- \ LIEUT.-GENEKAL SIR FKEPE1UCK SLEIGH ItOBEliTS, V.C., G.C.B., ( .l.K. MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK S. ROBERTS, BART., V.C., G.C.B., C.I.E., R.A. A MEMOIR. CHAELES EATHBONE LOW, I.N., F.E.G.S., AUTHOR OF THE " HISTORY OF THE INDIAN NAVY, ' ' MEMOIR OF LORD WOLSELEY," "HISTORY OF MARITIME DISCOVERY," ETC., ETC. LONDON: W. H. ALLEN & CO., 13, WATERLOO PLACE, PALL MALL, S.W. 1883. LONDON : PRINTED BY WOODFALL AND KINDER, MILFOED LANE, STRAND, W.C. PKEFACE. THE practice of writing a memoir * of a living public mail scarcely stands in need of defence, since it has become of such common practice. Within recent years, the careers of Lord Beaconsfield and Mr. Gladstone, Lord Wolseley and Mr. Bright, have been given to the public during their lifetime ; and the only question that arises, when considering the advisability of such a publication, conceding the necessity of abstaining from publishing matter that would violate any confidences, or unduly cause pain to the living or the representatives of the dead, would appear to have reference to the public demand in each particular instance. Such a question as applied to Sir Frederick Roberts must be unhesitatingly given in the affirmative. The military achieve- ments of the gallant officer are great and undeniable, " as a mountain open, palpable." They have received the unstinted acknowledgments not only of all classes of his countrymen, but of the highest professional authorities of the Continent. Count Von Moltke and the German generals expressed their unbounded admiration of the great march from Cabul to Candahar ; and the heroic Skobeleff, whose untimely death was such a crushing blow to the army he adorned, as well as to the cause of Pan- slavism, though the peace of Europe was the gainer by his * It should be stated that this memoir was completed early in 1882, but circumstances delayed its publication. It has been compiled from the Blue Books and official despatches, and from personal reminiscences supplied in conversation and by correspondence with Sir Frederick Roberts, who himself revised the entire work, chapter by chapter. 2068875 iv Preface. removal from the scene was enthusiastic in praise of the military genius displayed by Roberts throughout the two years he was the central figure of the war in Afghanistan. And here we may note a remarkable resemblance in the character and method of these two distinguished soldiers. Both were gifted with impetuous valour, complete knowledge of their profession, a quick intelligence in seizing the features of ground, and adapting the measures at their disposal to the end sought to be attained ; an unfailing skill in their tactical combinations, a perfect yet calm self-reliance, and a faculty for inspiring con- fidence in others. Roberts's dispositions for the capture of the Peiwar Kotul were most masterly, and his rapid march on Cabul with only 8,000 men, his skill in forcing the enemy's position at Charasia, and his seizure of Cabul were brilliant feats of arms worthy the best days of British prowess. On the abdication of Yakoob Khan he was, for a time, the de facto ruler of Afghanistan. His word was law, and he might have said : " Hoc sic jubeo ; sit pro ratione voluntas." Severe measures were necessary with the wretches who had murdered a British Envoy, a personage who, in the East as in every clime, is invested with a special sanctity ; but no Afghan suffered the extreme penalty who had not been implicated in that deed of shame. An unworthy attempt was made to impute blood-thirstiness to Sir Frederick Roberts, but to those who are conversant with his character, such a charge will scarcely demand refutation. In his humanity and gentleness of cha- racter, our hero resembles the " Happy Warrior " sketched by Wordsworth : " He who, though thus endued as with a sense And faculty for storm and turbulence, Is yet a soul whose master-bias leans To homefelt pleasures and to gentle scenes." Sir Frederick Roberts displayed in a remarkable degree the Preface. v self-reliance to which we have referred, during the memorable events that occurred at Cabul in December, 1879, when the cantonment of Sherpur was invested by no less than 100,000 or 120,000 armed men. At no time was there any change in the serenity of manner for which the General was distinguished, and which infused a like confidence in his small force belea- guered in the depth of winter by foes outnumbering them twenty-fold. Since the death of the great Ameer, Dost Mahomed Khan, the political condition of Afghanistan bore a striking analogy to that of England during the "Wars of the Roses. As the rival Houses of York and Lancaster contended for the crown, dividing the nobles and the country into two factions, so Afzul Khan and Shere Ali, the sons of the Dost, and their sons, Abdul Rahman and Yakoob Khan, bathed the country in the blood of their adherents. As in England during the 15th century, so in Afghanistan during the 19th, " uneasy lies the head that wears a crown ;" and in the see-saw from the throne to the dungeon, the epigram might be applied to the rival claimants for the perilous honour of ruling the turbulent races of Afghanistan : " Treason does never prosper ; what's the reason ? "Why, when it prospers, none dare call it treason." With the removal of Yakoob Khan to India, and the ap- pearance of pretenders in the person of his younger brother, Ayoob Khan, and other claimants for the throne, the task before Sir Frederick Roberts became more difficult, but with the assistance of his political officer, Major Hastings, and afterwards of Mr. (now Sir) Lepel Griffin, he initiated the negotiations with Abdul Rahman, which have resulted so favourably for the peace of Afghanistan. Sir Frederick Roberts's final achievement, the forced march from Cabul to Candahar with 10,000 soldiers and 8,000 non-combatants, and his brilliant victory over Ayoob Khan on the day following his arrival under the walls of the capital of Western Afghanistan, are now historic, and have vi Preface. earned for him a prominent place in that illustrious band of soldiers who have acquired for this country her Eastern Empire. The roll of England's victories chequered at distant inter- vals by reverses beginning at Cressy, has been prolonged to Candahar and Tel-el-Kebir. -Not even the annals of Rome can show such a record of victory, achieved over races the most savage and warlike, assisted by the forces of Nature when arrayed in her most austere and rugged mood. In climes where the eagles of her great prototype never penetrated, the standards of Britain have been planted, and countries having to her people only a legendary existence West Africa, the land of Prester John, and China have been subjugated by her arms or compelled to sign an ignominious peace. England has watered her horses on the banks of the classic Nile and Euphrates, and her legions have driven her hereditary foe, the Gaul, from America and India, and have triumphed alike over the Zulu in South Africa, the Afghan in Central Asia, and the Maori in New Zealand. Soldiers that could overcome the most renowned and martial races of four con- tinents must be : - " Types of a race who shall to time unborn Their country leave unconquered as of yore." But much, if not everything, depends upon leadership, and should a crisis arise in Europe or in any portion of our world- encompassing Empire, the eyes of the nation as after the massacre of the Cavagnari Mission, the disaster at Maiwand, and in our ignominious struggle with the Boers will instinc- tively turn to Sir Frederick Roberts as conspicuous among that small band of tried and capable officers to whom will be con- fided the defence of the honour and interests of the Mother country and her Colonies. C. R LOW. Kensington, June, 1883. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. Introduction Some Account of Sir Frederick Roberta's Family The Services of his Father, General Sir Abraham Roberts His Early Life, and Career at Eton, Sandhurst, and Woolwich Proceeds to India in the Bengal Artillery Serves on his Father's Staff and on the Frontier at Peshawur Outbreak of the Indian Mutiny . CHAPTER II. The Siege of Delhi Roberts joins the i*unjaub Movable Column Proceeds to Delhi as Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General of Artillery Lieutenant Roberts participates in the Action of the 9th July Gallantry of his Friend, Lieutenant Hills Roberts is wounded in the Fighting on the 14th July Prepa- rations for the Bombardment Roberts serves in No. 2 Battery at Ludlow Castle The Storm and Capture of Delhi Sir James Brind's Reminiscences of Sir Frederick Roberts at Delhi . 18 CHAPTER III. Lieutenant Roberts takes the Field with Colonel Greathed's Movable Column The Action at Bolundshur Narrow Escape of Lieu- tenant Roberts The Capture of Allyghur Roberts is engaged in the Pursuit with 9th Lancers The Surprise at Agra of the 10th of October lloberts's share in the Severe Fighting and Pursuit The March to Mynpoorie Skirmish and Pursuit of the Rebels to the Ganges Arrival at Cawnpore . 48 CHAPTER IV. Departure of Lieutenant Roberts from Cawnpore with Brigadier Hope Grant's Column for the Relief of Lucknow Narrow Escape of Roberts from Capture by the Rebels at Buntheera March upon Lucknow Roberts as Quartermaster-General of Sir Hope Grant's viii Contents. PAGE Division He leads the Army from the Alumbagh Is sent by Sir Colin Campbell on a Special Mission to Alumbagh Is associated with Captain Garnet Wolseley in the Capture of the 32nd Mess-house The Return March to Cawnpore The Battle of Cawnpore on the 6th of December The Affair at Serai Ghat. 62 CHAPTER V. Roberts gains the V.C. at Khodagunj Occupation of Futtehgurh on the 2nd of January, 1858 A Day's Pig-sticking The Army crosses into Oude Arduous Nature of Roberts's Duties on the Staff Storm of Meeangunj Roberts's Humanity The Siege of Lucknow Operations Trans-Goomtee The Action of Koorsie Roberts is invalided and returns to England .... 76 CHAPTER VI. Lieutenant Roberts returns to India la employed in Charge of the Viceroy's Camp Lord Clyde's Letter to Lord Canning recommending Roberts Promotion to a Brevet-Majority On Tour with Sir Hugh Rose Is ordered on Special Service to Umbeyla Critical State of Affairs on the North-West Frontier in 1863 The Action of Laloo The Capture of Umbeyla The Burning of Mulkah Major Roberts Compiles a Route Book for the Bengal Presidency Returns to England on Sick Leave On his return to India proceels to Abyssinia with the Expedition under Sir Robert Napier Major Roberts's Services in Abyssinia. 91 CHAPTER VII. The Looshai Campaign Description of the Country and Cause of the War Colonel Roberts fits out the two Columns of the Expe- ditionary Force He joins General Bourchier at Cachar March of the Cachar Column Arrival at Tipai Mookh Attack on the Kholel Villages led by Colonel Roberts Further Operations against the Looshais Action of the 25th of January, 1872 Colonel Roberts Commands at the Capture of Taikoom Arrival at Chumfai Conclusion of Peace and Return of the Column to India Roberts is appointed Quartermaster-General at Army Head-quarters His Services in that Capacity Lord Lytton and General Roberts Roberts is nominated Commandant of the Punjaub Irregular Force and Special Commissioner on the Sciude-Punjaub Frontier 109 Contents. ix CHAPTER VIII. PAGE The Afghan War General Roberts is Appointed to the Command of the Kurram Field Force Constitution of the Field Force Brief Description of the Kurram Valley and its Inhabitants The Advance from Thull into Afghan Territory The Occupa- tion of the Kurram Fort The Operations of the 28th November Reconnoissances and Preparations for the Attack on the Peiwar Kotul . 132 CHAPTER IX. The Midnight March up the Spingawi Ravine Treachery in the Ranks The Capture of the Spingawi Pass Advance along the Ridge and Severe Fighting General Roberts is Wounded The Night Bivouac in the Mountains Occupation of the Peiwar Kotal Account of the Operations by an Officer of the Staff General Roberts Reconnoitres the Shutargardan Pass . . . 149 CHAPTER X. General Roberts returns to Kurram by the Sappri Defile Attack by the Mangals on the Baggage Escort Preparations for the Occu- pation of the Kurram Valley during the Winter The Court- Martial on the Treacherous Soldiers of the 29th Punjaub N.I., and Roberts's General Order to the Force Disposal of the Troops into Winter Quarters Expedition into the Khost Valley The March from Kurram to Hazir Pir, and thence into the Khost Valley Occupation of the Fort of Matun Action of the 7th January and Defeat of the Mangals Reconnoissance by General Roberts of the Khost Valley 174 CHAPTER XL General Roberts makes a Tour of the Valley Army Signalling in Khost Durbar of the Headmen of the Khostiwals and Mangals Evacuation of Matun and Return March to Hazir Pir Prepa- rations for the Advance on Cabul Reconnoissance by General Roberts Conclusion of the Treaty of Gundamuck Arrival at Ali Kheyl of the Cavagnari Mission General Roberts Returns to Simla 195 Contents. CHAPTER XII. tAOE .Massacre of the British Mission at Cabul Receipt of the Intelligenca by Sir Frederick Roberts at Simla He Proceeds to take the Field Arrival at Ali Kheyl Preparations for the Advance on Cabul Sir Frederick Roberts Moves across the Shutargardan Pass He Experiences a Narrow Escape Arrival at Kooshi Interview with Yakoob Khan Proclamations of Sir Frederick Roberts to the Army and the People of Cabul .... 218 CHAPTER XIII. Advance on Cabul Battle of Charasia Sir Frederick Roberts arrives before the Capital His Visit to the Scene of the Massacre of the British Mission Occupation of the Bala His^ar Proclamation of the 12th of October The Punishment Meted out to Cabul 236 CHAPTER XIV. The Cabul District after its Occupation by the British Events at the Shutargardan Pass The Explosion in the Bala Hissar Occu- pation of the Sherpur Cantonment Sir Frederick Roberts Reconnoitres the Passes towards Jugdulluck Abandonment of the Shutargardan The Expedition to Maidan Unsettled State of the Country Deportation of Yakoob Khan to India A Review of the Situation in Northern Afghanistan before the Events of December 1879 . 256 CHAPTER XV. The National Rising of December, 1879 The Plans of Sir Frederick Roberts to Check the Movement The Cavalry Action of the llth December Critical Condition of Affairs at Sherpur and in Cabul Prompt Action of Sir Frederick Roberts Movements of Brigadier- Generals Macpherson and Baker The Attempt to Capture the Takht-i-Shah on the 12ta December Severe fight- ing on the 13th December Capture of Koh Asmai Successful Counter-Attack by the Enemy Heavy Losses Experienced by the British Force Sir Frederick Roberts Determines to Concen- trate in Sherpur Retirement of the British Troops within the Cantonment 280 Contents. CHAPTER XVI. PAGE The Situation at Sherpur and in Cabul The City and Bala Ilissar Seized by the Enemy Their Movements against Sherpur Sir Frederick Roberts places the Cantonment in a Condition of Defence Colonel Hudson and the Garrison at Lutterbund Desultory Fighting with the Enemy between the 14th and 21st December The Attack of the 23rd December Final Rout of the Afghans by Sir Frederick Roberts Arrival of Brigadier- General Charles Gough with Reinforcements The Future Government of Afghanistan The Rival Pretenders to the Auieership Sir Donald Steward succeeds to the Chief Command in North-Eastern Afghanistan 302 CHAPTER XVII. Sir Frederick Roberts and the Negotiations with Abdul Rahman Appointment of the Sirdar to the Ameership Restless State of the Sirdars and People of Afghanistan Arrival of Abdul Rahman at Cabul and Assumption of the Ameership Sir Frederick Roberts's Views on the Kurram Valley Question The Maiwaud Disaster Sir Frederick Roberts appointed to the Command of the Relieving Column His Preparations for the March on Candahar Dramatic Aspects of the Afghan War . 328 CHAPTER XVIII. English Public Opinion on the Projected March through Afghanistan Sir Frederick Roberts quits Cabul for Beni Hissar Incidents of the Forced March to Ghuznee Arrival at Ghuznee and Sur- render of the Town and Citadel The Forced March to Khelat-i- Ghilzye Relief and Removal of the Garrison Sir Frederick Roberts on the Line of March The Advance on Candahar Preparations for the Attack on Ayoob Khan's Position . 343 CHAPTER XIX. Arrival of the Cabul-Candahar Force at Robat Letter from General Phayre Sir Frederick Roberts's State of Health Arrival before Candahar Reconnoissance of the 31st August Preparations for the Attack Dispositions of the Army The Advance on the Pir Paimal Position Storming of the Village of Gundi .Mulla Sahibdad Death of Colonel Brownlow Capture of Pir" Paimal Brilliant Advance of Macpherson's and Baker's Brigades Gallant Conduct of Major White Incidents of the Fight xii Contents. Capture of the Enemy's Camp at Mazra Losses of the British Results of the Victory Sir Frederick Roberts Resigns his Command in Afghanistan ........ 362 CHAPTER XX. Sir Frederick Roberts quits Afghanistan The Question of the Reten- tion of Candahar Sir Frederick Roberts Arrives in England . His Reception by his Countrymen Rewards Conferred on Sir V Frederick Roberts Precedents in the Case of Rewards for Military Services His Speech at the Mansion House Changes in Army Reform due to Sir Frederick Roberts's Criticisms He is appointed to the Command of the Army sent to Coerce the Boers Departure for and Return from South Africa Sir Frederick Roberts attends the German Autumn Manoeuvres His Comments on the German Army and Military System Sir Frederick Roberts is appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army He leaves England for India Conclusion . . 377 MEMOIR OF SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS. CHAPTER I. Introduction Some Account of Sir Frederick Roberts's Family The Ser- vices of his Father, General Sir Abraham Roberts His Early Life, and Career at Eton, Sandhurst, and Woolwich Proceeds to India in the Bengal Artillery Serves on his Father's Staff and on the Frontier at Peshawur Outbreak of the Indian Mutiny. A MEMOIR of an officer, of whose principal achievement, the march from Cahul to Candahar, German military critics declare that it is the most brilliant performance of a British Army since Waterloo, and which a distinguished officer, who had served throughout Lord Strathnairn's victorious campaign in Central India, declared to us was, in his estimation, the finest exploit achieved by our arms since Sir Charles Napier's con- quest of Scinde the memoir of such a soldier cannot be without interest not only to men of his own cloth, but to the British public, which reads with avidity biographies of its military heroes. Sir Frederick Roberts comes of a military stock, and was cradled, so to speak, amid arms and soldiers. His father, the late General Sir Abraham Roberts, G.C.B., lived to attain the age of ninety, and was the patriarch of Indian Generals. In his day he had achieved no mean renown ; but though his name has been commemorated in military history as that of a gallant ' 2 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. and capable soldier, it is by the achievements of his still more remarkable son that the name of Roberts will live in our history. There are yet surviving a few grizzled and aged warriors, who can bear witness that Brigadier Roberts, of the first Afghan War, was a good soldier and true, and more, was possessed of a sagacity and prescience, which, had it been found in those responsible for the political and military direc- tion of affairs in Afghanistan, might have averted a terrible calamity. The late Sir Abraham Roberts entered the Royal Army in July 1801, with the intention of making it his profession, but the Peace of Amiens in the following year, which caused great reductions, induced him, with many other officers, to join the Indian Service, which had then every prospect of active employ- ment. On the 1st January, 1803, he was gazetted an Ensign in the Army of the Honourable East India Company, on the Bengal Establishment, and, in the following year, served under Lord Lake in his campaign against the Mahrattas. The young officer lived to see the boundaries of British India ex- tended from Delhi and Ferozepore to the Khyber Pass, and was fated to take a prominent part in restoring to his throne that Shah Soojah, who, with his brother Zematin Shah, at this time fluttered the Council Chamber at Calcutta with fears of an Afghan invasion. How vast were the changes, political, military, and social, he witnessed in India during the seventy years succeeding his arrival at Calcutta ! The poet Campbell writes of the motives that induced our forefathers to conquer India : " Did Peace descend, to triumph and to save, When freeborn Britons cross'd the Indian wave 1 Ah, no ! to more than Rome's ambition true, The nurse of Freedom gave it not to you." It was the pursuit of commerce that brought us to India, and were we to own the truth, it is no high-flown sense of duty, but our own selfish purposes, and our national love of aggrandize- ment that keeps us there, and has induced us to lavish the best blood of England in fighting our way to supreme sove- reignty over an empire vaster than that of Aurungzebe, and maintaining it against a military revolt that would have ousted His Fathers Career in India. 3 from the country any other power but ours. However, as was said by Marshal McMahon on a memorable occasion : " J'y sids, etfy rcste." In 1805, Lieutenant Roberts accompanied Lord Lake in the pursuit, across the Sutlej, of Holkar and Ameer Khan, and, in April, 1806, he joined the first battalion 13th Regiment Native Infantry, then on service in Bundelcund. While so employed he suffered severely from the prevailing sickness, caused by fatiguing duties and constant exposure, as, in the absence of cantonments, the army was under canvas during the hot winds and rains, and continually employed against Pindarees and marauders. Early in 1807, Lieutenant Roberts was appointed Adjutant of his regiment, being at the time the youngest officer on the establishment performing this duty. At the close of the year he acted as Major of Brigade to General Dickens's force at the sieges of Komona and Gunnowrie, in the Doab, where the troops suffered severely in killed and wounded. In 1810, he volunteered for Java, but his services were not accepted. In May, 1814, Lieutenant Roberts was appointed to the department of Public "Works, but, in November of that year, his regiment being warned for service in Nepaul, he obtained permission to rejoin it, and was present at the storm of Kullunga, where the gallant General Sir Rollo Gillespie fell. On the 27th December following, though only a subaltern, he commanded his regiment, which was actively engaged with the enemy at the Morle-ke- Tehee, close to the fort of Jetuk. The force, which was commanded by Major (afterwards General Sir) William Richards, received the high approbation of the Marquis of Hastings.* On the 2nd April, 1815, Roberts was Staff Officer * The Adjutant-General wrote to General G. Martindale, commanding the column : " The conduct of Major Richards and his detachment claims the unqualified approbation of the Commander-in-Chief ; that officer suc- cessfully accomplished the main object for which he was detached, and maintained his position against superior numbers for an entire day, during which Major Richards afforded conspicuous proofs of his judgment, coolness and deliberate valour. His Excellency desires that his particular thanks and approbation be expressed to Major Richards for his conduct on the above arduous occasion, as well as to the whole of the officers and men who composed his detachment, and so ably supported him by their determined exertions of bravery, zeal, and discipline, and patient endurance of fatigue and privations." B 2 4 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. to a Brigade under the command of Sir William Richards, which was successfully engaged at Birla-ke-Tebee, capturing the Nepaul chief, and completely routing the enemy, for which service he received the thanks of his Commanding Officer, and of the Governor- General, the Marquis of Hastings, who per- mitted him on the conclusion of the campaign, as a mark of favour, to return to his appointment in the Puhlic Works Department. On the 9th April, 1816, Lieutenant Roherts again joined his regiment, which was ordered by express from Moradabad to quell a rebellion at Bareilly, in Rohilcund, and made the march of fifty miles without a halt. While in Rohilcund he was placed in charge of the Famine Fund, and had the satisfaction of relieving many thousands of poor sufferers. He now again returned to his appointment in the Public Works Department, where his zeal and activity were proverbial.* Ever anxious to see active service, like his distinguished son, Captain Roberts, in 1824, volunteered for service in the Burmese War, and received the following reply from Colonel Marley, Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Edward Paget, G.C.B., dated 30th June, 1824: "With respect to yourself, there cannot be a doubt upon the subject, you fill a very responsible situation under Government, and it is in it your services will be most useful. Every one who is acquainted with you knows well, that if storming a stockade formed any part of your duty, you would go at it like an Irishman." So valuable were the services in the Public Works Depart- ment, alluded to above, that, on the 2nd February, 1828, Lord * Colonel Penson, the Superintendent of Public Works, writing to Mr. W. B. Bailey, Chief Secretary to Government, under date 30th May, 1817, submitting letters and bills from Lieutenant Roberts, says : " The sum which has been saved on the estimate is considerable, and is highly credit- able to Lieutenant Roberts. I have likewise the pleasure to submit several testimonials in behalf of Lieutenant Roberts, which show how great a favourite this gentleman is in both Civil and Military Departments, and when I consider how greatly an officer of his activity, practical knowledge, and integrity, is wanting to look after the valuable public property in the extensive district of Rohilkund, I hope they may ultimately lead to his fixture in that province. I lately had an opportunity of examining the addition to the jail at Mynporee while erecting under this gentleman's superintendence, and I think he may challenge all India to produce I etter work." Services of Major Abraham Roberts. 5 Amlierst, the Governor- General, presented Major Roberts with a handsome piece of plate, with an inscription testifying to " the services rendered by him as head of his department." On the 28th September, 1831, he was promoted to Lieu- tenant-Colonel, and, in the following year, was selected by Sir E. Barnes, Commander-in-Chief, to command the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, the only European regiment then on the Establish- ment ; and the offer of the appointment was accompanied with handsome letters from the Adjutant and Quartermaster-Gene- rals. Colonel Roberts worked up this fine regiment, then mustering considerably over 1,000 bayonets, to a high state of efficiency, and the General commanding the Dinapore Division wrote to him on 18th January, 1833 : " What I said to the regiment this morning, was what I really felt, and had I the power of language, or a greater fluency of speech, a fair field was open to me to say more. My A.D.C., who has seen many reviews at home, declared he had not for years seen a better performance than the one your fine regiment treated us with this morning." At length, after an uninterrupted service of over thirty years in India, Colonel Roberts * quitted the country on his return home to arrange for the education of his children. After a residence in England of two years, Colonel Roberts returned to India. In 1838 took place the Afghan War, and on the 1st November, Colonel Roberts was placed in command of the 4th Brigade of the Army of the Indus, composed of his own regiment and the 35th and 37th Bengal N.I. In February, 1839, he commanded in Upper Scinde, and at Bukker, on the Indus, had to superintend the crossing of the park, treasure, Commissariat stores, and baggage of the army, which was done * When Colonel Roberts -was about to return home from Cawnpore, General Sir James Sleigh, K.C.B., wrote to him, under date January 5th, 1834: "As you are about to embark for England, and the Lord knows when we may again meet, I am induced to send you these few lines to offer you a memento of my esteem and regard ; and from your having been so considerable a time stationed at Cawnpore, while I had the honour of commanding successively the Station and Division, it may not be less gratifying to you than it is pleasing to myself to assure you how much that esteem was increased by the assiduity and attention invariably observed in your exertions to promote the good of the service, and to fulfil the important duties intrusted to your superintendence." 6 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. without loss. Brigadier Roberts commanded the 4th Brigade at the storming of Ghuznee on the 23rd July, 1839, and re- ceived the thanks of the Commander-in-Chief and Governor- General. Succeeding Sir Robert Sale, who was wounded, in command of the fortress, under the arrangements he made, Captain (the late Sir George) Macgregor secured the person of the commandant, Hyder Khan, a son of Dost Mahomed, with many of his followers, for which Sir John Keane personally thanked Brigadier Roberts. On the termination of the campaign, the Brigadier was ap- pointed to the command of the Shah's troops, and Lord Auck- land promised him the chief command in Afghanistan. Briga- dier Roberts was an outspoken officer, possessing great expe- rience of Orientals, and he entirely disagreed with the course adopted by Sir William Macnaghten, the Envoy and Minister to the Court of our puppet, Shah Soojah, who, having passed his life in the secretariat, had no experience of governing a turbulent race, but took an optimist view of affairs in Afghan- istan, and persisted in disregarding the warnings of his coad- jutors and assistants, Burnes, Rawlinson, Macgregor, Nott, Roberts, and others. Macnaghten being all-powerful at Simla, carried everything with a high hand, and any one who displayed independence incurred his displeasure. Thus he counselled the recall from Candahar of General Nott, because of his blunt out- spokenness and unco'nciliatory manners ; but the Government had the good sense to retain this capable officer, who saved British honour in Southern Afghanistan. Brigadier Roberts saw the true position of affairs, and, warned by the unsettled state of the country, and the several minor disasters that had occurred at outposts, was convinced of the urgent necessity of precautionary measures. Accordingly he recommended that the Bala Hissar and detached forts at Cabul should be strengthened and well armed with artillery ; that in them all the treasure, with an ample supply of grain, should be lodged, and the troops quartered, so that a large force might be available for service in the field. He also remonstrated against the location of troops in remote or exposed situations where they could not be efficiently supported, and, above all, entreated that the force of Afghan levies might be very limited, until Brigadier Roberts and Sir William Macnaghten. 7 officers were better qualified, by more perfect knowledge of their language, customs, and feelings, to command them, and until, from observation and experience, some trustworthy judgment could be formed of their conduct, trustworthiness and utility. But his counsels were disregarded, and the levies raised under Maule, Hopkins, and other officers, eventually proved to be mutinous and utterly useless. Again, the military chest for the whole army was kept in the paymaster's quarters in the city, and Roberts pointed out the great danger of this practice, par- ticularly as the force at Cabul was often very weak. While at Cabul, with the consent of the Envoy, he caused the treasure to be placed in the Bala Hissar, and at the same time stored therein a supply of grain. However, shortly after, at the request of the paymaster, but contrary to the wishes of Brigadier Roberts, the treasure was sent back to the city, and when, on the fatal 2nd November, 1841, the paymaster's house was attacked, the money fell into the hands of the insurgents, not only feeding the rebellion but leaving the British force without funds. Thus it was that the most ordinary military precautions in an enemy's country were deemed superfluous by the ruling civil authority, and the steps Roberts had taken, and the measures he had recommended, were considered either unnecessary, or as indicative of an admission of weakness. After the crash, a high political officer, writing to Robertson 14th February, 1842, bears witness to his sagacity : " How satisfactory it must now be for you to have written those opinions to which you can refer as having been calculated to prevent much, if not all, of the sad disasters that have befallen the fine force you left here." The Envoy with whom privately Roberts was on the best of terms, for Sir William Macnaghten was an accomplished gentle- man, and possessed a generous, noble nature looked upon Roberts as an alarmist, and pitted his own ignorance of mili- tary affairs against the veteran soldier's experience of forty years. He accordingly vetoed Roberts's measures and thwarted his endeavours to provide for the coming storm. Lord Auck- land, who had confidence in the Brigadier, supported him, and in the following letter, dated 6th July, 1840, administered some- thing like a reprimand to his zealous, but injudicious represen- 8 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. tative : "It may, however, I am directed to remark, be of advantage to both services, as well as to the public finances, if deference were upon many points paid to the opinion of Briga- dier Roberts His Lordship in Council has a strong desire, in which he looks for your concurrence, to uphold the military position of Brigadier Roberts. Whenever the regular forces shall be withdrawn from Afghanistan, he will be your first military authority, and every British officer employed in that country should be led to look up to him. But for the reasons that have been given, his Lordship in Council, though he would be glad to know that he is frequently consulted by you and the Shah, would not have him directly interfere with the organization and internal management of the corps wbich are not attached to the Contingent. His Lordship can only express his approbation of the care which is exhibited by the Brigadier for the force committed to his charge, and he will be glad when circumstances will permit him to carry into effect his views for its discipline and comfort. His Lordship in Council can have no doubt that in the event of a Corps of Afghans being substituted for one of the Hindostanee corps of the Contingent, Brigadier Roberts will regularly attend to any instructions which he may receive from you upon those ' grave political considerations' which are attached to every measure bearing upon the national habits of Afghanistan." Fortified by this expression of confidence, Roberts continued to press his advice on the Envoy with a freedom justified by his responsibilities and the vast interests at stake : but all to no effect. He writes of his action in the matter : " We had ample means, if properly applied, for any emergency, for Lord Auck- land had the force most liberally supplied with all requisites for attack or defence, and he was no doubt disappointed at receiving such different reports from the Envoy and myself, but as I was not permitted to use my own judgment in military matters, or to exercise a salutary control over the force I was supposed to command, and as I could not convince the ruling local authority that precaution was necessary, I, with great regret, wrote to Lord Auckland to say how distressed I was at all that had occurred, and stated that under existing circum- Sir Abraham Roberts s Later Services. 9 stances I felt that I could not do justice to the very responsible situation I had the honour to hold." On again writing in the same sense, "Roberts was informed that his resignation w r as accepted, and, in 1841, Brigadier Anquetil, who perished in the passes during the disastrous retreat in January, 1842, was sent to relieve him, and so his connection with Afghanistan ceased. In 1842, when a large force was concentrated at Ferozepore, Koberts was placed in command of the 4th Brigade of the Army of Reserve, and, in 1844, proceeded to England, thus missing the Gwalior Campaign and the Sutlej and Punjaub Campaigns. In 1851 Colonel Roberts returned to India, and was appointed to the command of the Lahore and Peshawur Divisions. On the murder of Colonel Mackeson, Political Agent at Peshawur, in 1853, Brigadier-General Roberts restored confidence by his prompt military arrangements. In December, 1853, he was compelled from very severe illness to resign his command, and finally returned to England, thus con- cluding an honourable and useful military career. Attaining the rank of Major- General in 1854, ten years later he became a full General, and in 1862 was appointed Colonel of the 101st Regiment, formerly his old corps, the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, which boasts of so brilliant a record of service from Plassey to Lucknow, and which he had commanded at the time of the birth of the subject of this memoir. A Companion of the Bath of 1839, General Roberts received the K.C.B. on the 20th of March, 1865, and, finally, on the 8th of December, 1873, was decorated by Her Majesty at Windsor Castle with the Grand Cross of that Order. Within three weeks of receiving this honour, the aged soldier, who could speak of the " brave days of old " of Wellesley and Lake, sank to his rest, full of years and honours. His widow, through the kindness of the Queen, resided, until her death last year, in Hampton Court Palace, and had the gratification, denied to her husband, of surviving to witness the achievements of her son on the fields where his father had earned distinction before him. Our hero's earliest memories were connected with that most io Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. debatable of all military subjects, the first Afghan War, in which the varying phases of success and failure became to his youthful mind an oft-told, but ever entrancing tale. As a boy at his father's table, the talk was " Of sallies and retires ; of trenches, tents ; Of palisadoes, frontiers, parapets ; Of basilisks, of cannon, culverin ; Of prisoners' ransom, and of soldiers slain, And all the currents of a heady fight." To him Afghanistan was a word conjuring up memories that quickened his pulse, and as, round the board of his venerable father, he heard discussions with old companions-in-arms of those dramatic scenes of war, of disgraceful capitulation, of seemingly hopeless imprisonment, and, finally, of glorious retrieval, the boy often longed for the time when he would embark on a military career in that distant land, our conquest of which forms one of the most remarkable episodes in the world's history. Of those veteran comrades of his father few indeed now survive, the most distinguished being Sir George Lawrence, Sir James Airey, Sir Vincent Eyre, Sir George Macgregor, and General Colin Mackenzie,* who, though he did unsurpassed good service during the events at Cabul in 1841-42, alone remains undecorated. Such were the incidents, having a prominent place in the memories of childhood, that occupied the thoughts of young Eoberts, and it is scarcely surprising that the future hero of Peiwar Kotul, Charasiah and Candahar, should have dreamed of emulating the career of his sire in the fields which witnessed some of the most painful and glorious events in our military annals. Of the family of Sir Frederick Koberts, some particulars kindly placed at our disposal by Sir Albert W. Woods, Garter- King-at-Arms, will interest those of genealogical tendencies. The Eoberts family have been settled for generations in County Waterford, Ireland. One John Roberts married Mary, daughter of Major Sautelle, one of the French Protestant refugees, who fought under William the Third, at the battle of the Boyne. * Since this was written, nearly two years ago, the three last-named gallant officers have " gone over to the majority. 1 ' Genealogy of the Roberts Family. 1 1 Their son was the Rev. John Roberts, Magistrate of Passage, Co. Waterford, who married, on 23rd January, 1771, Anne, daughter of Kev. Abraham Sandys, of Dublin, and died in 1814, leaving, among other issue, Captain Sir Samuel Koberts, C.B., R.N., of Belmont, near Waterford ; Captain Thomas Roberts, R.N. ; and the father of the subject of this memoir, born at Waterford, on the llth April, 1784. The late. Sir Abraham. Roberts married, as his first wife, Frances Isabella, daughter of George Poyntz Ricketts, Bengal Civil Service, and by her had one son, Major-General George Ricketts Roberts, Bengal Army ; and two daughters, Fanny Eliza, married Major Charles Grant, Bengal Horse Artillery (died in November, 1853) ; and Maria Isabella, married Lieu- tenant William Maconachie Wellwood. Sir Abraham married secondly, on the 2nd August, 1830, Isabella, daughter of Abraham Bunbury* of Kilfeacle, Co. Tipperary (formerly captain in the 62nd regiment) and widow of Major Hamilton George Maxwell, of Ardwell, by whom she had one son, Colonel Hamilton Maxwell, and one daughter, married to John Davis Sherston, Esq., of Evercreach, Somerset. Besides our hero, Frederick Sleighf Roberts, the issue of this marriage was one daughter, Henrietta Mercer, who died unmarried on the 8th October, 1880. Sir Abraham Roberts died on the 28th December, 1873, in his 90th year, and was buried in the parish church of Clifton, where he had continued to reside after his return from India. \ Sir Frederick Roberts was born at Cawnpore on the 30th September, 1832, and proceeded to England early in 1834 with his parents, who, on their return to India, two years later, left * The Bunburys, who came over to England with the Conqueror, had not long been resident in Waterford. f He received his second name of Sleigh from his godmother, widow of General Sir Francis Sleigh. J The following is the heraldic description of the arms, crest, and sup- porters, conferred on Sir Frederick Roberts as G.C.B. : Arms. Azure, three estoile3 or, on a chief wavy of the last, an eastern crown gules. Crest. A Lion rampant or, armed and langued gules, charged in the shoulder with an eastern crown of the last, and holding in the dexter paw a sword, the blade wavy argent, hilt and pommel gold. Supporters Dexter, a Highlander of the 92nd Regiment, sinister, a Ghoorka, both habited and holding in their exterior hands a rifle, all proper. Motto Virtute et valore. 12 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. him at Clifton. During the succeeding eleven years the home of young Roberts was at Clifton, where he made many friends, who will recall the delicate, rather sickly boy whose buoyant spirits and indomitable nature even then gave promise of future eminence. Frederick Roberts received the rudiments of his education at Miss Carpenter's, Long Ashton, between 1838-40, and for the following two years at Monsieur Desprez's, at Clifton. Between 1842-45 he was a pupil of Mr. Mills, at Hampton, and, in September of the latter year, was entered at Eton, where his tutor was the Rev. T. Eyre Young. He was in the fourth form at Eton, and gained a prize in mathematics, and recently we have seen how his old school claimed the honour of welcoming its distinguished Alumnus, to whom the boys presented a sword. In July, 1846, young Roberts left Eton, and, in the following January, entered Sandhurst, of which Sir George Scovell was Governor, and General Taylor Lieutenant-Governor. At Sand- hurst, where he remained until June, 1848, he gained a German prize and took up three out of the six steps required for a commission without purchase. At this time his father, who was on leave in England, procured him a nomination to Addiscombe, through the interest of General Caulfield. There was, however, no vacancy at the Company's Military Seminary, and Roberts was entered temporarily as a pupil at Stoton's (now Brackenbury's) Preparatory Military Academy at Wimbledon, whence he proceeded to Addiscombe on the 1st February, 1850. Here his military education was conducted under the superintendence of General Stannus, and of his successor in the Governorship, Sir Frederick Abbott, who still survives to congratulate himself on his successful pupil. At Addiscombe, where Roberts attained the rank of corporal, he remained for nearly two years, and, in the winter of 1851, came out ninth in a batch of between forty and fifty cadets who passed the qualifying examination. The six at the top of the list selected the corps of Engineers. The two next, to his great satisfaction, preferred the Bombay Artillery, and so Roberts was posted, according to his special wish, to the Bengal Artillery, the chances of seeing service, and the field Roberts s School and Addiscombe Days. 13 of distinction being greater during the present century in that Presidency than in those of Madras and Bombay. Among Roberts' s contemporaries, during the four terms he was at Addiscombe, were Major-General Sir James Hills, V.C., K.C.B., whose services at Delhi, in Abyssinia, and in Afghanistan, shed such lustre on the corps of which, like Roberts, he was a member ; Captain Elliott Brownlow, of the Bengal Engineers, who was killed at Lucknow; Colonel Lambert, of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers; and Colonel ^Eneas Perkins, R.E., C.B., A.D.C., for whose services as Command- ing Engineer, Roberts applied when he was first appointed to the command of the Koorum force, and who served under his old Addiscombe friend throughout the Afghan War. The two latter officers were, with Roberts, members of a party of six, who " chummed " together and had a fund in common which was placed at the disposal of the fortunate individual who got leave to London from Saturday to Monday. While at Addiscombe, Roberts was in very indifferent health, and suffered so much from heart complaint, that at times he would have sherry by his bedside at night to revive him. However, his spirits never flagged, but rose superior to the ailments of a delicate body, so that he was always remarkable for his gaiety and cheeriness. Though small and far from robust, his figure was well knit and very wiry, and his personal appearance in his Addiscombe days is described as giving the impression of his being much older than he was, and he was then, as through life 'under the most discouraging circumstances, very particular in his dress. On the 12th December, 1851, Roberts was gazetted a second Lieutenant in the Bengal Artillery, a branch of the Company's Service which has reared many eminent soldiers, as Horsford, D'Arcy Todd, Pollock, Henry Lawrence, Archdale Wilson, Harry Tombs, and others too numerous to mention. On the 20th February, 1852, Lieutenant Roberts sailed from Southampton in the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steam- ship Ripon, by the overland route, which, with its changes at Alexandria, Cairo, and Suez (and at Aden for the Bombay passengers), those who went out to India, " Consule Planco," will contrast unfavourably with the present through system of 14 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. passage by the Canal. At Suez, Roberts took passage in the Oriental, which embarked a double complement of passengers, owing to a delay in the previous steamer. The heat in the Red Sea was very trying to the " griffins," who had left England in the depth of winter, and one of the number, a gallant officer, who has seen much hard service in Delhi and elsewhere, told us he had never forgotten Roberts remarking to some of them one day : " I don't know how we shall ever be able to fight in India if it is as hot as this." The gallant youngster, however, learned to fight throughout the terrible heat of the days at Delhi, and recently we have seen how the fiery sun of Afghanistan was unable to quench his ardour for the rough school of war. Among Roberts's fellow-passengers to Calcutta were Sir Barnes Peacock, Chief Justice of Bengal, who is still in harness as a Member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and that veteran officer, Sir John Gough, G.C.B., going out to resume his office of Quartermaster- General of Queen's troops. On his arrival in India, Roberts reported himself at Dum Dum, then the head-quarters of the Bengal Artillery, but, after a brief stay of four months, proceeded up- country to Peshawur, where his father was Brigadier- General in command of the Division. Here he served on his father's staff in the capacity of acting aide-de-camp, not having passed the languages, but, early in 1852, joined the 1st Peshawur Mountain Battery, commanded by Captain (now Major-General) Tom Brougham, who had the satisfaction of giving the first training in the duties of gunner to the hero of the second Afghan War. Lieutenant Roberts's activity and smartness in acquiring his duties procured him the coveted "jacket," and, at the end of 1854, he was posted to the 1st troop, 2nd Brigade, Bengal Horse Artillery, that splendid service which drew from Lord Hardinge, no mean judge, the avowal that it was unequalled by any in the world. It was no mean distinction to serve in this troop, then commanded by Colonel Barr, an officer who had served with distinction in Afghanistan, and Roberts, by his zeal and efficiency as an artillery officer, kept up the prestige it had acquired. Roberts's early service was uneventful. He was not so Roberts s Service at Peshawur. 15 fortunate as to be engaged in the war against Burmah, which took place in the year of his arrival in India, but though a valuable province was acquired as the result of the campaign, little honour accrued to our arms in the defeat of so unworthy a foe. Still it was disappointing to an eager soldier like Roberts, and a weary five years passed without his seeing a shot fired. To serve on the staff is in India, as in England, the ambition of the most capable officers of the army, and, on the 25th March, 1856, Roberts was appointed to officiate as Deputy- Assistant - Quartermaster - General of the Peshawur Division, an appointment he held, with a brief intermission, until the outbreak of the Mutiny in 1857. The question of the causes of the Mutiny have been discussed by so many writers that it may almost be said, quot hominis tot sententite. Many well qualified to speak have attributed that great convul- sion which rivalled the French Revolution in its horrors, and the magnitude of the political and social changes introduced by its agency to our recent annexation of Oude, to the bad faith with which the Native Army was treated, and to our denial of the rights of adoption to the Hindoo chiefs ; but these, whether taken singly or together, do not, in our opinion, account for the Indian Mutiny. The annexation was a measure for the good of the people of Oude, necessitated by the incredible misgovernment of its rulers, who had been warned since the time of Lord Wellesley of its imminence. The question of adoption had only a contingent interest for the Native rulers, and in no way concerned the Native Army; and as to the charge of bad faith, the Sepoys had been petted and spoiled until they entertained an overweening estimate of their import- ance an idea likely to be renewed if the fuss made over the Indian Contingent for their recent services in Egypt is to be repeated on every occasion we have need of their services beyond the Indian frontier. Rather may we attribute the Mutiny to the lax discipline of the Native Army, the small power entrusted to the European officers, which had been so whittled away that, by an order of Sir William Gomm (Commander-in- Chief in succession to Sir Charles Napier, in 1851), a Sepoy might appeal against the Commanding officer to a court-martial. In our opinion Sir 1 6 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. Richard Temple, whose experience of Indian questions is un- surpassed, hit the right nail on the head when, in his " Men and Events of my Time," he gives the following reason as a " sufficient and self-evident explanation" of the great Mutiny : " The short and plain truth is that the great Mutiny of 1857 arose because the British Government in India had for a long time maintained a Native Army much too large, and a British force much too small. The Government thus unwittingly placed itself in the power of the Sepoys. This, and this alone, was the main cause of that tremendous event. The Sepoys would never have revolted unless they had felt themselves able to do so with some chance of success." Nothing is so certain in India as the unforeseen. When, early in 1857, the first symptoms of disaffection manifested themselves among our Sepoys, few even among the most sagacious anticipated the deluge of mutiny that was about to overwhelm the land. It was a time of fierce trial to every English-speaking individual in the peninsula. In view of the magnitude of the interests affected, the extent of the area over which warlike operations raged, and the dramatic nature of the scenes that enthralled the attention of the civilized world, well might the portents have been expected, anticipated by Caesar's wife on the eve of the "Ides of March," so memor- able in classic history : ''Fierce fiery warriors fight upon the clouds, In ranks, and squadrons, and right form of war, Which drizzled blood upon the Capitol ; The noise of battle hurtled in the air, Horses did neigh, and dying men did groan." But though mutterings of sedition were heard at Barrackpore and elsewhere, and portended disaster to those " who had ears to hear," and recalled the scenes before enacted there and at Vellore, yet no one dreamed of the storm that was about to burst over the land. Balls and pic-nics enlivened the dulness of the military stations as in former years, and all " went merry as a marriage bell " at Meerut, Jhansi, Futtehgurh, and Cawn- pore that name of horror to English ears always one of the gayest of stations. The fair women, some newly arrived from England, looked forward with pleasing anticipations to winning 77/6' Eve of the Indian Mutiny. 1 7 the hearts of the gallant men, of which many were so soon to be stilled in death. And these brave men, whose names are imperishably recorded in the history of the events of '57, what recked they of the wrath to come ? Did not a great master of their art enunciate for their guidance a philosophic truth that has nerved the hearts -of many in the supreme moment of battle ? ' Cowards die many times before their deaths, The valiant never taste of death but once." 1 8 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. CHAPTER II. The Siege of Delhi Roberts joins the Punjaub Movable Column Proceeds to Delhi as Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General of Artillery Lieutenant Roberts participates in the Action of the 9th July Gallantry of his Friend, Lieutenant Hills Roberts is wounded in the Fighting on the 14th July Preparations for the Bombardment Roberts serves in No. 2 Battery at Ludlow Castle The Storm and Cap- ture of Delhi Sir James Brind's Reminiscences of Sir Frederick Roberts at Delhi. ON the 12th May, 1857, news of the mutiny at Meerut and the seizure of Delhi was received at Peshawur, where Lieutenant Eoberts was officiating as Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster- General of the division then commanded by Major-General Eeed. Before noon of the following day, a council of war to provide for the defence of the Peshawur valley and the Punjaub generally, -was held at the General's quarters, at which was assembled a group of officers such as any country might be proud to number among her sons Brigadier Sydney Cotton, commanding the Peshawur garrison ; Lieutenant - Colonel Herbert Edwardes, Commissioner of the division ; Lieutenant- Colonel Nicholson, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur; and Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, commanding the Punjaub Frontier Force. It was a meeting fraught with mighty conse- quences, for on the counsels of the assembled officers rested, in a measure, the destinies not only of the Punjaub, but of the entire Peninsula. At Nicholson's suggestion it was decided that a Movable Column should be formed to operate upon any point menaced with danger. General Reed, accompanied by Lieutenant Roberts as the officer representing the Quartermaster-General's department of his division, went to Rawul Pindee, whither he had been sum- moned by Sir John Lawrence, Chief Commissioner of the Punjaub, to concert measures for the safety of the border province of the Empire during the crisis which, that sagacious The Punjaub Movable Column. 19 statesman recognized with prescient vision, had arrived. After conferring with Sir John Lawrence, General Reed submitted to the Commander-in- Chief by telegraph the names of Cotton, Edwardes, Nicholson, and Chamberlain for the command of the Movable Column formed on the 20th May, and General Anson telegraphed back his selection of the last-named officer for the responsible duty. General Chamberlain appointed Lieutenant Roberts to be staff officer of the column, which they joined at Wuzeerabad on the Chenaub. It consisted of the following troops from Seal- kote : H.M.'s 52nd Light Infantry, Colonel Campbell ; Major Michael Dawes' troop of Horse Artillery ; Captain G. Bourchier's (No. 17) Field Battery ; the 35th Native Infantry, Colonel Younghusband; and a wing of the 9th Cavalry. There were also attached Major Knatchbull's battery of Native Artillery, the 16th Irregular Cavalry, and wing of the 17th Cavalry. A difficulty now arose on a question that, in our Army, has so often proved a stumbling-block to military efficiency the question of com- mand as regulated by seniority. Colonel Campbell was senior to Neville Chamberlain, and declined to serve under his junior ; but on referring the matter to Lahore, it was soon set at rest, Colonel Campbell being informed that he must either retire from the force or serve under his junior's command. Like a good soldier he selected the latter alternative, and, at a later date, arriving at Delhi with General Nicholson, did good service at the siege. As Colonel Herbert Edwardes wrote at the time : " How common sense revenges itself upon defective systems when real dangers assail a State. Had there been no struggle for life or death when would Neville Chamberlain and John Nicholson, in the prime of their lives,* with all their faculties of doing and enduring, have attained the rank of brigadier-general ? Why should we keep down in peace the men whom we must put up in war ?" The Movable Column marched from Wuzeerabad on the 28th May, and in a few days arrived at Lahore. The troops at Meean Meer, the military cantonment of Lahore, consisting of three regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, had already been dis- * General Nicholson was at this time thirty-five, and General Chamber- lain two years his senior. Edwardes himself was only thirty- eight. c 2 2O Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. armed by Brigadier Corbett, and it was now decided to dismount the 8th Cavalry, a notoriously disaffected corps, like most of the mounted regiments. The operation was successfully effected in the following manner. By a slight change in the usual marching order of the column, H.M.'s 52nd were placed in front, it having been previously intimated to the officer com- manding that, while the left wing and the rest of the column halted at the civil station at Anarkullee, the right wing was to march on to Meean Meer, the encampment six miles farther on, and take up ground at the central picket. The wing arrived in the dim twilight, and drew up alongside the picket, which consisted of two companies of H.M.'s 81st Foot, four guns of the Horse Artillery, and Lieutenant Nicholson's * Irregular Cavalry. The 8th were then ordered out. Over- awed by the proximity of so large a European force, and with Coke's unsympathising Punjaubees at their side, they sullenly obeyed the order to dismount. General Chamberlain halted with the Movable Column at Lahore for a few days, during which two Sepoys of the 35th Native Infantry, the same regiment which had done such good service at Jellahabad under Sir Robert Sale, were tried for using seditious language and endeavouring to instigate their comrades to mutiny, and, being convicted, were, on the 9th of June, blown away from guns. On the previous evening intelli- gence had been received by telegraph of the mutiny of the 36th and 61st Native Infantry at Jullundhur, and, on the night of the execution, the Movable Column marched thither, and, on the following day, had covered the distance of thirty miles between Lahore and Umritsur. Near the sacred city of the Sikhs is the important fortress of Govindghur, garrisoned at this time by a company of artillery, and a company of H.M.'s 81st Regiment. Here General Cham- berlain received orders to join the Delhi Field Force, to take the place of Colonel Chester, the Adjutant-General, who had been killed at the action of Budlee-Kee- Serai, on the 9th June ; and Colonel Denniss, second in command of the 52nd, took tempo- * Lieutenant Charles Nicholson, who was a brother of General Nicholson, lost an arm at the storm of Delhi, and died some time later when on a visit to the grave of his brother, whose death affected his health. Roberts 's Sewices with the Movable Column. 21 rary command until the arrival of the Column at Jullundhur on the 21st of June. On the following day, Brigadier-General Nicholson assumed charge, to the great satisfaction of the entire force, and, on the 24th, proceeded to Phillour. Lieutenant Roberts continued on Nicholson's staff in charge of the quar- termaster-general's department, and soon gained the entire con- fidence of his chief. These two soldiers, whose exploits during crises in our Indian history have placed their names high in the temple of fame, had much in common. Both possessed that impetuous valour which refuses to he deterred by difficulties when an object has to be achieved, and yet both were gifted with that military insight which correctly gauges the means necessary to effect the end sought to be attained ; inspired on the field of battle by the " Gaudia certaminis," the rapture of the strife, referred to by Attila in his address to his soldiers, these born leaders of men were never more self-possessed than at such a time. In short, Nicholson and Roberts were gifted with that spark of heavenly fire we call genius, whether possessed by the poet, painter, states- man, or soldier. Speaking of the military qualifications of the officers under whom he served during the Indian Mutiny, Roberts gives the palm iucontestably to Nicholson, as not only the best, but indeed the only one who was possessed of that rarest of attributes. From Jullundhur General Nicholson marched to Phillour, twenty-four miles distant, on the right bank of the Sutlej, in the direct line of the Grand Trunk Road, a place of such great strategical value, that Sir Charles Napier described it as the " key of the Punjaub." The safety of Phillour was of essential importance, as in the strong fort is a magazine, with munitions of war only inferior in importance to those stored at Ferozepore and at Delhi, now feeding the rebellion, owing to the same system of crass stupidity which cost us an army at Cabul the system by which the very sinews of war are placed within the keeping of those who may be our enemies. Some difficulty was experienced in crossing the Beas, which had risen ; but Lieutenant Roberts effected the passage of the troops and stores with a success that elicited the commendation of his chief. On the morning of the 25th of June, on his 22 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. arrival at Phillour, General Nicholson put into execution a step he had been for some time revolving in his mind. This was the disarming of the 33rd and 35th Regiments of Native Infantry, the arrangements for which were made by Lieutenant Roberts, and were carried out with complete success. When the General made his appearance on the camping-ground, there were no signs of preparation for any unusual occurrence. The Europeans and the guns were in advance, and so placed that when the suspected Sepoy regiments came up in succession to the camping-ground, they were completely at the mercy of their white comrades. These had their instructions, and were so disposed, many of the Europeans lying on the ground as if for rest, that the most suspicious could detect no symptom of the impending disarmament. As, however, the first of the Native regiments came up, the men were told to pile their arms by Nicholson, who, leaning over one of the guns, gave his orders as unconcernedly as though they were of the most ordinary character. " If they bolt," he said to Captain Bourchier, of the artillery, "you follow as hard as you can ; the bridge will have been destroyed, and we shall have a Sobraon on a small scale." But the Sepoy regiments, entrapped by the suddenness of the order, and scarcely knowing what they were doing, piled their arms at the word of command, and suffered them to be taken to the fort. This done, Nicholson addressed them, saying that desertion would be punished with death, and that they could not possibly escape, as the fords were watched. Eight men made the attempt, but were brought back, tried, and con- demned.* On the following day Lieutenant Roberts severed his con- nection with the Punjaub Movable Column. Hearing that artillery officers were urgently required at Delhi, he applied for permission to resign his appointment, and join the army there. General Nicholson at first would not give his consent, but Roberts urged his request so earnestly, that, at length, the gallant General, who could not but sympathize with the ardour of the young staff officer, whose ambition to be where blows were * See " Eight Months' Campaign against the Bengal Sepoy Army," by Colonel G. Bourchier, C.B., Bengal Horse Artillery. Roberts s Arrival at Delhi. 23 thickest, struck a responsive chord in his own breast, gave the required permission. Quitting the column at Phillour, Lieutenant Roberts trav- elled in a mail cart with two officers Lieutenant C. F. Packe, 4th Native Infantry (attached to the 4th Sikh Infantry during the siege), who was shot in the ankle and maimed for life the morning after their arrival at Delhi, and Captain W. G. Law, 10th Native Infantry (attached to the 1st Punjaub Infantry, known as Coke's Rifles, from their gallant leader), who was killed during the siege. On arriving at Delhi, on Sunday, the 28th of June, Lieu- tenant Roberts was first appointed Deputy- Assistant Quarter- master-General to the cavalry brigade, but, at his own request, was transferred in the same capacity to the artillery. Within a few days of his arrival in the camp, beneath the historic " ridge" whereon the batteries of the immortal Delhi Field Force were placed, the army was strengthened by some small reinforce- ments, but at no time did it exceed 9,000 efficient combatants. The siege, upon which the small British force, under the command of Sir Henry Barnard, entered in June, 1857, is, probably, unparalleled in modern times, for the besiegers were at times equally the besieged, and they were outnumbered as three to one, so that the labour and fighting were harassing in the extreme. Such an event as a regular siege undertaken during the monsoon months was unknown in our Indian history, and would have horrified such old campaigners as Lord Gough, being contrary to what honest Fluellen calls "the true and ancient prerogatifes and laws of the wars." It was a time when the stubborn character of the English blood was displayed at its best, and the men who know not when they are beaten clung with desperate tenacity to their lines and batteries, whilst con- tinuous bodies of rebels poured into the city, flushed with murder and rapine, and bent on establishing the truth of the prophecy held out as a bait to them that the English Raj, which was founded at Plassey on the 23rd of June, 1757, would come to an end on the hundredth anniversary of that event. It was a time of stern, arduous effort, when every man had to play his part, and the heroic in the nature of each found opportunities of display. 24 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. Delhi in 1857 was no place for poltroons or fops, such as the lord Avho excited the ire of the soldierly Percy : "Neat, trimly dress'd, Fresh as a bridegroom ; and his chin, new reap'd, Show'd like a stubble-land at harvest time. * * * * As the soldiers bore dead bodies by, He called them untaught knaves, unmannerly, To bring a slovenly unhandsome corse Betwixt the wind and his nobility." All eyes in India were centred on Delhi, the focus of rebellion, and it was universally recognized that upon the ability of the small British force, scarce stronger at times than a brigade, to bring the siege to a successful conclusion, depended our hold of the great Eastern dependency and the safety of every white man, woman, and child in the country. It was resolved, in spite of some more timid counsels in high places, to fight it out on that ridge, and, bull-dog like, to die, if needs be, before relinquishing their hold on the throat of rebellion. While the effective strength of the besieging force, even with the addition of wings of H.M.'s 8th and 61st Regiments, only numbered 6,600 men, the rebels received constant rein- forcements, and, on the 1st and 2nd July, the Rohilcund mutineers marched over the bridge of boats across the Jumna, in full view of the British troops on the ridge above the camp. They consisted of No. 15 Horse Battery, two 6-pounder guns, the 8th Irregular Cavalry, and the 18th, 28th, 29th, and 68th Native Infantry. The rebels continued to receive accessions of strength, and, during the month of June, there arrived the Jhansi troops, consisting of half No. 18 Light Field Battery, a wing 12th Native Infantry, and the 14th Irregular Cavalry; and the Neemuch Brigade, which included a troop of Native Horse Artillery, a wing 1st Light Cavalry, the 72nd Native Infantry, the 7th Regiment of the Gwalior Contingent, and the cavalry and infantry of the Kotah Contingent. At the lowest esti- mate, Lieutenant Norman, Assistant Adjutant-General of the Field Force, places the rebel strength in August at 30,000 men, exclusive of undisciplined men recruited from the city and rural population. Their supply of guns and ammunition was practically inexhaustible, owing to their possession of the Roberts s First Brush with the Enemy. 25 magazine in Delhi, the British force being scarcely sufficient to invest one-third of the walls, and access to the left bank of the Jumna being secured to the rebels by the bridge of boats, which was protected by the fire of the guns at Selimgurh, and was fully 2,500 yards from the British batteries. A constant stream of supplies was poured into the city, the British commanders being content to be able to keep open their rear, and communi- cate with the Punjaub, whence all their supplies were derived. Had the large force of trained regular and irregular cavalry at the disposal of the rebel leaders been properly handled, it is certain that communications with Umballa and other points in the rear could not have been maintained, thus ensuring the raising of the siege and the temporary success of the rebellion until the arrival of reinforcements from England ; but through- out the protracted operations known as the Mutiny, the rebellious Sepoys were destitute of any directing head or leader of capacity, and there being no plan of combined action, such advantages as they possessed were neglected. Lieutenant Roberts had not been long in camp before his ardent spirit was gratified by participating in the almost daily conflicts in which the Field Force was engaged, either repel- ling an attack or taking the initiative. On the 30th June the rebels made an attack on the position on the extreme right, at Hindoo Rao's house, and Lieutenant Roberts witnessed some sharp fighting, lasting from 9 A.M. till 2 P.M., when the enemy were repulsed. During the afternoon of the 3rd July, encouraged by the arrival of large reinforcements, a body of some 5,000 or 6,000 insurgents moved into the gardens and suburbs on the right of the British position, and pushed on rapidly from Alipore, one march in rear of the camp, compelling the squadron of 5th Punjaub Cavalry stationed there to fall back towards Rhye. The fire of the enemy's guns could be heard in camp, and at 2 A.M. on the 4th July, Major Coke was sent to intercept the rebels with a column, consisting of four guns of Captain Money's troop of Horse Artillery, and two guns of the native troop, Major Scott's Horse Battery, a squadron Carabineers, a squadron 9th Lancers, the Guide Cavalry, the wing H.M.'s 61st Regiment, and the 1st Punjaub Rifles. Roberts, in the 26 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. capacity of staff officer, accompanied this column, which num- bered in all about 300 cavalry, 800 infantry, and 12 guns, which were all that could be spared from the camp. At one time grave fears were felt that the rebels might be pushing on to attack Kurnaul, or, at least, to intercept treasure on the road under native escort between that station and Delhi. About sunrise, however, it became known that they had re-crossed the canal near Alipore, and were returning towards Delhi along the high and dry ground running nearly parallel with the canal, and at a distance from it of a mile or more. Major Coke at once moved to take them in the flank, but had to proceed over a swampy cross-country road for a mile and a half to a bridge over the canal, and then had more than a mile of swampy fields to pass over. The Artillery came first into action, and were immediately answered by the insurgents' guns, which had been moved into a village when they perceived the British approach, their infantry and cavalry at the same time facing towards the advancing enemy. The infantry, however, save some posted in the village, soon com- menced moving off again, their cavalry shortly did the same, and their artillery fire slackening, it was evident their guns also were being withdrawn. Major Coke again advanced his guns, though with much difficulty, owing to the nature of the ground, and, hurrying on the infantry and mounted men, the Guide Cavalry on the left were directed to push forward and get on the line of the enemy's retreat ; owing, however, to the deep mud, little progress could be made, and the rebels carried off all their guns. However, all the plunder taken from Alipore was re-captured, together with some artillery waggons and ammunition. On his return towards camp, Major Coke rested his infantry and some of his cavalry at the canal bank, and, while here, was attacked by some fresh troops from Delhi, including a body of 800 horse. The firing was sharp, and cavalry and artillery were sent from camp to Major Coke's support. The attack, however, had been virtually repulsed before these supports arrived, and all returned to camp, the Europeans having suffered much from the intense heat of the sun. On the 5th of July, the Commander-iu-Chief, Sir Henry The Sortie of the <^th July. 27 Barnard, an officer much liked and respected, expired of cholera, after an illness of six hours, and General Reed, as senior officer in the camp, became Provisional Commander-in- Chief, being the third since the 23rd of May, when General Anson had died of that terrible Indian scourge. On the 9th of July, a severe action was fought with the enemy, in which Lieutenant Roberts participated in the capacity of staff officer of the force engaged. During the morning the rebels, in great force, showed out of the city in the suburbs on the right, and about ten o'clock a body of horse, assisted by the treachery of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, made a determined raid into the British lines. On the right was a mound, on which was a battery of three 18-pounders, with an infantry picket, facing the Subzee Mundee suburb, and to the right again were stationed two Horse Artillery guns, with an escort of a troop of the 6th Dragoon Guards (Carabineers). Beyond these, at a position called the Fakir's Enclosure, was a native officer's picket of the 9th Irregulars, with two vedettes thrown forward. The folly of placing an inlet of the camp practically in the keeping of these horsemen, who had shown by their action at Budlee-Kee- Serai, on the 8th of June, that little confidence could be reposed in them, was soon made manifest. The rebel cavalry suddenly charged through the picket of Irregulars and dashed upon the two Horse Artillery guns of Major Tomb's troop, commanded by Lieutenant Hills.* The gallantry and self-sacrifice displayed by this officer should be chronicled here in a memoir of his old Addiscombe friend, whom he accompanied in his memorable advance on Cabul, after the massacre of the Cavagnari mission. The Carabineers, only numbering thirty-two troopers, all young soldiers, turned and broke, with the exception of Lieutenant Stillman and two or three men. Lieutenant Hills, seeing the rebel horsemen advancing unopposed, and desirous of giving his gunners time to unlimber, took the desperate resolution of charging single-handed the head of the column. It was a self-sacrificing resolve, worthy to be compared with * Now Major-General Sir James Hills, V.C., K.C.B. 28 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. that of the Curtius who sacrificed his life for the good of the Republic, and it was right gallantly carried out, and gained that young officer the coveted V.C., which was never more worthily be- stowed. Charging with impetuosity, Hills cut down the first man he met with, slashed a second across the face with his sword, and turned to meet two other horsemen who had made at him. The horse of the young officer came into violent collision with the steeds of the sowars, and he was hurled to the ground ; the fall probably saved his life, for both his enemies had made desperate cuts at him, which did not take effect, though one laid open his jacket just below the left arm. Hills lay for a moment stunned, and the sowars, thinking him killed, passed on ; recovering him- self, he regained his sword, which lay about ten yards off, and had just time to secure it before he found himself confronted with three " Pandies," two on horseback and the third on foot. The position was as desperate as can well be imagined, but Hills managed to engage them in detail. The first man he brought down from his horse by a sword-cut, and as the second charged him, lance in rest, he dexterously guarded the thrust, and, with a swinging blow, brought him also off his perch. The fellow had received a terrible gash across the head and face, but advanced upon young Hills, who, in a second encounter, despatched him by a sabre wound on the head. He had hardly disposed of this antagonist when the third and most for- midable of the trio, a young and powerful man, was upon him. Hills was now exhausted, and moreover was almost suffocated by his cloak, which during the struggle had got tightly twisted round his throat. A cut he made at his adversary's head was parried, and the Pandy, running in, seized the hilt of Hills' sword and wrenched it out of his hand. Having nothing left but his fists, the young Englishman brought into play the " noble art " he had acquired at Addiscombe. "Punching the head " would, however, do little in the case of a man with a sword, and Hills fell in the struggle, and would have been despatched had not Major Tombs, at the critical moment, dropped his antagonist by a lucky " potshot " with his revolver at thirty yards. But Hills' penchant for fighting was not yet satisfied. Re- turning after some time to secure the imlimbered gun which A Hot Days Work. 29 had been left behind, the two officers saw the man whom they thought killed making off with a pistol which Hills had hurled at one of his assailants during the recent melee. The young officer ran after him, and made a cut at him with his sword, which the Pandy cleverly avoided by springing on one side, at the same time inflicting a severe wound on Hills' head. The latter sprang to his feet, and cutting at his adversary, nearly severed his hand at the wrist. Major Tombs now arrived and despatched the plucky native by running him through the body. Both these gallant artillery officers received the Victoria Cross, and both acquired great subsequent distinction.* Meanwhile, the rebel horsemen riding over and past the guns, followed the flying Dragoons in at the right of the camp, but, failing to induce a troop of native horse artillerymen to join them, were soon driven out by some troops hastily collected together by Captain Fagan, of the Artillery. During this epi- sode the rebels maintained a heavy cannonade from the guns on the city walls and field-pieces in the open, while large bodies of the enemy, stationed in the enclosures and gardens of the suburbs, opened fire on the batteries and Subzee Mundee pickets. To dislodge these a column was formed, under the command of General Chamberlain, who was accompanied by Lieutenant Roberts. The force consisted of Major Scott's Horse Battery, the available men of the wings 8th and 61st Foot, and the 4th Sikh Infantry, in all about 700 infantry and six guns, reinforced en route by the head-quarters and two companies 60th Rifles, under Lieutenant-Colonel J. Jones, the infantry being commanded by Brigadier "W. Jones, C.B. As this column, under constant and heavy showers of rain, swept up through the Subzee Mundee, Major Reid, commanding the Sirmoor Battalion, was instructed to move down from Hindoo Rao's picket on the ridge and co-operate with such infantry as could be spared from the main picket. The insurgents were cleared out of the dense vegetation of the gardens without difficulty, though at some of the serais they offered a very obstinate resistance, and were not dislodged without considerable * Sir Harry Tombs, the very beau ideal of a soldier in character and personal appearance, died a few years ago of a painful malady. 30 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. loss. The success of the day, says Norman, " was greatly due to the admirable and steady practice of Major Scott's Battery, under a heavy fire, eleven men being put liors de combat out of its small complement." The British loss was one officer and forty men killed, and eight officers and 163 men wounded ; that of the enemy being officially computed at 500. This was the first severe action in which Roberts was en- gaged, and it so whetted his appetite for fighting that a few days later, when another " tamasha" came off, he was in the thick of it, and received a wound which was near putting a premature termination to his career. The hardships of camp life were much increased by the torrents of rain which continued to deluge the British lines, while that terrible scourge, cholera, decimated the ranks of the brave little army ; the wings of the 8th and 61st Regiments being the chief sufferers. Reports were received that the rebel chiefs, probably encouraged by the destruction of the can- tonment at Agra by the Neemuch Brigade, had sworn to cap- ture the British guns on the ridge, and smoke their hookahs in Hindoo- Rao's house, the key of the position, which was held throughout the siege by Major Reid with the Sirmoor Battalion and two companies of the 60th Rifles. Accordingly, on the morning of the 14th July, they swarmed out in great force, and attacked the batteries on the right flank, and the fire for many hours from great guns and small-arms was con- tinuous and very heavy. As the batteries on the ridge failed to drive the rebels back, about four o'clock a column of attack was formed, under Brig- adier Showers, who was accompanied by General Chamberlain, on whose staff Roberts served for the day. The column con- sisted of half of Major Turner's and Captain Money's troops of Horse Artillery, six guns ; the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, under Major Jacob ; Coke's Corps of Punjaubees, and Major Reid's Sirmoor Battalion ; with some details of Guide Cavalry and Hodson's Horse. The action that ensued was not an unquali- fied success, for though the rebels lost heavily, our small army, in which every life was of consequence, also suffered severely. The column marched through the Subzee Mundee, and drove Roberts is Wounded. 31 off the enemy, on whom they inflicted great loss, but, in the ardour of the pursuit, followed them up close under the walls of the city, when they got under the range of the heavy guns, which opened on them with grape. There was nothing to do but to retreat, when the rebels sallied out, but did not care to come to close quarters, and a charge of cavalry was effectively met by Hodson, who, wrote Greathed, in his letter describing the events of the day, " always turns up in moments of diffi- culty." The British loss was fifteen men killed and sixteen officers and 117 men wounded. Among the officers wounded were Brigadier-General Chamberlain, who had his arm shat- tered by a grape-shot when leading the troops with all the ardour that distinguished this beau sabreur. Roberts, who was actively engaged on the staff, had a narrow escape of his life. As the force was retreating, a bullet lodged in his cap-pouch, and broke the skin of his back, making a severe bruise close to the spine, though had it not been for the cap-pouch he must have been killed. This article of accoutre- ment was a small native-made affair, less than three inches across, similar to what was worn by most officers in carrying revolver caps, and was always carried in front. By some means the pouch had worked round to the back, and was thus the means of saving the life of its wearer, who, on being struck, put his hand to the part affected, and could not at first make out what it was he had got there. For more than a month Lieutenant Roberts was not permitted to go on duty by the doctor, which was a great trial to him, though he visited the batteries, and could not be prevailed upon to keep quiet in his tent. The enemy suffered severely on the 14th of July, their loss being estimated at 1,000, and, for hours, carts were seen con- veying their dead into the city. A change now again took place in the chief command. General Reed, who had been in ill-health since he joined the force on the 8th of June, and was daily growing feebler, re- signed the command into the hands of Brigadier Archdale Wilson, commanding the Artillery, an officer who possessed the confidence of the army, having, in the actions of the 30th and 31st of May, on the Hindun, displayed considerable skill, 32 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. and with 700 men defeated a rebel force seven times his strength. There were officers senior to Wilson in the camp, but the times were too grave for such considerations to have any weight. The only one of them having superior claims was General Chamberlain, who would have been selected with the unanimous approval of the camp had not the severe wound received on the 14th, incapacitated him from active service during the remainder of the siege, and even from continuing his duties as Adjutant-General, which were filled with con- spicuous ability and success by Lieutenant (now General Sir) Henry Norman, of the 31st Native Infantry. On the 18th of July, the last serious fighting took place in the Subzee Mundee, for, by this time, the Engineers had cleared away the walls, serais, and gardens for some distance round the posts held by the British pickets in that suburb, while the breastwork connecting them with the crest of the Hindoo Rao range was completed. The nearest post to the city, an old temple, called by the European soldiers the " Sammy House," some way down the slope of the ridge, and within 900 yards' grape range of the Moree Bastion, was greatly strengthened and cover provided for its garrison. On the ridge itself, addi- tional captured field-guns were planted in favourable positions, thus greatly increasing the duties of the Bengal Artillery, an unsurpassed body of gunners ; and had it not been for the aid of the newly-raised Sikh Artillery, and volunteers from Euro- pean regiments, it would have been impossible to have worked the guns. In these congenial duties, Lieutenant Roberts, when time and opportunity offered, participated with the ardour which, it is said, induces actors, during their evenings of occa- sional leisure, to witness the performance of their brethren of the " sock and buskin." On the 20th of July, a reconnoissance was made by a column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Seaton, C.B., 35th Native Infantry, a gallant and able officer, who had served under Sir Robert Sale throughout the siege of Jellalabad ; and, three days later, a strong force was sent under Brigadier Showers to drive away the enemy, who, emerging from the Cashmere Gate, had occupied Ludlow Castle, and annoyed the pickets with the fire from some field-guns. The rebels were dispersed after some Heavy Fighting before Delhi. 33 smart skirmishing ; among the British officers wounded being Colonels Seaton and Drought, and Captain Money, commanding a troop of horse artillery, the command of which now devolved on Captain Blunt. The enemy at this time displayed great boldness, and, on the night of the 1st of August, a strong body, with guns and mor- tars, which had marched out of Delhi on the preceding day with the intention of getting into the rear of the camp, on their return moved through the Kissengunj suburb, and attacked the position on the extreme right of the ridge, coming close up to the breastworks, as many as 127 bodies being counted in front of one to the right of the Sammy House. The rebels now turned their attention to annoying the British position at Met- calfe's picket on the extreme left, near the river, and in front of Ludlow Castle and the Khoodsee Bagh. At dawn of the 12th of August, a column proceeded to drive them out of their positions, under the command of Brigadier Showers, and was completely successful, though at considerable loss, among the severely wounded being those invaluable officers, Brigadier Showers and Major Coke, the commander of the 1st Punjaub Infantry, or Coke's Rifles. Meanwhile Sir John Lawrence was straining every nerve to reinforce the Delhi Army, for, with characteristic sagacity, he recognized the fact that, on the early downfall of the head- quarters of the rebellion, depended the safety of the Empire. Denuding his province of almost every soldier, he despatched Brigadier- General Nicholson to the assistance of General Wilson, with a brigade of all arms, including H.M.'s 52nd Regiment, 600 bayonets, the remaining wing of H.M.'s 61st Regiment, and Bourchier's Light Field Battery. Nicholson, posting on in advance of the column, arrived at the camp on the 8th of August, and dined that night at the head-quarters mess, Mr. Greathed* describing him as "a fine, imposing- * The letters of Mr. Hervey Harris Greathed, Commissioner and Political Agent with the Delhi Field Force, who died on the 19th of September before the walls of Delhi, were republished by his widow, and form one of the most interesting records of that eventful struggle. He was one of three brothers who served throughout the siege of Delhi, the others being Colonel (the late General Sir) Edward Greathed, commanding H.M.'s 8th Regiment, and Lieutenant Wilberforce Greathed, of the Bengal Engineers, who was severely wounded at the assault on the 14th of September. D 34 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. looking man, who never speaks if he can help it." Eeturning to rejoin his brigade, it marched into camp with drums beating and colours flying on the 13th of August. The advent of Nicholson was hailed with satisfaction by the entire camp, as he had a great reputation as a fighting general, like his friend Neville Chamberlain, but was credited with more caution ; both had been trained in the Punjaub school, like other soldiers then before Delhi, the famous Hodson, and Coke, Daly, Probyn, Watson, and Roberts. On the 25th August, Nicholson moved with a strong force, including 16 guns and 800 European infantry, to Nujufgurh, in which direction a large column of the enemy had marched with the intention of intercepting the siege train then moving up from Ferozepore under a weak escort. He asked Roberts to accom- pany him as staff officer, but on the latter applying to do so, the doctors refused permission as his wound was not sufficiently healed. It was a great disappointment to our hero. Nicholson was completely successful, and the rebels were defeated with the loss of thirteen out of eighteen guns they had taken with them. On the day this action was fought, the 26th of August, the enemy turned out of Delhi in great force, under the belief, apparently, that the camp would be denuded of troops, but they were repulsed with severe loss. On the 4th of September, the siege train arrived, and all the reinforcements expected having come in, the total strength of all arms, including Lascars and artillery drivers, was 8,748,* of whom the Europeans were : artillery 580, cavalry 443, infantry 2,292. This was exclusive of the men in hospital, 2,977, and sickness prevailed to such an alarming extent that some European regiments were mere skeletons, the 52nd Light Infantry, which arrived only three weeks before, 600 strong, having but 242 effectives. The siege train consisted of forty heavy guns and howitzers, ten heavy and twelve light mortars, manned by some companies of artillerymen, and there were, in addition, four troops of * These numbers are exclusive of the Cashmere Contingent, which was accompanied by Major (now Lieutenant-General) R. Lawrence, 2,200 men and four guns, and some few hundred men under the Rajah of Jheend. Opening of the Breaching Batteries. 35 horse artillery (one, Major Tombs's, having only four guns), and two field batteries. The engineer force was small, only consisting of 120 trained sappers, but the officers who planned the attack, were unsurpassed in the knowledge of their pro- fession, and included Colonel Baird Smith, chief engineer ; Captain (now Sir) Alexander Taylor, director of the attack, on whom the actual responsibilities of the siege operations, pro- perly so called, devolved owing to his superior being wounded ; and a band of young officers, including Lieutenants Salkeld, Home, Maunsell, and Greathed, such as any corps might be proud to own. The park, under Lieutenant Brownlow, of the Bengal Engineers, had been assiduous in collecting material, and 10,000 fascines, an equal number of gabions, and 100,000 sand-bags had been prepared, with scaling-ladders and other necessaries. The plan adopted by the General was to hold in check the enemy's batteries on the right, between the Moree Bastion and Cabul Gate, and to push the main attack on the left between the Cabul Gate and Water Bastions, close to the river, which protected the flank, and where there was better cover. The Moree, Cashmere, and Water Bastions were very strong, and the curtain walls connecting them were 24 feet in height, and protected by a ditch 16 feet deep and 20 feet wide, with an escarp 8 feet in height, revetted with stone, and a sloping glacis. On the evening of the 7th of September, No. 1 Battery was traced within 700 yards of the Moree Bastion, and by the following morning it was armed. The battery was in two portions, the right, for five 18-pounders and one 8-inch howitzer, to silence the Bastion, and the left portion, for four 18-pounders, to hold the Cashmere Bastion partially in check. The officer in charge of this battery, forming the right attack, which succeeded in silencing the enemy's fire exposed to it, was Major (now General Sir) James Brind, a gallant and able officer, who commanded the foot artillery throughout the siege from the 26th June, and subsequently did excellent service under General Walpole and Sir Colin Campbell. Setting to work directly his guns were in position, Major Brind' s practice soon made a visible impression on the Moree D 2 36 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. Bastion. Mr. Greathed says in his letter of the 9th of September : " Major Brind has got his sixteen guns at work, and was firing salvos at the Moree and Cashmere. The effect on the Moree, which is nearest, is very telling ; every shot strikes home and sends up a column of dust, and the shells burst inside it." The next battery established, known in its proper sequence as No. 2, is of especial interest as that in which Lieutenant Roberts served throughout the bombardment. No. 2 Battery was traced in the evening of the 8th of September, within 600 yards of the city walls, at the advanced position at Ludlow Castle, which, to their surprise, the rebels allowed the besiegers to seize without opposition. An Engineer officer to whose perspicuous account of the siege operations, pub- lished in the Lahore Chronicle, under the nom de plume of " Felix," and to Lieutenant Norman's excellent official narra- tive, we are indebted for these details expresses his opinion that this inertness was due to the belief of the enemy that the attack was to be on the right, where all the fighting had hitherto been and the old batteries were mostly located. Lud- low Castle and the Khoodsee Bagh were occupied with strong detachments, and formed the chief supports to the left attack. During the 9th, the rebels opened a sharp musketry fire on these positions from the jungles in front, and with shot and shell from the Water and Cashmere Bastions, but the work of com- pleting the battery went on, and, during the nights of the 9th and 10th, it was completed and partially armed. No. 2 Bat- tery was in two divisions, one to the left, armed with nine 24-pounders, under command of Major Campbell, whose fire was directed to breach the curtain between the Cashmere and Water Bastions, immediately to the left of the former, and to knock off the parapet to the right and left for some distance so as to give no cover for musketry. Lieutenant Roberts, having gained permission of General Wilson, attached himself to this portion of No. 2 Battery. His ardent spirit could not confine itself to watching the effects of the fire of our guns, while his services might be utilized in directing them. Like the fiery Hotspur : " His forward spirit Would lift him where most trade of danger ranged." Roberts s Services in the Batteries. 37 The second portion of No. 2 Battery, placed 200 yards to the right, commanded by Major Kaye, consisted of seven 8-inch howitzers and two 18-pounders, and its duty was to co-operate with the first portion. During the afternoon of the 10th of September, the left section of Major Brind's Battery, consisting of four guns, under the immediate command of Major Kaye, met with an accident, to which we will refer here as Lieutenant Roberts was engaged. Sir James Brind writes to us : " On the 10th of September the left section of my battery was destroyed by the enemy's fire, which would have been attended by disastrous consequences had we not succeeded in removing its guns and magazine into the shelter of the adjacent ravine before he perceived his advantage, and brought to bear upon the burning mass a greatly increased fire which caused some casualties. The work of this section of the battery had fortunately been effected, and as the guns were urgently required for the Ludlow Castle Battery, Major Johnson was directed to take them in charge. This energetic officer claimed my assistance in accomplishing a most difficult task under the cover of night. He was accompanied by Lieutenant Roberts ; and by the indefatigable exertions of officers and men, the operation was effected over difficult ground with- out accident, though full of incidents of a most engrossing character, making that night's work memorable in the history of the siege." During the night of the 10th September, the arming of No. 2 Battery was completed by the arrival of the 18-pounders from Brind's Battery, and No. 3 Battery, for six 18-pounders, under command of Major Scott, was also finished within 180 yards of the Water Bastion. The audacity with which this work was completed under a hot musketry fire, was an earnest of what was to follow. No. 4 Battery, under Major Tombs, consisting of ten heavy mortars, was completed at the same time in the Khoodsee Bagh. The only steps taken by the enemy to break the ring of iron encircling their boasted defences, were to construct an advanced trench parallel to these batteries, and about 350 yards from them, from which they maintained a heavy musketry fusillade throughout the rest of the siege, and to bring into the open in the Taleewarra 38 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. suburb some field-guns wbich caused considerable annoyance to Nos. 1 and 2 Batteries by their enfilading fire. Before the guns of No. 2 Battery opened fire, a sortie was made from the Cashmere Gate, which was repulsed with loss, and a constant fire was kept up from the trenches in front. A portion of the first Punjaub Eifles, under Lieutenant Nicholson, brother of the General, was, from the 8th to the 14th, engaged in protecting the battery, being posted behind a low wall in advance, with a reserve of the same corps together with some European infantry at Ludlow Castle, and the other batteries were also guarded by strong parties of infantry. All being in readiness, the batteries of the left attack opened fire on the llth, the signal being a salvo from the nine 24-pounders with which Roberts was stationed. The Engineer officer, already quoted, says that this " salvo showed by the way it brought down the wall in huge fragments what effect it might be expected to produce after a few hours. The Cashmere Bastion attempted to reply, but was quickly silenced, and both portions of No. 2 went to work in fine style, knocking the bastion and adjacent curtains to pieces." The fire was kept up with great spirit during the day, and, in the evening, Roberts had a narrow escape of being killed. He and the other officers of the battery, Major Campbell and Captain (now General Sir) Edwin Johnson, were lying under the parapet, read- ing a newspaper, when a discharge of grape-shot whizzed over the parapet, and a piece struck Major Campbell, who was lying outside, in the thigh, inflicting so severe a wound that he was compelled to surrender the command of the battery to Captain Johnson, Assistant Adjutant-General of Artillery, who, like Roberts, had obtained permission from General Wilson to assist in working the guns of this battery. No. 3 Battery did not open fire till the 12th, when fifty guns and mortars were engaged pouring a continuous fire of shot and shell on the defences of the rebels, who must have had it brought home to them that the hour of retribution was about to strike. From 10 A.M. on the llth till the morning of the 14th, when the signal for assault was made, there was no cessation of the fiery hail, which the enemy bore with that resignation to the decrees of fate instilled into the hearts of Narrow Escape of Roberts. 39 the followers of the Prophet as an axiom of their religion, and though unable to work a gun from any of the three Bastions so fiercely assailed the Mores, Cashmere, and Water Bastions the rebel gunners stood by their field-pieces in the open, which partially enfiladed the British batteries, and showed that the lessons our officers had taught them at Maharajpore, Sobraon, and Goojerat had been turned to account. Not only from these light pieces, but from a gun whose fire was brought to bear from a hole in the curtain wall, from rockets directed from a Martello tower, and a heavy fusillade from their advanced trench and from the city walls, the enemy made a vigorous resistance, and sought to delay the impending hour of doom. The force of Foot Artillerymen even without relief, being insufficient to man the guns, nearly all the officers and men of the Horse Artillery were sent into the batteries and worked in them until the morning of the assault, when they rejoined their troops. In addition to these, the Carabineers and 9th Lancers furnished a quota of volunteers, " whose intel- ligence and goodwill rendered their services most valuable." Several infantry officers, who had volunteered their services, had been under instruction for some days before the breach- ing batteries opened, and were afterwards most usefully em- ployed in the latter. The men of the two field batteries of the force were not taken for the siege guns, as one battery fur- nished the three divisions of guns for the pickets, and the other was in reserve in camp. During the bombardment Lieutenant Eoberts had another narrow escape. He had charge of the right guns, and on opening the embrasure to fire, while laying one of them, a round shot took off the arm of the gunner who was "serving" the vent and knocked him over, but he escaped without serious injury. General Wilson now thought the time had come to storm the city, and, during the night of the 13th of September, some Engineer officers stole down and examined the two breaches near the Cashmere and Water Bastions, Lieutenants Medley and Lang the former, and Lieutenants Greathed and Home the latter. Both breaches were reported practicable, and orders were issued that night for the assault to take place at daybreak 4O Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. on the following morning. Four columns of assault were formed ; the first, under Brigadier-General Nicholson, to storm the breach near the Cashmere Bastion, and escalade the face of that Bastion ; the second, under Brigadier Jones, to storm the breach in the Water Bastion ; the third, under Colonel Campbell, to assault by the Cashmere Gate after it had been blown open ; and the fourth, under Major (now General Sir Charles) Reid, to attack the Kissengunj suburb and enter by the Lahore Gate. There was also a reserve column under Brigadier Longfield. Lieutenant Roberts now rejoined the staff of General Wilson, as the services of all the officers attached to the Commander-in- Chief would be in requisition during the critical operations connected with the assault. At 4 A.M., on the 14th of September, the different columns fell in and were marched to their respective places, the heads of Nos. 1, 2, and 3 columns being kept concealed until the moment for the actual assault should arrive. The signal was to be the advance of 200 men of the 60th Rifles, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, as skirmishers to the front to cover the heads of the columns. It is not our province to describe the thrilling details of the assault of the breaches at the Cash- mere and Water Bastions ; the explosion of the Cashmere Gate by the band of heroes, Lieutenants Home and Salkeld, and Serjeants Carmichael, Burgess, and Smith ; and the death of the ever to be lamented Nicholson, when, having carried all before him at the point of the bayonet, he proceeded, with the eagerness characteristic of his heroic nature, to clear the ram- parts between the Moree Bastion and Lahore Gate, and fell while animating his troops to increased exertions.* * Roberts says it was impossible for any troops in the world and none finer could be found than the well-seasoned soldiers of the Delhi Field Force to have carried the Lahore Gate, the narrow streets and passages leading to which were commanded by loopholes and housetops from which a hot fire rained down on the heads of every man who showed himself. In that terrible ordeal Nicholson called on his men for further efforts, and seven officers stepped to the front to show the way. All were shot down save his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Kennett Dixon, of the Bengal Cavalry. " I shall not forget you, Dixon, should we survive,'' said the hero, whose majestic form was soon laid low by a bullet. The writer has a special satisfaction in recording this incident of a young officer his relative who was killed a few months later heading a charge of the Mooltanee Horse. The Storm of Delhi. 41 The storm of Delhi is an oft-told tale, though it is one that reflects undying lustre on the arms of our country. The only failure throughout the operations of this eventful day was that of the fourth column under Major Reid, which, advancing from the Subzee Mundee suburb towards Kissengunj, in company with the Cashmere Contingent, was compelled to fall back with heavy loss, among the severely wounded being the gallant commandant. The Cavalry, 600 sabres, under Brigadier Hope Grant, with a troop and a half of Horse Artillery, under Major Tombs, co- operated during the assault by checking any attempt of the enemy to attack the storming columns in flank by a sortie from the Lahore Gate. The actual loss, among combatants, during the bombard- ment between the llth and 14th, was 327 officers and men, including Captain Fagan of the Artillery, as fine a soldier as any in the camp, and t during the assault (exclusive of the casualties sustained by the Cashmere Contingent), no less than 66 officers and 1,104 men were killed and wounded, being nearly one-third of the force engaged. The Bengal Fusiliers, of which 250 went into action, lost nine officers, including Major Jacob commanding; and other regiments suffered in proportion. Of seventeen Engineer officers on duty at the assault, ten were placed hors de combat, including the three officers, Lieutenants Medley, Greathed, and Maunsell, leading Nos. 1, 2, and 8 columns, and Lieutenants Tandy and Salkeld of the storming party, the former of whom was killed, and the latter died of his wounds.* Lieutenant Roberts had his horse shot during the day. He was going round the position with Captains Norman and Johnson, and came under a heavy fire from a party of the enemy. At the time the horse was killed he had dismounted and was leading the animal. During the 15th several mortars were got into position to shell the town and palace, a battery was opened from the College Gardens of the Palace, and a breach was made also from the College in the magazine defences. Meanwhile the * During the siege the 60th Rifles lost in killed and wounded 389 men out of 640 ; the Sirmoor Battalion, 319 out of 540 ; and the Corps of Guides, 303 out of 550. 42 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. enemy kept up a cannonade on our portion of the city from the fortified post known as Selimgurh, and from the magazine a constant musketry fire was maintained on the College com- pound. At dawn on the 16th, the magazine was successfully stormed by H.M's. 61st Eegiment, and Kissengunj was evacu- ated by the enemy, who left five heavy guns, of which posses- sion was taken by a party sent forward from Hindoo Rao. "We were now, for the first time," says Norman, "enabled to see the immense strength of the insurgents' position here and in Taleewarra, and which they had spared no labour to improve." Gradually pushing on, but making all secure in his rear before taking another step, General Wilson, on the 17th and 18th, brought his right and left positions at the Cabul Gate and magazine into direct communication by a line of posts ; the Bank, Major Abbott's house and the dwelling of Khan Mahomed were also taken, so that his posts were now close to the Palace and Chandnee Chouk. "These advances," says the Engineer officer already quoted, as inhabited by Jajis who are Soonies like themselves, the Turis being of the Sheeah feet of Mahommedans, between whom, all over the East, the feeling is as bitter as between Protestants and Roman Catholics. 136 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. be fortified with redoubts and intrenchments to protect tbe camps which were placed on the plateau. From the southern face of the Sika Earn, of which the Peiwar Kotul forms a spur, descends a watercourse, known as the Spingawi, or the White Track, which, joining another watercourse, runs to the south into the Kurram river, passing the village of Peiwar on the right hand, and leaving the deserted Afghan cantonment of Habib Killa on the left, as it debouches into the plain. This watercourse was the road used by General Roberts on the night of the 2nd December, in his attack on the Peiwar Kotul, which has an elevation of 8,500 feet above sea level. No description could do justice to the wild and difficult nature of the country about the Peiwar Kotul, with its tremen- dous mountain defiles and narrow plateaus, only reached by a track winding through a pine forest, and amazement at Geneial Roberts' s success is not confined to those who formed a portion of the force with which he effected his brilliant capture of the Peiwar Kotul on the 2nd December, but is shared by all mili- tary critics. A very competent one, General C. L. Showers, who afterwards went over the ground with the victor as his guide, assured us that the Afghan position was apparently impregnable, and an attack on disciplined troops, such as those of the Ameer stationed in the Pass, with the limited means at Roberta's disposal, appeared an act of rashness which only success could justify. The mass of mountains to the left of the Kurram river cul- minates in a peak called Saratiga, whose spurs and branches, says Major Colquhoun, fill up the whole of the ground between the road from Ali Kheyl to Cabul by the Pass of the Shutar- gardan (" Camel's Neck ") and the road to Ghuznee. The great Ghilzai tribe who are just now paramount in Afghan- istan, having defeated their ancient rivals, the Dooranees, whose cause is identified with Ayoob Khan have fixed then- boundary at a place known as Karatiga (" Black Rock") on the southern side of the Shutargardan, and have spread over the crest of the pass unopposed by their weak neighbours, the Jajis. Other formidable passes in the vicinity are the Hazar- darakht (" 1,000 trees "), and Surkhai Kotul. At the foot of the Shutargardan runs the Logar river, with the usual belt of Physical Difficulties of the Kurram Valley. 137 vegetation marking its course, and on the farther side of the river lie the Pughmari mountains, the southern continuation of the mighty Hindoo Koosh. At the foot of the hills on the Afghan side the road goes over an open plain, and crossing a low spur known as the Shinkai Kotul, then turns westward to Kooshi, a large village where General Roberts was joined by Yakoob Khan in his memorable dash on Cabul, after the mas- sacre of the Cavagnari Mission. The city of Cabul, which is only thirty-seven miles distant from Shutargardan, as also the course of the Logar, which flows into the Cabul river below the capital, is shut out from view by a spur that closes the valley of the " Camel's Neck." Starting from Kurram Fort, and proceeding along the bed of the river past the Chumkunnies and the Suffee Mangals, the Ahmed Kheyl district is reached, in which lies the Ghuznee, or Surki river, with a Kotul, or saddle, over which is the road to Ghuzuee. Another track turns off from this road and leads to Cabul. The road down the valley from AH Kheyl joins the first of these roads at the Ghuznee river, which is the road taken by those great conquerors, Genghiz Khan and Timour the Tartar, when invading India. " The physical difficulties of the road between the Peiwar Kotul and Kooshi," says General Roberts, " are certainly far greater than any which present themselves in the Khyber route. Doubtless in time they could be materially lessened, and at no very considerable outlay ; but the construction of a really, good cart road between the points indicated would be a matter of great difficulty and vast expense. In the event of our re-occupy- ing the Kurram valley, and a line of railway being constructed to the foot of the Peiwar Kotul, there would only remain a dis- tance of ninety miles between it and Cabul, though the diffi- culties of this short space are almost insurmountable at certain seasons of the year save to an enterprising commander." To such an one, General Roberts is of opinion, even during the months from the middle of December to the end of March, the Shutargardan would not be impassable, so that he adds " prac- tically troops quartered in the upper portion of the Kurram valley are capable of being pushed on to Cabul all the year round." 138 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. But though the Peiwar Kotul, All Kheyl and the tableland of the Hurriab are admirably suited for the location of troops, General Eoberts deprecated the continued occupation of Kurram valley as it " proved very unhealthy to native troops, through- out the valley pneumonia and fever being very prevalent." On the other hand, the military advantages of the Kurram valley route to Cabul are, in General Roberta's opinion, great and manifest. From Rawul Pindee to Kohat and Thull the country, though sparsely inhabited, is under British jurisdic- tion, and from Thull to Peiwar Kotul the territory belongs to the friendly Turis, now declared independent of the Ameer. The Shutargardan passed and Kooshi reached, " the force enters the rich and fertile valley by the Logar, where supplies are procurable," and from thence "Cabul is approached by the least defensive and least difficult line, a defile within five miles of Cabul being the only point at which an effective stand could be made, and this could be turned by the Indki route." Of the races of the Kurram valley, the Bungash occupy the lower portion as well as the fertile plains of the Miranzai valley, within the British border between Thull and Kohat, and muster 15,000 fighting men. The powerful Afreedee tribes inhabiting the mountainous district between the Miranzai and Kurram valleys, are the Orakzais, who are subdivided into Alizais and Alisharzais, and the Zymookhts, about 5,000 men. The Turis of the Kurram valley, divided into five clans or sections, and the Jajis, chiefly inhabiting the Hurriab, each muster an equal number of fighting men, and many of the latter opposed Roberta's advance at the Peiwar Kotul. The Mangals, a powerful tribe, inhabit the country to the south of the Kurram river, and might number 20,000 fighting men ; and the territory to the south of the Khost valley is the habitat of a section of the Waziris, one of the most powerful and the bravest of the tribes on our north-west frontier, who extend from this point to Thull and thence eastward towards Bunnoo, and south as far as the Gomul Pass, their main road into India. Finally there only remains to mention the Jadrans, a cognate tribe to the Mangals, inhabiting the western hills of the Khost valley. Kohat, where General Eoberts joined the Kurram Field Roberts Assumes the Command. 139 Force placed under bis orders, is a cantonment lying to the south of Peshawur, from which it is separated by a range of mountains. On assuming command of the force on the 9th October, General Roberts set to work with characteristic energy, organizing it for the advance, and, this completed, on the 18th November reached Thull, sixty- three miles distant, whither he had already despatched the greater portion of the force. Between the 9th October, the date of his arrival at Kohat, and the 18th November, when he reached Thull, General Boberts's labours had been great, and he had infused into his force some of his own energy and a sense of perfect confidence in their leader. The orders he issued during his stay at Kohat, while engaged organizing the small division which proved such an efficient weapon in his hands, are multifarious, and embrace every provision for the efficiency and comfort of his men, no detail being considered too trivial or unimportant. His European troops were the 2nd Battalion 8th Regiment, and a wing of the 72nd Highlanders. The former corps had arrived from Rawul Pindee, and, owing to sickness, chiefly fever, was scarcely in a fit state to take the field ; the battalion had been only a short time in India, and was composed of young and unacclimatized soldiers. General Roberts, like Sir George Pollock, a brother officer of the Bengal Artillery and former commander of an army invad- ing Afghanistan, almost daily visited the hospitals and person- ally inquired into each case. The effect was remarkable on both doctors and patients. The former looked forward to the visits, and the men began at once to improve. General Roberts's speciality always has been organization, and now everything was prepared, even to the postal arrangements, which were as perfect as in Looshai, before a move in advance was made. During the day he would work for many hours without cessation in organization and correspondence, and during the morning and evening he was ubiquitous, inquiring into every- thing, and permitting no minutiae of detail to escape his notice. At Thull, two months' supplies of provisions were collected, and preparations made for the advance across the frontier, on receipt of the reply to the ultimatum addressed by Lord Lytton to the Ameer Shere Ali ; and, on the 20th November the 140 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. General issued orders for an advance into Afghan territory on the following morning. This was effected by the 29th Punjaub N.I. crossing the river by a trestle-bridge, with the 10th Hussars and 12th Bengal Cavalry acting as flanking parties ; and thus " the Rubicon was passed," and the invasion of Afghanistan commenced. The Afghan fort of Kapiyang was found deserted by Colonel Gordon, who commanded the advance, which was accompanied by the General. The cavalry followed in pursuit, but without overtaking the enemy, and the Infantry, with No. 1 Mountain Battery, followed, and encamped that night at Ahmed-i-Shama, eight miles distant. On the two following days a further portion of the troops, under the command of Colonel Stirling, R.H.A., and Brigadier- General Cobbe, joined the advance, and the General moved from Kapiyang, with headquarters, on the 23rd, to Hazir Pir, a distance of fifteen miles, where the troops in advance were now encamped, the fort in the rear being occupied by Brigadier-General Thelwall, who moved up from Thull. The difficulties of the first portion of the road between Ahmed-i-Shama and Hazir Pir were very great. There was no road for the wheeled guns of the battery of Horse Artillery, and the advance, under Colonel Gordon, consisting of the 23rd Pioneers, wing of 5th Punjaub Infantry, and the company of Sappers, had to make a passage for the guns under the General's personal directions. The troops, therefore, got no further than the village of Esoar, four miles from Hazir Pir, to which place General Roberts proceeded with headquarters. As he passed along the road, the headmen of the villages paid their respects, and, on approaching Hazir Pir, he found a repast in the native style, prepared for him, spread out sub tegmine fagi. The villagers also turned out with milk, eggs, and dried fruit, which they offered to the troops for sale, and supplies of grass and fuel were also brought in abundance. General Roberts held a durbar of the leading men in the lower Kurram valley, and assured them of the friendly feelings enter- tained towards them by the British Government, and promised his protection so long as they committed no act of hostility. On the following day, Sunday, the 24th November, the General marched to an encamping ground about a mile distant Arrival at the Kurram Fort. 141 from the southern end of the Durwazi (Gate) Pass, with Head- quarters and the following troops : Squadron 10th Hussars, 12th Bengal Cavalry, No. 1 Mountain Battery, 29th Punjaub N.I., and Wing 5th Punjaub N.I. The march presented no difficulties, and the country was uninhabited, though streams of water, stocked with fish, were crossed. During the day intelligence was received of the evacuation of the Kurram Fort by the Ameer's troops, who were retreating by the Peiwar Kotul, and, on the following morning, the General moved across the Durwazi Pass which leads over the chain of mountains which bounds the Kurram valley on the south, and has an ascent of about five miles, and a descent of three miles and occupied the Kurram Fort, which was found in good condition, save for the roofing which the Turis had carried off as soon as the place had been evacuated by Shere Ali's troops. On the same day Brigadier-General Cobbe marched from Hazir Pir to the camp at the Durwazi Pass, and Brigadier-General Thelwall took his place from Ahmed-i-Shama. Camp was pitched on an open plain between two nullahs, about half a mile to the west of the Kurram fort, a mud work about 120 yards square, with round bastions at the corners, a keep in the centre, about fifty square yards, and only one gateway protected by an outwork. The thickness of the outer wall was about 6 feet, height 20 feet, that of the keep being 10 feet higher ; outside the wall was a broad fausse braye* about 12 yards wide, to the edge of the ditch, on the west and south sides of which were parapet walls. The Governor's quarters were in one of the bastions, which was raised into a three- storied house, but, like the rest of the fort, with the exception of a small mosque, it had been wrecked by the Turis ; both these buildings were used as hospitals as soon as the necessary alterations and repairs had been effected. About a quarter ol a mile distant from the Kurram fort, was a walled barrack enclosure, about 100 square yards in extent, having stables for horses as well as huts for the troops, which was known as the Upper Fort. These military works were found useful for storing the Commissariat, Engineer, and Ordnance park stores, * A. fausse Iraye is a kind of counter-guard, or low rampart, for the pro- tection of the lower part of the main escarp in the rear. 142 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. as well as for a hospital. In the vicinity was a large fruit garden, amply stocked, and a two-roomed edifice, surrounded with a verandah, which was transferred to the political officers for use as a Court-house. General Koberts was received, on approaching the fort, by Mahomed Noor, one of the leading men of the valley, who came to pay his respects, escorted by a following of mounted men and footmen. Having completed the inspection of the fort, the General, accompanied by two squadrons of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, proceeded to reconnoitre in the direction of the Peiwar Kotul, twelve miles distant. On approaching the village of Peiwar, two other villages were seen to be in flames, and a report was brought that the Ameer's troops, consisting of three regiments of infantry, with twelve guns, had evacuated the cantonment of Habib Killa, about a mile to the east of Peiwar, through which they were passing. General Roberts was able, by the aid of glasses, to see the enemy retiring towards the valley leading to the foot of the Peiwar Pass, but his means did not permit of an attack, and he retired to the camp at Kurram. On the following day, the 26th November, the General issued orders for the advance, which was to be made " as light as possible," officers' baggage being limited to half a mule load, and two officers occupying one tent of 80 Ibs. The soldiers were to have one tent of two palls (having a superficial area of 512 square feet and a height of 8 feet) between 40 Europeans, 50 Sepoys, and 60 camp followers ; and a bell tent between 25 British soldiers or 20 natives. The troops selected for the advance were put in orders on the 26th, on which day Brigadier-Generals Cobbe and Thelwall crossed the river and came into the Kurrain Camp, so that the whole Division was now massed ready for the advance. A small garrison was de- tailed to hold the fort, and the remainder of the force, which General Roberts held in readiness to accompany him in the first critical operation of the war, numbered 83 officers and 969 effective European soldiers of all ranks, and 2,854 effective Native troops, with nine 9-pounders, and four 7-pounders. We have seen how the French required 50,000 men to subdue the Arabs of the small territory of Tunis, each of the The Advance towards the Enemy s Position. 143 operating columns exceeding the strength of General Roberta's entire force, and in contrast we find a British General, with the utmost confidence, advancing against one of the strongest positions in the world with less than 4,000 men, of whom only one quarter were Europeans. That a favourable result accrued was due mainly to the genius of the commander, who possessed the true admixture of caution and dash, and whose dispositions were admirably framed for the operation in hand. But none the less was it a desperate undertaking, for we remember a distinguished member of the Indian Council informing us during the brief interval that elapsed between Roberts's departure from his camp and the report of his victory, that he and his colleagues were " very anxious " for the safety of the force. At 5 A.M. on the 28th November, the morning being very dark and the cold severe, the troops formed up in two parallel columns,* and before six the start was made, General Roberts marching at the head of the left column, which arrived about ten, near Habib Killa, having made a fatiguing march of four- teen miles. On his arrival the General received intelligence, which afterwards proved to be false, that the Afghans had abandoned their guns at the foot of the Peiwar Kotul, and were retreating in disorder, and he determined, without loss of time, to make the march of seven miles and take possession of the guns. General Roberts sent Brigadier-General Cobbe to the left with his brigade, with instructions to turn a ridge forming the southern boundary of the valley, through which was the road from the village of Peiwar to the Kotul, and to seize the Mangal village of Turrai ; and Brigadier- General Thelwall was ordered to move in support of the left column by proceeding past the village of Habib Killa up the regular road to the Pass. * Left column. One squadron 12th Bengal Cavalry ; two guns No. 1 Mountain Battery ; four companies 5th Punjaub N.I. ; remainder of the 1st, or Brigadier General Cobbe's, Brigade, consisting of 5th Punjatibees ; 23rd Pioneers ; 29th Punjaub N.I. ; 8th Regiment ; and two guns, F Battery, A Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery, on elephants. Right Column. One squadron 12th Bengal Cavalry ; two guns No. 1 Mountain Battery ; four companies N.I. ; remainder of 2nd, or Brigadier- General Thelwall's, Brigade, consisting of 5th Goorkhas ; wing 72nd High- landers ; 2nd Punjaub N.I., and two guns F Battery, A Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery, on elephants. 144 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. General Cobbe carried out his orders with the 5th and 29th Punjaubees and two mountain guns, and, as the enemy were seen on the side of the spur, he moved down towards the vil- lage of Turrai, but the remainder of the brigade, disposed in support, did not round the southern side of the spur, but keeping to the north, eventually met the right brigade as they moved up the road. General Cobbe, in descending the moun- tain path towards Turrai, finding the passage into a valley, called "the Punch-Bowl," barred by precipices, had to make a retrograde movement, which always excites the warlike ardour of Pathan mountaineers, who are in their element in harassing warfare, but rarely make a direct attack on regular troops un- less in overwhelming force. A party of them now moved down from a spur and commenced an attack, as the 29th N.I., with a- wing of the 5th Punjaubees in support, moved towards the village. It was 2 P.M. when General Roberts arrived at Turrai, and at the same time the right brigade came in. Observing that an engagement was in progress between our men and the Afghans, which formed no part of his programme, the General proceeded with the 5th Goorkhas to the assistance of General Cobbe, and the force was withdrawn by alternate regiments. The loss in this affair was slight, and included Lieutenant A. Reed, of the 29th N.I., severely wounded. At 3 P.M., during General Roberts' s absence, the camp was marked out by Briga- dier-General Thelwall, in some terraced fields below the village, and the troops were waiting the arrival of the baggage, when the Afghans, having sent to the main ridge in the rear for a gun, opened fire with shell at a range of 1,700 yards, which was replied to by the guns of F Battery, A Brigade, Horse Artillery, which also fired on some riflemen who were annoying a picket of the 5th Punjaubees. It accordingly became neces- sary to move back the camp, and a spot was selected 1^ miles in the rear, but it was not until a late hour that the different corps could find their baggage and take rest, after a very fatigu- ing day and a march of more than twenty miles over diffi- cult ground. That General Roberts should pitch his camp under fire of the enemy's guns was a proceeding so completely at variance with the military antecedents of so experienced a soldier, and True Account of Roberts s Strategy. 145 the war correspondent of one of the London daily papers having, in conversation with us, animadverted upon the Gene- ral's strategy in this respect, we asked General Roberts for the true story, and he, with that soldierly frankness which is so distinguishing a feature of his character, far from taking offence at the outspoken question and the opinions that had given rise to it, described, in the following words, the circum- stances under which his camp became exposed to the enemy's fire, necessitating a retrograde movement : " Having received information that the enemy were in a hollow and could not get their guns away which proved incorrect, as at this time the Afghan army was securely entrenched on top of the Peiwar Kotul I sent Brigadier-General Cobbe's Brigade round the enemy's right to prevent their getting on the crest of the Peiwar Kotul, while Brigadier-General Thelwall's Brigade was directed to attack in front, so as to get the enemy between two fires. Soon the advance regiment of Cobbe's Brigade got under fire from the enemy's flanking positions near the Peiwar Kotul, when I went on to see what was happening in the front, leaving orders for the main column to be halted and pitch tents at a point about two miles from the foot of the ascent to the Kotul. This order was not carried out, and during my absence in front with the leading regiments of Cobbe's Brigade, some of the baggage animals were allowed to come too far in advance, and the camp was marked out on a spur which proved to be within the range of the enemy's guns on the Kotul. On seeing this, I ordered the baggage animals to be taken to the rear, and camp to be pitched on the spur I had first selected. This movement gave rise in the minds of those ignorant of the facts, to the opinion that there had been a retirement, which was due to a misconception on the part of the Brigadier- General who had been ordered to pitch the camp in a safe position." On the following morning a portion of the camp was moved to a more suitable spot, and the troops were given a day's rest in order that the supplies might be moved up and the neces- sary reconnoissances made. Colonel .ZEneas Perkins, Com- manding Royal Engineers, Roberts's friend at Addiscombe, for whose services he had specially applied, escorted by two com- L 146 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. panies of the 23rd Pioneers, proceeded up the valley beyond the north picket, with the object of ascertaining whether the ridge was connected with the Peiwar Kotul. Colonel Perkins reported that a deep valley lay between the picket ridge and the Kotul itself, and that it was impossible to direct an attack from this side. A second reconnoissance, conducted by Major Collett, Assis- tant-Quartermaster-General, accompanied by his assistant, Cap- tain Carr, and Captain "VVoodthorpe, Pi.E., escorted by two companies of the Pioneers, proceeded to ascertain the practic- ability of the route by the Spingawi ravine. Marching by a road unsuited for wheeled guns, they reached the summit of a ridge about five miles distant from the British camp, over- looking the Spingawi nullah. It was ascertained that " the road up the Kotul itself appeared to be on the same ridge as the Peiwar Kotul, and that a force working from the former towards the latter would pass over a series of dominating posi- tions." Major Collett was of opinion that the enemy did not occupy the Spingawi Pass in force, though there was a picket and a gun on a commanning knoll to the south of the Pass, and one apparently on the Kotul itself. Colonel Gordon, with a company of his regiment, the 29th N.I., reconnoitred the south ridge of the valley, and ascertained that it was contin- uous with the main ridge, and that an attack could be con- ducted along it. During the day the troops were engaged making roads in the camp, which was wretchedly situated, being surrounded by a thick oak jungle, but no better site could be found without moving back three or four miles towards the village of Peiwar, and the camp itself was protected from attack by strong pickets on the hill sides. That the enemy were mustering in consider- able strength to meet the apprehended attack on the Peiwar Kotul appeared certain, from the circumstance that their posi- tion had been considerably extended on both flanks, but little information could be procured. At dawn on the following morning, the 30th November, as Montague says : "So soon as the all-cheering sun Should in the further East begin to draw The shady curtains from Aurora's bed," General Roberts s Plans. 147 General Koberts was astir, and proceeded to reconnoitre in the direction Colonel Perkins bad taken, being accom- panied by Colonel Currie, 23rd Pioneers, and Captain Eicbard Kennedy,* Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-Geueral, an officer of singular promise, in whom bis commander recognized a soldier, who, had he lived, must have attained great distinc- tion in bis country's service. Colonel Gordon again recon- noitred the hills on the enemy's right, and Major Collett and Captain Carr made a secret reconnoissance,f unaccompanied by troops, from the village of Peiwar up the regular road to the Spingawi, and succeeded in reaching a point about \\ miles distant from the Kotul, and getting a fairly good view of the approaches thereto. General Roberts carefully considered the reports of these officers, and, on the evening of the 30th, decided to abandon any attempt at attacking the Peiwar Kotul in front, which would certainly entail great loss. He would however make a feint in front on the Peiwar Kotul, to be deve- loped into an attack at the proper moment, while the real attack would be a flanking movement to the right rear round by the village of Peiwar, and thence by the Spingawi ravine to the plateau of hills on the right of the Peiwar Kotul. This, which was to be the main attack, he resolved to conduct in person, but he kept his councils to himself, the only officer whom he brought into his confidence being Major Collett, who, from his reconnoissances, was conversant with the road as far as the Spingawi plateau. Having formed his plans, including the portioning off of the regiments, without reference to any one, at 4 P.M. on Sun- day, the 1st December, General Roberts convened a meeting in his tent of the brigadiers, officers commanding regiments and batteries, and chief staff officers, and laid before them in detail his plans. In his address to the assembled officers, General Roberts enjoined on them the strictest secrecy, as were his intentions to get wind, the consequences would be fatal to success. He requested them not to speak of them to any one, and not even to look in the direction of what he * The late Colonel Kennedy, who met with a premature death by drown- ing soon after his return to Ireland from service in Afghanistan, t See Sir F. Roberta's despatch of the 5th of December, 1878. L 2 148 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. intended should be the main attack. He pointed out the difficulties of a long night march, where so much depended on discipline and endurance, and enjoined upon his hearers the absolute necessity for silence in the ranks, and, above all, that the regiments should keep touch of each other in the darkness, as otherwise they might lose their way, and cause a mis- carriage of the enterprise. The entire force at his disposal to capture a strong position defended by a superior force of regular troops with artillery, was 3,314 men, of whom only 899 were Europeans. The night march by the Spingawi Pass, he proposed to undertake himself with Brigadier- General Thelwall's Brigade, the direct attack on the Peiwar Kotul to be made by Brigadier- General Cobbe. In order to encourage the belief among the enemy that the attack was to be a front one on the Peiwar Pass, General Koberts sent ostentatious reconnoitring parties to both flanks of the Peiwar Kotul, and directed a party of pioneers, under an engineer officer, and a covering party of the 8th Regiment, to construct a battery near the village of Turrai, in advance of the camp. The enemy fired shells at this de- tachment from the Kotul battery, but without doing much damage. General Roberts discovered that the Afghan strength was concentrated on the centre and right, while their left, which was to be the objective point of the turning movement, was comparatively weak. So well was the secret kept that not only the Afghans expected a front attack on the Kotul, but every man in camp anticipated that the morrow would see them engaged in storming by a direct movement the formidable Pass, behind which lay the enemy in unknown strength. In order to strengthen this impression, the half battery of G battery, 3rd Brigade, Royal Artillery, and the squadron of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, which had been brought from the Kurram Fort on the previous day, were paraded in full view of the enemy. 149 CHAPTER IX. The Midnight March up the Spingawi Ravine Treachery in the Ranks The Capture of the Spingawi Pass Advance along the Ridge and Severe Fighting General Roberts is Wounded The Night Bivouac in the Mountains Occupation of the Peiwar Kotal Account of the Operations by an Officer of the Staff General Roberts Reconnoitres the Shutargardan Pass. THE operation in which General Roberts was about to embark was one calculated to daunt all but the very brave. Behind the wall of rock that barred his advance lay an enemy of whose numbers and composition he could gain no information. The regular army of the Ameer Shere Ali numbered " at least 50,000 men, with over 300 guns and ammunition in abun- dance,"* and in a country where every adult male bears arms, the nucleus afforded by the garrisons of the posts stationed in the Kurram could be strengthened at short notice by large numbers of tribesmen, who would flock with religious ardour to war against the infidel invader. The Afghan force of regulars that had retired before the British Army, was known to consist of 1,800 men, with 11 guns, and, by the end of November, reinforcements of infantry and a battery of artillery had arrived, while they had the advantage of superior artillery, and an almost impregnable position, besides the aid of the war- like mountaineers and tribesmen. Not until after " tattoo " were the troops of the turning force, drawn from Brigadier- General Thelwall's brigade, warned to be ready to march. At 10 P.M., the column, under the immediate command of General Roberts, numbering 43 officers and 2,220 men, with the hospital dhoolies and ammunition mules in rear of each regiment, marched off in silence, without sound of drum or bugle, and, passing from the light of the camp fires, which were kept brightly burning, disappeared into * See General Roberta's Memorandum, dated " Cabul, 29th May, 1880." 150 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. the darkness, and commenced the march for the Spingawi nullah by the circuitous route of the village of Peiwar in the rear. The 29th Punjaubees, 5th Goorkhas, and Mountain Bat- tery, under Colonel J. Gordon, 29th P.N.I., led the column, followed by the wing of the 72nd Highlanders, 2nd Punjaub In- fantry, 23rd Pioneers, and four guns of the F-A Horse Artillery, on elephants, escorted by two companies of the Pioneers, under General Thelwall. The first part of the march to Peiwar was about three and a half miles, over broken ground, the tracks, for there was no road, passing through oak jungle, and crossing many ravines and stony watercourses, before the cultivated ground surrounding the village was reached, when the road ran along a terrace on the cultivated slope to the edge of the Spingawi nullah. A watercourse flowed swiftly along the bed of the nullah, the banks of which and the boulders on the slope were thickly covered with ice, rendering the descent tedious and difficult for man and beast. It was fortunate that General Roberts started as early as 10 P.M., which was done with the intention of giving the troops time to rest on the road, as it was correctly surmised that, owing to the slow rate of progression, the Spingawi Pass, involving a further march of at least six miles from the village of Peiwar, would be reached none too soon to allow of a surprise at early dawn. There was a cutting wind blowing, the elevation at starting being 7,000 feet, while the ascent was continuous to the top of the Pass, which had an elevation of 9,400 feet. The labour of keeping one's feet or holding up the horses was excessive, owing to the broken nature of the road, and the boulders with which it was covered, while the difficulties of the march were much increased by the extreme darkness of the night. But the men kept on bravely, and there was no murmuring, all looking forward with eagerness to the hour of conflict, and placing implicit confidence in the skill of their leader. Owing to the darkness and the difficulties of the road, which had only before been traversed by Major Collett, the 2nd Punjaubees lost touch of the 72nd Highlanders, and, instead of turning up the nullah, crossed it, thinking the turning point was further on. The 23rd Pioneers and the Horse Artillery followed in The Night-March. 151 their track, and it was not for some time that Brigadier-General Thelwall, riding at the head of this portion of the column, hecame aware of the absence of half his force. On discovering this fact he sent his orderly officer, Lieutenant Turner, of the 8th Regiment, to bring them back, which that officer did after a ride of two miles ; owing to this mishap the Brigadier- General, and the 2nd and 23rd Kegiments and four guns with him, were practically " out of the hunt." The further the column marched, the worse appeared the road, if the bed of the nullah could be dignified by the term, as it was, says General Roberts, " nothing but a mass of stones, heaped into ridges and furrowed into deep hollows by the action of the water." After General Roberts had advanced with the troops still accompanying him for a mile and a half up the nullah, an incident occurred, which showed the risky nature of the operation in which the column was engaged, and nearly caused the miscarriage of the surprise which the General had prepared with such care. From the ranks of the 29th Punjaub N.I., marching at the head of the column, suddenly a shot was fired, quickly followed by a second. What could this mean but treachery ? General Roberts found himself confronted with a danger on which he had not counted. With everything against him in conducting a critical operation, save his skill and the valour of his troops, it was a terrible revelation thus flashed on him from the rifles of his own men, but the trial found him equal to the occasion. Colonel Gordon, commanding the 29th, halted his regiment, and the General, who was riding close behind the advance party, immediately ordered the 5th Goorkhas and two companies of the 72nd Highlanders to pass them and head the column. But it was feared that the mis- chief had been done, and the alarm had been given to the Afghans, though this was not so, owing to the accidental cir- cumstance of the direction of the wind and the conformation of the hills at this spot preventing the sound travelling towards the enemy's position.* But this Roberts knew not at the time, and his anxiety at the success of his plans was greatly in- * Major Colquhoun says, that it was afterwards ascertained that " an Afghan sentry heard the shots, and woke up the commander of the post who took no action in the matter, hearing no further cause for alarm." 152 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. creased, though he had no hesitation or thought of changing them. Like Hotspur, " He walk'd o'er perils as on an edge, More likely to fall in than to get o'er." But such dangers acted as a spur to his ardent nature, and he took the course great spirits adopt in crises when lesser men fail he "plucked the flower, safety, out of the nettle, danger." Colonel Gordon endeavoured to discover the men who had fired their rifles, but none of their comrades could or would identify them. One of the native officers of the regiment examined the rifles of several men, and found out some which had recently been discharged, but being a co-religionist he sought to screen the delinquents, and affected not to have discovered them. During the Umbeyla Campaign, the Punjaub regiments engaged at the Mahabun, were mostly recruited from Pathans, and proved faithful to their salt under the most trying circum- stances, as they have on numberless occasions in our border wars, and no doubt was now entertained of their fidelity ; but this deed of treachery revealed a -new source of dread, and, but for a fortunate circumstance, the well-laid plans of the British General might have been baulked, and a sanguinary struggle, if not a repulse, might have changed the fortunes of the campaign. But General Eoberts had embarked his fortunes and the lives of the handful of troops with him, in the perilous task of snatching a victory by a surprise, and he resolved to prosecute the attempt to the end at whatever hazard. As Cassius said before Philippi : "Why now, blow wind, swell billow, and swim bark ! The storm is up, and all is in the hazard." The advance was now resumed, the 5th Goorkhas and two companies of the 72nd Highlanders leading, and about four in the morning the main bed of the watercourse was quitted, and the march was continued along the ravine to the left, at the top of which, distant three miles, was the Spingawi Kotul. The General had intended to halt the column for an hour or two in order to rest the men, but owing to the distance that yet Treachery in the Ranks. 153 remained to be traversed being greater than was anticipated, he had to abandon the intention. Plodding doggedly along, the troops made their way up the ravine, the obscurity of which was scarcely relieved by the light of the stars, and, at length, shortly before six in the morning, the head of the column reached the foot of the pass, where the track left the ravine and turned up the spur. The guides, who had led the troops up to this point, were dismissed at their own request, and the men moved on expecting momentarily to fall in with the enemy. Presently, just as day was breaking, the challenge of a double sentry was heard, and two shots, fired in rapid succession, warned every one that the struggle had begun. The order, " Front form companies," rang out on the morning air, and an advance party of the 5th Goorkhas, gallantly led by Major FitzHugh and Captain Cook, made a rush for the first stockade, fifty yards up the hill, while the remainder of the regiment extended and swarmed round the flanks of the obstacle. Sir Frederick Eoberts has given us the following account of the advance up the Spingawi ravine, and the act of treachery by the 29th Punjaub Native Infantry, which nearly proved fatal to the success of his operations : " I was going along just in rear of the advance, and began to be aware that gradually the pace was becoming slower and slower, with great straggling among the men of the 29th Kegiment, and as I had given special orders that the regiments were to keep touch, I halted the column to find out if the remainder of the troops were with me. On the return of the staff officer , whom I had sent back for this purpose, I found that the 5th Goorkhas, the four com- panies of the 72nd Highlanders, and the mountain battery were following the 29th, but the remainder of the column had lost touch ; the 23rd Pioneers I did not see again till 11 A.M. on the following day, and Brigadier- General Thelwall till 1 P.M. " While the column was halting, I heard two shots fired in the ranks of the 29th, and immediately gave orders to Colonel Gordon to find which men of his regiment had been guilty of the act. He reported that he could not identify them. I then said that the 29th could no longer lead the advance because of the slow pace at which they marched, and ordered the Goorkhas 154 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. and Highlanders to head the column. This caused some delay, and I hecame anxious, as it was necessary we should reach the Spingawi Pass before daylight, which broke about six o'clock. I asked Colonel Villiers the time. Taking out his watch he said, ' Three o'clock.' This reassured me, as it would give time to reach the enemy's position before daylight ; but soon after he came to me and said he had made a mistake, that it was four o'clock. This renewed my anxiety, as we were travelling over ground unfamiliar to us. The Goorkhas were now leading, and soon a further delay occurred owing to the regiment taking a wrong road, which at this point bifurcated. I halted the column and sent an officer to find them, and they soon returned, but this caused a further delay of half an hour. " The ground now began to ascend rapidly, and I knew from this that we must be nearing the final slope. I now told Major FitzHugh, commanding the 5th Goorkhas, that I should give him no further orders, but that he was to move on rapidly, and on reaching the foot of the Afghan position he was to give the order, ' Front form companies,' and go at the enemy as hard as he could, and I promised to support him with the 72nd High- landers and other regiments as fast as I could bring them into action. At the first streak of dawn I heard the order, ' Front form companies,' and a few seconds after the enemy began firing." The firing became general on both sides, and the dense pine woods were illuminated by the discharges of the rifles, for day- light was only just beginning to break. The Afghan fire is described to us by one who was present, as a perfect rain of bullets, but it was almost ineffective, as, owing to the steepness of the hill, the bullets passed over the men's heads. With admirable dash the Goorkhas stormed the stockade after a brief hand-to-hand struggle. The Afghans fell back on a second stockade, eighty yards in the rear, but the spur here being a little wider, the flanks of the stockade were turned, and the agile little Goorkhas, assisted by the Highlanders, under Colonel Brownlow, were in the midst of the stalwart Afghans, who speedily gave way. Meantime General Koberts directed Captain Kelso to take his mountain battery to the front, which that officer did with great Capture of the Stockades. 155 gallantry, and himself advanced up the hill with the remaining companies of the wing of the Highlanders, who, forcing their way through the timher that grew on the precipitous sides of the spur, came up on the right flank of the advance, and push- ing on in support of the latter, followed the fleeing Afghans up the hills to their last defences near the crest. From the second stockade to the crest of the hill the ground was open, "the track ascending in short zigzags," while the crest itself was covered by the enemy, who kept up a heavy musketry fire on the troops, and also maintained an ineffective shell fire. The obstacles of the attack were increased by the felled timber lying across the slope of the hill, and by a knoll on the flank pro- tected by shelter-trenches, which it was necessary to take as it occupied a commanding position. The Goorkhas and Highlanders pressed up the hill, and soon captured the third stockade, the Afghans suffering heavily, though they succeeded in removing the gun which commanded the line of advance. The 29th Punjaubees were in support, and, later, repelled an attack on the right flank, while General Roberts, on foot, accompanied the 72nd Highlanders on the right, and seized the knoll which commanded the ground above the third stockade. At this time the force suffered a loss in the death of Captain Kelso. This officer, following the Goorkhas and Highlanders, had brought two of his guns into action in the battery vacated by the Afghans, and not being aware, owing to the dim light, that the enemy had temporarily returned to the first stockade, after the advance had pushed up the hill, was proceeding through the work with his chief native officer to find a position for one gun on the knoll, when too late he discovered his mistake, and as he turned round was shot through the back of the head and fell dead on his face. Im- mediately afterwards the 29th Regiment advanced, and a second time turned the enemy out of the stockade. Meantime, the Highlanders, led by Colonel Brownlow, and accompanied by General Roberts, pushed up the ascent, the enemy falling back till they were driven among the pine woods which clothed the spur. The Goorkhas also carried on a front attack up the hill above the last stockade, when a party of Afghans charged down, but were met by the gallant Captain 156 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. Cook, who rescued Major Galbraith, the Assistant-Adjutant- General from death at the hands of a powerful Pathan.* The fighting was severe throughout, and within the first, or great, stockade, seventy-eight dead bodies of Afghans were found, proving that they had defended the position with resolution. The troops were now formed up on the edge of the " merg," or small grass plain, beyond the last stockade. By 6.30 the whole of the Spingawi stockades had changed hands, and the line of the enemy's defence was completely turned, while he withdrew towards the Peiwar Kotul, and along the edge of the woods to the north. General Koberts heliographed the news of his success to Brigadier- General Cobbe, and instructed him to co-operate vigorously from below in attacking the Kotul. Having re-formed the troops on the crest of the hill, he sent for the supports, which were still some way in the rear, under the command of Brigadier-General Thelwall. After giving the men a rest, at 9.30 General Roberts, feeling the importance of pressing the enemy while they were dispirited, determined to push on without waiting for the sup- ports. Sending word to General Thelwall to come to his assis- tance, he marched with the troops then with him the 72nd, Goorkhas, and 29th to dislodge the enemy from the dense woods surrounding the plateau in the direction of the Peiwar Kotul, in which they had sought shelter. The 29th now led the way, followed by the Goorkhas, the 72nd, and the mountain battery, under Lieutenant Jervis. The column crossed the plateau unopposed, and then plunged into the pine wood on the rocky hill-side in skirmishing order, a species of fighting which tries the discipline and courage of troops, who are less under the leadership of their officers. The men skirmished through the forest and over rocks and bushes j n a way that spoke well for their training, driving the enemy before them, and reached the crest of the hill, a very steep acclivity, with slopes towards the Peiwar, which afterwards received the name of Picnic Hill, as the troops later in the day dined here out of the contents of their haversacks, and were * For this act of gallantry Captain Cook received the V.C., but did not long survive to enjoy the distinction and a brevet majority he had well earned, as he fell at Cabul, hi December of the following year. Critical Position of the Column. 157 soon met by a hot fire from the Afghans assembled in great strength on an equally steep hill on the opposite side of the narrow valley, only fifty yards in breadth at this point. General Roberts took up a position, amid a heavy fire, on the left of the line in rear of the 29th, opposite the neck which communicated with the hill on which the Afghans were crowded in great strength, but from which they would have to be driven if the Peiwar Kotul was to be stormed. The enemy exhibited great hardihood, and relying on their numbers, which enabled them to extend along the crest of the hill, a mile to the left and half a mile to the right of the neck, and also on the strength of their position, poured in a hot fire, and even charged down the hill towards the British troops, but each time were driven back. Though the time for the advance had not yet arrived, as the attack in front, by Briga- dier-General Cobbe, was not developed, it was foreign to General Roberta's nature to act only on the defensive, and he directed the 29th to proceed down the hill and, covered by the fire of the mountain guns, attack the enemy on the opposite slope, and sent word to the Goorkhas and Highlanders to act in support. The Punjaubees succeeded in reaching the top of the oppo- site hill, but unfortunately the Goorkhas and Highlanders lost their way in the dense forest, and there being no support, the 29th were driven back. General Roberts accompanied the last company of the regiment, and was about halfway up the opposite hill, believing the Goorkhas and Highlanders were close behind, when he met the 29th rushing back, having been driven down by the Afghans, who were in overwhelming force. The General had sent one after the other all the members of his Staff, in- cluding even the chaplain, Rev. J. Adams, to find out where Brigadier-General Thelwall was with the supports, and where the Highlanders and Goorkhas had strayed to, but neither his officers returned with news, nor did the wished for troops make an appearance. The position now became very critical. In vain the General sought by voice and example to rally the panic-stricken Pun- jaubees. With his wonted valour, freely exposing his person, he was now the centre of a storm of bullets, and that he 158 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. escaped death was a marvel, though a contusion in the hand from a spent bullet bore evidence to the personal danger to which he was exposed. At this time General Koberts's attention was attracted by an act of devotion towards himself, which should find a place in this personal record. When returning up Picnic Hill from the Afghan position, after vainly endeavouring to rally the discom- fited Punjaubees, on turning round to look back, he beheld his Sikh orderly, Dhyan Singh by name, of the 5th Punjaub Infan- try, walking close behind him with his arms stretched out to cover the body of his master, exposed to the Afghan fire across the narrow valley, which, as before said, was only fifty yards in width. Officers who have served on the North-West frontier can recall many instances of a like devotion on the part of those serving under them, whether Sikhs or Pathans, and it is a dis- graceful calumny to say that the virtue of gratitude is unknown to the inhabitants of the Indian Peninsula. At this anxious moment, when all seemed lost, as neither General Thelwall, with the supports, nor the Highlanders and Goorkhas, had made an appearance, a party of the 23rd Pion- eers appeared, coming down the hill, under Colonel Currie, who informed General Roberts that Major Anderson, of his regi- ment, was close by with more of his men. The Pioneers were soon under fire, and a few minutes afterwards, Major Anderson was killed, a little to the left ; but his death was avenged by Colonel Currie, who drove back the enemy. This timely assis- tance saved a further retirement, and soon afterwards the Goor- khas and Highlanders, finding the right direction by the sound of the heavy firing, returned to the hill, having lost their way in the dense wood.* Even now the 2nd Punjaub N.I., and the four Horse Artillery guns, forming, with the Pioneers, General Thelwall's brigade, had not arrived. The action had proceeded for two hours all along the front, with great expenditure of ammunition, but with small loss, owing to the cover, when a portion of General Cobbe's troops came on the scene, and their presence prevented the necessity * General Roberts said he afterwards tried to find out whither the Highlanders had wandered, but no one could explain, though the dense- ness of the forest and the want of guides was perhaps a sufficient excuse. A Further Flank Movement. 159 of driving the enemy from their strong position by a front attack. The 5th Punjaub N.I. and 2nd Battalion 8th Regi- ment had been detailed for the front attack on the Peiwar Kotul, and the former, in order to co-operate with the flank attack, began ascending one of the principal spurs that run down from the range between the Peiwar and Spingawi Passes. Leaving camp before dawn, the Punjaubees were six hours reaching the summit, when, guided by the sound of the firing, Major Macqueen, the commanding officer, accompanied by Colonel Perkins, commanding Koyal Engineers, who gave most valuable information regarding the enemy's position on the Peiwar Kotul, led his men up to the rear of the hill where the duel was progressing between the British and Afghan main forces. General Eoberts, acting on the information brought by Colonel Perkins, sent two mountain-guns to shell the Afghan camp, which was exposed to view by an opening in the woods, the range being about 1,000 yards across the face of the pre- cipitous Peiwar range. The shells set fire to the tents and caused a panic among the men and animals, which was in- creased when, about noon, the elephants arrived with the four Horse Artillery guns, under Colonel Stirling, which were brought into action on the left of the hill that the Afghans had lately held so tenaciously. On the arrival of the 2nd Punjaub N.I., which had been absent, with the remainder of the sup- ports, from the fighting line, General Roberts ordered them to hold the crest of the hill, while the troops, who had been marching and fighting continuously for more than fourteen hours, rested and refreshed themselves with the cooked provi- sions they had brought in their haversacks, and hence the hill, that had witnessed such hot work, received the name of Picnic Hill. General Eoberts says : " I walked across to the hill lately held by the enemy for the purpose of reconnoitring, the horses of the mounted officers having been left at the foot of the ascent ; but it was impossible to pursue the Afghans in this direction through the thick forest and undergrowth, and as guides could not be had, and as there were only two or three hours more daylight, I decided to make a further flank move- 160 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. merit with the object of getting still further round the enemy's rear, and to make an attack on the following morning. Leaving the 2nd Punjaubees on Picnic Hill, on the north of the Kotul, and the 29th to hold the hill overlooking the Spingawi and protect the field hospital which had been estab- lished there, I took the remainder of the troops I had brought with me from camp, including 5th Punjaub Infantry, and pro- ceeded on the endeavour to get round the enemy's rear." Just before dark he reached a hill having an elevation of nearly 10,000 feet, where he bivouacked, amidst intense cold, the thermometer marking 25 degs. of frost. Though the troops, the 5th Goorkhas leading, commenced the march from Picnic Hill at 2 P.M., it was four before the head of the column emerged from the forest on to the open slopes above the highest cultivation in the Hurriab Valley. No enemy was in sight, and as the short December day was already closing in, and the troops were quite worn out with their exertions, the General gave the order to bivouac, and soon huge fires were lit, and afforded the troops the only means of keeping out the piercing cold of this elevated spot. General Roberts shared the discomfort of his men and shivered in his greatcoat; but he had the added trouble caused by anxiety as to the absence of news from Brigadier- General Cobbe, of whom he had not heard since Colonel Perkins left him in the morning, as owing to the intervening hills, he had been unable to communicate by heliograph with the camp after the first signal in the morning reporting the capture of the Spingawi Pass. About eight o'clock in the evening, however, the General's anxiety was relieved by a hastily scribbled note from Colonel Waterfield, Political Officer with the Force, announcing that six companies of the 2nd Battalion 8th Ptegiment, under Colonel Barry Drew, were in possession of the Peiwar Kotul. The column for the front attack,* numbering 30 officers and 838 * The column consisted of the 8th Regiment ; 5th Punjaub Infantry ; 12th Bengal Cavalry ; 2 guns F A, R.H.A. ; 3 guns G 3, R.A. ; and the Turi and other levies. General Cobbe received general instructions to open fire on the enemy about 6 A.M. ; to get his troops into position in front of the Peiwar Kotul by 8.30, and to storm the place when the flank attack had become sufficiently developed to shake the enemy's defence. The Front Attack. 161 men, under command of Brigadier-General Cobbe, had moved from camp at 5.30 A.M., and about seven o'clock, having reached the last spur (separated from the Pel war Kotul by a glen), became engaged with the enemy, whose artillery also opened fire on our guns, which returned the compliment with vigour. The duel went ou till about ten o'clock, when the enemy, trying to outflank the skirmishing line of the 2nd Battalion 8th Regi- ment, a squadron of the 12th Bengal Cavalry charged across the line of fire and forced them to retire. An hour later General Cobbe was wounded in the leg, when the command devolved on Colonel Drew. The Afghans held their ground in the Kotul, until, panic-stricken at the success of the further flank move- ment made by General Roberts, and fearful of having their line of retreat cut off, they evacuated the Kotul, which was occupied at 2.30 P.M. So hastily had the enemy abandoned their position that they left their tents standing, and dinners ready cooked, and the road towards Ali Kheyl was strewed for some distance with guns, limber boxes, and other materiel. The camp was plun- dered by the Turis, who had been directed to move in co- operation on the enemy's right, but kept out of harm's way until the camp was in the occupation of the British. Colonel Hugh Gough, commanding the cavalry, proceeded in pursuit of the enemy, but they had had too long a start, no signs of them were visible, and the cavalry returned to the camp at the foot of the hill, whence tents and rations were sent for the men of the 8th Regiment, who passed the night on the Kotul. The loss in the action, which was chiefly confined to the column under General Roberts' s immediate command, was twenty-one killed, including two officers Major Anderson, 23rd Pioneers, and Captain Kelso, R.A. and seventy-two wounded, including two officers Brigadier-General Cobbe and Lieutenant Monro, 72nd Highlanders. The enemy, though occu- pying a defensive position, suffered far more heavily, and the wounded, who were removed, crowded the villages in the Hur- riab Valley, while six field-pieces and twelve mountain-guns were captured. The victory achieved was in every way a remarkable one. The Afghans had everything in their favour an almost im- M 1 62 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. pregnable position, perfect knowledge of the ground, superior numbers, and a stronger force of artillery, with an ample supply of provisions and ammunition ; but all were neutralised by the genius of the British General and the valour of his troops. An officer of the Staff who was by General Roberts's side throughout the operations that resulted in the capture of the Peiwar Kotul has given us the following interesting account of the proceedings : " On the 28th of November we reached the foot of Peiwar Kotul about three in the afternoon. The General had in- formation to the effect that the enemy were entrenched at the entrance of the Pass, and had six guns. The whole force at the General's disposal marched from Kurram at 5A.M., reached the ground opposite the Afghan cantonment of Habibkila about 10 A.M., when dispositions were made for attacking what was supposed to be the enemy's position. Colonel T. Gordon, com- manding the 29th P.N.I., was ordered to proceed to the left, and turn their right flank, and he was given his own regiment, the 5th P.I., under Major McQueen, and two mountain guns. Brigadier-General Cobbe, with the 28th Foot and four moun- tain guns, was ordered to advance on the enemy's centre ; and the General, with Thelwall's brigade, moved against the enemy's left. " The ground was covered with a kind of dwarf ilex, which grew like a thick shrub rather than a tree, and which was well calculated to conceal even a large body of men. It was also inter- sected by several deep ravines. Along this ground, then, Thel- wall's brigade advanced, and we were on the tiptoe of expecta- tion, believing that the enemy were close in front, and that at any moment we might see the leading men of our skirmishers open fire. But on we went, and still there was no sign of the enemy. Then the ground was reached where they were said to be entrenched, but still no sign of either enemy or entrench- ment, and the idea that the Afghans had fled began to gain ground amongst those of us who were new to Asiatic methods of warfare. At last a bit of open ground was reached, where there were signs of the enemy's last encampment, and a halt was made. The Staff Officer's Account. 163 " We had seen Colonel Gordon, with part of his force, cross a hill on our left and dip down into a valley behind a spur just in front of us, and we could see Colonel McQueen, with part of his regiment, holding a commanding position on this spur. Glasses were directed towards the top of the Kotul, but nothing could be discerned at first, and the idea that the enemy had fled, or had moved back to some stronger position, began to gain ground. Meanwhile, the General had directed a search to be made for water, and the open bit of ground to be examined with a view to encamping on it for-the night. " About this time officers with good glasses detected men moving about on the top of the Kotul, and the dress of these men was so like that of our 29th P.N.I, that many declared them to be our men, who had worked round through the valley behind the spur on the end of which was Major McQueen. All doubt, however, as to whether they were friends or foes was soon dissipated as the sounds of very heavy firing reached us from the gorge or narrow valley along which Colonel Gordon had advanced. " The General immediately sent Captain Kennedy, A.Q.M.G., back to stop the baggage, and to choose a place for a camp a little further down the pass, and giving directions as to what was to be done on the spot where he then was, he sent an officer to McQueen to hold his position till Colonel Gordon and the force with him had retired, for the General had determined not to attack the enemy's position that day, it being far too strong to attempt to take at that late hour in the afternoon, with troops who had been marching from before daylight. One great point effected by Colonel Gordon's move, and by the advance of the whole force to the foot of the Pass, was that the whole of the enemy's position in our front was unmasked. The General himself, and some of his Staff, went up the valley by which Colonel Gordon had advanced, and when he saw the strength of the enemy's position he ordered the 5th Punjaub Infantry to advance and cover the retirement of Colonel Gordon's force. This was most satisfactorily accomplished, the whole of the casualties amounting, I think, to only eleven. The artillery and rifle fire was exceedingly heavy for a considerable time, and the small number of casualties on our side is another in- M 2 164 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. stance of how ineffectual a heavy fire often is from a very elevated position. " The troops were all got back comfortably into camp, and we were all thoroughly satisfied at having found the enemy at last, though his position was much stronger than we should have supposed. The General seemed satisfied that he had now got them within striking distance, and next morning he prepared for a thorough reconnoissance of the different spurs which led from the Peiwar Kotul into the plain below. Those on the right and left of our camp were carefully examined, and towards evening the impression gained ground that the General would probably order the attack along the spur on our left, the highest point of which was held by a picket of McQueen's regi- ment. Our camp was almost under the spur on our right, where we had a very strong picket also of 23rd Pioneers. These pickets were inspected continually, as well as those in front and rear of our camp, by Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. G. Villiers,* whom the General had appointed Superintendent of Outposts. Next day reconnoitring still went on, and the General himself went up to the picket of the 23rd Pioneers, and from that commanding position was able to get a very good view both of the enemy's position and of the spur on our left, along which it was thought he would probably deliver his attack on Monday, the 2nd December, as the General said he would rest quietly until that day in order to give the troops, who had had some very harassing marches, time to recover from the effects before tasking their energies with the attack of so strong a position as that chosen by the enemy. But he had not as yet said how, or at what hour on Monday he would attack. " On Sunday morning there was divine service in the open air just a little out of range of the enemy's artillery. The General and all his Staff attended, and there was a very large number of communicants. Towards the middle of the day an attempt was made to throw up an earthwork in front of our position, which had the desired effect of leading the enemy to suppose that the principal attack would be made on their centre and along the high road that led to the top of the Kotul. This * Colonel Villiers was Military Secretary of the Viceroy, and subsequently did good service in Zululand, under Sir Garnet Wolseley. The Staff Officer's Account. 165 attempt was, I believe, ordered to be carried on until it drew the enemy's fire, when the working party was to retire. About four in the afternoon the General summoned all officers com- manding brigades, regiments, and batteries to a council in his own camp, and he then explained to them that he had had the road leading to the Spin Gawai Kotul carefully reconnoitred by Major Collett, Assistant Quartermaster-General to the Division, and Captain Carr, Deputy- Assistant Quartermaster- General of Cavalry, and that the report was so favourable he had determined upon making his chief attack on that point. He then ex- plained how this was to be done, and all the details of the movement had been so carefully worked out by Major Collett that no little point was forgotten. " The General's plan, briefly, was this : Not to warn the troops till 1 P.M., when the regiments appointed for the attack were all to turn out without any noise or speaking, and with- out sound of drum, bugle, or trumpet. The fires in the camp were to be kept alight, and all the tents were to be kept stand- ing. The men were each to carry one day's cooked rations, and the march was to continue all night till about 4 A.M., when it was calculated we should be tolerably close to the Spin Gawai Kotul. It was then intended to halt until a little before dawn, when it was proposed to time the movement so that the attack should be actually delivered at dawn. " Brigadier-General Cobbe was left in command of the camp with the 2nd battalion 8th Foot, four guns G battery 3rd brigade Koyal Artillery, and two guns F battery A brigade Eoyal Horse Artillery, and one squadron of cavalry. With this force he had orders to attack the enemy's centre as soon as he found the enemy's left had been turned at Spin Gawai. " A few minutes after ten General Roberts, with the re- mainder of his force, marched off in silence. There was a little moonlight for the first hour, but that help to marching soon vanished, and the troops marched on as best they could in the darkness, in the teeth of a cutting wind. The road lay up the bed of the Spin Gawai Nullah, which was covered by huge boulders, over which the men had to pick their way as best they could. " The march proceeded without incident till about 2 A.M., 1 66 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. when two shots were fired by men of the 29th P.N.I., apparently with the intention of giving warning to the enemy of our approach. Their object, however, was frustrated by two causes. First, the wind blowing strongly down the Nullah prevented the sound from travelling upwards, and secondly, the conformation of the hills at that particular spot was unfavourable to sound travelling in the direction of the enemy. This conduct of the two men of the 29th P.N.I, necessitated a change in the order of the march. The 5th Goorkhas and a company of the 72nd Highlanders, under Colonel Brownlow, took the place in front that had hitherto been held by the 29th. " As soon as this arrangement was made the line marched on again in the darkness, and without incident or mishap, until the foot of Spin G-awai Kotul was reached. So little did the enemy suspect our approach that our leading men had actually come within a few hundred yards of their advanced double sentry before they were aware of our presence. Two shots fired by the double sentry gave the alarm, and then rang out the orders on our side for the attack. It was still quite dark, and under the pine trees, through which our men advanced, the flashes of our rifles and those of the enemy from the big stockade on the top of the Pass lit up fitfully the whole scene. This stockade was gallantly taken by the 5th Goorkhas and the company of 72nd Highlanders, and two other stockades on the left of the enemy's position were also attacked and taken. The two guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery, under Major Kelso, who had taken up a position, by the General's direction, on a knoll that commanded the stockade, contributed greatly to the rapid success of the movement. The firing having ceased, and it being still almost dark, Major Kelso advanced with one gun through the stockade, hoping to get a shot at the retreating enemy, but the force which held the stockade, finding that they were unpursued in the darkness, and that the line of attack had followed the direction of the two stockades on their left, re- turned again to their first position in the big stockade. These men were dressed so much like our 29th P.N.I, that Major Kelso, seeing them in the stockade in the dim light of the early dawn, supposed they were men of that regiment, and did not discover his mistake till he was close upon them, when they The Staff Officers Account. 167 fired and shot him through the head. A similar mistake was also made hy Captain Woodthorpe, R.E., at whom they also fired, but he escaped almost by a miracle, the hilt of his revolver and part of his coat being shot away, and for some months afterwards he bore on his skin the mark or burn which the graze of the bullet left upon it. " The enemy's return necessitated the taking of the stockade a second time, which was done by the 29th P.N.I., and the whole position, held so strongly by a very large body of the enemy, was in our hands a little before 7 A.M. As an instance of the difficulty of shooting down hill, I may mention that very few of our men were hit during the advance up the hill. The enemy's fire Avas very heavy and well sustained, but was just too high to be destructive to our people. They themselves, though occupying what appeared to be a secure position inside the big stockade, suffered heavily, and seventy-eight dead bodies were counted next day lying in and around the stockade. "As soon as the Spin Gawai Kotul was in our hands the troops were formed up, and an advance made across the open ground in the direction of Peiwar Kotul. The 29th P.N.I, led the advance, and every effort was made to press on the retreat- ing enemy as fast as possible. Leaving the ' merg,' the line of advance lay along thickly-wooded spurs, covered with a great deal of undergrowth. After some distance had been traversed our advanced skirmishers suddenly drew the fire of the enemy, who, having retreated from Spin Gawai, had joined their com- rades at Peiwar, and now took up a strong position on the route we were following to Peiwar Kotul. General Roberts never hesitated, but he sent back at once for the 5th Goorkhas and 72nd Highlanders, and with a view to encouraging the men of the 29th P.N.I., went down the hill with them, and up the opposite side under a very heavy fire. With this small force he actually reached the top of the hill occupied by the enemy ; but there was delay in getting up the 72nd and the 5th Goorkhas, caused by the thick undergrowth and the nature of the ground, which both prevented the regiments seeing what point to make for, and the officers of the General's staff sent in quest of them, from finding them easily. In consequence of this short delay the men of the 29th P.N.I, were forced to 1 68 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. retire to the opposite hill, which we then held with the Goorkhas, 72nd, 23rd Pioneers, and 2nd P.I., all of whom had now come up. Holding this position, General Roberts then tried to open communication with General Cobhe's force, which it was under- stood was at this time attacking the enemy in front. But the nature of the ground prevented the signallers from opening communication. " Shortly afterwards, Colonel Perkins, E.E., and Major McQueen, 5th P. I., who were in the front attack, contrived to ascend the spur to the right of their line of attack, and to join General Roberts, thereby giving him full information of what had taken place in front up to the time when they left. After consulting with them and the commanding officers of the force he had with him, the General resolved to get round in the rear of the enemy, and to leave a regiment, the 2nd P.I., to hold the position he then occupied. Before making this move two mountain guns were brought into action at a spot pointed out by Colonel Perkins, who, on his road up, had observed that the enemy's camp at the Peiwar Kotul would be exposed to artillery fire at that point. " The General, about one o'clock, commenced his march to the flank and rear of the enemy, and this movement, being observed by them, caused at once their retreat on all sides within our view ; but their position was so extended that we could not tell how far the retreat was general, nor whether it included the force opposed to Cobbe's brigade. It was impossible with our tired troops, who had been marching all night and fighting all day, to follow up an enemy who took no one line of retreat, but fled in many directions. The General, therefore, having completed the flank movement, and got in rear of the enemy's position, bivouacked for the night on a hill above the village of Gandigan. " At this time we did not know how completely the flank movement had routed the enemy, but we afterwards learned that the enemy, seeing it, and fearing it would cut off their retreat, had all of them fled precipitately. Meanwhile, the front attack, finding that the enemy's fire had altogether ceased, began to advance in the direction of the road leading up to the Kotul, their attack hitherto having followed the line of a spur on the Roberts in the Enemy's Works. 169 proper left of that road. Colonel Waterfield and Colonel Hugh (rough were, I believe, the first to reach the top of the Kotul, which they found utterly deserted. This was about 3 P.M. Immediately afterwards the troops followed, under the command of Colonel Drew, 2nd battalion 8th Foot, and occupied the ground lately held by the Afghans on the top of the Kotul. About 8 P.M. a messenger from Colonel Waterfield (or Colonel Gough, I forget which) reached us, with a letter which informed the General that the enemy had fled, and that what remained of their camp was in the possession of Cobbe's brigade." General Eoberts had a cheerless bivouac on the night of the 2nd of December, and, on the following morning, he moved his force, comprising four guns, Eoyal Horse Artillery, and two mountain guns, wing 72nd Highlanders, 5th Goorkhas, and 23rd Pioneers, to the open ground about half a mile from Zabberdasht Killa,* where the camp was pitched on the arrival of the tents from the camp at the foot of the Peiwar Kotul. During the afternoon the 2nd Punjaub N.I. joined him from Picnic Hill, and the 29th N.I. were sent back to the standing camp on the other side cf the Kotul. General Roberts was of opinion that it would be useless to attempt the pursuit of the enemy over a hilly and, in parts, thickly-wooded country, as they had not retreated in a compact body, but, like the Israelites of old, fled " every man to his city, and every man to his own country." During the forenoon he rode, with his Staff, to the Peiwar Kotul, and carefully examined the position, of which his admirably designed and executed strategy had dis- possessed the enemy. Along the whole line of the narrow pass, extending from Zabberdasht Killa to the Kotul, appeared the usual indications of a precipitate flight. He describes it as " a place of enormous natural strength, and the enemy's dis- positions for repelling any attack on it from the front were very complete and judicious. It is also evident, from the enormous stores of ammunition and supplies which have been captured, that it was the intention of the Afghan Government that their troops should remain here for the winter, and that they fully expected to be able to maintain their position against the British * Zabberdasht means " high-handed," and Killa is a fort. j 70 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. forces." The strength of the enemy on the 2nd December was ascertained to be 8,500 regular infantry with 18 guns, and a large number of tribesmen. After an interview with Colonel Drew he rode down the hill to the camp, and directed that the hospital, which was under the protection of the 29th Kegiment, should be moved back to the Kurrum Fort, where he had established the base hospital. On arriving at headquarters General Roberts sat down at a little camp-table, in the open air, to w T rite the despatch an- nouncing his splendid achievement, and his Aides-de-Camp and the officers of his Staff wrote as best they could at the same table, sending news of their safety to anxious relatives and friends. They were not long thus occupied when an orderly came to announce that the trench was ready for the reception of those who had fallen on the previous day, upon which the General immediately left his writing, and, accompanied by the officers of his Staff, followed the bodies to the grave, where they were interred with as much ceremony as the circumstances permitted. Towards evening he returned to his camp near Zabberdasht Killa, and, writes the officer of his Staff, already quoted, " while riding back it was a matter of general comment how admirably the enemy had chosen their position at Peiwar, and also a matter of congratulation that so difficult a task had been performed with the loss of so few officers and men." On the following day, the 4th December, the bodies of the two officers killed, Major Anderson and Captain Kelso, were com- mitted to the grave, on a little hill between Zabberdasht Killa and Gandigan, in the presence of the General and other officers. During the day General Roberts issued a congratulatory order* to his gallant troops, and, on the 7th, he had the grati- * The following is General Roberts's order to his troops : " Major- General Roberts congratulates the Kurram Field Force on the successful result of the operations of the 2nd December against the Peiwar Kotul, a position of extraordinary strength, and held by an enemy resolute and well armed. Not only had the enemy the advantage of ground, but also of numbers, as they were largely reinforced from Cabul the evening previous to the 'attack. A position apparently impregnable has been gained, a con- siderable portion of the Afghan army has been completely routed, and seventeen guns, with large stores of ammunition and supplies, have been captured. The result is most honourable, and could only have been attained by troops in a high state of discipline, capable of enduring hardships, and able to fight as soldiers of the British Army have always fought. Major- Arrival at Alt Kheyl. 171 fication of announcing to them the following telegram from her Majesty the Queen, forwarded through the "Viceroy, who added his" warm congratulations on the success achieved:" "I have received the news of the decisive victory of General Roberts and the splendid behaviour of my brave soldiers with pride and satisfaction, though I must ever deplore the unavoid- able loss of life. Pray inquire after the wounded in my name. May we continue to receive good news." The troops halted in their positions on the 3rd December, when the 5th Punjaub N.I., under Major MacQueen, proceeded to bring in a large quantity of provisions left by the Afghans in the neighbouring villages, and the 2nd Battalion 8th Regiment furnished working parties to assist in taking the captured guns back to the camp for transmission to the Kurram Fort, a work of no small difficulty, owing to the steepness of the hill, but which was facilitated by using the long drag-ropes employed by the Afghans in bringing the ordnance up the ascent. Preparations were now commenced for halting the troops that were to remain at the Kotul, the company of Sappers and Miners being ordered up from Kurrana to assist in this and road-making, and three guns of G Battery, 3rd Brigade R.A., were ordered for the defence of the position. Brigadier- General Thelwall was placed in command of the troops* remaining for the winter at and near the Peiwar Kotul, and at ten o'clock on the morning of the 6th December, General Roberts marched from the camp at Zabberdasht Killa to Ali Kheyl, with the re- mainder of the troops, f the column being temporarily under the command of Colonel Barry Drew until Brigadier-General General Roberts deeply regrets the brave men wbo have fallen in the gallant discharge of their duty, and feels for the sufferings of the wounded. In Major Anderson, 23rd Pioneers, and Captain Kelso, Royal Artillery, the Major- General has lost two personal friends, and the Government two valuable officers." The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick Haines, also telegraphed his congratulations to General Roberts. * At the Peiwar village, 12th Bengal Cavalry ; at the Camp, near the village of Turrai, 29th Punjaub N.I. ; at the Kotul, the 8th Regiment, three guns G Battery 3rd brigade Royal Artillery, and a company of Sappers. t Advance-guard detachment, 12th Bengal Cavalry ; wing, 23rd Pioneers, No. 1 Mountain Battery. Main body 72nd Highlanders, 2nd Punjaub N.T., 5th Punjaub N.I., and 5th Goorkhas. Rear-guard Four guns F Battery A Brigade Royal Horse Artillery, on elephants ; wing, 23rd Pioneers. T 72 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. Cobbe returned to duty. The march to Ali Kheyl, a distance of twelve miles, was made without much difficulty, the road being in the river-bed or along the bank, and camp was pitched on the plateau beyond the village. On arriving at Ali Kheyl, General Eoberts, at 1 P.M., pro- ceeded to examine the road in the direction of the Shutar- gardan Pass, taking with him as escort 250 men of the 72nd Highlanders, 250 of the 5th Goorkhas, and two guns of the Mountain Battery, the whole under the command of the late Lieutenant- Colonel Brownlow, who fell at Candahar, on the 1st September, 1880, in the last action of the war. The first march was made to Rokian, a distance of three and a half miles, and, on the following day, the General marched to Jaji Thanna, a force in support, consisting of the 2nd and 5th Punjaub N.I., under the command of Lieutenant- Colonel Tyn- dall, of the former regiment, with the two remaining guns of the Mountain Battery, taking the place of the escort at Eokian. The cold was intense, the thermometer marking 5 Fahr. at 7 P.M., but the weather was clear, and there was no snow. On the 9th, General Roberts and Staff, escorted by fifty men of the Highlanders, and an equal number of the Goorkhas, leaving his camp standing, pushed on to the crest of the Shutargardan, a distance of about ten miles, and eagerly scanned the Logar Valley and the road that led to Cabul, some fifty miles distant. Between the Peiwar Kotul and Dreikula, a point eight miles beyond Ali Kheyl, the route lay through the country of the Jajis, who had fought against the British in the action of the 2nd December, but who were so completely at the mercy of the invaders that they were glad to make terms with Colonel Waterford, the Political Officer, who proceeded to Ali Kheyl, and promised them good treatment if they assisted the trans- port of the force, which they continued to do for some months without giving cause for complaint. Beyond Dreikula to. the Shutargardan, says General Roberts, " the country was abso- lutely uninhabited, though Jajis, Mangals, and Ghilzais can collect there in considerable numbers to oppose the advance of a force, both in the Hazardarakt defile and on the slopes of the Shutargardan. " Roberts at the Shzitargardan Pass. 173 The Government had decided that the Shutargardan was to be the limit of the advance into Afghan territory at the present season of the year, and so General Roberts, after wistfully regarding the land of promise from the summit of the Afghan Pisgah, returned to Ali Kheyl, leaving on the further slope of the Shutargardan a battery of brass guns, which the Afghan reinforcements, under Wali Mahomed Khan, had abandoned when, climbing the ascent, they met the flood of their retreat- ing countrymen, and swelled its volume instead of stemming the tide. General Roberts returned, on the 10th December, to Ali Ivheyl, where a company of the 29th Punjaubees was perman- ently quartered, and the 2nd and 5th Punjaub N.I., and the four guns of the Horse Artillery, marched for Kurrarn, to which the General decided to return by the northern route, over a range of hills occupied by the hostile Mangals, with the object of exploring the country between the Hurriab and Kurram valleys, and of acquiring a knowledge of an important route by which the Peiwar Kotul could be turned. 1 74 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. CHAPTER X. General Roberts returns to Kurram by the Sappri Defile Attack by the Mangals on the Baggage Escort Preparations for the Occupation of the Kurram Valley during the Winter The Court-Martial on the Treacherous Soldiers of the 29th Punjaub N.I., and Roberta's General Order to the Force Disposal of the Troops into Winter Quarters Expedition into the Khost Valley The March from Kurrain to Hazir Pir, and thence into the Khost Valley Occupation of the Fort of Matun Action of the 7th January and Defeat of the Mangals Re- connoissance by General Roberts of the Khost Valley. GENERAL ROBERTS marched from All Kheyl by the Sappri, or Manjiar defile at 9 A.M. on the 12th December, with a force consisting of the 5th Goorkhas, wing 72nd Highlanders, the 23rd Pioneers, and the Mountain Battery. The operation of marching a considerable force, with its long baggage train, through a defile held by a hostile tribe of mountaineers is one of the most difficult in war, and it was not effected on the present occasion without some loss, which included two excel- lent officers. The village of Sappri, distance seven miles from Ali Kheyl, was reached about mid-day. The road was difficult and wild, and led along the Hurriab river till the Kurram was reached, on the right bank of which it continued, until, after passing the two villages of Kermana, it again recrossed the bed of the Kurram, and lay up a narrow glen, a part of the route being through a pine forest.* General Roberts had received inform- ation that the Mangals intended defending a defile and pass about two miles beyond the larger village of Kermana, and, at four in the afternoon, pushed on the 23rd Pioneers to occupy the Kotul and bivouac near the village. An hour after mid- night the tents were struck, and at 3 A.M., the night being bitterly cold and dark, the General resumed his march with the * See Major Colquhoun's " With the Kurram Field Force." Threading the Sappri Defile. 175 troops in the following order : Advance Guard : two companies of the 23rd Pioneers. Escort for the baggage, four companies. Baggage. Mountain Battery. Wing, 72nd Highlanders. Eear-guard : 5th Goorkhas. The track of the Kotul was steep and difficult for the camels, owing to the frozen water rendering the footing very slippery, and it was not until past 8 A.M. that the rear-guard began the descent from the top of the Kotul. No enemy was in sight, and it was hoped that the early hour of the march had defeated any intentions they may have entertained to attack the baggage ; but this anticipation was not verified by the result. The descent of the pass was even more difficult for the camels than the ascent, and the road was about as suitable a one for a surprise as could be conceived. " The gorge at the foot of the hill, " says the military historian already quoted, " extended for five miles, the track for the first part ran through a deep ravine with perpendicular walls, which narrowed in places to but a few yards, over-hanging the path till they seemed to meet, and made a gateway or tunnel through which the road passed. The ordinary precautions in forcing a pass, of crowning the hills on either side, could scarcely be put in practice, as these in their turn were commanded by other ridges running parallel to the ravine, while there were ample facilities for a lurking ambush in the side ravines which broke into the road, if that could be called so which was a rough and stony watercourse. But this part of the road was passed in safety, and as the more open part was reached, some of the Mangals were seen perched high up on the sides of the mountains, looking at the line of march defiling below. On reaching the valley, the troops, with the exception of the Goorkhas, were allowed to push on ahead of the baggage, and make their way to the camp which was to be pitched at the vil- lage of Keraiah. But all danger was not yet at an end, and the mountaineers, seemingly regretting that such a chance of looting should escape them, began collecting in small detached parties, which gradually closed in on the rear of the column. No duty in war is more difficult or hazardous than escorting a convoy through a long pass in the occupation of a predatory tribe. Byron graphically describes such a scene : 176 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. " The rest in length'ning line the while Wind slowly through the long defile ; Above, the mountain rears a peak, Where vultures whet the thirsty beak, And theirs may be a feast to-night, Shall tempt them down ere morrow's light." Captain F. Goad, Transport Officer, was in charge of the baggage, and was walking close to a small party of the guard, consisting of a sergeant and three men of the 72nd High- landers, when some of these Mangals approached salaaming and making signs. The sergeant in charge, named Green, appre- hending treachery, asked leave to fire, but Captain Goad, under the impression that the hillmen were inspired by amicable inten- tions, refused permission. Immediately afterwards the Mangals fired a volley, and Captain Goad fell wounded with a bullet through both legs. Sergeant Green picked him up, and, having placed him under cover of a rock, prepared with his three men to defend the unfortunate officer against the enemy pressing on them now from all sides ; and so close and accurate was the fire of these brave men that they succeeded in killing several, and driving off the remainder of their assailants.* The firing now became general, as the Mangals, seeing their anticipated prey escaping from their clutches, attacked the rear- guard, which was hotly engaged under the command of Major Fitz Hugh, of the 5th Goorkhas. Captain Powell, of the same regiment, received two wounds, which subsequently proved fatal. The scene at this time, as the escort, dismounting, sought to keep the enemy at bay, and the latter, sheltering behind every rock and inequality of ground, maintained a hot return fire upon the British troops, may be well described in that passage in the " Giaour :"- " With steel unsheathed, and carbine bent, Some o'er their courser's harness leant, Half shelter'd by the steed ; Some fly behind the nearest rock, And there await the coming shock, Nor tamely stand to bleed Beneath the shafts of foes unseen Who dare not quit their craggy screen." On General Roberts hearing of the attack on his rear-guard * For his gallantry Sergeant Green received a commission in his regiment. The Fight in the Sappri Defile. 177 he despatched the main body of the Goorkhas back to assist in driving off the enemy, but this had already been done before their arrival, and Major Fitz Hugh had the satisfaction of bringing his convoy in safety into camp without the loss of a single camel. On the following day, the 14th December, General Roberts, leaving his troops in camp 'at Keraiah, proceeded, accompanied by his staff, to Kurram, a distance of twenty-one miles. The road, which lay along the bank of the Kurram river, was covered with boulders, and was altogether too rough for guns or wheeled transport. The General determined, if possible, to punish the marauders who attacked his baggage in the Sappri defile, and sent Mr. A. Christie, of the Civil Service, Assistant- Commissioner, to Keraiah, to enquire if an attack on their villages was possible, and also despatched Captain Kennedy, Deputy- Assistant-Quartermaster-General, to reconnoitre up the river with the same object ; but the result of these enquiries proved that there were no villages sufficiently large to be worth the trouble of destroying, and, furthermore, it was ascertained that the attacking party was not wholly composed of Mangals, but was recruited from the Jajis and Chumkunnies, and that some of the Ameer's soldiers, defeated on the 2nd December, took part in the attempt on the baggage. General Roberts issued a complimentary order, thanking the 5th Goorkhas for their " great gallantry and steadiness " in the affair of the 13th, " when passing through the most difficult defile the Major-General had ever seen. " On this day Captain Goad died of the wounds received in the Sappri Pass, and, on the 16th, was buried at Kurram, whither his body was brought from Keraiah, with military honours, in the presence of the General and his staff. On the same day the troops stationed at Keraiah, under the command of Colonel Drew, left for the Kurram fort, where they arrived in two marches. General Roberts arranged for the protection of the wire between his head-quarters and Thull, which had been frequently cut of late, detachments of troops being posted at Suddar and Ahmed-i-Shama, and agreements were made with the head men of the villages, who were to supply armed men for the purpose of patrolling the intermediate sections of the line, an N 178 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. arrangement which worked well. Meanwhile the process of hutting the 2nd Battalion 8th Eegiment at the Peiwar Kotul proceeded apace, and three redoubts and block-houses were commenced on commanding positions, while the hill-sides were cleared of trees where necessary, and the Sappers and Miners were engaged in making a practicable road to the Kotul for laden animals. In order to provide against the contingency of a sudden attack from the direction of the Hurriab, detach- ments from the 12th Bengal Cavalry and 2nd Punjaub Infan- try were stationed at Zubberdasht Killa, and, in his orders and arrangements generally, General Roberts took all the precautions for the safety and comfort of his soldiers and camp-followers, the care of his camels and other transport animals, and the security of the Kurram valley, that military skill and experience could suggest. The troops throughout the valley had to be on the alert, and on the night of the 16th December, the cavalry post at Ibra- himzai, three and a half miles from Suddar, was fired into by some men of the Orakzai tribe, who were reported to be assem- bling in the adjacent hills. The General immediately strongly reinforced the post, which he placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Cochrane, of the 8th Regiment, and, on the 18th, he rode thither accompanied by his staff, and, having en- quired into the affair, proceeded to Suddar, where he caused the destruction of the house of a Moollah who had incited the people against the British rule, the owner taking care to be non est inventus. As soon as he had a little breathing time, General Roberts convened a general court-martial to bring to justice the soldiers of the 29th Punjaub N.I., who had been guilty of treachery during the eventful night of the 2nd December, while making the flank march on the Peiwar Kotul. The Court-martial as- sembled on the 20th December, at the Kurram fort, for the trial of Sepoy Hazrat Shah, " for having unlawfully loaded and discharged his rifle with intent to communicate intelligence to the enemy." The prisoner was found guilty of the charge, and was condemned to death by hanging. Another Sepoy, Mira Baz, of the same corps, was tried for a similar offence, but was acquitted, though he was brought in guilty on the Court-martial on the Traitors. 179 second count, which charged him with firing his rifle, " thereby causing risk of disclosing to the enemy the position of the column, and producing alarm and confusion in the same ;" and was sentenced to he imprisoned with hard labour for two years. Before the same Court-martial, on the following day, Jemadar* Kazan Shah, of the 29th Punjaub N.I., was charged with having, on the same occasion, " after becoming aware that Hazrat Shah, of his company, had unlawfully fired his rifle, with intent to communicate intelligence to the enemy, omitted to disclose the same to his commanding or other superior officer, and not having reported any of the circumstances of the case until the 5th December following." The Jemadar was found guilty, and sentenced to be transported for seven years. Before the same Court-martial, on the same day, seventeen other soldiers of the 29th Punjaubees, were arraigned for " having, in time of war, on the 2nd December, whilst the regiment was engaged with the enemy near the Spingawi Kotul, quitted their regiment without leave and returned to camp, and having thus remained in camp without authority until the return of the regiment on the following day." The whole of the prisoners were found guilty of the charge, and were sen- tenced, five of them to transportation for 14 years, eight for 10 years, two for 7 years, one to be imprisoned with hard labour for 2 years, and one for 365 days. General Roberts confirmed all these sentences, and issued a general order, dated the 23rd December, which he directed to be read at the head of each Native Regiment under his com- mand, in Urdu and Pushtu, in which, while expressing his sorrow " for the stain reflected on a gallant and distinguished Regiment, by the misconduct of some of its members," he described the act of the Sepoy under sentence of death as one " of gross treachery, and which, had it succeeded, would, in all probability, have involved, not only his own Regiment, but the rest of the force associated with it, in one common disaster." The sentences passed on the deserters, the General declared, " were not more than the crime deserved ; indeed, the Court- martial would have been justified in sentencing one and all of * Jemadar is a native officer of the rank of Lieutenant. N 2 180 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. the prisoners to death." Finally, he expressed his trust that the sentences " will serve as a warning, and that all native soldiers who enlist in the service of Her Majesty the Queen of England and Empress of India will clearly understand, that while in that service, they must loyally and faithfully carry out all and every duty they may be called upon to perform." On the following day, at 11 A.M., the sentence of death was carried out on Hazrat Shah, in presence of the troops of the Kurram Field Force, who were formed up in a hollow square, and the prisoner met his fate with the stoicism of his race. There can be no doubt that the execution proved a salutary lesson to the native soldiers, who were incited by the Moollahs, and the proclamations of the Ameer, preaching a "Jehad," or holy war, to place the requirements of their religion before the duties they owed to the State whose salt they had eaten. After the execution, the 5th Punjaub N.I. marched for Thull and Kohat, with the convoy of sick and wounded, the ordnance captured on the Peiwar Kotul packed on elephants, and the prisoners sentenced to transportation and imprisonment. On their departure the troops prepared to move into winter quarters, as it was evident from information received that no attack would be made from Cabul on the British positions in the Kurram valley, while the inhabitants of this valley were satisfied to exchange the mild regime of the conqueror for that of their Afghan oppressor. The 5th Goorkhas and one company of the 72nd Highlanders, under Major Fitz Hugh, were de- tailed to occupy the Kurram Fort, where the supplies and am- munition were stored, the remaining three companies of the Highlanders being quartered at the Afghan cantonment near Peiwar, called Habib Killa, after the nearest village (but after- wards re-christened Peiwar), while they were enabled to give a support, if required, to the garrison of the Peiwar Kotul, which consisted of three guns G Battery, 3rd Brigade, R.A., four companies of the 8th Regiment, and the 2nd Punjaubees. General Roberts had determined to proceed on an expedition into the Khost valley, with the object of " investigating its resources in men and supplies, and to ascertain to what extent the combination of the inhabitants of the country against us could affect our line of communications." There were sub- The Expedition to Khost. 181 sidiary considerations that influenced the General who had no intention of annexing the Khost valley, though subsequently it was formally surrendered to him by the Afghan Governor in undertaking this expedition ; among which were the exploration of the road from the west end of the valley to Ghuznee, and to discover the practicability of despatching a force for the punish- ment of the Wuzeerees, who had been giving some trouble on our frontier, and whose chief town, Kanigorarn, was not far distant. The Khost country was marked on the map as a blank, and the streams that run into the Kurrarn valley at Hazir Pir were only defined at their embouchure. Captain Carr, Deputy- Assistant Quartermaster-General, had reconnoi- tred to a little distance beyond the first march into the valley, and reported the country open and accessible for cavalry, but beyond this it was a perfect terra incognita. On the 27th December, General Roberts struck his camp near the Kurram fort, and marched with a squadron of the 10th Hussars, F Battery, A Brigade, R.H.A.,the 29th Punjaub N.I., and No. 1. Mountain Battery, to Ibrahirnzai, a distance of 15 miles, on the way threading the Darwaza Pass, in which a few camp followers were killed by a body of 60 or 80 marau- ders, who, however, were driven off by a working party of the 23rd Pioneers, and three of their number captured. The road lay for the first part along the banks of the Kurram, and then crossed the Kermanah River. About six miles from Kur- ram was a large fort and a walled village, like others in this country, where preparation for defence is the only protection against oppression. As General Roberts passed this and the other fortified villages on the road, the walls were lined with women and children, while the men collected on the bank below and respectfully saluted the lord of the invincible legions. At two o'clock, camp was pitched near the village of Ibn> himzai, and, on the following morning, the 28th December, General Roberts marched with headquarters and wing of the 12th Bengal Cavalry to Hazir Pir, a distance of about sixteen miles, the road being through or along cultivation the whole way, except when crossing some ravines. On the way Suddar was passed, where a company of the 21st Punjaub N.I. was employed making a road to Hazir Pir, a mile above which the 182 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. column crossed the Kurram Eiver at a ford. At Hazir Pir was already encamped a force under the command of Colonel Cochrane, of the 8th Regiment, consisting of No. 2 Mountain Battery, 5th Punjaub Cavalry, and the 21st Punjaub N.I., who were located on a site sheltered from the north wind by a low range of hills, at the angle formed by the confluence of a stream which drained the valley leading to Khost. On the 2nd January, 1879, at nine in the morning, General Roberts commenced his march for Khost, with the following troops, which were drawn chiefly from that portion of the Kurram Field Force that had not yet been engaged, and had been concentrated at Hazir Pir: Squadron 10th Hussars, three troops 5th Punjaub Cavalry, Nos. 1 and 2 Mountain Batteries, 21st and 28th regiments of Punjaub N.I., and wing of the 72nd Highlanders, 200 men, who had marched up from Kohat. The Infantry was in command of Colonel Barry Drew, the Cavalry, of Colonel Hugh (rough, C.B., V.C., ; and the Artillery, of Lieutenant- Colonel A. Lindsay, R.A. Nearly 900 camels accompanied the column for the carriage of supplies, as the productions of the country were as unknown as its topography. In the camp at Hazir Pir were left three guns, F Battery, A Brigade, R.H.A., one company 8th Regiment, wing 12th Bengal Cavalry, and wing 29th Punjaub N.I.* The 23rd Pioneers, who were engaged road-making in the Darwaza Pass, were under orders to proceed, on its completion, to the camp at Hazir Pir. The first day's march of the Khost column was ten miles to Jaji Maidan, a cluster of about ten villages, situated in a basin formed by low hills, forming the head of the valley leading to Khost. This valley or basin, which has a breadth varying from three to five miles, though fertile, is quite uncultivated, owing to the insecurity of life and property, for between the * The remainder of the Kurram Field Force was disposed as follows for the winter : At Thull, 3 guns F Battery, A Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery, one troop 5th Punjaub Cavalry, one company 8th Regiment, and wing 29th Punjaub N.I. ; at Kurram Fort, one company, 72nd Highlanders, half troop 12th Bengal Cavalry, and 5th Goorkhas. At the Peiwar Kotul and vicinity, three companies 72nd Highlanders ; wing, 8th Regi- ment, three guns G Battery, 3rd Brigade, Royal Artillery, one squadron 12th Bengal Cavalry, 2nd Punjaub N.I., and company of Sappers and Miners. Entry into the Khost Valley. 183 Afghan rulers and the freebooters inhabiting the mountains that dominate the valley, the industrious husbandman (if the term can be applied to the inhabitants of any part of Afghan- istan and its appanages) had little chance of reaping the fruits of his toil. Camp was pitched near the chief village in the rice fields, which are dry and suitable at this season. The people were very civil, and the camp was abundantly supplied with provisions. On the following morning the march was resumed, for five miles over open country, when it became rough and steep, the hills closing in on the road on either side. So slow was the rate of progression, the cavalry having to go in single file, that it was nearly noon before the rearguard marched out of camp, the Jaji villagers watching with interest the progress of the never-ending column. The scene from the Kotulwas extensive and not wanting in beauty. At the end of the descent lay the plain of the Khost country, with a distant blue line of moun- tains blocking the horizon to the south, and smaller ranges in front. General Roberts reached the summit of the Pass about noon, but as, owing to the nature of the road, the camels of the Commissariat convoy, carrying fifteen days' provisions for the column, could not arrive till dark, he gave instruc- tions that they should be halted at the village of Dhani, about one mile on the Jaji Maidan side of the Kotul, and, in order to guard against an attack of Mangals, a squadron of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, No. 1 Mountain Battery, and the 21st Punjaub N.I., were halted as an escort. The remainder of the force pitched camp at Nar, one of the Bakh group of villages at the northern end of the Khost dis- trict, the total distance traversed from the Jaji villages being eleven miles, four miles of which, from the Kotul to a nullah, were very difficult. The headmen of the village showed a want of friendliness in not presenting themselves before the General, who thereupon sent for them, and warned them to be careful against displaying hostility towards the British, and pro- mised them good treatment if they behaved well ; at the same time the prices to be paid for stores were settled with them. During the 4th of January a halt was made at Nar, to which the Commissariat camels and escort marched on the fol- ] 84 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. lowing morning without molestation, and advantage was taken of the rest by that indefatigable and excellent surveyor, Captain "VVoodthorpe, R.E., who commenced the survey of the country, which, beginning at the highest hill of the range, was prose- cuted during the stay of the column in Khost, until the whole of the country was mapped out. Hence, although owing to political considerations, which demanded its ultimate abandon- ment, the result of the invasion of this hitherto unknown valley was nil, at least geographical science benefited largely, and what was a blank on our map is now accurately delineated. General Roberts's attention was again drawn to the careless way in which the camels were loaded, and he issued a stringent order on this vital question of transport, directing regimental officers to see personally to proper loading, the neglect of which, apart from humanitarian considerations, not only causes the deaths of these valuable animals, and consequent loss to the Exchequer and crippling of the mobility of a force, but in traversing passes, or marching in single-file, necessitates the halt of the entire column while one load is being re-adjusted. On the 5th January, at the usual hour for marching, 9 A.M., the force proceeded, and as the country was open, the baggage marched in two broad columns, under a guard, the mules on one side and the camels on the other, so that the march of seven miles was concluded by 1 P.M. The road lay across a plain, past a fortified serai and village, and across the Kara Khost, or little Khost River, to the village of Khubi, contain- ing about 1,000 souls, near to which the camp was pitched. General Roberts, accompanied by his Staff, proceeded to recon- noitre the road over the pass in the range, which would form the morrow's march, but observing a party of horsemen, whom he concluded were the Governor of the Khost district with whom he had been in correspondence for some weeks and escort, coming to pay his respects to him, he rode back to camp, as a meeting in the road might have borne the appear- ance of his advancing to meet the Sirdar halfway.* * The particulars of the marches and events in this expedition to the Khost country are derived from Major Colquhoun's work, " With the Kur- ram Field Force," and from General Roberts's despatches, of which he kindly sent copies of this and his other campaigns in Afghanistan from Calcutta to the author. Roberts s Arrival at Matun. 185 His conjecture was correct, and, at 8 P.M., the Acting- Governor, Akram Khan by name, came with a large number of attendants and principal maliks, or headmen, and was re- ceived by the General in the Durbar tent. The Sirdar was about forty-five or fifty years of age, and the expression of his face was not of a character to inspire confidence. He had not been long in Khost, having previously served for seven years in the Kurram valley as Deputy- Governor under Sirdar Wali Mahomed, whose deputy he was now at Khost. During the interview, which was brief, Akram Khan promised, on the arrival of General Eoberts at Matun, to make over to him the fort and all the records of the Khost country. On Monday, the 6th January, the column marched with the baggage animals and camp followers, under an escort, in the centre, the force being divided into two equal portions in front and rear. The road, after passing for three miles across an open plain, led over a kotul, and then for about two miles through some low hills, till the plain was reached, in which are situated Matun and numerous other villages. As the baggage column defiled through the Pass, flanking parties crowned the heights on either side. On reaching the brow of the slope overlooking the Matun valley, the squadron 10th Hussars, which formed the advance-guard, halted, when the Governor and his escort rode up, and was soon joined by General Roberts, who, escorted by the Hussars, proceeded in company with Akram Khan towards Matun, about three miles distant. On arriving within half a mile of the fort, the General halted the Hussars on the open ground where the camp was subsequently pitched, and, accompanied by his staff and only a few files of the 10th, rode into the fort up to the door of the keep, where the Governor had his private quarters. The fort of Matuu, which is about eight miles distant from Khubi, is described as a square walled enclosure, with circular corner bastions, the length of the side being about one hundred yards. The interior was occupied by huts along the outer walls, which were used as barracks and stables. Over the gateway leading into the fort, which was reached by a road crossing the exterior ditch, was a suite of rooms, which was occupied by the Governor's brother. In the centre of the 1 86 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.' fort was the keep, a smaller square enclosure, with round towers at two of the angles. As General Koberts neared the fort, the garrison, consisting of 200 juzailchees, or matchlock-men, were drawn up at the entrance, in two lines, " with red silk triangular banners at the end of the lines." The British General was greeted by the beating of tomtoms, and, as he rode through the gateway, each man saluted by raising his hand to his forehead. General Roberts dismounted at the entrance to the keep, and, accom- panied by his staff, was conducted to a room on the ground floor, having access to the garden, which occupied the centre of the enclosure, above the level of which it was raised some three feet. The floor was covered with a coarse felt cloth, with strips of a superior quality arranged around three sides for visitors to sit or recline, but the General preferred to remain standing. Tea, without milk, according to the Afghan manner, was handed round during the interview, which lasted about half an hour, at the conclusion of which General Roberts and his staff remounted their horses and returned to the escort. The great defect of the fort as a military position was the absence of water, which appeared to be derived from the surface irrigation canal passing close by it ; but as this could be easily diverted from the point of its leaving the Matun river, an attempt had been made to find water inside the fort, and a well had been dug to a depth of about sixty feet, but without result. The whole of the force having arrived, the camp was pitched, facing outwards, the headquarters tent being in the centre, thus obviating the necessity of rear-guards. General Roberts, forewarned by Akram Khan, who stated that he had received information of large numbers of Mangals assembling, and that they were being joined by some of the inhabitants of the Khost valley, with the object of attacking the British camp, took every precaution against a surprise. The attitude of the people was unfriendly, and the Maliks, even when summoned to attend General Roberts, appeared uneasy, and asked permission to return before they accom- panied him to the camp. The General had hoped that, as had happened with the Turis and Jajis of the Kurram valley, the The Camp Surrounded. 187 people would soon become reassured, and accept the presence of the British troops as inevitable, but Akram Khan undeceived him, and stated that the moollahs, of which the district pos- sessed a large number, famous for their fanaticism, had been engaged in fanning the religious prejudices of the people, who were summoned to attack the camp and expel the invaders. Before night closed in, the Mangals commenced to assemble in the neighbouring villages in the valley, upon which the General instructed Colonel Waterfield, the political officer with the column, to send " purwanas," or written notices, to the Maliks, warning them that if the camp was attacked, summary and severe retribution would be exacted on the villages which had harboured the Mangals or other persons having hostile intentions towards the British. This at first had the desired effect, for before midnight nearly all the Maliks from Matun, as the cluster of walled villages is called, came into camp and informed the General that the Mangals had departed for their homes, and they offered to remain in camp as hostages for the good behaviour of the villagers. The night passed quietly, but, on the following morning, some Maliks whom General Roberts had sent to ascertain if the Mangals had really dispersed to their homes, returned with the information that the men were on their way when they were met by large numbers of their tribesmen proceeding to Matun, and that the whole had returned. They also announced that other hillmen were assembled in the valley, and that the camp would certainly be attacked that night by many thousands of men. On receipt of this intelligence the General sent out a troop of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, under Major J. C. Stewart, accompanied by Captain Carr, Deputy- Assistant- Quartermaster-General, to endeavour to ascertain the real state of affairs. The troop had not ridden two miles when it was fired upon, and soon it became clear that the enemy had collected round three sides of the camp. " It was evident to me," says the General in his despatch, "that the time had arrived when prompt and vigorous action was required to ensure our safety. The strength of the column, which amounted to about 2,000 men, all told, was insignificant in comparison with the number we might find arrayed against us. We were separated by 1 88 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. many miles of difficult country from our nearest support, and I judged it to be a matter of urgent necessity that the tribes who had dared to organise an attack on our camp should receive speedy and severe punishment." It became apparent that a hot day's work was in store for the British force, as these fierce hillmen, whose country had never yet suffered the humiliation of a hostile visit from the conquerors of India, were anxious to measure themselves against the invaders of their valley. On his part, General Roberts completed his arrangements with deliberation, and the troops, which had been directed to fall in about 9.30 A.M., to repel an attack from the north-west, were dismissed, as it became apparent that the enemy's plan of action embraced a simultaneous onslaught from all sides. At about noon a stampede of grasscutters and camelmen from the north-east direction, where no enemy had been observed, showed that the Mangals had completed their movement of surrounding the British camp. In the first instance General Roberts reinforced Major Stewart's troops with all his disposable Cavalry, under Colonel Gough, retaining only 25 sabres, and sent in support six com- panies of the 28th Punjaubees, under Colonel Hudson, and No. 2 Mountain Battery, under Captain Swinley. These troops operated to the north-west of the camp, where the enemy appeared in greatest strength. The villages in the plain were found to have been evacuated by the enemy, who occupied in great force the low hills at the foot of the mountains. The 10th Hussars, 70 sabres, under Major Bulkeley, dismounting, took up a position on the crest of some low mounds, and opened fire on the enemy, as did the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, 130 men, from the foot of some detached hills on the right. The Afghans retired, on which the cavalry took up an advanced position, and a troop of the 5th Punjaubees, under Major Williams, made a brilliant charge up another hill, in the centre of the enemy's position, and, rapidly dismounting, commenced to harass them in their retreat. The cavalry kept up so close and effective a fire that the enemy gave way at all points and fled up the rocks, and nothing remained for the 28th Punjau- bees to do on their arrival, though the Mountain Battery made excellent practice, and completed their dispersion. A prominent The Action at Matun. 189 object in the sky line was a Malik, who fearlessly displayed a banner as a rallying point to his followers, until a well-directed shell utterly destroyed him, and in Homeric phraseology, " Everlasting slumber closed his eyes." While these troops operated to the north-west of the camp, where the enemy appeared to be in greatest strength, the right, or eastern, flank was protected by a wing of the 21st Punjaub N.I., under Major Collis, and two guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery ; the other wing of the 21st Punjaubees, under Captain Carruthers, and the remaining two guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery, covered the rear of the camp, and the front and left flank were defended by the wing of the 72nd Highlanders, under Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke. The whole of the troops in and around the camp were placed under the command of Colonel Drew, who was directed to hold his own until Colonel Gough had disposed of the enemy in his front, which he did in the manner to be expected of an officer of his military talent and experience. General Roberts having made his arrangements for the defence of the camp, started off to watch the progress of the attack on the heights, under Colonel Gough. He was only accompanied by his staff, as by some mistake the twenty-five men of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, who should have remained in camp under Colonel Drew's orders, had marched with their regiment ; and he left with that officer his personal escort of eight Sowars. Immediately after he quitted the camp, says an officer who was present, the enemy, who occupied the villages towards the north-east, began to show themselves, on which Captain Morgan's two guns were brought into action, and threw shells amidst the masses with such excellent effect, that they retreated towards the villages in their rear, and to the south. This they were enabled to do without hindrance, as the few Sowars sent out against them were brought up by a water- course, impassable in this direction. The enemy opened a heavy fusilade in the rear to the south, from some old Afghan cavalry lines and a walled village, and the fire was returned by the left wing of the 21st Punjaubees, and two guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery, supported by Captain Spens's detachment of i go Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. Highlanders. The shell fire quickly dislodged the tribesmen, who retreated beyond the range of the guns, while the dis- charges of musketry became brisk and roused the echoes on the hillside in that lonely valley. Byron describes a similar scene : "And pealing wide or ringing near It echoes on the throbbing ear, The death shot hissing from afar ; The shock, the shouts, the groan of war, Reverberate along that vale, More suited to the shepherd's tale." Meanwhile, Colonel Gough's attack on the enemy in the north-west having succeeded in driving them to the mountain top, he retired the force under his command slowly and steadily, and so cowed were the enemy that they made no attempt to harass him. Before this, General Roberts, who had witnessed the fighting, ordered a troop of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, under Major Stewart, to follow him, and returned to camp about 2.30, when he directed the wing of the 21st Punjaub N.I., with the detachment 72nd on their flank, and the mountain guns, to follow up the enemy retreating to the east and south-east, and to burn the villages which had harboured them during the night. Colonel Drew proceeded with the main body for about three miles and burnt five villages, which were found to be deserted, and Captain Carruthers, with the left wing of the 21st, occupied and burnt a village in the south-east direction, and also a second village, which was first shelled, as the enemy appeared inclined to make a stand. Crossing the Matun river a third village was fired, the guns meantime shelling a crowd of the enemy, who streamed across the plain to the spurs of the range which closed the valley to the south. The troop of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, under Major Stewart, which had followed General Roberts to camp, made a very effective charge on a large body of the enemy, who were escaping from the rear of a village in which Captain Carruthers' wing of the 21st was advancing. Major Stewart rode them down, killing over 20 of their number, and many more would have fallen beneath the " tulwars " of the Punjaubee horsemen but that they got away to the stony bed of a broad nullah, commanded by a high bank, lined with matchlock-men whose fire compelled Major Stewart to withdraw his men. Soon the 21st came up, and the advance Defeat of the Enemy. 191 was continued against a village beyond the bank, into which the enemy had retired. On seeing themselves again threat- ened, the tribesmen evacuated the village, but a party of about 80 of them, finding their retreat cut off, ran back, and, after some parley, surrendered. On examining them, Colonel Waterfield, the political officer, discovered that they did not belong to the Khost country, but were Waziris. Accordingly, they were taken to the camp, and General Roberts directed that they should be placed under charge of the 21st Punjaub N.I., as it was his intention to demand a ransom of fifty-eight rupees per man from the Garbaz section of the tribe to which they belonged. In the evening, General Roberts sent for the headmen of Matun, and told them that they had brought this punishment on themselves, that it had been his earnest desire to have avoided all bloodshed, and that they must now see the futility of attempting to withstand disciplined troops, though greatly inferior in numbers. During the next few days the headmen of the Khost district came into camp, and the General im- pressed on them the views he had enunciated to the Matun maliks, and assured them they had nothing to fear so long as they abstained from hostile acts, the sole object he had in view in entering their country being to oust the government of the Ameer of Cabul. " There is evidence," wrote General Roberts to the Viceroy, " that the combination against us was widespread, and that if a severe example had not been made of those who fought against us on the 7th inst., the ill-feeling would have extended. It might, under the circumstances, have become impossible to leave any portion of my small column here. The aspect of affairs is now changed; the headmen of nearly all the neighbouring villages have come in, and the remainder are reported to be anxious to submit." But the change was more apparent than real, and the opinion, in which Colonel Waterfield concurred, that " an adequate force could now be left here with safety, provided that the troops in the Kurram valley are maintained in sufficient strength to keep open our long line of communications," was soon proved to be fallacious. The sturdy tribesmen were irreconcilable in their enmity, which perhaps was not surprising, as the punishment 1 92 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. they had received was undoubtedly severe, though similar to what it has always heen the custom to mete out to refractory hillmen in our dealings on the north-west frontier. Burning the habitations of the Khostwallies in the depth of winter appears a harsh measure to our English views, but it was no more than the people merited, and such as they anticipated, for the troops found them all deserted ; but the nearest villages to the west were left uninjured, as the inhabitants had acted up to their engagements, and warned the camp followers not to proceed beyond their protection, while those further off in this direction, which had afforded shelter to the enemy, were spared, as it was considered that sufficient punishment had been inflicted. It was estimated that the combined tribes taking part in this attack, numbered 6,000 men, of whom 2,000, chiefly Man- gals, attacked the camp from the north-west. The Jadrans and Waziris, with the Khost people in league with them, were en- gaged on the south and east sides. The defeat of the com- bined tribes had been complete, and the effect of it was appa- rent during the remainder of the stay of the British troops in the Khost country ; while it had been achieved with the nominal loss of only two killed and six wounded. It would appear that this attack was part of a combination against the infidel invaders, by the Mangals and Jajis, as, at the same time, taking advantage of the absence of the column in Khost, these tribes organized an onslaught on the Peiwar Kotul. 4,000 of them, assisted by 2,000 of the Hasan Kheyl section of the Jajis, advanced against the British blockhouses on the crest of the Pass. But Brigadier-General Thelwall warned of their approach by the gallant and able Captain Rennick, of the 29th N.I., political officer at Ali Kheyl, who kept at his post with only twenty men ordered up reinforce- ments from Kurram and Habib Killa, and though, on the 6th January, a body of 1,500 of the enemy approached close to the British position, they feared to make the attack, and retired on finding all preparations complete for their reception.* * General Roberts had received a report from General Thelwall of this intended attack on the 6th of January, and sent 200 Goorkhas to his assistance, but he telegraphed to Government that as everything had been placed in a state of defence at Peiwar Kotul. he saw no necessity for calling on Kurram Fort for assistance. An Attempted Rescue. 193 During the evening of the 8th January the Waziri prisoners made a desperate attempt to escape, which was frustrated, though not without some loss of life. About 7 P.M., it being dark, the moon not having risen, one of them managed to escape from the guard, a strong party of the 21st Punjaub N.I., under a Subadar, but was shot dead by the picket near which he passed. Instantly a shot was fired from the bank of a watercourse, showing that the attempt was part of an organized effort to effect a rescue, upon which the whole of the eighty- six prisoners, "who were secured by their hands being tied to ropes which were picketed down to tent poles, rose as one man, and began to try to free themselves, crying out, ' Now is the time to run.' ' Subahdar Makkan Singh, in command of the guard, called out to the prisoners in Pushtoo to sit down or they would be fired upon, but without avail, and those of the prisoners who succeeded in freeing themselves rushed at the sentries and tried to deprive them of their arms. The native officer gave the order to fire, and on receiving a volley, which told with fatal effect on the struggling mass, they threw them- selves flat down, and quiet was immediately restored. On separating the dead and wounded from the untouched it was found that nine had been killed, including three who had man- aged to clear themselves of their bonds, one had escaped, and fourteen were wounded, five mortally, and one severely, leaving sixty-three uninjured. The wounded were carefully attended to, and the remainder of the survivors, by General Roberts's directions, divided into three parties under separate guards. The firing created an alarm in the camp, but perfect order pre- vailed ; the troops fell in and took their appointed stations in case of a night attack, " and in less than five minutes from the first alarm, every one was at his post." During this affair a party of horsemen, under a friendly Malik, who were passing along the south-west flank of the camp, failed to return the challenge of the sentry, who fired at them, when the chief was wounded in the shoulder. The night's proceedings were concluded by the cavalry being sent to scour the neighbourhood of the camp, and as they returned with the report that no enemy was in sight, the troops were dismissed and quiet reigned once more around. o 194 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. During the 9th detachments were sent out to bring in the grain from the deserted and partially burnt villages, and a con- siderable body of men were observed on the low ranges of hills to the north, who had come from Yakubi to loot the camp, as they had been informed that the Mangals had gained a glorious victory in the fighting of the 7th, and they naturally desired to share in the plunder ; but on arriving at the end of the pass overlooking the plain, they found to their amazement the tents standing and all secure in the British camp. So confident had they been of the truth of the intelligence brought to them that, headed by their Maliks, they treacherously seized and ill- treated a small party of eight Sowars left under their pro- tection to guard the mail to Hazir Pir. On learning the true state of affairs the Maliks restored to the troopers their horses, arms, and clothes, of which they had robbed them, though this did not satisfy the Sowars, who loading their carbines, forced the two Maliks who had ill-treated them to accompany them to the camp. There an investigation was made into the cir- cumstances of the case, and the Maliks were tried by a General Court-martial presided over by Colonel Gough (the offence being against the Military law), and were sentenced to seven years' transportation. General Eoberts, having resolved to make a reconnoissance in force towards the west end of the valley, occupied the fort of Matun, some rooms in which were utilised as a hospital, tents being pitched within the area for the remainder of the sick. Colonel Collis was placed in command of the fort with his regiment, the 21st Punjaub N.I., and a troop of the 5th Pun- jaub Cavalry, under Captain Vousden ; and Mr. A. Christie, Bengal Civil Service, remained with him, as Political Officer. 195 CHAPTER XI. General Roberts makes a Tour of the Valley Army Signalling in Khost Durbar of the Headmen of the Khostiwals and Mangals Evacuation of Matun and Return March to Hazir Fix Preparations for the Advance on Cabul Reconnoissance by General Roberts Conclusion of the Treaty of Gundamuck Arrival at All Kheyl of the Cavag- nari Mission General Roberts Returns to Simla. ON the morning of the 13th January General Roberts, accom- panied by Akram Khan, marched with the following troops : Squadron 10th Hussars, three troops 5th Punjaub Cavalry, Nos. 1 and 2 Mountain Batteries, left wing 72ud Highlanders, and 28th Punjaub N.I. The first day's march was to Dehgan, a village six miles distant from the camp, the route being across the river Matun and over a deep watercourse and a nullah, on the opposite bank of which the people assembled in great numbers as though to oppose the crossing, but, on inquiry, it was found that their object was the peaceful one of selling supplies to the strangers, whose custom of paying for all they required, when they could take what they wanted, was one that baffled their philosophy. The prices asked were four annas (sixpence) for a fowl, and four or five shillings for a sheep. The column halted at Dehgan for a day, and General Roberts, escorted by a troop of the 10th Hussars, and one of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, rode across the plain on which the camp was pitched, to the village of Durgai, at the southern end of the valley, occupied by the Thunnies. The General was respect- fully received by the villagers, and, assembling the head men in an open spot in the centre, he addressed them in English, his words being translated, sentence by sentence, by Mahomed Hyat Khan, Assistant Political Officer, warning them against any act of hostility, and holding them responsible for keeping him advised of any projected raids by their brethren in the o 2 196 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. hills. The headmen presented the General with a sheep as a peace-offering, after receiving which he rode through the village with his staff and a small party, and, passing round it, rejoined his escort. Thence General Roberts rode to another village in the west end of the valley, ahout four miles from Dehgan, where he again assembled and addressed the headmen, and then pro- ceeded to a third village, where he repeated his warning, and rested his horses for an hour. Camp was reached about 4.30, when he was greeted with intelligence of an apprehended attack by the Mangals that night. But though 2,000 of them had, it was reported, sworn on the Koran to attack the camp, the night passed without any alarm, though shelter-trenches were thrown up, and other arrangements made to receive them. On the following day the column returned to Matun. As there was little forage for the camels, 400 of them, whose loads had been consumed, were sent back to Hazir Pir, under escort of a body of Turis of the Kurram valley, and, on the 18th, a convoy, with fifteen days' supplies, for which the General had sent, arrived from Hazir Pir, escorted by the 23rd Pioneers and a detachment of the 5th Goorkhas, under Captain Cook, which latter returned on the following morning escort- ing the remainder of the camels whose loads had been consumed. On the 19th January, the survey party, under Captain Wood- thorpe, escorted by a detachment of the 28th Punjaub N.I., proceeded to survey the southern range which lay in Waziri territory, their safety being guaranteed by the chief of the Atakheyl section of the Waziris, Keeput by name, who arrived in camp with some followers, and, after paying his respects to the General, accompanied the surveyors. Captain Wynne, Superintendent of Army Signalling, who accompanied the survey party, on reaching the highest peak of the range, named Lazam, heliographed to the camp, twenty miles distant, and also to Bunnoo, on the British side of the frontier, a distance of thirty miles from the peak, where the message was read by Colonel Noel Money, commanding the 3rd Sikh Regiment, who fortunately had been instructed in the code, and Colonel Godby, commanding the Punjaub Frontier Force, who happened to be A Threatened Attack. 197 at Bunnoo at the time, flashed back to General Roberts, through Captain Wynne, the intelligence that the Mahsood Waziris had raided and burnt Tank. Taking advantage of this means of communication, General Roberts heliographed to Lord Lytton, then at Calcutta, and the messages from the distant Khost valley, over vast ranges of mountains, reached the Viceroy within two hours, truly one of the most astonishing instances of army signalling on record. General Roberts had determined to raise local levies, chiefly from among the friendly Turis, to hold the valley on the de- parture of the British troops, and on the arrival of Captain Arthur Conolly, of the Meywar Bheel Corps (a name that has an honoured, though painful, memory in our relations with Afghanistan), who had great experience in converting the wild tribes of the Indian peninsula into disciplined soldiers, directed him to embody and command 200 horse and 200 foot, in which he succeeded, though the subsequent abandonment of the valley involved their disbandment. During the 20th January, General Roberts inspected the cavalry under Colonel Gough, and directed that a royal salute should be tired in honour of the surrender of Candahar, and the day concluded with races and athletic sports for the men. On the following day, the 23rd Pioneers marched on their return to Hazir Pir, by the eastern road, which they were directed to improve, as the General intended to return to Kur- ram by it. On the 22ud January, General Roberts, accom- panied by his staff, and escorted by a troop of the 10th Hussars, rode towards the east end of Khost, and examined the villages, the largest in the valley, assembling and addressing the head- men as to their duties and responsibilities towards the domi- nant power, and returned in the afternoon after a ride of over twenty miles. Information was received on the 23rd that an attack on the camp was meditated by the Mangals, who had collected in great force about twelve miles distant ; and to be prepared against a night attack, General Roberts ordered the exposed sides of the camp to be defended by an entrenchment thrown up 100 yards from the tents, and so admirably did the different regiments and batteries work, under the direction of Captain Colquhoun, R.A. (in the absence of Colonel Perkins, 198 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. K.E.), tliab before dark the camp was reported secure, an earthen hank, 3-|- feet high, and the same width, having been thrown up in exposed parts, which, with the saddles of 1,200 camels, formed a breastwork that would defy a rush of Mangals on any part of the camp. The cavalry were sent out to recon- noitre, but returned without finding any large body of the enemy, though the villagers at the north end of the valley were defiant, and the enemy were doubtless concealed in the houses; during the day the survey party came back, having completed the examination of the Khost ranges, and connected their work with the triangulation of the Trigonometrical Survey of India. General Roberts received in the afternoon a deputation from a party of Mangals who had settled in the Keraiah end of the Kurram valley, asking for a share in the distribution of money and turbans to those who had behaved well to British rule, and were dismissed fairly satisfied at the extent to which this request had been complied with. During the night of the 23rd, some star shells were fired to show the Mangals and other would-be enemies that the British were ready for them ; the effect was excellent, the light from the shells illuminating a space, 800 yards by 400, for a distance varying from 400 to 600 yards. During the two succeeding days the defence of the camp was completed, under Lieutenant Spratt, R.E., by an earthen rampart being thrown up in place of the camel saddles, the construction of a new bastion, with abattis, at the south- east angle, filling the ditches with water, and other works. In the afternoon of the 25th January, General Roberts held in the Durbar tent an assembly of the headmen of the Khost valley, with those of the Mangals and Jadrans who cared to attend. The General, in a speech translated by Mahomed Hyat Khan, first addressed the Khost chiefs, to whom he de- scribed the arrangements that would be made on the evacuation by his troops of the valley, which would be placed temporarily under the administration of Shahzada Sultan Jan, who had been employed at Kohat in the Punjaub commission, and who would be supported, if necessary, by the British troops at Hazir Pir. General Roberts also took advantage of the opportunity to enlarge on the faithlessness of Russia towards the Ameer Durbar of Hill Chiefs. 199 Sbere Ali, whose troops, defeated in every encounter, had re- ceived aid neither in men nor money from that Power. Leaving Colonel Waterfield, the Political Agent, to confer with the headmen individually, and bestow rewards on those who had rendered services, the General addressed the chiefs of the hill- men, wild, fierce-looking fellows, with unkempt hair and dirty garments, but armed to the teeth, and told them in a good- humoured way that if they wanted more fighting he and his men were ready for them, but that he advised them to keep quiet. The durbars were concluded by a dinner to the head- men, for which twenty sheep were slaughtered, and the distri- bution of a few rupees to each man to pay his expenses. On the 26th, General Roberts received a letter from Sirdar Wali Mahomed, son of the late Ameer Dost Mahomed by a Turi woman, and half-brother of Ameer Shere Ali, reporting his escape from Cabul, and arrival by the Shutargardan Pass at Rokian, six miles from Ali Kheyl. The General immediately sent instructions to Captain Rennick, Political Officer at Ali Kheyl, to treat the Sirdar with consideration, and escort him to Hazir Pir, where he would meet him. All the arrangements for the evacuation of the Khost valley being complete, and the Shahzada Sultan Jan having been installed as temporary Gover- nor, on the 27th January, the thermometer marking eight degrees of frost, the return march was begun, the first stage being to the village of Sabbri, twelve miles distant. The road from Matun lay past three detached hills, near the village of Madhi Kheyl, on the crest of the centre one of which was a field-work, said to have been made by Timour in one of his invasions of India, and, skirting the range and crossing several ravines and watercourses, the road led through a pass, about seven miles from the camp, to the banks of the Kam Khost river, across the river, and over another gorge leading into the Sabbri valley. A halt was made here on the 28th, while Gen- eral Roberts reconnoitred in the direction of Thull, and the survey party took observations from the hill, about four miles to the north-east of the camp. At 10 that night the General received an express from the Governor left at Matun, reporting that the Mangals were gathering to attack the fort, with the intention of killing him and the garrison. The General quickly 2oo Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. formed his plans, which were to remove the Khost garrison and leave the distracted valley to the tender mercies of the Mangals, or whoever chose to harry it ; and, at daybreak on the 29th January, leaving as many troops as he could spare in camp at Sahbri, under the command of Brigadier-General Drew, ha started for Matun with a detachment 72nd Highlanders, the squadron 10th Hussars, 5th Punjaub Cavalry, No. 2 Mountain Battery, and 28th Punjaub N.I.* Starting at 6.15, the General arrived at the deserted camp at Matun at 9.80, when the Mangals were observed on the skirts of the hill where they had been previously defeated, but ex- pecting an easy prey in the levies, they were evidently disin- clined to try conclusions with a powerful enemy. Loading some camels he had brought with him, with grain from the fort, the General sent them in advance, under charge of the Turi levies, and, after the column had breakfasted, commenced to retire, as evacuation having been decided upon, no object would have been gained by attacking the enemy, for they could not be followed up to the hills, as General Roberts's troops had already marched twelve miles, and he was desii'ous of returning to his camp that day. The Mangals, who were in great force, esti- mated at quite 6,000, had meanwhile ventured out into the plain, about two miles off, and formed a line a mile in length, and it must have been a source of disappointment to the General, who had already once chastised them severely, that the exigencies of the public service, and the necessity for hus- banding the strength of his men, prevented him from attacking them. With the limited force at his disposal it required mili- tary capacity in the commander, and steadiness on the part of the troops, to effect a retirement before these savage moun- taineers, whose guerilla tactics are conducive to successful attacks on a retreating force. The Mangals remained drawn up in anticipation of an attack, and General Roberts encouraged the belief by advancing his cavalry, which took up a position about a mile from the enemy, who commenced skirmishing in regular order, under * The troops left in the camp, trhich was placed in a condition to repel an attack, were 200 men of the Highlanders, No. 1 Mountain Battery, and the 21st Punjaub N.I , being a total of about 1,000 men. Evacuation of the Khost Fort. 201 the direction of mounted leaders, one of whom, riding a white horse, was killed by a lucky shot from the Martini-Henry of a trooper of the 10th Hussars, which had been thrown for- ward, in skirmishing order, about 600 yards in advance of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry. Shortly before noon the General com- menced the retirement by moving off the 28th Punjaub N.I. and mountain battery, and when they had increased their distance from the Mangals to about three and a half miles, the cavalry retired, leaving the enemy in doubt as to the object of this movement. They accordingly halted, fearing to be drawn into the open plain, where the British horsemen could ride them down, and only discovered their mistake as the troopers trotted off and rejoined their comrades. Then the Mangals swarmed into the deserted entrenchment and fort, while the column, making its way unopposed, reached the camp at Sabbri about five in the afternoon, after a most fatiguing day. Pre- cautions were taken to guard against a night attack, but none was attempted. The march was resumed on the following day, the 30th January, and General Roberts, escorted by a troop of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, pushed on to Hazir Pir, about twenty-four miles distant from Sabbri. The troops, under Brigadier- General Drew, made a long march of nearly twenty miles, passing through a defile in the hills intervening between the Khost and Kurram valleys, and encamped at Baghzai on the following day, making the short march of four and a half miles to Hazir Pir. On the ] st February Sirdar Wali Mahomed, accompanied by some Maliks from the Logar valley, and escoiked by Captain Rennick, from All Kheyl, arrived at Hazir Pir. General Roberts and Captain Conolly, now Acting Political Officer, and the General's aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Neville Chamberlain, a well-known name in Afghan annals, welcomed the Sirdar, and at noon, on the arrival of the cortege at the camp, Roberts, accompanied by his staff, met the Wali Mahomed at the end of the headquarters street of tents, and conducted him to his own tent, where a guard of honour and the band of the 21st Punjaub Native Infantry were drawn up to salute the distinguished guest. The General invited the Wali to dinner, but this, so 2O2 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. far as the Sirdar was concerned, was little more than a Barme- cide repast, as his Mussulman prejudices prevented him from partaking of anything more than bread and water with un- believers. The Indian Government appeared to consider the Wali Ma- homed in the British camp as a matter of considerable political importance, which subsequent events hardly justified, as the Wali was a man of no ability, and by his descent from a low- born Turi woman could have but slight pretensions to the Ameership of a people like the Afghans, who think so highly of " blue blood." Under orders from the Viceroy, on the 4th Feb- ruary the Sirdar started for Jellalabad, via Thull, Kohat, and Peshawur, in order to confer with Major Cavagnari, Chief Po- litical Agent, and with Sir Samuel Browne, commanding the Khyber column. On the day before the Wali's departure, General Roberts, being desirous of examining the roads, rode to Ahmed-i-Shama, returning by another route through the hills. During the day, also, the 29th Punjaub Native Infantry, which had been en- camped at Hazir Pir during the past month, marched for Thull, and the squadron 10th Hussars, greatly to the regret of their comrades in the late campaign, proceeded to join the head-quarters of their regiment with Sir Samuel Browne. On the 4th February General Roberts broke up his camp at Hazir Pir, and, escorted by No. 2 Mountain Battery and the 28th Punjaub Native Infantry, started for Kurram fort and the Peiwar Kotul, leaving in camp three guns F Battery A Brigade Royal Horse Artillery, left wing 72nd Highlanders, 12th Bengal Qavalry, wing 5th Punjaub Cavalry, and wing 21st Punjaub Native Infantry. General Roberts entered the Kurram river at a ford, where it was 50 yards wide and 3 feet deep, and, visiting the village of Suddar, where the headmen petitioned him to remit the fines imposed for their ill-treat- ment of the troopers placed under their protection, a request he refused, arrived at Ibrahimzai, where his camp was pitched. On the following day Kurram was reached, and on the 7th, General Roberts, having inspected the upper and lower forts, marched with the same escort for the Peiwar Kotul and Habib Killa ; on the same day Brigadier-General Cobbe, who The Punjaub Chiefs Contingent. 203 had sufficiently recovered from the wound received on the 2nd December, left for Thull, and did not return to the command of the 1st Brigade until the 2nd March following. General Roberts, after inspecting the British Camp and positions, pro- ceeded to Thull (at this time garrisoned by the half F Battery A Brigade Royal Horse Artillery, wing 14th Bengal Lancers, and 19th Punjaub Native Infantry), and thence to Kohat, his base of operations. At this time the Government placed at the General's dis- posal for keeping up the communications of the Kurram Field Force, a contingent offered by the Punjaub Chiefs, of whose services he was glad to avail himself, as it set free his forces for field operations. The contingent was commanded by Bri- gadier-General Watson, C.B., V.C., an officer of acknowledged gallantry and ability, who had served at Delhi and Lucknow, and was an old comrade and personal friend of the commander of the Kurram Field Force. Half of the contingent, which arrived at Kohat on the 9th February, was sent to Bunnoo on the 13th, and the remaining half marched for Thull on the follow- ing day, and arrived in time to be inspected by General Rooberts on the 19th.* After the inspection the General left for Kohatf, 63 miles distant, which he reached on the following day. During his rest at Kohat, General Roberts turned his attention to preparing for the much desired forward movement in the spring, and for- warding two months' supplies to Kurram, for which, besides camels and local transports, 2,000 carts, each drawn by 4 bul- locks, and carrying 20 maunds, or 16 cwt., were employed, the journey there and back occupying nearly a fortnight. These * While at Thull General Roberts made a new disposition of the Kurram Field Force. The 2nd Brigade was to consist of the troops in advance of Kurram from Habib Killa to Ali Kheyl ; the 1st Brigade, all other troops across the frontier, at Kurram, Hazir Pir, and on the road from Kurram to Thull. The troops in British territory at Thull and Kohat to be under Brigadier General Watson. f The following was the Kohat garrison at this time : Squadron 9th Lancers, half G Battery 3rd Brigade Royal Artillery ; left wing, 2nd Battalion 8th Regiment ; headquarters wing, 14th Bengal Lancers, and 5th Punjaub Infantry. During General Roberta's stay at Kohat the 92nd Gordon Highlanders and 2nd Punjaub Native Infantry joined the Kurram Field Force. The command at Kuhat was held by Colonel Osboru Wilkin- son, 3rd Bengal Cavalry. 204 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. arrangements completed, and having inspected the 92nd Gordon Highlanders that magnificent Regiment whose name is iden- tified with the most brilliant achievements of British arms in Afghanistan which joined the Field Force under his command, General Roberts left Kohat, and, on the 4th of March, issued from Headquarters at the Kurrain Camp, the orders for the movement of his troops preparatory to their reassembly at Kurram on the 15th of the month. On llth March, General Roberts, with his staff, arrived at Shinnak, 26 miles from Thull, where he was met by Brigadier- General Watson, who had been making a flying visit to Kurram Valley and Peiwar Kotul, and they proceeded in company to Thull, to receive the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick Haines, who was expected to make an inspection of the Kurram Field Force. On the arrival of his Excellency with the Head- quarter Staff of the Army, General Roberts accompanied him to Kurram, where, on thair arrival on the 22nd, they were received by Brigadier-General Drew, and in the afternoon the troops assembled there were inspected, when their smart ap- pearance elicited the encomiums of Sir Frederick Haines, who, on the conclusion of the inspection, called the officers to the front, and complimented General Roberts on the gallantry and good conduct of his men. During his visit the Com- mander-in-Chief inspected the Fort and Regimental Hospitals, and, accompanied by General Roberts, went to Habib Killa, where he inspected the 72nd Highlanders, No. 2 Mountain Battery, and 2nd Punjaub Infantry, and thence rode to the Peiwar Kotul, where the garrison, consisting of half of the 9th Battery 3rd Brigade, Royal Artillery, and a wing of the 2nd Battalion 8th Regiment, were inspected, and the party made their way through six inches of snow to one of the Block houses in the Pass. On the 26th of March the Commander- in-Chief left Kurram on his return to India, and was accom- panied by General Roberts as far as Shinnak, whence he rode back the twenty-six miles to Kurram, in one day, amid pouring rain, which made the road across the cultivated land as heavy as a bog. During the next few days the 72nd Highlanders and 23rd and 28th Native Regiments marched to Ali Kheyl, in the Preparations for the Advance. 205 Hurriab Valley, as it was desirable to occupy that place before the melting of the snow from the Shutargardan Pass permitted its seizure by the enemy, and the 67th Regiment, C. Battery 4th Brigade, Royal Artillery, and Headquarter wing 14th Bengal Lancers, were pushed on into the Kurram Valley, the 5th Goorkhas and 21st Punjaub Native Infantry, which were to form part of the force held in readiness for the ap- prehended march on Cabul, being moved up. Carriage for supplies and stores was now, as always, the great difficulty, owing to the death of the camels, and the scarcity of suitable mules ; but all difficulties were overcome by the energy im- pressed into the officers of the Transport Department by the example of General Roberts, who appeared to be ubiquitous, per- sonally inquiring into everything, and encouraging every one to increased exertion. There being a paucity of animals for the transport of Ordnance Stores, the General ordered the Artillery horses and mules to be employed, and natives were engaged to carry the ammunition, about 200 tons, over the Peiwar Kotul itself. On the 1st of April General Roberts established his head- quarters at Byan Kheyl, in the Hurriab Valley, on the further side of the Peiwar Kotul, where he went to inspect the road- making, and on the 6th, returned to Kurram from visiting Ali Kheyl where, three days later, he was joined by the 92nd Higlanders and half of the 9th Battery 3rd Brigade, Royal Artillery. On the same day the General, accompanied by Colonels Gough and Lindsay, commanding the Cavalry and Artillery of the Force, rode out to pay a visit to a leading Turi Chief, Noor Mohamed, who lived in a fortified village about six miles from Kurram. The Chief happened to be absent, but the General was received by his representative, who offered for his acceptance a handsome carpet, which, however, he declined. Noor Mohamed returned the visit next day, attended by a following of horse and footmen. General Roberts, desirous of winning the confidence of all classes, paid a visit, two days later, to the camp of a large number of Ghilzyes, returning to the Logar valley with their flocks, who appreciated the honour, and hospitably received the " Lord Sahib.' 3 206 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. Throughout his stay in the Kurram and Khost valleys General Roberts adopted what would appear to more timid natures the hazardous course of throwing, himself on the good faith of the fierce hillmen. He habitually attended Durbars and Jirgas of chiefs, sometimes numbering 200 or 300 armed men, with an escort of four Goorkhas and two Sikh orderlies of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, who were kept in the background, and though his life was exposed to the knife or musket of any fanatic desirous of earning immortality by slaying an un- believer, or of the avenger of blood smarting at the loss of a relative killed in battle, yet he reckoned correctly on the chivalry of his foes, and led what might be called a charmed life when conversing freely with the ferocious sectaries, any one of whom had it in his power to plunge his knife into the heart of the British general who had overthrown his people in battle, and robbed his country of her independence. An immediate advance on Cabul being expected, the General, after an interview with the commanding officers of the regi- ments and batteries of his force, published a divisional order regulating the scale of carriage for all ranks. The Kurram Field Force was strengthened by the arrival of half C Battery 4th Brigade, Royal Artillery bringing with them thirty-seven elephants for carrying the 9-pounder guns over the mountains and the 67th Regiment, which had been sent from the Madras Presidency. The General went out to meet the new arrivals, and welcome them to the force under his command. Other reinforcements arrived during the next few days, includ- ing the llth Bengal Native Infantry, and the Punjaub chiefs' contingent, consisting of the three arms, numbering nine British officers and 2,560 men, with seven guns, the whole under Brigadier-General Watson ; the 2nd Brigade also received a new commander in Brigadier-General Forbes, General Thel- wall having returned to India on sick leave. Deputy- Surgeon General Townsend also became Principal Medical officer of the Division, while the signalling department received a new chief in Captain Straton, 22nd Regiment, a gallant officer, who rendered excellent service to General Roberts during the re- mainder of his campaign in Afghanistan, and fell at Candahar on the 1st September, in the last action of the war. Preparations for the Advance. 207 Meanwhile the regiments and batteries were being pushed on over the Peiwar Kotul into the Hurriab valley, and at 5 A.M. on the 20th April, General Roberts, accompanied by Colonel Colley (the late ill-fated General Sir George Colley), private sec- retary to the Viceroy, who had arrived at Kurram on the pre- vious day, started off to ride to Rokian, in the defile beyond Ali Kheyl, and returned to the Peiwar Kotul, where they passed the night, having covered during the day no less than seventy miles of ground, including the Pass, a feat which speaks highly for the powers of endurance of both these distinguished officers, as the cold was severe and the weather inclement. On the following day they returned to Kurram by the Spin- gawi route, the first visit the commander of the Field Force had paid to the scene of his memorable achievement of the 2nd December. Undeterred by the heavy fall of snow and wretched weather, General Roberts, whose sleepless activity was the wonder of all witnesses, on the succeeding day, accompanied by Brigadier- General Watson, rode to Badesh Kheyl, seventeen miles distant, returning the same day to inspect the camels, 2,700 in number, assembled there, of which only 1,900 were passed as fit for service by a committee presided over by Major Mac Queen, 5th Punjaub Native Infantry. Every point relating to the advance and the efficiency of the force he proposed to take with him was carefully considered ; and as the European portion of the Kurram garrison would be small, he took steps to render the forts defensible. By the 29th April the arrangements for the advance from Ali Kheyl, including the storing of provisions and ammunition, and the ordnance and Engineer parks, were complete, and, on the following day, the General established his headquarters at that place, where the greater portion of the Kurram Field Force was now assembled.* The camps of the 1st and 2nd Brigades, * The following was the constitution of the Kurram Field Force : Royal Artillery under Colonel G. H. Lindsay. F Battery A Brigade Royal Horse Artillery, G Battery 3rd Brigade Royal Artillery, No "2 Mountain Battery. Cavalry Brigade, under Colonel H. H. Gough, V.C., C.B., squadron 9th Lancers, 12th Bengal Cavalry. 14th Bengal Cavalry (Lancers). First Brigade Infantry, under Brigadier-General Cobbe, 72nd Highlanders, 5th Goorkhas, 23rd Pioneers, 28th Punjaub Native Infantry, 7th Company Sappers and Miners. Second Brigade, under Brigadier-General H. Forbes, 208 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. with the former being the headquarters, and with the latter the Artillery, were pitched on two plateaus and fortified, being sur- rounded by loose stone walls, with picket towers on commanding sites. The spur jutting out from Matungi, between the two plateaus and the village of AH Kheyl, had been crowned with a series of works, the highest of which consisted of picket towers protected by ditches and scarps ; also a redoubt, with emplacements for guns and parapets for infantry, and other positions on the slope of the hill were also occupied. General Roberts inspected all these works, and, on the 1st of May, accompanied by Brigadier-General Watson, rode up the Hazar- darakht defile as far as Dreikulla. On the 3rd of May a grand parade of all the troops * at Ali Kheyl and Byan Kheyl was held, and was witnessed by a con- course of the native population of the neighbourhood ; but the effect of the review was much marred by a heavy thunderstorm, with rain and hail. In the afternoon the General, accompanied by the brigadiers, political officers (Colonel T. Gordon, C.S.I., and Captain Rennick) and Staff, held a durbar, which was largely attended by the headmen of the Hurriab valley. Turbans and dresses of honour as rewards for friendly conduct were distri- buted, and then the General made a speech, which was translated into Pushtoo by Mahomed Hyat Khan, C.S.I., Assistant-Political Officer, in which he assured his audience of the intention of the British Government to annex the Kurram and Hurriab valleys, a determination which was altered at a later period. He also warned the Jajis to keep on their good behaviour, or he would pay a hostile visit to their most secluded vales. 92nd Highlanders, 5th Punjaub Native Infantry, 21st Pui jaub Native In- fantry. The Kurram Valley Reserve, under Brigadier- General Watson, V.G , C B., half C Battery A Brigade Royal Artillery, No. 1 Mountain Battery, 5th Punjaub Cavalry. First Infantry Brigade, 2nd Battalion 8th King's Regiment, and llth Bengal Native Infantry. Second Infantry Brigade, 67th Regiment, and 29th Punjaub Native Infantry. * The strength of the Kurram Field Force, including the Punjaub chiefs' contingent, was as follows on the 1st of May : 212 British officers and 3,511 European soldiers of all ranks, exclusive of five officers and 95 men sick and wounded ; 9,180 native officers, non-commissioned officers, and men effective, and 259 in hospital ; grand total, 13,269 ; 15 9-pounder and 12 mountain guns ; 4,673 public, and 2,230 private, camp followers. Of animals for the service of the guns and cavalry there were 2.613 horses, 277 mules, 26 bullocks, and 58 elephants. Also 800 grass cutters' ponies. The Treaty of Gundamuck. 209 Advantage was taken of the halt by the Survey department to examine the Shutargardan, and a party returned by the Thabai pass, which enters the Hazardarakht defile at Jaji Thanna, a route which was pronounced impracticable for camels. Survey parties, under Captains Woodthorpe and Martin, with a strong escort, also explored the neighbouring country, including the range between the Manjiar Pass and the Peiwar Kotul; also the Jahtra Pass, opposite Byan Kheyl, and the ranges over- looking the Ahmed Kheyl villages, by which much valuable in- formation was procured, and a considerable tract of country, with the course of the Hazardarakht, or upper Kurram River, mapped out. On the 9th May, the General, with his staff, rode to Shalu- zan, to select a site out of some that had been examined by Major Collett, the head of the Quartermaster-General's depart- ment, and a few days later proceeded to the Kurram valley, returning to Ali Kheyl on the 14th. On the following day he issued a lengthy order detailing the system on which the Trans- port was to be worked from the 1st June. But all these preparations appeared as if they were to end in naught, for, on the 13th May, intelligence was received in camp that Yakoob Khan had accepted the terms on which was based the instrument known in history as the treaty of Gundamuck, thus concluding all probability, as it was mistakenly supposed at the time, of a further prosecution of hostilities. On the following day the chiefs of the Ahmed Kheyl section of the Jajis, who had been consistently hostile to the British, came into camp and made their submission, saying that they had been informed that they were freed from allegiance to the Ameer of Cabul. General Roberts, now that there was slight chance of an advance on Cabul, occupied himself in conducting a series of reconnoissances, by which he personally gained an intimate knowledge of the surrounding mass of mountains, with their peaks and passes, within two days' march of the British camp at Ali Kheyl. Accompanied by his staff he made a reconnois- sance in force, on the 22nd May, of a peak on the south-western side of the camp, between the points visited in the reconnois- sances of the 10th and 17th of the month. The escort con- 2io Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. sisted of four companies of the 72nd Highlanders, two com- panies of the 3rd Goorkhas, with a reserve of two companies of the 92nd Highlanders, two companies of the 21st Pimjaub Native Infantry, and two guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery ; and some of the lately hostile Ahmed Kheyls accompanied the party, with which also went the survey officers. The peak which General Koberts ascended, had an altitude of 10,300 feet, whence a magnificent view was obtained, and signals were ex- changed with the camp and reserves by means of an interme- diate party on the further side of the Sappri valley, overlooking Ali Kheyl. So important were the results obtained in these reconnoissances that the General issued a divisional order, in which, after thanking the troops, and the officers for their sketches and reports, he declared that " the results obtained possess a political, in addition to their topographical, value, and the people of this country now understand that the paths over their precipitous mountains can be traversed by British troops as easily as by themselves." On the Queen's Birthday (24th May) General Koberts held a grand parade of all the troops forming the Kurram Field Force, the regiments and batteries coming up from Peiwar to take part in the display. On the ground, drawn up in three lines, were 5,500 infantry, 1,200 cavalry, with twenty-seven guns and two Gatliugs. After the usual three cheers and feu-de-joie, the General rode up to the 5th Goorkhas, and decorated Captain Cook with the Victoria Cross for his gallantry on the 2nd De- cember, in saving the life of Major Galbraith, Assistant- Adjutant- General, and conferred on two native officers and seven non- commissioned officers and men of the regiment, the 3rd class Order of Merit, for distinguished gallantry at the Peiwar Kotul. He then addressed Major Fitz Hugh on the pleasure it afforded him to have his distinguished regiment under his command, and eulogized Captain Cook as an officer of established repu- tation in the Punjaub Frontier Forces before the present cam- paign. A march past of the division concluded the ceremony, and during the day, the orders for the return of the troops to the Kurram valley were published. On the following day the division broke up, and on the 26th General Koberts marched with headquarters to Shaluzan, where Reconnaissances by General Roberts. 2 1 1 Brigadier-General Watson, on behalf of the Punjaub chiefs, gave an open air luncheon to General Roberts and his staff, and about 100 other officers, who were regaled on luxuries such as they had not enjoyed since the commencement of the cam- paign. When the company had done justice to the delicacies spread before them, General Roberts made a speech, thanking the Punjaub chiefs for the assistance they had afforded the government, to which General Watson returned thanks, and then proposed the health of the gallant commander of the Kurram Field Forces, which was drunk with enthusiasm. During the day a telegram was received, reporting the signature of the treaty of Gundamuck. General Roberts returned to Kurram and thence to the Pei- war Kotul, inspecting the site of an artillery camp halfway between Shaluzan and the Peiwar (or Habib Killa) cantonment. Having ordered a re-distribution of troops on the return of the Punjaub Chiefs' Contingent* to India on the 31st May, the General returned with headquarters to Ali Kheyl ; and, on the 1st June, rode up the Lakkerai Pass, a distance of eighteen miles, with the object of meeting Captain Strahan, R.E., and Major Stewart, Guide Corps, who had been sent from Gunda- muck to report on the road ; but after waiting some time, he returned to camp, and a telegram was afterwards received, re- porting that they had been unable to cross the pass as their baggage animals had been seized by robbers. But Mr. Scott, of the Survey Department of the Khyber column, reached the summit of the Peak of Sikaram, whence he saw the Kurram and Hurriab valleys spread out like a map at his feet, but though a lookout was kept at Ali Kheyl in anticipation of a heliographic signal, he was unable for some reasons to com- municate with the signallers below, f * On the 2nd of June General Roberts issued a farewell order, express- ing "his high appreciation of the valuable services rendered by Brigadier- General Watson, and the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, during the three months they had been under his command, when they were employed in escorting convoys and protecting the line of communica- tion." So excellent had been the behaviour of the n-.en, both in camp and on the line of march, that he added, " Their conduct has not been the subject of a single complaint by the inhabitants of the country, and their steadiness and good discipline reflect honour on those chiefs whom they serve." t Captain Colquhoun's " With the Kurram Force." P 2 212 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. On the 2nd June General Roberts, escorted by two companies of the 92nd, four companies of Goorkhas, and two mountain guns, marched on a reconnoissance of the country of the Ahmed Kheyl section of the Jajis, which had not yet been visited, though visible from the ranges to the south of Ali Kheyl. The people did not appear friendly, and the chief failed to put in an appearance to pay his respects, on which the General sent a native assistant political officer to require his presence, when he came into camp, which was pitched for the day at a ridge called Dobozai. Accompanied by his staff, and an armed escort of the villagers, locally called a " badragga," the General ascended a spur running south from Saratiga (white rock), a peak forming the centre of a series of spurs, which spread out like a fan from the neighbourhood of the Shutargardan. The view from this point was of a sea of mountain chains and peaks, the Zermatt valley in Afghanistan being visible, but the General was unable to see Ghuznee, which lay on the further side of a low range of hills which bounded the horizon to the south-west. As soon as the Mangals in the valley below saw the party on the ridge which overlooked their country, they raised the alarm, and began to collect with the object of intercepting their return, on which the General, who besides the "badragga," was accompanied by only a few orderlies, returned to camp, and thence proceeded to Ali Kheyl that night. In order to complete his knowledge of the network of mountains to the south of the Hurriab valley, General Roberts proceeded, on 6th June, with his staff, and some officers of the survey, escorted by two companies 28th Punjaub Native Infantry, and No. 1 Mountain Battery, and a "badragga " of Jajis, to explore the route by the Ishtiar Pass, which, starting from Byan Kheyl, leads across the range, and emerges in the upper Kurram valley. In order to co-operate against an attack by Mangals, the 12th Bengal Cavalry, and 300 men of the 5th Punjaub Native Infantry had been ordered on the 1st June to march from the camp at Peiwar to Keraiah, in the upper Kurram valley. The destination of the reconnoissance was kept secret, so that no opposition was experienced. The pass was found to be less steep and rugged than the Manjiar defile, A Critical Time. 213 and the camp was pitched in a broad open valley, at the west end of the range that slopes down from the Peiwar Kotul. On the following day the march was made to Keraiah, eight miles distant, near the mouth of the Manjiar Pass. The survey officers connected their survey of the Kurram valley with that of Khost, which lay to the south, on the other side of the range of mountains, and several reconnoissances were made in this direction across the Kurram river. On the 15th June the last of these was to be made, enabling the survey officers to map the course of the Kurram river between Keraiah and the country of the Ahmed Kheyls, the chiefs of whom, Zaib and Cassim, the headmen of the Hassan Kheyls, were in camp, and guaranteed the safety of the party with which General Roberts intended to proceed. A part of the road, however, passed through the territory of the Lajji Mangals, who sent into camp ten hostages for their good behaviour. General Roberts started with the survey officers and an escort, consisting of No. 1 Mountain Battery, a detachment of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, and the 5th Punjaub Native Infantry, and was about entering a difficult gorge by which the Kurram river enters the valley, one mile and a half from camp, when a man of the " badragga," consisting of Chumkunnies, who owned this part of the river bed, observed that the Mangals would make an objection to the advance of the party the General intended to take with him, which consisted of only the survey officers, eight men of the 5th Native Infantry under Major Mac Queen, and four orderlies of his escort. General Roberts sent the Assistant-Political officer, Mahomed Hyat Khan, to ascertain if this was so, and on his reporting the road clear, the party continued their march, and reached the first Mangal village, two miles further on, where the headmen paid their respects to the General. Pushing on along the hillsides, a body of Mangals were seen about 400 yards distant, who assumed a hostile attitude, on which the General ordered a halt, as the Ahmed Kheyl villages, which were the goal of the expedition, lay three miles higher up, and it would have been unwise, if not impossible, to have pushed on there against opposition, while their return would have been cut off. Accordingly, a halt was called under 214 Memoir of Sir. Frederick Roberts. a plane-tree, at the entrance of a glen leading to the bed of the river, while an attempt was made to bring the Mangals to terras ; but they refused to permit the passage of the party. While the General was discussing the matter with the head- men, under the shade of the plane-tree, suddenly a party of Mangals poured in a volley from a peak overlooking the glen. Had it not been for a wall of rock, thirty feet high, which screened most of the party, few would have escaped. Colonel Mark Heathcote and Major Collett, both officers of the Quarter- master-General's Department, had narrow escapes, and one sapper and a nephew of the Hassan Kheyl Chief, were wounded. The General had already taken the precaution to order the return of the survey party, and had sent word to the supports to be ready to advance, if necessary, and now gave the order to retire, which was done with order and deliberation. Meanwhile the badragga had disappeared, and the enemy swarmed down from the peak, and kept up a hot fire on the small escort, which, under the leadership of Major Mac Queen, managed to keep them off until the supports were reached. On the return of General Roberts to the camp at Keraiah, the Man gal hostages were sent to Kurram for detention till their tribe had paid a fine of 1,000 rupees for breaking their engagements.* The maliks of Keraiah were also sent prisoners to Kurram for failing to warn the General of the treachery of their neighbours. On the 17th of June the camp at Keraiah was broken up, and General Roberts returned to Shaluzan, whence the head- quarters were moved to the Peiwar Kotul, as being more salubrious. In the second week of July, Brigadier-General Dunham Massy arrived to relieve General Roberts, and take up the command of the advanced brigade of the Kurram Field Force, now reduced by the breaking up of the 2nd Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General Forbes, Brigadier-General Cobbe, commanding the 1st Brigade, having been appointed to command at Agra. On the 15th July arrived Major Cavagnari, * The Mangals made their submission on the 5th of July, and paid up 500 rupees, expressing their inability to pay tb.3 remainder, which was remitted. General Roberts and Major Cavagnari. 215 C.B., the recently appointed Envoy to the Court of the Ameer Yakoob Khan, and, on the following day, the remaining officers of the Mission, Mr. Jenkins, C.I.E., Secretary, Surgeon-Major Kelly, and Lieutenant Hamilton, V.C., of the Guide Corps, who commanded the escort of fifty men from the infantry, and twenty-five from the cavalry, of his own regiment. General Roberts and Major Cavagnari proceeded together to Ali Kheyl, the 5th Punjaub Infantry escorting the rest of the Mission, which encamped near Zubberdusht Killa. In order to impress the natives with a proper sense of respect due to Her Majesty's Envoy, and also to give as many officers as circumstances permitted the opportunity of visiting the Shutar- gardan Pass, General Roberts detailed a strong force, under Brigadier- General Massy, consisting of two companies from each of the three British regiments, a squadron of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, 4* guns No. 2 Mountain Battery, and the 5th Goorkhas, which inarched on to Dreikulla, ten miles up the Hazardarakht defile, where they were joined, on the 18th July, by the General and Envoy from Ali Kheyl. The camp was pitched that afternoon at Saratiga,f and in the evening Major Cavagnari gave a farewell dinner to General Roberts, at which mutual good wishes were exchanged between the host and his guest, which subsequent events too sadly belied. On the following morning, the 19th July, Sirdar Khusdil Khan, formerly Governor of Afghan Turkestan, de- puted by Yakoob Khan to welcome the British Envoy, arrived at the camp. He was received by General Roberts and Major Cavagnari, and as soon as all was ready, the cavalcade started on the mission for the Afghan camp at Cassirn Kheyl, in the Shutargardan plain, and General Roberts, accompanied by his staff, and all the officers on leave, marched for the Pass, from the summit of which they viewed the Logar valley and the road to Cabul, which all thought with a sigh they were not to traverse. * The two mountain batteries had used only four guns during the cam- paign, but when the preparations for the advance on Cabul were in progress they were made up to the strength of six guns. t Saratiga derives its name from a light- coloured cliff near, forming the boundary of the Jaji territory. 216 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. On his return, General Eoberts visited Khusdil Khan, who received him with ceremony, hut created anything but a favour- able impression, owing to the sinister expression of his face and want of cordiality. Among the chiefs accompanying the Sirdar was Padshah Khan, chief of the Eastern Ghilzyes, whom the late Ameer Shere Ali had appointed "VYuzeer, or Prime Minister, and who had received gifts from the British for his friendliness towards them. After the interview a dinner was served in the Afghan fashion, in large trays raised about six inches off the ground, but the cuisine was by no means despicable, and the menu was varied, though there was only one spoon on each tray, and no plates or knives and forks, the former being represented by large " chupatties," or flat cakes of flour, and the latter by the fingers of each guest. Only four chairs were provided for the Sirdar, the General, the Envoy, and his secretary, the remaining officers participating in the banquet having to sit cross-legged on the floor. After the guests had washed their hands in basins passed round by the attendants, tea was served, and then hot milk, sweetened and spiced, completed the entertainment. On this day General Roberts was gazetted, in London, to a Knight Commandership of the Bath, and never had the honour been more worthily earned, and many officers of the staff and of the force under his orders received decorations and pro- motion. Major Cavagnari was also made a K.C.S.I. Sir Frederick Roberts remained for the night at Cassim Kheyl, and, on the following morning, bade farewell to his entertainer, and the ill-fated British Envoy, who, with his officers and escort, was seen no more by his countrymen. As the newly-made Knight of the Star of India watched the last of the gallant array that disappeared from view with Sir Frederick Roberts, it may well be a subject of speculation whether such thoughts presented themselves to his mind as Shakespeare puts into the mouth of Henry IV., who gloomily exclaimed, when insurrection, which he had employed to over- throw the unhappy Richard, raised its head to eject him from the throne, " heaven ! that we might read the book of fate, And see the revolution of the times." Roberts returns to Simla. 217 Though, recognizing the wisdom that hides our fortunes under the pall of futurity, the King adds " If this were seen, The happiest youth viewing his progress through, What perils past, what crosses to ensue Would shut the book, and sit him down and die." Sir Frederick Boberts returned to AH Kheyl, where he held a farewell durbar of the chiefs of the surrounding tribes and clans, to whom, in the name of the Government, he made presents. Handing over the command of the Kurram Field Force in its diminished strength, to Brigadier-General Massy, he left the scenes of his triumphs and returned to Simla, where he had been summoned as a member of the Army Com- mission, which Lord Lyttou had assembled for the purpose of considering the reorganization of the Indian Army. 2 1 8 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. CHAPTEE XII. Massacre of the British Mission at Gabul Receipt of the Intelligence by Sir Frederick Roberts at Simla He Proceeds to take the Field Arrival at Ali Kheyl Preparations for the Advance on Cabul Sir Frederick Roberts Moves across the Shutargardan Pass He Experi- ences a Narrow Escape Arrival at Kooshi Interview with Yakoob Khan Proclamations of Sir Frederick Roberts to the Army and the People of Cabul. SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS was received at Simla with much distinction by the Viceroy, Lord Lytton, who gave a grand banquet in his honour, at which, in the presence of the highest dignitaries of the State, his Lordship designated his guest, " the hero of the Afghan War," a title he had fairly won as the victor of the Peiwar Kotul, by far the most brilliant and prominent achievement of the campaign, which, as regards the Khyber and Bolan columns, was rather barren of military exploits. But hardly had the congratulations of the General's friends and well-wishers ceased to sound in his ears, and scarcely was the ink dry on the proclamation of the Viceroy, announcing the conclusion of the peace of Gundamuck, than that much-vaunted instrument was torn to shreds by an act of more than Oriental treachery, and the paean of triumph sung by the Viceroy was turned into expressions of horror and lamentation at the fall of his friend, Sir Louis Cavagnari, and the gallant officers and men who composed the mission to Cabul. Before proceeding with the narrative we will interpolate a brief account of the circumstances attendant on the perpetra- tion of this tragedy, as they bear on the relations that later existed between Yakoob Khan and Sir Frederick Roberts. On the conclusion of the treaty of Gundamuck the Ameer Yakoob Khan returned to Cabul, accompanied by Habibulla Khan, the Mustaufi, or Finance Minister, Daoud Shah, his Massacre of the Cavagnari Mission. 219 Coniniander-in-Chief, and a native agent in the employ of Sir Louis Cavagnari, named Buktiar Khan, who was entrusted with the duty of preparing for the reception of the British mission. Sir Louis Cavagnari, after bidding farewell to Sir Frederick Eoberts, on the 19th of July, proceeded by the Shutargardan pass to Cabul, which he entered on the 24th of July, having been received en route with the utmost consideration and ceremony by the Ameer's ministers and troops, and in his reception by Yakoob Khan was treated with every mark of esteem and honour. Unfortunately Buktiar Khan died a few days before the Envoy's arrival at Cabul, and the death of so tried an agent was a great loss to Sir Louis; but beyond some trivial disputes in the Bazaar between the Ameer's troops and the Envoy's escort, all went well, and, says the Viceroy in his letter to the Secretary of State for India, dated September 15th, 1879, detailing the events preceding the massacre, the Envoy's last private letter, dated 30th of August, concluded with the words : " I per- sonally believe that Yakoob Khan will turn out to be a good ally, and that we shall be able to keep him to his engagements." The Ameer spoke with pleasure of his proposed visit to the Viceroy, in which he was to be accompanied by the Envoy, and on the 2nd September, Sir Louis Cavagnari despatched a telegram to Lord Lytton, the last received from him, conclud- ing with the words, " all well." On the following day the British Residency in the Bala Hissar, or Citadel of Cabul, was attacked by three regiments, called the Ordal Regiments, who had come to the pay office in the Bala Hissar to receive their arrears, and on hearing that they were not to be paid in full, two of the regiments attacked the Residency, and being joined by the mob, succeeded in setting the buildings on fire and destroying its defenders after a despe- rate resistance. The news of this extraordinary outrage was conveyed to Ali Kheyl, in the form of a letter addressed by Yakoob Khan to Sir Frederick Roberts. In the first, dated 4 P.M., the 3rd September, the Ameer reports the attack, at 8 A.M., on the Residency by the troops and " people from city and surround- 22O Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. ing country," and adds that he had sent without avail his son and Daoud Shah, whom he reported as "dying;" and the second letter, dated 4th September, reported that the attack on the Residency had gone on from " morning till evening," when the building was set on fire, but added, that he had no " certain news " of the fate of the Envoy, and that he himself, "with five attendants, had been besieged." The statements of the messenger who brought these letters, an uncle of Padshah Khan, the great Ghilzye Chief, left no doubt as to the fate of the mission and escort. In Sir Louis Cavagnari, Sir Frederick Roberts lost a per- sonal friend, of whom Lord Lytton spoke in no exaggerated terms when he said, that " by his life and death he had bequeathed to the Service he adorned a splendid example, and to the Empire for whose interests he lived and died, the grateful guardianship of his honoured memory and spotless name." But he did not die unavenged, for his friend the British General swiftly appeased his manes, as did Achilles those of Patroclus : " Whole hecatombs of Trojan ghosts shall pay." Thousands of Afghans bled for the treacherous deed enacted on the 3rd September, and the faineant monarch who sur- veyed the scene from his palace windows while he despatched messengers, and ultimately his Commander-in-Chief, Daoud Shah, the only honest man of them all, to check his mutinous soldiery suffered for his want of good faith by the sacrifice of his throne. The fate of Lieutenant Hamilton, V.C., who commanded the escort, an officer young in years, but of great distinction and still higher promise, was especially tragic, and had in its circumstances all the elements of the heroic. Standing at bay, sword and revolver in hand, the heart of the young hero quailed not, while he confronted the surging mob thirsting for his blood. A melancholy interest attaches to some lines, displaying considerable poetic merit, written, shortly before his death, by Lieutenant Hamilton, and sent from Cabul on the 25th of that August, eight days before he was massacred : Lieutenant Hamilton, V.C. 221 "THE VILLAGE BEHMAEU." (Scene of outbreak of Cabul disaster, 1841. Revisited, August, 1879.) " Though all is changed, yet remnants of the past Point to the scenes of bloodshed, and, alas ! Of murder foul ; and ruined houses cast Their mournful shadow o'er the graves of grass Of England's soldiery, who faced a lot That few, thank Heaven ! before or since have shared ; - Slain by the hand of treachery, and not In open combat, where the foe ne'er dared To show themselves. The fatal, honest trust Placed in an enemy who loved a lie And knew not honour was a trust that cost The lives of those that gave it. Yet to die Game to the last, as they did, well upheld Their English name. E'en now their former foe Frankly avers the British arms were quelled By numbers only and the cruel snow. 'Tis forty years since British soldiers turned To look their last on this now peaceful scene, Whose lingering gaze spoke volumes as it yearned For vengeance due to treachery so mean. And vengeance true did Pollock, Sale, and Nott Deal with a timely and unerring hand As they with victory effaced the blot Which first had dimmed the annals of our land. And, now, while standing here, where side by side Fell many fighting with a fruitless bent, Regret were uppermost were't not for pride Which gives no place for weaker sentiment. And Pride might well be foremost if one thought That though fair Fortune smiled not for awhile, How England's fame shone brighter as she fought, And wrenched lost laurels from their funeral pile, And rose at last from out misfortune's tide Supreme for God and right were on her side." Sir Frederick Koberts was at Simla, engaged on the Army Commission to which he had been appointed before the out- break of the war, when, at 1 o'clock on the morning of the 5th September, he was suddenly roused from his sleep with a telegram from Captain Arthur Conolly, Political Officer at Ali Kheyl, announcing the astounding news of the murder of the British Envoy at Cabul, with the other members of the Mission, and all save nine men of the escort. Sir Frederick immediately sent the telegram to Lord Lytton, and proceeded in person shortly afterwards to Government House. The Viceroy settled with him the composition of the force that 222 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. was to be launched against the city of Cabul, and a meetirg of the Council was summoned, at which the Commander-in- Chief attended. General Koberts's achievements in the first phase of the Afghan War pointed him out as the man for the crisis that had arisen, and Lord Lytton, who had hailed him as " the hero of the Afghan "War," now that hostilities had so unex- pectedly broken out, with a discrimination that does his judg- ment infinite credit, selected the young General for the Com- mand of the Force that was to vindicate the outraged name of England. It was a high honour, but Koberts's whole career pointed to him as the man pre-eminently fitted to cope with the emergency that had arisen. As Warwick says : " There is a history in all men's lives, Fixing the nature of the times deceased, The which observ'd, a man may prophesy, With a near aim, of the main chance of things As yet not come to life." Those who had watched Roberts' s career since he made his name at Delhi, recognized in him the man of the hour, and public opinion fully endorsed the Governor- General's action in appointing him to the command of the army of retribution, in spite of the claims of seniority. It was admitted that the campaign in the Kurram Valley had introduced to the world a soldier of uncommon excellence, one combining the caution of Nestor with the fiery valour of Achilles, " impiyer, iracundns, inexorabilis, acer" In the afternoon of the following day, the 6th September, Sir Frederick Roberts started for Ali Kheyl, with orders to advance rapidly on Cabul with a force of -about 6,500 men. He travelled post by night and day, taking the rail to Jhelum, and thence proceeding by mail-cart and riding, and arrived at Thull on the 10th September, and at Ali Kheyl on the 12th. Meanwhile Brigadier-General Massy had been instructed by telegraph to occupy the Shutargardan Pass, and General Stewart, who had evacuated Candahar, was directed by the Viceroy to return to the city, whilst Jellalabad was re-occupied, and a reserve of 5,000 men assembled between Rawul Piudee and Peshawur. By the llth September, the 5th Goorkhas, 23rd Pioneers, Roberts s arrival at AH Kheyl. 223 and No. 2 Mountain Battery, the whole under Colonel Currie, commanding the Pioneers, acting under Sir Frederick Eoberts's instructions, were securely entrenched on the crest of the Shutargardan Pass. As it was a matter of the greatest im- portance that every facility should be afforded for the easy passage of the artillery across the Shutargardan, Sir Frederick Roberts telegraphed orders on the 9th September, directing the 7th Company of Sappers and Miners, then at Shaluzan, to march with all speed towards the Pass. This order was executed promptly, and by the 13th inst. they were at work on the Sirkai Kotul, a steep and awkward ascent about three miles beyond the summit of the Pass. Sir Frederick Roberts was accompanied, or followed, by the following officers whom he had selected for high command. Brigadier-Generals H. T. Macpherson, C.B., V.C., and T. D. Baker, C.B., to command the two infantry Brigades ; Brigadier- General J. Gordon to command the column of 4,000 men holding the country from Shutargardan to Thull ; Brigadier- General H. Gough, C.B., V.C., to be Road Commandant. Brigadier-General D. Massy, now commanding at Ali Kheyl, was nominated to command the Cavalry Brigade. He selected as Chief of the Staff, Colonel C. M. Macgregor, C.B., of the Quartermaster-General's Department, an officer, though young in years, of great military experience and considerable talent. General Baker proceeded, on the 13th September, to take command of the troops at Shutargardan, the position at which was strongly entrenched, and every precaution taken against a surprise. With the energy that distinguished this gallant officer while serving under Sir Garnet Wolseley in Ashantee, he made a reconnoissance on the 16th, as far as Shinkai Kotul, but met with no resistance. Two days before, Nawab Sir Gholam Hussein Khan passed thourgh Shutargardan and proceeded to Ali Kheyl where he joined Sir Frederick Roberts. This distinguished native officer was proceeding from Candahar to Cabul, to assist Sir Louis Cavagnari, but fortunately heard on the road of the massacre of the British Mission. Sir Frederick Roberts's first consideration was transport for the force of between 6,000 to 7,000 men, whom he was going to take with him to Cabul. With the usual want of fore- 224 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. thought at Army Headquarters, where a renewal of hostilities was not anticipated, the animals of the transport department of the Kurram Field Force were suffered to fall below the strength essential to maintain its efficiency. Sir Frederick Koberts writes : " Transport was the great difficulty which had to be met. Owing to the continuous and hard work to which the animals had been subjected, their numbers had steadily but rapidly diminished until, at the commencement of the month of September, there remained about 1,500 mules, 500 sickly camels, and 800 bullocks, or barely sufficient to enable the Commissariat to feed the force which it was presumed would remain in the Kurram valley for the winter. It is true that a large number of pack bullocks had been despatched for the Commissariat service in the valley, but of these many had been knocked up by the journey from the Punjaub, or were suffering from semi-starvation to such an extent as to be practically useless." As he said to the writer, " On arriving at Ali Kheyl I found that there was only transport for half the force I was to take to Cabul. Little provisions were in store, and there was no communication with the Khyber Column." And yet within about six weeks, his communications would be transferred by the snowing up of the Shutargardan route to that by the Khyber. In his endeavours to improvise a transport Roberts had the support of the Viceroy, a functionary whose word is law in our despotically-governed dependency. By Lord Lytton's orders, the Peshawur district was swept clean of transport cattle, but still the number was insufficient, owing to the enormous loss among the camels and the improvidence of the Indian authorities, who, not anticipating a renewal of hostilities, had suffered the transport to lapse into its chronic state of unpreparedness. Sir Frederick Roberts, and, before his arrival at Ali Kheyl, the able political officer, Captain Conolly, exerted themselves to procure carriage, and his old allies, the Turis of the Kurram Valley, and the Jajis, brought in all the animals they could spare, with drivers, and Padshah Khan, the G-hilzye Chief, whom Sir Frederick had met in the previous July, gave his aid, so that the commissariat were enabled to collect a con- siderable amount of supplies at the Shutargardan, "quite Roberts and the Ameers Emissaries. 225 sufficient," he says, " to relieve any anxiety as to the immediate want of the troops left there, and to move still larger stores forward for the force advancing upon Cabul." The position of Yakoob Khan, brought on by his vacillation and timidity, if not treachery, was not an enviable one at this time, between his countrymen who hated him for signing an igno- minious treaty and receiving a British Envoy, and the British Government, whom he knew would call him to strict account for suffering the murder of their representative. In order to conciliate Sir Frederick Roberts, he sent to Ali Kheyl the Mustaufi, Habibullah Khan, and the Wuzeer, Shah Mahomed, with a letter declaring his fidelity to the British alliance, and announcing his intention of seeking the protection of the British Commander ; but the real object of the visit of these ministers of the Ameer was, in Sir Frederick's opinion, to use their influence in preventing him from getting supplies, to blind him as to the real state of affairs, and, above all, to seek by every argument in their power to deter him from ad- vancing on Cabul. The Ameer's ministers arrived at Ali Kheyl on the 23rd September, and during their stay, which extended over three days, were treated with becoming consideration and respect. In their conversations with Roberts and his political officers, they pretended that their master desired the assistance and protection of a British force, but at a later period ; while at the same time they wrote to Lord Lytton deprecating an imme- diate advance, and secretly used all their influence to deter the Jajis, Turis, Ghilzyes, and others from furnishing supplies. In the Commander of the Cabul Field Force these wily Orientals found one versed in the treacherous ways of East- erns, a man whose open, truthful nature did not blind him to the insincerity and downright lying which is untlushingly practised among Asiatics of the governing class from Constantinople to the wall of China. Taking this view of the Afghan character in general, and that of the two emissaries of Yakoob Khan in particular, Sir Frederick Roberts was civil to them, but let them clearly understand that they did not blind him by their protesta- tions and pretences, and that as soon as he had collected suffi- cient supplies for the advance he would move on Cabul without fail. It would be almost impossible to exaggerate the difficulties of Sir Frederick Roberts's position at this time. With a force of Q 226 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. 6,500 men, and with supplies and transport for only one half that number, he was required to advance upon Cabul before a fall of snow had rendered the Shutargardan impassable, and mete a swift and crushing punishment on that city and the Ameer's Army for their treachery towards a British Ambas- sador. During the winter, once across the Shutargardan, he would be thrown on the resources of the country and the sup- plies forwarded by the line of the Kyber Pass, with open enemies to contest his hold of the country, and secret foes in his camp. He could not also blind himself to the difficulties of the march on the capital. The Afghan Army, so carefully raised and disciplined by Shere AH, had not yet been broken by defeat on their own soil, and the populace were numerous, fana- tical, and inured to the use of arms. They had taken up positions selected by themselves of enormous strength, while the Intelligence Department of the British General was defec- tive, and he was embarrassed -by the attitude, and, a few days later, by the presence of the Ameer, as whose ostensible ally he was about to restore his authority over his rebellious capital. Sir Frederick Roberts' s orders from the Viceroy requiring him to keep on terms with the Ameer, he wrote to him a conciliatory letter from AH Kheyl, to which he received a reply, suggestive, in the General's opinion, of a guilty conscience, and in this view he was strengthened by the conduct of Yakoob's envoys, and, at a later date, of the Ameer himself, who, Sir Frederick knew, though he was obliged to treat him as a friend and ally, was seeking from the vantage point of the British Camp to thwart his every move. In contrasting to us the difficulties and achievements of his world-famed march from Cabul to Candahar, in August, 1880, with the advance on Cabul, in September to October of the pre- vious year, Sir Frederick Roberts expressed his opinion that the latter was incomparably a more arduous and brilliant feat of arms, and this opinion, he added, would be endorsed by every competent military critic ; but the world was struck by the boldness and rapidity of the masterly advance through Afghanistan, bringing to mind Napoleon's march into Italy, or across Spain in pursuit of Sir John Moore, while the swift reconnoissance of the 31st August, and battle of the following day, was quite in the " reni, vidi, vici " style, so familiar to General Order to the Army. 227 every schoolboy, and commanded the popular applause, which, indeed, it well merited. So successful were the arrangements made by Sir Frederick Roberts for collecting supplies, that, before the snow had cut off his communications with Ali Kheyl, three or four months' sup- plies were collected for his troops and camp followers, and six weeks' forage for his animals. By the 18th September he had firmly established on the summit of the Pass the 72nd High- landers, 5th Goorkhas, 23rd Pioneers, No. 2 Mountain Battery, and the 7th Company of Sappers and Miners. In addition 200 men of the 5th Punjaubees were posted in the walled serai at Karatiga, 1|- miles from the Sirkai Kotul. On the 24th September, while at Ali Kheyl, Sir Frederick Roberts issued the following general order to the troops under his command : " The Government of India having decided that the Kurram Field Force shall proceed with all possible despatch to Cabul, in response to his Highness the Ameer's appeal for aid, and with the object of avenging the dastardly murder of the British representative and his escort, Sir Frederick Roberts feels sure that the troops under his command will respond to the call with a determination to prove themselves worthy of the sacred duty entrusted to them and of the high reputation they have main- tained during the recent campaign. " The Major-General need address no words of exhortation to soldiers whose courage and fortitude have been so well proved. The Afghan tribes are numerous, but without organi- zation ; the regular army is undisciplined, and, whatever may be the disparity in numbers, such foes can never be formidable to British troops. The dictates of humanity require that a distinction should be made between the peaceable inhabitants of Afghanistan and the treacherous murderers for whom a just retribution is in store, and Sir Frederick Roberts desires to impress on all ranks the necessity for treating the inoffensive population with justice, forbearance, and clemency. The future comfort and well-being of the force depend largely on the friendliness of our relations with the districts from which our supplies must be drawn ; prompt payment is enjoined for all articles purchased by departments and individuals, and all disputes must be at once referred to a political officer for deci- O 2 228 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. sion. The Major- General confidently looks forward to the successful accomplishment of the object of the expedition, and the re-establishment of order, and a settled government in Afghanistan." The first shot fired in the campaign was on the 22nd September, when a combined attack was made by Mangals and Ghilzyes upon a telegraph party whilst on the march between the Sirkai Kotul and Karatiga. Between 200 and 300 of these tribesmen attacked the party, who were escorted by eleven sepoys of the 5th Punjaub Infantry, and killed seven of the latter, one telegraph linesman, twelve muleteers, and five coolies, and captured the eighty-four mules intended to convey the telegraph poles from Karatiga to Shutargardan. They also attacked a party of 50 men of the 72nd Highlanders, stationed in a block-house on the Sirkai Kotul, but were repulsed with loss. A detachment of this regiment from Kazim Kheyl was sent in pursuit of the marauders, but without success. On the 24th Brigadier-General Baker moved from Shutar- gardan with a column,* and, passing through Dobandi, which was found to have been deserted by its inhabitants, crossed over the Shinkai Kotul, and reached Kooshi the same evening, thus securing the entrance into the Logar Valley. Three days later Sir Frederick Roberts moved from Ali Kheyl to the Shutargardan in company with the headquarters of the Cavalry Brigade, one squadron 9th Lancers, 5th Pun- jaub Cavalry, 28th Punjaub N.I., and a detachment of the 5th Punjaub Infantry. The infantry were directed to bring up the rear, whilst the General, with his staff and the cavalry, pushed forward in order to reach Kazim Kheyl or the Pass before dark. On the road he had a narrow escape, and the event proved that the tribesmen all along the line of route were in a dangerous state of excitement. About 10.30 the General was fortunately joined by twenty-five men of the 92nd Highlanders, whom Colonel Perkins had taken the precaution to send from Karatiga to act as an advance guard, in conse- quence of a rumoured gathering of Mangals and Ghilzyes in the Hazardarakht defile. At 11 A.M., whilst halting to allow * The following troops accompanied General Baker : F Battery A Brigade Royal Horse Artillery ; 12th Bengal Cavalry ; 2 guns No. 2 Mountain Battery ; one Company 72nd Highlanders ; 7th Company Sappers and Miners ; 5th Goorkhas, and 23rd Pioneers. Roberts has a Narrow Escape. 229 the luggage to come up, General Roberts received a report that 2,000 Mangals barred his advance, occupying the Pass between Jaji Thanna and Karatiga, and Captain Vousden, 5th Punjaub Cavalry, who was ordered to reconnoitre, reported that the enemy held in force both sides of the ravine half a mile beyond Jaji Thanna. Suddenly a large party of Mangals, who had been lying in ambush, fired a volley at the General and the headquarter staff, and Deputy Surgeon-General Townsend, head of the Medical Department, was severely wounded by a bullet which entered his right cheek. The Highlanders and a troop of dismounted Lancers cleared the northern side of the gorge, but the enemy clung to the precipitous hills on the south, and some time elapsed before they were driven from their posi- tion. The 28th Punjaub Native Infantry, on arriving, held a commanding hill until the rearguard had passed. General Hills, C.B., V.C., Roberta's old Addiscombe friend, who had joined him at Ali Kheyl, having received leave from the Commander-in-Chief to accompany him to Cabul in an unofficial capacity, describes the narrow escape General Roberts had on this occasion : " We pushed forward towards the pass, when suddenly we were confronted with a party of Afghans, who had taken up a position commanding the road, which lay up the dry bed in the Hazardarakht defile. Waiting till the headquarters came up, the enemy let drive into the 'brown' of them. I was riding alongside Townsend, who received a slug in his cheek, and General Roberts was a little ahead. Roberts dismounted the Lancers, and they, and the company of the 92nd, fortunately sent from Shutargardan, drove them off." Meanwhile a smart affair had been in progress in the direction of Karatiga, whence had been despatched a small detachment consisting of eighteen men of the 92nd Highlanders and forty-five of the 3rd Sikhs, led by Colour-Sergeant Hector Macdonald and Jemadar Shere Mahomed. This gallant band fought their way up a steep spur commanding the Hazardarakht defile, and drove off the enemy, inflicting severe loss, and thus cleared the way for the General and his staff. These events showed that caution would be necessary, and Brigadier- General Macpherson, commanding the troops thai moved, on the 29th September, from Ali Kheyl to join the General, took precautions to guard the large convoy of 1,500 230 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. laden animals he was escorting. A feeble attack was made in the Hazardarakht defile on the rear-guard of the column by a small party of marauders, but they were beaten off by the 67th Regiment. Pushing on, Sir Frederick Roberts only rested one night at the Shutargardan Pass. A General Officer who accompanied Mm described to us the rapidity of the movements of his friend, who, in order to economize transport, made the cavalry horses carry rations and arms, while the men walked beside their steeds over the Pass. . On the 28th September General Roberts reached Kooshi, where the Ameer Yakoob Khan, accompanied by his eldest son, by Sirdars Yahya Khan, Daoud Shah, the Mustaufi, "VVuzeer Gholam Mahomed Khan, and a suite of forty-five persons, with an escort of 200 horse- men, had arrived on the preceding day, and been received by Brigadier- General Baker, commanding the advance. Sir Frederick Roberts paid a formal visit to the Ameer, accom- panied by his staff, Brigade Commanders, and by Major- General James Hills. He was received by Daoud Shah, late Commander-in-Chief, and conducted into the presence of the Ameer, where the usual inquiries as to health were made, after which the British General left. During the course of the afternoon the Ameer, accompanied by his son and the nobles of his suite, returned the visit. Sir Frederick replied to the Ameer's pleading for delay, that not even for one day would he defer his march on Cabul, and the latter returned to his tent, having failed to convince or turn his host, whose suavity of manner was only equalled by his determina- tion, the pressure of the iron hand being apparent beneath the velvet glove. Yakoob's treacherous attitude in the British Camp may be described in the words Cassius used of Antony : " The posture of your blows are yet unknown, But for your words, they rob the Hybla bees, And leave them honeyless." Roberts firmly declined to delay his advance or listen to the pleadings of Yakoob, to whom his reply was similar to that of Octavius : " I draw a sword against conspirators ; When think you that the sword goes up again ? Never till Caesar's three-and-thirty wounds Be well avenged." Roberts s Determination of Character. 231 Yakoob Khan, who now practised deception, had himself learnt by painful experience to value aright the word of an Afghan ruler. Though Shere Ali guaranteed his safe conduct by an oath on the Koran, yet even the father, when he got his sou into his power, threw him into a dungeon, where he pined for many years in darkness and solitude. Transport was the weak point of the situation, and only four- teen days'supplies could be taken, but with such tried Regiments as the 72nd Highlanders and 5th Goorkhas, and magnificent corps like the 92nd Highlanders and 67th Regiment, commanded by Brigadiers like Baker and Macpherson, General Roberts had no fear as to the result of his daring move, while his soldiers on their part reciprocated the feeling of confidence. On the 29th September the Cavalry Brigade, under General Massy, with two guns of the Horse Artillery, two Companies 72nd Highlanders, and the 5th Punjaub Infantry, moved from Kooshi to Zerghan Shah to collect supplies. The same day the rear-guard, under General Macpherson, marched to the Shutar- gardan, and next day arrived at Kooshi. On the 1st October the last of the troops intended for the advance on Cabul arrived at Kooshi from Ali Kheyl, when the force* at Sir Frederick Roberts's disposal numbered 192 officers, 2,558 Europeans, and 3,867 natives, with 18 guns. * The following were the troops that accompanied Sir Frederick Roberts to Cabul : Divisional and Brigade Staff Officers, 60. F Battery, A Brigade, R.H.A. G Battery, 3rd Brigade, R.A. No. 2 Mountain Battery 9th Lancers 5th Bengal Cavalry . 12th Bengal Cavalry 14th Bengal Cavalry 67th Regiment 72nd Highlanders . 92nd Highlanders . 5th Punjaub Infantry 23rd Pioneers . 28th Punjaub Native Infantry 5 Goorkhas . . 7th Company Sappers Two Gatling Guns . Also about 6,000 camp followers and 3,500 transport animals. Officers. [.A 7 A 7 Men. 118 137 3 223 4 118 7 325 6 328 7 407 18 686 23 746 17 717 8 610 6 671 ntry 8 636 , 7 574 Miners 3 95 . 1 34 232 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. On the preceding day Sir Frederick went to Zerghan Shah, where he met Wall Mahomed Khan and several other Sirdars, chiefly Barukzyes, from Cabul, all of whom professed great friendship for the Indian Government. The rapidity with which the two Batteries of Horse and Foot Artillery had crossed the Shutargardan Pass, hitherto deemed impracticable for wheeled guns, filled these Sirdars and all Afghans with astonishment. Sir Frederick returned to Kooshi the same day, and, on the 1st October, issued the following notification to the Troops, impressing upon them the necessity for discipline and self- restraint : " Sir Frederick Roberts desires general officers, and officers commanding corps, to impress upon all officers under their command the necessity for constant vigilance in prevent- ing irregularities likely to arouse the personal jealousies of the people of Cabul, who are, of all races, most susceptible as regards their women. The deep-seated animosity of the Afghans towards the English has been mainly ascribed to in- discretions committed during the first occupation of Cabul, and the Major-General trusts that the same discipline so long exhibited by the troops under his command will remove the prejudices of past years, and cause the British name to be as highly respected in Afghanistan as it is throughout the civilized world." The references to the personal jealousies of the people of Cabul, and the "indiscretions committed during the first occu- pation of Cabul," referred to a delicate subject touched upon by Sir John Kayeinhis " History of the first Afghan War," which greatly incensed against their conquerors the Afghan nation, who, like all Mahornedan nations, Are sensitive as regards their women. In his general order, issued at Ali Kheyl on the 24th Sep- tember, Sir Frederick Roberts, with the humanity for which he was conspicuous, enjoined on his army, " the necessity for treating the inoffensive population with justice, forbearance, and clemency," and, on the 3rd October, he issued a proclamation to the people of Cabul, copies of which were sent in advance of the column, requiring those who had taken no part in the massacre of the Cavaguari Mission, and the well-disposed, and Proclamation to the People of Cabul. 233 especially the women and children, to arrange for their safety by either coming into his camp or by removing from the city. In conclusion, he gave warning that, after the receipt of this proclamation, " all persons found armed in or about Cabul will be treated as the enemies of the British Government."* 1 A little before noon on the 2nd October Sir Frederick Roberts, accompanied by the Ameer and his Sirdars, marched with two infantry brigades from Kooshi for Zerghan Shah, where Generals Baker and Massy were posted. On the fol- lowing day the march was resumed by headquarters and Massy's and Macpherson's Brigades for Zahidabad, a distance of fifteen miles. The road lay along the Logar Valley, past several villages, which formed a pleasant contrast to the inhos- pitable region about the Shutargardan, and over the Logar River. The movements of the Cabul Field Force were much hampered by the presence in the camp of so many Princes and Sirdars, with their retinue. There were now Yakoob Khan and his father-in-law, Yahya Khan, and his troop of nobles and large escort ; Wali Mahomed Khan, and the Barukzye Sirdars, all antagonistic towards each other, and only as one in their distrust and hatred of the foreign invader. * The following is the text of this proclamation issued at Zerghan Shah on the 3rd of October : " Be it known to all, that the British Army is advancing on Cabul to take possession of the city. If it be allowed to do so peaceably, well and good, if not, the city will be seized by force. Therefore all well-disposed persons who have taken no part in the dastardly murder of the British Embassy, or in the plunder of the Residency, are warned that if they are unable to prevent resistance being offered to the entrance of the British Army, and to the authority of his Highness the Ameer, they should make immediate arrangements for their own safety, either by coming into the British camp, or by such other measures as may seem fit to them. And as the British Government does not make war on women and children, warning is given that all women and children should be removed from the city beyond the reach of harm. The British Government desires to treat all classes with justice, and to respect their religious feelings and customs, while exacting full retribution from offenders. Every effort will therefore be made to pre- vent the innocent suffering with the guilty. But it is necessary that the utmost precaution should be taken against useless opposition. Therefore, after the receipt of the proclamation, all persons found armed in or about Cabul will be treated as the enemies of the British Government ; and further, it must be clearly understood, that if the entry of the British force is resisted, I cannot hold myself responsible for any accidental mischief which may be done to persons and property, even of well-disposed people who may have neglected this warning." 234 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. On the 2nd October, the day Sir Frederick Roberts quitted Zerghan Shah, the Mangals and Ghilzyes made a most deter- mined attack on the entrenched camp at the Shutargardan, where the General had left, as a permanent garrison, 4 guns No. 1 Mountain Battery, the 3rd Sikhs and 21st Punjaub Native Infantry, under Colonel G. N. Money, of the 3rd Sikhs, an officer in whose coolness and judgment he placed a reliance which was justified by subsequent events. The enemy, emboldened by the weakening of the force, and calculating on an easy victory, took up a position on the hills overlooking the crest of the pass at 7 A.M. on the 2nd October. As it was necessary to secure this crest in order to maintain heliographic communication with Sir Frederick Roberts in the Logar Valley, Colonel Money sent Major Griffiths with 100 men of the 3rd Sikhs, together with a party of signallers, to occupy it. But a strong body of the enemy anticipated the movement, and seized the crest, on which Colonel Money sent 100 men of the 3rd Sikhs to reinforce Major Griffiths, who was desired to halt for a short time at the request of Captain Turner, the Political Officer, who expected the arrival in Camp of Alla-ood-deen, brother of Padshah Khan, Chief of the Ghilzyes, who, it was hoped, would exercise a moderating influence and induce the tribesmen to withdraw. The enemy, some 1,500 men, mistaking this hesitation for pusillanimity, began firing on Major Griffiths' s party, on which Colonel Money ordered the advance. Captain Morgan opened fire with his Mountain Battery, and Major Griffiths attacked with 200 men of his regiment, and 50 of the 21st Punjaub Native Infantry, with 150 of the same regiment in reserve, and carried the position at the point of the bayonet, himself receiving a wound. The enemy fled in all directions, and for some time the Shutargardan force received no more molestation. Owing to the deficiency in the transport animals, which were required to work double tides, General Baker's Brigade halted one day at Zerghan Shah, when they pushed on for Zahidabad. On nearing the bridge over the Logar River, the rear-guard, under the command of Major C. M. Stockwell, 72nd High- landers (now Colonel Stockwell, C.B., A.D.C.), was attacked by the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages. Captain R. G. Fighting at the Shutargardan. 235 Kennedy, Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General, who was superintending the passage of the river, was wounded. At one time, says the General, the enemy approached so close that it became necessary for the covering companies of the 72nd Highlanders to drive them back at the point of the bayonet. Nothing could exceed the steadiness throughout the campaign of this fine regiment, which repeated in Egypt the lessons they learned in Afghanistan under the leadership of soldiers like Brownlow and Stockwell. As Campbell, the national poet, sings : "Triumphant be the thistle still unfurled, Dear symbol wild ! on Freedom's hill it grows, Where Fingal stemmed the tyrants of the world, And Roman eagles found unconquered foes." The villagers repeated these hostile acts on the 4th October, and on the following morning, before leaving Zahidabad, Sir Frederick Koberts despatched a force to punish them.* * Sir Frederick Roberts, after perusal of the MS. of this chapter of the Memoir, wrote to us : " I have just been reading with great interest chapter XII. of the Memoir. It was the part I was most anxious should be carefully written, and I must congratulate you on having done it extremely well." 236 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. CHAPTEE XIII. Advance on Cabul Battle of Charasia Sir Frederick Roberts arrives before the Capital His Visit to the Scene of the Massacre of the British Mission Occupation of the Bala Hissar Proclamation of the 12th of October The Punishment Meted out to Cabul. ON the 5th October Sir Frederick Koberts, accompanied by General Baker's Brigade, strengthened by the 92nd Highlanders, marched to Charasia, eleven miles distant from Cabul, and with Baker's and Massy's Brigades he had the honour of adding to the achievements of the British Army, not the least brilliant of the many History records. As the insufficiency of carriage did not permit of both brigades moving together, Brigadier- General Macpherson was left to protect the reserve ammunition and commissariat stores at Zahidabad, with a wing of the 67th Regiment, 28th Punjaub Native Infantry, two guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery, and a squadron of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry. General Roberta's camp was pitched about a mile from the orchards, south of the village of Charasia, which lies at the foot of the ranges of steep and high hills, extending east and west, the Chardeh Valley lying on the left front over a more gradual slope, and in front a mass of mountains, excluding all view of Cabul. Charasia is a highly cultivated valley, having a breadth of about two miles. The ranges of hills overlooking the village of the same name rise one behind the other, that in the imme- diate rear being very precipitous, with four or five peaks stand- ing out in bold relief. Between this range and another lies the Sang-i-Nawishta Pass, through which the Logar River passes into the Cabul valley. The road beside the river, being com- manded by the high hills on either side, would be difficult to force if properly defended, and the Afghan Commander, Sirdar Nek Mahomed Elian (son of the great Ameer, Dost Mahomed, and Sir Frederick Roberts s Plans. 237 uncle of Yakoob Khan), posted twelve guns on the heights, and three or four others on the plains below. But he counted without his host, for the British General intended to make a feint attack by the Sang-i-Nawishta Pass, and his main attack by the road skirting the hills into the Chardeh valley. Immediately on arriving at Charasia Sir Frederick Koberts sent reconnoitring parties of cavalry along the three roads lead- ing towards Cabul, but though a few shots were fired at them, there were no traces visible of any large body of the enemy. When night set in the General threw strong pickets all round the camp, and gave directions to the commander of his cavalry brigade to despatch patrols at daybreak to feel for the enemy, of whose intention to attack him, or bar his advance on the capi- tal, he was convinced, though he could obtain no information from the Ameer or his Ministers and Sirdars. But this want of intelligence, and apparent absence of the enemy, did not influence him in his determination to seize as soon as possible after dawn the crest of the Sang-i-Nawishta Pass, by which road to Cabul he had decided to advance, and which was between five and six miles in advance of his camp at Charasia. During the course of the same day the 1,500 baggage animals were sent back to Zahidabad to bring up the stores under escort of Macpherson's Brigade. There was much difficulty in pro- curing supplies from the neighbouring villages, and Yakoob Khan, who anticipated that the British would meet with a repulse, made no effort to assist them. Having formed his plans with the rapidity he had displayed on the eve of the memorable capture of Peiwar Kotul, Sir Fred- erick resolved to attack before the enemy, who were already in great force, had further strengthened their position. He came to this resolution, though he had with him little more than half his infantry ; but with the intuition of genius, he divined that no considerations could outweigh those demanding im- mediate action, although the enemy outnumbered him probably three to one, and held positions along the ridge, which sloped on one side to the Sang-i-Nawishta Pass, and on the other to the road by the Chardeh Valley to Cabul, which would be re- garded as impregnable to attack by any but a large force of the best troops. Such were those under Roberts's command, 238 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. seasoned and highly-disciplined soldiers, for the most part veterans who had learnt to despise the enemy when led by a General in whom they had confidence, and whose eagerness was increased by a strong desire to measure themselves with the re- creants who had committed the cowardly massacre of the British Envoy and his escort. Soon after daybreak on the 6th October, as Benvolio says : " An hour before the worshipp'd sun Peer'd forth the golden window of the East," Sir Frederick Koberts sent some infantry to work on a difficult place on the road through the Sang-i-Nawishta defile, and was about to follow himself to examine personally the pass and the ground beyond, when, before these arrangements could be carried out, the cavalry patrols were fired upon and compelled to return, and all doubts as to the intentions of the enemy were dispelled. He writes : " Troops could be seen in large numbers and regular formation, crowning the crest line of the hills which extended from the narrow defile of the Sang-i-Nawishta (both sides of which were held) in their extreme left, to the heights above the Chardeh valley which formed their right. No hurry nor confusion marked their movements ; positions were taken up and guns placed with so much deliberation and coolness that it was evident a large number of regular troops were massed against us." Soon afterwards Sir Frederick Roberts received a report that the cavalry patrols had been fired upon, and were retiring slowly. Meantime General Macpherson's Brigade was making its way from Zahidabad, and a report was received that the road was blocked, and the column, with its endless string of baggage animals, would be attacked. Sir Frederick sent a squadron of cavalry to Macpherson's assistance, and directed him to push on with all despatch to join him. The condition of affairs at this time was most critical. The enemy occupied in front a position, described to us by a General officer who was present, as " impregnable to a direct attack, but from which it was imperatively necessary that they should be dislodged before dark." Their occupation of the heights intervening between the British advance and Cabul could not be tolerated, while it was evident that they were mustering in strong Critical Position of the British. 239 force on the hills on both sides of the camp, with the object of waiting for nightfall or a favourable opportunity to attack. General Eoberts had only two-thirds of his small force at his disposal, and yet he decided on an immediate advance on the enemy's position, for every hour he knew would add to its strength, as behind those hills, and the forces arrayed thereon against him, lay the city of Cabul, with its extensive suburbs of Chardeh and Deh-i-Afghan, and the villages of the Cabul Plain, filled with a teeming population, every male adult of whom was inured to bear arms from his youth, and which, as the events of the following December showed, could turn out over 100,000 fighting men. A reverse, of course, under the circumstances, would mean annihilation, and success could only be achieved by a vigorous offensive movement, such as General Eoberts was the officer to conceive and his brave troops the men to execute. The preparations for capturing the heights above Charasia completed, the General put once more into execution the flanking tactics he had adopted with such success on the 2nd December. " Their position," says the General, " was so strong and could only have been carried with such loss, that I deter- mined the real attack should be made by an outflanking move- ment upon the right of the enemy, while their left continued to be occupied by a feint from our right." Dividing his force* into two parts, he entrusted to Brigadier-General Baker the difficult task of dislodging the enemy from the heights above the Chardeh valley, which formed their extreme right, and placed at his disposal a force of about 2,000 men, while a second column, under Major White, of the 92nd Highlanders, was directed to proceed towards the Sang-i-Nawishta defile, * General Baker's Column consisted of the 72nd Highlanders, under Colonel Clarke ; 4 guns No. 2 Mountain Battery, Captain Swinley, R.A. ; and 2 Gatling Guns, Captain Broadfoot, R.A. ; 7th Company of Sappers and Miners, Lieutenant Nugent, R.E. ; 6 Companies 5th Goorkhas, Major Fitzhugh ; 200 bayonets 5th Punjaub Infantry, Captain Hall ; and 450 of the 23rd Pioneers, Lieutenant-Colonel Currie. Major White took with him 3 guns G Battery, 3rd Brigade, Royal Artillery, Major Parry ; wing of 92nd Highlanders, Major Hay ; 2 squadrons of Cavalry made up of the 9th Lancers, 5th Punjaub Cavalry and 12th Bengal Cavalry, under Major Hammond ; 5th Punjaub Cavalry ; and 100 men of the 23rd Pioneers, Captain Paterson. 240 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. where the enemy had concentrated all their guns, in the belief that the main British attack would be on that point. Owing to his numerical weakness Sir Frederick Roberts could not retain in camp any considerable number of troops from the two attacking columns, and as General Macpherson's Brigade was advancing from the rear, he decided to incur the danger that would have arisen from a determined attack on his camp, which was one of those inseparable from the conduct of war- like operations. He was in constant communication with the operating columns by means of the heliograph, directed by Captain Straton, and indeed without this novel but valuable adjunct to the equipment of an army in the field, he could not have conducted the operations to a successful conclusion with such precision. General Baker assembled his little force in the wooded enclo- sures of Charasia, a collection of detached villages, such as are common in the country, in the most convenient of which he placed his reserve ammunition and Field Hospital, and helio- graphed to General Roberts to increase the strength of the guard he was able to leave in charge. The General, accord- ingly, sent at once 100 rifles of the 5th Punjaub Infantry, fol- lowed by the remainder of the regiment as soon as he could procure sufficient transport for their ammunition. The troops defending the camp were now reduced to between 600 and 700 infantry and 450 cavalry.* Having secured his base, General Baker advanced over " some bare undulating hills, forming a position easily defen- sible, and flanked by steep, rocky crags, varying in height from 1,000 to 1,800 feet above the sloping plain which our troops had to cross." The main position of the enemy, which com- manded their entire front, and was only accessible in a few places, was about 400 feet higher. Seeing the great natural strength of the position, General Baker directed Major White, who was placed under his orders, " to continue threatening the Sang-i-Nawishta Defile, to prevent the enemy occupying the village of Charasia, and to advance within artillery fire of the * See Sir Frederick Roberta's despatch, dated " Bala Hissar, Cabul, 20th October, 1879," to which we are mainly indebted for the account of the action of Charasia. Battle of Charasia. 241 enemy's main position," and finally, as soon as the outflanking movement was fully developed, and the enemy were in full retreat, to pursue through the pass with his cavalry, all which instructions Major White carried out with the soldierly ability anticipated by General Eoberts when he selected him to com- mand the supporting column. The first portion of Brigadier- General Baker's force to become engaged was Captain Brooke- Hunt's Company of the 92nd Highlanders, which was ex- tended to crown the heights on the left, the remainder of the regiment, protected by the fire of two mountain guns, making the attack in front. Soon the Highlanders found their advance checked by the extremely difficult nature of the ground on their left flank, where the enemy, ensconced behind " sungas," or stone breastworks, opened a hot fire. General Baker brought forward two companies of the 5th Goorkhas, under Captain Cook, V.C., to strengthen Captain Brooke-Hunt, and two more companies of that regiment, under Major Fitzhugh, and 200 rifles of the 5th Punjaub Infantry, under Captain Hall, were sent to reinforce the direct attack. The Afghan commander now seeing that the real attack was directed against his right, brought his men from the direction of the Sang-i-Nawishta Defile, and his British antagonist strained every nerve to carry the position before it could be reinforced. After some spirited fighting, in which Lieutenant Martin, of the Goorkhas, specially distinguished himself, about two o'clock the British troops succeeded in seizing the ridge on the left of the position, thus exposing the enemy to a heavy cross-fire, which in- flicted great loss. The general advance was now sounded, and soon the British troops were in possession of the first position. The Afghans now took up a position about 600 yards in the rear, but from this they were driven, after some sharp fighting, our troops advancing in rushes, supported by the fire of the mountain guns. In this affair, says the General, the attack made by a company of the 23rd Pioneers, led by Lieutenant Chesney, supported by the 72nd Highlanders, 5th Goorkhas, and two companies of the 92nd Highlanders, " proved irre- sistible." By 3.45 the entire ridge was gained, thus exposing the enemy's line of defence to being taken in reverse, which caused B 242 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. them to retire precipitately from their position on the Sang-i- Nawishta, in which quarter the operations were conducted by Major White with a judgment and skill that fully justified the trust reposed in him by Sir Frederick Roberts. When the enemy, perceiving that the real attack was on the right of their position, weakened their left resting on the defile, Major White attacked with spirit, himself leading his men with characteristic gallantry. The Afghans gave way, leaving some guns in his hands, on which he pursued them through the pass and effected a junction with General Baker in the rear of the enemy's position. Their loss was estimated by Sir Frederick Roberts at upwards of 300 men killed, besides a large number wounded. All their guns, 20 in number, brought out from Cabul to assist in the defence of the position, were captured. Sir Frederick Roberts calculated that thirteen regiments of regular infantry were opposed to him, and they were aided by contingents from the city and neighbouring villages. In addition there was a large muster of tribesmen, chiefly Ghilzyes, on the hills which lay to the east and west of the camp, who caused some annoy- ance, but were dislodged by a detachment of the 92nd High- landers, and prevented from venturing into the plain by patrols of cavalry. General Macpherson's advance from Zahidabad, with a large convoy of stores and reserve ammunition, was also opposed, but he easily drove off his assailants, and after his arrival at the camp, all anxiety on the score of its safety ceased. The British loss in the action of Charasia was 16 soldiers and 4 camp followers killed, and 3 officers, 59 men and 5 camp followers wounded ; of these 38 belonged to the 72nd High- landers, of whom several died. Sir Frederick Roberts struck his tents at sunset, as with characteristic promptitude he resolved to follow up the enemy and march through the Sang-i-Nawishta Defile towards Cabul, before they had time to recover themselves and organize further resistance. Events soon proved that had he delayed in attack- ing the enemy on the 6th October, even to the extent of waiting for the arrival of General Macpherson's Brigade, the resistance to be overcome would have been vastly increased, as the regular regiments of the Afghan Army acted as a nucleus, around which the natives rallied, and every hour brought accessions The Strength of the Enemy. 243 to the ranks of the opposing force. On this point the Viceroy, writing to the Secretary of State on the 16th October, from Simla, says "It is now known that the plans for arresting the advance of our troops upon Cabul had been carefully laid, and that the Ghilzyes had been instructed to act against the flanks and rear of our column, while the regular troops and the Cabul people undertook to bar its passage across the hills in front." It was the receipt of information to this effect that decided the General to attack at once the force on the heights, since delay would have given the enemy time to bring up reinforce- ments from the city, and to strengthen a position rendered sufficiently formidable by nature. Early in the morning of the 7th October Sir Frederick moved out of his camp to Beni Hissar (or Ben-i-Shahr, as it is indifferently called) on the Cabul Eoad, with the cavalry brigade, two guns of F-A, Horse Artillery, two guns of G-3, Royal Artillery, a wing of the 92nd Highlanders, 7th company Sappers and Miners, the 23rd Pioneers, and the Gatling guns, his intention being to gather his whole force at Beni Hissar prior to the final advance on Cabul.* Marching by way of * The following geographical description of the country about Cabul, which was the scene of stirring events during the next three months, is by the correspondent of the Times (writing from Cabul on the 19th of June :) " As Sir Frederick Roberts's force debouched from the Sang-i-Nawishta Pass into the Cabul Valley, it had on its left a range of hills running almost due north and south, which commencing near Char-Asia, is first broken at the Deh-i-Mazung defile, as it has been convenient to call it. The highest point of this range is the Takht-i-Shah, or King's Throne, a little to the south of Cabul. North of the Takht-i-Shah the range makes a dip, and rises again to what is locally known as the Shahr-Dawaza (City Gate) hill, under which to the east nestles the city of Cabul. The Takht-i-Shah is about 7,600 feet, and the Shah-Dawaza, 7,166 feet above the sea level. A long spur, with a tolerably easy slope, is thrown off from the Takht i-Shah due east to the villages of Beni-Hissar, and another from the Shahr-Dawaza, on the lowest extremity of which latter is placed the Upper and Lower Bala Hissar. This last spur encloses the city of Cabul to the south. In very ancient times the safety of the city from attack from the west was provided for by a masonry wall, which starting from where the Bala Hissar wall ends, is continued. first up the spur and thence along the whole crest of the Shahr-Dawaza, and down the precipitous northern face of it, into the bed of the Cabul river. Tbe range of hills described above is continued on the northern side of the Cabul river, and here changes its course to north-west. The hill immediately above the Cabul river, and facing the northern slopes of the Shah-Dawaza, is known as Asmai, or Koh-Asmai. B 2 244 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. the Sang-i-Nawishta Defile, where some parties of hillmen opened fire upon his troops, but were easily dispersed, he arrived at Beni Hissar, where Brigadier-General Baker joined him with the main portion of his force during the same afternoon. It must have been with no little eagerness that Sir Frederick Roberts first cast his glance on the towers and ramparts of the Bala Hissar, that famous citadel whose name arouses such painful recollections in the minds of those conversant with the Indian history of 40 years ago. To Roberts the sight must have called up memories of his father, whose services during the Afghan war were so distinguished, and whose warnings were disregarded by a Government who con- tinued to call "Peace, Peace, when there was no Peace." By a strange fatality the son was destined by services that are historical to associate his own name with a fortress which in its blood-stained records has played a part similar to our Tower of London, that palace, prison and fortress in one. Once again, after the lapse of 40 years, the Bala Hissar was to receive a hostile British Army. History has indeed repeated itself in a remarkable way, and the writer of this memoir, who, in a work on the first The Koh-Asmai is 6,790 feet above the sea at its highest point, just above the Deh-i-Mazung defile. The wall mentioned as starting from the Bala- Hissar is continued up the Koh-Asmai also, and meets at the culminating point a second wall, also carried up the face of the hill from the village or rather suburb of Cabul called Deh-Afghana. The Koh-Asmai has a length of about a mile, when it sinks into a Kotul or saddle ; over it passes one road to Urghundeh and Ghazni, and on the right of the road the hill rises again to a conical point. The whole surface of Koh-Asmai is of the most rugged character, offering numerous peaks and monster rocks most favourable for defence. In conclusion, this range of hills continues a north- westerly course, broken by occasional gaps, until it joins the Pughman range about twenty-two miles from Chara^ia. It forms the northern limit of the beautiful Chardeh Valley, from whence it alters its direction to north-west, just as during its noithern course it had formed the eastern boundary of that valley. It is further the watershed which divides the drainage of the Cabul river from that of the Juibar stream, which runs through the Kohistan country. The Cabul valley itself is a plain only broken by the low flat-topped Siah-Sung hills. The Cabul river approaches the city through the Deh-i Mazung defile, and is over-hung by the Shahr- Dawaza on one side and Koh-Asmai on the other. After passing through the city it takes a north-westerly course, and crossing the road which con- nects the Bala Hissar with Sherpur, it flows about midway between Sherpur and the northern part of the Siah Sung Hills." The Afghan Wars of 1839 and 1878. 245 Afghan war,* (drawn from the papers of the late General Augustus Abbott, who served throughout those protracted operations, and commanded the artillery of Sir Robert Sale's force,) published in 1878, deprecated the outbreak of hostilities, and drew a parallel of the circumstances under which war was declared by the Governments of Lords Auckland and Lytton could scarcely have supposed that the coincidences would be still further borne out by the murder of a British envoy, followed by the arrival before Cabul of a British Army of retribution, which, moreover, was commanded, as in 1842, by an officer of the old Bengal Artillery. It was ascertained that the Bala Hissar had been evacuated, and the Ameer assured the General that he would meet with no further opposition. Little reliance, however, could be placed on the statements of a man who confidentially informed the British General that he would meet with no resistance at Charasia, whereas it was afterwards discovered that he was kept informed of the true state of affairs by Afghan emis- saries, who visited him in the British Camp during the advance from Kushi, and it was even confidently stated that Nek Mohamed, the Afghan commander at Charasia, was among his visitors, and tried to induce him to place himself at the head of the Army. On the morning of the 8th October Sir Frederick Roberts, having received information that those of the enemy who had not dispersed to their homes would probably retreat towards Kohistan, directed General Massy to proceed with the cavalry brigade, consisting of 8 squadrons, or 720 sabres, and take up a position across their line of retreat. From General Massy's report it appears that a hostile force, consisting of remnants of the regiments which had fought at Charasia, to- gether with three fresh regiments, which had arrived on the preceding day from Kohistan, supported by the " budmashes," or bad characters, of the city and neighbouring villages, had taken up a strong position, which was further strengthened by * The writer will be pardoned for mentioning that this work found its way into the British Camp before Cabul in 1879-80, and Sir Frederick Roberts informed him that the special correspondent of the Times placed it in his hands for perusal. 246 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. twelve guns, on a high hill beyond the Bala Hissar, called the Asmai heights, immediately overlooking the city on the north- west side. The enemy were under the leadership of Mahomed Jan, a soldier whose name appears prominently in the suc- ceeding operations ; among other chiefs present being Khusdil Khan, who had been deputed by Yakoob Khan to receive and escort to Cabul the Cavagnari mission. In order to dislodge the enemy and compel them to fall back on the cavalry, Roberts directed Brigadier- General Baker to advance with a column,* consisting of 1,044 infantry, two guns, and one Gatling. Owing, however, to the difficult nature of the ground, much delay ensued, and the day. was far advanced before Baker found himself near enough to open fire with his guns on the enemy, who were posted in the angle formed by the two walls running up the Koh Asmai from the Bala Hissar and suburb of Deh Afghan, and on the slopes of the hill to the westward. Reinforcements, consisting of a wing of the 67th Regiment, two companies of the 5th Goorkhas, and the remain- ing two guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery, were despatched to his aid from camp, but did not reach him until past five o'clock, when there was not sufficient daylight to render an attack advisable. About this time Sir Frederick Roberts received intelligence that three regiments of regular infantry and twelve guns had started from Ghuznee a few days before in order to join Mohamed Jan's troops on the Asmai heights, and helio- graphed to General Baker his intention to strengthen him dur- ing the night with four guns of F-A, Royal Horse Artillery, on elephants, the remaining wing of the 67th Regiment, and the 28th Punjaub Native Infantry, under General Macpherson, who, as senior officer, would assume chief command. General Baker was also informed that Brigadier-General Gough had been sent with two Horse Artillery guns, and two squadrons of cavalry to watch the Kohistan road. Meanwhile General Massy, who had left the camp an hour before noon, had crossed the low Siah-Sung range of hills, and * The following was the constitution of General Baker's command : 2 guns, No. 2 Mountain Battery, under Lieutenant E. A. Smith, R.A. ; 1 Gatliiig, Captain A. Broadfoot, R.A. ; 2 Companies 72nd Highlanders, Captain C. Guinness ; Headquarters wing, 92nd Highlanders, Lieutenant- Colonel Parker ; 23rd Pioneers, Lieutenant-Colonel Currie. Capture of Sherpur. 247 proceeding northwards, entered and took possession of the fortified camp at Sherpur, which had been abandoned by the enemy, who had left therein seventy-three guns of various calibre, and three howitzers. Thence General Massy marched to the west, and then, making a great detour to the north, in order to get in rear of the enemy's position on the Asmai heights, eventually, about sunset, he debouched into the Chardeh plain, thus blocking the line of the enemy's retreat, and took up a position of observation to the westward of the village of Deh Mazung, though when night fell, he drew in his brigade and bivouacked under cover of the walled enclosures near the road running past Aliabad.* Unfortunately Sir Frederick Roberts's carefully laid plans were foiled by the roughness of the road, which prevented the reinforcements sent to General Baker from reaching the ground in time to deliver an attack before nightfall, a miscalculation which had a disastrous result in prolonging the struggle and rendering possible the combination of the following December, which required such vigorous measures before it could be dis- persed. During the night General Baker, fearing that the enemy might abandon their position under cover of the dark- ness, sent a strong patrol, at 1.30 A.M., to ascertain if any change had taken place, and three hours later it was reported to him that the camp, containing twelve guns, some ele- phants, and a large supply of camp equipage, was deserted. General Baker immediately communicated this intelligence to General Massy, and informed him that in accordance with instructions received from Sir Frederick Roberts, any move- ment of the cavalry in pursuit would be supported both by the troops under his command and those under General Macpher- son, who joined General Baker about dawn. Accordingly, General Massy went in pursuit with his cavalry, sending, under instructions from Sir Frederick Roberts, two squadrons across country, up to and beyond the Kohistan road, but such an extraordinary faculty have Afghan levies in dispersing and mixing with the peaceful portion of the community that, though the entire country was scoured throughout the day, of the * See despatch of Sir Frederick Roberts. 248 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. thousands assembled on the Asmai heights only a small party of fugitives was overtaken on the Ghuznee road by the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, who sabred twenty or thirty of them. General Massy detached two squadrons of the 12th Bengal Cavalry to continue the pursuit, and returned to camp late in the evening with the remainder of his brigade, who had suffered much from fatigue and scanty food. The troops under Generals Macpherson and Baker, and the small force of cavalry and guns, under Brigadier-General Gough, also arrived in camp before night- fall.* On the 9th General Roberts moved the camp of the whole of the division from Beni Hissar to the Siah-Sung hills, a low flat-topped ridge, the scene of severe fighting during the first Afghan war, which completely dominates the city of Cabul. The only troops not in camp were the 5th Goorkhas and four guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery, which were stationed on the upper Bala Hissar hill. It soon became apparent, as might have been anticipated, that the villagers of the Cabul Valley, and almost the entire people, were hostile to the invaders, and shooting at the sentinels became a nightly practice, while efforts were made to raise the tribesmen for an organized attack on the camp. On the following day, the 10th October, Sir Frederick Roberts visited the Sherpur cantonment, f and despatched the 5th Pun- jaub Cavalry thither for the protection of the guns and stores. * See despatch of Sir Frederick Roberts. t Sherpur is thus described by the Times correspondent : " Shere Ali's great straggling cantonment of Sherpur takes the shape of a huge parallel- ogram, the long sides of which lie north and south. The length of the long slies is about 2,700 yards, and of the short sides 1,100. When our troops entered it in October the west and south faces only were completed, and even these were much out of repair. The north side was and is still formed by the Behmaru heights, a round-topped ridge of hill, broken in the centre by a broad gorge, and rising, perhaps, 800 feet above the plain. The fourth side, that on the east, was only traced. Shere Ali's original design is believed to have been to carry the walls all round the Behrnaru heights, and thus to form a great square, with the heights in the centre, upon which he had already laid the foundation of a citadel. He had also laid the foundation of a palace for himself at the southern foot of the heights. What was the ultimate object of this ambitious design can only be conjectured. It was possibly part of the same idea which led him to devote such pains to the manufacture of guns, of which, when the war broke out, he possessed no less a number than 379, of which 34 were of siege calibre, 145 field, and 150 mountain. It has also been found, from Roberts Visits the Bala Hissar. 249 It was the general belief that Shere All contemplated the removal of Cabul to Sherpur, and the demolition of the Bala Hissar, which is commanded from the adjacent heights ; but his false move in throwing himself into the arms of Russia put an end to his plans, and resulted in his dying a miserable fugitive at Mazar-i- Sheriff. On the llth October Sir Frederick Roberts, with his staff and a small escort, accompanied by the Ameer's ministers and Daoud Shah, paid an informal visit to the Bala Hissar, where crumbling walls and neglected buildings attested the decay which awaits everything in this distracted land. The General, after closely examining the fortress, visited the ruined buildings of the late Residency, where Cavagnari and his gallant band made their desperate stand for life. Very great, albeit painful, was the interest with which the British General, ascending to a point in the shattered walls affording a commanding view, surveyed the scene of desolation in the immediate foreground, with the beautiful Cabul Valley spread out at his feet. The quarters occupied by the Guides, adjoining the Resi- dency, were also visited, and the gate where Lieutenant Hamil- ton made his memorable defence, when, sword and revolver in hand, he three times charged out into the thick of the enemy, like the swift-footed son of Peleus : " High o'er the scene of death Achilles stood, All grim with dust, all horrible in blood ; Yet still insatiate, still with rage in flame, Such is the lust of never-dying fame." Leaving this scene of sadness and pride to every English- man, Sir Frederick Roberts visited the Ameer's Palace, and returned to camp after an inspection not likely ever to be for- gotten. At noon on the day succeeding this visit, the Bala Hissar was formally occupied by a portion of the British troops. The whole division having lined both sides of the road from the camp to the citadel, a distance of over a mile, Sir Frederick examination of the magazine records, that he possessed no less than 50,000 small arms of all sorts, of which all but about 12,000 were either English, or cleverly imitated, like many of his guns, from English models by Native artificers." 250 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. Roberts, accompanied by General Hills and his four Brigadier- Generals, Macpherson, Massy, Baker, and Gough, and a large number of the most influential Sirdars of Cabul, rode slowly along the splendid display of the flower of our British and Indian troops to the Bala Hissar, the infantry presenting arms, the cavalry trumpets braying forth a salute, and the bands playing. As the head of the brilliant procession entered the fortress, the British flag was hoisted over the gateway, under a royal salute of thirty-one guns fired on the glacis. From the gateway one company of the 67th Regiment, followed by the band, led the way to the Diwan-i-Aum, or Grand Reception Room, Sir Frederick and his Generals, with their respective Staffs, following, and the procession being closed by the remain- der of the 67th Regiment. The scene in the Diwan-i-Aum was singular and suggestive. Around the British Commander crowded the Afghan Sirdars, ready to make any promises to their conqueror, and equally ready, as the event proved, to break them. At his side stood Moosa Khan, a child six years of age, heir-apparent of the Ameer, who excused himself from attending on the score of indispo- sition. This was the ostensible cause of his absence, but the real reason, which was kept secret for manifest considerations of state, is set forth in the following account given by Sir Frederick Roberts : " Early on the morning of this day the Ameer walked to my camp, accompanied by only two attendants, and expressed his determination to resign the Ameership. He said he had intended doing so before going to Kushi, but had allowed himself to be over-persuaded. He was in very low spirits ; said his life had been a miserable one ; that he would rather be a grass cutter in the English camp than Ruler of Afghanistan, and begged he might live in this camp until he could be sent to India, or London, or wherever the Viceroy might desire to send him. I placed a tent at his disposal ; ordered breakfast to be prepared for him, and begged him to think over the matter for two or three hours, and said I would see him at ten o'clock, the time appointed the previous evening for His Highness to come to my camp, and accompany me to the Bala Hissar. The Ameer knew nothing of the proposed proclamation, and was quite ignorant of my intentions towards The Durbar in the Bala Hissar. 251 the Mustaufi, the AVuzeer, Yaliya Khan and his brother. At ten I had a second interview with the Ameer, who stated that he had quite decided to give up the throne of Cabul ; that he could not possibly accompany me to the Bala Hissar, but that he would send his eldest son, and all his Ministers would be in attendance. I again pointed out the serious step His High- ness was taking ; but finding his mind was made up, I said I would telegraph to the Viceroy for instructions ; that of course he could not be forced to remain on as Ameer against his will ; but that I should ask him to retain the title until I could re- ceive a reply to the telegram." Sir Frederick Roberts addressed the assembled Sirdars, and then read to them a proclamation* indicating the intentions of * The following is the text of the proclamation : ''Bala Hissar, Cabul, 12th October, 1879. In my proclamation of the 3rd October, dated Zerghun Shah, I informed the people of Cabul that a British Army was advancing to take possession of the city, and I warned them against offering any resistance to the entry of the troops, and the authority of His Highness the Ameer. That warning has been disregarded. The force under my command has now reached Cabul, and occupied the Bala Hissar ; but its advance has been pertinaciously opposed, and the inhabitants of the city have taken a conspicuous part in the opposition offered. They have there- fore become rebels against His Highness the Ameer, and have added to the guilt already incurred by them, in abetting the murder of the British Envoy and of his companions, a treacherous and cowardly crime, which has brought indelible disgrace on the Afghan people. It would be but a just and fitting reward for such misdeeds if the city of Cabul was totally destroyed and its very name blotted out. But the great British Govern- ment is ever desirous to temper justice with mercy, and I now announce to the inhabitants of Cabul that the city will be spared. Nevertheless it is necessary that they should not escape all penalty, and that the punishment inflicted should be such as will be felt and remembered. Therefore such of the buildings as now interfere with the proper military occupation of the Bala Hissar, and the safety and comfort of the British troops quartered in it, will be at once levelled with the ground ; and further, a heavy fine, the amount of which will be notified hereafter, will be imposed upon the inhabitants, to be paid according to their several capabilities. This punish- ment, inflicted upon the whole city, will not, of course, absolve from further penalties those whose individual guilt may be hereafter proved. A full and searching inquiry will be held into all the circumstances of the late outbreak, and all persons convicted of bearing a part in it will be dealt with according to their desert. I further give notice to all, that, in order to provide for the restoration and maintenance of order, the city of Cabul and the surrounding country, to a distance of ten miles, are placed under martial law. With the consent of the Ameer, a Military Governor of Cabul will be appointed to administer justice, and to punish with a strong hand ail evil doers. The inhabitants of Cabul and of the neighbour- ing villages are hereby warned to submit to his authority. For the future the carrying of dangerous weapons, whether swords, knives, or firearms, 252 Memoir of Sir .Frederick Roberts. the British Government, and the punishment he intended to mete out to the people of Cabul for offering resistance to his advance and the authority of the Ameer, contrary to the warning con- veyed in his proclamation of the 3rd Octoher. He said that he would spare the city, though were he to raze it to the ground, for the treacherous murder of the British Mission, and the rebellion against their sovereign the Ameer, he would only be meting out a just retribution. But he could not permit that the Gabulees should escape all punishment, and he intended to destroy certain buildings that interfered with the military occupation of the Bala Hissar, and to inflict a fine on the whole city, while a full and searching inquiry into the circumstances of the massacre would be held, and all persons convicted of par- ticipating in it, would be dealt with according to their deserts. He also declared that the city of Cabul and the surrounding country, for a radius of ten miles, was placed under martial law, and a military governor would be appointed to administer justice and inflict punishment on all evil doers. The carrying of arms was prohibited in Cabul, or within a distance of five miles, and after a week from the date of the proclamation, any person found armed within these limits would be liable to the punishment of death. All arms delivered up would be paid for at a stipulated rate, and finally, rewards, graduated from within the streets of Cabul, or within a distance of five miles from the city gates, is forbidden. After a week from the date of this proclamation any person found armed within these limits will be liable to the penalty of death. Persons having in their possession any article whatever which formerly belonged to members of the British Embassy, are required to bring them forthwith to the British Camp. Anyone neglecting this warning will, if found hereafter in possession of any such articles, be subjected to the severest penalties. Further, all persons who may have in their possession any firearms or ammunition formerly issued to, or seized by the Afghan troops, are required to produce them. For every country-made rifle, whether breech or muzzle-loading, a sum of three rupees will be given on delivery ; and for every rifle of European manufacture, five rupees. Any one found hereafter in possession of such weapons will be severely pun- ished. Finally, I notify that I will give a reward of fifty rupees for the surrender of any person, whether soldier or civilian, concerned in the attack on the British Embassy, or for such information as may lead directly to his capture. A similar sum will be given in case of any person who may have fought against the British troops, since the 3rd September last, and has therefore become a rebel against the Ameer. If any such person so surrendered or captured be a captain or a subaltern officer of the Afghan Army, the reward will be increased to seventy-five rupees ; and if a field officer, to 120 rupees." Roberts and the Cabulees. 253 120 rupees for a field officer, 75 rupees for officers of inferior rank, and 50 rupees for a soldier or civilian, were offered for the surrender of any persons concerned in the attack on the British Residency, or for such information as might lead to their cap- ture ; and similar rewards were offered for the apprehension of any person who had fought against the British Army since the 3rd September, the date of the massacre, as they had placed themselves by this act within the category of rebels against the authority of their sovereign the Ameer, who had issued a proclamation from the British Gamp at Kushi, requiring his subjects to abstain from resorting to arms. Very severe strictures were passed in the House of Com- mons and by a portion of the English Press on those provi- sions of this proclamation punishing with death persons found armed within five miles of Cabul, and those who had been en- gaged in the recent fighting; but the fact was, that they re- mained a dead letter, never having been acted upon. Sir Fred- erick Roberts, writing to us of these provisions, says: " The order must of course be read in connection with my other orders, and with a clear understanding of the position I was placed in, with Yakoob Khan in my camp, ostensibly as my friend, as being rebelled against by his own soldiers." The order referred to by Sir Frederick Roberts is the proclamation to the people of Cabul, issued at Kushi on the 3rd October, warning them against resisting his advance, and the general orders to his troops of the 24th September and 1st October appealing to the officers and men to exercise mercy and for- bearance orders which the gallant General copied out for us with his own hand, so desirous is he that his countrymen should do justice to the feelings of humanity with which he was actuated in his dealings with the Afghan nation. Those who have a personal knowledge of Sir Frederick Roberts needed no such disclaimer as the above, for a more humane officer does not exist, and no detractor, if any there now be, can point to an incident in his career when he displayed harshness towards the weak or vanquished. No officer in India had acquired a better title to be regarded as humane in a calling which tends to sear the heart, and Roberts fulfilled the requirements of Wordsworth's ideal Christian Warrior : 254 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. " Who, doom'd to go in company with pain, And fear, and bloodshed, miserable train ! Turns his necessity to glorious gain ; In face of those doth exercise a power Which is our human nature's highest dower ; Controls them, and subdues, transmutes, bereaves Of their bad influence, and their good receives ; By objects, which might force the soul to abate Her feeling, rendered more compassionate." The comments of Admiral Oliver Jones, in an incident at the storm of Meeangunj in the Oude Campaign (given in a preceding chapter) testify that from an early period in his military career the subject of this memoir had earned a charac- ter for humanity in times and under circumstances when this virtue was not a distinguishing trait of the British soldier. When dismissing the Sirdars from his presence after the durbar, Sir Frederick Roberts directed the arrest of the Mus- taufi, Habibullah Khan, the Wuzeer, Shah Mahomed, and Yahya Khan, whom he informed of his intention to retain them until the circumstances connected with the attack on the Residency had been inquired into. The 67th Regiment was ordered to encamp in the gardens which lie immediately in front of the Diwan-i-Aum, and six companies of the 5th Goorkhas were moved into the upper Bala Hissar fort. On the day following the reading of the proclamation of the 3rd October, the inhabitants of Cabul had to submit to the humiliation of seeing a foreign army march through the streets of the capital. " Horse, Foot, and Dragoons," the whole gallant array, the Cavalry Brigade leading, followed by the General with his Staff and escort, five regiments of Infantry bringing up the rear, traversed its principal streets and bazaars, including the famous Char Chonk, one of the finest in Central Asia, which was partially blown up by Sir George Pollock in 1842 as a punishment for the treachery of the Cabulees. In accordance with the terms of the proclamation, Major-General James Hills, C.B., V.C., who had accompanied the army as the guest of the Commander, was appointed Military Governor of Cabul, and under his rule mercy tempered the stern requirements of martial law. For the investigation of the causes and circumstances of the late outbreak, and the collection of all possible evidence regard- The Military Commission. 255 ing the conduct of individuals since the arrival of the British Embassy in Cabul, Sir Frederick Roberts nominated a com- mission, consisting of his Chief of the staff, Colonel C. M. Macgregor, C.B., C.S.I., Surgeon-Major Bellew, C.S.I., and Mahammed Hyat Khan, C.S.I. Their duties were comprehen- sive, and included the submission of recommendations regard- ing the punishment to be inflicted on all persons whom they found guilty of participation in the attack on the Residency. The actual trial of the prisoners was confided to a second military commission, consisting of a Brigadier- General and two other officers. Meanwhile, Sir Frederick Roberts made strenuous efforts to collect a reserve of supplies, for winter was approaching, and he was anxious to guard against any eventualities. As the son of an officer whose warning voice was raised, and raised in vain, during the first Afghan War, he knew well the danger of under-estimating the powers of resistance of the Afghan people, even when seemingly beaten to the earth and powerless, so he kept his troops prepared for a sudden crisis, and busied himself in collecting supplies and perfecting his transport. 256 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. CHAPTER XIV. The Cabul District after its Occupation by the British Events at the Shutargardan Pass The Explosion in the Bala Hissar Occupation of the Sherpur Cantonment Sir Frederick Roberts Reconnoitres .the Passes towards Jugdulluck Abandonment of the Shutargardan The Expedition to Maidan Unsettled State of the Country Deportation of Yakoob Khan to India A Review of the Situation in Northern Afghanistan before the Events of December 1879. THE people of Afghanistan, truculent and treacherous though they are, and tainted, like Byron's Corsair, with " a thousand crimes," possess, like him, "one virtue," and that is a sturdy love of independence. This they displayed in the darkest hour of the first Afghan War, and ultimately compelled a British force to evacuate the country under a humiliating Convention. In the present instance they had to deal with a General of a different calibre to General Elphinstone, but they struggled manfully to shake off the yoke of the invader. During the stirring events of the following December it seemed to the outside world that a terrible tragedy was about to be enacted on the very scene of the disasters of 1841-42. Sir Frederick Roberts' s countrymen in England watched with bated breath the struggle for mastery under the walls of Cabul, but never for one moment did the gallant upholder of England's cause, who displayed in the crisis the " antique heroism" with which Lord Raglan was credited by Marshal St. Arnaud, lose his calmness and confidence in the success of his plans. In the middle of October, to which the course of events has brought us, the Afghans, utterly defeated in the field, and with their capital occupied by a foreign foe, did not lose heart, but, within a few days of the public entry of Sir Frederick Roberts into Cabul, reports were current that a strong force was on the march for the city from Afghan Turkistan. On receiving information to this effect, on the 14th October, Sir Frederick Fighting at the Shutargardan. 257 Roberts immediately sent some Cavalry to reconnoitre, but nothing definite could be ascertained of their movements. On the 13th October, the day Sir Frederick Roberts made his triumphal march through Cabul, he received intelligence from Colonel Money, commanding at the Shutargardan, that he expected to be attacked by the Ghilzyes, who were assem- bling in great strength in his neighbourhood. This information proved correct, and at 8 A.M. on the following morning, some 2,000 of these tribesmen fired upon the party sent to relieve the detachment occupying the blockhouse in the Sirkai Kotul, which had before been strengthened. Colonel Money ordered Major Griffiths to proceed with two companies of the 3rd Sikhs and two of the 21st Punjaub Native Infantry, with one gun, tc hold the steep ridge near the camp, and this post he not only defended throughout the day, notwithstanding every effort of the enemy to dislodge him, but carried at the point of the bayonet a position they had taken up on a rocky ridge and pursued them for two miles. On the 17th, Sir Frederick Roberts sent Brigadier- General Gough to the Shutargardan with a force consisting of 4 guns No. 2 Mountain Battery, 5th Punjaub Cavalry, and 5th Punjaub Infantry, together with a large convoy of transport animals for the three-fold object of opening out his communications, bring- ing up supplies, and rendering aid to Colonel Money. Briga- dier-General Gough arrived at a most opportune moment, for the tribes that had attacked the Shutargardan position, though defeated, were by no means disheartened, and, on the 15th, had received such large accessions from Zurmat, Hazara, and else- where, that by nightfall they were calculated to number about 10,000 men. They dismantled the unoccupied post of Karatiga, and were so confident of overwhelming the British garrison that they brought their women to witness their triumph, and actually offered to spare the lives of the garrison if they would lay down their arms. Colonel Money rejected the terms with scorn, and took the wise precaution of concentrating his strength by withdrawing the garrison of the Sirkai Kotul, but adopted no offensive steps. Encouraged by his apparent inactivity, and strengthened by some hundreds of men belonging to the mutinous regiments of the regular army, the enemy's sharp- s 258 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. shooters opened fire on the garrison. But the tables were soon turned. On the morning of the 19th Colonel Money learnt by heliographic signal of the arrival of Brigadier- General Gough at Kooshi, and immediately took the offensive. Moving out his skirmishers he opened fire with four guns of the Kohat Mountain Battery, and the enemy finding that their oppor- tunity had gone, quitted their positions, and by the evening not a man was to be seen. Alla-ood-deen, brother of the great Ghilzye Chief, Padshah Khan, was severely wounded by a shell while approaching the advance picket on his return from making an attempt to break up the hostile combination of his countrymen, and paid the penalty of his conduct, which was supposed to be treacherous, with his life, as his wound proved mortal.* On the 16th October, about 1 P.M., the British troops and the inhabitants of Cabul were startled by a loud report from the direction of the upper Bala Hissar, and a vast column of smoke and showers of debris showed that an explosion had occurred in the Arsenal, in which were stored over one million pounds of powder, as roughly calculated by Colonel Perkins, Commanding the Royal Engineers. The 67th Regiment were in tents in the Ameer's garden, and the 5th Goorkhas in the upper Bala Hissar fort, and both Corps suffered some loss. One soldier of the 67th and twelve of the latter regiment, were killed; also three Sowars of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, and five Ordnance Lascars, fell victims to the explosion, and Captain Shafto, R.A., Commissary of Ordnance, who was ex- amining the godowns containing the ammunition, and making an inventory of the contents, shared the same fate. In addition to these, four men were seriously injured. Sir Frederick Roberts immediately ordered the 5th Goorkhas to leave their camp, and also directed the 67th Regiment to remove from the garden of the Dewan-i-Aum, which was in dangerous proximity to tLe now burning ruins. He would not even permit them to remove their tents or kit, and with the exception of their regimental ammunition, everything was * See despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, dated Shutargardan, 19th October, 1879. The Explosions at CabuL 259 left behind. The wisdom of this precipitate evacuation was soon apparent, as exactly two and a half hours after the first explosion, a second occurred of greater violence, by which some natives, upwards of 400 yards distant from the magazine, were killed by falling stones and debris. The 67th Kegiment was accommodated for the night in the tents of the 72nd and 92nd Highlanders, and an instance of the camaraderie (to use an expressive French term) existing between the 72nd and the 5th Goorkhas, brothers-in-arms at the Peiwar Kotul and com- panions in many a bivouac, was exhibited by a large number of the Highlanders coming forward and insisting upon lending their great coats for the night to the brave little mountaineers of Nepaul. This was no small act of self denial, as the nights were bitterly cold.* Sir Frederick Roberts's anxiety was not lessened for some days, as a terrible danger threatened the entire city in the possible ignition of the main magazine, in which were stored upwards of 450 tons of gunpowder. Barely ninety yards intervened between this magazine and the flames, and during the night of the 16th, its explosion was momentarily expected ; indeed, its walls, which were by no means of substantial con- struction, were considerably scorched. Providentially, towards morning the wind went down, and with it the flames began to subside, and the explosions, which had never ceased, became less frequent. On the following afternoon, the 17th October, Sir Frederick Roberts deemed the danger so considerably lessened as to allow of working parties endeavouring to ex- tinguish the conflagration. Even then, he says, the work was one of considerable danger, as the main magazine (to prevent the fire spreading to which was the principal task) was fitted with a weak roof, much projecting woodwork, and badly-fitted doors of the same inflammable material. However, the officers and men worked with energy and devotion, and though the fire smouldered for days, all anxiety as to the safety of the main magazine ceased. * A similar instance of soldierly feeling was afforded during the defence of Jellalabad in the last Afghan War, between Her Majesty's 13th ilegi- ment and the 35th Bengal Native Infantry, a regiment which unhappily subsequently disgraced itself by mutinying in the Punjaub in 1857, as already detailed in a preceding chapter. s 2 260 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. " The Arsenal," writes Sir Frederick Roberts to us, "was in the form of an oblong, on slightly sloping ground, and the long low buildings in which the ammunition was placed were simply constructed of mud, the doorways being wooden ones. The powder was stored in the upper buildings of the enclosure, and the small arms ammunition and shells below ; but between the end of the long shed containing the various loaded shells, and the wooden door of the nearest building containing powder, there was a distance of barely fifteen yards. The first ex- plosion, which proceeded from a large quantity of powder stored underneath the small arms ammunition, not only ignited a large quantity of cartridges and shells, and caused the death of Captain Shafto, R.A., and the men of the Goorkhas, as you have stated, but the concussion alone was sufficient to burst open the doors of the main powder magazines. These magazines were each filled up to the doorway with large jars, or "Kappas," of hide, each containing some 2001bs of powder, and had any one of these been pierced by the thousands of bullets or fragments of shell that were flying about from the lower buildings, the friction would no doubt have caused an explosion which would have communicated itself to the sur- rounding powder, and an enormous loss of human life and destruction to property would have been the result. " Throughout the night the conflagration went on, varied by rushes of flame, and columns of smoke as the fire reached more powder which had hitherto escaped, but still, to the wonder of the watchers on the Siah-Sung heights, the big magazine gave no sign, though at any moment they were prepared for some almost supernatural explosion. Next day the fire had abated, and though it was not entirely extinguished till some time afterwards, an exploring party managed to make their way inside. The place was a heap of smouldering ruins, and they were reminded by the constant explosion of an eight-inch shell or a box of Snider cartridges, that it was anything but a safe mission they were bound on. Leaning against the wooden frame of the door of the end powder magazine was a burning beam, which was removed by Lieu- tenant Neville Chamberlain. It had already commenced to char the door itself, and there can be no doubt that another General Roberts on the Explosions. 261 half-hour would have sufficed to ignite the powder 800,000 Ibs ! We have, perhaps, no record of any such amount having exploded at once, and though it was believed by the Engineer Officers with the Cabul Field Force, that the shock would have caused the large town of Cabul to be levelled in one vast ruin, it requires a skilled mathematician, and one learned in the force of explosives, to tell us, after learning the precise configuration of the ground on which the magazine stood, how far, and to what extent, that gigantic mass would have made its power felt. " Engineer Officers were immediately ordered to destroy the powder in the most expeditious manner, and daily a large quantity was run down a steep slope in a kind of trough, into the water, which flows round the Bala Hissar ; but the place being abandoned during the fighting which took place early in December, a considerable amount remained, which fell into the hands of the Afghans." Sir Frederick Roberts has been blamed for not having destroyed the powder at once, but clearly he has been misjudged. Handling powder at any time is necessarily a delicate and dangerous operation, and must be slowly and cautiously carried on ; but when one con- siders that this enormous mass of powder was in skin jars, which could not be moved without tumbling to pieces, and that it was impossible to blow it up without causing a disaster, it would seem clear that General Eoberts took the best measures possible for its destruction, and he cannot be blamed if this was not completed before the troubles of December began. In the Cabul Force there was at first a decided suspicion of treachery. It was believed that the Afghans had hidden in the vaults of the Magazine some infernal machine which was to explode after our troops had filled the Bala Hissar ; but in Sir Frederick Roberts' s opinion, subsequent inquiries proved that this was scarcely possible. The General, accompanied by his Staff, visited the magazine the day before the explosion, and found everything in a state of the utmost confusion. Instead of the order which ought to reign supreme in any Arsenal, loose powder, percussion caps, cartridges, loaded shells, fuses, and friction tubes were strewed about indiscriminately. Poor Captain Shafto commented on this at the time, and expressed 262 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. his intention of getting everything safely arranged, each in its proper place, as soon as possible ; and it was probably the case that, on the following day, as he and his men were at work, some one of them trod on a friction tube or a. percussion cap, or powder exploded, which communicated the fire to the whole magazine. The Military Commission, presided over by Brigadier- General Massy, convicted five persons of participating in the attack on the Residency, and on the 20th October, they were executed in the Bala Hissar. One of these men was the Kotwali, or Police Magistrate, of Cabul, who was implicated in the massacre of the Cavagnari Mission and urged the people of Cabul to resist the advance of Sir Frederick Roberts's force. Another of the prisoners was a Mollah, or priest, of great sanctity, who exerted his religious influence over a fanatical people to induce them to wage war against the unbelievers, and who had taken an active part in the attack on the Residency. The other culprits were a Chief of the Barukzye, or reigning clan, and an officer of the Ameer's Army, who fought against the British on the 6th October. The fifth and most culpable of all was a man who had actually imbrued his hands in the blood of the victims of the treacherous and savage deed of the 3rd September. These and others convicted of participation in the Massacre were executed, and met their doom with the stolidity, or forti- tude, whichever we may regard it, characteristic of the Oriental, whose fatalistic creed is embodied in the words Hector addressed to his spouse in his final memorable interview : " Fixed is the term of all the race of men ; And such the hard condition of our birth, No force can then resist, no flight can save, All sink alike, the fearful and the brave." Since the 12th October, when Yakoob Khan resigned the Ameership into the hands of Sir Frederick Roberts, saying he would rather be a grass-cutter in the British Camp than ruler of so turbulent a race as his quondam subjects, the British General, while awaiting tne orders of the Government, had been the de facto sovereign of North-Eastern Afghanistan, and exercised autocratic power over life and property. On the 27th Abdication of Yakoob Khan, 263 October, he received instructions from the Viceroy, and issued the following proclamation to the people of Cabul. " I, Gen- eral Roberts, on behalf of the British Government, hereby pro- claim that the Ameer having by his own free will abdicated, has left Afghanistan without a government. In consequence of the shameful outrage upon its Envoy and since the British Govern- ment has been compelled to occupy by force Cabul, the Capital, and to take military possession of other parts of Afghanistan, the British Government now commands that all Afghan author- ities, Chiefs, and Sirdars, do continue their functions in main- taining order, referring to me whenever necessary. The British Government desires that the people should be treated with justice and benevolence, and that their religious feelings and customs be respected. The services of such Sirdars and Chiefs as assist in preserving order will be duly recognized, but all disturbers of the peace and persons concerned in attacks upon the British authority will meet with condign punishment. The British Government, after consultation with the principal Sirdars, tribal Chiefs, and others representing the interests and .wishes of the various provinces and cities, will declare its will as to the future permanent arrangements to be made for the good government of the people." As for the ex- Ameer, he appeared much relieved since he had ceased to wield the sovereignty of the Afghan nation, and it was his habit, occasionally, in the evening to emerge from his tent in the British camp, and walk with the General while the band discoursed sweet music. " The Ameer," writes Sir Fred- erick Roberts to us, " was treated with the greatest kindness and consideration, and it was not until I was satisfied from the results of the proceedings of the Court of Enquiry, over which Colonel Macgregor presided, that the attack on the Resi- dency, if not actually instigated, might at least have been checked by Yakoob Khan, that the guard which had hitherto been a guard of honour, was made responsible for his safe custody. Even then, all possible courtesy was shown to the Ameer, but this restraint was rendered still more necessary by inform- ation I received, from which I was convinced that Yakoob Khan was contemplating flight, which, if he had succeeded 264 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. in effecting, would have been the signal for a general rising."* The General reported to the Viceroy that "the Ameer seems much broken in spirits, and wholly unfit to resume his former position and responsibilities." The despotic ruler of a martial nation found himself a close prisoner under the walls of his * Some time before the Ameer's deportation from Cabul, Sir Frederick Roberts had a conversation with him regarding the political events imme- diately preceding the rupture between his father, Shere Ali, and the British Government. Sir Frederick took notes of the conversation, the substance of which he stated to be as follows : " In 1869 my father was fully prepared to throw in his lot with you. He had suffered many reverses before making himself secure on the throne of Afghanistan, and he had come to the conclusion that his best chance of holding what he had won, lay in an alliance with the British Government. He did not receive from Lord Mayo as large a supply of arms and ammunition as he had hoped, but, nevertheless, he returned to Cabul fairly satisfied, and so he had re- mained until the visit of Nur Mahammud Shah to India in 1873. This visit brought matters to a head. The diaries received from Nur Mahammud Shah during his stay in India, and the report which he brought back on his return, convinced my father that he could no longer hope to obtain from the British Government all the aid that he wanted, and from that time he began to turn his attention to the thought of a Russian alliance. You know how that ended. When my father received from the Govern- ment of India the letter informing him that a British Mission was about to proceed to Cabul, he read it out in Durbar. The members of the Russian Embassy were present. After the reading was finished, Colonel Stolietoff rose, saluted the Ameer, and asked permission to leave Cabul. If permitted, he would, he said, travel without delay to Tashkend, and report the state of affairs to General KaufFmann, who would inform the Tzar, and thus bring pressure to bear on England. He promised to return in six weeks or two months, and urged the Ameer to do everything in his power meanwhile to prevent the British Mission from reaching Cabul. " Colonel Stolietoff' never returned to Cabul. He lost no time in reaching Tashkend, where he remained for a few weeks, and he then started for Russia. The Afghan official, Mirza Muhammad Hassan Khan, generally known as the Dabir-ul-Mulk, who had travelled with Colonel Stolietoff* from the Oxus to Cabul, accompanied him on his return journey to Tash- kend. Here the Mirza was detained under pretence that orders would shortly be received from the Emperor, until the news of my father's flight from Cabul reached General KaufFmann. He was then permitted to leave. Two Aides-de-Camp were sent with him, one a European, the other a native of Bokhara. My father was strongly urged by General KaufFmann not to leave Cabul. At the same time the members of the Embassy were ordered to return to Tashkend, the doctor being permitted to remain with my father, if his services were required. Throughout, the Russian Embassy were treated with great honour, and at all stations between Mazar-i-SharifF and Cabul, orders were given for the troops to turn out, and for a salute to be fired on their arrival and departure." Sir Frederick Roberts in his letter to the Viceroy giving this summary, refers to the prevalence of Russian ware and coins in Cabul, no less than 13,000 gold pieces having been found in the late Ameer's treasury. Occupation of Sherpur. 265 Capital, and bitterly must he have rued his timidity, or trea- chery, in not restraining the mutinous regiments when they first turned upon the Eesidency on that fatal 3rd September. With the unhappy cause of Ilium's woes he might have ex- claimed : " Would heaven, ere all these dreadful deeds were done, The day that show'd me to the golden sun, Had seen my death." On the last day of this eventful month of October, the British troops moved into the Sherpur Cantonments, the barracks of which had been cleared and made habitable by an army of artisans and coolies, and further accommodation was in course of construction to quarter the entire force. A variety of rea- sons influenced Sir Frederick Roberts in adopting this course, the Chief of which were, that the works raised with such care by Shere Ali, and called after him, afforded better shelter, and were more defensible during the winter ; also the Commissariat Depot was there, to protect which required a guard, and as guards were stationed in the Bala Hissar and City, the strength of the troops was not only unduly taxed, but they were more scattered than was judicious. The wisdom of concentration and keeping the supplies within the lines occupied by the troops, were among the chief lessons inculcated by the disastrous teachings of the first Afghan War, and soon again received a striking illustration. Writing of the reasons that influenced him in his choice of Sherpur Sir Frederick Roberts says : " The advantage of using all existing roof accommodation at the first glance pointed out the Bala Hissar as the quarter which promised best to meet my requirements ; but its dangerous proximity to the large maga- zine which had escaped destruction, and the fact that it would not accommodate all my force, and that the troops would have to be more or less scattered, eventually led me to decide upon occupying the large, and for the most part fortified, cantonment of Sherpur, which was built by the late Ameer as winter quar- ters for his regular troops. This Cantonment lies rather less than a mile north-east of the city, and contains long ranges of brick buildings, which will at once enable me to house the entire European portion of my force, and also provide accommo- 266 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. datiou for the Commissariat Stores. The Native troops are engaged hutting themselves, and, aided by the materials at hand and woodwork brought from the dismantled portion of the Bala Hissar, have already made considerable progress." The Cantonment, though more extensive than was desirable for this small force, was enclosed on three sides by a lofty and massive loop-holed wall, with numerous flanking towers, while the rear was protected by the Behmaroo heights (on which General Roberts proposed erecting certain defensive works), at the base of which lay the Cantonment. The site was close to the old British Cantonment, and actually embraced in its defences the heights which were such a danger in 1841, and for the possession of which many sanguinary struggles took place, as recorded in the pages of Lady Sale and Sir Vincent Eyre. By the end of October Sir Frederick Roberts had laid in sufficient supplies to relieve him of all anxiety regarding the provisioning of the force during the winter. As regards the fort of the Bala Hissar, the General wrote to the Government proposing to raze it to the ground, as an act of retributive justice, which he considered would have a deeper significance than the destruction of any number of houses belonging to obscure individuals in the city. It was historical, its name was symbolical of Afghan power, and it was inti- mately connected with the past history of the country. Moreover, the fact that it had been destroyed and levelled with the ground, would spread throughout the length and breadth of Afghanistan, bearing with it a political significance that could not be under-rated. As a further reason for its demolition he urged, that from its walls a heavy fire was kept up on the defenders of the Residency, and he was of opinion that not a vestige of any place which bore a part in that day's doings should be allowed to remain. Of the preparations made by the Ameer Shere Ali to engage in hostilities with the British, the General wrote : ' ' Before the outbreak of hostilities last year the Ameer had raised and equipped with arms of precision, sixty-eight regiments of Infantry, and sixteen of Cavalry. The Afghan Artillery amounted to near 300 guns. Numbers of skilled artisans were constantly employed in the manufacture of rifled cannon Roberts s Reasons for Occupying Sherpur. 267 and breach-loading small arms. More than a million pounds of powder, and, I believe, several million rounds of home- made Snider ammunition were in the Arsenal at the time of the late explosion, and swords, helmets, uniforms and other articles of military equipment, were stored in proportionate quantities. Finally, Shere Ali had expended upon the con- struction of the Sherpur Cantonments, an astonishing amount of labour and money. The extent and cost of these works may be judged of from the fact that the whole of the troops under my command, will find cover during the winter within the Cantonment and its outlying buildings, and the bulk of them in the main line of parapet itself, which extends to a length of nearly two miles under the southern and western slopes of the Behmaroo hills. Shere Ali's original design was apparently to carry the wall entirely round the hills, a distance of five miles, and the foundations were already laid for a considerable portion of this length." The reasons given by Sir Frederick Roberts for occupying Sherpur Cantonment dispose of certain statements by an historian of the war, which have given rise to inferences that the occupation of Sherpur was done in a hap-hazard sort of way, and that the commanding General, having overcome the Afghans in the field, had grown careless. But nothing could be more erroneous than such a supposi- tion, which was opposed to the character of the subject of this Memoir, who never left anything to chance, and, from his knowledge of Afghan warfare, derived not only in the field, but from the lessons inculcated by his father, would have been the last man to regard a lull in the active resistance of such a turbulent people as the Afghans, as aught but evidence of the existence of a ground-swell which experienced mariners know is the prelude to a coming storm. Regarding his reasons for placing his force in Sherpur in October, Sir Frederick Roberts writes to us : " The fact is, that I thought over our position most carefully before I decided on occupying this Sherpur Can- tonment. Instead of being deceived by the state of quiet we happened to be then in, I felt very sure we should have trouble once winter set in. I knew that it was essential to keep my force together, and that it would be very difficult in the short 268 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. time before snow usually fell, to house the troops and followers, and collect a sufficiency of supplies and forage. I examined the Bala Hissar most particularly, for I quite appreciated the advantages it offered. I found that it would not contain one third of my force, and that the remainder, with all the transport animals, would have to go elsewhere. There were no villages or forts near the Bala Hissar that would answer; in fact, there was hut the one place, Sherpur, which could accommo- date all the troops and animals, as well as the required amount of supplies, added to which, shelter already existed in Sherpur for the whole of the British troops, and three-quarters of the native ones. The fault of Sherpur was its size, too large for my forces to defend properly a fault which would have been far more serious had I diminished my strength by occupying the Bala Hissar as well. Another drawback was that the whole of the City of Cabul intervened between Sherpur and the Bala Hissar, and holding the Bala Hissar would not have prevented the enemy from occupying the city, once we had been beaten off the Asmai heights which we were by the sheer force of numbers on the 14th December, 1879. I had about 6,000 men, and the enemy were certainly not less than 100,000. In my despatch, I said about 60,000, as I wished to be well within the mark, and it was impossible to get any accurate estimate, but many influential natives, who had the means of judging, told me that the enemy numbered 100,000 or 120,000. I mention all this as Hensman's book is certainly misleading ; he, no doubt, never knew how much thought I had given to our position during the winter. So anxious was I to hold the Bala Hissar, that I consulted the Commanding R.E., as to the possibility of hutting the balance of the troops on the Siah- Sung ridges, where we first encamped, but it was pronounced an impossibility within the time." On the 26th October, Sir Frederick Roberts visited Boot- kak, where he selected a position for an outpost in the direction of the line of advance of the Khyber column, which, under the command of Major-General Bright, had entered Jellalabad two days before. On the 1st November, Brigadier-General Mac- pherson proceeded to Bootkak to open communications with General Bright's column, the line by the Shutargardan being Roberts Reconnoitres towards the Khyber. 269 closed for the winter. Many chiefs of the Tezeen* valley and neighbouring country between it and Jellalabad, came into his camp to make their submission and get the best terms procurable from the British Commander. On the following day Sir Frederick Eoberts, accompanied by Colonel Macgregor, Chief of the Staff, and Daoud Shah, the Commander-in-Chief of the late Afghan Army, rode out to Bootkak, and, joining General Macpherson there, proceeded with a strong escort to reconnoitre the Lutterbund Pass. On the following morning the General, who was joined by the headmen of the neighbouring Ghilzyes, reconnoitred to within three or four miles of Tezeen, proceeding thence to the Khoord- Cabul, that terrible defile which bears such an ominous sound in the ears of those who remember the fearful scene of slaughter enacted within its savage and precipitous gorges. Threading the Khoord-Cabul, the General returned to Bootkak, and in the evening rode back a further distance of ten miles to the Sherpur Cantonment by the line of Telegraph just com- pleted, making over forty miles of country covered during the day. As the result of this examination, General Roberts decided to use the Lutturbund Pass for the future line of communica- tion with General Bright at Jellalabad, the road by the Khoord- Cabul (which General Macpherson was directed to use in forming a junction near Jugdulluck with Brigadier-General Charles Gough* advancing from Jellalabad with a portion of General Bright's division) being considerably longer. On the 4th November the General rode out towards Beni Hissar to meet Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, who arrived at Sherpur escorting a large convoy, and bringing with him the troops lately stationed at Shutargardan, under Colonel Money. The General warmly congratulated Colonel Money and thanked the 3rd Sikhs and the Mountain Battery for their gallant re- * This officer must not be confounded with his brother, Hugh Gough, though both were at Delhi in Hodson's Horse. Hugh Gough served in Sir Hope Grant's force throughout the mutiny with the subject of this Memoir ; Charles Gough was also a cavalry officer, and, like his distinguished brother, earned the Victoria Cross in the mutiny ; and during the first phase of the Afghan War, ending with the Treaty of Gundamuck, commanded the cavalry of the Khyber, or Sir Samuel Browne's, Division. 270 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. pulse of the attack by an overwhelming force of Mangals and Ghilzyes. And these brave native soldiers received an ovation from their comrades on their arrival in camp. On the way the General was met by Padshah Khan, the intriguing Ghilzye Chief, to whom he gave a cool reception. The British force at Cabul had been seriously weakened by the absence of the troops under Generals Macpherson and Gough, and the return of the latter with the Shutargardan garrison, made a welcome addition to a force of insufficient strength, as later events proved, to cope with a combination of the tribes. During the next few days Sir Frederick Eoberts visited the Chardeh valley, and inspected the scene of the fighting on the 6th and 8th October ; and a column proceeded under command of Brigadier-General Baker to the villages in the same valley, and brought away some soldiers of the regiments who had taken part in the attack on the Residency, whose names and addresses were found on the regimental muster rolls. These men were handed over for trial to the Military Commission, under Brigadier- General Massy, and such as were found to be guilty were hanged. The claims of justice being satisfied, on the 12th November Sir Frederick Eoberts issued a Proclamation of Amnesty* to all persons who had fought against the British * The following is the text of the proclamation : " To all whom it may concern. On the 12th October, Shawal, a proclamation was issued in which I offered a reward for the surrender of any person who had fought against the British troops since the 3rd September, fifteenth Ramazan, and had thereby become a rebel against the Ameer Yakoob Khan. I have now received information which tends to show that some at least of those who shared in the opposition encountered by the British troops during their advance on Cabul, were led to do so by the belief that the Ameer was a prisoner in my camp, and had called upon the soldiery and people of Cabul to rise on his behalf. Such persons, although enemies to the British Govern- ment, were not rebels against their own sovereign. And the great British Government does not seek for vengeance against enemies who no longer resist. It may be that few only of those who took up arms were thus led away by the statements of evil-minded men ; but rather than punish the innocent with the guilty, I am willing to believe that all were alike deceived. On behalf of the British Government, therefore, I proclaim a free and complete amnesty to all persons who have fought against the British troops since the 3rd September, fifteenth Ramazan, provided that they now give up any arms in their possession and return to their homes. The offer of a reward for the surrender of such persons is now withdrawn, and they will not for the future be molested in any way on account of their opposition to the British advance. But it must be clearly understood that the benefits of this amnesty do not extend to any one, whether soldier The Moolah Mooskh-i-Ahim. 271 troops since the 3rd September, provided that they gave up any arms in their possession and returned to their homes ; but those persons who took part in the attack on the Residency, or who might be found in possession of any property belonging to members of the Embassy, were exempted. Up to the 15th November, the executions at Cabul, under the recommendation of the Military Commissioners, were seventy- eight, chiefly' soldiers of the regiments which attacked the Residency. A more pleasing duty to a humane officer like Sir Frederick Roberts was the establishment in Cabul of a Civil Dispensary, of which not only the male inhabitants but the ladies of the Sirdars' families availed themselves. Sir Frederick Roberts appointed as Governor of Afghan Turkestan, Sirdar Wali Mahomed Barukzye, to whom an ad- vance of two lacs of rupees (20,000) was made for the pay of levies, and to the charge of Kohistan, always a turbulent district, he commissioned Shahbaz Khan. Besides these Sirdars there were in the British Camp during the month two leading Ghilzye Chiefs, from Hissarak, near Jugdulluck, who agreed to keep open the road, and Mahomed Said, Governor of Ghuznee, where disturbances had already broken out, under the fiery exhortations of the aged Moollah, Mooskh-i-Alum, who now appeared on the stormy sea of Afghan politics. The influence wielded by this turbulent priest was enormous, though we have seen its counterpart in Mediaeval Europe, with which Central Asia, at the present time, bears a striking resemblance, both in its religious and political conditions. The monks in the priest-ridden courts and peoples of Europe, a thousand years ago, possessed an influence paralleled by the Moollahs among the ignorant and fanatical clansmen of Afghanistan and our frontier, or in the cabinet of such a bigot as the late Nas- or civilian, who was concerned directly, or indirectly, in the attack upon the Residency, or who may hereafter be found in possession of any property belonging to members of the Embassy. To such persons no mercy will be shown. Further, I hold out no promise of pardon to those who, well know- ing the Ameer's position in the British camp, instigated the troops and people of Cabul to take up arms against the British troops. They have been guilty of wilful rebellion against the Ameer's authority, and they will be considered and treated as rebels whenever found." Up to the 13th November the Cabulees surrendered 6,729 rifles and muskets, of which 742 were Enfields, and 560 Sniders. 272 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. rullah Khan, Ameer of Bokhara. The ninety years of Mooskh- i-Alum (literally " Scent of the Universe ") had not softened his fanatical hatred of the unbeliever. He was zealous in the cause of the faith, and his saintly life gave him great influence over his countrymen, who placed implicit faith in the assurances of one "Whose beard the silver hand of peace hath touch' d, Whose white investments figure innocence." But now his utterances breathed not of peace, as became his years and calling, but of slaughter and extermination. The "Jehad" was preached from every minaret and mosque, and the Minister of Peace dedicated the remainder of his days to urging futile resistance in which thousands of his countrymen perished. " Turning his books to graves, his ink to blood, His pens to lances, and his tongue divine, To a loud trumpet and a point of war." It was the old intolerant spirit of the Israelitish priest who maddened the people to deeds of blood by appeals to "the Sword of the Lord and of Gideon," though in this instance the call was to defend his countrymen's hearths from aggression, and therefore justifiable, if affording a chance of success. Meanwhile the General took active steps to provide against the contingencies of the coming winter, and busied himself in collecting a reserve of supplies from Maidan, Logar, and Kohis- tan, advances being made to the Sirdars for its transmission, and all ineffective transport animals were sent back to India, in order to economize forage. To facilitate the transport of supplies from India the road on the Lutterbund was improved by the Pioneers ; at this time also the British Camp was put in communication with Jellalabad by means of the telegraph wire. Sir Frederick Roberts found his hand strengthened against the possibility of the dangers of a divided command by his promotion to the local rank of Lieutenant-General, with the command of all the troops as far as Jamrood at the mouth of the Khyber Pass, so that General Bright' s division of 12,000 men was placed in subordination to him. Towards the end of November, on the return of General Macpherson's Brigade to Disturbed State of Affairs. 273 Sherpur, Sir Frederick Roberts despatched Brigadier- General Baker with a strong force to Maidan, about twenty-five miles from Cabul, in the direction of Ghuznee, to enforce the collection of grain and forage, which is ordinarily due from that district as part of the revenues of the State. On the following day, taking with him a small Cavalry escort, Sir Frederick joined General Baker. A chief of some local importance proved recalcitrant, and refused to send in his quota of supplies ; on which Captain Turner, Assistant Political Officer, was sent with two Squadrons of Cavalry, to bring him in ; but the troopers were fired upon and compelled to retire. In order to compel his submission, at daybreak on the 24th November, Sir Frederick moved against the rebel chief's fort, but it was found to be deserted. Having burnt the fort and the neighbouring villages he returned to Maidan, and, on the following day, rode back to Sherpur, leaving General Baker to complete his mission. On his arrival he was greeted with reports of the disturbed state of Afghan Turkestan and Kohistan, where large bodies of men were collecting, and the Governor recently appointed to the latter district found his position untenable. General Baker returned to Sherpur early in December, having collected the forage demanded from Maidan. He reported that he left all quiet in the district ; but it was a deceptive lull, for hardly had he left the valley than the Governor he had installed, a Barukzye Sirdar and a son of the great Ameer Dost Mahom- med, was murdered. The Governor appointed to the Logar District was equally an object of suspicion and contempt by the people, who refused to recognize the authority which lacked the support of British bayonets. On every hand there were portents, and the situation resembled that of 1840, when Sir "William Macnaghten represented the British power in Afghanistan, and Shah Sojah was his puppet. The catas- trophe, doubtless, would have been equally fatal to British interests and prestige had not there been in Sir Frederick Roberts an officer wielding supreme political and military command, who was fully alive to the dangers of the situation, and quite capable of coping with them. Meanwhile, the ques- tion of supplies, especially forage for the thousands of troop- 274 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. horses and transport animals, continued to engross the General' s attention, over 100,000 maunds (80 Ibs. to the maund) heing necessary to complete the supply for the winter. He had also not completed the storage of fuel and provisions for six months, which, with wise prevision he had set himself to collect from the day of his arrival at Cabul. The winter set in with severity early in December, the thermometer marking 20 of frost, and Sir Frederick Roberts was reluctantly compelled to forego an expedition he had meditated to Ghuznee, the head-quarters of the malcontents on that side of Cabul, as it would expose his soldiers to consider- able hardship. Early in the morning of the 1st December, before the camp was astir, the ex- Ameer Yakoob Khan turned his back on his late Capital and proceeded a prisoner to India, guarded by an escort of Cavalry. The Commission of Inquiry into the circum- stances of the massacre of the British Mission at Cabul, consist- ing of Colonel Macgregor, Dr. Bellew, and Mahomed Hyat Khan, had presented their report to the General on the 18th November, and the Government of India, on learning its conclusions, ordered the deportation of the ex-Ameer. Sir Frederick Roberts and some of his Staff were present to bid him farewell, and so ended the brief and stormy reign of the son of Shere Ali, who shared the vicissitudes which make the history of the family of his grandfather, Dost Mahommed, one of the most interesting and romantic recorded in the annals of any country. Little more than a twelvemonth before, his father, Shere Ali, had attained a more powerful position than " the Dost" or any of the Ameers of the preceding Suddozye dynasty since the time of Ahmed Shah ; but evil advisers and a reliance on Russian promises of support, which he found the broken reed it proved in the hands of his father forty years before, brought him down to the dust. His armies, defeated at Ali Musjid and the Peiwar Kotul, and his southern capital, Candahar, cap- tured, Shere Ali fled to Afghan Turkestan, but in vain sought permission to proceed to the throne of the Czar, there to plead his cause against the Indian Viceroy. After a few weeks' illness, broken-hearted at all his ambitious schemes having so utterly Shere Ali and Yakoob Khan. 275 failed, be died at Mazar-i- Sheriff, and, like Wolsey, there were " none so poor to do him reverence." " But yesterday, and who had mightier breath 1 A thousand warriors by his word were kept In awe ; he said, as the Centurion saith, ' Go,' and he goeth ; ' Come,' and forth he stepp'd. The trump and bugle till he spake were dumb, And now nought left him but the muffled drum." Scarcely more fortunate was his son and successor, Yakoob Khan, at one time one of the most fiery and successful warriors in Central Asia. To the sword of Yakoob Khan his father owed his throne, for when quite a youth he wrested Candahar from his enemies, when Shere Ali's fortunes were at their lowest ebb, and inflicted a crushing defeat on his uncle Azim, and his cousin Abdurrahman, now, in the see- saw of Afghan politics, the ruler of a united Afghanistan. The most brilliant anticipations were formed of Yakoob's future. But whether it was that his successes were due to fortune, and not to superior skill, or that his energies and spirit were broken by five years' incarceration in a dungeon, Yakoob Khan displayed none of the royal qualities that distinguished many of the Barukzyes, and specially his father and grandfather. His cowardice on the 3rd September, when a display of personal energy would have saved the life of the man he called his friend, rendered him an object of contempt, and was the measure of his degra- dation from the Yakoob Khan who was the " King-maker" of Afghanistan. He was still in the prime of youth, not being over thirty years of age, was prepossessing and distinguished in appearance, and his personal valour had been the theme of all tongues.* But he had signally failed to rule his turbulent * Writing of Yakoob Khan before the outbreak of the Afghan war, one well versed in Oriental politics says : " The character of Yakoob Khan shines out from among that of all his countrymen, not only as the most able and the most intelligent, but also as the most courteous, the most moderate, and the most refined. The life of such a man is a study in itself, and its recital will arouse sympathy in the hearts of all true lovers of brave deeds and noble actions. His life is also conterminous with the most eventful portion of modern Afghan history, and his career is closely intertwined with the fortunes of Shere Ali." The following is a brief sketch of his history : Yakoob Khan was born in or about the year 1849 of a noble mother. Arminius Vambery speaks of him in November, 1863, when the Afghan Prince appeared to the traveller "a good-humoured, inexperienced child." T 2 276 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. countrymen, and, while not possessing the courage to strike a blow in defence of his throne, suffered his chiefs and soldiers to engage in a strife from which he would profit in the event of success, while he was careful that failure should compro- mise only his honour. How fallen he was from the warrior prince whom his countrymen had regarded as the pink of chivalry and the mould of form ! " Unlike that Arthur, who, with lance in rest, From spear to plume a star of tournament, Dashed through the lists at Camelot and charged Before the eyes of ladies and of knights." The General political situation, as it developed itself in the early part of December, and the causes which contributed to pro- duce a state of affairs that at one time appeared to be fraught with disaster, may be summarised from a despatch by Sir Frede- rick Roberts to the Adjutant-General in India. After the outbreak of September and the massacre of the His career in the history of his country commenced very shortly after his interview with the Hungarian traveller ; for, in 1864, Shere Ali's brother disputed his possession of the crown, and Yakoob Khan was left in command at the recently captured fortress of Herat. While Shere Ali was carrying on the war with varying fortune victorious at Kujhbaz, routed at Shaikha- bad, losing his eldest son in the former fight, and deserted by his best general, Mahomed Eefik, on the eve of the latter, but in the end expelled from Candaharand all the eastern country Yakoob Khan was slowly but surely consolidating his rule over Herat and Ferrah, and propitiating, in so far as he was able, the northern Khan of Maimene. So it happened that when Shere Ali suffered his last overthrow beneath the walls of Khelat-i-Ghilzye and fled to Herat, he had not abandoned all hope of restoring the declining fortunes of his cause. During three years Yakoob Khan had preserved peace in the west, had restrained the Persians, and had sent many a wel- come contingent of hardy troops to the scene of battle in Candahar and Cabul. There was yet one chance left ; but the degree of success that might be attained no longer rested with Shere Ali. In the field of battle he had been worsted, both by Azim and Abdurrahman, and his own reputa- tion had become dimmed by disaster. The fate of Cabul trembled in the balance when its real arbiter advanced on Candahar in the early days of 1868. That city fell at once after a sharp fight in the outskirts of the town, and then once more Candahar became Shere Ali's base for the recon- quest of Cabul. At first the joint army of Shere Ali and Yakoob Khan encountered little opposition. Cabul, after an absence of more than three years, was entered in triumph, and south of the Hindoo Koosh there remained no rebel. Azim in the meanwhile had fled to Balkh to join his nephew, and in face of the great emergency they each agreed to forego their jealousies. With a large force they advanced against Cabul, but their adversary had been more prompt, Yakoob Khan held the Bamian Pass aa they came forth from the Sighan Valley, and worsted them in a pitched encounter. But they found their retreat cut off. The Khan of Maimene had declared for Shere Ali, and was operating in their rear. They had no The Situation at Cabul. 277 Envoy, the advance of the British force from All Kheyl was too rapid to give the Afghans as a nation time to create an effective opposition, and the defeat of Charasia put an end to all organ- ized resistance. The Afghans, judging from antecedent history, believed that, as in 1842, after some signal act of retribution had been inflicted on the city of Cabul, the British Army would withdraw to India. It thus happened that, after the action of Charasia, there followed a period of expectation and doubt. The Afghans were waiting on events, and the time had not yet arrived when any national movement was possible. But this pause was marked by certain occurrences which touched the military pride of this turbulent nation to the quick. The occu- pation of the fortified cantonment called after their Ameer, the appropriation of the park of artillery and vast munitions of war which he had accumulated with such care and at so great ex- pense, the dismantling of the Bala Hissar, the historic fortress of the nation and the residence of its Kings and principal nobles, and, lastly, the imprisonment and deportation to India of Yakoob Khan and his leading ministers, all conspired to inflame to a high degree the national animosity felt towards a foreign invader. The temper of the people being in this condition, it was clear that only mutual jealousy and distrust among the chiefs could prevent their making common cause against their con- hope left now, except in making one desperate rush on the capital and sur- prising Shere Ali. But each of these schemes was frustrated. They crossed the Hindoo Koosh by a pass to the east of Bamian, hut Yakoob Khan was close behind, driving them before him. Past Cabul they fled with the young chief hot on their track, until they turned to bay in sheer despair in the neighbourhood of Ghuznee. Routed there they fled for safety to Persia, where Azim died, and Abdurrahman passed on to Khokand and Russian territory. The five years Avar had at last terminated, but its close brought credit to Yakoob Khan alone. Since then Yakoob was Governor of Cabul (1869), of Candahar (1870), and, after a brief exile, of Herat (1871). In all these posts, says the writer before quoted, he ex- hibited the same great capacity that he had demonstrated on the field of battle ; but Shere Ali feared him, as he recognized his superior, and believed that ties of blood would prove but a slight restraint upon the im- pulses of ambition. In 1872 Yakoob Khan came to Cabul, trusting to a safe conduct from Shere Ali, and was imprisoned for five years, and his younger brother, Ayoob Khan, threatened in Herat, was glad to find safety in Persia. The invasion of Afghanistan by the British brought the three cousins to the front once again, and in different ways their names are in- dissolubly associated with the history of the war. 278 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. querors, and that, if any sentiment could be found strong enough to dominate such internal dissensions and fuse the dis- cordant elements into one mass, a powerful movement might be evoked, having for its object the expulsion of the foreigners from the country. Such an impulse was supplied by the fervent addresses to Mahomedan religious feeling made by the aged Mooskh-i-Alum and by the denunciation of the English in the mosques of every city and village. It was further fanned by the ladies of Yakoob Khan's family, who appealed to the popular sympathies, and distributed the concealed treasure which was at their command ; and, lastly, a powerful incentive was added by the expectation of sharing in the plunder of the British Camp. The Moollahs, having once succeeded in subordinating the private jealousies of the chiefs to a desire for revenge on the common foe, the movement rapidly assumed the proportions of a national uprising against the English invaders. The me- mories of the disaster of 184142 were appealed to ; it was urged that what had happened once might happen again ; and the people were assured that if they would only rise suddenly and simultaneously the small English Army in Sherpur might easily be driven from its position, and, as before, be over- whelmed in its retreat through the difficult passes between Afghanistan and India. Such were the hopes of the chiefs and religious leaders, who for a wonder were, for a brief period, united against the English infidels. According to information received by Sir Frederick Koberts, their intention was to gain possession of the city and Bala Hissar, and after occupying the numerous forts and villages in the neighbourhood of Sherpur, to surround the cantonments. To attain this object, they arranged that the forces from the south, that is, from Logar, Zurmat, the Mangal and Jadran dis- tricts, and intervening Ghilzai country, should seize the range of hills which extend from the city towards Charasia and include the Bala Hissar and the high conical peak called the Takht-i- Shah ; that the forces from Kohistan should occupy the Asmai heights and hills to the north of the city ; while those from Maidan, Wardak, and the Glmznee direction moved upon the city from the westward. Combination of the Chiefs. 2 79 As it \vas evident that if these several bodies once concen- trated on Cabul they would be joined by the disaffected portion of the people of the city and adjoining villages, the General formed his plans to break up the combination before it came to a head, and to deal in detail with the forces gathering in Maidan, under Sultan Jan, and in Koh Daman, the southern part of the Kohistan, under MeerButcha, whose role was to march south- ward and coalesce with Sultan Jan. 2 So Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. CHAPTEK XV. The National Rising of December, 1879 The Plans of Sir Frederick Roberts to Check the Movement The Cavalry Action of the llth December Critical Condition of Affairs at Sherpur and in Cabul Prompt Action of Sir Frederick Roberts Movements of Brigadier- Generals Macpherson and Baker The Attempt to Capture the Takht-i- Shah on the 12th December Severe fighting on the 13th December Capture of Koh Asmai Successful Counter-attack by the Enemy Heavy Losses Experienced by the British Force Sir Frederick Roberts Determines to Concentrate in Sherpur Retirement of the British Troops within the Cantonment. IN pursuance of his plans, on the 8tli December Sir Frederick Roberts despatched Brigadier-General Macphersou with a column* towards the west, via Killa Aushar and Urghundeh, in order to meet and r 1rive the enemy back on Maidan. On the following day, Brigadier- General Baker also marched with a force, f via Charasia, towards Maidan with the object of placing himself across the line by which the enemy, after being defeated by General Macpherson, would have to retire. To give time for the completion of this movement, and to draw the enemy forward by an appearance of hesitation, Sir Frederick Roberts halted General Macpherson at Killa Aushar on the 9th. By the absence of these two Brigades the troops at Sherpur were reduced to a point of dangerous weakness, but in order to strike a decisive blow against the hostile confederacy, the General decided to incur the risk, which was inseparable from the conduct of military operations with so limited a force as was at his disposal, barely 8,000 men. However, he guarded against any eventualities to the best of his power, by ordering up from Jugdulluck, on the 7th * Four guns F Battery, A Brigade, R.H.A. ; 4 guns No. 1 Mountain Battery ; 1 squadron 9th Lancers ; 2 squadrons 14th Bengal Lancers ; 401 men, 67th Regiment ; 393 men, 5th Goorkhas ; and 509 men, 3rd Sikhs. f Four guns No. 2 Mountain Battery ; 2^ squadrons 5th Punjaub Cavalry ; 450 men 92nd Highlanders ; 450 of the 5th Punjaub Infantry ; and 25 men Sappers and Miners. 28l December, the whole of the guides, Infantry and Cavalry, under Colonel Jenkins. These troops arrived at Sherpur on the night of the llth at a most opportune moment. Meanwhile, on the 9th December, when General Macpherson was halting at Killa Aushar, Sir Frederick discovered from a Cavalry reconnoissance, made by Lieutenant-Colonel Lockhart, Assistant Quartermaster-General, that large numbers of the enemy were moving northwards from Urghundeh and Pughman towards Kohistan; and also that a considerable force of Kohistauees had collected at Karez Meer, about ten miles to the north of Cabul. Impelled by the necessity for dispers- ing this gathering before it could be joined by the enemy hastening from the west, Sir Frederick directed General Macpherson to change his line of advance and attack the Kohistanees, and as their country was unsuited for the move- ments of Horse Artillery and Cavalry, he ordered him to leave this portion of his column at Killa Aushar, taking with him only one squadron of the 14th Bengal Lancers. On reaching the Surkh Kotul, about two miles short of Karez Meer, General Macpherson found that his arrival was well timed, that the enemy from the west was still below him in the Pughman Valley, and that it was in his power to deal with the Kohistanees before a junction could be effected. He, accordingly, attacked them vigorously and promptly, and drove them back with heavy loss. The enemy, advancing from Maidan, seemed inclined at first to ascend the Surkh Kotal from the Pughman Valley, and assist the Kohistanees ; but on seeing that our troops held all the commanding positions, and probably hearing of the defeat of their allies, they retreated towards Urghundeh. Of this, says Sir Frederick Roberts in his despatch of 23rd January, 1880, detailing the events of the preceding month, General Macpherson informed him by heliograph soon after noon on the 10th. In order to try and cut in on the enemy's line of retreat, Sir Frederick immediately ordered the advance of the Horse Artillery and Cavalry from Killa Aushar, strengthened by two additional squadrons from Sherpur, the whole being under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Gordon, R.H.A. The movement, however, was unsuccessful, for as soon as the 282 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. Cavalry appeared, the enemy took shelter in the villages, and on the skirts of the high hills which surround Pughman. General Macpherson encamped on the night of the 10th at Karez Meer, and General Baker, who had steadily pursued his march by a very difficult road, halted a short distance to the west of Maidan. Sir Frederick Eoberts sent orders to General Macpherson to march very early on the llth, to follow the enemy, who were now retreating south and west by the Pughman Valley, and to endeavour to drive them towards General Baker. Macpherson was informed at the same time that the Horse Artillery and Cavalry, under Brigadier- General Dunham Massy, who was sent from Sherpur to assume command of the force,* would leave Killa Aushar at 9 A.M., and that he was to join them on the Urghundeh road. General Massy's orders, says, Sir Frederick Koberts, were, " to advance from Killa Aushar by the road leading directly from the City of Cabul towards Urghundeh and Ghazni ; to proceed cautiously and quietly, feeling for the enemy; to communicate with General Macphersou, and to act in conformity with that officer's movements, but on no account to commit himself to an action until General Macpherson had engaged the enemy." Instead of gaining the Ghuznee road by the ordinary route, General Massy started across country, intending to strike that road beyond the village of Killa Kazi. He detached one troop of the 9th Lancers, under Captain Chisholme, to com- municate with General Macpherson, who was some miles be- hind in the hills, and the troop did not rejoin him during the day. "Although, on nearing Killa Kazi," says Sir Frederick Roberts, " General Massy's advance guard reported to him that the enemy were in considerable force on the hills on either side of the Ghazni road, some three miles in advance, he still moved on. Shortly afterwards further reports were received by him that the enemy were coming down into the plain, with the evident intention of attacking him." The caution General Massy had been directed to exercise now disappeared, and he committed himself to engaging the enemy * His force was 4 guns F Battery, A Brigade, R.H.A. ; 2 squadrons 9th Lancers ; and 1 squadron 14th Bengal Lancers. Cavalry Action of the nth December. 283 without regard to the circumstance that he was directed to subordinate his movements to those of General Macpherson. With the object of checking the enemy until he could com- municate with that officer, General Massy opened fire with his guns at 2,900 yards, but as this had not the desired effect, he ordered the Battery of Horse Artillery to advance 400 yards nearer ; and finding the enemy continued advancing, he directed the guns again to move forward. They came into action at 2,000 yards, and in this position remained until the opposing forces arrived within 1,700 yards' range. The Afghans still continuing to advance, General Massy dismounted thirty men of the 9th Lancers, who commenced firing as soon as carbine range was reached, but the enemy were in such force according to General Massy' s estimate, 10,000 that, as he reported, the fire of the dismounted Lancers " had no appreciable effect." At this time Sir Frederick Roberts, accompanied by General Hills and Staff, arrived on the ground, in the expectation of witnessing the execution of his carefully laid plans, and taking command of the united columns of Generals Macpherson and Massy. His disappointment was great on finding the tables turned, and his troops in difficulties. Recognizing the critical state of affairs, and the inutility of continuing an action with Cavalry and Horse Artillery against an enemy in such overwhelming strength, and on ground so unfavourable, he ordered General Massy to retire and watch for an oppor- tunity for a Cavalry charge in order to extricate the guns. He also directed General Massy and Colonel Gordon, who had accompanied the former from Killa Aushar, where he had previously been in command, to find a road by which the guns could be withdrawn in safety. Sir Frederick Roberts writes to us of the situation, and the further steps he took at this juncture : " From the moment of my arrival on the ground I saw how critical the position was, and at once despatched one of my aides-de-camp, Lieutenant Sherston, of the Rifle Brigade, to General Macpherson, with a written order to wheel to his left, and advance to the assistance of the guns and Cavalry as rapidly as possible. At the same time I directed General Hills to gallop to Sherpur, and warn General Hugh 284 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts, Gough of what had occurred, to order him to be on the alert, and to send a wing of the 72nd Highlanders, with all possible speed, to the village of Deh Mazung, where they were to hold the gorge of the Cabul river at all hazards. Seeing at a glance the hopelessness of continuing the fight on such difficult ground with a handful of Cavalry, and observing that the extreme flanks of the Afghan Army were rapidly over- lapping the small party, I ordered General Massy to retire the guns towards Cabul, and to cover the movement by a Cavalry charge." The Cavalry charge, gallantly led by Lieutenant- Colonel R. S. Cleland, who was dangerously wounded, and by Captain Bloomfield Gough, on the flank, was well delivered, and did considerable execution, but did not succeed in checking the enemy for more than a few minutes. The gallant Colonel of the 9th Lancers was dangerously wounded,* and many others, officers and men, fell in the vain effort to check the advance of an army. The charge was necessary to save the guns, but it was well-nigh as desperate as that of Balaclava. In its in- cidents it resembled that made by the 2nd Bengal Cavalry at Purwandurrah, in the Kohistan, in December, 1840, when Dost Mahommed led the opposing horsemen, though it was more creditable, as the native troops disgraced themselves by leaving their officers to bear the brunt of the action. This act of infamy British Lancers were not likely to imitate. Retiring alternately, two Royal Horse Artillery guns re-opened fire, but the Afghans pressed on them hard, the gunners found their further movements stopped by a deep and narrow nullah, and in order to give them time while searching for a passage across, Sir Frederick Roberts ordered a second Cavalry charge. He writes to us : " Seeing that the guns were stuck in the watercourses, and the enemy still pressing on, I ordered General Massy to try a second charge, but this was not carried out ; the 9th Lancers were much broken, and before they could be got together, the guns had to be abandoned and spiked." During the retirement, Lieutenant Hardy, R.H.A., who was last seen endeavouring to help Lieutenant Forbes, 14th Bengal * Colonel Cleland died of his wounds on his return to India, after much and prolonged suffering. Results of the Cavalry Action. 285 Lancers, whose leg was broken, was killed, but the gunners and drivers succeeded in retreating in safety with the cavalry. "When the retreat took place my first object," writes Sir Frederick Roberts to us, " was to rally the Cavalry ; and together with my own small escort, a sufficient number of the 9th Lancers, 14th Bengal Lancers and gunners were got together, who by their dismounted fire checked in some slight measure the onward rush of the enemy. Slowly this weak party retired in the direction of the Deh Mazung village, the object being to give the Highlanders time to get there from Sherpur before the Afghans could seize the position." During the retirement, the squadron of the 14th Bengal Lancers, under the command of Captain Neville, covering the retreat, behaved with great steadiness and coolness. Many men had lost their horses in the charges, fifty- one having been killed in the small column, and many opportunities were afforded for the dis- play of that devotion which is never absent in a British force, even when most hardly pressed by an enemy.* The situation had become extremely grave, when the 72nd Highlanders, led by the chivalrous Brownlow, were seen advancing at the double through the gorge. Their advent was received with cheers by the troopers of the 9th. "It was literally touch and go as to who should reach the village first, the Highlanders or the Afghans, but our men swept in, and swarming to the tops of the houses the breechloaders soon checked the advancing tide." In vain the Afghans, headed by some Ghazees, surged round * In his despatch Sir Frederick Roberts gives the British loss as twenty- seven killed, of whom eighteen belonged to the 9th Lancers, and twenty- five wounded. The 9th Lancers lost two officers, Lieutenants Ricardo and Hearsey ; the Artillery one officer, Lieutenant Hardy ; and the 14th Bengal Lancers, one officer, Lieutenant Forbes. He writes : " Brigadier- General Massy specially mentions Lieutenant and Adjutant E. B. Mclnnis, and Lieutenant C. J. W. Tower, both of the 9th Lancers, for their gallantry ; whilst I personally witnessed the devoted bravery of the Reverend J. W. Adams, the chaplain attached to my force. Mr. Adams dismounted to assist a wounded man of the 9th Lancers, and, while so occupied, lost his horse ; when making his way back on foot, and although the enemy were but a few yards distance from him, Mr. Adams, regardless of his own safety, was mainly instrumental in saving the lives of two men of the 9th Lancers, who were caught under their horses, which had fallen in a water- course, and who, but for his aid, must have been speedily killed by the advancing enemy." For his gallantry Mr. Adams received the V.C., being the first clergyman who has gained the decoration. Captain Stewart-Macken- 286 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. the village, whence a deadly fire decimated their ranks. Foiled at every attempt to capture it by the rush, they abandoned the attempt to enter Cabul by the gorge, and took ground to the right, and occupied the Takht-i-Shah and all the slopes leading up to it, as well as the large walled villages in the Chardeh valley, thereby threatening the Upper Bala Hissar. We will now follow the operations of Brigadier- General Macpherson, as detailed in the despatch. Marching from the Surkh Kotul at 8 A.M., Macpherson moved in a south-westerly direction towards Urghundeh, but observing large bodies of the enemy crossing his front and proceeding towards Cabul, and hearing the firing of General Massy's guns on his left, he brought his right forward, and at 12.30 P.M., or about an hour after the Cavalry and Artillery had commenced retiring, he found himself very nearly on the ground where General Massy's action had been fought. Here he came across the rear of the enemy, who were speedily dispersed, some making for the hills above Killa Kazi, others for the Chardeh Valley. General Macpherson, not being fully informed of the result of General Massy's action, decided, about 3.30 P.M., to halt for the night at Killa Kazi, but afterwards received 'an order from Sir Frederick Roberts, directing him to fall back on Deh Mazung, where he arrived at 7 P.M., thus still further securing the approach to the city. Writing to us of General Macpherson's movements during the day, his Chief says : " His soldierly instinct had told him to wheel to his left on hearing Massy's guns, before my order to that effect reached him, and rapidly advancing, he soon came into collision with a large body of the enemy who were holding the ground over which the 9th Lancers had previously charged. Elated by their recent victory, these seemed disposed to show fight, but the brigade steadily advanced in line, and company volleys soon put them to flight." On his arrival at Deh Mazung, Sir Frederick Roberts, leaving with him the wing of the 72nd zie and Captain Bloomfield Gough, both of the 9th Lancers, distinguished themselves on this occasion, and the former officer brought the regiment out of action, and remained in the field until late in the day, although suffer- ing from a severe contusion. Second-Lieutenant Hunter and some non- commissioned officers and men of the 9th Lancers were also specially commended by Sir Frederick Roberts. The Crisis in Cabul and Skerpur. 287 Highlanders, returned to Sherpur, where he arrived about 8 P.M., after an exciting day, destined, however, to be followed by others equally full of incident. The position of affairs at Sherpur at one time had been suf- ficiently serious. With a vast cantonment, full of the winter supplies of food and forage for the British army, and almost denuded of troops, Brigadier-General Hugh Gough made the best dispositions for defence that lay in his power. His resolute bearing and military experience inspired confidence, until the arrival of Colonel Jenkins,* from Lutterbund, with the Guides, Cavalry and Infantry, tended to lessen the immediate danger somewhat, though reports were current of an intended attack on the Cantonments by the Kohistanees. The situation in Cabul during the day was also a very anxious one for General Hills, who, after despatching the Highlanders to Deh Mazung, took steps to defend the city committed to his charge against the soldiers of Mahomed Jan, or the malcon- tents and " budmashes," or swash-bucklers, who, as well as fanatics, swarm in these cities of Central Asia. The resources at General Hills's disposal were but limited, but a braver-hearted soldier does not exist, and he put a bold face on it, which goes a long way with the scum of great cities. At the Kotwallee,f or Magistrate's office, where he administered justice, General Hills placed a guard of forty Kuzzilbashes (literally " red heads," from the colour of their turbans), a tribe descended from the followers of Nadir Shah, who have always been friendly to the British, and he manned the gates with strong armed bodies of the same race. He himself patrolled the city with 100 Sikhs, and there was a company of the 72nd Highlanders posted on the Upper Bala Hissar. Though these were all the troops at his disposal, his arrangements averted a rising. Sir Frede- rick Roberts, on his way to the Cantonment from Deh Mazung, * Sir Frederick Roberts writes : " Foreseeing the probability of rein- forcements being required, and thinking that troops coming from India would have a good effect politically, I had ordered Colonel Jenkins on the 7th December to march on Cabul from Jugdulluck." t Had General Hills been attacked, as then anticipated, his fate might have been that of Sir Alexander Burnes in 1841, or Sir Louis Cavagnari in 1879, though what he chiefly feared was being burnt out, for which these buildings offer peculiar facilities. 288 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. detached a party of the 72nd Highlanders to reinforce the picket of the 67th, and this force, numbering 213 men, under Captain Jarvis, of the latter regiment, though attacked during the night with great determination, repulsed the enemy with heavy loss. Meantime the lost guns had been recovered by Colonel Macgregor. When his chief fell back on Deh Mazung, that gallant officer, judging that the infantry ordered from Sherpur might take the road by the Kotul to the north by Killa Aushar, went in that direction to meet them, and observing from this point that the ground where the guns were lying had been partially cleared of the enemy by the advance of General Macpherson's troops, he, with the assistance of some officers, collected a small party of the 9th Lancers, 14th Bengal Lancers, and Artillerymen, who had remained with him, retraced his steps, and picking up, en route, a few soldiers belonging to General Macpherson's baggage guard, was enabled to recover the guns and bring them into Cantonments before night. The Afghans had stripped them of all movable parts, and the ammunition boxes had been emptied, but otherwise they were intact, and were ready for use on the following day. During this eventful day the force detached under Brigadier- General Baker had also been engaged with the enemy. Start- ing early on the morning of the llth from his encampment in the neighbourhood of Maidan he found the enemy in considera- ble force, occupying the hills on either side of the Urghundeh road. The main body of General Baker's force was allowed to proceed unmolested, but his rear-guard and baggage were some- what hotly attacked ; owing, however, to the able manner in which the rear guard was commanded by Captain McCullum, 92nd Highlanders, and to the energy of the officers in charge of the Transport, the whole of the baggage was brought through in safety. Baker's advanced-guard had, in the meantime, reached Urghundeh, and found the Afghans in possession of both sides of the gorge through which the road runs into the Chardeh Valley. Although late in the afternoon it was neces- sary to dislodge the enemy from their position, commanding, as it did, the road to Cabul. This was effected in a brilliant manner by a portion of the 92nd Highlanders, under the com- Concentration within Sherpur. 289 mand of Major White, gallantly led by Lieutenant the Hon. J. Scott Napier, son of Lord Napier of Magdala. General Baker encamped that night at Urghundeh, being unaware of the mis- fortune that had befallen General Massy's force, all efforts to communicate with him on the part of the commanding General having been unsuccessful. Early on the morning of the 12th a heliogiaphic signal from Sherpur put Baker in possession of the changed situation. He was informed that the enemy were threatening the city in very considerable numbers, that Sir Frederick Koberts had found it necessary to withdraw General Macpherson's brigade to Deh Mazung, and that it was his wish he should return forthwith, as it was important that the whole force should be concentrated in the neighbourhood of the city and cantonment. Accordingly General Baker marched on Sher- pur, where he arrived during the day. It has been said that Sir Frederick Roberts underrated the strength of the forces from Wardak, Logar, and Maidan, con- trolled by Mahomed Jan, and that he committed an error in denuding Sherpur and despatching two brigades by the Chardeh and Logar Valleys, and thus separating them by a mountain range so that no communication could be maintained between them ; but even if this is so, the responsibility of failure in his arrangements does not rest with him, and all would have gone well had his plans been carried out as he intended. Sir Frederick, from his lengthened experience of the warlike capa- bilities of the Afghan levies, such as constituted the bulk of the forces arrayed against him under Meer Butcha and Mahomed Jan, was of opinion that either Macpherson's or Baker's brigades could have dealt with them singly, while they were on the march and not entrenched in strong positions ; but once they acquired the prestige of success by the capture of British guns they became infinitely more powerful, both morally and numerically, as our experience of the events round Cabul in 1841 amply testified would be the case. Had Sir Frederick kept Brigadier-General Baker back, and sent him by the Indikee route, that officer would have been in a position to attack Mahomed Jan as he slipped past Brigadier-General Macpher- son, but the Afghan Commander, who displayed considerable astuteness and military capacity, hearing that Baker was in his u 290 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. rear, made for the Cabul Valley, and at one time the position of the Sherpur Cantonment was most critical. At no juncture in his remarkable career did Sir Frederick Koberts display the genius of the great commander in a more striking manner than when, with the intuition of genius, he occupied the gorge leading to the city with the 72nd Highland- ers. That move, perhaps, saved the Cantonment from capture, for though the dispositions of Brigadier-General Gough were all that skill could devise and calm courage carry out, yet what would his small force of about 1,000 men, distributed over the vast enceinte of Sherpur, have effected against an infuriated horde of soldiers, villagers, and Ghazis, bent on revenge and rapine ? In a letter detailing the critical events by which the Camp at Sherpur was saved Sir Frederick Koberts says : " I reached Deh Mazung with the Cavalry which had been rallied, and which retired very steadily, squadron by squadron, keeping the enemy in check. "VVe came as slowly as possible, as I knew that unless the 72nd Wing, sent for from Sherpur, could reach Deh Mazung before we did, it would be scarcely possible for us to prevent the enemy from occupying that village and the neighbouring heights. The 72nd arrived just in time, and I remained until the arrival of General Macpherson's brigade, which I had ordered to fall back from Kila Kazi." It would be ungenerous to bear hard on General Massy, who suffered much for his rashness, as not only did Sir Frederick Haines, the Commander-in-Chief, animadvert severely on his conduct, but he was recalled to India. There was an error of judg- ment on his part, but mistakes have been made by the greatest commanders, and General Massy was a very gallant officer.* * A distinguished officer, who was an eye-witness of these events, places the blame of the disaster of the llth December unreservedly on Brigadier-General Massy, who, he maintains, did not carry out Sir Frederick's instructions. He said to us: "Sir Frederick Roberts thought each column, unassisted, quite able to drive off any force. Baker was to have caught Mahomed Jan's troops, but they, hearing he was in the rear, gave him the slip and made for the city. The enemy halted about six miles from Cabul, when Massy attacked them without orders. He took it upon himself to do so, as he had distinct orders to wait for Macpherson to attack with the infantry. The cavalry ought to have retired by the Ghuznee main road, which protected the city, or by the w -\j by which they came, which was practicable for guns ; had they done so the guns would have been saved. But instead of that Massy moved them through the fields and watercourses, Attack on the Takkt-i-Shah. 291 On the following day, Friday the 12th December, Sir Fred- erick Roberts resumed operations against the enemy, who, on finding that they were unable to enter the city, took up a strong position on a lofty peak known as the Takht-i-Shah (or King's throne), which is connected with the hill above the Bala Hissar by a long neck, or saddle, of very rough and difficult ground. Sir Frederick Roberts felt that unless he was to play the part of a second Elphinstone, an effort must be made to dislodge the enemy, and directed General Macpherson to make the attempt. Accordingly, Colonel Money, 3rd Sikhs, who had gained such distinction by his defence of the Shutargardan, was directed to make the attempt with two guns and 560 men.* The position held by the enemy was of great natural strength. The slopes of the Takht-i-Shah are very steep, strewn with jagged masses of rock and intercepted with scarps, and the natural impediments with which the assaulting party had to contend were still further increased by " sungars," or breast- works, which the enemy had thrown up at different points on the ascent to the peak. Behind these defences the Afghans, like Easterns, might be credited with fighting with resolution. In spite of the gallantry of the troops and the accuracy of the fire of Captain Morgan's guns, it was speedily manifest that a much larger force than Sir Frederick Roberts could spare from the defence of Sherpur, with Baker's Brigade absent, would be necessary to carry the heights. " The position," writes the between these two roads, and so got into difficulties and lost his guns. Sir Frederick Roberts at once grasped the situation, and sent General Hills to Sherpur with orders to turn out a wing of the 72nd Highlanders under Colonel Brownlow, to seize the gorge leading to the city. Hills did so, and just got there in time to save the retreating column and check the rebels from getting into the city. Meanwhile JNlacpherson was doubling up at the rear. It is, therefore, nonsense to declare that Massy threw himself into the gap as there were no British troops, and saved Sherpur. Had he waited for Macpherson there would have been no difficulty at all. Sir Frederick Roberts was driven back to the gorge, the guns being lost, and there were the 72nd Highlanders." The highest authority on the events of the llth December writes to us with characteristic generosity of the part played by Brigadier-General Massy : " He was taken by surprise, and failed to appreciate the part which his cavalry -was intended to play, as a portion of General Macpherson's brigade, upon the movements of which he should have waited." * The following was the constitution of the small column : 2 guns No. 1 Mountain Battery ; 215 men from 67th and 72nd Regiments ; 150 of the 3rd Sikhs ; and 195 men of the 5th Goorkhas. u 2 292 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. General, "was an exceedingly formidable one, and after gallant attempts to carry it, which lasted during the greater part of the day, I ordered the assault to be deferred. I saw that to ensure success without very serious loss, and to prevent the enemy relieving and reinforcing the party holding the peak, as I had observed them to be doing during the day, it was necessary not only to attack in front, but to operate also on the enemy's line of retreat."* General Macpherson was, accordingly, directed to hold the ground of which he had already gained possession, and informed that, on the following morning, General Baker, who only arrived at Sherpur in the evening, after a long and fatiguing march, would co-operate with him from the Beni Hissar side. Early on the morning of the 13th December, Sir Frederick Roberts commenced operations with vigour. Brigadier-General Baker was despatched with a column f with orders to proceed by the Bala Hissar road in the direction of Beni Hissar, to seize the heights above that village, and to operate on the enemy's position on the Takht-i-Shah from the south-east. At the same time Brigadier- General Macpherson was instructed to act in conjunction with General Baker from the direction of the north of the Bala Hissar. Soon after passing the Bala Hissar General Baker observed the enemy streaming out of the villages immediately below the Beni Hissar ridge, and resolved to cut their line in two. Covering his advance with the fire of his two batteries, the infantry advanced on the villages, the centre of which was seized by a movement described by the General as " bold and rapid." The 92nd Highlanders led the advance, under Major * The losses during the day were four killed and twelve wounded, includ- ing three officers, Lieutenant Faskin, 3rd Sikhs, Lieutenant Fergusson, 72nd Highlanders, and Major Cook, Y.C., 5th Goorkhas, who died on 29th December, mortification of the leg having ensued from his wound. Sir Frederick Roberts issued a graceful order to his troops, recounting the ser- vices of this gallant officer, whose loss was deplored by the entire force and was indeed of national concern. " He was one," says the General, " who would, had he been spared, have risen to the highest honours of his profes- sion." t Four guns G Battery, 3rd Brigade, R.A. ; 4 guns No. 2 Mountain Battery ; 1 squadron 9th Lancers ; 5th Punjaub Cavalry ; 6 Companies 92nd Highlanders ; 7 Companies Guides Infantry ; 300 rifles 3rd Sikhs ; afterwards reinforced by 150 rifles 5th Punjaub Infant y. Capture of the Enemy s Position. 293 White, who had so greatly distinguished himself at Charasia and elsewhere during the present campaign, and the attack on the enemy's first position was gallantly headed by Lieutenant Forbes, who, together with his Colour- Sergeant, James Drum- mond, was killed in a hand-to-hand fight. On seeing them fall there was a momentary waver among the Highlanders, when Lieutenant Dick Cunyngham rushed forward, and rallied the men by his example and cheering words.* As a national poet sings : " Joy to the chiefs that lead old Scotia's ranks, Of Roman garb and more than Roman fire." The Afghans on this occasion displayed unwonted daring, but the position was won after a brief struggle, and a large portion of the enemy were thus prevented from uniting themselves with those occupying the Takht-i-Shah. The 92nd High- landers and Guides, covered by the fire of Major Swinley's guns, which had by this time gained the summit of the lower ridge, and aided by that of Major Craster from the plain below, con- tinued the advance on the conical hill, though every foot of the way was contested. At length, shortly before noon, the 92nd Highlanders and Guides had reached the summit, where they were met by a party from the Bala Hissar side, consisting of the 72nd Highlanders, 3rd Sikhs and 5th Goorkhas, under the command of Major Sym, 5th Goorkhas, who had arrived there a few minutes before, f Large bodies of men were about this time seen issuing from the lower Bala Hissar and city, part of whom made for the heights of Siah-Sung, whilst the rest, advancing towards Beni Hissar, occupied two strongly fortified villages situated on either side of the road. One of these was captured by General Baker's troops on their return from the Takht-i-Shah ; the other, later in the day by a detachment of the 5th Punjaub Infantry, under Major Pratt, which Sir Frederick Roberts had sent from Sherpur to keep open the communication with General Baker. Observing the collection of men on the Siah-Sung, and thinking that Brigadier-General Baker might have some * This officer was awarded the V.C. for his gallantry on this occasion, and never was that much-coveted distinction more worthily gained. f Colour-Sergeant John Yule, 72nd Highlanders, was the first man up, and captured two standards. This gallant non-commissioned officer was killed on the following day. 294 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. difficulty in dealing with so many detached parties of the enemy, Sir Frederick despatched Brigadier- General Massy with the Cavalry brigade* to his assistance. During the operation the Guides Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel G. Stewart, made a brilliant charge, as did the 9th Lancers, under Captain Butson, who was killed, together with Sergeant-Major Spittle and three men ; Captain Chisholme and Lieutenant Tower with eight men of the same regiment being wounded. Notwithstanding the severity of his wound, Captain Chisholme remained in the saddle, and brought his regiment out of action. The 5th Pun- jaub Cavalry, under Lieutenant- Colonel Williams, also distin- guished themselves, Majors Hammond and Stewart both leading successful charges, so that the Cavalry had an ample revenge in the loss they inflicted on the enemy for the misad- venture of the llth December. The result of the day's operations was regarded by Sir Fred- erick Roberts as very satisfactory. The enemy had been driven from the southern range, and their advance in that direction had been stopped ; they had suffered greatly from the British Artillery and infantry fire when on the hill sides ; and on the plain below they had been severely dealt with by the Cavalry. In the evening Sir Frederick recalled General Baker to canton- ments, and directed General Macpherson to move from Deh Mazung and occupy the Bala Hissar heights, leaving the 5th Goorkhas to retain possession of the Takht-i-Shah.f But stern work was before the Cabul Field Force, and before night- fall on the succeeding day, the aspect of affairs changed, and the aggressors became the defenders. Every one in Sherpur, including Sir Frederick Roberts, was of opinion that the marked success that had attended the opera- tions of the day, and the heavy losses inflicted on the enemy, would result in their dispersion, but the light of morning * General Massy took with him from Sherpur : 1 squadron 9th Lancers, and 2 squadrons 14th Bengal Lancers ; and was joined on Siah-Sung by 2 squadrons 5th Punjaub Cavalry, and 1 squadron 9th Lancers. The Guides Cavalry were an independent command. t The losses during the day were : Killed, iiwo officers, Lieutenant Forbes, 92nd Highlanders, and Captain Butson, 9th Lancers, and twelve men, half British. Wounded two officers, Captain Chisholme and Lieu- tenant Tower, 9th Lancers, and twenty-seven British soldiers and s ; xteen natives. Twenty horses were also killed and thirty-two wounded. Roberts takes the Offensive. 295 quickly dispelled the illusion. Fortunately the British Com- mander was prepared for any fortune, and reverses found him as calm and collected, and his resources as well in hand as after such successes as the Peiwar Kotul and Charasia. When daylight broke on the 14th December, large masses of men, with many standards, were observed in occupation of a high hill on the Kohistan road, about a mile north of the heights of the Koh Asmai ; and as the day advanced, they passed in great numbers from this hill, and also along the Ko- histan road, to the crest of the heights, where they were joined by other bodies from the direction of Chardeh and the city. It now became apparent, adds Sir Frederick Roberts, that, "foiled in their western and southern operations, the enemy had concentrated to the north-west, and were about to deliver an attack in great strength from that quarter." The General was not the man to sit tamely by while the enemy took the initiative, but resolved to drive them off the Asrnai heights, and to cut their communications with the north. The Koh Asmai, it should be noted, flank Sherpur in the west, at a distance of about a mile, and as their occupation in force was a menace to the security of the cantonment, the expulsion of the enemy was a paramount necessity. Accordingly, at 9 A.M. on the 14th, Sir Frederick Roberts despatched Brigadier- General Baker with a force* to the eastern slope of the Asmai, to drive the enemy off the range. Under cover of the fire of his field and mountain guns, which came into action close to the ruined village of Biland Kheyl, General Baker seized the small conical hill which forms the northern shoulder of the Aliabad Kotul, thus placing himself on the enemy's line of communication, and preventing the force on Asmai receiving support either from the large bodies on the hill to the north or on the Kohistan road. Having gained this preliminary advantage, General Baker sent Colonel Jenkins to attack the conical hill with a small force. f Having effected * Four guns G Battery, 3rd Brigade, R.A., under Major Craster ; 4 guns No. 2 Mountain Battery, under Major Swinley ; 14th Bengal Lancers ; 72nd Highlanders, 192 men ; 92nd Highlanders, 100 ; Guides Infantry, 460 ; 5th Punjaub Infantry, 470 men. t One hundred and ninety-four men, 72nd Highlanders ; 70 of 92nd Highlanders ; and 422 Guides Infantry. 296 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. this with small resistance on the part of the enemy, Colonel Jenkins left a party of sixty-four men of the 72nd Highlanders and sixty of the Guides Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant- Colonel Clarke, of the former regiment, who had led the suc- cessful attack upon this point, to hold the conical hill, and with the remainder pushed on to dislodge the enemy from the posi- tion on Asmai, from the western side. The 5th Punjaub Infantry was held in reserve with the guns, while the Cavalry, following the attacking force, descended into the Chardeh Valley. The advance on the enemy's position at Asmai was led by Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow with his Highlanders, the Guides Infantry on the right affording assistance by operating on the enemy's flank, and it was conducted with the gallantry that had distinguished those regiments on the previous day. As soon as the eastern point of the main position had been carried, General Baker directed four guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery, escorted by 100 rifles of the 5th Punjaub Infantry, to reinforce the party which had been left on the conical hill, with a view of supporting the advance by engaging the enemy in the Chardeh and Kohistan directions. He also covered the advance by the four guns of G Battery, 3rd Brigade, under Major Craster, R.A., and Sir Frederick Roberts rendered assistance by bringing into action four guns of F Battery, A Brigade R.H.A., commanded by Captain II . Pipon, which was posted near the south-west corner .of the Sherpur cantonment. The attack was further assisted by the fire of four guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery, under Captain Morgan, R.A., attached to Brigadier- General Macpherson's Column, from the Bala Hissar hill, and by two companies of the 67th Regiment, under Major G. Baker, which, crossing the Cabul river and acting on the enemy's left rear, contributed to render their position on the Asmai heights untenable. The ground was most difficult, and the enemy fought with the greatest obstinacy ; the Highlanders and Guides were, how- ever, not to be denied, and eventually reached the highest peak, where stood a number of Ghazis in their white robes, as typical of their resolution to die for the faith. Here a severe struggle took place, and many acts of gallantry were performed, but at 12.30 the British troops were in possession of the Severe Fighting. 297 Asmai heights. It seemed as if complete success had rewarded the combinations of Sir Frederick Roberts and the gallantry of his troops ; but a change suddenly came over the scene, and victory was turned into very like defeat, due to the over- whelming forces of the enemy. The first intimation to cause anxiety was a heliographic message from Brigadier- General Macpherson, informing Sir Frederick Roberts that very large bodies of the enemy were moving northwards from Indikee, with the apparent intention of effecting a junction with the hostile force that still held the hills towards Kohistan, and of endeavouring to re-take the original position. Similar information was about this time communicated to Brigadier-General Baker by Colonel Ross, commanding the cavalry, which he had sent over the low western spurs of the conical hill to ascertain the numbers and movements of the enemy, and suddenly a large body of the Afghans, creeping up the hill- side from the Chardeh villages, made an attack on the small party left on the conical hill, and before a reinforcement of 100 men of the 5th Punjaub Infantry, sent by General Baker, could arrive to their assistance, the enemy stormed the position. In seeking to rally his men and re-take the hill, Captain Spens, 72nd Highlanders, was killed, and two guns of the Mountain Battery were lost, though no blame whatever attached to the officers and men, who displayed conspicuous gallantry. " The mountain guns," writes Sir Frederick Roberts to us, " had already limbered up, and were retiring down the hill in good order, when the Afghans gained the crest two of the gun mules were shot, and though the gunners rolled the two 7-pounders down the hill, it was found impossible to carry either of them away, and they fell into the hands of the enemy. Though Captain Hall's reinforcement of the 5th Punjaubees was at first carried away by the panic, yet they and the remainder of the party re-formed again at the foot of the slope, and with their fire covered the retreat of the other two guns of Swinley's battery." Sir Frederick Roberts witnessed these events with great chagrin, but he had done all that lay in his power to prevent the loss of the hill, by despatching to General Baker's assist- ance from Sherpur 200 men of the 3rd Sikhs, who had been 298 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. escorting Captain Pipon's guns. Meanwhile, as on the previous day, heavy masses of the enemy were observed collecting on Siah-Sung, and proceeding round the eastern flank of canton- ments in the direction of Kohistan. Sir Frederick accordingly despatched a small force of cavalry and two guns of F Battery, A Brigade, B.H.A., under the command of Brigadier- General Hugh Gough, to disperse them, but owing to the ground in that direction being much intercepted by deep watercourses, the advance of the guns was necessarily slow, and by the time the obstacles had been overcome, the enemy had got so far on the road towards Kohistan and so close to the hills that pursuit was impossible. A party of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, under Captain Vousden, who had done good service in the Kurram campaign, met with better success. This regiment was quartered in the Shah Bagh (King's garden) which played so prominent a part in the siege of General Elphinstone's army in 1841 situated about a third of the way between Sherpur and the city, and Sir Frederick had in the morning sent orders to the commanding officer, Lieutenant- Colonel Williams, to be on the look-out for any enemy that might pass in that direction. About 1 P.M. some 300 or 400 were observed moving along the left bank of the river, and Captain Vousden, who, with one troop, was out on reconnoissance, most gallantly charged into the midst of them. Though only twelve of his men were able to follow him, he succeeded in dispersing the enemy, and in inflicting severe loss upon them, killing five men with his own hand. Half of his gallant little band were placed hors de combat. " My object throughout these operations," writes Sir Frederick, " had been either to break up the combination against us by dealing with the enemy in detail, or at least to prevent their getting command of the hills to the north and west of Cabul, and thus gain possession of the city and Bala Hissar. Up to this time I had no reason to apprehend that the Afghans were in sufficient force to successfully cope with disciplined troops, but the resolute and determined manner in which the conical hill had been re-captured, and the in- formation sent to me by Brigadier- General Macpherson from the signal station on the Bala Hissar, that large masses of the Retirement into Sherpur, 299 enemy were still advancing from the north, south, and west, made it evident that the numbers combined against us were too overwhelming to admit of my comparatively small force meeting them, especially on ground which still further in- creased the advantages they possessed from their vast numeri- cal superiority. I, therefore, determined to withdraw from all isolated positions, and to concentrate the whole force at Sherpur, thus securing the safety of our large cantonments, and avoiding what had now become a useless sacrifice of life." It was with great reluctance that General Roberts adopted this measure, as it involved the temporary abandonment of the city and the Bala Hissar, a loss serious in itself, and likely to produce a bad effect on the country at large. Under the circumstances, however, no other course was left to him but to remain on the defensive, and wait until the arrival of reinforce- ments, or the growing confidence of the enemy should afford him a favourable opportunity for inflicting a defeat on them. Time, under any circumstances, would work in his favour, as the enemy did not possess supplies sufficient to enable them to keep the field in such vast numbers in the depth of winter. Orders to retire within Sherpur were accordingly issued to Brigadier-Generals Macpherson and Baker, and the withdrawal from the Bala Hissar and Asmai heights was accomplished without loss, and in a manner highly creditable to the discipline of the troops. General Macpherson, whose brigade had to pass through a portion of the city and the suburb of Deh Afghan, had before him a critical task, but he performed it with the coolness and ability that had distinguished him throughout the past few days. His rear-guard was harassed, and his troops were subjected to a heavy fire as they moved along the narrow streets and through the numerous gardens and orchards, but the Brigadier-General brought off his men and baggage in perfect order, and with comparatively little loss. General Macpherson was well seconded by the officers commanding corps, especially Colonel Knowles, commanding the 67th Regiment. The retirement of Brigadier-General Baker's troops down the eastern face of Asmai, under a heavy fire, was also well conducted by Colonel Jenkins, who spoke in high terms of the 300 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. gallantry of Colonel Brownlow and Major Stockwell, 72nd Highlanders, and also of Colonel E.. Campbell, of the Guides. During the retreat an officer of the Guides displayed great devotion. Captain Hammond had been very forward during the storming of the Asmai heights, and now, when the enemy were crowding up the western slopes, he remained with a few men on the ridge until the Afghans were within thirty yards of them, and when one of the Guides was shot, he stopped and assisted in carrying him away, though the enemy were at the time close by and firing heavily.* By the evening of the 14th all troops and baggage were within the cantonments, and that night the Afghan army occupied the city and Bala Hissar. Sir Frederick Roberts directed the operations of the 12th, 13th, and 14th, from the roof of the quarters he occupied in Sherpur, whence he could see very fairly all the surrounding country. Except when riding out to meet the troops returning from fighting, in order to encourage the men and speak to the wounded, he did not quit the Cantonment during those days. As the British General mustered his soldiers behind the sheltering ramparts of Sherpur he had reason to deplore the loss of many gallant menf during the past eventful week. Eighty-three had fallen, including 8 officers, and 192 were wounded, among whom were 12 officers, some of whom died, including Colonel Cleland and Major Cook, V.C. Like Hector, after his warriors had been chased within the sheltering walls of Troy " Round the battlement and round the plain For many a chief he look'd, but look'd in vain." Considering the vast numerical superiority of the enemy and * Captain (now Major) Hammond received the Victoria Cross for his gallantry on this occasion, as did likewise Captain (now Major) Vousden of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry. t The losses on the 14th December were : General Baker's brigade Killed, 2 officers, Captain Spens and Lieutenant Gaisford, 72nd Highlanders, and twenty-seven men ; wounded, three officers, Captain Gordon, 92nd Highlanders ; Captain Battye, Guides ; and Lieutenant Egerton, 72nd Highlanders, and eighty-six men. General Macpherson's brigade had five killed and eleven wounded. Cavalry brigade, eight wounded. Grand total, thirty-four of all ranks killed, and one hundred and sixty-six wounded. Roberts on the Situation. 301 the nature of the positions from which they were dislodged during the operations, this loss is very moderate, though heavy in comparison with that suffered in previous encounters with the Afghans. It has been sought in some quarters to convey the impression that Sir Frederick Roberts was taken by surprise during the month of December, but this is not so. Though the Com- manding general had no reason to expect the rapid gathering of such enormous numbers as beleagured Sherpur, computed by the Afghan leaders themselves at between 100,000 and 120,000 men and certain Sirdars in camp, notably Daoud Shah, the late Commander-in-Chief of the ex- Ameer, who was placed under arrest for his treachery, gave false information he anticipated be- ing closely pressed during the winter, and it was to guard against this probability that he made strenuous preparations to provide for a siege or blockade by laying in supplies for men and animals in such vast quantities. He says : " Though my information for some weeks previous to the disturbances made me aware of the increasing hostile feeling with which we were regarded, and of the fact that the tribes were assembling in considerable strength, yet it was impossible to form any estimate as to what numbers we should have to contend with at Cabul." At the same time, he was too well versed in Asiatic warfare and too familiar with the Afghan character to act on the defensive, and leave the gatherings in Logar and Kohistan to develop into a national rising without seeking to suppress them by vigorous action, which was only ineffectual from the circum- stance, as he writes to us, " that 6,000 men were numerically incapable of, at the same time, leaving a sufficient garrison in Sherpur, and taking the offensive against armies numbering twenty times their strength." 3O2 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. CHAPTER XVI. The Situation at Sherpur and in Cabul The City and Bala Hissar Seized by the Enemy Their Movements against Sherpur Sir Frederick Roberts places the Cantonment in a Condition of Defence Colonel Hudson and the Garrison at Lutterbund Desultory Fighting with the Enemy between the 14th and 21st December The Attack of the 23rd December The Final Rout of the Afghans by Sir Frederick Roberts Arrival of Brigadier-General Charles Gough with Reinforcements The future Government of Afghanistan The Rival Pretenders to the Ameership Sir Donald Stewart Succeeds to the Chief Command in North-Eastern Afghanistan. To some in the Camp unaccustomed to the vicissitudes of war, and to most of their countrymen in England, who received the intelligence by telegraph, the situation of affairs on the evening of the 14th December was alarming ; but it was not so in the eyes of the general officer commanding the Cabul Field Force, who had gone through the leaguer of Delhi, and at the Peiwar Kotul and Charasia showed the world what military genius and indomitable resolution could effect against enormous odds. He was much stronger now than when achieving either of these memorable feats of war, and though he was placed under the disadvantage of temporarily assuming the defensive, an uncon- genial role to one of his ardent temperament, yet he had in his favour an easily defensible position, with ample supplies of stores and ammunition, thanks to his own prescience. Time also would work in his favour, as the elements of coherence were wanting in the ranks of the enemy, and an assault of his works would only end in their own discomfiture, while rein- forcements would be despatched to his aid as soon as practic- able. Nevertheless, these were anxious days, but the cheerful and confident bearing of Sir Frederick Roberts instilled a like feeling into the officers and men, who were quite content to trust their lives and the honour of the flag to the tried com- Roberts s Reasons for Concentrating in Sherpur. 303 mander who had weathered so many of the storms of war. There was also a bracing effect in " the stern joy which warriors feel In foemen worthy of their steel." There were not wanting critics in India who condemned the abandonment of the Bala Hissar, and the concentration of the force at Sherpur, pointing to the disastrous effects of the former step in the first Afghan War. But the conditions of the problem were altered, and concentration in an easily defensible position was widely different from concentration in a cantonment commanded on all sides and with the supplies stored without its walls. Sir Frederick Roberts set forth the causes that induced him to place his force at Sherpur in preference to occupying the Bala Hissar and the Siah Sung heights in a despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, written at this time. His chief reason was the inadequacy of the Bala Hissar to contain and afford shelter to the entire force, with its camp followers and numerous transport animals. Hence it would have been obligatory to have divided his troops a measure to which he was very averse by locating a portion of them elsewhere, possibly upon Siah Sung, a bare and bleak plateau, nearly a mile distant from the remainder of the force, where water would have been procurable with difficulty, and where no single facility for carrying on the necessary hutting opera- tions existed. On the other hand, there was an abundant supply of running water at Sherpur, and wells could be readily sunk, water being procurable within seven feet of the surface. Again, the disastrous explosions of the 16th October led Sir Frederick Roberts to regard as a grave risk the permanent settlement of the greater portion of the force close to and around a vast magazine, which, there was a strong presumption to suppose, was mined. These facts, added to the existence of accommo- dation sufficient to at once house the Commissariat stores, the entire European portion of the force, and a large part of the native troops, and the rapid approach of the Afghan winter, induced him, after carefully weighing the matter, to decide upon the occupation of Sherpur, and, he added, in writing after the critical events of December, "I see no reason, in the light of recent occurrences, to alter that opinion." 304 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. On the other hand, there were drawbacks to placing the force in Sherpur, the chief of which were, the vast extent of the Cantonment, and the impossibilty of at all reducing its line of defences. Sherpur was in the form of a parallelogram, whose northern side was formed by the Behmaroo ridge,* a range of low but steep, isolated hills, rising some 300 feet above the surrounding plain, and running almost due east and west for a distance (including the slopes at either end) of 2,500 yards. A large lake, or " jheel," whose breadth varies from a quarter to half a mile, lies between the northern slope of the ridge and the steep hills which form the southern boundary of the Kohistan country. As this lake is not more than a mile and a half distant from, and is parallel to, the Behmaroo heights for quite three miles, it formed a barrier, round whose flanks and between which and the heights, no troops would dare advance against an enemy well provided with artillery. The southern face of the cantonment, which had a length of 2,650 yards, was a continuous and massive mud wall, sixteen feet high, pierced at intervals of about 700 yards by three gateways, which again were protected by lofty circular bastions. Between these gates, and also at the angles, were a series of lower bastions, which gave an admirable flanking fire. The western flank, about 1,000 yards in length, was constructed on a precisely similar plan, save that the northern portion was much damaged by an explosion which occurred the day before the cantonment was first entered by General Massy. The eastern face was the weakest, as the original design was never completed ; the wall, which was intended to resemble that of the other faces, did not exceed seven feet in height, and even this was incomplete for a considerable distance. From this point the line of defence tended to the north-west, and, skirting the village of Behmaroo, ran into the eastern slope of the Behmaroo ridge. The first step that recommended itself to the judgment of Sir Frederick Eoberts on occupying Sherpur, in order to * This ridge, which commanded the old cantonment in 1841, played a chief part in rendering it untenable, and much fighting occurred on its slope and base. The Defences of Sherpur. 305 prevent annoyance in the event of a strong combination, was to destroy the villages and walled enclosures surrounding it, so as to create an esplanade round the Cantonments ; but the pres- sure of even more important work, the collection of supplies and the provision of shelter for such of the troops as had not already been housed, combined with the scarcity of labour, compelled him in a great measure to defer this precautionary step. He was, also, unwilling to arouse ill-feeling on the part of the people of Cabul, by what might have appeared an un- necessary act of harshness. As he said : " It was his constant endeavour, from the first, to make the occupation of the country as little irksome to its inhabitants as the safety and welfare of the troops permitted." But he paid the penalty of his humanity, for several of the villages, which were described as "small fortresses protected by massive mud walls, impervious to all but heavy artillery, and guarded by strong, loopholed, flanking towers," gave considerable trouble during the events which occurred between the 15th and 23rd of December, and eventually had to be razed to the ground. As soon as it became apparent that the events of the llth December were the forerunners of a serious movement, Sir Frederick took all the necessary steps for strengthening the defences of Sherpur, and made every preparation to meet the large force known to be assembling. As regards food and ammunition he had no anxiety at this period. Sufficient supplies were actually stored in Sherpur to last the entire force for nearly four months, with the exception of "bhoosa " (chopped straw), of which there was only enough for six weeks. There was ample firewood for all purposes ; medicines and hospital comforts were sufficient for all possible requirements for a similar time ; and there was enough ammunition, both for guns and rifles, to have carried on an obstinate defence for three, or even four, months. To facilitate the strengthening of the defences, Sir Frederick Roberts divided them into five sections, which were placed under the following officers : Brigadier- General Macpherson, C.B.,V.C., to command the section from the 2nd Brigade gate, on the southern face, to the Behmaroo village on the east. Colonel Jenkins, C.B., Corps of Guides, the section from the x 306 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. Behmaroo village up the eastern slope of Belimaroo ridge. Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, C.B., V.C., that from the eastern extremity of the Behmaroo village to the gorge which divides the ridge. Major-General J. Hills, C.B., V.C., the sec- tion from the gorge to the head-quarters gate. Lieutenant- Colonel Bro\vnlow, C.B., that from the head-quarters gate to the 2nd Brigade gate. Brigadier-General Massy was placed in the centre with the Cavalry, whilst Brigadier-General Baker, C.B., commanded the reserve, which was formed up at the southern entrance to the gorge leading through the Behma- roo ridge.* Telegraphic communication was established between Sir Frederick Roberts's head-quarters on the west face, and the temporary head-quarters of Generals Macpherson, Gough, Hills and Baker, and the Native field hospital. All the five sections and the Behmaroo heights were also brought into communication with each other and head-quarters by means of visual signalling. The defences adopted to strengthen the works were the follow- ing: A "laager," made out of captured Afghan gun-carriages and limbers, was constructed at the north-western corner of Cantonments, closing the open ground which lay between the front of the Behmaroo heights and the north-west circular bastion, and the ground in its immediate front was strengthened by means of abatis and wire entanglements, whilst a village, which formed an excellent flank defence along the western and northern face, was held as an independent post. Six towers had been previously constructed on the Behmaroo heights, * The troops were allotted for the defence, says the Times correspondent, as follows : The 3rd Sikhs, the 5th Goorkhas, and a wing of the 23rd Pioneers held the Behmaroo heights, each that portion near its own lines ; the Guides held Behmaroo village ; a detachment of the 28th Punjaub Infantry the field hospital and adjoining defences. On the east face the 67th Foot had a company in the redoubt near the south-east angle ; and the remainder of the regiment and a wing of the 72nd Highlanders held the parapet and three gateways on the south face. The west face and the General's gateway were held by the Sappers, some marks- men from the British regiments, and the 5th Punjaub Infantry, the latter regiment being also answeraUe for the defence of the gap at the north- west angle. The reserve consisted of the 92nd Highlanders and a wing each of the 67th and 72nd, one mountain battery, and six squadrons of dis- mounted cavalry at night. The Defences of Sherpur. 307 and the shelter-trenches which existed there were deepened and so prolonged as to form one continuous line of defence throughout its entire length. An abatis protected the front of the shelter-trench, and gun-pits were constructed at those points where artillery fire could be most advantageously used. The works in the gorge were strengthened and so arranged as to bring a galling flanking fire to bear upon an enemy advancing from the north. In order to strengthen the north- east corner a two-gun battery was thrown up on the eastern slope of the heights, and connected with the tower above it and the village below. Behmaroo village was loopholed, the outlying buildings to the front made defensible, and the open space to the north-east obstructed with abatis and wire entanglements. The same steps were taken at the Native field hospital, and sand-bag parapets built upon the roof, which was somewhat exposed. The low wall of the eastern face of the Cantonments was raised by logs of wood being placed along the top in several tiers, thus affording good shelter the front here, as elsewhere, being faced with abatis, for which purpose the wood cut down in clearing the nearest gardens and enclosures supplied the material.* The construction of all these defences was conducted under the superintendence of Lieutenant-Colonel Perkins, C.B., Com- manding Royal Engineers. In order to supplement the field guns,f and leave them free to move out as opportunity offered, several of the captured Afghan guns were utilized, and, under the superintendence of Colonel Gordon, R.A., mounted on the defences, whence they subsequently played with good effect. A number of marksmen were provided with Enfield rifles and cartridges found in the Bala Hissar, by which means ammunition was economised. Early in the morning of the 15th December the telegraph wire was cut, but not before Sir Frederick had communicated the situation of affairs to the Commander-in-Chief and the * See despatch of Sir Frederick Roberts. f The field guns of the British force consisted of twelve 9-pounders and four 7-pounders. Among the ordnance captured was a complete battery of siege guns, four smooth bore 18-pounders, and two 8 -inch howitzers, presented to Shere AH by the Indian Government, which were mounted on the southern face. x 2 308 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. Government of India, and urged the advisability of sending reinforcements as speedily as possible to enable him to assume the offensive. At the same time he sent orders to General Bright at Jellalabad, to move Brigadier-General Charles Gough's brigade from Gundamuck to Cabul without loss of time, and to send Brigadier-General Arbuthnot's brigade towards Cabul as soon as fresh troops should reach Jellalabad from India. He decided upon recalling to Sherpur the small garrison of Bootkak, which was in an exposed and isolated position, and considered the expediency of withdrawing the force under Colonel Hudson, 28th Punjaub Native Infantry, at Lutturbund, which consisted of two mountain guns, the 28th Punjaub Native Infantry, and a wing of the 23rd Pioneers, regarding whose safety he was very anxious. But as the position was a strong one, ammunition plentiful, and it was in direct helio- graphic communication with Cabul, he decided to maintain the post. He had every confidence in Colonel Hudson, and felt satisfied that, so long as Lutturbund was held, no serious opposition could be offered to General Gough's advance; and the result justified this decision, for but slight resistance was offered to General Gough at Jugdulluck, and none what- ever after that point was passed. This post of Lutturbund was, in fact, the chief link in the line of communications, but there was some hazard in holding it with a weak garrison, who, moreover, were known to be short of provisions, and as the troops at Bootkak had been withdrawn to Sherpur the only assistance they could receive was from Brigadier-General Charles Gough, against whom the tribesmen, under Asrna- tullah Khan, were gathering. The General heliographed an order through Colonel Hudson for Gough to advance with all speed, and directed him to hold his own as best he could until the arrival of that officer, which he anticipated would be in two days, though it was dela} 7 ed until the 23rd, owing, says a General officer present at Cabul, to the order not appearing of a peremptory character. Colonel Hudson flashed a reply to the General that the Lut- turbund garrison were on half rations, but after the 20 th would have nothing, upon which Sir Frederick Roberts got some Hazara men, with sixty mules, to carry provisions to The Investment of Sherpur. 309 Colonel Hudson, under the promise of a large reward if they reached Lutturbund that night. On leaving Sherpur these faith- ful mercenaries made a great detour, passing round Bootkak, then held by the enemy, and reached Lutturbund on the following morning with the loss of only a few animals. This timely assistance saved the Lutturbund garrison from retiring, with the probability of suffering heavily, as the tribesmen were all in arms in the passes. On the 16th, a body of about 1,000 men threatened Colonel Hudson, who, however, at- tacked and dispersed them, inflicting considerable loss in both killed and wounded. The Afghans, as is usual with Asiatics, showed an extra- ordinary incapacity to take advantage of their recent good fortune, and allowed the fever-heat produced by the intoxi- cation of success to pass away without making an effort to assault the works of Sherpur. They appeared on the heights above Deh Afghan in great force, but beyond shouting and carrying standards took no active measures to profit by their success. On the other hand, Sir Frederick Koberts, with the assistance of his Engineers, pushed the construction of the defences of the Cantonment where they were defective or incomplete, and the respite of the few days succeeding the 14th December was put to such excellent use that the works soon became practically impregnable to the assaults of any army Afghanistan could bring against them. The Infantry and a portion of the dismounted Cavalry were stationed along the extensive enceinte, and slept at their posts, being pro- vided with extra blankets to guard against the cold. The reserve, under General Baker, was kept in readiness to turn out at a moment's notice and proceed to any threatened point. But the enemy were seemingly busy sacking the Hindoo and Kuzzilbash quarters in Cabul, and the houses of all those citizens and Sirdars who had shown favour to the British, and no reliable estimate could be formed, from the reports of spies, of the intentions of Mahomed Jan and the other leaders of the movement. It was known, however, that Moosa Khan, Yakoob Khan's heir, had been proclaimed Ameer, but, from his tender years, he was of course a mere puppet to give the pretence of legality to the proceedings of Mahomed 3io Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. Jan, whose low extraction made him obnoxious to the Sirdars, though the boy's mother, a woman of remarkable energy, threw herself heart and soul into the movement, and the assist- ance and countenance afforded by Mooskh-i-Alum gave an air of religious respectability that tended to rally to the national standard all the Ghazis and fanatics of the country. The excitement, as was to be expected, extended to the passes between Bootkak and Gundamuck, and the Tezeen valley, which a fortnight before was the scene of a junction between the brigades of Generals Macpherson and Charles Gough, was in a disturbed state, and the Jugdulluck Pass through which Sir Michael Kennedy had ridden to Cabul shortly before, escorted by a few Sowars, and Yakoob Khan had passed, guarded by a single troop was held in such strength that Brigadier- General Charles Gough, who was advancing to the relief of the beleaguered garrison of Sherpur at the head of 5,000 men, reported that it was impracticable without rein- forcements. Not only did the Ghilzyes and Khugianis oppose Gough's advance, but further to the eastward, on the line of advance from the Khyber, the Mohmunds were actively hostile to the British, who had deported to India their chief, father-in-law of the ex- Ameer Yakoob. During the next few days the enemy confined their active efforts against the garrison of Sherpur to a distant fusillade from old walls and dismantled forts, and the King's garden, or Shah Bagh, which figured in the former investment of 1841- 42. On the 17th they assembled in crowds on the Siah Sung hill and the heights over Deh Afghan, but all the fervid prompt- ings of the Moollahs could not bring them to advance, and they dispersed after receiving a few shots amidst their ranks. The Afghan strength brought together at this time round Sherpur in the hope of plunder, united with hatred of the unbeliever, was placed by Sir Frederick Roberts in his despatches at 60,000 ; but this, he informs us, was an under-estimate, and he afterwards heard from reliable native sources, that between 100,000 and 120,000 men had gathered at Cabul in response to the fiery exhortations of the Moollahs. Again, on the 18th, the enemy came out of Cabul in great strength, the Ghazis, as usual, exposing themselves, but they The Investment of Skerpur. 3 1 1 were met by such a hot and well-directed fire from the walls, that they could not be brought to encounter the perils involved in leaving the cover of the gardens and buildings, and risking assault across the open. Nothing could exceed the excellent spirit animating the troops, both European and Native, though the intense cold and the night bivouac in the snow must have severely taxed the latter especially. Nevertheless cheerfulness reigned throughout the camp, the men looking forward with eagerness to the time when their trusted commander would lead them from behind the rampart of Sherpur against the enemy who insulted them by voice and gesture, but abstained from making the long-threatened attack. Sir Frederick Koberts was very desirous of keeping open his communications with India, and as cavalry would be of great service to General Charles Gough in the advance from Luttur- bund, he despatched the 12th Bengal Cavalry at 3 A.M., on the morning of the 22nd, to effect a junction with him. Major Green, their commanding officer, acting under instructions, finding that Bootkak was occupied by the enemy, passed on to Lutturbund and joined Colonel Hudson, after a skirmish, in which he lost some men. Major Green conducted this duty in a manner that elicited the commendations of his chief. Each day, between the 14th and 21st December, Cavalry reconnoissances were made from Sherpur, and some portion of the force turned out to dislodge the Afghans from points in vicinity to the walls. Some of the forts and other cover in the immediate neighbourhood of Sherpur were also destroyed. In one of these affairs, an attack on the fort of Meer Akhor ("Master of the Horse "), a gallant young officer, Lieutenant Montanaro, E.A., received a mortal wound. Sir Frederick, however, confined himself to minor operations of this descrip- tion, and did not undertake any sortie in force with the object of gaining possession of portions of the enemy's position. His force was not sufficiently large to admit of his holding them, and he, therefore, wisely determined to wait until he could act decisively. Mahomed Jan and his coadjutors thinking that, as they had compelled the British to retire within their own cantonments, as in the dismal days of 1841, they had only to complete the 312 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. parallel and destroy the army in the passes on the return march to India, had the audacity to offer terms almost identical with those wrung from the timid and incompetent General Elphin- stone nearly forty years before. Mahomed Jan, playing the part of Mahomed Akbar Khan, offered to permit the Army to retire from Afghanistan without molestation too well history has taught us what reliance could be placed on such a promise from an Afghan while the British General was to place two officers of rank in his hands as was done in the case of Major Pottinger, and Captains Lawrence and Colin Mackenzie and was, further, to engage to restore Yakoob Khan to the throne one of the conditions proposed by Akbar Khan, who required the return to Cabul of his father, Dost Mahommed, then a prisoner at Calcutta. But these insolent demands were received with the scorn they merited. Roberts was no Elphinstone, and, save that the combination against him was numerically more powerful than that which besieged the British Cantonment* in 1841, all the conditions were in his favour. He pos- sessed a far greater proportion of European troops ; his Sepoys were not effeminate Bengalees ; all his soldiers were armed with weapons superior to those of the enemy; he possessed ample supplies of ammunition, and reinforcements were com- ing up to his assistance, some 17,000 men being assembled between Rawul Pindee and Jugdulluck. At no time was Sir Frederick Roberts anxious as to the safety of his force, and having taken every precaution to guard against an assault by overpowering numbers operating on all sides of Sherpur, the only real danger, he was content to bide his time, and abstain from throwing away his soldiers' lives in attempts to expel the enemy from Cabul, which could be effected on the arrival of reinforcements, or after Mahomed Jan had delivered his long- promised assault on the Cantonments. Every night, he says, information reached him that an attack was contemplated, but it was not until the 21st December that the enemy showed signs of special activity. On that day and the following, large numbers of them moved from the city, and, * The site of Sherpur was close to that of General Elphinstone's entrenched camp, portions of the walls of which could yet be traced near the Shah Bagh. Assault by the Enemy. 3 1 3 passing round to the eastward of Sherpur, occupied the numer- ous forts in that direction in great force. It hecame apparent that this movement was preparatory to an attack from that quarter. At the same time information was received that the enemy was preparing a number of ladders, with the intention of scaling the southern and western walls. Sir Frederick Roberts made all his dispositions, which, indeed, were complete already, and awaited in confidence the signal for the assault, which he and every man in the force under his command felt would also be the signal for the discomfiture of the combination that had enjoyed the unwonted triumph of beleaguering a British force. The night of the 22nd passed quietly, but the songs and cries of the enemy, as they sought to encourage each other to deeds of valour, resounded in the night air. From his spies the British General learned that the 23rd of December, being the last day of the " Muhurram," was selected for the great effort ; and, further, in order to encourage the Ghazis and religious devotees, it was announced in the Afghan ranks that Mooskh-i-Alum would, with his own hand, light the beacon fire at dawn on the Asmai heights, which was to be the signal for the commencement of the attack. The appearance of the signal fire on the Asmai heights, shortly before daybreak, showed at once that the information was correct, and announced the beginning of the assault. But it found the British General calm and confident of success, and every soldier at his post and rejoicing that the hour for action had struck. General Roberts took up his station at the western gateway, and throughout the succeeding operations was in con- stant communication with the officers commanding the different posts. Heavy firing almost immediately commenced against the southern and eastern faces, and by 7 o'clock A.M. an attack in force against the eastern side was fully developed, whilst a large number of the enemy, provided with scaling ladders, were drawn up under cover of the walls to the south. The intelligence telegraphed him from General Hugh Gough and Colonel Jenkins of the determined attack by the enemy in dense masses, found self-possessed and confident one who had long been impatiently waiting for it, and whose preparations for meeting the crisis "were complete. It was welcome news that 3 H Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. " The enemy comes on in gallant show, Their bloody sign of battle is hung out." For three hours repeated attempts were made to carry the low eastern wall by escalade, but though the enemy on several occasions reached the abattis, they were each time repulsed, and many dead marked the spots where the assault had been most resolutely pressed home. This part of the defences was held by the Guides, under Brigadier- General Hugh Gough, who was struck full in the breast by a spent ball, which buried itself in his " posteen," or sheepskin cloak. About 9 A.M. it was reported to General Roberts that the Ghazis had taken possession of a small village outside the defences, and just under the eastern end of the Behmaroo heights, and that the fire of the field guns which could be brought to bear was ineffectual to dislodge them. To this point General Baker had already directed a considerable portion of his reserve, both infantry and guns, and a wing of the 3rd Sikhs had been also withdrawn to the neighbourhood of Beh- maroo from the western end of the heights. As the General saw that the fire of the 18-pounders and howitzers on the walls was sufficient to deal with the attack on the south and south-west faces, and that the danger of anything serious in this quarter might be disregarded, he determined to deal at once with the Behmaroo attack. Finding, he says, that it was impossible to dislodge the enemy by any fire that could be brought to bear on them from our defences, he determined to attack them in flank, and for this purpose directed four guns of G Battery, 3rd Brigade, Royal Artillery, under Major Craster, and the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, to move out through the gorge in the Behmaroo heights. This counter-attack was delivered with energy, and the effect was immediate and decisive. The Afghans wavered and shortly afterwards broke. And now, says the General, the time for the action of Cavalry having arrived, Brigadier-General Massy was directed to ride out with every available man and horse, and do his utmost against the enemy. Sir Frederick Roberts proceeded to the heights above Beh- maroo, and made arrangements for reaping the fruits of his Repulse of the Enemy. 315 success. A party of Infantry and Sappers moved out to des- troy some villages to the south, which had caused considerable annoyance, and from which it was necessary the enemy should be driven to facilitate the arrival of Brigadier- General Charles Gough's brigade. This work was successfully accomplished, but two gallant English officers, Captain J. Dundas, V.C., and Lieutenant C. Nugent, commanding the 7th Company Sappers and Miners, were killed by the premature explosion of a mine. The Cavalry, meanwhile, made a wide circuit round the east side of Sherpur, and succeeded in intercepting the rear of the Kohistauee fugitives, who were sabred by the 5th Punjaub Cavalry. This movement of the Cavalry caused the enemy in all the villages on the east and south-east to abandon 'them to prevent their retreat being cut off. Continuing their victorious advance round the eastern face of Sherpur, the Cavalry ascended the Siah Sung hills, and there the 9th Lancers and 5th Pun- jaub Cavalry did further execution among the fugitives, numbers of whom fell beneath their sabres, the remainder fleeing in utter rout towards the city. The scene afforded a counterpart to that so graphically drawn in the " Iliad," when the Trojans fled before the face of the conquering Greeks to the shelter of their works. "Tumultuous clamour fills the fields and skies, Thick drifts of dust involve their rapid flight, Clouds rise in clouds, and heavea is snatch'd from sight, Th' affrighted steeds, their dying lords cast down, Scour o'er the fields, and stretch to reach the town." It was the impression of those who watched General Massy's progress, says a General officer, that the Cavalry were well handled this day, and the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, which was in front, rendered excellent service. In the course of the after- noon clouds of dust in the direction of Bootkak gave intima- tion of the approach of Brigadier-General Charles Gough's brigade, and his camp was afterwards descried pitched within easy distance of the bridge over the Logar river, about six miles from Cabul. By evening all resistance had ceased, and daylight on the following morning showed that the enemy, abandoning all hope of success, had dispersed, not a man being found in the adjacent villages or visible on the surrounding hills. The city 316 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. was clear of them, and so precipitate was their flight that they left their dead unburied where they fell. On the morning of the 24th, a party of the 72nd Highlanders occupied without opposition the fort of Mahomed Shereef the capture of which, on the 6th November, 1841, had been one of the few successes achieved by the British troops during the siege ; this fort, with the adjoining Shah Bagh, played an important part in both investments. During the day the force under General Charles Gough joined Sir Frederick Eoberts. The Cavalry, divided into two parties, commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals Massy and Hugh Gough, proceeded by Beni Hissar and the Chardeh Valley in pursuit, but their movements were impeded by a snowstorm, and so rapid had been the enemy's flight that they were compelled to reiurn to Sherpur after nightfall, without meeting with any armed men. The casualties between the 5th and 24th December were 2 officers and 16 men killed, and 4 officers Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, Lieutenant C. A. Montanaro, E.A. (died), Lieu- tenant J. Burn-Murdoch, R.E.,* and Lieutenant C. F. Gam- bier, 5th Punjaub Cavalry and 66 men wounded. The religious and military chiefs of the movement having fled from Cabul, Sir Frederick Eoberts, on the following day, directed the occupation of the city and Bala Hissar. Cabul presented the appearance of having been sacked by an enemy. The Mahomedans had wrecked the houses of the Hindoo and Kuzzilbash quarters, the bazaars were deserted and all business suspended. Captain Hall, with one company of the 5th Pun- jaub Infantry, took post for the night in the Kotwallee, which up to the previous evening had been the head-quarters of the Ghazis, who had shown their spite before leaving by doing as much damage as possible to the building, and by defiling all the adjoining houses and shops. General Hills, the Military Governor of the city, now resumed his functions, and was heartily welcomed by all the peaceable and well-disposed inhabi- tants. * This young officer, who was specially mentioned in despatches by Sir Frederick Roberts for his gallantry, gained equal credit during the recent Egyptian campaign, when serving with the Indian Contingent at Tel-el- Kebir and Zagazig. Collapse of the Hostile Combination. 3 r 7 The collapse of the combination was complete, although it in- cluded all the fighting elements of North-Eastern Afghanistan, from Kohistan to the Ghilzye country, whose chief, Padshah Khan, a former ally, and Asmatullah Khan, the principal Lughman chief, had thrown in their lot with Mahomed Jan. The arrangements of Sir Frederick Roberts had met with complete success, and the wisdom of his plan of permitting the enemy to select their own time of attack, and not wasting valuable lives by quitting the sheltering walls of the Canton- ment in desultory attacks on them and the strong forts in the neighbourhood, was amply justified by the result. But though he is entitled to full credit for his sagacity, and acted through- out on his own opinions without seeking advice from subordin- ates, he was singularly fortunate in the superior officers under his command. Brigadier-Generals Macpherson, Baker, and Hugh Gough were unsurpassed by any officers in the army in the possession of the qualities that command the confidence of all ranks under their orders ; and Colonel Macgregor, though young in years, was a veteran in experience. Three of those four officers, like the commander of the Cabul Field Force, bore on their breasts that cross "for valour" which it is the most eager aspiration of every soldier to win. Then among the corps commanders were such excellent officers as Colonels Perkins, B.E., Gordon, R.A., Hudson, Brownlow, Money, Parker, White, and Jenkins ; also heroes like Cook, Vousden, Hammond, Cunyngham, and others in the ranks. In such warfare as that in which the Cabul Field Force had been engaged, military capacity and personal prowess had many opportunities for display. As in the defence of Jellalabad, in the first Afghan War, men like Havelock, Abbott, Backhouse, and Broadfoot made their reputations, so in the somewhat analogous circumstances of the investment of Sherpur, and the events of December, brave spirits like those mentioned above showed to the front, though they had not the same oppor- tunities for distinction, for the leader of the Cabul Field Force was of a different calibre from the gallant but irresolute com- mander of the Jellalabad garrison, who owed his most memor- able achievement, the victory over Akbar Khan on the 7th April, to the promptings of some of the officers mentioned above. 318 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. A General officer, before quoted, described to us the bearing of Sir Frederick Roberts during the anxious time now brought to a close. " Throughout the investment of Sherpur, Roberts was the most cheerful man in camp. His bright face and cheery smile instilled confidence among his soldiers, and one felt there could be no doubt of success as long as he was with them." Indeed, Sir Frederick Roberts never entertained any anxiety as to the result, though his countrymen at home, who exaggerated the power of the Afghan nation, failed to recognize the fact that it was the hope of plunder that kept these undisci- plined Asiatics together, and gratified, as they were, by the sack of Cabul, it was impossible for any commander not possessed of military genius, such as no Afghan has displayed since the days of Ahmed Khan, to keep together the heterogeneous assemblage of tribesmen which constitutes the nation in arms. The total loss during the operations commencing with the 10th December, and ending in the dispersal of the Afghans, was 103 killed, including 10 officers ; and 263 wounded, includ- ing 15 officers, of whom 3 died. Notwithstanding the want of ammunition and the hindrance to rapid progress caused by the heavy fall of snow, Sir Fred- erick Roberts determined to punish the Kohistanees, and Briga- dier-General Baker left with a strong column for the district in the Koh Daman belonging to Meer Butcha, and returned on the last day of the old year, having destroyed the villages and the strong fort under whose protection they nestled. This act of severity showed the Afghans that the British troops were quite in a condition to resume the offensive, though owing to the inclemency of the weather, the General determined to post- pone his visits to the other tribesmen till the spring. Briga- dier-General Charles Gough's brigade, which included the 9th Regiment, now occupied the Bala Hissar, and Colonel Hudson's small force was moved from Lutturbund to Sherpur, giving a welcome increase to the strength of the garrison, seriously decimated by the losses during the recent fighting and the large number of sick. At this time Daoud Shah, the Commander-in-Chief of the ex- Ameer's Army, who was found to have been in communi- cation with the leaders of the recent rising, was sent to join his Roberts on the Situation. 319 master in exile in India, and the Military Commission, whose functions were revived for the trial of certain offenders a few of whom were hanged completed its labours and was dissolved. Political capital was sought to be made out of the acts of retri- butive justice of Sir Frederick Roberts by the opponents, in the Press and Parliament, of the Conservative Government, whose agent he was, but the attempt was futile. On this point he writes to us : " I gave full explanation of my acts while supreme at Cabul to the Government to whom I was respon- sible, and furnished them with a list of all executions, with the reasons given in each case. I stated at the time that no soldiers had been executed for fighting against us. These papers are published in the Blue-book, and can be read by every one. Had any other troops but British been at Cabul in October, 1879, the city would have been razed to the ground. The Afghans quite expected this, and never ceased to wonder at our leniency." Sir Frederick Roberts now issued a proclamation of amnesty, exempting only a few leaders, on condition of the tribesmen sending delegates to Sherpur, to whom should be made known his will as to the future permanent arrangements to be made for the good government of the people. The Kohistanee chiefs generally responded to this invitation, as well as some from Lughman, Logar, and the Ghilzye country, and, on the 9th Jan- uary, Sir Frederick Roberts held a grand durbar at Sherpur, to present gifts to those who had proved faithful to the English in their hour of trial. This durbar was attended by a large number of these nobles, including Padshah Khan, the great Ghilzye chief, who had borne arms against the British, and also many powerful Barukzye Sirdars, among them Wall Mahomed Khan, and other near relatives of the late Ameer Shere Ali. The scene presented was very picturesque, and suggestive of British clemency and magnanimity, when it is remembered that not many days since most of these chiefs were leading vast masses of their countrymen against the small army that so gallantly rallied round the British General, before whom they now salaamed,' and cringed with true Oriental subserviency, wondering, no doubt, at the generosity, or weakness, which 320 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. ever way tbey construed it, of the Government that could hold out the hand of forgiveness to those who so recently bore arms against them. It was a study to watch the ex- pressions on the countenances of these Afghan chiefs. Curiosity, mingled with respect, as they gazed on the man who scattered to the winds their combinations and well-laid plans for your Oriental can only understand the logic of the sword ; and, doubtless, they were puzzled at the issue of the Amnesty so soon after the crushing defeat, which left them, their pro- perty and families, at the mercy of the conqueror for an Afghan victor would have ruthlessly executed every malik that fell into his hands, and destroyed their villages and forts. During the durbar Sir Frederick Roberts addressed* the * The following is the address made by Sir Frederick Roberts : " Sirdars and Maliks, I am very glad to see that so many of the Kohistan maliks have taken advantage of the Amnesty published on the 26th of December last, and have come to Cabul to pay their respects to the British Govern- ment, and to express their regrets for having taken a part in the recent dis- turbances. I trust that those maliks who are still holding aloof will follow the good example that has thus been set them, and will soon make their appearance at Cabul. I told you, when you vi-itedme in my camp at Siah Sung, after the arrival of the Briti.-h troops at Cabul, that the British Government had nothing but goodwill towards the people of Afghanistan ; that it is their desire to respect your lives, your property, and your religion, and to molest no one who would live at peace with them. You have had ample proof of the truth of what I told you. At the instigation of ill- advised men you came from your homes in Kohistan to attack the British troops at Sherpur. All that you succeeded in doing was to plunder from your own countrymen who live in the City of Cabul. You did the British troops but little injury, and in a few days you were beaten off, and had to return to your homes with the loss of several hundred killed and wounded. You brought this punishment upon yourselves, and must not blame the British Government. What that Government did was to offer a pardon to all who would come in except the malik who, it is believed, was the main cause of your being led astray. It was necessary he should be punished ; but, in doing so, every care was taken that no one else should suffer injury. The British troops marched through your country as far as Bala Kuch Kar, treating you all as friends, and paying liberally for everything in the shape of food and forage you were able or willing to provide. I hope the lesson will not be lost upon you, and that you will not misunderstand the genero- sity and forbearance with which you have been treated. It is a great plea- sure to me to find that so many of the more intelligent and well-informed of the people of Afghanistan took no part in the recent disturbances. First and foremost, I would name Sirdars Wall Mahomed Khan, Ibrahim Khan, Hashim Khan, Abdulla Khan, Mahomed Yusuf Khan, Mahomed Karim Khan, Shahbaz Khan, Ahmed Ali Jan, Mahomed Sirwar Khan, Ataullah Khan, Anitoollah Khan, Habibulla Khan (the Mustaufi). Malik llamid Khan, and Khan Mahomed Khan. Then several of your own chiefs remained with me throughout. General Faiz Mahomed Khan, the son of Naik Measures for the Defence of Cab^lL 321 assembly, especially directing his remarks to the Kohistan Chiefs, on the recent events, and having expressed his in- tention of sending Shahbaz Khan as Governor of Kohistan, invited them to select some of their number to remain at Sherpur as representatives. But the malcontent faction, headed by Mahomed Jan, who had borne off Moosa Khan to Ghuznee, refused to give in their adhesion, and sent a demand for the restoration of Yakoob Khan, which was treated with silent contempt. Meanwhile the Engineers were employed in strengthening the works for the defence of Cabul, according to the plan approved by Sir Frederick Roberts before the recent events, so that the city could be held against any army Afghanistan could furnish. Towers were commenced on commanding positions on Koh Asmai and the heights above the Bala Hissar, military roads were cut round the city, and the weak points about the cantonment were strengthened, and all build- ings affording cover within 1,000 yards of the walls levelled with the ground. Sir Frederick Roberts appointed the Wali Mahomed Governor of Cabul in place of General Hills, in order to conciliate native opinion, and as a testimony that annexation had no place in our plans for the future govern- ment of the country. This Sirdar was a consistent adherent of the British " faithful 'mid the faithless found ; " though, un- fortunately, he did not possess the strength of character neces- sary to rule over such a turbulent race as his countrymen. But this was only a temporary measure, as the Indian Government, yielding to pressure from home, and alive to Aminulla Khan, of Logar ; the family of the Mustafi, Sirdar Habibulla Khan, of Wardak ; the Kuzzilbashes, and many other influential men in the city of Cabul, refrained from joining the disturbers of peace and order ; and I am glad to have this opportunity of thanking them on the part of the British Government for the good service they thereby performed. I am now about to give Khilluts to those Kohistanis who remained at Sherpur with me ; after which you are at liberty to return to your homes. I am sending back with you to Kohistan Sirdar Shahbaz Khan, whom you have yourselves asked for as your Governor. He will settle your disputes and preserve order in the country. Also that I may be fully informed by yourselves of all that passes, and of all that you may wish to represent hereafter, I invite you to select certain of your number, who will remain here and act as a medium of communication between us. They will be treated with consideration and will have free access to me. The rest of you may return to your homes, and for your own sake remember all that has passed." Y 322 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. the strain on the resources of the great dependency committed to their charge from the continued occupation of Afghanistan, began seriously to consider the question of the future admin- istration of the country. Lord Lytton and his Council ad- dressed a despatch, on the 7th January, 1880, to Lord Cran- brook, the Secretary of State for India, expressing their view that " the question of the resuscitation of the fallen kingdom of the Barukzyes cannot now be entertained, and that we must accept the separation of its constituent provinces as our basis for the political reconstitution of Afghanistan." In order to carry out this policy the Viceroy proposed, in accord- ance with a decision already adopted by the Home Govern- ment, that " Persia should be provisionally permitted to occupy Herat, under sufficient guarantees for her good administration of it, and for her adequate protection of British and Indian in- terests, and with a special reservation of our right to occupy the place with British forces on certain eventualities." The districts of Pisheen, Sibi, and Kurram, being assigned to England under the treaty of Gundamuck, were to be retained, but Cabul and Candahar were to be separated ; the proposal being " to establish the province of Candahar as an inde- pendent and separate state, under an hereditary ruler selected from the representatives of the old ruling families ; " but while contemplating " no interference in the internal administration of the province," they proposed " to retain a British garrison at or near Candahar." In order to assist Sir Frederick Koberts in political affairs in North-Eastern Afghanistan, which Lord Lytton proposed should " remain in military occupation until all resistance has ceased," Mr. Lepel Griffin, an experienced political official, was despatched to Cabul, where he arrived on the 20th March. Meanwhile the Wali Shere Ali was appointed " hereditary ruler" of Candahar, but the task of finding a ruler for Cabul proved a difficult one, owing to the number of candidates, each with his adherents, and the choice at first lay between Wali Mahomed Khan, Hashim Khan, Moosa Khan, and Ayoob Khan, all members of the ruling Barukzye family. On reference to the Viceroy's despatches, the first mention Abdul Rahman Khan. 323 we have of Abdul Rahman, the present ruler of Afghanistan, as a candidate for the Ameership, is in a telegram, * dated the 14th March, addressed to the Secretary of State, in which his lordship advocates the "early public recognition of Abdul Rahman as legitimate heir of Dost Mahomed, and open deputation of Sirdars with British concurrence to offer him the throne of Afghanistan, as sole means of saving country from anarchy." The reply, on the following day, from the India Office, authorized the nomination of Abdul Rahman, if he was " acceptable to the country and would be contented with Northern Afghanistan." This resolve, as proved by subsequent events, was a wise one, though it en- countered much opposition, owing to Abdul Rahman having been for ten years a resident in Russian Turkestan, and in receipt of a pension of 25,000 roubles a year from the Czar. Yakoob Khan was impossible, Moosa Khan was a child, Ayoob Khan, Yakoob's brother, was not considered acceptable, and events seemed to point to Abdul Rahman, son of Afzul Khan, elder brother of Shere Ali, as the most desirable personage to ascend the musniid. Abdul Rahman, who was now about fifty, accompanied his father when he crossed the Indus to aid the Sikhs in their final struggle against us in 184849, and after the death of Dost Mahomed fled to Bokhara when Afzul, who was appointed Governor of Balkh by his brother, Shere Ali, was removed to Cabul by that Prince for intriguing against his authority. "When Shere Ali was at Candahar, Abdul Rahman crossed the Oxus, and having established his authority at Balkh, marched with his uncle, Azim, on Cabul, which surrendered to him on the 2nd March, 1866 ; this success was followed up by a victory at Sheikhabad and the capture of Ghuznee, when Afzul became Ameer, and his son consolidated his rule by his victory over Shere Ali at Khelat-i-Grhilzye early in the following year. But soon a change came over the political scene with the frequency and rapidity characteristic of Afghan affairs. Afzul died of his excesses, Azim was equally incapable and more tjTannical, and Abdul Rahman retired in disgust to Afghan Turkestan. Now * See Blue Book, "Afghanistan (1881), No. 1." T 2 324 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. Yakoob Khan came forward to champion his father's rights, and, advancing from Herat, followed up a victory on the Helmund, which resulted in the flight of Azim's son from Candahar, by defeating Abdul Kahnian at Bameean, and finally restored his father to the throne by the crushing defeat inflicted in the winter of 1868 at Tinah Khan. Abdul Eahman and Azim fled from Balkh, and thence to Meshed, in Persia, where the latter died in October, 1869, while his nephew proceeded to Khiva and Bokhara, and arrived in May, 1870, at Tashkend, where he received permission from General Kaufmann to reside on Russian territory as a pensioner of the Czar. It seemed as though the possibility of Abdul Eahman obtain- ing another favourable opportunity to strike a blow for the throne of Cabul was remote indeed, for Shere AH had firmly established himself in power ; but his ill-advised intrigue with Russia gave the desired chance, and involved that unhappy prince and his country in a period of prolonged anarchy, disaster, and bloodshed, from which it has only now apparently emerged. The words of Hector to Paris might be applied to the ill-fated Shere Ali : " Bleak fate hangs o'er thee from th' avenging gods, Imperial Troy from her foundations nods : Whelm'd in thy country's ruins shalt thou fall, And one devouring vengeance swallow all." After the deportation to India of Yakoob Khan, the people of Afghan Turkestan, remembering the moderation with which he formerly ruled them, rallied to the cause of Abdul Rahman, and on the 17th March, 1880, Lord Lytton telegraphed to the Secretary of State, that he had received " authentic intelligence that the Sirdar is in Afghan Turkestan, having lately arrived there from Badakshan, where he defeated the Meer Shahzada Hassan." Such was the new aspirant for the perilous honour of ruling the race whom his former conqueror declared were so turbulent that he would rather be a grass-cutter in the British camp than their sovereign. By the middle of March, Sir Frederick Roberts had under his command at Cabul about 11,500 men and twenty-six guns. The Cabul Field Force was divided into two divisions, the first being under the immediate command of Sir Frederick, and the Durbar at Sherpur. 325 second under Major-General Ross, C.B., while the command of the line of communications was held by Major-General Bright. Brigadier- General Massy had been ordered to proceed to India, and was succeeded in the command of the Cavalry by Brigadier- General Hugh Gough. Sherpur had been made impregnable against the attack of any Asiatic army, and forts were built 011 both sides of the Cabul gorge and on the Siah Sung hill. In response to an invitation to discuss the question of the future of their country, addressed by Sir Frederick Roberts to the Chiefs of Mydau, Logar, and the neighbouring districts, through Habibullah Khan, whom he had found trustworthy, a large number of Chiefs and Sirdars assembled at Sherpur to learn the intentions of Government. Sir Frederick Roberts, attended by his Staff, and accom- panied by Mr. Griffin and his general officers, entered the Durbar tent, and took his place amid the respectful salutations of the assembly. Sir Frederick opened the proceedings by a short speech,* and Mr. Griffin delivered a lengthy address in Persian, in which he explained to the Sirdars and people of Cabul generally, and to the delegates who presented the demands of the Maliks and Chiefs of Logar, Ghuznee, Mydan, AVardak, and the southern Ghilzye country, the general instructions of the Indian Government regarding the future government of Cabul. The restoration of Yakoob Khan was * " Sirdars and Maliks, I am very glad to meet you here to-day, espe- cially those who through the good offices of the Mustaufi have been induced to come into Cabul to make their wishes known to me. I trust this Durbar is the beginning of the end, and that it will now be possible for us to enter into such an arrangement with the yeo le of Afghanistan as will ensure an honourable peace and lasting friendship between them and the British. Same of you, I understand, 1 esitated to accompany the Mustaufi, feat ing your treatment and reception by us might not be such as we have pro- mised you, and that some evil might befall you. You need r.ever have any such fear when your safety has been assured on the word of a British officer. The British do not say one thing and do another. You who have come in have been honourably treated, and after this Durbar you ate all at liberty to depart-. I trust, when you leave Cabul, you will carry away with you a more friendly feeling towards us than some of jou have hitherto entertained ; and that those of your party who are still holding aloof will be wise enough to follow the good example you have set them, and will accept our invitation to come to Cabul. Mr. Lepel Griffin, Chief Political Officer in North and Eastern Afghanistan, with whom you have already become acquainted, will now, on the part of the Government of India, answer the request you have made.'' 326 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. declared impossible, and their choice of rulers was restricted to the other members of the ruling family, Wali Mahomed, brother of Shere Ali, Hashim Khan, who had married a daughter of the ex- Ameer, and possessed his money, or Moosa Khan and Ayoob Khan, his son and brother. The British troops, it was haughtily notified, would be withdrawn from Afghanistan " when the Government considers the proper time has come ; as they did not enter Afghanistan with your permission, so they will not withdraw at your request." Chief mention should here be made of a hardly contested action fought, on the 26th April, on the old battle ground of Charasia, by a portion of Sir Frederick Roberts's force, under Colonel Jenkins, who had left Sherpur a few days before with a small column. Sir Frederick Roberts, learning by helio- graphic signal that Colonel Jenkins was hard pressed, sent some reinforcements to his aid, under General Macpherson, and the enemy were defeated with heavy loss. Sir Frederick ordered the column to return to Sherpur, and rode out to meet them and congratulate the successful leaders. The excitement in Camp during the 26th April brought back recollections of the days of December. All the forts were manned and the whole of the Cabul Field Force was on the qui vive, as an attack of Kohistanees was expected. A few days later Sir Frederick Roberts was relieved of the chief political and military command in North-Eastern Afghanis- tan by the arrival of his senior officer, Sir Donald Stewart, who had marched from Candahar to break up any hostile com- bination at Ghuznee, and open communications with Cabul, leaving a division of troops from the Bombay Presidency, under Lieutenant- General Primrose, to hold the city and province, which he had administered so successfully, and the civil government of which was now handed over to the Wali Shere Ali. In order to act in co-operation with Sir Donald Stewart, Sir Frederick Roberts, on the 16th April, sent a strong column from Sherpur under command of Major- General Ross. Little actual resistance was met by Ross's column, though the Mydan people were sulky and ill-disposed. General Ross was accompanied by General Hills, who had served at Candahar in Roberts is Relieved by Sir Donald Stewart. 327 the first phase of the Afghan War, as Assistant Adjutant- General to Sir Donald Stewart's Division ; and that officer related to us how at the moment when he and General Ross had topped the watershed between Wardak and Mydan, a heliographic signal was flashed to them by General Stewart, a distance of about forty miles, giving news of his arrival at Ghuznee and his victory at Ahmed Khel on the 19th April. General Hills, when he left Sir Donald Stewart at Candahar, told him that he would meet him at Ghuznee, and on the previous day had been anxious to redeem his promise, but General Ross would not give him leave, as Sir Frederick Roberts had ordered that the Cavalry should not advance beyond the pass. Having got half a troop of Cavalry as escort, General Hills now rode on and found his old chief two miles on the Cabul side of the Dahan pass. Sir Donald Stewart's troops turned off into the Logar country, and, accompanied by General Hills, he joined General Ross's column and proceeded to Sherpur, where he arrived on the 1st May, and making over his own division to Brigadier- General Hughes, 63rd Regiment, who held the command until relieved by General Hills, on the 2nd May he assumed com- mand of the troops in North-Eastern Afghanistan, also reliev- ing Sir Frederick Roberts of the charge of political affairs. Our hero looked forward to shortly quitting the country in whose eventful history he had played so important a role, and, like Richard, his u Bruised arms hang up for monuments." But, again, for the third time within two years, he was to be called upon to encounter the responsibilities of command in an emergency ; for the time had not yet come when he could exclaim with Gloucester : " Our stern alarums chaug'd to merry meetings, Our dreadful marches to delightful measures." 328 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. CHAPTER XVII. Sir Frederick Roberts and the Negotiations with Abdul Rahman Appoint- ment of the Sirdar to the Ameership Restless State of the Sirdars and People of Afghanistan Arrival of Abdul Rahman at Cabul and Assumption of the Ameership Sir Frederick Roberta's Views on the Kurram Valley Question The Maiwand Disaster Sir Frederick Roberts appointed to the Command of the Relieving Column The Dramatic Aspects of the Afghan War His Preparations for the March on Candahar. SOME notice is necessary in a biographical work of the personal share taken by Sir Frederick Roberts in the political proceed- ings which ended in the acceptance by the British Government of Abdul Rahman as Ameer of North-E astern Afghanistan. Lord Lytton having authorized him and Mr. Griffin to open negotiations with the Ameer, on the 2nd April a Kohistan Chief, Surwar Khan, an active adherent of the Pretender, was despatched from Sherpur to Koondooz, in Afghan Turkestan, where he arrived on the 10th. At an interview with Abdul Rahman, Surwar Khan expressed the friendliness entertained towards him by the British General, and advised him to repair to Cabul, where he would be honourably received. Surwar Khan received a letter from the Sirdar, couched in guarded and general terms, expressive of his gratitude to the British Government, and his desire to live at amity with both England as well as Russia, whose hospitality he had enjoyed for twelve years,* and, leaving Kooudooz, arrived at Sherpur on the 21st April. He was also the bearer of a message from Abdul Rahman, offering to go to Charikar, in Kohistan, with an escort of 500 men, and there discuss matters with the British Political Officers in person. Sir Frederick Roberts and Mr. Griffin, after consideration of the letter and message, decided to accede to the Sirdar's request, proposing Cabul as an alternative place of meeting, and to * For letter see p. 22 of Blue Book on Afghanistan. The Negotiations with Abdul Rahman. 329 offer him the Ameership on his agreeing to accept the conditions regarding Candahar, the frontier between the two countries, and the foreign relations of Afghanistan conceded to the British by the treaty of Gundamuck. On communicating the steps they had taken to the Viceregal Government, Sir Frederick Eoberts and Mr. Griffin received a lengthy despatch, dated the 27th April, communicating the intentions of Lord Lytton, which briefly were to the effect that Cabul was to be evacuated by the British troops " not later than October next," and impressing on their attention " the importance of avoiding any expression which might appear to suggest or admit matter for negotiation or discussion in reference to the relative positions of the Sirdar and the Government of India." They proposed " uncondi- tionally transferring the government of the country " to Abdul Eahnian, who would receive, if he required it, assistance from the Viceroy, and in the event of his proving " able and disposed to conciliate the confidence of his countrymen, without forfeit- ing the good understanding he seeks with us, will assuredly find his best support in our political appreciation of that fact." Further, the Government of India declared that their " only reasons for not immediately withdrawing their forces from Northern Afghanistan have hitherto been, first, the excited and unsettled condition of the country round Cabul, with the atti- tude of hostility assumed by some leaders of armed gatherings near Ghuzuee ; and secondly, the inability of the Cabul Sirdars to agree among themselves on I he selection of a ruler strong enough to maintain order after the evacuation of the country." The first-named of these reasons no longer existed after the victory at Ahmed Kheyl achieved by Sir Donald Stewart during his advance from Candahar, and on the arrival of that officer at Cabul on the 2nd May, Sir Frederick Roberts, being junior in rank, ceased to be supreme political no less than military chief in Northern Afghanistan, and the negotiations with Abdul Rahman were conducted in the name of Sir Donald Stewart, acting in conjunction with Mr. Griffin. To the subject of this Memoir it seemed as if no further chance of increasing the renown he had earned by his conduct of military affairs, could offer itself in Afghanistan. By his 330 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. victories at Peiwar Kotul and Charasia, and generally by the masterly and daring advance on Cabul, no less than by the complete success of the operations in December, he had earned for himself a high place among England's most trusted soldiers. Nothing more brilliant had been achieved for many years than this series of successes, which were gained not by fortune or any adventitious aid, but by boldness and able strategy. " Nothing succeeds like success," and Sir Frederick Roberts possessed the complete confidence of every officer and man under his command, whose only regret was that no further chances of earning dis- tinction under his orders could accrue, since the Liberal Govern- ment, following up the policy of their predecessors in office, had decreed that the evacuation of North-Eastern Afghanistan was to take place as soon as Abdul Rahman had been accepted as the future Ameer by a sufficient portion of his countrymen, or, in any case, not later than October. But in these calculations of the late Cabul Field Force, sufficient allowance was not made for the unforeseen, always a potent factor in Oriental politics. The vicissitudes of political and military affairs in Afghan- istan had extended their influences to British interests, and the reputations of two general officers in South- Western Afghan- istan suffered as sudden and disastrous an eclipse as the char- acter for military prowess of Yakoob Khan, Ayoob Khan, and Abdul Rahman had experienced during their chequered careers. On the other hand, the military fame of Sir Frederick Roberts shone out with increased lustre during the hour of trial still in store for the arms of England, and when he emerged at Can- dahar after his famous march through Afghanistan, he added to the reputation already achieved, a European renown as one of the greatest soldiers of the age, a claim conceded to him by the illustrious Skobeleff, the hero of Plevna and Geok Tepe. Notwithstanding the overwhelming force of 18,000 seasoned soldiers, the flower of the Indian army, assembled at Cabul, under the command of Sir Donald Stewart and Sir Frederick Roberts, the Afghans were as truculent as ever, and it was manifest that they would never submit to the foreign yoke ; and in the latter part of June, General Hills marched into the Logar district with the late Candahar division, in order to pro- cure supplies and put down a gathering of Zoormuttees and Disturbed State of Logar. 331 Wardakees. In bis account to us of bis proceedings in tbe Logar Valley, be describes all tbe bill-sides as covered witb tbe watcb-fires of tbe villagers, wbo tbougbt be was going into Zoor- mut. Soon after, be moved temporarily to Cabul witb bis divi- sion, on wbicb tbe tribesmen, under Hassan Kbau, an adberent of Yakoob Kban, came down into tbe Logar Valley, and tried to induce tbe Logarees to join tbem for anotber rising similar to tbat in December. On General Hills returning to tbe Logar Valley, most of tbe tribesmen retired, but about 1,500 Zoor- muttees took up a position at tbe village of Padkao Sbana, wbere tbey were attacked and dispersed by tbe cavalry of Hills's division, under Brigadier-General Palliser. Tbese were tbe men of wbom Sir George Campbell, M.P., asked in tbe House of Commons wbetber it was true tbat " in- offensive ryots" bad been attacked. Witb bis Indian experience and knowledge of tbe cbaracter of tbe officers of tbe Indian Army and tbe reputation of General Hills, tbe member for tbe Kirkaldy borougbs ougbt to bave known better tban to bave inferred tbat an officer wbose cbaracter for bumanity stood as bigb as bis own, would bave been capable of attacking in- offensive ryots. Tbese tribesmen, wbose leader, Mabomed Hassan Kban, bad run away from Jellalabad witb treasure, tbougbt tbat Mabomed Jan bad corne down from "Wardak to assist tbem, and took advantage of General Hills's absence to work up tbe Logarees to figbt ; but tbese latter declined to join tbem, saying tbat tbe General and Major Ewan Smitb, Political Officer witb tbe division, bad treated tbem well and paid for all supplies. Tbe only otber notewortby incident was tbe deportation to India of tbe Mustaufi, Habibullab Kban, wbo was accused of conspiring against tbe Euglisb, and was sent to join bis master and Daoud Sbab. During May and June negotiations were carried on witb Abdul Rabman at Kbanabad, near Koondooz, in Afgban Turk- estan, tbe Britisb Agents being Sirdar Ibrabim Kban, Sber Mabomed Kban, and Afzul Kban, a ressaldar of tbe lltb Bengal Lancers. Tbe Mission left Sberpur on tbe 3rd May, and was received witb bonour by tbe Sirdar, wbo besitated before giving a final answer, as bis acceptance involved tbe sur- 332 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. render of Candahar and the Kurram Valley, which would make him unpopular with his countrymen. Sir Frederick Roberts quite agreed with the Liberal Govern- ment that an end should be put to the occupation of North-Eastern Afghanistan by our army during the autumn, whether terms were made with Abdul Rahman or not. On this point he writes in his despatch, dated 29th May : " If the present negotiations with Abdul Rahman succeed, I should hamper him with the fewest possible conditions ; if they fail, I would be inclined to let the tribes of Eastern Afghanistan please themselves about an Ameer. In course of time some strong man would win his way to power, and meanwhile it would be wiser not to force a ruler upon them. Any nominee of ours would certainly not be acceptable, and, in all probability, would not be able to hold his own after our departure. Under any circumstances, I am strongly in favour of not remaining at Cabul after the great heat of the Indian summer has passed and travelling through the Khyber is possible. If we cannot settle matters with the Afghans at this season of the year, when everything is in our favour, we shall certainly not be able to do so in the winter, when the difficulties of an occupation are immeasurably in- creased." On the Afghan question, so far as Russia is con- cerned, he says : " We have learnt by experience what a con- siderable force is required to occupy Cabul and to maintain our communications with India by the Khyber route. There is no denying the fact that, if the ruler of Cabul should at any future time be assisted by Russian officers, the army of 25,000 men which we now find it necessary to employ on the Khyber line alone would have to be very considerably increased. Nor do I think that, even if the Afghans themselves were on our side, we could deal as effectually with Russia in Eastern as in Western Afghanistan. To what extent those offensive measures might be pressed in Southern or Western Afghanistan scarcely comes within the scope of this paper, depending, as they as- suredly would, on numerous and complicated eventualities, such as the attitude of Persia, the object and strength of Russia, and the state of Afghanistan generally. It might be found necessary to make a rapid advance on Herat and mass a con- siderable army there, or it might, on the other hand, be deemed Views of Sir Frederick Roberts. 333 ./ \J *J \J desirable to confine operations to Candahar itself, or to Seistan, and the valley of the Helrnund. It will be sufficient for our present purpose if we can come to the conclusion that the ' Candahar line will be the one by which all offensive movements against Russia would be carried on. If this point be admitted, it only remains for us to consider to what extent communication should be maintained between the north-west frontier of India and Cabul. My own opinion, which I offer with considerable diffidence, is that the Kurram line should be given up alto- gether, and that the responsibilities which we ought to incur on the Khyber route should be limited to such as would ensure the execution and integrity of any guarantees we have given to the rulers of Lalpura and Kuner. Viewing Cabul in the altered and powerless condition in which we shall leave it, with a ruler quite unable to cause us trouble or even anxiety in India, and knowing (as we now do) with what ease and quickness we can again at any time make ourselves masters of Cabul by either of the two roads under consideration, I can see no reason why regular troops should be kept either in the Kurram or the Khyber. Moreover, I cannot too strongly urge upon the consideration of the Government of India the desirability of not leaving the Native portion of the army in the field after the ensuing autumn. Many of the regiments will then have been on service since October, 1878 ; they have done admirably, indeed I doubt if at any former period the Native Army has ever be- haved more loyally or gallantly ; all ranks are in good heart, and will cheerfully carry out any work they may be called upon to perform. There is, however, a limit beyond which it would be impolitic to require them to remain away from India. This limit I place at two years. It would be found difficult, if not impracticable, to relieve the troops now on service. All the Goorkhas, and nearly all the Punjaub Corps, are in the first line. This is another strong argument in favour of an early withdrawal." Abdul Rahman and his advisers hesitated to give a definite answer to the British demands, or to come to Cabul, because, as Mr. Lepel Griffin wrote on the 4th August, they " feared greatly that our intention was to rid ourselves of a formidable 334 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. opponent, and that, had he come straight into Cabul, he would have been arrested, and deported to British India." So critical did the negotiations appear towards the end of June that Sir Donald Stewart, with whom the Viceregal Government left considerable discretionary powers, advised no further dealings with Abdul Eahman. In the despatch of the 27th July, giving in detail the negotiations with that Sirdar, Lord Ripon, the newly-arrived Viceroy, and his Council wrote : " Sir D. Stewart and Mr. Griffin represented to the Govern- ment of India, for the second time, their conviction of the danger of trusting Abdul Rahman, the imprudence of delay- ing immediate action, and the necessity, in this critical situa- tion, of breaking off with Abdul Rahman, and adopting other means of establishing a government in Cabul before our evacuation." But Lord Ripon fortunately decided otherwise, as he considered that, " as matters stood then, an arrangement with Abdul Rahman offered the most advisable solution, while he doubted whether it would not be found very difficult to enter into any alternative arrangement." The subsequent course of events fully justified the statesman- like course adopted by the Indian Viceroy, and Abdul Rahman, having made up his mind to accept the terms offered him by the British Government, left Khanabad on the 28th June, with 2,000 men and 12 guns, and, crossing the Hindoo Koosh, reached Tootumdurrah, near Charikar, at the entrance of the Ghorebund Valley the forts of which were successfully attacked by Sir Robert Sale in 1840. The Sirdar arrived on the 20th July at Charikar, and a large number of leading Chiefs and other influential personages, including Mooshk-i-Alum, and some of the principal Ghilzye and Wardak Chiefs, signified their acquiescence in his recognition, and many went to meet him at Charikar. The faithless Asmatullah Khan, Ghilzye,* Abdul Guffoor, Logaree, and thirty-five others of less note, who wrote from Maidan that all there assembled were ready to accept as Ameer whomever the British Government * True to his character, Asmatullah has recently intrigued against the Ameer Abdul Rahman, who put a letter of his to Ayoob Khan in his hand in open Durbar and threw him into prison. Mahomed Jan and Abdul Guffoor have also been executed, and Meer Butcha is a fugitive. Recognition of Abdul Rahman. 335 might select, whether Yakoob Khan, or Abdul Rahman, or Ayoob Khan ; but that in the interests of the country and the Govern- ment, it was essential to at once declare the choice of the authorities, as there was no other way of bringing to an end the period of uncertainty, and of re-assuring the people. Abdul Rahman was acknowledged by the British military and political authorities as Ameer of Afghanistan, and received a promise of support so long as he remained friendly to England. The ceremony took place at a grand Durbar, held on the 22nd July, at Sherpur, at which Sir Donald Stewart, accompanied by Sir Frederick Roberts and Mr. Lepel Griffin, received the representatives of Abdul Rahman.* The new Ameer left Charikar, and was met on 3rd August at Zimma, about 16 miles from Cabul, by Mr. Lepel Griffin, who proceeded with an escort from General Charles Gough's camp in the Kohistan road, and arrangements were made for his taking over Cabul, the governorship of which had been resigned by the Wali Mahomed Khan, who himself had been a candidate for the throne. Abdul Rahman's chance of election was supposed to be remote indeed, a few months before, the taint of Russian support being regarded as an absolute bar to his selection by the British Government, who preferred the claims of the Barukzye Sirdars, Wali Mahomed, Hashim Khan, and Ayoob. But by a turn of the wheel of fortune all this was changed, and Abdul Rahman came to power under the aegis of British protection and with subsidies in money and arms, which have enabled him to gain over by force of arms and the power of the purse the whole of Afghanistan. But all Afghan history shows that the fickle nobles and people of Cabul may soon tire of him, and should fortune declare against him in the field, like the Roman * Mr. Lepel Griffin thus describes him : " Amir Abdul Rahman Khan is a man of about forty, of middle height, and rather stout. He has an exceedingly intelligent face, brown eyes, a pleasant smile, and a frank courteous manner. The impression that he left on me and the officers who were present was most favourable. He is by far the most prepossessing of all the Barukzai Sirdars whom I have met in Afghanistan, and in conversa- tion showed both good sense and sound political judgment. He kept thoroughly to the point under discussion, and his remarks were charac- terized by shrewdness and ability. He appeared animated by a sincere desire to be on cordial terms with the English Government." 336 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. people upbraided by Marullus, they would hail his successful rival : " Many a time and oft Have you climb'd up to walls and battlements, To towers and windows, yea, to chimney-tops, Your infants in your arms, and there have sat The livelong day, with patient expectation, To see great Pompey pass the streets of Rome." Popularity among the Sirdars and people of Afghanistan is very much a question of bribes and license to the former, and a liberal dispensation of the panem et circenses to the latter. Meanwhile important military events had occurred, which removed Sir Frederick Roberts from the scene of these pro- tracted negotiations, and gave him employment in the field, a more congenial sphere to one of his temperament than the fetid atmosphere of Afghan intrigue. On the 29th July the startling news arrived at Cabul that General Burrows' brigade had been " annihilated " at Maiwand; and though subsequent details placed the disaster in not quite so bad a light, the utter rout of a British force, followed by the investment of Candahar, and the virtual supremacy of Ayoob Khan over the province, formed a sufficiently grave conjuncture of affairs to demand prompt and energetic action. All eyes in England and India were instinctively turned to Sir Frederick Roberts as the man for the crisis that had so suddenly arisen, and the British Army in Afghanistan felt no one was equally fitted to cope with the new peril that had arisen, and lead them to wipe away the stain from their arms. Sir Donald Stewart and Sir Frederick Roberts both agreed that it would be necessary to send a strong division from Cabul, and not to leave the retrieval of our position in South- Western Afghanistan to General Phayre, who commanded the Bombay troops in reserve on the Scinde frontier and at Pisheen, whose want of transport would, they felt certain, delay his arrival at Candahar. With soldierly alacrity, and pending orders from the Supreme Government, steps were taken to prepare a force of about 10,000 men to march upon Candahar. Sir Frederick Roberts's offer to assume command was at once accepted by Sir Donald Stewart, and the appointment was hailed by the army The Maiwand Disaster. 337 with satisfaction, for all felt that success was already almost assured. The Maiwand disaster came at an unfortunate time, and was near imperilling the negotiations in progress between Abdul Rahman and Mr. Griffin, acting on behalf of the Indian Government ; but these difficulties were tided over at an inter- view, and the new Ameer, who was glad to be quit of the British army from Cabul, raised but slight objection to a division marching through the country to Candahar. The Indian Government, on the urgent representations of Sir Donald Stewart, who telegraphed on the 5th August, and wrote a lengthy despatch in the same sense five days later, directed the immediate withdrawal of the remainder of the British troops from Afghanistan, the posts at Lundi Kotul and in the Khyber Pass being held in temporary occupation. Accordingly, on the llth August, Sir Donald Stewart quitted Sherpur, having that morning had an interview with the new Ameer, at which Mr. Lepel Griffin and General Hills, com- manding the Cabul Division, were present. Before the news of the defeat of Burrows's Brigade at Mai- wand, the military authorities at head-quarters had ordered the evacuation of Afghanistan by the army of 18,000 men as- sembled at Cabul. The withdrawal was to be effected in two bodies. One portion was to retire by the Khyber Pass, under Sir Donald Stewart, and the other, under the orders of Sir Frederick Roberts, by the Kurram Valley, where a division, under the command of Major-General Watson, C.B., V.C., had remained since Sir Frederick quitted Ali Kheyl to commence his march on Cabul in the preceding autumn. These troops were for the present directed to remain in the Kurram Valley ; but, on the 3rd of September, the Viceroy and his Council came to the resolution, in accordance with the wishes of the inhabit- ants, to place the Jajis of the Upper Kurram, and the tribes of the Hurriab district beyond the Peiwar Kotul, under the new Ameer ; though the Turis, in the Kurram Valley, whose inde- pendence had been solemnly promised to them by Sir Frederick Roberts, were not included in this arrangement. Accordingly, the Kurram Valley was evacuated by General "Watson on the 16th October, and the Turis were placed under their leaders, z 338 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. Badsbali Gul and Meer Mahomed Khan. While noting this termination to our occupation of districts conquered by Sir Frederick Roberts, it should be borne in mind that, as a soldier thoroughly conversant with the strategical and political value of the Kurram Valley, he agreed with the almost unanimous consensus of opinion against the occupation of this territory, though in his elaborate and well-reasoned Memorandum on the situation in Afghanistan, as it affected our position in India, penned at Cabul on the 29th May, Sir Frederick Roberts based his opinion on the hypothesis of the retention of Candahar.* But his main argument was directed towards proving the inutility of holding positions on the Kurram line by showing that, in any future war in Afghanistan, we ought to remain on the defensive on our North-West frontier, and that our most effective line of advance against an enemy in the interior of the country would be from the southward ; while, apart from strategical considerations of this general nature, the special weight of his reasoning on military, political, and financial grounds, bears decidedly against our maintaining garrisons on the Kurram highlands. Sir Frederick Roberts' s connection with Cabul and North- Eastern Afghanistan was now to cease, and he turned his face westwards to reap fresh honours, and add a glorious page to the military annals of his country. Upon receipt at Cabul of the telegram from the Viceregal Government announcing the Maiwand disaster, both the British Commanders concluded * The following paragraphs from this Memorandum are of especial value, and no notice of the views in this important question, held by Sir Frederick Roberts, would be complete without them : " The state of affairs which brought about the Treaty of Gundamuck has completely changed. In place of our being obliged to occupy the advanced strategic positions secured to us by that treaty, and which the safety of our Indian Empire forced us to hold as long as Cabul was the centre of a great political and military power, we can now afford to withdraw our troops within our original frontier. We have nothing to fear from Afghanistan, and the best thing to do is to leave it as much as possible to itself. It may not be very rlattering to our amour propre, but I feel sure I am right when I say that the less the Afghans see of us the less they will dislike us. Should Russia in future years attempt to conquer Afghanistan or invade India through it, we should have a better chance of attaching the Afghans to our interests, if we avoid all interference with them in the meantime. The military occupation of Candahar is, as I have before stated, of vital importance ; but even there we should make our presence but little felt, merely control- ling the foreign policy of the ruler of that province." Roberts and the Maiwand Disaster. 339 that a division should march from Cabul, in addition to any troops despatched from Scinde, which could only reach Can- dahar at this season of the year with great difficulty and delay. The Cabul corps d'armee of 18,000 seasoned troops, accustomed to act together, and commanded by some of the best generals in the British army, was fit to go anywhere and do anything at a moment's notice. The following were the circumstances under which Sir Frederick Roberts assumed command of the force ordered to avenge the disaster at Maiwand. As it had been arranged that he should return to India by the Kurram route with a portion of the troops, he rode to Jellalabad to visit scenes so interest- ing to every soldier. " While there," he writes to us, " I instinctively felt anxious in case any disturbance, owing to the near approach of Abdul Rahman, should take place at Cabul; so I hurried back, riding from Gundamuck to Cabul on the 28th July. Sir Donald Stewart met me a few miles out, and told me what had happened at Maiwand. Feeling it was most im- portant that troops should be sent from Cabul to Candahar, and believing that the authorities at Simla would hesitate to send troops who were under orders to return to India, I telegraphed to the Adjutant-General, urging that a force should be sent with- out delay, and guaranteeing that none of the soldiers at Cabul would demur at going, provided I could assure them that they would not be kept to garrison Candahar after the work in the field there was over. I begged the Adjutant-General to show the telegram to the Foreign Secretary, by whom it was given to Lord Ripon, who then decided to send me with a force. Before despatching the telegram I showed it to Sir Donald Stewart." The reply of the Viceroy sanctioning the despatch of an expedition from Cabul to Candahar, in conformity with the suggestion of Sir Frederick Roberts, was received on the 3rd August, and the equipment and constitution of the force were left to the two Generals, who were required to state the earliest date on which the relieving column could march, and when it was expected to arrive at Candahar. After consultation they returned an answer that Sir Frederick Roberts would leave Cabul on the 8th August, and that he expected to reach the capital of Southern Afghanistan on the 2nd September. z 2 34-O Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. With the public spirit and friendly feeling that always cha- racterized Sir Donald Stewart in his dealings with his hrother- in-arms, that officer gave carte blanche to Sir Frederick Roberts as to men and equipment. Colonel Chapman, R.A.,* Chief of the Staff to Sir Donald Stewart, who now took up the same appointment in the force about to march on Candahar, only does justice to his former chief when, in a lecture on this famous march, delivered at the Royal United Service Institution on the 9th March, 1881, he observed : " No record of the work thus undertaken would be complete which did not set forward very prominently the self-abnegation and high military capacity evinced by Lieutenant- General Sir Donald Stewart, who was in supreme command at Cabul, and who, without reference to the difficult task of withdrawal by the Khyber, which was to be his share of the programme, placed unreservedly at Sir Frede- rick Roberts' s disposal the entire resources of the North Afghan- istan Field Force in transport and equipment ; nor wmtld it be possible to pass by without respectful recognition the singleness of purpose and true genius with which the two Commanders devoted themselves to perfect the machinery which it was intended to employ in the execution of a difficult enterprise. The spirit they evinced became the leading principle that guided all ranks in the task of preparation." During the succeeding few days Sir Frederick Roberts busied himself in selecting the troops he intended to take with him in his march, which, for the adventurous spirits in camp, had all the charm, and much more than the hazard, of a knight- errant's expedition in mediaeval times, so great was the element of uncertainty attaching to its progress from the moment the troops, without base and cut off from all .communication with the outer world, plunged into the heart of Afghanistan with, at the other extremity, a triumphant enemy and a defeated and beleagurecl body of fellow-countrymen awaiting their arrival. The present Afghan war has been not less full of romantic incidents and sudden melodramatic changes than the war we had waged forty years before in the same country, and this last * This officer, like Sir Frederick Roberts and Colonel Perkins, Chief Engineer in the Kurram and Cabul campaigns, had received his professional training at Addiscombe, whence he entered the old Bengal Artillery. Dramatic Character of the Afghan War. 341 scene formed a fitting climax to the play in which human lives and a kingdom had been the stakes. Not only India and Eng- land, hut the whole civilized world watched with breathless interest the denouement of the drama about to be played out, which may be said to have divided itself, with strict regard to the unities, into five acts. The first unfolded the gathering of the three armies, the insult offered to the British Envoy at AH Musjid, the swift and victorious advance into Afghan territory, and the signing of the Treaty of Gundamuck, the curtain de- scending amid a shower of honours on the victors, and the banquet given by Lord Lytton at Simla to " the hero of the Peiwar Kotul." The second act dealt with the brief record of the Cavagnari Mission, received with such honour at Cabul, and expiring in a scene of fire and blood, in which British valour and devotion to duty shone out proudly and shed an un- dying lustre on its victims. But a change now came over the spirit of the play. With the rising of the curtain the third act deals with the revenge justly inflicted by a British army on the cowardly crew who dishonoured the flag of England, and dragged through the mire of the Afghan capital the headless body of her represen- tative. The brilliant advance of Sir Frederick Roberts from Ali Kheyl, the victory of Charasia and occupation of the Bala Hissar, with his visit to the still smoking and reeking ruins of the Residency, brought to a conclusion one of the most exciting episodes of this drama amid the plaudits of the auditory. But again the storm of war, long foreseen, and its contingencies thoughtfully provided for by the British General, burst on the scene. After a chequered struggle against vast odds, the British army was driven within its entrenched camp, whence, after the enemy had in vain attempted to overwhelm it by force of numbers, it issued to inflict severe chastisement on its enemies. Again sunshine succeeds storm, and with the junction of the armies of Sir Donald Stewart and Sir Frederick Roberts, and the conclusion of terms with the new Ameer for peacefully evacuating the country, it seemed as though the sword might be returned to its sheath, and an era of peace and goodwill inaugurated between Briton and Afghan. But this was not yet to be, and the ambition of one man and the iucom- 342 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. petence of another, resulted in a disaster transcending Isandhl- \vana, and only surpassed by that experienced by General Elphinstone in the passes between Cabul and Gundamuck. But like those reverses, only more speedily, if not more de- cisively, Maiwand was wiped out by the victory of the 1st Sep- tember, on which followed the withdrawal of our troops from the scene of so much glory and disaster. For the last time the curtain descends, and the Afghan War of 1878-80 was " as a tale that is told." 343 CHAPTER XVIII. English Public Opinion on the Projected March through Afghanistan Sir Frederick Roberts quits Cabul for Beni Hissar Incidents of the Forced March to Ghuznee Arrival at Ghuznee and Surrender of the Town and C'itadel The Forced March to Khelat-i-Ghilzye Relief and Removal of the Garrison Sir Frederick Roberts on the Line of March The Advance oil Candahar Preparations for the Attack on Ayoob Khan's Position. WHEN it was announced by telegraph in England that Sir Frederick Roberts proposed to march through Afghanistan with- out a base of operations or communications of any kind, as is usual, a host of military critics in Parliament, and the Club-gentlemen who are more familiar with " the shady side of Pall Mall " than with the deserts and mountain ranges of Afghanistan, and the conditions attaching to waging war with Oriental races, adduced numberless reasons, drawn from pre- cedent and theoretical treatises, satisfactorily demonstrating that, by the rules of war, Sir Frederick Roberts was courting disaster, and insisting that the step he was taking must be contrary to the better judgment of both himself and General Stewart, and was doubtless due to a determination on the part of the Government to carry out the evacuation of the country as previously arranged, without consideration for the safety of Roberts' s force. But these military critics were at fault alike in their judgment of the prudence of the march under ex- isting conditions, as was proved by the inexorable logic of events, and in their opinion as to the views held by the two experienced Generals in Afghanistan, who never had any doubt that a division of 10,000 properly equipped and commanded British troops could traverse Afghanistan in safety. As it had been determined to evacuate the Bala Hissar and the Sherpur Cantonment by the llth August, when Sir Donald Stewart intended to commence the retrograde move- ment on India, Sir Frederick Roberts had expressed his in- 344 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. tention to march three days before that date. The time at his disposal in which to select his force, and survey and complete its equipment \vas brief; but it was sufficient for the purpose. In this instance the selection of the troops, especially the Native corps, that were to accompany him, was an exceptionally difficult task. As pointed out by him in his Memorandum of 29th May, two years was, in his opinion, the limit at which the latter could be kept away from their homes ; but this had now been exceeded in the case of some of the Goorkha and Pun- jaubee regiments, and it would have been an ungracious task to disappoint these gallant soldiers, who were looking forward to return to their families after an unexampled absence from them, and call on them to undergo the chances of a forced march of over 300 miles, and, perhaps, of an arduous cam- paign. They had suffered heavily in action and through sick- ness, and naturally longed for a period of rest, so when it was understood that the usual proportion of Native regiments would accompany the column, the intelligence was not received with enthusiasm, and the selection was anxiously awaited. The Chief of the Staff, Colonel Chapman, says on this point : " It was not with eager desire that the honour of marching to Candahar was sought for, and some commanding officers of experience judged rightly the tempers of their men when they represented for the General's consideration the claims of the regiments they commanded to be relieved as soon as possible from field service. I lay stress on this fact, and claim for those officers, who subordinated their own wishes in the interest of the soldiers they commanded, as also for the Generals who acted on their representations, an insight into the character of our Native troops, the result of long experience. It was not easy to estimate the confidence created by such knowledge as was thus brought to bear on the question of selection, nor rightly to describe the sense of duty, and of absolute trust in their commanders, which marked the behaviour of the troops at this time. The enthusiasm which carried Sir Frederick Roberts's force with exceptional rapidity to Candahar, was an after-growth evolved by the enterprise itself, and came as a response to the unfailing spirit which animated the leader himself." The constitution of the force was published in General Orders Constitution of the Cabul-Candahar Column. 345 on the 3rd August. It was to consist of 3 Brigades, each of one British and three Native Battalions, with a Battery of guns attached. The Cavalry Brigade worked independently, its commander reporting direct to Head-quarters.* The guns, 7-pounders, were carried on mules, no wheeled artillery being taken, and one of the batteries consisted of screw-guns, which had a reputation for accuracy exceeding the 9-pounders, which they did not belie in action. On this question of artillery, opinions differed in the camp ; but both the Generals were of one mind, and the result proved that they were correct in their judgment. The object was to reach Candahar in the shortest possible time ; and it was not improbable that should Ayoob Khan endeavour to march on Ghuznee and Cabul, he would * The following was the strength of the regiments and batteries taken from Colonel Chapman's lecture : Officers British Native Drivers Soldiers. and Muleteers. Staff 79 Royal Artillery 6-8 Royal Artillery . . . 6 95 139 11-9 . . 6 95 139 Sepoys. No. 2 Mountain Battery . .5 ... 140 Cavalry Brigade 9th Lancers .... 19 318 3rd Bengal Cavalry . 7 ... 394 3rd Punjaub Cavalry . 9 ... 408 Central India Horse . . 11 ... 495 First Brigade 92nd Highlanders . . . 19 651 23rd Pioneers ... 8 ... 701 24th Punjaub Infantry^ . 7 ... 575 2nd Goorkhas ... 7 ... 501 Second Brigade 72nd Highlanders ... 23 787 2nd Sikhs .... 7 ... 612 3rd Sikhs .... 7 ... 570 5th Goorkhas ... 8 ... 561 Third Brigade 2-60th Rifles ... 21 616 15th Sikhs .... 10- ... 650 4th Goorkhas . . 8 ... 629 25th Punjaub Infantry . 7 ... 637 Total 274 2,562 7,151 This total of 9,987 was increased to 10,148 by the discharge of sick from hospital. 346 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. avoid the ordinary road and move by the valleys of the Urgundab or the Urgustan. The nature of the ground throughout Afghanistan is such that Artillery can never be safely employed with Cavalry alone unsupported by Infantry, as was shown on the llth December in General Massy's action. Nor is the rapidity of movement of this arm so much required in countries like Afghanistan, as the power of being able to operate over the most difficult ground without causing delay to the rest of the troops. It was not forgotten, moreover, that on arrival at Candahar the column would be augmented by a battery of 40-pouuders, a battery of field artillery, and four guns of Horse Artillery. "It is unques- tionable," says Sir Frederick Roberts, " that had either horse or field artillery accompanied the force the march could not have been performed with the same rapidity." Before leaving Cabul everything that was possible was done to lighten baggage. Ten British soldiers were told off to each mountain battery tent, usually intended to hold six, and fifty to a sepoy's tent of two pals, 341bs. of kit only being allowed for each man. The allowance to each Native soldier was 201bs. of baggage, inclusive of camp equipage. Each officer was allowed one mule, and an additional mule to every eight officers for mess. The amount of supplies taken with the force was for Euro- peans, thirty days' tea, sugar, rum, and salt, and five days' flour, and five days' rations for Native troops. One day's grain was carried by Cavalry horses and transport animals in addition to the ordinary load. The exact strength of the Cabul-Can- dahar Field Force, as it was officially designated, was 10,148 combatants, 223 Medical Staff, and 8,134 Native followers, in- cluding 2,192 doolie bearers.* So admirable were the arrangements elaborated by Sir Fred- erick Roberts, whose genius for organization received a fresh * The number of animals that left Cabul on the 8th August was 1,779 Cavalry chargers and 450 Artillery mules ; for the service of the trans- port, 1,589 yaboos (Afghan ponies), 4,510 mules, 1,244 Indian ponies, and 912 donkeys ; and for sick transport 286 ponies, 43 donkeys, and 6 camels. The grand total of animals was 10,819, exclusive of 415 purchased on the line of march. A formidable number to feed while making forced marches over 300 miles of country ! The casualties were 733, due to the hard work. Constitution of the Cabul-Candahar Column. 347 illustration during this famous march, -and so excellent was the service rendered by Lieutenant-Colonel Low and Major Bad- cock, the officers in charge of the Commissariat and Transport Departments,* and their assistants, that no instance was brought to notice in which either a soldier or camp-follower failed to receive his daily ration. Sir Frederick, we were told by a General officer, not only personally organized every detail of his force, but examined every man and beast, excluding those that were weakly. Flour and sheep were procurable throughout the country to be traversed, with the exception of some thirty miles before reaching Khelat-i-Ghilzye ; and the crops were in season for the cattle, so that forage was obtainable to any amount. The Division of Infantry was under the command of Major- General J. Ross, C.B., the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades being commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals H. T. Mac- pherson, T. D. Baker, and C. M. Macgregor. Brigadier-Gen- eral Hugh H. Gough commanded the Cavalry ; Colonel Alured C. Johnson the Artillery ; Colonel M. Perkins was com- manding Royal Engineer ; Colonel Chapman, R.A., Chief of the Staff, and Deputy- Surgeon General J. Hanbury, Principal Medical Officer. The head of the Political Department was Major Hastings, who had held the office at Cabul before Mr. Lepel Griffin's arrival, his principal assistant being Major Ewan Smith, who had been Chief Political Officer under Sir Donald Stewart at rd Hartington, Secretary of State for War, in his speech in the House of Commons on the 1st June, and by Lord Morley, in the Upper House, that on the preceding 1st May, the deficiency on the English establishment was 8,554 men, and on the Indian establishment 321, while on that date no less than 4,971 soldiers were on their way from India to claim iheir discharge. The Army Reserve at that date stood at 28,700 men, and the Militia Reserve at 25,000, being 5,000 below the establishment. This deficiency was, in part, artificial, as the army was increased by 3,700 men, and it was also due to the fact, that in 1882, an abnormally large number of men, enlisted for twelve aud six years, in 1870 and 1876 respectively, were discharged. The following are the changes proposed to remedy this state of affairs. Those soldiers in the ranks who are eligible to pass into the Reserve will be offered a I.ounty as an in- ducement to serve on till they have completed in effect five years' more service, or twelve years in all. They will then have the option of re- engaging so as to complete twenty-one years' service, on the recommenda- tion of their commanding officers. Men belonging to regiments in India are to be offered a bounty of 2 for the purpose of extending their service in that country. These regulations, together with the reduction of height and chest measurement, and the practical lowering of the minimum age to eighteen years, will no doubt increase the flow of recruits, but the Reserve must suffer proportionately as men re-engage for a pension. i( The length of time," said Lord Hartington, " during which these measures will con- tinue, will depend upon the state of recruiting and upon the number of men who appear inclined to avail themselves of our proposals." 398 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. any rate copy its perfection of organization, which constitutes it simply the most finished and easily-worked fighting machine the world has known. It seemed at one time as though Sir Frederick Roberts would have a new field for the exercise of his military talents, when telegraphic intelligence was received of the defeat at Majuha Hill and death of Sir George Colley on the 27th February. On the following day he was called upon by the Government, with the unanimous approval of the nation, to forego the remainder of his sick leave and sail for the Transvaal, in order to assume command of the troops, some 10,000 men, assembled at New- castle under the command of Sir Evelyn Wood. Though little glory could be reaped from a victory over the Boers, and the task of coercing a small nationality who had been clearly wronged by the policy pursued towards them, was not a con- genial one to an officer of his sense of justice and humanity, yet at the call of duty Sir Frederick Roberts cheerfully waived his own predilections, and, accepting the command at such short notice, sailed from England on the 6th March in the Balmoral Castle, accompanied by Major-General Newdigate and some Staff officers. Two days before quitting this country he repaired to Eton, where his old school presented him with a sword bringing to the memory that saying of Wellington, that " Waterloo was won on the playing-fields of Eton" and thence proceeded to Windsor Castle, where he had an audience of the Queen. On the 23rd March peace was concluded with the Boers,* and Mr. Childers telegraphed to Sir Frederick Roberts to proceed no further than Cape Town. Accordingly he left South Africa the day following his arrival, and on the 19th April the same day that Lord Beaconsfield died arrived in England, re infecta, it is true, but having proved that his services were at the dis- posal of his country for any task, without regard to personal convenience or his state of health. Sir Frederick Roberts was present at the Review held by the Queen at Windsor Great Park, when 52,000 Volunteers marched * The convention befween the British and Boer Commissioners was not signed until the 3rd August, and it was not until the 25th October that it received the ratification of the Volksraad. Roberts at the German Army Manoeuvres. 399 past the Sovereign, in the presence of the Royal Family and the Crown Prince of Germany. He also attended, as a private spectator, for such are " the rules of the Service," at the Review of Scottish Volunteers held at Edinburgh on the 25th August, when over 40,000 men marched past the Queen, so that he had the advantage of seeing over 90,000 of our citizen soldiers under arms. Among honours paid to Sir Frederick Roberts by his country- men should be mentioned the degrees of D.C.L., conferred at Oxford, and of LL.D. at Dublin. He was also feasted by the citizens of the Irish capital, of Liverpool, and Bristol, where a service of plate was presented to him by his numerous friends, who remembered him when residing there as a boy with his father. Sir Frederick Roberts was despatched by the War Office to attend the autumn manoeuvres of the German Army in 1881, and brought away with him the pleasantest reminiscences of his visit to Germany as military representative of his country at the manoeuvres of the Hanover and Schleswig-Holstein Army Corps, held for the fortnight between the 5th and 17th of August. In the preceding year Sir Garnet "Wolseley had been despatched by the "War Office to the head-quarters of the German Emperor, who, as well as his Army, appreciated the compliment paid by this country in accrediting her most eminent generals to this mimic " sport of Kings." The Emperor William received Sir Frederick Roberts with the utmost cordiality, and congratulated him on his successful campaigns in Afghanistan, the fortunes of which, he assured him, the German Army had followed with great interest. Again, when taking leave of his English guest, the fine old monarch, who so worthily represents the armed might of Germany, said that, perhaps, after the exciting scenes of real war in which he had been the central figure, the manoeuvres he had witnessed might appear tame, but he trusted they had interested him. Von Moltke, the organizer of victory, also expressed himself to Sir Frederick Roberts in complimentary terms as to the military qualities he had displayed in his conduct of the Afghan campaigns ; and praise from that great soldier must have sounded sweet even in the 400 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. ears of one wlio, like our hero, has been satiated with compli- ments from people of every degree, and with very varying qualifications to appreciate his achievements. Of the German generals, who received him with consideration and treated him with the utmost hospitality, Sir Frederick Eoberts was very favourable impressed, especially with Count Yon Waldersee, Chief of the Staff to the 10th, or Hanoverian, Army Corps, who has been recently promoted to the office of Quartermaster- General at Army Head-quarters, an appointment held in abey- ance since the Franco-German War of 1870. Count Waldersee is now the assistant, or adlatus, of Count Von Moltke, and is designated as the successor of that great soldier. But it was the German Army as a military machine, that filled Sir Frederick Eoberts with wonder. To such perfection has its organization been brought, that in one night any Army Corps can be mobilized. He was told that in the bureau of the General Staff, letters were ready stamped and addressed to every department and commanding officer of the several Army Corps, only requiring the date to be filled in for despatch in ten minutes. He was assured that all the horses belonging to private people throughout the country were marked off for the regiments and batteries to which they would be attached in war time, and also the hour and the train by which each horse would be despatched to its destination. The whole country was organized for war, and every individual capable of bearing arms knew where to go and what to do in the event of a call being made for his services. All the railway officials, telegraphists, and other public bodies in England consisting of civilians in Germany are soldiers, and the heads of these departments are general officers, who organize them chiefly to meet the exi- gencies of war. Even the private servants of the Emperor are old soldiers, always in uniform, with their breasts covered with medals ; and while the talk everywhere is military, every one appeared as though on the alert for immediate service. Of course such a state of affairs, though desirable from a military point of view, and perhaps necessary to a country placed like Germany between three powerful military monarchies, any two or all of which might coalesce against her, is utterly destructive of national progress, the accumulation of wealth (a doubtful ad- His Opinion of the German Army. 401 vantage), or the enjoyment of freedom as we understand it in this happy island ; and few who have witnessed the condition of feverish expectation characterising the country, now trans- formed into a vast camp, would change for it our freedom from anxiety, coupled though it he with a military system which, in comparison with that in force on the Spree, may be considered a happy-go-lucky one. Sir Frederick Roberts was much surprised at the favourable condition of the German officer, which he was always led to believe was far from being an enviable one. On the contrary, he found the German officer better dressed and horsed than his British brother-in-arms, and though their private incomes are small every officer is expected to possess between 25 and 180 a-year and the pay not handsome, yet there are many attendant advantages ; and, above all, the officers are attached to regiments which are never moved out of the province in which the corps d'armee is raised. The State allows each officer of Cavalry and Artillery one horse, which, at the end of five years, becomes his own property, and the Cavalry spend much money in mounting themselves. Sir Frederick Roberts declares he never saw officers, both Regimental and Staff, so well mounted as in the German Army. The German officer personally knows every man under his command, and having drilled them, has the assurance that when the country requires their services after they have returned to Civil life, they will come back to him. Not only do the officers drill their men, but they teach them riding and shooting ; for the riding master and instructor of musketry are unknown in the German Army. Every Captain is responsible to the Colonel that every man in his company is efficient by a certain date, the subalterns being responsible again to their immediate superior. This system, which is practically in force in the Indian Army, Sir Frederick Roberts thinks should partially be adopted in the British Army, and he would make the officers responsible for the fitness of their men. Our officers would doubtless hail this change if the men they have trained could remain under their command. By the present system officers train men who are drafted off to other corps or the "linked battalion," when the pressure to fill gaps in regiments on active D D 4O2 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts. service arises ; and General Roberts, in speaking of this reform, referred to the expressions of disappointment with which some officers of his acquaintance spoke of their unending and result- less labours, reminding one of the classic legend of Sisyphus and his stone. During his residence in England the late commander of the Army operating in Afghanistan has been inundated with letters from soldiers who have served under him, stating their hard case, and asking for his advice or assistance with the War Office. In this country the claims of old soldiers are almost totally ignored ; but in Germany long and honourable service is the stepping-stone to remunerative employment, and to " have done the State some service " is rightly regarded as a claim for provision in old age. When we consider the cruel neglect meted out to the wives and families of our soldiers who have died on active service, or succumbed to disease in the unhealthy climates to which they are exposed, one may hope that short service will have the redeeming feature of limiting military marriages, which in too many instances have brought untold misery on innocent women and children ; and this absence of domestic ties, if one may believe Lord Byron, has a further incidental advantage, if it is true that : "Nought so bothers The hearts of the heroic in a charge As leaving a small family at large." Sir Frederick Eoberts was offered, and accepted, the Com- mand-in-Chief of the Madras Army, with the local rank of Lieutenant-General, and, on the 26th October, in company with Lady Roberts, left London for India, on his way visiting Paris and Venice. Already his energetic spirit has shown itself in the institution of much-needed reforms, including the formation of three camps of exercise in one cold season, an innovation in the history of the old " coast army." There is complete unanimity among military men as to the deserts of General Roberts. Though his latest achievements astonished the world by their brilliance, his career was not of that meteoric character which owes its celebrity to some excep- tional combination of good fortune with a spasmodic display of military talent. Those who knew him best and had watched Review of Roberts s Career. 403 his career through the long years of uphill work, from the lowest rung of the ladder of the Quartermaster-General's Depart- ment to the head of the office, predicted great things of him, should he ever be placed in a position of responsibility. To them his success was no surprise. But it was otherwise to the world, which, it is said, "knows not its greatest men." When the Kurram campaign brought to the front the young General, exceptionally fortunate in attaining rank and a command at the age of forty-six an unusual circumstance in our seniority-ridden service, though Wellington and Napoleon fought their last field at that age, and Nelson closed his wonderful career at forty- seven much interest was excited in General Roberts, and the bald enumeration of his services showed that Lord Lytton had exercised sound discrimination in his choice. We have within recent years seen the phenomenon in our military history of a youthful General repeated in the case of Lord Wolseley, who, even more fortunate, was a Major-General commanding an army in the field at the age of forty, and achieved his last and most striking success in Egypt at the age of forty-nine, Roberts's age at the battle of Candahar. The career of these two distinguished soldiers have other singular points of resemblance. Both were Irishmen, and passed the greater portion of their service in the Quartermaster- General's Department of the Staff. Both, moreover, served as Assistant-Quartermaster-General during the Mutiny on Sir Hope Grant's Staff, one succeeding the other, and on one occasion they were brought into connection with one another. There are also many points of resemblance in the attain- ments and military method of these successful soldiers, whose names have been so much in the mouths of their country- men during recent events, and whose services and relative merits have been contrasted with more freedom than good manners. Small and spare of body, they are remarkable for their skill in horsemanship and powers of enduring fatigue. Both are gifted with the bright geniality of expression, soldierly frankness, and that charm of manner which conciliates all with whom they come into contact ; and equally they possess the confidence of all ranks and the affection of their immediate subordinates. Again, alike they have that exhaustless energy, 404 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts, that ardent love of their profession, that boundless resource in difficulty, and that indomitable spirit which rises in the hour of danger, and instils a like lofty spirit in all around. One advan- tage Wolseley has had over Roberts, the want of which still further increases the claims of the latter to our admiration. The victor of Arabi Pasha possesses an iron constitution, which has been denied to the conqueror of Ayoob Khan, who has found in Indian fever the hardest enemy he has had to battle against an enemy to combat whom has only brought into greater relief the heroism of the man, whose military genius, as at Candahar, shone with a brighter light amid the deadening vapours of earth. To the annals of our Indian Empire the subject of this Memoir has added achievements which will form one of its brightest pages. In the history of Afghanistan that highway by which the conquering races in Central Asia have descended upon the fertile plains and rich cities of India, and which has formed the battle-ground of some of the mightiest con- querors of antiquity, through which Semiramis and Alexander marched on their way to Hindostan, the former to be vanquished and the latter to triumph, which was traversed by Genghiz Khan, Tamerlane, and Nadir, and ruled by Mahmoud and Ahmed Shah in that historic country, with its memories lost in the haze of antiquity, the name of Sir Frederick Roberts will be remembered as one who, at Peiwar Kotul, Charasia, and Candahar, achieved some of the most striking successes recorded in history. But there is no memorial of his victories, either political, owing to our abandonment of the country, or material, such as a fortress or monument ; and indeed, there is none of any of the conquerors of this " land of stones and men," as Dost Mahomed bitterly called it when surveying the palaces of Calcutta, for they passed through it as a ship passes through the sea, leaving no trace in its wake. The only exception is Alexander, the Sekunder of the East, whose name and fame have survived more than 2,000 years, unlike the Assyrian monarchy of Nimrod and Semiramis, with its " thirteen hundred years Of empire ending like a shepherd's tale.'' Not only in India, on the banks of the Sutlej and at Mooltan, Conclusion. 405 but in Afghanistan, at Bamian and near Candahar, are memo- rials of the "Macedonian madman," of whom it may be said, in the words put by Byron, in his play of " Sardanapalus," into the mouth of the effeminate grandson of the great Assyrian Queen, when speaking of Bacchus, the legendary Conqueror of India : " Of all his conquests a few columns Which may be his, and might be mine, if I Thought them worth purchase and conveyance, are The landmarks of the seas of gore he shed, The realms he wasted, and the hearts he broke." Unlike these great soldiers and sovereigns, who were animated solely by ambition and the greed of power, Roberts invaded Afghanistan at the bidding of his Government, who deemed that the security of the vast dependency committed to their charge was menaced by the military preparations of the Afghan Ameer, whose claim of neutrality, as between the gigantic neighbours on his northern and southern boundaries, was belied by the welcome he accorded to the Ambassador of the Czar, and his refusal to receive the Envoy of the Empress of India. Whether our Government was justified in drawing the sword or wise in precipitating the quarrel, is a question for politicians, with which Sir Frederick Roberts, as a soldier, had no concern. Much bloodshed and suffering ensued, and many homes in Afghanistan and England were made desolate, yet for these inevitable results of war our hero was not responsible. He was guiltless of shedding " seas of gore " or of " wasting realms ;" but, on the contrary, strove to soften the asperities incidental to the conduct of warlike operations. He spared the vanquished when often he lay at his mercy, and, when enfor- cing the behests of a code which demands blood for blood, tempered the claims of justice with clemency. THE END. THE LIFE OF EDWARD LORD HAWKE, ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET, VICE-ADMIRAL OF GREAT BRITAIN, AND FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY FROM 1766 TO 1771. WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN OP THE ENGLISH WARS IN THE REIGN OF GEORGE THE SECOND, AND THE STATE OF THE ROYAL NAVY AT THAT PERIOD. BY MONTAGU BURROWS, CAPTAIN, R.N. (RETIRED LIST), AND CHICHELE PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. 8vo, with Portrait, 21s. OPINIONS OF THE PRESS. " From his unmerited obscurity Captain Burrows has rescued Lord Hawke, and in addition has presented the public with a most interesting account of the gradual organization of the Royal Navy." 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