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MODERN PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 BY JAMES MURDOCK, D. D. 
 
 AUTHOR OF MURDOCK'S MOSHEIM. 
 
 NEW-YORK: M.W. DODD, 
 
 HARTFORD; JOffi^I C. WELLS. 
 
 1814. 
 
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1S42, by 
 
 ■ JA3IES MURDUCK, 
 
 in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of Connecticut. 
 
 
MB 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 This work was commenced about a year ago, at the re- 
 quest of several gentlemen, chiefly clergymen, who said 
 ihey could obtain no definite ideas of the modern Germa 
 Philosophy. To meet the wants of these friends, and oth- 
 ers in like circumstances, the author undertook to publish 
 some short Essays in the Congregational Observer, edited 
 by Messrs. Tyler & Poiter of Hartford. Soon after the 
 publication commenced, the editors proposed striking off a 
 number of copies in the volume form; and also encouraged 
 some enlargement and extension of the plan of the work. 
 But before its completion, the Newspaper was discontinu- 
 ed ; and the two last Chapteis now first appear in print. — 
 The piecemeal composition of the work will account for 
 some want of uniformity in the style and manner of treat- 
 ing the subject; and the author's distance from the press, 
 and the difficulty of Newspaper correction, must excuse 
 several unfortunate errata. 
 
 The author here brings before the public no new system 
 of philosophy, nor smy a.ttempted improvemoits of the sci- 
 ence. Neither does he offer a critique upon the writings 
 and speculations of others. He is not a philosopher ; he 
 has no favorite opinions to introduce an'' recommend ; and 
 he does not assume the office of a teaciicr of philosophical 
 science. He comes forward as a mere historian, narrating 
 the progress of speculative philosophy in modern times, es 
 
>V' PREFACE. 
 
 { ecially among the Germans. And for this purpose, after 
 a brief statement of the two principal modes of philoso- 
 1 hizing, he endeavors to describe summarily but di.-*- 
 tinctly, all the more noted systems proposed by the meta- 
 I'hysical philosophers from the times of Des Cartes to the 
 present day. In this survey, he endeavors to discriminate 
 accurately between the different systems mentioned, to state 
 clearly and concisely the fundamental principles of each 
 .system, its objects and aims, the estimation in which it was 
 held, and the extent to which it has prevailed. 
 
 The principal authorities consulted in the twelve first 
 chapters of the work, are JV. G. Tennemanri's Grundriss der 
 Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. 1829 : T. A. Rixner's 
 Handbuch der Gesch. der Philos. ed. 1822 ; W. T. Krug's 
 Encyclopadisch-Philosophisches Lexikon. ed. 1832-33 : 
 and the Algem. Deutsche Real-Encyclopadie. ed. 1824. 
 In the remaining chapters, the authorities are generally sta- 
 ted in the work. While writing the four chapters on the 
 Kantean Philosophy, the author had not the Critik der 
 reinen Vernunft before him, but relied upon very copious 
 t.) tracts w\i\c\i he. made from that work about eight years 
 ago. Since obtaining the Critik, he has not had leisure for 
 a thorough verification ; but he hopes his statements will 
 be found substantially correct. 
 
 JAMES MURDOCK. 
 
 New Haven, Sept. 17, 1842. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 TWO MODES OF PHILOSOPHIZING. 
 
 Description and Character of the two modes. . Page 7 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHIZING. 
 
 Bacon, Lock e, Berkeley, Reid, &c 14 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHERS. 
 Des Cartes, S pinoza , Malebranche. ... 22 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 THE FIRST GERMAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Leibnitz and Wolf. ...... 33 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 KANT AND HIS CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Introductory Remarks. Critic on Sensation. Time 
 and Space 44 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Understanding defined. Its Conceptions. The Cat- 
 egories. ........ 55 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 THE CRITICAL PH!LOSOPHY. 
 
 Pure Reason, Transcendental Ideas. Rational The- 
 ology 68 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Results to whicn this Philosophy arrives. . . 79 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 ANTI-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Effects of the Critical Philosophy. Reinhold's Doc- 
 
m CONTENTS. 
 
 trine of Thought. FiclUc's Doctrine of Science, or 
 WissenschaftsJeUre. 9S 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Schelling''s Doctrine of Identity, Identitatslehre. 
 Fichte's altered Doctrine of Science. Other Pan- 
 theists . Boutericek, Bardili, Eachenmayer, Wagner, 
 Krause 104 
 
 CHAP. XI. 
 
 PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 HegeVs absolute Idealism. Logic the only lM#l!qPhys- 
 ics 118 
 
 CHAP. xn. 
 
 INSTINCTIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Jacobins Philosophy of Faith or Instinct. His follow- 
 ers, Koepen, von IVeiler, Salat. Ability and Hon- 
 esty of the German Philosophers. Scltulzc, the on- 
 ly Skeptic among them, 129 
 
 CHAP. XIII. 
 
 FRENCH PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The new School in France. Its Origin, and Pres- 
 ent State. Its Advocates. Its Doctrines. . 141 
 
 CHAP. XIV. 
 
 GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA. 
 
 Its Introduction. Coleridgeism. . . . 156 
 
 CHAP. XV. 
 AMERICAN TRANSCENDENTALISM. 
 Propriety of the Name. Its origin among us. It? 
 radical Principles. ...... 167 
 
 CHAP. XVI. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF DR. RAUCH. 
 
 JBiographical Notice. His Psychology, Transcer.den- 
 tal, Hegelian. Outline of his Philosophy. Its 
 bearing on Theology. ..... 183 
 
^7 
 
 or THE ^ 
 
 c 
 
 two MODES OF PHILOSOPHIZING. 
 
 Description and Chardcter of the two Modes. 
 
 Two fundamentally different modes of Pbilos- 
 opiiizing have long prevailed, and have divided 
 Philosophers into two general classes. Aristotle 
 and Plato, — Bacon and Descartes, — Locke and 
 Leibnitz, — the Scotch and English on the one 
 hand, and the modern Germans with some of 
 the recent French on the other, — represent the 
 two classes. The first consider the human mind 
 as born without knowledge, and as incapable of 
 originating any knowledge, from itself, or by the 
 mere exercise of its own powers. It must, they 
 say, receive, from without, the subject matter of 
 all knowledge ; and this it does, especially, 
 through the senses. Reflection on its own sen- 
 sations and perceptions, gives form and consis- 
 tency to the given matter derived from without ; 
 and thus leads to that true and perfect knowledge 
 of things which is properly called philosophy. — ' 
 The other class of philosophers do not deny, that 
 the bodily senses are an inlet of knowledge; and 
 
8 TWO MODES OF PHILOSOPHIZING. 
 
 that reflection on our sensations and perceptions 
 will give form and consistency to this sort of 
 knowledge. But, say they, this is not properly 
 philosophical knowledge ; it is merely empirical 
 knowledge, or knowledge derived from sensa- 
 tions and experience. It is the acquisition of 
 the Intelle c or Understanding, and not of the 
 Reason, which is a higher power of the mind, and 
 capable of a higher and more important kind of 
 knowledge. According to some of this class, 
 the human mind has certain innate or connate 
 ideas, which exactly correspond with the essence 
 of things, by contemplating and comparing 
 which and by reasoning from tliem correctly, this 
 higher and more important knowledge is obtain- 
 ed. Others among them, not admitting of in- 
 nate ideas, maintain that human Rettson— that 
 higher faculty of the soul — is capable of acquir- 
 ing knowledge, by mere inspection or intuition, 
 and likewise by reasoning a priori ; and in these 
 ways, it does acquire that iiigher and more per- 
 fect knowledge, which is properly called philoso- 
 phical or rational knowledge, that is, knowledge 
 acquired by the aid of Reason. This rational or 
 philosophical knowledge, they say, differs essen- 
 tially frona empirical knowledge, or from the ex- 
 perimental knowledge acquired by the Under- 
 standing. — First ; it is more certain. For it is 
 
TWO MODES OF PHILOSOPHIZING. J# 
 
 always either immediate vision, or it is derived 
 from demonstration ; whereas empirical knowl- 
 edge is derived directly or indirectly from the 
 senses ; which are always liable to fail us, and to 
 give us either false impressions, or impressions 
 too feeble and too indistinct to be relied upon. — 
 Secondly ; it is more solid or fundamental. For 
 it is knowledge of the real nature and essence 
 of things ; whereas empirical knowledge is al- 
 ways superficial and extends only to the phenom- 
 ena or appearances ofthingp. It does not ac- 
 quaint us with things themselves, or with their 
 internal nature and character, but only with their 
 effects or operations upon our bodily organs. — 
 Thirdly ; rational knowledge has a character of 
 necessity and universality^ wliich empirical 
 knowledge never can have. When we see the 
 real nature and essence of thing, we know at 
 once what must of necessity and universally be 
 its operation. But when we know a thing only 
 empirically, we actually know only what was 
 the fact in the several instances in which we ob- 
 served it, or put it to the test of experiment. — 
 We may illustrate the difference by a case in 
 pure mathematics. Geometry demonstrates that 
 the three angles of every right lined triangle are 
 equal to two right angles. And the demonstra- 
 tion is so complete, that the mind is fully satis- 
 
 s/' 
 
]0 TWO MODES OF niiLosornizixa. 
 
 fled that this must, necessarily, and universally, 
 hold good of every possible right lined triangle. 
 But the empirical measurement of the angles of 
 two, twenty, or a thousand triangles, could not 
 produce the same result; It would only prove 
 to us, that all the triangles we had examined, had 
 been found to be of this character, not that all 
 others must necessarily and certainly be of the 
 same character. And so of all general truths 
 or principles, '\i Reason discovers them or bring-s 
 us acquainted with them, they have this charac- 
 ter of universaHty and necessity ; but if we have 
 only empirical knowledge of them, they liave 
 not this character ; they are only maxims of ex- 
 perience, and though they may serve as useful 
 guides in matters of common life, they can not be 
 made the foundation of demonstrative reasoning^, 
 or of absolute certainty ; they can not be ad- 
 mitted into scientific reasoning ; they belong not 
 to the science of philosophy, but only to the 
 mass of our empirical knowledge. 
 
 The two general modes of philosophizing 
 above described, may be denominated the empi- 
 rical^ and the metaphysical. The term empirical, 
 so current among the Germans, comes from the 
 Greek empeiria, experience, which is derived 
 from PEiRAN to try. It is not disrespectful in its 
 import, and it well expresses the thing intended. 
 
TWO MODES OF PHlLOSOrniZING. 11 
 
 'The term metaphysical is used, as being suited 
 to convey to Americans a correct idea of the 
 other mode of philosophizing. The Germans 
 do not use it in this connexion, but call this 
 mode of philosophizing the rational, and the sci- .,- 
 entific mode. ^ 
 
 The manner in which tiiese two classes of 
 philosophers regard each other, may easily be 
 conceived. The empirical class, not believing 
 the human mind to possess any higher power 
 than that of the intellect or understanding, and 
 supposing man to be incapable of any other than 
 empirical knowledii:e, of course look upon the 
 metaphysical philosophers as idle dreamers, who 
 mistake the workings of the imagination, and 
 unreal speculations, for truths of the highest 
 order. Despising such fancied wisdom, they 
 will not take pains to acquaint themselves with 
 it. It is to them all moonshine, and unworthy 
 the attention of one who seeks only for solid and 
 useful knowledge. On the other hand, the met- 
 aphysical philosophers regard the empirical as 
 mere children in science, and strangers to the 
 .noble powers of human Reason^ that divine or 
 Godlike principle in man. Like the ancient 
 navigators, they timidly coast along the shores of 
 the vast ocean of human knowledge, keeping y 
 always in sight of land : they never venture to 
 
12 TM^O MODES OF PHILOSOFHIZIIS'G. 
 
 launch forth in search of foreign realms, depen- 
 ding on tlie sure principles of science to guide 
 their adventurous course. Such explorers, say 
 the metaphysicians, may indeed advance the 
 physical sciences by their close observation of 
 nature, and by their laborious experiments upon 
 her phenomena ; but they must ever remain 
 strangers to even the first principles of true phi- 
 losophy, and can never erect a solid and endur- 
 ing system of philosophical science. For, al- 
 though they actually adopt, unconsciously, many 
 of the principles of rational knowledge, and ap- 
 ply them in their philosophical investigations, 
 yet not relying solely on such principles, or build- 
 ing exclusively upon them, but relying equally 
 upon empirical principles, commingling both, 
 and erecting superstructures out of both, their 
 systems lack entirely that character for certainty, 
 solidity, and pure science, which will entitle them 
 to confidence and to the appellation of true phi- 
 losophy. 
 
 We may add, that the sjjirit and the tendency 
 of the two modes of philosophizing are very dif- 
 ferent. The one is slow, cautious, dubitating, 
 and modest. It examines every thing, fears de- 
 ception and mistake, and seldom ventures to be 
 positive or dogmatical. The other is more dar- 
 ing, bold, and self-confident : it feels its own 
 
TWO MODES OF PHILOSOPHIZING. 13 
 
 Strength, is proud of its lofty powers, and there- 
 fore inclines to be dogmatical and overbearinoj. 
 The former prompts men to enquire, to hesitate, 
 to confine themselves down to sense, and to dis- 
 trust all that can not be put to the test of fair 
 experiment. Hence it has actually led multi- 
 tudes to skepticism, to materialism, and to in- 
 fidelity. Tile other prompts to an over-weening 
 estimate of the powers of human reason, to bold 
 and hasty conclusions, and to the excessive love 
 of novelty and of paradox. And henco it has 
 actually led to the exaltation of reason above rev- 
 elation, to bold and confident dogmatism, to 
 idealism, to pantheism, and to transcendent su- 
 pernaturalism. 
 
 In conclusion, we remark that the English, the 
 Scotch, and the Americans, almost universally, 
 belong to the empirical school ; while nearly all 
 the Germans, several of the latest French philos- 
 ophers, with a very few in England and Amer- 
 ica, belong to the metaphysical school. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 EMPIEICAL PHILOSOPHIZING. 
 Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, Reid, &c. 
 
 "In the first Chapter, two fundamentally dif- 
 ferent modes of philosophizing were described. 
 Tiie present Chapter will relate to the history of 
 tliem, anterior to the recent German systems of 
 philosophy. 
 
 The founders of the two schools were Aristotle 
 and Plato : the former pursuing the empirical, 
 the latter the metaphysical method. During the 
 middle ages, Aristotle had most adherents, but 
 Plato found here and there a few followers. 
 
 Prior to the 17th century, the empirical phi- 
 losophers made almost no experiments, but took 
 up their first impressions as adequate, and pro- 
 ceeded immediately to generalization and the 
 construction of systems. But in the beginning 
 of this century, Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam, 
 published his Chart of the Sciences, and his 
 New Method of fiursuing them — de Augmentis 
 Scientiarum, in 1605, and Novum Organum, in 
 1520 — in which lie recommended dependence on 
 reiterated and well conducted experiments, as 
 being the only sure method of advancing the 
 physical sciences. Lord Bacon's works put the 
 
EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHIZING, 1^' 
 
 friends of these sciences upon a new course ; 
 which has been pursued to the present time, 
 and with the most splendid results. The bril- 
 liant achievements of the empirical method in 
 these departments of knowledge, tended to bring 
 the metaphysical method of philosophizing into 
 discredit in regard to every branch of philoso- 
 phy, especially in England and France ; yet, foi* 
 a time, there were a few who pursued the meta- 
 physical method, especially in ethics^ natural 
 theology, and the law of nations. Thus, Lord 
 Herbert of Cherbury, a contemporary of Bacon, 
 held to connate knowledge, or to general truths 
 latent in the soul as it comes into life. And H. 
 More and R. Cudworth, both Platonists, believed 
 in moral and religious ideas either born with us, 
 or coming to us by immediate inspiration from 
 God In France, also, Des Cartes attempted, 
 though with little success, to revive the meta- 
 physical method in all the sciences. In Eng- 
 land, however, the metaphysical method was 
 nearly extinct, when Mr. Locke, in the year 
 1698, attacked it, and wholly exterminated it 
 from the British soil, by his famous Essay on 
 the Human Understanding. In this elaborate 
 and classical work, Mr. Locke confutes the doc- 
 trine of innate or connate ideas, and maintains, 
 that all human knowledge is acquired, or is the 
 result of sensation or reflection ; that is, it is 
 
16 EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHIZING. 
 
 eitlier obtained directly through the bodily sen- 
 ses, or it originates from reflei^tion on what is so 
 obtained. In addition to these common and 
 fundamental principles of the empiric school, he 
 maintained the objective reality of our knowl- 
 edge of the external world. In his viovF, all our 
 ideas are either simple or complex : the former 
 are derived immediately from our sensations and 
 reflection, and exactly correspond with the real 
 nature and essence of things. The latter are 
 formed by the understanding, being compound- 
 ed of simple ideas ; and when duly compounded, 
 they also correspond with the nature of things. 
 Mr. Locke's book has been classical, and its 
 principles have maintained the highest authority, 
 in all the empirical schools down to the present 
 time. The work Avas soon translated into French^ 
 and subsequently into other languages ; and for 
 more than a century it was revered and followed, 
 very much as the writings of Aristotle were in the 
 days of the schoolmen. 
 
 It has already been stated, that the spirit of 
 this mode of philosophizing is slow, cautious, 
 dubitating and modest : it examines every thing, 
 fears deception and mistake, and seldom ven- 
 tures to be positive or dogmatical. At the same 
 time, as it prompts men to inquire, to hesitate, 
 to confine themselves much to the senses, and to 
 distrust all that cannot be put to the test of ex- 
 
PHILOSOPHIZING. 17 
 
 periment, it has led multitudes to skepticism, to 
 materialism, and to infidelity. The proof of this 
 lies in the fact, that from this school have pro- 
 ceeded all the English and French freethinkers, 
 deists, skeptics, materialists and atheists, from 
 the age of Bacon down to the present day ; and 
 that these, one and all, have depended on argu- 
 ments which they derived from this philosophy, 
 and from no other, to support their peculiar opin- 
 ions ; and they have claimed for themselves ex- 
 chisively the appellation o^ philosophers, because 
 they thus followed this philosophy to its legiti- 
 mate results, unrestrained and untrammeled by 
 vulgar prejudices and by traditional belief. Of 
 the skeptics, David Hume, and his imitators and 
 admirers, are a striking example. As to the 
 deists, we might cite the whole catalogue, both 
 English and French : Hobbe^, Blount, Roches- 
 ter, Toland, Shaftesbury, Collins, Woolston, Tin- 
 dal, Morgan, Chubb, Bolingbroke, Hume, Gib- 
 bon, ifec, among the EngHsh ; and Rousseau, 
 Voltaire, D'Argens, Toussaint, Buffon, Raynal, 
 Condorcet, St. Lambert, Dupuis, D'Alembert 
 and Diderot, the encyclopedists, and all the 
 other infidel philosophers of France. Of ma- 
 terialists from this school, (and I know of none 
 from any other,) we may name as pre-eminent, 
 Hobbes, Shaftesbury and Priestley, among the 
 2 
 
18 IMPERfAL 
 
 Englisli ; and De la Mettrie and Helvetius, amon^ 
 the French. Among the avowed atheists in this 
 school, we may mention De la Mettrie, Diderot, 
 the Baron d'Holbach, Naigeon, Marechal, and 
 the astronomer, De la Lande. 
 
 As all these erratic philosophers belanged to 
 the empirical school, and professed only to fol- 
 low this philosophy into its legitimate conse- 
 quences, the defenders of the Bible and of Chris- 
 tianity have labored much, to shew that this phi- 
 losophy, instead of subverting Christianity and 
 all revealed religion, really confirms and supports 
 them, if it be rightly understood and applied. 
 And to make good this position, some of them 
 have ventured to modify certain tenets of Mr 
 Locke, yet without departing from his funda- 
 mental principles. Thus, Bishop Berkeley dis- 
 carded the idea, that by the bodily senses we 
 apprehend material objects themselves, and be- 
 come acquainted with tlieir real nature. Tlie 
 senses, he maintained, cavi apprehend only the 
 phenomena of external objects, or their impres- 
 sions on our organs. Hence, he inferred, we 
 know nothing of the nature of the world with- 
 out, or the material world, except that it is an 
 incomprehensible cause of various eftects or im- 
 pressions on our bodily senses. And he deemed 
 it most philosophical, to suppose that the great 
 
PHILOSOPHIZpGf. ^ 0> l^ii'l^ ^ 
 
 /(U jinrPT' '^^^'^'^ 
 
 First Cause and Author of all things, is,'liimself 
 the immediate producer of these sensations in 
 us ; and that material objects, as SBcondary and 
 intervening causes between God and us, are 
 mere fictions of our imaginations. In short, he 
 denied the existence of matter altogether ; and 
 maintained, that God and inferior or finite spirits, 
 (angelic and human,) are the only real existen- 
 ces in the universe. By this amendment of Mr. 
 Locke's system, the excellent bishop hoped to 
 bring all philosophers to believe, that they lite- 
 rally see and hear and feel the immediate power 
 of God, present every moment with them, and 
 operating all around them. And such a belief, 
 he imagined, would banish infidelity and irreli- 
 gion from every philosophic mind : but the ideal- 
 ism or spiritualism of Berkeley, has not met gen- 
 eral approbation. 
 
 After this, Tho. Reid, Ja. Beattie, and some 
 others, in order to confute Hume's skepticism, 
 Berkeley's idealism, and other aberrations from 
 the common belief, without renouncing the em- 
 pirical mode of philosophizing, called in the aid 
 of common sense, or the common apprehensions 
 of the unsophisticated mind, as a supreme arbi- 
 ter in such controversies. They did not recall 
 the long exploded doctrine of innate ideas, nor 
 adopt that of the intuitions and judgments of 
 
/^.6^; l^itr/u 
 
 20 -^IMPERIAL 
 
 reason^ as a higher power of the mind — which 
 would have been to take their stand among the 
 metaphysical philosophers — but they held, that 
 certain instinctive apprehensions of mankind at 
 large, apprehensions which mysteriously accom- 
 pany all our ordinary sensations, and are inde- 
 pendent of all reasoning and all philosophy, are 
 often more sound and correct than the apprehen- 
 sions and conclusions of the most acute philoso- 
 phers. Thus, by making the principles of com- 
 mon sense, or a mysterious and incomprehensi- 
 ble instinct, more to be relied on than philosophi- 
 cal reasoning, and by teaching that the latter 
 must succomb to the former in case of disagree- 
 ment — they virtually taught, that the empirical 
 mode of philosophizing is unsafe, without a re- 
 gulator and a guide ; and, that unphilosophical 
 conclusions are often more correct than those of 
 philosophy. This new doctrine of common 
 sense, without being formally recognized by all, 
 has spread widely among empirical philosophers 
 in England, France and America ; and it has 
 been the frequent refuge of many, when grap- 
 pling with adversaries whose arguments they 
 were unable to confute by sound logical reason- 
 
 </ ing. 
 
 Subsequent to these chief innovators upon Mr. 
 Locke's system, Dugald Stewart, Tho. Brown, 
 
PHILOSOPHIZING. 21 
 
 and others, have carefully revised, enlarged and 
 perfected the whole system, by elaborate treatises 
 on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, con- 
 structed on pure Baconian principles. In 
 France also, the Abbe Condillac, Chas. de Bon- 
 net, and some others have attempted to improve 
 upon Locke. 
 
 The valuable treatises of various individuals 
 of this school, on particular branches of philoso- 
 phy, such as ethics, natural theology, the law of 
 nations, &c., are omitted, as not being necessary 
 to the main object of these essays, which is, to 
 convey to Americans some clear and correct ideas 
 of the modern German philosophy. And for the 
 same reason, the elaborate researches and in- 
 valuable discoveries of numerous successful ex- 
 plorers of nature, in all her departments, are here 
 passed in silence. The voluminous publications 
 of the so called Philosophical Societies, and the 
 numberless other profound works on natural 
 science, show the wonderful achievements of ex- 
 perimental philosophy, when directed to its pro- 
 per objects, and prosecuted according to Lord 
 Bacon's rules. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 Des Cartes, Spiuoza, Malebrauche. 
 
 The metaphysical n^ode of philosophizing' 
 does not, Hke the empirical, decide every pomt 
 separately, and on independent grounds ^ but it 
 searches a^ter general truths, or first i^rinciples, 
 and by applying them to specific cases in a logi- 
 cal manner, it obtains a scientific answer to every 
 question. 
 
 The modern history of this mode of philoso- 
 phizing commences with Rene Des Cartes, a 
 French nobleman of fine talents, who flourished 
 in the 2d quarter of the 17th century. Dissatis- 
 fied witli all the systems of philosopliy then pre- 
 vailing, he undertook to form a more sohd one, 
 based on certain knowledge. 
 
 He began with the enquiry, What does man 
 know, with perfect certainty 1 And he found '^n 
 answer, in the consciousness that he was tlien 
 
METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHERS. 23 
 
 thinking. He therefore inferred his own existence 
 to be certainly known : (cogito : ergo sum :) 
 and also, that he was a thinking being. But he 
 was likewise conscious, that his mental powers 
 were very limited ; he could comprehend only a 
 small part of the numberless objects around him. 
 At the same time, he could conceive of a mind 
 capable of comprehending every thing; and not 
 only capable of understanding, but also of creat- 
 ing and upholding all things, and possessing 
 every possible perfection. This idea he found 
 floating in his mind, and he was not conscious 
 of having designedly fabricated it : he therefore 
 concluded, that it came to him from without, and 
 from that infinite Being himself, of whom it was 
 the idea. There is then a God, an all perfect 
 Being; and our idea of him is innate. He like- 
 wise proved the existence of God, by the marks 
 of wisdom and design visible every where in the 
 natural world. And from the perfections of the 
 divine Being who created us, he inferred the truth 
 and infallibility of human reasoning, when pro- 
 perly conducted ; because it is not conceivable, 
 that such a Creator would endow us with facul- 
 ties calculated to mislead us. Clearness and dis- 
 iinctness, he supposed, are the evidence of the 
 truth or certainty of our knowledge. The bodily 
 senses seldom afford clear and distinct knowK 
 
24 METAPHYSICAL 
 
 edge ; and thereibre such knowledge as tliey af- 
 ford, can not always be depended on. But, be- 
 sides the perceptions of the senses, we have ideas 
 formed in the mind, by reasoning and reflection ; 
 and also innate ideas, or ideas implanted in our 
 minds by our Creator. The last (our innate 
 ideas) are the most clear and certain, and there- 
 fore the best sources of argumentation. The 
 ideas formed in the mind are the next in value 
 for reasoning ; because they canrMft be made clear 
 and distinct, if we are only careful to always 
 think clearly and distinctly. 
 
 Assuming the broad principle, that all clear 
 and distinct ideas contain true objective knowl- 
 edge, Des Cartes was less careful to search for 
 the origin, and to demonstrate the correctness of 
 our ideas, than to make his own ideas clear and 
 distinct. And this was the chief source of his 
 many errors, and of his baseless theories : for 
 when he had analyzed any of his conceptions 
 and made them \ery clear and distinct to his own 
 mind, he conceived them to be objectively true, 
 or to correspond with the real nature and essence 
 of things. In this way, he was led to believe, 
 that the very essence of J7iind or spirit consists in 
 thinking ; and the very essance of matter in mere 
 extension. Hence, he inferred, spirits can have 
 no extension, and no parts ; and matter can 
 
PHILOSOPHERS. 25 
 
 never think, perceive, or will. And, as extension 
 is the very essence of matter, there can be no 
 void space, or space unoccupied by matter; and 
 consequently, the material universe is an infinite- 
 ly extended plenum ; and of course, all motion 
 of bodies must produce a kind of vortices or 
 whirlpools. The soul^ having no extension, is 
 uncompounded ; and therefore, it can never be 
 dissolved oi die, being in its very nature immor- 
 tal. But the brutes are not immortal ; of course 
 they can have no souls, and are mere machines^ 
 with no thoughts, no volitions, and no percep- 
 tions. To explain the mode of communication 
 between the soul and the body, he supposed a 
 very subtile fluid, secreted from the blood and 
 called animal spirits, to circulate in the nerves, 
 and to convey intelligence from every part of the 
 body to the soul resident in the pineal gland of 
 the brain ; and thence, also, to convey the com- 
 mands of the soul to all the muscles employed in 
 voluntary motion. 
 
 Des Cartes was a man of genius, a fine wri- 
 ter, and, in general, a sound logical reasoner. 
 Yet his premises were too often mere assump- 
 tions ; and his conclusions of course, without 
 support. He struck out many new thoughts, and 
 he was the first in modern times, to frame a 
 regular system of philosophy based on metaphy- 
 
26 METAPHYSICAL 
 
 sical reasoning. His writings excited much at- 
 tention, anci they prompted many to engage in 
 philosophical studies ; but they also met with 
 great opposition. Gassendi and tlie adlierents 
 to the Baconian method, of course rejected Des 
 Cartes' views. The Jesuits in France, and many 
 of the protestants in Holland, did the same. In 
 England, he scarcely had a follower. His prin- 
 cipal adherents were, in France, several of the 
 Messieurs de Port- Roy al, especially Malebranche, 
 and in Holland, Spinoza and a few others. 
 
 Tlie next metaphysical ])hilosopher claiming 
 a place in this sketch, was Benedict Spinoza, a 
 learned Jew of Amsterdam, who died at the age 
 of 45, in the year 1677. 
 
 He had studied the Talmud, and was dissatis- 
 fied with its doctrines. Being discarded by the 
 Jews for his opinions, he associated with Chris- 
 tians, and among tliem, read and admired the 
 writings of Des Cartes. But he thought the sys- 
 tem of that philospher susceptible of improve- 
 ment. 
 
 Des Cartes had defined a substance to be, " a 
 thing-whicli so exists, as not to depend on any 
 thing else for its existence." And he had said, 
 that in this its proper sense, the term belongs 
 exclusively to the self-existent God. Relying on 
 the correctness of this definition, Spinoza main- 
 
PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 27 
 
 tained, that there is but one proper substance in 
 the universe; namely, the self-existent and all- 
 perfect God. All other creatures and things, not 
 only originated from this one infinite substance, 
 but in such a manner as to consist of it, and be 
 inseparable from it. They exist in God, and 
 God in them. As to essence or substance, the 
 whole universe is God ; God existing and ope- 
 rating in numberless modes and forms, which 
 his infinite wisdom has devised. According to 
 this theory, God himself is natura naturans, as 
 the philosophers express it ; and the created uni- 
 verse \ii?iatiira nafurata. Spinozism, however, 
 is not the Berkeleyan theory so extended as to in- 
 clude minds as well as material things. Berke- 
 ley supposed material objects, to be nothing more 
 than a constant divine operation^ supplying the 
 place of permanent material causes. But Spin- 
 oza did not suppose either matter or mind, to be 
 nothing more than a divine operation ; he admit- 
 ted them to be a proper product^ or rather effiux^ 
 of divine power, (though sustained and actuated 
 permanently by the divine Being,) and having 
 in themselves the power of action, according to 
 certain laws impressed upon them. 
 
 With Des Cartes, he held the essence o^ mind 
 to consist in thinkings and the essence of matter 
 to consist in extension. And believing that there 
 
28 METAPHYSICAL 
 
 is but one proper substance, or self-exi&lent 
 Being, fronj whom and in wliom all created 
 beings and things have their existence, he sup- 
 posed this' self-existing substance or Being, to be 
 at once, infinite mind or thinking power, and infi- 
 nite extension : and that when he creates finite 
 minds, it is, by sending forth a portion of his 
 thinking power, to think, and will, and choose, 
 according to certain laws ; and when lie creates 
 material objects, he in like manner sends forth 
 a portion of his other essential nature, extension^ 
 to fill assigned places, to move and be moved, 
 and to exhibit all the phenomena which we as- 
 cribe to material bodies. 
 
 All actions, he supposed to be necessary, or 
 governed by the laws of causation ; even those 
 of God liimself, who cannot act otherwise than he 
 does, beiiiu compelled by his own infinite attri- 
 butes. Yet we may say, God acts freely ; be- 
 cause he is self-moved, or acts only from internal 
 impulses. J/rt/z,on the contrary, does not act free- 
 ly ; not only because he is a dependent existence, 
 but also, because he is a finite being, and is sub- 
 ject to a thousand influences from the objects 
 around him. 
 
 All the divine perceptions or ideas, he suppos- 
 ed, are absolutely perfect: and all our ideas 
 would also fully accord with the nature of things, 
 
PHILOSOPHERS. 29 
 
 if we were always careful to think according to 
 the laws of thinking. It is only illegitimate and 
 careless thinking, that can lead to error ; since 
 the human mind, though finite, is an efflux of 
 the infinite and all-perlect mind. The object 
 which we can the most perfectly know or compre- 
 hend, is the divine Being himself ; in whom we 
 exist, and who is constantly developing himself 
 in each and every created thing around us. To 
 know and contemplate God, is man's highest 
 bliss ; and to obey his commands, is man's high- 
 est freedom. 
 
 Such is the best outline I can give of Spino- 
 za's pantheistic system. It is manifest, that he 
 carried his speculations quite beyond the bounds 
 of human knowledge, and ran into downright 
 transcendentism^ in which obscurity must ever 
 reign. But he also wrote in vei-y barbarous 
 Latin, and is a very obscure writer. I have not 
 relied so much upon my own power to unravel 
 his enigmas, as on the labors of those Germans, 
 who have attentively studied his works in order 
 to compare his opinions with those of the recent 
 German pantheists. Spinoza had scarcely a 
 single follower, in the age in which he lived ; and 
 he was generally regarded with abhorrence, as 
 being an atheist, and a subverter of all that is 
 rational. And yet he is reported to have been a 
 
30 METAPHYSICAL 
 
 very ami;ible man, perfectly correct in morals, 
 and devout also, in his way. 
 
 The next philosopher we shall mention, was 
 the pious Nicholas Malebranciie, ot' the Con- 
 gregation of the Oratory at Paris, who died in 
 1715, at the age of 77. ITjs princi[)al work was, 
 the Searcli after Truth, first published in 1673, 
 and afterwards, much altered and eidarffed in 
 1712, only 3 years before his death. 
 
 Malebranche, it has been said, was the most 
 profound metaphysician that France ever pro- 
 duced. He was an original thinker ; he called 
 no man master. Yet he took much from Plato, 
 Augustine, and Des Cartes. From the last he 
 took, unaltered, his ideas of substance^ of mind. 
 and of matter. 
 
 He undertook to searcli out, and to portray, the 
 sources both of error and of true knowledge. — 
 The great source of crror^ he supposed to be, the 
 following of the senses and the imagination. — 
 And the only source of true and certain knoicl- 
 edge, he held to be, God himself. His grand 
 principle was, we see all things in God. The 
 manner in which we do so, (notwithstanding the 
 pains he took to explain himself,) is not very 
 cleai. Sometimes he seems to hold to a sort of 
 mystical union and communion of the soul with 
 God, in which God imparts knowledge to us. — 
 
PHILOSOPHERS. 31 
 
 At Other times, and more generallj, he seems to 
 come very near to Spinoza's pantheistic notions. 
 For he held the soul to be a portion of the divine 
 Logos or Reason ; and the material world, to be 
 a development of the one infinite substance; and 
 both to exist stiil in God, and to be incapable of 
 any action whatever, except as God worksinthem. 
 The immediate objects of all our knowledge of 
 things, he declares to be the ideas of things, not 
 the things themselves. These ideas of things 
 existed in the divine mind, or in God, before any 
 thing was created ; and, when we direct our 
 views upon God, we behold these ideas of things, 
 just as they exist in the divine mind ; and this ia 
 true knowledge. These ideas of things, existing 
 iu God, and which we can behold in him, are 
 not the ideas or images of individual objects, but 
 general or abstract ideas, the ideas of the 
 genera and species of things ; by knowing which 
 we know the very essence or the true nature of 
 all things material and immaterial. And as 
 these ideas uf things are, at all times, to be seen 
 in God, we may, by viewing them in him, have 
 a true knowledge even of objects that never fell 
 underthecognizanceof our senses, or were never 
 the objects of our empirical knowledge. When 
 vve contemplate external objects only through the 
 bodily senses, we obtain only indistinct images 
 
32 METAPIISICAL PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 of those things ; and we must turn our view to 
 God, and contemplate tiie ideas of those things 
 in him, or we can not have any correct and ade- 
 quate knowledge of them. So when we attend to 
 our own internal consciousnesses, and endeavor 
 thence to obtain a knowledge of our own souls or 
 minds, we have only indistinct conceptions, until 
 we look to God, and contemplate the idea of a 
 soul, as it there exists in the most perfect form. — 
 We may now see, why Malebranche considered 
 reliance on etnpirical knowledge, as the grand 
 source of all errors. We may also learn what 
 he intended, when he said, Gud is our intclligi- 
 bh iDorld. God himself, we are able to behold 
 with immediate vision; and in him, we may see 
 the perfect ideas of all created things. Innate 
 ideas, Malebranche did not admit ; such ideas 
 being unnecessary for those who can at any mo- 
 ment see the perfect ideas of all things in the ever 
 present God. 
 
 The truly religious spiriUn which Malebranche 
 wrote, his easy and alluring style, and his very 
 inijenious reasoninjj, caused his writino^s to be 
 much read and admired ; but the complete as- 
 cendency of the empirical mode of philosophi- 
 zing, prevented his views from gaining much 
 currency. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE FIRST GERMAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Leibnitz and Woif. 
 
 We come now to the rise of the first German 
 Philosophy. Its author was Godfrey William 
 VON Leibnitz, a contemporary of Locke and 
 Malebranche, and a man whom any nation might 
 be proud to call its own. He was a general 
 scholar, acute, ingenious, and indefatigable in 
 his exertions to advance both literature and 
 science. Although he gave much of his time to 
 the study of philosophy, and became the father 
 of the first German system of that science, yet 
 he had not leisure to compose a general treatise 
 on the subject. 
 
 He pursued the metaphysical method ; imitat- 
 ing in this the example of Plato and Des Cartes, 
 whom he diligently studied, but did not servilely 
 follow. His aim was, to reform the systems of 
 his predecessors, and to make philosophy as 
 perfect a science of reason, as the pure mathe- 
 
34 THE FIRST GERMAN 
 
 niatics. In this way he hoped to put an end 
 to all strife and all controversy, not only among 
 philosophers themselves, but between them and 
 theologians, moralists, and others. To accom- 
 plish this object, he proposed to treat philosophy 
 in the mathematical manner; that is, by laying 
 down such first principles as none can deny, and 
 then giving logical demonstrations of every pro- 
 position. This method he deemed practicable, 
 because necessary general truths are not confin- 
 ed to the mathematics, but belong equally to 
 philosophy. These truths, he justly supposed^ 
 are not the result of experience, but have their foun- 
 dation in the mind itself. He considered i hem 
 to be innate, or a part of that intellectual furni- 
 ture which we receive from the Creator, and 
 which become developed by rejection. The 
 ground of their certainty, lies in the divine con- 
 stitution of things ; and the perception or knowl- 
 edoje of them, is what distinijuishes a rational 
 sou! from the souls of brutes. 
 
 But unfortuuiUely, Leibnitz did not build his 
 superstructure, entirely, of such solid materials. 
 He held, (with Mr. Locke,) that all simple ideas 
 of sensation (simple perceptions by the senses) 
 are ohject'ivcly true ; that is, they correspond per- 
 fectly with their objects. And he also maintain- 
 ed, (with Des Cartes and others,) that all the 
 
PHILOSOPHY. 35 
 
 simple ideas of reason are objectively true, or 
 accord with the real nature and essence of things. 
 At the same time, he confounded the logically 
 true, viz. what involves no contradiction or ab- 
 surdity, with the rtalhj true, or the true in fact. 
 Hence he supposed that, by mere thinkings we 
 may arrive at the knowledge of all those primary 
 truths or first principles of things, from which 
 may be deduced, by logical reasoning, a com- 
 plete system of philosophical knowledge. The 
 Cartesian doctrine, that clearness and distinct- 
 ness of ideas is adequate evidence of their 
 truth or correctness, Leibnitz discarded as falla- 
 cious. He proposed more rational and logical 
 tests of truth ; namely, lor all abstract and gen- 
 eral truths, the principle which lies at the founda- 
 tion of mathematical demonstrations, that of 
 identity ov contradiction; and for all questions 
 of fact or real existence, the principle of ade- 
 quate cause, or, that whatever occurs or exists 
 must have a cause. And on this last principle 
 of reasoning, he proved the being of a God from 
 the existence of the world around us. He like- 
 wise deemed the ontological proof, or that de- 
 rived from the conception of a God in our own 
 minds, to be valid proof. 
 
 As specimens of his deductions from these first 
 principles and laws of philosophing, we may 
 
36 THE FIRST GERMAN 
 
 consider his doctrines of Monads^ of pre-estab- 
 lished Uarmomj^ and of the Best System of the 
 world. 
 
 1. His doctrine of Monads. All the objects 
 apprehended by our senses, he said, are com- 
 pounded bodies, or such as may be separated 
 into parts. How far the subdivisions of matter 
 may be carried, our senses from their obtuseness, 
 can not determine. But infinite divisibility is 
 inconceivable and absurd. Yet the smallest pos- 
 sible, subdivisions of any and every substance, 
 must have no parts ; and of course, can have no 
 dimensions, no figure or shape, and no exterior 
 or interior. Such elementary parts, he denomi- 
 nated ilTow^f/^-. And as these Monads can have 
 no external qualities, (dimensions, shape, color, 
 &-C.) all their qualities must be strictly internal. 
 But the only strictly internal qualities are those 
 of mind^ such as sensibility, thought, volition, 
 &c. Hence all Monads must be, in their nature, 
 living active beings, or minds. — Our knowledge 
 extends io jour kinds of Monads, and no more. 
 First in the order of excellence is the self-exist- 
 ing God, the author and upholder of all the other 
 Monads, the IMonas Monadum, who is infinite 
 in all his attributes. Next in order are finite 
 spirits and human sonls. These are distinguish- 
 ed from their great parent Monad, by being finite 
 
"^^ 
 
 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and dependent minds ; and they are distinguish- ^ 
 ed from the lower orders of Monads, by posses- '' 
 sing reason. The third order are the souls of 
 brutes ; which have the power of perception, 
 thought, and volition, but are not capable of un- 
 derstanding either general or necessary and eter- 
 nal truths. The fourth and lowest order of 
 Monads are sleeping, unconscious, and unthink- 
 ing beings ; yet they possess life, feeling, and the 
 power of action; and they are always blindly strug- 
 gling to change their condition. Aggregates of 
 Monads of this fourth and lowest order, constitute 
 material bodies. One Monad of thethird order, sur- 
 rounded by an organized aggregate of Monads of 
 the fourth class, constitutes a brute animal. And 
 one Monad of the second order, surrounded by a 
 similar aggregate of Monads of the lowest order, 
 constitutes a man or a human being. Such 
 being the essential nature of all existing beings 
 and things, space and time can be nothing more 
 than tlie arrangement of Monads, considered as 
 co-existent or as existing in succession. Both 
 are mere ideal things, or things without real ex- 
 istence. By this doctrine of Monads, Leibnitz 
 supposed he could explain, what Plato intended 
 by ideas, and Aristotle by his entelechias ; and 
 likewise overthrow entirely the pantheism of 
 Spinoza, 
 
38 THE FIRST GERMAN 
 
 2. His doctrine of pre-established Harmon)^, 
 As the created Monads have no external qualities, 
 no shape, no dimensions, no interior or exterior 
 parts, — it is impossible, that they should act upon 
 one another in a physical manner. One Monad 
 cannot penetrate another, nor can one touch an- 
 other externally. Each is, in its nature, as in- 
 dependent of all physical actions from the others, 
 as it would be were it the only Monad in exis- 
 tence. In other words, as Monads have only 
 internal qualities, or those of minds ; — it is im- 
 possible that they should either act, or be acted 
 upon, mechanically. — How then can we accouut 
 for the constant action and reaction apparent 
 throughout the material world; and for the con- 
 trol of the mind over the body, and the influen- 
 ces of the body on the mind, in human beings ? 
 He replies : the created universe is an organized 
 whole. Each Monad stands connected with the 
 whole system, but has special relations to the 
 Monads nearest to it, and in every living being, 
 the unthinking Monads form a sort of world 
 around the intelligent Monad which is its souL 
 Now, by a law of their Creator, impressed on 
 them when they first issued from his hands, every 
 finite Monad is compelled to act conformably to 
 its relations, or to do and to endure whatever its 
 relations require, in order to a perfect barmonj 
 
a»HILO SOPHY. 39 
 
 in all ihe movements of thisva-t and complicat- 
 ed machinery. And this Jaw of tlje Creator is 
 what he denominates the pre-established Har- 
 mony. Hence, the apparent action of finite 
 Monads on each other is, in reality, divine action, 
 or the result of an original law of the Creator ; 
 and by this hiw, God secures infallihly those re- 
 sults, which he contemplated when he formed 
 t-he universe. 
 
 3. His Best System of the world. — In his 
 Theodicee, or Essay on the goodoess of God, 
 free-wiil i.i man, and the origin of evil, — Leib- 
 nitz maintained that, among the many possible 
 systems for a created universe, God has chosen 
 the very best: and that this may be proved from 
 his perfections. His infinite wisdom could de- 
 vise the best system, his infinite goodness would 
 choose it, and his infinite power would then pro- 
 duce it. Hence, the piesent system must be the 
 best possible in its place: and nothing eoul-d be 
 changed, without changing the system and ren- 
 dering it less perfect. God indeed chooses noth- 
 ing, for its own sake, but what is good. But 
 physical evil or imperfection, is inseparable from 
 whatever is finite ; and of course, such evil must 
 pervade a world of finite beings and things. — 
 From this imperfection of all finite beings and 
 tilings, natural £2;t7s(pain and suffering) naturally 
 
40 THE FIRST GERMAN 
 
 and necessarily follow ; and moral evil or sin, is 
 likewise a natural, ihougli not a necessary con- 
 sequence. Natural evil God chose ; not indeed 
 for its own sake, but as the means of good. He 
 designed it for chastisement or punishment ; and, 
 by the pre-established Harmony of the universe, 
 he causes it naturally to overtake sooner or later 
 the transgressors. Moral evil or sin, arises 
 naturally from the free-will of finite rational 
 beings: and God does not choose it, but only 
 permits it; and he permits it, because he could 
 not otherwise have the best possible system. — 
 Free-will conshU in acting according to our own 
 choice^ and without any compulsion or physical 
 necessity. But our choice is determined always 
 by the circumstances in which we are placed. It 
 therefore depends, in all cases, o.i the pre-estab- 
 lished Harmony of the universe; and of course 
 it was, from eternitj', absolutely certain how we 
 would choose in e.wery instance. 
 
 This system of })hiIosophy spread rapidly, 
 and soon became the national philosophy of Prot- 
 estant Germany. The man who did the most to 
 explain and recommend it to his countrymen, 
 was Christian Wolf, who died in 1754, at the 
 age of 75. He drew out and expanded the prin- 
 ciples of Leibnitz into a complete system ; and 
 composed, for this purpose, elementary works on 
 
PHILOSOPHY. 4f 
 
 nearly every branch of the science. And, as 
 many of his treatises were written in the vernacular 
 language, this philosophy spiead among the 
 common people. Wolf resolutely met every as- 
 sailant, and spent his life in explaining and de- 
 fending the Leibnitzian principles : and hence, 
 this system has obtained the name of the Lei- 
 bnitzian- Wolfian Philosophy. In regard to prin- 
 ciples, Wolf scarcely deviated at all from Lei- 
 bnitz; except in denying sensations to the lowest 
 order of Monads, and in confining: the so called 
 pre-established Harmony to the jiiutual inter- 
 course of the soul and body. But in practical 
 or moral philosophy, of which Leibnitz did not 
 treat. Wolf devised a new central point, or fun- 
 damental principle; viz. that o^ perfection^ q.s 
 comprising all that is morally right and obligato- 
 ry. According to this principle, the whole duty 
 of man consists in striving after perfection^ in 
 himself and in all around him ; the perfection of 
 his entire character and condition, for time and eter- 
 nity. «As Wolf surveyed the whole field of philoso- 
 phy, so he distributed it into its several depart- 
 ments ; a thing which had not before been done. 
 He divided all philosophy into theoretical and 
 practical^ the former treating of rational knowl- 
 edge^ and the latter of rational conduct. Theoret- 
 ical philosophy he divided into Logic and J/c^- 
 
42 THE FIRST GERMAN 
 
 aphjsics ; and under Metapliysics lie included 
 Ontology^ metapliysical (not empirical) Psy- 
 chology, Cosmology, and natural Theology. — 
 Pracliciil or moral philosophy he divided into 
 Ethics, the Law of Nature, and National Policy. 
 And this classification of the Philosophical 
 Sciences, with the addition of Esthetics, has 
 been generally followed in Germany quite to the 
 present time. In all his elementary treatises, 
 which were numerous. Wolf pursued strictly the 
 mathematical method. He also introduced a 
 niultitndH of new technical term?, derived chiefly 
 from the Greek language ; nearly all of which 
 have since passed into common use in the Ger- 
 man schools. 
 
 This Leibnitzian-Wolfian philosophy reached 
 its culminating point, about the middle of the 
 18th century. Soon afterwards, from various 
 causes, it began to decline. Many had all along 
 questioned the soundness of its principles, and 
 still more, the tendencies of some of its doc- 
 trines. The downright pedantry of most of its 
 advocates, who dogmatized ostentatiously, and 
 stuffed their writings with formal demonstrations 
 of the simplest truths, rendered it disgusting to 
 well informed minds. About the same time, M^* 
 Locke's principles, or those of the empirical 
 gchool, found their way into Gernjany. And 
 
PHILOSOPHY. 43 
 
 these principles were propagated in, and along 
 with, the writings of the English and French 
 deists and skeptics, (Hume, Voltaire, Rousseau, 
 &.C.) which began now to circuiute extensively, 
 and to produce in that country a set of free- 
 thinkers and contemners of long established opin- 
 ions. The friends of revealed religion were 
 alarmed at the progress of infidelity and skepti- 
 cism, under the assumed name of philosophy ; 
 and they anxiously enquired : What is true 
 philosophy? It was amid this state of things, 
 that Emanuel Kant appeared on the stage, as a 
 masterspirit controlling and guiding public opin- 
 ion by his superior talents. 
 
C H A P T E R V 
 
 KANT AND HIS CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Introductory Remarks. Critic on Sensation. Time and Space. 
 
 Emanuel Kant was born at Konigsberg, in 
 the year 1724, and spent his whole life in that city, 
 never havina^ been more than 22 Eno-lish miles 
 from it. He first studied theology, then became 
 a lecturer, and afterwards a professor of logic 
 and metaphysics, in the university ; and died in 
 1804, at the age of 80. That he was a man of 
 great acuteness, and a patient investigator, his 
 works evince ; and that he was a man of pure 
 morals, conscientious, upright, modest, and ami- 
 able, is the testimony of all who knew him. He 
 has been called the modeiHi Socrates ; and, em- 
 phatically, the Philosopher of Konigsberg. 
 
 Kant arose at a most critical period in Ger- 
 many. French and English infidelity had just 
 broken into the country, and threatened to sweep 
 away all the established religious opinions and 
 institutions. Metaphysics was sinking into dis- 
 
KANT AND HIS CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 45 
 
 repute. The Leibnitzian-Wolfian philosophy 
 was waning ; and the disgusting dogmatism of 
 its advocates only hastened its downfall. Many 
 were bewildered, and having little confidence in 
 any system of philosophy, adopted eclecticism 
 as the safest guide to truth. And Hume's skep- 
 ticism was spreading and undermining all estab- 
 lished opinions. It was, to arrest this progress 
 of infidelity, to raise the sinking character of 
 metaphysical learning, to discourage dogmatism 
 and eclecticism, and to guard the public mind 
 against the withering influence of skepticism, 
 that this great man undertook to discriminate 
 between true philosophy and false, to point out 
 the nature, use, and ends of the former, and to 
 unmask the sophistry of the latter. 
 
 With most of his countrymen, he considered 
 
 philosophy to be rational science^ or the product 
 
 of pure Reason ; and divisible into two parts, 
 
 the one speculative or theoretical, and the other 
 
 practical or moral, the former treating of rational 
 
 knotoledge, and the latter of rational conduct. 
 
 He expresses himself thus : " All the interests 
 
 of my Reason center on these three questions ; 
 
 JVhat can I know 1 What ought I to do ? and, 
 
 What may I hope for ?" The first of these 
 
 questions, he says, belongs wholly to speculative 
 
 Reason ; the second belongs wholly to practical 
 
46 KANT AND HIS CRITICAL 
 
 Reason ; and the third belonors to both ; because^ 
 when practical Reason has decided the question 
 in a general manner, speculative Reason must 
 come in to define more particularly what it is we 
 may hope for. (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p, 
 833. 
 
 Kant believed, that the failure of every pre- 
 ceding attempt to establish a sound philosophy, 
 had arisen from the admission of unsound ma- 
 terials into the foundations of the building, or 
 from the assumption in the outset, that we have 
 rational knowledge of things, of which we have 
 not such knowledge. Hence, he wisely conclud- 
 ed that the only safe and sure method of pro- 
 ceeding, was, to begin by tracing human knowl- 
 edge to its sources, to examine all the functions 
 of the mind concerned with the production or 
 enlargement of knowledge, and to subject the 
 whole process of the mind to the most rigid criti- 
 cism before the tribunal of pure Reason. Such 
 therefore was the method of proceeding which 
 he himself adopted, and which he pursued rig- 
 orously, and with uncommon industry and per- 
 severance. 
 
 The work which he composed in answer to 
 the first inquiry of Reason, What can I hiom^ 
 is the most celebrated of all his works, and is 
 intitled a Critic of Pure Reason. It was the 
 
PHILOSOPHY. 47 
 
 result of many years' labor, was first published 
 in 1781, and fills an 8vo vol. of nearly 900 pages. 
 The title of the book is expressive of its true 
 character : it is a criticism of pure Reason on the 
 powers of the human mind in regard to knowl- 
 edge, showing definitely how far they can go, and 
 where human knowledge must ever stop, so lono- 
 as the mind is dependent solely on its own re- 
 sources. The work is not properly a system of 
 philosophical knowledge, embracing a summary 
 of all that philosophy can teach : it is rather an 
 introduction to sound philosophizing. And, so 
 far as 1 can judge from their titles, and from the 
 representations of others, (for I have not had ac- 
 cess to them,) most of his other philosophical 
 works are of a similar character ; that is, they are 
 critical introductions to the several branches of 
 science of which they treat. Such I understand 
 to be, his Critic of Practical Reason ; his Critic 
 of the Judging Faculty ; his Prolegomena to 
 every future system of Metaphysics that can 
 claim to be scientific ; a Foundation for the 
 Metaphysics of Morals; &c. &c. — Such beino- 
 the character of Kant's writings, we cannot ex- 
 pect to find in them a statement of his opinions on 
 all the important questions in philosophy ; but, 
 only the fundamental principles of his mode o( 
 reasoning and judging on such questions. 
 
48 KANT AND HIS CRITICAL 
 
 In the Introduction to his Critic of Pure Rea- 
 son, Kant first discriminates between pare knowl- 
 edge a priori and empirical knowledge. The 
 former has the characteristics of universality and 
 necessity — (the same as described in No. I. of 
 these Essays) — the latter has not these charac- 
 teristics, but always relates to particular facts or 
 things which have fallen under observation. He 
 then tell us, that the former kind of knowledge 
 is the proper basis of all philosophy. He next 
 observes, that philosophy requires a previous 
 science^ which shall determine the ^ossi6^7^7^/, the 
 principles, and the extent of this pure knowledge 
 a priori. He then discriminates between ana- 
 lytical and synthetical judgments. In the for- 
 mer, the predicate is really and truly contained 
 in the subject ; and a mere explanation evolves 
 it. But in synthetical judgments, the predicate 
 lies out of the subject, and the judgment advan- 
 ces to meet it. Of this kind are, all our judg- 
 ments of experience. Now it is a question of 
 fundamental importance, whether synthetical 
 judgments a priori, or synthetical judgments of 
 pure Reason, are j9ossi6/e. If they are not pos- 
 sible, then Reason can only form analytical 
 judgments ; that is, she can only analyze her few 
 and scanty pure ideas. But he concludes such 
 judgments to be possible, in certain cases ; and 
 
PHILOSOPHY. 49 
 
 that they actually occur in all the theoretical 
 sciences, in mathematics, in the pliysical 
 sciences, and in metaphysics. Such judgments, 
 however, can never relate to the matter of our 
 knowledge, which must always be given ; but 
 solely to i\ie forms of our knowledge, or to the 
 general principles or laws by which our intellec- 
 tual faculties are governed. These general prin- 
 ciples or laws by which our intellectual facul- 
 ties are governed. Reason can discover a priori, 
 or by the mere inspection of these faculties and 
 their mode of operation ; and, having discovered 
 them, she can in some measure anticipate expe- 
 rience, or determine beforehand what is possible 
 and what is not possible in human experience. — 
 And hence, there is a field open for exploration 
 by that previous science, which philosophy re- 
 quires. This previous science, he denominates 
 Transcendental Philosophy ; andofithe will treat 
 in his Critic of Pure Reason. He divides the 
 work into two parts ; the first and much the 
 largest, treats of the elements of this new sci- 
 ence, or it surveys all the faculties of the mind 
 that afford us knowledge, and criticises their 
 several products ; the second part gives the gen- 
 eral results of the previous survey, and states the 
 uses of this preliminary science. 
 
 We now come to the Critic itself. Followiug 
 4 
 
50 KANT AND HIS CRITICAL 
 
 the established doctrine of metaphysical philoso- 
 phers, that v/e possess three distinct facwlties,- 
 Sensation, Understanding, and Reason ; Kant 
 first subjects Sensation to the scrutiny of Reason. 
 And he makes Reason decide, that this faculty 
 is a mere receptivity of the impressions made 
 upon our senses by l^he objects around us. Sen- 
 sation therefore brings to us no knowledge of the 
 essential nature of external' objects, but only of 
 their Phenomena. The unknown objects which 
 make the impressions, Katit calls- Noumena 
 (»oi^/«,5v«, from »«£<> to understand ;) that 
 is, things which are understood or conceived to- 
 exist, but of which we have no certain knowl- 
 edge, and of which consequently we can give nc 
 further account. Phenomena therefore, and 
 phenomena alone, are the elementary matter of 
 all our knowledge of the sensible world around' 
 as. 
 
 But Reason can discover a priori or by pure 
 intuition, that these phenomena must present 
 themselves to our senses either as being simulta- 
 neous, or as being consecutive ; and if simulta- 
 neous, they must have a relative location, and if 
 consecutive, they must follow each oth-er in some 
 order, and with a greater or le&s degree of rapidi- 
 ty. And thus pure Reason perceives, intuitively^ 
 that all external phenomena must present them- 
 
PHILOSOPHY. 51 
 
 selves to our senses as being limited and bound- 
 ed by time and place. Time and place, then, 
 are pure intuitions of Reason : they are not 
 things existing in nature, nor are they the pro- 
 perties nor the relations of things in nature ; they 
 are purely ideizl things, and are merely the laws 
 of sensation, the forms of tlie phenomena of ex- 
 ternal sense, or the aspects in which those phe- 
 nomena must always present themselves to our 
 senses. Whether any other beings — God, for 
 instance — must also view material objects as ex- 
 isting in time and place, we do not know. And, 
 as time and place are merely the laics of Sensation, 
 we have no right to predicate them, or either of 
 them, of God, of spirits, or of any abstract 
 ti'uths or ideas. For, these objects never pre- 
 senting themselves to the bodily senses, can never 
 fall under the laws of sensation. 
 
 But although time and space are merely ideal 
 tilings, or mere laws of sensation, yet they are 
 empirical realities ; that is, they always accom- 
 pany our sensations, and, without ther», set|sible 
 perceptions can not exist. And being thus em- 
 pirical realities, and at the same time perfectly 
 simple ideas, with no composition and no quali- 
 ties whatever, except mere magnitude, they are 
 capable of being adequately depicted or repre- 
 ■eated by diagrams and numbers, and thus oit 
 
d» KANT AND HIS CRITICAL 
 
 becoming themselves the objects of sensible in- 
 tuition. And hence they lay a foundation for a 
 pure science of Reason, namely mathematics. 
 But no other of our simple ideas can be thus de- 
 picted and subjected to sensible intuition ; and 
 therefore they can never become the subject of a 
 pure science of Reason. 
 
 Such in general is the result of Rant's criticism 
 of the sensitive faculty. His views of the wide 
 difference between noumena and phenomena, 
 seem to have met general approbation. But his 
 ideas of time and place, though accordant with 
 the dogmas of the Wolfian school, have been con- 
 troverted. Many can not persuade themselves 
 that noumena, or things themselveSjhave nothing 
 to do with time and place. And indeed, if we 
 may predicate time and place of phenomena, it 
 seems difficult to say why they are not equally 
 predicable of noumena ; on the supposition that 
 noumena really exist, and are the immediate 
 physical causes of phenomena. For how can 
 physj^al effects be limited to time and place, and 
 not also the physical causes which produce 
 them 1 Can a material thing operate or produce 
 effects, where it is not present ? Or can Reason 
 ^ny more conceive, a priori, of a necessity for 
 phenomena to exist only in time and place, than 
 for noumena to exist in the same manner? If 
 
t>flILOSOPIIY. 53- 
 
 then Reason decides a priori, or intuitively, that 
 phenomena must so exist, does she not equally 
 decide a priori, or intuitively, that noumena must 
 so exist "? It is no objection to this reasoning, that 
 we do not understand the essential nature of 
 noumena ; or that we know nothing of them, 
 except that they are created things and the im- 
 mediate cause of all the phenomena of the ma- 
 terial world. For, by assigning them time and 
 place to exist in, we affirm nothing respecting 
 their nature or essence, but merely the when and 
 the where of their existence and operation. Be- 
 sides, we must suppose that there is an unknown 
 difference of properties in different noumena, in 
 order to account for their producing different phe- 
 nomena. And if we are compelled to make 
 such a supposition, notwithstanding our total 
 ignorance of the essential nature of noumena ; 
 why may we not assign them locations in time 
 and place, in consistency with the same igno- 
 rance of their essential nature 1 
 
 Kant indeed tells us in a subsequent part of 
 the Critic, (Elements, Pt. 11. B. II. Ch. IH.) that 
 all our knowledge of external objects is limited 
 to the conditions which render experience possi- 
 ble ; and therefore we can never attain to a 
 knowledge [he should have said, to empirical 
 knowledge] of any objects which, can not be 
 
54 KANT AND HIS CRITICAt PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 subjected to the senses. Hence the only objects 
 known to us [empirically] are phenomena. The 
 objects of real existence^ which present to us 
 these phenomena, we do not know. Yet, as we 
 admits and ought to admit, their existence, they 
 may be called noumena. This statement may 
 be fully admitted, without reducing time and 
 place to mere forms of our sensations, having no 
 relation to things themselves or to noumena. — 
 For it is not contended, that we have empirical 
 knowledge of the fact that noumena exist in time 
 and place. We only ijifer the; fact, from the 
 known and necessary existence of their phenom- 
 ena in this manner. It is Reason which compels 
 us to admit the fact, and not experience ; just as 
 it is Reason, and not experience, which compels 
 us to admit the more general fact that noumena 
 really exist. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Understanding defined. Its Conceptions. The Categories. 
 
 Tlie faculty of Sensation havinor been exam- 
 ined at the bar of Reason, the Understanding is 
 next arraijrned before the same tribunal. — Rea- 
 son pronounces the Understanding or Intellect, to 
 be an active faculty of the mind ; and not a 
 mere receptivity like Sensation. It is the office 
 of this faculty, to take the multifarious impres- 
 sions on the senses, or the crude matter o^ knowl- 
 edge, just as it is brought into the mind by the 
 sensitive faculty, and to shape and fashion it into 
 conceptions of objects, end judgments concerning 
 them. The Understanding, therefore, is that 
 faculty of the mind, which forms conceptions 
 and judgments of the objects around us. In other 
 words, it is the faculty which tJiinJ:s and judges 
 of all the objects apprehended by our bodily 
 senses. To facilitate her operations, (which are 
 incessant, and endlessly various, and requiring 
 
56 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 not only accuracy, but great despatch,) the hu- 
 man Understanding classes all objects of fre- 
 quent occurrence, under genera and species, and 
 forms both a conception and a name for each 
 class. 
 
 According to the received doctrine of the met- 
 aphysical school, tliis faculty, like that of Sensa- 
 tion, is common to man with the brutes , yet in 
 men, it may have some powers, which it has not 
 in brutes; arising, perhaps, from its being com- 
 bined with Reason in us, and not in them. In 
 men, the Understanding is distinguished from 
 Reason, by the sphere of its action, by the objects 
 with which it is concerned, and by the product 
 of its hibors. The sphere of its action is the 
 sensible world, or the world of phenomena ; the 
 objects with which it is concerned, are sensa- 
 tions, conceptions, and simple judgments ; and 
 the product of its labors, is empirical knowl- 
 sy edge. The sphere of the operations of i2e«5ow, 
 on the contrary, is, the supersensible world, 
 or the world of spirits, of ideas, of gene- 
 ral truths, of virtue, &c. ; the objects with which 
 it concerns itself, are ideas, (not conceptions,) 
 things which the mind can contemplate, but 
 which can never be subjected to the senses ; and 
 its product is, rational knowledge, or knowledge 
 of universal and necessary truths. The con- 
 
THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 57 
 
 foundina^of Reason with Understandings and of 
 Ideas with Conceptions, by Mr. Locke, in his 
 Essay on the Human Understanding, and by 
 most of the English, Scotch, and American wri- 
 ters since the days of Locke, (though -it was a 
 natural, and almost necessary consequence of 
 supposing all human knowledge to be derived 
 from sensations, and reflections on them,) has 
 spread much obscurity and confusion through 
 all the metaphysical productions of these writers ; 
 and, by introducing the indiscriminate use of 
 terms which should never be confoiinded, it has 
 contributed not a little to render the English lan- 
 guage unfit for clear and conclusive reasoning 
 on metaphysical subjects. And, I apprehend 
 that this is one great reason, why so many 
 among us can not understand and appreciate the 
 writings of the German philosophers. Their 
 clear, precise, and definite thoughts, the moment 
 they are translated into English, become obscure, 
 indefinite and vague ; because the language, /^ 
 into which they are translated, is so. It is true that 
 the Germans have introduced a multitude of new 
 technical terms into philosophy, which sound very 
 strange in our ears ; and Kant, in particular, has 
 been censured, even by his own countrymen, for 
 his excessive coinage : but if our language had 
 appropriate terms for expressing the more neces- 
 
58 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sary distinctions of thought, we mis^ht contrive 
 some way to avoid the use of German technics, 
 and yet convey to English minds the real views 
 of the German writers. — After this necessary 
 digression, we will return to the Rantean Criti- 
 cism. 
 
 The conceptions of the Understanding consti- 
 tute all our knowledge of material objects or 
 things ; or rather, they are the very objects them- 
 selves^ so far as we know them ; for they are 
 combinations of phenomena ; and beyond phe- 
 nomena, our knowledge of things does not ex- 
 tend. These conceptions are a sort of mental 
 iman-es of sensible thinsfs. Each imao^e is com- 
 posed of more or fewer distinct impressions, 
 which were made by the object on our senses, 
 when we examined it ; such as, figure, color, di- 
 mensions, attitude, position, motion, taste, smell, 
 noise or sound, its feeling, its actions, its opera- 
 tions on other objects, and the effects of other 
 objects upon it. These various impressions are 
 called the characters or marks of the thing ; and, 
 when duly combined in the mental picture, they 
 constitute the conception of the object. As we 
 sometimes wish to examine individual marks or 
 characters of objects, separately, or uncombined 
 with other marks, this gives rise to abstract con- 
 ceptions^ or conceptions of the qualities or attri- 
 
THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 59 
 
 butes of objects. And, observing that various 
 objects in nature possess many marks in com- 
 mon, the Understanding combines those common 
 marks into separate conceptions ; and thus she 
 forms conceptions of species, genera, and higher, 
 and still liiglier genera. But it is obvious that, 
 as the conceptions mount upwards to the higher 
 and more general classes, they must contain few- 
 er and fewer marks. The conception of an in- 
 dividual object, will contain all the marks, which 
 belong to that object ; the conception of the 
 species, will contain only the marks common to 
 all the individuals of the species; and the con- 
 ception of the genus, only the marks CQmmon to 
 the genus: and so of the higher genera. Con- 
 ceptions, therefore, always become more meager 
 or more simple, the more extensive their sphere ; 
 that is, the greater the variety of the objects they 
 embrace, the fewer are the marks they contain. 
 
 In forming these various conceptions, the Un- 
 destanding exhibits the skill and judgment of a 
 practiced arciiitect. Scarcely any object in nature 
 presents itself to the senses, as absolutely isolat- 
 ed or alone. Along with the impressions from 
 the object itself, many other impressions, from 
 the connected or surrounding objects, enter the 
 mind ; for the sensitive faculty, like a faithful 
 mirror, presents them all just as they strike upon 
 
60 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 it ; and tlie Understanding lias to separate them, 
 in order to combine together only those belong- 
 ing to the object itself. This often requires a 
 very critical examination of the impressions or 
 marks, and a discriminating judgment. And 
 when the proper marks or impressions are select- 
 ed, they must be skillfully combined, in order to 
 form a correct mental picture of the object. In 
 referring individual objects or things to their pro- 
 per species, and species to their genera, accurate 
 discrimination is necessary. And in putting her 
 conceptions together, so as to form from them a 
 correct and useful system of empirical knowl- 
 edge, gr^at skill and judgment are requisite. 
 Yet all this, the Understanding learns by prac- 
 tice, to perform with much accuracy and de- 
 spatch. 
 
 After glancing at these manifold and impor- 
 tant operations of the Understanding, (which it 
 is the proper business of Logic, or the Art of 
 Thitdiing, to describe more fully,) Kant makes 
 Reason to decide, that the Understanding is 
 wholly dependent on the sensitive faculty, for all 
 the materials of her knowledge. She is tho 
 mere architect to select, to combine, and to ar- 
 ran"^e the materials brought into the mind by 
 Sensation. Hence, the Understanding can pro- 
 duce no knowledge, except what is enipirical. — 
 
v^ OF TH^ ^> 
 
 THE CRITICAL PHIIIOSOPByT '* '' "Bl' \ "J 
 
 She can not enlarge, at all, our rational or philo- .,P 
 sopliical knowledge. 
 
 But, by inspecting the operations of this skill- 
 ful architect, Reason discovers, that the Under- 
 standing has four pu7'e ideas ; which serve her 
 as general laws or principles, by which to con- 
 struct her conceptions, and regulate her judg- 
 ments, of all the objects of sensible intuition. — 
 These four ideas, to which Kant gives the 
 name of Categories, are those of quantiti/, qual- 
 ity^ relation, and modaliti/. When the Under- 
 standing would form a conception, or a judgment, 
 of any new bundle of impressions brought to 
 her by the senses, or would test the correctness 
 of any conception or judgment already formed, 
 she calls to her aid these four ideas ; and they 
 suggest, that the thing must be examined as to 
 its quantiti/, its quality, its relations, and its mo- 
 dalitij ; and they also teach, that there are three, 
 and only tliree, results under each inquiry, to 
 which the Understanding can come. 
 
 1. The first inquiiy respects the logical quan- 
 tity of an object or conception. And the only 
 possible answers are, it is a unity, ^plurality, or 
 a totality. For instance, the conception bear- 
 ing the appellation man, must denote either a 
 single man, or a plurality of men, or man in gen- 
 eral, that is mankind, the total race of men. — 
 
62 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 There are only these three subcategories, under 
 the general category of logical quantity. 
 
 2. The second inquiry resj.ects the logical 
 qualitif of an object or conception : (qualitas, 
 from quails, of ivhat sort or kind.) — To answer 
 this inquiry, the Understanding places the ob- 
 ject by the side of ano.hcr object, whose quality 
 is known, and then aifirins tlieir agreement, or 
 tlieir disagreement, or decides that they agree in 
 part, or in a limited degree. Proceeding in such 
 a manner, the Understanding affirms that, this 
 object is an animal ; that other object is not an 
 animal ; it is a plant ; and that third object is 
 partly an animal, am\ partly not ; it is a zoo- 
 phyte. So she declares, this house is painted ; 
 that house is unpaintcd ; and that third house 
 is partly painted, tindi partly unpainted. Thus, 
 affirmation, negation, and limitation of the affir- 
 mation or negation, are all the subcategories of 
 logical quahty. 
 
 3. The third inquiry respects the relation of 
 the object or conception to other objects or con- 
 ceptions. There are three, and only three, spe- 
 cies of relations ; namely, inherence, dependence^ 
 and external connection or coherence. Tlie rela- 
 tion of inherence is, that which exists between 
 substances and the attributes of substances. — 
 The relation of dependence is, that which exist* 
 
THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 63 
 
 between causes and their effects. The relation 
 of external connection or coherence is, that which 
 exists between any object and the surrounding 
 objects : for all objects have their places in the 
 universe, or are surrounded bj other objects, 
 with which thej are more or less closely con- 
 nected. 
 
 4. The fourth inquiry respects the modality^. 
 or the mode of existence of an object, so far as it 
 is known to us. According to our apprehensions 
 of things, we may predicate of them possible ex- 
 istence, actual existence, or necessary existence. 
 Whatever accords with the formal conditions of 
 experience, or is not contradicted by any law of 
 human experience, is possible or may exist. — 
 What is directly attested by our experience or 
 observation, is actuator really exists. What all 
 human experience requires, necessarily, must 
 exists or exists necessarily. Of this necessary 
 existence, there are two kinds, the one internal, 
 absolute, and ^unconditional ; as, roundness in a 
 circle ; because, if you take away the roundness, 
 it is no longer a circle. The other is external, 
 and hypothetical, or conditional, depending on 
 the laws of causation ; as, every child that is 
 born, must have a father and a mother. " Every 
 house is builded by some man." A ponderous 
 body, in the air, mustfall^ if it is not. supported. 
 
64 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 It is manifest, from a mere inspection of these 
 categories, and of our continual use of them, 
 that they give form or shape to all our concep- 
 tions and judgments of sensible objects. They 
 are the all-pervading laics of human thinkings 
 and of human language. 
 
 It is therefore of importance to inquire, from 
 what source did these categories originate ; what 
 is the ground of their validity ; and what limits 
 are there to the application of them. — That they 
 did not originate from a knowledge of the nature 
 of things themselves, or of noumena, must be 
 manifest ; because we have no such knowledge 
 of things themselves : all our knowledge of sen- 
 sible objects, is confined io phenomena. It seems 
 then, tliat the categories must have been derived 
 solely from the inspection of phenomena. And, 
 as they are pure ideas, they must be the product 
 of Reason, the only faculty which produces ideas. 
 This higher faculty of the mind, in contemplat- 
 ing phenomenal matter, perceived it to be capa- 
 ble of being arranged under the categories ; and 
 as the Understanding needs some formulee for 
 her conceptions and judgments, in order to make 
 thein capable of being wrought into a system of 
 empirical knowledge at the suggestion of her 
 sister faculty, Reason, the Understanding tried 
 the system of the categories; and, finding the sys- 
 
THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 65 
 
 tern to work well, and to produce no discovera- 
 ble errors or mistakes, she continues to frame all 
 her conceptions and judgmWits according to 
 these formulae. Such, Reason pronounces to be 
 the origin of the categories, so far she can dis- 
 cover. And the admission of such an origin of 
 them, will account for the superiority of the hu- 
 man Understanding, which is aided by Reason, 
 over the Understanding of biiutes which is not so 
 aided. — The validity of the categories, therefore, 
 or the right of the Understanding to make use 
 of them, arises from the necessity of her having 
 some formulae to guide her, and from the experi- 
 ence of solid advantages, and no serious evils, 
 arising from the use of them. — But, from this 
 view ofthe subject, it is most obvious, that we have 
 no authority for extending the use of the catego- 
 ries beyond the sphere of our sensible intuitions. 
 We have no authority for applying them to nou- 
 mena, nor to any thing supersensible ; because we 
 do not knoic, either a priori, or from experience, 
 that such things can be brought under their em- 
 pire, without producing misapprehensions and 
 erroneous conclusions. We can not test the re- 
 sults of such application, by experience, as we 
 are able to do in the sphere of sensible intui- 
 tions ; and hence, we can .never make such ap- 
 plication on safe and solid grounds. — Yet when 
 5 
 
66 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 we venture beyond the sphere of onr sensible in- 
 tuitions, and atteiiii3t to discuss such cjuestions^, 
 as, Whether the* world had a beginning ; 
 Whether there is a God ; &.c. it seems allowable 
 to apply the categories to them ; because knowl- 
 edge on such subjects must rest on some princi- 
 ples ofreasoning, and we can discover none better 
 than the categories. Still we should not forget, that 
 this is a transcendei^t use of the categories, or an 
 application of them transcending the principles 
 of certain knowledge. — Such, in general, are the 
 doctrines of Kant, in regard to the human Un- 
 derstanding. 
 
 Whether he has not gone too far, in confining 
 the legimate application of the categories solely 
 to the phenomena of the sensible world, may be 
 questioned. The remarks made in the preceed- 
 ing Chapter on Kant's doctrine concerning time 
 and place, (the categories of Sensation,) that 
 they are merely our mode of intuiting phenom- 
 ena, may be applied with little variation to his 
 doctrine concerning the categories of the Under- 
 standing. It was there stated, that we must sup- 
 pose some unknown difference of properties to 
 exist in different nouniena, in order to account 
 for their producing different phenomena. Now 
 it is admitted by all, tkat phenomena accord very 
 well with the categories. May we not then con- 
 clude, that noumena also must possesssuch a differ- 
 
THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 67 
 
 cnce of properties, as will make the categories in 
 some measure applicable to them ? The suppo- 
 sition does not imply, that the categories lead us 
 to any objective knowledge of the inherent pro- 
 perties of noumena, or of any other supersensi- 
 ble things. It only permits us to say that, from 
 the diversity of their effects or phenomena, we 
 are authorized to judge, that they do differ ; and 
 that they so differ, as to present to us phenome- 
 na corresponding with their own inherent differ- 
 ences. — It is at least true, that Reason can dis- 
 cover, a priori, no valid reason why the catego- 
 ries should not be as applicable to supersensible 
 things, as to the phenomena of sensible things. 
 If the term 7nan may always be so used as to de- 
 note either an individual man, or a plurality of 
 men, or the ivliole race of men ; why may not 
 the term angel, in like manner, be always used 
 to denote either an individual angel, or aphirali- 
 tij of angels, or the whole host of angels 1 Can 
 Reason discover any other or better ground for 
 the application of this category of quantity, in 
 the one case, than in the other ] And so of all 
 the categories. Indeed, the simple fact that phi- 
 losophers and metaphysicians, in all ages, have 
 apphed the categories to supersensible things, un- 
 hesitatingly, and most abundantly, shows that 
 Reason discovers no diffiulties in making the ap« 
 plication. 
 
 r 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Pure Reason. Transcendental Ideas. Rational Theology. 
 
 Kant next brings theoretical Reason, that 
 higher intellectual faculty of man, under a criti- 
 cal examination. 
 
 The distinction between speculative or theoret- 
 ical Reason, which imparts to us rational hiowl- 
 edge, and practical OY moral Reason, which en- 
 joins upon us rational conduct, has already been 
 noticed. Our present concern is with the for- 
 mer. — It will be recollected, that the sphere of 
 theoretical Reason is the supersensible world, the 
 VfovXdo^ spirits, 0^ general truths, o^ virtue, &c. ; 
 that the o^ects with which it is concerned, are 
 ideas, things which the mind can contemplate, 
 but which can never be subjected to the senses ; 
 and that the product of its labors is rational 
 knowledge, the knowledge of universal and ne- 
 cessary truths. 
 
 The distinction between analytical and s^^n- 
 i7teh"ca/ judgments, was stated in the Introduction 
 to the Critic : and the power of Reason to form 
 
THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 69 
 
 synthetic judgments a priori, was there limited to 
 the mere forms of our knowledge ; that is, to the 
 determining what is possible, and what is not 
 possible, in human experience. In regard to all 
 objects of real existence, she can form only 
 analytical judgments, unless the objects are 
 given or already known. And hence, to form 
 analytical judgments by means of middle terms, 
 or to reason in the logical manner, is the only 
 function of theoretical Reason in regard to our 
 knowledge of whatever may exist around us, 
 within us, or above us. But analytical judg- 
 ments are those in which the predicate is really 
 and truly contained in the subject of the proposi- 
 tion. Of course theoretical or speculative Rea- 
 son can never acquaint us with any unknown 
 object, that may exist within us, around us, or 
 above us. She can only draw forth the knowl- 
 edge of these objects, which we already possess, 
 Of can only present it to us in a different attitude 
 and form. 
 
 To establish these strong positions respecting 
 the importance of speculative Reason, Rant in- 
 stitutes an elaborate examination of what he 
 calls the transcendental ideas of pure Reason, 
 that is, the ideas which Reason attempts to form, 
 by a logical deduction, of the nature and essen- 
 tial properties of the human soul, of the material 
 
70 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 tvorld, and of God : and he shows, tliat the sup- 
 posed logical deduction is unsound and falla- 
 cious. 
 
 I. As to the idea of the soul: — The reason- 
 ing which attempts to educe a knowledge of its 
 nature and of its inherent properties^ from those 
 acts of the soul of which we all are conscious, 
 is a mere paralogism. : In the assertions, / thinks 
 I love, I hate, I will, I choose, I remember, ^^c.^ 
 various actions are affirmed of the subject T ; 
 and on the most solid grounds, because we are 
 conscious of those acts. But the actions of any 
 being or thing, are not the thing itself; nor are 
 they any part either of its essential nature, or of 
 its inherent attributes. We may indeed infer, 
 that whatever acts, must really exist ; and that it 
 must be of such a nature as to be capable of per- 
 forming the acts ascribed to it. But all this 
 implies no knowledge of the mode of its exis- 
 tence, or of those inherent qualities which make 
 it capable of performing the acts. Hence, the 
 following reasoning is wholly inconclusive. / 
 thinJc ; therefore I am a thinking Substance. — 
 That substance is not perceived by the external 
 senses, but only by internal consciousness ; it is 
 therefore immaterial or a Spirit. It has no per- 
 ceptible or conceivable pai-ts ; it is therefore a 
 simple Substance. Being a simple substance, 
 
TiiE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 71 
 
 *and immaterial, it must be of an immortal or ««- 
 dying uatiire. It acts in and by tbe bodily or- 
 gans ; and therefore it is the Soul, the animating 
 principle of the body. All this is sophistical rea- 
 soning; because it mistakes the ^M/yeci of the con- 
 sciousness, for theo^jec^of thatconsciousness. It 
 is sophisma figurse dictionis. — But, though incon- 
 clusive as reasoning, it may nevertheless be 
 true : and it may serve as a convenient basis of a y 
 system of psychology. 
 
 IE. The cosmological idea^ of pure Reason, or 
 those transcendental ideas which Reason forms 
 of the ezternal world, are equally baseless, con- 
 sidered as the results of logical reasoning. — 
 For, both the thesis and the antithesis of them, 
 may be proved by very similar arguments. Thus 
 it may be proved — (I.) That the world had a 
 beginning in time, and is of limited or finite ex- 
 tent ; and, on the contrary, that it had no begin- 
 ning in time, and has no limits in extent. — (2.) 
 That all substances consist of simple elementary 
 parts, (or Monads, as Leibnitz called them ;) 
 and, on the contrary, that no substance whatever 
 consists of such simple elements, because 
 such simple elements can not exist. (3.) 
 That pliysical causes can not be the only 
 causes in existence, there must be a free cause, 
 to give existence to the physical causes; and, 
 
72 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 on the contrary, that no free cause can possibly 
 exist, and conseqently physical causes alone 
 must exist. — (4.) That there must be, either in 
 the world, or beyond it, a Being who exists neces- 
 sarily, and who is the first cause of all things ; 
 and, on the contrary, that no such Being exists, 
 either in the world, or beyond it. — As sj)ecimens 
 of the arguments adduced by Kant, take the 
 following : 
 
 The 3d Thesis is thus proved : Unless we 
 assume a cause prior io the first physical cause, 
 and commencing the series of physical causes, 
 there will be no cause for the whole series of 
 physical causes, and of course none for any part 
 of it. We must therefore suppose an uncaused 
 cause, prior to the first physical cause. But an 
 uncaused cause must be one that is free, or one 
 that acts without being conqielled to act by any 
 higher cause. The Antithesis is tiius proved : 
 Every causality is itself a change, since it is the 
 state of the cause when in action, which is dif- 
 ferent from its state when not in action. Now 
 as every change presupposes a cause, the change 
 in the supposed free cause, by which it proceeds 
 to action, must have a cause. And therefore, 
 there can not beany free cause, or one that acts 
 without being caused to act. 
 
 The 4th Thesis is thus proved : The world is 
 
THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 73 
 
 full of changes. But the existence of every 
 change is conditioned ; i. e. it presupposes some- 
 thing which is its condition^ or a cause on which 
 it depends. Now if there were no existence that 
 is absolutely unconditioned, the conditioned could 
 not be conditioned. Consequently, there must 
 be an absolutely necessary Beings whose exis- 
 tence is unconditioned or uncaused : otherwise 
 the series of the conditions or causes would be 
 incomplete. The Antithesisis thus proved : Every 
 member of a series of changes must of course be 
 conditioned. Hence, the supposed absolutely 
 unconditioned Being, if in the world, and a part 
 of the series, must himself be a conditioned 
 Being ; contrary to the thesis. And if such a 
 Being existed out of the world and commenced 
 the series of changes in the world, his causality 
 at least would belong to the loorld, and of course 
 he would constitute a parif of the series: which 
 contradicts itself. We must therefore reject the 
 thesis altogether, in order to make the series of 
 the conditioned complete. 
 
 The objects of these cosmological ideas lie 
 wholly beyond the reach of experience. Hence, 
 experience can never decide in favor of either 
 the Theses or the Antitheses. Reason alone 
 must solve her own contradictions. The side of 
 the Theses, is that which good men incline to 
 
74 THE CRITICAL PIIILOSOPHY. 
 
 take ; and it may be called the Dogmathm of 
 pure Reason. The side of the Antitheses is tliat, 
 which is espoused by philosophizing skeptics; 
 and, as its arguments are founded on the princi- 
 ples of pure empiricism^ tliis side may be called 
 the Empiricism of pure Reason. 
 
 Critical Idealism^ which admits and even 
 demonstrates the existence of noumena or things 
 lying beyond all sensible intuition, can alone 
 solve these dialectical contradictions. This criti- 
 cal Idealism is equally removed from material' 
 ism, which supposes we can have sensible intui- 
 tions of noumena, and from empirical Idealism, 
 which denies the existence of noumena. Now 
 this critical Idealism., by maintaining that sensi- 
 ble intuition extends only to phenomena, or that 
 we have empirical knowledge only of what is 
 sensible, does not deny the possibility of some 
 knowledge, other than empirical, of objects lying 
 beyond the reach of our senses. It only warns 
 us not to strive after erapincaZknowledge of such 
 subjects, and not to reason about them upon the 
 supposition of such knowledge. Taking this 
 stand, and carefully examining both the Theses 
 and the Antitheses respecting the cosmological 
 ideas, critical Idealism declares that both may be 
 true, because they relate to diiVerent things.— 
 The Antitheses direct attention only to phenom' 
 
THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 75 
 
 ena or the objects of empirical knowledge : but 
 the Theses look beyond phenomena, to their 
 came ; and they consider the total series of phe- 
 nomena as complete and dependent as a whole, 
 on an iutelligible cause lying without the bounds 
 of nature. Hence, both the Theses and the An- 
 titheses may be true ; the one maintaining, e. g. 
 that there is a God beyond nature^ and the other 
 that there is no God toithin nature. And so in 
 all the contradictions, one side includes an intel- 
 ligihle thing among the phenomena of nature ; 
 which the other does not, but only reasons back 
 through phenomena, to an intelligible thing lying 
 beyond them. And therefore, though the side of 
 the Theses failed of proving its assertions with 
 apodictical certainty, yet the opposite party fail- 
 ed of proving the contrary, there not being any 
 such contradiction as would make the one proof 
 overthrow the other. Nor can the latter party 
 overthrow the Theses of the former, unless it can 
 prove, e. g. that out of and beyond nature there 
 is no God, or in other words, that the supposition 
 is itself absurd and self-contradictory, which it 
 is not. 
 
 III. The third transcendental idea of pure 
 Reason, is thatof a supreme and all-perfect Heing. 
 Reason is disposed to admit the existence of 
 such a Being, because she needs this perfect 
 
 W hihot, /^^ ¥h: '/^ 
 
76 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ideal of absolute excellence, and still more, be- 
 cause her moral wants demand it. But the ar- 
 guments of speculative Reason to prove that 
 such a Being exists, are defective. 
 
 The ontnlogical proof, or that derived from 
 the very idea of a God, (that to be ^perfect Being, 
 he must be a necessary existence, and that a 
 necessary existence can not but exist,) is entirely 
 fallacious, being a mere assumption of the thing 
 to be proved, and then inferring it from that as- 
 sumption. The cosmolgical proof, or that stated 
 in the Theses of the third and fourth cosmologi- 
 cal ideas, besides tiie objections already noticed 
 can only prove o. first cause, which is uncaused ; 
 and not, that this first cause is the great ideal 
 himself. This argument therefore rests upon the 
 ontological for support. And the physico- theol- 
 ogical proof, or that founded on the marks of 
 wisdum and design in the works of nature, is 
 illogically reasoning from objects of experience 
 among men, to objects lying wholly out of the 
 reach of all human experience ; and moreover, 
 if admitted, it does not prove the author of na- 
 ture to be an infinite and perfect Being, but only 
 a Being of sufficient intelligence and power to 
 produce such a world as this. Hence, this argu- 
 ment also falls back on the ontological proof. 
 
 Kant here goes into a Critic of all Theology, 
 
THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 77 
 
 on the ground of speculative Reason. — Theolo- 
 gy is the knowledge of an Original Beings a 
 God^ the Author of all things. This knowledge 
 may be derived either from mere Reason^ or from 
 Revelation. In the former case, it is rational 
 theology {\\\Qo\og\?i rationalis;) in the latter case 
 it is revealed theology (theologia revelata.) — 
 Again; rational theology is g'\\\\qx transcendental 
 theology, or it is natural theology. 
 
 Transcendental theology^ which is that of a 
 Deist, contemplates its object as it is presented 
 to us in those transcendental ideas, of which we 
 have been treating. It therefore regards God as 
 being known to us merely as the original cause 
 of all things, (ens originarmm, realissimum, ens 
 entium.) Yet as it does not deny him to be an 
 intelligent Being, we must say, that it admits the 
 existence of a God. In so far as it takes the 
 cosmological ideas for its basis, it may be called 
 cosmO'theology : and in so far as it relies on the 
 ontological argument for proof, it may be called 
 onto-theology. 
 
 Natural theology is that of a Theist. It con- 
 templates its object as being an infinite Intelli- 
 gence or Mind, of which the human mind is the 
 finite image or likeness. It therefore recognizes 
 a living God, a Being of boundless intelligence, 
 who by his wisdom and power created and gov- 
 
78 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 erns the world. This theology alone can satisfy 
 the wants of man. — It is physico-theology, so far 
 as it relies upon the physico-theological proof of 
 the existence of a God ; that is, so far as it infers, 
 from the beauty and order of the natural world, 
 an all-wise Architect ; just as, from any produc- 
 tion of human art, we infer that it had an intelli- 
 gent fabricator. But it is moral theology when, 
 from the moral law within us, it infers a moral 
 government of the rational universe ; and of 
 course, a supreme Lawgiver and Judge^ who 
 takes account of human actions, and will reward 
 or punish esery man according to his deserts. 
 
 From all that has been said in the preceding 
 criticism of Reason, it will be seen, that every 
 attempt to establish theology on a scientific basis, 
 by means of mere speculative Reason, must be 
 futile. It can not be done. Yet when /)r<7c//ca/ 
 Reason, by means of the moral law within us, 
 has taught us to believe and to confide in God, 
 speculative Reason may be of use, to purify our 
 conceptions and to give form and consistency to 
 our theoloofical views. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The Results to which this Philosophy leads. 
 
 We now come lo the concluding part of the 
 Critic of pure Reason. 
 
 The autlior says : If we compare a system of 
 transcendental philosophy with an edifice, the 
 former part of this work has examined the ma- 
 terials of which the edifice is composed, and this 
 second part will survey \\\e plan of it. And here 
 we shall have to treat of a Discipline^ a Canoii^ 
 an Architectonic^ and a Hist or?/ o^ pure Reason, 
 
 I. Discipline of pure reason. — A discipline is 
 the opposite of a culture. It restrains, and ulti- 
 mately destroys, the constant inclination to 
 swerve from and overleap the rules by which we 
 should be governed. Culture carries us forward 
 in the right way ; discipline keeps us back from 
 pursuing wrong ways. 
 
 (1.) Discipline of pure reason in its dogmatic 
 use. 
 
 Philosophical knowledge is rational knowl- 
 edge derived immediately from ideas or abstract 
 conceptions. Mathematical knowledge is ration- 
 
80 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 al knowledge derived from the construction of 
 such ideas or conceptions ; that is, from schema- 
 ta^ diagrams, or sensible representations of the 
 conceptions. Mathematics is concerned only 
 with quantities ; which are always capable of 
 being adequately constructed or represented to 
 the eye. But philosophy is concerned with 
 qualities^ which can not be thus constructed or 
 represented. And this it is, makes the wide 
 difference between mathematics and philosophy. 
 For all our knowledge rests ultimately on» intui- 
 itions of the objects of it. But philosophical 
 knowledge can have no other than empirical intit- 
 tions of lis objects, while mathematical knowl- 
 edge can make its most abstract conceptions the 
 object of direct intuition by means of its con- 
 structions. Thus we can construct a conical 
 figure^ which shall represent all cones ; but we 
 canneverconstructtheco/orof acone: nor can we 
 draw anyc^i^o'raw which shall adequately represent 
 simple existence^ though we may easily draw one 
 to represent extension or magnitude. For exam- 
 ple ; ask a mathematician what is the sum of 
 the three angles of every right-lined triangle, and 
 he will draw his diagram to represent every pos- 
 sible triangle, and will demonstrate by it that 
 the sum must be equal to two right angles ; and 
 his diagram subjects the whole to our intuition. 
 
THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 81 
 
 Now ask a philosopher the same question, and 
 he goes to analyzing his abstract conceptions of 
 angles and lines, but can never find an answer 
 in this way. So the algebraist represents ade- 
 quately his quantities, known and unknown, by 
 letters ; and then by a regular process, he can 
 solve his problems. But the philosopher can not 
 mak5 out any such sensible representations of 
 his. general conceptions : he can only analyze 
 them ; unless he will recur to the sensible intui- 
 tion of the objects themselves, i. e. of some indi- 
 vidual thing under the genus ; which will afford 
 only empirical, and never philosophical knowl- 
 edge of them. Hence, all purely philosophical 
 reasoning is discursive or purely logical, that is, 
 is based immediately on our conceptions. But 
 mathematical reasoning is not purely logical, as 
 it rests on intuitions of the general conceptions, 
 hy means of its constructions. Mathematics and 
 philosophy are therefore essentially different 
 sciences ; and the precision and certainty of the 
 former can never be carried into the latter. 
 
 Philosophy can not make out complete defi- 
 nitions of the objects of which' it treats, as 
 mathematics can do. For those objects are 
 either empirical facts, with regard to which we 
 are liable to much deception, and which are 
 moreover always particular facts, and not uni- 
 6 
 
8*2 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 versal truths; or they are pu7'e conceptions a 
 priori, (e. g. substance, cause, right, equity, iVc.) 
 and therefore so obscure as to be incapable of any 
 adequate description on which reliance can be 
 placed. We can indeed expound our conceptions 
 of the thin<js ; but we can never be certain that 
 our conceptions correspond exactly with the 
 things as they exist. On the contrary, tlic ob- 
 jects of the mathematician^ being always arbitra- 
 ry combinations or creations of the mind, and 
 also capable of construction, and of course of 
 heiag intuited, are the only objects that will ad- 
 mit of perfect clcjinitions. 
 
 Philosophy moreover can not have her axioms, 
 as mathematics can. For all axioms are propo- 
 sitions so clear and evident, from mere inspec- 
 tion, as to need no proof. Now mathematics, 
 by means of her constructions, can submit many 
 of her fundamental positions to our immediate 
 inspection ; and therefore she has her axioms. — 
 But philosophy, being unable to construct any 
 thing, has to depend wholly on discursive or logi- 
 cal reasoning, and therefore can have no axioms. 
 For, all discursive reasoning is merely the analy- 
 zing of our conceptions, and therefore it can 
 educe from those conceptions only what is really 
 and truly contained in them. Philosophy can 
 make no syntheticjudgnitnts a^n'on* respecting the 
 
THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 83 
 
 objects of nature, but only eminrical judgments', 
 and she can reason about them only discursively^ 
 that is, logically. — Direct synthetic judgments 
 from perceptions^ are Dogmata: similar judg- 
 ments from construction^ are Blathernata^ Now 
 all Dogmata are uncertain ; Mathemata are not. 
 (2.) Discipline of pure reason in its polemic 
 Kse.-By its polemic use, I intend, its use in defend- 
 ing positions against the dogmatical deniers of 
 them, or in maintaining that the contrary cannot 
 be proved^ ur even be shown to be more j^robable. 
 Here Kant introduces those critical remarks 
 on the theses and antitheses of reason in regard 
 to her cosmological ideas, which were quoted in 
 our last number. 
 
 He then proceeds : The Critic of pure rea- 
 son is the proper tribunal, before which all the 
 contests of pure reason should be brought. — 
 Without the aid of this tribunal, reason issituat- 
 ed like men in a state of nature, where no im- 
 partial decision of controversies is practicable, 
 but the parties must fight it out, aud never come 
 to agreement. — This critic may put us at ease, 
 and dispel all fear lest the enemies of religion 
 should succeed in overthro\V<ng the belief of a 
 God, of the immortality of the soul, a future 
 state, &c. They can never do any such thing. 
 At the same time, it teaches us not to relv on the 
 
84 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ordinary proofs, (the ontological, cosmological, 
 and physico-theological,) as alone adequate, and 
 such as none but bad men can hesitate to admit : 
 and it shews us, that moral proofs^ derived from 
 practical reason, and from the reasonableness of 
 the things themselves, must be our chief reliance. 
 Such a critic should never lead us to become 
 skeptics^ like Hume and Priestley ; but by show- 
 ing us the true boundaries of rational knowledge, 
 it should keep us from dogmatism. The first 
 steps taken in matters of pure reason, are apt to 
 make us dogmatists^ as being yet but children in 
 knowledge. The next steps bring us into per- 
 plexities, and seem to require universal skepti- 
 cism. But the third and last steps (those of 
 sound criticism) show us the limits of true ration- 
 al knowledge, and dispel skepticism as well as 
 dogmatism, 
 
 (3.) Discipline of pure reason in regard to 
 hypotheses. 
 
 Admitting that the conclusions of pure reason 
 in matters of fact are not proved with apodictical 
 certainty, it may still be a question whether those 
 conclusions may not be received as hypotheses, 
 and be used advantageously as such. And un- 
 doubtedly they may be so received and used, in 
 certain cases ; but not in all cases, and for all 
 purposes. In particular, they may be used to 
 
THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 85 
 
 answer objections ; by showing the objector that 
 his arguments are liable to exceptions. But 
 they must never be made the foundation of any 
 system g£ positive knowledge. In the field of 
 speculative reason, this rule is necessary, in order 
 that nothing may be assumed without the evi- 
 dence of certainty. But in the field of practical 
 reason, which does not aim to evince truths but 
 only to advance the best interests of man, the 
 same caution in regard to hypotheses is not 
 liecessary. 
 
 II. The Canon of pure reason. — By a Canon^ 
 he tells us, he intends o. summary of the principles 
 a priori of the right use^ in general, of any of our 
 intellectual powers. Thus the analysis of the 
 powers of the understanding, in the first part of 
 the work, is a canon of pure understanding. 
 
 (1.) Of the idtimatc aims of the pure use of 
 our reason. — It may be asked, What are the 
 problems^ which it is the ultimate aim of pure 
 reason to solve 1 The answer is : The specula- 
 tions of reason in her transcendental operations 
 all center on three subjects ; viz. the freedom of 
 the ivill, the immortality of the soul, and the eX' 
 istence of a God. But the merely speculative in- 
 terests of reason in regard to all the three sub- 
 jects, are very small, and hardly worth pursuing 
 through so much toil. Because, the sum of our 
 
86 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 philosophical hunvledge would be very little en- 
 larged bv an affirmative decision of these ques- 
 tions. But it is far otherwise in regard io practi- 
 cal reason, or when the question comes up, "What: 
 ought we to do. 
 
 (2.) Of an idea of the supreme good, as deter- 
 mining the aim of pure reason. — All the inter- 
 ests of my reason unite in these three questions : 
 I. What can I know ? II. What ought 1 to do ? 
 III. What may I hope fori T\\q first question 
 belongs wholly to speculative reason ; and it has 
 (I trust) been adequately answered already. — 
 T^hQ second question belongs wholly io practical 
 reason. It is not however transcoidental, but 
 moral; and therefore does not belong to this 
 Critic. The third question is both j^raciical and 
 theoretical: because, when practical reason has 
 decided it in a general manner, speculative Jea- 
 son must]come in to define particularly what we 
 may hope for. 
 
 The second question, What ought 1 to do, 
 enquires after a rule of duty, not after a mere 
 rule of expediency, or a path to happiness. Com- 
 plete happiness would consist in the full, entire, 
 and eternal satisfaction of all our propensities or 
 desires. And a rule to guide us to such a state, 
 must be founded on empirical principles ; be- 
 cause experience alone can show us what our 
 
THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 87 
 
 propensities are, nnd whiit w'lW satisfi/ them. A 
 moral law, on the contrary, shows us wliat will 
 render us worthi/ to be happy. It overlooks our 
 propensities, and the means of their gratifica- 
 tion. It treats us as free rational beings, and 
 points us to the conditions of our being made 
 happv. It must therefore rest on the mere ideas 
 of pure reason, and must be known a priori. I 
 assume the existence of such a moral laio ; and I 
 refer to the moral judgment of every man, who 
 will candidly examine his own moral feelings, 
 for authority to make the assumption. — Pure 
 reason, in her practical or moral exercise, is our 
 voucher for some principles of the possibility of 
 experience, namely, 'for the practicability of 
 such actions as will accord with the precepts of 
 the moral law. For, if the law imperatively 
 commands certain actions, those actions must be 
 possible, and the performance of them depends 
 on our freewill. And hence, the principles of 
 pure reason, in her practical or moral capacity, 
 must have objective reality. — From the absolute 
 demands of the moral law, we also infer the pos- 
 sibility of a moral system or unity ; of which, 
 however, speculative reason can have no knowl- 
 edge, because her province does not extend over 
 the territory of /rce z^^i//. Amoral loorld would 
 be one conforming to all the precepts of the 
 
OO THE CRITICAL PHILOSOI'IIF. 
 
 moral law. Such a world must be possible^ in 
 consequence of the freedom of the will ; and 
 such ought to he the character of the existing 
 world. It must be an intellectual world, and not 
 a physical ; because it must be free from all com- 
 pulsion^ and must make no allowances for the 
 weaknesses and imperfections of human nature. 
 The idea of such a world has objective reality^ not 
 from any actual intuition of it, but as an object 
 of ^u\'e practical reason. — Thus we answer the 
 first of the two questions of pure practical rea- 
 son, (What ?nust I do?) — namely, obei/ perfectly 
 the moral law ; make the existence oj a moral 
 world to be a reality ; or in other words, do that, 
 which will render you worthy of happiness. 
 
 The last question is, If I do so, may I expect 
 to be happy ? And, from the principles of pure 
 practical reason, we infer an affirmative answer. 
 For we have seen, that a moral world (one in 
 which every man shall do what he ought to do) 
 ought to exist ; such being the imperative com- 
 mand of the moral law. But the possible exis- 
 tence of such a world presupposes a supreme 
 moral ruler or lawgiver who wills its existence ; 
 because, no otherwise can such a world be pos- 
 sible. Blind nature could never produce it. So 
 then, there must be a supreme Reason, which 
 legislates on moral principles, and which is also 
 
THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. Oil 
 
 the author of nature. Such an Intdligence^ 
 connecting aperfect moral will in creatures with 
 their highest happiness^ and thus causing all the 
 happiness which results from morality, I denom- 
 inate the ideal of the supreme good. Now, as 
 we do not find the world around us, or the pres- 
 ent state of things to be such a moral world as 
 we have seen should exist, and in which perfect 
 happiness reigns, we necessarily infer 2i future 
 state, an unseen world, in which all this shall be 
 realized. This future state as distinguished from 
 the kingdom of nature, Leibnitz called the king- 
 dom of grace. Practical reason commands us 
 to connect ourselves with the kingdom of grace, 
 and to expect happines in it, provided we do not 
 render ourselves unworthy of it. In order to our 
 happiness, it is necessary that all our conduct 
 be regulated by moral maxims ; that is, by the 
 precepts of the moral law. But reason cannot 
 feel this necessity, if she regards the moral law 
 as a mere idea without objective reality. Hence, 
 she is obliged to assume the existence of an effi.- 
 cient cause, a God, the maker and executor of 
 this Jaw. For if there be no God, and no future 
 unseen state, the ideas of morality may excite 
 our admiration or wonder, but can never become 
 efficient motives controlling the will and conduct. 
 Neither happiness alone, nor morality alone, ("the 
 
90 
 
 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 latter considered as rendering man loorthy of 
 liappiness,) can be reasoii's supreme good. We 
 must superadd tlie expectation of tliis happiness, 
 on condition of being worthy of it. And hence 
 the necessity of assuming that there is a God, 
 tlie lawgiver, and the center of tlie rnorai unity, 
 or head of the moral world. This supreme In- 
 telligence must be one, not many icills, because 
 many wills would destroy the wiity of the moral 
 world. He must be omnipotent, to order all 
 things in subserviency to the unity of ihe moral 
 world ; omnisctent, to know the inmost thoughts 
 and purposes of creatures and their moral de- 
 serts ; omnipresent, to order all events in subser- 
 viency to the interests of the moral world ; and 
 eternal, to conduct all events to their final issue. 
 (3.) Of ojnnion, knoivledge, and faith. — Truth 
 consists in the agreement of a proposition with 
 the objects of real existence. The truth of a 
 proposition may be admitted either on objective 
 grounds, or on subjective ; that is, either for 
 causes existing in the thing, or for causes existing 
 in our own minds. In the former case, the ad- 
 mission is conviction ; in the latter it is persua- 
 sion. In persuasion there is frequently an illu- 
 sion, the subjective ground being mistaken for an 
 objective. To prove whether we are under such 
 
 ^ ,(^^ 
 ')\^' 
 
 ^< 
 
THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 91 
 
 illasion, propose the case to others, and see if 
 their minds view it as we do. 
 
 To admit without the consciousness of either 
 subjective or objective validity, is to presume or 
 to he of opinion. If the ground of the admis- 
 sion is subjectively adequate^ but not objectively 
 sOf the admission is faith or belief: as, e. g. 
 when the object Jies beyond our personal cogni- 
 zance, and we admit the Statement because we 
 have confidence in the testimony of other?, or for 
 any other satisfactory reason existing in our own 
 minds. If the ground is both subjectively and 
 objectively adequate, the regarding as true is 
 knowledge ; we know it. ^ 
 
 We should never venture to hold an opinion., 
 without knowing something about the thing, 
 which may render it possibly true. In the judg- 
 ments of pure speculative reason^ opinions are 
 wholly inadmissible : the proposition must con- 
 tain what is known a priori, and therefore have 
 apodictical certainty or be rejected altogether. 
 In the transcendental operations of pure reason, 
 an opinion is too little, and knoicledge too much 
 to be expected. In the disquisitions o^ practical 
 reason, faith OY belief is admissible; and indeed, y 
 generally, it is all we can expect. 
 
 The two remaining chapters of the Critic of 
 pure Reason, (viz. the Architectonic, or syste- 
 
92 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 matic arrangement, and the History of pure 
 reason,) are so concise, and contain so little to 
 interest the reader, that I pass them in silence. 
 
 In these sketches, I have endeavored faithfully 
 to exhibit the leading views of Kant in his most 
 celebrated work, and to show in general the spirit 
 and tendency of his Critical Philosophy. That 
 I have in no instance misapprehended his mean- 
 ing, is more than I dare assert. I can only say, 
 I have done the best I could, to represent him 
 fairly, and intelligibly, to my readers ; so that 
 they might be able to form some correct estimate 
 of the merits and demerits of this coryphaeus of 
 modern German philosophers. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 ANTI-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Effects of the Critical Philosophy. Reinhold's Doctrine of Thought, 
 Fichte''s Doctrine of Science, or Wissenschaftslehre. 
 
 Kant's Critic of pure Reason, first published 
 1781, was little noticed for a few years ; and 
 thus it suddenly arrested the attention of all Ger- 
 many. The majority of the learned assailed it, 
 as subverting many of the best establislied truths, 
 narrowing far too much the boundaries of hu- 
 man knowledge, and rendering philosophy a 
 meagre science of little value or importance. 
 The Wolfian dogmatists considered it as a direct 
 attack upon their doctrines : and the philosophi- 
 zing dogmatists regarded it as little short of a 
 protestation against all philosophy. Still it 
 found numerous friends; and it was speedily 
 admitted and expounded in all the universities. 
 And it was soon apparent, that it had completely 
 subverted the older systems of philosophy ; and 
 that it had roused the lovers of science through- 
 out Germany, to high enthusiasm for metaphysical 
 studies, and especially for investigating the foun- 
 
94 ANTI-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 dation, source, and origin of rational knowledg'e. 
 During a very few years, more new and essen- 
 tially different bases for systems of philosof liy 
 were brought forward, and elaborately discussed, 
 in Germany, than in all the rest of Europe since 
 the revival of learning. Some of these were 
 only modifications of the Critical Philosophy ; 
 others were intended to subvert it, and to restore 
 the old philosophy remodeled and established on 
 sounder principles ; and others again sought to 
 find entirely new principles, on which to estab- 
 Jish a more perfect philosophy than had ever 
 before been dreamed ot. 
 
 The chief aim of most of these systems was, 
 to penetrate into the terra incognita of Kant, 
 that is, into the region of noumena and of super- 
 sensible things. The authors were unwilling to 
 believe we can know so little, as Rant had rep- 
 resented. They therefore attempted to rend the 
 vail, which conceals the unknowable; or to 
 bridge the unjuissahle gulf of Kant, which sep- 
 arates between phenomena and noumena in the 
 material world, and between ideas and the ob- 
 jects of them in the world of thought. 
 
 One of the earliest of these projectors, was 
 Charles Leonard Reinhold, a professor at Jena 
 and Kiel, who died in 1823, at the age of G^. 
 His theory appeared as early as 1789. It was, 
 
ANTI-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 95 
 
 that thinking (Vorstellen), or the representing 
 h thing to our own raind, gives us the desired 
 objective knowledge. For our eQnsci'c).usnes3-' 
 assures us, that in all tliinldng there are present 
 three things, the thinker^ the thought^ and the 
 thinking. The thinker is the subject of the ac- 
 tion ; the thinking is the «c^ of the thinker ; and 
 the thought is the product of that act. Now in 
 this product there is, — (I.) Something derived 
 from the objects without the mind, and which is 
 the matter or material of which the thought is 
 composed ; — (2.) Something derived from the 
 mind itself, namely, the fonn of the thought :— 
 and (3.) The consciousness that the material 
 when shaped by the mind, does take that par- 
 ticular form. — But this theory was soon put 
 down ; and the author himself ingenuously aban- 
 doned it, when shown that it does not explain at 
 wWihe nature of the matter of thought, but only 
 the powers of the mind in the act of thinking. — 
 This system was called Vorstellungslehre, the 
 Doctrine of Thought. 
 
 Afar wider and more durable popularity at- 
 tended the speculations of John Gottlieb 
 FiCHTE, a professor of Jena, who died in 1814, 
 at the age of 52. At first he embraced the Criti- 
 cal Philosophy of Kant ; but afterwards he 
 thought he discovered a way to carry absolute 
 
96 ANTI-CRITICAL nilLOSOPHY. 
 
 science into regions, of which Kant affirms, we 
 can have no knowledge. His views were first 
 published in 1794. 
 
 His system is entitled the Doctrine of Science 
 (WisscnschaftsleJire) ; and he describes it as 
 being the Science, which establishes the possibil- 
 ity and the validity of all science. Such a pre- 
 liminary science, he said, must rest on a single 
 fundamental principle; and that principle must 
 be so certain in itself as to need no proof from 
 without, and so comprehensive as to embrace 
 both the substance and the form of all scientific 
 knowledge. And such a principle, be maintain- 
 ed, is found in the simple proposition I am I. 
 For, every thing is, ichat it is ; neither less nor 
 more. This self-evident trutli may be expressed 
 thus: A=A. Now by substituting the /, of 
 which every one is conscious, in the place of A ; 
 and the verb of existence am, of which also we 
 are conscious, in place of the copula ; we obtain 
 the proposition I am I ; of which our conscious- 
 ness, as often as we reflect upon our own mental 
 acts, furnishes the subject, ihe predicate, and the 
 copula. Of course, this proposition has apodic- 
 ticai certainty ; for it rests on the ground of a 
 perfect and known identity between the subject 
 and the predicate. 
 
ANTI-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 97 
 
 Now by affirming this proposition, 2^ judgment 
 is expressed. But to judge, is to act. Here then 
 is a an act of the /. The / directly affirms its 
 own existence. It is the actor, and at the same 
 time the object of its own actiou ; and herein 
 consists the consciousness which furnishes the 
 knowledge of the proposition. But this act of 
 the /, affirming itself to be /, and nothing more 
 nor less, implies a stop, boundary, or limitation 
 of the sphere of the /: in other words, it postu- 
 lates the existence of something that limits the 
 activity of the /, and confines it to its own sphere. 
 Now this something which limits the /, whatever 
 it maybe, is certainly not I. And hence the 
 proposition I am I, proves the existence of tivo 
 "things or objects ; namely, the I wiiich is affirm- 
 ed, and the not /which is postulated. It more- 
 over proves, that these two objects limit or bound 
 each other; so that neither of them, in so far as 
 it is considered as bounded by the other, is infi- 
 nite or unlimited, but is finite. 
 
 But what is this not /, which sets bounds to the 
 I? — Manifestly it is something which owes its 
 existence to the /. For the /, when reflecting 
 upon itself and its operations, voluntarily or 
 spontaneously limits and bounds itself; and 
 thereby it gives up its claim to boundless exis- 
 tence and activity, and transfers a portion of ex- 
 7 
 
yb ANTI-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 istence and activity to the not-I ; vhich is to the 
 / the external world, or llie universe without. 
 This not-I^ therefore, has no existence hut what 
 the /gives to it, hy the act of limiting iiself m 
 the judgment, I AiM I. Of course the world 
 around us, or the universe, is only an ideal exis- 
 tence, a world of our own creation. We indeed 
 conceive of it as real, when we consider it a& 
 limiting the I: but this limitation is of our own 
 making; the / is the only real oc/or. And this 
 holds true of all the individual objects, nialerial 
 or immaterial, which the mind contem[)lates as 
 exterior to itself, and to which collectively she 
 gives the ajopellation not-I. For the /, in all its 
 actions, meets with obstructions, boundaries or 
 limitations to its activity; and according to the 
 variety in the obstructions or limitations, it forms 
 numberless conceptions or ideas of supjiosed or 
 postulated objects, which are endlessly varied, and 
 which develop themselves continually in new and 
 unexpected forms. The conceptions, so endlessly 
 various, are the postulated objects, considered as 
 limitations of the I. But as the /, in all cases, 
 voluntarily limits itself, or gives being to the ob- 
 structions to its own activity, the J is the only 
 actor; and tiie various conceptions of objects 
 without, are only cerin'in forms of the activity of 
 the /; that is, they are all ideal existences. 
 
ANTI-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 99 
 
 We now come to the practical or moral part of 
 Fichte's system. And here again, he takes the 
 same proposition, I am I, for his fundamental 
 principle : and he also reasons from it in much 
 the same manner. But he contemplates the I in 
 a different character. In the first or theoretical 
 part, he considered the / as a merely intellectual 
 activity ; here he contemplates it as a free agent, 
 strivinor to accomplish objects or to attain ends. 
 
 In itself, and as limiting the not-I, the practical 
 /is absolute and free, infinite, and the only real 
 existence. And as a free activity, it is a causali- 
 ty : but in its consciousness, or when it affirms 
 itself in the form I am I, it always appears as 
 someth'wgfnite, something limited by a not-I ; 
 and its causality can manifest itself to the con- 
 sciousness only as an effort to accomplish some- 
 thing ; which effort is always obstructed and 
 limited by the not-I. Hence the finite practical 
 /contemplates itself as acted upon, limited, and 
 restrained by a nr?i-/; while the absolute practi- 
 cal /contemplates itself as acting upon, restrain- 
 ing, and limiting the not-I, and therefore feels 
 itself to be free, unlimited in action, and the 
 only real existence. But the not-Iis a mere 
 creature of the /, as we have before seen. And 
 lience, the inert and lifeless not-I, by which the 
 practical /is limited in its hee activity is a mere 
 
100 ANTI-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ideal existence. And thus we arrive at a knowl- 
 edge of the essential nature hoth of the practical 
 1 and its opposing not-I ; just as we previously 
 ascertained the essential nature of the theoreti- 
 cal / and its opposing wof-/; and in both, we 
 find the f to be the only actor^ and the only real 
 existence, and the not-I to be a postulated ideal 
 thing, which owes its existence entirely to the 
 action of the /. 
 
 " After thus annihilating, by his idealism, the 
 evidence of the objectivity of any sensible world, 
 and leaving us only a system of empty images, 
 (says Tennemann,) he labors to establish by 
 means of conscience, a belief in the reality not 
 only of a sensible world, but also of an intellec- 
 tual world independent of it, and of a supersen- 
 sible order in the latter world ; and moreover 
 the possibility of acting for ends, which may be 
 realized by such action. He commences with 
 the idea o^ freedom, i. e. a universal and absolute 
 independence, manifesting itself in the tendency 
 of the /, from which originates the idea of inde- 
 pendence. The principle of morals, therefore, 
 or the moral law, (the law for free actions,) con- 
 sists in the necessary thought or purpose of an 
 intelligent being, to determine its free choice un- 
 conditionally, agreeably to the idea of indepen- 
 dence ; or, in popular language, to follow con- 
 
ANTI-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 101 
 
 science unconditionally. This determines what 
 is dutf/. Virtue consists in being in perfect har- 
 mony with ourselves." (Tennemann, Grundriz, 
 §. 395, p. 500.) 
 
 " But Fichte's religious pldlosophy attracted 
 most notice. For he there asserts expressly, 
 that God is the moral order of the world ; and 
 that to this conclusion the /is brought, by the 
 consciousness that its free activity is bound by 
 the idea of duty. For, by striving to realize 
 duty, the / strives after a moral order in the 
 world of its own creation ; and thus it approxi- 
 mates io God, and has the life which comes 
 from God. In this moral order of the world, 
 happiness is the result of morality. But this 
 happiness is not perfect felicity ; which never 
 existed, and never can. And thus all regard for 
 perfect felicity is excluded. We need no other 
 God than this order of the world ; although we 
 are prone to think of a particular Beings as the 
 Creator of it : For, (I.) It is not possible to as- 
 cribe intelligence and personality to God, with- 
 out making him a finite being like ourselves. 
 (2.) To conceive of God as a particular sub- 
 Mance^ is idolatry^ and militates with the very 
 idea of him ; because a substance is something 
 which has a sensible existence in time and place. 
 (3.) We can not ascribe existence to him, because 
 
102 ANTI-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 existence belongs only to objects of sense. (4.) 
 There has never yet been brought forward any 
 intelligible word, by which we can express the 
 creation of the world by God. (5.) The expec- 
 tation o^ perfect felicity (Gluckseligkeil), is a 
 chimera ; and a God supposed to produce it, is 
 an idol ministering to our pleasure, — the prince 
 of this world. These representations, brought 
 forward in extravagant paradoxes and with great 
 assurance, (but which Fichte himself abandon- 
 ed afterwards,) were treated as real atheism ; 
 and they drew upon him very disagreeable con- 
 sequences, which he did not altogether- merit." 
 (Tewiem. p. 502. 
 
 "Fichte attempted, by various statements of 
 his doctrine, to bring people to understand him, 
 and he also changed his views on some points ; 
 as, among others in regard to the relation his 
 system bears to the Critical Philosophy, (for at 
 first, he maintained them to be in accordance.) 
 and in regard to the way in which the original 
 activity of the /is brought into consciousness, 
 (for he first attempted it by the mere laws of 
 thinking, but afterwards by an intellectual intu- 
 ition). But the most striking difference between 
 the more recent and the earlier form of his Doc- 
 trine of Science, is, that at first it was idealism^ 
 and afterwards realism. In the former, the 
 
ANTI-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 103 
 
 starting point was the activity of the 1; in the 
 latter, it is ike absolute existence of God, as the 
 only real Being, who is self-existent and life 
 itself and of whom the world and consciousness 
 are a likeness or schema ; and objective nature, 
 he considered, as the absolute barrier or limita- 
 tion of the divine activity. In producing this 
 change in the Doctrine of Science, Sehelling's 
 philosophy, as well as Fichte's sense of religion, 
 seems to have been operative. The Doctrine of 
 Science excited great attention, and met with 
 warm approbation and warm friends ; and like- 
 wise with severe critics and strenuotis opposers, 
 especially among the Kanteans. And at last, it 
 had the fate of every system : for, notwithstand- 
 ing its imposing tone, (by which it greatly pro- 
 moted an extravagant love of speculation, and 
 contempt for real knowledge,) it could not gain 
 the standing of a generally received philosophy. 
 Yet it can not be denied, that Fichte's idealism 
 had great influence on the spirit of his age ; and, 
 by the force of the author's peculiar eloquence, 
 14: fostered in many minds a strong predilection 
 for the super-sensible." ( Tennem. p. 505.) 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Schelling'' s Doctrine of Identity, Identitatslebre. Fickte's altered 
 Doctrine of Science. Other Pantheists: Bouterwek, Bardili, 
 Esckenmayer, Wagner, Krause. 
 
 The next system demanding our attention, is 
 SchQW'mg's Doctrine of Identity^ Identitatshhre ; 
 so named, from its maintaining the perfect iden- 
 tity o^ the knowledge of things and the ihijigs 
 themselves, or the entire coincidence of the ideal 
 and real, the subjective and the objective. It is 
 also called the doctrine of All-One, AUeinheits- 
 lehre, or Alltinslehre : because it maintains that 
 the universe is God, and God the universe ; or, 
 that God developing himself in various forms, 
 and according to general laws, is the only exis- 
 tence. 
 
 The distinguished author of this system, Fred. 
 Wm. Jos. von Schelling, was born in 1775, 
 studied at Tubingen til! he passed Philos. Dr., 
 then at Ijcipsic, and afterwards at Jena under 
 Fichte. In 1802 he became M. D., and the next 
 year a professor of philosophy at Wurtzburg : 
 thence he removed to Munich in 1817, to Erlan- 
 
PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 105 
 
 gen in 1820, and back to Municli in 1827, where 
 he probably still lives, an academician, a court- 
 counsellor, and a professor of philosophy. — 
 Schelling became an author at the age of 20, 
 being then an admirer of Fichte's philosophy, 
 from which he soon swerved ; and at the age of 
 25, had published the ground-work of his new 
 system, which he labored to perfect during a few 
 years, and then turned his attention to other ob- 
 jects. For nearly 30 years he has published 
 very little on i)hilosophy : and his s}stem has 
 never been so fully and so lucidly explained, 
 that the philosophizing public could perfectly un- 
 derstand it. And this, in the opinion of Krug, 
 is one reason why his philosophy, which at first 
 attracted so much notice and so many admirers, 
 is now seldom mentioned in the German univer- 
 sities, and is sinking into oblivion. 
 
 The philosophy of Schelling depends lesson 
 logical demonstrations, than on bold assumptions 
 claiming to be intellectual intuitions. Yet it does 
 not disclaim all support from sound reasoning. 
 A fundamental principle with the author, is, that 
 the very idea o^ philosophi/ presupposes the pos- 
 sibility of a perfect and known coincidence be- 
 tween our knowledge of things and the essential 
 nature of these things : because, it is only such 
 a knowledge of things that can be justly called 
 
106 PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 philosophical or true knowledge. Then, with- 
 out stopping to inquire, as Kant has done, how- 
 far such knowledge can extend, he goes on the 
 supposition that there are no definable limits to 
 it; and therefore his only inquiry is, how such 
 knowledge may be supposed to originate ; or, 
 how can the fact be explained, that we have such 
 knowlediie. 
 
 Now, if the laws of nature were also the laws 
 of human consciousness, or if the former were 
 always exactly coincident wiih the latter, then 
 our consciousness would contain an exact trans- 
 cript, a perfect fac-simile, of what is taking place 
 in the natural world around us, at least so far as 
 our coirnizance of tliini;s without extends. In 
 other words, our minds would be mirrors reflect- 
 ing perfect images of the things around us, and 
 of all changes they undergo. And hence, by 
 looking into our own minds wc might there read 
 the laws of nature, and learn perfectly the true 
 nature of every thing that falls within the circle 
 of our observation. Now this supposition so 
 perfectly explains how philosophical knowledge 
 is possible, and so pours broad daylight upon 
 what Wris before dark and inexplicable, that we 
 can not reasonably hesitate to adopt it as true. 
 It is therefore to be assutued with confidence. 
 
 But still a difficulty remains ; viz. How hap- 
 
PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 107 
 
 pens it, that these two mysterious streams (the 
 colIr^e of nature in the objective world, and the 
 course of human consciousness in tlie subjective 
 or intellectual world,) should so perfectly agree, 
 or he identical in all their raeanderings ? Our 
 actual observations can not trace them back to 
 their source, nor follow them down to their final 
 termination; what then can explain the mystery 
 of their entire coincidence'? Answer: Spinoza 
 has shf)wn us, that there is only one substance, or 
 one real existence^ in the universe, namely God ; 
 who is continually developing himself, and by 
 that development gives being to all that exists, 
 whether material or immaterial. And here is a 
 key to the mystery. The two streams flow from 
 one and the same fountain, namely, God, as he 
 existed anterior to his development. They are 
 equally in their nature God, or the divine first 
 principle of all things, who uitfolds himself alike 
 in both. They are therefore not two, but one 
 and the same, in their essential nature, and of 
 course also in the laws of their movement. We 
 thus arrive at the source, the grand central point, 
 from which all things radiate, and in which all 
 contrarieties and diversities meet and coalesce : 
 viz. the Divine, the Absolute, the All-One, in 
 its primitive state or form. And all true philoso- 
 phy must begin with a knowledge of this primal 
 
108 PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 All-One ; and then, by tracing the developments 
 of ih'is All-One till it expands itself into the uni- 
 verse around us, a complete and perfect system 
 of philosophy will be obtained. 
 
 This system, which Tennemann justly charac- 
 terises -diSlUe poetry of the human mind, attempts 
 to explain exactly xhe process by which the Ab- 
 solute or the All-One gradually developed itself, till 
 itbecamethe now existing universe. But it would 
 carry us too far to go over the whole process, 
 and we therefore only subjoin the following gen- 
 eral scheme of it. 
 
 I. The primitive form of the Absolute or All- 
 One, (God), is that in which all contrarieties and 
 diversities are completely merged and lost, and 
 only an abstract identity of every thing can be 
 apprehended. 
 
 II. This Absolute reveals itself in nature ; 
 which is the Absolute in the copy. And it reveals 
 itself under two general forms or aspects ; the 
 one form is that of real existences, or things ; 
 the other form is that of ideal existences, or ob- 
 jects which exist only in the mind, and which 
 can never be subjected to the senses. The ob- 
 jects belonging to each form possess different 
 degrees or quantities of that essential nature 
 which is common to them as a class; and this 
 difference in degree or quantity is denoted by the 
 
PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 109 
 
 algebraic expressions for the powers of quantities, 
 a^, «2, a^. The real existences, or the proper 
 thino^s, are of three kinds or degress ; viz. 
 
 1. (a^) The ponderous, or mere matter. 
 
 2. (a^) The light, or moiion, power, force. 
 
 3. (a^) The living, or organic beings. 
 
 The crown and complement of all these real 
 existences, are(l) 3Ian, the microcosm or world 
 in miniature ; and (2.) The external Universe, 
 as a whole. 
 
 The ideal existences are also of three kinds or 
 degress; viz. 
 
 1. (a^) Truth, the subject of knowledge and 
 ideas. 
 
 2. (a-) Goodness, the subject of religion and 
 feeling. 
 
 3. (a^) Beauty, the subject of taste and the 
 arts. 
 
 The crown and complement of the ideal%x\s- 
 tences, are (1) Society ; and (2) the History of 
 man or of the human race. 
 
 Schelling has devoted himself chiefly to the 
 developments of the Absolute in nature, or to 
 the real side of his system ; and has only occa- 
 sionally, and in geneial terms, explained his 
 views of the ideal and moral side of his scheme. 
 Respecting morals, he maintains that to Icnow 
 God is the foundation of ail morality : and that 
 
110 PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 there can be no moral world, unless there is a 
 God. Virtue is a state, in whicli the soul acts 
 agreeably to the internal necessity of" its nature, 
 and not conformably to some law wiihout. Mo- 
 rality is nho /lappiness ; for happiness is not a 
 mere perquisite of virtue, but is virtue itself. 
 The tendency of the soul to be in union with 
 its center God, is morality. Civil Socitty is col- 
 lective life conformed to the primitive divine im- 
 age, so far as respects religion, science, and the 
 arts. It is an exterior organization of a selt- 
 erected harmony in the department of freedom 
 itself. Hi&tory as a whole, is a gradually devel- 
 oping revelation of the Absolute or of God. 
 Beauty is " the infinite represented as finite." 
 Art^ as an ability to represent ideas to the senses, 
 is a clear perception of God by the mind. 
 
 Tennemann objects to this pliilosophy : (1) 
 Th[fl it subverts all virtue and moral obligation, 
 by subjecting every thing to blind fatality, or to a 
 natural necessity ; for God must develope him- 
 self ; and whatever occurs, must occur, from the 
 very laws of nature. There is therefore no 
 freedom of action, and of course no virtue, and 
 no morality, in any being whatever. (2) The 
 system has no basis or foundation ; for the Ab- 
 solute^ in which all things are said to originate, is 
 a sheer nothing. Because an absolute^ i. e. an 
 
PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. Ill 
 
 abstract Identity^ without any relative Identity, 
 or without any things which are identical^ can 
 have no existence. (3) The form of this system 
 has only the appearance of being scientific. It 
 exhibits no substantial proofs, no scientific de- 
 ductions, but only positive assumptions and 
 naked hypotheses. (4) It presumptuously 
 claims to have a perfect knowledge of God ; and 
 it identifies him with external nature, and is so 
 far jjantheism ; and moreover it subjects God to 
 the higher conditions or laws of his nature, and 
 therefore denies him all freedom of action. As 
 a whole, it is rather ihe poetry than ilm philosophy 
 of a reasoning mind. 
 
 The pantheistic principle of Spinoza, or the 
 doctrine that God developes and expands him- 
 self into the existing universe, which Schelling 
 thus revived and made the basis of his philoso- 
 phy, was eagerly adopted by vast 'numbers in 
 Germany ; and many who did not follow Schel- 
 ling's opinions on other points, embraced this 
 doctrine as true, and as shedding much light on 
 philosophy. Hence in different ways it was 
 wrought into various new systems of philosophy, 
 of which it was made to be an essential element. 
 Even FicHTE himself, when he found how ab- 
 Ijorrentto public sentiment was his former doc- 
 trine, (namely that God is only the moral order 
 
112 PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the vvorl(J,) did not hesitate to adopt Schel- 
 ling's idea of an Absolute Existence, from which 
 every thing finite is propaj^ated or evolved. — 
 From the year 1804, till his death in 1813, instead 
 of maintaininjr, as he had done, that the /or the 
 human mind is the only real existence in the uni- 
 verse, antecedent to which nothing real ever exist- 
 ed, and around and above which nothing real 
 now exists, he acknowledged an eternal self-ex- 
 isting God to be the only and the living source 
 of all being; and that He, by developing him- 
 self, ffivesrea/ though not independent existence 
 to all human minds. These finite human minds 
 are still the / of philosophy ; and as they are 
 divine in their origin and nature, being a part of 
 God himself, they are capable of understanding 
 and knowing God, and of loving and serving 
 him. As to the external woild, or the noUl, it is 
 altogether inanimate and lifeless ; it is no part of 
 the divine nature or essence, but is merely the 
 abutting and bounding of the acts of God and of 
 human minds, or the voluntary limitations which 
 the acts affix to themselves; and therefore they 
 are merely ic?ea/things, the creations of the sponta- 
 neous activityofthe living or real beings, viz. God 
 and his progeny. Fichte therefore no longer made 
 the /the sole foundation and source of all phi- 
 losophy ; but rather assumed a new foundation, 
 
PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 113 
 
 namely, tlie idea of God^ of which the /, from 
 its participation in the divine nature, is capable 
 of an immediate and true knoweledge. l^ut the 
 general opinion of the learned was, that 
 Fichte's new principle was entirely irrecon- 
 cilable with all his former doctrines. And 
 hence his attempt to improve his system and to 
 render it more acceptable to the public, only tend- 
 ed to convince people that it had no solid founda- 
 tion ; and thus to induce his followers to leave 
 his school, and seek for other guides- in philoso- 
 phy. 
 
 Professor Fred. Bcuterwek, of .Gottingen, 
 likewise supposed that there is but one real eX' 
 istence in the universe ; and that this absolute 
 Existence pervades all things, and constitutes 
 their reality. Whatever is leal^ or whatever 
 truly exists, is a development of the Absolute, 
 or of this one real Existence: all else is merely 
 imaginary, or ideal, and destitute of objectivity. 
 And therefore, to have any true objective knowl- 
 edge of things, or to understand and know when 
 our conceptions have objective reality, must be 
 simply to apprehend the presence or the absence 
 of the Absolute ; that is, it is merely to perceive 
 where the Absolute exists, and where there is only 
 the deceptive appearance of its presence. But 
 mere thinking and reasoning discursively on the 
 8 
 
114 PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 subject can n^ver detect the presence of the Ab- 
 solute ; lor all iliinkiiig and discursive reasoning 
 have to assume it as already known. And hence 
 reason must possess an absolute /?o?z:£r of knuW' 
 ing the real ; a power whicli neither thinks nor 
 feels, hut which is the foundation of all thinking 
 andfeelinor on the subject. Entertaining these 
 views, Professor Boulerwek published in 1799, 
 whiit he called an Apodictlc, or a demonstration 
 of true knowedge ; in which he maintained that 
 the human mind, as it§elf partaking of the Abso- 
 lute, has immediate j)crcepiicm or knowledge of 
 the presence or absence of reality in the objects 
 of its contemplation. But after a few years, re- 
 calling this opinion, he maintained th^it reason 
 can have no immediate intuitions of the Abso- 
 lute himself, or of his actual presence in objects ; 
 nevertheless, feeling her power to rise above 
 mere sense, reason confides in her conclusions or 
 judgments respecting the presence of the Abso- 
 lute. He moreover asserted, that it is the proper 
 business of philosophy to investigate this whole 
 subject ; and to ascertain definitely how far rea- 
 son can go in detecting the presence or absence 
 of the Absolute in objects, and where we must 
 be contented with mere probabilities on this great 
 question. 
 Professor C. G. Bardili, of Stutgard, brought 
 
PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 115 
 
 out in 1900 a new method of connecting the Ab- 
 solute, or the Original-One^ (Ur-Eius, as he 
 denominated it,) with philosophy. This Origi- 
 nal-One is the subject matter of all logical think- 
 ing : so that Logic is a real science, and the 
 only true metaphysics. All logical thinkings 
 moreover, is computation or reckoning, in the 
 mathematical sense. That is, it is the perpetual 
 repetition and involution of one and the same 
 unit, the Original-One. But abstract thinking 
 has reference to no definite object or finite being. 
 It therefore does not afford us any objective 
 knowledge, until we apply it to some definite 
 object. It only shews us what is possible in the 
 nature of things. But when we apply it to any 
 definite object, then real or objective matter is 
 brought into the process: and a judgment is 
 formed of that object, by which the object is 
 pronounced to be a real existence, or only a 
 possible existence. This seeras to be the amount 
 of his obscure treatise, entitled the Elements of 
 the first Logic, <fec., which puzzled the brains of 
 speculators for a lime, and then was rejected as 
 a baseless phantom. 
 
 Professor C. A. Eschenmayer, of Tubingen, 
 at first agreed very well with Schelhng; but io 
 1803, he departed essentially from him, by main- 
 taioiDg that the Absolute which reason intuits, if 
 
116 PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 not directly and immediately the Absolute him- 
 gelfjthe primary source of all that exists ; but is only 
 an image or likeness of him. And hence philo- 
 sophical knowledge is far more limited, than 
 Schelling's theory supposes. The comprehensi- 
 ble and the explicable fall within the sphere of 
 knowledge or philosophy ; but the Absolute him- 
 self, and whatever is incomprehensible and inex- 
 plicable, belong to the sphere o^ faith or religion. 
 
 So also professor J. Wagner, of Wurtzburg, 
 left the ranks of Schelling's adherents in 1804, 
 and has ever since philosophized in his own way. 
 The Absolute himself, says Wagner, is no ob- 
 ject of our direct knowledge : but the created 
 universe is the living form of him ; and the laws 
 of the universe are the type by which he dis- 
 plays himself. Hence we must recognize him 
 as existing beyond our ken, and as knowable 
 only through the laws of nature. And as math- 
 ematics is the science which best investigates and 
 defines the laws of nature, philosophy must de- 
 pend chiefly on that science, in connexion with 
 the history of man and the study of nature. 
 
 Professor C. C. F. Krause, of Gottingen, 
 coincided with the leading views of Eschen- 
 lijayer, as above stated. He held the Absolute, 
 or th€ Original Beings (das Urwesen, as he chose 
 to c^li him,) to be the Eternal, far above both 
 
PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 117 
 
 ihe natural and the intellectual worlds, those two 
 spheres into which the created universe divides 
 itself; and yet he is the essential principle of 
 both, pervading them and giving them life and 
 being, though not discoverable by us. In his 
 opinion, philosophy naturally divides itself into 
 — (1) General Philosophy, or Ontology ; — (2) 
 Intellectual Philosophy ;- — (3) Philosophy of 
 nature:— and (4) Synthetic Philosophy. 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 
 PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Hegel's absolute Idealism : Logic the only Metaphysics. 
 
 The most famous and the most recent of the 
 German pantheists who liave attempted to im- 
 prove upon Schelling, is Dr. Geo. Wm. Fred. 
 Hegel, a professor at Berlin, who died in 1831, 
 at the age of 61. He was born at Stuttgard, 
 and educated at Tubingen, where lie became in- 
 timate witli Schelling, and adopted and for a time 
 defended his philosophy. But at length, gradu- 
 ally deviating from Schelling, he set up a new 
 school, which became very popular, and has of 
 late altogether eclipsed that of his former friend. 
 
 Both maintained the identity of God and the 
 universe, and the perfect coincidence between 
 subjective and objective knowledge. But He- 
 gel's was a system of absolute idealism ; while 
 Schelling's was rather a system of realism. For 
 Schelling, like Spinoza, considered the original 
 All-One as a real substance, which evolved itself 
 into the existing universe : but Hegel considered 
 mere ideas or conceptions, as the only real exis- 
 tences ; he believed, that there is nothing in the 
 
PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 119 
 
 universe more substantial or more real than what 
 he calls concrete ideas and conceptions. Ajrain ; 
 Schelling supposed, that reason has direct intui- 
 tion oi ihe true nature of tilings, or of tlie ob- 
 jects existing around us and without us: but 
 Hegel denied any such intuition of objects with- 
 out ; and maintained, tiiat the mind only looks 
 inward upon itself, its conceptions and ideas, 
 and by analyzing thern arrives at all philosophi- 
 cal knowledge. And hence, according to He- 
 gel, a logical analysis of ideas and conceptions, 
 is the only real metaphysics, or the true and 
 proper science of things ; and Logic, instead of 
 being, what it has generally been regarded, a 
 merely /o?'w<r// science, or one that treats only of 
 the abstract forms of thought and the laws of 
 correct reasoning, is really and truly a science of 
 things, and the only source of true philosophical 
 knowledge. 
 
 In accordance with these views, Hegel divides 
 all philosophy into three parts ; namely, the 
 science of Looic, or philosophy in general ; the 
 philosophy of nature ; and the philosophy of 
 mind. The first part, called Logic, is the science 
 of things in general, and corres|)onds with what 
 is usually termed Ontology and pure Metaphys- 
 ics. The second part, the philosophy of nature, 
 treats of time and space, matter and motion, 
 
120 PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 material bodies and llieir properties, and of or- 
 ganic nature, geoloj^y, vegetables, and animals, 
 Tiie third part, the pliiiotiophy of mind, treats 
 of the human soul and its faculties, of right and 
 wrong, morality and duty, and of the arts, reli- 
 gion, and pliilosophy. Only the first part has 
 been fully developed by the author, in his Science 
 of Logic, in two vols. 8vo. first printed in 1812 
 and 1816. But he has given us a general trea- 
 tise covering the whole ground in his, encyclo- 
 paedia of the philosophical Sciences, in one vol. 
 8vo, first published in 1817, and again in 1827 
 and 1830. Both these works are now before 
 me. 
 
 Hegel is the most unintelligible writer I ever 
 read. Even the most acute German philoso- 
 phers complain of his style, as being not onlj 
 very harsh and (\ry^ but so extremely obscure 
 that they cannot fully understand him. Al- 
 though abundantly warned on this point, 1 had 
 the temerity to take up his Encyclopaedia, and 
 read it attentively from beginning to end, and 
 gome parts of it a secoinl, a third, and even a 
 fourth time, comparing it ofi»m with his Logic, 
 vainly hoping to get some idea of thai logical 
 analysis which he tells us is the bnsis of all phi- 
 losophy. But, after a fortnight's hard study, I 
 was nearly as ignorant of the whole process^and 
 
PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 121 
 
 of every part of it, as wlien I first sat down to 
 examine it. The most 1 could learn, was, that 
 he commences with the idea of entity (das 
 Seyn) in the abstract. He then tells us, that his 
 second definition of entity, is, that it is nothing 
 (das Nichts) ; and that the union of entity and 
 nothing, or the transition of the one into the 
 Other, constitutes actual existence (das Daseyn); 
 which, he say>!, may be illustrated by the verb 
 to become (loerden), as whatever becomes any 
 thing, pasj^es over from not being ihai thing, to 
 heing th.it thing. It may also be illustrated by 
 the import of the noun beginning (An fang), as 
 beginning is a transition from non existence to 
 existence. After advancing thus far, I found 
 myself in the midst of water so deep and so tur- 
 bid, that I could neither reach nor see tiie bot- 
 tom. Still I sut^ered him to carry me forward. 
 When he had fully analyzed and explained, as 
 he averred, all that is material in the idea of 
 pure entity, he proceeded to analyze and explain 
 the idea of being (Wesen)y or thing, in the ab- 
 stract ; and then the \deiis o( phenomenon, and 
 actuality, and lastly of conception, and object, 
 and ideas. This closed the first part. Qn the 
 philosophy of nature and of mind, he was equal- 
 ly obscure and incompreliensible : I could un- 
 dej-stand only here Qnd there a detached thought. ^^^ 
 
If52 PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 As I am unable to comprehend liis works my- 
 self, I can (Jo nothing better than detail the opin- 
 ions of others. I will therefore translate from 
 Krug, (Eiicyclop. Philosoph. Lexicoti,) such 
 parts of his statements as seem most deserving 
 a place in these sketches. 
 
 In the body of his work, as printed in 1833, 
 KruiTihus writes: "Hegel was at first a true 
 follower of Schelling, wi:h whom he united in 
 publishing a critical Journal of Philosophy, 
 Tubiiijr. 1802—3. In this period of his philoso- 
 phizing also appeared his Tract on the differ- 
 ence between Fichte's system and that of Schel- 
 ling. But he gradually separated himself from 
 his master, and rejected in particular his doc- 
 trine of intellectual intuition, as being an unwar- 
 ranted assumption. Yet he retained Schelling's 
 fundamental idea, namely, the oneness of the 
 subjective or ideal and of the objective or real ; 
 and in the idea of this oneness he searches for 
 that absolute knowledge and absolute truth, to 
 which, according to the demands of this school 
 philosophizing must soar. Hetice also, he main- 
 tained that pure conception in itself, is entity ; and 
 that real entity is nothing but pure conception. 
 And this he does, without first demotistrating the 
 unity of entity and conception, or, as it should be 
 called, (since conception is only the product of the 
 
PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 123 
 
 thinkinor mind,) llie oneness ofentity and tMnlcing, 
 Equally arbitrary is his assertion, in a practical 
 view, lliat whatever is rational is actual, and 
 whatever is actual is also rational ; a position, 
 which may be considered as making moral pre- 
 cepts, viewed as demands of reason upon the 
 will, altogether nugatory and superfluous, since 
 the will can make nothing to be real, but what 
 will thereby become rational. But the weakest 
 part of Hegel's system is the aisiheiical or the 
 philosophy of art, and the theological or the phi- 
 losoj)l'y of religion. And here, one who was 
 formerly a \(iYy warm advocate of his system, 
 but who on a better acquaintance with it cooled 
 down considerably, (Wtisse, in his Syst. of 
 ^sthtnics,) says, that iEstlielics and Theology 
 begin, where Hegel leaves olF; for, ' what we 
 call ideas of the Beautifid and of God, Hegel 
 recognizes only as to their psychological and 
 historical apparition; that is, he con.-iders them 
 as ))henomena, and the science of them as a 
 part of the phenomenology of mind.' In short, 
 Hegel seems^ioito have fully perfected his sys- 
 tem. And as he was any thing rather than a 
 master in the art of composition, and as his writ- 
 ings suffer as much from their obscurity as from 
 a sort of dry harshness, it is scarcely possible to 
 form a satisfactory judgment of his philosophy. > 
 
124 PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Those who profess to comprehend it, discover in 
 it the consummated system of pure rational 
 science. ******* Moreover, it 
 is a strikinij fact, tliat among llie numerous fol- 
 lowers of Heijel, no one has hitherto heen able 
 to remove the obscurity, heaviness, and drynesa 
 of his mode of philosopliizintf, by a more clear, 
 agreeable, and lively exhibition. All use the 
 words, the phrases, and the turns of expression 
 of their master ; as if they were magic formu- 
 las, which would lose their power by the slight- 
 est change. Jurare in verba mogistri seems to 
 be no stranger in tins school. Yet this renown- 
 ed philosopher, who received special favor from 
 the great, and thereby gained the more adherents, 
 did not fail of opposers who assailed him with 
 more or less ardor." After recounting various 
 attacks upon Hegel's system, Krug proceeds : 
 "It may here be asked, whether this school will 
 be able to sustain itself long, against so many 
 and certainly not inconsiderable oj)posers. To 
 us it appears, this school no lonjjer has internal 
 union ; and therefore it is n()l lil^dy to escape 
 dissolution, whatever may be d(Uie from without 
 tobolst(Tit up, on the false supposition that it is' 
 better suited iban any other to sustain the exist- 
 ing order of thinjrs in church and slate. Even 
 the founder of it himself seems to iiave had some 
 
PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 125 
 
 presentiment of such a result. For, afjreeabJy to 
 a letter from Berlin, (inserted in a Periodical, 
 Dec. 17, 1831 J wiiicli in general speaks favora- 
 bly of HegeL he said a little before he died, that 
 he was anxious respecting ihe fate of his philos- 
 pliy after his decease, hecanse among all his dis- 
 ciples only one understood him, and that one 
 misunderstood him." 
 
 In his supplemental volume, printed in 1838, 
 Krug resumes his account of Hegel, thus; 
 " The three principal parts of his system, are ; 
 Logic^ as being the science of idea in itself (an 
 sich) ; Philosophy of Nature, as being the 
 science of idea in its secondary state (in ihrem 
 Andersein); and Philosophy of Mind, as being 
 the science of idea in its reversion from its sec- 
 ondary state into itself. Accordingly, there ap- 
 pears every where in this system a triplicity'of 
 subjects, together witli their reconciling unity, in 
 which they are all contained as momenta or ele- 
 ments. In this system th(; oneness of Entity 
 and Conception is vindicated, on tiie ground of 
 a supposed necessity inherent in Conception to 
 move (develop) itself; and this it docs, by a 
 progressive negation ; so that, e. g. Entity, by a 
 negation of itself, passes into Existence ; and 
 God, by a negation of himself, passes into a 
 World ; &c. For God is in self (an sich)^ and 
 
126 PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 must also be for self (fur sich) ; in order to 
 which, he must become his second self ( semem 
 Andern), and this is Nature, or the World. So 
 in Heorel's Lectures on tlie Piiilos. of Rehgion, 
 (published by Marheineke in 1832f this funda- 
 mental tlio\iglit is variously drawn out, that God 
 is the eternal, all-comprelieiiding: process of the 
 absolute idea, which returns from the form of its 
 secondary state (ilires Anderseins), its manifes- 
 tation in nature, into itself, and, by means of 
 human consciousness, attains to its individuality 
 (ihrem Fursichsein) as Spirit. That this doc- 
 trine comes near to Pantheism, is not to be denied; 
 notwithstanding Hegel and his school will not 
 admit it, and by the use of biblical and religious 
 phraseology — to which however they annex a 
 new and professedly deeper and more occult 
 meaning, they endeavor to give to their doctrine 
 a colormg of orthodoxy. And hence Eschen- 
 mayer (in his Tract entitled, Hegel's religious 
 philosophy compared with the principles of 
 Christianity, p. 100,) passes the following judg- 
 ment on this philosophy : ' It is nothing but a 
 Logic vaunting itself in Christian verities.' And 
 he goes on, perhaps with too much severity : 
 '* Hegel has a God without holiness, a Christ 
 without free love, a Holy Ghost without illumina- 
 tioD, a Gospel without faith, an Apostasy with- 
 
PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 127 
 
 out sin, Wickedness witliout conscious guilt, an 
 Atonement without remission of sin, a Death 
 without an oflerin<(, a religious Assembly with- 
 out divine worship, a Release without imputa- 
 tion, Justice without a judge, Grace without re- 
 demption, Dogmatic Theology without a revela- 
 tion, a this Side without a that side, an Immor- 
 tality witliout a personal existence, a Christian 
 Religion without Christianity, and in general, a 
 Religion without religion.' And in an Article 
 on Hegel's philosophy, (in the Allg. Kirchenzeit. 
 1836,) in which the religious and ecclesiastical 
 part of this philosophy is particularly reviewed, 
 the following severe judgment is pronounced : 
 'Hegel's philosophy is nothing in itself and bi/ 
 itself ^ nor was its author in himself hut beside 
 himself.^ Compare also the Words of a Lay- 
 man on the Hegelian-Straussian Christology. 
 Zurich 1836, 8vo. No less unsatisfactory have 
 the explorers of nature found Hegel's theory of 
 the philosophy of nature. Thus Link^ (in his 
 Propylaen &.c. vol. I. p. 46.) tells us, that HegePa 
 system, although framed with the greatest meta- 
 physical acuteness, * is of no value in the science 
 of nature ; indeed, it is painful to see what blun- 
 ders Hegel makes, when he speaks on subjects 
 of natural science, astronomy and mathematics. 
 He is also so dictatorial and so bitter, that one 
 
128 PANTHEISTIC PIIILOSOPHV. 
 
 would laugh over him, if it were a la«jghable 
 thing to see such a man so self-deceived.' " 
 
 After these ren)aiks, Krug fills nearly three 
 large 8vo paores with notices of the numerous 
 works for and against Hegel's philos(){)liy, which 
 issued from the German press durini; about 12 
 years ending in 1837. After Hegel's death in 
 1831, his devoted followers and admirers, (chief- 
 ly young men, in and around Berlin,) resolutely 
 met the asisailants of his system, and exerted 
 themselves strenuously to recommend it and give 
 it currency. For this end they collected and 
 published a voluminous edition of Hegel's 
 Works, including his private letters, and his 
 manuscripts and notes for Lectures, with elabo- 
 rate prefaces and introductions. On the other 
 hand, numerous adversaries, (and among them 
 were many of the older and graver philosophers,) 
 assailed the Hegelian phdosophy in an uncom- 
 promising manner. They analyzed it, they 
 confuted it, ihey ridiculed it, and held it up to 
 scorn and contempt. The issue of the conflict^ 
 I have not the means of knowing. 
 
CHAPTER Xn. 
 
 INSTINCTIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Instinctire Philosophy. JacohVs Philosophy of Faith or Instinct. His 
 followers : Koeppen, von fVeiller, Sulat. Ability and Honesty of 
 the German Philosophers. Schuhe, the only Skeptic among them. 
 
 We have now taken a brief view of most of 
 those systems of German [)hilosophy, which 
 profess to give us a true and scieniific knowledge 
 of supersensible thii)g.s; of whicli, Kant tells us^ 
 we can have no scientific knowledge. And we 
 find, that all these systems end, eitiier in absolute 
 Idealism, or in what may be called Pahtheism ; 
 that is, they either make all noumena and all 
 supersensible things, together with their phe- 
 nomena, to be nothing but conceptions and ideas 
 existing in our own mii)ds, and existing no where 
 else ; or they reduce all things to one primal 
 substance, the All-One, or God, which develop! 
 itself according to certain laws inherent in ite 
 very nature, and thereliy presents to us all the 
 variety, beauty, and harmony of this great uni- 
 verse. And the latest and most renowned of 
 these philosophers makes this primal All-One to 
 be himself nothing but an idea' or conception of 
 the human mind. 
 9 
 
130 INSTINCTIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 0|)posecl to all these scliools, and also to th« 
 Kanteari school, was the ceh^hraled Fred. Henrj 
 Jacobi, and a very resf)eclah!c number of piiiios- 
 ophers and divines who coincideii wiih liim in 
 his general views. Of this school we now pro- 
 ceed to givn some account. 
 
 Fred. Hrnry Jacobf, privy counselor to the 
 king of Bavaria, and prcfiident of the royal 
 academy of soierice at Muniih, was di^iinguisb- 
 cd as a fine writer, a poet, and a philosopher. 
 He died at Munich in 1819, iiiied 7G. Disgusted 
 with the speculations of the pliilosophers around 
 him, he assailed ihecn all in their turn, yet with 
 candor and disciimination. He was also more 
 intent on overthrowing false systems, than on 
 propanaiiiig a better one of his own devising. 
 To Kant he awarded jjreat merit, for successful- 
 ly prostrating the delusive speculations of the 
 former dogmatists, and for establishing on a firm 
 basis a pure system of moral or practical philos- 
 ophy. But he thought that Kant laid too much 
 stress on the necessity of demonstration in order 
 to true knowledge ; for, by this error, he subven- 
 ed all spocuiative knowledge of supersensible 
 things, and then was unable to derive aiiy satis- 
 factory knowledge of them from practical rea- 
 son. But the other schools, in his view, were 
 still more erroneous. Their entire schemes were 
 
INSTINCTIVE PHILOSOPHY. 131 
 
 fundamentally wrono:, anJ when carried out, 
 would necessarily lead lo fatalism and to pan- 
 theism. 
 
 He supposed that there is a source of true 
 rational knowledge, wiiicli tliese philosophers 
 overlook. They reject all speculative knowl- 
 edge, which can not be traced eiiher to immedi- 
 ate rational inluitiotis, or to logical deductions 
 from self-evident truths; thus making the intui- 
 tions of reason and the legitiuiate deductions 
 from such intiiitions the only sources of scientific 
 Of philoso[)hical knowledge. But Jacobi sup- 
 posed, thiJt we have true knowledge hy faith in 
 tlie operations of our own fiiculiies. 1'hisyaiM, 
 be considers, as a rational inslinct, a knowing 
 from immed\ale mental feeling, n rlirect percep' 
 Hon of the true and the supersensible, without 
 any intervejiingproof; and of courst,it is entire- 
 ly different from what is ordinarily called faith, 
 or a belief founded on tesdn'on". And the 
 knowledge based on this faith, is essentially 
 differentfromspeculiitive or scientific knowledge; 
 which is generally only second-hand knowledge, 
 or knowledge derived from intervening evi- 
 dence or proof. According to Jacobi, there are 
 two grand sources or itdets of knowledge to the 
 human mind : first, ci/erwa/ sense^ by which we 
 acquire a knowledge of the external world or of 
 
132 INSTINCTIVE PHIL080PBT. 
 
 material objects ; and secondly, an internal 
 sense^ the or<;an of truth, (or, as he afterwardf 
 named it, Reason^ the [)ovver of immediate 
 kno\vledge,) by wliieli we acquire a knowledge 
 of God, of what is foreseen, of free agency, of 
 immortality, of virtue, in a word of supersensible 
 things. By this twoluld revelation to him, (and 
 Jacobi believed in no oiher divine revelation,) 
 man is roused to self-consciousness, with a feel- 
 ing of his elevation above blind nature, or of hit 
 free agency. He recognizes God, and his own 
 free agency, immediately, by means of Reason, 
 Moral doctrines also are capable of confirma- 
 tion only by feeling. Reason^ as being ihe facul- 
 ty of ideaSj which reveal themselves in our in- 
 most feelings, iiives to philosophy its subject mat- 
 ter; and the Understandings as being the faculty 
 of conceptions^ gives to that subject matter its 
 form. At least, so Jacobi expresses himself in 
 his latest writings. Previoiisly he did not ex- 
 plain himself with sufficient clearness, respecting 
 iXvAi faith or internal revelation which he regard- 
 ed as the foundation of philosophy; but left the 
 point in considerable obscurity. And from tbit 
 source, and from his not making a clear distinc- 
 tion between Reason and Understanding, and 
 finally, from the fact that his theistic doctnne of 
 faith and internal feeling was developed in a 
 
INSTINCTIVE PHILOSOPHY. 133 
 
 loose and unsystematic} manner, chiefly in oppo- 
 sition to others, various misapprehensions and 
 objections originated. Still his merits, at least 
 indirectly, in rejrard to the progress of philoso- 
 phy among the Germans, are undeniable.— 
 (Tennem. Grundritz, p. 531 &c.) 
 
 Jacobi's doctrine was well received, especially 
 by those who place a higher value on faith and 
 feeling than on the other manifestations of the 
 mind. On the contrary, it was regarded as a 
 subordinate mode of philosophizing by those, 
 who give rational thiidiing a higher rank than 
 feeliiii!;. I5ut his want of clearness in discrimi- 
 nating bf'tween Reason and Understanding, 
 ieem.s to have led the cultivators of his philoso- 
 phy to separate into two parties. For, some 
 considered ideas as a divine revelation to the 
 mind, through the medium of Reason ; and they 
 Supposed the conceptions of the Understanding 
 lo have a negative relation to ideas, or that ideas 
 <jan never be reached by concejdions ; that ideoM 
 are incomprehensible and inexplicable, they 
 manifetit themselves in feeling; and, that /a i/ A 
 preceiles all scientific knowledge. But others 
 sjlowed a wider sphere for conceptions. Thej 
 considered philosophy as consisting in the union 
 of Reason and Understanding, deriving its sub- 
 stance (Wesseii) from the former, and its form 
 
134 INSTINCTITE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 from the latter: and to this opinion, Jacobi, in 
 his latter years, was nif)st inclined. In the first 
 party, Frederic Koeppen sUu)d3 cons-p'icmnis ; in 
 the latter, James Salut. (Tennem. p. 533 &/C.) 
 Frederic Rueppi;n, a friend and pupil of 
 Jacohi, was horn at Lnhec in 1775, was firsts 
 preacher at Bremen, and llien a professor of 
 philosophy at Landslmt, whence he retnoved io 
 Munich in 1826, and afterwards to Eriangen, 
 where he prohably still lives. Once cordially ab- 
 tached to his paternal friend and guide, he \\a§ 
 since hecome dissatisfied with Jacohi's j)hHoso- 
 phy, and now devotes himself to the study of 
 the ancients, especially Plato. As a follower of 
 Jacobi, he madeyV6fe agfncTf his starting point; 
 as Jacobi himself did. Free agency is a self-de- 
 termining, self-originating, and perfectly inde- 
 pendent activity. It is therefore an ariginal 
 cause^ the ground of all existence; it is Being 
 properly so called. But it is absolutely inconi* 
 prehensible ; even its possibility can not be clear- 
 ly perceived ; nor its actual existence be demon* 
 strated. Ic is an immediate matter of fact, in 
 our knowing and acting. Nccessiti/ is an order 
 of things establislied by free agency. The Di* 
 ▼ine aclivity is a perfect, absolute free agency. 
 But the essence of humanity is, a comhinalion 
 of the internal and the external man ; and of 
 
INSTINCTIVE PIIILOSOPIIT. 135 
 
 course, man's free airency is limited. And 
 hence philosophy is dualistic, reposing on both 
 sense hiuI reason. And from this dualism, arise 
 the insurmr)iintable contradictions of human 
 tcience. And, we may add, (^ays Ttimcmann^) 
 another {<j<riti mate consequence, namely, that OD 
 this grouid, philosophy itself is impos^ihli^; and 
 the proltleni, to establish it as a strict and proper 
 science, falls of itself. Stili, as Tenncmann 
 admits, ^he publi(.-ati(Mi of RorppjMi's views, as 
 well as of Jacobi's, had a salutary influence on 
 the philosophy if the day, in as mm h as they 
 opposed the philosophy and the blmd dooniaiism 
 of the vschoois, and exhibited in a lively manner 
 many thoughts, either appropriately their own, 
 or borr«»\ved I'rom Plato. 
 
 To this branch of Jacobi's school, behmged 
 Cajetan von Weiller, a learned clergyman of 
 the Romish church, secretary of the academy of 
 science at Munich, and a distinguished writer, 
 who died in 1828, ag^d 64. But he di<l not, like 
 Jacobi, make faith or Jeding the sole basis of 
 philosophy ; for belabored to discover for it some 
 other and moreintelligiblegrounds. He was like- 
 wise a believer in supernatural revelation ; which 
 Jacobi was not. To the same school bf-longs. 
 Christian Weiss^ born in 1774, first a professor 
 of philosophy at Leipsic, and since, a school and 
 
i36 IN8TINGTITE PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 government counselor at Merst^burg, a write? 
 of considerable eminence. (Krug^ and Ten* 
 nem.) 
 
 Ja. Salat, a liberal Roman Catholic priest- 
 born in 1760, professor at Munich, and after- 
 wards at Landsiajt, where he slill resides, a 
 vohiininons but inelegfint wriier, is a strenuous 
 opposer of Romish bijfotry, as well as of Schel- 
 ling^s anil HegeTs phdo.sophy. He tftkes a mid- 
 dle course between Kant and Jacubi, and found* 
 philosophy on a revelatiott through the medium 
 of Reason. That of'je.ct'we thing, which is to us 
 the ground of phdusophy, has two aspects; 
 first., as being the subject matter of phdosophy; 
 and secondly., as being the foundali«ui in us or 
 the innate faculty for philosophiziM<r. This na- 
 tive faculty, when suiial-ly brought into action^ 
 develops itself in an ainiduncctmiii u{ the Divine, 
 anterior to any sid)jective actiiui of the mind» 
 In consequence of this announcenieiil, the mind 
 recognizes the Divine, and eagerly seizes npoD 
 it. This annouucemeni is no Ijijical act of the 
 mind, but is a realization of the Divine in the 
 mind's deepest recesses ; whence it {)roceed» 
 forth from the will. If this aniu>uMcetiienl is ap- 
 prehended by the mind, it is next to be compre- 
 hended, to be nunJe mtellijrible, and t») become 
 iOoaelUing known i and this is what philosopher 
 
INSTINCTIVE PHILOSOPHY. 137 
 
 accomplishes hy the aid of Understanding. He 
 considers Metaphysics as tlie whdie of scientific 
 philosophy; and Lojfie, Anihropolojry, and the 
 Criticism of the iniellectufd powers, as only pre- 
 paratory studies. There are three branches of 
 phiU)sophy, corresponding with the threefold re- 
 lations of man ; viz. moral nhilo.-ophy, the phi- 
 losophy of rio:ht, and the phdosopliy of religion, 
 (Krug.aud 2e/m. p.536; 
 
 We have now completed oar survey of the 
 various meliiods devised hy Kanl's successors, 
 for passing that impracticnble gulf, wjjich, as 
 Kant supposed, must ever separate between nou- 
 mena and phenomena in the material world, and 
 between the ol-jective and the subjective in the 
 •piritual world. 
 
 Before we take our leave of these acute but 
 adventurous German philosopliers, it seems per- 
 tinent to remark, that in general they appear to 
 be, not only men of great learning and industry, 
 but, what is more important, sincere and honest 
 inquirers after truth, men who labor to discover 
 a true and useful philosophy, a philosophy that 
 will satisfy the wants of man as a rational and 
 immortal being. And hence, though whole 
 schools of them have landed in Idealism, and 
 Pantheism ; and though great numbers of them 
 were rationalists ortheistSjdisbelievinfj the divinti 
 
Ids INSTINCTIVE PIIILOSOPHir* 
 
 inspiration of the Bible ; yet not a single indi- 
 ▼idual, since the pubhcation of Kant's Criticism, 
 (so far as 1 know,) has professed either atlieism 
 or materiahsm, or advocated lax moral princi- 
 ples, or treated religion with levity or contempt, ox 
 denied a future state of rewards and punish- 
 ments, or, in a word, showed himself a disbelie- 
 ver in the great principles of natural religion. 
 And only a solitary individual among them has 
 professed to be a skeptic ; and his skepticism 
 was of a mild character, and was afterwards re- 
 tracted or greatly modified. With some account 
 of that individual, we shall close the present chap- 
 ter. 
 
 Gottlob Ernst Schulze^ (born in 1761, Dr. 
 and prof, of philos. at Gottingen, and honorary 
 member of the Philos. Acad, at Philadelphia in 
 our country, died at Gottingen in 1833 ;) pub- 
 lished in 1792 an anonymous work, in opposi- 
 tion to Reinhold's theory and to Rant's Critic, 
 entitled: iEnesidemus ; or, on the foundation of 
 prof. Reinln)ld's Elemental Philoso, hy ; togeth- 
 er with a Defence of Skepticism, in regard to the 
 pretensions of the Critic of Reason. This work 
 professed to annihilate the illusions of imagina- 
 ry knowledge, and to carry farther than Kant 
 had done, the self-knowledge of Reason, by de- 
 tecting the hereditary faults of all philosophy. 
 
INSTINCTiyiC PHILOSOPHY. 139 
 
 The result of the investigation was, that tlie origin 
 of human knowledge is unknowable ; and there- 
 fore, there can be no philosophy which shall ex- 
 plain it : that all that the schools tell us respect- 
 iHg the origin of knowledge, is mere play upon 
 words without meaning; an»i that our curiosity 
 should be limited to inquiries respecting tho 
 constiuent parts of knowledge, the diiferent kinds 
 of it, and the laws by which conviction accompa- 
 nies its several species. And this he called 
 Skepticism, and likewise Antidogmatism, found* 
 ed on the essential and necessary condition of 
 the mind of m;in. This skepticism moreover, 
 recognized the so called facts of consciousness; 
 ond it maintained, that the human mind, from 
 its very coiistitution, is obliged to recognize thesa 
 facts of consciousness as real, and to govern 
 itself by them in practice. After farther inquiry 
 Schulze narrowed down his skepticism still 
 more ; for, winle he still denied the possibility 
 of infallible criteria of truth, i. e. of the argree- 
 mentof our knowledge with the essential nature 
 of things, lie did not divest the mind of ability, 
 to discover how far our knowledge of particular 
 objects is in harmony with the original constitu- 
 tion of the human mind, and to discriminate be- 
 tween such knowledge, and that which originate! 
 ^om our peculiar temperament or character ai 
 
140 INSTINCTIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 individuals. At length, being fully convinced 
 of the untenableness of skepticism, he attempted 
 an investigation of the origin, the truth, the per- 
 fectibility, and the limits of human knowledge, 
 according to the approved laws of natural sci- 
 ence. His later views of philosophy approach 
 near to the doctrines of Jacobi. He agrees with 
 those who taking Plato for their pattern, regard 
 Reason (distinct from the comparing faculty, the 
 Understanding) as a source of knowledge of su- 
 persensible things, and who endeavor by means 
 of it to solve the proper problems of philosophy. 
 With his eye on those feelings, which distinguish 
 men fr/5m brutes, he divides philosophy into four 
 grand departments : viz. theoretical pliilosophy 
 or nletaphysics, explaining religious feeling; 
 practical philosophy, explaining moral feeling ; 
 logic in the sense of the ancients, explaining in- 
 tellectual feeling ; and aesthetics, explaining the 
 feeling of ihe beautiful. (Krug^ and Tennem,, 
 p. 637 &c.; 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 FRENCH PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The new school in France : its Origin, and Present State : its Adfo<- 
 cates : its Doctrines. 
 
 As a conclusion to these sketclies, we sliall no- 
 lice the part whicli France has taken iu the 
 modern developments of philosophy. 
 
 From near the limes of Mr. Locke till quitft 
 recently, empiricism, and that of the grossest 
 kind, has reigned undisturhed in France. About 
 the middle of the last century, the abbe Gondii* 
 lac expounded the philosophy of Locke, omit* 
 ting rejleciion as a distinct source of knowledge. 
 Reflection, he said, can add noihing to the matter 
 on which it reflects. Itcan only recognize, compare, 
 generalize, and give form to the ideas\vhichsensa» 
 tion presents. Of course, all our ideas in his 
 Yiew, are ideas of sensation, or in other words, are 
 sensations. This became the reigning doctrine 
 in France. The infidels, Voltaire, the encyclo- 
 paedists, &c. all embraced it ; and many of them 
 deduced from it the materiality of the soul, athe-- 
 ism, fatalism, and sensuality as man's chief 
 good. A few ecclesiastics and others feebly re* 
 
142 PRENCU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 listed ihe tendencies of this philosophy ; but 
 without exposing or clearly discerning the un- 
 sound basis on wliich it rests. During tlie first 
 years of the revolution, (1789—95,) all eyes 
 were directed to the portentous occurrences of 
 the day, and the only branch of philosophy much 
 regarded, was political philosophy ; and in that, 
 man was considered merely as a reasoning ani- 
 mal, whose interests are all confined to the pres- 
 ent life. Under the Directorial government, 
 (1795—99,) the Instiluie and the Normal 
 Schools called some attention to education, and 
 required the study of philosophy on the princi- 
 ples of Condillac and the materialists. Under 
 the Consular government, (1799 — 1804 J philos- 
 ophy was more zealously pursued, but on the 
 iame general principles. Cabanis and Destutt 
 de Tracy were the most distinguished writers on 
 philosophy. Under the Imperial government, 
 (1804 — 14,) a reformation m philosophy com- 
 menced, and it had made some progress before 
 the restoration of the Bourbons. From that 
 time onwards it has been steadily advancing, and 
 it now has the weight of talent and influence on 
 its side. The philosophers of the new school 
 assume the name of Eclectics; and the name 
 appears appropriate. We shall first notice the 
 principal persons concerned in this reformation 
 
PRENCH PHILOSOPHY. 143 
 
 of philosopljy, and then attempt some descrip- 
 tion of their principles. ^ 
 
 Peter Laromiguiere^ hnrn in 1757, first tauglit 
 at Toulouse, and afierwanls at Paris, where ha 
 was a member of the National Institute and a 
 distinguished writer, till his death in 1837. He 
 deviated considerahl}' fronj Candillac ; for h« 
 maintained that the soul is aciive^nuil not merelj 
 passive, in the acquisi'ion of knowltdge. Sen- 
 sation indeed furnishes the materials for all our 
 knowledge ; hut the mind gives form and shape 
 to those materials. The activity of the mind is 
 therefore a source of knowledge as well as sen- 
 sation. The two aro coordinate. Laromiguicre 
 being a charming writer and a man of great 
 acuteness, liis doctrines spread far and were not 
 without considerable influence. 
 
 Maine de Biran^ who died at Paris in 1824, 
 oged 58, obtained a prize from the Berlin Acad- 
 emy of Science in 1809, for the best essay on 
 this qiiestton ; Is there any inunedifite, internal 
 [intellectual] iniiiitini; and how does it differ 
 from sensible percaplianl Cousin considered his 
 works so valuable, that he undertook to edit them 
 himself so late as 1834. De Biran was so oppos- 
 ed to the doctrines of the materialists, that Iw 
 leaned towards universal idealism : whenca 
 Cousin compares hint with the German Ficlite. 
 
144 FRENCH PHILOSOPHY* 
 
 He is said to liave adopted Leibnitz's doctrine of 
 Monads, with aibme alterations. He believed 
 that all substances, or all real existences, are 
 active powers or forces of some sort ; ibat minds 
 or souls liave iiilelli<^ence, voliiion, ^c, \vliil« 
 material substances bave only motive force. He 
 theref(»re clearly distinguisbed tbe soul from tbe 
 body ; and in examining' tbe faculties and pow- 
 ers of tbe former, be commenced wiib conscious- 
 ness. 
 
 John Pefer Fred. AnciUon was born in 1766 
 at Berlin, wbere bis futber was minister of the 
 Fr. Prot. cburcb. He was bimself preacber to 
 the satne cbsircb, tlien professor of pbilosophj 
 in tlie military academy at Berlin, member of 
 the Acad, of Sciences, counselor of state for 
 foreign affairs, &c., and died in 1S37. Ancillon 
 wrote altogf'tiier in French ; and be published 
 various works on philosophical subjects, jiolitical, 
 moral, &c. ; in which he appeared pretty clear)/ 
 to belong to the school of Jacobi. His worki 
 were read in France. 
 
 Peter Paul Royer- C ollard ^ born in 1763, 
 was first an advocate in the parliament of Paris, 
 and then active but moderate in the revobition ; 
 afterwards, being made dean of the Faculty of 
 Letters in the Normal School at Paris, he lectur- 
 ed on philosophy with great applause, from 1811 
 
fRENCH PHILOSOPHY. 145 
 
 to 1814, when he returned to political life, and 
 became head of the party called Doctrinaires, 
 which took middle ground between the royalists 
 and ihe ultra-republicans. In his lectures he 
 brouo;ht forward Reid's doctrine of Common 
 Sense, as an independent source of true knowl*- 
 edge, and urged it strenuously and successfully 
 in opposition to the doctrine of Condillac.-^ 
 This source of the knowledge of noumena and 
 supersensible things, he called naturalinduction ; 
 and he described it as being a spontaneous and 
 necessary action of the mind. His eloquence 
 and his acute and powerful reasoning transfused 
 this doctrine into nearly all liia pupils ; and thus 
 laid the foundation for the new French school 
 in philosophy. Yet only one of hi^ lectures has 
 been published entire, although many extracts 
 from them have been given to the public, espe- 
 cially in JoufFroy's French edition of Reid's 
 works, Paris 1828. 
 
 Victor Cousin^ born in 1792, and educated 
 under Royer-Collard, succeeded him in the Nor- 
 mal School in 1815, and carried forward the re- 
 formation in philosophy begun by his predeces- 
 sor. In 1820 he was displaced, for his too libe- 
 ral political opinions, and retired to Germany; 
 but he returned in 1828, and resumed his lec- 
 tures. His lectures for that year contain an In 
 10 
 
146 FRENCH PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 troduction to the liistory of philosophy. These 
 have been elegantly translated by H. G. Linberg, 
 and were published at Boston in 1832. They 
 contain the best exposition I have seen of his 
 philosophical opinions. In 1829 he published a 
 course cfF lectures in two volumes, on the philos- 
 ophy of the 18ih century. The first volume 
 contains general views of philosophy and its 
 history. The second volume contains an elabo- 
 rate criticism on Mr. Locke's Essay, which has 
 been well translated by the Rev. C. S. Henry» 
 D. D. of New York. On the accession of Louis 
 Philippe in 1839, Cousin was admitted into the 
 French Academy; and the next year, he was 
 sent by the king to examine the literary institu- 
 tions of Germany, especially of Berlin, and 
 make report. On his return in 1832, he "was 
 made a peer of France; and in 1804, minister 
 of public instruction. He may be considered 
 the corypheus of the eclectic or new school phi- 
 losophers of France. But before we examine 
 his philosophical doctrines, we will notice some 
 others who have co-operated in the reformation 
 of French pliilosophy. 
 
 The baron de Massias^ for some time French 
 consul general at Dantzic, and then charge d'af- 
 fairs at Berlin, published various philosopliical 
 works, between 1821 aud 1835 ; in which, it is 
 
FRENCH PIIILOSOrufT^^^ 147 ^ 
 
 said, he seems to come near to Kantean principles ; 
 but lie professes to differ from Kant, as well as 
 from Royer-ColIarJ and Reid. Krug could not 
 exactly define his position ; but tells us, he was 
 ranked among the new eclectics of France. 
 
 The baron Degerando, born in 1772, and 
 made a peer of France in 1837, the author of 
 the Comparative Hist, of Philosophy, was a fol- 
 lower of Condiliac in 1802 ; but when he pub- 
 lished the 2d edit, of his history, in 1822—3, he 
 accorded with Royer-Collard and Cousin, or 
 was an eclectic. 
 
 Berard^ who died m 1828, at the age of 35, 
 published a work in 1823, in which he main- 
 tained the immateriality of the soul, and assailed 
 the doctrines of the materialists openly and vig- 
 orously. And in the same year, Virey publish- 
 ed a treatise on Vital Power, in which he takes 
 the same ground. 
 
 Theodore Joiiffroy^ born in 1793, and now 
 professor of philosophy in the Faculty of Litera- 
 ture at Paris, is an active member of the eclec- 
 tic school. In 1828, he published Reid's works 
 in French, with abstracts from Royer-Collard's 
 lectures ; and likewise Dug. Stewart's Outlines 
 of Moral Philosophy. Jouffroy devotes himself 
 especially to Moral Philosophy ; and he comes 
 frequently before the public, in works which ar« 
 
148 FRENCH PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 said to be creditable both to his head and his 
 heart. 
 
 Philip Damiron, educated under Cousin, and 
 HOW professor of phiIoso|)liy in the college of 
 Lonis le Grand at Paris, is liie author of a his- 
 tory of philosophy in France in the IQlh century, 
 2 vols., first publislied in 1828, and again in 
 
 1830. From this work, Krug and Dr. Henry 
 appear to have derived most of their information 
 respecting the recent history of French philoso- 
 phy ; and on them I am chiefly dependent. In 
 
 1831, Diuniron commenced publishing a Course 
 of Philosophy ; of which fourvolumes had appear- 
 ed inlS34,enibracing Psychology and Morals. In 
 his history, Damiron gives account of twenty- 
 seven French philosophers of the 19th century ; 
 whom he divides into three classes: viz. 
 
 '"^ I. Sensualists; e. g. Azias, Cabanis, Destutt 
 
 de Tracy, G^^ll, Laromiguiere, Volney, &-c. 
 !* II. Theulogists ; e. g. Vallanche, de Bonald, 
 
 de Maistre, de la Mennais, &.c. 
 ^ III. Eclectics; e. g. Ancillon, Berard, Bon- 
 
 P t^ Stettin, Cousin, Damiron, Degerando, Droz, 
 ^^ /^ Jouffroy, Kerelrny, Massias, Maine de Biran, 
 * ''^' Royer-Colliird, Vn-ey, &,c. 
 
 The French philosophers of the new school 
 appear to be ingenuous, liberal-minded, honest 
 men ; men who have no selfish or sinister views, 
 
FRENCH PHILOSOPHY. 149 
 
 no vain ambition of applause, no pride of learn- 
 ing, in short, no other aim than to discover and 
 to recommend the useful and the true, in a 
 branch of knowledge long degraded and abused 
 in their country by superficial and reckless men. 
 They are harmonious in their efforts to raise 
 ))hijosophy in France to the rank of an honora- 
 ble and useful scinnce, by the careful study of 
 foreign writers. Dititring among themselves on 
 various points, they are yet tolerant to each 
 other, and assume the common sense of Eclec- 
 tics. Indeed they appear not yet to have ma- 
 tured their thoughts. They all read the Scotch 
 philosophers, Reid and Stewart, and some of 
 them also Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Jacobi, &c. ; 
 and from all these, as w(!ll as from Plato, Aris- 
 totle, Des Cartes, Leil)nitz, &c. they take what 
 seems to them plausible, and too often, without 
 due regard to the congruity or incongruity of 
 that syncretism which they call eclecticism. At 
 least, this appears to me to be true of Cousin, the 
 present leader of the school. Dr. Henry has '^ 
 indeed exhibited a pretty coherent system, as 
 being held and taught by Cousin. But he does 
 not refer us to the works of the author for proofs ; 
 and as, with the three volumes of Cousin's lec- 
 tures before me, I can not verify all his state- 
 ments, and yet find in Cousin mvnQ dogmas and 
 
150 FRENCH PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 positions which are not distinctly mentioned hj 
 Dr. Henry, instead of abridging the professor's 
 statement, I will subjoin what I have been able 
 to glean directly from Cousin. It should be 
 recollected, that the works I consult are not pre- 
 cise and logical disquisitions, but loose popular 
 lectures, and addressed also to a French audi- 
 ence, whose fancy must be pleased to secure 
 their attention. Hence, not only is the language 
 often popular rather than scientific, but in too 
 many instances the reasoning also. Most of my 
 references are to the Introduction to a Hist, of 
 Philos. &c., translated by Linberg, Boston, 1833. 
 According to Cousin, philosophy is the science 
 which strives to comprehend things, and to ac- 
 count for what takes place. It is the result of 
 reflection, of the study of ideas and of thought ; 
 and its aim is, to advance all the great interests 
 of man. It is one of man's most real wants, 
 (p. 19—25, 51, 52, 367 &c.) Philosophy com- 
 mences with reflection, with a critical examina- 
 tion of the human mind, or with what is called 
 psychology, (p. 368 «fec. 380, 390 &c.) From 
 psychology it proceeds to logic, metaphysics, 
 ontology, natural theology, cosmology, morality, 
 A-c. And its method or mode of proceeding is, 
 to begin with observation and induction, or careful 
 researches a posteriori ; and then to introduce 
 
FRENCH PHILOSOPHY. 151 
 
 analysis and deduction, or reasoning a ^nort. 
 (p,416&c. 95—103.) 
 
 All the facts of psycholog^y are found on the 
 records of consciousness ; and to these records 
 we must go for a knowledore of tliem. It is by 
 reflection^ «hat we inspect that record, and learn 
 those facts, (p. 147 &c. 152, 159, 1(31 &,c. 193.) 
 Cousin recognizes three faculties of the mind; 
 viz. sensibility^ or susceptibility of impressions 
 from objects without ; volition or the will, the 
 source of voluntary action ; and reason or intel- 
 lect, the knowing, judging, reasoning faculty. 
 On the fii-t, (sensibility,) he says hut little in this 
 volume, and he seems to hold the common views 
 of pln]i»sopiiers. RespFcting the will or volun- 
 tary power, he is singular in maintaining that 
 this faculty is the sole foundation of i)ersonality. 
 The other faculties are not of a personal nature ; 
 they are common properties of our race ; and 
 they would operate in the same manner and 
 with the same results, in all men, if they were 
 not influenced in individiuds, by the persoiial fac- 
 ulty or the will. (p. 125 &-c. 128, 169, 175 &c.) 
 
 Reason^ or intelligence, is nothing personal to 
 us as individuals. There are not as many rea" 
 sons^ as there are reasoning beings ; but there is 
 one eternal reason, which is a sort of common 
 property of all intelligent beings, and which 
 
152 FRENCH PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 they all use at pleasure, according to their ahil- 
 ity. The infinite God, who is intelligence itself, 
 enjoys and uses it without any lin»itation ; but 
 finite beings can make only a limited use of it. 
 (p. 125-129, 167, 171.) 
 
 Reason as a faculty of the human mind, ope- 
 rates in two ways ; viz. spontancousli/, or with- 
 out the co-operation of the will ; and voluntari- 
 ly^ or under the guidance of the will, as when 
 we intentionally reflect, think, judge, A^c. From 
 its first mode of operation we derive all our pri- 
 mary knowledge, and all those general truths 
 which seem to he innate or connate. This ope- 
 ration of reason is the Common Sense of Dr. 
 Reid ; and by Cousin it is denominated the in- 
 stinctive perception of truth, the instinct of rea- 
 son, original perception^ and also faith^ and 
 inspiration, (p. 1G2 — 175, 193, 417; comp. his 
 Hist, of Philos. II. 38S— 392.) 
 
 Reason, in both her modes of operation, is 
 governed by three fundamental latvs or first prin- 
 ciples; which he calls the elements of reason 
 and which occupy the same place in his system 
 with the categories in the Rantean system : they 
 give form, consistency and unity to all our 
 knowledge. Moreover, as reason is not subjec- 
 tive or personal to us, but is universal, or the 
 common property of all intelligent beings, and 
 
FRENCH PHILOSOPHY. 153 
 
 is the same in man as in God ; hence these laws 
 or elements of reason are not merely the laws 
 of our mode of thinking (as Kant erroneously 
 maintained,) but they are the laws of all rational 
 thinking, and the mode of God's viewing things ; 
 and of course they accord with the divine consti- 
 tution of the universe, or with the real nature of 
 things ; that is, they have objective validity. 
 They are the basis, not only of human logic, 
 but of true metaphysics, and of a solid system 
 of ontology. According to these fundamental 
 laws of reason, whatever exists above us, around 
 us, or within us, falls under one or the other of 
 these two categories ; viz. (1) the finite, the mul' 
 tiple, the particular, the limited, the dependent, 
 the phenomenal, &.t;. or (2) the infinite, the one, 
 the universal, the unlimited, the absolute, the 
 substance &c. These are the two first catego- 
 ries or fundamental laws of reason. The third 
 is the result of an analysis of the two preceed- 
 log. It is, that whatever exists under either of 
 these categories, stands in inunediate relation 
 with its corresponding thing in the other catego- 
 ry ; so that neither can be conceived as existing, 
 or as being possible, without the other. Moreo- 
 ver, all the things existing under the first 
 category, (the finite, the mu!ti|)le &-c.) stand 
 related to the corresponding things under the 
 
154 FRENCH PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 second category as effects stand related to 
 their causes ; that is, the infinite is the cause of 
 the finite, tlie one of tiie rnuhiple, tlie universal 
 of the particular, the unlimited ot the limited, 
 the absolute of the dependent, the substantial ol 
 the phenomenal, &c. And finally, by summing 
 up separately all that exists under each of the 
 two first categories, we have, as the sum total of 
 the first, the world or nature ; and as the sura 
 total of the second, God the author of nature ; 
 and then this third category unites the two sums 
 in a harmonious whole, which isihe universe, (p. 
 108—131, 158 — 160, 418.; Cousin seems 
 aware, that these views approximate so near to 
 those of Schelling, that they may expose him to 
 the ch.irgK of pantheism ; a charge which he did 
 not well know liow to answer, (p. 132, 141 — 
 143, 147, 158, 233, 420.) Yet he did not intend 
 to identify God with nature, or to teach tii;U there 
 is no God distinct from the world, (p. 16, 132, 
 143.) Creation he held to be a development of 
 (jod's power, an act of l)is will ; and in some 
 sense a m» c >s«ary act. (p. 133 iVc. 142, 153.) It 
 will also follow from these laws of reason, that 
 God is as comprehensible by us, as any other 
 object : and Cousin admits the inference, (p. 
 132, 133) Indeed he is so far a Hegelian, as to 
 believe that idf . ....»' '''^^nces, and not the 
 
FRENCH PHILOSOPHY. 1 55 
 
 mere imas^es or representatives of something 
 else. (p. 21 &c. 123—125, 127, 129,) And he 
 even tells us, that ideas constitute the nature of 
 God. (p. 133, 134, 15S, 165, 166 ) Cousin 
 liolds firmly to the providence and moral govern- 
 ment of God. He says : " God's perpetual 
 agency, in respect to the world and to humanity, 
 is providence.'* '* The great deeds recorded in 
 history, are the decrees of God's moral govern- 
 ment of the world." (p. 224, 225.) And he dis- 
 tinctly avows himself to be a Christian j)hil6so- 
 pher. (p. 49, 57, 338, 339.) He says : " I be- 
 lieve that in Christianity all truths are contained ; 
 but these eternal truths may and ought to be ap- 
 proached, disengaged, and illustrated by philos- 
 ophy. Truth has but one foundation ; but 
 truth assumes two forms, nainely, mysteiy" [tlu; 
 form in which religion is presented to the mind 
 in ordinances of worship, and in representations 
 intended to excite devotion]" and scientific expo- 
 sition : I revere the one, I am the organ and in- 
 terpreter of the other," 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA. 
 
 Its Introduction. Coleridgeism. 
 
 The original design of these sketches, was, 
 merely to give a general idea of the principal 
 systems of German philosophy. This object 
 was pursued through the twelve first Chapters. 
 Another Chapter was added, on the new ec- 
 lectic pliilosophy in France. And now, it is 
 deemed expedient to annex some account of 
 those schemes of modified German philosophy 
 which have excited most attention in our own 
 CDuntry ; namely, the philosophy of Coleridge^ 
 as contained in liis Aids to Reflection ; the so 
 called Transcendental Philosophy^ contained in 
 the Dial and other recent works published in 
 Massachusetts; and tlie philosophic system of 
 Dr. Fred. A. Rauch^ contained in his Psy- 
 cliology. 
 ^ Until within about twenty years, the empirical 
 philosophy as tauglit by Locke and the Scotch 
 writers, and which was described in the first 
 Chapter of these sketches, had dominion in all 
 our colleges and schools, and was regarded every 
 where as the only true philosophy. Berkeley's 
 
GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA. IS? 
 
 idealism was indeed received by a few ; and, if it 
 did not originate, it doubtless helped to give cur- 
 rency to, that species of pantheism which is fun- 
 damental in the theology of the Emmons school. 
 Berkeley made immediate divine agency the sole 
 cause of all the phenomena of the material 
 world; and Emmons extended the same im- 
 mediate agency throughout the intellectual 
 world. But neither of these very acute reason- 
 ers aimed to overthrow the empirical mode of 
 philosopliizing. The first only wished to 
 strengthen the argument from experience for 
 the being of a God, and the second to reconcile 
 the doctrines of Calvinism with a sound phi- 
 losophy. 
 
 A little more than twenty years ago the Ger- 
 man language, and with it, German literature 
 and science began to be studied in this country ; 
 and soon, here and there an individual was in- 
 duced to look with some fovor on German phi- 
 losophy. But the perfect novelty of its princi- 
 ples, and its strange terminology, rendered it al- 
 most unintelligible. Under these circumstances 
 the writings of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who 
 had mastered and adopted some of the funda- 
 mental principles of Kant, found their way into 
 the country and were eagerly caught at and read 
 by several of our younger theologians. His 
 
158 GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA. 
 
 / 
 
 Bios^rapliia Literaria, liis work entitled The 
 Friend, and his Aids to Reflection, found as 
 warm admirers in this country as in England. 
 In 1829, Pres. James Marsh, D.D. now a Pro- 
 fessor in Burlington, Vt., published an American 
 edition of the Aids to Reflection, with an elabo- 
 rate Preliminary Essay vindicating and recom- 
 mending the principles of the book. From that 
 period Coleridgeism has spread very considera- 
 bly in A^ew England. The Biographia Litera- 
 ria of Coleridge, and his Friend, which I read 
 hastily soon after their publication, are not now 
 at hand, and I shall therefore confine my re- 
 marks to his Aids to Reflection. 
 
 This work is not so much a treatise on phi- 
 losophy, as a treatise on practical or experimen- 
 tal religion, and was intended especially for the 
 use of young men who are studying for the min- 
 istry. Dr. Marsh well says : "It might rather be 
 denominated a philosophical statement and vin- 
 dication of the distinctively spiritual and peculiar 
 doctrines of the Christian system.'''' Coleridge 
 was one of the most evangelical men of his 
 times in the English Episcopal church : and he 
 supposed he could explain and establish in the 
 most satisfactory manner the religious doctrines 
 which he held in common with Abp. Leighton 
 and other early Puritans, by means of those 
 
GERMAN PIirLOSOPHY IN AMERICA. 159 
 
 principles of the Kantean philosophy mIucIi he 
 had imbibed, and especially by means of what 
 he calls the inomentous distinction hetiveen Rea- 
 son and Understanding. By means of this dis- 
 tinction, he thought he could establish more 
 clearly and precis^ely the import of certain scrip- 
 tural terms, such as carnal, fleshly, spiritual, the 
 flesh, the spirit, &c. ; and likewise "establish the 
 distinct characters of Prudence, Morality, and 
 Religion ;" and finally, could shew the perfect 
 harmony of "all the peculiar doctrines of the 
 Christian faith" wilh reason or sound philoso- 
 phy. (Aids &c., p. 62-64, ed. New York, 
 1840.) 
 
 But Coleridge was a poet: and poets seldom 
 write well on metaphysical subjects. Besides, 
 he has justly been pronounced a turgid and ob- 
 scure writer : and although in his Aids to Re- 
 flection he aims at a more chastened and simple 
 style than in his other prose writings, yet he has 
 preposterously employed, in this purely didactic 
 work. Aphorisms instead of logical definitions 
 and fully developed arguments. He assumes 
 that his readers know too much, or that they can 
 understand him from a mere hint, a passing re- 
 mark, a brilliant fragment of thought, without 
 any full and clear delineation of his new theo- 
 ogical views ; and, like a genuine poet, he leaps 
 
160 GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA. 
 
 in medias res, and throws out his new and 
 gtrange ideas, without pivparing our minds to 
 receive them, or even to understand them. Thus 
 the all-important distinction between Reason 
 and Understanding, which is the basis of his 
 whole system, but of which nine tenths of the 
 reading public have no clear idea, is every where 
 held up to view as fundamental, and yet is no 
 where described or defined. And his learned 
 editor, catcliing too much of his spirit, says ex- 
 plicitly, (p. 48,) : "What is the precise nature of 
 the distinction between the understanding and 
 reason, it is not my province, nor have I under- 
 taken, to shew. My object is merely to illus- 
 trate its necessity." The consequeLice is, most 
 readers of the book are utterly unable to com- 
 prehend it ; and therefore, they strongly suspect 
 the author was groping in darkness, or that he 
 did not see clearly those shadowy objects which 
 he would not venture to describe. 
 
 From the language and reasonings of Cole- 
 ridge, as well as from his known partiality for 
 German philosophy, it is presumable that he 
 adopted substantially that distinction between 
 reason and understanding which was described 
 in the sixth Number of these sketches. There, 
 however, we had especially in view the distinc- 
 tion between what is called theoretical or specU' 
 
GET?MAN PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA 161 
 
 lat'ivc Reason, and the Understanding considered 
 as an intellectual focully : but Coleridge is prin- 
 cipally concerned with j^r^^t^ica/ Reason, or Rea- 
 son in its relation to the Will and to the moral 
 actions of man ; in which relation, Coleridge 
 says, it is " tiie determinant of ultimate ends," 
 that is, it is the source of those pure ideas of 
 right, of duty, of moral obligation, which should 
 be the supreme law of action to a rational being. 
 To distinction from this faculty, the Understand- 
 in<jf considered as a principle of action, bears a 
 striking resemblance to the Instinct of the more 
 inteliiirent animals, tlie ant, the bee, the beaver, 
 &c. It is the ability to select and apply fit means 
 to proximate ends. Its views are limited to the 
 object in immediate contemplation ; and it is 
 but another name for ingenuity, sagacity, prac- 
 tical judgment in affairs, or the power of jud'y- 
 ing according to the maxims of experience. 
 (See Aids, &c., page 241, note ; and page 353.) 
 Coleridge often calls it " the faculty of judging 
 according to sense ;" ihat is according to empi- 
 rical wisdom. 
 
 Now man, according to Coleridge, was en- 
 dowed by his Creator with tlie faculties of Un- 
 derstanding and Reason, which he was to devel- 
 ope and employ in the fulfillment of his duties 
 as a creature of God. His Understanding was 
 
162 GERxMAN PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA. 
 
 to supply in liim the place of Instinct in the 
 brutes ; speculative Reason was to enable him to 
 cultivate scientific knowledge ; and practical 
 Reason was to regulate and govern his moral 
 conduct, or to enable him to yield rational obe- 
 dience to the laws of his Creator. But by the 
 apostacy, in which all participate as soon as they 
 become capable of moral action, the Will of man 
 divorces itself from practical Reason, and sub- 
 mits to the control of the Understanding and the 
 natural propensities. By so doing, fallen man 
 turns away from those high and^ure principles 
 of right, of duty, of moral obligation, which 
 should be his ultimate aims, and fixes his regai'ds 
 on proximate ends, or in the language of an 
 apostle, on " the lust of the flesh, the lust of the 
 eyes, and the pride of life." He practically, if 
 not also theoretically, discards the idea of there 
 being any thing higher or more excellent than 
 personal enjoyment or individual happiness : 
 and in determining what will make him happy, 
 or what is his supreme good, he recurs to expe- 
 rience as the best and the proper criterion. 
 Thus, by following his Understanding as his 
 only guide, fallen man is selfish and earthly- 
 minded, until, by the new birth, practical Reason 
 is restored to her throne in the soul. 
 
 But for the full understanding of this subject, 
 
GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA. 
 
 163 
 
 tlie wide difference between nature and/ree Will 
 must not be overlooked : for, as Dr. Marsh says : 
 **The key to his system will be found in the dis- 
 tinctions which he makes and illustrates between 
 nature and free Will, and between the Under- 
 standing and Reason." (See Aids, &c., p. 17.) 
 Throughout the kingdom o? nature accord- 
 ing to Coleridge, one universal law prevails, and 
 has absolute control. It is, that of the necessary 
 dependence of one thing on another, or the law 
 of cause and effect. To this law not only all 
 material bodies, but all vegetable and animal life, 
 and all the sensitive and elective faculties both of 
 brutes and of man's animal nature, are entirely 
 subject. But \hefree Will of a rational being, in 
 his opinion, is not subject to this law. It acts 
 spontaneously, and independently of any causa- 
 tion from without. It is not controlled by mo- 
 tives as the proper causes of its elections : "The 
 man makes the motive, and not the motive the 
 man." - (p. 106.) Now when the Will renoun- 
 ces its allegiance to practical Reason and sub- 
 jects itself to the guidance of the Understanding 
 and the natural propensities, it renounces its high 
 and spiritual character, and consents to become 
 as it were a part of nature ; and thus the whole 
 man becomes carnal, earthly, selfish, and scarce- 
 ly superior to the brutes, so far as the discharge 
 
164 GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN AMEHICA. 
 
 of his duties and obligations as a creature of God 
 is concerned. And this is the radical principle 
 of sin or depravity in fallen man, or what the 
 scriptures denominate the iiesh,the carnal mind, 
 and the mindin<? the thin^rs of the flesh. And 
 consequently, the recovery of man from this sin- 
 ful state, is, making him spiritual or spiritually 
 minded ; it is excitmg- his debased and degraded 
 Will to renounce its subjection to sense and to 
 the Understanding, and be obedient to the com- 
 mands of practical Reason, or to the law of right, 
 of duty, of moral obligation. Now both scrip- 
 ture and experience show, that when the Will 
 has been long enslaved to sense, its energies are 
 paralyzed, and divine aid or supernatural grace 
 is necessary to restore it to sound and l^ealthy 
 action. Besides, the guilt incurred by a course 
 of criminal disobedience to the law of God, pre- 
 sents an additional obstacle to the restoration of 
 the sinner to the favorable regards of his Creator. 
 And hence the necessity of a divine Redeemer 
 for fallen man, a Redeemer who can act both on 
 and in the V/ill, and can stand up as a Mediator 
 between God and sinful man. (See Aids, &.C., 
 p. 297, iS^c.) 
 
 Coleridge has moreover taken much paii>s to 
 ascertain the precise import of the terms pru- 
 dence, morality, and spiritual religion. Prudence^ 
 
GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA. 165 
 
 he says, has for its chief organs the senses and 
 the understanding. Its sole aim is the advance- 
 ment of our personal interest or happiness ; and 
 it is especially careful to guard against every 
 thing that may do us harm, frustrate our plans, 
 or mar our happiness. 3Iorality has for its 
 chief organ the heart, or the natural affections 
 and sympathies of our nature ; and it seeks the 
 happiness of others, hecause we find pleasure iu 
 doing so. Spiritual religion has for its organs 
 free Will and practical Reason ; and its sole 
 aim is to make the whole conduct of the man to 
 harmonize with the divine law. From these 
 definitions, it is manifest that a man may have 
 and may exhibit much prudence and much 
 morality, and yet be entirely destitute of spir- 
 itual religion. 
 
 Such, according to Coleridii^e, are some of the 
 radical principles of mental philosophy ; and 
 they are of very high importance to the right 
 understanding and the vindication of the pecul- 
 iar doctrines and precepts of Christianity. They 
 give us clear and just conceptions of the apostacy 
 of man, of both original and actual sin, of that 
 carnal mind whicli is enmity against God, be- 
 cause it is not subject to the law of God, neither 
 indeed can be ; and hence also, of that redemp- 
 tion which is bv Jesus Clirist, of regeneration by 
 ' II* 
 
166 GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA* 
 
 divine grace, and of that holiness williout which 
 no man shall see the Lord. Not that this philo- 
 sophy, or any other, is competent to teach us 
 originally all the peculiar doctrines of Christian- 
 ity, or to demonstrate their truth, without the 
 aid of revelation. But when these momentous 
 truths are revealed to us, this philosophy enables 
 us to comprehend them, and to see that they are 
 reasonable, and are worthy of all acceptation as 
 comina: from God. 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 
 AMERICAN TRANSCEXDEXTALISM. 
 
 Propriety of the Name. Its Origin. Its Radical Principles. 
 
 That species of German Philosophy which 
 has sprung up among the Unitarian Clergy of 
 Massachusetts, and which is advocated especial- 
 ly in a recent periodical called the Dial, is known 
 by the appellation Tkanscendentalism. The 
 propriety however of the appellation, may be 
 questioned. Kant, who, so far as I know, first 
 brought the term Transcendental into philosophy, 
 would certainly not apply it to this or to any 
 similar system. He would denominate it Trans- . 
 CENDENT, not Transcendental. The difference, 
 according to his views, is immense. Both terms 
 indeed denote the surpassing or transcending of 
 certain limits ; but the limits surpassed are en- 
 tirely different. That is called Transcendental, 
 which surpasses the hmits of sensible or empi- 
 rical knowledge and expatiates in the region of 
 pure thought or absolute science. It is therefore 
 truly scientific ; and it serves to explain empiri- 
 cal truths, so far as they are explicable. On the 
 other hand, that is called Transcendent, which 
 
168 AMERICAN TRANSCKNDENTALISM. 
 
 not only f^oes beyond empiricism, but surpasses 
 the boundaries of human knowledge. It expa- 
 tiates in the shadowy region of imaginary truth. 
 It is, therefore, falsely called science : it is the 
 opposite of true philosophy. A balloon sent up 
 by a besieging array to overlook the ramparts of 
 a fortification, if moored by cables, whereby its 
 elevation, its movements, and its safe return into 
 camp are secured, is a transcendental thing ; but 
 if cut loose from its moorings and left to the 
 meicy of the winds, it is transcendent ; it has no 
 connection with any thing stable, no regulator ; 
 it rises or descends, moves this way or that way, 
 at hap-hazard, and it will land, no one knows 
 where or when. Now, according to the Critical 
 Philosophy, all speculations in physical science 
 that attempt to go beyond phenomena, and all 
 speculations on supersensible things which at- 
 tempt to explain their essential nature, are trans- 
 cendent ; that is, they overleap the boundaries of 
 human knowledge. In violation of these can- 
 ons, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel plunged head- 
 long into such speculations, and yet called them 
 Transcendental ; and the new German Philoso- 
 phers of Massachusetts follow their example. 
 
 Waiving however this misnomer, — as every 
 real Kantian must regard it, we will call this 
 philosophy Transcendental; since its advocates 
 
AMERICAN TRANSCENDEJhTALISM. 169 
 
 choose to call it so, and seeing the name has 
 hecome current in our country. And we will 
 first inquire into its ori;L;in among- us, and then 
 proceed to notice its prominent characteristics. 
 
 Origin of Transcendentalism among us. 
 
 Accordinn; to tlieir own representations, the 
 believers in this philosophy are Unitarian clergy- 
 men, who had for some time been dissatisfied 
 with the Unitarian system of theology. They 
 tell us, they found it to be a meagre, uninterest- 
 ing system, which did not meet the religious 
 wants of the community. While laboring to 
 improve their system of theology, or to find a 
 better, they cast their eyes on foreign countries. 
 There they discovered a different philosophy 
 prevailing ; a philosophy which gives an entirely 
 new version to Christianity, invests it with a more 
 spiritual character, with more power to move the 
 soul, to call forth warm emotions, and to produce 
 communion with God. This phdosophy they 
 have now embraced. Such, they inform us, was 
 the oriirin of Transcendentalism amonij them. — 
 But it may be more satisfiictory to give their own 
 statements on this head. 
 
 The Rev. G. Ripley, or whoever Composed 
 the long anonymous letter to Prof. Norton, on 
 his Discourse before the Alumni of the Cam- 
 
170 AMERICAN TRANSCEXDEXTALISM. 
 
 bridge Theological School, in 1830, says (pages 
 11, 12) : '-' In our happy state of society, as there 
 is no broad line of distinction between the clergy 
 and the rest of the community, they [the Alumni] 
 iiad shared in the influences, which, within the 
 last few years, have acted so strongly on the 
 public mind : with intelligent and reflecting men 
 of every pursuit and persuasion, many of them 
 had been led to feel the necessity of a more 
 thorough reform in iheology : they were not 
 satisfied that the denial of the Trinity and its 
 kindred doctrines gave them possession of all 
 spiritual truth : they wished to press forward in 
 the course which they had begun, to ascend to 
 higher views, to gain a deeper insight into Chris- 
 tianity, to imbibe more fully its divine spirit, and 
 to apply the truths of revelation to the wants of 
 society and the progress of man. Their experi- 
 ence as pastors had brought them into contact 
 with a great variety of minds ; some of which 
 were dissatisfied with the traditions they had 
 been taught ; the religion of the day seemed 
 too cold, too lifeless, too mechanical for many of 
 their flock ; they were called to settle difficul- 
 ties in theology of which they had not been 
 advised in the school ; objections were presented 
 by men of discernment and acuteness, which 
 could not be set aside by the learning of books ; 
 
AMERICAN TRANSCENDENTALISM. 171 
 
 it was discovered that many had become unable 
 to rest their religious faith on the fou||dation of a 
 material philosophy, [viz. the empirical philoso- 
 phy of Locke ;] and that a new direction must 
 be given to their ideas, or they would be lost to 
 Christianity, and possibly to virtue. The wants 
 of such minds could not be concealed," &-c. . . 
 . ..." In the course of the inquiries which 
 they had entered into, for their own satisfaction 
 and the good of their people, they had become 
 convinced of the superiority of the testimony of 
 X\iQ soul to the evidence of the ex^eniflZ senses; 
 the essential character of Christianity, as a prin- 
 ciple o^ spiritual faith, of reliance on the Uni- 
 versal Father," &-c. 
 
 The Rev. O. A. Brownsox, in his Charles 
 Elwood, (Boston, 1840, p. 261,) says: "It can 
 not have escaped general observation, that reli- 
 gion, for some time, has failed to exert that in- 
 fluence over the mind and the heart that it should. 
 There is not much open skepticism, not much 
 avowed infidelity, but there is a vast amount of 
 concealed doubt, and untold difficulty. Few, very 
 iQW among us but ask for more certain evidence 
 of the Christian faith than they possess. Many, 
 many are the confessions to this effect, which I 
 have received from men and women whose reli- 
 gious character stands fair in the eyes of the 
 
172 AMKKICAX TIIANSCEXDEXTALISIM. 
 
 church. I Jmve been tol.l by men of unquestion- 
 able piety,' 'that the oniy means they have to 
 maintain their behef even in God, is never to 
 suffer themselves to inquire into the grounds of 
 that belief. The moment they ask for proofs, 
 they sa}^ they begin to doubt. Our churches are 
 but partially Med, and the majority of those who 
 attend them complain that they are not fed." — 
 — "Surely, tiien, it is time to turn Christianity 
 over and see if it have not a side which we have 
 not hitherto observed. Perhaps when we come 
 to see it on another side, in a new light it Vt ill 
 appear unto us more beautiful and have greater 
 power to attract our love and reverence." 
 
 The Rev. R. W. Emehsox, in his Address to 
 the Senior Theological Class, at Cambridge, in 
 183S, says, (page 17,) " It is my duty to say to 
 you, that the Jieed luus never greater of a new 
 rcuelatlon than now. From the views I have 
 already expressed, you will infer the sad convic- 
 tion, which I have, I believe, with numbers, of 
 the universal decay and now almost death of 
 faith in society. The soul is not preached. The 
 church seems to ^o^^cr ^0 ?7s/<7//, almost all life 
 extinct." Again, (page 24,) he says : " I think 
 no man can go with his thoughts about him, into 
 one of our churches, without feeling that what 
 hold the public worship once had on men, is gone 
 
AMERICAN TRANSCENDENTALISM. 173 
 
 or going. It has lost its gra&p on the affection 
 of the good, and the fear of the bad. In the 
 country neighborhood?, half parishes are signing 
 off, — to use the local term." .... And (on 
 })age 21.) he says : " The prayers and even the 
 dogmas of our church, are like the zodiac of 
 Denderah, and the astronomical instruments of 
 the Hindoos, wholly insulated from anything now 
 extant in the life and business of the people. 
 They mark the height to which the waters once 
 rose." 
 
 For the perfect accuracy of these statements, 
 I cannot vouch from my own personal knowl- 
 edge. Nor are they here adduced to prove the 
 actual state of the Unitarian congregations, but 
 simply to show how defective the Transcenden- 
 talists consider the Unitarian theology, and of 
 course, the grounds of ^//eir dissatisfaction with 
 it. 
 
 The author of an elaborate and highly inter- 
 esting article in the Dial for April 1841, entitled 
 the Unitarian Movement in ISqw England, has 
 given a very philosophical account of the origin 
 of the Unitarian community in this country, as 
 well as of the recent rise of the sect of Trans- 
 cendentahsts in that community. According to 
 this able writer, the doctrine of the Trinity, and 
 the connected doctrines of man's deep-rooted 
 12 
 
174 AMERICAN TRA^SCENDE^TALISM. 
 
 depravity, and his dependence on divine grace 
 for a recovery to holiness and happiness, will 
 admit of a satisfactory explanation and vindica- 
 tion, only on the principles of the Platonic, or 
 (as we have called it) the metaphysical philoso- 
 phy. On the principles of the sensuous or empi- 
 rical philosophy, as he supposes, a Trinity in the 
 Godhead is an absurdity, and the connected doc- 
 trines mysterious and inexplicable. But, as is 
 well knovv^n, from the days of Locke this latter 
 philosophy held the ascendency ; or rather, it 
 was, until quite recently, the only philosophy 
 known in the country. While addicted to such 
 a philosophy, our theolot^ians could not reason 
 closely on the articles of their faith, without 
 meeting with difficulties and perplexities : and 
 they were in great danger of falling into different 
 opinions respecting the Christian doctrines. At 
 the same time, the orthodox creeds forbade any 
 deviation from the established faith. The result 
 was, that those most given to free inquiry, fell 
 into Unitarianism, and the doctrines connected 
 with that system. Thus originated, according 
 to this writer, the Unitarian movement in New 
 England: for he says expressly, (page 431,) 
 " We regard it [Unitarianism,] as the result of 
 an attempt to explain Christianity by the sensual 
 philosophy, instigated by a desire to get rid of 
 
AMKRICAN TRANSCEXDEXTALIS3I. 175 
 
 mystery, and to make every thing clear and 
 simple." 
 
 Tlie proximate causes of the rise of Trans- 
 <;endentahsm among the Unitarians, are thus 
 described by this writer, (page 422 — 3) : " The 
 Unitarian movement disenthralled the minds of 
 men, and bade them wander wheresoever they 
 might list in search of truth, and to rest in what- 
 soever views their own consciences miirht ao- 
 prove. The attention of our students was then 
 called to the literature of foreisrn countries. — 
 They wished to see how went tlie battle against 
 sin and error there. They soon found a differ- 
 ent philosophy in vogue, and one which seemed 
 to explain the facts of their own experience and 
 observation more to their satisfaction, than the 
 one they had been accustomed to meet in their 
 books. In most cases the pleasure of the dis- 
 covery was heightened by the fact, that these 
 men, in their previous inquiries, had come to the 
 same or similar conclusions. In some cases 
 they had been too ditiident to express them, 
 while in others the expression of them had called 
 forth manifest indications of disapprobation, i^ 
 
 not of open persecution." The concluding 
 
 sentences in this quotation shew, that the Trans- 
 cendentalists, before they became acquainted 
 with foreign philosophy, were not satisfied witii 
 
176 AMERICAN TRANSCENDENTALISM. 
 
 the Unitarian system of theology ^ and that some 
 of them had, at that time, arrived at nearly their 
 present theological views, the expressions of 
 which then met the disaj)probation, if not the 
 open persecution of the staunch Unitarians. — 
 The inconsistency of the Unitarian body in ad- 
 vocating unhmited freedom of inquiry, and then 
 censuring the Transcendentaiists for practising 
 it, is severely rebuked in the following passage, 
 (page 434,) " They have made a great move- 
 ment in favor of freedom of inquiry, and thor- 
 ouo:hness and fearlessness of investigation ; and 
 now, like the witch of Endor, they seem terrified 
 at the spirit they have called up. This would 
 seem to indicate that the movement in favor of 
 freedom and liberty was not the offspring of 
 pure, disinterested love of truth and princij)le." 
 The defects of the Unitarian theology are de- 
 scribed by this able writer, in the following terms, 
 (page 436,) " Unitarians make Christianity too 
 plain, plainer than from the very nature of the 
 case it can possibly be." " There is, more- 
 over, a degree of religious experience that Uni- 
 tarianism fails to satisfy," [Page 438] : " Uni- 
 tarianism is sound, sober, good sense. But the 
 moment a i)reacher rises to eloquence he rises 
 out of his system," [^^gG 440] : " We think 
 
AMERICAN TRANSCENDENTALISM. 177 
 
 that in its principles and logical tendency, it is 
 allied to the most barren of all systems." 
 
 Characteristics of the Transcendental Philoso- 
 phy. 
 
 None of theTranscendentahsts of this country 
 are Philosophers by profession. Nearly all of 
 them are clergymen, of the Unitarian school ; 
 and their habits of thought, their feelings, and 
 their aims, are manifestly theological. Nor do 
 they give us proof that they have devoted very 
 great attention to philosophy as a science. They 
 have produced, I believe, no work professedly on 
 the subject, not even an elementary treatise ; 
 and, if I do not mistake, they have brought for- 
 ward no new views or principles in philosophy. 
 So far as I can judge, they have merely taken 
 up the philosophy of Victor Cousin, and, after 
 comparing it according to their opportunity with 
 that of the more recent German schools, have 
 modified a little some of its dicta, and applied 
 them freely to scientific and practical theology. 
 At the same time they take little pains, to eluci- 
 date and explain the principles of their new phi- 
 losophy. They address us, as if we all read and 
 understood their favorite Cousin, and were not 
 ignorant of the speculations of the German pan- 
 theists : and their chief aim seems to be, to shew 
 12* 
 
178 AMERICAN TKANSCENDENTALISM. 
 
 US how much better thisGallo-Germanic philoso- 
 phy explains the religion of nature and of the 
 bible, than the old pJiilosophy cf Locke and the 
 Scottish school. Whoever, therefore, would un- 
 derstand the Transcendental writers, must first 
 understand, if he can, the French philosopher 
 Cousin and the German pantheists. 
 
 The philosophy of Cousin, as well as that of 
 the modern Germans, we have attempted to de- 
 scribe very briefly, in the preceding chapters ; 
 and to them the reader is referred. 
 
 Cousin maintains that, by taking a higher 
 point of observation, he has brought all previous 
 systems of philosophy to harmonize with each 
 •other. [See his Introd. to Hist, of Phil, by Lin- 
 berg, page 414.] He therefore adopts, and uses 
 at pleasure, the peculiar phraseology of all the 
 systems, as being all suited to express his own 
 new views. This causes his writings to exhibit, 
 iiot only great variety, but apparently, if not 
 really, great inconsistency of terminology. And 
 Jience different persons, aiming to follow him as 
 a guide, may easily mistake his meaning, and 
 adopt different principles ; or, if they adopt the 
 same principles, they may express themselves in 
 a very different manner. And, if we suppose 
 the same persons, with only a moderate share of 
 philosophic learning and philosophic tact, to 
 
AMERICAN TRANSCENDENTALISM. 179 
 
 attempt to re-construct the philosophy of Cousin, 
 by comparing it with the German systems from 
 which it is taken, and at the same time to adopt 
 Cousin's lax use of language ; we may easily 
 conceive, what confusion of thought and obscu- 
 rity of statement may appear on their pages. 
 Now the Transcendentalists, if I do not mistake, 
 have thus followed Cousin. Of course, they 
 differ considerably from one another ; some fol- 
 lowing Cousin more closely, and others leaning 
 more towards some German ; some preferring 
 one set of Cousin's terms, and others another, 
 or coining new ones to suit their fancy. After 
 all, Linberg's translation of Cousin's Introduc- 
 tion to the History of Philosophy may be consid- 
 ered as the great store house, from which most 
 of them — e. g. Brownson, Emerson, Parker, &c. 
 — have derived their peculiar philosophical opin- 
 ions, their modes of reasoning, and their forms 
 of thought and expression. 
 
 The radical principle of the Transcendental 
 philosophy, the corner stone of the whole edifice, 
 is, Cousin's doctrine that Spontaneous Reason 
 acquaints us with the true and essential nature 
 of things. According to this doctrine, Reason, 
 when uncontrolled by the Will, or when left free 
 to expatiate undirected and uninfluenced by the 
 voluntary faculty, always apprehends things as 
 
180 AMEIUCAN TRANSCENDENTALISM. 
 
 tliey arc, or has direct and absolute knowledf^e 
 of the objects of its contemplation. This clair- 
 voyance of Reason, Cousin calls " an instinc- 
 tive perception of truth, an entirely instinctive 
 development of thought," " an original, irre- 
 sistible, and unreflective perception of truth," 
 "pure apperception, and spontaneous faith," — 
 " the absolute affirmation of truth, without re- 
 flection, — inspiration, — veritable revelation." — 
 [Introd. &c. pages 163, 167, 172, 166.] The 
 characteristics of this kind of knovvledofe, as 
 being immediate, and infallible, though not al- 
 ways perfectly distinct at first, and as being 
 divine, or as coming from God either directly or 
 indirectly, all Transcendentalists maintain. But 
 in what manner, or by what mode of action, our 
 Reason acquires this knowledge, they do not dis- 
 tinctly inform us. Whether our Creator has en- 
 dowed us with an intellectual instinct, a power 
 of rational intuition ; or whether the rational 
 soul, as itself partaking of the divine nature, 
 has this inherent sagacity An and of itself; or 
 whether the divine Being, God himself, is al- 
 ways present in the soul and acting in it by way 
 of inspiration, these philosophers seem not to 
 have decided. They use terms, however, which 
 fairly imply each and all of these hypotheses, 
 and especially the last. But however undecided 
 
AMERICAN TRANSCENDKXTALISM. 181 
 
 on this point, which is of so much importance in 
 a philosophic view, on tlie g'eneral fact that all 
 rational beings do possess this knowledge, they 
 are very explicit ; and some of them attempt to 
 prove it, by reasoning from the necessity of such 
 knowledge to us, and from the current belief of 
 mankind. [See Cousin's Psychology, Chap. vi. 
 and a writer in the Dial, vol. ii. page 80, &c.] 
 
 The effects of this principle, when carried into 
 theology, are immense. It dispels all mysteries 
 and all obscurities from this most profound of 
 all sciences, and gives to human Reason absolute 
 dominion over it. For, it makes the divine Be- 
 ing, his government and laws, and our relations 
 to him, and all our religious obligations and in- 
 terests, — every part of theology, theoretical or 
 practical, — perfectly comprehensible to our Rea- 
 son in its spontaneous operation. It makes all 
 the doctrines of natural religion the objects of 
 our direct, intuitive knowledge : we need no ex- 
 planations and no confirmations from any books 
 or teachers ; we have only to listen to the voice 
 of spontaneous Reason, or to the teachings of 
 our own souls, the light that shines within us, 
 and all will be perfectly intelligible and absolute- 
 ly certain. And hence, we need no external 
 revelation^ no inspired teacher, to solve our 
 doubts and difficulties, or to make any part of 
 
182 AMERICAN TRANSCENDENTALISM. 
 
 natural religion, or any principle of moral duty, 
 either more plain or more certain. We are, all 
 of us, prophets of God, all inspired tlirough our 
 Reason, and we need no one to instruct and 
 enlighten us. Tlie great Seers of ancient times, 
 Moses and t!ie prophets, Christ and the apostles, 
 were no otherwise inspired than we all are ; they 
 only cultivated and listened to spontaneous Rea- 
 son more than ordinary men ; and this enabled 
 them to see further and to speak and write better 
 than other men on rcli<rious subjects. If we 
 would determine whether the hibh was ^vritten 
 by inspired men, we need not pore upon the so 
 called external evidences, miracles, prophecies, 
 &:.c. but merely listen to the testimony of our own 
 souls, the teachings of spontaneous Reason, or 
 what is called the internal evidence, and we 
 shall at once see the clear and infallibie marks 
 of inspiration. And to understand the bible, we 
 need no aid from learned interpreters. Only give 
 us the book in a language we can read, and the 
 suggestions of our own inspired minds will ena- 
 ble us to compreliend perfectly the import of 
 every sentence, and to see clearly what is divine 
 and what is human, or what originated from 
 spontaneous Reason and wliat from human in- 
 firmity, in the holy scriptures. And of course, 
 every man is competent to decide, definitely and 
 
AMERICAN TRANSCENDEXTALISM. 183 
 
 infallibly, all the controversies among theologians 
 and all the disputes between different sects of 
 Christians, respecting the doctrines taught in the 
 bible. In short, not only the profound researches 
 of philologists, antiquarians, and biblical com- 
 mentators, but also the elaborate discussions of 
 didactic theologians, polemic, apologetic, and 
 metaphysical, are all of little or no value in the- 
 ology. Instead of depending on them, the the- 
 ological inquirer should rather retire to solitude 
 and silence, and while musing on religious sub- 
 jects, with the bible and the book of nature be- 
 fore him, he should refrain from giving any de- 
 terminate direction to his thoughts, and allowing 
 them to flow on spontaneously, he should listen 
 to the voice of Reason as she expatiates freely 
 in the open field of visions ; then he will be 
 caught up, as it were, to the third heaven, and 
 will see all that the inspired prophets saw ; his 
 knowledge will be superhuman and divine. 
 
 But to understand more fully the metaphysics 
 of the Transcendental writers, we must not over- 
 look their ontological doctrines. If Reason ac- 
 quaints us with the true and essential nature of 
 all things, then the field of ontology is open fully 
 to our inspection, and we may form there a per- 
 fectly solid and safe science. Accordingly, all 
 Transcendentalists, on both sides of the Atlantic, 
 
184 AMERICAN TRANSCKNDKNTALISM. 
 
 assume some system of oiitoloiry as the basis of 
 their speculations. The prevaihng system among 
 the modern Germans, and that to which Cousin 
 and his American followers assent, is pantheistic: 
 that is, it resolves the universe into one primor- 
 dial Bein^, who develops himself in various 
 finite forms : in other words, it supposes God 
 and the developments of God, to be the only real 
 existences, the ro 7ri/.v,tlie entire universe. But 
 when they attempt to explain this general state- 
 ment, the Germans bring forward difi'ierent hypo- 
 theses. Some, following Spinoza, invest the 
 primordial Being with the essential attributes of 
 both a substance and a person ; and they sup- 
 pose him to create from himself, or to 
 form out of his own substance, all ra- 
 tional and sentient beings and all material 
 things. Others, with Schelling, suppose him to 
 be originally neither a person nor a substance, 
 but the elementary principle of both, which, in 
 developing itself, becomes first a person and a 
 substance, and then a universe of beings and 
 things. Others follow Hegel, and adopt a sys- 
 tem of pure idealism. They suppose concrete 
 ideas to be the only real existences, and the 
 logical genesis of ideas to be the physical gen- 
 esis of the universe. Take the simple idea of 
 existence, and abstract from it every thing coi> 
 
AMKRICA?^' THANSC; 
 
 
 ceivable, sotlmt it shall become evanescent ; and 
 in tha#evanescent state, while fltvctimtiiig between 
 something and nothing, it is the pf'hTiitivS^, the 
 generative principle of all things. For it is the 
 most comprehensive or generical of all ideas, 
 including all other ideas under it as subordinate 
 genera and species ; and therefore, when expan- 
 ded or drawn out into the subordinate genera 
 and species, it becomes the ro ttxv^ the universe 
 of beings and things. Vacillating among all 
 these theories, especially between the two last, 
 and trying to amalgamate them all in one, Cou- 
 sin, without exhibiting any very definite ideas, 
 merely declares the Infinite to be the primitive, 
 and all that is finite to be derivative from the 
 Infinite, while yet both the Infinite and the finite 
 are so inseparable that neither can exist without 
 the other. The appellation Pantheists^ it ap- 
 pears, is unacceptable to Cousin, and to most of 
 liis American followers ; but some of the latter 
 voluntarily assume it ; and they unscrupulously 
 apply it to all Transcendentalists. That the 
 doctrines of the Transcendentalists, as well as 
 those of Spinoza, Schelling, and Hegel, are 
 really and truly pantheistic^ appears from the 
 fact that they all hold to but one essence, or one 
 substance, in the universe. They expressly deny, 
 that God created or produced the world out of 
 113 
 
180 AMERICAN TRANSCEXDE\TAL1SM, 
 
 nothings or that he gave existence to beings and 
 things the substance or matter of which had no 
 previous existence : tliey say, he created or 
 brought forth the world //ow himself^ or formed 
 it out of his own suhstaiice ; and also, that he 
 still exists in the created universe, and the cre- 
 ated universe in him, thus constituting an abso- 
 lute unity^ as to essence or substance. That the 
 e^iihei pantheistic may properly be applied to 
 such doctrines, seems not to be deniable. [See 
 Krug's Philos. Lexikon ; art. Pantheismus.'] 
 
 As Pantheists, the Transcendentalists must 
 behold God, or the divine nature and essence, in 
 every thing that exists. Of course, none of them 
 can ever doubt the existence of God^ or be in 
 the least danger of atheism ; for they cannot 
 believe any thing to exist, without finding God 
 in it : they see him, they feel him, they have 
 sensible perception of his very substance in 
 
 every object around. Moreover, if our souls 
 
 are only portions of the Divinity, if they are 
 really God working in us, then there is solid 
 ground for the belief that si^ontancous Reason 
 always sees the true nature of things, or has 
 divine knowledge of the objects of its contem- 
 plation. And again, if it is the Divine Nature 
 
 which lives and acts in all creatures and things, 
 then all their action is Divine action. All crea- 
 
AMERICAN TRANSCENDENTALISM. 187 
 
 ted inteljigences think, and feel, and act, as 
 God acts in them ; and of course, precisely as 
 He would have tliein. There can, then, be 
 nothing icrong^ nothing sinful., in the character 
 or conduct of any rational beinir. . There may 
 be imperfection, or imperfect action, because the 
 whole power of God is not exerted ; but every 
 act, so far as it goes, is just what it should be, 
 just such as best pleases God. And hence, 
 though men may sigh over their imperfections, 
 or may. ardently desire and strive to become 
 more perfect, yet they can have no reason for 
 repentance^ for sorrow and shame and self-con- 
 demnation, for any thing they have done or have 
 omitted to do. Neither can they feel themselves 
 to need any radical change of character, to make 
 them acceptable to God ; or any Redeemer, to 
 rescue them from impending perdition. All 
 they need, is, to foster the divinity within, to 
 give it more full scope and more perfect action ; 
 then they will become all that it is possible they 
 should be, and all they can reasonably desire. — 
 These inferences from their principles, are not 
 palmed upon Transcendentalists by their adver- 
 saries, but are admitted and defended by their 
 ablest writers. Says one of them, whom we 
 have before quoted, [Dial, vol. i. pages 423 — 4,] 
 " Holding as they do but one essence of all^things, 
 
188 
 
 AMF.RICAX TItANSCENDEN rALIS>r. 
 
 which essence is God, Pantheists must deny the 
 existence of essential evil. All evil is negative, 
 — it is imperfection, non-growth. It is not es- 
 sential, but modal. Of course there can be no 
 such thing as hereditary sin, — a tendency posi- 
 tively sinful in the soul. Sin is not a wilful 
 transgression of a righteous law, but the difficul- 
 ty and obstruction which the Infinite meets with 
 in entering into the finite. Regeneration is noth- 
 ing but an ingress of God into the soul, before 
 which sin disappears as darkness before the ris- 
 ing sun. Pantheists hold also to the atonement, 
 or at-one-ment between the soul and God. This 
 is strictly a unity or oneness of essence, to be 
 brought about by the incarnation of the spirit of 
 God, [in us,] which is going on in us as we grow 
 in holiness. As we grow wise, just, and pure, — 
 in a word, holy, — we grov/ to be one with him 
 in mode, as we always were in essence. This 
 atonement is effected by Christ, only in as far 
 as he taught the manner in which it was to be 
 be accomplished more fully than any other, and 
 gave us a better illustration of the method and 
 result in his own person than any ojie else that 
 has ever lived." 
 
CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF DR. RAUCH. 
 
 Biographical Notice. — His Psychology — Transcendental — 
 Hegelian. — Outline of his Philosophy. — Its bearing on 
 Theology. 
 
 The Rev. Frederic A. R.vuch, Ph. D., late 
 President of Marshall College, Penii., was born 
 in Hesse Darmstadt, in the year 1806. His fa- 
 ther, a pious and orthodox clergyman of the Ger- 
 man Reformed Church, is still living, and is an 
 active pastor in the vicinity of Frankfort on the 
 Maine. Dr. Ranch received his education at 
 Marburg, Giessen, and Heidelberg, and became 
 a Professor in the two last named places. In 
 some of his lectures at Heidelberg he uttered his 
 thoughts too freely on the affairs of government, 
 and found it necessary to flee the country. He 
 came to America in 1831. The next year, he 
 took charge of the classical school connected 
 with the Theological Seminary of the German 
 Reformed Synod at York, Pennsylvania ; and 
 on the removal of that institution to Mercersberg 
 in 1836, he was made President of the College, 
 and Professor of Biblical Literature in the Sem- 
 13* 
 
190 riTiLosoniY of dr. raucii. 
 
 inaiy. He died on tlie 2d of Marcli, 1841, in 
 the 35l1i year of his age. (Sec an Obituary No- 
 tice in the New York Observer, Marcli 27, IS41 ; 
 and the Prehminary Notice to Ranch's Psychol- 
 ogy, 2d edition.) 
 
 Dr. llauch was one of that class of German 
 philosopliers, who, embracing fully the transcen- 
 dental speculations of Schelling and Hegel, have 
 labored to reconcile them with the religion of the 
 bible. The two most prominent men of this par- 
 ty in Germany, have been Dr. Philip Marheine- 
 ke of Berlin, and Dr. Charles Daub of Heidel- 
 berg. The former is still living, and is the editor 
 of the Works of Hegel, and also of the Works of 
 Daub, who died in 1836. The biographer of 
 Dr. Rauch characterizes Daub, as being a " gi- 
 ant in the sphere of mind," and " a man who 
 had followed Kant, Schelling, and Hegel, to the 
 farthest bounds of speculation, without surren- 
 dering for a moment his firm hold upon the great 
 objects of faith." This metaphysical giant, wlio 
 travelled the whole round from Kantism to He- 
 gelism, is best known by his mystical work on 
 the nature and origin of Evil, intitled, Judas Is- 
 cariot, or Evil in its relation to Good ; Heidelb. 
 1816 — 18. 8vo. Dr. Rauch was the favorite 
 pupil of Daub ; who, it is said, "had fixed his eye 
 upon him as a young man of more than common 
 
rillLOSOPIlY OF DI?. RAUCII. 191 
 
 promise, who might be expected to do good ser- 
 vice in the cause of science, in tiie department to 
 which he wished to consecrate his hfe." The 
 doctrines wliicli Daub instilled into the mind of 
 his pupiJ, Dr. Ranch appears to have brought 
 with him to America, and to have retained as long 
 as he lived. 
 
 The first and only publication of Dr. Ranch 
 in this country, was his Psychology, or View of 
 the Human Soul, including Anthropology; first 
 published in 1840, and revised by him for a 
 second edition, 1841. Tiie subject of this w^ork, 
 like that of most German treatises on Psycholo- 
 gy, and like the English treatises on. Mental Phi- 
 losophy, is Empirical Psychology, not Rational 
 or Speculative Psychology. That is, it embra- 
 ces that knowledge of the human Mind, whic4i 
 is derived from experience and observation ; not 
 that which is obtained by philosophical specula- 
 tions on the nature and properties of the soul. It 
 therefore has but little to do with Philosophy 
 in tlie proper sense of the term, or with strictly 
 rational science. It treats of empirical knowl- 
 edge, not of that which is scientific. Still there 
 is a philosophy underlying it, which it is not dif- 
 ficult to discover ; and that philosophy is mani- 
 festly transcendental^ and derived from the school 
 of Hegel, 
 
193 PHILOSOPHY OF DR. RArCH. 
 
 Dr. Ranch, being a man of genius, and famil- 
 iar with the numerous and learned works of the 
 Germans on Psychology, and having access to 
 the more recent investigations of his countrymen 
 in physical science, has been able to embody in 
 his work much that is new and interesting to 
 American readers, especially in the mode of 
 explaining and illustrating the mental phenome- 
 na. In the first part of his work entitled Anthro- 
 pology, he treats largely o^ Life, both in vegeta- 
 bles and animals ; of Instinct, as a part of ani- 
 mal nature ; and of the influence of external 
 Nature on the Mind, and of the Mind on the 
 body. In the second part, or l*sychology prop- 
 er, he treats oi Self -consciousness, the distinguish- 
 ing mark of a rational being : and of our two 
 mental faculties, Reason and Will. Reason in 
 man has three modes of action. Sensation, Intel- 
 lect, and Pure Thinking. The Will, in the 
 natural or unregenerate man, follows the natural 
 Desires, Inclinations, Emotions, and Passions : 
 in the regenerate, it follows the Divine Will. 
 Some concise remarks on true and false Religion 
 conclude the work. The short chapter on Pure 
 Thinking, is the only part of the book that di- 
 rectly treats on speculative Philosophy : but phi- 
 losophical remarks and observations occur 
 throughout the work. 
 
PHILOSOPHY OF DJl. KAUCH. 193 
 
 As a phiJosoplier, Dr. Raueli was a Transcen- 
 dentalist : for, he maintains that our Reason 
 gives us objective knowledge of things, and not 
 merely subjective knowledge. Thus in the de- 
 partment of nature or the material world, he sup- 
 poses our knowledge to extend beyond Phenom- 
 ena, and to embrace what Kant calls Noumcna. 
 After describing the Conceptions of the Under- 
 standing as being mental Images of objects exis- 
 ting in nature, he says, page 227 : " The image 
 is the same as the thing it represents, . . . the same 
 as the object; for it cannot be without it, and, un- 
 less it includes what the object includes, it is not 
 
 its true image The image has therefore the 
 
 same contents as the object, with this difference, 
 the one has them as they exist in the mind, ide- 
 ally, the other as they are in the material thing 
 really. We would say, therefore, by the power 
 of conceiving, the contents of an object, and the 
 object itself, become contents oj our conceptions 
 or images." So also, in regard to supersensible 
 objects, or things in the world of thought and of 
 ideas, he supposes we have power to discover 
 their real essence, or their ontological nature. — 
 Describing the objects which are the subject mat- 
 ter of Pure Thinking, he says, page 281: "They 
 are wholly general ; and as such have no exis- 
 tence independent ofthiid\ing. Yet they truly 
 
194 PHILOSOPHY OF DR. RAUCH, 
 
 exist ; tlicj are not a mere abstraction ; tliey are 
 the pure being and nature of individual things, 
 their soul and ///c." And we sliall see, as we 
 proceed, that lie undertakes to tell us prcciscFj 
 what is the essential tiature of the human soul or 
 mind; of life also, both in vegetable and animal 
 bodies ; and indeed, of all the mysterious po2^'t7s 
 which operate in any part of the created uni- 
 verse. 
 
 Being a Transcendentalist, Dr. Rauch was di- 
 ametrically opposed to tli^e views of Kant, whos*? 
 Critical Philosophy has for its chief aim to over- 
 throw all Transcendentalism, or as Kant would 
 rather call it, Transcendentism. Kant supposed 
 an impassable gulf to lie between subjective and 
 objective knowledge in all created things. But 
 Transcendentalists either discover no gulf there, 
 or they suppose they have found out a way to 
 transcend and fairly get over it. 
 
 As a Transcendental philosopher, Dr. Rauch 
 belonged to the school of Hegel, and not to that 
 of Schelling. For, his whole chapter on Pure 
 Thinking shews that he did not, with Schelling, 
 regard ^a knowledge of the essential nature ©f 
 things as attainable by mere inspection, or by a 
 rational intuition ; hut, with Ilegel, he consider- 
 ed such knowledge as the result of a logical pro- 
 cess^ a generalization y or as he denominates it. 
 
VKrLOSOPHY OF DR. RAUCH. 195 
 
 Pare Thinking. Thus he writes, page 275: — • 
 *' Thinking is the true basis of all our knowledge, 
 for until we have penetrated our conceptions by 
 thought, until we know their nature, their ground, 
 their connexion with each other, we have no sci- 
 encey He says also, page 277 : " Thinking is 
 that activity of mind which generalizes. * * * 
 The generality here s]>oken of, is not gained by 
 <^ih sir action^ but by position ; it is not the pro- 
 duct o^man, nor of any object^ it is neither sub- 
 jective nor objective^ but above both ; its origin 
 is in pure reason, as such. It exists not meielj 
 in our«thoughts, but equally as much in nature; 
 it is in the sphere of nature the genus ; in the 
 sphere of mind the identity ; and in that of sci- 
 ence the generality.''' In the passage quoted 
 a few paragraphs back, he says of these general- 
 ities : *' They are the pure being and nature of 
 individual things, \he\v soul and life^ 
 
 According to Dr. Rauch's philosophy, a crea- 
 ted substance or things is a mere activity or pow- 
 er of acting; and not, as is generally supposed, 
 an inscrutable essence, with inherent qualities 
 and accidents. Of course, as many kinds of 
 activity as exist, so many kinds of substances or 
 things , are there in the universe. These, i£ 
 seems, are ascertained to be four in number, 
 viz. (1) Mind or soul, an activity that has self- 
 consciousness, intelligence, and will : (2) Ani- 
 
196 PHILOSOPHY OF DIJ. KAUCH. 
 
 mal Life, a plastic power having sensation or 
 feeling, and generating organic bodies, wiiich it 
 nourishes and matures, and then transmits itself 
 tlirough them to a progeny of similar activities ; 
 (3) Vegetable Life, a plastic power without feel- 
 ing, which produces organized bodies with roots 
 and leaves, and matures seeds, whereby it prop- 
 agates itself; and (4) Lifeless 3Iattcr, which can 
 act only mechanically, or by impulse, attraction, 
 repulsion, decomposition, dispersion, combina- 
 tion, aggregation, &.c. These four kinds of ac- 
 iivities, variously combined, and operating upon 
 and with each other, and under various ^rcum- 
 stances and condition?, constitute the created 
 universe, and produce all its varied phenomena. 
 Of course, a thorough knowledge of these four 
 activities involves or includes a perfect and sci- 
 entific knowledge of the entire universe of crea- 
 ted beings and things: for, each of these activi- 
 ties is, in the sphere of nature, the genus of all 
 the beings and things under it; in the sphere of 
 rnind or thouglit, it is their idcntitij ; and in the 
 sphere of science or logical arrangement, it is 
 their generality, or that which comprehends and 
 embraces them all. If now curiosity enquires, 
 what is the essential nature of these all-compre- 
 hending activities ; Dr. Ranch is prompt to an- 
 swer. Each of them is a definite Thought com- 
 
PHFLOSOPHY OF DR. RAUCH. 197 
 
 bined with a Volitioji of God. The infinite 
 Mind conceived them, and the divine fiat made 
 them reahties. Four divine thoughts, therefi)re, 
 combined ^^ ith divine volitions, constitute the en- 
 tire created universe : and God and his thoughts 
 are all that exists or has any being. 
 
 Some of the passages in Dr. Rau h's Psych- 
 ology involving such sentiments, ' ere follow. 
 Page 43 : '* Most of us are in the habit of con- 
 sidering nature and its manifold powers as a 
 mechanical whole, whose parts have been brought 
 together by some mechanic, and whose powers 
 ezist side hy side, without having any afiinity to, 
 or connection with each other. But the oppo- 
 site of all this is the case. Nature is a system, 
 not a conglomeration ; alive and active in all its 
 elements and atoms, it is filled with powers, from 
 the mechanical, chemical, magnetic, and galvan- 
 ic, up to the organic, all of which flow invisibly 
 into each other, affect and determine each other. 
 Eternal laws divell in them, and provide that 
 while these powers receive and work with and 
 through each other, none interferes with the other, 
 or in any degree changes its nature, but supports 
 and upholds it. Thus we have a constant life, 
 
 powers flow up and down, to and fro.'''' Page 
 
 183 : " All life, wherevei it exists, is formed and 
 organized. Form is not and cannot be the re- 
 
198 PHILOSOPHY OF DR. RAUCH. 
 
 suit of matter, which is chaotic and shapeless. 
 Form in man, and throughout the universe, is 
 the result o^ thought. Hence life^ being formed, 
 does not proceed from matter ; but is a thought 
 of God^ accompanied hy the divine will^ to be re- 
 alized in nature, and to appear externally by an 
 organized body. As the thought gives the form, 
 so the divine will, resting in the thought, and in- 
 separably united with it, works as power and law 
 
 in all nature The animal, with its 
 
 members and senses, what else can it be but a 
 divine thought exhibited in an external form V' 
 Page 184 : " The soul of man is likewise a di- 
 vine thought, a creation of God, filled with poic- 
 er to live an existence of its own.'''' — Page 150: 
 
 " The mind is pure activity But this 
 
 activity takes different directions, and unfolds it- 
 self in different ways, and thus it may be said to 
 be the union of manifold activities, all of which 
 are internally united.'''' — Page 195: " The soul 
 contains in its simple, identical activity, all that 
 afterwards appears in succession, under the form 
 of faculties. They are but the development of 
 the energy of the soul." — Page S56 : " Reason 
 has not its origin in itself ; its author is God, 
 whose ivill lives in it as its law.''"' — Page 185 : 
 Man is soul only, and cannot be any thing else. 
 This soul) however, unfolds itself externally in 
 
PH1L0S50PHY OF DR. RAUCH. 199 
 
 the life of the hody^ and internally in the life of 
 mind. Twofold in its development, it is one in 
 its origin, and the centre of this union is our per- 
 sonality." — Page 184: "The particles of the 
 
 body are not at all a part o^man; they 
 
 are dust, and only their connection and the life 
 connecting them, is truly human." — Page 283: 
 *' That which truly is in nature, are the divine 
 thoughts, the divine laws : and all the rest is but 
 matter." — Page 191 : " It is not nature nor mat- 
 ter that produces personality, but God^ who is 
 the ground of all personality. We can know a 
 thing thoroughly only when we are acquainted 
 with its ground — so man must know God before 
 he can become trxdy acquainted with himself'' 
 
 In his Preface, page iv.. Dr. Ranch tells us 
 that one great object which he aimed to accom- 
 plish, was, " to give the science of man a direct 
 bearing upon the other sciences, and especially 
 upon religion and theology.'*'' And it must be 
 admitted that he every where manifests profound 
 reverence for God, and a deep sense of the im- 
 portance of religion. But whether his philoso- 
 phy is favorable to sound views of religion, de- 
 serves more examination than comports with the 
 design of these sketches. If I have not entirely 
 misunderstood him, he is a Transcendentalist 
 and a Pantheist pf the school of Hegel. It is 
 
^00 PHILOSOPHY OF DR. EAUCH. 
 
 also noticeable that his book makes no allusion 
 to any special Revelation from God, or to an 
 apostasy of man, the intervention of a Savior, 
 the forgiveness of sin in consequence of an atone- 
 ment, a future judgment, and eternal retribidittns 
 after the jjresent life. At the same time, his pan- 
 theistic, transcendental principles seem to leave 
 little or no room for these cardinal doctrines of 
 the Bible ; which are either discarded, or essen- 
 tially changed, by all German, as well as Amer- 
 ican Transcendentalists. He utterly denies the 
 freedom of the Will in the natural man ; and he 
 gives to the divine Will an absolute control over 
 the human, in the regenerate. See page 155, 
 &c., 292, &c., 309 — He affirms that, by nature, 
 or in his natural state, man is wholly incapable 
 of holiness. See pages 383, 398. — He explicitly 
 says : " Religion is not a mere quality, but the 
 
 substance of man He ceases to be man, 
 
 in the full sense of the term, when he has no re- 
 ligion." See Pre'", page iv. — He defines true re- 
 ligion to be, " a peculiar activity of God, which, 
 announcing itself to the heart of man, changes 
 it, converts it, and restores man to peace with 
 himself, with the world, and with God." See 
 page 388. He thus explicitly admits a regenera- 
 tion of the sold by the power of God ; but he 
 makes it to be a change of man's substance or 
 
PHILOSOPHY OF DR. RAUCH. 201 
 
 nature ; a change too, which seems to consti 
 tute tlie whole of man's redemption, or to leave n© 
 room for the pardon of sin through an atone- 
 ment, and no work for a Mediator between G ) J 
 and man. The simple activity of God upon the 
 heart, accomplishes the whole business. Inshort, 
 like other Trancendentahsts, he seems to mike 
 religion in man, to be an operation of God, car- 
 rying out and perfecting the Creation of a ration- 
 al soul. 
 
ERRATA. 
 
 Pa£e 17, 1. 24, for encyclopedists r. encyclopyedist!?. 
 
 18 and 20, Running Title, forlsiPKRiAL r. Empirical. 
 
 24, 10, for cannot be, r. can be. 
 
 48, 5, for No. I r. Chap. I. 
 
 64, 26, after knowledge, insert a comma. 
 
 83, 15, for number r, chapter. 
 
 93, 3, for thus it r. then it. 
 
 95, 20, for powers r. process. 
 106, 18, for all changes r. all the changes, 
 112, 14, for of philosophy r. of his philosophy. 
 
 " 23, for the acts r. these acts. 
 114, bottom line, for Stutgard r. Stuttgard- 
 
 126, 8, insert a ) after 1832. 
 26, for Chris r. Christ. 
 
 140, 8, after who, insert a comma. 
 
 141, 13, after ideas, insert a comma. 
 146, 18, for 1804 r. ]840. 
 
 " 26, r. charge d'affaires. 
 
 148, 5, for Lonis read Louis. 
 " 18, for Azias r. Azais. 
 
 149, 11, for common sense r. common name. 
 
 150, 13, for 1833 r. 1832. 
 
 160, 26, for Number r. Chapter. 
 
 163, 7, after nature, insert a comma. 
 
 " 9, after It is, omit comma. 
 
 165, 3, for happiness r. well-being. 
 
 176, 3, for expressions r. e.xpression. 
 
 [ For want of suitable type the omission of the accents 
 in German, Greek and French words must remain without 
 con ection. —Pmtcr, 
 
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