v - 
 

THE 
 
 ANALOGY 
 
 O F 
 
 RELIGION, 
 
 NATURAL AND REVEALED, 
 
 TO THE 
 CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE. 
 
 TO WHICH ARE ADDED, 
 
 TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS : 
 
 I. On Perfonal Identity, II. On the Nature of Virtue, 
 
 TOGETHER W-ITH 
 
 A CHARGE, 
 
 Delivered to the CLERGY of the Diocefe t>f Durham, at the Primary Visitation, 
 in the Year MDCCLI. 
 
 BY JOSEPH BUTLER, LL. D. 
 
 LATE LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM. 
 
 jEjut (Analogic) h<ec -vis eft, ut id quod dulium tjl t ad aliquid fimile de quo non 
 quacritur, rcferat j ut incerta certis probct. 
 
 QUINT. JNST. ORAT. L.I. C. f. 
 
 A NEW EDITION, CORRECTED, 
 
 WITH A 
 
 PREFACE, 
 
 Giving fome ACCOUNT of the CHARACTER and WRITINGS of the AUTHOR, 
 
 By SAMUEL, LORD BISHOP of GLOUCESTER. 
 
 PRINTED AT BOSTON, 
 BY MANNING AND L O R I N G, 
 
 FOR DAVID WEST, No. 36, MARLBOROUCH-STREEIV 
 
 MDCCXCIU," 
 
r//i) 
 
 TO THE REVEREND 
 
 Dr. THOMAS BALGUY, 
 
 ARCHDEACON AND PREBENDARY OF WINCHESTER, &c. 
 
 DEAR SIR, 
 
 I TRUST you will excufe the liberty I have 
 
 taken of prefixing your name to the following meets ; 
 
 the latter part of which, I am confident, will not bs 
 
 thought undeferving of your approbation ; and of the 
 
 former part you will commend the intention at leaft, 
 
 if not the execution. In vindicating the character of 
 
 Bifhop BUTLER from the afperfions thrown upon it 
 
 lince his death, I have but difcharged a common duty 
 
 of humanity, which furvivors owe to thofe who have 
 
 deferved well of mankind by their lives or writings, 
 
 when they are pail the power of appearing in their 
 
 own defence. And if what I have added, by way of 
 
 opening the general defign of the works of this great 
 
 Prelate, be of ufe in exciting the younger clafs of ftu- 
 
 dents in our univerfities to read, and fo to read as to 
 
 underftand, the Two Volumes prepared and publifh- 
 
 ed by the Author himfelf ; I flatter myfelf I mall 
 
 have done no inconfiderable fervice to morality and 
 
 religion. Your time and ftudies have been long fuc- 
 
 cefsfully devoted to the fupport of the fame great 
 
 caufe ; and in what you have lately given to the 
 
 world, both as an author and an editor, you have 
 
 largely contributed to the defence of our common 
 
 Chriftianity, and of what was efleemed by one, who 
 
 was perfectly compettfrit to judge, its beft eftablim- 
 
 A 2 ment, 
 
 003 
 
IV 
 
 ment, the Church of ENGLAND. In tne prefent 
 publication I confider myfelf as a fellow-labourer with 
 you in the fame defign,. and tracing the path you 
 fiave trod before, but at great diflance, and with 
 unequal paces. When, by his MAJESTY'S good- 
 nefs, I was raifed to that ftation of eminence in the 
 church, to which you had been firft named, and 
 which, on account of the infirmity of your health, 
 you had defired to decline ; it was honour enough 
 for me on fuch an occafion to have been thought 
 of next to you : And I know of no better rule by 
 which to govern my conduct, fo as not to difcredit 
 the royal hand which conferred on me fo fignal 
 and unmerited a favour, than in cafes of difficulty 
 to put the queftion to myfelf, How you would prob- 
 ably have acted in the fame iituation. You fee, Sir, 
 I itill look up to you, as I have been wont, both as 
 my fuperior and my example. That I may long 
 ' reap the benefit of your advice and friendfhip ; and 
 that fuch a meafure of health and ilrength may be 
 continued to you, as may enable you to pafs the 
 evening of your days with comfort, and enjoy the 
 bleffings of the life you love, is the cordial wifh of, 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 Your very affectionate 
 and faithful Servant, 
 
 S. GLOUCESTER, 
 
 Partmouth-Street, Weftminfter, 
 iztlxMay, 1786, 
 
PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 ** When I confider how light a matter very often fubjefts the 
 beft eftablifhed characters to the fufpicions of pofterity, 
 poflerity often as malignant to virtue as the age that faw it 
 was envious of its glory ; and how ready a remote age is to 
 catch at a low revived flander, whicJi the times that brought 
 it forth faw defpifed and forgotten almoft: in its birth ; I 
 cannot but think it a matter that defcrves attention." Let- 
 ttr to the. Editor of the. Letters on the Spirit of Patriotifm, &c 
 by Bp. WAR BUR TON. See his Works, Vol. VII. p. 547. 
 
 JL HE CHARGE to the Clergy of the Dio- 
 cefe of Durham, which is fubjoined to the prefent 
 volume, was printed and publiihed in the year 1751, 
 by the learned Prelate, whofe name it bears ; and, 
 together with the SERMONS and ANALOGY of the 
 fame writer, both too well known to need a more 
 particular defcription, completes the collection of his 
 works. It has long been confidered as a matter of 
 curiofity, on account of its fcarcenefs ; and it is equal- 
 ly curious on other accounts, its fubject, and the cal- 
 umny to which it gave occafion, of reprefenting the 
 Author as addicted to fuperjlition, as inclined to popery, 
 and as dying in the communion of the church of Rome. 
 The improved edition of the Biographia Britannic a, 
 now pubH fhing under the care of Dr. Kippis, having 
 unavoidably brought this calumny again into notice ; 
 it may not be unfeafonable to offer a few reflections 
 in this place, by way of obviating any impreflions that 
 may hence arife, to the difadvantage of fo great a 
 character as that of the late Bifhop BUTLER -, refer- 
 ring thofe who defire a more particular account of his 
 life, to the third vqjpme of the fame entertaining 
 work, printed in 178% Art. BUTLER (Jofeph.) 
 
 I. The 
 
VI 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 I. The principal defign of the Bimop, in his Charge, 
 is to exhort his Clergy to " do their part towards re- 
 viving a practical fenfe of religion amongft the people 
 committed to their care ;" and, as one way of effect- 
 ing this, to " inftrudt them in the importance of exter- 
 nal religion" or the ufefulnefs of outward obfervances 
 in promoting inward piety. Now, from the com- 
 pound nature of man, confiding of two parts, the 
 body and the mind, together with the influence which 
 thefe are found to have on one another, it follows, 
 that the religious regards of fuch a creature ought to 
 be fo framed, as to be in fome way properly accom- 
 modated to both. A religion which is purely fpirit- 
 ual, flripped of every thing that may affect the fenfes, 
 and considered only as a divine philofophy of the 
 mind, if it 'do not mount up into enthufiafm, as has 
 frequently been the cafe, often finks, after a few fhort 
 fervours, into indifference : An abftracted invifible 
 object, like that which natural religion offers, ceafes 
 to move or intereft the heart ; and fomething further 
 is wanting to bring it nearer, and render it more pref- 
 ent to our view, than merely an intellectual contempla- 
 tion. On the other hand, when, in order to remedy 
 this inconvenience, recourfe is had to inftituted forms 
 and ritual injunctions ; there is always danger left men 
 be tempted to reft entirely on thefe, and perfuade 
 themfelves that a painful attention to fuch obfervances 
 will atone for the want of genuine piety and virtue. 
 Yet furely there is a way of fteering fafely between 
 thefe two extremes ; of fo confulting both the parts 
 of our conftitution, that the body and the mind may 
 concur in rendering our religious fervices acceptable 
 to God, and at the fame time ufeful to ourfelves. 
 And what way can this be, but precifely that which 
 is recommended in the Charge ; fuch a cultivation of 
 outward as well as inward religion, that from both 
 may refult, what is the point okiefly to be laboured 
 
 after, 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 VI! 
 
 after, and at all events to be fecured, a correfpondent 
 temper and behaviour ; or, in other words, mch an 
 application of the forms of godlinefs as may be fub- 
 fervient in promoting the power and fpirit of it ? No 
 man who believes the Scriptures of the Old and New 
 Teftament, and uriderftands what he believes, but 
 fnuft know, that external religion is as much enjoin- 
 ed, and conftitutes as real a part of revelation, as that 
 which is internal. The many ceremonies in ufe 
 among the Jews, in confequence of a divine com- 
 mand ; the baptifm of water, as an emblem of moral 
 purity ; the eating and drinking of bread and wine, 
 as fymbols and reprefentations of the body and blood 
 of Chrirt, required of Chriftians, are proofs of this. 
 On comparing thefe two parts of religion together, 
 one, it is immediately feen, is of much greater impor- 
 tance than the other ; and, whenever they happen to 
 interfere, is always to be preferred : But does it follow 
 from hence, that therefore that other is of little or no 
 importance, and, in cafes where there is no compe- 
 tition, may entirely be neglected ? Or rather is not 
 the legitimate concludon directly the reverfe, that 
 nothing is to be looked upon as of little importance, 
 which is of any ufe at all in preferring upon our minds 
 a fenfe of the Divine Authority, which recals to our 
 remembrance the obligations we are under, and helps 
 to keep us, as the Scripture expreifes it, in the fear of 
 tke Lord all the day long ?* If, to adopt the inftance 
 mentioned in the Charge, the fight of a CHURCH 
 fhould remind a man of ibme fentiment of piety ; if, 
 from the view of a material building dedicated to the 
 fervice of God, he (houkl be led to regard himfelf, his 
 own body, as a living temple of the Holy Ghoft^ and 
 therefore no more than the other to be profaned or 
 deiecrated by any thing that defileth or is impure ; 
 could it be truly faid of fuch a one that he was fuper- 
 
 ftitious, 
 
 * Prov. xxiii. 17. f i Cor. vi. 19. 
 
via PREFACE 
 
 ftitious, or miftook the means of religion for the end ? 
 If, to ufe another, and what has been thought a more, 
 obnoxious inftance, taken from the Bifhpp's prac- 
 tice, a CROSS, eredled in a pla.ce of public worfhip,* 
 fhould caufe us to reflect on him who died on a crofs 
 for our falvation, and on the neceffity of our own dy- 
 ing tofinj^ and of crucifying the fiefo with its off eft ions 
 and lufts ; j would any worfe confequences follow from 
 fuch fentiments fo excited, than if the fame fentiments 
 had been excited by the, view of a picture, of the cru- 
 cifixion fuppofe, fuch as is commonly placed, and 
 with this very defign, in foreign churches, and indeed 
 in many of our own ? Both the inflances here ad- 
 duced, it is very poiTible, may be far from being apr 
 proved, even by thofe who are under the moil fincere 
 convictions of the importance of true religion ; and it 
 is eafy to conceive how open to fcorn and cenfure they 
 muft be from others, who think they have a talent for 
 ridicule, and have accuftomed themfelves to regard all 
 pretenfions to piety as hypocritical or fuperftitious. 
 But wifdorn is juftified of her children.^ Religion is 
 what it is, whether men will hear, or whether they will 
 forbear :>\\ and whatever in the fmallefl degree pro- 
 motes its interefts, and affifts us in performing its 
 commands, whether that afliflance be derived from, 
 the medium of the body or the mind, ought to be 
 efteemed of great weight, and deferving of our moil 
 ferious attention. 
 
 However, be the danger of fuperftition what it may, 
 no one was more fenfible of that danger, or more ear- 
 nefl in maintaining that external a<5t$ of themfelves 
 are nothing, and that moral holinefs, as diftinguifhed 
 from bodily obfervances of every kind, is that which 
 conftitutes the eflence of religion, than Bifhop BUT- 
 LER. Not only the Charge itfelf, the whole inten- 
 tion 
 
 * See note [A], at the end of this Preface. 
 
 f Rom. vi. i r. J (3aL v. 24. 
 
 Matth. xi. 19, }j Ezek. ii. 5, 
 
BY THE EDITOR. Lx 
 
 tion of which is plainly nothing more than to enforce 
 the neceffity of pratiical religion^ the reality as well as 
 form, is a demonftration of this ; but many paffages 
 befides, to the fame purpofe, feledted from his other 
 writings. Take the two following as fpecimens. In 
 his Analogy he obferve* thus : " Though mankind 
 have, in all ages, been greatly prone to place their re- 
 ligion in peculiar pofitive rites, by way of equivalent 
 for obedience to moral precepts ; yet, without mak- 
 ing any comparifon at all between them, the nature 
 of the thing abundantly fhews all notions of that kind 
 to be utterly fubverfive of true religion- : As they are, 
 moreover, contrary to the whole general tenor of Scrip- 
 ture ; and likewife to the mofl exprefs particular dec- 
 larations of it, that nothing can render us accepted of 
 God, without moral virtue."* And to the fame pur- 
 pofe in his Sermon^ preached before the Society for the 
 Propagation of the Gofpel, in February, 1738-9. 
 " Indeed amongft creatures naturally formed for re- 
 ligion, yet fo much under the power of imagination as 
 men are, fuperftition is an evil, which can never be out 
 of fight. But even againft this, true religion is a great 
 fecurity, and the only one. True religion takes up 
 that place in the mind, which fuperftition would ufurp, 
 and fo leaves little room for it ; and likewife lays us 
 under the ftrongeft obligations to oppole it. On the 
 contrary, the danger of fuperftition cannot but be in- 
 creafed by the prevalence of irreligion ; and by its 
 general prevalence, the evil will be unavoidable. For 
 the common people, wanting a religion, will of courfe 
 take up with almoft any fuperftition which is thrown 
 in their way ; and, in proceis of time, amidft the in- 
 finite vicifiitudes of the political world, the leaders of 
 parties will certainly be able to ferve themfelves of that 
 fuperftition, whatever it be, which is getting ground ; 
 and will not fail to carry it to the utmoft length their 
 
 * occafions 
 
 '' Analogy, Part U. Chap. i. 
 
* P R E F A C fe 
 
 ticcafionS require. The general nature of the thing 
 fliews this ; and hiftoiy and fact confirm it. It is 
 therefore wonderful, thofe people who feem to think 
 there is but one evil in life, that of fuperflition, ihould 
 not fee that atheifm and profane nefs rnuft be the in- 
 troduction of it."* 
 
 He who ean think and write in fuch a manner, can 
 never be faid to miflake the nature of real religion : 
 And he, who, after fuch proofs to the contrary, can 
 perfift in aiTerting of fo difcreet and learned a perfon, 
 that he was addicted to fuperftition, muft himfelf be 
 much a ftranger both to truth and chanty. 
 
 And here it may be worth our while to obferve, 
 that the fame excellent Prelate, who by one fet of men 
 was fufpe&ed otfuperftition, on account of his Charge^ 
 has by another been reprefented as leaning to the op- 
 pofite extreme of entkujtafm, on account of his twodif- 
 courfes On the Love of God. But both opinions are 
 equally without foundation. He was neither fuper- 
 ftitious nor an enthufiafl. His mind was much too 
 ftrong, and his habits of thinking and reafoning much 
 too ftridt and fevere, to iuffer him to clefcend to the 
 weakneiFes of either character. His piety was at once 
 fervent and rational. When, imprefled with a gener- 
 ous concern for the declining caufe of religion, he la- 
 boured to revive its dying interefts, nothing he judged 
 would be more effectual to that end, among creatures 
 fo much engaged with bodily things, and fo apt to be 
 affected with whatever ftrongly folicits the fenfes as 
 men are, than a religion of fuch a frame as fhould in 
 its exercife require the joint exertions of the body and 
 the mind. On the other hand, when penetrated with 
 the dignity and importance of the firft and great com- 
 
 vdmentSf Love to God, he let himfelf to inquire, 
 what thofe movements of the heart are, which are clue 
 to him, the Author and Cauie of all things ; he found, 
 
 in 
 
 * Serra. XVI. p. 339, 340. Ed. 4th, 1749. 
 f .Matih. xxii. 38. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xi 
 
 in the coolefl way of confideration, that God is the 
 natural object of the fame alFe&ions of gratitude, rev- 
 erence, fear, defire of approbation, truft, and depend- 
 ence ; the fame affections, in kind, though doubtlefs in 
 a very difproportionate degree, which any one would 
 feel from contemplating a perfect character in a crea- 
 ture, in which goodnels with wifdorn and power are 
 fuppofed to be the predominant qualities, with the 
 further circumflance that this creature was alfo his 
 governor and friend. This fubject is manifeflly a 
 real one ; there is nothing in it fanciful or unrealbn- 
 able. This way of being affected towards God is piety^ 
 in the ilrictefl fenfe : This is religion, confidered as a 
 habit of mind ; a religion, fuited to the nature and 
 condition of man.* 
 
 II. From fuperftition to popery the tranfition is 
 eafy. No wonder then, that, in the progrefs of de- 
 traction, the fimple imputation of the former of thefe, 
 with which the attack on the character of our Author 
 was opened, mould be followed by the more aggra- 
 vated imputation of the latter. Nothing, I think, 
 can fairly be gathered in fupport of fuch a fuggefbion 
 from the Charge, in which popery is barely mentioned, 
 and occafionaliy only, and in a fentence or two ; yet 
 even there, it mould be remarked, the Bimop takes 
 care to defcribe the peculiar obfervances required by 
 it, " fome as in themfelves wrong and fuperftitious, 
 and others of them as being made fubfervient to the 
 purpofes of fuperftition." With refpect to his other 
 writings, any one at all converfant with them needs 
 not to be told, that the matters treated of both in 
 his Sermons and his Analogy did, none of them, direct- 
 ly lead him to confider, and much lefs to combat, the 
 opinions, whether relating to Faith or Worfhip, which 
 are peculiar to the Church of Rome : It might there- 
 fore have happened, yet without any jufl conclufion 
 
 arifing 
 
 * See note [B], at the end of this Preface. 
 
Xll 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 arifmg from thence, of being bimfelf inclined to favouf 
 thofe opinions, that he had never mentioned, fo much 
 as incidentally, the fubject of popery at all. But for- 
 tunately for the reputation of the Bifhop, and to the 
 eternal difgrace of his calumniators, even this poor 
 refource is wanting to fupport their malevolence. In 
 his Sermon at St. Bride's, before the Lord Mayor, in 
 1740, after having faid that " our laws and whole 
 confcitution go more upon fuppofition of an equality 
 amongft mankind, than the constitution and laws of 
 other countries ;" he goes on to obferve, that " this 
 plainly requires, that more particular regard mould be 
 had to the education of the lower people here, than in 
 places where they are born ilaves of power, and to be 
 ma,dej!avsoffypfrftiti<w;"*l Meaning evidently in 
 this place by the general term fuperflition, the partic- 
 ular errors of the Romanifts. This is fomething ; but 
 we have a ftill plainer indication what -his fentiments 
 concerning popery really were, from another of his 
 Additional Sermons, I mean that before the Houfe of 
 Lords, on June the i ith, 1 747, the anniverfary of his 
 late Majefty's acceflion. The paflage alluded to is as 
 follows, and my readers will not be difpleafed that I 
 give it them at length. " The value of our religious 
 eftablimment ought to be very much heightened in 
 our efteem, by confidering what it is a fecurity from ; 
 I mean that great corruption, of Chriftianity, popery, 
 which is ever hard at work to bring us again under 
 its yoke. Whoever will confider the popifh claims 
 to the difpofal of the whole earth, as of divine right, 
 to difpenfe with the mod facred engagements, the 
 claims to fupreme abfoiute authority in religion ; in 
 fhort, the general claims which the Canonifts exprefs 
 by the words, plenitude of power whoever, I fay, will 
 confider popery as it is profeffed at Rome, may fee, 
 that it is maniieit, open ufurpation of all human and 
 
 divine 
 
 * Serm. XVII. p. 3 $7, 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xiii 
 
 divine authority. But even in thofe Roman-catholic 
 countries where thefe monftrous claims are not ad- 
 mitted, and the civil power does, in many refpecb, 
 reilrain the papal ; yet perfecution is profeffed, as it 
 is abiblutely enjoined by what is acknowledged to be 
 their higheft authority, a General Council, fo called, 
 with the Pope at the head of it ; and is practifed in 
 all of them, I think, without exception, where it can 
 be done fafely. Thus they go on to fubiiitute force 
 inflead of argument, and external profeflion made by 
 force inftead of reafonable conviction. And thus 
 corruptions of the grofTeft fort have been in vogue, 
 for many generations, in many parts of Chriftendom ; 
 and are fo-ftill, even where popery obtains in its leaft 
 abfurd form : And their antiquity and wide extent 
 are inlifted upon as proofs of their truth ; a kind of 
 proof which at beft can only be prefumptive, but 
 which lofes all its little weight, in' proportion as the 
 long and large prevalence of fuch corruptions have 
 been obtained by force."* In another part of the 
 fame fermon, where he is again fpeaking of our ec- 
 cleliaftical conftitution, he reminds his audience that 
 it is to be valued, " not becaufe it leaves us at liberty 
 to have as little religion as we pleafe, without being 
 accountable to human judicatories ; but bscaufe it 
 exhibits to our view, and enforces upon our con- 
 fciences, genuine Christianity, free from the fuperfli- 
 tions with which it is defiled in other countries ;'* 
 which fuperflitions, he oblerves, " naturally tend to 
 abate its force." -f The date of this Sermon mould 
 here be attended to. It was preached in June, 1 747 ; 
 that is, four years before the delivery and publication 
 of the Charge, which was in the year 1751 ; and ex- 
 actly five years before the Author died, which was in 
 June, 1752. We have then, in the palfages now 
 laid before the reader, a clear and unequivocal proof, 
 
 brought 
 
 * Serm. XX. p. 440442. f P. 449. 
 
XIV 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 brought down to within a few years of Bifhop BUT- 
 LER'S death, that popery was held by him in the ut- 
 moft abhorrence, and that he regarded it in no other 
 light than as the great corruption of Chriftianity, and a 
 manifejl) open usurpation of all human and divine author- 
 ity. The argument is decifive ; nor will any thing be 
 of force to invalidate it, unlefs from fome after-aft 
 during the mort remainder of the Bifhop's life, befideS 
 that of delivering and printing his Charge, (which, 
 after what I have faid here, and in the Notes added 
 to this Preface and to the Charge, I muft have leave 
 to confider as affording no evidence at all of his in- 
 clination to papiflical doctrines or ceremonies) the 
 contrary mail incontrovertibly appear. 
 
 III. One fuch after-act, however, has been alleg- 
 ed, which would effectually demoliih all that we have 
 urged in behalf of our Prelate, were it true, as is pre- 
 tended, that he died in the communion of the church of 
 Rome. Had a ftory of this fort been invented and 
 propagated by Papiils, the wonder might 'have been 
 lefs: 
 
 Hoc Ithacus velit, & magno mercentur Atridse. 
 
 But to the reproach of proteflantifm, the fabrication 
 of this calumny, for fuch we mall find it, originated 
 from among ourfelves. It is pretty remarkable, that 
 a circumftance fo extraordinary fhould never have been 
 divulged till the year 1767, fifteen years after the Biih- 
 op's deceale. At that time Dr.TnoMAsSECKER was 
 Archbifhop of CANTERBURY ; who of all others was 
 the moft likely to know the truth or falfehood of the 
 fact aflerted, having been educated with our author in 
 his early youth, and having lived in a conftant habit 
 of intimacy with him to the very time of his death. 
 The good Archbifhop was not filent on this occafion : 
 With a virtuous indignation he flood forth to protect 
 the pofthumous character of his friend ; and in a pub- 
 lic newfpaper, under the fignature of Mifopfeudes, call- 
 ed 
 
B-Y THE, EDITOR. xy 
 
 ed upon his accufer to fupnprt what he had advanced, 
 by whatever proofs he could. No proof, however, nor 
 any thing like a proof, appeared in reply j and every 
 man of fenfe and candour at that time was perfectly 
 convinced the aflertion was entirely groundlefs.* As 
 a further confirmation of the rectitude of this judg- 
 ment, it may not be amifs to mention, there is yet in 
 exiftence a ftrong ! frefumptive argument at lead in its 
 favour, drawn from the teflipaony of thofe who attend- 
 ed our author in the ficknefs of which he died. The 
 laft days of this excellent Prelate were pa -(Ted at Bath ; 
 Dr. NATHAN A EL FORSTER, his chaplain, being con- 
 tinually with him ; and for one day, and at the very 
 end of his illnefs, Dr. MARTIN BENSON alfo, the then 
 Bifhop of GLOUCESTER, who fliortened his own life 
 in his pious hafte to vifit his dying friend. Both thefe 
 perfons conftantly wrote letters to Dr. SECKER, thea 
 Bifhop of OXFORD, containing accounts of Bifhop 
 BUTLER'S declining health, and of the iymptoms and 
 progrefs of his diforder, which, as was conjectured, fooii 
 terminated in his death. Thefe letters, which are flill 
 preferved in the Lambeth library ,-f I have read ; and 
 not the flendereft argument can be collected from 
 them, in justification of the ridiculous ilander we are 
 here confidering. If at that awful feafon the Bifhop 
 was not known to have expreiled any opinion, tending 
 to mew his diflike to popery ; neither was he km- 
 to have faid any thing, that could at all be conftrued 
 in approbation of it : And the natural prefumption 
 that whatever fentiments he had formerly entertained 
 concerning that corrupt fyftem of religion, he contin- 
 ued to entertain them to the lad. The truth is, nei- 
 ther the word nor the idea of popery feems once to 
 have occurred either to the Bifhop himfelf, or to thofe 
 who watched his parting moments : Their thoughts 
 were otherwiie engaged. His diforder had reduced 
 
 him 
 
 * See note [C], at the end of this TrefAce. 
 f See note [~DJ, at the euu ri JbosJ .uce. 
 
PREFACE! 
 
 him to fuch debility, as to render him incapable of 
 fpeaking much or long on any fubject ; the few bright 
 intervals that occurred were parTed in a ftate of the uN 
 nioft tranquillity and compofure ; and in that compo- 
 fure he expired. Mark the perfett man, and behold the 
 upright ; for the end of that man is peace.* Let me die 
 the death of the righteous, and let my laft end be like Us !^ 
 Out of pure refpect for the virtues of a man, whom 
 I had never the happinefs of knowing, or even of fee- 
 ing, but from whofe writings I have received the great - 
 eft benefit and illumination, and which I have reafon 
 to be thankful to Providence for having early thrown 
 in my way ; I have adventured, in what I have now 
 offered to the public, to flep forth in his defence, and 
 to vindicate his honeft fame from the attacks of thofe, 
 who, with the vain hope of bringing down fuperior 
 characters to their own level, are forever at work in de- 
 trading from their jufl praife. For the literary repu- 
 tation of Bifhop BUTLER, it (lands too high in the 
 opinion of the world, to incur the danger of any dimi- 
 nution ; but this in truth is the leaft of his excellen- 
 cies. He was more than a good writer, he was a good 
 man ; and, what is an addition even to this eulogy, he 
 was a fincere Chriftian, His whole fludy was directed 
 to the knowledge and practice of found morality and 
 true religion : Thefe he adorned by his life, and has 
 recommended to future ages in his writings ; in' which, 
 if my judgment be of any avail, he has done effential 
 fervice to both ; as much, perhaps, as any {ingle per- 
 fon, fince the extraordinary gifts of the word of wif- 
 dom and the word of knowledge'^ have been withdrawn. 
 
 IN what follows, I propofe to give a fhort account 
 of the B.ilhop's MORAL and RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS^ 
 as thefe are collected from his works. 
 
 I. His 
 
 * Pf, xxxvii. 37. f Numb, xxiii. io t * Cor. xti. S, 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xvli 
 
 I. His way of treating the fubject of morals is to be 
 gathered from the volume of his SERMONS, and par- 
 ticularly from the three firft, and from the preface to 
 that volume. 
 
 " There is," as our Author with fingular fagacity 
 has obfefved, *' a much more exact correipondence be- 
 tween the natural and moral world, than we are apt to 
 take notice of." The inward frame of man anfwers 
 to his outward condition. The feveral propenfities, 
 paffions, and affections, implanted in our hearts by the 
 Author of nature, are in a peculiar manner adapted to 
 the circumftances of life in which he hath placed us. 
 This general obfervation, properly purfued, leads to 
 feveral important concluiions. The original internal 
 conftitution of man, compared with his external con- 
 dition, enables us to difcern what courfe of action and 
 behaviour that conftitution leads to, what is our duty 
 refpecting that condition, and furniihes us befides with 
 the moil powerful arguments to the practice of it. 
 
 What the inward frame and conftitution of man is, 
 is a queftion of fact, to be determined, as other facts 
 are, from experience, from our internal feelings and 
 external fenfes, and from the teftimony of others. 
 Whether human nature, and the circumftances in 
 which it is placed, might not have been ordered other- 
 wife, is foreign to our inquiry, and none of our con- 
 cern : Our province is, taking both of thefe as they 
 are, and viewing the connexion between them, from 
 that connexion to difcover, if we can, what courfe of 
 action is fitted to that nature and thofe circumftances. 
 From contemplating the bodily fenfes, and the organs 
 or inftruments adapted to them, we learn that the eye 
 was given to fee with, the ear to hear with. In like 
 manner, from confidering our inward perceptions and 
 the final caufes of them, we collect that the feeling of 
 fliame, for inftance, was given to prevent the doing of 
 
 B things 
 
 * Serm. VI, 
 
XV'iii 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 things fliameful ; companion, to carry us to relieve 
 others in diftrefs - y anger, to refift fudden violence of- 
 fered to ourfelves. If, continuing our inquiries in this 
 way, it fhould at length appear, that the nature, the 
 whole nature of man, leads him to and is fitted for that 
 particular courfe of behaviour, which we ufually dif- 
 tinguim by the name of virtue ; we are authorized to 
 Conclude, that virtue is the law we are bom under, that 
 It was fo intended by the Author of our being ; and 
 we are bound by the mofl intimate of all obligations, a 
 regard to our own higheft interefl and happinefs, to 
 conform to it in all fituations and events. 
 
 Human nature is not fimple and uniform, but made 
 tip of feveral parts ; and we can have no jufl idea of it 
 as a fyftem or conflitution, unlefs we take into our view 
 the refpects and relations which thefe parts have to each 
 other. As the body is not one member, but many, 
 fo our inward ftruclure confifh of various inflincts, 
 appetites, and propenfions. Thus far there is no dif- 
 ference between human creatures and brutes. But 
 befides thefe common paffions and affections, there is 
 another principle, peculiar to mankind, that of con- 
 fcience, moral fenfe, reflection, call it what you pleafe, 
 by which they are enabled to review their whole con- 
 duct, to approve of fome actions in themfelves, and ta 
 difapprove of others . That this principle will of courfe 
 "have fome influence on our behaviour, at leafl at times, 
 will hardly be difputed : But the particular influence 
 which it ought to have, the precife degree of power in 
 the regulating of our internal frame that is affigned it 
 by him who placed it there, is a point of the utmoft 
 confequence in itfelf, and on the determination of 
 which the very hinge of our Author's moral fyfiem 
 turns * If the faculty here fpoken of be, indeed, what 
 it is afferted to be, in nature and kindfuperior to every 
 other paffion and affection ; if it be given, not merely 
 that it may exert its force occafionally, or as our pref- 
 
 en-t 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xix 
 
 t'n't humour or fancy may difpofe us, but that it may 
 "at all times exercife an uncontrollable authority and 
 government over all the reft ; it will then follow, that 
 in order to complete the idea of human nature, as a 
 fyftem, we muft not only take in each particular bias, 
 propenfion, inflinct, which are feen to belong to it, but 
 we muft add, befides the principle of contcience, to- 
 gether with the fubjectien that is due to it from all the 
 other appetites and pafiiohs ; juft as the idea of a civil 
 conftitution is formed, not barely from enumerating 
 the feveral members and ranks of which it is compofed, 
 but from thefe confidered as acting in various degrees 
 of fubordination to each other, and all under the di- 
 rection of the fame fupreme authority, whether that 
 authority be vefted in one perfon or more. 
 
 The view here given of the internal conftitution of 
 man, and of the fupremacy of confcience, agreeably 
 to the conceptions of Bilhop BUTLER, enables us to 
 comprehend the force of that expreffion, common to 
 him and the ancient moralifts, that virtue confifts in 
 following nature. The meaning cannot be, that it 
 confifts in acting agreeably to that propenfity of our 
 nature which happens to be the ftrongeft ; or which 
 propels us towards certain objects, without any regard 
 to the methods by which they are to be obtained ; but 
 the meaning muft be, that virtue confifts in the due 
 regulation and fubjection of all the other appetites and 
 affections to the fuperior faculty of confcience ; from 
 a conformity to which alone our actions are properly 
 natural^ or correfpondent to the nature, to the whole 
 nature of fuch an agent as man. From hence too it- 
 appears, that the Author of our frame is by no means 
 indifferent to virtue and vice, or has left us at liberty 
 to act at random, as humour or appetite may prompt 
 us ; but that every man has the rule of right within 
 him ; a rule attended in the very notion of it with au- 
 thority, and fuch as has the force of a direction and a 
 B 2, command 
 
xx PREFACE 
 
 command from him, who made us what we are, what 
 courfe of behaviour is fuited to our nature, and which 
 he expects that we mould follow. This moral faculty 
 implies alfo a pre-fentiment and apprehenlion, that the 
 judgment which it paffes on our adions, considered as 
 of good or ill defert, will hereafter be confirmed by the 
 unerring judgment of God ; when virtue and happi- 
 nefs, vice and mifery, whofe ideas are now fo clofely 
 connected, mail be indiffolubly united, and the divine 
 government be found to correspond in the moil exact 
 proportion to the nature he has given us. Laflly, this 
 juft prerogative or fupremacy of confcience it is, which 
 Mr. POPE has defcribed in his Univerfal Prayer, though 
 perhaps he may have exprefled it rather too ftrongly, 
 where he fays, 
 
 " What confcience dictates to be done, 
 
 ** Or xvarns me not to do, 
 " This teach me more tkan Hell to fliun, 
 
 " That more than Heaven purfue." 
 
 The reader will obferve, that this way of treating 
 the fubject of morals by an appeal tofafls does not at 
 all interfere with that other way, adopted by Dr. 
 Samuel Clarke, and others, which begins with inquir- 
 ing into the relations andjitneffes of things, but rather 
 illuftrates and confirms it. That there are effential 
 differences in the qualities of human actions, eftablifh- 
 ed by nature, and that this natural difference of things, 
 prior to and independent of all will, creates a natural 
 fonefs in the agent to.act agreeably to it, feems as little 
 to be denied, as that there is the moral difference before 
 explained, from which we approve and feel a pleafure in 
 what is right, and conceive a diftafle to what is wrong. 
 Still, however, when we are endeavouring to eflablifh 
 either this moral or that natural difference, it ought 
 never to be forgotten, or rather it will require to be 
 diflinctly (hewn, that both of thefe, when traced up to 
 their fource, fuppofe an intelligent/ Author of nature 
 
 and 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xxi 
 
 and moral Ruler of the world ; who originally ap- 
 pointed thefe differences, and by fuch an appoint- 
 ment has fignified his WILL that we fhould conform 
 to them, as the only effectual method of fecuring our 
 HAPPINESS on the whole under his government.* 
 And of this confideration our Prelate himfelf was not 
 unmindful ; as may be collected from many expref- 
 fions in different parts of his writings, and particularly 
 from the following paffages in his Xlth Sermon. " It 
 may be allowed, without any prejudice to the caufe of 
 virtue and religion, that our ideas of happinefs and mif- 
 ery are, of all our ideas, the neareft and mod important 
 to us ; that they will, nay, if you pleafe, that they ought 
 to prevail over thofe of order, and beauty, and harmo- 
 ny, and proportion, if there fhould ever be, as it is im- 
 poflible there ever fliould be, any inconfiftence between 
 them." And again, " Though virtue or moral recti- 
 tude does indeed confift in affection to and purliiit of 
 what is right and good, as fuch ; yet, when we fit down 
 in a cool hour, we can neither juftify to ourfelves this 
 or any other purfuit, till we are convinced that it will 
 be for our happinefs, or at lead not contrary to it."-j- 
 
 Befides the general fyftem of morality opened above, 
 our Author in his Volume of Sermons has ftated with 
 accuracy the difference between felf-love and benevo- 
 lence ; in oppofition to thofe, who on the one hand 
 make the whole of virtue to confift in benevolence, 
 and to thofe, who on the other aflert that every par- 
 ticular affection and action is refolvable into felf-love. 
 In combating thefe opinions, he has fhewn, I think un- 
 anfwerably, that there are the fame kind of indications 
 in human nature that we were made to promote the 
 happinefs of others, as that we were made to promote 
 our own -: That it is no juft objection to this, that we 
 have diipoiitions to do evil to others as well as good ; 
 
 for 
 
 * See note [E], at the end of this Preface. f Serjn. XI. p. 229. 
 
 See the ad Differtation Q>. tie Nature of Virtue^ at the end of the dnakgy< 
 
3X11 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 for we have alfo difpofitions to do evil as well as goo<2 
 to our/elves, to our own moft important interefts evert 
 in this life, for the fake of gratifying a prefent paffion ; 
 That the thing to be lamented is, not that men have? 
 too great a regard to their own real good, but that 
 they have not enough : That benevolence is not. more 
 at variance with or unfriendly to felf-love, than any 
 other particular affection is ; and that, by consulting 
 the happinefs of others, a man is fo far from lejjening 
 his own, that the very endeavour to do. fo, though he 
 fhould fail in the accomplimment, is a fource of the 
 highefl fatisfaction and peace of mind.* He has alfo v 
 in paffing, animadverted on the philofopher of Malwf- 
 bury, who in his book Of Human Nature has advanced* 
 as difcoveries in moral fcience, that benevolence is on- 
 ly the love of power, and companion the fear of future 
 calamity to ourfelves. And this our Author has done, 
 not fo much with the defign of expofing the falfe rea- 
 foning of Mr. Hobbes, but becaufe on fo perverfe an 
 account of human nature he has raifed a fyftem, fub- 
 verfive of all juftice and honefty.^ 
 
 II, The Religious Syftem of Bifhop BUTLER is 
 chiefly to be collected from the treatife, entitled The 
 Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Con- 
 Jlitution and Courfe of Nature* 
 
 All things are double one againfl another, and God hatk 
 made nothing imperfeft.'l On this fingle obfervation of 
 the Son of Sirack, the whole fabric of our Prelate's 
 defence of religion, in his Analogy, is raifed. Inftead 
 of indulging to idle fpeculations, how the world might 
 poflibly have been better than it is ; or, forgetful of 
 the difference between hypothefis and fad, attempting 
 to explain the divine economy with refpect to intelli- 
 gent creatures from pre-conceived notions of his own ;- 
 he nrfl inquires what the conititution of nature, as. 
 
 made 
 
 * See Sermons I. nml XI. and the Preface to the Volume of Sermons. 
 fr See the Notes to Sermon I, and V, J Ecclus. xlii. 24. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xxiii 
 
 made known to us in the way of experiment, actually 
 is j and from this, now feen and acknowledged, he en- 
 deavours to form a judgment of that larger conftitu- 
 tion, which religion difcovers to us. If the difpenfa- 
 tion of Providence we are now under, confidered as 
 inhabitants of this world, and having a temporal in- 
 tereft to iecure in it, be found, on examination, to be 
 analogous to, and of a piece with that further difpen- 
 fotion, which relates to us as defigned for another 
 world, in which we have an eternal intereft, depend- 
 ing on our behaviour here ; if both may be traced 
 up to the fame general laws, and appear to be carried 
 on according to the fame plan of adminiflration ; the 
 fair prefumption is, that both proceed from one and 
 the fame Author. And if the principal parts objected 
 to in this latter difpenfation be fimilar to, and of the 
 lame kind with what we certainly experience under 
 the former, the objections, being clearly inconclufive 
 in one cafe, becaufe contradicted by plain fact, muft, 
 in all reafon, be allowed to be inconclufive alfo in the 
 other. 
 
 This way of arguing from what is acknowledged to 
 what is difputed, from things known to other things 
 that referable them, from that part of the divine eftab- 
 lifhment which is expofed to our view, to that more 
 important one which lies beyond it, is on all hands 
 confefled to be juft. By this method Sir Ifaac New- 
 ton has unfolded the Syftem of Nature ; by the fame 
 method Bifhop BUTLER has explained the Syftem of 
 Grace, and thus, to ufe the words of a writer, whom I 
 quote with pleafure, " has formed and concluded a 
 happy alliance between faith and philofophy."-f- 
 
 And although the argument from analogy be al- 
 lowed to be imperfect, and by no means fufficient to 
 folve all difficulties refpedting the government of God, 
 and the defigns of his Providence with regard to man- 
 kind, 
 
 * Mr. Main-war ing's Differtation, prefixed to his Volume of Sermons. 
 
XXIV 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 kind, (a degree of knowledge, which we are not fur- 
 nifhed with faculties for attaining, at leaft in the pref- 
 ent ftate) yet furely it is of importance to learn from 
 it, that the natural and moral world are intimately 
 connected, and parts of one flupendous whole or fyf- 
 tem ; and that the chief objections, which are brought 
 againft religion, may be urged with equal force againft 
 the conflitution and courfe of nature, where they are 
 certainly falfe in fact. And this information we may 
 derive from the work before us ; the proper defign of 
 which, it may be of ufe to obferve, is not to prove the 
 truth of religion either natural or revealed, but to con- 
 firm that proof, already known, by conliderations from 
 analogy. 
 
 After this account of the method of reafoning em- 
 ployed by our Author, let us now advert to his man- 
 ner of apply ing' it, firft to the fubjecl: of Natural Re- 
 ligion, and fecondly to that of Revealed. 
 
 i. The foundation of all our hopes and fears is a 
 future life ; and with this the treat ife begins. Nei- 
 ther the reafon of the thing, nor the analogy of nature, 
 according to Bifhop BUTLER, give ground for imagin- 
 ing, that the unknown event, death, will be our de- 
 ftrudtion. The ftates in which we have formerly ex- 
 ifled, in the womb and in infancy, are not more differ- 
 ent from each other than from that of mature age in 
 which we now exift : Therefore that we mail continue 
 to exift hereafter, in a ftate as different from the prefent 
 as the prefent is from thofe through which we have 
 palled already, is a prefumption favoured by the anal- 
 ogy of nature. All that we know from reafon con- 
 cerning death, is the effects it has upon animal bodies : 
 And the frequent inftances among men of the intel- 
 lectual powers continuing in high health and vigour, 
 at the very time when a mortal difeafe is on the point 
 of putting an end to all the powers of fenfation, in- 
 duce us to hope that it may have no effect at all on 
 
 the. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xxv 
 
 the human foul, not even fo much as to fufpend the 
 exercife of its faculties ; though if it have, the fuf- 
 penfion of a power by no means implies its extinction, 
 as fleep or a fwoon may convince us.* 
 
 The probability of a future ftate once granted, an 
 important queftion arifes, How bed to fecure our in- 
 tereft in that ftate. We find from what pafies daily 
 before us, that the conflitution of nature admits of 
 mifery as well as happinefs ; that both of thefe are 
 the confequences of our own actions ; and thefe con- 
 fequences we are enabled to forefee. Therefore, that 
 our happinefs or mifery in a future world may depend 
 on our own actions alfo, and that rewards or punilh- 
 ments hereafter may follow our good or ill behaviour 
 here, is but an appointment of the fame fort with 
 what we experience under the divine government, ac- 
 cording to the regular courfe of naturc.-f 
 
 This fuppofition is confirmed from another circum- 
 fiance, that the natural government of God, under 
 which we now live, is alfo moral ; in which rewards 
 and punifhments are the confequences of actions, 
 confidered as virtuous and vicious. Not that every 
 man is rewarded or punifhed here in exact proportion 
 to his defert ; for the elTential tendencies of virtue 
 and vice to produce happinefs and the contrary are 
 often hindered from taking effect from accidental 
 caufes. However, there are plainly the rudiments and 
 beginnings of a righteous adminiftration to be dif- 
 cerned in the conftitution of nature ; from whence 
 we are led to expect, that thefe accidental hindrances 
 will one day be removed, and the rule of diflributive 
 juftice obtain completely in a more perfect ftate. % 
 
 The moral government of God, thus eflablifhed, 
 implies in the notion of it fome fort of trial, or a 
 moral poffibility of acting wrong as well as right, in 
 thofe who are the fubjects of it. And the doctrine 
 
 of 
 
 * Part L Chap. i. f Ch. 2. Ch. 3. 
 
xxvi PREFACE 
 
 of religion, that the prefent life is in fad a flate of 
 probation for a future one, is rendered credible, from 
 its being analogous throughout to the general con- 
 duct of Providence towards us with refpe<5l to this 
 world ; in which prudence is necefTary to fecure our 
 temporal interefl, juil as we are taught that virtue is 
 neceffary to fecure our eternal interefl ; and both are 
 trufted to ourfelves,* 
 
 But the prefent life is not merely a flate of probation, 
 implying in it difficulties and danger ; it is alfo a flate 
 of difcipline and improvement ; and that both in our 
 temporal and religious capacity. Thus childhood is 
 a flate of difcipline for youth ; youth for manhood, 
 and that for old age. Strength of body, and matu- 
 rity of underfland ing, are acquired by degrees ; and 
 neither of them without continual exercife and atten- 
 tion on our part, not only in the beginning of life, 
 but through the whole courfe of it. So again with 
 refpecl: to our religious concerns, the prefent world is 
 fitted to be, and to good men is in event, a flate of 
 difcipline and improvement for a future one. The 
 feverai paflions and propenfions, implanted in our 
 hearts, incline us, in a multitude of inftances, to for- 
 bidden pleafures : This inward infirmity is increafed 
 by various fnares and temptations, perpetually occur- 
 ring from without. Hence ariies the neceflity of rec- 
 ollection and felf-government, of withflanding the 
 calls of appetite, and forming our minds to habits of 
 piety and virtue ; habits, of which we are capable, 
 and which to creatures in a flate of moral imperfec- 
 tion, and fallen from their original integrity, mufl be 
 of the greatefl ufe, as an additional fecurity, over and 
 above the principle of conference, from the dangers 
 to which we are expofed.-j- 
 
 Nor is the credibility here given, by the analogy of 
 nature, to the general doctrine of religion, deflroyed 
 
 or 
 
 * Ch. 4, f Ch. 5. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xxvii 
 
 or weakened by any notions concerning neceflity. 
 Of itfelf it is a mere word, the fign of an abftra& 
 idea ; and as much requires an agent, that is, a necef- 
 fary agent, in order to effect any thing, as freedom re- 
 quires a free agent. Admitting it to be fpeculatively 
 true, if confidered as influencing practice, it is the fame 
 as falfe ; for it is matter of experience, that, with regard 
 to our prefent intereft, and as inhabitants of this world, 
 we are treated as if we were free ; and therefore the anal- 
 ogy of nature leads us to conclude, that, with regard 
 to our future intereft, and as defigned for another 
 world, we (hall be treated as free alfo. Nor does the 
 opinion of neceflity, fuppofmg it poffible, at all affect 
 either the general proof of religion, or its external 
 evidence.* 
 
 Still objections may be made againft the wifdom 
 and goodnefs of the divine government, to which 
 analogy, which can only fliew the truth or credibility 
 of fads, affords no anfwer. Yet even here analogy is 
 of ufe, if it fuggeft that the divine government is a 
 fcheme or fyflem, and not a number of unconnected 
 acts, and that this fyflem is alfo above our cpmpre- 
 henfion. Now the government of the natural world 
 appears to be a fyflem of this kind ; with parts, re- 
 lated to each other, and together compofmg a whole ; 
 in which fyflem ends are brought about by the ufe 
 of means, many of which means, before experience, 
 would have been fufpected to have had a quite con- 
 trary tendency ; which is carried on by general laws, 
 fimilar caufes uniformly producing fimilar effects ; the 
 utility of which general laws, and the inconveniences 
 which would probably arife from the cccafional or 
 even fecret fufpenfion of them, we are in fome fort 
 enabled to difcern j-f but of the whole we are incom- 
 petent judges, becaufe of the fmall part which comes 
 
 within 
 
 * Ch. 6. 
 
 f See a Treatife on Drvint Bt*ewknce 9 by Dr. Tkmat JBalguy, Part II, 
 
xxviii PREFACE 
 
 within our view. Reafoning then from what we 
 know, it is highly credible, that the government of 
 the moral world is a fyflem alib, carried on by general 
 laws, and in which ends are accomplifhed by the in- 
 tervention of means ; and that both conflitutions, the 
 natural and the moral, are fo connected, as to form to- 
 gether but one fcheme. But of this fcheme, as of 
 that of the natural world taken alone, we are not 
 qualified to judge, on account of the mutual refpeft 
 of the feveral parts, to each other and to the whole, 
 and our own incapacity to furvey the whole, or, with 
 accuracy, any fmgle part. All objections therefore 
 to the wifdom and goodnefs of the divine government 
 may be founded merely on our ignorance ;* and to 
 iuch objections our ignorance is the proper and a fat- 
 isfadory anfwer. ~j~ 
 
 2. The chief difficulties concerning Natural Re- 
 ligion being now removed, our Author proceeds, in 
 the next place, to that which is Revealed ; and as 
 an introduction to an inquiry into the credibility of 
 Chriilianity, begins with the coniideration of its im- 
 portance. 
 
 The importance of Chriftianity appears in two 
 refpets. Firft, in its being a republication of Nat- 
 ural Religion, in its native fimplicity, with authority, 
 and with circumflances of advantage ; afcertaining, 
 in many inflances of moment, what before was only 
 probable, and particularly confirming the do&rine of 
 a future flate of rewards and punimments. * Second- 
 ly, as revealing a new difpenfation of Providence, 
 originating from the pure love and mercy of God, and 
 conducted by the mediation of his Son, and the guid- 
 ance of his Spirit, for the recovery and falvation of 
 mankind, reprefented in a flate of apoflacy and ruin. 
 This account of Chriftianity being admitted to be 
 
 * See note [F], at the end of this Preface. 
 
 f Ch. 7. 
 
 } See note [G], at the end of this Preface. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xxbc 
 
 juft, and the diftin& offices of thefe three Divine Per- 
 fons being once discovered to us, we are as much 
 obliged in point of duty to acknowledge the relations 
 we ftand in to the Son and Holy Ghoft, as our Me- 
 diator and Sanctifier, as we are obliged in point of du- 
 ty to acknowledge the relation we ftand in to God the 
 Father ; although the two former of thefe relations 
 be learnt from revelation only, and in the laft we are 
 inftru&ed by the light of nature ; the obligation in. 
 either cafe arifmg from the offices thcmfelves, and not 
 at all depending on the manner in which they arc 
 made known to us.* 
 
 The preemptions againft revelation in general are, 
 that it is not difcoverable by reafon, that it is unlike 
 to what is fo difcovered, and that it was introduced 
 and fupported by miracles. But in a fcheme fo large 
 as that of the univerie, unbounded in extent, and ev- 
 erlafting in duration, there mutt of necefiity be num- 
 berlefs circumflances which are beyond the reach of 
 our faculties to difcern, and which can only be known 
 by divine illumination. And both in the natural and 
 moral government of the world, under which we live, 
 we find many things unlike one to another, and there- 
 fore ought not to wonder if the fame unlikenefs ob- 
 tain between things viiible and invifible j although it 
 be far from true, that revealed religion is entirely 
 unlike the constitution of nature, as analogy may 
 teach us. Nor is there any thing incredible in reve- 
 lation, confidered as miraculous ; whether miracles be 
 fuppofed to have been performed at the beginning of 
 the world, or after a courfe of nature has been eftab- 
 liilied. Not at the beginning of the world ; for then 
 there was either no courfe of nature at all, or a power 
 muft have been exerted totally different from what 
 that courfe is at prefent. All men and animals cannot 
 have been born, as they are now ; but a pair of e -ch 
 
 fort 
 
 * Part II. Ch. r. 
 
P & E F A C E 
 
 fort muft have been produced at firft, in a way alto 
 gether unlike to that in which they have been iince pro- 
 duced ; unlefs we affirm, that men and animals have 
 exifted from eternity in an endlefs fucceffion : One 
 miracle therefore at lead there muft have been, at the 
 beginning of the world, or at the time of man's crea- 
 tion. Not after the fettlcment of a coitrfe of nature, on 
 account of miracles being contrary to that courfe, or, 
 in other words, contrary to experience : For in or- 
 der to know whether miracles, worked in atteftation 
 of a divine religion, be contrary to experience or 
 not, we ought to be acquainted with other cafes, fim- 
 ilar or parallel to thofe, in which miracles are alleged 
 to have been wrought. But where mall we find fuch 
 fimilar or parallel cafes ? The world which we inhabit 
 affords none. We know of no extraordinary revela- 
 tions from God to man, but thofe recorded in the Old 
 and New Teftament ; all of which were eftablifhed by 
 miracles. It cannot therefore be faid that miracles are 
 incredible, becaufe contrary to experience, when all 
 the experience we have is in favour of miracles, and ori 
 the fide of religion.* Betides, in reafoning concerning 
 miracles, they ought not to be compared with com- 
 mon natural events, but with uncommon appearances* 
 fuch as comets, magnetifm, electricity ; which to one 
 acquainted only with the ufual phenomena of nature, 
 and the common powers of matter, muft, before proof 
 of their adtual exiftence, be thought incredible.-}- 
 
 The prefumptions againft revelation in general be- 
 ing difpatched, objections againft the Chriftian reve- 
 lation in particular, againft the fcheme of it, as diftin- 
 guimed from objections againft its evidence, are con- 
 Sdered next. Now, fuppofmg a revelation to be re- 
 ally given, it is highly probable beforehand, that it 
 muft contain many things, appearing to us liable to 
 
 objections* 
 
 * See note [H], at the end of this Preface. 
 f Ch. 2. 
 
BY THEEDITOR, xxxi 
 
 objections. The acknowledged difpenfation of nature 
 is very different from what we ihould have expected j 
 reafoning then from analogy, the revealed difpenfation, 
 it is credible, would be allo different. Nor are we in 
 any fort judges at what time, or in what degree, of 
 manner, it is fit or expedient for God to inftruct vis, in 
 things conferTedly of the greatcft ufe, either by natural 
 reafon, or by fupernatural information. Thus, argu- 
 ing on Ipeculation only, and without experience, it 
 would feem very unlikely that fo important a remedy 
 as that provided by Chriflianity for the recovery of 
 mankind from a ftate of ruin, ihould have been for 
 fo many ages withheld ; and, when at kft vouchfafed, 
 ihould be imparted to fo few ; and, after it has been 
 imparted, fhouid be attended with obfcurity and 
 doubt. And juft fo we might have argued, before 
 experience, concerning the remedies provided in na- 
 ture for bodily difeafes, to which by nature we are ex- 
 pofed : For many of theie were unknown to man- 
 kind for a number of ages ; are known but to few 
 now ; fome important ones probably not difcovereci 
 yet ; and thofe which are, neither certain in their ap- 
 plication, nor umverfal in their uic. And the fame 
 mode of reafoning that would lead us to expect they 
 Ihould have been fo, would lead us to expect that the 
 neceffity of them mould have been luperfeded, by 
 there being no difeafes ; as the necefiity of the Chrii- 
 tian fcheme, it may be thought, might alfo have been 
 fuperfeded, by preventing the fall of man, fo that he 
 mould not have flood in need of a Redeemer at all.* 
 As to objections againft the wifdom and goodneis 
 of Chriftianity, the fame anfwer may be applied to 
 them as was to the like objections againft the confti- 
 tution of nature. 'For here alfo, Chriftianity is a 
 fcheme or economy, compofed of various parts, form- 
 ing a whole ; in which fcheme means are ufed for the 
 
 accomplishing 
 
 * Ch, , 
 
PREFACE 
 
 accomplifhing of ends ; and which is conducted by 
 general laws ; of all of which we know as little as we 
 do of the conflitution of nature. And the feeming 
 want of wifdom or goodnefs in this fyftem is to be 
 afcribed to the fame caufe, as the like appearances of 
 defects in the natural fyftem ; our inability to difcern 
 the whole fcheme, and our ignorance of the relation 
 of thofe parts which are difcernible to others beyond 
 our view. 
 
 The objections againfl Chriftianity as a matter of 
 fat, and againil the wifdom and goodnefs of it, hav- 
 ing been obviated together, the chief of them are now 
 to be coniidered diftincHy. One of thefe, which is 
 levelled againfl the entire fyftem itfelf, is of this fort : 
 The reiteration of mankind, reprefented in Scripture 
 as the great defign of the Gofpel, is defcribed as re- 
 quiring a long feries of means, and perfons, and dif- 
 penfations, before it can be brought to its completion ; 
 whereas the whole ought to have been effected at 
 once. Now every thing we fee in the courfe of na- 
 ture mews the folly of this objection. For in the nat- 
 ural courfe of Providence, ends are brought about by 
 means, not operating immediately and at once, but 
 deliberately and in a way of progreflion ; one thing 
 being fubfervient to another, this to fomewhat further. 
 The change of feafons, the ripening of fruits, the 
 growth of vegetable and animal bodies, are inftances 
 of this. And therefore that the fame progreffive 
 method mould be followed in the difpenfation of 
 Chriftianity, as is obferved in the common difpenfa- 
 tion of Providence, is a reafonable expectation, jufti- 
 fied by the analogy of nature.* 
 
 Another circumftance objected to in the Chriftian 
 fcheme is, the appointment of a Mediator, and the 
 laving of the world through him. But the vilible gov- 
 ernment of God being actually adminiftered in this way, 
 
 or 
 
 * Ch. 4. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xxxiii 
 
 $f by the mediation and Jnftrumentality of others, there 
 can be no general prefumption againft an appoint- 
 ment of this kind, againft his invifible government 
 being exercifed in the fame manner. We have feen. 
 already that, with regafd to ourfelves, this vifible gov- 
 ernment is carried on by rewards and punifhrrients ; 
 for happinefs and mifery are the confequences of our 
 own actions, confidered as virtuous and vicious, and 
 thefe confequences we are enabled to forefee. It might 
 have been imagined, before confulting experience, that 
 after we had rendered ourfelves liable to mifery by our 
 own ill conduct, forrow for what was pail, and behav- 
 ing well for the future, would, alone and of themfelves, 
 have exempted us from deferved punifhment, and re- 
 ftored us to the divine favour. But the fact is other- 
 wife ; and real reformation is often found to be of no 
 avail, fo as to fecure the criminal from poverty, fkk- 
 nefs, infamy, and death, the never-failing attendants 
 on vice and extravagance,- exceeding a certain degree. 
 By the courfe of nature then it appears, God does not 
 always pardon a finner on his repentance. Yet there 
 is provifion made, even in nature, that the mileries, 
 which men bring on themfelves by unlawful indulgen- 
 ces, may in many cafes be mitigated, and in fome re- 
 movecj ; partly by extraordinary exertions of the of- 
 fender himfelf, but more efpecially and frequently by 
 the intervention of others, who voluntarily, and from 
 motives of companion, fubmit to labour and forrow, 
 fuch as produce long and lafting inconveniences to 
 themfelves, as the means of refcuing another from the 
 wretched effects of former imprudences. Vicarious 
 punifhment, therefore, or one perfon's fufferings con- 
 tributing to the relief of another, is a providential dif- 
 pofition, in the economy of nature : * And it ought 
 not to be matter of furprife, if by a method analogous 
 to this we be redeemed from fin and mifery, in the 
 
 C economy 
 
 * See note [I], at tke end Of this Preface, 
 
xxxiv PREFACE 
 
 economy of grace. That mankind at prefent are in a 
 ftate of degradation, different from that in which they 
 were originally created, is the very ground of the 
 Chriftian Revelation, as contained in the Scriptures. 
 Whether we acquiefce in the account, that our being 
 placed in fuch a ftate is owing to the crime of our firft 
 parents, or choofe to afcribe it to any other caufe, it. 
 makes no difference as to our condition ; the vice and 
 unhappinefs of the world are Hill there, notwithftand- 
 ing all our fuppofitions ; nor is it Chriftianity that 
 hath put us into this ftate. We learn alfo from the 
 fame Scriptures, what experience and the ufe of ex- 
 piatory lacrifices from the mofl early times might 
 have taught us, that repentance alone is not fufficient 
 to prevent the fatal confequences of paft tranfgref- 
 fions ; but that ftill there is room for mercy, and 
 that repentance fhall be available, though not of it- 
 felf, yet through the mediation of a Divine Perfon, 
 the Meffiah ; who, from 'the fublimeft principles of 
 compailion, when we were dead in trefpajjes and fins* 
 fuffered and died, the innocent for the guilty, thejuft 
 for the imjitft^c that we might have redemption through 
 his bloody even the forgivenefs of fins. \ In what 
 way the death of Chrift was of that efficacy it is faid 
 to be, in procuring the reconciliation of finners, the 
 Scriptures have not explained : It is enough that the 
 doctrine is revealed ; that it is not contrary to any 
 truths which reafon and experience teach us ; and 
 that it accords in perfect harmony with the ufual 
 method of the divine conduct in the government of 
 the world. 
 
 Again it hath been faid, that if the Chriftian reve- 
 lation were true, it muft have been univerfal, and 
 could not have been left upon doubtful evidence. 
 But God, in his natural Providence, difpenfes his gifts 
 
 ia 
 
 * Ephef. ii. i. f Pet. iii. 18. 
 
 Colofl". i. 14* Ch. 5. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xxxv 
 
 in great variety, not only among creatures of the fame 
 fpecies, but to the fame individuals alfo at different 
 times. Had the Chriftian revelation been univerfal 
 at firft, yet from the diverfity of men's abilities, both 
 of mind and body, their various means of improve- 
 ment, and other external advantages, fome perfons 
 muft foon have been in a fituation, with refpeft to 
 religious knowledge, much fuperior to that of others, 
 as much perhaps as they are at prefent : And all men 
 will be equitably dealt with at laft ; and to whom 
 little is given, of him little will be required. Then 
 as to the evidence for religion being left doubtful, 
 difficulties of this fort, like difficulties in practice, af- 
 ford fcope and opportunity for a virtuous exercife of 
 the underflanding, and difpofe the mind to acquiefce 
 and reft fatisfied with any evidence that is real. In 
 the daily commerce of life, men are obliged to act 
 upon great uncertainties, with regard to fuccefs in 
 their temporal purfuits ; and the cafe with regard to 
 religion is parallel. However, though religion be not 
 intuitively true, the proofs of it which we have are 
 amply fufficient in reafon to induce us to embrace it ^ 
 and diflatisfaction with thofe proofs may poflibly be 
 men's own fault.* 
 
 Nothing remains but to attend to the pofitive evi- 
 dence there is for the truth of Chriftianity. Now, 
 befides its direct and fundamental proofs, which are 
 miracles and prophecies, there are many collateral cir- 
 cumftances, which may be united into one view, and 
 all together may be conlidered as making up one ar- 
 gument. In this way of treating the fubject, the 
 revelation, whether real or otherwife, may be fuppofed 
 to be wholly hiftorical : The general defign of which 
 appears to be, to give an account of the condition of 
 religion, and its profeflbrs, with a concife narration of 
 the political ftate of things, as far as religion is affect - 
 C z ed 
 
 *Ch. 6, 
 
XXXVi 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 ed by it, during a great length of time, near fix thou* 
 land years of which are already paft. More particu- 
 larly it comprehends an adcount of God's entering 
 Into covenant with one nation, the Jews, that he 
 would be their God, and that they mould be hia 
 people ; of his often interpofing in their affairs ; giv- 
 ing them the promife, and afterwards the poffeffion, 
 of a flouriming country ; alluring them of the greatefl 
 national profperity, in cafe of their obedience, and 
 threatening the fevereft national punifhment, in cafe 
 they forfook him and joined in the idolatry of their 
 pagan neighbours. It contains alfo a prediction of a 
 particular perfon, to appear in the fulnefs of time, in 
 ivhom all the p'romifes of God to the Jews were to be 
 fulfilled : And it relates that, at the time expected, a 
 perfon did actually appear, afTuming to be the Saviour 
 foretold ; that he worked various miracles among 
 them, in confirmation of his divine authority ; and, 
 as was foretold alfo, was rejected and put to death by 
 the very people who had long defired and waited for 
 his coming ; but that his religion, in fpite of all op- 
 pofition, was eflablifhed in the world by his difciples, 
 invented with fupernatural powers for that purpofe ; 
 of the fate and fortunes of which religion there is a 
 prophetical defcription, carried down to the end of 
 time. Let any one now, after reading the above hi 
 toryyand not knowing whether the whole were not a 
 fiction, be fuppofed to afk, Whether all that is here 
 related be true ? And inftead of a direct anfwer, let 
 him be informed of the feveral acknowledged facts, 
 which: are found to correfpond to it in real life ; and 
 then let him compare the' hiftory and facts together, 
 and obferve the aftoniming coincidence of both ; 
 Such a joint review mufl appear to him of very great 
 weight, and to amount to evidence fomewhat more 
 than human. And unlefs the whole feries, and 
 every particular circumftance contained in it,, can 
 
 be 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xxxvii 
 
 be thought to have arifen from accident, the truth 
 of Chriitianity is proved.* 
 
 The view here give a of the moral and religious 
 fyflems of Bifhop BUTLER, it will immediately be 
 perceived, is chiefly intended for younger ftudents, 
 efpecially for ftudents in divinity ; to whom it is "hop- 
 ed it may be of ufe, fo as to encourage them to pe- 
 xufe, with proper diligence, the original works of the 
 Author himielf. For it may be necerTary to obferve, 
 that neither of the volumes of this excellent Prelate 
 are addrefled to thofe, who read for amufement, or 
 curiofity, or to get rid of time. All fubjects are not 
 to be comprehended with the fame eaie ; and moral- 
 ity and religion, when treated as fciences, each ac- 
 companied with difficulties of its own, can neither of 
 them be underflood as they ought, without a very pe- 
 culiar attention. But morality and religion are not 
 merely tobe.fludied as fciences, or as. being fpecula- 
 tively true ; they are to be regarded in another and 
 higher light, as the rule of life and manners, as con- 
 taining authoritative directions by which to regulate 
 our faith and practice. And in this view, the infinite 
 importance of them confidered, it can never be an 
 indifferent matter whether they be received or reject- 
 ed. For both claim to be the voice of God ; and 
 whether they be fo or not, cannot be known, till their 
 
 claims 
 
 * Ch. 7. To the Analogy are fubjoined Two DifTertations, both originally 
 inferted in the body of the work. One on Perform! Identity, in which are 
 contained fome flriftures on Mr. Locke, who afierts that confcioufnefs makes 
 or conftitutes perfonal identity ; whereas, as our Author obferves, confciouf- 
 nefe makes only personality, or is necelfairy. .to the idea of a perfon, i. e. a 
 thinking intelligent being, but prefuppofe>, and therefore cannot conflitute 
 perfonal identity ; juft as knowledge prefuppofes truth, but does not confti- 
 tute it. Confcioufnefs of paft actions does indeed fliew us the identity of 
 ourfelves, or gives us a certain alfurance that we are the fame perfons or liv- 
 ing agents now, which we were at the time to which our remembrance can 
 look back ; but frill we fhould be the fame perfons as we were, though this 
 cozifcioufnefs of what is part were wanting, though all that had been done 
 fcy us formerly were forgotten ; unlefs it be true, that no perfon has ex i lied 
 a fingle moment beyond what he can remember. The other DiiTertation is 
 On the Natur: of Virtue, which properly belongs to the moral fyftem of our 
 Author, already explaiu'id. 
 
xxxviii EPITAPH. 
 
 claims be impartially examined. If they indeed come 
 from him, we are bound to conform to them at our 
 peril ; nor is it left to our choice, whether we will 
 fubmit to the obligations they impofe upon us or 
 not ; for fubmit to them we muft in fuch a fenfe, as 
 to incur the punimments denounced by both againft 
 wilful difobedience to their injunctions . 
 
 The following EPITAPH, faid to be written by Dr. Natkanael Forfler, is 
 infcribed on a flat marble flone, in the cathedral church of Brijlol, placed 
 over the fpot where the remains of Bilhop BUTLER are depofited ; and 
 which, as it is now almoft obliterated, it may be worth while here to 
 preferve. 
 
 H. S. 
 
 Reverendus admodum in Chrifto Pater 
 J O S E P H U S BUTLER, LL. D. 
 
 Hujufce primo Dioeceieos 
 Deinde Dunelmeniis Epifcopus. 
 
 Qualis quantufq; Vir erat 
 
 Sua libentiflime agnovit setas : 
 
 Et fi quid Praefuli aut Scriptori ad famam valent 
 
 Mens altiflima, 
 
 Ingenii perfpicacis et fubaclii Vis, 
 
 Animufq; pius, fimplex, candidus, liberalis, 
 
 Mortui haud facile evanefcet memoria. 
 
 Obiit Bathonise 16 Kalend. Julii, 
 
 A.D. 1752. 
 Annos natus 60. 
 
 NOTES 
 
NOTES 
 
 TO THE 
 
 PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 D 
 
 Page viii, [A], 
 
 .. BUTLER, when Bifhop of BriJIol, put up a 
 crofs, a plain piece of marble inlaid, in the chapel of his 
 cpifcopal houfe. This, which was intended by the blame- 
 lefs Prelate merely as a fign or memorial, that true Chriftians 
 are to bear their crofs, and not to be afhamed of following 
 a cruciiied Matter, was confidered as affording a prefump- 
 tion that he was fecretly inclined to popifh forms and cere- 
 monies, and had no great diflike to popery itfelf. And, on 
 account of the offence it occafioned, both at the time and 
 fmce, it were to be wimed, in prudence, it had not been 
 done. 
 
 Page xi. [B]. 
 
 Many of the fentiments, in thefe two difcourfes of Bifhop 
 BUTLER, concerning the fovereign good of man ; the impof- 
 fibility of procuring it in the prefent life j the unfatisfaclo- 
 rinefs of earthly enjoyments ; together with the fomewhat 
 beyond and above them all, which once attained, there will 
 reft nothing further to be wimed or hoped ; and which is 
 then only to be expe&ed, when we fhall have put off this 
 mortal body, and our union with God fhall be complete 5 
 occur in Hooker's Eccleftaftical Polity, Book I. xi. 
 
 ^ Page xv. ^ [C]. 
 
 When the firft edition of this Preface was publifhed, I 
 had in vain endeavoured to procure a fight of the papers, in 
 which Bifhop BUTLER was accufed of having died a papifl, 
 and Archbiihop BECKER'S replies to them ; though I well 
 remembered to have read both, when they firft appeared in 
 the public prints. But a learned profeffor in the uriiverfity 
 of Oxford has furniflied me with the whole controverfy in 
 its original form ; a brief hiftory of which it may not be 
 unacceptable to offer here to the curious reader. 
 
 The 
 
xl NOTES TO THE PREFACE 
 
 The attack was opened in the year 1 767, in an anonymous 
 pamphlet, entiled The Root of Protejlant Errors examined ; in 
 which the author aflerted, that " by an anecdote lately given 
 him, that * fame Prelate,' (who at the bottom of the page 
 is called B p of D m) is faid to have died in the com- 
 munion of a church, that makes ufe of faints, faint days, 
 and all the trumpery of faint worfhip." When this remark- 
 able fact, now firft divulged, came to be generally known, it 
 occafioned, as might be expected, no little alarm ; and intel- 
 ligence of it was no fooner conveyed to Archbifhop SECKER, 
 than in a (hort letter, figned Mifopfeudes> and printed in the 
 Si. James's Chronicle of May 9, he called upon the writer to 
 produce his authority for publifhing " fo grofs and fcandal- 
 ous a falfehood." To this challenge an immediate anfwer 
 was returned by the author of the pamphlet, who, now af- 
 fuming the name of Phileleutheros , informed Mifopfeudes^ 
 through the channel of the fame paper, that " fuch anec- 
 dote had been given him ; and that he was yet of opinion 
 there is not any thing improbable in it, when it is considered 
 that the fame Prelate put up the popifh infigma of the crofs 
 in his chapel, when at Briftol ; and in his laft epifcopal 
 Charge has fquinted very much towards that fuperilition." 
 Here we find the accufation not only repeated, but fupported 
 by reafons, fuch as they are -, of which it feemed necefiary 
 that fome notice ftiould be taken : Nor did the Archbifhop 
 conceive it unbecoming his own dignity to ftand up> on this 
 occafion, as the vindicator of innocence againft the calumni- 
 ator of the helplefs dead. Accordingly, in a fecond letter 
 in the fame newfpaper of May 23, and fubfcribed Mifop- 
 feudeS) as before, after reciting from Bifliop BUTLER'S Sermon 
 before the Lords the very paflage here printed in the Pref- 
 ace, and obferving that " there are, in the fame Sermon, 
 declarations, as ftrong as can be made, againft temporal 
 punifliments for herefy, fchifm, or even for idolatry," his 
 Grace exprefles himfelf thus : " Now he (Bifhop BUTLER) 
 was univerfally efteemed, throughout his life, a man of ftricl: 
 piety and honefty, as well as uncommon abilities. He gave 
 all the proofs, public and private, which his (lation led him 
 to give, and they were decifive and daily, of his continuing 
 to the laft a fincere member of the church of England. Nor 
 had ever any of his acquaintance, or moft intimate friends, 
 nor have they to this day, the leaft doubt of it." As to 
 putting up a crofs in his chapel, the Archbiihop frankly owns, 
 . - - - ' - ' .- that 
 
fc Y T H E E D I T O R. xli 
 
 that for himfelf he wifhes he had not ; and thinks that in fo 
 doing the Biihop did amifs. But then he afks, " Can that 
 be oppofed, as any proof of popery, to all the evidence on 
 the other fide ; or even to the fingle evidence of the above- 
 mentioned Sermon ? Moil of our churches have crofles upon 
 them : Are they therefore popifh churches ? The Lutherans 
 have more than crofles in theirs : Are the Lutherans there- 
 fore papifts ?" And as to the Charge, no papift, his Grace 
 remarks, would have fpoken as Bifhop BUTLER there does, 
 of the obfervances peculiar to Roman catholics, feme of 
 which he exprefsly cenfures as wrong and fuperftitious, and 
 others as made fubfervient to the purpofes of fuperflition, 
 and, on thefe accounts, abolifhed at the reformation. After 
 the publication of this letter, Phileleutkeros replied in a fliort 
 defence of his own conduct, but without producing any 
 thing new in confirmation of what he had advanced. And 
 here the controverfy, fo far as the two principals were con- 
 cerned, feems to have ended. 
 
 But the difpute was not fuffered to die away quite fo foon. 
 For in the fame year, and in the fame newfpaper of July 2f, 
 another letter appeared ; in which the author not only con- 
 tended that the crofs in the epifcopal chapel at Erijlol^ and 
 the Charge to the clergy of Durham in 1751, amount to fuil 
 proof of a ftrong attachment to the idolatrous communion 
 of the church of Rome, but, with the reader's leave, he 
 would fain account for the Bifhop's "tendency this way." 
 And this he attempted to do, " from the natural melancholy 
 and gloominefs of Dr. BUTLER'S difpofition ; from his great 
 fondnefs for the lives of Romifh faints, and their books of 
 myftic piety ; from his drawing his notions of teaching men 
 religion, not from the New Te (lament, but from philofoph- 
 ical and political opinions of his own ; and above all, from 
 his tranfition from a ftricl: diflenter amongft the prefbyteri- 
 ans to a rigid churchman, and his fudden and unexpected 
 elevation to great wealth and dignity in the church." The 
 attack thus renewed excited the Archbifhop's attention a 
 fecond time, and drew from him a frefh anfwer, fubfcribed 
 aifo Mifopft'udeSy in the St. James's Chronicle of Auguft 4. 
 In this letter our excellent Metropolitan, firft of all obliquely 
 hinting at the unfairnefs of fitting in judgment on the char- 
 acter of a man who had been dead fifteen years, and thea 
 reminding his correfpondent, that " full proof had been al- 
 ready published, that Bjihop BUTLER abhorred popery as a 
 
 vile 
 
xlii NOTES TO THE PREFACE 
 
 vile corruption of Chriftianity, and that it might be proved, 
 if needful, that he held the Pope to be Antichrift," (to 
 which decifive teftimonies of undoubted averlion from the 
 Romifti church another is alfo added in the poftfcript, his 
 taking, when promoted to the fee of Durham, for his do- 
 rneftic chaplain, Dr. Nath. Forfter, who had publiftied, not 
 four years before, a Sermon, entitled, Popery deftruftive of 
 the Evidence of Cbriftianity) proceeds to obferve, " That the 
 natural melancholy of the Bifhop's temper would rather have 
 fixed him amcmgft his firft friends, than prompted him to 
 the change he made : That he read books of all forts, as 
 well as books of myftic piety, and knew how to pick the 
 good that was in them out of the bad : That his opinions 
 were expofed without referve in his Analogy and \liis Ser- 
 mons, and if the doctrine of either be popifli or unfcriptural, 
 the learned world hath miftaken ftrangely in admiring both : 
 That inftead of being a drift diffenter, he never was a com- 
 municant in any difienting aflembly ; on the contrary, that 
 he went occafionally, from his early years, to the eftabliflied 
 wormip, and became a conftant conformift to it, when he was 
 barely of age, and entered himfelf, in 1714, of Oriel College : 
 That his elevation to great dignity in the church, far from 
 being fudden and unexpected, was a gradual and natural rife, 
 through a variety of preferments, and a period of thirty two 
 years : That as Bifhop of Durham he had very little authority 
 beyond his brethren, and in ecclefiaftical matters had none 
 beyond them ; a larger income than mod of them he had ; 
 but this he employed, not, as was infinuated, in augmenting 
 the pomp of wormip in his cathedral, where indeed it is no 
 greater than in others, but for the purpofes of charity, and 
 in the repairing of his houfes." After thefe remarks, the 
 letter clofes with the following words : " Upon the whole, 
 few accufations, fo entirely groundlefs, have been fo perti- 
 nacioufly, I am unwilling to fay malicioufly, carried on, as 
 the prefent ; and furely it is high time for the authors and 
 abettors of it, in mere common prudence, to fhew fome re- 
 gard, if not to truth, at leaft to fliame." 
 
 It only remains to be mentioned, that the above letters of 
 Archbilhop Seeker had fuch an effect on a writer, who 
 figned himfelf in the St. James's Chronicle, of Auguft 25, 
 A Dtffenting Mmijler, that he declared it as his opinion, 
 that "the author of the pamphlet, called The Root of Protef- 
 tant Errors examined, and his friends, were obliged in can- 
 dour, 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 lour, in juftice, and in honour, to retract their charge, un- 
 lefs they could eftablifh it on much better grounds than had 
 hitherto appeared :" And he exprefied his " hopes that it 
 would be underftood that the diffenters in general had iro 
 hand in the accufation, and that it had only been the aft of 
 two or three miftaken men." Another perfon alfo, "a 
 foreigner by birth," as he fays of himfelf, who had been 
 long an admirer of Bifhop BUTLER, and had perufed with 
 great attention all that had been written on both fides in 
 the prefent controverfy, confefles he had been "wonder- 
 fully pleafed with obferving, with what candour and tem- 
 per, as well as clearnefs and folidity, he was vindicated from 
 the afperfions laid againft him." All the adverfaries of our 
 Prelate, however, had not the virtue or fenfe to be thus 
 convinced ; fome of whom ftill continued, under the figna- 
 tures of Old Martin, Latimer, An Impartial ProteJIant, Pau- 
 linus, Mifonothos, to repeat their confuted falfehoods in the 
 public prints ; as if the curfe of calumniators had fallen 
 upon them, and their memory, by being long a traitor to 
 truth, had taken at laft a fevere revenge, and compelled 
 them to credit their own lie. The firft of thefe gentlemen, 
 Old Martin, who dates from N-c-ft-e, May 29, from the 
 rancour and malignity with which his letter abounds, and 
 from the particular virulence he discovers towards the char- 
 acters of Bifhop BUTLER and his defender, I conjecture to 
 be no other than the very perfon who had already figured in 
 this difpute, fo early as the year 1752 ; of whofe work, en- 
 titled A ferious Inquiry into the Ufe and Importance of External 
 Religion, the reader will find fome account in the notes fub- 
 joined to the Bifhop's Charge, at the end of this volume. 
 
 Page xv. [D]. 
 
 The letters, with a fight of which I was indulged by the 
 favour of our prefent mo ft worthy Metropolitan, are all, as 
 I remember, wrapped together under one cover ; on the 
 back of which is written, in Archbifhop SECKER'S own 
 hand, the following words, or words to this effect, Pre- 
 fumptive Arguments that Bi/Jjop Butler did net die a papift. 
 
 Page xxi. [E], 
 
 "Far be it from me," fays the excellent Dr. T. Balguy,* 
 i to difpute the reality of a moral principle in the human 
 heart. I fed its exiftence : I clearly difcern its ufe and im- 
 portance. 
 * Difcourfe IX. 
 
*liv NOTES TO THE PREFACE 
 
 portance. But in no refpect is it more important, than as it 
 fuggefts the idea of a moral Governor. Let this idea be once 
 effaced, and the principle of conference will foon be found 
 weak and ineffectual. Its influence on men's conduct has, 
 indeed, been too much undervalued by fome philofophical in- 
 quirers. But be that influence, while it lalts, more or lefs, 
 it is not a Jleady and permanent principle of action. Un- 
 happily we always have it in our power to lay it ajleep.* 
 Neg/eft alone will fupprefs and ftifle it, and bring it almoft 
 into a {late of ftupefaction : Nor can any thing lefs than 
 the terrors of religion awaken our minds from this danger- 
 ous and deadly fleep. It can never be matter of indiffer- 
 ence to a thinking man, whether he is to be happy or mife- 
 rable beyond the grave." 
 
 Page xxviii. [Fl. 
 
 The ignorance of man is a favourite doctrine with Bi(hop 
 BUTLER. It occurs in the fecond Part of the Analogy ; it 
 makes the fubject of his fifteenth Sermon ; and we meet 
 with it again in his Charge. Whether fometimes it be not 
 carried to a length which is exceffive, may admit of doubt. 
 
 Page xxviii. [G]. 
 
 Admirable to this purpofe are the words of Dr. T. 
 Balguy, in the IXth of his Difcourfes, already referred to. 
 " The doctrine of a life to come> fome perfons will fay, is a 
 doctrine of natural religion ; and can never therefore be 
 properly alleged to {hew the importance of revelation. 
 They judge perhaps from the frame of the world, that the 
 prefent fyftem is imperfeR : They fee defigns in it not yet 
 completed ; and they think they have grounds for expecting 
 another ftate, in which thefe defigns (hall be farther carried . 
 on, and brought to a conclufion, worthy of Infinite Wifdom. 
 I am not concerned to difpute thejujlnefs of this reafoning ; 
 nor do I wi(h to difpute it. But how far will it reach ? 
 "Will it lead us to the Chrijlian doctrine of a judgment to 
 come ? Will it give us the profpect of an eternity of happi- 
 nefs ? Nothing of all this. It {hews us only, that dedth is 
 not the end of our beings ; that we are likely to pafs here, 
 after into other fyflems, more favourable than the prefent 
 to the great ends of God's Providence, the virtue 'and the 
 happinefi of his intelligent creatures. But into what fyf- 
 tems we are to be removed ; what new fcenes are to be pre- 
 fented to us, either of pleafure or pain j what new parts we 
 
 dial! 
 

 
 BY THE EDITOR, xltr 
 
 {hall have to aft, and to what trials and temptations we may 
 yet be expofed ; on all thefe fubjedts we know juft nothing, 
 That our happinefs forever depends on our conduct here, 13 
 a moft important propofition, which we learn cnly from 
 revelation" 
 
 Page xxx. [HJ 
 
 <f In the common affairs .of life, common experience is fuf- 
 ficient to direct us. But will common experience ferve to 
 guide our judgment concerning the fall and redemption of 
 mankind ? From what we fee every day, can we explain 
 the commencement^ or foretel the dlffolution of the world ? 
 To judge of events like thefe, we (hould be converfant in 
 the hiftory of other planets ; {hould be diftindtly informed 
 of God's various difpenfations to all the different orders of 
 rational beings. Inftead flten of grounding our religious 
 opinions on what ive call experience, let us apply to a more 
 certain guide, let us hearken to the teftimmy of God himfelf. 
 The credibility of human teftimonj, and the conduct of human 
 agents^ are fubjects perfectly within the reach of our natural 
 faculties ; and we ought to defire no firmer foundation for 
 our belief of religion, than for the judgments we form in 
 the common affairs of life j where we fee a little plain tefti- 
 mony eafily outweighs the moft fpecious conjectures, and 
 not feldom even ftrong probabilities." Dr. Balguy'% 4th 
 Charge. See alfo an excellent pamphlet, entitled, Remarks 
 en Mr. Hume's Effay on the Natural Hijlcry cf Religion^ v. 
 And the 6th of Dr. Powell's Difcourfes. 
 
 Page xxxiii. [I]. 
 
 Dr. ARTHUR ASHLEY SYKES, from whofe writings fome 
 good may be collected out of a multitude of things of a 
 contrary tendency, in what he is pleafed to call The Scrip- 
 ture Doclrine of Redemption,* oppofes what is here advanced 
 by Bifhop BUTLER j quoting his words, but without men- 
 tioning his name. If what is faid above be not thought a 
 fufficient anfwer to the objections of this author, the reader 
 may do well to confult a Charge On the Ufe and Abufe of 
 Philofophy in the Study cf Religion, by the late Dr. Powell, 
 who feems to me to have had the observations of Dr. Sykes 
 in his view, where he is confuting the reafonings of certain 
 philosophizing divines againft the doctrine of the Atone- 
 ment. Powell's Difcourfes, Charge III. p. 342 348. 
 
 * See the Obfervationo on the texts cited in his firft chapter, and alfo in 
 chapter? the Mfh and futh. 
 
TO THE 
 RIGHT HONOURABLE 
 
 CHARLES LORD TALBOT, 
 
 
 BARON OF HENSOL, 
 
 LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF GREAT 
 BRITAIN, 
 
 THE FOLLOWING 
 
 TREATISE 
 
 IS, WITH ALL RESPECT, 
 
 gnfcrtbetr, 
 
 IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE HIGHEST 
 OBLIGATIONS TO THE LATE 
 
 LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM AND 
 TO HIMSELF, 
 
 BY HIS LORDSHIP'S 
 
 MOST DUTIFUL, 
 
 MOST DEVOTED, 
 AND MOST HUMBLE SERVANT, 
 
 JOSEPH BUTLER, 
 
ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 IF the reader fliould meet here with any thing 
 which he had not before attended to, it will not be in the ob- 
 fervations upon the conftitution and courfe of nature, thefe be- 
 ing all obvious, but in the application of them ; In which, 
 though there is nothing but what appears to me of fome real 
 weight, and therefore of great importance, yet he will obferve 
 feveral things which will appear to him of very little, if he can 
 think things to be of little importance, which are of any real 
 weight at all upon fuch a fubjecl: as religion. However, the 
 proper force of the following treatife lies in the whole general 
 analogy confidered together. 
 
 It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted by 
 many perfons, that Chriftianity is not fo much as a fubjeft of 
 inquiry, but that it is now at length difcovered to be fictitious. 
 And accordingly they treat it as if, in the prefent age, this 
 were an agreed point among all people of difcernment, and 
 nothing remained but to fet it up as a principal fubject of mirth 
 and ridicule, as it were by way of reprifals for its having fo 
 long interrupted the pleafures of the world. On the contrary, 
 thus much, at leaft, will be here found, not taken for granted, 
 but proved, that any reafonable man, who will thoroughly con- 
 fider the matter, may be as much a/lured as he is of his own 
 being, that it is not, however, fo clear a cafe that there is noth- 
 ing in it. There is, I think, ftrong evidence of its truth ; but 
 it is certain no one can, upon principles of reafon, be fatisfied 
 of the contrary. And the practical confequence to be drawn 
 from this is not attended to by every one who is concerned 
 in it. 
 
 MAY, 1736. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 /Page 
 NTRODUCTION 55 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Of NATURAL RELIGIOJ*. 
 
 CHAP. L 
 
 Of a Future Life 67 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Of the Government of God by Rewards and Pun- 
 foments ', and particularly of tke latter 86 
 
 CHAP, III. 
 
 Of the Moral Government of God 98 
 
 CHAP, IV. 
 
 Of a State of Probation^ as implying Trial, Diffi^ 
 cutties and Danger - - - - 123 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Of a Stale of Probation, as intended for moral 
 Difcipline and Improvement - - 131 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION, 
 
 Jr ROBABLE evidence is eflentially dif- 
 tinguiflied from demonftrative by this, that it admits 
 of degrees ; and of all variety of them, from the high- 
 eft moral certainty, to the very loweft prefumption. 
 We cannot indeed fay a thing is probably true upon 
 one very flight prefumption for it, becaufe, as there 
 may be probabilities on both fides of a queflion, there 
 may be fome againft it ; and though -there be not, 
 yet a flight prefumption does not beget that degree of 
 conviction which is implied in faying a thing is prob- 
 ably true. But that the flighteft poflible prefump- 
 tion is of the nature of a probability, appears from 
 hence, that fuch low prefumption, often repeated, 
 will antount even to moral certainty. Thus a man's 
 having obferved the ebb and flow of the tide today, 
 affords fome fort of prefumption, though the loweft 
 imaginable, that it may happen again tomorrow ; but 
 the obfervation of this event for fo many days, and 
 months, and ages together, as it has been obferved by 
 mankind, gives us a full aflurance that it will. 
 
 That which chiefly conftitutes probability is ex> 
 prefled in the word likely^ i. e. like fome truth,* or 
 true event ; like it, in iffelf, in its evidence, in fome 
 more or fewer of its circumftances. For when we de- 
 termine a thing to be probably true, fuppofe that an 
 event has or will come to pafs, it is from the mind's 
 remarking in it a likenefs to fome other event, which 
 we have obferved has come to pafs. And this obfer- 
 vation forms, in numberleis daily inftances, a prefump- 
 tion, opinion, or full convi&iori, that fuch event has 
 
 or 
 
 * Verlfimil". 
 
56 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 or will come to pafs, according as the obfervation is, 
 that the like event has fometimes, mofl commonly, or 
 always fo far as our obfervation reaches, come to pafs 
 at like diftances of time, or place, or upon like occa- 
 lions. Hence arifes the belief that a child, if it lives 
 twenty years, will grow up to the ilature and ftrength 
 of a man ; that food will contribute to the preferva- 
 tion of its life, and the want of it for fuch a number 
 of days, be its certain deftrudtion. So likewife the 
 rule and meafure of our hopes and fears concerning 
 the fuccefs of our purfuits ; our expectations that 
 others will ad fo arid fo in fuch circumitances ; and 
 our judgment that fuch actions proceed from fuch 
 principles ; all thefe rely upon our having obferved 
 the like to what we hope, fear, expect, judge ; I fay 
 upon our having obferved the like, either with re- 
 fpect to others or ourfelves. And thus, whereas the 
 prince * who had always lived in a warm climate, nat- 
 urally concluded in the way of analogy, that there was 
 no fuch thing as water's becoming hard, becaufe he 
 had always obferved it to be fluid and yielding, we 
 on the contrary, from analogy conclude, that there is 
 no prefumption at all againft this ; that it is fuppofa- 
 ble there may be froft in England any given day in 
 January next ; probable that there will on fome other 
 day of the month ; and that there is a moral certain- 
 ty, i. e. ground for an expectation without any doubt 
 of it, in fome part or other of the winter. 
 
 Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but 
 an imperfect kind of information, and is to be confid- 
 ered as relative only to beings of limited capacities. 
 For nothing which is thepoffible object of knowledge, 
 whether pail, prefent, or future, can be probable t<5 an 
 infinite Intelligence, fince it cannot but be difcerned 
 abibutely as it is in itfelf, certainly true, or certainly 
 falfe. But to us, probability is the very guide of life. 
 
 From 
 
 * The ftory is told by Mr. LOCK? in the Chapter of Probability, 
 
INTRODUCTION. 57 
 
 From thefe things it follows, that in queflions of 
 difficulty, or fuch as arc thought fo, where more fatis- 
 factory evidence cannot be had, or is not feen ; if 
 the refult of examination be, that there appears upon 
 the whole, any the lowed prefumption on one fide, 
 and none on the other, or a greater prefumption on 
 one iide, though in the loweft degree greater ; this de- 
 termines the queflion, even in matters of fpeculation ; 
 and in matters of practice, will lay us under an abfo- 
 lute and formal obligation, in point of prudence and 
 of intereft, to aft upon that prefumption or low prob- 
 ability, though it be fo low as to leave the mind in 
 very great doubt which is the truth. For furely a 
 man is as really bound in prudence to do what upon 
 the whole appears, according to the befl of his judg- 
 ment, to be for his happinets, as what he certainly 
 knows to be fo. Nay, further, in queflions of great 
 confequence, a reafonable man will think it concerns 
 him to remark lower probabilities and prefumptions 
 than thefe ; fuch as amount to no more than (bowing 
 one fide of a queftion to be as fuppoleable and cred- 
 ible as the other ; nay, fuch as but amount to much 
 lefs even than this. For numberlefs inftances might 
 be mentioned refpe&ing the common purfuits of life, 
 where a man would be thought, in a literal fenfe, dif- 
 fracted, who would not act, and with great applica- 
 tion too, not only upon an even chance, but upon 
 much lefs, and where the probability or chance was 
 greatly againft his fucceeding.* 
 
 It is not my defign to inquire further into the nature, 
 the foundation, and meafure of probability ; or whence 
 it proceeds that likenefs fliould beget that prefump- 
 tion, opinion," and full conviction, which the human 
 mind is formed to receive from it, and which it does 
 neceffarily produce in every one ; or to guard againft 
 the errors, to which reafoning from analogy is liable, 
 
 E This 
 
 *SeeCh. vi. Part II. 
 
$8 INTROD UCTIOtf. 
 
 This belongs to the fubjecT; of logic ; and is a part of 
 that fubject which has not yet been thoroughly confid- 
 ered. Indeed I fhall not take upon me to fay, how 
 far the extent, compafs, and force of analogical rea- 
 foning can be reduced to general heads and rules, 
 and the whole be formed into a fyftem : But though 
 ib little in this way has been attempted by thofe who 
 have treated of our intellectual powers, and the exer- 
 cife of them, this does not hinder but that we may 
 be, as we unquestionably are allured, that analogy is 
 of weight, in various degrees, towards determining 
 our judgment and our practice. Nor does it in any 
 wife ceafe to be of weight in thofe cafes, becaufe per- 
 forts, either given to difpute, or who require things 
 to be flated with greater exactnefs than our facul- 
 ties appear to admit of in practical matters, may 
 find other caies in which it is not eafy to fay, whether 
 it be or be not of any weight ; or inflances of feem- 
 ing analogies, which are really of none. It is enough 
 to the prefent purpofe to obferve, that this general 
 way of arguing is evidently natural, jufl, and conclu- 
 live. For there is no man can make a queftion but 
 that the fun will rife tomorrow ; and be feen, where 
 it is feeii at all, in the figure of a circle, and not in 
 that of a fquare. 
 
 Hence; namely from analogical reafoning, Origen* 
 has with iinguter fagacity obierved, that he who be- 
 lieves the Scripture to have proceeded from him who is 
 the Author of nature, may well expetl to find the fame 
 fort of difficulties in it, as are found in the conjlitution of 
 nature. And in a like way of reflection it may be 
 added, that he who denies the Scripture to have been 
 from God upon account of thefe difficulties, may, for 
 
 the 
 Xp>i jtAgv TOI yf rov 
 
 TOCVTIXI; rots &q&s TrsTrs'iG'S&i on ocra, Trrt rns 
 
 XTKTfCO? aTTCttTM TOI? r)T3<n TOJ/ TTfpt CtUTri? AoyjV, TOtUTfli 
 
 WV ypxfuv, Philocal. p. 23, Ed. Cant* 
 
INTRODUCTION. 59 
 
 the very fame reafon, deny the world to have been 
 formed by him. On the other hand, if there be an 
 analogy or likenefs between that fyftem of things and 
 difpenfation of Providence, which revelation informs 
 us of, and that fyftem of things and difpenfation of 
 Providence, which experience, together with reafon, 
 informs us of, i. e. the known courfe of nature ; this is 
 a prefumption, that they have both the fame author 
 and caufe ; at leaft fo far as to anfwer objections againft 
 the former's being from God, drawn from any thing 
 which is analogical or fimilar to what is in the latter, 
 which is acknowledged to be from him ; for an Au- 
 thor of nature is here fuppofed. 
 
 Forming our notions of the conftitution and gov- 
 ernment of the world upon reafoning, without foun- 
 dation for the principles which we affume, whether 
 from the attributes of God or any thing elfe, is build- 
 ing a world upon hypothefis, like Des Cartes. Form- 
 ing our notions upon reafoning from principles which 
 are certain, but applied to cafes to which we have no 
 ground to apply them, (like thofe who e'xplain the 
 ftructure of the human body, and the nature of dif- 
 eafes and medicines, from mere mathematics, without 
 fufficient data) is an error much a-kin to the former ; 
 lince what is afiumed in order to make the reafoning; 
 
 t^ 
 
 applicable, is hypothefis. But it muft be allowed juft, 
 to join abftract reafonings .with the obfervation of 
 facts, and argue from fuclt facts as are known, to 
 others that are like them ; from that part of the divine 
 government over intelligent creatures which comes 
 under our view, to that larger and more general gov- 
 ernment over them, which is beyond it ; and from 
 what is prefent, to colled, what is likely, credible, or 
 not incredible, will be hereafter. 
 
 This method then of concluding and determining 
 being practical, -and what, if we will ad at all, we can- 
 not but aft upon in the common purfuits of life ; be- 
 E 2 ing 
 
60 INTROD UCTION. 
 
 mg evidently conclufive, in various degrees, propor^ 
 tionable to the degree and exaftnefs of the whole anal- 
 ogy or likenefs ; and having fa great authority for its 
 introdu&ion into the fubject of religion, even reveal- 
 ed religion ; my defign is to apply it to that fubjeft in 
 general, both natural and revealed ; taking for proved, 
 that there is an intelligent Author of nature, and nat- 
 ural Governor of the world. For as there is no pre- 
 fumption againft this prior to the proof of it, fo it has 
 been often proved with accumulated evidence ; from 
 this argument of analogy and final caufes ; from ab- 
 flradt reafonings ; from the moft ancient tradition 
 and teilimony, and from the general confent of man- 
 kind. Nor does it appear, fofar as I can find, to be 
 denied, by the generality of thofe who profefs them- 
 felves diflatisfied with the evidence of religion. 
 
 As there are fome, who, inilead of thus attending to 
 what is in fat the conflitution of nature, form their 
 notions of God's government upon hypothecs ; fo 
 there are others, who indulge themielves irr vain and 
 idle fpeculations, how the world might poffibly have 
 been framed otherwile than it is ; and upon fuppofi- 
 tion that things mi^ht, in imagfmino; that they mould, 
 
 O O 7 . O O J 
 
 have been difpofed and carried on after a better mod- 
 el than what appears in the prefent difpofition and 
 conduct of them. Suppofe now a perlbn of fuch a 
 turn of mind, to go on with his reveries, till he had at 
 length fixed upon fome particular plan of nature, as ap- 
 pearing to him the bell ; one mail fcarce be thought 
 guilty of detraction againft human underflanding, if 
 one ihould fay, even beforehand, that the plan which 
 this fpeculative perfon would fix upon, though he were 
 the wifeft of the fons of men, probably would not be 
 the very befl, even according to his own notions of 
 beft ; whether he thought that to be fo, which afford- 
 ed occaiions and motives for the exercife of the great- 
 ell virtue, or which was productive of the greateft hap- 
 
 pineis, 
 
INTRODUCTION. 61 
 
 pinefs, or that thefe two were neceffarily connected, 
 and run up into one and the fame plan. However, it 
 may not be amifs once for all to fee, what would be 
 the amount of thefe emendations and imaginary im- 
 provements upon the fyftem of nature, or how far they 
 would miflead us. And it feems there could be no 
 Hopping, till we came to fome fuch conclufions as 
 thefe : That all creatures mould at firft be made as 
 perfect and as happy as they were capable of ever be- 
 ing : That nothing, to be lure, of hazard or danger 
 fhould be put upon them to do j fome indolent perfons 
 would perhaps think nothing at all ; or certainly, that 
 effectual care fhould be taken, that they fhould, wheth- 
 er necerTarily or not, yet eventually and in fad:, always 
 do what was right and mod conducive to happinefs, 
 which would be thought eafy for infinite power to ef- 
 fecl ; either by not giving them any principles which 
 would endanger their going wrong, or by laying the 
 right motive of action in every inftance before their 
 minds continually in fo ftrong a manner, as would 
 never fail of inducing them to ad: conformably to 
 it ; and that the whole method of government by 
 puniihments fhould be rejected as abiurd, as an 
 awkward round-about method of carrying things 
 on ; nay, as contrary to a principal purpofe, for 
 which it would be fuppofed creatures were made, 
 namely happinefs. 
 
 Now, without confidering what is to be faid in par- 
 ticular to the feveral parts of this train of folly and ex- 
 travagance, what has been above intimated, is a full, 
 direct, general anfwer to it, namely, that we may fee 
 beforehand that we have not faculties for this kind of 
 fpeculation. For though it be admitted, that from 
 the firft principles of our nature, we unavoidably judge 
 or determine fome ends to be abfolutely in themfelves 
 preferable to others, and that the ends now mentioned, 
 or if they run up into one, that this one is abfolutely 
 
 the 
 
6z INTRODUCTION, 
 
 the beft ; and confequently that we muft conclude 
 the ultimate end defigned, in the conftitution of na- 
 ture and conduit of Providence, is the moil virtue and 
 happinefs poffible : Yet we are far from being able to 
 judge, what particular difpofition of things would be 
 mod friendly and afiiftant to virtue ; or what means 
 might be absolutely necelTary to produce the moil 
 happinefs in a fyflem of fuch extent as our own world 
 may be, taking in all that is paft and to come, though 
 we mould fuppofe it detached from the whole of 
 things. Indeed we are fo far from being able to judge 
 of this, that we are not judges what may be -the necef- 
 fary means of railing and conducting one perfon to the 
 higheft perfection and happinefs of his nature. Nay, 
 even in the little affairs of the prefent life, we find men 
 of different educations and ranks are not competent 
 judges of the conduct of each other. Our whole na- 
 ture leads us to afcribe all moral perfection to God, 
 and to deny all imperfection of him. And this will 
 forever be a practical proof of his moral character, to 
 fuch as will confider what a practical proof is ; becaufe 
 it is the voice of God fpeaking in us. And from hence 
 we conclude, that virtue muft be the happinefs, and 
 vice the mifery of every creature ; and that regularity 
 and order and right cannot but prevail finally in a uni- 
 verfe under his government. But we are in no fort 
 judges, what are the neceffary means of accomplishing 
 this end. 
 
 Let us then, inftead of that idle and not very inno- 
 cent employment of forming imaginary models of a 
 world, and fchemes of governing it, turn our thought* 
 to what we experience to be the conduct of nature 
 with refpect to intelligent creatures ; which may be 
 refolved into general laws or rules of adminiftration, 
 in the fame way as many of the laws of nature reipect- 
 ing inanimate matter may be collected from experi- 
 ments. And let us compare the known conftitution 
 
 anc} 
 
INTRODUCTION. 63 
 
 and courfe of things, with what is faid to be the moral 
 iyflem of nature ; the acknowledged difpenfations of 
 Providence, or that government which we find our- 
 felves under, with what religion teaches us to be- 
 lieve and expert ; and fee whether they are not 
 analogous and of a piece; And upon fuch a com- 
 parifon, rt will I think be found, that they are very 
 much fo ; that both may be traced up to the fame 
 general laws, and refolved into the fame principles of 
 divine conduct. 
 
 The analogy here propofed to be confidered is of 
 pretty large extent, and confifts of feveral parts ; in 
 fome more, in others lefs exact. In fome few in- 
 flances, perhaps, it may amount to a real practical 
 proof; in others not fo. Yet in thete it is a con- 
 firmation of what is proved other ways. It will un- 
 deniably mow, what too many want to have mown 
 them, that the fyftcm of religion, both natural and 
 reveal-ed, confidered only as a fyflem, and prior to the 
 proof of it, is not a fubject of ridicule, unlefs that of 
 nature be fo too. And it will afford an anfwer to al- 
 moft all objections againfl the fyflem both of natural 
 and revealed religion ; though not .perhaps an anfwer 
 in fo great a degree, yet in a very considerable degree 
 an anfwer, to the objections againft the evidence of it .: 
 For objections againft a proof, and objections againft 
 what is faid to be proved, the reader will obferve are 
 different things. 
 
 Now the divine government of the world, implied 
 in the notion of religion in general and of Chriftianity, 
 contains in it, That mankind is appointed to live in a 
 future ftate ;* that there, every one mall be rewarded or 
 punilhed ;-f rewarded or puniihed refpectively for all 
 that behaviour here, which we comprehend under the 
 words, virtuous or vicious, morally good or evil : 
 That our prelent life is a probation, a ftate of trial, 
 
 and 
 
 * CU. i, f Qh. U. J Ch. iii, $ Ch. \\\ 
 
64 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 and of difcipline,* for that future one ; notwithftand* 
 ing the objections, which men may fancy they have, 
 from notions of neceffity, againft there being any fuch 
 moral plan as this at all ;-f and whatever objections 
 may appear to lie againft the wifdom and goodnefs of 
 it, as it flands fo imperfectly made known to us at 
 prefent : J That this world being in a flate of apof- 
 tacy and wickednefs, and confequently of ruin, and the 
 fenfe both of their condition and duty being greatly 
 corrupted amongft men ; this gave occafion for an ad- 
 ditional difpenfatioa of Providence ; of the utmofh im- 
 portance^ proved by miracles i|| but containing in 
 it many things appearing to us ftrange and not to 
 have been expected ;** a difpenfation of Providence, 
 which is a fcheme or fyftem of things ; f-f- carried on 
 by the mediation of a divine perfon, the Meffiah, in 
 rder to the recovery of the world ; J j yet not revealed 
 to all men, nor proved with the ftrongeft poffible evi- 
 dence to all thofe to whom it is revealed ; but only to 
 fuch a part of mankind, and with fuch particular evi- 
 dence as the wifdom of God thought fit. The de- 
 lign then of the following Treatife will be to mew, 
 that the feveral parts principally objected againft in 
 this moral and Chriftian difpenfation, including its 
 fcheme, its publication, and the proof which God has 
 afforded us of its truth ; that the particular parts prin- 
 cipally objected againft in this whole difpenfation, are 
 analogous to what is experienced in the conftitution 
 and courfe of nature, or providence ; that the chief 
 objections themfelves which are alleged againft the 
 former, are no other than what may be alleged with 
 like juftnefs againft the latter, where they are found in 
 fact to be inconclufive ; and that this argument from 
 analogy is in general unanfwerable, and undoubtedly 
 
 of 
 
 * Ch. v. f Ch. vi. + Ch. vii. 
 
 Part II. Ch. i. || Ch. H. ** Ch. iii. 
 
 ft Ch. iv. +1 Ch. v. Ch. vi, vii. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 65 
 
 of weight on the fide of religion,* notwithftanding the 
 objections which may feem to lie againft it, and the 
 real ground which there may be for difference of opin- 
 ion, as to the particular degree of weight which is to 
 be laid upon it. This is a general account of what 
 may be looked for in the following Treatife ; and I 
 fhali begin it with that which is the foundation of 
 all our hopes and of all our fears, all our hopes and 
 fears which are of any confideration, 1 mean a fu- 
 ture life. 
 
 * Chap, viii. 
 
THE 
 
 ANALOGY 
 
 O F 
 
 RELIGION 
 
 TO THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION and COURSE of NATURE. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Of NATURAL RELIGION 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of a Fuiure Life. 
 
 UTRANGE difficulties have been raife<3 
 by fome concerning perfonal identity, or the fameneis 
 of living agents, implied in the notion of our exifling 
 now and hereafter, or in any two fucceflive moments ; 
 which, whoever thinks it worth while, may fee con- 
 fidered in the firfl Diflertation at the end of this 
 Treatife. But without regard to any of them here, 
 let us confider what the analogy of nature, and the 
 leveral changes which we have undergone, and thofe 
 which we know we may undergo without being de- 
 ftroyed, fuggeft, as to the effeft which death may or 
 
 may 
 
8 Of a Future Life. 
 
 may not have upon us ; and whether it be not from 
 thence probable, that we may furvive this change, and 
 exift in a future ftate of life and perception. 
 
 I. From our being born into the prefent world in 
 the helplefs imperfect ftate of infancy, and having ar- 
 rived from thence to mature age, we find it to be a 
 general law of nature in our own fpecies, that the fame 
 creatures, the fame individuals, fhould exift in de- 
 grees of life and perception, with capacities of action, 
 of enjoyment and fuffering, in one period of their be- 
 ing, greatly different from thofe appointed them in 
 another period of it. And in other creatures the 
 fame law holds. For the difference of their capaci- 
 ties and ftates of life at their birth (to go no higher) 
 and in maturity ; the change of worms into flies, and 
 the vaft enlargement of their locomotive powers by 
 fuch change ; and birds and infects burfting the (hell, 
 their habitation, and by this means entering into a 
 new world, furniilied with new accommodations for 
 them, and finding a new fphere of action ailigned 
 them ; thefe are inftances of this general law of nature. 
 Thus all the various and wonderful transformations of 
 animals are to be taken into confideration here. But 
 the ftates of life in which we ourfelves exifted formerly 
 In the womb and in our infancy, are almoft as different 
 from our prefent in mature age, as it is poflible to 
 conceive any two ftates or degrees of life can be. 
 Therefore, that we are to exift hereafter in a ftate as 
 different (fuppofe) from our prefent, as this is from 
 our former, is but according to the analogy of na- 
 ture ; according to a natural order or appointment 
 of the very fame kind with what we have already 
 experienced. 
 
 II. We know we are endued with capacities of ac- 
 tion, of happinefs and mifery ; for we are confcious 
 of acting, of enjoying pleafure, and fuffering pain. 
 Now that we have thefe powers and capacities before 
 
 death, 
 
Of a Future Life. 69 
 
 tleath, is a prefumption that we fhall retain them 
 through and after death ; indeed a probability of it 
 abundantly fufficient to act upon, unlefs there be fome 
 pofitive reafon to think that death is the deftruction 
 of thofe living powers ; becaufe there is in every cafe 
 a probability, that all things will continue as we ex- 
 perience they are, in all refpedb, except thofe in 
 which we have fome reafon to think they will be al- 
 tered. This is that kind* of prefumption or proba- 
 bility from analogy, exprefled in the very word contin- 
 uance, which feems our only natural reafon for believ- 
 ing the courfe of the world will continue tomorrow, 
 as it has done fo far as our experience or knowledge 
 of hiftory can carry us back. Nay, it feems our only 
 reafon for believing that any one fubftance now ex- 
 ifling will continue to exift a moment longer, the 
 felf-exiftcnt fubftance only excepted. Thus if men 
 were aflured that the unknown event, death, was not 
 the deftruction of our faculties of perception and of 
 action, there would be no apprehenfion that any other 
 power or event unconnected with this of death, would 
 deftroy thefe faculties juft at the inftant of each crea- 
 ture's death, and therefore no doubt but that they 
 would remain after it ; which fliows the high proba- 
 bility that our living powers will continue after death, 
 unlefs there be fome ground to think that death is 
 their deftruction.-f- For, if it would be in a manner 
 certain that we mould furvive death, provided it were 
 
 certain 
 
 * I fay /-/Wof prefumption or probability j for I do not mean to affirm 
 that there is the fame degree of convidlion, that oar living powers will con- 
 tinue after death, as there is, that our fubilances will. 
 
 f Dcjiru&ion if living powers, is a manner of expreffion unavoidably ambig- 
 uous ; ami may fignify either the deftruftion of a tiring />fi% f fo as t&at the fame 
 living being JJiali be uncapable of ever perceiving or aftitig aguin at ail ; or, the dt~ 
 Jlruclion of thofe means and injlruments hy 'which it is capable of its prefent life, of in 
 prefent Jtate of perception and of action. It is here ufed iu the former fenfe. 
 When it is ufed in the latter, the epithet prejtn: is added. The lofs of a 
 man's eye, is a deftruftion of living powers in the latter fenfe. Rut we have 
 no reafon to think the deftrudlion of living powers in the former fenfe, to be 
 poflihle. We have o more reafon to think a being endued with living pow- 
 ers ever lofe; them during its whole exiflence, than to believe tfoit 
 ever acquires them, 
 
ja> Of a Future Life,- PART L 
 
 certain that death would not be our deflruction, it 
 mufl be highly probable we (hall furvive it, if there 
 be no ground to think death will be our deflruction. 
 
 Now, though I think it mud be acknowledged, 
 that prior to the natural and moral proofs of a future 
 life commonly infifled upon, there would arife a gen* 
 eral confufed fufpicion, that in the great mock and 
 alteration which we (hall undergo by death, we, i. e. 
 our living powers, might be wholly deflroyed ; yet, 
 even prior to thofe proofs, there is really no particu- 
 lar diflinct ground or reafon for this apprehenlion at 
 all, fo far as I can find. If there be, it muil arife 
 cither from the reafon of the thing, or from the analogy 
 of nature* 
 
 But we cannot argue from the reafon of the thing, that 
 death is the deflruction of living agents, becaufe we 
 know not at all what death is in itfelf ; but only 
 fome of its effects, fuch as the difTolution of flefh, 
 ikin, and bones. And thefe effects do in no wife ap- 
 pear to imply the deflruction of a living agent. And 
 befides, as we are greatly in the dark, upon what the 
 exercife of our living powers depends, fo we are whol- 
 ly ignorant what the powers themfelves depend up- 
 on ; the powers themfelves as diflinguifhed, not only 
 from their actual exercife, but alfo from the prefent 
 capacity of exercifing them ; and as oppofed to their 
 deflruction : For fleep, or however a fwoon, fliews us, 
 not only that thefe powers exifl when they are not ex- 
 ercifed, as the paffive power of motion does in inani- 
 mate matter ; but mews alfo that they exifl, when 
 there is no prefent capacity of exercifing them ; or 
 that the capacities of exercifing them for the prefent, 
 as well as the actual exercife of them, may be fuf- 
 pended, and yet the powers themfelves remain unde- 
 ftroyed. Since then we know not at all upon what 
 the exiflence of our living powers depends, this mews 
 further, there can no probability be collected from 
 
 the 
 
CHAP. I. Of a Future Life. 71 
 
 the reafon of the thing, that death will be their de- 
 ftru&ion ; becaufe their exiftence may depend upon 
 fomewhat in no degree affe&ed by death, upon fome- 
 what quite out of the reach of this king of terrors. 
 So that there is nothing more certain, than that the 
 reafon of the thing (hews us no connexion between 
 death, and the destruction of living agents. Nor can 
 we find any thing throughout the whole analogy of 
 nature^ to afford us even the flighted prefumption, 
 that animals ever lofe their living powers ; much lefs, 
 if it were poffible, that they lofe them by death ; for 
 we have no faculties wherewith to trace any beyond or 
 through it, fo as to fee what becomes of them. This 
 event removes them from our view. It deftroys the 
 fenfible proof, which we had before their death, of 
 their being pofTefled of living powers, but does not 
 appear to afford the leaft realbn to believe that they 
 are, then, or by that event, deprived of them. 
 
 And our knowing that they were pofTefled of thefe 
 powers, up to the very period to which we have facul- 
 ties capable of tracing them, is itfelf a probability of 
 their retaining them beyond it. And this is confirm- 
 ed, and a fenfible credibility is given to it, by obferving 
 the very great and aftoniihing changes which we have 
 experienced ; fo great, that our exiftence in another 
 flate of life, of perception and of action, will be but 
 according to a method of providential conduct, the 
 like to which has been already exercifed even with re- 
 gard to ourfelves ; according to a courfe of nature, 
 the like to which we have already gone through. 
 
 However, as one cannot but be greatly fenfible 
 how difficult it is to filence imagination enough to 
 make the voice of reafon even diftinclly heard in this 
 cafe ; as we are accuflomed, from our youth up, to in- 
 dulge that forward delufive faculty, ever obtruding 
 beyond its fphere ; of tome afliftance indeed to appre- 
 heniion, but the author of all error ; as we plainly lofe 
 
 ourfelves 
 
7^ Of a Future Life. 
 
 ourfelves in grofs and crude conceptions of things, 
 faking for granted that we are acquainted with what 
 indeed we are wholly ignorant of; it may be proper to 
 conlider the imaginary prefumptions, that death will 
 be our deftruftion, arifingfrom thefe kinds of early and 
 lading prejudices ; and to mew how little they can re- 
 ally amount to, even though we cannot wholly diveft 
 ourfelves of them. And, 
 
 I. All prefumption of death's being the deftruc- 
 tion of living beings, muft go upon fuppoiition that 
 they are compounded, and fo difcerptible. But lince 
 confcioufnefs is a fingle and indivilible power, it ihoukl 
 feem that the fubjeft in which it refides muft be fo 
 too. For were the motion of any particle of matter 
 abfolutely one and indivifible, fo as that it mould im- 
 ply a contradidtion to fuppofe part of this motion to 
 exift, and part not to exift, i. e. part of this matter to 
 move, and part to be at reft, then its power of motion 
 would be indivifible ; and fo alfo would the fubjeft in 
 which the power inheres, namely, the particle of mat- 
 ter : For if this could be divided into two, one part 
 might be moved and the other at reft, which is con- 
 trary to the fuppofition. In like manner it has been 
 argued,* and, for any thing appearing to the contrary, 
 juftly, that fince the perception or confcioufnefs, which 
 we have of our own exiftence, is indivifible, fo as that 
 it is a contradiction to fuppofe one part of it mould be 
 here and the other there, the perceptive power, or the 
 power of confcioufnefs, is indivifible too ; and confe- 
 quently the fubjeft in which it refides, i. e. the con- 
 fcious being. Now upon fuppofition that living agent 
 each man calls himfelf, is thus a fingle being, which 
 there is at leaft no more difficulty in conceiving than in 
 conceiving it to be a compound, and of which there is 
 the proof now mentioned, it follows, that our organ- 
 ized bodies are no more ourfelves or part of ourfelves, 
 
 than 
 
 * See Dr. Clark's Letter to Mr. Do<t:vc!f f and the defences of it. 
 
CHAP. I. Of a Future Life. 73 
 
 than any other matter around us. And it is as eafy 
 to conceive how matter, which is no part of ourfelves, 
 may be appropriated to us in the manner which our 
 prefent bodies are, as how we can receive impreiTions 
 from, and have power over any matter. It is as eafy 
 to conceive that we may exiil out of bodies, as in 
 them , that we might have animated bodies of any 
 other organs and fenfes wholly different from thefe 
 now given us, and that we may hereafter animate thefe 
 fame or new bodies varioufly modified and organized, 
 as to conceive how we can animate fuch bodies as our 
 prefent. And laftly, the dhTolution of all thefe feverai 
 organized bodies, fuppofmg ourfelves to have fuccef- 
 fively animated them, would have no more conceiva- 
 ble tendency to deftroy the living beings ourfelves, or 
 deprive us of living'faculties, the faculties of percep- 
 tion and of action, than the duTolution of any foreign 
 matter, which we are capable of receiving impreffioas 
 from, and making ufe of for the common occafions of 
 life. 
 
 II* The fimplicity and abfolute onenefs of a living 
 agent cannot, indeed, from the nature of the thing, be 
 properly proved by experimental obfervations. But 
 as thefe fall in with the fuppofition of its unity, fo 
 they plainly lead us to conclude certainly, that our 
 grofs organized bodies, with which we perceive the 
 objects of fenfe, and with which we a6l, are no part of 
 ourfelves ; and therefore fhow us, that we have no 
 reafon to believe their deftrucuon to be ours, even 
 without determining whether our living fubftances be 
 material or immaterial. For we fee by experience, 
 that men may lofe their limbs, their organs of fenfe, 
 and even the greatefl part of thefe bodies, and yet re- 
 main the fame living agents. And perfons can trace 
 up the exiftence of themfelves to a time, when the 
 bulk of their bodies was extremely fmall, in compari- 
 fon of what it is in mature age ; and we cannot but 
 F think 
 
* 
 
 74 Of a Future Life. PART f* 
 
 think that they might then have loft a coniiderable 
 part of that fmall body, and yet have remained the 
 lame living agents ; as they may now lofe great part 
 of their prefent body, and remain fo. And it is cer- 
 tain that the bodies of all animals are in a conftant 
 flux, from that never eeafing attrition which there is 
 in every part of them. Now things of this kind un- 
 avoidably teach us to diftinguifh between- thefe living 
 agents ourfelves, and large quantities of matter, in 
 which we are very nearly interefted ; fince thefe may 
 be alienated, and actually are in a daily courfe of fuc- 
 ceflion, and changing their owners ; whilft we are af- 
 lured, that each living agent remains one and the fame 
 permanent being.* And this general obfervation leads 
 us on to the following ones. 
 
 Firft, That we have no way of determining by ex-' 
 perience, what is the certain bulk of the living being 
 each man calls himfelf ; and yet, till it be determined 
 that it is larger in bulk than the folid elementary par- 
 ticles of matter, which there is no ground to think any 
 natural power can diffolve, there is no fort of reafon 
 to think death to be the diflblution of it, of the living 
 being, even though it fhould not be abfolu-tely indif- 
 cerptible. 
 
 Secondly, From our being fo nearly related to and 
 interefted in certain fyftems of matter, fuppofe our 
 flefli and bones, and afterwards eeafing to be at all re- 
 lated to them, the living agents ourfelves remaining 
 all this while undeftroyed, notwithstanding fuch alie- 
 nation ; and confequently thefe fyftems of matter not 
 being ourfelves, it follows further, that we have no 
 ground to conclude any other, fuppofe internal fyjlems 
 of matter, to be the living agents ourfelves ; becaufe 
 we can have no ground to conclude this, but from 
 our relation to and intereft in fuch other (yftems of 
 matter ; and therefore we can have no reafon to con- 
 
 elude,. 
 
 * See Differ tation I. 
 
CHAP. I. Of a Future Life. 75 
 
 elude, what befals thofe fyftems of matter at death, to 
 be the deftruclion of the living agents. We have al- 
 ready feveral times over loft a great part or perhaps 
 the whole of our body, according to certain common 
 eflablifhed laws of nature, yet we remain the fame 
 living agents ; when we mall lofe as great a part, or 
 the whole, by another common eflabliilied law of na- 
 ture, death, why may we not alfo remain the fame ? 
 That the alienation has been gradual in one cafe, and 
 in the other will be more at once, does not prove any- 
 thing to the contrary. We -have palled undcil 
 through thofe many and great revolutions of matter, 
 io peculiarly appropriated to us ourfelves ; why ihould 
 we imagine death will be fo fatal to us ? Nor can it 
 be objected, that what is thus alienated or loft, is no 
 part of our original 1'blid body, but only adventitious 
 matter ; becaufe we may lofe entire limbs, which muft 
 have contained many iblid parts and velfels of the 
 original body ; or if this be not admitted, we hcivs 
 no proof, that any of thefe lolid parts are dilTolved or 
 alienated by death. Though, by the way, we are 
 very nearly related to that extraneous or adventitious 
 matter, whilft it continues united to and diftending 
 the feveral parts of our folid body. But after all, the 
 relation a perfon bears to thofe parts of his body to 
 which he is the moft nearly related, what does it ap- 
 pear to amount to but this, that the living agent and 
 thofe parts of the body mutually affect each other ? 
 And the fame thing, the fame thing in kind, though 
 not in degree, may be faid of all foreign matter, which 
 gives us ideas, and which we have any power over. 
 From thefe obfervations, the whole ground of the 
 imagination is removed, that the dilToIution of any 
 jnatter is the deftruclion of a living agent from the 
 mtereft he once had in fuch matter, 
 
 Thirdly, If we coniider our body fomewhat more 
 
 't-fl'mdJy, as made up of organs and initruments of 
 
 V z perception 
 
76 Of a Future Life. PART I, 
 
 perception and of motion, it will bring us to the fame 
 conclufion. Thus the common optical experiments 
 mow, and even the obfervation how fight is affifled by 
 glafies mows, that we fee with our eyes in the fame 
 fenfe as we fee with glafTes. Nor is there any reafon 
 to believe, that we fee with them in any other fenfe ; 
 any other, I mean, which would lead us to think the 
 eye itfelf a percipient. The like is to be faid of hear- 
 ing ; and our feeling diftant folk} matter by "means of 
 fomewhat in our hand, feems an inftance of the like 
 kind as to the fubject we are confidering. All thefe 
 are inftances of foreign matter, or fach as is no part of 
 our body, being inftrumental in preparing objects for, 
 and conveying them to the perceiving power, in a 
 manner iimilar or like to the manner in which our 
 organs of fenfe prepare and convey them. Both are 
 in a like way inilruments of our receiving luch ideas 
 from external objects, as the Author of nature ap- 
 pointed thofe external objets to be the occafions of 
 exciting in us. However, glafles are evidently in- 
 ftances of this ; namely of matter which is no part of 
 our body, preparing objects for and conveying them 
 towards the perceiving power, in like manner as our 
 bodily organs do. And if we fee with our eyes only 
 in the fame manner as we do with glafles, the like 
 may juftly be concluded, from analogy, of all our other 
 fenfes. It is not intended, by any thing here faid,- 
 to affirm, that the whole apparatus of vifion, or of 
 perception by any other of our fenfes, can be traced, 
 through all its fleps, quite up to the living power of 
 feeing, or perceiving ; but that fo far as it can be trac- 
 ed by experimental obfervations, fo far it appears, that 
 our organs of fenfe prepare and convey on objects, irt 
 order to their being perceived, in like manner as for- 
 eign matter does, without affording any fhadow of ap- 
 pearance that they themfelves perceive. And that we 
 have no reafon to think our organs of fenfe percipi- 
 ents. 
 
CHAP. I, Of a Future Life. 77 
 
 ents, is confirmed by inftances of perfons lofmg Tome 
 of them, the living beings themfelves, their former 
 occupiers, remaining unimpaired. It is confirmed 
 alfo by the experience of dreams ; by which we find 
 we are at prefent pofTefled of a latent, and, what would 
 otherwife be, an unimagined, unknown power of per- 
 ceiving fenfible objects, in as ftrong and lively a man- 
 ner without our external organs of fenfe as with them. 
 
 So alfo with regard to our power of moving, or di- 
 recting motion by will and choice : Upon the deflruc- 
 tion of a limb, this a&ive power remains, as it evi- 
 dently feems, unleflened ; fo as that the living being, 
 who has fuffered this lofs, would be capable of mov- 
 ing as before, if it had another limb to move with. 
 Jt can walk by the help of an artificial kg ; juft as it 
 can make ufe of a pole or a leaver, to reach towards 
 itfelf, and to move things, beyond the length and the 
 power of its natural arm ; and this laft it does in the 
 fame manner as it reaches and moves, with its natural 
 arm, things nearer and of lefs weight. Nor is there 
 fo much as any appearance of our limbs being endu- 
 ed with a power of moving or directing themfelves, 
 though they are adapted, like the feveral parts of a 
 machine, to be the inflruments of motion to each 
 other, and fome parts of the fame limb, to be inflru- 
 nients of motion to other parts of it. 
 
 Thus a man determines, that he will look at fuch 
 an objecl through a microfcope ; or being lame fup- 
 pofe, that he will walk to fuch a place with a ftaff a 
 week hence. His eyes and his feet no more deter- 
 mine in thefe cafes, than the microfcope and the 
 flafT. Nor is there any ground to think they any 
 more put the determination in practice ; or that his 
 eyes are the feers or his feet the movers, in any other 
 fenfe than as the microfcope and the ftarT are. Upon 
 the whole then, our organs of fenfe and our limbs are 
 certainly inftruments, which the living perfons our- 
 
 < fclvcs 
 
7 8 Of a Future Life. PART L 
 
 felves make ufe of to perceive and move with ; there 
 is not any probability that they are any more, nor con-* 
 iequently, that we have any other kind of relation to 
 them, than what we may have to any other foreign 
 matter formed into .inftruments of perception and 
 motion, fuppofe into a microfcope or a ftaff; (I fay 
 any other kind of relation, for I am not fpeaking of 
 the degree of it) nor confequently is there any probar 
 bility, that the alienation or diffolution of thefe in- 
 ftruments is the deftrucuon of the perceiving and 
 moving agent. 
 
 And thus our rinding, that the diffolution of mat- 
 ter, in which living beings were moft nearly interefted, 
 is not their diffolution, and that the definition of 
 feveral of the organs and inftruments of perception and 
 of motion belonging to them, is not their deftruction, 
 {hows, dsmonilratively, that there is no ground to 
 think that the diffolution of any other matter, or de- 
 ftru&ion of any other organs and inftruments, will be 
 the diffolution or definition of living agents, from 
 the like kind of relation. And we have no reafon ta 
 think we ftand in any other kind of relation to any 
 thing which we find diffolved by death. 
 
 But it is faid thefe obfervations are equally applicable 
 to brutes ; and it is thought an infuperable difficulty, 
 that they mould be immortal, and by confequence ca- 
 pable of everlafting happinefs. Now this manner of 
 expreffion is both invidious and weak ; but the thing 
 intended by it, is really no difficulty at all, either in the 
 way of natural or moral consideration. For i/. Sup- 
 pole the invidious thing, deligned in fuch a manner of 
 expreffion, were really implied, as it is not in the leaft 
 in the natural immortality of brutes ; namely, that 
 they muft arrive at great attainments, and become ra- 
 tional and moral agents ; even this would be no diffi- 
 culty, iince we know not what latent powers and ca- 
 pacities they may be endued with. There was once. 
 
 prior 
 
CHAP. I. Of a Future Life. 79 
 
 prior to experience, as great presumption againfl hu- 
 man creatures, as there is againfl the brute creatures, ar- 
 riving at that degree of understanding, which we have 
 in mature age. For we can trace up our own exist- 
 ence to the fame original with theirs. And we find it 
 to be a general law of nature, that creatures endued 
 with capacities of virtue and religion, mould be placed 
 in a condition of being, in which they are altogether 
 without the ufe of them, for a considerable length of 
 their duration ; as in infancy and childhood. And 
 great part of the human fpecies go out of the prefent 
 world, before they come to the exercife of thefe ca- 
 pacities in any degree at all. But then, 2^/y, the nat- 
 ural immortality of brutes does not in the lead im- 
 ply, that they are endued with any latent capacities of 
 a rational or moral nature. And the economy of the 
 univerfe might require, that there mould be living crea- 
 tures without any capacities of this kind. And all dif- 
 ficulties as to the manner how they are to be difpofed 
 of, are ib apparently and wholly founded in our ig- 
 norance, that it is wonderful they Ihould be infilled 
 upon by any, but fuch as are weak enough to think 
 they are acquainted with the whole fyflem of things. 
 There is then abfolutely nothing at all in this objec- 
 tion which is fo rhetorically urged againfl the greatefl 
 part of the natural proofs or presumptions of the im- 
 mortality of human minds : I fay the greatest part ; 
 for it is lefs applicable to the following obfervation, 
 which is more peculiar to mankind : 
 
 III. That as it is evident our prefent powers and ca- 
 pacities of reafon, memory and affection, do not de- 
 pend upon our grofs body in the manner in which per- 
 ception by our organs of fenfe does ; fo they do not 
 appear to depend upon it at all in any fuch manner, 
 as to give ground to think, that the diflblution of this 
 body, will be the destruction of thefe our prefent pow- 
 ers of reflection, as it will of our powers of feniation ; 
 
 or 
 
8o Cff a Future Life. TAKT L 
 
 or to give ground to conclude even that it will be fo 
 much as a fufpenfion of the former. 
 
 Human creatures exifl at prefent in two ftates of 
 life and perception, greatly different from each other ; 
 each of which has its own peculiar laws, and its own 
 peculiar enjoyments and fufferings, When any of our 
 fenfes are affected or appetites gratified with the ob- 
 jects of them, we may be laid to exift or live in a flate 
 of fenfation. When none of our fenfes are aifefted or 
 appetites gratified, and yet we perceive and reafon and 
 act, we may be faid to exifl or live in a ftate of reflec- 
 tion. Now it is by no means certain, that any thing 
 which is dilfolved by death, is any way neceffary to the 
 living being in this its ftate of reflection, after ideas are 
 gained. For, though from our prefent conflitution, 
 arid condition of being, our external organs of fenie 
 are necellary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting 
 powers, as carriages and leavers and fcaffolds are in ar-? 
 chitecture j*yet when thele ideas are brought in, we 
 are capable of reflecting in the molt intenfe degree, and 
 of enjoying the greateft pleafure, and feeling the great- 
 eft pain by means of that reflection, withoijt any af- 
 liftance from our fenfes ; and without any at all, which 
 We know of, from that body which will be diflblved by 
 death. It does not appear then, that the relation of 
 this grofs body to the reflecting being, is, in any De- 
 gree, neceflary to thinking ; to our intellectual enjoy-, 
 ments or fufferings : Nor, confequently, that the dif- 
 folution or alienation of the former by death, will be 
 the cleftruction of thofe prefent powers, which render 
 us capable of this ftate of reflection. Further, there 
 are inftances of mortal difeafes, which do not at all af- 
 fect our prefent intellectual powers ; and this affords 
 a prefumption, that thofe difeafes will not deftroy thefe 
 prefent powers. Indeed, from the obfervations made 
 above,* it appears, that there is no prefumption, from 
 their mutually afleCting each other, that the diffolu- 
 
 tion 
 
 * P. 74, 75, 76. 
 
CHAP, I, Of a Future Life. Si 
 
 tion of the body is the deftruction of the living agent. 
 And by the fame reafoning, it muft appear too, that 
 there is no prefumption, from their mutually affecting 
 each other, that the dilTolution of the body is the cle- 
 ftru&ion of our prefent reflecting powers ; but inflances 
 of their not affecting each other, afford a prcfump- 
 tion of the contrary. Inftances of mortal difeafes not 
 impairing our prefent reflecting powers, evidently turn 
 our thoughts even from imagining fuch difeafes to be 
 
 o o o 
 
 the deftruction of them. Several things indeed great- 
 ly affect all our livipg powers, and at length fafpend 
 the exerdfe of them ; as for inftance drowfineis, in- 
 creafmg till it ends in found fleep ; and from hence 
 we might have imagined it would deftroy them, till 
 we found by experience the weaknefs of this way of 
 judging. But in the difeaies now mentioned, there is 
 not fo much as this fhadow of probability, to lead us 
 to any fuch conclusion, as to the reflecting powers 
 which we have at prefent ; for in thofe diferfes, per- 
 ions the moment before death appear to be in the 
 higheft vigour of life ; they diicover apprehenfion, 
 memory, reaibn, all entire ; with the utmoft force of 
 affection ; fenie of a charafter, of ihame and honour ; 
 and the higheft mental enjoyments and iuffcrmg?, 
 even to the laft gafp : And theie furely prove even 
 greater vigour of life than bodily ftrength does. Now 
 what pretence is there for thinking, that a progrefiive 
 difeafe when arrived to fuch a degree, I mean that de- 
 gree which is mortal, will deftroy thole powers which 
 were not impaired, which were not affected by it, dur- 
 ing its whole progreis quite up to that degree ? And 
 if death, by difeaies of this kind, is not the deftruc- 
 tion of our prefent reflecting powers, it will icarce be 
 thought that death by any other means is. 
 
 It is obvious that this general obiervation may be 
 carried on further ; and there appears fo little con- 
 nexion between our bodily powers of fenfation, and 
 pur prefent powers of reflection, that there is no reafon 
 
 to 
 
82 Of a Future Life. PART I- 
 
 to conclude, that .death, which deftroys the former, 
 does fo much as fufpend the exercife of the latter, or 
 interrupt our continuing to cxift in the like flate of re- 
 flection which we do now. For fufpenfion of reafon, 
 memory, and the affections which they excite, is no 
 part of the idea of death, nor is implied in our notion 
 of it. And our daily experiencing thefe powers to be 
 exercifed, without any affiilance, that we know of, 
 from thofe bodies, which will be diiiblved by death ; 
 and our finding often that the exercife of them is fo 
 lively to the laft ; thefe things afford a fenfible appre- 
 henfion, that death may not perhaps be fo much as a 
 difcontinuance of the exercife of thefe powers, nor of 
 the enjoyments and fufferings which it implies.* So 
 that our poflhumous life, whatever there may be in it 
 additional to our prefent, yet may not be entirely be- 
 ginning anew, but going on, Death may, in fome 
 fort, and in fome refpecls, anfwer to our birth ; which 
 is riot a fufpenfion of the faculties which we had be- 
 fore it, or a total change of the (late of life in which 
 we exifted when in the womb ; but a continuation of 
 both, with fuch and fuch great alterations. 
 
 Nay, for what we know of ourfelves, of our prefent 
 life and of death, death may immediately, in the nat- 
 ural courfe of things, put us into a higher and more 
 enlarged (late of life, as our birth does j f a ftate in 
 
 which 
 
 * There are three diflincl: queflions, relating to a future life, here confid- 
 ered : Whether death be the delh udlion of living agents ; if not, Whether 
 it be the deftru&ion of their prefent powers of reflection, as it certainly is 
 the definition of their prefent powers of fenfation ; and if not, Whether it 
 be the fufpenuon, or discontinuance of the exercife, of thefe prefent reflect- 
 ing powers. Now, if there be no reafon to believe the laft, there will be, it" 
 that were poiuble, lets for the next, and lefs ftill for the firft. 
 
 t This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans, 
 
 fjiV y>XQ >1 TQV fJ.l/ l/&g lQV, COJ & 
 
 rov 1 Scivarov, yiviviv t\$ rov OJ/TW? j?iov, xat ruv 
 
 rot? (piX'0(Td^T<rafl-t" Lib. XV. p. 1039. ^* ^ m ^' 1 /o7' To 
 which opinion perhaps Antoninus may allude in thefe words, 
 
 (TK 
 
 KTjw rw w^av tv y TO ^ocoiov (ra rz 
 Lib. IX. c. 3. 
 
CHAP. I. Of a Future Life. 83 
 
 which our capacities and fphere of perception and 
 of action may be much greater than at prefent. For 
 as our relation to our external organs of fenfe ren- 
 ders us capable of exifting in our prefent ftate of 
 fcnfation, fo it may be the only natural hindrance 
 to our exifling, immediately and of courfe, in a 
 higher ftate of reflection. The truth is, reafon does 
 riot at all mew us in what ftate death naturally leaves 
 us. But were we fare that it would fufpend all our 
 perceptive and active powers, yet the fufpenfion of 
 a power and the deftruction of it are effects fo to- 
 tally different in kind, as we experience from flecp 
 and a fwoon, that we cannot in any wife argue from 
 one to the other, or conclude, even to the lowed 
 degree of probability, that the fame kind of force 
 which is fufficient to fufpend our faculties, though 
 it be increafed ever fo much, will be fufficient to 
 deftroy them. 
 
 Thefe obfervations together may be fufficient to 
 fliew, how little prefumption there is, that death is 
 the deftruction of human creatures, However, there 
 is the fhadow of an analogy which may lead us to 
 imagine it is ; the fuppofed likenefs which is obferv- 
 ed between the decay of vegetables, and of living 
 creatures. And this likenefs is indeed fufficient to 
 afford the poets very apt allufions to the flowers of 
 the field, in their pictures of the frailty of our prefent 
 life. But in reafon, the analogy is fo far from hold- 
 ing, that there appears no ground even for the com- 
 parifon, as to the prefent queftion ; becaufe one of the 
 two fubjects compared is wholly void of that, which is 
 the principal and chief thing in the other, the power 
 of perception and of action, and which is the only 
 thing we are inquiring about the continuance of ; fo 
 that the deftruction of a vegetable is an event not 
 llmilar or analogous to the deftruction of a living 
 agent. 
 
 But 
 
84 Of a Future Life. PART I, 
 
 But if, as was above intimated, leaving off the de- 
 lufive cuflom of fubflituting imagination in the room 
 of experience, we would confine ourielves to what we 
 do know and underfland, if we would argue only from 
 that, and from that form our expectations, it would 
 appear at firft fight, that as no probability of living- 
 beings ever ceafing to be fo, can be concluded from 
 the reafon of the thing, fo none can be collected from 
 the analogy of nature, becaufe we cannot trace any 
 living beings beyond death. But as we are confcious 
 that we are endued with capacities of perception and 
 of action, and are living perfons, what we are to go 
 upon is, that we fhall continue fo, until we foreiee 
 fome accident or event which will endanger thole ca- 
 pacities, or be likely to defhroy us j which- death does 
 in no wife appear to be. 
 
 And thus, when we go out of this world, we may 
 pafs into new fcenes, and a new flate of life and ac- 
 tion, jufl as naturally as we came into the prefent. 
 And this new flate may naturally be a focial one. 
 And the advantages of it, advantages of every kind, 
 may naturally be bellowed, according to fome fixed 
 general laws of wifdom, upon every one in proportion 
 to the degrees of his virtue. And though the ad- 
 vantages of that future natural flate, fhould not be 
 beflowed, as thefe of the prefent in fome meafure are, 
 by the will of the fociety, but entirely by his more 
 immediate action, upon whom the whole frame of na- 
 ture depends ; yet this diflribution may be jufl as 
 natural as their being diflributed here by the inftru- 
 mentality of men. And indeed, though one were to 
 allow any confufed undetermined fenfe, which people 
 pleafe to put upon the word natural, it would be a 
 mortncfs of thought fcarce credible, to imagine that 
 no fyflem or courfe of things can be fo, but only what 
 we fee at prefent ; efpecially whilft the probability of 
 a future life, or the natural immortality of the foul, is 
 
 admitted 
 
CHAP. I. Of a Future Life. 85 
 
 admitted upon the evidence of reafon ; becaufe this is 
 really both admitting and denying at once, a ftate of 
 beins; different from the prelent to be natural. But 
 the only diftinct meaning of that word is ftated>fixed y 
 or fettled ; fince what is natural, as much requires and 
 prefuppofes an intelligent agent to render it fo, i. e. to 
 effecl: it continually or at ftated times, as what is fu- 
 pernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once. 
 And from hence it,muft follow, that perfons' notion of 
 what is natural, will be enlarged in proportion to their 
 greater knowledge of the works of God, and the dif- 
 penfations of his providence. Nor is there any ab- 
 furdity in fuppofmg, that there may be beings in the 
 univerfe, whole capacities, and knowledge, and views, 
 may be fo extenfive, as that the whole Cliriftian clif- 
 penfation may to them appear natural, i. e. analogous 
 or conformable to God's dealings with other parts of 
 his creation 1 ; as natural as the vifible known courfe 
 of things appears to us. For there feems fcarce any 
 other poflible ienfe to be put upon the word, but that 
 only in which it is here tried ; fimilar, ftated, or 
 uniform, 
 
 This credibility of a future life, which has been 
 here infifted upon, how little foever it may fatisfy our 
 curiollty, feems to anfwer all the purpofes of religion, 
 in like manner as a demonftrative proof would. In- 
 deed a proof, even a demonftrative one, of a future 
 life, would not be a proof of religion. For that we 
 are to live hereafter, is juft as reconcileable with the 
 icheme of atheifin, and as well to be accounted for by 
 it, as that we are now alive, is ; and therefore nothing 
 can be more ablurd than to argue from that fcheme, 
 that there can be no future ftate. But as religion im- 
 plies a future ftate, any preemption againft iuch a 
 ftate is a prefumption againft religion. And the fore- 
 going oblervatioas remove ail preemptions of that 
 ibrt, and prove, to a very coafiderable degree of prob- 
 ability, 
 
86 Of the Government of Goct PART!* 
 
 ability, one fundamental dodtrine of religion ; which,, 
 if believed, would greatly open and difpofe the mind 
 ferioufly to attend to the general evidence of the 
 whole* 
 
 C H A P. 1L 
 
 Of the Government of God by Rewards and Punifh- 
 ments ; and particularly of the latter. 
 
 nr 1 
 JL HAT which makes the queftion con- 
 
 cerning a future life to be of fo great importance to 
 us, is our capacity of happinefs and mifery. And that 
 which makes the confideration of it to be of fo great 
 importance to us, is the fuppofitiori of our happinefs 
 and mifery hereafter depending upon our actions here* 
 Without this, indeed, curioiity could not but fome- 
 times bring a fubjedl, in which we may be fo highly 
 interefled, to our thoughts ; efpecially upon the mor- 
 tality of others, or the near profpecl: of our own. But 
 reafonable men would not take any farther thought 
 about hereafter, than what mould happen thus occa- 
 fionally to rife in their minds, if it were certain that our 
 future interefl no way depended upon our prefent be- 
 haviour ; whereas, on the contrary, if there be ground* 
 either from analogy or any thing elfe, to think it does, 
 then there is realbn alib for the moil active thought 
 and folicitude to fecure that interest, to behave fo as 
 that We may efcape that mifery and obtain that hap- 
 pinefs in another life, which we not only fuppofe our- 
 felves capable of, but which we apprehend alfo is put in 
 our own power. And whether there be ground for th is 
 Lift apprehenlion, certainly would deferve to be rnofl fe- 
 rioufly confidered,were there no other proof of a future 
 life and intereil than that prefumptive one which the 
 foregoing obfervations amount to. Now 
 
CHAP. II. by Rewards and Pumfliments. 87 
 
 Now in the prefent flatCj all which we enjoy, and a 
 great part of what we fufTer, is put in our own power. 
 For pleafure and pain are the conlequences of our ac- 
 tions ; and we are endued by the Author of our na- 
 ture with capacities of forefeeing thefe confequences. 
 We find by experience he does not fo much as pre- 
 fcrve our lives, exclusively of our own care and atten- 
 tion to provide ourfelves with, and to make uie of, 
 that fuftenance, by which he has appointed our lives 
 mall be preierved, and without which, he has appoint- 
 ed they mall net be preierved at all. And in general 
 we forefee that the external things, which are the ob- 
 jects of our various pailions, can neither be obtained 
 nor enjoyed without exerting curfelves in fuch and 
 Inch manners j but by thus exerting ourielves, we 
 obtain and enjoy thefe objects in which our natural 
 good confifts ; or, by this means God gives us the 
 pofieflioa and enjoyment of them. I know not than 
 we have any one kind or degree of enjoyment, but by 
 the means of our own actions. And by prudence and 
 care we may, for the rnoft part, pafs our days in tol- 
 erable eafe and quiet ; or, on the contrary, we may by 
 rafhnefs, ungoverned paflion, wilfulnefs, or even by 
 negligence, make ourielves as miferable as ever we 
 pleafe. And many do pleafe to make themfelves ex- 
 tremely miferable, i. e. to do what they know before- 
 hand will render them fo. They follow thofe ways, 
 the fruit of which they know by inftrudtion, example, 
 experience, will be difgrace, and poverty, and (icknefs, 
 and untimely death. This every one obferves to be 
 the general courfe of things ; though it is to be al- 
 lowed, we cannot find by experience, that all our fat- 
 ferings are owing to our own follies. 
 
 Why the Author of nature does not give his crea- 
 1 i*es promifcuouily fuch and fuch perceptions, with- 
 out regard to their behaviour ; why he does not make 
 them happy without the inftrumentality of their own 
 
 adi 
 
SS Of the Government of God PART L 
 
 actions, and prevent their bringing any .fufferings up^ 
 on themfelves, is another matter. Perhaps there may 
 be fome impossibilities in the natiire of things, which 
 we are unacquainted with. Or lefs happinefs, it may 
 be, would Upon the whole be produced by fuch a 
 method of conduct, than is by the prefent. Or per- 
 haps divine goodnefs, with which, if I miftake not^ 
 we make very free in our {peculations, may not be a 
 bare fmgle difpofition to produce happinefs, but a dif- 
 pofition to make the good, the faithful, the honed 
 man happy. Perhaps an infinitely perfect Mind may 
 be pleafed with feeing his creatures behave fuitably 
 to the nature which he hss given them, to the rela- 
 tions which he has placed them in to each other, and 
 to that which they (land in to himfelf ; that relation 
 to himlelf, which, during their exifkence, is even 
 neceflary, and which is the molt important one of all. 
 Perhaps, I fay, an infinitely perfect Mind may be 
 pleafed with this moral piety of moral agents* in and 
 for itfelf ; as well as upon account of its being efFen- 
 f ially conducive to the happinefs of his creation. Or 
 the whole end, for which God made, and thus governs 
 the world, may be utterly beyond the reach of our 
 faculties ; there may be ibmewhat in it as impoilible 
 for us to have any conception of, as for a blind man 
 to have a conception of colours, But however this be, 
 It is certain matter of univerfal experience, that the 
 general method of divine adminiftration is forewarn- 
 ing us, or giving us capacities to forefee, with more or 
 lets clearneis, that if we act fo and fo, we fhall have 
 Uich enjoyments, if fo and fo, fuch fufferings ; and 
 giving us, thofe enjoyments, and making us feel thofe 
 fuSerings, in conlequence of our actions. 
 
 " But all this is to be afcribed to the general courfe 
 of nature." True. This is the very thing which I 
 am obferving. It is to be afcribed to the general courfe 
 of nature , L e. not iurely to the words or ideas, courfe 
 
 ' 
 
CHAP. II. by Rewards and Punifliments. 89 
 
 6f nature, but to him who appointed it, and put 
 things into it ; or to a courfe of operation, from its 
 uniformity or conftancy, called natural ;* and which 
 neceflarily implies an operating agent. For when 
 men find thernfelves neceffitated to confefs an Author 
 of nature, or that God is the natural Governor of the 
 world, they muft not deny this again, becaufe his 
 government is uniform ; they muft not deny that he 
 does things at all, becaufe he does them conftantly ; 
 becaufe the effects of his acting are permanent, wheth- 
 er his acting be (b or not, though there is no reafon to 
 think it is not. In mort, every man, in every thing 
 he does, naturally acts upon the forethought and ap- 
 preheniion of avoiding evil or obtaining good ; and if 
 the natural courfe of things be the appointment of 
 God, and our natural faculties of knowledge and ex- 
 perience are given us by him, then the good and bad 
 confequences which follow our actions are his appoint- 
 ment 5 and our fcrefight of thoie confequences is a 
 warning given us by him, how we are to act. 
 
 " Is the pleafure then naturally accompanying every 
 particular gratification of paffion intended to put us 
 upon gratifying ourfelves in every fuch particular in- 
 fiance, and as a reward to us for fo doing r" No cer- 
 tainly. Nor is it to be faid, that our eyes were natu- 
 rally intended to give us the fight of each particular 
 object, to which they do or can extend ; objects which 
 are deftructive of them, or which, for any other rea- 
 ion, it may become us to turn our eyes from. Yet 
 there is no doubt but that our eyes were intended for 
 us to fee with. So neither is there any doubt but 
 that the forefeen pleafures and pains belonging to the 
 naflions were intended, in general, to induce mankind 
 to act in fuch and fuch manners. 
 
 Now from this general cbfervation, obvious to eve- 
 ry one, that God has given us to uriderftaad he has ap* 
 
 G pointed 
 
 *r. 8 4 , s 5 . 
 
90 Of the Government of God PART L 
 
 pointed fatisfadtion and delight to be the confequence 
 of our acting in one manner, and pain and uneafinefs 
 of cur acting in another, and of our not afting at all ; 
 and that we find the confequences which we were be- 
 forehand informed of uniformly to follow we may 
 learn, that we are at prefent a&ually under his govern- 
 ment in the ftri&eft and moil proper fenfe ; in fuch a 
 fenfe, as that he rewards and punifhes us for our acx 
 tions. An Author of nature being fuppofed, it is not 
 Ib much a deduction of reafon as a matter of expe- 
 rience, that we are thus under his government ; under 
 his government, in the fame fenfe as we are under the 
 government of civil magiftrates. Becaufe the annex- 
 ing pleafure to fome actions and pain to others, in our 
 power to do or forbear, and giving notice of this ap- 
 pointment beforehand to thofe whom- it concerns, is 
 the proper formal notion of government. Whether 
 the pleafure or pain which thus follows upon our be^ 
 haviour be owing" to the Author of nature's ailing up* 
 on us every moment which we feel it, or to his having 
 at once contrived and executed his own part in the 
 plan of the world, makes no alteration as to the mat- 
 ter before us. For if civil magiflrates could make 
 the fandtions of their laws take place, without inter- 
 pofing at all after they had paifed them, without a tri- 
 al and the formalities of an execution ; if they were 
 able to make their laws execute themielves, or every 
 offender to execute them upon himfelf ; we fhould be 
 juft in the fame fenfe under their government then, as 
 we are now, but in a much higher degree, and more 
 perfect manner. Vain is the ridicule, with which one 
 fore fees fome perfons will divert themfelves, upon 
 finding lefler pains coniidered as inflances of divine 
 punifhment. There is no poflibility of anfwering or 
 evading the general thing here intended, without de- 
 nying all final caufes. For final caufes being admit- 
 ted, the pleafures and pains now mentioned mufl bs 
 
 admitted 
 
CHAP. II. iv Rewards end Ptmffit&its. 91 
 
 admitted too as inftances of them. And if they are, 
 if God annexes delight to fome actions and uneafinefs 
 to others, with an apparent deiign to induce us to act 
 fo and fo, then he not only difpenfes happinefs and 
 mifery, but alfo rewards and punifhes actions* If, for 
 example, the pain which we feel, upon doing what 
 tends to the deftruction of our bodies, fuppofe upon 
 too near approaches to fire, or upon wounding our- 
 felves, be appointed by the Author of nature to pre- 
 vent our doing what thus tends to our deftruction, this 
 is altogether as much an inftance of his punifning 
 our actions and confequently of our being under 
 his government, as declaring by a voice from 
 heaven that if we acted fo, he would inflict iuch 
 pain upon us, and inflicting it, whether it be greater 
 or lefs. 
 
 Thus we find, that the true notion or conception 
 of the Author of nature is that of a mailer or govern- 
 or, prior to the confederation of his moral attributes. 
 The fa of our cafe, which we find by experience, is, 
 that he actually exefcifes dominion or government 
 over us at prefent, by rewarding and punifhing us for 
 our actions, in as itrict and proper a ienfe of thefe 
 words, and even in the fame ienfe, as children, fer- 
 vants, fubjects, are rewarded and punifhed by thoic 
 who govern them. 
 
 And thus the whole analogy of nature, the whole 
 prefent courfe of things, moft fully (hows, that there 
 is nothing incredible in the general doctrine of relig- 
 ion, that God will reward and puniih men for their 
 &&ions hereafter ; nothing incredible, I mean, aridng 
 out of the notion cf rewarding and punifhing. For 
 the whole courfe of nature is a prefent inftr.nce of his 
 -King that government over us, which implies in 
 .i. rewarding and puniih: 
 
 Gz BUT 
 
9<2 Of the Government ofGoJ PART L 
 
 BUT as divine punishment is what men chiefly 
 object againft, and are moil unwilling to allow, it 
 may be proper to mention fome circumftances in 
 the natural' courfe of punifhments 1 at prefent, which 
 are analogous to what religion teaches us concerning 
 a future fcate of punimments ; indeed fo analogous, 
 that as they add a farther credibility to it, fo they 
 cannot but raife a- moft ferious appreheniion of it itj 
 thofe who will attend to them. 
 
 It has been now obferved,that fuch and fnch miferies 
 naturally follow fuch and Inch actions of imprudenca 
 and wilfulnefs, as well as actions more commonly and 
 more diftinctly confidered as vicious ; and that thefe 
 eonfequences, when they may be forefeen, are proper^ 
 ly natural punifhments annexed to fuch actions. For 
 the general thing here infifted upon is, not that we 
 fee a great deal of rm'fery in the world, but agre^it deal 
 which men bring upon themfelves by their own be- 
 haviour, which they might have forefeen and avoided. 
 Now the circumftances of thefe natural punimments 
 particularly deferving our attention, are fuch as thefe : 
 That oftentimes they follow or are inflicted in confe- 
 quence of actions, which procure many prefent ad- 
 vantages, and are accompanied with much prefent 
 pleafure -, for inflance, ficknefs and untimely death is 
 the confequence of intemperance, though accompa- 
 nied with the higheft mirth and jollity : That theie 
 punim'rnents are often much greater than the advan- 
 tages or pleafures obtained by the actions of which they 
 are the punimments or confeqnences : That though 
 we may imagine a conftitution of nature, in which 
 thefe natural punimments which are in fact to follow 
 would follow, immediately upon fuch actions being 
 done, or very foon after ; we find on the contrary in 
 our worfd, that they are often delayed a great while, 
 fometimes even until long after the actions occaiioning 
 them are forgot -, fo that the constitution of nature is 
 
 fuch. 
 
CHAP. II. by PuriJJiments. 93 
 
 fuch, that delay of punifhment is no fort nor degree 
 of prefumption of final impunity : That after fuch 
 delay, thefe natural punilhments or miferies often 
 come, not by degrees, but fuddenly, with violence, 
 and at once ; however, the chief mifery often does : 
 That as certainty of fuch diflant mifery following fuch 
 actions is never afforded perfons, fo perhaps during 
 the actions they have feldom .a diflmct full expecta- 
 tion of its following ; * .and many times the cafe is 
 only thus, that they fee in general, or may fee, the 
 credibility that intemperance, fuppofe, will bring after 
 it dileafes, civil crimes civil punifhments, when yet 
 the real probability often is that they (hall efcape ; 
 but things notwithstanding take their deftined courfe, 
 and the mifery inevitably follows at its appointed 
 time, in very many of thefe cafes. Thus alfo, though 
 youth may be alleged as an excufe for rafhnefs and 
 folly, as being naturally thoughtlefs, and not clearly 
 foreiecLag all the coniequences of being untractable 
 and profligate, this does not hinder, but that thefe 
 confequeaces follow, and are grLevoufly felt throughout 
 the whole ccurfe of mature life. Habits contracted 
 even in that age are often utter ruin ; and men's fuc- 
 cefs in the world, not only in the common fenfe of 
 worldly fuccefs, but their real happinefs and mifery 
 depends, in a great degree, and in various ways, upon 
 the manner in which they pafs their youth ; which 
 confequences they for the moft part neglect to con- 
 lider, and perhaps feldom can properly be laid to be- 
 lieve, beforehand. It requires alfo to be mentioned, 
 that in numberlefs cafes the natural courfe of things 
 affords us opportunities for procuring advantages to 
 ourielves at certain times, which we cannot procure 
 when we will, nor ever recal the opportunities, if we 
 have neglected them. Indeed the general courfe of 
 nature is an example of this. If, during the oppor- 
 tunity 
 
 * See Part II. Chap. vi. 
 
94 Of the Government of God PAUT L 
 
 tunity of youth, perfons are indocile and felf willed, 
 they inevitably iurFer in their future life for want of 
 thofe acquirements which they negiecled the natural 
 icaibn of attaining. If the hufbandman lets his feed 
 time pafs without lowing, the whole year is loft to him 
 beyond recovery. In like manner, though after men 
 have been guilty of folly and extravagance up to a cer- 
 tain degree, it is often in their power, for inflance, to 
 retrieve their affairs, to recover their health and charr 
 after, at lead in good mealure ; yet real reformation 
 is, in many cafes, of no avail at ail towards preventing 
 the miferies, poverty, ficknefs, infamy, naturally an- 
 nexed to folly and extravagance exceeding thai degree \ 
 There is a certain bound to imprudence and rnifbe- 
 haviour, which being tranfgrefied, there remains no 
 place for repentance in the natural courfe of things. 
 It is further very much to be remarked, that neglects 
 from inconiideratenefs, want of attention,* not look- 
 ing about us to fee what we have to do, arc often at- 
 tended with confequences altogether as dreadful as 
 any active mifbehaviour, from the moil extravagant 
 paiTion. And lailly, civil government being natural, 
 the puniihments of it are ib too , and fome of theie 
 puniihments are capital, as the effeds of a dilTolute 
 courfe of pleafure are often mortal. So that many 
 natural puniihments are final -f to him who incurs 
 
 them, 
 
 * Part II. Chap. vi. 
 
 f The general consideration of a future flate of punilhment, moll evident- 
 ly belongs to the labjedl of natural religion. But if any of thefe reflections 
 ihould be thought lo relate more particularly to this doclrine, as taught in 
 jcripture, the roader is defired to obierve that gentile writer?, both moralifls 
 and poets, fpeak of the future punilhment of the wicked, both as to the du- 
 ration and d. gree of it, in a like manner of expfeffion and of delcription as 
 the fcripture does. So that all which can positively be alferted to be matter 
 of mere revelation, with regard to this doctrine, Isems to be, that the great 
 diflinclion between the righteous and the wicked ihaii be made at the end of 
 tni: world 5 that each ihail then receive according to his dcfeits. Rcafon 
 did, as it well might, conclude that it Ihould, finally and upon the whole, be 
 well -,vith the righteous and ill with the wicked ; but it could not be deter- 
 mined upon any principles of reafon, whether human creatures might not 
 h.'ire been appointed to pafs through other Hates of life and being, before thai; 
 
 uiftributivo 
 
CHAP. II. by PuniJJiments. 95 
 
 them, if confidered only in his temporal capacity ; and 
 feem inflicted by natural appointment, either to re- 
 move the offender out of the way of being further mif- 
 chievous ; or as an example, though frequently a dif- 
 regarded one, to thofe who are left behind. 
 
 Thefe things are not what we call accidental, or to 
 be met with only now and then ; but they are things 
 of every day's experience : They proceed from gene- 
 ral laws, very general ones, by which God governs the 
 world, in the natural courfe of his providence. And 
 they are fo analogous to what religion teaches us con- 
 cerning the future punifhment of the wicked, fo much 
 of a piece with it, that both would naturally be ex- 
 preifed in the very fame words and manner of deicrip- 
 tion. In the book of Proverbs ,* for inftance, Wif- 
 dom is introduced as frequenting the mod public 
 places of refort, and as rejected when me offers herfelf 
 as the natural appointed guide of human liie. How 
 long, fpeaking to thofe who are paffing through it, 
 how long, yejimple ones, will ye love fol/y, and the [com- 
 ers delight in their f corning, and fools hate knowledge ? 
 Turn ye at my reproof. Behold, / will pour out my Spirit 
 upon you, I will make known my words unto you. But 
 upon being neglected, Becaufe I have called, and ye 
 refufed, I have ftretched out my hand, and no man re- 
 garded ; but ye have fet at nought all my cowifd, and 
 would none of my reproof : I a'fo will laugh at vour ca- 
 lamity, I will mock when your fear comet h ; when your 
 fear comet h as deflation, and vour deft ruction comet h as a 
 whirlwind ; when diftrefs and anguijh cometh upon you. 
 Then Jkall t key call upon me, but I will not anfwer ; they 
 jhallfcck me ear/y, but they fall not find me. This paf 
 
 fage 
 
 diiVibutive jufticc fhould finally and effectually take place. Revelation 
 teaches us, that the next ftate of things after the prefect is appointed for the 
 execution of this juftice, that it fhall he no longer delayed ; but the m\f.:ry of 
 6W, the great myflery of his fuftering vice and confufmn to prevail, fall then 
 he finijhtd\ and he will t,iic fo him hh gnat foivtr and -will reign, by rendering 
 to every one according to his works. 
 
 * Chap. i. 
 
96 Of the Government of God PART I. 
 
 fage every one fees is poetical, and fame parts of it are 
 highly figurative ; but their meaning is obvious. 
 And the thing intended is exprefled more literally in 
 the following words : For that they hated knowledge., 
 and did not choofe the fear of the Lord therefore (liall 
 they eat of the fruit of their own wav, and be filled with 
 their own devices. For the fecurity of the fimple fliall 
 flay them, and the prof per ity. of fools ft a! I deftroy them. 
 And the whole paffage is fb equally applicable to. 
 what we experience in the prefent world concerning 
 the confequences of men's actions, and to what re- 
 ligion teaches us is to be expected in another, that it 
 may be queftioned which of the two was principally 
 intended. 
 
 Indeed when one has been recollecting the proper 
 proofs of a future flate of rewards and punifhments, 
 nothing methinks can give one fo fenfible an appre- 
 henfion of the latter-, or representation of it to the 
 mind, as obferving, that after the marry difregarded 
 checks, admonitions and warnings, wdiich people meet 
 with in the ways of vice and folly and extravagance ; 
 warnings from their very nature ; from the examples 
 of others ; from the leller inconveniences which they 
 bring upon themielves ; from the inflructions of wile 
 and virtuous men after thefe have been long defpif- 
 ed, fcorned, ridiculed ; after the chief bad confe- 
 quences, temporal confequences, of their fellies have 
 been delayed for a great while ; at length they break 
 in irrefiilibly, like an armed force ; repentance is too 
 late to relieve, and can ferve only to aggravate their 
 diilrefs ; the cafe is become defperate, and poverty and 
 iicknefs, remorfe and anguifh, infamy and death, the 
 effects of their own doings, overwhelm them, beyond 
 poffibility of remedy or eicape. This is an account 
 of what is in fact the general conflitution of nature. 
 
 It is not in any fort meant, that according to what 
 appears at prefent of the natural courfe of things, men 
 
 are 
 
CHAP. II. by Punijlments. 97 
 
 are always uniformly punifhed in proportion to their 
 mifbehaviour ; but that there are very many inftaiices 
 of mifbehaviour punilhed in the feveral ways now 
 mentioned, and very dreadful inftances too ; furlicjent 
 to fhow what the laws of the univerle may admit, and, 
 if thoroughly confidered, fufficient fully to aniwer all 
 objections againfl the credibility of a future (late of 
 punifhments, from any imaginations that the frailty 
 of our nature and external temptations almofl annihi- 
 late the guilt of human vices, as well as objections of 
 another fort, from neceffity, from funpolitlons that 
 the will of an infinite Being cannot be contradict- 
 ed, or that he muft be incapable of offence and 
 provocation.* 
 
 Reflections of this kind are not without their ter- 
 rors to ferious perfons, the moil tree from enthuliafm, 
 and of the greatefl ftrength of mind ; but it is fit 
 things be ftated and coniidcred as they really are. 
 And there is, in the prefent age, a certain fearlefsnefs, 
 with regard to what may be hereafter under the gov- 
 ernment of God, which nothing but an univertally 
 acknowledged demonflration on the fide of athcifm 
 can juflify ; and which makes it quite neccrlary, that 
 men be reminded, and if poffible made to feel, that 
 there is no fort of ground for being thus preiumptu- 
 ous, even upon the moft fceptical principles. For, 
 may it not be faid of any perfon upon his being bora 
 into the world, he may behave to as to be of no iervice 
 to it, but by being made an example of the woful ef- 
 fects of vice and folly ? That he may, as any one may, 
 if he will, incur an infamous execution from the hands 
 of civil juflice ; or in fome other courfe of extrava- 
 gance Ihorten his days j or bring upon himfelf infamy 
 and difeaies worfe than death ? So that it had been 
 better for him, even with regard to the prefent world, 
 that he had never been born. And is there any pre- 
 tence 
 
 * See Chap. iv. and vi. 
 
98 Of tlie Moral PART I. 
 
 tence of reafon, for people to think themfelves fecure, 
 and talk as if they had certain proof, that let them adt 
 as licentioufly as they will, there can be nothing anal- 
 ogous to this, with regard to a future and more gene- 
 ral intereft, under the providence and government of 
 the fame God ? 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Of the Moral Government of God. 
 
 the manifold appearances of defign 
 and of final caufes, in the conftitution of the world, 
 prove it to be the work of an intelligent Mind, fo the 
 particular final caufes of pleafure and r^in diftributed 
 amongft his creatures, prove that they are under his 
 government ; what may be called his natural govern- 
 ment of creatures endued with fenfe and reafon. This, 
 however, implies fomewhat more than feems ufually 
 attended to, when we fpeak of God's natural govern- 
 ment of the world. It implies government of the 
 very fame kind with that, which a mailer exercifes 
 over his fervants, or a civil magiftrate over his fub- 
 je&s. Thefe latter inftances of final caufes as really 
 prove an intelligent Governor of the world, in the fenfe 
 now mentioned, and before* diftindtly treated of, as 
 any other inftances of final caufes prove an intelligent 
 Maker of it. 
 
 But this alone does not appear at firft fight to de-> 
 termine any thing certainly, concerning the moral 
 character of the Author of nature, considered in this 
 relation of governor ; does not afcertain his govern- 
 ment -to be moral, or prove that he is the righteous 
 
 Judge 
 
 * Ch. ii. 
 
CHAP. III. Government of God. 
 
 Judge of the world. Moral government confifts, not 
 barely in rewarding and punifhing men for their ac- 
 tions, which the moft tyrannical perfon may do ; but 
 in rewarding the righteous and punifhing the wicked, 
 in rendering to men according to their actions, con- 
 fidered as good or evil. And the perfection of moral 
 government confifts in doing this, with regard to all 
 intelligent creatures, in an exact proportion to their 
 perfonal merits or demerits. 
 
 Some men feem to think the only character of the 
 Author of nature to be that of fimple abfolute benev- 
 olence. This, confidered as a principle of action and 
 infinite in degree, is a diipolltion to produce the great* 
 eft pofilble happinefs, without regard to pcrions' be* 
 haviour, otherwise than as fuch regard would produce 
 higher degrees of it. And iuppofing this to be the 
 only character of God, veracity and juftice in him 
 \vould be nothing but benevolence conducted by \vif- 
 dom. Now iu rely this ought not be aflerted, unlefs 
 it can be proved ; for we fliould fpeak. with cautious 
 reverence upon fuch a fubject. And whether it can 
 be proved or not, is not the thing here to be inquired 
 into ; but whether in the conftitution and conduct of 
 the world a righteous government be not difcernibly 
 planned out ; which neceilarily implies a righteous 
 Governor. There may poflibly be in the creation be- 
 ings, to whom the Author of nature manifefts himielf 
 under this moft amiable of all characters, this of infi- 
 nite abfolute benevolence ; for it is the moil amiable, 
 fuppofmg it not, as perhaps it is not, incompatible 
 with juiiice ; but he manifefts himfelf to us under 
 the character of a righteous Governor. He may, con^ 
 fiftently with this, be fimply and absolutely benevo- 
 lent, in the ienie now explained ; but he is, for he has 
 given us a proof in the conftitution and conduct of 
 the world that he is, a governor over fcrvants, as he 
 s and punifhes us for our actions. And in the 
 
 conftitution 
 
TOO Of the Moral PART!, 
 
 conftitution and conduct of it, he may alfo have giv- 
 en, befides the rcafon of the thing, and the natural 
 prefages of conference, clear and diflinCt intimations 
 that his government is righteous or moral ; clear to 
 iuch as think the nature of it deferving their atten- 
 tion ; and yet not to every carelefs peribn, who cafts 
 a tranfient reflection upon the fubjec\.* 
 
 But it is particularly to be obferved, that the divine 
 government, which we experience ourielves under in 
 the prefent ftate, taken alone, is allowed not to be the 
 perfection of moral government. And yet this by no 
 means hinders but that there may be fomewhat, be it 
 more or lefs, truly moral in it. A righteous govern- 
 ment may plainly appear to be carried on to fome de^ 
 gree ; enough to give us the apprehenfion that it {hall 
 be completed, or carried on to that degree of perfec- 
 tion which religion teaches us it mall ; but which can- 
 not appear, till much more of the divine adminirtra- 
 tion be feen, than can in the prefent life. And the 
 defign of this Chapter is to inquire, how far this is the 
 cafe ; how far, over and above the moral nature -f- 
 which God has given us, and our natural notion of 
 him as righteous Governor of thofe his creatures, to 
 whom he has given this nature ; I fay how far befkles 
 this, the principles and beginnings of a rqoral govern- 
 ment over the world may be diicerned, notwithftand- 
 ing and amidft all the confufion and diforder of it. 
 
 Now one might mention here, what has been often 
 urged with great force, that in general lefs uneafmefs 
 and more latisfaclion are the natural confequences "| of 
 
 a virtuous 
 
 * The objections againft religion, from the evidence of it not being uni? 
 verfal, nor fo ftro ig as might poiiibly have been, may be urged againft nat- 
 ural religion, as well as againft revealed ; and therefore the confuleration of 
 them belongs to the firfl part of this Treatife, as well as the fecond. But as 
 thefe objedliotas are chiefly urged againft revealed religion, I chofe to con- 
 fider them in the fecond part. And the anfxver to them there, Ch. vi. as 
 Uiged agaiafl Chriflianity, being alnrjoft equally applicable; to them as urged 
 againft the religion of nature j to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to 
 that chapter. 
 
 f Dijjcrtation II. 
 
 % See Lord Shaftflury's Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part IL 
 
CHAP. III. Government of God. 101 
 
 a virtuous than of a vicious courfe of life, in the prel- 
 ent ftate, as an inftance of a moral government eftab- 
 lifhed in nature ; an inftance of it, collected from ex- 
 perience and preient matter of fact. But it mud be 
 owned a thing of difficulty to weigh and balance pleaf- 
 ures and uneafinefles, each amongft themfelves, and 
 aifo again ft each other, fo as to make an eftimate, with 
 any exactnefs, of the overplus of happineis on the fide 
 of virtue. And it is not impoffible, that, amidfl the 
 infinite diforders of the world, there may be excep- 
 tions to the happinefs of virtue, even with regard to 
 thole perfons whofe courfe of life, from their youth up, 
 has been blamelefs ; and more with regard to thole 
 who have gone on for fome time in the ways of vice, 
 and have afterwards reformed. For fuppofe an in- 
 ftance of the latter cafe ; a perfon with his paffions in- 
 flamed, his natural faculty of felf-government impair- 
 ed by habits of indulgence, and with all his vices about 
 him, like fo many harpies, craving for their accuftomed 
 gratifications, who can fay how long it might be, be- 
 fore fuch a perfon would find more fatisfaction in the 
 reafonablenefs and prefcnt good confcquences of vir- 
 tue, than difficulties and feif denial in the reftraints of 
 it ? Experience alfo (hows, that men can, to a great 
 decree, get over their fenfe of lhame, fo as that by 
 profeffing themfelves to be without principle, and 
 avowing even direct villany, they can fupport them- 
 felves againft the infamy of it. But as the ill actions 
 of any one will probably be more talked of, and oftener 
 thrown in his way, upon his reformation, fo the infamy 
 of them will be much more felt, after the natural fenfe 
 of virtue and honour is recovered. Uneafmeffes of 
 this kind ought, indeed, to be put to the account of 
 former vices ; yet it will be faid, they are in part the 
 confequences of reformation. Still I am far from al- 
 lowing it doubtful, whether virtue, upon the whole, be 
 happier than vice in the prefent world, But if it were, 
 
 vet 
 
102 Of the Moral PART 
 
 yet the beginnings of a righteous adrniniltration may, 
 beyond all queftion, be found in nature, if we will at- 
 tentively inquire after them. And, 
 
 I. In whatever manner the notion of God's moral 
 government over the world might be treated, if it did 
 not appear whether he we're in a proper fenfe our gov^ 
 ernor at all, yet when it is certain matter of experience, 
 that he does manifefi: himfelf to us under the charac- 
 ter of a governor, in the fenfe explained,* it mud de- 
 ferve to be confidered, whether there be not reafon to 
 apprehend, that he may be a righteous or moral Gow 
 ernor. Since it appears to be fact, that God does gov- 
 ern mankind by the method of rewards and punilh- 
 rnents, according to fome fettled rules of diftribution, 
 it is iurely a queftion to be aiked, What prefumption 
 is there againft his finally rewarding and puniihing, 
 them, according to this particular rule, namely, as they 
 aft reafonably or unreasonably, virtuoufly or vicioully ? 
 iince rendering men happy or miferable by this rule, 
 certainly falls in, much more falls in, with our natural 
 apprehenfions and fenfe of things, than doing fo by 
 any other rule whatever ; iince rewarding and punifh- 
 ing actions by any other rule, would appear much 
 harder to be accounted for by minds formed as he ha* 
 formed ours. Be the evidence of religion then more 
 or lefs clear, the expectation which it raifes in us, that 
 the righteous (hall, upon the whole, be happy, and the 
 wicked miferable, cannot however poffibly be confid- 
 ered as abfurd or chimerical ; becaufe it is no more 
 than an expectation, that a method of government 
 already begun, mall be carried on, the method of re- 
 warding and punifhing actions ; and mall be carried 
 on by a particular rule, which unavoidably appears to 
 us at firft fight more natural than any other, the rule 
 which we call distributive juftice. Nor, 
 
 II. Ought it to be cntirply pafied over, that tran- 
 quillity, fatisfaction, and external advantages, being 
 
 the 
 
 * Chap. ii. 
 
CKAF. III. Government of God. 103 
 
 the natural confequences of pradent management of 
 ourfelves, and our affairs ; and rafhneis, profligate neg- 
 ligence, and wilful folly, bringing after them many in- 
 conveniences and funerings ; thefe afford inftances of 
 a right confutation of nature ; as the correction of 
 children, for their own fakes, and by way of exn:::pie, 
 when they run into danger or hurt themfelves, is a 
 part of right education. And thus, that God governs 
 the world by general fixed laws, that he has endued 
 us with capacities of reflecting upon this conftitution 
 of things, and forefeeing the good and bad confe- 
 quences of our behaviour, plainly implies fome fort of 
 moral government ; iince from fuch a conftitution of 
 things it cannot but follow, that prudence and impru- 
 dence, which are of the nature of virtue and vice,* 1 
 mud be, as they are, respectively rewarded and pun- 
 ihed. 
 
 III. From the natural courfe of things, vicious ac- 
 tions are, to a great degree, actually punithed as inif- 
 chievous to fociety ; and befkles punilhment actually 
 inflicted upon this account, there is alfo the fear and 
 apprchenilon of it in thofe peribns, whofe crimes have 
 Tendered them obnoxious to it, in cafe of a difcovery ; 
 this fr.ate of fear being itfelf often a very confiderable 
 punrfhment. The natural fear and apprehenfion of it 
 too, which reftrains from fuch crimes, is a declaration 
 of nature againft them. It is neceifary to the very 
 being of fociety, that vices destructive of it mould be 
 punifhed as being fo ; the vices of talfehood, injuflice, 
 cmelty - y which punifhment therefore is as natural as 
 fociety, and fo is an inftance of a kind of moral gov- 
 ernment, naturally eftablifhed and actually taking 
 place. And, fince the certain natural course of things 
 is the conduct of Providence or the government of 
 God, though carried on by the infcrumeniiality of 
 men, the obfervarion here made amounts to this, that 
 
 mankind 
 
 * Src Dlfinatic- II 
 
i 04 Of the Moral PARTI. 
 
 mankind find themfelves placed by him in fuch cir- 
 eumflances, as that they are unavoidably accountable 
 for their behaviour, and are often punifhed, and fome- 
 times rewarded under his government, in the view of 
 their being mifchievous, or eminently beneficial to/ 
 fociety. 
 
 If it be objected that good actions, and fuch as 
 are beneficial to fociety, are often punifhed, as in the 
 cafe of perfecution and in other cafes, and that ill and 
 mifchievous actions are often rewarded, it may be an- 
 fvvered diftinctly, firfl, that this is in no fort neceffary, 
 and confeqiiently not natural, in the fenfe in which it 
 is neceffary, and therefore natural, that ill or mif- 
 chievous actions mould be punifhed ; and in the next 
 place, that good actions are never punifhed, confider- 
 ed as beneficial to fociety, nor ill actions rewarded, un- 
 der the view of their being hurtful to it. So that it 
 (lands good, without any thing on the fide of vice to 
 be fet over againft it, that the Author of nature has 
 as truly directed, that vicious actions, considered as 
 mifchievous to fociety, mould be puniihed, and put 
 mankind under a necemty of thus punifhing them, as 
 he has directed and neceflitated us to preferve our 
 lives by food. 
 
 IV. In the natural courfe of things, virtue as fuck 
 is actually rewarded, and vice as fuch punifhed ; which 
 feems to afford an inftance or example, not only of 
 government, but of moral government, begun and 
 eltablifhed ; moral in the flricteft fenfe, though not in 
 that perfection of degree, which religion teaches us to 
 expect. In order to fee this more clearly, we muft 
 ciiftinguifh between actions themfelves, and that qual* 
 ity afcribed to them, which we call virtuous or vi- 
 cious. The gratification itfelf of every natural paffion., 
 muft be attended with delight ; and acquifitions of 
 fortune, however made, are acquifitions of the means 
 or materials of enjoyment. An action then, by 
 
 which 
 
CHAP. III. Government of God. 
 
 which any natural paffion is gratified or fortune ac- 
 quired, procures delight or advantage, abftra&ed from 
 all confederation of the morality of fuch a&ion. Con- 
 fequently, the pleafure or advantage in this cafe is 
 gained by the action itfelf, not by the morality, the 
 virtuoufnefs or vicioufnefs of it ; though it be, per- 
 haps, virtuous or vicious. Thus, to fay fuch an ac- 
 tion or courfe of behaviour procured fuch pleafure or 
 advantage, or brought on fuch inconvenience and pain, 
 is quite a different thing from faying, that fuch good or 
 bad effect: was owing to the virtue or vice of fuch ac- 
 tion or behaviour. In One cafe, an action, abftra&ed 
 from all moral confideration, produced its effect ; in 
 the other Cafe, for it will appear that there are fuch 
 cafes, the morality of the action, the ahon under a 
 moral coniideration, i. e. the virtuoufnefs or viciouf- 
 nefs of it, produced the effect. Now I fay, virtue, as 
 fuch, naturally procures confiderable advantages to the 
 virtuous, and vice, as fuch, naturally occafions great in- 
 convenience and even mifery to the vicious, in very 
 many inflances. The immediate effects of virtue and 
 vice upon the mind and temper are to be mentioned 
 as inflances of it. Vice, as fuch, is naturally attended 
 with feme fort of uneafinefs, and, not uncommonly, 
 with great difturbance and apprehenfion. That in- 
 ward feeling, which refpecYmg leffer matters, and in 
 familiar fpeech, we call being vexed with onefelf, and 
 in matters of importance and in more ferious language, 
 remorfe, is an uneafinefs naturally ariimg from an ac- 
 tion of a man's own, reflected upon by himfelf as 
 wrong, unreafonable, faulty, i. e. vicious in greater or 
 lefs degrees ; and this manifeftly is a different feeling 
 from that uneailnefs which arifes from a fenfe of mere 
 lofs or harm. What is more common, than to hear 
 a man lamenting an accident or event and adding, 
 but however he has the fatisfaction that he cannot 
 blame himfelf for it ; or on the contrary, that he has 
 H the 
 
Of the Moral PART L 
 
 the uneafinefs of being fenfible it was his own doing ? 
 Thus alfo the difturbance and fear, which often follow 
 upon a man's having done an injury, arife from a fenfe 
 of his being blameworthy ; otherwife there would, in 
 many cafes, be no ground of difturbance, nor any rea- 
 fon to fear refentment or fhame. On the other hand, 
 inward fecurity and pea'ce, and a mind open to the 
 feveral gratifications of life, are the natural attendants 
 of innocence and virtue. To- which muft be added 
 the complacency, fatisfa&ion, and even joy of heart, 
 which accompany the exercife, the real exercife, of 
 gratitude, friendfhip, benevolence. 
 
 And here, I think, ought to be mentioned, the 
 fears of future punifhment, and peaceful hopes of a 
 better life, in thofe who- fully believe, or have any fe- 
 rious apprehenfion of religion.-, becaufe ,thefe hopes and 
 fears are prefent uneafinefs and fatisfa&ion to the 
 mind ; and cannot be got rid of by great part of the 
 world, even by men who have thought moft thor- 
 oughly upon the fubjecl: of religion. And no one can 
 fay, how considerable this uneafinefs and fatisfaction 
 may be, or what upon the whole it may amount to. 
 
 In the next place comes in the confederation, that 
 all honeft and good men are difpofed to befriend hon- 
 eft good men, as fuch, and to difcountenance the vi-r 
 cious, as fuch, and do fo in fome degree, indeed in a 
 confiderable degree ; from which favour and diicour- 
 agement cannot but arife confiderable advantage and 
 inconvenience. And though the generality of the 
 world have little regard to the morality of their own 
 actions, and may be fuppofed to have lefs to that of 
 others, when they themfehres are not concerned, yet 
 let any one be known to be a man of virtue, fome 
 how or other he will be favoured, and good offices 
 will be done him, from regard to his character with- 
 out remote views, occaiionally, and in fome low de- 
 gree, I think, by the generality of the world, as it hap- 
 pens 
 
CHAP. III. Government of -God. 107 
 
 pens to come in their way. Public honours too and 
 advantages are the natural confequences, are fome- 
 times at leaft the confequences in fact, of virtuous ac- 
 tions ; of eminent ju.ftice, fidelity, charity, love to our 
 country, confidered in the view of being virtuous. 
 And fometimes even death itielf, often infamy and 
 external inconveniences, are the public confequences 
 of vice, as vice. For intlance, the fenfe which man- 
 kind have of tyranny, injuiiice s oppreflion, additional 
 to the mere feeling or fear of mifery, has doubtlefs 
 been inftrumental in bringing about revolutions, 
 which make a figure even in the hiftory of the world. 
 For it is plain, men relent injuries as implying faulti- 
 neis, and retaliate, not merely under the notion of 
 having received harm, but of having received wrong; 
 and they have this refentment in behalf of others, as 
 well as of thernielves. So likewife even the generality 
 are, in fome degree, grateful,. and difpofed to return 
 good offices, not merely becaufe fuch an one has been 
 the occafion of good to them, but under the view, 
 that fuch good offices implied kind attention and 
 good defert in the doer. To all this may be added 
 two or three particular things, which many perfons 
 will think frivolous ; but to me nothing appears fo, 
 which at all comes in towards determining a queilion 
 of fuch importance* as, whether there be or be not a 
 moral inftitution of government, in the ftricceft fenlb 
 moral, vifiblv eftablifhed and begun in nature. The 
 particular things are thele : That in domeftic govern- 
 ment, which is doubtlefs natural, children and others 
 allb are very generally puniihed for falfchood and in- 
 justice and ill behaviour, as fuch, and rewarded for the 
 contrary ; which are inftances where veracity and juf- 
 tice, and right behaviour, as fuch, are naturally en- 
 forced by rewards and punifhments, whether more or 
 lets confiderabie in degree : That, though civil gov- 
 ernment be fuppofed to take cognizance of actions in 
 H 2 no 
 
I'c8 Of the Moral PART li- 
 
 no other view than as prejudicial to fociety, without 
 refpect to the immorality of them ; yet as fuch ac- 
 tions are immoral, fo the fenfe which men haVe of the 
 immorality of them very greatly contributes, in differ- 
 ent ways, to bring offenders to jitftice ; and, that en^' 
 tire abience of alt crime and guilt in the moral fenfe, 
 when plainly appearing, will almoft of courfe procure, 
 and circumftances of aggravated guilt prevent, a re- 
 iniflion of the penalties annexed to civil crimes, i 
 many cafes, though by no means in all. 
 
 Upon the whole then, befides the good and bad ef- 
 fects of virtue and vice upon men's own minds, the 
 courfe of the world does, in fome meafure, turn upon 
 the approbation and difapprobatiori of them, as fuch, 
 in others. The fenfe of well and ill doing, the pre- 
 fages of conference, the love of good characters and 
 diflike of bad ones, honour, fliame, refentment, grati- 
 tude ; all thefe, confidered m- themfelves, and in their 
 effects, do afford manifeft" rea? instances of virtue, as 
 fuch, naturally favoured,- and of vice, as fuch, difcoun- 
 tenanced, more or lefs-, in the daily courfe of human 
 life ; in every age, in every relation, in every general 
 circumftance of it. That God has given us a moral 
 nature,* may molt juftly be urged as a proof of our 
 being under his moral government ; but that he has 
 placed us in a : condition, which gives this nature, as 
 ene may fpeak, fcope to operate, aiid in which it does 
 unavoidably operate, i. e, influence mankind to act, 
 fo as thus to favour and reward virtue, and difcoun- 
 tenance and punifh vice- this is not the fame, but a 
 further additional proof of his moral government, for 
 it is an inftance of it. The firff is a proof that he 
 will finally favour and fupport virtue effectually ; the 
 fecond is an example of his favouring and fupporting 
 it at prefent, in forne degree. 
 
 If a more diftinct inquiry be made, whence it arifes 
 that virtue, as fuch, is often rewarded, and vice, as 
 
 fuch, 
 
 * See Di/trtation I& 
 
CHAP. III. Government of Gcd. 
 
 fiich, is puniihed, and this rule never inverted it 
 will be found to proceed, in part, immediately from 
 She moral nature itfelf, which God has given us ; and 
 alfo, in part, from his having given us, together with 
 this nature, fo great a power over each other's happinefs 
 and mifery. For^^?, it is certain that peace and de- 
 light, in fome degree and upon fome occafions, is the 
 neceffary and prefent effect of virtuous practice ; an 
 effect arifing immediately from that conftitution of 
 our nature. We are fo made, that well doing, as 
 fuch, gives us fatisfa&ion at leaft in fome inftances \ 
 ill doing, as fuch, in none. Andfecond/y, from our 
 moral nature, joined with God's having put our hap- 
 pinefs and mifery in many refpects in -each other's 
 power, it cannot but be that vice, as fuch, fome 
 kinds and inftanccs of it 2,t leaft, will be infamous, 
 and men will be difpofed to punim it, as in itfelf de- 
 teftable ; and the villain will by no means be able al- 
 ways to avoid feeling that infamy, any more than he 
 will be able to efcape this further punifhment, which 
 mankind will be difpofed to inflict upon him, under 
 the notion of his deferving it. But there can be noth- 
 ing on the lide of vice to anfwer this, becaufe there is 
 nothing in the human mind contradictory, as the lo- 
 gicians fpeak ? to virtue. For virtue confifts in a re- 
 gard to what is right and reafonable, as being fo ; in 
 a regard to veracity, juftice, charity, in themfelves ; 
 and there is furely no fuch thing as a like natural re- 
 gard to falfehood, injuftice, cruelty. If it be thought 
 that there are inflances of arj approbation of vice, as 
 fuch, in itfelf, and for its own fake, (though it does 
 not appear to me that there is any fuch thing at all ; 
 but fuppofing there be,) it is evidently monftrous ; as 
 much fo as the moil acknowledged perverfiou of any 
 palfion whatever. Such inftances of perverfion then 
 being left out, as merely imaginary, or, however, un- 
 natural, it muft follow from the frame of our nature, 
 
 and 
 
no Of the Moral PART I. 
 
 and from our condition, in the refpecls now defcribed, 
 that vice cannot at all be, and virtue cannot but be 
 favoured, as fuch, by others, upon fome occafions, and 
 happy in itfelf in fome degree. For what is here in- 
 filled upon, is not the degree in which virtue and vice 
 are thus diftinguimed, but only the thing itfelf, that 
 they are fo in fome degree, though the whole good 
 and bad effect of virtue and vice, as fuch, is not in- 
 confiderable in degree. But that they muft be thus 
 diftinguifhed in (ome degree, is in a manner necef- 
 fary ; it is matter of fact of daily experience, even in 
 the greatefc confufion of human affairs. 
 
 It is not pretended but that in the natural courfe 
 of things, happinefs and mifery appear to be diftrib- 
 uted by other rules than only the perfonal merit and 
 dement of characters. They may {Sometimes be dif- 
 tributed by way of mere difcipline. There may be 
 the wifeft and bell reafons, why the world mould be 
 governed by general laws, from whence fuch promif- 
 cuous diftribution perhaps mufl follow, and alfo why 
 our happinefs and mifery mould be put in each other's 
 power in the degree which they are. And thefe 
 things, as in general they contribute to the rewarding 
 virtue and punifhing vice, as fuch, fo they often con- 
 tribute alfo, not to the inverfion of this, which is im- 
 poifible, but to the rendering peribns profperous, 
 though wicked ; afflicted, though righteous ; and, 
 which is worfe, to the rewarding fome actions > though 
 vicious, and puni/king other adions, though virtuous. 
 But all this cannot drown the voice of nature in the 
 conduct of Providence, plainly declaring itfelf for vir- 
 tue, by way of cliftindtion from vice, and preference to 
 it. For, our being fo conftituted, as that virtue and 
 vice are thus naturally favoured and clifcountenanced, 
 rewarded and puniihed lelpectively, as fuch, is an in- 
 tuitive proof of the intent of nature that it fliould be 
 fo y otherwife the conflitution of our mind, from 
 
 which, 
 
CHAP. III. Government of God .^ nt 
 
 which it thus immediately and directly proceeds, would 
 be abfurd. But it cannot be faid, becaufe virtuous 
 actions are fometimes punilhed, and vicious actions 
 rewarded, that nature intended it. For, though this 
 great diforder is brought about, as all actions are 
 done, by means of feme natural paffion, yet this may 
 be> as it undoubtedly is, brought about by the perver- 
 lion of fuch pafTion, implanted in us for other and 
 thofe very good purpofes. And indeed thefe other 
 and good purpoies, even of every paflion, may be 
 clearly feeri. 
 
 We have then a declaration in fome degree of pref- 
 ent effect, from Him who is fupreme in nature, which 
 fide he is of, or what part he takes ; a declaration for 
 virtue, and againft vice. So far therefore as a man is 
 true to virtue, to veracity and juftice, to equity and 
 charity, and the right of the cafe, in whatever he is 
 concerned, fo far he is en the fide of the divine ad- 
 miniilration, and cooperates with it ; and from hence, 
 to fuch a man arifes naturally a fecret fatisfaction and 
 fenfe cf fecurity, and implicit hope of fomewhat fur- 
 ther. And, 
 
 V. This hope is confirmed by the necefTary tenden- 
 cies of virtue, which, though not of prefent effect, yet 
 are at prefent difcernible in nature, and fo afford an 
 inftance of fomewhat moral in the eifential conftitu- 
 tion of it. There is, in the nature of things, a ten- 
 dency in virtue and vice to produce the good and bad 
 effects now mentioned in a greater degree than they do 
 in fact produce them. For inftance ; good and bad 
 men would be much more rewarded and punilhed, as 
 fuch, were it not that juftice is often artificially eluded, 
 that characters are not known, and many, who would 
 thus favour virtue and difcourage vice, are hindered 
 from doing fo by accidental caufes. Thefe tendencies 
 of virtue and vice are obvious with regard to individ- 
 uals. But it may require more particularly to be 
 
 confidered s 
 
H2, Of the Moral PART I, 
 
 confidered, that power is zfociety, by being under the 
 direction of virtue, naturally increafes, and has a neo 
 eflary tendency to prevail over oppofite power, not un- 
 der the direction of it ; in like manner as power, by 
 being under the direction of reafon, increafes, and has 
 a tendency to prevail over brute force, There are 
 feveral brute creatures of equal, and feveral of fuperior 
 ftrength, to that of men, and poffibly the fu.rn of the 
 whole ftrength of brutes may be greater than that of 
 mankind ; but reafon gives us the advantage and fu- 
 periority over them, and thus man is the acknowledg- 
 ed governing animal upon the earth. Nor is this fu- 
 periority confidered by any as accidental, but as what 
 reafon has a tendency, in the nature of the thing, to 
 obtain. And yet perhaps difficulties may be raifecj 
 about the meaning as well as the truth of the ailertion, 
 that virtue has the like tendency, 
 
 To obviate thefe difficulties, let us fee more diftinct- 
 ly how the cafe ftands with regard to reafon, which 
 is fo readily acknowledged to haye this advantageous 
 tendency, Suppofe then two or three men, of the 
 beil and moft improved underftancjing, in a defolate 
 open plain, attacked by ten times the number of beafts 
 of prey would their reafon fecure them the victory 
 }n this unequal combat ? Power then, though join- 
 ed with reafon, and under its direction, cannot be 
 expected to prevail over oppofite power, though mere- 
 ly brutal, unlefs the one bears fome proportion to the 
 Other. Again put the imaginary cafe, that rational 
 and irrational creatures were of like external fliape and 
 manner ; it is certain, before there were opportunities 
 for the firft to diftinguifh each other, to feparate from 
 their adverfaries, and to form an union among them- 
 felves, they might be upon a level, or in feveral re- 
 fpeds upon great difadvantage, though united they 
 might be vaftiy fuperior ; fince union is of fuch effi-r 
 cacy, that ten men, united, might be able to accom- 
 
 plifh 
 
CHAP. III. Government of God, 113 
 
 plifli what ten thoufand of the fame natural ftrength 
 and underdanding, wholly ununited, could not. In 
 this cafe then, brute force might more than maintain 
 its ground againil reafon, for want of union among 
 the rational creatures. Or fuppoie a number of men 
 to land upon an ifland inhabited only by wild beads, 
 a number of men, who, by the regulations of civil 
 government, the inventions of art, and the experience 
 of fome years, could they be preierved fo long, would 
 be really fufficient to fubdue the will} beads, and to 
 preferve themfelves in fecurity from them ; yet a con- 
 juncture of accidents might give liich advantage to 
 the irrational animals, as that they might at once 
 overpower, and even extirpate, the whole fpecies of 
 rational ones. Length of time then, proper fcopc and 
 opportunities for reafon to exert itfelf, may be ablb- 
 lutely neceilary to its prevailing over brute force. 
 Further dill there are many indances of brutes fuc- 
 ceeding in attempts which they could not have un- 
 dertaken had not their irrational nature rendered them 
 incapable of forefeeing the danger of fuch attempts, 
 or the fury of paffion hindered their attending to it ; 
 and there are indances of realbn and real prudence 
 preventing men's undertaking what, it hath appeared 
 afterwards, they might have lucceeded in by a lucky 
 rafhnefs. And in certain conjunctures, ignorance 
 and folly, weaknefs and difcorcl, may have their ad- 
 vantages. So that rational animals have not necef- 
 farily the fuperiority over irrational ones ; but, how 
 improbable ibever it may be, it is evidently poflible* 
 that, in fome globes, the latter may be luperior. 
 And were the former wholly at variance and diiunit- 
 ed, by falle lelf intered and envy, by treachery and in- 
 judice, and confequent rage and malice againd each 
 other, whild the latter were firmly united among 
 themfelves by inftincl:, this might greatly contribute 
 to the introducing fuch an inverted order of things, 
 
 For 
 
214 Of the Moral PART I. 
 
 For every one would confider it as inverted, fince rea- 
 fon has, in the nature of it, a tendency to prevail over 
 brute force ; notwithftanding the poffibility it may 
 not prevail, and the neceffity which there is of many 
 concurring circumftanccs to render it prevalent. 
 
 Now I lay, virtue in a ibciety has a like tendency 
 to procure fuperiority and additional power, whether 
 this power be conridered as the means of fecurity from 
 oppoiite power, or of obtaining other advantages. 
 And it has this tendency, by rendering public good 
 an object and end to every member of the fociety ; 
 by putting every one upon coniideration and diligence, 
 recollection and felf government, both in order to fee 
 what is the mofl effectual method, and alfo in order 
 to perform their proper part for obtaining and pre- 
 ferving it ; by uniting a ibciety within itfelf, and fo 
 increaimg its ftrength ; and, which is particularly to 
 be mentioned, uniting it by means of veracity and juf- 
 tice. For as thefe laft are principal bonds of union, 
 fo benevolence or public fpirit, undirected, unreilrain- 
 cd by them, is, nobody knows what. 
 
 And fuppofe the inviiible world, and the invifible 
 difpenfations of Providence, to be in any fort analo- 
 gous to what appears, or that both together make up 
 one uniform fcheme, the two parts of which, the part 
 which we fee, and that which is beyond our obferva- 
 tion, are analogous to each other, then there mud be 
 a like natural tendency in the derived power, through- 
 out the univerfe, under the direction of virtue, to pre- 
 vail in general over that which is not under its protec- 
 tion, as there is in reafon, derived reafon in the uni- 
 verfe, to prevail over brute force. But then, in order 
 to the prevalence of virtue, or that it may actually pro- 
 duce what it has a tendency to produce, the like concur- 
 rences are neceilary as are to the prevalence of reafon. 
 There muft be fome proportion between the natural 
 power or force which is, and that which is not, under 
 
 the 
 
CHAP. III. Government of Qod. 115 
 
 the direction of virtue ; there mud be fufficient length 
 of time ; for the complete fuccefs of virtue, as of rea- 
 fon, cannot, from the nature of the thing, be other- 
 vviie than gradual ; there mud be, as one may fpeak, 
 a fair field of trial, a flage large and exteiifive enough, 
 proper occafions and opportunities, for the virtuous 10 
 join together to exert themfelves againft lawlefs force, 
 and to reap the fruit of their united labours. Now 
 indeed it is to be hoped, that the difproportion be- 
 tween the good and bad, even here on earth, is not lo 
 great but that the former have natural power fufficient 
 to their prevailing to a confiderable degree, if circuni- 
 flances would permit this power to be united. For 
 much lefs, very much lefs power under the direction of 
 virtue, would prevail over much greater not under the 
 direction of it. However, good men over the face of 
 the earth cannot unite, as for other reafons, ib bccaule 
 they cannot be fufficiently afcertained of e*ch other's 
 characters. And the known couric of human things, 
 the fcenc we are now pafling through, particularly the 
 fhortnefs of life, denies to virtue its full {cope in feve- 
 ral other refpeets. The natural tendency, which we 
 have been confidering, though real, is hindered from 
 being carried into effect in the prefent ftate ; but thefc 
 hindrances may be removed in a future one. Virtue, 
 to borrow the Chriftian allufion, is militant here, and 
 various untoward accidents contribute to its being oft- 
 en overborne ; but it may combat with greater ad- 
 vantage hereafter, and prevail completely, and enjoy 
 its confequent rewards in ibme future ftates. Neg- 
 lected as it is, perhaps unknown, perhaps defpifed and 
 oppreflecl he*e, there may be fcenes in eternicy lafting 
 enough, and in every other way adapted, to afford it a 
 fufficient fphere of action, and a fufficient fphere for 
 the natural confequences of it to follow in fact. If the 
 foul be naturally immortal, and this ftate be a progrefs 
 towards a future one, as childhood is towards mature 
 
ii6 Of the Moral PART L 
 
 age, good men may naturally unite, not only amongft 
 themfelves, but alfo with other orders of virtuous crea- 
 tures, in that future ftate. For virtue, from the very 
 nature of it, is a principle and bond of union, in fome 
 degree, amongft all who are endued with it, and 
 known to each ether ; fo as that by it a good man 
 cannot but recommend himfelf to the favour and pro- 
 tection of all virtuous beings, throughout the whole 
 univerfe, who can be acquainted with his character, 
 and can any way interpofe in his behalf in any part of 
 his duration, And one might add, that fuppofe all 
 this advantageous tendency of virtue to become effect, 
 amongft one or more orders of creatures, in any dif* 
 tant fcenes and periods, and to be feen by any orders 
 of vicious creatures throughout the univerfal kingdom 
 of God, this happy effect of virtue would have a ten- 
 dency, by way of example, and pofiibly in other ways, 
 to amend thofe of them who are capable of amend- 
 ment, and being recovered to a juft fenfe of virtue. 
 If our notions of the plan of Providence were enlarged, 
 in any fort proportionably to what late difcoveries have 
 enlarged our views with refpect to the material world, 
 repreientations of this kind would not appear abfurd or 
 extravagant. However, they are not to be taken as 
 intended for a literal delineation of what is in fact the 
 particular fcheme of the univerfe, which cannot be 
 known without revelation ; for iuppofitions are not to 
 be looked on as true, becaufe not incredible, but they 
 are mentioned to mew, that our finding virtue to be 
 hindered from procuring to itfelf fuch fuperiority and 
 advantages is no objection againft its having, in the 
 effential nature of the thing, a tendency to procure 
 them. And the fuppofitions now mentioned do plain^ 
 ly Ihew this ; for they fhevv that theie hindrances ar$ 
 ib far from being necellary, that we ourfelves can eaii- 
 ly conceive how they may be removed in future ftates, 
 and full fcope be granted to virtue. And all thefe ad* 
 
 vantageous 
 
CHAP. III. Government of God. 117 
 
 vantageolis tendencies of it are to be considered as dec- 
 larations of God in its favour. This, however, is tak- 
 ing a pretty large compafs ; though it is certain that, 
 as the material world appears to be, in a manner, 
 boundlefs and irnmenfe, there muft be feme fcheme of 
 Providence vaft in proportion to it. 
 
 But let us return to the earth our habitation, and 
 we (hall fee this happy tendency of virtue, by imagin- 
 ing an inftance not fo vaft and remote ; by fuppofing 
 a kingdom or fociety of men upon it, perfectly virtu- 
 ous, fora fucceffion of many ages, to which, if you 
 pleafe, may be given a fituation advantageous for uni- 
 verfal monarchy. In fuch a ftate there would be no 
 fuch thing as faction ; but men of the greateft capac- 
 ity would of courfe, all along, have the chief direction 
 of affairs willingly yielded to them ; and they would 
 fhare it among themfelves without envy. Each of 
 thefe would have the part affigned him to which his 
 genius was peculiarly adapted ; and others, who had 
 not any diilinguifhed genius, would be fafe, and think 
 themfelves very happy, by being under the protection 
 and guidance of thofe who had. Public determina- 
 tions would really be the refult of the united wifdom 
 of the community , and they would faithfully be exe- 
 cuted, by the united ftrength of it. Some would in 
 a higher way contribute, but all would in fome way 
 contribute, tq the public profperity ; and in it, each 
 would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue. And as in- 
 juftice, whether by fraud or force, would be unknown 
 among themfelves, fo they would be fufficiently fe- 
 cured from it in their neighbours ; for cunning and 
 falfe felf intereft, confederacies in injuftice, ever flight, 
 and accompanied with faction and inteftine treachery ; 
 thefe on one hand would be found mere childim folly 
 and) weaknefs, when fet in oppofition againft wifdom, 
 public fpirit, union inviolable, and fidelity on the 
 other j allowing both a fufficient length of years to 
 
 try 
 
 
Of the Moral PART I. 
 
 try their force. Add the general influence which fuch 
 a kingdom would have over the face of the earth, by 
 way of example particularly, and the reverence which 
 would be paid it. It would plainly be fuperior to all 
 others, and the world mud gradually come under its 
 empire ; not by means of lawlefs violence, but partly 
 by what niuft be allowed to be jufl conqueft, and part- 
 ly by other kingdoms fubmitting themfelves volun- 
 tarily to it, throughout a courfe of ages, and claiming 
 its protection, one after another, in fucceffive exi- 
 gencies. The head of it would be an univerfal mon- 
 arch, in another lenfe than any mortal has yet been $ 
 and the eaftern flyle would be literally applicable to 
 him, that all people, nations and languages jliould ferve 
 him. And though indeed our knowledge of human 
 nature, and the whole hiftory of mankind, mew the 
 impoflibiiity, without feme miraculous interpofition, 
 that a number of men, here on earth, mould unite in 
 one fociety or government, in the fear of God and uni- 
 verfal practice of virtue ; and that fuch a government 
 mould continue fo united for a fucceffion of ages ; yet 
 admitting or fuppofing this, the effect would be as 
 now drawn out. And thus, for inflance, the wonder- 
 ful power and profperity promifed to the Jewiih na- 
 tion in the fcripture, would be, in a great meafure, the 
 confequence of what is predicted of them,- that the 
 -people JJiould be all righteous and inherit the land for- 
 ever,* were we to underfland the latter phrafe of a 
 long continuance only, fufficient to give things time 
 to work. The predictions of this kind, for there are 
 many of them, cannot come to pafs in the prefent 
 known courfe of nature j but fuppofe them come to 
 pafs, and then the dominion and preeminence promif- 
 ed muft naturally follow, to a very confiderable degree. 
 Confider now the general fyftem of religion ; that 
 the government of the world is uniform, and one, and 
 
 moral ; 
 
 * Ifai. Ix. at. 
 
CHAP. III. Government of God. 119 
 
 moral ; that virtue and right fhall finally have the ad- 
 vantage, and prevail over fraud and lawlefs force, over 
 the deceits as well as the violence of wickedneis, un- 
 der the conduct of one fupreme Governor ; and from 
 the obfervations above made, it will appear, that God 
 has, by our reafon, given us to fee a peculiar connex- 
 ion in the feveral parts of this fcheme, and a tendency 
 towards the completion of it, arifmg out of the very 
 nature of virtue ; which tendency is to be confidcred 
 -as fomewhat moral in the elTential constitution of 
 things. If any one fhould think all this to be of lit- 
 tle importance, I deiire him to confider what he would 
 think if vice had, eflentially and in its nature, thefe 
 advantageous tendencies ; or if virtue had efTcntially 
 the direct contrary ones. 
 
 But it may be objected, that, notwithstanding all 
 thefe natural effects and thefe natural tendencies of 
 virtue, yet things may be now going on throughout 
 the univerie, and may go on hereafter, in the fame 
 mixed way as here at preient upon earth ; virtue fome- 
 times proiperous, fometimes depreflocl ; vice fome- 
 times punifhed, fometimes fuccelsful. The anfwer to 
 which is, that it is not the purpofe of this chapter, nor 
 of this treatife, properly to prove God's perfect moral 
 government over the world, or the truth of religion, 
 but to obferve what there is in the constitution and 
 courie of nature to confirm the proper proof of it, 
 fuppofed to be known ; and that the weight of the 
 foregoing obfervations to this purpofe may be thus 
 diftinctly proved. Pieafure and pain are, indeed, to a 
 certain degree, fay to a very high degree, dittributed 
 amongft us without any apparent regard to the merit 
 or demerit of characters. And were there nothing 
 elie, concerning this matter, diicernible in the confti- 
 "uUon and courfe of nature, there would be no ground 
 from the conftitutipn and courfe of nature, to hope or 
 to fear that men would be rewarded or puniihed here- 
 after 
 
lid Of the Moral PART L 
 
 after according to their deferts ; which, however, it is 
 to be remarked, implies that even then there would be 
 no ground from appearances to think, that vice upon 
 the whole would have the advantage, rather than that 
 virtue would. And thus the proof of a future ftate of 
 retribution would reft upon the ufual known argu- 
 ments for it ; which are, 1 think, plainly unanfwera- 
 ble, and would be (b, though there were no additional 
 confirmation of them from the things above iniifbdfl 
 on : But thefe things are a very ftrong confirmation 
 of them. For, 
 
 Firjt, They fhew that the Author of nature is not 
 Indifferent to virtue and vice. They amount to a 
 declaration from him, determinate and not to be evad- 
 ed, in favour of one ? and againft the other ; fuch a 
 declaration, as there is nothing to be fet over againft 
 or aniwer, on the part of vice. So that were a man, 
 laying afide the proper proof of religion, to determine 
 from the courfe of nature only, whether it were moit 
 probable that the righteous or the wicked would have 
 the advantage in a future life, there can be no doubt 
 but that he would determine the probability to be, 
 that the former would. The courfe of nature then, 
 in the view of it now given, furnifhes us with a real 
 practical proof of the obligations of religion. 
 
 Secondly, When, conformably to what religion 
 teaches us, God mall reward and punifh virtue and 
 vice, as fuch, fo as that every one mall, upon the whole, 
 have his deferts, this diftributive juflice will net be a 
 thing different in kind, but only in degree, from what 
 we experience in his prefent government. It will be 
 that in effeff, towards which we now fee a tendency. 
 It will be no more than the completion of that moral 
 government, the principles and beginning of which have 
 been fhewn, beyond all difpute, difcernible in the prei- 
 ent conftitution and courfe of nature. And from 
 hence it follows, 
 
 Thirdly 
 
CHAP. III. Government of God. 121 
 
 Thirdly, That as under the natural government of 
 God, our experience of thofe kinds and degrees of 
 happinefs and mifery which we do experience at pref- 
 ent, gives juft ground to hope for and to fear higher 
 degrees and other kinds of both in a future ftate, fup- 
 pofing a future flate admitted, fo under his moral 
 government, our experience, that virtue and vice are, 
 in the manners above mentioned, actually rewarded 
 and punifhed at prefent, in a certain degree, gives juft 
 ground to hope and to fear that they may be rewarded 
 and punifhed in an higher degree hereafter. It is ac- 
 knowledged indeed that this alone is not fufficient 
 ground to think that they actually will be rewarded 
 and punifhed in a higher degree, rather than in a low- 
 er; but then, 
 
 Lqftly, There is fufficient ground to think fo, from 
 the good and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For 
 thefe tendencies are eifential, and founded in the na- 
 ture of things, whereas the hindrances to their becom- 
 ing effect, are, in numberlefs cafes, not neceffary, but 
 artificial only. Now it may be much more ftrongly 
 argued, that thefe tendencies, as well as the actual re- 
 wards and punifhments of virtue and vice, which arife 
 directly out of the nature of things, will remain here- 
 after, than that the accidental hindrances of them 
 will. And if thefe hindrances do not remain, thofe 
 rewards and punifhments cannot but be carried on 
 much further towards the perfection of moral govern- 
 ment, i. e. the tendencies of virtue and vice will be- 
 come effect ; but when, or where, or in what particu- 
 lar way, cannot be known at all, but by revelation. 
 
 Upon the whole, there is a kind of moral govern- 
 ment implied in God's natural government ; * virtue 
 and vice are naturally rewarded and punifhed as ben- 
 eficial and mifchievous to fociety,-f and rewarded and 
 pun idied directly as virtue and vice. J The notion 
 
 I then 
 
 ^ P. I0i. f P. 107. * P. 104, &C. 
 
Of the Moral Government of God. PART . 
 
 then of a moral fcheme of government is not fictitious 
 but natural, for it is fuggefted to our thoughts by the 
 conftitution and courfe of nature ; and the execution 
 of this fcheme is actually begun, in the inftances here 
 mentioned. And thefe things are to be confidered as 
 a declaration of the Author of nature for virtue and 
 agamft vice ; they give a credibility to the fappofition 
 of their being rewarded and punifhed hereafter, and 
 alfo ground to hope and to fear that they may be re* 
 warded and punifhed in higher degrees than they are 
 here. And as all this is confirmed, fo the argument 
 for religion from the conftitution and courfe of nature 
 is carried on farther, by obferving, that there are nat- 
 ural tendencies, and, in innumerable cafes, only artifi- 
 cial hindrances, to this moral rfcheme's being carried 
 on much farther towards perfection than it is at prei- 
 ent.* The notion then of & moral fcheme of govern- 
 ment much more perfect than- what is feen, is not a 
 fictitious but a natural notion, for it is fuggefted to 
 our thought-s by the eflential- tendencies of virtue and 
 vice. And thefe tendencies are to be confidered as in- 
 timations, as implicit promifes and threatenings from 
 the Author of nature, of much greater rewards and 
 punifhments to follow virtue and vice than do at pref- 
 ent. And : indeed, every natural tendency which is to 
 continue, but which is hindered from becoming effect 
 by only accidental caufes, affords a prefumption that 
 fuch tendency will, fome time or other, become effect ; 
 a prefumption in degree proportionable to the length 
 of the duration through which fuch tendency will con- 
 tinue. And from thefe things together arifes a real 
 prefumption, that the moral fcheme of government 
 eftablimed in nature fhall be carried on much farther 
 towards perfection hereafter, and, I think, a prefump- 
 tion that it will be abfolutely completed. But from 
 thefe things, joined with the moral nature which God 
 
 has 
 
 * P. I If, &C. 
 
CHAP. IV. Of a State of Trial. 123 
 
 has given us, confidered as given us by him, arifes a 
 practical proof* that it will be completed ; a proof 
 from fad:, and therefore a diflindt one from that which 
 is deduced from the eternal and unalterable relations, 
 the fitnefs and unfitnefs of adtions. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Of a State of Probation, as implying Trial, Difficulties 
 and Danger. 
 
 A HE general doctrine of religion, that 
 our prefent life is a ftate of probation for a future one, 
 comprehends under it feveral particular things diftin6t 
 from each other. But the firft and mod common 
 meaning of it feems to be, that our future intereft is 
 now depending, and depending upon ourfeives ; that 
 we have fcope and opportunities here for that good 
 and bad behaviour, which God will reward and punifh 
 hereafter ; together with temptations to one, as well 
 as inducements of reafon to the other. And this is, 
 in great meafure, the fame with faying, that we are un- 
 der the moral government of God, and to give an ac- 
 count of our adions to him. For the notion of a 
 future account and general righteous judgment im- 
 plies feme fort of temptations to what, is wrong, oth- 
 ervvife there would be no moral poffibility of doing 
 wrong, nor ground for judgment or difcrimination. 
 Rut there is this difference, that the word probation is 
 more diftin&ly and particularly exprefiive of allure- 
 ments to wrong, or difficulties in adhering uniformly 
 to what is right, and of the danger of miicarrying by 
 luch temptations, than the words moral government. 
 
 I 2 A ftate 
 
 * Ve this proof drawn out briefly. Ch. vi. 
 
j 24 O/* tf <S/rf/ 0/" Trial PART i, 
 
 A Hate of probation then, as thus particularly imply* 
 ing in it trial, difficulties and danger, may require to 
 be confidered diflin&ly by itfelf. 
 
 And as the moral government of God, which re- 
 ligion teaches us, implies that we are in? a fiate of tri* 
 al with regard to a future world, fo alfo his natural 
 government over us implies that we are in a fiate of 
 trial in the like fenfe with regard to the prefent world. 
 Natural government by rewards and punimments as 
 mucjh implies natural trial as moral government does 
 moral trial. The natural government of God here 
 meant,* confifls in his annexing pleafure to fome ac- 
 tions and pain to others, which are in our power to 
 do or forbear, and in giving us notice of fuch appoint- 
 ment beforehand. This neceflkrily implies, that he 
 has made our happinefs and mifery, or our interefl, to 
 depend in part upon ourfelves. And fo far as merr 
 have temptations ta any courfe of action which will 
 probably occafion them greater temporal inconveni- 
 ence and uneafinefs than fatisfa&ion, fo far their tem- 
 poral interefl is in< danger from themfelves, or they 
 are in a fiate of trid with refpecl: to it. Now people 
 often blame others, and even themfelves, for their mif- 
 conduct in their temporal concerns. And we find 
 many are greatly wanting to themfelves, and mifs of 
 that natural happinefs which they might have obtain- 
 ed in the prefent life ; perhaps every one does in fome 
 degree. But many run themfelves into great incon- 
 venience, and into- extreme diflrefs and mifery ; not 
 through incapacity of knowing better, and doing bet- 
 ter for themfelves, which would be nothing to the 
 prefent purpofe, but throtigh their own fault. And 
 thefe things neceflarily imply temptatien, and danger 
 of mifcarrying, in a greater or lefs degree, with refpect 
 to our worldly interefl or happinefs. Every one too, 
 without having religion in his thoughts, fpeaks of the 
 
 hazards 
 
 * Ch, ii. 
 
CHAP. IV. Of a State of Trial 125 
 
 hazards which young people run, upon their fetting 
 out in the world ; hazards from other caufes than 
 merely their ignorance and unavoidable accidents. 
 And ibme courfes of vice, at leaft, being contrary to 
 men's worldly intereft or good, temptations to thefe 
 muft at the fame time be temptations to forego our 
 preient and our future intereft. Thus in our natural 
 or temporal capacity we are in a ftate of trial, i.e. of 
 difficulty and danger analogous or like to our moral 
 and religious trial. 
 
 This will more diftin&ly appear to any one who 
 thinks it worth while more diftin&ly to confider 
 what it is which conftitutes our trial in both capaci- 
 ties, and to obferve how mankind behave under it. 
 
 And that which conftitutes this our trial, in both 
 thefe capacities, muft be fomewhat either in our ex- 
 ternal circumftances, or in our nature. For, on the 
 one hand, perfons may be betrayed into wrong be- 
 haviour upon furpriie, or overcome upon any other 
 very fingular and extraordinary external occafions, who 
 would otherwile have preferved their character of pru- 
 dence and of virtue ; in which cafes, every one, in 
 fpeaking of the wrong behaviour of thefe perfons, 
 would impute it to fuch particular external circum- 
 ftances : And on the other hand, men who have con- 
 tracted habits of vice and folly of any kind, or have 
 fome particular paffions in excefs, will feek opportu- 
 nities, and, as it were, go out of their way to gratify 
 themfelves in thefe refpe&s, at the expenfe of their 
 wifdom and their virtue ; led to it, as every one would 
 fay, not by external temptations, but by fuch habits 
 and paffions. And the account of this laft cafe is, 
 that particular paffions are no more coincident with 
 prudence, or that reafonable ielf love, the end of which 
 is our worldly intereft, than they are with the princi- 
 ple of virtue and religion, but often draw contrary 
 ways to one as well as to the other , and fo fuch par- 
 ticular 
 
1 26 Of a State of Trial. PART L 
 
 ticular paffions are as much temptations to act im- 
 prudently with regard to our worldly intereft, as to ad 
 vicioufly,* However, as when we fay, men are mif- 
 led by external circumftances of temptation, it cannot 
 but be underftood that there is fomewhat within 
 themfelves to render thofe circumftances temptations, 
 or to render them fufceptible of impreffions from 
 them ; ib when we fay, they are milled by paffions, 
 it is always fuppofed that there are occaiions, circum- 
 flances and objects, exciting thefe paffions, and afford- 
 ing means for gratifying them. And therefore, 
 temptations from within and from without coincide 
 and mutually imply each other. Now the feveral 
 external objects of the appetites, paffions and affec-. 
 tions being prefent to the fenfes, or offering themfelves 
 to the mind, and fo exciting emotions fuitable to 
 their nature, not only in cafes where they can be grat^ 
 ified confiflently with innocence and prudence, but 
 alfo in cafes where they cannot, and yet can be grati- 
 fied imprudently and viciouily ; this as really puts 
 them in danger of voluntarily foregoing their prefent 
 intereft or good as their future, and as really renders 
 felf denial as neceffary to fecure one as the other ; i. e, 
 we are in a like ftate of trial with refpect; to both, by 
 the very fame paffions, excited by the very fame 
 means. Thus mankind having a temporal intereft 
 depending upon themfelves, and a prudent courfe of 
 behaviour being neceffary to fecure it, paffions inor- 
 dinately excited, whether by means of example, or by 
 any other external circumftance, towards fuch objects, 
 at fuch times, or in fuch degrees, as that they cannot 
 be gratified confiftently with worldly prudence, are 
 temptations, dangerous and too often fuccefsful temp- 
 tations, to forego a greater temporal good for a lets ; 
 i, e. to forego what is, upon the whole, our temporal 
 
 intereft, 
 
 # See Sermons preached at thejRo//j, 1726. zd. Ed. p, 205, &V. Pref, j> 4 
 5, SV. Serin, p. u, &V. 
 
CHAP. IV. Of a State of Trial 1 2 7 
 
 intereft, for the fake of a prefent gratification. This 
 is a defcription of our ilate of trial in our temporal ca- 
 pacity. Subftitute now the word future for temporal, 
 and virtue for prudence^ and it will be juft as proper a 
 defcription of our ftate of trial in our religious capac- 
 ity ; ib analogous are they to each other. 
 
 If, from confideration of -this our like -date .of trial 
 in both .capacities, we -go on to obferve farther how 
 mankind behave under k, we- mall find there are fome 
 who have fo little ienfc of -it -that they fcarce look be- 
 yond the parung day ; they are fo taken up with pref- 
 ent gratificatioRs as to have, in a manner, no feeling 
 of -contequences, no regard to their future eafe or for- 
 tune in this life, any more than to their happinefs in 
 another. Some appear to be blinded and deceived by 
 inordinate paflion in their worldly concerns as much 
 as in religion. Others are -riot deceived, but as it w^re 
 forcibly carried away by the like paiTions, againft their 
 better judgment and feeble refolutions too pt -acting 
 better. And there are men, and truly they are not a 
 few, who Ihamelefsly avow, not their interefl, but their 
 mere will and pleafure, to be -their law of life, and who, 
 in open defiance of every thing that is realbnable, will 
 go on in a .courfe of vicious extravagance, foreieeing, 
 with no remorie and little fear, that it will be their 
 temporal ruin, and fome of them under the apprehen- 
 fion of the confequences of wickednefs in another 
 flate. And to fpeak in the moft moderate way, hu- 
 man creatures are not only continually liable to go 
 wrong voluntarily, but we lee likewife that they often 
 actually do fo, with refpe& to their temporal interefb 
 as well as with reiped to religion. 
 
 Thus our difficulties and dangers, or our trials, in 
 our temporal and our religious capacity, as they pro- 
 ceed from the fame caufes, and have the fame effect: 
 upon men's behaviour, are evidently analogous and 
 of the fame kind. 
 
 It 
 
1 2 S Of a State of Trial. PART L 
 
 It may be added, that as the difficulties and dangers 
 of mifcarrying in our religious ftate of trial are greatly 
 increafed, and one is ready to think in a manner wholly 
 wade, by the ill behaviour of others ; by a wrong edu- 
 cation, wrong in a moral fenfe, fometimes pofitively 
 vicious j by general bad example ; by the difhoneft 
 artifices which are got into bufmefs of all kinds ; and, 
 in very many parts of the world, by religion's being 
 corrupted into fuperftitions, which indulge men in 
 their vices ; fo in like manner, the difficulties of con- 
 ducting ourfelves prudently in refpect to our prefent 
 interefl, and our danger of being led afide from purfu- 
 ing it, are greatly increafed by a foolifh education ; 
 and, after we come to mature age, by the extravagance 
 and careleffhefs of others whom we have intercourle 
 with, and by miftaken notions, very generally preva- 
 lent, and taken up from common opinion, concerning 
 temporal happinefs, and wherein it coniifts, And per- 
 ibns, by their own negligence and folly in their tem- 
 poral affairs, no lefs than by a courfe of vice, bring 
 themfelves into new difficulties, and, by habits of in-, 
 dulgence, become lefs qualified to go through them ; 
 and one irregularity after another embarraifes things 
 to fiich a degree, that they know not whereabout 
 they are, and often makes the path of conduct fo in- 
 tricate and perplexed, that it is difficult to trace it 
 out, difficult even to determine what is the prudent 
 or the moral part. Thus, for inftance, wrong beha- 
 viour in one ftage of life, youth ; wrong, I mean, con- 
 fidering ourfelves only in our temporal capacity, with- 
 out taking in religion ; this, in feveral ways, increafes 
 the difficulties of right behaviour in mature age ; i. e. 
 puts us into a more difadvantageous ftate of trial in 
 our temporal capacity. 
 
 We are an inferior part of the creation of God, 
 There are natural appearances of our being in a ftate 
 of degradation. And we certainly are in a condition, 
 
 which 
 
CHAP. IV. Of a State of Trial. 129 
 
 which does not feem, by any means, the moft advanta- 
 geous we could imagine or defire, either in our natural 
 or moral capacity, for iecuring either our prefent or 
 future intereft. However, this condition, low and 
 careful and uncertain as it is, does not afford any juft 
 ground of complaint. For, as men may manage their 
 temporal affairs with prudence, and fo pals their days 
 here on earth in tolerable cafe and fatisfaction, by a 
 moderate degree of care, fo likewife with regard to re- 
 ligion, there is no more required than what they arc 
 well able to do, and what they muft be greatly want- 
 ing to themfelves if they neglect, And for peribns 
 to have that put upon them which they are well able 
 to go through, and no more, we naturally confide r as 
 an equitable thing, fuppofing it done by proper au- 
 thority. Nor have we any more reafon to complain 
 of it, with regard to the Author of nature, than of 
 his not having given us other advantages, belonging 
 to other orders of creatures. 
 
 But the thing here iniifted upon is, that the ftate of 
 trial, which religion teaches us we are in, is rendered 
 credible by its being throughout uniform and of a 
 piece with the general conduct of Providence towards 
 us, in all other refpe&s within the compafs of our 
 knowledge. Indeed if mankind, confidered in their 
 natural capacity, as inhabitants of this workl only, 
 found themfelves, from their birth to their death, in a 
 fettled (late of fecurity and happinefs, without any ib- 
 licitude or thought of their own ; or if they were in 
 no danger of being brought into inconveniences and 
 diftreis, by carelelfnefs, or the folly of paffion, through 
 bad example, the treachery of others, or the deceitful 
 appearances of things ; were this our natural condi- 
 tion, 1 then it might feem flrange, and be feme pre- 
 jumption againfl the truth of religion, that it repre- 
 fents our future and more general intereft, as not fe- 
 cure of courfe, but as depending upon our behaviour, 
 
 and 
 
130 Of a State of Trial. PART L 
 
 and requiring recollection and felf government to ot> 
 tain it. For it might be alleged, " What you lay is 
 our condition in one rcfpect is not in any wife of a fort 
 with what we find, by experience, our condition is in 
 another. Our whole prefent intereft is Tenured to our 
 hands, without any folicitude of ours > and why fhould 
 not our future intereft, if we have any fuch, be fo 
 too ?" But fmce, on the contrary, thought and con- 
 fideration, the voluntary denying ourielves many 
 things which we defire, arid a courie of behaviour far 
 from being always agreeable to us, are abfoluteiy nec- 
 efTary to our .acting even a common decent and com- 
 mon prudent part, fo as to pafs with any fat is faction 
 through the preient world, arid be received upon any 
 tolerable good terras in it ; ilnce this is the cafe, all 
 prefumption againft felf denial and attention being 
 neceffary to fecure our higher intereft, is removed. 
 Had we not experience, it might, perhaps fpecioufly, 
 be urged, that it is improbable any kind cf hazard 
 and danger fhould be put upon us by an infinite Be- 
 ing, when every thing which is hazard and danger in 
 our manner of conception, and will end in error, con- 
 fufion and mifery, is now already certain in his fore- 
 knowledge. And indeed, why any thing of hazard 
 and danger fhould be put upon fuch frail creatures as 
 we are, may well be thought a difficulty in (pecula- 
 tion, and cannot but be fo till we know the whole, or, 
 however, much more of the cafe. But ftill the con- 
 flitution of nature is as it is. Our happinefs and mif- 
 ery are trufted to our conduct, and made to depend 
 upon it. Somewhat, and in many circumftances a 
 great deal too, is put upon us, either to do or to fuf- 
 fer, as we chooie. And all the various rniferies of life 
 which people bring upon themfelves by negligence 
 and folly, and might have avoided by proper care, are 
 inftances of this ; which mifenes are beforehand juft 
 as contingent and undetermined as their conduct, and 
 Jeft to be determined by it. Thefe 
 
CH A p . V. Of a State of Moral Discipline. 131 
 
 Thefe obfervations are an anfwer to the objections 
 againft the credibility of a ftate of trial, as implying 
 temptations, and real danger of mifcarrying with re- 
 gard to our general intereft, under the moral govern- 
 ment of God ; and they fliew that, if we are at all to 
 be coniidered in fuch a capacity, and as having fuch 
 an intereft, the general analogy of Providence muft 
 lead us to apprehend ourfelves in danger of mifcarry- 
 ing, in different degrees, as to this intereft, by our 
 neglecting to act the proper part belonging to us in 
 that capacity. For we have a prefent intereft, under 
 the government of God which we experience here upon 
 earth. And this intereft, as it is not forced upon us, 
 io neither is it offered to our acceptance, but to our 
 acquisition, in fuch fort as that we are in danger of 
 miffing it, by means of temptations to negledt, or 
 act contrary to it ; and without attention and ielf 
 denial muft and do mifs of it. It is then perfectly 
 credible that this may be our cafe, with refpect to that 
 chief and final good which religion propofes to us. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Of a State of Probation, as intended for Moral Difd- 
 pline and Improvement. 
 
 JFKOM the consideration of our being 
 in a probation ftate, of fo much difficulty and hazard, 
 naturally ariles the queftion, how we came to be placed 
 in it. But fuch a general inquiry as this would be 
 found involved in inluperable difficulties. For though 
 iome of thele difficulties would be leffened, by obferv- 
 ing that all wicked nefs is voluntary, as is implied in 
 its very notion, and that many of the miieries of life 
 
 have 
 
132 Of a State of PART I r 
 
 have apparent good effects, yet when we confider other 
 circumftances belonging to both, and what muft be 
 the confequence of the former in a life to come, it 
 cannot but be acknowledged plain folly and prefump- 
 tion to pretend to give an account of the whole reaibns 
 of this matter ; the whole reafons of our being allot- 
 ted a condition, out of which fo much wickecjnefs and 
 mifery, fo circumflanced, would in fact arife. Wheth- 
 er it be not beyond our faculties, not only to find out, 
 but even to underftand, the whole account of this ; or, 
 though we mould be fuppofed capable of underftand- 
 ing it, yet, whether it would be of lervice or prejudice 
 to us to be informed of it, is impoffible to fay. But 
 as our prefent condition can in no wife be fhewn in- 
 confident with the perfect moral government of God, 
 fo religion teaches us we were placed in it that we 
 might qualify ourfelves, by the practice of virtue, for 
 another ftate which is to follow it. And this, though 
 but a partial anfwer, a very partial one indeed, to the 
 inquiry now mentioned, yet is a more fatisfactory an- 
 fwer to another, which is of real, and of the utmoft 
 importance to us to have anfwered, the inquiry, 
 What is our bufinefs here ? The known end, then, 
 why we are placed in a ftate of fo much affliction, 
 hazard and difficulty, is, our improvement in virtue 
 and piety, as the requifite qualification for a future 
 ftate of fecurity and happinefs. 
 
 Now the beginning of life, confidered as an educa- 
 tion for mature age in the prefent world, appears plain- 
 ly, at firft fight, analogous to this our trial for a future 
 one ; the former being in our temporal capacity, what 
 the latter is in our religious capacity. But fome ob- 
 fervations common to both of them, and a more dif- 
 tinct confideration of each, will more diftinctly (hew 
 the extent and force of the analogy between them, and 
 the credibility which arifes from hence, as well as from 
 
 the 
 
CHAP. V. Moral )ijcipline. 135 
 
 the nature of the thing, that the prefent life was in- 
 tended to be a flate of difeipline for a future one. 
 
 I. Every fpecies of creatures is, we fee, defigned for 
 a particular way of life ; to which the nature, the ca- 
 pacities, temper, and qualifications of each fpecies, are 
 as neceffary as their external circumftances. Both 
 come into the notion of iuch {late, or particular way 
 of life, and are conftituent parts of it. Change a. 
 man's capacities or character, to the degree in which 
 it is conceivable they may be changed, and he would 
 be altogether incapable of a human courfe of life, and 
 human happinefs ; as incapable as if, his nature con- 
 tinuing unchanged, he were placed in a world where 
 he had no fphere of action, nor any objects to anhver 
 his appetites, pafTions, and affections of any fort. One 
 thing is fet over againil another, as an ancient writer 
 exprefles it, Our nature correfponds to our external 
 condition : Without this correfpondence, there would 
 be no poflibility of any fuch thing as human life and 
 human happinefs ; which life and happinefs are, there- 
 fore, a refult from our nature and condition jointly ; 
 meaning by human life, not living in the literal fenfe, 
 but the whole complex notion commonly underflood 
 by thole words. So that without determining what 
 will be the employment and happinefs, the particular 
 life of good men hereafter, there mufl be fome deter- 
 minate capacities, fome neceiTary character and qual- 
 ifications, without which perfons cannot but be utterly 
 incapable of it ; in like manner as there mull be fome, 
 without which men would be incapable of their prei- 
 ent ftate of life. Now, 
 
 II. The conilitution of human creatures, and in- 
 deed of all creatures which come under our notice, is 
 iuch, as that they are capable of naturally becoming 
 qualified for ftates of life, for which they were once 
 wholly unqualified. In imagination we may indeed 
 conceive of creatures as incapable of haying any of 
 
 their 
 
134 Pf a tate f PAKT 1 
 
 their faculties naturally enlarged, or as being unable 
 naturally to acquire any new qualifications ; but the 
 faculties of every fpecies known to us are made for 
 enlargement, for acquirements of experience and hab- 
 its. We find ourfelves in particular endued with ca- 
 pacities, not only of perceiving ideas, and of knowl- 
 edge or perceiving truth, but alfo of ftoring up our 
 ideas and knowledge by memory. We are capable, 
 not only of acling, and of having different momentary 
 impreilions made upon us, but of getting a new fa- 
 cility in any kind of a&ion, and of fettled alterations 
 in our temper or chara&er. The power of the two 
 laft is the power of habits ; but neither the percep- 
 tion of ideas, nor knowledge of any fort, are habits, 
 though abfolutely necelTary to the forming of them. 
 However, apprehenfion, reafon, memory, which are 
 the capacities of acquiring knowledge, are greatly im- 
 proved by exercife. Whether the word habit is ap- 
 plicable to all thefe improvements, and in particular 
 how far the powers of memory and of habits may be 
 powers of the fame nature, I mall not inquire. But 
 that perceptions come into our minds readily and of 
 courfe, by means of their having been there before, 
 feems a thing of the fame fort as readinefs in any par* 
 ticular kind of action, proceeding from being accuf- 
 tomed to it. And aptnefs to recollect practical ob- 
 fervations of fervice in our conduct, is plainly habit in 
 many cafes* There are habits of perception, and hab- 
 its of action. An inflance of the former is our con- 
 flant and even involuntarily readinefs, in corredting 
 the impreflions of our fight concerning magnitudes 
 and diftances, fo as to fubftitute judgment in the room 
 of feniation imperceptibly to ourfelves. And it feems 
 as if all other affociations of ideas not naturally con- 
 nected, might be called pailive habits, as properly as 
 our readinefs in underflanding languages upon fight, 
 or hearing of words. And our readinefs in ipeaking 
 
 and 
 
CHAP. V. Moral Discipline. 
 
 and writing them is an inftance of the latter, of active 
 habits. For diftinctnefs, we may coniider habits as 
 belonging to the body or the mind ; and the latter 
 will be explained by the former. Under the former 
 are comprehended all bodily activities or motions, 
 whether graceful or unbecoming, which are owing to 
 ufe ; under the latter, general habits of life and con- 
 duct, fuch as thofe of obedience and fubmiffion to au- 
 thority, or to any particular perfon ; thofe of veracitv, 
 juftice and charity ; thole of attention, induftry, felf 
 government, envy, revenge. And habits of this latter 
 kind feem produced by repeated acts, as well as the 
 former. And in like manner as habits belonging to 
 the body are produced by external acts, fo habits of 
 the mind are produced by the exertion of inward 
 practical principles, i. e. by carrying them into act, or 
 acting upon them ; the principles of obedience, of ve- 
 racity, juftice and charity. Nor can thofe habits be 
 formed by any external courte of action, otherwiie 
 than as it proceeds from thefe principles ; becaufe it is 
 only thefe inward principles exerted, which are ftriftly 
 acts of obedience, of veracity, of juftice, and of charity. 
 So likewife habits of attention, induftry, (elf govern- 
 ment, are in the fame manner acquired by exercife ; 
 and habits of envy and revenge by indulgence, whether 
 in outward act, or in thought and intention, i. e. in- 
 ward act ; for fuch intention is an act. Refolutions 
 alfo to do well, are properly acts. And endeavouring 
 to enforce upon our own minds a practical fenfe of 
 virtue, or to beget in others that practical fenfe of it 
 which a man really has himieif, is a virtuous act. Ail 
 thefe, therefore, may and will contribute towards 
 forming good habits. But going over the theory of 
 virtue in one's thoughts, talking well, and drawing fine 
 pictures of it, this is fo far from ncceiiarily or 
 tainly conducing to form an habit of it, in him who 
 thus employs himfelf, that it may harden the mind in 
 
 a contrary 
 
Of a State of PART I. 
 
 a contrary courfc, and render it gradually more infen- 
 iiblc, i. e. form an habit of infenfibility to all moral 
 considerations. For, from our very faculty of habits, 
 paffive impreilions, by being repeated, grow weaker. 
 Thoughts, by often paffing through the mind, are felt 
 lefs fenfibly ; being accuftomed to danger begets in- 
 trepidity, i. e. leflens fear ; to diflrefs, lefTens the pal- 
 lion of pity j to inflances of others' mortality, leliens 
 the feniible apprehenfion of our own. And from 
 thefe two obfervations together, that practical habits 
 are formed and lengthened by repeated acts, and that 
 paffive impreflions grow weaker by being repeated up- 
 on us, it muft follow, that active habits may be 
 gradually forming and ftrengthening, by a courfe of 
 acting upon fuch and fuch motives and excitements, 
 whilft thefe motives and excitements themfelves arc, 
 by proportionable degrees, growing lefs fenfible, i. e. 
 are continually lefs and lefs fenfibly felt, even as the 
 active habits ftrengthen. And experience confirms 
 this ; for active principles, at the very time that they 
 are lefs lively in perception than they were, are found 
 to be, fome how, wrought more thoroughly into the 
 temper and character, and become more effectual in 
 influencing our practice. The three things jufl men- 
 tioned, may afford inflances of it. Perception of clan- 
 ger is a natural excitement of paffive fear, and aclive 
 caution ; and by being inured to danger, habits of the 
 latter are gradually wrought, at the fame time that 
 the former gradually leflens. Perception of diflrefs in 
 others is a natural excitement, paftively to pity, and 
 actively to relieve it ; but let a man fet himfelf to at- 
 tend to, inquire out, and relieve diilrefled peribns, and 
 he cannot but grow lefs and lefs fenfibly affected with 
 the various miferics of life with which he mud become 
 acquainted, when yet at the fame time benevolence, 
 conildered not as a pafiion, but as a practical principle 
 of action, will ftrengthen ; and whilft he pamvely com- 
 
 pafiionatcs 
 
CHAP. V. Moral Discipline. 137 
 
 paflionates the diftrefTed lefs, he will acquire a greater 
 aptitude actively to affift and befriend them. So alfo 
 at the fame time that the daily inftances of men's dy- 
 ing around us give us daily a lefs fenfible paffive feel- 
 ing or noprehenfion of our own mortality, iuch in- 
 ftances greatly contribute to the {lengthening a prac- 
 tical regard to it in ferious men, i. e. to forming an 
 habit of acting with a conftant view to it. And this 
 feems again further to ihew, that paffive impreffions 
 made upon our minds by admonition, experience, ex- 
 ample, though they may have a remote efficacy, and 
 a very great one, towards forming active habits, yet 
 can have this efficacy no otherwife than by inducing 
 us to iuch a courfe of action ; and that it is, not be- 
 ing affected fo and fo, but acting, which forms thofc 
 habits ; only it muft be always remembered, that real 
 endeavours to enforce good impreflions upon ourfelves, 
 are a fpecies of virtuous action. Nor do we know 
 how far it is poflible, in the nature of things, that ef- 
 fects mould be wrought in us at once, equivalent to 
 habits, i. e. what is wrought by ufe and exercife. 
 However, the thing infifted upon is, not what may be 
 pofiible, but what is in fact the appointment of nature ; 
 which is, that active habits are to be formed by exer- 
 cife. Their progrefs may be fo gradual as to be im- 
 perceptible in its fteps ; it may be hard to explain the 
 faculty by which we are capable of habits throughout 
 its feveral parts, and to trace it up to its original, fo 
 as to diflinguifh it from all others in our mind ; and 
 it feems as if contrary effects were to be afcribed to it. 
 But the thing in general, that our nature is formed to 
 yield, in fome iuch manner as this, to ufe and exercife, 
 is matter of certain experience. 
 
 Thus, by accuftoming ourfelves to any courfe of 
 action, we get an aptnefs to go on, a facility, readinefs, 
 and often pleafure in it. The inclinations which ren- 
 dered us averfe to it grow weaker ; the difficulties in 
 
 K it, 
 
r}3 Of a State of PART L 
 
 It, not only the imaginary but the real ones, leflen ; 
 The realons for it offer themfelves of courfe to our 
 thoughts upon all occalions, and the leaft glimpfe of 
 them is fufficient to make us go on in a courfe of ac- 
 tion to which we have been accuftomed. And prac- 
 tical principles appear to grow ftronger abfolutely in 
 themfelves by exefcife, as well as relatively with re- 
 gard to contrary principles, which, by being accuf- 
 tomed to fubmit, do fo habitually and of courfe. And 
 thus a new character in fcveral refpects may be form- 
 ed, and' many habitudes of life not given by nature, 
 but which nature directs us to acquire, 
 
 II 1. Indeed we may be allured, that we fhould 
 never have had thefe capacities of improving by expe- 
 rience, acquired knowledge and habits, had they not 
 been necellary, and intended to be made ufe of. And 
 accordingly we find them fo neceffary, and fo much 
 intended, that without them we mould be utterly in- 
 capable of that which was the end for which we were 
 made, confidered in our temporal capacity only, the 
 employments and fatisfactions of our mature flate of 
 life. 
 
 Nature does in no wife qualify TIS wholly, much lefs 
 at once, for this mature Hate of life. Even maturity 
 of uriderflanding and bodily ftrength are not only ar- 
 rived to gradually, but are alfo very much owing to the 
 continued exerciie of our powers of body and mind, 
 from infancy. But if we fuppofe a perfon brought into 
 the world with both thefc in maturity, as far as this is 
 conceivable, he would plainly at firft be as unqualified 
 for the human' life of mature age as an idiot. He 
 would he in a manner diftracted with aftonifhment, 
 and apprchenfion, and curiofity, and fufpenfe ; nor can- 
 one guefs how long it would be before he would be 
 familiarized to himfelf, and the objects about him, 
 enough even to fet himfelf to any thing. It may K v 
 queitio-aed too, whether the natural information of hi r < 
 
 fight 
 
CHAP. V. Moral Difciplme. 139 
 
 light and hearing would be of any manner of ufe at all 
 to him in adting, before experience. And it feems, 
 that men would be ftrangely headftrong and felf will- 
 ed, and difpofed to exert themfelves with an impetuofi- 
 ty which would render fociety infupportable, and the 
 living in it impracticable, were it not for fome acquir- 
 ed moderation and felf government, fome aptitude 
 and readihefs in retraining themfelves, and conceal- 
 ing their fenfe of things. Want of every thing of 
 this kind which is learnt, would render a man as un- 
 capable of fociety as want of language would, or as 
 his natural ignorance of any of the particular employ- 
 ments of life would render him uncapaple of provid- 
 ing himfelf with the common conveniences, or fup- 
 plying the neceifary wants of it. In thefe refpe&s, 
 and probably in many more, of which we have no par- 
 ticular notion, mankind is left by nature an unform- 
 ed, unfinilhed creature, utterly deficient and unquali- 
 fied, before the acquirement of knowledge, experience 
 and habits, for that mature (late of life which was the 
 end of his creation, confidering him as related only to 
 this world. 
 
 But then, as nature his endued us with a power of 
 fupplyirig thofe deficiencies by acquired knowledge, 
 experience and habits, fo likewife we are placed in a 
 condition, in infancy, childhood and youth, fitted tor* 
 it ; fitted for our acquiring thofe qualifications of all 
 fortSj which we ftand in need of in mature age. 
 Hence children, from their very birth, are daily grow- 
 ing acquainted with the objects about them, with the 
 fcene in which they are placed and to* have a future 
 part, and learning fomewhat or other neceffary to the 
 performance of it. The fubordinations to which they 
 are accuftomed in domeftic life, teach them felf gov- 
 ernment in common behaviour abroad, and prepare 
 them for fubje&ion and obedience to civil authority- 
 What pailes before their eyes, and daily happens to 
 K 2 them, 
 
/4<> Of a State of PART L 
 
 them, gives them experience, caution againfl treache- 
 ry and deceit, together with numberlefs little rules of 
 action and conduct, which we could not live without, 
 and which are learnt fo infenfibly and fo perfectly as to 
 be miftaken perhaps for inftinct, though they are the 
 effect of long experience and exercife, as much fo as 
 language, or knowledge in particular bufmefs, or the 
 qualifications and behaviour belonging to the feveral 
 ranks and profeflions. Thus the beginning of our 
 clays is adapted to be, and is, a ftate of education in 
 the theory and practice of mature life. We are much 
 affifted in it by example, inftraction, and the care of 
 others ; but a great deal is left to ourfelves to do. 
 And of this, as part is done eafrly and of courfe, fo 
 part requires diligence and care, fche voluntary forego- 
 ing many things which we deiire, and fetting ourfelves 
 to what we mould have no inclination to, but for the 
 neceffity or expedience of it.- For, that labour and 
 induftry which the ftation of fo many abfolutely re- 
 quires, they would be greatly unqualified for in ma- 
 turity, as thofe in other ftations would be for any oth- 
 er forts of application, if both were not accuftomed to 
 them in their youth. And 1 according as perfons be- 
 have themfelvesj in the general education which all 
 go through, and in the particular ones adapted to par- 
 ticular employments, their character is formed and 
 made appear ; they recommend themfelves more or 
 lefs, and are capable of and placed in different itations 
 in the fociety of mankind. 
 
 The former part of life then is to be confidered as 
 an important opportunity which nature puts into our 
 hands, and which, when loft, is not to be recovered. 
 And our being placed in a ftate of difcipline through- 
 out this life for another world, is a providential difpo- 
 lition of things, exactly of the fame kind as our being 
 placed in a ftate of difcipline during childhood, for 
 mature age. Our condition in both refpects is uni- 
 form 
 
V. Moral Difcipline. 141 
 
 form and of a piece, and comprehended under one 
 and the fame general law of nature. 
 
 And if we were not able at all to difcern how or in 
 *yhat way the prefent life could be our preparation for 
 another, this would be no obje&ion againrt the credi- 
 bility of its being fo. For we do not difcern how 
 food and fleep contribute to the growth of the body, 
 nor could have any thought that they would before we 
 had experience. Nor do children at ail think, on the 
 one hand, that the fports and exercifes to which they 
 are fo much addicted contribute to their health and 
 growth ; nor on the other, of the neceffity which there 
 is for their being reftrained in them ; nor are they 
 capable of underftanding the ufe of many parts of dif- 
 cipline, which neverthelefs they muft be made to go 
 through, in order to qualify them for the bufinefs of 
 mature age. Were we not able then to diicover, in 
 what refpech the prefent life could form us for a fu- 
 ture one, yet nothing would be more fuppofeabie 
 than that it might, in feme refpects or other, from 
 the general analogy of Providence. And this, for 
 ought I fee, might reafonably be faid, even though 
 we fhould not take in the confideration of God's 
 moral government over the world. But, 
 
 IV. Take in this confideration, and confequently 
 that the character of virtue and piety is a necefTary 
 qualification for the future flate, and then we may 
 diftinctly fee how, and in what refpec~h, the prefent 
 life may be a preparation for it ; fince we want, and 
 are capable of, improvement in that charaRer, by moral 
 and religious habit;, and the prefent life is fit to be a ft ate 
 of discipline for fuch Improvement ; in like manner as we 
 have already oblerved how, and in what refpech, in- 
 fancy, childhood and youth are a neceffary prepara- 
 tion, and a natural (late of difcipline, for mature age. 
 
 Nothing which we at prefent fee would lead us to 
 the thought of a folitary una&ive flate hereafter - y but, 
 
 if 
 
Of a State of PART I. 
 
 if we judge at all from the analogy of nature, we muft 
 fuppofe, according to the Scripture account of it, that 
 it will be a community. And there is no fhadow of 
 any thing unreafonable in conceiving, though there 
 be no analogy for it, that this community will be, as 
 the Scripture reprefents it, under the- more; immediate, 
 or, if fuch an expreflion may be ufed, the more fenfi- 
 ble government of God. Nor is our ignorance what 
 will be the employments of this happy community, nor 
 our confequent ignorance what particular fcppe or oc- 
 cafion there will be for the exercife of veracity, juftice 
 and charity amongft the members of it with regard to 
 each other, any proof that there will be no. fphere of 
 exercife for thofe virtues ; much lefs, if that were poi~ 
 fible, is our ignorance any proof, that there will be no 
 occafion for that frame of rnind, or character, which is 
 formed by the daily practice of thofe particular virtues 
 here, and which is a refult from it. This at leaft 
 muft be owned in general, that, as the government 
 eftablifhed in the univerie is moral, the character of 
 virtue and piety muft, in fome way or other, be the 
 condition of our happinefs, or the qualification for it. 
 Now from what is above obfervec}, concerning our 
 natural power of habits, it is eafy to fee that we are 
 capable of moral improvement by difcipline. And 
 how greatly we want it, need not be proved to any one 
 who is acquainted with the great wickednefs of man- 
 kind, or even with thole imperfections which the beft 
 are confcious of, But it is not perhaps diftindly at- 
 tended to by every one, that the occalion which hu- 
 man creatures have for difcipline, to improve in them 
 this character of virtue and piety, is to be traced up 
 higher than to excefs in the paffions, by indulgence 
 and habits of vice. Mankind, and perhaps all finite 
 creatures, from the very conftitution of their nature, 
 before habits of virtue, are deficient, and in danger of 
 deviating from what is right ; and therefore Hand in 
 
 need 
 
CHAP. V. Moral Bifdplint. 143 
 
 need of virtuous habits, for a fecurity againft this dan- 
 ger. For, together with the general principle of moral 
 underflanding, we have in our inward frame various 
 affections towards particular external objects. Thefe 
 affections are naturally and of right fubject to the 
 government of the moral principle, as to the occafions 
 upon which they may be gratified, as to the times, de- 
 grees and manner in which the objects of them may be 
 purfued ; but then the principle of virtue can neither 
 excite them, nor prevent their being excited. On 
 the contrary, they arc naturally felt, when the objects 
 of them are prefent to the mind, not only before all 
 confederation whether they can be obtained by lawful 
 means, but after it is found they cannot. For the 
 natural objects of affection continue fo ; the necefla- 
 ries, conveniences and pleaiur.es of life remain naturally 
 delirable, though they cannot be obtained innocently - y 
 nay, though they cannot ppiTibly be obtained t all. 
 And when the objects of any affection whatever can- 
 not be obtained without unlawful means, but may be 
 obtained by them, fuch affection, though its being ex? 
 cited, and its .continuing ibme time in the mind, be it 
 as innocent as it is natural and neceilary, yet cannot 
 but be conceived to have a tendency to incline perfons 
 .to venture upon fuch unlawful means, and therefore 
 mud be conceived as putting them in fonie danger of 
 it. Now what is the general fecurity againfl this dan- 
 ger, againft their actually deviating from right ? As 
 the danger is, fo alfo mull the iecurity be from with- 
 in j from the practical principle of virtue.* And the 
 
 (lengthening 
 
 * It may be thought, that a fenfe of inter.eft would as edeclually reftraio 
 creatures from doing wrong. But if by a fenfe of inttrejl is meant a fpecu- 
 lative conviction or belief, that fuch and Vuch indulgence would occafion 
 them greater uneafinefc, upon the whole, than fat isf action, it i* contrary to 
 prefent experience to fay, that this fenfe of intercft is fuflkient to reftrain 
 them from thus indulging themfelves. And if by afenjt: of intcreji is meant 
 a practical regard to what is, upon the whole, our happinefy, this is riot only 
 coincident with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the 
 idea itfelf. And it is evident this reafonabk felf love wants to be improved, 
 
144 Of a ^ tate f PART I, 
 
 flrengthening or improving this principle, confidered 
 as practical, or as a principle of action, will lefTen the 
 danger, or increafe the fecurity againft it. And this 
 moral principle is capable of improvement by proper 
 difcipline and exercile, by recollecting the practical 
 imprefiions which example and experience have made 
 upon us, and, inftead of following humour and mere 
 inclination, by continually attending to the equity and 
 right of the cafe in whatever we are engaged, be it in 
 greater or lefs matters, and accuftoming ourfelves al- 
 ways to act upon it, as being itfelf the juft and natural 
 motive of action ; and as this moral courfe of beha- 
 viour muft neceifarily, under divine government, be 
 our final intereft. Thus the principle of virtue ', im- 
 proved into an habit, of which improvement we are thus 
 capable, will plainly be, in proportion to the ftrength of jf 9 
 a fecurity againjl the danger which finite creatures are in, 
 from the very nature of propenjion, or particular affections* 
 This way of putting the matter fuppofes particular af- 
 fections to remain in a future ftate, which it is fcarce 
 pofliblc to avoid fuppofmg. And if they do, we clear- 
 ly fee that acquired habits of virtue and felf govern- 
 ment may be neceffary for the regulation of them. 
 However, though we were not diflinftly to take in 
 this fuppofition, but to fpeak only in general, the 
 thing really comes to the fame. For habits of virtue, 
 thus acquired by difcipline, are improvement in vir- 
 tue ; and improvement in virtue muft be advance- 
 ment in happinefs, if the government of the univerie 
 be moral. 
 
 From thefe things we may obferve, and it will far- 
 ther mew this our natural and original need of being 
 
 improved 
 
 as really as any principle in our nature. For we daily fee it overmatched, 
 not only by the more boifterous paffions, but by curiofity, fhame, love of imi- 
 tation, by any thing, even indolence ; efpecially if the intereft, the temporal 
 intereft, fuppofe, which is the end of fuch felf love, be at a diftance. So 
 greatly are profligate men miftaken, when they affirm they are wholly gov- 
 erned by intereftednefs and felf love. And fo little caufe is there for moral- 
 ills to difciaim this principle. See p. 125, 126. 
 
CHAP. V. Moral DifcipJlne. 145 
 
 improved by discipline, how it comes to pafs, that 
 creatures made upright fall ; and that thofe who pre- 
 ferve their uprightnefs, by fo doing raife themfelves to 
 a more fecure ftate of virtue. To fay that the former 
 is accounted for by the nature of liberty, is to fay no 
 more than that an event's actually happening is ac- 
 counted for by a mere poffibility of its happening. 
 But it feems diftinctly conceivable from the very na- 
 ture of particular affections or propenlions. For, 
 fuppofe creatures intended for fuch a particular {rate 
 of life for which fuch propenfions were neceflary ; fup- 
 pofe them endued with fuch propenfions, together 
 with moral underftanding, as well including a practi- 
 cal fenfe of virtue as a fpeculative perception of it, 
 and that all thefe feveral principles, both natural and 
 moral, forming an inward conftitution of mind, were 
 in the moil exact proportion poflible, i. e. in a pro- 
 portion the mod exactly adapted to their intended 
 Hate of life ; fuch creatures would be made upright, 
 or finitely perfect. Now particular propenfions, from 
 their very nature, muft be felt, the objects of them 
 being prefent, though they cannot be gratified at all, 
 or not with the allowance of the moral principle. But 
 if they can be gratified without its allowance, or by 
 contradicting it, then they muft be conceived to have 
 fome tendency, in how low a degree foever, yet fome 
 tendency, to induce perfons to fuch forbidden gratifi- 
 cation. This tendency, in fome one particular pro- 
 penfion, may be increafed by the greater frequency of 
 occaiions naturally exciting it, than of occalions ex- 
 citing others. The leaft voluntary indulgence in for- 
 bidden circumfhinces, though but in thought, will 
 increafe this wrong tendency, and may in create it fur- 
 ther, until, peculiar conjunctures perhaps confpiring, 
 it becomes effect ; and danger of deviating from right, 
 ends in actual deviation from it ; a danger neccffarily 
 arifing from the very nature of propenfion, and which 
 
 therefore 
 
146 Of a State of PART I. 
 
 therefore could not have been prevented, though it 
 might have been efcaped, or got innocently through. 
 The cafe would be as if we were to fuppofe a (trait 
 path marked out for a peribn, in which fuch a degree 
 of attention would keep him fleady ; but if he would 
 .not attend in this degree, any one of a thoufand ob^ 
 jefts catching his eye might lead him out of it. Now 
 it is impcffible to fay how much, even the firft full 
 overt aft of irregularity, might diforder the inward 
 conftitution, unfettle the adjuftments, and alter the 
 proportions which formed it, and in which the up- 
 rightnefs of its make confiiled ; but repetition of ir- 
 regularities would produce habits : And thus the con- 
 ilitution would be fpoiled, and creatures made upright 
 become corrupt and depraved in their fettled char- 
 after, proportionably to their repeated irregularities in 
 occafional afts. But on the contrary, theie creatures 
 might have improved, and railed themfelves to an 
 higher and more fecure ilate of virtue, by the con- 
 trary behaviour ; by fteadily following the moral prin- 
 ciple, fuppoied to be one part of their nature, and 
 thus withftanding that unavoidable danger of defec- 
 tion, which neceilarily arofe from propenlion, the other 
 part of it, For, by thus preierving their integrity for 
 iome time, their danger would leflen, fince propen^ 
 lions by being inured to fubmit, would do it more ea~ 
 lily and of courie ; and their fecurity againfl this lef- 
 fening danger would increafe, iince the moral princi^ 
 pie would gain additional ftrength by exercife ; both 
 ivhich things are implied in the notion pf virtuous 
 habits. Thus then, vicious indulgence is not only 
 criminal in itfelf, but allb depraves the inward confti- 
 tution and character. And virtuous felf government 
 is not only right in itfelf, but alib improves the inward 
 conftitution or character ; and may improve it to fuch 
 a degree, that though we fhould iuppofe it impofTible 
 for particular affections to be abiblutely coincident 
 
 with 
 
CHAP. V. Moral Difdpline. 147 
 
 with the moral principle, and confequently flioulcl al- 
 low, that inch creatures as have been above fuppofed 
 would forever remain defectible, yet their danger of 
 actually deviating from right may be almoft infinitely 
 leffened, and they fully fortified again ft what remains 
 of it, if that may be called danger againft which there 
 is an adequate effectual fecurity. But ftill this their 
 higher perfection may continue to confift in habits of 
 virtue, formed in a ftate of difcipline, and this their 
 more complete fecurity remain to proceed from them. 
 And thus it js plainly conceivable, that creatures with- 
 out blemiih, as they came out of the hands of God, 
 may be in danger of going wrong, and fo may ftand in 
 need of the fecurity of virtuous habits, additional to 
 the moral principle wrought into their natures by him. 
 That which is the ground of their danger, or their 
 want of fecurity, may be confidered as a deficiency in 
 them, to which virtuous habits are the natural fupply. 
 And as they are naturally capable of being railed and 
 improved by diicipline, it may be a thing fit and 
 requilite that they mould be placed in circumftances 
 with an eye to it ; in circumftances peculiarly fitted 
 to be to them a ftate of diicipline for their improve- 
 ment in virtue, 
 
 But how much more ftrongly rnuft this hold -with 
 refped: to thofe who have corrupted their natures, are- 
 fallen from their original rectitude, and whole paffions 
 are become exceflive by repeated violations of their 
 inward conftitution ? Upright creatures may want to 
 be improved ; depraved creatures want to be renew- 
 ed. Education and clifcipline, which may be in ail 
 degrees and iorts cf gentlenefs and of feverity, is ex- 
 pedient for thole, but mult be ablblutely neceilary for 
 thefe. For thele, diicipline of the icverer fort. too, 
 and in the higher degrees of it, mull be necellary, in 
 order to wear out vicious habits ; to recover their 
 primitive ftrength of felt government, which indul- 
 gence 
 
148 Of a State of PART I. 
 
 gence mufl have weakened ; to repair, as well as raife 
 into an habit, the moral principle, in order to their 
 arriving at a fecure {late of virtuous happinefs. 
 
 Now whoever will confider the thing, may clearly 
 fee, that the prefent world is peculiarly ft to be a (late 
 of diicipline for this purpofe, to fuch as will fet them- 
 felves to mend and improve. For, the various temp- 
 tations with which we are furrounded 5 our experience 
 of the deceits of wickednefs ; having been in many 
 inftances led wrong ourfelves ; the great vicioufnefs of 
 the world ; the infinite diibrders confequent upon it ; 
 our being made acquainted with pain and ibrrow, ei- 
 ther from our own feeling of it, or from the fight of 
 it in others ; thefe things, though fome of them may 
 indeed produce wrong effects upon our minds, yet 
 when duly reflected upon, have, all of them, a direct 
 tendency to bring us to a fettled moderation and rea- 
 fonablenefs of temper, the contrary both to thought- 
 lefs levity, and alfo to that unreftrained felf will, and 
 violent bent to follow prefent inclination, which may 
 be obierved in undifciplined minds. Such experience 
 as the prefent {late affords, of the frailty of our nature ; 
 of the boundlefs extravagance of ungoverned paflion ; 
 of the power which an infinite Being has over us, by 
 the various capacities of mifery which he has given us ; 
 in fhort, that kind and degree of experience which the 
 prefent flate affords us, that the constitution of nature 
 is fuch*as to admit the poflibility, the danger, and the 
 actual event of creatures lofing their innocence and 
 happinefs, and becoming vicious and wretched, hath 
 a tendency to give us a practical fenfe of things very 
 different from a mere fpeculative knowledge, that we 
 are liable to vice, and capable of mifery. And who 
 knows, whether the fecurity of creatures in the high- 
 eft and moft fettled {late of perfection may not in part 
 arife from their having had fuch a fenfe of things as 
 this, formed and habitually fixed within them, in Ibme 
 
 flats 
 
CHAP. V. Moral D if dp line. 149 
 
 ftate of probation. And patting through the prefent 
 world with that moral attention which is necerTary to 
 the acting a right part in it, may leave everlafting im- 
 preflions of this fort upon our minds. But to be a 
 little more diftinct allurements to what is wrong ; 
 difficulties in the difcharge of our duty ; our not be- 
 ing able to act an uniform right part without fome 
 thought and care ; and the opportunities which we 
 have, or imagine we have, of avoiding what we diflike, 
 or obtaining what we defire, by unlawful means, when 
 we either cannot do it at all, or at lead not fo eafily, 
 by lawful ones ; thefe things, i. e. tlv* mares and 
 temptations of vice, are what render the prefent world 
 peculiarly fit to be a (late of difcipline to thofe who 
 will preferve their integrity, becauie they render being 
 upon our guard, refolution, and the denial of our 
 paffions necefTary in order to that end. And the 
 exercife of fuch particular recollection, intention of 
 mind, and felf government in the practice of virtue 
 has, from the make of our nature, a peculiar tendency 
 to form habits of virtue, as implying not only a real 
 but alfo a more continued and a more intenfe exercife 
 of the virtuous principle, or a more conftant and a 
 ftronger effort of virtue exerted into act. Thus fup- 
 pofe a perfon to know himfelf to be in particular dan- 
 ger for fome time of doing any thing wrong, which 
 yet he fully refolves not to do ; continued recollection, 
 and keeping upon his guard, in order to make good 
 his refolution, is a continued exerting of that act of vir- 
 tue in a high degree ^ which need have been, and per- 
 haps would have been, only inftantaneous and weak, 
 had the temptation been fo. It is indeed ridiculous 
 to aflert, that felf denial is effential to virtue and piety; 
 but it would have been nearer the truth, though not 
 ftrictly the truth itfelf, to have faid, that it is efiential 
 to difcipline and improvement. For though actions 
 materially virtuous, which have no fort of difficulty, 
 
 but. 
 
156 Of a State of PART!, 
 
 but are perfectly agreeable to our particular inclina- 
 tions, may poflibly be done only from thefe particu- 
 lar inclinations, and fo may not be any exercife of the 
 principle of virtue, i. e.- not be virtuous actions at all ; 
 yet on the contrary, they may be an exercife of that 
 principle ; and when they are, they have a tendency 
 to form and fix the habit of virtue. But when the 
 exercife of the virtuous principle is more continued* 
 oftener repeated, and more mtenfe, as it muft be in 
 circumftances of danger, temptation, and difficulty 
 of any kind and in any degree, this tendency is in- 
 creaied propGrtionably, and a more confirmed habit is 
 the conference. 
 
 This undoubtedly holds to a certain le'ngth ; but 
 how far it may hold I know not; Neither our intel- 
 Ie6tual powers, nor our bodily ftrength, Can be im- 
 proved beyond fuch a degree ; and both may be over- 
 wrought. Poffibly there may be fomewhat analogous 
 to this, with fefpecl: to the moral character, which is 
 fcarce worth confidering. And 1 mention it only, left 
 it mould corne into fome peribns' thoughts, not as an 
 exception to the foregoing obfervations, which perhaps 
 it is, but as a confutation of them, which it is not. 
 And there may be feveral other exceptions. Obfer- 
 vations of this kind cannot be fuppoied to hold mi- 
 nutely and in every cafe. It is enough that they hold 
 in general. And thefe plainly hold fo far, as that 
 trorn them may be feen diflin&ly, which is all that is 
 intended by them, that the' prefent world is peculiarly 
 jit to be a flat e of difdpline, for our improvement in vir- 
 tue and piety f , in the fame fenfe as fome fciences, by 
 requiring and engaging the attention, not to be fare 
 of fuch perfons as will not, but of fuch as will, fet 
 themfelves to them, are fit to form the mind to habits 
 of attention. 
 
 Indeed the prefent ftate is fo far from proving, in 
 event, a difcipline of virtue to the generality of men, 
 
 that* 
 
CHAP. V- Moral Difcipline. 
 
 that, on the contrary, they feem to make it a difci- 
 pline of vice. And the vicioumefs of the world is, in 
 different ways, the great temptation which renders it 
 a ftate of virtuous difcipline, in the degree it is, to 
 good men. The whole end and the whole occafion 
 of mankind's being placed in fuch a ftate as the pref- 
 ent, is not pretended to be accounted for. That 
 which, appears amidft the general corruption, is, that 
 there are fome perfons, who, having within them the 
 principle of amendment and recovery, attend to and 
 follow the notices of virtue and religion, be they more 
 clear or more obfcure, which are afforded them ; and 
 that the prefent world is, not only an exercife of vir- 
 tue in thefe pevfons, but an exercife of it in ways and 
 degrees peculiarly apt to improve it ; apt to improve 
 it, in fome refpefts, even beyond what would be by 
 the exercife of it required in a perfectly virtuous foci- 
 ety, or in a fociety of equally imperfect virtue with 
 themfelves. But that the prefent world does not ac- 
 tually become a ftate of moral difcipline to many, 
 even to the generality, i. e. that they do not improve 
 or grow better in it, cannot be urged as a proof that, 
 it was not intended for moral difcipline, by any who 
 at ail obferve the analogy of nature. For, of the nu- 
 merous feeds of vegetables and bodies of animals, 
 which are adapted and put in the way to improve to 
 fuch a point or ftate of natural maturity and perfec- 
 tion, we do 'not fee perhaps that one in a million ac- 
 tually does. Far the greateft part of them decay be- 
 fore they are improved to it, and appear to be abfo- 
 lutely deftroyed. Yet no one, who does not deny all 
 final cautes, will deny that thofe feeds and bodies 
 which do attain to that point of maturity and perfec- 
 tion, anfwer the end for which they were really cleilgn- 
 ed by nature, and therefore that nature defigned them 
 for fuch perfection. And I cannot forbear adding, 
 though it is not to the prefeat purpofe, that the att- 
 
t$z Of a State of PART I, 
 
 pearance of fuch an amazing wafte in nature, with re- 
 iped to thefe feeds and bodies, by foreign caufes, is to 
 us as unaccountable, as, what is much more terrible, 
 the prefent and future ruin of fo many moral agents 
 by themfelves, i. e. by vice. 
 
 Againft this whole notion of moral difcipline it may 
 be objected in another way, that fo far as a courfe of 
 behaviour, materially virtuous, proceeds from hoper 
 and fear, fo far it is only a difcipline and ftrengthen- 
 ing . of felf love. But doing what God commands, 
 becaufe he commands it, is obedience, though it pro- 
 ceeds from hope or fear. And a courfe of fuch obe- 
 dience will form habits of it. And a conftant regard 
 to veracity, juftice and charity may form diftindt hab- 
 its of thefe particular virtues, and will certainly form 
 habits of felf government, and of denying our inclina- 
 tions, whenever veracity, juilice or charity requires 
 it. Nor is there any foundation for this great nicety, 
 with which fome affect to diftinguith in this cafe, in 
 order to depreciate all religion proceeding from hope 
 or fear. For, veracity, juftice and charity, regard to 
 God's authority, and to our own chief intereft, are not 
 only all three coincident, but each of them is, in it- 
 felt, a juft and natural motive or principle of action. 
 And he who begins a good life from any one of them, 
 and perfeveres in it, as he is already in fome degree, 
 ib he cannot fail of becoming more and more of that 
 character, which is correfpondent to the conftitution 
 of nature as moral, and to the relation which God 
 {lands in to us as moral governor of it ; nor conie- 
 qucntly can he fail of obtaining that happinefs which 
 this conftitution and relation neceflarily fuppofe con* 
 ne&ed with that character. 
 
 Thefe feveral obfervations concerning the active 
 principle of virtue and obedience to God's commands 
 are applicable to paffive fubmiffion or refignation to 
 his will, which is another efiential part of a right char- 
 acter, 
 
CHAP. V. Moral Difcipline. 153 
 
 acter, connected with the former, and very much in 
 our power to form ourt elves to. It may be imagined, 
 that nothing but afflictions can give occafion for or 
 require this virtue ; that it can have no refpect to, nor 
 be any way neceffary to qualify for, a ftate of perfect: 
 happinefs ; but it is not experience which can make 
 us think thus. Profperity itfelf, whilft any thing fup- 
 poled deferable is not ours, begets extravagant and un- 
 bounded thoughts. Imagination is altogether as 
 much a fcurce of difcontent as any thing in our exter- 
 nal condition. It is indeed true, that there can be no 
 fcope for patience, when forrow (hall be no more ; but 
 there may be need of a temper of mind which fhall 
 have been formed by patience. For though felf love, 
 confidered merely as an active principle leading us to 
 purfue our chief intereft, cannot but be uniformly co- 
 incident with the principle of obedience to God's 
 commands, our intereft being rightly underftood ; be- 
 caufe this obedience, and the purfuit of our own chief 
 intereft, muft be in every cafe one and the fame thing ; 
 yet it may be queftioned, whether felf love, confidered 
 merely as the defire of our own intereft or happinefs* 
 can, from its nature, be thus abfolutely and uniformly 
 coincident with the will of God, any more than par- 
 ticular affections can , coincident in fuch fort, as not 
 to be liable to be excited upon occallons and in de- 
 grees, impoiiible to be gratified confidently with the 
 conftitution of things, or the divine appointments. 
 So that habits of resignation may, upon this account, 
 be requifite for all creatures ; habits, I fay, which fig- 
 nify what is formed by ufe. However, in general it 
 is obvious, that both felf love and particular affections 
 in human creatures, confidered only as paflive feelings, 
 diftort and rend the mind; and therefore (land in need 
 of difciplinc. Now denial of thofe particular affec- 
 tion?, in a courie of active virtue and obedience to 
 God's will, has a tendency to moderate them, and 
 ] < feem. 
 
154 Of a $ tate f PA&T Iv 
 
 feems alfo to have a tendency to habituate the mind 
 to be eafy and Satisfied with that degree of happinefs 
 which is allotted us, i. e. to moderate felf love. But 
 the proper discipline for refignation is affliction. For 
 a right behaviour under that trial 1 ; recollecting our- 
 Selves So as to confid'er it in- the view in which religion 
 teaches us to conrkkr it, as from the hand of God ; 
 receiving it as what he appoint s y or thinks proper to 
 permit, in his world and under his government -, this 
 will habituate the mind to a dutiful fubmiffion. And 
 inch SuhmifSon, together with the active principle of 
 obedience, make up the temper and character in us 
 which anfwers to his Sovereignty, and which abSolute- 
 ly belongs to the condition of our being, as depend- 
 ent creatures. Nor can it be faid that this is only 
 breaking the mind to a fubmiffion to mere power, for 
 mere power may be accidental, and precarious, and 
 ufurped ; but it is forming within ourfelves the tem- 
 per of refignation to his rightful authority, who is, by- 
 nature, Supreme over all. 
 
 Upon the whole, Such a character, and fuch qual- 
 ifications, are neceflary for a mature flate of life in the 
 preSent world, as nature alone does in no wife beftow, 
 but has put it upon us in great part to acquire, in our 
 progrefs from one flage of life to another, from child- 
 hood to mature age ; put it upon us to acquire them,- 
 by giving us capacities of doing it, and by placing us, 
 in the beginning of life, in a condition fit for it. And 
 this is a general analogy to our condition in the pref- 
 ent world, as in a State of moral discipline for another. 
 It is in vain then to object againft the credibility of 
 the prefent life's being intended for this purpofe, that 
 all the trouble and the danger unavoidably accompa- 
 nying fuch difcipline might have been Saved us, by our 
 being made at once the creatures and the characters 
 which we were to be. For we experience, that 'what 
 iv e were to be was to be the effect of what we would 
 
 do; 
 
CHAP. V. Moral Difdpline. 
 
 do ; and that the general conduft of nature is, not to 
 lave us trouble or danger, but to make us capable of 
 going through them, and to put it upon us to do fo. 
 Acquirements of Our own, experience and habits, are 
 the natural fupply to our deficiencies, and fecurity 
 againft our dangers, iince it is as plainly natural to fet 
 ourfelves to acquire the qualifications, as the external 
 things, which we ftand in need of. In particular, it 
 is as plainly a general law of nature that we mould, 
 with regard to our temporal intereft, form and culti- 
 vate practical principles within us, by attention, ufe 
 and difcipline, as any thing whatever is a natural law ; 
 chiefly in the beginning of life, but alfo throughout 
 the whole courfe of it. And the alternative is left to 
 our choice, either to improve ourfelves, and better 
 our condition, or, in default of fuch improvement, to 
 remain deficient and wretched. It is therefore per- 
 fedtly credible, from the analogy of nature, that the 
 fame may be our cafe, with refped: to the happinefs of 
 a future Rate, and the qualifications neceflary for it. 
 
 There is a third thing^ which may feem implied in 
 the preient world's being a {late of probation ; that it 
 is a theatre of a&ion for the manifeftation of perfons' 
 characters, with refpedt to a future one ; not to be 
 fure to an a)l knowing Being, but to his creation or 
 part of it. This may, perhaps, be only a coniequence 
 of our being in a fcate of probation in the other fenfes. 
 However, it is not importable that men's (hewing and 
 making manife'ft what is in their heart, what their re- 
 al character is, may have refped to a future life, in 
 ways and manners which we are not acquainted with ; 
 particularly it may be a means, for the Author of na- 
 ture does not appear to do any thing without means, 
 of their being difpofed of fuitably to their characters ; 
 and of its being known to the creation, by way of ex- 
 ample, that they are thus difpcfed of. But not to 
 enter upon any conje&ural account of this, one may 
 L 2 jult 
 
256 Of the Opinion of Neceffity, PART I. 
 
 juft mention, that the manifestation of perfons' char- 
 alters contributes very much, in various ways, to the 
 carrying on a great part of that general courfe of na- 
 ture, relpefting mankind, which comes under our ob- 
 fervation at prefent. I fliall only add, that probation, 
 in both thefe fenfes, as well as in that treated of in the 
 foregoing chapter, is implied in moral government, 
 fmce by perfons' behaviour under it their characters 
 cannot but be manifefted, and, if they behave well,; 
 improved. 
 
 G H A P. VI 
 
 Of the Opinion of Necejfity, confidered as 
 Practice. 
 
 JT HROUGHQUT the foregoing trea- 
 tife it appears, that the condition of mankind, confid- 
 ered as inhabitants of this world only, and under the 
 government of God which we experience, is greatly 
 analogous to our condition as defigned for another 
 world, or under that farther government which relig- 
 ion teaches us. If therefore any afiert, as a fatalifl 
 muft, that the opinion of universal neceffity is recon- 
 cileable with the former, there immediately arifes a 
 queflion in the way of analogy, whether he mud not 
 alfo own it to be reconcileable with the latter, i. e. 
 with the fyflem of religion itfelf, and the proof of it. 
 The reader then will obferve, that the queftion now. 
 before us is not abfolute, Whether the opinion of rate 
 be reconcileable with religion ; but hypothetical, 
 Whether, upon fuppofition of its being reconcileable 
 with the conftitution of nature, it be not reconcileable 
 with religion alfo j or, what pretence a fatalifl, not 
 
 other 
 
CHAP. VI. as influencing Pr fifties. 157 
 
 other perfons, but a fatalift, has to conclude from his 
 opinion that there can be no fuch thing as religion. 
 And as the puzzle and obfcurity -which muft unavoid- 
 ably arife from arguing upon fo abfurd a fuppofition 
 as that of univerfal neceflity will, I fear, eafily be ieen, 
 it will, I hope, as eafily be excufed. 
 
 But fmce it has been all along taken for granted, as 
 a thing proved, that there is an intelligent Author of 
 nature, or natural Governor of the world ; and lincc 
 an objection may be made againft the proof of this, 
 from the opinion of univerfal neceflity, as it may be 
 feppofed that fuch neceflity will itfelf account for the 
 origin and prefervation of all things, it is requifite that 
 this objection be diftinctly anfwered, or that it be 
 fhewn that a fatality, fuppofed confident with what 
 we certainly experience, does not deflroy the proof of 
 an intelligent Author and Governor of nature, before 
 we proceed to confider whether it deilroys the proof 
 of a moral Governor .of it, or of our being in a (late of 
 religion. 
 
 Now, when it is faid by a fatalift, that the whole 
 conftitution of nature, and the aclions of men, that 
 every thing, and every mode and circnmftance of ev- 
 ery thing, is necefTary, and could not poflibly have 
 been otherwife, it is to be obferved, that this necef- 
 {ity does not exclude deliberation, choice, preference, 
 and ading from certain principles, and to certain 
 ends ; becaufe all this is matter of undoubted expe- 
 rience, acknowledged by all, and what every man 
 may, every moment, be confcious of. And from 
 hence it follows, that neceflity, alone and of itfelf, is 
 in no fort an account of the conftitution of nature, 
 and how things came fo be and to continue as they are ; 
 but only an account of this circumjlance relating to 
 their origin and continuance, that they could not have 
 been otherwife than they are and have been. The 
 aflertion that every thing is by neceflity of nature, is 
 
 ngt 
 
158 Of the Opinion of Ncceffily, PART L 
 
 not an anfwer to the queflion, Whether the world 
 came into being as it is, by an intelligent Agent form- 
 ing it thus, or not ; but to quite another queftion, 
 Whether it came into being as it is, in that way and 
 manner which we call neceJJarUy^ or in that way and 
 manner which we call freely. For fuppoie farther, 
 that one who was a fatalifl, and one who kept to his 
 natural fenfe of things, and believed himfelf a free 
 agent, were diiputing together, and vindicating their 
 refpeftive opinions, and they mould happen to inftance 
 in a houfe, they would agree that it was built by an 
 architect. Their difference concerning neceflity and 
 freedom would occafion no difference of judgment 
 concerning this, but only concerning another matter, 
 whether the architect built it neceflarily or freely, 
 Suppofe then they mould proceed to inquire concern- 
 ing the conflitution of nature ; in a lax way of fpeakr 
 ing, one of them might fay it was by neceflity, and 
 the other by freedom ; but if they had any meaning 
 to their words, as the latter mud mean a free agent, 
 ib the former mufl at length be reduced to mean an 
 agent, whether he would fay one or more, afting by 
 neceflity ; for abftract notions can do nothing. Inr 
 deed we afcribe to God a necefTary exiftence, uncaufed 
 by any agent. For we find within ourf elves the idea 
 of infinity, i. e, immenfity and eternity, impoffible, 
 even in imagination, to be removed out of being. 
 We feem to difcern intuitively that there mufl and 
 cannot but be fomewhat, external to ourfelves, anfwer- 
 ing this idea., or the archetype of it. And from 
 hence (for this abftraffi, as much as any other, implies 
 a concrete] we conclude that there is, and cannot but 
 be, an infinite and immenfe eternal Being, exifling 
 prior to all defign contributing to his exiftence and 
 exclufive of it. And from the fcantinefs of language, 
 n. manner of fpeaking has been introduced, that necef- 
 lity is the foundation, the reafon, the account of the 
 
 exiflencQ 
 
C K A P . " V I. as influencing Pra&ice. 159 
 
 exiftence of God. But it is not alleged, nor can it be 
 at all intended, that every thing exiils as it does, by 
 this kind of neceffity, a neceffity antecedent in nature 
 to delign : It cannot, I fay, be meant that every thing 
 exifls as it does, by this kind of neceffity, upon feveral 
 accounts ; and particularly becaufe it: is admitted, 
 -that defign, in the actions of men, -contributes to ma- 
 ny alterations in nature. For if any deny this, I (hall 
 not pretend to reafon with them. 
 
 From thefe things it follows, JF/V/?, That when a fa- 
 talifl afTerts that every thing is by necejfity, he mull 
 mean by an. agent acting ve&flarily ; he muft, I fay, 
 mean this, for I am very fenfible he would not choofe 
 to mean it : And, Secondly, That the neceffity by 
 which fuch an agent is fuppofed to act does not ex- 
 clude intelligence and deii2;n. So that were the fyf- 
 tem of fatality admitted, it would juft as much ac- 
 count for the formation of the world as for the flruc- 
 ture of an houfe, and no more. Neceffity as much 
 requires and fuppofes a neceflary .agent, as freedom 
 requires and fuppofes a free agent, to be the former of 
 the world. And the appearances of dejign and of final 
 caufes in the conflitution of nature as really prove this 
 acting agent to be an intelligent defigner^ or to act from 
 choice, upon the fcheme of neceffity, fuppofed poi- 
 ftble, as upon that of freedom, 
 
 It appearing thus, that the notion of neceffity does 
 not deftroy the proof that there is an intelligent Au- 
 thor of nature and natural Governor of the world, the 
 prefent queftioh, which the analogy before mention- 
 ed* fuggefts, and which, I think, it will anfwer, is 
 this, Whether the opinion of neceffity, fuppofed 
 confntent with poffibility, with the conflitution of the 
 world, arid the natural government which we expe- 
 rience exercifed over it, deftroys all reaibnable ground 
 of belief that we are in a ilate of religion ; or whether 
 
 that 
 *p. 156, 
 
1 60 Of the Opinion of 'Neceffity, PART!. 
 
 that opinion be reconcileable with religion, with the 
 fyflem and the proof of it, 
 
 Suppoie then a fatalift to educate any one, from his 
 youth up, in his own principles ; that the child 
 fhould reafon upon them, and conclude that fmce he 
 cannot poffibly behave otherwife than he does, he is 
 not a fubject of blame or commendation, nor can de-? 
 ferve to be rewarded or punifhed : Imagine him to 
 eradicate the very perceptions of blame and commen- 
 dation out of his mind, by means of this fyflem ; to. 
 form his temper, and character, and behaviour to it, 
 and from it to judge of the treatment he was to ex- 
 peel:, fay from reafonable men, upon his coming abroad 
 into the world ; as the fatalift judges from this fyftem 
 what he is to expect from the Author of nature and 
 with regard to a future ftate. I cannot forbear flop- 
 ping here to aik, whether any one of common fenfe 
 would think fit that a child mould be put upon thefe 
 fpeculations, and be left to apply them to practice, 
 And a man has little pretence to reafon, who is not 
 ienfible that we are all children in {peculations of this 
 kind. However, the child would doubtlefs be highly 
 delighted to find himfelf freed from the reftraints of 
 fear and fhame, with which his playfellows were fet- 
 tered and embarraffed, and highly conceited in his fu- 
 perior knowledge, fo far beyond his years. But con- 
 ceit and vanity would be the leaft bad part of the in-* 
 fluence which thefe principles mufl have, when thus 
 reafoned and acted upon, during the courfe of his ed- 
 ucation. He muft either be allowed to go on and be 
 the plague of all about him, and himfelf too, even to 
 his own deftruction, or elfe correction muft be con- 
 tinually made ufe of, to fupply the want of thofe nat- 
 ural perceptions of blame and commendation which 
 we have fuppofed to be removed, and to give him a 
 practical imprefiion of what he had reafoned himfelf 
 out of the belief of, that he was in fact an accountable 
 
 child, 
 
.CHAP. VI. as influencing Prattle e. 161 
 
 child, and to be punifhed for doing what he was for- 
 bid. It is therefore in reality impoffible, but that the 
 correction which he mud meet with, in the courfe of 
 his education, mud convince him that if the fcheme 
 he was inftructcd in were not falfe, yet that he realbn- 
 ed inconclufively upon it, and fome how or other mif- 
 applied it to practice and common life ; as what the 
 fatal ifl experiences of the conduct of Providence at 
 prefent, ought in all reafon to convince him that this 
 icheme is mifapplied when applied to the iubject of 
 religion. But fuppofing the child's temper could re- 
 main flill formed to the fyftem, and his expectation 
 of the treatment he was to have in the world be regu- 
 lated by it, fo as to expect that no reafonable man 
 would blame or punifh him for any thing which he 
 (hould do, becaufe he could not help doing it upon 
 this iuppofition it is manifeft he would, upon his com* 
 ing abroad into the world, be infupportable to ibcie- 
 ty, and the treatment which he would receive from it 
 would render it fo to him, and he could not fail of do- 
 ing fomewhat very foon for which he would be deliv- 
 ered over into the hands of civil juftice. And thus, 
 in the end, he would be convinced of the obligations 
 he was under to his wife inftructor. Or fuppofe this 
 fcheme of fatality in any other way applied to practice, 
 fuch practical application of it will be found equally 
 ablurd, equally fallacious in a practical ienfe. Far 
 inflance, that if a man be deflined to live fuch a time, 
 he fhall live to it, though he take no care of his own 
 prefervation ; or if he be deflined to die before that 
 time, no care can prevent it ; therefore all care about 
 preferving one's life is to be neglected, which is the 
 fallacy inftanced in by the ancients. But now on the 
 contrary, none of thefe practical abturdities can be 
 drawn from reafoning upon the iuppofition that we are 
 free ; but all fuch reafoning with regard to the com- 
 mon affairs of life is iu (lifted by experience. And 
 
 therefore, 
 
Gf the Opinion of Neceffity, PART I. 
 
 therefore, though it were admitted that this opinion 
 of neceffity were fpeculatively true, yet with regard to 
 practice it is as if it were falfe, fo far as our experience 
 reaches ; that is, to the whole of our prefent life. 
 For, the conftitution of the prefent world, and the 
 condition in which we are actually placed, is as if we 
 were free. And it may perhaps juftly be concluded, 
 that iince the whole procefs of action, through every 
 ftep of it, fufpenfe, deliberation, inclining one way, 
 determining, and at lad doing as we determine, is as 
 if we were free, therefore we are fo. But the thing 
 here infilled upon is, that under the prefent natural 
 government of the world, we find we are treated and 
 dealt with as if we were free, prior to all consideration 
 whether we are or not. Were this opinion therefore 
 of neceffity admitted to be ever fo true, yet fuch is in 
 fact our condition and the natural courle of things, 
 that whenever we apply it to life and practice, this ap- 
 plication of it always misleads us, and cannot but mif- 
 lead us, in a molt dreadful manner, with regard to 
 our prefent intereft. And how can people think 
 themfelves fo very fecure then, that the fame applicar 
 tion of the fame opinion may not miflead them alfo, 
 in fome analogous manner, with refpect to a future 
 or more general and more important intereft ? For, 
 religion being a practical fubject, and the analogy of 
 nature mewing us that we have not faculties to apply 
 this opinion, were it a true one, to practical fubjects, 
 whenever we do apply it to the fubject of religion, and. 
 thence conclude that we are free from its obligations, 
 it is plain this conclulion cannot be depended upon. 
 There will ftill remain juft reafon to think, whatever 
 appearances are, that we deceive ourfelves ; in fomewhat 
 of a like manner, as when people fancy they can draw 
 contradictory conclulions from the idea of infinity. 
 
 From thefe things together, the attentive reader 
 will fee it follows, that if upon fuppofition of freedom 
 
 the 
 
CHAP. VL as influencing Practice, 163 
 
 the evidence of religion be conclufive, it remains. fo 
 upon luppofition of neceffity, becaufe the notion of 
 neceffity is not applicable to practical fubjects, i. e, 
 with refpect to them, is as if it were not true. Nor 
 does this contain any reflection upon reafon, but only 
 upon what is unreafonabie. For to pretend to act 
 upon reafon, in oppofition to practical principles, 
 which the Author of our nature gave us to act upon, 
 and to pretend to apply our reafon to fubjects, with 
 regard to which our own ihort views, and even our 
 experience, will (hew us it cannot be depended upon, 
 and fucli at beft the fubject of neceffity muft be, this 
 is vanity, conceit and unreafonableneis. 
 
 But this is not all > for we find within ourfclvcs a 
 will, and are confcious of a character. Now if this in 
 us be reconcileable with fate, it is reconcileable with it 
 in the Author of nature. And befides, natural gov- 
 ernment and final caules imply a character and a will 
 in the Governor and Defigner ;* a will concerning the 
 creatures whom he governs. The Author of nature 
 then being certainly of fome character or other, not- 
 withstanding neceffity, it is evident this neceffity is as 
 reconcileable with the particular character of benevo- 
 lence, veracity and juftice in him, which attributes are 
 the foundation of religion, as with any other charac- 
 ter ; fince we find this neceffity no more hinders men 
 from being benevolent than cruel, true than faithleis, 
 juft than unjuft, or if the fatalift pleafes, what we call 
 unjuit. For it is faid indeed, that what, upon fuppo- 
 fition of freedom, would be juft punifhment,upon ftip- 
 polition of neceffity becomes manifeftly unjuft,becauie 
 it is punilhment inflicted for doing that which peribns 
 could not avoid doing ; as if the neceffity which is 
 fuppofed to cleftroy the injuftice of murder, for in- 
 
 ftance, 
 
 * By ivlll and character is meant that, which, in fpeaking of men, we 
 fhould cxprefs, not only by thefe words, but rilb by the words fcmfer, /<-,;, 
 etifpo/itiom, practical -principles j that wfalc frasnc of nnnd } from ivhc'tct; we aft i* 
 fne manner rather than another. 
 
164 Of the Opinion of NeceJJity, PART L 
 
 ftance, would not alfo deilroy the injuilice of punifli- 
 ing it. However, as little to the purpofe as this ob- 
 je&ion is in itfelf, it is very much to the purpofe to 
 obferve from it how the notions of juftiee and injuftice 
 remain, even whilft we endeavour to fuppofe them re- 
 moved ; how they force themtelves upon the mind, 
 even whilft we are making fuppofitions deftru&ive of 
 them ; for there is not, perhaps, a man in the world, 
 but would be ready to make this objection at mil 
 thought. 
 
 But though it is moil evident, that univerfal necef- 
 fity, if it be recondleable with any thing, is reconcile- 
 able with that character in the Author of nature which 
 is the foundation of religion, " Yet, does it not plain- 
 ly deftroy the proof that he is of that character, and 
 confequently the proof of religion ?" By no means. 
 For we find, that happinefs and miiery are not our fate, 
 in any fuch fenfe as not to be the confequences of our 
 behaviour ; but that they are the confequences of it.* 
 We find God exercifes the fame kind of government 
 over us with that which a father exercifes over his 
 children, and a civil magiftrate over his fubjects. 
 Now, whatever becomes of abftract queflions con- 
 cerning liberty and neceffity, it evidently appears to 
 us, that veracity and juftiee muft be the natural rule 
 and meafure of exercifmg this authority or govern- 
 ment, to a Being who can have no competitions, or 
 interfering of interefts, with his creatures and his 
 fubjects. 
 
 But as the doctrine of liberty, though we experience 
 its truth, may be perplexed with difficulties which run 
 up into the moft abftrufe of all {peculations, and as 
 the opinion of neceffity feems to be the very baiis up- 
 on which infidelity grounds itfelf, it may be of fome 
 ufe to offer a more particular proof of the obligations 
 of religion, which may diftinctly be fhewn not to be 
 deftroyed by this opinion. The 
 
 *Chap. ii. 
 
CHAP. VI. as influencing Practice. 165 
 
 The proof from final caufes of an intelligent Author 
 of nature is not arTe&ed by the opinion of neceffity, 
 fuppofing neceffity a thing poffible in itfelf, and recon- 
 cileable with the conflitution of things.* And it is a 
 matter of fad, independent on this or any other fpec- 
 ulation, that he governs the world by the method of 
 rewards and punifhments ;-}- and alib that he hath 
 given us a moral faculty, by which we diftinguifh be- 
 tween actions, and approve fome as virtuous and of 
 good defert, and difapprove others as vicious and of 
 ill defert. j Now this moral difcernment implies in 
 the notion of it a rule of action, and a rule of a very" 
 peculiar kind ; for it carries in it authority and a right 
 of direction j authority in fuch a fenfe, as that we can- 
 not depart from it without being felf condemned. 
 And that the dictates of this moral faculty, which are 
 by nature a rule to us, are moreover the laws of God, 
 laws in a fenfe including fanctions,may be thus proved. 
 Confcioufneis of a rule or guide of aftion, in creatures 
 who are capable of confidering it as given them by 
 their Maker, not only raifes immediately, a fenfe of 
 duty, but alfo a fenfe of fecurity in following it, and 
 of danger in deviating from it. A dire&ion of the 
 Author of nature, given to creatures capable of look- 
 ing upon it as fuch, is plainly a command from him ; 
 and a command from him neceflarily includes in it,, 
 at leafl, an implicit promife in cafe of obedience, or 
 threatening in cafe of difobedience. But then the 
 fenfe or perception of good and ill defert, || which is 
 contained in the moral difcernment, renders the fane- 
 tion explicit, and makes it appear, as one may fay, ex- 
 preffed. For fmce his method of government is to re- 
 ward and punifli a&ions, his having annexed to fome 
 actions an infeparable fenfe of good defert, and to 
 others of ill, this furely amounts to declaring upon 
 
 whom. 
 
 * P. 157, &c. f Ch. ii. * Dr/trtathn II. 
 
 . Sermon --. at the Re'!:. Jj D for tat ion 11, 
 
166 Of the Opinion of Neceffiiy, PART I 
 
 whom his puniihments fhall be inflicted, and his re- 
 wards be beftowed. For he mtifl have given us this 
 difcernment and fenfe of things, a : s a prefentiment of 
 what is to be hereafter ; that is, by way of informa- 
 tion beforehand what we are finally to expect in his 
 world. There is then moft evident ground to think, 
 
 O 
 
 that the' government of God, upon the whole, will be 
 found to correfpond to the nature which he has given 
 us ; and that in the upfhot and iffue of things, happi- 
 nets and miiery fhall, in fact and event, be made to 
 follow virtue and vice refpectively, as he has already, 
 in fo peculiar a manner, affociated the ideas of them 
 in our minds. And from hence might eafily be de- 
 duced the obligations of religious worl-hip, were it on- 
 ly to be confiderecl as a means of preserving upon our 
 minds a fenfe of this moral government of God, and 
 ibcurmg our obedience to it ; which yet is an ex- 
 tremely imperfect view of that moil important duty. 
 Now I fay, no objection from .nece'flity can lie 
 againft this general proof of religion. None againft 
 the proposition reafoned upon, that we have fuch a 
 moral faculty ^and difcernment, becaufe this is a mere 
 matter o SaSt, a thing of experience, that human kind 
 is thus coriftituted ; none againft the concluiion, be- 
 caufe it is immediate and wholly from this fact.. For 
 the conclufion, that God will finally reward the righ- 
 teous and punifh the wicked, is not here drawn from 
 Its appearing to us fit* that he Jhould^ but from its ap- 
 pearing 
 
 * However, I am far from intending to deny that the will of God is deter- 
 mined, by xvhat is fit, by the right and reafoii of the cafe ; though one choofes 
 to decline matters of fuch abftract fpeculation, and to fpeak with caution 
 when, one does fpeak of them. But if it be intelligible to fay, that /'/ is Jit and 
 reasonable for every one to cmfult his oiun happinefs) then fityff* tf uffion, or t j ;c 
 right and rrafon of th? cafe, is an intelligible manner of fpeakirrg. And it feems 
 as inconceivable to fuppofe God to approve one courfe of action, or one end, 
 preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from dcfign implies that he 
 does, without fuppofing fomewhat prior in that end to be the ground of the 
 preference, as to fuppofe him to difcern an abflracl: proportion to be tru<-, 
 without fuppofing fomewhat prior in it to be the ground of the difcernment:. 
 It doth not therefore appear, that moral right is any more relative to percep- 
 tion than ahftracl truth is ; or that it is any more improper to fpeak of the 
 litnefs and rightnefs of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, 
 than to fpeak of abstract truth, as thus founded. 
 
CHA?. VI. as influencing Praftice. 167 
 
 pearing that he has told us he will. And this lie hath 
 certainly told us, in the promife and threatening which 
 k hath been obferved the notion of a command im- 
 plies, and the fenfe of good and ill defert which he has 
 given us, more diftindly expreffes. And this reafon- 
 ing from fad is confirmed, and in feme degree even 
 verified, by other fads ; by the natural tendencies of 
 virtue and of vice ;* and by this, that God, in the 
 natural courfe of his providence, punifhes vicious ac- 
 tions as mifchievous to fociety, and alfo vicious ac- 
 tions, as fuch, in the ftrideft fenfe.-}- So that the gen- 
 eral proof of religion is unanfwerably real, even upon 
 the wild fuppofition which we are arguing upon. 
 
 It muft likewife be obferved farther, that natural 
 religion hath, befides this, an external evidence, which 
 the doctrine of necedity, if it could be true, would 
 not afTed. For fuppofe a perfon, by the obfervations 
 and reafoning above, or by any other, convinced of the 
 truth of religion ; that there is a God, who made the 
 world, who is the moral Governor and Judge of man- 
 kind, and will upon the whole deal with every one ac- 
 cording to his works ; I fay, fuppofe a perfon con- 
 vinced of this by reafon, but to know nothing at all 
 of antiquity, or the prefent ftate of mankind ; it would 
 be natural for fuch an one to be inquifitive what was 
 the hiflory of this fyftem of.jdodrine j at what time, 
 and in what manner, it came, firft into the world, and 
 whether it were believed by any coniiderable part of it. 
 And were he upon inquiry to find, that a particular 
 perfon in a late age firft of all propofed it, as a deduc- 
 tion of reaibn, and that mankind were before wholly 
 ignorant of it ; then, though its evidence from reafon 
 would remain, there would be no additional proba- 
 bility of its truth, from the account of its difcovery. 
 But inftead of this being the fad of the cafe, on the 
 contrary he would find, what could not but afford 
 
 him 
 
 * P- ii r. f P. 103, &c. 
 
1 6 8 Of the Opinion of tfeceffity, PART!. 
 
 him a very ftrong confirmation of its truth, Firft 9 
 That ibmewhat of this fyftem, with more or fewer ad- 
 ditions and alterations, hath been profefled in all ages 
 and countries, of which we have any certain informa- 
 tion relating to this matter. Secondly ', That it is cer- 
 tain hiftorical faft, fo far as we can trace things up, 
 that this whole fyftem of belief, that there is one God, 
 the Creator and moral Governor of the world, and that 
 mankind is in a ftate of religion, was received in the 
 firfl ages. And, Thirdly ', That as there is no hint or 
 intimation in hiftory, that this fyftem was firft reafon- 
 ed out, fo there is exprefs hiftorical or traditional evi- 
 dence, as ancient as hiftory, that it was taught firft by 
 revelation. Now thefe. things muft be allowed to be 
 of great weight. The firft of them, general confent, 
 {hews this fyftem to be conformable to the common 
 fenfe of mankind. The fecond, namely, that religion 
 was believed in the firft ages of the world, efpecially 
 as it does not appear that there were then any fuper- 
 ftitious or falie additions to it, cannot but be a farther 
 confirmation of its truth. For it is a proof of this 
 alternative, either that it came into the world by rev- 
 elation, or that it is natural, obvious, and forces itfelf 
 upon the mind. The former of thefe is the conclu- 
 iion of learned men. And whoever will confider how 
 unapt for {peculation rude and uncultivated minds 
 are, will, perhaps from hence alone, be ftrongly in- 
 clined to believe it the truth. And as it is {hewn in 
 the lecond part* of this treatife, that there is noth- 
 ing of fuch peculiar prelumption againft a revelation 
 in the beginning of the world, as there is fuppoied to 
 be againft fubfequent ones, a iceptic could not, I 
 think, give any account, which would appear more 
 probable even to himfelf, of the early pretences to rev- 
 elation, than by fuppofing fome real original one, 
 from whence they were copied. And the third thing 
 
 above 
 
 * Ch. if. 
 
CHAP. VI. cis influencing Pra&ice. 169 
 
 above mentioned, that there is exprefs hiftorical or 
 traditional evidence as ancient as hiftory, of the fyf- 
 terrt of religion being taught mankind by revelation ; 
 this rnufl be admitted as fome degree of real proof 
 that it was fo taught. For why mould not the moft 
 ancient tradition be admitted, as fome additional 
 proof of a fad, againft which there is no prefumption ? 
 And this proof is mentioned here, becaufe it has its 
 weight to mew, that religion came into the world by 
 revelation, prior to all confideration of the proper au- 
 thority of any book fuppofed to contain it, and even 
 prior to all confideration whether the revelation itfelf 
 be uncorruptly handed down and related, or mixed 
 and darkened with fables. Thus the hiftorical ac- 
 count which we have of the origin of religion, taking 
 in all circumftances. is a real confirmation of its truth 
 no way affected by the opinion of neceflity. And the 
 external evidence, even of natural religion, is by no 
 means inconfiderable. 
 
 But it is carefully to be obferved, and ought to be 
 recollected after all proofs of virtue and religion, which 
 are only general, that as fpeculative reafon may be 
 neglected, prejudiced and deceived, fo alfo may our 
 moral underftanding be impaired and perverted, and 
 the dictates of it not impartially attended to. This 
 indeed proves nothing againft the reality of our fpec- 
 ulative or practical faculties of perception ; againft 
 their being intended by nature to inform us in the 
 theory of things, and inftruct us how we are to be- 
 have, and what we are to expect in confequence of 
 our behaviour. Yet our liablenefs, in the degree we 
 are liable, to prejudice and perverlion, is a moft ferious 
 admonition to us to be upon our guard with refpect 
 to what is of fuch confequence as our determinations 
 concerning virtue and religion, and particularly not to 
 take cuftom, and fafhicn, and flight notions of hon- 
 our, or imaginations of prefent eafe, life and conve- 
 nience to mankind, for the only moral rule.* 
 
 * Diflertatbn II. M The 
 
170 Of the Opinion of NeceJJity, PART I. 
 
 The foregoing obfervations, drawn from the nature 
 of the thing, and the hiftory of religion, amount, 
 when taken together, to a real practical proof of it, 
 not to be confuted ; fuch a proof as, confidering the 
 infinite importance of the thing, I apprehend would 
 be admitted fully fufficient, in reafon, to influence the 
 aclions of men who aft upon thought and reflection, 
 if it were admitted that there is no proof of the con- 
 trary. But it may be faid, " There are many proba- 
 bilities, which cannot indeed be confuted, i. e. (hewn 
 to be no probabilities, and yet may be overbalanced 
 by greater probabilities on the other fide - 7 much more 
 by demonflration. And there is no occafion to object 
 againft particular arguments alleged for an opinion, 
 when the opinion itfelf may be clearly mewn to be 
 falfe, without meddling with fuch arguments at all, 
 but leaving them juft as they are. Now the method 
 of government by rewards and punifhments, and ef- 
 pecially rewarding and puniihing good and ill defert, 
 as fuch, refpectively, muft go upon luppolition that 
 we are free, and not neceflary agents. And it is in- 
 credible that the Author of nature ihould govern us 
 upon a fuppolition as true, which he knows to be falfe i 
 and therefore abfurd to think he will reward or puniih. 
 us for our actions hereafter, efpecially that he will do 
 it under the notion that they are of good or ill defert." 
 Here then the matter is brought to a point. And the 
 anfwer to all this is full, and not to be evaded, that 
 the whole conftitution and courfe of things, the whole 
 analogy of Providence, mews' beyond poffibility of 
 doubt, that the conclufion from this reafoning is falfe, 
 vvhereever the fallacy lies. Tlie doctrine of freedom 
 indeed clearly (hows where ; in fuppofing ourielves 
 neceffary, when in truth we are free agents. But up- 
 on the iuppolition of neceility, the fallacy lies in tak- 
 ing for granted, that it is incredible necerTary agents 
 mould be rewarded and puniihed. But that, Tome 
 
 how 
 
CM A p. VI. as influencing Practice. 171 
 
 how or other, the ccnclufion now mentioned is falfe, 
 is moft certain. For it is fact, that God does govern 
 even brute creatures by the method of rewards and 
 puniihments, in the natural courfe of things. And 
 men are rewarded and punimed for their actions, pun- 
 imed for actions mifchievous to fociety as being fo, 
 puniihed for vicious actions, as fuch, by the natural 
 inftrumentality of each other, under the prefent con- 
 duel of Providence. Nay even the affection of grati- 
 tude, and the paffion of refentment, and the rewards 
 and punimments following from them, which in gen- 
 eral are to be confidered as natural, i. e. from the Au- 
 thor of nature, thefe rewards and punifhments, be-- 
 ing naturally* annexed to actions confidered as imply- 
 ing good intention and good defert, ill intention and 
 ill defert, thefe natural rewards and punimments, I 
 fay, are as much a contradiction to the conclufion 
 above, and mew its falfehood, as a more exact and 
 complete rewarding and punifhing of good and ill de- 
 fert, as fuch. So that if it be incredible that neceffary 
 agents mould be thus rewarded and punimed, then 
 men are not neceflary, but free ; fince it is matter of 
 fact that they are thus rewarded and punifhed. But 
 if, on the contrary, which is the fuppoiition we have 
 been arguing upon, it be infiiled that men are necef- 
 fary agents, then there is nothing incredible in the far- 
 ther fuppofition of neceflary agents being thus reward- 
 ed and puniOied, fince we ourfelves are thus dealt with. 
 From the whole, therefore, it muft follow, that a 
 neceffity fuppofed poffible, and reconcileable with the 
 conftitution of things, does in no fort prove that the 
 Author of nature will not, nor deftroy the proof that 
 he will, finally and upon the whole,- in his eternal gov- 
 ernment, render his creatures happy or miferable, by 
 feme means or other, as they behave well or ill. Or, 
 to exprefs this conelufion in words conformable to the 
 M 2 title 
 
 * Sermon 8th, at the Rolls. 
 
IT t T/ie Government of GW, PART L 
 
 title of the chapter, the analogy of nature fhews us, 
 that the opinion of neceffity, confidered as practical, 
 is falfe. And if neeeffity, upon the fuppofition above 
 mentioned, doth not deftroy the proof of natural re- 
 ligion, it evidently makes no alteration in the proof 
 of revealed. 
 
 From thefe things likewife we may learn, in what 
 fenfe to underftand that general after t ion, that the 
 opinion of neceffity is efTentially deftructive of all re- 
 ligion. Firft in a practical fenfe ; that by this notion, 
 atheiftical men pretend to fatisfy and encourage them- 
 felves in vice, and juftify to others their diiregard to 
 all religion. And fecondly, in the ftrifteft fenie, that 
 it is a contradiction to the whole conftitution of na- 
 ture, and to what we may every moment experience 
 in ourfelves, and fo overturns every thing. But by 
 no means is this aflertion to be underftood, as if ne- 
 ceffity, fuppofing it could poffibly be reconciled with 
 the conftitution of things and with what we experi- 
 ence, were not alfo reconcileable with religion -, for 
 upon this fuppofition it demonftrably is fo. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Of the Government of God, confidered as a Scheme or 
 Cotiftitution, imperfectly comprehended. 
 
 THOUGH it be, as it cannot but be, 
 acknowledged, that the analogy of nature gives a 
 ftrong credibility to the general do&rine of religion, 
 and to the feveral particular things contained in it, 
 confidered as fo many matters of fad, and likewife 
 that it (hews this credibility not to be deftroyed by 
 any notions of neceffitv, yet ftill objections may be 
 
 infifted 
 
CHAP. VII. a Scheme iitcomprehenjible. 
 
 infifted upon againft the wifdom, equity and goodnefs 
 of the divine government implied in the notion of re- 
 ligion, and againft the method by which this govern- 
 ment is conduced ; to which objections analogy can 
 be no direct anfwer. For the credibility or the cer- 
 tain truth of a matter of fact does not immediately 
 prove any thing concerning the wifdom or goodnefs 
 of it ; and analogy can do no more, immediately or 
 directly, than (hew fuch and fuch things to be true or 
 credible, conlidered only as matters of fact. But dill, 
 if, upon fuppofition of a moral conflitution of nature 
 and a moral government over it, analogy fuggefts and 
 makes it credible that this government muft be a 
 Scheme, fyftem, or conftitution of government, as dif- 
 iinguiflied from a number of fmgle unconnected acts 
 of diftributive juflice and goodnefs, and likewiie that 
 it muft be a fcheme fo imperfectly comprehended, and 
 of luch a fort in other refpects, as to afford a direct 
 general anfwer to all objections againft the juftice and 
 goodnefs of it, then analogy is, remotely, of great fer- 
 vice in anfwering thofe objections, both by fuggefting 
 the anfwer, and mewing it to be a credible one. 
 
 Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the 
 cafe. For, Firft, Upon fuppofition that God exer- 
 cifes a moral government over the world, the analogy 
 of his natural government fuggefts and makes it cred- 
 ible that his moral government muft be a fcheme quite 
 beyond our comprehenfion ; and this affords a general 
 anfwer to all objections againft the juftice and good- 
 nefs of it. And, Secondly, A more diftinct obtervation 
 of fome particular things contained in God's fcheme 
 of natural government, the like things being fuppofed 
 by analogy to be contained in his moral government, 
 will farther mew how little weight is to be laid upon 
 thefe objections. 
 
 I. Upon fuppofition that God exercifes a moral 
 government over the world, the analogy of his natural 
 
 government 
 
174 The Government of God, PART I. 
 
 government fuggefts and makes it credible that his 
 moral government muft be a fcheine quite beyond our 
 comprehenfion ; and this affords a general anfwer to 
 all objections againfl the juftice and goodnefs of it. 
 It is moft obvious, analogy renders it highly credible, 
 that upon fuppofition of a moral government, it muft 
 be a fcheme ; for the world, and the whole natural 
 government of it, appears to be fo, to be a fcheme, fyf- 
 tem, or conftitution, whofe parts correfpond to each 
 other and to a whole, as really as any work of art, or 
 as any particular model of a civil conftitution and 
 government. In this great . fcheme of the natural 
 world, individuals have various peculiar relations to 
 other individuals of their own fpecies. And whole 
 fpecies are, we find, varioufly related to other fpecies 
 upon this earth. Nor do we know how much farther 
 thefe kinds of relations may extend. And, as there is 
 not any action or natural event, which we are ac- 
 quainted with, fo fingle and unconnected as not to 
 have a refpect to fome other actions and events, fo 
 poffibly each of them, when it has not an immediate, 
 may yet have a remote natural relation to other actions 
 and events, much beyond the cornpafs of this prefent 
 world? There feems indeed nothing from whence we 
 can fo much as make a conjecture, whether all crea- 
 tures, actions and events, throughout the whole of 
 nature, have relations to each other. But, as it is ob- 
 vious that all events have future unknown confe- 
 quences, fo if we trace any as far as we can go into 
 what is connected with it, we mall find, that if fuch 
 event were not connected with fomewhat farther in na- 
 ture unknown to us, fomewhat both paft and prefent, 
 fuch event could not poffibly have been at all. Nor 
 can we give the whole account of any one thing what- 
 ever ; of all its caufes, ends and neceffary adjuncts ; 
 thofe adjuncts, I mean, without which it could not 
 have been. By this moft aftoniihing connexion^ 
 
 thefe 
 
CHAP. VII. a Scheme incomprehenjible. 175 
 
 thefe reciprocal correfpondencies and mutual relations, 
 every thing which w fee in the courfe of nature is ac- 
 tually brought about. And things feemingly the 
 nioft insignificant imaginable, are perpetually obferv- 
 ed to be necelTary conditions to other things of the 
 greateft importance ; fo that any one thing whatever 
 may, for ought we know to the contrary, be a necefTa- 
 ry condition to any other. The natural world then, 
 and natural government of it, being fucli an incom- 
 prehenfible fcheme, fo incomprehensible that a man 
 muft really in the literal fenfe know nothing at all, 
 who is not fenfible o his ignorance in it, this imme- 
 diately fuggefts, and ftrongly mews the credibility, that 
 the moral world and government of it may be fo too. 
 Indeed the natural and moral conftitution and govern- 
 ment of the world are fo connected, as to make up to- 
 gether but one fcheme ; and it is highly probable, 
 that the firft is formed and carried on merely in fub- 
 ferviency to the latter, as the vegetable world is for 
 the animal, and organized bodies for minds. But 
 the thing intended here is, without inquiring how far 
 the adminiftration of the natural world is fubordinate 
 to that of the moral, only to obferve the credibility 
 that one mould be analogous or fimilar to the other ; 
 that therefore every act of divine juflice and goodnefs 
 maybe fuppofed to look much beyond itfelf,and its im- 
 mediate object ; may have fome reference to other parts 
 of God's moral adminiflration, and to a general moral 
 plan ; and that every circumftance of this his moral 
 government may be adjuited beforehand with a view 
 to the whole of it. Thus for example ; the deter- 
 mined length of time, and the degrees and ways in 
 which virtue is to remain in a ftate of warfare and dif- 
 cipline, and in which wickednefs is permitted to have 
 its progrefs ; the times appointed for the execution of 
 juflice ; the appointed inftruments of it ; the kinds of 
 rewards and puniihments, and the manners of their 
 
 diilribution j 
 
ij6 The Government of God, PART I. 
 
 distribution ; all particular inftances of divine juflice 
 and goodnefs, and every circumstance of them, may 
 have fuch refpects to each other as to make up all to- 
 gether a whole, connected and related in all its parts ; 
 a fcheme or fyftem which is as properly one as the 
 natural world is, and of the like kind, And fuppof- 
 ing this to be the cafe, it is moft evident that we are 
 not competent judges of this fcheme, from the fmall 
 parts of it which come within our view in the prefent 
 life ; and therefore no objections againft any of thefe 
 parts can be infifted upon by reafonable men. 
 
 This our ignorance, and the confequence here 
 drawn from it, are univerfally acknowledged upon 
 other occafions ; and, though fcarce denied, yet .are 
 univerfally forgot, when perfons come to argue againft 
 religion. And it is not perhaps eafy, even for the 
 moft reafonable men, always to bear in mind the de- 
 gree of our ignorance, and make due allowances for it. 
 Upon thefe accounts, it may not be ufelefs to go on a 
 little farther, in order to mew more diftinctly how juft 
 an anfwer our ignorance is, to objections againft the 
 fcheme of Providence. Suppofe then a peribn boldly 
 to afTert that the things complained of, the origin and 
 continuance of evil, might eafily have been prevent- 
 ed by repeated interpofitions ;* interpofitions fo 
 guarded and circumftanced, as would preclude all mif- 
 chief arifing from them ; or, if this were impractica- 
 ble, that a fcheme of government is itfelf an imperfec- 
 tion, fmce more good might have been produced with- 
 out any fcheme, fyftem, or constitution at all, by con- 
 tinued fingle unrelated acts of distributive juftice and 
 goodnefs -, becaufe thefe would have occafioned no ir- 
 regularities. And farther than this, it is presumed, 
 the objections will not be carried. Yet the anfwer is 
 obvious, that were thefe aiTertions true, ftill the obfer- 
 vations above, concerning our ignorance in the fcheme 
 
 of 
 * p. 179, 1 80. 
 
CHAP. VII. a Scheme incvmprelienfille. ijy 
 
 of divine government, and the confequence drawn 
 from it, would hold in great meafure, enough to vin- 
 dicate religion againft all objections from the diforders 
 of the prelent ftate. Were thefe aflertions true, yet 
 the government of the world might be jtift and good 
 notwithftanding ; for, at the moil, they would infer 
 nothing more than that it might have been better. 
 But indeed they are mere arbitrary afTertions, no man 
 being fufficiently acquainted with the pofiibilities of 
 things to bring any proof of them to the lowed de- 
 gree of probability. For however poflible what is af- 
 icrted may feem, yet many inflances may be alleged, 
 in things much lefs out of our reach, of fuppolitions 
 abfolutely impoflible, and reducible to the mod pal- 
 pable felf contradictions, which not every one by any 
 means would perceive to be fuch, nor perhaps any one 
 at firft fight fufpect. From thefe things it is eafy to 
 fee diftinctly how our ignorance, as it is the common, 
 is really a fatisfactory anfwer to all objections againft 
 the juftice and goodnefs of Providence. If a man, 
 contemplating any one providential difpenfation, which 
 had no relation to any others, mould object, that he 
 difcerned in it adifregard to juftice, or a deficiency of 
 goodnefs, nothing would be lefs an anfwer to fuch ob- 
 jection than our ignorance in other parts of Providence, 
 or in the poflibilities of things no way related to what 
 he was contemplating. But when we know not but 
 the parts objected againft may be relative to other 
 parts unknown to us, and when we are unacquainted 
 with what is in the nature of the thing practicable in 
 the cafe before us, then our ignorance is a fatisfac- 
 tory anfwer ; becaufe, fome unknown relation, or 
 fome unknown impoflibility may render what is ob- 
 jected againft juft and good ; nay, good in the highefh 
 practicable degree. 
 
 II. And how little weight is to be laid upon fuch 
 objections will farther appear, by a more diftinct ob- 
 
 iervation 
 
1 7 8 The Government of God, PART!. 
 
 fervation of fome particular things contained in the 
 natural government of God, the like to which may be 
 iuppofed, from analogy, to be contained in his moral 
 government. 
 
 Firft y As in the fcheme of the natural world no 
 ends appear to be accomplished without means, ib we 
 find that means very undefirable often conduce to 
 bring about ends, in iuch a meafure defirable as great- 
 ly to overbalance the difagreeablenefs of the means. 
 And in cafes where fuch means are conducive to fuch 
 ends, it is not reafon, but experience, which mews us 
 that they are thus conducive. Experience alfo mews 
 many means to be conducive and neceflary to accom- 
 plifh ends, which means, before experience, we mould 
 have thought would have had even a contrary tenden- 
 cy. Now from thefe obfervations relating to the nat- 
 ural fcheme of the world, the moral being fuppofed 
 analogous to it, arifes a great credibility, that the put- 
 ting our mifery in each other's power to the degree it 
 is, and making men liable to vice to the degree we 
 are, and in general, that thofe things which are ob- 
 jected againft the moral fcheme of Providence, may 
 be, upon the whole, friendly and affiflant to virtue, 
 and productive of an overbalance of happinefs, i. e. 
 the things objected againft may be means, by which 
 an overbalance of good will, in the end, be found pro- 
 duced. And from the fame obfervations, it appears 
 to be no prefumption againft this, that we do not, 
 if indeed we do not, fee thofe means to have any fuch 
 tendency, or that they feem to us to have a contrary 
 one. Thus thofe things which we call irregularities, 
 may not be fo at all ; becaufe they may be means of 
 accompliming wife and good ends more confiderable. 
 And it may be added, as above, that they may alfo 
 be the only means by which thefe wife and good ends 
 are capable of being accompliflied, 
 
 After 
 
CHAP. VII. # Scheme incomprehenfible. 179 
 
 After thefe obfervations it may be proper to acid, in 
 order to obviate an abfurd and wicked conclufion from 
 any of them, that though the conftitution of our na- 
 ture from whence we are capable of vice and mifery, 
 may, as it undoubtedly does, contribute to the per- 
 fection and happinefs of the world ; and though the 
 adual permiflion of evil may be beneficial to it, (i.e. it 
 would have been more milchievous, not that a wicked 
 perfon had himfelf abftained from his own wickednefs, 
 but that any one had forcibly prevented it, than thai 
 it was permitted) yet notwithftanding, it might have 
 been much better for the world if this very evil hail 
 never been done. Nay, it is mod clearly conceivable, 
 that the very cornmiffion of wickednefs may be bene- 
 ficial to the world, and yet that it would be infinitely 
 more beneficial for men to refrain from it. For thus, 
 in the wife and good conftitution of the natural world, 
 there are diibrders which bring their own cures, dii- 
 eaics which are themielves remedies. Many a man 
 would have died, had it not been for the gout or a 
 fever ; yet it would be thought madnefs to aifert, that 
 iicknefs is a better or more perfect (late than health, 
 though the like with regard to the moral world has 
 been afferted. But, 
 
 Secondly , The natural government of the world is 
 carried on by general laws. For this there may be 
 wife and good reafons ; the wifeft and beft, for ought 
 we know to the contrary. And that there are fuch 
 reafons, is fuggeiled to our thoughts by the analogy of 
 nature ; by our being made to experience good ends 
 to be accompli ihed, as indeed all the good which we 
 enjoy is accompliihed, by this means, that the laws by 
 which the world is governed are general. For we have 
 fcarce any kind of enjoyments but what we are, in 
 fome way or other, inftrumental in procuring our- 
 leives, by acting in a manner which we fore lee likely to 
 pio.jure them ; now this forefight could not be at all, 
 
 were 
 
i So The Government of God y PART I. 
 
 were not the government of the world carried on by 
 general laws. And though, for ought we know to the 
 contrary, every fingle cafe may be at length found to 
 have been provided for even by thefe, yet to prevent 
 all irregularities, or remedy them as they arife, by 
 the wifefh and bed general laws, may be impoffible in 
 the nature of things, as we fee it is abfolutely impoffi- 
 ble in civil government. But then we are ready to 
 think, that, the conftitution of nature remaining as it 
 is, and the courfe of things being permitted to go on 
 in other refpects as it does, there might be interpo- 
 fitions to prevent irregularities, though they could not 
 have been prevented or remedied by any general laws. 
 And there would indeed be reafon to wifh, which, by 
 the way, is very different from a right to claim, that aJl 
 irregularities were prevented or remedied by prefent 
 interpofitions, if thefe interpositions would have no 
 other effect than this. But it is plain they would have 
 fome vifible and immediate bad effects ; for inftance, 
 they would encourage idlenefs and negligence, and 
 they would render doubtful the natural rule of life, 
 which is afcertained by this very thing, that the courfe 
 of the world is carried on by general laws. And far- 
 ther, it is certain they would have diftant effects, and 
 very great ones too, by means of the wonderful con- 
 nexions before mentioned.* So that we cannot fo much 
 as guefs what would be the whole refult of the inter- 
 pofitions defired. It may be faid, any bad refult might 
 be prevented by farther interpofitions, whenever there 
 was occafion for them ; but this again is talking quite 
 at random, and in the dark.-f- Upon the whole then, 
 we fee wife reafon s, why the courfe of the world mould 
 be carried on by general laws, and good ends accom- 
 pliihed by this means ; and, for ought we know, there 
 may be the wifefh reafons for it, and the bed ends ac- 
 complifhed by it. We have no ground to believe, that 
 
 all 
 
 *P. I74,&c. fP. 176, 177, 
 
CHAP. VIL a Scheme incomprehenfille. 181 
 
 all irregularities could be remedied as they arile, or 
 could have been precluded, by general laws. We find 
 that interpofitions would produce evil, and prevent 
 good ; and, for ought we know, they would produce 
 greater evil than they would prevent ; and prevent 
 greater good than they would produce. And if this 
 be the cafe, then the not interpofing is ib far from be- 
 ing a ground of complaint, that it is an inftance of 
 goodnefs. This is intelligible and furikient, and go- 
 ing farther feems beyond the utmoft reach of our fac- 
 ilities. 
 
 But it may be faid, that " after all, thefe fuppofed 
 impoffibilities and relations are what we are unac- 
 quainted with, and we muft judge of religion, as of 
 other things, by what we do know, and look upon 
 the reft as nothing ; or however, that the anfwers here 
 given to what is objected againft religion, may equally 
 be made ufc of to invalidate the proof of it, iince their 
 ftrefs lies fo very much upon our ignorance." But, 
 
 Firftj Though total ignorance in any matter does 
 indeed equally deftroy, or rather preclude all proof 
 concerning it, and objections againft it, yet partial ig- 
 norance does not. For we may in any degree be con- 
 vinced, that a perfon is of fuch a character, and con- 
 fequently will purfue fuch ends, though we are greatly 
 ignorant what is the proper way of acting, in order the 
 moft effectually to obtain thole ends ; and in this cafe, 
 objections againft his manner of acting, as ieemingly 
 not conducive to obtain them, might be anfwered by 
 our ignorance, though the proof that fuch ends were 
 intended might not at all be invalidated by it. Thus 
 the proof of religion is a proof of the moral character 
 of God, and confequently that his government is mor- 
 al, and that every one upon the whole (hall receive ac- 
 cording to his deierts ; a proof that this is the deligned 
 end of his government. But we are not competent 
 judges what is the proper way of acting, in order the 
 
 moft 
 
i Ss The Government of God* PAH T L 
 
 moil effectually to accomplifh this end.* Therefore 
 our ignorance is an anfwer to objections againfl the 
 conduct of Providence in permitting irregularities, as 
 teeming contradictory to this end. Now, fince it is 
 fo obvious that our ignorance may be a fatisfactory 
 anfwer to objections againfl -a thing, and yet not affect 
 the proof of it, till it can be ihewn, it is frivolous to 
 aiFert that our ignorance invalidates the proof of relig- 
 ion, as it does the objections againfl it, 
 
 Secondly , Suppofe unknown impoflibilities and un- 
 known relations might juftly be urged to invalidate 
 the proof of religion, as well as to anfwer objections 
 againfl it, and that m confequence of this the proof 
 of it were doubtful, yet flill, let the aflertion be de- 
 Ipifed, or let it be ridiculed, it is undeniably true that 
 moral obligations would remain certain, though it 
 were not certain what would, upon the whole, be th? 
 confequences of obferving or violating them. For, 
 theie obligations arife immediately and neceiTarily from 
 the judgment of ottr own mind,unlefs perverted, which 
 we cannot violate without being felf condemned. And 
 they would be certain too, from confederations of in- 
 terefl. For though it were doubtful what will be the 
 future conlequences of virtue and vice, yet it is, how- 
 ever, credible, that they may have thofe confequences 
 which religion teaches us they will ; and this credibil- 
 ity is a certain--)- obligation in point of prudence, to 
 abflain from all wickednefs, and to live in the confci- 
 entious practice of all that is good. But, 
 
 Thirdly , The anfwers above given to the objections 
 againft religion, cannot equally be made ufe of to in- 
 validate the proof of it. For, upon iuppofition that 
 God exercifes a moral government over the world, 
 analogy does mofl ftrongly lead us to conclude, that 
 this moral government rnufl be a fcheme or conflitu- 
 tion beyond our comprehenfion. And a thonfand 
 
 particular 
 
 * P. 6r, 62. f P. 57. and Part II. Ch. vi* 
 
CHAP. VII. a Scheme incomprehenjib/c. 183 
 
 particular analogies mew us, that parts of fuch a 
 fcheme, from their relation to other parts, may con- 
 duce to accomplim ends,which wefhould have thought 
 they had no tendency at all to accomplim ; nay ends, 
 which before experience we ihould have thought fucli 
 parts were contradictory to, and had a tendency to 
 prevent. And therefore all thefe. analogies mew, that 
 the way of arguing made ufe of in objecting againft 
 religion, is deluiive ; becauie they fhew it is not at all 
 incredible, that, could we comprehend the whole, we 
 fhould find the permiiTion of the diforders objected 
 againft to be confident with juftice and goodnefs, and 
 even to be inftances of them. Now this is not appli- 
 cable to the proof of religion, as it is to the objections 
 againft it j* and therefore cannot invalidate that proof 4 
 as it does thefe objections. 
 
 Lajily^ From the obfervation now made, it is eafy 
 to fee, that the anfwers above given to the objections 
 againft Providence, though in a general way of fpeak- 
 ing, they may be laid to be taken from our ignorance, 
 yet are by no means taken merely from that, but from 
 fomewhat which analogy fhews us concerning it. For 
 analogy fhews us pofitively, that our ignorance in the 
 poiTibilities of things, and the various relations in na- 
 ture, renders us incompetent judges, and leads us to 
 falie conclufions, in cafes fimilar to this, in which we 
 pretend to judge and to object. So that the things 
 above infilled upon, are not mere fuppofitions of un- 
 known impoflibilities and relations, but they are fug- 
 gefted to our thoughts and even forced upon the ob- 
 fervation of ierious men, and rendered credible too, by 
 the analogy of nature. And therefore, to take thefe 
 things into the account, is to judge by experience and 
 what we do know ; and it is not judging fo, to take 
 no notice of them. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 * Sermon at the Rolls, p, 314. zd Ed. 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
 JL HE obfervations of the lafl chapter lead 
 us to confider this little fcene of human life, in which 
 we are fo bufily engaged, as having a reference, of 
 fome fort or other, to a much larger plan of things. 
 Whether we are any way related to the more difhant 
 parts of the boundlefs univerfe, into which we are 
 brought, is altogether uncertain- But it is evident 
 that the courfe of things which comes within our view 
 is connected with fomewhat pad, prefent, and future, 
 beyond it.* So that we are placed, as one may fpeak, 
 in the middle of a fcheme, not as a fixed but a pro- 
 greffive one, every way incomprehenfible ; incompre- 
 heniible in a manner equally with refpecl: to what has 
 been, what now is, and what mail be hereafter. And 
 this fcheme cannot but contain in it fomewhat as won- 
 derful and as much beyond our thought and concep- 
 tion^ as any thing'in that of religion. For, will any 
 man in his fenfes fay, that it is lefs difficult to conceive 
 how the world came to be and to continue as it is, 
 without, than with, an intelligent Author and Governor 
 of it ? or, admitting an intelligent Governor of it, 
 that there is fome other rule of government more nat- 
 ural and of eaiier conception than that which we call 
 moral ? Indeed, without an intelligent Author and 
 Governor of nature, no account at all can be given 
 how this univerfe, or the part of it particularly in 
 which we are concerned, came to be, and the courfe 
 of it to be carried on, as it is -, nor any of its general 
 end and deiign, without a moral Governor of it. 
 That there is an intelligent Author of nature and 
 natural Governor of the world, is a principle gone up- 
 on in the foregoing treat ife, as proved, and generally 
 
 known 
 
 * P. 174, &c. f See Part II. Ch. ii. 
 
ART I. CONCLUSION. 185 
 
 known and confeiled to be proved. And the very 
 notion of an intelligent Author of nature, proved by 
 particular final caufes, implies a will and a character.* 
 Now as our whole nature, the nature which he has 
 given us, leads us to conclude his will and character to 
 be moral, juft and good, fo we can fcarce in imag- 
 ination conceive what it can be otherwife. However, 
 in confequence of this his will and character, whatever 
 it be, he formed the univerfe as it is, and carries on 
 the courfe of it as he does, rather than in any other 
 manner; and has aligned to us, and to all living 
 creatures, a part and a lot in it. Irrational creatures 
 aft this their part, and enjoy and undergo the pleaf- 
 ures and the pains allotted them, without any reflec- 
 tion. But one would think it impoflible, that crea- 
 tures endued with reafon could avoid reflecting fome- 
 times upon all this ; reflecting, if not from whence we 
 came, yet, at lead, whither we are going ; and what 
 the myflerious fcheme, in the midft of which we find 
 ourfelves, will, at length, come out and produce ; a 
 fcheme in which it is certain we are highly interefted, 
 and in which we may be interefted even beyond con- 
 ception. For many things prove it palpably abfurd to 
 conclude, that we mall ceafe to be at death. Partic- 
 ular analogies do moft fenfibly mew us, that there is 
 nothing to be thought ftrange, in our being to exift 
 in another ftate of life. And that we are not living 
 beings affords a ftrong probability that we (hall con- 
 tinue fo, unlefs there be fome pofitive ground, and 
 there is none from reafon or analogy, to think death 
 will deftroy us. Were a perfuafion of this kind ever 
 fo well grounded, there would furely be little reafon to 
 take pleafure in it. But indeed it can have no other 
 ground, than fome fuch imagination as that of our 
 grofs bodies being ourfelves ; which is contrary to ex- 
 perience. Experience too moft clearly {hews us the 
 
 N folly 
 
 * P. ic?. 
 
186 CONCLUSION. PART t 
 
 folly of concluding, from the body and the living 
 agent affecting each other mutually, that the diffolu- 
 tion of the former is the deftruction of the latter. 
 And there are remarkable inftances of their not affect- 
 ing each other, which lead us to a contrary conclusion. 
 The fuppofition then, which in all reafon we are to 
 go upon, is, that our living nature will continue after 
 death. And it is infinitely u'nreafonable to form an 
 inflitution of life, or to act, upon any other fuppolition. 
 Now all expectation of immortality, whether more or 
 lefs certain, opens an -unbounded profpect to our hopes 
 and our fears ; fince we fee the constitution of nature 
 is fuch as to admit of mifery, as well as to be produc- 
 tive of happinefs, and experience ourfelves to partake 
 of both in fome degree ; and fince we cannot but know 
 what higher degrees of both we are capable of. And 
 there is no prefumption againfl believing farther, that 
 our future intereft depends upon OUT prefent beha- 
 viour ; for we fee Our prefent intereil doth, and that 
 the happinefs and mifery which are naturally annexed 
 to our actions, very frequently do not follow till long 
 after the actions are done to which they are refpective- 
 ly annexed. So that were fpeculation to leave us un- 
 certain whether it were likely that the Author of na- 
 ture, in giving happinefs and mifery to his creatures, 
 hath regard to their actions or not, yet fince we find 
 by experience that he hath fuch regard, the whole 
 fenfe of things which he has given us plainly leads us, 
 at once and without any elaborate inquiries, to think 
 that it may, indeed muft, be to good actions chiefly 
 that he hath annexed happinefs, and to bad actions 
 mifery ; or that he will, upon the whole, reward thofe 
 who do well, and punifh thofe who do evil. To con- 
 firm this from the comtitution of the world, it has 
 been obferved, that fome fort of moral government 
 is neceffarily implied in that natural government of 
 God, which we experience ourfelves under j that good 
 
 and 
 
FART I. CONCLUSION. 187 
 
 and bad actions at prefent are naturally rewarded and 
 punifhed, not only as beneficial and mifchievous to 
 fociety, but alfo as virtuous and vicious ; and that 
 there is, in the very nature of the thing, a tendency to 
 their being rewarded and punifhed in a much higher 
 degree than they are at prefent. And though this 
 higher degree of diftributive juflice, which nature thus 
 points out and leads towards, is prevented for a time 
 from taking place, it is by obftacles which the flate of 
 this world unhappily throws in its way, and which 
 therefore are in their nature temporary. Now as thefe 
 things, in the natural conduct of Providence, are ob- 
 fervable on the fide of virtue, fo there is nothing to be 
 fet againft them on the fide of vice. A moral icheme 
 of government then is vifibly eftablifhed, and in fome 
 degree carried into execution ; and this, together with 
 the eflential tendencies of virtue and vice duly confid- 
 ered, naturally raife in us an apprehenfion, that it will 
 be carried on farther towards perfe&ion in a future 
 Hate, and that every one mail there receive according 
 to his deferts. And if this be fo, then our future and 
 general intereft, under the moral government of God, 
 is appointed to depend upon our behaviour, notwith- 
 ftanding the difficulty which this may occafion of fe- 
 curing it, and the danger of lofmg it, juft in the fame 
 manner as our temporal intereft, under his natural gov- 
 ernment, is appointed to depend upon our behaviour, 
 notwithftanding the like difficulty and danger. For, 
 from our original conftitution, and that of the world 
 which we inhabit, we are naturally trufted with our- 
 felves, with our own conduct and our own intereft. 
 And from the fame conftitution of nature, efpecially 
 joined with that courfe of things which is owing to 
 men, we have temptations to be unfaithful in this 
 truft, to forfeit this intereft, to negledt it, and run 
 ourfelves into mifery and ruin. From thefe tempta- 
 tions arife the difficulties of behaving fo as to fecure 
 N z our 
 
i8'8 CONCLUSION. PART 1> 
 
 our temporal intereft, and the hazard of behaving fa 
 as to mifcarry in it. There is therefore nothing in- 
 credible in fuppofing, there may be the like difficulty 
 and hazard with regard to that chief and final good 
 which religion lays before us. Indeed the whole ac- 
 count, how it came to pafs that we were placed in 
 fuch a condition as this, muft be beyond our compre- 
 neniion ; but it is in part accounted for by what re- 
 ligion teaches us, that the character of virtue and piety 
 muft be a neceflary qualification for* a future ftate of 
 fecurity and happinefs under the moral government of 
 God, in like manner as fome certain qualifications or 
 other are neceflary for every particular condition of life 
 under his natural government ; and that the prefent 
 ftate was intended to be a fchool of discipline for im- 
 proving in ourfelves that character. Now this intention 
 of nature is rendered highly credible by obferving, that 
 we are plainly made for improvement of all kinds ; 
 that it is a general appointment of Providence that we 
 cultivate practical principles, and form within ourfelves 
 habits of action, in order to become fit for what we 
 were wholly unfit for before ; that in particular, child- 
 hood and youth is naturally appointed to be a ftate of 
 difcipline for mature age ; and that the prefent world 
 is peculiarly fitted for a ftate of moral difcipline. And 
 whereas objections are urged againft the whole notion 
 of moral government and a probation ftate, from the 
 opinion of neceflity, it has been fhewn, that God has 
 given us the evidence, as it were, of experience, that 
 all objections againft religion on this head are vain and 
 delufive. He has alfo, in his natural government, fug- 
 gefted an anfwer to all our fhort fighted objections 
 againft the equity and goodnefs of his moral govern- 
 ment ; and in general he has exemplified to us the 
 latter by the former. 
 
 Thefe things, which, it is to be remembered, are 
 matters of fact, ought, in all common fenfe, to awaken 
 
 mankind ; 
 
FART I. ' CONCLUSION. 189 
 
 mankind ; to induce them to coniider in earneffc their 
 condition, and what they have to do. It is abfurd, 
 abfurd to the degree of being ridiculous, if the fubjedt 
 were not of fo ferious a kind, for men to think them- 
 felves fecure in a vicious life, or even in that immoral 
 thought leffnels which far the greateft part of them are 
 fallen into. And the credibility of religion jarifing from 
 experience and facts here conlidered, is fully fufficient, 
 in reafon, to engage them to live in the general prac- 
 tice of ail virtue and piety ; under the ferious appre^ 
 henfion, though it fliould be mixed with fome doubt, * 
 of a righteous administration eftablifhed in nature, 
 and a future judgment in confequence of it ; efpec- 
 ially when we confider how very queflionable it is, 
 whether any thing at all can be gained by vice ;-} now 
 unqueftionably little, as well as precarious, the pleaf- 
 ures and profits of it are at the beft ; and how foon 
 they muft be parted with at the longed. For, in the 
 deliberations of reafon, concerning what we are to pur- 
 fue, and what to avoid, as temptations to any thing 
 from mere paffion, are fuppofed out of the cafe, fo in- 
 ducements to vice, from cool expectations of pleafure 
 and intereil fo fmall and uncertain and fhort, are re- 
 ally fo infignificant, as, in the view of reafon, to be al- 
 moil nothing in themlelves ; and in comparifon with 
 the importance of religion, they quite difappear and 
 are loft. Mere paffion indeed may be alleged, though 
 not as a reafon, yet as an excufe, for a vicious courfe of 
 life. And how forry an excufe it is will be manifefl 
 by obferving, that we are placed in a condition, in 
 which we are unavoidably inured to govern our paf- 
 fioris, by being neceffitated to govern them j and to 
 lay ourfelves under the fame kind of reflraints, and as 
 great ones too, from temporal regards, as virtue arid 
 piety in the ordinary courfe of things require. The 
 plea of ungovernable paffion then, on the tide of vice, 
 
 is 
 
 * Part II. Ch. vi< f P. 100, xoi. 
 
i 9 o CONCLUSION. PART L 
 
 is the poorefl of all things ; for it is no reafon, and 
 but a poor excufe. But the proper motives to relig? 
 ion are the proper proofs of it, from our moral nature, 
 from the prefages of confcience, and our natural ap- 
 prehenfion of God under the character of a righteous 
 governor and judge ; a nature and confcience and ap- 
 prehenfion given us by him ; and from the confirma- 
 tion of the diclates of reafon, by life and immortality 
 brought to. light bv the Qofpe/ ; an d the wrath of God 
 revealed from heaven, againjl all ungodliness^ and wi* 
 rightcoufnefs of men. 
 
 THE END OF THE FIRST PART. 
 
ANALOGY 
 
 O F 
 
 RELIGION 
 
 TO THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION and COURSE of NATURE. 
 
 PART II. 
 Of REVEALED RELIGION. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of the Importance of Chriftianity. 
 
 OOME perfons, upon pretence of the fuf- 
 ficiency of the light of nature, avowedly reject all rev- 
 elation, as in its very notion incredible, and what mud 
 be fictitious. And indeed it is certain no revelation 
 would have been given, had the light of nature been 
 fufficient in fuch a fenfe as to render one not wanting 
 and ufelefs. But no man, in ferioufnefs and fimplicity 
 of mind, can poffibly. think it fo, who confiders the 
 ftate of religion in the heathen world, before revela- 
 tion, and its prefent flate in thofe places which have 
 borrowed no light from it ; particularly the doubt- 
 .fulnefs of fome of the greatefl men concerning things 
 of the utmofl importance, as well as the natural inat- 
 tention and ignorance of mankind in general. It is 
 impoflible to fay who would have been able to have 
 
 reafoned 
 
192 Of the Importance PART II. 
 
 reafoned out that whole fyftem, which we call natural 
 religion, in its genuine ilmplicity, clear of fuperftition ; 
 but there is certainly no ground to affirm that the 
 generality could. If they could, there is no fort of 
 probability that they would. Admitting there were, 
 they would highly want a Handing admonition, to re- 
 mind them of it, and inculcate it upon them. And 
 farther dill, were they as much difpofed to attend to 
 religion as the better fort of men are, yet even upon 
 this iuppofition there would be various occafions for 
 fupernatural inftruction and affiftance, and the greateft 
 advantages might be afforded by them. So that to 
 fay, revelation is a thing fuperfluous, what there was 
 no need of, and what can be of no fervice, is, I think, 
 to talk quite wildly and at random. Nor would it 
 be more extravagant to affirm, that mankind is fo en- 
 tirely at eaie in the prefent ftate, and life fo complete- 
 ly happy, that it is a contradiction to fuppofe our con- 
 dition capable of being in any reipe6t better. 
 
 There are other perfons, not to be ranked with 
 thefe, who feem to be getting into a way of neglect- 
 ing, and, as it were, overlooking revelation as of fmall 
 importance, provided natural religion be kept to. 
 With little regard either to the evidence of the former, 
 or to the objections againfl it, and even upon fuppo- 
 fition of its truth, " the only defign of it," fay they, 
 " muft be to eftablifli a belief of the moral fyftem of 
 nature, and to enforce the practice of natural piety 
 rind virtue. The belief and practice of thefe things 
 were, perhaps, much promoted by the firfl publication 
 of Chriflianity ; but whether they are believed and 
 pradlifed, upon the evidence and motives of nature or 
 of revelation, is no great matter." * This way of con- 
 
 fidering 
 
 * Iiivenis multos propterea nolle fieri Chriftianos, quia.quafi fuffici- 
 
 unt fibi de bona vita fua. Bene vivere opus eft, ait. Quid mi hi pra'ccptu- 
 rus eftChriftus? Ut bene vivam ? Jam bene vivo. Quid rnihi necellarius 
 eft Chriftus ? Nullum homicidium, nullum furtum, nullam rapinam facio, 
 res alienas non concupifco, nuilo adulterio contaminor. Nam inveniatur 
 in vita mea aliquid quod reprehendatur, et qui reprehenderit faciat Chrifti- 
 anum. S&JT. in Pjal. xxxi% 
 
CHAP. I. of Chrijiianity. 193 
 
 iidering revelation, though it is not the fame with the 
 former, yet borders nearly upon it, and very much, at 
 length, runs up into it, and requires to be particularly 
 coniidered, with regard to the perfons who feern to be 
 getting into this way. The confideration of it will 
 likewife farther lliew the extravagance of the former 
 opinion, and the truth of the obfervations in anfwer to 
 it, juft mentioned. And an inquiry into the import- 
 ance of Chriftianity, cannot be an improper introduc- 
 tion to a treatife concerning the credibility of it. 
 
 Now if God has given a revelation to mankind, and 
 commanded thofe things which are commanded in 
 Chriflianity, it is evident, at firfl light, that it cannot 
 in any wife be an indifferent matter, whether we obey 
 or difobey thofe commands, unlefs we are certainly af- 
 fured that we know all the reafons for them, and that 
 all thofe reafons are now ceafed, with regard to man- 
 kind in general, or to ourfelves in particular. And it 
 is ablolutely impoffible we can be allured of this. For 
 our ignorance of thefe reafons proves nothing in tha 
 cafe, fince the whole analogy of nature (hews, what is 
 indeed in itfelf evident, that there may be infinite rea- 
 fons for things, with which we are not acquainted. 
 
 But the importance of Chriftianity will more diC- 
 tinctly appear, by confidering it more diftinctly. 
 Firft, as a republication and external inftitution of nat- 
 ural or eflential religion, adapted to the prefent cir- 
 cumflances of mankind, and intended to promote nat- 
 ural piety and virtue : And, Secondly, as containing an 
 account of a ditpenfation of things, not difcoverable 
 by reafon, in confequence of which feveral diftinct pre- 
 cepts are enjoined us. For though natural religion is 
 the foundation and principal part of Chriilianity, it is 
 - not in any fenfe the whole of it. 
 
 I. Chriilianity is a republication of natural religion. 
 It inftruds mankind in the moral fyftem of the world , 
 that it is the work of an infinitely perfect Being, and 
 
 under 
 
194 Q/" tf ie Importance PART II. 
 
 under his government ; that virtue is his law ; and 
 that he will finally judge mankind in righteoufnefs, 
 and render to all according to their works, in a future 
 fhate. And, which is very material, it teaches natural 
 religion in its genuine fimplicity, free from thofe fuper- 
 ftitions with which it was totally corrupted, and un- 
 der which it was in a manner loft. 
 
 Revelation is farther an authoritative publication 
 of natural religion, and fo affords the evidence of tefti- 
 mony for the truth of it. Indeed the miracles and 
 prophecies recorded in Scripture were intended to 
 prove a particular difpenfation of Providence, the re- 
 demption of the world by the Mefliah ; but this does 
 not hinder but that they may alfo prove God's general 
 providence over the world, as our moral governor and 
 judge. And they evidently do prove it, becaufe this 
 character of the Author of nature is neceffarily con- 
 nected with and implied in that particular revealed 
 difpenfation of things ; it is likewife continually taught 
 exprefsly, and infilled upon, by thofe perfons who 
 wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies. 
 So that indeed natural religion feems as much proved 
 by the Scripture revelation, as it would have been had 
 the defign of revelation been nothing elfe than to 
 prove it. 
 
 But it may pofiibly be difputed, how far miracles 
 can prove natural religion, and notabfe objections may 
 be urged againfl this proof of it, considered as a mat- 
 ter of fpeculation ; but confidered as a practical thing, 
 there can be none. For fuppofe a perfon to teach 
 natural religion to a nation, who had lived in total ig- 
 norance or forgetfulnefs of it, and to declare he was 
 commiffioned by God fo to do, fuppofe him, in proof 
 of his commiflion, to foretel things future which no 
 human forefight could have guefied at, to divide the 
 fea with a word, feed great multitudes with bread from 
 heaven, cure all manner of difeafes, and raife the dead, 
 
 ever; 
 
CHAP. I. of Chrlftianlty. 195 
 
 even himfelf, to life, would not this give additional 
 credibility to his teaching, a credibility beyond what 
 that of a common man would have, and be an authori- 
 tative publication of the law of nature, i. e. a new proof 
 of it ? It would r^e a practical one, of the ftrongeft 
 kind, perhaps, which human creatures are capable of 
 having given them. The Law of Moles then, and 
 the Gofpel of Chrifl, are authoritative publications of 
 the religion of nature ; they afford a proof of God's 
 general providence, as moral governor of the world, as 
 well as of his particular difpenfations of providence to- 
 wards finful creatures, revealed in the Law and the 
 Gofpel. As they are the only evidence of the latter, 
 fo they are an additional evidence of the former. 
 
 To mew this further, let us fuppofe a man of the 
 greatefl and moft improved capacity, who had never 
 heard of revelation, convinced upon the whole, not- 
 withftanding the diforders of the world, that it was un- 
 der the direction and moral government of an infinitely 
 perfect Being, but ready to queftion whether he were 
 not got beyond FHe reach of his faculties, fuppofe 
 him brought, by this mfpicion, into great danger of 
 being carried away by the univerfal bad example of al- 
 moil every one around him, who appeared to have no 
 fenfe, no practical fenfe at leaft, of thefe things, and 
 this, perhaps, would be as advantageous a fituatibn 
 with regard to religion, as nature alone ever placed 
 any man in. What a confirmation now muft it be to 
 fuch a perfon, all at once to find that this moral fyf- 
 tem of things was revealed to mankind, in the name 
 of that infinite Being, whom he had from principles of 
 reafon believed in ; and that the publifhers of the rev- 
 elation proved their comrniftion from him, by making 
 it appear, that he had entrufted them with a power of 
 fiifpending and changing the general laws of nature. 
 
 Nor muft it by any means be omitted, for it is a 
 thing of the utmoft importance, that life and inimor- 
 
 talitv 
 
196 Of the Importance PART II, 
 
 tality are eminently brought to light by the Gofpel, 
 The great doclrines of a future ftate, the danger of a 
 courfe of wicked nefs, and the efficacy' of repentance, 
 are not only confirmed in the Gofpel, but are taught, 
 efpeciatly the lail is, with a degree of light to which 
 that of nature is but darknefs. 
 
 Farther : As Chriftianity ferved thefe ends and pur- 
 pofes when it was firft publifhed, by the miraculous 
 publication itfelf, fo it was intended to ferve the fame 
 purpofes in future ages, by means of the fettlement of 
 a viiible church ; of a fociety diftinguifhed from com- 
 mon ones, and from the reft of the world, by peculiar 
 religious inftitutions, by an inftituted method of in- 
 ftru&ion, and an inftituted form of external religion. 
 Miraculous powers were given to the firft preachers of 
 Chriftianity, in order to their introducing it into the 
 world ; a vifible church was eftablifhed in order to 
 continue it, and carry it on fucceffively throughout all 
 ages. Had Mofes and the prophets, Chrift and his 
 apoftles, only taught, and by miracles proved, religion 
 to their cotemporaries, the benefits of their inftrudions 
 would have reached but to a fmall part of mankind. 
 Chriftianity muft have been, in a great degree, funk 
 and forgot in a very few ages. To prevent this, ap- 
 pears to have been one reafon why a vifible church was 
 inftituted ; to be like a city upon a hill, a ftanding 
 memorial to the world of the duty which we owe our 
 Maker ; to call men continually, both by example and 
 inftruclion, to attend to it, and by the form of religion 
 ever before their eyes, remind them of the reality ; to 
 be the repofitory of the oracles of God ; to hold up 
 the light of revelation in aid to that of nr^ture, and 
 propagate it throughout all generations to the end of 
 the world the light of revelation confidered here in 
 no other view than as defigned to enforce natural re- 
 ligion. And in proportion as Chriftianity is profeffed 
 and taught in the world, religion, natural or eflen- 
 
 tial 
 
CHAP. L of Ckrijfiantty. 197 
 
 tial religion, is thus diftin&ly and advantageoufly laid 
 before mankind, and brought again and again to 
 their thoughts, as a matter of infinite importance.. 
 A vifible church has alfo a farther tendency to pro- 
 mote natural religion, as being an inftituted method 
 of education, originally intended to be of more pecu- 
 liar advantage to thofe who would conform to it. For 
 one end of the inflitution was, that by admonition and 
 reproof, as well as inftru&ion, by a general regular 
 difcipline, and publick exercifes of religion, the body of 
 Chrijl, as the Scripture fpeaks, mould be edified, i. c. 
 trained up in piety and virtue, for a higher and better 
 ftate. This fettlement then appearing thus beneficial, 
 tending in the nature of the thing to anfwer, and in. 
 fome degree actually anfwering, thofe ends, it is to be 
 remembered that the very notion of it implies pofitive 
 inflitutions ; for the viiibility of the church coniifts in 
 them. Take away every thing of this kind, and you 
 lofe the very notion itfelf. So that if the things now 
 mentioned are advantages, the reafon and importance 
 of pofitive inflitutions in general is molt obvious, iince 
 without them thefe advantages could not be fecured to 
 the world* And it is mere idle wantonnefs, to infill 
 upon knowing the reafons why fuch particular ones 
 were fixed upon, rather than others. 
 
 The benefit arifing from this fupernatural affiilance 
 which Chriftianity affords to natural religion, is what 
 fome peribns are very flow in apprehending. And yet 
 it is a thing diflincl: in itfelf, and a very plain obvious 
 one. For will any in good earriefl really fay, that the 
 bulk of mankind in the heathen world were in as ad- 
 vantageous a iituation with regard to natural religion 
 as they are now amongft us ; that it was laid before 
 them, and enforced upon them, in a manner as dif- 
 tincT:, and as much tending to influence their practice ? 
 
 The objections againfh all this, from the perverfion 
 cf Chriftianity, and from the fuppofition of its having 
 
 had 
 
198 Of the Importance PART II 
 
 had but little good influence, however innocently they 
 may be propofed, yet cannot be infilled upon as con- 
 clufive upon any principles but fuch as lead to down- 
 right atheiim ; becaufe the manifeflation of the law 
 of nature by reafon, which upon all principles of theifm 
 muft have been from God, has been perverted and ren- 
 dered ineffectual in the fame manner. It may indeed, 
 J think, truly be laid, that the good effects of Chrifli- 
 anity have not been fmall ; nor its fuppofed ill effects 
 any effects at all of it, properly {peaking. Perhaps too 
 the things themfelves clone have been aggravated ; and 
 if not, Chriflianity hath been often only a pretence ; 
 and the fame evils in the main would have been done 
 upon fome other pretence. However, great and 
 fhocking as the corruptions and abufes of it have re- 
 ally been, they cannot be infilled, upon as arguments 
 againfl it upon principles of theifm. For one cannot 
 proceed one flep in reafoning upon natural religion, 
 any more than upon Chriilianity, without laying it 
 down as a firft principle, that the difpenfations of Prov- 
 idence are not to be judged of by their perverfions, but 
 by their genuine tendencies ; not by what they do ac- 
 tually feem to effect, but by what they would effect if 
 mankind did their part, that part which is juflly put 
 and left upon them. It is altogether as much the 
 language of one as of the other, He that is unjuft let 
 him be. unjuft ftill ; and he that is holy let him be holy ftill. * 
 The light of reafon does not, any more than that of 
 revelation, force men to fubmit to its authority ; both 
 admonifh them of what they ought to do and avoid, 
 together with the confequences of each, and after this 
 leave them at full liberty to act juft as they pleafe, till 
 the appointed time of judgment. Every moment's 
 experience ihews, that this is God's general rule of 
 government. 
 
 To return then : Chriflianity being a promulgation 
 of the law of nature, being moreover an authoritative 
 
 promulgation 
 
 Rev, xxii. 1 1. 
 
CHAP. I. of Ckriftianity. 
 
 promulgation of it, with new light, and other circum- 
 ftances of peculiar advantage adapted to thewants of 
 mankind, thefe things fully mew its importance. 
 And it is to be obierved farther, that as the nature of 
 the cafe requires, fo all Chriftians are commanded to 
 contribute, by their profeffion of Chriflianity, to pre- 
 ferve it in the world, and render it fuch a promulga- 
 tion and enforcement of religion. For it is the very 
 fcheme of the Gofpel that each Chriftian mould, in 
 his degree, contribute towards continuing and carry- 
 ing it On ; all by uniting in the publick profeflion and 
 external practice of Chriftianity ; fome by inftructing, 
 by having the over fight, and taking care of this religi- 
 ous community, the church of God. Now this far- 
 ther (hews the importance of Chriftianity, and, which 
 is what I chiefly intend, its importance in a practical 
 fenfe ; or the high obligations we are under to take it 
 into our moil ferious confideration, and the danger 
 there muft neceflarily be, not only in treating it de- 
 fpitefully, which I am not now fpeaking of, but in 
 d [{regarding and neglecting it. For this" is neglecting 
 to do what is exprefsly enjoined us, for continuing 
 thofe benefits to the world, and tranfmitting them 
 down to future times ; and all this holds, even though 
 the only thing to be confidered in Chriftianity were 
 its fublerviency to natural religion. But, 
 
 II. Chriftianity is to be confidered in a further view, 
 as containing an account of a difpenfation of things 
 not at all difcoverable by reafon, in confequence of 
 which feveral diftinct precepts are enjoined us. Chrift- 
 ianity is not only an external inftitution of natural 
 religion, and a new promulgation of God's general 
 providence, as righteous governor and judge of the 
 world, but it contains alfo a revelation of a particular 
 difpenfation of providence, carrying on by his Son 
 and Spirit, for the recovery and faivation of mankind, 
 who are represented in Scripture to be in a ftate of ruin. 
 
 Aad 
 
SOD Tfie Importance PART 11, 
 
 And in confequence of this revelation being made, we 
 are commanded to be baptized, not only in the name 
 tf the Father, but alfo of the Son, and of the Holy Ghojl ; 
 and other obligations of duty, unknown before, to 
 the Son and the Holy Ghofl, are revealed. Now the 
 importance of thefe duties may be judged of, by ob~ 
 ferving that they arife, not from politive command 
 merely, but alfo from the offices which appear from 
 Scripture, to belong to thofe divine perfons in the 
 Gofpel difpenfation ; or from the relations which we 
 are there informed they fland in to us. By reafon is 
 revealed the relation which God the Father {lands in 
 to us. Hence arifes the obligation of duty which we 
 are under to him. In Scripture are revealed the rela- 
 tions which the Son and Holy Spirit fland in to us. 
 Hence arife the obligations of duty which we are un- 
 der to them. The truth of the cafe, as one may fpeak, 
 in each of thefe three refpeds being admitted ; that 
 God is the governor of the world, upon the evidence 
 of reafon that Chrifl is the mediator between God 
 and man, and the Holy Ghofl our guide and fan&ifier, 
 upon the evidence of revelation ; the truth of the cafe, 
 I fay, in each of thefe refpe&s being admitted, it is no 
 more a queflion, why it fliould be commanded that 
 we be baptized in the name of the Son and of the Holy 
 Ghoft, than that we be baptized in the name of the 
 Father. This matter feems to require to be more 
 fully ftated.* 
 
 Let it be remembered then that religion comes un- 
 der the twofold confideration of internal and external ; 
 for the latter is as real a part of religion, of true relig- 
 ion, as the former. Now when religion is coniidered 
 under the firft notion, as an inward principle, to be 
 exerted in fuch and fuch inward a6ls of the mind and 
 heart, the eflence of natural religion may be faid to 
 confift in religious regards to God the Father Almighty ; 
 
 and 
 
 ** See, The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy, of the Chriftian Sacraments, 
 f <fc. and Collier of revealed Religion, as there quoted. 
 
CHAP. I. of Chrtftianity. 201 
 
 and the effence of revealed religion, as diftinguifhed 
 from natural, to confifl in religious regards to the Son 
 and to the Holy Ghoft. And the obligation we are 
 under, of paying thefe religious regards to each of 
 thefe divine perfons refpe&ively, arifes from the refpeo 
 tive relations which they each (land in to us. How 
 thefe relations are made known, whether by reafon or 
 revelation, makes no alteration in the cafe ; becaufe 
 the duties arife out of the relations themfelves, not 
 out of the manner in which we are informed of them. 
 The Son and Spirit have each his proper office, in that 
 great difpenfation of Providence, the redemption of 
 the world ; the one our mediator, the other our fanc- 
 tifier. Does not then the duty of religious regards 
 to both thefe divine perfons as immediately arife, to 
 the view of reafon, out of the very nature of thefe of- 
 fices and relations, as the inward good will and kind 
 intention, which we owe to our fellow creatures, arifes 
 out of the common relations between us and them ? 
 But it will be afked, " What are the inward religious 
 regards, appearing thus obvioufly due to the Son and 
 Holy Spirit, as arifing, not merely from command in 
 Scripture, but from the very nature of the revealed 
 relations which they ftand in to us ?" I anfwer the 
 religious regards of reverence, honour, love, truft, grat- 
 itude, fear, hope. In what external manner this in- 
 ward worfhip is to be exprefled, is a matter of pure 
 revealed command, as perhaps the external manner in 
 which God the Father is to be worfhipped may be 
 more fo than we are ready to think , but the worfhip, 
 the internal worfhip itfelf, to the Son and Holy Ghoft, 
 is no farther matter of pure revealed command, than 
 as the relations they ftand in to us are matter of pure 
 revelation ; for the relations being known, the obliga- 
 tions to fuch internal worihip are obligations of reafon, 
 arifing out of thole relations themfelves. In ihort, 
 the hiftory of the Gofpel as immediately Ihews us the 
 
 O reafon 
 
202 Of the Importance PART II, 
 
 reafon of thefe obligations, as it fhews us the meaning 
 of the words, Son and Holy Ghoft. 
 
 If this account of the Chriftian religion be juft, 
 thofe perfons who can fpeak lightly of it, as of little 
 confequence, provided natural religion be kept to, 
 plainly forget that Chriftianity, even what is peculiarly 
 fo called, as diftinguifhed from natural religion, has 
 yet fbmewhat very important, even of a moral nature. 
 For the office of our Lord being made known, and the 
 relation he (lands in to us, the obligation of religious 
 regards to him, is plainly moral, as much as charity to 
 mankind is ; fince this obligation arifes, before ex- 
 ternal command, immediately out of that his office 
 and relation itfelf. Thofe perfons appear to forget, 
 that revelation is to be confidered as informing us of 
 fomewhat new in the ftate of mankind, and in the 
 government of the world ; as acquainting us with 
 fome relations we ftai>d in, which could not otherwife 
 have been known. And thefe relations being real, 
 (though before revelation we could be under no obli- 
 gations from them, yet upon their being revealed) 
 there is no reafon to think, but that neglect of behav- 
 ing fuitably to them will be attended with the fame 
 kind of confcquences under God's government, as 
 neglecting to behave fuitably to any other relations 
 made known to us by reafon. And ignorance, wheth- 
 er unavoidable or voluntary, fo far as we can poflibly 
 fee, will, juft as much, and juft as little, excufe in one 
 cafe as in the other ; the ignorance being fuppofed 
 equally unavoidable, or equally voluntary, in both 
 cafes. 
 
 If therefore Chrift be indeed the mediator between 
 God and man, i. e. if Chriftianity be true, if he be in- 
 deed our Lord, our Saviour, and our God, no one 
 can fay what may follow, not only the obftinate but 
 the carelefs difregard to him in thofe high relations. 
 Nay, no one can fay what may follow fuch difregard, 
 
 even 
 
CHAP. I. of Chnjllaniiy. 203 
 
 even in the way of natural confequence. For, as 
 the natural confequences of vice in this life are doubt- 
 lefs to be confidered as judicial punifhments inflicted 
 by God, fo likewife, for ought we know, the judicial 
 punifhments of the future life may be, in a like way or a 
 like fenfe, the natural confequence of vice ; * of men's 
 violating or disregarding the relations, which God 
 has placed them in here, and made known to them. 
 
 Again : If mankind are corrupted and depraved in 
 their moral character, and fo are unfit for that ftate 
 which Chrift is gone to prepare for his difciples ; and 
 if the afliftance of God's Spirit be necefiary to renew 
 their nature, in the degree requifite to their being 
 qualified for that ftate ; all which is implied in the 
 exprefs though figurative declaration, Except a man 
 be born of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of 
 God -^ fuppofing this, is it poffible any ferious perfon 
 can think it a flight matter, whether or no he makes 
 <\ife of the means exprefsly commanded by God for 
 obtaining this divine affiftance ? efpecially fince the 
 whole analogy of nature mews, that we are not to 
 expect any benefits without making ufe of the appoint- 
 ed means for obtaining or enjoying them. Now rea- 
 fon (hews us nothing of the particular immediate 
 means of obtaining either temporal or fpiritual bene- 
 fits. This therefore we muft learn, either from expe- 
 rience or revelation. And experience the prefent cafe 
 does not admit of. 
 
 The conclufion from all this evidently is, that Chrift- 
 ianity being fuppofed either true or credible, it is un- 
 fpeakable irreverence, and really the moft prefump- 
 tuous rafhnefs, to treat it as a light matter. It can 
 never juftly be efteemed of little confequence, till it 
 be pofitively fuppofed falfe. Nor do I know a higher 
 and more important obligation which we are under, 
 than that of examining moft ferioufly into the evi- 
 O 2. dence 
 
 * Ch. v, f John iii. 5. 
 
204 Of the Importance PART It, 
 
 dence of it, fuppofing its credibility, and of embracing 
 it, upon fuppofition, of its truth. 
 
 The two following deductions may be proper to be 
 added, in order to illuftrate the foregoing obfervations, 
 and to. prevent their being miftaken. 
 
 F'trfti Hence we may clearly fee, where lies the dif- 
 iinctiqn between what is pofitive and what is moral in 
 religion. Moral precepts are precepts the reaibn of 
 which we fee ; pofitive precepts are precepts the rea^ 
 fons of which we do not fee.* Moral duties arife out 
 of the nature of the cafe itfelf, prior to external com- 
 mand. Pofitive duties do not arife out of the nature 
 of the cafe, but from external command ; nor would 
 they be duties at all, were it not for fuch command, 
 received from him whofe creatures and fubjefts we 
 are. But the manner in which the nature of the cafe 
 or the fact of the relation is made known, this doth 
 not denominate any duty either pofitive or moral, 
 That we be baptized in the name of the Father, is as 
 much a pofitive duty, as that we be baptized in the 
 name of the Son, becaufe both arife equally from re- 
 vealed command ; though the relation which we 
 {land in to God the Father is made known to us by 
 reafon, the relation we ftand in to Chrifl by revelation 
 only. On the other hand, the difpenfation of the 
 Goipel admitted, gratitude as immediately becomes 
 clue to Chrift, from his being the voluntary minifter 
 of this difpenfation, as it is due to. God the Father, 
 from his being the fountain of all good ; though the 
 firil is made known to us by revelation only, the fec- 
 ond by reafon. Hence alfo we may fee, and, for dif- 
 rinchiefs fake, it may be worth mentioning, that pofi- 
 tive inftitutions come under a twofold confederation. 
 
 They 
 
 * This is the diftiniflion between moral and pofitive precept?, confidered 
 refpec~livcly as fuch. But yet, fmce the latter have fomewhat of a moral na- 
 ture, we may fee Che realon of them, confulered in this view. Moral and 
 jxjfitive precepts are in fome refpedls alike, in other retpecls different. So 
 far as they are alike, we difcern the reafons of both ; fo far as they are dif- 
 ferent, we difesrn the reafons of the former, but not of the latter. 
 
CHAP. J. of Chri/lianity. 205 
 
 They are either inftitutions founded on natural relig- 
 ion, as baptifm in the name of the Father, though this 
 has alfo a particular reference to the Gofpel diipenia- 
 tion, for it is in the name of God, as the Father of 
 our Lord Jefus Chrift ; or they are external inftitu- 
 tions founded on revealed religion, as baptifm in the 
 jume of the Son and of the Holy Ghoft. 
 
 Secondly, From the diftindion between what is 
 moral and what is pofitive in religion, appears the 
 ground of that peculiar preference which the Scripture 
 teaches us to be due to the former. 
 
 The reafon of pofitive inftitutions in general is very 
 obvious, though we mould not fee the reafon why fuck 
 particular ones are pitched -upon rather than others 
 Whoever therefore, inftead of cavilling at words, will 
 attend to the thing itfelf, may clearly fee that pofitive 
 inftitutions in general, as diftinguimed from this or 
 that particular one, have the nature of moral com- 
 mands, iince the reafons of them appear. Thus, for 
 inftance, the external worfhip of God is a moral duty, 
 though no particular mode of it be fo. Care then is 
 to be taken, when a comparifon is made between pofi- 
 tive and' moral duties, that they be compared no far- 
 ther than as they are different ; no farther than as the 
 former are pofitive, or arife out of mere external com- 
 mand, the reafons of which we are not acquainted 
 with ; and as the latter are moral, or arife out of the 
 apparent reafon of the cafe, without fuch external 
 command, Unlefs this caution be obferved, we mail 
 run into endlefs confufion. 
 
 Now, this being premifed, fuppofe two (landing 
 precepts enjoined by the fame authority ; that, in cer- 
 tain conjunctures, it is impoffible to obey both ; that 
 the former is moral, i. e. a precept of which we fee 
 the reafons, and that they hold in the particular cafe 
 before us ; but that the latter is pofitive, i. e. a pre- 
 cept of which we do not fee the reafons ; it is indif- 
 
 putable 
 
206 Of the Importance PART II. 
 
 putable that our obligations are to obey the former ; 
 becaufe there is an apparent reafon for this preference, 
 and none againft it. Farther, pofitive inflitutions, I 
 fuppofe all thofe which Chriftianity enjoins, are means 
 to a moral end ; and the end muft be acknowledged 
 more excellent than the means. Nor is obfervance of 
 thefe inflitutions any religious obedience at all, or of 
 any value, otherwife than as it proceeds from a moral 
 principle. This feems to be the find logical way of 
 Hating and determining this matter ; but will, per- 
 haps, be found lefs applicable to practice than may be 
 thought at firfl fight. 
 
 And therefore, in a more practical though more lax 
 way of confideration, and taking the words, moral law 
 and pojitive inftitutionSy in the popular fenfe, I add, 
 that the whole moral law is as much matter of reveal- 
 ed command, as pofitive inflitutions are ; for the 
 Scripture enjoins every moral virtue. In this refpect 
 then they are both upon a level. But the moral law 
 is, moreover, written upon our hearts- interwoven in- 
 to our very nature. And this is a plain intimation of 
 the Author of it, which is to be preferred, when they 
 interfere. 
 
 But there is not altogether fo much neceffity for the 
 determination of this queftion as fome peribns feem to 
 think. Nor are we left to reafon alone to determine 
 it. For, Firfty Though mankind have, in all ages, 
 been greatly prone to place their religion in peculiar 
 pofitive rites, by way of equivalent for obedience to 
 moral precepts, yet, without making any compari- 
 fon at all between them, and confequently without de- 
 termining which is to have the preference, the nature 
 of the thing abundantly mews all notions of that kind 
 to be utterly fubverfive of true religion ; as they are, 
 moreover, contrary to the whole general tenor of Scrip- 
 ture, and likewife to the mofl exprefs particular decla- 
 rations of it, that nothing; can render us accepted of 
 
 God 
 
-CHAP. L of Chriftiantiy, 207 
 
 God without moral virtue. Secondly ^ Upon the oc- 
 cafion of mentioning together pofitive and moral du>- 
 ties, the Scripture always puts the ftrefs of religion 
 upon the latter, and never upon the former ; which, 
 though no fort of allowance to neglect the former, 
 when they do not interfere with the latter, yet is a 
 plain intimation that when they do, the latter are to 
 be preferred. And farther, as mankind are for plac- 
 ing the ftrefs of their religion any where rather than 
 upon virtue left both the reafon of the thing, and 
 the general fpirit of Chriftianity, appearing in the inti- 
 mation now mentioned, mould be ineffectual againft 
 this prevalent folly, our Lord himfelf, from whofe 
 command alone the obligation of pofitive inftitutions 
 arifes, has taken occaiion to make the comparifon be- 
 tween them and moral precepts, when the Pharifees 
 cenfured him, for eating with publicans andfmners ; 
 and alfo when they cenfured his difciples for plucking 
 the ears of corn on the Sabbath day. Upon this com- 
 parifon, he has determined exprefsjy, and in form, 
 which mall have the preference when they interfere. 
 And by delivering his authoritative determination in 
 a proverbial manner of expreffion, he has made it gen- 
 eral : I will have mercy, and not facrifice.* The pro- 
 priety of the word proverbial is not the thing infifted 
 upon, though I think the manner of fpeaking is to be 
 called fo. But that the manner of fpeaking very re- 
 markably renders the determination general, is furely 
 indifputable. For, had it, in the latter cafe, been faid 
 only, that God preferred mercy to the rigid obferv.ance 
 of the Sabbath, even then, by parity of reafon, moil 
 juftly might we have argued, that he preferred mercy 
 likewife to the obfervance of other ritual inftitutions, 
 and in general, moral duties to pofitive ones. And 
 thus the 'determination would have been general, 
 though its being fo were inferred and not exprefled. 
 
 But 
 
 * Matth- ix. 13, and xii. 7. 
 
208 Of the Importance ofChriftianity. PART II, 
 
 But as the paffage really ftands in the Gofpel, it is 
 much ftronger. For the fenfe, and the very literal 
 words of our Lord's anfwer, are as applicable to any 
 other inftance of a comparifon, between pofitive and 
 moral duties, as to this upon which they were fpoken. 
 
 And if, in cafe of competition, mercy is to be pre- 
 ferred to pofitive inftitutions, it will fearce be thought 
 that juftice is to give place to them. It is remarkable 
 too, that, as the words are a quotation from the Old 
 Teftament, they are introduced, on both the foremen- 
 tioned occafions, with a declaration that the Pharifees 
 did not underftand the meaning of them. This, I 
 fay, is very remarkable. For, fince it is fearce poffi- 
 ble for the moft ignorant perfon not to underftand the 
 literal fenfe of the pafTage in the prophet,* and lince 
 underflanding the literal fenfe would not have pre- 
 vented their condemning the guiltlefs,^ it can hardly be 
 doubted that the thing which our Lord really intend- 
 ed in that declaration was, that the Pharifees had not 
 learnt from it, as they might, wherein \hegeneral fpirit 
 of religion confifts ; that it confifts in moral piety and 
 virtue, as diflinguifhed from forms and ritual obferv- 
 ances. However, it is certain we may learn this from 
 his divine application of the paflage in the Gofpel. 
 
 But, as it is one of the peculiar weaknefles of human 
 nature, when, upon a companion of two things, one is 
 found to be of greater importance than the other, to 
 confider this other as of fearce any importance at all, 
 it is highly necefiary that we remind ourfelves how 
 great prefumption it is, to make light of any inftitu- 
 tions of divine appointment ; that our obligations to 
 obey all God's commands whatever are abfolute and 
 indifpeniible ; and that commands merely pofitive, 
 admitted to be from him, lay us under a moral obli- 
 gation to obey them an obligation moral in the 
 ftridteft and moft proper fenfe. 
 
 To 
 
 * Hof. vi. f See Matth. xii. 7. 
 
CHAP. II. Of the fuppofed Preemption, s?r. 209 
 
 To thefe things I cannot forbear adding, that the 
 account now given of Chriftianity moll ftrongly ihews 
 and enforces upon us tlie obligation of fearching the 
 Scriptures, in order to fee what the fcheme of revela- 
 tion really is, inflead of determining beforehand from 
 reafon what the fcheme of it mud be.* Indeed if in 
 revelation there be found any paifages, the feeming 
 meaning of which is contrary to natural religion, \ve 
 may mod certainly conclude fuch feeming meaning 
 not to be the real one. But it is not any degree of a 
 preemption againfl an interpretation of Scripture, that 
 fuch interpretation contains a doctrine which the light 
 of nature cannot difcover,-j~ or a precept which the Jaw 
 of nature does not oblige to. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Of the fuppofed Prefumption agawft a Revelation, 
 fidered as miraculous. 
 
 JtlAVING (hewn the importance of the 
 Chriftian revelation, and the obligations which we are 
 under feriouily to attend to it, upon fuppoiition of its 
 truth, or its credibility, the next thing in order is, to 
 confider the fuppofed preemptions againd revelation 
 in general, which mail be the iubjecl: of this chapter ; 
 and the objections againft the Chriftian in particular, 
 which fhall be the Iubjecl: of fome following ones. J 
 For it feems the mod natural method to remove the 
 prejudices againft Chriftianity, before we proceed to 
 the confederation of the politive evidence for it, and 
 the objections againd that evidence. 
 
 It is, I think, commonly fuppofed, that there is fome 
 peculiar preemption, from the analogy of nature, 
 
 againft 
 
 *See Ch. iii. f P. 210, 211. 
 
 J Ch. iii, iv, v, vi. Ch. vii. 
 
210 Of the fitppofed Prefumption PART II. 
 
 -agamft the Chriftian fcheme of things, at leaft againft 
 miracles ; fo as that ftronger evidence is necefTary to 
 prove the truth and reality of them than would be fuf- 
 ficient to convince us of other events, or matters of 
 .faft. Indeed the confideration of this fuppofed pre- 
 fumption cannot but be thought very insignificant, by 
 many perfons ; yet, as it belongs to the fubject of this 
 treatiie, fo it may tend to open the mind, and remove 
 fome prejudices, however needlefs the conlideration of 
 it be upon its own account. 
 
 I. I find no appearance of a prefumption, from the 
 analogy of nature, againft the general fcheme of Chrift- 
 ianity, that God created and inviiibly governs the 
 world by Jefus Chrifl, and by him alfo will hereafter 
 judge it in righteoufnefs, i. e. render to every one ac- 
 cording to his works ; and that good men are under 
 the fecret influence of his Spirit. Whether thefe 
 things are or are not to be called miraculous, is per- 
 haps only a queftion about words, or however, is of no 
 moment in the cafe. If the analogy of nature raifes 
 any prefumption againft this general fcheme of Chrift- 
 ianity, it muft be either becaufe it is not difcoverable 
 by reafon or experience, or elfe becaufe it is unlike that 
 courfe of nature which is. But analogy raifes no pre^ 
 fumption againft the truth of this fcheme, upon either 
 of thefe accounts. 
 
 Firft, There is no prefumption, from analogy, againft 
 the truth of it upon account of its not being difcover- 
 able by reafon or experience. For fuppofe one who 
 never heard of revelation, of the moft improved un- 
 derftanding, and acquainted with our whole fyftem of 
 natural philofophy and natural religion, men an one 
 could not but be fenfible that it was but a very fmall 
 part of the natural and moral fyftern of the univerfe, 
 Avhich he was acquainted with. He could not bu,t be 
 fenfible that there muft be innumerable things, in the 
 <iifpeniations of Providence paft, in the invifible gov- 
 ernment 
 
CHAP. II, agalnjl Miracles. 211 
 
 crnment over the world at prefent carrying on, and in 
 what is to come, of which he was wholly ignorant,* 
 and which could not be difcovered without revelation. 
 Whether the fcheme of nature be, in the ftri&eft ienie, 
 infinite or not, it is evidently vail, even beyond all pot- 
 fible imagination ; and doubtlefs that part of it which 
 is opened to our view is but as a point, in companion 
 of the whole plan of Providence, reaching throughout 
 eternity pad and future ; in comparifon of what is even 
 now going on in the remote parts of the bouncllefs uni- 
 verfe ; nay, in companion of the whole fcheme of this 
 world. And therefore, that things lie beyond the nat- 
 ural reach of our faculties, is no fort of prefumption 
 againft the truth and reality of them ; becauie it is 
 certain there are innumerable things, in the conftitu- 
 tion and government of the univerie, which are thus 
 beyond the natural reach of our faculties. Secondly 9 
 Analogy raifes no prefumption againft any of the 
 things contained in this general doctrine of Scripture 
 now mentioned, upon account of their being unlike 
 the known courfe of nature. For there is no pre- 
 fumption at all from analogy, that the wJwle courle of 
 things, or divine government, naturally unknown to 
 us, and every iking in it, is like to any thing in that 
 wfyich is known, and therefore no peculiar prefump- 
 tion againft any thing in the former, upon account of 
 its being unlike to any thing in the latter. And in 
 the conftifution and natural government of the world, 
 as well as in the moral government of it, we fee things 
 in a great degree unlike one another, and therefore 
 ought not to wonder at luch unlikeneis between things 
 vifible and invifible. However, the fcheme of Chrift- 
 ianity is by no means entirely unlike the fcheme of na- 
 ture, as will appear in the following part of this treatiie. 
 The notion of a miracle, confidered as a proof of a 
 divine million, has been Hated with great exact nefs by 
 
 divines, 
 *p. 174, i 7S , 
 
sis Of tJie fuppofed Preemption PART II. 
 
 divines, and is, I think, fufHciently underftood by 
 every one. There are alfo inviiible miracles, the in- 
 carnation of Chrift, for inflance, which being fecret 
 cannot be alleged as a proof of fuch a miffion, but re- 
 quire themfelves tp be proved by vifible miracles. 
 Revelation itfelf too is miraculous, and miracles are 
 the proof of it ; and the fuppofed prefumption againft 
 thefe, fhall prefently be confidered. All which I have 
 been obferving here is, that, whether we choofe to call 
 every thing in the difpenfations of Providence, not 
 difcoverable without revelation, nor like the known 
 courfe of things, miraculous, and whether the general 
 Chriftian difpenfation now mentioned, is to be called 
 fo or not, the foregoing obfervations feem certainly to 
 {hew, that there is no prefumption againft it, from, 
 the analogy of nature. 
 
 II. There is no prefumption from analogy again& 
 fome operations, which we mould now call miracu- 
 lous, particularly none againft a revelation at the be- 
 ginning of the world ; nothing of fuch prefumption 
 againft it, as is fuppofed to be implied or expreffed in 
 the word miraculous. For a miracle, in its very no- 
 tion, is relative to a courfe of nature, and implies 
 fomewhat different from it, confidered as being fo. 
 Now, either there was no courfe of nature at the time 
 which we are fpeaking of, or if there were, we are not 
 -acquainted what the courfe of nature is, upon the 
 firft peopling of worlds. And therefore the queftion, 
 whether mankind had a revelation made to them at 
 that time, is to be confidered, not as a queftion con- 
 cerning a miracle, but as a common queftion of fa<ft. 
 And we have the like reafon, be it more or lets, to 
 admit the report of tradition concerning this queftion, 
 and concerning common matters of fa& of the fame 
 antiquity ; for inftance, what part of the earth was 
 tirft peopled; 
 
 Or 
 
CHAF. IT. againjl Miracles. 21$ 
 
 Or thus : When mankind was firft placed in this 
 ftate, there was a power exerted totally different from 
 the prefent courfe of nature. Now, whether this pow- 
 er, thus wholly different from the prefent courfe of na- 
 ture, for we cannot properly apply to it the word mt- 
 raculous, whether this power flopped immediately 
 after it had made man, or went on, and exerted itfelf 
 farther in giving him a revelation, is a queftion of the 
 fame kind, as whether an ordinary power exerted it- 
 felf in fuch a particular degree and manner or not. 
 
 Or fuppofe the power exerted in the formation of 
 the world be coniidered as miraculous, or rather be 
 ealled by that name, the cafe will not be different 5 
 fmce it mufl be acknowledged, that fuch a power was 
 exerted. For fuppofmg it acknowledged, that our 
 Saviour fpent fome years in a courfe of working mira- 
 cles, there is no more preiumption, worth mentioning, 
 againfl his having exerted this miraculous power in a 
 certain degree greater, than in a certain degree lefs ; 
 in one or two more inftances, than in one or two few- 
 er ; in this, than in another manner. 
 
 It is evident then, that there can be no peculiar 
 prefumption, from the analogy of nature, againft fup- 
 pofing a revelation when man was firft placed upon 
 the earth. 
 
 Add, that there does not appear the leaft intima- 
 tion in hiftory or tradition, that religion was firft rea- 
 ibned out ; but the whole of hiftory and tradition 
 makes for the other fide, that it came into the world 
 by revelation. Indeed the ftate of religion in the fi 
 ages, of which we have any account, feems to fuppofe 
 and imply that this was the original of it amongft 
 mankind. And thefe reflections together, without 
 taking in the peculiar authority of Scripture, amount 
 to real and a very material degree of evidence, that 
 there was a revelrtion at the beginning of the world. 
 Now this, as it is a confirmation of natural religion, 
 
 and 
 
2 1 4 Of thefuppofed Prefumption PA R T II, 
 
 and therefore mentioned in the former part of this 
 treadle,* fo likewife it has a tendency to remove any 
 prejudices againft a fubfequent revelation. 
 
 III. But fell it may be objected, that there is fome 
 peculiar prefumption, from analogy, againft miracles, 
 particularly againft revelation, after the fettlement and 
 during the continuance of a courfe of nature. 
 
 Now with regard to this fuppofed prefumption it is 
 to be obferved in general, that before we can have 
 ground for railing what can, with any propriety, be 
 called an argument from analogy, for or againft revela- 
 tion, conlidered as fomewhat miraculous, we mufl be 
 acquainted with a fimilar or parallel cafe. But the 
 hifiory of fome other world, feerningly in like circum- 
 ftances with our own, is no more than a parallel cafe, 
 and therefore nothing fliort of this can be fo. Yet, 
 could we come at a prefumptive proof for or againft a 
 revelation, from being informed whether fuch world 
 had one or not, fuch a proof, being drawn from one 
 (ingle inftance only, muft be infinitely precarious. 
 More particularly : Firft of all, There is a very ftrong 
 prefumption againft common fpeculative truths, and 
 againft the moft ordinary facts, before the proof of 
 them, which yet is overcome by almoft any proof. 
 There is a prefumption of millions to one againft the 
 ftory of Cafar, or of any other man. For fuppofe a 
 number of common fads fo and fo circumftanced^ of 
 which one had no kind of proof, fhould happen to 
 come into one's thoughts, every one would, without 
 any poffible doubt, conclude them to be falfe ; and 
 the like may be laid of a fmgle common fact. And 
 from hence it appears, that the queftion of importance 
 as to the matter before us, is, concerning the degree of 
 the peculiar prefumption fuppofed againft miracles ; 
 not whether there be any peculiar prefumption at all 
 againft them. For, if there be the prefumption of 
 
 millions 
 
 *P. 167, &c. 
 
CHAP. II. againjl Miracles. 215 
 
 millions to one againft the mod common fads, what 
 can a fmall prefumption additional to this amount to, 
 though it be peculiar ? It cannot be eftimated,and is as 
 nothing. The only material queftion is, whether there 
 be any fuch prefumption againft miracles, as to render 
 them in any fort incredible. Secondly, If we leave out 
 the confideration of religion, we are in fuch total dark- 
 nefs upon what caufes, occafions, reafons, or circum- 
 ftances,the prefent courfe of nature depends, that there 
 does not appear any improbability for or againft fuppoP 
 ing, that five or fix thoufand years may have given fcope 
 for caufes, occafions, reafons, or circumftances, from 
 whence miraculous interpofitions may have ariien. 
 And from this, joined with the foregoing obfervation, 
 it will follow, that^here muft be a prefumption be- 
 yond all comparison greater, againft the particular 
 common fads juft now inftanced in, than againft mir- 
 acles in general, before any evidence of either. But, 
 Thirdly, Take in the confidential) of religion, or the 
 moral fyftem of the world, and then we fee diftinct 
 particular reafons for miracles to afford mankind in- 
 ftrudion additional to that of nature, and to att'jft 
 the truth of it. And this gives a real credibility to 
 the fuppofition, that it might be part of the original 
 plan of things, that there mould be miraculous inter- 
 pofitions. Then, Laftly, Miracles muft not be com- 
 pared to common natural events, or to events which, 
 though uncommon, are fimilar to what we daily expe- 
 rience -, but to the extraordinary phenomena of na- 
 ture. And then the comparifon will be between the 
 prefumption againft miracles, and the prefumption 
 againft fuch uncommon appearances, fuppofe, as com- 
 ets, and againft there being any fuch powers in nature 
 as magnetifm and electricity, fo contrary to the prop- 
 erties of other bodies not endued with thefe powers. 
 And before any one can determine whether there be 
 any peculiar prefumption againft miracles, more than 
 
 againft 
 
2 r 6 The Credibility of Revelation P A R x IL 
 
 againft other extraordinary things, he muft confider 
 what, upon firft hearing, would be the prefumption 
 againft the laft mentioned appearances and powers, to 
 a perfon acquainted only with the daily, monthly, and 
 annual courfe of nature refpecting this earth, and with 
 thofe common powers of matter which we every day 
 fee. 
 
 Upon all this I conclude, that there certainly is na 
 fuch preiumption againft miracles as to render them in. 
 any wife incredible $ that on the contrary, our being 
 able 'to difcern reafons for them gives a pofitive credi- 
 bility to the hiftory of them, in cafes where thofe rea- 
 fons hold ; and that it is by na means certain, that 
 there is any particular prefumption at all, from analo- 
 gy, even in the lowed degree, againft miracles, as dif- 
 tinguiihed from other extraordinary phenomena 
 though it is not worth while to perplex the reader 
 with inquiries into the abftracl: nature of evidence, in 
 order to determine a queftion, which without fuch in- 
 quiries we fee* is of no importance. 
 
 CHAP. IIL 
 
 Of our Incapacity of judging what were to be expefled IK 
 a Revelation ; and the Credibility, from Analogy , that 
 it mujl contain Things appearing 'liable to Objections* 
 
 J3ESIDES the objections againft the evi- 
 dence for Chriftianity, many are alleged againft the 
 fcheme of it, againft the whole manner in which it is 
 put and left with the world, as well as againft feverai 
 particular relations in Scripture ; objections drawn 
 from the deficiencies of revelation ; from things in it 
 appearing to men foolt/Jmefs ; -j~ from its containing; 
 
 matters. 
 
 * P. 215. f i Cor. i. 28. 
 
CHAP. III. liable to Objections. 217 
 
 matters of offence, which have led, and it muft have 
 been forefeen would lead, into ftrange enthufiafm and 
 fuperflition, and be made to ferve the purpofes of ty- 
 ranny and wicked nefs ; from its not being umverfal ; 
 and, which is a thing of the fame kind, from its evi- 
 dence not being ib convincing and fatisfactory as it 
 might have been ; for this laft is fometimes turned 
 into apofitive argument againit its truth.* It would 
 be tedious, indeed impoffible, to enumerate the feveral 
 ^particulars comprehended under the objections here 
 referred to ; they being fo various, according to the 
 different fancies of men. There are perfons who think 
 it a ftrong objection againft the authority of Scripture, 
 that it is not compofed by rules of art, agreed upon 
 by criticks, for polite and correct writings. And the 
 fcorn is inexprefiible, with which fome of the prophet- 
 ick parts of Scripture are treated ; partly through the 
 raflinefs of interpreters, but very much alfo on account 
 of the hieroglyphical and figurative language in which 
 they are left us. Some of the principal things of this 
 fort mall be particularly confidered in the following 
 chapters. But my defign at prefent is to ob ferve in. 
 general, with refpect to this whole way of arguing, 
 that, upon fuppofition of a revelation, it is highly cred- 
 ible beforehand, we mould be incompetent judges of 
 it, to a great degree ; and that it would contain ma- 
 ny things appearing to us liable to great objections, 
 in cafe we judge of it otherwife than by the analogy 
 of nature. And therefore though objections againit 
 the evidence of Chriftianity are moft lerioufly to be 
 confidered, yet objections againfl Chriftianity itfelf are, 
 in a great meafure, frivolous ; almoft all objections 
 againit it, excepting thofe which are alleged againit 
 the particular proofs of its coming from God. I ex- 
 prefs myfelf with caution, left I mould be miftaken to 
 vilify reafon, which is indeed the only faculty we have 
 P wherewith 
 
 * See Cb. vi, 
 
2 1 8 The Credibility of Revelation PART U, 
 
 wherewith to judge concerning any thing, even reve* 
 lation itfelf ; or be mifunderftood to afTert, that a fup- 
 pofed revelation cannot be proved falfe from internal 
 characters. For, it may contain clear immoralities or 
 contradictions, and either of thefe would prove ifc falfe. 
 Nor will I take upon me to affirm, that nothing elfe 
 can poilibly render any fuppofed revelation incredible, 
 Yet ftill the obfervation above is, I think, true beyond 
 doubt, that objections againft Chriftianity, as diftin- 
 guifhed from objections againfl its evidence, are friv-^ 
 olous. To make out this, is the general delign of the 
 prefent chapter. 'And with regard to the whole of 
 it, I cannot but particularly wilh that the proofs 
 might be attended to, rather than the aflert ions cavil- 
 led at, upon account of any unacceptable confequenc- 
 es, whether real or fuppofed, which may be drawn 
 from them. For, after all, that which is true muft 
 be admitted, though ,it mould Ihew us the Ihortnefs 
 of our faculties, and that we are in no wife judges of 
 many things, of which we are apt to think ourfelves 
 very competent ones. Nor will this be any objection 
 with reafonable men, at leaft upon fecond thought it 
 will not be any objection with Rich, againft the juft- 
 nefs of the following obfervations. 
 
 As God governs the world, and inftructs his crea- 
 tures, according to certain laws or rules, in the known 
 courfe of nature, known by re'afon together with ex- 
 perience, fo the Scripture informs us of a fcheme of 
 divine Providence additional to this. It relates, that 
 God has, by revelation, inftructed men in things con- : 
 cerning his government which they could not oth- 
 erwife have known, and reminded them of things 
 which they might otherwife know, and attefted the 
 truth of the whole by miracles. Now if the natural 
 and the revealed difpenfation of things are both from 
 God, if they coincide with each other, and together 
 make up one fcheme of Providence, our being in- 
 competent 
 
CHAP-. III. liable to Objections. 219 
 
 competent judges of one, mult render it credible that 
 we may be incompetent judges alfo of the other; 
 Since, upon experience, the acknowledged conftitution 
 and courie of nature is found to be greatly different 
 from what, before experience, would have been expect- 
 ed, and fuch as men fancy there lie great objections 
 againfl, this renders it beforehand highly credible, 
 that they may find the revealed difpenfation likewiie, 
 if they judge of it as they do of the conftitution of na- 
 ture, very different from expectations formed before- 
 hand, and liable, in appearance, to great objections ; 
 objections againfl the fcheme itfelf, and againft the de- 
 grees and manners of the miraculous interpofitions by 
 which it was attefted and carried on. Thus, luppofe 
 a prince to govern his dominions in the wifeft manner 
 poifibiej by common known laws, and that upon fome 
 exigencies he mould iufpend thefe laws, and govern, 
 in feveral inftances, in a different manner ; if one of 
 his fubjedts were not a competent judge beforehand, 
 by what common rules the government mould or 
 would be carried on, it could not be expected that 
 the fame perfon would be a competent judge, in what, 
 exigencies, or in what manner, or to what degree, thole 
 laws commonly obferved would be fulbended or devi- 
 ated from* If he were not a judge ot the wifdom of 
 the ordinary adminiflration, there is no reafon to think 
 he would be a judge of the wifdom of the extraordi- 
 nary. If he thought he had objections againft the 
 former, doubtlefs it is highly fuppolable he might 
 think alfo that he had objections againft the latter. 
 And thus as we fall into infinite follies and miflakes, 
 whenever we pretend, otherwife than from experience, 
 and analogy, to judge of the conftitution and courfe 
 of nature. it is evidently fuppofable beforehand that 
 we mould fall into as great in pretending to judge, in 
 the like manner, concerning revelation. Nor is there 
 
 C5 
 
 any more ground to expedt that this latter mould ap- 
 P 2 pear 
 
520 The Credibility of Revelation PART fL 
 
 pear to us clear of obje&ions, than that the former 
 Ihould. 
 
 Thefe obfervations, relating to the whole of Chrift- 
 ianity, are applicable to infpiration in particular. As 
 we are in no fort judges beforehand, by what laws or 
 rules, in what degree, or by what means, it were ta 
 have been expected, that God would naturally inftruct 
 us, fo upon fuppofition of his affording us light and 
 inftruction by revelation, additional to what he has af- 
 forded us by reafon and experience, we are in no fort 
 judges by what methods, and in what proportion, it 
 were to be expected that this fupernatural light and 
 inftruction would be afforded us. We know not be- 
 forehand, what degree or kind of natural information 
 it were to be expected God would afford men, each by 
 his own reafon and experience ; nor how far he would 
 enable and effectually difpofe them to communicate 
 it, whatever it fhould be, taeach other; nor whether 
 the evidence of it would be certain, highly probable r 
 or doubtful ; nor whether it would be given with equat 
 clearnefs and conviction to all. Nor could we guefs y 
 upon any good ground I mean, whether natural knowl- 
 edge, or even the faculty itfelf by which we are capa* 
 ble of attaining it, reafon, would be given us at once, 
 or gradually. In like manner we are wholly ignorant, 
 what degree of new knowledge it were to be expected 
 God would give mankind by revelation, upon fuppo- 
 fition of his affording one - y or how far, or in what way, 
 he would interpofe miraculouily to qualify them, to 
 whom he fhould originally make the revelation, for 
 communicating the knowledge given by it, and to fe- 
 cure their doing it to the age in which they mould 
 live, and to fecure its being tranfmitted to pofterity* 
 We are equally ignorant whether the evidence of it 
 would be certain, or highly probable, or doubtful ;* 
 or whether all who fhould have any degree of inftruc- 
 
 tioix 
 * See Cb. vi, 
 
CHAP. III. liable to Objections. 221 
 
 tion from it, and any degree of evidence of its truth, 
 would have the fame ; or whether the fcheme would 
 be revealed at once, or unfolded gradually. Nay, we 
 are not in any fort able to judge, whether it were to 
 have been expected that the revelation mould have 
 been committed to writing, or left to be handed down, 
 and confequently corrupted by verbal tradition, and at 
 length funk under it, if mankind fo pleafed, and dur- 
 ing fuch time as they are permitted, in the degree they 
 evidently are, to act as they wilt 
 
 But it may be faid, " that a revelation in fome of 
 the above mentioned circumftances, one, for inftance, 
 which was not committed to writing, and thus fecured 
 againft danger of corruption, would cot have anfwered 
 its purpofe." I afk, what purpofe ? It would not have 
 anfwered all the purpofes which it has now anfwered, 
 and in the fame degree ; but it would have anfwered 
 others, or the fame in different degrees. And which 
 of thefe were the purpofes of God, and befl fell in with 
 his general government, we could not at ail have de- 
 termined beforehand. 
 
 Now fince it has been (hewn, that we have no prin- 
 ciples of reafon, upon which to judge beforehand how 
 it were to be expeed revelation mould have been left, 
 or what was mod fuitable to the divine plan of gov- 
 ernment in any of the forementioned refpects, it 
 muft be quite frivolous to object afterwards as to any 
 of them, againft its being kft in one way rather thaa 
 another ; for this would be to object againft things, 
 pon account of their being different from expecta- 
 tions, which have been Ihewn to be without reafon. 
 And thus we fee that the only queftion concerning the 
 truth of Chriftianity is, whether it be a real revelation ; 
 not whether it be attended with every circumftance 
 which we mould have looked for and concerning the 
 authority of Scripture, whether it be what it claims to 
 be j not whether it be a book of fuch fort, and fo pro- 
 
 mulged, 
 
zzz The Credibility of Revelation PART II, 
 
 mulged, as weak men are apt to fancy a book con- 
 taining a divine revelation fhould. And therefore nei- 
 ther obicurity, nor feeming inaccuracy of ftyle, nor 
 various readings, nor early difputes about the authors 
 of particular parts, nor any other things of the like 
 kind, though they had been much more confiderable 
 in degree than they are, could overthrow the authority 
 of the Scripture ; unlefs the prophets, apoftles, or our 
 Lord, had promifed that the book containing the di- 
 vine revelation mould be fecure from thofe things. 
 Nor indeed can any objections overthrow fuch a kind 
 of revelation as the Chriftian claims to be, fmce there 
 are no objections againfl the morality of it,* but fuch 
 as can (hew that there is no proof of miracles wrought 
 originally in atteftation of it, no appearance of any 
 thing miraculous in its obtaining in the world, nor any 
 of prophecy, that is, of events foretold which hu- 
 man fagacity could not foreiee. If it can be ihewn, 
 that the proof alleged for all thefe is abfolutely none 
 at all, then is revelation overturned. But were it al- 
 lowed that the proof of any one or all of them is lower 
 than is allowed, yet, whilft any proof of them remains, 
 revelation will (land upon much the fame foot it does 
 at prefent, as to all the purpofes of life and practice, 
 and ought to have the like influence upon our be- 
 haviour. 
 
 From the foregoing obfervations too it will follow, 
 and thofe who will thoroughly examine into revelation 
 will find it worth remarking, that there are feveral 
 ways of arguing, which, though juft with regard to 
 other writings, are not applicable to Scripture ; at leafl 
 not to the prophetic parts of it. We cannot argue, 
 for inftance, that this cannot be the fenfe or intent of 
 fuch a paflage of Scripture, for if it had it would have 
 been expreffed more plainly, or have been reprefented 
 under a more apt figure or hieroglyphick ; yet we may 
 
 * P. si. 
 
CHAP. III. liable to Objections. 2,23 
 
 juftly argue thus with refpect to common books. And 
 the reafon of this difference is very evident, that in 
 Scripture we are not competent judges, as we are in 
 common books, how plainly it were to have been ex- 
 pected, what is the true fenfe (hould have been ex- 
 prefTed, or under how apt an image figured. The 
 only queflion is, what appearance there is that this is 
 the fenfe, and fcarce at all how much more determi- 
 nately or accurately it might have been exprefied oj 
 figured. 
 
 " But is it not felfevident, that internal improba^ 
 bilities of all kinds weaken external probable proof ?** 
 Doubtlefs. But to what practical purpofe can this be 
 alleged here, when it has been proved before,* that 
 real internal improbabilities, which rife even to moral 
 certainty, are overcome by the rncft ordinary teftimo- 
 ny, and when it now has been made appear, that we 
 fcarce know what are improbabilities as to the matter 
 we are here confidering as it will farther appear from 
 what follows. 
 
 For though from the obfervations above made, it is 
 manifeft that we are not in any fort competent judges 
 what fupernatural ihftru&ipn were to have been expect- 
 ed, and though it is felfevident that the objections of an 
 incompetent judgment muft be frivolous, yet it may 
 be proper to go one flep farther, and obferve, that if 
 men will be regardlefs of thefe things, and pretend to 
 judge of the Scripture by preconceived expectations, 
 the analogy of nature mews beforehand, not only that 
 it is highly credible they may, but alfo probable that 
 they will, imagine they have ftrong objections againfl 
 it, however really unexceptionable ; for fo, prior to ex- 
 perience, they would think they had, againft the cir- 
 cumfbmces and degrees, and the whole manner of that 
 inftruction which is afforded by the ordinary courfe of 
 mature. Were the inftru&ion which God affords to 
 
 brute 
 *p. i 
 
224 The Credibility of Revelation PART II, 
 
 brute creatures by inflincts and mere propenfions, and 
 to mankind by thefe together with reafon, matter of 
 probable proof, and not of certain obfervation, it 
 would be rejected as incredible in many inftances of it, 
 only upon account of the means by which this inftruc- 
 tion is given, the feeming difproportions, the limita- 
 tions, neceffary conditions and circumftances of it. 
 For inftance would it not have been thought highly 
 improbable, that men ihould have been fo much more 
 capable of difcovering, even to certainty, the general 
 laws of matter, and the magnitudes, paths and revo- 
 lutions of the heavenly bodies, than the occafions and 
 cures of diftempers, and many other things in which 
 human life teems fo much more nearly concerned than 
 in aftronomy ? How capricious and irregular a way 
 of information, would it be faid, is that of invention* 
 by means of which nature instructs us in matters of 
 fcience, and in many things upon which the affairs of 
 the world greatly depend ; that a man fliould by this 
 faculty be made acquainted with a thing in an inftant, 
 when perhaps he is thinking of fomewhat elfe which he 
 has in vain been fearching after, it may be, for years. 
 So likewife the imperfections attending the only meth^ 
 od by which nature enables and directs us to communi- 
 cate our thoughts to each other, are innumerable. Lan- 
 guage is in its very nature inadequate, ambiguous, lia- 
 ble to infinite abufe even from negligence, and fo liable 
 to it from defign,that every man can deceive and betray 
 by it. And to mention but one inftance more, that 
 brutes without reafon Ihould act, in many refpects, 
 with a fagacity-and forefight vaftly greater than what 
 men have in thofe refpects, would be thought impof-? 
 iible ; yet it is certain they do act with fuch fuperior 
 forefight whether it be their own indeed is another 
 queftion. From thefe things it is highly credible be- 
 forehand, that upon fuppofition God fliould afford men 
 fome additional inftruction by revelation, it would be 
 
 with 
 
CHAP. III. liable lo Objections, 225 
 
 \vith circumftances, in manners, degrees and refpects, 
 which we (hould be apt to fancy we had great objec- 
 tions againft the credibility of. Nor are the objections 
 againft the Scripture, nor againft Chriftianity in gene- 
 ral, at all more or greater than the analogy of nature 
 would beforehand not perhaps give ground to ex- 
 pect, for this analogy may not be fufficient in fome cafe 
 to ground an expectation upon, but no more nor 
 greater than analogy would mew it, beforehand, to b$ 
 fuppofable and credible that there might feem to lie 
 againft revelation. 
 
 By applying thefe general obfervations to a particu- 
 lar objection, it will be more diftinctly feen how they 
 are applicable to others of the like kind, and indeed 
 to almofl al] objections againft Chriftianity, as diftin- 
 guifhed from objections againft its evidence. It ap- 
 pears from Scripture, that as it was not unuiual in the 
 apoftolick age for perfons, upon their converfion to 
 Chriftianity, to be endued with miraculous gifts, fo 
 fome of thofe perfons exercifed thefe gifts in a ftrange- 
 ly irregular and diibrderly manner ; and this is made 
 an objection againft their being really miraculous. 
 Now the foregoing obfervations quite remove this ob- 
 jection, how confiderable foever it may appear at firft 
 fight. For confider a perfon endued with any of 
 thefe gifts, for inftance, that of tongues, it is to be fup- 
 pofed that he had the fame power over this miracu- 
 lous gift, as he would have had over it had it been 
 the effect of habit, of ftudy and ufe, as it ordinarily is, 
 or the fame power over it as he had over any other 
 patural endowment. Confequently he would ufe it 
 in the fame manner he did any other, either regularly 
 and upon proper occalions only, or irregularly and up- 
 on improper ones, according to his fenfe of decency, 
 and his character of prudence. Where then is the 
 obje&ion ? Why, if this miraculous power was indeed 
 given to the world to propagate Chriftianity and atteft 
 
 the 
 
26 The Credibility of Revelation PART II. 
 
 the truth of it, we might, it feems, have expected 
 that other fort of perfons fhould have been chofen to 
 be invefled with it ; or that thefe fhould, at the fame 
 time, have been endued with prudence ; or that they 
 fhould have been continually reftrained and directed 
 in the exerciie of it ; i.e. that God Ihould have mi- 
 raculoufly interpofed, if at all, in a different manner or 
 higher degree. But from the obfervations made 
 above, it is undeniably evident that we are not judges 
 in what degrees and manners it were to have been ex- 
 pected he fhould miraculoufly interpofe, upon fuppo- 
 fition of his doing it in fome degree and manner. 
 Nor, in the natural courfe of Providence, are fuperior 
 gifts of memory, eloquence, knowledge, and other tal- 
 ents of great influence, conferred only on perfons of 
 prudence and decency, or fuch as are diipofed to make 
 the propereft ufe of them. Nor is the inftruction and 
 admonition naturally afforded us for the conduct of 
 life, particularly in our education, commonly given in 
 a manner the moil fuited to recommend it, but often 
 with circumftances apt to prejudice us againft fuch 
 inftruction, 
 
 One might go on to add, that there is a great re- 
 femblance between the light of nature and of revela- 
 tion in feveral other refpects. Practical Chriftianity, 
 or that faith and behaviour which renders a man a 
 Chriftian, is a plain and obvious thing, like the com- 
 mon rules of conduct with refpect to our ordinary 
 temporal affairs. The more diftinct and particular 
 knowledge of thofe things, the fludy of which the 
 Apoftle calls going on unto perfe&ion* and of the pro- 
 phetick parts of revelation, like many parts of natural 
 and even civil knowledge, may require very exact 
 thought, and careful confideration. The hindrances 
 too, of natural and of fupernatural light and know- 
 ledge, have been of the fame kind. And as, it is owned, 
 
 the 
 
 * Heb. vi. i. 
 
CHAP. Ill, liable to Objections. 227 
 
 the whole fcheme of Scripture is not yet underflood, 
 fo, if it ever comes to be underflood, before the refti* 
 tution of all things,* and without miraculous interpofi- 
 tions, it muft be in the fame way as natural knowledge 
 is come at, by the continuance and progrefs of learn- 
 ing and of liberty, and by particular perfons attending 
 to, comparing and purfuing intimations fcattered up 
 and down it, which are overlooked and difregarded by 
 the generality of the world. For this is the way in 
 which all improvements are made, by thoughtful men's 
 tracing on obfcure hints, as it were, dropped us by 
 nature accidentally, or which feem to come into our 
 minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible, that a 
 book which has been fo long in the poflefiion of man- 
 kind mould contain many truths as yet undifcovered. 
 For, all the fame phenomena and the fame faculties 
 of invefligation, from which fuch great difcoveries in 
 natural knowledge have been made in the prefent and 
 laft age, were equally in the poffefTion of mankind feve- 
 ral thoufand years before. And poflibly it might be in- 
 tended, that events, as they come to pafs, fliould open 
 and afcertain the meaning of feveral parts of Scripture. 
 It may be objected, that this analog}' fails in a mate- 
 rial refpeel ; for that natural knowledge is of little or no 
 confequence. But I have been fpeaking of the gene- 
 ral inftru&ion which nature does or does not afford us. 
 And befides, fome parts of natural knowledge, in the 
 more common reftrained fenfe of the words, are of the 
 greateft confequence to the eafe and convenience of 
 life. But fuppofe the analogy did, as it does not, fail 
 in this refpecl:, yet it might be abundantly fupplied 
 from the whole conftitution and courie of nature, 
 which fliews that God does npt difpenfe his gifts ac- 
 cording to our notions of the advantage and confe- 
 quence they would be of to us. And this in general, 
 with his method of difpenfing knowledge in pariicu- 
 
 lar, 
 
228 The Credibility of Revelation PART IL 
 
 lar, would together make out an analogy full to the 
 point before us. 
 
 But it may be obje&ed ftill farther and more gen- 
 erally, " The Scripture reprefents the world as in a 
 ftate of ruin, and Chriflianity as an expedient to re- 
 cover it, to help in thefe refpects where nature fails j 
 in particular, to fupply the deficiencies of natural light. 
 Js it credible then, that fo many ages ihould have 
 been let pafs, before a matter of fuch a fort, of fo great 
 and fo general importance, was made known to man- 
 kind ; and then that it (hould be made known to fo 
 fmall a part of them ? Is it conceivable, that this fup- 
 ply mould be fo very deficient, fhould have the like 
 obfcurity and doubtfulnefs, be liable to the like per- 
 verfions, in fhort, lie open to all the like objections, 
 as the light of nature itfelf ?"* Without determin- 
 ing how far this in raft is fo, I anfwer, it is by no 
 means incredible that it might be fo, if the light of na- 
 ture and of revelation be from the fame hand. Men 
 are naturally liable to difeafes, for which God, in his 
 
 fDod providence, has provided natural remedies. -f- 
 ut remedies exifling in nature have been unknown 
 to mankind for many ages, are known but to few now, 
 probably many valuable ones are not known yet. 
 Great has been and is the obfcurity and difficulty in. 
 the nature and application of them. Circumftances 
 feem often to make them very improper, where they 
 are abfolutely necefiary. It is after long labour and 
 fludy, and many unfuccefsful endeavours, that they are 
 brought to be as ufeful as they are ; after high con- 
 tempt and abfolute rejection of the moft ufeful we 
 have ; and after difputes and doubts which have feem- 
 ecl to be endlefs. The bell remedies too, when un- 
 fkilfully, much more if difhoneftly applied, may pro- 
 duce new difeafes ; and with the righted application, 
 the fuccefs of them is often doubtful. In many cafes 
 
 they 
 
 * Ch. vi. f See Ch. v. 
 
CHAP. HI. liable to Objections. 229 
 
 they are not at all effe6lual ; where they are, it is oft- 
 en very flowly ; and the application of them, and the 
 iiecelTary regimen accompanying it, is, not uncom- 
 monly, fo difagreeable, that fome will not fubmit to 
 them, and fatisfy themfelves with the excufe, that if 
 they would, it is not certain whether it would be fuc- 
 cefsful. And many perfons who labour under difeafes 
 for which there are known natural remedies, are not 
 fo happy as to be always, if ever, in the way of them. 
 In a word, the remedies which nature has provided for 
 difeafes are neither certain, perfect, nor univerfal. 
 And indeed the fame principles of arguing which 
 would lead us to conclude that they muft be fo, would 
 lead us likewife to conclude that there could be no 
 occafion for them, i. e. that there could be no difeafes 
 at all. And therefore, our experience that there are 
 difeafes, (hews that it is credible beforehand, upon 
 fuppofition nature has provided remedies for them, 
 that thefe remedies may be, as by experience we find 
 they are, not certain, nor perfect, nor univerfal ; be- 
 caufe it mews, that the principles upon which we 
 mould expect the contrary are fallacious. 
 
 And now, what is the juft confequence from all 
 thefe things ? Not that reafon is no judge of what is 
 offered to us as being of divine revelation. For this 
 would be to infer that we are unable to judge of any 
 thing, becaufe we are unable to judge of all things. 
 Reafon can and it ought to judge, not only of the 
 meaning, but alfo of the morality and the evidence 
 of revelation. Firjl, It is the province of reafon to 
 judge of the morality of the Scripture ; i. e. not 
 whether it contains things different from what we 
 ihould have expected from a wife, juft, and good Be- 
 ing, for objections from hence have been now obviat- 
 ed ' y but whether it contains things plainly contradic- 
 tory to wifdom, juflice or goodnefs ; to what the light 
 of nature teaches us of God. And I know nothing of 
 
 this 
 
30 The Credibility of Revelation PART 1L 
 
 this fort objected againft Scripture, excepting fuch ob- 
 jections as are formed upon fuppoiitions, which would 
 equally conclude that the conflitution of nature is con- 
 tradictory to wifdom, juftice, or goodnefs, which mod 
 certainly it is not. Indeed there are fome particular 
 precepts in Scripture, given to particular perfons, re- 
 quiring actions which would be immoral and vicious 
 were it not for fuch precepts. But it is eafy.to fee 
 that all thefe are of fuch a kind, as that the precept 
 changes the whole nature of the cafe and of the ac- 
 tion, and both conflitutes and fhews that not to be. 
 unjuft or immoral, which, prior to the precept, mud 
 have appeared and really have been fo -, which may 
 well be, fmce none of thefe precepts are contrary to 
 immutable morality. If it were commanded to culti- 
 vate the principles, and act from the fpirrt of treach- 
 ery, ingratitude, cruelty, the command would not al- 
 ter the nature of the cafe or of the action in any of 
 thefe inilances. But it is quite otherwife in precepts, 
 which require only the doing an external action ; for 
 inflance, taking away the property or life of any. For 
 men have no right to either life or property, but what 
 arifes folely from the grant of God - f when this grant 
 is revoked, they ceafe to have any right at all in ei- 
 ther ; and when this revocation is made known, as 
 furely it is poilible it may be, it muft ceafe to be un- 
 juft to deprive them of either. And though a courie 
 of external acts, which without command would be 
 immoral, muft make an immoral habit, yet a few de- 
 tached commands have no fuch natural tendency. I 
 thought proper to fay thus much of the few Scripture 
 precepts, which require, not vicious actions, but ac- 
 tions which would have been vicious had it not been 
 for fuch precepts ; becauie they are fometimes weakly 
 urged as immoral, and great weight is laid upon ob- 
 jections drawn from them. But to me there feems no 
 difficulty at all in thefe precepts,, but what arifes from 
 
 their 
 
CHAP. III. liable to Objections. 23 1 
 
 their being offences, i. e. from their being liable to 
 be perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked defigning 
 men, to ierve the molt horrid purpofes ; and, perhaps, 
 to miflead the weak and enthufiaftick. And objec- 
 tions from this head are not objections againft revela- 
 tion, but againft the whole notion of religion as a trial, 
 and againft the general constitution of nature. Second-* 
 /v, Reaibn is able to judge, and muft, of the evidence 
 of revelation, and of the objections urged againft that 
 evidence ; which fhall be the fubject of a following 
 chapter.* 
 
 But the confequence of the foregoing obfervation is, 
 that the queftion upon which the truth of Chriftiani- 
 ty depends is fcarce at all what objections there are 
 againft its fcheme, fince there are none againft the 
 morality of it ; but what objections there are againft its 
 evidence, or what proof there remains of it, after due al- 
 lowances made for the objections againjl that proof-, be- 
 caufe it has been (hewn, that the olyefiioxs agaixj: 
 Chriftiaittiy, as diftmguijhed from objections againft its 
 evidence, are frivolous. For furely very little weight, 
 if any at all, is to be laid upon a way of arguing and 
 objecting, which, when applied to the general confti- 
 tut ion of nature, experience (hews not to be conclu- 
 iive ; and fuch, I think, is the whole way of objecting 
 treated of throughout this chapter. It is refolvable 
 into principles, and goes upon fuppofitions which 
 miflead us to think that the Author of nature would 
 not act as we experience he does, or would act, in fuch 
 and fuch cafes, as we experience he does not, in like 
 cafes. But the unreafonablenefs of this way of ob- 
 jecting will appear yet more evidently from hence, 
 that the chief things thus objected againft are juftiri- 
 ed, as (hall be farther mown,-)- by dutinct, particular 
 and full analogies, in the conititution and courib of 
 rtature- 
 
 But 
 
 * Ch. vii. f Ch^iv. latter part. And v, vi. 
 
232 Chriftianity a Scheme \ PART II. 
 
 But it is to be remembered, that, as frivolous as 
 objections of the foregoing fort againfl revelation are, 
 yet, when a fuppofed revelation is more confiftent with 
 itfelf, and has a more general and uniform tendency 
 to promote virtue, than, all circumftances confidered, 
 could have been expe&ed from enthufiafm and polit- 
 ical views, this is a preiumptive proof of its not pro- 
 ceeding from them, and fo of its truth ; becaufe we 
 are competent judges what might have been expected 
 from enthuiiafm and political views. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Of Chriftianity y confidered as a Scheme or ConjtituiloK, 
 imperfectly comprehended* 
 
 IT hath been now fhewn* that the anal- 
 ogy of nature renders it highly credible beforehand, 
 that fuppofing a revelation to be made, it mull con- 
 tain many things very different from what we mould 
 have expected, and fuch as appear open to great ob- 
 jections, and that this obfervation, in good meafure, 
 takes off the force of thofe objections, or rather pre- 
 cludes them. But it may be alleged, that this is a 
 very partial anfwer to fuch objections, or a very un- 
 Satisfactory way of obviating them, becaufe it doth 
 not fhew at all that the things objected againft can be 
 wife, juft and good, much lefs that it is credible they 
 are fo. It will therefore be proper to fhew this dil- 
 tinctly, by applying to thefe objections againft the 
 wifdom, juftice and goodnefs of Chriftianity, the an- 
 iwer above -f- given to the like objections againft the 
 conftitution of nature, before we confider the particu- 
 lar analogies in the latter to the particular things ob- 
 
 je&ed 
 
 * In the foregoing chapter. 
 
 f Part I. Cli. vii. to which this all along refers. 
 
CHAP. IV. imperfeElly comprehended. 233 
 
 je&ed againft in the former. Now that which affords 
 a fufficient anfwer to objections againft the wifdom, 
 juftice and goodnefs of the conftitution of nature, is 
 its being a conftitution, a fyftem or fcheme imperfectly 
 comprehended ; a fcheme in which means are made: 
 life of to accomplim ends, and which is carried on by 
 general laws. For from thefe things it has been prov- 
 ed, not only to be poffible, but alfo to be credible, 
 that thole things which are objected againft may be 
 conliftent with wifdom, juftice and goodnefs, nay 
 may be inftances of them ; and even that the confti- 
 tution and government of nature may be perfect in 
 the higheft poflible degree. If Chriftianity then be a 
 fcheme, and of the like kind, it is evident the like ob- 
 jections againft it muft admit of the like anfwer. 
 And, 
 
 I. Chriftianity is a fcheme, quite beyond our com- 
 prehenfion. The moral government of God is exercif- 
 ed, by gradually conducting things fo in the courfe of 
 his providence, that every one, at length and upon the 
 whole, 11) all receive according to his deferts ; and nei- 
 ther fraud nor violence, but truth and right, (hall fin. 
 prevail. Chriftianity is a particular fcheme under this 
 general plan of Providence, and a part of it, conducive 
 to its completion, with regard to mankind ; confift- 
 ing itfelf alfo of various parts, and a myfterious econ- 
 omy, which has been carrying on from the time the 
 world came into its prefent wretched ftate, and is ftill 
 carrying on for its recovery, by a divine perfon, the 
 Meffiah, who is to gather together in one, the children 
 of God that are fiatt ere d abroad * and eftablifh an ever- 
 lafting kingdom, wherein dwelleth right eoufnefs.^- And 
 in order to it, after various maniteftations of things, 
 relating to this great and general fcheme of Providence, 
 through a fucceffion of many ages : (For the Spirit of 
 Chrift, which was in the prophets, tefiified beforehand his 
 Q^ 
 
 * Joh. xi. 52. f 2 Pet. iii. 13. 
 
Qwi/tianity a Scheme, PART IIv 
 
 i and the glory that JJiould follow ; unto whom it 
 was revealed, that not unto themfelves, but unto us they 
 did mini/I er the things which are now reported unto us by 
 them that have preached the Gofpel ; which things the an- 
 gels dejire to look into*) after various difpenfations, 
 looking forward and preparatory to this final falvation, 
 inthefullnefs oftime,when infinite wifdom thought fit, 
 He, being in the form of God, made himfelfof no repu- 
 tation^ and took upon him the form of afervant, and was 
 mad? in the likenefs of men ; and being found infajhion as. 
 a man, he humbled Jiimf elf , and became obedient to death^ 
 even the death of the crofs ; wherefore God a/fa hath high- 
 ly exalted him, and given him a name^which is above every 
 name ; that at the name ofjefus every knetflw*ldbw&<> of 
 things in heaven, and things in the earth, and things un- 
 der the earth ; and that every tongue JJiould confefs, that 
 Jefus Chrift is Lord, to the glory of *God the Father, f 
 Parts likewife of this economy, are the miraculous rnif- 
 iion of theHolyGhoft,and his ordinary afiiftance given 
 to good men; the invisible government which Chrift at 
 prefent exerciies over his church ; that which he hirn- 
 ielf refers to in thefe words r | In my father's houfe are 
 many manjions I go to prepare a place for you ; and his 
 future return to judge the world in right eoufnefs, and 
 completely reeftablifh the kingdom of God. For the 
 Father judge th no man ; but hath committed all judgment 
 unto the Son, that all men JJiould honour the Son, even as they 
 honour the Father. All power is given unto him in heav- 
 en and in earth. \\ And he mujl reign till he hath put 
 all enemies under his feet. Then comet h the end, when he 
 JJiall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Fa- 
 ther ; when he fliall have put down all rule, and all au- 
 thority and power. And when all things Jhall be fubduect 
 unto him, then Jhall the Son a ] fo himfelf befubjecl unto him 
 that put all things under him, that God may be all in all. ** 
 Now little, iurely, need be faid to fliew that this fyftem 
 
 or 
 
 * i Pet. i. n, iz, f .Phil. ii. J Joh. xiv. t. 
 
 Joh. v. 22, 23. |1 Matth. xxviii. 18. ** i Cor. xv. 
 
CHAP. IV. imperfe&lv comprehended. 235 
 
 or fcheme of things is but imperfectly comprehended 
 by us. The Scripture exprefsly alTerts it to be fo. 
 And indeed one cannot read a paflage relating to this 
 great mvjtery of Godlinejs,* but what immediately runs 
 up into fomething which (hews us our ignorance in it ; 
 as every thing in nature ihews us our ignorance in 
 the conftitution of nature. And whoever will fen- 
 oufly confider that part of the Chriftian fcheme which 
 is revealed in Scripture, will find fo much more unre- 
 vealed, as will convince him, that, to all the purpofes of 
 judging and objecting, we know as little of it as of the 
 conftitution of nature. Our ignorance, therefore, is 
 as much an anfwer to our objections againfc the per- 
 fection of one as againfl the perfection of the other, -f- 
 II. It is obvious too, that in the Chriftian difpen- 
 fation, as much as in the natural fcheme of things, 
 means are made ufe of to accomplilh ends. And the 
 obfervation of this furnifhes us with the fame anfwer 
 to objections againft the perfection of Chriftianity, as 
 to objections of the like kind againft the conftitution 
 of nature. It (hews the credibility, that the things 
 objected againft, how foolijh J foever they appear to 
 men, may be the very belt means of accompli filing 
 the very r beft ends ; and their appearing foolijJmefs is no 
 prefumption againft this, in a fcheme fo greatly beyond 
 our comprehenfion. 
 
 III. The credibility that the Chriftian difpenfation 
 may have been, all along, carried on by general laws, || 
 no lefs than the courfe of nature, may require to be 
 more diftinctly made out. Confider then upon what 
 ground it is we fay, that the whole common courfe of 
 nature is carried on according to general foreordained 
 laws. We know indeed feveral of the general laws of 
 matter, and a great part of the natural behaviour of 
 living agents is reducible to general laws. But we 
 know in a manner nothing by what laws, ftorms and 
 Q^2 tempefts, 
 
 * i Tim. iii. 16. -f- P. i*4, &c. + i Cor, i, 
 
 <}P. i ; 7 , 178. HP. 179, 1 80. 
 
236 CJirijliamty a Scheme, PART It, 
 
 tempefts, earthquakes, famine, peftilence, become the 
 inftruments of deftruction to mankind. And the 
 laws by which perfons born into the world at fuch a 
 time and place are of fuch capacities, geniufes, tem- 
 pers -, the laws by which thoughts come into our 
 mind in a multitude of cafes, and by which innume- 
 rable things happen, of the greateft influence upon the 
 affairs and ftate of the world ; thefe laws are fo wholly 
 unknown to us, that we call the events which come to 
 pafs by them accidental, though all reasonable men 
 know certainly that there cannot, in reality, be any 
 fuch thing as chance, and conclude that the things 
 which have this appearance are the refult of general 
 laws, and may be reduced into them. It is then but 
 an exceeding little way, and in but a very few refpefts, 
 that we ean trace up the natural courfe of things be- 
 fore us to general laws. And it is only from analogy 
 that we conclude the whole of it to be capable of be- 
 ing reduced into them only from our feeing that 
 part is fo. It is from our finding that the courfe of 
 nature, in fome refpe&s and fo far, goes on by general 
 laws, that we conclude this of the reft. And if that 
 be a juft ground for fuch a conclufion, it is a juft 
 ground alfo, if not to conclude, yet to apprehend, to* 
 render it fuppofable and credible, which is fufficient 
 for anfwering objections, that God's miraculous inter- 
 pofitions may have been, all along in like manner, by 
 general laws of wifdom. Thus, that miraculous pow- 
 ers mould be exerted at fuch times, upon fuch occa- 
 fions, in fuch degrees and manners, and with regard to* 
 fuch perfons, rather than others that the affairs of 
 the world, being permitted to go on in their natural 
 courfe fo far, mould, juft at fuch a point, have a new 
 direction given them by miraculous interpofitions 
 that thefe interpofitions mould be exactly in fuch de- 
 grees and refpe&s only, all this may have been by- 
 general laws, Thefe laws are unknown indeed to us, 
 
 but 
 
CHAP. IV. imperfeElly comprehended. 237 
 
 but no more unknown than the laws from whence it 
 is, that fome die as foon as they are born, and others 
 live to extreme old age that one man is fo luperior 
 to another in underflanding with innumerable more 
 things, which, as was before obferved, we cannot re- 
 duce to any laws or rules at all, though it is taken for 
 granted they are as much reducible to general ones as 
 gravitation. Now, if the revealed difpenfations of 
 Providence, and miraculous interpolations, be by gen- 
 eral laws, as well as God's ordinary government in the 
 courfe of nature, made known by reafon and expe- 
 rience, there is no more reafon to expert that every 
 exigence, as it arifes, mould be provided for by thefe 
 general laws or miraculous interpofitions, than that 
 every exigence in nature mould by the general laws of 
 nature ; yet there might be wife and good reafons that 
 miraculous interpofitions mould be by general laws, 
 and that thefe laws fhould not be broken in upon, or 
 deviated from, by other miracles. 
 
 Upon the whole then, the appearance of deficiencies 
 and irregularities in nature is owing to its being a 
 fcheme but in part made known, and of fucli a cer- 
 tain particular kind in other refpe&s. Now we fee no 
 more reafon why the frame and courfe of nature fliould 
 be fuch a fcheme, than why Chriflianity fliould. And 
 that the former is fuch a fcheme, renders it credible 
 that the latter, upon fuppofition of its truth, may be 
 fo too. And as it is manifeil that Chriflianity is a 
 fcheme revealed but in part, and a fcheme in which 
 means are made ufe of to accompli fh ends, like to 
 that of nature, fo the credibility that it may have 
 been all along carried on by general laws, no leis than 
 the courfe of nature, has been diftincdy proved. And 
 from all this it is beforehand credible that there might, 
 I think probable that there would, be the like appear- 
 ance of deficiencies and irregularities in Chriftianity as 
 ju nature j i. e. that Chriflianity would be liable to 
 
 the 
 
238 Chrijiianity a Scheme, PART II. 
 
 the like obje&ions as the frame of nature. And thefe 
 objections are anfwered by thefe obfervations concern- 
 ing Chriftianity, as the like objections againft the 
 frame of nature are anfwfered by the like obfervations 
 concerning the frame of nature. 
 
 THE objections againft Chriftianity, confidered as 
 a matter of fact,* having in general been obviated in 
 the preceding chapter, and the fame, confidered as 
 made againft the wifdom and goodnefs of it, having 
 been obviated in this, the next thing, according to the 
 method propofed, is to fhew that the principal objec- 
 tions, in particular, againft Chriftianity may be an- 
 fwered by particular and full analogies in nature. 
 And as one of them is made againft the whole fcheme 
 of it together, as juft now defcribed, I choofe to con- 
 fider it here, rather than in a diftinct chapter by itfelf. 
 The thing objected againfl this fcheme of the Gofpel 
 is, " that it feems to fuppofe God was reduced to the 
 neceffity of a long feries of intricate means, in order to 
 accomplish his ends, the recbvery and falvation of the 
 world ; in like fort as men, for want of underflancling 
 or power, not being able to come at their ends direct- 
 ly, are forced to go roundabout ways, and make ufe 
 of many perplexed contrivances to arrive at them." 
 Now every thing which we fee {hews the folly of this, 
 confidered as an objection againft the truth of Chrift- 
 ianity. For, according to our manner of conception, 
 God makes ufe of variety of means, what we often 
 think tedious ones, in the natural courfe of providence, 
 for the accompliihment of all his ends. Indeed it is 
 certain there is fomewhat in this matter quite beyond 
 our comprehenfion ; but the rnyftery is as great in na- 
 ture as in Chriftianity. We know what we ourfelves 
 aim at, as final ends, and what courfes we take, mere- 
 ly as means conducing to thofe ends. But we are 
 
 greatly 
 *p. 172. 
 
CHAP. IV. imperfeftly comprehended. 239 
 
 greatly ignorant how far things are considered by the 
 Author of nature, under the fingle notion of means 
 and ends ; fo as that it may be laid, this is merely an 
 end, and that merely means, in his regard. And 
 whether there be not fome peculiar abfurdity in our 
 very manner of conception, concerning this matter, 
 fomewhat contradictory arifing from our extremely 
 imperfect views of things, it is impoflible to fay. 
 However, thus much is manifeft, that the whole nat- 
 ural world and government of it is a fcheme or fyf- 
 tem ; not a fixed, "but a progrefiive one ; a fcheme, 
 in which the operation of various means takes up a 
 great length of time, before the ends they tend to can 
 be attained. The change of feafons, the ripening of 
 the fruits of the earth, the very hiftory of a flower, is 
 an inftance of this, and fo is human life. Thus vege- 
 table bodies, and thofe of animals, though poflibly 
 formed at once, yet grow up by degrees to a mature 
 ilate. And thus rational agents, who animate thefe 
 latter bodies, are naturally directed to form each his 
 own manners and .character, by the gradual gaining of 
 knowledge and experience, and by a long courfe of 
 action. Our exiflence is not only fuccefiive, as it 
 muft be of neceffity, but one ilate of our life and be- 
 ing is appointed by God to be a preparation for an- 
 other, and that to be the means of attaining to anoth- 
 er fucceeding one ; infancy to childhood, childhood 
 to youth, youth to mature age. Men are impatient, 
 and for precipitating things ; but the Author of na- 
 ture appears deliberate throughout his operations, ac- 
 compliming his natural ends by flow fuccefiive fleps. 
 And there is a plan of things beforehand laid out, 
 which, from the nature of it, requires various fyflems 
 of means, as well as length of time, in order to the 
 carrying on its feverai parts into execution. Thus, in 
 the daily courfe of natural providence, God operates 
 ^n the very fame manner as in the difpenfation of 
 
 Chriftianity, 
 
240 The Appointment of PART II 
 
 Chriftianity, making one thing fubfervient to another, 
 this to fomewhat farther, and fo on, through a pro- 
 greffive feries of means, which extend, both backward 
 and forward, beyond our utmoft view. Of this man- 
 ner of operation, every thing we fee in the courie of 
 nature is as much an inftance, as any part of the 
 Chriftian difpenfation, 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Of the particular Syftem of Chrijtianity ; the Appoint- 
 ment of a Mediator ^ and the Redemption of ths World 
 by him. 
 
 JL HERE is not, I think, any thing re- 
 lating to Chriftianity which has been more objected 
 againfl than the mediation of Chrift, in fome or other 
 of its parts. Yet, upon thorough confederation, there 
 feems nothing lefs juilly liable to it. For, 
 
 I. The whole analogy of nature removes all imag- 
 ined prefurnption againft the general notion of a Me^ 
 diator between God and man*' For we find all living 
 creatures are brought into the world, and their life in 
 infancy is preferved, by the inftrumentality of others ; 
 and every fatisfaction of it, fome way or other, is be- 
 llowed by the like means. So that the vifible govern- 
 ment which God exerciies over the world is by the in^- 
 ftrumentality and mediation of others. And how far 
 his inviiible government be or be not fo, it is impoffi- 
 ble to determine at all by reafon. And the fuppolition 
 that part of it is fo, appears, to fay the leaft, altogeth- 
 er as credible as the contrary. There is then no fort 
 of objection, from the light of nature, againft the gen- 
 eral notion of a mediator between God and man, con- 
 
 fidereci 
 
 * i Tim. ii. 5. 
 
CHAP. V. a Mediator and Redeemer* 2,4.1 
 
 fidered as a doctrine of Chriftianity, or as an appoint- 
 ment in this difpenfation ; fmce we find by experience 
 that God does appoint mediators to be the inftru- 
 ments of good and evil to us, the initruments of his 
 juftice and his mercy. And the objection here re- 
 ferred to is urged, not againft mediation in that high, 
 eminent and peculiar fenfe in which (Thrift is our me- 
 diator, but abfolutely againft the whole notion iticif 
 of a mediator at all. 
 
 II. As we muft fuppofe that the world is under tns 
 proper moral government of God, or in a ftate of re- 
 ligion, before we can enter into consideration of the 
 revealed doctrine concerning the redemption of it by 
 Chnft, fo that fuppoiition is here to be diftinctly tak- 
 en notice of. Now the divine moral government 
 which religion teaches us, implies that the confequencc 
 of vice mail be mifery, in fome future ftate, by the 
 righteous judgment of God. That iuch confequent 
 puniihment (hall take effect by his appointment, is 
 necelfarily implied. But, as it is not in any fort to be 
 iuppofed, that we are made acquainted with ail the 
 ends or reafons for which it is fit future punithments 
 ^ {hould be inflicted, or why God has appointed iuch. 
 and fuch confequent mifery mould follow vice, and as 
 we are altogether in the dark how or in what manner 
 it tliould follow, by what immediate occafions, or by 
 the inft rumen tali ty of what means, there is no abfurd- 
 aty in fuppofmg it may follow in a way analogous to 
 that, in which many miferies follow iuch and fuch 
 courfes of action at prefent ; poverty, ficknefs, infamy, 
 untimely death by difeafes, death from the hands of 
 civil juftice. There is no abfurdity in fuppofmg fu- 
 ture puniiliment may follow wickedneis of courie, as 
 we fpeak, or in the way of natural conlequence from, 
 God's original coi^titution of the world, from the na- 
 ture he has given us, and from the condition in which. 
 Jie places us j or in a like manner, as a perfon ralhly tri- 
 fling 
 
4 The Appointment of PART II. 
 
 fling upon a precipice, in the way of natural confe- 
 quence, falls down ; in the way of natural coniequence, 
 breaks his limbs, fuppofe ; in the way of natural con- 
 fequence of this, without help, perifhes. 
 
 Some good men may perhaps be offended, with 
 hearing it fpokeri of as a fuppofable thing, that the 
 future punifhments of wickednefs may be in the way 
 of natural confequence ; as if this were taking the ex- 
 ecution of juftice out of the hands of God, and giv- 
 ing it to nature. But they fhould remember, that 
 when things come to pafs according to the courfe of 
 nature, this does not hinder them from being his do- 
 ing, who is the GocJ of nature ; and that the Scrip- 
 ture afcribes thofe punifhments to divine juftice which 
 are known to be natural, and which muft be called fo, 
 when diftinguifhed from fuch as are miraculous. But 
 after all, this fuppofition, or rather this way of fpeak- 
 ing, is here made ufe of only by way of iliuftration of 
 the fubject before us. For fince it muft be admitted, 
 that the future punilhment of wickednefs is not a mat- 
 ter of arbitrary appointment, but of reafon, equity 
 and juftice, it comes, for aught I fee, to the fame thing, 
 whether it is fuppofed to be inflicted in a way analo- 
 gous to that in which the temporal punifhments of 
 vice and folly are inflicted, or in any other way. And 
 though there were a difference, it is allowable, in the 
 prefent cafe, to make this fuppofition, plainly not an 
 incredible one, that future punifhment may follow 
 wickednefs in the way of natural confequence, or ac- 
 cording to ibme general laws of government already 
 eftabliihed in the univerfe. 
 
 III. Upon this fuppofition, or even without it, we 
 may obierve fomewhat much to the prefent purpofe 
 in the conftitution of nature or appointments of Prov- 
 idence ; the proviiion which is made that all the bad 
 natural confcquences of men's actions mould not al- 
 ways actually follow ; or that fuch bad confequences 
 
CHAP. V. a Mediator and "Redeemer. 243 
 
 as, according to the fettled courfe of things, would in- 
 evitably have followed if not prevented, fhould in 
 certain degrees be prevented. We are apt prefmnp- 
 tuoufly to imagine, that the world might have been fo 
 conftituted, as that there would not have been any fuch 
 thing as mifery or evil. On the contrary we find the 
 Author of nature permits it ; but then he has provid- 
 ed reliefs, and, in many cafes, perfect remedies for it, 
 after fome pains and difficulties ; reliefs and remedies 
 even for that evil, which is the fruit of our own mif- 
 conduct ; and which, in the courfe of nature, would 
 have continued and ended in our deftruction, but for 
 fuch remedies. And this is an inftance both of fever- 
 ity and of indulgence, in the conftitution of nature. 
 Thus all the bad confequences now mentioned, of a 
 man's trifling upon a precipice, might be prevented. 
 And though all were not, yet fome of them might, by 
 proper interpofition, if not rejected ; by another's 
 coming to the ram man's relief, with his own laying 
 hold on that relief, in fuch fort as the cafe required. 
 Perlbns may do a great deal themfelves towards pre- 
 venting the bad confequences of their follies ; and 
 more may be done by themfelves, together with the 
 afiiftance of others their fellow creatures ; which af- 
 fiftar*ce nature requires and prompts us to. This is 
 the general conftitution of the world. Now fuppofe 
 it had been fo conftituted, that after fuch actions were 
 done as were forefeen naturally to draw after them 
 mifery to the doer, it fhould have been no more in 
 human power to have prevented that naturally confe- 
 quent mifery, in any inftance, than it is in all, no 
 one can fay whether fuch a more fevere conftitution 
 of things might not yet have been really good. But 
 that, on the contrary, provifion is made by nature, that 
 we may and do to fo great degree prevent the bad 
 natural effects of our follies, this may be called 
 mercy or companion in the original conftitution of the 
 
 world ; 
 
Appointment of PART II, 
 
 world ; companion as diftinguifhed from goodnefs in 
 general And, the whole known conftitution and 
 courfe of things affording us inftances of fuch com- 
 palTion, it would be according to the analogy of na- 
 ture to hope, that, however ruinous the natural con- 
 fequences of vice might be, from the general Jaws of 
 God's government over the univerfe, yet provifion 
 might be made, poffibly might have been originally 
 made, for preventing thofe ruinous confequences from 
 inevitably following ; at lead from following univer-. 
 fally, and in all cafes. 
 
 Many, I am fenfible, will wonder at finding this 
 made a queftion, or fpoken of as in any degree doubt- 
 ful. The generality of mankind are fo far from hav- 
 ing that awful fenfe of things, which the prefent ftate 
 of vice, and mifery and darknefs feems to make but 
 realbnable, that they have fcarce any apprehenfion or 
 thought at all about this matter any way ; and fome 
 ferious perfons may have fpoken unadvifedly concern- 
 ing it. But let us obferve what we experience to be, 
 and what from the very conftitution of nature cannot 
 but be, the confequences of irregular and diforderly 
 behaviour ; even of fuch rafhnefs, wilfulnefs, neglects, 
 as we fcarce call vicious. Now it is natural to appre- 
 hend, that the bad confequences of irregularity will be 
 greater, in proportion as the irregularity is f ). And 
 there is no comparifon between thefe irregularities, and 
 the greater inftances of vice, or a difTolute profligate 
 difregard to all religion, if there be any thing at all in 
 religion. For conficier what it is for creatures, moral 
 agents, prefumptuoufly to introduce that confufion and 
 mifery into the kingdom of God, which mankind have 
 in fact introduced to. blafpheme the fovereign Lord 
 of all to contemn his authority to be injurious to 
 the degree they are, to their fellow creatures, the crea- 
 tures of God. Add that the effects of vice in the 
 prefent world are often extreme mifery, irretrievable 
 
 ruin. 
 
CHAP. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 245 
 
 ruin, and even death ; and upon putting all this to- 
 gether it will appear, that as no one can fay in what 
 degree fatal the unprevented confequences of vice may 
 be, according to the general rule of divine govern- 
 ment, fo it is by no means intuitively certain how far 
 thefe confequences could poflibly, in the nature of the 
 thing, be prevented, confidently with the eternal rule 
 of right, or with what is in fad the moral conftitution 
 of nature. However, there would be large ground to 
 hope that the univerfal government was not fo feverery 
 ftrift but that there was room for pardon, or for hav- 
 ing thole penal confequences prevented. Yet, 
 
 IV. There feems no probability that any thing we 
 could do would alone and of itfelf prevent them ; pre- 
 vent their following or being inflided. But one would 
 think, at leaft, it were impoflible that the contrary 
 mould be thought certain. For we are not acquaint- 
 ed with the whole of the cafe. We are not informed 
 of all the reafons which render it fit that future pun- 
 imments mould be inflidbed, and therefore cannot 
 know whether any thing we could do would make 
 fuch an alteration as to render it fit that they mould 
 be remitted. We do not know what the whole nat- 
 ural or appointed confequences of vice are, nor in what 
 way they would follow, if not prevented ; and there- 
 fore can in no fort fay, whether we could do any thing 
 which would be fufficient to prevent them. Our ig- 
 norance being thus manifeft, let us recollect the analo- 
 gy of nature or Providence. For, though this may be 
 but a flight ground to raife a pofitive opinion upon in 
 this matter, yet it is fufficient to anfwer a mere arbi- 
 trary alfertion, without any kind of evidence, urged by 
 way of objection againft a doctrine, the proof of which 
 is not reafon but revelation. Confider then people 
 ruin their fortunes by extravagance ; they bring dif- 
 eafes upon themfelves by excels ; they incur the pen- 
 alties of civil laws, and furely civil government is nat- 
 ural ; 
 
246 The Appointment of PART !! 
 
 ural ; will forrow for thefe follies paft, and behaving 
 well for the future, alone and of itfelf prevent the nat- 
 ural confequences of them ? On the contrary, men's 
 natural abilities of helping themfelves are often im- 
 paired ; or if not, yet they are forced to be beholden 
 to the afliftance of others, upon feveral accounts and 
 in different ways ; affiftance which they would have 
 had no occafion for had it not been for their mifcon- 
 duct, but which, in the difadvantageous condition 
 they have reduced themfelves to, is abfolutely necef- 
 fary to their recovery, and retrieving their affairs. 
 Now fince this is our cafe, confidering ourfelves mere- 
 ly as inhabitants of this world, and as having a tem- 
 poral intereft here, under the natural government of 
 Gocl, which however has a great deal moral in it, 
 why is it not fuppofable that this may be our cafe alfo 
 in our more important capacity, as under his perfect 
 moral government, and having a more general and fu- 
 ture intereft depending ? If we have mifbehaved in 
 this higher capacity, and rendered ourfelves obnoxious 
 to the future punimment which God has annexed to 
 vice, it is plainly credible, that behaving well for the 
 
 time to come, may be not ufelefs, God forbid 
 
 but wholly infufficient, alone and of itfelf, to prevent 
 that punimment, or to put us in the condition which 
 we mould have been in had we preferred our inno- 
 cence. 
 
 And though we ought to reafon with all reverence, 
 whenever we reafon concerning the divine conduct, yet 
 it may be added, that it is clearly contrary to all our 
 notions of government, as well as to what is in fafit the 
 general conftitution of nature, to fuppofe that doing 
 well for the future mould, in all cafes, prevent all the 
 judicial bad confequences of having done evil, or all 
 the punimment annexed to difobedience. And we 
 have manifeftly nothing from whence to determine, in 
 what degree and in what cafes reformation would pre- 
 vent 
 
CHAP. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 
 
 vent this punifhment, even fuppofmg that it would in 
 feme. And though the efficacy of repentance itfelf 
 alone, to prevent what mankind had rendered them- 
 {elves obnoxious to, and recover what they had for- 
 feited, is now infilled upon in oppofition to Chriftian- 
 ity, yet, by the general prevalence of propitiatory 
 facririces over the heathen world, this notion of re- 
 pentance alone being fufficient to expiate guilt, ap- 
 pears to be contrary to the general tenfe of mankind. 
 
 Upon the whole then, had the laws, the general 
 laws of God's government been permitted to operate, 
 without any interpofition in our behalf, the future 
 pumfhment, for aught we know to the contrary, or 
 have any reafon to think, mud inevitably have follow- 
 ed, notwithftanding any thing we could have done to 
 prevent it* Now, 
 
 V. In this darknefs, or this light of nature, call it 
 which you pieafe, revelation comes in confirms every 
 doubting fear, which could enter into the heart of 
 man, concerning the future unprevented confequence 
 of wicked nefs fuppoies the world to be in a (late of 
 ruin (a fuppofition which feems the very ground of 
 the Chriftian difpenfation, and which, if not proveable 
 by reafon, yet it is in no wife contrary to it) teaches 
 us too, that the rules of divine government are fuch as 
 not to admit of pardon immediately and direclly upon 
 repentance, or by the fole efficacy of it ; but then 
 teaches at the fame time what nature might juftly have 
 hoped, that the moral government of the univerfe was 
 not fo rigid, but that there was room for an interpo- 
 fition to avert the fatal confequences of vice, which 
 therefore by this means does admit of pardon. Rev- 
 elation teaches us, that the unknown laws of God's 
 more general government, no leis than the particular 
 laws by which we experience he governs us at prefent, 
 are compaflionate,* as well as good in the more gene- 
 ral 
 
 * P. HZ, fcc. 
 
248 The Appointment cf PAR? 11 
 
 ral notion of goodnefs ; and that he hath mercifully 
 provided that there fhould be an interpofition to pre- 
 vent the deftruclion of human kind, whatever that 
 deftruction unprevented would have been. God fo 
 loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that 
 whofoever believeth, not to be fure in a fpeculative, 
 but in a practical feafe, that whofoever believeth in him 
 fhoidd not perijh ;* gave his Son in the fame way of 
 goodnefs to the world as he affords particular perfons 
 rhc friendly affiftartce of their fellow creatures, when 
 without it their temporal ruin would- be the certain 
 coniequence of their follies ; in the fame way of ^ood- 
 nefs, I fay, though in a tranfcendent and in finitely- 
 higher degree. And the Son of God loved us and gave 
 Umfelf for us, with a love which he himfelf compares 
 to that of human friendfhip, though in this cafe all 
 companions rnuft fall infinitely fhort of the thing in- 
 tended to be illuilrated by them. He interpoied in 
 flich a manner, as was neceflary and effectual to pre- 
 vent that execution of juftice upon finners, which 
 God had appointed mould otherwife have been exe- 
 cuted upon them ; or in iuch a manner as to pre- 
 vent that puniihment from actually following, which, 
 according to the general laws of divine government, 
 niult have followed the fins of the world, had it not 
 been for fuch interpofition.-}- If 
 
 * [oh. iii. 1 6. 
 
 f It cannot, I fuppofe, be imagined, even by the moft curfory reader, that 
 it is in any fort affirmed or implied in any thing faid in this chapter, that 
 none can have the benefit of the general Redemption but fuch as have the 
 advantage of being made acquainted with it in the prefent life. But it may 
 be needful to mention, that federal queftions which have been brought into 
 the fubjecl before us, and determined, are not in the leaft entered into here ; 
 queftions which have been, 1 fear, raihly determined, and perhaps with equal 
 rafhnefs contrary ways. For inftance, whether God could have faved the 
 world by other means than the death of Chrilt, confidently with the general 
 laws of his government. And had not Chrift come into the wot Id, what 
 Vv'ould have been the future condition of the better fort of men, thofe juft per- 
 fons over the face of the earth, for whom Manajfes in his prayer alferts, re- 
 pentance was not appointed. The meaning of the firfl of theie queilions is 
 greatly ambiguous; and neither of them can properly be anfwered, without 
 going upon that infinitely abfurd fuppofition, that we know the whole of the, 
 cafe. And perhaps the very inquiry, <what tuou/d Aavc followed if Goa fad net 
 dine as he has, may have in it fome very great impropriety, and ought not to 
 be carried on any farther than is necefiTary to help our partial and inade- 
 quate conceptions of things. 
 
CHAP. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 249 
 
 If any thing here faid fliould appear, upon firft 
 thought, inconfiftent with divine goodnefs, a fecond, 
 I am perfuaded, will entirely remove that appearance. 
 For were we to fuppofe the conftitution of things to 
 be fuch as that the whole creation muft have perimed, 
 had it not been for fomewhat, which God had ap- 
 pointed mould be, in order to prevent that ruin, 
 even this fuppofition would not be inconfiftent in any 
 degree with the moft abfolutely perfect goodnefs. But 
 ftill it may be thought, that this whole manner of 
 treating the fubject before us fuppofes mankind to be 
 naturally in a very flrange ftate. And truly fo it does. 
 But it is not Chriftianity which has put us into this 
 flate. Whoever will confider the manifold miferies, 
 and the extreme wickednefs of the world, that the bell 
 have great wrongneiTes within themfelves, which they 
 complain of and endeavour to amend, but that the 
 generality grow more profligate and corrupt with age - 9 
 that heathen moralifts thought the prefent ftate to be 
 a ftate of punimment ; and what might be added, that 
 the earth our habitation has the appearances of being 
 a ruin ; whoever, I fay, will confider all thefe, and 
 fome other obvious things, will think he has little rea- 
 fon to object againft the fcripture account, that man- 
 kind is in a ftate of degradation ; againft this being the 
 fact, how difficult foever he may think it to account 
 for, or even to form a diftinct conception of the occa- 
 fions and circumftances of it. But that the crime of 
 our firft parents was the occafion of our being placed 
 in a more difadvantageous condition, is a thing 
 throughout and particularly analogous to what we lee 
 in the daily courfe of natural providence ; as the re- 
 covery of the world by the interpofition of Chrift has 
 been fhewn to be lo in general. 
 
 VI. The particular manner in which Chrift inter- 
 pofed in the redemption of the world, or his office as 
 mediator, in the largeft ftnfe, between God and man, is 
 
 R thus 
 
256 The Appointment of PART II 
 
 thus reprefented to us in the Scripture. He is the 
 light of the world ;* the revealer of the will of God in 
 the mofl eminent fenfe. , He is a propitiatory facri- 
 fice ;-}* The Lamb of God ; \ and, as he voluntarily of- 
 fered himfelf up, he is ftiled our high prieft. And, 
 which feems of peculiar weight, he is defcribed be- 
 forehand in the Old Teftament, under the fame char- 
 acters of a prieft, and an expiatory victim. || And 
 whereas it is objected, that all this is merely by way of 
 allufion to the facririces of the Mofaick law, the apof- 
 tle on the contrary affirms, that the law was a fliad- 
 ow of good things to come, and not the very image of the 
 things ;** and that the priefts that offer gifts according 
 to the law -ferve unto the example andfliadow of heaven- 
 ly things, as Mofes was admomfhed of God when he was 
 about to make the tabernacle, for fee ', faith he, that thou 
 make all things according to the pattern fliewed to thee in 
 the mount -^^ i. e. the Levitical priefthood was a fhad- 
 ow of the priefthood of Chrift, in like manner as the 
 tabernacle made by Mofes, was according to that (hew- 
 ed him in the mount. The priefthood of Chrift, and 
 the tabernacle in the mount, were the originals ; pf 
 the former of which the Levitical priefthood' was a 
 type, and of the latter the tabernacle made by Mofes 
 was a copy. The doctrine of this epiftle then plainly 
 is, that the legal facririces were allufions to the great 
 and final atonement,, to.be made by the blood of 
 Chrift ; and not that this was an allufion to thofe. 
 Nor can any thing be more exprefs or determinate^ 
 than the following paflage. // is not pojjible that the- 
 blood of bulls and of goats jhould take away fin. Where- 
 fore when he cometh into the world, he faith, Sacrifice and 
 "offering, i. e. of bulls and of goats, thou wouldejl not, but 
 
 a body 
 
 *' Job. i. and viii. 12. f Rom. iii. 25. and v. n. i Cor. v. 7. Eplv 
 
 v. 2. i Joh. ii. 2. Matth. xtfvi. 28. % Joh. i. 29, 36. and through- 
 
 out the Book, of Revelation. Throughout the Epiftle to the He* 
 
 brews. j| Ifai. liii. Dan. ix, 24.- Pf, ex. 4. ** Heb. x. u 
 
 f f Heb. viii. 4, 5. 
 
CHAP. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 251 
 
 a body haft thou prepared me Lo I come to do thy will 
 
 O God By which will we are fanftifie d, through the 
 offering of the body of Jefus Chrift Once for all* And to 
 add one paflage more of the like kind Chrift was once 
 offered to bear the fins of many, and unto them that look 
 for himJJiall he appear the fecond time, without Jin, \. e. 
 without bearing fin as he did at his firft coming, by 
 being an offering for it, without having our iniquities 
 again laid upon him, without being any more a fin of- 
 fering ; unto them that look for himjhall he appear the 
 fecCnd time, without Jin, unto falvation.^ Nor do the 
 infpired writers at all confine themfelves to this man- 
 ner of fpeaking concerning the fatisfadtion of Chrift, 
 but declare an efficacy in what he did and fuffered for 
 us, additional to and beyond mere inftruction, exam- 
 ple and government, in great variety of expreflion : 
 That Jefus J/iou/d die for that nation the Jews ; and not 
 for that nation only, but that a/Jb, plainly by the efficacy 
 of his death, he JJiou Id gather together in one, the children 
 of God that were fcattered abroad ; J that he fuffered for 
 Jins, thejuftfor the unjvjt ; that he gave his life, himfelf^ 
 a ranfom ; |! that ^ve are bought, bought with a price $** 
 that he redeemed us with his blood ; redeemed us from the 
 curfe of the law being made a curfe for us~i\"\- that he 
 is our advocate, inter cejjbr and propitiation -,\\ that he 
 was made perfect, or confummate, through fufferings ; 
 and being thus made perfect, he became the author of fol- 
 iation ; that God was in Chrift reconciling the world 
 to himfe/f, by the death of his fon, by the crofs, not imputing 
 their trefpajjes unto them',\\\\ and laftly, that through death 
 he dejlroyed him that had the power of death. ^ Chrift 
 then having thus humbled himjelf, and become obedient 
 to death, even the death of the crofs, God a/fo hath highly 
 
 exalted 
 
 * Heb. x. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10. f Heb. ix. 28. \ Job. xi. 51, 52. 
 
 $ i Pet. iii. 18. || Matth. xx. 28. Mark x. 45. i Tim. ii. 6. 
 
 ** 2 Pet. ii. r. Rev. xiv. 4. i Cor. vi. 20. ff i Pet. i. 19. Rev. 
 
 v. 9. Ga!. iii. 13. ++ Heb. vii. 15. i Joh. ii. i, 2. Heb. 
 
 ii. ro. and v. 9. jjjj 2 Cor. v. 19. Rom. v. 10. Eph. ii. 16. 
 
 f Heb. ii. 14. See alfo a remarkable paffage-in the Book of Job, xxxiii. 54, 
 
 Rz 
 
252 The Appointment of PART IL 
 
 exalted him, and given him a name which is above every 
 name ; hath given all things into his hands ; hath com- 
 mitted all judgment unto him ; that all men JJiould honour 
 the Son even as they honour the Father* For, worthy 
 is the lamb that was jldin, to receive power, and riches, 
 and wifdom, and Jlrength, and honour, and glory, and 
 blejjing. And every creature which is in heaven, and on 
 the earth^ heard I> faying* EleJJing, and honour, and glory, 
 and power, be unto him thatfittetJt upon the throne , and un- 
 to the Lamb for ever and ever.jp 
 
 Thefe paffages of Scripture feem to comprehend 
 and expreis the chief parts of Chrift's office, as media- 
 tor between God and man, fo far, I mean, as the na- 
 ture of this his office is revealed ; and" it is ufually treat- 
 ed of by divines under three heads. 
 
 Firft, He was, by way of eminence, the prophet ; 
 that prophet thatJJiould come into f'he world, J to declare 
 the divine will. He published anew the law of nature 
 which men had corrupted, and the very knowledge of 
 which, to fome degree, was loft among them. He 
 taught mankind, taught us authoritatively, to live fo- 
 berly, right eou/Iy and godly in this prefent world, in ex- 
 peclation of the future judgment of God. He con- 
 firmed the truth of this moral fyftem of nature, and 
 gave us additional evidence of it, the evidence of tef- 
 timony. He diftinctly revealed the manner in which 
 God would be wor (hipped, the efficacy of repentance, 
 and the rewards and punifhments of a future life, 
 Thus he .was a prophet in a fenfe in which no other 
 ever was. To which is to be added, that he fet us 
 a perfect example, that we JJwuld follow his Jleps. ^ 
 
 Secondly, He has a kingdom, which is not of this world* 
 He founded a church, to be to mankind a {landing 
 memorial of religion, and invitation to it, which he 
 promifed to be with always even to the end. He ex- 
 erciies an invifible government over it himfelf, and by 
 
 his 
 
 * Phil. ii. 8, 9. Joh. iii. 35, and \v 22, 23. \ Rev. v. 12, *3> 
 
 $ Joh. vi. 14. P. 194, &c. 
 
Or A?. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 253 
 
 his Spirit - 3 over that part of it which is militant here 
 on earth, a government of difcipline,/or the perfecting 
 of 'the faints, for the edifying his body, till we all come, 
 in the unity of the faith, *rtd of the knowledge of the Son 
 vf God, unto a perfeEl man, unto the measure of the feature 
 of the fulnefs of Chrift* Of this church, all peribns 
 Scattered over the world, who live in obedience to his 
 laws, are members. For thefe he is gone to prepare a 
 flace, and will wme again to receive them unto him f elf* 
 
 that where he is there they may be alfo and reign with 
 
 him forever and ever ;-f* and likewife to take vengeance 
 on them that know not God, and obey not his Gofpel. j 
 
 Againfl thefe parts of Chrift's office, I find no ob- 
 jections but what are fully obviated in the beginning 
 of this chapter. 
 
 Lajlly, Chrift offered himfelf a propitiatory facrifice, 
 and made atonement for the fins of the world ; which 
 is mentioned laft in regard to what is objected againft 
 it. Sacrifices of expiation were commanded the Jews, 
 and obtained amongfb moft other nations from tradi- 
 tion, whole original probably was revelation. And 
 they were continually repeated, both occafionally, and 
 at the returns of ftated times, and made up great part 
 of the external religion of mankind. But now once in 
 the end of the ivorld Chrift appeared to put, away Jin by 
 ike facrifice of himfelf .^ And this facrifice was, in the 
 higher!: degree and with the mod extenfive influence, 
 of that efficacy for obtaining pardon of fin, which the 
 heathens may be fuppofed to have thought their fac- 
 rifices to have been, and which the Jewiih facrifices 
 really were in fome degree, and with regard to fome 
 peribns. 
 
 How and in what particular way it had this efficacy, 
 there are not wanting peribns who have endeavoured 
 to explain ; but I do not find that the Scripture has 
 explained it. We teem to be very much in the dark 
 
 concerning 
 
 "? E^h, iv. 12, 13. f Job. xiv. 2, ?. Rev. iii. 21. and xi. 15. 
 
 1 2 Theff. i. 8. Heb. u. 26. 
 
254 T&e Appointment of PART II, 
 
 Concerning the manner in which the ancients undeiv 
 flood atonement to be made, i. e. pardon to be ob^ 
 tained by facrifices. And if the Scripture has, as 
 furely it has, left this matter of the fatisfaction of 
 Chrift myilerious, left fomewhat in it unrevealed, all 
 conjectures about it muft be, jf not evidently abfurd, 
 yet at leaft uncertain. Nor has any one reafon to 
 complain for want of farther information, unlefs he 
 can (hew his claim to it, 
 
 Some having endeavoured to explain the efficacy of 
 what Chrift has done and fuffered for us, beyond what 
 the Scripture has authorized, others, probably becaufe 
 they could not explain it, have been for taking it away, 
 and confining his office as redeemer of the world to his 
 inftruction, example and government of the church. 
 Whereas the doctrine of the Gofpel appears to be, not 
 only that he taught the efficacy of repentance, but 
 rendered it of the efficacy which it is by what he did 
 and fuffered for us ; that he obtained for us the ben- 
 efit of having our repentance accepted unto eternal 
 life ; not only that he revealed to finners that they 
 were in a capacity of falvation, and how they might 
 obtain it, but moreover that he put them into this 
 capacity of falvation by what he did and fuffered for 
 them ; put us into a capacity of efcaping future pun- 
 ifhment, and obtaining future happinefs. And it is 
 our wifdom thankfully to accept the benefit, by per- 
 forming the conditions upon which it is offered on our 
 part, without difputing how it was procured on his. 
 For, 
 
 VII. Since we neither know by what means punifli- 
 ment in a future ftate would have followed wickednefs 
 in this ; nor in what manner it would have been in- 
 flicted had it not been prevented ; nor all the reafons 
 why its infliction would have been needful -, nor the 
 particular nature of that ftate of happineis which 
 Chrift is gone to prepare for his difciples - 9 and fince 
 
 we 
 
V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 253; 
 
 we are ignorant how far any thing which we could do 
 would, alone and of itfelf, have been effe&ual to pre- 
 vent that punifhment to which we were obnoxious., 
 .and recover that happinefs which we had forfeited, 
 it is moil evident we are not judges antecedently to 
 revelation, whether a mediator was or was not necef- 
 fary to obtain thofe ends, to prevent that future pun- 
 ifhment, and bring mankind to -the final happinefs of 
 their nature. And for the very fame reafons, upon 
 fuppofition of the neceffity of a mediator, we are no 
 more judges, antecedently to revelation, of the whole 
 nature of his office, or the feveral parts of which it con- 
 fifts, of what was fit and requifite to be afligned him, 
 in order to accomplim the ends of divine Providence 
 in the appointment. And from hence it follows, that 
 to object againfl the expediency or ufefulnefs of par- 
 ticular things, revealed to have been done or {uffered 
 by him, becaufe we do not fee how they were condu- 
 cive to tbofe -ends, is highly abfurd. Yet nothing is 
 more common to be met with than this abfurdity. 
 But if it be acknowledged beforehand that we are not 
 judges in the cafe, it is evident that no objection can a 
 with any fhadow of reafon, be urged againfl any par- 
 ticular part of Chrifl's mediatorial office revealed in 
 Scripture, till it can be fliewn positively not to be req- 
 uifite or conducive to the ends propofed to be accorrir 
 plifhed, or that it is in itfelf unreasonable. 
 
 And there is one objection made againfl the fatis- 
 faction of Chrift, which looks to be of this pofitiye 
 kind, that the -doctrine of his being appointed to fuf- 
 fer for the fins of the world, reprefents God as being 
 indifferent whether he punifhed the innocent or the 
 guilty. Now from the foregoing obfervations we may 
 fee the extreme flightnefs of all fuch objections ; and 
 (though it is mofl certain all who make them do not 
 fee the confequence) that they conclude altogether as 
 much againfl God's whole original conflitution of na- 
 ture, 
 
The Appointment of PART II. 
 
 ture, and the whole daily courfe of divine Providence 
 in the government of the world, i. e. againft the whole 
 fcheme of theifm and the whole notion of religion, as 
 againft Chriftianity. For the world is a conftitution 
 or fyftem, whofe parts have a mutual reference to each 
 other; and there is a fcheme of things gradually car- 
 Tying on, called the courfe of nature, to the carrying 
 on of which God has appointed us, in various ways, 
 to contribute. And when, in the daily courfe of nat- 
 ural providence, it is appointed that innocent people 
 fhould iuffer for the faults of the guilty, this is liable 
 to the very fame objection as the inftance we are now 
 confidering, The infinitely greater importance of that 
 appointment of Chrifhianity which is objected againft, 
 does not hinder but it may be, as it plainly is, an ap- 
 pointment of the very fame kind with what the world 
 affords us daily examples of. Nay, if there were any 
 force at all in the objection, it would be ftronger in 
 one refpect againft natural providence than againft 
 Chriftianity ; becaufe under the former we are in 
 many cafes commanded, and even necefiitated wheth- 
 er we will or not, to fufter for the faults of others 
 whereas the fufferings of Chrift were voluntary. The 
 world's being under the righteous government of God 
 does indeed imply that, finally and upon the whole, 
 every one fhall receive according to his perfonal de- 
 ferts ; and the general doctrine of the whole Scripture 
 is, that this fhall be the completion of the divine gov- 
 ernment. But during the progrefs, and for aught we 
 know even in order to the completion of this moral 
 fcheme, vicarious punifhments may be fit, and abfo- 
 lutely neceflary. Men by their follies run themfelves 
 into extreme diftrefs, into difficulties which would be 
 abfolutely fatal to them, were it not for the interpo- 
 fition and affiftance of others. God commands by 
 the law of nature, that we afford them this affiftance, 
 in many cafes where we cannot do it without very 
 
 great 
 
*. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 257 
 
 great pains, and labour, and fufferings to ourfelves. 
 And we fee in what variety of ways one perfon's fuf- 
 ferings contribute to the relief of another ; and how, 
 or by what particular means, this comes to pafs or fol- 
 lows, from the conftitution and laws of nature which, 
 come under our notice ; and being familiarized to it 
 men are not mocked with it. So that the reafon of 
 their infilling upon objections of the foregoing kind 
 ttgainft the fatisfaction of Chrift, is, either that they 
 do not confider God's fettled and uniform appoint- 
 ments as his appointments at all, or elfe they forget 
 that vicarious punifhment is a providential appoint- 
 ment of every day's experience ; and then, from their 
 being unacquainted with the more general laws of na- 
 ture or divine government over the world, and not fee- 
 ing how the fufferings of Chrift could contribute to 
 the redemption of it, unlefs by arbitrary and tyranni- 
 cal will, they conclude his fufferings could not con- 
 tribute to it any other way. And yet, what has been 
 often alleged in juftifieation of this doctrine, even from 
 the apparent natural tendency of this method of our 
 redemption ; its tendency to vindicate the authority 
 of God's laws, and deter his creatures from fin, this 
 has never yet been anfwered, and is \ thijik plainly un- 
 anfwerable, though I am far from thinking it an ac- 
 count of the whole of the cafe. But without taking 
 this into confideration, it abundantly appears from the 
 observations above made, that this objection is not an 
 objection againft Chriftianity, but againft the whole 
 general conftitution of nature. And if it were to be 
 considered as an objection againft Chriftianity, or con- 
 fidering it as it is, an objection againft the conftitu- 
 tion of nature, it amounts to no more in conclufion 
 than this, that a divine appointment cannot be necef- 
 fary or expedient, becaufe the objector does not dii- 
 cern it to be fp, though he muft own that the nature 
 of the cafe is fuch, as renders him uncapable of judging 
 
 whether 
 
The Appointment of PART II, 
 
 whether it be fo or not, or of feeing it to be neceffary, 
 though it were fo, 
 
 It is indeed a matter of great patience to reafonable 
 men, to find people arguing in this manner, objecting 
 againft the credibility of fuch particular things revealed 
 in Scripture, that they do not fee the neceffity or expe- 
 diency of them. For though it is highly right, and 
 the moil pious exercife of our underftanding, to in- 
 quire with due reverence into the ends and reafons of 
 God's difpenfations, yet when thofe reafons are con- 
 cealed, to argue from our ignorance that fuch difpen- 
 fations cannot be from God, is infinitely abfurd. The 
 prefumption of this kind of objections feems almoft 
 loll in the folly of them. And the folly of them is 
 yet greater, when they are urged, as ufually they are, 
 againft things in Chriftianity analogous or like to thofe 
 natural difpenfations of Providence which are matter 
 of experience. Let reafon be kept to ; and if any 
 part of the fcripture account of the redemption of the 
 world by Chrift can be fhewn to be really contrary to 
 it, let the Scripture, in the name of God, be given up ; 
 but let not fuch poor creatures as we, go on objecting 
 againft an infinite fcheme, that we do not fee the ne- 
 ceffity or utefulnefs of all its parts, and call this rea- 
 foning ; and, which ftill farther heightens the abfurd- 
 ity in the prefent cafe, parts which we are not actively 
 concerned in. For it may be worth mentioning, 
 
 Laftly, That not only the reafon of the thing, but 
 the whole analogy of nature, mould teach us not to 
 expect to have the like information concerning the 
 divine conduct as concerning our own duty. God 
 inftructs us by experience, (for it is not reafon, but 
 experience which inflructs us) what good or bad con- 
 fequences will follow from our acting in fuch and fuch 
 manners ; and by this he directs us how we are to be- 
 have ourfelves. But, though we are fufficiently in- 
 flructed for the common purpofes of life, yet it is but 
 
CHAP. V. a Mediator and 'Redeemer. 259 
 
 an almoft infinitely fmall part of natural providence 
 which we are at all let into. The cafe is the fame 
 with regard to revelation. The doctrine of a mediator 
 between God and man, againft which it is objected 
 that the expediency of fome things in it is not under- 
 ftood, relates only to what was done on God's part ia 
 the appointment, and on the Mediator's in the exe- 
 cution of it. For what is required of us, in confe- 
 quence of this sracious difpenfation, is another fub- 
 ject in which none can complain for want of informa- 
 tion. The conftitution of the world, and God's nat- 
 ural government over it, is all myflery, as much as the 
 Chriftian difpenfation. Yet under the firft he has 
 given men all things pertaining to life, and under the 
 other all things pertaining unto godlinefs. And it 
 may be added, that there is nothing hard to be ac- 
 counted for in any of the common precepts of Chrift- 
 ianity ; though if there were, furely a divine command 
 is abundantly fufficient to lay us under the ftrongeft 
 obligations to obedience. But the fact is, that the 
 reafons of all the Chriftian precepts are evident. Pofi- 
 tive inftitutions are manifeflly neceliary to keep up 
 and propagate religion amongft mankind. And cur 
 duty to Chrift, the internal and external worfhip of 
 him ; this part of the religion of the Gofpel manifeft- 
 ly arifes out of what he has done and fuffcred, his au- 
 thority and dominion, and the relation which he is 
 jsvealed to ftand in to us.* 
 
 * P. 200j &C. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
CHAP. VI. 
 
 Of the Want of Universality in Revelation ; and of the 
 fuppofed Deficiency in the Proof of it. 
 
 IT has been thought by fome perfons, 
 that if the evidence of revelation appears doubtful, 
 this itfelf turns into a pofitive argument againft it, b'e- 
 caufe it cannot be fuppofed that if it were true it 
 would be left to fubfift upon doubtful evidence. And 
 the objection againft revelation from its not being 
 tmiverfal is often infifted upon as of great weight. 
 
 Now the weaknefs of thefe opinions may be (hewn, 
 by observing the fuppofitions on which they are found- 
 ed, which are really fuch as thefe, that it cannot be 
 thought God would have beftowed any favour at all 
 upon us, unlefs in the degree which we think he might, 
 and which we imagine would be moft to our particu- 
 lar advantage ; and alfo that it cannot be thought he 
 would beftow a favour upon any unlefs he beftowed 
 the fame upon all ; fuppolitions which we find contra- 
 dicted not by a few inftances in God's natural govern- 
 ment of the world, but by the general analogy of na- 
 ture together. 
 
 Perfons who fpeak of the evidence of religion as 
 doubtful, and of this fuppofed doubtfulnefs as a pofi- 
 tive argument againft it, fhould be put upon coniid- 
 ering what that evidence indeed is, which they aft up- 
 on with regard to their temporal inlerefts. For, it is 
 not only extremely difficult, but, in many cafes, abfo- 
 lutely impoflible, to balance pleafure and pain, fat if? 
 faction and uneafinefs, fo as to be able to fay on which 
 fide the overplus is. There are the like difficulties and 
 impoffibilities in making the due allowances for a 
 change of temper and tafte, for fatiety, difgufts, ill 
 health , any of which render men incapable of enjoy r 
 
CHAP. VJ. Revelation not univerfal, &c. 261 
 
 ing, after they have obtained, what they moil eagerly 
 deiired. Numberlefs too are the accidents, beiides 
 that one of untimely death, which may even probably 
 difappoint the beft concerted fchemes $ and ftrong ob- 
 jections are often feen to lie againft them, not to be re- 
 moved or anfwered, but which feem overbalan-ced by 
 realbns on the other fide ; fo as that the certain dif- 
 ficulties and dangers of the puriuit are, by every one, 
 thought juftly difregarded, upon account of the ap- 
 pearing greater advantages in cafe of fuccefs, though 
 there be but little probability of it. Laftly, every one 
 obferves our liablenefs, if we be not upon our guard, 
 to be deceived by the falfehood of men, and the falfe 
 appearances of things ; and this danger mud be great- 
 ly increaied, if there be a ftrong bias within, fuppofe 
 from indulged paffion, to favour the deceit. Hence 
 arifes that great uncertainty and doubtfulnefs of proof, 
 wherein our temporal intereft really confifts, what are 
 the moil probable means of attaining it, and whether 
 thofe means will eventually be fuccefsful. And num- 
 berlefs inftances there are, in the daily courfe of life, 
 in which all men think it reafonable to engage in pur- 
 fuits y though the probability is greatly againft fuc- 
 ceeding, and to make fuch proviiion for themfelves, 
 as it is fuppofable they may have occaiion for, though 
 the plain acknowledged probability is that they never 
 mall. Then thole who think the objection againft 
 revelation, from its light not being univerfal, to be of 
 weight, ihould obferve, that the Author of nature, in 
 numberlefs inftances, beftows that upon fome which 
 he does not upon others who feem equally to (land in 
 need of it. Indeed he appears to bellow all his gifts 
 with the moft promifcuous variety among creatures 
 of the fame fpecies ; health and ftrcngth, capacities 
 of prudence and of knowledge, means of improvement, 
 riches, and all external advantages. And as there are 
 not any two men found of exactly like lhape and fea- 
 tures, 
 
262 Revelation not univerfal . PART If* 
 
 tures, fo it is probable there are not any two of an ex- 
 actly like conftitution, temper and fituation, with re- 
 gard to the goods and evils of life. Yet, not with ftand- 
 ing thefe uncertainties and varieties, God does exercife 
 a natural government over the world, and there is fuch 
 a thing as a prudent and imprudent inftitution of life, 
 with regard to our health and our affairs, under that 
 his natural government. 
 
 As neither the Jewifh nor Chriflian revelation have 
 been univerfal, and as they have been afforded to a 
 greater or lefs part of the world, at different times, 
 fo likewife at different times both revelations have had 
 different degrees of evidence. The Jews who lived 
 during the fucceffion of prophets, that is, from Mofes 
 till after the captivity, had higher evidence of the 
 truth of their religion, than thofe had, who lived in 
 the interval between the laft mentioned period and 
 the coming of Chrift. And the iirft Chriftians had 
 higher evidence of the miracles wrought in atteftatior* 
 of Chridianity than what we have now. They had 
 alfo a flrong prefumptive proof of the truth of it, per- 
 haps of much greater force, in way of argument, than 
 many think, of which we have very little remaining ; 
 I mean the prefhmptive proof of its truth, from the 
 influence which it had upon the lives of the generality 
 of its profefTors. And we, or future ages, may poffi- 
 bly have a proof of it, which they could not have, 
 from the conformity between the prophetick hiftory 
 and the (late of the world and of Chriftianity. And 
 farther, if we were to fuppofe the evidence which fome 
 have of religion to amount to little more than feeing 
 that it may be true, but that they remain in great 
 doubts and uncertainties about both its evidence and 
 its nature, and great perplexities concerning the rule 
 of life ; others to have a full conviction of the truth 
 of religion, with a diftincl: knowledge of their duty ; 
 and others feverally to have all the intermediate de- 
 grees 
 
CHAP. VI. Suppofed deficiency in its Proof. 263 
 
 grees of religious light and evidence, which lie be- 
 tween thefe two, if we put the cafe, that for the pref- 
 ent it was intended revelation fhould be no more than 
 a fmall light, in the midft of a world greatly over- 
 fpread, notwithstanding it, with ignorance and dark- 
 nefs ; that certain glimmerings of this Hght mould ex- 
 tend and be directed to remote diftances, in fuch a 
 manner as that thofe who really partook of it mould 
 not difcern from whence it originally came ; that fome 
 in a nearer (ituation to it mould have its light obfcur- 
 ed, and in different ways and degrees intercepted ; 
 and that others mould be placed within its clearer in- 
 fluence, and be much more enlivened, cheered and di- 
 rected by it ; but yet that even to thefe it mould be 
 no more than a light 'flatting in a dark place ; all this 
 would be perfectly uniform and of a piece with the 
 conduct of Providence in the diftribution of its other 
 bleiTings. If the fact of the cafe really were, that ibmc 
 have received no light at all from the Scripture, as 
 many ages and countries in the heathen world ; that 
 others, thou'gli they have by means of it had eiTential 
 or natural religion enforced upon their confciences, 
 yet have never had the genuine fcripture revelation, 
 with its real evidence propofed to their consideration, 
 and the ancient Perfiam and modern Mahometans may 
 pofilbly be inftances of people in a fituation fomewhat 
 like to 1 this ; that others, though they have had the 
 Scripture laid before them as of divine revelation, yet 
 have had it with the fyftem and evidence ofChriftianity 
 fo interpolated, the fyftem fo corrupted, the evidence 
 fo blended with falfe miracles, as to leave the mind in 
 the utmoft doubtfulnefs and uncertainty about the 
 whole ; which may be the (late of fome thoughtful 
 men, in moil of thofe nations who call themleives 
 Chriflian. And laftly, that others have had Chrifl- 
 ianity offered to them in its genuine fnnplicity, and 
 with its proper evidence, as perform in countries and 
 
 churches 
 
264 Revelation not universal : PART II- 
 
 churches of civil and of Chriftian liberty ; but how- 
 ever that even thefe perfons are left in great ignorance 
 In many refpedls, and have by no means light afforded 
 them enough to fatisfy their curioiity, but only to 
 regulate their life, to teach them their duty, and en- 
 courage them in the careful difcharge of it : I fay, if 
 we were to fuppofe this fomewhat of a general true 
 account of the degrees of moral and religious light 
 and evidence, which were intended to be afforded 
 mankind, and of what has actually been and is their 
 fituation, in their moral and religious capacity, there 
 would be nothing in all this ignorance, doubtfulnefs 
 and uncertainty, in all thefe varieties, and fuppofed 
 difadvantages of fome in companion of others, refpecl:- 
 ing religion, but may be paralleled by manifeft anal- 
 ogies in the natural difpenfations of Providence at 
 prefent, and coniidering ourfelves merely in our tem- 
 poral capacity. 
 
 Nor is there any thing (hocking in all this, or which 
 would feem to bear hard upon the moral adminiftra- 
 tion in nature, if we would really keep in mind that 
 every one mall be dealt equitably with, inftead of for- 
 getting this, or explaining it away, after it is acknowl- 
 edged in words. All fhadow of injuftice, and indeed 
 all harm appearances, in this various economy of 
 Providence, would be loft, if we would keep in mind 
 that every merciful allowance (hall be made, and no 
 more be required of any one than what might have been 
 equitably expeded of him, from the circumftances in 
 which he was placed, and not what might have been, 
 expected had he been placed in other circumftances ; 
 i. e. in Scripture language, that every man mall be 
 accepted according to what he had, not according to what 
 he had not* This however doth not by any means 
 imply that all perfons' condition here is equally ad- 
 vantageous with refpect to futurity. And Provi- 
 dence's 
 
 * 2 Cor. viii. ia. 
 
CHAP. VL Suppofed Deficiency in its Proof . 265. 
 
 dence's defigning to place fome in greater darknefs 
 with refpect to religious knowledge, is no more a rea- 
 fon why they ihould not endeavour to get out of that 
 darknefs, and others to bring them out of it, than 
 why ignorant and flow people in matters of other 
 knowledge fliould not endeavour to learn, or mould 
 not be inftru&ed; 
 
 It is not unreafonable to fuppofe that the fame wife 
 and good principle, whatever it was, which difpofed 
 the Author of nature to make different kinds and or- 
 ders of creatures, difpofed him alfo to place creatures 
 of like kinds in different fituations ; and that the fame 
 principle which difpofed him to make creatures of dif- 
 ferent moral capacities, difpofed him alfo to place 
 creatures of like moral capacities in different religious 
 fituations, and even the fame creatures in different pe- 
 riods of their being. And the account or reafon of 
 this is alfo mofl probably the account, why the con*- 
 flitution of things is fuch, as that creatures of moral 
 natures or capacities, for a confiderable part of that du- 
 ration in which they are living agents, are not at all 
 fubjects of morality and religion, but grow up to be 
 ib, and grow up to be fo more and more, gradually 
 from childhood to mature age. 
 
 What, in particular, is the account or reafon of 
 thefe things, we muft be greatly in the dark, were it 
 only that we know fo very little even of our own cafe. 
 Our prefent ilate may poifibly be the confequence of 
 fomewhat paft which we are wholly ignorant of, as it 
 has a reference to fomewhat to come, of which we 
 know fcarce any more than is neceffary for practice. 
 A fyftem or conflitution, in its notion, implies varie- 
 ty ; and fo complicated an one as this world, very 
 great variety. So that were revelation univerial, yet 
 from men's different capacities of underflanding, from 
 the different lengths of their lives, their different edu- 
 cations and other external circurnftances, and from 
 
 S their 
 
s66 Revelation not univerfatt PART IL 
 
 their difference of temper and bodily conftitution, 
 their religious fituations \vould be widely different, 
 and the diiadvantage of fome in comparifon of others, 
 perhaps, altogether as much as at prefent. And the 
 true account, whatever it be, why mankind, or fuch a 
 part of mankind, are placed in this condition of igno- 
 rance, muft be fuppofed alfo the true account of our 
 farther ignorance, in not knowing the reafons why or 
 whence it is that they are placed in this condition. 
 But the following practical reflections may deferve the 
 ferious confederation of thofe perfons who think the 
 circumftances of mankind or their own, in the fore- 
 mentioned refpects, a ground of complaint. 
 
 Firft, The evidence of religion not appearing ob- 
 vious, may conftitute one particular part of fome men's 
 trial in the religious fenfe, as it gives fcope for a virtu- 
 ous exerciie or vicious neglect of their underflanding, 
 in examining or not examining into that evidence. 
 There feems no poffible reafon to be given, why we 
 may not be in a ftate of moral probation, with regard 
 to the exerciie of our underftanding upon the fubjecl; 
 of religion, as we are with regard to our behaviour in 
 common affairs. The former is as much a thing 
 within our power and choice as the latter. And I 
 fuppofe it is to be laid down for certain, that the fame 
 character, the lame inward principle, which, after a 
 man is convinced of the truth of religion, renders him 
 obedient to the precepts of it, would, were he not thus 
 convinced, fet him about an examination of it, upon 
 its fyftem and evidence being offered to his thoughts ; 
 and that in the latter ftate his examination would be 
 with an impartiality, ferioufnefs and folicitude pro- 
 portionable to what his obedience is in the former. 
 And as inattention, negligence, want of all ferious 
 concern about a matter of fuch a nature and fuch im- 
 portance, when offered to men's confideration, is, be- 
 fore a diftincl: conviction of its truth, as real immoral 
 
 depravity 
 
C H A P . VI . Snppofed Deficiency in its Proof. 267 
 
 depravity and diffolutenefs, as negleft of religious prac- 
 tice after fuch conviction, fo active folicitude about 
 it, and fair impartial confederation of its evidence be- 
 fore fuch conviction, is as really an exercife of a morally 
 right temper as is religious practice after. Thus, that 
 religion is not intuitively true, but a matter of deduc- 
 tion and inference ; that a conviction of its truth is 
 not forced upon every one, but left to be, by fome, 
 collected with heedful attention to premifes ; this as 
 much conftitutes religious probation, as much affords 
 fphere, fcope, opportunity, for right and wrong beha- 
 viour, as -any thing whatever does. And their man- 
 ner of treating this fubject when laid before them, 
 (hews what is in their heart, arid is an exertion of it. 
 Secondly, It appears to be a thing as evident, though 
 it is not fo much attended to, that if upon confidera- 
 tion of religion the evidence of it fhould feem to any 
 perfons doubtful, in the higheft fuppofable degree, 
 even this doubtful evidence will, however, put them 
 into a general ftate of probation in the moral and relig- 
 ious fenfe. For, fuppoie a man to be really in doubt 
 whether fuch a perfon had not done him the greatefl 
 favour, or whether his whole temporal intereft did not 
 depend upon that perfon, no one, who had any fenfe 
 of gratitude and of prudence, could poflibly confider 
 himfelf in the fame fituation with regard to fuch per- 
 fon, as if he had no fuch doubt. In truth, it is as juft 
 to fay that certainty and doubt are the fame, as to fay, 
 the fituations now mentioned would leave a man as en- 
 tirely at liberty in point of gratitude or prudence, as 
 he would be were he certain he had received no favour 
 from fuch perfon, or that he no way depended upon 
 him. And thus, though the evidence of religion 
 which is afforded to fome men fhould be little more 
 than that they are given to fee the fyftem of Chriftian- 
 ity, or religion in general, to be fuppofable and cred- 
 ible, this ought in all reafon to beget a ferious prac- 
 S 2, tical 
 
268 Revelation not timverfatt PART 1!, 
 
 tical apprehenfion that it may be true. And even this 
 \vill afford matter of exercife for religious fufpenfe and 
 deliberation, for moral refolution and felf government, 
 becaufe the apprehenfion that religion may be true, 
 does as really lay men under obligations as a full con- 
 viction that it is true. It gives occafion and motives 
 to confider farther the important fubject, to preferve 
 attentively upon their minds a general implicit fenfe 
 that they may be under divine moral government, an 
 awful folicitude about religion, whether natural or re- 
 vealed. Such apprehenfion ought to turn men's eyes 
 to every degree of new light which may be had, from 
 whatever fide it comes, and induce them to refrain in 
 the mean time from all immoralities, and live in the 
 confcientious pratice of every common virtue. Ef- 
 pecially are they bound to keep at the greatefl diftance 
 from all diffolute profanenefs ; for this the very nature 
 of the cafe forbids ; and to treat with higheft rever- 
 ence a matter, upon which their own whole intereft 
 and being, and the fate of nature depends. This be- 
 haviour, and an active endeavour to maintain within 
 themfelves this temper, is the bufinefs, the duty, and 
 the wifdom of thofe perfons, who complain of the 
 doubtfulnefs of religion ; is what they are under the 
 moft proper obligations to. And fuch behaviour is 
 an exertion of, and has a tendency to improve in; 
 them that character, which the practice of all the fev- 
 eral duties of religion, from a full conviction of its 
 truth, is an exertion of, and has a tendency to improve' 
 in others ; others, I fay, to whom God has afforded 
 fuch conviction. Nay, confidering the infinite im- 
 portance of religion, revealed as well as natural, I think 
 it may be faid in general, that whoever will weigh the 
 matter thoroughly may fee there is not near fo much 
 difference as is commonly imagined, between what 
 ought in reafon to be the rule of life, to thofe perfons 
 who are fully convinced of its truth, and to thofe 
 
 who 
 
CHAP. VI. Sitppofed Deficiency in its Proof. 269 
 
 who have only a ferious doubting apprehenfion that 
 it may be true. Their hopes, and fears, and obliga- 
 tions will be in various degrees ; but, as the fubject 
 matter of their hopes and fears is the fame, fo the 
 fubjed matter of their obligations, what they are 
 bound to do and to refrain from, is not fo very unlike. 
 
 It is to be obferved farther, : hat from a character 
 of underftanding, or a lituatio.i of influence in the 
 world, fome perfons have it in their power to d^ 
 nitely more harm or good, by fetting an ex i 
 profanenefs and avowed difregard to all relig'on, or, 
 on the contrary, of a ierious, though perhaps do 
 ing apprehenn n o 1 ' its truth, and of a reverent! re- 
 gard to it under this doubtfulnefs, than they can do, 
 by acting well or ill in all the common intercourfes 
 amongft mankind. And confequently they are mod 
 highly accountable for a behaviour, which they may 
 eafily forefee is of fuch importance, and in which 
 there is moft plainly a right and a wrong, even ad- 
 mitting the evidence of religion to be as doubtful as 
 is pretended. 
 
 The ground of thefe obfervations, and that which 
 renders them juft and true, is, that doubting necefTa- 
 rily implies fome degree of evidence for that of which 
 we doubt. For no perfon would be in doubt con- 
 cerning the truth of a number of fads fo and fo cir- 
 cumftanced, which mould accidentally come into his 
 thoughts, and of which he had no evidence at all. 
 And though in the cafe of an even chance, and where 
 confequently we were in doubt, we mould in common 
 language lay that we had no evidence at all for either 
 fide, yet that fituation of things, which renders it 
 an even chance and no more, that fuch an event will 
 happen, renders this cafe equivalent to all others, 
 where there is fuch evidence on both fides of a quef- 
 tion,* as leaves the mind in doubt concerning the 
 
 truth, 
 
 * Introduftioa. 
 
270 Revelation not univerfal : PART II. 
 
 truth. Indeed in all thefe cafes, there is no more ev- 
 idence on one fide than on the other ; but there is 
 (what is equivalent to.) much more for either than 
 for the truth of a number of fads which come into 
 one's thoughts at random. And thus in all thefe 
 cafes doubt as much prefuppofes evidence, lower de- 
 grees of evidence, as belief prefuppofes higher, and 
 certainty higher ftiU. Any one who will a little at- 
 tend to the nature of evidence, will eafily carry this 
 obfervation on, and fee that between no evidence at 
 all, and that degree of it \vhich affords ground of 
 doubt, there are as many intermediate degrees, as there 
 are between that degree which is the ground of doubt, 
 and demonflration. And though we have not facul- 
 ties to diftinguifh th fe degrees of evidence with any 
 fort of exactnefs, yet in proportion as they are difcern- 
 ed they ought to influence our practice. For it is as 
 real an imperfection in the moral character, not to be 
 influenced in practice by a lower degree of evidence 
 when difcerned, as it is in the underftanding not to 
 difcern it. And as in all fubjects which men connder, 
 they difcern the lower as well as higher degrees of evi- 
 dence, proportionably to their capacity of underftand- 
 ing, fo in practical fubjects they are influenced in 
 practice, by the lower as well as higher degrees of it* 
 proportionably to their fairnefs and honefty,- And as, 
 in proportion to defects in the underftanding, men 
 are unapt to fee lower degrees of evidence, are in clan- 
 ger of overlooking evidence when it is not glaring* 
 and are eafily impofed upon in fuch cafes, fo in pro- 
 portion to the corruption of the heart, they feem ca- 
 pable of fatisfying themfelves with having no regard 
 in practice to evidence acknowledged real, if it be not 
 overbearing. From thefe things it muft follow, that 
 doubting concerning religion implies fuch a degree of 
 evidence for it as, joined with the confideration of its 
 importance, unqueftionably lays men under the obli- 
 gations 
 
CHAP. VI. Suppofed Deficiency in its Proof. 271 
 
 gat ions before mentioned to have a dutiful regard to 
 It in all their behaviour. 
 
 Thirdly r , The difficulties in which the evidence of 
 religion is involved, which fome complain of, is no 
 more a juft ground of complaint, than the external 
 circumftances of temptation which others are placed 
 in, or than difficulties in the practice of it after a 
 full conviction of its truth. Temptations render our 
 ilate a more improving ftate ef -difcipline* than it 
 would be otherwife, as they give occafion for a more 
 .attentive exercife of the virtuous principle, which 
 confirms and ftrensjthens it more than an eaiier or lefs 
 attentive exercife of it could. Now fpeculative diffi- 
 culties are, in this refpect, of the very fame nature with 
 thefe external temptations. For the evidence of relig- 
 ion not appearing obvious, is to fome peribns a temp- 
 tation to reject it, without any consideration at ail ; and 
 -therefore requires fuch an attentive exercife of the vir- 
 luous principle, ferioufly to confider that evidence, as 
 there would be no occafion for but for fuch temptation. 
 And the fuppofed doubtfulnefs of its evidence, after 
 it has been in fome fort confidered, afibrds opportu- 
 nity to an unfair mind of explaining away, and deceit- 
 fully hiding from itfelf, that evidence which it might 
 fee, and alfo for men's encouraging themfelves in vice 
 from hopes of impunity, though they do clearly fee 
 thus much at lead that thefe hopes are uncertain ; in 
 like manner as -the common temptation to many in- 
 fiances of folly, which end in temporal infamy and 
 ruin, is the ground for hope of not being detected, 
 and of efcaping with impunity ; i. e. the doubt^ 
 fulnefs of the proof beforehand, that fuch foolifh be- 
 haviour will thus end in infamy and ruin. On the 
 contrary, fuppofed doubtfulnefs in the evidence of re- 
 ligion calls for a more careful and attentive exercife of 
 the virtuous principle, in fairly yielding themfelves up 
 
 to 
 
 * Part I. Chaj>. v. 
 
Revelation not universal : PART II. 
 
 to the proper influence of any real evidence, though 
 doubtful, and in practifing confcientioufly all virtue, 
 though under fome uncertainty whether the govern- 
 ment in the univerfe may not poffibly be iuch, as 
 that vice may efcape with impunity. And in general, 
 temptation, meaning by this word the leifer allure- 
 ments to wronq; and difficulties in the difcharge of 
 our duty, as well as the greater ones temptation, I 
 fay, as fuch, and of every kind and degree, as it calls 
 forth fome virtuous efforts, additional to what would 
 otherwiie have been wanting, cannot but be an ad- 
 ditional difcipline and improvement of virtue, as well 
 as probation of it in the other fenfes of that word.* 
 So that the very fame account is to be given why the 
 evidence of religion mould be left in fuch a manner, 
 as to require in fome an attentive, folicitous, perhaps 
 painful exercife of their underfhmding about it, as why 
 others mould be placed in fuch circumflances as that 
 the practice of its common duties, after a full convic- 
 tion of the truth of it, fhould require attention, folic- 
 itude and pains ; or, why appearing doubtfulnefs 
 fhould be permitted to afford matter of temptation to 
 fome, as why external difficulties and allurements 
 fhould be permitted to afford matter of temptation to 
 others. The fame account alfo is to be given why 
 fome fhould be exercifed with temptations of both 
 thefe kinds, as why others mould be exercifed with 
 the latter in fuch very high degrees as fome have been, 
 particularly as the primitive Chriflians were. 
 
 Nor does there appear any abfurdity in fuppofing, 
 that the fpeculative difficulties in which the evidence 
 of religion is involved, may make even the principal 
 part of fome perfons' trial. For, as the chief tempta- 
 tions of the generality of the world are, the ordinary 
 motives to injuftice or unreilrained pleafure, or to live 
 in the negledt of religion, from that frame of mind 
 
 which 
 
 * Part I. Chap, v, and p. 155, 
 
CHAT. VL/ Suppofed Deficiency in its Proof. 273 
 
 which renders many perfons almoft without feeling as 
 to any thing diftant, or which is not the object of their 
 fenfes, f there are other perfons without this fhal- 
 lownefs of temper, perfons of a deeper fenfe as to what 
 is invifible and future ; who not only fee, but have a 
 general practical feeling, that what is to come will be 
 prefent, and that things are not lefs real for their not 
 being th objects of fenfe ; and who, from their nat- 
 ural conftitution of body and of temper, and from 
 their external condition, may have fmall temptations 
 to behave ill, fmall difficulty in behaving well in the 
 common courfe of life. Now when theie latter ]-cr~ 
 fons have a diftinct full conviction of the truth of re- 
 ligion, without any poiTible doubts or difficulties, the 
 practice of it is to them unavoidable, unlefs they will 
 do a conftant violence to their own minds ; and re- 
 ligion is fcarce any more a diicipline to them than it 
 is to creatures in a ftate of perfection. Yet thefe per- 
 fons may poffibly ftand in need of moral diicipline and 
 exercife in a higher degree, than they would have by 
 fuch an eafy practice of religion. Or it may be requi- 
 fite for reafons unknown to us, that they mould give 
 fome farther manifestation* what is their moral char- 
 acter, to the creation of God, than fuch a practice of 
 it would be. Thus in the great variety of religious 
 Situations in which men are placed, what constitutes, 
 \vhat chiefly and peculiarly constitutes the probation, 
 in all fenfes, of fome perfons, may be the difficulties in 
 which the evidence of religion is involved ; and their 
 principal and diftinguifhed trial may be, how they will 
 behave under and with refpect to theie difficulties. 
 Circumftances in men's fituation in their temporal ca- 
 pacity, analogous in good rneafare to this refpecting 
 religion, are to be obferved. We find fome perfons are 
 placed in fuch a fituation in the world, as that their 
 chief difficulty with regard to conduct, is not the do- 
 ing 
 
274 Revelation not univerfal : PART II, 
 
 ing what is prudent when it is known, for this in num- 
 berlefs cafes is as eafy as the contrary, but to fome the 
 principal exercife is, recollection and being upon their 
 guard againft deceits, the deceits fuppofe of thofe about 
 them, againft falfe appearances of reafon and prudence. 
 To perfons in fome fituations the principal exercife 
 with refpect to conduct is, attention in order to inform 
 themfelves what is proper, what is really the reafona- 
 ble and prudent part to act, 
 
 But as I have hitherto gone upon fuppofition, that 
 men's diffatisfaction with the evidence of religion is not 
 owing to their neglects or prejudices, it muft be added 
 .on the other hand, in all common reafon, and as what 
 the truth of the cafe plainly requires mould be added, 
 that fuch duTatisfaction poifibly may be owing to thofe, 
 poflibly may be men's own fault. For, 
 
 If there are any perfons who never fet themfelves 
 heartily and in earnefl to be informed in religion ; if 
 there are any who fecretly wifh it may not prove true, 
 and are lefs attentive to evidence than to difficulties, 
 and more to objections than to what is laid in anfwer 
 to them, -thefe perfons will fcarce be thought in a 
 likely way of feeing the evidence of religion, though it 
 were moft certainly true, and capable of being ever fo 
 fully proved. If any accuflom themfelves to conficler 
 this fubject ufually in the way of mirth and fport ; if 
 they attend to forms and reprefentations, and inade- 
 quate manners of expreflion, inflead of the real things 
 intended by them ; (for figns often can be no more 
 than inadequately expreffive of the things fignified) or 
 if they fubftitute human errors in the room of divine 
 truth, why may not all, or any of thefe things, hin- 
 der fome men from feeing that evidence which really, 
 is feen by others, as a like turn of mind with refpect 
 to matters of common fpecuiation and practice, does, 
 we find by experience, hinder them from attaining that 
 knowledge and right underftanding,in matters of com- 
 mon 
 
CHAP. VI . Suppofed Deficiency in its Proof. 
 
 mon fpeculation and practice, which more fair and at- 
 tentive minds attain to ? And the effect will be the 
 fame, whether their neglect of ferioufly confidering the 
 evidence of religion, and their indirect behaviour with 
 regard to it, proceed from mere carelelThefs, or from 
 from the grofler vices ; or whether it be owing to this, 
 that forms and figurative manners of exprefiion, as 
 well as errors, adminifler occaiions of ridicule, when 
 the things intended and the truth itfelf would not. 
 Men may indulge a ludicrous turn fo far as to lofe all 
 fenfe of conduct and prudence in worldly affairs, and 
 even as it feems to impair their faculty of reafon. 
 And in general, levity, careleifnefs, pailion and preju- 
 dice do hinder us from being rightly informed with 
 refped to common things ; and they may in like man- 
 ner, and perhaps in fome farther providential manner, 
 with refpecl to moral and religious fubjects ; may hin- 
 der evidence from being laid before us, and from be- 
 ing feen when it is. The Scripture* does declare that 
 every QnzJJiall net under/} and. And it makes no dif- 
 ference by what providential conduct this cornes to 
 pafs ; whether the evidence of Chriftianity was, orig- 
 inally and with defign, put and left fq as that thole 
 who are defirous of evading moral obligations mould 
 not fee it, and that honeft minded perfons ihould ; or 
 whether it comes to pafs by any other means. 
 
 Farther, The general proof of natural religion and 
 of Chriftianity, does, I think, lie level to common 
 men : even thofe, the greateft part of whofe time, 
 from childhood to old age, is taken up with providing 
 for themfelves and their families the common conve- 
 niences, 
 
 * Dan. jcii. 10. See alfo Ifai, xxix. 13, 14. Matth. vi. 23. and xi. 2s. 
 and xui.jj, 12. Joh. iii. 19. Job. v. 44. i Cor. ii. 14. and 2 Cor. iv. 4. 
 2 Tim. iii. 13. and that affectionate, ns well as authoritative admonition, lo 
 
 very many times inculcated, He t/'iat hath cars to /':car, let him near. Grants 
 
 ''i:v fo flrongly the thing intended in thefe and other paflages of Scripture 
 cf the like fenfe, as to fay that the proof given us of Chriftiamty was iels than 
 it might have been, for this very purpofe j Ut ita fertno Evangeia ta 
 Tafis effet Lyaiux ad ^uetn ingcntu far.abilia ixfhrurentur. De Ver. R. C. L. 2, 
 JpTvards the end. 
 
276 Revelation not universal : PART IL 
 
 niences, perhaps neceffaries of life ; thofe I mean of 
 this rank, who ever think at all of afking after proof or 
 attending to it- Common men, were they as much 
 in earned about religion as about their temporal af- 
 fairs, are capable of being convinced upon real evi- 
 dence, that there is a God who governs the world ; 
 and they feel themfelves to be of a moral nature, and 
 accountable creatures. And as Chriftianity entirely 
 falls in with this their natural fenfe of things, fo they 
 are capable, not only of being perfuaded, but of being 
 made to fee, that there is evidence of miracles wrought 
 in atteftation of it, and many appearing completions 
 of prophecy. But though this proof is real and con- 
 clufive, yet it is liable to objections, and may be run 
 up into difficulties ; which, however, peribns who are 
 capable not only of talking of, but of really feeing, are 
 capable alfo of feeing through ; i. e. not of clearing up 
 and anfwering them fo as to fatisfy their curiofity, for 
 of fuch knowledge we are not capable with refpect to 
 any one thing in nature, but capable of feeing that the 
 proof is not loft in thefe difficulties, or deftroyed by 
 thefe objections. But then a thorough examination 
 into religion with regard to thefe objections, which 
 cannot be the buiinefs of every man, is a matter of 
 pretty large compafs, and from the nature of it requires 
 fome knowledge, as well as time and attention, to fee 
 how the evidence comes out upon balancing one thing 
 with another, and what upon the whole is the amount 
 of it. Now if perfons who have picked up thefe ob- 
 jections from others, and take for granted they are 
 of weight, upon the word of thofe from whom they 
 received them, or by often retailing of them come to 
 fee or fancy they fee them to be of weight, will not 
 prepare themfelves for fuch an examination with a 
 competent degree of knowledge, or will not give that 
 time and attention to the iubject, which from the na- 
 ture of it is neceflary for attaining fuch information, 
 
CHAP. VI. Suppofed Deficiency in its Proof. 
 
 in this cafe they mud remain in doubt fulnefs, igno- 
 rance or error, in the fame way as they muft with re-> 
 gard to. common fciences, and matters of common life, 
 if they neglect the neceffary means of being informed 
 in them. 
 
 But ftill perhaps it will be objected, that if a prince 
 or common mafter were to fend directions to a fer- 
 vant, he would take care that they mould always bear 
 the certain marks who they came from, and that their 
 fenfe mould be always plain, fo as that there mould be 
 no poflible doubt, if he could help it, concerning the 
 authority or meaning of them. Now the proper an- 
 fwer to all this kind of objections is, that, whereever 
 the fallacy lies, it is even certain we cannot argue thus 
 with refpect to Him who is the governor of the world ; 
 and particularly that he does not afford us fuch in- 
 formation with refpect to our temporal affairs and 5n- 
 terefts, as experience abundantly (hews. However, 
 there is a full anfvver to this objection from the very- 
 nature of religion. For, the realbn why a prince 
 would give his directions in this plain manner, is, 
 that he ablblutely defires fuch an external action 
 fhould be done, without concerning himfelf with the 
 motive or principle upon which it is done ; i. e. he 
 regards only the external event, or the thing's being 
 done, and not at all, properly fpeaking, the doing of 
 it, or the action. Whereas the whole of morality and 
 religion confifting merely in action itfelf, there is no 
 fort of parallel between the cafes. But if the prince 
 be fuppofed to regard only the action, i. e. only to de- 
 fire to exercife or in any fenfe prove the underftanding 
 or loyalty of a fervant, he would not always give his 
 orders in fuch a plain manner. It may be proper to 
 add, that the will of God refpecting morality and re- 
 ligion may be confidered either as abfolute or as only 
 conditional. If it be abfolute, it can only be thus, 
 that we mould act virtuoufly in fuch given circum- 
 
 (lances $ 
 
278 Revelation not ttniverfa! !' PART IL 
 
 fiances ; not that we fliould be brought to act fo by 
 his changing of our circumftances. And if God's 
 will be thus abfolute, then it is in our power, in the 
 higheft and ftrictefl fenfe, to do or to contradict his 
 will, which is a mod weighty consideration. Or his 
 will may be confidered only as conditional, that if we 
 act fo and fo we {hall be rewarded ; if otherwife, pun- 
 ifhed ; of which conditional will of the Author of na- 
 ture the whole conflitution of it affords moil certain 
 inftances. 
 
 Upon the whole that we are in a flate of religion 
 necefTarily implies that we are in a ftate of probation ; 
 and the credibility of our being at all in fueh a flate 
 being admitted, there feems no peculiar difficulty in 
 fuppofing our probation to be juft as it is in thofe re- 
 fpects which are above objected againft. There feems 
 no pretence, from the reafon of the thing , to fay, that the 
 trial cannot equitably be any thing, but whether per- 
 fons will act fuitably to certain information, or fuch as 
 admits no room for doubt ; fo as that there can be no 
 danger of mifcarriage, but either from their not at- 
 tending to what they certainly know, or from over- 
 bearing paffion hurrying them on to act contrary to 
 it. For, fince ignorance and doubt afford fcope for 
 probation in all fenfes, as really as intuitive conviction 
 or certainty, and fmce the two former are to be put 
 to the fame account as difficulties in practice, men's 
 moral probation may alfo be, whether they will take 
 due care to inform themfelves by impartial confidera- 
 tion, and afterwards whether they will act as the cafe 
 requires, upon the evidence which they have, however 
 doubtful. And this, we find by experience, is fre^ 
 quently our probation^* in our temporal capacity. 
 For, the information which we want with regard to 
 our worldly interefls is by no means always given us 
 of courfe, without any care of our own. And we are 
 
 greatly 
 
 *-P. 93, 271, 273, 274, 
 
C H A P . VI. Suppofed Deficiency in its Proof. 279 
 
 greatly liable to felf deceit from inward fecret preju- 
 dices, and alfo to the deceits of others. So that to be 
 able to judge what is the prudent part, often requires 
 much and difficult confideration. Then after we 
 have judged the very beft we can, the evidence upon 
 which we mud act, if we will live and ad at all, is per- 
 petually doubtful to a very high degree. And the 
 conftitution and courfe of the world in fact is fuch, as 
 that want of impartial confideration what we have to 
 do, and venturing upon extravagant courfes becaufe 
 it is doubtful what will be the confequence, are often 
 naturally, i. e. providentially, altogether as fatal as 
 mifconduct occafioned by heedlefs inattention to 
 what we certainly know, or difregarding it from over- 
 bearing paffion. 
 
 Several of the obfervations here made may well 
 feem flrange, perhaps unintelligible, to many good 
 men. But if the perfons for whofe fake they are made 
 think fo perfons who object as above, and throw off 
 all regard to religion under pretence of want of evi- 
 dence, I defire them to confider again whether their 
 thinking fo be owing to any thing unintelligible in 
 thefe obfervations, or to their own not having fuch a 
 fenfe of religion and ferious folicitude about it as even 
 their ftate of fcepticifrn does in all reafon require. It 
 ought to be forced upon the reflection of thefe per- 
 fons, that our nature and condition neceiTarily require 
 us, in the daily courfe of life, to act upon evidence 
 much lower than what is commonly called probable ; 
 to guard not only againft what we fully believe will, 
 but alfo againft what we think it fuppofable may, 
 happen ; and to engage in purfuits when the proba- 
 bility is greatly againil fuccefs, if it be credible that 
 poilibly we may iucceed in them. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 280 ] 
 
 CHAR VII. 
 
 Of the particular Evidence for Chrijlianity. 
 
 JL HE prefumptions againft revelation, and 
 obje&ions againft the general fcheme of Chriflianity 
 and particular things relating to it, being removed, 
 there remains to be considered what poiitive evidence 
 xve have for the truth of it, chiefly in order to fee what 
 the analogy of nature fuggefts with regard to that ev- 
 idence and the objections againft it, or to fee what is, 
 and is allowed to be, the plain natural rule of judg- 
 ment and of action, in our temporal concerns, in cafes 
 where we have the fame kind of evidence and the 
 fame kind of objections againft it that we have in the 
 cafe before us. 
 
 Now in the evidence of Chriftianity there feem to 
 be ieveral things of great weight, not reducible to the 
 head either of miracles or the completion of prophecy, 
 in the common acceptation of the words. But thefe 
 two are its direct and fundamental proofs, and thofe 
 other things, however confiderable they are, yet ought 
 never to be urged apart from its direct proofs, but al- 
 ways to be joined with them. Thus the evidence of 
 Chriftianity will be a long feries of things, reaching, 
 as it feems, from the beginning of the world to the 
 prefent time, of great variety and compafs, taking in 
 both the direct and alfo the collateral proofs, and 
 making up, all of them together, one argument ; the 
 conviction arifing from which kind of proof may be 
 compared to what we call the effeft in architecture or 
 other works of art, a refult from a great number of 
 things fo and fo difpofed, and taken into one view. 
 I {hall therefore, FIRST, make fome obfervations re- 
 lating to miracles and the appearing completions of 
 
 prophecy, 
 
GH A p . VII. Of the particular Evidence, <c. 281 
 
 prophecy ^ and confider what analogy fuggefts in anfwer 
 to the objections brought againft this evidence. And, 
 SECONDLY, I (hail endeavour to give fome account 
 of the general argument now mentioned, confiding 
 both of the direct and collateral evidence, confidered 
 as making up one argument ; this being the kind of 
 proof upon which we determine moft queftions of dif- 
 ficulty, concerning common facts, alleged to have hap- 
 pened or feeming likely to happen, efpecially queftions 
 relating to conduct. 
 
 FIRST, I fliall make fome obfervations upon the 
 direct proof of Chriftianity from miracles and prophe- 
 cy, and upon the objections alleged againft it. 
 
 I. Now the following obfervations relating to the 
 hiftorical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation 
 of Chriftianity appear to be of great weight. 
 
 i. The Old Teftament affords us the fame hiftoric- 
 al evidence of the miracles of Mofes and of the proph- 
 ets, as of the common civil hiftory of Mofes and the 
 kings of Ifrae!, or as of the affairs of the Jewiili nation. 
 And the Gojpels and the Ads afford us the fame hrf- 
 torical evidence of the miracles of Chrift and the apof- 
 tles, as of the common matters related in them. This 
 indeed could not have been affirmed by any reaibnable 
 man, if the authors of theie books, like many other 
 hiftorians, had appeared to make an entertaining man- 
 ner of writing their aim, though they had interiperfed 
 miracles in their works, at proper diftances and upon 
 proper occafions. Thefe might have animated a dull 
 relation, amufed the reader, and engaged his atten- 
 tion. And the lame account would naturally have 
 been given of them as of the ipeeches and deicriptions 
 of fuch authors ; the fame account, in a manner, as is 
 to be given why the poets make ufe of wonders and 
 prodigies. But the fads, both miraculous and natu- 
 ral, in Scripture, are related in plain unadorned narra- 
 tives, and both of them appear, in all reipeds, to (land 
 T upon 
 
282 Of the particular Evidence PART IL 
 
 upon the fame foot of hiflorical evidence. Farther 
 fome parts of Scripture, containing an account of mir- 
 acles fully fufficient to prove the truth of Chriftianity, 
 are quoted as genuine, from the age in which they 
 are faid to be written, down to the prefent ; and no- 
 other parts of them, material in the prefent queftion, 
 are omitted to be quoted in fuch manner as to afford 
 any fort of proof of their not being genuine. And as 
 common hiftory, when called in queflion in any in- 
 ftance, may often be greatly confirmed by cotempo- 
 rary or fubfequent events more known and acknowl- 
 edged, and as the common fcripture hiftory, like many 
 others, is thus confirmed, fo likewife is the miracu- 
 lous hiftory of it, not only in particular inftances, but 
 in general. For the eftablifhment of the Jewifh and 
 Chriftian religions, which were events cotemporary 
 with the miracles related to be wrought in attefta- 
 tion of both, or fubfequent to them, thefe events 
 are juft what we mould have expected, upon fuppofi- 
 tion fuch miracles were really wrought to atteft the 
 truth of thofe religions. Thefe miracles are a fatif- 
 factory account of thofe events ; of which no other 
 fatisfaftory account can be given, nor any account at 
 all but what is imaginary merely and invented. It 
 is to be added, that the moft obvious, the moft eafy 
 and direct account of this hiftory, how it came to be 
 written and to be received in the world, as a true hif- 
 tory, is, that it really is fo j nor can any other account 
 of it be eafy and direct. Now, though an account 
 not at all obvious, but very far fetched and indirect, 
 may indeed be, and often is, the true account of a mat- 
 ter,. yet it cannot be admitted on the authority of its 
 being afferted. Mere guefs, fuppofition, and poflibil- 
 ity, when oppofed to historical evidence, prove nothing 
 but that hiftorical evidence is not demonftrative. 
 
 Now the juft confequence from all this, I think, is, 
 that the fcripture hiftory in general is to be admitted 
 
 as 
 
CHAP. VII. for Ckriftianitv. 283 
 
 as an authentick genuine hiftory, till fomewhat pofi- 
 live be alleged fufficient to invalidate it. But no 
 man will deny the confequence to be, that it cannot 
 be rejected, or thrown by as of no authority, till it can 
 be proved to be of none ; even though the evidence 
 now mentioned for its authority were doubtful. This 
 evidence may be confronted by hiftorical evidence on 
 the other fide, if there be any ; or general incredibility 
 in the things related, or inconiiftence in the general 
 turn of the hiftory, would prove it to be of no author- 
 ity. But lince, upon the face of the matter, upon a 
 firft and general view, the appearance is that it is an 
 authentick hiftory, it cannot be determined to be fic- 
 titious without fome proof that it is ib. And the fol- 
 lowing obfervations, in fupport of thefe and coincident 
 with them, will greatly confirm the hiftorical evidence 
 for the truth of Chriftianity. 
 
 2. The epiftles of St. Paul, from the nature of 
 epiftolary writing, and moreover from feveral of them 
 being written, not to particular perfons, but to church- 
 es, carry in them evidences of their being genuine, 
 beyond what can be in a mere hiftorical narrative, left 
 to the world at large. This evidence, joined with that 
 which they have in common with the reft of the New 
 Teftament, feems not to leave fo much as any partic- 
 ular pretence for denying their genuinenefs, considered 
 as an ordinary matter of fad, or of criticifm ; I fay 
 -particular pretence for denying it, becaufe any fmgle 
 fa&, of fuch a kind and fuch antiquity, may have gen- 
 eral doubts raifed concerning it, from the very nature 
 of human affairs and human teftimony. There is alfo 
 to be mentioned, a diftincl; and particular evidence of 
 the genuinenefs of the epiftle chiefly referred to here, 
 the firft to the Corinthians, from the manner in which 
 it is quoted by Clemens Romanus, in an epiftle of his 
 own to that church.* Now thefe epiftles afford a 
 
 T 2 proof 
 
 * Clem. Rom. Ep. I. c, 47. 
 
284 Of the particular Evidence PART II, 
 
 proof of Chriftianity, detached from ail others, which 
 is, I think, a thing of weight, and alib a proof of a 
 nature and kind peculiar to itfelf. For, 
 
 In them the author declares, that he received the 
 Gofpel in general, and the intlitution of the Commu- 
 nion in particular, not from the reft of the apoflles, or 
 jointly together with them, but alone, from Ch rift 
 himfelf, whom he declares likewife, conformably to 
 the hiftory in the Atts, that he faw after his afcen- 
 fion.* So that the teftimony of St. 'Paul is to be 
 confidered as detached from that of the reft of the 
 apoftles. 
 
 And he declares farther, that he was endued with a 
 power of working miracles, as what was publickly 
 known to thofe very people fpeaks of frequent and 
 great variety of miraculous gifts, as then fubfifting in 
 thofe very churches to which he was writing, which he 
 was reproving for feveral irregularities, and where he 
 had perfonal oppofers ; he mentions thefe gifts inci- 
 dentally, in the moft eafy manner and without effort, 
 by way of reproof to thofe who had them, for their 
 indecent ufe of them, and by way of depreciating 
 them, in companion of moral virtues ; in Ihort, he 
 fpeaks to thefe churches, of thefe miraculous powers, 
 in the manner any one would fpeak to another of a 
 thing, which was as familiar and as much known in 
 common to them both, as any thing in the world, -f- 
 And this, as hath been obferved by ieveral perfons, is 
 lurely a very confiderable thing. 
 
 3. It is an acknowledged hiftorical fact, that 
 Chriftianity offered itfelf to the world, and demanded 
 to be received, upon the allegation, i. e. as unbeliev- 
 ers would fpeak, upon the pretence of miracles, pub- 
 lickly wrought to attefc the truth of it in fuch an age, 
 and that it was actually received by great numbers in 
 
 that 
 
 * Gal. i. iCor. xi. 23, &c. i Cor. xv. 8. 
 
 f Rom. xv. 19. i Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10 28, &c. and ch. xiii. i, 2, 3, and the 
 whole xivth ch. 2 Cor. xii. iz, 13. Gal. iii< 2, 5. 
 
CHAP. VII. for Ckriftianity. 285 
 
 that very age, and upon the profeffed belief of the re- 
 ality of thefe miracles. And Chriftianity, including 
 the difpenfation of the Old Teftament, feems diftin- 
 guifhed by this from all other religions. I mean, that 
 this does not appear to be the cafe with regard to any 
 other ; for furely it will not be fuppofed to lie upon 
 any perfon, to prove by pofitive hiftorical evidence that 
 it was not. It does in no fort appear that Mahomet - 
 anifm was firft received in the world upon the foot of 
 fuppofed miracles,* i. e. publick ones ; for, as revela- 
 tion is itfelf miraculous, all pretence to it mult necef- 
 farily imply fome pretence of miracles. And it is a 
 known fad that it was immediately, at the very firft, 
 propagated by other means. And as particular infti- 
 tutions, whether in paganifm or popery, laid to be 
 confirmed by miracles after thofe institutions had ob- 
 tained, are not to the purpofe, fo were there what 
 might be called hiftorical proof, that any of them were 
 introduced by a fuppofed divine command, believed 
 to be attefted by miracles, thefe would not be in any 
 wife parallel. For lingle things of this fort are eafy to 
 be accounted for, after parties are formed and have 
 power in their hands, and the leaders of them are in 
 veneration with the multitude, and political interefts 
 are blended with religious claims and religious diftinc- 
 tions. But before any thing of this kind, for a few 
 perfons, and thofe of the lowed rank, all at once to 
 bring over fuch great numbers to a new religion, and 
 get it to be received upon the particular evidence of 
 miracles, this is quite another thing. And I think 
 it will be allowed by any fair adverfary, that the fact 
 now mentioned, taking in all the circurnftances of it, 
 is peculiar to the Chriftian religion. However, the 
 facl iticif is allowed that Chriftianity obtained, i. e. 
 was profefied to be received in the world, upon the be- 
 lief of miracles, immediately in the age in which it is 
 
 # See the Koran, c. xiii. and c. xvii, 
 
286 Of tJie particular Evidence PART II. 
 
 faid thofe miracles were wrought ; or that this is what 
 its firft converts would have alleged, as the reafon for 
 their embracing it. Now certainly it is not to be fup- 
 pofed, that fuch numbers of men, in the mofl diftant 
 parts of the world, mould forfake the religion of their 
 country in which they had been educated, feparate 
 themfelves from their friends, particularly in their fef- 
 tival (hows and folemnities, to which the common 
 people are fo greatly addicted, and which were of a na- 
 ture to engage them much more than any thing of 
 that fort amongft us, and embrace a religion which 
 could not but expofe them to many inconveniences, 
 and indeed muft have been a giving up the world in a 
 great degree, even from the very firft, and before the 
 empire engaged in form againft them, it cannot be 
 fuppofed that fuch numbers mould make fo great, 
 and, to fay the leaft, fo inconvenient a change in their 
 whole inftitution of life, unlefs they were really con- 
 vinced of the truth of thofe miracles, upon the knowl- 
 edge or belief of which they profefled to make it. 
 And it will, I fuppofe, readily be acknowledged, that 
 the generality of the firft converts to Chriftianity muft 
 have believed them ; that as by becoming Chriftians 
 they declared to the world they were fatisfied of the 
 truth of thofe miracles, fo this declaration was to be 
 credited. And this their teftimony is the fame kind 
 of evidence for thofe miracles as if they had put it in 
 writing, and thefe writings had come down to us. 
 And it is real evidence, becaufe it is of facts which 
 they had capacity and full opportunity to inform 
 themfelves of. It is alfo diftinS from the direct or 
 exprefs hiftorical evidence, though it is of the fame 
 kind ' 3 and it would be allowed to be diftind in all 
 cafes. For were a fad exprefsly related by one or 
 more ancient hiftorians, and difputed in after ages ; 
 that this fad is acknowledged to have been believed 
 by great numbers of the age in which the hiftorian 
 
 fays 
 
CHAP. VII. for Ckrijlianiiy. 287 
 
 fays it was done, would be allowed an additional proof 
 of fuch fad:, quite diftincl from the exprefs teftimony 
 of the hiftorian. The credulity of mankind is ac- 
 knowledged, and the fufpicions of mankind ought to 
 be acknowledged too, and their backwardnefs even to 
 believe, and greater ftill to praclife, what makes againft 
 their intereft. And it muft particularly be remember- 
 ed, that education, and prejudice, and authority, were 
 againft Chriftianity, in the age I am fpeaking of. So 
 that the immediate converfion of fuch numbers, is a 
 real prefumption of fome^hat more than human in 
 this matter ; I fay prefumption, for it is not alleged as 
 a proof alone and by it (elf. Nor need any one of the 
 things mentioned in this chapter be confidered as a 
 proof by itfelf; and yet all of them together may be 
 one of the ftrongeft. 
 
 Upon the whole as there is large hiftorical evi- 
 dence, both direct and circumftantial, of miracles 
 wrought in atteflation of Chriftianity, collected by 
 thofe who have writ upon the fubjecl:, it lies upon 
 unbelievers to (hew, why this evidence is not to be 
 credited. This way of fpeaking is, I think, juft, and 
 what perfons who write in defence of religion naturally 
 fall into. Yet, in a matter of fuch unipeakable im- 
 portance, the proper queftion is, not whom it lies up- 
 on, according to the rules of argument, to maintain 
 or confute objections, but whether there really are any 
 againft this evidence, fufficient in reafon to deftroy the 
 credit of it. However, unbelievers feem to take upon 
 them the part of mewing that there are. 
 
 They allege, that numberlefs enthufiaftick people, 
 in different ages and countries, expofe themielves to 
 the fame difficulties which the primitive Chriftians 
 did, and are ready to give up their lives for the moft 
 idle follies imaginable. But it is not very clear to what 
 purpofe this objection is brought. For every one 
 iurely, in every cafe, muft diftinguifh between opinions 
 
 and 
 
288 Of the particular Evidence PART II. 
 
 and fads. And though teflimony is no proof of en- 
 thufiaftick opinions, or of any opinions at all, yet it is 
 allowed in all other cafes to be a proof of fads. And 
 a perfon's laying down his life in atteflation of fads or 
 of opinions, is the ftrongefh proof of his believing them. 
 And if the apoftles and their cotemporaries did believe 
 the fads, in atteflation of which they expofed them- 
 felves to fufferings and death, this their belief, or rather 
 knowledge, mull be a proof of thofe fads ; for they 
 were fuch as came under the obfervation of their fenfes. 
 And though it is not of equal weight, yet it is of weight 
 that the martyrs of the next age, notwithflanding they 
 were not eye witnerTes of thofe fads, as were the apof- 
 tles and their cotemporaries, had, however, full op- 
 portunity to inform themfelves whether they were true 
 or not, and gave equal proof of their believing them 
 to be true. 
 
 But enthufiafm, it is faid, greatly weakens the evi- 
 dence of teitimony even for fads, in matters relating 
 to religion ; fome feem to think it totally and abfo- 
 lutely deilroys the evidence of teflimony upon this 
 fubjed. And indeed the powers of enthufiafm, and 
 of difeafes too which operate in a like manner, are very 
 xvonderful in particular inflances. But if great num- 
 bers of men, not appearing in any peculiar degree weak, 
 nor under any peculiar fufpicion of negligence, affirm 
 that they faw and heard fuch things plainly with their 
 eyes and their ears, and are admitted to be in earneft, 
 fuch teflimony is evidence of the ftrongeft kind we can 
 have for any matter of fad. Yet poiiibly it may be 
 overcome, ftrong as it is, by incredibility in the things 
 thus attefled, or by contrary teflimony. And in an 
 inflance where one thought it was ib overcome, it 
 might be jufl to confider, how far fuch evidence could 
 be accounted for by enthufiafm ; for it ieems as if 
 no other imaginable account were to be given of it. 
 But until fuch incredibility be fhewn, or contrary tefli- 
 mony 
 
CHAP. VII. for Chrijliamty. 289 
 
 mony produced, it cannot furely be expected, that fo 
 far fetched, fo indirect and wonderful an account of 
 fuch teftimony as that of enthufiafm muft be ; an ac- 
 count fo ftrange, that the generality of mankind can 
 fcarce be made to imderftand what is meant by it ; it 
 cannot, I fay, be expected that fuch account will be 
 admitted of fuch evidence, when there is this direct, 
 eafy and obvious account of it, that people really faw 
 and heard a thing not incredible, which they affirm 
 fmcerely and with full afiurance they did fee and hear. 
 Granting then that enthufiafm is not (ftrictly fpeak- 
 ing) an abfurd but a poffible account of fuch tefti- 
 mony, it is manifeft that the very mention of it goes 
 upon the previous fuppofition that the things fo at~- 
 tefted are incredible, and therefore need not be confid- 
 ered until they are (hewn to be fo. Much lefs need it 
 be confidered after the contrary has been proved. 
 And I think it has been proved to full fatisfaction, 
 that there is no incredibility in a revelation in general, 
 or in fuch an one as the Chriftian in particular. 
 However, as religion is fiippofed peculiarly liable to 
 enthufiafm, it mayjufl be oblerved, that prejudices 
 almoft without number and without name, romance, 
 affectation, humour, a defire to engage attention or 
 to furprize, the party fpirit, cuftom, little competi- 
 tions, unaccountable likings and diflikings, thefe in- 
 fluence men ftrongly in common matters. And as 
 thefe prejudices are often fcarce known or reflected 
 upon by the perfons themfelves who are influenced by 
 them, they are to be confidered as influences of a like 
 kind to enthufiafm. Yet human teftimony in com- 
 mon matters is naturally and juftly believed notwith- 
 {landing. 
 
 It is intimated farther, in a more refined way of ob- 
 fervation, that though it fhould be proved that the 
 apoftles and firit Chriftians could not, in fome re- 
 fpedts, be deceived themfelves, and in other refpects 
 
 cannot 
 
290 Of the particular Evidence PART II. 
 
 cannot be thought to have intended to irnpofe upon 
 the world, yet it will not follow that their general 
 teftimony is to be believed, though truly handed down 
 to us ; becaufe they might ftill in part, i.e. in other re- 
 fpects, be deceived themfelves, and in part alfo defign- 
 edly impofe upon others ; which, it is added, is a thing 
 very credible, from that mixture of real enthufiafm 
 and real knavery to be met with in the fame characters, 
 And I muil confefs I think the matter of fad, con- 
 tained in this obfervation upon mankind, is not to be 
 denied ; and that fomewhat very much a-kin to it, is 
 often fuppofed in Scripture as a very common cafe, 
 and moil feverely reproved. But it were to have been 
 expected, that perfons capable of applying this obfer- 
 vation as applied in the objection, might alfo fre- 
 quently have met with the like mixed character, in in- 
 ftances where religion was quite out of the cafe. The 
 thing plainly is, that mankind are naturally endued 
 with reafon, or a capacity of diftinguifhing between 
 truth and falfehood ; and as naturally they are endued 
 with veracity, or a regard to truth in what they fay ; 
 but from many occafions, they are liable to be preju- 
 diced and biafled and deceived themfelves, and capa- 
 ble of intending to deceive others, in every different 
 degree infomuch that as we are all liable to be de- 
 ceived by prejudice, fo likewife it feems to be not an 
 uncommon thing for perfons, who from their regard 
 to truth would not invent a lie entirely without any 
 foundation at all, to propagate it with heightening 
 circumftances, after it is once invented and fet agoing. 
 And others,, though they would not propagate a lie, 
 yet, which is a lower degree of falfehood, will let it pafs 
 without contradiction. But notwithstanding all this, 
 human teftimony remains ftill a natural ground of af- 
 fent, and this alTent a natural principle of action. 
 It is objected farther, that however it has happened, 
 is, that mankind have, in different ages, been 
 
 ftrangely 
 
CHAP. VII. for Chrjftianity. 291 
 
 ftrangely deluded with pretences to miracles and won- 
 ders. But it is by no means to be admitted that they 
 have been oftener, or are at all more liable to be de- 
 ceived by thefe pretences than by others. 
 
 It is added, that there is a very considerable degree 
 of hiflorical evidence for miracles, which are on all 
 hands acknowledged to be fabulous. But fuppofe 
 there were even the like historical evidence for thele, 
 to what there is for thofe alleged in proof of Chrifli- 
 anity, which yet is in no wife allowed, but iuppofe 
 this, the conlequence would not be, that the evi- 
 dence of the latter is not to be admitted. Nor is 
 there a man in the world who, in common cafes, would 
 conclude thus. For what would fuch a conclufion 
 really amount to but this, that evidence confuted by 
 contrary evidence, or any way overbalanced, deflroys 
 the credibility of other evidence, neither confuted nor 
 overbalanced ? To argue that becauic there is, if there 
 were, like evidence from teftirnony for miracles ac- 
 knowledged falfe, as for thofc in atteftation of Chrift- 
 ianity, therefore the evidence in the latter cafe is not 
 to be credited, this is the lame as to argue, that if 
 two men of equally good reputation had given evi- 
 dence in different cafes no way connected, and one of 
 them had been convicted of perjury, this confuted the 
 teilimony of the other. 
 
 Upon the whole then, the general obfervation that 
 human creatures are fo liable to be deceived, from en- 
 thufiafm in religion, and principles equivalent to en- 
 thufiafm in common matters, and in both from neg- 
 ligence ; and that they are fo capable of difhoneftly 
 endeavouring to deceive others, this does indeed 
 weaken the evidence of tefhirrxony in all cafes, but does 
 not deftroy it in any. And theie things will appear, 
 to different men, to weaken the evidence of tefhimony 
 in different degrees ; in degrees proportionable to the 
 obfervations they have made, or the notions they have 
 
 any 
 
292 Of the particular Evidence PART II. 
 
 any way taken up, concerning the weaknefs and neg- 
 ligence and difhonefty of mankind, or concerning the 
 powers of enthufiafm, and prejudices equivalent to it. 
 But it feems to me that people do not know what they 
 fay, who affirm thefe things to deftroy the evidence 
 from teilimony, which we have of the truth of Chrift- 
 ianity. Nothing can deftroy the evidence of teftimony 
 in any cafe, but a proof or probability that perfons 
 are not competent judges of the fats to which they 
 give teftimony, or that they are actually under fome 
 indirect influence in giving it in fuch particular cafe. 
 Until this be made out, the natural laws of human 
 actions require that teftimony be admitted. It can 
 never be fufficient to overthrow dired hiftorical evi- 
 dence, indolently to fay, that there are fo many princi- 
 ples from whence men are liable to be deceived them- 
 ielves, and difpofed to deceive others, efpecially in 
 matters of religion, that one knows not what to believe. 
 And it is furprizing perfons can help reflecting, that 
 this very manner of fpeaking fuppofes they are not 
 fatisfied that there is nothing in the evidence of which 
 they fpeak thus ; or that they can avoid obferving, if 
 they do make this reflection, that it is on fuch a fub- 
 je6t a very material one.* 
 
 And over againft all thefe objections is to be fet the 
 importance of Chriftianity, as what muft have engaged 
 the attention of its firft converts, fo as to have render- 
 ed them lefs liable to be deceived from carelefTnefs than 
 they would in common matters ; and likewife the 
 ftrong obligations to veracity which their religion laid 
 them under ; fo that the firft and moft obvious pre- 
 fumption is, that they could not be deceived them- 
 felves, nor would deceive others. And this pre fump- 
 tion in this degree is peculiar to the teftimony we have 
 been confidering. 
 
 In 
 
 * See the foregoing chapter, 
 
CHAP. VII. for Ck'iftianiiy . 293 
 
 In argument, ailertions are nothing in themfelves, 
 and have an air of pofitivenefs which fometimes is 
 not very eafy ; yet they are necefTary, and neceflary 
 to be repeated, in order to connect a diicourie, and 
 diftindlv to lay before the view of the reader what is 
 propofed to be proved, and what is left as proved. 
 Now the conclufion from the foregoing observations 
 
 O O 
 
 is, I think, beyond all doubt, this that unbelievers 
 muft be forced to admit the external evidence for 
 Chriftianity, i. e. the proof of miracles wrought to at- 
 teft it, to be of real weight and very conficlerable, 
 though they cannot allow it to be furncient to con- 
 vince them of the reality of thofe miracles. And as 
 they muft in all reafon admit this, fo it feems to me, 
 that upon confideration they would in facl admit it ; 
 thofe of them, I mean, who know any thing at all of 
 the matter : in like manner as perfons, in many cafes, 
 own they fee ftrong evidence from teftimony for the 
 truth of things, which yet they cannot be convinced 
 are true cafes, fuppofe, where there is contrary tefti- 
 mony, or things which they think, whether with or 
 without reafon, to be incredible. But there is no tef- 
 timony contrary to that which we have been cdnfider- 
 ing ; and it has been fully proved that there is no in- 
 credibility in Chriftianity in general, or in any part 
 of it. 
 
 II. As to the evidence for Chriftianity from proph- 
 ecy, I (hall only make fome few general obfervatioris 
 which are fuggefted by the analogy of nature, i. e. by 
 the acknowledged natural rules of judging in com- 
 mon matters, concerning evidence of a like kind to 
 this from prophc- 
 
 i. The obfcurity or unintelligiblenefs of one part 
 of a prophecy does not, in any degree, invalidate the 
 proof of forefight, arifmg from the appearing comple- 
 tion of thofe other parts which are underftood. For 
 the cafe is evidently the fame as if thofe parts, which 
 
 arc 
 
294 Of tf ie particular Evidence P A R T II . 
 
 are not underftood, were loft or not written at all, or 
 written in an unknown tongue. Whether this obferva- 
 tion be commonly attended to or not, it is fo evident, 
 that one can fcarce bring one's felf to fet down an in- 
 ftance in common matters to exemplify it. How- 
 ever, fuppofe a writing, partly in cypher, and partly in 
 plain words at length, and that in the part one un- 
 derftood there appeared mention of feveral known 
 facts, it would never come into any man's thoughts to 
 imagine, that if he underftood the whole, perhaps he 
 might find that thofe fads were not in reality known 
 by the writer. Indeed, both in this example and 
 the thing intended to be exemplified by it, our not 
 underftanding the whole (the whole fuppofe of a 
 fcntence or a paragraph) might fometimes occallon 
 a doubt, whether one underftood the literal meaning 
 of fuch a part ; but this comes under another con- 
 fideration. 
 
 For the fame reafon, though a man mould be in- 
 capable, for want of learning or opportunities of in- 
 quiry, or from not having turned his ftudies this way, 
 even fo much as to judge, whether particular prophe- 
 cies have been throughout completely fulfilled, yet 
 he may fee in general, that they have been fulfilled to 
 fuch a degree as, upon very good ground, to be con- 
 vinced of forefight more than human in fuch prophe- 
 cies, and of fuch events being intended by them. For 
 the fame reafon alfo, though by means of the deficien- 
 cies in civil hiftory, and the different accounts of hif- 
 torians, the moft learned mould not be able to make 
 out to fatisfadion, that fuch parts of the prophetick 
 hiftory have been minutely and throughout fulfilled, 
 yet a very ftrong proof of forefight may arife from that 
 general completion of them which is made out ; as^ 
 much proof of forefight, perhaps, as the Giver of 
 prophecy intended mould ever be afforded by fuch 
 parts of prophecy. 
 
 2. A 
 
CHAP. VII. for Chrijlianity. 295 
 
 2. A long feries of prophecy being applicable to 
 fuch and fuch events, is itfelf a proof that it was in- 
 tended of them ; as the rules by which we naturally 
 judge and determine in common cafes parallel to this 
 will (hew. This obfervation I make in anfwer to the 
 common objection againft the application of the 
 prophecies, that confidering each of them diftin&ly by 
 itfelf, it does not at all appear, that they were intend- 
 ed of thofe particular events to which they are appli- 
 ed by Chriftians ; and therefore it is to be fuppofed 
 that, if they meant any thing, they were intended of 
 other events unknown to us, and not of thefe at all. 
 
 Now there are two kinds of writing which bear a 
 great refemblance to prophecy, with refpecl: to the 
 matter before us ; the mythological, and the fatirical, 
 where the fatire is to a certain degree concealed. And 
 a man might be affured, that he underftood what an 
 author intended by a fable or parable, related without 
 any application or moral, merely from feeing it to be 
 eafily capable of fuch application, and that fuch a 
 moral might naturally be deduced from it. And he 
 might be fully affured, that fuch perfons and events 
 were intended in a fatirical writing, merely from its be- 
 ing applicable to them. And, agreeably to the lafl 
 obfervation, he might be in a good meafure fatisfied 
 of it, though he were not enough informed in affairs, 
 or in the ftory of fuch perfons, to underftand half the 
 fatire. For, his fatisfa&ion that he underftood the 
 meaning, the intended meaning of thefe writings, 
 would be greater or lefs, in proportion as he faw the 
 general turn of them to be capable of fuch application, 
 and in proportion to the number of particular things 
 capable of it. And thus, if a long feries of prophecy 
 is applicable to the prefent ftate of the church, and to 
 the political fituations of the kingdoms of the world, 
 iome thoufand years after thefe prophecies were deliv- 
 ered, and a long feries of prophecy delivered before 
 
 the 
 
296 Of the particular Evidence PART IL 
 
 the coming of Chrift is applicable to him,- thele 
 things are in themfelves a proof, that the prophetick 
 hiftory was intended of him, and of thofe events ; in 
 proportion as the general turn of it is capable of fiich 
 application, and to the number and variety of partic- 
 ular prophecies capable of it. And, though in all jufi 
 way of confederation, the appearing completion of 
 prophecies is to be allowed to be thus explanatory of, 
 and to determine their meaning, yet it is to be re- 
 membered farther, that the ancient Jews applied the 
 prophecies to a Meffiah before his coming, in much 
 the fame manner as Chriftians do now ; and that the 
 primitive Chriftians interpreted the prophecies refpect- 
 mg the ftate of the church and of the world in the laft 
 ages, ih the fenfe which the event ieems to confirm 
 and verify. And from theie things it may be made 
 appear, 
 
 3. That the mewing even to a high probability, if 
 that could be, that the prophets thought of fome 
 other events in fuch and fuch predictions, and not 
 thofe at all which Chriftians allege to be completions 
 of thofe predictions ; or that fuch and fuch prophecies 
 are capable of being applied to other events, than thofe 
 to which Chriftians apply them, that this would not 
 confute or deftroy the force of the argument from 
 prophecy, even with regard to thofe very inftances. 
 For, obferve how this matter really is. If one knew 
 fuch a perfon to be the fole author of fuch a book, 
 and was certainly allured, or fatisfied to any degree, 
 that one knew the whole of what he intended in it, 
 one mould be affured or fatisfied to fuch degree, that 
 one knew the whole meaning of that book '- y for the 
 meaning of a book is nothing but the meaning of the 
 author. But if one knew a perfon to have compiled 
 a book out of memoirs, which he received from anoth- 
 er of vaftly fuperior knowledge in the fubject of it, 
 especially if it were a book full of great intricacies and 
 
 difficulties, 
 
CHAP. VII. for Chriftianity. 297 
 
 difficulties) it would in no wife follow that one knew 
 the whole meaning of the book, from knowing the 
 whole meaning of the compiler ; for the original mem- 
 oirs, i. e. the author of them, might have, and there 
 would be no degree of prefumption in many cafes 
 againft fuppofing him to have, fome farther meaning 
 than the compiler faw. To fay then that the Scrip- 
 tures, and the things contained in them, can have no 
 other or farther meaning than thofe perfons thought 
 or had, who firft recited or wrote them, is evidently 
 faying that thofe perfons were the original, proper, and 
 fole authors of thofe books, i. e. that they are not in- 
 fpired ; which is abfurd, whilft the authority of thefe 
 books is under examination, i. e. until you have de*- 
 termined they are of no divine authority at all. Un- 
 til this be determined, it muft in ail reafon be fuppof- 
 ed, not indeed that they have, for this is taking for 
 granted that they are infpired, but that they may 
 have fome farther meaning than what the compilers 
 faw or underftood. And upon this fuppofition it is 
 fuppofable alfo, that this farther meaning may be ful- 
 filled. Now events correfponding to prophecies, in- 
 terpreted in a different meaning from that in which 
 the prophets are iuppofed to have underftood them, 
 this affords in a manner the fame proof, that this dif- 
 ferent fenfe was originally intended, as it would have 
 afforded if the prophets had not underftood their pre- 
 dictions in the fenfe it is fuppofed they did ; becaufe 
 there is no prefumption of their fenfe of them being 
 the whole fenfe of them. And it has been already 
 Ihewn, that the apparent completions of prophecy 
 muft be allowed to be explanatory of its meaning. 
 So that the queftion is, whether a feries of prophecy 
 has been fulfilled, in a natural or proper, i. e. in any- 
 real fenfe of the words of it. For fuch completion is 
 equally a proof of forelight more than human, wheth- 
 er the prophets are or are not fuppofed to have under- 
 U ftood 
 
198 Of the particular Evidence PART IL 
 
 flood it in a different fenfe. I fay, fuppofed -, for, 
 though I think it clear that the prophets did not un- 
 derftand the full meaning of their predictions, it is 
 another queftion how far they thought they did, and 
 in what fenfe they underftood them. 
 
 Hence may be feen to how little purpofe thofe per- 
 fons bufy themfelves* who endeavour to prove that the 
 prophetick hiftory is applicable to events of the age 
 in which it was written, or of ages before it. Indeed 
 to have proved this before there was any appearance 
 of a farther completion of it, might have anfwered 
 fome purpofe ; for it might have prevented the ex- 
 pectation of any mch farther completion . Thus, could 
 Porphyry have fhewn that fome principal parts of the 
 book of Daniel, for inftanee, the feventh verfe of the 
 feventh chapter, which the Chriflians interpreted of 
 the latter ages, was applicable to events which hap- 
 pened before or about the age otAntiochusEpipkanes, 
 this might have prevented them from expecting any 
 farther completion of it. And, unlefs there was then, 
 as I think there muft have been, external evidence con- 
 cerning that book more than is come down to us, 
 fuch a difcovery might have been a ftumbling block 
 in the way of Chriftianity itfelf ; confidering the au- 
 thority which our Saviour has given to the book of 
 Daniel, and how much the general fcheme of Chrift- 
 ianity prefuppofes the truth of it. But even this 
 difcovery, had there been any fuch,* would be of ve- 
 ry little weight .with reafonable men. Now, this paf- 
 fage, thus applicable to events before the age of Por- 
 p/iyry, appears to be applicable alfo to events which 
 iucceeded the diflblution of the Roman empire. I 
 mention this, not at all as intending to infmuate, that 
 
 the 
 
 * It appears that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in this way,. 
 For Jerom on the place fays, Duas po/ienores beftias in uno MaceJonum regno 
 fonit. And as to the ten kings, Dcc'.m reges enumerat, qui fuerunt fxvijjinii .- 
 ipfofque reges nan unius ponit regni, verbi gratia^ Macedonia, Syria, fipa ft 
 sEgyptia ; fed de diverfn regnis unum efficit regnum ordinem. And in this way of 
 interpretation any thing may be made of any thing. 
 
CHAP, VII. for Ghriftianity. ' 299 
 
 the divifion of this empire into ten parts, for it plainly 
 was divided into about that number, were, alone and 
 by itfelf, of any moment in verifying the prophetick 
 hiftory ; but only as an example of the thing I am 
 {peaking of. And thus upon the whole, the matter 
 of inquiry evidently mud be, as above put, Whether 
 the prophecies are applicable to Chrirc, and to the 
 prefent ftate of the world and of the church, appli- 
 cable in iuch a degree as to imply fore fight ; not 
 whether they are capable of any other application, 
 though 1 know no pretence for faying the general turn 
 of them is capable of any other. 
 
 Thefe obfervations are, 1 think, juft, and the evi- 
 dence referred to in them real, though there may be 
 people who will not accept of fuch imperfect informa- 
 tion from Scripture. Some too have not integrity and 
 regard enough to truth, to attend to evidence which 
 keeps -the mind in doubt, perhaps perplexity, and 
 which is much of a different fort from what they ex- 
 pected. And it plainly requires a degree of modefly 
 and fairnefs, beyond what every one has, for a man to 
 fay, not to the world, but to himfelf, that there is a 
 real appearance of fomewhat of great weight in this 
 matter, though he is not able thoroughly to fatisfy 
 himfelf about it ; but it mall have its influence upon 
 him, in proportion to its appearing reality and weight. 
 It is much more eafy, and more falls in with the neg- 
 ligence, prefumption and wilfulnefs of the generality, 
 to determine at once, with a decifive air, There is 
 nothing in it. The prejudices ariling from that abfo- 
 lute contempt and fcorn with which this evidence is 
 treated in the world, I do not mention. For 'what 
 indeed can be faid to perfons, who are weak enough 
 in their underflanding to think this any prefumption 
 againft it, or if they do not, are yet weak enough in 
 their temper to be influenced by fuch prejudices, up- 
 on fuch a fubjecl ? 
 
 U ^ I mall 
 
300 , Of the particular Evidence PART II. 
 
 I (hall no\v, SECONDLY, endeavour to give feme 
 account of the general argument for the truth of 
 Chriftianity, confifling both of the direft and circum- 
 ftantial evidence, confidered as making tip one argu- 
 ment. Indeed to ftate and examine this argument 
 fully, would be a work much beyond the compafs of 
 this whole treatife ; nor is fo much as a proper abridg- 
 ment of it to be expedted here. Yet the prefent fiib- 
 jeft requires to have fome brief account of it given. 
 For it is the kind of evidence, upon which moft quef- 
 tions of difficulty in common pra&ice are determined ; 
 evidence anting from various coincidences which fup- 
 port and confirm each other, and in this manner prove, 
 with more or lets certainty, the point under confider- 
 ation. And I choofe to do it alfo : Firfl, becaufe it 
 feems to be of the greatefl importance, and not duly 
 attended to by every one, that the proof of revelation 
 is, not ibme dire and exprefs things only, but a great 
 variety of circumftantial things alfo ; and that though 
 each of tiefe direct and circumftantial things is in- 
 deed to be considered feperately, yet they are after- 
 wards to be joined together ; for that the proper force 
 of the evidence confifts in the refult of thofe feveral 
 things, confidered in their refpefts to each other, and 
 united into one view. And in the next place, becaufe 
 it feems to me, that the matters of fad here fet down, 
 which are acknowledged by unjjjelievers, mud be ac- 
 knowledged by them alfo to contain together a de- 
 gree of evidence of great weight, if they could be 
 Drought to lay thefe ieveral things before themfeives 
 diftindiy, and then with attention confider them to- 
 gether, inftead of that curfory thought of them to 
 which we are familiarized. For being familiarized 
 to the curfory thought of things, as really hinders 
 the weight of them from being feer^ as from having 
 its due influence upon pradice. 
 
 The 
 
CH A P . VII. for Chriflianity* 3 o I 
 
 The thing afTerted, and the truth of xvhich is to be 
 inquired into, is this, that over and above our reafon 
 and affedtions, which God has given us for the infor- 
 mation of our judgment and the conduct of our lives, 
 he has alfo, by external revelation, given us an ac- 
 count of himfelf and his moral government over the 
 world, implying a future (late of rewards and punifh- 
 ments ; i. e. hath revealed the fyftein of natural relig- 
 ion ; for natural religion may be externally* revealed 
 by God, as the ignorant may be taught it by mankind 
 their fellow creatures that God, I fay, has given 
 us the evidence of revelation, as well as the evidence 
 of reafon, to afcertain this moral fyftem ; together 
 with an account of a particular difpcnfation of Provi* 
 dence, which reafon could no way have dHcovered, and 
 a particular infliturion of religion founded on it, for 
 the recovery of mankind out of their prefent wretch- 
 ed condition, and railing them to the perfection and 
 final bappinefs of their nature. 
 
 This revelation, whether real or fuppofed, may be 
 confidered as wholly hi ftcrical. For prophecy is noth- 
 ing but the hiflory of events before they come to pafs - 9 
 doctrines alfo are matters of fact ; and precepts come 
 under the fame notion. And the general defign of 
 Scripture, which contains in it this revelation, thus 
 confidered as hiftorical, may be faid to be to give us 
 an account of the world, in this one (ingle view, ns 
 God's world ; by which it appears efientially diitb- 
 guifhed from all other books, fo far as I have found, 
 except fuch as are copied from it. It begins with an 
 account of God's creation of the world, in order to af- 
 certain and diftinguim from ail others who is the ob- 
 ject of our worfliip, by v. hat he has done ; in order to 
 afcertain who he is, concerning whofe providence, 
 commands, promifes and threatcnings, this facred book 
 all along treats 5 the Maker and Proprietor of the 
 
 world, 
 
 * P. 193, &c. 
 
302 Of the particular Evidence PART II. 
 
 world, he whofe creatures we are, the God of nature ; 
 in order likewife to diftinguifh him from the idols of 
 the nations, which are either imaginary beings, i. e. no 
 beings at all, or elfe part of that creation, the hiftor- 
 ical relation of which is here given. And St. John, 
 not improbably with an eye to this Mofaick account 
 of the creation, begins his Gofpel with an account of 
 our Saviour's preexiftence, and that all things were 
 made by him, and without him was not any thing made 
 that was made ;* agreeably to the doctrine of St. Pau/> 
 that God created all things by Jefus Chrift.jf This be- 
 ing premiied, the Scripture, taken together, feems to 
 profefs to contain a kind of an abridgment of the hif- 
 tory of the world, in the view juft now mentioned ; that 
 is, a general account of the condition of religion and 
 its profeffors, during the continuance of that apoftacy 
 from God, and ftate of wickednefs, which it every 
 where fuppofes the world to lie in. And this account 
 of the ftate of religion carries with it fome brief ac- 
 count of the political ftate of things, as religion is af- 
 fected by it. Revelation indeed confiders the com- 
 mon affairs of this world, and what is going on in it, 
 as a mere fcene of diffraction, and cannot be fuppofed 
 to concern itfelf with foretelling at what time Rome 
 or Babylon or Greece, or any particular place, mould 
 be the moft contpicuous feat of that tyranny and dil- 
 iblutenefs, which all places equally afpire to be ; can- 
 not, I lay, be fuppofed to give any account of this wild 
 fcene for its own fake. But it feems to contain fome 
 very general account of the chief governments of the 
 world, as the general ftate of religion has been, is, or 
 fhall be, affected by them, from the firft tranfgreflion, 
 and during the whole interval, of the world's continu- 
 ing in its preient ftate, to a certain future period, ipok- 
 en of both in the Old and New Teftament, very dif- 
 tinctly and in great variety of expreffion : The times of 
 
 the 
 
 * Joh. i. 3. f Eph. iii. 9. 
 
CHAP. VII. . for Chrijlianity. 303 
 
 the reflitution of all things : * when the myftery of God 
 ftiall be finijhed, as he hath declared to his fervants the 
 prophets : -f- when the God of heaven fhall fet up a king- 
 dom * which Jhall never be dejlroyed : and the kingdom 
 jjiall not be left to other people, J as it is reprefented to be 
 during this apoftacy, \>\fr judgment jhall be given to the 
 faints^ and they Jhall reign : || and the kingdom and do- 
 minion, and the greatnefs of the kingdom under the whole 
 heaven, JJiall be given to the people of the faints of the 
 Mojl HigLy 
 
 Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would re- 
 mark how great a length of time the whole relation 
 takes up, near fix thoufand years of which are pafl ; 
 and how great a variety of things it treats of; the nat- 
 ural and moral fyflem or hiflory of the world, in^ 
 eluding the time when it was formed, all contained 
 in the very firft book, and evidently written in a rude 
 and unlearned age ; and in fubfequent books, the va- 
 rious common and prophetick hiftory, and the partic- 
 ular difpenfation of Chriftianity. Now all this to- 
 gether gives the largeft (cope for criticifm ; and for 
 confutation of what is capable of being confuted, ei- 
 ther from reafon, or from common hiftory, or from 
 any inconfiftence in its feveral parts. And it is a thing 
 which deferves, I think, to be mentioned, that where- 
 as fome imagine the fuppofed doubtfulnefs of the evi- 
 dence for revelation implies a pofitive argument that 
 it is not true, it appears, on the contrary, to imply a 
 poiitive argument that it is true. For, . could any 
 common relation, of fuch antiquity, extent and variety 
 (for in thefe things the ftrefs of what I am now obferv- 
 ing lies) be propofed to the examination of the world ; 
 that it could not, in an age of knowledge and liberty, 
 be confuted, or (hewn to have nothing in it, to the fat- 
 isfaclion of realbnable men, this would be thought a 
 ftrong prefumptive proof of its truth. And indeed it 
 
 muft 
 
 * Adts iii. 41. f Rev. x. 7< 
 
 J Dan. ii. Dan. vii. zz. jj Rev, ^[ Dan. vii. 
 
304 Of the particular Evidence PART II. 
 
 muft be a proof of it, juft in proportion to the proba- 
 bility, that if it were falfe, it might be (hewn to be fo ; 
 and this, I think, is fcarce pretended to be fhewn but 
 upon principles and in ways of arguing, which have 
 been clearly obviated.* Nor does it at all appear, that 
 any fet of men who believe natural religion, are of the 
 opinion that Chriftianity has been thus confuted. But 
 to proceed : 
 
 Together with the moral fyflem of the. world, the 
 Old Teftament contains a chronological account of 
 the beginning of it, and from thence an unbroken 
 genealogy of mankind for many ages before common 
 hifbory begins ; and carried on as much farther, as to 
 make up a continued thread of hiftory of the length 
 of between three and four thoufand years. It con- 
 tains an account of God's making a covenant with a 
 particular nation, that they mould be his people, and 
 he would be their God, in a peculiar fenfe ; cf his often 
 interpofmg miraculoufly in their affairs ; giving them 
 the promiTe, and long after the pofTeifton, of a partic- 
 ular country ; alluring them of the greateil national 
 profperity in it, if they would worlhip him, in oppo- 
 lition to the idols which the reft of the world worfhip-i 
 ped, and obey his commands, and threatening them 
 with unexampled punifhments, if they difobeyed.him, 
 and fell into the general idolatry ; infomuch that this 
 one nation mould continue to be the obfervation and 
 the wonder of all the world. It declares particularly, 
 that God 'would fcatter them among all people, from one end 
 of the earth unto the other ; but that when they flioidd 
 return unto the Lord their God, he would have compaf- 
 fan upon them, and gather them from all the nations 
 whither he had featured them ; \k&\.IfraelJJioiddbeJaved 
 in the Lord with an ever lofting falvation, and not be 
 afnamed or confounded world without end. And as fome 
 of thefe proinifes are conditional, others are as abfo- 
 
 lufe 
 
 *'Ch. ii, iii, &c. 
 
CHAP. VII. far Chrijlianity. 305 
 
 lute as any thing can be expreffed ; that the time 
 Ihould come, when the people ftiould be all righteous^ 
 and inherit the land for ever ; that though God would 
 make a full end of all nations whither he had fcattered 
 theni) yet would he not make a full end of them ; that he 
 would bring again the captivity of his people Ifrael, and 
 plant them upon their land^ and they ftiould he no more 
 pulled up out of their land ; that the feed of Ifrael fliould 
 not ceafe from being a nation for ever* It foretells, 
 that God would raife them up a particular perfon, in 
 whom all his promifes fhould finally be fulfilled ; the 
 Median, who fhould be in an high and eminent fenfej 
 their anointed Prince and Saviour. This was fore- 
 told in fuch a manner, as railed a general expectation 
 of fuch a perfon in the nation, as appears from the 
 New Teftament, and is an acknowledged fact ; an ex- 
 pedtation of his coming at fuch a particular time, be- 
 fore any one appeared claiming to be that perfon, and 
 when there was no ground for fuch an expectation, 
 but from the prophecies ; which expectation therefore 
 muft in all reafon be prefumed to be explanatory of 
 ihofe prophecies, if there were any doubt about their 
 meaning. It feems moreover to foretell, that this 
 perfon ihould be rejected by that nation, to whom 
 he had been fo long promifed, and though he was fo 
 much defired by them.+ And it exprefsly foretells, 
 that he mould be the Saviour of the Gentiles ; and 
 even that the completion of the fcheme, contained 
 in this book, and then begun, and in its progrefs, 
 fhoukl be fomewhat fo great, that, in companion 
 with it, the reiteration of the Jews alone would be but 
 of fmall account. // is a light thing that thoujl:<\ 
 be my fervzr.t to raife up the tribes of Jacob, and to re* 
 Jlore the preferred of Ifrael : I will a/fa give thee for a 
 light to the Gentile^ that thou may eft be for falvattori unto 
 
 tfa 
 
 * Deut. xxviii. 64. Ch. xxx. z, 3. Ifai. x!v. 17. Ch. lx. 11. Jer. xxx. 
 xi. Cn. xlvi. 28. Amos ix. 15. Jer. xxxi. 36. 
 
 f Ifai. viii. 14, 15. Ch. xlix. 5. Ch. liii. Mai. i. 10, u. and Ch. iii. 
 
3 o 6 Of the particular Evidence PART II. 
 
 the end of the earth. And, In the lafl days, the moun- 
 tain of the Lord's houfe Jhall be ejlablijhed in the top of 
 the mountains , an d fliall be exalted above the hills ; and 
 
 all nations fliall flow into it -for out of Zion fliall go 
 
 forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerufalem. 
 
 And he fliall judge among the nations and the Lord 
 
 alone /hall be exalted in that day, and the idols he fliall ut- 
 terly abolijh.* The Scripture farther contains an ac- 
 count, that at the the time the Meffiah was expected, 
 a perfon rofe up, in this nation, claiming to be that 
 Meffiah, to be the perfon whom all the prophecies re- 
 ferred to, and in whom they mould center > that he 
 fpent fome years in a continued courfe of miraculous 
 works, and endued his immediate difciples and follow- 
 ers with a power of doing the fame, as a proof of the 
 truth of that religion which he commiffioned them to 
 publim ; that, invefted with this authority and power, 
 they made numerous converts in the remoter! coun- 
 tries, and fettled and eftablifhed his religion in the 
 world, to the end of which the Scripture profeffes to 
 give a prophetick account of the ftate of this religion 
 amongft mankind. 
 
 Let us now fuppofe a perfon utterly ignorant of hif- 
 tory, to have all this related to him out of the Scrip- 
 ture. Or fuppofe fuch an one, having the Scripture 
 put mto his hands, to remark thefe things in it, not 
 knowing but that thq whole, even its civil hiflory, as 
 well as the other parts of it, might be from beginning 
 to end an entire invention, and to alk, What truth 
 was in it, and whether the revelation here related was 
 real or a fidion ? And inftead of a dired anfwer, fup- 
 poft him, all at once, to be told the following confeil 
 facts, and then to unite them into one view. 
 
 Let 
 
 * Ifai. xlix. 6. Ch. ii. Ch. xi. Ch. lyi. 7. Mai. i. n. To ' which muft 
 be added the other prophecies of the like kind, feveral in the New Tefla- 
 ment, and very many in the Old ; which defcribe what fhali be the comple- 
 tion of the revealed plan of Providence. 
 
CHAP. VII. for Chriftianity. 307 
 
 Let him firft be told in how great a degree the pro- 
 fefllon and eftablifhment of natural religion, the be- 
 lief that there is one God to be worfhipped, that virtue 
 is his law, and that mankind mall be rewarded and pun- 
 ifhed hereafter, as they obey and difobey it here ; in 
 how very great a degree, I fay, the profeffion and eftab- 
 li foment of this moral fyftem in the world is owing to 
 the revelation, whether real or fuppofed, contained in 
 this book ; the eftablifhment of this moral fyflem, even 
 in thofe countries which do not acknowledge the prop- 
 er authority of the Scripture.* Let him be told alfo 
 what number of nations do acknowledge its proper 
 authority. Let him then take in the confideration of 
 what importance religion is to mankind. And upon 
 thefe things he might, I think, truly obferve, that this 
 fuppofed revelation's obtaining and being received in 
 the world, with all the circumftances and effects of it, 
 confidered together as one event, is the moil confpicu- 
 ous and important event in the (lory of mankind ; 
 that a book of this nature, and thus promulged and 
 recommended to our consideration, demands, as if by a 
 voice from heaven, to have its claims moft ferioufly ex- 
 amined into ; and that, before fuch examination, to 
 treat it with any kind of fcoffing and ridicule, is an of- 
 fence againft natural piety. But it is to be remember- 
 ed, that how much foever the eftablifliment of natural 
 religion in the world is owing to the fcripture revela- 
 tion, this does not deftroy the proof of religion from 
 reafon, any more than the proof of Euclid's Elements 
 is deftroyed by a man's knowing or thinking that he 
 mould never have feen the truth of the feveral propoii- 
 tions contained in it, nor had thofe propofitions come 
 into his thoughts, but for that mathematician. 
 
 Let fuch a peribn as we are ipeaking of be, in the 
 next place, informed of the acknowledged antiquity 
 pf the firft parts of this book, and that it's chronology, 
 
 its 
 * p. 263. 
 
3 oS Of tlie "particular Evidence PART IL 
 
 its account of the time when the earth and the feveral 
 parts of it were firft peopled with human creatures is 
 no way contradicted, but is really confirmed, by the 
 natural and civil hiftory of the world, collected -from 
 common hiftorians, from the ftate of the earth, and 
 from the late invention of arts and fciences. And as 
 the Scripture contains an unbroken thread of common 
 and civil hiftory, from the creation to the- captivity, for 
 between three and four thoufand years, let the perfon we 
 are fpeaking of be told in the next place that this gen- 
 eral hiftory, as it is not contradicted but is confirmed 
 by profane hiftory as much as there would be reafon to 
 expect, upon fuppofition of its truth, fo there is noth* 
 ing in the whole hiftory itfe!f % to give any reafonable 
 ground of fufpicion of its not being, in the general, a 
 faithful and literally true genealogy of men, and fe* 
 ries of things. I fpeak here only of the common 
 fcripture hiftory, or of the courfe of ordinary events 
 related in it, as diftinguiflied from miracles and from 
 the prophetick hiftory. In all the fcripture narrations 
 of this kind, following events arife out of foregoing 
 ones, as in all other hiftories. There appears nothing 
 related as clone in any age, not conformable to the 
 manners of that age ; nothing in the account of a fuc- 
 ceeding age which, one would fay, could not be true, 
 or was improbable, from the account of things in the 
 preceding one. There is nothing in the characters 
 which would raife a thought of their being feigned ; 
 but all the internal marks imaginable of their being 
 real. It is to be added alfb, that mere genealogies, 
 bare narratives of the number of years which peribns 
 called by fuch and iuch names lived, do not carry the 
 face of fiction, perhaps do carry fome prefumption of 
 veracity ; and all unadorned narratives, which have 
 nothing to furprize, may be thought to carry fome- 
 what of the like prefumption too. And the domef- 
 tick and the political hiftory is, plainly credible. 
 
 There 
 
CHAP. VII. fof'CJirtftianlty. 309 
 
 There-may be incidents in Scripture, which taken 
 alone in the naked way they are told, may appear 
 ftrange, efpeciaily to perfons of other manners, tem- 
 per, education ; but there are alfo incidents of un- 
 doubted truth, in many or mod perfons' lives, which, 
 in the fame circurnflances, would appear to the full 
 as ftrange. There may be mi (lakes of tranfcribers, 
 there may be other real or feeming miftakes not eafy 
 to be particularly accounted for ; but there are cer- 
 tainly no more things of this kind in the Scripture, than 
 what were to have been expeded in books of fuch an- 
 tiquity, and nothing in any wife fufficient to diicredit 
 the general narrative. Now, that a hiftory claiming 
 to commence from the creation, and extending in one 
 continued feries through fo great a length of time and 
 variety of events, mould have fuch appearances of re- 
 ality and truth in its whole contexture, is furely a ve- 
 ry remarkable circumftance in its favour. And as all 
 this is applicable to the common hiflory of the New 
 Teftament, fo there is a farther credibility, and a very 
 high one, given to it by profane authors ; many of 
 thefe writing of the fame times, and confirming the 
 truth of cuftoms and events which are incidentally as 
 well as more purpofely mentioned in it. And this 
 credibility of the common fcripture hiftory, gives fome 
 credibility to its miraculous hiftory; efpeciaily as this is 
 interwoven with the common, fo as that they imply 
 each other, and both together make up one relation. 
 Let it then be more particularly obferved to this 
 perfon, that it is an acknowledged matter of fact, which 
 is indeed implied in the foregoing obfervation, that 
 there was fuch a nr.ion as the Jews, of the greateft 
 antiquity, whofe government and general polity was 
 founded on the law here related to be given them by 
 Mofes as from heaven ; that natural religion, though 
 with rites additional, yet no way contrary to it, was 
 their eltabiiihed religion, which cannot be faid of the 
 
 Gentile 
 
gio Of the particular Evidence PART II. 
 
 Gentile world ; and that their very being as a nation 
 depended upon their acknowledgment of one God, 
 the God of the univerfe. For, fuppofe in their cap- 
 tivity in Babylon, they had gone over to the religion 
 of their conquerors, there would have remained no 
 bond of union to keep them a diftincl: people. And 
 whilft they were under their own kings, in their own 
 country, a total apoftacy from God would have been 
 the dilfolution of their whole government. They, in 
 fuch a fenfe, nationally acknowledged and worihipped 
 the Maker of heaven and earth, when the reft of the 
 world were funk in idolatry, as rendered them, in fad, 
 the peculiar people of God. And this fo remarkable 
 an eftablifhment and prefervation of natural religion 
 amongft them, feems to add fome peculiar credibility 
 to the hiftorical evidence for the miracles of Mofes and 
 the prophets ; becaufe thefe miracles are a full fatisfac- 
 tory account of this event, which plainly wants to be 
 accounted for, and cannot otherwise. 
 
 Let this perfon, fuppofed wholly ignorant of hiftory, 
 be acquainted farther, that one claiming to be the 
 Mefliah, of Jewifh extraction, rofe up at the time 
 when this nation, from the prophecies above mention- 
 ed, expe&ed the Mefliah ; that he was reje&ed, as it 
 feemed to have been foretold he mould, by the body 
 of the people, under the direction of their rulers ; 
 that in the courfe of a very few years he was believed 
 on and acknowledged as the promifed Meffiah, by 
 great numbers among the Gentiles, agreeably to the 
 prophecies of Scripture, .yet not upon the evidence of 
 prophecy, but of miracles,* of which miracles we have 
 alfo ftrong hiftorical evidence ; (by which I mean here 
 no more than muft be acknowledged by unbelievers, 
 for let pious frauds and follies be admitted to weaken, 
 it is abfurd to fay they deftroy, our evidence of mira- 
 cles wrought in proof of Chriftianity-f) that this relig- 
 ion, 
 
 * P. 184, &c. f P. 
 
CHAP. VII. for Chrijlianity. 3 1 1 
 
 ion, approving itfelf to the reafon of mankind, and car- 
 rying its own evidence with it, fo far as reafon is a 
 judge of its fyftem, and being no way contrary to rea- 
 fon in thofe parts of it which require to- be believed 
 upon the mere authority of its Author,-^-that this re- 
 ligion, I fay, gradually fpread and fupported itfelf, for 
 fome hundred years, not only without any afliftance 
 from temporal power, but under conftant difcourage- 
 ments, and often the bittereft perfections from it, and 
 then became the religion of the world ; that in the 
 mean time the Jewifh nation and government were 
 deftroyed, in a very remarkable manner, and the peo- 
 ple carried away captive and difperfed through the 
 moft diftant countries, in which (late of difperfion 
 they have remained fifteen hundred years ; and that 
 they remain a numerous people, united amongfl them- 
 felves, and diftinguifhed from the reft of the world, as 
 they were in the days of Mofes, by the profeffion of 
 his law, and every where looked upon in a manner 
 which one fcarce knows how diftindUy to exprefs, but 
 in the words of the prophetick account of it, given fo 
 many ages before it cam- to pafs Thouflialt become an 
 aftom/hment) a proverb, and a byword, among all nations 
 whither the Lord fhall lead t/iee.* 
 
 The appearance of a ftanding miracle, in the Jews 
 remaining a diftind people in their difperfion, and the 
 confirmation which this event appears to give to the 
 truth of revelation, may be thought to be anfwered by 
 their religion's forbidding them intermarriages with 
 thofe of any other, and prefcribing them a great many 
 peculiarities in their food, by which they are debarred 
 from the means of incorporating with the people in 
 whofe countries they live. This is not, I think, a fat- 
 isfa&ory account of that which it pretends to account 
 for. But what does it pretend to account for ? The 
 correfpondence between this event and the prophecies ; 
 
 or 
 
 * Dcut. xxviii. 37. 
 
3 1 2. Of the particular Evidence PART II. 
 
 or the coincidence of both, with a long difpenfation 
 of Providence of a peculiar nature, towards that peo- 
 ple formerly ? No. It is only the event itfelf which is 
 offered to be thus accounted for, which fingle event 
 taken alone, abftracbed from all fiich correfpondence 
 and coincidence, perhaps would not have appeared 
 miraculous ; but that correfpondence and coincidence 
 may be fo, though the event itfelf be fuppofed not. 
 Thus the concurrence of our Saviour's being born at 
 Bethlehem, with a long foregoing feries of prophecy 
 and other coincidences, is doubtlefs miraculous, the 
 feries of prophecy, and other coincidences, and the 
 event, being admitted ; though the event itfelf, his 
 birth at that place, appears to have been brought 
 about in a natural way ; of which, however, no one 
 can be certain. 
 
 And as feveral of thefe events feem m fome degree 
 exprefsly to have verified the prophetick hiftory alrea- 
 dy, fo likewtfe they may be confidered farther as 
 having a peculiar afped towards the full completion 
 of it, as affording fome preiumption that the whole of 
 it mail, one time or other, be fulfilled. Thus, that 
 the Jews have been fo wonderfully preferved in their 
 long and wide difperfion, which is indeed the direct 
 fulfilling of fome prophecies, but is now mentioned 
 only as looking forward to fomewhat yet to come ; 
 that natural religion came forth from Judea, and 
 fpread in the degree it has done over the world, before 
 loft in idolatry, which together with fome other things 
 have diflinguimed that very place, in like manner as 
 the people of it are diftinguifhed ; that this great 
 change of religion over the earth, was brought about 
 under the profefiion and acknowledgment that Jefus 
 was the promifed Mefiiah ; things of this kind natu- 
 rally turn the thoughts of ferious men towards the full 
 completion of the prophetick hiilory, concerning the 
 final reiteration of that people, concerning the eftab- 
 
 lidiment 
 
CHAP. Vli. for Chrtftianity. 313 
 
 liihrnent of the everlafting kingdom among them, the 
 kingdom of the Meffiah, and the future (late of the 
 world under this (acred government. Such circum- 
 ftances and events compared with thefe prophecies, 
 though no completions of them, yet would not, I think, 
 be fpoken of as nothing in the argument, by a perfon 
 upon his firft being informed of them. They fall in 
 with the prophetick hiftory of things ftill further, give 
 it fome additional credibility, have the appearance of 
 being fomewhat in order to the full completion of it. 
 
 Indeed it requires a good degree of knowledge, and 
 great calmnefs and confideration, to be able to judge 
 thoroughly of the evidence for the truth of Chrift- 
 ianity, from that part of the prophetick hiftory which 
 relates to the lituation of the kingdoms of the world, 
 and to the ftate of the church, from the eftablifh- 
 ment of Chriftianity to the prcicnt time. But it ap- 
 pears, from a general view of it, to be very material. 
 And thofe perfons who have thoroughly examined it, 
 and fome of them were men of the cooleft tempers, 
 greateft capacities, and lead liable to imputations of 
 prejudice, infift upon it as determinatelytonclufive. 
 
 Suppofe now a perfon quite ignorant af hiftory , firft 
 to recollect the paiiages abovementioned out of Scrip- 
 ture, without knowing but that the whole was a late 
 fiction, then to be informed of the correfpondent facts 
 now mentioned, and to unite them all into one view ; 
 that the profeffion and eftablidiment of natural relig- 
 ion in the world is greatly owing, in different ways, to 
 this book, and the iuppofed revelation which it con- 
 tains ; that it is acknowledged to be of the earlieft an- 
 tiquity ; that its chronology and common hiftory are 
 entirely credible ; that this ancient nation, thejratf, of 
 whom it chiefly treats, appear to have been in fact the 
 people of God in a diftinguiflied fenfe ; that, as there 
 was a national expectation amongft them, railed from 
 the prophecies, of a Meffiah to appear at fuch a time, fo 
 W one 
 
314 Of the particular Evidence PART it.- 
 
 one at this time appeared claiming to be that Meffiah ; 
 that he was reje&ed by this nation, but received by the 
 Gentiles, not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of 
 miracles ; that the religion he taught fupported itfelf 
 under the greatefl difficulties, gained ground, and at 
 length became the religion of the world ; that in the 
 mean time the Jewrm polity was utterly deftroyed, and 
 the nation difperfed over the face of the earth ; that 
 notwithstanding this, they have remained a diftinct nu-* 
 merous people for fo many centuries, even to this day, 
 which not only appears to be the exprefs completion of 
 feveral prophecies concerning them, but alfo renders 
 it, as one may fpeak, a vifible and eafy poflibrlity that 
 the promifes made to them as a nation may yet be ful- 
 filled ; and to thefe acknowledged truths, let the per- 
 fon we have been fuppofing add, as I think he ought, 
 whether every one will allow it cr not, the obvious ap^ 
 pearances which there are, of the (late of the world, in 
 other refpecls be (ides what relates to" the Jews, and of 
 the Chriflian Church, having fo long anfwered and 
 ffill anfwering to the prophetick hiilory ; fuppoie, 
 I fay, thefe fatfe fet over againft the things before men- 
 tioned out of the Scripture, and ferioufly compared 
 with them-, the joint view of both together mud, 
 I think, appear of very great weight to a confiderate 
 reafonable perfon j of much greater 4 indeed, upon hav- 
 ing them firft laid before him, than is eafy for us who 
 are fo familiarized to them to conceive, without fome 
 particular attention for that purpofe. 
 
 All thefe things, and the feveral- particulars contain- 
 ed under them-, require to be diffincYiy and moil thor- 
 oughly examined into, that the weight of each may be 
 judged of upon fuch examination, and fuch conclufiori 
 drawn as refults from their united force. But this has 
 not been attempted here. I have gone no farther than 
 to {how, that the general imperfect view of them now 
 given, the confer! hiftorical evidence for miracles, and 
 
 the 
 
C H A P . VII. for Chrtftiamty. 3 1 
 
 the many obvious appearing completions of prophecy, 
 together with the collateral things* here mentioned, 
 and there are feveral others of the like fort ; that all 
 this together, which being fat mud be acknowledged 
 by unbelievers, amounts to real evidence of fomewhat 
 more than human in this matter ; evidence much 
 more important than carelefs men, who have been ac- 
 cuftomed only to tranfient and partial views of it, can 
 imagine, and indeed abundantly fufficient to acl: upon. 
 And thefe things, I apprehend, mud be acknowledged 
 by unbelievers. For though they may fay, that the 
 hiftorical evidence of miracles, wrought in atteftation 
 of Chriflianity, is not fufficient to convince them that 
 fuch miracles were really wrought, they cannot deny 
 that there is fuch hiftorical evidence, it being a known 
 matter of fad that there is. They may fay, the con- 
 formity between the prophecies and events is by acci- 
 dent ; but there are many inftances in which fuch con- 
 formity itfelf cannot be denied. They may fay, with 
 regard to fuch kind of collateral things as thofe above- 
 mentioned, that any odd accidental events, without 
 meaning,will have a meaning found in them by fanciful 
 people ; and that fuch as are fanciful in any one cer- 
 tain way, will make out a thoufand coincidences which 
 feem to favour their peculiar follies. Men, I fay, may 
 talk thus ; but no one who is ferious can poffibly 
 think thefe things to be nothing, if he confiders the 
 importance of collateral things, and even of letter cir- 
 cumftances, in the evidence of probability, as diflin- 
 guiflied in nature from the evidence of demonftration. 
 In many cafes indeed it feems to require the trueft 
 judgment, to determine with exact nefs the weight of 
 circumftantial evidence ; but it is very often altogeth- 
 er as convincing, as that which is the moft exprefs and 
 
 direch rni . 
 
 This 
 
 * All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, net reducible to 
 the head of certain miracles, or determinate completions of prophecy. 
 8o, z8i. 
 
 W2 
 
3 1 6 Of the particular Evidence P A R T iL 
 
 This general view of the evidence for Chriftianityv 
 confidered as making one argument, may alfo ferve to 
 recommend to ferious perfons, to fet down every thing 
 which they think may be of any real weight at all in 
 proof of it, and particularly the many feeming com- 
 pletions of prophecy ; and they will find that, judging 
 by the natural rules by which we judge of probable 
 evidence in common matters, they amount to a much 
 higher degree of proof, upon fbch a joint review, than 
 could be fuppofed upon confidering them feparately 
 at different times, how ftrong foever the proof might 
 before appear to them upon fuch feparate views of it. 
 For probable proofs, by being added, not only in- 
 creafe the evidence, but multiply it. Nor mould I 
 difluade any one from fet ting down what he thought 
 made for the contrary fide. But then it is to be re- 
 membered, not in order to influence his judgment, 
 but his practice, that a miflake on one fide may be, 
 in its confequences, much more dangerous than a rni- 
 take on the other. And what courfe is moil fafe, and 
 what moft dangerous, is a confideration thought very 
 material, when we deliberate, not concerning events, 
 but concerning conduct in our temporal affairs. To- 
 be influenced by this confideration in our judgment, 
 to believe or difbelieve upon it, is indeed as much prej- 
 udice as any thing whatever. And, like other prej- 
 udices, it operates contrary ways, in different men. 
 For fome are inclined to believe what they hope, and 
 others what they fear. And it is manifeft unreafona- 
 blenefs, to apply to men's paffions in order to gain- 
 their aflent . But in deliberations concerning conduct:, 
 there is nothing which reafon more requires to be tak- 
 en into the account, than the importance of it. For, 
 fuppofe it doubtful what would be the confequence of 
 acting in this, or in a contrary manner, ftill that tak- 
 ing one fide could be attended with little or no bad 
 confequence, and taking, the other might be attended 
 
 with 
 
CHAP. VII. for Chrijtiamty. 317 
 
 with the greateft, muft appear to unprejudiced reafon 
 of the highefl moment towards determining how we 
 are to at. But the truth of our religion, like the 
 truth of common matters, is to be judged of by all 
 the evidence taken together. And unlefs the whole 
 fcries of things which may be alleged in this argu- 
 ment, and every particular thing in it, can reafonably 
 be fuppofed to have been by accident, (for here the 
 ftrefs of the argument for Chriftianky lies) then is the 
 truth of it proved ; in like manner as if in any common 
 cafe, numerous events acknowledged, were to be alleg- 
 ed in proof of any other event difputed, the truth of 
 the difputed event would be proved, not only if any 
 one of the acknowledged ones did of itfelf clearly im- 
 ply it, but, though no one of them fingly did fo, if the 
 whole of the acknowledged events, taken together, 
 could not in reafon be fuppofed to have happened, un- 
 lefs the difputed one were true. 
 
 It is obvious how much advantage the nature of 
 this evidence gives to thofe perfons who attack Chrift- 
 ianity, efpecially in converfation. For it is eafy to 
 fhew, in a mort and lively manner, that fuch and fuch 
 things are liable to objection, that this and another 
 thing is of little weight in itfelf ; but impoflible to 
 fhew, in like manner, the united force of the whole ar- 
 
 gument in one view. 
 
 However, laftly, as it has been made appear that 
 there is no prefumption againft a revelation as mirac- 
 ulous ; that the general fcheme of Chriftianity, and 
 the principal parts of it, are conformable to the expe- 
 rienced conftitution of things, and the whole perfectly 
 credible, fo the account nov/ given of the pofitive ev- 
 idence for it, mews that this evidence is fuch, as from 
 the nature of it cannot be deftroyed, though it mould 
 be leffened, 
 
 CHAP. 
 
CHAP. VIIL 
 
 Of the Objections which may be made againft arguing 
 from the Analogy of Nature, to Religion. 
 
 IF every one would confider, with fuch 
 attention as they are bound even in point of morality 
 to confider, what they judge and give characters of, 
 the occafion of this chapter would be, in fome good 
 meafure at lead, fuperfeded. But fince this is not to 
 be expected, for fome we find, do not concern them-, 
 felves to underftand even what they write againft ; 
 lince this treatife, in common with mod others, lies 
 open to objections which may appear very material to 
 thoughtful men at firft light ; and, befides that, feems 
 peculiarly liable to the objections of fuch as canjudg~ 
 without thinking, and of fuch as can cenfure without 
 judging, it may not be amifs to fet down the chief 
 of thefe objections which occur to me, and confider 
 them to their hands. And they are fach as thefe ; 
 
 " That it is a poor thing to folve difficulties in rev- 
 elation, by faying that there are the fame in natural 
 Teligion, when what is wanting is to clear both of them, 
 of thefe their common, as well as other their refpec- 
 tive, difficulties \ but that it is a ftrange way indeed 
 of convincing men of the obligations of religion, to 
 fhew them that they have as little reafon for their 
 worldly purfuits ; and a ftrange way of vindicating 
 the juftice and gpodnefs of the Author of nature, and 
 of removing the objections againft both, to which the 
 fyftem of religion lies open, to fhew that the like ob r 
 jections lie againft natural providence ; a way of an- 
 fwering objections againft religion, without ib much 
 as pretending to make out that the fyftem of it, or the 
 particular things in it objected againft, are reafonable $ 
 
 efpecially, 
 
CHAP. VIII. Objections againft the Analogy ', sV. 3 19 
 
 efpecially, perhaps fome may be inattentive enough to 
 add, Muii this be thought ftrange, when it is confef- 
 fed that analogy is no aniwer to fuch objections ; that 
 when this fort of reafoning is carried to the utmoft 
 length it an be imagined capable of, it will yet leave 
 the mind in a very unfatisfied (late ; and that it muft 
 be unaccountable ignorance of mankind, to imagine 
 they will be prevailed with to forego their prefent in- 
 terefts and pleat ures, from regard to religion, upon 
 doubtful evidence." 
 
 Now, as plaufible as this way of talking may ap- 
 pear, that appearance will be found in a great meafure 
 owing to half views, which (hew but part of an object, 
 yet Ihew that indiftindtly, and to undeterminate lan- 
 guage. By thefe means weak men are often deceived 
 by others, and ludicrous men by themfelves. And 
 even thofe who are ferious and confiderate, cannot al- 
 ways readily difentangle,and at once clearly fee through 
 the perplexities in which fubjects themfelves are involv- 
 ed, and which are heightened by the deficiencies and 
 the abufe of words. To this latter fort of perfons, 
 the following reply to each part of this objection fev- 
 erally may be of fome afiiflance, as it may alfo tend a 
 Jittle to flop and filence others. 
 
 Firjt, The thing wanted, i. e. what men require, is 
 to have all difficulties cleared. And this is, or at lead 
 for any thing we know to the contrary it may be, the 
 fame as requiring to comprehend the Divine Nature, 
 and the whole plan of Providence, from everlafting to 
 everlafting. But it hath always been allowed to argue 
 from what is acknowledged to what is difputed ; and 
 it is in no other fenfe a poor thing to argue from natu- 
 ral religion to revealed, in the manner found fault with, 
 than it is to argue in numberleis other ways of prob- 
 able deduction and inference, in matters of conduct, 
 which we are continually reduced to the neceffity of 
 doing. Indeed the epithet poor, may be applied, 1 fear 
 
 as 
 
320 Objections againft the Analogy PART II, 
 
 as properly, to great part or the world of human life, 
 as it is to the things mentioned in the objection. Is 
 it not a poor thing, for a phyfician to have fo little 
 knowledge in the cure of difeafes as even the rnoft 
 eminent have ? To a6t upon conjecture and guefs, 
 where the life of man is concerned ? Undoubtedly it 
 is ; but not in comparifon of having no fkill at all in 
 that ufeful art, and being obliged to aft wholly in the 
 dark. 
 
 Further (ince it is as unreafonabie as it is common, 
 to urge objections againfl revelation which are of equal 
 weight againfl natural religion ; and thofe who do 
 this, if they are not confufed themfelves, deal unfairly 
 with others, in making it feem that they are arguing 
 only againfl revelation, or particular doctrines of it, 
 when in reality they aje arguing againfl moral provi- 
 dence, it is a thing of confequence to mow that fuch 
 objections are as much levelled againfl natural religion, 
 as againfl revealed. And objections, which are equal- 
 ly applicable to both, are properly fpeaking anfwered, 
 by its being mown that they are fo, provided the form- 
 er be admitted to be true. And without taking in 
 the confideration how diflinctly this is admitted, it is 
 plainly very material to obferve, that as the things ob- 
 jected againfl in natural religion, are of the fame kind 
 with what is certain matter of experience in the courfe 
 of Providence, and in the information which God af- 
 fords us concerning our temporal interefl under his 
 government, fo the objections againfl the fyflem of 
 Chriflianity and the evidence of it, are of the very fame 
 kind with thofe which are made againfl the fyflem and 
 evidence of natural religion. However, the reader 
 upon review may fee, that mofl of the analogies infill- 
 ed upon, even in the latter part of this treatiie, do not 
 necelTarily require to have more taken for granted than 
 is in the former ; that there is an Author of nature, or 
 natural Governor of the world ; and Chriflianity is 
 
 vindicated, 
 
CH A P , VIII. of Nature to Religion. 321 
 
 vindicated, not from its analogy to natural religion, 
 but chiefly from its analogy to the experienced con- 
 ftitution of nature. 
 
 Secondly, Religion is a practical thing, and confifts 
 in fuch a determinate courfe of life, as being what 
 there is reafon to think is commanded by the Author 
 cf nature, and will upon the whole be our happinefs 
 under his government. Now if men can be convinc- 
 ed that they have the like reafon to believe this, as to 
 believe that taking care of their temporal affairs will 
 be to their advantage, fuch conviction cannot but 
 be an argument to them for the practice of religion. 
 And if there be really any reafon for believing one of 
 thefe, and endeavouring to preferve life, and fecure 
 ourfelves the neceffaries and conveniences of it, then 
 there is reafon alfo for believing the other, and endeav- 
 ouring to fecure the interefl it propofes to us. And 
 if the interefl which religion propofes to us be infinite- 
 ly greater than our whole temporal intereft, then there 
 muft be proportionably greater reafon for endeavour- 
 ing to fecure one than the other ; fince by the fuppo- 
 fition, the probability of our fecuring one, is equal to 
 the probability of our fecuring the other. This feems 
 plainly unanfwerable, and has a tendency to influence 
 fair minds, who confider what our condition really is, 
 or upon what evidence we are naturally appointed to 
 act ; and who are difpofed to acquiefce in the terms 
 upon which we live, and attend to and follow that 
 practical iriftruction, whatever it be, which is afford- 
 ed us. 
 
 But the chief and proper force of the argument re- 
 ferred to in the objection lies in another place. For, 
 it is laid that the proof of religion is involved in fuch 
 inextricable difficulties as to render it doubtful, and 
 that it cannot be fuppofed that if it were true it would 
 be left upon doubtful evidence. Here then, over and 
 above the force of each particular difficulty or objec- 
 tion, 
 
322, Objections agalnjl the Analogy PART II. 
 
 tion, thefe difficulties and objections, taken together, 
 are turned into a pofitive argument againft the truth 
 of religion ; which argument would ftand thus. If 
 religion were true jt would not be left doubtful, and 
 open to objections to the degree in which it is ; there- 
 fore that it is thus left, not only renders the evidence 
 of it weak, and lefiens its force in proportion to the 
 weight of fuch objections, but alfo fhews it to be falfe, 
 or is a general prefumption of its being fo. Now the' 
 obiervation, that from the natural conftitution and 
 courfe of things, we muft in our temporal concerns, 
 almoft continually, and in matters of great confe- 
 quence, aft upon evidence of a like kind and degree 
 to the evidence of religion, is an anfwer to this argu- 
 ment ; becaufe it mews that it is according to the con- 
 duct and character of the Author of nature to appoint 
 we fliould act upon evidence like to that which this ar- 
 gument prefumes he cannot be fuppofed to appoint we 
 fhould act upon ; it is an inflance, a general one made 
 up of numerous particular ones, of fomewhat in his 
 dealing with us fimilar to what is faid to be incredible. 
 And as the force of this anfwer lies merely in the par- 
 allel which there is between the evidence for religion 
 and for our temporal conduct, the anfwer is equally 
 juft and conclufive, whether the parallel be made out 
 by {hewing the evidence of the former to be higher, 
 or the evidence of the latter to be lower. 
 
 Thirdly > The defign of this treatife is not to vindi- 
 cate the character of God, but to (hew the obligations 
 of men ; it is not to juftify his providence, but to (hew 
 what belongs to us to do. Thefe are two fubjects, 
 and ought not to be confounded. And though they 
 may at length run up into each other, yet obfervations 
 may immediately tend to make out the latter, which 
 <io not appear by any immediate connexion to the 
 purpofe of 'the former ; which is lef&our concern than 
 many feem to think. For, ift, It is not neceflary we 
 
 fliould 
 
C H A P . VIII . of Nature to Religion. 323 
 
 ihould juftify the difpenfations of Providence againft 
 objections, any farther than to fhew that the things ob- 
 jected againft may, for aught we know, be confident 
 with juftice and goodnefs. Suppofe then, that there 
 are things in the fyflem of this world, and plan of Prov- 
 idence relating to it, which taken alone would be un- 
 juft, yet it has been fliewn unanfwerably, that if we 
 could take in the reference which thefe things may 
 have to other things prefent, pad and to come, to the 
 whole fcheme which the things objected againft are 
 parts of, thefe very things might, for aught we know, 
 be found to be not only confident with juftice, but in- 
 ftances of it. Indeed it has been (hewn, by the anal- 
 ogy of what we fee, not only poflible that this may be 
 the cafe, but credible that it is. And thus objec- 
 tions drawn from fych things are anfwered, and Prov- 
 idence is vindicated, as far as religion makes its vindi- 
 cation neceffary. Hence it appears, idly, That objeo 
 tions againft the divine juftice and goodnefs are not 
 endeavoured to be removed, by (hewing that the like 
 objections, allowed to be really conclufive, lie againft 
 natural providence ; but thofe objections being fup- 
 pofed and fliewn not to be conclufive, the things ob- 
 jectec} againft, confidered as matters of fact, are farther 
 fhewn to be credible from their conformity to the coiir 
 ftitution of nature ; for inftance, that God will reward 
 and puniih men fqr their actions hereafter, from the 
 obfervation that he does reward and punifh them for 
 their actions here. And this I apprehend is of weight. 
 And I add, 3dly, It would be of weight, even though 
 thofe objections were not anfwered. For, there being 
 the proof of religion above fet down, and religion im- 
 plying feveral facts, fqr inftance again, the fact lad 
 mentioned, that God will reward and puniih men for 
 their actions hereafter, the obfervation that his prei- 
 nt method of government is by rewards and puniih- 
 nicnts, (hews that future fact not to be incredible ; 
 
 whatever 
 
3 24 Objections againft the Analogy PART II. 
 
 whatever objections men may think they have againft 
 it, as unjuft or unmerciful, according to their notions 
 of juftice and mercy, or as improbable from their be- 
 lief of neceffity. I fay, as improbable ; for it is evident 
 no objection againft it, as unjuft, can be urged from 
 neceffity, fmce this notion as much deftroys injuftice 
 as it does juftice. Then 4thly, Though objections 
 againft the reafonablenefs of the fyftem of religion, can- 
 not indeed be anfwered without entering into confid- 
 cration of its reafonablenefs, yet objections againft the 
 credibility or truth of it may. Becaufe the fyftem of 
 it is reducible into what is properly matter of fact ; and 
 the truth the probable truth of facts, may be (hewn 
 without confideration of their reafonablenefs. Nor is 
 it necefiary, though in fome cafes and refpects it is 
 highly ufeful and proper, yet it is not neceffary, to give 
 a proof of the reafonablenefs of every precept enjoined 
 us, and of every particular difpenfation of Providence 
 which comes into the fyftem of religion. Indeed the 
 more thoroughly a perfon of a right difpofition is con- 
 vinced of the perfection of the divine nature and con- 
 duct, the farther he will advance towards that perfec- 
 tion of religion which St. John* fpeaks of. But the 
 general obligations of religion are fully made our, by 
 proving the reafonablenefs of the practice of it. And 
 that the practice of religion is reafonable may be fhewn, 
 though no more could be proved than that the fyftem 
 of it maybefo, for aught we know to the contrary ; and 
 even without entering into the diftindt confideration 
 of this. And from hence, 5thly, It is eafy to fee, that 
 though the analogy of nature is not an immediate an- 
 fwer to objections againft the wifdom, the juftice or 
 goodnefs of any doctrine or precept of religion, yet 
 it may be, as it is, an immediate and direct anfwer to 
 what is really intended by fuch objections, which is t 
 fhew that the things objected againft are incredible. 
 
 * ijoh.iv. 1 8. 
 
C H A P . Vilt. cf Nature to Religion. 325 
 
 Fourthly^ It is moft readily acknowledged that the 
 foregoing treatife is by no means fatisfadtory, very far 
 indeed from it ; but fo would any natural inftitution 
 of life appear, if reduced into a fyftem, together with 
 its evidence. Leaving religion out of the cafe, men 
 are divided in their opinions whether our pleasures 
 overbalance our pains ; and whether it be, or be not, 
 eligible to live in this world. And were all fuch con- 
 troverfies fettled, which perhaps in fpeculation would 
 be found involved in great difficulties, and were it de- 
 termined upon the evidence of reafon, as nature has 
 determined it to our hands, that life is to be preferr- 
 ed, yet ftill the rules which God has been pleafed to 
 afford us, for efcaping the miferies of it and obtaining 
 its fatisfa&ions, the rules, for inftance, of preferving 
 health, and recovering it when loft, are not only falli- 
 ble and precarious, but very far from being exact. 
 Nor are we informed by nature in future contingencies 
 and accidents, fo as to render it at all certain what is 
 the befl method of managing our affairs. What 
 will be the fuccefs of our temporal purfuits, in the 
 common fenfe of the word fucccfs, is highly doubtful. 
 And what will be the fuccefs of them in the proper 
 fenfe of the word, J. e. what happinefs or enjoyment 
 we (hall obtain by them, is doubtful in a much higher 
 degree. Indeed the unfatisfadory nature of the evi- 
 dence with which we are obliged to take up, in the 
 daily courfe of life, is fcarce to be expreiied. Yet men 
 do not throw away life, or difregard. the interefts of it, 
 upon account of this doubtfulnefs. The evidence of 
 religion then being admitted real, thoie who object 
 againfi: it as not fatisfa&ory, i. e. as not being \vhat 
 they wiih it, plainly forget the very condition of our 
 being ; for fatisfacfcion in this fenfe does not belong to 
 fuch a creature as man. A ad, which is more mate- 
 rial, they forget alfo the very nature of religion. For, 
 religion prefuppofes, in all thofe who will embrace it, 
 
 a certain 
 
526 Objsftions again/} the Analogy PART IL 
 
 a certain degree of integrity and honefly, which it was 
 intended to try whether men have or riot, and to ex- 
 ercife in fuch as have it, in order to its improvement. 
 Religion prefuppofes this as much, and in the fame 
 fenfe, as fpeaking to a man prefuppofes he underftands 
 the language in which you fpeak, or as warning a man 
 of any danger prefuppofes that he hath fuch a regard 
 to himfelf as that he will endeavour to avoid it. And 
 therefore the queftion is not at all, Whether the evi- 
 dence of religion be fatisfadtory, but, Whether it be 
 in reafon fufficient to prove and difcipline that virtue, 
 which it prefuppofes. Now the evidence of it is fully 
 fufficient for all thofe purpofes of probation, how far 
 foever it is from being fatisfactory as to the purpofes 
 of curioiity, or any other ; and indeed it anfwers the 
 purpofes of the former in feveral refpects, which it 
 would not do if it were as overbearing as is required. 
 One might add farther, that whether the motives or 
 the evidence for any courfe of action be fatisfactory, 
 meaning here by that word, what fatisfies a man, that 
 fuch a courfe of action will in event be for his good, 
 this need never be, and I think ftrictly fpeaking never 
 is, the practical queftion in common matters. But 
 the practical queftion in all cafes is, Whether the evi- 
 dence for a courfe of action be fuch as, taking in all 
 circumftances, makes the faculty within us which is 
 the guide and judge of conduct,* determine that 
 courfe of action to be prudent. Indeed fatisfaction 
 that it will be for our intereft or happinefs, abundant- 
 ly determines an action to be prudent ; but evidence 
 almoft infinitely lower than this determines actions to 
 be fo too, even in the conduct of every day. 
 
 Fifthly, As to the objection concerning the influ- 
 ence which this argument, or any part of it, may or 
 may not be expe&ed to have upon men, I obferve as 
 above, that religion being intended for a trial and ex- 
 
 ercife 
 
 * See Di/ertaiion II. 
 
C H A p . VIII. of Nature to Religion. 327 
 
 ercife of the morality of every perfon's character who 
 is a fubjecl: of it, and there being, as I have (hewn, 
 fuch evidence for it as is fufficient in reafon to influ- 
 ence men to embrace it, to object that it is not to 
 be imagined mankind will be influenced by fuch evi- 
 dence, is nothing to the pnrpofe of the foregoing trea- 
 tife. For the purpofe of it is not to inquire what fort 
 of creatures mankind are, but what the light and 
 knowledge which is afforded them requires they mould 
 be ; to fhew how in reafon they ought to behave, not 
 how in fad: they will behave. This depends upon 
 themfelves, and is their own concern, the perfona! 
 concern of each man in particular. And how little 
 regard the generality have to it, experience indeed does 
 too fully (hew. But religion, confidered as a proba- 
 tion, has had its end upon all perlbns, to whom it has 
 been propofed with evidence fufficient in reafon to in- 
 fluence their practice ; for by this means they have 
 been put into a ftate of probation, let them behave as 
 they will in it. And thus, not only revelation, but 
 reafon alfo, teaches us that by the evidence of religion 
 being laid before men, the defigns of Providence are 
 carrying on, not only with regard to thofe who will, 
 but likewife with regard to thofe who will not, be in- 
 fluenced by it. However, laftly, the objection here 
 referred to allows the things infifted upon in this trea- 
 tife to be of fome weight ; and if fo, it may be hoped 
 it will have fome influence. And if there be a proba- 
 bility that it will have any at all, there is the fame rea- 
 fon in kind, though not in degree, to lay it before" men, 
 as there would be if it were likely to have a greater in- 
 fluence. 
 
 And farther, I defire it may be confidered, with re- 
 fpect to the whole of the foregoing objections, that in 
 this treat He I have argued upon the principles of others,* 
 
 not 
 
 * By arguing upon t'ie principles of others, the reader will obferve is meant, 
 not proving any thing /-ow thofe principles, but notivithjiand:t;g them. Thus 
 religion is proved, no/tfrom the opinion of neceffity, which is ablurd, but 
 tat with/landing or even though that opinion were admitted to be true. 
 
328 Objections againft tlic Analogy PART IL 
 
 not my own ; and have omitted what I think true, 
 and of the utmoft importance, becaufe by others 
 thought unintelligible, or not true. Thus I have ar- 
 gued upon the principles of the fatalifts, which I do 
 not believe ; and have omitted a thing of the utmoft 
 importance which I do belbve, the moral fitnefs and 
 unfitnefs of actions, prior to all will whatever ; which 
 I apprehend as certainly to determine the divine con- 
 duel:, as fpeculative truth and falsehood necefiarily de- 
 termine the divine judgment. Indeed the principle 
 of liberty and that of moral fitnefs fo force themfelves 
 upon the mind, that moralifts, the ancients as well as 
 moderns, have formed their language upon it. And 
 probably it may appear in mine, though I have endeav- 
 oured to avoid it, and in order to avoid it, have fome- 
 times been obliged to exprefs myfelf in a manner which 
 will appear ftrange to fuch as do not obferve the reafon 
 for it ; but the general argument here purfued does 
 not at all fuppoie or proceed upon thefe principles. 
 Now, thefe two abftract principles of liberty and mor- 
 al fitnefs being omitted, religion can be coniidered in 
 no other view than merely as a queftion of fact ; and 
 in this view it is here coniidered. It is obvious that 
 Chriftianity, and the proof of it, are both hiftorical. 
 And even natural religion is, properly, a matter of fact ; 
 for, that there is a righteous Governor of the world, 
 is fo ; and this propofition contains the general fyftcm 
 of natural religion. But then, feveral abftract truths, 
 and in particular thofe two principles, are ufually taken 
 into oonfideration in the proof of it, whereas it is here 
 treated of only as a matter of fact. To explain this ; 
 that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right 
 ones, is an abftract truth ; but that they appear fo to 
 our mind, is only a matter of fact. And this laft muil 
 have been admitted, if any thing was, by thofe ancient 
 icepticks who would not have admitted the former ; 
 but pretended to doubt, Whether there were any fuch 
 
 thing 
 
CHAP. VIIL of Nature to Religion. 329 
 
 thing as truth, or, Whether we could certainly depend 
 upon our faculties of underftanding for the knowledge 
 of it in any cafe. So likewife that there is, in the nature 
 of things, an original ftandard of right and. wrong in 
 actions, independent upon all will, but which unalter- 
 ably determines the will of God to exercife that moral 
 government over the world which religion teaches, 
 i. e. finally and upon the whole to reward and punifli 
 men refpectively as they aft right or wrong, this af- 
 fertion contains an abftract truth, as well as matter of 
 fact. But fuppofe in the prefent ftate every man, with- 
 out exception, was rewarded and punifhed in exact pro- 
 portion as he followed or tranfgreffed that fenfe of right 
 and wrong which God has implanted in the nature of 
 every man, this would not be at all an abftract truth, 
 but only a matter of fact. And though this fact were 
 acknowledged by every one, yet the very fame difficul- 
 ties might be raifed as are now, concerning the abftract 
 queftions of liberty and moral fitnefs ; and we mould, 
 have a proof, even the certain one of experience, that 
 the government of the world was perfectly moral, with- 
 out taking in the consideration of thofe queftions ; 
 and this proof would remain, in what way foever they 
 were determined. And thus, God having given man-, 
 kind a moral faculty, the object of which is actions, 
 and which naturally approves fome actions as right and 
 of good defert, and condemns others as wrong and of 
 ill deiert ; that he will, finally and upon the whole, 
 reward the former and punim the latter, is not an af- 
 fertion.of an abftract truth, but of what is as mere a 
 fact as his doing fo at prefent would be. This future 
 fact I have, not indeed proved with the force with 
 which it might be proved, from the principles of lib- 
 erty and moral fitnefs, but without them have given 
 a really conclufive practical proof of it, which is greatly 
 ftrengthened by the general analogy of nature ; a proof 
 eafuy cavilled at, eafily (hewn not to be demon ftrative, 
 
 X fof 
 
330 Objections againft the Analogy r , iSc. PART II. 
 
 for it is not offered as fuch ; but impofiible, I think, 
 to be evaded or anfwered. And thus the obligations 
 of religion are made out, exclulively of the queflions 
 concerning liberty and moral fitnefs, which have been 
 perplexed with difficulties and abftrufe reafonings, as 
 every thing may. 
 
 Hence therefore may be obferved diftinctly what is 
 the force of this treatife. It will be, to fuch as are con- 
 vinced of religion upon the proof arifmg out of the two 
 laft mentioned principles, an additional proof and a 
 confirmation of it -, to fuch as do not admit thofe 
 principles, an original proof of it,* and a confirmation 
 of that proof. Thofe who believe, will here find the 
 fcheme of Chriftianity cleared of objections, and the 
 evidence of it in a peculiar manner ftrengthened ; thofe 
 who do not believe, will at leaft be (hewn the abfurd- 
 ity of all attempts to prove Chriftianity falfe, the plain 
 undoubted credibility of it ; and, I hope, a good deal 
 more. 
 
 And thus, though fome perhaps may ferioufly think 
 that analogy, as here urged, has too great ftrefs laid up- 
 on it ; and ridicule, unanfwerable ridicule, may be appli- 
 ed, to {hew the argument from it in a difadvantageous 
 light, yet there can be no queftion but that it is a 
 real one. For religion, both natural and revealed, im- 
 plying in it numerous facts, analogy being a confirma- 
 tion of all fads to which it can be applied, as it is the 
 only proof of moft, cannot but be admitted by every 
 one to be a material thing, and truly of weight on the 
 fide of religion, both natural and revealed ; and it 
 ought to be particularly regarded by fuch as profefs to 
 follow nature, and to be lefs fatisfied with abftraft 
 reafonings. 
 
 * P. 165, &c. 
 
 CONCLUSION, 
 
t 33 1 1 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 \V HATEVER account may be given 
 of the ftrange inattention and difregard, in fome 
 ages and countries, to a matter of fuch importance as 
 religion, it would, before experience, be incredible that 
 there fhould be the like difregard in thofe who have 
 had the moral fyflem of the world laid before them, as 
 it is by Chriftianity, and often inculcated upon them ; 
 becaufe this moral fyflem carries in it a good degree 
 of evidence for its truth, upon its being barely propofed 
 to our thoughts. There is no need of abilrufe rea- 
 fonings and diftin&ions, to convince an unprejudiced 
 understanding that there is a God who made and gov- 
 erns the world, and will judge it in righteoufnefs, 
 though they may be neceffary to anfwer abflrufe diffi- 
 culties, when once fuch are raifed ; when the very 
 meaning of thofe words which exprefs mod intelligi- 
 bly the general doctrine of religion, is pretended to be 
 uncertain, and the clear truth of the thing itfelf is ob- 
 icured by the intricacies of fpeculation. But to an 
 unprejudiced mind, ten thoufand thoufand inftances 
 of defign cannot but prove a defigner. And it is in- 
 tuitively manifeft, that creatures ought to live under 
 a dutiful fenfe of their Maker, and that juftice and 
 charity muft be his laws, to creatures whom he has 
 made focial and placed in fociety. Indeed the truth 
 of revealed religion, peculiarly fo called, is not felfevi- 
 dent, but requires external proof in order to its be- 
 ing received. Yet inattention among us to revealed 
 religion, will be found to imply the fame diflblute im- 
 moral temper of mind as inattention to natural relig- 
 ion ; becaufe, when both are laid before us in the 
 manner they are in Chriftian countries of liberty, our 
 X 2 obligations 
 
33* 
 
 CONCLUSION. PART It 
 
 obligations to inquire into both, and to embrace both 
 upon fuppofition of their truth, are obligations of the 
 fame nature. For, revelation claims to be the voice 
 of God ; and our obligation to attend to his voice is 
 furely moral in all cafes. And as it is infilled that its 
 evidence is conclufive, upon thorough confideration 
 of it, fo it offers itfelf to us with manifeft obvious ap- 
 pearances of having fomething more 7 than human in 
 it, and therefore in ail reafon requires to have its claims 
 mod ferioufly examined into. It is to be added, that 
 though light and knowledge, in what manner foever 
 afforded us, is equally from God, yet a miraculous rev- 
 elation has a peculiar tendency, from the firft princi- 
 ples of our nature, to awaken mankind, and infpire 
 them with reverence and awe ; and this is a peculiar 
 obligation to attend to what claims to be fo with fuch 
 appearances of truth. It is therefore moil certain that 
 our obligations to inquire ferioufly into the evidence 
 of Chriftianity, and upon fuppofition of its truth to 
 embrace it, are of the utmofl importance, and moral in 
 the highefl and mofl proper fenfe. Let us then fuppofe 
 that the evidence of religion in general, and of Chrift- 
 ianity, has been feriouily inquired into by all reafona- 
 ble men among us. Yet we find many profelTedly to 
 rejed both, upon fpeculative principles of infidelity. 
 And all of them do not content themfelves with a bare 
 negleft of religion, and enjoying their imaginary free- 
 dom from its reftraints. Some go much beyond this. 
 They deride God's moral government over the world. 
 They renounce his protection, and defy his juftice. 
 They ridicule and vilify Chriftianity, and blafpheme 
 the Author of it ; and take all occafions to tnanifeft a 
 fcorn and contempt of revelation. This amounts to 
 an active fetting themfelves againft religion, to what 
 may be confidered as a pofitive principle of irreligion ; 
 which they cultivate within themfelves, and, \vhether 
 they intend this efTed or not, render habitual, as a 
 
 good 
 
PART II. CONCLUSION. 333 
 
 good man does the contrary principle. And others, 
 who are not chargeable with all this profligatenefs, yet 
 are in avowed oppofition to religion, as if difcovered 
 to be groundlefs. Now admitting, which is the fup- 
 pofition we go upon, that thefe perfons act upon what 
 they think principles of reafon, and otherwife they are 
 not to be argued with, it is really inconceivable that 
 they fhould imagine they clearly fee the whole evidence 
 of it, confidered in itfelf, to be nothing at all ; nor do 
 they pretend this. They are far indeed from having 
 a jufl notion of its evidence ; but they would not fay 
 its evidence was nothing, if they thought the fyftern 
 of it, with all its circumftances, were credible, like of 
 matters of fcience or hiftory. So that their manner 
 of treating it muft proceed, either from fuch kind of 
 objections againft all religion as have been anfvvered or 
 obviated in the former part of this treatife, or elfe from 
 objections and difficulties fuppofed more peculiar to 
 Chriilianity. Thus, they entertain prejudices againft 
 the whole notion of a revelation and miraculous in- 
 terpofitions. They find things in Scripture, whether 
 in incidental paiTages or in the general fcheme of it, 
 which appear to them unreafonable. They take for 
 granted that if Chriftianity were true, the light of it 
 muft have been more general, and the evidence of it 
 more fatisfactory, or rather overbearing ; that it muft 
 and would have been, in fome way, ofherwiie put ar.d 
 left than it is. Now this is not imagin. the 
 
 evidence itlelf to be nothing or inconfiderable, but 
 
 te another thing. It is being fortified againft the 
 .knee in fome degree acknowledged, by thinking 
 they fee the lyftem of Chriftianity, or ibmc ich 
 
 appears to them neceffarily connected with it, to be in- 
 credible or falfe ; fortified againft that evidence which 
 might otherwife make great imprefilon upon them. 
 Qr, laftly, if any of thefe perfons are, upon the whole, 
 
 doubt concerning the truth of Chviftianity, their 
 
 behaviour 
 
334 CONCLUSION. PART II. 
 
 behaviour feems Owing to their taking for granted, 
 through flrange inattention, that fuch doubting is, 
 in a manner, the fame thing as being certain againft it. 
 To thefe perfons, and to this ftate of opinion con- 
 cerning religion, the foregoing treatife is adapted. 
 For, all the general objections againil the moral fyftem 
 of nature having been obviated, it is fliewn that there 
 is not any peculiar preemption at all againft Chrift- 
 ianity, either considered as not difcoverable by reafon, 
 or as unlike to what is fo difcovered ; nor any worth 
 mentioning againft it as miraculous, if any at all ; 
 none certainly which can render it in the leaft incred- 
 ible. It is mewn that upon fuppofition of a divine 
 revelation, the analogy of nature renders it beforehand 
 highly credible, I think probable, that many things 
 in it muft appear liable to great objections ; and that 
 we muft be incompetent judges of it to a great de- 
 gree. This obfervation is, I think, unqueftionably 
 true, and of the very utmoft importance ; but it is 
 urged, as I hope it will be underftood, with great cau- 
 tion of not vilifying the faculty of reafon, which is 
 the candle of the Lord within us ; * though it can af- 
 ford no light where it does not mine, nor judge where 
 it has no principles to judge upon. The objections 
 here fpoken of, being firft anfwered in the view of ob-. 
 jections againft Chriftianity as a matter of fact, are in, 
 the next place coniidered as urged more immediately 
 againft the wifdom, juftice and goodnefs of the Chrift- 
 ian difpenfation. And it is fully made out that they 
 admit of exactly the like anfwer, in every refpect, to 
 what the like objections againft the conftitution of na- 
 ture admit of ; that, as partial views give the appearance 
 of wrong to things, which upon farther confideration 
 and knowledge of their relations to other things are 
 found juft and good, fo it is perfectly credible that the 
 things objected, againft the wifdom and goodnefs of the 
 
 Chriftiaa 
 
 * Prov. xx. 27. 
 
PART II. CONCLUSION. 335 
 
 Chriflian difpenfation, may be rendered inflances of 
 wifdom and goodnefs by their reference to other things 
 beyond our view ; becaufe Chrjflianity is a fcheme as 
 much above our comprehenfion, as that of nature, and 
 like that, a fcheme in which means are made ufe of to 
 accomplifli ends, and which, as is mofl credible, may 
 be carried on by general laws. And it ought to be 
 attended to, that this is not an anfwer taken merely 
 or chiefly from our ignorance, but from fomewhat 
 pofitive which our obfervation fhews us. For, to like 
 objections the like anfwer is experienced to be jufl 
 in numberlefs parallel cafes. The objections againfi 
 the Chriflian difpenfation, and the method by which 
 it is carried on, having been thus obviated in general 
 and together, the chief of them are confidered diftinct- 
 ly, and the particular things objected to are fhewn. 
 credible, by their perfect analogy, each apart, to the 
 conflitution of nature. Thus, if man be fallen from 
 his primitive (late, and to be reftored, and infinite 
 wifdom and power engages in accompHfhing our re- 
 covery, it were to have been expected, it is laid, that 
 this mould have been effected at once, and not by 
 fuch a Jong feries of means, and fuch a various econ- 
 omy of perfons and things ; one difpenfation prepar- 
 atory to another, this to a farther one, and fo on 
 through an indefinite number of ages, before the end 
 of the fcheme propofed can be completely accom- 
 plifhed ; a fcheme conducted by infinite wifdom, and 
 executed by almighty power. But now on the con- 
 trary, our finding that every thing in the conflitution 
 and courfe of nature is thus carried on, 'fhews fuch ex- 
 pectations concerning revelation to be highly unrea- 
 fonable, and is a fatisfactory anfwer to them, when 
 urged as objections againft the credibility that the 
 great fcheme of Providence in the redemption of the 
 world may be of this kind, and to be accomplifhed in 
 this manner. As to the particular method of our re- 
 demption, 
 
336 CONCLUSION. PART IL 
 
 demption, the appointment of a Mediator between 
 God and man, this has been (hewn to be moft obvi- 
 oufly analogous to the general conduct of nature, i. e. 
 the God of nature in appointing others to be the in- 
 flruments of his mercy, as we experience in the daily 
 courfe of Providence. The condition of this world, 
 which the doctrine of our redemption by Chrift pre- 
 fuppofes, fo much falls in with natural appearances, 
 that heathen moralifts inferred it from thofe appear- 
 ances ; inferred that human nature was fallen from 
 its original rectitude, and in confequence of this de- 
 graded from its primitive happinefs. Or, however 
 this opinion came into the world, thefe appearances 
 mud have kept up the tradition, and confirmed the 
 belief of it. And as it was the general opinion un- 
 der the light of nature that repentance and reforma- 
 tion, alone and by itfelf, was not fufficient to do away 
 lin, and procure a full remiflion of the penalties an- 
 nexed to it, and as the reafon of the thing does not 
 at all lead to any fuch conclufion, fo every day's ex- 
 perience fhews us that reformation is not, in any fort, 
 fufficient to prevent the prefent difadvantages and 
 miieries which, in the natural courfe of things, God 
 has annexed to folly and extravagance. Yet there 
 may be ground to think that the punifhments, which 
 by the general laws of divine government are annexed 
 to vice, may be prevented , that provifion may have 
 been even originally made, that they fhould be pre- 
 vented by fome means or other, though they could 
 not by reformation alone. For we have daily inftances 
 oifuch mercy > in the general conduct of nature ; com- 
 panion provided for mifery,* medicines for difeales, 
 friends againft enemies. There is provifion made, in 
 the original conftitution of the world, that much of 
 the natural bad confequences of our follies, which 
 perfons themfelves alone cannot prevent, may be pre- 
 
 ventecj 
 
 * Serm. at the Rolls, p, 106, 
 
PART II. C O N C.L U S I N. : 3 ^ 
 
 j ^ t 
 
 vented by the afnftance of others ; affiftance which 
 nature enables, and difpofes, and appoints them to af- 
 ford. By a method of goodnefs analogous to this, 
 when the world lay in wickednefs and confequently in 
 ruin, Godfo loved the wor/d, that lie gave his only begot- 
 ten Son to lave it ; and he being mads per/eel by fitffer- 
 in^ became the author of eternal falvation to all them thai 
 obey him.* Indeed neither reafon nor analogy would 
 lead us'to think, in particular, that the interpofition 
 of Chrift, in the manner in which he did interpofe, 
 would be of that efficacy for recovery of the world 
 which the Scripture teaches us it was ; but neither 
 would reafon nor analogy lead us to think, that other 
 particular means would be of the efficacy which expe- 
 rience mews they are, in numberlefs inftances. And 
 therefore, as the cafe before us does not admit of ex- 
 perience, fo that neither reafon nor analogy can (hew 
 how, or in what particular way, the interpolation of 
 Chrift, as revealed in Scripture, is of that efficacy which 
 it is there reprefented to be, this is no kind nor de- 
 gree of prefumption againft its beincr really of that 
 efficacy/ Farther the objections againft Cnriftianity, 
 from the light of it not being univerial, nor its evi- 
 dence fo ftrong as might pofiibiy be given us, have 
 been anfwered by the general analogy of nature. 
 That God has made fuch variety of creatures, is in- 
 deed an anfwer to the former ; but that he diipenics 
 his gifts in fuch variety, both of degrees and kinds, 
 araongft creatures of the fame fpecies, and even to the 
 fame individuals at different times, is a more obvious 
 and full anfwer to it. And it is ib far from being the 
 method of Providence in other cafes, to" afford usYuch 
 overbearing evidence as tome require in proof of Cnrift- 
 ianity, that on the contrary, the evidence upon v 
 we are naturally appointed to ad in common mat- 
 ters, throughout a very great part of life, is doubtful 
 
 in 
 
 * Joh. iii, 1 6. Heb, v. 9, 
 
338 CONCLUSION. PART II. 
 
 in a high degree. And admitting the fad, that God 
 has afforded to fome no more than doubtful evidence 
 of religion, the fame account may be given of it as of 
 difficulties and temptations with regard to pradice. 
 But as it is not impoflible,* furely, that this alleged 
 doubtfulnefs may be men's own fault, it deferves their 
 mod ferious confederation whether it be not fo. How- 
 ever, it is certain that doubting implies a degree of 
 evidence for that of which we doubt ; and that this 
 degree of evidence as really lays us under obligations, 
 as demonflrative evidence. 
 
 The whole then of religion is throughout credible ; 
 nor is there, I think, any thing relating to the revealed 
 difpenfation of things, more different from the expe- 
 rienced conftitution and courfe of nature, than fome 
 parts of the conftitution of nature are from other parts 
 of it. And if fo, the only queftion which remains is, 
 what pofitive evidence can be alleged for the truth of 
 Chriflianity. This too in general has been confidered, 
 and the objections againft it eflimated, Dedud there- 
 fore what is to be deduded from that evidence, upon 
 account of any weight which may be thought to re- 
 main in thefe objections, after what the analogy of 
 nature has fuggefted in anfwer to them, and then con- 
 fider what are the pradical confequences from all this, 
 upon the mod fceptical principles one can a.^ue upon, 
 (for I am writing to perfons who entertain thefe prin- 
 ciples) and upon fuch confideration it will be obvious 
 that immorality, as little excufe as it admits of in it- 
 felf, is greatly aggravated in perfons who have been 
 made acquainted with Chriflianity, whether they be- 
 lieve it or not ; becaufe the moral iyftem of nature, or 
 natural religion, which Chriflianity lays before us, ap- 
 proves itfelf, almoft intuitively, to a reafonable mind 
 upon feeing it propofed. In the next place, with re- 
 gard to Chriflianity it will be obferved, that there is a 
 
 middle 
 
 * P. 274, &c. 
 
PART II, CONCLUSION. 339 
 
 middle between a full fatisfadion of the truth of it, 
 and a fatisfadion of the contrary. The middle ftate 
 of mind between thefe two, confifts in a ferious appre- 
 henfion that it may be true, joined with doubt whether 
 it be fo. And this, upon the befl judgment I am able 
 to make, is as far towards fpeculative infidelity as any 
 fceptick can at all be fuppofed to go, who has had 
 true Chriftianity, with the proper evidence of it, laid 
 before him, and has in any tolerable meafure conlid- 
 ered them. For I would not be miftaken to compre- 
 hend all who have ever heard of it ; becaufe it feems 
 evident that in many countries, called Chriftian, nei- 
 ther Chriftianity nor its evidence are fairly laid before 
 men. And in places where both are, there appear to 
 be fome who have very little attended to either, and 
 who rejed Chriflianity with a fcorn proportionate to 
 their inattention, and yet are by no means without 
 underflanding in other matters. Now it has been 
 Ihewn that a ferious apprehenfion that Chriftianity 
 may be true, lays perfons under the ftrideft obliga- 
 tions of .a ferious regard to it throughout the whole of 
 their life ; a regard not the fame exactly, but in many 
 refpeds nearly the fame, with what a full conviction of 
 its truth would lay them under. Laftly, it will ap- 
 pear that blafphemy and profanenefs, I mean with re- 
 gard to Chriftianity, are abfolutely without excufe. 
 For there is no temptation to it but from the wan- 
 tonnefs of vanity or mirth ; and thefe, coniidering the 
 infinite importance of the fubjed, are no fuch tempta- 
 tions as to afford any excufe for it. If this be a juft 
 account of things, and yet men can go on to vilify or 
 difregard Chriftianity, which is to talk and ad as if 
 they had a demonftration of its falfehood, there is no 
 reaibn to think they would alter their behaviour to 
 any purpofe, though there v/ere a demonftration of 
 its truth. 
 
 THE END OF THE SECOND PART. 
 
TWO BRIEF 
 
 DISSERTATIONS. 
 
 I. Of PERSONAL IDENTITY. 
 II. Of the NATURE of VIRTUE. 
 
A D V ERTISEM E N T. 
 
 IN the fir ft copy of thefe papers, I had iti- 
 ferted the two following Differ tat ions into the chapters, 
 Of a Future Life, and> Of the Moral Government 
 of God, with which they are clofely connected. But 
 as they do not directly fall under the title of the fore- 
 going Treatife, and zyould have kept the fubjeft of it 
 too long out of fight y it feemed more proper to place 
 them by themf elves. 
 
DISSERTATION I. 
 
 Of Perfonal Identity. 
 
 HETHER we are to live in a future 
 flate, as it is the moft important queftion which can 
 pofiibly be afked, fo it is the moft intelligible one 
 which can be expreffed in language. Yet ftrange per- 
 plexities have been raifed about the meaning of that 
 identity or famenefs of perfon, which is implied in the 
 notion of our living now and hereafter, or in any two 
 iucceffive moments. And the folution of thefe diffi- 
 culties hath been ftronger than the difficulties them- 
 felves. For, perfonal identity has been explained fo 
 by fome, as to render the inquiry concerning a future 
 life of no confequence at all to us, the perfons who are 
 making it. And though few men can be mifled by 
 fuch fubtleties, yet it may be proper a little to con- 
 fider them. 
 
 Now, when it is afked wherein perfonal identity 
 confifts, the anfwer mould be the fame as if it were 
 afked wherein confifts fimilitude or equality ; that all 
 attempts to define would but perplex it. Yet there 
 is no difficulty at all in afcertaining the idea. For as, 
 upon two triangles being compared or viewed togeth- 
 er, there ariies to the mind the idea of fimilitude, or 
 upon twice two and four, the idsa of equality, fo 
 iikewife, upon comparing the confcioufneiles of one's 
 
 felf 
 
344 Of P^fonal Identity. Diss. L 
 
 felf or one's own exiftence in any two moments, there 
 as immediately arifes to the mind the idea of perfonal 
 identity. And as the two former comparifons not 
 only give us the ideas of fimilitude and equality, but 
 alfo fhew us that two triangles are alike, and twice 
 two and four are equal, fo the latter comparifon not 
 only gives us the idea of perfonal identity, but alfo 
 mews us the identity of ourfelves in thofe two mo- 
 ments ; the prefent, fuppoie, and that immediately 
 paft ; or the prefent, and that, a month, a year, or 
 twenty years paft. Or in other words, by reflecting 
 upon that which is my felf now, and that which was 
 my felf twenty years ago, I difcern they are not two s 
 but one and the fame felf. 
 
 But though confcioufnefs of what is paft does thus 
 afcertain" our perfonal identity to ourfelves, yet to fay 
 that it makes perfonal identity, or is neceffary to our 
 being the fame perfons^ is to fay that a perfon has not 
 exifted a fmgle moment* nor don'e one action, but 
 what he can remember ; indeed none but what he re- 
 flects upon. And one mould really think it felfevi- 
 dent, that confcioufnefs of perfonal identity prefup- 
 pofes, and therefore cannot conftitute, perfonal iden- 
 tity, any more than knowledge in any other cafe can 
 conftitute truth, which it prefuppofes. 
 
 This wonderful miftake may pombly have anfen 
 from hence, that to be ejndued with confcioufnefs is 
 infeparable from the idea of a perfon or intelligent be- 
 ing. For, this might be expreffed inaccurately thus, 
 that confcioufnefs makes perfonality, and from hence 
 it might be concluded to make perfonal identity. But 
 though prefent confcioufnefs of what We at prefent do 
 and feel is neceflary to our being the perfons we now 
 are, yet prefent confcioufnefs of paft actions or feelings 
 is not neceflary to our being the lame perfons, who 
 performed thofe aclicns or had thofe feelings. 
 
 The 
 
>iss. I. Of Perfonal Identity. 
 
 The inquiry, what makes vegetables the fame in the 
 common acceptation of the word, does not appear to 
 have any relation to this of perfonal identity, becaufe 
 the word feme, when applied to them and to perfon, is 
 not only applied to different fubjecls, but it is alfo 
 ufed in different fenfes. For when a man fvvears to 
 the fame tree as having flood fifty years in the fame 
 place, he means only the fame as to all the purpofes of 
 property and t<fes of common life, and not that the 
 free has been all that time the fame in the flric~l phi- 
 lofophical fenfe of the word. For he does not know, 
 whether any one particle of the prefenf tree be the 
 fame with any one particle of the tree which flood in 
 the fame place fifty years ago. And if they have not 
 one common particle of matter, they cannot be the 
 fame tree in the proper philofophick fenfe of the word 
 fame ; it being evidently a contradiction in terms to 
 fay they are, when no part of their fubflance and no 
 one of their properties is the fame ; no part of their 
 fub A ance, by the fuppofition ; no one of their prop- 
 erties, becaufe it is allowed that the fame property can- 
 not be transferred from one fubflance to another. And 
 therefore when we fay the identity or famenefs of a 
 plant confifls in a continuation of the fame life, com- 
 municated under the fame organization to a number 
 of particles of matter, whether the fame or not, the 
 word fame^ when applied to life and to organization, 
 cannot poffibly be underflood to fignify what it figni- 
 fies in this very fentence when applied to matter. la 
 a loofe and popular fenfe then, the life and the organ- 
 ization and the plant are juflly faid to be the fame, 
 notwithftanding the perpetual change of the parts. 
 But in a ftricT: and philofophical manner of fpeech, no 
 man, no being, no mode of being, no anything, can be 
 the fame with that with which it hath indeed nothing 
 the fame. Now famenefs is ufed in this latter fenfe 
 when applied to perfons. The identity of thefe, there- 
 fore, cannot fubfift with diverfity of fubflance. 
 
 Y The 
 
346 Of Perfonal Identity. Diss. t 
 
 The thing here confidered, and demonflratively, as 
 I think, determined, is propofed by Mr. Locke in thefe 
 words, whether /'/, i. e. the fame felf or perfon, be the 
 fame identical fubftance ? And he has fuggefled what is 
 a much better anfwer to the queflion than that which 
 he gives it in form. For he defines perfon, a thinking 
 intelligent being, &c. and perfonal identity, the famenefs 
 of a rational being.* The queflion then is, whether 
 the fame rational being is the fame fubflance ; which 
 needs no anfwer, becaufe being and fubflance in this 
 place ftand for the fame idea. The ground of the 
 doubt, whether the fame perfon be the fame fubflance, 
 is faid to be this, that the confcioufnefs of our own 
 exiflence in youth and in old age, or in any two joint 
 fucceffive moments, is not the fame individual aftion^ 
 i. e. not the fame confcioufnefs, but different fuc- 
 ceffive confcioufnefTes. Now it is flrange that this 
 fhould have occafioned fuch perplexities. For it is 
 furely conceivable that a perfon may have a capacity 
 of knowing fome objecl: or other to be the fame now, 
 which it was when he contemplated it formerly ;' yet 
 in this cafe, where by the fuppofition the objecl is per- 
 ceived to be the fame, the perception of it in any two 
 moments cannot be one and the fame perception . And 
 thus, though the fucceffive confcioufnefTes which we 
 have of our own exiflence are not the fame, yet are they 
 Confcioufnefles of one and the fame thing or objecl: ; 
 of the fame perfon, felf, or living agent. The perfon 
 of whofe exiflence the confcioufnefs is felt now, and 
 was felt an hour or a yar ago, is difcerned to be, not 
 two perfons, but one and the fame perfon ; and there- 
 fore is one and the fame. 
 
 Mr. Locke's obfervations upon this fubjedt appear 
 hafly ; and he feems to profefs him felf difTatisfied 
 with fuppofitions which he has made relating to it.'|* 
 
 But 
 
 * Locke's Works, vol. I. p. 146, 
 f Locke, p. 146, 147. 
 p. 152. 
 
Diss. I; Of Personal Identity, 347 
 
 But fome of thofe hafly obfervations have been carried 
 to a ftrange length by others, whofe notion, when tra- 
 ced and examined to the bottom, amounts, I think, 
 to this.: * "-That perfonality is not a permanent, but 
 a tranfient thing; that it lives and dies, begins and 
 ends continually ; that no one can any more remain 
 one and the fame perfon two moments together, than 
 two fucceflive moments can be one and the fame mo- 
 ment ' y that our fubftance is indeed continually chang- 
 ing ; but whether this be fo or not, is, it feems, noth- 
 ing to the purpofe, fince it is not fubftance, but con- 
 fcioufnefs alone, which conflitutes perfonality, which 
 confcioufnefs being fucceflive cannot be the fame in 
 any two moments, nor confequently the perfonality 
 conftituted by it." And from hence it muft follow, 
 that it is a fallacy upon ourfelves to charge our prefent 
 felves with any thing we did, or to imagine our prefent 
 felves interefled in any thins which befel us yefterday, 
 or that our prefent felf wiH be interefted in what will 
 befal us tomorrow j fince our prefent felf is not, in real- 
 ity, the fame with the felf of yefterday, but another 
 like felf or peifon coming in its room, and miftaken 
 for it i to which another felf will fucceed tomorrow- 
 This, I fay, muft follow ; for if the felf or perfon of to- 
 day, and that of tomorrow, are not the fame, but on- 
 ly like perfons, the perfon of today is really no more 
 interefted in what will befal the perfon of tomorrow, 
 than in what will befal any other perfon. It may 
 be thought perhaps,, that this is not a juft reprefenta- 
 tionof the opinion we are fpeaking of; becaufe thofe 
 who maintain it allow, that a perfon is the fame as far 
 back as his remembrance reaches. And indeed they 
 do ufe the words identity zn&fame perfon. Nor will 
 language permit thefe words to be laid afide ; fince if 
 they were, there muft be, I know not what ridiculous 
 
 periphraiis 
 
 * See an anfwer to Dr. Clarke's third defence of his letter to Mr, Dud* 
 ad edit, p, 44, 56, &c, 
 
 Y2 
 
348 Of Perfonal Identity. Digs. L 
 
 periphrafis fubftituted in the room of them. But 
 they cannot, confiftently with themfelves, mean that 
 the perfon is really the fame, For, it is felfevident that 
 the perfonality cannot be really the fame, if, as they 
 exprefsly aifert, that in which it confifts is not the 
 fame. And as, confiflently with themfelves, they can- 
 not, fo I think it appears they do not, mean that the 
 perfon is really the fame, bxit only that he is fo in a 
 fictitious fenie ; in fuch a fenfe only as they affert, for 
 this they do affert, that any number of perfons what- 
 ever may be the fame perfon. The bare unfolding 
 this notion, and laying it thus naked and open, feems 
 the beft confutation of it. However, fmce great flrefs 
 is faid to be put upon it, I add the following things. 
 
 Firft, This notion is abfolutely contradictory to 
 that certain conviction which hec'effarily and every 
 moment rifes within us, when we turn our thoughts 
 upon ourfelves, when we reflect upon what is pall, and 
 look forward upon what is to come. All imagination 
 of a daily change of that living agent which each man 
 calls himfelf, for another, or of any fuch change 
 throughout our whole prefent life, is entirely borne 
 down by our natural fenfe of things. Nor is it poflible 
 for a perfon in his wits fd alter his conduct, with re- 
 gard to his health or affairs, from a fufpicion that 
 though he mould live tomorrow, he mould not, how- 
 ever, be the fame perfon he is today. And yet, if it 
 be feafonable to aS, with refpect to a future life, up- 
 on this notion that perfonality is tranfient, it is reafon- 
 able to act upon it with refpect to the prefent. Here 
 then is a notion equally applicable to religion and to 
 bur temporal concerns, and every one fees and feels the 
 inexpreflible abfurdity of it in the latter cafe ; if there- 
 fore any can take up with it in the former, this cannot 
 proceed from the reafoh of the thing, but mud be ow- 
 ing to an inward unfairnefs and fecret corruption of 
 heart. 
 
PISS. f. Of Perfonal Identity. 349 
 
 
 
 Secondly, It is not an idea, or abftrad notion, or 
 quality, but a being only, which is capable of life ancj 
 action, of happinefs and mifery. Now sill beings con* 
 fefledly continue the fame, during the whole time of 
 their exiftence. Confider then a living being now 
 exifting, and which has exifted for any time alive - 9 
 this living being muft have done and fufrered and 
 jenjoyed, what it has done and fuffcred and enjoyed 
 formerly, (this living being, I fay, and not another) as 
 really as it does and fuffers and enjoys, what it does 
 and fufFers and enjoys this inftant. All theie fucceffive 
 actions, enjoyments and fufFerings, are actions, enjoy- 
 ments and fufferings of the fame living being. And 
 they are fo, prior to all confideration of its remember- 
 ing or forgetting ; fmce remembering or forgetting 
 can make no alteration in the truth of pad matter of 
 fact. And fuppofe this being endued with limited 
 powers of knowledge and memory, there is no more 
 difficulty in conceiving it to have a power of knowing 
 itfelf to be the fame living being which it was fome 
 time ago, of remembering fome of its actions, fuffer- 
 ings and enjoyments, and forgetting others, than in 
 conceiving it to know or remember or forget any thing 
 elfe. 
 
 Thirdly, Every perfon is confcious, that he is now 
 the fame perfon or felf he was as far back as his re- 
 membrance reaches ; fmce when any one reflects upon, 
 a pafl action of his own, he is juft as certain of the per- 
 fon who did that action, namely, himfelf, the perfon, 
 who now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the ac- 
 tion was at all done. Nay, very often a perfon's aiTur- 
 ance of an action having been done, of which he is ab- 
 folutely allured, arifes wholly from the confcioufnefs 
 that he himfelf did it. And this he, perfon, or felf, muft 
 either be a fubftance, or the property of fome fubftance. 
 If he, if perfon, be a fubftance, then confcioufnefs that 
 J;e ip th^ fame perfon, is conicioufnefs that he is the 
 
3 jo Of Perfonal Identity. Diss. I. 
 
 fame fubftance. If the perfon, or he, be the property 
 of a fubftance, ftill confcioufnefs that he is the fame 
 property is as certain a proof that his fubftance remains 
 the fame, as confcioufnefs that lie remains the fame 
 fubftance would be ;' fince the fame property cannot 
 be transferred from one fubftance 'to another. 
 
 But though we are thus certain that we are the 
 fame agents, living beings, or fubftances now, which 
 we were as far back as our remembrance reaches, yet 
 k is afked whether we may not poifibly be deceived 
 in it ? And this queftion may be afked at the end of 
 any demonftration whatever ; becaufe it is a queftion 
 concerning the truth of perception by memory. And 
 he who can doubt whether perception by memory cari 
 in this cafe be depended upon, may 'doubt alfo whether 
 perception by deduction and reafoning 3 which alfo in- 
 clude memory, or indeed whether intuitive perception 
 can. Here 'theri we can go no farther. For it is ri- 
 diculous to attempt to prove the truth of thofe per- 
 ceptions, whofe truth we can no otherwife prove than 
 by other perceptions of exactly the fame kind witli 
 them, and which there is juft the' fame ground to fuP 
 peel: ; or to attempt to prove the truth of our facul- 
 ties, which can no otherwife be proved than by thg 
 ufe or means of thofe very fufpected faculties them* 
 felvesi 
 
DISSERTATION II. 
 
 Of the Nature of Virtue. 
 
 JL HAT which renders beings capable or 
 moral government, is their having a moral nature and 
 moral faculties of perception and of action. Brute 
 creatures are imprefled and actuated by various in-, 
 ftindts and propenfions ; fo alfo are we. But addit 
 tional to this, we have a capacity of reflecting upon 
 actions and characters, and making them an object to 
 our thought ; and on doing this, we naturally and 
 unavoidably approve fbme actions, under the peculiar 
 view of their being virtuous and of good defert, and 
 difapprove osiers, as vicious and of ill defert. That 
 we have this moral approving and difapproving * fac- 
 ulty, is certain from our experiencing it in ourfeive^, 
 and recognizing it in each other. It appears from 
 our exercifing it unavoidably, in the approbation and 
 difapprobation even of feigned characters ; from the 
 words, right and wrong, odious and amiable, bafe 
 and worthy, with many others of like lignirication in 
 ail languages, applied to actions and characters ; from 
 the many written fyftems of morals which fuppofe it, 
 fmce it cannot be imagined that all theie authors, 
 
 throughout 
 
 * This way of fpeaking is taken from Epi'flefus, [a] and is made ufe of as 
 Teaming the.moft full, and leaft h'able to cavil. And the moral faculty may be 
 underftood to have theie two epithets, Joxi^cao-nxii and OCTTO JoxijCAflHrnxi}, 
 upon a double account ; becaufe, upon a furvey of actions, whether before 
 or after they are done, it determines them to be good or evil ; and alfo be- 
 caufe it determines itfelf to be the guide of aclion and of life, in contradif- 
 tindtion from all other faculties, or natural principles of aclion ; in the very 
 lame manner as ipeculative reafon diretfly and naturally judges of fpeculative 
 truth and falfehood, and at the fame time is attended with a confcioufnef; 
 upon refleflion, that the natural right to judge of them belongs to it, 
 
 [a] Arr. Efift. /. I. r. x. 
 
35* Of the Nature of Virtus. Diss. II. 
 
 throughout all thefe treat ifes, had abfolutely no mean- 
 ing at all to their words, or a meaning merely chimer- 
 ical j from our natural fenfe of gratitude, which im- 
 plies a diftinction between merely being the inftrument 
 of good and intending it j from the like distinction 
 every one makes between injury and mere harm,which, 
 Hobbs fays, is peculiar to mankind ; and between in- 
 jury and juft punimment, a diftinction plainly natural, 
 prioc to the confide rat ion of human laws. It is man- 
 ifeft great part of common language, and of common 
 behaviour over the world, is formed upon fuppofition 
 of fuch a moral faculty, whether called conicience, 
 moral reafon, moral fenfe, or divine reafon ; whether 
 confidered as a fentiment of the understanding, or as 
 a perception of the heart, or, which feems the truth, 
 as including both. Nor is it at all doubtful in the 
 general what courfe of action this faculty or practical 
 difcerning power within us approves, and what it dif- 
 approves. For, as much as it has been difputed 
 wherein virtue confifts, or whatever ground for doubt 
 there may be about particulars, yet, in general, there 
 is in reality an univerfally acknowledged Standard of 
 it. It is that which all ages and all countries have 
 made profeflion of in publick ; it is that which every 
 man you meet puts on the (hew 'of; it is that which 
 the primary and fundamental laws of all civil confti- 
 tutions, over the face of the earth, make it their bufi- 
 nefs and endeavour to enforce the practice of upon 
 mankind ; namely, juftice, veracity, and regard to 
 common good. It being manifeft then, in general, 
 that we have fycli a faculty or qifcernment as this, it 
 may be of ufe to remark fome things more distinctly 
 concerning it. 
 
 Firjt, It ought to be obferved that the object of 
 this faculty is actions,^ comprehending under that 
 
 name 
 
 ^f\\ \ r / i , v > / i/r 
 
 T oudg r? apsm xtx,i xstxioc, v 7rei<rt oaXXa, svspyeiot. M. 
 Auton. 1. 9. 1 6. Virtutis laus omnis in adione confiftit. Cic. Off. 1. i. 
 c, 6. 
 
Piss. II. Of the Nature of Virtue. 353 
 
 name active or pra&ical principles ; thofe principles 
 from which men would act if occafions and circum- 
 itances gave them power, and which, when fixed and 
 habitual in any peribn, we call his character. It does 
 not appear that brutes have the leaft reflex fenfe of 
 actions as difjinguifhed from events, or that will and 
 deiign, which conftitute the very nature of actions, as 
 fuch, are at all an object to their perception. But to 
 ours they are ; and they are the object, and the only 
 one, of the approving and difapproving faculty. Act- 
 ing, conduct, behaviour, abftracted from all regard to 
 ;vhat is, in fact and event, the confequence of it, is it- 
 felf the natural object of the moral difcernment, as 
 fpeculative truth and faliehood is of fpeculative reafon. 
 Intention of fuch and fuch confequences, indeed, is al- 
 ways included, for it is part of the action itfelf ; but 
 though the intended gopd or bad confequences do not 
 follow, we have exactly the fame fenfe of the action as 
 if they did. In like manner we think well or ill of 
 characters, abftracted from all confederation of the 
 good or the evil which perfons of fuch characters have 
 it actually in their power to clo. We never, in the 
 moral way, applaud or blame either ourfelves or others 
 for what we enjoy or what we fuller, or for having im- 
 preflions made upon us which we coniider as altogether 
 out of our power ; but only for what we do, or would 
 have done, had it been in our power, or for what we 
 leave undone which we might have done, or would 
 have left undone though we could have done it. 
 
 Secondly, Qur fenfe or difcernment of actions as 
 morally good or evil, implies in it a fenfe or difcern- 
 ment of them as of good cr ill defert. It may be dii* 
 ficult to explain this perception, ip as to anfwer all the 
 queftions which may be aiked concerning it j but ev- 
 ery one fpeaks of fuch and fuch actions as deferving 
 punifhment, and it is not, I iuppole, pretended that 
 they have abfolutely no nic;nu::g at all to the expref- 
 
 lion. 
 
354 Of the Nature of Virtue. Diss. II, 
 
 fion. Now the .meaning plainly is not, that we con- 
 ceive it for the good of fociety that the doer of fuch 
 actions mould be made to fuffer. For if unhappily it 
 xvere refolved that a man, who by fame innocent ac- 
 tion was infected with the plague, mould be left to 
 perim, left by other people's coming near him the in- 
 fection mould fpread, no one would fay he delerved 
 this treatment. Innocence and ill defert are inconfift- 
 ent ideas. Ill defert always fuppofes guilt ; and if one 
 be not part of the other, yet they are evidently and 
 naturally connected in our mind. The fight of a man 
 in mifery raifes our companion towards him ; and if 
 this mifery be inflicted on him by another, our indig- 
 nation againft the author of it. But when we are in- 
 formed that the furFerer is a villain, and is puniflied 
 only for his treachery or cruelty, oqr companion ex- 
 ceedingly leflens, and in many inftances our indigna- 
 tion wholly fubfides. Now what produces this effect, 
 is the conception of that in the fufferer which we call 
 ill defert. Upon confidering then, or viewing togeth- 
 er, our notion of vice and that of mifery, there reiults 
 a third, that of ill defert. And thus there is in hu- 
 man creatures an aflbciation of the two ideas, natural 
 and moral evil, wickednefs and punimment. If this 
 aflbciation were merely artificial or accidental, it were 
 nothing ; but being moil unqueflionably natural, it 
 greatly concerns us to attend to it, inftead of endeav- 
 ouring to explain it away. 
 
 It may be obferved farther, concerning our, percep- 
 tion of good and of ill defert, that the former is very 
 weak with refpect to common inftances of virtue ; 
 one reafon of which may be, that it does not appear 
 to a fpectator how far fuch inftances of virtue proceed 
 from a virtuous principle, or in what degree* this prin- 
 ciple is prevalent, fmce a very weak regard to virtue 
 may be fufficient to make men act well in many com- 
 mon inftances. And on the other hand, our perception 
 
 of 
 
P i s s . II. Of the Nature of Virtue. 
 
 of ill defert in vicious actions leflens, in proportion to 
 the temptations men are thought to have had to fuch 
 vices. For, vice in human creatures confiding chiefly 
 in the abfence or want of the virtuous principle, though 
 a man be overcome, fuppofe, by tortures, it does not 
 from thence apnear to what degree the virtuous prin- 
 ciple was wanting, All that appears is, that he had it 
 not in fuch a degree as to prevail over the temptation ; 
 but poffibly he had it in a degree which would" have 
 rendered him proof againft common temptations. 
 
 Thirdly^ Our perception of vice and ill defert arifes 
 from, and is the refult of, a comparifon of actions with 
 the nature and capacities of the agent. For, the mere 
 neglect of doing what we ought to do, would in many 
 cafes be determined by all men to be in the higheft 
 degree vicious. And this determination muft arite 
 from fuch comparifon, and be the refult of it, be- 
 cauie fuch neglect would not be vicious in creatures 
 of other natures and capacities, as brutes. And it 
 is the fame alfo with refpect to pofitive vices, or 
 fuch as confift in doing what we ought not. For, 
 every one has a different fenfe of harm done by an 
 idiot, madman, or "child, and by one of mature and 
 common underftanding, though the action of both, 
 including the intention which is part of the action, be 
 the fame ; as it may be, iince idiots and madmen, as 
 well as children, are capable not only of doing mif- 
 chief, but alfo of intending it. Now this difference 
 muft arife from fomewhat difcerned in the nature or 
 capacities of one, which renders the action vicious, 
 and the want of which in the other, renders the fame 
 action innocent or lefs vicious ; and this plainly fup- 
 poies a comparifon, whether reflected upon or not, 
 between the action and capacities of the agent, previ- 
 ous to our determining an action to be vicious. And 
 hence arifes a proper application of the epithets, 
 incongruous, undatable, difproportionate, unfit, tcJ 
 
 actions, 
 
Of the Nature of Virtue, Diss. II 
 
 actions ivhich our moral faculty determines to be 
 vicious. 
 
 Fourthly, It deferves to be confidered whether men 
 are more at liberty, in point of morals, to make them- 
 ielves miferable without reafon, than to make other 
 people fo ; or difiblutely to neglect their own greater 
 good, for the fake of a prefent letfer gratification, than 
 they are to neglect the good of others, whom nature 
 has committed to their care. It mould feern, that a 
 due concern about our own intereft or happinefs, and 
 a reafonable endeavour to fecure and promote it, 
 which is, I think, very much the meaning of tha 
 word prudence, in our language, it mould feem, 
 that this is virtue, and the contrary behaviour faulty 
 and blameable ; fince, in the calmeft way of re* 
 flection., we approve of the firft, and condemn ths 
 other conduct, both in ourfelves and others. This 
 approbation and difapprobation are altogether differ-. 
 cnt from mere defire of our own, or of their happinefs, 
 and from forrow upon miffing it. For the object or 
 occafion of this laft kind of perception is fatisfaction 
 or uneafinefs ; whereas the object of the firft is active 
 behaviour. In one cafe, what oar thoughts fix upon 
 Is our condition ; in the other our conduct. It is 
 true indeed, that nature has not given us fo fenfible 
 a difapprobation of imprudence and folly, either in 
 elves or other s,zs of falfehood, injuflice and cruelty; 
 fuppofe, becaufe that conftant habitual fenfe of pri- 
 vate intereft and good, which we always carry about 
 with us, renders fuch fenfible difapprobation lefs 
 neceffary, lefs wanting, to keep us from imprudently 
 neglecting our own happinefs, and foolimly injuring 
 ourfelves, than it is neceffary and wanting to keep us 
 from injuring others, to whofe good we cannot have fa 
 ftrong and conftant a regard ; and alfo becaufe im- 
 prudence and folly, appearing to bring its own punifh- 
 ment more immediately and constantly than injurious 
 
 behaviour, 
 
 ourfe 
 I fu 
 
Diss. II. Oftfie Nature of Virtu*. 357 
 
 behaviour, it lefs needs the additional punifliment 
 which would be inflicted upon it by others, had they 
 the fame fenfible indignation againft it as againft in- 
 juftice and frau'd and cruelty. Beftdes, unhappinefs 
 being in itfelf the natural object of compaffion, the 
 unhappinefs which people bring upon themfelves, 
 though it be wilfully, excites in us fome pity for them ; 
 and this of courfe lefiens our difpleafure againil them. 
 But ftill it is matter of experience, that we are form- 
 ed fo as to reflect very feverely upon the greater in- 
 ftances of imprudent neglects and foolifh raflinefs, 
 both in ourfelves and others. In inftances of this 
 kind, men often fay of themfelves with remorfe, and 
 of others with fome indignation, that they deferved 
 to fufTer fuch calamities, becaufe they brought them' 
 upon themfelves, and would not take warning. Par- 
 ticularly when perfons come to poverty and diftrefs by 
 a long courfe of extravagance, and after frequent ad- 
 rnonitic'ns, though without falfehoo'd or injuftice ; we 
 plainly do not regard fuch people, as alike objecls of 
 companion with thofe who are brought into the fame 
 condition by unavoidable accidents. From thefe 
 things it appears, that prudence is a fpecies of virtue, 
 and folly of vice : meaning by folly fomewhat quite 
 different from mere incapacity ; a thoughtlefs want 
 of that regard and attention to our own happinefs 
 which we had capacity for. And this the word prop- 
 erly includes, and, as it feems, in its ufual accep- 
 tation for we fcarce apply it to brute creatures. 
 
 Movvever, if any perfon be difpofe'd to difpute the 
 matter, I fhall very willingly give him up the words 
 virtue and vice, as not applicable to prudence and 
 folly ; but muft beg leave to infrft, that the faculty 
 within us, which is the judge of actions, approves of 
 prudent actions, and difapproves imprudent ones ; I 
 fay prudent and imprudent aEHons, as fuch, and con- 
 fidered diftindly from the happinefs or miiery which 
 
 they 
 
3 5 8 Qf /A<? Nature of Virtue. T) i s s, 1L 
 
 they occafion. .And by the way, this obfervation; 
 may help to determine what juftneis there is in that 
 obje&ion againfl religion, that it teaches us to be in- 
 terefted and felflili. 
 
 Fifthly ', Without inquiring how far and in what 
 fenfe virtue is refolvable into benevolence, and vice 
 into the want of it, it may be proper to obferve, that 
 benevolence and the want of it, fingly contidered, are 
 in no fort the whole of virtue and vice. For if this 
 were the cafe, in the review of one's own character or 
 that of others, our moral underftanding and moral 
 fenie would be. indifferent to every thing but the de- 
 grees in which benevolence prevailed, and the .degrees 
 in which it was wanting. That is, we fhould neither 
 approve of benevolence to fome perfons rather than to 
 others, nor difapprove injuflice and falfehpod upon 
 any other account than merely as an overbalance of 
 happinefs was forefeen likely to be produced by the 
 tirfl, and of mifcry by the fecond. But now on the 
 contrary, fupppfe two men competitors for any thing 
 whatever which would be of equal advantage to each 
 of them, though nothing indeed would be more im- 
 pertinent than for a ftranger to bufy himfelf to get one 
 6f them preferred to the other, yet fuch endeavour 
 would be virtue in behalf of a friend or benefa&or,- 
 abftracted from all consideration of diflant confe- 
 quences ; ^that examples of gratitude and the cul- 
 tivation of frienclihip would be of general good to the 
 world. Again, fuppofe one rhan fhould, by fraud or 
 violence, take from another the fruit of his labour, 
 with intent to give it to a third, who, 'he thought, 
 would have as much pleafure from it as would bal- 
 ance die pleafure which the firft pofleffor would have 
 had in the enjoyment and his vexation in the lofs of 
 it ; fuppofe alfo that no bad confequences would fol-< 
 low ; yet fuch an action would furely be vicious. 
 Nay farther, were treachery, violence and injuflice no 
 
 otherwife 
 
D 1 5 s . II* Of the Nature of Virtue. 339 
 
 otherwife vicious than as forefeen likely to produce an 
 overbalance of mifery to fociety, then, if in any cafe 
 a man could procure to himfelf as great advantage by 
 ah act of injuftice as the whole forefeen inconvenience 
 likely to be brought upon others by it would amount 
 to, fuch a piece of injuflice would not be faulty or 
 vicious at all, becaufe it would be no more than, in 
 any other cafe, for a man to prefer his own fatisfac- 
 tion to another's in equal degrees. The fact then ap- 
 pears to be, that we are conltituted fo as to condemn 
 falfehood, unprovoked violence, injuftice, and to ap- 
 prove of benevolence to fome preferably to others, ab- 
 ftracted from all confederation which conduct is like- 
 lied to produce an overbalance of happinefs or mifery. 
 And therefore, were the Author of nature to propofe 
 nothing to himfelf as an end but the production of 
 happinefs, were his moral character merely that of be- 
 nevolence, yet ours is not fo. Upon that fuppoiition 
 indeed, the only reafon of his giving us the above- 
 mentioned approbation of benevolence to fome per- 
 fons rather than others, and difapprobation of falfe- 
 hood, unprovoked violence, and injuftice, muft be, 
 that he forefaw this conftitution of our nature would 
 produce more happinefs than forming us with a tem- 
 per of more general benevolence. But ftill, fmce this 
 is our conftitution, falfehood, violence, injuftice, muft 
 be vice in us, and benevolence to fome preferably to 
 others, virtue, abftracted from all confideration of the 
 overbalance of evil or good which they may appear 
 likely to produce. 
 
 Now if human creatures are endued with fuch a 
 moral nature as we have been explaining, or with a 
 moral faculty the natural object of which is actions, 
 moral government muft coniift in rendering them hap- 
 py and unhappy, in rewarding and puniihing them, 
 as they follow, neglect, or depart from, the moral rule 
 of action interwoven in their nature, or fuggefted and 
 
 enforced 
 
360 Of the Nature of Virtue. D i s s . IL 
 
 enforced by this moral faculty ;* in rewarding and 
 punifhing them upon account of their fo doing. 
 
 I am not fenfible that I have, in this fifth obferva- 
 f ion, contradicted what any author defigned to affert. 
 But forfie of .great and diftinguifhed merit have, I 
 think, expreffed themfelves in a manner which may 
 occafion fome danger to cafelefs readers, of imagin- 
 ing the whole of virtue to confift in fingly aiming, ac- 
 cording to the beft of their judgment, at promoting 
 the happinefs of mankind in the prefent Rate ; and 
 the whole of vice, in doing what they forefee, or 
 might forefee, is likely to produce an' overbalance of 
 tmhqjpinefs in it ; than which miftakes, none can be 
 conceived more terrible. For it is certain that fome 
 of the moil mocking inftances of injuftice, adultery, 
 murder, perjury, and even of perfecution, may, in 
 many fuppofable cafer>, not have the appearance of be- 
 ing likely to produce an overbalance of mifery in the 
 prefent ftate ; perhaps fometimes may have the con- 
 trary appearance. For this reflection might eafily be 
 
 carried on, but I forbear The happinefs of the 
 
 world is the concern of him, who is the lord and the 
 proprietor of it ; nor do we know what we are about, 
 when we endeavour to promote the good of man- 
 kind in anyways but thofe which he has directed, 
 that is indeed in all ways not contrary to veracity and 
 juilice. I fpeak thus upon fuppofition of perfons real- 
 ly endeavouring, in fome fort, to do good without re- 
 gard to thefe. But the truth feems to be, that fuch 
 fuppofed endeavours proceed, almoft always, from am- 
 bition, the fpirit of party, or fome indirect principle, 
 Concealed perhaps in great meafure from perfons 
 themfelves, And though it is our bufinefs and our 
 duty to endeavour, within the bounds of veracity and 
 juftice, to contribute to the eafe, convenience, and 
 even cheerfulnefs and diversion of our fellow crea- 
 tures, 
 
 * P. l6q. 
 
D i s s . II. Of the Nature of Virtue. 361 
 
 tures, yet from our fhort views, it is greatly uncertain 
 whether this endeavour will, in particular inftances, 
 produce an overbalance of happinefs upon the whole, 
 iince fo many and diflant things muft come into the 
 account. And that which makes it our duty, is, that 
 there is fome appearance that it will, and no pofi- 
 tive appearance fufficient to balance this on the con- 
 trary fide ; and alfo that fuch benevolent endeavour 
 is a cultivation of that mod excellent of all virtuous 
 principles, the aclive principle of benevolence. 
 
 However, though veracity as well as juftice is to be 
 our rule of life, it muft be added, otherwife a fnare 
 will be laid in the way of fome plain men, that the 
 ufe of common forms of fpeech generally underftood, 
 cannot be falfehood, and, in general, that there can be 
 no defigned falfehood without defigning to deceive. 
 It muft likewife be obferved, that in numberlefs cafes 
 a man may be under the ftricteft obligations to what 
 he forefees will deceive, without his intending it. 
 For it is impofiible not to forefee that the words and 
 actions of men in different ranks and employments, 
 and of different educations, will perpetually be mif- 
 taken by each other ; and it cannot but be fo whilft 
 they will judge with the utmoft careleflhefs, as they 
 daily do, of what they are not, perhaps, enough in- 
 formed to be competent judges of, even though they 
 confidered it with great Attention. 
 
A 
 
 CHARGE 
 
 DELIVERED TO THE 
 
 CLERGY 
 
 AT THE 
 
 PRIMARY VISITATION of the DIOCESE of DURHAM, in the Year 
 
 MDCCLI ; 
 
 BY THE RIGHT REVEREND FATHER IN COD 
 
 JOSEPH BUTLER, LL. D. 
 
 THEN LORD BISHOP OF THAT DIOCESE. 
 
 WITH NOTES, 
 
 Containing a Defence of the Charge againfl the Obje<5lions of an anonymous 
 
 Writer. 
 
 BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 Z 2 
 
C H A R G 
 
 DELIVERED TO THE 
 
 CLERGY, 
 
 AT is impoflible for me, my brethren, 
 upon our firft meeting of this kind, to forbear lament- 
 ing with you the general decay of religion in this na- 
 tion ; which is now obferved by every one, and has 
 been for fome time the complaint of all ferious perfons. 
 The influence of it is more and more wearing out of 
 the minds of men, even of thofe who do not pretend to 
 enter into fpeculations upon the fubjec~t ; but the num- 
 ber of thofe who do, and who profels themfelves unbe- 
 lievers, increafes, and with their numbers their zeal. 
 Zeal, it is natural to afk for what ? Why truly for 
 nothing, but againft every thing that is good and fa- 
 cred amongft us. 
 
 Indeed, whatever efforts are made againft our relig- 
 ion, no Chriftian can poffibly d^fpair of it. For He, 
 who has all power in heaven and earth, has promifed 
 that he will be with us to the end of the world. Nor 
 can the prefent decline of it be any {tumbling block 
 
 to 
 
 * The publication of Bifliop BUTLER'S Charge, in the year 1751, was 
 followed by a pamphlet, printed in 1752? entitled, A Serious Inquiry into the 
 Ufe and Importance cf External Religion, occajloned by fome Pajfages in the Right 
 Reverend the Lord fcijhop of Durham's Charge to the Clergy of that Dioccfe, &c. 
 humbly addreffed to his Lordjhif. This pamphlet has been reprinted in a mif- 
 cellaneous work ; fuch parts of it as feemed moft worthy of obfervation, the 
 reader will find in the Notes fubjoined to thofe paffages of the Charge, to 
 which the pamphlet refers. 
 
366 Charge to the 
 
 to fuch as are confiderate ; fince he himfelf has fo 
 flrongly expreifed what is as remarkably predicted in 
 other paiTages of Scripture, the great defection from 
 his religion which mould be in the latter days, by that 
 prophetick queflion, When the Son of Man cometh^ftiall 
 he find faith upon the earth ? How near this time is, 
 God only knows ; but this kind of fcripture figns of 
 it is too apparent. For as different ages have been 
 diftinguimed by different forts of particular errors 
 and vices, the deplorable diftinction of ours is an avow- 
 ed fcorn of religion in fome, and a growing difregard 
 to it in the generality. 
 
 As to the profeffed enemies of religion, I know 
 not how often they may come in your way ; but often 
 enough, I fear, in the way of fome at lead amongft 
 you, to require confideration what is the proper beha- 
 viour towards them. One would, to be fore, avoid 
 great familiarities with thefe perfons ; efpecially if they 
 affect to be licentious and profane in their common 
 talk. Yet if you fall into their company, treat them 
 with the regards which belong to their rank ; for fo 
 we muft people who are vicious in any other refpect. 
 We mould iludy what St. James, with wonderful ele- 
 gance and expreffivenefs, calls meeknefs of wifdom, in 
 our behaviour towards all men, but more efpecially 
 towards thefe men - y not fo much as being what we 
 owe to them, but to ourfelves and our religion, that 
 we may adorn the doEirine of God our Saviour , in our 
 carriage towards thofe who labour to vilify it. 
 
 For difcourfe with them, the caution commonly 
 given, not to attempt anfwering objections which we 
 have not confidered, is certainly juft. Nor need any 
 one in a particular cafe be alliamed frankly to ac- 
 knowledge his ignorance, provided it be not general, 
 And though it were, to talk of what he is not ac- 
 quainted with, is a dangerous method of endeavour- 
 ing to conceal it. But a confiderate perfon, however 
 
 qualified 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1751. 367 
 
 qualified he be to defend his religion, and anfwer the 
 objections he hears made againft it, may fometimes 
 fee caufe to decline that office. Sceptical and profane 
 men are extremely apt to bring up this fubjed at 
 meetings of entertainment, and fuch as are of the freer 
 fort ; innocent ones, I mean, otherwife I mould not 
 fuppofe you would be prefent at them. Now religion 
 is by far too ferious a matter to be the hackney fub- 
 jed upon thefe occafions. And by preventing its being 
 made fo, you will better fecure the reverence which is 
 due to it, than by entering into its defence. Every one 
 obferves, that men's having examples of vice often be- 
 fore their eyes, familiarizes it to the mind, and has 
 a tendency to take off that juft abhorrence of it which 
 the innocent at firft felt, even though it fhould not 
 alter their judgment of vice, or make them really be- 
 lieve it to be lefs evil or dangerous. In like manner, 
 the hearing religion often difputed about in light fa- 
 miliar converfation, has a tendency to lefTen that fa- 
 cred regard to it, which a good man would endeavour 
 always to keep up, both in himfelf and others. But 
 this is not all ; people are too apt inconfiderately to 
 take for granted that things are really queftionable, be- 
 caufe they hear them often difputed. This indeed 
 is fo far from being a confequence, that we know de- 
 monftrated truths have been difputed, and even mat- 
 ters of fad, the objeds of our fenfes. But were it a 
 confequence, were the evidence of religion no more 
 than doubtful, then it ought not to be concluded falfe 
 any more than true, nor denied any more than affirm- 
 ed ; for fufpenfe would be the reafonable ftate of mind 
 with regard to it. And then it ought in all reafon, 
 confidering its infinite importance, to have nearly the 
 fame influence upon practice, as if it were thoroughly 
 believed. For would it not be madnefs for a man to 
 forfake a fafe road, and prefer to it one in which he 
 acknowledges there is an even chance he mould lofe 
 
 his 
 
3 68 Charge to the 
 
 his life, though there were an even chance likewife of 
 his getting fafe through it ? Yet there are people ab- 
 furd enough to take the fuppofed doubtfulnefs of re- 
 ligion for the fame thing as a proof of its falfehood, 
 after they have concluded it doubtful from hearing 
 it often called in queflion. This (hews how infinitely 
 unreafonable fceptical men are, with regard to religion, 
 and that they really lay afide their reafon upon this 
 fubject as much as the mofl extravagant enthufiafts. 
 But further, cavilling and objecting upon any fubjed 
 is much eafier than clearing up difficulties ; and this 
 laft part will always be put upon the defenders of re- 
 ligion. Now a man may be fully convinced of the 
 truth of a matter, and upon the ftrongeft reafons, and 
 yet not be able to anfwer all the difficulties which may 
 be raifed upon it. 
 
 Then again, the general evidence of religion is 
 complex and various. It confifts of a long feries of 
 things, one preparatory to and confirming another, 
 from the very beginning of the world to the prefent 
 time. And it is eafy to fee how impoffible it mufb 
 be, in a curfory converfation, to unite all this into 
 one argument, and reprefent it as it ought ; and could 
 it be done, how utterly indifpofed people would be to 
 attend to it I fay in a curfory converfation , where- 
 as unconnected objections are thrown out in a few 
 words, and are eafily apprehended, without more atten- 
 tion than is ufual in common talk. So that, notwith- 
 ilanding we have the befl caufe in the world, and 
 though a man were very capable of defending it, yet 
 I know not why he mould be forward to undertake it 
 upon fo great a difadvantage, and to fo little good ef- 
 fect, as it muft be done amidft the gaiety and careletT- 
 nefs of common converfation. 
 
 But then it will be neceflary to be very particularly 
 upon your guard, that you may not feem, by way of 
 compliance, to join in with any levity of difcourfe 
 
 refpecting 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1751. 369 
 
 refpe&ing religion. Nor would one let any pretend- 
 ed argument againft it pafs entirely without notice ; 
 nor any grofs ribaldry upon it, without expreffing our 
 thorough difapprobation. This lad may fometimes 
 be done by filence ; for filence fometimes is very ex- 
 preflive ; as was that of our bleffed SAVIOUR before 
 the Sanhedrim, and before Pilate. Or it may be done 
 by obferving mildly, that religion deierves another fort 
 of treatment, or a more thorough confideration than 
 fuch a time, or fuch circumftances admit. However, 
 as it is abfolutely neceflary that we take care, by dil- 
 igent reading and ftudy, to be always prepared, to be 
 ready always to give an anfwer to every man that ajketh 
 a reafon of the hope that is in us, fo there may be oc- 
 cafions when it will highly become us to do it. And 
 then we muft take care to do it in the fpirit which the 
 apoftle requires, with meeknefs and fear : * Meeknefs to- 
 wards thofe who give occaiions for entering into the 
 defence of our religion ; and with fear, not of them, 
 but of God ; with that reverential fear which the na- 
 ture of religion requires, and which is fo far from be- 
 ing inconfiilent with, that it will infpire proper cour- 
 age towards men. Now this reverential fear will 
 lead us to infill ftrongly upon the infinite greatnefs of 
 God's fcheme of government, both in extent and du- 
 ration, together with the wife connexion of its parts, 
 and the impoffibility of accounting fully for the feve- 
 ral parts, without feeing the whole plan of Providence 
 to which they relate j which is beyond the utmoft 
 ilretch of our underflanding, And to all this muft be 
 added the necefTary deficiency of human language, 
 when things divine are the fubjecl of it. Theie ob- 
 fervations are a proper full anfwer to many objections, 
 and very material with regard to all. 
 
 But your ftanding bufinefs, and which requires con- 
 ftant attention, is with the body of the people , to re- 
 vive 
 
 * i Pet. iii. 15, 
 
370 Charge to the 
 
 vive in them the fpirit of religion which is fo much 
 declining. And it may feem, that whatever reafon 
 there be for caution as to entering into any argu- 
 mentative defence of religion in common converfation y 
 yet that it is neceffary to do this from the pulpit, in or- 
 der to guard the people againfl being corrupted, how- 
 ever in ionic places. But then furely it mould be 
 done in a manner as little controversial as porTible. 
 For though fuch as are capable of feeing the force of 
 objections are capable alfo of feeing the force of the 
 anfwers which are given to them, yet the truth is, the 
 people will not competently attend to either. But 
 it is eafy to fee which they will attend to mod. And 
 to hear religion treated of, as what many deny, and 
 which has much faid againft it as well as for it, this 
 cannot but have a tendency to give them ill impref- 
 fions at any time ; and feems particularly improper 
 for all perfons at a time of devotion, even for fuch as 
 are arrived at the moft fettled ftate of piety ; I fay 
 at a time of devotion, when we are aflembled to yield 
 ourfelves up to the full influence of the Div i N E PRES- 
 ENCE, and to call forth into actual exercife every pi- 
 ous affection of heart. For it is to be repeated, that 
 the heart and courfe of affections may be difturbed 
 when there is no alteration of judgment. Now the 
 evidence of religion may be laid before men without 
 any air of controverfy. The proof of the being of 
 God, from final caufes,or the defign and wifdom which 
 appears in every part of nature, together with the law 
 of virtue written upon our hearts ;* the proof of 
 
 Chriftianity 
 
 * The law of virtue written upon our hearts.] The author of the Inquiry , 
 mentioned above, informs us in his Poftfcript, that " the certain confequence 
 of referring mankind to a lu-iu of nature or i.-irfue written upon their hearts is their 
 having recourfe to thd, oivn fen ft- of things on all occafiom ; which being, in a 
 great majority, no better Chan family fuperftition, party prejudice, or f'elf in- 
 tereftcd artifice, (perhaps ;! compound of all) will "be too?pt to overrule the 
 plain precepts of the Gofpel." And he declares, he has " no better opinion 
 of the rlearnrf", certainty, uniformity , universality, &C. of this law, than" he. 
 has " of the importance of external religion." What then muft we fay to St. 
 Paul, who not only atferts, in the ftrongeft terms, the reality of fuch a law, 
 
 but 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1751 
 
 37 
 
 Chriftianity from miracles, and the accompli (liment 
 of prophecies ; and the confirmation which the nat- 
 ural and civil hiftory of the world give to the fcripture 
 account of things ; thefe evidences of religion might 
 properly be infixed on in a way to afTecl: and influence 
 the heart, though there were no profeilcd unbelievers 
 in the world ; and therefore may be infifted on with- 
 out taking much notice that there are iuch. And 
 even their particular objections may be obviated with- 
 out a formal mention of them. Befides, as to religion 
 
 in 
 
 but fpeaks of its obligation as extending to nil rrmkir.d ; hbming Tome 
 among the Gentiles as without excufe, for not adverting to and obeying it : and 
 commending others for doing by nature (in contradiction to revelation) the 
 things contained in the lam, t\\UsJhe-iuin^ rkr -n-ork of tkf. la<n> written in thtir In art t. 
 If, becaufe " natural religion is liable to he mirtaken, it is high time to have 
 done with it in the pulpit," how comes it that the fame apoftle refers the 
 Philipfiatuio the ftudy of this religion, M :<>': if foe ve r things are true, htnrft, /"/?, 
 lovely and f,f good ieport * And yet without fuch a ftudy our knowledge of' MS 
 moral law muft always remain imperfect ; for a complete fyftem of morality- 
 is certainly no where to he found either in the Old or New Teftame- r. [ i] 
 When aChnftian minifter is enforcing the duties or doctrines of revealed re- 
 ligion, he may perhaps do well to " tell his people he has no other proof of r'ie 
 original, truth, obligations, prefent benefits and future rewards of religion to 
 lay before them, than what is contained in the Scriptures." But what if his 
 purpofe be to inculcate fome moral virtue ? Will it not be ufefnl here, befides 
 obferving that the practice of that virtue is enjoined by a divine command, to 
 recommend it ftill further to his hearers, by Ihewing that it approves itfelf to 
 our inward fenfe and perception, and accords with the native fentiments and 
 lugge rtions of our minds ? Metaphyficians may fay what they will of our feel- 
 ings of this fort being all illufive, liable to be perverted by education and 
 habit, and judged of by men's own fcnfe of things ; they whofe underftandings 
 are yet um'poiled I>\ pJUlofophy and vain deceit will be little difpofed to liften to 
 inch aiiertions. Nor are there wanting arguments which prove, and, as 
 ihould feem, to the fatisfaction of every reafonable inquirer, that the great 
 and leading principles of moral duties have in all ages been the fame ; that 
 fuch virtues a? benevolence, juftice, companion, gratitude, accidental ohfta- 
 cles removed, and when the precife meaning of the words has b^en once ex- 
 plained, are inftmctively known and approved by all men ; an^'that our ap- 
 pro'intion of thri'e is :>s inuch a part of our nature implanted in us by God, and 
 as little liable to capncc and fafhion, as the lenfe of feeing, given us aho by 
 Him, by which all bodies appear to us in an erect, and not an inverted pofi- 
 tion. [b] Mr. Locke's authority has been generally looked up to as decifive 
 on fuch queflions, and his fentiments have been embraced implicitly and 
 without examination. That great and good man, however, is not to be 
 charged with the pernicious comequences which others have drawn from his 
 opinions ; confequences which have been carried to fuch a length, as to de- 
 flroy all moral difference of hut nan actions ; making virtue and vice alto-r 
 gether ^bitary ; calling evil good, 6 > ;rknefs for light > and 
 
 tight fit darkneft putting bitter for fiueet t and jit-cct for bitter. 
 
 [a] See the fccoid of Dr. Balguy's Chat;: . 
 
 [b] See the third of Bifap Hurd's SfrmofH) Vol. I, 
 
372* Charge to the 
 
 in general, it is a practical thing, and no otherwife 
 a matter of fpeculation, than common prudence in 
 the management of our worldly affairs is fo. And 
 if one were endeavouring to bring a plain man to be 
 more careful with regard to this laft, it would be 
 thought a flrange method of doing it, to perplex him 
 with flat ing formally the feveral objections which men 
 of gaiety or fpeculation have made againft prudence, 
 and the advantages which they pleafantly tell us folly 
 has over it, though one could anfwer thofe objections 
 ever fo fully. 
 
 Nor does the want of religion in the generality of 
 the common people, appear owing to a fpeculativc 
 difbelief or denial of it, but chiefly to thoughtleflhefs 
 and the common temptations of life. Your chief 
 bufmefs, therefore, is to endeavour to beget a practi- 
 cal fenfe of it upon their hearts, as what they acknowl- 
 edge their belief of, and profefs they ought to con- 
 form themfelves to. And this is to be done by keep- 
 ing up, as well as we are able, the form and face of re- 
 ligion with decency and reverence, and in ftich a de- 
 gree as to bring the thoughts of religion often to their 
 minds ; * and then endeavouring to make this form 
 more and more fubfervient to promote the reality and 
 
 power 
 
 * By keeping up the form and face of religion \nfuck a degree as to bring 
 the thoughts of religion often to their minds.] To this it is faid by our Inquirer, 
 that " the Clergy of the Church of England have no xvay of keeping up the 
 form and/</^ of religion any cftener, or in any other degree, than is directed by 
 'the prescribed order of the Church." As if the whole duty of a parilh prieit 
 confided in reading prayers and a fermon on Sundays, and performing the 
 occasional offices appointed in the liturgy ! One \vould think the writer who 
 made this objection had never read more of the Charge than the four pages he 
 has particularly felecled for the fubjea of his animadverfions. Had he look- 
 ed farther, he would have found other methods recommended to the Clergy 
 of introducing a fenfe of religion into the minds of their parishioners, which 
 occur mttck oftener than the times allotted for the publick fervices of the 
 Church ; fuch as family prayers ; acknowledging the divine bounty at our 
 meals ; perfonal applications from minifters of parishes to individuals under 
 their care, on particular occafions and circumftances, as at the time of con- 
 firmation, nt firft receiving the holy communion, on recovery from ficknefs, 
 and the like ; none of which are prefcribed in our eftablilhed ritual, any 
 more than thofe others fo ludicroufiy mentioned by this writer, " bowing to 
 the eaft, turning the face to that quarter in repeating the creeds, dipping the 
 finger in water, and therewith crofting the child's forehead in baptifm." 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1751. 373 
 
 power of it. The form of religion may indeed be 
 where there is little of the thing itfelf; but the thing 
 itfelf cannot be preferved amongft mankind without 
 the form.* And this form frequently occurring in 
 ibme inftance or other of it, will be a frequent admo- 
 nition *f to bad men to repent, and to good men to 
 grow better ; and alfo be the means of their doing ib. 
 That which men have accounted religion in the 
 feveral countries of the world, generally fpeaking, has 
 had a great and confpicuous part in all publick appear- 
 ances, and the face of it been kept up with great rev- 
 erence throughout all ranks from the higheft to the 
 loweft ; not only upon occafional folemnities, but al- 
 fo in the daily courfe of behaviour. In the heathen 
 
 world, 
 
 * The thing itfelf cannot be preferved amongft mankind without the 
 form.] The Quakers reject all forms, even the two of Chrift's own inftitu- 
 tion ; will it be faid that " thefe men have no religion preferved among 
 them ?" It will neither be faid nor infmuated. The Quakers, though they 
 have not the form, are careful to keep up theyiic^ of religion ; as appears not 
 only from the cuftom of aflemhling themfelves for the purpofes of publick 
 worfhip on the Lord's day, but from their filent meetings on other days of 
 the \veek. And that they are equally fenfible of the importance of main- 
 taining the influence of religion on their minds, ismanifeftfromthe practice of 
 what they call inward prayer, in conformity to the direction of Scripture to 
 fray continually : " Which," faith Robert Barclay, " cannot be underftood of 
 outward prayer, becaufe it were impoffible that men Ihould be always upon 
 their knees, expreifing the words of prayer, which would hinder them from 
 the exercife of thofe duties no lefs pofitively commanded." si pal ogy fir the 
 Quakers. Prop. xi. Of Wsrjki-p. 
 
 f This form frequently occurring in fome inftance or other of it, will be a 
 frequent admonition, &c.] Here it has been objeaed, that " the number, va- 
 riety, and frequent occurrence of forms in religion are too apt to be confidered 
 by the generality as commutations for their vices, as fomething fuljlltuted in lieu 
 of repentance, and as loads and incumbrances upon true Chriflian edifica- 
 tion." This way of arguing againft the ufe of a thing from the abufe of it, 
 inftcad of arguing from the nature of the thing itfelf, is the matter fophifm. 
 that pervades the whole performance we are here examining. What reafon- 
 able man ever denied that the pomp of outward worfhip has been fometimes 
 miftaken for inward piety? That pofitive inftitutions, when rerted in as 
 ends, mftead of being applied as means, are hurtful to the interefts of true 
 religion ? Not Biihop BUTLER certainly, who blames the obfervances of the 
 papifts on this account ; fome of them as being in themfelves wrong and 
 fuperftitious;" and others, as being "made lublervient to the purpofes of 
 luperftition," and for this reafon " abolifhed by our reformer?." In the 
 meanwhile it will ftill be true, that bodily worlhip is by no means to be dif- 
 carded, as unufeful in exciting fpiritual devotion ; on the contrary, that they 
 mutually affift and ftrengthen each other ; and that a mere mental inter- 
 courfe with God, and a religious fervice purely intellectual, is altogether 
 unfuitable to fnch a creature as man, during his prefcnt ftate on earth 
 
374 Charge to the 
 
 world, their fuperftition was the chief fubjeft of ftatii~ 
 ary, fculpture, painting and poetry. It mixed itfelf 
 with bufinefs, civil forms, diverfions, domeftick enter- 
 tainments, and every part of common life. The Ma- 
 hometans are obliged to fhort devotions five times be- 
 tween morning and evening. In Roman Catholick 
 countries, people cannot pafs a day without having 
 religion recalled to their thoughts, by fome or other 
 memorial of it, by fome ceremony or publick relig- 
 ious form occurring in their way ; * befides their fre- 
 quent holidays, the fliort prayers they are daily call- 
 ed to, and the occafional devotions enjoined by con- 
 feffors. By theie means their fuperftition links deep 
 into the minds of the people, and their religion 
 
 alfo 
 
 * In Roman Catholick countries, people cannot pafs a day without having 
 religion recalled to their thoughts, by fome ceremony or publick religious form 
 occurring in their way.] " What in the former period" (when fpeaking of 
 the heathen world) was u ca&edfttperJiitioH, becomes in this" (when fpeaking 
 of Roman Catholicks) "religion and religious forms i which the papifts pre- 
 tending to connect with Chriftianity, and the Charge giving no hint that this 
 is no more than a pretence, a plain reader muft needs take this as fpoken of 
 the means and memorials of TRUE RELIGION, and will accordingly confider 
 thefe as recommended to his practice and imitation." If a plain reader, at 
 firft view of the paliage alluded to, Ihould inadvertently fall into fuch a mif- 
 take, he would find that miftake immediately corrected by the very next fen- 
 tence that follows, where the religion of the Roman Catholicks and their fu- 
 perftition are diftinguifhed from each other in exprefs words. But the 
 terms in queftion are ufed with the ftricteft propriety. The defign of the 
 Bifhop, in this part of his Charge, is to confider religion, not under the no- 
 tion of its being true, but as it affects the fenfes and imaginations of the mul- 
 titude. For Ib the paragraph begins. " That which men have accounted re- 
 ligion in the feveral countries of the world," (whether the religion be true 
 or falfe is befide his prefent argument) " generally fpeaking, has had a great 
 and confpicuous part in all puhlick appearances." This pofition he illuf- 
 trates by three examples, the Heathen, the Mahometan, and the Roman 
 Catholick religions. The two firft of thefe, having little or nothing of true 
 religion belonging to them, may well enough be characterized under th.5 
 common name of fuperftition; the laft contains a mixture of both, which 
 therefore the Bilhop, like a good writer as well as a juft reafoner, is careful 
 to diftinguhh. In Roman Catholick countries a man can hurdly travel a mile 
 without palling a crucifix erected on the road fide ; he may either flop to 
 worihip the image reprefented on the crofs, or he may fimply be reminded 
 by it of his own. relation to Chrift crucified ; thus by one and the fame out- 
 ward fign " religion may be recalled to his thoughts," or fuperftition may 
 take polfellion of his mind. In the celebration of the eucharift, the element-; 
 of bread and wine are regarded by a papift as the very body and blood of 
 Chrift to a proteftant they appear only as fymbols and memorials of that 
 body and blood ; what in one is an act of rational devotion, becomes in the 
 other an inftance of the groffeit fuperftition, if not idolatry. 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1751. 375 
 
 alfo into the minds of fuch among them as are ferious 
 and well difpofed. Our reformers, confidering that 
 fome of theie obfervances were in themfelves wrong 
 and fuperftitious, and others of them made fubfervi- 
 ent to the purpofes of fuperflition, abolifhed them, 
 reduced the form of religion to great fimplicity,and en- 
 joined no more particular rules, nor left any thing more 
 of what was external in religion than was, in a man- 
 ner, neceiTary to preierve a ienfe of religion itfclf up- 
 on the minds of the people. But a great part of this 
 is neglected by the generality amongft us; for inftance, 
 the lervice of the Church, not only upon common 
 days, but alfo upon faints' clays ; and feveral other 
 things might be mentioned. Thus they have no cuf- 
 tomary admonition, no publick call to recollecl the 
 thoughts of GOD and RELIGION from one Sunday 
 to another. 
 
 It was far otherwife under the LAW. Thtfe words , 
 fays Mofes to the children of ISRAEL, which I com- 
 mand thee, fliall be in thine heart ; and thou JJialt teach 
 them diligently unto thy children, and fliali talk of them 
 when thou fat eft in thine houfe, and when thou walk* 
 eft by the way, and when thou Heft down, and when thou 
 rij'eft up* And as they were commanded this, fo it 
 
 is 
 
 * And when thou riffjl up.] Allowing that "what Mofes in this paffage 
 wanted to have effeaed was obedience to the moral law," nothing lure could 
 be of greater ufe in fecuring that obedience than the pradlice here enjoined. 
 Our inquirer however is of a different opinion ; and " very much queftions 
 whether his Lordlhip could have fallen upon any paffage in the Old Tefla- 
 ment, which relates at all to his fubjeft, that would have been lefs favoura- 
 ble to his argument." Who flail decide ? &c. The Bifhop goes on, " As 
 
 they (the Jews) were commanded this, fo it is obvious how much the ccnfti- 
 tution of their law was adapted to effea it, and keep religion ever in view." 
 Upon which the Inquirer remarks, " It was then very ill, or at lenft vary 
 unwifely done, to abrogate that law, whofe conftitution was adapted to lo 
 excellent a purpofe." Let us firft fee what may be offered in defence of the 
 Bifnop, and then confider what is to be faid in anfwer to his opponent. The 
 purpofe for which the Mofaick conftitution was eftablifhed was this, to pre- 
 ferve, amidft a world univerfally addicted to polytheifm and idolatry, the 
 great doarme of the Unity of the Divine Nature, till the \\-ed Jhsuil come to 
 -whom the fromife was made. As a means to this end, the liraclircs were not 
 only to be kept feparate from every other nation, but, the better to enfure 
 fuch feparation, they were to be conftantiy employed in a multifarious ritual, 
 
 which 
 
3 76 Charge to the 
 
 is obvious how much the conftitution of that law was 
 adapted to effect it, and keep religion ever in view. 
 And without fomewhat of this nature, piety will grow 
 languid even among the better fort of men ; and the 
 worii will go on quietly in an abandoned courfe, with 
 fewer interruptions from within than they would have, 
 were religious reflections forced oftener upon their 
 minds,* and confequently with lefs probability of their 
 amendment. Indeed in moft ages of the church, the 
 care of reafonabie men has been, as there has been for 
 the mofh part occafion, to draw the people off from 
 laying too great weight upon external things ; upon 
 formal acts of piety. But the flate of matters is quite 
 changed now with us. Thefe things are neglected to 
 a degree which is, and cannot but be, attended with a 
 
 decay 
 
 which left them neither time nor opportunity for deviating into the fuper- 
 ftitious obfervances of their pagan neighbours. And this, I fuppofe, may 
 fuffice for vindicating the Bifhop's affertion, that " the conftitution of the 
 Jewish law was adapted to keep religion ever in view." Kut the Jewifh 
 law was not only adapted to this end ; we are next to obferve that the end 
 itfelf was actually gained. For though it be too notorious to be denied, that 
 the Jews did not always confine their religious homage to the God of Ifrael, 
 but polluted the fervice, due to Him alone, with foreign worlhip, yet, even 
 in their worft defections, it fhould he remembera!, they never totally re- 
 jected the true Jehovah ; arid after their return from captivity, they were fo 
 thoroughly cured of all remaining propenfity to the idolatrous rites of hea- 
 thenifm, as never again to violate their allegiance to the God of their fathers. 
 It appears then that, in confequence of the Jewifh feparation, the principle 
 of the Unity was in fact preferved inviolate among that people till the com- 
 ing of Chrift. When the Mofaick conftitution had thus attained its end, and 
 mankind were now prepared for the reception of a better covenant, the law 
 expired of courfe ; the partition wall that had divided the Jew from the 
 Gentile was taken down, and all diftin&ion between them loft under the 
 common name of Chriftians. And this may fuffice to (hew, in oppofition to 
 our Inquirer, that it was both very well and very wifely done to abrogate a 
 law, when the purpofe for which the law had been enacied was accomplilhed. 
 
 * Were religious refieclions/orr?^ oftener upon their minds.] " Accord- 
 ing to the Bifhop's doftrine, then," fays the Inquirer, " it ihould be not only 
 good policy, bat wholefome difcipline to force men in England to come to 
 church, and in France to go to mafs." And again, " If externals have this 
 virtue to enforce religious refieclions, it muft be right to compel thofe who are 
 indifpofed to fuch reflections to attend thefe memorials." Yes ; granting 
 that the fenfe of the pafiage in the Charge is not fhamefully perverted, and 
 that we are to underftand the Bifhop here to fpeak of external force and com- 
 pulfion. Whereas by " religious reflections forced" is plainly meant no more 
 than religious reflections oftener throiun in men's iuay, brought more frequently 
 into their thoughts, fo as to produce an habitual recollection that they are al- 
 ways in the divine prefencc. 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1751. 377 
 
 decay of all that is good. It is highly feafonable now 
 to inftru& the people in the importance of external 
 religion.* 
 
 And doubtlefs under this head muft come into 
 confideration a proper regard to the flruclures which 
 are confeerated to the fervice of God. In the prefent 
 turn of the age, one may obferve a wonderful frugali- 
 ty in every thing which has refpect to religion, and ex- 
 travagance in every thing eife. But amidft the ap- 
 pearances of opulence and improvement in ail common 
 things, which are now feen in mofl places, it would 
 be hard to 'find a reaion why thefe monuments of an- 
 cient piety mould not be preferved in their original 
 beauty and magnificence. But in the lead opulent 
 places they muft be preferved in becoming repair ; 
 and every thing relating to the divine fervice be, how- 
 ever, decent and clean ; otherwife we fhall vilify the 
 face of religion whilft we keep it up. All this is in- 
 deed principally the duty of others. Yours Fs to prefs 
 .ftrongly upon them what is their duty in this refpect, 
 and admonifh them of it often, if they are negligent. 
 
 But then you mufl be fure to take care and not 
 neglect that part of the facred fabrick which belongs 
 to you to maintain in repair and decency. Such neg- 
 lect would be great impiety in you, and of mod per- 
 nicious 
 
 * To inftruft the people in the importance of external religion.] " The 
 importance of external religion," the In^vim remarks, " is. the grand engine 
 $i the papilla, which they play with the greateft en~e<5l upon our common, 
 per ]'!', V.TK.. :-. : c :-l.va>s iooncll taken and eninared by farm Mftdjftav ; and, 
 ?o far nc \.< concur with thorn in the principle, we are doing their \voi iv ; 
 fince IF Sxternals, as fuch, are important, the plain natural confeuuence is, 
 thf >,.>..re of t him the letter." He had the fame reflection once before " If tme 
 .religion cammt be preserved .among men without/o/-i, the cvntequence mufk 
 
 h^ Thai the K^tniJJi religion, having 'we frequent occurrences of forms, is 
 
 better thun o;her religions which have f(-iuc>- of thefe occurrences" To 
 
 thii argurrtent I reply, Ntgo c\ . There may be tuo much t'f forri 
 
 in religion, ?.s well as too little ;*the one leads to cnthufi?.irn, the other d<>- 
 geiKjrat.es into funerftition ; one is puritanifm, the oth^r popery whereas 
 the rational worlltiip of God is equally removed from either extreme. Did 
 the Inquirer never hear of the poifibility of having too much of a gcc;c 
 Or does he fuppofe, with the late hiilorian of Great Britain, that all relig'.ca 
 \i divided into two i'pccies, Uie fuperftitious aud the fanatical; tnd that 
 wh-t"ver is not one of thefe muft of ner.eility be 
 
 A p 
 
378 Charge to the 
 
 nicious example to others* Nor could you, with any 
 fucceis, or any propriety, urge upon them their duty 
 in a regard in which you yourfelves mould be openly 
 neglectful of it. 
 
 Bimop FLEETWOOD has obferved,* that unlefs the 
 good publick fpirit of building, repairing, and adorning 
 churches prevails a great deal more among us, and be 
 more encouraged, an hundred years will bring to the 
 ground an huge number of our churches. This excellent 
 prelate made this obfervation forty years ago ; and no 
 one, I believe, will imagine that the good fpirit he has 
 recommended prevails more at preient than it did 
 then. 
 
 But if thefe appendages of the divine fervice are to 
 be regarded, doubtlefs the divine fervice itfelf is more 
 to be regarded ; and the confcientious attendance up- 
 on it ought often to be inculcated upon the people, 
 as a plain precept of the Gofpel, as the means of grace, 
 and what has peculiar promifes annexed to it. But 
 external acts of piety and devotion, and the frequent 
 returns of them are, moreover, neceflary to keep up a 
 fenfe of religion, which the affairs of the world will 
 otherwife wear out of men's hearts. And the fre- 
 quent returns, whether of publick devotions, or of 
 any thing elfe, to introduce religion into men's feri- 
 ous thoughts, will have an influence upon them in 
 proportion as they are fufceptible of religion, and not 
 given over to a reprobate mind. For this reafon, be- 
 iides others, the fervice of the church ought to be 
 celebrated as often as you can have a congregation to 
 attend it. 
 
 But fince the body of the people, efpecially in 
 country places, cannot be brought to attend it often- 
 er than one day in a week, and fince this is in no fort 
 enough to keep up in them a due fenfe of religion, it 
 were greatly to be wimed they could be perfuaded to 
 
 any 
 
 * Charge to the Clergy of St Afaph, 1710. 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1751. 379 
 
 any thing which might, in fome meafure, fupply the 
 want of more frequent publick devotions, or ferve the 
 like purpofes. Family prayers, regularly kept up in 
 every houfe, would have a great good effect. 
 
 Secret prayer, as exprefsly as it is commanded by 
 our SAVIOUR, and as evidently as it is implied in the 
 notion of piety, will yet, I fear, be grievously forgot- 
 ten by the generality, until they can be brought to fix 
 for themfelves certain times of the day for it ; fmce 
 this is not done to their hands, as it was in the Jew- 
 ifh church by cuftorri or authority. Indeed, cuftom, 
 as well as the manifeft propriety of the thing, and ex- 
 amples of good men in Scripture, juftify us in infilling, 
 that none omit their prayers morning or evening, who 
 have not' thrown off all regards to piety. But fecrct 
 prayer comprehends not only devotions before men 
 begin and after they have ended the bufinefs of the 
 day, but fuch alfo as may be performed while they are 
 employed in it, or even in company. And truly, if 
 befides our more fet devotions, morning and evening, 
 all of us would fix upon certain times of the day, ib 
 that the return of the hour lliould remind us to fay 
 'fhort prayers, or escercife our thoughts in a way equiv- 
 alent to this, perhaps there are few perfons in fo high 
 and habitual a ftate of piety, as not to find the benefit 
 of it. If it took up no more than a minute or two, 
 or even lefs time than that, it would ferve the end I 
 am propofing ; it would be a recollection that we are 
 in the Divine Prefence, and contribute to our being in 
 the fear of the LORD all the day long. 
 
 A duty of the like kind, and ierving to the fr.m? 
 purpofe, is the particular acknowledgment- of God 
 when we are partaking of his baunty at 'Our meals. 
 The neglect of this is laid to have been icandalous to 
 a proverb in the heathen world ;* but it is without 
 
 fliame 
 
 * Cudworth on the Lord's Supper, p. 8. Cafaub. in Athenaeum, L. i. c. 
 xi. p. 22. Duport. Prael. in , Theophraftum Ed. Needham. C. ix. p. 335, c 
 
|8o Charge to the 
 
 fliame laid afide at. the tables of the highefl and the 
 loweft rank among us. 
 
 And as parents iliould be admonifhed, and it fhould 
 be prefled upon their confciences, to teach their chil- 
 dren their prayers and catechifm, it being what they 
 are obliged to upon all accounts, fo it is proper to be 
 mentioned here, as a means by which they will bring 
 the principles of Chriftianity often to their own minds* 
 inflead of laying afide all thoughts of it from wqek** 
 end to week's end. 
 
 General exhortations to piety, abftrafed from thft 
 particular circumftanees of it, ate of great uie to fuch 
 as are already got into a religious courle of life ; but 
 fuch as are not, though they be touched with thetfi* 
 yet when they go away from church they fcarce know 
 where to begin, or how to fet about what they are 
 exhorted to. And it is with refped to religion afc 
 in the common affairs of life, in which many things of 
 great coniequence intended are yet never done at all 
 becaufe they may be done at any time, and in any 
 manner ; which would not be, were fome determin* 
 ate time and manner voluntarily fixed upon for the 
 doing of them. Particular rules and directions, then, 
 concerning the times and circumftanees of perform- 
 ing acknowledged duties, bring religion nearer to prac- 
 tice ; and fuch as are really proper, and cannot well 
 be miftaken, and are eafily obferved. Such particu- 
 lar rules in religion, prudently recommended, would 
 have an influence upon the people. 
 
 All this indeed may be called form, as every thing 
 external in religion may be merely fo. And there- 
 fore whilft; we endeavour in thefe, and other like in- 
 Jftances, to keep up the form of godlinefs * amongft 
 thofe who are our care, and over whom we have any 
 influence, we muft endeavour alfo that this form be 
 made more and more fubfervient to promote the power 
 of it. * Admoniih them to take heed that they mean 
 
 what 
 
 * * a Tim. iii. 5. 
 
Clergy of Bwhem, 
 
 what they fay in their prayers, that their thoughts and 
 intentions go along with their words, that they really 
 in their hearts exert and exercife before God the at- 
 fbaions they ejcprefs with their mouth- Teach them, 
 not that external religtori is nothing, for this is jiet 
 true in any ferue ; it being fcarce poffibk but that 
 it will lay tome fort of reftraint upon a man's morals ; 
 and it is moreover of good effect with refpeft to ths 
 world about him. But teach them that regard to 
 one duty will in no fort atone for the neglect of any 
 other. Endeavour to raife in their hearts fuch a fenie 
 of GOD as fhall be an habitual, ready principle of 
 reverence, love, gratitude, hope, truft, refignation and 
 obedience. Exhort them to make ule of every cir- 
 cumftaace which brings the fubject of religion at all 
 before them ; to turn their hearts habitually to him ; 
 to recoiled: ferioufly the thoughts of his prefence in 
 whom they live and move and have their being, and by 
 a ihort act of their mind devote thcmfelves to his fer- 
 vice. If, for inftance, perfons would accuflcm them- 
 felves to be thus admonilhed by tlie very fight of a 
 CHURCH, could it be called fuperfiition ? Entorce up- 
 on them the necefnty of making religion their principal 
 concern, as what is the exprefs condition of the gofpel 
 covenant, and what the very nature of the thing re- 
 quires. Explain to them the terms of that covenant 
 of mercy, founded in the incarnation, facrificeand in- 
 terceflion of CHRIST, together with the promifed aflift- 
 ance of the HOLY GHOST, not to fuperfede our own 
 endeavours, but to render them effectual. The great- 
 er feftivals of the church being inftituted for com- 
 memorating the ieveral parts of the gofpel hiilory, of 
 courfe lead you to explain theie its ieveral doctrines, 
 and fhew the Chriftian pradice which ariies out of 
 them. . ...C\ the more occafional folemnities of rejig- 
 io-n, as well as thefc feflivals, will often afford you the 
 faireft oj^ortuaitics cf enforcing jii thefc things in 
 
 familiajr 
 
3^ 2 " Charge to the 
 
 familiar converfation. Indeed all affectation of talk- 
 ing pioufly is quite naufeous ; and though there be 
 nothing of this, yet men will ea'fily be difgufted at 
 the too great frequency or length of thefe cccafional 
 admonitions. But a word of GOD and RELIGION 
 dropped fometimes in converfation gently, and with- 
 out any thing fevere or forbidding in the manner of it, 
 this is not unacceptable. It leaves an impreflion, is 
 repeated again by the hearers, and often remembered 
 by plain well difpofed perfons longer than one would 
 think. Particular circumftances too which render 
 men more apt to receive inftru&ion, mould be laid 
 hold of to talk ferioufly to their confciences. For in- 
 ftance, after a man's recovery from a dangerous lick- 
 nefs, how proper is it to advife him to recoiled: and 
 ever bear in mind, what were his hopes or fears, his 
 wifhes and refolutions when under the appreheniion of 
 death, in order to bring him to repentance, or confirm 
 him in a courfe of piety, according as his life and char- 
 after has been. So likewife the terrible accidents which 
 often happen from riot and debauchery, and indeed 
 almoft every vice, are occasions providentially thrown 
 in your way to difcourfe againft thefe vices in common 
 converfation, as well as from the pulpit, upon any fucli 
 accidents happening in your parim, or in a neighbour- 
 ing one. Occalions and circumftances of a like kind 
 to fome or other of thefe occur often, and ought, if I 
 may fo fpeak, to be catched at, as opportunities of con- 
 veying inftruftion, both publick and private,' with 
 great force and advantage. 
 
 Publick inftru&ion is alfo abfolutely neceffa'ry, and 
 can in no fort be difpenfed with. But as it is com- 
 .mon to all who are prefent, many perfons ftrangely 
 neglect to appropriate what they hear to themfelves, 
 to their own heart and life. Now the 0nly remedy 
 for this in our'power is a particular perfonal applica- 
 tion. And a perfonal application makes a very dif- 
 ferent 
 
Clergy cf Durham* 1751. 383 
 
 ferent impreffion from a common, general one. It 
 were therefore greatly to be wifhed, that every man 
 fhould have the principles of Chriftianity, and his own 
 particular duty enforced upon his confcience, in a 
 manner fuited to his capacity, in private. And be- 
 fides the occafional opportunities of doing this, fome 
 of which have been intimated, there are ilated oppor- 
 tunities of doing it. Such, for inftancc, is confirma- 
 tion ; and the ulual age for confirmation is that time 
 of life, from which youth mud become more and 
 more their own mailers, when they are often leaving 
 their father's houfe, going out into the wide world and 
 all its numerous temptations ; againil which they par- 
 ticularly want to be fortified, by having flrong and 
 lively impreflions of religion made upon their minds. 
 Now the 6 1 ft canon exprefsly requires, that every 
 miniiler that hath care of fouls mall ule his bed en- 
 deavour to prepare and make able as many as he can 
 to be confirmed ; which cannot be done as it ought 
 without fuch perfonal application to each candidate in 
 particular as I am recommending. Another opportu- 
 nity for doing this is, when any one of your parifhioners 
 iignifies his name, as intending for the firft time to be 
 partaker of the communion. The rubrick requires 
 that all perfons, whenever they intend to receive, mail 
 fignify their names beforehand to the miniiler ; which, 
 if it be not infilled upon in all cafes, ought abfolutely 
 to be infifled upon for the firil time. Now this even 
 lays it in your way to difcourfe with them in private 
 upon the nature and benefits of this facrament, and en- 
 force upon them the importance and neceffity of re- 
 ligion. However, I do not mean to put this upon 
 the fame foot with catechiiing youth and preparing 
 them for confirmation ; thefe being indiipenfable ob- 
 ligations, and exprefsly commanded by our canons. 
 This private intercourie with your pariihioners prepar- 
 atory to their firft communion, let it, if you pleafe, be 
 
 confidered 
 
384 Charge to the 
 
 confidered as a voluntary fervice to religion on your 
 part, and a voluntary inftance of docility on theirs. 
 1 will only add as to this practice, that it is regularly 
 kept up byfome perfons,and particularly b) one, whole 
 exemplary behaviour in every part of the paitoral of- 
 fice is enforced upon you by his ftation of authority 
 and influence in (this part* efpecially of) the diocefe, 
 I am very fenfible, my brethren, that fome of thefe 
 things, in places where they are greatly wanted, are im- 
 practicable from the largenefs of parilhes, fuppofe. 
 And where there is no impediment of this fort, yet the 
 performance of them will depend upon others, as well 
 as upon you. People cannot be admonimed or in- 
 ftruded in private, unlefs they will permit it. And 
 little will you be able to do in forming the minds of 
 children to a fenfe of religion, if their parents will not 
 affift you in it ; and yet much Icfs, if they will fruftrate 
 your endeavours, by their bad example, and giving 
 encouragement to their children to be difiblute. The 
 like is to be faid alfo of your influence in reforming 
 the common people in general, in proportion as their 
 fuperiors aft m like manner to fuch parents ; and 
 whilft they, the lower people I mean, muft have fuch 
 numerous temptations to drunkennefs and riot every 
 where placed in their way. And it is cruel ufage we 
 often meet with, in being cenfured for not doing what 
 we cannot do, without, what we cannot have, the con- 
 currence of our cenfurers. Doubtlefs very much re- 
 proach which now lights upon the clergy would be 
 found to fall elfewhere, if due allowances were made 
 for things of this kind. But then we, my brethren, 
 mud take care and not make more than due allow- 
 ances for them. If others deal uncharitably with us, 
 \ve muft deal impartially with ourfelves, as in a matter 
 of confcience, in determining what good is in our 
 power to do - y and not let indolence keep us from fet- 
 
 tmg 
 
 * The Archdeaconry of f& 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1751. 38^ 
 
 ling about what really is in our power, nor any beat 
 of temper create obftacles in the profecution of it, or 
 render infuperable fuch as we find, when perhaps gen- 
 tlenefs md patience would prevent or overcome them. 
 
 Indeed all this diligence to which I have been ex- 
 horting you and myfelf, for GOD forbid I mould not 
 confider myfelf as included in all the general admoni- 
 tions you receive from me ; all this diligence in thefe 
 things does indeed fuppofe that we give our f elves whol- 
 ly to them. It fuppofes, not only that we have a real 
 fenfe of religion upon our own minds, but allb, that 
 to promote the practice of it in others is habitually up- 
 permoft in our thought and intention, as the bufmefs 
 of our lives. And this, my brethren, is the bulinefs 
 of our lives, in every fenfe, and upon every account. 
 It is the general bufinefs of ail Chriftians as they have 
 opportunity ; it is our particular bufinefs. It is fo, as 
 we have devoted ourfclves to it by the moft folemn 
 engagements ; as according to our Lord's appointment 
 we live of the Gofpel ;* and as the prefer vat ion and ad- 
 vancement of religion, in fuch and fuch diftrifts, are, 
 in fome refpefts, our appropriated truft. 
 
 By being faithful in the difcharge of this our truft, 
 by thus taking heed to the mini/try we have received in 
 the Lord that we fulfil it ^ we mall do our part to- 
 wards reviving a practical fenfe of religion amongft the 
 people committed to our care, And this will be the 
 jecureft barrier againft the efforts of infidelity ; a great 
 fource of which plainly is, the endeavour to get rid of 
 religious reftraints. But whatever be our fuccefs with 
 regard to others, we fliall have the approbation of our 
 confciences, and may reft allured that, as to ourfelves 
 at leaft, our labour is not in vain in the LORD.J 
 
 * i Cor. ix. 14. f Col. iv. 17 * i Cor. xv. 58. 
 
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