen^ 
 
 4 : OF THE 
 
 ^AUTHOR 
 
 THIS Small Treafife is a' together more b&Cn-t- 
 
 riigfa its Birth to Fortune, or rather an 
 Accident of Div;rtifem?nt, then to any ft* 
 ricwD fyn. Font hap fen**^ ThataPer- 
 fcn of .Quality, entertaining a Yiung Ksb'ftnan^ tt'ht 
 mads afpear a So'.tdity of Judgment, and a Penetration 
 of Wit much abov-j hit Years ; am *ng otlxr D>fa>nr{e told 
 him, that when he himfcif&ai a Yonttg MJX, he had met 
 itHth a Perfon* from tp'txnt in Fifteen D*ys tons he had 
 learnt the great eft and mo ft material Pan of Logic. 
 ThisDifcMrfe gave occaficn to another Perfon then prefent, 
 and one who u> <aj no great Admirer of thai Science, t9 
 
 tnjojer {pith a Smile of Contempt, That if Monficur ^ 
 
 v vi'd give himfeif the trouble , he would under trig to 
 teach him off that tvaj of any ufe 9 in tbefo much crfd up 
 Arc of Logic, in four or five Dayt. Which Propnfai 
 made in the Air, having fn feme timsferv'd *sfor Pa- 
 ftims- I rej-jlvd to make an EjJ'ay : And becavfe 7 did 
 not thinly the vu'gar Logics, either Compendioufly or 
 Politely written^ I deftgnd an Abridgment for the par- 
 ticular Hfe ef the Young Gentleman himfelf. 
 
 This was the only Aim I had a>hen Ifirft began the 
 nor did IthtnJ^ts havefpent above a day about it. 
 4 'L But
 
 An Advertifcment ', &c. 
 
 JBwf fo Joon as I had fet my ft If to work^, fo many new 
 Reflections crowded into my Thoughts, that I teat cw- 
 ftraind to write *em down for the di[clwge of tnj A: 
 mory. So tint injle'nd of we day*' I fpfntfow or f-: 
 during which time, this Body of LOJTIC was forrrid, to 
 a'hic'j afterwards fevfral other things were added. 
 
 New tho it ftvetid to a greater Bulk, of Matter then 
 ?;.;. -:-'/:'/ ? ; >'V,;<Av7, yet had the Ej] ay tk fame fncifefs 
 
 hi at fr ft expected, l-'r.r the Young-Kobtcma;. 
 Wiincft the whole into fiur Table.', he learnt with eafs, 
 one a day, without any <ijj~ftance of a Teacher. Tha true 
 it is, we cannot, expect that others, feould be fo nijnl-i 
 a: he who had a Wit altogether extraordinary faid prompt 
 to Attain whatever depended upon the Vnderftanding; 
 
 And this &,jj the accidental otcafion that producd this 
 T'icanj. But now whattver cenfnrc it may undergo in. 
 the World, I cannot be jxfth blamdfor commit ting it 
 tie Prcfs j fines it was rather a fared then voluntary 
 del. For fiver al Perfins having obtained Copies cf it i~i 
 Writing {which cannot well be done without Jeveral Errors 
 cf the Pen) and under/landing withal , That Jeveral 
 Book fellers were about to Print it, I thought it better 
 to fend it into tic World corrected and entire, than to It; 
 ic be Printed from defective Manufcripts. But then 
 <rg<i*, I thought myfetf obligdta mal(e divers Additions, 
 tvhich fwetfd it about a Third Parr, believing the Li- 
 mits of the Firft Eflay too Jhort for 4 Public View. 
 4 jfnd to that purpose we have made it the SubjeEi of the 
 following Difcourje to explain the End, tt>bich we propofe 
 to curjelves, and the reafon why we have included fo much 
 
 ' . - THE
 
 # iVK "fl 
 
 ' : :i .va * ' J V. i * i\ 
 
 TRANSLATORS 
 
 TO THE 
 
 *" 
 
 ~ 
 
 r I ^ H E Common Treatises of L^ze are almoft 
 JL v/ichout number, and while every Author 
 drives to add fbmething of his own, fometimes 
 lierle to the purpofe, fomerfmes altogether from the 
 rmrter, the' Art is become, not only Obfcure and 
 Tediou?, but in a great Meafure Impertinent and 
 Ufelefs. 
 
 - Tnus the Schoolmen may be faid to hare cloggtt 
 and fetter'd Reafon, -which ought ro he free as "Air, 
 and p!am as Derhonlfratimi it felf, with vain mil- 
 applicatjonsofrhssArr to Notion and Nicety, while- 
 they make tife of ir only ro maintain litigtous Cavils 
 and wrangling Difpures. So that incfced- rhe com- 
 m-,:n Logics rtre but as ffj many Counrerfbrps to (hel- 
 ter the obftinare and vain glorious, that diiHairr Stab- 
 million and Convinccmenr, and therefore retire 
 vlrhin their Fortifications of diriiculr TCTIT.SU wrap 
 irc-j up in Quirk and Sucrlery, and (o efcape. 
 oafon in lie Clouds and MI ft* of their 
 
 . tmedy of which we arebcfol&ri to thi= Fa- 
 A
 
 Tranflators to the Reader. 
 
 mous Author, who has at length recover'd this Art 
 ( then a noble Science when not Pedantic ) from 
 Night and Confufton j clear'd away the Rubbifh 
 tr*i: oppre-fled ir^ and Prun'd off thpfe Underwoods 
 ync fuperfluous Boughs, that over {haded and Ec- 
 clipfed the light of true Reafbn ; (b that now Logic 
 may befaid to appear like Truth it felf,naked and 
 delightful, as being freed from the Pedantic Duft 
 of the Schools, <f, 
 
 It has had this Influence upon the World alrea- 
 dy, that feveral Books have been already Written 
 Irum the Rules of this Logic, noi; only by the Au- 
 dior himfelf, no lefs Celebrated for his Writings, 
 ihen for many other worthy Actions that recom- 
 mend him to the Common wealth of Learning : 
 Nor is his diligence in this particular, lefs to be ap- 
 plauded, for having cleans*d the Augean Srables of 
 ib many Syftemji from ftudied ^rbanfln and Deli- 
 TKan* For which Reafbn this Logic was thrice Ro 
 piinr^d in brana, Co great was the fatisfadion tn 
 thofe Ptrts ; and likewife Tranflated into Latin for 
 Universal Btneht; ar.d now is rendered into Engijjl}^ 
 as being a fmail Treatifc,no lefs Uicful for the Con- 
 duel: of liloKon L$~e, than to inllrucl: and guide us 
 wanciring in the LA^rinths of Itnfettfd fy/ifon. 
 
 Let not the lifajer fiightlj pafs thcfe Pages over, 
 butftriou% digeit ^hisArtoflhinktr.g, and being 
 cligclltd, let him ciifperle the dfp'ications into all 
 jhe yudgmKntS) vhtch he makes ot Things, and into 
 all th'.:^?*wM of his L;>, if KnotrteJge and "Under- 
 ng be hii /., 

 
 
 . 
 /noil ( aunfib^ Jo 
 
 ^Sffcfe^ 1 "'' 
 
 CON 
 
 #00 SfifiJ o'r r *iyifi-jJi ^jujti io Jfigii ^ p^cti. 
 
 THe firft Difcourfe, &*, tfc </*/ ,/ ,/tf 
 new Logic. F ^ la 
 
 I he Second Difcourfe, Containing an Anfteer to the 
 Principal ObjeBims made againft thit Logic. IQ. 
 
 PAR T^l* ^ 
 
 Containing Kfflexiont upon Ideas , or Upon i 
 JfittMW if'fWMW^itb * ca fd fa 
 
 Chap. i. O/ Ideas, iM&&teqtfr Nature *and 
 Original it ^iosgilil; , . T 
 
 Chap. i. o//^ oljefa of Weaa 
 
 Chap. 3. 0/Ariftotle's Ten Predicament* 
 
 Chap. 4. OftheCompofnion and Simply v _ VH ,, 
 
 - f^ri w ^y&wwW themnner vf knotting bj Ab- 
 Jlraclton -:i B9U ^ r 
 
 Chap. y. 0/r/H. Vniwrfality, Ptrticufaritj and Sin- 
 gularity of Ideas 6-. 
 
 Chap. Of the Five Univerfal Ideas, Genus, Spe- 
 acs, Difference, Pr^r W /frc/W^A 86* 
 
 Chsp. 7. Of the Complex'd Tom?, ^> Vnivcr- 
 ft! ity and Singularity , ~. 
 
 Chap. 8, Of the Clearnefs and DiftinRimof Ideas ; 
 
 ' <% alfoof their clfiuritj and cmfufion 8 r . 
 
 Chap. 9, Some E&m,f/ c , of tmfufd Idea?, &afr* 
 from .Ethics., ^_ 
 
 Chap*
 
 The CONTENTS. 
 
 Chap. 10. Of another caufe of Confufion in cm- 
 thoughts and difcourfe* \ 06. 
 
 Chap. J 1 . Of the t(medy ofConfufions in our Thoughts 
 *nd fyttiocifiations, art/ing from the confafion of words. 
 Of the benefit of defining urords j and of the difference 
 between the Definition of Things and Names III. 
 
 Chap. I ^. Certain Qbfervatious of great Importance, 
 touching the definition of words "A$wt- 118. 
 
 Chap. 13. Of another fort of Definition tf 'Names , by 
 
 which their figmfications are denoted ^cording to 
 
 common uft 1 1 ? . 
 
 PART H. 
 
 Chap. I. VPbtt a. Propfifion is? Of the four fort* cf 
 Propofitions l ^ 
 
 Chap. X. Of the Oppofitton of Propofitions, having the 
 fane Sufyeft and Predicate 1AO. 
 
 Chap. 3. Of Propofition* Sirnp'e *nd Compound* That 
 there are fome which feem to be Jimple but are not ^ 
 andtthicJa may be calfd Complex Pioftofittons, &th 
 as to the Subject and Attribute 1 4 j . 
 
 Chap. 4. Of the 'Nature of Incident Profo/itioitJ, tbtit 
 mike a part of Prspvfiti&ns ccwpJcx'd 148: 
 
 Chap. 5% Of the fa'Jkood that occurs in Complex Terms, 
 4nd fncidsnt Preptjifwnj 'T?- 
 
 Chap. 6. Of Complex Prcjwfj front, according t* sfffir- 
 fjf.ition and Negation. Of one fort cf Propofitions 
 which t'je Phiiofopbers ca// Modal J T9 
 
 Chap. 7. Of fever al forts of Catnpcs*d Prcpfitions 1 6 3. 
 
 Chap. 8. Of Propefi: ions composed in fince iji. 
 
 Chap. 5. O^tr-vationj to find cut the Predicates and, 
 Subjetls in Prcfofittons, txprtfs-d after 4 lefs rfital I 
 
 manner \
 
 The CONTENTS. 
 
 Chap, i o. Other Obftrvatioxs to /ftw/p vhptixr Pro- 
 pofittoni arc Vni-uerfal or Particular i $%. 
 
 Ghap. 1 1. Of two font of Propjitims neccjfcr? for t/x 
 Learning of the Scitnces, Definition Mid Divifion 195. 
 
 Chap. 11. Of the Definition O f a Tb^ , ^ 
 
 Chap, i $. Of the Conrerfan of Proportions, trish a 
 thorough Inquifition into the Nature of Affirmtticn 
 and NtgaticH, upon which ^ Convsrfion defends. 
 Andfirfl of the Kature of 4$r ma t>on 104, 
 
 Chap. 14. Of the Conixrjicn of Affirm* 
 ' 
 
 Chap. 15. Oftlx Nature fNcgteive Prtyfitions 
 Cil. i 6. Of the Converfwn of Negative Pro^fiticns ^l> 
 
 P ^R-T^IIL v 
 
 Of Difcourfe or fytiocination ^<\ '^ >fafaf .. a j r. 
 
 Chap, j . Qf the Nstw of fytiotination , and the f e '- 
 
 WAlptrts of it ^ w 2 , 7 
 
 Chap. z. The Ow/J^/SyJbgifms into St>n?l e and 
 
 .Conjunfiive ; and of,fvn f l e ,nto Ineompkx and Com- 
 
 fi^^^^-twsWxM \9 ^^ri.V1f ^i y> , ^^l. 
 
 Chap, ,. G^rrW ^/ for fafb Syllc^fms Incem- 
 
 " 
 
 ^ , ?- 
 
 C-hap. 4. O/ /, F^wr^ ^W Ai^^ 6/ Syllogifms i* 
 
 -General. That t hers can he no more than five Ft- 
 
 t 2> j l . 
 
 Chap. j. T^ Hl'^Modet and Foundations ofthtfrji 
 
 .. -. ... 
 Chap. 6. Tfc !(///, A^., ^ Princi pi es O f t fa 
 
 cond Figure ^ Jf 
 
 Cha p , 7 . jbc fyle,, Modes arf Grounds of the t* ir d 
 "i** Figitr*
 
 The CONTENTS. 
 
 ^r 
 
 Chap. 8. Of the M*ks of the Fourth Figure *. 
 Chat) 9. 'Of 0>m/&x Sylfogifms , and how they may 
 bs MJibtdinto Common Syllogifins, and bo* judg d 
 by tl* fame *plei 
 
 Chap. I Q. A General Principle, bi the Mf rf *i 
 tritfaut any other ZeduBion into R&arn and Modes, 
 The Truth or Fa/Jhood of a2 Syllogifins may be *M 
 
 ^6^ 
 
 Ch,o. i i. 74. .ipffati***** ** 1 **#*<> 
 
 feveral Syllogiims ^//m be intrtcate 
 Chap, i z." Q/- ConjimElive Syllogifms 17*. 
 
 Chap. 15. Cy-SyUogHms,^/.^^^ '*- 
 
 iurifiive . ' -' 
 
 Chap. 14. Of Enthymemcs WEnthymematic^a. 
 
 x o 4" 
 tenees . ""* 
 
 Chap. 15- O/Syllogifrnsc^/*/^/^ ^ 
 
 Chap. 16. Of Dtlemm* 
 
 Chao 17 0/^r Pwc or Method to find out Ar^u- 
 
 rncnt!', and bo* this Method is of little ufe a 9 y. 
 Chap. I 8. TbeVwifw ^ Pi into Maces of Gram- 
 
 mar, Logic **/ Mctaphylics 3 J 
 
 Chap. 19. O/ the fwralforttof wiuu Arguments, 
 
 cafd Sophifms 
 
 Chap. xo. O/ Mre&King ' civil Cnverfatum and 
 Dfcoutf 337- 
 
 -PART IV. 
 
 e//^ ** 
 
 Qup. i . O/ K^/^V, /^ ftov w^c* tbi>%, that 
 the Knowledg of things by the mind is mare certain
 
 The CONTENTS. 
 
 than what we know by our Senfesjbat there are feme 
 firings of which Mans underftanding is unsalable. The 
 advantage of this necejfary ignorance. 3 &4* 
 
 Chap. a. Of the two forts of Method, AnalyfiS and 
 Synthefis. An Example of Analyfis 397- 
 
 Chap. 3. Of the Method of Compo/ition, and particu- 
 iarfy that, which is obfeiJd ly the Geometricians 
 .yj't^vi- 4 9' 
 
 Chap. 4. A more particular Explication of the forego- 
 ing little s, and firft of thofe that relate to Defintions 
 
 411. 
 
 Chap. 5:. That the Geometricians fee m not to have 
 fight ly underflood the difference between the Definition 
 ef words and things 418. 
 
 Chap.6. Of the titles in Inference to Axioms 41 ^ . 
 
 Chap. 7. Certain Axioms of Moment that may ferve 
 for Principle* of great Truth 43 I . 
 
 Chap. 8. Of Cities relating to Demonft ration 434- 
 
 Chap. 9. Offome Errors ufuaJlj occurring in the Afe- 
 thod of the Geometricians 437. 
 
 Chap, i o. An Anfwer to what the Geometricians al- 
 ledgefor thtmfehes 4-4-7- 
 
 Chap. u. The Methcd of Sciences reducd to Eight 
 Principal tytlcs 4T- 
 
 Chdp. 11. Of what we knott) hy Faith, whether Hu- 
 man or Divine ? 4 5- 1 . 
 
 Chap, i 5. Certain Rules for the Guidance of Kfofon t 
 the belief of Events that depend upon Human 
 Faith 45-6'; 
 
 Chap. 14; An Application of the preceding tyife to 
 the Belief of Miracles 461. 
 
 Chap,
 
 The CONTENTS. 
 
 Chap, i 5*. Other Remark a fan the fame Suhiebi, of 
 
 ^tbe tirief of Events 468. 
 
 Chap. 1 6. Of the Judgments we ought to make of 
 
 Future Accidents 
 
 LOGIC
 
 THE 
 
 FIRST DISCOURSE; 
 
 Shewing the 
 
 DESIGN 
 
 OF THIS 
 
 New Logic. 
 
 HERE ij nothing more worthy of B 
 Item, than foundnefs of Judgment, and 
 an exaa meafure of Wit to diicern be- 
 
 T 
 
 it iw UHC-crn DC- 
 
 r,cuL f *r5f? and falfli d - A " * e * 
 
 faculties of the Mrad are of fingular ufe, butex- 
 aa n dsofReafoni.univerfally profitable upon aH 
 
 it Tno" S o n i ni i n TheSc- e employi r e . ms ofLi ^ ?<* 
 
 Afeir. and Adtions both of 'the Body md" Mind! 
 
 wh,ch are the Subjea, ot Human Difcourfe. Ther= 
 
 sery one a iignal difference, while fornc are 
 
 rue and feme are falfe and therefore it belongs to 
 
 <eaf to make the choice. Who chufe aright,
 
 as 
 
 make 
 
 udgmenr, 
 
 ^u-HfiWeinay 
 bis utmoft diligence 
 IQ we muft make ufe of 
 to acquire Knowledge, 
 '- uie of 
 
 . 
 
 es of the Underton^ ., 
 
 And therefore it ought 3 oe <n r 
 
 Study of a Man - 
 and to tender it. the 
 te -, the 
 oaght to tend 
 Reafon, ' 
 an d on B 
 
 Knowledge to perfeft ^' t va l ue than all 
 tenting being .nfin, cl y of grea ^ ^^ 
 {peculative Knowledge , bj me ^ ^ ^ ^. 
 and certain Sciences: Wh,ch o B fartkr i 
 
 , all Men of P'^Je'reyfrrvetothaten 
 thefe Speculafons, than wn^/ dfe nottoem . 
 
 an d only to "H their Wit. 
 
 do not tend to the 
 ^ f , ative 
 
 ftronomy andPhy- 
 , n AmuK ment, or that 
 
 fick, to'be ' h r t e h " 1 b a c ; a au ed,han ,he Ignorance 
 ,heybe much more to b> " &dvantag e, 
 
 of Lfi things 5 wteh at lealt h ^ ff Men 
 chat it i. left "" the ofaibe to 
 
 in 
 
 For if 
 end, they 
 
 Barren Sciences. 
 
 Th
 
 ^ Bg Firfl Dijcourfe. ^ 
 
 The hidden Secrets and Myfteries of thofe Art- 
 are not on y of fictle profit, but altogether u?etrf,f 
 
 ^ C n For r M m nly " the f e1 ^ for them- 
 ves. For Men were not born to employ their 
 tiofc.il meaning Lines, in examining the pro- 
 >oion of Angles, or confidering the different Mo- 
 tions of Subftance Their Souls are too lofty, their 
 Life too fliort the,r 
 
 T . f n " ovui are coo lot 
 
 Life too fliorr, their Time too precious, 
 
 felves about fuch petty Objea*. But they ". 
 obliged tobejuft tobe upright, to be judicious ia 
 
 Aff^ lr ?. lf "" rres ' ma]1 th ^'r Aftion S ; an d in M 
 Affairs which they undertake. 
 
 of J udgm en t) i, be adn , re 
 others: For em 7 where we meet with none but 
 wandnng Llnderftandings, uncapaWe of dSnine 
 
 Truth, whomalithingstakeawrongCourfe who 
 tofy chemClve, with corrupted Reafons, an'dS 
 would ,mpole the fame upon others; who fuffer 
 themfelves to be led away wi.h the fmalleft & 
 :nces ; who are always i Exceffes and Extremes 
 hc wantfufficient ftaidnef, to preferve tS ' 
 :pnftanttothe Truths which they know, aTadh 
 .ng thereto, rather by hazard than found and j u di- 
 
 SSfiS .^f^ 1 . 00 "'^. continue f^ob- 
 nate y hxd ,n thar Opinions, that they wi'l not 
 .mucnas ,ften tothofc that could undeceive them 
 'ho boldly decide and dtrevmine ArguS 
 h,ch tneynother know nor imJc^nd, M^ 
 nrver yet underlfood bv =rv ;hcr: Who 
 
 maie
 
 The Firft Difcourfe. 
 
 make no difference at all between Speaking and 
 Speaking ; or only judge of the truth of Things 
 by the Tone of the Voice : He that talks fmoothly 
 and gravely, ipeaks Reafon ; he that cannot readi- 
 ly explain himfelf, and feems to be in a hear, mud 
 be in the wrong ; and more than this they know 
 
 not. j. . 
 
 Which is the reafon that there are no abfurdities 
 how infupportable fbever, which do not find their 
 Champions. He that has a defign to Deceive the 
 World, (hall not fail of Perfons as ready to be gull d, 
 and the moft ridiculous Fopperies {hall meet with 
 Under (landings proportionate to their Folly. And 
 indeed we ought not t wonder at any thing, while 
 we findfb many People infatuated with the Foole- 
 ries of judicial Aftrology, and Perfons of Gravity 
 Jo ferioiifly handling that Subject. There is a cer- 
 tain Conftcllation in the 'Firmament which feme 
 i\fcn have been pleas'd to call a Ballanze; as like a 
 Ballance as a Wind-Mill, and all one. This Bal- 
 % face they cry, is an Emblem of Juftice, and all that 
 are bom under that Conftellation (hall be upngnt 
 and juft. There are three other Signs in the Zo- 
 diac which they call, theoncalfcw, the other a 
 Bull, the third a Goat ; and which they might as 
 well have called an Elegant, a Crocodile, or a Ityf- 
 noceru. Now the J^, the B//, and the Goat are 
 Beafts that chew the Cud; and therefore they that 
 r ke Phyfick when the Moon is in any pt thele U>n- 
 Itcllations, (hill be in danger to vomit it up again. 
 Thcfc arcftrai^c
 
 ~ -- 
 The Firfl Difcottrfe 
 
 ved I M d worfe managed. There are few ofTfe 
 
 
 hofe bound, wh,cl: .are proper fortheirCa- 
 ..- 
 
 r..-y, ^ajnrmgemftomnwdling.witb ,ho 
 hmgs of wh,ch they are uncapable. NevcrthlkH 
 CB very true, that the greateft part of theWaciot' 
 Vgmem, among Men proceed' notfrom ,h s Pri ' 
 
 Sto? bC ' ng , ra , ther u ' d >>yl precipitation of 
 the Bra n, and through -defca of Confideration 
 
 e ;t rr to ^WS3Sr 
 
 qr only know obfcurely and confufedl/ 
 P 3 Th^
 
 The Firft Difcourfe. 
 
 The little regard and love of Truth in Men, is the 
 Reafon that they take fo little pains, the chiefefl: 
 part of their time, to diftinguim what is true from 
 what is falfe. They admit into their Breafts all 
 forts of Difcourfes and Tenents, rather chufing to 
 f uppofe them to be true, than to examine 'em. If 
 they underftand them not, they are willing to be- 
 lieve that others do. And thus they load their me- 
 mories with an infinite number of Falfities, and af- 
 rerwards argue upon thofe Principles, never confi- 
 dering what they fay, or what they think. 
 
 Vanity and Prefumption alfo contribute very 
 much to this Mifcarriage. They think it a frame 
 to doubt, and not to know ; and they rather chufo 
 to talk, and determine at a venture, ^ than to ac- 
 knowledge their not being fufficiemly inform'd to 
 : ,cge aright. Alas ! we are full of Ignorance and 
 Error 5 and yet It is the mail difficult labour in the 
 World to draw from the Lips of Men Rich a ConfeP 
 Con as this, Ianat*JlnJ, lam at.aftawl', though 
 fo juft and fo conformable to their Natural Condi- 
 tion. 
 
 Others there are, on the other fide, who not 
 having wit enough ro know that there are a thou- 
 fand things full of obfcurity and uncertainty ; and 
 yet out of another fort of Vanity, dcfirous to lei 
 the World fee that they are not fway d by populai 
 Credulity, take a pride in maintaining that there 
 is nothing at all certain. Thus they difcharg< 
 themfelves of the trouble of Examination, anc 
 mifguided by this evil Principle, they queftion thj
 
 The Firfl Difcourfe. 7 
 
 moft conftant Truth*, even of Religion it felf. 
 
 This is a Source of Pynonifm, which is another 
 Extravagance of human Wit 5 which, though ic 
 appears jquire contrary to the raftinefs of thofe that 
 decide and determine all things, flows neverthelefs 
 from the lame Spring, that is to fay, want of Ccn- 
 fideration; For as the one will not take the pains 
 to find out Error, the other will not be at the 
 trouble to face Truth with that ftedfaftnefs which 
 is requifite for convincement. The leaft glimmer- 
 ing fuffices to make the one believe notorious Falf- 
 hocds ; and to the other is a fufficient fatisfoclion 
 to make 'em queftion the greateft certainties. Bur 
 as well in the one as the other ; it is only want of 
 Induftry thatproduces fuch different Effects. 
 
 True Reafon places all things in their proper 
 Sration. She caufes us to fcruple ail things that 
 are doubtful, to reject what is falfe, and ingeni- 
 oufly to acknowledge what is clear and evident ; 
 without contenting our felves with vain Arguments 
 of the Pjrronians, which do no way deftroy the 
 rational Aflurance we have of things certain, not 
 in the very Judgments of thofe that propofe 'em. 
 No Man ever ferioufly doubted whether there were 
 a World, Sun and a Moon, or whether the whole 
 were bigger than its part ? Men may outwardly 
 lay wirh their Lips that they doubt fach a thing, . 
 but they can never affirm it m their hearts. There- 
 fore Pyrronifm cannot be call'd a Sect of People 
 that are perfwaded of what they -aver, but a Seel: 
 of Lyars. So frequently <jo they contradict one 
 B 4 another
 
 8 .The F/rfi Difcourfe. 
 
 another in difcouifing of their Opinions, their 
 Hearts not being able to accord with their Tongue?, 
 as we may find in Montaigne^ who has endeavour'd 
 to reftore that Se6l to this latter Age. For after he 
 lias afHrm'd, that the Academics differed from the 
 fyrroniavs , he declares himlelf for the Pyrromans 
 5n thefe words, The Opinion of the Pyrronians, faith 
 he, is more bold, and altogether much more f rob able : 
 Whence it appears, that there are fbme things 
 more probable than others. Nor does he fpeak 
 this to maintain a piece of Subtilty : They are words 
 that efcaped him before he was aware, and that 
 proceeded from the bottom of Nature^ which the 
 Falflhood of Opinion cannot ftifle. 
 
 But the mischief i?, that in things that are not fo 
 fubjecl: to Sence, thefe Perfons that place their 
 whole delight in doubting all things, will not per- 
 mit their Wit to apply itfelf to what might con- 
 firm their Judgments , or if they do, 'tis very (light- 
 ly j by which means they fall into a voluntary fuf- 
 pence and wavering in matters of Religion, as be- 
 ing pleas'd with that ftate of Darknefs which they 
 procure to themfelves, and more convenient to al- 
 lay the flings and reproaches of their Conscience, 
 and give the free Reins to their paflions. 
 
 Seeing then, that thefe Irregularities of the Un- 
 derftanding, which appear fo oppofite, while th< 
 one gives eafie belief to what is obfcure and uncer- 
 tain, the other Rill queftions what is clear and evi 
 denr, have yet the ft me Source ; that is to (ay, wart 
 of attentive Study to difcern the Truth 5 the Remedj
 
 ~~ . _ 
 
 The Fir ft Difcourje. 
 
 it 
 
 B 5 our.
 
 io The Firfl Difcourfe. 
 
 our. For fince that Men are frequently deceived 
 fn their Judgments, and fbmetimes again as right- 
 ly underftand when the argue one while ill, another 
 while well ; and after they have argued ill, are ca- 
 pable to fee their Error ; 'tis but obfer.ving by re- 
 fled ing upon their own thoughts, what method 
 they follow'd when they argued well, and what was 
 the caufe of their miftake, when they happen'd to 
 be deceived ; and, by vertue of thofe reflections, to 
 irame Rules to themfelves, whereby to avoid being 
 farprized for the future. 
 
 This is properly that which the Philofophers un- 
 dertake, and which they make luch magnificent 
 jpromiles to perform ; and therefore if we may be- 
 iieve'em, they furnifli us in thai fort of Learning 
 which they defjgn to this purpole, calling it by the 
 name of Logic, with a Light fufficient to diflipate 
 all thofe Clouds that darken our Under flan ding. 
 They correct all the Errors of our Thoughts, and 
 give us fuch infallible Rules that we cannot mils the 
 Truth, and fo neceflary withal, that without them 
 it is impoflible to know any thing of certainty. 
 Theleare the Applaufes which they themfelves give 
 their own Precepts. But if we confider what we 
 find by Experience concerning the ufe which thefe 
 Philosophers have made of thole Rules, as well in 
 Logic as in other parts of Phijbfbphy, we may 
 luve fufEcient caufe to miftruft the verity of their 
 Fronjilcs. 
 
 But becaufe it is not juft to reject whatever is be- 
 r.diciai in Logic, bccaufe of the ill ufe that is made 
 
 of
 
 The Firft Difcourfe. n 
 
 of it; and for that is is not probable that fo manv 
 great Wits, who have fo feduloufly ftudied the 
 Rulesof Rcafoning, could find out nothing that was 
 id and material; and laftly for that Cuftom has 
 mtroducda kind of neceffity for us to have at leaft 
 a rough knowledge of Logic, we thought it might 
 i tome meafure contribute to the publick Advan- - 
 tage to ^draw from thence whatever it conrain'd 
 moft ferviceable to reflifie our Judgmens. And this 
 is chiefly thedefignof this Treatife, together with 
 fome new Refleftions that came into our Thoughts 
 while the Pen was in our hands, and which indeed 
 makeupthegreateftand moft confiderable part of 
 the whole. 
 
 For we find that the ordinary Philosophers had 
 10 other intention than to fit down the Rules of 
 goocj and bad Arguments. Now though it cannoc 
 be faid that thefe Rules are altogether ufelcfs, fincc 
 many times they ferve to difcover the Fraud of in- 
 ncate and puzling Arguments, and to difpofeour 
 thoughts to argue and refel in a more convincing 
 manner; neverthelefs we are not to believe that 
 :his benefit extends very far ; the greateft part of 
 the Errors of Men not con fitting in their fuffering 
 themfelres to be deluded by ill Confequences, but 
 in permitting themfelves to befway'd by falfe judg- 
 ments, .from whence falfe Conferences are drawn. 
 And this is that for which they who have hither- 
 o treated of Logic have found but little Remedy ; 
 id which ,s therefore the Subject of the new Re- 
 flections fo freaueut in this Treatife. 
 
 Never-
 
 12, The Firfl Difcourfe. 
 
 Neverthelef?, we are obliged to acknowledge, 
 that thefe Reflexions which we call new, becaufe 
 they are not to be found in Common Logics, are 
 not all the Author's own ; but that we have bor- 
 rowed fome from the Writings of a Famous Philo- 
 fbpher of this Age, wherein appears as much per- 
 Ipicuity and curiofity of Wit, as there does confu- 
 iion in others. Some few other Reflections we have 
 alfb drawn from a fmall Manufcript of the deceas'd 
 Monjjeur Pafcbal, entitled, The Soul of Geometry, and 
 this is that which we have made ufe of in the Ninth 
 Chapter of the firft part of the Difference between 
 the Definitions of Name, and the Definitions of 
 Tfeg,and the five Rules which are explained in the 
 Fourth Part, more largely handled there than in 
 .this Treatife. 
 
 As to what we have taken out of the ordinary Lo- 
 gic Books, our following Obfervations declare! 
 
 In the firlt place we had a defign to bring into 
 this Treatife all that was really beneficial in others, 
 as the Rules of Figures, the Divifions of Terms and 
 Ideas, withfbme Reflections upon the Propositions : 
 other things we thought of little life, as the Cate- 
 gories or Predicaments and Places j but becaufe they 
 were fhort, eafie and common, we did not think 
 t to omit 'em with a caution however, what judg- 
 ment to make of 'em, to the end they might not be 
 thought more ufeful than indeed they are. 
 
 We were more doubtful what to do with certain 
 other Things, fufficiently knotty, butot little pro- 
 fit, as trie Converfion of Profojitim^ the Demonftra- 
 
 tioa
 
 The Firfl Difiourfe. 
 
 tion of the Rules of Figures ; but at length we re- 
 folvednot to leave 'em our, the difficulty it felfnot 
 being altogether ufelefs : For true it is, that when 
 it docs not terminate in the knowledge of any 
 Truth, we may have reafbn to fay, Stultum eft dif- 
 ficile* habere nugas, 'Tis a foolt/h thing to labour in 
 difficult tnfles. Yet are they not altogether to be 
 avoided, when they lead us to fbmething of Truth, 
 fince it may prove to a Mans Advantage toExef- 
 cife himfelf in the undemanding of Truths that are 
 intricate. 
 
 There are fome ftomacks that only digeft- light 
 and delicate Dier, and there are fbme Wits that 
 cannot apply themfelves to the ftudy of other than 
 eahe Truths array'd in the Ornaments of Eloquence, 
 Both the one and the other is a nicenefs not to be 
 commended, or rather a real Weakness. For a 
 Man muft endeavour to enable himfelf to difcover 
 Truth, when it is moft concealed and envelopped, 
 and to refpea her in what (hape fotver (he appear?. 
 For if a Man be not able to furmount that nicenefs 
 and diftaftej which is eafily conceived of things 
 that appear a little Subtle and Scholaftfc, he does 
 but thereby contraa and flirivei up his Under- 
 ftanding, and render himfelf uncap.ible to appre- 
 hend any more than what is to be known by a long 
 Series of feveral Proportions. So -chat when one 
 Truth depends upon three or four Principles which 
 he muft ^neceflarily confider and ftudy all at one 
 time, he is amazed and foikd, and many times 
 deprived of the knowledge of feveral things highly 
 
 Advan-
 
 14 The Firfl Difcourfe. 
 
 Advantageous j which is a Fault of great Confe- 
 quence. 
 
 The Capacity of Man's Underftanding (brinks 
 or dilares its feif according to ufe and cuftom, and 
 therefore for the enlarging of the Intellect the Ma- 
 thematicks and all difficult Studies chiefly conduce; 
 for they caufean Expanfion of Thoughts, and ex- 
 crcife 'em in diligence, and embolden them in a 
 fteddy confidence to ftick to what they know. 
 
 Thefe are the Reafons that induced us not to 
 omit thofe thorny Subjects, and to difcourfe of them 
 as nicely as any other Treatife of Logic. They 
 who think them tedious, may forbear to read them, 
 and indeed we have already given them that cau- 
 tion at the beginning, that they may have no rea- 
 fbn to complain, fince it is at their owa choice to 
 read or let them alone. 
 
 Nor did we think it neceflary to mind the difgufl 
 of fbme Perfbns that abhor certain terms of Art, 
 fram'd only to retain more eafily the feveral Ffr 
 gures of Argumentation, as if they were fome 
 Charms in Magic, and frequently fpcnd their in- 
 fipid Jefts upon Baroco and Baraltpton, as being too 
 Pedantical j for we looked upon their Puns to be 
 more Pedantical than the words ; for there is no- 
 thing Ridiculous in the Terms, provided they be 
 not adored for too great Myfteries ; for it would 
 be veryabfard indeed for a Man that was going to 
 difpute, to admonifti his Opponent before-hand that 
 he intended to difpute in Baroco or Felxpton. 
 
 Men (bmetimes make an ill ufe of that reproach 
 

 
 The firfl Dtfcourfe. 
 
 of Pedantry, and fbmetimes fall into it themfelves, 
 While they lay it upon others. Pedantry is a Viceof 
 the Mind not of the Profeflion ; for there are Pe- 
 dants in all Habits, of all Conditions and all Quali- 
 ties. To utter Law and mean things in bombafl 
 Expreflions, to bring in Greek, and Latin by Head 
 and Shoulders, to be in a pelting chafe about the 
 Order of the Attick Months, the Habits of the Afc- 
 ctJontans or fuch like Frivolous Disputes j outragi- 
 oufly to abufe another, that is not of his Opinion 
 about a paflage in Suetoniut ; or about the Etimo- 
 logy of a Word, as if his Religion and his Country 
 lay at Stake ; to endeavour to raife all the World 
 againft a Man, as a Difturber of the Peace of 
 Chriftendom, that has not a venerable Opinion of 
 Cicero, as Julius Scaliger has endeavoured to do a- 
 gainft Erafmui ; to intereft himfelf for the Reputa- 
 tion of an antient Philofopher, as if he were one of 
 his neareft Relations ; this is properly that which en- 
 titles a Man to Pedantry. But to make ufe of a 
 term of Art ingenioufly round out, for the eafe of 
 the Memory, may be eafily allow'd without any 
 fuch Reproach. 
 
 ^ It remains that we fliould give a Reafonfor o- 
 mitting fo many Queftions as are found in the com- 
 mon Logic-Books, as thofe which are handled in 
 the Prolegomena j, univerfal apanerei, Relations, and 
 fuch like. To which it may fuffice to anfwer, that 
 they belong rather to Metafbifukf than to Logic, 
 though that was not the principal Reafon that in- 
 duced us fo to doj for when we believe th^t fuch
 
 The Fir ft Difcourfe. 
 
 or fiich a thing may conduce to recUfie the Judg- 
 ment, 'tis not material to what Science it belong?. 
 The ordering of various forts of Knowledge is as 
 free as the ranging and methodizing Letters in a 
 Printing-houfe, provided the Method be natural,! 
 3 Tis fufficient that the thing inferted be ferviceable 
 to our ufe, and not to coniider whether it be fo- 
 reign, but whether it be proper, and therefore it is 
 that you fliall meet in this Treatife with feveral 
 things appertaining to Phyflcl^ and Ethicly, and as 
 much Metaphyfick* as are neceiTary to be known ; 
 though as tor thofe things we do not pretend to 
 have borrow'd from any other Perfon. Whatever 
 miy be lerviceable to Logic appertains to it : And 
 indeed it is a ridiculous thing to fee how feveral 
 Authors torment themfelves, efpecially Upmus and 
 the R&mifti, though otherwife Men of Sence, to 
 bound the Jurifdi&ion of every Science, and to keep 
 them from entrenching one upon another, as if they 
 were marking out the limits of Kingdoms, or bound- 
 ing the Prerogatives of Parliaments. 
 
 But that which induced us wholly to lay afide 
 thefe School- queftions was not barely their difficul- 
 ty, and their being out of ufe , for we have handled 
 leveral of the fame Nature ; but becaufe that ha- 
 ving fo many bad qualities, we thought they might 
 be difpens'd with, without offending any perlon, 
 as being fo little regarded or efteemed. 
 
 For it behoves us to make a great difference be- 
 tween unprofitable queftions, with which the Wrir' 
 tings of Philofophers are infjgnihcandy fluffed. 
 
 Same
 
 The Fir ft Difcourfe* 
 
 Some there are fufficientiy contemn'd by the Authors 
 themfelves ; and others there are which are cela- 
 brated and authentick, and which are notoriouflv 
 handled in the Writings of Perfons otherwife of 
 great Efteem. 
 
 And therefore it teems to be a kind of Obligati- 
 on upon us, in reference to thofe celebrated and com- 
 mon Opinions, how falfe foever they may be 
 thought to be, not to be ignorant of what has been 
 faid concerning them. We owe that Civility, or 
 rather that Juftice, not to their falfhood, which 
 defervesit nci, out to Men prejudiced againft rhdfe*, 
 to prevent their reje&ing what others value with- 
 out Examination. It being but reafonable to pur- 
 chafe at the trouble of underftanding thofe Quefti- 
 ons, the priviledge to fcorn *em. 
 
 But there is a greater liberty allow'd in reference 
 to the former, and thofe Logical ones which we 
 have thought fit to omit are or that nature : They 
 have this convenience, that they are o little Credit, 
 not only in that part of the ^Vorld where they are 
 unknown, but even among thofe that profefs to 
 teach 'em. No Man, God be thanked , takes the 
 part of Vniverfal a. fane rei, the Vmties offyafon, nor 
 Second Intentions, and fo we have no reafon to fear 
 lead any one fhould be offended, for pafling 'em 
 over in Silence. 
 
 Nor will it be amifs to advertize the Reader, 
 that we have allow'd our felves a difpenfation, not 
 always to follow the Rules of a Method altogether 
 as having fee down many things in the Fourth 
 
 Part.
 
 1 8 The Firft Difcourfe. 
 
 Party which relate to the Second and Third. But 
 we did it of fet purpofe, becaufe we thought ic 
 more proper to fee in one and the fame place, all 
 that was necefTary to render a Science altogether 
 perfect, which is the main defign of the method 
 handled in the Fourth Part, and for that reafon it 
 was that we referved the Difcourfe of Axiom* and 
 Demonftrations for that place. 
 
 And thus we have well nigh given ye a profpeel: 
 of our defign in this Logic. Peradventure for all 
 this there will be very few that will reap any Ad- 
 vantage by it, because it is not their Cuftom ufually 
 to practice Precepts by exprefs Reflections. Never* 
 thelefs, we hope that they who will carefully per- 
 ufe thefe Sheets, will recive (uch a Tincture from 
 thence, as will render them more exact ^nd folid 
 in their Judgment before they perceive it ; as there 
 are certain Remedies that cure the Difeafes of the 
 Body, by. augmenting and fortifying the vigour of 
 the Parts. However it be, the Treatife will be no 
 long trouble to any one ; for they who are but a 
 little before hand in the World of Learning may 
 read and con it in feven or eight days, and it is a 
 hard cafe, if in a Treatife that contains fb much 
 Variety, they do not find fomething fufficient to 
 repay their trouble. . 
 
 T HE
 
 THE SECOND 
 
 DISCOURSE' 
 
 Containing an Anfwer to the Principal Ol- 
 jeftions made againjt fhis Logic. 
 
 THEY who adventure to impart their Works 
 to publick view muft refolve at the fame 
 time to have as many Cenfurers as Rea- 
 ders. Nor ought this Condition to appear either 
 unjuft or burthenfbm. For if they are really uninte- 
 refted, they ought to have abandon'd their Proprie- 
 ty in making the thing publick, and from that time 
 look upon it wkh the fame indifference,as upon the 
 Works of a Stranger. 
 
 The only right that they can referve to them- 
 felves is that of corre&ing what (hall be found dc- 
 fedive,ro which end thofe various Cenfures that are 
 made of Books, are very advantageous. For they 
 are always profitable when they are juftjand when 
 unjuft, they do no harm. 
 
 Never thelefs Prudence fometimes requires that 
 upon feveral Occafions we fhould fubmit to Cen- 
 fures not always altogether fb juft ; for though they 
 do not make appear the thing reprow'd to be bad, 
 ihey (bew us at leaft that it is not proportionable to 
 the Underftanding of thofe that find fault. Now it 
 
 is
 
 lo The Second Difcourfe. 
 
 is better without doubt, if it may be done without 
 falling into any grea'er Inconvenience to chule a 
 Temperature fo juft, as in facisfying the judicious, 
 not to difpleafe thofe whofejudgments are not (6 ex- 
 act , fince 'tis not to be fuppofed,'that all our Rea- 
 ders will be Mtn of Wit and Intelligence. 
 
 Thus,it were to be wifti'd, that Men would not 
 look upon the firft Editions of Books, but as rude 
 Effays which the Authors propofe to the Learned to 
 underftand their Sentiments of the Compofition,to 
 the end that by a Collection of various Thoughts 
 and Cenfures, they may endeavour upon a fccond 
 review to bring theirWork to Perfection to the ut- 
 moftof their Capacities. 
 
 And this is the Courfe we would willingly have 
 taken in the Second Edition of this Logic 5 had we 
 heard more than what the World had already did 
 of the former.Neverthelefs we have done what we 
 could; as having added,ftruck out,and corrected fc- 
 veral things according to the thoughts of thofe who 
 were fo kind as to let us know their Objections. 
 
 And firft of all for the Language,we have almoft 
 in every thing follow'd the advice of two Perfons, 
 who gave them (elves the trouble to obferve fome 
 faults that were crept in through Inadvertency, and 
 certain Expreflions which they thought were not 
 properly chofen. Nor did we adhere to their Opi- 
 nions till by Confultation with others,we found that 
 all their Opinions agreed.In which cafe we thought 
 we might be allow'd our Liberty. 
 
 The Reader will find more Additions then Al- 
 terations
 
 The Second Difcourfe. 2, x 
 
 terations or Retrenchments;not being duly inforrn'd 
 of the faults that were found in. what was already 
 done. However 'tis true what we underftood of fbme 
 genera lObjeaions that were madeagainft theBook, 
 which we thought no Let to our further Progrefs; 
 believing that they themfelves who made 'em,would 
 eafily be fatisfyed,when we fhould give our Reafons 
 for what we did.For which Caufe, it will not be a- 
 mifs to return an Anfiver to the chiefeft of thofe 
 Objections. 
 
 Some there were offended at the Tirle,0/ the Art 
 of XM/,i n ftead of which they would have had, 
 The An of well Ugafoning. But we defire 'em to confi- 
 der,that in regard the Aim and Defign of Logic is 
 to give Rules for all the Aaionsof the Underftan- 
 dmg and as well for fimple Ideas, as for Judgment 
 and Arguments, there was no other word that com- 
 prehended all thofe different Aftions; whereas the 
 wordT/w/*/,, comprehends'em all. Simple I^are 
 thoughts tfttfements are thoughts, and Arguments are 
 thoughts. True it is, a man might have (aid the Art 
 of weU thinking-, but that Addition was not necefla- 
 Wing fufficiently imply \j by the word ^,which 
 figriifics of it felf a method of doing any thing 
 well. And therefore it is enough to fay the Art ff 
 *> tinting, theArtofNumbnng; fince no Man fuppo- 
 o be an Art to Paint ill, or miftake in calling 
 Accompts. 
 
 There is another Objeaion againfl that multi- 
 tude of things drawn from other Sciences dilcours'd 
 of in this Logic. Which bccaufc it affaults the 
 
 whole
 
 The Second Dtfcourfe. 
 
 whole Defign, and gives us an occafion to explain 
 our felves, it is neceffary to examine with fo much 
 the more care. To what purpofe, fay they, al 
 this motley, variety of Rhetoric, Ethics, Ply fa Me- 
 Mftfezfa and Gwwe/9 ? When we thought to meet 
 only with Logical Precepts, we are tranfported ofc 
 a fuddain into the Upper Region of the moft lofty 
 and notional Sciences, before the Author know 
 whether we underftand them or not. Rather ought 
 he not to have confider*d, that if we had all thole 
 Sciences already perfeft, we fhould have no need 
 of his Logic ? And had it not been better for him 
 to have given us a plain and down-right Logic, 
 with Ruks explain d by Examples drawn trora 
 common Things, than to encombcr them with 
 perplext and intricate Notions. 
 L But they who argue thus, have not furhciently 
 confider'd, that the greateft difad vantage to a Book 
 is, not to be read , fince it can only be ferviceable 
 to thofe that read it. And fo whatever contributes 
 tocaufe a -Book to be read, contributes to render it 
 uieful. Now it is certain, that had 1 gratified tli 
 Fancies, and made a dry barren Logjc with the 
 ufual Example of AmnuA and Horfc, how exaa fo* 
 ever and -methodical it might have been, it wou 
 have only augmented the number of fo many other 
 Boob, of which the World is full, and which are 
 therefore never read. Whereas it is this i CoUecli- 
 on of different Things that has procurdthe Sale . 
 this, and caus'd it to be with lefs annoyance and 
 
 d-iftaft than others, 
 
 IN ever-
 
 The Second Difcourfe- 2,3 
 
 Nevertheless this was not the principal Aim we 
 had in this mixture ; for we are apt to believe we 
 have follow'd the moft natural and mod ufeful way 
 of handling this Art, by applying a Remedy, as 
 much as in us lay, to an inconvenience, that ren- 
 der'd the Study of it almoft Fruitlefs. 
 
 The Experience (hews us, that of a Thoufand 
 yonng Men that learn Logic, there are hardly Ten 
 that know any thing of it, fix Months after they 
 have performed their Exercifes. Now the real caufe 
 of this fo frequent either forgetfulnefs or negligence 
 feems to be this, for that all the Subjects treated of 
 ia Logic, being of themfelves abftraded and remote 
 from ufe, the Examples alfb by which they are ex- 
 plain'd are no way taking, and feldam difcours'd 
 of otherwhere ; fb that making no impreffion upon 
 the. Fancy, they are with the greater difficulty re- 
 tain'd in memory, which fuddainly lo/es all the Ideas 
 it had a while ago conceiv'd. 
 
 Moreover finding thefe common Examples not 
 fufficient to prove that the Art it felf may be ap- 
 %'d to any thing ufeful, they accuftom themfelves 
 o immure Logic within it felf, not fuffering it to 
 :xeend any farther ; whereas Logic was invented 
 o be Serviceable, as an Inftrument to the reft of 
 he Sciences j fb that having never feen irs true ufe, 
 hey never make any ufe of ir, but are glad to be 
 id of it, as of a mean and unprofitable Know- 
 Jdge. . 
 
 For remedy of which Inconveniency, we thought 
 the beft way not to feperate Logic, according to 
 
 the
 
 2,4 The Second Dtfcoitrfe* 
 
 the ulual Cuftom, fo far from the reft of the Sci- 
 ences, for the Service of which it was defign'd, 
 but to join them together both the one and the other 
 by the means of Examples drawn from folid Rea- 
 ding, (hewing at the lame time both the Rules and 
 the Practice, to the end that fo the Scholar may 
 learn to Judge of thole Sciences by Logic, and re- 
 tain Logic in his Memory, by the help of the 
 Sciences. 
 
 So that this Variety is Co far from being a mean? 
 to darken thefe Precepts,that nothing can contribute 
 more to brighten and explain them j for of them- 
 (elves they are too fubtil to make any Imprefliori 
 upon the Mind, if there be not (bmething to make 
 them pleafing and acceptable to the Fancy. 
 
 Therefore to render this mixture the more ac- 
 ceptable, we have not borrow'd Examples at a ven- 
 ture from thole Sciences, but have made choice of 
 the moft important Points of Truth, and which 
 might be moll ferviceable to the Rules and Princi- 
 ples to find .out the Truth in othe^Matters, which 
 could not be handled at the (ame time. 
 
 For Example, as to what concerns Rhetoric, 
 we confider'd that there is little advantage to. be 
 drawn from that Artjfor the finding out of Thoughts; 
 Expreflions and Embellishments. Our wit f urnilhe? 
 us wich Thoughts ; Ufe affords us Exprenlon, anc 
 for Figures and Ornaments they are many times 
 fuperfluous , 16 that all the Benefit from thenc< 
 confifts in avoiding certain evilHabirs of Writing 
 and Speaking, elpecially an Artificial and Rhero 
 
 lica
 
 rica! Srilc 
 
 
 
 Second Difcourfe. 
 
 , Vice, in anOrTtor? |Thf ?' Ubl of 
 knowing and "fvo'id^rhoi '"n'Ti 1 ' " for the 
 
 ^3 h /-'*"S"i;^ 
 
 sfiaSass^WSRS 
 SSS^%&2 
 
 SHS?SjiiS 
 
 mark'! ouTgjf^ S MI de wherefn are 
 
 illi 
 
 S theprincij 

 
 __ 
 
 The Se cond V/fcourfe. 
 
 Gri and ,;/, in l^ft ^ astbin jttet c- 
 ther Chapter of fallacious arguing that happen 
 til Converfe, that Men may lee the large ex^n 
 of it, and how it conduces to difplay a great pare 
 of human Irregularities. 
 
 There is nothing in 
 rable than the Original of our too,, 
 peration of Spiritually from Forms ; 
 The diftinaion of the Soul from the Body, and the 
 Proofs of its Immortality founded upon that chftm- 
 dion. All which things are largely handled in tl 
 Fitjl and Fourth Part. 
 
 In feverul Places alfo occur the greateft part ot 
 the general Principles of P^c, which lit wiU be no 
 difficult thing to Collea together. From whence 
 the Reader maybe fufficiently enlightned m what 
 ismoft proper to be known concerning Pondcro- 
 lity, the fcnW Qualities, the A&fa, theSences, 
 ,Vie attnidlivc Faculties, the occult Vertues, fub- 
 ikntial Forms, fuffici^t to undeceive us of an in- 
 numerable Company of falfe J*, which we 
 fuck'd in from our Infancy to the prejud.ce of 
 
 'Not that I, however, becauft here are many 
 things to be Uarn'd, would have the Reader neg- 
 kcl tuch Boo^s a.cxprcily treat upon thofe Sub- 
 iefts, which are therefore carefully to be ftudy A 
 But we have coniidered that there are certain Per- 
 fons, who may think this general and curiory 
 Knowledge of the Sciences lufficient ; ana lo it may 
 be perhaps to thofc thai never intend to devote them-
 
 
 
 The Second Difiourfe. 
 
 affirmation, unkf it hf n V y '" in their 
 For as for rf L L? fere 'o Geometry. 
 
 by 
 
 to 
 
 83
 
 2,8 The Second Dfawrfe. 
 
 us clear J&uand Proportions not to becontrover- 
 
 For Example, fpeaking of reciprocal Proprie- 
 ties, we hare affirmM, that there is fuck a Proprie- 
 ty in Reftangle Triangles, where the Square ot the 
 Htfotenufe is equal to the Squares of the reft ot the 
 fides. Which is clear and certain to all that under- 
 ftand it : They that do not apprehend it, may fup- 
 pofe it to be fo; nor will they for that the lefi ap- 
 prehend the thing it felf, which the Example is 
 brought to prove. 
 
 A^ain, if we had been to produce the common 
 Example of Hifiiliy, which is the reciprocal Pro- 
 priety of Man, certainly we had proposd a thing 
 not only very obfcure but very much controverted. 
 For if we underftand by Ability, a power ot con- 
 rrafting and dilating the Lips, I know not why we 
 maynotteach Beads to imitate thofe Motions ot the 
 Lips ; andfome we know there are that do to. But 
 if we include within the f>gnification of this word, 
 not only the change of the Countenance, but allo 
 the Thoughts that accompany and produce it ; and 
 fo by 'i$a*Kty mean a Power to Laugh, h tbinhng ; 
 in that manner all human Adlaons may be called re- 
 ciprocal Qual"5 there being none but what are 
 proper to men, if we join them with Thoughts: 
 And thus Walking, Eating, Drinking fell be cal- 
 led reciprocal Qualities of Men; fince one -Mar 
 Walks, Eats and Drinks thinking. Which it 
 granted, we ifhall never want Examples of recipro- 
 cal Proprieties 5 which ha^'ever will never fansfie
 
 The SeconJ Difcourfc 
 
 rhofe, who attribute 
 may as well allow 
 
 
 Mind, though the Imagination cannot from 
 denneation of ir, be fo diftind as to difplay T 
 pneue, Curforily alfo wealTerted that one of 
 Propnet.es of this Figure was, that all thefeAngt 
 were eual to 
 
 It remains that w e clear our fe! ra from an en- 
 
 n 0raP K a ' m 't 3 ' f me Pcrfo " s ha " ** 
 Us that we have taken out of ArtfaV, Ex 
 
 of vitious Definitions, and ill cl* Ar" 
 tanons ; which feerm to be donrouf ofa 
 
 But tff hV^ 7 the Per!patet '' C Ph f " ''> 
 But they had never pronounced fo 
 
 bf '- C nerf "1 o 
 
 obferved , c.tmg Examples of Errors, which 
 
 however we haveadhered to in quoting^ 
 firy?, Expenence ihews us, rh thofe which 
 
 ga z propos ^ are f iittie r n ^ 
 
 h to be remembred, as being fram'd at plea- 
 C 3 fiire:
 
 30 Tke Second Difcourfe. 
 
 fare j befides that the Errors are fo palpable and fo 
 vifible, that a Man would- think it impoflible to 
 tumble upon them. Therefore it is much more 
 t.-i the purpofe, to the end that what is faid con- 
 cerning thofe Errors, may be the more deeply re- 
 tain'd in Memory, and the more eafily avoided, 
 to felect fome notable Example of the Errors, into 
 which fome celebrated Author has already fallen. 
 
 For finding the Reputation of great Men not 
 tree from noted flips, we are incited by Care and 
 kciuflry to preferve cur (elves from the like Sur- 
 prises. 
 
 Moreover feeing every Man is bound to make 
 :.c writes as profitable as may be, therefore 
 of fet-purpoie thofe Examples of Errors are to be 
 produced, of which it moft imports us not to be 
 Ignorant. For .it would be an endlefs Toil to re- 
 member all the dreams and trifles of Find, Vanhcl- 
 w.cnt an.d Paracelfns. And therefore it is better to 
 (earch Examples in Famous Authors, whole Errors 
 il may be worth while to unclerftand. 
 
 Now. all this is to be found in Ariftotle to a Hairs 
 Breadth. For nothing can fo effedtually perfwade 
 a Man to avoid a fault, as to mew that fuch a 
 a Man as he, ftumbled at the fame Block, And 
 bij Philofbphy is become fo famous through the 
 vafl number of deferving Perfons that have em- 
 braced it, that there is all the Reafon in the World, 
 his Defers ftiould be expos'd. Which being fo, 
 we thought it would be worth while for the Rea- 
 der to take a review of the Maxims of the Peripa- 
 tetic
 
 Ike Second Difcourfe. 3 1 
 
 tetic Philofophy, yet becaule it is never good to be 
 deluded, thofe Maxims are fo proposed, that wha? 
 they are may be eafily known, as having curfb- 
 rily marked out the Defers,- for farther detection 
 of their Fallacies. 
 
 Which we have not done to leffen the Reputa- 
 tion of Ariftotlc, but rather to do him honour as 
 much as may be done by . thole that differ in Opi- 
 nion irora him. And 'tis vifibk in other placer* 
 that the points which arc tax'd of Errors, arc of 
 no great Importance, nor (hake the Foundations 
 of his Phiiofbphy, which we had no Intention to 
 aflaii. 
 
 But if we make no mention of thofe things 
 wherein Anftotle has excelled in Several of his Book% 
 the Reafbn was this, becaule the Series of the Dif- 
 courfe did not afford an Opportunity fo to do 
 which however we would willingly and gladly 
 have done, if Occafion had offered ; nor had A- 
 riftotle wanted his due Applaufe, who, beyond all 
 Controveriie,wa3 a Perfon of a capacious and fearch- 
 ing Genius, upon which he relying, has linked 
 together long Chains of Confluences in fucl^ Mat- 
 ters upon which he difcourled : And therefore he has 
 been very Prqfperous in what he has written in the 
 Second Book of his Rhetoric concerning the PaiP 
 fions. Egregious alfb are his Notions and Ob- 
 fervations which he has delivered in his Politics, 
 his Ethics, his Problems, and his Hiftory of Ani- 
 mals : And as confufed as his Analtics are, yet we 
 muft confefs that almoft all we know concerning 
 C 4 the'
 
 The Second Difcourfe. 
 
 the Rules of Logic, is taken trom (hence; fo 
 that there is nor any Aurhor from whom we 
 have borrowed more than from Ariftotle in this 
 Logtc 5 as one to whom the Body of the Precepts 
 belong. 
 
 True it is, that the moft imperfect of his Work 
 ftems to be his Phyfick?, as being alfo that which 
 for a long time as been condemn'd and forbidden 
 by the Church, as a Learned Perfbn has made 
 appear in a Treatife written to that purpofe; 
 though the principal Fault of it was not that ic 
 was Falfe, but that a was too True, and taught 
 Ftothing but fuch Things as could .not be con- 
 cealed from our Knowledge. For whoever doubt- 
 ed but that all Things were compofed of Matter, 
 and a certain Form of Matter ? Whether Matter 
 being to put on Form did not want it before, that 
 is to fey, whether it did not fuffer Privation ? Or 
 whoever queftion'd thofe other Principles of his 
 Metaphyficks, wherein we are taught that all 
 Things depend upon Form ; that bare Matter is 
 void of Action ; that there are Place, Motion, 
 Faculties and Qualities : But after all this, we do 
 not feem to have learn'd any thing new, or are 
 we more able to give a Reafon of any of Nature's 
 
 But if there be any Perions, as many there are, 
 who believe it a Crime to d'flent from Ariftotle, ic 
 will be no difficult thing to make it appear how 
 far remote from Reafbn (uch a vain Affertion is. 
 
 For
 
 - - 
 rke Seco d Vjfrvurfe. 
 
 For if we are oblig'd to Rever*n/v- k \/r 
 of fane PhHofophersf that ff on^or tt & 
 
 J^^-^rfH-lU^ro 
 
 have adhered, or for the Reputation which thev 
 have acquir'd among the Learned 
 
 For the fake of Truth we Rerer-ence them, when 
 
 of 
 
 And the aon _ s .cau in cotr 
 General,^ we may bejuftljr fcfpeaed 
 F t,on as beheving our fd4 more 
 than (b many ether?. 
 
 But when the Learned World is d.VWed in 
 
 ' 
 of Reputation appear on both fides, We 
 
 not thetrob ,ged to that Refervcdnefi, and w 
 
 *c con- 
 
 And now behold tl,e true Condition or M Me 
 h, s Day H,s Phitofophy has experienced bo.-h 
 Fortunes, fomet.mes exploded and cordtmned by, 
 a otberwMe received and . by all
 
 34 T^ e S econ d Difcourfe. 
 
 At this Day it is reduced into a middle Condi- 
 tion between the two Extreams. In France, Flan- 
 ders, England, Germany and Holland they Write fre- 
 quently for, and againfl:, Artftotles Philofbphy. 
 The Parifian Conferences as well as their Writings 
 are divided, into Two Parts ; nor. does any one 
 complain of this open War, declared againft hirru 
 The moft famous Profeflbrs no longer condemn 
 themfelvesto that Slavery of blindly receiving and 
 maintaining whatever they find in his Books, and 
 fome of his Opinions are utterly exterminated ; 
 for what Phyfician will now maintain that the 
 Nerves proceed from the Heart, as Anflotle belie- 
 ved,, fince Anatomy clearly demonftrates now, 
 that they derive their Original from the Brain, 
 ^hence proceeded that laying o( St. Auftin. 
 
 Jduitxfunfto cercbri & quafi Centra omnes Stnfw 
 diffudit* . 
 
 Who diffwd all the Senfes from the Point, W, at it'. 
 Mere, the. Center of the 'Brain, 
 
 And what Philofbpher dares be (b obflinate as 
 to affirm, that the.fwiftnefs of ponderous Things 
 descending, encreafesproportionablytothe propor- 
 don of their Weight ? When any Man may end. 
 ?his difpute, by letting two ponderpus Bodies never 
 .:".') unequal in proportion, fall from a high place , 
 iVt what time he fhall find very little difference in, 
 'ihe fwiftnels of their Motbn, 
 
 All things violent are of fhort Continuance-,, 
 all Extreams are violent. 'Tis very hard 
 prolcribe all Anfotles. ^ Opinions, as tor-- 
 
 mgrljj
 
 The Second Difcourfe. 
 
 " 
 
 that alt that is to be concluded, when 
 
 P inf **n t from; 
 , that we do not confent m others: much- 
 * that we have any Averfion againft them ' 
 fek to Degrade or Lcfie B their wSrtl, And 'y . 
 modeft procedure of ours, we hope, will bean 
 Proved by , tt juft Judges, 'and thatVy In ac
 
 3 6 The Second Difcourfe. 
 
 knowledge, that there is nothing in the whole 
 World, but a fmcere defire to contribute to the 
 publick Good, as Far as lies in the power of a Trea- 
 tife of this Nature, without Pafljon or Hatred a- 
 gainft any Perfon liviog. 
 
 &OGIC:
 
 37 
 
 LOGIC: 
 
 OR, THE 
 
 ART 
 
 THINKING. 
 
 L3 G I C is the Art of well ufing Reafon in 
 the Knowledge of Things, for the Inftru- 
 clion as well of a Man's felf, as of others. 
 This Art is derived from the Reflexions which 
 Men have made upon the Four Principal Opera- 
 tions of the Mind, Apprehenjion y Judgment , Dif- 
 eourfe and Difpofition. 
 
 We call 4pprekenfion the fimple Contemplation of 
 Things that prefent them/elves to the Mind, as 
 when we confider the Sun, the Earth, a Tree, Ro- 
 tundity, a Square, Cogitation, Entity, pronoun- 
 cing nothing exprefly concerning them ; and the 
 Form under which we confider them is called an 
 
 We,
 
 38 Logic ; Or, 
 
 We call Judgment, that Aion of the Mind, by 
 which aflembling together feveral Ideas, we either 
 deny or affirm This to be That. Thus confider- 
 ing rhe Idea, of the <*&, and the Idea afctytfait we 
 affirm or deny the Earth to be round. 
 
 Difcourfe we call that Operation of the Mind, by 
 which out of: feveral Judgments we frame another : 
 Thus when we have judged that true Vertue ought 
 to be referred to God, but that the Pagans did not 
 refer it to God ; from thence we infer, that the 
 Vertue of the Heathens was not true. 
 
 We call Diffofition that Adtion of the Mind, by 
 which we range various Ideas, Judgments and /fci- 
 tiocinations- upon one and the fame -Subject, in that 
 Order which is moft proper for its Explanation ; 
 and .this by another. Name, we call Method. 
 
 Thefe Operations proceed meerly from Nature, 
 and that fometiraes more perfectly from thofe, 
 that are altogether ignorant of Logic, than from 
 others that have learn'd it. So that it is not the 
 bufinefs of this Art to find out the way to perform 
 thefe Operations, for that we have from Nature 
 alone, that has given us the Ufe of Reafon, but ra- 
 ther to make certain Animadverfions upon thofe 
 Things which Nature her felf operates in us, which 
 may be of a threefold life to us. 
 
 Firft, we are thereby allured, that we make a 
 right u(e of our Reafon. For rhe Confideration of 
 Rules begets in us a more fervent Application aad 
 attentive Induftrf of the Mind, 
 
 Thd
 
 The Art of Thinking. 39 
 
 The Second is, That thereby we more eafily de- 
 left and explain the Errors and Defe&s, which 
 we meet within the Operations of the Mind. For 
 oftentimes it falls out, that we difcover by the 
 mecr Light of Nature the Faults of Ratiocination, 
 yet are not able to give a Reafon why it is falfe. 
 Thus they who know not what belongs to Paint- 
 ing, may take Exceptions at the Defeats of a Fi- 
 gure ', though- they are not able to tell the Reafon 
 why they find fault. 
 
 The Third is, That we are brought to a more 
 accurate Knowledge of the Nature of our Under- 
 ftanding by thele Reflections upon the Operations 
 of the Mind : Which, if we look no further than 
 meer Speculation, is to be preferred before the 
 Knowledge of all Corporeal Things, which are in- 
 finitely below Spiritual Confiderations. 
 
 Now fuppofing thofe Things, which we revolve 
 in our Minds, in reference to our own Thoughts, 
 were only done with refpecl: to our felves, it would 
 fuffice to confider them in themfelves, not cloathed 
 with Words or any other Signs: but in regard 
 we cannot anife(l our Thoughts to others, but 
 by the Benefits of exterior Marks : And for that 
 this Cuftom is fb prevalent, that when we medi- 
 tate alone, the Things themfelves do not prefent 
 themfelves to our Thoughts, but in the cloathing- 
 of thole Words by which we exprcfs them to o- 
 thers, it is neceilary for Logic to confider Ideas 
 join'd to Words, and Words join'd to Ideas. 
 
 And
 
 40 Logic : Or, Part I. 
 
 And thus by what we havefaid it follows, That 
 Logic may be divided into Four Parts, according to 
 the feveral Reflections which we make upon the 
 Four Operations of the Mind. 
 
 FIRST PART 
 
 Containing Reflections upon Ideas, or upm 
 the frft Operation of the Mind, ivhzch is 
 called Apprehenjion. 
 
 SINCE we cannot have any Knowledge of 
 what is without us, but by the afliftance of 
 Ideas which arc within us, what we {hall difcourfc 
 of Ideas may be thought perhaps to be the mod im- 
 portant part of Logic, as being the foundation of 
 all the reft. 
 
 We may reduce thefe Reflections to five Heads, 
 according to the tive ways of conlidering Ideas. 
 i. According to their Nature and Original 
 i. According to the principal difference of the 
 Objects which they prefent. 
 
 3, According to their being fmgle or compound ;, 
 where we (hall treat of Abftrattion* and frectjwns of 
 the Intellect. 
 
 4, According to their Extent or Reflection ; 
 that is to fay, their Univerfality, Particularity or 
 Singularity. 
 
 y. According as they are clear and obfcu re, di- 
 fiinft or confuted;. CHAP.
 
 Chap I. The Art of Thinking. 4I 
 
 C H A P. I. 
 
 Of Ideas, according to their Nature and 
 Original. 
 
 HT HE word 7*4 is of the number of thofe words 
 * t whtch are fo clear, that they need noc to bt 
 
 So that all that can be done in this cafe, to a- 
 vod Errour and Miftake, is to obferve the falfe 
 Notions and Interpretations that may be attributed 
 to this Word ; while fome make ufe of it only to 
 jmhe that manner of conceiving, which is per- 
 formd by the application of the Mind to thofe 
 Form, ; that are depainted in our Fancies, and is 
 call d Imagination.
 
 Lci Or, 
 
 between Imagination and perfect Undemanding. 
 As for Example, when I imagine a Triangle, I do 
 not contemplate it only as a Figure conhftmg ol 
 three Right Lines ; but I alfo confider thole three 
 Right Lines as prefent, by the force and internal 
 Application of the Mind ; and this is properly w 
 imagine. Or, itl would thipk of a Figure with 
 aThoufand Angles, I prefently apprehend that it 
 is a Figure confiding of a Thoufand fides, as eal 
 ly as I apprehend a Triangte to confift of three 
 Sides; but I cinnot imagine the Thoufand Sides ot 
 that Figure, nor behold them as being prefent, with 
 the Eyes, as I may fo fay, of my Mind. 
 
 Nevenhelefs, 'tis very true, that the daily pra- 
 aice of Imagination, in apprehending Corporeal 
 Things is the Reafon, than oft-times, when we 
 imagine a Figure of aThoufand Angle?, we torn 
 in our Thoughts tome confufed Figure or other. Buc 
 it is evident, that the Figure thus formed by the 
 Afliftanceof Imagination, is not a Figure of a Thou- 
 fand Angles; as nothing differing from that Form, 
 which any one would frame in his Thoughts, were 
 he to imagine a Figure of Ten thoufond Angles ; 
 as alfo for that it is no ways ferviceable to difcover 
 the Proprieties that made the difference between a 
 Figure of a Thoufand Angles from any other P- 
 
 And therefore I cannot properly imagine a Fi- 
 gure of a Thoufand Angles, for that the Figure 
 which I would frame in my Imagination woiM re- 
 prefent to me any other* Figure with a great Num- 
 
 ber
 
 Chap. I. The. An of Thinkiw.
 
 44 Logic : Or, Part I. 
 
 felves the Idea of the thing fignified by our words; 
 though that Idea may happen to be (ometimes more 
 plain and diftin& ; fometitnesmore obfcureand con- 
 ius'd, as we (hall declare hereafter. For he would 
 contradict himfelf that (hould affirm, he knew what 
 he meant by the wo'rds which he pronounces ; and 
 yet at the fame time that he pronounces them, fiiould 
 underftand nothing but the found of thofe words. 
 
 And this is that which {hews us the falflty of two 
 Opinions a broached by the Philofophers of thefe 
 Times. 
 
 The firft is, that we have no Idea of God. For 
 if we had none, in pronouncing the word God, we 
 ftiould apprehend no more than the three Letters 
 G, O, D, and he that only (peaks Bngli/h, would 
 have no more in his Thought^ when he hears that 
 word pronounced, than if he fhould come into a 
 Synagogue, not underftanding a tittle of Hibretv, 
 and hear the Names of God, Adonia or E/ohim. 
 
 Moreover when Ibme Men would be called Gods 
 ( which was the Frenzy of Caligul* and Domitian ) 
 there could be no Crime of Impiety laid to their 
 Charge, for that there is nothing in the three Let-| 
 ters G, O, D, or the two Syllables De-its which may 
 not be attributed to a Man, abftra&ing the Ideal 
 from the word : For which reafon the Hollander was! 
 never tax*d with Impiety, who cali'd himfelf Lud*-\ 
 vicvs De-ut. What was then the Impiety of thofe 
 Princes, but that they left at lead a part of its i 
 Idea to the Word Dew, fo that it fignified that tran- 
 (cen4dent and adorable Nature of a Deity, and 
 
 ap-
 
 46 Logic : Or, Pare I. ' 
 
 We are willing to believe, that thefe Word? 
 contain an Obje&ion far remote from the Sence ot 
 the Propofer ; but in regard that being fo Dogma- 
 t ically exprefled, they ruin the Immortality of the 
 Sou), it will be of great Importance to lay open 
 the Fallacy of the .Objection j which it wilrbe no 
 difficult thing to do. For the Covenants, of which 
 the Philofbpher (peaks, can be no other than the 
 content of Men, to take certain Sounds for Signs 
 of thofe Ideas exifting in our Minds. So that if 
 we had not befides the Names, the Ideas of Things 
 in our felves, thofe Covenants would have been in> 
 poflible j as it is impoflible by any fuch Covenant 
 to make a blind Man underftand what is meant 
 by the words, %eJ 9 Grem or Blew. For not ha- 
 ving thefe Ideas in his Mind, he cannot join them 
 to the Sound. ( 
 
 Moreover feveral Nations having given different 
 Names to Things, even to thofe that are moft ap- 
 parent and Gmple, as are thole which are the Ob- 
 jects of Geometry, they could not difcourfe in the 
 lame manner of the fame Truths, if Difcourle were 
 nothing but a Connexion of Names by the Word, 
 Eft, it is. 
 
 And fince it appears by this variety of words, . 
 that the Arabians ( for Example fake ) do not a- 
 gree with the Englijh about the fame fignification oF*- 
 Names, fo could they never agree in Judgment oc * 
 Difcourfe, if their Difcourfe depended upon that 
 Covenant; 
 
 J Laftly.l
 
 Chap. I- Tke Art ef Thinking. 47 
 
 Laftly, when we fay, that the fignification of 
 words are Arbitrary or ad placitum^ we ftick deep 
 in Equivocation. For it is true, that it is a thing 
 altogether Arbitrary to join this Idea, to that Sound, 
 rather than another. But Ideas are not Arbitrary 
 things that depend upon our Fancy, more efpect- 
 ally thofe that are evident and diftinft : Which that 
 we may make manifeft we lay, that it would be 
 very ridiculous to think that real Effects could de- 
 pend upon things purely Arbitrary. Now when a 
 Man has concluded by his Reafbn, that the Iron 
 Axel that pafles through the two Mill-ftones of a 
 Corn-mill could turn about, without turning the 
 lower Mill-ftone, if being round it pafs'd through 
 round hole ; but that the fame Axle could not 
 jrn, without turning the upper Mill-ftone ; if be- 
 g fquare, it were faftned in a fquare hole of the 
 jper Mill-ftone 5 what he has undertaken to prove 
 ndeniabiy follows. And by conlequence this DIC- 
 nirle is not a Connexion of Names according to a 
 ovenant entirely depending upon the Fancy of 
 len ; but a folid and conclufive Judgment of the 
 am re of Things, by the confideration of Ideas, 
 hich Men have been pleas'd to denote and fignifie 
 certain Names. 
 
 Thus much as to what we underftand by the 
 /ord idea; we are now to fay fbmething concern- 
 g their Original. 
 
 And now the Qiieftion is, whether our Ideas 
 oceed from the Senfcs, and whether the ccm- 
 Maxim be true , There is nothing in the Intelkft, 
 not firft m the Scnfe. This
 
 4& Logic : Or, Patt I. 
 
 This is the Opinion of a Philofopher of Greac 
 Reputation in the World, who begins his Logic 
 with this Proportion ; Every Idea derive* its Original 
 from the Senfes. He confefles however that all Ide- 
 as are not the fame in our Senfes,as they are in the 
 s\UnJ.Eut he pretends that they were at leaft form'd 
 out of thofe that paft through our Senfes, either by 
 competition j as when out of the leparate Ideas at 
 G<?W,and a Mountain jwc make zMoimtain of Gold ^ or 
 by Amplification and Diminution^ as when out of the 
 Idea, of a Man of ordinary Stature^ we make a Giant t 
 or a Ptgmee ; or by Similitude and Proportion ; as 
 when out of the Idea of a Houfe we have feen, we 
 make the Delineations of a Structure that we have 
 not feen : And thus, faith he, we apprehend God, 
 who is above the reach of Senfe, under the fhapeof 
 a venerable Old Man. 
 
 But according to this Doctrine , it would follow, 
 that all our Heatjtho relating to no particular Objecl: 
 that ever approach'd our Senfes, muft be all Cor- 
 poreal, and reprefent nothing to us, but what has 
 paft at leaft by parrs, through our Senfes ; and con- 
 fequendy that we can conceive nothing but by the 
 help of Images, like thofe which are forrn'd in the 
 Brain when we fee or imagine Bodies. 
 
 But tho this Opinion be maintain'd by other 
 School Philofophers as well as himfelf, I mall no! 
 fcruple to affirm that it is very abfurd, and as con- 
 trary to Religion as to true Philofophy. For to fpeak 
 nothing but what is evident, what is there that we 
 conceive more diitinclly than our thoughts them- 
 
 ftlves ?
 
 ._ __ 
 
 The Art of Thinking, 
 
 r-Iition clearer than this, / &* 
 
 ^^IS^^K 
 ^^rtrit^^fe 
 
 Nau&oiB to enter the r-fe i H~ 5^S*B? or 
 hard, to glide through 
 they were form-d of 
 
 frum whence thefc /',*, n f P , 'mages arc , 
 
 8 .OF tljg -p nce thar
 
 Logic : Or, Part 
 
 him ; and yet it cannot be faid that the Pidur 
 drew its Original from the Money. 
 
 But what the fame Authors add, lhat the 1& 
 which we have of God, draws it Original trot 
 Sence, becaufe we app/ehend him under the Idt 
 of an Old-man, is a thought unworthy any othc 
 than the Antkrofomrfln^ and which confoundm 
 the true M* that we have of Spiritual T hmg 
 with the falfe Imaginations that we conceive ot tnp< 
 Sublimites out of an evil Cuftom, of imagmin 
 all things amif S ; whereas it is as abfurd to prctoi 
 to imagine that which is not Corporeal, as to he; 
 Colours and fee Sounds. 
 
 To refute this Opinion, we need nc 
 
 than confider, that if we had no <*taoM*< 
 
 God than of a venerable old Man, all thofe oth 
 
 Judgments which we make of that Idea ougl 
 
 to appear falfe to us, that are contrary to ih 
 
 Idea -for we are naturally induced to believe th 
 
 our Judgments are falfe, when we clearly fee th 
 
 they are contrary to the lde which, we have 
 
 thinps. Orherwife we (hall never be able to co; 
 
 elude certainly that God does not confift rfpaf 
 
 tfatte is Incorporeal, Omnifrefent and Lnifibc, wh( 
 
 all thofe lAw are noway agreeable to that ot 
 
 Venerable old Man. And if God had at any tin 
 
 ever appear'd in that Form, it does not prcfcnl 
 
 follow that we (hould have no other Idea of r, 
 
 but that; for fo we {hould have no other -Idea 
 
 the H^G^ than that of a Dow, becaufe he 
 
 .ippea/d in that Shape, as God in the fame mann
 
 
 e,, * ws 
 
 ^fei^sS^sr^ 
 
 4
 
 $x Logic : Or, Parti. 
 
 Avho have no Ideas of Sound, yet fofre the J& of 
 their Thoughts, at leaft when they reflect upon 
 their Thoughts. 
 
 C HAP. H. 
 
 Of the Oljefts of Ideas. 
 
 WHatever we conceive is represented to our 
 Minds, either as a X5/, or a manner 0/ 
 a Thing, or as a Thing modified. 
 
 I call that a T/k/ng which is conceived to confif 
 of it felf, and as the Subject of all thofe Thin 
 that are comprehended in it, which by another nam< 
 is 'called Subftance. 
 
 The Manner , Attribute or J^tiality of a Thing, 
 call that, which when it is conceived to be compre- 
 hended in the Subftance, and not to be able to ful 
 .lift without it, determines it to exift after a cert 
 manner, and gives it a certain denomination. 
 
 A Thing modified, I call a Subftance, as it is 
 termined by a certain mode or manner. 
 
 All which things will be apprehended more cles 
 ly by Examples. 
 
 When Iconlidera Body, the Idea of it reprefe: 
 to me a Thing or Subftance, becaufe I confitkr it! 
 .as a thing fubfifting by k felf, and which has nee|i 
 of uo other to exiil.
 
 this
 
 54 Logic : Or, Part I. 
 
 of the Manner, bccaufe it is as it were inherent in 
 the Su ? >jefc And this is called the Subftantive ab- 
 ftra&ed, as Humanity, Corporeity, Rfa/on. 
 
 Neverthelefs, it is of great Importance to diflin- 
 guifh that which is truly the Mode from that 
 which only fcems to be To, for the Confounding of 
 Manners with Subftance?, and Subftances with Man- 
 ners is the chief ground of all our Errors. There- 
 fore the Nature of the true Mode is fuch, that the 
 Subftance of which it is the Manner, may be clear- 
 ty and diftin&ly conceiv'd without it ; but the 
 ftianner cannot be alternately clearly conceiv'd ; un- 
 lefs the Relation which it has to its Subftance be as 
 readily apprehended, without which it cannot natu- 
 rally exift. 
 
 Not but that we may apprehend the Manner, 
 without fuch an exact and diftinft confideration of 
 the Subject. But that which demonftrates that the 
 Relation of the Manner to the Subjeft, is conrain'd, 
 at leall, confufedly in its Conception ; becauie we 
 cannot deprive the Manner of that Delation, but that 
 we muft deftroy the Idea of it at the fame Time. 
 Whereas when we Conceive two Snbftances, we may 
 deny one thing of the other ; yet never deftroy the 
 Ideas of either. 
 
 For Example, I may deny Prudence, without 
 confidering the Man who is prudent ; but I cannot ' 
 conceive Prudence, and at the fame time deny tn*? 
 Relation which it has to Man, or any other intelii- 1 
 gible Nature capable of Prudence. 
 
 Con-1
 
 Chap. II. The Art of Thinking. 5- 5- 
 
 Contrariwiie, when I confider what appertains 
 to an extended Subftance, which is called a Body, 
 zs-Extenfo*, .Figure, M&ilitj, DiviJ&i/ity, and on the 
 other fide whatever belongs to the Mind, as Think- 
 ing, Doubting, Memory, Will, Difcourfe, I may 
 deny all that of the Extende4 Subjlance, which I con- 
 ceive belongs to the Thinking Stance, and yec 
 diftin&ly apprehend the Extended Subflanee, and all 
 th Adjuncts that belong to it. And I may recipro- 
 cally deny of the Think^ Stance, whatever I ap- 
 prehend of the Extended Subfttncc, without con fide- 
 ring what I have conceived of the Thinking Subftance. 
 
 Which alfo proves, That Thinking is not the Man- 
 ner of the Extended Subjlance, becaufe that Bx ten/ion 
 with all the reft of the Attributes belonging to x- 
 tended. -Sub/lance may be deny'd of Thought, and 
 yet a Man may rightly apprehend of Thinking. 
 
 It may be here farther obferved, That there are 
 fame of thefe Modes or Manners, which may be calPd 
 Jntrinfic becaufe they are apprehended to be in the 
 Subitance, as round or fquare j others may be (aid 
 :o be Extrmjic ; becaufe they are taken from fome- 
 hing which, is not inherent in the Sub/lances ; a 
 skvsd, feeu't defied ; -but theft things depend upon 3 
 he Actions of others. And thefe forts of Modes or 
 Mowers, are called in the Schools, Extrinftcal Deno- 
 minations. But if thefe 'Modes are taken according 
 to the Manner whereby Things arc apprehended, 
 hey are called Second Intentions. ThusVo be Sul>~ 
 tfted, to be Predicated are Second Intentions, becaufe 
 bey are the Manners whereby the Things rhemfelves 
 
 D A, ar^>
 
 5 6 Logic : Or, Part I. 
 
 are apprehended, as they are in the Understanding, 
 conjoining two Ueat, affirming one to be the other. 
 
 It is farther to be cbferv'd, that there are other 
 Modes which we may call Sub/tanttabt becaufe they 
 rcprefent to us true Subftanccs applied to other Sub- 
 flances like to Manners j of which fort are Cloatb'd, 
 Arrnd^ &C. 
 
 There are others which we may call fimply ^/, 
 and thefe are the true Manners, which are not Sub- 
 flances, but Manners of Subftance. 
 
 Laftly, There are others which we may call Ne- 
 gatives, becaufe. they represent the Subftance to us, 
 with a Denial of fbme real or fubftuntial Manner. 
 
 Now if the Objeh represented by thele Meat, 
 whether Sitt>ftances or Manners, are really fuch as 
 rhey are reprefenred to us, we call them true. If 
 nor, they are falfe Ideat^ in fuch a manner as they 
 may be. And thefe are they which in the Schools 
 are called Entia Hatione!, Entities of %4/ow, which 
 h.ippen for the mod part when the Mind conjoins 
 rwol<fr<ff real in themfelves, but diftin6l j thus the 
 Idea, of a Golden Mountain is an Entity of Rgafon, cbn> 
 p. unded of two Ideas of a Mountain and Gild, which 
 the Mind rrprelcnts as conjoiad, when really they 
 are not fo. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 Chap. III. The Art of Thinking. 57 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 Of AriflotleV Ten Predicaments. - 
 
 HTO this Head of the Objects of Mas, the Ten 
 Predicaments of Anftotle may be reduc'd : as- 
 being but Several Gaffes, under which that Phiiofo- 
 phercomprehended all the Objeas of our Thoughts - 
 comprehending all Subftances under the Rift, and' 
 all Accidents under the other Nine 
 
 Cojoref SttrfjS " ^ ??*"* <* 
 *' j MIC lecond ^Quantity, which is either- 
 
 Wrnt, when the Parts are divided as Numbers - 
 
 UrO^;W when the Parrs are conjoined, and 
 then either fucceflire, as T , me an d Notton or P 
 roanent, wh,ch by another Name is called Space 
 or Extension m Length, Breadth and Profund^y 
 Length alone making Lines, Length and Breadth 
 making furface, and all together caufmg S*M 
 
 Thud ^U^ of which.^,)?^ makes Four^ 
 
 B. 
 Body, acqu.r'd by 
 
 the 
 
 The Second Nvmal At.li,, f uc h as are the Fa- 
 
 f ,T S f t SOUl rBod ^ 'heUnderftandJng, 'fi 
 |, the Memory, ,he Five &nfe s , SwifrSfs of 
 
 D - 'The
 
 58 Logic : Or, Part I. 
 
 The Third, Senfible Jgualitits, as Hardnefs, Soio 
 nefs, Ponderofity, Hot, Cold, Colours, Sounds, 
 Odors, and feveral forrs of Rcliflies. 
 
 The Fourth, Form -and Tigitre , which is the ex- 
 trinfecal Determination of Quantity , as tyund, 
 Square , Spherical) Cubical. 
 
 Fourthly, Relation of one Thing to another, 
 'at of father to Son, Mafler to Servant, KJ n g * Subjeft , 
 cf Power to the ObjeS, of Sight to the "Thing viftbls j 
 to which may be added all things denoting Com- 
 parifbn ; as Itkf, equal, bigger, lefs. 
 
 Fifth, Aftion, either confidercd in its felf ; as to 
 w^ks leap, to knotp, to love ; or externally, as toflrify, 
 to fau>, to break* to manifeft, to bear. 
 
 Sixth, Suffering as to be firicksn, broken, to le 
 wanifejled^ heated. 
 
 Seventh, where ', as when we anfwer to Quefti- 
 ons about Place ; He it at Rome, at Paris, in hit 
 Study, or a Bed. 
 
 Eighth, When we anfwer to Queftions about 
 Time, as when did he live ? a hundred Years ago : When 
 WM this done? Yefterday. 
 
 Ninth, Situation ; as Sitting, Standing, Lying, lie- 
 Before, upon the Right-hand, on the Left. 
 
 The Tenth, the manner of having, ,as to have 
 tny thing about a Man for Cloathing, Ornament, Ar- ' 
 . cr to be Cloa'tid, Adorn d, Ann A, to wear Eree- 
 
 occ, 
 
 Tnefe are jnjjjptfia Ten Predicaments form'd 
 for theBirthoffo m;in) -Myfteries, though, to fay 
 tru : h 3 of very little u&, and (b far from rcdbifying 
 
 of
 
 Chap. III. The Art of Thinking* 5-9 
 
 of Judgment, which is the Scope of Logic, that 
 they frequently' do much mifchief , and that for two 
 Caufes which it will be worth while to difplay in 
 this place. 
 
 The firft i?, That thefe Predicaments are things 
 look'd upon as Things grounded upon Reafon and 
 Truth, whereas they are Things meerly. Arbitrary, 
 and whjch have no ground but the Imagination of 
 a Man, that has no Authority to prefcribe Laws to 
 others, who have as much Right as he, to difpofe 
 in the fame, or any other Order, the Ohje&s of 
 Thinking, according to the Rules of Philofophy, 
 which every one Embraces. In a word, the follow- 
 ing Diftic, contains whatever falls under our Con- 
 lideration, according to the new Philofophy: 
 
 y Menfurn^ quies^ motus^ PqftturA t Figtira, 
 Sunt cum materia CiwElanim Exordia reram. 
 
 For the Followers of this Philofophy believe they 
 have drain'd all Nature out bf thefe feven Heads. 
 
 i . Mens, br the Thinking SubftAnce. 2.. Matter^ 
 or the Extended Subilanee. 5, Meafurc or the Big- 
 nefs or Smalnefi of every part of the Matter. 4. 
 Pofition, or Situation one in refpeV of another. ^. 
 Figure. 6. Their Motion. 7. Their Mffttl or flower 
 Motion. 
 
 The other Reafon 'why .we think this. Series of 
 Predicaments to be pernicious is- this, becaufe it oc- 
 cafions Men to latisfie thefrifelves with the outward': 
 Rind of Words, inftead of Profiting by the whole- 
 fora Fruir, and to believe they know all things, fo 
 
 they
 
 6o Logic : Or, Part I. 
 
 they are able to fay by rote certain Names of Arbi- 
 trary Signification, which yet imprint no clear or 
 diftin& Ideas, as we fliall afterwards demonflrate. 
 
 Here fbmething might be faid of the Attributes 
 of the LuVtfts, Goodnefs, Patience, Magnitude, 
 and the reft. But it is fuch a ridiculous Invention, 
 to think that they are able to give a Reafon of all 
 things by the application of a few Metaphyfical 
 Words, that it is not worth refuting. 
 
 And therefore a very Modern Author has affirm- 
 ed with great Realbn, That the Rules of AriftotleV 
 Logic are ferviceabl&, not Jo much to discover what we 
 arc ignorant of^ but to explain to others what we know 
 already : But that Lully taught ut to prattle fluent!?, 
 and without Judgment, of that cf which we know no- 
 thing at att. And therefore Ignorance is to be pre- 
 ferr'd far before this falfe Knowledge ; for as Sr. 
 Auftin judicioufly obferves in his Book of the utility 
 of Belief, fuch a difpofition of the Mind is highly 
 to be blam'd for two Reafons : One, For that he 
 mho t's ferfwaded that hs underflands the Truth, renders 
 himfelf uncafable of Learning any more : And Second- 
 iy, becaufe fuch a Preemption and Rafhnefs is a 
 iign of an ill-govern'd and ill-qualified Mind. Opi- 
 nari, faith he, Duos ob res turfiflimum eft, quod dif- 
 fers nonpotejt, quifibijamfe jcire perfuafit, G? per Jg 
 if/a temeritas non Itene affefli Animi fignnm eft : For 
 ihe word Opinari, in the purity of the Latin Tongue,. 
 linifies a difpofition of Mind, that confents too 
 iijihny to uncertain things, and fo believes that he ' 
 k;io\vs what he does not underftand, and therefore 
 
 ail
 
 Chap. IV. The Art of Thinking. 61 
 
 all the Philofbphers raaintain'd, Sapicntem nihil O- 
 f inari ; and Cicero blaming himfelf for that Defeft, . 
 fays, that he was Magnus Ofinafor. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Of the Compaction and Simplicity of Ideas, 
 wherein is difcourfed the manner of know- 
 ing ly Alftraction or Precificn* 
 
 X 7\ 7E have affirm'd by the by, in the fecond 
 V V Chapter ; that we may apprehend the 
 Mode or Form without confidering diftin&ly the 
 Subflance of which it is the Mode, from whence we 
 take an occafion to explain, what is Abftraftion of 
 the Intel/eft. 
 
 The narrow Limits to which our Souls are con- 
 fin*d, are the Reafbn that we cannot perfectly ap- 
 prehend things, if a little compounded, without 
 confidering them in Parts, and according to the 
 feveral Shapes that they may receive. Which is 
 thar, which we generally call knowing by Ab- 
 (iraftion. 
 
 But in regard that things are varioufly cam- 
 pounded, fame of Parts really diftincl, which we 
 call Integral, as the Body of Man, Number, &c. It is 
 eafie thenCe to underftand, that the Mind may con- 
 fider one Part and not another, becaufe thefe Parts 
 are really diftinguifo'd .- But this is not that which 
 we call Jltyrtfiien. Now
 
 6i Logic : Or," ^Part I. 
 
 Now it wili be, more advantageous ro confider 
 thefe Parts feperarely, to a diftincl: Knowledge of 
 which we can never elfe attain. For Example, the I 
 "Body of Man can be no otherwife known, than by 
 dividing it into all its Parts, as veil fimilar asdiffi-t 
 milar, and by letting feyeral. Names upon every I 
 one. Arithmetic al'fo ftands upon this Foundation. ] 
 For we have no need of Art to Meafure or Compt 
 little Numbers, for, the Mind is able to receive 
 them entire. So that the whole Art confifts in nuni- 
 bring feparately thofe Parts of Number, v/hich be- 
 ing whole we cannot reckon. Foi* as Capacious as 
 the Mind is, it is impoffible for it to multiply two 
 Numbers confiding ,of eight or nine Figure?, with- 
 out a feperate Multiplication of each Figure by it 
 felf. 
 
 Secondly, we know by Parts, when we apply 
 our felves to one manner, not confidering the Sub- 
 ftance; or to two feperately, which are not how- 
 ever inherent in one and the fame Subject. This 
 is done by the Geometricians, who make a Body 
 extended in Length, Breadth and Profundity, the 
 Object of Geometry. But for the more accurate 
 Knowledge of this, they firft apply themfeives to 
 the Confjderation of one only Dimenfion. Then ] 
 they confider two Dimenfions, Length and &r*t&, ; 
 which they call a Superficies; and laltly all the three 
 Dimensions together, which they call/s/iW Bodies. \ 
 
 Hence it appears how vain and ridiculous the I 
 Subtleties of the Skeptics we, who endeavour ; 
 in queflion the certainty of Geometry, bscaufe it ; 
 
 fuppofes
 
 Chap. IV. The Art of Thinking. 6j 
 
 < fcppofss Lines and Superficies that never were 
 tor it does not fuppofe Lines' without Latitude, nor 
 Superficies without Profundity; but it fuppofe^ 
 that Longitude may be confider'd without the con- 
 Deration of Latitude ; which is a thing beyond 
 Controverfie, for in meafuring the diftanct be- 
 tween City and City, we only meafure the Length 
 of the way, not troubling our ftlves about The 
 Breadth. 
 
 Now by how many the more Manners we divide 
 fhmgs, fo much the more capable we become of 
 accurately undemanding them. Thus we fee ,' 
 Motion, when the determination to what place is 
 not nghtly diftmguifli'd, as well from the Motion 
 as the parts of the Determination, fo long nothing 
 can clearly be concluded concerning the caufes of 
 
 f^ I -M *%f in * im > which is dne by the help 
 of thiDiftin6to>n, as may be feen in the Second 
 Chapter of Des Cartel-Optics. 
 
 Thirdly, we know by Abftra^n, *hen the thing 
 ha S> feveral Atrnbures, but we only confider oneV 
 
 Un f 1 / '^ t^ F r Exam ? le ' J co "^er 
 hat I /M, and by Conftquence that lam he u>hl 
 
 M Now in this Uca ot WJ fclf-tkin.^, I can 
 nly confider the T/^-r/, ^, not co ^ er/ 
 
 ,? a /\ ^^%i thiugb in'Aft, My - 
 elf, and the T^T/^ arc one "nd the 4mc; 
 fidfo the I*- which I have conceived of the Per. 
 m Ttnteg will not only reprefent me ^ /,//, but 
 1 other P./ ttetbi* In the r ame ^^ 
 I confer an Equilateral Triangle, as it is de- 
 
 fcribed
 
 $4 Logic: Or, Part L 
 
 Icribed in filch a Paper, with all its other deter- 
 mining Circumftances ; that Idea will only repre- 
 lent this Triangle to me. But if I call off my 
 Thoughts from the confideration of thele particular 
 Accidents, and apply my felf to the confideration 
 of this Figure, as confifting of three Lines j the 
 Idea thus form'd will hence more clearly explain 
 the Equality of the Lines ; and thence I become 
 more apt and Skilful to make a Reprefentation of 
 all other Triangles of the fame Nature. If. I am 
 to go farther, and not to ftop at the Contempla- 
 tion of the Equality of Lines, but am to confider 
 it as a figure confiding of three right Lines, this 
 Idea will expfefs all the forts of Triangles. Laft- 
 ly, if omitting the number of the Lines, I only 
 conceive a Superficies bounded with Right-Lines, 
 I fhall form an Idea of Figures confiding of Right- 
 Lines ; and thus by degrees I may afcend to exten- 
 fion itfelf. .For in thefe Abftradions, the inferior 
 degree contains the fuperior, together with fome 
 conjoin'd Determination. Thus I thinly contains the 
 Thing-thinking : Thus an equilateral Triangle con- 
 tains a Triangle, and thus -a Triangle comprehends 
 a Right-lin'd Figure, and the upper reprefents 
 many things fb much the more clearly, by how 
 much the lefs it is determin'd. 
 
 Laftly, It is manifeft, that by ita benefi; of Ex- 
 traciitn, Comm:n Ideas are produc'd out of Singular, 
 and out of Common ones fliil more Common. By 
 which we are admonlfh'd to proceed to what is to 
 be faid concerning the Vniverfditf and Parneu!arinef.\ 
 of 'Ideas. CHAP,
 
 Chap V. The Art of Think ing. 6$ 
 
 C H A P. V. 
 
 Of the Umverfality, Particularity and Sin- 
 gularity of Ideas. 
 
 ALthough what ever exifts be Singular, ne- 
 verthelefs, by the help of AbJlratHons, we 
 may have feveral forts of Ideas, of which fome will 
 exprefs Singulars ; and fuch is the Idea which every 
 one has of himfelf ; others will exprefs many things 
 together, as when a Man thinks a Triangle, con- 
 fidering nothing elfe but that it is a Figure contain- 
 ing three Lines, and as many Angles - y which Idea 
 fo form'd, may fervc for the apprehenfion of all 
 other Triangles. 
 
 Ideas reprefenting one thing, are call'd Singular 
 and Individual, and their Obje&s are called Indi- 
 viduals ; but they that reprefent feveral things, are 
 called Univerfal, Common or General. 
 
 The Names that denote the firft^ are Proper 
 Name?, as Socrates, fyme, Bucephalus. Thefe that 
 fignifie the latter Common and Appellatives, as, a 
 Man, a CV^, a Horfe. And as well Vniverfal Idea 
 as Common Names may be called Generical Terms. 
 
 Note that there are two forts of Generical Term^ 
 one of thofe that are called Vnjvocals, to which the 
 Univerfal ideas are fb tied, that the (amc Name raay 
 agree with feveral Things according to the fame 
 Sound, and the fame Notion that is annexed to 
 
 the
 
 66 Logic: Or, Parti. 
 
 the Sound j of which (ore are, a Man, a G/r, a 
 
 The other is of thofe that are called Equivocate, 
 the Sound of which is the laoie annexed to diffe- 
 rent Ideas, fo that the fame Sounder Word may 
 agree to (eve; al Things, but not according to the 
 fame, but v;.ri jus Ideas which Cuftomhas fubjeted 
 to the Word. Thus Canon fignifies'a great Gun, 
 and Ecclefuftical Decree, and a Rtile^t Art ; for 
 ihefe Significations belong all to different Ideas.' 
 
 Thefe Vniverfal Equivocal* are of two forts. For 
 various Ideas, fiibje&ed to one Sound',' have either 
 no Relation one with another, as in the Word 
 Canon j or elfe they have fome Relation, as when 
 the Name primarily fignifies one Idea, others no - 
 otherWife than as. thty relate to the firit 7<&vr, as 
 the Caufi t .EffeEl or Sign, and ttiefe- Equivocal* are- 
 called Analogous : Thus Animals, the Air and >/>/, 
 are (aid to be Healthy. 
 
 Now the Idea firft join'd to the Word, denotes 
 Health, which is proper to Animals; but others- 
 are added, approaching near to the primary Idea, 
 as being the Caufe of Health; and therefore we 
 citll the Air Healthy, and Diet Healthy, becaufe 
 they both contribute to the preservation of Health. 
 
 Neverthelefs, when we hear fpeak only of Vni~ ^ 
 ivrfal Terms, we underftand Vnivocals only, with 
 the Vniverfal-McM annex'd. 
 
 But among all thefe Vniverfal Ideas, there are two 
 which ic highly concerns us rightly to diftineuifh, - 
 that is to fay, Gomprehenfion and Extenfim. 
 
 I call :
 
 Chap. V. The -Art of Thinking. 67 ' 
 
 I call the Comprebenjton of an Idea all thofe Attri- 
 butes that are contained within it ; fb that none : 
 an be taken away, but the Idea muft be d*ftroy'd. 
 Thus the Ccmprekenfion of the Idea of a Triargle,^ 
 ncludes Extenfion* Figure, Three Lines, Three 
 Angles, and the Equality of thofe Angles with 
 wo Right Angles. 
 
 I call Exfenjjon the Subject with which the Idea 
 grees, which are alfb called the-fq/rwn of-thg-fc**- 
 iwrjal Terms, which being related to thofe, car- 
 ies the name of Superior* TTfius-the Centrical Idea 
 >f a Tr'angle extends its (elf to all the feveral Spe- 
 ies of Triangles. 
 
 But though the Generical Idea, confufedly extends 
 
 felf to all the inferior Subjects, neverthelefs be- 
 
 ween the Attributes which it comprehends, and the 
 
 bjcEls to which ic is extended, tnedifferericr arifes 
 
 rom hence, that we cannot defpoil the Idea of an/ 
 
 f its Attributes without dcftroying it, as hath been 
 
 aid ; whereas we may reftrain the Extenflon of the 
 
 ame, by applying it to fome of the Suftjefts, yet 
 
 lever injure the Idea. 
 
 Now the fyftrtftton of the Generteal Idea-mxy 
 jappen two ways. 
 
 Firft, by the Addition of an Idea diftin&.and 
 etermin'd. Thus if I add to the Generical Idea of a 
 Triangle, that it has a Right Angle, I reftrain the 
 lenerical Idea of Triangles to a certain Species of 
 Triangle, which is therefore called a Rsftangls 
 triangle. 
 
 : Secondly,
 
 68 Logic: Or, Part. I. 
 
 Secondly, By the Addition of an Idea confus'd, 
 and undetermin'd j as if a Man fhould fty, Jome Iri- 
 angle. In which cafe the Term is made particular, 
 becaufe that now it extends it felf only to a part of 
 tbe St&jt&s, which before comprehended all, aed 
 yet that part to which it is reftrain'd is not deter- 
 mined. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Of the Five Univerfal Ideas ; Gemtf> Spe- 
 cies, Difference, Proper and Accident. 
 
 \7\ 7"HAT has been (aid in the former* 
 1 ' * Chapters opens us a way for the expla- 
 nation, in few words, of thofe "UniverfaU which are 
 Vulgarly r^ade ufe of in the Schools. 
 
 For when the Centrical Idea reprefenrs to us their | 
 Objeclfc as Things, and that in Suiftantives and abfo- 
 lute Terms, it iscall'd either Genus or Species. 
 
 Of G:nm. 
 
 Genus is call'd an Idea^ as being fb common, that 
 it extends it felf alfo to other Vnivsrfal Ideas. Thus* 
 a fquare Figure of four fides is a Genut, in re- 
 fp^cl: of a Paralleflogram or a Trapezium. And ir 
 like manner Subftarite is the fame in refpecl of Sub- 
 
 ftanct
 
 Chap. VI. The Art of Thinking. 69 
 
 flance extended, which is a Body j and the Winding 
 Subftance, which is a Spirit. 
 
 Of Species. 
 
 But the common Idea, which is another more 
 Common and General, is call'd Species. Thus a 
 Parallelogram and Trapezium, are Species of a fquare 
 Figure : And thus Body and Spirit are Species of 
 Subftance. 
 
 But one and the fame Idea may be call'd a Genw, 
 if it be referred to other Ideas to which it extends 
 it. (elf .- But the Species, if it relates to an Idea more 
 General, to which it is fubfervient. Thus Eody is 
 a Gemis'm refptcl: of a B^ animate or- inanimate; 
 but a fyw, in refpecl otStibftance. Thus a Square 
 is a Genui'm refpeft of a ParaHeliogra*n, but a 5/?/ 
 in refpecl: of a Figure indeterminately taken. 
 
 But there is another Notion of Species, which docs 
 not fall but upon thofe Ideas, which cannot be call- 
 ed Genuis ; as when any Idea, has only under it /- 
 jMuls *ndfingu!ars. Thus a Circle has only un- 
 der it lingular Circles, which yet are all of the 
 fame Species, and thefe Species are call'd the Lo*sr- 
 
 There is al/b a C7 w which cannot be a %, 
 which -is called the Supream of all Gemus, whether 
 t be Ens or Sutyance. Nor is it much material 
 o know ir, as relating rather to Metafiles than 
 
 I h r/e
 
 70 Logic : Or, 
 
 I have call'd thofe Idea* which reprcfent to u 
 their Objects as Things, either Genus's or Specter 
 However it is not abfblutely neceflary that thof< 
 Objects fliould be either Things or Subftances ; it fuf 
 fices that they be apprehended to be like them 
 For though they be Manners, they may be repre- 
 lented without any Relation to their Sub/lances,. anc 
 only be referr'd to other Ideas of Manners, eithei 
 more or lefs General. Thus Figure , which is the 
 Manner of a figur'd Body is a Genus, in refpedt oi 
 Figures confifting of (height or crooked Lines. 
 
 On the contrary, Ideas that reprefent to us theii 
 Objects as Things modified, and that in adjeftive 01 
 connative Terms, if they be compar'd with Sub 
 fiances which thefe Connative Terms fignifie but con-J 
 fufedly, though directly, whether thefe ConnativA 
 Terms denote Effential Attributes ( which indeed! 
 are nothing elfe but the Tilings themfelves ) or MJH-JJ 
 ners, yet are they not call'd either Genus's or Spiciefm 
 but either Differences, or Propers, or Accidents. 
 
 They are called Differences when the Object of 
 the Ideat is an Effential Attribute, by which the, 
 Species is diftinguifh'd from another Specie* as Ex4 
 tended, Thinking, Rational. 
 
 They are cilled Propers, when the Object realllj 
 belongs to the Effcnce of the Thing, though notil 
 the firft thing that is confider'd in ir, but depend-? 1 ! 
 i.lg upon the firft j as Divifible, Immortal, Docib'e. 
 
 Common Accidents are fo cali'd, when ihcir Ob-| 
 jecl:s are true Manners, which cannot be leperated 
 by the Underftanding, from the Thing \vhofe Ac-j
 
 Chap. VI- The Art of 'Thinking. 71 
 
 cidents they arc, without deftroying the Idea of 
 the Thing in our Minds ; as $gwd 9 Hard, ?/$/?, 
 Prudent. 
 
 Of Difference. 
 
 Now whereas GenM has under it two Species ; 
 of necejffity the Ideas of both include (bmething of 
 themfelvs, which is not comprehended in the Idea 
 of the Genus. For if they had nothing different from 
 the. Genus, they would be Genus's themfelves ; and 
 as the Genus is predicated of both the Species's, fo 
 both the Species's are predicated one of another. 
 Hence the Eflential Attribute to the Species not be- 
 ing found in the Genw, is called the Difference of 
 it, and is the Vniverjal Idea which we have of it ; 
 becaufe it can folely and only reprcfent to us this 
 Difference, where-ever it be found j that is, in all 
 Inferiors of that Species. 
 
 For Example, Body and Spirit, are two Species 
 of Sulftance : Therefore there muft be fomcthing 
 more in the Ideas of Body and Spirir, than in the 
 Idea of Subftance. Now that which we fir ft fee 
 more in Body is Extenflon\ what, we fee fir ft in 
 Spirit is Thought. Hence the Difference cf "Body will 
 be Extcnjion ; of Spirit, Cogitation.. That is Body 
 will be a Subflancs extended ; Spirit, a Tainting %o- m 
 dj. 
 
 Hence it follows, That Difference is doubly re- 
 ferred, either to the Ger.w, which it divides, or to 
 the fy fries which it Ccnftitutes r and farther, that 
 
 it
 
 72, Logic i Or, Part I. 
 
 it is the primary part of that which in theCompre- 
 henfion of the Idea is lincluded in the Species. Hence 
 every Species may be exprefs'd by one word only, 
 as Mind , Body , or by two conjoyntly , that is of 
 Genw and Species, which is alfb call'd a Definition , 
 as Sub/lance extended, zTbinkjngSubftance. 
 
 Seconly Difference , becaufe it conftitutes the Spe- 
 cies , and Differences it from other Species's , ought 
 to have the fame extent with Species ^ and for thai 
 reafon Difference and Species ought to be predicated 
 one of another ; as thus a What ever things tt a Spirit 
 every Spirit thinks. 
 
 But oftentimes it happens, that in feveral thing 
 
 there is no Attribute that offers it (elf which agree 
 
 fb fully with the whole Species as to agree onl] 
 
 with that Species and no other. In this ca(e rfa 
 
 way is to join together feveral Attributes , and th 
 
 AJJemblageftati. being to be found in any other Spi 
 
 ties, conftitutes the difference* Thus the Platonft 
 
 aliening that the Demons were no lefs rational Art 
 
 mals, then Men , would not admit Rational to fe 
 
 the Reciprocal difference of Man , but added art! 
 
 ' ther to it , that is to fay, Mortal j which is not dj 
 
 Reciprocal difference of Man, as being common! 
 
 Beafts : }'tt being both joyn'd together, they od 
 
 relate to Man. And thus we frame to our fet 
 
 Ideas of the moft part of Beafts. 
 
 Laftly, It is to be obferved, that it is not 9 
 ways rcquir'd that both the Differences dividing a 
 Genus 9 fhould be Pofitive : it fuffices that only 1 
 be fuch. Thus two Men arc diffidently ciifti 
 
 gulfll
 
 in it 
 
 contains 
 Men; 
 be them which s 
 So that the difference be 
 the to. O f . fc 
 ^ (WM/ neither 
 
 !n.w,Ain itsCompe 
 ff" contam-d inits 
 *, 
 
 tb , 
 
 itfr 
 
 HI f "tl r into the na 
 *u'e dependin^ 
 Connexion , an 
 
 g * thu onl 
 
 fame 
 
 ut Brutes 
 of Brutes 
 
 5 the 
 
 r neve,th e - 
 
 
 Attribute 
 
 ". if enui- 
 find 
 
 neceffi - 
 ragree-
 
 74 
 
 Logic : Or, _ Part L 
 
 For Example, To have a tight Angle h the 
 cffential Difference of a Bangle Tragic. 
 bccaufe it nectflarily follows, that Angles being 
 Mbt, the Square of the Qpn*f* is equal to the 
 Squares of the other fides, the Equality of thole 
 Squares is taken for the Propriety of a Bangle 
 Triangle, which agrees with all and only Bangle 
 Triangles. r 
 
 Neverthelefs, fome will have this name of Proper 
 to be of a larger Extent, and hence anfe 
 tour Species of it. 
 
 The firft is that which we have already ex-.; 
 plain'd, and which agrees with all foldj, andatoajsil 
 Thus it is the Propriety of all Circles, and only : 
 Circles, and always to have all Lines drawn tron 
 the Center to the Circumference equal. 
 
 The fecond agrees with All, but not *b*4 
 Thus it agrees with an extended Body to be divi| 
 fible, becaufeall extended Bodies maybe dividoj 
 although Duration, Kumber and Force may allo 
 Divided. . , ' 
 
 The third may agree with one onfa but not wicfl 
 all. Thus it is only proper to a Man to be a Phj^ 
 iitian or a Philofophtr ; though all Men are neither 
 Philofophers nor Phyfitians. 
 
 The fourth may agree wi:h all and only, bur n ' 
 
 <i}s. . . 
 
 An Example of this we have in Grey-hairs ol 
 old Men, which is proper M/y and to all Mf*J 
 rot ,:/r^i that is, not till Men arrive to C 
 
 *&' Of
 
 Of Accidents. 

 
 7 6 Logic : Or, Part I. 
 
 Man and Cloatbs. But to be Cloathed, in rcfpecl: of 
 that Man is the manner of his appearing only, 
 under which that Man is conceived, though the 
 Garments are Subftances : And thus, to be clad, 
 will belong to the frft Vniverfal. 
 
 And fo much for the Univerfals fo pompoufly! 
 cri'd up in the Schools; for 'tis little material to 
 know that there are Gentu, Spectes, Difference, Pro- 
 priety and Accident^ but to know the trueG<rww 7 s, 
 the true Sfccws of Genus\ their Proprieties arf* 
 Accid ents, that's the main thing requir'd ; for ti 
 attaining of which knowledge we make no queftk 
 to give fome light in the following Chapters, af-i 
 ter we have fpoken {bmething before-hand of 
 Complex'd Terms. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Of the Complex* d Terms, tbeir Univerfality 
 and Particularity. 
 
 SOmetimes to fome certain Term we joyn otl 
 Terms , from which arifes in our Minds a 
 tal tiea, of which we may affirm or deny thofe thin| 
 which cannot either be deny'd or affirm'd of 
 fingle Terms feparately taken ; from whence p 
 ceed the Complex d Terms ; as a Prudent Man, a Tr-a 
 fjwrmi Body, Alexander the
 
 Chap. VII. The ^ 
 
 are fometimes made by Pro. 
 
 There Additions 
 
 And indeed it may be affirm'd that although 
 thefe Pronouns are not always exprefs'd, yet they 
 arealwaysto be underitood, becaufe that in J 
 
 But that which is chiefly ro be obferv'd 
 
 in c 
 
 U<, at the firft Term )0r l eaft wh f ch ^ *^ 
 itnm^w, fo that it agrees with it genera! y 
 and accord,ng to fa entire Extenfion. A! when I 
 
 " " Cr '''" are ""*"'' m ' lb ><> i or, 
 
 " M " al ' 
 
 or 
 
 , 
 w hat is here added i, only ./, 
 
 - I 1 " 8 any thi "B in thewho!e 
 
 u annexed to the wdM, nor 
 
 " g n ' y Certa!n Mcn > 
 
 M Ure are toe ^'''<"" which areap. 
 Names, diftinaiy denoting *,/,, 
 
 y> L ndonii >he ' 
 
 E 3 
 
 Ariftotle
 
 78 Logic : Or, Part I. 
 
 Afiftotle tlx Prince of Pbilofofhers \ William the 
 Third Kjng of England $ for here the Jingle Terms 
 fa pronounced, loofe nothing of their Extenfion, 
 as being firft determined as much as they could be- 
 
 Determinative is that, which being added, re- 
 trains the fortification of the General Term, fo that 
 it is not now accepted in its full Extenfion, but 
 comprehends only a part of it } as, Tranfparent Bc- 
 dies, Wife Men, a Rational Creature. Thefe Addi- 
 tions are not /imply Explicative but Determinative, 
 becaufe they maim and curtail the Extenfion of the 
 iirft Term j for the Name of Eody here fignifies 
 only a part of the Body of Man, as a part of Men; 
 cfa Creature, as part of the Creatures. 
 
 But it is the Nature of .thefe Additions fometfmes 
 to create a Singular out of a Common Term, when 
 they contain Conditions Inaividuant : As when I fay, 
 the K,ing now feigning, the Common Name of King 
 is determin'd to the iingle and only Perfbn of Wil- 
 tem III. 
 
 There are alfo two other kinds of Complex'^ 
 Terms ; of which the firft is Ctmflexed in Words, 
 the other in Sence only. 
 
 Of the firft kind are thole that have the Addition 
 cxprefs'd, as in the Examples hitherto mentioned. 
 
 Of the other kind are they, in which one of 
 the Terms is only pronounced, the other under- 
 flood, as when we fay, the King. This Term is 
 Comflcxed in Senfe becaufe when we pronounce 
 the word, the MCA of the common Name does 
 notprelent it teff to -our minds alone, but, as^ad- 
 
 join'd
 
 . VH.^ The ArtofThnkinz. 
 
 ^ 
 
 jom'dtoir, thcWr-ofw^III. whonow reign* 
 of fhlf K- ?t ' W/ T number of* is meant 
 of hofcwh,ch being thus ^fr^, occur in daily 
 Talk as ,n every Family, Ma ft^ i rap l ying fuc 
 a one. Some Ferms are alfo Ccmpl exe d wei i 
 
 Th, ,h P 93 ? f V ^ UC after Various ". 
 
 .us the Pnnceof P^/^^iscomplexed in words, 
 becaufe the name of Prince is d.termin'd by the word 
 P!oW er . b c m rcrpea to M*> whon1 
 the Schoo men are fo addi^ed ro give that Title 
 
 complexed in Senfe, when the &< of Anflvk 
 is only obvious to the mind, nor being expre.Vd 
 by any Sound that denotes the Perfon. ' 
 
 AU &*#' or Ccnnof ^^ are either Parrs of 
 
 are 
 
 _ i ,u ^in h ' dlc Ugt P c together 
 
 w,th , their Mbftance*, or cc.npt^d in Scnfe, when 
 s Subftanriees are underftood; Beaufe, as we 
 Md in the Second Chapter, thefe Connective 
 Names denote the Subject directly indeed but 
 econfufedly; the Jftde or Form indireaiy but 
 more antinitly. 
 
 ' And therefore the # O f the Subject is very 
 
 B^r romllm r: s COnfUfH *?**<**& Sometimes 
 i -,-n J wnich ror the moft part 
 determined by a diftina Form of the 1^ Thus 
 gfcfc fignifies a Thing that has Whi^t. And 
 lence the confufed Idea of the Thing, is determined 
 
 figmfie thofe things only that are White 
 
 1 However in this Matter, it is chiefly tobs-ob- 
 :rved that there are fome Corned Terms, 
 Vhich although they be only determined to one only 
 
 E 4 jgft.
 
 80 Logic : Or, Part I. 
 
 Individual, nevenhelefs retain an Equivocal 
 faiity^ which may be called an Vnivnfrlity of Error. 
 For when Men agree that one only Thing, is fig- 
 nified by fuch a Term, but difpute what that only 
 Thing really is, it happens that this Term is apply*d 
 by fome to fignifie this Thing, by others, another 
 Thing. Hence it is requifite that fiich a Term be 
 farther determined, either by the variety of Circum- 
 flance?, or the Series of Difcourfe, that the fignificati- 
 cn of the Term may be made precifely apparent. 
 
 Thus true Religion fignifies one fole Religion, 1 
 which is really the Church of England ; but becaufe 
 all People and every Hercfie think their own Re- 
 ligion to be truefir, thefe Terms are highly Eqniw 
 c&e, by Equivocation of Error. For if an Hiftorian 
 fhould write that his Prince was moil acidified tc 
 the true Religion, it cannot be faid what he mean?. 
 unlefs it be known what Religion the Hiftorian pro- 
 fefe'd. For if he were a Church of England Man, 
 it isurderitocd of a Church of England Prince, 01 
 of a Mauumetan, if the Hiftorian were an ArtbiM 
 Maiumetan j and ib of a fyman Catholic Prince, iJ 
 I he Author were a Ionian Catholic. 
 
 Complexsd Terms, wherein there is Equivocation ol 
 Error ) chiefly comprehend thofe Qualities of whict 
 the Senfif is no Judge, but the Mind. For Met! 
 are prone to differ in their Opinion, concerning (ucri 
 Things. 
 
 For Example, fhould we affirm that no Soldier;! 
 were lifted by Marim, but luch as were f:x fooj 
 wigh this Ctwpicxed Term, Soldier, fix foot high: 
 
 i;
 
 Chap. VII. The Art of Thinking. .81- 
 
 is not fubjecl: to Equivocation of Error, when it is 
 eafie for Soldiers to be meafured, that we may 
 know whether they be fix foot high or no. But 
 had it been decreed, that none {hould be lifted but 
 fuch as werey?0tt, this Term had been much more 
 liable to Equivocation, when as it might be attribu- 
 ted to Rich Soldiers that look'd like ifout Men, buc 
 are indeed but mecr Cowards. 
 
 This Equivocation of Error is often found in Com' 
 flexed Terms, Tlie Chief eft of the Part/Ian Geometrici- 
 ans j the moft Learned, the Wickede/l, the Htcbeft of 
 Men. For though thefe Terms are divided by Sn- 
 dividuant Conditions, feeing that one Perfbn might 
 be the chiefeft of the Parisian Geometricians ; never- - 
 thelefs, this Term might be afcribed to federal, 
 though proper only to one ; in regard it is an eafie 
 thing for Men to vary in their Judgments concern- 
 ing this matter \ fb that every one (hall give this 
 Tide to him, whom he thinks to be the beft and 
 ft excellent Geometrician. 
 Thele Forms of Speech alfo, Ike Sence of the Au- 
 r t tvh.it the Author declares upon thii Siibjett, are of 
 ic Number of thefe Equivocates ; efpeeially if the 
 Author be fo obfcurc, that there be any dilute 
 bout his Senle. And thus we find continual Al- 
 ercations concerning Ariflotlfs Opinion of Philo- 
 aphers, while every one endeavours to draw him 
 o their Party. For although Ariftotle had but one 
 ence concerning one thing ; yet becaufe he ia va- 
 ioufly underftood by fevcral, thefe words, the Sence 
 i are the Equivocations of Error. For 
 E
 
 8 2 Logic : Or, Part I. 
 
 every one pronounces that to be the Judgment of 
 Ariftotle, which he is perfwaded that Aripotle meant ; 
 and fo if feveral believe, That Ariftotlt had a diffe- 
 rent Opinion of the fame thing j thefe Terms, tie 
 Sence of Ariftotlc in ftich a matter, though fingular 
 in themfelves, can never be applied to many, that 
 is to fay, to all thofe things, that Ariftotte fhall be 
 faid to have written upon fuch a Subject ; for fo 
 they fhall fignifie with every one, what every one 
 is perfwaded the Philofbpher thought 
 
 But that we may the better underftand, where 
 lies this Equivocation of Error, it is to be obferv'd, 
 that the Terms of it are Cannotative ; either ex- 
 prefly or in Sence. Now, as I have faid, in Con- 
 notative Terms may be confidercd as well the Sub- 
 ject, which is direftly or confufedly exprefs'd, as 
 the Form or Mule which is dirc&ly and indiftindlly 
 fignified. 
 
 ThusWtiifc confufedly denotes a Body, diftinc"l- 
 IjWhiienefii thus the Sence of Ariflotle, confuledly, 
 :bgnifies fbme Sentence, Thought or Dpclirine of 
 his; diftinclly, the Relation of that Doctrine to 
 Anftotle, to whom it is attributed. 
 
 However the Equivocation which is found in thefe 
 Terms, does not properly arife from the Form or 
 Mode, which being dillincT:, can never vary \ nor 
 from the Subject confafedly confider'd, as not being 1 
 freed from that confufion. For Example thefe 
 words. Princ/of Philofopbers, cannot be Equivocates,. 
 an regard the Idea of Pnnce of Pfolofophers can be di- \ 
 &n&ly apply'd to no li&vidtM/. But EquiVoca- '-! 
 
 lib n
 
 Chap. VII. The Art of Thinking. , 83 
 
 tion confifts only in This, that the Mind inftead of 
 the confus'd Subject fubftitutes another which is 
 diftincl; and determinate, to which Form or Manner 
 are apply'd. But in regard Men difpute about this 
 matter, they may afcribe the Title of Prince or 
 Chief to feveral Perfbns, and fignalize them after- 
 wards with what additional word they think mod 
 convenient. Thus formerly Plato was called the- 
 Prince of Pbtlofofhers ; which Title is now conferred 
 upon Ariftotle. Thus the words, True Religion, 
 not having any diftincl:, but a confus'd Idea of any 
 Religion, ars no Equivosates, becaufe they denote 
 nothing but that Religion which is abfolutely True. 
 But when the Mind has annexed the Idea of True 
 Heligian to the diftinft Idea of Come particular Wor- 
 ftiip diftinclly known, they become egregious E- 
 quivocates, and fignih'e that Worfliip with every 
 one, which they account the True Religion. 
 
 The fame is the Condition of thefe Words, That 
 witch fucb a Philofofler held of Jitcb a blatter. For 
 while they abide in their general Idea, the general 
 Idea fimply and generally will fignifie the Doctrine 
 delivered by fuch- a Philolbpher concerning fuch a 
 Matter ; as the Doctrine of Anjlotle concerning 
 the Nature of the Soul. Whereas the (ame wcyd?, 
 that which, &c. that is to fay, this Do&rine, while 
 it is urtder a confus'd Idea apply'd to no diftincl; Idea, 
 is not capable of Equivocation. But when the Mind, 
 inftead of that Do&rine confufedly conceiv'd, fub- 
 ilitutes a diftincl: Dodlrine, and a diftincl: Subject ; 
 then according to the variety of diftinft Z^M/, that 
 
 farue
 
 84 / Logic : Or, Part I. 
 
 fame That which, &c. may be liable to Equivocation. 
 Thus the Do&rine of Ariftotle touching the Na- 
 ture of the Soul, is an Equivocate with Pompona- 
 //;, who aflerts that Ariftotle believed the Soul to 
 be Mortal, and with feveral others of his Interpre- 
 ters, who on the other fide affirm that Ariftotle taught 
 the Immortality of the Soul, as well as Plato a.nd 
 Socrates. Hence it is, that words of (his Nature 
 moft frequently fignifie the thing with which the 
 Form indirectly exprefs'd cannot agree. Suppofe, 
 for Examples fake, that Philip was not the Father 
 of Alexander, as Alexander himfelf endeavoured to 
 make out; thefe words, the Son of Philip, denoting 
 CJenerality, any perfbn begot by Philip, erroneoufly 
 (pokcn of Alexander, denote the perfon that is not 
 really the Son of Philip* In like manner thefe 
 words, the Sence of Scripture alledged by a Quaker, 
 to prove a Seft quite contrary to Scripture fhall de- 
 note that very Seel: in his Mouth, which he thinks 
 to be according to the Sence of Scripture, and 
 which he has therefore dignified with that name, of 
 die Sence of Scripture j nor are the Papifts more in 
 the right than they,, who pretending to adhere to. 
 ihe. Word of God for among them the Word of Goek- 
 iigqifies that Oglio of Superftitions which they would 
 obtrude upon, the Proteftants inftead of 
 Word, * 
 
 CHAP,
 
 Chap. VIIL The Art of Thinking. 8 5- 
 
 CHAP, VIII. 
 
 Of the Clearnefs and Diftinftin of Ideas, QS 
 alfo of their Olfcurity and Confufion. 
 
 TN Ideas clearnefs may be difcern'd from Diflin^ 
 ttton, and obfcurity from confufion ; for we 
 may call that a clear Idea, when it imprints in us a 
 lively, as I may call it , Sence of it felf, whereas 
 otherwife it may not be fo diftinft. The Idea of 
 Pain, becaufe it (hikes fb fenfibly, may be call'd a 
 Clear Idea \ . but yet it is confufed, becaufe it repre- 
 lents P<tous, as being in the Hand, when indeed 
 it lies in the Sence. 
 
 Neverthelefs, we may call every Idea clear, fb 
 far as it is diftin& ; for all Obfcurity arifes out of 
 Confufion. Thus the Sence of the Pain that hurts 
 v us is clear and alfo diftinft ; but what is confufed in 
 the Feeling, that is to (ay, that the Pain is in the 
 Hand, cannot be (aid to be clear. 
 
 Now becaufe Clearnefs Lnd Diftinclion are one 
 and the fame in Ideas, ic will be very requifite to 
 examine why fome Ideas are clear, others confus'd. 
 
 But this will be more apparent by the help of 
 Examples, than any other way, and therefore let us 
 weave together a Catalogue of the firft Ideas, as 
 well clear and diftin&, as obfcure and confufed. 
 
 The moft clear Idea is that which every Man 
 of hirafelf, as .of the Thing that thinly j as allb the 
 
 Ideas
 
 S6 Logic : Or, Part I. 
 
 Ideas of thofe other Appendixes to our Thought?, 
 as to Judge, Difcourje, Deliberate, Perc$ive, Ima- 
 gine. 
 
 Idea* of extended Sulftances alfb are mod chiefly 
 clear to us, as alfb the Idea of their Proper- 
 ties; as Figures, Motion, Rfft ; for though we may 
 feign that there is no Body, no Figure ( though 
 we cannot feign any fiich thing of the thinking Sub- 
 ftance, while we think ) yet we cannot fay we 
 clearly perceive what is Extenfion and Figure. 
 
 We alfb clearly apprehend Duration, Order and 
 Number, fb that we confider the Duration of any 
 thing to be Form, under which we confider the 
 thing, fb long as the Form continues in it. 1 Thus 
 order and number no way differ in effecl: from 
 Things order'd and number'd. 
 
 All thefe Ideas are fb clear, that we frequently 
 render them more obfcure, while we endeavour 
 to illuftrate them with new Observations, and frame 
 to our felves other Ideas than thofe which we have . 
 from Nature. 
 
 We may al(b fay, that the Idea of God is clear in -. 
 one reipeft, though in another molt obicure and 
 imperfect. 
 
 It is clear, becaufe it fufficcs to dilcover the ^reac 
 number of Attributes in God, which we certainly I 
 know are no where elfe to be found but in God ; I 
 but it is obfcure in refpe& of that Idea which the 1 
 Bleffed have of him in Heaven. And it is alfo 1 
 imperfeft, in regard our Minds being limired and ' j| 
 finite, cannot but mojt imperfectly conceive an in- V 
 
 finhc I
 
 Chap. VIII. The Art of Thinking. 87 
 
 finite "Being ; for Perfcaion and Clearncfs in Ideas 
 are two different things. For they are fcrfeS 
 when they reprelent to us whatever is in the Ob-' 
 je& ; Clear, when they reprefent to us as much as 
 fuffices to apprehend the Objecl; clearly and di- 
 ftmelly. 
 
 On the other fide, they are confus'd and obfiure 
 I&* which we have of Senfible gualitic, as of 
 Colours, Sounds, Odors, Xj/fc, Cold, Heat, P e dero- 
 fry, &c. AsalfothofeofourJDefires, as of Hun- 
 ger, Thirft, Pain, & c . Now mark the reafon of 
 the Obfcurity of thefe Ideas. 
 
 In regard we were firft Children before we were 
 Men, and that exterior things operating within UF, 
 tirred up various Senfations in our Mind, by the 
 help of thofe Impreffions which they made in our 
 
 ff A i the . Ml ' ndconrciousthatt nore Senfations are 
 afFfaed agamft her Will, and that by fome BodJes 
 (as for Example, the Senfation of heat by the Fire) 
 would not only judge that there were fome things 
 witnout her, which were the caufcs of thefe Sen- 
 lations ( wherein Oie was not. deceived ) but going 
 farther , imagiu'd fomething in the Objeft?, altoge- 
 ther hke Senfation, or at leaft like the/^ thence 
 "f r^ ^f^ Coflfid ^^ns therefore, fhe 
 orm d Ibv to her felf, and transferr'd the Senfa- 
 ons of H eat9 Cold, & e . into thofe things that are 
 ithout her. And by that means thof? confufed 
 d obfcure & M of fenfible Qualities aro fe from 
 nce, that .the Mind intermixed her own faiie 
 judgments with thofe that (he deriv'd from Nature. 
 
 Now
 
 88 Logic: Or, Part I. 
 
 Now in regard thele Ideas are not natural but: 
 Arbitrary, Men have made a moft fantaftical u(e 
 of them, and turn'd them into meer Chimera's; for 
 though that Heat and Burning are two forts of Sen- 
 fation ; the one weaker, the other fiercer, we have 
 allow'd heat to the Fire, affirming Fire to be en- 
 dued with heat, yet we have deprived Fire of the 
 burning Faculty, or of the pain which we feel in 
 approaching too near it, denying Fire to be arTe&ed 
 with Pain. 
 
 But if Men bad rightly apprehended, that Pain 
 is not to be attributed to the Fire that burns the 
 Hand ; yet had they been in another Error, while 
 they thought pain to be in the Hand which the 
 Fire burns, when as pain is only in the Senfe. 
 
 This was not only the Opinion of fome of the 
 Ancient Philofbphers, as the Cyrenarchs, but even of 
 St. Auflin himlelf; For, fays he in his 14 Book, 
 De civitat. dei, Pains faid to be Pains of the Fle/b, art 
 fains of the Sml in the Flefh and out of the Flejh ; for 
 fain of the Flefh K only an Injury to the Soul, and a 
 certain dijjent from its fuffering : as the fain of tie 
 Soul, tffhicb K Sadnefs^ K a dijjentfrom thofe things that 
 befal us againji our Wtlfs. 
 
 Thus in his feventh Book upon Genejis, chap, 19.- 
 Wkcn the Soul feels the afflittions of the Body, Jhe it of- 
 fended, in her aft of Government of the Body, her tyde 
 being difturtid, and this offence K calfd Pain. 
 
 Now that that Pain which is call'd the Pain of the 
 Body, belongs to the Soul and not to the Body, is 
 manifeft from this, that thofe things that affeft us 
 
 with
 
 Chap VIII. The Art of Thinking. 89 
 
 -with Pain, feldom trouble us when our minds are 
 intent upon other things, as we find by the African 
 Prieft ( of whom St. jtuftin, lib. 14. deCivitat. dei+ 
 04^.14.) Who when f leafed, upon the Counterfeiting of 
 Groans and Lamentations, would fo abftrad: himfelf 
 from Strife s, and lie <K it were for dead, that they could 
 not make him fenfible of f inching and f ricking, nor of 
 the beat of Fire, titi it began to fcorch his Slqn. 
 
 Moreover it is to be obferved, that neither the 
 ill difpofition of the Hand, nor any motion arifing 
 from burning, caufes the Soul to be fenfible of the 
 Pain, unlefs this Motion be communicated to the 
 Brain, by certain /mall Strings included in the 
 Nerves^ and extended from the Brain to the Hands, 
 and oiher par is of the Body, which cannot be rno- 
 ved unlefs that part of the Body be alfb moved from 
 whence they derive themfelves. So that if there 
 be any Accident that 'hinders thefe little Strings 
 from communicating their motion to the Brain Cas 
 in the Palfie ) a Man may endure Wounds and 
 Pain without any fence of Pain. Infomuch, that 
 what appears yet more ftrange, a Man may have 
 a pain in his hands that wants hands, as often it 
 happens to thofe whofe hands are cut off j for that 
 if the threads of the Nerves extended from the 
 Hand to the Brain be moved near the Elbow, 
 where they terminate, they may move that part of 
 the Brain to which they are faftned, in the fame 
 manner as it might be moved, if the fame threads 
 dcfcended to the hand, as the one end of a fmall 
 Rope may be moved in the fame manner, if drawn 
 
 about
 
 po Logic : Or, Part I. 
 
 about the middle, as if pulled at the other Extre- 
 mity ; and thus the Soul ftiould feel the fame pain 
 as it would feel if the Perfon had hand?. For the 
 Soul dire&s its attentivenefs thither from whence 
 that motion of the Brain ufed to proceed, which 
 before affected it with that fort of Pain. Thus the 
 Reflexions that we behold in a Glafs appear in the 
 fame place where they would be, (hould they be 
 looked upon with dire6fc beams, as being the moft 
 ufual manner of beholding Objtb. 
 
 And theft things fhallfuffice to let us underftand 
 that it may well be, that a Soul feperated from the 
 Body may be liable to the Torments of Hell-fire, 
 and to feel the fame Pain, as any one would feel 
 through the Tortures of Earthly-fire; in regard 
 that when it was join'd to the Body, it was not the 
 Body but the Soul that felt the pain of the Fire, and 
 that pain was nothing but a certain fadnefs of 
 Mind wherewith it was affii&ed for the fufterings 
 of the Body, to which it was join'd by God. Why 
 then may we not conceive that Divine JtiiHce may 
 fo accommodate fbme part of the material Body to . 
 the feparate Soul, that the motion of that matter 
 may excite troublefbm and afflicSHng Thoughts in 
 the Soul fo feparaied. 
 
 But let us return to confufed Ideas. The ldt& \ 
 of Ponderofity is no left confufed than any of the 
 reft already recited; for, having observed from 
 our Infancy, that Stones and other heavy things fall 
 down as foon as let go out of our Hands, we form'd 
 an Idea of the thing falling which is genuine and 
 
 true.
 
 'Chap. VIII. The Art of Thinking. 9 1 
 
 true. We alfb forra'd an Idea of the Reafon why 
 the Thing does fall, which is true like wife j but 
 when we only faw the Stone, and nothing elfe that 
 forced it downward, out of the Ra&nefs of our 
 judgment, we concluded there was no fuch thing 
 as what we did not fee, and therefore that the 
 Stone fell by vertue of its own proper and intrinfic 
 Force, and at length we affix'd to this confuted Idea, 
 coin'd only in our own Judgments the name of Pon- 
 derofity. 
 
 It came to pafs alfb, that we made different 
 Judgments of the fame Things of which the fame 
 Judgment was to be aflerted, for as we faw Stones 
 moved toward the Earth, we found Straw move 
 toward Jer, and Steel toward the Loadftone. 
 Therefore the fame Reafon that bequeaths that 
 quality to Stones to be moved toward the Earth, 
 ought to allow the fame qualities to Straw and.Iron 
 for moving towards Jet and the Loadftone. How- 
 ever, this would not fatisfie j but on the contrary, 
 we have aflign'd to Jer, Amber and the Loadftone 
 certain Qualities which we call Attractive, when 
 with the fame eafe we might have endued the 
 Earth with the fame qualify of Attra&ing heavy 
 Things. However thefe attractive Qualities ( as 
 alfb Ponderofity it felf ) fprang from Illegitimate 
 Ratiocination, by which it was concluded, that Iron 
 was neccflarily attracted by the Loadftone, becaufe 
 there was nothing feen that pufli'd the Iron to- 
 ward the Magnet i whereas it can never be con- 
 ceived, that one Body Ihould attract another, un- 
 
 Icfi
 
 ?x Logic: pr, Parti. 
 
 Isfs the Body attra6Hng be moved, and the Body at- 
 tracted be faftned to it. 
 
 To thefe Judgments of our Infancy, we owe for 
 thole Ideas that reprefent to us Ponderous and Hard 
 Things, more foiid than light and thin, and ha- 
 ving mere Body or Matter. Thus we believe that 
 a Veliel full of Gold contains more Matter 4 than if 
 it wasfill'd with Air, for thofe Ideas deriv'd thera- 
 lelvesfrom no other Foundation, than that .when 
 we were Children we were wont to make extrinfi- i 
 cal Judgments of all Things, according to their 
 Actions in reference to us. Hence becaule ponderous 
 and hard Bodies afted more violently than Light 
 ancmin, we concluded that they contained more . 
 oUuuance than the other. When true Reafbn 
 tells us, that the fame part of Matter poffeffes the 
 famefpace, and the fame fpace is always filled with 
 the lame quantity of matter. 
 
 So that a Cubic Veflel of a Foot will contain no , 
 more Matter, being fill'd with Gold than Air. Nay, 
 in fomeSence it may be faid, that being fill'd with 
 Air, it contains more matter, for a Reafon not now 
 longer here to be infilled on. 
 
 It may be laid, that from the fame Root of Fore- 
 judging of Things, fprang the foolifli Opinions 5 
 
 . lome, That our Souls arc either the thineft 
 part of the Air compofed of Atoms, according to 
 Democritwih \\KEpicureans; or the Air kindled, 
 as theStoiclv ; or a particle of Celeftial Light, as 
 iteManicheans, or of later Day?, Flud; or'afuttle 
 Wind, as the Sociniw, for none of thefe could ever I 
 
 perfwade .
 
 Chap. VIII. The Art of Thinking. 93 
 
 perfwade themfelves that Wood, Stones or Durt 
 could ever be capable of thinking. And therefore 
 Cicero at the fime time that he aflerts with the 
 Stoickf, our Soul to be a futtle Flame, places it a- 
 mong abfordities, not to be endu'd to think it fhould 
 eer derive its Original from Earth or thick Air; 
 For, faith he, 7 lefeech je t is it fojjible to thinly that 
 fuck 4 force and mafs of Memory vat ever fowtd in the 
 Earth to ffring up again, or tbickped together out of 
 Cloud) and Foggy Air ? For they believed that the 
 more futtle and pure they made the matter, fo much 
 the lefs material, the lefs thick and corporeal it 
 would be, that foat length they might rarifie it into 
 a Thing of Thought, which however is very ridicu- 
 lous ; for a Body is not thinner than a Body, only 
 that is divided into leffer particle?, and more eafiiy 
 agitated. For thus on the other fide it makes lefs 
 refinance than other Bodies j on the other it more 
 eafiiy penetrates their Pores. But whether it be in- 
 diviiible or divided, whether it reft or be moved, 
 however it ;s not lefs material, lefs corporeal, or 
 more capacious of Thought, it being impoffible 
 that the Motion or Figure of the Matter, whether 
 futtle or thick, fhould have any thing common 
 with Cogitation ; or that a certain part of the 
 matter That never thought, when ic refted like 
 the Earth, or was gently moved like the Water, 
 fhould come to a Knowledge of in felf, upon a 
 more vehement Motion or augmenting rne Force 
 of Agitation, 
 
 Much
 
 94 Logic : Or, Part I. 
 
 Much more might be (aid upon this Subject, 
 but this (hall fuffice for the underftanding of all 
 confufed Ideat t when they have all their Caufes like 
 to thefe. 
 
 There is one Remedy for this Mifchief, to 
 caft away all prejudicate Opinions ingrafted in 
 our Infancy, and to aflert nothing of what it be- 
 longs to Reafon to prenounce, becaufe we fo 
 judg'd it heretofore, but becaufe we now judge 
 it to be fo upon Examination. So (hall we have 
 only natural Ideas, and for fuch as are confufed, 
 we (hall only retain thofe that are clear, as that 
 there is fomething in the Fire which is the Rcafbn 
 that I feel the heat j that all things which are pon- 
 derous, are pufh'd down by fome certain caufc ; not 
 determining any thing of what is in the Fire that 
 caufes that burning, or of the caufe that makes the 
 Stone fall down till I find ray knowledge confirm'd 
 by clear Reafons. 
 
 CHAIV
 
 2hap. IX. The Art o] Thinking. 95- 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 Some Examples of confufed andolfcitre Ideas 
 drawn from Ethics. 
 
 N the former Chapters we hare brought fome 
 Examples of confuted idea^ which for the rea- 
 
 ns given, we legally aflert to be falfe; but being 
 1 taken out of Pbyfjcs, it may not be from the 
 urpofe to produce lome others out of Ethics,' in re- 
 ard that falfe Ideaf, which are form'd of Vertues 
 nd Vices, are far more dangerous. 
 
 Nor indeed is any one more happy, or more un- 
 ippy,becaufc he has a true or falle, a clear or ob- 
 ure Idea of Ponderofity, Senfible Dualities, or the Senfei. 
 
 in thofe things h be more or lefs knowing, he 
 ill neither be the better nor the worfe ; whatever 
 ur Opinion be touching thofe things, we (hall ne- 
 r alter it for our own fakes. Their Being is in- 
 pendant from our knowledge, and the Conduct 
 
 our Life is independant from their Being. So 
 at all Men are allowed to await that Knowledge 
 
 bich (hall be our portion after this Life, and to 
 ave the Government of the World to the Good- 
 
 fs and Wifdom of God who governs ir. 
 
 But no Man canexcufe himfelf from endeavour- 
 g to acquire a right Information concerning Ver- 
 e and Vice, becaufe that from the Prefcripts of 
 dgrnents made upon tliele Things, our Lives are 
 
 to
 
 9 6 Logic : Or, Part 1. 1 
 
 to begovern'd, our Manners compofed, and the E- 
 ternity of good or evil to be expected. 
 
 And as the falfe MM of Vertue and Vice are the 
 reafbn that we jugde amifs of them j fo infinitely 
 better would it be to know and amend thefe with 
 Care and Induftry, than to ftudy the re&ifying of 
 thofe other, which precipitancy of Judgment, or 
 the prejudicate Errors of Youth have obtruded up- 
 on us in reference to natural Things, which cart 
 only fupply Matter for lean and barren Specula- 
 tion. 
 
 To difcover all thofe falfe Ideas, would require 
 a Tranfcription of the whole Body of Ethics ; but 
 our only Defign here is to propofe certain Ex- 
 amples of the manner, how they are form'd by 
 annexing together (everal Ideas that are not really 
 annexed, which produces feveral vain and idle Phan- 
 toms, which Men never ceafe hunting after, and 
 miferably wafte their time in hopes to attain that 
 which is of no value when attain'd. 
 
 Man finds in himfelf the Ideas of Mifery and 
 Happinefs, which is neither falfe nor confufed, 
 while general and abftrafted : He has alfo the Idea 
 of Bafenefs and Excellency. He covets Happinefi, 
 avoids Mifery ; he admires Excellency, difpifes Bale- 
 neft. 
 
 But the Contamination of Sin, which has aliena- 
 ted God from Man, in whom alone he could have 
 found true Felicity, and to whom alone he cughl 
 to affix the idea of it, has affix'd this Idea of Hap- 
 pinefs to an innumerable Company of other Things, 
 
 Tc
 
 Chap. IX. 
 
 tn 0^14 i*jnenes from 
 

 
 o8 Logic:- Or, 
 
 __ 
 
 that (he confiders as happy, and as little 
 
 all thofe that are poor and unhappy. And this is 
 
 the reafon that we contemn the poor, and admire 
 
 the opulenr. But thefe are fuch uipuft and falfe 
 
 judgments, that St. Tto* believes lUsAisWor- 
 
 .fhipand Admiration of Riches, which '^ ch 
 
 comemn'd by St. James the Apoftle, while he for- 
 
 bids a more honourable place to be affignd to the 
 
 Rich than to the Poor ; though this place is not to 
 
 be fo literally expounded, as if we were not to foe w 
 
 fome outward- veneration to the Rich, which is not 
 
 due to the Poor ; feeing that the Order or the 
 
 World, which Religion does not difturb, requires 
 
 it, and this praaife has been all along obfervd a- 
 
 mong Men, highly eminent for their Piety. And 
 
 therefore ID is to be underftood of that .inward re- 
 
 fpeft, which looks upon the Poor as fubjeSed un- 
 
 der the Feet of the Rich, and the Rich as infinite! 
 
 exalted above the Poor. 
 
 But though thefe Ideas and the judgments tht 
 arife from thence are falfe and unreafonable, yc 
 are they common to all Men that have not redil 
 them, as proceeding from Concupifcence with whict 
 all Men are infeaed. Hence it happens, that W< 
 not only think fo Honourably of the Rich, bi 
 that we alfo know that all o, her Mortals rende 
 them the fame Honour and Etreem. So that v 
 reprefent to our Iclvcs their Condition not only 8 
 environ'd with all Splendor and Advantages thatal 
 tend ir, but \\'or(hip it wich all that inward Ado 
 ration of Judgments wkh which we fetter A
 
 Chap. IX 
 
 99 
 
 - ,m, 
 
 own Experi- 
 
 of 
 
 *e Ambitious fo hof T I 7 u " the Crue 
 
 - 
 
 but oneonly Mania 
 Rfon, and all t he re ft 
 w ^ dl hu State moved v 
 one thinking Wan I y 
 
 ' 
 
 with 
 
 ' nes > a "<! that 
 t a " ** 
 
 Prived of Reafon 
 
 to move them by certain s"" 7& "' J "' dQ * Iecrec Wa 7 
 
 juire from Me i w 5 L a niind to re- 
 
 mould fometimes take n!^ 7 ^ thfs Perf on 
 
 vith the Several !U ^ ieaiure to direrd/e himself 
 
 F^sm^isi. 
 
 -' kn?th WOT,!^ r r V man 7 p "-~ 
 
 l^wgg^^ 
 
 te^^f ^1:^.^^
 
 TOO . 'Logif Or, 
 
 - 
 
 So that it is not the fimplc and external Obedi- 
 ence o> Attendants feparated from the internal Sub- 
 miiTion of the Mind that is the Objeft of afpinng 
 Ambition. 'Tis Dominion over Men ^ &*"* 
 which they covet -, and the pleafare of thofe that 
 Rule proceeds from the Impreffions ot tear, E 
 fteem and Admiration, which they imprint in o 
 
 -From whence it is manifeft that the 1*4 with 
 which they are blinded, is no lefs vain and empty, 
 than the Idea of thofe whom we properly call ttwr- 
 knm Men, who are they that feed themfelves 
 with Praifes, Eulogies, Titles and other Things 
 of this Nature: the only thing that diftmguiihes 
 the one from the otter, is the fmgle difference < 
 Opinions and Judgments, which both are defirous 
 to communicate to others. For as it is the main de- 
 , fire of the Vain-glorious to excite in others a jfcnle 
 of Love and Efteem for their Knowledge^ o 
 tnience, Wit and Dexterity 5 'tis the Dehghtot i 
 Ambitious to excite in others Motions of Terror, 
 of Obedience and Submiffion to their Grandeur, 
 and tea* conformable to thofe Judgments, by means 
 whereof they appear Formidable, Exalted and Po- 
 tent. So that both the one and the other place 
 their Happinefs in the Thoughts of another : 
 the one mike choice of one fore of Thoughts, the 
 other of another. f 
 
 There is nothing more common than to 1 
 vain Phantoms compos'd of the falfe Judgments < 
 Men, bo* they overturn Enterprises ot g^eateli
 
 Chap. IX. TkeArtofninki^. ^ 
 
 In Jnjy* as !* ingt r h . principal mark I0 
 
 all the Actions of our Lives arc fretted 
 
 wJu ' 1^1 Val r Ur u fo ^ efteem>d in l 
 World, which caufa them that would be fona- 
 
 izd for brave and flout, to [nrow themfelveslnro 
 the moft apparent and threatning Dangers, is no 
 mo soft-times than an over earned biding the 
 Mmd to thefe vain and (hallow Things that fill 
 the Bra,n. Few Perfons when they are^feriou d - 
 fp,fe L,fe, and they who feemtodare Death at a 
 Breach or m a Battel, tremble like others and fa- 
 
 n e- r a B r re p afr ^. when Death **SS 
 
 in their Beds. But this fime bravery of their 
 wbd, i they (hew upon fundry Occafions proce d 
 from hence; ,h they have dill hovering before 
 their Eye S the Reproaches thrown upon Cow rS 
 and Pufflan.mous Creatures ; and on Theoiher (1 
 Appkufe which are given to the Valiant " 
 f ' from thcfe 
 
 - 
 
 rou a R f *, fe "' bec m " the mo(l Gene- 
 rou, and Brave ; and that, becaufe of the Jud,- 
 ment, which other Men make of him. Hence k 
 ^mestopaS that the Captains are more Cour^ 
 Cammon SouW ^, "d that the No- 
 
 fad
 
 i ox Logic : Or, Part L 
 
 (aid a great Captain, are not equally toylfom to a 
 General of an Army and a Common Soldier: For 
 the Captain of an Army, upon whom the Eyes of 
 all Men are fix'd, is thruft forward to difficult 
 Undertakings, whereas a Common Souldier dilates 
 his Thoughts no farther than the hopes of his Pay, 
 or the gains of Plunder, or the Reputation of be- 
 ing Stcur, which feldora extends beyond his own 
 Regimenr. 
 
 What do they propofe to themfelves that build 
 fuch (lately Fabricks ahove their Condition and their 
 Fortune ? Not the Advantage of commodious Li- 
 ving therein. For fuch a coftly Magnificence 
 does them more harm than good j and it is evi- 
 denr, that if they were alone in the World,, they 
 xvou'd never put themfelves to that Charge and 
 Trouble ; or if they thought they flioukl be de- 
 fpis"d by all that faw thofe Houfes, Therefore 
 the Houfis are built for the fake of others, that 
 they think will applaud the Buildings. They, 
 imagine that all tnar^Qiall behold thofe Palaces, 
 will entertain Motions of RefpecT: and Admi- 
 ration for the Mailer. And therefore they re- 
 pTefent themfelves to themfelvcs as in a Theater, 
 luting in the midft of their Palaces, environ'd 
 with crouds of People, that behold all from Top 
 to Bottom, and thence conceive them Great, Po- 
 ten!, Harpy and Magnificent; and thlsldea filling, 
 ti~uh Minds, fpurs them on to thofe Expences and; 
 10 be at that Trouble. 
 
 Why
 
 X^ The ArttfTbinkinfr '103 
 
 Why do Men load their Coaches with fuch a 
 great number of Lacqueys ? Not for the great 
 Serv,ce they do, for they are rather a Trouble than 
 
 enCC Ut t0 1<mri 
 
 the 
 an Idea that it is f ome Perfon of 
 
 T; 1 ^ l y -l u^ 3 ^ > and the p rof p^ <>f 
 
 that Idea, wh,ch they imagine the fight of /Coach 
 To loader . w,U create in the Beholders, fatisfies the 
 vanity of him to whom thofe Caches Won* 
 
 ' i ' 
 
 Co ' n m te ame < ali 
 
 Conditions , all Employments, all Profeffions that 
 
 are efteem'dm the World, we {hall find that tha- 
 which renders them delightful, and nlleviates the' 
 am and Toyl that attends them, is this, that they 
 reprefemto the M,nd the /** of Refpecl, Efkem, 
 ear and Admiration that others have for as; On 
 the other fide, that which renders Solitude tedioiw 
 to the moft part of the World, is this, that in fe- 
 perating themfelves from the view, they alfo fipa- 
 ratettemfelves from the Judgments and Thoughts 
 
 rf Harts become 
 
 MM K- r f arts ecome em P f y an 
 
 amiftid as bemg depnv'd of their ufual Nourift 
 
 taenr , and not finding in themfelves, wherewithal 
 
 to feed I their Thoughts. And therefore the Hea- 
 
 then Phdofophers deem'd a folitary Life fo infup- 
 
 pombie ; that they f crup led, not to aver, that a 
 
 wife Man would not be bound to enjoy all the 
 
 Bleffings of Body and Mind, to live alone : and 
 
 not to haveany Perfon to whom he might imparr 
 
 ibis Happmefs by Difcourfe. And indeed the.e is 
 
 ;notnmg but the Chriftian Religion, that can render 
 
 V A O i 
 
 4 Soli-
 
 104 Logic: Or, Parti- 
 
 Solitude defirable-, for becaufe if teaches Men to 
 dcfpife the World, it affords them at the fame 
 rime other Objects to employ the Mind, and more 
 worthy to fill the Heart, for which they have no 
 need of the Sight and Commerce of Company. 
 
 But here it is to be obferv'd, that the dciires of 
 Wen do not terminate in knowing the Thoughts 
 and Judgments of others concerning themfelves \ 
 but being known, they make a farther ufe of theni 
 to Aggrandife and Exalt the Idea which they have 
 of themfelves, adding to them, and incorporating 
 ether Afcititious and Eoreign Ideas, and imagining 
 through a grofs Delufion that they are really grea- 
 ter, becaufe they live in a larger Houfe, and that 
 there are more people who admife^m. - Though 
 all ihefe Things are excrinfical as^kt^emfelves, 
 and belong hot to them at all ; nor can tnl^f noughts 
 of other Men preftrve or vindicate thera^om the 
 want and mifery to which they were before obno- 
 xious. 
 
 From whence we may difcover what it is that 
 renders agreeable to Men ftveral Things which o- 
 therwife are altogether incapable to divert and de- 
 light the Mind. For the Reafbn of the Pleafurc 
 that Men take therein arifes from this, that the 
 Ue& of themfelves reprelents them to themfelves 
 greater than ordinary, by means of Ibmc vain Cir* 
 cum (lance which they add to it. 
 
 They take Delight in difcourfing of the Dangers 
 they have run, as forming from the Accidents an 
 Idea, which reprelents us to our (elves, either as 
 
 prudent,
 
 . IX. The Ar 
 
 prudent , orelle particularly favour'd by God. We 
 kreto AToourfe of Sckndb we have efcaped as 
 jpreftntingwour (elves the ftrength of - our Be- 
 fuch dcf P"e Attack. 'of 
 
 We love to be Victorious in every Thin,?, ever, 
 
 i Th e K ther , e is no!hin of c " ni s ^ ii 
 
 ard, though we do not play for Gain ? a^ne 
 to ou, own z*.,he ^ of H.ppinefs at t'he fim ? 
 hTntl^i '""ffnary Happinefs we are apt to 
 W^ belongs to us, a s a permanent QuaKyr," which 
 make, mdjum ^ f ame f uccefs fort ^ e 
 
 g GmefterS Chufe to " 
 
 happy 
 
 lid hu l their Mi "l s ' who a i 
 
 orld, hare no other Obj e a 3 - o f their 
 
 - 
 
 o t 
 
 E B ^"r' C 'f- *at-da,-ly 
 
 eir Brains ; and even they who carry the 
 ^Reputation for Wifdom, feed SSSfi 
 
 eywodirea the ; r Lires ahd theAcl; f 
 ^es to Etwal Thing,, may.be faid ro nx h dr 
 thoughts upon real, fclM and perrna.cnt o' 
 m, when all h ers do but follow V a ,iry''"d n
 
 ro 6 Logic : Or, Part I. 
 
 pry Nothing, arid give theml elves over to Lyes and 
 Errors. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 Of another Caufe of Qonfufwn in our 
 Thoughts and Dzfcourje ; Ideas annexed 
 to Words. 
 
 WE have already faid, that the Neceffity 
 we have to make ufe of External Signs 
 to exprefs our Mind?, is the Reafbn that we fix ! 
 e!e.;> to words in fuch a manner, that many times 
 we confider the Words more than the Things. 
 
 For it is to be obferved, that though IVlen have 
 Frequently different Ideas of the fame Things, nev.er- 
 thekfs they make ufe of the fame words to exprefs* 
 them ; as the Idea, which a Heathen Philofopher has 
 of Vertue, is not the fame which a Divine hath, 
 yet both exprefs their Idea by the fame Word,, 
 Vcrtne. 
 
 Moreover the fume Men, at different Ages, have 
 confider'd the fame Things after very 'different 
 Manners j and yet they have rammafs'd all the fa i 
 HIM under one name : Which \% the Reafon, that^ 
 in pronouncing the word, or hearing it pronour.c'd,, 
 a Man is prefently Confounded, apprehending the-; 
 word fbmerimes according to one Idea 9 fbmetimes' j 
 
 according '
 
 Chap. X. The Art of Thinking. 107 
 
 according to another. For Example, a Man un- 
 derftanding that he has Something within him, 
 whatever it be, which is the occafion of his Nou- 
 rifhmentar.d Growth, has cail'd it a Soul, and has 
 extended this Idea not only to what refembles it in 
 Animals, but in Plants. 
 
 And perceiving alfo that he had Thoughts, he has 
 call'd this principle of Thought by the Name of the 
 Soul. Whence it has come to pafs thac by this 
 Refemblance of the Name, he has taken for the 
 fame Thing, the principle of Thought, and the 
 principle of Nourilhment and Growth. -In like 
 nanner, the Name of Life is given totliat Faculty 
 rom whence the Animal Functions proceed, as alk> 
 he Cogitative Faculty, which are two Things abfo- 
 utely different 1 . 
 
 Thus thefe words, Sence and Senfation, when 
 they are fpoken of any of the Five Senfes, are vehe- 
 mently pefter'd wilh Equivocations. For three 
 Things happen to us when we make ufe of our 
 enfes ; as, r. When we fee any thing. There is 
 
 Motion in the Corporeal Organs, as the Brain 
 nd Eye. z/Thele Motions give an occafion to 
 be Soul, to perceive fbmeihing. As when by the 
 Motions firft begun in the Eye, by the Refledlion 
 f the Light, in the falling Rain oppos'd to the 
 Sun-Beam?, it has the Lktts of Red, Blew and 
 r ellow. 3; We make a Judgment of what we 
 ee ; and thus we judge thei'e Colours to belong to 
 le Rainbow* which we pronounce to be of (uch a 
 of fuch a Figure, and at (udi a diu
 
 io8 Logic : Or, PartT. 
 
 from us. Of thefe three the firft only belongs \.o 
 the Body ; the other two fblcly to the Mind j how- 
 ever by occafion of what is perform'd in the Body. 
 Neverthelefs we comprehend all thefe three Things 
 under the name of Sence or Senfation of the Sight 
 or Hearing. For when we fay the Eye fees, or 
 the Ear hears, it cannot be underftcod but accord- 
 ing to the Corporeal Organ j it being apparent 
 that the Eye does not apprehend the Objedls which 
 irfees, nor judge of them. On the other fide we 
 Jo not fay, we have feen fuch a one, if the 
 Mind, call'd off by another Object, has not made 
 Refle&ion upon the Perfbn that prefenred himlelf 
 before our Eyes. And then we take the word See 
 for the Thought form'd in our Mind, in purfuit of 
 what paft in our Eye and in our Brain. And ac- 
 cording to this Signification of the word, tee, -it is 
 the Soul and not the Body which fees, as Platd 
 maintains, and Cicero after him. For indeed, faith 
 he, we do not now behold with our Eyes the Thing which 
 IPS fee ; for there is no fence in the "Body. There are 
 M it were certain Pajjltges made from the Seat of thg 
 Soul- to the Eyes, she Ears and Nofe, and- therefore fee* 
 ing often- interrupted either ly feme thought, or tk 
 force of Come Difeafe, we neither hear nor fee with, 
 open or entire Eyes or Ears. Whence . we may ea/I/f 
 Afprthend that the Soul both Ixars and fees, not theft 
 farts which Are but as the Windows of the Sottl. Id 
 fliort, we take thofe words, Senfation of Sight, Hear* 
 inp, &V. for the lad or thefe three Things, thaD 
 i?. fcr the Judgments which the Saul makes in pur* 
 
 fuar.ce
 
 Chap. X. The Art of Thinking. 109 
 
 ftiancc of the Perceptions it has made, by occafion 
 of what pafs'd in the Corporeal Organs, as when 
 we fey the Sences are deceived, at the fame time 
 that we fee a crooked Stick fb appearing in the 
 Water, or the Sun but two Foot in Diameter. For 
 it is certain there can be no Error or Falfity nei- 
 ther in thofe Things that happen in the Corporeal 
 Organs, nor in the bare Perception of the Soul, 
 which is only a fimple Apprehenfion j but the Er- 
 ror proceeds from hence, that we judge amifs, in 
 concluding that the Sun is but two Foot in Dia- 
 meter, in regard that by reafbn of its vaft diftancc 
 from us, it comes to pals that the Image of the Sun 
 ivhich is form'd in the bottom of the 'Eye, is near 
 it Hand, of the feme b5gnefs which an Object of 
 wo Foot would form at a diftance more propor- 
 ionable to our manner of Sighr. But becaufe We 
 lave made this Judgment in our Youth, and for 
 hat we are fb much accuftom'd to it, that it is made 
 at the ferae Inftant that we fee the Sun without 
 any Examination hardly* we atttribute it to the 
 Sight, and we fay we fee the Objects little or great, 
 as they are nearer or more diftant from us, though 
 it be indeed the Mind, not the Eye that judges of 
 their fmallnefs or magnitude. 
 
 All Languages are full of words of the feme 
 Nature, which not baring any more than one 
 Sound, are nevertheless the fignification- of Ideas al- 
 together different. 
 
 Bui we are to underftand that when an Equivcn 
 eal word fignifiea two Things which haye no Re- 
 lation
 
 iro Logic: Or, Parti. 
 
 lation one to another, and which Men have never 
 confounded in their Thought?, it \s almoft im- 
 poffible that Men fhould thereby be deceiv'd, or 
 that they fhould be the caufe of Errors, For the 
 Equivocal word, Aria a Ham, which figniSes both 
 a certain Creature, and a Stgn in the %odiac 9 fhall 
 never impofe upon a Perfon that has but a grain of 
 common Sence. Whereas it is a difficult Thing 
 not to be deceiv'd when the Equivocation nrifes 
 from the Errors of Men, who have negligently con- 
 founded different Idea*, as in the word Soul ; for 
 we take it for granted, that they who firft made 
 ufe of thofe words, did inquire into their Significa- 
 tions, and fo it fuffices us to pronounce them, 
 without ever examining whether the .Idea which 
 we have of if be clear and diftinfr. Nay, fome- 
 times (ve attribute thofe Things to the fjgni- 
 fication of the fame word, which falls not but upon 
 Tdeat of. Things altogether incompatible, not per- 
 ceiving that we have, confounded two different 
 Things under the fame Word. 
 
 CHAP}!
 
 Cbap. XL The Art of Thinking. 
 
 CHAP. XL 
 
 Of the Remedy of Cotfa&otiin our thoughts 
 WRatiocinations, *rifi*gf rm the Q m . 
 
 . 
 
 Won of Words : Off be Benefit of defining 
 Words* and of the Difference between tfc 
 Definition of Things WNames.. 
 
 HT H E bed way to avoid the Confufion of words 
 * which we find in different Languages, is to 
 make a new Language, and to coyn new Worcfc, 
 to belong oniv to thofe l^,, which they are 
 affign d to %mhe. To which purpofe there is no 
 neceflity to frame new Sounds of Words, becaufe 
 *e may make ufe of fuch as are ufually praais'd 
 ookmg upon them as if they had no Signification 
 hat we may afcnbe to them thofe Notions which 
 ve intend them j which it behoves us todefig n bvr 
 nher fimpfc words, free from all Equivocltiol 
 hus were it to be prov'd, that the Soul is I m - 
 3ortal th,s word Anima, the Soul, being E *uho. 
 *l, will eafily make a Confufion in wha? isfo be 
 J.d. For the avoiding of which, I will retain this 
 
 ake nf' ? * T d d f tute of ^ Norion, and 
 i^e ufe of ,t only to denote that Thing which 
 > us is the principle of Thought, by fc^ 
 
 Behold
 
 Iix Logic : Or, Part f. 
 
 Behold here the Definition of the Word, with 
 fo much benefit made ufe of by the Geometricians, 
 which is cautioufly to be diftinguimM from the 
 Definition of the Thing. 
 
 For in the Definition of the Thing, as thus, a 
 "Man* w a Rational Creature, Time w the Meafitre oj 
 Motion^ we leave to the Term defin'd, that is Man, 
 and Time the ufual Notion wherein we aflert odier 
 Ideas to be contained, as the Idea of Rational Crea* 
 ture, Meafurc of Time, whereas in the Definition of 
 the Word, as we have already faid, we only mind 
 the Sound, and afterwards determine the Sound 
 to be the Sign of forae /<&, deiign'd for other 
 .Words. 
 
 But great heed is to be taken lead we confound' 
 this Definition of the word of which we here Dif- 
 courfe, with that other* of which other? fpeak, who 
 will have it be the Explanation of what a Word 
 fignifies according to the vulgar Idiom of the Lan- 
 guage, or its Etimology, which we (hall fpeak 
 more of in another place. But here we only mind 
 the particular ufe to which he that defines a word 
 will have it apply 'd for the better underftanding his 
 meaning, not caring whether it be taken in the'- 
 fame Sence-by others. 
 
 And from hence it follows, i. That the DefV 
 rations of Words are at pleafuie, but thatthofe otf 
 Things are not fo: For every Sound being of its : 
 felf, and in its own Nature indifferent, to fignifiejj 
 any Thing, it is lawful for me, for my particular^ 
 ufe, provided I advertife others of it, to deter< 
 
 mine;
 
 Chap XI. The Art of Thinking i j 3
 
 114 Logic: Or, PartL 
 
 Thirdly, it follows that every Definition of a 
 Word, when it cannot be call'd inQueftion, may 
 be taken for a Principle. WHich cannot be (aid of 
 the Definitions of Things ; in regard they are Prc- 
 pofitions that may be deny'd by thofe that find any 
 Obfcurity therein. And therefore, like other Pro- 
 pofitions, they ought to be proved, and not to be 
 taken for True j unlefs they appear perfpicuous in 
 themfelves, like Axiom?. 
 
 But as to what I faid but now, that the Defini- 
 tion of a Name may fupply the place of a Principle, 
 it requires a farther Ilhittration. For it is only! 
 true, in regard it cannot be controverted but that! 
 the determined Idea may be call'd by the aflign-j 
 ed name. Neverthelefi, we ought not to con-j 
 elude any thing of the Idea it felf, nor to be-! 
 lieve it can exhibite any thing pofidvely to us fotj 
 that reafon alone, becaule it is called by fuch a 
 Name. For Example, I may define the Name ofl 
 Chimera, and fay, I call a Chimera that which imi 
 plies a contradiction ; however it does not thencej 
 follow that a Chimera is any thing. In like mannefl,i 
 a Philofbpher fays to me, I call Ponderofiry the In- 1 
 terior- Principle which caufes a Stone to defcen^j 
 without any compulfive violence, I fhould willing*-. 
 ly grant the Definition without contradiction, be-i 
 caufe ic leads me to the Knowledge of what he de-1 
 fires to make me underftand ; but I will deny, that] 
 what is fignified by the word Gravity, is any thing 
 real, in regard there is no iiich principle in 
 Stones. 
 
 -
 
 <L The Art of Thinking. 
 
 I will explain this a little farther, becaufe there 
 are two great Errors committed in Vulgar PhiJo- 
 fophy upon this Subject For it confounds the 
 I Definition of the Name with the Definition of the 
 Thing, and attributes to the former what only be- 
 longs to the Second. For the Philofphers having 
 ^om d an infinite number not of Names but of 
 Things according to their own Fancies which are 
 utogether falfe, as not explaining neither the Na- 
 ure of Things, nor the Ideas which naturally we 
 save of them, yet they obtrude thefe Definitions 
 jpon us for fuch as are not to be contradifted. So 
 hat if any one deny them, when defervedly they 
 nay be denied, they exclaim againft him as one 
 hat ought to be exterminated the Schools, as. not 
 , to be difputed with. 
 
 Secondly, the Vulgar Philofophers very feldora 
 w never make ufe of thofe Definitions of Names, 
 o remove or clear any Qbfcuricv, nor fix them to 
 ny certain Afe* c! ear ]y defign'd, but leave them in 
 fcrknefe and Confufion. Whence it happens that 
 noil o their Difpures, are only Difputes of Words : 
 nd whatever is clear and true in Ideas, that they 
 bufc, to tfhblifli and maintain, what is confus'd 
 nd dark m the (ame : Which Error would be a- 
 oided by the Definition of the Name. Thus the 
 hilofophers believe that there is nothing in the 
 
 orld more unqueftionable than that Fire is hot, 
 r that a Stone is heavy, and that it would be a 
 oly to deny either. Which indeed they may 
 ke all the World believe, fo long as they for- 
 bear
 
 Ii6 Logic : Or, Part I. 
 
 bear from the' Definition of Names. But when 
 once they do that, it will prefently appear what is 
 Obfcure, and what apparent in reference to thofe 
 Things. Firft then it is to be asked them, what 
 they mean by thefe words Hot and Ponderous ? For if 
 ihey anfwer, that by Hot they only mean that which 
 is only properto caufe in us a Sentiment of Heat, 
 and by Heavy that which falls downward not being 
 propt up ; they may then defervedly fay; that it is 
 a Folly to deny Fire to be Hot, and Stones to be 
 Heavy. But if they mean by Heat that which has in 
 its felf a Quality like to that which we imagine 
 when we feel heat } and by Heavy that which has 
 in it felf an Internal Principle* which caufcs it to 
 fall to the Center, not being compell'd by any Vio- 
 lence from without; it will be eafic then to de- 
 monftrate to 'them, that it is no denial of a clear 
 thing, but of a thing which is very Obfcure, if 
 not altogether falie, that Fire is hot in that Sence, 
 or that a Stone is heavy ; in regard it is apparent 
 that Fire caufes in us a Sence of Heat, by that acti- 
 on whereby it operates upon our Bodie?, but it is 
 no way evident that there is in the Fire any thing 
 like to that which we feel in the Fire. And it is 
 as evident in the fame manner that Stones fall down jj 
 but it is not fo clear, that they fall of themftlves 
 without any outward -detruding Violence. 
 
 Thus we fee the great benefit of Defining 
 Names, for that by this means we underftand what 
 it is we difpute of, that we may not contend in vairt 
 about words, which we underftand fome one way, 
 
 fome
 
 Chap. XI. The An of Thinking. r 1 7 
 
 fbme another, as is frequently praftiVd even in our 
 -ordinary, Dilcourles. 
 
 But befides rhis Benefit there is alfo another, 
 which is. rhar we cannot many times have a diftin& 
 Idta of , Thinp, unlefs we make ufe of many words 
 to denote ir. Now it would be Impertinent efpe- 
 cially m writings that concern the Sciences to be 
 always repearing a Jong Series of words. And 
 therefore having once defin'd the thing by feveral 
 Words, we fix to fome one word the Idea conceiv'cf 
 to ferveinfteud of a!! the reft. 
 
 Thus after we have found that there are Num- 
 >ers that may be divided into two equal Numbers, 
 o avoid the often Repetition of thofe words, we 
 "ixthis Propriety, and call a Number that may be 
 
 *[ ded ln - r tW equal Numbers an * Number* 
 Whence it is apparent, that as often as we make 
 ife of the defin'd Name, the Definition is to be 
 nentally fupply'd, which a Man muft have always 
 o ready in his Mind, that as foon as he hears e- 
 'en Numbers, he prefently underftands fuch a 
 lumber as may be divided into two Numbers : 
 Vnd thefe two Things ought to be fo infeparable 
 rom the Thoughts, that the Tongue fliould no 
 xmer exprefs the one, but the Mind fliould add 
 ie other. For they who have dtfined Names as 
 ic Geometricians do with fo much Care, did it 
 nly to abridge their Writings (,or as St. Auflm 
 i/sj Leaft bj continual Circumlocution they fhould 
 eate Delays : But yet they do not doit to abridge 
 10 Uus of the Things of which they Dilcourfe, 
 
 be.
 
 -,. 
 
 n8 Logic : Or, Part 
 
 believing the Mind will fupply the entire Definition' 
 to fliorc Words, which they only make ufe of tc 
 avoid the Perplexity which multitude of Word] 
 would produce. 
 
 CHAP. XII. 
 
 Certain Qlfervations of great Importance, 
 touching the Definition of Words. 
 
 H/Wing thus explain'd the Nature, Benefit and 
 Neceffity of the Definition of Names, it will 
 not be from the purpofe to fpeak fomething of theii 
 Ufe, lead an ill Ufe be made of them. 
 
 Firft, all Names are not to be defin'd ; for thai 
 would be often unprofitable and impoflible to be 
 done. I fay unprofitable ; for that when the Ideak 
 conceiv'd of Things are diftincl, and that all Men] 
 underftanding the fame Language, conceive the 
 fame Idea, it would be fiipei fluous to define fuch a 
 Nam?, becaufe we have already the intent of the 
 Definition^ as being fix'd without a Definition to 
 the diftint and clear Idea. 
 
 But this happens in Things that are purely fim- 
 pie, of which all Men naturally have the fame I- 
 dea, fo that the words by which they are denoted* 
 are underftood by all Men in the fame Sence, or IE 
 there be any mixture of Obfcurity, that which fl 
 clear is primarily underftood. And fb they wh'o 
 
 mate
 
 Chap. XII. The An of Thinking. n 9 
 
 i make ufe of foch words to denote a clear Idea, need 
 .not fear lead they fliould be underftood ami 
 Such are the words, Ens, er being, Thought, Exten- 
 sion, EquaHy, Duration or Time. For though fbrae 
 may Obfcure the Idea of Time by feveral Propc- 
 .fitioiM, which they call Definitions; -as, that Time 
 *the Meafure of Motion ascordmg to Prwitj and Pofte- 
 runtj-, nevertheless they nevermind thefe Detini- 
 rions rhemfelves, when they fpeak of Time, nor 
 to they conceit any other thing of ir. So that 
 *>th Learned and Unlearned with the fame Facility 
 underftand the fame thing when they hear, That a 
 tyfi takes up left nme , facing 4 p . ^ 
 lortoije. 
 
 ^ I have faid moreover, that it is impoffibie tode- 1 
 me all words. In regard that to define fome word., 
 here is a neceffiry of tifing other words that ex' 
 >refs the Idea, to which ;hat word is to be an- 
 iex d. And then if thefe w >rds which were made 
 -re of to expUin the firtr, b, alfo to be defin'd 
 
 &e w W \A / J 16 " >fi y F r ther W0fds > * & to 
 ne Worlds End. And therefore there are fomc 
 Timitivc Words which cannot be defin'd, and it 
 /ould be great a Fault to be too curious about 
 
 ^Definition, as not to define fufficieatly ; for 
 oth ways we fall into the fame Confulion, which 
 'e labour to avoid. 
 
 The Second Obfervation is, that we ought not 
 change D^tioni known and already r?ceiv'd 
 
 W ' k u ^^^ fn them that is < 
 with j for it is always more eafie 
 
 to
 
 ixo 
 
 c : Or, Parti. 
 
 to reach rhe fignification of a. word to othrrs, when 
 Cuftora already received, at lea ft among the Lear- 
 ned, has fix'd it to an Idea, than 10 annex it anew 
 to another Idea, and force it from a former, to 
 which it has been properly join'd by daily life. And 
 therefor, it would be a great Error to alter the 
 Definitions receiv'd by the Mathematicians, unleft 
 where there are any that are not fufficiently plaki 
 and obvious to Sence, or fuch whole Ideas are not 
 Politely defer ib'd, as in Euchd may be thought the 
 Definition of single and Proportion. 
 
 Thirdly, it is to be obferv'd, that when there 
 45 a neceflity to define a Name, it behoves us to ap- 
 proach as near as may be to common Cuftom, and 
 not to give to Words a Sence altogether Foreign 
 to what they already have, or which are contrary 
 to their Etimology ; as if a ParalleHogram fhouk 
 be defin'd, a Figure confiding of three Lines 
 But if the Word has two Significations, it muft be 
 depriv*d of one, that the other may be only affix'c 
 to ir. Thus when Heat fignifiesas well the feelinj 
 which we have of it, as the Quality which we be* 
 lieveto be in the Fire, like to that which we feel,. 
 to remove this ambiguity, I will ufe the Name of 1 ) 
 Heat, but I muft not apply it but to one of thefe l-ll 
 dcat, difmiflSng it from the other, faying, I call!) 
 Meat that feeling which I have when I come near! 
 the Fire j and to the caufe of this Senfation 1 would;! 
 give a name altogether different, as of Ardour 01 
 Burning ; or elfe the fame name with fome Addi- 
 tion, which determines and diilinguilhes it from 
 
 Heat
 
 a word, are 
 the Word 
 
 , oblirerate, 
 late Defi nition . So 
 
 .hemfd 
 
 
 
 
 ffiiti 
 
 Signature
 
 I^z Logic: Or,, Part 
 
 Signature of the Aftronomers could be any wa 
 effe&ual for the Cure of Difeafes. 
 
 But that which is more insufferable- in this ja: 
 gonry, or gibbrifh of the Cbymifts, is their Pr< 
 phaning the Sacred Myfterics of Religion to mali 
 them ferveas a Vail to cover their pretended S< 
 crets ; infbmuch that fome are arriv'd at that heigl 
 of Impiety ; as to apply what the Scriptures fpeal 
 of the true Chrifmns, That they are the chofon %act 
 the tyyal friefthood, the Holy Nation, the People pin 
 ckafd by God t and whom he hat calfd out of darkpe^ 
 to his wonderful Light, to the Chimerical Fraternit 
 of the fiofic-Crucians, whom in their own Imagine 
 lions they term the only wife Men that have al 
 tain'd Immortal Happinefs ; as having by vertue c 
 the Philofbphers Stone, found out the way to fi 
 the Soul in the Body ; for as much, fay they, a 
 there is no Body fo fix'd and incorruptible as Gol< 
 Of which Dreams, and of feveral others of tB| 
 fame Nature, there are to be found a great numbfj 
 in Gajfindus's Examen of Flud's Philosophy. WhJB 
 dcmonftrates that there is no Difeafe of the Min 
 more dangerous than that of Enigmatical Scriblinj 
 which caufes Men to imagine that their leaft fbli 
 Thoughts, if I may not call them Falfe and alttl 
 gether Impious, will pals for great Myfteries, j, 
 dad in words unintelligible to the Common Sort (,, 
 Men. 
 
 CHAli
 
 CHAP. XIII. 
 
 to Common Uf
 
 Logic : Or, 
 
 Parti- 
 
 of them. And this demonftrates alfo to us that De- 
 finitions may be contefted, becaufe we find daily 
 Sutesabou't the Unification which Cuftom gcves 
 
 10 NoV' though thefe]- forts of Definitions of 
 words feem to be the bufmefsof the Qrammanans 
 wnofc Province it is to make Diaionanes, whicb 
 Tre nothing elfe but the Explication of He* which 
 Men have agreed to affix certain Sounds, yet ma> 
 we raife upon this Subjea feveral important Re 
 fleaions for the reaifying our Judgments 
 
 The firft, which may ferve as the Foundatior 
 of all the reft, that Mendonotmany time^ conti 
 der the whole figniflcation of Words i that is, tna 
 the Words often fignifie more than they feem 
 fignifie, and that therefore they who .interpret th, 
 filnification, do not throughly unfold I all the Jdg 
 which the Words imprint in the Minds Of 
 
 Tor 16 fignifie in a Sound pronounc'd or writtj 
 is no other than to raife an Idea by ftriking ourEa 
 or our Eyes. Now it comes frequently to pafi! 
 that one Word, befides the principal Idea, wh| 
 is look'd upon as the proper fignification ot tj 
 Word, excites feveral other Ideas, which mayj 
 term'd Acceffiries, of which we take little nott 
 although the Mind receive their Impreffion. . 
 
 For Example, if a Man (hould fay to anofl 
 tcu Lye, and that there fhould be no more none 
 taken than of the principal fignification of the 1 
 preflbn, 'tis no more than to fay, lou l&s :| 
 
 contt*
 
 115-
 
 : -neparrof the Reproof and I ins neceflary 
 -~t that IiM in the mind ot the bcrvanr, 
 
 -would have it make. 
 
 But foments thefe Acce&ry J* are fax d 
 -at ufually tbey 
 And 
 
 rhrooexoieiotatprQO. 
 
 this is rhe Reaion thar among Tevcral Expreiho 
 
 tbafeem to fe theOme Thing, fomeare m- 
 
 nofR, feme arc mSd, fame tnodcft, otfeen im- 
 Vwdert, feme booeft, others diflioneft; for dat 
 53* the prindptl Ji ^a wfakh they agree, 
 l&w which are the cauieot 
 
 V-- --- 
 
 Aad ths Obfertatko may fore to difcover a 
 dual aoocg thofc who COK- 
 which 
 For
 
 Chap. XIII. ~ The Art of Thin king. i 07 
 
 nuate the Crime which he laid to the othera Charge 
 And thofe are the ways which Prudent and Mo-' 
 derate Men make ufeof, unlefs f ome Rea Vn 
 vail with them, tuaft with raore rartnefs 
 nemency. 
 
 Hence alfo may be underflood the difference be- 
 tween a plam and a figur'd Stile, and why the fame 
 Thoughts feem much more lovely, whe/they are 
 expre/sdbya F,gurr, than if they were reftrain'd 
 to a plain manner of Speech. Which proceeds 
 from hence that figur'd Express, befides, the 
 P cu- lp L hmg ' % niflet he Motion and Geftu^e 
 ot him that fpcafcs, and imprint both the one and 
 the other Ueam the Mind, whereas f, mp !e Expref- 
 /Ions fets forth only the naked Truth: For Exam. 
 pie, ofthishalfVerfcof VngiL 
 
 ne mori miferum eft ? 
 were exprefs'd fimply and without a Figure, 
 Nm ejl ufyue a&o mori miferum. 
 
 ^ithout doubt the Sentence would not have had 
 hat force i and the Reafon is, becaufc the firft 
 ^preffioa figmfies more than the fecondi for it 
 oes not only exprefs the Thought, that it is not fo 
 ulerablc a Thing as Men think to die; but itrc- 
 rdents alfo the tea of a Man, as it *ere pro- 
 )kmg Death, and undauntedly looking it in tha 
 ace, which, wjtbput queftion is a great and live. 
 
 G
 
 i-2 8 Logic : Or, Parti 
 
 ly Acceffion to the Signification of the Words 
 Hence it is no wonder that it makes a deep impfef 
 fion in the Hearer ; for the Mind is only in 
 ftru&ed by the variety of Ideas, but flie is notrous'c 
 but by the Reprefcntation of Affections, 
 
 v fi vts me flere dolendum eft 
 
 Primum ipfe tibi " 
 
 " ' "If tkw wouldft have me weep, it f>ft bcl 
 thy felf to g ricve - 
 
 But as figur'd Stile not only fignifies the Thir 
 themfeivcs, but al(o thofe AfFelions of the Mir 
 which we conceive in meditating and fpcakir 
 we may judge from thence, the ufe which we ou 
 lo make of it, and what are the Subjects rr.oft pr 
 per for it. Vifible it is, that it is ridiculous t| 
 make ufe of it in matters meerly Speculative, whic 
 v^e con rem plate with a calm and placid Eye, 
 which produce no Motion in the Mind. For fii 
 that Figures expre/s the Paffibns of the Soul, wl 
 ^Figures are intermix'd where the Soul is no.wa 
 mov'd, fuch Agitations of the Min'd are conn 
 to Nature, and feem to be a kind of Convulfic 
 For which reafcn there can be nothing more 
 pofterous than the ftir and hurly burly which I 
 Preachers make, who fly out into Fury and 
 travagant Bombafts, upon all manner of Sut 
 and who are no left Furious upon Philofbphical 
 greffions, than upon Truths, the moft weighty! 
 necejlary for Salvation.
 
 ^^ 
 
 On the other fide, when the Subject of the Dif- 
 
 of rh M J 1 ' C 1C r eqUlVeSa r ufin S and ^king 
 of the M,nd, it a fault to deliver himfelf in a 
 
 Son J and With Ut a " 7 manner of 
 
 Therefore Divine Truths not being foply pro- 
 pos d only to be known, but much more to" be be. 
 lovd, reverenc'd and ador'd By Men, without 
 <foubr, the noble devated and figur'd manner of 
 Eloqirion, obferv'd by the Holy Fathers, is much 
 more proportionable to the Subject, than a flat 
 and meager Sti!e, like that of the SchoMicks; 
 IfifK* it not only teaches us the Truths we are to 
 now, but alfo endeavours to raife in us thofe Sen- 
 ;;nmemsof Love Reverence and Affe^ion, whick 
 Fathers had for thofe Truths, when they 
 rote and which reprefenting, muft of neceffiti 
 i:ontnbure more to imprint the like in us. Where- 
 . s the Scholaftic ft,le being plain, and contenting It 
 pCwith th, U* of the naked Truth, is nothfng. 
 J^efeauai to produce in our Souls thofe Motion! 
 F RdTpeft and Love, which we ought to have for- 
 
 ' |J I ]r * , f ^ hriftiani ^ which, render it not 
 : ly lefi profitable but lefs delightful, fince the 
 
 7 ft IS ^n dd '8 w J 'bferving the Mo. 
 ^of her A&aions, than ia acquiring Know-, 
 
 Daftly, ^ by mans -of this Obfervstion, that 
 V may refolve that famous Queftion among the 
 nt Phdofophers, whether there be any words 
 counted unchaft ? And by whkh we may 
 G 5 alia
 
 130 
 
 Logic : Or, Part I. 
 
 slfb refute the Arguments of the 5/c^,who juftiGed 
 that we might make ufe indifferently of any Words, 
 though Impudent and Obfcene. 
 
 They were of pinion, faith Cicero in a Letter, 
 which he wrote upon this Subje&, That there were 
 no Words that were either Nafty or Obfcene ; for 
 they fay, that the .Obfcenity proceeds either from 
 the Things, or it is in the Words. It does not 
 proceecITirqply from the Things, becaufe they may 
 be exprefs'd in other Words that are not efteem'd 
 fo Naufeous j nor is it in the Words, confider'd as 
 they are, becaufe it happens oft-times, that one 
 Word fjgnifies two Things, and (b in one fignifi- 
 cation it may be naufeous, in another well enough 
 approv'd. 
 
 But all this is no more than a vain piece of feb- 
 tlety which grew from hence, that thofe Philofb- 
 phers did not confider thofe acceflbry AccidentSj 
 which the Mind adds to the principal Ideas of Things: 
 for from thence it comes to pafs, that one and the 
 fame Thing may be exprefs'd honeftly by on 
 found, and lafcivioufly by another, if one of the 
 iounds has an Idea which covers the Obfcenity, and 
 the other an Idea that lays it open. 
 
 Thus Adultery^ Inter eft , Male-Copafation are no 
 Obfcene Words, though they fignifie moft Obfcene 
 Actions, becaufe they represent them cover'd with 
 a vail of Abhorrency, which fiiews that we loolc 
 upon them as Crimes, fo that thofe Words rather 
 iignifie the Wickednefs of the A&ions themfelves. 
 Whereas there are certain words that exprefs thofe 
 
 4
 
 Chap. XIII. Ue Art of Thinking 1 1 1 
 
 Aas, wjthouuny Abhorrency, and which defcribe 
 them rather grateful and plea fing, withal, adding 
 an Idea of Impudence and Lafcivioufhefs. And 
 
 ** *- r *aiawu^,iL 
 
 There are alfo cettain Circumlocutions, by which 
 ertaifl adlions are chaftly expreft, which, though 
 lawful yet participate fomething of the Corrupt 
 on of Nature- for fuch Circumlocutions, not only 
 plainly exprefs the things themfelves, but alfo the 
 difpofition of him who fpeaks of 'em in that man- 
 ner and which bv his referv'dnefs tertifie, that he 
 mentions em with trouble and diflike, and that 
 rt is his defire they foould beconceal'd, as well from , 
 himfelfas from others: Whereas others uttering the 
 fame things more freely and at random, make itV 
 pear, that they take delight in thofe kind of .. 
 jecls which being a Lafcivious Pleafure, it is no 
 wonder,ir the wordswhich imprint that 1^*, fliould 
 be accounted contrary to Modefty. 
 
 For which Reafon it comes to pafs, that fome- 
 :nes the fame word is efteem'd modeft at one time, 
 and immodeft at another ; which has conftrain'd 
 fome of the Hfa* Rabbies, to place certain & 
 *cm words in the Margin of the Bible, to be 
 pronounced by thofe that read it, Jnftead of thofe 
 which the Scripture makes ufe ofj which happened 
 om hence, that when thofe words were made u/e of 
 :hey were not at all immod^becaufe they were read 
 fchfome certain U eA that reprefented thefe words 
 "a referv^aefi and modefty. But afcerwardi 
 
 thai
 
 3^7""" Logic : Or, Part I. 
 
 that Idea being feparated, and cuftom having added 
 another of Impudence and Wantonnefs, they became 
 naufeousand uncivil: And therefore the Qattns, to 
 prevent the mind from being amusd with that evil 
 Idt4, were felicitous, that the People fliouldmake 
 ufe of others in reading the Bible, which no way 
 aker'd the Text. 
 
 And therefore it was an ill'Excufe of an Author, 
 whom the ProfeiTion of Religion oblig'd to an ex- 
 'a& Modefty, and who was delervedly tax^d t 
 have made ufe of an undecent Word, to fignme an 
 infamous Place, to alledge, that the Fathers had 
 rot fcrupled to make- ufe of the word Lupanar, a 
 Srotbel-boufe, and that he often found in their W ri- 
 ling*, the words Mcretrix and Leno, Whore and 
 Pander, and feveral others hardly to be endured in 
 our Language. For the Liberty which the Fa- 
 thers took to make nfe of thofe words, ought to 
 have convine'd him, that they were not at that 
 time accounted words of Ignominy, that is to fay, 
 that Cuftom had not added that Idea of Obfcenity 
 which render'd them Infamous j and therefore he 
 drew an ill conclafibn from thence, that it was fot 
 that reafon, permitted him to make ufe of Terrai 
 of Debauchery, fo efteem'd to be in our Language! 
 for that thefe words do not really fignifie the fan* 
 thing, which thofe did of which the Fathers made 
 ufe ; feeing that befides the principal Idea in which 
 they agree, they alfo exhibit the Idea of a debaudvd 
 Mind," and contain a mixture of Licentious Impu- 
 dence,. 
 
 Seeing
 
 Chap. XIII. The Art of Thinking 133 
 
 Seeing then thefe Accefforj Ideas are of fo great 
 Importance, and diflblve the Primary Motion, into 
 o many various Ideas, they would do well, who 
 compile Vocabularies or D&ionanes, to mark out 
 thofe Significations, and make a diftinftion to the 
 Readers, between words Contumelious and Civil 
 Tart, Chart and Immodcft, or rather abfolutely to 
 obliterate the Latter, which it would be much bet- 
 ter to bs ignorant of, than to underftand. 
 
 The End of the Firft
 
 LOGIC: 
 
 OR, THE 
 
 ART 
 
 OF 
 
 THINKING. 
 
 ContainingConfiderations of Men about 
 Proper Judgments. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 C H A P. I. . 
 
 iat a Proportion u * Of the four .forts of 
 Proportions. 
 
 Fter we apprehend the Things themlelves^ 
 by the help of Ideas we compare the Ideas 
 together, and obferve them as they agree 
 difbr oae among another,_and in that manner
 
 Logic : Or, Part II 
 
 join or feparate them, which is call'd to affirm o; 
 deny, and by a general Name to judge. 
 
 This Judgment is otherwife call'd a Propofition 
 and it is manifeft that it ought to have twoTerms 
 the one, of which any Thing is affirm'd or deny'd 
 which is called the Subjeft ; the other, which i, 
 affirm'd and deny'd, which is call'd the Attribute 01 
 Predicate. 
 
 Nor does it fuffice to have apprehended theft 
 two Terms, but they muft be conjoined or fepara- 
 ted in the Mind. And this Operation of the Mind, 
 is noted in the Propofition, by the word /?, it K 
 when it is alone, it is -Affirmative ; but when we 
 deny, we add the Particle non or not : Thus when 
 J fay, God is juft, God is the Subject of the Propo- 
 fition, juft the Predicate. The Verbs #, denotes 
 the action of the Mind affirming, that is conjoining 
 the Idea of God, and the Idea of /'/?, as agreeing to- 
 gether. But if I fhould fay, God i: not />//?, the 
 Verb #, with the Adverb join'd, denotes an action 
 contrary to affirmation ; by which I affirm thofe 
 Ideas do not agree together ; for that there is fome- 
 thlng in the Idea of ;>//?, which does not agree} 
 with that which is contained in the Idea of God. 
 
 But though it be neceflary that every Propofition, 
 fhould confilt of thefe three words, yet it may con-? 
 fiftoftwo, and fometimes only of one. 
 
 For Men, for the more fuccin& way of fpeak* 
 ing, have invented feveral words, which fignifie 
 both the Affirmation, that is the Subftantive, and 
 the .Attribute which is affirm'd. Of this number \ 
 
 are 1
 
 Chap. I. The Art of Thinking. 137 
 
 are all thofe words that are called Subftantives, as 
 Godexifa that is, is exiftent ; God loves Afc, that 
 is, Hex a lover of Men ; but the Subftamive, when 
 it isfingle, ceafes to be purely Subftantrve ; for 
 that then the moft general of the Attributes, is 
 joined toir, which 5sE*r, or being, and fo wn ego 
 fum, lam. not, is as much as, I am not a being, or any 
 *ng. 
 
 In the fame manner at other times, the Subject 
 and the Affirmation is included in the fame word, 
 as in the firft and fecond Perfons among the Latins' 
 as when I fay, fumChrifl'ianits, I am A Chriftian ; for 
 ego is the Subject of this Propofition, included in 
 the wordfum. 
 
 Hence it is apparent, that one word among the 
 Latins conftitutes a Proportion, in firft and fecond 
 Perfons of thofe Verbs, which before contained' 
 he affirmation with the Predicate j fo'ww, wV/, 
 , are three intire Propofitions. 
 Hence it may alfo be concluded, that every Pro- 
 jofitibp is either Negative or Affirmative; and this 
 s that which is contained either in the affirmation 
 r the denial. 
 
 But there is another difference of Propofitions 
 leducdfrom the Univerfality, Particularity or Sin- 
 ;ularity. 
 
 For The Terms, as is faid in the firft part, are ei- 
 icr fingular, particular or univerfal. 
 
 Univerfal Terms may be taken, either accord- 
 to the full Extent, the figns of Univerfality be- 
 >g either exprefs'd or underftood. As are ^ fw 
 
 an
 
 i 3 8 
 
 Logic: Or, 
 
 Part II! 
 
 an Affirmation, for denial none, as aU Men, 
 Men ; or according to the indefinite part of the Ex- 
 tent, with the Addition of the word TOW?, as alu, 
 Homo, fame Man ; or any other way, according tc 
 propriety of Speech. 
 
 Hence happens a certain variety, greatly to 
 obferv'd in Propofitions ; for when the Subject 
 the Propofition is the Univerfal Term, taken in in 
 full Extent, it is call'd a univerfal Propofition, wl 
 ther it be affirmative j as every impious Man is 
 Fool; or negative, no wicked Man is bleffed. 
 
 When the common Term is taken according tc 
 the indefinite part of its Extent, as being reftrain'c 
 by the addition of the word fom;^ it is call'd a par- 
 ticular Propofition, whether it be affirmative, 
 fonte cruel Men are Cowards ; or negative, fome f 
 Men are not miferable. 
 
 But if the Subject of a Propofition be fingular, 
 when I fay William the -$d. hath taken Rachel, it 
 called fingular. 
 
 But though this Propofition fingular be dil 
 from the Univerfal in this, that the Subject of 
 is not common, yet has it a greater Affinity witl 
 it, than with the particular, becaufe the Subje<! 
 for the very R.eafon that it is fingular, is neceflari 
 taken in its full Extent, which is the Eflential Pr 
 priety of an Univerfal Propofition, and diftinguil 
 it from the particular ; for, that a Propofitic 
 may be Univerfal, it little imports, whether tl 
 Extent of the Subject be great or finall, provic" 
 it comprehends all Things.- And this is the Reafbn
 
 Chap. I. The Art of Thinking 
 
 that fingular- Proportions fupply the place of Uni- 
 verfals in Argumentation ; fo that all Propofitions 
 may be reduced to four forts; which are marked 
 
 Mcmof 1S A ' E ' L ' f r the Cafe of thc 
 
 A. An univerfal Affirmative, as, A U ^^ U:n 
 Are Slavei. 
 
 An Univerfal Negative, as, N. vicious U*n ,* 
 Hafjy. 
 
 A particular Affirmative, as, Sow 
 f\icb 
 
 0. A particular Negative, as, Sem* 
 
 . 
 
 And that they may be the better retain'din me- 
 mory, they are comprehended in this Diftic. 
 
 rit A, negttE, wrum gener titter 
 "t /, negat O 9 fed fartKuUntfr ambo.
 
 140 Logic : Or, Part II- ] 
 
 that every Propoficion declaring the Judgmen c 
 which we make of Things, it is true, when tha* i 
 Judgment is conformable to Truth, and Falfe when 
 it is not conformable. 
 
 But becaufe we often fail of Sufficient Light, to| 
 difcern Truth from Falfhood, befides thofe Pro- 
 pofitions that feem to be true, and thofe that feem 
 to us to be fal/e, there are fome that feem to be 
 true ; but of which the Truth is not fo evident, 
 but that we have fbrne apprehenfion that they may 
 be falfe ; or elfe fuch as feem to be falfe ; but of 
 the FaHhood of which we are not fully aflured. 
 Thefe are called probable Propofitions, of which the 
 firft are more probable, and -the latter lefs probable. 
 
 'CHAP. II, 
 
 Of the Oppofition ef Proportions, having the, 
 fame Subjeft. and Predicate. 
 
 WE have already declared, there are four' 
 forts of Propoficion?, A, E, f, O. Now 
 it may be demanded wherein they agree or differ,, 
 when feveral forts of Propofitions are deduced fronr 
 the lame Subject, and the fame Attribute, which is 
 called Oppofition. 
 
 It is eafily feen, that there can be but three forts 
 of Oppofitions j though one of the three is fubdi- 
 vided into two others. 
 
 For
 
 Chap. II. 
 
 For if they be oppofed in quantity and quality 
 both together, A O and /, they are called Con- 
 tradiaones; as, Ever? >Man is an Animal: Some 
 Man ,s not an Animal : No Man w fice from fin ; 
 Some Man is free from fin. 
 
 If they differ in Quantity only, and agree in Qua- 
 lity, ^ A I and E O, they are call'd Subalterns. As 
 <very Man is a Creature, fomeMan is a Creature- 
 No Man is free from fin- fome Man is not free 
 rrom fin. 
 
 . Bur if they differ in Quality, and agreein Quan- 
 tity, then they arecalled Contranes orlwrL/ - 
 Contraries when they are Vniverfal- as, Evny 
 Man ts a Creature, No Manis a Creature. 
 
 Subcontract, when they are particular: Some 
 
 XT" "9?*"'"; Same Mm u tut aCreature. 
 
 vow !f thefe Propofitions are lookM upon as they 
 are true or falfe; it is eafie to judge. 
 
 liat Contradiaories are never together either 
 true or falfe 5 bunf one be true, theother is falfej 
 and if one be falfe, the other is true: For if it be 
 true, that every Man is a Creature, it cannot be 
 
 [ Vj -r me , Man I3 no Cre *ture : On the o- 
 :her fide, if it be true that fomu Man is no Crea- 
 te, it cannot be true that every Man is a Crea- 
 
 This is f clear that a farther Explanation would 
 butrender.it more obfcure. 
 .2. Contraries can never be probable, but they 
 y be both^fe They cannot be true, becauie 
 Contradiaorks would be true ; for if it be 
 
 true
 
 Logic : Or, PartH 
 
 true that every Man is an Animal, it is fall 
 that fome Man is not an Animal, which is th 
 Contradi&ory, and by confluence, much mor 
 falfe, that no Man is an Animal ; which is its con 
 trary. 
 
 But the Falfity of the one does not infer th 
 Falfity of the other ; for it may be falfe, that a 
 Men are juft, and yet it may not be true, that n 
 Man is juft ; fmce there may be juft Men, thoug 
 all Men are not fb. 
 
 3. Subcontraries, by a Rule altogether oppofifr 
 to that of Contraries may be probable, as in thef 
 two Propofitions. Some Man it juft , fome Man t 
 not juft ; for Juftice may agree with fome (brt o 
 Men j and not with the other. And therefore Af 
 firmation and Negation never happen in the fami 
 SubjccVi for fome Man is taken for one part of Mei 
 in one part of the Propofition, and for anothe 
 part in the other. But rhey cannot be both falfe 
 for if it were falfe, that fome Man is juft, it wouli 
 be true, that no Man is juft, which is the Contra 
 di&ory, and much more true, that fome Man is no 
 juft, which is the Subcontrary. 
 
 4. As for the oppofnion of Subalterns, it 'is re 
 true Oppofition, becaufe the particular is the Con 
 fequence of the Univerfal ; for if all Men are Cre/t 
 tures 9 $m a Man is a Creature : If no Man be an Ape 
 fome Man is not an Afe : Therefore the Truth of Uni 
 verfality infers that of Particulars 5 but the Truth o: 
 Particulars does not infer that of Univerfals j for i 
 does not follow,becaule it is true,that/2mff Man is juft 
 
 thai
 
 Chap. III. The Art of Thinking. i 43 
 
 that it fhould be true, that at Men are jufl : On the 
 other fide the Falfhood of Particulars infers the 
 FaJfliood of Univerfals ; for if it be falfe that fome 
 Man is free from Sin, k is more falfe that all Men 
 are free from Sin : But the Falfhood of Univerfals 
 does not infer the Falfhood of Particulars for 
 tho it be Falfe, that all Men are juft, yet it does not 
 
 follow, but that fome Man may be juft. Whence 
 t follows, that many times Subaltern Proportions 
 
 may both happen to be true, and fometimes both 
 
 to befalle. 
 
 I forbear to fpeak of the Reduftion of oppoflte 
 
 Oppofitionstothe fame Sence, as being altogether 
 
 unprofitable, and for that the Rules are only true in 
 
 the Latin. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 y 'Proportions fimple and compos d; That 
 
 there are fome which feem to le fimple, 
 
 but are not, and which may le called com- 
 
 plex. Of complex Vropofitions, loth <u 
 
 to the Suljeft and Attrilute. 
 
 , havefaid, that every Propofition ought*to 
 B have at leaft, one Subject and one Attribute ; 
 it it does not follow from thence, that it ought 
 ot to have no more than one Subjeclr and one Pre- 
 
 dicate,
 
 144 L& c Or, Part II 
 
 dicate. Such ihen as have but one Subject and on 
 Attribute are call'd (Tmple, and they that ha* 
 more than one Subject and one Predicate are call' 
 ComposU As when I fay Good and Evil, Lif 
 and Death, Poverty and Riches come from rh 
 Lord. The predicate, Come from the Lord is affir 
 med not only of one Subject, but of many, tha 
 is of Good and Evil y &C. 
 
 But before we explain the compos'd Propofiti 
 ons, we muft obferve that there are fome whic 
 teem to be compos'd thac are not fb, but Simpl( 
 For the fin,glcnefs of a Propofition is taken for th 
 Unity of the Subjea and the Attribute. Now ther 
 are feveral Propofitions*that have properly but on 
 Predicate and one Attribute ; but of which eithe 
 the^Subjea or the Attribute is a Term complex 
 which includes other Propofitions, that may b 
 call'd Incident, which make no part of the Subjed 
 or Predicate, being join'd by the Pronoun RelatiW 
 who or which, whofe Propriety it is to join togethe! 
 feveral Propofitions, to the end .they may all en! 
 corporate into one. 
 
 Thus when Chrift fays, He that does the "mM 
 vny father who is in Heaven, /hall enter into the f^in^ 
 dam of Heaven. 
 
 The Subject of this Proportion contains tiKJ 
 Propofitions, as containing two Verbs ; but in fCj 
 gard they are join'd by the Relative who, they on 
 ly make a part of the Subjea. Whereas when !, 
 lay, good and evil proceeds from the Lord, then, 
 are properly two Subjects, becaule I affirm equallj,
 
 time only conceived ^ e 
 "happens to be t 
 nour.ce thefe ft 
 Participles 
 
 , ha 
 
 . . well in the one a 
 
 not to a ffi rm thar r , 
 d 
 
 Ddrius - 
 principal 
 
 , or that 
 
 . affirm 
 ^Created t 
 to be
 
 146 
 
 Logic : Or, 
 
 Part II. 
 
 Ctions (hould be called composed P'opofitions ; 
 whereas we may call the other Proportions com- 
 
 obferve, tbat complexed propo 
 
 ] \ Complexity falls upon the Subjea, when the 
 Subjia is a Term Complexed, as in thispropofi 
 
 tion. He it a 
 
 not 
 
 iis 
 
 Bettus iSe 
 
 Vt frifca g<** Mortalium, 
 Vtttrnn Rpw b&M excrcet Suit 
 Solutifi ommfanore. 
 
 For the Verb Ef is underftood in the kft 
 poGtion; Br-rn being the predicate, and all 
 
 c 
 
 the Attribute is a Term complex'd, as ?* 
 Vcrtue that render* a M** ba f p in the gre^ A** 
 fitict. 
 
 SumDt* Anc^fMfup"**"*'* 1 - 
 
 But here we muft obferve that att propofKio 
 compofed of Verb, aaive, and their cafes goven 
 ma/be called Complex, as containing in to
 
 frequently 
 
 other be 
 
 ing 
 " 
 
 Whfch 
 
 P"t 
 
 
 
 mak f! the 
 
 in the word C 
 
 ation is
 
 148 Logic:. .Or, -Part IL 
 
 Thefc are the three ways that Propofnions may 
 be complexed as to their Matter, that is to lay, 
 both as to the Subjed and the Predicate. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 Of the Nature of Incite* Tnopofitions , that 
 make apart ef Proportions Complex d. 
 
 BU T before We fpeak of Propofitions, whofc 
 Complexity may fall upon the Form, that is 
 to fay, upon the Affirmation or Negation, there 
 are feveral important Remarks to be made upon 
 the nature of Incident Propofitions, which make 
 one par: of the Subject or Attribute of thofe that 
 are complcx'd according to matter. d 
 
 i. It has been already faid, that Incident Propo 
 fitions are thofe whofe Subjed is the Pronoun, who ; 
 as, Men who are created to AWW and love God', or, 
 Menarbotrefiau, where the Term Men being ta- 
 ken away, the reft is an Incident Proportion; 
 
 But here we muft call to Mind what lias been 
 faid in the fixth Chapter of the firft Part. That 
 the Additions of Terms complex'd are of two to 
 the one may be call'd fimple Explications, wU 
 the Addition alters nothing in the Idea of the 1 -errn, 
 in regard that what is added, agrees generally w;th 
 the Term in its full cxcent i as, Men who are created 
 to kpov and love God. ^.
 
 The other may be cdled Decerminatiom ; for 
 
 Now when the pronoun rfej a BxfKcain, the 
 e0 i, affirmedof he 
 
 1
 
 1 50 Logic : Or, Part Ifc 
 
 pofuion is only that, by which our Understanding 
 judges, that the Idea of P;,w, is not incompatible 
 with that of Men., and fo they may be confidered 
 as joined together ; and afterwards we may exa- 
 mine how they agree together, being thus united. 
 
 Many t?mes there are Terms that are doubly and 
 rrebljf^Complexed, being comuofed of feveral parts, 
 of which every one 1 is feparately complexed j and 
 fo we may meet with feveral incident propositions, 
 and of feveral forts j the pronoun of the one being 
 ExplicAti-ve, and the other Determinative as in this 
 Example. Tkt Do&rine that places Sovereign Hap- 
 fin* ft in the'Pleafures of the Body, which anu taught 
 by Epicure, is wtvanby 4 Philofipber. The attri- 
 bute of this proportion is Unawrthjr'a Philofafher, 
 and all the reft is the Subject : And fo the propo- 
 fition is a complex Term that includes two incident 
 propofirions. The firft, That f laces Sovereign Hap* 
 finefiin the Pleafufcs of the Body, where the pronoun 
 is determinative ; for it determines (Do6trine/ in 
 general to be that which affirms Soveregn Felicity 
 to confift inrhe pleasures of the Body ; whence it 
 would be an abfiirdity to fubftitute the word Do~ 
 Urine to the pronoun, by faying^ Do8rine f laces 
 fcvtreign Happineft in bodily Pleafure. 
 
 a. The fecond incident propofition is, which 
 was taught by Epicurus, and the Subject wherett> 
 the pronoun \jvhjck~\ refers, is the whole complex 
 Tern) [ The Deftring wkitb placet Sovereign Happi' 
 nefj m bodily ?leafure~] which denotes a fmgular and 
 individual Define, capable of divers Accidents ;. 
 
 as
 
 Chap. IV. The Art of Thinking. 1 5- 1 
 
 as to be maintained by fever al perfons : though in 
 its felf it be determined to be taken always after 
 the lame wanner, at leaft in this precife cafe, as it 
 is extended. And therefore ic is, that the Rela- 
 tive of the fecond incident proposition which was 
 taught by Epicurus ] is not determinative but only 
 explicative ; fo that the Subject to which the Pro- 
 noun refers may be fubftimted in the place of the 
 pronoun, by faying, The Do&rtrte which places Sove- 
 reign Happinefs in bodily P!ea/u r e 9 tfM taught by Epr- 
 curus. 
 
 g. Thelaft remark is, that to judge of the Na- 
 ture of cheie proportions, arid to know whether it 
 be determinative or explicative, it behovt s us tti 
 mind rather the Sence and Intention of him that 
 fpeaks, than the Exprefiton alone. 
 
 For there are many times complex'd Terms, 
 that feem uncomplex'd ; or iefs complex'd than in- 
 deed they are ; for that one part of what they en- 
 clofe in the mind of him that Difcourfes, is alto- 
 gether understood and not exprefled, as has been 
 laid in the fixth Chapter of the Firft Parr, where 
 we have fhown that there is nothing moreufual in 
 Difcour(e,than to fignifie fmgulars by general word, 
 for that thcCircumftancesof Difcourle make itap- 
 ipear that there is a Singular and diftirtvlj</p4, joyn'd 
 1 to that common Idea which anfwersto the word,thac 
 [.deter mines it to lignihe only one thing. 
 [ I faid that this- was generally known by the Cir-, 
 leumirances, In AtgHfiJi the Word King fignitiec 
 
 H 4 Bu?
 
 152. Logic : Or, Part II. 
 
 But there is yet a Rule that may ferve us to judg, 
 when a common Term retains a general Idea, and 
 when ic is determin'd by a diftinc~t and particular l- 
 dea, though not cxprefs'd. 
 
 When it is a manifeft Abfurdity to apply a Pre- 
 dicate to a Subject, retaining a general &4fWe muft 
 believe that he who made that Propnfuiun , has de- 
 priv'd that Subject of it's general Idea. Thus if I 
 hear a Man fay, the Ring bat commanded me fitch a 
 thing , I am afiur'd that he has not left the word 
 f\ing in it's general Idea; for a King in general gives 
 uo particular Command. 
 
 If a Man fliould (ay to me , The Bruflel'j Ga^et 
 of the t^th.of January 1691. isf<i/fe as to what was 
 tranced At Parii,! fhould be affur'd,that there was 
 ' fomething more in the mind of him that fpoke, than 
 what was exprefs'd in thofe Terms.For thofe words 
 are not fuificient to make me judge whether the Ga- 
 zetre be true or falfe : So that the Relator muft have 
 in his thoughts fome piece of News diftin<t and 
 particular, which he judges contrary to the Truth j 
 as if the Gazette had related, that the King had made 
 A hundred Ktitgkts of the Order of the Garter, 
 
 Alfp in fuch Judgments as are made of the Opi- 
 hions of Philofophers, when we fay, that the Do- 
 clrine of fuch a Philosopher is falfe, without ex* 
 prefling diflinclily what that Doctrine is, as ("the 
 the Doctrine of Lucretius, touching the Nature of 
 cur Soul is falfe) ic neceflarily follows, that in 
 inch forts of Judgments they who make them, do 
 mean diftincl and particular Opinion under the 
 
 general.
 
 Chap. V. The Art of Thinking. 
 
 general wards (Do6trineof fuch a Pbilofopher. ) 
 /.nd fo fuch forts of proportions diflblve into o- 
 thers like to thefe. Such an Opinion that wot main- 
 tain d by fucb an Autlxsr iffalfe, Ike Opinion that cur 
 Soul is comfofcd of Atoms, which was taught by Lucre- 
 tius is falfe. So that thefe kinds of Judgments al- 
 ways enclole two. Affirmations, when they are not 
 diftin&ly exprcflTed. The one primary which re- 
 lates to the Truth it felf ; which is, that it is a great 
 Error to believe that our Soul is compofcd of A- 
 toms ; the other Incident, which refers only to the 
 Hiftorical part ; -that this Error was generally 
 taught by Lucre tiuf.- 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Of the Faljlood that occurs in Complex TernH 
 and Incident Proportions. 
 
 WHAT we have already (aid way ferve in 
 anfwer to one celebrated Queftion, how 
 to know whether there be no Falfhood bur. in pro- 
 pofinons, and whether there be none in Ideas and 
 fimple Terms. 
 
 I (peak of Falfhobd, rather than of Truth ; for 
 there isa Truth in Things that is certain, which 
 is their Conformity to the Will of Cod, whether 
 Men think of them or not j ;but there can be no 
 Falflbood of Things, but as. they relate to the Un : 
 H 5 derftandinj
 
 154 Logic : Or, 
 
 derftanding of Man, or any other underftanding, 
 fubjedl to errors, which judges falfly that a thing 
 is that which it is not. 
 
 The Queftion is, whether this falfliood is only 
 to be met in Proportions and Judgments. 
 
 The ufual anfwer is, no j which is true in on 
 (enfe ; however that hinders not, but that there 
 may be falfhood, not in fingle !<&<, but in com- 
 plex Terms. For it is diffident , that fomething 
 may be judg'd or affirm'd in them, either exprefly 
 or virtually. 
 
 Which will be more plain, if we confider par- 
 ticularly two forts of complex Terms ; the one, 
 of which the Pronoun is explicative, the other of: 
 which it is determinative. 
 
 In the firft fort of Complex Terms, we ai 
 not to wonder if we find any falihood. For the at-j 
 tribute of the Incident Proportion, is affirm'd by 
 the Subject to which the Pronoun Delates. As in 
 Alexander who if the Son of Philip, I affirm, though 
 incidently, the Son of Philip of Alexander ; andj 
 by cnnlcqucnce there is a falfhood in ir, if it 
 not fo. . 
 
 But here we are to make two or three remarl 
 of moment. 
 
 i . That the falfity of an Incident Propo/ttiott dc 
 not blemifh the truth of the Principal Prefcfition. 
 
 For example, Alexander who wa& the Soft of Pf. 
 tvercame the Perfians : This proportion ought 
 pafs for true , though Alexander were not the 
 of Phi/if 5 becaufe the affirmation of the prii
 
 Chap. V. The Art of Tbin 
 
 pal Proportion, falls only upon Alexander, and whal 
 " mcidently added, does not hinder, but that Alex* 
 *nder might vanqui'fh the Perfians. 
 
 Neverthelefs, if the attribute of the principal 
 
 proportion, had relation to the incident Proportion 
 
 Wjr I fliodd fay, Alexander the Sen of Philip ^ A - 
 
 ' Grandchild: Then Would it only be, tnV 
 
 r ralfhood of the incident proposition, would 
 
 : render the principal propofition falfe. 
 
 i. Titles that are given' to certain Dignities 
 may be given to all that pofTefs that Di^iry . 
 ' though what ,s fignify'd by the Tide, do not a? 
 . aU agree with em. Thus becaufe the Titles of 
 fljk and Thrice Mj, was formerly given to al 
 Jftopt, we find, that the Catholic Bi/hops at rha 
 Conference of Carthage, did not fcruple to g.Vi 
 that Title to the Dm*ifi Bifhops (the mofl ^//p e< 
 xtomjMit) though they knew well that therr 
 ooOld be no true Hclinefs in a Heretic Biftop, Wf 
 nd alio,that S.P4/gi V es theTitle ofkfi andU fx . 
 '*lent toFeftus Governor of fc^becaufe it was the 
 Title ufually given to the Chid' Governors 
 r f *f 1C " ' e [> whe " a Ferfon is the Author 
 )t a Title which he g,ves to another, and which 
 ie gives according to bis own, and not the opini- 
 n of: others, or according to popular error for 
 hen we may impute to haifdf "rhc falfl^ood of' 
 propofifon. Thus when a Man fays, Anftotle, 
 t, the Prince of PbiloTcfbers, or fi mp ]y T /J 
 itf Philofophtrs, beiiev'd that the Original of 
 Nerves wa in the Heart j we have no feafcn
 
 156 Logic : Or, PartlSJ 
 
 to tell him this is falfe, becaufe Artjlot/e was not the 
 befl: of Philofbphers ; for it is enough that he has 
 follow*d in this the common opinion, though it 
 were falfe. But if a Man fhould fay, That GajJen-\ 
 dus, it'ho is the ntjft Learned of PhiloCofhCn^ belirvdi 
 that there trot A Vacuum in nature ; we may with 
 reafon difpute the Title which he would give Gaf- 
 (cndits, and make him refponfible for the falfliood, 
 couc'd in that incident proposition. A Man may. 
 be alfo accus*d of Falfliood, who gives to the fame 
 perfon a Title which is not fuitable to him, yet 
 not be blamed . for giving him another Title, 
 which is lefs true and.lefs agreeable. For example, 
 fope John the XII. tP<tt neither Holy t nor Chafte, nor 
 Ptcus : As Baronitu acknowledges j for tho they 
 who called him moft Holy could not be taxed of 
 falfhood, yet they who called him moft Chaft 
 and Pious, were very great Liars, though they did 
 
 faid, 
 
 ir'by Incident Propofirionsj as if they had 
 the XIJ. the moft Cbafl Pope, decreed fuch a thing. 
 This is what I had to fay concerning incident 
 Propofuions,where the Pronouns (Who or Which), 
 are explicative ; as to thofe other where the Pro- 
 nouns are determinative, as Men who are Pious,. 
 Qvgs wLo love their Sufyeftj, certain.it Is, they are. 
 not liable to falfliood, becaufe the. predicate o 
 the Incident propofition is not affirmed of the Sub- 
 jcft to which the pronoun relates. For example, 
 ihould it be faid, That fitch Judges at do -nothing for 
 favour or reward y are worthy of applaufe , it is not 
 therefore affirmed, that there arc any fuch Judges,. 
 
 who !
 
 ^ "" The Art of Thinking. 157 
 
 who are fo upright. Neverthelefs I believe there 
 
 i* always in theft propofnions a tacit and virtual Af- 
 
 firmation, not of the aftual Congruity of the Prc 
 
 oicate, with the Subject to which the pronoun re- 
 
 noun relates ; but of the po/fible Congruity. And 
 
 icre beany deceit in this, we may rationally 
 
 conclude there is 4 falfliood in the Incident propofi- 
 
 tions. As if ic had been faid, Seuls that J e f^ e 
 
 *r* morefolid than thofe tvktch arc round j here the 
 
 Ideas ^ Square and Round being Incompatible with 
 
 the fi of a Soul , taken for the rincile of 
 
 And hence it may be faid, that the greateft part 
 of our errors proceed. For having the U, a of a 
 Jhing we frequently join to it another incompati- 
 ble 64 a nd-by that means attribute to the Lie 
 w, that which is not fuitablc to it. 
 
 f>,;,l hus ^S 8 in ur felves cwo Ue "> one of fa 
 
 iking Subflance, another of the extended Sub- 
 
 bnce, ic frequently happens, that when we confi- 
 
 der our Soul, which is the thinking Subfhnce, we 
 
 mfer.fib^ntermix fomething of the 7^ O f th ; ex ! 
 
 t ndcd Subftance as when we imagin that the Soul 
 
 h p a t? - llke the My ' and lhar ft -w 
 
 not be ; at all ,f ,t were no -where, which are not 
 ifopemestnat belong to a Bo'dy: Whence arofe - 
 that Irapwua Error of the Mortality of the Soul. 
 We may read an excellent Difcourfe^f Sr. ^ 
 on this Sub^a, in his Tenth Book of the Trini- 
 5 where hcj fhews- that there is nothin- fo eafie-
 
 1 5 fc Lvgici Or, PartH. 
 
 as to know the nature of our Soul. But that which 
 confounds men is this, that being cfefir-ous to know 
 ir, they are not latisfied with what they know, 
 without any great trouble ; that is to fay, that ft 
 is a Subftancc that thinks, defines, doubts and 
 knows ^ but they add to what it is, what it is not, 
 fancying the Soul under fome of thofe Phantofms, 
 under which they were wont' to conceive Corpo- 
 ral things. 
 
 On the other fide, when we confider Bodies, we 
 have much ado to abftain from intermixing fbme* 
 thing of the Ide* of the Subftance that thinks, 
 hence we affirm that heavy things tend to the Cen- 
 ter ; of Plants, that they frek for proper nouriffi- 
 ment ; of Cnfih in Difeafes, that ir is nature that 
 goes about to difcharge it felt of what is baneful* 
 and a thoufand other Whmftys. More efpeciaily in 
 our Bodies, that Nature has an Inclination to do 
 this or that ; when we are aflurel that we have no 
 fuch defire, nor ever had any fuch thought, and 
 that it is ridiculous to imagin, that there is within* 
 us any other thing than our (elves, that knows 
 what is good or hurtful for us, that defires the 
 one, and efchews the other. 
 
 I believe moreover that we are to attribute to 
 thefe incompatible Ideas , all thole murmurings of 
 Men againft the Deities ; for it would be impof- 
 fible to murmur againft God, if we conceiv'd him 
 aright: as he is, altogether Wife, Omnipotent 
 and all Goodnefs. But the Ungodly confidering - 
 him as Omnipotent, and the Soveraign Lord ot 
 
 all
 
 Chap. VI. The- Art of Kinking. 
 
 all the World, attribute to him all the misfortunes 
 tnat berail em, wherein they are not deceiVd 
 but becaufe ar the fame time they apprehend him 
 to be cruel and unjuft, which is incompatible with 
 his goodnefs, they impiouily inveigh againft him 
 as the Author of the miferies which they fuffer 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Of Complex Propofitions, according to Affir- 
 nation and Negation : of one fort of thofe 
 kinds of Proportions which the Thilofo* 
 phers call Modal. 
 
 BEfides thofe Propofitions where the Subjefl or 
 Attribute is a Term Complex, there are alfo 
 others that arc Complex ; becaufe there are Terms 
 or incident Propofitions, which only regard the 
 form of the Proportion, that is, the Affirmation 
 
 VT^I?? WhlGh " CX P refs>d b ^ the Verb ; as 
 f Hhould (ay J affirm that the E A nh r*md t Here 
 f aftrm, is only an incident Propofition, which 
 ought to make a part of fomething in the princi- 
 pal Propoimon. N^cnhelefs it S vifible that i C 
 make* no part either of the Subject, or of the At- 
 ibute: for they fuffer no alteration's being un- 
 derftood ..entiy, as if I <h ou l d faplywr, * 
 
 , 
 
 So that. the incident Propofirion 
 falls
 
 160 Logic : Or, Part II 
 
 falls only upon the Affirmation which is exprcfs'c 
 in two manners ; the one mod commonly by the 
 Verb[E/?] the Earth is round ; and the other exs 
 prefly by the Verb I maintain 
 
 So when they fay, I deny it, it is true ; it is 
 not true. Or when they add in one Propofition 
 that which fupports the Truth ; as when 1 fa} 
 The Qea/ons of Aftronomy convince us, that the Sun 
 much bigger than the Earth. For the firft part 
 only a fupport of- the Argument. 
 
 Neverthelefs it is of great Moment to knov 
 
 that there are a fort of thefe PropoGtvops whic 
 
 are Ambiguous, and which may. be taken difFe 
 
 rently, according 'to the defign of the Propounde 
 
 As when" I fay, all Pbitofopbers affure us , that he 
 
 things fall of tbemjelves. Now if it be my Inten 
 
 tion to (hew that heavy things fall down of them 
 
 felves, the firft part of- this Propofition will be on 
 
 Jy Incident, and will only fupport the affirmation o 
 
 the latter part. But if I intend to report this opi 
 
 nion of the Philofbphers, without approving ir 
 
 then the Hrft part will be the principal Proportion, 
 
 and the laft will only be a part of the Attribute 
 
 Forfo I affirm not only that heavy things fall oj 
 
 t-hr mfelves, but that all Philosophers ailevt it. And 
 
 k 4S. eafily- feen that thefe two ways of changing, 
 
 the Propofit5on r alter it in manner, that it becomes 
 
 tw-o different Propofitions, and different in Sence. 
 
 But it is eafie xojudg by the Confequence, in 
 
 ^vhich of the two Senfes the Propofitions are to be 
 
 taken. For Example, the. Proportion being 'laid
 
 Gliap. VI. TheArtofTktnkini. ri* 
 
 down, I fhould add ; But Stones are heavj, there- 
 fere they fall down ofthemfehes, would be plain that 
 b had taken the firft Sence, and that the firft part 
 was only Incident. Oh the other fide, if I fhould 
 conclude thus, Nou, this ,s an Error, and by confe. 
 fence an Error may be taught by the Philojopber,, then 
 it would be manifeft that I had taken the Propo- 
 fition in the fecond Sence ; that is, that the firfb 
 part will be the principal Propofition, and the fe- 
 cond part only the predicate. 
 
 A< for Complex Proportions, where the Com- 
 plexity falls upon the Verb, and not upon the Sub- 
 ject, nor the Predicate, Philofophers have particu- 
 larly taken notice of thofe that are called Modal i 
 ibecaufe the Affirmation or Negation is modified by 
 one of the four Modes, PoJJifa, Contingent, Im- 
 
 And becaufe every Mode may be affirm*d or 
 toed, as it *fffiUe t it not poffible , and in 
 30th manners be join'd with the Affirmative or Ne- 
 Dative Propofition, every Mode may have four 
 ?ropofitions, and the four together fixteen, which 
 re denoted by the/e four words, PVRPVREA 
 LIACE AIAAB1MUS, EDENTULI ; of which 
 his is the Myftery. Every Syllable marks one of 
 he four Modes. 
 
 I. Poflible. 3 . Impo/fible. 
 * Contingent. 4. Neceflary. 
 
 And
 
 1 62, Logic: Qr, Pare II 
 
 And the Vowels in every Syllable, which arc 
 A. E. L or U. denotes whether the Mode be af- 
 firm'd or denied, and whether the Propofition 
 which they call the Thing faid, ought to be denied 
 or affirmed in this manner. 
 
 A. The Affirmation of the Mode, and the 
 Affirmation of the Propofition. 
 
 E. The Affirmation of the Mode and Denial of 
 the Propofition. 
 
 I. The Denial of the Mode, and Affirmation of 
 the Propofition. 
 
 U. The Denial of the Mode, and Denial of the 
 Negation. 
 
 It would be loft time to produce Examples, 
 which are eafily found OUT. We are only to ob- 
 ferve that P V l^P V I^E A anfivers to the A, 
 of Propofitions Incomplex. I LI ACE to the 
 E. AMAEIMUS to the I. EDENTVLI 
 to the U. So that if we intend the Example 
 fliould be true, having chofen a Subjeft, we muft 
 take for Pur pure* an Attribute that may be uni- 
 verfolly affirm'd. For //;'#*, one that may be uni- 
 verfally' denied. For Amabimu^ one that may be 
 affirru'd particularly, and for Edentuli, one that 
 may be denied particularly. 
 
 But whatever Predicate we take, this is always- 
 certain, that all the four Propofitions of the fame 
 word have always the- fame Sence* fo thUt one be- 
 ing true, all the reft are true. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 Chap VII. The Art of Thinking. 1 63 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Of fever at forts of Compofed Proportions. 
 
 WE have already faid, that compoled Propo- 
 ficions have either a double Subject, or a 
 double Predicate. Now of thefe there are two 
 forts. One where the Corapofition is exprefly 
 mark'd ; the reft where it lies more concealed, and 
 which the Logicians for that reafon call ExptnaUe j 
 which require Expofition or Explanation. 
 
 Thofe of the firft fort may be reduced to Six 
 Kinds, Copulatives, Disjunctives, Conditional, Cau 
 fai, Relative and Difcretive. 
 
 COPVLATIVES. 
 
 We call Copulative thofe that include feveral 
 Subjects or (evcral Attributes join'd together by an 
 Affirmative or a Negative Conjunction j that is to 
 fay (and) or {neither.} For (wither) does the (atne 
 thing as (and) in thcfe forts of prepofitions ; for 
 that (neither) fignifies [ and J wiih a Negative 
 r hich falls upon the Verb, and not upon the Uni- 
 on of the two words which it j?,ins ; as if I fbould- 
 (ay, That Kjwwledge and Inches Jo rut mak? a Ma 
 b*fp Here I unire Knowledge and Riches, af- 
 firming of both that they do not make a Man hap- 
 py, in the fame manner as if 1 fhould have iaidi,
 
 Logic : Or, _ Part IIS 
 
 That t^iotpledge and fychss render a Man Vain-glorious. 
 
 Thefe popofuions may be diftirguilhed into three' 
 
 Ibrts. 
 
 i. When they have more Subjec~b. 
 Life and Death are- in the power of the Tongue. ' 
 i. When they have feveral Predicate 
 
 Aurtatn 
 Diliget) tuttts caret obfolcti, 
 Sordtbus-Tefti) caret invidenda t 
 Regibus Aii!a. 
 
 A well Compos*d Mind hopes For good Fortune 
 in bad, and fears not bad fortune in Profperity. 
 
 3. When they have feveral Subje&s and feveral 
 Attributes. 
 
 Nor Houfe, nor Land, nor heap* cf Brafs or Gold, 
 from the Stcl^ Lord a Fever can withhold, 
 "> Nor anxious cares repel. . 
 
 The truth of thefc Propofitions depends upori -j 
 the truth of both the two parts. Thus if I fay 
 that Faith and a good Life are neceflary to Salva-^ 
 tion, this is-- true, becaufe both the one and the 
 other is neceflary. Butfhouldl have faid,agood 
 Life and Riches are necefliry for Salvation, this is 
 a falfe Propofition, becaufc Riches are not necefla- 
 ry for Salvation. Pro-
 
 Chap.: VII. The Artflf Thinking. 165- 
 
 Propo&ions that are coniidercd as Negatives,and 
 contradictory in rtfpect of Copulatives and all fl- 
 itters competed, aie not all luch, where Negations 
 occur, but only (uch where the Negation falls upon 
 the Conjunction, which happens feveral ways, as 
 by putting lhe. NorJ at the head of the propo- 
 fition. Thou doit not love, and forfake thy Friend. 
 
 For thus it i?, that a propofition is made Con- 
 tradictory to the Copulative, by exprefly denying 
 the Conjunction ; as when we fay that it cannot 
 be, That a thing /hould be this and that at the fame 
 time. 
 
 That a Man cannot be wife and love at the 
 fame time. 
 
 Amare & /apart vix Deo conceditur. 
 
 That Love and Majefty do not accord well to- 
 gether* . 
 
 Non bene copvenjunt, nee in una fede Morantw Mf- 
 }<H & Amor. 
 
 Of Disjunctives. 
 
 Disjunctives are of great ufe ; and thefe are they, 
 ivhereio -the disjunctive Conjunction {or~] is found. 
 
 Amity either finds Friends equal, or makft thtme- 
 jual. 
 
 A Woman either loves or hates ; there is no 
 Medium. 
 
 Aut
 
 1 66 Logic : Or, _ Part II 
 
 Aut amat, out odtt mutter, nibil eft tenium. 
 
 He that altogether lives in Soiitucf?, is either 
 Beaft or an Angel, fays 
 
 Men are guided either by Inter eft or Fear 9 
 
 Either the Sun moves about the Eart& 9 or the Eart 
 
 about the Sun. 
 
 Every A8icn proceeds from good or bad Judgment. 
 
 The truth of thefe proportions depends upor 
 the neceflary Oppofition of the parts, which a< 
 mits no Medium. But as they ought to admit n 
 Medium, that they may be neceflarily true 
 that they may be only morally true, it fuffices tha 
 they do not ufually admit a Medium. And there 
 fore it is absolutely true, That an Action done wit 
 'Judgment is either good or bad, the Theologian 
 making it manifefl that there is nothing in particu 
 lar that is untrue; But when they (ay, that Me 
 never aft but by Intereft or Fear ; this is not able 
 lutely true, fince there are fbme who are lead ne 
 ther by the one or the other of thefe paflions, bull 
 meerly upon the confederation of their Duty : So 
 that the main Truth of this propofition lies in this, 
 That the greateft part of Men are govern'd by 
 thefe two Affe&ions. 
 
 Propofitions contradictory to disjunctives are 
 thofe where the Truth of the Disjunction is denied. 
 Which among the Latins (as in all other compe- 
 ted propofitions ) by putting the Negative at the 
 
 Head
 
 Chap. VII. The Art ofThinking. 167 
 
 
 
 Head of the proportion. Won munis aBio eft b<m* 
 velmala: and in Englijh, It is not true, that every 
 A&ionis goqd or bad. 
 
 Cridttimtlt. 
 
 Conditionals are fiich as have two parts bound 
 by the condition (*/) of which the firft where 
 the condition lies, is called {he Antecedent ; and the 
 other the Confequent. tf tbt Soul be Spiritual, is the 
 Antecedent ; it is Immortal, isthe'Confcquenr. 
 
 This Confluence is (bmetimes mediate ; fbme- 
 times immediate . It is only mediate, when there is 
 nothing in the Terms that binds both parts toge; 
 ther ; as when I fay, 
 
 If the Earth ft and ftill, the Sun 
 If God btjuSt, the 
 
 i The Consequences are very good, but they are not 
 
 \ immediate $ for that the parts not having any com- 
 
 itnoh Term, are bound together by fbmething 
 
 I which is not expreffed but rcferved in the Mind ; 
 
 that the Earth, and the Sun being perpetually in 
 
 different Situations ; neceflarily it Follows, that the 
 
 one is movcable, and the other immoveable. 
 
 When the Conlequence is immediate, it is ufu- 
 ally require* 
 
 i . Either that both parts have the fame Subject. 
 If Death bt * fajjage to a more happy Life, it it de- 
 ftttfe 
 
 V
 
 l<58 Logic : Or, Part II 
 
 If you have failed to, feed the Poor, you have filled d 
 Poor. 
 
 a. Or that they have the fame Predicate. 
 
 If whatever God inflict upon us for Tiyalsfalg, ough 
 to be dear to us. 
 
 Sictytejs ought to be dear to us. 
 
 3. Or that the Attribute of the firft be the Sub 
 je&of the fecond. 
 
 If Patience be a Vertue, 
 Some Venues are trig/cone. 
 
 4. Orlaftly, that the Subject of the firft part be! 
 the Attribute of the fecond ; which cannot be bu 
 when the fecond part is Negative. 
 
 If all true Chriftians live according t* the Goft>el t 
 
 There are no trueChriftians. 
 
 Here the Truth of the propofition is not regard- 
 ed, but the Truth of the confequence. For the 
 the one and the other part be falfe, neverthelcfs ii 
 the confluence of the one, in refpecl: of the o- 
 ther, be good, the propofition, as far as it is con 
 ditional, is true. As, 
 
 . If the wiU of the Creature be able to Under the ac 
 comflijhing of GoJs will. 
 
 God it not Omnipotent. 
 
 Negative Contradictories are oppofcd to Condi- 
 tionals, when the condition is deny'd ; which a- 
 mong the Latins is done by prefixing the Nega- 
 tive 
 
 Non fi miferum for tuna Simonem 
 Tinxit, vanum etiam mendacemque improba fixtin. 
 
 But
 
 2hap. VII. The Art of Thinking. 169 
 
 But in Englifh they are expreflcd by (altho) and 
 Negative. 
 
 If you eat of the forbidden Fruit, you /hall die. 
 
 Though you eat of the forbidden Fruit, you fall not 
 'e. 
 
 Or elfe by, It is not true ; 
 
 It is not true, that you /hall die if you eat of the 
 r bidden Fruit. 
 
 OfCaufals. 
 
 Caufals are thofe that contain two propofitions 
 in'd together by Conjun&ion of the Caufe (be- 
 \ufe) or (to the end that .) 
 
 Woe to the Rich, becaufe tfyy have their Felicity / 
 iis World. 
 
 The wicked are advanced, to the end, that fatting from 
 \ high, their fall may be the greater. 
 Tfjey can, becaufe they thinly they can. 
 Such a Prince was unfortunate, becaufe he aw not 
 
 under fuch a Planet, 
 Inder the(e forts of propofirions may bealfo rc- 
 thofe which are called $e<tuplicativcs. 
 w 3 of Men, are rational. 
 \ings, as Kjngs, are fubjeS to none but God. 
 That thefe propofitions be true, it is requir'd, 
 it one of the parts fhould be the ca,ufe of the o- 
 r ; whence it comes to pafs, that both are true ; 
 that which is falfe is no caule, nor ha$ it any 
 "; why it fhould be. Yet both parts may be 
 , when the Caufal is falfe. Thus a Prince may 
 Unfortunate and born under fuch a Planer : 
 I
 
 170 Logic : Or, Partll* 
 
 Though it be falfe that he was therefore Unfortu- 
 nate, becaufe he was born under fuch a Planet. 
 
 Therefore the contradi&ories of propofitions 
 chiefly confift in this, that one thing is denied to 
 be the caufe of the other. 
 
 Not- therefore unhappy , becaufe born under fucb a Con- 
 fteRation. 
 
 RELATIVES. 
 
 Relatives are thofe that include fome Compari 
 fbn and fbme Relation. 
 
 Where the Treafure ts, there is the Heart. 
 
 As be lived) fo he died. 
 
 At much 4f thcit haft, fo much art thou worth. 
 
 Here the Truth depends upon the exa&nefs o 
 the Relation ; and they are contradi&ed by deny 
 ing the Relation. 
 
 It is not true, that as be lived, fo he died. 
 
 It is not tnie, that a Man is efteemd in this Worl> 
 tfcording to what he has. 
 
 Of 
 
 Difcretives are thole, where various Judgment 
 ire made, and this variety is denoted by the Par 
 tides (.but) (notwithftanding) or words of the lik 
 nature, either exprefied or underftood. 
 Fortune may deprive me of my Wealth, but not my V& 
 
 tue. 
 1 endeavour \ to fet my felf above things t but not to I 
 
 fubjcfted to them.
 
 For though 
 .his f o 
 
 Happmefs defends neither 
 Happinefs defends both upn 
 
 Thus we fee thatr c 
 of Difcretives. F 
 Copulative. 
 
 e 
 
 ' n betwec 
 
 r i 
 
 CHAR
 
 172, Logic : Or, Pare IT. 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 Of Proportions composed in Sence. 
 
 THere nre other compofed proportions, whole 
 Compofition is more conceal'd and intri- 
 cate ; which may be reduced under four forts. 
 I. Exc/ufoe, i. Exceptive, 3. Comparative, 4, In- 
 ceptive or De/itive. 
 
 I. Of EXCLVS1VES. 
 
 Thofe are called Exclufive, which denote, that 
 a predicate fo agrees with his (ubje&, as to agree 
 with that alone, and no other. Whence it follows, 
 that they iuclude tvo various Judgments, and by 
 confequence are compos'd in Sence. Which is ex- 
 prcffed by the word (onlyj or fome fuch like words. 
 Or in Englifh, There it none but God only, who it to 
 le beloved for his cam falg, all other Things are to be 
 admired for the lake of God. 
 Only tbofe Riches which tbcu freely beftctveft, fhalt tkou 
 
 freely enjcy. 
 Vcrtner.nly makes Nobility, nothing elfe renders a Man 
 
 truely Nctte. 
 
 Iknow this on/j, that I kpw nothing, faid the Acade- 
 mics. 
 
 Lucan fpcaking of the Druids, makes this Dis- 
 \uncfcive Propofition compofed of two Exclufives.
 
 Chap. VIII. The Art of Thinking. 1 7 3 
 
 * "- you 
 
 The God *nd Heavenly Numens, you alone ^ 
 Or e Ife to only you they are unsown. 
 
 Thefe propofitions are contradicted three man- 
 ner of ways: 
 I. By denying that the predicate agrees with the /til- 
 
 ]c:l alone- 
 
 a. By affirming it agrees with fame thing elfe. 
 :. By aHedging it agrees nriit) the one and the other. 
 
 Thus this propofition, only Vertug is true NobtUty, 
 it may be contradi&ed. 
 I . That Vertue does not makf any one Noble. 
 ^. That Birth renders a Man Noble <# well as Vertue. 
 3 . That Birth ennobles a Man, and not Vertue. 
 
 So the Maxim of the Academics, this is only cer- 
 tain that there is nothing certain^ was varioufly contni- 
 di&ed by the Dogmatics and the Pyrronians. For the 
 Dogmatics deny ir, by maintaining^ hat it is doubly 
 fallt-, becaufe there are many Things that we 
 know moft certainly ; and therefore it was not true, 
 that we were certain that we knew nothing. And 
 the Pyrronians averred that it was falfe, forthecon- 
 i trary reafbn, that every Thing was fb uncertain, 
 that it was uncertain whether any thing were cer- 
 tain. 
 
 And therefore there is a defect of Judgment in 
 what Lucan (peaks of the Druids , becaufe there was 
 no nectflity, that only the Druids fhould be in the 
 Truth, in refpectcf the Gods, or that they (hculd 
 only be in an Error. For in regard there wert 
 I 3 fundrj
 
 174 Lo & c Or ' Part IT * 
 
 lundry Errors, concerning the Nature of the Gods, 
 it might well be, that though the Druids had dif- 
 ferent Thoughts concerning the Gods, from thofe 
 of 'other Nation?, they were no lefs in an Error 
 ihar. other Nations. Here it is alfo to be obfervcd, 
 ;:ere are propofinons which are excluhve 
 in Sence, though the exclufion be not expreffed. 
 Asm thi Verfe of Virgil, where the Exclufion is 
 marked our, 
 
 Vnafalw viftis, 'nu/lam/perarefalutcm. 
 Thus luckily Tranflated into French, where the Ex- 
 clu.Gon is underftood. 
 
 DC falut del vaincui eft de n'en point at tenders, 
 'i+sf.ifetyofthe'vanquifhed, is not to expefttt. 
 . Neverrhelels, it n more ufual in the Latin thaa 
 l : renca t to fupprefs ExclufiOns. So that there are 
 lome p .iflagcs not to be Tranilated with 'all their 
 forte, without making Excluhve propofitions , 
 though in the Latin the Exclufion be not mark'd. 
 
 Thus 2. Cor. 10. 17. J^/v; glonatur, glorietur Do- 
 mino ; ought to be thus TranfUted, Wljoever re- 
 joiceS) let him rejoice in the Lord. 
 
 Gal. 6. 7. ^# feminavcrit homo, h<ec & metet. 
 
 A Man (hall reap no more than what he has fbwn, , 
 
 Ephef. 4. 5^. Vnus Dominiis, una fides, tmusEap-. 
 
 tifmta. There is but one God, but one Fakb, but 
 
 one Baptifm. 
 
 Mat. 5-. 46". Si diligitis eos qtii vos di'igunt, quam 
 mcrcedsm habtbitis .- If you love only thofe that love 
 you, what recompense fhall ye delerve ? 
 
 Seneca.,
 
 Chap.VIII. The Art of Thinking. 17$ 
 
 Seneca in his T/u-tf, Nu/las habet fpes Troj.i, fi tales 
 habet. If Tro> has no other hope than this, it h; s 
 none at all : As if the Latin had faid, Si tanium 
 tales habet. 
 
 L. Of EXCEPTIVE*. 
 
 Exceptives are thofe where a Thing is affirm'd 
 of the whole Subject, except iome one of the In- 
 feriors of the Subject, by adding arparticle of Ex- 
 ception, which denotes that what is predicated, 
 does not agree with that Inferior. Which vifibly 
 includes two Judgments, and renders thefc Propo 
 fitions compofed in Sence. As if I fhould fay, 
 None of theSefts of the Antient Plnhfophers, except that 
 
 of the Platonics, have acknowledged God to be in* 
 
 corporeal. 
 
 Where two things-are to be underftood, i . That 
 the Antient Philofbphers believed God to be Cor- 
 poreal. ^. That the Platonics believed the 
 
 con- 
 
 trary. 
 
 The covetous Man does nothing welt, but when he d:e$ 
 
 No Man miserable, unlefs ccmfar'ci. 
 
 N<? Man ts mi/chief t but by kimfelf. 
 
 Except the wife Man, faid the Stoics, all Men are truly 
 
 Fools. 
 
 Thefe proportions are contradicted as many 
 ways as the Exclufive. 
 
 i . By affirming that the Stoics wife Man was as 
 much a Fool as arher Men. 
 
 i. By maintaining there were ethers, befidesthc 
 Stoics wife Men, that were no Fools. 
 
 I 4 3--By
 
 176 Logic : Or, Part II. 
 
 3. By alledging that the Stoics wife Man was a 
 Fool, and that others were wife Men. 
 
 We are farther to obferve, that the exclufive and 
 exceptive Propofirions are the fame thing, only tx- 
 prefiejd after a different manner, fo that with little 
 difficulty they may be changed the one into the o- 
 ther. And thus we fee that this exceptive of Te- 
 rence. 
 The Ignorant think* nothing well done but what he dots 
 
 birnfe/f. 
 
 Was changed by Cornelius Galliw into this exclufive, 
 That, on!j right he think}) which he does hiwjelf. 
 
 Of COMPARATIVES. 
 
 Tropofition?, where a comparative is defign'd, 
 include two Judgments. For it is one thing to fay 
 a Thing is fuch a Thing, and to fay that it is more 
 r lefs than another By which means thefe Pro- 
 pofuions become compofed in Sence. 
 The gr nat eft of Lojjes is to lofe a Friend. 
 Man? times a pleajing fyillery makes a deeper ImpreJJlem 
 
 in the moft important Affairs, than the befl of %e 
 
 Lefs hurtful are the wounds of a Friend, 
 the deceitful Kifles of an Enemy. 
 
 Thefe Propofit ions are contradicted feveral wai 
 as that maxim of Epicurus, Pain is the greatefl of 
 Evils, was contradicted one way by the Stoics, and 
 after another manner by the Peripatetics, while the 
 Peripatetics aver'd, that pain was an evil j but they 
 likewife maintain'd that Vice and other Irregulari- 
 ties
 
 Chap. VIII. The An of Thinking. 1 7 7 
 
 ties of the Mind were far greater Evils than Pain. 
 On the other fide the Stoic* would not allow p.u'n 
 to be an Evil, fb far were they from acknowledg- 
 ing it to be the greateft of all Evils. 
 
 But here it may be difputed, whether it be al- 
 ways neceflary tharin thefe propofuions the pofuive 
 of the Comparative, ihould agree wkh borh the 
 Members of the Companion ; for Example, whe- 
 ther weought to fuppofe two Things to be good, 
 that we may aver the one to be better than the o- 
 ther ? 
 
 It teems at firft that -it fiiould be Co ; but we find 
 itotherwife inpraclile; for we fie the Scriptures 
 niake ufe of the word better, not only in comparing 
 two good Things together : Better is Wifdom than 
 Strength^ and a frndent Man than aflrong Mm. 
 
 But alfb in comparing a Good with an EviljZfcwr 
 t the fatient than the fraud Man. 
 
 And ftmetimes in comparing two evil Thingt 
 ogether, Better is it to live tftth a. Dragon, than 4 
 tiding Woman. And in the Gofpel, // is better for 
 
 Man to be thrown into the Sea with a hliijlms. abate 
 s Nccb than to hurt one of the faithful. 
 
 The Reafon of this practice is, becaufe a greater 
 ;ood is better than a lefler. And by the fame rea* 
 >n we may lay, though lefs properly, that a Bcne- 
 it is bitter than an Evil } for tha: whatever has 
 
 e goodnefs, has more than that which has none 
 t all. We may alfb fay 5 that a lefler Evil is better 
 wn a greater Evil, and therefore the lefler Evil 
 as more of that fort of Goodnels than the greater 
 ;il, I T But -
 
 178 Logic : Or, Part II. | 
 
 But we are to take care leaft the over-heat of j 
 Difpute carry us unawares into vain Brangles about ; 
 tbele Forms of Speech, as they did Crefconiw the 
 Donatift Grammarian, difputing againft St. Aitfiin. 
 For that fame Father having faid that the Catho- 
 licks had more reafbn to upbraid the Donatifts with 
 Tradition, than the Donatifts to reproach the Ca- 
 thollcks. Crefconiu; thought he might from thofe 
 words, "Traditisnem nos vobis -probabilius Objicimus, 
 conclude, that St. Anflin acknawledg'd that the 
 Donatifts had reafon to tax the Catholicks. For if 
 you, laid he, more -probably, tee therefore more probably. 
 For the degree augments what is placed before ir, 
 does not impugn or deny what is faid before ir. 
 But St. A'iflin refutes this vain fubtilty, firft by 
 Examples of Scripture, and among the reft by that 
 paffnge of the Epiftlc to the Hebrews, where Sr. 
 foul having faid, That the Earth bearing only 
 Thorns was' Cur ft, and was only to expert to be 
 burnt, he adds, But we hofe better things of you dear 
 Brethren ; not, fays the Father, that they were good- 
 Things which he had rebearjed before, to bring forth 
 Thorns and Briers, and to deferve burning, but rather^ 
 tecaufe they were evil, that thofs being avoided, they 
 :Lnfi and tfi/h for better^ that is-, Benefits con* 
 fray tofnch great Evils. And afterwards he (newfe; 
 from the moll famous Grammarians the Fa!(hood of 
 'r.L Confcquence in regard that Virgil might have 
 been taxed in the fame manner, to have taken for a 
 Good the violence of a Diftemper, that enrages 
 Men to tear their own Members, becaufejhe wifhes 
 better may befal gocd Men. p
 
 Dii meliora fiis crroremque hoftibus ilium, 
 Difcijfis nudis laniabxnt dentibus artw* 
 
 How ihen, Mcliora piis t fays the Holy 
 d^ifthey had been BleJJing,, and not rather exi 
 *#*, to tear their Bowls with their own Teetb. 
 
 Qf.lNCEPTWES and DESITIVES. 
 
 When we fay that any thing begins, or ceafis 
 o be there are two Judgments made 5 one, that 
 the thing was before the time chat we talk of- the v 
 other, what * was afterward, and fo thefe Propc-' 
 fi.onsofwbchthe one are called IncepnVe, "the 
 other Defanve, are compofcd in Sence, and they 
 are fo alike, that it is much better ro make but one 
 fort of them, and to handle them both together 
 
 We Jews did not begin till fair return f rom fa 
 Cnpnvity cf Babylon, tom^ no hn^r tt r e #$& 
 **Cb*rrt m , kicb ** ,W t arc ^ C "
 
 i8o Logic : Or, Part II 
 
 the Temple. Which is contradi&ed by others, 
 who affirm that points were never us'd till after the 
 firft Century. 
 
 A General I(EF LECTION. 
 
 Though we have fliewed that thefe proportions 
 Exclufive, Exceptive, &c. may be contradicted 
 feveral ways, yet it is as certain, that when they 
 are barely denied, without any farther Explanation, 
 the Nagation falls naturally upon the Exclufion or 
 the Exception, or trie Comparison, or the Altera- 
 tion, denoted by the Words of beginning or cea- 
 ng. Therefore if any one believed that Epicurws 
 did not place his chief happinefs in bodily pleafure, 
 and it fhould be fsid to him, that only Epicurus 
 f laced chief 'bapfinefs in Pieafure, if the other barely 
 denied ir, without adding any other thing, if 
 would be in full declaration ofhisSence, becaufe a 
 &1an might have reafcn to believe upon that bare 
 Negation, that he ftill believed that Epiwus pkc'd 
 his chief Happinefs in Pleafure, but that he was not 
 the Oi)ly Perfbn who was of that Opinion.. 
 
 Allb if a Perfbn fhould ask me, knowing the in-, 
 tegriry of a Judge, vbttber be fitll fold Juftice } I 
 eoiHd not anfWtr barely, No. 
 
 For that fuch a No. would only fignifie that he 
 did not ftill fell Juilice ; bur at the fame time the 
 other was left to believe, that he hadformerlj done. 
 it 
 
 Which flitws us that there areibme Proportions,.
 
 Chap. IX. The Art of Thinking. i 81 
 
 to which it would be unjuft to require a bare an- 
 fwer by 7 or No-, for that when they include 
 two Senfes, a true anfwer cannot be given but by 
 explaining both the one and the other 
 
 CHAP. DC 
 
 Olfcrvattois to fnd out the Predicates and 
 buljetlsm Proportions, expreffed after 
 a lefs ufttal manner.
 
 II. 
 
 1 82, Logic : Or, Part 
 
 The only and true Rule is to oblerve by the 
 Senfe, of what a thing is affirm' Jy and what is af- 
 firm'd is this, for the firft is always the Subject, 
 and the latter the Predicate, however difpofed in 
 Order. 
 
 Thus there is nothing more common than thefe 
 forts of Propofitions ; It is a ihameful Thing to be 
 a (lave to Luft. Where by the Sence it is vifible, 
 that a /hameful thing is that which is affirm'd, and 
 confequently the Predicate ; and to be a flave to Luft, 
 is that which is affirm'd of the thing, that it is a 
 ftiameful thing, and confequently the Subject. Like- 
 wife in St. Paul accord ing to the Latin. Eft queflw 
 magnus Pietat cum fufficientia j whereas the true or- 
 der fhould be Godlinefs, with fufficiency, is great 
 gain. 
 
 Likewife in this Verfe. 
 / 
 
 Hafp the Man that knows the caufe cfThingt. 
 
 Happy is the Predicate, all the reft is the Subject. 
 
 But the Subject and the Attribute are yet more 
 difficult to be found out in complex propofitions. 
 And we have already (hewed, that (bmetimes there 
 is no difcerning, but by the conftquence of the Dif 
 courfe, and the Authors Intention, which is the 
 chief propofuion, and which the Incident in the 
 two propofitions. 
 
 But befides what has been laid, we may yet ob- 
 (erve, that in complex proportions, where theiirft 
 part is only the Incident proportion, and the latter
 
 Chap. IX. The Art o{ Thinking. 1 83 
 
 is the principal ; as in the Major and Conclufion of 
 this Argument, 
 
 God Commands us to Honour 
 
 William III. is Kjng. 
 
 Therefore God commands ta to Honour William III. 
 
 Here the Verb Active is to be changed into the 
 Paffive, to find out the true Subject of this principal 
 Propofition. For it i& plain when I argue after this 
 manner, that my principal Intention in the Major, 
 is to affirm fbmething of Kings. Whence I may 
 conclude that we are to Honour WiUiam IIL And 
 therefore what I affirm of the Command of God, 
 is only an mekkfit Propofition which confirms this 
 Affirmative, that Kings are to be honoured. 
 Whence it follows, that Kings is the Subject of the 
 Major, and William III. the Subject of the Con- 
 clufion. Though if we coufider things bui only 
 fuperficially, both the one and the other (eem to be 
 no more than a part of the Attribute. 
 
 Thefe propoiitions are alfo frequent in our Lan- 
 guage. If ts a folly to liften to flatterers. If is ths 
 Hail that falls . It is God who has fur chafed us j But 
 the Sence fufficiently dempnftrates, that to replace 
 thefe Proportions in their natural order, they ought 
 to be thus exprefled. 
 
 To liften to Flatterers is a tolly. 
 
 It ts the Hail that falls. 
 
 He that hat fttrchafid w ts Gcd. 
 
 And
 
 184 Logic : Or, Part II) 
 
 And this is almoft Univerfal in all Propofnions 
 that begin with It K, and where afterwards follows 
 (who) or (that] to have the Attribute at the be- 
 ginning, and the Subject at the end. And let this 
 fiiffice for once, to let you lee, that the examples 
 prodsced demonftrate, that we are to judge by the 
 Sence, and not by the order of the Words. And 
 this is neceflary to be known, that we may not 
 be deceiv'd in taking thofe for falfe Syllogifms, that 
 are really true. For that want of difcerning the 
 Subject and the Attribute in the Propofitions, we 
 believe 'em contrary when they are conformable to 
 the Rules. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 Other Olfervations, to know whether the 
 Propofitions are Unii/erfaL or Particular > 
 
 SOme Obfervations of the fame nature, and no 
 lefs ufeful, may be made of Particularity and 1 
 
 Univerfaliry. 
 
 I. OBSERVATION. 
 
 We muft diftinguifh Univerfality into two Sorts^ 
 The one may be called Metaphyiical, the other ' 
 
 I call Metapbyfial Universality, when the Uni- 
 
 verfality
 
 Chap. X. TJ:e Art of Thinking. 185 
 
 verfality is perfect and without Exception; asi 
 tvery Man ts living, which admits no exception. 
 
 I call Moral Universality, that which admits 
 fome Exception : For in Moral Things it fuffices, 
 hat things are fb for the moil part. As St. Paul 
 30th cites and proves, 
 The Cretans art always Ljars, evil Beafts y Shtt>- 
 
 Or as the fame Apoftle alledges in another place. 
 AU fsek. their own Things, not the things cf Jefus Chrift. 
 
 Or according to that of Horace, 
 All Mtificiam have this Vice^ &C. 
 
 Or according to the ufual Phrafes, 
 
 All Women love to chatt. 
 All Yojmg Men are inconftant. 
 AU Old MenprAif* the time faff. 
 
 In all thefe Propofmons it fuffices that it be fo 
 for the moft party neither is any thing to be conclu- 
 ded ftri&!y. 
 
 For as all thefe propofirions are not fb general, 
 jut that they admit Exceptions, fb they may ren- 
 !er the Conclufion falfe. For it could not be par- 
 icularly inferr'd, that any Cretan was a Lyar, or 
 in evil Bead, though the Apofrle cites in general 
 hat Vcrfe of one of their own Poets. 
 
 e Cretans are always Ljars, evil Beajis, and Slow- 
 
 bellies. 
 
 For that fbme of that Ifland might not be 
 
 lilty of thofe Vices which were common to o- 
 cbers. 
 
 There-
 
 1 86 Logic: Or, Part II- 
 
 Therefore the moderation to be obferv'd in 
 thefe Conclufion?, which are only morally Univer-j 
 fal, is on the one fide, to draw from thence with] 
 great judgment particular Conclufions ; and on the 
 other fide, not to contradict 'em, nor to reject 'em 
 as falfe j tho we may oppofe certain Inftances where- 
 in they may ftray from the Truth, but to be fatis- 
 fy'd, if they may be extended frcm others beyond 
 their jufl limits, that they ought not to be taken 
 too rigoroufly according to the Letter. 
 
 2. OBSERVATION. 
 
 There are fome Propofitions that ought to pafs 
 for Metaphyfically Univerfal, tho they may ad- 
 mit of Exceptions, that is, when thofe Exception* 
 are exotic, and fuch, as, according to common ufe, 
 are not comprehended in thofe Univerfal Terms. 
 As when I fay, AH men have ttvo Arms, This pro- 
 pofition ought to pafs for true, according to ordi- 
 nary ufe. And it would be but mere brangling to 
 oppofe againft it , that there have been Monftera 
 who were Men, though they had four Arms. It 
 being plain that there was nothing intended con- 
 cerning Monfters, in thefe general proportions ; 
 and that the only meaning of the Aflertion was, 
 that according to the order of Nature , all Men 
 had two Arms. 
 
 In like manner it may be faid, that all Men 
 make life of words to exprefs their thoughts ; but 
 Men do not make ufe of writing. Nr 
 
 would.
 
 Chap. X. The Art of Thinking. 187 
 
 Rrould it be a rational Objection to contradict the 
 tuth of the proportion, by inftancing dumb peo- 
 ?le, becaufe it is evident, though the fenfe be not 
 ?xprefs'd in words, that it was not meant of fuch 
 s had a natural impediment to make ufe of founds, 
 ither becaufe they could not underftand 'em, as 
 hofe that are deaf ; or becaufe they could not ut- 
 er 'em, like thole that are dumb. 
 
 3. OBSERVATION. 
 
 There are other propofitions which are not Uni- 
 r erfal, but only becaufe they are to be underftood 
 >f the fmgle fpecies'* of Genus, and not .of the In- 
 lividuals of Species* Thus it is faid, that all Crea- 
 ures were fav'd in Noah's Ark, becaufe that fbme of 
 very Species were fav'd. Jefus Chrift rebuk'd the 
 barifees for taking the Tenths of all Herbs 5 not 
 hat they took the Tenths of all Herbs that were 
 aken in the world ; but becaufe that there was no 
 brt of Pot-herb of which they did not take the 
 fythes. Thus faid St. Paul, I endeavour to pleafe 
 11 Men in all things ; that is, I endeavour to 
 rame ray felf to the condition and humour of all 
 brts of perlbns, Jews, Cbriftians, Gentiles ; though 
 le did not ftrive to pleafe hi profecutors, that were 
 b numerous. Thus it is faid, a Man has pafs'd all 
 Dffices : that is all forts of Offices luitable to his 
 :ondition.
 
 1 88 Logic: Or, Part II 
 
 4. 
 
 There are propofirions that are not Univerfal,bu 
 only as the Subject ought to be taken, as reftrainec 
 by one part of rhe Attribute. I fay by one part 
 for it would be ridiculous to think it fhould be re- 
 ftrain'd by the whole Attribute. As if any one 
 fhould affirm this Propofition to be true ; All Men 
 are juft, becaufe he gave no other Explication oi 
 it, than that all juft Men arc juft. But when the 
 Attribute is Complex, and confifts of two parts, as 
 in this Propofition ; All Men are juft ly the Grace of 
 Jefus Chrift. Then we may wirh reafon affirm the 
 term of juft to be fiibintelle&ed in the Subject, 
 though it be not exprefs'd. For then it is clear that 
 the meaning of the Proportion is , that all Mea 
 who are juft, are not juft but by the Grace of Je- 
 ftfs Chrift. And (b this Propofition is true in all re- 
 fpeb } though it may feem to be falfe, if we coa- 
 fider no more than what is exprefs'd in the Sub- 
 ject ; there being fo many Men who are wicked 
 and finful, and by confequence have not been ju- 
 ftify'd by the Grace of Jefus Chrift. There are a 
 great number of Proportions in Scripture, which 
 are to be taken in this fence ; and among the reft 
 that of St. Paul , As all dyd in Adam, fo alijhall 
 live again in Jefus Chrift. For it is certain, that a 
 great number of Pagans that dy'd in their incredu- 
 lity, (hall not live again in Jefus Chrift. And that 
 they (hall have no part in the Life of Glory, of 
 which Sr. Paul fpeaks. 
 
 are allb feveral Proportions which are 
 
 not
 
 Chap- X. The Art of Thinking. 189 
 
 jot morally Univerfal, but in this manner. The 
 7 rencb are good Sotildiers ; the Hollanders are good Sea- 
 nen , The Flemings are good Painters j The Italians 
 ire good Comedians. As much as to /ay, that the 
 Drench who are Souldiers, are good Souldiers j and 
 o of the reft. 
 
 5-. O B S E ^ V A T 10 N. 
 
 We are not to think that there are no other 
 narks of Particularity, then thefe words, ^uidam t 
 tliqim, and the like. On the other fide it is very 
 arely that we make ufe of 'ern , efpecially in our 
 -anguage. 
 
 The Plural number without the Particle \Tbe~\ 
 aakes the word to be taken particularly, whereas 
 he Particle being added, renders^jhe word Gene- 
 al. Thus there is a great difference between thefe 
 wo Propofitions. The Phjfitians now believe, that it 
 \ good to drin^ in the hot fit of a Fever , and Phyfiti- 
 ,ns now believe, &c. For in the firft Propofition, 
 
 Phyfitiansy concludes all Phyfitians : But in the 
 wwj denotes only forae particular Phy- 
 jtians. 
 
 But frequently then is, or there are, precede the 
 angular or the Plural Number, and that in two 
 lanners. 
 
 The firft by placing after there K, or there are t 
 ic Subftantive to be the Subject, and the Adje- 
 tive to be the Attribute of the Proportion. There 
 f e fame fains tvholefome j There are fame fleafures 
 
 deadly
 
 I9Q Logic : Or, p art 
 
 ^ There are falfe Friends. There is a genero 
 Humility ; Then are Vises cornea? d under the appea 
 once of Venue. The fecond manner is by joynir 
 the Adjective and the Subftantive together, by tr 
 particles which or who. At, there are fears which a 
 rational. But tlaefe particles do not hinder, but th-,i 
 thefe propofitions may be Tingle in fence, thougi 
 complex'd in expreffion. For 'tis no more thanlj 
 fay, fame fears are rational. But thefe phrafes c 
 Speech are mod ufual ; There arefome Men who on 
 love tkemfelves; There are Chriftians who are unwortl. 
 of the Name. 
 
 All or every one with a Negation makes a part 
 CUlar proportion. Every one that fays to me, Lore, 
 Lord, /hall not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. Evt 
 ryfm is not a crime. 
 
 6. OB 
 
 When there is no Term of Univerfality or Par- 
 ticularity, as Man ,s readable, Man is >/?, is , 
 quertwo band/d among the Phylofophers, whethft 
 thefe propofuions which they call Indefinite, ought 
 to pafs for Univerfal or Particular. 
 
 To which the Phylofophers reply, that the prfr 
 joficion ought to be Univerfal in a matter neceffary | 
 but particular in a Contingent matter. 
 
 I find this opinion approv'd by federal Learned 
 
 Men, and yet it is very erroneous- Rather we 
 
 ought to believe the Indefinite propofition to be 
 
 luiverfal, m whatever matter it be, when feme- 
 
 thing
 
 Chap. X. The Art of Thinking. 191 
 
 thing is affirm'd of the common Term, and there- 
 fore in Contingent matter, it ought not to be call'd 
 a particular propofition, but a falle univerfal pro- 
 pofition. And this is the natural Judgment of all 
 Men concerning propofitiom, rejecting 'em as falfe, 
 when they are not generally true, or at leaft not in 
 a moral generality, which is fufficient in common 
 difcourfe of the affairs of the World. 
 
 For who would endure to hear a Man affirming, 
 that Bears are white, that Men are black i that the 
 Parijians are Gentlemen j the Polonians, Socinians \ the 
 Englj/h ^ua^ers. Nevertheleft, according to the di- 
 ftin&ion of thefe Philofophers, thefe propofitions 
 ought to pafi for true, in regard that being indefinite 
 in a contingent matter, they ought to be taken for 
 particulars. Now it is true that fbme Bears are 
 white, as in Nova Zambia ; fome Men are black as 
 the Ethiopians ; fbme Parifians are Gentlemen, fbme 
 Polonians are Socinians ; and Ibme of the Englt/h are 
 l^ua^ers. Clear it is then, that in whatever matter 
 they be made, indefinite propofitions of this Nature 
 are taken for Univerfal : But in a Contingent mat- 
 ter, a Moral Univerfality is fufficient. Therefore 
 thefe propofitions are true, the French are valiant : 
 the Italians are jealous j the Germans are tall, the 
 Orientals are voluptuous ; though they be not true 
 of all particulars, but only for the moft part. 
 
 Here is therefore a more pertinent Diftinr.ion 
 to be made that thefe indefinite Propofitions are 
 Univerftl in matter of Do5trme, when we fay, 
 the A^e's are inwpwe.i!) and only particular in 
 
 Matters
 
 Logic : Or, Parti 
 
 Matters of Faft, and Hiftorical Narrations. / 
 When it is faid in the Go/pet, The Souldien haw* 
 made a, Crown of Thorns, fet it upon his Head. Th 
 is clearly to be understood of fbme and not of a 
 the Souldiers. For in matter of fmgle A<5Hons, e 
 fpecially when they are determin'd to a certai, 
 time, they do not ufually agree with the commoi 
 Term, but becaufe of forae particulars, the Idea o 
 which is diftinft in the underftanding of thole tha 
 make the Propofitions, as may be judged by wha 
 has been (aid of complex'd Terms in Sence, i par 
 cap. 6. l part cap. 4. 
 
 7. OBSERVATION. 
 
 The Names of Body, Community, People, being 
 as ufually they are taken Golleaively, for the whole 
 Communalty, all the People, do not make the 
 Propofitions wherein they are inferted properly U- 
 niverfal, nor particular, but rather fmgular. Thus 
 when I fay, 
 
 The Romans vanquifh'd the Carthagenians, 
 The Venetians maly War againfl the Turk. 
 The Judgesoffucha place condemn' d a Criminal. 
 
 The/e propofitions are not llniver&l ; otherwife 
 we fhould conclude of every Koman, that he had 
 vanquifli'd the Carthaginians, which is falfe. Nor 
 are the particulars. For that would be no more than 
 if I (houldfay, That fomeofthe Jfcaww vanquiOi. 
 ed the Carthaginians. But they are fmgular. For the 
 
 People
 
 Chap. XI^ The Art of Thinking ^ 
 People isconfider'd morally as one JVJ an Jivine <~e 
 
 tr J W " e V3nt!Uift ' d ^ t 
 took ^, overcame the Gtu l, 
 
 } by one and the fame Term, ^, M ^ U!1r . 
 
 ; 
 
 CHAP. XL 
 
 if *>" 
 
 nece 
 
 '"' ng 
 
 WC [^ fornething of two 
 wh.ch are of reat u f e 
 
 great 
 
 and
 
 194 Logic : Or, Part II. 
 
 But as there are two forts of the whole 9 fb there 
 are two forts of Divifions. There is one whole 
 composM of feveral parts, which are really di(linc*r, 
 whofe parts are call'd Integral parts ; and the Di- 
 vifion of this whole is properly calfd Partition. As 
 when we divide a Houfc into its Apartments, a City 
 into its Wards and Quarters ; a Kingdom into 
 its Provinces ; Man into Body and Soul, and the 
 Body into its Members. The only Rule for ma- 
 king this Partition aright, confifts in the accurate 
 numbring of the parts, fb that nothing be omit- 
 ted. 
 
 The other Wliole is call'd by another name, A R 
 and! its parts are Sutyftive or Inferior parts .- for t 
 tiiis All, is a common term, and its parts are t 
 Subjects contain'd in its extent. As the word Cr 
 rure is the All of that nature, whofe inferior 
 as Man and Bead, which are comprehended in its 
 extent, are fubje&ivc parts. This Divifion retains 
 properly the name of Divifion, of which there 
 are four forts. 
 
 i. When the Genus is divided by its Species* 
 Thus, All fubftancc K either Body or Spirits. All Crea- 
 tures Are Man or ~Beaft. 
 
 a. When the Genus is divided by differences: 
 Every Creature is either rational or irrational. Ail num 
 iiers are even er odd. All Proportions <ire true or fal$. 
 All Lines arc fir eight or crooked. 
 
 3. When a common Subject is divided by the 
 cppofite Accidents, of which it is capable ; or ac- 
 cording to the diverfity of Accidents and Times. At 
 
 ever?
 
 Chap. XI. The Art of Thinki^. 
 
 The Rules of this DiVifion are 
 
 " ""' * " 
 
 
 n-
 
 196 Logic : Or, Part II. 
 
 ^.difpcs'd and fickly. Between day and night there 
 is r i \vilighr. Between Piety and Impiety there is 
 iuperflkion. And form times this Medium is twofold, 
 as between Covetoufhefs and Prodigality, there is 
 Liberality and Frugality. Between fear that fears 
 very thing, and rafhnefs, that fears nothing, there 
 is valour that is not affrighted at danger ; and wa- 
 rinefp, that avoids unneceffary dangers. 
 
 z. The fecond Rule is, that the Members of the 
 JDivifion be oppcs'd, as even, odd, rational, irration- 
 al. However it is not ncccfJary that all the difFe- 
 rences that make the Members oppofite, fhould be 
 Fofitive ; it being fufficient that one be fb, and 
 that the other be the Genus alone, with the Nega- 
 tion of the other difference ; for from hence arifes 
 the moil certain oppofiticn of the Members. Thus 
 a Bead is diftinguifiied from a Man , only by his 
 want of Reafbn, which is nothing Pofitive. 
 
 Thusc^ in number is only the negation of di-;: 
 .vifibility into cqusl parts. Thus in the firft number, 
 there is nothing more than what h in the compound 
 number, unite being the meafure of both ; and the 
 Hi it number no way differing from the Compound 
 number, but in this, that it has no ether meafure 
 tut the Unite. 
 
 However we muft confefs it is better to exprefi 
 the oppofite differences by pofitive Terms, if it 
 may be done. For thereby the Nature of the 
 Members of the Divifion , is more clearly under- 
 ftood. Therefore the Divifion of Subflance into 
 Thinking^ and expended, is better than into Materi- 
 al
 
 Chap. XL The Art of Thinker. 197 
 
 al and Immaterial j or into Corporeal and Incor- 
 poreal i for that the words Immaterial and Incor- 
 poreal, give us but an imperfect and confu/d 1de4 t 
 of what is much better apprehended by the words 
 thinking Subjlance. 
 
 The Third Rule, being a Consequence of the 
 Second, is, that one of the Members be not fb en* 
 clos'd in the other ,tbat this m-iy be affirm'd of thit ; 
 wugh perhaps it may be included ariorher way. 
 'or a line is included in the Superficies, and the term 
 f the folid, as,a term of the (olid. But th.it doed 
 ot hinder, but that the extent may be divided inro 
 urfacc, line and folid j for that it cannot be affir- 
 med, that the Line is a Superficies, nor'that the 
 uperficies.is a folid. But on the other fide, number 
 annot be divided into even, odd and fatare, bccaufe 
 very fquare number being even or odd, it is en- 
 os'd in one of the twofiril Members. 
 Neither mult we divide opinions into true, falie 
 nd probable, becaufe every true opinion is cither 
 tie or falfe. But they, may be firft divided into 
 ue and falfe ; and then tnth the one and the 
 ther into certain and probable. 
 Uttmui and his Followers ftrangely torment them- 
 !vcs to fliew that all Divifions ought non to have 
 bove two Members. Which indeed is the bed 
 ray of Divifion, when it may be commodioufly 
 one. But Clearnefs and Facility, being that which 
 ught to be moft confider'd in the Sciences, Divi- 
 ons into three or more Members, ought not to be 
 Reeled, (b much the rather, when they are moil 
 K 3
 
 198 Logic : Or, Part II. 
 
 natural, and that there be a neceffity of forc'dftib- 
 divilions, ro make 'em confift of no more than two 
 Members. For ihen inftead of eafing the Memory, 
 which is the only benefit of Divisions, we load it 
 wi'h a great number of Subdivifions, much more 
 difficult to be retained in Memory, than a Divifion 
 into more Members all at once. For example, is in 
 pot more fhort and natural to fay, Every extent is 
 cither A Line, a Superficies, or a folid, than with Ra- 
 ti-iuj, Every Magnitude is a Line, or a thing Conffting 
 cf Lines j every thing confifting of Lines t is either * 
 Super fcief cr afolid Body. 
 
 Laftly, we may obferve that it is equally erro- 
 neous not to make anow, as to make too many Di- 
 vlfions, the one does not fufficiently fatisfie the 
 Mind j the other confounds and amuies the Under- 
 Handing. Crajjotus, in great Elleem among the In- 
 terpreters of Ariflotle, has greatly injur'd his Book 
 with a multitude of Divifions ; by which we fall 
 into that Confufion which we feck to avoid. 
 ever is cut into Duft is Cwfus'd. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 Chap. XII. The Art of Thinking. 199 
 
 CHAP. XII. 
 
 Of the Definition of a Thing. 
 
 THere are two fbrrs of the Definition of thing*, 
 the one more exact, which retains the name 
 of Definition ; th other kfi exa&, which is cali'd 
 a Dtfcription. 
 
 The more exacl is that which explains the na- 
 ture of the thing by Eflontial Attributes ; of 
 which thofe that are common are cali'd Genus, and 
 thole thar are proper Difference. 
 
 Thus man is defin'd a rational Creature. The 
 Soul is a Subftance that thinks ; the Body is a 
 Subftance extended ; God is a perfect Being, And 
 great care is to be taken that the Genus in the De- 
 finition be che nexr, and not the remote Genus of 
 the thing defined. 
 
 Sometimes we define by integrant parts,as when 
 we (ay, a man is defined of Soul and Bjdy. But 
 then there is fomething that fupplies the place of 
 uj j as here the Compound Being ^ the reft are 
 taken for the difference. 
 
 The lei's exaft Definition, which is called De- 
 (cription, is that which gives fbme knowledg of a 
 thing by the accidents that are proper to it ; and 
 lb determines it, that we may frame fuch an Ids* 
 of ir, as diftinguifhes from other things. 
 
 Thus we defcribe Plant?, Fruits and Animal* 
 by their fh-ipe, by their bulk, their colour, and 
 K 4 . fuch
 
 2.00 Logic : Or, Part II. 
 
 fi:ch like accidents. And thefe are the dtfcripii- 
 OHS moll ufed by Poets and Orators. 
 
 There are alfb Defcriptions made by the Cau- 
 fes, by the Matter, Form, by the end, &. As 
 when we define a Clock to be an Engine compos'd 
 af feveral Wheels, whofe regular morion limits the 
 Several hours. 
 
 There are three things neaffary to make a De- 
 finition good: that ir be univafal, .proper and 
 clear. 
 
 i. It muft be univcr/al, that is, it rnuft contain 
 the whole thing defined ; therefore the common 
 rkfimcion of Time, to be the measure of Motion 
 is not good. For that is very probable that time 
 may be the mcafure f Reft as well as Motion, in 
 regard we lay as well, that a thing has been (b long 
 at reft, as that it has been fb long in Motion. So 
 that time feems to be nothing eile but the cominu- 
 ance of a thing in any Condition whatever. 
 
 a. It muft be proper, that is, it muft agree wi.h 
 the thing defined. Therefore the common Defini- 
 tion of Elements, to be a Simple Corruptible Bodj, is^ 
 erroneous. For the Heavenly Bodies bung no Ie6 
 fitnple B jdics than the Elements by the Confeffion ' 
 of the Philofophers, we have no realbn to believe 
 but that there are alterations in the Heaven?, Ana- 
 logous to thofe that happen upon Earth ; fince not 
 to fpeak of Comets which we now find, are not 
 form'd of the Exhalations of the Earth, as Ariftotle 
 imagined, we di/cover fpots in the Sun, which'ga- 
 ther together,' nd then fcatter again in the fame-. 
 
 manner
 
 Chap. XII. The Art of Thinking, 2 O I 
 
 manner as our Clouds, tho much larger in ex- 
 tent* 
 
 Thirdly, it muft be clearer ; that is, it ought 
 t<5 render the Idea of a thing defined,' more plain 
 and diftincT:, and make us as much as may be to 
 underlland the nature of ir, and be ferviceable to 
 us to give a reafbn of us principal Proprieties, 
 Which is that which we ought principally to con- 
 fider in Definitions , and which is wanting in.ths 
 greateft part of Ariftotles. 
 
 For whoever underftood the nature of motion, 
 the better for the help of this Definition j An A:l , 
 of Ens in. Potently, as in Potentia> or Power? Is 
 nor the idea of it, wherewith Nature furnifhes usa 
 lundred times more clear than that ? and indeed 
 what did it ever avail to explain the Proprieties ol 
 Vlotion ? 
 
 The four celebrated Definitions of the four firfl 
 itiesi are nothing better. 
 
 Dric t (ays he, i& that U'liich is eafily retain*^ 
 within its bounds, and difficultly wkhin thole of un 
 ther Body. 
 
 Moifture. On the other fide is that which is eafi< 
 y retam'd in the Ebunds of. another Body diificult- 
 
 within its own. 
 
 i. Theft Dehnitions better agree with hard and 
 -iquid Bodies, then with Bodies moift and dry. Fof 
 ve lay of the Air, thvu here .it is dry, in anothef 
 face moid, tho .it be always eafily retained wiihia 
 he Bounds of another Body, as being always Li-, 
 uid. Moreover, we do not fee how An Rule cor. 14 
 K * fci
 
 Logic : Or, Part 
 
 fay that Fire, that is, Flame, was dry according 
 to this Definition, becaufe ic is eafily confined 
 within the Bounds of another Body. Whence 
 Virgil calls ir Liquid Fire. And it is a vain fub- 
 tilty to fay with Campanellaj that Fire enclofed, 
 either breaks or broken ; for th?t proceeds not 
 from irs pretended _drinefs , but becaufe its own 
 Fmoak ftiflcs if, if it have not Air , and there- 
 fore ir will be more eafily reftrained within the 
 limits of another Body , provided it may have 
 fbme Breathing- hole to let out the Smoak which 
 it continually fends forth. 
 
 As for Hat, he defines it, that which congregates 
 Htmogeneals, and ftparttej Heterogeneals. 
 
 Cold) he defines that which unites Heterogeneals^ 
 and dtjfipates Homogeneals. Which fbmetimes a 
 grees as well with Hot as with Cold ; but not 
 always, and which is of no ufe, neither to fihew 
 us the c:.ufe why we call fbme Bodies Sfot 9 and 
 others Cold.- So that Chancellor Bacon had rea- - 
 fon to fay, that thefe Definitions were like thofe 
 thit fhould dtfine a Man t be a Shoe-maker , or a : 
 yjne-drcjfer. 
 
 The fame Philoropher defines Nature, the fnt> 
 v'ple of friction and J^/? , in that wherein tt it. 
 Which is grounded upon an opinion that he 
 had, that all natural Bodies differM in this from 
 Artificial Bodies, that natural Bodies had in 
 themfelves the Principle of their Motion , and 
 that the motion of Artificial Bodies was from 
 whereas it is evident that no J3od/ can 
 
 givr.
 
 Chap. XII. The Art of Thinking. 
 
 give mat ion to its felf : in regard that matter 
 being indifferent either to Morion or Reft, can- 
 not be determined to either of thefe, but by an 
 extnnfic caufe , which not being able to pro- 
 ceed to Infiniry , it follows that God alone 
 gives motion ro matter , and preserves it in its 
 Motion. 
 
 His celebrated Definition of the Soul is ro 
 lefs defeSive, the fir? *fl of a nattnrj C (g a ic Bi* 9 
 ' 
 
 Firir it does not appear what he Would define. 
 For if it be the Sou], as common to men and 
 Bcafts, it is a Ci-tmera which he has defined, 
 there being nothing common between thole two 
 thing?. 
 
 2,. He has explained an obfcure Term by four 
 or five that arc more obfcure. FOJ to omit the 
 reft, the Idea which we have of the word Life , Ji 
 no lefs confuted than that which we have of th 
 Soul ; thcfe two Terms being equally Aoibicruoui 
 and Equivocal. 
 
 Thefe are the Rules of Definition and Divifi. 
 
 ; but tho there be nothing of more moment 
 in the Sciences, than to define and divide wtll, 
 we need % n? more in this place j becaufe ir 
 iepends much more upon the knowledge of 
 |e Subject in difputes than upon Logical
 
 2,04 Logic : Or, Part IL 
 
 CHAP. XIII. 
 
 Of the Conner/ton of Propositions, where is a 
 through Ittquifithn into the Nature of 
 Affirmation and Negation, upon which 
 this Qonverfion depends. And fir ft of the 
 Nature of Affirmation. 
 
 I Have deferred till now to fpeak of the Conver- 
 f ion of Propofidom, becaufe upon that depend* 
 Foundation of all Argumentation, of which 
 we are to difcourfe in the next parr. And there- 
 fore it w_as nor proper that this matter fhould be 
 remote from what we have to fay of the Nature of 
 Arguments, though it behoves us to repeat fome 
 thjng of what we have faid concerning Affirmation 
 and Negation, that we may throughly explain the 
 Nature boih of the one and the other. 
 
 Certain it is, that we cannot explain a Propo* 
 iuiott. to others, bur we muft make ufe of two Ideas 
 e cne for the Subj:<a, the other fur the Aftri 
 luirejas alfo of another word which denotes the 
 l.mon, which our Underftanding conceive, be* 
 iv/ecn them. 
 
 hio Union cannot be better cxprcfled than by 
 ords themfelves whicir we make ufe of to 
 while we fay, that one Thing is another 
 
 whence it is evic'eit, t'r jt the Nature of 
 
 Affirraa^-
 
 Chap. XIII. The Art'of Thinking. ao T 
 
 Affirmation is to Unite and Identifie, as I may fo 
 Tay, the Subjea with the Attribute; for this is that 
 which is figmfied by the word^, ,> 
 
 And it follows alfo, that ic is the Nature of Affir- 
 
 S ? S* the ^ ttribute in a]1 that is ex P refr ^ 
 
 n he Subject according to the Extent which it has 
 m the Propofition. As when I fay, vay Man it 
 * Creature, I woaid fignifie, that whatever is Man 
 
 Whereas if I only fay, f OOTe Man is juft, I do 
 
 1- o C M ? A " ribure f ^ to a11 ' r"**ty to 
 
 Here we muft alfo confidcr what has been al- 
 ready laid, that in j*4,we mu ft diftinguifh their 
 Comprehenfion from their Extenfion , for that the 
 omprehenuon marks out the Attributes contain'd- 
 m one Idea ; and the Extenfion the Subjc6b which 
 contain that Idea. - 
 
 For thence it follows, that an J^ is always af- 
 md according to its Con^rehenfion, for that by 
 depnvmg it ot fome one of irs Effemial Attributes 
 
 fan ^ C ^!? Hat S f thaLit i?no ^ reth ^ 
 ie tt And by con^quence when it is affirm'd, 
 
 t 'salwaysaccordinvrto all that which it compre! 
 bends m u fclf. Thus^when I fay, that a tyzLle - 
 <-a P-Arallellogram, I affirm of a Bangle all that is 
 comprehended in an Idea -of a Paralhllo Z ram. For 
 .fjhere were any part of this idea t which did not- 
 ^8ang/e, it wou ld follow, that the 
 not agree with it, butonly.one part. 
 And
 
 Logic: Or, Part II. 
 
 And therefore the word ParaUellogram ought to be 
 denied, and not affirm'd of a I(elang!e* Which 
 we (hall find to be the Ground of all Affirmative 
 Argument?. 
 
 ' And it follows, on the other fide, that the Idea 
 of the Attribute is not taken according to its full 
 Extenfion j at leaft that ks Extenfion was not grea- 
 ter than that of the Subject. 
 
 For if I fay, that all Lafcivious Menare d&nnd, I 
 do not fay they only (hall be damn'd, but that they 
 ihallbe of the number of the damn'd. 
 
 Thus the Affirmation placing the Idea of the Pre- 
 dicate in the Subject, it is properly the Subject 
 which determines the Extenfion of the Attribute, in 
 an affirmative Propofition, and the Identity which 
 it denotes, regards the Attribute, as included in an 
 extent equal to that of the Subject ; and not in all 
 its Univerfality, if it have any more than the Subject 
 For it is true, that Lions are all included in the Idea 
 of CreMtire, but it is not true that they are all the 
 Creatures that are. 
 
 I have {aid, that the Predicate is not taken in 
 its full Generality, if it have any more than the 
 Subject. For not being retrained but by the SubjeeT 1 , 
 if the Subject be as general as the Attribute, it is 
 clear, that the Predicate (hall enjoy all its Generali- 
 ty, becaufe it (hall have as much as the Subject, 
 and for that we fuppofe, that according to its own 
 Nature it cannot have more. 
 
 From whence we may gather thefe Four un- 
 doubted Axioms. 
 
 I. AXIOM.
 
 Chap. XIII. The Art of Thinking. 
 
 i. AXIOM. 
 
 The Attribute is placed in the Subject by the Propo- 
 (jtion affirmative, according to the full Extent of the 
 Subject in the Propo/ition. That if, if the Subject be 
 Univcrfal, the Attribute is conceived in the full ex- 
 tent of the Subject ; and if the Subject be parti- 
 cular, the Predicate is only conceiv'd in a part of 
 the Extenfion of the Subject : As in the foregoing 
 Examples. 
 
 i. A XIOM. 
 
 Ihe Predicate of an Affirmative Prop ofition t it af- 
 rnfd according to its full Comprekenfion : That is to 
 ay, according to all its Predicates. 
 
 3. A XIOM. 
 
 ^l 
 
 The Predicate of an Affirmative Proportion, may lc 
 affirmed according to Us full Exten/ion, if it be in itsfelf 
 renter than that of its Subjttt. As when we fay that 
 Vlen are Creatures, (hi word Creature fignifies no 
 nore all fort of Creature?, but only foch Creatures 
 s are Men, 
 
 C-H- A R
 
 2-oS Logic : Or, Parr II. 
 
 CHAP. XIV. 
 
 Of the Gorrverjion of Affirmative Prop ^ 
 fitions* 
 
 WE call that the Convention of a Proport- 
 ion, when the Subject is changed into the 
 Predicate, and yet the Proposition holds true, ific, 
 were fo before : Or rather that it neceflarily fok 
 lows to be true by the Converfion, fuppofing that 
 it were fiich before. 
 
 Nowfrom what we have faid, it may be eafily* 
 under flood how this Conversion is to be made. For; 
 as it is impoSfible that one thing Should be jjyn'cfT; 
 and united to another ; but tnat rhe other muft-bel 
 j oyn'd to the firft ; and that it follows of Cour/e./ij 
 if. A bejoyn'd to 8, B is aifo joyn'd to ^, it is eviJl 
 dent, that it is impoflabie that two Things Shouldf 
 be conceived as Identified, which is the inoft per-| 
 fe<a of all Unions, bu; that the faid Union niuft > 
 be reciprocal, that is, unlefs icmay be affirm j d of/ 
 both Terms, that they are united in the fame man^ | 
 ner as they are (aid -to be. Which is call'd Con^ 
 verfion. 
 
 Therefore, as .in particular Affirmative Propo-'; | 
 fitions for Example, whsn it is faid, feme Mm it I \ 
 jufl, the Subja and the Predicate are both Parti- 
 cular i for that the Predicate juft being reftrain'd 
 by the Extent of the Subject, Signifies only that 
 
 particular-.-
 
 Chap. XIV. He Art of Thinking 2.09 
 
 particular Jultice which is in i >me one Man ; it is 
 evident that if fome one Man be Identified wiih />//?, 
 fomewhat of juft is alfo Identified with fome one 
 Man. And therefore there needs no more than 
 fimply to change the Attribute into the Subject, 
 obferving the lame particularity, to convert thele 
 forts of Propositions, 
 
 We cannot fay the fame thing of Univerfal Af- 
 firmative Propofitions, becaufe that in thofe Pro- 
 pofitions the Subject is only Uniwfal, that is, is 
 :aken in its fu!l Extent, and the Attribute on the 
 her fide is limited and reftrain'd. And therefore 
 hen it is to be made the Subject by Converfion, 
 te fame reftri&ion is to be obferved, and the 
 iark which determines. it, -ruuft be added, leaft ic 
 lould not be taken generally. Thus when I fay, 
 "hat Man is a Creature, I unire the Idea of Man 
 ich that of a Creature, reftrain'd and limited on- 
 to Men. And therefore if I would invert. this 
 nion, by beginning from a Creature^ of which 
 ay afierwavds be predicated, the fame Reftri&ion 
 : rhe firft Term is to be obferv'd, and for fear of 
 ;ing deceiv'd, fome note of determination mud 
 added. 
 
 However, becaufe Affirmative Propofirlons can- 
 it he converted, but into particulir Affirmatives, 
 at they are left properly converted than others., 
 at as they are compofed of a general Subject, and 
 reftrain'd Predicate, it is evident when they are 
 inverted, by changing the Attribute into the Sub* 
 c~t,they ought to have a reftrain'd or limited Sub- 
 % When
 
 zio Logic: Or, Part II. j 
 
 When we deduce thefe two Rules. 
 i. Rule. 
 
 Vniverfal Affirmative Propofitions may be converted^ \ 
 by adding a mart(. of Particularity to the Attribute, and 
 become the Subjfft. 
 
 2.. Rule. 
 
 Particular Affirmative Propofitions are to be. conver- 
 ted without any Addition^ or any change. That is, re- 
 taining only for the Attribute, become the Subjects, 
 the Mark of particularity, that belong'd to the ft; &' 
 Subject. 
 
 But thefe two Rules may be reduced to one thatj 
 (hall comprehend bath. 
 
 The Attribute being limited by the SubjeR, in .all af~ 
 firmative Propofitions^ if the Predicate is to be changd 
 into the Subjetl, the f(eft-ficiim mnft be obferved : And 
 by confequence it muft have a marl^ of particularity an" 
 Hexed, whether the firft Subject were "Untverfal or Par" 
 ticular. 
 
 Neverthele^ it often happens, that Univerfal Af- 
 firmative Propofitions, may be converted into o- 
 rhers that are Univerfal. But this is only when the 
 Attribute is of it felf no larger in Extent than the 
 Subject, as when difference or propriety are affirm'd 
 of the Species, or the Definition of the Thing de- 
 fin'd. For then the Attribute not being reftrain'd, 
 may be taken in the Converfion, as generally as the 
 Subject, All Mm are Rational, all Rational Creatures 
 are Men. 
 
 But
 
 Chap XV. The Art of Thinking. m 
 
 But theft Converfions not being true, unlefsupon 
 articular Occafions, they are look'd upon as true 
 Ibnverfions, which ought to be certain and infalii- 
 ile, by the Difpofition of the Terms. 
 
 CHAP. XV. 
 
 Of the Nature of Negative Proportions. 
 
 I 1HE Nature of a Negative Propofition cannot 
 JL be more clearly exprefled than by faying, 
 at one Thing is conceived not to be another. 
 But to the End one Thing may not be another, 
 is not neceflary that it fhould have nothing corn- 
 on with it y it being fufficient that it has not all 
 lich the other has ; as it is fufficient for a Bead 
 )t to be a Man, that he has not all that a Man 
 s, not but that he may have fbmething common 
 th Man. From whence this Axiom follows. 
 
 $T. A X I O M 
 
 A Negative Proportion does not fe par ate from the Sub* 
 ? all the farts contain d in the Compre ben/ion of the 
 (tribute ; bat it only fepar ate s the total Idea compofed 
 all the united Attribute $ i 
 
 If I fay, That Matter is not a thinking Subftance, 
 t do I not deny it to be a Subltance, but I fay it is 
 t a Thinking Subftance, which is the total and 
 itire which I deny of the Matter. 
 
 " It,
 
 a rx Logic i Or, ' Part III 
 
 It is quite otherwiie with the Extenfion of an 
 Idea. For the Negative Propofkion (cparates from^ 
 the Subject, the Idea of the Attribute in its full Ex-1 
 tent. The Reafon of which is evident. For to j 
 be the Subje& of an Idea, and to be contain'd in ics J 
 Extenfion is no more than to include that Idea, andj 
 by confequence when we fay, that one Idea does! 
 not include another, which may be call'd deny ing J 
 we fay that it is not one of the Subjects of the Idea, j 
 
 Thus when .1 fay, That a Man is not an Injenfible 1 
 BWTJT, I fay at the fame time, That Man is none 
 of the Infenfible Beings, and by confequence I deny 
 all Things Jnfenfible of Man, whence we may de- '! 
 rive this Axiom. 
 
 6. AXlOty. 
 
 The Attribute of a "Negative Propo/ition is always tn*. \ 
 ken generally. Which may be exprtls'd more diirincl- 
 Ij. AH the Subjects of anldea t which are denied of ana? \ 
 tkerldea, are alfo denied of the former Idea. Ir a Tri- L 
 angle be denied of Squares, whatever is Triangula? i 
 fhall be denied of a Square. In the Schools they j 
 ufuallyfay, what is denied of the Genus, is denied j 
 alfo of the Species. For the Species is the Subject | 
 of theGew;, as Man is theSebje& d Creature, be- i 
 ing contain'd in the Extenfion of Creature. 
 
 Not only Negative Proportions Separate the At- 
 tribute from the Subject according to the full Exten- 
 fion of the Attribute ; but they f eparate that Attri- 
 bute alfb from the Subject, according to the full 
 Extenfion which the Subject has in the Proportion. 
 
 That
 
 Chap. XVI, The Art of Thinking. 
 
 Thar is, it feparares it univer/ally, if the Subject be 
 llniverlal ; particularly, if Particular. As it I fry, 
 10 vicious Man is happy, I feparate all vicious per- 
 bns from happy Pel-Tons. And if I fay fome one Do- 
 fbr is not learned, I fcparate learned from fonie Do- 
 r. From whence we draw this Axiom. 
 
 7- 
 
 Ever? Attribute denied of a Subject, ,j denied of alt 
 t ts contain din the Extent which the Subject ha in 
 e Proportion. 
 
 CHAP. XVI. 
 9ftfo Converfon of negative Proportions. 
 
 \S it ttimppffible to reparate two Things to- 
 tally, but that the fepar;;; n muft be mutual 
 I reciprocal, it is evident that if I fiy, JV, M* 
 Stone, I can iikewife fay, No Stone is a Man. 
 it any Stone were a Man, trm Man would be 
 tone, and by confluence it would not be true 
 at no Man was a Stone. Hence this Rule. 
 
 Vnivetftl Negative Proportion, may be converted jm- 
 ^ by changing the Attribute into the Subjctt , and by 
 [erving the Attribute, become the Subject, the fane 
 toerfality winch the farmer Subject Lid, 
 fe negative Propofitiuns, the Attribute is always 
 
 taken
 
 14 Logic : Or, Part II. 
 
 taken Univerfally ^ as being denied according to 
 its full extent. 
 
 But the fame Reafbn will not allow the Conver- 
 (ion of particular Negative Propofirions : For ex- 
 ample, we cannot fay that fbme one Phyfician is not 
 a Man, becaufe we may fay that fome one Man is 
 no Phyfician. Which proceeds from the Nature 
 of the Negation itfelf, that in negative Propositions 
 the Attribute is always taken Univerfdlly, and ac- 
 cording to its full Exteirfion. So that when a par- 
 ticular Subject becomes an Attribute by Converfion 
 in a Negative particular Proportion, it becomes U- 
 niverfal, and changes its Nature, contrary to the 
 Rules of true Converfion j which ought not to 
 change the ReftricVion of the Terms. So in this 
 Proportion, Some one Man uno Phjfician, the term 
 Man is taken particularly. But in the falfe Conver- 
 fion, Some me Phyfician is no Man, the word Man is 
 taken Univerfally. 
 
 Now it no ways follows, that becaufe tjie quality 
 of the Phyfician is feparated from fome one Man in 
 this Proportion, Some one Man is no Phyfician j or 
 becaufe the Idea of a Triangle is denied of fome o- 
 ther Figure, as in this Propofition, Some one Figure 
 is no Triangle, I fay it does not follow hence , that 
 there are any Phyficians that are not Men, nor any 
 Triangles that are not Figures. 
 
 The End of the Second Part.
 
 LOGIC: 
 
 OR, THE 
 
 ART 
 
 O F 
 
 THINKING. 
 
 PART III. 
 
 Of Difcoarfc or Ratiocination. 
 
 THIS Part of which we are now to treat, 
 containing the Rules of Diicourfe, is ao 
 compted the moft imporrant Part of Lo- 
 }*ic, and is almoft the only Part which ought to be 
 handled moft accurately. But we have lorae rea- 
 
 (bn
 
 ^l6 Logic : Or, Pare III. 
 
 ion to fufpea whether it be altogether fb ufeful. For 
 the greatcft Part of the Errors among Men, as we 
 have already faid, arifes from hence, that they 
 build their Difcourfes upon falfe Principles, rather 
 than from their dra'wing falfe Conditions from 
 their Principles. It rarely happens that we are im- 
 pofed upon by fuch Difeourfes which are therefore 
 only falfe, becaufe the Confequences are ill drawn. 
 Seeing they who are not able to difcover thole Fal- 
 fities by the Light of Nature, will for the moft 
 part be as unable to underfrand, much lefs to apply 
 the Rules which are laid down for D'icourfe. Ne- 
 verthelefs fhould thele Rules be lookVi upon only | 
 but as fptcularive Truth, they would be very ufeful j 
 for the Exercife of the* Wit. And moreover it 
 cannot be deny'd but that they be of fome ufc upon ( 
 feveral Occafions, efpecially to fiich who being j 
 of a quick and lively Apprehenfion, never fuffer 
 themfelves to be deluded by falfe Confequence%J 
 but for want of Heed and Attention, wh^ch a due 
 Reflection, upon thefe Rules would eafi y re6tifie. 
 However it be,- we here prefcnt ye with what has 
 been ufually faid concerning this matter, and with | 
 Ibmethimg more than has hitherto yet been difco^ 
 vered. 
 
 CHAR
 
 217 
 
 Chap. I. The Art of Thinking 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Oftbe Hereof Ratiocination and tbcfrus- 
 ral forts of it. 
 
 THE nece% f Difcourfcaonij founded ur- 
 on the narrow Bounds of Human Wir - 
 which be,ng to judge of the Truth or FalftoodoV 
 a Propofition wh,ch IS then call'd a ^ t0 n, cannoc 
 o it by the confideration of tho two 
 
 ie 
 call d the Leffar Tern, becaufe the Subjeft i 
 
 SSte*" r r Pr ^" ; and rhe ^ 
 
 call d the GrwfcrT lor the contrary Reafon 
 o then, whet, the folc Confidcration of thefe wo 
 "*" Oes ^ce for 
 
 Now ,h,, Ccmpa.ifon of the two /* , OW thor 
 mean, of ,he MM, m wou | d be u[ - de% J 
 to be made with only one of he 
 
 
 he Soul 
 the Soale Spmmal or no ? And not u 
 
 , I ftould ra ake choice of th 
 
 jpurpjfe to compare Though'
 
 2, 1 8" Logic : O, Part I IF. 
 
 with the Soul, if it did not conceive fome corre- 
 fpondency between Thought and the Predicate or 
 thing Spiritual, by means of which I may be able 
 to judge whether it agrees with the Sou]. Thus I 
 may fay the Soul thinks, but I cannot thence con- 
 clude that the Soul is Spiritual, unlefs I conceive 
 ferae Relation between Thought and that of Spiritual. 
 So then it is requiike, that the Middle Terra 
 fliould be compar'd as well wkh the Subject or Lef- 
 (erTerm, as with the Predicate or Greater Term, 
 whether it be with both apart as in Syllogifms, 
 which are therefore call'd Simple ; or with both to- 
 gether at one time, as in Arguments which are 
 call'd CwjunQive. 
 
 But as well in the one as other manner, this Com- 
 parifbn requires two Proportions. 
 
 We fhall fpeak in particular of Conjunctive Ar r j 
 guments ; but in Simple Arguments the Thing fi : 
 clear; for that the Middle Term being compar dfi 
 with the Predicate of the Conclufion ( which can-, 
 ' rot be done but by affirming or denying ) makeeii 
 the Proportion which we call the Major , becau&l; 
 the Attribute of the Conclufion is call'd the Greattn. 
 
 And bdng another time compar'd withth^Suk 
 ject of the Conclufion,, it makes that propofirioBJi 
 which is called the Ai^t-, bccaufe the Subjea ^ 
 ' the Conclufion is call'd the Leffer Twn. And th(; 
 Conclufion is inferr'd, which is the Proportion K 
 (elf to be prov'd, and which before it was provV 
 was call'd the queflion. 
 
 I
 
 Cha 
 
 2,19 
 
 to
 
 2,2,0 Logic : Or, Part III. 
 
 be full of Defires, and there I (hall confider the 
 Idea of wanting thofe Things which a Man defires, 
 and the mifery of that .privation j from whence I 
 342y form this Argument. 
 
 Covetcus Men are full of Defires. 
 
 Ikey who are full of Defer et WAnt feVeral "Things j it 
 
 being impcflible they fhould fati.'fie their Defer es. 
 
 Now they that want what they defire are miferable. 
 Covet cm Men are therefore tnifer able. 
 
 This fort of Argumest compofedof feveral propo-' 
 iitions, of which the fecond depends upon the firnV, 
 ihe third upon the fecond, and fb forward is call'd 
 Sorites. And thefe are thofe Arguments which are 
 moft ufual in the Mathematics. But becaufe when 
 they are fb long the Intellect has much ado to 
 follow them, and for that the number of three 
 propofitions is fuificiendy proportionable to the ex- 
 tent of our Underftandingj Men have taken the 
 more care to examine the Rules of good and bad 
 Syllogifms, that is to fay, of Arguments of three 
 propofitions. Wherein it will not be amifs to fol- 
 low the Footfleps of others j becaufe thofe Rules 
 may be readily apply 'd to all Arguments compofed 
 of feveral propofitions j fb that if they are good, ji 
 they may be reduced into Sillogifms. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 CHAP. u. 
 
 The Dhtfons of Sytogfa into Simple ^ 
 and Conjunctive, and of ^ ; f f 
 
 complex and Complex.
 
 212, Logic : Or, Part IIL 
 
 Terms of the Conclusion, are alfb of two forts. 
 
 The one, where every, Term is joined entirely 
 with the middle Term ; that is to fay, with the 
 predicate entirely in the Major, and with the fub- 
 30t entirely in the Minor. 
 
 The other, where the correlation being Com- 
 plex, that is, compofed of Terms complex ; one 
 part of the fubjecl:, or one part of the predicate, is 
 joined with the middle Term in one of the propo- 
 iuicns^ and all the reft, which is no more than one 
 fole Term, is join'd with the middle Term in the 
 otker propofiridn. As in this Argument, 
 
 Tie Law of< God obliges us to Honour Kjngs. 
 
 VViiiiarn the Third is Ring j Ergo, 
 
 The Law of God obliges us to Honour VViiiiarn tie 
 Third. 
 
 We (hall call the firfr, fort of Argument Clear or 
 Incompltx'd, and the other Implicated or Ccmplexd j, 
 not that ail thofe that contain complex'd propofitions 
 are of the latter fort j but becaule there are none 
 of the latter fort wherein there are not complexed 
 proportions. 
 
 Now .though the Rules are generally, given for 
 fimple fyllogifms, may ferve for all complex'd fyllo- 
 gifms, provided they be inverted, nevertheless be- 
 caufe the force of the Conclufion does not depend 
 upon that Inverfion, we fliall here apply the 
 Rules for fimple fyllogifms only to Incomplex'd, re- 
 fcrving another place to fpeak of fyllogifms cora- 
 plcxcd. 
 
 C H A P.'
 
 Chap. III. The Art of Thinking. zii 
 
 C HA P. III. 
 
 General Rules for ilrapie Syliogifms Tn- 
 compiexed. 
 
 TZw Chapter, with thofe that folloa) to the Twelfth are 
 y?/c, ofwbich &e bdve Jpcken in our Preliminary Dtf- 
 courfe, that contain things fnktil 'and quaint , and nc- 
 ceffxry for 'the Speculation of L'cgic, im of little 
 Vft.
 
 Logic : Or, Part III. 
 
 Affirmative, Negative, Univerfal and Particular, 
 which we (hall here only repeat, as being prov'd 
 in another place. 
 
 i . Particular propofitions are included in gene- 
 rals of the lame nature, and not generals in par- 
 ticulars. / in A and O in , not A in I, nor 
 in O. 
 
 i. The fubjeft of a proportion taken univer- 
 fally or particularly, is that which renders it uni- 
 verfal or particular. 
 
 5. The predicate of an Affirmative propofition, 
 being never of a larger Extent than thefubjedr, is 
 always considered as taken particularly : For that 
 ir is only by accident, if it be (bmetimes taken ge- 
 nerally. 
 
 4. The predicate of a Negative propofition is 
 always tiken generally. 
 
 Upon the(e Axioms chiefly are founded thege-i 
 ncralRulesof SyUogtJms, not to be violated without! 
 falling into falfe Argumentation. 
 
 i. Rule. 
 
 TLe middle Term cannot be taken twice particular!}, fat* 
 it ought to be taken at lea/I once Vniverfa/fy. 
 
 For in regard the two Terms of the Conclufion 
 are to be united or diyuin'd, it is apparent that no 1 
 fuch thing can be done, if the middle Term be ta-^ 
 ken for t#o different* parts of the fame whole, fmce 
 it may happen that it may not prove to be one and 
 
 the
 
 The Art of Thinking. 
 
 the two Terms that fall be united 
 Now being taken twice particularly, 
 for r tWodffo ^P^s of the fame 
 confequence nothingcan be conch,- 
 
 end * no necefrari]y - Whlch cnoii h 
 
 nder an Argument Vicious ; f lnce We w if a 
 befalfe ffh ' n ' u hatWh fe Con <"n cannot 
 gument ? ** ^ As lhttS in rhis Ar " 
 
 '<? Man is Pious. 
 Someone Man is a jobber. 
 Therefore fome on* jobber w Pious'. 
 
 parts of Men, cannot unite jobber with Piow ' 
 paufeitjsnot the fame perfon that is a Hotter and 
 "tow. 
 
 . The fame cannot be faid of the Subject and 
 ^cateoftheConclufion. Fortho' they betaken 
 ce particularly, yet r hey may be joined together 
 17 undone of the Terms to the middle Terra 
 i the full Extent of the middle Term. For it fol 
 !>ws from thence very well, that if the middle 
 Q be united in any one of its parts to fome pare 
 the other term, the firft term which we have faid 
 be joinid to the entire middle Term, will bs 
 ned alfo vvuh the. Term to which any part of the 
 idd^Term is joined. Thus if there be fome 
 *cb. in all the Houfes in P*,*, and chat there -be 
 rmans in fome Houfes in Paris, -k follows -that 
 iereare fome Houfes in Par K , where there lives 
 - atleaftone German, and <w Frenchman. 
 
 L 5- If;
 
 zz6 Logic : Or, Part III. 
 
 If fame t(icb Men arc Fools. 
 And all 1$ich Men are to be honour d t 
 There art fans' Fools to to honoured, 
 For the Rich that are Fools are alib to be ho- 
 noured, fince all Rich Men are to be honoured, 
 and by confequence in thofe Rich and honoured 
 Fools, the qualities of Fools and Honoured are 
 joined together. 
 
 a. Rule. 
 
 The Terms of the Conclusion cannot be taken more Vni- 
 verfatty in the Conclufion than in the Premifes. 
 
 And therefore if the one or the other Term be 
 taken Univerfally in the Conclufion, the Argument 
 will be falfe, if it be taken particularly in the two 
 firft propositions. 
 
 The Reaion is, for that nothing can be conclu- 
 ded from a Particular to an Universal. For because 
 fomebne Man is a Blacfamore, it cannot be thence- 
 oncludcd that all Men are Blacl&moresi , 
 
 I. Corollary. 
 
 There muft be always one Univerfal Term 
 more in the Premifes which is not fuch in the Con- 
 clufion. For every Term that is UniveHal in the 
 Conclufion, muft be Univerfal in the Premifts ; and 
 moreover the middle Term muft be at leaft once 
 univerfally taken,
 
 Chap. III. The Art of Thinking. 12,7 
 
 2.. Corollary. 
 
 When the Conclufion is Negative, of necdfry 
 the greater Term mu ft be taken general!/ in rhe 
 Major For it is taken Generally in che Conclu- 
 ton (by the Fourth Axiom) and by conference- 
 mult be taken generally in the Major (by th- 
 . Rule) J 
 
 3. Corollary. 
 
 The Major of an Argument-, of which the G?h- 
 
 ufion is Negative, can never be a particular Af- 
 
 rmative : For the Subject and Predicate of an Af- 
 
 rmative propofition are both taken particularly - 
 
 'the Second and Third Axiom) and fothe greater 
 
 erm would be taken particularly contrary to the 
 
 ve&td CoroRary. 
 
 4 Car oft dry. 
 
 The k-ffer Term is always in the Conclufion ai 
 the premifts, that is as it cannot but be parties 
 ' the ConcIuGon when it is particular in the Pre- 
 ies, foon the contrary it muft be always general 
 
 L u TTP 1 ?* 5 - ?' xvhen ^ c is fo in the Premifcs. 
 
 thelefler Term cannot be General in the Mi- 
 
 r j when it is the Subjeft of it, unlefs it be gene- 
 
 ly united or difuniced from the middle Term, 
 
 >r it cannot be a predicate and taken univerfally, 
 
 J the propofition be Negative, becaufe the pre^ 
 
 ite ot an Affirmative propofition is always taken 
 
 rticularly. , Now in Negative propofidons if - 
 
 the
 
 12,8 Logic : Or, Part III 
 
 the predicate be taken in its full Extent, it is a fign 
 that it is difunited from its Subjeft. And by con- 
 fequence, a proportion where the middle Term is 
 univerfal, denotes a union of the middle Term with 
 the whole lefler Term, or a difunion of the middle 
 Term from the whole Idler Term. 
 
 Now if by this Union of the lefler Term with 
 the whole middle Term, it be concluded that fbme 
 other Idea is join'd with the lefler Term, it is to 
 be concluded that it is join'd with the whole, and 
 not wuh part : For the middle Term being join'd 
 to the whole lefler Term, can by that Union prove 
 nothing of one parr, which it docs not prove of the 
 reft as being; join'd to the whole. 
 
 In like manner, if the difunion of the middle j 
 Term from the lefler Term prove any thing of any ] 
 part of the lefler Term, it proves it of all the parts, j 
 as being from all the parts equally difunited. 
 
 y. Corollary. 
 
 When the Minor is a Negative univerfal, if a. j 
 lawful Conclufion may be drawn from it, it muft 
 be always General. This is a confequence of the 
 Corollary preceding. For the lefler Term cannon 
 fail to be taken generally in the Minor when it isa 
 Negative Univerfal, whether it be the Subject (by 
 the fecond Axiom ) or the Predicate ( by ihe. 
 Fourth.)
 
 Chap. III. The Art of Thinking. 
 
 3. Hule. 
 
 Nothing can be concluded from two Negative Propo- 
 
 Jttions. 
 
 For two Negative Propofitions feperate the Sub- 
 
 ject from the middle Term, and the Predicate al- 
 
 fo. Now when two Things are fcperated from the 
 
 third Thing, it does not follow either that thole 
 
 Things are or are not the fame third Thing. For 
 
 ~rom hence that the Spaniards are not Turk?, and 
 
 hat the Turks are not Chriftilns, it does not follow 
 
 hat the Spaniards are not Chriftians. Nor does it 
 
 bllow that the Chinefes are Chriftians, though they 
 
 )e no more Turly than the Spaniards. 
 
 4. tyle. ' . 
 
 A Negative Conclufion cannot be proved by two Af- 
 firmative Propofitions. 
 
 For becaufe the two Terms of the Conclufion are 
 united with the third Term, it does not follow but 
 that they* may be difunited one from another. 
 
 5. fyle. 
 
 The Conclufion always follows the weaker Part ; That 
 is to fay , if one of the Propofitions be Negative the Con- 
 clujion muft be Negative i if the Proportion be particu- 
 lar, the Conclusion muft be particular. 
 
 For if one Propofition be Negative, the middle 
 Term is difunited from one of the parts of the 
 Conclufion, and therefore cannot unite both, which 
 however is neceflarily required to make an Affir- 
 mative Conclufion. Alfo
 
 2.30 Logic*. Of, 
 
 Alfo if one of the Prppofitions be particular: the 
 
 Conclufion cannot be General For if the Conclufi. 
 
 on be a Univrerfal Affirmative, the Subject beino 
 
 Univerfal, ic ought to be Univerfal in the Mino? 
 
 and by confluence the Subject of it, the predicate 
 
 never being taken generally in -Affirmative Propo- 
 
 fitions. Therefore the Middle Term added to this- 
 
 Subject ihall be particular in the Minor, and there- 
 
 fore General in the Major ; otherwife it will be 
 
 twice particularly taken. Therefore it fhall be the 
 
 bubjedt of. it, and by conference this Maior Pro- 
 
 pofition fhall be Univerfal. Thus it is plain that no 
 
 particular Propofuion can precede, whofeconclufion 
 
 inall be Universal 
 
 u Which is yet more manifcft in Univerfal Nega- 
 tive Conclufions. For thence it would follow that 
 there ought to be three UmVerfal Terms in the Pfe- 
 nnfes^y the firft Corollary) but in regard there I 
 oagbl to be one Proporfition Affirmative fby the I 
 TtortWr) whofe predicate is taken particularly, ic I 
 follows that all the other three Terms ai > e ta k en 
 UniverfaUy and by conference both Subjeas of I 
 Premifes (hall be taken UniverfaUy, which ren- - 
 dcrs em Univerfal. Which was the thing to be I 
 demonftrated. 
 
 6. Coronary. 
 That vbieb conclude, the Generalt concll{ ^ ^ & ,, 
 
 . 
 
 That which concludes A, concludes I, and that' 
 which concludes , concludes O. But that which 
 
 conclude*
 
 Chap. III. The Art of Thinking. 
 
 concludes the Particular docs not for all that con- 
 clude the General. This is a confequence of the 
 preceding Rule and the firft Axiom. But we are 
 to underftand that moft men are pleas'd to confider 
 theft forts of Syllogifrns only according, to their 
 moft Noble Conclufion which is the General : So 
 that they do not accompt for a particular fort of 
 Syllogifm that wherein it is only concluded of the 
 Particular j becaufe it may be concluded of the 
 Univerlal. 
 
 So that there is no fort of Syllogifm, where the 
 
 Major being A, and the" Minor E, the conclufion is 
 
 O. For (by the ?. CW/<iry),the Conclufion of an 
 
 Univerfal Negative Minor may be always Univer- 
 
 ilr So that if an Univerfal Condition cannot be 
 
 rawn, the Reafon is , becaufe there can be none 
 
 t all. Hence A, E, O, never conftitute a Syllo^ 
 
 jifm, but when A,E, E, are included. 
 
 from two particular Proportions nothing follows, 
 For if they are both Affirmatives , the middle 2 
 Term (hall there be taken twice particularly, whe- 
 ther it be the Subject (by the 2. Axiom) or the pre- 
 dicate (by the 3 . Axiom.} Now by the firft Rule 
 there is nothing concluded by a Syllogifm, whole 
 middle Term is taken twice particularly. 
 
 But if one of the Premifes be a Negative, the 
 Conclufion being the fame, by the preceding Rule, 
 there ought to be at leaft two Universal Terms in 
 
 the
 
 Logic : Or, Part III. 
 
 the Premifes .'according to the 4 Corollary.} There- 
 fore there muft be one Univerfal Propofnion in the 
 two Premifes, it being impofTible fo to difpofe three 
 1 erms in two Propofitions, where there ought to 
 be two Terms taken Univerfally, but that there 
 muft be two Negative Predicates, which would be 
 agamtt the third Rule 5 or fome one of the Subject 
 Univerfal, which makes the Proportion Uaiverfal. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Of the Figures and Mades of Syllogifins ' m 
 General. That there c an be no more than, 
 four Figures. 
 
 THE General Rules being eftablimt whicb t 
 ^neceflarily ought to be obferved in fimple I 
 Syllogifrns, it remains that we obferve how many 
 Ibrts of Syllogifms there are. 
 
 Generally there are as many forts of Syllogifms, 
 as there are different Manners of di/pofmg, accor- 
 ding to thefe Rules, the three Propofitions of one 
 Syllogifm, and the three Terms of which they are 
 compos'd. 
 
 The Difpofif n of the three Syllogifms accord . 
 ing to their four Differences A. E. i, O. is cali'd the, 
 Mode. 
 
 The Difpoficion of the three Terms, that is, of 
 the middle Term, with the three Terms of the 
 Conclufion, is cali'd Figure.
 
 Chap. IV. The Art of Thinking 
 
 Now it may be known how many concluding 
 Modes there may be, the various figures not b 
 ing confider'd,according to which every Mode may 
 confute feveral Syllogifms. For by the Doarine 
 Combinations , four .Terms, as A, E. I. O. be- 
 ng taken three and three, cannot be varioufly dif- 
 pos d in any more than 64 manners. But of thefe 
 64 manners, they who will take the pains to confi- 
 ler every one apart {hall find that there are 
 
 28 Deluded by the 3 and 6 Rule, that no- 
 hmg is concluded from two Negatives and two 
 >arnculars. 
 
 1 8 by the 7. That the Conclufion follows the 
 treaker part. 
 
 6 by the 4. That nothing can be concluded Ne- 
 gatively from two Affirmatives, 
 
 > fay I. E. O. by the 3 Corollary of
 
 Logic: Or, Part TIT; 
 
 ding to the manner, whence arife the DiVerfity cf 
 byllogifms, which is the various dHpofition of tfte 
 three Terms, which iscalfd Figure as we have al- 
 ready laid. 
 
 Now for this drfpontion of three Terms, ir on!? 
 regards i thetwofirft Propofitions ; for the Condi 
 fion is luppos d before you can make the SyllooiTm- 
 to provr it. And thus when the middle Term can 
 only bedrfpos'd m four manners, there can be no 
 more the four poffible Figures. 1 
 
 For either the middle Term is- the SuljeFl in the 
 Major and the Predicate in the Minor} which makes- 
 the hrft Figure. 
 
 Or it is the Predicate in tie Major and Atowr.whlc 
 makes the fkond Figure. 
 
 Or it is the Suljtfk both in th one and tie cd-cr ' 
 which makes the third Figure. 
 
 Or it is the Predicate in the -Major and tie Subjec 
 in the Mtnor, which makes the fourth Figure Ic 
 being certain, that what fuffices neceflarily to make 
 a true Syllogifm, may be fometimes concluded in 
 this manner. We (hall produce Examples aft*- 
 
 wards. 
 
 Neverthelefs, becgufe nothing can ' be prov'd 
 rom this fourth Manner, but after a manner, not 
 very natural, Ariftotk and his followers have not aJ- 
 low d the name of Figure to this Mode. Y*t G*. 
 i maintains the contrary : So that ic is clear the 
 Jnpute J is only about words, which is to be decided, 
 when they mail both agree what they mean by the 
 word Figure. 
 
 But
 
 Qiap.IV. The Art of Thinking ""^ 
 
 But they mart certainly lye under a miftake, who 
 take for the fourth Figure (which they accufe^u 
 
 e 
 
 flotle not to have underftood) thofe Syllo^ifms 
 wherein th~ Major and Minor are tranfpos'd a* 
 thus ; 
 
 .Every 'Body K divifole. 
 
 Every thing that dnifible is iwferfetl. 
 
 Therefore, every Body i) intperfeft, 
 
 I admire Gajjendm fhould fall into this frrare. For 
 it is ridiculous to take for the Major of a Syllogifa, 
 the Proportion which firft appears, and for the Mi- 
 nor the fecond Proportion. For fo we might as well 
 take the Conclufion for the major, or the Minor 
 i an Argument, becaufe it is oft times the firft or 
 lecond of the Propofitions that compofe it : as in 
 ade Vcrfesof Horace the Conclufionis the firft, the 
 Minor the fecond, and the Major the third. 
 
 ^j' me/ior fervo qui liber i or fit avaro, 
 
 In triviis faum cum fe dinuttit ad ajfem, 
 
 Won 'video : nam qui cupt^ metuet quoque porro 
 -$&, metuens vivtt, liber mibi mm erit mquam. 
 Ul which may be reduc'd into this Syllogifm. 
 tie that lives under continual Jpprehenfrns t s not free 
 Every covetous wan livesunder continual Apprehenficru. 
 Therefore, no covetous man is free. 
 
 Therefore there is no regard to be had to the fim- 
 >le Local Difpofition of the Propofitions, which 
 ; nake no change in the Intelled. But we are to take 
 prSyllogifrns of the firft Figure, all thofe where 
 ;he middle Term is the Subjeft of the Proportion, 
 /here is found the greater Term or Predicate of 
 
 the
 
 136 Logic: Or, Part IIF. 
 
 the Conclufion ; and the Predicate in that Propo-i 
 fition where is found the lefTer Term, or the Sub- 
 ject of the Conclufion. And fo thofe are to be rec- 
 kon 'd Syllogifms of the fourth Tigure, where mid- 
 dle Terra is the predicate injthe Major,and the Sub- 
 ject in the Minor. And fb hereafter we (hall call 
 'em, hoping no body will take it ill, becaufe we 
 give 'em fair notice before hand, that we do not 
 underftand by this word Figure, any thing more, 
 than a different Difpofidon of the middle Term. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 The Rules, Modes and Foundations of the 
 frfl Figure. 
 
 TH E firft Figure is that where the Middle- 
 Terra is the Subject of the Major and the 
 Predicate of the Minor. And this Figure has two- 
 Rules, 
 
 I ^ V L E. 
 
 The Minor muft be Affirmative. 
 For were it Negative, the Major would be Affir- 
 mative by the third general Rule,and the conclafiori 
 Negative by the fifth. Therefore the greater Term 
 would be taken Univerfally in the Conclufion, as be- 
 ing a Negative, and particularly in the Major, be- 
 C-aufe it is the predicate of it in this Figure, and 
 
 would
 
 Chap. V. The Art of Thinking. 
 
 would be the Major Affirmative ; which is con- 
 trary to the fecond Rule, which forbids concluding 
 from a Particular to a General. This Reafon alfo 
 takes place in the third Figure, where the greater 
 Term is the predicate in the Major. 
 
 2. RULE. 
 
 The Major muft be Vniverfal. 
 For the Minor being affirmative by the prece- 
 ding Rule, the middle Term which is the Predicate 
 of it, is there taken particularly , therefore it muft 
 be UnirerfoJ in the Major where it is the Subjeft, 
 which renders it Univerfal ; otherwife it would be 
 :aken twice particularly againft the firft General 
 
 That there can he but four Modct in the firji Figure. 
 The Demonjlration. 
 
 We have (bewed in the preceding Chapter, that 
 |here can be but ten concluding Modes. But of 
 jhefe ten Modes A.E. E. and A.O. O. are excJu- 
 led by the firft Rule of this Figure. 
 
 I. A.I. and O. A. O, by the fecond, where the 
 viajor is to be Univerfal. 
 
 ^ A. A. I. and E. A. O. are excluded by the fourth 
 Corollary of the General Rules. For that the JeiTer 
 Perm' being the Subject of the Minor, it cannot 
 ic Univerfal, but the conclufion may be Univerfal 
 kewife. 
 
 And fo by Confluence there remains but thefe 
 iur Modes. 
 
 i. Affir-
 
 2.38 Logic-. Or, Parr ITT 
 
 ^A.A.A. VE. A.E. 
 
 a. Affirmatives i. Neg.% 
 
 C.A.i.1 cE.i.0. 
 
 Which we are to Demonflrate^ 
 Thele four Modes, to the end they may be the 
 more eafily retain'd in Memory, , have been deno- 
 ted by certain artificial words ; of which the three 
 Syllables denote the three Proportions ^ and the 
 vowel of each Syllable the mode of the Propofiti- 
 ons. So that thefe three words hare this Conve- 
 nience in the Schools, that they {hew the entire 
 Species of the Syliogifb, which without it couk 
 not be done without a long Circumlocution o 
 words. 
 B A R-tVhoever fuffers to die for Hunger thofi whom 
 
 he ought to frffferve^ n a Homicide. 
 B A- All Rich Men who do not. give Alms in public^ 
 necejjlties fuffer thofe to die with Hungtl 
 whom they ought to frefervt, Ergo, 
 R A. They are Homicides. 
 
 C E. No impenitent Robber can expert to befavd. 
 L A- All thofe who dye after they have enrich\ 
 themfelves with the goods of the Churd 
 without Reftitution, are impenitent Robbers. 
 RENT. Therefore none of thofg can expeft to fa 
 
 Saved. 
 DA- Whatever makes for Salvation 
 
 R I. Some Ajfliflions make for Salvation.* 
 
 I. Therefore there are Ajfiiftions that are advafl 
 
 E.F
 
 Chap. IV. Thedrt 
 
 F E. Whatever is attended with a ju/l Repentance 
 
 K not to be defired. 
 R I. There are fome Pleafures that are attended 
 
 With jrtft Repentance. 
 O. ' Therefore there are feme Pleads that are not 
 
 to be dsfired. 
 
 Now in regard that in this Figure the greater 
 1 erm is denied or affirmed of the middle Term 
 taken Univerfally,affirm'd afterwards in the Minor 
 ot the leffer Term, or the Subject of the Conclu- 
 lion, KB clear that it is only founded upon two 
 Principles, the one, for Moods Affirmative, the 
 <?ther for the Negative .Moods: 
 
 The Principle of the Moods Affirmative. 
 Whatever agrees with an Idea talyn Vmverfa/fy, a . 
 gnes with all whatever that Idea affirmed of, whe- 
 ther it be the Subject of that Idea, or comprehended 
 within its Extenfun-, For thefe Expreffions are Sy- 
 nonimous. 
 
 Thus the. Idea of Animtl agrees with all Men, 
 ir agrees alfo with all the Ethiopians. This Prin- 
 ciple has been fo explain'd in the Chapter where 
 we have treated of affirmative Propofitions, that 
 there is no need of any farther Expofitioni It (hall 
 urriee to add that in the Schools it is exprefs'd in 
 Lheie Terms, That winch agrees with the Confcquen^ 
 agrees with the Antecedent ; -and that by the Term 
 "onfequent is meant a general Idea that is affirm'd of 
 inother,for that in effe<3 the Predicate is drawn bv 
 -onfequence from the Subjea If he be a Majj he 
 s an Animal. 
 
 The
 
 Logic : Or, p^ n 
 
 The Ground of tit Negative 
 
 i denied of an Idea taken Vniverfallj, 
 demed of all that is affirmed of that Idea 
 
 A *T r c G u M f S]I Animals ' ir Is he ^ 
 denied of all Men, becaufe they are Animals. 
 
 It is thus exprefs'd in the Schools , Whatever 
 demed of the Confident, is denied of the Anteccden 
 That which has been already fpoken in the Chat 
 Negative Propofmons, is the reafon we fa 
 no more here. 
 
 It is to be obferved that onty the firft Ffeur 
 concludes in A. E. /. o. 
 
 And that only the fame Figure concludes in A 
 reafon of it is, for that to the end the conclufi 
 on may be Affirmative, there is a neceffiry that rh< 
 lefler term (hould be generally taken in the Minor 
 and by confequence that it fhould be the SubjecT: o: 
 it, and that the Minor term fhould be the PredicaK 
 oF it i from whence it comes to pafs that the middle 
 Term is taken particularly. It muft be therefore 
 taken generally in the Major fby the firft general 
 Rule) and by Confequence it muft be the Subject 
 L ^ u No ^ J this ls che ^ture of the firft Fiurfc 
 that the middle Term is the Subjeft in the 
 and the Predate in the Minor. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Ml** **J Profiles of ^ 
 Second Figure. 
 
 IT, xL fecond "PifMir * L. t 
 1 RULE. 
 
 e L the 
 
 erm, which ,s always the Predicate 
 particularly comrar ,, y M ' 
 
 > RULE. 
 
 Kt il^ar mujf !,, 
 For the Conclufion being Neo 
 cm, fc!! be taken Univfrfi, 
 the Subrfl of , he 
 
 Of
 
 Logic : Or, 
 
 Part III- 
 
 Of the ten concluding Modes, the four Affir- 
 mative are excluded by the fecond Rule of this Fi- 
 gure, that one of the Premifes ought to be Ne| 
 tive. . 
 
 O.A.O. is excluded by the fecond Rule, that tl 
 major ought to be Universal. 
 
 E. A. O. is excluded for the fame Reafbn, as 
 the fir ft Figure, becaufe the leffer Term is the 
 }ec~l in the Minor. 
 
 So that only thefe four Moods remain. 
 
 rE-A.E. CE. i. O. 
 
 2.. General.-? a. Particular.*^ 
 
 CA.E.E. <-A. O.O. 
 
 Which four Modes are comprehended ur 
 thtfe Artificial Word?. 
 CE- No Lyar is to be believd. 
 SA- Every good Man is to be believd. . 
 R E. Therefore no good Man is a Lyar. 
 C A. All thofe that belong to Jefus Chrifl , Cr 
 
 the Fle/h. 
 M E S- All thofe that lead a Life of Pleafitre and 
 
 luptuoufnefs, do not Crucifie them/elves. 
 F R E S. Therefore none of thofc belong to Jefiu Cl 
 FES. No Vertue ts contrary to the Love of Tn 
 T I- There is a Lwe of Peace which if contrary 
 
 the Love of Truth. 
 N O. Therefore there is a Love of Peace, ffit. 
 
 not Vertue. 
 
 B A. All Vertue is accompanied with Discretion. 
 R O. There are feme forts of %eal that are not AC 
 companicd with Prudence. 
 
 CO
 
 Ulap.VI. 
 
 Feftmo. 
 
 Ccf are 
 
 
 icate is aYo denied. 
 M 2 
 
 This
 
 2-44 Logic : Or, Part HI. 
 
 This (hews us however that the Arguments in 
 Cefare are in (erne manner indirect, fmce that which 
 ought to be deniedjts not denied but indirectly. But 
 becaule that does not hinder the Intellect from com- 
 prehending eafily and clearly the force of the Ar- 
 gument, they may pafs for direct, if this word may 
 iignifie a clear and natural Argument. 
 
 This fliews us alfb that thefe two Modes of Ce- 
 fare and Fcftino nothing differ from the two Modes of 
 >the firft Figure, Celarent and Ferio, only that the 
 M^jor is converted. But tho we may fay that the 
 Negative Modes of the firft Figure are more di- 
 rt cl, it often happens nevertheless that thefe two 
 Modes of the fccond Figure that are anfwerable to 
 J em, are both more natural and more eafie to be un- 
 .derftood. For example, as to what we firft propos'd, 
 ,rho the direct order of Negation requir'd, that W 
 fliould have faid, no perfon that is to be bcliev'd is 
 .a.Lyar, which had. made an Argument in Celarent, 
 y*t it is moie clear to the Underitanding, that no 
 X.yar is to be believ*d. 
 
 lie Grounds Of the Arguments in Came ft res and 
 Barocco. 
 
 In thefe two Modes the middle Term is affirm'd 
 of the predicate of the Conclufion , and denied of 
 the Subjtct, which Jhews that they are directly 
 grounded upon this Principle. -Whatever K compre- 
 hended in the Extenfion of an Vniverfal Idea , agrees 
 with none of the Subjects of which th.it it denied- The 
 Predicate of A Negative Proportion being taken according
 
 Chap; VII. The Art of Thinkin 
 
 to its full Extent, as- has been frovci in tie fecond . 
 Part. 
 
 True ChriftJan is comprehended under the ex- 
 rent of Charitable, in regard every rrue Chri/tian 
 is Charitable. Charitable is denied of one that lias 
 no pity upon the Poor, and therefore a true Chri- 
 (fen is denied to have no pity upon the Poor which 
 produces this Argumenr. 
 
 Every True Chnjiian K Charitable : 
 
 Noferfon without pity toward the Poor Cbaritatie, 
 
 therefore no pet fan without Pity toward the Poor is a- 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 The Rules, Modes and the Grounds of th&. 
 
 Third Figure. 
 \ 
 
 IN the third Figure, the middle Term iV twice 
 the Subje& Whence it. follows. 
 
 i. RULE. 
 
 That tie Minor ought to be Affirmative. 
 
 Which we have prov'd by the firft Rule of the 
 rft Figure ; becaufe that both in the one and the o 
 gr the predicate of the conclufion is predicate m 
 le Major. 
 
 M 3 2. RULE
 
 Logic: Or, Part III. 
 
 x. RULE. 
 
 There is no concluding bat Particularly. 
 
 For the Minor being always Affirmatively , the 
 lefftT Term, which is the predicate is particular, 
 therefore cannot be Univerfal in the Conclufion, 
 where it is the Subject ; which would be to con* I 
 elude a General from a Particular. 
 
 Demonftration. 
 
 That there can be but fix modes in the third Figure. 
 Of the ten concluding Modes, A. E. E. and A. 
 O. O. a r e concluded by the firft Rule of this Fi- 
 gure, that the Minor cannot be Negative. 
 
 A.A.A. E.A.E. are excluded by the fecond Rule, 
 that the Conclufion cannot be general. 
 So that only fix Modes remain. 
 
 rA.A.1. C E.A.O. 
 
 3. Affirmative.-? A.LI. 3. Neg.3E.I.O. 
 
 6I.A.I. O. A. O. 
 
 Ail thefe Modes are reduc'd under fix artificial 
 words, tho in another order. 
 D A- The Div.filility of Infinite matter cannot le 
 
 comprehended. 
 
 R A- The Divifiblity of Infinite matier is moft cer- 
 tain. 
 P T I. Therefore there are fome mnft certain things 
 
 which are Incomprehenfille. 
 F E. No man can defert himftlf. 
 LAP. Every man is an Enemy to kimfc'f. 
 TON. Therefore fome Enemies cannot be .deferted. 
 
 DI.
 
 Chap. VII. The Art of Thinking. 147 
 
 D I. There are feme tricked Men that abound in wealth. 
 
 S A- All. ivickgd Men are miserable, 
 
 MIS. Therefore fame miserable Men abound in 
 
 Wealth. 
 
 D A- Ew7 Servant of God is A Kjng. 
 T I- There are Servants of God that are Poor. 
 S I. Tljercfore there are fome poor Men that are 
 
 B O- There are fame forts of Anger not to be bUm*d. 
 
 CAR.- All Anger is a PaJJion. 
 
 D Q. Therefore fome Pafflons are not to be blamd.. 
 
 F E- No absurdities are Elegant. 
 
 R I- There are absurdities in Figures. 
 
 SON. Therefore there are Figures that are not Elegant 
 
 The Grottnd of the third Figure- 
 
 The two Terms in the Conclufion being Attri- 
 Ibures in the Conclufion , and fix'd to the fame 
 lerm in the PremifeSj which fupply the place 
 of a middle Term, the Affirmative modes of this. 
 [Figure may be reduc'd under this principle. 
 
 The Ground of the Affirmative Modes. 
 two Terms may be affirmed of one and ths fame- 
 
 thing, the one Term may be affirmed of the other parti- 
 cularly. 
 
 For being united with the fame thing, becaufe 
 they bo;h agree with it ; it follows that they are 
 ibmetimes united together, and therefore the one 
 may affirm, of the other particularly. But tha t we 
 M 4 may
 
 '148 Logic: Or, Patt III. 
 
 may be aflured that two terms are affirm'd of one 
 and the fame thing, the middle Term muft be ta- 
 ken universally. For (hould-k be taken twice parti- 
 cu'arly, they would be thought to be two feveral 
 parts of one common Term, which would not be 
 :he lame thing. 
 
 The Ground of the Negative Mode?. 
 
 lichen of the two Terms the one may be denied, tbi otlxr 
 affirmed of the fame thing , th one may be denied of 
 the other particularly 
 
 For it is certain they are not always conjoint 
 when they are not united in this thing. Therefore 
 the one may fbmetimes be denied of the other, that 
 is, that the one may be denied of the other taken 
 particularly \ but for the fame realbn, the middle 
 Term muft be always taken univerfally, that it 
 may be one and the fame thing- 
 
 CHAP. VIIF. 
 
 Of the Modes of the fourth Figure. 
 
 TH E fourth Figure is that wherein the mud- 
 dle Term is the predicate of the Major, and 
 the Subject in the Minor ; but it is fb regular, that 
 it is hardly worth while to fet down the Rules, were 
 it not that nothing may be wanting to demonftrate 
 all the fimple Modes of Arguments. 
 
 i. RULE
 
 Gbap. VIII. The Art of Thinking. 49 
 
 1. RULE. 
 
 When the Major is dffirmativt, the Minor is always 
 Vniverfal. 
 
 For the middle Term is taken particularly in the 
 Major Affirmative. And therefore by the firft Ge- 
 neral Rule, it mud be taken Univerfally in the Mi- 
 nor, becaufe it is the Subject of it. 
 
 2. RULE. 
 
 When the Miner is djfirmative , tie Conclufion is 
 ways Particular. 
 
 For the kflerTerm is the Predicate in thcMinor. 
 nd by confequence it is taken particularly when ic 
 
 Affirmative ; whence it follows by the fecond 
 eneral Rule, that ic ought to be aKo particular in 
 e conclufion, which renders it particular, as being 
 e Subject of it. 
 
 3. RULE.' 
 
 In the Negative Modes the Major nnift be General. 
 
 For the conclufion being Negative, the greater 
 "erm is- there taken generally. And therefore by 
 e lecond General Rule, ic muft be taken generally 
 
 the Premifes. Now it is the Sabjccl of the Mu- 
 r, as well as in the Figure, and therefore by con- 
 quence as well here as in the lecoiid Figure, being 
 sncraSSy taken, it muft render the major Gene- 
 L 
 
 M Dimon-
 
 2 $ o Logic : Or, Part III. 
 
 Demonftration. 
 
 That there CM le but five Modes in the fourth Figure. 
 Of the ten concluding Modes, A. 1. 1. and A. O. 
 O. are excluded by the firft Rule. 
 A. A. A. and E. A. E. by the fecond.' 
 O. A. O. by the third. 
 So that only five remain. 
 
 5A.A.I. 
 tive. "S 
 H A. I. 
 
 Affirmative. "S 3 . Neg. 
 
 Thefe five Figures are reduced under thefe five 
 artificial words. 
 
 BAR- All miracles of Nature are ordinary. 
 B A- Want ii ordinary does not move w. 
 R I. Therefore fame things do not move us which art 
 
 Miracles of Nature. 
 
 C A- All the evils of tins Life are tranfitory. 
 LEN- All tranjjtory Ez>/7jr are not to be fear 4. 
 TES. Therefore no Evil of this Life is an Evil to be 
 
 feard. 
 
 DI- Some Fools Jpea^Trutb. 
 
 B A- Whoever fpeakj Truth, is worthy to be admired. 
 T I S. Therefore there are fomc' to be admired, tpho 
 
 ceafe not however to be Fools. 
 FES. No vertue is a natural quality. 
 P A- Every natural quality hat God for its Author. 
 M O. Therefore feme Natural qualities that have God 
 
 for their Author , are not Vertues, 
 FRE No mtferable Perfm is content. 
 
 SI-
 
 Chap. VIII. The Art of Thinking. i 5 i 
 
 S I There are contented Perfons that are Poor. 
 SOiM. Therefore there are fome foor Men that ore net 
 Mferable. 
 
 It is to be obferved that thefe fiVe modes are 
 generally denoted by thefe words, Baratipten, Ce* 
 /antes, Dabitis, Fapefmo, Trifefomorum ; which pro- 
 ceeded from this, that Ariftotle not ' having made 
 any feparated Figure of thefe Modes, they are 
 not look'd upon, but as indirect modes of the iirft 
 Figure, wherein the Conclusion was Inverted, the 
 :rue Subject being the Term predicated. For which 
 reafbn, the/ who follow'd that Opinion, have pur 
 ;or the firft Propofition , that wherein the Subject 
 of the Conclufion enters, and for the Minor, that 
 wherein the Predicate enters. 
 
 And therefore to this firft Figure they aflrgr-.d 
 nine Modes, four direcr, and five indired, which 
 they reduced under ihefe two Verfes. 
 
 Barbara Celarent, Dnrii l Ferio, Baruliptonj 
 Fslapton^ Difimis, Dati/i, BocarJo, Fcrijon, 
 
 But in regard the conclufion being always fup- 
 >ofed, as being that which is to be prov'd, cannot 
 >roperly be /aid to be ever inverted, we thought it 
 more advantageous to take always for the Major, 
 he Proportion where the Attribute of the Con- 
 rlufion enters, which oblig'd us that we might put 
 he Major firft, to invert the order of the Syllables 
 
 thofe Artificial svoVds in this manner. 
 
 Barhvi, C 'denies, Dibatis, Fefp.'ifrno. Frifefin,
 
 ' Logic : Or, Part III. 
 
 A Recapitulation of the feveral forts of Syllo- 
 gifm?. 
 
 From what has been faid, we may conclude that 
 there are Nineteen forts of Syllogifms, which may 
 be varioufly divided, 
 
 *w Generals 5^. Q Affirm. 7. 
 
 I. Into*v 2. Into< 
 
 ^Particulars 14. cNegat, n. 
 
 /A. j. 
 
 3, Into fuch as conclude ^ ' 4- 
 
 4. According to feveral Figures, in fubdividing 
 J em by the Modes, which has already been fuffici- 
 cntly done by the explication of every Figure. 
 
 5*. On the contrary according to the Modes in 
 fubdividing 'em by the Figures, which will produce 
 Nineteen fpecies of Syllogifms , becaufe there are 
 three Modes, of which every one conclude in one 
 Figure only ; fix, of which every one concludes in 
 two Figures j and one that concludes in all the four. 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 Of complex Syllogifms , and how they tnay 
 le reduced into common Sy/logifms , and 
 how judged ly the fame Rules. 
 
 WE muft confefs, that if there be any thing 
 wherein Logic does good , there is much 
 more wherein it does mifchief : and we muft ac- 
 
 know-
 
 Chap. IX. The Art of Thinking. 1 5 3 
 
 knowledge at the fame time, that there are none 
 to whom it does more Injury than thole who vain- 
 glorioufly affecl: to appear moft excellent in the Art. 
 iFor this Affe&ation it (elf being a mark of a Wic 
 I mean, and of little Solidity, it happens ufually 
 i that while they employ their whole time rather up- 
 on the bark of Rules, than in the Study of good 
 Sence, they are eafily induced to reject, as evil 
 [Arguments fuch as are very good, not having diP 
 cretioq enough to accommodate them to the Rules 
 themfelves, which only lerve to deceive them, be- 
 ing but imperfe&ly underftood. 
 
 To avoid this Vanity which favours fb much of 
 Pedantry fb unbecoming a generous Spirit, we 
 ought to examine the folidity of an Argument ra- 
 ther by the Light of Reafbn, than by Forms. And 
 one of the ways to facceed is, when we meet with 
 any difficulty, to form other Syl&gifms of the fame 
 nature upon different Matters, and when it clearly 
 appears to us that they conclude right, to confider 
 only true Sence. For then, if we find any thing 
 that does not feem conformable to Rules, we ought 
 rather to believe 'tis the Defect of our Underftand- 
 ing, and not that they are contrary to Rule. 
 
 But thofe are the Arguments of which it is moft 
 difficult to make a true Judgment; and in which it 
 is moft eafie to be deceived, which as we have alrea- 
 dy faid, are call'd Complex'^, not fimply, becaufe 
 they confift of complexed proportions; but becaufe 
 the Terms of the Conclufion being complex'd, 
 were not taken entirely in any of the premUes ro- 
 be
 
 Zqg/c : O, Part 
 
 be join'd' with the middle Term, but only with a 
 part of one of the Terms. As in this Example. 
 
 The Sun is a thing Infenfible. 
 
 The Perfians adore the Sun. 
 
 Thersfore the Perfians adored a thing Infenfible. 
 
 Where we find that the conclufion having for its 
 Predicate, adored A thing Infenfible, there is but one 
 part in the Major, that is a thing Infenfible, and 
 adord in the Minor. 
 
 As to thefe Syllogifms therefore we (hall do two 
 Things. 
 
 Firft, we (hall (hew how they may be reduced 
 to Incomplex'd Syllogifms, of which we have fpo- 
 ken hitherto, that we may be able to examin 'em. 
 by the lame Rules. 
 
 In the fecond place we (hall demonftrate, that 
 there may be general Rules given for the quick Ex- 
 amination of the Truth, or Falfhood of thefe Syl 
 logifms, without the help of Reduction. 
 
 And indeed it is a ftrange thing, that although. 
 Logic be fo highly valued above its deferts, even 
 to maintain that it is abfolutely neceflary for the 
 Acquifition of the Sciences, it is yet fo fuperficially 
 handled, that there has been norhing (aid of thofe 
 Things which are moft ufeful in it. For they gene- 
 rally content themfelves with giving Rules for iim* 
 pie Syllogifms, which are fo clear, that no body 
 ever thought to propofe them ferioufly in any Di 
 courfe; for whoever minded fuch a Syllogifm as 
 this ? Every Man is an Animal., Peter is a Man, 
 therefore Peter is an Animal, 
 
 But>
 
 Chap. IX. The Art of Thinking. 2,5-5- 
 
 But they never trouble themfelves to apply the 
 Rules of Syllogifms to Arguments, whofe Propo- 
 fitions are Complex'd, tho* it be oft-times very dif- 
 ficult, and that there are many Arguments of this 
 Nature, which appear to be falfe ; but yet are ve- 
 ry true. Befides that thefe forts of Arguments are 
 imuch more in ufe than thafe that are entirely fim- 
 
 le ; which is moreeafie to be (hewn by Examples 
 
 han Rules. 
 
 I. EXAMPLE. 
 
 For Example, we have affirm'd that, all Propo- 
 fitions compofed of Verbs A&ire, are in fome 
 manner complex'd, and of thefe Proportions oft- 
 times Arguments are fram'd, whofe form and force 
 of concluding, it is a hard matter to underftand ; 
 as in this. 
 
 The Divine Law commands w to honour 
 
 William the Third ts Kjng. 
 
 ThereJIre the Divine Lam commands lit to honour 
 William the Third. 
 
 Some Perfons wanting Judgment, have accufed 
 thefe forts of Syllogifms of being defeclive. Be- 
 caufe, fay they, they are compofed of pure Affir- 
 matives in the fecond Figure, which is an eflential 
 defect. But thefe Perfons plainly make it appear, 
 that they confulted more the Letter and outward 
 ! Rind of Rules, than the Light of Reafon by which 
 thefe Rules were found out ; for this Argument is 
 fo true and concluding, that if it were contrary to 
 
 the
 
 Logic-. Or, Part 
 
 the Rule, it would be an Argument that the Rule 
 it (elf was falfe , and not the Syllogifm. 
 
 I fay ihen that this Syllogifm is true j for in this* 
 proportion , the Law of God commands us to honour 
 Kings , the word Kjngt is taken generally for ail 
 Kings in particular, and by confequcnce William the 
 Third is of the Number of thofe Kings, whom the 
 Law of God commands us to Honour. 
 
 In the Second place I fay, that the word iQng 
 which is the middle Term, is not the Predicate in 
 this Propofition, T/x Law of God commands us to ho- 
 nour %tngs t though it be join'd to the predicate Com- 
 mands,^ lot that which is truly the Predicate, is 
 affirm'd and agrees with the Law of God. z. The 
 predicate is reftrain'd to the fubjecl. Now the 
 word-King is not reftrain'd in this proportion, T&e 
 Divine Law commands us to honour I(ings y becaufe it 
 is taken generally. 
 
 If therefore any one demand where the myftery 
 lies, That that word is the fubjecl; of another pro- 
 pofition envelopped in the former. Fo*\vhen I 
 fay, The Law of God commands us to Honour ^tngs t I 
 attribute Command to the Law, and Honour to Kings, 
 as if I fhould have faid, The. Law of God Commands 
 that Kings Jkouid be honour d. 
 
 Moreover in this Concluficn, the Law of God 
 commands us to honour William the Third. WiSiam 
 the Third is not the Predicate, though join'd to 
 the predicate j but on the contrary the fubjecl of 
 the latent proportion, as if I had faid, the Law 
 ot God commands that militm the Third fhould be 
 honour'd.
 
 Chap* IX. The Art of Thinking. 
 
 ' So then the propofitions being unfolded in this 
 aaanner. 
 
 The Divine LAW commands that flings Jhould be ho- 
 
 William the Third is a 
 
 Therefore the Divine Law commands that William 
 he Third be honoured. 
 
 It is clear, that the whole Argument coufifts in 
 heie proportions. 
 
 Kjngs ought to be honoured. 
 
 William the Third is a King. 
 
 Therefore William the Third ought to be honoured. 
 
 And that this propofition, the Divine Law com-, 
 nands, which appear'd to be the principle, is only a 
 propofition incident to the Argument, which is 
 oin'd to the Affirmation of which the Law of God 
 s a proof. 
 
 And it is alfb clear, that this Syllogifia belongs to 
 he firft Figure in Barbara, the fmgular Terms, Wil- 
 jam the Third, parting for Univerfal, as being taken 
 n their entire Extent. 
 
 a. Example. 
 
 For the fame Reafon this Argument which feems 
 o be of the fecond Figure, and conformable to the 
 ules of that Figure is invalid* 
 
 We ought to believe the Scripture. 
 
 Tradition is no Scripture. 
 
 Therefore taught not to believe Tradition. 
 ?or it ought to have been reduced to the firft Fl* 
 
 The
 
 Logic : Of, Part IIF; 
 
 Tlx Scripture ought to be believed. 
 Tradition is not the Scripture. 
 Therefore Tradition is not to be believed. 
 Now there is nothing concluded from a Negative 
 Minor in the firft Figure. 
 
 3. EXAMPLE. 
 
 There are other Arguments which feem to be 
 purely Affirmative in the fecond Figure, which ne-i 
 verthelefs are moft concluding j as thus, 
 
 Every good Shepherd is ready to lay down his Life for' 
 his Sheep. 
 
 But there are now adays few Shepherds who are ready 
 to lay down their Lives for their Sheep. 
 
 Therefere there are now adays few good Shepfordf' 
 
 Now that which makes this Argument good ir 
 this, That there is no Conclufion affirmatively, bat 
 in appearance ; for the Minor is an Exclufive Pro* 
 pofition which contains in its Sence this Negative. 
 Several Sheplxrds now adays are not ready to lay down 
 their *Lives for their Sheep. And the Concluf ion re 
 duces it felr* to this Negative, Several Shepherds not* 
 adays are not good Shepherds. 
 
 4. EXAMPLE. 
 
 - Here is an Argument, which being of the firft 
 Figure, feems to have a Minor Negative 3 and yet 
 its very true. 
 
 All they, from whom what tfey deligfy in cannot be 
 taken awny by force , are fafe from the ajfaults of their 
 Enemies. 
 
 But
 
 Chap IX. The Art of Thinking. 15-9 
 
 | But from thoje, who love God alone ^ tbofe things in 
 \vbicb the} delight cannot be taken away. 
 
 Therefore all they iff ho love God alone , are free from 
 be ajj'aults of their Enemies. 
 
 ' That which makes this Argument good is, that 
 ;he Minor is not Negative but in appearance, being 
 [eally Affirmative. 
 
 I For the Subject of the Major, which ought to 
 le the Predicate of the Minor, is not, They from 
 vhcm can be taken what they delight in ; but quite 
 jontrary, they from whom thole Things cannot be 
 bken. Now this is that which is affirm'd of thole 
 lhat love none but God alone, according to the 
 tence of the Minor. 
 
 I Now all they who love none but God alone, are of the 
 Dumber of thofe from whom that which they delight in 
 unnot be taken away. Which is vifibly an Affirma- 
 | ve Proportion. 
 I 
 
 ?. EXAMPLE. 
 
 I And this happens allb when the Maj^r is a Pro- 
 
 lofition Exclufive j as thus, 
 
 I The Friends of God are only happy. 
 
 1 Now t/jere ars feme Men wlw are not the Friends of 
 
 \od. 
 
 \ Therefore there are fame Hyb Men that are not happy. 
 
 J For the Particle only is the realbn that the tirft 
 
 Jropofiiion of^ this Syllogifm is equivalent to thele 
 
 ivo, The Friends of Gad are happy, but other Mortals t 
 
 \hoare not the Friends of God t are not happy. 
 
 Now
 
 ^6o Logic : O, Part HF 
 
 Now in regard the force of the Argument de- 
 pends upon the fecond Proportion, the Minor 
 which feem'd to be Negative becomes Affirmative, 
 becaufe the Subject of the Major, which ought to 
 be the predicate in the Minor, is not the friends 
 of God, but they who are nor the Friends of God, 
 fb that the Syllogifm ought to be reduced into* this' 
 Term. 
 
 AS thofe who ate not the- Friends of Gcd are not 
 happy. 
 
 But there are fame Rich "Men who arc net in the 
 xumber of tbofe tvho are the Friends of God. 
 
 Therefore there are fome I(ic!} Men tsfhoarcnothapppi 
 
 Now becaufe it is not neccffiry to exprefs the Mi- 
 nor in this manner, but that the form of a Nega- 
 tive Proportion may be allow'd if, therefore k i 
 the lame thing to fay Negatively, as affirmative- 
 ly,thata Man is of the number of thofe who are nog 
 the Friends of God. 
 
 6. Example, 
 
 There are many other Syllogifins of the fame 
 Nature, whofe Propofitions appear Negative, and 
 yet they are true, becaufe there is one which is not 
 Negative but in appearance, and which is really 
 affirmative, as we (hall make appear by this Exam- 
 ple. 
 
 That which has not Parts cannot peri/h ly the dtjfi~ 
 fation of Parts. 
 
 The Soul has no Parts,
 
 mp. IX. The Art of Thinking. 2,61 
 
 Therefore the -Soul cannot perifh by the dijfolution of 
 rfc. 
 
 There are fbme who bring thefe forts of Syllo- 
 rifms to fhew that that fame Logical Axiom f no- 
 tiing is to be concluded from pure Nagatives is 
 rue) is not true. But they did not confider that 
 s to the Sence, the Minor of this Syllogifm and 
 >thers of the fame nature is Affirmative, becaufe 
 be middle Term which is the Subject of the Ma- 
 or, is its predicate. Now the Subject oftheMa- 
 or is not, Whatever has Parts, t>ut whatever has no 
 jarts. And fb the Sence of the Minor is, Our Soul K 
 thing which has no parts, which is an Affirmative 
 'ropdfition of a Negative Predicate. 
 
 The fame Perfbns prove that thefe Syllogisms are 
 oncluding by thefe Examples. 
 
 John is not rational. 
 
 Therefore John is not a Man, 
 
 No Animal fees, 
 
 Therefore John docs not fee. 
 
 But they ought to confidcr that thole Examples are 
 mly Enthymenes ; and no Enthymcne concludes, but 
 y vertue of a Proportion fitbintellcctcd, and con- 
 equently ought to bereferved in the Mind, though 
 lot exprefled. Now in both thefe Examples, the 
 ^rcpoikion fubinrellected is neceffarily Affirmative, 
 IS thus, Every Man is reafonable, John is not r-ea- 
 "on'able, Therefore John is no M.in , and every Man 
 's an Animal, no Animal fess, therefore no Man fees. So 
 :hat ir cannot be faid the(e Syllogifms are purely 
 Negative ; And by Confequertce Entlymenet which 
 
 never
 
 a 62, Logic: Or, Part III. 
 
 never conclude but becauic they inclofe the whole 
 Syliogifras in the Mind of the Argumentator, can- 
 not be brought as an Example to {hew that fbme Syl~ 
 logifms purely Negative, truly conclude. 
 
 C H A P. X. 
 
 A General Principle ly the help of which ',,-, 
 ivithout any other Reduction to Figure sand 
 Modes the Truth or Faljhitod of all Syllo- \ 
 gifws may le known. 
 
 WE have feen how to judge of Complex'd 
 Syilogifms, whether conclufive or defe- 
 6Hve ; by reducing them to the forms of common 
 Syllogifms, and examining them by the common 
 Rules. But as it is not likely that our Underftandiog 
 fhould ftandin need of that Red u&ion, to judge of 
 the force of Syliogifrns, fo we bethought our felvc?, 
 that there muft be fbme more General Rules, upon 
 which the Common Rules depend, by which an 
 eafie judgment may be given of the Truth or Fal- 
 (hood of all manner of Syllogifki?. And this is chat 
 which came into our Thoughts. 
 S^ When a Proportion, the Truth of which is not 
 fo clear, is offered to be proved, there feems only 
 this to be done, to find out a Propofni on njore 
 known which confirms that, which for inac realbn 
 may be called the Containing Propofinon. 
 
 Bui
 
 >hap. X. The Art of Thinking. 163
 
 164 Logic-. Or, Part III. 
 
 Negative is properly enclofed in the Negation only, 
 it feems thatihe negative Proportion ought always 
 to be taken for the Container, and the Affirmativ( 
 for the Applicative; whether the Negative be the 
 Major, as in Celarent, ferio, Cefare, feftino ; or whe- 
 ther it be the Minor as in Cameftres and Baroco : a 
 if I were to prove by this Argument, that no cove- 
 tous Man is happy. 
 
 Every happy Man is content, 
 No cove torn Man is content, 
 Therefore no covetous Man is happy. 
 It is more natural to fay that the Minor, whiq) 
 Is Negative, contains the Conclufion which is alfi 
 Negative, and that the Major demonftrates it. Fo 
 the Minor, No covetous Man is contented, totally fe 
 perating content from covetous, feparates alfb hap 
 py ; fmce according to the Major, happy is totall] 
 excluded in the extent of Content. 
 
 It is no difficult thing to (hew, that all the Ru'4 
 which we have given ferve only to fhew that the Con 
 cluiion is contain'd in one of the firft Propoficionf 
 and that the other makes the thing clear. And tha 
 Arguments are not defective but when they fail l< 
 obferve that Rule, and always true when they di 
 obferve it. For all thefe Rules are reduced to tw 
 principal ones, which are the foundation of the reft 
 the one, That no Term can be mwe genera! in the Con 
 clufion than in the Premifcs. Now this vifibly d< 
 pends upon this general Principle, that the Prcmift 
 ought to contain the Conciuhon. Which coul 
 never be, if the fame Term being in the Premifi 
 
 ar
 
 . Chap. X. The Art of Thinking 
 
 land in the Conclufion, there fliould belefsoctentin 
 > the premies rhan in the Conclufion. For the >ef s 
 General never contains the more general, Come 
 never contains All mm. ' 
 
 J^o lA^T 31 Rule iSj That the MJdlc Term 
 
 ends upon this Principle, nJ Cw/^Lfe 
 
 be contain d m the Premfa. For fuppofe we were 
 
 o prove, T*,,/** one fnend of God ,s poor j I fay, 
 
 ihah never evidently find, that this Propofition 
 mains the Conclufion, but by another Propofition 
 
 vnere the middle Term which Is Hofy, may> ra-' 
 
 fn umverfaily. For it is visible, that to the end this 
 
 .ropoljrion, ^^^w^^ r ,may contain the Con- 
 
 Jiion, fom s Friend of God poor, it is requifite, and 
 
 offices ihar the Term foms Heij Perfa contains 
 
 Term fome friend of God. For as to the other 
 
 _erm borh Propofitions have it in common. But 
 
 e particular Term has no determined Exten- 
 
 >n j nor does ir certainly contain any thing befides 
 
 ^ , c er.clofes within its comprehenLn an 
 
 And by confequenc?, to the end the Term Tome 
 lyPcrfon, may conruin the Term, f nne FliC nd of 
 K, A u requifite that friend of G*d be contained 
 rnm tne cornprehenlion of the/^ at' Holy 
 Now whatever is contained in the comprebenfi- 
 
 * an W f 4, -may be uniCeriahV -affirmed ,;f it 
 hatever is contained iu che comprcn -,'] n of 
 
 Idea of a Tnanglc may b, affirmed of rf] Tri- 
 
 ;le9. VV hatever is. contained in the Idea of -M.m 
 
 N nia/
 
 2,66 Logic -i Or, Part ill. 
 
 may be affirm'd of all Men. And by confequencc, 
 to the end that friend of God may be enclos'd in 
 fne Idea of Holt, it is rcquifite that .every holy Per- 
 fin be a friend cf God Whence it follows that this 
 Conclufion, feme f fiend of .God poor, cannot be 
 contain'd in this Proportion, feme holy Man is yoor^ 
 when the middle Term Holy is taken particularly, 
 but by vertue of a Proportion where it may be ta- 
 ken univerfally, (ince it ought to (hew that //;></ 
 of G~d is contained in the comprehenfion of the Idea, 
 of Holy. Whteh it cannot (hew but by affirming 
 friend. of God, of Holy, taken universally thus, every 
 holy perfcn rs a friend of Go^.And by confequence none 
 of the Premifes would contain the Conclufion, if 
 the middle Term being taken particularly in one 
 of the Proportions , were not taken univcrlally in 
 the other. 
 
 CHAP. XT. 
 
 The Application of this General Principle to 
 federal Syllogisms which feem to be in- 
 tricate. 
 
 K Mowing then by what we have already faid 
 in the Second Part, the meaning of compre- 
 liendon and extent of Terms, by which it may be 
 judg'd whether one proportion does or does not 
 contain another, we may judg of the truth or in- 
 validity of all Syllogifois,without confidering whe- 
 ther
 
 
 1 quefhon whether thi 
 
 - 
 
 
 he other, /^ ^ fi^ Duels ***?*** and !n 
 Now that Propofirions wherein there I, 
 
 that
 
 i68 Logic -. Or, Part III- 
 
 that fighting Duds is contain'd under the Term of 
 Ccwnnttjng wicked A^lions^ it evidences al(6 that the 
 Jiril Proposition contains the Conclufion. 
 
 -L. EXAMPLE. 
 
 'Iqueftion the Truth of thiVSyllogifrn. 
 Ths Gnfpcl promifes Salvation to Chriftians^ 
 There are wicked Pcrfons who are GhnftianS) 
 Therefore the Go/pel prcmifes Salvation to wicked 
 Pcrfont. 
 
 To juclg of this I am only to confider, that the 
 Major cannot contain the Conclufion, if the word 
 Chriftians be not generally taken for all Chriftians, 
 and not for fome Chriftians only. For if the Gofpel 
 promifes Salvation only to fome Chriftianp, it does 
 i.iot follow thar it promifes Salvation rothe Wicked, 
 \yiio proicfs Chriiriani'y ; becaafe iuch Chriftia 
 n.uy not be of the number ot thofe Chrillians r 
 whoin the Gofpel promifes Salv r ation. Therefore 
 liiis Argument concludes v/ell ; but the Major Is 
 fajfe, if the word Cbritliani be taken for all Chrifli- 
 a . And it concludes ill, if it betaken only for 
 "hnjltans ; for then the Gift Propoficion will 
 j, .: contain the Corclufion. 
 
 , to know whether it ought to be t^ken Uni- 
 
 /, that muft be examined by another Rule 
 
 n'h;.h we 'uvc ^iven in the fecond parr, at to ex- 
 
 t / jl'-e Aili whatever is affirmed of *em i s tal{tn Vni- 
 
 /,-. it is exfrejjed indefinite/: But now 
 
 iho riijs Tfrw , they that commit ti'ick'd afls , in 
 
 il:c hill example, and Cbrijlians in the fecond be 
 
 parts
 
 Chap. XI. The Art of thinking. 2.69 
 
 parts of the Predicates, yet they fupply the place 
 of Subjeih, of which the other parrs of the fame 
 Predicates are affirmed ; for they are the pins of 
 which the affirmation is made, that they are not to 
 b& praifed, that they are piomifed Salvation,' And by 
 confluence not being reftrain'd, they are to be ta- 
 ken Univerfaily. And fo both Syllogifms are true in 
 Form.But the Major of the fecond example is falfe, 
 if only they are underftood by the word Chriftians 
 who live conformably to the Gofpel ; becaule no 
 wicked perfons live conformably to the Gofpel. 
 
 3." E X A M P L E. 
 
 By the fame principle ic is eafie to fee that this 
 Syllogifm is invalid. 
 
 The Law of God commtnds us to obey Secular Ma- 
 gift r ales y 
 
 Therefore the Law of God d.es not command in to a- 
 ley Bi/hopf. 
 
 For here neither of the Premises contains the 
 Conclufion. For it does not follow than when the 
 Li.'/ of God commands one thing, it does not 
 command another, And thus the Minor (hews that 
 Bithops are not comprehended undtr the Term 
 Secular Map/lrates, and that the command to ho- 
 nour Magiftrates does not comprehend Bi/hops. Nor 
 does the Major lay that G^d has made no other 
 command than that, as it ouf;::t to have done, that 
 by the Minor it might have been apparent, that it 
 comprehended the Conc'ufion. For which region 
 the. following Syllogifm is true. 
 
 N 3 4. EX-
 
 2,70 Logic : Or, Part III. 
 
 4. EXAMPLE. 
 
 Chriftianity Joes not oblige Servants to obey their 
 $A<;(iers but in things which are agreeable to the Law of 
 God: but procuring of Harlots is contrary to the LAW of 
 God. 
 
 Therefore Chrijlianity does not oblige Servants to obey 
 their Mafters in procuring of Harlots. 
 
 For the Major contains the Conclufion, fmce by 
 the Minor, procuring of Harlots is included in the 
 number of thole things which are contrary to the 
 Law of God, and that the iMajor being exclufive, 
 is the fame as if it had been faid, The Law of God 
 dncs not oblige Servants in things which are contrary to 
 the Law of God. 
 
 5. EXAMPLE. 
 
 This Sophifm alfo may bt fctekd by the help of 
 this General Princi^. 
 
 He that fays you areSh Animal fays true- 
 He that fays you are a Goofejays you are an Animal, 
 Therefore he that fays you we a Goo/e, fays true. 
 For it is fufficient to fay, that neither of the 
 two firfl Propofirions contains the Conclufion. For 
 if the Major contain'd it , not being different 
 from the Conclufion, but only in the word Ani- 
 mal in the Major, and Goofs in the Conclufion \ 
 of neccflity, Animal fhould have comprehended 
 Goofe : But Animal is not taken particularly in 
 the major, bccaufe it is the Predicate of the Inci- 
 dent
 
 Chap. XI. The Art of Thinking 171 
 
 dent affirmative Propohtioa^ycw are an Animal ; and 
 confcquently it cannot contain Goole but in its Com- 
 prehenfion. For proof of which, Animal frnnld bs 
 taken universally in the Minor by affirming Goofe 
 of every Animal, which is neither done nor can be 
 done, feeing that Animal is taken particularly in 
 the Minor, being as well there as in the Major, the 
 predicate of the Incident Proportion you are an 
 Animal. 
 
 In the fame manner may be difcover'd that an- 
 cient Sophilrn quoted by Sr. Anjltn. 
 
 You are not what I am. 
 
 1 am a Man. 
 
 Therefore you are no "Man. 
 
 This Argument is Invalid by the Rules of Fi- 
 gures, as being of the firft ; and for that the fiift 
 Propofition which is here the Minor is a Negative. 
 But it is fufficient to fay that the Conclufion is not 
 contained in the firft Propofirion, nor does the kcond 
 fj am a Man] make it out to be fb. For the Conclu- 
 iion being Negative, the Term man is here taken 
 Univerfally, and fo cannot be contained in the Term 
 [what I am\ becaufe he that (b argues is not all Men, 
 but feme one Man. Which appears from hence for 
 that in the Applicative proportion, he only fays f 
 am a Man ; where the Term of Man is reftrain'd 
 to one particular Signification, becauie it is the Pre- 
 dicate o an Affirmative propofition. Now the Ge- 
 neral is never contained in the particular. 
 
 N 4. - CHAP.
 
 i 7 2. Logic : Or, Part III. 
 
 CHAP. XII. 
 
 Of Conjunctive Syllogifms. 
 
 OYllogifms Conjunctive are nor all thofe Syllo- 
 t^ gifms, whofe propofitions are Conjunctive or 
 Composed, but thofe whofe Major is fo composed 
 that it includes the whole Conclufion. They may 
 be reduced to three forts Conditional^ Disjunctive and 
 Copulative. 
 
 Of Syllogism Conditional. 
 
 Syllogifms Condirional are thole, where the Ma-. 
 jor is a Conditional Proportion that contains the- 
 whole Conclufion. 
 
 If there be a God^ be if to be belm d. 
 
 "But there is a God. 
 
 Therefore he ii to be Belovd. 
 
 The Maj->r coiiliib of two parts,the fir ft is call'cf- 
 the Antecedent, If there be a God; the.fecond is- 
 called the Cor.clufion ; he ought to be Bch-vd. 
 
 This Syliogifm may be of two forts, becaufe 
 that from the fame Major may be form'd two 
 Coi'clulion?. 
 
 The firft i?,when having affirm'd the conkquent 
 of the Major, the Antecedent is, affirm'd in the Mi- 
 nor, according to this Rule, the Antecedent bein% 
 granted^ the Consequent is granted. 
 
 If Matter cannot move ofitfelf^ it muft have its firft 
 motion from Col. 
 
 But
 
 Chap. XII. The Art of Thinking. 2,73 
 
 But matter- cannot move of it felf. 
 therefore it muft have its fir ft Motion from God. 
 The fecond is, when the Consequent is taken a- 
 way, to take away the Antecedent according to the 
 Rule, take away the confequenr, and the Antece- 
 dent is taken away. 
 
 If any we of the EleR ferifly, God is. decried. 
 
 "But God is not deceivd. 
 
 Therefore not any one of the Eleft psrifh. 
 
 This was the Argument of Sr. Attftin ; If any 
 one of thefe peri/h, God is deceivd j but none peri/b, be- 
 -aiife God is not deceivd. 
 
 Thefe conditional Arguments are falfe two rnin- 
 ier of ways. Firft when the Major includes a pro- 
 x>fition quite from the purpofe, and whofe confe- 
 }uence is contrary to all Rules ; as when I con- 
 :lude a general from a particular, as in faying, if 
 ye deceive our felves in any thing, we deceive our 
 r elvcs in- all .things. 
 
 But this falfhood of thefe Syllogifms in the Mi- 
 or relates rather to the Matter than the Form. So 
 bat they are never lockM upon as vicious in Form, 
 
 when there is a falfe conclusion xinuvn from a 
 najcr true or falfe, conformant or contrary co Rra- 
 bn, which is done two ways. 
 
 Fit it when the Antecedent is infen'd from the 
 onfequent in this manner. 
 
 If the Cbinefes are Mahumetans they are Infidels. 
 
 IB ttt the} are Infidels. 
 
 Therefore they art Mabunjctans. 
 
 The fecond fort of falfe conditional Arguments, 
 
 """ N 33
 
 a 74 Lo & c ' Or > Part III, 
 
 is when from the denial of the Antecedent, the de- 
 nial of the Confequent is inferred j as in the exam- 
 ple. 
 
 If the Chinefes are Mthumetanj t they are Infidelt. 
 But they are not Mahumetans, 
 Therefore the} are not Infidels. 
 Nevenhelefs there are fbme of thefe conditional 
 Arguments which fecm to have this lad defect, 
 which are neverthelefs very true,becaufe there is an 
 exclufion fubintelle&ed in the major, tho not ex 
 prefled, as for example. Cicero having made a Law 
 ugainft thofe that bought voices, and Murena being 
 accufed for breach of that Law, CVcertTfpeaks for 
 him, and thus argues in his own Juftification, being 
 reproach d by Cato for pleading againft his own Law. 
 Indeed, if I defended the Bribery given, and defended the 
 Fatl <x Of ell dene, l/hould do ttfickgdlj, tho another h*d 
 wade the Law j \>ut when I defend nothing committed 
 again/I the Lav, Wbyjheitld the making of a Law bin- 
 to my defence. 
 
 This Argument is like that of a great Blafphe- 
 mer, who 10 excufe himfelf thus argued : If 1 de- 
 vied there was a God I/kould he a -very wicked Perfon ; 
 kitt tho I Biafphetne, I do net deny there ii a God> then- 
 fore I am no teickgd Perfon. This Argument is Invalid, 
 hecaufe there are other Sins befides Atheifm that 
 render a man Wicked. But that which makes C- 
 cero* Argument good ( tho propofed by fymus as 
 an Argument of a falfe Syllogifmj is this, that it en- 
 clofes an exclufive panicle in the Sence, and which 
 might be more diftin&ly exprefc'd under thefe
 
 Chap. Xlf. The Art of Thinking. 
 
 It would be only then that they could reproach me for 
 having afted againft my own Law, /hould I confefs that 
 Murena. had purchatd voices , and yet for all that I 
 fhould juftifie the A8. 
 
 Sut I ajjert that he wai not guilty of purchafing 
 voices. 
 
 And therefore I do nothing againft my own Law. r> 
 
 The fame thing may be faid of that Argument o 
 Venus /peaking to Jupiter in Virgil. . 
 
 Si fine pace tua, ttque invito nttmine Trees 
 
 Italiam petiere^ luant feccata, neque il'os 
 
 Juvt.ii auxilio : Sin tot Rt/ponfa fe qttuti 
 
 j|W fupen manefque dtbant) cur nunc tua qujfquam: . 
 
 fletlcre jujfa poteft, aut cur nova conderc fata ? - 
 
 Mich Argument may be exprefi'd in thefe Terms. 
 If the Trojans adventured into Italy againft the good 
 
 ill of the Gods, they deferved funi foment. 
 3nt they did not adventure againft the good will of 
 Gods, 
 Therefore they do not dejerve fntnifhment. 
 
 [ere therefore is fbmethmg to be fupplied, other* 
 it would be like to this- that concludes no- 
 
 ung. 
 // Judas had entered into the Apjftlejhip without 
 
 Wg called he ought to have been rejected of God* 
 Sut he did not enter into it uncalled, 
 Therefore he ought not to be rejected of God. 
 
 ut that which makes the Argument of Vcmu K* 
 
 c true is this, that the major is to be considered a?
 
 Low : Or, Part Ilk 
 
 e xc!uiVv r e in the S.nce ; as if it had been thus ex- 
 prefs'd. > 
 
 Then only hail the Trojans to have been funift 1 d and 
 have been thought unworthy of the gods, if they had ad~- 
 ventured into Iraly againft their vtilU^ - - 
 
 Sat they did not adventure againft their wills, 
 
 Therefore, &c. 
 Or it may be faid, which is- the fame thing that 
 thofe affirmative words' fine pace tua, &c: include 
 this Negative io Sence. 
 
 If the Trojans did, not adventure into Italy tut by 
 order cf the Gods, it is not juft that the Gods foould a- 
 
 Sttt they did not adventure \m, but by order of the 
 di. 
 
 Therefore, &c. 
 
 Of Sjttogifins D'ujimftive. 
 
 Disjuuflive Syllogiihil arie thofc, whofe firft pro- 
 podribn is di?jan ( 5iive ; rV.at i?, whofe parts are uv 
 liitcd by the word Or, like thai of Cicero. 
 
 'They who Jelled Cefar are Parricides, or defenders cf, 
 the publicly Liberty, . 
 
 j&tt they are not Parricides, 
 
 Therefore they are defenders of the publicly Liberty. 
 Oi : thefe Syliogitms there are two Sorts : the iiift 
 U'hcnons part is taken away to prefeive the other/ 
 as in the foregoing, Syllogifrn or this that fol- 
 lows, 
 
 Ail wrtckfd feople ought to l>e funi/hed either in this 
 or the other. ; 
 
 Btit
 
 Ghap. XII. The Art of Uinking. ^ 77 
 
 Buf there are fame wicked feople that arenotftmifh* 
 ed in this world, 
 
 Therefore they /hall be in the other, 
 
 Sometimes there are three members in Syllogi/ms 
 of this Sort ; and then two members are to be taken 
 away to.preferve one. As in that Argument of Sr. 
 Auftin in his Book of Lying. 
 
 Either we muft believe good men, or we muft believa. 
 tbofe who we believe ought fometimes to lie. Or we muft 
 ut believe that good men do fometimes lye. 
 
 The firft is pernicious, the fecond fooltfh : it remains 
 'hen that good men never lie.. 
 
 The fecond Sort,though lefs natural,is when we 
 idmic one of the parts to take away the other. 
 
 St. Bernard teftifying that God had confirmed by his 
 Miracles the preaching of his Crofs, wot either a Hoi? 
 fan, or an Imfoftor. 
 
 But he wot a Holy Man, 
 
 Therefore he trjs no Impoftor. 
 
 1'he disjunctive Syllogifms are not falfe, but only 
 n the falfiry of the Major, wherein the diftindion 
 's not exaft , there being a middle Term between 
 wo oppofite members : As if I fliould fay, 
 I We are to obey Princes in what they command contrary 
 10 the Law of God or revolt from ''em,. 
 \ But we are not to obey" em, in mhat K contrary to- the 
 \.aw of God, 
 
 Therefore we mujhrevolt from 'em. 
 Or, 
 
 We, muft not revolt from 'em, 
 
 Therefore we muft obey 7 em jn what the? command 
 mtrary to t/js Lw of God. Boih.
 
 278 Log"' Or, Partly 
 
 Both thefe Syllogifms are falfe, becaufe in the dif- 
 junftions there is a medium that intervenes which 
 has been observed by the Chriftians, which is to 
 fuffer thole things patiently , rather than do any 
 thing contrary to rhe Law of God, and yet not re- 
 volt from their Princes. 
 
 Thefe faJfe disjunctions are in part the com-, 
 mon Springs whence arife all the falfe Argu- 
 ments among men. 
 
 Of Copulative Syllogifnu. 
 
 Thefe Syllogifms are but of one Sort, when in 
 the propofinon Copulative and Negative, the one 
 part is confirmed, the other rejected. 
 
 No man can be both together a, Servant of God t and 
 n Idoli^er of bis money, 
 
 But a covetous man is an Idoliqtr of bis money ^ 
 
 Therefore he is not a Servant of God. 
 Tlais fort of Syllogifm does not neceflarily con- 
 clude, when one part is taken away to fix the 
 other, as may be feen by this Argument, drawn 
 from the fame propofuion. 
 
 No man can be at the fame time a Servant of God t 
 and an Idok^cr of his money , 
 
 But the prodigal are no Idoli^ers of their 
 they are Servants of God. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 3hap. MIL The Art of Thinking. 
 
 CHAP. XIII. 
 
 Of SyUogifms whofe Conclufions are Con* 
 ditionaL 
 
 WE have feen that a perfect Syllogifrn can- 
 not have left than three Propofitions. But 
 :his is only true when they conclude absolutely, not 
 aypothetically. For fb the conditional propofition 
 may include one of the premifes befides the conclu- 
 fion, and fometimes both. 
 
 For example, if I would prove that the Moon 
 is a rough uneven Body, and not polifht like a 
 roirrour, as Ariftotle thought it to be, I cannot 
 ibfolutely conclude but by the help of three Pro- 
 pofitions. 
 
 Every Body that refleRs its light from all forts it 
 rugged and uneven. 
 
 The Moon refteRs her light from all parts, 
 Therefore the Moon is a rugged and uneven Body. 
 But to conclude conditionally , I need no more 
 than two Propofitions in this manner. 
 
 Every Ihdy that reflects its light from all .farts is 
 rugged and uneven, 
 
 Therefore if the Moon refltcl her light fawn *tl f*rts t 
 Jhe is a rugged and uneven Body. 
 And I may include this Argument in one fingla 
 Proportion thus.
 
 Logic : Or, Part Iff. 
 
 If every Body tint refletts her light from all farts be 
 rugged and uneven, and that the Moon reflets her light 
 from all fans, m mufl acknovledg thatjhe is no fofc 
 /he d Body, but rugged and uneven. 
 
 Or I may annex one Proportion to another by 
 the caufal particles, becaufe, or face that, as thus, I 
 If every true friend ought to be ready to lay down hit 
 life for his friend, 
 
 There are very few true friends, becaufe, 
 Very few friends arrive at that degree of friend/hip. 
 This fort of arguing is very common and very 
 neat;and this is that which fhews us how vainly they 
 imagirt that there are no other argument?, but 
 where they fee three propofitions feparated an* 
 rang'd as in the Schools : For certain it is, that this* 
 Propofition alone contains this Syllogifm entire, i 
 Every true friend ought to lay down his life for bit 
 friend, 
 
 But there are few feofle who are ready to lay dotvn' 
 their lives for- their friends, 
 
 Therefore there are few trut friends. 
 Ail the difference that there is^between abfoluteSyl-J 
 logifms, and-thofe where the Conclufion is included 
 with one of the premifes, in a conditional Prbpofi- 
 tion, is this, that the former cannot be entirely gran- 
 ted, unlefs that prefently follow that was to be pro- 
 ved ; whereas Syllogifms of the fecond fort may be 
 entirely granted, and yet thedifputantfli^il gain no 
 advantage all the while. For he is ftill to prove, that 
 the condition be true, upon which depends the coa : 
 Sequence allow'd him.
 
 :hap. XIII. 77*? Art of Tanking. * 8 1
 
 Logic: Or, Parr Tlfj 
 
 f. Therefore if the fenft of pain be in the hand which 
 
 is burnt 
 There is fome thought in the hand which is burnt 
 
 (Di&aw 
 
 Negatively. 
 
 6. Therefore if no thought be in the bod^ 
 No fence of pain is in the body. Celarent 
 
 7. Therefore if no be. aft thinly , 
 No beaft feels pain. Cameft res 
 
 8. Therefore^ if fome part of man does not thinly 
 Some part of man does not feel pain. Baroco I 
 
 9. Therefore if no motion of matter be a thought 
 No fence of pain is motion of matter. Cefare 
 
 J O. Therefore if nofentiment of pain be delightful. 
 
 Some thoughts are not delightful. Felapton 
 1 1. Therefore if fome fentiment of pain be not Wu 
 
 Some thoughts are not voluntary. Bocardo f/*ry, 
 Some other condirional conclufions might be 
 drawn from this general Mixim. AUSenfibility of pain 
 is a thought; but not being very natural, we omif 
 cm. Oi: thofe Propofitions which we have produ- 
 ced i there are fome that contain the Minor bcfides 
 the Conclujion, ^. the i.^.j. an d g. an d othera 
 the Major, befides the conclufion, vis. the 3,4, <> 
 6,9, 10, and jx. 
 
 We may alfo obferve Several conditional Con- 
 clufions thai may be drawn from a general Nega- 
 tive Propofition. For Example, 
 
 No matter thinly. 
 
 J . Therefore if every Soul of a Beaft be matter, 
 NoSoul of a Bea/i things. Celarent. 
 
 l.- There-
 
 Ohap. XIII. The Art of Thinking. 2.8 3 
 
 [. Therefore if feme fart of a Man be matter, fome fart 
 \ of a Man does not think. Ferfo. 
 [. Therefore if our Soul thinly : 
 
 Our Soul is not Matter. Cefare. 
 !. Therefore if fome fart of a Man things : 
 \ Some fart of a Man is not matter. Feftino. 
 
 Therefore if aU that isfenfible ef Pain thinks : 
 
 No matter isfenfible of Pain. Cameftres. 
 
 Therefore if all matter be a Subflance : 
 
 Some Subflance does not think. Felapton. 
 Therefore if fome matter be the caufe of 'feveral cf~ 
 
 fefts that affc,ar miraculous, whatever is the caufe of 
 
 miraculous ejfefts Joes not think. Ferifbn. 
 
 Of thefe Conditionals there are but five which in- 
 ude the Major befides the Conclufion ; all the reft 
 elude the Minor. 
 
 The chiefeft ufe of thefe Arguments, is to ob- 
 ge him with whom we difpute to acknowledg 
 e truth of a Confequence, which he may granc 
 ithout giving his confent farther , becaufe ic is 
 lily propounded conditionally, and feparated from 
 ke material Truth, as I may fb fay, of what it con- 
 .ins. And by this means the Opponent is difpofed 
 '< more eafily to admit the ablbliue conclufion 
 rawn from thence, either granting the Antecedent: 
 I gain the Confequent, or barring the Confequenc 
 I' take away the Antecedent. 
 
 Thus if any one grant me, that no matter 
 .inks , I will conclude , that if the Soul of a 
 
 1'aft thinks, it muft be diftinft from matter. 
 And
 
 And as hi cannot deny me this conditional cor 
 on I may draw from thence cither the oneo 
 the other of thefe two abftlute confluences 
 
 But the Soul of a Be*Jl thinly* 
 
 Therefore it * dijlmtt from matter. 
 Ur contrary, 
 
 But the Saul of a Be*/} it not JiJKnflfrom matter* 
 
 Therefore it doe* not thinly 
 
 From what has been faid it appears that thai) 
 ought to be four Propofirions, to the end, thefi 
 ifu of Arguments may be perfeft, and pro* 
 Something abfolutely. And yet they are not 'to b 
 laced in the number of Syllogifms,which are calfi 
 .coaapob'd, becaufe thefe four Propofitions contair 
 nothing more in Sence , than the three Propofui 
 on? ot a commorv Syllogifm. 
 
 Ni matter thinly , 
 
 Every Soul of a Beaft is matter, 
 
 Therefore no Soul of a Bead thinly. 
 
 CHAP. XIV. 
 
 Of Enthymcme , and Enthymematick 
 Sentences. 
 
 WE have already faid, that an Emhymeme is 
 a Syllogifm perfect in the mind, but imper- 
 fect in the expre&on ; . becaufe fome one of the 
 Propofitions is fuppreft, as being too clear and com- 
 mon ; and eafily fupplied by the underftanding of 
 thflfe with whom we difcourfe. This
 
 tap. XIV. Tbe Art of Thinking. 185" 
 
 This manner of argument is common in di 
 jr(e and writing, that ir is a rare thing to find all 
 : Proportions expreft, as being fo evident that 
 iy may be eafily fcppos'd ; befides that it is the 
 de of human wit to chufe rather to have fbme- 
 Ing left that may be fupplied , rather than to be 
 ght to want Inftru&ion in every thing. 
 u that this fappofition flatters the vanity of thofe 
 i whom we difcour(e,while ue remit fomething 
 leir own Under (landing, and by abridging our 
 ourfes, render it more fman and emc^ctbu*. 
 example, if from this verfe of Media, in Cvi4 9 
 ch contains a moft elegant Enthimeme. 
 'ervare potui, perdtre an pojjim rcgas 2 
 Any one fhould make an argument in Form, 
 r this manner. 
 
 -Ie that can preferve tkee t can deftroy thet, 
 ut I can prefers thce, 
 'here/ore lean deftroy tbee. 
 -Ie had certainly dKpoii'd it of all its Elegancy, 
 the reafbn of it is, becaufe as it is one of the 
 ncipal Beauties of dHcourfe to be full of Sence, 
 to give an occafion to the Under (landing to 
 m a Thought more extrnfive than the Exprefli- 
 Ib it is on the contrary, one of the greatcft dc- 
 encies to be void of Senfe, and to fpend multi- 
 :ity of word* upon a few thoughts *, which is al- 
 >ft inevitable in Philofophical Syllogifms. For 
 Morions of the Mind being more fwift than thcfe 
 the Tongue, and one of the Propofitions fuffi- 
 g for the undcrftanding of two \ the expreflion 
 
 cf
 
 of the fecond becomes unprofitable, not contain- 
 ing any new Sence. And this is that which 
 renders thefe forts of arguments (b rare in th( 
 converfacion of men j becaufe without making' 
 any Reflexions, we preiently quit that which L 
 tedious and trcublefome , and betake our felves 
 to what is precisely neceflary to be underftood. f 
 Enthymemes then are the ufiial way of rea- 
 foning moft common among Men , fupprefling thd 
 propofition which they judg may be eafily fup- 
 plied ; and this propofition is Ibmetimes the ma- 
 jor, lometimes the minor , and (bmetimes the 
 conclufion: altho then it be not properly called 
 an Enthymeme,when the whole force of the argu- 
 ment is included in the two firft Proportions. 
 
 It alfo happens (bmetimes, that the two Pro- 
 portions of the Enthymeme are included in OIK 
 propofition, which for that realbn Ariftotle cal 
 an EnthymematicI^ Sentence, of which he gives thi 
 Example. 
 
 
 
 Immortal anger bear nothing Mortal : which whd 
 Argument would run thus : He that is Mortal cugl 
 not to bear Immortal hatred j but you art Mortal, Then 
 fore bear not Immortal hatred. 
 
 CHAI
 
 CHAP. XV. 
 
 f Sytlogifms compos d of more than three 
 Propofitions. 
 
 rX 7" E have already intimated, that Arguments 
 f \ compos'cf of more than three Proportions 
 e called Sorites. 
 
 They may be diftinguifhed into three forts : i. 
 jfo Gradations, of which we need fay no more 
 mn what has been already (aid , in the firft 
 Chapter, third Part. 
 
 1. Into Dilemmas of which we (hall treat in the 
 blowing Chapter. 
 
 3. Into thole which the Greeks call Et;:hfrmas t 
 'hich comprehend the Proofs either of one of the 
 RTO firft Proportions, or of both together. And 
 f thefe we (hall difcourfe in this Chapter. 
 
 Now in regard we are bound to fupprefs in ciP 
 ourle certain Proptfitions, which are lo clear that 
 othing can be clearer ; it is alfo fbmetimes requifite 
 D advance uncertain and doubtful ones, and to join 
 roofs to 'em at the feme time, to prevent the Im- 
 /atience of thofe we difpute with, who are offend- 
 d fbmetimes when we go about to perfwade 'em 
 >y reafbns which to them appear falfe and doubtful j 
 or though the quarrel be eafily afterwards neon- 
 iled, yet is it dangerous to provoke the Minds of 
 ;he Auditors, though it be for never fo little a while. 
 And 16 it is much better that proofs (hould immedi- 
 ately
 
 *88 Logic: Or, p artl[] 
 
 ately follow doubtful queftions,than that they fhouj 
 be feparatcd from them. Which ^ration prod l 
 cesalfo another Inconvenience, rhat we are boun 
 ro repeat the propofition which we endeavour t 
 prove And therefore wherea* it h the method c 
 the Schools to propound the Argument entire, an 
 afterwards to prove the Proposition which receive 
 the Difficulty, th.it which is ufual in ordinary <$\ 
 courfe, is to join to doubtful Proportions th 
 Proofs that confirm 'em which makes a fort o 
 Argument composed of feveral Propofitions Fo 
 to the Major are the proofs of the Major joined, t< 
 the Minor thofe of the Minor, and then come 
 the Conclufion. 
 
 Thus the whole Oration for Uilo may be rd 
 duced into a compound Argument, of which the 
 Major is, that it is lawful to kill him that lies in 
 wait for my Life. The proofs of this Ann* 
 ment are drawn from the Law of Nature da 
 Law of Nations and Examples. The Minor is 
 that .Cfotoff laid wait for Mtio's Life, And tb 
 proofs of the Minor are .(he .Equipage of ct> 
 dw his Train, & e . The Concluiion is, that it 
 was therefore lawful for M/o to Idil him. 
 
 The proof of Original Sin is deduced from 
 the rrnferies which Infants endure, .according to 
 Dialcdbcal. method in this n^nrrr. 
 
 Children could not be bom mil >,!. . , but by 
 the pimifamem of fome Sin vn ; n \ f rora 
 
 their Inrancy. But they are'mifcuble, therei c it 
 is by reafon of ordinal Sin. Now the AJajor and 
 
 the
 
 ^Chap. XV. The Art of Thinking 2 g 9
 
 2,90 Logic : Or, Part IIL 
 
 " our fir ft Parent, to (ay that we were only born to 
 ** fuffer the puniftiment of fbme crimes which they 
 " bad committed in another Lite,and in like manner-. 
 " that our Souls were conjoined to corruptible Bodies, , 
 " according to that fort of punifhment, which the 
 " Tyrants of lufcany cauled thofe to fbffer whoai 
 " they ty'd alive to dead Bodies j but that opinib* 
 " that the Soul is join'd to the Body for the puniili- 
 *'* ment of crimes preceding in another Life is reje- 
 " cled by the Apoftle. What remains then but that 
 "either the Injuftice or the Inability of God,or the^ 
 " punifhment of original Sin, muft bs the caufi 
 " of (b many diffnal miferies ? But becaule God is] 
 "neither Juft nor Impotent, there only remains; 
 "that which you are unwilling to acknowledge^ 
 " but you muft acknowledg it whether you will of 
 " no i that this fame heavy yoke which the Sons oi@ 
 c< Adam are obliged to bear,from the time that theyji 
 " are delivered out of their Mothers Womb, till th 
 " day that they enter into the womb of their conwj 
 " mon Mother, the Earth, could never have beo>>: 
 " had they not delerved it for the Sin which they- 
 c * derive from their Original. 
 
 CHAP. XVI. 
 
 WE may define a Dilemma, a compos'd Ar- 
 gument, where after the divifion of the 
 whole into parts, we conclude negatively or affir- 
 matively, of t|je whole that which is concluded of 
 every part, I fay,
 
 Chap. XVI. Tke ArtofThinki^. 
 
 I fay that which* conduced of every p ar > and noc 
 hat whch is only affirmU For thaf is cX pr I 
 berly called a Dilemma, when that which is fiS 
 very part is fuftain'd by its particular keafe 
 For example being to prove, ^ 4 M, www , 
 4it may be done by thisz>,7 
 
 our fehtt to our P a ffi oni , 
 
 , 
 
 ifar , t rentiers us Ignominy nof are 
 sjiea. 
 
 If we war againfl 'em, we are mifrdle- ; in revtrd 
 *re u nothmg more fainful and l r^ cr 
 
 If we would prove, that fuch Bfiys who do not 
 lour for the Salvation of Souls commuted to their 
 
 T n v tneXa ' f " ble Hore G d > " raa ^ be d ne 
 ? this Dilemma. 
 
 Either they are caf^k of that charge , or they 
 e uncafable ; 
 
 If the) are capable , they are ineffable for 
 t employing their farts in the execution of their 
 arge. 
 
 If they are uncapatie, thy are inexcusable for tm- 
 a^ng Jo important a charge which they arc not 
 We to undergo.
 
 Logic : Or, Part III. 
 
 And by confiquence, which way foever you take if, 
 they are inexcufable before God, if they do not attend 
 with diligence the fahation of the Souls that are com- 
 mitted to their charge. 
 
 But there are fbme obfervations to be made up* 
 on thefe forts of Arguments. 
 
 The Firft is, that all the Propofitions are not al- 
 ways exprefled : For example, the Dilemma which 
 we hare proposed was comprehended in a few words 
 in the Oration of the Lord Charles at the en- 
 trance ot a certain perfbn into the Provincial Coun- 
 cils, if you are uncapable of fo great a charge, why fo am- 
 bitious ? If fit for it, why fo negligent ? 
 
 Thus there are many things fubintellected in that 
 memorable Dilemma by which an ancient Philofb- 
 pher prov'd. That no man ought to bufie himlelf in 
 public Affairs. 
 
 If anyperfon ai well, he will offend men ; if he <zflf , 
 ill, he will offend the Gods : therefore he ought not to , 
 meddle with the public. 
 
 In ihe fame manner another prov'd, that it was 
 not expedient to marry. 
 
 If the woman that marry r s be lovely, /he will caufe jea- 
 hujies, if /he be deformed, Jhe will never delight him : 
 tlxrefore .it is not expedient to marry. 
 
 For in both thefe Dilemmas, the Propofition 
 which ought to caufe the Partition is fubintelle- 
 cted, And this is that which is very ufual j be- 
 caufe it may be eafily fupply'd as being mar- 
 ked out by the particular Propofitions that argue 
 each part, 
 
 More-
 
 Chap. XVI. The Art of Thinking. 19 \
 
 Part 
 
 For as Montaign has well obferved, it was a great 
 blindnefs not to fee a third condition between thefe 
 two. Which is, that the Soul furviving the Body 
 may be in a ftate of mifery and torment : Which 
 may be a juft reafbn for a man to fear death,for fear 
 of falling into that condition. 
 
 Another Error that hinders Dilemmas from be- 
 ing conclufive is, when the particular conclufiens o i 
 every part are not neceffary. So it is not of neceffi 
 ry, that a beautiful woman fhould creat Jealoufie 
 For flit may prove fo wife and fb vertuous,that he, 
 Husband may have no caufe to miftruft her de 
 lity. 
 
 Nor is it of neceflity,that being deformed, fh 
 Ihould diflike her Husband ^ becaufe (he maj hav 
 thofe other advantageous qualities and venue 
 wherein a man may take the greateft delight. 
 
 The third Obfervation is,That he who makes ul 
 of a Dilemma ought to take care, that his argumer f 
 be not turned upon himfelf. Thus Ariftotle teftifif 
 that he turned upon the Philolbpher, who went 
 bout to prove that men were not to meddle w 
 State Affairs, his own argument. Far (ays he, 
 
 If a man govern according to the corrupt laws of m 
 be (hall content men. 
 
 If he obfirve true juft ice he will content the Gods, 
 
 Therefore he ought to inter eft kimfclfin fublicd 
 
 Ncverthelefi this Turn is not rational ; for 
 ought not to offend God that we may pleafe m 
 
 C H A
 
 Chap. XVII. The Art of Thinking. 195 
 
 CHAP. XVIL 
 
 'Of tbs places, or method to fnd out Argu- 
 ments ; and how this method is of little 
 ufe >. 
 
 P Laces of Arguments,fb cali'd by the Rhetorici- 
 ans and Logicians are a ream General Heads, 
 under which may Be brought all the proofs which 
 are made uie of in the various matters of difcourie 
 and that part of Logic which they call Inventicn, is 
 nothing elfe, but what they teach concerning thefe 
 places. 
 
 I(amus quarrels with Ariflotle and the School-men, 
 >ecaufe they difcour/e of places after they have gi- 
 ven the rules of argumentsjand he affirms againft'em, 
 hst they fhould firft explain what concerns Place? 
 md Invention before they lay down the rules of 
 Brgument.^um0's reafon is,becaufe Matter is firil to 
 be found out, before we think of difpofing it. 
 
 But this reafon is very weak : For though it be 
 very rcquifue,thallvlmer fliouid be found out for 
 difpofition, yet is it not neceflary to teach how to 
 ind out Matter, Before we know how to diipofe i:. 
 For to teach the difpofition of Matter, it fuffices to 
 lave certain general Matters to (erve for examples. 
 3tfides,that the Underftanding and common Sence 
 kffords matter fufficient witliout going a begging to 
 Art or the Method of Invention. So that it is true, 
 that we ought to have Matter ready to apply 
 O 4 to
 
 2-9^ Logic : Or, Part II 
 
 ro the rules of arguments but that there is an 
 neceffity to find out this matter by the method < 
 places, is a meer falfity. 
 
 We may rather urge <he quite contrary,that it 
 neceffary to know what an argument or Syllogifm i 
 before we learn from the do&rine of places todra 
 out Arguments and Syllogifms. But ir may be the 
 will anfwer, that nature alone fumifhcs us with 
 general knowledg of Ratiocination ; which is fu 
 ficiem to underfland what is faid in the difcourfe 
 of places. 
 
 Therefore they mifpend their time,who anxioud 
 trouble themlelves, in what place, Pla&s are to b 
 handled, fince it is fuch an indifferent Thing. Bu 
 perhaps it would be more profitable, whether it b 
 to any purpofe to difcourfe of 'em at all. 
 
 We know the Ancients held this method for 
 Sacred myftery ; and that Cicero prefers it alfo be 
 foie all other parts of Logic, as it was taught b 
 the Stoics, who took no notice of places. Let u 
 forego, faith he, that art which is mute in th 
 finding out of argument, loquacious in judging o 
 'em, Q>uinrilian and all the other Hhetoricians,AnJlotl 
 and all the Philofbphers fing the fame fong, fo tha 
 they would almoft prevail with us to agree witl 
 them, were they not oppos'd by univerftl expo 
 rience. 
 
 We might produce almoft as many Witnefles a 
 there are perfbns who have run through the ufua 
 coui fes of ftudy, and have learnt from this artifici- 
 al method to find out proofs, as they are taught in 
 
 Colledges.
 
 tChap. X VII. The Art of Thinking. 1.9 7 
 
 fcolledges. For is there one thac can truly af- 
 firm, that when he was oblig'd to any fubjefr, that 
 the ever made any Reflexions upon thefe places, oc 
 Bought thofe reafons which he wanted from thence ? 
 Let 'em confult all the famous Pleaders and 
 iPreachers which are in the World j and all thofe 
 numbers of Writers and Difputers, who never are 
 pumpt fb dry, but that they could ftill fry more j 
 queftion whether there will one be found that ever 
 o much as dreamt of Places from the Caufe^ Places 
 om the Ejfeft, Places from the AdjunEt to prove what 
 icy defired to perfwade. 
 
 Han alfo notwithstanding the great efteenv 
 fhows for this Art, is obliged nevertheless 
 acknowledge that there is no neceflity, when & 
 nan handles any fubject to go and knock at the: 
 oor of all thefe Places for Proofs and Arguments/ 
 et the (ludicui of Eloquence mind this alfo, that^ 
 h(n matter of Argument is propos'd, there is no ne* 
 jfitj to fearch all the fever al places, and at it were-- 
 go from door to door to kpottr whether they wifL 
 nfteer to what we intend to prove. 
 
 True it is, that all Arguments may be brought 
 
 nder thefe general Heads and Terms which are. 
 
 illed Places ; but their Invention rs not to be a- 
 
 Tibed to this method. Nature, confederation o- 
 
 le Subject , and the fore-knowledg of various. 
 
 ruths lead us to thofe probations ; and at length Arc 
 
 educes 'cm. to certain Genus s. So that we may 
 
 ruly fay of thefe Places what St. Auftm pronouncctF 
 
 general concerning Rhetoric. We find, faith. 
 
 Oy he,.
 
 Logic : Or, Part III. 
 
 _ 
 
 he, that the Rules of Eloquence are obferved in the 
 Difeourfcsof Eloquent perfons,though whether they 
 know 'em, or know 'em nor, they never think of 
 ,03. They prattife thefe Rules, becaufe they are 
 Eloquent, but they do not make ufe of 'em to attain 
 Eloquence. 
 
 We naturally walk as the fame Father observes 
 and in walking, we move regularly with our Bodiei 
 But it would be ridiculous for a Mafler of waling 
 pretend to tell us, that the Animal Spirits were . 
 fee fent into certain Nerves ; that fuch Mufcl 
 were to be moved j or to teach us, to move fac 
 joynts, and to fet one Leg before another. 'T 
 true, Rules might be given for all thefe things bu 
 that thefe actions (hould ever be performed by th 
 help of any rules were ridiculous. So in commo 
 difcourfe all thefe Places are made ufe of ; nor ca 
 any thing be faid but what may be referred to 'en 
 But it is not anexprefs Reflexion upon thofe Pint 
 that produces our thoughts ; fuch a reflexion fe 
 ving rather to flop the Career of Wit, and pre 
 venting it from finding out more natural and e 
 ie<3ual Reafons , which are the Ornaments 
 Dj/courfe. 
 
 Virgil m his Ninth Book of Amid, , after he ha 
 rr p relented Zwyalut furprized and environed by h 
 iinc m ies,who were ready to revenge upon him th 
 ueath of their Friends, whom J\y^, the Friend o 
 m-yak* had ilain,puts thefe words full of paffionan 
 iicc^on into the mouth of N/k 
 
 aic
 
 Chap. XVII. The Art of Thinking. 
 
 Me me. id[um slut fed t in me convert te fcrrtim 
 O /(////;, me a fram omnis ; mill ifta. nee aufitf, 
 Nee fotnit. Cesium hoc & fider* Cat/cut t eft or 
 Tantitm Lifeltcsm nimium dilexit Amicum. 
 Says fymtss, this is -an Argument from the tPici- 
 caufe. But we may fafeiy fwear,that Virgil ne- 
 drcamt of the Place from the Efficient Cd/<?,when 
 trade thefe Verfts. Nor had he ever made 'em 3 
 he had ftopt in fearch of fuch a thought in the 
 Caule. Nay it may be rather thought th::!: 
 ic 'not only forgot his Rules and his Places, if 
 he had any fuch knowlcdg, but was tran- 
 )rted beyond himfelf, when he represented fuch 
 Perfon and fucli Parfions. 
 
 ' And in truth , the Hale ufe lhat has been 
 of this method of Places from the long 
 'hile ago, that it was firft invented, is an evi- 
 fign how little it is to be regarded. For 
 they can pretend to by this method, is, only 
 Jo find our fcveral general, common, remote No-- 
 jions upon every fubic^t', fuch as the LuHifls find 
 >y the means of their Tables. Now fuch a 
 bopioufhefs is fo far from being advantageous, 
 it there is nothing more hurdul to' the Judg- 
 it. 
 
 Nothing hinders fb much the growth of good 
 Is as when they are over-grown with Weeds. 
 lothing renders, a Wit more barren in true and 
 thoughts than this evil fertility of low and 
 ion Notions; 
 
 Tfie
 
 
 
 3o Logic : Or, Part III. 
 
 The Witaccuftoming it felf to that facility- an 
 never forcing it felf to find out proper, particula 
 and natural Reafons,which never difcover themfelvf 
 but in attentive Confideration of the Subject. 
 
 Befides we are to confider this copioufnefs i 
 Place to be of no advantage ; as being feldom want 
 ing to the moft part of the World. For men oftei 
 become blameable for loquacity, feldom for wan 
 of faying too little. So that their Writings are moj 
 times too full of matter. And therefore to form 
 folid and judicious Eloquence it would be mud 
 more to the purpofe to teach men to hold thei 
 tongues than to talk,and how to retrench low, com 
 mon and falfe Notions, than how to produce a 
 they do , a confus'd oglio of good and bad At 
 gumenrs, with which they fill their Difcourfes. 
 
 Seeing then the ufe of thefe Places is ferviceable t< 
 no other end than to find out thefe forts of trafh] 
 Notions, we may fay, that if it be any way neceflar 
 to know what has been (aid of 'em (for they hav< 
 been the difcourfe of fo many eminent Men, that i 
 would bealmoft a crime to be altogether ignorant o 
 n) 'tis only to be convinced how ridiculous it woulc 
 be to make ufe of 'em in all things, even in thotf 
 which are moft remote from our Sight, as the Lul 
 lifts do by means of the general Attributes, whid 
 are a fort of Places ; and from thence to boaft a pre- 
 pofterous facility to difcourfe of all things, and to 
 give reafons for all things, is fo bad a Character of 
 Wit, that it is below the irrationality of Beafb. 
 
 So that all the advantage that can be drawn from 
 
 ibefe
 
 :hap.XVIII. The Art of Thinking. 301 
 
 ?iefe Places is no more than to get a flight and gene- 
 kl Tinfture, to the end that without much think- 
 hg, we may view the feveral Parts and Facts of 
 he matter of which we difcourfe. 
 
 CHAP. XVIII. 
 
 The Divifion of Places into Places of Gram- 
 mar, Logic and Metaphyfics. 
 
 THEY who have treated of Places, have di- 
 vided them feveral ways. That divifion 
 which Cicero followed in his Books of Invention,and 
 fecond, de Oratore, and Quintilian in his fifth Book 
 ot Inftitutions, is lefs Methodical, but more proper 
 for Pleading at the Bar, for which it is purpofely 
 defigned. And X*mui is too much perplexed wicn 
 Subdtvifions. 
 
 There is therefore another of a certain Germ An 
 Philofopher that feems more accurate ; this \sClau- 
 lergius, a perfon both folid and judicious, whofe 
 Logic came to my hands, when I had began to 
 
 Print this. 
 
 Thefe places are drawn either from Grammar, 
 from Logic or Metaphifics. 
 
 placet
 
 Places from Grammar. 
 Grammar, 
 
 Places from __ 
 produced fornc under oih "'7^ e a ' rea d/ 
 
 ^^^^^liid 
 
 faffs
 
 :hap.XVIII. The Art of Thinking. 303 
 
 Us all Men, happens aljo to the tnoft Potent. For they 
 nnot pretend to advantages above Humanity. 
 
 a. ~By defraying the Genus, the Species is deftroyed. 
 'e that never judges at aS, never judges amifs. He that 
 everfpeaksat all, never Jpeakj Indiscreetly. 
 
 3, In deftroying all the Species , the Genus is de- 
 royed. Terms tailed Subftantial , except the rational 
 oul, are neither Body nor Spirit j therefore no Sub- 
 net. 
 
 4. If the total difference may be denied or affir- 
 ned of any thing, the Species may be denied or 
 
 med. Extent is no t&ay agreeable to thought t there- 
 'are it is not Matter. 
 
 5-. If the property of any thing may be denied or 
 ffirmed, the Species may be alfb denied or affirmed. 
 
 being impojjlble to imagine the half of a Thought, nor a 
 ound or afquare Thought, it is impojjible itJJyould be a 
 tody. 
 
 The thing defined is denied or affirmed, of which 
 he definition is affirmed or denied. There Are few 
 berfonsjuft, becaufe there are ft IP perfcns willing to give 
 to every we their due. 
 
 Places of Metaphfjcs. 
 
 Places of Metaplyfics, are general Terms agree- 
 ing with all Beings, to which many Arguments are 
 referred, as Arguments from the Caufe, Ejfeft, 
 Whole, Parts+ Opfofites. Wherein lhat which is 
 molt ufeful is to know fomc general Divifions, 
 and chiefly of Caules, 
 
 The
 
 304 Logic: Or, Part II 
 
 The School-definitions of Caufes in General 
 that a Caufe w that which f reduces an Effett ; or tha 
 whereby a thing K, are fo flovenly, and it is fo diff 
 cult to di/cern how they agree with all the Genus 
 of caufe, that they would have done better neve 
 to have feparated this word from fuch as cannot b 
 defined j the Idea which we have of it , being a 
 clear as the definitions which they give. 
 
 But the divifion of caufes into four Sfeciu 
 which are the caufe final, Efficient, Material anc 
 Formal is fo celebrated, that it behoves us to take i 
 little notice of it. 
 
 The final caufe is called the end for whicl: 
 a thing is. 
 
 There arc primitive ends which are primarily 
 confidered, and Secondarie ends, which are confi- 
 dered Secondarily. 
 
 What we act to do or obtain a thing, is called 
 the end for whofe fake. Thus Health the end of 
 Phyfick, becaufe it pretends to procure it. 
 
 The end for which we labour is called the Pints \ 
 cui. Thus Man is in this Sence the end of Phyfic, 
 for whofe fjke (he pretends to make Medicines. 
 
 There is nothing more ufual than to draw Argtj. 
 ments from the End, either to fliew that a thing is 
 Imperfect, as an ill- contrived Difcourfe , when ?t is 
 not adapted to perfwade, or to (hew 'tis probable 
 that a Man has done, or will do, fome ad ion, be- 
 caufe that it h conformable to the end, which he 
 has accuftomed to propofe to himfelf. Whence that 
 famous faying of a K^mm Judge, Cui Aw, which 
 
 ought
 
 vhap XVIII. The Art of Thinking. 305 
 
 bght always to be our firft examination, that 
 j, what profit a Man aims at in doing fiich a 
 ling ; for generally profit and Intereft governs 
 ic actions of Men. Or - elfe to {hew that we 
 ught not to fufpeft a Man for doing fuch an 
 ftion, as being contrary ro his Intereft. 
 
 There are alfo feverai orher Arguments drawn 
 om the end, which a ripe Urderftanding will fbon- 
 r discover than all the direction of Rule?. 
 
 The Caufe Efficient is that which produces ano- 
 ber thing, from whence feverai Arguments are 
 rawn to fhew that theEfftcl: is not,in regard the 
 >aufe is not ftifficient ; or to fhew the effect is or 
 pill be in regard the Caufes are apparent. If the 
 aufes are not neceflary,the Arguments are not ne- 
 eflary. If they are free and contingent, the Ar- 
 ;ument is only probable. 
 
 There are fevcralloits of Efficient Caufes,whofe 
 lames it is ufeful to know. 
 
 God creating Mam was the total Caufe, in re- 
 gard that nothing could concur without him. But 
 he Father and Mother are only the partial caufes 
 > the Infants, in regard they want another. 
 
 The Sun is the Proper caufe of Light ; but he is 
 >nly the accidental caufe of the Death of a Man, 
 vhom excefs of heat kills, in regard he was not of 
 i ftrong Conftitution before. 
 
 The Father is the next Caufe of the Son. 
 
 The Grand- father the remote Caufe, 
 
 The Mother the Productive Caufe. 
 
 The Nurfe the Preferring Caufe. 
 
 The
 
 
 
 Logic: Qr } 
 
 ^^^^^. 
 
 Crod is only the %'**/ caufe in refoeft of r 
 
 Creatures, beuufe they are not of the na, U re 
 
 An Artifr is the Principal Caufe of his Workma 
 
 The Wind thaT fill/ "he 'organ -^' is the ^ 
 twj/S/ caufe of the Harmony. 
 The Sun is a Natural Caufr. 
 
 that burns the Wood U the 
 
 a Chamber is the prone 
 Windo-,v ' ' 
 
 
 The Man Aat fi-t it on Fire t. , 
 1 o the effioent caufe i s aifo a d de d the 
 
 die U't ; , W A 1C V S ', h r M dd f^ 
 the Work. As thedefign of a building, 
 
 Ac Arch,,e<a go mns himfe , fj or gf ne ,. 
 wh,ch the 0^a, w caufe of our iL, or of any 
 
 Kenth P L ^ tat ' 0n , WhateVer - As ^*'> *e Four- 
 teenth the Exemplary caufe of his Pifture 
 The material Caufe is, that out of which all 
 
 That which 
 
 the matter, agrees or difagrees with 
 
 thofe
 
 Chap XVIII. The Art of Thinking 307 
 
 ||hofe things which are competed cut of ir. 
 
 The formal caufe is, chat which makes the thing 
 what it is, and diftinguifiies it from ethers. Whe- 
 ther it be a Being really diftinguilhed from the 
 Matter, according to the opinion of the Schools ; 
 br only a difpofition of the Parts. By the knowledg 
 rf this Form, Propriety is to be explained. 
 
 There are as many different Effects as caufcs, the 
 ivords being Reciprocal.The ufiia) manner of draw- 
 ng Arguments from hence is to (hew, that if the 
 Effect be, the caufe is, fince nothing cirnot be 
 without a caufe. It proves alfb that a caufe is good 
 or bad, when the Effects are good or bad. Which 
 is not always true however in caufes by accident. 
 
 We have fpoken fufficiently of the whole and 
 Parts in the Chapter of Divifion , and therefore it 
 will be needlefs to add any thing more here. 
 There are Four forts of Oppofite Terms. 
 Relatives, as Father and Son, Matter and Ser- 
 vants. 
 
 Contraries, Cold, Hot, Sound and Sick. 
 Privaties, as Life, Death. Sight, Biindnefs, Hear- 
 ing, Deafnefs, Knowledg, Ignorance. 
 
 Contradictories which confift in one Term, and 
 in the fimple Negation of the Term, to fee, and 
 not to fee. The difference which there is between 
 thefe two latter forts of Oppofites , that the Priva- 
 tive Terms include the Negation of a Form in a 
 Subjeft which is capable of it,whereas the Negatives 
 do not denote that Capacity. Therefore we do not 
 
 fay
 
 
 farft Book of ha Rl lmc , where he te.che, 
 
 (everal
 
 Ihap. XIX. The Art of Thinking. 309 
 
 :veral ways to fhew chat a thing is profitable* 
 leafing, greater or left. Though it be certain 
 a man (hall never by this way arrive at any 
 :rtain knowledg. 
 
 CHAP. XIX. 
 
 / the fever al forts of vicious Arguments 
 which are call'd Sophifms. 
 
 A Lthough that when we underfland the Rules 
 [\_ of right Arguing, it be no difficult thing 
 o dirtinguifli thofe that are falfe ; nevertheless as 
 xamples to be avoided make a deeper impreifion 
 
 our minds, than examples that are worthy imi- 
 ation, it may not be amifs to lay open the four- 
 es of bad Arguments, which are called Sopbifms, 
 >r Paralogifins, whereby they may the more eafily 
 e avoided. 
 
 I (hall reduce 'em only to feven or eight Heads, 
 icre being fome fb notoriously llupid, that they 
 re not worthy remembrance. 
 
 SOPHISM I. 
 
 To prove another thing than that which K in qtteftion. 
 
 This Sophifm iscall'd by Ariftotie, Ignoratio Elen- 
 hi : The ignorance of that which is to be prov'd 
 igainfl the Opponent. For in difpuce we grow 
 
 hot,
 
 3 1Q 
 
 ____ 
 
 hot when many times we do not underftand 01 
 another. This is a common vice in the difputes 
 mong men. Through paffion, or falfliood we a 
 tribute that to the Opponent, which is remote fro 
 his thoughts, to combat him with more advantast 
 or we tax him with confcquences which v 
 think we can draw from his Doclrine, which r 
 Jifavows and denies. All this may be referred . 
 ic firft fort of Sophifm , which a man of won 
 
 , n o w 
 
 and lincenty ought to avoid above ail things. 
 It were to be wifli'd that Anlotle^o is too car, 
 
 noteo s too car, 
 
 rul to admomfli us of this defetf, had been alfo -\ 
 careful to avoid it. For it cannot be denied,bur tb'i 
 he has cncounter'd feverai of the ancient Philol 
 phers by citing their Opinions, not with that & 
 centy which he ought to have done. He rc>W 
 **nides and Me/.JJu;, f or not admitting but" or 
 fo!e Prmcipic of all thing,, as if they had meant b 
 that, the Principle of which they are compos'd 
 whereas they meant the folc and only Princiol 
 
 thlngS dl ' aW thclr On ' inal ^ 
 
 He accufes all the Ancients for not acknowkdg 
 
 ing Privation one of the Principles of natura 
 
 iings - and I for that, he inveighs againft ' era a 
 
 dull and ruftic. But who fo blind "as not to fee 
 
 at what he reprefents to us as a grand rnyfWno 
 
 known till he difcover'd it , could never be con 
 
 ceald from any man : fince ic is impoffible for 
 
 man not to apprehend, that the matter of which 
 
 Table is made, muft have the Privation of theforrr
 
 <hap, XIX. The Art of Thinking. 311 
 
 <a Table, that is, can be no Table before it is fha- 
 fcd-into a Table. 5 Tis true, the Ancients never 
 .tought of this ufe of Privation to explain the Prin- 
 oles of things natural, becaufe indeed there is no* 
 ting Icfs ferviceable to that purpofe. It being vifi- 
 |t, that we do not therefore the better know how 
 Clock is raade, becaufe we know that the matter 
 v* which a Clock was made,was not a Clock before. 
 There-lore it is a great piece of InyufHce in Arifto- 
 to reproach thefe ancient Philofbphsrs for having 
 Ren ignorant of a th:ng,which it was impofiible for 
 mm to be ignorant of ; and to accufe 'em for not 
 Baking ufe of a principle for the Explanation of 
 pt'amre that explains nothing at all : Nny he is 
 njilty of Delufion and Sophiim while he obtrudes 
 Ipon us the principle of Privation for a rare fc- 
 ker, when this was not that which they Tough r, 
 ihen they enquir'd into the Principles of Nature. 
 i;or it is certain, that nothing can be, before it is. 
 
 it we are defirous to know of what Prir. 
 || confifts and what is the Caufe that produced :~. 
 
 Thus, for example, there was never any Sr.i- 
 
 i jary , who to teach another the way to make 
 
 I Statue , gave his Scholar that Lcflbn for his 
 
 [<.rft Iniirudlion wherewith Ariftotle would have 
 
 s begin the Explanation of the works of Na- 
 
 ure. Friend, the fir ft thing you are to kn^w 
 
 5 this , that for the making of a Sratue , you 
 
 inuft chufe a pieCCx, of Marble, which is not yet 
 
 hat Statue which you defign to make. 
 
 H. T,
 
 Logic : Or, Part II 
 
 I I. 
 
 To fufpofe for truth the thing that is in qtieflion. 
 This is that which Ariftctle calls begging of the <jtt 
 fiion, which we manifeftly lee to be contrary totn 
 rcafbn. Since in all Arguments , that which ferv 
 for Proof, ought to be more clear and known th 
 the thing which we would prove. 
 
 Neverthelefs Gali/eus accufes Ariftotle , and th, 
 juftly too, to have fallen into this Error, when 
 would prove by this Argument, that the Earth 
 the Center of the world. 
 
 'Tts the Nature of heavy things to tend to the Cent 
 of the world, and of light things , to keep at a dtftan 
 from it. 
 
 Now experience fkeWi w, that Heavy things tena 
 the Center of the Earth, and light things kfep at a 
 fiance from it. 
 
 Therefore the Center of the Earth is the Cen 
 of the world. 
 
 Mod apparent it i> that there is in this Argume 
 a maniteft begging of the Principle. For we find 
 heavy things tend to the Center of the Earth, 1 
 where did Anftotle learn that they tend to the Ce 
 ter of the world, unlefs he fuppofe the Center o 
 the Earth and the Center of the world to be th' 
 fame. Which is the Conclufion that he woul< 
 prove by this Argument. 
 
 Meer beggings of the queftion alfo are thofe Ar 
 guments which are made ule of to prove a whimfi 
 
 ca 

 
 : Chap. XIX. The Art of Thinking. 3 i ; 
 
 lea! Genus of Subftanccs, calk-d in the Schools Sub- 
 
 ftntMt'&rmt, which they would have to \y Cor- 
 
 *eal though they are no Bodies, which is difficult 
 
 Underftandmg ro apprehend. If there were 
 
 Mw Subftannal Forms, fay they, there would be no 
 
 iGeneration L : But there isGenerarion in the World 
 
 ^hcrefore there are Subftamial Forms. 
 
 Now to ftew that this Arguments a meerBee- 
 ?i:-g of the queftion, there needs no more than ^o 
 ay open the Equivocation that Ijes in the word 
 Teneration. For if we muft urderftand by th~ 
 mrd Generation, a natural production of a nc 
 -..- m Nature, as The Pro8u5Hon of a Hen,which 
 form d in an Egg, in this fence we may truly 
 .low of Generation ; bur we c.nnot thence con- 
 lude that there are ne* Subfcantial Forms, becaufe 
 he fole Difpofit.on o[ the Parts by nature, may pro- 
 uoe thofe * m&*. But if rhey meL K 
 vori Generation, as they ufually do, the Produai 
 n or a new fubftance which never was before th^r 
 ; ro fay,of SubftantiulForm, We may juftly lub 
 ie thing that is ,n queftion, ic being vi(ib' e tha 
 e who denies Subftamial Forms can never e 
 hat nature produces Subftantial Forms. And I far 
 th,s Argument from perfwading a man to admit 
 ubftantial Forms, that he may draw a quite con- 
 ary Conclufion in this manner. 
 If 'here vereSxlflnntial Forms, Uattn m hlt p ro . 
 
 duce Subftances that never were before. 
 Sut Nature cannot produce n e(P SrMancet. 
 
 mmit/i ha - /. . J s* ~ > .
 
 314 Logic : Or, ParcIIL 
 
 And therefore there are no Sulftantial Forms. 
 Of the fame leven is this : If there were no Sub- 
 ftantial Forms, fay they, there would be no fuch 
 natural 'Beings at all, as they ca.\\perfe> Tctumperfe, 
 'but Beings by accident. But there areTota orM'uolet 
 perfe ; Therefore there are Subftantial Forms. 
 
 Firft we are to defire thole that make ufc 
 of this Argument to explain 'themfelm, what 
 they mean by fPhole per fe, totum ptr fe. For if 
 they mean, as they do, a Being compos'd of Muter 
 and Form, then it is clearly a Begging of the que; 
 ftion j for then it would be as if they {hould have; 
 faid, if there were no Subftantial Form?, natural] 
 Beings could not be compos'd of Matter and Forms f 
 Subftantial. But they are compos'd of Matter ancj 
 Forms Subftantial. Therefore there are Forms Su 
 ftantial. If they mean any thing elfe let 'em tell 
 and we (hall fee whether it will avail to mainta 
 their conclufion. 
 
 We have ftopp'd here a Hide by the by,to 
 the weaknefs of thefe Arguments, upon which t 
 Schools have grounded thefe forts of Subftanc 
 which can neither be difcover'd by the Sence, n 
 apprehended by the Underftanding, and of wh 
 we know nothing more, but that they are cal 
 Subftantial Forms. 
 
 Becaufe that although their Supporters do it , ^ 
 of a good defign, neverthelefs the Grounds wh 
 they make ufe of, and the Ideas which they g 
 of Forms obfcure, and trouble the folid and co 
 Voicing Proofs of the Immortality of the So 
 
 Wh
 
 Chap. XIX. T/x Art of Thinking. 3 i 5 
 
 which are drawn from rhe diiHnclion between 
 Bodies and Spirits, and the Impo/fibility thai a fub- 
 ftance which is not matter fliould periih by tl e 
 Changes that happen to matter. For by the means 
 o thefe Subftantial Forms, LOmrtim* furnifh them- 
 feives with examples of Subftances that perifh which 
 are not properly M-irrer, and to which they attri- 
 bute m Animals an Infinity of thoughts, that is, of 
 adrjons purely fpiriiual. And therefore it i? for the 
 benefit of Religion, and the Con vision of Infidels 
 i to overturn this Anfwer of theirs, to (hew that there 
 is nothing more ftupid nor worfe grounded, than 
 tele penfhable Subfhncts, which they call Sub- 
 |ftantial Forms. 
 
 To this m.iy be referr'd that fort of Sophifm 
 which L, drawn from a principle different from what 
 is in the quefbon, but which is known to be no lels 
 (conteiled by the Opponent. Thefe are two Maxims 
 qualiy cpnfrant among the Catholicks.The one that 
 ill pomrs ot raith drift be prcv'd'by Scripture alone 
 - other, that Children are capeble of Baptifm 
 crerore an Anab^tjl wou!d argue ill, Co prove 
 lagamft the Catholic^ That they are in the wrong 
 |D believe that Children are capable of Baptifm^- 
 :aufe we find nothing to prove it in Scripture - be- 
 - :aufe mat would (uppofe that we ought to believe 
 4 10 Article of Faith but what is in the Scripture, 
 Which is denied by the Catholics. 
 
 Laftly, we may refer to this Sophifrn, all thofe 
 
 Arguments, by which we endeavour to prove one 
 
 ling unknown, by another altogether as much un- 
 
 P * known,
 
 31 6 Logic: Or, Part IIL 
 
 known, or a thing uncertain by another thing alto- 
 gether or more uncertain. 
 
 III. 
 
 . To take for the Caufs that which is not the Caufi. 
 
 This Sophifm is called non Caufa fro Caufa. Thi 
 is very ufual among men, and they fall into it feve 
 ral waysThe one through the bare Ignorance ot th 
 real Caufes of things. Thus the Philofcphers hav 
 attributed a Thouland Effects to the Fear ot Vacuum 
 which at this day and by moft ingenious Experi- 
 ments is dcmonftratively proved to have no othe 
 Caufe than the Ponderofity of the Air, as we ma 
 fee in that excellent Treatifc of Monfiqur Pafa 
 lately Printed. The fame Philofophers teach us 
 that Veflels full of Water, crack when the Watd 
 is frozen,becaufe the Water clofes it felf,and leave 
 a void place which Nature cannot endure ; wherea 
 it is well known, rhat thofe Veflels break, becauf 
 the Water when congeal'd takes up more fbace thai 
 when fluid ; which is the reafon that the Ice fwim 
 upon the Water. 
 
 To this may be referr'd that other Sophifm,whe 
 we make ufc of remote caufes, and fach as prov 
 nothing , to prove things either clear of themfelw 
 or falfe, or at lead doubtful, as when Ariftot 
 would prove that the World is perfect by tb 
 Reafon. / 
 
 The World is ferfetl becaufe it contains Bodies: 
 Bcfy K ferfeQ becanfe it contains three Dimenfiont
 
 Cha p. X IX. The Art of Thinking. 317 
 
 he three Dimenfwns are f erf eel , becaufe there are all r 
 'quia tm Hint Omnia}, and there are all ^ becaifi we 
 never nfe the Word aS 9 when the thing is either one or 
 O) but there are three. 
 
 By which reafbn a man might prove that the 
 eaft Arcm is as perfecl as the World , bec?uie ic 
 las three Dimensions as well as the World. But this 
 s (o far from proving the World to be perfecl, that 
 lie quite contrary is rarher to be aiTerted v that every 
 \ody t quatfnw a Body, is 1 0ential!y imperfect ; and 
 hat the perfection of the World confiils chiefly 
 
 this , that it includes Creatures that are nor 
 
 The fame Philofopher proves that there are 
 riree fimple Motions , bec^ufe there are three 
 Dimenfions. Though it be a very difficult thing. 
 
 find a Conclufion from the Premifest 
 
 He alfb prove? 3 that the Heaven is unalterable azui 
 ncorruptib!e,becaufe ir moves Circularly. But fir ft v 
 
 is not well dffcovered y-et v/hat Contrariety or 
 Vlotion has to do with the Corruption or Altf ration 
 >f Bodies. In the fecond place there is Ids Reuibn 
 
 be given, why a Circular Motion from Euft 
 
 Weft, fhould be contrary to a Circular Motion 
 ,rom Weft to Eaft. 
 
 In the fccond place we fall into this fort of Sophx- 
 (ry through that filly Vanity that make* us afliarn'd 
 
 confers our Ignorance. Frcrn whence it happen?,. 
 iat we rather chufe to forge Imaginary caules of 
 ic things, for v/hich we areask'd thereafbn, than 
 ) confefs that we know it nor. And it is a pretty 
 P kind
 
 Logic': Or, Part III. 
 
 kind of way whereby we avoid this Confeflion of! 
 our Ignorance. For when we fee the effect of a' 
 C-iufe unknown we imagin we have di/covered ir, 
 when \ve have joyn'd to this effect a general word of 
 Vertue or Faculty which Forms in our mind no 
 o.her Uea^ but only that the effecT: has fbme caufe, 
 v/hieh we knew before we found out that word. Foi 
 example, there is no body but knows that the Arte- 
 ries bear, that Iron cleaves to the Adament, that Sent, 
 purges, and Poppy Stupifies. They who make nc 
 profeflion of knowledge, and who are not aftiamec 
 of Ignorance , freely confeis that ihey know th< 
 Effe6h,but underftar.d not the caufe, whereas other 
 that would blu(Ji to (ay fo, and pretend to have dif 
 covered the real caufe of effects presently cry, then 
 is a pulfific vertue in the Arteries, a Magnetic ver 
 tue in the Adamant , a Purgative vertue in Sena 
 and a Soporific vertue in fty/jy* Now is not thi! 
 quaintly refbl/d ? and might not the Chinefes whlj< 
 as much facility have extricated themfclves from al 
 their admiration of our Clock?, when fir ft bVoughJ 
 into fhi'-Sr Couniry ? For they might have fuid the" 
 knew oerk6tly the reafbn of what others were ( 
 pu'z,Zi'd ar, by affirming that it was only by an L, 
 Jicative vertue thar ri ; ,is Engin marked out thehouuj 
 upon the plane, and by a Sononfic quality that thi 
 tell ftrook. Certainly they might have pafled fc 
 as learned Perfons in the knowledge of Clocks, '< \ 
 our Philolbphers in caules of the beating of th 
 Arteries, &c. 
 
 There are alfb certain oiher words that lerve t;-; 
 
 rcndc;
 
 Chap. XIX. "The Art of Thinking. 319 
 
 render men learned at a fmall expence, as Sympathy, 
 .Antipathy and occult Dualities. Yet they that ulc 
 'em would utter nothing of falOiood , provided 
 they annexed the general notion of the caufe to the 
 words Vertue and Faculty j Whether it is Infernal or 
 External, Difpolrive or active. For certain ic is+ 
 that there is a Difpofition in the Mignet for wholib 
 |fake the Iron moves to that rather than to any other 
 ftone. 
 
 I And men have been allowed to call this Difpofition 
 
 whatever ir be, Magnetic Vertue. So that if they are 
 
 deceived 'tis only in thi?, ihut they imagin them- 
 
 lves to be more Learned than others tor having 
 
 ' found out the word ; or elfe, bccaofe they would 
 
 f have {jgnified by this word a certain imaginary quali- 
 
 ' ty, whereby the Magnet draws the Iron , which 
 
 neither they, nor any other Perlbn could ever ap- 
 
 prenead in their underflandings. 
 
 V But there are oihers who obtrude upon us for real 
 
 c.iu(es of nature pure Chimeras^ the Aftrologers ; 
 
 who refer aUcaulesto the Influences of the Stars. And 
 
 thefe are they forfooth who have found out thui 
 
 there muft of n^ ceflity be an Immoveable Heaven 
 
 jijove all the reft of the Spheres which they allow 
 
 motion ; because the Earth producing divers things 
 
 in different Clime?, 
 
 Non omnis fert omnia tel/W* 
 |i India mittit ebtir j moHes fa* thura Sab<ei: 
 
 There can be no caufes of fuch variety of produ- 
 
 ctions but the Influences of a Heaven, which being 
 
 P 4 immo-
 
 320 Logic :* Or, Part III. 
 
 immoveable has always the fame Afpecls upon the 
 fame parrs of the Emh. 
 
 Thus one of thefc Doctors having undertaken to 
 prove by Phyficai Reafons the Immobility of the 
 Eirrh, makes it one of the principal Demonftrarion 
 of that Myfterious Reafbn, that if the Earth mrru 
 about the Sun, the Influences of the S^ars would be 
 carried obliquely which would cayfe a great difbrc'e 
 in the world. 
 
 With thefe Influences they flrangtly terrific th 
 People, fo that when they fee any Comet appear, o 
 that any great EciSpfe happens,then the world tnui 
 be turn'J topfe-turvy, and wo to Spain, German; 
 :.>nd, or fbme other Country which they have 
 rnofF a peek at ; tho there be no reafbn that cithe 
 Comets or Eclipfes fhould have any confiderabl 
 eflFeft upon the Earth,or that general caules,qs the 1 
 a:e, (hould operate more effectually in one par 
 more than in another,or threaten a King or a Pi -ina 
 more than a Mechanic.befides that we find ahundrcc 
 Ccmers that were never Infamous for any of tho(c 
 Dire Effe$s laid to their cha:ve. 
 
 For what if Mortality, Peftilences, Wars, Death; 
 of Princes do fometimes happen after the Appear- 
 ance of Comets and fight of Eciiples, they as oftcr 
 happen without any fuch fignals. Befides rhefe ef 
 fedts are fb general and common, that ic is much ir 
 they do not happen in fbme part of the World ever) 
 year. So thac they who talk at Random, that furf 
 a Comet threatens the death of fbrne great Perfb- 1 
 , do not hazard their Reputation over much. 
 
 Bu
 
 t Chap. XIX. The Art of Thinking. 3 1 r 
 
 But it is far worfe when they give thefe Chime- 
 { rical Influences for the caufe of the vertuous or 
 i virious Inclinations of men, as alfo of the particular 
 i actions and events of their Life, without having any 
 t other ground, than only that among ten thoufand' 
 r Predictions it falls out by hap-hazard that fbme-" 
 one proves true. Altho if a man were to judge 
 of thefe things rationally and according to gopd. 
 t fence, he might as well fay that a Candle lighted in 
 \ the Chamber of a Woman that lyes in, ought to 1 
 iihave a greater Influence upon the Body of the In~ 
 ilant, than the Planet Saturn in whatsoever AJfcft or 
 ^Conjunction it be. Laftly there are fbme, who affign 
 ^Chimerical caufes of Chimerical effects ;.and fudr 
 iare thofe who fuppollng that nature abhors a Va- 
 .i|!cuiry,and that fhe, does her utir.oft to avofd ir/eigir; 
 .V,more Fictitious caufes- of this Fictitious horrour^the 
 ;r:cffecl it felf being imaginary, feeing rhat nature 
 j;fears nothing, and that all the effects which are.: 
 .i attributed to this dread of nature, depend upon the 
 } Cole Gravity of the Air. Nature abhors a Vaewim^ 
 i fays one of thefe profound Phiiofbphers,becaufe flie 
 j has need of Continuity of Bodies to Tranflhrt her In- 
 i fiuences,and for the Propaganda of Qi^ialities. A tnoft-: 
 % iwonderful Science indeed which goes about to prove 
 that 'which is not, by that which is not. 
 
 Therefore when we fcarch tire caufes of extra- 
 
 .4 ordinary eftecls, we ought carefully firft to examin 
 
 fwhether the effects be true. For fometimcs we la- 
 
 } bour to no purpofe to fenrch out the reafon of things- 
 
 P 5* thu: 

 
 3- a 2. Logic : Or, Part III 
 
 that are nor. Infbmuch that there are an Infirm 
 number of queftions which are to be refblved, a 
 Plutarch refolves this propounded by himfelf, Wk 
 fuck Colt 3 as are furfucd by the Wolf are faifter tba 
 others. For aftr he has faid, that perhaps the Wo 
 might have aflailed the more flow of Foot firft,an 
 fo they that escaped were the fwifteft, or elfe thi 
 fear having added wings to their feet had imparte 
 to r em that habitude of fwiftnefs which afcerwarc 
 they retained, he at laft brings another Iblutio 
 which feems to be very true and genuine; Perhtp 
 lays he, the thing it felf may be aftory. And this 
 the method we ought to oblerve in Philoibphizin 
 concerning fundry effects which are attributed \ 
 tre M>c, (uch as thefe, that the Bones are full < 
 Marrow opon the Increafe of die Mocn ; but empt 
 when fhe is in her wain ; And whereas alfo tfa 
 is fliid of Crevices or Cray-fifh ; there is r 
 ; anfwer to be made but that the whole is a FJ 
 bie, as feveral Perfors very diligent and exadl: ha\ 
 allured me, that as well the Bones and Cray-fi( 
 are fometimcs empty ,fomttimes full in all the Qua; 
 ters of the M>on. Many obfervations of this natui 
 there are in relerence to the cutting of Wood,fov 
 ing and gathering of Fruit, Grafting, and the vei 
 moment when fit to take Fhyfic. But the world wi 
 be delivered at length from theie little Bondage 
 which have no other ground than nicer fappoftt 
 ons that were never fcrioufly examined. And then 
 fore they are unjuft who require us, without an 
 Examination to believe their figments, mcerly uj
 
 Chap. XIX. The An of Thinking. 32,3 
 
 on one fingle Experiment, or an Allegation out of 
 fome ancient Author. 
 
 To this fbft of Sophiftry ought alfb to be re- 
 ferred that ufual fallacy of Human wit, Pofl hoc> 
 Ergo proffer hoc. After this, therefore for this. Hence . 
 it is that the Dog-Star is concluded to be the caufe 
 of the violent heat at that time of the year which 
 is called the Dog-days, which caus'd Virgil^ 
 ; tog of that Star to prcnounce thefc Verfes. 
 
 Iffe fitim morlofque ferens mortaltbia agris 
 Nafcitur, & lervo contriftat famine cxlum. . 
 
 Whereas Monfieur Gajjendus has well obferved, 
 hat there is nothing lefs probable than this vain 
 magination. For this lame Star being beyond the 
 Jne, the Influences ought to be ftronger m.ihgfe 
 that lye more perpendicularly under ir. And 
 et when the Dog days are fb vehemently hot with 
 is, it is Winter in other parts : So that they beyond 
 he Line may as well believe the Dog- Star to be the 
 baufe of Cold, as we to believe it to be the caufe.af 
 
 IV. S O P H 1 S M. . 
 ImperfeEi Enumeration, 
 
 There is no vice of Argument into which the 
 Learned fall more eafily than into this of falfe Enu*^ 
 neration , and of not duly confukring all the 
 
 manners.
 
 3M Logic : Or, Part III 
 
 manners how things may be, or be cffc&ed, whic 
 makes 'em conclude rafhly, either that it is nor, be 
 caufe it is -not in fuch a manner, though it may b 
 after another manner , or elfe that it is after fuch o 
 iuch a manner,when it may be after another manne 
 than they have yet thought of. 
 
 We may find (everal of thefe defective Argu 
 ments in the Proofs upon which GaJJendvt eftablifte 
 the Ground or" his Phiiofophy, vi$ That Vacuum 
 inter fpac'd between the Parts of Matter which h 
 Cills his Difteminated Vacuum. And I am th 
 more willing to produce 'em,in regard thatGa/c-W* 
 having been a famous Perfon in his time, and of grea 
 Knowiedg in the moft curious parrs of Learning,rh 
 Errors and .Failings which are to be feen fcatterc 
 into many great Volumes of his Works publifhe 
 .iftcr his death, are therefore the more worthy tob 
 known and dJPcuflcd : whereas it would be to n 
 na.-pofc to fake ponce of the Errors fo frequent i 
 Au:hors of no account. 
 
 The- firft Argument which Gajfindus employs t 
 ' rove \VrDiffeminatedVacuum^\\&. which he woul 
 nakc us believe to be as certain -as a Mathematics 
 Demonflration, is thfe, 
 
 If there were not a Vacuum, but that the whol 
 were fili'd with Bodfes , ihe motion would be im 
 poflfib!e,and the world would be a meer heap of Stifj 
 Inflexible and Immoveable Matter. For the Worl. 
 being all full,no body could be movM but it csuft g> 
 into the place of another. Thus if the Body A. b 
 mov'd, it rnuft displace another Body at leaft tqur
 
 Chap. XIX, The Art of Thinking. 315- 
 
 to it, w>j. B. and B. removing mud difplace ano- 
 ther. Now this cannot happen otherwife than two 
 ways : one that this difplacing of Bodies muft ex- 
 tend it felf to Infinity, which is Ridiculous and Im- 
 poflible : the fecond that the motion muft be Circu- 
 lar, that ib the laft body rernov'd may fupply the 
 place of A. 
 
 Hitherto there is no imperfect Enumeration ap- 
 pears : and it is true moreover, that it is a Ridicu- 
 lous thing to imagin, that one body being remov'd 
 Bother Bodies fucceflively by removing difplace one 
 another to Infinity : Only they fay,that the rrotion 
 is Circular, and that the laft Bodies being removed, 
 i pofleffes the place of the firft which is A. and fo the 
 whole is full. And this is that which Gajfcndw un- 
 [; dertake* to refute by the following Argument. The 
 firft Body removed which is A. cannot be moved, 
 f if the laft which is X. do not move. Now X. 
 > cannot move for that if it remain it muft poflefs 
 f the Place of A. which is not yet void ; and fb X. 
 
 I not being able to move, neither can A ; for which 
 i: reafbn the whole muft be immoveable. All which 
 *: Argument is founded only upon this Suppolition, 
 : that the Body X. which is immediately before A. 
 
 cannot be removed, unlels the pkce of A. be void 
 before hand, when it begins to move. So that be- 
 fore that inftant that it pofleiles that place,there may 
 be (aid to be another which may be faid to be Va- 
 
 I 1 CUUttJ. 
 
 But this Suppofition is falfe and imperfedl:. For 
 there is yet another cafe, wherein it is very impofll- 
 
 ble
 
 Logic: Or, Part III, 
 
 ble that X. may be moved, that is ro lay, that at the I 
 fame inftant that it pofleffcsthe place of A, A. may : 
 quit that place, and in that cafe, there will be nc 
 inconvenience, if A. pufliB. forward, and B. thruftj j 
 forward C till they come to X. and that X. at the j 
 fame time pofefles the place of A. For by this means 
 there will be a Motion, and yet no Vacuum. 
 
 Now that it may be poflible that a Body may pof \ 
 fefi the Place of another Body at the fame inftant J 
 that the Body_ leaves it, is a thing which we are! 
 obliged te confefs, in whatever Hypoihefis, provi-J 
 ded only that we adrnit fbme continued Matter.! 
 For example let us grant two parts in a Staft, im-:j 
 mediately contiguous, it is evident that at the fame:! 
 time that the place is quitted by the firft, it is pof-!| 
 fcfled by the fecond, and that there is no inftanti 
 wherein there can be faid to be a Vacuum. But this! 
 is more clear by an Iron Circle that turns about irsl 
 Cemer,for ihen at the lame inftant every part pof-1 
 ftfles the fpace which was quitted by that which'] 
 went before, with that celerity that will admit no I 
 Vacuum, fb much as to be imagined. Now if thisJ 
 lie poffibie In a Circle of Iron, fliall it not be the J 
 fame in a Circle partly of Wood, and partly ofil 
 Air f And therefore the Body A. fuppofed to be of)| 
 Wood, pufhing forward, and difpkcing the Body 1 1 
 b. fuppofed to be of Air, why may not B. difplace- 1 
 another, and that another to X. which (hall enter J 
 into the place of A. at the fame inftant that A.I I 
 quits it P 
 

 
 :hap. XIX. The Art of Thinking. 317 
 
 It is clear then that the faid effect of Gaflen- 
 w's Reafbn proceeds from hence, .that Gajfendus 
 nought that one Body could not poflefs the Place of 
 ic other, but that the place muft be void before- 
 and, and in a preceding inftant j not considering 
 sat there was the fame inftant of quitting and 
 ofletfing. 
 
 [ His other proofs are deduced from feveral experi- 
 ments, by which he proves with good reafon that 
 pne Air is comprefled,and that new Air may be for- 
 hed into the place which feemed already full j as we 
 fee in Wind-Guns and Bladder Foot-balls. 
 j, Upon vhich Experiment he forms this Argu- 
 Enent. If the fpace A. already full off Air, be ca- 
 : iab!e to receive a new quantity of Air by Comprel- 
 nr, of neceflity this new- Air, muft ehher be 
 torcfd in, by Penetration into the fpace already 
 Itofie&d by Penetration, which is impoflible ; or 
 'rife that- the Air which is enclofcd in A. does not 
 hntirely fill the fpaeej but that between the parts 
 , >f the Air there were certain void (paces, wherein 
 I his new Air is received ; And this fecond Hvpofbejh 
 rayshe.proves what I aim at, which is to make it our, 
 j hat there are void fpaces bet ween the parrs of mat- 
 r. But it is very ftrange, that GaffenJiu .&d not 
 ipprehend that he reaibned upon a falfe Enumera- 
 l:ion, and that befides the HjpotbcJJt of Penetration, 
 iv. hich he had realbn to j uc ^g e naturally impo 
 fi-ble, and that of facuums dominated between the 
 1 parts of Matter, there was yet a third, of which he 
 fays nothing,and which being pofiiblc, is the reafon 
 
 that
 
 Logic: Or, Part II] 
 
 that his Argument concludes nothing. For w 
 may fuppofe that between the thick and grofle 
 parts of the Air, there may be another more fubtil 
 rarify'd, and which being able to pafs through J] 
 pores of all the Bodies , caufes the fpace whic i 
 feems full of Air , to receive other new Ail 
 For that this rarify'd Matter being chas'd out cj 
 the pores through the parts of the Air which | 
 forced in, gives way to the new Air. 
 
 And indeed Monlieur Gajfindus was fb much rhl 
 more obliged to refute this Ifyothefis, as admitting 
 himfelf this fubtile matter which penetrates Bodies j 
 and paffes through the Pores,in regard he affirm:] 
 that Coid and Heat and certain little Bodies that er ; 
 ter the Pores of our Bodies, and afferts the faro j 
 thing, of Light, and acknowledges, in that famouJ 
 Experiment made with Quick-Silver,in pipes fill'd uj 9 
 to the height of two foot three fingers and a hall) 
 leaving fti 11 a fpace above that length which fceiu] 
 void, as not being fill'd wkh any fenfible, matter j 
 I fay he acknowledges, that fpace cannot he callec \ 
 Vacuum^ as being penetrated by the Light whid < 
 he takes for a Body. 
 
 And fo by filling with fubtile matter thofe /pace: . 
 which he takes to be void,he will find as much (pact 
 for his Bodies to enter , as if they were afluallv 
 void. 
 
 V. 
 
 of A thing vfah onlj agree, With it by acci- 
 dent. 
 
 This
 
 2hap. XIX. Tke Art of Thinking. 319 
 
 This Sophifm is call'd in Schools Faltacia acciden' 
 r,', the Fallacy of the Accident. When we draw 
 \ abiolure Conc'ufion fimple and wkhout re- 
 IHiiion from what is not trus but only by sccidenr. 
 t"his is that which caufes fo many people to exclaim 
 l^air.ft Antimony, becaufe that being ill apply'd 
 t produces bad effects. And that others attribute to 
 lloquence all thofe bad effects which the abufe of it 
 reduces j and to Phyfic the Faults of Ignorant 
 poctars. 
 
 I But it is no Sophifm, as the Papifts pretend, when 
 
 ged againft thofe Inventions of Satan, Invocation 
 
 IF Saints, Veneration of Reliques and Praying for 
 
 it dead which were never of any antiquity, but 
 
 jperftitious cheats impos'd upon the people by 
 
 opes far remote from Antiquity in the limes 
 
 f darkefl Ignorance and Impie:y. 
 
 We alfo fall into this vitious way of arguing 
 
 hen we take fimple occafions for real caufes ; as 
 
 we fhould accufe the Chriftian Religion for ha- 
 
 t'ing been the caufe of the Mftfiacre of fb many 
 
 lukitudes, who rather chole to fufFer Death than 
 
 enounce Chrift ; whereas we are not to impute 
 
 iofe Murders to the Chriftian Religion, nor the 
 
 Conftancy of the Martyrs, but only to the Injti- 
 
 tice and Cruelty of the Pagans. 
 
 We alfo fir.d a confiderable example of this 
 ophifm in the Ridiculous Arguments of the 
 ificurcans, who concluded that the Gods had hur 
 nan fhape, becaule that only man is endued with 
 leafon. 
 
 The
 
 130 Logic : Qr, _ Part II 
 
 Go^, % they, are mo ft happy. None 11 
 
 Form; we muft therefore confefs the Gods to h'\ 
 human fhape. 
 
 ' But they were ftrangely blind, not to fee th th! 
 bubitance which t'ninks and reaftns,may bejoyne. 
 to the Body; 'tis not human fhape that"caufe| 
 Thought and Reafon in man. It being ridiculous t-i 
 imagin that Thought and Reafon depend upon ' 
 mans having a Nofe, a Mouth, Cheeks, two Arm! 
 
 wo Hands, two Feet. And therefore it wasaChii 
 diih Sophifm of thofe Philofophers to conclude tha 
 there could be no Reafon but in human fhape=; jj 
 being only joyn'd by accidents to human fbape ii 
 
 Man* 
 
 VI. 
 
 To pafs from fence dMd to f cnee comfoj ^ ey f .^ 
 face composed to fence divided. 
 
 The one of the Sophifms is called Ftlfaia Com- 
 ttftioms, fallacy O f Condon- and the other 
 Fallacy or divilion , which are both apprehended 
 better by examples. 
 
 Jefw Clvift faith in his Gofpel, fpeakimj of his 
 Miracles, The S/;W fee, the Lame walk,, the Deaf 
 bear, J his cannot be true, while we take things 
 :parately and not conjoyntly, that is to fay, in a 
 fence divided, and not in a (ence compos'd. For 
 the blind fee nor, while they are blind, neither do 
 
 the
 
 (hap XIX. The Art of Thinking. 3 3 1 
 
 p deaf hear, while they remain fo ^ but after they 
 Ad recovered their fight and hearing by the Mi- 
 jJFjles of Chrtft they both heard and law. 
 tin the fame fence it is laid in Scripture that God 
 Stifies the wicked. Not that he accoreprs thofe for 
 I who abide in their wickednefs , but that by his 
 race he juftities thofe who were Impious be- 
 te. 
 
 On the other fide (here are fbme Proportion?, 
 lich are not true but in a fence cppos'd to that 
 iich is the fence divided. As when St. Paul 
 rs, that Slanderers, Fornicators and Covetous men 
 all not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. For 
 s not meant that none of thofe who are Guilty of 
 ofe vices ihall be faved j but only thofe who re- 
 ain impenitent, and obftinately go on in their fins 
 all not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. 
 It is manifeft now that there is no TVandtion from 
 e of thefe fences to the other without a Sofbi/m* 
 nd for example, it is apparent that they would 
 gue very ill, that fhould hope for Heaven, that 
 rfevere in their fins, because tliat Chriil came to 
 ve iinners, and becaufe he fay?, that wicked wo- 
 en fhall precede the Pharifees in the Kingdom of 
 eaven ; feeing that he did not come to fave fin- 
 rs abiding in their fins , but to. teach and admo- 
 fh 'em to forfake their fins. 
 
 VII. 
 
 ' pafi from what is true in Jome refyeft to tthat it 
 fimfly true.
 
 Logic: Qr, p arc 
 
 This call'd in the Schools ^ JiBo fecun&im 
 diftrnn fimpliciter. As for example the 
 Tove^that the Gods had human fliape, been 
 there is no form fo loveiy as that, and for that 
 tltet is lovely ought to be in God. For human for 
 is not abfolurely Beautiful, but only in refp<-& 
 otner Bodies. And fo being a Perfection only 
 cundum quid, or in fome refpe& and not limply " 
 does not follow that it ought to be the flnpe 
 ^od, becaule'aH perfections are in God, there 
 mg no perfections buf whar are fimply fo, that 
 which exclude all manner of Imperfection, that ca 
 be afcribed to God. 
 
 We find alfo in Cicero, Lib. 3. de Katura Deorun 
 .Jdiculous Argument of Cteta, againft the Ex 
 fence of God, which may be reduced to this S 
 phtfm : Hm t fays he, can we conceive God, when * 
 can attribute no venue to him ? for Jh all tve fay that h 
 hat 
 
 ? Prudence confifts in the choice of * n 
 !: now Gcd can have no wed of this choice,* 
 being capable of any m7. Shall we fay that he h 
 Under/landing and tygfin? we makf ue of Vnderftan 
 ing and t^afon to difcover what is unfanvi to us by h 
 we know : notv there cm be nothing unkpoam to Go 
 Nor can Jnjlicebe in God *hich only relates to Huma 
 Society: Nor Temperance, becaufe be km no tleafur^t 
 govern ; nor fortitude, for that ^in never oppress God 
 nor labour vearies him ^ and befil es be is expol^ to 
 danger. How then can that btGod, which hat neithe 
 undemanding nor vertm ? 
 
 Nothing
 
 '-hap. XIX. The Art of Tkhking. 3 3 3 
 
 LKothing can be conceived more impertinent than 
 Lk manner of argning.For thus might any Conn- 
 ly man difcourfe, who never baving leen any other 
 ian Tharcht Houfe?, and having heard that in Gi- 
 ps there are no Houfes covered v;irh Thatch,fliould 
 lence conclude that there are no Houfes in Cities, 
 lid that they who live in Chies live mifenvbly ex- 
 pfed to all the Injuries of the Weather. For thus 
 b<r, or rather Cicero argues. There can be no ver- 
 [es in God like to thole which are in men ; there- 
 Ire there can be no venue in God. And what is 
 lore wonderful is thi?, that he does not conclude, 
 pat there is no vertue in God but only becaufe tbe 
 nperfe&ions of human vertue cannor b .- in God. 
 b that it is one of his proofs that God wants uiv- 
 brftahding aod knowledge, bccaufe ail things are 
 tnown to him. That is, that God fees nothing, bc- 
 kufe he fees aU things : that he is unable bee vuie he 
 I Omnipotent ; that he enjoys nothing ot happi- 
 )cf% becaufe he enjoys all fcHcity. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 o abuje the Ambiguity of words becaufe it nay le 
 done divert ways. 
 
 4 ' 
 
 To this fort .of Sophifm may be referr'd all Syllo- 
 ;ifrus that are vicious, as having 4 Terms. Whether 
 t be that the middle Term be taken twice parricu- 
 'arly, or whether rt be that it is taken in one fence in 
 tie firft Proportion, and in another fence ia the fc- 
 
 , cond,
 
 334 Logic. i Or, Part ft 
 
 cond, or laftly whether the Terms of the Condi 
 fion be not taken in the fame fence in rhe Prera 
 fes, as in the-Conclufion. For do not reft rain ri 
 .word Ambiguity to the only words which are gro 
 equivocal ; for they rarely fail, but we mean t 
 that whatever can change the fence of words, efp 
 cially when men are not eafily aware of the chang 
 in regard than divers things being figniried by tl 
 fame found they take 'em for the fame thing.Iirn 
 ference to which may be feen what lias been {a 
 already toward the end of the firfl Part, where n 
 have not only fpoken of the Remedies againft tl 
 Confufiou of Ambiguous words, by defining 'e 
 fo clearly that no man can be deceived. 
 
 I Jhall therefore produce fome examples of tl 
 Ambiguity that many times deceives men of rr 
 apprehenfions. Such is that, which is found in WOT 
 that fignifie fome Wnolc, which may be taken eitb 
 Collectively or Diftributively ; thus ought the 'Si 
 phi/m of the Stately to be rciolved, who argued th! 
 the World was an Animal endu'd with Reafun. 
 
 For that which has the ufe of t(eafon is better th 
 that which i\:f not. 
 
 Now there nothing, fay they, can be letter tk 
 the World. 
 
 Therefore the World hath the nfi of Deafen. 
 
 The Minor of this Argument is falfe, becai 
 they attribute to the World what is only to be 
 fcribed to God.Who is fuch a .B,than which tW 
 can be nothing greater or more perfect But if it 
 fpoktn of the Creatures only nothing can be me 
 
 P
 
 lap. XIX. Tke Art of Thinking. 335- 
 
 feel than the World, if it be Collet ively taken 
 the Univerfaliry of things created by God. Bijt 
 ce it can only be inferr'd that the. World is en- 
 d with Reafbn, in fbme of its parts as Angels 
 Men j but ConjunSively it cannot be faid to 
 a Rational Animal. 
 
 t would be alfb a bad way of Arguing to fay, 
 
 t a man think?, or a man is compos'd of Soul 
 
 Body, therefore the Soul and Bed/ think. For 
 
 fufficient to fay that a man thinks, when one 
 
 t of him only is laid to think ; from whence ic 
 
 way follows that the other part think?. 
 
 IX. 
 
 draw a general Conclusion from A dcfeciivs Induclion. 
 
 We call Induction, when the fearch of feveral 
 ticuiars leads us to the fearch ct a General 
 uth. 
 
 Thus when we have experimented that mod: 
 as are Salt, and that the water of moft Ri- 
 rs is frefh, we generally conclude that the Sea- 
 iter is Salt, and River-water frtfli. The va- 
 >us Experiments which we make that Gold 
 es nothing in the fire, gives us reafon to Judge 
 at this is true of all Gold. And in regard 
 2 never met with any pejple but what fpoke, 
 2 believe that all men fpeak, that is make uie 
 Sounds to fignifie their Thoughts. 
 
 From
 
 Logic.'- Or, Part II 
 
 From this Induction alfo all our knowledge tak 
 its rife,in regard that particulars prefcnt themfeiv 
 to us before Univerfals ; though afterwards V 
 make ufe of Univerfals to underftand particulars. 
 
 Howe'ver ic is equally certain, that Indudion 
 lone is never any allured means to acquire perfe 
 knowledges we Hull denionftrate in another pla< 
 The confideration of Singular?, affording an oppo 
 tunity only to the undemanding to be more atte 
 tire upon natural I&w,according to which v/e Jud 
 of the Truth of Generals. For example,! fliouid r 
 ver have thought of confidcring the nature of a T 
 angle, had I never (ccn a Triangle which gave 
 an occafioti to thirjk of it. However it is notthe | 
 ticular Examination of all Triangles which m; 
 me conclude generally and certainly of all, that 
 fpace which they comprehend is equal to that 
 a Rectangle of all their Bale, and the half of t 
 Height (tor this examination' would be impoffi 
 but tke fole confideration of what I know is inclu 
 in the Idea of a Triangle which J find in my 
 derlianding. 
 
 However it be, luving revived to treat of 
 matter in another place, it fuffices here to fay,i 
 defective Inductions, that is to fay, fuch as are 
 entire, are the caufcs of manifold Errors. 1 (halt 
 ly produce one memorable Example. 
 
 All Philofbphers to this day , have held it for i 
 unquestionable Truth , that a Pipe being ftoppi, 
 it was impoflible to pull out the ftoppel wuhc 
 breaking the Pipe, and that water might be for4
 
 ut 
 o 
 
 3bap. XX. The Art of Thinking. 337 
 
 is high as a man' pleafes by the help of Crifitian 
 engines called Afprait Pur*};. \ And that which 
 rnade 'era fb confident was, that they thought thern- 
 elves affured of it by a moft certain Induclion, as 
 saving made an infinite number of Experiments, 
 ^ut both the one and the other is found to be faffe 
 IT that new Experiments have face been rr.ade thac 
 Stopple may be drawn out of a Sip/jon never fb 
 ell ftopt without breaking the Pipe, provided the 
 rce be equal to the weight of thefyltn&r of the 
 arer, thirty three foot high , and of the fame 
 icknefs with the Pipe : and That in Pumps afpi- 
 nt the water does not afcend bigfier than from 
 irtj two to thirty three foot'. 
 
 CHAP. xx. 
 
 / lad rcafw'w^ in.Civil Converfathn and 
 , : -commex Difccurfc. 
 
 fTItherto we have fhewn Examples of falfe Ar- 
 
 ' in gumehtations in matters of Science.Bui bcc.iufc 
 
 iie principal ufe of reafon does not conli!} in acqiiN 
 
 ing Sciancts that, are of Ihtle ufe for the conduct of 
 
 veli iifing, wher^trtic is ofdangerous ccnfequence 
 
 . o be:d.t*eivd; ic will be : of.much more advantage 
 
 o coofidsr generally, that which engages men into 
 
 | 'hde -faife Judgments which are made of ail forts of 
 
 t f ihing?, .and blind .men with prejudice in matters 
 
 Q .chjeflf
 
 338 Logic : Or, Part III 
 
 chiefly importing manners, and conducing to tb 
 Government of Civil Life.and are the general Sub 
 je&s of our Common Difcqurfe. But in regard thi 
 defign would require a Treatife by ir felF, whic 
 would comprehend almoft all Morality ; we flia 
 only mark out here in general a part of the caufi 
 of thofe falle Judgments that are fo common amon 
 Men. 
 
 We (hall not here fpend tirhe in diftinguifhing fall 
 Judgments from bad reafoning ; as well for that fall 
 Judgments are the fburces of bad Reafonings,\vhic 
 they draw after 'em by a nectflary Confluence ; i 
 alfo for that there is for the rnoft part an implici 
 and latent Ratiocination in that which to us appea 
 a fimplejudgment,there being always fomething th 
 ferves as a Motive and Principle to that Judgmer 
 For example, when we fay that a Stick is crooked 
 the Water, becaufe it fb appears to usj Thisjud; 
 ment is grounded upon this general and falfe Fr 
 pofition, that what appears crooked to our fences 
 crooked indeed, and fo includes a reafon which do 
 not difplay it felf,generally therefore confidered, ti , 
 caufes of our Errors may be referr'd to two head 
 the one internal, which is the Irregularity of q 
 will, that troubles and diforders our Judgment ; t: 
 other External, which confifts in the Cbje&s : 
 what we judg,and which delude our underftandi ; 
 by a falfe appearance. Now that thete caufes s; 
 feldom feparated ; neverthelefs,there are certain I- 
 rors wherein the one difcovers it (elf more plairr 
 than the other 5 and therefore We (hall treat of '< 
 a part.
 
 3hap. XX- The Art of "Thinking. 339 
 
 Of the Sophifms, of Self-love, Intereft and Pajfioit. 
 
 If we carefully examin why fbme men (b obftP 
 lately dore, rather upon one Opinion than another, 
 ve (hall find it to be not through any penetration in- 
 o the Truth, or the force of Arguments, but fbme 
 ngagement of Self-love, Intereft or Paflion. This 
 s the weight that weighs down the Ballance, and 
 , vhich determines the moft part of our doubts ; 
 his is that which gives us the greateft ftiogg to our 
 udgments, and ftops the career of Confutation. 
 jyVe judg of things not as they arc in themfelves, 
 )ut as they are in refpeft of us : and Truth and 
 ^rofit are to us the fame thing. 
 We need no other proofs of this, than what we 
 every day, that thirvgs in other places generally 
 for doubtful or falfe, are accounted altogether 
 tain by all thofeof one Nation, Profefficn or 
 For It not being poffible that what is true 
 n Spain (hould be falfe in France j or that the under- 
 hnding of the Spaniards, that, while both judge of 
 hings by the Rules of Reafbn, what generally ap- 
 pears true to the one, {hould generally appear falfe 
 o the other,it is apparent that thisdiverfity of Judg- 
 nent can proceed from no other caufe than that the 
 me are pkas'd to hold for Truth what is for their 
 icivantage, which not being for the intereft of the 
 >ther, they have a contrary opinion of it. 
 
 Now what is there more unreafbnable,than to take 
 
 )Ur Intereft for a Motive to believe a thing ? All that 
 
 JUght to be done in fuch a Ciift-, is but to coniider 
 
 Q.% the
 
 340 Logic : Or, Part III. 
 
 pounding 'em to be fufficient to make all the world 
 fubrair. And for this reafbn they take little care to 
 bring proofs. 
 
 They give little ear to the Reafons of others ; 
 they would carry the day by their own Authorky .: 
 becaufe they make no diftin&ion between their Au- 
 thority and Reafon : They take all Perfons for in- 
 sonfiderate who are not of their Opinion ; not con- 
 lideringthat if others be not of their }udgment?,the) 
 ihemfelves are not of the Opinions of others ; anc 
 that it is not jufl to fuppolc without proof, that w< 
 have reafon, when we make it our bufinefs to con-j 
 vince others that differ from us,for np other Reaibc 
 butbecauic they believe we are not jn ihe Righr. 
 
 i v; 
 
 There are others who have no other ground to re 
 je&certainOpinions,thanthis pleafam Argument, 
 it tFerefoJ fhould not be a Learned Perfon,now I ai. ( 
 a Learned Perfbn,therefore it is fo.For thisrea(on,cer 
 tain paft profirable cures in Phyfic have been negled 
 e:1, and fo m ny cercain Experiments have been laj< 
 afide,becaufe they who had not the good hap to thinl 
 of J em,vvere afraid to be thought to have been fb lor 
 in an Error.How ! % iky,if the Blood had any C; 
 cular Motion in the Body, if the nourifliment c 
 n-)t \\\fs to the Liver through the Mefarajc Veins. 
 the Vein Artery corivc-ycd the Eiocd to the He 
 If ihe Blood yfce-.-dv-d. through the deicendlng -. 
 low Vein j if Nature did. npr dread a V?cuum: y
 
 Chap. XX. The Art of Thinking 
 
 tbe Air were Ponderous and had a Motion down- 
 w.ard,I bad been ignorant of many important things 
 both in Phyfick and Anatomy. And therefore the 
 things mutt not be To. Therefore for the cure of Inch 
 
 Bumpered Fancies, there needs but only this who!-_ 
 fome Inftrution>thatit is a fmall matter for a man to* 
 be deceived, and that they maybe learned in other 
 
 [thingvho perhaps not fo well vcrs'd in new difcove- 
 
 nes. 
 
 V. 
 
 There is nothing alfe more common , tr.sn to 
 hear men fcurribufly 'revile one another, and 10 
 tax one another of Obftinacy, Patifion and ^ Litigi- 
 ous wrangling, becaufe they cannot agree in their 
 jinions ; and fo they that are in the right , and 
 jrthat are in the wrong, talk all the fame Lan- 
 ige',' inake the fame complaints, and afcYibc to 
 another the fame defect, than which there is harc- 
 
 be found a greater mifchief among men, and 
 h obfcures Truth and Error, Juftice and Inju- 
 in.fuch a manner, that it is impr.fTible for the 
 vulgar fort of men to difcern 'em ;. and hence is 
 happens that feveral men adhere at hap hazard, 
 fome to the one, and lome to the other, of the 
 rwo diilenting parries* and that others condemn 
 both being equally in the wrong. 
 
 Now all this Fanrafticalnefs of humour arifes 
 
 from this diftemper, that ever/ one is o nee i red of 
 
 his own reafon. For from that Principle it *eafito 
 
 conclude^thatallthofcthatccntPadiaiis are opinio- 
 
 Q. 4 nated j
 
 34 o Logic : Or, Part III 
 
 the more attentively to us the reafons that may dif 
 cover to us the Truth of what we defire mould b 
 true. Nor is there any other Truth than this, rha 
 ought to be indepeadant from our defires, whicl 
 ought to prevail over us.I am of this Country ,theri 
 fore I rauft believe that fuch a Saint firft Preache 
 the Gofpei here. I am of fuch an Order, therefor 
 I believe fuch an Inftitution is true. But thefe ar 
 no Reafons. Be 'of what Order 'or Country foeve: 
 we are only to believe what is true, and which w 
 would believe, of whatever Country, Profeffion c 
 Order foever we are. 
 
 II. 
 
 But this Delufion is now apparent when it hai \ 
 pens from change of Pafsions. For tho all orb 
 -things remain in the fame condition, yet to the 
 that are provoked with new Pafsions it feems, th 
 the new change that has happened in their Ddir, 
 has altered the whole courfe of things, which a: 
 any way related to 'em. As we find that there c- 
 Tome Perfons, that will not acknowledg any go I 
 Quality, either natural or acquired , in thofe 
 ; rainft whom they have conceived an Antipathy, r 
 that have in any thing thwarted their Sen timer, 
 their defires or their Interefts ? Prefently fuch m t 
 be traduced for rafli, haughty, ignorant, per fid io 1 , 
 faithlefs and void of all Confcicnce.Their AfFeai<s 
 5ire no lefs unjuft and immoderate than their defis. 
 if they have an Affection to another, he is fe 
 (com all manner of Faults. AH that they ' 
 
 "F>
 
 Chap. XX, The Art efni*kin 34* 
 
 fire i< iuft and eaiie,whatever they do not defirc.un- 
 iuftandimpofsible.; without alledging any reafon 
 for thcfe Judgments,, other than that over-ru.es 
 'em So that sltho they do not form this rational 
 Argument in their Minds. I love him, therefore h 
 is the moft accompliQied Peifon in the world -, I hate 
 him, therefore he is a worthlefs Rafcal; yet they 
 do it in their hearts j and therefore we may a 
 thefe forts of Extravagances, Sophiims and 
 [Hems of the heart j whcfe Nature it is I 
 llport our Paffions to the Objeas ot OUT 
 (which we therefore judge to be fuch as we 
 I have or defire they fhould be. Which is a mmg 
 ITOO& unreafonable, fince our Defires change no- 
 I thing of the Being of what is without us ; and that 
 htherlisnone but God alone whofe wiliis to all-pow- 
 |rfui, that things are always, what his plcafure it is 
 (they fhould be. 
 
 III. 
 
 We may alfo refer to this Delufion of Self- love 
 mat other delufion of thofe who determine all 
 things by a moft general and convenient Principle, 
 7bat they have reafon and know the Truth. Whence 
 it -is no difficult thing for them to determin, that 
 they who think the contrary are deceived : for the 
 conclufion neceflarily follows. 
 
 The Mtftake of thefe Perfons proceeds only from 
 
 hence that the good opinion which they have of 
 
 their Wit caufes'emto deem all their thoughts to be 
 
 fo clear and evident, that they believe the bare pro- 
 
 Q, 3 pounding
 
 344 Logic : Or, Part III 
 
 nated ; fince obfiinacy is nothing elfe but a flub 
 born refute! to fubmir to Reafon. 
 
 Now tbougK it be true, that thefe Reproaches o 
 being Paffionate, Blind and Brabiers, which ar< 
 very unjuft from thofe that are in the wrone ar< 
 juft and lawful from thofe that are in the right: ne 
 verthelefs, becaufe the Truth is fuppos'd to be ui 
 on the Upbraider's fide, prudent and judicious Pe 
 Ions, that feandle any matter in Controverfie oug! 
 to avoid rhe ufe of ; em before they have fufficient 
 confirmed the Truth and Juftice of the Caufe,whic 
 they maintain ; and never let them accufe the 
 Adversaries of obfUnacy,rafhnef5 and want of con 
 mon Sence, before they have well prov'd it. L 
 'em never fay,before they have made it appear, th, 
 they talk abliirdly and extravagantly :For the othe 
 will retort as much back again j for this is the wa 
 never to come to any iflue. So that ir will be muc 
 better to obferve that equitable Rule of St. Auflin 
 Let w omit tbofe common things that may be Jpofan , 
 either fuk, though they cannot be fpoken truly of citL 
 Jide. And then they will tljink it iufiicienf to defer 
 the Truth with thofe Arms which are moft prope 
 and which falfhood cannot borrow, which are .clei 
 and folid Reafons. 
 
 VI. 
 
 Men are not only fond of themfelves, but rtat 
 rally alfo jealous, envious and malignt-rs ppe -o 
 another, hardly enduring others to be prefcn 'd be 
 fore em, as coveting all advantages to tbcmfclves 
 
 aiu
 
 Chap; XX. The Art of Ticking. 
 
 and as it is a thing that deserves great honour to 
 1 have found out any Truth, or brought any new 
 Light into the world,all men have a fecret defire to 
 ravifti that honour to themlelves ; which often en- 
 gages men to encounter the Opinions and Invent!" 
 ons of others without an}/ fhadow of Reafon. 
 
 And therefore as Self-love caufes us frequently 
 
 to utter thefe ridiculous forts of Reafbning, This 
 
 i is a thing of my own Invention ; this proceeded 
 
 tjfromfbme of my own Profeffion ; this fits my hu- 
 
 * incur ; and therefore it is true. So natural Ma'lig- 
 : nity fuggefts another way of Arguing no lels ab- 
 : furd, 'TVas another, and not I, that (aid it, 
 4 therefore 'tis falfe ; 'Twas not I that made this 
 ..Book, therefore 'tis idle arid filly. 
 
 Jj This is the fource of the fpirit of Contradiction 
 -ifo frequent among men, which when they hear or 
 
 * read any thing of another man's , they take little 
 i iced of the Re afbns urg'd for Convincemenr, and 
 .: riind only thofe which they think they can oppofe. 
 :; They are always upon the Sentry againft the 
 it Truth, and think of nothing but how to repel and 
 Jbb&ureit, where they generally prove fuccefsful, 
 .7 .he wit of man being an inexhauftible fpring o 
 
 I alfe Realons. 
 
 When this vice predominates, it marks out one 
 | ^ the Principle Characters ot Pedanrry, whofe 
 .( ihiefeft pleafure and delight it is to brable and: 
 | : vrangle about petty things>and to contradict all men 
 -i vith a mean and ab}e& Malignity. But fonietimes 
 . his vice lyes more conceai'd than to be eafjly per- 
 Q. y ceiv'd,,
 
 344 
 
 Logic : O, 
 
 Part III. 
 
 ?ived, and it may be affirmed, that r.a man 
 exempted from it , becaufe it is rooted in felf- 
 bvc which never dies in Mea 
 
 The knowledge of this Malignant and envious \ 
 difpofuion which refides in the Bottom of Mer 
 hearts teaches us one of the mod important Rules 
 that are to be obferved, for fear of engaging rholc-: 
 with whom we difpute into headlong Error , and 
 alienating their minds from the love of that Truttj 
 ro which we endeavour to invite 'em, is this, tha ! 
 i> to fay, as little as may to irritate their envy ami 
 jealoufie by boafting of a Mans felf, or by fpe; ' 
 hg of other things on which thofe affections 
 lay hold. 
 
 For men paflionately in love with themfelv*) 
 impatiently brook thofe Honours which are donet 
 other men j whatever they cannot challenge t 
 themfelves is odious and troubk'fbme, fa that of 
 times from the hatred of thePerfbn they fly. out ij 
 to a hatred of his Reafbns and Opinions j ar 
 therefore prudent men avoid as much as in 'em lie 
 the expofyng of their Advantages of parts and ci 
 ebwmehts to the Eyes of other men, they wiihdra 
 from publick view, and fly spplaufe ; and rath j 
 c'-iufe to lye hid among the croud, tothecndthl 
 nrhing may. appear in their Dilcourfes but iheba: 
 1'ruth which they propofe. 
 
 The deceas'd Monfitur Pafebal who knew 
 much of Rhetoric as ever c:iy perlon living s exM 
 cd this Rule Ib far, as to affirm that every 
 man ought to abftain from To much as-nami; 
 
 hi-
 
 Chap. XX. Tt3 Art o/ Thinking. '345 
 
 himfelf, or making ufe of the words 7, or A# ; and 
 was wont to fay upon this Subject , that (_>.iiiUn 
 Piety had ab'>lifhM that humane Exprcflion, 7, 
 which common civility had unly hi-forc fupprefi'd, 
 not thar this Rule ought to be fo cx.-ct y obfeiTcd 
 neither. For there are fbme occ : . lions, v. here ic 
 would be a vain Torture, to fbtbear the njonrioh 
 of a mans felr. 
 
 Burir is good to have this Rule always before a 
 Mans Eyes, whereby we may the more eafily fhun 
 that evil cuiiom of fome perfbn?, who never talk 
 but of therafelve?, and are always quoting them- - 
 tielrces, when there is no queftion concerning their 
 [Sentiments. M 7 tiich givean occ'inon'to their Hc.ircr.-, 
 itharthis fo frequent rcfpeftof tbcmlelves arifes ironi 
 a Secret complacency which they be.ir toward the 
 ;objecl of their Love ; and raifcs in'Vnj bv a r.aru- 
 Tal confequence a fecret aver/ion for other p. 
 gild whatever they (ay. 
 
 Ancirhis i* that which {hews u?, that one of the 
 moft unworthy Characters of a pcrfon of credit ;j 
 'that which Montaigne has afFccled ; which is, to 
 > entertain his Readers with nothing el(e but hi- ova. 
 fHumour?, his own Inclination;, hi#owh Fj-nci.?,! is 
 |jwn Di!lemper?,Verrue? and Vices: all which anfc-s 
 us well from a defect of Judgment as trom a viuier.n 
 ove of himfelf. True it is thar be endeavt u;'s ;3 
 I nuch as he cm to remove from himfeif the liifpiti- 
 1m of a mean and popular vanity, fpeakfng freely 
 if "I his defects, as well as of his good Qualities 3 
 : therein there is f>mething of comely, through an 
 
 appear-
 
 348 Logic : Or, Part Ilf. 
 
 appearance of fmcerity. But it is eafie to fee that 
 all that is but a kind of Sport and Artifice which 
 ought to render him more odious. He fpeaks of his 
 vices to difplay *em to the world,not to caufe a dete- 
 ftation of 'em, nor efteeming 'em any diminution of 
 his Honours. He looks upon 'era as things almoft In-* 
 <jifferent,and rather pieces of Gallantry than Jgnonw 
 ny.If he difcover 'era,'ti9 becaufe he thinks they litrte 
 concern him, and that he believes himfelf never the 
 worfe,nor more defpicable for what he has done. But 
 where he apprehends any blot or {tain of his credkj 
 no man more cunning or diligent to conceal it. For 
 which reafbn an eminent Author of this age very 
 pleafantly obferves, that feeing he was fo careful to 
 little purpofe, to advertife us, that he had a Pagfe 
 ("who was a fort of Servant little becoming a Gentkhi 
 . man that had not above fix thoufand t 
 
 * About 300 /. . . _ ... 
 
 fpr 4mwn. Livers ToianoK a year) he dtd not take 
 
 the fame care to tell us that he hadjl 
 Clerk too, feemghewasaCounccllor in the Parlia- 
 ment of Boitrdc-aux. But that employment, though 
 Vry honourable in it fclf,was not fufficient to fhetf 
 the vanity of the man who would rather be thought 
 a Gentleman and aJSoldier, than one of the Long 
 Rcbe, and a Pleader of Proccfles. 
 
 However it is very probable he would not have 
 conceai'd that part of his life, could he have founc 
 out any Marfhal of France that had been a Coucel- 
 lor of the Parliament of Bourdeaux, as he was fmcc 
 hr is no Icfs diligent to Trumpet forth himfeif re 
 rim- been Mayor of that City, e'te he has firft tok
 
 i :hap. XX. The Art of Thinking. .. 349 
 
 & that -he fucctcded Marfhal tyron, and refign'd it 
 h Marfhal Matignon, 
 
 ' But the vanity of this Author is not his worft 
 -irne, he is fo full of fliamelefs infamy, to abound- 
 to in Epicurean and impious Maxims, that 'tis a 
 Bonder he has been fo longfuffered to be publick in 
 ne World, and that fo many Perfbns of great un- 
 ;erftandmg have taken fo little notice of the ve- 
 [om that fpreads it felf in all his Writings. 
 & We need no other proofs tojudge of his Liberti- 
 i|ifm than his manner of repeating his Vices. For 
 iConfeffing in his Book that he had been guilty of 
 liberal Criminal Diforders, he declares neverthelefs 
 (n other parts that he never. repented of any, and 
 iihatif he were to live over his life again, he would 
 ingain ad the fame things : As for my felf, fays he, I 
 .yonld not dcftre in general to be other than I am. I 
 'Wight Condemn my TJnivtrfal Perm ; 7 nii&t dtfre 'of 
 t$od:*n entire Reformation^ and to excujc my natural In- 
 i'tirmifies, but I ought riot to call this Repentance no 
 vcre than a diCcmtent that I ant net an Angel or Cato. 
 f ftty- Aftioas are regulatsd and conformable to what I am, 
 tnd my Condition and Repentance di not fropr'y 
 :or.cern us as to thofe thing* that are not- in oar Power* 
 \'lt tras never in my thoughts moafter-li^e to tye the 
 tayt of (i Pk;!tfipb?r to the Head and Body of a Profli- 
 %ate, nwthjt the end and remainder <f a. wretched 
 'and miferable life foould accurfe and belje thef.nr^ entire 
 land longer fart of my d*ys. Were I to live 'em over a- 
 %am y I would live 'em as 1 have done, nor do I complain 
 tfwhat paft, ncr do I fear what is to come. Hor- 
 rible
 
 34 8 __ Logic: Or, p art l} 
 
 'Me words, and which 'denote an urter extinfti, 
 of all thoughts of Religion. But well enough b 
 coming him who thus delivers himfelf in anoth 
 Part. I flung, my (klf hadlong fiddly lMo Death 
 into a fiUm and obfcure ^ ^ ^^ ^^ J 
 
 U* an Infant and ftifles me in a moment, full tf> 
 W fry, full of InfipMtf Md Indo! et ,c } an d in* 
 ether flace Dettb no more tb M * guvttr of an heu 
 Suffering , without future Confluence or H a , m a) 
 Which merits no f articular prccefts 
 
 Now though this Digrtffionfeems remote fro, 
 
 ne matter, yet it returns again where it kft ofc 
 
 th rwfon , in regard there is no Book that nio , 
 
 ihfufes this evilcuftom of magnifying a mans fdf,< 
 
 making ufe of himfelf and his own Thoughts upo 
 
 all occafions, ar.d requiring others to do fo L 
 
 Wh !C h extreamly corrupts in us our Reafun an, 
 
 >ence through that vanity which always accoKpa 
 
 n. ihefc D,fcourfcs an d in orhcrs,through that h 
 
 ted Ant,pathy wh,ch they ha7e againft it. There J 
 
 no men are permitted to fpeak of therafelves,but per 
 
 Tons of em.nent vertue whotefliHe by their marine 
 
 ef doing lt thac thcy on]y pub];fh tkjr 
 
 Adjons, only to excite others to pra ift God, 
 "" 
 
 faulr a m ^ c < 
 
 faults publlck, ,t ,, only to humble thcmfelve.s be. 
 
 ^re men, and 10 d.flwade '.m from the Jikecourf 
 But for common perfons it is a ridiculous vanity 
 to, nform others of their petty parts, and an Imp? 
 ce defervmg punifhment to difcovcr their Di!or. 
 derst^ the world without the kail touch of remorfe,
 
 top. XX. The Art o{ Thinking. 349 
 
 ice it is the higheft excefsof vice neither toblufh, 
 ,r be aftum'd,nor repent of evil aliens , but to 
 ifcourfecarelefsly and indifferently of their Impie. 
 es, as of other matters ; wherein properly con 
 fts the excellency of Montaigne's Wit. 
 
 VII. 
 
 > We may diftinguift from malignant and envious 
 
 ontradiaion, another Humourlefs mifchierou?, but 
 
 [ttch eneases us in the fame errors ot reafonmg, 
 
 lirtiichisthe Itch of difputing, which very much 
 
 tepraves the undemanding. 
 
 No: that Difputcs are to be blamd in genera* 
 ,-ather the contrary is to be affirm'd, provided t 
 ; -iaht ufe be made of 'em ; for fo there IS;TOT 
 
 -nore ferviceable,either for the difcovery ot Truth, 
 -,r to convince others. The morion of a wit a.to* 
 gether bulled in the examination of fbme knotty 
 
 matters generally too cold and laflguHhing. There 
 
 is a certain Ardor rcquifue to excite and awaken us 
 
 ideas And it frequently comes to pafs, that by QI- 
 I verfityofoppofuion, we difcover where confifts the 
 : difficulty of perfwafion , and the obfcurity of i 
 
 Toefa ; which gives us an qccafisn to endeav&ur'tc 
 overcome ir. , . , . 
 
 But true it is, that as this Exerciie is prohrable, 
 when \ve make a right ufe of it, dihnga^d fron 
 
 paffion y fo it is as dangerous when we make a wrong 
 c , ufe of it, and glory in maintaining an Argurnem, 
 
 at what rate foever, merely for contradittions jfake 
 
 There
 
 : r> Part]! 
 
 There being nothing more effeftual to Eloignes 
 From Truth, and plunge us into Figaries and is 
 Humours, than this fort of humour. 'Hence we - 
 cuftom our telves to /eek for reafons every whf 
 or rather to fet our felves above reafon, to whJ 
 we fcorn to fubmir. Which by little and little Jen 
 us to have nothing certain, and to confound Tm 
 with Error, looking upon the one and the other, s 
 equally probable. Which is the reafon, that it it 
 thing fo rare , that we determin any thing ' 
 difpute, and that it never happens that two Phi- 
 fophers agree. We have always fomething to rep, 
 and wherewith to maintain the Combat j becaufr 
 was never their intention to avoid the crror,but beir 
 Went; believing ir lefs ignominious to be always o 
 ceived, than to confcfs themfelves once miilaken. 
 
 1 herefore, unlefs we have accuflomed our felv . 
 
 by longexercife to govern our paeons, it is a dif 
 
 cult thing not to loofe the profpea of Truth ' 
 
 D./putes, there being nothing that more heats ax 
 
 exafperates all regulated Affeclions. Wh* Vic* * 
 
 they not awaken, faith a famous Author, bei'na fi 
 
 the.moft part commanded by choler ? We ?reV 
 
 cnipicj firft with the Reafons,and then with the P^ 
 
 wns. We learn to difpute meerly to contr; 
 
 and while every one contradict and is contradict' 
 
 K happens that the Fruit of difpure h the Annih; 
 
 lationof Truth. One goes into the Eafr, ancrhc 
 
 into the Weft, they loofe the Principal, and wac 
 
 :r in a croud of Incidents ; after an hour of Store 
 
 and Tempelr, they know not what they feek, ou
 
 :hap. XX. The Art of Thinking. 3^3 
 
 below, another above, another on one fide, ano- 
 ier lays hold of a word and fimilimde to carp a r, 
 icther neither hears nor underftands any more 
 ian that he is oppos'd , and is fc> intent upon his 
 lace, that neglefting his opponent, he purfues 
 imfelf only. There are others, who finding them- 
 rlves too weak, fear every thing, refufe all, con- 
 yand the difpute at the Beginning, or elfe. in the 
 Viddle mutinoufly give over, afflaing a haughty 
 bmempt, or an avoiding of contention infipidly 
 
 Another, fo he may hit his Adverfary, cares 
 
 - ; .ot how he lays himfelf open to his Opponent. 
 
 * Another counts his words, and weighs 'em for rea- 
 
 - ons. Another only makes ufe of the advantage 
 f his Voice and his Lungs. And fome you (hall 
 se, that argue < againfV themfel ves ; and fome there 
 
 : .re that tire-and dunny all the world with long Pre- 
 acesand ufelefs Djgrefiions : And others there are 
 
 - hat Porcupine themfeives with Reproaches, and 
 n\\\. quarrel like Dutchmen in their drink, to (hear 
 
 - ilear, of a Perfon that preffes too clofe upon 'em -in a 
 - : difpute.: TKefe are the ordinary vices of our Difpu- 
 j :ants, which are ingenioufly defcribed by this Wri- 
 - : :er, who being ignorant of the true dignity of-hu- 
 
 - .-nan Nature, has fufficiently underftood the vices 
 
 - and corruptions of it, from whence it is eafie to 
 \ lpdge v ,hdw apt the fe contentious diiputes are to 
 ; diforder the mind, unlefs a Man be very wary, not 
 
 only how he falls firft himfelf into thefe Errors, but 
 alfo how he follows others into the fame fnares, and 
 
 ib
 
 3? z Logic: Or, Pare I; 
 
 fo to regulate hhnfelf,that he may be able toobfeii 
 the Figaries of others, without wandring him* 
 from the end which he propofcs, which is the - 
 lucidation of the Truth. 
 
 V I I -I. 
 
 There are fome Perfons, chiefly in the Coi* 
 of Princes, who, knowing how troublefome d 
 djfplcafing thefe humours of contradiaion a; 
 fleer a quire contrary courfe, which is to commit 
 and applaud all things indifferently. And thai 
 that which they call Cornflake* which is a II- 
 mour more commodious for the gaining of prelu 
 menr, but altogether as ruinous ro the judgmd 
 *or as they that ftudy contradiction; take alw^s 
 for tfre Truth,! he contrary of what is fpokerv ; e 
 Complaifant, admit for truth whatever you %d 
 cm,' and this .-curtom corrupts, firft their DifcoiiiL 
 and tken their Undcriknding. 
 
 Hence Commendations are become fb comrnt, 
 and Pra;fc fo promi/cuoufly bfflrow'd upon all Mr, 
 that we know not what to conclude of rhe Perf a 
 applauded. What Preacher is there whom the u- 
 poedots not extol, for rhe moft eloquent of Mi, 
 and a Ravjlher of his Auditory, through the p- 
 teundeefi of his Learning ? All that die are II:- 
 ihiousfor their Piety. Petty Authors might m* 
 whole Books of Elogie* which they receive fni 
 ieir Friends. So that in this exccffire Prodigal^ 
 >r EncomiHnn, made with fo little difcretion, s 
 
 camt
 
 hap XX. The Art of Thinking. 353 
 
 ,nnot but wonder that Men (hould be fb covet- 
 js of 'em. 
 
 It is impoflible but that this confufion in Lan- 
 Jage, mud breed the fame confufion in Under- 
 anding, and that they who accuftom themfelvcs 
 praile every body, muft accuftom themfelves al- 
 j tc approve evsry thing. But though the falfity 
 aould be only in the words and not in the mind,yet 
 , fiiou.d ferve, methiaks, to alienate from it, thofe 
 ,iat fincerely love Truth. It is not neccffary to re- 
 irove whatever a Man fees amifs. But there is a 
 eceffiiy of not commending what is truly commen- 
 able 5 otherv/ife we throw thofe that we thus corn- 
 lend into dclufion ; They contribute to deceive 
 lofe, who judge ot thefe Perfons by their praifes ; 
 nd,they wrong thofe that merit true praife, by 
 laking it common to thofe that deferve it not ; and 
 iltly.we dcftroy all Faith of Speech, and confound 
 11 the Idea* of Words, making *em ceafe to be the 
 igns of our Judgments and our Thoughts, but on- 
 y. of an outward Civility, which we are willing to 
 lay to thofe we commend. Which is all that is to 
 >e concluded of cmlinary Praiies and Comple- 
 ments. 
 
 IX. 
 
 Among the feveral ways that Self love plunges 
 Vien into error, or rather fixes 'em therein, we 
 rujft not forget one, which without doubt is one of 
 )><. Chiefert: and moil common. That is, the en- 
 gaging a Mans felt to maintain an opinion,to which 
 
 a Man
 
 iff Logic-. Or, Part ]| 
 
 a-Man isurged by other confiderations, than thole f 
 uth. For this condition of defend ing -an Arji 
 ment caufes iuch a negligence, that we never J 
 gard the reafons which we make ufe of, whetl 
 they be true or falfe, but whether they may be ill 
 vjceable to perfwade what they go- about to mal 
 tain. To this purpofe they make ufe of all forts 1 
 Arguments good or bad ; that fomething may I 
 laid, to impofe upon all the world. And lometiri 
 we proceed fb-far, as to utter things which we kn<l 
 to be abfolutely falfe, to the end that they rrl 
 jerve to the end which is propos'd. Of which I 
 wall produce fome examples. 
 
 No intelligent Perfon fufpefts that Montaigne el 
 
 beiievdall the Dreams and Extravagances of jul 
 
 al AdroIogy.Neverthelefs when he thinks it pi 
 
 r to make ufe of 'em,in contempt of Human * 
 
 Jre, he produces 'em as good Reafons, When s 
 
 conftder, fays he, the Dominion and Power which tfr\ 
 
 Bodes have not only over our Lives, and the con*\ 
 
 tiom of our Fortune, but over our Inclinations the* I 
 
 fetes, pujkt forward at the mercy of their Jnfiuenc t \ 
 
 vhyfaU We 4 efrive * em ef a ^ of Ufe ^ nd .r^\ 
 
 courfe ? 
 
 Will he deftroy the Priviledge that Men haH 
 over Beafts, by the Commerce of Speech ? He te 
 us ridiculous Tales, of which he knows the extraviJ 
 gancy as well as any man, and yet from theni^ 
 draws more ridiculous Conclufions. There are Con, ? 
 told he, that have boafled their undemanding the La\4 
 t of Bea/ls, * Apollonius, Thyaneus, Melampu M 
 
 Tyrefur
 
 JChap. XX. The Art of Thinking. 357 
 
 Tyrefias, Thales ; and fince, <xfime Cofmografhers af- 
 Jfw,- ihsre are Nations that acknotvledg a Dog for their 
 'iittg, they muft of neceffity understand bit Barings, and 
 \\ter-fret his Gefticulations. 
 
 i From thi.r reafon we may conclude, that when 
 Caligula made his Horfe Conful, there was a neceffi- 
 57 for his Officers to underftind the Orders which 
 .e gave in the exercile of his charge. But we wrong 
 flontaigne, to accufe him of this bad .confequence. 
 His deiign was not to (peak rationally, but to make 
 i confus'd Colle&ion of what could be (aid a- 
 ifainft Men ; which however is a vice aito^e r her 
 ontrary to the Equity of Reafon , and the Candor 
 f Ingenuitv. 
 
 : As infufterable is anorher Argument of the fame 
 \uthor, upon the Subject of the Heathen South- 
 aye rs. -Of all the Predictions of times paft, the mfft 
 mcient and the mcfl certain wsre theft which were 
 'aken front the flight of Birds. iVe have ntthirg 
 rotKparable to it, nor fo admirable. But tha regular and 
 orderly motion of the wing, from whcnc* they 'dreto tl.e 
 tyiotvleclge of future Confe^uer.ces^ muft bs ccndufted by 
 fane excellent means, to Jo noble an operation. But to 
 afcribe this wonderful effeft, without the consent, under- 
 ft&ndmg and difcourje of him^ by whom it is froduced^to 
 the Laws of Nature is a madnefs^ and the opinion is evi- 
 dently falfe. 
 
 Is it not a very pleafant thing to fee a Man,wbo 
 believes nothing to be evidently true, or evidently 
 falfe , in a Treatife exprefly compoled to eftablifh 
 and to deftroy evidence and certainty 
 ierioufly
 
 Logic: Or, p art 
 
 on and Imperfection -, and that this mixture iso 
 of the moft ufual fources of falfe judgments amoi 
 Men. 
 
 Through this deceitful mixture it is, that t 
 good qualities of Perfons, for whom we have a i 
 fpe&, caufes us to approve their d.efe&s ; 
 defects of thofe for whom we have no 
 caufe us to condemn trieir vertues, in regard Jj 
 not confider, that perfons, the moft dcprav'dH 
 not/o in ^every thing, and that God leaves 
 Imperfections in the moft vertuous ; which bei 
 the remains of human Infirmity, ought not t$ 
 the object of our imitation or eileem. 
 
 -Therefore Juftice and Reafon require, tl 
 things which there is this intermixture 
 evil, ^that we fliould mak^ A diiltnc; 
 in thi'jud'ciousreparationj-'hat the e>- 
 undemanding appears. By vertuc ci 
 thers of the Church have exjrac^ed q-j 
 tings of the Heather.?, tbofp 
 rcnce to manner3,and that Sr. ^.-./r-.a l^fl 
 to borrow from a Donatift Hei'tlk 
 the undemanding of Sc.'ipture. 
 
 Therefore reufbn obliges us, when It is in' 
 Power, to make this Djftin&ion. But becaule 
 have not always leifure to examin particula 
 wrKHther is of good or ill in every thin&ic ifbi 
 jut^ upon luch occaCcns, to give 'em the jiaf 
 which they ckferve, and which agrees wirh tbi 
 m)ft confiderable part. Thus we ought 
 Man is a good Pniiofophcr,. wl.cn he ufu R lly rca/ci
 
 XX. The Art ef Thinking. 
 
 til j and that a Book is good,When there is raacb 
 ;iore m it of truth than FalQiood. 
 
 There is alfo another thing wherein Men are 
 ready deceived when they make general Judgments 
 f things. For oft-times they only blame or efteem 
 tch things which aremoft fuperfisial and acceflbry ; 
 icir want of Undemanding not permitting 'em to 
 enetrate the principal Matter, as not being (b or> 
 aous to the Senee. 
 
 ;) Thus altho they who have skill in Painting, 
 fteem infinitely more the deiign than the colours or 
 uriofity of Painting, yet the Ignorant are more ta- 
 en wich a Painting, whofe colours are brisk and 
 vely, then with, a cloudy Pencil, tho the defign be 
 ever fo Incomparable. 
 
 We muft acknowledg however, that falfe Judg- 
 ments are not fo frequent in Arts j becaufe the Ig- 
 orant more eafily comply with the Judgment of 
 lofe Alat are Skilful. But they are frequent in fuch 
 nings where the People take a Priviledg to judg, 
 s of Eloquence. 
 
 For exaaple,we call a Preacher Eloquent, when 
 >is Cadences are juft , and that he makes ufe of no 
 ad words. Upon which fcore, Monfieur Vauglai 
 fnrm'd that one bad word does a Preacher or a 
 Header at the Bar more Injury than a bad Argu- 
 nent. For it is to believ'd that he relates a mar- 
 er of Fact, not an opinion of his own Amhorifmg, 
 t being certain that there are Perfor.s who judg af- 
 er this manner ^ tho it be as certain on the other 
 ide that there is nothing more remote from Truth 
 R then
 
 362, .Logic : Or, Part III, 
 
 tb?n thefe (ores of Judgments. For purity of Lan- 
 guage, and number of Figures in an Orator an 
 no other in Eloquence, than the (hadows of Colour 
 ing in Painting ; that is to fay, that it is only th< 
 lower and material part j the principal defign o 
 Oratory being to conceive things ftrongly and clear 
 ly in the Mind^nd being conceived to cxprefs 'en 
 in fuch a manner, that they may imprint in th< 
 Breads of the Hearers a clear and lively Image o 
 the things exprefc'd, which not only reprcfent tb 
 things barely as they are, but alfo the Motions ani 
 affe&ions with which they are conceived. And thi 
 is that which may be found in perfons not (o dili 
 gent in fbrting their words, and adjufting their E 
 gurcs j but is rarely Yeen among thole who ar 
 over-curious in ftrdning their words and fimilitudef 
 for that fame curbfity calls off their minds frot 
 the confideration of Realties, and weakens the v 
 gour of our thoughts, as Painters obfervejf thj 
 they who are excellent for Colouring, are feldoi 
 good Defigners j the mind not being capable t 
 Hudy two things at once, and the one difturbin 
 ajid bindring the other. . ftYW^ 
 . .And indeed we may fa)[ in general, that the mo 
 part of the World judges of things by the outwai 
 appearance ; for there are hardly any that pen 
 triue the indde and bottom of things. The Ru 
 of ail ludgment is the Tide, and wo be to the: 
 wnof > 'Tills difplealci. Be a Man as Learned, 
 Prudiru, as perfpicatious as he pleafes, if he fa 
 wr in his Language, and does not anfwer accurat
 
 Chap. XX. The Art of Thinking. 
 
 ly roan officious Complement, he is undone for the 
 whole Remainder of his Life , and condemned to 
 live defpifed among the Vulgar. *Tis no great mat- 
 ter to want due Praife ; but the greateft thing is 
 to infift upon thefc prejudices.; and to look no far- 
 ther than the back of things j and this is that wtf 
 fljould endeavour to avoid. 
 
 II. 
 
 Among the caufes that engage us in Error, 
 through a falie Luftre that hinders iis from difcern- 
 ing ir,we may juftly reckon a certain pompous and 
 Magnificent fore of Eloquence, which Cicero calls a 
 bounding in founding words and copious Sentences. 
 For it is a wonderful thing how falfe Rafoning 
 fieals away our aflent with a Pf riod that tickles the 
 Ear, or a furprizing Figure that fets all the Hear- 
 ers a gazing. 
 
 Thefe Embellifhments not only rob us of the 
 ProfpecT: of thofe Falflioods which are inrermix'd 
 in difcourfe ; but infenGbly allure ns to others, be- 
 caufe they feem neceffary for the more carious Com- 
 pofure of the Period or Figure. So that when we 
 tee an Orator begin a long Gradation, or an Anti- 
 thefis of feveral Members, we ought to (land upon 
 our Guards j for it rarely happens that he gets quit 
 of 'ern, without wrefting and fcrewing the Truth, 
 to make it conformable t this Figure. He orders 
 the fame truth as they do Stones in a Building, or 
 the materials for a Statue , he cuts and extends ir, 
 R -L fore-
 
 Logic : Or, PartllL 
 
 fore fhortens it, and difguifes it to make it fit for the 
 place which he defigns it,in his vain piece of Work- 
 manflhip and ftructure of words. 
 
 How many falfe thoughts has the defire of main- 
 taining a nicety produced ? How many Lies has the 
 Law of Hhitne begot ? The great affe&arion to 
 make ufe of none but Ciceronian words, and that 
 which they call pure Latin ; of how many abfur- 
 dities has it made feveral Italian Authors guilty ? 
 Who would not laugh to hear Rsmbo cry that the 
 Pope was Elected by the favour of the Immortal 
 Gods ? Deorum Immonalium bcneficiis. There are alfb 
 certain Poets that imagin it to be eflential to Pcerryj 
 to introduce the Pagan Divinities into their Poems f 
 and rhus a certain German Poer, being defervedl/' 
 repTOv'q by Picttt "Mirandula , for having introduc'd 
 inte a Poem which he made of the V/ars of the 
 Chriftians, all the Pagan Divinities, and intermix'^, 
 Apafto , Diana and Mercury with the Pope, theTtn- : 
 ?>erour and the Electors, maintains that had he not' 
 Jo done, he had been no Poet ; and to prove his 
 aflenion alledges for a ftrange Reafon,that the Ver- 
 ft-s of Hfiod t Hffmer and^i'r^'/, are full of the Names 
 and Fables of the Gods. Whence he concludes it 
 lawful for him to do the fame. 
 
 T'beJe ralfe arguments are imperceptible to thofe 
 :at make 'em, and deceive them firlt of all. They 
 ife'oii7.7/ii:d with the found of words and the Luftre 
 >w tneir Figure dnik-s 'em, and the pomp of cer- 
 ^.in v/urds alhires '^m rnawAres to thoughts fb vain 
 *a fnvolour, that if they did bii; make any refle- 
 xion
 
 Chap. XX. The Art of Thinking. 
 
 xion upon s em, they would certainly reject 'em 
 themfelves. 
 
 Is it credible,that a Writer of this age Ihould be 
 fo in Love with the word Veftal^ as to life it in an 
 Argument to perfwade a young Lady not to be a~ 
 fliam'd to learn the Latin Tongue, telling her that 
 fhe need not be afharn d to (peak a Language,whlch 
 the Veftals fpoke. For had he weigh'd the force ot 
 his Argument, he could not but have apprehended 
 that he might as well have told the Lady, that 
 fte needed not be afhamed to fpeak a Langaga, 
 which all tbe HOMM Cttrtefans fpoke, who were Far 
 more numerous than the Vefiali -, or that (he needed 
 not to be afhamed to fpeak uny other Language 
 than that of her own Country , fmce the I'sfa* 
 [pake no other. All thefe Arguments that fignifie 
 nothing, are as good as any that Author brings ; 
 and the truth is, the Vfjlab can do him no Service 
 to juftifie or condemn fuch young Ladies that learn 
 Latin. 
 
 Such falfe Reafonings as thefe whicH we meet 
 with frequently in the Writings of fuch Authors as 
 effe& Eloquence, make it appear hoW much it con- 
 cerns thofe perfbns that fpeak or write, to keep clofe 
 to that excellent Rule, that there is nothing lonely but 
 b*t n true ; which would prune off an inhnite num- 
 ber of falfe thoughts, and vain Embtllifhments trom 
 their Writings. True it is that this exaiSnefa ren- 
 ,ders the ftile lefs Pompous , and more Barren ; 
 but it renders it more lively, more ferious, more 
 clear, and more becoming a candid Ingenuity 
 R It:
 
 $66 Logic : Or, Part lit- 
 
 It makes a deeper Impreflion, and more durable. 
 Whereas that which arifts from Periods adjufted,' 
 ..is fo fuperficial, that it vanifhea almoft as foon as 
 I ht Periods are heard. 
 
 Ill 
 
 There is another fault very frequent a-mong Men, 
 to >jdg raflily of the Actions and Intentions of o- 
 ihers, which is occasioned by a falfe Reasoning, by 
 n^ans cf ^which, not difcerning all the caufcs that 
 may produce fome c;ffe<5r, we atiribute the effect 
 precifely to one caule, when it may. have been pro- 
 duced by feveral others. Or elfe we fuppofe that 2 
 eaufe, which by accident has one effea at one time, 
 as being join'u to feveral Circuffiftanccs. ought to 
 have the fame effect at other times. 
 
 _ Suppofc fbme Learned man be of the fame opi- 
 nion with a Heretick in fome matter altogether di- 
 ftin&from things controverted in Religion^ prefenr- 
 ly fome malicious Adverfary will conclude, that he 
 has a kindnefs for Heretics j but he may conclude 
 raflily and maliciously , becaufe that perhaps only 
 Reafon and Truth confirm him in his Opinion. 
 
 Suppofe fome Writer fhouid vehemently inveigh 
 agiinit any opinion that he thinks dangerous : forae 
 will accufe him of Hatred and Anlrnofity againft 
 the Author that maintained ir, but unjuftly and 
 raflily ; in regard this vehemence may arife from 
 - ^' a ! for T ruih * ^ weli ^ from hatrecCagaiVl the 
 
 JPCLTiQIlS*? "i * 
 
 ^ e 10 tc 3)0 sjfetn 
 >rjd"r v cr !
 
 Chap. XX. Tfo Art of Thinking. 
 
 Suppofe a Man be a friend to a wicked Per fon ; 
 fome prefently will conclude him to be an .** ' 
 plice with the other in his Crime, ; whtch ***** 
 follow, fince he may be ignorant of e , aifc 
 he may never have given his content. - 
 
 Some Perfon may have fa.ld in paying that r 
 fpea which he ought to have done where w 
 due. This Man, cry they, is proud and Ififo 
 when perhaps it may be only Inadvertency, 01 
 Forgetfukiefs. r , 
 
 Ail exterior things are only equivocal figns, that 
 13 to fay, fuch as may fignifie federal thirds, a: . 
 therefore it will be rafhnefs in him to deterir:;! this 
 fign to any particular thing, without feme particu- 
 lar Reafoi.. Silence is fotneumes a fign of Mo- 
 defty and Judgment, fometimes ot a Brute. ;lay 
 and Hefiration foroetimes denotes Prudence, fome 
 timeg dulnefs of Mind. Change is foravmes a fign 
 of Inconftancy, fometimes of Sincerity. 
 Is a point of ill-reafoning to cor.clade a Kfer. mpon- 
 ftant, meerly becaufc he has changed his Opimoa, 
 for he may have reafbn fo to do. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Falfe Induaions by which we draw from general 
 Propoiitions particular Experiments, are one oF the 
 moft common Ssurces of falfe Rcafoning among 
 Men. We need not above three or four Examples 
 to form an Axiom, and common Place ; of which 
 we may afterwards make ufe as of a Principle to 
 decide all things. R^
 
 * a w e n 
 
 the moft able Phyhcians, fo that Remedies are ma 
 ny time, ot hrtle Efficacy. From hence fome Hot 
 fpurs conclude, that Phyfic altogether unprofia 
 bank* Ph > fldans no ^tter than Moun 
 
 There are Tome Women wanton and unchaft 
 I his is enough for thofe that are jealous to have an 
 ! opnion of thofe that are chaft and honed, and 
 lor licentious Authors to condemn all in general. 
 
 I here nre Tome per/bns that conceal great vices 
 under a ftew of piety ; f rom whence Llbertims 
 conclude that all Devotion is Hypocrite. 
 
 There are fome things obfcure and concealed 
 
 and we are fometimes grofly mifhken 5 therefore 
 
 ay the tnoem and new Pjrrboniam, all things are 
 
 Mcure and uncertain, and we cannot certainly dif 
 
 cern^the truth from falfhood. 
 
 There is an inequality among the aaions of fome 
 
 5 this is fuftcient to frame a common place, 
 
 out of which no Man fliall be exceptcd. ^/, f ay 
 
 ^hey, n fo Jefetlw, and fo bhnd, that what thin,, J< 
 
 * 
 
 > 
 
 lt are the Jams things, all Subjtfs Dually, and 
 Nature in general, difavow, it, Junfdiftion. W think 
 cfnotbmg that we have a W t H to, but at the ^ In. 
 Pantwebw a mil to ,> and we w>U no^ng f ree ^ 
 nvkmg abfolutelj, nothing conflantly. 
 
 The greatcft part of the Wurld pronounce the 
 Virtues and V 1C es of others only in general and 
 Hyperbolical Terms. Out of which particular aas 
 
 they
 
 _ _ _____ 
 
 Chap.XX. The Art of Tbi 
 
 they infer Habit ; out of three or four defaults 
 Cuftom. That which happens once a Month, or 
 once a Year happens every day, every hour, every 
 moment in the Bifcourfe of Men. So little care do 
 they take in their Words , and the Bounds of 
 Verity and Juftice. 
 
 
 Tis a piece of Weaknefs and Injustice, often 
 condemn*d and little avoided, to judg of COUB- 
 fels by Events , and to render guiky of all the 
 bad enfuing Consequences, thofe who have taken 
 a prudent Refolution according ta all the Cir- 
 ! cumftances which they could forcfee ; either 
 through the bare chance or malice of thofe that 
 crofs'd 'cm , or through fome other Accidents 
 which they could not pofllbly forefee. 
 
 Men not only live to be as fortunate as wife, but 
 they make no difference between fortunate and wife, 
 nor between unfortunate and wicked. This diiKncttr 
 on they look upon as too nice. We are ingenious to 
 find out the defects that we believe occasioned our 
 bad fuccefs. And like Aftrologers when they arc 
 certain 01 an AccTdenr, ffiil not to fi-id out the Ai- 
 peel: of the Star that produced ff. In iike manner 
 after Calamities and Misfortunes, we never fail tg 
 pafs ourCcnftires upon the perf()n, tha: he deicrvcd 
 > em by hh ImpYuocnce. He did noc 'fucceed, thsre^ 
 fore he was in the wrong. Thus they reafon in the 
 World, and thus they have always feafcned ; be- 
 R ",
 
 Logic: Or t Part III. 
 
 eaufe the judgments of Men have always wanted 
 the guidance of Equity, and for that not knowing 
 the true Caufes of things, they fubftitute others ac- 
 cording to the Events, . extolling the fucccfsful, and 
 condemning the Unfortunate. 
 
 V I. 
 
 But there is. no fo fort of falfe Reafoning more 
 frequent than when we judg rafhly of the Truth,by 
 venue of fuch an Authority which is not fuffident 
 ro^aflureus , or when we, decide the bottom of 
 things by the manner tf their being Propounded. 
 The 'one fs called a Sophifm of Authority, the other 
 Sophi/m of the Manner. 
 
 That we may underfland how frequently we fall 
 Into the/e SopHiffru we need only confider, that the 
 jaoft part of Men never believe one opinion more 
 than &nother,upon folid and effemial Reafons,vhich 
 v/ould difplay the Truth, but upon certain outward 
 marks, which are more agreeable, or at leaft tern 
 more agreeable to Trurh than Falfhood. 
 
 " The reafcnis, that the internal verity of things 
 m frequently conceal'd i that the Underftandings 
 of Men are weak and dark, fyll of Clouds a,id 
 ralfe Lights, whereas the external marks are clear 
 and perceptible. So that Men being raoreeafilj in- 
 enncd to what is moft facile, they always take that 
 fide where they fee the external marks that are & 
 Wy di&ernablc, 
 
 The?
 
 Chap. XX. The Art rf Thinking 3 7* 
 
 They may be reduced to two principal Head'*, 
 the Authorky of the Propoitoder, and the 1 man- 
 ner of Propounding. And thefe two ways are fo 
 powerful, that they draw after 'em the Aflent of 
 almoft all underftandmgs. 
 
 And therefore God who defign'iJ, that the cer- 
 tain knowledg of the Myfterles of Faith, might 
 be acquir'd by the meaneft capacities, among tfee 
 Faithful, vouchfaf'd to conddcend to the Infirmity 
 of Human Under (landings , which he would noL 
 therefore have depend upon a particular examina- 
 tion of the points, which are propos'd to us to be- 
 lieve, bur hasgiven us, for a certain Rule, the Au- 
 thority of the Univerfal Church, which is the Pro- 
 pofer of thefe Articles 5 which being clear and un- 
 doubted, retrieves our underftandings from that La* 
 berynth) where particular difcuffious of Myfteries, 
 would of neceffiry engage it. 
 
 Therefore in matters of Faith, the authority of 
 the Univer&l Church is entirely decifive j and fo 
 far it -js ifom being fubject to error, that we never 
 fall into error, but when we wander from its au- 
 thorky, and refufe to fiibmit to it. 
 '. V/e alfo draw convincing Arguments in marten 
 of Religion, from the manner of their Wing pro> 
 pounded. 
 
 For example, when we find thtf for thefe many 
 Ages of the Church, efpeciaJiy in 'thefe latter agc,? 9 
 that fo many perfons have eno'esvoured to cftablifl-.; 
 their opinions by Fire and Sword, when we have 
 teen 'era arm'd againft trie Church with Schifm, a- 
 
 gainil
 
 Logic: Qr 9 Part 
 
 gainft ihe Temporal Magiftrare, ,wkh Rebellion 
 .when we have ieen People without ordinary M 
 ^pn, wiihout Miracles, without any marks of Pi 
 87, but rather .with fenllble marks of Impiety, U i 
 tertake to change the Faith and Difcipline of tl 
 Church, fijch a criminal manner of propounding 
 -more than fufficiem, to caule all rational Perfons i 
 lejecl the thing propounded, and to prevent it 
 meaner fort from liftening to fuch Arguments 
 
 But in things the knowledg of which is not abf, 
 lutely neceflary,and where God has left every Ms 
 co his own particular reafon, Authority and Mai 
 aer^of propounding, ferve only to engage fever 
 perions in judgment contrary to the Truth 
 
 We do not undertake here to give Laws an 
 prefcnbe Rules and precife Limits of that refpei 
 which we owe to Authority in Human Things 
 but to mark out fome grofs miftakes that are cora 
 irrtred, touching this matter. 
 
 Sometimes we only regard the number of T< 
 ftimonies, rot confidering whether number be tfc 
 noft. probable Argument, that we have found w 
 
 1 - T j-fe F , r 3S a Auth r f chJs a 8 e has obfe; 
 ved in difficult ihmgs,Truth difcovers iffelf to one 
 fooner than to many.There.fore this is no good COB 
 fcquence : This opinion is upheld by a great nun, 
 oer of Phiiofophers, therefore it is true. 
 
 Sometimes we are perfwaded by certain qualkie 
 wd ! endowments pf Men,which have no coherent 
 with the truth of things which are difcoiu-fed of 
 tnere are a great number pf people that be
 
 Chap. XX. fb*. Arrof Thinking. ' 373 
 
 lieve without" any other examination, 'thofe that are 
 more aged and have'' more experience ; tho tnfi 
 things believU neither depend upon age nor expe- 
 rience, but the acutenefs of undcrftanding. 
 
 Piety, Wifdom, Moderation, are without doubt 
 qualities the moft to' be e'fteemed in the World,, and 
 there is a g^eat Authority due to fuch perfons, in 
 things- that depend uporf'Piety, Sincerity and an 
 Illumination from God, probably more .particular- 
 ly conferr'd upon thole, that ferve him moft purely. 
 But there are an infinite number of things that on- 
 ' ly depend upon human Intellect , human Experi- 
 ; ence and human Penetration. In which things, 
 they who have the-greaieft ad vantages' of wit and 
 ftudy, merit more belief than others. Neverthelefi 
 the contrary often happens, and moft Men think 
 k moft fafe to follow in the &me,the opinion of the 
 greateft number. 
 
 Which comes to pdS'tt'.ptfrt From hence, . that 
 the(e advantages of v/it are 'riot .fo conTplcuous, as 
 -the exterior Regularity, which appears in perfons 
 of piety, and partly, for that Men nerer 'care to 
 make d'iftSn&ions. Thele diftincl'lons confound 'em ; 
 ; fo- that 'they will have all or nothing. If they 
 give credit to any perfbri in fome things , they 
 believe him in all things j if they give no cre- 
 dit to another Man, they believe him in nothing. 
 They love thofe ways that are (hor't , dccifive 
 and compendious. But this humour, though u- 
 lual, is contrary to reafbn ; which (hews us, that 
 tke (kme perfcns ddnot merit belief in all things, 
 
 bccaufe
 
 374 Lozici Or. Part g 
 
 becaufe they are not eminent in all things, and tha 
 it is a deprav'd mode of concluding This i, 
 
 C 
 
 fn dl C 
 
 VII. 
 
 True ,t isthat there are fome pardonable error*, 
 fuch asarethofe, when we give a greater 
 
 eater epe 
 
 to the Opinions of thofe whom we efteera tube 
 me i?Qj& But there is one delufioo, much 
 more abfurd ,n,t felf, and which is nevenhelefs 
 J7 frcqu< :nr ; which is to believe that a Man f 
 
 n pea 
 
 ^l^S t a , p ^ of ^. 
 
 Not that any Perfon expre/ly makes thefe Cwi- 
 clufions He has a Hundred Thoufand LivreH 
 y f\ r rC hC JS Wif ^ He is nobly defend 
 
 Let the fame thing be propos'd by 
 
 us, touching this 
 
 Cert4ia
 
 :haaXX. The Art of Thinking. 37? 
 
 Certain it is, that complacency and flattery have 
 great (hare in the approbation which is given t< 
 ic adions and words of Perfons of Quality, and 
 -hich oft- times they draw to themfelves by a certain 
 xternal Grace, and manner of Behaviour, noble, 
 'ee and natural. Which is fometimes fo peculiar to 
 tiemfelves,that it is hardly to be imitated by thofe 
 ?ho are of a low and mean Birth.But as certain it is 
 hat there are alfo feveral, who approve all that 
 rteat Men fay and do, out of an inward pronenels 
 >f fpirit, which bows under the burden of Gran- 
 deur, and which has not a fight ftrong enough to 
 ibide its Luftre ; and that the exterior Pomp which 
 gnvirons thofe great Men, impofcs not a -little, and 
 makes feme impreflion upon the more prudent fort. 
 
 The reafon of this deception, proceeds from the 
 Corruption of the Heart of Man, who having a 
 burning pafl'ion for honour and pleafure, neceffun- 
 ly conceives a great love for Wealth and -^ Riches, 
 and thofe other qualities whereby they acquire both 
 pleafures and honour. Now the Love which they 
 have for all thefe things that the World admires, is 
 the reafon that they are efteem'd happy who en- 
 joy 'em j and judging them happy, they place 
 thofe Perfons above themfelves, and look upon em 
 as eminent and exalted. Which cuftom infenfibly 
 glides frcm the confideration of their Fortunes, to 
 the confideration of their Minds. Meo do not u- 
 fually do things by halves. And therefore they give 
 the Rich and Potent a Soul as exalted, as their 
 condition ; and this is the reafon of that great crc-
 
 ^ Which,hey meet wirh in all Affair,, that the } 
 
 But this delufion is much more prevalent in the 
 great ones themfelves, who are not careful to cor 
 re^ that uapt-effion, which -their fortune natuSh 
 in their minds, as well as in the minds of 
 their Inferiors. For there are few of 'em < 
 whom Riches and Dignities have not the weight dl 
 leafon , and who do not believe that their opinions 
 
 and judgments are fuperior to the judgments of thofe 
 that are beneath 'em. They cannot brook that** 
 Tons whom they look upon with contempt ^ 
 pretend to have fo much reafbn and ' 
 
 uconer em, as things entirely St ranger5 
 
 * 
 
 t0 
 
 R 
 n Body and Soul, but th-u their 
 
 b. ,hr to,, and 
 
 look 
 
 If 
 
 35 
 
 to 
 the reft of 
 
 human
 
 -XX. * Art v-*g- 377 
 
 .uman Race : Their Imaginations never intermix 
 >ith rhe common crowd of Men. They arc al- 
 ways Counts or Dans in their own Eyes, never meer 
 Mortals j and fo they cat a Soul and a judgment, 
 ccording to the Propofition of their Fortune.' And 
 relieve themfelves no lefs above others in their Un- 
 ierftanding, than they towre above 'em in Wealth 
 nd Dignity. 
 
 The Felly of Men is fuch, that tnere is nothing 
 )f which they do not make ufe to aggrandize the 
 Vfo, which they have of theaafebcs. A fumptupus 
 cioufe, a Magnificent habit, and a great Perriwigg 
 nakes him efteem himfelf more learned than others ; 
 ind if we take a nearer obfervation, .we (hall find* 
 hat fome believe them Pelves wifcr a Horfe-back or 
 n a Coach, than a Foot. 
 
 *Tis an cafie thing to perfwade the world^ that 
 here is nothing more ridiculous than thofc judg- 
 inents^ but it is' a difficult thing to exempt 'em from 
 the fecret Impreffion, which thefe exterior thing?, 
 I make in the mind. All that can be done, is to as- 
 '. cuftom cur felves as much as in us lies,not to give 
 any Authority to any of thefe qualities that GO not 
 contribute to the finding out of Truth : Nor to 
 them neither, farther than as they contribute dt- 
 aively. Age, Knowledg, Study, Experience, 
 Wit, Vivacity, Moderation, Accurateneft, Labour, 
 ferve to find out the Truth of things conceaTd,and 
 fo far thefe qualities deferve to be refpeaed. But 
 they are diligently to be weigh'd,and afterwards to 
 be compar'J with contrary Reafons, For from a-
 
 : Or, 
 
 fT !n p - articular> thcre !s nothin g 
 
 of certainty ; fince there arc falfef 
 nipns that have been approv'd by Perfons of 
 
 VIII 
 
 .There is yet fomething more deceitful in the fur- 
 prrceswh-charife from the manner. For we " 
 to Wfc?e that 
 
 mcuraliy enclin'd to Wfc?e that Mjn has 
 
 who fpKs w,th a Grace, fluently, with gravity 
 
 w, h rnoderanon, an d fwee,nef s , and to believe ,| 
 
 h" cTivelv T S - u 2t fpeaks ^ P^""^. 
 W " h PrefUmf " i0n " * 
 
 K t ' tlle " 
 
 , _ but by theft exterior and fenfible m M . 
 
 but that we raufl be often fe 
 c feme Perfons that utter their 
 
 w - 
 , who bemg naturally brisk and airy, or'lefi 
 
 ^ T P^"" th " 'Pl* <h Ge- 
 
 ttoVf5 n T. S ' HaTC n le ' s trurh h WCT o 
 fide. There arefome Men of mean and fuper- 
 
 fa capacK.e,, who having been bred ., C L, 
 where they more d,I,gen,!y ftudyand praaife the 
 
 f/n,,' I P nc (' than in othcr P !a ^. haw 
 
 whth U TO T S ' hat are ^ P ka "g. "*r 
 "ch they make pafs for current many falfe jud e - 
 nt, whBc others not hairing thofe outward ern- 
 
 Ulifh-
 
 XX. The Art of Thinking. 
 
 , ^ 
 
 
 to avoid thofe irkfome manners that only fer 
 
 SUe We C "remember, to wh* we incend 
 ro oerfwade, 'tis not of fo much importance to
 
 -" 
 
 Logic : 
 
 Partlf! 
 
 
 to 
 
 they 
 
 tributes
 
 dap. XX. The. Art jof Thinking. 3.$! 
 
 joutes to himfelf. So that if he be eager and im- 
 pious, he alienates the minds of his auditors ; be- 
 cjfe it-feems, -as if he would carry by his Autho- 
 ry and a kind of Tyranny, what he ought to ob- 
 t n by reafbn and perfwafion. ,1 jpjKfieot* 
 
 [This Injuftice is much greater, when it aakes.-uitr 
 k thefe difpleafing manners, to combat and over- 
 row opinions commonly receiv'd. .For the. rea- 
 jh of a particular ;.perfon, may be preferr'd before 
 hat of feveral, when it is moft in the right, but no 
 ijivate perfon ought to pretend his Authority to be 
 fjore prevalent than the judgment , of all others. 
 I, So that not only Modtfty and Prudence, but Ju- 
 liiee it felf, obliges us to an humble and fubmiffive 
 5 ir of Reafoning, when we combat commonly re- 
 \ rived opinions,or a confirm,'d Authority ; otherwife 
 \ lat Injuftice can never be avoided of oppofing pri- 
 [ ite to public and universal Authority, or at leaft 
 he chiefeft and beft eftablifh'd. We. cannot fhew 
 bo much moderation.; when Wfi^Q about tatrou-* 
 Re the pofleflion of a received opinion , or a belief 
 JHat hasbaen fix'd time out of mind } which isfo 
 
 uf , that St. Auftin extends the fame to the Verities 
 > f Religion ; having given this excellent Rule to all 
 Jhofe that are oblig'dto inftrucl: others. 
 
 See, faith he, what method the Prudent and Pious 
 
 latholio Teachers take, in what they are hound to 
 \ each others. If they are things common and autho- 
 \ i$ed, they profofe 'em after a nioft ajjiired manner, 
 -ind which teftifia nothing of doubt, j/st with all the 
 
 Ivtetnefs and 'mildnefi 4m agin able. Hut if they be 
 
 tbingt
 
 j^ Logic : Or, PartllL 
 
 things which are extraordinary, though they are JmL 
 things which, they clearly kno to be true, ytt t & 
 rvher frofofe *em at doubtful ytefans 5 and to\ 
 examined, then & Axioms and Maxims, that in tfa 
 they may condefcend t0 tht infirmity ef the Auditon 
 Or t f it be * Truth fi fuUime, that , 4 *w the 
 reach ef thofe to whom it is frofounded, they rather 
 chufe to fnfpreft 4> for fimetin* , that their Hearers 
 may have time to encreafe their IpovteJge, and en- 
 large their capacities, than to drover it to *em, in the 
 height ef their weokpefs, tohen if would but am**, and 
 their underjlandingt. 
 
 The End of the Third Part. 
 
 
 LOGIC 
 
 i
 
 LOGIC: 
 
 O R, T H E 
 
 ART 
 
 O F 
 
 THINKING. 
 
 PART IV. 
 
 Concerning METHOD. 
 
 IT remains for us to difcourfe, touching the 
 Fourth part of Logic,which concerns Method, 
 which without doubt is the mod profitable and 
 important part. We thought it requilite to 
 incert into this part, that which relates to De- 
 monftration} which does not ufually confift in any 
 
 one
 
 Log 
 
 ic 
 
 _____ Part rc 
 
 S^sa*^> 
 
 FaSaSSSSc** 
 
 tra ^n- h ^ m ""ft s^t ., c - >to pene 
 
 
 over-
 
 Chap I. The Art of Thinking. 385- 
 
 iver-rule us,whether it be Authority or Reafon;If ic 
 je Authority, which caufes us to imbrace what is 
 propofed this is that which is called Faith j If it be 
 ,-eafon, then where this Reafon does not produce 
 in entire Convidlion, but leaves fbme doubt {till 
 Behind, this Acquiefcency of the Mind accompa- 
 lied with fome fort of diffatisfadlion is called 
 >pinicn. 
 
 i But if Reafon clearly convinces us, then wher 
 ic is not clear, but only to outward appearance, and 
 for want of attention, then the perfwafion which ic 
 produces, proves an Error, if Jt be falfe in reality; 
 or at leaft a faife Judgment, if being true in it felf, 
 we have not reafon (Sufficient to believe it true. 
 
 But if this Reafbn be not only apparent but folid 
 and true, which is found out by a more diligent and 
 exacl: attention, by a more rm Perfwafion, and 
 by the quality of perfpicuity, which is more lively 
 knd more penetrating, then the Conviction which 
 this Reafon produces, is calkd Knowlcdg, about 
 which many queftlons arile. 
 
 The nrft is, whether there be any fuch Know- 
 lcdg, that is to fay, whether we have any Know- 
 ledg grounded upon clear and certain Reufons ; cr 
 m gcnecal, whether we have any clear and certain 
 knowledg ; for this queflion relates as well to llo- 
 derftanding as to Knowledg. 
 
 There are fome Philofophers who make it their 
 
 Profeflion to deny this Knowledg, and who have 
 
 i raifed the whole Structure of iheir Philofbphy upo 
 
 this Foundation. -Of which Philosophers jfomc there
 
 386 Logic i Or, Part IV. 
 
 are who deny Certainty, admitting Probability ,and 
 rhefe are the new Academic! : the other forr, who 
 are the Pyrrhonians , deny even Probability it fel 
 pretending that all things are equally uncertain. 
 
 But the truth is, ihat all thefe opinions that have 
 made fuch a noife in the World, had never any fub- 
 fiftenee but only in Difcourfes, Difputes and Wri- 
 tings, and that no Man was ever otherwise perfwa- 
 ded, but that they were only the Toys and Diiiri- 
 ums of ingenious perfbns that had nothing elfe to 
 do, but never fuch Sentiments of which they were 
 entirely fo fatisfy'd as to walk and ftand by 
 thofe Maxims, as the Rules of Life. And therefore 
 the beft way to convince thefe Philofophcrs, is to 
 cite 'em to the Tribunal ok their Consciences, and 
 fincere Hor.efty,and to ask 'em after all thefe difcour- 
 fes, by which they endeavour to (hew that there is 
 no difference between fleeping and waking, nor be- 
 twcen Madncte, and being in a Man's Sences, whe- 
 ther they du> not verily believe at the lame time, 
 in defpite of all their Reafon?, that they are both a- 
 \vake, and in their Wits 5 and whether if they had 
 but the Icaft remainder of Ingenuity, they would 
 rtot give the Lye to all thefe Vanities and Subtiicies, 
 and frankly confefs that they could never believe 
 thefe things, though they fhould make it never fo 
 much their endeavour. 
 
 But if there ftiould be any perfon , who fibou'd 
 doubt whether he were awske, or in his Sences, or 
 coukl believe that the Exigency of all exterior things 
 ** uncertain, and that he -qu^Kons whether there 
 
 bs
 
 Chap I. The Art of Thinking. 387 
 
 be a Sun, a Moon, or anyfuch thing as Matter,yet 
 no Man could ever doubt, as St. Auflin affirms, 
 whether he be, whether he think, or whether he 
 live. For whether he be afleep or awake, whether 
 in or out of his Wits, whether he be deceiv'd or not 
 deceiv'd ; it is certain at leaft, that while he thinks, 
 he both K and lives, it being impoflible to feparate 
 "Being and Life from Thought, and to believe that 
 he who thinks he neither is nor lives. So that 
 from this clear, certain and unqueftionable Know- 
 ledg, may be drawn a Rule, whereby to approve 
 all thofe thoughts as true and clear, which appear 
 to a Man like this. 
 
 It is impofiible alfb to doubt of the Percepti- 
 ons of the Senfes by feparating 'em from their Ob- 
 ject. For whether there be a Sun or an Earth or no ; 
 certain it is that I imagin I fee one. I am certain that 
 1 am in doubt while I doubt, that I believe I fee, 
 when I doubt whether I believe I fee ; and I be- 
 lieve I hear, when I queftion whether I believe I 
 hear,and therefore not extending our thoughts be-. 
 \ yond thofe things which are a6bd in the Mind it 
 | jelf, and confidering what is only done there, 
 ' we (hall find there an Infinite number of Cer* 
 tainties.of which it is Impoffible to doubt. 
 
 Which Confideration may ferve to decide ano- 
 ther queftion which arifes upon this Subject ; which 
 is, whether thofe things are only perceiv'd by the 
 ; Mind, are more or lels certain than thole things 
 which we underftand by the Sences ? for it is clear 
 by what we have (aid, that we are more aflurecf 
 3 \- of
 
 3 8*8 Logic : Or, Part IV. 
 
 of our Perceptions and Meat , which we only know- 
 by the Reflexion of our Minds,then we are of all ihe 
 objects of our Senfes. We may alfb fay, that tho 5 
 our Senfes do not always deceive us in the report of 
 things which they make us, yet that the afTurance 
 we have, that they do not deceive us,does not pro- 
 ceed from our Senfes, but from a reflexion of the 
 Mind, by which we difcern when we oughr, and 
 when we ought nor, to believe our Sences. 
 
 And therefore we muft acknowledg that St. Au- 
 flin after Plato, had reafbn to affirm, that the judg- 
 ment of Truth, and the Rule to difcern it belongs 
 not to .the Senfes, .but to the Mind. And that the 
 aflurance to be depended on from the Sence?, is 
 of no large extent, and that there are many 
 things which we believe we know by the Sences, 
 of which we cannot fay, that we have any abfoluce 
 ncrtaiaty. 
 
 For example, we may know by the Sences that 
 on Body is bigger than another ; but we cannot 
 know certainly what is the true and natural bignefs 
 of every Body ; for the manifeftation of which, we 
 are only to confider, . that if all the World had ne- 
 ver look'd upon exterior objects, but with multiply- 
 ing GlafleSjCertain it is,they would not have fhap'd 
 thofe Bodies and meafures of Bodies otherwife than 
 according to the Bignefs repreiented by the Magni- 
 fy ing- glafles,Now our Eyes are Magnify ing-glafies, 
 fcnd whether we knownotpreeifely, wediminiflior 
 enlarge the objects which we fee. Or, whether the 
 Magnifying-Glaijes, which we believe to 
 
 augment :
 
 Chap I. the Art of Thinking. 
 
 perfons in meifuring, agree togetoer, that luch , 
 Body does not contain above five Foot, 7* !* 
 that which one Man mean, by one ***" 
 another means by the lame met fore. For one ,0.- 
 ceives what is reprefented to him by hit Eyes , ana 
 the fame thing; yet it may b 
 perfon do not reprefent , c 
 
 ^Hotever.there S, great Probab!H t y,h tUU d^ 
 
 ference is not very great S.|*f ,** 
 
 n y difference ia the forrmng of the Eye, able lo 
 produce a change fo remae or tho our 
 
 e, if the Judgment of the 
 be any way vincertai, fo 
 nor ha we any re.fon to conclude that 
 isany more certainty in any other report. o 
 te SenSVor if I'do not know precifely what 
 the abfolute and Bat ural bignefi of n Elephant. 
 S 3 IWW "
 
 39 Logic: Or , p art ly 
 
 however I know , hat an 
 
 For there are fome things to be known clearl 
 and certamly There are other things, the tru^ 
 of whA we do not u yet clearly J*sSa? 
 
 fell' A 1 /.^ WC may hopetounderftan 
 hereafter. And there are other things which it i 
 I-npoffible that we ftould underftand lith certainty 
 ther becaufe we are ignorant of the Principle
 
 f Chap. I. The Art of Thinking. 3 9 1 
 
 fwhich it would be ridiculous to confine within the 
 f narrow Limits of our llnderftandings ; and gene- 
 t rally, as to whatever partakes of Infinity. For our 
 lUnderftanding being finite, lofts it (elfin the Laby- 
 E rinth of Infinity j and lies overwhelm'd under the 
 b multitude of thoughts, contradicting one another. 
 
 Hence may be drawn the moft convenient and 
 I fhorteft folurion of many queftions, about which 
 f there will be no end of difputing,fb long as Men are 
 infeded with the Itch of difpute, in regard they ci 
 | never be able to arrive at any certain knowledg. 
 5 whereby to affure and fix the Underftanding. Is Jt 
 poffible any creature fhould be created'from Eterai- 
 ' ty ? Is it poMible for God to make a Body infinite 
 in quantity, a movement infinite in fwiftnefs, a 
 multitude infinite in number Ms a number infinirc 
 evcn or odd ? Is one infinite more extenfive than air- 
 other ? He that fhould nnfwer once for all, I know 
 nothing of it, may be laid to have made as fair a 
 Progress in a moment, as he that had been beating 
 his Brains twenty years, about thefe Niceties. The 
 only difference between thefe Perfbns i&,that he that 
 drudges day and night about thefe Queftions, is m 
 the greateft d mger of falling a degree, lower than 
 bare Ignorance ; which is.to believe he knows that 
 which he knows not at all. 
 
 There are alfo an infinite number of Metaphyfi- 
 cal Queftions,which being far remote and abftra&ed 
 from Principles clearly known^can never be refblv'd : 
 So that the fared way is, for a Man to rid himfelf 
 of 'em the fooneft he qan , and after we have flight- 
 
 S 4 ly
 
 392. Logic : Or, Part IV 1 1 J 
 
 |y read what has been faid of 'em , to rcfolve t'l < 
 unlearn 'em again. 
 
 Nt/cire qtttdam magn* far* fapienti<e. 
 
 By which means, ridding our felvei of vain ancl 
 ufelefs fcrutinies, we (hall be the more able to make! 
 a fairer progrefs in fuch things as are more proper- 1 
 tionable to our underflandings. 
 
 Moreover,we arc to underftand, that there are I 
 feme things which are incomprehenfible in their I 
 manner, yet certain in their exiftency, we cannot! 
 comprehend how they are, however it is certain, I 
 they are. 
 
 What is more incomprehenfible than Eternity ? I 
 and yet at the fame time what is more certain ? In- 1 
 fornuch that they , who through a deteftable blind- j 
 nefs, have defaced in their minds the knowledge of j 
 God, are conftrain'd to attribute it to the vileft and i 
 moft contemptible of Beings, which is Mitter. 
 
 How can we comprehend, that the fmalleft At- 
 torn of Matter is divisible to Infinity, and that we 
 can never come to fb fmall a part,that does not on- 
 ly enclole feveral others, but alfb an infinity of o- 
 ther parts. That a fmall grain of Wheat encloses 
 In it felf as many parts, though leffer in proportion 
 as the whole world ? That all imaginable figures are 
 a&ually there to be found, and that it contains a 
 lirtle world in it felf with all its parts, a Sun, a Hea- 
 ven, Stars, Planets and an Earth , in a moft admi- 
 ja>le correspondency of Proportion ? What can 
 
 that
 
 - j Chap. I. The Art of Thinking. 393 
 
 ^ :hat part of this little World be, which anfwers t 
 lithe bignefi of a grain of Wheat ; and what a ftu- 
 , pendious exiguity muft that be, of which we may 
 ' truly (ay, that it is fuch in refpecl of a grain o 
 r Wheat, as a grain of Wheat is compar x d with the 
 j whole World ? Neverthelefs this part which is fa 
 . j incomprehenfible to us, contains another proportio- 
 jjnable World, and fb ad infinitum ; there being ftill 
 [no part which does not comprehend as many pro- 
 , portional parts as the World, how large (bever ws 
 
 make ic. 
 
 .] ! Thefe things are above Conception ; yet nece 
 i'farily they muft be fb, becaufe the divifibility o 
 ! Matter is demonftrable, as appears by the proofs 
 ; whkb Geometry furnilhes us with, as clear as any 
 v which (he produces. 
 
 For this Science fliews us, that there are fbme 
 ? lines which have no common Meafure, which for 
 i that reafbn are caird Incommenfurable, as the Dia* 
 k gonal and fides of a Square. Now if this Diago- 
 t nal and fides were compos'd of a certain number o 
 [ divifible Parts, one of thefe parts would be the com- 
 mon meafare of thole Lines; and by confequence 
 1 it would be impoffible that thofe two Lines ihould 
 be compos'd of Indivifible parts. 
 
 Secondly, The (ame Science reaches us, that it fa 
 impbflibie that a fquare Number (hould be doub! 
 another fquare Number ,, and yet 'tis poffible for an 
 extended Square to be double to another extended 
 Square. Now if thefe two Squares were compos'd 
 
 the great Square 
 S 5:
 
 394 Logic . Or, Partnr. 
 
 would Icontam double as many parts as the 
 
 rs as te e( 
 
 fcoth be.. , U are, there would be a fquare N u 
 to Bother f.uare N UB1 bel whlchl, 
 
 ' nothl " n g 
 
 rhat 
 
 

 
 Jhap.T 'TbeArtoffkinkitif,. 
 
 ie bottom of the Ship, to the Eye of the Perfoa 
 >oking from rhe Port, through a Glafs or TranF 
 arent Body (hall pafs through a certain point ot 
 le Glafs, and the Horizontal Kadiw Ihall pals 
 arough another fcmewhat more Elevated. Now 
 js the Veflcl makes Sail, the point of the H*diut 
 hat terminates at the bottom of the Ship, (hall al- 
 lays mount, and infinitely divide the fpace between - 
 he two points, and the farther the Veffel moves 
 fF, the higher it will flowly afcend, without ever 
 :eafmg to afcend, or ever being able to touch the. -: 
 >oint of the Horizontal fydiM, becaufe thofe two . 
 Jnes interring each other in the Eye, can never i 
 >e Parallel nov the fame Line. 
 
 Which Example, at the fame time, affords IB an", 
 infinite DiviGbility of an Extent, and. a flackning-; 
 of motion to Infinity. 
 
 By this Infinite Diminution of Extent, whica 
 arifes from its Dwfibility may be prov'd thefe Pro- 
 blems that feem impoffible in their Terms. Ta find 
 an Infinite ff as* tqual. to a Finite - y or which it no more* 
 than the Mf or the 'third fart of a Finite ff ace. Ot - 
 which among many other*, here is one, very eahe, , 
 though not 16 polite. Take the half of a Square, 
 and the half of that Square, and fo ad Infinity 
 and joyn all thefe halfs by their longeft Line ; tha 
 Confcquence will be a Superficies 06 an irregular H 
 sure, and which will diminifli <i<.Lirnitum,-tt on 
 of the ends, but which will be equal to the whole 
 fquare. For the half and the half of the halh, the * 
 half of the fecond half, and fo ^ *$$***
 
 _ Or, Part IV 
 
 the whole. The third, and the third of the third 
 and the third- of the new thir.d, and fo ad tn flnit um , 
 make the half. The fourth's taken after the fame 
 Jnanner make the third part, and the fifth partis 
 Ifie fourth ; which joyning together at the ends, 
 willproduce a Figure containing a half, or a third 
 
 ?* A 5. f Ar " f the whole > and whlch on Ac oat 
 sffiall be infinite in length, diminilhing proporti- 
 nably m breadth. 
 
 The advantage that may be made of thefe Spe- 
 Rations is not only the bare knowledge of thefe 
 things, which b barren enough ; but to teach us the 
 uts of our underflandings, and to make us ao 
 knowledge mfpitc of our felves, that there are cer- 
 tain things that are, which we are not capable to 
 Apprehend. And therefore it is profitable in fome 
 mealure to take pains about thefe niceties, were it 
 only to. tame our preemption, in oppofingour fee* 
 ble apprchenfions aabft the Truths w fi hfch ^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 For ; fceing,that the force and vigor of human wk 
 J i fore d to fuccomb to the lea ft Atom of matter, 
 d to confer, lhw he clear]y ^ ^ & ^ ^ ^ 
 
 ^ty , notapprehending how itcan-be donej 
 is t not vifibly a f ln againft Reafon, to refufe to 
 
 it mcomprehcnfible j and only be- 
 it is above our Apprehenfion? 
 **}. ^crimes, profitable for a Man to 
 of the weaknels 
 of
 
 hap. II. The A^ Thinking. 397 
 his own Undemanding, by the confiderationof 
 ofe Objeas which arc above it, .t i> no lefi certain, 
 at he ought to mate choice of Subjefe and Mat- 
 , s , for h!mo,e general ftudy, ^charewithm 
 ,e reach of his Capacity, the truth of which h 
 nv be able to find out and comprehend, whether, 
 /proving the Effect by the Caufes, or a trim ; 
 ?b P y demonftratingtheCaufesby theEffeas,wh,ch 
 
 , call'd Demonftration a Fojleriori. Neverthelefs, 
 hefignification of ihefc Terms muft be d.lated, to 
 "he end, that under them all forts of Demonftrauons 
 Lay be reduc'd ; though here it may fuffice to g.ve 
 St of them by the by, that they be underftood 
 ndnot feem uncouth to us, when we meet with 
 hem in the Writings and Difcourfe, of PMofophy ; 
 ^ndfor that, Arguments of this Nature be.ng com- 
 pos'dof ftveral parts; it is requ&e, for the ren- 
 ting them more clear and concludmg, to , d.fpofe 
 them in a certain Order and Method. Of which 
 McThod it is, that we {hall difcourfe in the chiefeft 
 part of this Book. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Of tfc two forts of Method, Analyfis **d 
 Synthcfis. An Example of Analyfis.. 
 
 MEthod maybe generally call'd, the Art if 
 well WpoJingaferietoffoeYankougbt,, etthty 
 to dfiover the Truth of which we are ignorant^ or to frow
 
 Part 
 
 The greateft pa* of what is foUre & * Que- 
 s ftion. 
 
 to lend ns are either about 
 words or things. : 
 
 
 fes by the 
 
 he 
 
 are 
 
 by ob- 
 
 Cu- 
 
 we knw the ^- 
 
 tbei '*M< 
 Various e ^ 
 
 i moton. 
 
 guir
 
 j lp . IT. The Art of Thinking. 399 
 
 t*he Cecond is, when we feek to find out the Ek- 
 j, by the Caufes. For example, we hnd that 
 hd and Water have a great Force to move Bodies. 
 , the Ancients not having fuffidently- examined 
 It might be the effete of thofe caufes , never 
 Be ufe^of J em, for many WJf^f^"^ 
 :nd out to the great benefit of Mankind, and the 
 (at eafe of human Labour, which ought to have 
 *n the true Fruit of Phyfical Study. So that it 
 ay be faid, the firft fort of aueftions, whereby 
 /feek the Caufes by the Effeds, include the J 
 ativepart of Phyfics, and the fecond part that 
 fe for the Effeas by the Caufes, contains the 
 
 The^rdfortof Qtfeftions,.is when fre feek for 
 te "kaowledg of the whole by the parts. As whe* 
 ;e have -many Numbers, we feck for the Sum by 
 .ddition oV Multiplication. 
 
 The Fourth is,when having the whole and Lome 
 arr, we feck for the other part : Aswhenweknow 
 'certain number, a, d what i, fubftraacd from it, 
 ve feek to find what remains j or as when we le 
 o know what will be the /. mucb, of a given num- 
 
 3e But here k is to be obferv'd that for the farther 
 mention of thefe two forts of Queftions ; and that 
 they may comprehend what cannot be properly re : 
 ferr'd to the former, the word part is to be tabu 
 more generally for all that comprehends a thing, 
 ks Mwnen, its Rtmmitie,, its Autdaitt, its ? 
 andgencraUy all its Atrifacj-, So that he
 
 
 
 one 
 
 
 and of omittiog any , 
 ! Fof both ways S 
 
 P
 
 tap. IT. The Art of Thinking. 4* 
 
 lAs for Example, in the firft manner, if it Oiould 
 tdemanded of us, what Creature that goes upon 
 fcr Feet in the Morning, upon two at Noon, and 
 |ee in the Evening, we {hould err to think our 
 I/es bound to take thefe words, Feet, Morning 
 ton, Evening in their proper and genuine fignih- 
 lion: ForthePropounderof the Enigma requires 
 I fuch condition : And therefore it is iwfficient 
 fct they may be apply 'd by a Metaphor to fome 
 jner thing : And fo the Riddle will be well refolv d, 
 1 faying that fame Creature is a Man. 
 I Let us fuppofe the Queftton to be, how the Sta- 
 B of Tantalw could, be made lying upon a Co- 
 nn in the midft of a V&, in the pofture of a Man 
 wping down to drink, but could not do it, bccaule 
 e water in the Vfa might afcend up to his 
 owh j but fenk down again fo Toon as it began 
 touch his Lip?. We (hould err in adding fuch 
 ueftions that would be of no ufe to the folution 
 "the Queftion* and trouble our brains to find out 
 me wonderful fecret in the Statue of iT**** 
 at caus'd the Water to fink down fo loon as it 
 pproach'd his Lips. For nothing of that is inclu- 
 edinthequeftion. For if it be rightly conceivd, ic 
 ay be Efficient that we imagine a Veflel made 
 antain Water to fuch a height, and which em- 
 ties again, if it be fill'd above fuch a mark; which 
 eafie to be done, by concealing a private Pipe in 
 ie Column, of which one Branch admits the Wa- 
 into the V&, ^ other which is 
 
 , 
 
 own below the bottom of the V&. For the Wa- 
 
 ter
 
 402 
 
 w * 
 a, who Oiew'd his tricks at P 
 
 
 
 in C " lne '/PP ear 'd to be of d 
 ; which 
 
 ro 
 
 prevem 
 
 Snd fo 
 
 that con-
 
 bp. II. The Art of Thinking. 43 
 
 fhe other manner of erring in the examina- 
 fcof the marks and circuraftances of the thing 
 bh we fearch for,is when we omit what is moft c 
 hi to the queftion propounded. For example, we 
 Cole to find out the perpetual motion by Art. For 
 tnow well that there are perpetual motions mna- 
 ir as thofe of Fountains, Rivers and Stars. 1 here 
 Come, who believing the Earth turns upon its 
 |tre, which is nothing but a great Load-ftone, 
 hich the common Adamant has all the proper 
 believe alfo that an Adamant may be fo or- 
 d as always to turn about Circularly. Which 
 igh they could bring to pafs, yet would it no- 
 a contribute to find out the perpetual motion 
 Art in regatd that other motion would be as 
 Lira!,' as that of a Wheel expos'd to the current 
 i River. _. 
 
 Therefore when we have well examined rtieUf 
 nftances, that mark out what is unknown m the 
 fticn, we are next to examin what is known; 
 thereby we (hall come to the knowledg of wha 
 mknown. For we are not to imagine that we are 
 find out new Genius* of things, in regard < 
 ndsareno farther capable to find out things un- 
 owiyhen as they participate after fuch or uch a 
 xinner, with the nature of things which we know, 
 |>r example, if a Man were blind from his birth, 
 fc- fhould kill our felves in vain,to feek out Argu- 
 lents and Proof?, to make him fenuble of the true 
 I'M of Colours, fuch as we have by means of our 
 ! rices. Alfo if the Loadftone, and thofe other 
 
 Bodies,,
 
 Or, 
 
 Bodies, whofe nature we are inquifitive to 
 new Genus's of Beings, and fuch that 
 
 efparr for ever to attain to the knowledge of d 
 
 Keafons or Arguments, but we tiiould ftan 
 
 eed of another undemanding tban our own 
 
 lntw rew l are r tobell ' evethatwe have fo ^ 
 
 fl that can be found by Human Invention, cc 
 
 ; c concci ^ dirtily, that fuch a mixture of 
 
 ' and Natures, which are known to us, could r, 
 
 ^uce thofc efFe^s which are known to us in the Lo 
 
 N OW it is chiefly in our Attention to whai 
 own m ,,;., .u- _ eflion whjch 
 
 confifls 
 
 
 ma, 
 
 and lh 
 
 doub 
 ub jn 
 
 i i -/ " .ie ooul to IIJJIIM 
 doubt of all things elfe, withou 
 1 it think or no, in regard the 
 
 dmfible,
 
 II. The Art of Thinking. 4? 
 
 i &c without deftroying the MM which we 
 tofThought, wecondudethatThoughc.s 
 
 Wofw *V b r ufe * 2 f f t! 
 
 e of a .M~r that cannot be.concew d, rf the 
 fa be deny'd of it whofe wfe Whence we 
 E * Thought being no M of extend^ 
 fence, it muft be the Attribute of fome other 
 fence ' and fo the Sbftance that thinks, and 
 fcaed Subft^nce, ?* 
 Wydiftina. Whence it follow? that, 
 i,aion of the one does no way argue the de- 
 aion of the other, fince the Barf &4- 
 ee is not woperl, deftroy'd but , ha, all th* 
 nens in that which we call deftfua.on is no- 
 e fe but a change or diffolution of fome part, 
 ml matter which remains **W i Njtnre, - 
 '. ( riehtly judge, that inbrekmg the Wheels of a 
 * , he Subtoce of the Clod. .is no. WtroA 
 we fay.the Clock i> deftroy'd. Wh.ch (hews 
 sSnot being divifible or mpM rf 
 part,, cannot peril, and by confequcnce ,s 
 
 f Thif is that which is call'd -to>j6, or a B /W- 
 L where you re to obferve, i.That reo.ght 
 "take our progrefi, as in the method o ; Compo- 
 : : ion,from that which i, mod known, to that wfajch 
 ,. lft known. For there is no true memod that 
 tm difoenfe with this Rule 
 I : T That it differs from the method of Conapo- 
 .tion I this that we conQder thefc kno^vn Truth, 
 the particular mmination of the trang wbch
 
 - parrs canno, be deft .'d .' bu we 
 degrees to ,hofe ener 
 
 h 
 
 "" 
 
 general Rule, 
 
 4- That thefe two Merhor? ^'<T 
 w that leads from a V a ev to " 7> M 
 from that which rf V Mi n , 
 ntai ' he t0 of 
 
 - IKII wmcn Jeads f ro -n 
 
 MounramtoaVaiJeyrOrasZ^ 
 
 fer, to prove that fueh a P r manner s 
 
 Sr. Lewis, of whiVh ri n 1S de/ " cenj ed fr, 
 
 EsSsSSSSsa 
 
 an one, and fo down to SVx^ T 
 
 
 obftryet
 
 ap. IL The Art of Thinking. 407 
 
 irved in the Sciences, where after we have 
 Me ufe of Analyfu to find out Tome truth, we ap- 
 our felves to the other method, to explain what 
 If have found out. 
 
 By this we may underftand what is the Anatfit ot 
 '^Geometricians, which confifts in this. AQueftion 
 Sng propounded to them, which they know not 
 wether it be true or falfe. As whether it be a Iheo- 
 .|i ? or if a Theorem ,the pofiibility or impoffibiliry of 
 iiThey fuppofe it to be,as it is propos'd,and exami- 
 c.ig what will follow from thence,5f upon that ex- 
 Siination they light upon evident Truth, of which 
 kit which is propos'd is a neceflary contequence, 
 Ey conclude from thence, that the thing propofed 
 True : Then beginning again where they left off, 
 ley dt-monftrate ii by the !vL thod of Ccmfofaion.'Bix 
 I through necelTary Inferences, they tall into &b- 
 Irdiry and impoflibility, they conclude the thing 
 Wopos'd to be abfurd and impo&We. 
 I This is what can be generally faid of Aruttfi, 
 1'hich confifts more in judgment and dexterity f wit 
 Iian in particular /</. Neverthelefs thefe four 
 Jvhich Monfieur Des'Cartes propos'd in his method 
 I nay be beneficial for a Man to guard himftlf from 
 I'rring in the fearch of Truth, relating to human 
 ' science?, though indeed they may be generally ap- 
 t ' ^ly'd to all forts ot Methods , and not particularly 
 
 an!y'to Analyfis, 
 
 I. Never to receive any thing for Truih, which a 
 Inot know to be evidently fuch , that is, carefully to 4- 
 \ wd potation and prejudice j and not to t&nfKfhmd
 
 408 Logic : Or, 
 
 any thing more in a Mans. Judgment, then what p e 
 ttfelf dearly to ths undemanding, and which is alt 
 tier Mid abfolutely unqueftionablc. 
 
 ^. To divide the Difficulties that are under Ex<[ 
 nation, into as many parts and parcels at he can, and 
 reqwfite for their folutien. 
 
 ?. Tognem his thoughts ly order, beginning f, 
 cbjetls themoft plain and eafie to know, that he "L, 
 
 ****"' f the &Mg* of things^ 
 and compounded; and fuppofinga certain 
 thofe things which do not naturally precede om 
 nother. 
 
 4. To number his Mediums, and make his re-ofa 
 foextaiy, that he my be affuSd of not hawng omit, 
 the leaft Particle. 
 
 1>ue ft ] S , that it is a very difficult thing to c: 
 fcrve thefe Rules ; but it is always neceflary to be 
 aem in mind, and to obferve them with all the 
 adtnefi that lies in a Man's power, when he wou 
 find out Truth by the way of R ea fon, and as f 
 as our undemanding is capable to reach. 
 
 CHAf
 
 Chap. III. The Art of Thinking. 409 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 "the Mtthod of Compofition, and particu- 
 larly that winch is obfervdly the Geome- 
 tricians. 
 
 Hat we have faid in the foregoing Chap- 
 ter, has already given us fbme idea of 
 e Method of Compofition, which is the moft im- 
 irtant, as being that which we make ufe of in the 
 xplanation of the Sciences. 
 This Method confifts principally in beginning 
 om Things the moft plain and general, and af- 
 nding to the left general and more compounded; 
 y this means we fhun ungrateful Repetitions ; for 
 ould we be to treat of Species's before Genws, fince 
 is impoffible to underftand the Species rightly bc- 
 re we underftand the Geut, there would be a ne- 
 flity of feveral times explaining the nature of G- 
 r in the explanation of every Species, 
 There are many things alfoto be obferv'd, to ren- 
 :r this method perfea and properfor obtaining the 
 opos'dend, which is to give us a clear and diftincl: 
 jiowledge of the Truth. But becufe the gcne- 
 il Precepts are more difficult to underftand, when 
 cy are abftrafted from all manner of matter, we 
 ill confider the Method of the Geometrician*, as 
 sing that which we have always thought moft pro- 
 :r to convince us of rhe Truth. And firft we (hall 
 T (hew
 
 410 Logic : Or, PartrV 
 
 (hew what is to be commended in this Method, an 
 fecondly what it has defective. 
 
 It being the chief aim of the Geometricians to a( 
 vance nothing but what is truly convincing, the 
 might attain their ends by obferving three thinj 
 in general. 
 
 I . Not to Jiiffer any Ambiguity in their Teims, 
 galnft which they have provided by definitions < 
 words. 
 
 1. Not t9 ground their Arguments but upon clear at 
 evident Principles ; and which can never be queft 
 on'd by any pcrfon of underftanding ; which is tr. 
 reafbn, that they lay down their Axioms which the 
 require, (hould be granted them, as being fb clea 
 that they would be but obfcur'd, by going about! 
 prove them. 
 
 3. To frove demonflrati'velj all thefe ConcluJJtt, 
 'by the help of fetlcd Definitions, Principles gran 
 ed them, as being moft Evident, and Propoiitioi 
 which they have already drawn by the force < 
 Reafbn, infbmuch, that after that they becon 
 Principles. 
 
 So that we may reduce to thefe three Head 
 whatever the Geometricians obferve to convinc 
 the Underftanding, and include the whole in the: 
 five Rules of great Importance. 
 
 Stylet necejfary for Definitions* 
 * 
 
 I . Not to learns any thing in the Terms obfcure, 
 F.$ivoG4l witbout defining i/. 
 
 2.
 
 Chap III. The Art of Thinking. 411 
 
 , i.. Tomakf ufe of none but Terms perfectly l&ottm, tr 
 ilready explain d. 
 
 for AXIOMS* 
 
 , To propound no Axioms but what is tnosJ deaf, 
 nd evident. 
 
 for DEMONSTRATIONS. 
 
 [.. To prove all Proportions any thing ob/lure, by 
 be help of preceding Proportions or Axioms concede^ 
 ropcfitions Demonftrated, or laftly by the Conftruftion 
 * the thing in queftion, when there is any Operation t 
 /hewn. 
 
 5". Never to make ufe of tlx Ambiguity of Terms, ly 
 failing mentally to explain tho/e Definitions that reflrain 
 mid explain it. 
 
 Thefe are the Rules which the Geometricians 
 lave thought neceflary to render their Probation* 
 convincing and invincible. And we muft confefi, 
 that a diligent obfervation of thefe Rules is fufficl- 
 icnt to avoid the making of falfe Arguments, while 
 we treat of the Sciences. Which without doubt is 
 die principal thing ; when all the reft may be faid 
 to be rather profitable thajjnecefTary-. 
 
 T i CHAP.
 
 4i z Logic : Or, Partl\ 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 A more particular Explication of the fort 
 going Rules^ And fr$ of thofe that relat 
 to Definitions. 
 
 THo-wc have declar'd in the firft part the benef 
 of the Definition of Terms, neverthelefs it 
 of that Importance, that we cannot bear it too ofte 
 in remembrance, in regard that thereby we unrav< 
 a great number of queftions ; which are very diff 
 ulr, by reafon of the Ambiguity of their Term: 
 which fbme take in one Sence, fome in another. Ir 
 fbraucb, that very great contefts would ceafe in j 
 Moment, if either of the Difputants did but take car j 
 to define clearly and in few words what he means b \ 
 the Terms which are the Subject of the Difpute. 
 
 Cicero has obferv'd that the greateft part of the di^ 
 putes between the ancient Philofophers, efpeciall; \ 
 the Stoics and Academies were founded only upoi 
 this Ambiguity of Words ; while the Stoics to exal | 
 themfelves, took theTerrasof Morality in Senfe 
 quite different from others. Which made Mer 
 believe that their Morab were much more (evert 
 and more perfect : tho' indeed that pretended Per- 
 kcHon ws only in Words, and not in Things, the^ 
 Ijgeftoftbe Stoicks no iefs indulging himlelf to the 
 pleafuresof this Life, than the Philofophers of other 
 .Jirfist that were more Latitudiniry and remift. Nor 
 
 did
 
 - Chap. IV. The Art of Thinking. 413 
 
 did they with lefs care avoid the Evil and Inconveni- 
 ences of Life, only with this difference, that where- 
 
 - as other Phifofbphers made ufe of the ordinary 
 words Good and Evil, the Stoics call'd the pleafures 
 
 ' which they enjoy'd, things to be f refer* d ; and the 
 Evils which they ftiun'd, things to be avoided. 
 
 And therefore it is abfolurely require to retrench 
 ^ from all difputes, whatever is founded upon the E- 
 |/ iquivocarions of Words, by defining them by other 
 
 Words fo clearly underftood, that there can be no fault 
 : found, or exception taken. 
 
 To which purpofe ferres the firft of the foregoing 
 "' Tlules, to leave nothing in the Terms obfcure or Eqtii* 
 : real mtbsttt defining it. Buc that we may be able 
 \ -') make the bell of thefe Definitions, we are to add 
 J,he ftcond Rule, To make "ft of none but Terms ftr- 
 1 / Rlj> knci&n or drcAdy txpUind ; that is to (ay, terms 
 ffhat cefi^n as clearly as may be, the Mca which we 
 nean by the \Vord that we define. 
 
 1 For fo long as we have not clrarly and didin^lj 
 Jpnou^h (et forth the Idea to which we would affix to 
 |!he Word, it is almoft impoflfible to avoid Hiding 
 JLito another Uea different from that we have de- 
 TJgn'd j that is to fiy, but that inft-ead of fubftituting 
 t ! nnrally, every time we make ufe of the Word, the 
 lame Ide* defign'd, we fubftitute another wirh 
 | Vhich Nature furriifhcs us. 'U'hich is eafily difco- 
 \ r ercd by fubtlituting the Definition in tbe place of 
 i he thing defin'd. For then there is nothing ought 
 
 o be chang'd in the Propofition, if there has been a 
 .. -onftancy to the Idc*\ whereas otherwifc there will 
 
 * >e an apparent Change. T 5* This
 
 4*4 Logic: Or, p art IV 
 
 This will be better underftood by Example 
 ^defines a plane Reailineal Angle, /fc L 
 *ng<f two nght Lines inclin'4 ufon tkef* me Plane. 
 we center this Definition's a bare Definition of tl 
 
 3rd, fo .that we are to look upon the word Ang 
 u being difpoird of all Signification, but that of? 
 netting of tm Lines, we have no Reafon to blan 
 
 ichd. For it is lawful for Euclid to fignifie by th 
 word Angle the meeting of two Lines? But he 
 
 mnd to remember himfelf, and not to ufe t 
 
 >rd Angle but only in that Sence. Now to t 
 whether he has done it, every time that he fpca 
 u r? n r g -> WC are to fubftitu to the word Ang 
 Definition which he has given of it, and if 
 comparing the Definition, there be found any a 
 luijdiry m what he fays concerning an Angle; 
 will follow that he has not been conftant to the fair 
 &4 which hehaddefig'd, but that he is infenfib 
 fallen into another, which is that of Nature. F 
 Example, he teaches us to divide an Angle in tw 
 Compare his Definition, and you (hall find that 
 is not the meeting of two Lines that he would har 
 us divide in two, that it is not the meeting of tw 
 Lines that has two fides and a Bafe but that a 
 this agrees with the Space comprehended betwec 
 
 tWO l.tn/c. 
 
 v j_mtv:. 
 
 It is viable therefore, that that which puzzl'd & 
 and hindered him from defining an Ang!< 
 
 rvo Jrvir*t>,^..-L_ J.J I . 9 
 
 foorte
 
 Chap. IV. The Art of Thinking. 4 1 5 
 
 , Ihorter, and yet the Angle not be left or bigger- 
 Neverthelels he ought not to have concluded from 
 ihence, that an Angle was not a fpace, but only that 
 .it was a fpace comprehended between two right Lines 
 that meet indefermin'd in refpc& of one of the two 
 Dimenfions that anfwer to the length of the Lines, 
 .and determin'd according to the other, by the pro- 
 , port ional part of a Circumference, which has for its 
 i Center, the point where the Lines meet. 
 
 The Definition defines fb clearly the Ide* whicli 
 i all Men have of an Angle, that it is both a Defini- 
 i rion of the worel, and of the thing ; only that the 
 word Angle comprehends in common difcourfe a 
 folid Angle, whweasby this Definition it is rcftram'ci 
 .tofignifie a Plane Re&ilinial Angle. 
 
 And when we have thus defin'd the Angle, his 
 unqueftionable that whatever afterwards can be faid 
 ef a Plane Rectilineal Angle, fuch as is found m 
 all Rectilineal Figures, {hall be true of thi* Angle 
 thus defin'd, without being oblig'd to change tk* 
 ; Idea j nor will any abfiirdity follow by fubftiru- 
 ting the Definition in the place of the rhing de- 
 fin'd. For it is the fpace thus explain'd, that cannot 
 be divided into two, three or four. This is that 
 (pace which has two fides between which it is com- 
 prehended j and which on that part which is unde- 
 termin'd of in it felf, may be deterniin*d by a Line 
 which is called the Bafe, or typothcfu. Nor is it 
 accounted greater or left, as being comprehended 
 between longer or fhortcr Lines, for the mea- 
 fure of great or left is not to be taken from the part 
 T 4 which
 
 4*6 
 
 *gic : Or, 
 
 Part IV 
 
 
 
 fourth,
 
 >hap. IV. The Art of Thinking. 417 
 
 lurch. So that there is nothing to be laid to thefe 
 ' ^efinirtons of EucliJ, provided he continue conftanc 
 > thofe A/Mf which he has defign'd by thefe words, 
 id which he has given to the words of Reafon and 
 roportion. But he is not cocftant, for that accor- 
 ?ng to the whole feries of his Book.thefe four Num.- 
 ?rs,3- 5*. 8. 10. are not proportionable,tho the De- 
 bition which he has given to the word Proporti- 
 h agrees with 'em. For that there is between the 
 rft number and the fecond compar'd together ac- 
 brding to quantity,a habitude like to that bet ween 
 be third and the fourth. 
 
 ! Now that he might aroid falling into this Incon- 
 enience he (hould have ob(erv'd,that there are two 
 ''ays of comparing two Magnitudes ; one by confi* 
 'ering how far the one furpafles the other, and the 
 rcond, by confidering after what manner the one 
 ; contain'd in the other. And in regard thefe two 
 abitudes are different, he ought to have given 
 ;m difterent Names, to the firft the name of D/^- 
 rence, to the lecond the name of Deafen. After- 
 wards he ought to have defin'd Proportion, the E- 
 ualityof the one or the other of thefe two Ibrts of 
 labirudes, that is, of Difference or Reafon. And as 
 ais makes two Species's, to have difringuifh'd 'em 
 Ifb by two feveral names , calling the Equality of 
 differ ence, Arithmetic^ Proportion, and equality of 
 \eaftn t - Proportion Gtome fried. And becaufe the 
 liter is much more beneficial than the former, the 
 leaders are to be admonifli'd, that when Proportion 
 ' r fatwtjwdl^nitw&r'kT* barely nain'd, it is ro 
 
 T <> hi
 
 4 1 8 Logic : Or, Partl\ 
 
 be underftood of Geometrical Prof option ; but ; r 
 Arithmetical Proportion, it is never to be undi-j 
 Hood, but when it is exprefs'd.W hich would have i . I 
 reil*d allobfcurky,and taken away all Equivocation, 
 This (hews us that we are not to make an ill i: 
 f that Maxim, That the Definitions of words v. 
 Arbitrary. But that great heed is to be taken to c> 
 'figa fo dearly and exa&ly the Idea to which we a 
 the word, that is to be defined, that we may not 
 Ieceiv'd in the Series of the Difcourfe ; by takii 
 the word in another Sence then that which is } 
 Ten it by the Definition ; fo that we may alwa 
 fubftitute the Definition to the thing dcfin'd witho 
 falling into Abfurdity* 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 the Geometricians feem not to fun 
 rightly underftood the difference letwet 
 the Definitions of words and things. 
 
 ALthough there are not any Wrkers,who mal 
 a better ufe of the Definitions of Words,rhs 
 the Geometricians - y yet I cannot but obferve, th 
 they have not rightly underftood the difference b 
 tween ihe Definitions of words and things ; which ; 
 that the firft are difputable,the fecond not to becoi 
 teovcrted; For I firid fomc thar raiff Difputes aboi 
 
 j
 
 [j)hap. V. The Art of Thinking. 419 
 
 he Definitions of words with the fame heat, as if 
 :hcy were difputing about the things themfelves. 
 
 Thus we find in the Commentaries of Claviut up- 
 on Euclid, a long difpute and mighty hot, between 
 iPeSetier and Him, touching the fpace between the 
 Tangent and the Circumference, which Clavivt de- 
 jiyes, PeKetier affirms to be an Angle. Who does not 
 (fee, that all this might be determin'd in one word, 
 iby demanding of Both, what they meant by the 
 Word Angle ? 
 
 We find alfo the Famous Simon Stevtn, Mathe- 
 matician to the Prince of Orange, having defin'd 
 Number to be, That by which is explained the quan- 
 tity of every Thing, he puts himfclf into fuch a pel- 
 ting Chafe againft thofe that will not have the U- 
 nite to be a Number, as to exclaim againft Rhetoric^ 
 as if he were upon fbme folid Argument. True it is 
 that he intermixes in his Difcourfes a queftion of 
 fome Importance, that 5% whether a Vnite be to 
 Number, as a Point is to a Line. But here he Qiould 
 have made a diftincYion, to avoid the jumbling toge- 
 ther of two different things. To which end theft 
 two queftions were to have been treated apart ; ttrhe* 
 tber a Unite be Number, and whether a Vnite be to 
 Number, <u a Point is to a Line \ and then to ?hc 
 firft he fhould have faid , that it was only a Dif- 
 pute about a Word, and that an Vnite was, or was 
 not a Number, according to the Definition, which 
 a Man would give to Number. That according to 
 Euelid*s Definition of Number ; Number rs a Mulfi^ 
 tndg of VniM_ tjfimbbd pgttbfti * c w &kle, that
 
 ____ . 
 
 1 
 
 - 
 er aw , r """yJor tho the part 
 
 commort with >em bun it do ^ thl 
 
 tude 

 
 (hap. V. The Art of Thbtking. 411 
 
 tic of Unites, nor give to Unite more then its 
 
 rme of Unite, or part of Number. 
 The Secoud Argument which Steven produces- is 
 
 kj no more force. 
 
 ' \fffiom a Number given we fttbftraft any Number, 
 tb'g Number given remains. 
 
 '( \ Jf then the "Unite were not a Number, SiibftraRing 
 one 'out of three, the Number given would 're* 
 wain, which is abfurd. 
 
 But here the major is ridiculous, and fuppofes trie 
 ing iq Queftion. For Euclid will deny that the 
 limber given remains after fubftra&ion of another 
 imber. For to make it another Number then 
 at was given, there needs no more then to fub- 
 i6t. a Number from it, or a part of a Number, 
 ich is the Unite. Befides, if this Argument were 
 od, we might prove in the fame manner, that 
 taking a half Circle from a Circle given, the 
 rcle given would remain, becaufe no Circle is 
 en away. 
 
 So that all Stevens Arguments prove no more, 
 that Number may be defin'd in fuch a man- , 
 r, that the word Number may agree with U- 
 y, becaufe that Unite and multitude of Unites 
 :ord (b well together, as to be fignify'd by the 
 HC word, yet they no way prove that num- 
 ean be no way defin'd, by reft raining the word 
 the Mukitude of Unites, that we may not bs 
 lig'd to except the Unite, every time we explain 
 e properties that belong to all numbers, except' 
 e Unite ' 
 
 But
 
 43,2, Logic : Or, Part TV 
 
 But the (econd Queftion, Wkt/xr an Vnite be < 
 Numbers, /is a point it to a Line t is a difputc co- ; 
 cerning the thing ? For it is absolutely falle, that ; ; 
 Unite is to number as a point is to a Line. Since ; I 
 Unite added to number makes it bigger, but a Li 
 is aot made bigger by the addition of a point. T 
 Unire is a part of Number, but a Point is no pr. j 
 of a Line. An Unite being fubftradled from i 
 Number, the Number given docs not remain j b 
 a point being taken from a Line, the Line givJ 
 remains. 
 
 Thus doth Stevin frequently wrangle about ll 
 Definition of words, as when he chaffs himfelf ] 
 prove that Number is not a quantity difcreer, tr.rj 
 Propofition of Number is always Arithmetical, a. \ 
 not Geometrical, That the Root of what Numb 1 j 
 fbever, is a Number, which (hews us that he cij 
 not properly undcrftand the definition of won,! 
 and that he miftook the definition of words, whi' \ 
 were difputable for the definition of things th i 
 were beyond all Comrovcrfie. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Of the Rules in Reference to 
 
 r A LL Men agree, that there are fbme Propo 
 tions (b clear and evident of themfelves, th 
 have no need of being demonftrated - t ai 
 
 tt
 
 Chap. VI. The Art of Thinking. 4*3 
 
 I :hat all that arc not dcmonftrared, ought to be 
 : : uch, that they may become the Principle of true 
 
 Demonftration. For if they be fully 'd with the 
 ' leaft incertainty, it is clear, that they cannot b the 
 t ground of a conclufion altogether certain. 
 
 1 But there are fbme who do not apprehend where- 
 P'n this clearnefsand evidence of a Propofition con- 
 
 fifts. For it is not to be imagin'd, that a Propofi- 
 'tion is then clear and certain, when no body con- 
 ? tradicls it : Or that it ought to be queftion'd, 
 
 or at leaft that we fhould be oblig'd to prove it ; 
 ; ) Iwhen we meet with any one that denies it. For if 
 ; <i that were fo, there would be nothing clear and cer- 
 
 - tain, in regard there are a fort of Philofbphers that 
 i tjueftion every thing ; and others, who aflert that 
 
 * there is no proportion more probable then its con- 
 c trary. And therefore we muft not judge of ccrtain- 
 ' ty or truth by the conreft among men. For there 
 
 - ; 'is nothing about which we may not contend, efpc- 
 
 ': cially in words: But we are to take that for clear 
 
 and certain, which appears to be fo to all thofe, who 
 
 will take the pains diligently to confider things, and 
 
 * 'no lefs fincere and ingenious to difcover what in- 
 :: wardly they think of 'em. And therefore it is a 
 
 great faying of Ariftotle, that Demonftration relates 
 more to the inward Eviction of the mind, then to 
 the forcing of an outward belief. For that there is 
 nothing which can be fb evidently demonftrated, 
 r 'which may not be deny'd by a Per/on truly opini- 
 ated j who many times engages himftlf in difputes 
 about things, of which he is inwardly perfwaded to 
 
 the
 
 PartIV 
 
 
 the contrary. Which i? a fign of froward Difpof:' 
 tiorr, and an ill contriv'd Genius : Though it b ! 
 too true, that this humour is frequently predomir 
 nant in the Schools of Philofbphy, wherein cuftom 
 of brangling has prevaiTd and it is thought difho- 
 nourable to fubmic in the Jeaft ; he being accoun 
 trd to have molt wit, who is rnoft ready at fliiftii 
 and evafions. Where it is the Character of an in 
 genious Man ro yeiid his Arms to trurh, as fbon a < 
 fhe comes to be perceiv'd, and to admire her evei 
 in the Mouth of his Ad c /erfary. 
 
 Secondly, all Philofophers, who affirm that ouj 
 Ideas proceed from our fenfes, maintain alfo I 
 that all certainty and evidence of Propofirions, pro^j 
 ceed either immediately or mediately from the fen-j 
 fes. For, fay they, this Axiom, then wbicb theri\ 
 can be no nothing defird more char And evident, Tht\ 
 trbole is greater then a fart, hat gaind no belief i\ 
 our under ft Andings, hut only became we have farticuA 
 larly obfervd from eitr ftftncf, that every Man 
 ti/gar then bis Head, that a Houfe is bigger then A 
 Chamber, A Forreft den Tree, and the whole Heaven \ 
 'then a Star. 
 
 This Imagination is as fklfe as that which we 
 have refuted in the firft part, That all our Ideas pro- ' 
 ceed from our Since*. For if we were not afiur'd of 
 this Truth, That the Whole is bigger then a Part, 
 but by our obfervations from our Infancy, in regard 
 Induction is no certain means to know a thing, but 
 when we are aflur'd the induction is entire. There 
 being nothing more frequent, then to difcover the 
 W falfiry I
 
 (hap. VI . The Art of Thinking. 4x5- 
 
 Ifity of what we have believ'd upon the credit of 
 "du&ions, which feem'd ro us fb general, that it 
 . ns thought impoflible to make any exceptions a- 
 'jiinft 'em. 
 
 i Thus it is not abore two or three years fince, 
 
 :at it was thought a thing not to be queftion'd, 
 
 _"*atthe Water contained in an Arch'd Veflel, ha- 
 
 >'ng one fide much more capacious then the other, 
 
 i.?pt always at an even level, not rifing higher on 
 
 ; ie greater fide then on the lefier, becaule we feem'd 
 
 . be aflur'd of ir, by an infinite number of expe- 
 
 : rnent?. But lately this has been found to be falfe, 
 
 i -ovided that one of the fides of the Veflel be ve- 
 
 V narrow, -for theq the water will rife higher on 
 
 Jkat, then on the other fide. This mews us, that 
 
 ^ |kkictiGTiS only can give us no fblid aflurance of 
 
 .;y Truth, unlefs we could be certain they were 
 
 tctrcral, which is irnpofTible. And by confequence 
 
 e could be but probably afiur'd of the Truth of 
 
 lis Axiom \ The whole ii bigger then the part, were 
 
 ;e IID- other way afliir'd of ?r, but becaufe we have 
 
 ten a Man ; bigger then his- Head, a Forreft bigger 
 
 aen a Tree, a Houfe bigger then a Chamber, or 
 
 ne Heavens then a Star. For that we mould have 
 
 ,lways reafbn to doubt, whether there were not 
 
 kne other atbole, not fo big as its part that had 
 
 fcaped our knowledge. 
 
 'Tis not then upon the obfervations we have 
 ,tiade from our Infancy, that the certainty of this 
 \xiora depends, there being nothing more likely 
 o precipitate us into error, then to fruft to the pre- 
 judices
 
 judices of our Infancy. But it folely de 
 that whKh ieontam'J in the clear J 
 
 S * /w " and a r - that is ' - ha < "* - 
 
 And^ f n H 3 '"*) and *"" lefs th( " ^ * 
 And as for all our former observations of a Ma 
 
 ^ng b,gge r .henhi. Read, a Houfe then a 5 
 bar, they olrfy&rn'ifh us with an occafion to c,. 
 ficfcr more d,!,gemly ,he IJ, of the /W, and, 
 S?l 'I is / bfcIute 'V fcfi, thatthey are , j 
 Axiom' 3 " ' aUe CaUfa f lhc Tr "' h f '' 
 What we have faW of this Axiom may be t 
 of others, and fo I believe ,hat the Dainty 
 ev,dence of human knowledge in natural thin, 
 depends upon AM principle. 
 
 ? " Cm "' d '" ** ^'" S W '* 
 
 Th r , ' " rm ' >S- 
 
 i, f "fe that /te^/i s included in the J, 
 
 ^2 r an f rm of "- that hc 
 . Becaufe to have all its Diameters equal, is i 
 
 all ,ts u are equal : Btcai 
 
 " 
 
 nyinganevidence^ffiumrnKSgrSVe 
 ting up a ridiculous Pjrrhonifm. For we cannot judc 
 of things bur by the j& which we have of 'J 
 Unce we have no way to conceive 'em, but as the 
 c reprefcmed to our thoughts, and chat only b 
 
 the;
 
 lhap. VI. The Art of Thinking. 417 
 
 Jfeir Ideas. Now if the judgments which we make 
 nile we contemplate thefe Ideas, fliould only re- 
 fefent our Thoughts, and not the Things them- 
 jves j that is to fay, if from the knowledge that 
 * have; that the equality of three Angles, with 
 fro right Angles, is contain'd in the Idea of a Tri- 
 *gle, I could not conclude that every Triangle has 
 tore Angles, equal with two right Angles, but one 
 tat I thought lo, it is vifible, that-then we fliould 
 &ve no knowledge of Things, but only of our 
 Noughts ; and by confequence we fliould know 
 bthing of thofe things which we perfwade our 
 Hves to be moft certain of , only we might (ay that 
 \c think fo j that would manifeftly deftroy all man- 
 er of Science?. 
 
 And we need not fear, that there are any Perfons 
 >ho ftrioufly agree upn this confequence, that we 
 :now not the truth or falfliood of any thing confi- 
 [er'd in it felf. For there are fome things fo plain 
 ,nd evident j as, I tbinl( therefore 1 am ^ the iVbole 
 t bigger than its Part, that it is impoflible ferioufly 
 o doubt, whether they be fiich in thernfelves as we 
 :onceive 'cm to be. For we cannot doubt of 'em 
 ffithoat thinking, nor can we think without believe- 
 ng *em true^ and by confequence we cannot doubt 
 >r 'em. 
 
 Neverthelefs this one Principle does not fuffice to 
 udge of what ought to be receiv'd for an Axoim. For 
 :here are Attributes, which both may and ought to be 
 snclos'd in the J&*of things, which neverthelefs both 
 may and ought to be demonftrated,asthe equality of 
 
 all
 
 
 418 Logic: Or, Part IW 
 
 all the Angles of a Triangle to two Right ones : Or il 
 all the Angles of a Hexagon to eight Right Angk |j 
 But it will be needful to obferve, whether the Idea d 
 a thing require only a flight confideration, to fit 
 clearly that the Attribute is contain'il in the Idea \ cj 
 whether it be requifite to joyn fbme other Idea, til 
 discover the Connexion when it is only neceflary tj 
 confider the Idea only, the Propofition may be raj 
 ken for an Axiton, efpceial!y if that confideracioii 
 require but a flight attention, of which ordinar) 
 underftsndings may be capable ; but if it be requi 
 fite to joyn another Idea, to the Idea of the thing] 
 'tis a Proportion to be demonstrated, and (b thcfii 
 two Rules may be given concerning Axioms 
 
 i. RULE. 
 
 When, to fee that an Attribute agrees with a S/t$ 
 /'f# at to fee that it agrees with the whole to b: big* 
 per (hen i-ts part, thwe needs lilt a flight Attention to 
 unfiJer the ttfo Ideas of the Subjeft and the Attri~ 
 bute ; injlmuch that it may be done, without pereeti 
 ~ing that the Idea of the Attribute is included, in t! 
 Idea of the Subject, we have then reafon to tak$ thai 
 prof ofition for an Axiom which requires no Dfmcnflration^ 
 because it contains in it /elf a-ll the Evidence that De- 
 unonQr alien could give it j which can do no more then 
 fiettf that the Attribute agrees with the Subje8 y by 
 making ufe of a third Idea to foew the Connexion^ 
 whkk is already feen without ths affiance of A third 
 
 Idea, 
 
 But
 
 Ciap VI. The Art of Thinking. 4x9 
 
 But we muft not confound a bare Explication, 
 ftugh it carry*d fbme form of an Argument with 
 firue Demonftration. For there be Axioms that 
 ljuire Explanation, that they may be the better 
 derftood, though they have no need of Demon- 
 lation, explanation being nothing elfe but to 
 ftak in other terms, and more at large what is 
 Intain'd in the Axiom ; whereas an Axiom requires 
 ine near way which is no* clearly contained in 
 fe Axiom. 
 
 ^L. RULE. 
 
 Wlien the fole confederation of the Ideas of the Sub- 
 
 Wf and the Attribute fujfices not to Jhew dearly, that 
 
 e Attribute agrees with the Sutysft, the Propofition 
 
 at affirms it is net to-be taken for an Axiom j but 
 
 ought to be demonftrated bj making ufe of certain 
 
 her Ideas to /hem the Connexion as we make ufe of 
 
 e Idea of Parallel Lines, to foew t that three Angeh 
 
 ' a, Triangle are equal to two Bright Angels. 
 
 Thefe two Rules are of. greater moment, then 
 icy are generally taken to be. For it is one of the 
 loft ufual errors among Men, nottoconfulc them- 
 Ives fofiiciently in what they deny or affirm, but 
 give credit to what they have heard others fay, 
 r what they have formerly thought themlelves, 
 ever minding what they would think themfelves, 
 lould they take more time and ftudy to confidsr 
 neir own thoughts ; heeding more the found of 
 yords ; and affirming for clear and e?ident what is 
 mpolfible for 'cm to conceive; and deny ing as falfe, 
 
 what
 
 43 o Logic: Or, p arc v 
 
 what it would be as impoffible for 'em to be* 
 not to be true, would they but take the pain o 
 more Ieriousconfideration. 
 
 u F J ^P^ ^ who % tba ' a piece 
 M ood, befides its parts and their Situation, Hi 
 figure, their motion and their reft, and the p"e 
 that he between the part?, there is yet a fubftam 
 form diftina from ,11 thefe things, believe ,, 
 fpeak nothing bur Truth, yet all the while \\ 
 fpeak what neither They, nor any other Perfoli 
 vjng do comprehend or ever will. 
 
 However, if they would explain the effeaa 
 Nature, by the infenfible parts of which Bodies* 
 composed, and by their different fituation, bigri 
 figure, motion or reft, and by the Pores befws 
 the parts, that open or flop the paOage for 
 matters, they believe we talk nothing but Cht t 
 r, thougn we'll tell 'em nothing but what map 
 eafily conceivd And by a ftrange blindnefs! 
 underftandm&the eafinefs of conceiving thefe thirs 
 can iJcm to believe that they are not the real o 
 fes of Natures efteasj but that they are more > 
 cult and myfterious. So that they rather chufec 
 beheve thofe that explain 'em by Principles whfa 
 they conceive nor, then thofe that make ufe of Pi- 
 oples which they underftand. 
 
 And what is yet more pleafant, whenwetalki 
 em of mfenfible parts, they believe they have |1 
 ficient ground to rejeft 'em, becaufe they can r> 
 tber be felt nor fen : Whereasthey can fwallow fi. 
 ftantua Forms, Ponderofity, Vcrtuc Attraaive, . 
 
 whii
 
 < hap. VII. The Art of Thinking. 431 
 
 hich they cannot only neither fee nor feel, but 
 ,-rt fb much as conceive. 
 
 H A P. VII. 
 
 Certain Axioms of Moment that may ferue 
 \\ for Principles of great Truth. 
 
 [T is a thing by all confefs'd, that it is of great 
 Moment, to bear in our Memories and Minds 
 leveral Axioms and Principles, which being clear 
 ind unqueftionable may ferve as a Foundation to 
 cad us to the knowledge of things moft occult. 
 Though many that are moft ufually laid down^ 
 iire of fb little ule, that it is needlefs to know 'em. 
 ifbr that which they call the firft principle of Know- 
 ledge, it innpojpble that the fame thing fooitld be 9 
 land ntt <?, is molt clear and evident. But I know 
 ;no oceafion wherein it may be ferviceable to teach 
 [us general knowledge. 
 
 But thefe that follow may be of fomeufe." 
 
 I. AXIOM. 
 
 All that is concluded in the clear and diflin& Ide* 
 f a Thing may be affirm*d wkh Truth. 
 
 a. A X I O M. 
 
 The Exigence, at leaft, that which is poffiblg K in- 
 \ f hided in the Idea of that which fee fonceive dtarly and 
 
 For
 
 43 * 
 
 Logic: Qr, 
 
 3- -4 * j o M. 
 
 be the c* of any tting. p rom 
 
 o any tng. p ro 
 
 fprings other Axioms chat may be cfll'd Co 
 nes, fuchasthefethatfojiow 
 
 ' "* ' 
 
 w^^stt^^ 
 
 ceflary to d.ftinguifluwo Amgs ; n . '&?* 
 mence which the 7 fought tp avoid, if the for.
 
 ;hap. VII. The Art of Thinking. 43 3 
 
 felf were material, that is real matter. Or if it 
 rere not matter, that then it was to be a fubftance 
 sally diftincl. Which it was impoflible for them 
 [early to conceive, at lead to conceive it as a Spl- 
 it, or thinking[Swbftance ; as is the Form of Man, 
 'nd not the Forms of other Bodies. 
 
 7. AXIOM. 
 
 & 
 
 : A T <J 'Body can move another, unlefi it be motfd it filf. 
 W if a Body being at reft cannot give motion to 
 t'lelf, it can never give motion to another. 
 
 8. AXIOM. 
 
 We muft 'deny that which if clear and evident, lecaufe 
 bat which ts cbfcure^ cannot be apprehended. 
 
 " 
 
 9. AXIOM. 
 
 It is the nature of a final Spirit not ts apprehend 
 Infinite. 
 
 10. AXIOM. 
 
 1 The "Teftimony of a Perfon infinitely Powerful jnfinite- 
 > Wife, infinitely Good t and infinitely True, onght t 
 '* more effectual to convince us then the moft prevailing 
 Dtmonftratient. 
 
 For we ought to be more aflurM,that he who is 
 
 infinitely wife cannot be deceived j and that he who 
 
 U b
 
 434 'Logic ; Or, Part P 
 
 is infinitely good will not deceive us j then we c 
 be aflur'd, that we are not deceiv'd our felves 
 things moft evident. 
 
 The fc three laft Axioms are the Foundations 
 Faith, of which more hereafter. 
 
 II. AXIOM 
 
 Thofe ARions of which the Senfe may eaftly jua 
 being a.ttefted by a Great Number of Per/ons of funz 
 Centuries , ftivdry Nations and various Inter eft S, 
 /peaks of em, as feen by themselves ^ and whom we 
 not fufpttl for Confpiring to uphold a Fatfhood ought 
 fafs far as conftant and umgueftionable, as if we 
 feen 'em with our Eyes. 
 
 This is the Foundation of thegreateft part of < 
 Knowledge, there being infinitely a greater Nu 
 her of things, wkich we know by this means, th 
 of thofe which we know of our (elves. 
 
 C H A P. mil. 
 
 Of Rules relating to Demonflratien. 
 
 A True Demonftration requites two things.T 
 one that in the raattcr there be nothing, I 
 xvnat is certain' and unqueftionable. The other tW 
 thtr& be nothing faulty in the Form of the Argi 
 
 men
 
 ap. VIII. The Art of Thinking 435- 
 
 nr.- NOKT we (hall olxain both the one and the o- 
 obferre the two Rules, which we have 
 
 or there will be nothing, but what is certain 
 tie Matter, if all the Proportions made ufe of 
 Proofs, be, 
 
 Zither Definitions' of words already explain'd, 
 ch being Arbitrary cannot be queftion'd. 
 >Axiorm conceded, and which ought not to 
 dmitted, if thay be not clear and evident of 
 nfelves by the jj 'Rule. 
 
 Dr Propofitions already demonflrated, and which 
 confcQucnce are becdme clear and evident by 
 Demonftration made. 
 
 of the thing it felf, which is 
 iipute,when there any Operation to be done, 
 ch ought to be as unqtieftionable as the reft, (ince 
 Poffibiliry ought to be firft demonftrated, if
 
 43 6 Logic : Or, PartFi 
 
 the other, which happens chiefly in the Midi 
 Teim.whjch being taken in two various Scnfesl 
 the two Erft Propofitions, is the ufual fault of A 
 cious Arguments. Now it. is clear, that. Fault m 
 be avoided, if we obferve the fecosd Rule. 
 
 Not that thole are the only Vices of Syllogif 
 that arife from the Equivocation of Terms,but tb 
 other are of fuch a nature, that it is almoft irapo 
 ble, that a Perfon .but a mean and ordinary ca 
 .city fhould ever fall into 'eni, efpecially in fpeci 
 tive Matters. And therefore it would be a need 
 thing to admonifli 'em to beware of thofe Erron, 
 to prefcribe Rules. Befides that it would.ratherj 
 hurtful, inregard the confideration of theft fup 
 fluous Rales, would but draw off our Studies firw 
 thole that are more neceflary. 
 
 Therefore we find the Geotnctricians nercr troui 
 themfelves about the Forms of their Arguments^i 
 dream of conformity to the Rules of Logic, 
 yet thqy are never deceiv'dj in regard they are g4 
 dcd by nature, with the Affiftancc of much Stur 
 
 There is another Obfervation to be made up " 
 Proportions that require Demonftrat ions. That 
 that they are not to be reck'ned for fuch,which ffi 
 be demonftrated fcrjfuch by the Application ofm 
 Rule of Evidence to every evident Propoficions.! * 
 if ii were fb, there would hardly be any AxioJ 
 which would not require Dcmonftrarion ; wH 
 almoft all may be demonftrated by that Axioj,! 
 which we have laid down as the Foundation of 1 
 Evidwce. Whatever we find to be cent tin d in : 
 
 sir
 
 Clap. ]X. The Art of Thinking. 437 
 
 Ir and dtftinR Idea, may be affirm d for Truth. As 
 & Example, 
 
 MAS that we find in one dear and difttn& Idea may 
 
 be affirm d for Truth. 
 
 mNvtp we fee that the dear anddiflinR Idea, trhicb tt>e 
 I /save of the wholes includes its being bigger thin 
 
 it's Part. 
 
 mTherefore tfemaf affirm for Truth tbt the whole is 
 faer then its fart. 
 
 ful though this be a very good Proof, yet is it 
 
 1 abfeiutdy-neceflary, becaufe the Underftana- 
 
 fupplies the Major, without any neceftity of 
 
 articular confideration, and clearly and evident- 
 
 fees fhar the whole is bigger then a parr, with- 
 
 refle^ing from whence the Evidence arife?. 
 
 they are two different things to know a thing 
 
 denrly, and to know from whence urifes the 
 
 dences. / 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 fume Errors nfually occurring in ti\' Ms* 
 thoJ of tbe Geometric/am. 
 
 have (een what is good in the Method 
 of the Geometricians, that it has re- 
 us to five Rules, in the Obfervation of 
 U 3 which
 
 _ 
 
 e cannoi be too ex And we m < c 
 firi rh,ng moft admirable, they h 
 
 bv , 
 he 
 
 firm 
 Ru!cs - 
 
 S 
 
 e r 
 a! c 
 
 ' as 
 
 m.ke a j u dg men 
 
 to 
 
 more " 
 
 - 
 
 mto fo^e errors, which do not 
 cm however from their end, bu,, re . 
 -m n theydo ttainthe . rcnd 
 
 d/redt and cprBmodiouj way. Which 
 c^vourro makcbur dr ^ in fro 
 Wr, the luampics of thefe defaults. 
 
 I- 
 
 The Geometricians arc to be commended
 
 Chap. IX. The Art of Thinking. 439 
 
 ''oint, our Undemanding is not fully fatistied, and 
 hcrefore fearches ftiil after a farther Knowledge, 
 .hen that which it has ; a fign it has not yet atrain'd 
 \', true knowledge. And this is the (burce of all the 
 eft which we (hall obferve. 
 
 to 
 
 ' 
 
 To prove Things that have no need of Proof. 
 
 The Geometricians confefs that there is no need 
 
 proving thofe things that are clear of themfelves. 
 Jevertheleis they do it frequently ^ for that bting 
 lore fed ulous to convince, then clear the Under- 
 anding, they think they (hall be more able to con- 
 ince, by producing fbme Proof of things them- 
 Ives the moft evidenr, then by propofing 'em bare- 
 F , and leaving the Underftanding to find out the 
 .vidence. 
 
 This.inclin'd Enp'id to prove that two fides of a 
 "riangle b.eing taken together, are bigger than one 
 n!y, though it be evident by the fble notion of a 
 ight L'ne ; which is the fhorteft length that can 
 >e drawn between two points, and the natural mea- 
 ure of the Interval between Point and Point ; which 
 t could not be, if it were not the (hortcil of 
 til the Lines that can be drawn from a Point to 
 I'Poinr. 
 
 This alfo induc'd him to make a Problem of that 
 vhich he ought to have made aQueftion, w^. To 
 IWP a Line equal is a Line. given, j tho it be as eafie, 
 
 and
 
 44^ Logic : Or, Part TV 
 
 and more eafie then to draw a Circle having 
 Radius given. 
 
 ^^^K 
 
 knowledges natural things arifes from this Prin, 
 
 pie. That ^c may affirm of a thing, ^te vtr is cc 
 
 un a in it* clear and d$in& Idea. Whence it fc 
 
 lows that it were needlefs to know, that an Atti 
 
 e is concluded in an Idea, that upon the ba 
 
 confiaeration of the Idea without the addition of ar 
 
 other, ,t ought to pafs for evidenrand clear, as v< 
 
 have already faid. 
 
 I know there arc fome jft that are more e*fij 
 known to be concluded in the /&<*,then other. Bi 
 lieve it Efficient, if they may bec]ear j know 
 with a flight confideration, fo that no Perfon tfe 
 any thing of Ingenuity can f er ioufly queftion i 
 hat the Proportions be look'd upon as draw 
 from a bare confideration of jR/^, as f rom Princj 
 pie* that have no need of Proof, but of Explanati- 
 on and Tome little D^fcourfe. Thus I affirm, tha 
 here is no Man who has never fo (lightly confide* 
 the /</ of a R,ght-Line ; but he will not only pre 
 fently conceive that its Pofition depends only upor 
 two Points (which Euclid took for one of his Que- 
 rtfons) but that he will alfo clearly and eafily appre- 
 hend, that if one Right- tine cut another, and that 
 there be two points in the cutting Line, each equal- 
 \y Aftam from the points of the Line cut, there isno 
 other point of the Line cutting, which will not be 
 equally diftant from the two points tf the cut Line.
 
 ; iap . IX. The Art fff Thinking. 441 
 
 fern whence it will be eafic to know when any one 
 [ne will be Perpendicular to another, without 
 6 help of Angle or Triangle ; wnich ought not tc 
 handled till after the lay ing down of many things 
 ich cannot be demonftrated, but by Perpendi- 
 
 IWe are alfo to obferve, that excellent Geomefri- 
 to have laid down for Principles, Propofmons. 
 t'jch more obfcure then this of ours. As when 
 Mes builds his neateftDemonftranons ; upon 
 Is Maxim. If to Line* in the fane ?/ 
 
 I fame fvt'tbt conwJ will I* leffir 
 
 
 this error of going about : to pr^ that 
 required no Proof, feems to be but a (mall 
 r, and indeed none in it felf, yet we (hall find 
 o be a great one, if we confider the Confequen- 
 For fromhencearifes that tranfverfement of the 
 dor of Nature, of which hereafter; tbs deiire 
 proving that which is to be fuppos'd clear and 
 4ncoA: leif, having *?^<*"" 
 , treat of things on purpofe to furmQi ^ 
 Proofs for thofe things which they ought n 
 
 r ro 
 
 /prove, and which according < ol u 
 
 jr e, ought not :o have be** treaud of tilt 
 >ards,
 
 ToIJarie's ol *?* pr P erI ? no re *l 
 
 4. /)-
 
 <.iap. IX. The Art of Thinking 443 
 4. E F A V L T. 
 
 Dtmonflrations drawn from tiring* too remote. 
 
 This Error is very common among the Geometri- 
 Mt. They never trouble themfelves whence the 
 j roofs which they bring are taken, fb theyfbe but 
 pivincing,. Nevenhelefs it is but an imperfect 
 jay of proving things, by ways remote end foreign, 
 ; Don which the things demonftrated no way depend 
 ;;cording to the order of Nature. 
 ' All which we fhall underftand better by fame 
 w Examples. 
 
 Euclid. I. i . Propof, 5". proves that an tffiele* 
 "riangk has two Angles equal at the Bale. To this 
 urpofe he equally extends the fides of a Triangle, 
 nd makes new Triangles which he compares one 
 'ith an-other. 
 
 But it is not incredible that a thing fo eafie to 
 e prov'd as the equallity cf thole Angles would 
 ave need of fb much cunning to prove it, as if 
 i*re were any thing more ridiculous then to ima- 
 ine rhat this equality depended upon forreign Ta- 
 ngles ; whereas, had he follow'd true order, there 
 re many ways more eafie, fhorter and more natu- 
 al to prove .the fame inequality. 
 
 The Forty feventh of the (urns Book, where tie 
 ; prov'd that the Iquare of a Bafe that drains a 
 light Angle, is equal to the two (quares of the 
 ides, is one of the mo-ft t fteem'd Propofitions in
 
 444 
 
 Mi 
 
 afnd to thines mo f, "V^/rom thence t 
 confound ere,T thT 7 8 d and P articular > *e 
 *d Sulc 7 Tr g ', a " d ?" pellme!J of Li 
 
 . SlSSSfet s TT' i prove b ^ fi ' 
 
 infinite number of "h ^r^ and mak ' I 
 " thatdi( l 
 
 four frft Books I, -r rfa ? d ofExtfnt if 
 
 ben
 
 ;hap IX. The Art of thinking. 445 
 
 :rs in the feventh, eighth and ninth, to refume a- 
 ain in his tenth his firft difcourfe of extent. Which 
 a prepofterous diforder in general : But there arc 
 lany others more particular. He begins his firft 
 look with the Conftru&ion of an equilateral Tri- 
 .ngle; and xx Propofitions, after he has prefcrib'd 
 he general method of making a Triangle of three 
 tight Lines, given ; provided that two be bigger 
 han the third;which denotes the particular conftru- 
 ftton of an equilateral Triaagle,upon a Line given. 
 
 He proves nothing as ro perpendicular Lines,and 
 Parallels but by Triangles j, and intermixes Dimen- 
 >{ion of furfaces with that of Lines. 
 
 He proves,!*!. Prop. 1 6. that the fide of a Tri- 
 angle bting extended in length, the exterior Angle 
 lis bigger than either of the Angles inwardly oppo- 
 &:e ; and ftxteen Propofitions after that, that this 
 ; exterior Angle is equal to twooppofne. 
 
 It would require a Tranfcripiion of Euclid to 
 give all the Examples- of this disorder that miglit 
 be produc'd. 
 
 6. D E F A V L T. 
 Not t6 makf nfe of Divifions and Partitions. 
 
 It is another great error among Geometricians, not 
 to make ufe of Divifions and Partition*. Not but 
 that they mark out ajl the Sfeuefsof thofe G^ww'a 
 of which they treaty but becaufe they do it fimply, 
 by defining the Terms, and putting all the Defini- 
 tions
 
 "^ 
 
 44^ L*gic2_Qr L ^ ""pJi^F 
 
 tions afterwards, without obf^TtoTT: 
 has fo many %c w ,and chat it can have 
 becaufe the. general id.* O f ihe &,, r- 
 but io manvdift 
 
 For 
 ^, 
 
 The Sides are, 
 
 1, and jtfcfeallM 
 
 1, then 
 TJie Angles are, 
 
 r All three Acute, and are call'd Oxiguu- 
 
 Efthcrc.i,'^? ? n fe Acure 5 and then the third 'is 
 7 '<'ght, then calJ'd %eF}<m*fa 
 \OUuf; , then cail'd ^yfa 
 
 
 we ould have learnt, that 
 
 the
 
 X. The M-oj : Thinking. 447 
 
 he Angles of a Triangle muft be Acute, becaufe 
 hat ail three together are but equal to two Right 
 
 H This. Error minds- us of that of inverted order, 
 '.nice we ought not to treat of . Species, nor to define 
 cm, 'till after we uriderftand the Genw, efpecially 
 when-, there are many things co be faid of the Ge- 
 ratr; which may be explain'd without mentioning 
 thcr Species. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 An Anfiver'to what the 'Geometricians '*?/- 
 .tedg fir tbewfehes. 
 . 
 
 T Here are fome Geometrician who believe they 
 baue jwftity'd themlclves as to theft default?, 
 'n that they -never troubled their heads a- 
 b^vtff'-crftj'^hak-it is fufficiem ibr them to aver no- 
 thing but what<rhey prove "convincingly, and that 
 they are* thereof afiur'd that they 'ha-ve found out 
 the Truth, which is all they aim ar. 
 
 We rauft confefs indeed, that thefe defects are 
 notfb cortfider.iblejbut that we muft acknowledge,' 
 that of '&\\ -human- 'Sciences there are none better 
 Handled, than-thofc; that are comprehended 'tradar: 
 the' general name of 'Mathematics. Only. v;e ailirm, 
 that there may yet be fometh'ing added to. render. 
 'em more perfec^ 3 and that though. ;iie Principal . 
 
 thing
 
 Logic: Or, 
 
 thrng which they ought to confider.be, to advane 
 
 ottong but what H true, yet it were to be wifh', 
 
 that they would be more diligent i 
 
 *^^em1ay,ifthey P ! e afe, that they taken 
 
 fefe Pr f^ 3ny U 8 r ine rder > r t0 P"" 
 tnejr I ropofitwns, whether by ways natural or 
 
 mote fo they have their end of convincement re 
 can they not thereby alter the nature of ouTunder. 
 ftandmg, nor imprint a more clear, more entire 
 and more perfect knowledge of things which we 
 know by their true caufes and their true PrfocLS 
 
 Bei]des,that it is unqueOionably true, that thofe 
 hings are far more eafil, le a rnt,and better retal'd 
 
 L ! S T r 01 T' Wh<!ch WC Jearn ^ rJ S ht ^, in 
 regard thofe I,*,,, that are Jink'd one to anoine? 
 
 . * continued feries,are without confuf,on commit- 
 ted to the memory, an d awaken each other whei> 
 neec ^ requ.es more promptly and with greater^' 
 c'lity. We may ajfo affirm this rnoreoVer , that 
 what we aftrm by diving into rhe true reafon o 
 thmgs, , s noc reramJd fo much b the 
 
 by the Judgment- and it becomes fo much^ur 
 
 r r r Ca T C ? rget k - Whereas that v^hich. 
 we only know by dcmonftrations, not grounded 
 upon natural Reafons/ooner flip out of our Zk 
 and^ ore difficukl recoyer ,P. becaufeou ;^ 
 
 de ftandmg^notfurnifh us with the means to 
 recover what we have loft, We
 
 ,ap.X. The Art of Thinking. 44? 
 We muft then agree, that it is much better to 
 
 ssr^r^t^" 
 
 |:R3*3a 
 
 greater. 
 
 ay bmo're natural, but which no. fo con- 
 ping, nor fo exemot from all fuf.aon of ! 
 
 :! This is a veryfpeciousAnfwer : And Iconfef. 
 ^Lance el not being deceb'd i, **&' 
 C d before all things ; and that r.ght order b to be 
 ealeaed, where it cannot be followed without 
 SSng the force of Demonftration, and expofmg 
 %t(i\u to milbke. But I cannot agree, that 
 "Lpoflible to obferve both the one and the other : 
 iwibelieve that the Elements of <M -ought 
 Cfo con S po S 'd , that all things tmght be handled 
 b their naiural order, all the propofitions pro* d by 
 waysthat are moft natunl and fimple, and yet 
 tto all things fhould be clearly demonftrated. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 Logic: O r, p ar( . 
 
 " 
 
 CHAP. xr. 
 
 TvoHyles touching Definitions. 
 Tba tyfa f or Axiom). 
 
 4- I o
 
 3hap. XI. The Art of Thinking. 
 
 .4. To receive for evident that which requires 
 .ut a flight confideration to rrake it pafs for truth. ' 
 
 1w o Rule; for Democrat ton. 
 
 f. To prove all the Proportions that are but a 
 itrie .obfcure, by the ailiftance, of preceding Defi- 
 nitions, Axioms conceded^ ^or Proper Proportions 
 ijftady dem'onftrated. 
 
 \ir,& Never to make an ill ufe'of 4he : Ambiguity 
 a; Terms, by failing to iubftitutc at Icaft mental- 
 kj.thole definitions that reftrain* anB explain 'em. 
 
 - 
 Two Ryle$ for Method. 
 
 7. To handle Things^s aiuf.h asmay be,in their 
 Natural Order, beginning Ifrom 'fne moft fimple 
 and genera!, and explaining whatever appertains to 
 the nature of the Genu, before we proceed to par- 
 ticular Species, 
 
 8 . To divide, as much as may be every Ge nut 
 into all its Species^ every, whole into its parts, and 
 every difficulty -into all Cafes. I have added to 
 thefe Rules, ai much as may be, becaufe it is true, 
 that we. may meet with fbme occafions, wfierein 
 they cannot be;obferv'd to' the utmoft feverity ; ei- 
 ther becaufe of the narrow limits of human' urider- 
 ftanding; or by reafbn of thofe Bounds that we are 
 conftrain'd to aflign to every Science. 
 
 Whence it happens, that a Species-is (bmetimes 
 to be. explain'd before, we can explain all that be- 
 longs
 
 Logic.-. Qr, 
 
 < ur that 
 
 n, h we 
 
 icnr, before we pafs.ro the Specie,.- 
 
 However, I beiieve no Science can be 
 
 nL K C ' Ch ^ n0t thcrcf re to * 
 
 ^ens.d wi t hal,but upon abfolure ncffity, or foi 
 lome great adrantage. 
 
 CHAP. XII. 
 
 Ofwbat we know ly Faith, whether Human 
 or Divine .> 
 
 we We- hitherto di 
 
 ro 
 
 of another fort of Knowledge, which ofc 
 no )efi certain, nor lefs Evident in its 
 , than that which we draw from Autho- 
 
 ' TV 3re T gereral Wa 5"' b / whi * w 
 Thing to be true : Th e firft ;/ the know . 
 
 ledge
 
 Chap. XII. The Art of Thinking. 
 
 edg which we have by our felves,whether we have 
 ittain'd it by Obfervation or Ratiocination, whe- 
 ,her by our Sences or by our Reafon ; which may 
 DC generally term'd AM in re g ard the Sences 
 themfelves depend upon the judgment of ^/cor 
 Knowledge ; the word being here -more generally 
 taken than in the Schools; for all manner of know- 
 ledge of a"n object drawn from the fame object. 
 
 The other way is the Authority of Perfons wor- 
 thy of credit,who aflure us that a thing is fo. Thp 
 ef our felves rwe know nothing of it. Which is 
 -call*d Faith or Belief-, according to the words of 
 St. Auflin, for what we know, we owe to reafon j 
 for what we btlieve, to Authority. 
 
 .But as this Authority may be of two forts, ei- 
 ther from God or Men, fo there are two forts <o 
 Faith, Divine and Human. 
 
 Divine Faith cannot be Subject to error, becaute 
 -that God can neither deceive us nor be dcceiv'd. 
 
 Human Faith is of its-felf fubjet to error, for 
 all Men are Lyars according to Scripture : And be- 
 caufe it may happen, that he who {hill aflure us of 
 the certainty of a thing, may be deceiv'd himfelf. 
 Neverthelefs as we have already obferv'd ; there 
 -are fome things which we -know not,but by a Hu- 
 man Fairh, which nevenhelefs we ought to believe 
 for as certain and unqueftionable, as if they were 
 Mathematically demonftrated. As that which is 
 known by the conftant relation of fo many Per- 
 fons, that it is morally impoflible they ftiouki ever 
 .have confpir'd to affirm the fame things , if they 
 
 were
 
 454 
 
 
 
 Logic; Or, 
 
 Partr, 
 fcj 
 
 

 
 (nap XII. The Art of Thinking. 455- 
 
 cier places, we could never bring our (elves to be- 
 Ive that which is above our reafon, if reafbn it 
 ff h:id not perfwaded us, that there are fome 
 t'ngs which we do well to believe , tho v/e are 
 jt capable to apprehend 'em, which is principally 
 ue in refpect of Divine Faith. -For true Reafon 
 nches us, that God being truth it felf, he cannot 
 iceive us in what he reveals to. us concerning his 
 . and his Myfteries j whence is appears that 
 l--.ough we are oblig'd to captivate our Underftan- 
 ..ng in obedience to Faith, as faith St. Paul, yet 
 jie do it neither blindly nor unreafbnably fwhich 
 'f. the original o all falfe Religions ;) but with a 
 rnowledg of the Caufe, and for that it is but a 
 pafbaable Acl: to Captivate our (elves to the Au- 
 pority of God, when he has given us fufficient 
 ('roofs, fuch as are his Miracles and other Prodi- 
 gious Accidents, which oblige us to believe that 
 'ie himfelf has difcov^red 10 Men the Truths which 
 ve are to believe. 
 
 As certain it is in the (econd Placr, that Divine 
 '"airh ought to have a greater power orer our 
 Jnderflanding than our own Reafon. And that up- 
 Dn this Dic"tate of Reafon it felf, that the more cer- 
 :ain is to be prefer'd before the left certain ; and 
 that is more certain which God affufes us to be 
 true, than that which Reafon perfwades us ; when 
 it is more contrary to the Nature of God to de- 
 ceive us, than the ntturc of our ov/n Reafbn to 
 be drcciv'd. 
 
 C H A P.
 
 .-45* 
 
 Logic: Or, 
 
 p a 
 
 XIII. 
 
 H A P. 
 
 for the i 
 
 the //>/;*/ f z? ^ 
 
 trjc Dc-tlSj OJ cAJCntS 
 
 Human Faith. 
 T^HE moft cuftomaryufe of found Judgm 
 dinT^t^tntr 1 '^^ 
 
 
 * er e is no o,, 
 
 of d - TWlyto be m ade 
 
 ot , and where ,ts more nrceffary than in ti 
 judgment which we ought to make of w 
 pafe every day among Men. 
 
 1 lonotfpeakof judging whether an A 
 be good or bad, worthy of applaufe or reproof, 
 
 -i , L or Falfliood *i 
 
 Events, -which .may only be referr'd to Lo K ic,wlJ 
 .her we confider 'em as part, as when we onl'y . 
 
 o nnr 5 T f'*" WC U 8 ht belie ' J 
 or not ? or whether we confider 'em as bein* , 
 come, as when we fear or hope they will coml 
 paf,, wh,ch reguktes our hopes and our fear,. 
 
 l^Tr',^" f rae ^fl^ion, maybe ma 
 tpon th, s Subjefl; which perhaps may not be 
 getber unprofitable or rather may be^ofgrea 
 ' ng 3 " Errors into
 
 Jhap. XIIL The Art of Thinking 457 
 
 The hsil Reflexion is, that there is a vaft diffe- 
 
 iice to be made between two forts of Truth? ; the 
 
 :.je that only relates to rhe nature of things and their 
 
 immutable Eflerces^abftra&ed from their exiftence; 
 
 1; other that relates to things exiftent that relate to 
 
 [man and contingent Events, which may or may 
 
 ft come to pafs when we fpeak of the future, and 
 
 ?y probably never have bin, when we talk of 
 at is paft. I fpeak with this reference to their 
 ia|xt caufes, making an abftrac^ion of their Immu- 
 itfble order in Divine Providence; becaufe on the 
 >4e fide it does not hinder Conringence, and on the 
 her fide being unknown to us, it contributes no- 
 ing 10 make us believe the things themfelves. 
 Now as all things are requifite in truths of the 
 $ fort, there is nothing fare, which is not Uni- 
 AJ ;rlally true, and fb we muft conclude that a thing 
 falfeif it be falfe in any cafe. 
 But if we think to make ufe of the fame Rules in 
 vents ; we (hall always judge falfely, and 
 e aThoufand talfe Arguments. 
 For ihefe Events being naturally Contingent, it 
 uld be ridiculous tofeekout in them fora neceP 
 try Truth. And fo that Perfon would be altoge- 
 void of Reafon, who would believe nothing of 
 jch things unlefs it were made out to him, that it 
 /as abfblutejy neceflary they fhould be fb. 
 
 , Nor would he lefs deviate from Reafon that 
 '," /ould require me to believe any particular Event 
 "'' /uppofe it were ihe Converfion of the King of Chi- 
 >* to the Chriftian Religionj upon this only ground, 
 X be- 
 

 
 Logic : Or, Part. F 
 
 bccaufe it is not Jmpofifible to be fo. For feeing t\\ 
 another who fhould allure me to the contrary nj 
 make ufeof the fame Reafbn { it is clear that t 
 Rcafbn alone cannot determin me to believe 
 one rather then the other. 
 
 We muft therefore lay ir down for a certain a 
 unqutftionable Maxim upon this occafion, that t 
 PofJibiiiry alone of an Event is not a fufficient 
 Ton to make me believe ir, and that I may haver 
 &n alfb to believe a thing, tho I judge it not imp 
 tible, but that the contrary may have con e -to p^j 
 So that of the Two Events I may rarionally beiie 
 the. one and not the other, tho I believe 'ejn 
 partible. 
 
 How then (hall we refolve to .believe the one n 
 ther.than the other, ^F- we judge 'cm both poil 
 Obferve rhe following Rule. 
 
 Tu judge ot the Truth of an Ever.r, and tope 
 fwade my felf into a Rxfolution to believe, or n 
 ro believe a thing ; it muft not be confider'dnake 
 Iy, and in Jt felf, like a Prupoiition in Geometry 
 but al|,}he circumftances tha^t accompany it, as w 
 intern.il as external, are to be weighed with the fa? 
 coni-deration jlcsll Infernal Circumlhncesfuch; 
 belong to the Fuel; it feif j anti external, thole ti 
 relate to the Perfbns, whole Teftimonies induce^ 
 ro believe it. This being done, if all the Circur 
 ilanccs are fuch ? , that it never, or very rarely ha 
 pens, that tj^e farne Circumftances are accomp 
 ny*d with Falfhood : Our Underftanding natural 
 to believe the thing to be true , and there 'a
 
 ,Chdp. XI II. The Art of Thinking. 
 
 nfbn for fb doin&efpecialiy in .the Conduct of the 
 xjRonspif our Life, that never requires a greater 
 Vurance tTjaiV amoral Ccr tail i ty, and which is fa- 
 ' Jri'd'upon moft occa lions with a great Probability, 
 iiton the other lide, it" thefe Circumftances arc 
 '<ch -as are frequently accompanied with Falfliood ; 
 jeafon requires us to fufpend our Belief; or that we 
 lould look upon as falfe what is told us, when we 
 likelihood, that it fhouldbe true, tho we do 
 
 >r find any abioltue Impoffibility. ' 
 J jftrf Example,' we demand, whether the Hiftory 
 .'Ttlje Bciptifm of Conftantine by Sffoefter be true, or 
 l.tfc ? Baronius belieVes it true j but Cardinal Per- 
 
 n, Biihop SfandanW) Petavius, Morinns t and the 
 
 . :oft Eminent of the Roman Church believe it falfe. 
 
 !f we infift upon the fole Poflibility, we hive 
 
 D reafbn to reject Baronius. For his opinion contains 
 
 * oihirig ablblutely impoflible; and to fpeak ablb* 
 J itely, it is. alfo poffible, that Eufebiuf, who affirms 
 '' ic contrary, affirm'd an untruth in favour of the 
 : 'tnians j and rhat the Fathers that followed him 
 5 /ere deceiv'd by his Teftirnony.But if we make ule 
 f f the Rule already laid down, which is toconfider 
 
 vhat are the circumftances both of the one and the 
 ; )ther Baptifm of Cwftantine, and which are thofe 
 
 * hat carry the grealeft marks of Truth, we fhall find 
 ; em to be the latter. For on the one lide, there is no 
 ] ;>reat reafon to rely upon the Tettimony of a Wri- 
 \ :er, ; as Fabulous as ,the Author of the' Acls of.^/- 
 
 Defter, who is the only Petfon 'of 'Antiquity ,"wib 
 aas Ipoken of CV^'s being Ba P rizca ! a(^. 
 
 X 2 And
 
 Logic : Or, Part-P 
 
 ' 
 
 . . 
 
 And on the other fide there is uo likelihood rbat \ 
 Per/on fo Serious and Learned as Eufcbiut HIOL 
 prefiime to report an untruth relating to a thing 
 remarkable, a* the Baptifm of the rirft Emperc'; 
 that reftor'dthe Church to her Liberty, and whir 
 ought to have been fpread over all the World, 
 the fame time that he wrote, which was not abo 1 
 four or five Hundred years after the Death of tl ; 
 laid Emperor. 
 
 Nevertheless there is an Exception to this Rul. 
 by which we ought to be fatisfied with poffibilii; j 
 or likelihood. That is, when an a&ion, which ii 
 othcrwife fufficiently attefted, is contradicted by L ] 
 congruities and apparent contrarieties with oth<;J 
 Hiftories. 
 
 JFor then it fuffices that the Solutions brought 1 1 
 *nerv*e thefc Repugnances be poflible and prob; 
 ble ; and it would be unrealbnable to require othe 
 pofirive Proofs ; for that the Adi: it felf being Tuff 
 cicntly prov'd, it is not equitable to require that w I 
 Ihould prove all the Circumftances in the fam I 
 manner. Otherwife we might call in queftion I 
 Xhoufand moft certain Hiftories, which we cannc 
 make agree with others of lefs Authority, but b' 
 Conjectures which it is*impoflible to prove pofj 
 tivdy. 
 
 For Example^ we cannot bring to an agreemtn 
 what is delivered in the Kjngs and Chronicles concern 
 ing the years -of the Reigns of feveral of the Kin 
 Qf&if4*-aayl:IJraeJ 9 but by ajjgoing to fome of th< 
 Kfligs, .two beginnings of their Reigns, the one du
 
 ihap. XTIT. The Art of Tbinki*& 4$* 
 
 }ng the Life of the Reigning Prince, and the 
 
 'iiher after tHe De'ceafe of their Parents. Now tf it 
 
 .1 V ask'd what Proof we have that fuch a Prince 
 
 5'efen'd for fome time with his Father , we mull 
 
 ' mfcfi there is none Pofitive. But it fiifiices that it is 
 
 thing Poffible,. and which has often come to pate 
 
 other times, to make it Lawful for us to fup- 
 
 [ ofe ir, as a Circnmftance neceffary to reconcile Hi- 
 
 \ lories otherwife certain. 
 
 And therefore there is nothing more ridiculous 
 ien the endeavours of fome Perfons of this latter 
 i^e, to prove that Sr. Peter never was at tymel 
 "hey cannot deny this Truth to be artefted by all 
 ic Ecclefiaftic Writers, and thofe the moft ancienf,, 
 s Papias, Dtorii/jHSofCfttnrh. Caius, Iretueus^ Ter- 
 t'tiian j againit whom there is not any one that ha* 
 nade the leaft Contradiction. 
 ! Neverrhelefs they imagih they can ruin this 
 Truth by Conjectures ; for example, becaiife Sr. 
 *aul makes no mention of St. Peter in his Epiftles 
 Wicten at fyme 5 and when they are anfwer'd thac 
 St. Peter might be then abfent from %me t in regard^ 
 ne is not (aid to have fix'd 'his Seat there, as being 
 bne that offcn Travel l ? d abroad to Preach the Gof- 
 ipfel in other places; they repiy that this -isurg'd with- 
 out any Proof, wftnch iV impertinent, becaufc the afc 
 which they oppofe, being one of the moft confirm'd- 
 Truths in Ecclefiaftical Hiftory, it is fuffieient for 
 thofe. that uphold 5 r to reconcile thefe pretended con- 
 tr-ajries.asthey do thofe of the Scripture it felf ; for- 
 which, as we have (hew*d Poflibrlity wftifficienr. 
 
 x T i^
 
 i 
 
 A Application of the PreceeJiw R t ,r etl 
 
 ** ,/./,. 
 
 T" 1 H E ty/e which we have explain'd is wfc. 
 A out doubt of great Importance for 
 *''". ?**8 our Rcafon in the belief 
 g^MAk For want of ,he due Obfe* 
 wn-rf ...luch we are in great danger of f.|, 
 
 r n ritedX ang " ous cxtrcmities of Crcd ^ 
 
 r T? i 
 
 * or Example, there arc fame, who make a C> 
 feence of queftioning any Miracle 5 becaufe tly 
 
 on if tS& I ^^ fll UM ^ Obll '8 ld 
 on all, (hould they queftionar ; and for 
 
 ihersasr^culoufly ^agine, that it is in e 
 er of the Undemanding to call all Miracle* 
 'on, tor no Bother reafon, becaufe fo m. 
 related thai have prov'd to be filfe, ad 
 
 L ^ywr^Tjn- - f-r u *^ ^^ i<n ic, aj 
 
 there is no more realbn to believe re 
 one. than i^e, other. _^ *wi Wl & 
 
 . The. J.jclination of the firft is much more tolc - 
 ,k* rJ ,1,^ of he , atw . tho fruc |t .^ ^^ ^ 
 
 tie other argue .equally , a*ii& 
 
 Th
 
 "hap. 
 
 ~: They both depend upon common Place?. The 
 rft upo y n the Power and Goodnefi of God j upon 
 .tain and unqueftionable Miracles, which .they 
 rYine for proof of thofe that are called in , queftjoji j 
 '-nd upon the Blindnefs of WM% J ^ W1 ">?- 
 -ve nothing, but what is proportionable t< 
 ifon. Aihhisis very good in h's elf; but very 
 iteak to convince u*f a particular Miracle. 
 &od does not alvnys aa according to h.s Power ; 
 to is it an Argument, that a Miracle was wrought, 
 etecaufe others of the -fame ' Nature have been 
 i Bought. -And we may do well to bebeve, what * 
 i nve our Reafdn, without being oblig d to bel.eve 
 ,11 that Men are pleasM to obtrude upon us, as be- 
 ng above our Reafon. 
 
 The latter makes ufe of common Places of anc~ 
 r fert :1 ^-' Joir ^ Y ~' 
 
 Tr^,Vays one of 'em, 
 
 flCmfi4ic*J -f j > 
 
 *khold*itb the fame Eyes. I have have fc en tb e rif e tff e 
 Leral miraeles in my Time. And tho tl:ty tonifb d in the 
 Mirth, yet we cannot but forefie the train tkey rrould have 
 \fotlxnd, bt* rby-KvM to their full Age. For it to 
 Ktofind out the end of the Tliretd, and to cut it into as 
 ***? fcicel ai 0* pk& and-thtre u not a greater di- 
 K/tance between nothing and thefrnatltjl thivg in the* crld, 
 <it!-cn there n between this and the great eft. Note the 
 fsrft that were intoxicated with this beginning cf ?-. - 
 tf- w//7, coming to fprcad their Hiftmy, find h the cf~ 
 M fofitien which they mtet ttiih, tehoe the diftcnfty o ^ 
 Perfoafion loitret , aadmafy it 'tbnr tofatcft to Funcusf 
 X 4 ^ r
 
 - ... T-y , H/Jfe Piece, ptncularl. Error firf 
 ^ll^l^^^dwbepro^ 
 
 ^I^^EI^^ 
 
 But who fp blind as not to fee that we may make 
 a. common place oppofite to this, and that at lead 
 upon as good a Foundation.- 3 
 
 For as _t here are 'fonie piracies that would del 
 ^ . . " ^ , c rVuii, Inould .we enquire into their 
 Oj^mal, Jo there are others that vanifli out of the 
 Memories of Men, or which find but little credit ia 
 their judgmenrs,becatife they will nor take the pains 
 fo tnform themfel v es . Our .underftanding is not 
 %ea only^to one (ort of Didemper, but feveral, 
 and. thofe quite contrary.. There is a fottiih ftupi- 
 
 ^^^:^^^^p^
 
 T&Ari ifninki*g. 
 
 "or falle, whatever fiirpafes the narrow limits ol 
 'inderftanding. Sometimes we hunt after triHe.% 
 hnd neglect things of greateft moment. Falfe fto- 
 ies fpread themfelves every where, while 'true ones 
 iran hardly get liberty to creep abroad. "'., 
 
 Few Perfons have heard of tne miracle that hap- 
 pen'd irr our time at Fatafltinjlier, in the Per/on cr 
 i Kun, fb blind, that hardly the Balls of her Eye* 
 itvere left in her Head, who recover'd her fight t>y 
 rbuchir>g the Reliques of Sr. ~Fara t as I am afTur'd 
 
 3V the Teftimony of 'a Peffon that faw her in both 
 
 [VY ;.- 
 
 conditions. ,, -, v 
 
 St. Auftin afrtrms, that many real miracles were 
 Brought in his time, that were known but to few ; 
 emd which, though moft remarkable and wonder- 
 Rjrl, ipread no farther then from one end of the 
 TdWirto the other. Which induced him to write, 
 and relate in his Sermons to the People, fach as 
 t^ere M6ft certain. And he obferves in his Tffienij 
 Srcmd Bdok. of the CityofGdJ, that in the firigfe City 
 of Hippo , near Seventy Miracles were 'wroyglic 
 ivtthih two years afre-r the Building of a ChappH in 
 Hbridur of St. Stephen, befides a great number ef q- 
 rriers which he did not commie to writing,whicn 
 tbwever he teftifies to be true upon his -'know- 
 ledge. 
 
 We therefore fee that there is nothing mere irra- 
 tional, then to guide our (elves by corrimon pWce?^ , 
 upon thefe occafions j whether it fc>e in Wjectrng all 
 Mintcles, or embracing^!!. And'thereford me nid/li 
 Ntsmin 'Efi'b/ their particular CrcuiiiQradt^ iinla ^
 
 Logic: O, p artlv 
 
 u- 
 obl e Man of Sence to 
 
 But 1 affirm, that every Man of,Sc n , 
 
 his Rinlr j f- ^ ^unremons and 
 
 m i cook ^Cf/4f />, fome of which he faw' 
 and others of which he was inform'd by the p c ? 
 
 SSrSsR M wllofe fight the - y were '*m 
 
 As Qt the r BJmd Man cur'd at Ai^ before all rha 
 People, by touching the Reli C3 O f Sr.G.,J and 
 tytf".* w ^h ^ reports in his Tonf^ 
 
 ') 'Hid 
 
 D 
 
 -', ap. . ^ c . Mrade mas , 
 "' ' ~ m ' hm 
 
 i and the thing it 
 
 ^, crowding to fa ^& ./ tl^M^ 
 -WA. c/ijjTi^i^^ Protahus. 
 
 Of a \Voman cured in <4/hc, by flowers rlnr 
 
 BfflE^6s?^ 
 
 r,-[ ^ f ^ n] "r cur>d of " o> ty ,h, 
 
 % of the Crofs wh tt h ttc caus'd tobe made , Jp ! 
 i the bore, by one mat was newly Baptifei accor- 
 *ngto allenjatioo.whjch OK had -had, 
 SSSBT $
 
 :hap. XIV. The Art of ft: in king. 467 
 
 Of a Child- that dy'd Unbaptized, whcfe reftc- 
 mon to Life the Mother ubtain'd by her Prayers 
 rSt. Pfter, in tHe ftrength of her Faith, invo- 
 fag him in thefeVords, : Ho!y Mfrtfc iijlere me my 
 on: Thou -frofreft, I asi^ his Life for no other te$n, 
 ut'becarfe be flculd'not te titrn'alljr fy^r^tcd from 
 
 r ' Now If thefe things y be fappos'd to l&vj 
 Sppen'd as they are related, there is no rations:; 
 "grfbii biit : mult acknowledge thefe things to be tl 
 ffnaer of God. So that all their Incredulity could 
 [^would be to doubt of the Teflimony of St. M- 
 >/ and to believe him a falfifyer of the Truth, 
 o crain a Veneration of tlie Chriftian Religion 
 mon S theP^^. Which b that which they have 
 10 'colour to imagine. LJoair - - 
 
 " F/>/?, Bccftufe it is-not likely that h^-rftn c 
 Cement would have told an untruth- :n rh TO 
 ^ublic, wherein he mSgh: have been convn 
 'alftood by infinite Numbers' of Teftfmbm^ ^hi 
 KoM have redounded to the Ignominy of the 
 Chriftian Retigion.- 
 
 > Becaufc there was never any Period 
 
 i3c (///**/) LJ*- t w * i 
 
 more a profefs'd Enemy of Falfhood, then this Ho- 
 ly Man, efpecially in mutters of Religion, having 
 mad- it the work of enrird Treati !^ to prove that 
 it is not only unlawful to tell a lie ; hut a thing fo de- 
 teftable, that it is not to bs made ufe of; though, 
 the Converfion of Men to th~ Chriftian Fuiih. 
 I have the more enlaf^'d mv' : felf s ufoii lM9 r'. 
 
 . . ^ I U-^ ^.rtt rkrfMlli!.l__^^t.ri" SiJ ^>>tfe 
 
 nurkuble Bjtam^ of tke 3 
 
 :".
 
 l\ r 
 
 made in the Truth of A6Kom, to ierve as a Rule 
 upon the-hfc occafion* becaufe we mofr common 
 )/ demte m thofe : things. For every one 3 
 that ic is fufhcientfor the Decifwn of thofe to make 
 a common Place, which for t-he rnofl port is onh 
 
 :ornposd of Maxima, which,not only are not 3 
 verfa.I/ True but not fo much as probable, when 
 they are joyn'd with the particular Circumfhn^ 
 
 f Afhons that fall under Examination. And 
 therefore QrcumfWs are to be compared and 
 confiderd together, not confide, 'd a part Fori 
 often happens that an Ad which is not very pra- 
 bable , n one Grcumdance, ought to be e/eem'd 
 and taken fo, -certain, according to orher Circun> 
 ftances : And on the other fide, an Aclion which 
 
 ^tS^^^^^^ 
 
 Chapter. :nj - jom rf A 
 
 . . ZZ^'JS 
 
 
 
 ,'iiJ- 
 
 credit
 
 XV. The. Art of -Unking. 46? 
 
 edit be to be given to the Factor no ; there are 
 .me which we may call common Carcuvjfiances, be- 
 uife they frequently occur ; and are far oftner joy n- 
 irito Truth than Falfhood, and then if they be not 
 Counter- balianc'd by other paiticakT Circuinftan- 
 *s that ruin the motives of belief drawn from com- 
 non Circuraftances, we have reafon tobeiieve thofe 
 ivents, if not to be certain, yet at leaft to be pro- 
 jable ; which probability is fufBcient, when we are 
 bound to pronounce our opinion in fuch cafes. For 
 as we ought to be fatkfi'd with a moral aflurance, 
 fn things not capable of Metaphyfical certainty ; 
 fo when we cannot obtain a full moral affbrance, 
 the beft we can do, when wears to refblve, i to 
 embrace the moft probable ; for it would be con- 
 trary to reafon to embrace the leaft probable. 
 
 Bui it on the other fide th(e common Gircum- 
 ftances, which would have induc'd us lo. beliere a 
 . thing^ be joyn'd with other particular Circumftan- 
 ccs that ruin the motives of belief, drawn frbm 
 common Circurnftances, or be fiich as are rarely 
 found without falfhocd, we are not then any lon 
 ge r to believe 'th^t Ernr* Bat either we remain in 
 fufpence, if the particular Circumftances enfeeble 
 the weight of caftirnpnCireurnftances, or we believe 
 the aclion to be falfty if the Circumftanees arc fuch- 
 as are ufijally the marks of Falfliood. 
 
 Foe example, it is a common Ckcumftance,;: for 
 
 many Contracts to be figo'd by two, publick Nota- 
 
 - *tes ; that is, by .two publiek l?ej[pfls, w
 
 __^. 
 
 
 he contraa to be falffv") *? " fol ' e *> Wfcr
 
 <hap. XV. The Art of Thinking. 471 
 
 We may apply .aii this to fcveral matters 
 lat caufe frequent difputes among the Learned. 
 i/e demand it fuch a Book were written by 
 ch an Author whofe Name was always, to it? 
 nd whether the A&s of a Council are True 
 f Counterfeit. _ ; <ft pd jdsifli # lot* 
 
 Certain it is r that we ought to give Sentence 
 irthe Author, whole name has been long acknow- 
 >dged and affixed ro the Work j and for the Ad"U 
 |f ; a Council which we read every day ; nor are wa 
 x^beiicvc the contrary , but upon very lirong 
 
 fcafons t .^^oiiTi : Jv :^^^ k ;^^v* 
 
 Therefore a molt learned Perfon or this Agf^. 
 )eing to prove , that the Epiftle of Cjprian to 
 ?ope Stevw, about Martian. Biihop of Aries, was 
 lone of the Holy Martyrs, he could not con- 
 vince the Learned, his Conjectures not feeming 
 Efficient to deprive Sr. Cyfritn of a Piece that 
 had always carried his Name, and which has & 
 perfe& relemblance .of Stylo , withr the reft. of. 
 
 bus Works. ^fijji^bii^'iijwi 'Ol^^Ml*-' 
 In vain alfo it is, that Wondel and Salmafius, not 
 able to anfwer the Argument drawn from the Epi- 
 files of IrnAtiiU) for the fuperiority of Bilhops a- 
 bove Priefts,in the Infancy of the Church, pretend 
 thofe Epiftles to be Counterfeit, though as they 
 Were Printed by Voflitu and I'facr^ from the An- 
 cient Manulcript in the Florentine -Library : Info- 
 much that they have been refuted by thole of their - 
 own party. For that canfeffing as they do, : that.
 
 c; Or, -Part IV 
 
 &.jehm t Theodore* Mid Org* hraifclf, rhen 
 
 > 
 
 , that the true Epiftles fhault 
 havedifappear'd , and orb eh be eonntcrfcired % 
 nme befwreen P^ and -Or/'w or 
 
 , um 
 
 Befides, that thofe Epiftles of j^^w, which we 
 have no^, weatfuch a Character of the holinefi 
 and (impitc.ry, f o proper ro.the Apoftolic Time?, 
 that theyjuftifie themfelves againfl the vain accu- 
 fanons of being falfe and eounterfeir. 
 
 L*ftfo*\\. the difficulties -that Cardinal Perroti 
 propofes againft the Epiftles of the Council of ^ 
 yr,c,to PopeCW^,,, touching Appeals to the See, 
 cannot prevail with us to believe orherwife now therf 
 before, but that thofe Epiftles were really written' 
 by the Council. $mnn& 3d>iTjj-'->H-ft h { iA^l 
 
 But it happens fometin^ that particular Circum-: 
 
 ha-n long* 
 
 : So that altho the Epiftle of Sr. Clement to r 
 *w: BiOiop of frrufit/embe tranflcd byJ?ff ww; ,. 
 near upon thirteen hundred Years ago, and that it 
 cited and own'd for St. dement by a Council of; 
 France, above twelve Hundred years ago, yet w* : 
 can hardly believe it otherwifc than Coun'terreit In 
 regard that St. James being Martyr'd before Sr P?- 
 *r t it k impoffiblc that St..c; eme f fhould write after 
 *c _Death of St. &*?, as . the Epiftle fuppofes. 
 
 I hus tho the Commentaries upon Sr. Paid arc 
 attributed to St. Jlmb&find cited under his Name 
 ty a great number of Authors, togetbw with that
 
 = 
 
 p. XV. The. Art of Thinking. 47 3 
 
 '' " ' "" ' ' ' ..... mu. - I J -1 ---------- . ...i ,, ..[I... , 
 
 \ operfecl Work upon- St. Mafbeur, under the name 
 f'G&rjfoftom. All Men however at this day agree 
 Khat they belong to neither, but to other ancient 
 Authors full of many Errorfene e bNeaq^slib avurf 
 .. -Laftfy, the A<Sb of the two Sinueffon Councils 
 nder Mdrce/tin, and two or three at Rnme, under 
 ifoeftar^nd another at tyme undef Sijttvs HI. might 
 e fufficient to; perfvade us of the verity of 
 rhofe Councils , if they contain*d nothing but 
 yhat were congruous to reafbn, and which might 
 je proper for the times, wherein they are (aid to 
 p>e Celebrated j bvic they contain fb many abfbrdi-' 
 iea, fo disagreeable from thofe times , that there 
 * great likelihood of their being falfe and counter- 
 m , uy. ^aifti^a *Mi -?^Jtt^ : : 
 
 And thefe are the Remarks which may ferve for 
 hfe forts of judgments. But we muft not imagirr 
 el to be of fuch great u(e, as always to free, us. 
 Tom the danger of being dsceiv'd. All that they 
 ^tr dp at moft, is to .guard us from the.more grbfi 
 md apparent Abfurdities^ and to enure us it 
 :Q be carried aftray by common Places , which 
 containing Something of general Truth, ceafe net 
 however to be falfe upon many particular occafi- 
 ans, which is one of the chiefeft fources.of human. 
 Error.' 3io^ b'jviiiM nbd im .12 i*rfi txfuA 
 
 io 
 
 nocju wiKjirtwnfl^oD sdi od)
 
 474 <?<r/Vr Or, Part IV 
 
 iBg -yrTBei ji-. nari-w t t- 
 CHAP. XVI. 
 
 fc? 1 ' 
 
 Of the Judgments we ought to make of I 
 
 i it. i 
 
 THefe Rules that ferveus to judge of Thin 
 paft, may be apply 'd to things toccme. Fc 
 as we probably judge a Thing to have come 
 pafs, when the certain Circumftances which ' 
 know to be ufually joyn'd t the Fa6i: ; we may as 
 probably believe that fueh a thing will happen,; 
 when the prefent Circumftances are fuch as are u- 
 fually attended by fuch an Effe&. Thus the Phy- 
 fitians judge of the good or bad fuccefs of Difeafrs; 
 Captain of the future Events of War j and that 
 we judge in the world of the moft part of contin- 
 gent Affitirs. .fiuiflib E-redto eiobn^i ri^ifiw ISOT 
 But as to thcfe Accidents of which we are fame 
 part our (elves, and which wo may either promote 
 or prevent by our care and fore- fight, in avoiding 
 or expo fsng our (elves to harm or danger ; it hap- 
 pens that moft perfbns fall into many errors , 
 io much the more grievous, by how much they 
 (cem to be guarded by reafbn ; becaufe they only 
 fet before their Eyes,the (Grandeur and Confequence 
 -of the advantage which they wifh for,or the mif- 
 chiefs that they {ear,not coniidering the likelihood 
 and probability, that this advantage or inconve- 
 nience may happen or not happen. 
 
 In
 
 ;hap. XVI- The Art of Thinking. 47 5 
 
 t In like manner, when it is any great misfortune 
 which they fear, as loft of Life or Eftate, they 
 fcink it prudence not to take any care to prevent 
 s~ Or if it be any great advantage which they ex- 
 f>ecl, a? the gain of a Hundred Thoufand Crown?, 
 rhey think they act wifely to endeavour the gain- 
 ang of ir, if the Venter coft but little, let the pro- 
 fcability of fuccefs be- never fb. fmall. 
 
 By fuch a Ratiocination as this it war, that a 
 iPrincefs hearing that feme Perfbns had been over- 
 tvhclm'd by ihe fall of a Roof, would never go in- 
 to a Hou(e,'dil {he had all the Roofs firft view'd ; 
 [and (he was fo fully perfwaded, that (he had a rea- 
 fon for fo doing, that fhe accounted all other im- 
 prudenr, that did not as {he did. 
 
 'Tis al(o this appearance of Rea(bn,that engages 
 ieveral Perfons into inconvenient and exceffive cau- 
 tions for the prefervation of their Heal 1 . h. This is 
 that which renders others diftruftful even in liwle 
 >Things; for that having been fbmetimes deceiv'd, 
 they believe they fhall be deceiv'd in all their other 
 Buiinef*. This is that which enveagles fo raar>y 
 People to Lotteries, to gain, cry they, Twenty 
 Thoufand Crowns for one C rown, K not that a 
 very great advantage ? And every one believes 
 Jiimfelf {hall be that happy Perfon, upon whom 
 this great Fortune ihall ihowr it felf : Never con- 
 fidering, that though the I^ts promife Twenty 
 Thouland for One, 'ris Thirty times more pro- 
 bable to every particular perfon, that he {hall be a 
 loofer than a winqqtoi icn io O9q^td;^'aah90 
 
 And
 
 47< 
 
 ic.:..0r, - 
 
 babilirv ro Jo */^ as ninc ^ e S ree s of Pro* 
 
 M. 
 
 likdi-
 
 ^ '" 
 
 liap. X V^Tbe_Art of 'thinking. 477 
 
 I elihood of winning as looting, fooutd Play nine 
 flofc to one. Now if this be difadvantageous to 
 fcwhole Crowd, it muft be alfothefamc jio eve- 
 ir particular Perfon, becatrfe the ^obab.hty of 
 bfing, far more farpaffes' the Probably of gam- 
 fe then the advantage we Hope for the ' Madvai> 
 
 ereisauene 
 ,fs of a thing, that how advarkageousjoever it be, 
 fmaltfoeverTVhmrd of Winning, it 
 
 oohft 
 
 Jhtw maoever 
 Jtter not to hazard. Thus* would be : a foohft 
 
 So// a ^ ten 
 
 ii*L or againft a Kingdom, upon condition he 
 .ould not winn, unlefs fuch an Infant taking out 
 le Letters out of a Printers Cafe by accident did 
 fo of a fuddain Compofe thefirft twenty Verfes of 
 ,Ws ^Eneiads. For indeed there are tew Mo- 
 ,cnr' S fcape us, wherein we do nor run' the F 
 f loofmg more, than a King that fhould ftake 
 is Kingdom to fuch a Condtuon, 
 
 Thele Reflexions feem of .little value, and are 
 > indeed if ve ftop here ; but we may make ufcof 
 ni in matters of greater ^ Importance ; anc he, 
 hiefeft ufe we can make of 'em,is to render Us more 
 atioV ia l in our hopes and fears. For Example,, 
 here are fome Perfons that are in a Pannie dread 
 ^hen they hear it Thunder ; which clatter jmcl, 
 mri^burly in the Sky, if h pur em mmmd of 
 3od -and Death, ***&.? Bur : if only the fearof 
 
 ' iz Thunder-ftrutJkV'caul^this tctraordmary ap- 
 
 - prehenGcn, 
 
 >cin 
 ,
 
 Partly 
 
 * ' 
 
 478 Logic: 0^ 
 
 prehenfiori, then it will-eafily appear how imie 
 Reafon they have. For of two Millions of Per- 
 Ions ris vprv rrs?>,~I-i jr'^, ; __ L_ i M:J i 
 
 . ons o 
 
 ions cis very much if 'one be kili'd in that 
 i*r ; and w* may alfo aver , that there 
 fort of violent Death happens fo rarely. Sine. 
 then the fear of mifchief ought to be Prop J 
 uonabfc to the greatnefi of the danger, and th, 
 Probability of the Event, as there is no fort of 
 
 .1 fo T ly befals u as to be ww 
 
 Thunder fo have ive the leaft reafon'to 
 fcar Wl11 n 
 
 Hence Arguments may be produc'd not only 
 to undeceive fuch People as are fo over nJ- 
 rofely and unfeafbnably cautious J n the Prefer-. 
 vanon-of ,hejr Health an d Live, ,' by ftewing 
 em that thofe Precautions are much more ml 
 ctocjous than the danger fa remote from The 
 a cadentwh 1 ch they fear; but alfo to difabufe 
 Bother fort that always argue thus in other 
 affWs, there danger in this Bufmefs , there- 
 
 f r VV\ eV ' 1; In rCgard We ^not tojud, 
 of thofa things , either by the danger or J th e 
 advantage, but by to prO p Ortio / 0fie g 
 
 M ' h lhe ^ tUT r f thj ' n ^ S Finjre > be excee- 
 ded, how bulky foever they be by the le-ift of 
 things if multiplied often enough o the 
 l.rt!e t ,h !n gs are far more SupericSr o the Lea 
 ones i probkbi% of Event /than they lr! n- 
 tenor to \m in bigncfs. 
 
 For
 
 XVI. TJje Arj_ of n'i*ki*g._479 
 
 "For an Atome may exceed a Mountain if it 
 e(ufficientlymul5pl5ea,or if this great Good we 
 ifh for is fo difficult to be obtam'd , that t 
 irpafles the little one more in Magnitude, than 
 ne little oneTurpafles the grcawr in hiciluy ot 
 dng obtain'd. The fame is to be fuid of thole 
 nlfchiefs which we fear ; that is, th the leaft 
 Evil may be more confiderable 'than the greateft 
 Evil, which is not Infinite, if it furpafs it accor- 
 ling to this proportion. 
 
 There are nothing but .Infinite things that can DC 
 equall'dby any temporal advantage, and therefore 
 hey are never to be put in the Balance wirh.any 
 of the things of this World, And therefore tne 
 eaft degree of Facility for a Man to (ave himftli 
 is worth all the felicities of this World join d toge- 
 ther. And the leaadanga^nootmg : H.)^mQi-e 
 confiderable, than ail temporal mjfchiefs , it only 
 looked "upon as Misfortunes. " 
 
 And this may be fufficlent, for all rauopalper- 
 fons to draw from what has been (aid, this Con- 
 clufion, with which we will end our Logic T-r 
 the reatrtoftli Iwpn<&nce,,and btgbeft of all M*d- 
 m *$ *ofpcnd our U^ and , our "Km, >n any 
 tlinr e'fe than in what may be fcrvtceable to ac^re 
 IK 4 Life tb.it never '{hall bwe an end. Smce the 
 Good and Evil of this Life is nothing, if compa- 
 red to the felicities and fufterings of the other ; 
 and the danger of falling imp -the one is as great 
 ,3 ihc difficulty of acqutring the oiber ni 
 bngid ni en/ ^ 
 io r i
 
 Or, 
 
 " They who draw this Conclufion, and follow i! 
 m the Condurt of their Lives, are Prudent an,! 
 jfe, let em be never fo unlearned in Argument 
 cofcerning the Science* Whereas they who neoi 
 ea.r,tho never fo Learned in otherthings, are ca 
 kd in Scnpture Foo^Madmen, andnfake but a, 
 til ufe ofLog ( c,Reafon, or their Lives. 
 
 V ' t-s- 
 
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