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THE PHILOSOPHY OF

GASSENDI

G. S. BRETT

PROFKSSOR OF PHILOSOPHY, GOVKRNMBNT COLLBGE, LAHORE

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ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON

1908

OLASOOW: PRINTKD AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
BY ROBERT MACLEUOSE AND CO. LTD

PREFACE

Up to the present little attention has been paid
to Gassendi. The want of a reliable account of
his philosophy has caused him to be neglected, for
the nature of his own v/ritings is such as would
naturally obscure the value of his message. Hallam,
in his Introduction to the Literature of Europe
(Part IV. chap, iii.), indicates the extent to which
Gassendi has been neglected and also the reasons.
He refers to Gassendi's "prolixity of statement,"
" prodigality of learning," and " display of erudition,"
characteristics which have all militated against
recognition of his real merits. In consequence he is
little more than a name, or is known as the original
of Bernier's work, and is either misunderstood or
pushed aside as one who challenged Descartes from
an antiquated and untenable standpoint.

To remedy this error and supply what is un-
doubtedly a page in the history of philosophy I
have tried in this book to express briefly the
main lines of Gassendi's thought. It has been
necessary to condense the matter ruthlessly, but
this could be done with all the less danger because
so much of the contents of the volumes is historical.
None the less it is natural that there should arise

G53530

vi PREFACE

the feeling that a process which condenses chapters
into phrases and whole sections into sentences, is an
injustice to an author. The atmosphere of com-
prehensive learning which gives a peculiar charm to
these volumes cannot be reproduced elsewhere : it
is the breath of an age which every day puts
further from us. In compensation for this loss I
can only plead the advantages of conciseness. Time
works toward the setting forth of the skeleton
with the destruction of all else, and in the world of
books we take an optimistic view of this unavoidable
process and trust that it le^.ves us what is most
enduring and most essential.

That Gassendi deserves honourable mention in
the history of philosophy will hardly be doubted.
How far he is able to help in the solution of its
problems is a point that the reader will estimate
for himself. Now that we are recovering somewhat
from that disturbance of equilibrium which char-
acterised the development of Cartesianism, such
work as that of Gassendi has an opportunity of
asserting itself more effectively. If we pause to ask
what is the true and abiding characteristic of a
philosophic mind we shall see that it is compre-
hensiveness of view, breadth of vision, combined
with a power to see, and not merely look at, the
vast array of the knowable. This comprehensiveness
makes greatness : through it a man may be the
spectator of all times and places. But he must
not hope to gain this comprehensive outlook by
occupying one solitary peak : he must not flatter
himself that there is an essence of all essences,
that he can condense all life and thought into one

PREFACE vii

magic drop. On the contrary he must keep the
original wealth of material undiminished if he would
have a world in which ' life's garden blows ' ; if he
abstracts and simplifies the product is an ' essence,'
a drop of scent in place of the living flower.

This fact is gaining more recognition now than
it did some time ago. We do not always remember
that the necessity for emphasising the point was
not formerly so great as it has been recently. A
reading of Gassendi brings home to us the fact that
philosophy has not always considered concentration
its prime duty, and a return to the atmosphere
of naive pluralism is a refreshing reminder that
thought was once childishly unsophisticated. With
no intention of denying the value of the progress
that has been made, and no attempt to ignore
crudities and fallacies, we can still go back with
profit to a view of the world that is not obsessed
with the tendencies of extreme idealism : we can
even go back to the pre- Kantian days with profit
so long as we remember that they are pre-Kantian.
In some respects it is peculiarly profitable to see
what could be ^done with the material of knowledge
before Hume was sceptical or Kant awakened : in the
case of Gassendi the moderation and liberality of his
views makes him frequently strike the line to which
thought was destined to return, and thus appear in
close touch with later developments. In reference
to this I may add that the quotations from the
original have been limited as much as possible. As
the whole account is a mere summary the original
can be easily consulted, the chapters and divisions
of my account indicate the parts of the author which

viii PREFACE

are being considered. But I have felt compelled to
insert quotations and phrases wherever there seemed
a possibility of confusion or grounds for suspecting
that the language used by me was not justified
by the original. In the parts of this book which
profess to contain the thoughts and ideas of Gassendi
I have aimed only at exhibiting those thoughts
and ideas with no more additions than were required
to bridge over gaps caused by omission and no
interpretation beyond what was demanded to make
clear the underlying connexions of the original
work. All references to previous philosophers and
interpretations of their meaning within that part
(i.e. Parts i. to m.) are to be credited to Gassendi.
My own remarks are only intended to set the
essential elements of Gassendi's philosophy in what
I conceive to be their true historical light.

CONTENTS

PAoa

Introductory

The "Works of Gassendi ------ xi

Bibliography ..-----. xv

Introduction - - xvii

PAKT I. LOGIC 1

PAET II. PHYSICS
SECTION A

CHAP.

I. Introductory 19

II. Time and Space 34

III. First Principles

(a) The Material Principle 49

(6) Primary and Secondary Causes - - - 55

(d) On Qualities ------- 65

(e) On the Origin and Decay of Things - - 82

X CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE

SECTION B

I. Ti[E Inanimate World 89

II. The Animate World

(a) Introductory 98

{b) On Design in Nature 100

{d) The Anima Humana Ill

(e) The Basis of Psychic Life .... 115

III. Psychic Life

(a) Sense and Sensation 121

(6) Imagination 129

{d) The Habits of Intellect 150

(e) The Passions 153

IV. The Nature of Life

(a) The Vis Motrix 161

(6) Life and Death 168

PAKT III. ETHICS

I. On Happiness 183

II. The Virtues 196

III. On Liberty, Fate, and Divination - - - 2i8

IV. On God 224

NoTK on Declination 230

PART IV. GENERAL REVIEW

I. GaSSENDI 245

II. Later Views 270

Index 308

THE WORKS OF GASSENDI

The following is a complete list of the contents of the
edition of 1658.

Volume I

Syntagma philosophicum.

Liber prooemialis.

Pars prima quae est logica.

I. De origine et varietate logica.
II. De logicae fine.

Institutio logica.

1. De simplice rerum imaginatione.

2. De propositi one.

3. De syllogismo.

4. De methodo.

Pars secunda quae est physica.
Section 1.

Book 1. De universe et mundo.

2. De loco et tempore.

3. De material! principio.

4. De principio efficiente.

5. De motu et mutatione rerum.

6. De qualitatibus rerum,

7. De ortu et interitu.

Section 2. De Eebus Caelestibus.
(End of Vol. I. pp. 752.)

xii THE WORKS OF GASSENDI

Volume II
Syntagma philosophicum (continned).

Section 3. Part I. De rebus terrenis inanimis.
Book 1. De globo ipso telluris.

De vocatis vulgo meteoris (ventis, etc.).
De lapidibus ac metallis.
De plantis.

Part II. De rebus terrenis viventibus.
De varietate aninialium.
De partibus animalium.
De anima.

De generatione animalium.
De nvitritione.
De sensu universe.
De sensibus speciatim.
De phantasia.
De intellectu seu niente.
De appetitu et affectibus animae.
De vi motrice.
De temperie.
De vita et morte.
De animorum immortalitate.

' Pars tertia quae est ethica.
Book 1. De felicitate.
„ 2. De virtutibus.
„ 3. De libertate, fortuna, etc.
(End of Vol. II. pp. 860.)

Volume III

1. Philosophiae Epicuri Syntagma.

2. Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus Aristoteleos.

3. Fluddanae philosophiae examen.

4. Disquisitio metaphysica adversus Cartesium.
5-9. Epistulae.

(End of Vol. III. pp. 662.)

I 3,

,, 4,

Section 3.

Book 1.

"„ 3,

,, 4.

„ 5.

„ 6.

» 7.

„ 8.

„ 9.

„ 10.

„ 11.

„ 12.

„ 13.

„ 14.

THE WORKS OF GASSENDI xiii

Volume IV
Astronomica. Parts I.-V. pp. 536.

Volume V

1. Diogenis Laertii Liber X, cum nova interpretatione et

notis.

2. Vita Epicuri, Peireskii, Tychonis Brahei, Copernici,

Peurbachii, et Kegioinontani.

3. Abacus sestertialis seu de valore antiquae monetae ad

nostram redactae.

4. Romanum Calendarium compendiose expositum.

5. Manuductio ad theoriam musices.

6. Notitia ecclesiae Diniensis.

(End of Vol. V. pp. 740.)

Volume VI
Epistulae et responsa. pp. 545.

The whole of Gassendi's writings is thus contained in
six Volumes folio, with a total of 4095 double-columned
pages.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(i.) The edition of the works to which reference is
always made in this book is the edition of 1658 (Lyon).
This contains all Gassendi's works (some slightly abridged),
except some letters. On this point see Thomas, p. 28 :
' Celles qui ont et6 recueillies par M. de Montmor
forment le sixieme volume du Syntagma : mais leur
nombre a et6 considerablement augmente depuis, bien que
beaucoup restent encore a publier. (Voy. " Documents
inedits sur Gassendi," par Tamizey de Larroque : Revue
des questions historiques, 1877, t. xxii. " Oraison funebre
de P. Gassendi," par Nicolas Taxil, publiee par le meme,
1882. "Impressions de voyage de Pierre Gassendi," dans
le Bulletin de la SociM scientifique et liitSraire des Basses-
Alpes, 1887.)' I have no personal knowledge of these
documents.

(II.) Bernier, the traveller, a friend of Gassendi, com-
piled an Abr4g4 de la Philoso;phie dc Gassendi, 8 vols.,
1678; 2nd ed., 7 vols., 1684. This work is naturally
far less cumbersome than Gassendi's own volumes. It
is difficult to say quite what is wrong with it, but it is
certainly wholly misleading, and, having been read to
avoid the trouble of studying the original, has done much
harm. I began with this work myself, but, after once
looking into Gassendi, abandoned it. There is a wholly
different atmosphere about Gassendi's writing, and perhaps
the kindest criticism is to say that Bernier had more
zeal as a friend than ability as a philosopher.

(ill.) The only book on Gassendi which I have read
is La Philosophie de Gassendi, par P.-F^lix Thomas, Paris,

xvi BIBLIOGRAPHY

1889. I have read this since completing my own
account of (iassendi, and owe to it some useful hints and
references. Had it been other than it is, I should not
have been justified in publishing a second study on the
same subject. But the author seems to me to have done
less than justice to Gassendi : he does not seem to have
considered him an integral part of philosophy as a moving
body of thought. Perhaps he is right, but to me Gas-
sendi appears to have done more than patch up Epicurus :
he has tried to unite the results, not only of philosophy
in the narrower sense, but of all previous and contemporary
thought into one whole, as consistent as he thought it
could be. Hence we differ; but the student of Gassendi
will get more insight into Gassendi from Thomas than
he will from Bernier, and find this the conscientious
work of one who has gone for his information to the
fountain-head.

(IV.) For the rest, I know of no other ' literature of
the subject.' For the Life, Sorbiere's Sketch (vol. i.) is
the chief authority. There is also a Vie de Gassendi by
Bugerel (1737), and by Damiror {M4moire sur Gassendi,
1839). The best short account of Gassendi's philosophy
is that of Eitter, to which I have referred elsewhere
(p. 17).

(v.) The manuscripts of Gassendi have been preserved,
the majority at Tours, some in the Bibliotheque Rationale,
and some in Provence (Thomas, p. 28). The edition of
1658, though published after the author's death, repre-
sents his final corrections, and is acknowledged to be
substantially accurate.

INTRODUCTION

The line of tliouo;ht which terminates in Gassendi
began in Leucippus. The principal names in the
history of its exposition are unfortunately little
more than names, and in the case of both the main
periods we are dependent on what may be called
the second strings for the majority of our information.
Thus of Leucippus we know but little, and he is
usually taken in conjunction with Democritus, in
order that together they may fill out a paragraph in
the history of thought : similarly, while we are better
off in the case of Epicurus, we none the less find
it most convenient not to speak of Epicurus but
of Epicureanism, and so give ourselves the lati-
tude of using all the matter that can be collected
from the whole school, in which the name of
Lucretius stands forth prominently. As we desire
to show the development of the subject we shall
here try to keep the main points of the different
epochs distinct : it will then be apparent how the
theory grew and changed in face of new problems
and changing conditions.

Atomism and Epicureanism are very different
things, but the beginnings of the theory of Epi-

xviii PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI

cunis^ are to be found in the atomic school, and the
ditterences will be best understood if the growth
of that doctrine is followed. The founder was
Leucippus of Elea or Miletus. His standpoint does
not seem to have been properly understood by
historians of philosophy, but recent investigation
has cleared our views on the significance of his
lano-uage. He was in the first instance an Eleatic,
and though the main principle of the Eleatic school,
the unity and immovability of the One, seems so
entirely opposed to the atomistic trend of thought
that they could have nothing to do with each
other, we find that in fact the opposition is not
so great as appears at first sight, and the atomistic
view is generated out of the Eleatic. In this
interpretation we are guided by Aristotle, who says,
' Leucippus however thought he had a theory which
was in harmony with sense-perception and did not
do away with coming into being and passing
away, nor motion nor the multiplicity of things.
He made this concession to experience, while he
conceded on the other hand to those who invented
the One, that motion was impossible without the
void, that the void was not real, and that nothino;
of what was real was not real ! For,' said he,
' that which is strictly speaking real is an absolute
plenum ; but the plenum is not one. On the

^Gasseudi says Epicurus was neither 'Primus nee solus qui
Atomos defenderit.' Others are Mosohus — 'de quo Empiricus et
Strabo etiam ante bellum Troianum' — Leucippus, Democritus, Metro-
dorus, Ecphantus, Pythagoreus, Empedocles, Heracleitus, Plato (qui
Enipedoclis instar, elementa coniposuit ex particulis prae exilitate
inc<jnspicuis) Xenocrates, Asclepiades, Heraclides, Diodorus, Arte-
midorus, Mnesitheus, alii' (vi. 160). Truly a cloud of witnesses.

INTRODUCTIOxN xix

contrary, there are an infinite number of them, and
they are invisible owing to the smalluess of their
bulk. They move in the void (for there is a
void), and by their coming together they effect
coming into being : by their separation, passing
away.' ^

Atomism is thus at its birth the opposite which
Eleaticism generates : the principles of Parmenides
are retained, but the One to which they are applied
is no longer the only One, not the Whole, but a
whole : ' to each of the atoms which he thus
arrived at, he ascribed all the predicates of the
Eleatic One' (Burnet, 079. cit. 355). The result
was a pluralism which avoided the dialectic of
Zeno of Elea : the attempts which had been made
to combine the two notions of a continuum and
divisibility had failed because they inevitably led
to the abyss of endless division : it was obvious
that if the continuum could be divided anywhere
it could be divided everywhere and finally elude
us altogether, and there was no way out of the
difficulty but to stand by common sense and declare
the ultimate indivisible. Two points are interesting
in this connexion : t-he first is the fact that the
earliest form of Atomism is grounded in the
opposition of a commonsense view to its con-
temporary idealism, a heritage of strife to be handed
on from generation to generation : the second is
the very partial nature of the severance from
idealistic modes of thought;/^ At this stage of
thought no one blushes to make reality a predicate,
but the limitations of language bring us to a

^ For Leucippus v. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy.

XX PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI

dilemma: the void is declared real and not real,
and the difficulty lies in the substantive use of
' is ' : for the void is, but is not what is called
real : it must therefore belong to a class of existents
which we shall call the not-real : with all the
sturdy commonsense of a reformer Leucippus
says the categories must be made for the things
and not things for the category. Henceforth the
old reality was to be absorbed into a new Reality
which included both the real and the not-real of the
former category. The gist of all this argumentation
can be expressed in the phrase 'the non-corporeal
is as real as the corporeal.' This was first pro-
claimed by those who are usually regarded as
materialists ! For the rest we know that creation
was explained through the collision of the atoms,
in which atoms of like shape and form became
entangled, and from these entanglements of atoms
arose the heavenly bodies. Thus much we may
safely attribute to Leucippus, and if any one doubts
the reality of Leucippus, it is enough for our
purpose that he should stand for Atomism before
Democritus. This stage must certainly be dis-
tinguished, else we lose the significance of that
form of the doctrine in which we have as yet no
subjective elements and no attempt to think of
the atom as in any sense analysable.

II.

With Democritus w^e find atomism has undergone
a very important change, it has developed from a
mere sketch of a cosmogony to at least the
rudiments of a philosophy. By this we mean that

INTRODUCTION xxi

it recognises a far wider range of topics, and at
least attempts to give explanations of phenomena
not touched by the theory in its original form.
The two main influences to be noticed in this
connection are those denoted by the names of
Protagoras and Anaxagoras. From Protagoras
comes the subjective tendency of the doctrine,
while the work of Anaxagoras has brought into
prominence the question of causality and its
incidence. The idea of ' homoiomerae ' has also
expressed a possible theory of the nature of the
ultimate parts of the material world which is
sufficiently near to atomism to compel the true
atomist to define his position more exactly.

In opposition to Anaxagoras, Democritus expressly
makes things themselves the cause of motion :
whatever else it may have meant, the ' nous ' of
Anaxagoras implied a cause outside of the material
thing. This dualism is now rejected, and we get
the explicit statement that the world is to be
regarded as a product of matter in motion. The
atoms are now said to differ in shape, order, and
position : they have no cause, being eternal : they
possess motion from the beginning by virtue of
their nature, and this motion is in the abstract
straight ; but in fact, owing to collision, it becomes
rotatory. It is difficult to say whether Democritus
ascribed weight to the atoms or not : this w^as the
sort of detail which was only specifically settled
when an opponent made it necessary to give a
deliverance ex cathedra. Wallace remarks on this
point : ' There are passages from which it seems
that Democritus regarded weight as not an attribute

xxii PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI

of the atoms, but only of tlie aggregations which
they compose. But probably these statements are
to be taken in a different sense. They may mean
that the atom in all cases, however it may vary
in size (and such variations are incalculably great),
never reaches a size which can be seen by the bodily
eye, and therefore, inasmuch as the weight varies
directly with the size in the case of the atoms,
the atom is never ponderable except when it
combines with other atoms to form a body.' It
follows from this that the atom has weight but
is not ponderable, and this is, I think, correct for
two reasons. In the first place, it would be much
more difficult to conceive the atoms as falling
(which is the first conception of their motion)
if they had no weight in theory ; and secondly,
it is always a principle of this school to work
analogically and infer from the presence of a
quality in the compound its analogical counterpart
in the primary parts which enter into that compound.

The compounds are formed by the natural union
of similar particles. This was a point on which
considerable stress was laid because it was in
direct opposition to the mythical tendencies of
the Love and Hate theories of affinity : it was
a part of the polemic against all mysticism which
was to become characteristic of the spirit of this
school.

With regard to the universe Democritus held
that the Earth had now come to rest : from the
Earth there had arisen by natural j)rocesses organised
beings. The soul was composed of atoms of the
nature of fire. The individual is conceived as

INTRODUCTION xxiii

having specific organs each with its appointed
functions ; but these are very crudely differentiated :
the soul is in the head, and its function is thouglit :
eagerness is in the heart and desire in the liver.
Perception is caused by the effluxes ' sloughed
off ' from things : it is not wholly veracious and
requires to be corrected. Sense perception is indeed
explicitly opposed to the understanding, and the
latter is said to give us truth while the former
deceives. But this is not to be taken as implying
any very exact theory of knowledge : it is very
much the same to Democritus whether the deception
of the senses is due to physical conditions, such
as the distance of the object, or to what we
should call subjective conditions. In the same
elementary fashion we are told that we know
nothing, though we can go beyond our senses,
as we obviously do in arriving at a knowledge
of the atom ; a going beyond which is probably
most safely taken to mean reaching quantitatively
further, that is to say reaching to subtler forms of
matter than are given to the gross sense.

In his ethics Democritus is credited with having
uttered or quoted much that is sound ; but it is
too disjointed to be regarded as either system or
part of a system. We may note for further use
that he considered the soul the noblest part of
man and knowledge the source of true happiness :
he also laid stress on the will as the test of true
morality, and struck the keynote of later cosmo-
politanism in the saying that the country of the
wise man is the world.

xxiv PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI

III.

With Epicurus we come to a much more developed
phase of the original doctrine. At first we had
only a slender vein of cosmological reasoning : then
the theory was extended to psychology of a sort,
with an appendix on ethics to give it the appearance
of a full-grown theory : now ethics is made the prime
end and object of the philosophical treatment of
the world in which we live, and atomism is taken
as the guiding principle. There is considerable
difference between a theory of atoms and an atomic
theory of the universe : we shall be concerned
chiefly with the philosophical aspects as opposed
to what might be called the scientific elements,
and therefore for us it is especially important to
notice this phase and realise how the original
aims and scope of atomism were changed with
time, so that it became an instrument for general
us rather than a mere statement of what was
believed to be physical fact.

In order to understand the scope of a writer's
views we have to take some account of the
atmosphere in which he lived. In the case of the
earliest writers this is generally only possible in
the sense that we can detect some definite influence
against which he works : thus Leucippus founds
himself on and opposes himself to Parmenides :
Democritus takes up the very problem Anaxagoras
has striven to solve and finds in that opposite his
own definition. When we come to Epicurus, the
same principle holds good, but the stream of
thought has widened, and it bears along with it

INTRODUCTION xxv

the sand of many shores, and therefore the influences
we have to consider are greater both in number
and range.

The first influence to be considered is that of the
political conditions under which the doctrine arose and
to which we trace the temper that made its appeal
so successful. At the time when Epicurus came to
Athens (307 B.C.), the prevailing characteristic of
life was its uncertainty. The city was a hotbed
of intrigue, and no one could predict which party
would be in power next. Athens had lost her
empire but still retained enough vitality to struggle
periodically into a semblance of independent exist-
ence under such a leader as Demetrius Ppliorcetes.
At other times the Macedonian power regained
its supremacy and Athens lapsed into vassalage.
In either case the situation of the individual was
much the same, and from this point of view the
days of Epicurus and of Seneca are identical. ^^
both the individual, finding no objective point of
attachment, falls back upon himself, and the attitude
of the Epicurean in Athens is that of the Stoic in
Rome four hundred years later. With the upbreak
of a concentrated national life, the individual felt
that he belonged to nobody in the sense that he
belonged to himself, and nothing belonged to him
in the sense that his self belonged to him. Hence
the thinker keeps aloof from politics : he says
with Democritus, that the world is the wise man's
home ; but only in the negative sense, which means
abstraction from that immediate world of interests
in which alone is there a possibility of activity.
The first phase of cosmopolitanism is negative :

xxvi PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI

it renounces the living unity for a One which is
no more than a concept, which, having nothing
that can satisfy the heart, is for all practical
purposes nothing but a shroud for the burial of
hopes that have been sacrificed. Ignoring the
Whole, man turns to the parts, and the individual
occupies the first place in his thoughts.

Philosophically we can trace the same develop-
ment on different lines. Plato had been concerned
primarily with the scheme of the Whole as a
rational connected system. With Aristotle the
material of the system had emerged into prominence,
and his successors had gone still further, and ' the
speculative, transcendental element was eliminated,
and nothing left but "positive" science.'^ This
trend became more and more pronounced, and to it
we may trace the revival of materialistic types of
thought which are exemplified in both Stoicism and
Epicureanism. A third element is the consequence
of these influences, namely the importance attached
to ethics, ' if by ethics we mean an attempt to
discover what is the chief end of man, and how it
can be attained. ' "

These three points, then, ' their individualism in
morals, their subordination of all science to an
ethical end, and their materialistic realism,' are the
common characteristics of the great schools of this
period. We shall confine ourselves now to sketching
the main points of Epicureanism. The sources of
information are scattered, and it is difficult, if not
impossible, to say in many cases what was actually
taught by Epicurus and what was incorporated into

^Wallace, Epicureanism, p. 6. '^ Ibid. p. 16.

INTRODUCTION xxvii

the body of the doctrine by his disciples. For our
purpose it is sufficient to give a summary of the
teaching ascribed to Epicurus, merely noting those
details which we know were added later. The chief
source of information, apart from reports of Epicurus'
own teaching, is, of course, Lucretius : Gassendi's
version is not taken into consideration directly be-
•cause of the obvious danger of mixing his accbunt
of Epicurus with the views he proposed to graft
on the old stem. Epicurus divides the sphere of
thought into the three parts — Logic, Physics, and
Ethics : these headings we may as well preserve,
though examination of the details will show that
some of the subject-matter would hardly be so
classified now.

{a) The subjective sceptical element in the
philosophy of the period is reflected by the Logic
of Epicurus in the demand for a doctrine of criteria
of truth. The criteria enumerated are perceptions
and representations in the theoretical sphere, and
pleasure and pain in the practical. These form
the subject of the Canonica or doctrine of norms.
The idea in the mind of Epicurus is that we must
build entirely on the senses : these are in themselves
true and final in the sense that nothing can be
found to give us certainty when they fail. But he
also recognises that the mental life of the individual
goes beyond the exact moment during which the
sensation lasts ; and the persistent residue of the
sensation has also its function in the life of thought.
Hence he adds to the immediate sense-perception
the representations which are also called anticipations.
As criteria these must be regarded as bringing in

xxviii PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI

the elements of time and plurality. Epicurus does
not say in so many words tliat this is so, but a
moment's reflection on the use of these represen-
tations proves it. They are stored in the mind
and emerge into consciousness when the name of
the thing is uttered : moreover they function in the
strict capacity of norms in as much as they regulate
perceptions. 'To enable us to affirm that what
we see at a distance is a horse or an ox, we must
have some preconception in our minds which makes
us acquainted with the form of a horse and an
ox ' ; from which it is clear that the preconception
or secondary mental activity forms a standard of
reference to which we may return for a judgment
(criterium) on the presentation. This does not
upset the dogma that the perception as an affair
of the senses is always true : it merely tells us
how we may find out what the senses are, as it
were, trying to tell us.

From this stage we go a step further in the
formation of Opinion w^hich results from the presence
of the permanent residues in our minds. These
opinions may be true or false, and the natural
test is a return to experience. The opinion may
refer to the future or to the occult : in the former
case the test of direct experience is merely held
in abeyance. In the latter we have a problem,
for the opinion may be true but there is no way
of getting any collateral support : for this Epicurus
provides a negative justification in so far as we
are allowed to hold the opinion as true if no
contradictory evidence is forthcoming.

This constitutes the gist of the pure canonic of

INTRODUCTION xxix

Epicurus, but we may add to this some notes on
the method employed by the Epicureans and the
theory of knowledge implied in them. In the
first place the criticism which Ueberweg makes
upon the idea that the immediate sensation is
reality, should be noticed. ' The hallucinations of
the insane, even, and dreams are true : for they
produce an impression, which the non-existing
could not do. It is obvious in connection with
this latter argument, that in Epicurus' conception
of truth, the latter, in the sense of agreement of the
psychical image with a real ^object, is confounded
with psychical reality.' JPIiis is undoubtedly true
as pointing out that tlie Epicurean doctrine did
not properly distinguish logical and psychological
certainty. The entire emphasis is thrown on the
psychological groundwork of knowledge, and in
consequence the explanation of the attainment of
any knowledge beyond the sense-given is neglected
to an extent which is wholly unjustifiable in view
of the fact that the atom itself is not a sense-datuny
This deficiency was apparently felt by such disciples
as Zeno and Philodemus, who attempted to give
some theory of induction. But, whether they
could justify it or not, the Epicureans did get
from the known to the unknown : moreover they
made no secret of it, but declared that the true
process of knowledge was from known to unknown.
In addition to induction they also made great
use of analogy and, surreptitiously, of deduction.
We now have from the Herculanean manuscripts
clear proof that analogy was not only used by the
Epicurean but itself a direct object of analysis :

XXX PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI

Lucretius made use of it in a manner that has
been described as ' violent ' ; and it remained in
the school as one of the prime instruments in the
advancement of knowledge. In addition to this
there were one or two first principles which
occasionally come into active service and justify
a deductive procedure. The most notable is the
dogma ' ex nihilo nihil,' to which must be added
the regulative principle that nothing happens by
chance. The former of these rules is most
frequently used to justify a regress from a
comj)ound to its parts : for, it is said, if the whole
has such and such qualities the parts must have
these qualities though they may not be directly
observable in the parts themselves. The most
striking use of this principle is the passage where
Lucretius asserts that the atoms must have the
power of free action,' ^ since we find that power
in that complex of atoms called the soul. The
use of analogy is best exhibited in the construction
of the concept of the gods and their mode of life.
(h) In dealing with the physics it will be
convenient to divide it into physics proper and
psychology. The Epicurean would doubtless have
denied that psychology was not physics 'proper,'
but the mixture is rather confusins; to the modern
mind. First then, as to physics proper. We have,
the mise en scene of Democritus, a vast place bound-
less in every direction, full of atoms too small to be
visible, from whose conjunctions will arise all the
manifold life of this and other worlds. While
agreeing in the main with Democritus, Epicurus

^ Usually called ' free-will,' but see p. 230, Note on Declination.

INTRODUCTION xxxi

diverges from his teaching in some details. With
regard to the motion of the atoms he attributes the
abandonment of the original line of movement
which was conceived as in a straight line downward,
to the voluntary swerving of the atoms. This is
the most striking example of the subordination
of physics to ethics, for the difference between
Democritus and Epicurus consists in just this, that
Democritus tried to settle the question of the
nature of the atomic movements from what he
knew of the mechanical laws : Epicurus directly
opposes himself to the mechanical laws of motion
in order to get a basis for the admission of free-
agency. It is, in all probability, a mistake to
say that Epicurus gave his atoms anything like
free-will or spontaneity as we should understand
it now : we have to keep in view the fact that
the mind to which that free-will has to be referred
would be formulated in terms of matter, and there-
fore all that is required is that the motion of
matter should not be regarded as fixed from all
eternity : if it is so fixed, my motion counts for
nothing : if not, my motion is itself a real factor ;
and if I am conscious that I move, I may also
be sure that my movement is the factor which
produces the result that follows. This is an
extremely interesting phase of what was later
to be the ' free-will ' controversy : the difficulty of
understanding it and the temptation to misunderstand
it, lies in the ideas of choice which we introduce :
we ask, 'Am I free to choose, am I free to be
what I am ? ' but before ideas of God and the
last judgment came in to produce these subjective

xxxii PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI

problems, the question of freedom was naturally
limited to the simple problem, ' Am I in my activity
a real agent?' and it is for this real agency that
Epicurus makes room.^

A second point of difference is also of great
interest. So far our atom has been the ultimate :
it is itself beyond the senses and reached by
thought, yet it is conceived as sensuous inasmuch
as it might be presented to a sense acute enough
to detect it. Latent in the fact that the atom is
reached by an intellectual process, lies the possibility
of that development of the concept of the atom
as a concept, which we get in Leibnitz ; and in
Epicurus we do get so far as the acknowledgment
that the atom is logically divisible, this being
considered necessary for the explanation of variety
in shape. It is significant of the character of
thought at this period that it could employ a
principle that carried it beyond its own ultimate
unit, and yet never enquire whether the process
was a mere dividing of matter or a revelation of
the nature of thought and its categories.

In the construction of the world out of the
atoms Epicurus does more to tell us how it was
not done than how it was : his whole object is
to show that design has no share in the work,
there is no awful Power guiding and controlling
things : nature manages its own afiairs in perfect
contentment, and this spectre of a Providence is
nothing but the creation of the human imagination.
Out of dead matter comes life, and out of life
when it is sufficiently advanced comes consciousness.

^v. Note, p. 239.

INTRODUCTION xxxiii

Lucretius thinks that the phenomena of deep sleep
and swooning prove that life is motion, and it
must be allowed that he does not compromise his
orthodoxy by any truck with the sub-conscious ; but
regarding the motion of matter as the substratum
of conscious life, he consented when he lost hold
on consciousness to drop back into the region of
moving matter. The soul and the body form a
unity, so that the dissolution of death is annihilation
of the Self. This dreary prospect seems to have
been a comfort on the whole, both to the Greek
and the Eoman philosopher, which seems to be a
sufficiently severe expression of their views on the
charms of the life they led on earth !

(c) On the border line, none too clearly defined,
of the physics and the psychology, comes the
question of the constitution of the soul, which we
ascribe to the psychology because the chief interest
centres on the question of the thinking part.
' According to the statements given both by
Diogenes Laertius and Lucretius, the soul is a
complex of elements from air, fire, and wind, and
a fourth unnamed element. The last, which is the
difiierentiating constituent of the mind, suggests
that it is postulated by the feeling that there is
more in the psychical than physical analogies
altogether explain. And further, the introduction of
air, fire, and wind suggests that Epicurus supple-
ments the stricter atomic theory of Democritus by
additions from the early physicists who identify
the soul with air, or fire, or wind ; and from
Aristotle, in whose system the combination of the
four principles of cold, hot, wet, and dry played

xxxiv PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI

a main part, as explaining the processes of nature.'
The first elements are to be taken as composing
the anima, the fourth constitutes the animus.
This animus is the seat of will and thought in
Lucretius. The will we know, on the evidence of
direct experience, is free; but it should be noticed in
connection with what is said above, that its action
begins in the heart. Epicurus seems to have
regarded the breast as the seat of the rational soul,
a distinctly retrograde movement after Democritus
had placed it in the head.

With regard to the psychological activities, these
must be interpreted in a materialistic sense. The
secondary qualities have a material counterpart in
the existence of the finer particles which are the
cause of their perception : even the gods are known
by effluxes. 'This doctrine of sense-perception is
in a w^ay only part of a larger doctrine which has
important and direct bearings on the moral theory.
,In the first place, not merely do the skins shed by
the objects around us meet the eye now ; but even
long after the objects to which they may have
belonged have ceased to exist, these phantom husks
float about the world. Thus it happens that the
forms of the departed may visit us long after their
decease.' Thus Epicurus combined with his denial
of spiritualism as a theory of the existence of dis-
embodied personalities a materialistic spiritism to
account for ghosts. This is another instance of the
way that physical theories may be dictated by
extraneous ideas, and is really an example of the
practical application of the view that ethical con-
siderations come first. For the advantage of the

INTRODUCTION xxxv

view is that it permits those visions of gods and
divine beings which come to us in the night seasons,
and brighten our world with pictures of a blessedness
above and beyond our present attainments. How
such ideas could be of use to us as moral incentives
if we realised that the beings so revealed were not
personal, is a question we naturally ask now, but
get no answer from Epicureanism.

On the whole we may characterise this as a
theory of imagination. In it the intellect gets little
attention : even the ' imaginative impressions of the
intellect ' are to be taken as literally impressions.
If they are real they are effects, and all effects
have a cause which expresses itself in motion and
must therefore be in some sense material. The only
concession allowed to the intellectual impressions is
that they point to agents more subtle than those
which appeal to the senses. In one respect we have
traces of a less materialistic view of mental processes.
A certain degree of mental activity is implied in
the concession that we can form for ourselves fresh
ideas by ' new syntheses of sensations ' ; but the
suggestion is worth very little so long as we are
not expressly told whether this is or is not more
than a secondary movement of the particles of the
mind and purely mechanical. It avails nothing to
say that they are voluntary, for we have already
seen that any talk about the will carries us away
from Epicureanism if we venture to think of it as
other than materialistic in its nature.

I will close this summary of the main features
of Epicureanism with a passage from the work to
which I have already referred again and again : it

xxxvi PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI

expresses what I take to be the truth about Epicurus
in words that cannot be bettered.^ 'If we have
rightly understood Epicurus, he has simply ignored
the ego and consciousness and turned solely to
externality. He has adopted the attitude of science
and not of philosophy. He has fairly enough em-
ployed the ordinary conceptions of matter to explain
the processes of growth, nutrition, and sensation.
If not an adequate mode of conceiving these pro-
cesses, it has, at least for most minds, the merit of
affording an easy and simple rationale of them.
But as a philosopher he should have gone further.
His only answer, however, to the question, " What
are we ? " is, that we are what we see, and, if our
vision were expanded, might see. Each of us is an
object of sensitive and intellectual vision : of the
other fact that each is a subject, he says nothing.
And by a subject is not meant merely that each of
us is active as well as passive. For that matter
the same may be said of every piece of corporeal
substance in the universe : activity and passivity
are the very characteristics of existence in its every
shape. But in each of us there is the further element
of consciousness, sentiment, feeling, will, and know-
ledge. Of this Epicurus has no other explanation
than to say that it is nothing separable from certain
combinations of molecules, and may even be treated
as a mere aggregation of ethereal atoms.'

IV.

Between the days of Lucretius and the age of
Gassendi lie seventeen hundred years filled with

^ W. Wallace, Epicureanism.

INTRODUCTION xxxvii

the strife of minds and marked by much real
progress. The historians of philosophy have linked
together its different epochs, and he who would
comprehend how much was done in that time to
solve our human problems must turn to the
pages of the professed historian. He will find there
two main influences controlling the whole advance :
on the one hand, the theological and speculative
thinking of the patristic and scholastic periods :
on the other, the scientific trend of thought which
is most marked where Arabian influences pre-
dominate. These lines tend to converge, but there
are certain well-defined conditions which make
Faith and Science at present incapable of harmony.
Under these conditions, equally predominant in
modern times, the two parties present themselves
as rival claimants for the different areas within
the Kingdom of Thought : tract after tract was
claimed and lost or won by the alien forces of
reason, experience, or science. The real difficulty
for Dogma arose from the fact that it had assumed
control over regions of thought in which its forces
could never hold their own : its losses were rarely
such as could endanger its final stronghold ; but
every proof of decaying power was regarded as
hastening the final catastrophe. In the mean time
the two claimants establish a right to two kinds
of subjects : science claims to rule on all that can
be presented to the senses, dogma on all the
hyperphysical realities. With the main classes thus
determined, the discussion turns on the question
as to what is to be included under either head.
Slowly but surely the content of dogmatic philosophy

xxxviii PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI

is drained away until a daring spirit like Bruno
openly declares that the Bible is meant to teach
morals only — not physics. The growth of a non-
dogmatic philosophy is followed by a growth of
the spirit of enquiry itself. At first the opposition
to dogmatism takes the form of confronting theory
with fact ; this especially affected the authority
which grounded itself on Aristotle as one who is
above criticism, and proved most damaging wherever
the investigation of nature came into collision
with dogmatic deliverances on what ought to be
or happen in the physical world. As typical of
this collision between observation and groundless
theorising Galileo may be cited. But while we
speak of this as an awakening and as the triumph
of physics over metaphysics, it is necessary to
remember that the spirit of critical enquiry was
not yet freed from the matter to which it most
naturally allied itself: it w^as universally regarded
as applicable to all matter alike. A vigorous mind
like that of Valla might carry critical principles
from the sphere of the sciences into history : a
Montaigne might arise to suggest that even
Christianity was not beyond criticism ; but it was
still possible, or rather natural, for men to feel
that the hidden mysteries were a thing apart,
that the realities of faith must remain behind the
veil of the temple. For this reason it is incorrect
to suppose that those who still acknowledge the
rights of Faith are necessarily insincere, merely
compromising their beliefs to avoid public censure.
Much that is commonplace now was boldly original
in the sixteenth century ; and the boldness of

INTRODUCTION

XXXIX

originality is not to be measured only by the
extent to which physical safety is jeopardised : it
must be measured also by the mental strain which
it involves and the feeling which comes to every
sincere mind that the opinion of the many may
have more truth than the individual perceives.
The foolish can have the courage of their convictions
and rush in where the angels have feared to tread :
the wise find their courage more severely taxed in
the attainment of convictions. Where the struggle
ends in some grand renunciation it gains our
applause : where it ends in the belief that neither
extreme is right we feel that it is less noble, less
brilliant, and too often do injustice to the temperate
soul not knowing that its refinement is of fire.

Such was the age in which Gassendi appeared,
tinged already with a deeper scepticism, but on the
whole not yet grappling with the final questions.
If we may judge from the face portrayed in the
Frontispiece of the edition of 1658, he was a genial
kindly soul, not given to brawling but yet filled
with the temper that resists wrong. Ah the con-
troversy with Descartes he showed his qualities
explicitly^ r at first he shuns the arena : once en-
gaged, ne stiffens against the onset of the enemy ;
his temper rises with the progress of the battle,
yet never so as to confuse hand or eye : the
opponent grows impatient, speaks hastily and rashly,
but he sharpens the pen again and pursues without
swerving the relentless analysis. Such was the
man when pitted against a worthy foe, yet it was
peace he loved, not war. His Epicureanism was of
the lofty type : ease and pleasure have their rights.

xl PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI

but they exist only as parts in a life that is
unified by a great purpose : they are the condi-
mentum vitae ; not the things on which we live,
but the temper that leavens the whole. Such a
frame of mind is only distinguished from Stoicism
by great liberality in the interpretation of life and
a greater ability to compromise. Some spirits break
rather than bend : his could bend in season, and
when after the strife Descartes came to him in
days of sickness as a friend, he thought it no
shame to forgive and to forget.

The facts of Gassendi's life are well known.
Born on Jan. 22nd, 1592, at Champtercier, near
Digne, in Provence, he went to the College of
Digne at an early age, and, like many of the
great thinkers of his day, combined linguistic with
mathematical studies, and was equally successful in
both. He must have been something of an infant
prodigy, for in his sixteenth year he was invited to
lecture. From Digne he went to Aix and studied
philosophy under Fesaye, returning in 1612 to
Digne as lecturer in Theology. Four years later
(1616) he became Doctor of Theology and was
ordained the following year.

Gassendi had now definitely entered the Church ;
but from this time his interest in Theology seems
to have waned. He returned to Aix for a short
time to lecture on philosophy, and though appointed
to a canonry at Grenoble, continued to devote
himself to the reform of Philosophy. In 1624 he
was persuaded to publish his criticisms of Aristo-
telianism, a work which had its origin in the
criticisms which he was in the habit of appending

INTRODUCTION xU

to his formal expositions when lecturing at Aix.
The Exercitationes Paradoxicae adversus AHs-
toteleos were never finished. In this year (1624)
Book I. was published, and a fragment of Book ii.
was afterwards added in the collected works. A
note appended to this Fragment tells us that the
author abandoned the work after readino; the Pei^-
patetica of Franciscus Patricius. The part that
was published aroused considerable animosity, and
drew public attention at, once to the author's abilities
and mental attitude. /-Originality was not Gassendi's
strong point, and he showed in this work that his
strength lay in combining the ideas of others so as
to make them more effective^ In one respect the
work marks an epoch in his life : henceforth his
attitude toward Aristotle is defined by the declara-
tion that the Stagirite is to be taken as guide but
not worshipped as master and lord. In this, as
in other respects, his aim is not to be ' aut nimium
credulus aut parum plus' (vi. 172). While the
work of Patricius relieved him from the necessity
of pursuing these critical essays, he was also
enlightened by their efiect. He now saw that a
merely destructive criticism did little but raise the
dust. The true answer to existing systems could
only be made in another system which should include
in itself the whole range of human activity and
compel the thoughts of men to look at the Universe
as a whole./ Thus began the scheme of the Syn-
tagma, on which at least twenty years of labour
were expended. With a training in mathematics
supplemented by considerable knowledge of the
cognate sciences, of medicine also and such biology

xl PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI

The facts of Gassendi's life are well known.
Born on Jan. 22nd, 1592, at: Champtercier, near
Digne, in Provence, he went to the College of
Digne at an early age, and, like many of the
great thinkers of his day, combined linguistic with
mathematical studies, and was equally successful in
both. He must have been something of an infant
prodigy, for in his sixteenth year he was invited to
lecture. From Digne he went to Aix and studied
philosophy under Fesaye, returning in 1612 to
Digne as lecturer in Theology. Four years later
(1616) he became Doctor of Theology and was
ordained the following year.

INTRODUCTION xli

to his formal expositions when lecturing at Aix.
The Exercitationes Paradoxicae adversus Aris-
toteleos were never finished. In this year (1624)
Book I. was published, and a fragment of Book ii.
was afterwards added in the collected works. A
note appended to this Fragment tells us that the
author abandoned the work after reading the Peri-
patetica of Franciscus Patricius. The part that
was published aroused considerable animosity, and
drew public attention at once to the author's abilities
and mental attitude. /Originality was not Gassendi's
strong point, and he showed in this work that his
strength lay in combining the ideas of others so as
to make them more effective^ In one respect the
work marks an epoch in his life : henceforth his
attitude toward Aristotle is defined by the declara-
tion that the Stagirite is to be taken as guide but
not worshipped as master and lord. In this, as
in other respects, his aim is not to be ' aut nimium
credulus aut parum pius ' (vi. 172). While the
work of Patricius relieved him from the necessity
of pursuing these critical essays, he was also
enlightened by their effect. He now saw that a
merely destructive criticism did little but raise the
dust. The true answer to existing systems could
only be made in another system which should include
in itself the whole range of human activity and
compel the thoughts of men to look at the Universe
as a whole. Thus began the scheme of the Syn-
tagma, on which at least twenty years of labour
were expended. With a training in mathematics
supplemented by considerable knowledge of the
cognate sciences, of medicine also and such biology

xlii PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI

as there was, Gassendi was naturally attracted to
the idea of developing the content of the universe
as subject of thought.^ He was struck with the
difference in value between an abstract and an
applied science ; and theory abstracted from the
living world seemed to him to have all the inutility
of numbers that are multiplied for the value of
multiplying, without application or objective refer-
ence. Such a science as anatomy elicits his fervent
admiration, demanding as it does the highest
development of method with a perpetual relation to
the actual thing.

The year 1624 then was one of great moment, but
no results were to be seen for many years. In
1628 .Gassendi was travelling in Flanders and
Holland with his friend Luillier. In 1631, at the
request of Mersenne, he undertook the criticism of
the mystical doctrine of Fludd. In 1633 he became
Provost of the Cathedral of Digne, and shortly after
began his travels in Provence with the Duke of
Angouleme. In 1645 he was appointed Professor
of Mathematics at the College Royal, Paris, but had
to resign in 1648 through ill-health. The disease
of the lungs from which he had long suffered soon
became acute, and he died at Paris in 1655. The
treatment of the disease seems to have been pecu-
liarly perverse, and Sorbiere speaks with much

^The following anecdote given by Sorbifere illustrates Gassendi's
love of first-hand evidence : 'ut suspicionem autem prorsus amoliretur
quam de canali Cholidocho habuerat, quern Chylodochum dicere
maluerat, equos, in quibus omnino deficit, introspicere voluit. Et
raemini oflfendisse me aliquando euntem cum Martello, saeviente
admodum hieme, ad loca ilia in quae deportari solent viarum pur-
gamenta et trahi equorum cadavera quae plura, soluto pretio aperiri
jussit' (Gassendi, Of. Omnia., vol. i., Preface).

INTRODUCTION xliii

bitterness of the persistent way in which the medici
continued to bleed the exhausted patient.

Between the years 1624 and the date of his death,
Gassendi published writings of three distinct types.
First, the critical writings include the examination
of Fludd's philosophy already noted (1631), and the
attack on the Cartesian doctrine in 1642. As a
critic, Gassendi has a keen eye for weak points,
and a convincing style of attack : his natural faults
are less in evidence here than anywhere. ' II est
difficile de traiter les discussions philosophiques
avec plus de clart^, d'agr^ment et de naturel : la
polemique de Gassendi, sauf peut-etre un peu de
rh^torique, merite encore aujourd'hui d'etre propos^e
comme un modele. ' ^

The second class is that of the Lives, which were
famous in their day : the Vita Feireskii was trans-
lated in English, and had a considerable vogue.

^ F. Bouillier, Histoire de la Philosophie Carte'sienne, quoted by
Thomas, p. 14. Thomas also quotes the following address to the
' Lords of Mount Parnassus,' written by Boileau, which gives some
interesting sidelights on the opinions with which the Exercitationes
were received : ' Supplient humblement les maltres fes arts, prof-
fesseurs regens de I'Universite de Paris ; disant qu'il est de notoriete
publique que c'est le sublime et incomparable Aristote qui est sans
conteste le premier fondateur des quatre premiers Elements, le feu,
I'air, I'eau et la terre . . . ; et quoique pendant plusieurs sifecles il ait
6t6 maintenu d'un commun consentement dans une paisible possession
de tons ses droits, neanmoins depuis quelques annees en-gk, deux
particuliferes, nommees la Raison et I'Experience, se sont liguees
ensemble pour s'eriger un trone sur les ruines de son autorite ; et
pour parvenir plus adroitement k leurs fins ont excite certains esprits
fdcheux, qui sous les noms de Cartistes et de Gassendistes ont com-
mence h, secouer le joug du seigneur Aristote. ... Ce considere,
Nosseigneurs, il vous plaise ordonner . . . que Gassendi, Descartes,
Rohant, etc., et leurs adherents seront conduits a Athenes et con-
damnes d'y faire amende honorable devant tout la Gr5ce. . . .' (p. 9.)

xliv PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI

The peculiar characteristic of Gassendi's work in this
direction is the easy way in which the whole is
seasoned with genial humanity.^

In the third class may be reckoned the strictly
philosophical works. Though the work De Vita
morihus et doctrina Epicuri is a Life, and the notes
to the tenth book of Diogenes Laertius are critical,
they may both be reckoned as part of the working
out of an Epicurean Philosophy. They stand in
close relation to the Syntagma, which is the final
and all-embracing statement of his philosophy. As
this is to be the subject of the following pages,
only a remark or two need be made here. The
recorded judgments of the value of Gassendi's work
vary largely. Some think he has practically no
place in the history of philosophy : others regard
him as the forerunner of such modern philosophy
as concerns itself with the empirical rather than
the idealistic line of development. In my opinion
there is no fairer estimate of Gassendi than that
which Ritter gives in his Geschichte dei' Philosophie
(vol. X. p. 544). He says : ' Durch bedeutende
Erfindungen glanzte er nicht : dem neuem Ent-

1 ' Gassendi was one of the first after the revival of letters who
treated the literature of philosophy in a lively way. His writings
of this kind, though too laudatory and somewhat diffuse, have great
merit. They abound in those anecdotal details, natural yet not
obvious reflexions, and vivacious turns of thought which made
Gibbon style him, with some extravagance certainly, though it was
true enough up to Gassendi's time : ' Le meilleur philosophe des
litterateurs et le meilleur litterateur des philosophes ' {Encycl. Britt.,
'Gassendi,' vol. x.). Eitter {Oeschichte der Philosophie, x. 544),
speaking of Gassendi's encyclopaedic knowledge, says, ' Nicht ohne
Grund hat Bayle von ihm gesagt, er sei unter den Philologen der
grosste Philosoph, unter den Philosophen der grosste Philolog
gewesen,' which looks like the prototype of Gibbon's remark.

INTRODUCTION xlv

wicklimgsgange der Wissenschaften hatte er sich
doch nicht mit Eutschiedenheit angeschlossen ; gegen
das Copernikanische System hatte er nocli seine
Zweifel : die tlieologischen Fragen will er zwar
nicht der Philosophie beimischen, weil wir in dieser
nur dem Lichte der Natur zu folgen haben ' (544).
For some things the authority of the Church is
final : in the rest there is freedom : in philosophy
as such there is no one that must be taken as a
final authority ; his method of exposition belongs
to the earlier style in which all the authorities are
reviewed before a decision is made : he seeks a
middle course between scepticism and dogmatism.
He might indeed be reckoned among those who
had revived ancient systems in the earlier period
(this refers to Ritter's ' periods,' of which the last
brings the reader down to the reform of philosophy
by Bacon) but for the fact that his work is grounded
on the reformed methods of Bacon and ' ein bedeu-
tendes Glied fiir die systematische Entwicklung der
neuen Philosophie abgegeben hat' (545). This is
an accurate definition of Gassendi's position, and
shows that Ritter knew the actual contents of the
Syntagma at least. Its truth will be more apparent
when the summary of the Syntagma has been read
and the question of Gassendi's materialism can be
discussed in the light of his own statements.

PART I. LOGIC

LOGIC

Logic is defined by Gassendi as the science of
intellect ' qua veri sequax.' ^ Its rules, being general,
conduct to all knowledge, not merely the knowledge
of nature, but knowledge of every description.^ The
term Logic Gassendi connects with Logos, which de-
notes the inner conversation of the mind, of which
Ratio is a species.

Logic, then, in the first instance is the science
of all mental operations that are in any sense
organised. This science may be Dialectic, Organic,
or, thirdly, Logic in the narrower sense. Logic in
the widest sense is ars cogitandi ; as Dialectic it is
ars disserendi ; as Organic it is ars dirigendi actiones
mentis : while the ars Logica in the narrower sense
is canonica or ars veri et falsi diiudicandi. This
second use of the term Logic is confined to the
ars bene cogitandi, which is held to be difi'erent
from the ars cogitandi, and identical with the ars
ratiocinandi. This is the real Logic as usually under-

^ I. 31. 'objectum, seu tanquam scopus Intellectui propositus sit
Verum : objectum, seu scopus Voluntati propositus sit Bonum.'

^ 1. 31. ' Quanquam et quia Eegulae huiusmodi generales sunt, ideo
inservire intellectui non modo ad scientiam naturae, sed etiam ad
omnem omnino cognitionem possunt.'

2 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

stood, and the brancli that demands our serious
attention. Bene cogitare comprises bene imaginari,
proponere, colligere et ordinare : and in accord with
these our Logic will comprise the subjects of
Imagination, Proposition, Syllogism, and Method.

The action denoted by the verb ' imaginari ' is
that of forming an idea, also called species, notio,
praenotio, anticipatio, or conceptus. The ideas pre-
sent themselves to the mind as soon as the object
is named, and we, as it were, see right into them.^
This intuitive perception we call simple imagination,
because it is limited to the mere image of the
thing without affirmation oi negation. The idea is
identical with the phantasma. The proposition is
an enunciative judgment : colligere denotes the
illative judgment; while the correct treatment of
a number of judgments in related syllogisms con-
stitutes the ars bene ordinandi.

II.

Logic is in the first instance Natural. Men had
thoughts before they evolved any method of think-
ing, and probably even in the earliest times there
was some method of thought even if there was no
thought of method. The serpent in the garden of
Eden doubtless used subtle arguments ; but these
primary forms of Logic are of no serious import-
ance : we may therefore pass them over, and confine
y/ our attention to Artificial Logic.

The earliest Logic in the proper sense is that of
Epicurus. Zeno's Logic was purely eristic, and a

^ I. 33. ' nam simul ac res nominatur, obversari nobis in mente
experimur illarum imagines, in quas veluti intuamur.'

I.] LOGIC 3

non-syllogistic method. Epicurus has been accused
of despising Logic, but it was really only the Logic
of the Stoics which he rejected. When he dropped
the term Logic for the name 'canons' it was only
the name that he really changed : ' nomen rejecit
rem retinuit' [i. 52].

All questions, said Epicurus, are either about
things or words. When the question is about things
a criterion of Judgment is required. Things may
be classified as (a) naturales and (b) morales. In
the case of res naturales, we require sense and
mind : for res morales appetitus is required. As
there are three faculties, namely sense, mind, and
feeling, we have three criteria, namely sensation,
anticipation, and passion.

The term sense denotes both the faculty and the
function : as a criterion it denotes the function
primarily, for we judge by the perception of the
senses. The anticipatio is the image stored in the
mind ; the passio is the pleasure or pain which
controls choice. These will be better understood if
we quote the canons.

Canon i. Sensus nunquam fallitur : ac proinde
est omnis sensio omnisque Phantasiae sen appar-
entiae perceptio vera.

Canon ii. Opinio est consequens sensum sen-
sionique superadjecta in quam Veritas aut falsitas
cadit.

Canon iii. Opinio ilia vera est cui vel suflfragatur
vel non refragatur sensus evidentia.

Canon iv. Opinio ilia falsa est cui vel refragatur
vel non suffragatur sensus evidentia.

Canon v. Omnis quae in mente est anticipatio

4 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

seu praenotio dependet a sensibus : idque vel
incursione, vel proportione, vel similitudine vel
composition e.

Canon vi. Anticipatio est ipsa rei notio sive
definitio, sine qua quidquam quaerere, dubitare,
opinari, imo et nominari non licet.

Canon vii. Est anticipatio in omni Ratiocinatione
principium, quasi nempe id ad quod attendentes
inferimus unum esse idem aut diversum, conjunctum
aut disjunctum.

Canon viii. Quod inevidens est ex rei evidentis
anticipation e demonstrari debet.

These eight canons are the basis of the theory
of knowledge, in so far as one is given us. We
y start with a blank mind capable of bare sensation :
the evidence of sense is one against which there
is no appeal.^ In the fifth canon we have some
new terms : ' incursio ' denotes the entrance of an
idea as such : proportio is the creation of an idea,
e.g. of a giant, by extending the idea of a man ;
similitudo is construction of an object not seen by
analogy with one we know ; lastly, compositio is
the voluntary union of ideas such as we perform
in constructing the notion of the centaur. In the
sixth canon the phrase 'notio sive definitio' covers
two aspects of the anticipatio. As a mental image

' ' C'est en s'appuyant sur ces declarations, d'ailleurs formellea,
que les logiciens de Port-Royal et beaucoup de critiques k leur
suite, ont range Gassendi parmi les aensualistes. Nous verrons
bient^t ce qu'il faut penser de ce jugement lorsque, nous pla^ant
non plus au point de vue psychologique, nous etudierons de plus
prfes la formation de nos connaissons, et chercherons k determiner
avec plus de precision le role exact des deux facteurs dont elles
dependent : I'experience et la raison ' (P. Felix Thomas, La
Philosophie de Gassendi (Paris, 1889), p. 38). v. p. 1.3, note.

L] LOGIC 5

the anticipatio is that visualizing of an object
which we perform when we hear a name significant
to us. This not being the product of a present
object, is producible at will and is that which we
recall and mentally survey in framing a definition.
A verbal definition is a secondary product and not
necessary except for one desiring to communicate
his ideas. The essential thing is a formal notion
or a notion described and accurately delimited ; ^
and this is what Gassendi really wants.

III.

The remaining canons, ix. to xiv., are rules for
practical choice and clear speaking. Upon these
there follow summaries of the works of Lully,
Kamus, and Bacon.

The second book opens with the question of the
nature of that Truth which is considered to be
the end of Looic.

Truth is for Logic an end which is external to
it. The internal end for Logic is right think-
ing ; but right thoughts are higher and better
than this : Logic prepares the mind, and the end .
of this preparation is attained in applied thought.
The common distinction made between 'logica
docens ' and ' logica utens ' expresses this point.
The former is abjuncta a rebus, the latter conjuncta
cum rebus. It is only the latter, the concrete
applied logic, that concerns us at present. The
Truth whose nature we are pursuing is truth of
judgment. There is a truth of existence expressed

1 1. 54. ' impressa quaedam animo rei definitio ' : ' nisi taleni
quampiam animo deformatam habeamus.'

6 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

in the formula ' everything is what it is ' ; Gassendi
y recognises that reality must always be real, and
a picture is not primarily ' falsus homo ' but ' vera
effigies ' ; ^ on the other hand, he clearly does not
suspect that the existence of which he predicates
truth is always a being for mind. To Being as
it is for thought belongs another kind of truth,
truth of judgment, which is the agreement of
judgment with fact.

Gassendi is now grappling with a difficult subject,
and allowance must be made for the crudeness of
the position on account of its novelty. Gassendi's
aim is to reach a common-sense position. It appears
to him that everything is what it is in itself: like
all other defenders of this point he goes upon the
tacit assumption that the phrase 'a thing is what
it is' means a thing is for itself what it is for
consciousness. As yet the animistic vein is not
quite explicitly eliminated from the world of nature
as we know it : the object is not properly conceived
as always relative to mind ; still less is the object
as related to mind expressly distinguished from the
thing as a further ultimate reality. But with all
its crudity the theory of Gassendi commands respect
as a straightforward treatment of the world of daily
life. The primary dogma that ' everything is what
it is' is supplemented by the notion that sense
shows us everything as it is. There is therefore no
thought of the bodily medium being itself the
destroyer of all knowledge : the immediate relation
is the psychic atom out of which the fabric of know-
ledge is built, and is itself irresolvable and wholly

^i. 67.

L] LOGIC 7

real. Immediate relations are, however, not always
possible. Things are not all of the same kind.
Some are ' manifestae,' and with them we have no
trouble ; others are ' occultae,' either ' penitus,'
' natura,' or ' ad tempus.' ^ The first are hopeless :
the last may be left for Time to reveal : the second
form the sphere which it pays us to further
examine. It follows from this division that there
is an unknowable ; but that which is unknown is so
by reason of its own nature, not by reason of any
defect in us. The example given is the know-
ledge that the stars are even in number : the
unknown is in this case the answer to a problem,
and the knowledge that there is an answer depends
on a disjunctive judgment, 'stars are either odd
or even.' It would seem as though, if this is the
type of the unknowable, the unknowable ' penitus '
is always a case of the ' unknown ad tempus.'
The ' res occultae natura ' are those which can be
reached by inference : as, for example, the existence
of pores in an apparently continuous surface deduced
from the excretion of sweat. To reach these truths
which lie below the surface we require a criterion,
or instrument.

Properly a criterion is a standard of judgment, as
Gassendi recognises, but it is also employed in the
sense of instrument. He divides criteria into (1)
those by which we live, and (2) those by which
we learn. The former are standards, such as ' lex
patriae,' ' consuetudo,' and the like, together with
the moral tests of Epicurus, pain and pleasure.
These do not really belong to Logic, which is

1 1. G8.

8 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

concerned with the second class. This is subdivided
into (a) mechanical, and {h) natural criteria. The
former subdivision includes the foot-rule and
instruments of that kind ; the latter contains ' id
per quod ' and ' id secundum quod,' namely the
faculty and the function of the faculty. Some add
to these a third, ' a quo,' and define it as the
mind. But while for ascertaining the weight of a
thing we require the scales, the poising of the
scales, and the man to record the result, and also
for knowledge we require the sense, the function
of the sense, and the mind that knows the result,
the third is in both cases not a criterion, but a
judge.'

IV.

Now that we have determined the nature of the
world we confront and the criteria available for its
discovery, we must explore the question of the
possibility of knowledge, for that has been more
than once denied.

The Sceptics assert that man knows nothing in
the sense that he cannot penetrate into the inner
beings of things. The Dogmatists, on the other
hand, declare the criteria of sense and intellect to
be absolute : everything can be known through
them. Both the schools err from excess, and the
truth lies in the golden mean : some things are
known, and truly known, while others are obscure
and do not admit of more than probability. Truth
must be regarded as always possible, but not always
actual : what we do know is truth, but at the same
time we cannot be said to know all truth.

^ I. 69. ' non ci'iterium, est enim potius crites.'

I.] LOGIC J>

A difficulty arises here which Gassendi does not
seem to suspect. If we do not know all that might
be known, how does the ignorance arise, and how
is the present knowledge affected by the absence of
further knowledge ? Moreover, what do we require
to make our knowledge more complete ? Is it
more system or more senses ? Clearly if the whole
is regarded as a growing system, it is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that no one stage is in itself
finally true. On the other hand, if we imagine
that the world around us contains forces which
appeal to us in vain because we have no senses
that can respond to them, knowledge is bound to
remain cramped and imperfect for all time. The
atomism of Gassendi's standpoint now becomes
obvious. He thinks that a piece of the truth is
at least truth. The system of truths, then, only
differs from the individual truths in respect of
quantity. This point can be made clearer when we
have further considered the nature of knowledge.

In opposition to Gorgias, Gassendi asserts that
there must be something and some truth. Appear-
ances are admitted to be true : it is the occult truths
which give rise to doubt. To penetrate into the
occult truth we must advance by means of the known
to the unknown. A fact which is known and used
as the key to further knowledge is called 'signum,
medium, seu argumentum.' For example, in the
sentence ' if the sun shines it is day,' the signum
is 'if the sun shines.' Following Aristotle and
Quintilian,^ we divide the signa into (l) necessary
and (2) probable. The necessary signa are either (a)

^i. 81. This equals the distinction of TeK^-npiov and (rrj/j.^ou.

10 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

indicativa or (b) commonefactiva. When the signa
are indicativa they prove the existence of the occult
reality, as, for example, when sweat is taken as a
proof that pores exist in the skin. The commone-
factiva belong to the class of 'res ad tempus occultae.'
In this case both the objects concerned are possible
objects of experience. When a man sees smoke he
infers the presence of fire, and can proceed to verify
this by actual experience. It is not this but the
former case that the sceptics attack. The formula for
this is, ' If A is not, then B is not ' : hence given B,
A must be posited. The question therefore amounts
to this : can we have a perception that is not a sense-
perception, and none the less true ? Gassendi thinks
that we can. The signum is a sense-datum, and
must be given first ; but it has value only for a mind
that perceives and grasps it, so much so that the
mind is justified in revising and correcting its sense-
impressions. The position of the Sceptics that ex-
periences dijQTer and there is no universal truth is
refuted by the facts. For the experiences may differ,
but in recognising the differences we practically
admit that there are two fixed points, namely, the
cause and the disposition of the organism which is
affected. As knowledge is a relation the nature of
the relation may vary, and this may lead to partial
and confusing statements. We say ' the sun melts
the wax ' : we cannot say that the sun is in its own
nature 'melting,' any more than that it is 'hardening'
when it hardens the mud. The underlying fact is
that it radiates heat, which softens some bodies and
hardens others according to their dispositions. Our
limits are given at one erkl by the immediate cer-

I.] LOGIC 11

tainty of sense, and at the other by the ' indubitata
principia ' of mind. It follows that single facts and
true propositions are alike self-evident. If the in-
tellect makes errors it also corrects them, and knows
the pure truth of axioms.

The critical point of this logic is the determination
of the relation of reason to sense. At first it looks
as though this was a theory purely sensualistic, but
the modifications introduced finally reverse that
judgment. Gassendi's real meaning appears to be
that experience gives us all we know ; we may get
out of experience much that is not apparent to the
senses, but we must never suppose that we can by
ourselves 'make experience : knowledge is a relation,
and therefore a pure creative activity of mind is a
sheer impossibility. Gassendi does not say that the
mind cannot know much that the senses never reveal,
or that we cannot confront experience with concepts
derived from reflection : all he says is that however
far we travel from the sources, there can be no truth
or reality in thoughts that cannot be brought back
to their contact with experience^"' Psychologically
this is expressed by saying that the intellect is a
supersensuous agent, which is in fact always allied
to a sensuous organism.^

Gassendi thought Bacon and Descartes were both
extremists. Bacon confined himself too much to the
ars bene colligendi; his condemnation of the syllogism
was wrong, ' cum in syllogismo sit re ipsa robur
nervusque omnis ratiocinii ' : the syllogism is only
a failure because our universal is generally formed
' ex propositionibus non satis perspectis.' Descartes,

*Cp. Ritter, Geschichte der Philosophie, x. 545-555.

12 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

on the other hand, inclined to weave experience out
of his inner consciousness, to cultivate the ars bene
imaginandi without due regard to the material
(auxilia ad habendum veram germanamque rerum
notitiam, non tam ab ipsismet per se ac in se ex-
plorandis rebus, quam a solo, ipsoque a suis dumtaxat
cogitatis pendente Intellectu procedendum existimat,
I. 90). This definite expression of opinion makes it
clear that Gassendi was steering a middle course
between contemporary forms of empiricism and
rationalism (v. p. 134).

Gassendi has now finished defining his position
with regard to the relation of the mind to its world.
The position is obviously modelled on Aristotle, and
as was noticed above, is in a sense atomistic. A very
significant remark is to be found in the answer to
the Sceptics, who argued that, if a thing appears
diff'erently to diff'erent peojole, no one appearance
can be called the truth. Gassendi says that the
truth lies not in the appearance but in the
appearing.

Suppose an object appears to me to be of a certain
colour, I cannot say that this is ' ipsissima qualitas
quae sit in objecto,'^ but I can say that this is the
afi'ection due to this object, or this is the relation
which this object realises with me. The statement
that the object is not red to you cannot make it
cease to be red to me, while, on the other hand, the
fact that it is not to you what it is to me, proves
that it is what it is, for if there were no objective
reality the fact of diff'erence could not be explained
at all. This view logically implies that the object is

ii. 84.

I.] LOGIC 13

essentially what it does, or in other words, it is a
* possibility of action.'

Atomism necessitates the recognition of the 'thing'
as a solid unchanging occupant of space. Whether
it naturally leads to the rejection of the category
of substance for that of function, to the change of
the formula of the thing from what it is to what it
does, is a question that confronts us vaguely, but
with promise of growing clearness.

The Logic proper of Gassendi is divided into four
parts, and exhibited in the form of canons. The
parts deal with the idea, the proposition, the
syllogism, and method respectively.

The primary activity of the conscious being is
Imagination, or the reception of an image also called
idea. The idea is defined as the object of the mind
when it thinks (quae nobis rem quampiam cogitantibus
menti obversatur). All ideas come to us from the
senses, and we must endorse the saying : nihil in
Intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu (Canon iv.).^
These ideas are supplemented by those which the
mind constructs by its own activities." From the
activity of the mind we derive general ideas. Both

'How is this td be understood? In a letter to Valerius (vi. 151,
dated 1642) Gassendi says : ' id ipsum est quod alii dicunt nihil
esse in Intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu ; insinuaturque
interim ut in sensu praefuerint quae videntur nunquam transisse
per sensum.' In respect of God he says : ' quas habemus species
huiusmodi rerum, non esse absque analogia ad res, ut corporeas sic
sensu perceptas.' This seems to interpi'et the formula as meaning
*all human thought is sensuous,' which is hardly half-way to
Condillac.

*v. p. 4.

14 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [ft.

singular and general ideas are ' perfect ' in proportion
as they accurately represent the object, and accuracy
is obtained by discriminating all the parts of the
object, singular or general. So Gassendi praises
Anatomy, Chemistry, and all analytical sciences as.
leading to accurate knowledge of particular objects.
In the case of the general idea, he says it is more
perfect according as it contains more distinct classes.
The general idea of man, for example, is more perfect
if it contains not only Europeans, Africans, and
Asiatics, but also Americans. It is difficult, he says,
to get the idea free from particular distinctions, but
it can be done. The reader of Canon viii. will find
it difficult to say whether Gassendi's universal is to
contain all particular distinctions or be formed by
neglecting them. Man, as a general idea, must be
' omnibus discriminibus absolutum,' but at the same
time the universal concept cannot be gained by ab-
straction based on one individual, but results from
that process of explicating the essential, which is
grounded in the interaction of many particular ideas.

The Proposition is a union of ideas, and forms the
second stage of logical process. It is true when the
union it affirms is in agreement with objective reality.
The objective relation is that of substance and attri-
butes, and the Proposition unites substance and
attributes. As the union objectively considered is
sometimes necessary and sometimes contingent, so the
judgment contained in the proposition is sometimes
necessary (the opposite term being " impossible "),
sometimes probable.

The syllogism is a nexus of propositions, and is
treated by Gassendi in the ordinary formal way.

I.] LOGIC 15

Method is three-fold : of invention, of judgment,
and of doctrine. The method of discovery is either
analytic or synthetic. It consists essentially in
tracking down a middle term or connecting link.
Suppose one is required to prove that man is a
substance. Taking the subject man we may analyse
it and show that it contains the notion of substance :
or taking substance we may qualify it (synthetically)
until we get that qualification which is identical
with man. The process is obviously a resolution
of the equation, ' Man = a substance,' in the form :

Man = rational livino^ thins;.
Some substance = rational living thing.

Man = some substance.
Gassendi's preference for mathematical methods
would have been quite obvious without his parti-
cular reference to geometry.

The method of judgment is likened to proof in
arithmetic when we combine addition with subtrac-
tion, and use them alternately to prove a result.^

' Gassendi uses this example to explain the distinction between
logica utens and docens. To learn to count is merely to learn a
method, good enough in itself but useless by itself, and only
acquired in order that it may be applied to things. To go on
with thought-processes in abstraction is like multiplying a number
by itself ad infinitum ; the result is true but true of nothing : hence
he insists on the return to experience as being a process of verifica-
tion. The inner significance of mathematical reasoning does not
seem to have struck Gassendi ; he merely sees that the assertion
' twice two is four ' means that if two things have been given me
twice I ought to have four ; whether I have or not is a contingent
fact that requires immediate experience for its verification. In
both cases, mathematics and logic, we seem primarily to work
with ideas divorced from things ; but does this divorce extend to the
ideas which are intuitively guaranteed ? Gassendi apparently thinks
it does, for even the idea of God is 'verified' in the content of
experience.

16 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt. i.

The final verification is found in the criteria of sense
and judgment in which we must finally fix our faith.
The method of doctrine or teaching * begins with
resolution, and proceeds by composition' (Canon v.).
This is the method of all sciences, physical, mental,
and moral. In addition to this simple rule Gassendi
preaches clearness of language, clearness of division,
avoidance of useless digressions, and the necessity
of proceeding from the most common and essential
elements to the more obscure.

PART II. PHYSICS

SECTION A

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

By far the longest part of the Syyitagma of Gassendi
is comprised under the title ' Physics.' Of the
general nature of this work and its significance we
must speak later ; for the present we shall be
content to follow Gassendi's order of treatment and
reproduce his views on the various topics.

The Introduction is intended to clear our minds
as to the character and range of the subject. The
term nature is frequently used for two very distinct
things. If used with an active significance it denotes
a ' vis agendi,' a ' natura divina ' which sustains and
supports everything ; if used passively it denotes
simply the ' universitas rerum,' the totality of exist-
ing things. This distinction invites the use of two
terms made famous by Spinoza, naturans and
naturata. But terms live by their associations,
and as Gassendi does not use either of these verbal
forms, it is better to avoid them. Natura naturans
would indeed distort the meaning of 'vis agendi'
beyond recognition. In spite of the alternative
phrase, natura divina, this active aspect of nature
is in no sense God : the activity may be from God
and in its nature divine, but nature and God remain

20 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

distinct realities without fusion of their being. The
manifestations of this activity are the ordinary
processes of life, including all that belongs neither
to art nor chance, which are the complementary
categories.

Nature as the sum of existing things may be
regarded in an abstract or a concrete way. The
true sphere of our Physics lies in this system of
things, and the true keynote of our method is
concreteness. Thales was the founder of the true
method, because he first sought the explanation of
natural phenomena in natural causes. To be scientific
we must be immanent ; our results will probably not
be final, but none the less our end will be attained.
That end is, according to Gassendi, ethical : he is
never tired of pointing out that if we desire finality
we labour in vain. The greatest lesson of past ages
is that we too are doomed to be superseded. None
the less we are not aimless or without an end : it
is meritorious to do what we may, and as it is a
duty so it is also a happiness to attain a knowledge
of the world in which we live, and through Nature
come to God. Of the limitations of our powers
Gassendi has no doubt ; with Bacon he finds in
nature a subtlety we cannot compass. But he has
no scepticism by which hope is numbed or enterprise
chilled. It is the quantity not the quality of know-
ledge that suffers : what we can know is in its way
true and final, and if we pass beyond it, the lower
stage had its own reality in its own day.

To revert to detail, a scheme is given us in this
introduction of the whole work.^ It is to deal with

'Cp, p. xi.

II.] PHYSICS 21

(a) nature in general, (h) things celestial, (c) things
earthly. The subdivisions of the programme run
thus :

(a) De rebus naturae universe :

(1) The world — its number, parts, disposition.

(2) Time and place.

(3) Matter, causal principles, qualities, origin

and end.

(b) De rebus celestibus :

(1) The heavenly bodies, their motions and

the like.

(2) Predictions based on these.

(1) Plants.

(2) Animals.

(3) Man and especially the soul.

This programme we shall follow as Gassendi has
followed it.

The discussions of the first section are prolix and
contain chiefly refutations of views which are gene-
rally of theological import and belong to an age of
thought so entirely superseded that they are no
longer of any interest. We can therefore pass it
over with a mere summary of conclusions.

The first question of the plurality of worlds was
generally treated in an a priori and speculative
manner for which it was peculiarly unfitted. One
prominent argument of the scholastic divines asserted
that an infinite God could not express himself in a
finite world. The word here used is mundus, and
must be taken to mean a habited or habitable globe,

22 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

I
^'^^ as there is no question of the plurality of the heavenly-
bodies. The answer to such a 'trifling proposition' is
easy but instructive. In the first place, the infinity
of worlds might be successive, which is the more
probable if we grant that the given world must
perish. Again, it does not follow that an effect must
be identical with its cause, and therefore, an infinite
cause need not produce an infinite effect. Finally,
the whole argument suggests that we can judge the
Divine Agent by human standards, which Gassendi
denies. Gassendi refuses to say that ' Deus propter
excellentiam non immerito nihil vocatur'; the concept
of God has to be formed through our concepts of all
that is highest on earth, but the sublimation is carried
far enough to justify the position that when regarded
as active and real, God cannot be brought under
ordinary categories of judgment.

Current opinion was divided between two views.
Some upheld that each star was a world and these
worlds were related to each other :^ others maintained
that there was a plurality of worlds, but each one
dwelt apart, dissociated from the rest. In the second
case it follows that we cannot know the others; while
the former statement is a mere assumption, since we
do not in fact know those relations. The assumption
of relations was a pure deduction from the assumed
unity of the whole, and was made valueless by the
fact that the relations asserted to be actual were
never revealed in experience. An entirely different
proof was based on the assumption that the number
of atoms was infinite and could only be exhausted by
an infinity of worlds. These so-called proofs Gassendi

'i. 138.

II.] PHYSICS 23

rejects : his attitude is one of provisional scepticism
based on commonsense. There is no proof either for
or against, since the worlds if existent are certainly
unknown.^ He pours scorn on Lucretius for praising
Epicurus as though a proclamation of endless worlds
had broken down the barriers of human knowledge.
Lucretius exclaimed in vain

' moenia mundi
discedunt : video totum per inane geri res.'

The one word ' video ' reduced the whole sentiment
to bathos : it expressed exactly what could not be
done ; and there is no gain in widening the realm of
the unknown: it is not the number of possible objects
that must be increased, but the powers of sense and
constructive imagination as based on sense. To in-
dulge an empty fancy in the ecstasy that the word
''' infinite ' too often inspires is harmful rather than
advantageous : we must confine ourselves to what we
know, and curb the imagination within the limits
dictated by experience. In this reference at least
Gassendi seems to have been clear on the distinction
of unknown from unknowable, and to have felt the
futility of asserting existences to which we have no
relation.

II.

The fifth chapter takes up the question of the
World Soul, a subject which has been discussed from
time immemorable, and still retains something more

1 1. 141. 'Nam fatendum est quidem convinci demonstrationi non
posse, non esse niundos praeter hunc alios : quando profitemur
potuisse et posse adhuc condere Deuiu alios innumeiabileis. . . .
At vero tueri aliunde plureis mundos reipsa esse, praeter rationem
omnino est.'

24 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

than a merely historical interest. Gassendi's treat-
ment of it is systematic and much more interesting
than some of his other discussions.

The root of the question is the opinion that the
world is an organised whole ; not a ' totum in-
ordinatum ' like a pile of stones, but ' ordinatum '
or constituted of organised parts. ^ This position is
definitely though perhaps unconsciously advanced by
the addition of the idea that these parts stand to
each other in some relation other than that of mere
co-existence in space : it is universally admitted that
Earth, Sun, and Moon are interrelated (inter se
affectae relatione aliqua sint). This advance in the
doctrine really carries us over the crucial step from
the view of the world as organised to the declaration
that it is organic, from which an easy analogy brings
us to the all-pervading soul.^ It is this step that
we must defend or repudiate. In spite of the
example of the pile of stones, it may be possible
to have an ordered Universe without all the im-
plications of a universal soul.

The greatest advocates of the world soul are
Pythagoras and Plato, supported by i^j-istotle to a
certain extent, and the more recent 'chymici.' The
outline of the doctrine shows that the Soul of
the world was conceived as a very subtle sub-
stance pervading the Universe. Its nature is not
simple but twofold, being composed of a purer
and a grosser part, the latter being however

ij. 155.

"'Plerique . , . fatentur esse vim quandam per totum mundum
sic diffusam parteisque eius continentem cuiusraodi in Animali est
Anima.'

IL] PHYSICS 25

* purissima ' as compared with the grossness of
corporeal entities. This forms a spiritual body
which mediates the entrance of the higher part
into the natural body.^ These parts are called
respectively Mens and Anima {fov?, ^^x^'i). The
term anima then denotes voO^ taken as conjoined
to some material existent, and can be used in this
discussion without further reference to vov^ or mens
per se.

The anima was defined by Pythagoras as a
harmony, not of course in a material sense as we
speak of vocal harmony, but in the sense of
proportion of parts. We naturally ask what are
the parts and what are the proportions, and we
look to Plato's Timaeus for the answer. That
exposition is taken by Gassendi to be the true
statement of what the Anima Mundi meant to the
original authors of the doctrine. Are we to accept
this Anima or not? Such expositions as we have
clearly indicate that it is an entity whose being
is not exhausted in these analogical descriptions.
To say it is a harmony is only to say that its
nature can be thus analogically described. What
is it in reality? If we take it to mean God there
is no objection so long as we speak of him as

^This is Gassendi's interpretation of Plato's phrase, i'oi/:' /x^v iv ^vxvt
^vxv" 5^ ^'' cwyuari (Timaeus, 30 b). * Stallbaum,' says Archer-Hind
{Timaeus, p. 93), 'following the misty light of neo-platonic inspiration,
says of \piixv> media est inter corpora atque nientem.' In Timaeus, 36 E,
we are told God constructed body within soul : hence voDs, i'vxv, and
ffufjM were conceived as each including the other, like three concentric
circles, with I'oi/s comprehending ^vxv, '^^xv comprehending irw/ua. The
relation of this to the view that ' vovs is simply the activity of \f/vx'n
according to her own proper nature ' (Archer-Hind), is obvious if not
orthodox : for vovt can think ^vx'l but not vice versa, includes but is
not included by ^pvxv-

26 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

assistens, not pars, just as the pilot is in but not
part of the ship. Similarly it may be a fiery
substance (calor) if taken as immanent, not like
the sun's heat, irradiated. This interpretation
requires a further modification, inasmuch as the
position is radically altered by using the term
soul for a substance like calor. To use the term
soul in any intelligible way is to imply certain
functions such as generation and nutrition. These
are essential to life as we know it, either in
animals or plants, and without these the term
becomes meaningless. But one world does not
beget another, and therefore has no claim to be
recognised as an animal. Neither has the world
any functions of nutrition: Plato and the Stoics
have indeed spoken of the stars as being nourished
by exhalations from the earth, and the earth from
the water of the moon, but these are idle fables:
a commutation of parts there may be, but that is
not properly speaking nutrition. Finally, the earth
has no functions such as sight and hearing; and
if we speak of the 'heart' of the world, or make
it like a Cyclops with the Sun for an eye, these
are pure metaphors! Why, then, is the world said
to have a soul at all? The reason is, that without
it we cannot explain how there should be individual
souls. The only argument for it is a regress from
particular to universal. Lactantius expresses this
tersely : ' sic enim argumentatur : fieri non posse ut
sensu careat quod sensibilia ex se generat. Mundus
autem generat hominem, qui est sensu praeditus.
Ergo et ipsum sensibilem esse.' This argument
breaks down by generating its own contradiction:

II.] PHYSICS 27

for many things in the world have no soul, and it
is equally possible to argue from them that the
world has no soul. That which has soul derives
its soul from the particular antecedent to which
it owes its production and not to a universal
entity. (Animam nimirum habet animal non ex
totali anima muudi sed ex speciali anima quae aut
in parentibus praeest. This applies not to anima
as such only, but to any specific nature, e.g. of
stone, I. 160.)

A second main argument is derived from the
belief that the soul is the architect of its own
body. Granted then that the world is an animal,
it must have a Soul. As this argument assumes
the World to be an animal, and deduces from
that the presence of a soul, we must attack the
assumption. This animal called the world must
either be eternal or have had a beginning. If it
is eternal, in what sense did the soul make it? —
and if it was created, this must have been done
by some agent other than itself If it began, but
not by creation, it was born either spontaneously
or of parents, which means it was due either to
chance or to definite purpose. In any case its
cause is outside itself, and therefore cannot be
its own anima. It appears then, that the theory
has no support so long as we take the term soul
exactly. If we take it to mean either God or
a substance such as fire, we either go beyond the
world for its soul, or we apply the term soul to
material forms of existence in a way that will
make havoc of our psychology.

28 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

III.

Some additional questions remain to be settled,
but they are of minor importance. They comprise
a discussion on the leading theories of the universe
and their relative values, an enquiry into the
beginning and end of the world, and a description
of the known parts of the world. Of these the
last requires no notice, being a mere description
of the apparent place of things, e.g. the place of
the air, of the water, of the earth, and of the
heavenly bodies. This essay on physical geography
applied to the universe belongs, with its com-
plementary disquisition on the figure of the earth,
to an age still near the times when the earth was
thought to be flat, and may be consigned to the
limbo of forgotten problems.

The three main theories of the world were those
evolved by Ptolemy, Copernicus, and Tycho Brahe
respectively. Of these Gassendi considers that of
Tycho Brahe to be the best for reasons worth
noting. Ptolemy's system is dismissed for not ex-
plaining the movement of the heavenly bodies in a
satisfactory way : the Copernican system is most in
accord with facts, but the sacred texts attribute rest
to the earth and movement to the sun. Moreover,
there is a decree bidding us take this to mean not
apparent but real rest. Those, therefore, who respect
the decree must approve and defend Tycho Brahe's
modifications of the Copernican system. Here, as
elsewhere, Gassendi's language implies reluctant
acquiescence. He writes : ' Ideo superest ut tale
Decretum reverentibus Tychonicum potius systema
et probetur et defendetur ' ; and we can see through

II.] PHYSICS 29

tlie veil of orthodoxy that the author's heart is
with Copernicus and the system which can so truth-
fully be called ' planius et concinnius.'

In dealing with the question of the world's
beginning Gassendi is supported by Epicurus and
the Bible. The doctrine of atoms implies a theory
of creation, and therefore puts its adherents in
opposition to Aristotle and the supporters of an
infinite and unproduced world. But while support
is thus gained for the theory of creation, the alleged
method cannot be accepted. A blind concursus of
atoms is not a method of creation that a good
Churchman can advocate. Fortunately it can be
rejected on rational no less than religious grounds.
The world gives us obvious proof that it was made
by design : this implies a cause, which must be
outside it ; and therefore production in time, for
the cause existed before it produced the world, and
the relation of before and after constitutes Time.
Again, every part of the world is corruptible and
perishing, and the whole must therefore be of the
nature of the corruptible and have its own creation
and decease.

To understand this second argument, we must
take it as an argument on categories.^ The assumed
question is, ' Does the world belong to the category
of the infinite or the finite ? ' If any reason can
be shown for including it under one category rather
than another, the consequences follow without further
argument. Gassendi's argument against the eternity
of the world is based on cruder views than might be
expected. He notes that the sea and the rivers

iCf. p. 226.

30 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

continually reduce the land and even wear down
the mountains : ^ none of this matter is carried up
again, and therefore, if an eternity of time had
really elapsed, the whole earth must by now have
disappeared beneath the waters. This is a shame-
lessly eristic procedure for one who has just defended
the spherical form of the world.

There arises from this proof of a finite world one
problem which touches so nearly our views on
motion that it must not be left unsolved. Aristotle
had argued from the eternity of movement and
the necessity of God's continual action. Gassendi's
argument is also based on movement, for corruption
and decay may be regarded as primarily movements
and only apparent changes. It must also be borne
in mind that there are three indestructibles, namely
atoms, the void, and the universe. If the world
is composed of atoms, and atoms never perish, it
follows that the destruction of the world is neither

^ ' It might almost be supposed that the following lines were
written by one of our own contemporaries : they are, however,
extracted from a chapter of Avicenna on the origin of mountains.
This author was born in the tenth century. Mountains may be
due to two causes. Either they are effects of upheavals of the
crust of the earth, such as might occur during a violent earthquake,
or they are the eflfect of water, which, cutting for itself a new
route, has denuded the valleys, the strata being of different kinds,
some soft, some hard. The winds and waters disintegrate the one,
but leave the other intact. Most of the eminences of the earth
have had this latter origin. It would require a long period of
time for all such changes to be accomplished, during which the
mountains themselves might be somewhat diminished in size. But
that water has been the main cause of these effects is proved by
the existence of fossil remains of aquatic and other animals on
many mountains' (The Intellectual Developme7it of Europe, Draper,
I. 410). Gassendi at least aflfects a knowledge of Avicenna, and
frequently refers to him.

II.] PHYSICS 31

more nor less than the dissipation of its material.
Movement, then, would be eternal, and if the old
material forms a new world with never a break in
the history of its parts, why should this second
world be said to be created rather than evolved,
and why should not our present world be viewed
as evolved from a former world or even a former
condition of its own elements ? It may finally be
necessary to say that Gassendi never properly faced
this problem, but he seems to have been conscious
that such a problem was possible, and to have in
some degree anticipated it. His first defence is the
denial that time is dependent on motion. If time
and motion are inseparable, they must be coeval,
and motion is infinite, since it occupies all time :
to deny the dependence is to assert a time prior
to all motion, and thereby make motion a product
in time. The second is contained in the assertion
that the first cause need not be physical ; in other
words, a regress from motion to motion is not
infinite, but terminates in a First Cause, by whose
creative action motion itself first came into being.
The fact that all motion is, as motion, one, and
the term ' different motions ' must be taken to
mean motions of different ag-o-reoates of matter,
does not compel us to regard the creation of motion
as the imparting of one impulse to the whole : it
is possible, and even more probable, that in the
beginning many mobile bodies were created with
internal force of movement. As God's relation to
the world is purely external, and its movement is
for him a ' pure relation,' his essence is not aff'ected
by either its becoming or its dissolution.

32 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

As we progress more and more with the Physics
it will become more and more apparent how empty
and vain are these arguments. They perhaps
weighed heavily against those who taught that the
world could never be destroyed, but would be
purified and adorned with flowers ' ad puerulorum
non initiatorum neque in caelum translatorum ob-
lectationem.' But as serious philosophy they cannot
stand examination, because Gassendi never makes it
clear whether he is talking as a practical man of
science or a theorist. His position is in fact meta-
physical, and relies on pure reasoning. His real
theorem, therefore, is whether the human mind can
think its world and its series of causes as truly
infinite. He would probably have decided that the
infinite can only be thought by an infinite mind.
Speculation of this kind is however quite out of
place, for Gassendi never thinks of dividing mind
and object in this way. The consequence is that, in
spite of the logical and metaphysical character of
the argument, the conclusions are purely physical.
For Gassendi there are no antinomies of pure reason,
and the problems of infinity never suggest a recon-
sideration of experience itself So, in spite of the
encouraging way in which Gassendi takes up time
and causation as the fundamental points in the
problem of infinitude, he gets no further than a
dogmatic assertion that what is logically possible
is physically actual. If we may say of any
theory of reality that it regards the actual as
necessarily thinkable, it would still be false to
regard the thinkable as necessarily actual ; and
from Gassendi's point of view neither proposition is

II.] PHYSICS 33

defensible.^ The whole argument is therefore irrele-
vant and useless : our world as a subject for scientific
discussion is not affected by the conclusion ; and
the reader finds himself, after traversing a circle of
argument, for all practical purposes exactly where he
was before. It is impossible to suppose that Gassendi
was not aware of this, or that these forensic disputes
were left in such solemn isolation by mere accident.
The practical part of the treatise looks forward : the
theoretical serves a different purpose.

^Gassendi would allow both the assertions, namely — (1) Reality
is wider than Thought ; (2) Thought is wider than Reality. The
former is correct, because knowledge is a relation, and there is no
a priori reason why all the existent should be in that relation.
Since the relation does not constitute the being of anything, that
may be which is not thus related ; in other words, the knowable
may include the unknown (not unknowable) as well as the known.
The latter is also correct, because we may outrun our data and
assert our subjective (imaginative) constructions as real.

CHAPTER II

TIME AND SPACE
I.

The second book of the Physics on time and place
is so involved and subtle that its contents must be
stated in Gassendi's own way before any attempt
is made to formulate his views.

The title is peculiar and should be noticed. It
runs ' de loco et tempore seu spatio et duratione ' ;
and this duplication of terms persists throughout,
adding to the difficulty of interpretation. Gassendi
seems to have regarded the second pair as the
universals corresponding to the particular or specific
terms locus and tempus. He considers these two
identical in nature, so that anything we say about
space applies to time : we can therefore confine
ourselves to the more intelligible subject of space.

The traditional philosophy divides all being into
substance and accident, and declares that what is
neither of these is nothing. Space however is a
reality, and yet comes under neither of these heads.
In face of the facts authority must be disregarded
and a new classification be evolved. We must
recognise as distinct classes

(1) Substances — quae per se sunt.

(2) Accidents — quae per aliud sunt.

(3) Time and Space.

TT. II.] PHYSICS 35

This third class shares with the first the quality of
being per se : they are therefore properly called
substances, but the term substance always conveys
the idea of corporeal existence, and is therefore
objectionable unless a qualification is added. It is
not incorrect to speak of an incorporeal substance,
and this would meet the requirements of the case :
as Aristotle used it of the mind and Epicurus of
the void, it is not wholly without authority. Having
settled this first step of classification, Gassendi
attacks the categories. Quantity is the category
that concerns us at present. Space falls under the
category of continuous quantity. The tyranny of
matter gave rise to the opinion that quantity was
an ' accidens corporeum,' and as space came under
the category of quantity it was also asserted to be
corporeal. Corporeal, when applied to accidents,
means 'dependent on a body.' Length, breadth,
and weight clearly require a material something to
which they can be referred. Space, according to
Gassendi, does not : it is therefore more than a
mere quantity, more than so much room : it is
not only the place of things, it is a place for things,
a difi'erence that must be more fully discussed later.
Space, then, may be defined as a quantitative reality
independent of matter. The consequences and diffi
culties of this definition have now to be considered.
(1) The most obvious objection is that a quantity
of nothing is nothing ; but Gassendi replies that
in this case the quantity is a quantity of Space,
and space is something. If a body be removed
from a given place, the space of that place remains.
This argument is greatly assisted by the traditional

36 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

habit of obtaining a concept of matter per se by
abstracting all form : if tliis is possible why cannot
form be abstracted from all matter ? It follows
that the concept of the void is possible.

(2) As we may think of matter as reduced to
nothing, we may also think of it as infinitely great :
worlds may be infinite, and therefore space must be.

(3) As space has no faculties or actions, its adjec-
tives must be purely negative. It is infinite because
it is not finite, and incorporeal because it is not
corporeal. It cannot be a substance in the sense
that God is, else there are three equal substances,
and the being of God is not superior to the being
of space and time.

(4) The origin of space and time is an insoluble
problem. Gassendi does not say this in so many
words, but leaves it to be inferred. He merely
remarks that to say some essences are not properly
created by God is worse than admitting time and
space to be uncreated — a tortuous method of escaping
the dilemma.

(5) Space is imaginary, not in the sense of unreal
or fictitious, but as requiring to be constructed by
analogy.

The discussion thus summarised is followed by a
division of space according as it is (l) outside the
world, (2) dispersed among things, (3) collective.
The first is space left for new worlds, and is required
in order that God may not be limited in creating
new worlds ; the second is space as it occurs among
bodies which do not change ; the third is space as
it is produced by loss of volume or contraction.
This is technically called ' spatium coacervatum.'

II.] PHYSICS 37

These three kinds of space seem to be really three
kinds of vacua : they are rather asserted than proved,
and their assertion raises more problems than it
solves.

II.

As Gassendi's doctrine of time is a mere appendix
to that of space, it is necessary to form some idea
of his views of space before venturing to consider
those of time.

Following the hint given by Bernier in the Abrdge,
we may take space and the universe to be com-
plementary concepts. Space is infinite in three
dimensions, and is the place of all things, whether
already produced or existing only in the mind of
God. The confusing element in Gassendi's treatment
is its complexity. It is never quite clear whether
we are treating space as a given reality which can
be directly known or a reality which must be
deduced. The statement that space is imaginary is
extremely obscure. By imagination Gassendi always
means a power of compounding elements given
through the senses in such a way as to produce a
new representation of some object not actually
presented. If space is a pure quantity, its construc-
tion in imagination has no principle of limitation,
and it will be the subject of an infinite process.
Here there appear to be two errors which can only
be explained through the tendency of Gassendi's
philosophy to develope rationalistic features. The
first error is committed when from the ancient argu-
ment that if a vessel is absolutely empty its sides
must either collapse or preserve a distance between

38 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

them in which there is pure space, he infers that
a pure space can be given. Here there is a wholly
indefensible transition from the distinction of the
concepts of space and matter to a distinction of their
actual existence. As with the infinity of motion,
so here in the cognate subject of space the logical
conclusion is converted into a predicate of reality
in a way that implies a metaphysic unfortunately
not supplied by Gassendi.

The second error consists in supposing that we
have any right to regard as valid of reality a process
which is subjectively possible.^ Gassendi undoubtedly
commits this error because he uses the property of
numbers or mere quantity to enable him to assert
that our concept of space cannot stop at any given
point but must advance indefinitely. This, however,
is true of everything if taken abstractly in relation
to quantity, and has no special application to space.
The traditional problems gave a wrong turn to this
line of thought by putting it into a form half con-
crete and half abstract. If a man going to the end
of all things hurls a spear before him, what are we

^It is perhaps necessary to point out that subjective does not
mean ' mental' : there is no 'mentalism' at this stage of the history
of thought : the subjective is ' the work of the mind,' and is practi-
cally always limited to the work of the Imagination. This is why
we find so much confusion in the interpretation of philosophies which
belong to this period of transition. It is frequently the case that
the work of the mind as reason is considered unimpeachable, while
the work of the mind as imagination is the source of constructions
which may be, as we still say, ' put upon ' things. The phrase here
means that an imaginative construction is not necessarily more than
imaginative. It seems strange that after his comprehension of the
futility of abstract counting (p. 712) Gassendi should not have avoided
this error. But Sjjace, in spite of being a substance, so combines plurality
and unity (for many spaces are one space) that Gassendi lost his way.

II.] PHYSICS 39

to think ? Common sense replies that he was pro-
bably not at the end, but tradition says that it
follows that an end of space is unthinkable, and the
concrete reality of the spear gives the space, imagined
as its place, a fictitious reality.

We have here, then, a complete confusion between
the reality of our thoughts about space and the
reality of the space about which we think. Gassendi
does not know either how space originated in nature
or how it has become known. When he describes
it as form he speaks metaphorically ; it is not a
form either of sense or matter, but an independent
reality ; it is an immovable whole, otherwise a thing
might move and take its space with it, and so not
change its place even when moved. In a sense it
must be nothing, otherwise two things are in one
place, namely the thing and its space ; on the other
hand, it is a substance in relation to occupants of
space. In some cases, e.g. God and the angels, the
occupant is incorporeal. If a place is space occupied
by a body, can an incorporeal being have a space,
and if not, can it be and yet not be anywhere ? To
answer these questions Gassendi says space is ' quod
res locata occupat ' ; hence the angels have their
place where they are, and God is properly ' in se,'
which appears to mean that He is but does not exist,
has being but not spatial being.

This intricate maze of thought becomes entirely
unintelligible unless we accept it as the expression
of two views in one. In one part we are being told
what Space is in itself, in the other what it is in
experience. In the former aspect it is real, and that
is all we know ; definition, if any, must be negative,

40 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

and its nature must be assumed to be all that it is
not irrational to suppose it.^ Ultimate space is thus
really a hypothesis which is proved to be actual,
because without it we cannot understand the world
of experience. The latter aspect concerns us when
we deal with reality as known in the senses. Space,
having no activities, cannot be known through the
senses except ' ex parte rei locatae.' It is combina-
tion with the thing that makes space an object of
perception and gives the required ground upon which
imagination may work.^

III.
If Gassendi feels that space is an ultimate that
defies exact analysis and almost baffles description,
he is still more diffident about time. None the less
he feels that his position ought to redeem him from
blank despair. The words of St. Augustine sum up
the views of one class of thinker ; ^ to Gassendi
they seem justified only as the conclusion of a false
method. For if the corporeal is regarded as primary,
and our category of substance is practically confined
to the tangible, space and time alike become dis-
placed from reality and drift away through the pages-
of speculation like homeless phantoms refusing burial.

^ This is a definite logical principle derived from Epicurus, v. p. 3,
Canon iii.

^ Space, then, is perceived 'by sense in so far as it is given with
body. The question might be asked, Would an animal, having sense
only, perceive space ? I imagine Gassendi would have no answer to-
that : the a priori objectivity of space and the possibility of a sensi-
tive organism that did not think would both be endangered by its
discussion.

^ I. 220. Gassendi quotes from the Confessions : ' Si nemo ex m&
quaerat quid sit Tempus, scio : si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio.*

II.] PHYSICS 41

The rock on which Gassendi builds is good founda-
tion : come wliat may, these two are real, and it is
futile to try and explain away what we cannot
escape.

The majority of what has been said about space
can be transferred to time. The main conception
being the same, only one chapter is devoted to a
special discussion of time. Like space, it is a sub-
stance in its w^ay, incorporeal in its nature and not
in itself dependent on its content. The relation of
space to time is to be understood by the analogy
of corporeal entities ; for as the corporeal has a
permanent aspect, its extension, and also a successive
aspect, its movement, so we have in the incorporeal
sphere a permanent and a successive entity, which
are respectively the place of all extensions and the
place of all movements. As Space is really the Place
of all places, so Time is the Duration of all durations;
and as space has some unoccupied or potential places,
so Time overlaps the known durations and has its
'void.' In opposition to the Epicurean view, which
makes out that time would not be if there were no
minds or things,^ Gassendi holds to a lapse of time
before the beginning of the world and between
creations. He is really nearer the modern view than
at first appears ; for the Epicurean view did not
make time a form of perception, but merely regarded

^i. 223. 'Jam vero neque Epicurus videtur posse dicere esse diem,
noctemque aut longam aut brevem ab eo tempore quod cogitatiDiie
ipsi aflBngimus.' The reference is to Diogenes Laertius, x. Cp. i. 222.
' Videntur porro Stoici melius quam ipse Epicurus sensisse, reputantes
Tempus tale incorporeum, quod per se esse intelligatur, non tale
quod accidat rebus, eo sensu ut Tempus non foret, si res non esaent,
quae eo durarent, aut nisi etiani nostra mens durare ipsas cogitaret.'

42 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

it as dependent on its contents. Gassendi, on the
other hand, considers that events derive their order
from time, and considers that time must therefore
precede change. In the case of space it seemed an
easy matter to say that the annihilation of the thing
placed was not identical with annihilation of the part
of space which formed the place. If we are to pre-
serve the analogy we must say that annihilation of
change would not annihilate time. This Gassendi
is prepared to say, but it is a hard saying. It
would seem as though the assertion of time without
change necessitated our regarding time as a per-
manent entity, which would sacrifice its essential
distinction from space. Time moves without any
doubt : it is however hardly like a stream : a better
simile is that of the flame of a candle, which as it
burns changes indeed, but in such a way as not to
lose its identity, and so gives us a better idea of
continuity and the retention of identity in difier-
ence.^ The point which Gassendi wishes to emphasise
is that, if time and change are identical, there is no
background to define the movement. If a thing,
when it moves, takes its place with it, it moves
without change of place, which is nothing at all :
similarly, if an event takes its time with it, the
time-series is reduced to nothing, a reduction to
absurdity which makes it necessary to say that the
time is not the change, but the change is in the time.
To this point Gassendi clings, but if we seek further

^ I. 223. ' Appositum est magis comparare Tempus cum Lucernae
flamma, cuius esse ita in fluxu consistit, ut quovis momento alia ac
alia sit, et nusquam sit amplius quaecumque ante fuit, nusquam
adhuc sit, quaecumque est futura.'

II.] PHYSICS 43

for some explanation of the permanence implied in
this we can find no answer that satisfies. It is
to be feared that, following the analogy of space,
Gassendi thought of time as ultimately the sum of
all times, and so the time of the universe. This
comprehensive term substance was the shibboleth
that reigned before the absolute, and it swayed
men's minds to create concepts beyond their grasp.
If my life falls within the life of the world, and
that again within the life of the universe, it is not
unnatural to picture successively widening areas of
time corresponding to the span of each existence up
to that last time of the Universe, and if we remem-
ber that the Universe is indestructible, it will follow
that ultimate time and space are infinite indestruct-
ible realities. But what is the difference between
ultimate time and any other time, and do we get
nearer reality by getting further away from our
experience ? Gassendi seems to have omitted to
think over the relation of time to our experience,
and that in spite of the excellent hint in a passage
quoted from Diogenes Laertius, where we are ex-
horted to notice not only days and nights, but also
' passionibus et vacuitate ab ipsis.' In the absence of
definite information it must be assumed that Gassendi
did with time what he did with space: he constructed
a rational background to the data of sense, and thus
furnished himself with a double theory, one part
concerned with time as it is, the other with ultimate
time as it might be if it were at all.

Gassendi proves puzzling to the thoughtful reader
by his trick of abandoning one method for another.
It is natural to expect that a rationalistic position

44 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

will be developed by deduction. Gassendi on the
contrary makes no attempt to develope his theories
at all, but simply returns to experience for a fresh
start. For all practical purposes he has reduced time
to a standstill, and the natural deduction is that the
present is illusion. Far from accepting this conse-
quence, Gassendi argues that as the present is real
time cannot be nothing, and those who consider it to
be nothing do so because they erroneously seek in
the successive for that which is natural only to the
permanent. This can only have one meaning : in
the permanent the given points co-exist, and are
capable of recurring in experience : in the successive
there is no return. Man lives in Space, but he lives
through time, and if reason compels us to think of
both as wholes, that difference of our experience
persists and makes it necessary to form a different
conception of each whole.

The analysis of different kinds of time gives us
the so-called real and imaginary times. This was
the ancient distinction between the time given in
actual experience (real) and that which was before
the world (imaginary). This distinction Gassendi
repudiates. His time is imaginary in the sense that
his space was, and the real time is only one section
of that. This shows the weakness of Gassendi's
position : for however good his intentions he cannot
avoid the conclusion that the time we experience and
the time we represent in constructive imagination are
identical : which amounts to saying that time is either
not experienced at all or is experienced as a whole ;
but this would most likely be beyond Gassendi,
though he would be quite capable of regarding All

II.] PHYSICS 45

Time as one object/ especially as he must have
regarded the experience of time as essentially a
reflective consciousness of what a merely sensitive
organism could never comprehend.

A few more notes must close this summary.
Gassendi praises Posidonius for not taking the pre-
sent as a mere point. He argues against Aristotle
that time is not the measure of movement existing

only for the calculator, time does not depend on
movement, for plurality of movement does not involve
plurality of times, nor does a plurality of worlds.
In a subordinate sense movement may be said to
be the measure of time, as the movement of the sun
marks out periods of time. All points of space have
one time, i.e. every moment is the same everywhere.
On the other hand every point of space has all the
points of time, i.e. persists through the whole series
of moments.^

These remarks cannot be put in any connexion,
for Gassendi gives none. He does not properly dis-
tinguish the different views of time which they imply.
The most noticeable feature is his omission of any
distinction of the psychological aspect, an omission
which compels us to take his ' moment of time ' as
an absolute quantity. While he is clear about the
artificial measurements of time, he does not oppose
them to the subjective measurement of time, as
modern psychology does, but to real parts : a pro-

1 1. 224. ' Ut Locus secundum se totum est illimitatus, sic Teuipus
secundum se totum nee principium nee finem habet.'

The syntax here shows that we must not call Time a Whole, but
say, 'time regarded as a whole.'

^Ihid. ' Ut quodlibet Temporis momentum idem est in omnibus
locis — ita quaelibet Loci portio omnibus temporibus subest.'

46 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

ceeding which is certainly consistent with his view of
time as a whole in some sense suljstantive.^

The discussion of eternity which closes this chapter
is really concerned with the meaning of timeless,
though somewhat indirectly and perfunctorily treated.
Eternity might be defined as the time of God, which
is to say that it was popularly conceived as the
duration of God's life. The notion had passed into
philosophical treatises with all its crudities unanalysed.
Gassendi furnishes an analysis which dissipates the
common notions. He has however a further interest
which must be pointed out. The popular idea dis-
solves into nothing if we examine the phrase,
' duration of the life of God ' : it at once becomes
clear that the foremost idea is that of life, and the
understanding of the problem as it concerns time is
obscured by the other notions introduced. But over
and above this trifling proposition we find a real
difficulty in reconciling the concept of God with our
concept of time. We must perforce think of God
as one to whom past, present, and future are always
present : for whom therefore All Time exists at all
times, so that ultimately time must be again reduced
to a standstill and our distinctions of times to illu-
sion. This attack touches Gassendi very nearly
because of the way in which he is compelled to
maintain that time is a totality : the nature of God
seems to turn the scale finally in favour of a static
totality. His reply is subtle, but not futile or

1 His reference to Posidonius must therefore be read as meaning
that the present is a piece of real Time, a quantity of duration
forming a unit, not a ' saddle-back ' of time ; and the whole is there-
fore an infinite multiplication of finite parts. In Time atomism finds
a particularly intractable item.

II.] PHYSICS 47

perfunctory. He says, in brief, that God's he'm<r is
purely qualitative, not quantitative, and he is only
related to time extrinsically, which practically means
not at all. God's being is in fact not an experience
at all in our sense of the term. It may therefore
be a timeless experience, but it is not an experience
of the timeless. The latter phrase would imply that
the timeless was a possible object of any experience :
the former is one of those negative determinations
which, like inhuman, insensible, Gassendi delights to
regard as positive. The way in which this can be
understood will be best explained if we recall an
example by which Gassendi explains how the nature
of God is related to space. After remarking as to
the place of God, that ' Deus in se est' (i. 191), he
quotes the statement ' deum esse habendum prout est
in se,' and criticises it by saying God is unlimited,
' sed haec illimitatio seu infinitudo non est quam
nomine proprio appellamus immensitatem.' The
perfection of God, in short, must be conceived
qualitatively : ' ut in lacte aliud est summe candidum
esse, aliud esse valde copiosum ' ; and what is thus
explained in relation to sj^ace must be analogously
applied to time. The idea of substituting intensity
for extensity was excellent : it opens up wide possi-
bilities for speculative minds. Gassendi, having
made it, leaves it alone, thereby showing much
wisdom. It is much easier to understand an intensity
which does not involve quantity of space than to
comprehend an intensity which avoids quantity of
time. It is true there is not more whiteness in the
milk when there is more of the milk : and similarly
we may say that God is not more wise because He

48 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [ft. ii.

is wise for a greater time. This evades the real
problem, which lies in the assertion that if God were
God for less time, He would be less a God. So
long as time pertains to the nature of God at all,
it must pertain as a whole : to answer that it per-
tains not wholly, but none the less completely by
being intensively perfect, is either to talk nonsense or
to confuse time and thought.^

' If it were not so far from Gassendi's general position, this point
■would deserve further consideration. Modern psychology utilizes this
distinction of quality and quantity in oi^der to correlate the time-refer-
ence contained in an act of memory with the time-expanse of the
experience remembered. This line of txiought is entirely useless for the
explanation of Gassendi, because it is not the nature of thought but
the nature of real time that he is trying to explain. His position
therefore leaves him with an existence that has a Time but no times,
the whole without the parts. Timeless thought may or may not be
more intelligible, but it is certainly not Gassendi's present topic.

CHAPTER III

FIRST PRINCIPLES
(a) THE MATERIAL PRINCIPLE

Leaving time and space we now descend the scale
of Being, and come to pure corporeal reality, the
subject to which the term 'physical science' is
usually restricted. A speculative element still
remains in so far as the nature of ultimate matter
is reached by inference, and not given in direct
experience.

The science of ultimate matter carries us beyond
the limits of our sensible world ; it takes us there-
fore deeper than the elements, which are mutable
compounds, to some thing which even the imagina-
tion cannot further analyse. It is essential to the
nature of ' principia ' that they should not be pro-
duced either from one another or from any foreign
bodies. Not only must our first matter be itself
irreducible to any lower terms, it must also be
capable of explaining the solidity of compounded
bodies. Its limits are thus theoretically fixable :
unity and indivisibility form the maximum ; the
mathematical point and the numerical zero form
the minimum. These limits must be fixed else our
hypothetical material will be incapable of serving

50 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

the ends for which it was designed. As to the
maximum, if it be divisible it is not ultimate. As
regards the minimum, if it be nothing its multiples
remain nothing, and the actual world cannot be
generated from it. The danger in this direction is
exemplified by two current theories : some reduced
the unit of matter to a point which if taken mathe-
matically amounts to nothing ; others arrived at
the same practical result by going beyond the
simplest form of matter to pure form, which is
equally destructive of all return to the world of
common things. With characteristic ingenuity, some
acknowledging the force of argument, compromised
by giving matter the ' forma corporeitatis ' 1

Our ultimate then preserves its physical reality
and its 'corpus.' The criterion of this is activity,
which we further define as tangibility, for the incor-
poreal beings act, but only matter is an object of touch.
By ' touch ' Gassendi really means solidity or impene-
trability, for this may be a relation between two
inanimate bodies ; he thinks with his contemporaries
that matter may be taken as real apart from our
thought, and as maintaining in that absolute objecti-
vity some of the qualities by which we know it.

We may infer, from the multitude of forms, that
matter in itself must be indiff'erent to form. Its
quantity must be regarded as constant, change being
change of form. The dogma ' ex nihilo nihil ' is
a category valid for science, but it does not limit
God. This assertion is interesting as an example
of the way in which Gassendi is capable of keep-
ing to one point at a time. He has no intention
of regarding the doctrine ' ex nihilo nihil ' as any-

II.] PHYSICS 51

thing but absolute ; at the same time it is only a
law of thought for the sphere of material production :
if we go beyond that sphere to the nature of God
or the human soul, its jurisdiction will cease. ^

So far we have dealt with a priori necessary
determinations of matter : we have now to define
its nature somewhat more accurately. The history
of the subject presents several theories from which
to choose. There are (a) those who think matter
has qualities and (6) those who regard it as in
itself unqualified. Under (a) we have (1) those who
speak only of primary qualities and (2) those who
add secondary qualities. To begin with (a) (1) :
this class includes the physiologists who took earth,
air, fire, water, these being the typical embodiments
of the primary qualities heat, cold, etc. Gassendi
considers that the choice of one element was really
the choice of matter with one primary quality as
the unit and the ultimate unit. Under (a) (2) come
those who take actual complex substances as the
ultimates. Among the ancients Anaxagoras is the
example : while the contemporary chymici revived
his principles. The class {h) also divides into
(l) rationalist and (2) materialist thinkers.
Possibly ' spiritualist and materialist ' would have
been better terms. Here the atomists are classed as
materialist for want of a better term, but the limits
to the significance of the word must be remembered.
For Gassendi Plato and the Atomists are simply
two species of one genus, namely of those who
make the matter (A>/) airoiov, Gassendi's history
of the emergence of atomism is arranged so that

>i. 234.

52 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

the first solutions of the problem of an ultimate
seem most complex : refinement brings us to an
ultimate that is as simple as possible, and we have
our choice between making it 'spiritual' (Plato,
Pythagoras, and the Stoics) or non-spiritual
(atomism). In hoth cases the ultimate is super-
sensuous, and therefore 'metaphysical.'

It is unnecessary to recall all the details which
Gassendi laboriously records ; but as it was certainly
part of the scheme of his work to furnish a history
of human thought before his time, it would be an
omission not to allow some praise to the excellent
way in which these chapters are arranged, or the
clever and, I believe, original classification which
enables the author to refine the doctrine down in
such a way that the mere history of the case seems
an unanswerable proof that the atomistic theory is
simplest and best.

The principal characteristics of the atom as a
material ultimate are too well known to need mention
here. The doctrine of the Atom does not occupy so
much space as might perhaps be expected : it is not
the atom but atomism that interests Gassendi. He
notes that Democritus gave the atom only Magnitude
and Figure, while Epicurus added weight (l. 266,
V. p. 3). Gassendi keeps the three. Resistance, he
says, is not so much a property as ' ipsammet corporis
tribus reliquis [proprietatibus] subjectam naturam
[to vTTOKetfievov).' It is, in fact, solidity. The
atom has parts (as with Epicurus), but is indi-
visible : it is not conjunct in the sense that it might
ever be disjunct ; in other words, there is no Void
in the body of the Atom. The Atom is said to have

II.] PHYSICS 53

parts, inasmuch as these are required to account for
differences of Figure : there is no mention of motion
within the atom, though there is nothing in the
world of compound bodies that is not full of motion.
' Considera metallum v.c. plumbum in carino fusum :
cum ad speciem nihil quietius, immotiusque videri
possit, putasne intra ipsum motus, sive itus atque
reditus brevissimis spatiis, celeritate incomprehensibili
non fiunt.'

In following Epicurus and Lucretius on this point,
Gassendi does not seem to have noticed that a
perfectly hard body is not elastic, and therefore
would finally come to rest : which means the
destruction of matter.

The chief point of dispute has always been how
far the atom can be conceived purely in terms of
reason. The mediaeval thinker was familiar with
a * punctum physicum,' a ' punctum metaphysicum,'
and a ' punctum mathematicum.' These are not
infrequently confused, and Gassendi shapes his argu-
ments against writers who were already moving
toward the view of an atom as an immaterial point,
a centre of force or some cognate form of the doctrine.
He resists this tendency because it appears to him
to be an excess of analysis, going so far as to preclude
all possibility of return.^ He attributes to his atoms
magnitude, figure, and weight. They are ultimate
so far as we are concerned with the world of things
and the category of quantity. In opposition to
the average atomist, Gassendi does not consider that

' Atomi proinde non puncta sed tenuissima corpuscula sunt
praeditique adeo tantula magnitudine quae sit principium et quasi
radix magnitudinis omnium corporum.

54 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

our knowledge stops where the quantitative analysis
ends. He denies that the atom is eternal or unpro-
duced or infinite. God as creator is above and beyond
the physical world. With dependence in the way of
creation there is combined independence of action :
atoms have not ' a seipsis vim motricem,' but they
are self-moving ' Dei gratia ' : a distinction which
leaves the man of science unhampered and does
not despoil the theologian. The theory of creation
can be sketched briefly. At first God created as
many atoms as were necessary to form this world :
the atoms were not necesscmly created separately,
but the created mass of matter was such as could
be resolved into ' corpuscula ' : each of these minute
bodies has its own affinities, and the command that
the earth and water should produce plants and
animals, was the act of uniting in one place those
atoms suited to become one seed : this process can
be repeated wherever and whenever such atoms
co-exist as are fitted to cohere ; from this we can
elaborate the whole scheme of generation and
corruption, coherence and dissolution, which makes
up the history of the natural world.

This view clearly involves a possibility of free
movement, and therefore raises the question whether
the Void is not a principle as much as atoms.
Gassendi acknowledges that both are primary parts
of the universe ; but he considers that they differ
inasmuch as the Void is of the nature of a condition
rather than a cause, ^ and only atoms are capable
of constituting 'res generabiles.' As matter is itself
not a primary but a secondary cause, the validity

^ Inane vero solum locum discriminationemque ministiat.

IL] PHYSICS 55

of this distinction might be disputed : as Gassendi's
intentions are clear the point need not be raised.

(6) PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CAUSES

A doctrine of causes naturally begins in some way
or other with Aristotle. In this case it begins with
criticism and selection. The word causa is not quite
identical with Aristotle's ahla, the former implying
activity, the latter having a somewhat wider denota-
tion and meaning origin rather than producing force.
Thus of the four causes Gassendi says that Form
is properly an effect, matter is not a cause at all,
end a wholly different subject, and only the efficient
cause a cause in the proper sense. Gassendi is
certainly right in pointing out that ' cause ' was a
term generally used to denote ' power,' and therefore
not identical with the Greek idea expressed in
•atVm.

Confining the word cause to efficient causes, we
find that these can be divided into external and
internal. An external cause is an object capable of
acting on another object, as the sun on wax. This
is the field of common observation, and requires no
further comment. The question of internal causality
carries us beyond this threshold into the secret heart
of nature. We have to discover not merely the fact
that an object can produce an effect, but also the
inner constitution which enables it to act thus. This
constitution is the temperament and the source of
motion : it might be called the form, since it is
the essential part that is the cause of motion. We
can say, for example, ' the man moves the stick ' ;
and the man is the external cause, but if we wish

56 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

to speak accurately we must assign the activity to
the soul, which is the moving principle of the body.
There is also a sense in which the end is a cause,
in so far as the cause may act for an end, not only
blindly, as in instinct, but also consciously, with
a knowledge imparted by God, making the agent
more than a mere instrument. Gassendi does well
to distinguish this from Aristotle's meaning.

The classification of causes as external and internal
is a superficial separation of the popular from the
philosophical aspect of causality. The further dis-
tinction into primary and se^^ondary is of a diflerent
nature and affects the causes themselves.

We may dispose of the primary causes with the
statement that God, as creator and ruler, is the one
first cause. The secondary causes constitute the
world of nature : their causality is derived from
God, but we have much to learn about them, and
the acknowledgment of God's power in the world
is not to be made an excuse for avoiding the labours
of research.

We must first enquire into the nature of the
active principle in things, Some have thought it
incorporeal : the Stoics supported the claim of
spirits and Epicurus that of atoms. If we make it
incorporeal or spiritual, cause becomes separated
from matter, and our difficulties increase rather than
diminish. It is better therefore to take atoms as
the principle and make our cause concrete, that is,
call materia actuosa the cause. If the cause be
regarded as something immaterial, it becomes un-
intelligible : it requires to be united to matter in
order to be actual, and has in short all the failings,

II.] PHYSICS 57

of an unjustifiable abstraction. If matter is declared
causal its activity must be its nature : it cannot be
said to be active by virtue of containing particles
of the anima mundi, for that again is the separation
of the activity from the active body. As the cause
is matter, matter is active : the particles of heat
appear to be most active, so we may fix on corporeal
heat {i.e. heat as a substance) as the principle of
motion, activity, and causation in things.

The causality at which we arrive is substantive
in every sense of the term. Specific causality may
be a relation, but all the relations in which one
object can stand to another presuppose a state or
condition of the things related, and this state gives
the relation its significance. As Gassendi says, this
treatment of causality is really an enquiry into
temperaments. Given an object A which acts on
another object B (external causality), we may call
A the cause of B becoming b. But this manifesta-
tion is as it were a form of the causality of A, just
as A itself is a form of primary matter ; and as from
the multiplicity of material forms we argue one
indifferent matter, so from the multiplicity of forms
of causality we infer one general, indifferent causality.
The universality of this causal state is shown in
its formula. The composition of any one body is
never purely homogeneous : there is consequently
ceaseless internal unrest, some atoms freeing them-
selves, others struggling vainly in the toils, some
striving upward, and others sinking in dull inertia :^

^ I. 3.35. ' Atorni ob sui cuiusque figuram ac moleni aut liberiores,
aolutioresque sint et sese facilius ab irretientibus extricent faciliusque
vias inveniant quibus per corpus discurrentes inque haereutiores
partes impingentes niotum iniprimant.'

58 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

take any apparently inanimate object, and see how
it lives in every part of its complex substance : you
will then realise that causality is more than a
relation, it is a reality in (and perhaps for) every
organic and inorganic body.

Gassendi is often clearer in his thought than in
his language. His terms are usually defined with
scholastic accuracy ; but the terms themselves are
not as yet properly differentiated : they had still
to grow and add to slight differences an accretion
of argument and reference. It will have become
apparent long ago that causality in Gassendi means
simply activity. We cannot now speak of one
thing being causal, having now recognised that
causality is a relation ; but we do still speak as
though activity was the property of an isolated
object, though usually with an apology to nature
and a confession of ignorance. The tendency of
Gassendi's period is to take the object as a self-
subsisting entity and call it causal. If the analysis
is pushed further a curious reaction ensues. Desert-
ing the standpoint of the object, we penetrate to
that of the atom : causality is left behind, for in
the realm of the immutable it can have no place :
atom cannot change atom, and so no atom can be
causal : the universe viewed as a complex of atoms
must equally be void of causality, though replete
with activity. In this way even a thorough-going
physical realism finds its universal and particular
points of view at least superficially contradictory.
Gassendi is only dimly aware of this possibility :
he never dreams of opposing one part of knowledge
to another and dividing himself into the factions

II.] PHYSICS 59

of appearance and reality ; but none the less he
finds that secondary causes ultimately slip through
his fingers : the world of change becomes a seething
cauldron of endless changes coincident rather than
correlated ; and causality driven to the boundaries
of the universe is safe only among the attributes
of God.

The subject of Causality led us finally to the
question of internal movement or activity in bodies.^
It is now necessary to discuss the possibility and
nature of movement in general. Seeing that the
action of secondary causes is as Gassendi here
admits, identical with this motion, this book does
not deal so much with another subject as with
another aspect of the same subject.

The motion to be discussed is neither the activity
referred to before, nor that called mutation : it is

^ I. 337. ' Planius ergo did videtur cum in unaqnaque re princi-
pium actionis et motus sit pars ilia mobilissiraa, actuosissimaque et
quasi flos totius materiae quae et ipsa sit quam Formam solent
dicere, et haberi possit quasi tenuissima contextura subtilissiraarum,
mobilissiinarumque Atomorum ; ideo primara causam nioventem in
Physicis rebus esse Atomos : quod dum ipsae per se, et juxta vim a
suo authore ab initio usque acceptam moventur, motuui omnibus
rebus praebeant sintque adeo omnium quae in Natura sunt motuum,
origo, principium et causa.'

This quotation shows that Gassendi is confused. Motion in
bodies he attributes to the perpetual interaction of their parts,
which is possible, because some are finer than others. But the
original motion is in the Atom, which, as we have seen, being what
it is cannot have motion. To Gassendi this difficulty seems to be
overcome by saying God gave the motion to the Atoms. Gassendi's
atom is an ultimate, not only in the sense of being the last in
analysis, but also as the point at which physical explanation
collapses.

60 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

merely local motion, which is best defined as
* migratio de loco in locum,' in spite of many-
objections, such as his who said the axle of a wheel
revolved without changing its place. Gassendi finds
it necessary to repel many such objections. These
can be passed over in favour of the really important
question whether motion is possible at all.

(1) A single body is always a priori capable of
motion, because it is never an abstract (mathema-
tical) point. As motion is only attributed to
physical bodies, it is irrelevant to reduce a body to
merely imaginary unity and still discuss the possi-
bility of motion. As every physical body has parts,
a change in the relations of these parts implies
transference from one place to another, and the
whole body may be said to move, though the place
of the whole is not changed. The revolving globe
is the example intended.

(2) The more comprehensive question concerning
motion in general carries us back to the dialectic
of Zeno. Zeno however was really concerned to
prove that motion was impossible if motion, time,
and space were all continua (ex insectilibus con-
starent) : ^ as the atomist does not support that
position Zeno's dilemmas may be dismissed. A
problem arises as to degree of motion. Suppose
a body A moves through a space x in half the
time that B takes, can we say the movement of A
differs from that oi Bl Gassendi thinks not :
movement as such he clearly takes in an absolute
sense ; the minima of space and time are indivisible
and cannot be reduced : as the body, if it moves

ii. 340.

II.] PHYSICS 61

at all, must traverse a minimum of space in a
minimum of time, a given space as a multiple of
such minima must always be traversed in the same
time. For example, a body A which passes through
y, a minimum of space, in the minimum of time x,
will pass through any space ny in any time nx.

It follows from this that there are really no
degrees of motion : we must therefore explain
differences in rates of motion (tarditas et velocitas)
by supposing that the slower body has intervals of
rest. This is in harmony with the mixture of
opposites observable in other directions : for ' hac
ratione ex nivis lactisve candore ad corvi, carbonis
pervenitur nigritudinem.'

A final problem arises from the ancient declara-
tion, ' si quid movetur aut ubi est movetur aut ubi
non est.' This is dismissed by pointing out that 'est'
is here used absolutely : the object ' movetur ubi
est transeunter, movetur ubi non est permanenter ' ;
and with this aro-ument the last obstacle to the
recognition of local motion is removed. The jiroof,
in fact, consists in defending against time-worn
problems the doctrine of self-moving atoms and a
void : the position as such depends on these funda-
mental views which are to be taken as already
proved.

The next four chapters are a fairly elementary
treatise on motion, including the subjects of ac-
celeration, projection, and reflex motion.

Gassendi upholds the distinction of natural and
violent motion which Bacon condemns so scornfully.
The natural motion is that which atoms have by
their own nature : the violent is secondary and due

62 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

to some application of force. If we take nature
universally, nothing can be other than natural : we
have the right however to distinguish natura
specialis from universalis ; and it is a correct scien-
tific procedure to distinguish motions according as
they are inherent or impressed.

There are two main principles of motion — impulse
and attraction. Gravitation is a form of attraction,
but not as some have thought attraction to a
place : place as such has no fitness to attract : it
is the earth that attracts. This attraction is not
to be understood in any vague or spiritual sense :
there must be some real, which means material,
communication between the earth and the attracted
object. How is a stone, wandering in the void, to
know where the earth is that it may return to her ?
There can only be one answer : ' Praeter id quod
in lapide est, transmissio sit quaedam ex terra in
ilium, unde ad ipsum pelliciatur.'^ The earth may
best be likened to a huge magnet. This position,
it should be remembered, is evolved in opposition
to the view that a thing had a tendency to move
to its ' own place,' or else a tendency to ' seek the
earth.' Gassendi rejects the idea of a pZace having
any attraction, and proposes to mend the second
theory by making both the terms participate in
the attraction. Previously the attraction was a
* vis insita,' a tendency inherent in the thing and
wholly independent of that to which the tendency
related. By demanding that the earth should
attract the stone Gassendi converts the attraction
from a ' vis ab intrinseco pellens ' to a ' vis ab

^i. 346.

II.] PHYSICS 03

extrinseco trahens,' which is a change for the better,
even though it falls short of the best.

It will be apparent from this that action from
a distance is not accepted by Gassendi. In dealing
with mutation he expressly denies it. Mutatio he
treats purely as a kind of motion, and the subject
would be of no interest were it not for its con-
nection with the question, ' qua ratione per muta-
tionem seu alterationem creari rerum concretarum
qualitates possint.' After a long and arid tract of
discussion on the simplest problems of dynamics, we
return to a question that revives our flagging
interest. Put briefly, it amounts to this : how can
a collection of atoms, having only magnitude, figure,
and weight, combine so as to produce other quali-
ties, such as taste, heat, and colour ? This is clearly
a crucial point for a thinker who is undertaking to
build up a highly complex system from simple
substances and their movements.

There is a technical distinction between ' con-
juncta,' or properties, and 'eventa.' Magnitude,
figure, and weight are conjuncta ; the rest are
eventa.^ The primary eventa are concretio, which
subserves generation ; and secretio, which subserves
corruption, with ordo and situs, which are the
foundation of alteratio. Generatio and corruptio

^ Cp. I. 266. ' Praeter banc substantiam seu identitateni mavis seu
similitudinem dicere, attribuantur Atomis qualitates quaedaiii, sive
accidentia, quorum, ut jam aute insinuavimus, alia sunt Insepara-
bilia, ax'^pi-o'Ta (sic enim Plutarchus), et Lucretio Conjuncta vulgo
Propria appellitentur ; alia separabilia, et Lucretio Eventa, vulgo
accidentia communia dicantur : ideo sciendum est, agi heic non de
separabilibus, eventisve, qualia sunt concursus, connexio, positio,
ordo, etc., sed de inseparabilibus, conjunctisve, seu dicere inalis,
proprietatibus ' [e.g. magnitude, figure, weight].

64 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

can however be viewed as alteratio, and we are
left with five necessary assumptions — magnitude,
weight, figure, order, and position. The first three
belong to the atom as such ; the last two are
relations between atoms. We are to conceive the
variations of composite bodies of atoms as analogous
to the various possible combinations of letters (e.g.
et, te, roma, armo, etc.). As letters may be worked
up into words, sentences, and books ; so endless
atoms, in endless combinations, form the great book
of nature.

The starting point is given in the natural dififer-
ences of atoms which make some tit to enter one
organ of sense, as the eye, and adapt others to other
organs, as the ear or the nose. The relation of
sensible qualities to the atoms is exemplified in the
whiteness of sea- foam or the yellowness of the
decaying leaf: in both cases a colour results from
a colourless substratum by mere alteration in the
disposition of the atoms. The mere fact of change
is taken to be a proof that the elements must be
neutral. If the atoms had any colour of their own,
a complex of atoms would always have the same
colour ; but natural changes, such as decay, produce
changes of quality ; so the quality must be referred
not to the atoms but to their relations.

This position must be taken in conjunction with
Gassendi's views on the senses. At present he
leaves the vital question of the relation between
mind and object untouched. It cannot be said that
he wholly ignores the mind : his reference to words
is meaningless unless the mind to which they are
presented is assumed as a factor. The letters A

II.] PHYSICS G5

and B, he says, differ not only in shape but in
sound ; but in themselves they have no sound, and
only ' sensui diversum sonum exhibent.' He quotes
as his own opinion a passage from Galen containing
the words ' omnes qualitates sensibiles ex atomorum
concursu gigni, quatenus se habens ad nos qui
ipsarum sensum habemus.' Here is the first transi-
tion from a quantitative to a qualitative treatment
of the world in which we live : the task of producing
complexity from simplicity is solved by introducing
a new factor and correlating a composition of simple
elements with qualitative experiences which are not,
in that sense, composite at all. The remark already
referred to, that A and differ in sowid as well
as shape, is itself a comment on this point not to
be outdone in significance !

{d) ON QUALITIES

To an empirical philosopher the doctrine of
qualities is one of supreme importance. As Gassendi
puts it, all reason depends on the senses and on
sense-perception : only qualities are perceived, and
they are therefore the foundation of our objective
world. Substance we only know through induction :
all direct knowledge is knowledge of qualities.

The impression which such a statement leaves
on one's mind is that knowledge fails to penetrate
into the inner reality of things and remains con-
versant only with the outer, and possibly deceptive,
surface. Gassendi however does something to miti-
gate this superficiality of knowledge. The quality,
as he points out, is properly that which answers to
the question ' qualis est ? ' Practically qualities are

66 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

accidents, or rather a given state or condition
attributed to a substance is an accident, but taken
by itself is a quality. It follows that quality in
this sense goes deeper than quality in the sense
in which we oppose it to quantity : for quantity
will be a species of quality in some cases (e.g. tall
man) ; and quality will sometimes include relation
(e.g. slave). In these cases the determinations pass
from the usual category of quantity or relation into
that of quality by virtue of being essential. The
question then arises whether the absolutely essential
qualities of a thing are really qualities or are the
thing itself. From the point of view of physics
taken in the sense of natural science, the primary
qualities must clearly be the inner nucleus beyond
which nothing is required : primary qualities will
then be only the plural aspect of what we call
substance when regarded as a unity. The same
point can be looked at in another way. The form
of a thing must be a quality in every case in which
it is not identical with the spiritus : if the being
of a Being is a quality, it would seem that quality
ultimately merges into essence and absorbs all that
is denoted by substance ; but it must be remembered
that we are here speaking of things which are always
composite and plural, and so may have an existential
form realised in the disposition of parts. Prior to
such ' things ' is the single unitary substance which
they presuppose and which may be regarded as
lying deeper than the outward natures at present
under discussion.

The liberality of Gassendi's interpretation of the
term quality can be seen from his inclusion of

II.] PHYSICS 67

* animal esse, sentire, vegetari, vivere ' in the listj
of qualities. A quality must have an objectivel
reality, it must be a reality apart from mind. Hence 1
a relation as such cannot be a quality, and quantity j
will only be a quality when it is essential. If we
say 'John is five feet in height' the quantity
indicated is a quality : if we say ' John is taller
than James ' the quantity is relative and no quality
is indicated.^ Gassendi very truly remarks that
relations are dialectical and not physical categories.
Motion is denied a place among qualities on the
ground that it is properly a process to a quality.

Coming now to the nature of qualities in our
world of things, it is obvious that they must all
be more or less simple ways of grouping the primary
non-qualitative elements of things : in short, the
qualities are deducible from the possible modes of
combining atoms. For example, density and rarity
depend on the proportions of void and matter, or
the number of ' vacua spatiola intercepta. ' Figure
we may pass over in silence, but weight calls for
some comment. Upon weight depends all vis motrix,
for the atoms in one body struggle together, and
motion follows the striving of the majority, modified
by mutual implications. The atoms of spiritual
natures are the freest and most mobile : hence they
are thought to be the seat of voluntary motion.

By nature all motion is straight. Divergence from
the straight must therefore be explained by percus-
sion and repercussion. In order to acquire as it were
a fulcrum, one of the moving bodies must be regarded
as an immobile. The law is laid down that an

ii 374.

68 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

immovable part in a whole is essential to mobility.
The objection at once arises that, when an animal
runs, no part of it is immovable. In reply to this
Gassendi apparently practises a double evasion. He
first qualifies the law by admitting that the im-
movable part only requires to be comparatively such,
and then makes it impossible to say what is a 'whole'
in respect of motion. In the case of the animal, for
example, the modification of ' immovable ' to ' com-
paratively' immovable makes it possible to regard
the body as giving the required ' immovable ' for the
motion of the legs. If this did not satisfy the
opponent, Gassendi would doubtless include the earth
in the 'whole 'for purposes of motion. At present,
however, Gassendi's purpose is purely analytical. He
desires to say that motion is innate^ to atoms. This
innate motion is the original element of all motions :
it is circular, the atoms whirling among themselves
aimlessly. By collision new directions are imparted
to these atoms, but however much appearances may
seem to be against it the circular motion remains
at the root of everything. For the present, then,
our interest in animal motions may be summed up
and left with one conclusion : they have no ' motus
rectus qui non sit ex circularibus compositis.'

This view of motion as fundamentally one has
the advantage of reducing to one the various kinds
of motion. Impulsive motion is now clearly only
an aspect of self-motion : it is self-motion in relation
to some other body : similarly ' vis attractrix ' is self-
motion in relation to some other body. In opposition
to many of his contemporaries, Gassendi requires

i/.e. implanted by God ab initio.

II.] PHYSICS 69

actual contact in attraction ; whether immediate or
mediate does not matter, but it must be a literal
laying hold of the object.

Faculty is vis motrix, for a faculty is just as 7
much as it can do : it is nothing if not active. To
this the faculty of Resistance seems ipso facto a
contradiction. But, says Gassendi, resistance is not
passivity ; immobility is self-centred force : in the
case of the earth we have an example of complete
rest produced by complete tension of all the parts.
(This perfect equilibrium was called motus tonicus.)
Having removed this difficulty we may define faculty
as ' in unaquaque re ipsummet movendi seu agendi
principium, nisi primarium quod formam vocant,
saltem Secundarium, seu ex forma profluens eiusque
velut instrumentum.'

The Faculties are not ' a tota substantia ' : they are
dependent on the spiritus, for it is the decay or
destruction of these principles that involves the loss
of the faculties. Gassendi goes further, and says
that the faculties and the spiritus are one : for
though the spirits mught appear to be a primary
organ of the faculties running through the body
from the central faculty, yet this is a distinction
that involves no difference, just as the waters that
run in the streams are distinct but not different
from the waters that run at the fountain. This
simile does not throw much light on the subject,
but is apparently intended to convey the idea that
the faculty is only nominally centralised ; in function
it is all-pervading. It also follows that all faculties
are species of faculty, since they are all reducible
to motions of the spirits. As faculty is the same

70 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

as spirit, all faculties are innate. A faculty may-
be acquired, but only in the sense of actually absorb-
ing the matter to which the power is innate. Iron,
for example, only attains the faculty of heat by
acquiring the matter of fire, in which the faculty
of heat is inborn. We now see that a faculty is in
some sense the nature of a thing. It is, in ftict, the
nature of a thing looked at from the point of view
of active relations. It follows that there are as
many faculties as there are possible combinations of
atoms and possible relations of these combinations.
Speaking of the great varieties of faculties, Gassendi
says : ' id facit varietas tum multiformium corpuscu-
lorum, ex quibus una tota res constat : tum specialium
contexturarum quae varias partes attinent : tum
externarum facultatum quibus misceri ipsas con-
tingit.' In the apple, for example, different com-
binations produce smell and taste. If w^e take into
consideration the organ of the sentient being we find
still more variations, e.g. pleasant smell, sweet taste,
etc. This gives us a division of absolute and relative :
for smell is in the object one (absolute), but to the
sentient beings manifold (respective).

The classification of faculties is carried out thus :
first, according as the subjects are living or not
living. In the case of living things they are
(a) general (nutrition, procreation) ;
{h) special.
This method of classification applies to each class.
If we take from among animals. Quadrupeds, we may
have general and special faculties within these limits.

The second method of classification is quite
different. Here we divide into principal and

IL] PHYSICS 71

subservient, the division being decided by the mutual
subordination of motions.

Though a faculty cannot be acquired it can be
improved both ' ut fortius operetur et ut expeditius.'
For the attainment of greater strength nutrition is
required, which means in this connexion the attain-
ment of more spirits. The quantitative growth may
be accompanied by increase of efficiency attained by
use. Habit is the name given to facility of action :
this facility may pertain to the spirits or to the organ
which they employ, and it is, if anything, more
important that it should be realised in the organ.
The organ is a crass and rigid thing, against whose
unyielding disposition the volatile spirits exert them-
selves in vain.

Matter is thus a hindrance to mind, and habit
gives freedom in the sense that when the organ is
properly trained the spirits are no longer baulked
of their purposes. If, on the other hand, there is
no use for the organ it relapses into its original
crude condition : for nutrition, continually renewing
the substance of the organ, removes by degrees all j
the parts that had learned the law, and puts in their |
place an untrained rabble.^ This is a rather novel
and poetical interpretation of what is generally
supposed to result in ' atrophy.' The principles of
habit, Gassendi adds, are applicable to all except
inanimata, whose changes are purely ab extra.

One more form of the vis motrix remains to be
noticed — that which is called Gravity or Levity.
Levity is to be taken as in se nihil, so that we
are left with degrees of Gravity. As might be

^i. 387.

72 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

expected, the gradation is due to admixture of vacua :
the inane is a principle not as acting, but as reduc-
ing the ratio of bulk to weight. It is important to
notice that Gassendi regards all the action of gravity
as extrinsic, thus shaking off once for all, any influ-
ences that his predecessors may have exerted toward
the acceptance of Love or Hate or any other mystic
principles.

The next qualities may be passed over summarily.
They are Heat, Cold, Fluiditas, Mollities, Taste,
Smell, Sound. A few points are of interest. Heat
may be used as a special term to denote felt heat,
or generally (objectively) to denote a condition of
body. Calor is a word which denotes, not a quality,
but atoms of a certain kind. The atomi caloris are
not ex se calidi, but are called so ex effectu. That
body is called hot which sends out these atoms :
the atoms themselves are not called hot : their power
of producing heat is 'objective,' dependent on special
forms and activities. We must distinguish then
between that Heat which is a real kind and that
which is hot either (a) potestate or (h) actu. A
thing is hot ' potestate ' ^ when the atoms of heat are
retained in it, and hot ' actu ' when the atoms are
sent out. Retention of atomi caloris explains the
heat of pepper and similar bodies. If a substance
contains atoms of heat, motion increases that heat :
motion however is not the cause of heat, because
substances such as water, which do not contain atoms
of heat, are not heated by motion. Gassendi dis-
tinguishes between calescere, an internal increase of

' The difference between ' potestate ' and ' potentia ' should be
noticed.

II.] PHYSICS 78

heat, which applies only to fats the atoms of which
are ' hamatiores,' and calefieri or the attainment of
heat from without.

Cold is the opposite or complementary of heat :
it is not privation of heat. This conclusion is based
on the differences of the effects : the effect of heat
is ' discutere et disgregare,' that of cold ' congregare
et compingere.' Further, the atoms of cold differ
from atoms of heat in figure : what figure is to be
assigned to atoms of cold is a point that the ancients
discussed elaborately. Gassendi accepts Lucretius'
view that they are 'dentata': our senses can judge
how biting is the cold. It should be noted that
though Fire is an element, Cold is not : Earth, Air,
and Water are not bodies cold by nature, and
therefore cannot be summed up as the Primum
Frigidum in opposition to Fire, the Primum Calidum.

In the case of Fluiditas and MoUities, with its
two species Ductilitas (as in gold) and Tractilitas
(as in our muscles, contraction), we have qualities
whose opposites are privations. This will be evident
if we consider that mollities, e.g. depends on the
degree of * inane ' contained in a body : the inane is
not soft, but the real, which is hard, can only give
the appearance of softness by including void spaces.

The next set of qualities are ' ad organum,' or
relative to the senses. They all depend ultimately on
Touch. In Taste we have particles that act on the
palate. Sound has been held incorporeal,^ but its

^'Pythagoras, Plato, Aristoteles apud Plutarchum fecere sonum
incorporeum.' This was due to their considering the configuration of
the air the essence of sound : they took figure ' profunditatis exper-
tem,' or abstractly.

74 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

corporeality is proved by the reflex motion required
for echoes and the necessity of different configura-
tions to produce different sounds.

In Light we have a subject which, for many
reasons, has been a time-honoured field of strife.
Gassendi begins with definitions : the object of sight
is colour ; the organ of sight the retina ; light is
the essence of colour, but is not itself visible. Lux
is defined as ' corpuscula tenuissima in corpore
lucido ' ; a body is lucidum when it is a fount and
source of light ; bodies that depend on others for
light are not lucida, but illu strata. To produce the
required effect on the organ of vision, Light must
be a substantial efiluence. Aristotle indeed thought
otherwise, but if we give up the substantiality of
Light it will be necessary to employ one of the
acknowledged substances as vehicle of light : this
vehicle will however be unknown to the organ, for
that is only concerned with the visible, so that Light
is either itself a substance or involves the inference
of a substance. The diaphanous or ' perspicuum ' is
the name given to the substance which is the
substratum to light. Aristotle conceived its activity
as the vibration of a chord and considered the

activity was the light {evepyeiav Tov Siacjyavov?).

Descartes adopted a very similar idea, but defined
his ' perspicuum ' as a texture of the spherical cor-
puscles which fill up the interstices of air, water,
glass, etc. — a sort of atmosphere of the second degree
of refinement.

Whatever the origin of light may be, it is itself
a corporeal substance somewhat like a bundle of cor-
puscles or rays formed of corpuscles. This physical

IL] PHYSICS 75

reality is merely ' existens ' without relation to the
eye : it is ' completa ' when in relation with the eye
it produces light as an experience.

It is necessary to prove definitely that Light
is a substance, because this view is rarely accepted.
The proof consists in pointing out that Light has
certain powers which only a substance can have.
These are, first, local motion by which the rays
travel from the ' lucidum ' to the ' illustratum.'
Action at a distance is a fallacy, so that if the lumi-
nous body acts on a distant object, there must be
a transmission of the agent or agents through the
intervening sf)ace. The second and clearest proof
is that of Reflexion :^ for if light were incorporeal
it would not rebound from but pass through the
opposing body. A similar argument applies to
refraction, where the body does not entirely oppose
the passage of light but is in some degree
* transpicuum.' The similes which Gassendi uses
in this connexion are worth noting : speaking of
refliexion he compares the light to arrows or
javelins striking on a shield and rebounding : with
reference to action at a distance he says, if a foun-
tain wets your hand from afar it is because it projects
a stream of water on you : similarly a fire warms
by sending out a ray of heat, or as one might say
a spray of heat atoms, and light illuminates by
showering on the object 'streams of light.'

The objection which naturally arose against this
substantive view was that the motion of light
was too rapid to admit of any such corporeality.
Gassendi replies that if light is mere form it is

1 I. 426.

76 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

everywhere at once and has no motion : if it moves
some vehicle is required, and it follows that the
vehicle does as a matter of fact move just as fast
as light, in spite of a priori objections. Gassendi
here seems to be applying a doctrine that was
greatly needed — namely that notions of substance
must conform to experience, and our experience
must not be distorted or even rejected to preserve
traditional views.

Colour is either light itself or something in things
to which light is the perfecting form. Light itself
is white or that which appears white (nihil esse
aliud quam candor candicansve color videatur). This
is the fundamental colour, if it be a colour, of which
all others are varieties, according to degrees of
mixture of darkness.

The last of the sensible qualities is the imago, or
visible species. This subject naturally follows the
discussion of Light and Colour, and is properly a
question of the perception of forms. As a question
of perception it comes under Vision ; but objectively
considered the species are qualities, and must there-
fore be considered in this place. The simplest course
is to say that the vision ^ of an object is the light
radiated from it and determined by its form and
colour. Gassendi declines to leave the matter there,
but as the question of the nature of these ' visions '
has attracted so much attention he reviews the whole
history of the subject.

As nothing is absolutely smooth, but has on closer

' The English word ' vision ' has exactly the double meaning (act
of seeing, thing seen) which expresses the problem that troubled the
ancients.

II.] PHYSICS 77

inspection numerous 'faces,' the species can be pro-
jected in a straight line in any and every direction.
It follows that a thing can be viewed from any side,
and no two views will be exactly alike, though
generically alike. The objects in the field of vision
can be accommodated in the eye, in spite of their
great number, because the area surveyed is hemi-
spherical in shape, and the species are propelled
along lines which converge into a point.

The nature of the species has been differently
conceived by different schools of writers. The
' nominaleis ' say they are accidents : if so, they
must be dependent for transmission on the air ;
but an accident is not a reality unless it can be
separated from the vehicle which it uses : in this
case no separation is possible, and therefore species
are not truly accidents. Again, from the analogy
of sounds the idea arose that the object as a whole
produced movements in the surrounding atmosphere,
and so, as it were, sent forth pictures of itself.
Against this Gassendi argues that the theory in-
volves a movement of the object which sends forth
the picture, whereas seen objects are frequently
motionless.

These two phases of the doctrine that species are
insubstantial are rejected, as might be expected from
what has been already said about Light. Epicurus
thought the species were corporeal and of two kinds,
namely (a) ' coagmentationes ' or spontaneous group-
ings of atoms, such as occurs in a mirage, and (b)
' effluxiones.' It is with the second of these that
we are really concerned. Any given body as an
object of sight is supposed to be continually giving

78 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

off atoms. These form a picture of the thing by
purely natural means. As all atoms move in straight
lines unless deflected, and all have the same rate
of speed, these ' exhalations,' as they may be called,
retain the original disposition of their parts and
so produce an effect symbolic of their origin and of
nothing else. It is necessary to notice the difference
between this and the other view, that the object
as a whole produces a picture of itself. Upon that
view Gassendi pours scorn: the rock we see would,
he says, be in that case a consummate painter,
obviously meaning that the theory has a mystical
element. The second theory is mechanical: the
motion required is not of the whole as such : there
is only the innate motion of the atoms : the retention
of the original form is due to the mechanical pro-
perties of atoms moving in a medium too subtle to
disturb them normally : and, finally, the effect is not
a picture in the sense of being itself a representation
of the thing : it is an effect upon the organ of sight
which by these means attains a picture of the object.
In the former case apparently a ' picture ' was
supposed to float in the air : in this case the atoms
are not the picture but the cause of the picture :
just as light was a reality but not a complete reality
apart from the eye, so the picture is only realised
for a beholder, and apart from any eye is only an
agglomeration of atoms.

Gassendi defends the view that ' effluxiones ' are
substantial, not because it is right but because it
is less wrong than the other view. The real difficulty
is to explain how things can go on giving off matter
and yet never be exhausted. The usual plan of

II.] PHYSICS 79

explainiDg that the ' effluxiones ' are subtle beyond
all comprehension (omnem modum excedentes) is,
to say the least of it, feeble. But Gassendi attempts
no other, and appears to satisfy himself that it is
possible to have a substantial loss, which being
infinitely small only becomes perceptible in infinite
time. The real difference between an infinitely
subtle ' imago ' and an imago that is an accident,
is a question of terms and technicality rather than
commonsense. Gassendi apparently means us to
understand that what we see is the light from a
thing as that light is aff'ected by the thing : beyond
this there is nothing but tradition.

There remain now the so-called occult qualities.
These constitute a special class ; for certain qualities
are popularly regarded as peculiarly ' occult ' : in
reality all qualities are occult in some degree, and
the difference between ' occult ' and ' manifest ' is one
of degree only. What we look for is some explana-
tion of an effect : an occult cause is merely an
imperceptible quality which we attribute to an object
in order to explain the effects we believe to be
derived from it. The most typical of all these
qualities are the two know^n as Sympathy and
Antipathy. Now all the effects produced exhibit
the common forms of activity : we are therefore led
to assume that the cause can be interpreted in terms
of motion, though that motion may be too subtle
for our senses to perceive.

The assumption that all relations of cause and
effect are reducible to motion and communicated
motion, prepares us for a rationalistic explanation
of these miraculous qualities. When the chameleon

80 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

puts forth its tongue to catch the fly, we see the
agent of attraction : when the electrical body attracts
other bodies, how can it draw them to itself if not by
' innumerable rays darted out like tongues'? Beyond
the world of our senses lies another, identical in kind
but too minute for ordinary perception : if our senses
were magnified these invisible agents would start
into life : we should see the tiny thorns wherewith
the nettle stings us, and perceive the corpuscles
whose unsuitable shape makes the object painful to
our sight. All sympathy and antipathy then is a
question of physical causation, of 'corporea organula':
love and hate are ultimately physical, and friend is
literally like friend, for the essence of affection is
congruence of atoms ! The ancient philosophy of
Hate and Love is now completely inverted : physical
relations take the first place and repulsion or attrac-
tion explains all : repulsion need not be hate, but
hate is always repulsion.

The general theory of occult causes is now disposed
of: the discussion of particular instances has only a
secondary interest. The cases classed as ' general '
are (a) conspiratio partium universi and (b) influxus
coelestis. The former is identical with the dread of
a vacuum attributed to nature : the latter is a subject
about which we know little so far as astrology is
concerned : the movement of the tides is not really
a case of 'influxus lunae.'

The special cases also need not detain the reader :
why the sponge attracts (sic) the water is a question
hardly more scientific in form and suggestion than
the later query, Why does a cock frighten a lion ?
Both these cases seem explicable in ways not par-

II.] PHYSICS 81

ticularly 'occult.' In dealing with the occult qualities
of plants Gassendi shows a very interesting phase of
the development of thought : the love of the vine
for the elm might be pure poetry, but there were
relations between plants which were thought to be
of real importance : the female palm, for example,
was said to be fertile only when sown near the male :
the truth which might underlie this observation was
obscured by the notion of subtle ' effluviae ' trans-
mitted from one to the other.^

Gassendi discusses very gravely the occult quality
of hate as existing between the sheep and the wolf :
he says, ' ovis quidem odit lupum, nee immerito : ab
illo enim dilaniatur ' : the wolf however does not hate
the sheep, for he is good to eat : the apple may hate
us, but we who eat it say we like it. There is a
subtle vein of animism in all these popular fancies
which the philosopher still finds himself compelled
to treat seriously. The evil eye, the power of incan-
tations, the virtue some plants possess of healing the
wounded by being applied to the sword that struck
the blow : these and many others mark the flights of
undisciplined imagination. In the last case Gassendi
makes an interesting remark : the power of the drug
applied to the sword was supposed to reach the
wounded man, however far away, because the soul
of the world is one, and so what affects one part
must aff"ect the whole and all parts : thus Unity
received an apotheosis almost before it was born !

*Nehemiah Grew, whose investigations developed the idea of sex
in plants, was born in 1628, and did not publish his work until 1681.
It is improbable that Gassendi had an accurate knowledge of the
subject, though possibly it was 'in the air.'

82 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

(e) ON THE ORIGIN AND DECAY OF THINGS

Whatever our ultimate views may be on creation
and annihilation, there remains untouched by these
the whole sphere of becoming. Becoming can be
regarded from two points of view, according as we
consider that which becomes or that which ceases
in order that something may become. The negative
aspect of the becoming of any one thing is the ceas-
ing of its antecedent, so long as we allow that the
antecedent is really and truly such : if however we
prefer to deny the antecedence and declare the whole
movement of Becoming illusory, change may be
refined away to nothing more than variation of
qualities. In order to be clear as to the scope of
this discussion, the terms employed must be care-
fully distinguished. The first is creation, which
means the production of something out of nothing :
the second is mutation, which denotes a change from
one state to another. Now this change may afiect only
the quality of a thing or the thing itself: in the former
case it is called Alteratio, in the latter Generatio.

These extreme points of view are represented on
the one hand by Parmenides and all who deny
motion, on the other by those who regard all new
forms as creations. The standpoint exemplified in
Parmenides is that of the monistic schools for which
substance means the Whole rather than the Thing.
From this interpretation it naturally follows that all
change is change of the Whole, and since the Whole
cannot become something other than itself, the change
is ultimately an illusion. If, on the other hand,
substance means Thing, change will mean that one

II.] PHYSICS 83

thing becomes another thing, at least in the sense
that one thing gives place to another thing. But
even those who take substance in the pluralistic
sense do not agree in their explanation of change :
to many the idea of one thing becoming another
thing is repugnant : the tendency then is to return
to the position of Parmenides, but apply his doctrine
not to Substance but to substances. To do this suc-
cessfully we must establish our ultimate substances.
Common experiences can be appealed to as a proof
that we know what we mean by change. Every day
there is some new thing under the sun about which
we feel that to-day it is and yesterday it was not.^
But if our ultimate substances are things each with
a character of its own, the alterations it can undergo
must be limited by the necessity of retaining the
character. An acorn may become an oak, but the
oak does not become an elm, says the opponent :
when pressed further he will explain that the acorn
is potentially an oak, and therefore its development
is determined. But either the acorn is or is not an
oak : if it is an oak the Becoming is pure illusion :
if it is not, what is the principle of becoming ? The
answer is combination of parts. As these parts pre-
cede the whole, they are themselves neutral, i.e. fit
to enter into any combination." Generation is now

^ ' Perspicit abunde sagacitas tua, quo dicere sensu cum Sapiente
potuerim " nihil esse sub sole novum." Quare et lubens tibi sub-
scribo dum argumentaris nova esse omnia, ob continentem, quae in
rebus observitatur, mutationem ' {Ep. L. Valesio, 1647, vi. 264).

2 This must be taken with a limitation. The actual ultimate is
not the atom but the 'semina rerum,' i.e. atoms qualified to enter
into any combination of a given kind. The process of Generation is
' assimilation,' or reunion of like with like, a process of selection as
well as combination.

84 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

definable as mixture of parts : the matter is given
in plants and animals as much as in houses : the
mixture makes the thing !

It is clear that our neutral elements are the atoms.
Creation is the act that produces these primary-
elements : the atoms are created, not the world : the
world is the product of atoms endowed with a motion
of their own. One difficulty, however, remains. If
the matter is always the same, and the thing is a
combination of parts differing from other things not
in the nature of the ultimate elements but in their
combination, is it not really the Form, and the
Form only, that is generated ? Gassendi attacks this
position with skilful dialectic. It is said that when
a combination is effected a form is educed : this form
was not present before actu but potentia : then how
can it be educed any more than gold can be educed
from an empty purse ? ^ If the form does not arise
out of the matter, we have not eductio but generatio :
a form, that is, is realised which did not exist before,
and that is just what we mean by generation. If
the form is asserted to be something distinct from
matter, and yet no matter is lost in producing Form,
the Form must be especially created and we are
committed to a constant miracle.

1 1. 468. 'Eespondent potestatem materiae respectu Formae
duplicem esse, unam eductivam, quatenus forma potest vi agentis
ex ilia educi : aliam receptivam quatenus potest eandem forman
ex se eductam recipere : sicque materiam utraque hac potentia
formam continere. Ac priraum continere aliquid eductivS, potentiS.
nihil aliud est quam habere actu in se, quod possit exinde educi.
Ita crumena, in qua sunt actu decern aurei, dicetur illos continere
eductiva potentia, quatenus inde educi possint : nam alioquin, nisi
actu in se haberet, ii ex ea educi non possent, neque crumena dici
posset continere eductiva potentiS,.'

II.] PHYSICS 85

The result of our review of all previous doctrines
is then the survival as fittest of the common-sense
standpoint : and the achievement is perhaps greater
than it appears at first sight. At one point Gassendi's
position seems very much exposed, but the opponent
is silenced in anticipation. If mind is not matter,
have we not here a case in which a combination of
elements of one kind produces or conditions the
generation of a reality of a different order? The
point may be dealt with in two ways ; the first is
to stolidly assert that mind is a form of matter
generated by the particular combinations of matter
which it is found to accompany ; the second is to
attribute it to the act of God, and so leave it.
Gassendi chooses the second course, perhaps wisely.

SECTION B

CHAPTER I
THE INANIMATE WORLD

The second part of the Syntagma begins with a
treatise de rebus terrenis inanimis. The majority
of its contents are not worth reproduction in full or
with any degree of exactness. The connexion of
these chapters with the scheme of the whole work
may be gathered from the summary of the subject
matter already given (v. p. xii). A few points of
particular interest may be selected for special
comment.

After dealing with the land and the water, in-
cluding seas, rivers, and the tides, we advance to the
bodies that are found in the earth. These are
cla-ssified as ' mista perfecta ' in order to distinguish
them from the 'meteora' (winds, clouds, rains), which
are imperfecta : they are also called compositiora,
because they a,re compounded of more than one
element. This class includes Fossils, Plants, and
Animals. The term ' fossil ' is used in the bare
sense of things which have to be dug up : as a rule
this is limited to stones, metals, and minerals ; but
there are other treasures in the bosom of the earth
which are omitted by this limitation, and Gassendi
proposes to include under this heading the primar}-

90 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

forms of matter which are ' liquidiora. ' We are now-
dealing with the very lowest forms of existence.
Gassendi's intention is to begin at the bottom of the
scale of existence and rise in orderly procession to
the highest. He is not content with starting from
even such elementary stages as are given in metals,
but desires to get deeper still, to the most formless
conditions of matter, and begin with what he calls
the ' mean forms ' out of which nature constructs
the comparatively developed things called metals.
These ' mean forms ' or first conditions of matter are
the various kinds of earth, the ' succi concreti ' and
the ' mista mineralia.' The kinds of earth are first
enumerated and their relative fertility is commented
on ; then the succi concreti are catalogued in the
two main classes macri et pingues (among the macri
salt comes first, among the pingues sulphur and
bitumen are the most important), and finally the
mista mineralia are given in their order. Beyond
being an integral part of Gassendi's universe these
have no interest for us now, but as part of that
conception they demand attention. As we are now
in the realm of things inorganic the question of
becoming is important. Each class of things has
/ its own semina and each thing is formed by the
I cohesion of semina of one kind : that is to say,
1 generation is a simple process of cohesion of homo-
I geneous parts, and as there is no question of voluntary
\ unions, the production of any specimen of this class
I is dependent on the chance which collocates in one
place the kindred elements. Whatever we may have
to say later on about alimentation and the purposive
union of parts, this is the sphere in which we can

II.] PHYSICS 91

subscribe unreservedly to the action of chance as it
was primarily conceived by the earlier atomists.

Passing over the intermediary discussion of vol-
canoes and earthquakes we can take up at once the
question of the formation of inorganic bodies as it
is described by Gassendi, with special reference to
' lapides ' or stones in the sense in w^hich we use that
term when we speak of precious stones. It is absurd
to suppose that all these were created at the be-
ginning of things once and for all. Apart from the
inherent improbability of the idea, we can see for
ourselves that the process is going on around us
every day. The matter is in this as in every case
given. The point which calls for explanation is the
regularity with which similar forms are constantly
produced. For this we must postulate a formative
power, a vis interna, in this case a vis lapidifica :
there is no less reason for asserting the existence
of this formative power in the case of stones than
there is in the case of the plant or the chicken.^
If any doubt remained it would be dispersed by the
instance of crystallisation in which the presence of
such a causa constans is indubitable. This vis
lapidifica is a form of vis seminalis, that being the
more general term : in the case of some animals
and in plants the vis seminalis is obscurior ; and in
the case of stones it is still more obscure, but not

* ' Quamobrem calor quidem et frigus conferre interdum ad niaturi-
orem coitionem indurationemque possunt aliquid, at debet esse
praeterea vis quaedam lapidifica, quani et seminalem dicere nihil
vetat . . . est praeterea vis seminalis quae ex preparata materia tam
plantam quam puUum delineet : ita quo lapides formentur debet
omnino praeter calorem aliudve agens extrinsecum esse interior quaedam
vis quae conformationem moliatur et seminalis censeri possit' (ii. 114).

92 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

on that account to be denied altogether. We must
not however deduce from this too much : although
gems and all other stones are formed by the action
of this vis seminalis they are not on that account
to be called living things : they have not life in
the sense that the plants have : they are solid com-
pact bodies in which there is no circulation and no
alimentation, not even through that which they call
' insensilem transpirationem ' : they do not grow in
the proper sense of the term, and we certainly cannot
infer from the fact that one gem is bigger than
another that it is therefore older, or ' grown up ' !
The coral does indeed grow, but then it is a
plant !

The most important topic in this book is that of
the magnet. Gassendi has used the magnet fre-
quently in the later parts of his w^ork by way of
example, and, as it is one of those marginal topics
which seem to have a mystical affinity with higher
forms of existence, it will be as well to examine
carefully what Gassendi has to say here, where he
treats the subject directly and in its proper con-
nexion. The point about the magnet is that it
exercises attraction. When the iron comes within
its range it is drawn tow^ard it by some invisible
power, and the data thus given to the ordinary senses
of man are exactly fitted to encourage idle specula-
tion. In the first place Gassendi asserts that the
action of the magnet is purely physical : it must
therefore be mediated action, not action at a distance,
and the mediation must be achieved by a substan-
tialis corporeusve effluxus : there is to be no shirking
of the question by introducing emanations of a

PHYSICS 93

douuo- .1 order: if we had the required keenness of
sight we should see the hooks by which the magnet
lays hold of the iron. That is one question, and so
far we seem on safe ground ; but a more critical
point is raised by the two statements that the magnet
has something analogous to plants and to sense.
The analogy to plants turns out to be a similarity
of habits such that, as a cutting can only be grafted
on to a tree in one way, so the magnet can only
be joined to another magnet or a part of itself
according to the way the fibres run. As regards the
analogy of the magnet to that of the sensible agent,
the analogy consists in the following points of re-
semblance. (1) As the animal is attracted by the
object, so the iron is attracted by the magnet
(2) The action is in both cases per immissas species
that is, a definite something is emitted by the one
which passes over to the other. (3) The species thus
emitted enter into the soul of the object in both
cases and produce the disturbance which results in
the consequent movement. (4) The activity of motion
in both cases begins from the soul.

This language looks on the face of it extremely
animistic : none the less Gassendi does not mean
to imply that the magnet has a soul in the proper
sense of the term at all.^ He carefully adds every

^ ' videri esse in magnete ac ferro vim quandaiu analogam sensui :
id nempe propter attractionem baud absimilem Animali. Nam ut
Animal specie quadam objecti externi perculsum, ipsura statim
appetit, et ad illud rapitur : ita minor magnes ac ferrum quani-
primum maioris sive potentioris magnetis specie percellitur, appetitu
quodam rapitur ad ipsum. Certe ut sensibile objectuiu non. . . .
Et ut objectum sensibile per immissam speciem convertit trabitque
ad se animam quae vi sua corpus quantumvis crassum una versus
objectum transfert : ita et magnes per transfusam speciem videtur

94 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

time he mentions the word anima the qualifying
quasi : he distinguishes the other anima to which
this is analogous as anima sentiens, and assures us
that the magnet has only 'something analogous
to a soul' What we have in fact is a type of
motion ; what we might call responsive motion ;
and Gassendi is well aware that when he comes to
sensibility he will not be able to tell us much more
about it than can be summed up in some such phrase
as this of responsive motion. The significance of
this will be pointed out later (p. 262) : for the
present it is enough to show that we cannot assert
on the basis of what Gassendi has to say for himself
either that matter is always endowed with soul,
or that soul is always material : similarity does
not exclude diff*erence, nor does difference destroy
the possibility of co-existing similarity : the eagle
and the oyster are far enough apart, and yet
we find reason to put them on the same scale :
can we not then put the magnet and the animal
in some relation of similarity, though the mag-
net is no more an animal than the eao;le is an
oyster ?

The subject of Plants, which occupies the second
part of this section on things inanimate, is important
in one respect. We shall pass over all that is

ad se convertere trahereque ipsam quasi aniniam (seu florem sub-
stantiae) ferri, quae sua vi totam ferri massam versus magnetem
una abripiat. . . . Quare ut hoc modo subingressa speciei corpuscula
in substantiam animae (partisve sentientis ipsius) illam ita sollicitant
ut non sine quodam impetu in objectum feratur : ita videntur
corpuscula speciei magnetis subingressa ferri quasi animam, ipsius
corpuscula sic evolvere et in magnetem convertere ut hac ratione
sollicitata impetum vegetum in magnetem concipiat et quod amplius
est etiam parem speciem illico diffundat.'

II.] PHYSICS 05

said on the kinds and classification of plants, and
confine our attention to the consideration of their
nature, and the place which they are to occupy in
our scheme of the universe. Gassendi begins with
the most important point, namely the question, have
the plants a soul ? Many writers had held this
theory : as a rule it was a deduction from the
doctrine of the world-soul, and there were great
differences in the extent to which the doctrine was
pushed : the Manichaeans, for example, ' sic dederunt
plantis animam rationalem ut florem aut fructum
decerpere foret homocidium patrare ' : ^ while Aristotle
represents the other extreme of moderation in attri-
buting to them only a nutritive soul. Epicurus is
in direct opposition to these ideas, and declares that
plants have no soul at all, an opinion with which
Gassendi finds himself in perfect accord. He reviews
the meanings attached to the word animatus : its
Greek counterpart -^i^x'' i^ from '^v)(eh, which is to
say, ' flando refrigerare,' and this we all know is
peculiar to animals ; plants are not even animals
in the strict sense of ^wa, much less animata corpora ;
and finally, if we think of the derivation from avefxo^,
i.e. spiritus, this too excludes plants from the class
of animata. But while he is thus clear that a plant
is not an animal Gassendi obviously feels that there
is some excuse for the general tendency to give plants
a place in the scale of nature much nearer to the
animal than to the stone : he therefore enumerates
all the ' wonders of plant life ' which were known
in his day and seem to have been as fruitful a source
of credulous wonder then as now. There is doubt-

^11. 144.

96 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

less much that is to us extremely wonderful in the
apparently purposeful activities of plants, but, says
Gassendi, however wonderful they may be, the
original question, are there any proofs of a soul?,
remains unanswered : anima is often used loosely,
and we speak of things as animated^ to which we
should not give a soul if required to do so explicitly ;
in other words, there is much we call animate that
we should never call animal. We are in fact caught
between the animal sphere and the too comprehensive
sphere of nature in general. Finally, Gassendi defines
the plant as corpus vegetabile sensu carens, admitting
that it would be more natural, if less exact, to say
corpus animatum, i.e. ' vivens quod nutriri, crescere,
sibi simile generare possit.'

This last point directs our attention to the question
of the origin and perpetuation of plant life. The first
plant in the world's history must have arisen from a
conjunction of like atoms, and this was in the usual
way fortuitous. But the tendency which united the
first group of atoms in the first plant works on a
smaller scale in keeping together those atoms which
are the specific semen : hence the process of reproduc-
tion is made easier, and the reason why plants are
localised is apparent. In this connection Gassendi
returns to the question of the soul : the marvel of
the structure of the plant with all its adaptations and
contrivances rouses him to further comment on that
formative power which is thus shown to be innate to
the plant. We must, in fact, allow that there is a
central principle, and we may even call it a soul

^ We now speak of animated pictures as well as animated
nature !

II.] PHYSICS 97

if it be ^remembered that by this term we denote
only a definite principle, a substance most like to
a flame, which is indeed spread through all the
plant, but is especially concentrated in the parts
which form the seed (ii. 172).

CHAPTER II

THE ANIMATE WORLD

(a) INTRODUCTORY

The third section of the second part of the Syntagma
has two ' membra ' dealing with natural objects (rebus
terrenis) in general. We have discussed the former
part, and can now proceed to the second. The dis-
tinguishing characteristic of the subject-matter is
Life, in the sense which is implied by the title
Animate as opposed to all the previous existents
which have been classed as Inanimate. The highest
class of Inanimata comprised Plants : the specific
difi'erence which brings us to the next highest stage
is the appearance of Sensibility. The name Animal
is given ^«a rr^v aia-Orjcnv irpcoToog (ii. 193), hence we
shall not object to including under this title those
forms of organic life which have only the rudimentary
sensibility shown in reaction to touch, namely Zoo-
phytes (Plantanimalia), to which we can ascribe only
Tactus, and (perhaps) its localized form, Taste. With
this general determination of what constitutes an
Animal, we may proceed to classification. The stars
and the gods we may neglect, in/ sj)ite of Plato and
Aristotle : we have then terrestrial creatures left :
of these there are many traditional classifications.

PT. II.] PHYSICS 99

(1) The division into Rational and Irrational is
bad : for it introduces a negative class, and does
not exclude immortal beings who might certainly
be rational.

(2) An obvious division would be according to
mode of motion, e.g. the classes Volatile, Natatile,
Gressile, Reptile, Tractile, Immotum ; but this is
unsatisfactory, since the classes overlap, and there
seems to be no principle of division. The question
indeed arises whether a classification which serves
all purposes can be found. Generally we classify
to suit some particular purpose (pro occasione
petimus) : we choose as our basis, mode of genera-
tion, distribution of parts, habits (mores), nature
of food (ratione victus), or even the locality in
which the creatures are found. In such cases the
end must justify the means, but no one of these
can claim to be a final and universally valid
classification. Gassendi finally adopts the division
into Sanguinea and Exsanguia, acknowledging its
many faults, but finding it more adapted than any
other to comprehend such a large and various range
of objects. In spite of scholastic objections we do
finally adopt a negative classification : Gassendi
realises that such a dichotomy may fail in face
of species which are neither, and weakens his posi-
tion in so far as he seems to intend, not so much
to classify all animals as to make a classification
under which the animals are to be subsumed,
whether they will or no. It is essentially a
scholastic trait to make the law first and then adapt
nature to it. The scheme of classification which
guides the author through the remainder of this

100 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

book is so hopelessly out of touch with our concep-
tions that it may be consigned to oblivion : his
treatment of the subject is an excellent example of
his discursive style. He ranges from the elephant
to the fly, quotes authors innumerable, discusses
the probability of Centaurs and Sirens, and grants
respectful consideration to derivations of names too
ludicrous to be any longer amusing.

The Second Book opens with a formidable col-
lection in two chapters of all the names of the
parts of the human frame and of those parts which
are found in animals, but not in man. This too
is a mine of curious information, but hardly such
as would justify reproduction. The construction of
the sense organs we shall consider later, and pass
over the rest in silence.

(b) ON DESIGN IN NATURE

Under the heading ' Use of the parts in Animals '
Gassendi elaborates his views on the teleological
question. Epicurus, in accordance with his theory
of atoms and their fortuitous concourse, had denied
that the parts of the body were dilFerentiated for
definite purposes. Eyes were not made for seeing,
nor ears for hearing : if the contrary is asserted, it
will follow that hearing existed before the ear,
seeing before the eye, which is nonsense : and
Epicurus finally leaves the difi'erentiation of organs
unexplained, but accounts for difference of function
by supposing that the application of the Soul to
the organ results in an activity determined by the
nature of the organ (e.g. seeing, when the applica-
tion is to the eye, and so on). This conclusion

II.] PHYSICS 101

may be briefly stated by saying that the function
is the efl:ect and not the (final) cause of the organ.
Against this Gassendi argues at great length ; but
in spite of the clearness of his statement he seems
to have overlooked a rather obvious confusion, for,
if we speak of the eye, the ear, or the nose, we
naturally think of them as differing, because we
think of their correlatives in perception (sight,
hearing, smelling). If we resolutely exclude all
ideas of the sensations, and consider only the organ
as a mere compilation of atoms, the position of
Epicurus reduces itself to the unprovable proposition
that movements of difl"erent kinds of atomic groups
are different kinds of movement. This is not quite
such a quibble as it appears : for we have to
remember that Epicurus was not thinking of an
organism differentiated by the action of an environ-
ment which is the ground of variety in experience,
but of an organism which is in itself so differen-
tiated as to be able to produce variety in the
experience of a Soul which is a unitary thing going
out to its world.

While accepting the general theory of Epicurus,
Gassendi declines to commit himself to a rei2;n of
chance. His remarks are an instructive comment
on a stage of thought which so nearly arrived at
truths only recently appreciated. He recognises that
natural selection (natura electionis capax. ii. 228)
has determined what forms shall survive : from the
innumerable host of the created only some survive,
' illas puta quas contigit habere parteis sic con-
stitutas ut nactae fuerint accommodatum ad sui ip-
sarum conservationem generationemque consimilium,

102 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

usum.' Galen is quoted as the authority for an
opinion held by Epicureans that the tendons of the
hand are strong, not for use but from use.
Thirdly, the question is raised, if rain falls on the
crops by design, why does it also fall on the sea
and the rocks? We have here three distinct ques-
tions — first, as to creation ; secondly, as to develop-
ment ; lastly, as to God.

(1) The question of creation is taken as wholly
distinct from that of development : as the point
cannot be settled, Gassendi thinks it best to ascribe
creation to God, rather than chance.

(2) The remarks on development must be con-
sidered carefully, else it is easy to attribute to the
writer a position far beyond his actual attainment.
Instances are quoted of adaptation to circumstances,
as the hardening of the soles of the feet in people
who go barefoot : cases of useless parts in creatures
are noted, as, e.g., cur mares quoque expertes
lactis mammas haberent. But in neither case is
the real significance apprehended : for Gassendi
never seems to regard development in a way that
would admit of new species arising ; nor does it
occur to him that a structure that has no function
indicates a radical process of change. He was open-
minded enough to admit that a useless appendage
was no credit to Providence, but the idea that
development from one form to another might be
indicated by stages in which rudimentary organs
survived, belongs to a scheme of the universe not
revealed to Gassendi. For Gassendi, as for Epi-
curus, all process and becoming virtually ceased
when the world as it now is began to be. The

IL] PHYSICS 103

primeval matter — the atoms — might of course pro-
duce new forms ; but practically it is assumed that
the number of successful possibilities is now ex-
hausted. In this way an evolutionary is combined
with a static view of nature.

(3) In dealing with the question of a Creator,
Gassendi is not so hampered by the claims of
orthodoxy as on some other occasions. His middle
course is not only suitable to his orthodoxy, but
philosophically possible. We must not admire the
temple and ignore the architect,^ and as some
creative power, both wise and intelligent, has to
be acknowledged, it matters little whether we call
it nature or God. Mingled with the rhapsody
which proclaims the Creator we find some shrewd
remarks : the order of the Universe compels us to
see behind it a mind ; but the compulsion is
aesthetic, and the assertion of God rests on faith
rather than argument : the crude teleology which
has raised such bitter discussions is annihilated by
the remark that function and organ cannot be
separated : one does not come before the other
either logically or in the time order, and the
creature cannot be considered in abstraction from
the world in which he lives. Thus Gassendi avoids
the dogmatic tone of Lactantius, and preserves his
faith without sacrificing his reason, while his asser-
tion that current teleology is based on a false
abstraction marks an enduring distinction between
those who acknowledge the fitness of things and
those who would advance beyond the given data
to prove special design.

In. 231.

104 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENUI [pt.

To make Gassendi's position clearer, I may add
the following quotation from Wallace, Epicureanism
(p. 115):

' Throughout the whole of his explanation of the
origin of the earth . . . Epicurus is careful to ex-
clude any reference to divine action. There was no
design, no plan determining beforehand the process
of evolution, and adapting one part of the cosmic
structure to co-operate with another. ... In all
its phases teleology is extruded. The very animals
which are found upon the earth have been made
what they are by slow processes of selection and
adaptation. . . . Plants and animals have the same
source as rocks and sands. It is from the seeds or
elements contained in the earth that the animals
have in some strange maternal throes (as Lucretius
somewhat j&guratively puts it) been evolved in their
season : they have not fallen from heaven. The
same naturalistic explanation is given of the special
endowments of human beings. The organs of sense
were not given us ready-made in order that we
might use them : that which is born in our body,
on the contrary, generates for itself a use. The
structure, for example, which we call the eye was
not given us as an organ of vision : it arose, we
need not enquire too curiously how, and it was found
to be useful for the perception of objects in the
light. Whether this use by degrees created an
organ more and more appropriate for its purpose —
function, as it were, perfecting the organ — is a
point apparently not discussed by Epicurus.'

Thus much about Epicurus. As regards Gassendi,
we may say that he does consider the last point

n.] PHYSICS 105

mentioned as omitted by Epicurus, and this has led
him to see that there is a rehxtiou between the omau
and its function which is not expressed in a doctrine
of chance. In order to understand Gassendi, we
must keep in mind that there are three distinct
points of view. (1) We may rely on chance : this
excludes creation and design. (2) We may say that
the organ was designed for its function. This sounds
reasonable enough if taken wdth the significance that
the terms would have in modern parlance. In the
language of this period it implies that the function
existed before the organ, that there was a seeing
which was literally antecedent to the being of the
eye. This was easily shown to be absurd. In
modern evolution we have a totally different scheme,
the two factors given us in, e.g., Spencer's account,
are the sensitive material and light : in this scheme
it is light which exists before the eye ; in the other
scheme we have sight in place of light, which makes
all the difference. (3) We may refuse to accept
chance and decline to say that each organ w^as
specially created, but declare that the result proves
that there is design enough in the universe to
make possible those combinations of matter which
are required for these functions. If it were a case
of all chance, we might have only organs we did
not want, e.g. eyes in a world without light.
Selection can remove those organs we do not use,
but it could not create others. On the other hand,
if Providence controls every detail, the design would
be better than it is !

•

106 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [ft.

Gassendi discusses the nature of the Soul, not, as
might have been expected, in direct connection with
his psychological theory, but between the discussions
on the parts and the generation of animals respec-
tively. This will however be justified when we
understand the sense he attaches to the term Anima.

Primarily, it is the specific diff'erence which dis-
tinguishes the Animal from the inanimate and from
plants : for little as we may know about it, the soul
of the animal is assuredly something very distinct
from that soul which we may concede to plants.
Gassendi holds a modest opinion of his own ability
and the value of the discussion. We cannot expect,
he says, to learn the nature of the soul : it will be
enough to know what has been said about it ; the
Church alone gives us certainty on the subject.
With this tribute to orthodoxy, the philosopher
proceeds with the perilous theme in a manner which
his contemporaries must have regarded as dangerous
free thinking.

We are accustomed to confine psychology to the
study of phenomena in some degree intellectual.^
The mediaeval thinker avoided this path to error
by keeping two terms for all that we include under

^ I say ' in some degree intellectual ' without forgetting that the
tendency of much of our modern psychological writing is to go
beyond what we should ordinarily call intellectual phenomena. In
spite of this, and in spite of our 'animal psychology ' (which is largely
engaged in proving its own possibility) and our treatment of sub-
conscious phenomena, not to mention our phrenology and our analysis
of adolescence, we have not yet got to the point at which we could
speak of an active principle which did nothing but control digestion,
as a ' soul.'

II.] PHYSICS 107

the name ' Soul.' For the intellectual agent the
term Animus is used : Anima is a more comprehen-
sive term, and may be translated 'principle of life.'^
The historical discussion is, as usual, a splendid
display of erudition : one chapter deals with those
who consider the soul incorporeal, another with those
who regard it as corporeal. If it be regarded as
incorporeal, it may be either substance or attribute,
i.e. either an ' existens quidpiam in se,' or a form,
quality, accident, or inseparable adjunct. Pytha-
goras, Plato, and the Platonists are mentioned as
authorities for the view that it is a substance,
while to those who regard it as an attribute belong
Aristotle and all who define soul as a harmony
(Dicaearchus, Asclepiades), a theory best known by
the argument of Simmias in the Phaedo, though
others seem to have given it a different phase by
speaking of it as a harmony of the senses or a
temperament. The variations of the theory that the
soul is corporeal are scarcely worth recapitulating.
Gassendi notes that no one ever thought it of the
nature of earth — air and fire were the more usual
analogues — and quotes the well-known theories of
early Greek philosophy. More important than these
is the view that the soul was a ' spiritum ex sanguine
factum ' : so Virgil says, ' purpuream vomit ille

^This would not be admissible in all cases. Some thought that the
possession of Anima constituted a degree of dignity which could not
be attributed to all creatures, an opinion which was due to the
tendency to confuse the Anima Mundi with God, and a consequent
repugnance to including in the Anima Mundi beings not worthy
of the heaven of the elect. Hence the term Anima came to mean
soul in the sense in which it is used in the phrase, 'the soul that
sinneth it shall die.' For that class of thinker animals must be
automata.

108 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

aniraam,' and in the Bible we read, 'Vox sanguinis
fratris tui claniat ad me de Terra ! ' St. Augustine
thought the authority of the Scriptures indecisive,
for blood might be taken not as identical with, but
symbolic of, the soul : as the ' sedes immediata ' of
that all-pervasive principle of life. The ancients
too seem not to have meant sanguis, but rather
'sanguinis flos,' which is a possible interpretation of
* spiritus ex sanguine factus.' Galen and Hippocrates
supported this view, which ranked as the ' scientific
solution ' of the problem ; and here we have the
origin of those ' vital airs ' which played so large a
part in mediaeval psychology.

Gassendi is satisfied that the Anima is corporeal :
the inheritance of certain characteristics (non linea-
menta corporis solum sed etiam nota animae), the
fact that soul and body may be similarly affected,
that what nourishes the outer nourishes also the
inner man — these facts and the authority of the
fathers settle the question. It is characteristic of
Gassendi to settle one point at a time : so far we
conclude the soul to be corporeal, i.e. substantial,
not mere quality or disposition or symmetry of
material parts, but itself a ' principium agendi.' The
' materialist ' to-day inclines to make the soul a
non-entity, an epiphenomenon. Gassendi argues that
it does act, and because it acts it must be itself a
reality, a thing not a shadow, substance not mere
relation (as in a 'harmony'). This decision that Anima
is under the Category of corpus, does not decide
what kind of corpus it is : so long as it is not mere
quantity or quality or relation it must be corpus.
Modern arguments turn mainly on the question

II.] PHYSICS 109

whether a soul is body or spirit : Gasseudi's primary
task is to decide whether it is something or nothing :
whether the something is bodily matter or non-
bodily matter is a question of secondary importance.
An examination of the views of Epicurus leaves him
with no satisftictory position : ^ he feels moreover the
danger of dealing with the Anima in any way that
mig'ht bring him into collision with ecclesiastical
authority : he chooses therefore to express himself
de anima brutorum, though it is not the anima but
the animus which makes the crucial distinction and

^ Cp. with the account of Epicurus the following remarks by
Gassendi (ii. 248-250) : ' Epicurus probably made the atoms of the
soul round : he does not seem to have said what they were so much
as what they were not : Lucretius says " fugiens nil corporis aufert,"
which dematerialises the concept : "ad haec memorant Plutarchus et
alii Epicurum non fecisse simplicem Animae naturam sed esse
voluisse Kpa/xa (K T€cr<rdpoiv, e'/c ttoioO wvpwdovs, e/c TrotoC aepuiSovs, (k
iroioO TTvevfiaTiKov, e/c Terdprov TLvbs aKaTavofidffTov S 9jv avT(^ alcdi)TiK6v
(Stob. Ed. Phys. p. 798), temperatum quid ex quibusdam quattuor
nempe ex quodam igneo, ex quodam aereo, ex quodam flatuoso, ex
quarto quodam innoniinato quod ipsi est sentiendi vis": the four
mix in such a way as to produce a one (inde fiat una quaedam sub-
stantia). We see from this passage (1) that the matter is defined
so as to be practically immaterial ; (2) that a substance is introduced
simply to explain that which the others do not explain, sentience ;
(3) there is no suggestion of direct perception of a soul : it is an
inference, relying mainly on an induction from the data of a living
and a dead body by a method of diff"erences. The Logic of the
argument is curious. It is said, a dead body is not lighter than a
living body, hence the soul has no weight : a dead body does not
feel, hence the soul is that which has feeling, etc. These two argu-
ments alone would prove (1) that there was no soul, or else that it
stayed in the body, and (2) that death is loss of feeling — not of a
soul that feels. The assumption of the soul made these "proofs"
pass muster ; but it is obvious that it would change the position
very little indeed if we left out the soul as it is and confined
ourselves to what it does.

*Gass. sic. ToOro 5' Jjv Ritter et Preller 384.

110 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

superiority of man.^ The following data seem cer-
tain : the anima is collateral with life ; vita est quasi
praesentia animae in corpore : and therefore neither
cor nor sanguis can be identified with it, since these
may remain unimpaired after death. Secondly, it is
aliquid pertenue, and in fact not an object of the
senses at all : it can be perceived only by reason
which deduces its actuality from the necessity of
finding a principle of motion and nutrition. The
deduction is not criticised by Gassendi, but is
obviously faulty : the proof says, ' when the soul is
in the body the functions are possible : when it
departs, they are impossible,' a use of the deductive
canon which assumes that existence of the soul is
previously established. Thirdly, soul cannot be either
a Form or a harmony of elements, for it must be an
active principle, and if we call it Form or Harmony
it becomes a mere relation. Thus we arrive at the
definition that Anima is very slender substance as
it w^ere the flower of matter, with a specific habit
or disposition or symmetry of its parts : as substance
its extreme mobility qualifies it to be the principle
of all action, and its particular symmetry determines
the quality or mode of activity. It is in fact,

^11. 250. 'Principio vero distinguendum inter Animam Hominis
Animaliumque aliorum est : et cum operosior res sit circa Animam
Hominis, ideo videtur prius dicendum de caeterorum Anima, ut de
qua Mentis immortalis experte et philosophari liberius, et falli minore
cum periculo liceat.' It should be noted (1) that Gassendi expressly
says he will take for examination the Anima, 'quae sit in perfecto,
sanguineo, respiranteque animali,' and what is said of this will be
true of all ; (2) that Gassendi obviously thinks that what is said
about the Anima not conjoined with Mens will be true of the com-
posite Anima and mind. In both cases therefore the difference is in
the function, not the substance, for, as nothing is subtracted in lower
forms, so nothing is added in the higher.

IL] PHYSICS 111

* corpus, id tamen tenuissimum ' ; the physical body-
is massa corporis crassioris, and it is only relatively
to the crass body that we call the Anima ' incor-
poreal.' Again, as substance it is a contextura of
very subtle atoms, which maintains its unity though
extended throughout the body, the heat of the body
depends on it, and therefore it must be of the nature
of fire, which is also proved by the necessity of
heat for digestion and nutrition. This is the reason
for the circulation of the blood, namely to prevent
it from coagulating and cooling ; this process causes
a distribution of heat from the heart, while the
action of the lungs cools the heat and provides an
escape for smoky vapours. The expansive power of
heat explains the efficiency of the soul : we shall
not marvel that the elephant can be moved by its
soul if we remember the force which heat can im-
part to a cannon-ball ! The cold-blooded animals
offer a problem which is solved by the concept of

* insensible heat,' and we need not be troubled about
the fish, for they seem to lack the right ventricle
which is the place of heat (in quo calescere incipiat)
and the lung which carries off the adverse humours :
hence the fire is somewhat dulled in them (calorem
obtundat). Gassendi will not endorse the opinion
ascribed to Empedocles that fish from excess of heat
took to the water refrigerationis gratia !

(d) THE ANIMA HUMANA

The human soul might well be regarded as
differing from that of animals in degree only. The
objection to this is that it would place the brute
creation on the same scale as man, and make their

112 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [PT.

equality with man possible. The ecclesiastic mind
therefore prefers to assume that only the human
soul is qualified to receive ' supernatural gifts,' and
deduce from that potentiality a distinction of kind.
At the same time it had to be admitted that the
human soul has a sentient and a vegetative capa-
city, and is in part dependent on natural generation,
so that any explanation which is to be satisfactory
must allow for both aspects. Two theories hold
the field : the first declares the soul to be a simple
substance with dual functions, viz. the inorganic,
or those which require no organs (e.g. Intellection
and Volition) ; and the organic, which requires
bodily organs (e.g. Nutrition). This soul, they say,
is put in the body by God ready equipped with its
faculties : authorities have differed in the explana-
tion of the process which results in the presence of
the soul, some ascribing it to a direct act of God,
others to an evolution in which the vital seed
acts as a medium. The second theory declares
that the soul is not simple but twofold, having
a rational and an irrational part. This is more in
conformity with theology ; and the unity is not
more incomprehensible than the unity of soul and
body, which we are accustomed to accept without
demur.

Gassendi adopts this position ; but it is impossible
to avoid feeling that he regarded the question as
one of small philosophical importance, or at least a
point at which right reasoning must conform to
orthodoxy. On the other hand, apart from opinions
on its origin and destiny, the human soul must be
a separate subject of enquiry in so far as it fur-

II.] PHYSICS 113

nishes rational phenomena which are not available
from other sources. Gassendi tells us nothinsf of
the nature of the ' Anima humana ' in the sense in
which he determines the nature of the ' Anima
brutorum ' : he seems to have thought that the dis-
tinctive features of man belonged to the Animus ;
and while he is incapable of generating from the
corporeal soul of animals the incorporeal soul of
man he suggests that the combination of corporeal
and incorporeal soul in man is no more or less
difficult than the union of corporeal soul and crass
matter in the brute. It would seem therefore that
man only differed in the degree to which he is
divine ; and as Gassendi asserts that all life is
divine in its degree, it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that he views the whole scale of being
as having differences of degree only.

When in Physicae, ill. 4. 4, he discusses the
generation of animals he makes the Anima a con-
tinuous existence, so that birth is not a stage giving
Anima, but a stage in the history of Anima — a
stage at which it becomes individualised, as the
Anima of a plant individualises itself when an off-
shoot becomes an independent existence (ii. 279).
The rational part, being given by God, cannot of
course share this continuity : none the less there is
no period when a soul destined to be rational is
without rationality, the organs of intellectual activity
may not be developed, but these are necessary, ' ut
operari anima, non item ut inesse possit.' Thus he
renders the distinctive birth of the rational soul
unprovable, and even asserts that its emergence at
some definite time in the history of the foetus or

114 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

the child would be a case of ex nihilo quid ; ^ but
surely the phrase, ' corporis expers a Deo creetur
infundaturque in ipsum corpus,' either implies
absolute creation or means nothing at all.

My view of the point is that Gassendi purposely
states the received dogmas, with respect, and at the
same time intentionally reduces them to futility.
Whatever the value of this view may be, it is
derived from a careful study of his writing, and I
conclude that Gassendi's real view of the soul makes
it one in all entities, from the stones to man, but
with such obvious distinctions of degree that it is
no loss practically to admit differences of kind :
the common denominator cannot be shown ; and
just as a scale of colours is only a scale if we
look at it from the point of view of vibrations, but
in itself has differences of quality, so life has dif-
ferences of quality which cry aloud for reduction to

^ II. 281. I.e. because if we could say at such and such a time
that the offspring is without the anima, and then afterwards that
it now has the Anima, the soul must be educed from nothing.
The whole passage is very interesting, but too long to quote.
Writing in 1629 to 'D. Thomae Fieno, in Inclyta Louaniensi
Academia, Professori Medico Primario,' Gassendi speaks as though
he had already made up his mind on the point. At first, he says,
I thought the child derived its Anima from the parent, being only
an offshoot, like the cutting from a tree (juvabat me exemplum
rami resecti ex salice). But this clashed with the testimony of the
Scriptures, while it was supported by the evidences of heredity ;
so the only solution was to acknowledge that the Anima was twofold,
and say the Anima sensitiva is ex parente, the Anima rationalis was
created and 'poured in' by God, 'statim atque decisione facta, seu
foetus seu seminis, rationalis Anima Parentis seu foetum seu semen in-
formare desineret' (vi. 19). This statement is at once more orthodox
and dogmatic than that in the Syntagma. The real reason for dis-
tinguishing the being of the Anima rationalis is the need for a position
that will combine the facts of heredity with the truth of immortality.

II.] PHYSICS 115

unity, but cannot be reduced until some other term
is found, such that degrees of life can be formulated
as its powers. One such ' other term ' we have
always with us, viz. Motion : it is not the least
interesting part of our work to watch the extent
to which Gassendi employs it.^

(e) THE BASIS OF PSYCHIC LIFE

Faculties are natural, vital, and animal : of the
animal faculties some are cognitive, and the most
fundamental is the sensitive. The word sensus
may mean the faculty or the function, the power
of feeling or the state of feeling. We have four
terms, sensus, cognitio, perceptio, apprehensio : per-
ception, apprehension, and knowledge, if taken in
the widest sense, mean the same. Sensus and
cognitio denote a more explicit state, i.e. a relation
of subject and object in which the two are dis-
tinguished : perceptio and apprehensio are used for
a more implicit state, i.e. for what goes on in the
subject, whether consciously recognised or not. This
is made clearer by an example : suppose a magnet,
a flint, and some iron to be together in one place :
the iron has a perception of the magnet which the
flint has not : again, suppose a goat and a fox to
be standing under one tree : the goat perceives the
tree (assuming it to have edible foliage) but the fox

^Cp. with Gassendi's words what Lotze says in his Outlines of
Psychology (§ 81): 'At the place where, and at the moment when,
the germ of an organic being is formed amid the coherent system
of the physical course of nature, this fact furnishes the incitement
or moving reason which induces the all-comprehending One to beget
from himself, as a supplement to such physical fact, the soul
belonscinar to this orsranism.'

116 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

does not : these are parallel cases, and yet neither
is an example of what we usually mean by sensation.
Suppose we say ' is vero est sensus qui finiri solet
facultas percipiendi objecta sensibilia ' : we then have
a definition which defines both the faculty and the
object : consequently relativity is introduced, and
we must admit sensibility everywhere : if you say
the magnet has not sensus, the answer will be it has
sensus for its own particular sensibilia, as the oyster
and the monkey in their degree. As there is then
no justification for limiting sense to man we must
accept this result ; but we may distinguish general
from special sensibility. The former may be defined
as any motile response, and covers the case of all
objects not animal — especially magnetic bodies and
plants : the latter is sensibility as we know it.
There is a distinction between these, and therefore
it is confusing to speak of the relation of inorganic
things as antipathy or sympathy. Sense taken uni-
versally is the capacity for affinities or simply natural
affinity : Sense taken specially is not merely a faculty
of receiving species, but a reaction in which we
know what the species is a species of. This might
be called a teleological distinction, for Gassendi
recognises that as reactions all sensibility might be
reduced to a capacity for reaction to an appropriate
stimulus : it would thus be reduced to a mode of
motion, and he says it must be taken ' primum
universe pro quacumque facultate rei cuilibet natura-
liter insita ad percipiendum aliquid, cuius perceptione
seu mavis apprehensione moveatur.' In recognition
of this he adds that the sensus in animals is one
with the vis motrix corpusculorum movendi sive

II.] PHYSICS 117

agendi facultas {De Sensu Universe, ch. i.). This
activity is not transeunt but immanent, and is a
disturbance ^ of the ' sensitive ' organ.

It is obvious from what is said above that Gassendi
opposes those who translate lower functions into
higher. He will not allow that all ' motile response '
is sensation. This point is so vital to the under-
standing of Gassendi and has been so consistently
misunderstood (from my point of view), especially in
reference to the magnet, that I feel justified in adding
still another note to what has been said elsewhere.

I will quote first a passage from The Atomic
Theory of Lucretius, by John Masson (1884), p. 141,
part of a note entitled ' Note on Professor Clifford's
theory of mind-stuff as anticipated by Gassendi ' :
" again, because all living things, even the meanest,
those spontaneously generated, come from seminal
molecules, each after its kind, which have existed
either from the beginning of the world or from a
later time, ' for this reason it cannot be said that
conscious things come from non-conscious, but rather
from particles, which, though they do not actually
possess consciousness, nevertheless actually are or
do contain the elements of consciousness (principia
sensus).' Are not these 'elements of consciousness'
contained in Gassendi's molecules much the same
as Clifford's simple elementary feelings or Mind-
Stuff? Gassendi does not, it is true, say that every
separate atom contains an element of sensation. In
reality, by his distinction between prima materies
or non-conscious atoms, and secunda materies or
molecules which possess in a faint form the rudiments

^Alteratio, cp. Stoic, eTepoiuais.

118 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

of sensation, he does not at all escape the difficulty
of the origin of consciousness, which indeed he, like
Epicurus, very slightly realises.'

My objection to this as an interpretation of
Gassendi is as follows. The mind-stuff theory starts
from the top and asserts that the mind is made up
of parts, each of which is in its own nature mental :
it is a theory of the evolution of mind. Gassendi,
on the contrary, only tries to work out the analogical
relations of natural forms so as to show the evolution
to mind. In the mind-stuff the common denominator
is mentality : in Gassendi it is motility. Clifford is
far nearer Leibnitz than Gassendi, and Gassendi
is a long way from Leibnitz. The difference finally
lies in the view one takes of the concept of poten-
tiality, and as we have pointed out this is a concept
to which Gassendi takes objection. On Masson's
own showing the 'particles do not actually possess
consciousness ' : he does not seem to have understood
that Gassendi would not entertain the idea of poten-
tial presence, and therefore the statement that the
particles do not possess consciousness 'actually,' means
that they do not possess it at all. As I have tried
to show, Gassendi, for better or for worse, prefers
to take it that the peculiar properties of each degree
of organic life cannot be found in the parts as they
are before they are found in the synthesis of the
organism, but supervene on the fact of that synthesis.
The effects are data to be co-ordinated, not explained.
Gassendi would have said of nature as a whole what
James says of mental phenomena, that the square
of a plus that of 6 is not the same as the square
of (a + 6).

II.] PHYSICS 119

This point is, I am afraid, somewhat laboured. In
excuse I plead that it is vital, and has not been
understood by those who refer to Gassendi. As a
rule we are told that 'at any rate Gassendi says
the magnet has feeling,' so we may consider the
evidence on this point and take the conclusion as
proving the general position. In the chapter on
Gravitation we have the problem of attraction on a
large scale: Gassendi discusses it on the analogy of
the magnet, and we read, ' attractionem verbo fieri
a Terra, corpusculis missis, quibus illiciat lapidem,
eadem ratione qua et magnes emittit quibus pelliciat
ferrum' (i. 345). This, be it remembered, is stated
in explicit opposition to the idea that the stone
has any feeling after the earth, or any knowledge
where the earth is. On page 337 we read, ' vide-
licet praeter moralem metaphoricumque motorem
(the reference is to Aristotle's idea of that which
moves as end only) quaeritur quod sit in unaquaque
re quae per se agit ac movetur principium actionis
seu motionis primum. Neque enim cum puer ostenso
porno ad ipsum currit, requiritur solum quae meta-
phorica sit motio, qua pomum puer alliciat, sed
maxime etiam quae sit intra ipsum puerum physica
seu naturalis vis qua dirigitur ferturque ad pomum.'
This vis physica cannot be aroused by any but a
physical effluxus, and the movement of that which
wants to that which is wanted is primarily due to
an actual physical relation. Add to this what is
said in the preceding paragraph and it will be clear,
I think, that Gassendi is not trying to prove that
the magnet has a kind of feeling as we know it in
consciousness, but that the common denominator of

120 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt. ii.

the whole scale is motile response : whether it is
felt or not depends on whether it occurs in a con-
sciousness that can feel or in that which cannot.
I may add in confirmation of this, that those who
attribute sense to the magnet should also say the
earth has sense : which is a phase of the doctrine
of anima mundi expressly rejected by Gassendi.

CHAPTER III
PSYCHIC LIFE

(a) SENSE AND SENSATION

Although we speak of the Soul as sensitive, there
are many facts which seem to prove that the seat
of sensation can be more distinctly defined. The
Soul may be diverted and not notice an affection
of the senses, or it may carry on functions like
those of nutrition in which no sense-elements are
consciously realised. The conclusion is that the
sensitive ' textura ' is a part and not the whole of
the sentient Anima. This is the first step toward
regarding the mind as multiplex, and is in agree-
ment with the views of Epicurus. But a difiiculty
arises due to the difiiculty of keeping the unity of
the soul while rejecting its 'simplicity.' Lucretius
had said that the soul possessed a particular vis
animai, which implied that it could maintain its
existence independent of the body.^ Epicurus, on
the other hand, declared that it had no such cause
of sentience (sentiendi causam) nisi quatenus corpus
illam fovet. It follows that so far as sentience is
concerned, we must take as our unity not Anima
but Animal, not the soul alone but the totum com-

iii. 330.

1J2 PHILOSOPHV OF GASSENDI [PT.

positum. In either case the sense-organs need not
be regarded as mere channels ; but while Lucretius
might be so interpreted, Epicurus is quite definite.
It is true to say the mind sees or hears, but no
less true to say the eye sees or ear hears, just as
we say the hand writes. It may seem irrelevant
to discuss at this point the question of the vis
animae ; but the justification for so doing is the
fact that at this point we are deeply concerned with
the question of the unity of the soul and its
meaning. The rejection of a specific and separate
vis animae is one step toward the destruction of
the view that the soul is simple, in the technical
sense. Now, not only has it parts of which the
sensitive part is one, but it may be doubted whether
this part is a unity without difference. Clearly we
have many sense-organs, yet some say ' sense is
one ' ; and of course it is true that the senses are
all sense and in that way one, but that is not a
useful contention. To say the one Sense uses the
organs as a carpenter uses his various tools for
various purposes is to make a fallacious comparison.
It is the mind that is a unity relatively to the
senses ; and the opposition of the unitary sense to
the many kinds of sensation is a mere confusion
added to an assumption. Gassendi here seems to
realise the difficulty which attends the reduction of
all sense-affection to movement : whether we speak
of afferent or efferent activities, we are faced with
the fact that motions of different kinds of tissue
will not necessarily be different kinds of motion.
If differences of motion make differences in sensation,
since motions differ only in degree, we are liable to

II.] PHYSICS 123

drift on to the conclusion that sight is an acute
form of hearing, and thus be wrecked. Now we
cannot give up the point that senses are (juali-
tatively different : we must therefore take tliat as
a proof that sense-organs differ in texture and that
the recipient soul is just as manifold as the currents
conveyed to it or from it. This is a decision but
not a solution of the problem; and we are left with
a working hypothesis, not a demonstrated conclu-
sion ; but Gassendi seems to realise that sensation
as a physical fact belongs to a totally different
point of view^ from that which regards sensation as
a psychic fact ; and the quantitative analysis of the
one cannot be wholly identified with the qualitative
distinctions of the other.

The actual number of senses is five : they cannot
be reduced to Touch, but they might conceivably be
increased in number, and we might even have a sense
for the inner nature of things. This is a character-
istically mediaeval notion. As it is, our senses only
give us knowledge of qualities ; but it should be
noted that our ignorance of the natures rerum inti-
mas is not an inherent fault of our way of attaining
knowledge, but a question of mere limitation in the
number of senses.

Perception is not in the organ, but in the In-ain,
whose media are the nerves. What then is the
nature of the nerve? The sensitive part of the
organ must be animata, the other parts need only
be ' vegetative ' : it must also be in some way sus-
ceptible of touch: these qualities are found in nerves.
These nerves must be regarded (after Galen) as a
sort of diffused brain, and the brain as a kind of

124 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [ft.

highly developed nerve : every membrane consists
of a sheath coverins; an inner membrane : the inner
part is a chain of soft particles with a hollow centre.
The mechanism is not sensitive in itself, for the
sensation only arises when some shock to the nerve
is transmitted to the brain : this transmission requires
a state of tension, and is therefore only possible when
the animal spirits inflate these nerve channels suffi-
ciently. This explains the possibility of a physical
affection of the nerves having no psychic effect.
Gassendi does not appear to consider the question
of subconscious states. The ' innervation ' caused by
the animal spirits is the essential condition of actual
sensibility : consequently, physical shocks at the
nerve extremities are cut off from the brain alto-
gether unless the innervation occurs. This becomes
more familiar as psychology if we describe this
tension of the nerve system as ' attention ' and say
that affections to which we do not attend are not part
of our experience. It is necessary here to distinguish
appulse as cause and tension as condition of sensation.
Gassendi regards the nerves as not sufficiently
straight or tense to be the bearers of sensation
(oblique divertuntur et remissiore tensione sunt).
He therefore says ' id probabilius videtur peragi rem
per spiritum ob continuitatem mobilitatemque ' : at
the same time he anticipates the possible misinter-
pretation of the phrase ' bearers of sensation,' and
points out that nothing is really carried into the
^ brain •} it is the motion itself when actually arrived
in the brain that is the sensation.

^ non aliquid immitti, sed remitti potius repellive videtur : spiritus
nempe nervis contentus. Bernier translates this by ' rebondissement.'

»/

II.] PHYSICS 125

Tlie nature of the process called Sense-apprehcii-
sioD is thus described. All objects are known through
their ' species ' : not only in the case of sight, but in
the case of all the other sense-organs, the species are
the media of knowledge : these species are composed
of small corpuscula which enter the channels to
which they are suitable. It follows from the teach-
ing above, where all sense-organs were asserted to
have diflPerent textures, that there will be a certain
degree of selection, in so far as unsuitableness may
prevent some corpuscles from entering some channels.
These texturae of the various organs thus serve as
selective sieves : the species however have various
degrees of difference : over and above the differences
which make them unfitted to enter some organs at
all, they have further differences which make them
pleasurable or painful to an organ which can admit
them.

This seems written in a highly materialistic vein ;
but Gassendi's position is more physical than mater-
ialistic, which is to say he works out these problems
on mechanical lines without admitting that the
result is identical in kind with its original factors.
He diverges here from the common line by denying
that the species either are or need to be conveyed
to the sensorium or central faculty. He says, 'verisi-
milius tamen est non penetrare corpuscula sensoriis
externis allapsa in interiorem facultatem residentem
in cerebro sed fieri motionem nervorum spirituum-
que': which at least refines the material species down
to a brain-movement before it is finally transmuted
into thought. This modification is important in one
respect. If the species were the actual thing, sense-

126 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

affection would be wholly and objectively true : if,
on the other hand, the thing is not itself transmitted
but is represented by a movement, the quality of the
movement will be the ground of judgment and error
will be possible, as e.g. when a man's leg has been
cut off he still feels pain in it, though this is clearly
not an affection of the parts, but an affection of the
central faculty interpreted as coming from those
extremities. Gassendi considers that the nvev uXr]^
of Aristotle is to be thus explained/

The sensibles then are perceived intercedente

y motione : as to the nature of these Sensibles but
little is said, and most of it is Aristotle ; but it is
noted that Aristotle's distinction of essential and
accidental sensibles is a confusion as the ' accidents '
are perceived by the aid of Imagination and Memory.
This account of sensation has two points of particular
interest. Firstly, the object of the senses is not itself

y conveyed to the brain, but is symbolically represented
by the motion it creates : hence not only is it possible
to misjudge the given, but also that which is given
may itself be incurably false : Aristotle's saying, ' non
falli sensum circa ipsum,' is right in so far as it
means sense is what it is, but that will not help
us to decide whether it is wdiat it claims to be or
whether being what it is as effect it guarantees what
we think it ought to oruarantee as cause. But of
this more later. A more pressing question arises
from the general position. As we have already
remarked, Gassendi is quite aware that his scale of
the Universe is in imminent danger of resolving

^ Trept i^vxv^ 424 a : i] fiev aiadrjais icrri. to deKTiKbv tCjv aldOrfTdv eidOiv

II.] PHYSICS 127

itself into a series of disconnected stages : he is con-
tinually making ' synthetic assumptions,' taking a
stage A, for example, and advancing to yl + Z^ with
no explanation of the right to speak of A-{-B as the
next stage above A, when all we know is that the
addition of B makes A all that it was not before.
Sense is a case in point : for however much the
common mind may feel certain that plant, animal,
and man form an indisputable scale of ascending
dignity, it is not philosophic to accept the dogma
uncritically: on the other hand, if the problem is
squarely faced, it seems to present an absolute dilemma.
We might say Life is possible because all is animated
and so all is ' sensible ' ; but this is chaos, a night of
colourless reality. Rather than this, Gassendi clings
to the reality of distinctions and strives to defend
his position. Plants have ' quasi adumbratio sensus '
inasmuch as in them too the vital fire burns and
processes of absorption and nutrition are carried on:
the fact that they require their food makes it 'gratum.'
Thus the sophistry of Gassendi ! for who authorises
that ' gratum ' ? Is it more than poetry to say the
thirsty plant rejoices in the rain ? Can I argue that
because my boot wants soling therefore it likes it ?
But Gassendi knows that these scales of existence
are artificial constructions, and his own is built on
that abstraction called Motion. His second argument
is an appeal to Analogy : in all natural development
there is an inexplicable element : the whole attains a
nature such as was found in none of the parts : when
the tree ripens it passes from sour to sweet (a passage
from Non-Being to Being almost Hegelian !), and
when flint and steel can produce a spark, shall we

128 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

doubt that object and nerve may produce a sensa-
tion ? In short, quantitatively we can keep our
scale, if we look to quality our world falls apart at
every difference.

Gassendi appears well aware that the results will
not seem very satisfactory to those who desire greater
continuity. He says : ' Verumtamen, inquies, ex
verbis tam multis neque explicatur neque intelli-
gitur qua ration e fiat ut cum neque ipsa caloris,
flammulaeve corpuscula seorsim sumpta, et dum in
auras excedunt, sentiant : neque sentiant item parti-
culae corporis, quibus flammula inest, ac miscetur :
et ne ea quidem communi crassaque affectu, qua
quippiam tactu percipitur : quanam ratione, inquam,
fiat, ut ex iis commistis exoriatur sensio perceptiove
explicita, quam non possumus lucidiore dicere voce,
quam cognitionis, ac res proinde sentiens creetur ex
rebus insensilibus ? ' We have to confess our ignor-
ance, but this is only a special case of an ignorance
which is manifest in many other directions, in fact,
whenever we deal with qualities. 'Neque vero est
quare putes posse rem planius et agnosci et edisseri
in qualitatibus ceteris : siquidem ubi dixeris fructum
ex acerbo, e.g. dulcem fieri, etc. ... ex quo fit ut
cum idem dici proportione possit de qualitatibus
caeteris, mirum non sit, si cum ipsa quoque Qualitas
sentiendi difficilem adeo explicatum habeat . . . ex-
plicare non liceat, etc' This is a very clear state-
ment of the position, and shows beyond dispute that
Gassendi admits a complete break, not only here
but everywhere between the analytic and synthetic
aspects, our analysis and nature's synthesis. His
defence of Epicurus is that he did not make the

II.] PHYSICS 129

atoms incapable of being anything, and other
theorists have not succeeded any better than he
did. As a matter of fact we can only go back, in
the case of sentient things, to the semen, not the
atom, so that ' non posse dici absolute res sensileis
fieri ex insensilibus,' that is to say we can uphold
that the sensile only comes from the sensile, but
only by refusing to go down to our ultimate, by
stopping at a complex state (secunda materies) which
has attained sensation and declinino; to ask where
that degree of sensation comes from ^ (ii. 347).

(6) IMAGINATION

There is no subject more interesting or more
critical for writers of the class to which Gassendi
belongs than that of Imagination. The peculiar
combination which the activity of this faculty
presents in its union of inner significance with
outer form, places it in the perilous transition from
objective existence to subjective being, and makes
it too often the root of those wild extravagances,
whose ultimate object is always to confound with
material figures of speech the problem of Reason.
It is necessary therefore to follow this discussion
with care, and try to define accurately the position
of Gassendi. With the subject of Phantasia we
penetrate into the inner sanctuary of thought :
'sequitur facultas cognoscens interna,' says Gassendi,
' cuius nimirum tota functio sic interius peragitur
ut organum nullum exterius appareat.' We now

^This is the passage quoted by Masson {v. p. 117). Clearly it has a
different meaning in its context from that which Masson gives it by
taking it out of that context.

130 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

deal with the Animus : for ' ab anima quidem
vegetatio et sensus, ab animo vero cogitatio et
ratiocinatio pendent.'

In the first place we must decide whether this
faculty is one or many : for although the dogma of
the Fides Sacra is really all we can know, a little
additional enquiry will not be heterodox or useless !
The division of the Animus called Cogitatio has
often been subdivided into Imaginatio, Cogitatio,
Opinio, Prudentia, Consilium, and so on. These
faculties are however all reducible to Phantasy,
which thus comes to mean any activity of thought
carried on in terms of sense and its ' imagines.' This
raises the question as to whether Imagination is not
really the culminating point of sensation, i.e. whether
it could not be identified with the sensus communis.
It has been said, 'What is sense but the understanding
of the sensible, or the understanding but a sense
of the intelligible ? ' (cp. Aristotle's phrase,^ Oiyyducov
Koi vouju), but this was error, and we can never admit
that sense and thought are one.^ The identification
of Imagination and the sensus communis may be
rejected then, for the following specific reasons :
no sense can be made to judge, therefore it is useless
placing any faculty of the nature of sense at the
meeting-place of nerves to function thus : if there
is any central point it must be ascribed to Imagina-
tion : knowledge of the functions of sense belongs
to something beyond them — a phrase which recalls
the phrase of a later writer that sensations cannot
sum themselves.

AVe conclude then that in men we have only two

^3/et. 1072. b. 20. ^u. 398,

II.] PHYSICS 131

divisions of Animus, viz. Reasoning and Imagina-
tion, though some would add Judgment. This
addition was due to a false analysis of Illusion. A
certain Theophilus, Medicus, though a man of good
judgment in other respects, was afflicted with the
Imagination that he could hear flute players perform-
ing in some corner of his house. It was argued from
this case that his judgment was sound, but his
imagination unsound ; and therefore these were
distinct. Here Gassendi shrewdly points out that
the Doctor judged as he imagined, and the imagina-
tion was not itself wrong, but was made wrong
by the error of the judgment of causation by which
the internal state was attributed to a wrong cause.
Thus the case does not refute our position that
imagination and judgment are one : for an illusion
is Teal as a subjective state, and the state of imagina-
tion is not an object of judgment, but is itself an
affection combined with an activity of judgment,
so that the cause of imagination is normally also
the object of judgment. This point is by no means
easy to comprehend : it involves the following
analysis of perception. An object A is cause of an
inner state B of the nature of an image ; but as this
is a conscious image it is itself, as an inner state,
a judgment a,iid not a judgment on itself but on A,
its external cause. If B could be judged as an
inner state and compared with A, judgment and
imagination could be distinguished : which we deny,
since it involves a double access to the object A^
namely once by way of the image and once
immediately.

We are now fairly launched on the question of

132 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

Perception, and must follow Gassendi closely. To
return to the question of reducing all faculties to
Phantasy — what becomes of Memory ? This is really
a defect of ' species ' ; loss of memory means loss of
the ' species servatas,' leaving one with an inner
world depleted of objects : hence, as failure of
memory is failure of relation among species, it
seems to follow that memory is only imagination
regarded from the point of view of a system of
species. Now, what are the imagines or species
which thus constitute a faculty co-extensive with
empirical knowledge ? Perception, we have been
told, depends on excitement of the outer organ by
a species or ' qualitas sensibilis ' : the nerves filled
with animal spirits are ' spiritual radii,' along which
the vibrations travel to the brain. From this
results (1) that the faculty of feeling in the
appropriate quarter at once knows the object ; (2) a
vestigium is left behind. Once this function is
ended, the sense-faculty cannot know the object
again without a second shock. Phantasy how-
ever is a higher faculty, and can know the absent
thing : this is its final distinction from sense : also
its capacity of acting without the presence of the
thing proves that its object or ground of activity
is in the brain : we must therefore be clear as to
these 'vestigia.'

Gassendi asserts emphatically that the cerebral
residuum (species, (pavTaa-iua^ visum) is in no sense
a thing : we cannot construct any inter-cranial thing
which will give the qualities of the object of thought.
Colours, sounds, etc., have no typus in cerebro (as
a thing might have a typus in cera), but the process

II.] PHYSICS 133

is such ' ut per nervos contractos resilitio quaedam
spirituum in cerebrum fiat qua tarn cerebrum quam
facultas in eo residens percellatur ; ideo posse
sufiicere si id quod remanet cuiusmodi sit ut talis
perculsio eius interventu velut iteretur.'^ The impress
must therefore be taken as some efi*ect on brain
substance of the nature of a fold (quasi plicam
quandam in cerebro factam). This definite result
becomes the cause of reflective thought, a;s it gives
its character to those spirits which for any reason
move in its tracks : the imago impressa determines
what the thought shall be of, but we actually
envisage not the brain-fold, but the cause, i.e. the
original object now become a Phantasma : as we
think of an object without thinking of the sense-
apparatus or the brain, so in reflection we pass
beyond the immediate conditions to what lies
beyond. The impress belongs to the brain and
the phantasy regarded as a compound : that is to
say — when we say it is a brain-state, we do not
mean it is a state of the brain purely as matter,
but as a conscious agent. The materialistic difliculty
which might have arisen is thus anticipated l)y
refusing to consider the brain in abstraction from
its conscious functions, as though a dead brain were
still a brain in the fullest sense. Gassendi cannot
emphasise too much or repeat too often his belief
that the direct material of thought is purely symbolic
of the external reality : only the disposition of the
brain itself remains to testify to the action of an
object on the senses, and all the substantial nature
of things is reduced to a mode of motion of the

Mr. 405.

134 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

brain-substance, out of which we may build again
an insubstantial pageant of reflection.

Memory is discussed in connection with Imagina-
tion, since it is really only an aspect of the function
which preserves ideas. By thus connecting it with
his theory of Imagination and folds, Gassendi breaks
with those who viewed Memory as a ' storehouse ' :
he says, ' non tamquam vas quoddam concipienda,'
and rejects the simile of wax with equal clearness :
he admits however other metaphors : videtur ergo
potius concipi non male quasi charta munda seu
papyri purissimae solium, but the paper is to be
considered as receiving folds, not marks. This is a
remarkable anticipation both of Locke and Leibnitz,
while it savours of much later psychological work.
The analysis of the whole process is even more
remarkable. The folds, which are innumerable, can
be repeated in their order : the new co-exists with
the old, and an excitement beginning from any
point in the series runs through them all (una plica
arrepta caeterae quae in eadem serie sunt, quasi
sponte sequuntur). The act of recollecting consists
in voluntarily making many folds until by chance
we hit on the right one or one in the right series :
thus the apparently forgotten may be revived. Folds
tend to become obliterated by the number of later
folds or by humidity of the brain in old age :
memories are good and bad according to the tempera-
ment, which here means the degree to which the
humid element preponderates. Total oblivion results
from material cerebral changes, by which the original
folds become entirely obliterated.

We may now survey the functions of Phantasy

II.] PHYSICS 1 :{5

generally. They are three in number, namely simple
apprehension, composition or division, and Ratio-
cinatio, a list which proves that the term Phantasy
is not to be taken in any narrow sense.

The proper function is simple apprehension with-
out affirmation or denial, the most elementary
function of Imagination being naturally conceived
as the mere reception of imagines. This mere recep-
tion is however not a pure passivity : it follows from
the nature of the ' plica ' that there is some activity
of the organ or faculty : also there is here a principle
of unity if not exactly a unifying activity, for
Gassendi asks why we imagine one object only when
the spirits are agitated in many ' folds,' and bases
his answer on the unity of the fiiculty. This resolu-
tion of many movements into a unity is not strictly
intelligible so long as the relation between the
physical multiplicity and the psychical unity is left
without proper explanation. Gassendi also recognises
a selective activity, and points out that it is not
possible to attend to more than one thing at a time
unless the things are in some sense capable of
reduction to a unity : as a rule attention, which is
physically a movement of the spirits in one particular
direction, follows the greatest or dominant move-
ment, though a new movement may engage attention
in face of an older and stronger affection.

This treatment of attention looks better than it
really is : it might be good either physiologically or
psychically, but as stated it is a hopeless confusion.
In the first place, many movements might be the
physical counterpart of one thought ; but if the
unity of thought is described as a unity of move-

136 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

ment the many movements must be one in themselves
and as movements ; which is meaningless. Secondly,
Gassendi seems to think a unity comprehending the
multiplicity is not distinct from the unity gained
by omission. For him attention must always be
attention to one thing because, being a movement,
it can only be in one place at one time. This is at
least intelligible as an exposition in terms of place
and movement, but it makes the whole theory of
attention hopelessly crude, and by itself excludes
the mental characteristics which Gassendi is anxious
to include in this stage of the psycho-physical life.
Although rooted in experience Phantasy can com-
bine its elements in new ways, e.g. the imagination
of the Hippogriff. This brings us to the second
degree of Phantasy, which is called Compositio et
divisio or assensio et dissensio, or affirmatio et
negatio. The combination of ideas such as gives
the centaur or the golden mountain is a combination
of separate ideas : the ' compositio ' to which we now
pass differs from this in being an assimilation of one
idea to a pre-existent group of ideas. It follows that
this function is secondary, in the sense that it pre-
supposes groups of ideas (aggeries) and that the
process is of the nature of subsumption under a
universal. As Gassendi draws upon animal life for
his examples we might compare this with the ' Logic
of Eecepts.' The process is assumed to be purely
psychological, and consists in the assimilation of a
present idea with a group of ideas accompanied by
definite consciousness of the act, and therefore in
some degree constituting a 'judicium.' The progress
of experience results in various aggregates of ' ves-

II.] PHYSICS 137

tigia ' ill the brain : no one of these can be caUod
universal, but the common elements in them all may-
be taken to give a sort of type of the kind. Hence
a new perception may be identified as man rather
than lion, because, though not identical with any
existing man-image, it is more like a man's imai^e
than a lion's image. The difficulty of defining this
stage of psychic life is felt by all who study the
subject : it would be rash to assert that Gassendi
made it fully clear to himself. He is however clear
upon the point that if the activity is psychological
it must be positive. The emergence of the negative
marks the fully conscious proposition which is not
found at this stage. Thus Comparison, as found
here, is mere assimilation : it may be said ' this is
sweet' or 'this is bitter,' but not 'this is not sweet.'
If we are to refine to this degree, probably the terms
sweet and bitter would have to be ruled out, and
the psychic affirmative put in the form ' this is such.'
Gassendi would say that at this stage there is no
proposition at all, and thus save himself from the
accusation of such mental atomism as is implied in
the divorce of a positive notion (sweet) from its
correlative (not sweet). If the second operation
constitutes a perilous border region, how much more
the third, which is Ratiocinatio, argumentatio, or
discursus? But, ne voce ipsa statim oflfendamur, we
distinguish Reason as either Sensitiva or Intellectiva.
This is a distinction of kind which once for all settles
the difficulty which the Church had found in putting
beasts and men on one graduated scale. The difie-
rentia of this stage of Phantasy is found in the ability
of animals to go beyond the given : they anticipate

138 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

results, as when the dog runs from the uplifted
stick ; or choose between a present and a future
pain, as when the ass endures the beating rather
than go forward over the precipice. If we admit
that the hare can reason that a leap breaks the scent
^nd say with Gassendi ' esse speciem quandam
rationis in Brutis ' ; if we further discover that an
animal perceives agreement and disagreement, which
is the basis of propositions, where shall we limit
Phantasy ? The specious answer is to say that we
limit it by the capacities of animals, and after all
animals are not men. This might have been Gassendi's
reply ; but he seems satisfied with proving that
animals have some kind of Reason without troubling
to define it too accurately. The chapter ends with
a description of human reasoning which may have
been intended to suggest a superiority, but seems
more like a closure put on a discussion that threatened
to bring Faith into collision with Reason. The dis-
<jussion on Instinct begins with the definite statement
that the Brutes have common notions or general
propositions, which are rather innate to (ingenitae)
than produced by the Senses. The fundamental
faculty is Touch, and the dominant passions are
Pleasure and Pain : these are related respectively to
the good and the bad, and have as their active
aspects attraction and repulsion. The result is a
sort of innate proposition (notio sive habitus), such
as Faciendum quod juvat, non faciendum quod nocet.
The bull moves before the goad immediately; but
where action is undertaken to avoid a future pain,
we must admit argumentatio. The chapter adds
nothing to the theory of phantasy, but contains

11] PHYSICS 139

some interesting remarks on the ethics of animal
life. Care for the young is derived from the parent's
care for itself, the embryo being a part of the parent :
this is a provision which has a teleological aspect,
being intended to secure preservation of the species
(ad generis conservationem). The series of instinctive
actions are expressions of subjective conditions : the
period of gestation is a state upon which follows the
presentiment to find a place for deposit and care of
the young : memory, imitation, and a natural sense
of the useful are the psychic elements of this state.
Gassendi sums up his own doctrine thus : Phantasy
is a faculty whose first function is to know ; then,
secondly, to arouse appetite and, thirdly, motive
faculty, whose effects differ according to the means
used. These effects include :

(1) Excitation of desires and passions — love, hate,
and the like.

(2) Motion of spirits through the body.

(3) Tension of the nerves and muscles,

(4) Agitation of humours as in palpitation and
blushing.

(5) Impressio ilia macularum similitudinisque et
deformitatis in foetu.

(6) External effects of any kind. These are in
fact usually myths : external action (as e.g. that of
the evil eye) is impossible, for the activity of Imagi-
natio is essentially immanent.

The mind or the Intellect of man is no mere
faculty : it is a ' pars essentialis substantialisve

140 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

Hominis,' and therefore is the same as the Rational
Soul looked at as rational without regard to vegeta-
tive or sensitive parts. This view is the only one
possible if we remember that we must argue so as
to prove the Soul's immortality (' viam sternere ad
astruendum eius Immortalitatem,' ii. 425) : it would
be simpler to take mens and Phantasia as identical
in kind and different only in degree ; but that is
a priori impossible, as it leads to the admission that
brutes might win immortality. The theory that the
human anima is a part of the Anima Mundi must
be rejected : it does not follow from the existence
of stones that there must be a 'forma lapidis'
diffused through the universe, nor that the universe
has an anima because individual animae are found
on it : apart from this, if we admit the universal
mind, there is no sense in speaking of it as ' divided '
or ' distributed,' since it is not corporeal. The doc-
trine of Eeminiscence, as taught by Plato, is the
stronghold of this position, but not impregnable.
Why must we have innate ideas ? Is it not enough
if we have the facultas intelligendi comparandique
ideas : we can then form ' notiones anticipatas,' and
so have all that is required for the more intellectual
functions. Another time-honoured fallacy is the
duality of mind taught by those who recognise a
passive and a universal (active) part. If the uni-
versal part is really other than our intellect, it is
outside of our intellect, and therefore an unknown :
if it is justified as the condition of our intelligence,
it is not thereby proved an intelligence itself, any
more than light is proved to be sight by being
posited as the condition of sight. This is in fact

11] PHYSICS 141

regarded by Gassendi as a false attempt to go
beyond the intellectual sphere in order to explain
its functions : it ends in a hypostasis of mind to
explain minds : he himself looks rather to the unity
of mind as the source of illumination : we have
already found, he says, that a sort of general
phantasy arises in animals, which is actually nothing
but the co-existence and self-reflection of many par-
ticular acts of phantasy : why then may not the
light of reason be an immanent light and a self-
illumination ? (quorsum intelligibiles species non sua
quaeque speciali luce perfundantur ?).

II.

Gassendi, having rejected both Plato and Aristotle,
proceeds to develope his own view. A hint has
already been given us in the argument that the
existence of a stone is not a proof of any universal
form of stone pervading the universe. This argu-
ment is somewhat obscure, but it seems to mean
that from the point of view of Being, a specific form
implies not a general form, but a general substance
of which it is the form. Thus a stone presupposes
only matter-in-general, not stone-in-general, and the
matter is general not in esse suo, but in reference
to a special form. By analogy a specific mind will
not imply a universal mind, but might imply some
entity capable of standing in such a relation to the
particular mind as matter does to the particular
stone. This line of thought might seem to be lead-
ing us onward and upward to a mind above, but the
face of Gassendi is toward the origins ; and as matter
is a name for all existing atoms viewed as unity,

142 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

so if we penetrate beyond the specious unity of
mind we come upon the ideas in their multiplicity.
We must not suppose that by calling the Anima
Rationalis a substance Gassendi makes it a thing ;
he means merely to exclude the views which make
it a dependent existence, such as an ' inseparabilis
perfectio ' or a ' harmonia ' must necessarily be.^ He
defines it as substantia incorporea, formam tanquam
informantem, and this combination of terms defines
our problem : we must first see from Gassendi's
statements how he conceives this entity called
mind.

Our philosophy has given us an exposition of
Phantasy. The first requisite is a distinction of
mind from Phantasy. The points of difference are
these :

( 1 ) Phantasy is not capable of reflection : the
knowledge that we know denotes an incorporeal
agent, for it is a movement toward self, while the
movement of the corporeal is always toward another.

(2) Many objects of the mind are not imaginable :
they are intelligible, and the idea has significance,
but no sense representation is possible, i.e. we cannot
actually picture the sun as having the size which
we know it to have.^

(3) Our knowledge of universality proves that we
have a faculty higher than phantasy : the object here
is incorporeal, and therefore requires an incorporeal
Agent to know it. Gassendi distinguishes between
having universals and knowing universality : as in the

III. 440.

2 This is not the question of opposition between the sun as it is and
as it appears, but of the limits to imaginative reproduction.

II.] PHYSICS U3

case of animals, Phantasy may attain to universals
which Gassendi regards as purely psychological ; but
man is distinguished by having this ' knowledge of
universality,' which seems to be simply the existence
of the universal at a reflective stage of mind.

In these points the difference of mind and imagi-
nation are most marked ; but the existence and
nature of a higher faculty is made certain by other
proofs. Knowledge of God, though not intuitive,
demands a faculty that grasps the incorporeal. Will
aims at the good, and thereby indicates a faculty
capable of rising above the sense level, for which
pleasure and pain would be the only ends.

Having thus demonstrated the existence of Intellect
as a non-sensuous faculty, Gassendi proceeds to
further define the nature of the human mind. As
incorporeal and a form, the mind is in a sense ex
nihilo, and the passage from nothing to something-
being an infinite process requires God. This is a
declaration of war against the physical dogmas : the
categories of science may be adequate if we are only
concerned with things whose origin is really only a
fresh disposition of matter ; but w^hat if our regress
brings us to the whole ? Can it be treated as we
treat the parts ? Does not our physical system
demand for its own explanation something higher
and greater ? was not Daedalus greater than the
machines he made ? Ex nihilo nihil is, then, a
category which means that every combination of
elements postulates the existence of the elements
thus combined : it will not reach to substances
themselves, for we cannot show what elements or
what combinations are required to produce a soul :

144 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

it is for us a limit, and as such has beyond it only
chaos, the Not-Being which is its only antecedent.

This production, though ex nihilo, is not un-
natural : the propagation of man is ordained in uno
ordine, and the production of the soul is in eodem
ordine : so long as the phenomenal regularity is ob-
served this remains a natural event. Thus Gassendi's
treatment of the soul as an original underived entity
does not carry him into idle speculations : it is a
treatment which (as he well knows) does not change
the nature of the Anima, but serves to define the
inadequacy of categories which were in danger of
encroaching : it is a treatment also which never
admits that quality can be generated out of mere
quantity. This last point is most important, and
Gassendi never swerves from his position : at this
crisis, when we require to unite soul with body, and
all the delicate gradations of ' very subtle move-
ments ' offer themselves as intermediary links, he
sweeps them all away at a blow, declaring ' seu
crassum seu tenue sit corpus,' the difficulty remains
untouched. The position is acute : mind and matter
having nothing in common, the sensitive soul will
not serve as a link, hybrid though it be : to ascribe
the unity to God is to say less than nothing : we
stand before a unity for whose bond we find no
' gluten,' no grappling irons (ansis carentem), and
no supreme force. We may well pause to ask what
it is we propose to unite, and what manner of union
we have to expound ?

As to the nature of the soul confusion has arisen
through trying to unite entities which had previously
been so defined as to admit of no union : this

II.] PHYSICS 145

difficulty can therefore be removed. It consists in
supposing that the pure Intelligences, i.e. the angels,
represent the real nature of our souls taken in
abstraction from the body ; but why should a human
soul cease to be human merely because it is free
from the human body ? No change of kind is
proved, only a change of condition. We have there-
fore no right to suppose that our souls, like the
angelic beings, have any actus purus : on the con-
trary, the actus of souls is either mixtus or nothing
at all.

Gassendi introduces this point of view by simply
asserting that there are three natures of things, the
purely spiritual, the purely corporeal, and the mixed.
This gives us what might be called a concrete as
opposed to the ordinary abstract view : for it is no
longer possible to assert that the condition of the
soul is an imprisonment by which its functions are
impaired : its action is what it is, not because of
its union with the body, but because of its own
nature : it is not forced into an unequal yoke, but
joined in a divine wedlock for which it was pre-
destined (ipsaque ad eas nuptias propendeat). The
original difficulty was made acute by the emphasis
laid on the difference between soul and body : this
is dissolved by Gassendi's view, which does not
demand that the two should be of one kind, but
that they should be, like male and female, comple-
mentary. This is a recognition of identity in
difference which promises much ; but there is one
point which qualifies our hopes. It is after all to
the sensitive soul that the Anima Rationalis is united ;
and so ' interventu sentientis corpori uniatur ' : we

146 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

mighit conjecture that Gassendi foresaw a possible
difficulty in the fact that there are many forms of
matter to which Intellect does not ally itself: it
therefore became necessary to resolve both terms
and say, * it is the nature of Intellect to unite itself
to such matter as is of a nature to receive it.' We
may not perhaps be able to get much further on
the main issue, but it is well to see clearly how
much Gassendi really achieves. He is clearly right
in taking the unity as his standing point, and
not the absolute differences. He cannot be far
wrong in asserting that if the unity is (as it is)
a fact, the elements must be by nature adapted for
the unity. The root of his difficulty is the fact
that his terms do not represent these distinctions,
but are names for distinct beings, and, much as he
strives to get away from this, his factors, Soul and
Body, insist on starting into independent realities.
Here again the problem is confused by the terms,
for corpus is a term which implies more than mere
matter, and the union of the Anima Rationalis is
ultimately only a union with a corpus in so far as
that is previously Animatum (beseelt), though it has
a specious appearance of explaining the union of
opposites. To me this difficulty is made more
serious by the metaphor of the marriage : for that
clearly implies a tendency to introduce conceptions
of mutual attraction which are confusing. Gassendi's
statement that the sensitive soul is qualified to be
the recipient of the Anima Rationalis, not because
of its tenuity, but because of its function in phan-
tasy, shows that he rejects the attempt to make ' a
very subtle motion ' identical with a psychic activity.

II.] PHYSICS 147

but equally clearly shows that he pushes back his
real problem of passing over from physical to
i^sychical into the more obscure regions of animal
psychology.

We may now sum up Gassendi's position. The
Anima rationalis is so far distinct from all other
entities as to be underivable from them : it is there-
fore a new creation : on the other hand, its creation
is conditional, for it is so united to the Body as to
be not merely co-existent (adsistans) but also co-
herent (informans) : this union proves the factors
not wholly antagonistic, but it requires definite
conditions, and as the unity is also the birth of the
Soul (for it is created by God in ordine naturae)
it will follow that these conditions enter into its
very being.

At the risk of some repetition, which is not alien
to the spirit of Gassendi, we must further elucidate
the nature of the Intellect by stating what our
author calls its functions. The spirit of Occam
inspires Gassendi to limit the machinery of thought :
he identifies Anima Rationalis and mens in oppo-
sition to those who regarded the Intellect as a
distinct faculty or an instrument : he rejects the
distinction of active and passive unless agens be
used to mean direct thought and patiens, indirect
or reflective thought, where since the mind acts on
itself, there must be some right to speak of it as
receiving action (nata est recipere actum a se pro-
ductum).

Ultimately Gassendi recognises only two faculties
as required for the function of understanding. The
phantasmata are the only objects : these are sensible

u.-**^

148 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENUI [pt.

species, but they can be understood, and there is
therefore no need to interpose the so-called ' intelli-
gible ' species. Whatever the difficulties may be in
the way of asserting that sensible species are capable
of being understood, it is clearly better to take up
that position than to assert that the understanding
can have no objects except such as have already
been understood. This introduces a point of con-
siderable importance. The so-called ' intelligible '
species were a distinct class of species which, as
opposed to the sensible, were qualified to be the
content of the mind ; but how qualified 1 Appa-
rently by being in some way the world of mind ;
but if we take a functional view of the mind, this
reduces itself to absurdity, for the content of the
mind will be its own functions, its only inducement
to action will be the actions themselves, and know-
ledge will be impossible. This view of intelligible
species, therefore, must be rejected if we once give
up the idea of a mind which stores in itself pictures
that are ' intelligible ' before the mind understands
them : we can only say species are intelligible in the
sense in which all species must be intelligible, i.e.
capable of being understood.

The rejection of this bridge over the gulf neces-
sitates further explanations. If the notion of the
mind as envisaging pictures of the intellectual order
is objectionable, the situation is made even worse
by substituting pictures of the sensuous order.
Gassendi sees this and proceeds consistently : he
takes a functional view, inasmuch as he regards
ideas as actions rather than things ; but his idea of
function can only be interpreted in terms of motion,

II.] PHYSICS 149

and to these terms the ' picturing ' of phantasy must
be reduced. The image and the idea are now no longer
opposed entities ; they are both motions, and seem
ultimately the same motion. In the case of sight
we have a sense process ending in a perception : by
analogy we may have a process of phantasia ending
in an intellectual activity. Phantasy is subject to
appulse, but intellect is not : the phantasy is the
end of the motion of spirits, but in addition to the
perception there arises a conception : in eodem
momento intellectus contuetur, says Gassendi,^ and
if w^e take this with what has been said above
of the self-illumination of ideas, it will be seen that
contuetur means perception from the point of view
of a system : this action of mind is a reaction, and
by its nature cannot be explained as identical with
a motion ab extra : the passage from corporeal to
incorporeal must come somewhere, and in spite of
long delay, it remains at the last an unique process.
The terms in which Gassendi states the relation of
Intellect to Imagination are so far from conveying
any very definite idea that it may be best to elabo-
rate his position. He seems to mean that the agent,
whatever it be, of intellectual processes is so indi-
visibly one with the nature of man as thinking being
that any disturbance of any part must imply its
activity : a thrill runs through the whole mass if
the appulse once disturbs the equilibrium of the
sense machinery (dum phantasia percellitur, ipsi
coagat intellectus). To this we may make a most
important addition, viz. the converse : for if the
intellect acts, the Imagination responds as best

'II. 450.

150 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

it may. The idea of God is not derived from the
senses, and yet cannot be presented in thought
without a sensuous form. Hence, from the point
of view of physical analysis. Intellect and Imagi-
nation are not distinguishable : Gassendi therefore
adds the proofs that they are not identical, the most
important of which is the direct consciousness that
understanding goes beyond sensuous forms, that we
mean more than we can put into the sense forms :
if we present God in anthropomorphic fashion it is
not the human form that is of prime importance,
but the concepts which we thus embody.

(d) THE HABITS OF INTELLECT

If any doubt remained as to the extent to which
Gassendi regards man as an organic unity, it
would be dispelled at once by the tone of this
chapter. The so-called Habits of the understanding
are really habits of the brain : habit presupposes a
substance with some rigidity ; and we must fall
back on Phantasia and the doctrine of vestigia to
supply this want. It follows that in memory we
may have what are really products of Intellect, for
the Intellect creates a symbolic phantasy to enable
it to recall non-sensuous facts through a sensuous
train of ideas. All failure of the understanding to
receive its ideas are failures of this cerebral
machinery : if we suppose that there is a memory
belonging to pure Intellect, it would not be pos-
sible to explain defects of memory, which are
experienced quite as much in the non-sensuous as
in the sensuous sphere.

This polemic is really directed against some con-

II.] PHYSICS 151

temporary Platonism : it is therefore introductory
to the description of knowledge, and seems to clear
away all prejudices in favour of Reminiscence or
innate ideas. Three types of knowledge may be
distinguished : God knows intuitively by pure reason
and ' ideas innatas ' : angels know by virtue of
' ideas concreatas,' a limited form of intuition : man
requires the discursive reason which deals with
ideas furnished in Phantasy, and ultimately derived
from sense. ^ Without Intellect Phantasy is blind
(Phantasia ab initio sit quasi caeca sen specierum
omnino expers) : it has ' percepts ' in a sense, but
its species represent only the ' externos cortices ' of
things ; the Intellect surveying these species and
detecting the nature of some (perspectis aliquibus
possit vi sua suspicari et conjecturam ducere de
interna aliqua proprietate) proceeds to collect in-
stances, and so by induction arrives beyond the
outer husk to the inner core. The result of the
Inductive process is a direct intuition : the ideal is
to make our Intellect absolutiorem, i.e. capable of
seeing the whole in the part : so that Plato may
be said to have given us the right ideal and
Aristotle the rio;ht method. Gassendi here follows
Descartes in making the understanding move in
intuitions ; the form of the syllogism is therefore

1 II. 447. ' videtur mens nostra, seu Rationalis anima donee degit
in corpore, non aliis uti speciebus quam iis quas corpus subniinistrat,
quaeque in Phantasia resident : ac turn dumtaxat pari cum Angelis
conditione evadere, cum excedenti a corpore, ac Angelorum instar
futurae separatae, Deus indit species eiusmodi rerum, cjuas nosse
eius interest, sive ignoratae in corpore fuerint, sive eae sint quarum
cognitarum meminisse sit opus.' It is therefore a bare soul that
arrives in Heaven, and Gassendi at least means that only in Heaven
can we have an actus purus.

152 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

only of use for teaching others : the conclusion is
to the reasoner consistent with the premisses, and
forms with them a w^hole. As this process ends in
self-evident knowledge, Gassendi considers that all
the ' self-evident first principles ' dejDend on pro-
cesses : these truths are products of experience, and
all such products would be as self-evident as the
'axioms' if we knew as much about them. The
child from its birth sees objects with magnitude,
and therefore with parts : hence if the general pro-
position ' The whole is greater than its part ' is
propounded and the terms understood, the confused
experiences of a life-time leap into being and pro-
claim it true ; it will be equally self-evident that
the angles of a triangle are equal to two right
angles, when the mind is as familiar with the
nature of triangles. Gassendi objects to the com-
mon use of the phrase ' natura notiora ' : as applied
to universals it must mean better known by those
Avho know them, which is to say by us : it is
then false, for we know the particulars better : if
it means known to nature, it is wrong ; and if it
means in se nota it is nonsense, for knowledge is
a relation. In this last argument Gassendi strikes
at a position rooted in a substantive theory of
ideas : the tendency to regard thoughts as entities
made it possible to speak of ideas as possessing
knowledge much as substance possessed its primary
qualities, and by the same kind of ' inherence ' :
Gassendi's functional view enables him to see that
the reality of the known is to be known, its use
is intelligi, and the universals can have no quality
of knowableness, except such as our intellectual

II.] PHYSICS 153

experience verifies ; ^ and by this criterion we may-
judge the universal to be 'better known' in pro-
portion as the particulars are better known, or, in
other words, in proportion as its content is developed.
The reason why universals appear better known
is that we tend to isolate intellect, and it then
appears to know its own work best. But the ideas
must come from the particulars : if not, they are
created by the mind ; but why should the mind
create universals rather than particulars ? It is
only by allowing a knowledge of particulars that
we can justify the existence of universals, since the
universality is essentially relative to the plurality
of particulars. In this way the universal idea
obtains its merits at the hand of Gassendi. It
loses its character as an entity, with universal
being, and survives as an idea wdth more than a
particular significance : further than this we need
not at present go.

(e) THE PASSIONS

In distinction from the Intellectual part of the
Soul called Cognoscens, the term Appetens denotes
that faculty by which the Soul apprehends and
moves toward the good and bad. The pars appetens,
or substantively the Appetitus, denotes both faculty
and function, being in fact the voO^ SpeKTiKo^ of
Aristotle, and comprising both ope^i? and opuy. It
might well be called the pars affectiva of the
Soul, for it is more than mere cupiditas, and com-

^ Si notiora et manifestiora sunt, alicui ergo facultati cognoscenti
eiusmodi sunt, dici enim quid notuni, dici manifestum nisi respectu
eius cui innotescat manifestaturque, nou potest.

154 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

prises all affections : it is also more than will, for
voluntas is the name of an action only, and not
of a faculty. We are now entering on the psy-
chology of the practical life. As we shall see
(p. 162) the question of activity does not trouble
Gassendi in this connexion, for he believes that
thought is always activity ; consequently, the real
distinction comes in the nature of the objects
toward which the Soul's activity is directed. In
the case of the pars cognoscens this object is
truth, for the pars appetens it is the good or the
bad which the understanding comprehends, and the
appetite seeks or avoids. In a sense this faculty is
secondary, for it implies knowledge, a cognoscente
excitatur et dirigitur. In accordance with the line
of thought indicated above, where it was shown
that Phantasy was subject to action both from
without and from within, we may distinguish the
affections which come to the mind from without,
and those which originate from within. Under-
standing and Phantasy can act without Appetite
(or appetency). It follows therefore that the bodily
affections due to appulse are not identical with
those called appetite. The point is this : an affec-
tion ab extra ends in an idea : it is a motion that
produces an image : an appetency is a motion too,
and at first sight seems to have no difference
except that it goes in the opposite direction
(emotion). But there is more than this, for all
ideas do not continue into emotions, and the
phantasy, we are told, though closely bound up
with sense, can act without disturbing appetite.
We can therefore think without emotional feeling :

II.] PHYSICS 165

when the intellectual ' feeling ' does arouse appetite
we have the overflow of motion into the body
(appetitus functio in corpus redundet). For example,
if I see an apple and do not want it, the motion
terminates in perception : if on the contrary I do
want it, this want may exhibit itself in the overflow
of the spirits into the body : my mouth may water
or some other effect be produced.

The meaning of this is quite clear, but it is diffi-
cult to understand why a sensuous faculty, such as
phantasia, should have any functions that were not
in some degree emotional, why we should have
imaginations wholly free from any form of desire ;
and Gassendi seems here to have relied on the
distinction of motion inward and motion outward
with the accompanying idea that the reversal of the
motion would require a definite act of the central
organism.

If we can have perceptions without emotions in
the sphere of the phantasy, it might be thought
that the intellect would be self-contained, and either
have no emotions or only intellectual emotions.
Gassendi is however clear that an emotion is always
a bodily reaction, and he therefore expressly says
that even our most intellectual objects, if made
objects of desire, must arouse bodily reactions : he
is thus opposed to such an idea as the amor intel-
lectualis of Spinoza : quia Deus Rationalem Animara
corpori connectens ea conditione esse illam voluit ut
non modo res caeteras sed ipsum quoque gloriosum
Deum corporeo modo seu corporea aliqua specie quasi
obvelatum intelligat, nihil mirum est si voluntas
affectu quod am corporeo non modo in alia sed in

156 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

Deum quoque ipsum feratur : ac Deus idcirco amari
se ab homine ut ex tota mente totaque anima, sic
ex toto corde omiiibusque viribus jubeat; quippe
quasi mens animave amare quidem debeat, sed
amorem tamen suum nisi corde viribusque etiam
corporeis exprimere non possit.

It must be remembered in this connexion that if
Gassendi asserts that the affections of the mind
(Animus) differ from those of the body, he is not
thereby proving that one is psychic and the other
not : it may be a question of the higher and lower
parts of the Soul (Anima). Cp. ii. 480, ' esse unum-
quemque speciali quadam temperie ac non modo
corpus sed Animam quoque, hoc est inferiorem
partem animae, quae corporea est, speciali esse con-
textura . . . ut in quam rem propendeat corpus,
propendeat ipsa anima.' Our likes and dislikes are
therefore always psychic : the obscure point is what
relation of Animus to Anima could unite the Animus
to the Anima without necessitating the reverse rela-
tion of the Anima to Animus and a free pathway
for motions in either direction. Gassendi says the
Soul moves the body : we ask why cannot the body
move the Soul ?

It is clear that in this point the doctrine of
motion has not been allowed to work itself out
free from prejudice. The inconsistency, such as it
is, seems due to Gassendi's tendency to give the
non-corporeal part of man its due position : he
even asserts in so many words that the affections
of the mind must be wholly different from those
of the body, and inclines to over-assert his opposi-
tion to a materialistic interpretation of emotions.

II.] PHYSICS 1 57

The opinion ascribed to Epicurus was fundamentally
materialistic. The external stimuli, it was said,
penetrated to the senses and reached the Soul : if
they were agreeable, the Soul expanded, if disagree-
able it contracted, and the Soul being conscious of
its own movements, these expansions and contrac-
tions constituted emotions. The weak point of the
theory was its naive assumption that the motions
of the corpuscles could have any such character as
agreeableness or disagreeableness in themselves while
still on the way to the Soul. It is in opposition
to this that Gassendi asserts that the mind must
understand the impulse before there can be any
affection in the proper sense of the term : if this be
denied, only expansion and contraction will be left
to us, and these do not involve any kind of feeling
necessarily. Gassendi did w^ell to steer away from
such a shoal, but he can hardly be said to establish
an unambiguous result. If we consider the theory
further, it will be evident that the rationalistic
element which is generated by opposition to mate-
rialism, is itself arrested by a distinctly biological
vein of thought. Appetite is moved by contact,
and is therefore in a sense co-extensive with the
periphery of the body : all sense is touch and all
touch is either pleasant or painful. Pain is a breach
of continuity (dolorem ex ipsa continui solutione
oriri) : pleasure is the restitution of a normal con-
dition. This normal condition is Indolentia, a
mental state of complete equilibrium. Pleasure and
pain are states : the active element by which the
transition from one state to another is mediated,
is called Cupiditas. This middle term causes move-

158 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

nient out of the state of equilibrium : it is therefore
DOt necessary that every pleasure be preceded by a
pain, for it is possible to go from a state of pleasure
into one of pain. The primary affections, Pleasure
and Pain, in their lowest forms do not imply
intellectual activity : hunger and sexual desires are
made unpleasant in order that they may excite
actions conducive to the maintenance of the species.
In the natural condition the pleasant is the good ;
but the memory is liable to retain the idea of
pleasure and seek the sensation when the conditions
are wanting {e.g. eating when already satisfied).^ It
follows from this that the lowest stage of life to
which we trace emotions, is capable of such intellec-
tual activities as are implied in Phantasia, which is
consistent with Gassendi's denial that animals are
automata. Those emotions which differ from the
primary affections are marked by the presence of
opinion : the mere universal is not enough : we must
realise that the particular is a good for us : this
causes a movement of the heart and so leads to
action, whereas a speculative knowledge remains in
the head. This seems the high-road to ' popular
philosophy,' and scarcely calls for further attention.
We have already pointed out that the ' pars
affectiva ' can, like the Phantasy, be considered both
from the point of view of the activities which it
originates, and that of the activities originated in
it. Similarly, we can regard the ' pars affectiva '
either from the point of view of the feelings which
it undergoes or that of the feelings it originates.
Pain and pleasure are the fundamental affections,

^Cp. Bradley, Ethical Studies, on Lust.

II.] PHYSICS 169

and these terms are consequently the most com-
prehensive. The primary ground of feelings is the
actual physical effect which a thing is capable of
producing in the organism ; but if we are dealing,
as we now are, with complex organisms, there will
be more than the mere physical reactions which
lower organisms exhibit. Hence we find when we
come to classify the affections, that pleasure and
pain do not cover all the varieties of our experience.

The classification runs thus. Appetitus divides
into that which belongs to the ' anima rationales, '
and that which belongs to the pars irrationalis. In
the former case the appetitus is based on the
understanding, in the latter, on the phantasy. As
to the former, Gassendi declares that the soul (anima
rationalis) has affection of its own such as the pure
love of the good, but the abstract nature of this
affection, though capable of distinction in theory,
is not capable of very exact definition because it is
rarely found in isolation. The seat of this affection
is in the brain, and it is therefore so united with
the general organism, that it almost always functions
with some bodily reactions. The only practicable
distinction of these affections is that they imply a
rational activity prior to their own manifestation.

The second class, on the contrary, do not imply
the antecedence of any act of judgment : they
depend on phantasy and are modified by the action
of Will. The species of this genus are very varied,
but can be to some extent classified if we take into
consideration the elements of which they are com-
posed. The specific forms of pleasure and pain are
joy and sorrow, that is to say pleasure and pain

160 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt. ii.

are the states whose effects are joy and sorrow : for
it must be remembered that pleasure and pain are
terms which primarily denote states, whereas the
affection is not a state viewed as a cause of feeling,
but the feeling itself. Gassendi here takes into
consideration the expression involved in an emotion,
and so distinguishes the emotion as an effect from
the state or condition which is its cause. If pleasure
is directly connected with an object it developes
into love : if to this be added the condition of
absence or futurity we have the state of desire or
hope, from which come confidence and audacity.
On the other side, taking pain as our basis, we get
corresponding to these, hate, aversion, fear, despair,
and pusillanimity. These are the elements which
unite to form character.

On the contents of this chapter, which have not
greatly impressed me, I quote the judgment of
another more in sympathy with the topic : ' Nul
avant lui n'avait etudie avec autant de methode
et de profondeur les passions de I'ame . . . il est le
premier qui ait ebauche la science du charactere,
qui a pris une si grand e importance de nos jours.
Sur ce point, d'ailleurs, comme sur beaucoup d'autres,
nul ecrivain ne cite les recherches de Gassendi.'^ Is
this true outside of France, or only in it ?

^ Thomas : Gassendi, p. 194.

CHAPTER IV

THE NATUEE OF LIFE

(a) THE VIS MOTRIX

The subject of motion naturally follows the dis-
cussions on the cognitive and appetitive functions.
Nature indeed added this power as the complement
of the others, that we might not only know and
desire the good, but also act for its attainment.

The functions which have been discussed hitherto
have been motions, but such as are usually called
immanent : our present subject is local motion, in
so far as that is related to will, or, to put it more
comprehensively, in so far as it is traceable to an
inner principle. The line of distinction is not so
easy to draw as might at first appear. We are to
speak of all changes of place, and these will include
not only movements of one body, but also move-
ments of the parts of one body. Among these
movements of the parts are many which can only
loosely be called subordinate to the Will : for if
we reject ' motus cordis, cerebri, intestinorum ven-
arumque,' and confine ourselves to ' motus brachii,
capitis, linguae,' we may still find a difiiculty in
bringing all their movements under the head of
voluntary movements. In fact what Gasseudi does

162 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [ft.

is to make the Vis motrix from the first an instru-
ment of Will, and, without trying to make all
movements of the parts actions of Will, merely
aims at showing how these motions, which we
ascribe to Will, are made possible in the economy
of nature.

The power of motion is fundamentally one with
life : it is ' ex ipsa natura contexturaque animae,'
for the soul is by nature a fire (cp. p. Ill), and its
very life is motion (insita mobilitate vigens).^ We
thus annihilate at a stroke many threatening diflicul-
ties, strangling them in the cradle. If the soul is
an active principle, activity will be the principle of
the soul : we do not require to bridge the gulf
from psychical to physical activity, since they will
be one in their foundations : it may be that the
deeper we go the more real the unity : that the
corpuscles rather than the contextura corpusculorum
are the real home of the mobilitas ; but at anyrate,
in the spiritus ignei of our organism (the complex
referred to as corpore animato) we find a fit starting
point. Grassendi explicitly derives mobilitas from
the natura ignea, and therefore, since fire was
chosen principally for its mobility, commits him-
self to a circle : moreover, he considers that a body
cannot communicate motion to another unless it be
itself mobile, which is reasonable enough, except for
the assumptions which it involves : for there could
be no motion at all on this theory unless we could
find a substance with innate mobility, and that
mobility were communicable : these two points
therefore have to be assumed. These questions

In. 505.

II.] PHYSICS 163

we must leave for the present, and accept Gassendi's
position that the body is a living and moving
organism, of which a descriptive analysis (if not an
explanation) may be given.

The ' vis ' is the inner fire in its form of spirits :
its seat is decided according to the place where
the nerves arise, and therefore must be the brain,
not the heart : motion lags behind thought, because
the spirits must be moved through the whole area
of the body, and then re-directed to fresh courses.
The organ of the vis motrix is the muscular system :
a muscle includes vein, artery and nerve, the channels
respectively of blood, vital spirits and animal spirits :
anatomical experiments prove that the nerve is the
mediator or bearer of vis, and the medulla is a
subordinate centre or fountain of the virtus motrix
from the brain. The nature of the muscular move-
ment has been misunderstood by those who object
that a fixed point is required for contraction : the
muscle is not draw^n up to its head, it contracts in
the middle. Now, what is it that the nerve
contributes to this action? Gassendi says it is
an ' imperium ' : the essential part of the muscle
is the tendon, for that alone has an innate power
of contraction : the shock of the incoming current
of spirits awakens the dormant power and causes
action. This point is apparently considered to be
highly important : its significance seems to lie in
the fact that it dispenses with the necessity of any
power being conveyed from the centre to the seat
of action : tliere is no innervation in that .sense
of the term : the Mind or Phantasy issues its orders,
and nothing more, which is a metaphorical way of

164 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

denying material activity to the mind. How far
this ' imperium ' is immaterial when it equals
' appulsus spirituum ' is difficult to see, although
technically the spiritus are immaterial ; but it is
clear that Gassendi is content to relieve the brain
of the necessity of supplying the force that moves
the mass.

All movement is for some end : it applies there-
fore an antecedent phantasy giving the good as end.
Will then may be said to initiate movement, and
the difficulties which normally surround that pro-
position are dispersed if we remember that the
Appetitus Rationalis is one with the sensitivus and
Phantasy mediates sense and intellect. None the
less, ' sunt in hac re tria praesertim admiranda.'
They are (1) the choice of the nerves required ;
(2) the speed of the action ; (3) the amount of
the mechanical force. The first problem is shirked :
it is said that the branching of nerves is never a
division of a nerve, but only a dispersion of several
nerves joined together : hence any one nerve is
continuous, and the spirits will never be perplexed
like a traveller changing at a junction : this how-
ever is only an explanation of the persistence of
nerve-currents in one channel : what we hoped to
learn was how the current chooses the right course
at first. The second difficulty is settled by saying
that a fiery substance can of course act with the
rapidity of light ! As to the third, the answer has
already been given when it was pointed out that
the energy stored in the muscle is the immediate
cause of the mechanical motion.

The special treatment of the subject of motion

II.] PHYSICS 165

contains very little of interest to the modern reader :
even contemporaries must have found its elaborate
details wearisome. It is divided into three parts
dealing with (a) movements of parts ; (h) vocalisa-
tion ; (c) movements of the whole or modes of
progression. The first and third divisions do not
require any notice : they are mainly concerned with
very elementary anatomy, relieved with the quaint,
if unconscious humour, which occasionally crops up
in unpromising places. The chapter on the voice ^
is too characteristic to be passed over in silence.
In the first place the definition is carefully elaborated :
it runs thus : vox proprie est sonus emissione spiritus
in ore animalis aliquo affectu incitati creatus. The
word ' proprie ' excludes the ' voice ' of all instru-
ments ; ' emissione ' dismisses the theories of all
those who had not recognised that the act of
producing sound is that of expiration not inspira-
tion : aliquo affectu incitati is added to exclude
coughing, sighing, and the like. Sighing would
seem to be one of the ways of expressing ' affec-
tions ' ; but Gassendi explains that he means
' affectus animi ' : in short, a sound to be properly
vocal must be significant and voluntary, following
on some definite act of imagination. The mental
activity precedes the physical : for this reason the
ancients often spoke of the inner voice, but this is
not really a distinction of kinds of voices : the inner
voice is nothing more than thought itself which tlu>
outer or physical organ interprets. There appear
to have been some narrow-minded attempts at con-
fining the possession of a voice to man alone, and

III. 520.

166 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt

among other devices this voice of the mind was
invented that man might be distinguished from the
animals even in this detail : it would naturally
follow that the human voice was generically distinct
from that of animals, and capable of surviving the
dissolution of the body. This is one more instructive
example of the way entities can be multiplied to
serve irrelevant purposes. Gassendi's position is
comparatively a strong one : as the voice is the
servant of the imagination it will be just as coherent
in its expressions as the imagination is in its images.
Intelligibility is not an absolute quality, and animals
are probably intelligible to one another : their lan-
guage is foreign to us, but so is Chinese, and while
it may be ' impious ' to say they speak in the human
sense, each may be said to speak after its own kind
without offence. This correlation of the voice and
the faculty of images, puts Gassendi on a firm
basis capable of considerable expansion. When we
come to deal with the specifically human voice we
find the evolutionary aspect tending to obliterate
the hard and fast distinctions more natural to this
period of thought. The natural history of speech
must begin with a stage not so far removed from
that of the animals : infants make only vocal sounds :
fari non possunt, as the name witnesses ; and it is
only after time and experience that they reach the
varied articulations of developed speech. Gassendi
notes that pronunciation is directly related to
physical structure : it cannot be learned from
books, and in some degree remains always a birth-
right not to be won by labour. This point was
another blow at theorists who vaguely equated the

II.] PHYSICS 107

power of speech with human nature in general and
ignored the facts. On the question ' sintne noiuina
natura vel instituto' Gassendi takes the same view
as Epicurus, and avoids both extremes : the primary
name is a sound significant of pleasure or pain ;
but people even in the same place would regard
the same thing differently, and hence designate it
by different names : so that intercourse would be
impossible if convention did not supplement nature
and carry out a natural selection of sounds until
one object had one name : for succeeding generations
this would be a nomen ex instituto acquired through
the medium of society.

Gassendi quotes an example of the contemporary
science of language which shows that he knew where
to stop. The doctrine of natural names had been
defended on the ground that the meaning and
the motion were often identical. Tu and ego, for
example, necessitate movements of the lips outward
and inward respectively, that is to say toward you
and toward myself! The error which had most to
be combated was the use of arbitrary as the opposite
of natural. There could be no question to an intelli-
gent mind of arbitrary names : though an arbitrium
might be exercised in the selection of words when
a language was consolidated, in the early stages such
words as became ex instituto would be so from a
natural process rather than any direct activity of
human choice.^

1 Max Miiller, Science of Language, ii. 382 : ' And this, better than
anything else, will, I think, explain the strong objection which com-
parative philologists feel to what I called the Bow-wow and the
Pooh-i)ooh theories, names which, I am sorry to see, have given gieat
offence, but in framing which, I can honestly sjiy, I thought more of

168 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

{b) LIFE AND DEATH

The definition of life is a task essayed by writers
in generation after generation. A broad distinction
can at once be made according as the writer takes
life in the sense of a thing or a process. If he
regards it statically as a being or entity he is not
likely to advance far : if he regards it dynamically
as a doing or function he will at least be on the
right track. In this respect a philosopher who in-
clines to use motion as his common denominator is
guided by his general attitude of mind into paths
that may reach the goal. At the same time vita
and operatio are not quite identical : it is truer to
say vita per operationem patescit, although it cannot
be understood sine ordine ad operationem.

Gassendi proposes as his definition ' quaedam quasi
usura sive possessio animae facultatisque operandi
ipsius,' obviously wishing to combine with the notion
of unintermittent function the idea of an agent. It
is however a fallacy to try and erect the means of
life into Life itself. To define life as mansionem
caloris (or calidi innati) is to commit such a fallacy.
TJie calor is really fomentum vitae : it is necessary,
but not more so than the elements : though in fact
it prevails and is the principium agens. Its activity

Epicurus than of living writers, and meant no offence to either.'
Ibid. 398 : ' Even Epicurus, who is reported to have said that in the
first formation of language men acted unconsciously, moved by
nature . . . admitted that this would only account for one half the
language, and that some agreement must have taken place before
language really began.' The 'reported to have said' refers us to
Proclus ad Plat. Crat. p. 9 : o yap 'EttLkovpos fKeyev 8tl ovxl iTn<TTr)iJ.hvws
o5toi idevTO ra dvo/xara, dXXa (pvaiKuis Kivovfxevoi, ws oi ^TjcraovTes Kal TrraipovTe's
Kdl fiVKw/xevoi Kal vXaKTovi>T€s /cat (Trevd^ovres.

II.] PHYSICS l(i;>

is directed to the absorption of the liumours, which
are the pabulum vitae. All life is creation : the
individual is no isolated unit : the stream of bi--
comino- flows throuoh him : as worlds, nations, and
generations arise and decay, so the individual moves
along, dying daily and daily regaining new life.
Generatio is continuatio vitae and vita is a contiiiens
generatio. Life abides as the flame of a candle,
kindling what it burns : its fuel is the humour, itself
the flame, but only he can distinguish the one from
the other who can separate the burning from what
is burnt.

This position carries with it the doctrine that
identity is continuity of action : the original seed
contains two forces, the heating and the heated :
calidum primigenium and humidum primigenium as
opposed to such heat as that of the sun or humours
such as are obtained in food. From the first then
there is a duality which makes action possible. The
heat-corpuscles by virtue of their nature fly off and
take with them the humid : the consequent exhaus-
tion is checked by alimentation, by which the humitl
elements are multiplied and detain the heat-elements.
The action of the heat-elements is then employed
in distributing the new elements throughout the
body and renewing its tissues. Life then is the
interaction of these two principles, a conclusion wliich
derives its imjDortance from the fact that the current
doctrines supported a substantia immutabilis as th<'
secret entity called life. This view was dictated b}-
the false view of identity. In place of a fixed
identity we can put the identity of equivalence : a
part remains to connect the changes, and the form

170 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

is not lost in the flux of matter. From this however
Gassendi exempts the pars rationalis. Again, the
stages of growth are not reached per saltum : a
proportion is maintained and identity consists in
this proportion. As the brain also grows, thought-
identity cannot be absolute or immutable : empirically
at least it is partial : particles vanish and with them
parts of our experience : hence some things are for-
gotten and some remembered confusedly. There is
an unfortunate crudeness in speaking, as though an
experience could be attached to a brain particle ;
but it is redeemed by the last trenchant remark that
our identity abides because we have never been
separated from ourselves.

The processes of life as thus described would seem
to be unending, involving continual growth. There
are however natural conditions which prevent this.
Growth is checked by the hardening of parts wdiich
do not permit of accretion as they become closed
to the influx of new material. In the midst of life
there is death, and it is an error to confine the word
death to the act of expiring : death is properly the
whole course of failure to assimilate, unless it be
violent and due to some extraneous cause. Gassendi
discourses at large on all the legends of long life
in man and animals and also on all manner of violent
deaths : death by drowning was thought most awful,
for the soul being a flame is particularly averse to
water.

By regarding death as no less natural than life
Gassendi touches a question of great importance in
his day. His dictum, what has a natural birth has
also a natural death, was by no means generally

II.] PHYSICS 171

accej)ted, and his summary of the opposite teaching
is an interesting commentary on contemporary
thought. It must be remembered that this dis-
cussion does not affect the question of the immor-
tality of the souh

The common teaching was based on that antithesis
of life and death which regarded death as a purely
negative term : the reality was life, death an un-
reality, and some method ought therefore to be
discoverable by which life might be made infinitely
continuous. At the bottom of this doctrine lies the
idea of the World Soul, which, as it is perpetually
taken up by us and lost again through the dispersion
of particles, might be retained if the nature of man
was purified and made perfect. The prescribed
process was as follows ; the Anima Mundi will
remain in the perfect substance : this is gold which
can be relaxed so as to absorb from the rays of the
sun the principle of life : being thus enclosed in one
substance, a vital elixir may be formed from this
substance, and the Anima Mundi be conveyed into
the body, which gradually becomes purified and
perfected, attaining all the qualities which belong
to the spiritual body mentioned in the Bible, and
fulfilling the prophecy that men should be almost
angels, being ' a little lower than the angels.' ' Sane
vero,' says Gassendi, ' haec sunt non tam refutanda
quam diris omnibus devovenda,' Criticism is hardly
necessary even to the extent of pointing out that
if gold admits the external principle so easily it
might no less easily part witli it. Tlic whole scheme
is the work of ill-trained imaginations urged on by
the desires which are common to all races and all

172 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

times. The idea of reducing all things to one form
was based on the opinion that, if all things are forms
of matter, the matter must be some nature to which
all other natures were reducible, and through which
they could be transformed into any other given
nature. This fundamental common nature x being
a universal, its discovery would simplify all the
sciences, and especially that of medicine, making
possible a medicina catholica, for the unity of the
universal nature would admit of a medicine one
and universal, apparently because it would make a
plurality of diseases impossible. The tyranny of
the universal in the sciences has been noted often
enough : its power was at its highest when the
minds of men were dazzled by new discoveries, and
vague generalisations were suddenly quickened into
a new indefinite possibility of life by rumours of
great discoveries and vague echoes of unearthly
knowledge from the dim and superstitious cell of
the alchemist.

These two pages give an excellent account of the
essence of Alchemy as a magic science. Gassendi
also gives us a hint of the way in which Transub-
stantiation and Transmutation became confused :
' gloriosum Christi sanguinem . . . edixerunt nihil
aliud esse quam Catholicam suam Medicinam ! '
(ii. 615).

The word temperament or temperies which is used
by Gassendi to denote the constitution of living
bodies was ambiguous in his own time, and has now

II.] PHYSICS 173

diverged still further from its original meaning. The
complexity of meaning is however a true indication
of the evolution of the ideas the word denotes. The
Latin ' temperamentum ' originally meant no more
or less than the Kpaai^ of the Greeks, and is con-
vertible with ' commistio ' : it looks therefore entirely
to the physical composition of the body, and is a
name for the various ratios which may hold between
the elements in any ' totum compositum.' None the
less the purely physical aspect never excluded the
idea of character, which again, though applicable to
all things, tended to become restricted to psychical
character. In this way a natural course of develop-
ment carries us over from elements and atoms to
characters and dispositions.

The doctrine of Temperaments is a characteristic
element of mediaeval thought : its vaoueness gives
it a tinge of mysticism : it seems to unite the two
worlds of mind and matter in one comprehensive
grasp, and links the characters of our acquaintances
with the day of creation and the emergence of atoms
from chaos. Looked at from one point of view,
mediaeval thought will be seen to have no lack of
breadth : dogma was indeed a constricting power, but
it did not suppress the longing for universal terms
in which to state or solve problems, nor impose its
precision on minds that found much satisfaction in
undefined thoughts and over-defined diction.

Though the subject of temperament may now be
said to have vanished from what we usually call
philosophical works, much of what the mediaeval
thinker collected under that title can be found in
modern form in works that deal with the concrete

174 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

individual, with the natures and dispositions of
children, hygiene, adolescence, and the like, and we
find in books on these topics a growing tendency
to vindicate the relation of physical to psychical
characteristics in that concrete way which the
theories called ' psycho-physical ' rarely or never
attempt.

If we now turn to Gassendi's pages we find that
he begins with a summary of qualities, enumerating
three different classes, and then states quite generally
that all qualities owe their origin to the ' temperies,'
and as the temperament is so will the qualities be.
The chief reason however for discussing the question
of temperament is that we may be able to advance
to the questions of health and disease, which are
only natural and unnatural conditions of tempera-
ment. In a sense the temperament is life, for it is
that equilibrium which must be maintained, and
which admits only a limited degree of disturbance.

The history of the theory of Temperament divides
naturally into two periods. In the earlier the
question is mainly of elements, and always of some
form or other of matter : in the latter chemical
principles take the place of primaeval elements. If
any one finds this a distinction without a difi"erence,
and complains that chemical principles are a form
of matter, he must recollect that such was not the
attitude of the fourteenth century, when men were
most at home with ' dead matter,' and felt a difficulty
in classifying many of the chemist's discoveries.

Those doctrines which take as their basis either
atoms or elements, go back to the earliest days of
Greek thought. They have however many difficul-

II.] PHYSICS 175

ties. The nature of the combination is a fundamental
problem : the result has to be a mean of some kind ;
but if we deal with either atoms or elements as
irreducible ultimates, they must either (like grains
of corn) be simply co-existent, or they must inter-
penetrate. Co-existence clearly is not what is wanted,
and interpenetration implies that two bodies occupy
the same space. On the other hand, qualitative
difference is not obtainable if the elements are all
homogeneous : water added to water only gives a
difference of more or less : our combinations must
be different in kind, analogous rather to the mixture
of wine and water. This is in fact our type, and
we must explain the mixture as we have done in
discussing qualities, by introducing the concept of
intension. We have here really two questions. One
is of the temperamentum ex primis principiis : the
other of temperamentum ex contrariis. The former
goes deeper than the latter, and is an ulterior
question, the decision of which hardly affects the
second. Gassendi proceeds to deal with the latter.
As a theory it is really independent of the particular
given matter : it rests upon a category which may be
taken formally. Any combination x + y satisfies the
conditions if x and y are contrary. Hence there is
no a priori reason for taking only those four, earth,
air, fire, and water, to which the discussion is usually
confined. That choice is dictated by irrelevant
considerations of the physical constitution of the
universe : so far as our category goes, we might
employ such opposites as light, heavy, smooth,
rough, and the like. Avicenna indeed seems to have
been confused, and perhaps others with him : they

176 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

took the four elements as typical of four qualities,
and so were led astray, speaking as though the
qualities might change and mingle, whereas the true
view is that of Galen, who refused to divorce quality
from substance, and remained on firmer ground in
trying to explain the Temperament (Kpaai?) as an
interrelation of substances (Galenus probandus dum
elementarum substantias misceri totas per totas
dicit).^ These points we leave and simply admit
four substances, a hot, a cold, a wet, and a dry,
which, wherever they have obtained their qualities,
are mingled and tempered. Their mingling results
in some corpus (lapis, planta, animal), and we may
define a temperament as ' congrua calidi et frigidi,
humidi et sicci mistura.' This dogmatic solution of
the question seems dictated by the medical views of
the time on humours and diseases, which Gassendi
was probably not in a position to criticise. According
to Galen, temperaments may be distinguished into
nine kinds, one the canon or norm, the rest abnormal,
due either to excess of one quality (which gives four
kinds) or of two (giving four more). A temperament
may be too hot or too dry (siccum et calidum), but
cannot be too hot and too cold (calidum et frigi-
dum) : these eight are therefore the only combinations
possible. The mean temperature is itself twofold
according to Avicenna, namely universal and specific.
The universal is ad pondus, i.e. a typical form
assumed as the nature of universal substance and
determined quantitatively, the mixture comprising
mathematically equal quantities of the four opposites.
This however is condemned by Galen as purely

^n. 551.

II.] PHYSICS 177

theoretical, and if it existed it would be a pure
equilibrium which could exhibit no action and no
metabolism (neque si qualitates sic tempera tiie exis-
terent actio exseri ab illis ulla posset). The second
or specific kind is ad justitiam, a proportion which
realises a mean, and which, while being the same in
the sense of always being a mean, is not absolute
quantity. This kind varies with the nature of the
being and the diflferent ages of the same being,
but in such a way as to maintain its chief char-
acteristics. There will be degrees of better and
worse in the types thus realised, and therefore we
may derive from this a true type without assuming
the typical absolute type ad pond us. Every animal
is heterogeneous, and therefore its temperament is
complex. Some of its parts are fluent, some fixed :
the fluent are called humours and their excess gives
the four types sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric, and
melancholic : the fixed comprise the ' partes sper-
maticas semineasve et sanguineas ' : the spermatic or
ex semine formatae are bone, cartilage, ligament,
tendon, nerve, artery, and membrane : those ex san-
guine procreatae are the softer parts, heart, kidneys,
liver, and lungs. The whole has a harmony of its
own, and the whole animal is a well-ordered republic.

II.

The progress of knowledge tended to relegate to
the limbo of myths all the ancients had said about
elements. The Chemists substituted for principles
and primary elements their own chemical elements.
Into the details of this doctrine we need not pene-
trate : in the place of the four elements five

178 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

substances were recognised as the elements to
which all things could be reduced, and from which
they must therefore have arisen. Gassendi is not
concerned with the value of this position as a
scientific doctrine, but with its philosophic import.
He obviously regards it as pretentious, and his
criticism is an interesting composition of views on
the nature of things. There are four direct charges
against the doctrine ; the authors of it cannot agree
among themselves as to the number of ultimate
principles : special properties of natural objects, such
as the healing power of dictamum or the deadly
cold of hemlock, remain unexplained : no explana-
tion is given of the form of organic and inorganic
products ; and all the higher qualities such as saga-
city are completely overlooked.

Though these are details, they involve a principle
of the highest importance. The merely scientific
mind takes its stand on analysis : the chemist says
'analysis gives such and such elements, and therefore,
unintelligible as it may be, these must be the source
of all that we see.' But when is an analysis ex-
haustive ? If the chemists laugh at the ancient
physiologists, what will future ages say to the
chemists ? The assumption of finality is mocked by
progress ; and the progress we boast is part of a
movement to which we must succumb — a sentiment
that recalls the saying, ' the evolution of thought
is part of the whole evolution. ' When is an analysis
exhaustive ? Probably never, but at any rate only
when it admits of an adequate corresponding syn-
thesis. Gassendi shows that he clearly comprehended
this great principle. The chemist, he says, would

II.] PHYSICS 179

lauo'h at a surwon who declared that the living
being was no more than a sum of the parts which
he could dissect and display. If we try to make
our analytic of constitution a complete explanation
of life, failure must necessarily ensue. ^ The reason
is clear : we strive to exhaust in terms of sense
what is not given to the senses : we cannot reach
the ultimate because the torch that lights the in-
tellect fails us on the road.^ For this reason it is
useless to substitute for principia any imaginary
sensuous agents such as mechanical spirits : the
complexity of life in all its forms, with all its end-
less adaptations, cannot be explained by mechanical
agents unless we abuse the term and ascribe to
such agents properties which are foreign to mechanism.
The construction of a palace appears to us marvellous
with its endless processes : the wood has to be
brought from the forest, the stone from the quarry,

^This is one of the finest passages in Gassendi. The chemists,
he says, would laugh at a surgeon who said the body could only
be divided as far as anatomy divides it : they would say ' loe can
divide still further'; but 'quemadraodum sit tibi chirurgus ineptus
... sic ipse videaris futurus ineptus . . . ineptus, inquara, ipsi
Naturae.' Even this more penetrating analysis cannot get to the
bottom of things : ' utcunque ergo nactus sis huiuscemodi quod dis-
solvat agens, non niagis tamen nactus es agens quod ab eo secreta
compingat, quam chirurgus ille organum quod parteis scalpello
secretas adunet. Atqui est praeterea in Natura agens quod com-
pingat coadunetque.'

(adunare is Gassendi's technical term for the producing of unity
by composition : it really denotes more than compingere, indicating
the view of the result as a whole, while compingere remains at
the point of view of the parts as being welded together.)

2 II. 558. 'neque intellectus, tanquam praeeunte face destitutus
penetrare suo acumine potest in illorum substantiam.'

'Sensibusdestituimurquibuspraeeuntibus Intellectus sua acutie prin-
cipia huiuscemodi deprehendat,a8sequatur, prolustret, introapiciat' (559).

180 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt. ii.

and all the parts have to be shaped and fitted
together ; but in this case we see the agents, archi-
tect, masons, and woodcutters, and if we still find
cause of wonder in this, how much more should we
marvel at the construction of a living body where
all the agents are unseen and the structure has to
be maintained by incessant repair ! ^ We must not
think that we can exhaust nature : there is some-
thing that does not fall in the range of human
powers, and while we cannot completely explain
Nature we must so far bow before it as to acknow-
ledge that the whole is more than the parts, the
synthesis greater than our analysis.

This criticism is strengthened by the restraint
it shows : it ends in no dogmatic introduction of a
creator which science might require to have demon-
strated : it is intended only to define the limits of
science.^ The question arises, are those limits
necessary or contingent ? No distinct answer is
here given, but Gassendi seems to consider that
in time (perhaps infinite time) the unknown might
become revealed, not to sense alone but to an intellect
guided by sense. After this philosophic digression,
the treatise returns to the question of diseases and
their cure, medicine being the science to which the
doctrine of temperaments is properly ancillary. For
our present purpose this part of the subject is
superfluous.

Mi. 557.

^nullo non saccule Natura illud homini insusurret aut potius
inclamet,

'Tecum habita et noris quarn sit tibi curta suppellex.'
But 'nihil sit desperandum de humani ingenii sagacitate,' ii. 560.

PART III. ETHICS

CHAPTER I
ON HAPPINESS

The student who enters on the task of discovering
Gassendi's views on ethics has before him a problem
of considerable magnitude. The mass of quotations
is enormous : repetition is frequent : and the main
line of thought is obscured by the two-fold purpose
of defending and at the same time modifying the
views of Epicurus. The whole literature of the
subject is ransacked : the Greek philosophers are
quoted in almost unreadable type : passages from
the Fathers and other authors innumerable occupy
whole pages : while the doctrine actually supported
is obscured by endless polemics against authors now
for the most part deservedly forgotten. To repre-
sent the learning of the original is almost impossible,
while omission of the quotations must necessarily
deprive the reader of a true idea of Gassendi's
method of treating the subject. The doctrine must
however be stripped of this robe of erudition, and
perhaps a method that leaves the truth naked will
not be without its advantages.

Gassendi's preface states his position. Moral
philosophy is not speculative or concerned only

184 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

with theory : it is also a scientia activa, a treatise
de eligendis et fugiendis, a practical study. It is
a theory of Prudence rather than wisdom. As.
Gassendi notes, the word ' morals ' does not quite
equal the Greek ' ethics.' The latter indicates more
clearly the element of individual habituation ; and
virtue, though innate, requires education of the
soul. Man is solitarius, familiaris, and civilis.
Morality is properly concerned with man as soli-
tarius in the sense that the self is the foundation
of all, and thus this science is distinguished from
all others, such as Politics, which deal with man
in his relations to the society or the State.

We naturally expect from this a certain psycho-
logical and individual trend in the rest of the
treatment. The first book is on Felicity, the second
on the virtues, and the third on the kindred subjects
of Liberty, Fortune, Fate, and Divination.

II.

The discussion of Felicitas opens in a characteristic
way with twenty-seven pages of quotation. Felicity
is the end of life, but in what sense ? It is really a.
confusion of terms to make Felicity the summum
bonum, for felicity is the possession of the highest
good, which must therefore be determined separately.
The best of the many definitions of the summum
bonum is ' tranquillitas animi,' but we must conceive
that as an active state, a living, not a dead repose.
It is a permanent condition which must be reached
by the mind through its self-discipline. No external
means or sensual indulgences can produce the desired
state : meditation must free the soul from all care^

III.] ETHICS 185

especially the meditation of death, which enables
men to see life steadily and see it whole. The con-
dition which results is a pleasant state, and therefore
pleasure is in a sense the end of life. This statement
has unfortunately led to many errors, and it must
not be left unguarded : we must find out the real
meaning of pleasure before proceeding further.

The defence of pleasure as vitae beatae finem is
really a defence of Epicurus, and is put in the form
of a discussion on what Epicurus meant by pleasure.
Some writers have represented Epicurus as taking
pleasure in a bad sense : among these Cicero and
Athenaeus are most noteworthy : Seneca, on the
other hand, with Plutarch, can be quoted as defend-
ing Epicurus. Cicero seems to have been led astray
by considering the objects which give pleasures (ludos
et cantus et formas eas et quibus oculi jucunde move-
antur) and not the state of mind produced. Unless
the pleasure as a mental state is considered there can
be no distinction of good and bad : for the same
outward object may affect different minds differently.
Plutarch points out this difference between Epicurus
and Aristippus : the pleasure which Epicurus means
is of the mind, that which Aristippus praises is of
the body. Laertius points out other differences.
Aristippus confines the term to pleasure in motu,
Epicurus lays more stress on pleasure in statu or
tranquillity. This distinction is the root of further
divergence. Aristippus considers pleasure of the
body the only true pleasure : Epicurus admits or
rather emphasises pleasures of mind. The real
difference in these views is to be found quite apart
from the question of sensual or non-sensual pleasures,

186 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

in the problems of Being and Change. As Gassendi
points out, Pleasure (tjSopi'i) has never had a bad
significance in itself. The bad states were such as
luxury (rpvcf)/), mollities). To view the doctrines of
either Epicurus or Aristippus from the point of view
of moral and immoral pleasures is to misunderstand
the whole position : such a procedure is indeed natural
to us because we have become used to the morals of
the pulpit, which takes morality as the presupposi-
tion of its ethics : before the religious dogmas became
thus fixed ethical enquiry was the means by which
men hoped to attain a concept of the good, not
bolster up with theory what they had already deter-
mined to support. Thus it is a hysteron proteron
to condemn a pleasure as immoral, for the pleasant-
ness may prove the criterion of moralness. It is
true that the teaching both of Epicurus and of the
Cyrenaics was liable to be used as a justification
of sensuality ; but originally these thinkers were
more concerned with other problems, and especially
whether a pleasure could be anticipated, which
Aristippus denied and Epicurus affirmed. The kind
of dialectic employed here can easily be imagined.
Is the pleasure of anticipation a future pleasure or
a pleasure referred to the future ? What is the
relation of time involved in this ? Is not all pleasure
present pleasure, and will it not therefore be advan-
tageous to concentrate our powers upon the present ?
Is not rest a ceasing from action, and therefore from
the (active) enjoyment of pleasure, a lapsing from
life to nirvana ? At this last point the externality
of Aristippus' view shows itself only too plainly : the
quies or rest of contemplation is not a ceasing from

III.] ETHICS 187

all action : it is the highest activity, though it may
not go beyond the subject. In these ditierences of
opinion about becoming and movement we must look
for the roots of the more superficial divergences of
Epicurean and Cyrenaic doctrine. If we can get rid
of those ideas of pleasure which attach themselves
exclusively to the senses, we shall see that in its
broader sense pleasure is the very essence of life.
This broader sense Epicurus must have taken : he
considers pains of mind greater than pains of body,
and never ceases to insist on the place due to
pleasures of mind. Taking it in this comprehensive
way, we may say virtue and pleasure are as insepar-
able as the sun is from the day : true pleasure flows
from virtue, and they are by nature one (virtutem
esse causam felicitatis effectricem).

We may pause here to ask what is meant by 'true
pleasure.' It seems as though vera felicitas was an
ambiguous term in Gassendi. So far as we concern
ourselves with pleasure, true must either mean be-
longing to a normal constitution or must carry with
it suggestions of some criterion other than pleasant-
ness. We may of course take up the narrow position
of some critics of psychological hedonism and say
that pleasure admits of no modifications except in
the way of quantity. But this criticism, if relevant
to later doctrines, would not touch Gassendi, whose
whole attitude of mind precludes the possibility of
so abstract a view. He would consider it a mockery
of moral philosophy to set up pleasure in the sense
of pleasantness, felt pleasure, as end or criterion. It
is not enough that you as man find pleasure in the
deed : you as moral subject must first prove yourself

188 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

a fit judge. This brings us in sight of an old circle :
we seem on the verge of being told that we ought
to pursue pleasure and that we ought to find pleasure
only in that which we ought (for other reasons) to
pursue. We do in fact end in a dictum like that of
Aristotle : a true pleasure is such as a true man feels,
and if this avoids the difficulty of the man who finds
happiness in evil, it none the less gives us a concrete
norm.

Gassendi's solution, if such it be, of the problem
exhibits some familiar elements. To go back to the
question of kinds of pleasure. Though some say all
pleasure is good, all pain bad, it is true that some-
times pleasure is postponed to pain and vice versa.
The fallacy is discovered in the absolute use of the
term pleasure : Epicurus recognised several kinds,
some in tranquillitate, some in motu, including pro-
fligatorum voluptates. But this is not quite an
accurate statement : pleasure is not quite a motion,
it is rather ' condimentum actionis,' a pervading
sweetness. Moreover the suggested distinction of
motus animi and motus corporis is false : if the
mind moves there must also be corporeal move-
ment. Is pleasure essentially good (sua natura
bonum). Epicurus thought so : Antisthenes denied
it : the Stoics classed it as indilferens : some distin-
guish good and bad, and some say it is good, but not
the highest good.

The conclusion runs thus : all nature seeks what
is natural to it, and therefore seeks what is good
and pleasant. Bad pleasures must then be due to
some taint and to the fault of the agent. As the
good is per se attractive, all pleasures must be

III.] ETHICS 189

desirable. The reason why a pleasure is rejected
is generally some anticipated evil consequence, e.g.
when we refuse to eat the honey because we suspect
that it is poisoned.^ The proof that animals have
connate desires for what is pleasant is taken from
Cicero. About this there are two points to be
noticed : these connate desires are apparently to be
regarded as conscious purposes but without proof of
this consciousness : secondly, the passage in Cicero
makes the end self-love not pleasure. It is obvious
that, do what we may to clarify Gassendi's state-
ments, confusion must remain, for we have no clear
distinction between three very different ideas.
The Good may mean

(1) That which is good for the animal according
to the divine plan, or in the sight of God. This
may be different for each being, but it is such as
fulfils that creature's wants, if those wants be re-
garded from an external point of view, such as
might be ascribed to God.

(2) That which is good for the creature who
regards himself as part of a system and has a
rational comprehension of ends higher than his
individual satisfaction.

(3) That which the creature thinks to be his good.
Of these three the first is not properly in the

sphere of ethical considerations at all, while the
third is a question of illusion, since it is always
practically assumed that the agent chooses under
some conditions that warp his natural judgment.
In trying to define the end as both good and
pleasant Gassendi errs (in good company, too) by

^ii. 695.

190 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

not seeing that he is arbitrarily modifying both
terms, the chooser and the chosen. Doubtless, given
a man whose pleasure was in the good, the good
would be to him pleasant ; but an ethic that modifies
both terms ceases to be practical : it becomes ima-
ginary, speculative, and abstract. Love of God,
says Gassendi, is in the highest degree good and
pleasant : he means presumably that it ought to be
if it is not. If we revert to man as he is, can we
still maintain these statements ? Gassendi thinks
we can, and that is just one more instance of the
latent universal. The keynote to the whole posi-
tion is to be found in the phrase, ' omne animal
e natura sua sic comparatur ut natura duce nihil
prius requirat ' : where natura is clearly taken in
abstraction, as though there were a natura pos-
sessed by all creatures and capable of being held
over against the sum of desires. Such a natura is
a deduction from observation, and even if we allow
that man might oppose his idea of the nature of
man to his actual nature, as expressed in his
desires, it is clearly absurd to read into the exist-
ence of the animal a duality which reflective thought
has constructed. Gassendi has not properly com-
prehended the fact that he encroaches on the
metaphysic of ethics in taking the question in this
universal way. There is however another side to
his argument, which must not be overlooked. He
is concerned to prove that a good is no less a good
for being associated with pleasure. In words that
remind us of Locke's well-know^n phrase, he attri-
butes the association of goodness with pleasure to
the act of God. This seems to be supported by

Ill] ETHICS 191

such considerations as the union of goodness and
pleasantness in the acts of procreation or feeding ;
but it is significant that the position finds most
support from those forms of life which are furthest
removed from full consciousness as we know it, and
for which the goodness as such is presumably non-
existent. If we press the question we fall into
paradox : self-sacrifice we find is made for the
pleasure it gives : if Brutus killed his sons it was
because his sons were such as Brutus disliked, and
therefore it was a pleasure to Brutus to kill them :
a statement that shows that Gassendi was badly in
need of a distinction between what is pleasurable
and what is preferable.

III.

We should almost expect from the position
assigned to Pleasure that it would be pronounced
the end of all action. This is modified by a dis-
tinction between goods which are classified as
honestum, utile, and jucundum. The third class is
always chosen ob voluptatem : the others may not
be. Psychologically voluptas accompanies desire, and
desire is generated by want. The want comes first,
and the object is chosen as satisfying the want :
pleasure ceases with attainment, which in turn
generates a new want. This third class, things
jucunda, is meant to include those that satisfy
bodily wants. The first two classes generate pleasure,
because their absence is a want. Of these the class
Utile comprises objects which are not pleasant as
acts, but are sought with reference to the pleasure
to be obtained from them. Cooking, building, and

192 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

singing are examples. The highest class honestum,
including all honores, causes some difi&culty. It has
been said that these must be chosen 'for them-
selves ' : the honestum is per se dignum. But the
worth is not impaired by any addition of pleasant-
ness ; and the desire to divorce the two is really
due to a confusion between seeking a high position
and seeking the material advantages of position.
The honestum must be at least a permanent
spiritual attainment : it is only a low mind that
seeks the material advantages by themselves.^

IV.

As we foresaw, the practical solution of the ques-
tion What is the highest good ? has to be attained
by taking a concrete example. Though not expli-
citly stated, Gassendi clearly holds the opinion that
you know the good man when you see him. In
the chapter headed ' solum sapientem virtutem
moralem amplecti,' we have an analysis of the good
life from which we may learn the nature of the
highest good. This life is ' maxime naturalem,
maxime obtentu facilem, maxime durabilem, maxime
poenitentiae expertem.' It is based on tranquillitas
animi, which is not a state of death, but of sus-
tained equilibrium : ^ in it all desires are regulated

1 With this idea of the plebeian mind seeking praeter lucrum
nihil there is a close parallel in Ruskin, Crown of Wild Olive, § 32 :
' In every nation there are a vast class who are ill-educated, cowardly,
and more or less stupid. And with these people just as certainly
the fee is first and the work second, as with brave people the work
is first and the fee second.'

"^ ' non voluit Epicurus tranquillitatem esse quasi merum toi^porem,
sed voluit potius esse statum in quo omnes vitae actiones placide
simul et jucunde peragerentur ' (ii. 716).

III.] ETHICS 193

and co-ordinated : its end is final, an end in itself,
not creating a condition which is self-destructive,
but a persistent state. The good man will prefer
the contemplative life, but not in such a way as to
prevent him from sharing in the activities required
of a citizen. In short, the ideal is the familiar
wise man of the Stoics ; but there are certain modi-
fications which detract somewhat from the sternness
of that ideal. To suffer pain bravely is good ; to
escape suffering is better : goods of mind are most
excellent, but goods of body may be added. The
key of happiness is temperance, and the motto of
life should be parvo contentus. This is the tone of
an uncertain age, adopting in its anxiety the lesser
evil. It suited the unstable conditions of life that
inspired Stoicism : it appeals to men still, and
cannot lose its charm so long as fortune remains
fickle and life is a waiting for death. Yet would
not wealth be happiness if secure ? is it not better
to live on a higher level, having more and spending
more? The Roman Empire gave birth to a sick
man's ideal : the sage was to want little because
little was to be had, as the dyspeptic^ puts away
his desire for the full meal of the healthy : of
mental pleasures he might take his fill, for the hand
of the tyrant could not rob him of his store, but
the goods of this world he was to despise, for they
were insecure.

The conception of life which comes down to us
from Epicurus is one of extreme simplicity. It is
easy, we are told, to get what is necessary, nud

^ This is meant purely metaphorically : it has however been sug-
gested that Epicurus' mode of life was a 'dietetic e.xperinient.'

194 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

therefore life according to nature is always possible.
A quotation from Porphyry^ shows how little there
was of ' Epicureanism ' about Epicurus. Gassendi
accepts the natural life of Epicurus as the model :
he is content to prove that his teacher meant by
pleasure something more than self-indulgence, some-
thing lofty, spiritual, and in the highest sense
moral. This is good as an apology ; but if we are
to accept Gassendi as an independent teacher, it
seems impossible to avoid condemning his position
as weak. Mere transference of an ideal from one
age to another must necessarily be weak and
shallow : it implies an abstract attitude of mind
refusing to face the new conditions and new problems
that time unfolds : in spite of those elements of life
that are always with us, and those truths which
have been uttered once for all, such antiquarian lore
as fills the pages of Gassendi can only be dis-
appointing to a mind that looks for a theory in
touch at least with its own age, if not of value to
later generations.

In one respect perhaps this hardly does Gassendi
justice. His Insistence on the point that Pleasure
is not opposed to virtue, that we may be both
good and happy, was not merely the formal state-
ment of the Epicurean as opposed to the Stoic
ideal. Asceticism was still an ideal, and in general
men were impressed with the idea that the phrase,
'virtue for its own sake,' had a meaning. What
it had come to mean was that virtue was best by
itself, best if you mixed it with nothing, best if
taken in abstraction from the world and all that is

III. 729-730.

III.] ETHICS 195

worldl}^ Against this Gassendi preaches the right
of all things in life to their due recognition ; he
would have said, with much the same shade of
meaning, that it was ' better to be worldly than
other-worldly.' Gassendi's biography shows that he
drifted away from the Church : it was the Church
that had divorced virtue and the best life.

CHAPTER II

THE VIRTUES

The treatment of the special virtues, though con-
taining much that is too trite to need recording
again, adds a few points that are necessary to
complete our view of the Ethics.

The word ' virtue ' is not to be taken to denote
manliness, as its derivation might suggest, or a
specific function, such as is meant in phrases like
' virtus equi.' By virtue is meant a habit of the
mind by which we are rightly disposed toward our
affections. It would have been more accurate to
have said organism instead of mind, and it is clearly
necessary to take animus here in a sense that in-
cludes reference to the bodily conditions. A habit
or condition must not be confounded either with a
faculty or an affection, says Gassendi, with obvious
reference to Aristotle.

The animus has two parts, and each has its virtue.
A right disposition of the intellectual part enables
it to attain truth when affected by the objects that
appeal to the senses : similarly a right disposition
of the non-intellectual part enables it to attain truth
in action, or goodness when affected by anything
that appeals to the passions. It is possible to regard

VT. III.] ETHICS 197

this second part abstractly and divorce it trom the
intellect. We then have such habits and possi-
bilities of right action as are shared by the brutes,
but not completely moral action. To constitute
virtue a right habit must be so based on a right
mental state as to be constant and intentional. This
doctrine therefore recognises that goodness is possible
where there is only a low degree of intellect or none
at all. At the same time the degree of morality
must be judged relatively to the degree of intellectual
power possessed by the agent. As Gassendi does not
discuss the question of merit it is not easy to deter-
mine the significance of this point. The statement
that virtue requires knowledge may have either of
two meanings : it may imply that the agent must
be conscious of the end aimed at, that is consciously
adopt a course as good for him : it may also imply
that the agent must know how the end he adopts
is related to other ends, and ultimately to the universe
of ends. It is in the second sense that Gassendi
seems to use the phrase, but only with the intention
of dividing the ethical from natural virtues or the
' nativam in Appetitu aptitudinem ad virtutem.'
Consciousness of the end adopted is naturally con-
nected with the subject of merit, because it is not
infrequently assumed that goodness is proportionate
to the difficulty of choice, or briefly, the greater the
strusforle the better the man. We are therefore left
in twofold darkness when neither merit nor the need
of conscious choice is fully treated. Some further
light may be got from the following discussion of
the mean. The Stoics considered the mean was a
pollution of virtue, a compromise between extremes

198 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

of vice, and in itself nothing. Gassendi replying
in support of the doctrine, emphasises the distinction
between qualitative and quantitative means. In
Ethics we have to deal with qualitative distinctions,
and our mean is in se quid, not a vanishing point
between extremes but an extreme itself This decision
enables our author to deal very sensibly with another
question. As the extreme states are due to excess
of passion, ethical theory had tended to associate
with the mean state the absence of all passion. The
Stoics, considering that the passions were in the
rational part of the soul, saw no way short of com-
plete eradication. Epicurus, on the other hand,
declared the principal part of the soul to be free
from passion. This puts the passions in the position
of matter, upon which the moral agent may work
and makes possible their permanent retention. The
wise man of the Stoics was to be devoid of passion :
the ideal of Epicurus found room for pity and anger,
tears and sighs. There is however nothing which
could lead us to suppose that Gassendi or his teachers
attained to the idea of passions as natural forces
which could be employed for good : they are by
nature bad, without reference to the objects con-
cerned : consequently the only choice is between
extermination and limitation. The former leaves us
with a purely intellectual state, and if this is not
satisfactory we must take the second, admitting that
an immoral affection is moral if sufficiently limited.
But this is exactly what Gassendi repudiates as a
Stoic heresy when put in the form ' virtue is a mean
between vices,' or a mean vice. He points out that
a curve ) passing into ( is not a curve at all at the

III.] ETHICS 109

mean point [) | (]; and so with our vices, of whicli
however he gives no example. The fallacy of the
position seems to lie in the failure to distinguish the
passion from its object, and so, for example, make
room for righteous indignation beside bad tem])er,
or the sorrow of the afflicted beside the self-abandon-
ment of suicide.

One satisfaction remains : our ethic will at least
deal with human nature and leave us our natural
material. More than that, it will assert the unity
of virtues, on the very sound principle that if we
deny the unity we make virtuous acts and not
virtuous natures the ground of our judgment. What
has been said already on the necessity of virtue
being a habit helps us out here. We are not good
for the sake of being good : the pure love of virtue
is nonsense : we are good to be happy. As all virtue
tends to happiness the virtues satisfy the scholastic
condition and are one both in origin and end, arising
from Prudence and ending in happiness. The sceptic
sneers at the suggestion that virtue always makes
for happiness, and it can hardly be reckoned among
the propositions proved by Gassendi. There is none
the less much truth in the corollary that the good
nian finds happiness in virtue : if he does not, the
virtue must somehow be foreign to his nature :
fear of the law must be coercing him or even a
guilty fear of God ; and this is not that state of
tranquillity which is the crown of the man whose
good actions flow from the right disposition of his
soul and body.

The special virtues are divided into four classes —
Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, and Justice. In

200 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

addition to these main heads there are other sub-
divisions which are differently enumerated by different
writers. Aristotle himself speaks of several virtues
not named in this first general division. The scho-
lastics desired to elaborate such general heads as
would include all the nameable virtues, and finally
produced the following scheme. First, there are the
three parts called Subjectae, seu species : ' deinde
Integrantes, seu quas instar partium totum integrum
compouentium, necesse est concurrere ad actum per-
fectum cuiuspiam virtutis : denique Potentialeis seu
quae potentiarum ipsius animae instar sunt virtutes
quasi adjunctae.' These divisions may be exemplified
by quoting the actual subdivisions of our main
classes. ' Sic parteis Prudentiae Subjectas distinguunt
Privatam Oeconomicam Politicam Militarem Regiam :
integranteis Memoriam Intellegentiam Docilitatem
Solertiam Rationem Providentiam Circumspectionem
Cautionem: Potentialeis . . . Eubuliam, Synesin,
Gnomen.'

The other virtues can be similarly divided, and the
result is a list which the scholastics at least thought
exhaustive of all the known virtues.

The first and greatest of the virtues is Prudence.
This, as we have seen, is of five kinds — privata^
oeconomica, politica, regia, and militaria. Gassendi
deals with it under these heads. He begins w^ith
this virtue because it is, as Epicurus said, ' caput ac
fontem, sic quasi Reginam atque Principem caeter-
arum virtu tum.' We deal here with Prudence ' qua-
tenus est moralis virtus, quae omnes vitae actiones
recte moderatur,'and enables us to rightly distinguish
good and evil : it has been well defined by Cicero

III.] ETHICS 201

as ' rerum expetendarum scientiam ' : it is a habit of
mind ' non certus (not, that is to say, concerned with
necessary and immutable truths) sed conjecturalis ' :
it is finally * ars vitae,' and the essential quality of
the practical man who does not concern himself with
the end, but accepting the end without question
devotes his energies to the elaboration of means.
The three great functions of Prudence are bene con-
sultare, intelligere, and finally imperare. The mental
qualities required are sollertia, sagacitas, and all
that makes for clear and prompt judgments on
afiairs.

We need hardly follow Gassendi through all the
ramifications of the subject : in justice to him be
it said that he seems to have omitted nothing that
the good moralist and the conscientious preacher
ought to say. He conducts through all the aspects
of life, including the choice of a profession, the choice
of a wife, the duties of man as father, landowner,
master of servants, and, in the wider sphere of the
State, controller of war and peace. It has been said
that in these pages Gassendi shows himself as
judicious in his Ethics as he is profound in his
metaphysics ; and this we need not deny, though
the subject is less abstruse, in fact somewhat common-
place, and the treatment even more laborious, with
very little that cannot be culled or deduced from
Aristotle,

An interesting discussion arises on the meaning
to be attributed to the phrase, 'follow nature.'
Epicurus had advocated this course. Gassendi takes
it to mean ' study your aptitudes ' : choose the course
of life that is most suited to your tastes. Whether

202 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

the doctrine of motion is the implicit ground for
this doctrine or not I cannot say, as Gassendi gives
us no hint; but it would be very natural for a
philosopher imbued with ideas of force and motion
to adopt the idea of ' the line of least resistance.'
That this is the actual point of view cannot be
doubted. Every man has particular aptitudes : what
then is more natural or better than that he should
choose that mode of life which is calculated to
employ and improve those aptitudes rather than
limit or destroy them ? If we attempt tasks for
which nature has not designed us we make life an
uphill struggle, and labour perpetually ' Sisyphi
instar nixandi.' This seems a sensible point of view,
but Lactantius did not agree with it, and made it
a subject for censure. Epicurus, he said, aimed at
popularity, and made base concessions to the frailty
of human nature. As he states the opposite argu-
ment very fully the passage may be quoted at length :
' Propterea ut ad se multitudinem contrahat (Epi-
curus), apposita singulis quibusque moribus loquitur.
Desidiosum vetat litteras discere : avarum populari
largitione liberat : ignavum prohibet accedere ad
rempublicam, pigrum exerceri, timidum militare.
Irreligiosus audit deos nihil curare, inhumanus
et suis commodis serviens jubetur nihil cuiquam
tribuere: omnia enim sui causa facere saj)ientem.'
In these and other respects Lactantius thinks that
vice is encouraged : if you hate your wife it follows
you should leave her : if children dislike their parents
it is right to rebel against them ; in short, life should
be made easy, and private inclinations indulged at
any cost. Gassendi's answer to this is that it is an

Ill] ETHICS 208

extreme and unfair interpretation. It was probably
very typical of the treatment which Epicurean
philosophy received at the hands of extreme church-
men. To take one point in illustration. According
to Lactantius, Epicurus says if a man is lazy he need
not take exercise : according to Gassendi the doctrine
is, if nature has not intended you to be an athlete
do not try to become one. In other words, while
every one may know something about everything, we
must each of us choose some one thing in which we
aim to excel, and the economy of the universe
demands that the occupation chosen should be in
harmony with our nature. In this argument Gassendi
was on the winnino; side.

The second virtue is Courage, sometimes rather
unnecessarily labelled Fortitude, which is ' quandam
animi fortitudinem,' a fixed mental state rather than
brute force (in ipso robore et viribus corporis). It
differs from Temeritas and Feritas (ilia vocata
Aristoteli) in being a fixed disposition of mind,
and requiring for its highest realisation a clear
knowledge of the danger which is faced. In reality
the virtue is not primarily concerned with dangers
in the ordinary sense of the term : its permanent
function is the maintenance of a conviction once
it has been accepted, and the persistence which
endures and overcomes all difficulties in attaining
an ideal. It combines therefore in itself Constantia
et Persevcrantia, and its end may be expressed
generally as the maintenance of Justice : it is the
spirit which neither does nor suffers wrong. As a
fixed habit it enables us to endure all evils : these
may be public or priv9,te : the greatest is exile, but

204 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [PT.

there are many others, such as infamy, imprisonment,
and the loss of friends or wealth/

Temperance, the third virtue, is to be taken in
the Greek sense. It includes as partes subjectae
abstinentia et sobrietas (illam respectu cibi, hanc
respectu potus, says Gassendi, without telling us
why abstinence as such should differ for food and
for drink !) : as castitas et pudicitia : as integrantes,
verecundia et honestas : as Potentialeis, dementia,
humilitas, modestia itemque mansuetudo, miseri-
cordia, moderatio, decus, studiositas, eutrapelia seu
festivitas, urbanitas. This list certainly does not
seem to fail in respect of comprehensiveness.

Justice, the third virtue, is not subjected to
analysis under these standard heads. After remarks
based on Aristotle's discussion of this subject, we
come to the question of the origin of laws. Epicurus
had found the origin of laws in utility (Epicurus
omnem juris et aequi originem ab utilitate repetiit),
and had consequently been attacked by the sup-
porters of the opposite theory that laws are of
natural origin. Gassendi thinks the two theories
should be combined if we are to attain the truth.
Man may be regarded either absolutely as ' solitarius '
or in his relations as ' sociabilis.' Man as ' solitarius '
finds himself in a world filled with the gifts of
nature, and his instincts lead him to appropriate
them. In addition to these instincts he has the
faculty of self-preservation, with the implied right
to retain all that is necessary for this preservation :
here then is the root of the 'jus naturale ' (facultas
ista est in qua videtur dici posse consistere jus naturae

In. 770,

III.] ETHICS 205

primarium). But the things so appropriated were
originally given by nature, and therefore the question
arises why should one man have them more than
another and ' inde enascantur rixae, rapinae, odia,
vulnera, caedes ' ? These somewhat violent relations
bring us to the second stage : quamobrem spectandus
iam homo posteriore modo, sive quatenus sociabilis
est, ac in naturae quasi modificatae statu : man
recognises the need of mutual help, and a condition
of harmony is brought about by the aid of laws.
Thus nature and utility as principles are reconciled :
G-assendi further recognises that the view of man
as solitarius is not only abstract, but also a pseudo-
historical process of accounting for the evolution of
laws which has little probability : so far as we can
say, society is as old as man, and that too not in
the sense in which we speak of brutes as sociable,
but in the full sense of a community of intelligent
human beings.^

The root then of all law is the natural impulse
which drives men to form societies : for as soon as
we get beyond the individual as ' solitarius,' we find
that life is impossible without mutual agreement or
'pactiones.' These first charters are between man
and man, not contracts by which they surrender their
liberty to one ruler, but formal definitions of mutual
relations. Gassendi is not concerned to construct a

^ II. 795. ' Itaque quicquid sit de ilia sen suppositione sen fictione
status, in quo seu Epicurus seu alii vixisse ali([uando dicunt primos
homines, tam esse profecto videtur ipsa societas hoininuni, quani
illorum est origo antiqua : ac non eo quideni solum modo ijuo bruta
generis eiusdem sociabilia inter se sunt, veruin illo etiam, quo
quatenus sunt et intelligentes et ratione praediti, agnoscunt non posse
ullam inter se societatem esse securam nisi ea conventionibus pactisque
mutuis constabiliatur.'

206 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

theory in support of the rights of kings, so that his
' pactiones ' must be taken to be agreements between
all the individuals in any one society without as yet
any question of a ruler. The law is in fact the true
ruler, so that there is no need to deal w^ith the
existence of personal rulers except in so far as their
authority has a natural origin in the necessity of
delegating: the task of making the laws of a com-
munity to those who are its wisest and best. The
head of the society then is he who has been chosen
to make, explain, and administer the laws : his claim
to the position is contained entirely in his personal
character and ability : he rules as the embodiment
of law, not arbitrarily, but acting as the mouthpiece
of laws which are higher and greater than he, rooted
in the earth and reaching to the heavens, the object
which all men worship, and in the cult of which he
is ordained high priest.

The jus to which we have been hitherto referring
is that known as jus civile, the recognition of the
rights possessed by the member of a civitas or society
as such. This we have seen was based on utility,
but always on a utility which is itself natural : in
other words, it supplies wants which are rooted
in the nature of man. There are however other
kinds of jus, such as the jus gentium and jus
naturale. As a rule, the jus gentium was regarded
as e natura, even by those who thought the jus
civile owed its origin to utilitas. Gassendi declares
that the difference between the two is purely a
question of numbers (discrimen ad magis et minus) :
in nature the two are identical, and both are grounded
in utility.

III.] ETHICS 207

Now that we have expanded our view to include
all the kinds of Jus, we must discuss their relative
characters. The least comprehensive term is jus
civile, which has already been interpreted to mean
the rights constituted by citizenship. The term jus
gentium raises us to the higher level and a wider
outlook. It denotes the rights which men have
without reference to the particular society or state
to which they belong, the rights which they have
simply as men. Gassendi here becomes conscious of
a difficulty. The original significance of the phrase
jus gentium has been lost, now that humanity can
no longer be divided into Roman and non-Roman.
Consequently, jus gentium approaches very closely
to jus naturale, inasmuch as it indicates rights
which men may have apart from any definite
citizenship or special code. To avoid the confusion
which threatens us, we must go further into the
question of the scope of the jus naturale and the
limits of jus gentium.^

Jus is a term which covers both the facultas and
the lex, says Gassendi : we may therefore look at it
from either point of view. Man possesses a jus
naturale in so far as he is an animal and has faculties
such as the faculty of feeling.^ But the term natu-
rale implies a jus grounded in a natura and nothing
more : since then the plants have a nature and
faculties (such as the facultas sugendi), they must

^Voigt {Jus. Nat. vol. ii. 661) distinguishes Jus civile, Jus gen-
tium, and Jus naturale as the systems which applied respectively
to the citizen, the freeman, and the man. In the earlier stages of
its recognition it was an independent international private law
■which, as such, regulated intercourse between peregrins, or between
peregrins and citizens, on the basis of their common libertas.

208 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

have a jus naturale. To exactly define what is
usually included under jus naturale, we really
require a term 'jus animale' — or better still, 'jus
humanum.'

I find it difficult to determine the exact meaning
which Gassendi attaches to the phrase, 'jus is either
facultas or lex.' It seems most probable that he
thought of rights as primarily powers, the possession
of which constituted the individual's 'right' to the
advantages derived from their free exercise. These
rights become more extensive as we rise in the
scale of being : the plant has the least, the
savage man has more, the civilised man most.
We therefore rise from jus naturale to jus civile :
at the same time the lower species are most com-
prehensive, and therefore the jus naturale appears
more fundamental in proportion as it is more
universal. This however is only in appearance : the
jus naturale, though applied over a wider area, is in
itself more limited than the jus civile : it is man as
bare man that comes under its categories : as citizen
man enjoys laws which, if they are more limiting,
are also refined to far greater exactness. The facul-
tas which constitutes jus must be taken to be a
natural or social endowment which fits a being for
certain acts, and as it implies that nature intended
him to fulfil those functions for which he is thus
equipped, it also confers upon him a right to the
free use of those powers in the interests of the
universe at large. The plant has the power of
absorbing water, and so has a right to a supply of
water : the animal has a power of feeling and motion
entitling him to humane treatment and freedom.

III.] ETHICS 209

Man as man has the distinctively human faculties,
and with them the privileges of the jus humanum,
while the citizen has the quality of civitas, wliich
is his claim to the highest privileges of life. Thus
we see that rio-hts are o;rounded in natures, and the
nature of the subject determines the character and
limits of the rights. The nature of a being is there-
fore best realised under laws that establish these
rights. At first the law seems a limitation of the
nature, but a little reflection shows a different side
to the question : if my desire to harm you is re-
strained, your freedom is enlarged : if I am not
allowed to take away your wife, at least I may
expect to possess my own in safety. So while the
established law hedges me round about, it also pro-
vides a barrier against hostile irruptions.

We now see that the jus gentium can be defined
by reference to its content. If we look for specifi-
cally human activities we find them in the faculties
of speech, writing, reasoning, forming societies, and
the like. These as common to all men, but not
shared by man with the brutes, must constitute the
sphere of the jus gentium.

The term lex, as opposed to jus, implies a definite
contract and an executive power to enforce obedi-
ence. There is therefore no lex gentium nor lex
naturale in the proper sense. There may be such
universal laws as the lex spontanea^ or law of

1 Ulpian speaks of a jus naturale common to man and lower animals,
which is substantially instinct. This is said to be a law of nature
not referred to by any other jurist. The idea of jus naturale was not
peculiar to Ulpian. Gaius and Justinian equate Jus naturale and
jus gentium ; but while the jus gentium is more natural than the
civile, it is far from identical with the naturale. The jus naturale is

210 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [ft.

instinctive action : there may also be a law of rational
action ; but this is law in a different sense, the
hypothetical precept which dictates the means for
fulfilling some particular purpose. Though these
are not laws in the full sense of the term, they
stand very close to law in the highest and noblest
use of the word. Man has reason : he can therefore
see and understand the laws of his nature in a way
that animals cannot : he can identify himself with
this law so that the law of nature becomes his
law, the law of his reason, and finally one with his
reason.

Now, taking lex naturalis as the law of human
nature and analysing it, we get the elements of
law in its ethical aspect, the elements that is to
say of the laws which are embedded in human
nature. In order to ensure our attaining the original
simple laws we must aim at two qualities, univer-
sality and freedom from prejudice ; in other words,
we must collect our evidence from a sufficiently
wide area and at the same time not allow any pre-
conceived ideas to bias our choice : we then get
the following rules of conduct :

1. The first law instructs us to aim always at
the good, which is to be interpreted as our own

essentially a speculative element. Its most noticeable features are :
'(1) its potential imiversal applicability to all men ; (2) among all
peoples ; (3) at all times ; and (4) its correspondence with the innate
conviction of right.' It included among its propositions (1) recogni-
tions of claims of blood ; (2) duty and faithfulness to engagements ;
(3) apportionment according to equity ; (4) voluntatis ratio. (For
these facts see Voigt, quoted in the Encycl. Brit., loc. cit.) It will
be obvious from these notes on the character of the jus naturale
that it was eminently fitted for becoming the basis of a universal
ethic.

III.] ETHICS 211

good or advantage (primo itaque communissimum,
innatumque adeo est omnibus hominibus, ut quod
bonum, quod commodum, quod gratum fuerit, pro-
sequantur : quod vero malum, incommodum, ingra-
tumque refugiaut). The collateral use of the terms
denoting goodness and pleasantness should be
noticed : we shall have occasion to refer to them
later. It follows from this law that we are to love
our benefactors and hate our enemies : from this is
derived love of our children, our friends, and God,
as the greatest of benefactors. Gassendi apparently
assumes that all men will regard God as a benefactor :
the necessit}^ of worshipping him rests really on the
attitude adopted by the individual, but Gassendi
does not flice the problem of those who prefer to
'curse God and die.'

2. The second law is simple, * ut quisque se amet,
plusquam ceteros, seu ut sibi bene quam alteri malit.'
Some writers whom Gassendi contemptuously calls
' popular ' have denied this law, but it is regarded
by our author as indisputably natural and original.
Thus Egoism is the point from which we must start :
we love ourselves best and with ourselves all that
is peculiarly ours : we benefit our own families before
those of others, and, as the proverb rightly says,
begin our charity at home ! From this egoism, if
so simple and sensible a doctrine can be called by
that highly technical term, a mild and inofieusive
altruism is naturally derived : in brief, Gassendi says
that if you have time and opportunity there is no
harm in doing good to another, provided it entails
no loss to yourself. For example, it is only nice
and kind to put the lost traveller on the right road,

212 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

if otherwise convenient ; and from this comes profit,
for the deed has its reward in that most inestimable
sense of self-satisfaction (conscientia benefacti in-
estimabilis).

3. The third law is love of life, from which comes
the impulse to marry, beget children, and rear them
with all the advantages, such as education, which
one desires for oneself.

4. The fourth law is the love of society which has
its root and beginning in the union of the sexes. It
is not unnatural for a man to love the common good,
for he considers that his own is bound up in it. The
concluding remarks are of particular interest, and to
ensure their correct understanding I shall quote the
essential passages. As Gassendi does not divorce
the state and the individual, he does not raise the
question as to how an individual, intent on his own
good, ever gets to the point of considering the good
of others. From the first the concrete individual
is sociable, and therefore thinks of the public good
as only another aspect of his own, as that in which
his own is contained (quo intelligit contineri suum).
The end of society is not realised unless the indi-
viduals enter into it in this whole-hearted way and
take it up into their very natures. They must
realise the reciprocity which society implies and
which has been expressed in the fundamental law
'quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.' (I do
not know if Gassendi preferred the negative form
for any particular reason.) ^ In addition to this the

^Merito vero quasi prima secundum naturam habetur lex ilia,
quod tibi fieri non vult, alteri ne fecei'is : quippe ea omneis leges
societatis sic continet ut nemo violet alienum jus, nisi quia legem

Ill] ETHICS 213

citizen must not only abide by the law but also be
a law-abiding creature, he must not only do good
but also he good, as Leslie Stephen has put it. The
ideal condition is reached when no laws are required
but all are just by nature.

On these concluding remarks made by Gassendi,
Thomas ^ comments thus : ' Gassendi va meme plus
loin et ici sa doctrine s'dcarte de plus en plus de
celle d'Epicure : Ajoutons-nous, dit-il, que les saints
Ecritures ont excellemment dit que ce n'est pas au
juste que la loi est impos^e : parce que celui qui est
veritablement juste ne 1' observe pas par la crainte
des peines que les lois ordonnent, mais pour I'amour
meme de la justice et pour la veneration qu'il a
pour elle, de fa§on que quand il n'y aurait ni lois,
ni magistrats, il I'observerait toujours de meme.'
' On s'explique mal en lisant ces textes les accusations
severes qu'on a si souvent port^es contre la morale
de Gassendi.' He adds in a note, ' Cette regie de
Gassendi ne nous fait- elle pas songer a celle de
Kant et aux commentaires qui I'accompagnent ?
"Agis toujours," nous dit Kant, " de telle sort que
la maxim de ton action puisse etre ^rigee en loi
universelle." '

banc violat. . . . Manifestum quoque est finem societatis esse in eo,
ut cuique suo jure frui, absque impedimento liceat : . . . debet in
illis constans et perpetua voluntas tribuendi (hoc est conservandi
atque reponendi) suum cuique jus, reperiii : idee residere in ipsis
Publicam, communemve justitiam quasi tutricem ac vindicem juris
cuiusque singularis. If this is fully realised it follows supervacaneam ,i f
publicam illani fore. . . . Finally, vir vere Justus non ob intentas ^^
a legibus poenas, quas exacturus niagistratus sit, sed ipsiusniet
Justitiae aniore reverentiaque colit, et legibus etiam niagistratibus(iue
sublatis prorsus culturus est.

^Op. cit. 'ill.

214 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

On these comments I wish to make a few remarks
in order to further elucidate the view I take of
Gassendi's position and show why I cannot agree
with the suggestion that this is Kantian. Nothing
is easier than to lay hold of the suggestive phrases
so often found in Gassendi and make them appear
to anticipate some later doctrines. I do not mean
to suggest that this is a vice to which Thomas is
addicted : on the contrary, he often appears to me
to have stinted rather than amplified his author's
meaning ; but this is exactly the sort of point in
which two readers of the same book arrive at diffe-
rent conclusions through holding different opinions
on the way the subject should be studied : it is
thus an excellent opportunity of showing how and
why I venture to difier from my predecessor in the
task of expounding Gassendi.

The scope of Gassendi's ethic is defined by the
phrase an ethic of prudence : however far Gassendi
travels from that simple statement he never pretends
to rise above the sphere thus indicated. The very
laws given in detail show how Gassendi's good man
is far more concerned with a concrete immediate
welfare than is Kant's.

I have not avoided speaking of hypothetical and
categorical phases of the law ; but the transition
from one to the other can be expressed thus : the
hypothetical law of reason says, ' if you will to
attain this, you must act thus ' : the categorical
says, ' if you are what you are, you must act
thus ' ; but the former half of the sentence is
meaningless and can be omitted, leaving the simple
law, 'act thus.' But the being- what-you-are means

III.] ETHICS 216

being a social creature and implies no trans-
cendental Self, nor even that semi-transcendental
' dignity of man ' by which Mill so nearly arrived
at Kant's position. On the contrary, it is pure
common-sense, as though one should say ' being
man and not angel, you must walk to get there':
for the ' must ' refers to the means and not the
end which is given to all, namely Pleasure.

Again, Gassendi's law is formed by abstracting all
special conditions : it is in that sense a universal
law belonging to universal man ; but it is empirical
and objective, a solution of the problem of co-exist-
ence, not transcendental or subjective, or one that
must be obeyed ' though the heavens fall.' It is
true Gassendi says, * put yourself in his place ' and
' do not do unto others what you will not have
done to yourself,' but that much is in the Bible,
and one sentence does not make a theory. Hobbes
had got as ftir as this without feeling the necessity
of going any further ; and as this element in ethics
has a very patent origin I prefer to judge it from
the point of view of its antecedents rather than
speculate on its relations to later theories. The
point to which I would draw special attention is
the nature of the universality implied in Gassendi's
words. Kant tells us the supreme principle of juris-
prudence is, ' act so that the free use of thy elective
will may not interfere with the freedom of any
man so far as it agrees with universal law,' and
this is surely what Thomas should have quoted if
anything was to be quoted out of Kant. This I
consider is exactly Gassendi's meaning, and there-
fore, so far from attaining the point of view which

216 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

Kant would call ethical, he stops at that which Kant
expressly distinguishes as legal and external.

This question of the distinction of legal and ethical
principles is all the more interesting in view of what
I consider the real root of Gassendi's opinions. If
we say that according to Gassendi ethics is a matter
of relations between individuals and therefore always
external, the question is at once asked, ' What of the
clause about the pure love of justice ? ' In my opinion
this must be explained by reference to what the will
to be good meant to the lawyer ^ ? The influence
of philosophy, especially the Stoic, on Roman law,
was to make the emphasis fall on voluntas. ' The
desire to subordinate form to substance, the word
spoken to the will it was meant to manifest, the
abstract rule to the individual case to which it
was prepared to apply it' was, we are told, strong
in Cicero's time.^ Seeing that the pages of Gassendi
are full to overflowing with quotations from Cicero,
and the terms used not only follow a distinctly legal
argument, but are themselves legal, we seem justified
in thinking that this juridical development is the
source of Gassendi's inspiration, and he means no
more than that it is better to understand and
acquiesce in the natural laws of society than be
one of the victims of the good men, i.e. those
who have learned the secret of successful living.
Gassendi may well say *be good' as well as 'do
good,' since that course will bring most pleasure :
the idea of virtue for its own sake he has already

1 V. Encycl. Britt. vol. 20, p. 696 (tenth ed.).

^'neque enim est cur putemus solam justitiam esse constantem
atque perpetuam voluntatem, ut Jurisconsulti definiunt' (vi. 113).

HI.] ETHICS 217

dismissed. It would also be well if that phrase
were discarded by some other writers : it has the
appearance of making its advocate look more like
a saint than his fellow-men : in reality it means
nothing, being a stupid abstraction, as though virtue
could be cut off from life, and the good, the beauti-
ful, and the comfortable were not ideas that reacted
on each other.

But if we do not consider that Gassendi has
reached the heights of Kant, if he has most certainly
retained much that is ' pathological ' in his ultimate,
he certainly has, in the words of Lecky, ' abundantly
proved the possibility of uniting Epicureanism with
a high code of morals.' The tone throughout is that
of the Prudens, the man of even balance and shrewd
foresight, not given to useless asceticism or wasting
extravagances, but withal full-blooded in his righteous-
ness, and rejoicing in a godliness that is profitable
unto all things. If there is nothing of the self-
sacrificing strenuousness that makes Kant's ethics
so exacting and tense, there is a lofty humanism
which strikes the golden mean between the brute
that does not aspire and the god that does not
struggle.

CHAPTER III

ON LIBERTY, FATE, AND DIVINATION

The discussion on Liberty, Fate, and Divination
forms a metaphysic of Etliic in so far as Gassendi
recognises tlie necessity of supplying an argument
for the possibility of morality. Ethically, freedom
must be taken to mean responsibility on which
depend praise and blame. The common phrase
refers freedom to the will ; but the will follows the
judgment, and it is therefore more accurate to refer
freedom to the reason. The real crisis of choice as
a psychological act comes when we have the alter-
natives before us, and then it is upon the attention
that the strain falls : we feel that strain and recog-
nise that the eflbrt thus made seals the action as
ours.

We must admit then a ratio libera in the sense
of a power to choose under given circumstances one
out of the many possibilities. The further question
as to whether we should have preferred other circum-
stances and other alternatives is postponed. The
essence of liberty is indifference : some have said
complete determination is the highest freedom ; but
this Gassendi calls spontaneity or actio e natura,
such as is exemplified in cases of gravitation. There

PT. III.] ETHICS 219

is however a correct use of the term referriiifr not
to natura ipsa but natura informata, the * second
nature.' If the will for the good is such that evil
is not possible we may say voluntas sponte agit.
As freedom has been assigned to ratio rather than
voluntas the use of voluntas here should be noticed.
The spontaneity of will is a formed habit which has
reference only to some limited sphere : it leaves the
reason unfettered, and the whole man is not com-
pletely determined. If we extend spontaneity so as
to make all action so completely determined that
only one course is possible, we get the concept of
the Beatus Homo, who, like Aristotle's perfect man,
is not on the moral scale at all. Freedom to l)e
intelligible at all must be confined to the region of
those that struggle and can err.

Gassendi uses ' indifference ' in two senses. When
we used it above, it meant freedom from prior deter-
mination or from a bias. We may take the example
of the balance : the scales must be equal in weight
themselves if they are to act truly : they must be
'indifferent' before receiving any weights. They may
become ' indifferent ' again, namely when equally
w^eighted. So the will may be indifferent when the
reason has equal arguments on both sides. Here
then the will is indifferent not to but ivitJi the
arguments, and the indifference belongs properly to
the reason. Apparently wdll is to be regarded as
suffused by intellect, not intellect by will ; and as
we are told that Practical Reason and Appetite are
as inseparable as body and shadow, we seem com-
mitted to an intellectualism which entirely overlooks
the irrational elements in human conduct. Here as

220 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

everywhere we find the concept of the man who
deliberately chooses evil has not yet made a place
for itself : consequently an ethical theory never gets
a broader view than that which an analysis of the
typical good man can give. In accordance with this
we get the feeble compromises common to all philo-
sophy of this type : evil is chosen only sub specie
boni : the will is moved by the veri species which
may be germana or fucata. It is interesting to note
that Gassendi seems to throw the blame for wrong
judgments not on the mind but on the species.
Human experience goes astray, but there is a lumen
supernaturale, and knowledge of absolute good is
absolute knowledge, which falls outside our sphere.

Having thus defined the nature and sphere of
liberty and so dismissed some errors which were
really due to illegitimate use of the term, we may
revert to an ulterior question raised above. I may
be free to choose whether I shall stay on the burning
ship or be thrown overboard, but what if I say I did
not choose the situation, and therefore my freedom
is a mockery ? That question raises the general
problem as to whether all things are not determined
from the beginning of creation, my circumstances
and my choice among them : whether, in short,
physical causation has not already swallowed up
liberty. This universal causation is called Fate or
Fortune, and these terms must now be discussed.

The question whether liberty is not precluded by
causation takes two forms according as the causation
is purely physical or regarded as divine : according,
that is, as we make it a question of Fate or pre-
destination. The former is the tenet of the atomic

Ill] ETHICS 221

school, as we have ah'cady seen, and Gassendi's reply
is identical in spirit with that which we have already
had from Lucretius : he relies on the immediate testi-
mony of the moment of conscious choice :^ whether
this is a consciousness of freedom or only failure to
detect determination we are not told, but probably
Gassendi meant more by it than Lucretius did. We
have seen already that Gassendi gives us a clear and
accurate account of the act of choice so far as the
psychology is concerned ; and his idea of the differ-
ence between the freedom of the will and the freedom
of the reason justifies us in saying that he realised
the fact that our mental processes do not unwind
themselves before the reason but are definitely pre-
sented to and sanctioned or inhibited by the reason.
There is no trace of the ' declination ' theory of
Gassendi's predecessors, which seems to indicate that
Gassendi abandons entirely the attempt to make
freedom consist in irregularity of action, which is
all that the bare assumption of declination could give
us.^ The close union between thought and move-
ment which Gassendi assumes throughout saves him
the trouble of connecting the freedom of the will
with freedom of action : they are assumed to be the
same ; but the difficulty of resolves which never
result in action would have been shelved by Gassendi
by referring them to the reason and not the will.

The second aspect of the question is due to theo-
logical influences. The problem is simple, but it may
be doubted whether it seemed so simple in those
days as it does now to more rationalistic minds.

iv. p. 237.

2 II. 840. ' illi naturae lumini quo nos liberos esse exijeriiuur.'

222 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

If, they said, God foresees action, liow can it be
free ? In order to understand the problem we must
connect it with the older form of the Peripatetics.
For the Peripatetic had already asked whether the
truth of the disjunctive judgment did not prove that
freedom was impossible. If it is true that to-morrow
it either rains or it does not, and the one excludes
the other, it follows that the weather for to-morrow
is fore-ordained, determined or necessary, and freedom
is illusion. To this the answer was easy : thought
does not determine existence and the necessity of
the disjunctive judgment is not a determination of
' reality,' as then conceived.^ But if we suppose the
mind that judges to be the mind of the Almighty,
the question begins to look serious. To say that God
can consider two alternatives without the slightest
idea which will be realised is pure trifling : when the
Thought in question is creative, it seems as though
the thought of the future must be the creation of
the future, which therefore would only await develop-
ment in time. To this Gassendi's answer is that
as God foresees the choice so He also foresees the
freedom, a rather subtle turn of dialectic which
certainly seems calculated to throw the ordinary
opponent. It is to be assumed that God foresees
that there will be a necessity for choice, and also
that choice will be in accordance with the man's

^ ' Cumque Aristoteles pi'opterea admitteret solum, ut verum, coiu-
plexum eiusmodi duarum disjuncti varum enunciationum, aut erit eras
bellum navale aut non erit : Epicurus quoque hoc solum complexum
admisit, ut verum, aut vivet eras Hermarchus aut non vivet : pervidit
enim, si alteram disjunctionum verani esse admitteret, fore ut necesse
esset vivere eras Hermarchum, aut necesse non vivere : "nulla autem
est," inquit in natura talis necessitas' (ii. 837).

III.] ETHICS 223

nature : God's omniscience therefore enables him to
foresee what the result will be, but that result is left
entirely dependent on the nature of the individual
as a free agent. This sort of argument is none too
profitable, and there seems no need to pursue it
further. It might however be noticed that the argu-
ment seems to assume that there is a distinction
between the thought of God as knowing and as
creative, possibly due to the distinction in the case
of man between reason and will ; and also that it
puts indirectly but all the more effectively tlie most
complete bar to Pantheism that can be imagined in
thus severing the will of man from the will of God.

CHAPTER IV

ON GOD

A WORD or two may liere be added on the nature
and attributes of God. We have already learnt
that Gassendi is in direct opposition to Epicurus
on this point. He treats the subject as primarily
a question of causality, and discusses it as the first
part of the subject of efficient causation. The
primary efficient cause is God : this is considered
to be proved from the character (as opposed to the
nature) of the world. The order of the universe
naturally suggests to the mind the being of some
Power that can regulate and control the march of
events. This action is not really distinct from that
of creation, for it was at creation that God gave
to matter certain determinations which it preserves.^

^ I. 316. ' Sed demus fuisse talem materiam seu Atomorum temere
volitantium infinitatera, annon difficultas est semper quomodo in
tanta ilia laxitate, et infinitate spatiorum tot Atomi convenerint
ut illico potuerint se tarn valide revincire, tarn concinne disponere,
absque revinciente et disponente causa 1 Nam quod aninialia quidem
adeo exquisite formentur, id habent ex seminibus ad certas formas
comparatis : Atomi vero ilia non se habuere ut semina : quatenus
comparata magis ad gignendum Mundum, quam ad quidvis aliud
non fuere.' This passage deserves particular attention, because it
shows how Gassendi sees that the necessity for going below
determinate to indeterminate matter is one with the necessity for
postulating a Creator : the Atom being nothing 7nai/ be everything, but
it need not be anything : the necessity falls outside the Atom as such.

PT. III.] ETHICS 225

It is not enough, says Gassendi, to say that the
atoms were created, we must also allow that they
were created in certain kinds. In this point Gassendi
is really enlarging the hint given by Lucretius, who
had introduced the idea of atoms as ' semina rerum,'
which implies that certain lines of development
were prescribed. The common phrase that one atom
unites with another because it is like it, really
involves the same introduction of a pre-determina-
tion of the possible compositions of atoms. Before
Gassendi this argument was used to disprove the
necessity of a God. But here the purpose was
really extraneous to the argument : it was the
previous intention of getting rid of that watchful
providence which seemed to Epicurus nothing but
a source of fear, that dictated the conclusion.
Gassendi, setting out with the opposite purpose,
finds these arguments equally useful for the purpose
of establishing the being of God, and there is much
to be said for his view. He quotes from Lucretius
a passage which shows that this opponent of the gods
allows all the facts which he himself uses in the
defence of the one God. We must remember also
that as a believer in the Bible Gassendi would at
least be glad to find room for the idea of special
creation : in spite of the obvious connection between
his views and a theory of development, the times
were not yet ripe for any doctrine of the origin of
species, and it was tacitly assumed that in some
way or other the species found on the earth were
fixed and immutable. Now, the idea of semina
rerum supplies the required element : if we go
right back to the atom as purely indeterminate

226 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [ft.

it should be possible to get any combinations at
any time, and this was held to be opposed to the
laws of regular production. If we stop at the
semina rerum we have our actual elements given
with a considerable amount of determination, and
Gassendi seems to have been willing to go a step
further and say that the atoms were not created
at first in their isolation, but in complex masses
which were divisible into atomic parts. He is at
any rate quite clear that to begin with the atom
is a purely abstract and hypothetical result, which
could only be asserted to be in harmony with reality
if it solved all our problems, which it does not.
We are compelled to deduce from the nature of
the universe that there is something beside the
material cause, some Power which can supply the
elements of law and order, which moreover will
explain the creation of the atoms themselves. Thus
nature brings us to God both as creator and as rector
of the universe. The concession which is made to
science is that this does not imply perpetual interfer-
ence : once created with their guiding determinations
the world of matter is left to work out its own
laws.

The recognition of the reign of law, which was
so strongly insisted on by Lucretius, is now turned
against the materialist. The one thing that atoms
in themselves could not produce would be laws ;
and as law is, from the subjective point of view,
intelligibility, we may say that the atoms are not
capable of evolving an intelligible world. But the
intelligibility of the world is above all things that
which science demonstrates in the observation of

III.] ETHICS 227

laws, and it is thus a means by which the nature
of the world as intelligible is unfolded before us.
But while it explains what the intelligible is, in
reference to its content, it does not explain how
the intelligibility itself came to be there ; and that
is where we require to supplement our science with
Faith and Reason.

Having thus established the a priori need for a
God, we turn to the question of the ways by which
we get our knowledge of God. The first is Faith ^
and the second Reason ; but the difference between
these is not very great : in both the reaction of our
minds is the convincing point. As to faith, it is
the belief which arises in our minds when we hear
a description of God : we find that the idea has an
inner response which compels us to believe. The
effect is much the same in the case of reason : there
is formed within us an ' anticipatio ' as a sort of
residual impression produced by experience. This
is in a sense a priori. It is not derived from the
senses, but exhibited on the occasion of the sense-

* The justification of faith is somewhat over-subtle : ' jam vero
ista quae per sensus comprehenduntur occasiones sunt quae nos ad
formandum de Deo Anticipationem inducunt. Cum sit autem
duplex potissimum sensus, auditus scilicet et visus,' etc. (i. 292).
To auditus pertains the anticipatio which arises from hearing
about God, i.e. from authority, primarily the authority of the
Bible. It should be noted that this knowledge of God is an
intuition, like that which grasps axiomatic truths. In both cases
belief is due to 'seeing' (intuiting) the necessity of the conjunction
of ideas expressed in the words : it is therefore relative to the
individual's development. This argument is two-edged : for we
can either say ' idiots do not comprehend God,' or, ' those who do
not comprehend God are idiots' [ut quantumcunque aliqui hominum
mutili aut nascantur aut fiunt, hoc non obstat quin homines dicantur
habere ab ipsa natura suorum membrorum integritatem ita quantum-
vis aliqui aut nascantur aut fiant Athei, etc., i. 290.]

228 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

impressions calling it forth. Technically we have
to distinguish between an ' anticipatio ' got directly
by comprehension, and those which are got indirectly
by comparison. The latter are formed on the basis
of sense-impressions, but are rational, requiring an
activity that goes beyond the senses, and constructs
what is never given to the senses. It is by this
latter faculty that we attain the idea of God, which
is thus a concept. If we ask whether this is innate,
the answer is that the faculty is innate, but its
exercise is dependent on the occasion furnished by
the senses.

As to the relation of God to man, we are told
that Epicurus erred in denying a special providence
watching over man. At the same time man is a
free agent, his freedom being the gift of God that
he may work out his own salvation,^ Religion, as
is natural, produces in Gassendi a cheerful optimism :
the good man does indeed suffer evils, and the
sinners seem to flourish unduly ; but the good man
himself acknowledges that his sufferings are profit-
able, and all things work together for good, which
is at least a tribute to the goodness of the good
man ; but if he was less good perhaps his opinion
might have been less in accord with our philosopher's
creed.

With regard to this theology, some have said
that it is no part of Gassendi's real philosophy.
This I think is wrong. Apart from the question of

^ I. 331. 'Ad alia ut accedam, tametsi nos Deus sinit res nostras
agere : non minus idcirco illi curae sumus. Quippe qui naturS,
sumus liberi, idcirco nos, quae maxima ipsiua benignitas est, frui
patitur libertate nostra, ac nos interea procul dubio versus meliora
dirigit. Etenim vices parentis gerit,' etc.

III.] ETHICS 229

religious training and fear of the Church, the prin-
ciples of Gassendi's philosophy require that the idea
of causality should carry us beyond the physical
world of things. If it be necessary to go beyond
at all there seems no particular objection to the
acceptance of theism, for pantheism is out of the
question. It is as a metaphysical requirement that
Gassendi introduces God, not as an appendix to his
philosophy, but right in the middle, at the heart of
the subject, when he is dealing with causation. The
idea is for his times considerably refined: it would
probably have been hailed at a later time as deism,
and unconsciously goes very near to that as it is, for
the world manages its own ajQfairs (vi. 155), and
even man is only watched from afar with paternal
interest and led on to his self-fulfilment indirectly;
but in spirit there is certainly no suggestion of such
a conclusion, and God is theoretically rector mundi
in the fullest sense of the term. The question which
usually proves so great a stumbling block, that of
personality, is not raised by Gassendi. He seems to
have found no difficulty in the idea of human per-
sonality, and consequently none in that of God ;
though he is careful to point out that anthropo-
morphism is not essential, he does not reconcile that
with the converse assertion he frequently makes,
that man is created in the likeness of God.

NOTE ON DECLINATION

Gassendi discusses this point of declination very
fully. When I say (page 221) there is no trace of
it I mean that Gassendi does not build his own
theory on it in any way. As this ' declination '
has been the subject of much dispute, it will be
worth while comparing Gassendi's view of it with
later opinions. The most important of these later
opinions is that of Guyau in La Morale d'Ejpicure
(2nd edition, Paris, 1881). The whole position taken
up by Guyau is criticised by Masson {The Atomic
Theory of Lucretius), and I shall first state that
position and the criticisms made by Masson :

'M. Guyau's explanation of the subject is in
several respects a novel one, and especially so in
regard to one point, viz. his account of Epicurus'
teaching as to Chance and the very important part
which M. Guyau supposes it to play in the Epi-
curean philosophy. According to him Epicurus
believed that the element of chance which we see
at work in the world every day is the manifestation
and outcome of a principle of " Spontaneity" existing
in Nature. This "Spontaneity" is the consequence
of the power of Declination possessed by the Atoms.
Thus Epicurus believed both Free-will in man and
the element of Chance in the world around him to

PT. III.] ETHICS 231

be the result of the same power of Atomic Declina-
tion in its twofold working. Epicurus, says M.
Guyau, after having combated the religious idea of
Providence or Divine caprice, found himself con-
fronted with the scientific idea of necessity. Thus
his main philosophic aim was to escape from the
notion of gods interfering with nature on the one
hand and to steer clear of the doctrine of fate on
the other. It is well known that Epicurus solved
the difficulty in a way satisfactory to himself, by
assigning to the atoms the power of declination.
But for this power the world could never have
come into existence, for otherwise the atoms could
never have come into contact and produced the
earth or the life upon it. It is the same power of
spontaneous movement in the atoms of the soul
which alone originates and renders possible the
Free-will of man. ... It is commonly thought,' M.
Guyau continues, ' that Contingency, placed by Epi-
curus at the origin of things, existed, according to
him, at the origin alone, and then disappeared in
order again to leave room for necessity. The world
once made, the machine once constructed, why
should it not go on by itself without any need of
invoking any other force than Necessity ? ' (Masson,
pp. 210-214).

Further quotation shows that M. Guyau thinks,
in opposition to this common view, that Spontaneity
is always and everywhere active. The objection that
all production would then be of the nature of a
miracle is rebutted by saying that the idea of
miracles implies an agent outside the natural order ;
but here the agency is in the things whose sum is

232 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

nature : moreover the effect produced by this spon-
taneity would be very slight. (Masson rightly
points out that this is wrong : ' the spontaneous
movement of a mass of matter, however slight,
might still be able to give the initial impulse
required to let loose a mighty force.')

The result of M. Guyau's position is then that
' the Free-will which man possesses will exist every-
where in inferior degrees, but always ready to awake
and act. . . . The atoms which form our bodies
must possess a power of Free-will analogous to our
own, more or less extensive, more or less conscious,
but real.' The objections Masson makes to this,
apart from sundry obvious misinterpretations of
Lucretius,^ are that it destroys the concept of Law
in the universe which is so prominent a feature in
both Epicurus and Lucretius, and assumes, what
could not be proved from Epicurus, that masses of
matter would have the same freedom that the
atoms have.

The root of M. Guyau's view is his opinion that
'in Epicureanism there are no inconsistencies, but
only a few false deductions.' This cannot be allowed
if it means that Epicurus consciously recognised
both the fundamental difference of mind from matter
and the necessity for a final reunification. The great
error which it appears to me that M. Guyau has
committed is that he does not recognise the difference
of the ancient and modern methods : he looks at the
question himself from the standpoint of conscious-
ness as most important, and so inverts the position

^ E.g. nee ratione loci for regione loci in the passage quoted,
p. 2.36.

III.] ETHICS 233

of Epicurus. To this he was doubtless led by the
famous passage ^ of Lucretius. If we now quote the
remarks of Gassendi, we shall see how the matter
presented itself to one who was less biassed by
modern points of view, and probably far nearer the
truth.

' Videtur itaque Epicurus ex eo saltem laudandus
quod vel auctore ipso Plutarcho, nullum non movit
lapidem ut libertatem arbitrii intemeratam tueretur :
tametsi ad versus Democritum non habuerit aliud
paratius effugium quam declinationem illam ato-
morum, dictam Plutarcho . . . rem adeo exilem, ac
tarn vilis pretii. Ecquonam porro modo potuit hocce
qualecunque commentum Libertati accomodare ?
Forte, quatenus cum attenderet esse in animalibus
et in hominibus praesertim, triplex genus motus,
nempe Naturalem Violentum et Voluntarium seu
Liberum, existimavit primariam causam petendam
esse ex atomis, a quibus omnis motus principium.
Quare et velle potuit radicem motus naturalis esse
ipsum motum Primarium atomis ingenitum, eum
scilicet qui dicitur gravitatis et ponderis et quo
Atomus dicitur ad lineam sive perpendiculum ferri.
Violenti vero motum Reflexionis seu ilium qui est
ex occursione, seu plaga ictuque alterius. Denique
Voluntarii ipsum motum declinationis cui nulla regio
determinata, nullum tempus praefixum est. . . .
Verumtamen videtur fuisse excepturus Democritus
nullatenus posse Epicurum commentatione hac adju-
vari. Quoniam, cum hie declinationis motus tam sit
naturalis atomisve congeneus, quam qui ad perpen-
diculum est (quippe quern non extrinsecus, sed a

1 Quoted below, p. 236.

234 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

seipsis habeant) ideo tarn fient omnia Fato, tametsi
ille concedatur, quam si admissus non fuerit : cum
pari semper necessitate ea quae eveniunt sint eventura
pro varietate motuum, ictuum, repulsuum, clina-
minum, etc., aeterna quadam serie et quasi catena
sese consequentium : ac speciatim quidem quod ad
cognitionem appetitionemque attinet, ad quam referri
libertas debet. Etenim ut mens, sive animus earn
libertatem explicet, qua appetit, v.c. Pomum, debet
primo imago seu species visibilis pomi ex ipso pro-
cedere, trajectaque per oculos percellere mentem, ut
illud cognoscat. Pomum autem, ut speciem in oculum
transmitteret, debuit tali loco reponi ab eo, qui ex
arbore ipsum collegisset, collectumve aliunde habuisset.
Arbor vero praeter Solis radios, humoremque et terram,
unde adolesceret, etiam granum babuit, unde nasce-
retur. Id granum fuit ex pomo alio, hocque ex alia
arbore, huic non alio loco nee alio tempore sata : atque
ita retrogrediendo ad usque mundi initium, quo et
terra et terrena semina ortum habuere ex concur-
sionibus complexionibusque atomorum, quae ut iis
locis iisque modis convenirent, debuerunt exinde non
aliunde accedere : et ut accederent, debuerunt aut
ex inani aut ex alio sive uno sive multiplici Mundo
ita advenire ut per illud sive in illo ac isto non alio
modo fuerint : atque ita porro per totam antece-
dentem aeternitatem. Deinde, si animus quoque
coaluit ex atomis, debuere necessario tales atomi
contineri in parentum seminibus, debuere eo confluere
ex certis cibis, aere, sole. Debuere lii cibi, non alii
assumi : debuere ipsorum caeterae causae ex his
illisque non aliis esse atque ita rursus ab aeterno
tempore quod idem pari modo eveniet, quamcunque

III.] ETHICS 235

ex causis quasi lateralibus, et concomitantibus quae
in immensum pene excrescunt, quovis modo assump-
seris adeo ut cuicunque illarum ex tota serie te
addixeris, deprehensus si retexendo, ipsam ea con-
catenatione teneri cum aliis ut ex tota serie ad tale
usque momentum producta, necessum fuerit consequi
huiusmodi appetitionem. Scilicet ex aeterno usque
causae causis sic cohaeserunt ut postremae istae
denique concurrerint, quibus positis mens non potuit
non cognoscere et appetere pomum. Quodque de
causis dicitur, idem semper est intelligendum de
atomis, ex quibus conflantur et ex quarum motibus
variis motiones derivant, propter quas sunt causae.
Praetereo autem, quod Cicero videatur eodem respex-
isse. . . . Adhaec autem, ut aliquid ex ipsa Epicuri
mente probabiliter respondeatur : assumendum est eam
esse animorum contexturam ex atomis, ut quae in ea
sunt declinantes, eam rigiditatem quae ex aliis est,
flectant, naturamque flexibilem in omnem partem
faciant : in quo sit radix libertatis. Quare et animum
allectum cuiuspiam rei imagine, abripi quidem versus
illam : sed non ita tamen quin, si aliunde imago alia
occurrerit, allici ea rursus et abripi posset : adeo, ut
a priore deflectens, constituatur quasi in bivio et ad
utramque partem indifferens sit : quod sane est
liberum esse. Quod animus autem, cum sit ita
fiexilis ac indifferens, sese ad unam potius partem
quam ad aliam determinet, id oriri ex impressione
unius imaginis vehementiore, quam alterius : sicque
election em sequi ad apprehensionem eius rei quam
imago sive bonum sive meliorem exhibuerit. Denique
animum, ubi quippiam elegit, aut voluit, esse quasi
principem machinam, ex cuius motione, intercedenti-

236 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

busque spiritibus, qui per totum corpus discurrunt,
facultates omnes, ac membra exsequendo destinata,
excitentur eoque feratur quo tendit ipse animus.
Facere hue possunt, quae caiiit Lucretius,

* Declinamus item raotus, nee tempore certo,
iiec regiorie loci certa, sed ubi ipsa tulit mens.
Nam dubio procul his rebus sua quoique voluntas
principium dat : et heinc motus per membra vagantur.

' Quo loco declinare est flectere ac dirigere motus :
illudque nee tempore certo, etc., notat cum ipsam
animi indifferentiam seu libertatem, quatenus animus
ex se non ad ista potius quam ad ilia fertur : tum
varietatem rerum occasionum, imaginum, quae neque
semper, neque eaedem neque eodem modo in eum
incidunt ipsumque alliciunt.'

This is by no means an easy passage to com-
prehend, but if the mind of the reader can be
cleared of all presuppositions, he will see that the
following points are established :

(1) Epicurus is opposed to Democritus.

(2) His answer to Democritus is based on the

idea of Declination.

(3) His position would not be overthrown by

any objection urged by the supporter of
Democritus to the effect that Declination
is an original force, and therefore only one
more form of determination.

(4) His own doctrine proves that the mind is
capable of aiiy motion, and therefore up
to the time it moves is wholly undeter-
mined : it moves entirely in accordance
with the laws of force, and is therefore
free.

III.] ETHICS 237

This last is the point at which it seems to me
that our guides have led us astray. M. Guyau's
spontaneity surely means that the Will can and
does act in wholly indeterminate ways, i.e. in ways
which have no relation at all to the other co-existent
forces. Masson argues that this is a breach of law,
and therefore would not have been tolerated through-
out Nature (M. Guyau having thought it universal),
but is none the less valid of the mind : the ' fatis
avolsa potestas ' of Lucretius seems to have made
him think Lucretius exempted the Will from deter-
mination, though surely Lucretius must have seen
that one lawless element makes the whole lawless.
Masson's assumption seems to be that Law holds
in Nature only : hence Guyau's spontaneity in nature
must be a fiction. But the animus which we labour
to make free is also in Nature ; and therefore its
spontaneity is a fiction. Although Masson speaks
of ' the volition of the dead atoms,' I think he has
not really succeeded in putting himself entirely on
the material side and looking at things in the way
Lucretius did. If we can once begin to discuss
freedom without reference to consciousness as the
agent, if, that is, we can comprehend a freedom
revealed to consciousness but not dependent on
consciousness, we shall be on the right road.

Lucretius exactly formulates the position in the
phrase 'fatisque avolsa potestas.' The apparent
meaning of that is ' a power plucked from the grip
of Fate,' i.e. saved from the inexorable laws. But
that is just what it does not mean : on the contrary,
it means ' saved from the Fates in order to be
subject to law.' The Fates denote here the power

238 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt

which overrules physical laws, which is therefore^
from the point of view of Physics, an incommen-
surable quantity. Plato gives us this idea of Fate
in the Republic, Bk. x., for there we see that the
will of the individual is destined at one fell stroke
to follow out the chosen course of a whole life-
time. Now, express this in terms of Force. Two
forces act on the body ^ : as a result it moves in
direction x.

This is according to law : neither / nor /' produces
the direction x by itself — bat both together produce

a result which, given the factors involved, is always
calculable. Now if A moved in the direction M
or N, or any direction other than x, the reason
for that movement could only be found in some
determinant other than the given forces, i.e. in Fate.
Fate, then, is the contrary of regular law-abiding
action. Hence Gassendi says, ' Explodenda Democriti
sententia est . . . ilia Epicuri defendi quidem potest
quatenus Fatum et Naturam naturaleisve causas res
esse synonymas ducit.' It was then by making Fate
the same as Nature that Epicurus defended freedom \
This seems paradoxical, but the difference lies just
in this, that Democritus said Nature is Fate, and
in any case we are bound hand and foot: Epicurus
said Fate is nothing unless it is law, and the law
is my nature, not something ' extrinsecus,' over-
ruling me. So long, says Epicurus, as natural forces

III.] ETHICS 239

alone control action, I am free, for I am a real agent,
and when I say, / do this, there is no illusion : I
take my place among the forces of the world and
am content.

But if this is the opinion of Epicurus, what more
do we want ? Why does not Gassendi accept it ?
The answer is, that after all for us, as we now look
at it, with God and the hereafter to keep in mind,
this theory is useless. In it the future counts for
nothing : the forces all act a tergo : the what-I-am-
now alone counts : the future being, that which is
not, cannot have any place in a theory that aims
to be purely physical. As soon as Providence is
assumed and its implications examined, as they had
been in the literature of Christian philosophy, we
get the idea of end, and the possibility of the
consciousness of ends. Then the doctrine of Epicurus
must be relegated to the sphere of the animals, from
which it had been taken : the sphere that is of
those beings that move and think, but do not move
because of the thought.

Such is Gassendi's view and my conception of
its meaning. I add one or two remarks by way
of elucidation for which Gassendi is not responsible.
It might easily be said that Epicurus admitted the
influence of future happiness as determining present
choice, and therefore must have gone beyond the
sphere of physical action. To this there are two
answers: (l) The thought of the future is a present
thought, and therefore belongs, as active factor, to
the forces which are now and here. This I think
Epicurus would not have used. (2) The real answer
lies in the point that it is Freedom of the Will we

240 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [ft.

are discussing, not freedom of choice. Locke has
put this point very well. ' This then is evident,
that in all proposals of present action, a man is
not at liberty to will or not to will, because he
cannot forbear willing : liberty consisting in a power
to act, or to forbear acting, and in that only. For
a man that sits still is said yet to be at liberty,
because he can walk if he wills it. But if a man
sitting still has not a power to remove himself, he
is not at liberty : so likewise a man falling down a
precipice, though in motion, is not at liberty, because
he cannot stop that motion if he would ' (Essay,
Bk. ii. ch. xxi. § 24). This latter clause exactly
expresses the idea which Gassendi attributes to
r\r Epicurus. It is not a question of being free to

/ choose, but of being able to do what one does

choose. Freedom of choice belongs to Ratio : would
any Greek talk of freedom of Reason ? Certainly
not an Epicurean : for him it is enough that the
action begins from the man, the ap-^^J] rm Trpa^ecDs,
the voluntas principium dat of Lucretius.

At the close of Gassendi's exposition quoted above,
we see that he says ' the more vehement image or
impression determines action, i.e. we always follow
the better course. The words vehementior and
melior come so close together that it seems
impossible to suppose that Gassendi was not con-
scious of the transition. On the contrary, I think
it is an intentional juxtaposition expressing his
opinion that for Epicurus and Lucretius the better
must always be the stronger : in which he was
probably right. For his own theory this is a diffi-
culty, and perhaps explains why he transfers the

III.] ETHICS -241

liberty from voluntas to Ratio, a procedure which
is on the whole retrograde, and theological rather
than philosophical. After the Pelagian controversy
and the subtleties of posse non peccare and non posse
peccare, the moral quality of volitions was a more
important question than the efficiency of the will
as a factor in a world of motions.

PART IV. GENERAL REVIEW

245

CHAPTER I
GASSENDI

We have now passed in review all the main features
of Gassendi's thought : what are we to say of it
as a whole 1

Here and there in the literature of philosophy one
finds references to Gassendi. As a rule they are
patently second hand, and often accompanied by the
remark that Gassendi has been unduly neglected,
without however any clear indications of what is to
be expected from the study of his works. ^ We are
now in a position to consider the value of Gassendi's
writings and show the reasons why he was neglected
and also why he deserves a better fate.

The first phase of modern philosophy as it is
described by historians was marked by the revival
of ancient systems and a tendency to revert to pre-
Aristotelian doctrines, especially atomism. No one
however attempted to reconstruct atomism as a
system : the atomistic principles only afiected certain
phases of the teaching of contemporary philosophers :
until at last Gassendi published his work. Un-
fortunately, it came too late to catch the general ear :

246 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

already the keynote of modern thought had been
struck and a new point of view adopted by specu-
lative thinkers.^ The direct objectivity of Gassendi
could no longer find a responsive audience when
every mind was busily developing the new notions
of a subjective philosophy. Gassendi was ranked
among the ancients, true descendant of Democritus
and Epicurus : the world wanted no more of the
ancients : we, they said, are the ancients, and in the
history of thought the last is ripest and best. Not
only was Gassendi thus hampered by his relations
and discounted by being a disciple of Epicurus, he
was also regarded as materialistic, not in the sense
in which we might use the term now, but in opposi-
tion to the idealism which was daily gaining ground.
Descartes had at least succeeded in dividing mind
from matter, and so far laid the foundation of the
subjective movement in philosophy ; and for those
who cherished this position Gassendi's view of the
universe could have no attractions. The all-absorbing
question now was how to heal the wound that
thought had inflicted on itself, how to bridge the
gulf that these convulsions had made in the once
solid world of Being. Given a dualism of this kind

^Thomas {op. cit. p. 24) gives two reasons for the neglect into
which Gassendi fell. The first, quoted from Brucker, is that Gassendi
was too modest : his manner was so hesitating that it failed to win
the confidence of the reader. The other is want of clearness and
conciseness in the exposition. I think the true reason is rather to
be found in the fact that the necessity of getting down to nature was
not yet fully recognised, and the ideas of systen) and subjectivity
were more akin to the spirit of the times than those of content
and empirical classification. Thomas is certainly right in saying that
Gassendi -was as much damaged by his friends as his foes: Epicurus in
one way, and Bernier in another, combined to damage his prospects.

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 247

the central problem must be that of re- unification,
and so, as a matter of history, it was, from Descartes
down to Kant. On the very edge of this era stands
Gassendi, as it were the last of the old school : after
him comes the long period of restless searching, with
its slow growth, through many abstractions to a new
concreteness and fresh satisfaction in the discovery
that after all the world is my world.

Across this sea of strife we look back to-day, and
are surprised to see how near to us that last beacon
seems : the longer way takes much time, and in the
end we are further on, but not so far as we could
wish, seeing how many toilsome years have elapsed.
We have still with us the old problems, many of
them not yet entirely obscured by the multiplicity
of solutions : we have still the old antagonisms, and
philosophers strive in vain to repudiate the titles
with which the critics successfully label them. I
am far enough from suggesting that man has not
progressed in the sphere of thought just as un-
doubtedly as he has progressed in the sciences and
in adaptation to his world ; but as one reads the
pages of Gassendi there grows the feeling that this
was the ' synthetic philosophy ' of its age : that
Gassendi aimed to do what Herbert Spencer has
aimed to do : that the difference of their material
is a significant comment on what has been done ;
and their similarity an equally significant connnent
on what has not been achieved : while between
Gassendi and his opponent lay just the kind of gulf
that lies now between the Spencerian and the noii-
Spencerian.^

iSee p. 305.

248 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pi\

II.

In the list given by Ueberweg of those who revived
ancient doctrines we find ' Epicureanism by Gassendi.*
Further on we find a note on Gassendi which runs
thus : ' Gassendi sought to defend Epicureanism
against unjustified attacks, and to show that it
contained the best doctrine of physics, and at the
same time to combine it with Christian theology.
Gassendi's atomism is less a doctrine of dead nature
than is that of Epicurus. . . . From its relation to
the investigation of nature in modern times, Gassendi's
revival of Epicureanism is of far greater historical
importance than the renewal of any other system :
not unjustly does F. A. Lange consider Gassendi as
the one who may properly be styled the renewer in
modern times of systematic materialism.' These are
cautious words, and obviously more of Lange than
Gassendi : we may take them as our text, and see
how far they are true.

The passage quoted gives us two descriptions of
Gassendi : his philosophy is (1) Epicureanism modified
and (2) systematic materialism. The former defini-
tion does not help us much unless we know more
accurately how far the Epicureanism was modified,
and in any case Epicureanism was never a term of
very exact significance. We can leave this and take
up the second title, materialist, a label generally
affixed to the name of Gassendi and usually justified
by a reference to Lange, who seems to have been
more anxious to find a materialist in Gassendi than
to find out whether Gassendi was a materialist.

To define this term materialist we shall have to-

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 249

work backwards. It means in common use a phil-
osophy which starts from the object as something
distinct from and opposed to the subject. ' No object
without subject ' is, according to Schopenhauer, the
principle which for ever makes materiaUsm im-
possible : from which it seems to follow that object
without subject is the peculiar theme of the mate-
rialist. Certainly the materialist does not start from
' notion ' or ego, and so ftxr forth he is the antithesis
of the idealist. But materialism implies far more
than this : it implies a view of the universe as
altogether objective, as all object and no subject, as
a self- organising, self-subsisting whole, known only
as it is reflected in a consciousness which is a by-
product of its activities. Whether we take materialist ;
in the widest or the narrowest sense in which it can j
be used, one point is essential : mind must be a
function of matter, and this alone justifies us in
denying that Gassendi is properly a materialist. At
the same time he is certainly not an idealist. But
the necessity of dividing all philosophers into one
or other of these classes is what we are prepared to
dispute ; and, finally, we may discover a more suitable
title than materialist while clearing our minds on
this point.

To begin with the historical aspect, Gassendi as
related to the ancients might more suitably be called
a physical than a materialist philosopher. After
Kant, idealism takes as its motto, ' no object without
subject.' Before that era of criticism there was
idealism of another kind that retained many objects
that were only partially, if at all, dependent on a
subject. The Cartesian doctrine is rightly called

250 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

idealism in so far as it laid stress on the mind as
the centre of our universe of knowledge ; but that
world of knowledge lay in an ocean of Being that
stretched beyond its limits, unknown and as yet
unnamed. This idealism, the idealism that tells us
our world is known only through the mediation of
ideas, and so keeps asunder that world and the
cosmos of ideas, is far different from critical or
transcendental idealism, and its opposite is not mate-
rialism in the modern sense at all. How could it be,
seeing that the idealism in question kept its matter
a solid ' adverse occupant of space ' and carried the
reality of this matter up to the very threshold of
thought, even there trying to retain its being for
thought as the thought itself, and convert its gross-
ness into thought by refining it to its subtlest forms ?
History has done justice to Descartes, but hardly
to Gassendi. Even as contemporaries they were
mainly regarded as rival physicists, the one for atoms
and the other for vortices : yet one cannot help
thinking that if Gassendi had possessed the clearness
and directness of Descartes' or Hobbes' style he might
have commanded as much recognition as either. If
we take Descartes as the typical figure of this period,
and call his doctrine material idealism/ we shall
have a point which may enable us to determine the
bearings of Gassendi. The feature of that idealism is
that it makes extra-mental reality uncertain, or, to
put it more vigorously, draws the line of real and
unreal at the boundary of one's own skin. This
Gassendi does not do, so that title does not include
him.

^ I take the phrase from Kant.

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 251

It appeared promising for a moment, since the
ground of that distinction of inner and outer exist-
ents lies in the doctrine of representative ideas. This
doctrine we have also in Gassendi in the form of
symbolic brain movements, so that a similar result
might have been expected : as it is not forthcoming
we cannot say more, but go back and start again.

If we look once more we see another common
point. In a sense Descartes and Gassendi both start
from experience ; both are in a way empirical. But
Descartes begins with a prejudice for rationalism :
the ' cogito ergo sum ' may not have been the actual
starting point of his system, but its final emergence
has been declared in the verdict of history to
guarantee rationalism as the tone of the system.
As compared with this, Gassendi works with a pure
experience.

Once more we digress to wrestle with our termi-
nology. What is experience as a basis of philosophy ?
In the language of the philosophy of to-day it is to
be taken as the most comprehensive of all terms, the
name for reality as it lives and moves, not merely
in us, or in thought, but in itself. From it, as
derivatives, spring subject and object and all other
antitheses, and the work of philosophy is the analysis
of this experience. This brings us back to idealism
as Schopenhauer defined it. This is the result of the
Kantian standpoint and his analysis of the object.
Before Kant the object was the same as the thing, a
given and not a product ; and thought based on
experience was called empirical, now become an
opprobrious epithet. Empiricism then is the science
of experience in this cruder form. But as a rule

252 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

'empirical' as a philosophical label means subjective
in the sense that Locke's psychological method is
empirical. Philosophy rapidly took this psycho-
logical trend : it was the human understanding to
which all attention was directed, and with that the
question arose, ' how can I know what I know ? '
drawing the curiosity of man after it with irresistible
attraction.

Compared with these later enquirers (Berkeley and
Hume) the position of Locke, and still more of
Descartes, appears crude and uncritical. Yet there
is an element of strength and comprehensiveness
about them that is reassuring. This is due to their
fresh simplicity in believing that what is actual must
be possible, that what our experience gives us must
be accepted even if it cannot be explained. Experi-
ence is then taken in the broadest possible way, and
its truth accepted. Descartes, for example, finds his
theory divides mind from matter : yet in experience
they are one, and so they are again united : the
critic pounces on the ' inconsistency,' but Descartes
does better in bending theory to fact, as he knew it,
than in distorting fact to save the theory. Modern
philosophy has too much of the element that damned
scholasticism when it casts the theory first and fits
in the facts after. The shibboleth of theory plays
in modern thought the part that authority played in
scholasticism. We lay down for ourselves laws of
what we must have, and in the seclusion of the study
we get it : outside the reality breaks loose, and we
envy Hume, who found the problems that seemed to
mock his efforts vanish when he stepped out into the
sunshine.

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 253

Descartes stood for sincerity as well as he could.
Gassendi too, barring graceful concessions to the
dogmas he neglects, strikes us as sincere. For both,
Experience was the last great fact, the first great
synthesis that no theoretical analysis could destroy.
For Gassendi experience is life, the life of thought
and will and feeling, and the subject matter of
philosophy. Hence his philosophy is grounded in
experience ; but it is an analysis of the experienced,
.not of experience itself : it is a mapping out, so far as
may be an organisation, of the known, the felt and
the willed : not a criticism of knowing or feeling or
willing itself. As yet criticism is far off, looming in
the horizon of the future : the darkness of the night
is passing away, and in the day of freedom just
beginning men rejoice in sorting out, arranging and
setting in order the realities with which they feel
themselves in living contact now that they no longer
need to see the world throu2;h the veil of traditions.

Gassendi's basis is this experience, to him at least
not known as crude, and we may call him empirical,
hoping that the term is sufficiently explained.
Empiricism includes empirical idealism and empirical
realism. The former ' makes ideas into things,' and
gets rid of the world in the sense that Berkeley
did.^ With this Gassendi has nothing to do : he
must therefore be classed as an empirical realist.
But neither is this quite satisfactory. It is true we
have the atoms, but atomism has more forms than

1 ' I shall not therefore be surprised if spme men imagine that I run
into the enthusiasm of Malebranche. . . . He asserts an absolute
external world, which I deny ' (the Second Dialogue between Hylas
and Philonous).

254 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pi'.

one. It may be (l) pure physical atomism, such as
we associate with the name of Democritus ; or (2)
pure idealistic atomism, such as Leibnitz attempted ;
or finally, (3) a mixed form combining the atomistic
theory of the world with a non-materialistic view
of the mind. This is the construction of things
Gassendi gives us, and in this lies the great difficulty
of properly understanding him. The difficulty can of
course be overcome by saying that Gassendi was half-
hearted or allowed his theory to be ruined by his
orthodoxy. But is there any proof of this ? None,
I think, except that his construction does not work
out as some have thought it ought to ; does not
present the unity we demand in modern works. But
it is the prerogative of systems which start from
consciousness to attain unity to a degree we never
find in other systems ; and the lack of unity is
perhaps not so serious as appears at first, for if
matter does not carry us to the end we may find
that our pr-incij^les do, and we at least remain faithful
to our basis, experience.

The name atomism naturally allies itself with
materialism. We are accustomed to atomic theories
which belong to physical science, and therefore
remain within the realm of matter. But if we
reflect on atomism as a philosophical principle we
see that it is essentially a method or principle, not
a given matter, and therefore may be applied as a
principle to any given. I do not say that it can
rightly be applied ; but only that it does not of
itself necessitate matter being the only constituent
principle. Just as evolution is a way of looking
at things and does not tell us what that which

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 255

evolves must be in other respects, so atomism
merely lays down the law that a complex total
must be composed of indivisible parts : whether the
parts are material or spiritual is of no concern to
atomism as such. This is clear if we think of Locke's
atomic psychology, of W. K. Clifford's atomism, or
of Leibnitz ; and we need not fear the accusa-
tion of reversing history, for Giordano Bruno had
grasped before Gassendi the significance for idealism
of an atomistic doctrine, and rightly seen that
the speculative aspect of atomism is simply the
question of real minima. ^ The principle upon
which atomism works is that the ultimate is an
individuum, and this is not in any way touched
by having a spiritual as well as a material order :
whether there are to be more orders than one is a
question that must be decided on its own merits,
and Gassendi's reason for having a soul that is not
material is that he finds in his own life grounds
for belief in an immaterial entity, in other words
he takes it up from experience. For the present
we are content to point out that there is this
spiritual reality, and that it forms an integral pa it
of the whole doctrine. We must therefore be careful
to take our title ' empirical realism ' strictly to mean

^On this point Gassendi in his correspondence diverged into
humour with a translation of duo quaedam epigrammata ex Antho-
logia : I quote the second :

' Ex Atomis Epicurus ait consistere Munduni,
Alcime, quippe putans his nihil esse minus.
At si novisset Diophantum, constituisset
Ex ipso potius, qui minor est Atomis.
Aut alia ex Atomis texens, ipsas potuisset
Ex Diophanto Atomos coraposuisse prius.'

(VI. 160.)

256 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

that our ground is experience, and our world is real
in the anti-idealistic sense that it is not made by
mind.

III.

Having defined the scope of this philosophy a
few remarks may be added on its main features :
as our account of Gassendi is itself nothing but
a summary, there is no need to add summary to
summary, and nothing will be said here beyond
what is necessary to indicate the view I take of
the philosophy as a whole.

Gassendi' s philosophy is an analysis of our
universe, attained by examining experience, and
presented synthetically, or we might say syntacti-
cally (in a syntagma). As synthetic the presentation
has a definite principle upon which it is worked out.
This principle is the idea of ascending degrees of
complexity. The unit is the atom : things are com-
plexes of atoms : and each degree of complexity
has its own peculiar attributes. We thus get a
scale of Being; as follows :

(a) The atomic scale.

(1) Primary complexes of atoms (kinds of earth).

(2) Secondary complexes of atoms (metals, etc.).

(3) Primary organic complexes : plants.

(4) Secondary organic complexes : animals.

This does not by any means exhaust the content
of reality : we have as well as (a) the atomic scale
also,

(b) Time and Space.

(d) God.

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 257

About Time and Space Gassendi has little to tell
us : they were just the elements that could not be
satisfactorily treated on the basis which he had
chosen. But the difficulties which might have
made it impossible for him to proceed were in a
way solved by the method itself. If the world of
nature is resolvable into units that are ultimate,
impenetrable and irreducible, is there any objection
to the universe also being regarded as a sum of
irreducibles ? Gassendi often speaks of the universe
as a whole, and obviously thought of it as in some
way one : the way that unity is to be conceived is
an interesting question.

Must the whole be one ? In some form or other
philosophy has always answered yes. But there are
three distinct phases to this answer. The last is
that which is made possible by the subjective
character of modern idealism, in which the unity
is derived from the formative factor in know-
ledge. The first was the naive unity which appears
possible to a mind that can ask without qualifica-
tion for a single material principle. These extremes
have one point in common : they both regard the
unity as necessarily belonging to the constitutive
principle : they want to weave the universe of one
stufl" and relegate all diff"erences to the pattern.
The reason for this is the inequality of their
categories : categories as such should all be equal,
but in fact they are not : substance in the one case
and spirit in the other have swallowed up all the
other aspects of reality, and ceasing to be aspects
have become the stuff itself. Now, when the
crudeness of the primary standpoint has become

258 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [ft.

clear, the natural tendency is to move towards the
second ; and this movement being as yet bound up
with the progress of physical science, we find that
the first phase of a doctrine that gives its rights
to mind is the emphasis laid on law. To think of
the law and the matter in such a way as to separate
them is half-way toward making them collateral
realities, and for a time produces satisfaction in
minds that are dimly aware that all matter and no
mind makes a dull world. At this point, and while
we are as it were on tip- toe for the next develop-
ment, the addition of a corollary to the original
suggestion makes it into a useful basis for thought
of one type, and then it is defended against progress
as itself an ultimate standpoint. This phenomenon
we observe in the history of philosophy more than
once, namely the tendency for critical minds to
fortify what was originally nothing but a halting
ground, and sturdily refusing to go further, pro-
claim it the goal. The reason is not far to seek.
Some minds require to know what they can have,
others require to have what they desire : the latter
are always too eager for the delicate poise of a
mean position : they must fall one way or the
other ; but their more critical fellows fall neither
way, and reserve their energies for rescuing their
comrades and restoring once again the mean posi-
tion. Not indeed quite the same, for the ardent
souls ' fall to rise, are bafiled to fight better ' ;
and the rescuer himself never quite gets back to
the old footing, but to one sufficiently like it
to be recognisable. The mean position has always
got one characteristic, it has no constitutive

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 259

unity. Monism demands a constitutive unity :
whatever the stuff is, it must be one throughout.
As to the righteousness of this demand I have
nothing to say. I content myself with trying to
make clear what the man in the mean position has
to say for himself, for Gassendi is a type of that
class.

The constitutive unity, we can imagine him say-
ing, is an ideal, and no better than other ideals : if
it will not work it must be given up. The fact that
it appears to be the best ideal cannot help it if we
find that it is useless in practice. Further, it may
not be the best ideal if we think again, for that the
world should be One Being is no great advantage to
us, seeing that our interest does not lie in its being
but in its doing. What we want then is only a
world that is not One Being but one in its being,
one in its doing, in all its dealings with me, single
and not double. Its being is its being related to me,
and all I want is that the entities should be capable
of some sort of order, should be thinkable by me as
system.^

It is at this point that the ardent soul runs ahead
of the man in the mean position. He hears his cue in

^This question of the relations and comparative values of the
monistic and pluralistic ideals, of the One Being and the being at
one, is too big to be discussed incidentally. It has been touched
upon by Mr. F. C. S. Schiller in The Riddles of the Sphinx (p. 353) :
' We may reasonably conclude then that monism is a failure, that by
assuming uniU/ at the outset it incapacitates itself for the task of
explaining phenomenal plurality, and a fortiori for the still higher
task of really uniting the Many in a significant imion' ; p. 355 : 'And
Leibnitz might well take for granted that as the Many do interact,
they must be capable of interacting, and that it was unnecessary to
demonstrate that what actually existed was also capable of existing.'

260 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

the word ' thinkable,' and at once declares that the
thinkable is Thought, and therefore the objective
is ' ultimately' Thought, and possibly even its objec-
tivity is due to our having cast it from us, ' ejected '
it in that carelessness of youth which can be re-
trieved only by again taking it back into ourselves.
But this was exactly what was not meant : we
did not w^ant this assimilation of natures : on the
contrary, we find it far easier to think of the recipro-
cal action of things different in nature. We do not
say that the iron must really be a magnet or that the
soul must be a body, but only that they must have
the required affinities. And what are those affinities?
Why, the affinities they have as a matter of fact got !
Is this philosophy ? The ardent soul thinks not.
Yet what is the difference ? The one wants to make
the related factors one in nature, the other makes
them different ; but both want a relation, and ulti-
mately care nothing so long as there is a relation and
the possibility of relations.

We may by now seem to have rather wandered
from Gassendi, but the object of these more abstract
remarks is to suggest the outline of a position which
is none too easy to grasp, and is indeed not so explicit
in Gassendi as the above comparisons might suggest.
But a few data briefly recalled will bring us back to
our bearings. In Gassendi there are three substances —
corporeal, non-corporeal, and mixed. There are more
than three irreducibles, namely God, Time, Space,
the atom, and the Soul.

This is therefore pluralism. Numerical plurality
is not the point : else we should have to say there
were as many universes as there were atoms. It is

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 261

in qualitative plurality that we find the real irredu-
cibleness of the factors in our universe. But if
quality is the ground of plurality, where are we to
stop? Everything that is different from anything
else is qualitatively different, and in respect of the
quality is irreducible. The universe is therefore a
collection of irreducibles : it falls to pieces in our
hands : where is its unity ? Just here, in the fact
that, before we meddled with it, it succeeded well
enough : that if you give up meddling with it now it
will go on just as it did before :^ its unity is the bald
and simple fact that it holds together, and the philo-
sopher's business is simply to formulate the ways in
which that unity is in fact achieved.

The crudity of this is apparent, but we are not
concerned at present with the question is this a
good kind of philosophy, but rather is this a good
specimen of the kind. To gain further light on this
we shall examine three other points in detail, namely
(a) the place of motion in the system, (b) the use of
categories, and (c) the relation of quantity to quality.

(a) Any view of the universe that starts with
matter and mind as separate, relies largely on motion
to enable it to deal with the inert mass. But the
inertia of the matter is itself only a consequence of
the attempt to keep a bare entity as the type of all
things external : it is, in other words, a multiplica-
tion of entities which only leads us into difficulties
by driving us to separate in existence the things to

^In a letter to Valesius (vi. Ill, dated 1641) Gassendi distinguishes
two kinds of philosophy, (1) quam appellare twv (paivoixivuv^ seu His-
toricam soleo, (2) qua intiinae rerum naturae proprietatesque cognos-
cantur : . , . haec est quam Deo totani concede.

262 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [ft.

which we have given distinction. If we revert to
experience we find no such thing as motion in rerum
natura, only moving things. We are thus compelled
to unite in the unity of common life that which
thought divided. For a philosophy like that of
Gassendi motion is fundamental and at the same
time fraught with temptations. There is always the
tendency to use motion as a means of transition
from one aspect of reality to another. Taken
abstractly, motion is a common denominator : it is
one and the same in all things, being nothing but
change of place of atoms. But in order to get this
common denominator we must pursue the abstraction
of matter to such a degree as to make the motion a
pure motion, a motion of nothing, and finally nothing
at all. If this reduction to non-entity is recognised,
motion remains distinct from the moving, and we
get another factor which by its ill-defined nature is
able to work miracles for us. Activity is then thrust
forward as the essential quality of spirit : the quality
is thought of as a thing, activity, and material
activity being also a kind of activity, it seems clear
that activity is the link between mind and matter,
and if we can refine the material activity sufficiently
we shall have got across the everlasting gulf. If we
condemn this as mere abstraction in the interests of
either mind or matter, the ' tu quoque ' is ready : for
if the activity is neither the matter nor the mind, it
is yet no worse than matter which does not mentalise
or mind that will not materialise.

This pitfall Gassendi avoids by making motion,
in the primary sense of inner motion, one with
matter. The formula is materia actuosa, not matter

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 263

et actio ; and this is possible because he refuses to
reduce the ultimate to a mere imaginary entity.

There are three critical points of transition, namely
from inorganic to organic, from non-sentient to
sentient, from unthinking to thinking. Extremists
say these are the same ; but not so Gasseudi, whose
scale is Inorganic,!

Organic, J non-sentient, 1

sentient, J non-intellectual,
intellectual.
Gassendi realises that there is some difficulty in this.
He lays emphasis on the distinctness of animus, but
when he comes to it, the distinctness is dissolved
away. Is it any greater jump from non-intellectual
to intellectual than it was from insensile to sensile ;'
Whatever we do with our scale, it must fall to pieces
if we try to look for real bonds : mind is not joined
to body by any gluten or hooks :^ it is a question
of the other aspect, the quality, the what-it-is in
its actual being. Through the material sphere we
get our transitions mediated objectively by the idea
of movement and co-ordination. In the sphere of
sensation we have the non- sensile affinities (magnet
and iron) leading up to the sensile affinities,
which again have endless degrees as we rise from
lowest (oyster, e.g.) to highest. Complexity is the
medium by which we graduate this scale and ' most
complex' is the formula for what we call highest.
But the fact of being graduated does not mar the
reality of the degrees : they remain realities which
we graduate but do not fuse. For Gassendi the
real difficulty of dealing with mind comes in the

^ Cp. Lotze, Microcosmus, i. 237, ' a constantly renewed cement.'

264 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

foct that it implies a kind of movement which is
not in line with the others, a movement which
returns upon itself as no motion does in the physical
sphere ; but that is not regarded as a reason for
rejecting it, but as a necessity compelling us to
recognise that there is more than one kind of
motion in the universe, and a kind of reality which
is not subject to appulse : there is just the same
reason why there should be a reality so superior
to sense as is the mind, as there is for the eagle
with its superiority over the oyster. In both cases
the ' should be ' is the point we cannot deal with :
we have them as facts. The reality of the graduated
as actual things, in opposition to the graduation, we
shall discuss in section (c).

(6) Gassendi's exposition of his philosophy is often
made more difficult for the reader by the fact that
many of the discussions are dialectical disputes about
categories. The categories in question are simply
recognised headings, and when disputing with some
scholastic author or current theory, Gassendi employs
the categories as rules of formal disputation.

The prime category is that of substance. Under
this fall all corporeal entities without dispute ; but
trouble arises when a reality is given which is not
corporeal, and yet cannot be simply denied. The case
then stands exactly as it did with Leucippus. The
reality being not-not-ens must be ens, and there-
fore substance. But this seems to leave us with no
protection against hypostatising any concept into a
substance. To a certain extent this is guarded
against by the use which Gassendi makes of the idea
of function. This idea enables us to retain as reali-

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 265

ties much that cannot be accurately defined in regard
to its being : for we substitute for the being of the
thing its doing. In spite of the objective existence
which Gassendi gives to things, he adopts the some-
what idealistic method of defining them, and even
formulating them from the point of view of their
relation to us. Believing that things are what they
seem, in all normal cases, we can consistently define
the ultimate reality from the experience of it, the
manifestation of reality being its own definition.
Thus space and time are real, because in experience
things and events have spatial and temporal order.
The atom, the void, and the soul are real on the
same principles. Taking substance in this sense, it
equals reality, and reality is for Gassendi a category.
Quantity and quality are also categories, of which
more later. The other category is that of relation.
This is identical with place in the system, and as
such it is the final determination of the existent.
When we have shown that a thing is, ivhat it is,
and ivhei'e it is, we have done all that man can
toward the production of an ordered system of
things. It is a noticeable fact that Gassendi makes
no use of potentiality as a category, though it was
commonly so used : he criticises the particular appli-
cations of the idea, but does not state his reasons
for rejecting it. It may be surmised, but it is only
a surmise, that he considered it a confusion between
the categories of relation and substance. In any
case it certainly amounted to that, for it made what
was only a relation between the parts of a process
into an actual property, and left it uncertain whether
a thincr was what it was or was what it was firoinsf

266 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

to be. Gassendi was quite scholastic enough to argue
that the statement, ' the acorn is the oak,' involved
a false use of the verb ' to be,' whether you added
' potentially ' or not : he was also philosopher enough
to see that it either meant nothing or it implied the
unreality of all process, or what he would call the
unreality of degrees of being. This was in direct
opposition to his own ideas about quantity and
quality and their relations.

(c) As a rule the category of relation was made
substantive : that is to say, the being in an order
is made to be a reality for the thing as well as for
the ordering mind ; and the whole order is therefore
significant for the individual at any individual stage.
Hence A is said to be potentially B. This means
that ^ to ^ is a process which we view as a series of
states ; but so is lowest to highest in any case: relation
is a category for all, and only per accidens a special
category for some. The relating as such being the
same for all, why should it be more easy to say that
the acorn is potentially an oak, than to say mud
is potentially a man ? Yet it is easier (for Gassendi
and his contemporaries at least), because there are
real, and, as it were, closed circles. Within the
species we can understand growth, because it is
nutrition and assimilation of the like. Hence, in the
closed circle relation is expressible as potentiality.
But the definition of the circles comes from experi-
ence. Potentiality is therefore not a universal solvent.
This seems arbitrary, because the expansion of the
given circles is not limited : why should we stop
short at any but the most universal terms, say
matter, and make everything potentially everything

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 267

else ? It seems, indeed, that we ought not to stop
anywhere short of the mutually exclusive realities,
mind and matter. But Gassendi is opposed to the
whole frame of mind implied in this, and so far
from working up to this irrational stop at the differ-
ence of mind from matter, he works down from it
to a totally dijfferent conclusion. He does not admit
that the step from matter to mind is unique : he
does not admit that the diflference between two
substances is really greater than the difference
between radical forms of one substance : in any
composite there is an unanalysable addition, the
form, the being-what-it-is which is revealed only
synthetically in the function, the being of the whole
as whole. Now mind, he says, is nothing apart from
matter : hence mind plus matter is a functional unit.
Where is the marvel ? This complex produces this
result, and why should there not be this complex,
and with it this result ? If you say it is unique,
so is every other qualitative phenomenon qua
qualitative.

This is, I think, the crucial point of Gassendi's
thought, and he cannot be understood unless it is
grasped. It is exemplified in his whole treatment
of the universe of things. It is, moreover, an idea
capable of much expansion, but the expansion is
what it did not eret at the hands of Gassendi. He is

doubtless right in keeping quantity and quality apart,
right in realising the limits of mechanism, and yet
not suppressing the quantitative aspect. It is this
grasp of qualitative distinctions that saves him from
materialism, it saves him from trying to compromise
between mind and matter. But after all quantity

268 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

and quality are only categories, both alike objective,
ways in which the world of objects can be thought
of, formulae for its analysis. There we find the
weak point, right at the heart of the whole scheme :
so long as the object remains unanalysed and mind
and matter are equally objective, so long as the
categories are applied to a world of crude objects
such that mind and matter are both equally objective,
we reach the limit ; and our opinion on the value
of this point decides our estimate of Gassendi.
Criticism, aided by the development of philosophy
can find flaws only too easily, so much so that it
is not worth while to suggest any : yet there are
still many who will doubtless find that they can
read Gassendi with sympathy and, with all his
faults, recognise that he combined, with a vast
knowledge of facts, a truly philosophical attempt
to reach the truth that is in them.

The philosophical writings of Gassendi perpetually
recall to our minds the works of Leibnitz and Lotze
both in regard to matter and form. We have already
shown that Gassendi is not to be passed over lightly
as a mere materialist, a supporter of what Lotze calls
' evil materialism ' : we now require to see how our
author is related to the later Realists and how far
he may be regarded as anticipating their work.

Before entering into the details of this subject a
word or two must be said with regard to its dangers.
A moment's reflection will show that Leibnitz and
Lotze can hardly fail to differ one from the other
in their whole outlook with that difference which
Kant brought into philosophical work of every kind.
If we speak of Realism as though it were a line of

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 269

thought maintaining itself through an unbroken
succession of writers and uninfluenced by other lines
of thought, it will soon be apparent that the terms
we use are almost the only permanent elements ;
the letter abides but the spirit changes, and the
line of progress which thought follows under one
name is often the slow fulfilment of a circle that
places it at last adverse to its own starting point.
Whole passages in Leibnitz breathe the sentiments
of Gassendi : the Mikf'okosmus is planned with the
same comprehensiveness and in the same spirit as
the Physics of the Syyitagrtia : the reader leaves
them both with a strong sense of their likeness to
Gassendi. In following out the relations and the
differences of these writers I shall work with a
view chiefly to elucidate Gassendi and limit my
remarks to that scope, diverging into some general
remarks on the character of the periods under con-
sideration only so far as that purpose requires.

CHAPTER II

LATER VIEWS

(a) LEIBNITZ

To minds of a certain type works such as those
of Gassendi are irritating. They continually arouse
the question ' Is this philosophy ? ' and cause a
vague unrest which it is difficult to assign to any
one feature or characteristic. It is in fact due to
the way in which Gassendi and men of his class
stop short of the goal for which they seem bound,
stop short of the unity which is demanded by our
aesthetic nature. Their reason for so doing is a
conscientious recognition that they have not suc-
ceeded in making their universe truly a One. No
unity of the type required was possible until the
objective sphere of experience was united to the
subjective by such recognition of unity as Kant
was able to reach. The influence of Kant will be
considered when we come to Lotze : the point is
introduced here because we have in Leibnitz, as
compared with Gassendi, a most significant point
of difference, the logical element.

Gassendi follows the tradition of his school. His
logic is a book of canons. We feel that when it
is closed its power is at an end. In Leibnitz, on

PT. IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 271

the contrary, the logical principles are the essence
of a logical aspect of all things, and analysis and
synthesis as applied to things are so intimately
related to the forms of judgment that it would
seem as though we might say of the world of
Leibnitz that it is a translation of loQ-ic into

ontology.

There is still some doubt apparent in the litera-
ture of philosophy as to whether Leibnitz is to be
called an idealist or a realist. This is due probably
to the way in which the suppressed logic of Leib-
nitz o;ives his realism an idealistic character. What
Leibnitz actually does is to talk of a world of real
objects whose whole existence depends upon their
being given, as though that fact of being given
were not in itself as important a characteristic of
things as any other. Leibnitz is therefore clear on
the point that there are realities and on the in-
dividual worth of each separate reality ; but in so
far as he inadequately recognises the point of
contact between self and not-self, he naturally fails
to give sufficient consideration to its significance.
The origin of this error on the part of Leibnitz is
to be found in the fact that he comes to his world
of objects with a conceptual attitude — a desire to
analyse, and consequently a tendency to say what
a thing is without asking how it is.

At this point the reader will perhaps pause,
recalling the words of Lotze : ' What things are is
thus not incomprehensible to us, for that which is
in them they exhibit in their outer manifestation ;
how they can exist and can manifest themselves
anyhow is the universal enigma.' It would seem

272 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

then that we ask too much in demanding from
Leibnitz more information as to how the thing
becomes. But it is not because Leibnitz gives us
no answer that we complain ; it is because his
answer is given from a prejudicial standpoint.
Spinoza had dissipated the individual : his assertion
' omnis determinatio est negatio ' left the logical
activities of the mind with no focus and deprived
conception of its material. Leibnitz, as compared
with Spinoza, seems to restore to us our real world.
It may not be very hard^ or very solid, or very
matter of fact — it may indeed be ' idealistic ' in a
sense — but it is at any rate pluralistic and active.
Where then is the ground for complaint ?

In his treatment of the doctrine of induction
Leibnitz shows that he wholly underrated the philo-
sophic value of the moment of perception. The
consequence of this is that he is capable of treating
as a subjective construction what he has never shown
to be subjective in its nature : he invades the
whole region of the not-self with an army of
notions whose success depends entirely on accurate
information as to the character of the opposing
realities. In spite of the appearance of remaining
within the legitimate sphere of analysis, and evolving
in the closed cell of the monad a mental pano-
rama of reflected Being, Leibnitz really does no
such thing ; he goes forth into the world of
syntheses, and absorbs the advantages of experience
without acknowledgment or appreciation.

If it is ever possible to keep two parallel lines
of Reality and unite them in a pre-established
harmony, it must at least be done with the clear

iv] GENERAL REVIEW 273

recognition that all the predicates of reality are only-
predicates of experiences, that the experiences may
be real, but the reality may, none the less, remain
aloof, a thing-in-itself. This would only be possible
after an analytic of experience : it is not possible
if the basis of the position is no more than analytic
forms of judgment, because the judgment and the
mental machinery employed in it all presuppose a
given.

To justify Leibnitz in treating the world of
physics as he did we require from him some analysis
of the given. We assert that he did not furnish
this, that in place of analysing the given he treated
it as knowable deductively, as an existence to
which we can dictate what it must be. He thus
gets beyond Gassendi very rapidly, but not very
securely. The preponderance given to logic promises
us a more penetrative insight into experience as a
subjective construction based upon real activities :
we hope for just that element which was lacking in
Gassendi, a deeper comprehension of the extent to
which the understanding makes nature ; but in this
we are disappointed, for the logical standpoint gives
us nothing but categories that we vainly and un-
critically re-apply to a world of objects already
manufactured and passed without question.

Further attention must be given to this point,
because it is the centre of our discussion of the
relations between Gassendi and Leibnitz. This can
be shown if we return to those categories of experi-
ence which are implicit in Gassendi's work.

The category of substance {v. p. 264) is used by
Gassendi as a form for the classification of what

274 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

are commonly called ' things ' ; it includes also
those objects to which experience testifies that they
are 'outer.' Gassendi goes so far as to ignore
anything that falls beyond the focus of experience :
that which the thing does is the actuality of it, and
therefore the same as that which the thing is. But
it does not follow that my limitations are limitations
of the given : the more a writer insists that the
being of a thing is the same as its doing, the more
strictly is he compelled to admit that the existence
of all things is a matter of relations, and in a
relation only those capacities can be developed for
which both the terms are qualified.

In this connexion it is necessary to remember that
the post-Kantian philosopher usually works on a
method the inverse of that which the pre- Kantian
naturally took. Noiv it would be natural to regard
the whole X as the given from which A and B
might be analytically eliminated. Then it was more
natural to start with A and B and regard X as the
resultant of their relations. The consequence is that
the philosopher is compelled to work with terms
never completely defined. Spinoza provides for this
incomplete exhaustion of the relatum in the case of
God : the infinite with infinite possibilities stands
over against the other term of the relation as some-
thing transcendent and overlapping. If we have in
place of a monism a pluralism of reals, every real
entity must have these same characteristics so long
as it is presupposed as a possibility of relations and
not merely regarded as the explicit recognition of
what out of the relation is nothing.

Atomism is, on the face of it, a theory of real

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 275

ultimates capable of relation and composition. As
objects they have no right to such qualities as are
regarded as peculiarly subjective. It will therefore
not be possible to assert that the atoms as such have
any power of appreciating the relations in which they
stand : their ' elective affinities ' must be inner states,
but not perceptions. Gassendi often speaks as though
the analogy between attraction in the magnet and
the animal was a ground for speculation : he does
not use it as a proof that perception has rudimentary
forms below the level of animal life. In convertinor
the atom into the monad Leibnitz commits himselfl
to a position he cannot defend, for he asserts that j
powers or qualities found in aggregates are also found |
in simple bodies, and thereby destroys at a blow the
value of organisation as the ground of functions. ,

The notion of ' organism ' is used by Leibnitz in
a purely occasionalistic manner. He is obviously
prepared to recognise degrees of organisation as
connected in some manner with degrees of function-
ing power, and graduates his scale of real things
in the form of a scale of substances in which new
and higher powers are correlated wuth complexity
of structure. But the fact of being organised was
never given by Leibnitz due importance and rank
among the perceptual facts which make up the world
of physics. The reason for this is to be found in the
work of Leibnitz as a whole.

Criticism of Leibnitz seems at present to be in
vogue. A glance at contemporary literature will
show us science and philosophy are both in arms
against him. It will be sufficient if we note here
a few salient points.

276 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

We have already noted that the atomism of Leib-
nitz differs from that of Gassendi in so far as the
former suffuses his whole doctrine with a logical
tone and colours it with rationalism. The result is
that facts are ignored in the interests of forms of
thought. Hence (1) the law of continuity combined
with the notion of substance enables Leibnitz to pass
from perceived perceptions out to un perceived percep-
tions, without recognising that thought can thus
overrun its material in any direction and must curb
its tendencies within the limits of the given. (2) The
monad is an atom qualified by irrelevant adjectives.
The logical process which begins in stripping off
predicates from a subject leaves the subject bare :
it does not follow that there can be in nature a
substance stripped of qualities. The monad which
we are thus wrongly led to think of as simple, appears
on reflection to require to be complex. We are
always tempted to think that our ultimate element
must be capable of entering into all relations, and
therefore be itself simple and indeterminate. On the
contrary, the possibility of relations is, from the point
of view of the thing, not a negative but a positive
quality, and that which can enter into all relations,
like a man capable of occupying any post, must be
* highly qualified.' The intensive quality of the
monad may have appeared to Leibnitz to anticipate
this difficulty. It is however difficult to conceive
how inner or outer qualities are of use to beings
whose actuality is not affected though all relations
are destroyed.

The last word on Leibnitz must be a recognition
of his genius with a confession of his failure. If he

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 277

could have reduced his thought to a system it would
have been chastened to its advantage. As it is,
different lines of thought perpetually open up, and no
one of them is fully worked out. For this reason we
find flaws and chasms in the structure : matter is one
thing physically (prima materia) and another thing
psychically : continuity of kind as in the derivation
of consciousness from petites perceptions is linked
with discontinuity of being in the real world : sub-
jective idealism is perpetually breached by that going-
beyond-itself which is the one thing their rational-
istic author has denied the monads.

But if the whole fails to exhibit cohesion it has
never lacked inspiration and the power to inspire.
This I attribute to one quality which it exhibits, —
the grasp of unity as required for the being and the
understanding of a world. This unity Leibnitz does
not attain : his pluralism produces want of unity
both in the world as an objective existent and in our
thoughts as a reconstruction of it ; but he never loses
sight of it as a guiding principle, and is only pre-
vented from working it out by the notions of
substance and of concepts by which he was incessantly
hampered.

As the thought of a unity is the thought of a
whole which implicitly contains many parts capable
of being themselves brought into prominence, so the
thought of the world as a unity has an implicit
content whose nature is irrelevant so far as the
unity is concerned. There has for so long been a
rooted tendency to confine unity to material unity
that it may not be out of place to elaborate this
point.

278 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

The unity of the individual is not affected by the
diverse nature of its parts. The possibility of self-
unification may be grounded in one or more charac-
teristics. It may be asserted that I could not be
a unity unless I had a nervous organism so developed
as to have one supreme centre. To this the reply
is that the genesis of a unitary being may thus lie
in a condition which must first be fulfilled, but the
unity, when there is unity, includes its plurality
without reference to anything but the possibility of
co-operation. A human organism is a unity whose
parts are different : not only is a heart not a liver,
but one corpuscle is not another : yet the reality of
the unity cannot be denied. The fact is that when
we speak of a unity we must hold it over against
a plurality, and all we require of the parts of a
unity is that they should not be capable of collapsing
one into another : they must retain what we require
of them, namely the power to fill out the whole to
which we refer the unity.

Thus ultimate identity of nature, if it meant
identity of being, w^ould ruin both concepts, of
unity and of plurality : if it does not mean identity
of being it means nothing, for two ' identical ' natures
must always differ by one simple quality, that of
not being each other.

Many of these points Leibnitz adumbrates. He
seems, however, never to have grasped the relation
of conceptual unification to the unity of the per-
ceptually given world. In a word, the idea of unity
ran away with him in the form of continuity or
persistence of identical natures : a reference to
experience as perceptual knowledge of the world

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 279

around us would have shown that unity is not
translatable through substance into being (giving
an ultimate One in kind), but only through co-
operation into cohesion. It is useless to assert that
unity of nature is presupposed in unity of action :
that heart and liver are not different but only
distinct, being really qualified to belong to the
unity by virtue of unity of nature. This is pure
inversion : it is from the effects that we must
judge the nature : kinds are only subdivisions of
the unity which is not material but formal, which
embraces all kinds in the unity of co-operation
constituting the organism of nature.

(b) LOTZE

The philosophy of Leibnitz appears both disjointed
and distorted. Lotze gives us a far more syste-
matic view of things, and the advance he makes
is considerable.

Among the advantages which he enjoyed over
his predecessors, that of inheriting the results of
Kant's labours must necessarily be ranked high.
With Kant the opposing tendencies of rationalism
and sensationalism were to some extent reconciled :
the perceptual order regained the importance
rationalism had striven to take from it, and the
conceptual order lost none of its significance as
organisation of our inner conscious life. Kant gave
to his followers two main points : primarily, the
necessity for a point of contact between the knower
and that which was destined to be known :
secondarily, the necessity of recognising that the
origin of the object is to be looked for in a rela-

280 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

tion. This second point implies that henceforth
the term ' object ' must be taken in a new sense :
it can no longer denote that which is given for
consciousness, but only that which is given in con-
sciousness as being outer.

This view of the object is however not satisfactory
if we confuse the idea of a reality capable of rela-
tions with the idea of qualities as potential or
germinal relations. So far as concerns the distinc-
tion of substantia phenomenon from its ground,
Kant seems to have allowed this confusion to arise..
He clearly thinks of our conscious life as a vessel
filled from the greater vessel of the Universe : our
limitations are the reason why there is a surplus of
being over and above the known. The distinction
of Being (Beent) from Existent does not save the
situation : for Being cannot be thought of as relation -
less being, and is therefore either merely undiscovered
existence or pure nothing.

It would not be necessary to labour this point
if it were not that our thought naturally inclines
to regard development as an unfolding of a unitary
existence. Whether the thinker regards develop-
ment as ultimately timeless, or believes that all
development is in a real time, he rarely if ever
gets to the idea that continuity of development is-
not the same as unity of being. It is however
not less a ' rational ' dogma to assert that the seed
is the plant than to assert that all development
is timeless, more geometrico. The crux in either
case is the regress to the Whole, But in the case
of the plant our statement does not really concern
the whole plant but the whole life-history of the

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 281

plant, and obviously omits for its own purposes
the continuous natural synthesis involved in the
real development expressed in the perceptual order.
But if we cannot fix the plant as a Whole, on
account of its length, so to speak, in respect of
time, we feel we can fix the Universe as a Whole
because it is always itself. To properly combat
this view requires more digression than is here
justifiable. I merely state that there is primarily
the notorious difficulty of saying the Universe
is at all (of course if it is a Universe we beg
the question of its unity by naming it thus),
and secondly, that our right to omit the element
of real time is very dubious. If we do not
omit it, we come to the other view, that all
things are a co-existent unity which maintains
itself by perpetual re-adjustment of its parts, and
moves on from state to state through time. It would
be easy at this point to say progresses rather than
moves, but there is no need to beg the question as to
whether the movement is for better or for worse.

Kant's analysis of the object, then, we regard as
faulty in so far as it implies that ' we only know
phenomena.' We consider that the phrase appear-
ance of the real should be abolished, and our world
should be called not an appearance of reality but
the real as it appears. None the less the work
of Kant leaves its abiding eff"ect in the impossibility
of going back to naive realism ; and not acknow-
ledging that the percipient mind is a real factor
in the process of appearing, is in fact the comple-
mentary element which allows the real to express
itself in the terms of knowledge.

282 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [ft.

Lotze's philosophy interests us in many ways :
the form and matter of the Mikrohosmus in parti-
cular challenge comparison with the Syntagma of
Gassendi. We now desire to see especially how the
details are handled in the light of the progress made
between the days of Gassendi and Lotze. For in
a sense Lotze returns to the standpoint of Gassendi :
he eliminates in many ways the rationalistic elements
which Leibnitz had introduced, and his line of
thought can in the main be regarded as continuing
that of Gassendi. Leibnitz had tried to ' unite
Democritus and Spinoza ' : subsequent workers had
to eliminate the Spinozistic element, and thus free
from its encumbrances the Democritian line of
development.

The atoms of Democritus were meant to be physi-
cal points. The elaboration of the idea of ' points '
into a theory of physical, metaphysical, and mathe-
matical points was retrograde. The mathematical
points are not points in any relevant sense, and the
metaphysical points are physical points interpreted
through the concept of mathematical points. The
idea that they must be indivisible for thought is
irrelevant, because they are perceptual entities. We
may think of any unit as twice its own half, but it
does not follow that the perceptual datum can be
given as a plurality : if, on the contrary, it is never
so given we are right in declaring it to be indivisible,
i.e. a real unit.

Granted that the atom is a real unit, the question
arises, How are we to interpret this reality ? Our
reality as a whole will naturally be regarded as the
sum of its parts, allowing that it is not a mere

IV.] • GENERAL REVIEW 283

aggregation but rather an organic totality. Conse-
quently we shall expect the characteristics predicated
of the totality to be predicated of the parts. Now
Lotze's idea of the totality is coloured with the
notion that our aesthetic demands are a reality, and
the necessity of regarding the Universe as a whole
is not to be divided from the necessity of regarding
it as a whole of a certain kind. He therefore finally
concludes that the atom is unextended, because this
hypothesis alone enables us to regard it as animated
throughout.^ This however, besides being highly
conjectural, seems also unnecessary. We have already
been told that atoms do not require to be homo-
geneous, but may enter into composition equally wxll
if they are heterogeneous.^ From this it has been
correctly deduced that unity does not imply identity
in the elements : unity is the form in which we inter-
pret the cohesion of heterogeneous elements through
elective affinity in any single apparent whole. It
is therefore clearly possible that different natures
may so combine that the resultant has a nature
which belongs to none of its parts. The emergence
of this new functional value is dependent on the
recognition of something more than mechanical rela-
tions. The something more which is thus required
is provided by substituting chemical for mechanical
laws.

The influence of chemistry upon constructive
thought is extremely important for this one reason,
that it forces into recognition the fact that, regarded
as we must regard it from the point of view of its
doing, the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

^ MikroJcosmus, iii. ch. iv. Engl. Tran. p. 360. "^ Ibid. p. 35.

284 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

Man is thus no more to be regarded as a macliine.
Lotze rightly recognises that vitality is grounded
in a synthesis of co-operating elements : it is not a
separate entity to be imported into a mechanical
organism at birth and exported at death. It is out
of this aspect of functional activity as dependent on
organisation that Lotze gets the right to some of his
most pregnant assertions, such e.g. as the assertion
that the soul is where it acts. He formulates it
most definitely when he opposes the idea that Life
is something permanent, *a higher force' controlling
the changes of the body. On the contrary, he says,
life and death are not opposed realities : ' for why
should we not from this phenomenon {i.e. of corrup-
tion) rather draw the other conclusion, that the
activity of life can last only so long as the chemical
composition of the body yields the necessary con-
ditions and that the corruption of death is nothing
else than a disturbance of that composition which has
now become visible, but by which perhaps long since,
though less obviously, the conditions of life have
been aflPected ? ' ^

The phraseology of this passage clearly indicates
that we are to regard the ' composition ' as the ' con-
dition of life.' On another page^ Lotze states this
more definitely. He speaks of life as maintaining
itself through ' motive shocks,' which are ' yielded by
the processes of constant forming and reforming ' :
it is like burning coal, developed ' not through what
it was or through what it is to be, but through the
motion of the transition itself.' There is therefore
no longer any room for a ' vital force ' : 'in the

^ Mikrokosmus, iii. ch. iv. Engl. Tran. p. 52. ^ Ibid. p. 74.

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 285

living body every chemical change that takes place
sets to work forces not before in existence and brings
others to a pause ; thus at each moment there is laid
for subsequent development a new foundation, such
as gives occasion sometimes for a continuance of prior
states, sometimes for an evolution into new ones,
sometimes by a combination of both, for expansion
into a far fuller manifestation of character and
activity.'^

These passages show clearly the view taken of
life. We may now enquire into its degrees and
their relation. In the inorganic sphere we have
no development and no power of self-maintenance.^
Plant and animal life are of one kind in this respect :
they exhibit reactions which may be described as
expressions of their natural conation toward self-
preservation. But animal life is distinguished by
sentiency and human life by the presence of mental
powers. We might then expect a scale of the form
a, a + h, a-^b + c ; but what we are actually given
is a scale of the form a, x{ = a + b), y( = x + c).
This form of the scale implies that each stage is
more than the lower stage plus a quantitative
addition : it is emphatically a new stage.

Lotze denies that we can construct the scale
upward : we cannot start from the lower form and
deduce the higher form from a consideration of the
possible combination of elements. On the contrary,
mental life forms a new datum : our culture ' shows
the interval between the two spheres of existence
[animal and human] to be so vast that apparently
the addition of a wholly new germ of development

1 Ibid. p. 83. 2 jf,ifi_ p, 79^

286 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

is absolutely necessary to explain the superiority of
human culture.'^ Mind is thus set over against
soul, but ' we cannot return to the naivete of con-
ception that sees in psychic life and mind two
different and separate entities.' ^ We must not think
of body, soul, and mind as three entities of inde-
pendent value : our only reason for distinguishing
one from the other in the highest unity, that of
man, is the fact that they are given separately in
the universe, that animals have sentience without
mind, and plants have living bodies without either.^
A- real connexion for these must therefore be found,
' for, in whatever reason may consist, it is clear
that the soul cannot receive the gift of a new
faculty, unless it be so grounded in its constitution
that it either must of necessity be evolved from it,
or else mi2:ht be evolved should favourable condi-
tions supervene.' ^

The ' new faculty ' is not a new entity. A psychic
substance Lotze rejects : such a phrase implies the
reification of what is only given as a group of
unique reactions, a living content that ' by its own
specific nature directly acquires the capacity to act
and be acted on,' and so masquerades as a substance
for ' the unwary thinker.' But the idea of a group
of reactions has its dangers also. We may be led
to ignore the agent itself, whereas ' we cannot make
mi7id equivalent to the infinitive to think, but feel
that it must be that which thinks ; the essence of
things cannot be either existence or activity ; it
must be that which exists and that which acts.'^

^ Mikrokosmus, iii. ch. iv. Engl. Trail, p. 532. ^ Jbid. p, 535.

■^Ibid. p. 536. *Ib{d. p. 548.

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 287

This doctrine of mind shows clearly the three
phases of Lotze's philosophic thinking, namely the
occasionalistic, the idealistic, and the realistic. It
will be necessary to make a few remarks on these
separately.

(l) Crude occasionalism is self-condemned by its
abstractness. Over against a world in itself
purely material stands the purely psychical : their
unity of action is a parallelism of simultaneous
action : the ground of the coincidences is in a third
nature. This line of thought may be regarded as
wholly antiquated, and its many faults require no
resurrection. Among others, it overlooked the fact
that a given simultaneity of action is normally a
proof of reciprocity unless we have some a priori
reasons for assuming reciprocity impossible. In that
case we modify our view in the direction of a pre-
established harmony. This gives us a certain degree
of concreteness in so far as we reduce our sphere
of enquiry to the actually given agents : ultimate
questions however bring us to a third factor, the
creative activity in whose Will we ground all
unity of action. But here still the whole necessity
of an explanation lies in the presuppositions with
which we approach our subject ; and this presup-
position is, in these cases, the belief that substances
are in themselves opposed to relations.

The occasionalism which Lotze offers us is still
further modified by continuing the process which
makes the view concrete. To do this it is necessary
to merge the abstractions into a more and more
comprehensive unity. The differences in the given
must first of all be modified so that we no longer

288 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [ft.

oppose one kind of being to another : then the
unifying agency must be vested in the totality thus
formed, so that we are able to account for all
relatedness or reciprocity of action as possible when
the totality admits of it, and impossible when it
does not so admit of it.

I consider that Lotze makes a great advance on
the position of Leibnitz in many respects, but prin-
cipally in those directions in which his scientific
training made him a more judicious and compre-
hensive thinker. The effect of scientific training is
obvious in — (1) those elements of thought which
are due to biological and chemical studies ; (2) in
the truly scientific unwillingness to blur distinctions,
and call the higher the same as the lower, or the
lower itself ' potentially ' a higher form ; and (3)
in the concept of unity, as somehow requiring to
be expressed in terms of action and not substance.
But while progress is manifest in these points, the
results cannot be of permanent value unless the
principles which are used bring us safely to the end.

(2) In occasionalism proper all action, looked at
by itself, is disjointed. In the doctrine of Leibnitz
it is so connected as to form chains of parallel
activities. The series of actions start from points
that have a fixed amount of separation, and they
maintain this separation throughout. But we refuse
to accept this parallelism as ultimate : we do not
want to think of one rail as merely accompanying
another, but of two rails as so accompanying each
other that they form what we rightly call one
railway line. The unity we require is not approxi-
mation, rather the maintenance of the distance is

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 289

essential to it. If our lines converge when pro-
duced ' ever so far,' they cannot serve our purpose :
they destroy their own reality by destroying their
significance. And as our rails cease to be a railway
line if they converge, so our self and our not-self
can only come to insignificance and unreality if they
lose their distance and merge.

This metaphor, though quite a legitimate adapta-
tion of Leibnitz's idea of the two clocks, is not
perhaps very clear. It is intended to make think-
able the notion of a unity which holds together a
plurality in such a way as does not contradict the
plurality, but rather insists on the plurality as the
one thing essential to the unity. This I take to
be the proper meaning of unity if taken concretely
or in direct relation to a content which it makes
no attempt to annihilate.

It seems to me that in his advance from
Occasionalism Lotze reached an idealism which was
not compatible with the fundamental idea of the
occasionalistic phase of thought. That fundamental
idea is that activity of one kind cannot become
activity of another kind : lines of activity do not
cross : material activity is never mental activity.
To this fundamental idea Occasionalism was itself
faithless more than once when it tried to run the
lines back to that ' ever so far,' in which they
might be thought to have met. To carry material
actuality back to abstract points and mental activity
back to the point at which it is at least so abstract
as to have lost its conscious characteristics, is to
yield up our clear convictions to the illusions of
an indefinite perspective. So crude an error cannot

290 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt,

rashly be attributed to Lotze : whatever his errors are
they cannot but be refined, subtle, and significant. Yet
that his occasionalism is modified by strong idealism
cannot be denied, and it may be that the idealism
completes without improving the occasionalism.

As there is a danger that the following remarks
may be due to a misunderstanding of Lotze, I
shall not attempt to pad out my interpretation of
his thought with selected quotations : if the general
impression is wrong the selection of definite phrases
out of a book is only the addition of insult to
injury. I state my own view and leave it to the
reader to consult Lotze.

The vice of every system of philosophy is
always some degree of abstraction. From the
multitude of abstract points of view we trust we
are slowly arriving at a concrete view which shall
do justice to reality as we live it. Usually the
abstract view is patently an intrusion of the
influences of study : thought naturally occupies a
predominant place in a system which its author
has had to think out : less frequently it is an
intrusion of temperament, or a mere reaction from
the tyranny of the abstract thinker to a full-blooded
view of things. In Spinoza we recognise the retiring
thinker : in Leibnitz we see the eff"ect of mathematical
and logical thought mixed with the busy life of the
man of affairs, and the influence of relations in
which caution and impenetrability are of first
importance. In Lotze we have equally the effects
of scientific training, relieved however of any barrier
to frankness, and united with a strong ethical and
aesthetical tendency.

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 291

The ethical temperament, if that term may be
used, is on its psychological side prone to believe :
the aesthetical is prone to value form : the combina-
tion of the two makes possible a transcendent point
of view which grasps at form with a strong psycho-
logical conviction that it must have real active
value. The remarkable passage in which Lotze
pleads for the animation of nature is a shock to
the reader in its betrayal of new and startling-
elements in the author's idea of a constructive
philosophy. Apart from the particular point, which
we do not intend to discuss, the passage is the
first awakening of antagonism in a critical reader
who will at once proceed to ask whether the whole
construction is built on this foundation. He will,
I think, find that it is.

The crucial point in the idealism of Lotze is the
possibility of constructing and defending the unity
of the Whole. The beginning is made from the
Kantian element, the phenomenal character of the
matter of thought. Kant's view is modified in so
far as the doing which we know is related to the
being, the that-which-does, in an intimate way, such
as does not hold of noumena and phenomena : from
this it follows that the appearance is the life of
the real rather than its output, the actual doing
rather than the product of its work. It follows
also from the Kantian element that our construction
of reality is itself reality, real doing, though not
creative activity. In this concrete point of view
is involved the idea that our feelings, cravings,
and inspirations are reality, which is the justifica-
tion for demanding that reality should be presented

292 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

as satisfying that craving. As we have a craving
for unity and form we can assert that Reality is
both one and formed. We see the force of the
argument : we ask, what is its value ?

To begin with — what is this craving ? Is it ever
universal, and if not, does the craving for unity in
particular spheres justify an advance to a universal
unity ? The personal element is so manifest here
that if consciousness cannot be shown to have that
craving as part of its own nature the whole position
is endangered. And it must be granted that con-
sciousness has not got it qua consciousness. To get
it at all we must take consciousness as intimately
bound up with impulse, will, and individual purpose,
and each of these elements, while it enriches the
notion of consciousness, draws me further away
from the concept of a Whole. I cannot admit that
impulse proceeds wholly from consciousness, or
that will is entirely guided by reason, or that
the unity I desire is capable of projection away
from my individual scope to a hyper-individual
Whole.

Reflection on the history of thought confirms the
belief that ultimate unity is generally made accept-
able by withdrawing oneself from the immediate
conditions of life. Tradition ascribes this character
to the philosopher, and the history of philosophy is
a record of attempts to reach the higher truth by
climbing down. Lotze gives us a fruitful idea in
the notion of a whole whose parts are unified by
reciprocal action. But here again he seems to have
overstrained his parallel, which I take to be human
society. In his war against abstractions he notes

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 293

the hypostatising tendency expressed in such phrases
as ' the mind of the people,' ' the spirit of the times.'
He does not however seem to have fully estimated
the value of these indications or seen how far they
show that a generalisation expressed in a general
term may be the sign of a real conceptual unity
which in spite of its reality is not capable of action
or reaction. Now, if unity lies in significance, does
not the unity of anything partake essentially of the
nature of concepts or ideas ? And if so, is not the
unity the one point about things of which nothing
can be said in respect of action or reaction ? This, I
think, must be allowed, and the consequence follows
that in a world of action and reaction unity must be
irrelevant.

The point can be stated more clearly and directly,
but I have put it in this form because that is the line
of argument which Lotze suggests, and which seems
to me to apply to him most aptly because it is the
inversion of his own progress. The simpler and
clearer way is to assert that the unity of the Whole
implies a consciousness for which the Whole is a
unity. This leads us to the idea of a God. But if
God is outside our whole there must conceivably be
a ' higher unity ' giving a whole which comprises
God. Either therefore the Whole is not truly the
Whole or there is an infinite progress of wholes con-
stituted by presentation to a unifying agency which
is merged with them in ever higher and higher
wholes.

We now seem to have reached a reductio ad
absurdum. As stated, it is such a reductio ; but
the absurdity consists in the inner contradiction due

294 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

to calling that the Whole which we at the same
time do not make all inclusive. This contradiction
indicates that the thought movement has become
involved in itself. At the same time there emerges
^n idea which is fruitful and which was partially
expressed in the doctrine of monads. The monad
is a unity : the ruling monad is also a unity : this
latter unity includes plurality, and is therefore pro-
perly a unity : the mere monad as simple nature
ought not to be called a unity at all. Now, leaving
out other implications of the term monad, we may
say that the idea of progressive wholes comprehend-
ing at each stage the lower wholes, is justifiable.
We associate with development range of adaptation,
and increased range of adaptation is the objective
manifestation of increased organisation of either
physical or psychical powers. At each stage the
being comprehends a wider plurality, and the scale
of being is capable of gradation on this basis.

But is there any unity which is not unity for a
mind ? If we say no, there is no course open but
to set over against our Whole a mind for which it is
one. This would be a finite God. Not being able
to comprehend a world that sums itself any more
than a series of feelings that sum themselves, I am
unable to see how a pantheistic solution helps us.
On the contrary, if I conceived unity to be necessary
to the existence of the world, I should deduce from
that unity the being of God, and admit that the
unity was not only known but also felt and willed,
but I could not admit that the world was the same
as God, and therefore should not admit that the
will was omnipotent. Thus the mere assertion of

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 295

unity seems to lead us back into a transcendental
dualism.

The conclusion of the whole matter is that unity
is meaningless unless that which is unified is unified
by some mind. In the first instance the unity will
be that of my mind, and we must start from that.

Now I take it that in my mind unity is the
product of purpose. I do not consciously unify, but
I do consciously subordinate : the tendency is to
think in what respects the one is many rather than
how the many can be one. This is due to the
primacy of our practical life, in which the end is
given with all its plurality implicit. In action this
is obvious : the end is first and the discovery of
means subserves it. In the world of things it may
be less evident, but that which I call function is
ultimately the power to fulfil my end or purpose,
and the object as I know it is the manifestation in
perception of the thing that has the function. What
it is to itself I cannot know and need not ask.

It seems to me futile to speak of all existence as
animated, or talk of the ' experience of the atoms '
as Lotze does, if the nature of the whole cannot be
determined. It is only as parts of a whole that the
parts have any claim to these qualities, and if we
fail to construct our whole so as to get a new edition
of the old doctrine of a world soul (which Lotze
confessedly aims to do) the consequences dependent
on that proof must fail also.

Human society, coming last, seems the culminating
point of all development, and a revelation of the
significance of all lower forms of life. In it we have
the fullest exhibition of reciprocal activity. But its

296 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

unity is dependent on mind, and only a spurious

analogy can enable us to regard the universe as a

society. If we are not tempted to think of the

material world as associated atoms, we may yet

feel an inclination to regard it as teleologically

designed ; we should then have formal unity of

purpose among diverse actions. But here again it

seems impossible to show that there is one supreme

end, unless the whole is a unity ; or that the whole

is a unity, unless there is a supreme end. These

ideas are so far implicated that a plurality of being

necessitates a plurality of ends. It is equally wrong

to reject or to accept teleology as usually advocated.

The ethical view is right in emphasising the fact

that there are ends in the world. But these ends

arise with consciousness, are brought by us into the

world, and take their place as forces because our

mind directs our action. The hierarchy of ends is

the ideal counterpart of the hierarchy of wholes, and

each whole which exists for a mind is dominated by

an end. But that there should be an end of ends

seems unnecessary : we do not seek to unify ends,

we seek to multiply them in their diversity : the

progress of society is a perpetual production of minds

which become more concrete in every generation,

each one more capable of interpreting through itself

the end for its society, and thereby increasing the

number of ends that are efficient factors in life.

Self-preservation is the root from which spring all

ends, and if the higher organism of society seems

to have its need of preservation and its end we must

not forget that its existence depends largely on the

extent to which individuals realise themselves by

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 297

negation. Is it conceivable that for the end of ends
negation is equally necessary? Leibnitz thought so
when he limited the existent to the compossible.
We too may think so if we admit that our totality
has emerged from a crowd of possible totalities by
a species of selection. If we are not prepared to
sublimate our conceptions in this way but return
to the world of unfulfilled purposes and unsatisfied
desires, let us bravely acknowledge that all things
need not work together for good, that for such
adjustment as we do achieve or help others to achieve
we are grateful each to each, and each to all ; but
at the same time

'could you and I with Him conspire
To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire,
Would we not shatter it to bits, and then
Remould it nearer to the Heart's Desire ? '

(3) In addition to these points of view we have
in Lotze what may be called a realistic element.
To explain this is, I think, impossible : to explain
it away is unjustifiable. It is in opposition to
Panlogism that Lotze retains ' nuclei,' irreducible
elements, in his system of experience. This is the
Leibnitzian factor retained against the Spinozistic
trend : it is also the Democritean element preserved
through Leibnitz for succeeding writers. No defini-
tion of these nuclei is forthcoming : they are
primarily reached from the standpoint that all
determination is not negation ; that thought is a
system of relations, but reality includes over and
above relations the relata.

To define these nuclei is impossible, because
thought in its progress moves away from the

298 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

immediate point of contact given in sensation, moves
away from the stimulus in which they are revealed,
and in working up its material ignores existence
in order to concentrate itself upon significance.
The nuclei are in this sense the irrational factors.

It is not necessary here to do more than draw
attention to this point. The preservation of these
nuclei is of course one of the ways in which Lotze
defends the content of common consciousness against
such idealistic systems as seem to him to dissolve
reality into the thin air of pure thought. His
general attitude toward this point must be under-
stood by reference to Kant's views as expressed in
the Critique of Pure Reason. We must also bear
in mind the fact that pluralism grounds itself in
some measure on the impenetrability of the indi-
vidual consciousness, an idea which leads us to think
of individual minds as being to themselves more
than they can ever be to others. Hence the monad
with its dual existence, as it is in itself and as it
is in other monads in which it is represented.
Hence, too, in more refined forms, the idea that to
be perfectly intelligible is not to be thought but
to be thinkable, an idea expressed by Lotze when
he speaks of knowledge as a relation which would
be destroyed if the thinker could he that which is
thought, and wholly absorbing into himself the
object, exhaust not only the intelligibility but also
the being of that which is known.

Criticism of this view would lead us to consider
the claims of a higher unity. This criticism will
not be attempted, for it is our immediate purpose
to accept Lotze as he is, and only indicate how he

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 299

remains in the mean position between the extremes
of an idealism for which thought seems to exhaust
being and a realism for which thought seems to
confront an object only partly intelligible. The
peculiar difficulty which Lotze creates for us lies
in the extent to which the idealism is carried.
For the nuclei certainly seem to be no more than
nuclei of sensations, and it is only in so far as these
have a peculiar unity which is given to us by the
supersensible ground of objects, and not given by
us to objects, that they maintain the character of
being more than phenomena. They cannot be
' matter ' in the crude sense, and if they are the
matter of thought they seem to be ultimately sub-
jective affections in a sense that makes it difficult
to resist a progress toward pure idealism. Lotze's
refusal to make the advance must be ascribed to his
idea of the worth of the individual, which is so
bound up with the notion of consciousness that it
becomes necessary to re-interpret the idea of the
nuclei on the analogy of the individual consciousness
as non- spatial units that maintain themselves in a
unity of co-operation without fusion.

The revulsion which invariably follows excessive
systematisation seems to indicate that if ever a
' stable equilibrium ' is attained by thought, it will
have more of the character of the mean position
than of either extreme. For this reason a peculiar
interest attaches to the line of thought whose last
great representative is Lotze. It may seem at first
sight paradoxical that realism should emerge finally
as idealistic ; but, from the first, atomism com-
bines with realism an idealistic element, and the

300 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

preponderance of idealism finally is a natural result
due to the character of our progress in the realm
of thought.

Seeley has pointed out the way in which History
has gradually refined its content. At first it is a
complicated mass such as we find it in the times
of Livy or Pliny : from this mass various elements
detach themselves and evolve into independence :
natural history, for example, and political economy
are branches that have struck root and grow for
themselves, related to rather than dependent on the
residuum which now takes the place of the original
whole. In a similar way the progress of the sciences
has slowly depleted philosophy of its original con-
tent and at the same time defined its central
elements and true scope. A comparison between
such a magnum opus as that of Gassendi and the
worth of a modern philosopher shows the eff'ect of
progressive specialisation. It suggests also the ques-
tion, What is to be ultimately the real matter of
philosophy in the strict sense ?

The answer must be, in a sense, what it has
always been, that philosophy co-ordinates and
systematises the results of the special sciences.
There is however a strong and not unjustifiable
tendejicy to think that the peculiar function of
philosophy is the explanation of the -possibility of
the objects with which the sciences deal : in other
words, philosophy is epistemology. In any case it
seems clear that the duty of systematisation which
falls upon philosophy in no wise compels the philo-
sopher to unify his construction beyond the point
which his material will admit. That is to say, the

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 301

emphasis must be on co-ordination rather than
systematisation, and philosophy mistakes its function
if it in any way undertakes to dictate results to
the special sciences, as it has notoriously done in
some cases. We must, it seems, come back to the
view of philosophy as a dialectic of results, a sifting
of ends. Above all things, it must follow whither-
soever the w4nd carries it, and not pre-determine its
haven in the face of all the forces upon which it
relies for progress.

Philosophy is then more than mere epistemology.
But the epistemological problem is undoubtedly its
own peculiar centre. Upon the decision of the nature
of reality it centres its vital energies, and on this
point we seem to-day to have arrived at a temporary
decision that ' idealism based on realism ' is the
position which must be accepted for the present,
though we may hope it is not the last standpoint.

The reason why no further progress is possible is
that as yet the ' nucleus,' as Lotze understood it,
remains unresolved. However much may be done
to show that objects are ideal, that the ultimate
is a unit ideal in its character, the fact remains that
the unity characteristic of an existent thing is always
a unity whose actuality does not come from the
subjective side. It need not be disputed that a
thing is a complex of universals ; but this cannot
blind us to the fact that the reason for any one
object being this particular complex is to be found
in a determination of our activity which comes to
us, in perception, and does not go forth from us.

The realistic element then must not be over-
looked or ignored. But to advocate realism is not

302 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [ft.

to advocate materialism in any form. This may-
be taken as self-evident. The formula, ' no object
without a subject,' is the last word on that point.
But neither is the advocacy of an idealism based
on realism any ground for reaching a monism on the
idealistic side. In one of its aspects, the formula
quoted above means no unity without a conscious-
ness for which the unity exists. And while
materialism generates its peculiar monism by ignor-
ing this, idealism advances to its monism by an
equal denial of the truth of the formula only
obscured by greater subtlety. For extreme idealism
expresses the unity of the whole under the form of
thought unifying itself, which involves the presen-
tation of thought to thought, or a thought that
thinks itself. It is only in default of an attempt
to work out this idea that it seems plausible. On
further consideration it becomes a regress to infinity
just as much as the constitution of a whole by pre-
sentation to the mind of God proved an infinite
process. The question of the reality of time is the
inner point which wrecks idealism of this type.
For the assertion of timeless thought is a deduction
from the concept of what such a totality would be
if there weye such a totality. In experience how-
ever we find a sequence of events which is not a
mere logical interdependence, but an actual order.
Time may, and I think we are safe in saying must,
be regarded as subjective ; but order in time implies
over and above the subjective form an extra-subjec-
tive determination.

These subjects are large, and deserve further
elaboration. For the present I only desire to

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 303

indicate some of the reasons which seem to force
one back from the extremes to a middle course
of some kind. To define that middle course pro-
perly, it would be necessary to write a metaphysic.
Gassendi would help but little, for two obvious
reasons : he has no epistemology, and his idealistic
tendencies are too embryonic, as they were bound
to be so long as he could neither estimate the
significance of the possibility of objects nor make
up his mind as to the nature of time and space. As
I have indicated above, criticism finds him an easy
victim from this point of attack. His weaknesses are
apparent ; the interesting point about his work is
the way in which it defines problems still unsolved.
If we look in modern philosophy for a match to
Gassendi, we shall probably find the nearest approach
to one in G. H. Lewes. His ' Reasoned Realism ' is
very much akin to ' Empirical Realism,' as used
above of Gassendi (v. Problems of Life ajid Mind,
I. 176). Spencer's position is defined by Lewes as
'Transfigured Realism' (p. 192), 'for that theory
professes to be a theory of Perception, and declares
Perception to be symbolical ; whereas, according to
the Principles here expounded. Perception being the
resultant of two factors, internal and external, the
conclusion deduced is that the object thus felt
exists precisely as it is felt : existing for us only
in Feeling, its reality is what we feel. . . . Percep-
tion, because it is a resultant, not a symbol, does
not alter the Real : on the contrary, the object
only is to us what we feel it to be — it exists in
that relation.' Lewes' language is somewhat inaccu-
rate : a few lines lower he says, ' this particular thing

304 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

in this particular relation is what it is in this
relation, i.e. what it is felt to be.' Here ' thing '
is put in place of ' object,' and which of the two
terms should be used I cannot say : if Lewes meant
' thing,' the position is very like Gassendi's ; shall
we say ' no better than Gassendi's ' ? If he means
that 'thing' and 'object' are identical (except in
so far as the thing has more relations than it realises
with us), the position is one that Gassendi might
have endorsed : for that the real is the existent
which reveals itself to the senses, and has more
reality (in its unrelated self) than our senses are
adequate to, is just what he tries to say.

But we cannot extend to Lewes the consideration
which Gassendi deserves on account of his dis-
advantages. When Lewes says ' the object thus
felt exists precisely as it is felt,' he is simply re-
funding into both terms of the relation the product
of their relatedness : he might just as well say
that hydrogen and oxygen have each of them all
the properties of water. It may be true that per-
ception does not, as a process, alter, that is vitiate,
reality ; but that statement leaves it open to us to
regard the perception as a development of the real
grounds of perception and, as such, a process vital
to the real. In trying to get away from the notion
that being phenomenal is being unreal, Lewes has
fallen into the other pit and proves that perception
has no real ground : for if reality does not develope
in perception, its indifference amounts to non-
existence. With Lewes perception seems to be a
relation in which both terms are indifferent, and
that is not conceivable. If perception involves a

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 305

subjective advance from mere sensation to definite
apprehension, it must also involve an objective
advance from the mere stimulus to the true object.

Gassendi would be in principle nearer to Lewes
than to Spencer on the question of perception. It
is interesting to think over the points of resemblance
between the Synthetic Philosophy and the Syiitagma
Philosophicum. The scheme is so similar : the
matter so different. The progress of two centuries
is condensed in their differences. But the critical
question of the nature of the object-in-itself seems
to receive an answer from Spencer less acceptable
than that of Gassendi. We are however precluded
from discussion upon details by a primary difference
which completely swamps all similarity. This con-
sists in the deductive character of Spencer's synthetic
philosophy. In contrast to this Gassendi's method
is reductive. It is indeed true that Spencer gives
away his deduction by omitting that most important
element, the transition from inorganic to organic :
on consideration however it will be clear that the
deduction has really failed to vitally connect any
higher stage with a lower. If the deduction were
really successful at any point the evolutionary
doctrine could have passed from a method to a
theory, and attained that intuitive insight which,
as Leibnitz foresaw, would make it prophetic.
Spencer was overweighted with the possibilities of
a doctrine of Force : Gassendi was saved from that,
possibly by absence of temptation.

We cannot afford to overlook in modern philo-
sophy the recognition which scholasticism is receiving.
The best scholastic philosophy was marked l)y a

306 PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI [pt.

firm grasp on certain ultimate points and by clear
if somewhat formal definitions. Its relation to
religion put it in close contact with the deepest
thought of all ages, while it tended to keep aloof
the encroaching sciences. While therefore it erred
in dogmatically asserting itself as an authority in
spheres over which its formulae had no jurisdiction
either by nature or origin, it at the same time
retained intact, by force of circumstances, what
modern philosophy is striving to redeem from the
grasp of an apparently all-victorious science. The
points which it thus retained, uncritically but
resolutely, were the reality of the spiritual and
the necessity of a creator.

The creative factor we still must have. The
concept of God is one of those concepts which suc-
cessive ages refine. But however much we refine
the idea, it cannot be wholly refined away. The
elimination of sensuous and imaginative elements is
only a purification : as culture advances, the con-
struction which we put upon the idea advances from
the crudeness of anthropomorphism to other forms
which correspond to the higher mental level of the
race. And as at one extreme the concept of God,
so at the other the concept of matter is perpetually
refined and re-edited. But neither seems as yet to
have reached the vanishing point, and however com-
prehensive our scheme of development, it retains the
three movements of a given which developes, a form
of development which implies more than mere
mechanism, and a mind without which the develop-
ment cannot have come to its recognition.

The first is the matter. The second is the possi-

IV.] GENERAL REVIEW 307

bility of being intelligible, which must be reluctantly
allowed. The third is mind. As regards the second,
it must not be over-emphasised at present. To
assert that the given is purely intelligible overlooks
faults ; to assert that it is intelligence, leads to con-
fusion. For while it might be called ' intelligible '
through and through, if we had any knowledge of
a mind for which it was thus intelligible, in the
absence of such knowledge we have to confess that
what is not given to our intelligence as intelligence
is as much an unintelligible as though there were
no such mind. And this limitation to which the
absence of any omniscience which we can show forces
us, leaves an irrational element which is foreign to us,
however much we prophesy its final elimination.

The attempt to remove this from the ethical side
is premature. The ethical import of the whole is
not a valid ground for universal statements, so long
as the whole is not given as such. A view which
makes the whole a self-revelation of a Divine mind
moves in a circle, constructing the concept of that
mind to support its own correlative, the Whole
viewed as a One intelligible and ethical in character.
It is sounder to regard ethical characteristics as not
' cosmic,' else our will and our thought must be
regarded as identical with that which we attribute
to God, whereas Spinoza's determination of the
voluntas and cognitio Dei as only negatively deter-
minable, must be regarded as the true logical position.

INDEX

Activity, 162.

Analysis, value of, 178.

Anima, 106 (v. Soul). Ratioualis,

142.
Animals, how classified, 99.
Appetitus, 153.
Atoms : as described by

Democritus, xxi.

as hyper-sensuous, xxxii, 52.

how different, 64.
Atomism, xvii.

its origins, xix.

of Democritus, xx-xxii.

as philosophy, xxiv, 255, 274.

its revival, 245.

in Leibnitz, 276.
Attraction, 62, 119.
Avicenna, 30 n., 176.

Bacon, 11.

Causality, 57.
Cause, efficient, 55.
Chymici, 24, 51.

their elements, 177.

criticism of, 178.
Clifford, W. K., 117.
Compositio, 136.
Copernicus, 29.
Courage, 203.
Cupiditas, 157.

Declination, xxxi.
note on, 230.

Democritus.

his doctrine, xx-xxiii.

referred to, 52.
Descartes, xxxix.

his logic, 11.

relation to Gassendi, 251.

Empiricism.

Gassendi's relation to, 12, 251.
Epicurus, xvii.

relation to atomism, xviii.

life and teaching, xxv-xxxvi.

Logic, xxvii, 3.

Physics, XXX.

Psychology, xxxiii, 109, 121.

on imagines, 77.

on origin of laws, 204.

referred to, 52, 56, 101, 104,
167 n., 185, 198, 225, 231.
Eternity, 46.
Experience : meaning of, 251, 253.

Faculties : nature of, 69, 115.

Gassendi : his times, xxxix, 246.
character, xxxix.
life, xl-xlv.
Logic, 1.
Physics, 19.

on plurality of worlds, 22.
on World Soul, 23, 140.
on theories of the Universe, £8.
use of categories, 29, 35, 257, 264
. on space, 34.

INDEX

309

Gassendi :
on time, 40.
eternity, 46.
matter, 49.
the atom, 52-64.
efficient causes, 55.
pure causality, 57.
local motion, 60.
attraction, 62, 119.
qualities, 66.

nature of faculties, 69, 115.
gravity, 72.
light, 74.

visible species (imagines), 76.
Generation or Becoming, 83.
magnet, 92, 115, 119.
plants, 95.

classification of animals, 99.
teleology, 100.
de anima, 106.
the human soul, 111.
origin of soul, 113.
perception, 115, 123.
sensation, 116, 121.
mind-stuff theory, 118.
his scale of Being, 127, 263.
imagination, 129.
simple apprehension, 135.
compositio, 136.
Ratio Sensitiva, 137.
intellectus, 142.
appetitus, 153.
cupiditas, 157.
pleasure-pain, 157.
activity (vis motrix), 162.
vocal sounds, 165.
nature of life, 168.
identity and continuity, 169.
temperament, 174.
value of analysis, 178.
summum bonum, 184.
classes of goods, 191.
virtue defined, 196.
prudence, 200.

Gassendi :

on courage, 203.
temperance, 204.
justice, 204.
jus civile, 206.
jus naturale, 207.
jus gentium, 209.
natural law.s, 210.
liberty, 218.
predestination, 221.
God, 224.
Oassendi.

his position defined, 248.
character of his work, 256.
the concept of motion, 261.
Generation, 83.
God, 224.

relation to time, 47.
first cauise, 56.
Guyau, quoted 230.

Identity, 169.
Imagination, 13, 129.
Intellectus, 142.

Jus, civile, 206 ; naturale, 207 ;

gentium, 209.
Justice, 204.

Kant : his ethics in relation to
Gassendi, 214.
his influence, 274, 279.

Leibnitz : his logical standpoint,
271.
relation to Gassendi, 273.
defective idea of an organism,

275.
idea of unity, 277.
Leucippus, xvii.
development of his atomism,
xviii-xx.
Liberty, 218.
Life, defined, 168.

310

INDEX

Light : nature of, 74.
Logic.

of Epicurus, xxvii, 3.

of Gassendi, 1.
Lotze.

his aesthetic standpoint, 283.

doing opposed to being, 284.

three moments of his philosophy,
287.

occasionalism, 287.

idealism, 288.
Lucretius, xvii.

on the soul, xxxiii, 121.

quoted 23, 109 n., 226, 237.

Magnet, 92, 115, 119.

Masson, John, quoted 117, 230.

Materialism, 249.

Matter, 49.

Mind-stufF, 118.

Motion.

as general principle, 261.

local motion, 60.

vis motrix, 162.

Natural laws, 210.
Nature, view of, 20.

Occasionalism, 288.

Perception, 115, 123.

Plants, 95.

Plato, Timaeus, quoted 25.

Posidonius, quoted 45, 46.

Potentiality, 266.

Potestas, 72.

Predestination, 221.

Prudence, 200.

Pythagoras, on the World Soul, 25.

Qualities, 66.

Quality : opposed to quantity,

267.
Quantity : category of, 268.
relation to quality, 66.

Ratio, kinds of, 137.
Relation, category of, 265.

Sensation, 116, 121.
Signa, 10.
Soul, 106.

human. 111.

origin of, 113.

and body, 263.
Space, 34.

Species (visible), 76.
Speech, 165.

Substance, category of, 264, 272.
Summum bonum, 184.

Teleology, 100.

Temperament, 174.

Temperance, 204.

Thomas, P. Felix, quoted xv,

xliii, 4, 160, 213.
Time, 40.
Timeless, meaning of, 46.

Ueberweg, quoted 248.
Unity, 257, 277.
in Lotze, 291.

Virtue, 196.

Wallace, Epicureanism, quoted

xxvi, XXXV, 104.
World Soul, 23, 140.

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