SYSTEM 
 
 O F 
 
 MORAL 
 
 PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 IN THREE BOOKS; 
 
 WRITTEN BY THE LATE 
 
 FRANCIS HUTCHESON, L.L.D. 
 
 PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW. 
 PUBLISHED FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT, 
 
 BY HIS SON FRANCIS HUTCHESON, M. D. 
 
 To which is prefixed 
 SOME ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE, WRITINGS, AND CHARACTER OF THE AUTHOR, 
 
 BY THE REVEREND WILLIAM LEEGHMAN, D. D. 
 
 PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN THE SAME UNIVERSITY. 
 
 VOLUME I. 
 
 RK 
 
 GLASGOW: PRINTED AND SOLD BY R. AND A. F0UL13 PRINTERS TO THE UNIVERSITY-. 
 
 LONDON, 
 
 SOLD BY A.MILLAR OVER-AGAINST KATHARINE-STREET IN THE STRAND| 
 AND BY T. LONGMAN IN PATER-NOSTER ROW. 
 
 M.DCCLV.
 
 A a. ". 
 
 TO THE RIGHT REVEREND 
 
 FATHER IN GOD, 
 
 EDWARD. 
 
 LORDBISHOPOFELPHIN. 
 
 MY LORD, 
 
 'yj r OUR Lord/hip 's known regard for the facred in- 
 ter efts of Virtue and true Religion, is fufficient to 
 enfure your favourable reception of any -work which 
 tends to promote thofe great and important ends. The 
 fo Mowing has yet a farther claim to your Lordflnfs 
 favour. The Author, my excellent Father, (your Lord- 
 Jhip knows I exceed not the truth in calling him fo) 
 was formerly honoured with a place in your friend fliip. 
 As this was a fource of the higheft pleafure to him 
 while he lived, ft> it muft refleB particular honour wbon 
 his memory. It is with pleafure I embrace this public 
 opportunity of declaring myfelf with the- higheft re- 
 JpeB and gratitude, 
 
 MY LORD, 
 
 Your Lordship'j" moft obedient, 
 and moft humble Servant, 
 
 DUBLIN",? 
 
 Jan. 25,17550 
 
 Francis Hutcheson. 
 
 Y. /
 
 THE 
 
 PREFACE, 
 
 Giving fome Account of the Life, Writings, 
 and Character of the Author, 
 
 TAR. Francis Hutcheson was born on the 8th of 
 Auguft, A. D. 1 694. His father, Mr. John 
 Hutchefon, was minifter of a diffenting congregation 
 in the North of Ireland ; a perfon of good underftand- 
 ing, confiderable learning, and reputation for piety, 
 probity, and all virtue. His fon Francis, when about 
 eight years of age, was fent to be educated along with 
 his elder brother, under the eye and direction of their 
 grandfather Mr. Alexander Hutchefon, who was alfo 
 a worthy diffenting clergyman in the fame part of the 
 country, but had come from Scotland. He was fe- 
 cond fon of an ancient and reputable family in the 
 fhire of Ayr in chat kingdom. 
 
 A fuperior capacity, an ardent third for knowledge, 
 and the feeds of the fineft difpofitions foon began to 
 
 a
 
 ii PREFACE. 
 
 mew themfelves in Francis : particularly a Angular 
 warmth of affection and difintereftednefs of temper, 
 for which he was diftinguifhed thro' his whole life, ap- 
 peared in many inftances in this early period of it. 
 The innocence and fweetnefs of his temper, his great 
 capacity and application to his learning foon procured 
 him a diftinguifhing place in his grandfather's affec- 
 tions. But fuch was his love for his brother, that his 
 grandfather's fondnefs gave him no joy while his bro- 
 ther did not equally fhare it: nay the preference that 
 was fhewn him gave him real concern, and put him 
 upon employing all means and innocent artifices in his 
 power to make his brother appear equally deferving of 
 his grandfather's regard. And when his grandfather 
 in his Lift will had made an alteration of a prior fettle- 
 ment of his family-affairs in his favour , tho' many 
 arguments were ufed by his relations to prevail with 
 him to accept of it, he peremptorily refufed, and 
 infilled to the laft that the firft fettlement ihould 
 take place. Thefe, and many other inftances of the 
 like kind which might be related, were promifing pre- 
 faces of remarkable difintereftednefs in more advan- 
 ced years.
 
 PREFACE. iii 
 
 When he had gone thro' the co mmon courfe of fchool 
 education he was fent to an Academy at fome diftance 
 from his parents to begin his courfe of Philofophy : 
 he was taught there the ordinary Scholaftic Philofo- 
 phy which was in vogue in thofe days, and to which 
 he applied himfelf with uncommon affiduity and di- 
 ligence. 
 
 In the year 1 7 1 o he removed from the Academy, 
 and entered a ftudent in the Natural Philofophy clafs 
 in the Univerfity of Glafgow, and at the fame time 
 renewed his ftudy of the Latin and Greek languages : 
 and in all parts of literature, to which he applied him- 
 felf, he made fuch proficiency as might be expected 
 from a genius like his cultivated with great care and 
 diligence. 
 
 After he had finifhed the ufual courfe of philofo- 
 phical ftudies, his thoughts were turned toward Di- 
 vinity, which he propofed to make the peculiar ftu- 
 dy and profeffion of his life. For profecution of 
 which defign he continued feveral years more at the 
 Univerfity of Glafgow ftudying Theology under the 
 direction of the reverend and learned ProfefTor John 
 Simfon. 
 
 a 2
 
 iv PREFACE. 
 
 Among the manifold theological enquiries which 
 occurred to him as deferving his moil: ferious exami- 
 nation; he chufed to begin with the grand fundamen- 
 tal one concerning the being, perfections, and provi- 
 dence of God. The reverend Dr. Clark's learned and 
 ingenious book on this fubjccl, publiihed a fhort time 
 before, fell into his hands. Tho' he mod heartily ap- 
 proved of all the Doctor's conclusions, and had the 
 highefi fenfe of his Angular abilities and virtues, yet 
 after the mod ferious and attentive confideration of 
 his arguments, he did not find that conviction from 
 them which he wifhed and expected. In order to pro- 
 cure more fatisfaction on thisfubject, and particularly 
 with regard to the force and folidity of the arguments 
 a prion (as they are commonly called) he wrote a let- 
 ter to him, about the year 1 7 1 7, urging his objecti- 
 ons, and defiring a further explication. Whether the 
 Doctor returned any anfwer to this letter does not ap- 
 pear from Dr. Hutchefon's papers. After all the en- 
 quiry he could make, he ftill continued extremely 
 doubtful of the juftnefs and force of all the metaphy- 
 seal arguments, by which many have endeavoured to 
 
 monflratc the exiftencc, unity, and perfections of
 
 PREFACE. v 
 
 the Deity. He not only thought that thefe kind of 
 arguments were not adapted to the capacity of the 
 bulk of mankind, but even that they could afford no 
 folid and permanent conviction to the learned them- 
 f elves. It was his opinion in this early part of his life, 
 and he never faw caufe to alter it, that as fome fub- 
 jects from their nature are capable of a demonftrative 
 evidence, fo others admit only of a probable one ; and 
 that to feek demonftration where probability can only 
 be obtained is almoft as unreafonable as to demand 
 to fee founds or hear colours. Befides he was perfua- 
 ded that attempts to demonftration on fuch fubjecls as 
 are incapable of it were of very dangerous confequence 
 to the interefts of truth and religion : becaufe fuch 
 attempts inftead of conducting us to the abfolute cer- 
 tainty propofed, leave the mind in fuch a ftate of 
 doubt and uncertainty as leads to abfolute fcepti- 
 cifm : for if once we refufe to reft in that kind of evi- 
 dence, which the nature of the fubjecl: only admits of, 
 and go on in purfuit of the higheft kind, Ariel: demon- 
 ftratiom.we immediately conclude there is no evidence, 
 becaufe we do not meet with that kind of it which 
 we expected: and thus the mind remains in a ftate. cf
 
 v i PREFACE. 
 
 abfolute uncertainty, imagining there is no evidence, 
 when all that the nature of the cafe admits of is laid 
 before it, and enough to fatisfy every one whofe un- 
 derftanding is not difordered with an unnatural thirft 
 for fcientifical knowledge on all fubjecls alike. This 
 opinion of the various degrees of evidence adapted to 
 various fubjecls firft led Dr. Hutchefon to treat mo- 
 rals as a matter of fact, and not as founded on the ab- 
 ftracl relations of things. But of this more particu- 
 larly hereafter. 
 
 After he had fpent fix years at the Univerfity of 
 Glafcow, he returned to Ireland, and fubmitted to 
 trials, in order to enter into the miniftry, and was li- 
 ccnfed to preach among the DilTenters. Pie was jufl 
 about to be fettled a minifler in a fmall diffenting con- 
 gregation in the North of Ireland, when fome gentle- 
 men about Dublin, who knew that his abilities and 
 virtues qualified him to be more extenfively ufeful 
 than he could poilibly be in that remote congregation, 
 invited him to take up a private academy there. He 
 complyed with the invitation, and acquitted himfelf 
 in that Itation with fuch dignity and fuccefs as gave 
 entire fatisfaction to all thofe who committed their
 
 PREFACE. vii 
 
 children to his care; and foon drew the attention of 
 the public upon him. He had been fixed but a fhort 
 time in Dublin when his lingular merit and accom- 
 plifhments made him generally known : men of all 
 ranks, who had any tafte for literature, or efteem for 
 learned men, fought his acquaintance and friendfhip. 
 Among others he was honoured with a place in the 
 efteem and fri endfhip of the late Lord Vifcount Molef- 
 worch, who took pleafure in his converfation, and af- 
 fifted him with his criticifms and obfervations to im- 
 prove and polifh the Inquiry into the Ideas of Beauty 
 and Virtue, before it came abroad. The reverend 
 Dr. Synge, now Lord Bifhop of Elphin, whofe friend- 
 fhip Dr. Hutchefon always regarded as one of the 
 greateft pleafures and advantages of his life, likewife 
 revifed his papers, and affifted him in the general fcheme 
 of the work. 
 
 The firft edition came abroad without the author's 
 name, but the merit of the performance would not 
 fuffer him to be long conceal'd: fuch was the reputa- 
 tion of the work, and the ideas it had raifed of the 
 author, that Lord Granville, who was then Lord Lieu- 
 tenant of Ireland, whofe difcernment and tafte as to
 
 riii PREFACE. 
 
 works of genius and literature is univerfally acknow- 
 ledged, fent his private fecretary to enquire at the 
 bookfellers for the author, and when he could not 
 learn his name, he left a letter to be conveyed to him, 
 in confequence of which he foon became acquainted 
 with his Excellency, and was treated by him all the 
 time he continued in his government with the molt 
 diftinguifhing marks of familiarity and efteem. 
 
 From this time his acquaintance began to be ftill 
 more courted by moil: men of diftinction either for 
 ftation or literature in Ireland. Archbifhop King, the 
 author of the book De Origine Mali, held Dr. Hutche- 
 fon in great efteem, and his friendfhip was of great ufe 
 to him in an affair which might otherwife have been 
 very troublefome to him, and perhaps ended in put- 
 ting an entire ftop to his ufefulnefs in that place. 
 There were two feveral attempts made to profecute 
 Mr. Hutchefon, in the Archbifhop's court, for daring 
 to take upon him the education of youth, without 
 having qualified himfelf by fubferibing the ecclefia- 
 ftical canons, and obtaining a licence from the Bifhop. 
 Both thefe attempts were effectually difcouraged by 
 his Grace,with exprefTions of hearty difpleafure againli
 
 PREFACE. ix 
 
 the perfons who were fo forward as to commence 
 them. And at the fame time he allured him that he 
 needed be under no apprehenfion of difturbance from 
 that quarter, as long as it continued in his power to 
 prevent it. 
 
 He had alfo a large fhare in the efteem of the late 
 Primate Bolter, who, thro' his influence, made a do- 
 nation to the Univerfity of Glafgow, of an yearly fund 
 for an exhibitioner, to be bred to any of the learned 
 profeffions. This is only one inftance among many 
 of that prelate's munificent temper. Mr. Weft, a gen- 
 tleman of great abilities, and of known zeal for the 
 interefts of civil and religious liberty, was particularly 
 fond of Dr. Hutchefon, and lived in great intimacy 
 with him, while he continued in Ireland. 
 
 A few years after the Enquiry the Treatife on the 
 Paffions was publiihed : as both thefe books have been 
 long abroad in the world and undergone feveral im- 
 preffions, a fufficient proof of the reception they have 
 met with from the public, it would be needlefs to fay 
 any thing concerning them. About this time he wrote 
 fome philofophical papers accounting for Laughter, 
 in a different way from Mr. Hobbs, and more honour- 
 fa
 
 x PREFACE. 
 
 able to human nature: thefe papers were publifhed in 
 the collection called Hibemicus Letters. Some letters 
 in the London Journal 1728 fubfcribed Philaretus, 
 containing objections to fome parts of the doctrine in 
 
 Enquiry, occafioned Mr. Hutchefon's giving an- 
 Tsvcr.s to them in thofe public papers: both the letters 
 and anfwers were afterwards publifhed in a feparate 
 pamphlet. The debate was left unnniihed, Philaretus's 
 death having put an end to the correfpondence, which 
 
 is propofed to have been afterward carried on in a 
 more private manner. 
 
 After he had taught the private Academy in Dub- 
 lin for feven or eight years with great reputation and 
 fuccefs; in the year 1 729 he was called to Scotland to 
 be a ProfelTor of Philofophy in the Univerfity of Glaf- 
 
 w. His eftablifTied reputation for literature and 
 worth was the only confideration that induced the U- 
 aiverfity to elect him into the place vacant by the death 
 of the learned and worthy Mr. Gerfhom Carmichael. 
 The public approved of their choice, and the event 
 abundantly juftined the wifdom of it. The ProfelTors 
 
 er€ foon fenfible, that his admiifion into their body 
 
 d good effects both upon the reputation and inte-
 
 * 
 
 PREFACE. xi 
 
 refts of the fociety. Several young gentlemen came 
 along with him from the Academy, and his juft fame 
 drew many more both from England and Ireland. But 
 it will probably be rather matter of furprize to the rea- 
 der, that he accepted of the place, than that the Uni- 
 versity unfolicited made him the offer of it. If any 
 one mould ask, as it is natural to do, how it came 
 to pafs that a man of Dr. Hutchefon's accomplifh- 
 ments and virtues, and who could count fuch lifts of 
 honourable perfons, and many of them of great au- 
 thority and influence, in the number of his friends, 
 mould continue to teach a private Academy for feven 
 or eight years in the heart of a country where there 
 were fo many beneficial places proper to be beftowed 
 on men of genius and merit. Or if any one fhould 
 ask, how it came to pafs that he was permitted, to 
 leave his country, break off all connections with his 
 relations and friends, and in the midfl: of life remove 
 to another kingdom to accept a place in an Univerfi- 
 ty far from being lucrative and very laborious ? It is 
 fufficient to anfwer to thefe queftions : that it was not 
 the want either of inclination or power in his friends 
 to ferve him that was the flop to his preferment. He 
 
 b 2
 
 xii PREFACE. 
 
 had private reafons which determined him neither to 
 feek promotion, nor to encourage the mod probable 
 fchemes propofed to him for obtaining it. It is but 
 j uftice to his character to fay, that he was ufeful and 
 contented in that ftation in which it had pleafed Di- 
 vine Providence to fix him, and that neither the love 
 of riches, nor of the elegance or grandeur of human 
 life prevailed fo far in his breaft as to make him offer 
 the lead violence to his inward fentiments. To which 
 It may be added, that the filent and unfeen hand of 
 an all-wife Providence which over-rules all the events 
 of human life, and all the refolutions of the human 
 will,, conducted him to that ftation in life, which tha 
 far from being the higheft in external diftin£Hon, yet 
 was perhaps of all others the moft fuited to the Angu- 
 lar talents with which he was endowed, and gave him 
 the opportunity of being more eminently and extent 
 lively ufeful than he could have been in any other. 
 
 After his fettlement in the College he was not obli- 
 ged (as when he kept the Academy) to teach the lan- 
 guages and all the different parts of Philofophy, but 
 bad leifure to turn his chief attention to his favourite 
 
 dy Human Nature: he had high thoughts of its
 
 PREFACE. xiii 
 
 original dignity, and was perfuaded, that even in this 
 corrupt ftate, it was capable of great improvements 
 by proper inftruction and affiduous culture. The pro- 
 fe/fion of Moral Philofophy was the province afligned 
 him in the College. In cultivating this fcience he 
 purfued the fame method in which he began, fetting 
 afide all refearches into the abftract relations and e- 
 ternal fitnefs and unfitnefs of things, and directing his 
 enquiries into what is more obvious and immediately 
 known from obfervation and experience, viz. What 
 is in fact the prefent conftitution of human nature ; 
 what is that ftate of heart , and courfe of life which 
 is molt correfpondent to the whole frame. 
 
 He had obferved, that it was the happinefs and glo- 
 ry of the prefent age, that they had thrown off the 
 method of forming hypothefes and fuppofitions in na- 
 tural philofophy, and had fet themfelves to make ob- 
 fervations and experiments on the conftitution of the 
 material world itfelf, and to mark the powers and 
 principles which are difcerned operating in it: he faw 
 plainly that it was by adhering ftrictly to this method 
 that natural philofophy had been carried to a greater 
 degree of perfection than ever it was before, and that
 
 xiv P R E F A C E. 
 
 it is only by purfuing the fame method that we can 
 hope co reach higher improvements in that fci- 
 ence. He was convinced that in like manner a true 
 fcheme of morals could not be the product of genius 
 and invention, or of the greatefl precifion of thought 
 in metaphyfical reafonings, but muft be drawn from 
 proper obfcrvations upon the feveral powers and prin- 
 ciples which we are confcious of in our own bofoms, 
 and which muft be acknowledged to operate in fome 
 degree in the whole human fpecies. And that there- 
 fore, one proper method at leaft to be followed in 
 the moral fcience, is to inquire into our internal ftruc- 
 ture as a conftitution or fyftem compofed of various 
 parts, to obferve the office and end of each part, with 
 the natural fubordination of thofe pares to one ano- 
 ther, and from thence to conclude what is the defign 
 of the whole, and what is the courfe of action for 
 which it appears to be intended by its great Author. 
 He thought there was ground to hope, that from a 
 more ftrict philofophical enquiry into the various natu- 
 ral principles or natural difpofitions of mankind, in the 
 fame way that we enquire into the ftructure of an ani- 
 mal body, of a plant, or of the folar fyftem, a more
 
 PREFACE. xv 
 
 exact theory of morals may be formed, than has yet 
 appeared : and a theory too built upon fuch an obvi- 
 ous and firm foundation as would be fatisfactory to 
 every candid enquirer. For we can be as certain of the 
 feveral parts of our internal frame from inward per- 
 ception and feeling, as we are of the feveral parts of 
 an animal ftructure from ocular infpection : and we 
 can as little doubt of the ends for which the principal 
 parts at leaft of our internal conftitution are intended^ 
 as we can doubt of the ends for which the members 
 of our body, or our external fenfes were framed : and 
 whatever evidence we have for the exiflence and per- 
 fections of the Supreme Being, we have the fame evi- 
 dence that the moral conftitution of our nature is his 
 work, and thence we conclude, that it is mod certain- 
 ly his will, that we fhould cultivate that temper of 
 mind, and purfue that courfe of life, which is moil 
 correfpondent to the evident ends and purpofes of his 
 divine workmanfhip; and that fuch a ftate of heart 
 and plan of life, as anfwers moft effectually the end 
 and defign of all the parts of ir, muft be its moft per- 
 fect manner of operation, and muft conftitute the du- 
 ty, the happinefs, and perfection of the order of be- 
 ing's to whom it belongs.,
 
 xv [ PREFACE. 
 
 Our author has attempted in the following work, 
 firft to unfold the feveral principles of the human mind 
 as united in a moral conftitution, and from thence to 
 point out the origin of our ideas of moral good and 
 evil, and of our fenfe of duty, or moral obligation ; 
 and then to enquire what muft be the fupreme happi- 
 nefs to afpecies conftituted as mankind are; and then 
 he proceeds to deduce the particular laws of nature, 
 or rules neceffary to be obferved for promoting the 
 o-cneral good in our common intercourfes with one 
 another as members of fociety. How far he has fuc- 
 ceeded, mull: be left to the judgment of the attentive 
 and candid reader. 
 
 Whatever corrections or improvements his fcheme 
 may be fuppofed to admit of, after longer obfervati- 
 on and further examination into the frame and ope- 
 rations of our minds, one thing is certain that the re- 
 mit of his obfervations and reafonings muft meet with 
 entire approbation, as it places the higheft virtue and 
 excellence of a human character, where all found Phi- 
 lofophy and Divine Revelation has placed it, viz. In 
 fitch habitual and prevailing exercife of all thefe good 
 affections to God and man, as -will reft rain all other ap- 
 petites, paflions, and affeBions ivithinjufi bounds, and
 
 PREFACE. xvii 
 
 carry as out uniformly to purfue that courfe ofa&ion, 
 which will promote the happinefs of mankind in the mofl 
 extenfve manner to which our power can reach*. And 
 it muft alfo be acknowledged, that our Author's doc- 
 trine, which afferts that we are laid under a real in- 
 ternal obligation, of a mofl facred kind, from the very 
 conftitution of our nature f , to promote the good of 
 mankind, tho' at the expence of facrificing life itfelf 
 and all its enjoyments, coincides, or at leaft is no way 
 inconfiftent with thefe precepts of Chriflianity, by 
 which we are enjoined to lay down our lives for the 
 
 * Some feem to have miftaken our Au- 
 thor's doclrine fo widely, as to imagine 
 that he placed virtue in the mere fentiment 
 or perception of moral beauty and defor- 
 mity in affections and actions, which it is 
 owned the word of mankind may retain in 
 a very confiderable degree. Whereas he 
 always places it in theexercife of thefe af- 
 fections and actions flowing from them 
 which the moral faculty recommends and 
 enjoins. Or in other words, virtue does 
 not lye in the mere fentiment of approba- 
 tion of certain affections and actions, but 
 in acting agreeably to it. 
 
 f Some feem to have miftaken Dr. 
 Hutchefon fo far on this fubjecT, as to ima- 
 gine, that when he fays we are laid under 
 a moil: real and intimate obligation by the 
 moral fenfe to aft virtuoufly, he meant to 
 aflert that all other obligations from the 
 confideration of the will of God, and the 
 effects of his favour or difpleafure in this 
 
 and in another world werefuperfeded. No- 
 thing could be farther from his thoughts ; 
 nor is it a confequence of his fcheme. He 
 was fully fenfib!e of the importance and 
 necefllty of inforcing the practice of virtue 
 upon mankind from all poffiblc confide- 
 rations, and efpecially from thefe awful 
 ones of future rewards and punifhments. 
 If anyone fhould fay, that there is a natu- 
 ral fenfe of equity implanted in the human 
 mind, which will operate in fome degree 
 even on thofe who know not that there is 
 a God or a future ftate : it could not juftly 
 be concluded from thence, that fuch a per- 
 fon alfo maintained, that this natural fenfe 
 of equity alone, was fufficient to enfure 
 the uniform practice of juftice, in all man- 
 kind, even when meeting with number- 
 lefs flrong temptations to depart from it. 
 The application is fo obvious, that it is 
 needlefs to infill upon it.
 
 xv iii PREFACE. 
 
 bretheren; while at the fame time it gives usmore juft, 
 more amiable and worthy ideas of human nature, as 
 orio-inally intended to be actuated by more difintere- 
 fted principles, than thefe philofophers are willing to 
 allow, who labour to reduce all the motions of the 
 human mind to felf-love at bottom, however much 
 they may feem to be different from it at rirft appea- 
 rance. According to our Author's views of human na- 
 ture, tho' thefe generous principles may be born down 
 and ovcr-powcrcd in this corrupt ftate, byfenfualand 
 fcllifli paflions, fo as not to exert themfelves withfuf- 
 ficient vigour, even when there is proper occafion for 
 diem; yet the intention of the Author of Nature is a- 
 bundantly manifeft from this important circumltance, 
 that the moral fenfe is always fo far true to its office, 
 at it never fails to give thehigheft and warmeft ap- 
 probation to every inftance of truly difinterefted vir- 
 tue. The lefs fufpicion there is of any view even to 
 future fame in the behaviour of the martyr, the pa- 
 triot, or hero, when he yields up his life in a worthy 
 caufe, fo much louder and ftronger is the applaufe of 
 .ul fpeclators, andfo far as any intereftcd confiderati- 
 ons are fuppofed to influence him, the approbation
 
 PREFACE. xlx 
 
 given to him is proportionably diminifhed: according 
 to this reprefentation of things, the foul of man, not 
 only bears a refemblance of the Divine Intelligence 
 in its rational faculties, but alfo of the Divine difin- 
 terefted benignity in its focial and public affe£tions : 
 and thus too our internal conftitution , formed for 
 purfuing the general good, beautifully tallies with the 
 conftitution of the univerfe: we fee thro' the whole of 
 Nature what admirable provifion is made for carry- 
 ing on the general interefts of all the fpecies of living 
 beings. So that it is quite agreeable to the analogy of 
 Nature, that mankind, the higheft order of creatures 
 in this lower world, mould be formed with difpofiti- 
 ons to promote the general good of their fpecies, and 
 with a difcernment that it is their duty to part with 
 life itfelf, when a public inter eft requires it. 
 
 But Dr. Hutchefon's character, as' a man of parts 
 and learning, does not depend merely on the peculi- 
 arities of a fcheme of morals. His knowledge was by 
 no means confined to his own fyftem : that he was 
 well acquainted with the writings both of the anci- 
 ents and moderns relative to morality, religion, and 
 government will appear evident to every one who per- 
 
 C 2
 
 xx PREFACE. 
 
 ufes the following work. Nor did the ftudy of morals, 
 even in this extenfive view, engrofs his whole time 
 and attention. An ardent love of knowledge was na- 
 tural to him. He loved truth, and fought after it with 
 impartiality and conftancy. His apprehenfion was 
 quick and his memory ftrong: he was not only patient 
 of thought and enquiry, but delighted in it. His mind 
 was never fubject to that languor which frequently in- 
 terrupts the ftudies of worthy men: his faculties were 
 always at his command and ready for exercife. A mind 
 endowed and difpofed in fuch a manner, and employ- 
 ed in ftudy for a long courfe of years, muft have been 
 furnifhed with a large compafs of knowledge. 
 
 In the earlier part of his life he entered deeply in- 
 to the fpirit of the ancients, and was foon fenfible 
 of and admired that juftnefs and fimplicity both of 
 thought and cxprefllon which has preferved and di- 
 (tinguifhed their writings to this day. He read the 
 hiftorians, poets, and orators of antiquity with a kind 
 of enthufiafm, and at the fame time with a critical cx- 
 actnefs. He had read the poets efpecially fo often, that 
 he retained large parTigcs of them in his memory,which 
 he frequently and elegantly applied to the fubjects he
 
 PREFACE. xxi 
 
 had occafion to treat in the courfe of his prelections. 
 His knowledge and tafte in Latin appears from what 
 he has wrote in it. His Synopfis of Metaphyfics, Pneu- 
 matics, Natural Theology, and his Compend of E- 
 thics are written with a fpirit and purity of ftyle fel- 
 dom to be met with in modern Latin compositions. 
 He had ftudied all the parts of Philofophy with 
 fuch care as to have attained clear and comprehensive 
 views of them. He compofed a fmall treacife of Lo- 
 gic, which tho' not defigned for the public eye, yet 
 gives fufficient proof how much he was mafter of that 
 fcience. It appears from his treatife of Metaphyfics, 
 that he was well acquainted with the logomachies, 
 meaninglefs queftions, and trivial debates of the old 
 Scholaftics, which had thrown a thick darknefs on that 
 part of Philofophy : he has fet that branch of know- 
 ledge in a clear light, and rendered it inftructive and 
 entertaining. He underftood Natural Philofophy as it 
 is now improved by the afliftance of Mathematics and 
 experiments, and applied his knowledge of it to the 
 noble purpofes of eftabliihing the grand truths of the 
 exiftence, the perfections, and government of God. 
 He was well acquainted with the hiftory of the arts
 
 xxii PREFACE. 
 
 and fciences : he had carefully traced them from their 
 origin, thro' all their various improvements, progrefles, 
 interruptions, and revolutions,and marked the charac- 
 ters of the moil: remarkable Philofophers,and the diftin- 
 guiihing doctrines and peculiar genius of their Philofo- 
 phy. Befides he knew the civil and ecclefiaftical hiftory 
 both of antient and modern times with an exactnefs 
 that was furprizing in one fo much converfant in deeper 
 and feverer ftudies. He had ftudied too the original 
 laneuase f the Old Teftament, and tho' his other 
 neceffary ftudies had not permitted him to become a 
 critic in it himfelf, yet he knew the moft important 
 criticifms of the learned in that way. 
 
 His great capacity appeared in the ftrongeft light, 
 in his converfation with his friends ; there he difco- 
 vered fuch a readinefs of thought, clearnefs of expref- 
 fion, and extent of knowledge, on almoft every fub- 
 jecl that could be ftarxed, as gave delight to all who 
 heard him. There are fome men who have amafTed 
 great ftores of learning, but it is repofited as it were 
 in fome corner of the mind, and requires time to re- 
 collect it and bring it forth. In others you fee their 
 great erudition feems to darken their conceptions and
 
 PREFACE. xxiii 
 
 difturb their views of things, by the different ideas 
 which crowd into their minds at once. Bat the whole 
 compafs of his knowledge lay as it were always before 
 him, and was at his command at all times; and he 
 faw at once whatever was connected with his prefent 
 fubject, and rejected what did not belong to it. He 
 fpoke on the moft difficult and abftrufe fubjects with- 
 out any labour and with a degree of perfpicuity which 
 would have cofl: other men of no mean parts repeated 
 efforts, without equal fuccefs : he expofed and took 
 to pieces deceitful reafonings with the greater]: faci- 
 lity; and diftinguifhed at once, betwixt true learning 
 andfalfe, betwixt fubjects which admit of demonftra- 
 tion, and fuch as do not, and betwixt queftions which 
 are ufeful and important, and fuch as are only curious 
 and amufing. He gave an habitual attention to the 
 real ufes to which knowledge could be applied in life. 
 He did not chufe to amufe with infignificant fpecu- 
 lations, but in all his enquiries having the real good 
 and utility of mankind in view, he took occafion even 
 from metaphyfical difputes, (of which no other ufe 
 could be made) to-reprefs that pride and vanity that 
 is apt to puff up young minds from a notion of their
 
 xxiv PREFACE. 
 
 fuperior knowledge, by (hewing how uncapable the 
 acuteft of mankind are of penetrating into the inti- 
 mate nature and effences of things. 
 
 Thefe fineular abilities and talents were united in 
 Dr. Hutchefon with the moft amiable difpofitions and 
 moil ufeful virtues: die purity of his manners was un- 
 fpotted from his youth: as he always expreft the high- 
 eft indignation againft vice, he kept at the greateft 
 diftance from it, avoiding even the fmalleft indecen- 
 cies of conduct: but this feverity of virtue was with- 
 out any thing of that fournefs, ftifFnefs, or unfociable- 
 nefs which fometimes accompanies it, and renders 
 characters, otherwife valuable, in fome refpects difa- 
 greeable, and prevents the good effects that the exam- 
 ple of their virtues might produce upon others. His 
 integrity was ftrict and inviolable: he abhorred the 
 leaft appearance of deceit either in word or action : 
 he contemned thofe little artifices which too frequent- 
 ly pafs in the world for laudable arts of addrefs, and 
 proofs of fuperior prudence : his nature was frank, and 
 open, and warmly difpofed, to fpeak what he took to 
 be true : you faw at firft fight his fincere and upright 
 foul, and in all further intercourfe with him you found
 
 PREFACE. xxv 
 
 him always the fame. He was all benevolence and af- 
 fection; none who faw him could doubt of it; his air 
 and countenance befpoke it. It was to fuch a degree 
 his prevailing temper, that it gave a tincture to his 
 writings, which were perhaps as much dictated by his 
 heart as his head : and if there was any need of an a- 
 pology for the ftrefs that in his fcheme feems to be 
 laid upon the friendly and public affections, the preva- 
 lence of them in his own temper would at leaft form 
 an amiable one. 
 
 His heart was finely turned for friendlhip; he was 
 fparing indeed of the external profeffions of it, but 
 liberal of its moft important offices : he was the refuse 
 of his friends for advice and affiftance in all cafes of 
 perplexity and diftrefs. The ardor of his affection for 
 his friends got the better of a natural reluctance he 
 had to ask favours, which no regard for his own inte- 
 refts could have overcome: his kind offices were far 
 from being confined to the circle of his particular 
 friends and relations ; his heart overflowed with good- 
 will to all around him, and prompted him to embrace 
 every opportunity of doing kind and obliging things. 
 Tho' there are but few to be found who had fuch a
 
 xxvi PREFACE. 
 
 keen thirfl for knowledge, or who purfued it with fuch 
 unremitting attention and vigour ; yet even this tafte 
 yielded on all occafions to the more important one of 
 doing good. Among many other acts of beneficence, 
 he took a peculiar delight in aiTifling worthy young 
 men, in ftraitened circumftances, to profecute their 
 ftudies with his money, and admitting them to attend 
 his colleges without paying the cuftomary fees. 
 
 A remarkable degree of a rational enthufiafm for 
 the interefts of learning, liberty, religion, virtue, and 
 human happinefs, which animated him at all times, 
 was a diftinguiming part of his character : he was vi- 
 fibly moved by fome of thefe noble principles in what- 
 ever he faid or did. They had fuch an afcendency over 
 him as gave a peculiar cad to his whole converfation 
 and behaviour, and formed in him a public fpirit of 
 a very extenfive kind. Public fpirit in him was not a 
 vague and undetermined kind of ardor, for fomething 
 unknown or not diftinctly underftood; but it was an 
 enlightened and univerfal zeal for every branch of hu- 
 man happinefs, and the means of promoting it. His 
 love of valuable knowledge, his unabating activity in 
 purfuing it and fpreadiog a tafte for it, fitted him, in a
 
 PREFACE. xxvii 
 
 very lingular manner, for that ftation which Provi- 
 dence had afligned him. And perhaps very few men, 
 even in fimilar ftations, have difcovered equal zeal, or 
 had equal fuccefs, in promoting a tafte for true lite- 
 rature: but his zeal was not confined to what peculiar- 
 ly belonged to his own prof effion, but extended to eve- 
 ry thing that could contribute to the improvement of 
 human life. When he fpoke, you would have imagi- 
 ned that he had been employed in almoft all the dif- 
 ferent ftations in fociety, fo clearly did he appear to 
 underftand the interefts of each, and fuch an earned 
 defire did he exprefs for promoting them. His bene- 
 volent heart took great delight in planning fchemes for 
 rectifying fomething amifs, or improving fomething 
 already right, in the different orders and ranks of 
 mankind. Thefe fchemes were not airy and roman- 
 tic, but fuch as were practicable, and might have de- 
 ferred the attention of thofe whofe power and influ- 
 ence in fociety could have enabled them to carry them 
 into execution. This warm zeal for public good ap- 
 peared uppermoft in his thoughts not only in his more 
 ferious, but alfo in his gayer hours. But while he a- 
 bounded in projects for the interefts of others, none 
 
 d 2
 
 xxviii PREFACE. 
 
 ever heard of one which centered in himfelf. It has 
 already been obferved, that in the earlier part of life, 
 when thetaftc for external enjoyments is commonly 
 ftrongeft, he did not liften to propofals which offered 
 profpects of rifing to wealth and preferment : in a 
 more advanced age, but when he was ftill in fuch a vi- 
 gorous (late of health, as he might have hoped for ma- 
 ny years longer of life, he had offers made of remov- 
 ing him to the Univerfity of Edinburgh, to be Pro- 
 feffor of Moral Philofophy there, which might have 
 been a more lucrative place to him, and given him bet- 
 ter opportunities of forming connections with people 
 of the fir ft rank and diftinclion in this country, but 
 he was contented with his prefent fituation, and dif- 
 couraged all attempts to change it. 
 
 Thefe lingular accomplishments and moral endow- 
 ments rendered his converfation, cfpecially among his 
 friends, fo entertaining and inftructive, that it was a 
 ichool of wifdom to thofe who had the happinefs to 
 enjoy it. It muft have been an undifcerning company 
 which did not receive both pleafure and improvement 
 from him. A remarkable vivacity of thought and 
 exprelfton, a perpetual How of chearfulnefs and good-
 
 PREFACE. xxix 
 
 will, and a vifible air of inward happinefs, made him 
 the life and genius of fociety, and fpread an enlivening 
 influence every where around him. He was gay and 
 pleafant, full of mirth and raillery, familiar and com- 
 municative to the laff degree, and utterly free from 
 all ftatelinefs or affectation. No fymptoms of vani- 
 ty or felf-conceit appeared in him. He fought not af- 
 ter fame, nor had he any vain complacency in the un- 
 fought poffefiion of it. While he was vifibly fuperior 
 to others about him, he was the only one that was 
 quite infenfible of it. His own talents and endow- 
 ments were not the objects on which his thoughts 
 were employed : he was always carried away from at- 
 tending to himfelf, by the exercife of kind affections, 
 zeal for fome public generous defigns, or keen enqui- 
 ries after truth. This was fach an acknowledged part 
 of his character, that even thofe who were leafl: difpo- 
 fed to think well of him, never inilnuated that he was 
 proud or vain : the natural modefly of his temper was 
 heightened and refined by his religious fentiments. 
 
 He had a full perfuafion and warm fenfe of the great 
 truths of natural and revealed religion, and of the im- 
 portance of juft and rational devotion to the happi-
 
 xxx PREFACE. 
 
 nefs of human life, and to the (lability and purity of 
 a virtuous character. The power of devout fentiments 
 over his mind appeared in his converfation : in his 
 public prelections he frequently took occafion from 
 any hints which his fubjecl: afforded him, as well as 
 when it was the direct fubjecl: itfelf, to run out at great 
 length, and with oreat ardor, on the reafonablenefs 
 and advantages of habitual regards to God, and of 
 referring all our talents, virtues, and enjoyments to 
 his bounty. Such habitual references appeared to him 
 the fureft means of checking thofe emotions of pride, 
 vain complacency, andfelf-applaufe, which are apt to 
 fpring up in the minds of thofe, who do not ferioufly 
 and frequently reflect, that they did not make them- 
 felves to differ from others, and that they have nothing 
 hut what they received. Such fentiments deeply rooted 
 in the mind, he looked upon as the proper foundati- 
 on of that fimplicity of heart and life, which is the 
 higheft perfection of a virtuous character. 
 
 Such abilities, fuch difpofitions, and fuch ftores of 
 knowledge,as have been mentioned,accompanied with 
 a happy talent of fpeaking with eafe, with propriety 
 and fpirit, rendered him one of the molt mafterly and
 
 PREFACE. xxxi 
 
 engaging teachers that has appeared in our age. He 
 had a great fund of natural eloquence and a perfua- 
 five manner : he attended indeed much more to fenfe 
 than expreflion, and yet his expreflion was good: he 
 was matter of that precifion and accuracy of language 
 which is neceflfary in philofophical enquiries. But he 
 did not look upon it as his duty, either in his prelec- 
 tions, or in his writings upon moral and religious fub- 
 jects, to keep up ftridtly at all times to the character of 
 the didaclive teacher, by confining himfelf to all the 
 precifion requifite in accurate explication and ftricT: 
 argument. He apprehended that he was anfwering 
 the defign of his office as effectually, when he dwelt 
 in a more diffufive manner upon fuch moral confede- 
 rations as are fuited to touch the heart, and excite a 
 relifh for virtue, as when explaining or eftablifhing 
 any doctrine, even of real importance, with the moil 
 philofophical exactnefs : he regarded the culture of 
 the heart as a main end of all moral inftruction : he 
 kept it habitually in view, and he was extremely well 
 qualified for fucceeding in it,fo far as human means can 
 go : he had an uncommon vivacity of thought and fen- 
 fibility of temper, which rendered him quickly fufcep-
 
 xxxii PREFACE. 
 
 tible of the warmeft emotions upon the great fubjecfts 
 of morals and religion : this gave a pleafant unction 
 to his difcourfes, which commanded the attention of 
 the fludents, and at the fame time left ffrong impref- 
 fions upon their minds: he filled their hearts with a 
 new and higher kind of pleafure than they had any 
 experience of before, when he opened to their view, 
 in his animated manner, large fields of fcience of which 
 hitherto they had no conception: when, forinftance, 
 he pointed out to his pupils, in his lectures on Natu- 
 ral Theology, the numberlefs evidences of wonderful 
 art and kinddefign in the ftruclureof particular things, 
 and the ftill more aftonifhing evidences of the wifeft 
 contrivance, and of the moft: benign intention, in the 
 whole material fyftem confidered as one thing, it is 
 eafy to conceive that their tender minds, warm with 
 the love of knowledge, would be greatly ftruck. Such 
 views of nature were new difcoveries to them, which 
 filled them with delight and aftonifhment, and gave 
 them at the fame time the moft joyful and fatisfying 
 conviction of the being and perfections of the great 
 Author of all. In like manner, when he led them from 
 the view of the external world to the contemplation of
 
 PREFACE. xxxiii 
 
 the internal one, the foul of man, and mewed them 
 like inftances of Divine wifdom and benignity in the 
 contrivance of its moral constitution, they were filled 
 with freih delight and wonder, and difcerned new and 
 encreafing proofs of the glorious perfections of the 
 Father of our fpirits. And when he defcribed the fe- 
 veral virtues exercifed in real life, as beautiful in 
 themfelves, as the noblefl: employment of our ratio- 
 nal and moral powers, as the only fources of true dig- 
 nity and happinefs to individuals and to communities, 
 they were charmed with the lovely forms, and panted 
 to be what they beheld. The pleafure fpringing from 
 the light of truth and beauty of virtue breaking in 
 upon ingenious and well-difpofed minds, excited fuch 
 a keen defire of knowledge, and fuch an ardor of pur- 
 fuing it, as fufpended for a time thofe impulfes of 
 youthful paffions which are apt to hurry young men 
 away, in that period of life. But that it may not be 
 imagined thefe ftrong effects are entirely to be afcri- 
 bed to the charms of novelty, it deferves to be taken 
 notice of, that ftudents advanced in years and know- 
 ledge chufed to attend his lectures on Moral Philofo- 
 phy, for four, five, or fix years together, ftill finding 
 
 e
 
 xxxiv PREFACE. 
 
 frelh entertainment, tho' the fubject in the main was 
 
 the fame every feafon. 
 
 It was a great addition to the ufefulnefs of his lef- 
 fons, that they were not confined to high fpeculations, 
 and the peculiarities of a fcheme, but frequently de- 
 fcended to common life, fometimes pointing out and 
 expofing fafhionable vices and follies in the upper 
 part of the world, departures from real juftice and 
 equity in the bufy and commercial part of it, and the 
 dangerous rocks on which youth is apt to fplit and 
 make fhipwreck both of virtue and happinefs ; and 
 at other times infilling upon matters acknowledged 
 by all, to be of the higheft importance. The grand 
 maxims he dwelt upon, and laboured to inftil into the 
 minds of his pupils, were to rejoice above all things 
 in the firm perfuafion of the univerfal Providence of a 
 Being infinitely wife and good, who loves all his works, 
 and cannot be conceived as hating any thing he hath 
 made. This he conftantly inculcated in the warmed 
 manner, " a3 a fteady foundation of entire truft and 
 " confidence in him, and chearful fubmLTion to his 
 " will in all events. That fufferings may be confidered 
 <c as our grcated bleffings, by giving us an opportu-
 
 it 
 
 a 
 
 (( 
 
 ec 
 
 PREFACE. xxxv 
 
 " nity of pracliiing the moft fublime virtues, fuch as 
 refignation to the will of God, forgiving of injuries, 
 returning good for evil, and by leading us to form 
 juft notions of the vanity of all things, except the 
 " love of God, and the love and practice of univerfal 
 goodnefs : that all our advantages, of all kinds, are 
 things which ought never to be afcribed toourfelves, 
 " but to God the giver of all. That love and gratitude 
 afcribing to him the glory of all that is excellent, 
 joined to a vigorous zeal of doing good, feems to 
 " be the height of human perfection." He delivered 
 himfelf on thefe grand topics in that flmple but {hik- 
 ing manner which immediately touches the heart, and 
 prefents the imagination with the moft beautiful and 
 engaging forms. 
 
 As he had occafion every year in the courfe of his 
 lectures to explain the origin of government, and com- 
 pare the different forms of it, he took peculiar care, 
 while on that fubject, to inculcate the importance of 
 civil and religious liberty to the happinefs of mankind : 
 as a warm love of liberty, and manly zeal for promot- 
 ing it, were ruling principles in his own breaft, he always 
 infilled upon it at great length, and with the greateft 
 
 e 2
 
 xxxvi PREFACE. 
 
 ftreno-th of argument and earneftnefs of perfuafion : 
 and he had fuch fuccefs on this important point, that 
 few, if any, of his pupils, whatever contrary prejudi- 
 ces they might bring along with them, ever left him 
 without 'favourable notions of that fide of the que- 
 ftion which he efpoufed and defended. 
 
 Befides his conftant lectures five days of the week, 
 on Natural Religion, Morals, Jurifprudence, and Go. 
 vcrnment, he had another lecture three days of the 
 week, in which fome of the fineft writers of antiquity, 
 both Greek and Latin, on the fubjecl: of Morals, were 
 interpreted, and the language as well as thefentiment 
 explained in a very mafterly manner. 
 
 Befides thefe fetts of lectures he gave a weekly one 
 on the Sunday-evening, on the truth and excellency 
 of Chriftianity, in which he produced and illuftrated, 
 with clearnefs and ftrength, all the evidences of its 
 truth and importance, taking his views of its doc- 
 trines and divine fcheme from the original records of 
 the New Teftament, and not from the party-tenets 
 or fcholafiic fyftems of modem ages : this was the moil 
 crowded of all his lectures, as all the different forts 
 and ranks of (Indents, being at liberty from their pe-
 
 PREFACE. xxxvii 
 
 culiar purfuits on this day, chufed to attend it, being 
 always fure of finding both pleafure and inflrucftion. 
 
 A Mafter, of fuch talents, fuch afliduity in the du- 
 ties of his office, with the accomplifhments of the 
 gentleman, and fond of well-difpofed youth, entering 
 into their concerns,encouragingand befriending them 
 on all occafions, could not fail to gain their efteem and 
 affections in a very high degree. This gavehim a great 
 influence over them, which he employed to the excel- 
 lent purpofes of ftamping virtuous impreflions upon 
 their hearts, and awakening in them a tafte for litera- 
 ture, fine, arts, and every thing that is ornamental or 
 ufeful to human life. And he had remarkable fuccefs 
 in reviving the ftudy of ancient literature, particular- 
 ly the Greek, which had been much neglected in the 
 Univerfity before his time : he fpread fuch an ar- 
 dor for knowledge, and fuch a fpirit of enquiry every 
 where around him, that the converfation of the ftu- 
 dents at their focial walks and viiits turned with great 
 keennefsupon fubjects of learning and tafte, and contri- 
 buted greatly to animate and carry them forward in the 
 moil: valuable purfuits. He did not confine his attenti- 
 on to the pupils immediately under his care, but laid
 
 xxxviii PREFACE. 
 
 himfelf out to be ufeful to the fludents in all the diffe- 
 rent faculties, whenever any opportunity offered : and 
 he was efpecially folicitous to be ferviceable to the flu- 
 dents of divinity ,endeavouring,among other important 
 inflrucrions, to give them juft notions of the main de- 
 fio-n of preaching. High fpeculations on difputable 
 points, either of Theology or Philofophy, he looked 
 upon as altogether improper for the pulpit, at leafl on 
 all ordinary occafions. He particularly infifted upon 
 the ufeleffnefs and impropriety of handling in the pul- 
 pit fuch fpeculative queflions, as, whether human na- 
 ture is capable of difinterefled affections, whether the 
 original of duty or moral obligation is from natural 
 confcience, or moral fenfe, from law, or from ratio- 
 nal views of interefl, and fuch like enquiries. Tho' 
 fuch difquifitions might be proper and even neceffary 
 in a fchool of philofophy *, yet in his view of things 
 
 * According to our Author's fcheme 
 it is only vindicating the Divine Wif- 
 dom and Goodnefs, manifefted in ihe con- 
 ftitution of our nature, to affcrt the exi- 
 gence and binding authority of the mo- 
 ral fenfe ; bccaufe whatever other obliga- 
 tions we may be under, this internal one 
 will co-operate with them, when the mind 
 perceives them, and will exercife its autho- 
 rity without them, when thro' a variety of 
 caufes we may be hinJered from attending 
 
 to them. Is the law of God duely promul- 
 gated the fuprerae obligation on all intel- 
 ligent beings . in this view of obligation, 
 the internal law will co-operate with the 
 external one, when we are attentive to its 
 authority; and when we are not, it will 
 be a rulo of action, in fome degree at lead, 
 without it. Hefides it may be obferved, 
 that if the obligation of the moral fenfe be 
 aJmitted to be a real one, men of the moft 
 fceptical turn of mind muit be conGdered
 
 PREFACE. xxxhc 
 
 they did not fall within the province of the preacher, 
 whofe office is not to explain the principles of the 
 human mind, but to addrefs himfelf to them, andfet 
 them in motion : befides, as to the philofophical quefti- 
 on concerning moral obligation, all the different ways 
 of explaining it confpire to prefs the fame virtuous 
 courfe of action, which is the main thing the facred 
 orator mould be concerned about. The general plan 
 of preaching which he recommended was to this pur- 
 pofe: As mankind are weak,ignorant,guilty creatures, 
 altogether infufficient for their ownhappinefs, and eve- 
 ry moment expofed to many unavoidable calamities,. 
 let them be called upon to reflect upon themfelves as 
 iuch, and let thefe doctrines of natural and revealed 
 religion, which will impart confolation to them un- 
 der thefe humbling views of themfelves, be fet be- 
 fore them in the ftrongefl: light : As they are apt to: 
 
 as remaining under its authority when 
 they have fct themfelves at liberty from all 
 other ties. Let us fuppofe a perlbn fo un- 
 happy as not to believe that there is a Go J, 
 or a future (late of rewards anJ punifh- 
 ments, or t'^at it is his intereft upon the 
 whole in this life to adt the virtuous part; 
 even luch a person is 'tili under the po .ver 
 'of the intern d fentimrnt, that one thing 
 is right and another wrong. If h? acts con- 
 trary to it he violates a known obligation, 
 
 and mud be confeious that he deferves 
 pnnifhment, and that it awaits him, if 
 there is a judge and puniflier. If we fup- 
 pofe that the fenfe of right and wrong is 
 entirely erazed, then on our Author's 
 fcheme, as well as that of others, he is dill 
 accountable at lead for the previous fteps 
 he had taken to bring himfelf into this, 
 (late of total infenfibility as to all moral, 
 perceptions and views.
 
 xl PREFACE. 
 
 be feduced both from their duty and happinefs by fel- 
 fifh and fenfual pafllons, let both the awful doctrines 
 of religion, which may ftrike a dread and check the im- 
 pulfes of bad pafllons, and the joyful ones, which may 
 excite and encourage to the practice of purity, fince- 
 rity, and all goodnefs, be difplayed before them in all 
 their force. And as they are prone to reft in the ge- 
 neral knowledge of their duty, without ferioufly ap- 
 plying it to the government of their hearts and lives, 
 let the religious inftructor take care not to dwell too 
 much upon fuch general topics as the beauty, excel- 
 lency, and reafonablenefs of the Divine Laws, but 
 commonly defcend, in a minute and particular man- 
 ner, to direct their conduct in all the relations and 
 ftations of life, even the loweft, and in the ordinary 
 bufinefs and intercourfes of it. And let all thefe things 
 be done without laboured elevation of language, in 
 that plain and fimple manner which touches the heart, 
 and brings things home to the confeience and imme- 
 diate feeling of every one. 
 
 To all which it is but juft to add, that he was a 
 mod: valuable member of the Univerfity in all other 
 refpects as well as that of an inftructor of youth, his
 
 PREFACE. xlii 
 
 great talents qualifying him, and his unwearied zeal 
 prompting him on all occafions to promote all its ci- 
 vil as well as literary interefls. 
 
 Such was the life of this worthy perfon, fpent in a 
 courfe of affiduous but not painful ftudy, in continu- 
 ally doing good to the utmoft of his power, and pro- 
 pagating truth, virtue, and religion among mankind. 
 To conclude, he had uncommon abilities, uncommon 
 virtues, and fmall failings,and thefe arifing from good 
 qualities ; if he was at any time too much or too foon 
 heated, it was owing to the quicknefs of his parts 
 and fenfibility of his temper; if his indignation was 
 ftrong, it was only provoked by fuch bafenefs or ma- 
 lignity as his heart abhorred; if at any time he was o- 
 pen, when referve might have been more proper, it 
 proceeded from an honefty and fincerity of heart un- 
 accuftomed to diffemble. Some were difpleafed with 
 his honeft freedom, fome might emulate his reputa- 
 tion, fome traduce him thro' prejudice, fome thro' bi- 
 gotry ; but his parts, his fpirit, and his worth, will 
 be remembered, when any prejudices that were raifed 
 againfl: him will be entirely forgotten. 
 
 A firm conftitution and a pretty uniform ftate of 
 
 f
 
 xlii PREFACE. 
 
 o-ood health, except fome few flight attacks of the 
 o-out, till fome months before his death, feemed to 
 promife the world much longer enjoyment of fo valu- 
 able a life; but it pleafed all-wife Providence to cut 
 him off, after a few months of an uncertain ftate of 
 health, and a few days of a fever, in the fifty-third year 
 of his age, and about fixteen years after his coming 
 to Glafgow, to the great regret of the lovers of lear- 
 ning and virtue, and the irreparable lofs of the fociety 
 of which he had been a moft excellent member, and 
 of all who were connected with him, either by blood, 
 friendfhip, or acquaintance. 
 
 He was married, foon after his fettlement in Du- 
 blin, to Mrs. Mary Wilfon, a daughter of Francis 
 Wilfon, Efq; a gentleman of eftate in the county of 
 Langford, who diftinguimed himfelf at the Revolution 
 as a Captain in the fervice of the late King William 
 of glorious and immortal memory. He fhowed the 
 fame liberal and generous principles in this tranfacli- 
 on, which appeared in all the other fteps of his life. He 
 had an abhorrence of that fpirit of traffick which of- 
 ten mingles fo deeply in forming this alliance : he was 
 determinedfolely by the good fenfe ; lovelydifpoutions,
 
 PREFACE. xliii 
 
 and virtuous accomplifhments of the lady: and the 
 uniform happinefs of their whole conjugal ftate jufti- 
 fied the wifdom and virtue of his choice : he has left 
 behind him one fon, Francis Hutchefon, Dodlor of 
 Medicine, who gave early marks of genius , and is 
 the publisher of this Work. If any one mould 
 wifh to know any thing about Dr. Hutchefon's ex- 
 ternal form \ it may be faid it was an image of his 
 mind. A ftature above middle fize, a gefture and man- 
 ner negligent and eafy, but decent and manly, gave 
 a dignity to his appearance. His complexion was fair 
 and fanguine, and his features regular. His counte- 
 nance and look befpoke fenfe, fpirit, kindnefs and joy 
 of heart. His whole perfon and manner raifed a ftrong 
 prejudice in his favour at firft fight. 
 
 It only remains to be added, that it has been in- 
 tended, in any thing that is faid of the Author's Phi- 
 lofophy, to deliver his fentiments without any regard 
 to what may be the writer's own views of thefe fub- 
 jects. The Author was a lover of truth and freedom 
 of thought, and did not wifh that any one mould e- 
 fpoufe his opinions, farther than the evidence with 
 which they were fupported, determined him. There 
 
 f 2
 
 xliv PREFACE. 
 
 appears thro' the work fuch a manifeft aim of pro- 
 moting piety and virtue, and the good of mankind, 
 that it is hoped the main of it mult be approven of 
 by all unprejudiced and well-difpofed perfons, how- 
 ever the writer of thefe memoirs or others may differ 
 from the Author, as to particular fentiments, or the 
 decifion of particular queftions. 
 
 Some very good judges may think, and perhaps not 
 without reafon, that by any thing yet faid, juftice has 
 not been done to Dr. Hutchefon's character as an au- 
 thor : " That he has been reprefented only as en- 
 " quiring into the mind of man as a moral conftitu- 
 " tion, and aflertirig a diftincr, order of affeclions in 
 " it terminating ultimately on the good of others, and 
 11 a Moral Senfe, by which we inftantaneoufly perceive 
 " a certain fet of affections, characters, and actions 
 " as good, and a contrary one as bad ; all which is eom- 
 " monly done by that whole order of Philofophers 
 " who agree with him in admitting generous princi- 
 iC pies in human nature: whereas he juftly deferves to 
 " be exhibited to the public in the light of an ori- 
 '■ ginal, original in the moil: capital of all articles re- 
 u lative to taefcience of human nature and morality:
 
 PREFACE. xlv 
 
 " for tho' all the difciples of the generous philofophy 
 " affert, in the ftrongeft manner, a diftinct, order of 
 (i affections in our nature, having the happinefs of 
 " others for their ultimate object, yet when the agent 
 " is put upon determining the moil important mea- 
 " fure of human conduct, Why am I to gratify this 
 " prefent defire? or why mould I rather chufe to con- 
 " troul it in favour of another? the anfwer which this 
 " order of philofophers has given, is very different 
 " from that which is and muft be given by Dr. Hut- 
 " chefon: according to the former the agent is refer- 
 " red to the confideration of his perfonal happinefs* 
 " (arifing indeed from the prevalence of virtuous af- 
 -' fections) as the determiner of his choice; taking it 
 iC for granted, that there can be but one ultimate 
 " end of the agent's cool and deliberate purfuit, viz. 
 " his own highert intereft or perfonal happinefs: but 
 " Dr. Hutchefon's doctrine is far otherways; accord- 
 *' ing to him, there are three calm determinations in 
 <c our nature, namely, the calm defire of our own 
 i( happinefs, the calm defire of the happinefs of other 
 " beings, and the calm defire of moral perfeclion, 
 
 * Shaft. In^. f.ora p. 77 to 1 74, ard p. 69 middle feJt. Lond. Ed.
 
 xlvi PREFACE. 
 
 " each of them alike ultimate; that betwixt the fe- 
 " cond and third determination there can fcarce hap- 
 cf pen any oppofition, but that it is quite otherwife 
 " betwixt the rirft and the other two, where an appa- 
 lC rent oppofition at leaft may often fall out, and in 
 u all fuch cafes it is fo far from being intended by the 
 < ; conftitution of our nature, that the defire of pri- 
 11 vatehappinefs mould controul the other de(ires,that 
 lC the Moral Senfe never fails to dictate to the agent 
 " the voluntary facrifice of the firft, to either of the 
 a other two f : the whole is a queftion of fact, and 
 " every one muft judge of it for himfelf : but the diffe- 
 " rence is the greateft imaginable, whether the defire 
 ei of moral excellence, or the defire of private happi- 
 <l nefs is deftined to be the fupreme controuling prin- 
 " ciple according to the actual conftitution of our na- 
 il ture: and none of the Philofophers before our Au- 
 tC thor has ever hinted at fuch a reprefentation of our 
 " nature as pleads for the former as the juft account 
 " of the matter : nature has formed the union be- 
 {; tween the latter two of the three great ultimate de- 
 " terminations of the human mind; but it is religion 
 
 f Book I. chnp. iv. § 12. of this work.
 
 PREFACE. xlvii 
 
 " alone, according to him, that can render all the 
 " three invariably harmonious, and incapable of ac- 
 u ting in different and oppofite directions. " 
 
 It may be acknowledged that Dr. Hutchefon has 
 taught this doctrine more fully and explicitly than 
 any of the Philofophers either antient or modem J ; 
 but that none of them have ever hinted at it, tho' it 
 fhould be fo, cannot well be pofitively afferted with- 
 out a very extenfive, and at the fame time a very par- 
 ticular furvey of their works. Our Author has indeed 
 made no pretentions to new difcoveries, but rather 
 exprefsly difclaimed them * : but this may be owing 
 to the particular modefty of his genius and difpollti- 
 on: it was probably owing, in fome degree, to this 
 amiable turn of mind, that he chufed to confider mo- 
 rals rather in the humbler way of a matter of fact, 
 than in the more pompous one of fcientifical know- 
 ledge : and this too made him always more folicitous 
 that his doctrine mould in the main coincide with 
 that of other good Moralifts, than that it mould be 
 different or oppofite: thus he endeavoured to fhew, 
 
 X Book I. chap. iv. §12. of this work. 
 * Pref. to Effay on the PafT. p. 1 8 and 1 9.
 
 xlviii PREFACE. 
 
 that once admitting the generous affections into hu- 
 man nature and the Moral Senfe, the doctrine of the 
 eternal fitnefs and unfitnefs of things, and of immu- 
 table moral truths was very juft and folid. But it is 
 time to leave the candid reader to the perufal of the 
 Work itfelf, and to form fuch judgments of the Au- 
 thor's doctrine in all refpe&s, as upon ferious exami- 
 nation fhall appear to him to be well founded. 
 
 W. Leech man. 
 
 ,EGE,J 
 Dec. 24. 17 54- 
 
 GLASGOW-COLLEGE, 7
 
 CONTENTS of the FIRST VOLUME. 
 
 The Preface, giving fome Account of the Life, Writings, 
 and Character of the Author. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 Concerning the Conftitution of Human Nature, and the 
 Supreme Good. 
 
 Chap. i. Of the Conftitution of Human Nature and its 
 Powers; andfirft, theUnderftanding, Will, and 
 PafTions. Page I 
 
 Chap. 2. Concerning the finer Powers of Perception. 15 
 
 Chap. 3. Concerning the ultimate Determinations of the 
 Will, and benevolent ArTe&ions. 38 
 
 Chap. 4. Concerning the Moral Senfe, or Faculty of per- 
 ceiving Moral Excellence, and its Supreme Ob- 
 jects. 53 
 
 Chap. 5. The fenfe of Honour and Shame explain'd. The 
 univerfal Influence of the Moral Senfe, and that 
 of Honour; and their Uniformity. jy 
 
 BOOK I. PART II. 
 
 An Enquiry into the Supreme Happinefs of Mankind. 
 
 Chap. 6. How far the feveral Senfations, Appetites, Pafli- 
 ons and Affections, are in our Power. 1 00 
 
 Chap. 7. A Comparifon of the feveral forts of Enjoyment, 
 and the oppofite forts of Uneafinefs, to find their 
 Importance to Happinefs. 1 1 6 
 
 Chap. 8. A Comparifon of the feveral Tempers and Cha- 
 racters in point of Happinefs or Mifery. 148
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Chap, p- The Duties toward God ; andfirfr, of juft Senti- 
 ments concerning his Nature. Page 1 68 
 
 Chap. 10. The Affections, Duty, and Worfhip, to be exer- 
 eifed toward the Deity. 209 
 
 Chap. 1 1 . The Conclufion of this Book, fhewing the way 
 to the Supreme Happinefs of our Nature. 221 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 Containing a Deduction of the more fpecial Laws of Nature, 
 and Duties of Life, previous to Civil Government, and 
 other adventitious States. 
 
 Chap. i. TheCircumilances which encrcafe or diminifh the 
 Moral Good or Evil of Actions. 227 
 
 Chap. 2. General Rules of Judging about the Morality of 
 Actions, from the Affections exciting to them, 
 or oppofing them. 238 
 
 Chap. 3. The general Notions of Rights and Laws ex- 
 plained; with their Divifions. 252 
 
 Chap. 4. The different States of Men. The State of Li- 
 berty not a State of War. The way that private 
 Rights are known. The Neceflity of a So- 
 cial Life. 280 
 
 Chap. 5. The private Rights of Men ; firft, fuch as are 
 called Natural ; and the natural Equality of 
 Men. 293 
 
 Chap. 6. The adventitious Rights, real, andperfonal. Pro- 
 perty or Dominion. 309 
 
 Chap. 7. The Means of acquiring Property. How far it 
 extends. In what Subjects it reiides. 324 
 
 Chap. 8. Concerning derived Property, and the Ways of 
 alienating or transferring it. 340
 
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 I. 
 
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 Chriftopher Robinfon, Efq; 
 
 Mr. David Rofs. 
 
 David Rofs, Efq; Advocate, 
 
 Mr. George Rofs, late ProfefTor of Huma- 
 nity in the Univerfity of Glafgow. 
 
 The Rev. Mr. Andrew Rofs, Minifler at 
 Newmills. 
 
 Mr. William Ruat, ProfefTor of Church 
 Hiftory in the Univerfity of Glafgow. 
 
 Mr. James Ruddock. 
 
 The Rt. Hon. the Earl of Selkirk, twelve 
 Sets. 
 
 Matthew Sankey, Efq; 
 
 John Sargent, Efq; 
 
 William Scott, M. D. 
 
 Walter Scott of Harding, Efq; Member of 
 Parliament. 
 
 William Scott, Efq; 
 
 William Scot, Efq; Recorder of London- 
 derry. 
 
 Mr. Abraham Seawright of Drumore, in 
 the County of Down. 
 
 TheRev.Mr.JohnSeddon of Warrington. 
 
 The Rev. Patrick Simpfon, A. M. 
 
 Mr. Adam Smith, ProfefTor of Moral Phi- 
 lofophy in the Univerfity of Glafgow, 
 two Sets. 
 
 The Rev. Robert Smyth, A. M. 
 
 George Smyth, Efq; 
 
 The Rev. Benjamin Span, A. M. 
 
 Mr. Stephens of Exeter. 
 
 Dr. Stevenfon, two Sets. 
 
 James Stevenfon, Efq; 
 
 The Rev. Guy Stone, A. M. 
 
 Peter Storer, Efq; 
 
 The Rev. John Strong, A. M. 
 
 The Rev. James Strong, A. M< 
 
 Andrew Thomas Stuart, Efq; 
 
 James Stuart, Efq; 
 
 Alexander Stuart, Efq; 
 
 William Stuart, Efq; 
 
 William Stuart, Efq; of Londonderry. 
 
 Walter Stewart, Efq; Advocate. 
 
 George Swinton, Efq; Advocate. 
 
 The Rev. Mr.'William Thorn, Mimfier of 
 Govan.
 
 THE SUBSCRIBERS. 
 
 Mr. Edwin Thomas. 
 
 Mr. William Thurlburn, Bookfcller in 
 
 Cambridge. 
 John Tickell, Efq; 
 The Rev. John Torrence, A. M. 
 Mr. Peter Touchett, Merchant in Man- 
 
 cherter. 
 Mr. James Trail. 
 Mrs. Mary Trevor. 
 The Rev. Mr. Turner. 
 
 U. 
 
 Clotworthy Upton, Efq; 
 
 James Veitch, Efq; Advocate. 
 
 W. 
 The Hon. Mr. Juftice Ward. 
 James "Waddel, Efq; 
 Capt. James Wallace of Liverpool. 
 James Wallace, Efq; 
 Mrs. Sarah Wallace. 
 Mr. Robert Wallace. 
 James Wallace, Efq; 
 
 I The Rev. Bernard Ward, A.M. 
 Bernard Ward, Efq; 
 
 Alexander Wedderburn, Efq; Advocate. 
 The Rev. Peter Wefteura, A. M. 
 Richard Weld, M. D. 
 The Rev. Ifaac Weld. 
 Mark White, Efq; 
 Mr. Abraham Wilkinfon. 
 Godfrey Wills, Efq; 
 Mr. Thomas Williams. 
 Jofeph Williamfon, Efq; Advocate. 
 The Rev. John Williamfon, A. M. 
 W r iUiam Wilfon, Efq; 
 Mr. Robert Wilfon. 
 Mr. William Wilfon. 
 Rcbert Wood, Efq; 
 Hans Wood, Efq; 
 The Rev. Mr. Patrick Woodrow, Minifier 
 
 of Tarbolton. 
 William Wray, Efq; 
 
 Benjamin Yates, Efq; 
 
 Mr. John Young, Profeflbr of Philofophy 
 in the Univerfity of St. Andrews. 
 
 Omitted; 
 
 The Rev. Ebenezer Keay, A. M.
 
 .A 
 
 SYSTEM 
 
 O F 
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 Concerning the Conjiitution o/^Human Nature, 
 and the Supreme Good. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Of the Conjiitution of Human Nature and its Towers, 
 and fir ft the Underfiandihg, Will andT *aJ/ions. 
 
 I. f I "^HE INTENTION OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IS TO Moral PMofi. 
 
 J direct men to that courfe of action which fhyt wbet ' 
 tends moft effectually to promote their greater!: hap- 
 pinefs and perfection; as far as it can be done by obfer- 
 vations and conclufions difcoverable from the confli- 
 tution of nature, without any aids of fupernatural re- 
 velation : thefe maxims, or rules of conduct are there- 
 fore reputed as laws of nature, and the fyftem or col- 
 lection of them is called the Law of Nature. 
 
 As human happinefs, which is the end of this art, KwmUJge of 
 cannot be diftinctly known without the previous know-^/j;"Jf^; 
 ledge of the conftitucion of this fpecies, and of all its*- 
 ^perceptive and active powers, and their natural ob- 
 jects.; (fince happinefs denotes theflate of thefoul ari- 
 
 Vol. I. A
 
 2 The Perceptive Powers 
 
 Book I. fing from its feveral grateful perceptions ormodifica- 
 ^"V^tions;) the mod natural method in this fcience mud: 
 be firft to inquire into the feveral powers and difpoii- 
 tions of the fpecies, whether perceptive or active, into 
 its feveral natural determinations, and the obj eels from 
 whence its happinefs can arife ; and then to compare 
 together the feveral enjoyments this fpecies is capable 
 of receiving, that we maydifcover what is itsfupreme 
 happinefs and perfection, and what tenor of action is 
 fubfervient to it. 
 
 In this inquiry we mail but briefly mention fuch 
 parts of our conftitution, whether in body or mind, as 
 are not of great confequence in morals; avoiding un- 
 necefTary controverfies, and often referring to other au- 
 thors for thofe points which have been tolerably well 
 explained by them. Thus we pafs over many ingeni- 
 ous anatomical obfervations upon the advantages and 
 dignity of the human body above that of other ani- 
 mals. The reader may find them in the anatomical 
 authors, and Dr. Cumberland. 
 Sarj/infirmitia II. Confider mankind from their birth, you fee a 
 fpecies at firft weaker and lefs capable of fubfifting, 
 without the aid of the adult, than any other; and con- 
 tinuing longer in this infirm ftate. Animals of feveral 
 other kinds attain to their full vigour and the nerfecl 
 ufe of all their powers in a few months ; and few re- 
 quire more than four or five years to their maturity, 
 Ten or twelve years are necefTary to mankind before 
 they can obtain fubfiftence by their own art or labour, 
 even in civilifed focieties, and in the fineft climates af-
 
 ill H U M A N N A T U R E. J 
 
 ter they have been cleared of all beafts of prey. Many Chap. r. 
 other animals are both cloathed and armed by nature, v^v^O 
 and have all that is neceffary for their defence or con- 
 venient fubfiftence without any care or contrivance of 
 their own: the earth uncultivated offers them their 
 food, and the woods or rocks their ihelter. Mankind 
 are naked and unarmed ; their more falutary and agree- 
 able food is more rare, requiring much art and labour: 
 their bodies arelefs fit to refill: the injuries of weather, 
 without more operofe contrivances for cloathing and 
 fhelter. Their prefervation therefore, in their tender 
 years, mud: depend on the care of the adult ; and their 
 lives muft always continue miferable if they are in 
 folitude, without the aids of their fellows. 
 
 This is no unreafonable feverity in the Author of/Wr m-.i c*«* 
 Nature to our fpecies. We fhall foon difcover the 
 natural remedy provided for this lading imbecillity 
 of our younger years, in the tender parental affec- 
 tion of a rational fpecies ; and the final caufes of it, 
 in the feveral improvements we are capable of recei- 
 ving. The means of fubfiftence to our fpecies re- 
 quire much contrivance and ingenuity: we are ca- 
 pable of many noble enjoyments unknown to other 
 animals, and depending on ufeful and delightful 
 arts, which we cannot attain to without a long educa- 
 tion, much inftruclion and imitation of others. How 
 much time is requifite for learning our mother- 
 tongues? how much for dexterity even in the com- 
 moneft arts of agriculture, or in domeftic fervice? full 
 itreng;th of body, without a mind equally advanced in 
 
 A 2
 
 a External Sensations 
 
 Book I. knowledge and arts and focial habits, would make us- 
 
 VW^uno-overnable and untraceable to our parents or in- 
 
 ftru&ors. Since we need to be fo long in fubje&ion, 
 
 we fhould not foon be able to lhake off the neceflary 
 
 and friendly yoke. 
 
 rows ™nb jij. The natural principles which firft difcover 
 
 m«rM- themfelves are our external fenfes, with fome fmall 
 powers of fpontaneous motion, an appetite for food, 
 and an inftinct to receive and fwallow it. All thefe 
 powers exert themfelves in a way too dark for any of 
 us ever to apprehend completely: much lefs have the 
 brutes any knowledge to direcft them to the teats of 
 their dams, or notion of the preflure of the air upon 
 which fucking depends. At firft indeed we ail alike act 
 by inftincfts wifely implanted by a fuperior hand. 
 
 Our external fenfes foon introduce to the mind 
 fome perceptions of pleafure and pain: and along with 
 thefe perceptions there immediately appears a natural 
 conftant determination to defire the one and repel the 
 other; to purfue whatever appears to be the caufe or 
 occafion of pleafure, and to fhun the caufes of pain. 
 Thefe are probably our firft notions of natural good 
 or evil, of happinefs or mifery. 
 
 irop !r y«, of The external fenfes are thofe " determinations of 
 " nature by which certain perceptions conftantly arife 
 " in the mind, when certain impreffions are made upon 
 " the organs of the body, or motions raifed in them." 
 Some of thefe perceptions are received folely by one 
 fenfe, others may be received by two or more. Of the 
 farmer clafs, are thefe five forts, viz. colours, founds*
 
 External Sensations. 5 
 
 taftes, fmells, cold or heat; fome ingenious authors Chap. i. 
 reckon more: thefe we may call the proper ideas of^Wi 
 fenfation. 
 
 Thefe fenfations, as the learned agree, are not pic- 
 tures or reprefentations of like external qualities in ob- 
 jects, nor of the impreffion or change made in the bo- 
 dily organs. They are either Jignals, as it were, of new 
 events happening to the body, of which experience and 
 obfervation will mew us the caufe; or marks, fettled by 
 the Author of Nature, to mew us what things are fa i 
 hitary, innocent, or hurtful ; or intimations of things 
 not otherways difcernable which may affect our ftate; 
 tho' thefe marks or fignals bear no more refemblance 
 to the external reality, than the report of a gun, or the 
 flam of the powder, bears to the diftrefs of a fhip. The 
 pleafant fenfations of tafte, fmell, and touch, general- 
 ly arife from objects innocent or falutary, when ufed 
 in a moderate degree; the difagreeable or painful fen- 
 fations, from fuch as are pernicious or unfit for com- 
 mon ufe. But fight and hearing feem not to be im- 
 mediate avenues of pain; fcarcely is any vifible form 
 er any found the immediate occafion of it ; tho'- the vi- 
 olent motion of light or ak may caufe painful feel- 
 ings; and yet by fight and hearing the exquifite plea- 
 Hires of beauty and harmony have accefs to the foul,, 
 as well as the ideas of magnitudes, figures, fituation^ 
 and motion. It is by the former fenfes, and not by 
 thofe, that we receive the pleafures commonly called 
 fenfual. 
 The ideas of two or more fenfes are Duration, nuffi» dfl *^ irfrA " 
 
 tuafjjfnfitit
 
 6 Internal Consciousness. 
 
 Book I. ber, extenfion, figure, motion, reft. Duration and 
 v^ryx^ number are applicable to every perception or action of 
 the mind, whether dependent upon bodily organs or 
 not. The Ampler ideas of this clafs, which fome call 
 the Concomitant ideas of fenfation, are not generally 
 cither pleaiant or painful. It is from fome complex 
 modes of figure and motion that pleafure is perceived : 
 beauty, from fome proportions of figure with colour : 
 harmony, from fome proportions of time as well as of 
 tones or notes. The proportions of numbers and fi- 
 gures are the field in which our reafoning powers have 
 the moft free and vigorous exercife. Of thefe here- 
 after. 
 ideas of con/*- JV. There is another natural power of perception, 
 t\m. always cxercifed but not enough reflected upon, an in- 
 
 ward fenfation, perception, or confeioufnefs, of all the 
 actions, pafTions, and modifications, of the mind; by 
 which its own perceptions, judgments, reafonings, af- 
 fections, feelings,may become its object: it knows them 
 and fixes their names ; and thus knows itfelf in the 
 fame manner that it does bodies, by qualities immedi- 
 ately perceived, tho' the fub fiance of both be un- 
 known. 
 judging a ni w Thefe two powers of perception, fenfation and con* 
 fcioufnefs, introduce into the mind all its materials of 
 knowledge. All our primary and direct ideas or noti- 
 ons arc derived from one or other of thefe fources. But 
 the mind never reds in bare perception; it compares 
 the ideas received, difcerns their relations, marks the 
 changes made in objects by our own action or that of
 
 The different Powers of the Will. 7 
 
 others; it inquires into the natures, proportions, cau- Chap. i. 
 fes, effects, antecedents, confequents, of every thing, *</~Y^J 
 when it is not diverted by fome importunate appetite. 
 Thefe powers of judging and reafoning are more 
 known and better examined by all philofophers than 
 any other, and therefore we pafs them over. All thefe fe- 
 veral powers, of external fenfation, confcioufnefs, judg- 
 ing, and reafoning, are commonly called the acts of 
 the under ft andlng. 
 
 V. Tho' there are many other forts of finer percep-r/^ an* of the 
 tions to be confidered as natural to men, yet as fome 
 of them have the acts of the will, the affections, and 
 paflions, for their objects, it is neceflary to take a fhort 
 view of the will and its natural determinations, before 
 we proceed to thefe finer perceptions. 
 
 Here it is plain, as foon as any fenfe, opinion, or 
 reafoning, reprefents an object or event as immediate- 
 ly good or pleafant, or as the means of future plea- 
 fure, or of fecurity from evil, either for ourfelves or 
 any perfon about whom we are follicitous, there arifes 
 immediately a new motion of the foul, diftinct from 
 all fenfation, perception, or judgment, a defire of that 
 object or event. And upon perception or opinion of 
 an object or event as the occafionof pain or mifery, or 
 of the lofs of good, arifes a contrary motion called 
 aver/ion; on alloccafions of this fort, thefe primary 
 motions of the will naturally arife without any previ- 
 ous choice or command, and are the general fprings of 
 action in every rational a^ent. 
 
 To the will are commonly referred alfo two othcx ela f"°f tl,e ' aiis 
 
 J of the will.
 
 8 Powers of the Will. 
 
 Book I. modifications, or new ftates, arifing from our appre- 
 <c/v^^henilons of obje&s or events, as obtained or not- ob- 
 tained, according to our previous defire; or repel- 
 led and prevented, or not, according to our previ- 
 ous averfions; which are called joy and forrow. But 
 as they do not immediately move the foul to acti- 
 on, they feem rather new feelings or ftates of the foul, 
 than a6ts of the will, more refembling fenfations than 
 volitions. Thefe words however are often ufed pro- 
 mifcuoufly, as are many other names of the actions 
 and pafllons of the foul. Thus delight or joy, is often 
 ufed for the defire of any event which when it befals 
 will give delight; fo is forrow, for fear and averfion. 
 Thus we have the * old divifion of the motions of the 
 will into four general fpecies, Defire, Averfion, Joy, 
 andSorrow. Nor can we eafily imagine any fpirit with- 
 out thefe modifications and motions of Will of one 
 fort or other. The Deity indeed, as he is poflerTed of 
 all power and all perfection, mult be incapable of every 
 modification implying pain, 
 rfc/e feif,fi cr The acts of the will may be again divided into two 
 icncvoknt. c i a ff eSj according as one is purfuing good for himfelf, 
 and repelling -the contrary, or purfuing good for o- 
 thers and repelling evils which threaten them. The 
 former we may call felftft, the later benevolent. What- 
 ever fubtile debates have been to prove that all moti- 
 
 * See Cicero's Tufcul. lib. iii. & iv. 
 Hlnc metmait, cupiuntque> dohnt,gaude?it- 
 
 and xapi, in the perfected character, even 
 the Deity; but all thefe of an higher fort 
 
 que. Virg. j than the turbulent pafllons; of which di° 
 
 The Stoics, the avowed enemies of the I (Unction hereafter, 
 f.alfions, allowed ihe £jA.wrif«aod ithiZuK, \
 
 Of the different Powers of the Will. o 
 
 ons of the will fpring from one fountain, no man can Chap, r, 
 deny that we often have a real internal undifTembledv^"V"\J 
 defire of the welfare of others, and this in very diffe- 
 rent degrees. 
 
 VI. There are two calm natural determinations «**«*«/* 
 
 p. mi | * 1 1 r i i i -• determinations of 
 
 of the will to be particularly coniideredon this occa-^- 
 fion. Firft, an invariable conftant impulfe toward one's 
 own perfection and happinefs of the higheft kind. This 
 f initincl operates in the bulk of mankind very con- 
 fufedly ; as they do not reflect upon, or attend to, their 
 own constitution and powers of action and enjoyment; 
 few have confidered and compared the fevcral enjoy- 
 ments they are capable of, or the feveral powers of ac- 
 tion. But whofoever does fo will find a calm fettled 
 defire of the perfection of all our active powers, and of 
 the higheft enjoyments, fuch as appear to us, upon 
 comparifon, of the greateft importance to our happi- 
 nefs. Thofe who have not made fuch reflections and 
 comparifons, naturally defire all forts of enjoyments 
 they have any notion of by their fenfes or any higher 
 powers they have exercifed, as far as they are confi- 
 ftent with each other, or appear to be fo; and defire the 
 perfection of fuch powers as they attend to. Where 
 feveral enjoyments appear inconfiftent, the mind, 
 while it is calm, naturally purfues, or defires in prefe- 
 rence to others, thofe which feem of the greateft im- 
 portance to its happinefs. So far all agree. 
 
 The other determination alleged is toward the &»evok**. 
 
 f We need no apology, for ufing the I petite is in our language much confined to 
 word inftin&for our higheft powers, to lower powers; but in Latin the word is 
 thofe who know the Latin language. Ap- 1 applied to the higheft. 
 
 Vol. I. B
 
 IO Calm Desires ^^Passions. 
 
 Boor-T. univerfal happinefs of others. When the foul is calnr 
 and attentive to the conftitution and powers of other 
 beings, their natural actions and capacities of happi- 
 nefs and mifery, and when the felnfh appetites and paf- 
 fions and defires are afleep, 'tis alleged that there is 
 a calm impulfe of the foul to defire the greatcft hap- 
 pinefs and perfection of the largeft fyftem within the 
 compafs of its knowledge. Our inward confeioufnefs 
 abundantly teftifies that there is fuch an impulfe or 
 determination of the foul, and that it is truly ulti- 
 mate, without reference to any fort of happinefs of 
 our own. But here again, as few have confidered the 
 whole fyftem of beings knowable by men, we do not 
 find this determination exerted generally in all its ex- 
 tent; but we find natural defires of the happinefs of 
 fuch individuals, or focieties, or fyftems, as we have 
 calmly confidered, where there has intervened no pre- 
 judice againft them, or notion that their happinefs is 
 any way oppofite to our own. 
 
 As the notion of one's own highefi happinefs, or 
 the greateft aggregate or fum of valuable enjoyments, 
 is not generally formed by men, it is not exprefsly de- 
 fired or intended. And therefore we cannot fay that 
 every particular calm defire of private good is aim- 
 ing directly at that fum, and purfuing its object un- 
 der the notion of a neceflary part of that fum. Men 
 naturally defire, even by calm motions of the foul, 
 fuch objects as they conceive ufeful or fubfervient to 
 any valuable enjoyment, fuch as wealth, power, ho- 
 nour, without this conception of their making a part 
 
 five or li
 
 Calm Desires and Passions. it 
 
 of this greateft fum. In like manner we have calm be- Chap. i. 
 nevolent affedtions toward individuals, or fmaller fo-O'VX/ 
 cieties of our fellows, where there has not preceeded 
 any confideration of the moil extenfive fyftem, and 
 where they are not confidered formally as parts of this 
 largeft fyftem, nor their happinefs purfued as condu- 
 cing to the greateft fum of univerfal happinefs. Such 
 are our calm benevolent affections to friends, coun- 
 tries, men of eminent worth, without any reference 
 in our thoughts to the moft extenfive fyftem. We 
 can make thefe references of all felMi enjoyments pur- 
 fued by us to the greateft fum of private happinefs, 
 whenever we pleafe ; and we can in like manner refer 
 all our calm particular kind affe&ions to the general 
 extenfive benevolence ; and 'tis of great confequence 
 to have thefe large conceptions, and to make thefe re- 
 ferences. But 'tis plain the feveral particular affections, 
 whether felfifh or benevolent, operate, and that too 
 without turbulent or paftionate commotions, where no 
 fuch references have preceeded. 
 
 VII. But befide all thefe calm motions of the will tMo* pa/- 
 more or lefs extenfive, there are many particular pafr «S2J? 
 fions and appetites which naturally arife on their pro- 
 per occafions, each terminating ultimately on its own 
 gratification, without further reference; and attended 
 with violent, confufed, and uneafy fenfations, which 
 are apt to continue till the object or gratification is ob- 
 tained. Of thefe turbulent paflions and appetites fome 
 are felfifh, fome benevolent, and fome may partake of 
 both characters. Of the felfifh are hunger, thirft, luft, 
 
 B 2 
 
 fions felfifh or be-
 
 12 Calm Desires and Passions. 
 
 Book I. pafTions for fenfual pleafure, wealth, power, or fame; 
 Of the benevolent kind are pity, condolence, congra- 
 tulation, gratitude, conjugal and parental affections, 
 as often as they become violent and turbulent com- 
 motions of the foul. Anger, envy, indignation, and 
 fome others, may be of either kind, according as they 
 arife either on account of fome oppofition to -our own 
 interefls, or to thofe of our friends or perfons loved 
 and efteemed. Thefe all arife on their natural occa- 
 llons, where no reference is made by the mind to its 
 own greateft happinefs, or to that of others. 
 
 The difference between the calm motions of the 
 will and the paflionate, whether of the felfifh or bene- 
 volent kinds, muft be obvious to any who confider 
 how often we find them- acting in direct oppofition. * 
 Thus anger or luft will draw us oneway; and a calm 
 regard, either to our hip-heft intereft the preateft fum 
 of private good, or to fome particular intereft, will 
 draw the oppofite way : fometimes the pafTion conquer- 
 ing the calm principle, and fometimes being conquer- 
 ed by it. The calm defire of wealth will force one, tho' 
 with reluctance, into fplendid expences, when necefTa- 
 ry to gain a good bargain or a gainful employment ; 
 while the paffion of avarice is repining at thefe ex- 
 pences. The fedate defire of a child's or a friend's vir- 
 tue and honour and improvement, will make us fend 
 them abroad amidft dangers ; while the parental and 
 friendly pafTions are oppofmg this purpofe. Grati- 
 tude, pity, and friendly pafTions, folicite to one fide; 
 
 * See this well tkferibedin Plato. Rep, 1. 9, and /friftoh Eth. H .
 
 Spontaneous Motion. 13 
 
 and love of a country, or a yet more ex tenure benevo- Chap. r. 
 lence, may be foliciting on the other fide. We cor- O'VW 
 reel and reftrain our children, we engage them in un- 
 eafy ftudies and labours, out of calm good-will, while 
 this tender paflion is oppofmg every thing that is un- 
 eafy to them. Defire of life perfuades to abftinence, 
 to painful cures and naufeous potions, in oppositi- 
 on to the appetites deftined to preferve life in the 
 order of nature. 
 
 As there belong to the underftanding not only the 
 lower powers of fenfation, common to us with the 
 brutes, but alfo thofe of reafoning, confcioufnefs, and 
 -pure intellect, as 'tis called; fo to the will belong not 
 only the bodily appetites and turbulent paflions, but 
 the feveral calm and extenfive affeclions of a nobler 
 order. 
 
 VIII. To the Will we alio afcribe the power of Spon- ?««» ■>/«»- 
 taneous Motion; fince,inconfequence of our willing it, 
 we find many parts of the body move as we incline. 
 All its parts are not thusfubjecled to be moved as we 
 pleafe ; but only fuch as 'tis necefTary or ufeful in life 
 for us to have thus fubjected. The inward parts go on, 
 in thofe motions upon which the continuance of life 
 immediately depends, without any acts of our will ;nor 
 can we direelly, by any volition, accelerate or retard 
 them. To fuDerintend motions continually necef- 
 fary would engrofs the mind perpetually, and make 
 it incapable of any other bufmefs. Nor does every mo- 
 tion or imprefTIon on the parts of the body excite fen- 
 fations in the foul. There is no fenfation of the inter- 
 
 tion.
 
 ia Spontaneous Motion. 
 
 Book I. nal motions on which life immediately depends, while 
 L/VXJthe body is in good order. Such fenfation would be 
 an uneafy ufelefs diffraction of the mind from all va- 
 luable purpofes; as we experience, when a difeafe makes 
 the contraction of the heart,or beatings of thepulfe,be- 
 come fenfible. Senfations indicate only fuch changes, 
 and new events, or objects, as 'tis convenient we mould 
 be apprized of. Thus volitions move the head, the eyes, 
 the mouth, the tongue, the limbs, and, that exquifitc 
 inftrument of a rational inventive and artful fpecies, 
 the hand. All thefe are plain indications of the wife 
 and benign counfel of our Creator. Nay our limbs are 
 moved immediately in confequence of the contracti- 
 on of mufcles, and of fome power fent down by nerves 
 from the head. But in our fpontaneous motions we 
 neither know nor will thefe intermediate fteps : we in- 
 tend the lad: motion; and thofe other motions are per- 
 formed without any knowledge or will of ours. Sen- 
 fation in like manner immediatly enfues upon fome 
 motion in a nerve continued to the brain: we peiceive 
 no motion in the brain; but have a fenfation immedi- 
 atly referred to the extremity of the body where the 
 impreflion was made, and feeming to occupy that 
 place; in a manner quite inexplicable. Thefe confi- 
 derations have led fome ingenious and pious men to 
 conclude that a fuperior Being, or the Deity himfelf, 
 is the fole phyfical caufe of all our motions ; according 
 to certain g-eneral laws ; and the fole efficient caufe of 
 all our fenfations too, in the like manner.
 
 [ 15 ] 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Concerning the finer Towers ofTerception. 
 
 I. AFter the general account of the perceptive 
 
 ■**- powers, and of the will, we proceed to confl- 
 der fome finer powers of perception, and fome other 
 natural determinations of will, and general laws of 
 the human conflitution. 
 
 To the fenfes of feeing and hearing, are fuperad- p/a/i.««/i. 
 ded in moft men, tho' in very different degrees, cQx-" aghuitlm ' 
 tain powers of perception of a finer kind than what 
 we have reafon to imagine are in moft of the lower a- 
 nimals, who yet perceive the feveral colours and fi- 
 gures, and hear the feveral founds. Thefe we may call 
 the fenfes of beauty and harmony, or, with Mr. Ad- 
 difon, the imagination. Whatever name we give them, 
 'tis manifeft that, the feveral following qualities in ob- 
 jects, are fources of pleafure conftituted by nature; 
 or, men have natural powers or determinations to per- 
 ceive pleafure from them. 
 
 i . Certain forms are more grateful to the eye than Buiu1y> 
 others, even abftracling from all pleafure of any live- 
 ly colours; fuch complex ones, efpecially, where, uni- 
 formity, or equality of proportion among the parts, is 
 obfervable; nor can we, by command of our will, caufe 
 all forms indifferently to appear pleafant, more than 
 we can make all objects grateful to the tafte. 
 
 2. As a difpofition to imitate is natural to man- immm.
 
 I0 " Higher Powers ^Perception. 
 
 Book I. kind from their infancy, fo they univerfally receive 
 L/'V'VJ pleafure from imitation*. Where the original is beau- 
 tiful, we may have a double pleafure; but an exact 
 imitation, whether of beauty or deformity, whether 
 by colours, figures, fpeech, voice, motion or action, 
 gives of itfelf a natural pleafure. 
 lurw.v.j. 3. Certain compofitions of notes are immediatly 
 pleafant to the generality of men, which the artifts can 
 ealily inform us of. The fimpler pleafures arife from 
 the concords; but an higher pleafure arifes fromfuch 
 compofitions as, in found and time, imitate thofe mo- 
 dulations of the human voice,which indicate the feve- 
 ral affections of the foul in important affairs. Hence 
 Plato \ and Lycurgus J obferved a moral charac- 
 ter in mufick, and looked upon it as of feme confe- 
 quence in influencing the manners of a people. 
 *><&*• 4. As we are endued with reafon to difcern the fit- 
 
 nefs of means for an end, and the feveral relations and 
 connexions of things; fo, there is an immediate plea- 
 fure in knowlege^, diftinct from the Judgment itfelf, 
 tko' naturally joined with it. We have a pleafure alfo 
 in beholding the effects of art and defign, in any in- 
 genious machinery adapted to valuable purpofes, in 
 any utenfil well fitted for its end ; whether we hope to 
 have the ufe of it or not. We have delight in exer- 
 cifrng our own rational, inventive, and active powers; 
 we are plcafed to behold the like exercifes of others, 
 and the artful effects of them. In fuch works of art 
 
 * Ariflot. Poet. c. 4. calls man ';J-v fii/inrixirctrev. f De Repub. 1. 2. % Plut. Lb 
 Lycurgo. 4 Inquiry k. i. c. 3. and Arijlet, Ethic, there cited.
 
 Higher Powers ^Perception. 17 
 
 we are pleafed to fee intermixed the beauty of form, Chap. 2. 
 and imitation, as far as it confifts with the defign ; but^^V^w' 
 the fuperior pleafure from the execution of the de- 
 fign makes us omit the inferior when it is inconfiftent. 
 
 II. Granting; all thefe difpofitions to be natural, we Cau f< e f™ rie v 
 may account for all that diverfity of fancies and taftes 
 w T hich we obferve ; fince fo many qualities are natural- 
 ly pleafmg, fome of which may be chiefly regarded by 
 one, and others by others. The necefTitous, the bufy, 
 or the {loathful, may neglect that beauty in drefs, ar- 
 chitecture, and furniture, which they might obtain, 
 and yet not be infenfible to it. One may purfue only 
 the Ampler kind in the uniformity of parts; others 
 may alfo interfperfe imitation of the beautiful works 
 of nature ; and, of thefe, fome may chufe one fet of 
 natural objects, and others may chufe other objects 
 of greater beauty or dignity : the manner too of imi- 
 tation may be more or lefs perfect Again, fome in 
 their works may chiefly regard the pleafure from ap- 
 pearance of defign, and ufefulnefs, admitting only the 
 pleafures of beauty and imitation as far as they con- 
 fifl: with it. In the moft fantaftick drefles there is uni- 
 formity of parts, and fome aptitude to the human 
 fhape, and frequently imitation. But our modern dref- 
 fes are lefs fitted for eafy motion, and the difplaying 
 of the human fhape, than the antient. Spectators who 
 regard thefe ends may prefer the ancient drefles ; thofe 
 who do not think of them, or regard them, may pre- 
 fer the modern. 
 . In like manner as to architecture 5 they who dif- 
 Vol. L C
 
 x 8 Higher Powers ^Perception. 
 
 Book I. cern the imitation of the proportions of the human 
 
 ^/-W; body in certain parts, may relifh one manner on that 
 account. Others, who know the ufes of which cer- 
 tain parts prefent the appearance, may relifh this de- 
 fign; others, without thefe views, may be pleafed with 
 the uniformity of the parts: others may like or dif- 
 like through fome * aflbciations of ideas; of which 
 hereafter. 
 
 mt rtdudtu to One who would reduce all fenfe of beauty in forms 
 m/efkhuft. ^ fome real or apparent ufefulnefs difcerned, will ne- 
 ver be able to explain how the fpectator relifhes thofe 
 ufeful forms from which he gets no benefit, nor ex- 
 pects any beyond the pleafure of beholding them; nor 
 how we are pleafed with the forms of flowers, of birds, 
 and wild beafts, when we know not any real or appa- 
 rent ufes indicated by them ; nor how any fpeclator, 
 quite a Itranger to the views of the architect, fhall be 
 pleafed with the nrfl appearance of the work ; nor 
 whence it is that we are all pleafed with imitations of 
 objects, which, were they really placed where their ima- 
 ges are, would be of no advantage ; one may as well 
 affert that, before we can be pleafed with a favour, we 
 mull: know the figures of the minute particles, and 
 fee their inoffenfive nature to our nerves. 
 
 rf great confi. The pleafures of thefe f finer fenfes are of no fmall 
 ' importance in life. How much foever they feem ne- 
 
 * See the Inquiry into Beauty, b. i. 
 c 7. i. 4. 
 
 -f- One who would make all thefe to be 
 perceptions of the external fenfes, and de- 
 ny that we have any diftinct powers of 
 
 perception, may as well affert that the plea- 
 fures of geometry, or perfpeilive, are fen- 
 fual, becaufe 'tis by the fenfes we receive 
 the ideas of figure.
 
 Finer Perceptions or Senses. < 10 
 
 gle&ed by the votaries of wealth and power, they are Chap. 2. 
 generally much in their view for themfelves, in fome^vx/ 
 future period of life, or for their pofterity: as for o- 
 thers who have a more elegant tafte, they are the 
 end of a great part of their labours : and the greateft 
 part of men, when they are tolerably provided againft 
 the uneafy cravings of appetite, fhew a relifh for thefe 
 pleafures : no fooner are nations fettled in peace than 
 they begin to cultivate the arts fubfervient to them, as 
 all hiftories will inform us. 
 
 To thefe pleafures of the imagination mavbead-^^j^*; 
 
 J- O J deur ana novel- 
 
 ded two other grateful perceptions arifing from no- *■ 
 velty and grandeur. The former ever caufes a grate- 
 ful commotion when we are at leifure; which perhaps 
 arifes from that curiofity or defire of knowlege which 
 is deeply rooted in the foul; of which hereafter. Gran- 
 deur alfo is generally a very grateful circumftance in 
 any object of contemplation diftincl: from its beauty 
 or proportion. Nay, where none of thefe are ob- 
 ferved, the mind is agreeably moved with what is large,, 
 fpacious, high, or deep, even when no advantage ari- 
 fing from thefe circumftances is regarded. The final 
 caufes of thefe natural determinations or fenfes of 
 pleafure may be feen in fome * late authors. 
 
 III. Another important determination or fenfe o£ The fy }n P ath(lk?i 
 the foul we may call thejj/mpathetick,different from all common. 
 the external fenfes ; by which, when we apprehend the 
 Hate of others, our hearts naturally have a fellow-feel- 
 ing with them. When we fee or know the pain, dif- 
 
 * See Speftator N. 412. and the Inquiry into Beauty } laft feftion.. 
 
 C 2
 
 20 Finer Perceptions or Senses. 
 
 Book I. trefs, or miferyof any kind which another fuffers, 
 ^/V^j and turn our thoughts to it, we feel a ftrong fenfe of 
 pity, and a great pronenefs to relieve, where no con- 
 trary pallion with-holds us. And this * without any 
 artful views of advantage to accrue to us from giving 
 relief, or of lofs we mail fuftain by thefe fufferings. 
 We fee this principle ftrongly working in children, 
 where there are the feweft diftant views of intereft; fo 
 ftrongly fometimes, even in fome not of the fofteft 
 mould, at cruel executions, as to occafion fainting and 
 ficknefs. This principle continues generally during 
 1 all our lives. 
 congratulation. We have a like natural difpofition to Congratula- 
 tion with others in their joys; where no prior emulati- 
 on, imagined oppofition of intereft, or prejudice, pre- 
 vents it. We have this fympathy even with the brute 
 animals; and hence poets fo fuccefsfully pleafe us 
 with defcriptions of their joys. But as our own fel- 
 fiih pafl tons which repel evil, fuch as fear, anger, re- 
 fentment, are generally ftronger commotions of foul 
 than the pafTions purfuing private good ; fo pity is a 
 ftronger benevolent paftion than congratulation. And 
 all this is wifely contrived, fmce immunity from pain 
 feems previoully necelTary to the enjoyment of good. 
 Thus the ftronger motions of the mind are directed 
 toward that which is moft necefTary. This fympathy 
 feems to extend to all our affections and pafTions. 
 They all feem naturally contagious. We not only for- 
 row with the diftreffed, and rejoice with the profpe- 
 
 * See Inquiry into Virtus feft. 2.
 
 Propensity to Action. 21 
 
 rous; but admiration, or furprife, difcovered in one, Chap. 2. 
 raifes a correfpondent commotion of mind in all who ^VXJ 
 behold him. Fear obferved raifes fear in the obferver 
 before he knows the caufe, laughter moves to laugh, 
 love begets love, and the devout affections difplayed 
 difpofe others to devotion. One eafriy fees how direct- 
 ly fubfervient this fympathy is to that grand determi- 
 nation of the foul toward univerfal happinefs. 
 
 IV. Before we mention fome other finer fenfes, a natural pro- 
 which have actions of men for their objects, we mu&Tmo/lnLlZ 
 obferve one general determination of the foul to exer- 
 cife all its active powers. We may fee in ourfpecies, 
 from the very cradle, a conftant propensity to action 
 and motion ; children grafping, handling, viewing, 
 tafting every thing. As they advance they exert other 
 powers, making all cryals poffible; obferving all chan- 
 ges, and inquiring into their caufes; and this from an 
 impulfe to a6tion and an implanted inftinct toward 
 knowledge,even where they are not allured by any pro- 
 fpects of advantage. Nay w r e fee almoft all other ani- 
 mals, as foon as they come to light, exercifing their fe- 
 veral powers by like inflincts, in the way that the Au- 
 thor of Nature intended ; and by this exercife, tho' of- 
 ten laborious and fatiguing, made happier than a- 
 ny ftate of flothful fenfuality could make them. Ser- 
 pents try their reptile motions ; beafts raife themfelves 
 and walk or run; birds attempt to raife themfelves 
 with their wings and foar on high; water-fowl 
 take to the water as foon as they fee it. The colt is 
 practifing for the race, * the bull is butting with his 
 
 * Detite lupus } Sec. Hor. lib. i. fat. i. 1. 52.
 
 22 Propensity to Action. 
 
 Book I. horns, and the hound exercifing himfelf for the chace. 
 
 kj~v~\j Children are ever in motion while they are awake,nor 
 '' do they decline wearinefs and toil : they fhew an aver- 
 lion to flecp till it over-powers themagainft their wills : 
 they obferve whatever occurs, they remember and in- 
 quire about it; they learn the names of things, in- 
 quire into their natures, ftructures, ufes, and caufes; 
 nor will their curiofity yield to rebukes and affronts. 
 Kind affections foon break out toward thofe who 
 are kind to them; ftrong gratitude, and an ardor to 
 excel in any thing that is praifed; in vying with their 
 fellows they are tranfported with fuccefs and victory, 
 and exceedingly dejected when they are out-done by 
 others. They are foon provoked to anger upon any 
 imagined injury or hurt; are afraid of experienced 
 pain, and provoked at the caufe of it ; but foon ap- 
 peafed by finding it undefigned, or by profeftlons of 
 repentance. Nothing do they more refent than falfe 
 accufation or reproach. They are prone to fincerity, 
 and truth, and opennefs of mind, until they have ex- 
 perienced fome evils following upon it. They are im- 
 patient to relate to others any thing new or ftrange, 
 or apt to move admiration or laughter; ready to gra- 
 tify any one with what they have no ufe for them- 
 felves ; fond of pleafing, and void of fufpicion, till 
 they have had experience of injuries. 
 h ... This impulfe to action continues during life, while 
 
 kodkn. we retain the ufe of our powers. The men who are 
 mofl worthlefs and flothful yet are not wholly idle; 
 they have their games ; their cabals and converfation
 
 Propensity to Action. 2? 
 
 to employ them, or fome mean ingenuity about fen- Chap. 2 . 
 fual pleafures. We fee in general that mankind canw^v^X^ 
 be happy only by action of one kind or other; and 
 the exercife of the intellectual powers is one fource 
 of natural delight from the cradle to the grave. Chil- 
 dren are tranfported with difcoveries of any thing 
 new or artificial, and impatient to fhew them to o- 
 thers. Publick fhows, rarities, magnificence, give 
 them high entertainment: but above all, the impor- 
 tant actions of great characters ; the fortunes of fuch 
 men, and of the itates where they lived, whether re- 
 lated, read, or reprefented by action, are the delight 
 of all ages. Here the pleafure is heightened by our fo- 
 cial feelings of joy, and the keenefs of inquiry increa- 
 fed by our impulfe to compafiion, and our concern a- 
 bout the perfons we admire. 
 
 When men have the proper genius, and accefs to 
 more laborious knowlege, what ardour of mind do 
 fome fhew for geometry, numbers, aftronomy, and 
 natural hiflory ? All toils and watchings are born with 
 joy. Need we mention even fabulous hiflory, mytho- 
 logy, philology? 'Tis manifeft there is an high natu- 
 ral pleafure in knowledge without any allurements of 
 other advantage. There is a like pleafure in practical 
 knowlege about the bufinefs of life, and the effects of 
 actions upon the happinefs of individuals, or that of 
 focieties. How contrary are all thefe appearances of 
 Nature to that Philofophy which makes the fole 
 impulfe or determination of the foul to be a defire of
 
 .-4 noral fenfe. 
 
 AMoral Sense. 
 
 fuch pleafures as arife from the body and are refer- 
 red to it, or of immunity from bodily pain! 
 
 V. Action is conftituted to mankind the grand 
 fource of their happinefs by an higher power of per- 
 ception than any yet mentioned; namely, that by which 
 they receive the moral notions of actions and charac- 
 ters. Never was there any of the human fpecies, ex- 
 cept ideots, to whom all actions appeared indifferent. 
 Moral differences of action are difcerned by all, even 
 when they conlider no advantage or disadvantage to 
 redound to themfelves from them. As this moral 
 fenfe is of high importance, it fhall be more fully con- 
 sidered in a fubfequent chapter. It may fuffice at pre- 
 fent to obferve what we all feel, that a certain tem- 
 per, a fet of affections, and actions confequenton them, 
 when we are confeious of them in ourfelves, raife the 
 mod joyful fenfations of approbation and inward fatis- 
 faction; and when the like are obfervedin others, we 
 have a warm feeling of approbation, a fenfe of their 
 excellence, and, in confequence of it, great good-will 
 and zeal for their happinefs. If we are confeious of 
 contrary affections and actions, we feel an inward re- 
 morfe, and diflike to ourfelves ; when we obferve the 
 like in others, we diilike and condemn their difpofiti- 
 ons, reputing them bafe and odious. 
 
 The affections which excite this moral approbati- 
 on are all either directly benevolent, or naturally con- 
 nected with fuch difpof itions ; thofe which are difap- 
 proved and condemned, are either ill-natured, by 
 which one is inclined to occafion mifery to others ; or
 
 Sense o/H onour, 25 
 
 fuch felfifh difpofltions as argue fome unkind affecti- Chap. 2. 
 on, or the want of that degree of the benevolent af- <-/V~v> 
 fections which is requifite for the publick good, and 
 commonly expected in our fpecies. 
 
 This moral difcernment is not peculiar to perfon3 um ^-J" 
 of a fine education and much reflection. The rudeft 
 of mankind fhew fuch notions ; and young minds, 
 who think leaft of the diftant influences of actions u- 
 pon themfelves or others, and have fmall precaution 
 about their own future intereils,are rather more moved 
 with moral forms than others. Hence that flrong in- 
 clination in children, as foon as they underftand the 
 names of the feveral affections and tempers, to hear 
 fuch ftories as prefent the moral characters of agents 
 and their fortunes. Hence that joy in the profperity 
 of the kind, the faithful, and the juft; and that indig- 
 nation and forrow upon the fucceffes of the cruel and 
 treacherous. Of this power we mail treat more fully 
 hereafter. 
 
 VI. As by the former determination we are led to a fe»/e of hv 
 approve or condemn ourfelves or others according to 
 the temper difplayed, fo by another natural determi- 
 nation/which we may call a fenfe of honour and fhame, 
 an high pleafure is felt upon our gaining the approba- 
 tion and efteem of others for our good actions, and 
 upon their expreiTing their fen timents of gratitude; and 
 on the other hand, we are cut to the heart by cenfure, 
 condemnation, and reproach. All this appears in the 
 countenance. The fear of infamy, or cenfure, or con- 
 tempt, difplays itfelf by blufhing.. 
 
 Vol. I. D
 
 26 Senseo/Honour. 
 
 BookT. 'Tis true, we may obferve from our infancy, that 
 ^^\T\j men are prone to do good offices to thofe they approve 
 and honour. But we appeal to the hearts of men, whe- 
 ther they have not an immediate pleafure in being ho- 
 noured and cfteemed, without thinking of any future 
 advantages, and even when they previoufly know that 
 they can receive none. Are not we generally folicitous 
 about our characters after our death? And whence is 
 it that bluftiing accompanies this fort of fear, and not 
 the fears of other difad vantages, if this is not an im- 
 mediate principle ? 
 
 * Aristotle's account of this pleafure, tho' more 
 elegant, is not juit: " that we relifh honour as it is a 
 " teftimony to our virtue, which we are previoufly 
 " confeious is the greater! good." This confiderati* 
 on may fometimes make honour very grateful to 
 men who are doubtful and diffident of their own con- 
 duel. But have not alio the men of greateft abilities, 
 who are perfectly allured of the goodnefs of their con- 
 duct, a like natural joy in being praifed, diftinct from 
 their inward felf-approbation? 
 
 The kind intention of God in implanting this prin- 
 ciple is obvious. 'Tis a ftrong incitement to every 
 thing excellent and amiable: it gives a grateful re- 
 ward to virtue: it often furmounts the obftacles to 
 it from low worldly interefts : and even men of little 
 virtue are excited by it to fuch ufeful fervices as they 
 would have o therways declined. The felnih are thus,be- 
 yond their inclination, made fubfervient to a publick 
 intcreft ; and fuch are punilhed who counteract it. 
 
 • Ethic, ad Xi corn. 1. i. c. 5.
 
 Sense o/Decency and Dignity. 27 
 
 What may further prove that this fenfe of honour Chap. 2. 
 is an original principle, is this ; we value the praife of \y~Y~\J 
 others, not in proportion to their abilities to ferve us, 
 but in proportion to their capacity of judging in 
 fuch matters. We feel the difference, between the in- 
 terefted defire of pleafing the man in power who can 
 promote us ; and the inward joy from the approbation 
 of the judicious or ingenious, who cannot do us any 
 other good offices. The defire of praife is acknow- 
 leged to be one of the mofl univerfal paffions of the 
 foul. 
 
 VII. Tho' it is by die moral fenfe that actions be- ~ A fi : fi°f itc ™- 
 come of the greater!: confequence to our happinefs or 
 mifery ; yet 'tis plain the mind naturally perceives fome 
 other forts of excellence in many powers of body and 
 mind; muft admire them,whether in ourfelves or others; 
 and muil be pleafed with certain exercifes of them,wi th- 
 ou t conceiving them as moral virtues. We often ufe 
 words too promifcuoufly, and do not exprefs diftinctly 
 the different feelings or fenfations of the foul. Let us 
 keep moral approbation for our fentimencs of fuch dif- 
 pofitions, affections, and confequent actions, as we re- 
 pute virtuous. We find this warm approbation a very 
 different perception from the admiration or liking 
 which we have forfeveral other powers and difpofiti- 
 ons; which are alfo reliihed by a fenfe ox decency or- 
 dignity. This fenfe alfo is natural to us, but the per- 
 ceptions very different from moral approbation. We 
 not only know the ufe of fuch valuable powers, and 
 of their exercife, to the perfon poffibrTed of them ; but. 
 
 D 2
 
 >8 Sense o/Decengy ^Dignity. 
 
 Book I. have agreeable commotions of admiration and liking, 
 and thcfe in feveral degrees. Thus beauty, ftrength, 
 fwiftnefs, .agility of body, are more decent and efteem- 
 able than a ftrong voracious ftomach, or a delicate pa- 
 3 ate. The manly diveffions of riding, or hunting, are 
 beheld with more pleafure and admiration than eat- 
 inir and drinking even in a moderate decree. A tafte 
 for thcfe manly exercifes is often valued; whereas pur- 
 fuits of mere fenfuality appear defpicable even when 
 they do not run into excefs, and at beft are only in- 
 nocent. Nay there is fomething graceful, in the very 
 ihape gefture and motion, and fomething indecent 
 and uncomely ; abftracting from any indications of 
 advantage difcerned by the fpeclators. 
 
 But this is (till more obvious about the powers of 
 the mind and their exercife. A penetrating genius, 
 capacity for bufmefs, patience of application and la- 
 bour, a tenacious memory, a quick wit, are naturally 
 admirable, and relifhed by all obfervers; but with a 
 quite different feeling from moral approbation. To 
 every natural power there feems to be a correfponding 
 fenfe or tafte, recommending one fort of exercife, and 
 difliking the contrary. Thus we relifh the exercife of 
 all the ingenious arts, machinery of every kind, imi- 
 tation in painting, fculpture, ftatuary, poetry; garde- 
 ning, architecture, mufick. We not. only behold the 
 works with pleafure, but have a natural admiration of 
 the perfons in whom we difcern a tafte and genius 
 for thefe arts. Whereas the exercife of our lower 
 powers, merely fubfervient to fenfual gratification, are 
 
 : 
 
 grees.
 
 Sense ^Decency tf//;/ Dignity. 29 
 
 at belt beheld with indifference, are often matter of Chap. 2. 
 fhame, and the caufe of contempt. V^VXJ 
 
 Thus according to the juft obfervation of A#iWj&#«»7s«/«. 
 stotle, "The chief happinefs of active beings muft SLT**"" 
 Cf arife from action; and that not from action of eve- 
 " ry fort, but from that fort to which their nature is 
 " adapted, and which is recommended by nature.'* 
 When we gratify the bodily appetites, there is an im- 
 mediate fenfe of pleafure, fuch as the brutes enjoy, 
 but no further fatisfaction ; no fenfe of dignity upon 
 reflection, no Q-ood-likino; of others for their beino; 
 thus employed. There is an exercife of fome other 
 bodily powers which feems more manly and graceful. 
 There is a manifefr, gradation ; fome fine taftes in the 
 ingenious arts are ftill more agreeable ; the exercife is 
 delightful; the works are pleafant to the fpectator, 
 and reputable to the artift. The exercife of the high- 
 er powers of the underftanding, in difcovery of truth, 
 and juft reafoning, is more efteemable, when the fab- 
 jects are important. But the nobleft of all are the vir- 
 tuous affections and actions, the objects of the moral 
 fenfe. 
 
 Some other abilities and difpofitions of fold, which ^ I/i • M/,Vw5, 
 are naturally connected with benevolent difpofitions, 
 and inconfiftent with the hio-heft felfifhnefs and fenfu- 
 ality, feem to be immediatly approved by the moral 
 fenfe itfelf. Thefe we refer to another place. We 
 fhall only take notice here, that by certain affociati- 
 ons of ideas, and by frequent comparifons made in fi- 
 miliesand metaphors, and by other caufes, fomeina-
 
 Associations of Ideas. 
 
 nimate objects have obtained additional ideas of dig- 
 nity, decency, fanctity; fome appear as mean and de- 
 fpicable ; and others are in a middle ftate of indiffe- 
 rence. Our relifh for imitation and obferving refem- 
 blances has made all languages full of metaphors : 
 and iimilitudes and allegories give no fmall pleafure 
 in many compofitions : hence we cloathmany objects 
 with additional ideas of qualities they are not natu- 
 rally capable of; fome of thefe ideas are great and ve- 
 nerable, others low and contemptible. Some attempt 
 to explain the natural caufe or occaflon of laughter, 
 a commotion of mind generally agreeable, of which 
 all are fufceptible, from a natural fenfe of the ridicu- 
 lous in objects or events. 
 " '; VIII. Before we pafs to the difpofltions of the will, 
 
 atss very Ktcej- x i ? 
 
 we may obferve a natural involuntary determination 
 to affociate or bind together all fuch perceptions as 
 have often occurred together, or have made at once a 
 ftrong impreflion on the mind, fo that they (hall if ill 
 attend each other, when any object afterwards excites 
 any one or more of them. As this is experienced in 
 fmaller matters, fo it affects our apprehenfions of good 
 and evil natural and moral. When the {train of con- 
 verfation and popular maxims have long reprefented 
 certain actions or events as good, and others as evil ; we 
 find it difficult to break the affociation, even after our 
 reafon is convinced of the contrary. Thus certain ac- 
 tions are confufedly imagined honourable, others dif- 
 honourable; certain Rations miferable, and others 
 happy; as fpectres are imagined in church-yards. Tho'
 
 hap. r. 
 
 The Wil l and Habits. 
 
 many miferies and vices fpring from this fountain, we Qj 
 may fee the abfolute necefTity of this determination. 
 Without it we could have little ufe of memory, or 
 recollection, or even of fpeech. How tedious would 
 it be to need a particular recollection, upon each word 
 we hear or defire to fpeak, to find what words and 
 ideas are joined by the cuftom of the language? it mult 
 be as tedious a work as decyphering after we had found 
 an alphabet. Whereas, now, the found and idea are 
 fo aflbciated, that the one ever is attended with the 
 other. Nay, how is it we remember? when we are ex* 
 amined about a paft event, the time, or place, fome 
 circumftance, or perfon then prefent, is fuggefted in 
 the queftion, and thefe bring along with them the 
 whole train of the afTociated ideas. The fabject of a 
 debate is fuggefted; a man converfant in it finds, pre- 
 vious almoft to volition, the principal reafonings on 
 both fides arifing in his mind. To this difpofition 
 in a great meafure is owing the power of education, 
 which forms many aflbciations in our early years ; and 
 few have the patience or courage to examine, whether 
 they are founded in nature, or in the weaknefs of our 
 inftructors. 
 
 IX. Many of the natural determinations of the ™* via arJ 
 will are abundantly explained by fuch as treat defign- 
 ediy upon that fubject, and point out the natural oc- 
 casions of thefeveral paffions and affections. To thefe 
 authors we may refer much of this fubject. We con- 
 fidered, above, the ftrong natural propenfity to action. 
 We may alfo obferve another determination, or law
 
 The Will and Habits. 
 
 of our nature, by which the frequent repetition of 
 actions gives not only a facility in performing them, 
 by encreafmg our active powers, but makes the mind 
 more prone to them for the future, or more uneafy 
 when it is by violence reftrained from them. And this 
 is called an Habit. In our pafTive fenfations the plea- 
 fures and pains are rather abated by frequent feelings : 
 and yet the uneafinefs under the want of pleafures is 
 increafed by our being long enured to them. If we 
 find much detriment from habits of vice, equally great 
 is the advantage of the habits of virtue. It is of ge- 
 neral advantage to a rational fpecies, that it thus can 
 increafe any of its powers as it chufes, and make them 
 more (table and vigorous. It is ftill in our power, too, 
 to wear out any habits, by abftaining from their acts, 
 or refolutely acting in oppofition to them. Could we 
 acquire no habits, our powers muft remain miferably 
 weak, and all artificial action continue as uneafy as 
 we found our firft effays. 
 
 But all thefe aiTociations, habits, cuftoms, or pre- 
 judices, recommend objects to our liking, or raife a- 
 verfions to them, under the notion of fome quality or 
 fpecies perceivable by the fenfes we are naturally en- 
 dued with, nor can they raife any new ideas. No fen- 
 timents therefore of approbation or condemnation, 
 no liking or difliking, are fufficiently explained by at- 
 tributing them to prejudice, cuftom, or education, or 
 affociation of ideas; unlefs we can fully mew what 
 thefe ideas or notions are, and to what fenfe they be-
 
 Conjugal and Parental Affections. 33 
 
 long, under which thefe objects are approved or con- Chap. 2. 
 demned, liked or dif liked. L/^VNJ 
 
 X. At a certain age arifes a new defire between thec»w/™^- 
 fexes , plainly deftined for the continuance of our ™f ' "^ 
 race; which, as it would be pernicious or ufelefs in 
 our firft years, before we had acquired knowledge and 
 experience fufficient for the prefervation of offspring, 
 is wifely poftponed in the order of nature. This de- 
 fire in mankind does not terminate merely on fenfu- 
 al pleafure, as in the brutes; nor is it in mankind on- 
 ly a blind impulfe, fuch as excites the brutes, previ- 
 oufly to experience of pleafure. There is a natural 
 liking of beauty as an indication of a temper and man- 
 ners. A character is apprehended, and thence good- 
 will and efteem arifes, and a defire of fociety for life, 
 with friendfhip and mutual love, and united inter efts. 
 Thus thefe fentiments and defires, in mankind, al- 
 ways accompany the natural impulfe. They have al- 
 fo univerfally a defire of offspring, where no ftronger , 
 inconfiftent views reftrain them. 
 
 Toward offspring there is in man, as in other ani- 
 mals, a peculiar ftrong affection, and a tender folici- 
 tude for their prefervation and happinefs. In man- 
 kind this affection continues during life, as parents 
 may always do fome good to their pofterity. It de- 
 fcends to grandchildren, and their children, almoft 
 undiminished. In the brutes it is found where the 
 young need affiftance; where they don't, it is not 
 found. It lafts till the young can fupport themfelves-, 
 and then generally ceafes. All this carries with it ma- 
 
 Vol. I. E
 
 Mankind Social, 
 
 nifeft evidences of defign in the Author of Nature. 
 Like affections, but weaker, are found generally to 
 attend the tyes of blood among collaterals. Thefe 
 tender affections are the fprings of more than one 
 half of the labours and cares of mankind: and, where 
 there is any ability, they roufe the mind to diligence 
 and induflry, and to things gteat and honourable. 
 By means of them the heart is made more fufcep- 
 tible of every tender kind and focial affection. 
 M„ficu\ XL One can fcarce deny to mankind a natural im- 
 
 '"'^pulfe to fociety with their fellows, as an immediate 
 principle, when we fee the like in many fpecies of 
 animals ; nor Ihould we afcribe all affociating to 
 their indigence. Their other principles, their cu- 
 riofity, communicativenefs, defire of action ; their 
 fenfe of honour, their compaiTIon, benevolence, gai- 
 ety, and the moral faculty, could have little or no 
 exercife in folitude, and therefore might lead them 
 to haunt together, even without an immediate or 
 ultimate impulfe, or a fenfe of their indigence. The 
 tyes of blood would have the fame effect, and have 
 probably firft united large numbers for mutual af- 
 liffance and defence, upon a common apprehenfion 
 of their indigence in folitude. When many were 
 thus affociated, the fuperior goodnefs, prudence, or 
 courage of fome, would naturally procure them a fu- 
 perior efteem and confidence from all around them. 
 Controverfies would arife ; the mifchief of deciding 
 them by violence would foon appear. They would 
 foon fee the danger of divided counfels, either about
 
 Mankind Social and Religious. ^5 
 
 improving their condition, or common defence ; tho' Chap. 2. 
 all agreed in the general end. The moft efteemed V^W/ 
 would foon be chofen arbitrators of their controver- 
 iies, and dire&ors of the whole body in matters con- 
 cerning their common intereft ; and, as their prudence 
 fuggefted, laws and political inftitutions would be 
 eftablifhed. The reft, finding the fweets of good order, 
 fafety, and laws, would have a veneration for the fo- 
 ciety, and its governors, and conftitution. The fi- 
 ner fpirits would feel patriotifm and the love of a 
 country in their breads : and all, in fome meafure, 
 by bonds of acquaintance, andintercourfeof bufinefs, 
 and the enjoyments of protection for themfelves and 
 their fortunes, would acquire a love to the communi- 
 ty and zeal for its inter efts. 
 
 XII. As the order, grandeur, regular difpofitions^'^^''^' 
 and motions, of the vifible world, muft foon affect the 
 mind with admiration ; as the feveral claffes of ani- 
 mals and vegetables difplay in their whole frame ex- 
 quiflte mechanifm, and regular ftructure, evidencing 
 counfel, art, and contrivance for certain ends ; men of 
 genius and attention muft foon difcover fome intelli- 
 gent beings, one or more, prefiding in all this comely 
 order and magnificence. The great and the beauti- 
 ful ftrikes the mind with veneration, and leads us to 
 infer intelligence as refiding in it, or directing it: a 
 careful attention to the ftructure of our own nature 
 and its powers leads to the fame conclufion. Our 
 feeling moral fentiments, our fenfe of goodnefs and 
 virtue, as well as of art anddefign; our experience of 
 
 E 2
 
 5-» Mankind Social and Religious. 
 
 Book I. fome moral diftribution within, by immediate happi- 
 v_rw>nefs or mifcry conftantiy attending virtue and vice, and 
 of a like diftribution generally obtaining even in ex- 
 ternal things by a natural tendency, muft fugged that 
 there is a moral government in the world : and as 
 men are prone to communicate their knowledge, in- 
 ventions, conjectures, the notions of a Deity and pro- 
 vidence muft foonbe difFufed; and an eafy exercife of 
 reafon would confirm the perfuafion. Thus fome de- 
 votion and piety would generally obtain, and there- 
 fore may juftly be called natural to a rational fyftem. 
 An early revelation and tradition generally anticipa- 
 ted human invention in this matter: but thefe "alone 
 could fcarce have difFufed the belief fo univerfally, 
 without the aids of obvious reafons from ftrong ap- 
 pearances in Nature. Notions of Deity and fome fort 
 of worfhip have in facias univerfally obtained among 
 men, as living in fociety, the ufe of fpeech, or even 
 propagating their kind; and thus may be counted as 
 natural. 
 
 The feveral powers difpofitions or determinati- 
 ons above-mentioned are univerfally found in man- 
 kind, where fome accident hath not rendered fome in- 
 dividual monftrous, or plainly maimed and deficient 
 in a natural faculty. But, in the different individuals, 
 thefe difpofitions are not in the fame proportion as to 
 ftrength; one being prevalent in one, and another in 
 another: and hence the great diveriity of characters.. 
 Yet, upon a proper occafion, when there is no oppofl-
 
 The Causes ^Corruption. 37 
 
 rion from fomeftrongerprinciple,each of thefe powers Chap. 2. 
 will exert itfelf, and have its effect. \S~sr\j 
 
 XIII. Notwithstanding that all thefe nobler powers »< «*/« «/ 
 we mentioned are natural to us, the caufes of that vice 
 and depravity of manners we obferve, are pretty ob- 
 vious. Not to fay any thing of caufes not difcover- 
 able by the light of nature, mankind fpend feveral of 
 their firfl: years, where there is not a careful educati- 
 on, in the gratification of their fenfual appetites, and 
 in the exercife of fome lower powers, which, by long 
 indulgence,grow ftronger : reflecting on moral notions, 
 and the finer enjoyments, and comparing them with 
 the lower, is a laborious exercife. The appetites and 
 pafllons arife of themfelves, when their objects occur, 
 as they do frequently: the checking, examining, and 
 ballancing them, is a work of difficulty. Prejudices and 
 groundlefs afTociations of ideas are very incident to 
 men of little attention. Our felnfh paflions early gain 
 ftrength by indulgence. Hence the general tenor of 
 human life is an incoherent mixture of many fecial, 
 kind, innocent actions, and of many felnfh, angry, fen- 
 fual ones ; as one or other of our natural difp oil t ions 
 happens to be raifed, and to be prevalent over o- 
 thers,
 
 3* 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Concerning the Ultimate Determinations of the Will, 
 and Benevolent AffeBions. 
 
 ■ 
 
 I. A Fter this long enumeration of the feveral fen- 
 ■a. -L *■ ies or powers or perception, by which a great 
 
 multitude of objects maybe the occaiion of pleafure 
 or pain, or of fome forts of happinefs or mifery ; and a 
 like enumeration of many difpofitions of will, or de- 
 terminations of defire ; human nature mult appear a 
 very complex and confufed fabrick, unlefs we can dif- 
 cover fome order and fubordination among thefe 
 powers, and thus difcern which of them is naturally 
 lit to govern. Of this we fhall treat in fome following 
 chapters. In the firrt place the Under ft anding, or the 
 power of reflecting, comparing, judging, makes us 
 capable of difcerning the tendencies of the feveral 
 fenfes, appetites, actions, gratifications, either to our 
 own happinefs, or to that of others, and the com- 
 parative values of every object, every gratification. 
 This power judges about the means or the fubordi- 
 nate ends : but about the ultimate ends there is no rea- 
 foning. We profecute them by fome immediate dif- 
 pofition or determination of foul, which in the order 
 of action is always prior to all reafoning ; as no opini- 
 on or judgment can move to action, where there is no 
 prior delire of fome end. 
 
 Were there no other ultimate determination or de- 
 "" ■ re in the human foul than that of each one toward
 
 Ultimate Determinations. 39 
 
 his own happinefs ; then calm * f elf -love would be the Chap. 3. 
 fole leading principle, plainly deftined by Nature to \S~sT\j 
 govern and reftrain all other affections, and keep them 
 fubfervient to its end ; having reafon for its minifter 
 or counfellor, to fuggeft the means. But the end 
 would be conftituted by that ultimate determination, 
 without any reafoning. 
 
 This is a favourite tenet of a great many authors, Various McounU 
 and pleafes by its fimplicity. But very different and 
 contrary accounts are given, by thefe authors, of the 
 private enjoyments or happinefs purfued in the of- 
 fices we' commonly repute virtuous. Some make the 
 fole motive to all offices or actions even the moil: ho- 
 nourable, the fole end ultimately intended by them, 
 to be fome worldly advantage, fome bodily pleafures 
 or the means of them. This was the tenet of the Cy- 
 renakks, and probably of the Epicureans too, and of 
 fome moderns. Others fay, that we defire the good of 
 others, or of focieties, merely as themeans of our own 
 fafety and profperity; others, as the means of fome 
 fub tiler pleafures of our own by fympathy with others 
 in their happinefs: others make our end to be the 
 pleafures we enjoy in being honoured, or fome re- 
 wards we expect for our fervices, and thefe either 
 from God, or men. 
 
 But there is ftill an higher fcheme; allowing in- 
 deed no other calm fetled determination of foul but 
 
 * By felf-love we mean, one's defire of \ or preference of our moral character and 
 his own happinefs , and this only. By a fre- I accomplimments to thole of others, which 
 quent ufe of the word love, for efleem, I is contrary to what the model! and felf- 
 fome have imagined an unweiialflf-ejleew, j diffident continually experience,
 
 S e l f - L o v e and Benevolence. 
 
 that in each one toward his own happinefs ; but grant- 
 ing that we have a moral faculty, and many particu- 
 lar kind affections truly difinterefted, terminating u- 
 pon the happinefs of others, and often operating when 
 we have no reference of it in our minds to any enjoy- 
 ment of our own. But, fay they, " the fole original 
 " fpring of all calm deliberate purpofes of cultivating 
 " thefe generous affections, and of gratifying them 
 " in oppofition to any felfiih affections, is this; we ex- 
 " perience the fublimeft joys of felf- approbation in 
 " gratifying thefe generous motions; thefe joys are a 
 '• nobler happinefs than any other; and the d elite of 
 " them, flowing from the calm felf (lo determination, 
 " is the view of all deliberate purpofes of virtue; tho' 
 " the kind paffions themfelves often hurry us into 
 " friendly and generous actions without this thought." 
 This laft account gives a lovely reprefentation of 
 human nature and its affections, and leaves a great 
 deal of room for moil of the generous virtues of life; 
 but it does not pleafe us with fuch fimplicity as the 
 other fchemes, which directly deduce every motion of 
 the heart from felf love. This is not to be reckoned 
 among the felfiih fchemes, fince it makes all the emi- 
 nent virtues flow from difinterefted affections, natu- 
 ral to the heart, however in our calmer hours they 
 may be corroborated by the calm views and defires of 
 our own happinefs. But our bufinefs is to find the 
 truth, lee the fchemes, or their authors, be clafTed as 
 they will: and, for this purpofe, 'tis neceffary to conii- 
 der well, both thefe affections alledged to be difinte-
 
 , fives. 
 
 Ultimate Benevolence. 41 
 
 refted, and the moral faculty by which we judge of Chap. 3. 
 all the motions of the will; that we may fee, whe- v^/"V*\J 
 ther there be in the foul, as we alledged above, ano- 
 ther calm determination, befide that one toward our 
 own happinefs ; as well as many particular affections, 
 terminating upon the good of others, as their imme- 
 diate and ultimate obj eel:, without reference to private 
 intereft of any kind. 
 
 II. The calm f elf -love, or the determination of each Tn ie . tht 
 individual toward his own happinefs, is a motion of ■"><*&& di f ers 
 
 . n n n . from the wp- 
 
 the will without any uneafy fenfation attending it.- 
 But the feveral felnih defires, terminating on particu- 
 lar objects, are generally attended with fome uneafy 
 turbulent fenfations in very different degrees : yet 
 thefe fenfations are different from the act of the will 
 to which they are conjoined; and different too from 
 the motives of defire. The motive is fome good ap- 
 prehended in an object or ^event, toward which good 
 the defire tends ; and, in confequence of defire, fome 
 uneafinefs arifes, till the good is obtained. To averfl- 
 on, the motive is fome evil apprehended or feared, 
 and perhaps not yet felt. Uneafinefs too attends 
 the averfion, untill the evil is repelled. Profpects of 
 the pleafures or powers attending opulence are the 
 motives to the defire of wealth, and never the uneafy 
 feelings attending the defire itfelf. Thefe feelings are, 
 in nature, fubfequent to the defire. 
 
 Again, when we obtain the thing defined; befide 
 -the pleafures to be obtained from this object, which 
 were the motives of the defire, and often before we 
 
 Vol. L F
 
 t> Ultimate Benevolence-. 
 
 Book I. enjoy them, there is one pleafure immediatly arifihg* 
 •^/wfrom the fuccefs, at leaft in thofe cafes where there 
 was any difficulty in the-purfuit, or fear of difappoint- 
 ment. It would be abfurd to fay that this joy in the 
 fuccefs was the motive to the defire. We mould have 
 no joy in the fuccefs, nor could we have had any de- 
 iire, unlefs the profpect of fome other good had been 
 the motive. This holds in all our defires, benevolent 
 orfelfifh, i hat there is fome motive, fome end inten- 
 ded, diftin^ from the joy of fuccefs, or the removal of 
 the pain of defire ; otherways all defires would be the 
 moft fantaftick things imaginable, equally ardent to- 
 ward any trifle, as toward the greateft good ; fince 
 the joy of fuccefs, and the removal of the uneafinefs 
 of defire, would be alike in both forts of defires. 'Tis 
 trifling therefore to fay that all defires are felfiftv 
 becaufe by gratifying them we obtain the joy of fuc- 
 cefs, and free ourfelves from the unealy feelings of de- 
 fire. 
 
 III. 'Tis owned by all, that many actions, benefl- 
 wink not c j a i t0 otnerS) ma y directly fpring fromfelfiih defires 
 of rewards, of returns of good offices, of honour. One 
 may ferve others from fear of unjufl: violence, or of 
 juft punimment. Nay, from the defire of our own 
 happinefs we may have an inward undifTembled de- 
 fire of another's happinefs, which we conceive to be 
 the means of our own. Thus, one defires the fuccefs . 
 of a partner in managing the common flock; the pro- 
 fperity of any country or fociety upon which his for- 
 tunes depend} the advancement of a friend from
 
 Some Affections truly Disinterested. 43 
 
 whom we expert promotion; the fuccefs and good Chap. 3, 
 conduct of a pupil, which may redound to the ho- 
 nour of the mailer or tutor. Thefe real defires of the 
 welfare of others may all be fubordinate to one's own 
 felfifh defires. 
 
 Here 'tis agreed by all, that defires of the welfare whtthrKni a j- 
 of others, fubordinated to one's defires of his own %!!%"*/"**' 
 worldly advantages, without any other affection, have 
 nothing virtuous in them. A change of outward cir- 
 cumftances, without any change of temper, would 
 raife defires of the adverfity of others, in the fame 
 manner. The main quefKon is, whether the affections 
 reputed benevolent are fubordinated to fome finer in- 
 terefts than worldly advantages, and ultimately ter- 
 minate upon them: or, if there are not kind affecti- 
 ons ultimately terminating on the good of others ; and 
 thefe conftituted by nature, (either alone, or perhaps 
 fometimes corroborated by fome views of intereft,) 
 the immediate caufe of moral approbation. Now 'tis 
 plain, 
 
 IV. 1. That all hopes or fears from men, whether yv&onotm- 
 
 1 -if 1 • r* iti 'T'ln.-.te upon re- 
 
 about wealth or poverty, honour or infamy, bodily wards fmimn % 
 pleafure or pain, can only be motives to external acti- 
 ons or fervices, and not to any inward good-will or de- 
 fire of their happinefs ; fince we all know that our in- 
 ternal affections are hid from others. External deport- 
 ment alone can be the means of obtaining what we 
 hope from them, or of avoiding what we fear. 
 
 2. As felf-love can make us defire only what ap-^^%-/ 
 pears the means 01 our own happmeis, one can icarcc m-^r Q m- 
 
 l~y on. 
 
 r 2
 
 a a Some Affections truly Disinterested,. 
 
 Book I. alledge chat even the fubtileft interefts are the fprings 
 ^/"V^Oof real good-will to others. If one is aware of the 
 high pleafures of felf-approbation, arifing upon con- 
 fcioufnefs of inward good-will and kind affections, 
 or is convinced that the Deity will confer rewards u- 
 pon men of fuch tempers ; thefe two motives may 
 make one defire to have that ufeful fet of affections, 
 in order to obtain happinefs. Now, could we by com* 
 mand of the will directly raife what affections we de- 
 fire, from thefe motives we would raife kind affects 
 ons. But a temper or fet of affections cannot thus be 
 raifed. As efleem cannot be raifed, by any act of the 
 will, toward an object in which no excellence appears, 
 nor fear where there is nothing formidable, nor anger 
 where there is nothing hurtful, nor pity where there 
 is no fuffering, nor gratitude where there has been no 
 evidence of prior benevolence; fo neither can a mind 
 wholly determined toward felnth good raife in itfelf 
 kind affections, by a command of its will. The natu- 
 ral caufe mull be prefented before any affection can be 
 raifed. 
 tUwihintiavs If indeed our hearts are fo conftituted, as the affer- 
 °* tra V ' '" : -'■ tors of difintereited affections alledo;e, that upon pre- 
 
 men virtuous. o ' i ; 
 
 fenting the flate of any fenfitive beings to our calm 
 thoughts, when no oppofition of interefts or evil dif- 
 pofitions apprehended in them obftruct the natural 
 motion of our fouls, a kind good- will naturally arifes; 
 then the motives of gaining the nobler pleafures of 
 felf-approbation, or rewards from God, will incline us 
 to tumour calm attention to the flate of others; will
 
 Some Affections truly Disinterested. 45 
 
 furmount little interfering interefts, and remove even Chap. 3. 
 the obftacles of anger *. The fame motives will make ^/"VX^ 
 us inquire alfo into all fuch qualities excellencies or 
 good offices of others as are the natural occafions of 
 the warmer and more endearing affections. And thus 
 it is that the fanctions of the divine laws can influence 
 our affections. But,, 
 
 3 . From felf-love we defire only the means of our own 
 happinefs. Now the actual happinefs of others is nei- 
 ther the caufe nor means of obtaining felf-approbati- 
 on, nor rewards from God. Our hearts approve, us, 
 and God promifes -rewards to us, not becaufe others 
 are in fact happy, but becaufe we have, fuch kind dif- 
 pofitions, and act our parts well in their behalf, whe- 
 ther in the event they are happy or not. Our defire 
 therefore of the pleafure of felf-approbation, or of 
 divine rewards, can only make us defire to have thefe 
 affections, and to act a fuitable part. But thefe affec- 
 tions cannot be directly raifed by the will: and where- 
 ever they are, they plainly terminate upon the good 
 of others, as the ultimate end intended by them; tho' 
 in our previous confultations with ourfelves, or deli- 
 berations about the inward culture of the mind, we 
 may have refolved, with a view to our own perfection 
 
 * This is th? reference to our own high- 
 eft and noli nohle enjoyments and inte- 
 refts, which we fee made in fome of the 
 belt writings of the antients, and in Lord 
 Shaftesbury ; " That, confcious of the in- 
 <c ward delights and dignity of virtue fur- 
 "•paffingall other enjoyments, we refolve 
 "'to follow all the noble and generous 
 ^motions of our hearts in oppofition to 
 
 " the lower interefts of this life." Not that 
 they imagined we can raife any new affec- 
 tion, by command of theiiw/, which na- 
 ture had not planted -and connected with 
 its proper caufes : nor that all generous 
 affections have private good n view. 1 his 
 notion they oppofed wita th^ ^reateit zeal 
 and ftrength of reafon.
 
 Some Affections truly Disinterested. 
 
 and fublimeit happinefs, to incourage all fuch affec- 
 tions in ourfelves, and to turn our attention to all 
 fuch coniidcrations as are naturally apt to raife them; 
 and to defpife all the mean interfering interefts of this 
 prcfent world. Thefe generous affections often ope- 
 rate where there have been no fuch previous delibera- 
 tions and purpofes of cultivating them; and where 
 there have been fuch purpofes, ftill the generous af- 
 fection terminates and rells upon its natural objeel, 
 the good of others ; and muft have had its exiftence 
 in the foul previous to all defires and intentions of 
 cultivating it. 
 The There is nothing ftrange or unufual in this that 
 
 not arife imrne- . ° . rr n * r 
 
 ■•■'•one mould want certain tender generous arrections, or 
 "love, efteem, gratitude, pity, repentance for offen- 
 ces ; while yet he earneftly wifhes to have them. An 
 inward temper and a fet of affections do not ftart up at 
 once upon a wifh or command. Men who have been 
 carelefs about virtue and piety are often obferved, 
 upon approach of danger, and on other occafions, 
 heartily wiihing, from felf-love or fear of puniihment, 
 that they had love and gratitude to God, warm cha- 
 rity and good-will to their neighbours, meeknefs and 
 a forgiving temper, and forrow for their fins ; and yet 
 they have a diftrefling confeioufnefs that thefe difpo- 
 fitions do not arife in them. In good men thefe af- 
 fections operate without any intentions of interefts, 
 without views of felf -approbation, or future rewards. 
 Nay, are not fome of thefe kind affections itrongeft 
 where we leaft expect honour from men. rewards from
 
 Some Affections truly Disinterested, 47 
 
 God, or even any confiderable felf- approbation ; as Chap. ?. 
 the conjugal and parental affections, friendfhip, and^VV/ 
 gratitude? However the want of them is much con- 
 demned, thefe affections are reputed but a lower kind 
 of virtue, fome of them fcarce any virtue at all. 
 
 V. Some plead that our moit generous affections A]l Knd &&- 
 
 r 1 t • • r\ 1 r* r on% are not from 
 
 are lubordmate to private interelt by means of Jympa- fympathy 
 thy, which makes the pleafures and pains, the happi- 
 nefs or mifery of others, the conftant caufes of plea- 
 fure or pain to ourfelves. We rejoice in feeing others 
 happy, nay in knowing that they are happy tho' at a 
 diftance. And in like manner we have pain or forrow 
 from their mifery.. To obtain this pleafure therefore 
 and to avoid this pain, we have from felf-love, fay 
 they, an inward defire of their happinefs, undiffem- 
 bled, tho' fubordinate to our defire of our own. But 
 this fympathy can never account for all kind affecti- 
 ons, tho' it is no doubt a natural principle and a beau- 
 tiful part of our constitution. Where it operates alone ? 
 it is uniformly proportioned to the diftrefs or fuffer- 
 ing beheld or imagined without regard to other cir- 
 cumstances, whereas our generous affections are in ve- 
 ry different degrees and proportions ; we may have a 
 weaker good-will to any perfon unknown; but how 
 much ltronger is the affection of gratitude, the love 
 with elteem toward a worthy character or intimate 
 friend, the parental affection? This fympathy, if it is- 
 thecaufe of all love,muft be a very variable difpofition^ 
 increafing upon benefits received,moral excellence ob- 
 ferved, intimacies, and tyes of blood: for, the inward
 
 Some Affections truly Disinterested. 
 
 o-ood-will, the kind affection, is plainly increafed by 
 thefe caufes. 
 
 Grant it naturally varied from thefe caufes, yet this 
 fympathy could never account for that immediate ar- 
 dour of love and good-will which breaks forth toward 
 any character reprefenced to us as eminent in moral 
 excellence, before we have had any thoughts, or made 
 any inquiries into his ftate in point of happinefs or 
 mifery. Suppofe him in the remoteft parts of the 
 earth, or in fome other planet. Sure we can know the 
 intention of the foul in its purfuits or affections. Is our 
 own future pleafure in fome fympathetick joys the ob- 
 ject upon which every kind affection and every friend- 
 ly wilK terminates ? Does parental care, patriotifm, 
 even when it is deliberately facriricing life for its coun- 
 try, terminate upon fome private joy of its own? when 
 and where is it to be obtained? only a moment or 
 two, before death is to carry us off from all human 
 affairs, and few of us think of knowing the ftate of 
 our furvivors. Should God intimate to a brave man 
 that his death is approaching next moment, and that 
 he mould have no longer fellow-feeling with mortals 
 or memory of them, but that he would grant his laft 
 wifhes about his children, his friends, his country; 
 would he not as ardently defire their profperity as in 
 any former period of life, tho' his joyful fympathetick 
 imagination would ceafe next moment ? how will 
 one account upon this fcheme for thofe anxieties, ten- 
 der recommendations, advices, and ardent prayers of 
 men a-dying for thofe who were dear to them, tho'
 
 Some Affections truly Disinterested, 49 
 
 they are perfuaded that they {hall prefently be remo- Chap. 3. 
 ved from this ftate and know no more of human af-v^V~\J 
 fairs ? 
 
 Our companion too toward the diftreffed, 'tis plain, g»«**0«« ■* 
 terminates upon their relief, even when we have no 
 attention to our own pain. Nor is the termination of 
 any defire merely upon the removal of the uneailnefs 
 which accompanies it. Thus tho' there may be in na- 
 ture fome connections of intereft between us and the 
 objects of our tender affections, yet the affection ter- 
 minates on their good, is previous to this connexion, 
 and is the caufe of it. We therefore rejoice in the 
 happinefs of our child, our friend, our country, be- 
 caufe we previously had an ultimate good-will to them. 
 Nor do we therefore love them or wilh them well be- 
 caufe we have obferved that we would derive joy from 
 their happinefs, and forrow from their mifery. Hence 
 it is that, the flronger our previous love and efteem 
 was, the greater fhall our joy be on account of their 
 happinefs, and oui forrow for their mifery. 
 
 This may fufhce to eftablifh that important point, &»« & ' 
 that our nature is fufceptible of affections truly difin-^/S/ 
 terefled in the ftricteft fenfe, and not directly fubordi- 
 nated to feif-love, or aiming at private intereft of any 
 kind. The tyes of blood, benefits received, moral ex- 
 cellence difplayed, tho' we apprehend no advantage 
 redounding to ourfelves from it, are the natural caufes 
 of thefe particular kind affections ; many of them arife 
 unmerited; all terminate on the good of others; and 
 all of them often operate in the foul when it has no 
 
 Vol. I. G
 
 r Some Affections truly Disinterested. 
 
 Book I. views, or rational ground of hoping for any private 
 l^v^j advantage; nay when they are involving it in trouble 
 and anxiety. 
 
 VL As we obferved formerly that the particular 
 J motions of the will toward private good are, either the 
 calm (table affections, or turbulent paflions ; fo are 
 the particular motions of the generous kind: fome of 
 them are calm, fedate, and fteddy; aiming at the hap- 
 pinefs of their object, whether an individual or a fo- 
 eiety, attended with no turbulent fenfations, and on- 
 ly caufing uneafmefs when they are defeated in their- 
 intention; others are turbulent, and attended with un- 
 eafy fenfations. We may proceed further in this 
 comparifon. 
 Wkfturfhi hr.c- As there is found in the human mind,, when it re- 
 collects itfelf, a calm general determination toward 
 perfonalhappinefs of thehigheft kind it has any notion 
 of; fo we may find a like principle of a generous kind. 
 When upon recollection we prefent to our minds the 
 notion of the greater!: pofublefyftem of fenfitive beings.,. 
 and the higheft happinefs it can enjoy, there is alfo a. 
 calm determination to defire it, abftracting from any 
 connection with or fubferviency to our private enjoy- 
 ment. We fhall find thefe two grand determinations^ 
 one toward our own greateft happinefs, the other to- 
 ward the greateft general good, each independent oa 
 the other, each capable of fuch ftrength as to reftrain? 
 all the particular affections of its kind, and keep them 
 fubordinate to itfelf. 
 wither jbouu But here arifes a new perplexity in this complex 
 
 tbefelfijb yield it X S. J. A
 
 Some Affections truly Disinterested. *\ 
 
 ftructure, where thefe two principles feem to draw dif- Chap. 3. 
 ferent ways. Mufl: the generous determination, and<^V"V; 
 all its particular affections, yield to the felfifh one, and/! •; nci^Z 5*. 
 be under its controll? mufl: we indulge their kind moti- 
 ons fo far as private interefl: admits and no further? or 
 mufl: the felfifh yield to the generous ? or can we fup- 
 pofe that in this complex fyftem there are two ultimate 
 principles which may often oppofe each other, with- 
 out any umpire to reconcile their differences ? or (hall 
 we deny any original calm determination toward a 
 publick interefl: ; allowing only a variety of particular 
 ultimate kind affections ; not indeed arifing from felf- 
 love, or directly aiming at private good as their natu- 
 ral termination, and yet in all our deliberate counfels 
 about the general tenor of our conduct, fubjected, in 
 common with all the particular appetites and paffions 
 of the felfifh kind, to the original impulfe in each one 
 toward his own perfection and happinefs? This lafl: 
 feems to be the fcheme of fome excellent authors both 
 antient and modern. 
 
 To alledge here that,by our reafon and reflection, we Thh de f erm ~ 
 may fee what was the intention of God the Author"'//^." 
 of our Nature in this whole fabrick of our affections ; 
 that he plainly intended the univerfal happinefs, and 
 that of each individual, as far as it is confiftent with 
 it ; and that this intention fhould be our rule : that we 
 fhould therefore reftrain and controll, not only all 
 Felfifh affections, but even all generous particular af- 
 fections, within fuch bounds as the univerfal interefl: 
 Requires : this is true in fact, but does not remove the 
 
 G 2
 
 Some Affections truly Disinterested. 
 
 difficulty, unlefs we are firft told from what determi- 
 nation of foul, from what motive, are we to comply 
 with the divine intentions? if from a defire of reward, 
 then the felhfh calm determination is thefole ultimate 
 principle of all deliberate counfels in life: if from a 
 perception of his moral excellence, a defire of imitat- 
 ing him, and from love and gratitude, then the defire 
 of moral excellence muft be the fupreme original de- 
 termination. But this defire of moral excellence, how- 
 ever an original principle, muft prefuppofe fome an- 
 tecedent determinations of the will as its object. And 
 amone thefe there muft be fome one in which the fu- 
 preme moral excellence confifts, otherways our very 
 lenfe and defire of moral excellence, fince it may re- 
 commend many particular affections, which may in- 
 terfere with each other, will again lead us into a new 
 labyrinth of perplexity. The folution of thefe dif- 
 ficulties muft be found by confidering fully that mo- 
 ral fatuity above-mentioned, to which, in the next 
 place, we proceed; briefly touching at thofe rcafons 
 which fhew this moral faculty to be an original deter- 
 yn'inat'ion or fenfe in our nature, not capable of being 
 referred to other powers of perception.
 
 53 
 
 Chap. 4. 
 
 CHAP. IV. ^vxj 
 
 Concerning the Moral Senfe, or faculty of perceiving 
 moral excellence, and its fupreme obje&s. 
 
 I. A Ltho' we have kind affections ultimately aim- n e 'notion of 
 f± ing at the good of others, the faccefs of which Z" 1 ^^ 
 is joyful to us, yet our approbation of moral condu6l pi "^ cb) ' r >' m " 
 is very different from liking it merely as the occafion 
 of pleafure to ourfelvesin gratifying thefe kind affec- 
 tions. As we do not approve all conduct which gives 
 us this pleafure, fo we approve fometimes fuch con- 
 duct as does not give it; and our approbation of the 
 good conduct which gives this pleafure is not propor- 
 tioned to. the pleafure it gives us. Thus many in- 
 ventions, and much art and induftry which does good 
 to the perfons or country we love, is not approved as 
 virtuous: we approve generous attempts tho' unfue- 
 cefsful; we approve the virtues of enemies, which may 
 hurt the chief objects of our love. We equally approve 
 the virtues or generous defigns of good men in for- 
 mer ages toward their contemporaries, or in the re- 
 moter! nations, toward their countrymen, for whom 
 our affections are very faint and weak, as if the like 
 were done to our friends, or country, the objects of 
 our flroneefl: affections. 
 
 Again-— Tho' the approbation of moral excellence Hor pJe f" s wr 
 
 . ° ~ . . . . ,. . moral fenfe. 
 
 is a grateful action or fenfation of the mind, tis plain 
 the good approved is not this, tendency to give us a
 
 54 TbetrueNoTion of Moral Excellence. 
 
 Book I. grateful fenfation. As, in approving a beautiful form, 
 V^v~\j we refer the beauty to the object ; we do not fay that 
 it is beautiful becaufe we reap fome little pleafure in 
 viewing it, but we are pleafed in viewing it becaufe it 
 is antecedently beautiful. Thus, when we admire the 
 virtue of another, the whole excellence, or that quali- 
 ty which by nature we are determined to approve, is 
 conceived to be in that other; we are pleafed in the 
 contemplation becaufe the object is excellent, and the 
 object is not judged to be therefore excellent becaufe 
 it gives us pleafure. 
 ,/ ,/„/,- II. Much lefs is it the approved fpecies of virtue, 
 10 ''"that it is an affection or action which gives pleafure 
 to the agent. It always may indeed give him pleafure 
 upon reflection, by means of this moral faculty: but 
 'tis plainly then that we moft admire the virtue of a- 
 nother when we attend to its labours, dangers, diffi- 
 culties, pains ; and have no thought of any prefent or 
 future pleafures of the agent. 
 
 'Tis ftranffe that men mould be at a lofs to dif- 
 tot J r . cern what form, or conception, or fpecies it is, under 
 which they approve efteem or admire their own af- 
 fections and conduct, or that of others ; and difap- 
 prove and condemn the contrary. One would think 
 it manifeft that the notion under which one approves 
 virtue, is neither its tendency to obtain any benefit or 
 reward to the agent or to the approver. The appro- 
 ver never expects a reward for the virtue of another; 
 he approves where he fees no intereft of his own pro- 
 moted; and he would lefs approve fuch actions as are
 
 ThetrueNoTicm ©/"Moral Excel lence, 55 
 
 beneficent, the more he considered them as advanta- Chap. 4. 
 geous to the agent, and imagined him influenced by O^VX^ 
 the views of his own advantage. Actions are conceived 
 rewardable becaufe they are good, not good becaufe 
 they are to be rewarded. Both the fpectator and the 
 agent value good actions the more in point of virtue, 
 the more expenfive or difadvantageous they are to the 
 agent; and both will difapprove as immoral fome ac- 
 tions which the one will allure to by bribes, and the 
 other undertake ; both conceiving them in this man- 
 ner advantageous. 
 
 Now, if direct explicite opinions of tendencies to;,^™^,,^ 
 the advantage of the approver or agent do not raife °f advattU! £ e " 
 moral approbation, much lefs can we fuppofe that any 
 confufed imaginations, or vague aflbciations of ideas, . 
 about fuch advantages to the approver or the agent 5 
 can be the form under which virtue is approved. 
 
 'Tis alfo obvious that the notion under which we 
 approve virtue is not its tendency to procure honour. 
 A profpecl: of honour may be a motive to the agent, 
 at leaft to external actions : but the tendency of an ac- 
 tion to procure honour cannot make another approve 
 it, who derives no honour from it. Our very defire of 
 gaining honour, and the difpofition in fpeclators ta 
 confer it, muft prefuppofe a moral fenfe in both. And 
 any views an agent may have to obtain felf- approba- 
 tion muft alfo prefuppofe a moral fenfe. W e cannot 
 therefore fay an action is judged good becaufe it gains 
 to the agent the pleafure of felf-approbaiion; but it 
 gains to him this pleafure becaufe it was antecedent-
 
 The true Notion o/TVIoral Excellence. 
 
 ly good, or had that quality which by the conftituti- 
 on of this fenfe we muft approve. Our prefent que- 
 ftion is, what is that quality, and how perceived? 
 
 III. The primary notion under which we approve 
 is not merely a conformity to the divine will or laws. 
 We ferioully inquire about the moral goodnefs, juftice, 
 holincfs, rectitude, of the Divine Nature itfelf, and 
 likewife of his will or laws; thefe characters make up 
 our common praifes of them. They furely mean more 
 than that his will or laws are conformable to them- 
 fclves. This we might afcribe to an artful impure De- 
 mon. Conformity to his nature is not conformity to 
 immenfity, eternity, omnipotence. 'Tis conformity 
 to his goodnefs, holinefs, juftice. Thefe moral per- 
 fections then muft be previoufly known, or elfe the 
 definition by conformity to them is ufelefs. 
 
 Neither is the notion of moral goodnefs under, 
 which we approve it well explained by conformity of 
 affections and actions to truth, rcajon, true propofti- 
 ons, reafon of things ; as in the common acceptation 
 thefe characters agree to every object of the mind, a- 
 bout which it judges truly, animate or inanimate, vir- 
 tuous or vicious. Conformity to moral truth, or true 
 propofitions about morals, equally belongs to virtue 
 and vice; as the mind difcerns truth about both ; 
 and, as every true propofition is conformed to its ob- 
 ject, fo is the object to the propofition. If 'tis faid 
 that thefe moral truths intended are only fuch as fhew 
 what actions are good, what we are obliged to do, what 
 ought to be done. Thefe words mean no more than the 

 
 The true Notion 0/* Moral Excellence. 57 
 
 word moral goodnefs ; and then the definition is no bet- Chap. 4. 
 ter than this, " the moral goodnefs of an aclion is its^^~V\j 
 u conformity to fuch true propositions as mew the 
 u aclion to be good;" or, " good actions are fuch a- 
 " bout which 'tis true that they are good!' 
 
 In general, all defcriptions of moral goodnefs by 
 conformity to reafon if we examine them well, mult 
 lead us to fome immediate original fenfe or determi- 
 nation of our nature. All reafons excitino; to an ac- 
 tion will lead us to fome original affection or initincr. 
 of will; and all juftifying reafons, or fuch as mew an 
 aclion to be good, will at laft lead us to fome origi- 
 nal fenfe or power of perception. 
 
 In like manner all defcriptions of it by fitnefs, con- 
 gruity, agreement, mull: lead us to thefe original de- z ruit h &c. 
 terminations. The fitnefs of means or fubordinate 
 ends, does not prove them to be good, unlefs the ulti- 
 mate end be good. Now fitnefs of an end truly ulti- 
 mate mult be an abfurd exprefTion; as it is -referred 
 to nothing, or is lit for -nothing further. xA.ll ultimate 
 .ends are fetled by fome of the original determinati- 
 ons of our nature.* 
 
 "Tis in vain here to alledo;e inftrucTion, education, 
 ouftom,or afTociation of ideas as the original of moral 
 approbation. As thefe cangivenonewfenfes, let us exa- 
 mine what the opinion or what the notion is upon which 
 we approve, and to what fenfe it belongs, whatever 
 way the notion may have been conjoined, or whatever 
 
 * A compleat examination of thefe cha- I prefcnt tlefign ; we mull therefore refer to 
 ratfbrrswotfld call us off too much from the J the Hluflratiom a: th moral ' 
 
 Vol. I. H
 
 rg The Sense 0/* Moral Goodness. 
 
 Book I. nave been the caufes of our getting this opinion that 
 ^yv^^fuch a quality is inherent in or connected with the 
 action? and this will lead us to an original principle. 
 
 7h frf h a mo- IV. There is therefore, as each one by clofe at- 
 tention and reflection may convince himfelf, a natu- 
 ral and immediate determination to approve certain 
 affections, and actions confequent upon them ; or a na- 
 tural fenfe of immediate excellence in them, not refer- 
 red to any other quality perceivable by our other fen- 
 fes or by reafoning. When we call this determination 
 a fenfe or inftincl, we are not fuppofing it of that low 
 kind dependent on bodily organs, fuch as even the 
 brutes have. It may be a conftant fetled determinati- 
 on in the foul itfelf, as much as our powers of judging 
 and reafoning. And 'tis pretty plain that reafon is on- 
 ly a fubfervient power to our ultimate determinations 
 either of perception or will. The ultimate end is fetled 
 by fome fenfe, and ibme determination of will : by fome 
 fei fe we enjoy happinefs, and felf love determines to 
 it without reafoning. Reafon can only direct to the 
 means; or compare two ends previouily confKtuted 
 by fome other immediate powers. 
 
 rhu pu,h a. In other animal-kinds each one has irutincts to- 
 
 tker j. n • .-I i 1 • i n • 
 
 ,. ward its proper action, and has the higheit enjoyment 
 in following them, even with toil and fome pain. Can 
 we fuppofe mankind void of fuch principles ? as brutes 
 feem not to reflect on their own temper and actions, 
 or that of others, they may feel no more than prefent 
 delight in following their impulfes. But in men, who 
 can make their own tempers and conduct the ob-
 
 The Sense 0/" Moral Goodness. 59 
 
 jects of reflexion, the analogy of nature would make Chap. 4. 
 one expect a fenfe, a relifh about them, as well as a-^V"\J 
 bout other objects. To each of our powers we feem to 
 have a correfponding tafte or fenfe, recommending 
 the proper ufe of it to the agent, and making him re- 
 lifh or value the like exercife of it by another. This 
 we fee as to the powers of voice, of imitation, de- 
 figning, or machinery, motion, reafoning; there is a 
 fenfe difcerning and recommending the proper exer- 
 cife of them. It would be anomalous in our ftruc- 
 ture if we had no reliih or tafte for powers and acti- 
 ons of yet greater importance; if a fpecies of which 
 each one is naturally capable of very contrary affecti- 
 ons toward its fellows, and of confequent actions, each 
 one alfo requiring a conftant intercourfe of actions 
 with them, and dependant on them for his fubfiftence, 
 had not an immediate reliih for fuch affections and 
 actions as the intereft of the fyftem requires. Shall an 
 immediate fenfe recommend the proper ufe of the in- 
 ferior powers, and yet mail we allow no natural re- 
 liih for that of the fuperior? 
 
 V. As fome others of our immediate perceptive nu fare »*. 
 
 1 1 r i j • r ' Quires culture 
 
 powers are capable or culture and improvement, ioisL/ imp*** 
 this moral fenfe, without prefuppofmg any reference T ttt ' 
 to a fuperior power of reafon to which their percepti- 
 ons are to be referred. We once had pleafure in the 
 fimple artlefs tunes of the vulgar. We indulge our- 
 felves in mufick ; we meet with finer and more com- 
 plex compofitions. In thefe we find a pleafure much 
 higher, and begin to dcfpife what formerly pleafed us. 
 
 H 2
 
 6o The Sense o/" Moral Goodness. 
 
 Book I. A judge, from the motions of picy, gets many crimi- 
 nals acquitted : we approve this fweet tendernefs of 
 heart. But we rind that violence and outrages abound; 
 the fober, tuft, and induftrious are plagued, and have 
 no fecurity. A more extenfive view of a publick in- 
 tereft (hews fome forts of pity to occafion more exten- 
 five mifery, than arifes from a ftricl execution of juf- 
 tice. Pity of itfelf never appears deformed; but a 
 more extenfive affection, a love to fociety, a zeal to 
 promote general happinefs, is a more lovely principle, 
 and the want of this renders a character deformed. 
 This only fhews, what we ihall prefently confirm, that 
 among the feveral affections approved there arc ma- 
 ny degrees: fome much more lovely than others. Tis 
 rims alone we correct any apparent diforders in this 
 moral f J acuity, jevenas we correct our rcaibn itfelf. As we 
 improve and correct a low tafte for harmony by enur- 
 ing the ear to finer competitions; a low tafte for beau- 
 ty, by prefenting the finer works, which yield an high- 
 er pleafure; fo we improve our moral tajle by prefent- 
 ing larger fyftems to our mind, and more extenfive 
 affections toward them ; and thus finer objects are ex- 
 hibited to the moral faculty, which it will approve, 
 even when thefe affections oppofe the effect of fome 
 narrower affections, which confidered by themfclves 
 would be truly lovely. No need here of reference to 
 an higher power of perception, or to reafon. 
 
 Is not our reafon itfelf alfo often wrong; when we 
 ralhly conclude from imperfect or partial evidence? 
 muft there be an higher power too to correct our rea-
 
 The fever al Affections approved. 61 
 
 fon? no; prefenting more fully all the evidence on Chap. 4. 
 both fides, byferious attention, or the beft exercife ^V"^ 
 of the reafoning power, corrects the hafty judgment. 
 Juftfo in the moral perceptions. 
 
 VI. This moral fenfe from its very nature appears n e mra\ re»fe 
 to be defigned for regulating and controlling all our vf™fJ 9 Jj£, 
 powers. This dignity and commanding nature we f° wers - 
 are immediatly confeious of, as we are confeious of 
 the power itfelf. Nor can fuch matters of immediate 
 feeling be otherways proved but by appeal's to our 
 hearts. $ It does not eftimate the good it recommends 
 as merely differing in degree, tho' of the fame kind 
 with other advantages recommended by other fenfes, 
 fo as co allow us to practifc fmaller moral evils acknow- 
 ledged to remain fuch, in order to obtain iome great 
 advantages of other forts; or to omit what we judge 
 in the prefent cafe to be our duty or morally good, 
 that we may decline great evils of another fort. But as 
 we immediatly perceive the difference in kind, and that 
 the dignity of enjoyment from fine poetry, painting, 
 or from knowledge is fuperior to the pleafures of the 
 palate, were they never fo delicate; fo we immediatly 
 difcern moral good to be fuperior in kind and dig- 
 nity to all others which are perceived by the other per- 
 ceptive powers. 
 
 In all other grateful' perceptions, the lefs we mail 
 reliih. our ftate, the greater facriiice we have made of 
 
 * Thus the Stoick in Cicero de Fin. 
 1. iii. c. 1 o. Bonum hoc, de quo agi;nus, eft 
 Ulna quidem plurimi aeftiin.ir.duv>., fed ea 
 
 aeflimatio gen ere valet, 7ion magnitudine. 
 
 Alia eft aeftimatio virtutis, quae ggni~ 
 
 rtiztion crefcendo valet.
 
 6 2 The Affections approved in feveral Degrees 
 
 Book I. inferior enjoyments to the fuperior; and our fenfe of 
 ^r\^<J the fuperior, after the firft flutter of joy in our fuccefs 
 is over, is not a whit increafed by any facrifice we have 
 made to it: nay in the judgment of fpectators, the fu- 
 perior enjoyment, or our ftate at leaft, is generally 
 counted the worfe on this account, and our conduct 
 the lefs relifhed. Thus in facrificing eafe, or health, 
 or pleafure, to wealth, power, or even to the ingenious 
 arts ; their pleafures gain no dignity by that means; and 
 the conduct is not more alluring to others. But in mo- 
 ral good, the greater the neceffary facrifice was which 
 was made to it,the moral excellence increafes the more, 
 and is the more approved by the agent, more admired 
 by fpectators, and the more they are roufed to imitati- 
 on. By this fenfe the heart can not only approve itfelf 
 in facrificing every other gratification to moral good- 
 nefs, but have the high eft felf-enjoy men t, and appro- 
 bation of its own difpofition in doing fo : which plain- 
 ly fhews this moral fenfe to be naturally deftined to 
 command all the other powers. 
 Tle f VII. Let us next confider the feveral powers or dif- 
 
 hndaffcm- pofitions approved or difapproved by this faculty. And 
 here 'tis plain that the primary objects of this faculty 
 are the affections of the will, and that the feveral af- 
 fections which are approved, tho' in very different de- 
 grees, yet all agree in one general character, of ten- 
 dency to the happinefs of others, and to the moral 
 perfection of the mind poffeffing them. No actions, 
 however in fact beneficial to fociety, are approved as 
 > iituous if they are imagined to flow from no inward 
 
 are 
 ens
 
 by the Moral Sense. 63 
 
 good-will to any perfon, or from fuch difpofitions as Chap. 4 
 do not naturally fuppofe good-will in the agent, or ^^^ 
 at leaft exclude the higheft felfifhnefs. The defires of 
 glory, or even of rewards in a future (late, were they 
 fuppofed che fole affections moving an agent in the 
 moft beneficial fervices, without any love to God,efteem 
 of his moral excellencies, gratitude to him, or good- 
 will to men, would not obtain our approbation as mo- 
 rally good difpofitions : and yet a firm belief of future 
 happinefs to be obtained by Divine appointment, u- 
 pon our doing beneficent actions, might be as fleddy 
 and effectual a caufe of or motive to fuch actions as 
 any other. But mere defire of one's own happinefs, 
 without any love to God, or man, is never the object 
 of approbation. This itfelf may fhew us how difHnct 
 moral approbation is from a perfuafion of the ten- 
 dency of actions to the intereft of the approver, fince 
 he might hope equally great advantages from fuch a 
 fteddy interefted difpofition to actions in fact benefi- 
 cent, as from any kind affection. 
 
 That fome fort of benevolent affections, or foffle^"^ 
 difpofitions imagined to be connected with them, are 
 the natural objects of approbation; and the oppofite 
 affections, or the want of the kind ones, the objects 
 of condemnation, v/ill be plain from almofl all our 
 reafonings in praifing or cenfuring, applauding or con- 
 demning the characters and actions of mankind. We 
 point out fome kind or beneficent intention, or fome 
 bene ,C| cent purpofes propofed by the agent in what we 
 praife, 01 would vindicate from cenfure. We fhew
 
 The Affections approved in fever al Degi -ees 
 
 feme detriment enfuing to others, either intended or 
 known, or what cafily might have been known by one 
 who had any tender regard for the in terefts of others, 
 as the evidence either of ill-nature in the agent, or 
 fuch felfiftinefs, or fuch feliiih paifions as over-power 
 all kindnefs and humanity. 
 
 VIII. There is a plain gradation in the objects of 
 *f*mZt our approbation and condemnation, from the indif- 
 ferent fet of actions afcending to the higheit virtue, 
 or defcending to the lowefl: vice. It is not eafy to fetle 
 exactly the feveral intermediate fteps in due order, 
 but the hio-heft and lowefl: are manifeit. The indiffe- 
 rent affections and actions are fuch as purfue the in- 
 nocent advantages of the agent without any detriment 
 to focicty, and yet without any reference made by the 
 agent to any good of others. Such are the neceffaryand 
 moderate gratifications of appetite, and many trifling 
 actions. To explain the different degrees, we muft ob- 
 ferve, what was hinted at formerly, that befide the mo- 
 ral approbation of virtue, there is alfo another relifh or 
 fenfe of a certain dignity or decency in many difpoil- 
 tions and actions not conceived as virtuous. Thus we 
 value the purfuits of the ingenious arts, and of know- 
 ledge, nay even fome bodily perfections, fuch as 
 ftrength and agility, more than mere brutal fenfuaii- 
 ty. Y\ c in like manner value more in another activi- 
 ty, patience of labour, fagacity, andfpirit inbufinefs, 
 provided they are not injurious, tho' we conceive them 
 iolciy excrcifed for his own promotion- to wealth and 
 honour, than a lazy inactive indolence.
 
 by the Moral Sense. 6*5 
 
 The calm defire of private good, tho' it is not ap- Chap. 4. 
 proved as virtue, yet it is far from being condemned KS\^\J 
 as vice. And none of the truly natural and felfifh ap- €^'""" ««- 
 petites and pafllons are of themfelves condemned as virtue. L co» 
 evil, when they are within certain bounds, even t \ 1Q ,dcmneda 
 they are not referred by the agent to any publick in- 
 tereft. It was neceflary for the general good that all 
 fuch affections fhould be implanted in our fpecies ; and 
 therefore it would have been utterly unnatural to 
 have made them matter of difapprobation even while 
 they were not hurtful. Nay, as thefe felfifh affections 
 are aiming at an end neceffary to the general good, 
 to wit the good of each individual, and as the abilities 
 of gratifying them are powers which may be very ufe- 
 fully employed in fubferviency to the moft generous 
 affe&ions, it was highly proper and benign in the Au- 
 thor of Nature to invite us to the culture of thefe 
 powers by an immediate relifh for them wherever we 
 ■obferve them, in ourfelves or in others ; tho' this re- 
 liih is plainly different from moral approbation. 
 
 We all have by confcioufnefs and experience a no- 
 tion of the human conftitution, and of a certain pro- 
 portion of affections requifite to an innocent cha- 
 racter. The felrlfh affections are then only difap- 
 proved when we imagine them beyond that inno- 
 cent proportion, fo as to exclude or over-power the 
 amiable affections, and engrofs the mind wholly to 
 the purpofes of felfifhnefs, or even to obftru6t the pro- 
 •per degree of the generous affections in the ftation and 
 circumftances of the agent. 
 
 Vol. I. I
 
 Different Degrees of 
 
 IX. Buc there is another fet of difpofitions and abi- 
 lities ftill of a finer nature, tho' diftincl: from both 
 ■ the calm univerfal benevolence and the particular 
 . / kind affections ; which however are naturally connec- 
 frm v»d 0k- ^ ^[fa f uc h affections, natural evidences of them, 
 and plainly inconfiftent with the higheft forts of fel- 
 filhnefs and fenfuality; and thefefeem immediate ob« 
 jects of the moral fen fe, tho' perhaps not the higheft. 
 They feem to be approved immediatly, even before 
 we think of this connexion with difmterefted affecti- 
 ons, or imagine directly that the agent is referring 
 them to beneficent purpofes. Of thefe moral dif- 
 pofitions there are feveral forts, all immediatly ap- 
 proved, unlefs the mind directly difcerns that they are 
 employed in vicious purpofes. Thus is fortitude ap- 
 proved, as it imports that fomething moral is more 
 valued than life, and as plainly inconfiftent with the 
 higheft felfifhnefs : if indeed it be feen employed in ra- 
 pine, and merely felfifh purpofes, fuch as thofe of luft 
 or avarice, it becomes the object of horror. Candour, 
 d opennefs of mind, and fincerity, can fcarce ever be 
 unattended with a kind honeft heart; as 'tis virtue 
 and innocence alone which need no difguife. And 
 thefe difpofitions too are immediatly approved, per- 
 haps before we think of this connexion ; fo is alfo a 
 ftedfaft principle of veracity whenever we fpeak. 
 
 I know not if Cicero's account of this be exact;, 
 " that we naturally defire knowledge, and are averfe 
 " to ignorance, and error, and being deceived; and 
 " thence relifh thefe difpofitions which are the natu-
 
 Approbation and Condemnation. 67 
 
 " ral means of knowledge, and the prefervatives a- Chap. 4. 
 " gainft deceptions." Veracity feems to be im media t-O^v^w 
 ly and ftrongly approved, and that from our infancy; 
 as we fee the firft natural impulfe of the young mind 
 is tofpeak truth, till by experiencing fomeincon venien- 
 ciesitis taught to counteract the natural impulfe. One 
 needs not mention here courtefv and good manners : 
 they are the very drefs of virtue, the direct profeffion 
 of kind affections, and are thus approved. As all thefe 
 abilities and difpofitions are of great importance in 
 life, highly beneficial to mankind when exerted in 
 confequence of kind affections, and are naturally con- 
 nected with them, or exclude the opposite extreme,'tis 
 with the higheft goodnefs and wifdom that they are 
 immediatly recommended to our approbation by the 
 conftitution of our moral faculty . 
 
 But of all fuch difpofitions of our nature, different The r C 
 from ail our kind affections, none is fo nearly cojariec- ««*■«. 
 ted with them, none fo natural an evidence of them, 
 nonefo immediatly and neceffarily fubfer vient to them, 
 as an acute moral fenfe itfelf, a ftrong defire of mo- 
 ral excellence, with an hig-h relifh of it wherever it is 
 obferved. We do not call the power or fenfe itfelf vir- 
 tuous ; but the having this fenfe in an high degree na- 
 turally raifes a ftrong defire of having all generous af- 
 fections ; it furmounts all the little obftacles to them^ 
 and determines the mind to ufe all the natural means 
 of raiflng them. Now, as the mind can make any of 
 its own powers the object of its reflex contemplation, 
 -this high fenfe of moral excellence is approved above 
 
 I 2
 
 68 Different Degrees of 
 
 Book I. all other abilities. And the confequent defire of mo- 
 \y^/V ral excellence, the confequent ftrong love, efteem, and 
 good-will to the perfons where it is found, are imme- 
 diatly approved, as moft amiable affections, and the 
 higheft virtues. 
 The dfc7 s r " ^ # having premifed thefe confederations, we may 
 obferve the following degrees of approbation, as they 
 arife above what is merely indifferent. 
 
 i. One may rank in the firft ftep, as the object of 
 f &g«tj. f ome f ort f efteem or good liking, the exercife even 
 of thofe more manly powers, which have no neceffa- 
 ry or natural connexion with virtue, but fhew a tafte 
 above fcnfuality and the lower felfifhnefs : fuch as the 
 purfuits of the ingenious arts, of the elegance of life, 
 and fpeculative fciences. Every one fees a dignity in 
 thcfc pleafures, and muft relifh the defires of them ; 
 and indeed they are far lefs oppofite to virtue, or the 
 publick intereit, than keen taft.es or appetites of a 
 lower kind. 
 
 2. 'Tis plain however, that our moral fcnfe puts a 
 much higher value upon abilities and difpofltions im- 
 mediatly connected with virtuous affections, and which 
 exclude the worft forts of feliifhnefs. Thus candour, 
 veracity, fortitude, and a ftrong fenfe of honour, have 
 a moral eilimation above other abilities. 
 >-- 3. But to come to the more immediate objects of 
 moral approbation, the kind affections themfelves ; 
 'tis certain that, among affections of equal extent, we 
 more approve the calm ftable refolute purpofes of 
 heart, than the turbulent and paiFionate* And that,
 
 Approbation and Condemnation. 69 
 
 of affections in this refpedt alike, we more approve Chap. 4. 
 thofe which are more extenfive, and lefs approve ^A^ 
 thofe which are more confined. Thus, the ftable con- approved than 
 jugal and parental love, or the refolute calm purpofe ' 
 of promoting the true happinefs of perfons thus rela- 
 ted to us, is preferable to the turbulent paffionate dif- 
 pofitions of tendernefs. And the love of a fociety, a 
 country, is more excellent than domeftick affections. 
 We fee plainly the fuperior dignity in thcfe cafes from 
 this, that, notwithstanding the ftruggle felt in our 
 breads, and the oppofition made by the paffionate or 
 more limited affections, yet, when we refolutely fol- 
 low the calm and extenfive notwithstanding of this 
 oppofition, the foul in its calmeft hours and moft de- 
 liberate reflections approves of its own conduct; and 
 fcarce ever fails to approve the like conduct in others 
 at once; as in the cafe of others its paflions are not 
 raifed to give oppofition. On the contrary, when we 
 have yielded to the paffion or the limited affection, in 
 oppofition to the calm or more extenfive principle, 
 the foul upon reflection is diffatisfied with itfelf, and 
 at firft view it condemns the like conduct in others. 
 
 That difpofition therefore which is moft excellent, Tbectufnwai 
 
 i 11 • ll'in 1 1* * excellence, uni- 
 
 and naturally gams the nigheit moral approbation, is ver fai S ood--win. 
 the calm, ftable, univerfal good-will to all, or the moft 
 extenfive benevolence. And this feems the moft di- 
 ftinct notion we can form of the moral excellency of 
 the Deity. 
 
 Another difpofition infeparable from this in men, andhmofthli 
 and probably in all beings who are capable of fuchex-^ "*
 
 y Different Degrees of 
 
 Book! tenfive affection, is the relifli or approbation of this 
 V^V^O affection, and a naturally confequent defire of this 
 moral excellence, and an efteem and good-will of an 
 higher kind to all in whom it is found. This love of 
 moral excellence is alfo an high object of approbati- 
 on, when we find it in ourfelves by reflection, or ob- 
 ferve it in another. It is a pretty different affection 
 from benevolence or the defire of communicating 
 happinefs ; and is as it were in another order of affec- 
 tions ; fo that one cannot well determine whether it 
 can be compared with the other. It feems co-ordinate, 
 and the higheft poffible of that kind ; never in oppofi- 
 tion to benevolence, nay always confpiring with and 
 alTifting it. This defire of moral excellence, and love 
 to the mind where it refides, with the confequent acts 
 of efteem, veneration, truft, and resignation, are the 
 effence of true piety toward God. 
 
 We never fpeak of benevolence toward God ; as 
 that word carries with it fome fuppofal of indigence, 
 or want of fome good, in the object. And yet, as we 
 have benevolence toward a friend when he may need 
 our affiftance; fo, the fame emotion of foul, or the 
 fame difpofition toward him, fhall remain when he is 
 raifed to the bcft ftate we can wifh ; and it then exerts 
 itfelf in congratulation, or rejoicing in his happinefs. 
 In this manner may our fouls be affected toward the 
 Deity, without any fuppofition of his indigence, by 
 the higheft joy and complacence in his abfolute hap- 
 pinefs. 
 ifgrttt cf XL 'Tis eafy to obferve the like gradation from the 

 
 Approbation ^/^Condemnation. 71 
 
 indifferent State of the foul through the feveral de- Chap. 4. 
 grees of moral turpitude. The firft may be the wantO^V*\^ 
 of thefe more reputable abilities ; which indeed implies 
 no evil affection, and yet plainly makes a character 
 defpi cable, tho' not immoral. Thus we diilike the 
 imprudent conduct of any man with refpect to his 
 own intereSt, without thinking of any detriment to. 
 arife to fociety from it. Thus negligence, rafhnefs, 
 Sloth, indolence, are naturally difliked, abstracting 
 from their effects upon fociety. So is a mind infen- 
 fible to the more manly pleafures of arts and genius. 
 When indeed imprudent conduct, in point of private 
 intereSt,. is considered alfo as affecting a publick, or. 
 fome other perfons than the agent, whofe interefts he 
 ought to have regarded, as it generally does; then it 
 may be matter of high moral condemnation and re- 
 morfe: fo may the meannefs of our talents or abilities, 
 when occafioned by our immoderate floth and fenfua- 
 lity, and a defect of generous affections. 
 
 1 . The objects of the gentler!: moral difapprobati- SeveraJ deg 
 on or cenfure are thofe cafes " where one in gratify- 
 " ing fome lovely narrower affection has inadvertent- 
 " ly omitted what would have mofl tended to the 
 " publick good." Such is the promoting a good friend 
 or benefactor in oppofition to a competitor of fuperi- 
 or merit and abilities. The preferring, in fuch cafes, a 
 lefs worthy friend to one's felf, may be cenfured in- 
 deed as a want or due proportion among thefe lovely af- 
 fections, when a more extenfive one yields to the more 
 limited ; but the moral beauty of fome limited affecti- 
 
 recitid.
 
 y 2 Different Degrees 
 
 Book I. ons is fo great that we readily overlook fome defects 
 in the more extenfive. The fame is the cafe if one 
 has ferved a friend at a trouble or expence to himfelf 
 much above the value of the good he has done his 
 friend; perhaps too incapacitating himfelf for fome wi- 
 fer fa-vices hereafter. Where indeed one preferred to 
 himfelf a friend of equal merit, the publick interefl: 
 is as well promoted this way, and a beautiful affecti- 
 on of friendfhip is difplayed. And yet the contrary 
 conduct:, when there are no fpecial circumftances plead- 
 ing; for a friend, could not be cenfured as immoral. 
 
 2. Other objects of lighter cenfure are thofe actions 
 detrimental to the publick which a perfon is forced 
 to do to avoid death torture or flavery; when yet the 
 publick detriment is ftill greater than thofe evils he 
 avoids. Here the agent may have no ill-will; nay may 
 have many generous affections, tho' not of that heroick 
 ftreneth which the moral fenfe would recommend. 
 The guilt is exceedingly extenuated by the greatnefsof 
 the temptation, which few have fufncient lhengch of 
 foul to refiit. In order to retain the character of inno- 
 cence, we expect, not only the abfence of all malicious 
 difpofitions, but many good affections, and thofe too 
 of an extenfive nature; with much caution about the 
 intereits of others. The precife degrees cannot well 
 be determined; nor is it neceffary. But the ftronger 
 and the more extenfive the generous affections are, fo 
 much the better is the temper; the lower they are, 
 and the more that any oppofite or narrower ones pre- 
 vail againft them, fo much the temper is the worfe.
 
 ^/"Condemnation. 73 
 
 5 Tis our bufinefs to aim at the higheft moral excel- Chap. 4. 
 lence, and not content ourfelves with merely avoiding C/VX^ 
 infamy or cenfure. 
 
 3 . Another degree of vice are the fudden pafTionate 
 motions of anger, refentment, and ill-will, upon pro- 
 vocation either falfely apprehended, or aggravated be- 
 yond any real ground. Such paflions when they lead 
 to injury are vicious, tho' not in the higheft degree. 
 When indeed by indulgence they turn into habitual 
 rancour and fettled malice or revenge, they form a 
 moft odious character. 
 
 4. A more deformed fort of vice is when the felfifh 
 paflions andfenfual appetites lead men into like inju- 
 ries. Thefe are worfe excufes and weaker extenuati- 
 ons of guilt than the angry paflions. 
 
 5. A degree more deformed is when calm felfifh- 
 nefs raifes deliberate purpofes of injury known to be 
 fuch. In thefe cafes the moral faculty muft be quite 
 over-powered, and deprived of all its natural force in 
 the foul, and fo muft all humanity. The like is the cafe 
 when men from mere felfifhnefs, without any grievous 
 temptation, or without any motives of publick inte- 
 reft, counteract their moral fentiments by falfehood, 
 treachery, ingratitude, a neglect of honour, or low 
 cowardice dreading to lofe fome pofitive advantages, 
 even while there is no fuch evil impending as could 
 much affect a brave and good man. 
 
 6. In this clafs, or rather in a worfe one, we muft 
 rank impiety, or the want of all due affections to the 
 Deity, when he is known and conceived to be good* 
 
 Vol. I. K
 
 fevers h.to or- 
 i'.T, 
 
 Order among our Affections. 
 
 Our moral faculty muft be ftrangely afleep where the 
 defire of knowing the Supreme Excellence is a-want- 
 ine, or love to it when it is known: or where there is 
 no care to cultivate devout affections of gratitude 
 where there have been the greateft benefits received, 
 and where they are repeated every moment. 
 
 There is a difpofition ftill worfe, conceivable in the 
 abftract, but fcarce incident to mankind, or the crea- 
 tures of a good Deity ; a fixed unprovoked original 
 malice, or a defire of the mifery of others for itfelf, 
 without any motives of intereft. 
 
 XII. Without a diftinct confideration of this moral 
 faculty, a fpecies endued with fuch a variety of fenfes, 
 and of defires frequently interfering, muft appear a 
 complex confufed fabrick, without any order or re- 
 gular confiftent defign. By means of it, all is capable 
 of harmony, and all its powers may confpire in one di- 
 rection, and be confiftent with each other. 'Tis al- 
 ready proved that we are capable of many generous 
 affections ultimately terminating on the good of o- 
 thers, neither arifing from any felfiih view, nor termi- 
 nating on private good. This moral faculty plainly 
 fhews that we are alfo capable of a calm fettled uni- 
 verfal benevolence, and that this is deftined, as the fu- 
 preme determination of the generous kind, to govern 
 and controll our particular generous as well as felfiiri 
 affections; as the heart muft entirely approve its do- 
 ing thus in its calmeft reflections: even as in the order 
 of felfiih affections, our felf-love, or our calm regard 
 to the greateft private intereft controlls our particu-
 
 Order among our Affections. 75 
 
 lar felfifh paflions; and the heart is fatisfied in its do- Chat. 4. 
 ing fo. \y^T\J 
 
 To acknowledge the feveral generous ultimate af- cway^ftw 
 fections of a limited kind to be natural, and yet main-*" ^ e M reme 
 
 * J . principle, 
 
 tain that we have no general controlling principle 
 but felf-love, which indulges or checks the generous 
 affections as they conduce to, or oppofe, our own no- 
 bleft intereft; fometimes allowing thefe kind affecti- 
 ons their full exercife, becaufe of that high enjoyment 
 we expect to ourfelves in gratifying them ; at other 
 times checking them, when their gratification does 
 not over-ballance the lofs we may fuftain by it; is a 
 fcheme which brings indeed all the powers of the 
 mind into one direction by means of the reference 
 made of them all to the calm defire of our own hap- 
 pinefs, in our previous deliberations about our con- 
 duel: : and it may be juftly alledged that the Author 
 of Nature has made a connexion in the event at laft 
 between our gratifying our generous affections, and 
 our own higheft intereft. But the feelings of our heart, 
 reafon, and hiftory, revolt againft this account : which 
 feems however to have been maintained by excellent 
 authors and ftrenuous defenders of the caufe of virtue. 
 This connexion of our own higheft interefts with 
 the gratifying our generous affections, in many cafes 
 is imperceptible to the mind ; and the kind heart ads 
 from its generous impulfe, not thinking of its own in- 
 tereft. Nay all its own interefts have fometimes ap- 
 peared to it as oppofite to, and inconfiftent with the 
 generous pare, in which it perfifted. Now were there 
 
 K 2
 
 76 Universal Benevolence 
 
 Book I. no other calm original determination of foul but thac 
 iyy\j coward one's own intereft, that man muft be appro- 
 ved intirely who fteadily purfues his own happinefs, in 
 oppoiition to all kind affections and all publick in- 
 tereft. That which is the fole calm determination, 
 muft juftify every action in confequence of it, however 
 oppolite to particular kind affections. If it be faid 
 " that 'tis a miftake to imagine our intereft oppofite 
 " to them while there is a good providence:" grant it 
 to be a miftake ; this is only a defect of reafoning : but 
 that difpofition of mind muft upon this fcheme be ap- 
 proved which coolly facrifices the intereft of the uni- 
 verfe to its own intereft. This is plainly contrary to 
 the feelings of our hearts. 
 A**tber *W- Can that be deemed the fole ultimate determinati- 
 
 mate determlna- iri 1* l I'll * i • l 
 
 tiem of -mm to- on, the fole ultimate end, which the mind m the ex- 
 ercife of its nobleft powers can calmly refolve, with 
 inward approbation, deliberately to counteract? are 
 there not inftances of men who have voluntarily facri- 
 ficed their lives, without thinking of any other ftate 
 of exiftence, for the fake of their friends or theii coun- 
 try? does not every heart approve this temper and 
 conduct, and admire it the more, the lefs prefumpti- 
 on there is of the love of glory and poftumous fame, 
 or of any fublimer private intereft mixing itfelf with 
 the generous affection? does not the admiration rife 
 higher, the more deliberately fuch refolutions are for- 
 med and executed ? all this is unqueftionably true, 
 and yet would be abfurd and impoftible if felf-intereft 
 of any kind is the fole ultimate termination of all
 
 the Supreme Principle. 77 
 
 calm, defire. There is therefore another ultimate de- Chap-4. 
 termination which our fouls are capable of, deftined to <*/V^J 
 be alfo an original fpring of the calmeft and moft deli- 
 berate purpofes of action; a defire of communicating 
 happinefs, an ultimate good-will, not referred to any 
 private inter eft, and often operating without fuch re- 
 ference. 
 
 In thofe cafes where fome inconfiftency appears be- wm the mffm 
 tween thefe two determinations, the moral faculty at '*'/*«j*>«w 
 
 , * 1 1 • deftined to con- 
 
 once points out and recommends the glorious the &-troiuii others. 
 miable part; not by fuggefling profpects of future in- 
 terefts of a fublime fort by pleafures of felf- approba- 
 tion, or of praife. It recommends the generous part 
 by an immediate undefinable perception ; it approves 
 the kind ardour of the heart in the facrificing even 
 life itfelf, and that even in thofe who have no hopes 
 of furviving, or no attention to a future life in ano- 
 ther world. And thus, where the moral fenfe is in its 
 full vigour, it makes the generous determination to 
 publick happinefs the fupreme one in the foul, with 
 that commanding power which it is naturally deftin- 
 ed to exercife. 
 
 It muft be obvious we are not fpeaking here of the 
 ordinary condition of mankind, as if thefe calm de- 
 terminations were generally exercifed, and habitual- 
 ly controlled the particular pail ions; but of the con- 
 dition our nature can be raifed to by due culture; and 
 of the principles which may and ought to operate, 
 when by attention we prefent to our- minds the ob- 
 jects 01 reprefencations fit to excite them* Doubtlefs
 
 Umverfal Benevolence the Supreme Excellence. 
 
 fome good men have exercifed in life only the parti- 
 cular kind affections, and found a conitant approba- 
 tion of them, without either the molt extenfive views 
 of die whole fyitem, or the moft univerfal benevolence. 
 Scarce any of the vicious have ever confidered where- 
 in it is that their higheit private happinefs confilts, 
 and in confequence of it exerted the calm rational 
 felf-love; but merely follow inconfiderately the felfifh 
 appetites and affections. Much lefs have all good 
 men made actual references of all private or generous 
 affections to the extenfive benevolence, tho' the mind 
 can make them; or bad men made references of all 
 their affections to calm felf-love. 
 fining, iaw,re. XIII. But as the felnin principles are very itrong. 
 and by cultom, by early and frequent indulgences, and 
 other caufes, are raifed in the greatelt part of men 
 above their due proportion, while the generous prin- 
 ciples are little cultivated, and the moral fenfe often 
 alleep ; our powers of reafoning and comparing the fe- 
 veral enjoyments which our nature is capable of, that we 
 may difco ver which of them are of grea teft confequence 
 to our happinefs ; our capacity, by reafoning, of arri- 
 ving to the knowledge of a Governing M/Wprefiding 
 in this world, and of a moral adminiftration, are of 
 the highelt confequence and neceffity to preferve our 
 affections in a juit order, and to corroborate our moral 
 faculty: as by fuch reafoning and reflection we may dif- 
 co ver a perfect confiltency of all the generous motions 
 of the foul with private interelt, and find out a cer- 
 tain tenor of life and action the molt effectually fub-
 
 The Senfe of Honour a Natural Principle. 79 
 
 fervient to both thefe determinations. This mall be Chap. 5. 
 the {ubjecl of fome following chapters, after we fhall ^"V"\J 
 have fubjoined fome further confirmation of thefe 
 moral principles, from the fenfe of honour; and ob- 
 ferved the univerfality of both, and how far they feem 
 uniform principles in our fpecies. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 The Senfe of Honour and Shame explained. The unU 
 verfal influence of the Moral Senfe, and that of 
 Honour, and their uniformity. 
 
 I. TF we confult our own feelings we mufl acknow- seufitf*™* 
 
 111 -i • nr- ^ • . ^ • c.n immediate 
 
 led^e that as there are certain affections and acti- 
 
 *& 
 
 principle, 
 
 ons which we naturally approve, andefteem,and praife, 
 fo there is an immediate grateful fenfation felt when 
 we are approved and praifed by others, and generally 
 a moll uneafy one when we are cenfured ; without the 
 expectation of any other advantages or difadvantages 
 which may thence accrue to us. A more diftincl: con- 
 fideration of this fenfe of honour and fhame will much 
 confirm the preceding account of our moral faculty. 
 
 They who refer all the motions of the heart to tefiraa fnm 
 private intereft,. and would reduce all our perceptive f ^" u n ' u 
 powers to a very fmall number, by one artful refe- 
 rence or another, depart exceedingly from nature in 
 their accounts of thofe determinations about honour 
 and lhame, which are acknowledged to appear uni- 
 verfally among men,
 
 So The Sense o/Honour 
 
 Book T. They tell us "our honouring a man is merely reput- 
 ing him ufeful to us either explicitely, and thus we 
 honour the generous and beneficent, with whom we 
 have intcrcourfe, and by whofe offices we are profi- 
 ted; or implicitely, and by fome confufed imagina- 
 tions, and thus we honour -heroes who lived in prior 
 ages, or remote nations, imagining they are our 
 contemporaries or countrymen ; or thinking that 
 they would be very ufeful to us if we had intercourfe 
 with them. And thus our efteem is only an opini- 
 on of a character or conduct as ufeful to us, and a 
 liking it on this account." And, fay the] 7 , " we de- 
 fire to be honoured, or reputed ufeful to others, not 
 from an immediate fenfation, but becaufe we know 
 that men are ftudious of ferving fuch as they ho- 
 nour and repute ufeful to them ; not indeed from 
 ultimate love to them, but as a further allurement 
 to continue thus ufeful ; and we, in hopes of fuch 
 fervices from thofe to whom we are reputed ufe- 
 ful, defire to obtain this reputation of being ufeful 
 to others." 'Tis a pain to dwell upon fuch fchemes 
 as contradict the immediate feelings of the heart fo 
 manifeftly. 
 
 Upon this fcheme, the man who honours an a^ent, 
 and die agent himfelf who approves his own conduct, 
 mull: have notions of the fame honoured action the 
 moil different imaginable. The honourer muft only 
 • value it as tending to his eafe, wealth, pleafure, fafety ; 
 and the agent values it as the artful, and necefTary, but 
 difagreeable means of obtaining feme remote advan-
 
 ^natural Principle. 8i 
 
 tages from others, who will probably invite him to Chap. y. 
 continue fuch conduct by making him fome returns 
 of ufeful fervices. But 'tis plain there are many tem- 
 pers and actions ufeful to us, nay to a whole commu- 
 nity, which we don't honour; fuch as ufeful treachery, 
 a felfifh inventive induftry in improving manufactures ; 
 a promifcuous profufenefs. Nay we honour fome- 
 times what we conceive directly to be detrimental ; as 
 patriotifm or courage, in a foreigner, or an enemy. 
 Shall confufed imaginations of ufefulnefs be regarded 
 here, againft the moil direct opinions of detriment to 
 ourfelves? Who finds thefe imaginations refpecting 
 his own interefts, in reading antient hiffories, or dra- 
 matick writers, when the foul is fo ftrongly moved 
 with the feveral moral forms? 
 
 And then,furely, this notion of my own temper and 
 conduct as beneficial to others can upon their fcheme 
 have nothing immediately grateful to me. Thefe cool 
 uncertain profpects of returns of advantage from the 
 felfifh arts of others can have nothing alluring amidft 
 certain expences, labours, wounds, and death? whence 
 the ardour for a furviving fame ? this is all monftrous 
 and unnatural. Is all our admiration, our high zeal 
 for the brave, and merciful, and generous, and mag- 
 nanimous, all our ambition and ardour for glory, this 
 cool traffick, this artful barter of advantageous fer- 
 vices without an exprefs bargain ? We appeal to eve- 
 ry human heart in this matter ; to the hearts of the 
 young, who are moit ardent in praifing, and moft de- 
 lighted with praife; and have little felt thofe artful 
 
 Vol.L L
 
 82 The Sense o/Honour 
 
 Book I. mean defigns of intereft. Is all efteem and honour a 
 mere cool opinion that from fome actions and affec- 
 tions we fhall reap fome advantage ? Is all the con- 
 founding fenfe of fhame, and blulhing, only a fear of 
 fome future uncertain lofTes, which we know not well 
 what they fhall be, or how they will befal us ? Are 
 not men confcious of their own defigns in the pur- 
 fuits of honour; of their own apprehenfions in their 
 avoiding of what is fhameful ; and of the occaflon of 
 their forrow when they are afhamed ? furely thefe art- 
 ful views of our own intereft could not be unknown 
 to us. 
 
 rhh we «p- jj There is therefore an immediate fenfe of ho- 
 
 tesrs very tarly. •11 
 
 nour and fhame, often operating where there are no 
 fuch views of intereft, and plainly prefuppoflng a mo- 
 ral fenfe. It generally appears very early in life, be- 
 fore any confiderable reafoning or reflection can fettle 
 well the notions of morality; and thus before we can 
 judge for ourfelves we are wifely and benignly fub- 
 jected to the direction of others, are rewarded for our 
 compliance by a moft grateful fenfation, and by a 
 moft uneafy one deterred from frowardnefs and obfti- 
 nacy. The felfifh accounts of this principle make all 
 the ardour for glory the fame bafe temper with that 
 of a traitor or informer, who defires to appear ufe- 
 ful to others in hopes of a reward. No better no- 
 tion can they give of modefty, the fenfe of fhame, 
 the abhorrence of any imputation of moral turpitude, 
 that pudor of the R o m a n s, the fineft ftroke in a cha- 
 racter.
 
 an IMMEDIATE PRINCIPLE. 83 
 
 We fee this fenfe of honour admits feveral de- Chap. 5. 
 grees in conformity to the moral fenfe on which it is 
 founded. But firft, in confequence of that natural de- ««££$£ 
 fire or impulfe toward the perfection of all our powers, twf/' ani 
 and a fenfe of dignity and decency in fome of them 
 above others, we find a natural pleafure in difcovering 
 to others the perfection of any manly powers, and in 
 being valued in that refpect. Hence a tafte for the 
 ingenious arts of mufick, fculpture, painting, and 
 even for the manly diverfions, is reputable. The gran- 
 deur and elegance of living, in drefs, architecture, 
 furniture, gardens, are in certain circumftances mat- 
 ter of glorying and of praife: much more fo are the 
 abilities yet higher, a ftrong genius in acquiring know- 
 ledge, the high lively imagination of the poet or ora- 
 tor. This laft indeed plainly includes an high moral 
 fenfe. 
 
 But to come directly to our fenfe of pleafure in ob- 
 taining moral approbation. All actions which proceed 
 from any friendly or kind affection, and are not op- 
 pofite to fome more extenfive one, are attended with 
 aflurance, and opennefs of behaviour, and we glory 
 in them. The fenfual paffions, and ill-natured affecti- 
 ons of anger, malice, envy, and even cool felfifhnefs, 
 we naturally conceal ; and are afliamed of them. 
 
 III. One cannot well pafs by that peculiar branch tu modejty */ 
 of modefty fo confpicuous in all ages and nations, a- Mu 
 bout venereal enjoyments. As there is a very violent 
 appetite implanted for the moft neceflary purpofes of 
 the fyftem, requiring however, in order to anfwer thefe 
 
 L 2
 
 The Sense o/Honour 
 
 ends more effectually, a great deal of nice regulation, 
 by our reafon and confederation of the common in- 
 tereft of fociety. Tis with great wifdom and good- 
 nefs that fuch an early check is provided for this ap- 
 petite by a natural principle of modefty. Children un- 
 inftructed would not foon difcover to us this modefty, 
 nor have they for fome years a notion of the object 
 or defign of it, as the appetite does not arife in our 
 firft years. Should we whimfically fuppofe favages 
 come to maturity in folitude, without thefe objects 
 occurring to them which could excite focial affecti- 
 ons or moral notions; in this unnatural ftate fome na- 
 tural principles might not appear. But were they 
 brought into fociety, and had the actions and fenti- 
 ments of others prefented to them, their moral facul- 
 ty, and their fenfe of honour and fhame, would foon 
 difcover themfelves; and particularly their natural 
 modefty of this peculiar kind would quickly appear. 
 As they would approve all humanity and kindnefs, 
 even when practifed toward others, and abhor the con- 
 trary difpofitions, they would foon defpife fenfuality 
 and felfiirmefs. As foon as they knew how T the race of 
 mankind is preferved, they would defire marriage and 
 offspring; and when the occafion of this natural mo- 
 defty was felt, and the intention of the appetite known, 
 this natural check of fhame would difcover itfelf. 
 
 When the neceflity of ftrict marriage-laws for the 
 afcertaining to the fathers their own offspring was 
 once obferved, new reafons would appear for modeft: 
 behaviour, and for creating an early habit of it in the
 
 an IMMEDIATE PRINCIPLE. 85 
 
 education of both fexes. But, befides, there feem to be Chap. 5. 
 feveral natural difpofitions and fenfes peculiarly rela- V-/"V^J 
 tive to this affair, diftinct from the general fhame of 
 all immoderate felfiirinefs, particularly that of mo- 
 defty, which begins at that period when the appetite 
 which needs its controll arifes, and feems to abate in 
 old age along with the appetite. 
 
 IV. Having a natural capacity for moral notions, iiu fin/c <w 
 we may be afhamed of actions without knowing theSf'^ 
 true reafons why they are immoral. By education we 
 may contract groundlefs prejudices, or opinions about 
 tlie qualities perceivable by any of our fenfes, as if 
 they were inherent in objects where they are not. Thus 
 we are prejudiced againft meats we never tailed: but 
 we could not be prejudiced on account of favour, or 
 under that notion, if we had not the natural fenfe. 
 Thus it is always under fome fpecies recommended 
 by the moral faculty that we praife or defire to beprai- 
 fed, tho' we frequently have very imperfect views of 
 the tendencies of actions, and of the affections from 
 which they proceeded. 
 
 What we obferved about the moral faculty, holds 
 alfo in our fenfe of honour, that we are highly delight- 
 ed with the approbation of others, not only for the 
 good affections themfelves, but for. all thofe abilities 
 and difpofitions which are their natural concomitants, 
 or which exclude the contrary affections. Thus we 
 glory in fortitude/veracity, candour, opennefs of mind, 
 and. the defire of honour itfelf ; tho' the pleafure of 
 receiving praife is known to be fo ftrong, and there are
 
 g6* The Sense o/Honour and Shame 
 
 Book I. fuch fufpicions of our being envied for it, that men 
 \^r^\j are averfe to let any impatience for this pleafure ap- 
 pear, or to difcover their high delight in it, lead it 
 fhould argue too much felflfhnefs. 
 m«dMt V. The force of the moral fenfe, and that of ho- 
 J liinoitr, is diffufcd through all parts of life. The very 
 prtstfKft. j uxur y of the table" derives its main charms from 
 fome mixture of moral enjoyments, from communi- 
 catino- plcafures, and notions of fomething honour- 
 able as well as elegant. How univerfally defpicable is 
 the character of one who in folitude purfues eager- 
 ly the pleafures of the palate without fociety or ho- 
 fpitality. 
 
 The chief pleafures of hiftory and poetry, and the 
 powers of eloquence are derived from the fame fources. 
 Hiftory, as it reprefents the moral characters and for- 
 tunes of the great and of nations, is always exercifing 
 our moral faculty , and our focial feelings of the fortunes 
 of others. Poetry entertains us in a way yet more affec- 
 ting, by more ftrikingreprefentations of the fame objects 
 in fictitious characters, and moving our terror,and com- 
 panion, and moral admiration. The power of the ora- 
 tor confifts in moving our approbation or condemna- 
 tion, and the enfuing affections of efteem or indigna- 
 tion, by prefenting fully all the moral qualities of ac- 
 tions and characters, all the pityable circumftances 
 which may extenuate or excufe, to engage our favour; 
 or all the aggravating ones, to encreafe our indigna- 
 tion ; difplaying all the high colours on both fides, as 
 !xe is either praifing or making invectives.
 
 ^immediatePrinciple. 87 
 
 The very arts of rnufick, ftatuary, and painting,befide Chap. 5. 
 the natural pleafures they convey by exact imitations, V^"V\J 
 may receive an higher power and a ftronger charm 
 from fomething moral insinuated into the performan- 
 ces. 
 
 The chief beauties of countenance, and even of 
 behaviour, arife * from indications of feme fweet af- 
 fections, or morally efteemable abilities, as it appears 
 by almoft all the epithets of commendation. 'Tis al- 
 ways fome real or imagined indications of fomething 
 vicious which chiefly caufes our diflike, as we fee from 
 the qualities cenfured and condemned. Hence it is 
 that fuch deformity is j* obferved in the countenan- 
 ces of the angry, the envious, the proud, and the fel- 
 fifh; and fo much alluring fweetnefs in thofe which 
 difplay the tender gentle and friendly affections. 
 
 We fee how thefe moral indications affect the na- 
 tural defires between the fexes. Could one attain to 
 maturity without having any moral notions, which 
 however fcarce ever happened in one inftance, except 
 in ideots ; he might be moved by this inftincl: as the 
 brutes are. But we find that beauty raifes firft fome 
 favourable notions of an inward temper ; and, if ac- 
 quaintance confirms them, we feel an high eftcem and 
 a defire of mutual friendfhip. Thus we are admiring 
 wit, good-nature, prudence, kindnefs, chaftity, a com- 
 mand over the lower appetites, while the inftincl: is 
 
 * See Inquiry into Beauty See. § vi. pora. Licet ora ipfa cernere iratorum, out 
 
 f See Cicero de Offic. 1. i. c. 29. Appe- 
 
 eorum qui li'vidine aliqua, ant metu cotttmoti 
 
 thus qui longius evaga?itur — a quibus non j funt, aut voluptate nimia gefiiunt &c. and 
 modo animi perturbantur, verum etiam car* | often in his other works.
 
 88 The extenjive Influence of 
 
 Book I. alfo exciting to its natural purpofe. Hence it is that 
 \y^T\j this pailion is often obferved to make confiderable im- 
 provements of the temper in feveral amiable virtues. 
 'Tis in like manner fome moral -worth apprehen- 
 ded, fome juftice or goodnefs of intention in perfons 
 and caufes, which occafions moft of that keen zeal for 
 certain parties and factions, and thofe flrong attach- 
 ments to them, in people who have no hopes of thofe 
 advantages which the leaders of them may have in 
 
 Our intimacies y ip\\r 
 
 To alledge that our * chufing perfons of know- 
 ledge, court efy, and good-nature for our intimates, 
 and our avoiding the ignorant, the morofe, or felfifh, 
 argues all our intimacies to arife from felnfh views, 
 is plainly unjuft. 'Tis true the one fort of compani- 
 ons are improving, pleafant, obliging, fafe; and the 
 other ufelefs, unpleafant, dangerous. But are all 
 friendmips and intimacies mere grimace and hypo- 
 crify? does one feel no inward efteem of certain cha- 
 racters, and good-will to the perfons ? does one only 
 defire his own improvement or pleafure or gain, as 
 when he hues a matter to teach him a mechanick art, 
 or a mufician to entertain him, or a labourer to do a 
 piece of common work? do we only intend a fair out- 
 ward appearance with our beft friends, that we may 
 not lofe thefe advantages ? On the contrary does not 
 every one feel an inward efteem and good-will toward 
 any virtuous acquaintances, which ihall remain when 
 we are feparated, and hope not to meet them again? 
 
 AY ere there nofuch moral fen fe and fenfe of 'honour 
 
 * SzzHobbes, Bayle, Mandevil, in many places ; after Rockefocaulf,
 
 the Moral Sense and that o/*Honour. 89 
 
 in our constitution, were we as entirely felfifh as fome Chap. 5. 
 refiners alledge, human life would be quice different v^/vxj 
 from what we feel every day, a joylefs, lovelef, cold, 
 fullen ft ate of cunning and fifplclon. 
 
 "Tis worth our notice here that however by th.Q Things - inrenj]hle 
 early prejudices of the external fenfes we are apt to aremo fi real 
 imagine little reality in any thing which is not the ob- 
 ject of one or other of them, and to conceive what is 
 not thus fenfible to be fictitious and imaginary ; yet if 
 we attend to the inward feelings of our hearts, the 
 greateft realities, our very happinefs and mifery, that 
 dignity or worth in which alone we can have the mod: 
 entire fatisfaction with ourfelves, or for which we love, 
 efteem, and admire another, and count him excellent 
 or happy, or chufe him for a friend, are qualities en- 
 tirely infenfible, too noble and excellent to fall under 
 the cognizance of thefe powers which are chiefly de- 
 ftined for the fupport of the body. 
 
 - VI. Many fufpecl that no fuch fenfes can be natu- p'fifi* « *«- 
 ral, becaufe there are fuch different and oppofite no- 
 tions of morality, among different nations. But grant- 
 ing that their relifhes were different, that different 
 men and nations approved and condemned aclions 
 upon different accounts, or under different notions ; 
 this only proves that their fenfes are not uniform; 
 and not that no fuch principles are natural. Men's 
 palates differ as much; but who thence denies a fenfe 
 of tailing to be natural? 
 
 But the uniformity is much greater in our moral 
 faculty than in our palates. The different reafons gi- 
 
 Vol. I. M
 
 oo The Uniformity of thefe Senses. 
 
 Book I. ven by different perfons for their approving or con- 
 V/v~vj demning will all lead us at laft, when we examine 
 them, into the fame original fpecies or notions of mo- 
 ral good and evil. 
 
 In approving or vindicating of actions, in all nati- 
 ons, men generally alledge fome tendency to the hap- 
 pinefs of others, fome kind intention more or lefs ex- 
 tenfive, fome generous affections, or fome difpofrti- 
 ons naturally connected with them. When we alle- 
 viate any imprudent conduct, we fay, the agent in- 
 tended well; did notforefee the bad confequence; or 
 had fuch provocation as might have tranfported even 
 a kind temper, or a man of juftice. When we inveigh 
 againft bad conduct, we mew that all the contrary af- 
 fections or difpofitions were evidenced by it, fuch as 
 cruelty, wrath, immoderate felfimnefs, or a want of 
 fuch kind affections as we generally expect in our fpe- 
 cies. If we blame imprudent conduct, without this re- 
 ference to evil affections, or to the want of the good 
 ones, 'tis fome times from our good- will and pity to- 
 ward the agent, with fome contempt of his mean abi- 
 lities, his (loth, ftupidity, or indolence. And yet how 
 are we foftened by the thought that" thepoor creature 
 " intended no harm, or occafioned none to others." 
 This is often indeed a falfe excufe, as the publick fuf- 
 fers by any one's making himfelf lefs capable of fer- 
 ving it, as well as his more peculiar friends. 
 Jvfl ■""**" Nay we (hall find that men always approve upon 
 aib ■ fome opinion, true or falfe, that an action has fome of 
 thofe qualities or tendencies, which are the natural
 
 The Uniformity ofthefe -Senses. pr 
 
 objects of approbation. We may indeed often ima- Chap. 5. 
 gine without ground, that actions have good effects v 
 upon the publick, or that they flowed from good af- 
 fections, or that they are required by the Deity and 
 acceptable to him ; and then under thefe appearances 
 we approve them. 'Tis our reafon which prefents a 
 falfe notion or fpecies to the moral faculty. The fault 
 or error is in the opinion or underftanding, and not 
 in the moral fenfe ; what it approves is truly good; tho' 
 the action may have no fuch quality. We fome times 
 chufe and like, in point of intereit, what is in event 
 detrimental to ourfelves. No man thence concludes 
 that we are not uniform in felf-love or liking of our 
 own intereit. Nor do like miftakes about the moral 
 qualities of actions prove either that we have no moral 
 fenfe, or that it is not uniformly conftituted. The paf- 
 fions of fpectators, as well as thofe of agents, prevent 
 a ma ure examination of the moral natures of thofe 
 actions which are fubfervient to t;he defigns of the paf- 
 fions ; as luft, rage, revenge, will hurry men into what a 
 calm man would difcern to be ruinous. But thefe 
 things do not prove that men are difTimilar to each 
 other, either in their moral faculty, or their felf-love. 
 To prove that men have no moral faculty r , or very 
 difTimilar ones ; we muft mew either that nations or 
 great numbers of men hold all actions to be indiffe- 
 rent which don't appear to them to affect their own 
 private intereit; or that they are pleafed with cruelty, 
 treachery, ingratitude, unprovoked murders, and tor- 
 tures, when not practifed toward themfelves, juft as 
 
 M 2
 
 The Causes of 
 
 much as with their contraries: they fhould in fome 
 nations be deemed as reputable and lovely as huma- 
 nity, compafllon, liberality, faith: the action of Sex- 
 tus Tarquin, or Claudius the decemvir, mould be 
 approved as much as that of Scipio with his Spanifh 
 captive. But fuch nations have not yet been difco- 
 vered to us, not even by the invention of the boldeft 
 traveller. 
 The cvfcs of VII. The chief caufes of different approbations 
 afferent affro- are thefe three, i . Different notions of happinefs and 
 
 hathni and an- . . . . . • ' 1 
 
 fares, different the means of promoting it. Nations unacquainted 
 
 ■notions ofhatpi- . , , . 1'11'P • c 
 
 with the improvements which lire receives from art 
 and induftry, may fee no occafion for incouraging 
 them by fecuring to each man a property in the fruits 
 of his labours, while the bare neceffaries of life are ea- 
 fily obtained. Nay they can fee no harm in depriving 
 men of their artificial acquifitions, and (tores beyond 
 their prefent ufe, or of fuperfluities tending to dif- 
 folve them in pleafure and floth : hence no evil may 
 appear, in theft. If any nation faw no ufe in the afcer- 
 taining of their offspring to the fathers, or had no 
 defire of it; they might difcern no moral evil in prac- 
 tices which more civilized nations fee to be deftruc- 
 tive to fociety. But no nation has yet been found in- 
 fenfible to thefe matters. 
 ■j In fome civilized ftates laws have obtained which 
 
 <TWS. 11 l'* Till* 1 
 
 • we repute barbarous and impious. r>ut look into the 
 re-afons for them, or the notions under which they 
 were approved, and we generally find fome alledged 
 tendency to fome publick good. There may no doubz
 
 Diversity in Approbation. 93 
 
 be found fome few inftances where immoderate zeal Chap. 5. 
 for their own grandeur, or that of their nation, has ^/VV 
 made legiflators enact unjuft laws, without any mo- 
 ral fpecies recommending them. This only proves 
 that fometimes a different principle may over-power 
 our fenfe of juftice. But what foolifh opinions have 
 been received! what fantaftick errors and difTimili- 
 tudes have been obferved in the admired power of rea- 
 foning, allowed to be the characteriftick of our fpe- 
 cies ! Now almoft all our diverfities in moral fenti- 
 ments,and oppofite approbations, and condemnations, 
 arife from oppofite conclufions of reafon about the 
 effects of actions upon the publick, or the affections 
 from which they flowed. The moral fenfe feems ever 
 to approve and condemn uniformly the fame imme- 
 diate objects, the fame affections and difpofitions ; tho' 
 we reafon very differently about the actions which evi- 
 dence certain difpofitions or their contraries. And yet 
 reafon, in which all thefe errors happen is allowed to 
 be the natural principle ; and the moral faculty is not, 
 becaufe of the diverfities of approbation; whkh yet 
 arife chiefly from the diverfity of reafonings. 
 
 2 . A fecond caufe of different approbations are the v$«**MaQ 
 larger or more confined fyftems which men regard in 
 confidering the tendencies of actions ; fome regarding 
 only their own country and its interefr, while the reft 
 of mankind are overlooked; and others, having yet 
 narrower fyftems, only a party, feet, or cabal. But if 
 we enlarge our views with truth and juftice, and ob- 
 ferve the flructure of the human foul, pretty much
 
 oa The Causes of 
 
 Book I. the fame in all nations; none of which wants multi- 
 L/"V^>tudes of good men, endued with the fame tender af- 
 fections to kindred, friends, benefactors ; with the fame 
 companion for the diftrefled, the fame admiration 
 and love of eminent virtue, the fame zealous con- 
 cerns for their countries which we think fo lovely a- 
 mong ourfelves ; we muft find a facred tye of nature 
 binding us even to foreigners, and a fenfe of that juf- 
 tice, mercy and good-will * which is due to all. To 
 men of fmall attention their own countrymen or par- 
 tifans are the only valuable part of mankind : every 
 thing is juft which advances their power, tho' it may 
 hurt others. The different approbations here arife a- 
 gain from different opinions about a matter of fact. 
 Were certain nations or fects entirely impious, cruel, 
 and fixed upon fuch meafures as would involve all men 
 in eternal as well as temporal mifery, and poffeffed of 
 fuch arts of fafcination as no reafonings could effec- 
 tually withftand ; one could fcarce blame any violent 
 deftruction made of fuch monfters by fire or fword. 
 Under this very notion all perfecutors out of principle 
 behold fuch as they call hereticks ; under it they raife a 
 general abhorrence of them. The like notions many 
 little fects form of each other ; and hence lofe the 
 fenfe of moral evil in their mutual hatreds and per- 
 fection. 
 •nifcrcnt ofki- 3 . A third caufe of different fentiments about ac- 
 
 tns about Cod's • /- i • li'r* 
 
 commands, tions, as frequently occurring as any one, are the dif- 
 ferent opinions about what God has commanded* 
 
 * See this often inculcated in Jttarc. Antonln,
 
 Diversity in Approbation. q% 
 
 Men iomecimes trom deflre of rewards, and fear of Chap. 5. 
 punifhments, counteract their moral fenfe, in obedi-^^VXJ 
 ence to what they conceive to be divine commands ; 
 as they may alfo from other felfifh pafTions : they may 
 have fome confufed notions of matters of duty and 
 obligation, diftinct from what their hearts would ap- 
 prove were the notions of divine commands removed. 
 Habits and aflbciations of ideas affect men's minds in 
 this matter. But where there are different opinions 
 in different nations about the objects of the divine 
 command, there are fuch ftrong moral colours ox forms 
 in obedience and difobedience to God, that they muft 
 neceflarily caufe very different approbations and cen- 
 fures, even from the moil uniformly conftituted moral 
 faculties. God is generally conceived to be good and 
 wife, to be the author of our lives, and of all the good 
 we enjoy. Obedience muft be recommended to our 
 approbation generally under the high fpecies of gra- 
 titude, and love of moral excellence, as well as under 
 the notion of advantageous to the publick : and difo- 
 bedience muft appear cenfurable, under the contrary 
 notions. Difobedience therefore to what one believes 
 Cod has commanded, from any views of fecular ad- 
 vantages or fenfual pleafure, or the inveigling others 
 into fuch difobedience, muft appear grofsly ungrate- 
 ful, fenfual, felfifh or cruel. Where different opini- 
 ons about God's commands prevail, 'tis unavoidable 
 that different approbations and cenfures muft be ob- 
 ferved in confequence of thefe opinions, tho' the na- 
 tural immediate objects- of praife and cenfure were the
 
 The Causes of 
 fame to all men. 1 hio a^uuuts fur the different rites 
 of worfhip, different notions of fanctity and prophani- 
 ty, and for the great abhorrence fome nations may 
 have of fome practices in which others can difcern no 
 pernicious tendency, and repute indifferent, having 
 no opinion of their being prohibited. 
 Detroit rin-s Thefe conflderations account fufficiently for the 
 tofajffimfr- approbation of human facrifices and other monftrous 
 * rites : tho' 'tis probable they have been often practi- 
 
 fed merely from fear, without moral approbation, by 
 fuch as fcarce were perfuaded of the goodnefs of their 
 gods: they likeways fhew how inceft and polygamy 
 may be generally abhorred in fome nations, where a 
 few only can fhow their pernicious confequences; and 
 yet be deemed lawful in other nations. 
 Errors eft™ Let no man hence imagine that fuch actions flow- 
 ing from falfe opinions about matters of fact, or a- 
 bout divine commands, are light matters, or fmall 
 blemifties in a character. Where the error arifes from 
 no evil affection, or no considerable defect of the good 
 ones, the action may be very excufable. But many of 
 thofe errors in opinion which affect our devotion to- 
 ward the Deity, or our humanity toward our fellows, 
 evidence very great defects in that love of moral ex- 
 cellence, in that juft and amiable deflre of knowing, 
 reverencing, and confiding in it, which is requiflte to 
 a good character; or evidence great defects in huma- 
 nity, at leaft in the more extenflve and noble kinds of 
 it. Where thefe principles are lively, they muft ex- 
 cite men to great diligence and caution about their
 
 Diversity in- Approbation. 
 
 duty and their practical concluflons : and confequent- 
 ly muft lead them to juft fentiments in the more im-' 
 portant points, fince fufficient evidence is afforded in 
 nature to the fincere and attentive. No man can have 
 fufficient humanity of foul, and candour, who can. 
 believe that human facrifices, or the perfecution of 
 his fellow-creatures about religious tenets which hurt 
 not fociety, can be duties acceptable to Cod. 
 
 VIII. Our having a moral fen fe does not infer that we No imate td ± 
 have innate complex ideas of the feveral actions; Qx as f u ?P°f ed ' 
 innate opinions of their confequences or effects upon 
 fociety: thefe we difcover by obfervation and reafon- 
 ing, and we often make very oppofite concluflons a- 
 bout them. The object of this fenfe is not any exter- 
 nal motion or action, but the inward affections and. 
 difpofitions, which by reafoning we infer from the 
 actions obferved. Thefe immediate objects may be. 
 apprehended to be the fame, where the external acti- 
 ons are very oppofite. As incifions and amputations 
 may be made either from hatred, or from love ; fo love 
 fometimes moves to inflict painful chaftifements, and 
 fome times to confer pleafures, upon its object. And 
 when men form different opinions of thefe affections in 
 judging about the fame actions, one fhall praife what, 
 another cenfures. They fhall form thefe different opi- 
 nions about the affections from which actions proceed- 
 ed, when they judge differently about their tendency to 
 the good or the hurt of fociety or of individuals. One 
 whofe attention is wholly or chiefly employed about 
 fome good tendencies of the actions, while he over- 
 ^ Vol. I. N
 
 gg Private Interest to be confdered. 
 
 Book I. looks their pernicious effects, (hall imagine that they 
 ^/y\j flowed from virtuous affections, and thus approve 
 them : while a mind more attentive to their pernici- 
 ous effects, infers the contrary affections to have been 
 their fpring, and condemns them. 
 why a h ne- Were nothing more requifite in laying the founda- 
 ' - : tion of morals, but the difcoverins: in theory what 
 
 ion ? . 
 
 f vhtuc ^"•affections and conduct are virtuous, and the objects of 
 approbation, and what are vicious, the account now 
 o-iven of the conftitution of our moral faculty would 
 be fufficient for that purpofe; as it points out not on- 
 ly what is virtuous and vicious, but alfo fhews the fe- 
 veral degrees of thefe qualities in the feveral forts of 
 affections and actions ; and thus we might proceed to 
 confider more particularly the feveral offices of life, 
 and to apply our power of reafon to difcover what 
 partial affections, and actions confequent upon them, 
 are to be entirely approved, as beneficial to fome parts 
 of the fyftem, and perfectly confident with the gene- 
 ral good; and what affections and actions, even of the 
 beneficent kind, tho' they may be ufeful to a part, are 
 pernicious to the general fyftem ; and thus deduce the 
 fpecial laws of nature, from this moral faculty and the 
 generous determination of foul. But as we have al- 
 fo a ftrong determination toward private happinefs, 
 with many particular felfifh appetites and affections, 
 and thefe often fo violent as not immediately to fub- 
 mit to the moral power, however we may be confei- 
 ous of its dignity, and of fome conllderable effect it 
 has upon our happinefs or mifery ; as ftrong fufpici-
 
 Private Interest to be confidered. op 
 
 ons may often arife attended with great uneafinefs, Chap. 5. 
 that in following the impulfe of our kind affections 
 and the moral faculty we are counteracting our inte- 
 reft , and abandoning what may be of more confe- 
 quence to our happinefs than either thisfelf-approbati- 
 onor theapplaufes of others ; to eftabliih well the foun- 
 dations of morality, and to remove, as much as may 
 be, all opposition arifing from the felfifh principles, 
 that the mind may refolutely perfift in the courfe 
 which the moral faculty recommends, 'tis neceifary to 
 make a full comparifon of all human enjoyments with 
 each other, and thence difcover in which of them our 
 greateft happinefs confifts. 
 
 N 2
 
 Our Tower over the particular 
 
 B O O K I. P A R T II. 
 
 An Inquiry into the Supreme Happiness of 
 
 Mankind. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 How far the feveral Senfations, Appetites, Tajfions 
 and Affe&ions are in our power. 
 
 I. HHHE chief happinefs of any being muft confift 
 A in the full enjoyment of all the gratifications 
 <« %- its nature defires and is capable of; or if its nature ad- 
 mits of a great variety of pleafures of different and 
 fome times inconfiftent kinds, fome of them alfo high- 
 er and more durable than others, its fupreme happi- 
 nefs muft confift in the moft conftant enjoyment of 
 the more intenfe and durable pleafures, with as much 
 of the lower gratifications as confifts with the full en- 
 joyment of the higher. In like manner; if we cannot 
 ward off all pain, and there be different kinds and 
 degrees of it,wemuftfecure ourfelves againft the more 
 intenfe and durable kinds, and the higher degrees of 
 them; and that fometimes by bearing the lower kinds 
 or degrees, or by facrificing fome fmaller pleafures, 
 when 'tis neceffary for this end. 
 
 To direct us in this conduct 'tis neceffary to pre- 
 mife fome diftin£t account in what manner we have 
 power over our feveral affections and defires, and how 
 far any meditations or felf-difcipline may affect our
 
 De sir es and P a s sions. ioi 
 
 very perceptions of good and evil, of happinefs or mi- Chap. 6. 
 fery, in the feveral objects. VyW' 
 
 i . As the calm defires and averfions of the foul #« we &,„, 
 naturally arife from our opinions of good or evil m p p er . ov ' r cur 
 their objects, fo they are proportioned to the degrees 
 of good or evil apprehended. We have power over the 
 felfTih defires of any particular good only by means of 
 the calm original determination toward the greateft 
 happinefs ; and by the power of reafoning and com- 
 paring, which may difcover what are the values of the 
 feveral objects of defire. 'Tis by the correcting our 
 opinions of their values that the feveral defires are 
 kept in their due proportion. 'Tis alfo by means of 
 the other original determination toward publick hap- 
 pinefs of the moft extenfive kind, and by a like exer- 
 cifeof reafonin comparing the values of the obi eels 
 defired for others, that we can regulate the feveral kind 
 affections and defires : fince where a greater good is 
 difcerned, the calm defire of it is ftronger than that 
 toward a fmaller inconfiflent good, whether purfued 
 for ourfelves or others. 
 
 Here too the moral faculty difplays much of its 
 power. As the feveral narrower affections may often 
 interfere and oppofe each other, or fome of them be 
 inconfiftent with more extenfive affections to whole 
 focieties, or to mankind; our moral feufe by its ftrong- 
 er and warmer approbation of the more extenfive, 
 both points out the affection which mould prevail, 
 and confirms this nobler affection by our natural de* 
 iire' of moral excellence*
 
 I0 2 Our Tower over the particular 
 
 Book I. The turbulent appetites and particular pafiions 
 v_/*v~XJ whether of the felfifh or generous kind, are governed 
 .by the fame means. They naturally arife on certain 
 ***"' occafions, and that often with great vehemence. Ta 
 govern and reftrain them an habit is neceffary, which 
 muft be acquired by frequent recollection and difci- 
 pline. While we are calm we muft frequently attend 
 to the danger of following precipitantly the firft ap- 
 pearances of good or evil; we muft recollect our for- 
 mer experiences in ourfelves, and our obfervations a- 
 bout others, howfuperior and more lafting enjoyments 
 have been loft by our hafty indulgence of fome prefling 
 appetite, or paflion : how lafting mifery and remorfe 
 has enfued upon fome tranfient gratification : what 
 iliame, diftrefs, and forrow have been the effects of un- 
 governed anger : what infamy and contempt men have 
 incurred by exceffive fear, or by their averfion to la- 
 bour and painful application. We may thus raife an 
 habitual fufpicion of unexamined appearances, and 
 an habitual caution when we feel any turbulent paf- 
 fion arifmg. When the calm principles are thus con- 
 firmed by frequent meditation, and the force of the 
 pafiions abated, then it is we obtain the true liberty and 
 felf-command: the calm powers will retain and exer- 
 cife that authority for which their natural dignity has 
 fitted them, and our reafon will be exercifed in cor- 
 recting all appearances of good and evil, and examin- 
 ing the true importance of the feveral objects of our 
 appetites or pafiions. 
 
 II. To this purpofe 'tis neceffary to obferve the or-
 
 Desires and Passions, i g > 
 
 dinary caufes of our deception, and of our unjuft ef- Chap. 6. 
 timacion of objects : fuch as, i . The ftrength of the V-/~v^"Vj 
 imprefTLons and keennefs of the defires raifed by thino-s /«/«/'" u 
 prefent and fenfible, beyond what the infenfible or fu- 
 ture objects prefented by the underftanding and re- 
 flection can raife. Frequent meditation alone can re- 
 medy this evil. Our younger years are almoft totally 
 employed about the objects of fenfe: few can bear 
 the pains and energy of mind requifite to fix the at- 
 tention upon intellectual objects, and examine the 
 feelings of the heart. Strength is acquired by thofe 
 powers which are moft exercifed. The recurring mo- 
 tions of the appetites annex confufed notions of high 
 felicity to their objects, which is confirmed by thein- 
 tenfenefs of fome fenfations while the appetite is keen. 
 Few deliberately compare thefe enjoyments with o- 
 thers, or attend to the confequences, to the fhort du- 
 ration of thefe fenfations, and the enfuing fatiety, 
 fhame and remorfe. And yet 'tis evident to our rea- 
 fon that the duration of any enjoyment is as much to 
 be regarded as the intenfenefs of the fenfation ; and 
 that the enfuino; ftate of the mind when the brutal im- 
 pulfe is fated, is to be brought into the account as 
 well as the tranfient gratification. 
 
 2. Again — -Allowing; the imagination to dwell lnM &«z tbt 
 
 r i . ^ r . , imagination. 
 
 much upon fome objects prelentmg hopes of high 
 pleafure inflames our paflions and byafTes our judg- 
 ments. Little indeed is hereby added to the enjoy- 
 ment when we obtain it: nay our pleafure is rather 
 diminimed, as it feldom anfwers the previous expecta-
 
 Our power over the particular Dejires dndTPaJJions. 
 
 tion, and brings with ic the air of difappointment. 
 But by roving over all the pleafures and advantages of 
 certain flations, certain pitches of wealth or power, 
 our defines of them are made more violent, and our 
 notions reprefent an happinefs in them, much higher 
 than we mall find it to be when we attain to them. 
 And this uncorrected imagination never fails to in- 
 creafe the torment we fhall find upon a difappoint- 
 ment. 
 4pfe«ri»i of o B u t no caufe of immoderate defires, or unfair 
 eftimates is more frequent than fome groundlefs aflb- 
 ciations of ideas, formed by mftruction, or our ufual 
 converfation, annexing confufed notions of happinefs, 
 and even of virtue, and moral perfection, or their con- 
 traries, to what has little affinity to them. Seldom are 
 objecls of deilre prefented to the mind as they are, 
 without fome difguife. Wealth and power are truly 
 ufeful not only for the natural convenienci.es or plea- 
 fures of life, but as a fund for good offices. But how 
 many notions are there often likewife annexed of 
 ' great abilities, wifdom, moral excellence, and of much 
 higher joys than they can afford; which fo intoxicate 
 fome men that they forget their natural puipofes, be- 
 gin to love them for themfelves, affect the orientati- 
 on of them; and dread the lower (rations as abject, mi- 
 ierable, and inconfiifent with moral worth or ho- 
 nour. Some natural pleafures too by like affociations 
 are eitimated far above their worth, and immoderate 
 defines of them torment the foul. 
 
 4, Seme perverfe fuperftitions alfo, inftilled by e-
 
 The original Dejires experienced by all. 10^ 
 
 ducation, caufe groundlefs averfions to tenets and Chap. 6. 
 practices of the moil innocent nature, by annexing to' 
 them notions of impiety, enmity to God, and obfti- 
 nate wickednefs of heart ; while contrary tenets or 
 practices, not a whit better, are made indications of 
 piety, charity, holinefs and zeal for the fouls of men. 
 Hence arifes that rancour in the hearts of unwary 
 zealots of all forts againft thofe who differ from them; 
 and that perfecuting fpirit, with all the wrathful paf- 
 fions, which have been fo long a reproach to human 
 nature, and even to that religion which mould infpire 
 all love and meeknefs. 
 
 III. It is the more neceflary to obferve thefe feve-^// ««/«*'& 
 ral caufes of the wrong eftimations made of the ob- 1%™^™* 
 jects of our defire, and of the feveral enjoyments of ani £ aini ; 
 life, becaufe fcarce any of mankind can live without 
 fome folicitation or other from every one of thefe fe- 
 veral forts of enjoyments; nor can one hope to be 
 wholly unexperienced in contrary evils. The plea- 
 fures and pains of the external fenfes are in fome de- 
 gree felt by all who have the natural powers, and muft 
 raife defires and averfions. The impulfes of the ap- 
 petites too are unavoidable: they recur after certain 
 intervals, nor can their uneafy fenfations be other- 
 ways prevented altogether, than by gratifying them 
 with their natural objects. But, according to the be- 
 nign order of nature, fuch gratifications as may pre- 
 vent the pain of the appetites may very generally be 
 obtained ; and where fome moral reafon prevents the 
 gratification, there are higher moral joys accompany- 
 
 Vol.L O
 
 I0 6 The Original Desires 
 
 Bo ok I. ing this abftinence, which fully make up the lofs^ 
 v^/*w> Bodily pain feldom employs a great part of life; wife 
 men find out many prefervatives, which are general- 
 ly effectual ; and when they are not, may obtain ftrong 
 confolations and fupports under it. 
 t her ■■'res 'Tis more difficult to gratify other mofl: uneafy de- 
 - .fires, ariiing from fome opinions of great happinefs 
 
 m "' in certain enjoyments. Had we formed no fuch opi- 
 nions or confufed notions, we had felt no mifery in 
 the want of thefe enjoyments; which is not the cafe 
 with the appetites. But when we can change thefe 
 opinions, and rectify our confufed imaginations, the 
 defires and their attendant uneafinefles ceafe or abate. 
 A greater mare of the mifery of life is chargeable on 
 thefe defires than upon the appetites. Of this kind 
 are the defires of wealth, power, the grandeur and e- 
 legance of living, and of fame ; and our averfions ta 
 their oppofites are of the fame nature. Our affections 
 to others, and our kind defires, are affected by opini- 
 ons in the fame manner with our felfifh ones. What 
 we conceive as a great good we muft warmly defire for 
 thofe we love; we muft be uneafy upon any difap- 
 pointment. 
 
 Now when thefe opinions are true and natural, we 
 cannot alter them, nor would it be defirable. Feafon 
 and reflection will confirm them. But many opinions 
 and confufed notions which raife our defires are falfe 
 and phantaftick; and when they are corrected we are: 
 freed from much pain and anxiety. Some enjoyments 
 are flill in our power, which too may be found to be
 
 experienced by all, 1 07 
 
 the higheft. If this be true, it is our higheft interefl Chap. 6. 
 to be fully perfuaded of it; that our ftrongeft defires <~/*W; 
 may be raifed toward fuch things as may certainly be 
 obtained, and can yield us the nobleft enjoyments. 
 
 In general, the greater any good or evil is imagi- 
 ned, the ftronger are our defires and fears, the greater 
 is our anxiety while the event is in fufpence, and the 
 higher (hall our forrows be upon difappointment and 
 our firfl: tranfports upon fuccefs : but where the previ- 
 ous imagination was falfe, this joy foon vanifhes, and 
 is fucceeded by uneafinefs: on the other hand, the 
 forrow upon difappointment may remain long and ve- 
 ry intenfe, as the falfe imagination is not corrected 
 by experience of the enjoyment. This (hews the great 
 importance of examining well all our notions about 
 the objects of defire or averfion. Thus we ihould break 
 off from fenfual enjoyments, in our eftimation of 
 them, all thefe foreign notions of moral dignity, li- 
 berality, elegance, and good-nature, which difpofiti- 
 ons we may difplay in a much wifer and more virtu- 
 ous manner, without expenfive luxurious tables or 
 fumptuous living. Thefe additional notions inflame 
 the defires of fplendid opulence, and are a fund of 
 perpetual anxiety. 
 
 IV. Ideas once firmly affociated in this manner Affoc\at*&uen 
 give lafting uneafinefs to the mind; and a full convic-S.'^^"" 
 tion of the underftanding will not break the affocia- 
 tion, without long meditation and difcipline. There 
 are only confufed imaginations, and not fettled con- 
 clusions, or direct opinions, in the minds of the luxu- 
 
 O 2
 
 io8 The Original Desires 
 
 Book I. rious, the mifer, the ambitious, the lover, repreferr- 
 ting fome wonderful excellence in their favourite ob- 
 jects proportioned to their eager defires. But long in- 
 dulgence and repeated acts of defire, in a mind called 
 off from other objects, the ftrain of converfation, and 
 the airs of countenance, and the very tone of voice 
 of the men of the fame turn with whom they have 
 haunted, affociate high notions of felicity to the fa- 
 vourite gratification fo firmly, that a long attention 
 and reflection is neceiTary to rectify the confufed ima- 
 
 gination.. 
 
 o 
 
 juji ntwni of j± f u ij perfuafion of the excellence and importance 
 
 nectjjaTj a X 
 
 - -/ of virtue above all other enjoyments, provided we 
 have juft notions of it, mult always be for our intereft 
 The opinion, will ftand the teft of the ltricteit inqui- 
 ry, as we mail lhew hereafter * 7 and the enjoyment is 
 in our power. But difproportioned admirations of 
 fome forts of virtue of a limited nature, and of fome 
 inferior moral forms, fuch as mere fortitude, zeal for 
 truth, and for a particular fyftem of religious tenets, 
 while the nobler forms of goodnefs of more extenfive 
 good influence are overlooked, may lead men into 
 very bad affections, and into horrid actions. No -na- 
 tural fenfe or defire is without its ufe, while our. opi- 
 nions are true: but when they are falfe, fome of the 
 belt affections or fenfes maybe pernicious. Our moral 
 knfc and kind affections lead us to condemn the evil, 
 to oppofe their defigns ; nay to wifh their deftruction 
 ben they are conceived to be unalterably fet upon 
 the ruin of others better than themfelves. Thefevo
 
 experienced by all. m 109 
 
 ry principles, along with the anger and indignation Chap. 6. 
 naturally arifing againft what appears evil, may lead^^/V^V^ 
 us into a fettled rancour and hatred againft great bo- 
 dies of mankind thus falfely reprefented as wicked, 
 and make us appear to them, as they appear to us, 
 malicioufly fet upon the deftruction of others. 
 
 When our opinions and imagination are corrected, arrestng our 
 the natural appetites and defires will remain, and mayX^m?" 
 be attended with fome uneafinefs ; but the ftrength of 
 many will be abated and others will acquire more. 
 The fimpler gratifications of appetite, thefe of the 
 eafieft purchafe, may by good management be as fa- 
 tisfying, nay almoft as joyful and exhilarating as any. 
 The pleafures of the imagination may be highly relink- 
 ed, and yet no diftrefs arife from the want of them. 
 Much of this pleafureis expofed to all, and requires no 
 property, luch as that arifing from the exquifite beai> 
 ties of nature, and fome of the beauties of art. Nor are 
 even thefe either the fole or the higheft enjoyments. 
 
 V. The fympa the tick pleafures and pains in fome 
 degree or other muft affect us • no management : can /^./v^^ 
 prevent it. We muft live in fociety, and by the aid*™ 
 of others, whofe happinefs, or mifery, whofe pleafures, 
 or. pains, we cannot avoid obferving. Nay mankind 
 univerfally feel the conjugal and parental affections ; 
 eminent goodnefs too, when it occurs, muft excite 
 ftrong love and friendihip. Thus- we muft experience 
 the fympathe tick joys and forrows of the higher kinds. 
 In this matter too we muft watch carefully over our 
 opinions and imagination, that our minds be not in-
 
 p 
 
 no The Original Desires 
 
 Book I. flamed with vain defires at out mean tranfitory or un- 
 L/"Y"X> neceflary goods for others, or oppreffed with forrow 
 upon fuch evils befalling them as are fmall and tole- 
 rable. But unlefs we get the imaginations of our 
 friends corrected, we ihall ftill have occaiion for fym- 
 pathy. All mifeiy is real to the fufferer while it lads. 
 Whoever imagines himfelf miferable, he is fo in fact, 
 while this imagination continues. 
 
 Where choice binds the tye of love, the previously 
 examining well the character of the perfon, his opi- 
 nions and notions of life, is of the higheft confequence. 
 In the ftronger bonds of love with perfons of juft fen- 
 . timents and corrected imaginations, we have a fair 
 hazard for a large mare of thefe higher focial jovs, 
 with fewer intenfe pains ; as the happinefs of fuch per- 
 fons is lefs uncertain or dependent on external acci- 
 dents. 
 
 As there are not in human nature any neceflary 
 caufes of ultimate ill-will or malice, a calm mind con- 
 sidering well the tempers, fentiments, and real fprings 
 of action in others, will indeed find much matter of 
 pity and regret, but little of anger, indignation or en- 
 vy, and of fettled ill-will none at all. And thus we 
 may be pretty free from the uneafinefies and mifery 
 of the unkind affections and palllons. Human nature 
 is indeed chargeable with many weaknefTes, raih opi- 
 nions, immoderate defires of private intereft, itrong 
 fenfual appetites, keen attachments to narrow fvltems 
 beyond their merit : and very fubj ect to anger up- 
 on appearance of injury to themfelves ; or thofe they
 
 experienced by all 1 1 1 
 
 love: but 'tis free from all ultimate unprovoked ma- Chap. 6. 
 lice ; much influenced by fome moral fpecies or o-^WJ 
 ther; and abounding with fome forts of kind affecti- 
 ons. Many of their moft cenfurable actions flow from 
 fome miftaken notion of duty, or are conceived by the 
 agent to be innocent, and are the effects of fome par- 
 tial and naturally lovely affection, but raifed above its 
 proportion, while more extenfive ones are afleep. 
 
 VI. As foon as one obferves the affections of others miv^fJ^ 
 or reflects on his own, the moral qualities mult %ffid$. manhnd ' 
 the mind. No education, habit, falfe opinions, or even 
 affectation itfelf can prevent it. A Lucretius, an 
 Hobbes, a Bayle, cannot make off fentiments of gra- 
 titude, praife, and admiration of fome moral forms; 
 and of cenfure and deteftation of others. This fenfe 
 may be a fure fund of inward enjoyment to thofe who 
 obey its fuggeflions. Our own temper and actions 
 may be conftant fources of joy upon reflection. But 
 where partial notions of virtue and juftrceare rafhly en- 
 tertained, without extenfive views and true opinions 
 of the merit of perfons and caufes, the purfuit of 
 fome moral forms may occafion grievous diftafle and 
 xemorfe. Falfe notions of virtue may be lefs lafting 
 than other miftakes. Perfons injured by them feldom 
 fail to remonftrate; fpectators not blinded by our paf- 
 fions and intereft will mew their difguft. And thus 
 our ill-grounded joy and felf-approbation may foon 
 give place to fhame and remorfe. , , ,. ,, 
 
 . ~ s. Trie fenfe cf ->o- 
 
 The fenfe of honour too muft occafion pleafure or^"^/^^'- 
 pain, as the world about us happen to difclofe their.
 
 1 12 The Original Desires 
 
 Book I. fentlments of our conduct: and as we have not the 
 \S~sr\j opinions of others in our power, we cannot be fure of 
 efcaping all cenfure. But we can make a juft eftimate 
 of men and of the value of their praifes or cenfures, in 
 proportion to their qualifications as judges of merit; 
 and thus we rnav turn our ambition upon the praifes 
 of the wife and good. The approbation of our own 
 hearts, and the approbation of God, give fatisfactions 
 of an higher nature than the praifes of men can give. 
 We can reprefs the del ire of this lower enjoyment, 
 when it proves inconllftent with the higher. 
 
 VII. The deiires alfo of wealth and power muft af- 
 .•-•--feci the mind v."hen it difcerns their obvious ufefulnefs 
 to gratify even" original deiire. Thefe purfuits in men 
 of corrected minds may be eafy and moderate, fo that 
 difappointment will not give great pain. But when the 
 notions not onlv of external convenience and pleafure, 
 and of a fund for good offices, but of all valuable abi- 
 Ktv, and moral dignity, and happinefs are joined to 
 wealth or power, and of all bafenefs and mifery join- 
 ed to poverty and the lower ftations; when the natu- 
 ral ufe of thefe things is overlooked, and the mind is 
 conftandy intent upon further advancement, anxiety 
 and impatience muil imbitter and poifon every enjoy- 
 ment of life. 
 
 When the mind has been diverted from its natural 
 purfuits and enjoyments, fantaftick ones muft fuc- 
 ceed. When through indolence and averiion to ap- 
 plication men defpair of fuccefs in matters naturally 
 koHGurable: when any accidents have called off their
 
 any enjoy- 
 ments oppojite 
 
 experienced by all. 1 1 3 
 
 minds from the affe&ions natural to our kind, toward Chap. 6. 
 offspring, kindred, and a country; the defires of fome 
 fort of eminence, and of amufement and pleafure, in 
 an incapacity for all valuable bufmefs, mull: fet them 
 upon any purfuits, which have got reputation among 
 their fellows of like floth, incapacity, or depravation, 
 under fome confufed notions of genteelity, liberali- 
 ty, fociablenefs, or elegance. How elfe fhall one ac- 
 count for years fpent by young people of eafy fortunes 
 in hunting, gaming, drinking, fauntering, and the fil- 
 ly chat and ceremonies of the places of rendezvous 
 for gayety and amufement. 
 
 VIII. Now it is obvious our nature is incapable 
 of the higheft pleafures of all kinds at once, or of ^^<>n% 
 purfuing them together. There are manifeft incon- 
 filtencies among them, and the means of obtaining 
 them. An high relifh for one kind is inconfiftent with 
 a tafte for fome others. Senfuality and indolence are 
 plainly oppofite to all the higher active enjoyments. 
 The purfuits of knowledge and the ingenious arts are 
 oppofite to avarice, fenfuality, and to fome forts of 
 ambition: fo are the purfuits of virtue. Nay the high- 
 eft enjoyments of fome kinds are much increafed by 
 confcioufnefs of our having facrificed other inferior 
 purfuits and enjoyments to them, as thofe of virtue 
 and honour. 
 
 'Tis equally manifeft that in our prefent ftate, one 
 •cannot conftantly fecure to himfelf any one enjoyment 
 dependent on external things., which are all fubjecl 
 to innumerable accidents. The noble enjoyments of 
 
 Vol, L P 
 
 tent* 
 arc certain.
 
 Several Enjoyments are 
 
 piety, of which hereafter, and thofe of virtue, may be 
 '{table and independent on fortune. But a virtuous 
 temper, whatever fare enjoyment it may afford upon 
 reflection, ever carries a man forth beyond himfelf, to- 
 ward a publick good, or fome interefts of others; and 
 thefe depend not on our power. There's great pain in 
 the difappointment of virtuous defigns, tho' the tem- 
 per be ever approved. In this, as in all other things, 
 we depend on providence, which, as it gave us at firft 
 all our perceptive powers, and their objects, foit dif- 
 pofes of them, and particularly of the happinefs or nai- 
 lery of others, the object on which the virtuous affec- 
 tions terminate. This fufficiently fhews that the Dei- 
 ty muft, for this reafon, as well as many others, be the 
 fupreme object of our higheft happinefs : fince we can 
 never be fecure, nor can we enjoy true ferenity and 
 tranquillity of mind, without a firm perfuafion that 
 his goodnefs, wifdom, and omnipotence are continu- 
 ally employed in fecuring the felicity of the objects of 
 our nobleft affections. 
 
 - It would not be improper to confider here the plain 
 ' ,::t evidence for the exiitence of God and his moral per- 
 fections ; not only as a firm perfuafion of thefe points 
 is an high matter of duty, but as the Deity and his 
 providence are the foundations of our tranquillity and 
 higheft happinefs. But as the moft perfuafive argu- 
 ments on fome of thefe points are derived from the 
 very constitution of human nature, and that moral 
 admin'tftrationvrt feel within ourfelves, that ftructure 
 of our fouls deftined to recommend all thofe kind and
 
 oppo/ite to each other, 1 1 5 
 
 generous affections which refemble the moral perfec- Chap. 6. 
 tions of God; we fhall poftpone the fentiments andv^VN^ 
 duties of piety to be conlidered afterwards as the 
 higheft perfection of happinefs, as well as of moral ex- 
 cellence. 
 
 IX. As to other enjoyments which are uncertain; »„»•*-<«*•. 
 tho' pure unmixed happinefs is not attainable, yet "■'7 ,}dVCjm: 
 our endeavours are not ufelefs. We hinted alrea- 
 dy that having had high previous expectations, tho' it 
 may increafe the firft tranfports of fuccefs, when the 
 preceeding anxiety is removed; yet rather leffens the 
 fubfequent enjoyment, and ftill embitters difappoint- 
 ments, and makes misfortunes, in their own nature 
 light, become unfupportable : fo having our notions 
 lower about thefe uncertain objects, and our defires 
 moderate, rather encreafes our liable fenfe of pleafure 
 in the obj eel obtained, and abates the fenfe of difap- 
 pointment. 
 
 Thus the temperate, the fober, the chafte, the 
 humble, have fenfes as acute at lead as others, and 
 enjoy all the good in fenfual objects, and in honour. 
 Abiiinence and reftraint, when virtue requires, viti- 
 ates no fenfe or appetite. Moderation in profperity, 
 temperance, humility, and modefty, low notions of 
 happinefs in fenfual objects, prevent no fenfe of plea- 
 fure in advantages obtained. Men of this turn have 
 their reafon calm and active to procure the gratifica- 
 tions they deilre, and to find out other preferable en- 
 joyments when they are difappointed. In this uncer- 
 tain world their profperity and fuccefs is as joyful as 
 
 P 2
 
 1 1 6 ^ Comparison u/ 
 
 Book I. that of others. And then under misfortunes, 
 ^/V\; Si quis, quae mult a vides difcrimine tali. 
 
 Si quis in advert 'urn rapiat cafufve, deufve* 
 affain (And lure iuch diiappointments are as incident to the 
 inflamed admirers of external things as to others) the 
 difference is manifeft. The one had other funds of 
 happinefs : he forefaw fuch accidents ; the lofs to him 
 is tolerable. To the other; he is deprived of his gods ; 
 and do you ask what aileth him ? So neceffary is fre- 
 quent confideration of the uncertainty of human af- 
 fairs; the accidents we are fubjeclto; and the proper 
 reforts, and fprings of relief, and the other enjoy- 
 ments which may ftill be in our power. This abates 
 no folid joy in profperity, but breaks rain affociations, 
 and corrects the imagination; gives ftrength of mind, 
 and freedom from that terror and confternation which 
 diftracts the unprepared mind, and deprives it of the 
 good remaining in its power,. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 A Comparifon of the fever al So?~ts o/Enjoyment, 
 and the oppofite Sorts o/Uneasiness, to find 
 their Importance to Happiness-. 
 
 TQ difcover wherein our true happinefs confifts we 
 muft compare the feveral enjoyments of life, and 
 the feveral kinds of mifery, that we may difcern what 
 enjoyments arc to be parted with, or what uneafinefs. 
 
 * Virg. Aer.cid.'ufi. verf. 210.
 
 our fever al Enjoyments. 117 
 
 to be endured, in order to obtain the higheft and Chap. 7. 
 moft beatifick fatisfaclions, and to avoid the moll di-^-^v^vj 
 flrefling fufferings. 
 
 As to-pleafures of the fame kind, 'tis manifeft their ,^£"1*- 
 values are in a joint proportion of their intenfenefs **'!'"* and dl " 
 and duration. In eftimating the duration, we not orir 
 ly regard the conftancy of the object, or its remaining 
 in our power, and the duration of the fenfations ic 
 affords, but the conftancy of our fancy or relifh: for 
 when this changes it puts an end to the enjoyment. 
 
 In comparing pleafures of different kinds, the value 
 is as the duration and dignity of the kind jointly. We 
 have an immediate fenfe of a * dignity, a perfection, 
 or beatifick quality in fome kinds, which no intenfe- 
 nefs of the lower kinds can equal, were they alfo as 
 lafting as we could wifh. No intenfenefs or duration , 
 of any external fenfation gives it a dignity or worth e- 
 qua! to that of the improvement of the foul by know- 
 ledge^. or the ingenious arts ; and much lefs is it equal 
 to that of virtuous affections and actions. We never 
 hefitate in judging thus about the happinefs or per- 
 fection of others, where the impetuous cravings of ap^ 
 petites and paffions do not corrupt our judgments, as 
 they do often in our own cafe. By this intimate feel- 
 ing of dignity, enjoyments and exercifes of fome kinds, 
 tho' not of the higheft degree of thofe kinds, are in- 
 comparably more excellent and beatifick than the 
 moft intenfe and lafting enjoyments of the lower kinds. 
 Nor is duration of fuch importance to fome higher. . 
 
 * See. above chap. iv. .§ !0.
 
 1 1 8 ^Comparison 0/ 
 
 Book I. kinds, as ic is to the lower. The exercife of virtue 
 ^y\~\^£or a fhorc period, provided it be not fucceeded by 
 fome thing vicious, is of incomparably greater value 
 than the moil Lifting fenfual pleafures. Nothing de- 
 ftroys the excellence and perfection of the ftate but a 
 contrary quality of the fame kind defacing the for- 
 mer character. The peculiar happinefs of the virtuous 
 man is not fo much abated by pain, or an early death, 
 as that of the fenfualift; tho' his complex ftate which 
 is made up of all his enjoyments and fufferings of eve- 
 ry kind is in fome degree affected by them*. Nor is 
 it a view of private fublime pleafures in frequent fu- 
 ture reflections which recommends virtue to the foul. 
 We feel an impulfe, an ardour toward perfection, to- 
 ward affections and actions of dignity, and feel their 
 immediate excellence, abftracting from fuch views of 
 future pleafures of long duration. Tho' no doubt 
 thefe pleafures, which are as fure as our exiftence, are 
 to be regarded in our eftimation of the importance 
 of virtue to our happinefs. 
 
 Now if we denote by intenfenefs, in a more general 
 meaning, the degree in which any perceptions or en- 
 joyments are beatiiick, then their comparative values 
 are in a compound proportion of their intenfenefs and 
 duration. But to retain always in view the grand dif- 
 ferences of the kinds, and to prevent any imaginati- 
 ons, that the intenfer fenfations of the lower kinds 
 
 The Stoickshave run into extrava- I rls produclione majora. nonintei 
 
 gance on this head. SecGcerode Fin. Kill. \ valetudinis aejl'miaticnem Jpatie 
 c. io. I: .:?>;?:- XvirtutiSj apportunitate.
 
 our fever al Enjoyments. ho 
 
 with fufficient duration may compleatour happinefs; Chap. 7. 
 it may be more convenient to eftimate enjoyments by k^VXJ 
 their dignity and duration: dignity denoting the ex- 
 cellence of the kind, when thofe of different kinds are 
 compared ; and the intenfenefs of the fenfations, when 
 we compare thofe of the fame kind. 
 
 II. Tho' the feveral original powers above-mention- tu aferent 
 ed are natural to all men, yet through habit, affociated^ ? " ofmc,: ' 
 ideas, education, or opinion, fome generally purfue en- 
 joyments of one kind; and mew a difregard of others, 
 which are highly valued by men of a different turn. 
 Some are much given to fenfuality ; others to more in- 
 genious pleafures ; others purfue wealth and power ; 
 others moral and focial enjoyments, and honour. 
 Wealth and power have fome few faithful votaries a- 
 doring them for themfelves : but the more numerous 
 worfhipers adore them only as miniftring fpirits, or 
 mediators with fome fuperior divinities, as pleafure, 
 honour, beneficence. 
 
 Thus different men have different taftes. What ne# m fi ie 
 one admires as the fupreme enjoyments, another may exar ? mdi 
 dcfpife. Muft we not examine thefe taftes ? Are all 
 perfons, all orders of beings equally happy if each ob- 
 tains the enjoyments refpectively moft relifhed? At 
 this rate the meaneft brute or infect may be as happy 
 as the wifeft hero, patriot, or friend can be. What 
 may make a brute as happy as that low order is ca- 
 pable of being, may be but defpicable to an order en- 
 dued with finer perceptive powers, and a nobler fort 
 of defires. Beings of thefe higher orders are immedi- -
 
 120 ^Comparison o/* 
 
 Book I. ately confcious of the fuperior dignity and impor- 
 tance to happinefs in their peculiar enjoyments, of 
 which lower orders are incapable. Nature has thus 
 diftinguifhed the different orders by different percep- 
 tive powers, fo that the fame objects will not befuffi- 
 cicnt for happinefs to all ; nor have all equal happinefs 
 when each can gratify all the defires and fenfes he has. 
 The fuperior orders in this world probably experi- 
 ence all the fenfations of the lower orders, and can 
 judge of them. But the inferior do not experience 
 the enjoyments of the fuperior. Nay in the feveral 
 ftages of life each one finds different taftes and defires. 
 We are confcious in our ftate of mature years that 
 the happinefs of our friends, our families, or our coun- 
 try are incomparably nobler objects of our purfuit, and 
 adminifter proportionably a nobler pleafure than tire 
 toys which once abundantly entertained us when we 
 had experienced nothing better. God has ailigned to 
 each order, and to the feveral ftages of life in the 
 fame perfon, their peculiar powers and taftes. Each one 
 is as happy when its tafte is gratified as it can then be. 
 But we are immediately confcious that one gratifica- 
 tion is more excellent than another, when we have ex- 
 perienced both. And then our reafon and obfervati- 
 on enables us to compare the effects, and confequen- 
 ces, and duration. One may be traniitory, and the 
 occafion of great fubfequent mifery, tho' for the pre- 
 fent the enjoyment be intenfe: another may be Lift- 
 ing, fife, and fucceeded by no faticty, fhame, difguft, 
 t remorfe.
 
 the feveral Enjoyments. 121 
 
 Superior beings by diviner faculties and fuller know- Chap. 7. 
 ledpe may, without experience of all forts, immedi-^^V^^ 
 
 *~* „ J ■*• What men are 
 
 ately difcern what are the noblefl. They may hatfetbe b.jt'judgs. 
 fome intuitive knowledge of perfection, and fome flan- 
 dard of it, which may make the experience of fome 
 lower forts ufeiefs to them. But of mankind thefe 
 certainly are the bell judges who have full experience, 
 with their taftes or fenfes and appetites in a natural 
 vigorous flate. Now it never was alledged that focial 
 affections, the admiration of moral excellence, the de- 
 lire of efleem, with their attendant and guardian tem- 
 perance, the purfuits of knowledge, or a natural ac- 
 tivity, impaired any fenfe or appetite. This is often 
 charged with great juflice upon luxury, and forfeit- 
 ing, and indolence. The higheit fenfual enjoyments 
 may be experienced by thofe who employ both mind 
 and body vigorously in focial virtuous offices, and al- 
 low all the natural appetites to recur in their due fea- 
 fons'. Such certainly are the bell judges of all enjoy- 
 ments. Thus according to the maxim often inculca- 
 ted by Ariftotle, " The good man is the true judge 
 " and flandard of every thing." 
 
 But it may juftly be queitioned, whether men much xfc »&«&/* 
 devoted to fenfual pleafures, to thofe of the imagina- wii, 
 tion, or to wealth and power, are fufficiently prepa- 
 red to judge in this question. Such purfuits indeed 
 are feldom continued long without fome notion of 
 their innocence, nay of fome duty or moral obligati- 
 on. Habits fometimes deface natural characters and . 
 powers. Men of vicious habits have fmall experience 
 
 Vol. I. Q^
 
 1 22 W Comparison 0/ 
 
 Boo x I. of the generous affections, focial joys, and the delights 
 (^Y\y of true impartial uniform goodnefs. Bad habits weak- 
 en focial feelings, and the reliih of virtue. And yet 
 even fuch men on fome occaiions give a ftrong tefti- 
 mony to the caufe of virtue. 
 
 III. Having premifed thefe things we may firft com- 
 pare the feveral forts of enjoyment in point of digni- 
 tv and duration; and in like manner their oppolites, 
 fufferings. And then compare a little the feveral tem- 
 pers or characters in point of inward fatisfaction. 
 
 The pleafures of the external fenfes, are of two 
 ./ ."claffes: thofe of the palate, and thofe betwixt the fac- 
 es. Both thefe we call fenfual. 
 
 The pleafures of the palate how grateful foever 
 they may be to children, mull: appear the meaneit 
 and moll: defpicable enjoyments to all men of reflec- 
 tion who have experienced any others. The uneail- 
 nefs felt when the body needs fupport may be pretty 
 intenfe ; as 'tis wifely contrived, to engage us to take 
 neceilarv care oi the bodv. The allaying this pain 
 may give a itrong fenfation of pleafure at firft. But 
 the proper pleafure of tafle, the poiitive enjoyment, 
 muft be defpicable to all who are above the order of 
 brutes. The differences in point of pleafure among 
 the feveral kinds of food is io fmall, that the keennefs 
 of appetite is allowed to make a much greater. The 
 mod exquiiite cookery can fcarce give fuch high fen- 
 :ion of this kind to a fatisfied appeti:-. tl - it be 
 not furfeited; as the plaineit. fare will give to a brisk 
 appetite after abftinence and cxercile ; even altho
 
 the feveral Enjoyments. 123 
 
 there was no pain, inconfiftent with mirth and gay- Chap. 7. 
 ety, to be allayed. When therefore the allaying fo^VX^ 
 gentle an uneafinefs caufes more pleafure than any ex- 
 quifite favours without it, the poficive pleafure muft 
 be very inconfiderable. The preventing of appetite, 
 or the increafing or prolonging it by incentives of any 
 kind, are vain efforts for pleafure ; fo are all arts, ex- 
 cept exercife and abftinence, till the natural appetite 
 returns. The greater!: Epicures have acknowledged 
 this when bufinefs or diverfions have cafually led them 
 to make the experiment. 
 
 Men would univerfally agree in this point, were not Re/7fcns ofm ^ 
 thefe pleafures generally blended with others of very lf e Xr a 7' X puZ 
 different natures. Not only nice oeconomy, art, and^ m - 
 elegance in fine fervices and grandeur of apartments, 
 but even moral qualities, liberality, communication 
 of pleafure, friendihip, and meriting well from others, 
 are joined in our imaginations. Strip fenfuality of all 
 thefe borrowed charms, and view it naked and alone 
 as mere pleafing the palate in folitude, and it is fhame- 
 ful and defpicable to all. 
 
 Imagine a life fpent in this enjoyment without in- 
 terruption, and that, contrary to the prefent order of 
 nature, the appetite ftill remained ; but that there was 
 no focial enjoyment or affection, no finer perceptions, 
 or exercife of the intellectual powers ; this flate is be- 
 low that of many brutes. Their appetites allow in- 
 tervals for fome pleafures of a focial nature, and for 
 action; and when thus employed, they fhew an higher 
 joy than in feeding.
 
 A Comparison of 
 
 The duration too of thefe fenfations is inconfide- 
 rable. Su I m leed is the bounty of G:./. that the 
 means of allaying the cravings of appetite may be ea- 
 fily procured: and thus bv good management we may 
 all frequent' .e:t pleafures of 
 
 this kind. 1 the appetite is foon fatisfied. and re- 
 curs not till after Ions; inter Artificial incentives 
 o unnatural craving, but the allaying of 
 this gives little pL . Tis a real depravation a 
 ficknefs ; and, when long continued, turns to fuch bo- 
 dily indiY luft itop all enjoyments . Where 
 andeur and variety are afFecred. the I grows ca- 
 pricious and inconstant, and the objects uncerc 
 The humour may grow too expeniive for our fortunes, 
 and in be the means of gratification are di- 
 miniihecL 
 
 Many of the lame co:\ : o- 
 
 ther " ; of fenfual pleafure. " h muc ads 
 
 k-theal \-l im- 
 
 pulfe, [elf mean and incon- 
 
 v.tlove 
 t efteem of anv mc: - _ . )r the - tight of 
 
 qm ; Lting pleafure. a ; i: 
 
 ^nld not equal the delights v fbme of 
 
 brute beafts fee ; E _". 
 
 nc at is the molt tranfitorv of all. I:. 
 . and incentives, bring a] 
 ing; an impatien: 
 If-goven fall valua 
 
 ... Qrips the mind .:
 
 the feveral Enjoyments. 125 
 
 candour, integrity, andfenfe of honour. Add to this Chap. 7. 
 the capricioufnefs of fancy, the torments of dKap-v^vXJ 
 pointment,which fuch wandering diffolute defiresmuft 
 be expofed to ; and that after the tranfient fenfation;,. 
 there can fcarce remain any thing agreeable, to one 
 who has not loft all manly fenfe of good. The reflec- 
 tion on any paft fenfual enjoyments gives no fenfe of 
 any merit or worth, no ground of felf-efteem, or fcarce 
 any fort of joy except from the low hopes of repeat- 
 ing the fame, which may a little revive the appetite 
 after intervals. The remembrance is no fupport un- 
 der any calamity, chagrin, pain, provocation or for- 
 row, or any inward difturbance of mind, or outward 
 misfortune. The very nature of thefe fenfations we 
 call fenfual, and the inward fentiments of our hearts 
 about them, abundantly declare that the fupr erne hap - 
 pinefs of human nature muft confift in very different 
 enjoyments of a more noble and durable nature. 
 
 IV. 'Tis often occurring, on the other hand, that,JSdfrZ \7n 
 we fee multitudes who prefer fuch pleafures to all o-^^f thi ' 
 thers, and make the purfuits of fenfuality the bufi- 
 nefs of their lives ; and that therefore the bent of the 
 mind is naturally toward them ; and their power fupe- 
 lior to our moral fenfe, and to the generous affections. 
 
 To remove this caufe of fufpicion ; let us recollect 
 that the conftant purfuits of fenfuality are feldom e- 
 ver obferved without an opinion of their innocence. 
 Our moral faculty, our fympathetick fenfe, and our.' 
 kind affections are feldom fet in oppofition to them,, 
 or combat with them, in the minds, of men much de-
 
 126 //Comparison 0/ 
 
 Book I. voted to fenfuality. Where without this notion of in- 
 nocence men are hurried into fenfual enjoyments by 
 impetuous appetites, the ftate is miferable and full of 
 abject remorfe after the traniient gratifications. The 
 pr of effedly diffolute have fome fpecious reafons by 
 which they are deluded into a perfuation of the inno- 
 cence of their purfuits. 
 
 Kay fome moral notions, fuch as communication 
 of pleafure, love, friendihip, meriting well, and being 
 beloved, make the main charm even in fenfual enjoy- 
 ments. This is manifeft in the luxury and intempe- 
 rance of fuch as are not funk below the beafts, and u- 
 niverfally defpifed. It holds too in the unchafte paiii- 
 ons: and hence fome notions of moral excellencies^ 
 good nature, friendlinefs, fweetnefs of temper, wit, 
 and obligingncfs recommend their objects. But on 
 the other hand; fuch as by generous affections, and 
 love of moral excellence and honour, are led into a 
 virtuous courfe, avowedly defpife fenfual enjoyments; 
 nor does any confufed imaginations of them, or hopes 
 even of immunity from labour and pain recommend 
 it to their choice. The external evils, toil, expence, 
 and hardihips are known and defpifed as well as the 
 allurements of eafe and pleafure : the moral forms by 
 their own proper power are fuperior to them. In the 
 voluptuous, the moral finfe is feldom conquered; the 
 enjoyments feem innocent, or at leaft the guilt is fo 
 diminifhed by the fophifixy of the paiTions, that 'tis 
 only the fmalleil moral evil which feems to be incur- 
 red for the higheft fenfual good ; and the weakeft ef-
 
 the feveral Enjoyments. 127 
 
 forts of the moral kind overcome by the ftrongeft of Chap. 7. 
 fenfuality; and often, even by the affiftance of fome^W/ 1 
 miftaken moral fpecies. 
 
 It is here likewife proper to obferve that all fenfu- r</*«M«- 
 al gratifications are not oppoflte to moral enjoyments.^^/^ 
 There is a moderate indulgence perfectly innocent/' hi & hasan J- 
 fufficient to allay the uneafinefs of appetite; which too 
 by wife oeconomy may frequently be as high as any 
 fort of fenfual enjoyments, and even fubfervient to the 
 moral. The temperate, and fuch as, after proper felf- 
 government in coelibacy, have made a wife choice in 
 marriage, may have as high fenfual enjoyments as 
 any. In recommending of virtue we need not fuppofe 
 it oppofite to all gratifications of fenfe; tho' its power 
 in our hearts mould be maintained fo high that it may 
 be able to controll all the appetites which by accident 
 may oppofe it. Its gentle fway generally allows fuch 
 gratifications as may be the higheft of the kind ; or 
 where it does not, it makes abundant compenfation 
 for the lofs, by the joyful approbation of fuch abfti- 
 nence and felf-government. What rich compenfation 
 is made by the joyful approbation one muft feel of fi- 
 delity, friendfhip, and meriting well, and by the re- 
 turns of a conftant affection from a worthy heart, for 
 the want of the irregular, fhameful, perplexing, joy- 
 lefs paflions and indulgences, with perfons of no mo- 
 ral worth or ftedfaftnefs of affection . 
 
 V. We come next to confider the pleafures of the T. he ^, e f res 
 
 1 ofknovtledge and 
 
 imagination in the grandeur and elegance of living, and ^«j«««««*» 
 the perceptions of beauty and harmony, to which weW<-^^ ■■■■■-
 
 i 28 ^Comparison 0/ 
 
 Book I. may add thofe of the ingenious arts, and knowledge. 
 
 L/"W> Here there is no brutal uneafy previous appetite, the 
 fating of which might enhance the pleafure ; and yet 
 one may immediately find that thefe are enjoyments 
 fuperior to the fenfual, and more recommended by 
 the confHtution of our nature. When the cravings 
 of appetite are grown painful, one will readily quit 
 thefe pleafures till the pain is removed ; efpecially 
 when there are no apprehenilons of our not being at 
 liberty of fpeedily returning to them. But the behold- 
 ing beautiful forms, the curious works of art, or the 
 more exquifite works of nature; the entertainments of 
 harmony, of imitation in the ingenious arts; the dif- 
 covering of the immutable relations and proportions 
 of the objeclsof the pure intellect and reafon, give en- 
 joyments in dignity far fuperior to any thing fenfual, 
 where the fenfual are conlidered alone without bor- 
 rowed charms of an higher nature. Thefe more manly 
 pleafures are more fuited to our nature; and are al- 
 ways more efteemed and approved when we are judg- 
 ing of the purfuits of others. 
 arc dfi Thefe pleafures too farlurpafs the fenfual likewife 
 
 u?n. in duration. I hey can employ a great part or life 
 
 without fa tiety or cloying, as their pleafure is fo much 
 poiitive enjoyment independent upon the allaying of 
 any previous uneafy fenfations. They are the proper 
 excrcifes of the foul, where none of the higher focial 
 ices, or thofe of rational piety claim its activity. 
 They partake of its lading nature, and are not tran- 
 fitory, as all enjoyments are which are merely fubfervi-
 
 the feveral Enjoyments. 129 
 
 ent to the perilling body. Thus, as often as the Chap. 7. 
 more important offices of virtue allow any intervals, k - / " v ^' 
 our time is agreeably and honourably employed in hif- 
 tory natural or civil, in geometry, aftronomy, poetry, 
 painting, and mufick, or fuch entertainments as inge- 
 nious arts afford. And fome of the fweeteft enjoy- 
 ments of this fort require no property, nor need we 
 ever want the objects. If familiarity abates the plea- 
 fure of the more obvious beauties of nature, their 
 more exquifite inward fixuctures may give new de- 
 lights, and the ftores of nature are inexhauflible. 
 
 Such objects of thefe tafles as require property are 
 more uncertain, and the purfuit of them more folici- 
 tous and anxious, and the fancy more inconftant, as 
 longpoffefTion abates the relifh. The imagination here 
 needs ftrict reins, that it may not run out into excef- 
 five admiration by affociated notions of moral digni- 
 ty, and liberality; and thus involve us in innumerable 
 vexatious purfuits of what is not efferitial to happi- 
 nefs. 
 
 VI. Pleafures of the fympathetick kind arifing frbm/«%* vcryi*. 
 the fortunes of others are proportioned to the flxength . 
 of the kind affections we have for them. Our nature 
 is exceedingly fufceptible of thefe affections ; efpecially 
 the ftronger forts of them toward offspring, parents, 
 kinfmen, benefactors, or eminently worthy characters ; 
 toward fects, parties, countries. They furniih the far 
 greater part of the bufinefs, and of the happinefs or 
 mifery of life. 
 
 Compare thefe with others : Confider the joy of 
 
 Vol.L R
 
 !^ ^Comparison 0/ 
 
 Book! heart upon any confiderable profperity, or any emi- 
 ^/y\j nent virtue of one whom we heartily love, of a child, 
 a brother, a friend : upon any glory or advantage to 
 our party, or country ; to any honourable caufe we 
 have efpoufed, or any admired character; or upon their 
 efcaping any imminent danger. Where there is an 
 hearty affection thefe joys are incomparably fuperior 
 to any of the former. What pleafure of fenfe or ima- 
 gination would we not forego to obtain thefe events? 
 Some ecftacies of joy upon the efcaping of great im- 
 minent perfonal dangers have been too violent for na- 
 ture, and have proved fatal: we have more * inftances 
 of fympathetick joys which proved alfo unfupport- 
 able and fatal. And if fome tempers cannot bear life 
 after fome misfortunes befallen themfelves ; more in- 
 ftances are found of fuch as throw it away upon the 
 misfortunes of others. The enjoyments muftbevery 
 hio-h which can fweeten all the toil and labour about 
 offspring and friends, even in common characters. Ha- 
 ving affluence of all things defired for one's felf, abates 
 very little of the diligence of mankind. 
 -f Thefe pleafures endure as long as the perfon con- 
 tinues to be beloved and to be profperous. New fuc- 
 cefTes of our own, or of our friend, raife greater com- 
 motions at firft than advantages long poffefTed. But 
 while the affection continues, the fcnfe remains ; and 
 the fympathetick pleafure never cloys. Where indeed 
 affections are founded upon wrong fentiments of the 
 
 * See two inftances in Li-vy upon the defeat at Thrafymen, 1. xxii. c. 7. See on 
 this fubjeJl Ge'erc de Fin, 1. v. c. 24.
 
 the feveral Pleasures. 131 
 
 merit of perfons, or caufes, they can have no ftabili- Chap. 7. 
 ty, and the fympathetick joy may be loft, and fucceed-^VN-; 
 ed by difguft and indignation. But the chief caufe of 
 inftability in this branch of happinefs is the uncertain- 
 ty of the fortunes of thofe we love; for their mifery 
 muft occafion the moft fevere diftrefs. In this we 
 wholly depend on providence. 
 
 All that we can do to fecure any fund of joys of Belie f°fP rovi - 
 this kind is to examine well the merit of perfons, and«^ 
 caufes, and by thefe means to turn our ftronger affec- 
 tions toward the fuperior merit of men of true good- 
 nefs and correct imaginations, whofe happinefs is lefs 
 inconftant than that of others; to have a firm per- 
 fuafion of the wifdom and goodnefs of providence, and 
 to cultivate the moft extenfive affections. The ftron- 
 ger our univerfal good-will is, if our joys be fo much 
 the higher upon the general profperity, the greater 
 alfo fhall our regret be upon apprehended general mi- 
 fery. But what makes this affection ever fafe in all 
 events, and a fund of fuperior joy, is a firm perfuafi- 
 on of a good Providence governing the univerfe for 
 the beft, amidft all the apparent evils and diforders. 
 Of this more hereafter. ' 
 
 VII. The fourth clafs of enjoyments are the moral, word enjoy. 
 
 , /-» /-. <■ f . ~ r P 1 fv-. n . , meats are among 
 
 anlmg from the conicioumels or good arrechons and .*/.<%' 
 actions. Thefe joys are different from the fympathe-" 
 tick, which may arife from that happinefs of others 
 to which our affections and actions contributed no- 
 thing. But our affections and actions themfelves, ab- 
 itracting from the ftate of others, cannot be indiffe- 
 
 R 2
 
 A Comparison of 
 
 ::d 
 
 -1 
 
 ces. Thiie : r.:".J. :hc '::.'S--~'-'- 
 
 tanc both in refpecT: of dignity and < 
 How much inferior are the hig] 
 fures, or even thofe of the imagination, or fpecular i c 
 kn ledge, to the ftable joy of confcious goodnefs 
 ( - and to that high approbation one feels of 
 
 himfelf in any important offices for the good of his 
 country, or his friend; and to the joyful thought of 
 ri ring well of mankind, and deferving their applau- 
 T:e kind affections alone fit eaiy in the heart ; 
 there is an inward complacence in them, and we joy- 
 fully entertain them for life.* But our nature is fitted 
 i more than unactive affection. An high happinefs 
 : ifes from the exerting our powers ;an< 
 power is, the more bearifick is its exerci 
 tuous efforts are fuccefsful, there is fi 
 age of pure joys from confcious goodrn 
 ich others, and the expected love and a] 
 all, eipedally the complacency of our 1 
 furparles all other enjoyments, if 
 iuccefs, we may want the fympathetick 
 be touched wiri companion; but the od 
 r.ain: die moral enjoyments can 1 
 diitreffes from the misfortunes of the p< 
 efpc v hich without the confcioufiw 
 
 . „ ... v 
 
 ... '. .'. ..'.'.:
 
 the fevera! Enjoyments. 133 
 
 ing acted our part well, muft have been much more Chap. 7. 
 intolerable. ^/"VX>> 
 
 The fancy here is not inconfiitent. Our tafte for ri*> pu*km 
 virtue increafes by exercife; and habits make it QQ\ arem °fi durallt ' 
 more pleafant. The remembrance is ever delight- 
 ful, and makes the enjoyment lafting, where there 
 have been juft notions of virtue, and of the merit of 
 perfons and caufes. One end propofed in the creating 
 different orders of beings, and ordaining the different 
 itates of thofe of the fame fpecies, fome more, fome 
 lefs perfect, is probably this, that the nobler minds 
 fhould never want opportunities for the joyful exer- 
 cife of their good difpofitions toward the inferior ei- 
 ther in perfection or in fortune. Thefe joys too are. 
 feated above the power of fortune while men retain 
 fbundnefs of mind. A low ftation, and a hard condi- 
 tion of life, or external difadvantages may prevent our 
 doing the moft important fervices to others in exter- 
 nal things ; but can neither hinder the found inward 
 affections of heart, nor a courfe of action Anted to 
 our abilities ; and this is the higheft virtue. 
 
 Unexamined admirations of fome partial moral «. * ,. , 
 
 x Jtiji notions of 
 
 forms, and fome narrow affections, without true n6- virtue «<*r- 
 tions of merit in perfons and caufes, may lead us into 
 fuch conduct: as upon better information may be mat- 
 ter of fhame and remorfe. But where by clofe reflec- 
 tion we have attained juft notions of virtue and merit, 
 and of the effectual means of doing good, virtuous 
 action, as it is the natural purpofe of a rational and-
 
 
 i? a ^Comparison of 
 
 Book I. focial fpecies, fo it is their higheft happinefs, and al- 
 
 \y~v~\s ways in their power. 
 
 Among thefe moral enjoyments, the joys of reli- 
 o-ion and devotion toward God well deferve to be par- 
 ticularly remarked, which in the clafs of moral enjoy- 
 ments are the higheft of all. But as thefe enjoyments 
 are of a pretty different nature from the reft of the 
 moral ones, they (hall be confidered apart hereafter, 
 for reafons above-mentioned ; and we lhall (hew their 
 high importance to a ftable and fublime happinefs a- 
 bove all others. 
 
 IX. The pleafures of honour from the approbati- 
 on, efteem, and gratitude of others as they naturally 
 enfue upon virtue, fo when they are founded on it, are 
 among the moft grateful feelings of the foul. Thefe 
 joys of honour and virtue and the fympa the tick joys 
 are naturally connected, nor need we minutely com- 
 pare them ; as the fame conduct is naturally fubfervi- 
 ent to them all : and where they concur, no words can 
 exprefs the happinefs enjoyed. The fympa thetick 
 feelings may be more intenfe in fome tender affectio- 
 nate hearts: active fpirits in publick ftations may be 
 more affected withconfcious virtue and merited glory. 
 But where the three are united, with a firm perfuafion 
 of a good God approving our temper, and enfuring 
 the univerfal order and happinefs, our ftate muft come 
 neareft to that joy unjpeakable and full of glory, which 
 we hope for as the perfect confummation of the rati- 
 onal nature.
 
 And of great 
 duration. 
 
 the feveral Enjoyments. 135 
 
 True glory is alfo durable, not like the fenfualen- Chap. 7. 
 joyments,whichpafs like the fhadow of a cloud leaving 1 
 no trace behind them. The approbation and efteem 
 of others, when founded on virtue, may probably con- 
 tinue during life, and furvive us : and the approbati- 
 on of God fhall be everlafting. The purfuits of ex ten- 
 five fame for eminent abilities and virtues may indeed 
 be fubjecl: to difappointment, and be full of labour 
 and liable to excefs. Ordinary virtues; or even the 
 higheft virtues in the low ftations will not obtain the 
 extenfive applaufes of nations. But a wife and virtu- 
 ous man may generally obtain fuch honour either in 
 a narrower or larger fphere as may give great joy. And 
 a good heart, perfaaded of a good providence obfer- 
 ving all things, is fure of the approbation of the belt 
 judge, and that to eternity. 
 
 X. Among fuch folemn fubje&s the pleafures of The pkafures 
 mirth and o-ayety mult be of fmall account. And yet t f^/Z M 
 
 O J J Jtne hie of virtue. 
 
 even children defpifefenfuality in comparifon of them: 
 and fenfual enjoyments borrow from them many of 
 their charms, without which they would be defpicable 
 and fhameful. They are an agreeable feafoning to o- 
 ther enjoyments, and fome relief from the fatigues of 
 ferious bufmefs. The nobler joys are grave, fever e, 
 and folemn. But human life mull: have relaxations. 
 Now whatever value we put upon mirth and gayety 
 it muft be caft into the fide of virtue: fince that mind 
 is always beft difpofed for the reception of all chear- 
 fulnefs and pleafantry where all is kind and eafy ; free 
 from anger,. ill-will, envy, or remorfe. Thefe pleafures
 
 I 36" A Co::? a rison :f 
 
 ? . . . - -;•: ;. /;.. : . r.v :":'-::u:.r. T 
 
 \^/w, : amidft love, good-nature, and mutual efteem. 
 
 -.- ■• As wealth and power are not: Immediately pleafant, 
 
 buc the me::.; :: :::^:~:~:; r-eAlu:e 5 •. cfaeii impor- 
 tance to happineis mull be in proportion to that : 
 th aits to which the rredby the pot 
 
 The virtuous man therefore 
 to generous and virtuous purpofes, has a much nobler 
 ^f them than thofe who refer them : : the 
 jiiures of the imagination, or the elegance of lift 
 and yet this is a liner reference than that to fenfuality. 
 Where through confufed imaginations they are not 
 directly referred to their natural purpofes, but pur- 
 for themfelves, avarice and ambition become 
 etched infatiable cravings, hateful to all mankind; 
 and the pofleffions become ioylefs to the perfon who 
 obtains tie: 
 ;! XL As to fome other pretended enjoyments in gra- 
 -*■**«*- tkying the paifions of anger, malice, envy, revenge: 
 :: 5 certain there is no fmall fenfe of joy in thefe gra- 
 tifications, where the pailions were intenfe. But then 
 I obvious, that as good-will, love, efteem, gratitude, 
 and every kind affection are natural and original plea- 
 fures fitting eafy in the mind; fo the happineis of any 
 innocent perfon obfe: the occafionof pure un- 
 
 not arifing from the allaying any previous 
 I: the perfon has been in mifery, and thus has 
 ■fed our compafiion: his being relieved adds alfo a- 
 nother joy from flopping our fympatherick pain. But 
 the mifery of another is naturally uneafy to the ob-
 
 the fever al Enjoyments. 137 
 
 ferver: it muft then be by fome accident that it ever Chap. 7. 
 becomes grateful: by fome previous anger, or envy ;W^W 
 fome injury apprehended, or fome oppofition to the 
 interefts of fome perfon beloved. 
 
 Thefe pafTions of the unkind fort are not ufelefs J u t J? n 
 parts in our conftitution. Upon apprehenfion of inju- c '"■'-■■ 
 ry or damage done to us, or to thofe we love, anger 
 naturally arifes to roufe us for defence. When per- 
 fons we do not efteem are preferred to thofe of higher 
 merit, an honeft concern and indignation arifes. A 
 like indignation arifes againfl: all fuch as appear grofs- 
 ly immoral. Indulgence may make thefe pafTions 
 ftrong and habitual. The feelings attending them are 
 original uneafinefs and torment; to which however it 
 was reafonable for the general good that we mould be 
 in fome degree fubjected on certain occafions, as we 
 are to bodily pain. The fweeteft tempers have expe- 
 rienced fome fhort fits of them, and have felt how un- 
 eafy thefe moments pafs. Where fuch pafTions are 
 high and lading, degenerating into rancour and ftated 
 malice and envy, the mifery muft be very great: no 
 wonder then that the removal of it mould give at firft 
 a confiderable pleafure. The mifery is removed by the 
 fufferings of the perfon hated or envied. But this tur- 
 bulent joy, even while it lafts, is not to be compared 
 with the fweet fympathetick joys, the fenfe of merited 
 love and efteem, or the felf -approbation of forgiving, 
 where no publick intereft. requires puniihing. And 
 then this ill-natured joy foon ceafes after the paflion 
 is fated, as the mifery of the moft hated objecl: cannot 
 
 Vol.L S
 
 1^8 A C O M F a m 1 S O M tf 
 
 '. pleafe us long: nor is ic ever the ob : efl : : ippi ■: ration, 
 o^.'^w either in ourfelves or others, upon re :.:.. ds 
 
 :ierally fucceeded by remorfe, regre:. and forrow. 
 The calm mind can have no pleafure in the nailery 
 
 another, tho it may acquiefce in fuch fufferings as 
 a pubhck interell requires. \\ e cannot wiih to pro- 
 long vengeance but uponfome notion of repeate i .,::? 
 of unrelenting inefs ; or from fome remains of 
 
 the preceeding fear with which we were t Del 
 
 And ::::: ; one reafon why " the brave are not 
 
 u cruel. " The pleafures then 01 this ill-natured kind 
 are to the calm joys of humanity, as the llakins the 
 burnino- thirii c war. cr the fating a gnawing dif- 
 
 eafed Aon :o the enjoymenc of graceful food with 
 
 an heal:hv : arre:::e. 
 
 - , -•■ XII. W; :- ::fenc : rncerning chef-: I I en- 
 
 !; joyments, than with the moffl benign c::::afel om 
 ^^ minds are fo confticuced that we value chem upon 
 
 1m reflection in proportion to their importance to 
 the happinefs of the whole fyflc m . T hefe which only 
 re _ I e fafety and animal gratifications of the indi- 
 
 vidual 3re felt to be the meanelt; fuch as may be of 
 more exceniive life, and incite men to be ferviceazf ; 
 to others, are nacuralry m ed, and chat in 
 
 different degrees according to their extent. Thus we 
 
 :ue more the pleafures of the ingenious arts, and 
 fuch exercifes of body or mind as may naturally be 
 ufeful to man" I he partial narrow affections are 
 lovely and joyful; but 1H11 the more ftable and calm 
 and exteniive, as they are more ufeful, are alfo more
 
 the feveral Enjoyments. 139 
 
 joyful both In the exercife, and in the remembrance, Chap. 7. 
 where there has been any tolerable attention and re-^/"V^V> 
 flection. We fee then that the moral faculty moft ap- 
 proves and recommends fuch difpofitions as tend 
 moft to the general good, and at the fame time fuch 
 as may give the nobleft enjoyments to the agent upon 
 reflection . And thus the two grand determinations of 
 our nature, by a thorough confideration of our con- 
 ftitution, may appear perfectly confiftent, and be ge- 
 nerally gratified by the fame means. The fame con- 
 clufion will be confirmed by a comparifon of the feve- 
 ral forts of pain. 
 
 XIII. We come next to compare the feveral forts n e /event 
 of uneafinefs, or pain. And flrft it immediately oc-^f^"' ^ 
 curs, that the feveral forts of pain are not in the exact 
 proportion of the pleafures of thefe fenfes. Mere bo-i/;/%L5, ' 
 dily pleafure is the loweft and leaft intenfe, and yet 
 bodily pain may be very violent. But we cannot thence 
 conclude that it may be the greateft poflible mi- 
 fery, as fome have maintained. In pain, as in plea- 
 fure, the kind is to be regarded as well as the intenfe- 
 nefs. The prefervation of the body required this 
 ftrong connection with the foul, and that the fenfati- 
 ons indicating its fufferings fhould be very ftrong ; 
 fuch as fometimes wholly to occupy the weaker minds, 
 making them incapable of any attention to other 
 things. But the foul finds that it cannot approve the 
 facrificing its duty to the avoiding of any bodily pain; 
 and that moral evil is ftill fomething worfe. Some 
 kinds of pain have a quality contrary to that dignity 
 
 S 2
 
 A Comparison* of the 
 
 we mentioned, which makes them the caufes of great* 
 er mifery than any bodily pain, how intenfe foever it 
 may be. This debates not the worth of the perfon ; 
 nor caufes fuch an abject ftate of mifery. as the con- 
 fcioufnefs of the more odious moral evils, which oc- 
 caiion remorfe, and felf- abhorrence. We raihly con- 
 clude otherways from feeing perfons of ordinary vir- 
 tue breaking all tyes of affection, duty, and honour, 
 to avoid tortures : and betraying their friends and 
 country under fuch temptations. 
 
 But in fuch cafes the higheft bodily pain is com- 
 pared with fome lower fympathetick pain, in fome 
 weaker bonds of affection, or with fome lower moral 
 fpecies : whereas the higheft of both forts lhould be 
 compared to iind their importance. One who has no 
 high fenfe of virtue betravs his friend, or countrv. in 
 fome point no: conceived abfolutely neceffary to their 
 fafecv, nor certainly involving them in ruin by the 
 difcovery oz ic\ whereas his tortures are prefent and 
 unavoidable any other way. The cafes ihould be put 
 men of high virtue, where the point to be extorted 
 d be certain unavoidable ruin to their friends, 
 or countrv. Brave men in fuch caft e endured all 
 
 tortures; and fuch as cannot, ye: feel they have acted 
 nd difapprove their own choice of incurring 
 moral evil rather than the higheft pains There is a 
 cry of nature here: that men of fmall re- 
 c ;ho may conceive tortures as the greatest e- 
 
 ; c fome way expect it as natural conduct, and 
 pprove it. that men ihould Sacrifice what th
 
 feveral Sorts of P a i n. 1,4 1 
 
 take to be their higheft private intereft, by fuffering Chap. 7. 
 the greateft mifery, for a publick good. This con- v^/^/^j 
 firms what we faid above of a calm determination to- 
 ward a publick good without any reference to the pri- 
 vate intereft of the agent, how fublime foever; and 
 that this determination mould controll all others in 
 our nature. 
 
 In the more common cafes, how often do parents, 
 friends, patriots, endure the higheft fufferings to free 
 others from the like? The direct fenfe of hunger, toils, 
 wounds, and bodily pain, is lighter than the fympa- 
 thetick with the like fufferino;s of others. And in 
 parental affection there is feldom any view to duty, 
 honour, or compenfation. Some crimes are fo horrid 
 that many ordinary characters would endure tortures 
 rather than commit them; and freely expofe their 
 lives to avoid the imputation of them. 
 
 In- the cafes where duty yields to torture; the pri- 
 vate evil is prefent, certain and fenfible: the publick wlatea f ei r e 
 
 \ r . r prefer and-wbal 
 
 detriment abfent, uncertain, and otherways perhaps.*"- 
 avoidable. The moral turpitude is extenuated by the 
 greatnefs of the temptation, and the effort of the mo- 
 ral faculty is thus made more languid. Where virtue 
 conquers pain, the pain appears in its full ftrength ; 
 but is over-powered, by the generous affection, or the 
 abhorrence of what is bafe. Put both fenfations in- 
 their full ftrength without alleviation. Whether would- 
 one chufe.to commit the worft crimes without fuch 
 extenuating neceiTity, or to be. in the condition of one
 
 Z a 2 ^Comparisons/ the 
 
 Boo „ j tortured with the gout or ftone, as feverely as any ijn 
 V./-VN^rant could torture him? 
 
 Put cafes, as in fome antient fables: that, upon 
 fuch falfe information as nothing but a fault}', paffi- 
 onate, impetuous, and cruel temper could have enter- 
 tained, one had tortured to death a perfon unknown, 
 ho is afterwards found to have been his tender pa- 
 rent, his dutiful ion, or his generous friend, or affec- 
 tionate brother; what bodily pain could equal the re- 
 morfe and fvmpathetick forrow which muft arife ? and 
 yet here the guilt is alienated by ignorance. When 
 men have thrown away their own lives from remorfe, 
 the crimes have generally flowed from ignorance, in- 
 advertence, or fome furious paiTion ; all which are fome 
 alleviation of euilt. What muft the torment have 
 been had men knowingly, and unprovoked, commit- 
 ted the like crimes, and foon after recovered a fenfe 
 of virtue r But 'tis hard to rind inftances of fuch guilt; 
 as our nature is fcarce capable of it, or if it is, the 
 ynoral fenfc is irrecoverable. 
 
 Take the fympathetick fenfe alone. Where is the 
 great difference, in point of miferv, between enduring 
 tortures, and beholding the tortures of a beloved or 
 \!y child, or of a tender parent; or beholding them 
 fubjected to fome thing more ignominious : 7/ ould to 
 God I /:.::/ dyed for the:, is no feigned wiih on fuch 
 oc s. 
 
 In confident e ftate of fuch as are dear to u c . 
 moral evil appears always fuperior to bodily pain.
 
 fever al Sorts ofV a r n. \ao 
 
 Who could wifh a fon or friend to be rather funk irre- Chap. 7. 
 coverably in all vice and bafenefs of foul, but free from V-/"VXJ 
 pain, and abounding with fenfual pleafures ; than ex- 
 pofed to the greatefl: tortures in fome aft of heroifm, 
 with a lively fenfe of integrity and felf-efteem, and the 
 fympa the tick joys in the profperity of every intereft 
 that is dear to him? 
 
 The natural ftrength of the human mind in refi- 
 tting pain would app.ear much greater, were it not for 
 the terrors of death which generally attend the feve- 
 rer kinds of it. Remove this fear, and the foul can 
 bear it much eafier. In fome diversions, and in the ac- 
 cidents which attend them, where there is no fear of 
 any thing fatal, men without dejection of mind, nay 
 fome times with gayety, can bear very acute pain, and 
 defpife it.* 
 
 Pain in the extremities of the body may be very Boiiiy^h^ 
 lafting. But all bodily pain differs in this from moral ^ very hf:l " g ' 
 feelings, that it leaves no fenfe of evil when the un- 
 eafy fenfation ceafes. The reflection on it is rather 
 pleafant than uneafy, when there is no fear of its re- 
 turning. The foul is often bettered by it, as experi- 
 ence gives it more ftrength and fortitude. Where 
 pain was endured in any honourable caufe, it always 
 remairis matter of joy and glorying. 
 
 XIV. Our higher fenfes by which we receive the ^ '** im ^ 
 pleafures of the imagination, admit far lefs pain than'™" f ea f ure 
 pleafure, if the mind is under good difcipline. Bodily' ""^ 
 deformity or diftortion may be very uneafy to the per- 
 
 * On this fubjeft many noble fcntiments are to be found in Cicero's Tufculati. I. ii,
 
 A Comparison of the 
 
 ion who is fo unfortunate; and fo may meannefs. 
 the want of the decencies and elegancies of life, to 
 fuch as have high delires and notions of happinefs in 
 .h things. But there is no uneafy craving, as in the 
 appetites. previous to thefe imaginations of greatgood 
 in the objects; and the correcting of thefe imagine-. - 
 ons may remove all the pain, efpecially where nobler 
 enjoyments compenfate the want of thefe pleafures. 
 And then beaut} 7 , harmony, and ingenious works of 
 art, and true imitation of every kind, without any pro- 
 pern" in the external objects, give pretty high p 
 pleafures ; whereas the deformity of external ob 
 diffonance, bad imitations, or rude works of art, give 
 no other pain than that trifling fort from a difappoint- 
 ment of expectation in a matter of no neceility in life. 
 Knowledge is attended with exquiiite pleafure ; but 
 the want of it only occafions pain where there is an 
 high defire and admiration of it, or a fear of ihame 
 for the want of it. The uneafmefs even to an inflamed 
 imagination from the want of the grandeur and ele- 
 gance of life is generally lighter than bodily pain, or 
 the fympathetick, or the fenfe of moral turpitude and 
 infamy; and 'tis wife and juft that it inould be fo. as 
 thefe other fenfes are intended to guard mankind a- 
 gainft evils more pernicious to the fyitem. If men : 
 pofe fometimes their friends, families, and coun: 
 to many evils by immoderate expences on grandeur 
 and elegance; tie diftant miferies of others are un- 
 expected, or not attended to: there are hopes of nc 
 friends,, of fupport, of profitable employments by the
 
 feveral Sorts 0/* P a i n. 145 
 
 friendship of the great, the approaching evils are not Chap. 7. 
 apprehended, and the guilt is unobferved. Kyv^Kj' 
 
 XV. The fympathetick, and moral pain of remorfe, 7/, fymwht- 
 and infamy, are the higheft our nature admits, a&^-/^%T^ 
 their oppofite joys are the higheft: they can make life^*"* 
 quite intolerable. The mifery of one beloved, while 
 it continues and is attended to, is inceffant pain to 
 the obferver. When it ceafes by death, the painful 
 remembrance long furvives in an affectionate heart ; 
 till bufinefs diverts the thoughts, or deep reflection 
 fuggefts confolations. The fure refuge in fuch cafes 
 is to a good providence, and that future happinefs pro- 
 vided for all worthy objects of kind affections. 
 
 'Tis vain to ailed ge that all fympathy carries with , „ 
 
 o J r J Jj r -; v>e are 
 
 it pleafure fuperior to the pain. We mould not th€m ro '" !tatra s icaI 
 incline to change the ftate of the object. 'Tis true we *' 
 are prone to run to fpectacles of mifery, and are fond 
 of tragedies : and yet mifery alone obferved is the 
 caufe of mifery only. But there is a natural impulfe, 
 implanted for the kindeft reafons, forcing us to fuch 
 fpectacles of mifery, which generally brings relief to 
 the fufferers. And we can reftrain this impulfe where 
 we forefee that it can do no good. Let none be fur- 
 prifed at fuch impulfes where no pleafure is in view, or 
 any removal of our own pain: do not we obferve af- 
 ter the death of a dear friend, when we canferve him 
 no more,, nor enjoy any fympathetick pleafures with 
 him, the tormenting thoughts of his dying agonies 
 and groans are for many weeks, and months, and 
 years recurring to our minds. Our many efforts to 
 Vol. I. T
 
 - 
 
 ^Comparison of the 
 
 banifh the painful ufelefs thoughts are long ineffec- 
 tual. When thefe efforts are repeated frequently and 
 viaorouily, they may at lait banilh them ; but when 
 we intermit our watch they return again and torment 
 us. Can that fenfation have fuperior pleafure which 
 upon reflection we ihun to retain, and guard againlr, 
 as a torment ; which in tenderer conflitutions turns 
 into bodily kcknefs ? 
 
 In tragedy there is a lively imitation of manners,, 
 of heroick virtues, ftruggling againfl: fortune ; and 
 noble fentiments and affections are exprefled. Our 
 fvmpathetick feelings indeed of ever} 7 kind are exer- 
 cifed ; and compailion and terror are gently raifed up- 
 on diitreffes which we know are feigned. Can one fay 
 that terror has fuperior pleafure in it ; and yet we 
 fometimes court fuch ftories as terrify ourfelves. But 
 
 en the imitations by fculpture. painting, and mu- 
 fick, pleafe us to much that we can bear toil and hun- 
 ger, in prolonging the entertainment: what wonder 
 
 it that fuch noble imitations of manners delight 
 
 . notwithstanding the gentle unealinefs of fympa- 
 thy with imaginary fufferings ? what pleafure is there 
 in an infirmary or lazar-houfe, and in hearing real 
 groans, where there is abundant matter of compaili- 
 on, but without fuch virtues difcovered: mould one 
 forget that the diftreffes in tragedy are feigned, his 
 pain will increafe; but the lovely virtues and noble 
 fentiments affect the mind with the higher pleafure. 
 
 Remorfe may be the highelt torment, and make 
 \ ... life and all its enjoyments hateful. Tis not like ex-
 
 fever al Sorts o/Pain. i 47 
 
 ternal fenfations referred to a body, a material fyf- Chap. 7. 
 
 tern, indicating its diforders, but not abating that^^VXJ 
 
 inward worth for which a man efteems himfelf or 
 
 his friend. We feem confcious that the body is not 
 
 the perfo?t, the felj 'we efteem; and that its diforders 
 
 or decays of any kind do not abate the excellence or 
 
 worth of a rational active being. Moral evil we feel 
 
 to be the immediate bafenefs of this felf. It makes 
 
 our inmoft nature odious and diftafteful to ourfelves, 
 
 and to all who know it. 
 
 Thefe feelings are not tranfitory ; the remembrance 
 is always tormenting. They * are lefs acute while the 
 unfated paflion continues impetuous : their violence 
 appears when the crime is committed. They gnaw 
 the foul a long time, nor ceafe unlefs habit brings on 
 a ftupor on this power, and men become abandoned 
 to every thing that is bad. And even here any confi- 
 derable adverfity or danger, which checks a while the 
 vicious paffions, may revive the moral principle, and 
 renew the torment. 
 
 XVI. Infamy and reproach when they juftly be- */««7 « p** 
 fal us, are a great mifery. But when we unjuftlyfuf-" w * 
 fer this way, while our own hearts approve our con- 
 duct, the fufFering is much lighter, and we may have 
 many ftrong fupports under it. The evil in this latter 
 cafe is lefs durable ; as the truth often breaks out beyond 
 expectation. The omnifcient God knows we are in- 
 
 * Quumfcelus admittunt fuperejl conflantia. Quid fat 
 Atque nefaSf tandem incipiunt /entire, peractis 
 Criminihu. Juv. Sat. 13. 
 
 T 2
 
 A Co.MPARISO N Of 
 
 kI. jured, and the wifcr part 01 men with whom we have 
 do will (boner or later difcern our innocenec, a 
 are lure of their companionate regards. Reproach 
 however is generally a greater evil and more atfiicting 
 than molt of the bodily pains, and may be pretty kill- 
 ing. It over-balances all fenfual pleafures with fuch 
 as are not abandoned: to repel it many would facri- 
 rice their all, and many have hazarded even life itfelf. 
 After this impartial enquiry into our fever al fores 
 of pleafures and pains, how unnatural muff that ac- 
 count of the fupreme good and evil given by the old 
 Cyrer.aicks an r. Epicureans, and byfome moderns like- 
 wife, appear, which places the origin of both in the 
 bodily (eolations, and refers both ultimately to them, 
 
 CHAP. VIIE 
 
 I Campari) .:! Tempers and C >: a- 
 
 s, in point o/H appin Miser y. 
 
 THE grounds of fufpecring a great opposition be- 
 een one s private interefi and the indulgino- 
 :he focial affections in all generous offices of virtue, 
 be pretty well removed is alrea. : of 
 
 the high enjoyments of the fvmpathetick and mc 
 kinds. But the unreafonablenefs of all fuch fufpici- 
 ls will farther appear by coniidering which of the 
 fev . . :s of affections conftitutin^ the various cha- 
 rers of men, are of themfelves the fweeteft enioy- 
 men :, the moil eafy and ferene Hate of mind*
 
 the feveral Tempers. 149 
 
 As all the fenfes and affections above-mentioned Chap. 8. 
 are parts of our inward fabrick, fo each of them have ^~V*v 
 their natural ufe either to the animal itfelf, or to thenar* *fifri m m 
 fyftem of which it is a part. Moral goodnefs indeed tkJ - yjCm ' 
 confifts principally in the focial and kind affections 
 carrying us out beyond ourfelves. But there is a natu- 
 ral fubferviency of the private or felfifh affections, 
 while they are- kept within certain bounds, not only 
 to the good of the individual, but to that of the fyf- 
 tem ; nor is any one compleat in his kind without 
 them. And as the happinefs of a fyftem refults from 
 that of the individuals, 'tis neceffary to it, that each 
 one have the felfifh affections in that decree which his 
 belt ftate requires, confiftently with his mod effectual 
 fervices to the publick. 
 
 The molt benign and wife conftitution of a ratio- JfeM«»J» 
 nal fyltem is that in which the degree of -felfifh affec-^r ' 
 tion moft ufeful to the individual is confident with 
 the intereft of the fyftem ; a,nd where the degree of ge- 
 nerous affections moft ufeful to the fyftem is ordina- 
 rily confiftent with or fubfervient to the greateft hap- 
 pinefs of the individual. A mean low fpecies may in- 
 deed be wholly fubjected to the interefts of a fuperior 
 fpecies, and have affections folely calculated for thefe 
 higher interefts. But in the more noble fyftems it 
 would be a blemifh if in fact there was an eftablifhed 
 inconfiftence between the two grand ends to each rati- 
 onal being, perfonal enjoyment and publick happinefs, 
 and in confequence, an irreconcilable variance be- 
 tween the affections deftined for the purfuit of themu
 
 ^Comparison of 
 
 Boos I. None of our affections can be called abfolutely evil, 
 in even* degree ; and vet a certain hig;h decree, bevond 
 fv the proportion of the re. :ne of our gene- 
 
 rous affe maybe vicious, oracleaita im- 
 
 ifection. detrimental bo:h to che individual and die 
 fyftem. Ac the lame time the greateft ltrength of i 
 one kind is not of irfelf neceflarily evil : nay it may be 
 innocent, if the other affections have a ltrength pro- 
 portioned to this kind, and to the dignity of their feve- 
 ral natures, and of the purpofes for which they were 
 implanted. But where the mind is not capacious e- 
 noueh to contain this hi^h decree of other affections, 
 any one of the feltilh, and many of the generous, 
 mav be exceilive. The calm ex:e:\ : jood-will, the 
 defire of moral excellence, the love of God, and re- 
 fip-nation to his will, can never e a s they e : 
 
 not any partial good affection as far as it is afefa] , 
 nor any juft regard to private good. But the more 
 confined affections even of the generous fort mav ex- 
 
 ed their due proportion, and exclude or over-po- 
 other affections of a better fort : as : en fee in 
 
 rital love, pin", party-zeal, ire. The moral turpi- 
 tude confifts, not in the flrength of thefe affections, 
 but in the weaknefs of the more exteniive ones in pro- 
 portion to their dignity and fuperior v 
 
 Tis iTill more evident that the (clfiih \ re: dons 
 E Excefl toons. But i: ought alfo to be 
 
 obferved that there mav be a decree of them too low 
 and defective with refpect to the intention of nature. 
 If a creatv ofed to clangers, and yet neither ar-
 
 the feveral Tempers. 151 
 
 med by nature or art, were fearlefs, and had no con- Chap. 8. 
 cern for its own fafety in its fervices to others ; we^V^-> 
 do not count this temper vicious, but 'tis manifeftly 
 imperfect, hurtful to the individual, and ufelefs to the 
 fyftem. In the lower orders we difcern the wife oeco- 
 nomy of nature giving courage to the males along 
 with their fuperior jftrength or armour, and denying it 
 to the females,unlefs where the defence of their young 
 requires it. Strong focial paffions, little felf-regard, 
 with ardent defires of honour, in men of very fmall 
 abilities, would be an exeefs on one hand, or a defect 
 on the other. The fame generous ardours in men of 
 great abilities, with proportional caution, would be 
 ufeful and well proportioned: fuch focial affections 
 and relifhes for fome fine enjoyments of the imagina- 
 tion, as fit eafy in fome characters, and exclude no du- 
 ties of life, might to others occafion ufelefs mifery, 
 and ftarve all their other parts or faculties. 
 
 II. Now as we fhewed the focial and moral enjoy- -*ff tm ™ to - 
 
 . < J J -ward fecial and 
 
 ments, with thofe of honour, to be the higheft; we* 9rfl/ 'w««'* 
 fhall briefly mew that the affections purfuing thofe ob-vLtwZ / 
 jecls with which thefe enjoyments are connected, when 
 they are all kept in due proportion to their dignity 
 and ufe in the fyftem, are the moil: advantageous and 
 eafy to the individual ; and that the felfifh affections 
 when they are too ftrong and inconfiftent with the 
 generous, are hurtful to the individual. 
 
 Our nature is fufceptible of fuch ardour toward 
 moral and focial enjoyments as generally to be able to*/ t^ gr«*tfi 
 furmount all other defires, and make men defpife all "" s '
 
 1^2 ^Comparison'// 
 
 Book I. bodily pleafure or pain. We fee inftances not only 
 ^/W; among the civilized, or where notions of virtue are 
 ilrenp-thened by a liner education, but even among 
 rude barbarians and robbers. From a point of honour, 
 from Gratitude, from zeal to a clan, or refentment of 
 wrongs done to it, they can joyfully embrace all hard- 
 ships, and defy death and torments. 
 
 On the other hand, place one amidit the greateft 
 affluence of fenfual enjoyments, but let him feel Come 
 focial or moral diiturbance from fome diftrefs of his 
 friend, fome danger to his party, or to his character 
 from the imputation of cowardice, or treachery ; fen- 
 fual pleafures become naufeous, and wounds, and 
 death appear little to him. He fcoms one who tells 
 him. " that befall his party, his friend, his character, 
 " what will, he may itill enjoy his fenfual affluence. ' 
 He rinds within himfelf fuperior fprings of action, 
 which are likewife fuperior fources of happinefs, or 
 
 miferv. 
 
 Since then thefe focial and moral enjoyments are 
 the hio-heit; that tafte, thofe affections, and that courfe 
 of action which tends to procure a conflant train of 
 fuch enjoyments, and fecure us from their contraries, 
 muft be the natural means of the chief happinefs, and 
 prefervatives from the deepeit mifery. Now thefe 
 highert enjoyments are either thefe very affections and 
 fuitable actions, or the natural concomitants or con- 
 fluences of them. 
 
 Have we felt the Rate of mind under lively affecti- 
 3f love, good- will, bounty, gratitude, congratula-
 
 the feveral Tempers. 
 
 tion? What when we have acted vigoroufly andfuc- 
 cefsfully from fuch affections ; ferved a friend, reliev- 
 ed the diftreffed, turned forrows into joy and grati- 
 tude, preferved a country, and made multitudes fafe 
 and happy ? The fenfe of every man tells him this 
 date is preferable to all others. The vicious them- 
 felves, who feem wholly devoted to fenfuality, yet are 
 not void of fuch affections and fentiments. They have 
 their friendfhips, their points of honour, and engage- 
 ments to parties, how rafh or capricious foever. Some 
 delights of this kind, fome focial affections, and im- 
 perfect virtues are their higheft enjoyments: 'tis * the 
 general voice of nature that where thefe pleafures are 
 excluded there is no happinefs. And as fenfuality can- 
 not fufficiently employ or gratify human nature, affec- 
 tions of a contrary fort, fullennefs, morofenefs, fufpi- 
 cion, and envy muft arife, which are both immediate 
 mifery, and the fruitful fources of it, wherever the fo- 
 cial affections are fuppreffed. 
 
 Tho' the tendency of the focial affections is to pre- 
 
 . r , , r i • 1 <~ Bt<t require le- 
 
 vent miiery, and thus prevent iympathetick iorrows ;&/*«< tnjt »« 
 yet when this cannot be effected we muft neceffarily P " 
 feel fome degree of uneaflnefs of this generous fort. 
 Here we mould have recourfe to fome higher consi- 
 derations, of the wifdom and goodnefs of the Divine 
 Providence, of the duty and the moral excellence of an 
 entire reiignation to the fupreme wifdom and good- 
 nefs, and of the firm grounds of hope thence arifing, 
 that fuch evils as our beft efforts cannot prevent, are 
 
 * Cicero de Amicit* 1. 23. and often elfewhere. 
 
 Vol, I. U
 
 
 i r a ^Comparison 0/ 
 
 Book T. deftined by our univerfal Parent: for the be ft purpofes. 
 
 \^/^,^\^ Upon lefs prefumptions than thefe our fympathetick 
 s are of ten alleviated ; when we have probable 
 hopes chat what at prefent moves our companion is 
 fubfervient to fome fuperior future intereft of thofe 
 we love. This truft and refignation, with hope, upon 
 a firm perfuafion of the divine goodnefs. ihould be 
 maintained bv frequent meditation in iuch Bicngch 
 and vigour as to control! all narrower affections, and 
 fupport the foul under the focial diftrelTes occafioned 
 by them. Of this hereafter. 
 
 ,/* ' : ", I '/' To root out or abate the focial affections, if iz 
 4 would prevent or abate our focial forrows, mull: alfo 
 deftroy or abate proportionably all our focial and moil 
 of our moral joys. The abatement of even the nar- 
 rower affections is rather a detriment to the human 
 character. The moft natural and perfect ftate whi 
 our minds at prefent feem capable of. is that where 
 all the natural affections, defires and fenfes are pre- 
 ferred vigorous, in proportion to the dignity of the 
 object they - . ft) that the inferior are frill kept 
 
 1 Jer the restraint of the fuperior. and never allowed) 
 to defeat the end for which God intended them ; or 
 to con troll either of the twe i determinations : 
 
 our fouls toward the ha: perfection of the 
 
 .: of the fyftem. 
 III. The fever al unkind :. as, 'tis 
 
 I ain, are originally uneaiv. Nature clearly (hows :":::-. : 
 the ;.ld not be' ftate of the mind. 1 
 
 very degrees of them which are innocent, nay necef- 
 
 .
 
 the fever al Tempers. 
 
 fary to the fyftem, are attended with uneafy fenfati- 
 ons, and little approbation can for any length of time 
 accompany them. Such is anger, even in that degree 
 which is neceflary for defending ourfelves or our 
 friends, and repelling injuries: fuch is chat deliberate 
 refentment againft the infolent and injurious, which 
 aims at no more punifhment than the fafety of focie- 
 ty requires : fuch that honeft indignation againft men 
 advanced far above their merit. Thefe all are uneafy 
 affections ; and there is little lovely in them. The fame 
 is true of that felfifh defire of being fuperior to o- 
 thers, or the emulation or ftrong defire of eminence 
 in fome valuable qualities. This affection may be in- 
 nocent, and is an ufeful fpur to fome tempers ; but 
 'tis generally uneafy ; and there is no moral beauty 
 which the heart can calmly approve of this fondnefs 
 of furpaffing upon comparifon. 
 
 Befide the uneafinefs which attends thefe pafTIons, a 
 'tis plain they naturally tend to make fuch changes 
 upon their objects, as fhall put an end to themfelves, 
 and raife contrary motions of regret and pity ; when 
 the objects are fo depreffed that we ceafe to fear evil 
 from them, or are brought into an hearty repentance 
 for any thing in them vicious or injurious : whereas the 
 kind affections which we conftantly approve, aim at 
 fuch ends as remain delightful, and prolong and 
 ftrengthen the affections. Good-will, and pity, aim at 
 the happinefs of their objects, and this, when obtain- 
 ed, is matter of permanent delight to the agent: and 
 fach offices done to worthy objects increafe our love 
 
 U 2 
 
 ni only tmn- 
 ftent emotion)
 
 ^Comparison- 
 Book I. co them. T that the former fee of affc 
 v^/^ / ^^ are deitinc ?.rure robe only traniient occasional 
 emotions; but che latter to be the liable permanent 
 dilpoiitions of foul. 
 
 We have dated names for the excefles of thefe 
 
 *-,---• unkind paifions, or when they arife without juftor 
 
 portional caufes, and are habitual. : :c, malice, 
 
 -e, emy, ambition or pride. But we have no fuch 
 
 fettled names for the innocent degree?. Hence lbme 
 
 have too rafhly imagined that fome of our natural pat 
 
 {ions are abfolutely evil in all degrees. 
 
 But thefe unkind paifions, thus uneafy even while 
 innocent^ were implanted partly for the intereft : 
 the individual, and partly for that of the fyftem. As 
 the external fenfes by grateful perceptions point out 
 the fafe ftate of the body, and the ordinary en; - 
 ments. to the individual; and roufe him on the other 
 nd by uneafy fenfations occafionally, to ward off 
 ive: fo the moral faculty in a like fub- 
 fe: to the publick, recommends to the agent, 
 
 and to even* obferver too, by a grateful approbation, 
 I kind affections and actions; and on the other hand 
 by an uneafv reluctance and remorfe deters the agent 
 :m fuch affections as are pernicious to the fyftem ; 
 i by the uneafy impulfes of anger and indignation 
 :o oppofe his defigns. 
 :lij efe palHons of anger, refentment and indigna- 
 
 tion even while they are innocent, or ufeful, are un- 
 eafy: and this, as well as the foregoing obfervatioa, 
 that the;, i .: were deftined to be the oxdi- 
 
 -. : .: -■
 
 the fever al Tempers. 157 
 
 nary permanent difpofitions of the foul: they fhould Chap. 8. 
 only arife occasionally, when fomething pernicious to ( ^Y\J 
 the individual or the fyftem muft be repelled. They 
 are a fort of ungrateful medicines for diforders, and 
 not the natural food : they were implanted to repell 
 injuries, and fo far only as they are thus employed can 
 they be deemed innocent. Now as a fenfe or appetite 
 is depraved in an individual, which loaths its natural 
 food, or craves what is not nourifhing; as the organs 
 of feeling muft be difordered and fickly when they 
 are pained with the falutary air, or neceffary cloath- 
 ing ; furely that temper of mind muft be as much de- 
 praved, where anger arifes without hurt or injury re- 
 ceived ; or averfion and hatred, where there is no mo- 
 ral evil in the object; or envy upon thefuccefs of me- 
 rit; or ill-will toward any innocent part of a fyftem 
 formed for, and preferved by, a focial life, and an in- 
 tercourse of good offices. 
 
 'Tis therefore our interest to examine well the me- 
 rit of perfons and caufes, and to keep a ftrict rein over 
 the unkind paflions, which are uneafy while innocent ; 
 and fo apt to exceed, that even in their moderate de- 
 grees they look fo like fomething evil that they are 
 little approved. The calmer affections of the foul to- 
 ward the good either of the individual or the fyftem, 
 are more generally effectual than the turbulent paffi- 
 ons, whatever uie thefe paffions may have in minds 
 not enured to reflection., Tis defireable therefore to 
 have our lives committed to thefe fafer conductors, 
 and to have an habitual caution againft all violent
 
 X r8 ^Comparison <?/ 
 
 Book I. commotions of the unkind fort, as what are frequent- 
 
 ^S*v~\j\y dangerous. 
 
 7~ IV. If the focial affections are in themf elves and 
 
 "their confequents the noblefl: enjoyments, 'tis plain 
 the calm and cxtenfive are the bed of that kind, when 
 they are in their full vigour, and enjoy their natural 
 authority to direct or reflrain the fever-al narrower af- 
 fections. 
 
 Two imperfections are incident to our kind affec- 
 tions; one when they extend only to a pare, and yet 
 without any bad difpofitions toward any other part ; 
 the other is, where in the courfe of the operation of 
 ftrong kind partial affections towards fome, unkind 
 and mifchievous affections are apt to be excited to- 
 wards others. 
 :-*- In the firft cafe, Men of fmaller reflection may ne- 
 ver form that mod diffufed calm purpofe or defire of 
 good to all, which is the higheft moral excellence ; 
 and yet have friendly difpofitions as far as their views 
 and fphere of action extend, without ill-will to any. 
 This temper is verv excellent, nor can more be expec- 
 ted from the generality of mankind: nor is more need- 
 ful; as very few can have power to do the moil: exten- 
 iive fervices. "Tis no unjuft partiality, when men ge- 
 nerally follow the ftronger tyes of nature, or bonds 
 of gratitude, or the motions of hearty efteem toward 
 their worthy friends ; provided they neglect no fuch of- 
 fices as occur toward others, and can reflrain thefe 
 narrower affections when oppofite to any more exten- 
 five intereft which they difcover. 

 
 the feveral Tempers. j cq 
 
 The dangerous partiality is when there are ftrong Chap. 8. 
 affections to a few, without any regards to other parts ^v^j 
 of the fyftem equally valuable which are within idhe" ""S? ^ 
 compafs of our knowledge and fphere of action ; or,, 
 perhaps, malicious difpofitions toward them without 
 natural caufes,or quite beyond the proportion of them, 
 or any fubferviency to a publick intereft. Thefe fo- 
 cial tho' partial affections are often occallons of plea- 
 fure ; but the averfions may create as great uneafinefs. 
 When the kind affections are thus capricioufly placed, 
 there is little merit in them; they muft be inconftant, 
 and the felf-approbation muft vanifh upon reflection. 
 The object now admired may prefently be difliked, 
 and abhorred, by the fame capricioufnefs which made 
 it agreeable. In thefe partial affections there is lefs 
 participation of joy ; and what merit is in love without 
 a proportioned caufe? what fatisfaction in returns of 
 love from favourites injudicioufly chofen? whereas the 
 univerfal good-will, and even the limited affections u- 
 pon natural caufes, which exclude no juft affection to- 
 ward others, muft be full of joy, and give the con- 
 fcioufnefs of meriting well from all ; as fuch affections 
 are fubfervient to the good of all. 
 
 The unjuft averfions from an erroneous confcience Ddtt s" °fm- 
 and falfe notions of religion and virtue formed by™™'' 
 fuperftition and wrong education, muft lead into in- 
 numerable inconfiftences. If men do not banifh all 
 reflection there muft be grievous remorfe and inward 
 difpleafure : a bigot, a perfecutor, a robber, with a 
 fort of confcience of duty to his party or his fyftem
 
 j6o ^Comparison 0/ 
 
 BookT. of opinions, oppofing natural compafTion and the 
 Ky r \^~> plaineft dilates of juftice, can have but poor narrow 
 fatisfa6tions. What are fervices to a party or caufe 
 where we have no juft perfuafion of its worth, and in 
 oppofition to the intereft of many others ? What in 
 pleafing a Demon of whofe moral perfections we can 
 have no juft or confiftent notion? The ftruggles muft 
 be terrible between all the principles of humanity and 
 this falfe confcience. Reflection muft ever raife tor- 
 turing fufpicions that all is wrong. All ftable fatisfac- 
 tion muft be loft ; or they muft banifh reafon and in- 
 
 °l uii T- ; 
 
 Upon a falfe point of honour one kills a friend. 
 
 CompafTion and remorfe immediately fucceed. In per- 
 fection too, or cruelty from any party-zeal, may not 
 the remonftrances of the fufferers, the talk of the 
 world, or of the persecuted party, raife inward horrors 
 and remorfe, where they are often boldly denied ? 
 What is it to offend multitudes, and to be abhorred 
 by them ? How hard is it to juftify any conduct op- 
 pofite to humanity ? What may our condition be in 
 cooler years, when our prefent ambition and party- 
 fpirit may abate, and we lhall fee our conduct, to have 
 been full of guilt and cruelty toward the innocent ; 
 and offenfive to God and all wife men ? A good 
 mind will never think it can be too cautious againft 
 any fuch fuperftitions, or party-prejudices, as may im- 
 bitter it againft any of its fellow creatures. 
 TnfiWM- V. We next confider the temper where any or all 
 •J.ie felfiin pafhonsare too violent. They are chieny
 
 lift. 
 
 the fever al Tempers. i 6 i 
 
 thefe, the love of life, and of fenfual pleafure ', the de- Chap. 8. 
 Jire of hit ere ft, or of the means of pleafure and the ^^\^\J 
 conveniencies of\ife,defre of power, of glory, and eafe. 
 
 Of all thefe there is a moderate degree, confiftent 
 with focial affections in their full ftrength. But, as 
 we fhewed above, that the good, the happinefs aimed 
 at by them, is inferior to that arifing from the fociat 
 affections ; they ought therefore to yield to them and 
 to the purfuits of virtue. When they are beyond their 
 proportion they are calkd cowardice or pufilanimity, 
 luxury or voluptuoufnefs, avarice, ambition, vanity, 
 floth. 
 
 Love of life beyond a certain degree is a great un- xtu hv e of 
 happinefs. Life in many cafes is not worth retaining; 
 and to preferve it on certain terms may be too dear 
 a purchafe. Death doubtlefs in many circumftances 
 becomes an event earneftly to be longed for by the 
 perfon himfelf ; and others may wifh for it as a joyful 
 releafe to their deareft friends, whilft they ftudioufly 
 decline what others fee is eligible. The love of life 
 makes fome act againft their own interefl as enemies 
 to themfelves. The dread of death often defeats its 
 own end, betraying to dangers inftead of repelling 
 them, and taking away that prefence of mind which 
 in the courageous finds out the means of fafety. 
 
 The very pafllon itfelf is mifery ; to feel cowardice 
 and to be haunted with perpetual horrors. None live 
 free from danger. The moft athletick conftitutions 
 are not fecured againft acute diftempers. The dread of 
 death will poifon all parts of life and all enjoyments, 
 
 Vol. I. X
 
 162 ^Comparison 0/ 
 
 Bo ox I. even In the moft fortunate circumftances : it will force 
 \^rv^\j men on fome occafions into the meaneft conduct, and 
 make the heart fuch a wretched fight that we fhall 
 never endure to look into it ; when for life, which is 
 an uncertain enjoyment at belt, and muft be parted 
 with at laft, we have loft every thing generous and a- 
 miable which could make it worth retaining. 
 
 VI. The paffions of fenfuality, as we ihewed above, 
 purfue the meaneft enjoyments, and where they en- 
 grofs the man they make the moft defpicable charac- 
 ter. There is nothing in the enjoyments which we can 
 like upon reflection. Nay it requires a long habit to re- 
 ftrain a natural fenfe of ihame when we are keenly fet 
 upon fuch gratifications. Moral ideas muft be joined 
 in our imaginations to make the indulgence appear 
 reputable, and to avoid the uneafy checks of that*»a- 
 tural madefy which is defigned to reftrain thefe mean 
 defires. 
 
 Where paffions of this fort are immoderate, the ef- 
 fects are moft pernicious. They impair the health of 
 body and mind; and exclude all manly improvement: 
 the wafte of time, the effeminacy, and lloth, and a 
 thoufanddiforderly paffions, break the natural ftrength 
 of the foul, and the reins of felf-government. The de- 
 triment to fociety from the extravagancies of the a- 
 morous kind ; the bitter miferies occafioned in the 
 deareft relations of life ; the diftrefs and infamy this 
 
 * H» itmam rmderatarpu' J fively for our v:cra! fenfe; and *.',"_; is ufed 
 
 eflion of Cicero The » in. the lime extent by the Greeks*, 
 word is indeed often taken more exten- I
 
 the feveral Tempers. 163 
 
 treacherous love expofes its object to, muft be obvi- Chap. 8. 
 ous to the flighteft attention; and mull give the moft^ywy 
 bitter remorfe, where any fenfe of virtue or humanity 
 remains ; not to mention the wafte this paflion makes 
 in the honefty, ingenuity, and modefty of our nature. 
 Muft it not then be contrary to our intereft to have 
 fuch paffions violent? 
 
 VII. As wealth may be ufeful in gratifying any of Avaka * 
 our defires, may promote the good of the individual, m M * * 
 or be a fund for offices of humanity, 'tis no wonder 
 that it is very generally purfued by fuch as extend their 
 views beyond the prefent moment. A moderate de- 
 fire of it is innocent, and wife, and fubfervient to the 
 beft purpofes : and the pofTefTion is moft joyful to fuch 
 as refer it to the purpofes of humanity and virtue. But 
 when the defire is violent, and referred only to felfifh 
 purpofes ; or, by fome confufed notions of dignity and 
 power, terminating almoft only upon mere increafe of 
 porTeffions ; the temper is as wretched as it is unrea- 
 fonable, more oppreflive to the heart where it refides 
 than it can be to its neighbours. The natural deilres 
 are eafily fatisfied. Frugality and temperance with 
 fmall expence may equal in pleafure the higheft luxu- 
 ry. The thirft for wealth without reference to plea- 
 fure or offices of liberality, is an eager, infatiable, reft- 
 lefs, joylefs craving. Such as entertain high profpects 
 of dignity and happinefs fecured to their pofterity by 
 their acquifitions, frequently by their example and 
 inftruction root out as far as they can every joyful and 
 honourable difpofition out of their minds; and when 
 
 X 2
 
 ^Comparison©/" 
 
 , K t the ungainly leflbn has not its effect, the deformed 
 v_/~V^ example preiented to then" pofterity tempts them in- 
 to the oppofite extreme: and the hope of lazy opu- 
 lence and luxury quenches all ardour for improve- 
 ment in the honourable arts of life, and encourages 
 every diffolute inclination. 
 
 The fame things may be faid of the defires of power 
 fCTi and of glory. A moderate degree is innocent and ufe- 
 ful ; but when they grow too violent they are reftlefs 
 and uneafy to the individual, and often pernicious to 
 fociety, and generally break through the molt facred 
 tves of duty and humanity, and ruin every good dif- 
 pofition of heart. To defire reputation for integrity 
 and moral worth is natural to every good temper; and 
 it excites men to be what they deiire to be reputed, 
 which is the lhorteft way to true glory. Nay the de- 
 fire of eminence in valuable abilities, while it is mo- 
 derate, is ufeful in our conftitution and innocent. But 
 it may grow fo violent as to be a perpetual torment, 
 and the fource of the rileft and moil wretched pa 
 ons. All fuperior merit will d i le env; ill- 
 
 will, and an humour of detraction. The mind will 
 reftlefs. violent, ptious. eafily pro- 
 
 voked, incapable of bearing the leaft neglect, unc 
 to all, and diiliked by all. No pafTion can more de- 
 feat its end than w is more odious 
 and contemptible than arrogance, nothing more love- 
 ly than its oppofite, modefty and humility. 
 
 Y1II. The moft. oppofite temper to ambition is the 
 love of eafe. This loo while moderate is innocent and
 
 the feveral Tempers. 165 
 
 ufeful, as the defire of fleep when one is weary. But Chap. 8. 
 when it turns to habitual floth, not yielding to the fo-^V\j 
 cial affections, and declining all laborious offices, it 
 mult deftroy all true worth, all focial enjoyment, fenfe 
 of merit, and hopes of efteem. The languid fickly 
 ftate of a body uncapable of exercife appears in the 
 complexion and weak appetites ; a worfe diforder fei- 
 zes the mind that wants its natural exercife in the fo- 
 cial offices of life. It mull: have tedious hours, be fuf- 
 picious of contempt, jealous, and impotent in every 
 pafTton. The effects upon intereft are obvious. The 
 indolent are expofed to all inconvenience and perple- 
 xity in their bufmefs ; wanting to themfelves in every 
 thing, and deprived of the aid of others, as they have 
 merited none from them, and difcourage all affiftance 
 by their own inactivity. 
 
 Thus the exceffes of the felfifli paffions are certain 
 mifery. They make up the character called felfifli, 
 which is defpicable and deprived of all the nobler joys 
 of life. The temper as it is fhameful runs into fub- 
 tilty of conduct, and a feigned behaviour; lofes its na- 
 tural ingenuity and candour, and contracts diftruft, 
 fufpicion and envy. An intereft feparate from our fel- 
 lows is more and more formed every day, and the fo- 
 cial motions fupprefTed. At laft the temper becomes 
 compleatly wretched and hateful. 
 
 IX. Some extraordinary and rare inftances of molt Mmjrr<mp a f. 
 immoderate exceffes of thefe felfifh paflions are in^J v,beae£ a 
 common fpeech properly enough termed monftrous 
 and unnatural, but feem to have thefe epithets given-
 
 x <56 Monstrous Affections. 
 
 - x. them by fome authors, as it they were of a diltinct 
 L/VX^ kind: fuch as when men feem to delight in torments, 
 or to have an unprovoked deiire of infulting. or petu- 
 ::cv, unnatural lulls, enormous pride, tyranny and 
 mifanthropy. Thefe are only excelles of fome paill- 
 ons naturally implanted, but railed to a prodigious de- 
 gree without a juft caufe, upon fome falfe opinions or 
 nfufed imaginations, and by long indulgence and 
 frequent irritation. Even* one fees this to be the cafe 
 in monllrous lulls, where the natural paihon is grown 
 ungovernable ; and caprice and curiofity ofz make men 
 try all kinds of indulgences. 
 - ^. In the lame manner, when the temper from natu- 
 ral coniHtution and other caufes happens to be favage 
 and morofe, and where the mind has been long irri- 
 Catcd and galled by oppofition or fome apprehended 
 injuries, and no thorough reflection intervenes to flop 
 the growth of the pailion, furprizing rancour and cru- 
 el tv ma] -:.r. One may eailly fuggeil to him- 
 felf, how long continued felf-flatterv and ambition, 
 without any check from reflection, and the frequent 
 anger arillng from, the oppofitions which ambitious 
 fpirits generally meet with ; and the conllant caufes 
 of fufpieion which their own conduct mull afford, 
 may make that horrid temper of jealoufv, rage, cru- 
 elty, and opprelTion of ever}* thing free and virtuous, 
 which reigns in tyrants. 
 
 Confider the affedatioa of liberty, the an°;er at 
 
 •••• ., ° 
 
 thofe reilraints which the dilTolute meet with from 
 
 che laws of civilized focieties, the abhanenoe they ex-
 
 Monstrous Affections. 167 
 
 peel from their foberer fellow-citizens, and the often- Chap. 8. 
 tation of fortitude; and they will account for that fur-yvxj 
 prizing petulancy we meet with in fome characters. 
 
 Civilized nations of great humanity, from falfecon-^ 1 "^ trvdt ?- 
 ceptions of the fpirit and tempers of the reft of man- 
 kind, and from fome abfurd notions of dignity and 
 pre-eminence in themfelves, have thought them fit 
 only to be flaves : fome have found fuch entertainment 
 from the furprizing efforts of art and courage, that in- 
 fenfible to the mifery which was every moment obvi- 
 ous to their fight, they accounted it a fpectacle of high 
 delight, to behold gladiators putting each other to 
 death. We all know the notions entertained by the 
 vulgar concerning all hereticks ; we know the pride of 
 Ichoolmen and many ecclefiafticks ; how it galls their 
 infolent vanity that any man fhould affume to himfelf 
 to be wifer than they in tenets of religion by differing 
 from them. When this infolent pride is long indul- 
 ged by the enjoyment of power and popular venera- 
 tion, it grows prodigious ; and, it may explain how 
 fuch men,and their implicite votaries, can behold with 
 joy the moil horrid tortures of men truly innocent, 
 but drefled up in all the forms of impiety, and wicked- 
 nefs. 'Tis needlefs to explain the original of other 
 monftrous difpofitions. 
 
 As we fne wed already the mifery which attends the 
 fmaller exceffes of thefe felfifTi and ill-natured pafTi- 
 oris; 'tis plain the more monftrous exceffes muft be 
 ftill greater mifery. 
 
 We have hitherto confidered what affections of
 
 z : - 
 
 D I TIES ofKtLlGIC 
 
 at temper coward the enjoyments of this 
 
 •• 
 
 I -.;.:.:". :r:en : 
 
 zr.z :.-re.i:e:: 
 
 D. 
 
 then we flu 
 
 r.".ir.:= ::: 
 :;•: rr.is h 
 
 ::::"■".: :. 
 
 CXZi.'.zT.Zz 
 
 in fr:;: ver 
 upon ic 
 
 •::;•:■.:::;. .ire 
 :. The: 
 :o every rations 
 :ii:h. :"r:rr. vh; 
 
 .r r..i:r- 
 :err.iir_s 
 rir.i :o 
 
 
 
 r;.". mm: re :: 
 ippinefs. viz. the 
 >refides in the univerfe: and 
 the fources of all the enjoy- 
 able of. Our moral faculty 
 e object ; as it naturally de- 
 eerr. .ir.i rmmm.re m m;:m 
 i rmrv mm m::m ■::•-:: -:!!■: r.:e 
 :: me mremms v.- rich enme 
 
 C I- 
 
 n 
 
 .a. 
 
 P. IX. 
 
 T : r D v ~ : 
 
 timmts concerning bis Nature. 
 
 ( UR inquiries on this fob ject are reduced to two 
 firft, What are the fenriments concern- 
 
 .':' _V\~ A:r; :.:;:. v.* hi: ::: :m : f- 
 
 rorfhip fuited to thefe fenriments, and 
 
 n: •:; mirrmers mev irrrrc :: me :m- 
 
 e £>. 
 
 - . 
 
 Previous to our forming juft fenriments concern- 
 
 : me Dei", r. : m m;> 
 
 :-. Tim ' .-. me: .imeed rim: mere .... :;
 
 The Evidences that there is a Deity. i 69 
 
 be fome fuperior Mind, or Minds, endued with know- Chap. 9. 
 ledge and great power, prefiding over human af-^-^^ 
 fairs. Tradition no doubt from race to race has con- 
 tributed fomething to difFufe this perfuafion. The 
 experience of evil from unknown caufes, the fear of 
 them, and the defire of fome further aids againfl: them 
 when all vifible powers have failed, may have excited 
 fome to this enquiry: the natural enthufiafm and ad- 
 miration arifmg when we behold the great and beau- 
 tiful works of nature has raifed the curiofity of others 
 to inquire into the caufe: and this probably has been 
 the mod general motive: but the certainty of any te- 
 net depends not on the motives of inquiry into it, 
 but on the validity of the proofs ; and its dignity de- 
 pends upon its importance to happinefs. Vanity or 
 avarice may have excited fome to the itudy of Geo- 
 metry; no man on this account will defpife the fcience, 
 or count it lefs certain or ufeful in life. We (hall 
 only point out briefly the heads of argument on this 
 fubject. The whole of natural knowledge or natural 
 hiftory, is a collection of evidence on this affair. 
 
 II. Whitherfoever we turn our eves or our thouehts, f^Pf'™**' 
 
 m J O > jt nature of tie 
 
 there occur as great evidences of defign, intention, ™ rU - 
 art, and power, as our imagination can conceive. The 
 moft ftupendous orbs, the greateft malTes, moving 
 in conftant order, with great rapidity : forces and 
 powers exerted every where, in worlds as large as this 
 habitation of men : an univerfe large beyond imagi- 
 nation and all our powers of obfervation. But as far 
 as we can make obfervations, manifeft footfteps of 
 Vol. I. Y
 
 i - : The Evidences that there is a Deity. 
 
 Book I. contrivance and regular defign appear in the moil ex- 
 L^/V quifite iitnefs of parts for their feveral ufes, and in 
 mutual connexions and dependances of things very di- 
 ftant in place. The earth, were it alone, would be a 
 ftupid mafs, inactive and ufelefs ; but it is enlivened by 
 the fun: and 'tis impregnated with innumerable feeds, 
 which by warmth and moiiture, and the other nuni- 
 tive principles in the earth and air, extend and un- 
 fold their wondrous beautiful parts, and break forth 
 in innumerable regular forms of different orders, 
 from the loweft mofs, to the ftately oak: and thefe 
 generally fitted for the nourishment or other conve- 
 niences of fuperior orders of beings, endued with 
 powers of motion, of fenle, of reafon. 
 
 The animal bodies again difplay new wonders of 
 art, in their innumerable kinds, by the curious ftruc- 
 tures of their numerous parts, bones, mufcles, mem- 
 branes, nerves, veins, arteries. This wondrous frruc- 
 ture appearing, not in a few inflances, but in ever} 7 
 one of the innumerable individuals of each fpecies ; 
 fimilar to each other in their ftructures, and endued 
 with the feveral powers and inftincls of the kind, for 
 their prefervation and the continuance of the fpecies. 
 What nice organs to diflinguiih, receive, grind, fwal- 
 low, and dieeit their food : and to diffufe the nourifh- 
 ment to all their parts ! what a variety and nice ftruc- 
 ture of organs for fpontaneous motions, fubfervient 
 to their pleafure, fupport, or defence ! 
 fn- As all plants produce their curious feeds, many of 
 them with proper mechanifm to be difperfed by the.
 
 The Evidences that there is a Deity. 171 
 
 winds into their proper places : fo animals are endued Chap. 9. 
 with inftin&s for the fame purpofe, a new form arifes l/YV 
 of the fame kind with the parent-animal ; and, where 
 'tis necefTary, a falutary juice is prepared in the breads 
 or teats of the parent for its nourifhment: the young 
 has an inftinct to apply to the proper fource of its 
 fupport, and nourifhment : and the parent by a like 
 inftinct is prone to fupply it. A fond care continues 
 in the parent while the young needs protection, and 
 the parent can be of ufe to it; and ceafes when it is of 
 no further ufe. And, that nothing may appear fuper- 
 fluous or ill defigned, where the young of certain kinds 
 needs no fuch food or protection from the parent, no 
 fuch juices are prepared, no fuch inftincl is implan- 
 ted ; as is the cafe with fome kinds o^fjh, and infe&s. 
 
 III. The earth and all its beauties depend on the „ t 
 
 x Connexion of 
 
 fun. 'Tis placed at the moil convenient diftance: a'^<»^/"»?- 
 confiderably nearer, or more diftant fituation, would"** ««* *«* 
 
 1 , * 1 /* • 11* • r~r*1 r mal bodies. 
 
 make it a leis convenient habitation. 1 he eyes or a- 
 nimals are fitted to the degree of light, and to their 
 proper occupations , with the moft admirable art ; 
 ftronger light would be painful and pernicious, and 
 fainter would be inconvenient. Their lungs, their 
 ears, their blood, are fuited to the furrounding air, its 
 weight, and ordinary motions. This yielding, pref- 
 fing, falutary fluid, is the means of life, of breathing, 
 of circulation of blood, of voice to communicate de- 
 fires and fentiments, and of gratifying their tafte for 
 harmony. 
 
 .Land animals continually need frefh water. Such 
 
 Y 2
 
 1 72 The Evidences that there is a Deity. 
 
 Book I. is the extent of the ocean, itfelf alfo full of inhabi- 
 ^~V\J tants fuited to that element, fuch the heat of the fun, 
 that vail: quantities of vapours difencumbered of their 
 falts are daily railed, and float in the air, till grown 
 too denfe they defcend in fructifying mowers ; or, 
 meeting with hills or mountains in their motion, are 
 condenfed and fupply fountains and rivers, which af- 
 ter carrying water to great tracts of land, are again 
 difcharged into the ocean. Thus all is full of power, 
 activity and regular motion, wifely and exquilitely a- 
 dapted to the ufes of the living and fenfible parts of 
 the creation. 
 
 IV. The feveral claries of plants, and animals, owe 
 nothing of this wondrous ftructure to any wifdom of 
 their own or their parents ; no art of theirs contrived 
 the material frame, or the inward fabrick of their 
 powers and inftincts, or the conveniencies of their ha- 
 bitation. This immenfe power and wifdom mult refide 
 fomewhere elfe ; in fome other being. Were the world 
 fuppofed eternal, the argument is the fame. The ef- 
 fects, the evidences of wifdom, were upon that fup- 
 pofition in all times. In all times therefore wifdom 
 and power fuperior to human exifted in fome other 
 being. If this admirable frame had a beginning, the 
 evidence is more manifeft. 
 - r!s cf Men have fome power, and make fome changes : we 
 n exert our force in making them two ways ; one in 
 which we have no intention of any particular form or 
 effect; as when we throw carelelly any materials out of 
 our hands ; another, when we delign fome end, intend
 
 The Evidences that there is a Deity. 173 
 
 fome form, and direct motions for that purpofe. By Chap. 9. 
 the former manner of action fcarce ever arifes any^/"VXJ 
 thing regular, uniform, or wifely adapted to any pur- 
 pofe: by the other it is that we produce things regu- 
 lar and well adapted. Now the forms of nature in gt- A n ttaUircJ i ieivs 
 neral, the changes and fucceffive appearances in the dcJ ' sn ' 
 new plants and animals, are manifeftly of this later 
 fort, regular, uniform, curioufly adapted, andfimilar; 
 and hence we juftly conclude an original designing 
 wifdom and power. 
 
 Had we any evidence that the power or art which 
 modified thefe materials refided in themfelves, we 
 mould not perhaps recur to a prior caufe. But 
 whence that correfpondence, connexion, and fimilari- 
 ty? whence the mutual dependences of the feveral 
 fpecies, and of their individuals, on each other, and of 
 all of them upon the earth, the atmofphere, and the 
 fun ? whence this adapted habitation ? There muft 
 have preceded a concert among the feveral intelli- 
 gences of the parts, or there muft have been one pre- 
 lidino; Intelligence. We have no evidence for fuch 
 wifdom in the parts themfelves as could have contri- 
 ved their conftitutions : and therefore muft conclude 
 that there is a fuperior all-ruling Mind. 
 
 This Mind muft itfelf be fir ft and original 'in na- ~,. , 
 
 J J O This not reft- 
 
 ture; nor is there any room for the queftion, from* 1 ** 
 
 ,__, vial ii 
 
 what caufe did it proceed ? The order of nature fhews 
 that wifdom and power have always exifted fomewhere; 
 unlefs at fome period exiftence could commence with- 
 out a prior caufe; or a being void of all power, though^ 
 
 in the mats- 
 ■world.
 
 1 74 The Evidences that there is a Deity. 
 
 Boo- I. and wifdom, could at a certain period, without the 
 aid of any powerful or wife being, ftart into power or 
 wifdom; or a being void of all power orwifdom could 
 convey thefe perfections to others : all which fuppofi- 
 tions are abfurd. Since then there is evidence for ori- 
 ginal intelligence and power, as high as we could have 
 upon a fuppoiition that it exiited, where lhall we con- 
 clude it relides : Whether in this vail material fyftem 
 is there one intelligence or counfel enlivening; and 
 moving the whole, and modifying fome parts of it- 
 felf into particular intelligences for certain ends, and 
 ftill p-overnino- them from certain affections toward 
 them, and toward the whole: which was the notion 
 of fome Stoicks, who zealouilv taught manv duties of 
 piety and humanity: or does it refide in a fpirit, a be- 
 ing limple and uncompounded, diitinct from all divi- 
 fible, changeable, or moveable lubftance: which was 
 the notion of the Platonifts? The grand duties of pi- 
 ety, the foundations of our hopes, and the motives to 
 virtue, fubfilt on either fcheme: but that of the Sto- 
 icks is loaded with unfurmountable objections of a 
 metaphviical ki 
 
 V. \\ hen the exiftence of original boundlefs art 
 nd power is afcertained. the next point is the moral 
 character, or the difpoiitions of will toward other be- 
 ings capable of happinefs or mifery: which mult be 
 die foundation of all piety*, and all jov in religion. 
 Here firft. if we can any way reafon concerning the 
 iginal A at lire from w: reel in our own, or from 
 
 **' any of our notions of excellency or perfection,
 
 The Original Mind is Benevolent. ijy. 
 
 muft conceive in a Deity fome perceptive power ana- Chap. 9. 
 logous to our moral fenfe, by which he may have felf- KS^\T\J 
 approbation in certain affections and actions rather 
 than the contrary. Such a power muft bring a large 
 addition of happinefs, and that of the nobleft fort, a- 
 longwith it; and, in an omnipotent Mind, cannot be 
 inconfiftent with any other perfection or fource of en- 
 joyment. The ultimate determinations or affectionsof 
 the Divine Being, which can be approved by himfelf, 
 muft either be that toward his own happinefs ; or a de- 
 fire of the greateft univerfal happinefs ; or a defire of u- 
 niverfal mifery. The defire of his own happinefs cannot 
 be the fole ultimate defire or determination ; becaufe, 
 the defire of the happinefs of other beings diftinclfrom 
 himfelf would be another fource of fublime pure hap- 
 pinefs, diftincl from the former, but perfectly confiftent 
 with it, in a mind which always has it in its power to 
 gratify this defire to the utmoft, without obftrucling 
 any other fource of happinefs. The approbation and 
 delight in this kind determination muft be quite ex- 
 cluded from the Divine Mind, if there is no fuch ori- 
 ginal determination in it. And 'tis inconceivable that 
 the original Mind can want any fource of pure enjoy- 
 ment or happinefs, confident with every other fort of 
 excellence, while yet in other beings formed by the 
 counfels of that which is original we experience fuch 
 fources of happinefs. 
 
 The ultimate defire of univerfal mifery cannot be , ^ a / ; ; ;; :V 
 
 J t defire of the mi- 
 
 fuppofed the determination approved in the Divine/^ of others. 
 Mind, nor can any fuch affection be conceived as ori-
 
 The Original Mind 
 
 o-inal and eflential ; fince there can be no original fenfe 
 or power of perception correfponding to it in the Di- 
 vine Mind. The Deity muft have powers perceptive 
 of happinefs immediately. But in that which is origi- 
 nal and omnipotent there can be no fenfe of mifery, 
 nor any idea of it, but what is fuggefted by his know- 
 ledge of the perceptive powers he has granted to his 
 limited creatures, and the laws of fenfation to which 
 he has fubjected them. That cannot be fuppofed the 
 object of an original defire, the idea of which is not 
 perceived by fome original faculty of perception im- 
 mediately fuggefting it. 
 
 Befides, all malevolent difpofitions of will, as they 
 feem to carry along with them fome uneafinefs and 
 mifery to the mind where they refide, fo they natural- 
 ly tend to deftroy their objects, and thus to deftroy 
 themfelves. A refolute malice muft ever be uneafy 
 while its object fubfifts; and can only find reft by an 
 entire removal of it, upon which the affection alfo 
 ceafes. Anger tends to inflict fuch mifery on its object 
 as muft at laft produce entire repentance, and thus 
 remove the moral evil or turpitude which raifed the 
 wrathful indignation ; or to bring the object fo low 
 that all oppofition of intereft mult ceafe, and, along 
 with it, the paffion raifed by it. Envy has the fame 
 tendency, and when its purpofe is accomplilhed muft 
 in like manner ceafe. Whereas all the benevolent dif- 
 pofitions are in their own nature everlafting, produc- 
 ing happinefs, and delighted with its continuance. Pi- 
 ty tends to remove the mifery of its object; and thus
 
 IS BENEVOLENT Or GOOD. 177 
 
 its own attendant pain is removed; but the love and Chap. 9. 
 good- will remain unabated by this change. Tis evi-v/VV>> 
 dent therefore that malevolent difpofitions cannot be 
 conceived as original in that Mind which is omnipo- 
 tent, the fource of all, and the fovereign difpofer of 
 all : but original good- will, and propenfity to commu- 
 nicate happinefs muft be its efTential permanent im- 
 mutable difpofition. 
 
 To fuppofe a determination toward the univerfal 
 mifery of others to be original in the Divine Mind is 
 alfo entirely inconfiftent with the conftitution of all 
 his rational creatures, in whom no fuch determination 
 is found ; and with that great degree of happinefs we 
 experience in life. Omnipotence fure would have ef- 
 fectually gratified its defires, by the higheft univerfal 
 mifery. 
 
 We find in ourfelves that all the ill-will we are ca- 
 pable of arifes from our weaknefs, when we apprehend 
 fome damage or injury received, or dread it for the 
 future; or find fome oppofition to our intereft, or to 
 the interefts of thofe we wifh well to : in that which 
 is original, omnipotent, and the canfe of all exiftence, 
 there can neither be weaknefs, nor indigence, nor an 
 oppofition of its interefts to thofe of its workman fhip. 
 If thefe more abftracl: reafonings do not fatisfy, let 
 us confider others more obvious from the effects of 
 the Divine counfel and power. 
 
 VI. In judging of the defign of any mechanifm, Proofs of g ooi. 
 where we tolerably underftand it, we can always difcern^^tS 
 the natural intention, the proper end or effect of the Pewr ' 
 
 Vol. I. Z
 
 The Original Mind 
 
 Book I. contrivance: and diftinguiiri it from events which may 
 ^/V~v cnfue, or be the neceilary attendants or con- 
 
 fequents of it, tho* they are no part of the end aimed 
 at bv the contriver. The fined ftatue may hurt one, 
 tailing on him : the moll regular and convenient 
 . mull obftruct the inhabitant s pr :he 
 
 r.vens and the earth, more than a field does: and 
 mull put him to fome trouble and expence in fuppor- 
 tino; ic. By the mofl benign and wifely contriv 
 courfe of the fun fome fever mufl happen in 
 
 fome places. Some evils may be fo eiTentially connec- 
 ith the means of the fupreme good, that Om- 
 rxe cannc: :c it attainable to fome beir 
 :hout them. Such evils therefore mufl - in a 
 rid contrived bv perfect Goodnefs. The good:: 
 :herefore of the author of a fyflem, in which fome e- 
 ' vils appear, may befurEc:: :: : :1 if the natv 
 delign of the ilructure appears to be good and benign, 
 and the evils only fuch as mull enfue upon 
 
 or fuperior good. This reafoning wil. 
 confirmed if we find a great fuperic: 
 of pleafure, of happinefs, actually enjoyed by means of 
 the conflitution and laws eftabliihed in nature. C: 
 tures who have no immediate intuition of the Crea- 
 tor, nor a compleat knowledge of the whole plan and 
 all its parts, can ex : tter evidence; nor fhould 
 
 the re it. 
 
 X all : :echani&n obferved, has con- 
 
 fervation of life, pleafure, I in for 
 
 or other ; for its natural en;. _ . . . . I fenfes of
 
 IS BENEVOLENT Or GOOD. I 79 
 
 animals recommend things falutary, and reject what Chap. 9. 
 is deftructive: and the finer powers of perception in' 
 like manner recommend to every one what is benefi- 
 cial to the fyftem, as well as to the individual; and 
 naturally raife averfion to what is pernicious. The 
 whole inward conftitution of the affections and moral 
 faculty above explained, is obvioufly contrived for the 
 univerfal good, and therefore we only hint at it in this 
 place. Some kinds of animals are plainly fubordina- 
 ted to fome others, and the powers and inftincts of the 
 fuperior fpecies may be deftructive to the inferior; but 
 they are the means of good to the fpecies in which they 
 refide. The effects of them on the inferior is indeed 
 the depriving fome of them fooner of their exiftence ; 
 but not in a worfe manner than they mull have loft 
 it however in a natural death : nay the fuddennefs of 
 the violent death, to a creature of no fore-thought, 
 makes it preferable to the tedious fort we call natu- 
 ral. And many of fuch low kinds muft have periiTied 
 as early by want of fuftenance, had not nature pro- 
 vided other caufes more gentle than famine. An ori- 
 ginal malicious being would have exercifed its art in 
 proper engines of torture, in parts formed for no other 
 purpofes, in appetites and fenfes leading ordinarily to 
 what would be ufelefs or pernicious, even in a mode- 
 rate degree; in impatient ardours for what gave no 
 pleafure or ufe ; in excrefcences ufelefs for life or ac- 
 tion, but burdenfome and tormenting; and in af- 
 fections pernicious to fociety, approved by a perverfe 
 tafle. 
 
 Z 2
 
 !8o The Original Mind is benevolent. 
 
 Bo o x I. Obferve all nature as far as our knowledge extends; 
 
 l/^/^j we find the contrivance good. The objections of the 
 - Epicureans, and of fome moderns, arofe from their ig- 
 norance. The alledged blemilhes are now known to 
 be either the unavoidable attendants or confequents 
 of a Itruclure and of laws fubfervient to advantages 
 which quite over-ballance thefe inconveniences ; or 
 fometimes the direct and natural means of obtaining 
 thefe advantages. The vaft ocean, often reputed bar- 
 ren, we find is a necefTary refervoir of water for 
 the ufe of all land animals ; itfelf alfo peopled with 
 its own tribes, and richly furniihed for their fubfif- 
 tence, from which too men derive a great fupport. 
 The mountains are partly ufeful for pafture, for fruits, 
 and grain; and partly for procuring rain, fountains, 
 rivers. Storms arife from fuch caufes as are mofi: ne- 
 cefTary for life, the exhalation of vapours by the fun, 
 and their motion in the air. The care, attention, and 
 labour, incumbent on men for their fupport, invigo- 
 rate both the foul and the body: without them the 
 earth becomes a barren forreft, but by them becomes 
 a joyful copious habitation: and they are the natural 
 caufes of health and fagacity. 'Tis every way our ad- 
 vantage that we have no fuch flothful paradife as the 
 poets feigned in the golden age.* 
 
 VI. But tho' it be granted that the contrivance na- 
 '-turally tends to good, yet if God be omnipotent, fay 
 
 * Compare the cenfures of Lucretius 
 on the ftrufture of the earth lib. v. from 
 line 195 to 236, with our prefcnt difco- 
 veries in isatural Philofophy upon thefe 
 
 fubjecls. His brother-poet Virgil, beauti- 
 fully defends Providence upon the labori- 
 ous condition of mankind, 1 Georg. line 
 120 to 145.
 
 The Original Mind is benevolent. 181 
 
 fome authors, " why are we made of fuch poor ma- Chap. 9 . 
 
 " terials, that we are often oppreffed with pain during ^/"V\J 
 
 " life; often tormented by our own pafTlons, and by 
 
 " the injuries of others ? Our frame too at laft de- 
 
 " cays, and we yield our places with great pain to our 
 
 " fucceflbrs of the fame fpecies. Why are we of fuch 
 
 " frail materials ? why this fucceifion of generations ? 
 
 " why are our minds fo imperfect either as to know- 
 
 " ledge or virtue? might we not have had too greater 
 
 " ftrength of understanding, and a better proportion 
 
 " among our affections ?" 
 
 In anfwer to thefe arduous queftions let us confT- 
 der, what is highly probable, that the belt poffible '.•«#"''« Z 
 conftitution of an immenfe fyftem of perceptive b e . beJi M™' 
 ings may neceffarily require a diverfity of orders, fome 
 higher in perfection and happinefs, and fome lower. 
 There may be abundant enjoyments to fome orders 
 of beings without focial action. But this we are fure 
 of from experience, that there are orders of beings 
 pretty high in the fcale, whofe fupreme enjoyments- 
 confift in kind affections, and in exerting their powers 
 in good offices from thefe affections. Nay 'tis impof- 
 fible for us to conceive an higher fort of enjoyment. 
 The confcioufnefs of good-will to others tho' inactive, 
 is highly delightful; but there is ftill a fuperior joy in 
 exerting this difpofition in beneficent actions. What 
 if this be the fupreme enjoyment in nature, as our 
 minds feem to feel it is ? This muft be excluded out 
 of nature in a great meafure, unlefs there be imperfec- 
 tion, indigence, pain, and even moral evil in nature.
 
 Tbt Original Mind is benevok; 
 
 Book I. There may be a focial congratulation and efteem a- 
 rn :fed happy beings, in a ftate of inac- 
 
 : ■'■ . lout any diflicul ties. Bui: there can be no 
 
 ion where there is no evil. 
 
 N tto mention, what is obvious among men, that 
 
 ;) ~our fenfe of many high enjoymc th natural and 
 
 m - cedingly heightened by our having obfer- 
 
 vedo: of the con trary evils. The 
 
 .ole life of virtue among men, whic (hewed to 
 
 be the chief en] oyment, is a c : with evils natui al 
 
 or moral. No place can be for liberality where there is 
 no indigo r for fortitude where there is no danger; 
 
 or for temperance where there are not lc 
 an - 3ns; or for m - nd forgivene: viendly 
 
 monitions and counfels, and long-fuffering, and re- 
 quital of evil with good, where a : is incapable 
 
 moral evil. Such lovely offi c x ; . the remembrance of 
 
 lich mufl be eternal ghtful, mud L e excluded ; 
 
 or fome moral evils mud exiit,. > hat patience, 
 
 reiignation, and trull in G 3 d can be exercifed in a I 
 tern where mifery cannot s :hen the higheft en- 
 
 jjncei" :: 3 be introduced in- 
 
 to the univerfe. fome evils mult, come alono- with 
 them. Naj hat (hall of the 
 
 highell orders, if there were non. inf eri r to th : m ; no 
 good to be done, no kind offices, no evils to be war- 
 ded off, or good foraK anting to be commu- 
 
 . conceive any thing more bleffl 
 or delightful to the Deity, than communicating of 
 good to indigent c res in different orders I And
 
 The Original Mind is benevolent. 183 
 
 muft not the higheft goodnefs move him to furnifli to Chap. 9. 
 the feveral higher orders opportunities for fuch di-^VXJ 
 vine exercifes and enjoyments, by creating alfo orders 
 inferior to them, and granting different degrees of a- 
 bilities and perfection to the feveral individuals of the 
 fame fpecies, that thus they may exercife their good 
 affections in beneficent offices ? 
 
 If thus the moft perfect goodnefs would determine PerfeB oi : 
 the Author of Nature to create different orders of "^ mttJl make 
 beings, and lome of them fubjecl to many evils and w ^ oorf «y»- 
 imperfections ; the fame goodnefs muft require that' 
 this plan of creation be continued down to the lowed: 
 fpecies in which a fuperiority of good to the evils in 
 its lot can be preferved, while the creation of fuch in- 
 ferior fpecies obftructs not the exiftence of as many 
 of the fuperior, as the moft perfect univerfe can ad- 
 mit. The lot therefore of great imperfection mull: fall 
 fomewhere : mankind can no more juftly complain 
 that they were not in an higher order, than the brutes 
 that they were not made men. 
 Don't we fee this confirmed in experience ? We have , TKi c " 
 
 -L by experience. 
 
 no ground to believe that this earth could nourifh an 
 higher order than mankind. A globe of this kind may 
 be neceffary in the fyltem: it muft have fuch inhabi- 
 tants or be defolate. Befides all the men it could 
 maintain, there yet is* room for other lower orders fub- 
 ordinate and fubfervient to their fubfiftence. We find 
 all places peopled with fuch orders of life and fenfe 
 as they can fupport ; the inferior occupying what is not 
 fit for the fuperior, or what is neglected by them. In
 
 The Original Mind is benevolent. 
 
 like manner, lee us afcend to higher orders : there may 
 be as many fuch as the beft fyftem of the univerfe ad- 
 mits ; and yet in this great bouft of our father there arc 
 many man/ions unfit for the higher orders, but too 
 good to be dcfolate; and they are occupied by men, 
 and lower animals. This was their place, or they muft 
 not have exiftcd in the fyftem. This earth perhaps 
 could not furnifh bodies uncapable of decay, and as 
 this decay comes on, we lofe our keen appetites and 
 fenfes of the goods of life. The fcene cloys ; we quit 
 it, and give place to new fpectators, whofe livelier fen- 
 fes and appetites and more vigorous powers make it 
 a greater bleiTlno; to them. 
 
 VII. But men will make further complaints. "Why 
 J " thefe harm laws of fenfation, fubjectingus to fuch 
 " acute pains, to fuch fympathetick forrows, and re- 
 " morfer why fuch furious paihons ?" and cannot an 
 " omniprefent infinite Tower interpofe, beyond the 
 " common courfe of nature, in behalf of the inno- 
 " cent, the virtuous r no variety of bufmefs can fatigue 
 " or diftract the Deity" 
 
 But in reply to all this : 'Tis abfolutely neceflfary for 
 the prefervation of life that deftructive impreihons 
 from without, and indifpoiitions from within, fhould 
 occafion pain to animals. Were it not fo, how few 
 would in any keen purfuits guard againft precipices, 
 wounds, burning, bruifes, or hurtful abftinence from 
 food. How could we be apprized of diforders, or 
 euard aeainft what mi^ht increafe them ? This law is 
 abfolutely neceflary to men of maturity and know-
 
 The Original Mind is benevolent. 185 
 
 ledge; and how much more fo to the young and im- Chap. 9. 
 prudent ? Nor can we complain of the law as confti- ^V"\~; 
 tuting too acute fenfations, fince they do not univer- 
 fally obtain their end. The experience of the gout, 
 and ftone, and fevers, and racking fores, does not re- 
 ftrain all men from the vices which expofed them to 
 thefe torments.* 
 
 Can we morejuftly repine at other lawsfubjecKng us So art aU fgddl 
 to companion and remorfe? are they not the kind ad- ™ dm 9" l M 
 monitions and exhortations of the Univerfal Tare?2t 9 
 delivered with fome aufterity, to reftrain us from what 
 may hurt us or our brethren, and excite us to afllft. 
 them ; or natural chaftifements when we have been de- 
 ficient in our duty to any part of this family. 
 
 VIII. As to the ftopping of thefe laws in favour of theu^^uu 
 the innocent who by means of them are now expofed nothJhr > cd - 
 to many calamities, as by ftorms, fires, fhipwrecks, 
 the ruins of buildings, which make no diflinctions ; let 
 us confider that the conftant flopping or fufpending 
 the general laws when they would occafion any evil 
 not fubfervient immediately to fome prefent and fu- 
 perior good; or the governing the world by a variety 
 of diflimilar wills, and not by uniform rules or laws ; 
 
 * One would think this common rea- 
 foning abundantly clear and certain ; but 
 
 (dipa-ir*; <f zri y.avo; dusTpoerrrii \x. r ,hax. Mr. 
 
 Bayle in his Reponfe a un Provincial 
 ch. 77. tells us, " That we might have 
 " had an ordinary fenfation of pleafure 
 " when all was well ; and that a fenfible 
 " abatement of this pleafure might have 
 ** fufficiently intimated to us our dan- 
 
 VOL.I. 
 
 "gers: " Whereas we find that much 
 Wronger intimations and motives from the 
 acutefl: pains, do not always deter from 
 luxury and intemperance; or give fuffici- 
 ent caution even to the aged. And what 
 will deter the rafh and young ? This abate- 
 ment he talks of might indeed be fufficient 
 if men were fuch triflers as to mind no- 
 thing but that fenfation hefuppofes. 
 
 Aa
 
 I S5 The Original Mind is benevolent. 
 
 I. would immediately fuperfede all contrivance or fore- 
 <^s~kj thought of men, and all prudent action. There could 
 be no room for projecting any kind offices to others, 
 or concertin. fchemes for our own intereft, ilnce 
 
 could find no conitant or natural means for exe- 
 cuting- them . Nay all fueh (Solicitudes would be ufe- 
 s and vain, as there neither would be any proper 
 means, nor any need of action; fince we ihould find 
 U evil was prevented, and good obtained, with- 
 out our activity*. Thus all active virtue mult be ex- 
 cluded. 
 
 Or (hall the laws obtain whenever the effect is in- 
 nocent or ufeful, but always be fufpended when it is 
 "pernicious : This would make all human activity vain. 
 No good man would be faint or weary with failing, 
 or labour; or be cold when he was naked. No occa- 
 D for any ailiitance or good-offices to a good man. 
 Nay our pleafures would lofe a great deal of 
 
 m reliih, which partly arifes from experience of 
 pain. Reft is only grateful after wearinefs ; and food 
 ? the bed favour after hunger. And all active vir- 
 tues mult be fuperfeded as entirely fuperiiuous. 
 Or ihall the laws only then be fufpended when God 
 
 . 
 
 
 ,• 
 
 forefecs that no good ihall arife from thefe evils which 
 
 .—s, no roan would attempt 
 to move. - not folic 
 
 will, or not ic . ' ', or 
 
 it would ti. .rj inlUnc. 
 
 : t depend on the pro- 
 : of others, nor hope for 
 
 Food wo-jJd oftcr. 
 
 to nonr-fh ; nor would the want of it oc- 
 
 pain or death. Bodies wojld not 
 
 of reft, or motion ; 
 
 :. None would build, 
 
 '. If the 
 
 .ned, yet we could difcern no- 
 
 Poifons and
 
 The Original Mind is benevolent. 187 
 
 enfue upon them, but take place when good is to a- Chap. 9. 
 rife from them ? This may be fo in fact, tho' we do 
 not difcern the good that may arife from fuch evils. 
 But do they want that the laws mould be flopped 
 when fome prefent vifible fuperior good does not arife 
 from the evils they occafion ? that ficknefs or pain 
 befalling infants or other innocents mould be preven- 
 ted, whenever God forefees that none will, or none 
 can, by any virtuous office relieve them ? " Many e- 
 " vils, fay they, occafion no exercifes of virtue either 
 " by the fufferer, or by others. Many injuries do not 
 " exercife the virtues of patience, refignation, orfor- 
 " givenefs, but draw after them bitter refentments, 
 " and a Ions; train of mifchiefs. The laws of nature 
 " might in thefe cafes be fufpended, and take place 
 " in others." 
 
 But again, if the courfe of nature were ftill obfer- 
 ved to alter in favour of fuch whom none aflifted, all 
 fuccour would be fuperfluous. Men would continue in 
 thefe fins of omiiTion, that this grace might abound. 
 The good would ever be expofed to injuries and fuf- 
 ferings ; for to fuch they would give occafion for exer- 
 cifing patience, refignation, and forgivenefs ; but the 
 obitinate, the haughty, and the proud muft remain 
 fecure. And why ihould men ftudy to govern their 
 pafTtons, when the worft of them, they would fee, could 
 do no harm. 
 
 Or ihall the courfe of nature take its full effect in 
 bringing evils on the wicked, but always alter in favour 
 of the good? Evenfo, all care about the c;ood would 
 
 A a 2
 
 Tbe Origin a t M i n d is benevolent. 
 
 Boos I. be foolifh, and the mod delightful virtues would be 
 l/^.^X^ iuperfluous. Again, the happinefs of the virtuov 
 
 :en much connected with that of others. Mult all 
 their families, friends, and countries be prot \ 
 this rate call the order of nature, the 
 
 knowledge of which can direct our actions: The de- 
 don muft be as common as the ordinary courfe. 
 And then there would remain no exercife for the pa- 
 tience of the virtuous, their resignation, fortitude, fa- 
 rheir intereits tc C and the Tublick, when 
 they were thus made impailible, and inacceilible to 
 the ftrokes of fortune. 
 
 fa good God tc 
 order of beings whofe chief enjoyments inould con- 
 fift in the vigour and activity of kind affections, and 
 moral pleafures, there muft be different orders of be- 
 ings; the world muft be governed neral laws u- 
 niverialry obtaining: and rr it evils, natu- 
 ral and moral, muft be permitted. 
 
 the fole foundation of the moft plau- 
 
 lible fcheme of two independent principles, the one 
 
 / and nw . and the oth: the mix aire 
 
 E obferve of evil and good in this world: lir 
 
 have abundantly proved that there muft be fuch a 
 
 mixture intended by the moft per:\ :: G it chat 
 
 fuppoiition muft be without any rational foundation. 
 
 i we obferve fome beings per" _ ood. and others 
 
 perfectly evil, there might be fome prefumption for 
 
 3 oppofite principles ; or did we difcover any 1: 
 
 cftined for mifcief alone, and others deitined
 
 The Original Mind is benevolent. 189 
 
 for good; this too would be another prefumption. Bat Chap. 9. 
 that two Minds, with oppofite intentions, mould al- Ky r ^r\J 
 ways unite and confpire in a mixed fyftem is incon- 
 ceivable. Now the whole of natural knowledge mews 
 us the contrary of thefe prefumptions: no fpecies is 
 conftituted abfolutely evil : no law obtains which is 
 not defigned for fuperior good. For this we muft re- 
 fer to all the ancient and modern obfervations on the 
 conftitution of nature. 
 
 Oppofite intentions in two caufes of equal art and' xoe/eR/rom 
 power could have no effect. They could have no mo- //!!«/>/«. 
 tive to unite in forming a world : fince each would 
 know that the art and power of the other would in- 
 troduce as much of what was offenfive to him, as his 
 own art or power could effect of what was agreeable. 
 
 Upon this fuppofition mould we not plainly obferve 
 malicious mechanifm in the works of nature, as fre- 
 quently as we obferve what is kind and ufeful. But 
 nothing of this fort occurs. No malice, original, fe- 
 dace, and unprovoked appears in the works of nature; 
 but on many occafions we fee kindnefs gratuitous and 
 unmerited, in the tender relations of life, in the efteem 
 of virtuous characters by which we have not been pro- 
 fited, and in companion toward the unknown. No- 
 original or natural joy in mifery, it never pleafes with- 
 out fome previous notion of great moral evil in the 
 fufferer, or of fome oppofition to our inter eft. No 
 ?noral faculty is obferved approving what is hurtful to 
 the publick; but in all rational agents we find a con- 
 trary one, which immediately approves all kindnefs..
 
 
 Urn Original Mind 
 
 and humanity, and beneficence. Sure the arc of a ma- 
 licious principle mull: have exerced itfelf in fome ori- 
 ginal mechanifm deftined tor mifchief. 
 - ■ - - X. But granting the mechanifm to be nnivcrGuiy 
 
 good : yci if there appeared a prepollency of mifery in 
 orld, as fome good men in their melancholy de- 
 d amacions have alledged. it would ftill leave fome un- 
 c:.iv fufpicions in the mind. This prefent ftate is the 
 only fund of our evidence, independent of revelation, 
 from . we conclude about other worlds, or fu- 
 
 ture ftate S. If mifen* is fuperior here, tis true that 
 even in that cafe, the Deitj might be perfectly good, 
 as this miferv of a part might be neceffary for fome 
 fuperior good in the univerfe: but then we mould not 
 have full evidence for his o-oodnefs from the effects of 
 it. The cafe however is otherways. H.v s is far 
 
 fuperior to mifen*. even in this prefent world : and 
 this com I the evidence we could expect, or 
 
 require. 
 Firit as to natural Q-ood ' How frequent are the plea- 
 
 fkfmtr im tie O i i 
 
 V.-.-.v. fures of fenfe, and the g: dons of appetite: a 
 
 - how rare the acute fenfarion? oi pain? feldom do they 
 employ manv months in a life of feventv or eighty 
 : ;.rs : the weaker bodies who have a larger mare of 
 are not the hundredth part oi mankind. If bodi- 
 ly pleafure i low traniitory nature, fo is bo, 
 en the fenfation is paft, and \ ehenc 
 returns of it. all the evil is gone ; a 
 pleafanc i ions. Confider the frequent returns of 
 our pleafureSj and their duration will appear incorn-
 
 is perfeBly good. 191 
 
 parably greater; and they are pretty near as intenfe in Chap. 9. 
 their kind, as any pain we are commonly expofed to. ^VV 
 Such as are well experienced in both are not terrified 
 from fome high fenfual enjoyments by the danger of 
 pain enfuing. To ballance the acuter pains, which 
 are rare, let us confider the frequent recurrence of ve- 
 ry high pleafures. If many perifh early in life, the pain 
 they feel is probably neither fo intenfe, or lading, as 
 that felt by men in full ftrength ; nor is it increafed by 
 fears and anxiety. 
 
 The pleafures of the imagination, and of know- a ^;;^;* M 
 ledge, are pretty much a clear flock of good, with 
 fmall deductions, * as there is fcarce any pain proper- 
 ly oppofite to them : and the pains of fympathy are 
 over-ballanced, by the more lafting joys upon the re- 
 lief of the diftrefled, and upon the profperity of fuch 
 as we love : not to mention the joyful approbation of 
 the temper itfelf; the joyful hopes, under a good pro- 
 vidence, for all worthy objects of our affection: and 
 this pain we fee plainly is a neceflary precaution in 
 providence, to engage us to promote the happinefs 
 of others, and defend them from evil. 
 
 The difficulty feems greater as to moral evil. But Tie ^ :u n y 
 a perfon wholly devoid of all virtue is as rare as one' 1 /' 
 free from all vice. For the very kindefl: purpofes, God 
 has indeed planted a very high ftandard of virtue in 
 our hearts. We expect universal innocence, and a long 
 courfe of good-offices, to denote a character as good: 
 but two or three remarkably vicious actions make it 
 
 * See above ch. vii. § 14, 
 
 d evil.
 
 The Origi: t Mi 
 
 odious. Fraud, theft, violence, ingratirade, lewdnefs, 
 in a tew initances, ruin a character almoft irreparably; 
 tho the reft of life be innocent, and tho* thefe actions 
 were committed under great temptations, or flow 
 from no evil intention, but from fome felnih palTion 
 or ea^er appetite, or from even fome 1 artial 
 
 tendernefs, fuch as that to a family. There are few 
 in whofe \ e will not find an hundred actions not 
 
 onlv innocent, but flowing from fome lovely affection, 
 
 one flowing from any ill-natured intention- Paren- 
 tal love, rnendihips, gratitude,zeal forpartiesand coun- 
 tries, along with the natural appetites, and defires of 
 the means of felf-prefervation,are the common fprings 
 of human action. And feldom do their vices proceed 
 from any thing elfe than thefe principles grown per- 
 haps too ftrong to be reftrained by fome nobler or 
 more extenllve affections, or by a regard to the rules 
 which are requiiite for the good of focier e have 
 
 indeed a ftandard of virtue fet up in our hearts, which 
 we cannot keep up to : and thus are all confcious of 
 guilt in the fight of God. And yet the lower virtues 
 are fo frequent, that human life is generally not only 
 a fafe ftate, but very agreeable. 
 
 This circumftance in our conftitution, that the 
 ftandard of moral good is fet fo high, tho' it is apt to 
 give the mind an unfavourable impreflion of our fpe- 
 cies as very corrup : ry neceflary and ufeful, as 
 
 i s a ftrong reftraint from every thing injurious or 
 
 : ous, and a powerful fpur to a continual advance- 
 ment in perfection. Indeed without fuch a ftandard
 
 is perfe&ly good. 193 
 
 we could not have any idea of perfection, nor could Chap. 9. 
 there be any formed intention in the human mind x.o K - / ~ w ~ s ^ J 
 make progrefs in virtue. But when we fee fo few on 
 whom it has its full effect, even of thofe who live to 
 mature age, it feems to carry no faint intimation, 
 that either we once were in a higher ftate of perfec- 
 tion, or that fuch a ftate is ftill before us. Unlefs we 
 be deftined for fuch a ftate, the planting fuch a ftan- 
 dard muft have the fame unaccountable appearance, 
 as the laying up of great magazines, and trains of ar- 
 tillery, where no military operations were intended. 
 
 XL To confirm this prevalence of good in life, let A * °^ eal '• 
 us confider, that men can certainly tell what they 
 would defire upon any poflible fuppofition, as well as 
 in matters which actually befall them. Imagine a me- 
 dicine difcovered, which without pain would caff, both 
 foul and body into an everlafting fleep,or flop all thought 
 or exiftence for ever. In old age perhaps, or under 
 fome fore difeafes, fome few might chufe to ufe this 
 medicine, to efcape from all evil by the lofs of all 
 good ; but not one in a thoufand : and the few who 
 would, have enjoyed many years during which life was 
 eligible, for the months in which they would chufe 
 annihilation. Many of them have had their fhare of 
 life ; they mould be ready to leave it, as a fatisfied 
 gueft leaves a plentiful table. What altho' at laft death 
 mould for a few months become eligible to every one, 
 after an agreeable life for many years? If the judgments 
 of the young, while all the fenfes, appetites and pat 
 fions are vigorous, and joyful hopes inflame the ima- 
 
 Vol. I. B b
 
 The Original Mind 
 
 I. ginarion, may .ue the good of life the dg- 
 
 ^ments of the aged may be equally partial on the o- 
 ther fide, when all the powers are become languid, and 
 the mem : pleafures almoft effaced. Men in the 
 middle of hfe, who fee the condition of it, who re- 
 member the joys of youth, feel their prefent ftate, and 
 ob in others the condition of old age, a: 
 
 tainly the beft judges. Not one in a thoufand would 
 quit all he enjoys, to avoid all he fears. Tis high in- 
 gratitude in men to pique themfelves upon deprecia- 
 ting all the gifts of God, and aggravating all the e 
 
 our lot. Should Mercury come at their requefts, 
 when they have fretfully thrown down their burthens, 
 as in the old fable, they would foonintreat him, not 
 to take down their fouls to Lethe, but to help them 
 to take up their loads again. 
 
 In thefe debates fome recite all the wickednefs and 
 miiery they have feen, read, or heard related: wars, 
 murders, piracies, aflkflinations, lacking of cities, ra- 
 
 ;ing of countries, military executions, maflacr 
 crufado's, acts of faith in the holyinquifition: all the 
 frauds and villanies <L in courts of jufHce: all 
 
 the corruption, falfhood, diifimularion, ingratitude, 
 us undermining, and calumny, and lewdnefs, 
 in i : t c : woe the common employments 
 
 of mankind ; or as if a large portion of mankind were 
 concerned in fuch things by their ftations. Priibns, 
 and hofp i he abodes of the orirninal and difeafcd, 
 
 :r fo populous as the cities where they ftand: 
 they fcaice ever contained the thousandth part of a- 
 
 .
 
 is perfe&ly good. 195 
 
 ny flate. Miltons defcription of the infirmary, in his Chap. 9. 
 vifion, mud move the hardeft heart: but who will efti- V-/VX-^ 
 mate the health of a people from an infirmary. Amon- 
 ftrous plant or animal is long expofed to view in the 
 repoiicories of the curious : the rarity makes the view 
 entertain us, and makes us fond to talk about it. But 
 millions of regular compleat forms exift for one mon- 
 fter ; they are fo common that they raife no attenti- 
 on or admiration. We retain a lively remembrance of 
 any grievous ficknefs or danger we efcaped, of any 
 horrid calamity, or villany: our fouls are pierced with 
 wars, flaughter, mafTacres, plagues j forgetting the 
 vaftly fuperior numbers which efcape all thefe evils, 
 and enjoy the common peaceful condition of life. The 
 fufferers in thefe calamities feldom endure more pain 
 than what attends a natural death ; and they make not 
 a fortieth part of mankind. Scarce five hundred 
 thoufand of our countrymen have perifhed by thefe 
 calamities, in any century of the Britifh hiftory: and 
 forty times that number, in the word: of times, have 
 efcaped them. 
 
 'Tis that lovely natural companion which makes us ^^£"4= 
 fo deeply feel thefe great calamities and remember **«»**>««*. 
 them. We wifh well to all, and defire an happy flate 
 of the univerfe, from a yet finer principle ; and 
 deeply regret every contrary appearance, even when 
 we have no fears about ourfelves. Thefe lovely prin- 
 ciples in our conftitution mould plead more ftrongly 
 in our hearts for the goodnefs of the all-ruling Mind, 
 than thofe appearances of evil, were they as great as a 
 
 Bb 2
 
 jq6 The Original Mind 
 
 Boov . i. melancholy eloquence often paints them, could plead 
 c/W, for the contrary. 
 
 While hiftories relate wars, feditions, maiTacre:;, 
 and the corruptions and intrigues of courts, they are 
 fdent about thofe vaftly fuperior numbers who in fafe 
 obfcuritv, are virtuoufly or innocently employed in 
 the natural bufinefs and enjoyments of mankind. We 
 read the actions of the great, of men expofed to all 
 the temptations of avarice and ambition, raifed above 
 the common lot of honeft labour and induftry, with 
 minds often corrupted from their infancy by the ele- 
 vation of their fortunes, and all their paflions infla- 
 med by flattery and luxury. The focial joyful innocent 
 employments of the bulk of mankind are no fubjecls 
 of hiftory; nor even the ordinary regular adminiftra- 
 tion of a ftate in the protection of a people and the 
 execution of juftice. Hiftories dwell upon the critical 
 times, the fickneffes of ftates, the parties, and facti- 
 ons, and their contentions ; revolutions, and foreign 
 wars, and their caufes. Thefe dangers, their caufes, 
 and the remedies applied, muft be recorded for the 
 ufe of future ages ; and their rarity, in comparifon of 
 the natural bulinefs of focial life, makes them more 
 entertaining. Thus authors in medicine relate not the 
 agreeable enjoyments and exercifes of health. The 
 caufes, fymptoms, and prcgnofticks of diforders, their 
 critical turns, and the effects of different medicines 
 applied, are the proper fubj eels of their diflfertations. 
 
 Men placed in the higher conditions of life, enured 
 Do eafe and foftnefs, may imagine the laborious fhte
 
 is perfe&ly good. 107 
 
 of the lower, to be a miferable flavery, becaufe it Chap. 9. 
 v/ould be fo to them were they reduced to it with their ^-/"W^ 
 prefent habits of foul and body. But in the lower con- 
 ditions, ftrength of body, keen appetites, fweet inter- 
 vals of reft, moderate defires, and plain fare, make up 
 all their wants in point of fenfual pleafure. And the 
 kind affections, mutual love, focial joys, friendfhips, 
 parental and filial duties, moral enjoyments, and even 
 fome honour, in a narrower circle, have place in the 
 lower conditions as well as the higher; and all thefe 
 affections generally more fin cere, 
 
 XII. How mall a being too imperfect to compre- a™ men of 
 hend the whole adminiftration of this univerfe in aU2#£££ 
 its parts., and all its duration, with all the connexions wUe - 
 of the feveral parts, judge concerning the prefiding 
 Mind, and his intentions ? We fee particular evils 
 fometimes necefTary to fuperior good, and therefore 
 benignly ordered to exift. We fee alfo fome pleafures 
 and advantages occafioning fuperior evils. There may 
 therefore be other like connexions and tendencies on 
 both fides unknown to us. We cannot therefore pro- 
 nounce of any event that it is either abfolutely good, 
 or abfolutely evil, in the whole. How does a wife and 
 dutiful child judge of its parent's affections ? Or how 
 does one in mature years judge of the intention of his 
 phyfician when he is a ftranger to his art? The child 
 is fometimes reftrained in its pleafures, chaftifed, con- 
 fined to laborious exercifes or ftudies ; the patient re- 
 ceives naufeous potions, and feels painful operations. 
 But the child finds the general tenor to be kind; m->
 
 Tbe Original Mind 
 
 pleafures and conveniences fupplied ; and a con- 
 flant protection and fupporc afforded: it has found 
 the advantages arifing on fome occasions from re- 
 ilraint and difcipline : ic finds its powers, its know- 
 ledge.and its temper improved. The patient has found 
 health fometimes the effect of naufeous medicines. 
 Tis juft thus in nature. Order, peace, health, joy. 
 pleafure, are frill prevalent in this great family, fupe- 
 rior to all the evils we obferve. Human life is univer- 
 lly eligible,, tho 1 it is an unmixed iiate to none: we 
 a have no fuch prefumptions of any interefi of the 
 Supreme Mind oppoiite to that of his creatures, as 
 may lye againft the intentions of the belt of men. 
 Should we not then ufe that equity in our concluii- 
 ons about the D::r, , that is due to our fellows, not- 
 withflanding a few oppoiite appearance?. 
 
 XIII. Since then the whole contrivance of nature, 
 :ectly intended for good, and the prevalence of hap- 
 pinefs in confequence of it, proves the original ^ I: :.i 
 to be benevolent: wherever there is any real goodnc 
 a greater happinefs muil: be more deiired than a L; 
 and where there is ent power, the deiire ihall be 
 
 accompli If God be omnipotent and wife, all is 
 
 dl: the bell order obtains in the whole: no evil is 
 permitted which is not neceiTary for fuperior good, 
 or the neceiTary attendant and confequent upon what 
 is ordered with the moil benign intention for the 
 perfection and happinefs of the univerfe. 
 Tis arrogant to demand a particular account how 
 . each evil is neceiTary or fubfe: ;o fome fuperior
 
 is perfe&ly good. ioq 
 
 good. In the beft poffible fcheme many things muft Chap. 9. 
 be inexplicable to imperfect knowledge. The ends ^/w 
 and connexions muft be hid, as fome fteps in the oe- 
 conomy of the parent, or the practice of the phyfici- 
 an muft be dark to the child, or the patient. 'Tis 
 enough that we difcern the natural end to be good in 
 all the mechanifm of nature which we underftand ; 
 that happinefs is prevalent, and our ftate very eligible. 
 All new difcoveries increafe our evidence by fhewing 
 the wife purpofes of what before feemed an imperfec- 
 tion. A candid mind muft conclude the fame to be 
 the cafe of parts whofe ufes are yet unknown. The 
 very anxieties of men about this grand point, help to 
 confirm it, as they fhew the natural determination of 
 the foul to wilh all well in the univerfe ; one of the 
 cleareft footfteps of our benevolent Creator imprin- 
 ted in our own hearts. This truth muft be acceptable 
 to all, where vanity, affectation of Angularity and of 
 eminent penetration, or an humour of contradiction, 
 hath not engroffed- the heart. 
 
 XIV. Add to all this, that the prevalent goodnefs Thehpeso/a 
 obferved in the adminiftration of nature leads to an™}*//"*™ 1 " 
 hope which at once removes all objections, that of a 
 future ftate of eternal exiftence to all minds capable 
 of moral fentiments, of enquiring about the order of 
 the whole, of anxiety about it, of knowing its author, 
 or of any fore-thought about exiftence after death. 
 The powers of thought and reflection, as they extend 
 to all times paft and future, and to the ftate of others 
 as well as our own, and are accompanied with exten-
 
 
 200 The Original Mind 
 
 Bo ok I. five affections and a moral faculty, make all orders of 
 Kj^sf~\j being endued with them capable of incomparably 
 greater happinefs or mifery than any of the brutal 
 kinds. If the duration of men is to be eternal, and an 
 happy immortality obtained by thefe very means which 
 are moft beatifick to us in this life; the evils of thefe 
 few years during our mortal ftate are not worthy of 
 regard; they are not once to be compared with the 
 happinefs to enfue. 
 thllZn. ° f The boldeft. Epicurean never attempted direct proof 
 that a future ftate is impoiTible. Many have believed 
 it who conceived the foul to be material. Mankind 
 in all ages and nations have hoped for it, without any 
 prejudice of fenfe in its favour. The opinion is natu- 
 ral to mankind, and what their Creator has defigned 
 they mould entertain. 'Tis confirmed not a little by 
 arguments which fhew the fubj eel of thought, reafon, 
 and affections not to be a divifible fyftem of diftincr. 
 fubftances, as ever} 7 part of matter is. The fimplici- 
 ty and unity of confeioufnefs could not refult from 
 modes difperfed and inherent in an aggregate of dif- 
 ferent bodies in difHncl places.* Nor is the activity of 
 the foul confident with the paffivenefs of matter. We 
 feel our happinefs or mifery, and the dignity and per- 
 fection, or their contraries, for which we efleem or 
 diilike ourfelves or others, to be qualities quite infen- 
 
 * This argument from our confeiouf- 
 nefs of the unity of the perceiver and a- 
 gent, in all that multitude of fenfations, 
 judgments, aifeclions, defires, is well ur- 
 
 ged by Ariftotle de Anhna. 1. i. and by 
 Dr. Sam. Clarke. See alfo Mr. Baxter's in- 
 genious book on this fubjecr.
 
 is perfetlly good. 201 
 
 fible, no way related to the body or its parts, or af- Chap. 9. 
 fected by any changes befalling the body. <~^V~\-J 
 
 The nature and order of our perceptions fhew this t& nature «/ 
 diflinclion. Firft, external fenfat ions prefent fpims^rX*" 
 quite diftinct from this felf, and no further related to 
 it than that they are perceived. Their changes to the 
 better or the worfe affect not nor alter the ftate of 
 the perceiver. A fecond fet of perceptions approaches 
 a little nearer, thofe of bodily pleajure and pain. The 
 ftate of the perceiving felf is affected by them, and 
 made eafy or uneafy. But nature orders in a way quite 
 inexplicable, that thefe perceptions are connected with 
 parts of the body, or the fpaces which they once oc- 
 cupied: and the accident is naturally conceived as af- 
 fecting the body, and not altering the dignity of the 
 foul. Let Anatomijis talk of motions propagated by 
 nerves to the brain, or to fome gland the feat of the 
 foul : when the finger is cut, as fure as pain is felt 
 at all, 'tis felt in the finger, or in the fpace where the 
 finger was. Nature declares the event to be an ac- 
 cident to the body, not deftroying or abating the ex- 
 cellence of the perceiver: not even when the fenfati- 
 ons indicate fuch accidents as muft foon deftroy the 
 body altogether. Nay fome fuch fenfations of pain 
 increafe rather the perfonal dignity; and fome fenfa- 
 tions of pleafure abate it. But there is a third fort of 
 perceptions, when we are confcious of knowledge, 
 goodnefs, faith, integrity, friendlinefs, contempt of 
 fenfual pleafures, publick fpirit. Thefe we feel to be 
 the immediate qualities of this felj] the perfonal ex- 
 
 Vol. I. C c
 
 2 02 The Original Mind 
 
 Book I. cellencies in which all its true dignity confifts, as its 
 \SW~\J bafenefs would confift in the contrary difpofitions. 
 We know thefe qualities, and their names, as well as 
 we do the fenfible ones: we feel that thefe have no 
 relation to the body, or its parts, dimenfions, fpaces, 
 figures. * Nature thus intimates to us a fpirit diftinct 
 from the body over which it prefides, in regulating 
 its motions, as clearly as it intimates the difference 
 of our bodies from external objects. Nay it intimates 
 a greater difference, or difparity of fubftance ; as all 
 the qualities of the foul are quite difparate and of a 
 different kind from thofe of matter : and 'tis only by 
 their qualities that fubftances are known. 
 3 " XV. God declares by the conftitution of nature, 
 " by the moral faculty he has given us, that he efpoufes 
 the caufe of virtue and of the univerfal happinefs. 
 Virtue in many inftances is born down and defeated 
 in this world. In fuch events our belt difpofitions give 
 us much forrow for others, and virtue fome times ex- 
 pofes to the greateft external evils. From the good- 
 nefs of God we muft hope for fome compenfation to 
 the worthy and unfortunate; and that the injurious 
 and oppreifive mail find caufe to repent of their con- 
 tradicting the will of a. good Deity. There is no defect 
 of power in God ; no envy or ill-nature. Shall beings 
 of fuch noble powers, fo far advanced in the perfecti- 
 ons God approves, with fuch defires and hopes of im- 
 mortality, be frultrated in their moil honourable 
 hopes? Hopes neceffary to their compleat enjoyment 
 
 • This reafoning frequently occurs in Plato. See i Alcibiade: K
 
 is perfeBly good. 20 3 
 
 of virtue in this world, fince without them they could Chap. 9. 
 have little joy, in this uncertainty of human affairs, ' 
 either from their own ftate, or from that of the deareft 
 and worthieft objects of all their beft affections. Shall 
 a plan of an univerfe fo admirable in other refpects 
 want that further part which would make all com- 
 pleat? What altho' God could not be charged with 
 cruelty or injuftice upon this fuppofition, fince he has 
 made virtue itfelf the chief happinefs, and vice the 
 fupreme mifery ? Shall we expect no more from the 
 original omnipotent Goodnefs than what we count a 
 poor degree of virtue in a man, the doing only that 
 good which is necefTary to avoid the imputation of 
 injuftice? How far is this furpafTed by the overflowing 
 goodnefs of fome worthy men ? And how unlike to 
 the conduct of that liberal hand xhatfatisfieth the de- 
 foes of every thing that lives? 
 
 If there are in the univerfe any rational agents ca- 
 pable of defection from their integrity, fpectators of 
 human affairs, who need motives to perfeverance from 
 the fanctions of laws : if fuch beings difcern the ex- 
 ternal profperity of the wicked, when their ftupified 
 confciences are infenfible of remorfe, and they live in 
 affluence of all the pleafures they relifh, and in a mo- 
 ment go down to the grave free from all future pu- 
 nifhment ; how muft this encourage any imperfect 
 fpectator in his vices ? Muft not fuch impunity of tranf- 
 greflbrs deftroy the authority and influence of the di- 
 vine laws ? The minds of a nobler relifh fee indeed 
 that the vicious have loft the fupreme enjoyments of 
 
 Cc 2
 
 The Original Mind is perfectly Good. 
 
 life ; but the vicious have no tafte for them, nor re- 
 oret for the want of them, and wallow in what they 
 reliiri. Can fuch unfelt puniihments anfwer the wife 
 ends of government, the correcting and reforming 
 even of thofe who are depraved in a great decree r 
 How little effect can they have, if men need dread 
 nothing further : 
 
 Should one behold a building not yet riniihed. the 
 feveral parts mewing exquiiite art, yet frill wanting a 
 further part to make all compleat and convenient, 
 room left for this part, and even fome indications of 
 this further building; intended; would not a candid 
 fpeclator conclude that this further part was aKb in 
 the plan of the architect, tho' fome reafons retarded 
 the execution of it r This is the cafe in the moral 
 world. The itrucrure is exquiiite, but not compleat: 
 we fee fpace for further building, and indications of 
 the defign in the deiires and hopes of all ages and na- 
 tions, in our natural fenfe of juitice, and in our moft 
 noble and exteniive affections about the ftate of o- 
 thers, and of the univerfe: and mall we not confide 
 and hope in the art, the goodnefs, the inexhauitible 
 wealth of the great Arc J?'::. 
 
 We have dwelt long on this head, rather pointing 
 out the fources of evidence than difplaying it fully, 
 becaufe the afcertainina: the goodnefs of God. is the 
 grand foundation of our happinefs and the main pillar 
 of virtue. We mall briefly touch at his other attri- 
 butes, leaft any miftakes about them mould abate that 
 high veneration and admiration due to his excellency.
 
 The other at- 
 ttes cfGi 
 4 for it. 
 
 Other Attributes of the Original Mind. 205 
 
 XVI. Firft all the reafons which prove any think- Chap. 9. 
 ing being to be a diftinct fubftance from matter, prove 
 that God is a fpirit, and is not the great material mafs tri'uLTfGoi 
 of this univerfe; as all the proofs of his exiftence are 
 proofs of original thought, wifdom, confeioufnefs, ac- 
 tivity, affection; powers quite inconfiftent with the 
 nature of matter. By calling him a fpirit we do not 
 mean that he muft be a fubltance of the fame fpecies 
 or kind with the human foul, and only greater. Tho' 
 all thinking beings differ in kind from all matter, yet 
 there may be innumerable orders or kinds of fpiri ts, 
 with eflential differences from each other, from that 
 loweft fpirit of life, which is. in the meaneft animal, to 
 the infinite Deity. 
 
 Again, what is original r and u ncaufed cannot be con- 
 ceived as limited in its nature, either by its own choice, 
 or by the will of any prior caufe, to any particular fi- 
 nite degree of perfection, or to thofe of one kind, 
 while it wants others. No pofTible reafon or caufe 
 can be afllgned for fome forts or degrees rather than 
 others. We fee from the effects, that the original per- 
 fections are high beyond imagination: and there was- 
 no prior will or choice of any being to confine it to 
 one fpecies or degree. This leads us to conceive an 
 original boundlefs ocean of all excellency and perfec- 
 tion, from which all limited perfections have been, 
 derived. 
 
 The fame thoughts lead us to conceive the origi- 
 nal Being as one, and uncompounded of diilincl: be- 
 
 Infinite. 
 
 Aid Qatb
 
 206 Other Attributes of 
 
 Boos I. ings or pares. No poflible reafon or caufe for plurali- 
 
 s^W/ ty, tor one number of original beings, rather than any 
 other. No evidence for more, from any effects or ap- 
 pearances which one origir.alCanj: cannot account for. 
 Nay all the appearances of connexion, mutual depen- 
 dencies of parts, and fimilarity of itructure, in thofe 
 rich are very remote from each other, lead us to 
 unity oi defigm and power. This ihews futiiciently the 
 vanity of 'Polytheifm, if any ever believed a plurality 
 of original beings. The wifer Heathens had a different 
 Tofytbeifin; and that of the vulgar arofi from low 
 conceptions of the Deities as weak and imperfect, fub- 
 ject to diffraction and confufion by a multitude of 
 cares, or bv an exteniive providence, and like men, 
 embaraffed when they undertake too much. One al- 
 mighty a ifcient Being can prelide eailly over all, 
 without toil or confuiion. 
 
 c«i/rf^. The continual power exerted in all parts of the 
 univerfe, and the unlimited nature of the original Be- 
 Is us to conceive himpoffeit of fuch omnipre- 
 ind im s is requilite to univerfal know- 
 
 ledge and acn;::. And that which is original mull: be 
 eternal. 
 g... XVI. From power, wifdom. and p-oodnefs we infer 
 
 ***• that God exercifes an univerfal providence. To a Be- 
 g endued with thefe perfections the itate of an uni- 
 verfe of fo manv creatures capable of happinefs or mi- 
 fery cannot be indifferent. Goodnefs mult excite him 
 to exert his power and wifdom in governing all for
 
 the Original Mind. 207 
 
 the beft purpofes, the univerfal happinefs. Nor can Chap. 9. 
 we conceive any exercife of his powers more worthy^-^v^o 
 of God, or more delightful to him. 
 
 iij-i 1 • 1 i /"• Goodnefs the 
 
 What other motive to create, but a delire to com- f P riu g of cnati- 
 municate perfection and happinefs ? God cannot be "' 
 conceived as ultimately ftudious of glory from crea- 
 tures infinitely below himfelf. And all defire of glory 
 muft prefuppofe that fome thing is previoufly difcern- 
 ed as excellent, that fome determination of his na- 
 ture, or fome affection, is effentially the object of his 
 approbation : and what other determination can we 
 fuppofe the objecl of his higheft approbation than per- 
 fect goodnefs, ever difpofmg him to communicate 
 happinefs. This determination muft move him to dif- 
 play his own excellencies to his rational creatures by 
 his works, that thus he maybe the fource of the higheft 
 happinefs to them, the nobleft objecl: of their contem- 
 plation and veneration, of their love, efteem, hope, and 
 fecure confidence, and the beft pattern for their imi- 
 tation. God difplays his perfections to make his crea- 
 tures happy in the knowledge and love of them ; and 
 not to derive new happinefs to himfelf from their prai- 
 fes, or admiration. 
 
 The ivifdom and goodnefs of God mew us his roo- ^jjjj 8 "^ "* 
 ral purity or holinefs. As he is independent, almighty, 
 and wife, he cannot be indigent: he can have no pri- 
 vate ends oppofite to the univerfal good; nor has he 
 any low appetites or paffions. Thefe are all the incite- 
 ments to moral evil which we can conceive. In God 
 none of them can have place, nothing contrary to
 
 so8 Oth r Attributes of the Original Mind. 
 
 Book I. d&t univerfal goodnefs in which he muft have the 
 higheit complacence. 
 
 His conduct toward his creatures muft be fuch as 
 o-oodnefs and wifdom fuggeft. K s mull: be good 
 
 and juft, adapted to the intereft and perfection of the 
 whole. No unwc rtfaj favourites ihall rind in him a par- 
 tial tendernefs inconliftent with the general good or 
 the (acred authority of his laws: no private views lhail 
 flop the execution of their fanctions, while the gene- 
 ral intereft, and the fupporting the on of thefe 
 laws require it. Tis no iniuft partiality that the lot 
 i hould have many advantages above that of 
 .;:>.::-?. This, we (hewed above, the be:: onkx mil 
 harmony ot the whole may require. Thefe are the na- 
 tural notions of juftice in a i Tis a 
 branch of goodnefs conjoined to wifdom, which muft 
 determine the governor to fuch conduct as may fup- 
 port the authority and influence of his laws for the ge- 
 neral good.
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 The Affections, Duty, and Worship, to be 
 exercifed toward the Deity. 
 
 I. TN the confideratlon of the feveral enjoyments of ma af e m nl 
 A our nature we fhewed the frequent occaflon men^k V<lf«- 
 muft have for recourfe to the Divine Providence, for'"""' 
 the fecurity of their enjoyments, and a (table tran- 
 quillity of mind, under the adveriities of this life 
 which may befall ourfelves, or the objects of our ten- 
 dered affections. We eftablifhed in the preceeding 
 chapter that grand foundation of our happinefs, the 
 exiftence, and moral perfections of God, and his pro- 
 vidence. It remains to be confidered what affections 
 and duty are incumbent on us toward the Deity thus 
 abundantly made known to every attentive mind. 
 
 In this matter, as much as any, our moral 'faculty r/,»w»^ 
 is of the higheft ufe. It not only points out the af- 
 f editions fuited to thefe perfections, but facredly re- 
 commends and enjoins them as abfolutely neceffary 
 to a good character ; and as much condemns the want 
 of them, as of any affections toward our fellow-crea- 
 tures. Nay points them out as of more facred obliga- 
 tion. The moral faculty itfelf feems that peculiar 
 part of our nature moft adapted to promote this cor- 
 refpondence of every rational mind with the great 
 Source of our being and of all perfection, as it imme- 
 diately approves all moral excellence, and determines 
 
 Vol. I. Dd
 
 2l0 The Worship due 
 
 Book I t ^ ie ^ ou ^ t0 r ^ e ^ OVe °^ lZ > anC * a PP roves c ^ s l° ve a S 
 
 ^/-y~\J the greateft excellence of mind; which too is the moil 
 
 ufeful in the fyftem, fince the admiration and love of 
 
 moral perfection is a natural incitement to all good 
 
 offices. 
 
 The worfhip fuited to the Divine Attributes is ei- 
 " ther internal, or external : the former in the fentiments 
 and affections of the foul; the later in the natural ex- 
 preilions of them. 
 h Our duty in refpecl: of the natural attributes of God 
 '"is to entertain and cultivate, by frequent meditation, 
 the higheft admiration of that immenfely great ori- 
 ginal Being, from which all others are derived ; and 
 to reftrain all low imaginations which might diminifh 
 our veneration; all conceptions of the Deity as limi- 
 ted, corporeal, refembling any brutal or human form, 
 or confined within certain places ; all which feem in- 
 confiftent with his infinite power and perfection, and 
 his original uncaufed exiftence. 
 ~ "" II. Due attention to the moral attributes muft ex- 
 
 /T*i in ii i 
 
 «■«• cite the higheft; poilible efteem, and love, and grati- 
 " tude. Extenfive liable goodnefs is the immediate ob- 
 ject of approbation, love, and efteem. \\ ifdom and 
 power joined to it, raife love, efteem, and admiration 
 to the higheft. They muft excite the moft zealous 
 ftudy to pleafe, the greateft caution againft offending, 
 and give the hio;heft fatisfaction in the confcioufnefs 
 of conformity to the will of a Being pofferTed of fuch 
 excellencies. When we are confcious of having of- 
 fended him, they muft fill our fouls ; not only with
 
 to the D E I T Y. 211 
 
 fears of punifhment, but with inward remorfe, inge-CHAp. 10. 
 nuous fhame, and forrow, and defire of reformation. <*/"V\j 
 
 Thefe divine perfections firmly believed, beget Tr:i ! 1 end re * 
 truft and refignation, and entire fubmiffion to every '" 
 thing ordered by Providence, from a firm perfuafion 
 that all is ordered for the beft, for the greateft uni- 
 verfal intereft, and for that of every good man. Ex- 
 tenfive goodnefs muft defire the beft ftate of the 
 whole ; omnifcience muft difcover the means ; and om- 
 nipotence can execute them. Every thing becomes 
 acceptable in the place where God orders, or permits 
 it; not indeed always for itfelf, yet upon implicit truft 
 or faith that it is neceffary for the purpofes of infi- 
 nite goodnefs and wifdom. We know that the be- 
 nign intentions of the Deity are partly to be execu- 
 ted by the active virtues of good men ; and that in 
 thefe virtues a great fhare of their fupreme perfection 
 and happinefs confifts. Our dependence therefore u- 
 pon the Divine Power and Goodnefs will retard no 
 kind and virtuous purpofes of ours, but rather invigo- 
 rate and fupport us with joyful hopes of fuccefs. The 
 fame refignation and truft we exercife for ourfelves,and 
 our own interefts, we fhall alfo exercife for all who are 
 dear to us by any virtuous bonds, for every honourable 
 caufe in which we or others are engaged; that it fhall 
 be profperous in this life, or tend to the future glory 
 and happinefs of thofe who have efpoufed it. 
 
 III. Juft apprehenfions of the creation and provi- cmuudt ani 
 dence of God muft raife the higheft refentments of gZ, %f!tyZ 
 gratitude, muft reprefs all vanity in his fight, all con-^/ °" rfd ' 
 
 Dd 2
 
 212 The Worship due 
 
 Bo ox I. tempt of others, and beget true humility. All the 
 <<^Y~\J good we enjoy, all the pleafures of fenfe, all the de- 
 lights of beauty and harmony, are fo many favours 
 ,. conferred on us by God. To his power we owe our ve- 
 ry beino-, we owe thefe obi eels, and the fenfes by which 
 iutaKm. ' -we enjoy them. If we interpofe our activity in impro- 
 ving the objects, or cultivating our own reliih, it was 
 God who gave us all our powers, all our art or fagaci- 
 tv, and furnilhed us opportunities for fuch pleafant 
 exercife, and fo agreeably rewards it. All the joys we 
 feel in mutual love, all the advantages we receive from 
 the aids of our fellows, are owing to God, who contri- 
 ved that frame oi foul for man. gave him fuch affec- 
 tions, and made him fufceptible of whatever can be 
 the object of love in him. He gave to all animal kinds, 
 human or brutal, their powers, fenfes, initincts, affec- 
 tions. He bound together the fouls of men with thefe 
 tender and focial bonds which are the fprings of all 
 good offices. The external advantages we procure to 
 each other by our active virtue?, God could have im- 
 mediately conferred by his power without any action 
 of ours ;. but, fuch was his goodnefs, he chofe that we 
 ihould enjoy fome ihare of that divine and honour- 
 able pleafure of doing good to others ; and, by the ex- 
 ercife of our kind affections and by our moral faculty, 
 we do partake of it. The joys we feel in being honoured 
 by our fellows are alfo his gift to us ; by his implan- 
 ting this fenfe of moral excellence, and that natural 
 delight we perceive in the approbation and efteem of 
 other
 
 io the Deity. 213 
 
 All the pleafures of knowledge, all the effects of Chap. 10. 
 art and contrivance, are owing to him, who taught us ^\^\J 
 more than the beafls of the field, and made us wlfer 
 than thefoxvls of heaven ; to him we owe that we can 
 difcern the beauty and kind intention and wifdom of 
 his works, and thus adore the footfteps of his wifdom 
 and goodnefs; that we can difcern moral beaucy, the 
 affections and conduct which are acceptable to him, 
 and mod refemble the Divine Beauty; that we can dif- 
 cover his perfections, and: imitate them ; and that we 
 can give fecure tranquillity to our fouls by an entire 
 confidence in them, and refignation to his providence. 
 By the reafon he gave us he converfes with us, affures 
 us of his good-will, gives us the moft friendly admo* 
 nitions ; and, by the affections of efteem, love, and 
 gratitude he has implanted, calls us to a ftate of friend- 
 ship with himfelf. Thus all our happinefs and excels 
 lency is from his, bounty. Not unto us, Lord, not un* 
 to us y but to thy name be the pralfe. 
 
 IV. 'Tis vainly alledo;ed, "that thefe devout affee- 7 hc ex ' r< S e * f 
 " tions are vain or ufelefs becaufe God needs them ""#7 t0 us > 
 " not, nor do they increafe his happinefs." They are 
 the. chief enjoyments of rational fouls, their higheft 
 joy in profperity, and fweeteft refuge in adverfity. The 
 rational heart cannot approve itfelf if it wants them ; 
 if it prefers them not to its chiefeft joys. Without 
 love, friendfliip, gratitude, life is infipid. Thefe affec- 
 tions, when mutual, are the more joyful the more ex- 
 cellent the objects are. What (table and tranfporting
 
 2ia The Worship due 
 
 Book I. joy mn & ar ^" e ^ rom nv i n g with an habitual fenfe of 
 the Divine Prefence, with the higheft love, admirati- 
 on, and gratitude, and juftly perfuaded of being ap- 
 proved and beloved and protected by him who is in- 
 finitely perfect and omnipotent. 
 
 Without this confidence in God, what can we call 
 fecure? Our bodies and all external things are obvi- 
 oufly uncertain: fo is the profperity of our friends, of 
 all the objects of our generous affections. Their very 
 virtues, tho' among the moll: (table things of life, are 
 not fecured againft change. Some accidents can dif- 
 turb their reafon and their virtue. 'Tis only the foul 
 refigned to God, with firm truft in his perfections, that 
 can promife to itfelf in the whole every thing happy 
 and honourable at laft. 
 
 In every good temper certain affections muft arife 
 upon their natural occafions, whether they can affect 
 the ftate of the object or not. Tho' we were fullv aware 
 of our own impotence, or want of opportunity to do 
 good offices, or make returns, a temper muft be odi- 
 ous which had no love and efteem of great excellen- 
 cy, no gratitude for great benefits. Thus joy muft a- 
 rife in a good heart upon the profperity of one belo- 
 ved, tho' we cannot add to it; and forrow upon his ad- 
 verfity, tho- we cannot remove or alleviate it. The 
 want of fuch affections, where there are fuch ftrong 
 natural caufes prefented, muft argue a depravity of 
 foul which we cannot avoid abhorring upon reflecti- 
 on. Thefe affections are as it were the natural attrac-
 
 to the Deity. 215 
 
 tion of the Divinity upon our fouls, and of every ex- Chap. 10. 
 cellence which refembles him in his works ; and every L^W>> 
 pure foul feels its force. 
 
 Nay, without lively apprehenfions of the Divine Noflahletran . 
 Providence, and continual refignation to his will, with?"' 7 ^ er . ha f' 
 a joyful confidence in his goodnefs,which are the main^™. 
 acts of devotion, our nobleft affections muft expofe 
 us to grievous fympathetick forrows in this uncertain 
 world. But a firm perfuafion of an omnipotent, om- 
 nifcient, and moft benign univerfal parent, difpofing 
 of all in this fyftem for the very beft ; determined to 
 fecure happinefs in the whole co the virtuous, what- 
 ever evils may befal them in this life ; and permitting 
 no further evil than what the moft perfect conftitution 
 requires, or necefTarily brings along with it ; a perfuafi- 
 on of all this, with like extenflve affections in our fouls, 
 muft afford the ftrongeft confolation in all our tender 
 forrows, and bring our hearts either chearfully to em- 
 brace, or at leaft calmly to acquiefce in whatever is 
 ordered or permitted by fovereign wifdom and good- 
 nefs. If our friends or favourites are at prefent un- 
 fortunate : this the very belt polity in this grand ftate 
 required: many more of our brethren and fellow-ci- 
 tizens, of as great virtue, are ftill happy. They have 
 their dear friends rejoicing with them ; their affections 
 are as tender and lovely ; their virtues are as valuable, 
 as thofe in our fet of friends. If ours are in diftrefs and 
 forrow, others with equal tendernefs and virtue are 
 rejoicing. One generation paffeth, and another comes;, 
 and the univerfe remains for ever; and ever as fruitful
 
 2*6 The Worship due 
 
 : t. in virtue felicity, Nay from the lhort period 
 
 lA^uwc know, we cannot conclude about the future mife- 
 
 arc now unfortunate. \\ e know not 
 
 .r-during couife of ages may bring to chofe 
 
 Ions whole misfortunes or vices we arebewai- 
 
 ling. The thoughts of a future eternity, under a good 
 
 G . make all things appear ferene, and joyful, and 
 
 rious. 
 
 \ conftant regard to God in all our actions and 
 •-■--'- ■■ -} ryments, will give a new beauty to evay virtue, by 
 ms : .l an act ot gratitude and love to him: and 
 
 increafe our pleafure m every enjoyment, as it will ap- 
 i :r an evidence of his goodnefs : it will give a divi- 
 r purity and Gmplicdty of heart, to conceive all our 
 virtuous difpoiltions as implanted by God in our hearts, 
 id all c :ent of our proper work, and 
 
 the natural duties of that Ration we hold in his uni- 
 udthefc ' - " e to this nobler country. 
 
 Our mii: I - flffiiom the lower views 
 
 of honours, or returns from men, and from all con- 
 ten: r pride toward our fellows who ihare not e- 
 quafl: ; goodnefs: our little pailions and refent- 
 
 jnts fhall be fuppreffed in his prefence. Our hearts 
 ■1 chic don, our aims ih all be 
 
 tained \ the part ailigned us faithfully 
 
 and gratefully to our great Creator, let others act as 
 thev pleafe toward us. The miitakes, imperfections, 
 provocations, calumnies, injuries, or ingraritude of 
 others we fhall look upon as ir prefented to us 
 
 by r providence for the exereiie of the virtues 0.
 
 to the Deity* 217 
 
 endued us with, by which we may more approve our Chap. 10, 
 felves to his penetrating eye, and to the inward fenfe <*/V*\J 
 of our own hearts, than by the eafier offices of virtue 
 where it has nothing to difcourage or oppofe it. 
 
 Thus as the calm and moft extenfive determination 
 of the foul toward the univerfal happinefs can have no 
 other center of reft and joy than the original indepen- 
 dent omnipotent Goodnefs ; fo without the knowledge 
 of it, and the moft ardent love and refignation to it, 
 the foul cannot attain to its own moft ftable and high- 
 eft perfection and excellence : nor can our moral fa- 
 culty y naturally delighting in moral excellence, obtain 
 any other compleat object upon which it can be fully 
 exercifed, than that Being which is abfolutely perfect, 
 and originally pofleft of all excellence, and the fource 
 of all fuch excellencies in others. 
 
 IV. External worfhip is the natural expreffion of tu „*&*& 
 thefe devout fentiments and affections. The obvious e ^[" al wr * 
 reafons for it are thefe; the exercife and expreffion of 
 all fentiments and affections makes their impreffions 
 deeper, and ftrengthens them in the foul. Again 5 
 gratitude, love and efteem, are affections which de- 
 cline concealment when they are lively; we are natu- 
 rally prone to exprefs them, even tho' they give no 
 new happinefs to their object. 'Tis plainly our duty 
 to promote virtue and happinefs among others : our 
 worihipping in fociety, our recounting thankfully 
 God's benefits, our explaining his nature and perfecti- 
 ons, our expreffing our admiration, efteem, gratitude, 
 and love, prefents to the minds of others the proper 
 
 Vol.L Ee
 
 The Worship d:.t 
 
 jm I. motives of like affections; and by a contagion, obfer- 
 ^v~\_ table in all our paiTions, naturally tends to raife them 
 in others. Piety thus diifufed in a fociety. is the l^rong- 
 efl reitraint from evil : and adds new force to even* fo- 
 rd difpoiition, to every engagement to good offices. 
 T ": " " The natural expreilions are, mitxucting others in 
 the perfections of Go i. and the nature of piety and vir- 
 tu: rreat end of his laws: praifes, thankfgiving-. 
 acknowledgements of his providence as the fpring of 
 all good by pravers, and expreilions of truit and re- 
 signation ; corrfelTion of our fins and imperfections ; 
 and imploring his pare :::. and :V.:ure aids for our a- 
 menenv. .:. We may add folemn invocation of him 
 the v.i and avenger of /.hood in our af- 
 fertions or promifi erever it may be requiiite to 
 fettle fome important right of our fellows, or to give 
 them confidence in our hdelitv. 
 
 J 
 
 V. O ur praife, adinira tic : k s . a d i n 3thing 
 
 to the Divine felicity; our confefTion give ; no new in- 
 formation : our importunity alters not his purpofes 
 -. .. * from what he had formerlv determined as be::. Our 
 earing makes him no more attentive, or difpofed to 
 execute iu(Uce, nor gives it any new right to puniih. 
 T heft f adoration, praife, thank ; . c : of - C 
 
 lion, prayer, increafe our own piety, love, and gra ti- 
 le, our abhorrence of moral evil, and our delires of 
 it d ^ood, and our reiignation t«: ill. 
 
 W hen we have lively difpolitions of this :re 
 
 befl prepared to improve all temporal blelhngs, and 
 may hope for them accoi iing to the gracious tenor
 
 to the Deity. sia 
 
 of Divine Providence. Invocations of God by oaths, in Chap. ro. 
 a religious manner, and on important occafions, muftl/'A^' 
 imprint the deepefl fenfe of our obligations to fidelity, 
 and of the crime of fallhood; and thus give the great- 
 -eft fecurity we can give, by words, to our fellow-crea- 
 tures. The effect of all thefe acts is upon ourfelves, 
 and not upon the Deity > or his purpofes, which have 
 been originally fixed upon a thorough forefight of all 
 the changes which could happen in our moral difpo- 
 fitions, which themfelves alfo are a part of the objects 
 of his eternal counfels and power. 
 
 'Tis a needlefs inquiry whether a fociety of Atheifts ?h e influence? 
 could fubfifl ? or whether their ftate would be better or ZS^mZi 
 worfe than that of men pofTefTed with fome wicked 
 fuperflition? True religion plainly increafes the hap- 
 pinefs both of individuals and of focieties. Remove all 
 religion, and you remove fome of the flrongefl bonds, 
 fome of the nobleft motives, to fidelity and vigour 
 in all focial offices. 'Tis plain too that fome fyflems 
 of religious tenets, where much wicked fuperflition 
 makes a part, may contain many noble precepts, rules, 
 and motives, which have their good effects upon the 
 minds of fuch as are not concerned in executing the 
 purpofes of the fuperflition. Thus many of the belt 
 moral precepts, and the doctrine of future rewards ap- 
 pointed for virtue, are retained in Popery, and excite 
 many to the mofl virtuous offices, whilfl others by 
 the fuperflitious political tenets, deflined for the ag- 
 grandifing of the ecclefiaflicks, and the enflaving of 
 
 E e 2
 
 220 The Worship due to the Deity. 
 
 Book I. the fouls and bodies of the reft of mankind, are exci- 
 
 ^/V^Jted to the moft horrid cruelties. 
 
 'Tis of no importance to determine whether fuch 
 fuperftitions have worfe effects than Atheifm. They 
 may, as to men in certain ftations ; tho' they hurt 
 not the reft confiderably. The experiment of a fo- 
 ciety of Atheifts has never yet been made. Grant 
 that the effects of fome fuperftitions were worfe than 
 thofe of Atheifm : this is rather honourable to reli- 
 gion. The beft ftate of religion is incomparably hap- 
 pier than any condition of Atheifm ; and the corrup- 
 tions of the beft things may be moft pernicious. A 
 forfeit of nourifhing food, may be more dangerous 
 than that of food lefs nourifhing : fpoiled wines are 
 more dangerous than bad water. 'Tis the bufinefs of 
 rational minds to take all the blefTings of a true reli- 
 gion, and guard againft any corruption of it, without 
 fearching out what motives might remain to fome 
 forts of virtues under the joylefs wretched thought 
 that the univerfe is under no providence, but left to 
 chance, or as blind and undefigning neceflity ; if reli- 
 gion, when depraved, does great mifchief ; a pure and 
 good religion is a powerful engine of much good.
 
 221 
 
 Chap, itl 
 
 CHAP. XL v^v^ 
 
 The Conclusion of this Book, /hewing the Way 
 to the Supreme Happiness of oar Nature. 
 
 HAving thus confidered the feveral fources of nefumo/hu. 
 happinefs our nature is capable of; and, upon"*'*****' 
 a full comparifon, found that the nobleft and moft 
 lafting enjoyments are fuch as arife from our own af- 
 fections and actions, and not the paffive fenfations we 
 receive from thofe external things which affect the 
 body: having alfo compared the feveral fort of affecti- 
 ons and actions, whether exerted toward our fellows 
 in narrower or more extended fyftems, or toward the 
 Deity, whofe nature and grand intention in the ad- 
 miniftration of the univerfe we have alfo endeavoured 
 to difcover: and having found that, as our moral fa- 
 culty plainly approves in an higher degree, all the 
 more extenhre affections toward our fellows than it 
 approves the more confined affections or paffions ; that' 
 thefe extenfive affections are alfo more noble fources 
 of enjoyment; and that our love of moral excellence;: 
 our knowledge, veneration, and love of the Deity, con- 
 ceived as perfectly good and wife and powerful, and 
 the fountain of all good ; and an entire refignation to 
 his will and providence is the fouree of our fublimeft 
 happinefs, the grand foundation of all our tranquil- 
 lity orfecurity as to any other object of the moft ho- 
 nourable deflres : 'tis plaiaour fupreme and complete
 
 • 2g 77v Supreme Happiness 
 
 :::; :: the univcrfal doctrine of the 
 ^r-\^^ v. lie:: men in all ages,fmuft confift in the compleat ex- 
 
 bler virtues, efpeci:. y that entire 
 love and refignarion to God, and o: :r vir- 
 
 tue i do not interfere with the fuperior: and in 
 
 the enj yment rf (befa c .:;.- is we cm, 
 
 nfiftendy with virtue, obtaii 
 r -' ""'- II. The courfe of life minted our to us 
 
 immediately by arm .". c . .. and banfinncd by all 
 mmjhg^juft conllderarion of our tru. in: ere::, nufi be the 
 vervirne which xhe. generous calm dete would 
 
 mend, a conftant ftudy to promote the moit u- 
 niverfal happinefs in our pov : doing all good of- 
 
 fices as v. e have opportunity which i: e with no 
 
 exteniive intereft of the fyftem . pref al- 
 
 ways the more extend ve and important offices to tb 
 
 Is extent and importance; and caution li- 
 
 ning from whatever may occafion any unneceiiarv mi- 
 y in this fyftem. This is the cardinal virtue of 
 juflice which the antients make the fupreme one. DO 
 ich the reft are all fubfervient. It may include even 
 cu: aa:ii : - Gi.i. 
 
 As fenfual enjoyments are the meaneft and moft 
 tranlitory, the delires c : v the impetuous fc i 
 
 of fome of our brutal pafllons, frequently feduce men 
 6 . m the courfe of virtue, i : mnfl be of high impor- 
 tance to be fully convinced of their meannefs, and to 
 acquire an habit of felf-command, a power over thefe 
 appetites in the mann. iained hen we 
 
 : : ~ : : • : ■
 
 of our Nature. 223 
 
 considered the nature of thefe enjoyments. 'Tis e- Chap. h. 
 qually neceilary by clofe reflexion to make a juft efti-^/V^j 
 mate of other more elegant enjoyments of the ima- 
 gination, that, as they are far inferior to moral and fo- 
 cial enjoyments, they may yield to them in our choice 
 where they interfere. This is the virtue of temperance. 
 
 A juft eftimation of the value of this life, and of and fortitude. 
 the feveral forts of evil we are expofed to, muft be 
 equally neceflary. If moral evils, and fome fympathe- 
 tick fufFerings are worfe than any external ones, and 
 can make life fhameful and miferable amidft all afflu- 
 ence of other things, as we fhewed above; if at beft r 
 life is but an uncertain pofleffion we muft foon lofe; 
 we fhall fee fomething that is more to be dreaded 
 than death, and many juft reafons why it may on cer- 
 tain occafions be our intereft to incur the danger of 
 it. Were death an entire end of all thought it would 
 indeed put an end to all good, but furely no evil could, 
 enfue. 
 
 num trifle videtur 
 
 ^uicquam ? nonne omni fornno fecurior extat, 
 But if we are to exift after death under a good Pro- 
 vidence, what a glorious foundation is this for forti- 
 tude in every honourable caufe? what ftrength of mind 
 muft that hope give to every good man upon appre- 
 henfions of death, or any of the evils which lead to it?. 
 This is the third cardinal virtue. 
 
 Trudence is that habit of attention to the nature P ^'T 
 
 rejuijtte tt virr 
 
 of the feveral objects which may follicit our defires, en- *« °f «">*** 
 gaging us to a thorough inquiry into their impor-
 
 224 "* Supreme Happiness 
 
 Book I. tance, in themfelves and their confequences, either to 
 c/^/^o the greater!: private happinefs of the individual, or to 
 that of the fyftem. This virtue is fome way prerequi* 
 fite to the proper exercife of the other three, and is 
 generally firft mentioned in order; xhd juftice is the 
 fupreme one to which all the reft are fubfervient. We 
 leave it to more practical treatifes to dilate upon thefe 
 things. The proper confiderations, and the means of 
 acquiring thefe four habits of virtue muft be evident 
 from what is faid above concerning the comparative 
 values of the feveral forts of good and evil, and con- 
 cerning the fupreme enjoyments of our nature. 
 Mimics. m. Many are difcouraged from a vigorous culture 
 of their minds for the reception of all virtues by a ram 
 prejudice. We are dazzled with the confpicuous glo- 
 ries of fome great fuccefsful actions in higher ftati- 
 ons ; we can allow fuch virtues to be the nobleft en- 
 joyments ; but they are placed fo high that few have 
 accefs to them. Nay perfons in higher ftations often 
 defpair when their power is not abfolute. The hu- 
 mours, follies, or corrupt views of others obftrucl all 
 their good intentions. They are freted with fuch dis- 
 appointments, and quit the purfuits of virtue, defpon- 
 ding of any valuable enjoyment attending it. 
 
 To arm the foul againft this prejudice, we mould 
 remember that the reality and perfection of virtue, 
 and the inward fatisfaction of it too, to a calm mind, 
 depends not on external fuccefs, but upon the inward 
 temper of foul. Perilfting under thefe doubts about 
 the fuccefs or glory, in the publick offices of virtue;
 
 of our Nature. • 225 
 
 or if we are excluded from them, in all the lower pri* Chap, i i. 
 vate offices ; in a conftant fweetnefs of deportment in vy"W/ 
 obfcurity, and a conftant refignation to the Jiipreme 
 Mind; embracing chearfully the lot appointed for us, 
 repreffing every envious motion, and every repining 
 thought againft providence, refolving to go ftcdfaftly 
 on in the path pointed out to us by God and nature,. 
 till our mortal part fall down to that earth from 
 whence it fprung; muft appear rather more noble and 
 heroick to the All-fear ching Eye, and to the judg- 
 ment of every wife man, than the more glittering vir- 
 tues of a profperous fortune. In thefe there is lefs 
 purity and fimplicity difcovered, fince the alluring 
 views of glory and worldly interefts may have had a 
 large fhare in the affections, or been the principal mo- 
 tives to the agent. 
 
 When we defpair of glory, and even of executing 
 all the good we intend, 'tis a fublime exercife to the 
 foul to perfift in acting the rational and focial part as 
 it can; difcharging its duty well, and committing the 
 reft to God. Who can tell what greater good might 
 be attainable if all good men thus exerted their powers 
 even under great uncertainties of fuccefs, and great 
 dangers of mifreprefentations and obloquy? Or how 
 much worfe fhould all matters proceed, if all good 
 men defponded and grew remifs under fuch apprehen- 
 lions ? If virtue appears more glorious by furmounting 
 external dangers and obftacles, is not its glory equal- 
 ly increafed by furmounting thefe inward difcourage- 
 ments, and perfifting without the aids of glory or 
 
 Vol, L F f
 
 226 The SrpifcME Happiness of our Nature. 
 
 Book I. applaufe, conquering even the ingratitude of thofe it 
 ferves, fadslied with the filent teftimony of our hearts, 
 and the hopes of Divine approbation. Thus the moil 
 heroick excellence, and its confequent happinefs and 
 inward jov. may be attained under the vrorft circum- 
 ftances of fortune: nor is any ftation of life excluded 
 from the enjoyment of the fupreme good. 
 
 THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.
 
 22? 
 
 V 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 Containing a Dedu&ion of the more fpecial Laws of 
 Nature, and Duties of Life, previous to Civil 
 Government, and other adventitious States. 
 
 CHAP. L 
 
 The Circumflances which increafe or diminijh the 
 Moral Good, or Evil of ABions. 
 
 HAving fhewed, in the former book, that the 
 courfe of life which God and Nature recom- 
 mends to us as moil lovely and moll: conducive to the 
 true happinefs of the agent, is that which is intended 
 for the general good of mankind in the wifeft manner 
 that our reafon and obfervation can fuggeft ; we pro- 
 ceed, in this book, to enquire more particularly into 
 the proper means of promoting the happinefs of man- 
 kind by our actions, which is the fame thing with in- 
 quiring into the more fpecial laws of nature. And this 
 we fhall endeavour to do firft abftracting from thofe 
 adventitious ftates or relations which human inftitu- 
 tions or actions have conftituted, confidering only that 
 relation which nature hath conftituted among all. But 
 it may be neceflary here to premife fome account of 
 many complex notions of moral qualities, the under- 
 Handing of which feems prerequifite to the doctrine of 
 the particular laws of nature. This fhall be the fufa- 
 ject of this and the two following chapters. 
 
 Ff 2
 
 22? Circumstances affecting 
 
 Book II. I. The ground of all imputation * of actions as 
 V-/^v~vj virtuous or vitious is, " that they flow from fome af- 
 •• fection in the agent, and thus are evidences of his 
 " temper and affections. V irtue, as it was proved in 
 the former book, confifts primarily in the affections. 
 The higheft kind of it is the calm and fixed principle 
 of good-will to the greateft fyftem ; and love, efteem, 
 gratitude, and refignation to God, upon a full per- 
 iuafion of his moral perfections, and a conftant preva- 
 lent defire of making dill further progrefs toward that 
 moral perfection of which we perceive ourfelves to be 
 capable. The lower kinds, are the particular kind af- 
 fections and pafllons purfuing the good of particular 
 focieties, or individuals, coniiftently with the general 
 good. This, one would think, could fcarce be matter 
 of debate among Chriftians, after the fum of the law 
 delivered to us, "j~ viz. Loving God and our neighbour. 
 If virtue be not placed in the affections, but in fome 
 other faculty different from the will, as reafon or in- 
 tellect, then love is to be called an act of the underftan- 
 ding, contrary to all language. 
 . ,f II. From this defcription 'tis eafy to find what cir- 
 cumftances affect the morality of actions, or omifll- 
 
 - tons. J 7 
 
 ons, increafing or diminishing the moral good, or evil, 
 in them ; or making actions good, which otherways. 
 had been evil ; or evil, which otherways had been good. 
 trty. Firft. 'Tis manifeft that whatever action, or rather 
 event, happened not in confequence of one's will, ei- 
 
 • imputation is or.e of the voces viediae i tho 1 more commonly ufed in charging men 
 with guilt, \ >ia;th. aii . 3 0, 3 1 .
 
 the Morality ©/"Actions. 225 
 
 ther at prefent, or in fome prior time, cannot be im- Chap. i. 
 puted as either good, or evil. Nor can any omiffion \y^T\J 
 or abftaining from action be imputed as good, or evil, 
 to him who could not have performed it by any ef- 
 forts, and knew this impoiTIbility. Such events or o- 
 miffions can evidence no affection, either good, or bad. 
 Events, however, are then only called neceffary with 
 refpecl to an agent, which he could not prevent tho' 
 heferioufly defired it; notfuch as, through his ftrong 
 averfions or habits, he. cannot avoid defiring. Thofe 
 only are called impofllble, which no efforts of his can 
 accomplifh by any means. We . call any thing pof- 
 fible, which one who heartily defires it, can get ac- 
 complifhed, whether by his own power, or by any aid 
 of others which he can obtain.* 
 
 Thefe alone are the neceflary and wholly unimpu- Ke^ry f . 
 table events f which neither any prefent defire or ac- 7 
 tion of ours can prevent, nor could they have been 
 prevented by any prior diligence or care which we 
 ought to have had about fuch matters. Such events 
 as prior fore-thought and care could have prevented, 
 tho' they be now unavoidable, are in fome meafure vo- 
 luntary J and imputable ; whether they happen from 
 free agency, or from natural inanimate caufes. Thus 
 if one by negligence in his office fuffers banks or- 
 mounds to decay, when a ftorm comes he cannot pre- 
 vent the inundation ; and yet it is juftly counted volun- 
 tary and imputable to him, 
 
 * This explains the common maxim, hnpofjibihum et necejfariorum nulla ejl imputa- ■ 
 tie. 7 Ittmluataria et it; ft, et imjiia catt/a. j Invebtntaria infe } fed?ioiimfua caufa. 
 
 vents, not moral
 
 C I R C U M S T A XCES offeShlg 
 
 So the omilTions of actions now impoffible are jufl> 
 ly imputed, when they might have been pofllble, had 
 that previous diligence been exerted which becomes 
 a good man. A ilothful profufe man cannot now dif- 
 char2;e his debts, vet as a prior courfe of prudent oe- 
 conomy would have prevented this injury to his cre- 
 ditors, the non-payment is imputable. In thefe cafes, 
 indeed, the unavoidable event or omiflion, contrary to 
 prefent ftrong inclination, ihews no prefent evil affec- 
 tion. But the former negligence, which made one in- 
 capable of doing iuftice, argues a prior culpable de- 
 fect of good dilpolitions. And 'tis here that the guile 
 properly lyes. Two perfons may be equally criminal 
 in die fight of God, and their own confeiences, when 
 the events of their conduct are verv different. Sup- 
 pofe equal negligence in both, and that both become 
 infolvent. but one by an unexpected inheritance dif- 
 charges his debts; the other, tho" equally inclined, re- 
 mains incapable of it. They are equally criminal, tho' 
 one by accident does no wrong in the event to his 
 creditors. 
 
 III. No diflant effects or confequents of actions or 
 omiilions, affect their morality, if they could not have 
 been forefeen by that diligence and caution we expect 
 from good men: for then they are no indications of 
 the temper of the agent. For the fame reafon any 
 profperous effects which were not intended, donotin- 
 creafe the moral goodnefs of an action ; but an evil 
 action is made worfe by all the evil confequents, which 
 would have appeared to a man of fuch caution as good 
 
 I i
 
 the Morality ^/"Actions. 231 
 
 affections would naturally raife, tho' the agent did not Chap. r. 
 actually forefee them. They do not indeed prove any KS^TKJ 
 direct evil intention ; but there are other forms of mo- 
 ral evil. The very want of a proper degree of o-ood 
 affections is morally evil. One ftudious of the publick 
 good will be cautious and inquifitive about the effects 
 of his actions ; the inquifitive will difcover fuch effects 
 as are difcoverable by their fagacity. He then who is 
 ignorant of fuch effects, tho' he had no direct evil in- 
 tention, betrays a culpable weaknefs of the good af- 
 fections. 
 
 In judging of the moral characters of fuch as have 
 not had any confiderable reformation made in their 
 affections, 'tis not of confequence whether the guilt 
 be evidenced by fome prefent action, or omhTion; or 
 by fome preceeding one equally criminal. That apho- 
 rifm therefore is juft, that " an action can be made 
 " virtuous only by fuch good confequents as areactu- 
 " ally intended for themfelves : but may be made vi- 
 " cious by any evil confequences which a good and 
 " honeft mind could have forefeen as probably en- 
 " fuing." 
 
 But good confequents intended then only prove an 
 action to be good, when the fum of them over-ballance 
 all the evil ones which could have been forefeen, and 
 when the good confequents could not be obtained 
 without thefe evils. If the cafe is otherways, they may 
 extenuate the guilt, but do not juftify the action. On 
 the other hand, evil confequents forefeen, but not de- 
 fired for themfelves, do not always make an action
 
 2 1 : Circumstances. tg 
 
 Book II. CfiL Tis or.lv in fiidh c they over-ballancc 
 
 v^v^^ all the good effects to which thi >n is fubfervient, 
 
 and for which it was intended; an -:-re this over- 
 dance mi2;ht have been forefeen. or when the £ood 
 effeel c mid have been ol i with efe evils. 
 
 By confequents of an a frand not on- 
 
 ly the direct and natural efic : is 
 
 : be proper caufe ot: but all thefe events too which 
 enfue upon it, and had not happened had the action 
 been omitted. A good man regard :ever he fore- 
 
 fee ;mi:tak.-. follies, orvices 
 
 of others; and hat he forefees will occaiion 
 
 l cious actions, or unreafonable offences, in o: 
 tho' oth: it might have been innocent: unlefs 
 
 the j : to be obtained, over- 
 
 ballance thefe part: 
 
 IV. Ignorance of the tendency or effi 9s of actions, 
 >-■■■ affects their morality differently, according to the <K£ 
 \-.-_ ferent caufes >fthe ignorance or error, and the diffi- 
 cull . greater or Ids, oi coming to t". : of 
 
 the truth, if the i gn nance or eiTor be al in- 
 
 vincible by anv prefent, or any prior e, evil 
 
 confequents th rannotbe imputed. as tt 
 
 can dew no evil affection, no: any i eft :: in good aflec- 
 : : . :;s. If that degree oi cautic: :h we expect in 
 
 ;s from the belt men could not furmount the 
 ance tho' the utmoit. pofilble camion might, 
 frill count it morally Dy cxculing 
 
 from guilt, except in cafes where all men know that 
 
 * Rom. <Lr. ;: f Mirth. 7. 34, ;
 
 the Morality ^Actions. 23^ 
 
 the utmoft caution is incumbent on them. But where Chap. i. 
 the ordinary caution of a good mind would have fore- <*/"V\J 
 feen fuch confequents, then the ignorance argues a 
 defect of good affections, is vincible, and tho' it may 
 alleviate the guilt, it does not wholly take it away. 
 
 Ignorance and error may be at prefent invincible 
 and involuntary, and yet prior diligence might have 
 prevented them ; or it may be invincible and involun- 
 tary every way.* The latter only takes away all im- 
 putation: the former, fhews that there is no direct evil 
 intention at prefent, but it may evidence a prior want 
 of good affections, and thus be juftly culpable. 
 
 But as direct evil intention, or infenfibility of the 
 evil we plainly fee we are doing to others, are much 
 more odious tempers than mere inadvertence, or the 
 want of fuch warm affections as would raife accurate 
 attention ; all ignorance not directly affected or defi- 
 red is feme alleviation of guilt; and that in different 
 degrees, according as the effects were more or lefs ob- 
 vious. The eafier the difcovery was, the lefs does the 
 ignorance alleviate the guilt. 
 
 Ignorance may either be about the effects of &»<,«»« •/ 
 the action, or the true intent and meaning: of laws. '7^ 
 
 o J 
 
 The fame maxims hold about both. Only, finee wife 
 legillators take care fo to publiih their laws that the 
 fubjects may always know them by proper diligence, 
 ignorance of the law cannot be deemed abfolutely 
 invincible. If any laws are abfolutely undifcoverable 
 
 * Involuntaria in fe> fed non in fua caufa. or, Involuntaria et in fe } et in fud 
 
 caufa. 
 
 Vol.I. Ge-
 
 2? a Circumstances affe&'wg 
 
 Book II. by the fubjects-, they are not laws given to them ; their 
 c/^Wjnot obeying them cannot be culpable.* 
 
 V. The queftions about vincible ignorance, and 
 confciences erroneous, or doubtful, are only difficult 
 through ambiguity of words. Confcience fometimes 
 denotes the moral faculty itfelf : fometimes " thejudg- 
 " ment of the understanding concerning the fprings 
 " and effects of actions upon which the moral fen ft 
 " approves, or condemns them.'* And when we have 
 got certain maxims and rules concerning the conduct 
 which is virtuous, or vicious, and conceive them to 
 be, as they truly are, the laws given to us by God the 
 author of nature and of all our powers ; or when we 
 are perfuaded that other divine laws are revealed to 
 us in a different manner, then confcience may be de- 
 fined to be " Our judgment concerning actions com- 
 " pared with the /.. 
 "' Now firft, " A perfon purpofinQ- to act virtuouf- 
 •• " ly, and yet by miftake imagining that action to have 
 " a good tendency, and to be conformable to the law, 
 f - which is of a contrary nature in reality, will certain- 
 " ly during his error follow his confcience: fince no 
 u man in an error knows that he errs.' 1 The obfervers 
 only can make the queftion, whether 'tis better for 
 him to follow his confcience, or counteract it: And 
 this cannot in all cafes be anfwered the fame way. 
 2. " He who follows the erroneous judgment of 
 
 
 11 his mind in doing what he believes to be good, at 
 " prefent evidences a good difpofition: and acting a- 
 
 * Ignznntia juris } igjicraniij /.:.
 
 the Morality ©/"Actions. 235 
 
 " gainft his judgment, during his error, muft evidence Chap. 1, 
 " fome vicious difpofition; fuch as neglect of more ex-^"V>^ 
 " tenfive good, or of the lawgiver." This holds in ge- 
 neral true as to all men who are firmly perfuaded of 
 the goodnefs of God and his laws. As we all cenfure 
 a man who from any narrower affection of a lovely 
 fort ihould counteract the views of the more extenfive 
 affections ; the fame way we muft cenfure the counter- 
 acting fuch commands of God, as we believe are cal- 
 culated for the moft extenfive happinefs, tho' the a- 
 gent has been excited to it by fome humane and love- 
 ly affections of the narrower fort ; which, however, in 
 all cafes alleviate the guilt. 
 
 But when there is no fuch fettled apprehenfion of 
 God, or his laws, as perfectly benevolent ; and only a 
 notion of high private intereft in obedience, and great 
 private danger to ourfelves from difobedience, with a 
 confufed notion of duty or obligation to obey; if fome 
 very tender humane difpoficions of heart fhould lead 
 one to difobey fome fevere and cruel orders imagined 
 to come from the Deity ; whatever convulfions he 
 might feel in his own heart by the ftruggles between 
 two fuch oppofite principles, a judicious fpectator 
 could fcarce condemn the counteracting fuch a con- 
 fcience from principles of humanity: for example, if 
 one who believed it his duty to perfecute hereticks to 
 death, yet were reftrained by companion to his fel- 
 low-creatures. 
 
 3 . " The falling into fuch vincible errors, fo oppofite a>i errors an 
 4( to the humane difpofitions of the foul, in matters fo" c 
 
 Gg2
 
 2 o6 Circumstances affecting 
 
 : TT. " deeply affecting the interefts of our fellows as that of 
 " perfecutdon, and fome others, muft argue great prior 
 
 uilt and deficiency of good affections. And there- 
 fore, during the error, whether one follows his con- 
 ference, or not, we have fome evidence of a bad tem- 
 per. If he follows it, his prior negligence is very cul- 
 pable: if he does not, and yet believes the command 
 to have been given by a good God for the general in- 
 tereft, his prior negligence is culpable as in the other 
 cafe, and now he fuperadds the guilt of omitting his 
 duty to God, and the general intereft. But where one 
 has no notions of the Divine Goodnefs, and the be- 
 nign tendency of his laws, counteracting the ifnagined 
 law may be lefs odious, if it be from a lovely humane 
 difpofition. 
 
 4. When the confeience is doubtful, the fafeil way 
 is to defer acting till further inquiry be made, unlefs 
 fome general potent reafon urges to a fpeedy determi- 
 nation. Cafes happen in which 'tis plainly better to 
 do either of the two actions, about the preference of 
 which we are doubting, than to omit both; and there 
 may be no time for delays. In fuch cafes we m 1 
 upon one or t'other, according to fuperior probability 
 of its importance. If thefe probabilities are equal, we 
 muft do what rirft occurs. 
 
 What is the duty then of one in an error: or what 
 conduct will be entirely approved? Tis plain the er- 
 ror already has evidenced a prior culpable negligence. 
 The only conduct which now fhall gain entire appro- 
 bation again is correcting the error by a new unpreju- 
 
 ... ; err.
 
 the Morality ^Actions. 237 
 
 diced inquiry. The erroneous, during their error, do Chap. i. 
 not fee this to be their duty; but 'tis the only way to 1 
 fet all right again. And this fhews the great advantage 
 of model ty and diffidence as to our own underfland- 
 ings 5 and the danger of felf-confklence and bigotry. 
 
 The degree of diligence requifite in a good man, 
 cannot be precifely determined. We naturally expect 
 very different degrees from different capacities, ftari- 
 ons, opportunities. Ariftotle* well obferves, that" ma- 
 " ny points in morals, when applied to individual ca- 
 " fes, cannot be exactly determined; but good men 
 " know them by a fort of fenfation : the good experi- 
 " enced man is thus the laft meafure of all thines." 
 This holds in general: " the greater the diligence and 
 " caution about our duty is, the character is fo much 
 u the better ; and the lefs the dilip-ence and caution: 
 "is, fo much the worfe is the character, when other 
 " circumftances are equal." 
 
 * Nic&m. 1. iii. c. 4. and 1. ii. c. ult. and 1. vi. c. 1 1 . and often in the Magna Mo- 
 riih&y particularly 1. ii. c. 10, Hence the arbttr'mm viri proki, with the Civilians.
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 General Rules of judging about the Morality of 
 Actions, from the Affections exciting to them, or 
 oppofing them. 
 
 ALtho' men cannot accurately judge about the de- 
 grees of virtue, or vice, in the actions of others, 
 becaufe their inward fprings are unknown : yet fome 
 general rules may be abundantly certain and ufeful 
 in our judging about ourfelves. And we have no great 
 occafion to make application of them to others, which 
 muft be extremely uncertain. 
 
 i . Where kind affections alone are the fprings of 
 ■tea of anions, a &i onjtne good effected by any agent is as the ftrength 
 of thefe affections and his ability jointly. The ftrength 
 of affection therefore is directly as the good effected, 
 and inverfely as the abilities ; or, in plainer terms, 
 when the good done by two perfons is equal, while 
 • their abilities are unequal, he fhews the better heart, 
 
 whofe abilities were fmaller. 
 < of 2. Where men are alfo excited by views of private 
 intereft, the effect, of thefe felfifti defires is to be de- 
 r&mu. dueled, and the remainder fhews the effect of the vir- 
 tuous difpofition. Where motives of private intereft 
 diffuaded from fome good action performed, the virtue 
 appears the higher by furmounting thefe motives. 
 
 3. In like manner we compute the moral turpitude 
 of unkind or bafely felfiih affections leading us to in- 
 jury. The ftrength of them is directly as the evil ef- 
 fected, and inverfely as the abilities. That is, where
 
 General Rules about the Morality of AB ions, 239 
 
 equal mlfchiefs are done by two, who had it in their Chap. 2. 
 power to do more, in gratification of their evil affecti- V/W 
 ons, he mews the worfe temper, who had the fmaller 
 power but exerted it further. 
 
 4. When private interefts excite to hurtful actions, 
 the effect of the felfifh defires is not the fame way to ne fame dr. 
 be deducted to find the pure effect of fome inclination Zuaul"". ' 
 wholly vicious. We feldom can have any fuch incli- 
 nations. The moral evils of men generally flow from 
 the immoderate degrees of fome felfiih affections, 
 which in a moderate degree would be innocent; and 
 the very want of high degrees of fome good affections 
 is vicious. This deduction can only be made where 
 the exciting felfifti motive was the avoiding fome great 
 fufferings terrible even to very good minds ; and fuch 
 temptations much extenuate the guilt. Where great 
 interefts known to the agent diffuaded from the evil 
 action, indeed the guilt is exceedingly aggravated, as 
 the depravity of temper furmounts thefe interefts, as 
 well as all fenfe of duty and generous affection. 
 
 II. But in comparing actions and characters we The ihd , fth , 
 not only regard the ftrength of the exciting affection/^'' 1 t0 h 
 
 J O O O ' regarded. 
 
 but the kind of it, fince, as we obferved above, our 
 moral fenfe, by the wife conftitution of God, more ap- 
 proves fuch affections as are molt ufeful and efficaci- 
 ous for the publick intereit. It immediately approves 
 the calm fedate good-will either to particular focie- 
 ties, or individuals, more than the turbulent paffions 
 of the generous fort ; and of the calm affections molt 
 approves the molt excenfive. And thus tho' the effects
 
 240 General Rules about 
 
 Book II. of two actions were equal, that one is more approved 
 ^/V\j which flowed from a calm fettled principle of kind- 
 nefs, than another from fome turbulent paflion. The 
 fuperior excellency of thefe calm difpofitions is al- 
 lowed on all hands; and mews men what temper na- 
 ture recommends to their culture, by all the power 
 .we have over our affections ; and what reftraints mould 
 be laid upon the lefs excenlive affections, whether 
 calm or paffionate, that they may never defeat the 
 purpofes of the moft extenfive and excellent difpofi- 
 tions of the foul. Here we fee alfo the reafon why no 
 oreat virtue is imag;med in our kindnefs to our off- 
 fpring, kindred, or even benefactors. Stsrong particu- 
 lar pailions naturally arife toward perfons fo related 
 to us, whether we have any of the more extenfive af- 
 fections lively in our breads or not : and few characters 
 are fo depraved as to be void of thefe natural affecti- 
 ons. The want of them indeed, for reafons prefently 
 to be mentioned, would argue a temper depraved in 
 the mod odious degree. 
 h,tj to fix III. When promoting the publick good is oppofite 
 to the agent's worldly intereft, 'tis hard to fix a pre- 
 cife degree of good affection requifite merely to avoid 
 a bad character, or obtain that of bare innocence- 
 One may be called in one fenfe innocent who never 
 hurts others in purfuit of his own intereft. But not- 
 withstanding this he may be a bad man, if he contri- 
 butes little to a publick intereft. God has fet in our 
 hearts, if we would attend to it, a very high ftandard 
 of neceffary goodnefs, andwemuft be difpleafed with
 
 JiAP. 
 
 the Morality g/'Actions. 
 
 ourfelves when we omit any office, how burdenfome 
 or hurtful foever to ourfelves, which in the whole 1 
 would increafe the publick happinefs after all its con- 
 fequents are confidered. In our common eftimations 
 of characters and actions we do not judge fo rigidly, 
 nor can one eafily tell precifely how far one muft facri- 
 fice his private interefts to the publick, to avoid a 
 bad character. The extremes of virtue and vice are 
 abundantly known; but intermediate degrees are lefs 
 difcernible from each other when they approach very 
 near, as in colours fhaded into each other. The fol- 
 lowing maxims feem pretty probable, or certain; 
 
 i . That affections of equal degrees of extent or Stvtfal s c '"- 
 ftrength are not expected from perfons of unequal cir- 
 cumftances and opportunities, tho' originally of equal 
 tempers. More is demanded from fuch as have had 
 inftruction, leifure for meditation, and accefs to bet- 
 ter ftations. 
 
 2. Such offices as are ufeful to others, and of no 
 expence or labour to the agent, are juftly expected 
 from all toward all who need them. They are but low 
 evidences of virtue, but refufing them is very hateful, 
 and mews a temper void of humanity. 
 
 3. Nay we univerfally condemn the refufal of fuch 
 fmaller expences or trouble as can fcarce difturb the 
 happinefs of life, when it is neceflary for any impor- 
 tant advantage even to a ftranger. 
 
 4. The greater the expence or trouble is one fub- 
 mits to for the benefit of others, it muit be to others 
 the greater evidence of his virtue, 
 
 Vol.L Hh
 
 242 General Rules ahout 
 
 Book II. 5. The fmaller the advantages are for the fake of 
 v^/v^_^ which one does what is detrimental to the publick, 
 or declines any ufeful fervices, the worfe we mud con- 
 clude his character. 
 vn-rrrmtr r^^ ^ mQ difficulties may appear in determining; 
 ^/•»fl«f.t-p rec if e ly how far the narrower affections in particular 
 cafes mould yield to the more extenfive; or how far 
 the interefts of families, kindred, benefactors, friends, 
 our party, or country, mould be facrifked to more ex- 
 tenfive interefts, to avoid a bad character or the charge 
 of guile. A calm mind, folicitous about its own con- 
 duel, will blame every defect of that moft perfect mo- 
 ral order, which requires facrificing all narrower in- 
 terefts to the more extenfive. But there is fomething 
 fo beautiful and fo engaging in many narrower affec- 
 tions of the foul, that we judge lefs rigidly of the con- 
 duct of men who from fuch lovely principles neglect 
 the higheft perfection. And as it is but a fmall degree 
 of attention and difcernment, which can be reafon- 
 ably expected from men of lower ftations and capaci- 
 ties, much encumbred by procuring to themfelves and 
 their immediate dependents the neceflaries of life, na- 
 ture is far from leading us to pronounce the charac- 
 ter bad, which does not in all cafes adhere to the moft 
 exact rules of perfection. But withal the attentive re- 
 flecting mind cannot but fee the faireft mark fet up 
 by God in his heart, a clear idea of perfection. The 
 nearer he can come to it, fo much the better and more 
 excellent he is. Nor was it the Divine intention that 
 we mould fatisfy ourfelves by merely avoiding fuch
 
 the Morality ^Actions. 243 
 
 conduct as is matter of infamy. Two general maxims Chap. 2. 
 are abundantly obvious in thefe cafes. L/~VXJ 
 
 1 . Firft, that to maintain the calm and moft ex- 
 tenfive affection toward the univerfal happinefs the 
 ftrongeft principle of the foul, able to controll all nar- 
 rower affections when there is any oppofition; and the 
 facrificing all narrower interefts to the moft extenfive, 
 while yet every tender affection in the feveral relati- 
 ons of life is preferved in as great ftrength as the juft 
 fubordination of it to the fuperior will admit; is the 
 higheft perfection of human virtue. 
 
 2. And yet when fome of thefe narrower kind af- 
 fections exceed their proportion, and overcome the 
 more extenfive, the moral deformity is alleviated in 
 proportion to the moral beauty of that narrower af- 
 fection by which the more extenfive is overpowered. 
 Thus 'tis more excufable if we do what is hurtful to 
 the moft general intereft, from zeal for our country, 
 for a whole people ; than if the fame had been done 
 for aggrandizing a party, a cabal, or a family. And 
 any of thofe tender affections extenuate the guilt 
 more than any merely felfifh principle could have done, 
 fuch as avarice, ambition, fenfuality. 
 
 IV. The greater part of mankind, by the necefla- t& »«?;«*? 
 ry avocations of life, are incapable of very extenfive^" i"l^ 
 defigns, and want opportunities and abilities for fuch °f ltve ' 
 fervices. But we have this juft prefumption, that by 
 ferving innocently any valuable part of a fyftem, we 
 do good to the whole. The lives therefore of many 
 of the moft virtuous are juftly employed in ferving 
 
 H h 2
 
 2 a a Rules o/" computing 
 
 BookTT. fuch particular perfons, or fmaller focieties, who are 
 i_/"v^jmore peculiarly recommended to them by the very or- 
 der of nature. Nature constitutes many particular 
 attachments and proper caufes of loving fome more 
 than others. Some of thcfe caufes are of a generous 
 kind, but in different degrees. Such as the conjugal 
 and parental relations, and the other of blood ; 
 
 benefits conferred^ which excite a generous gratitude, 
 tho' we expecl no more ; eminent virtues obferved j and 
 the very relation of countrymen. Of the felriih fort are, 
 a profitable intercourfe of offices, dependence for future 
 preferment, or other favours. All thefe are natural 
 caufes not only of keener pailions, but of a ftronger 
 calm good-will in moft of men. On the other hand, 
 tho', to a man of juft reflection, there can be no natural 
 caufe of any calm ultimate ill-will, yet to the greater 
 part of mankind there are natural caufes of the un- 
 kind paiTions, anger, indignation, envy, and averiion ; 
 fome wholly felriih, fuch &% private injuries received, 
 cppofition to our intereit; others of a generous kind, 
 fuch as moral evil obferved, injuries done to the pub- 
 lick, or to friends, unreafonable promotion, to the ex- 
 clufion of more worthy men. 
 
 Now a temper is certainly fo much the better, the 
 more fufceptible it is of all fweet affections upon {mai- 
 ler caufes, efpecially thofe of the generous kind, pro- 
 vided it entertains proportionally warmer affections 
 where greater caufes appear ; and the lefs fufceptible 
 it is of unkind paffions upon any caufes, efpeciallv the 
 felriih. The temper muft be very good which retains
 
 /^Morality ^Actions. 245 
 
 good-will, where many occurrences would readily ba- Chap. 2. 
 nifh ic from the heart: and that temper muft be very Ky~V\j 
 bad, where love cannot be kindled by the natural 
 caufes. 
 
 In general, the ftronger the merit or the natural 
 caufes of love there are in any perfon, our want of love 
 to him muft evidence the greater depravation: and 
 any low degree below the proportion of the merit, 
 muft evidence the fmaller virtue. A temper where any 
 thing virtuous remains muft be warmed by eminent 
 virtues, or by great benefits conferred. And fince there 
 muft appear in the Deity all the higheft caufes of 
 love, when one with tolerable attention contemplates 
 him as the author of all good natural and moral, as 
 the fupreme moral excellence, as the great benefactor 
 of all ; the want of the higheft love to him muft evi- 
 dence the greateft moral deformity in any rational 
 mind to whom his perfections are difcovered. 
 
 V. Thefe principles lead to fome more fpecial con- Mer < f? eii « l 
 clufions. 1 . Defect of power, of opportunities, of the" 
 means of external good offices, without any fault of 
 ours, will not exclude us from the moft heroick vir- 
 tue.* This maxim is the moft joyful to a good heart. 
 
 2. No difappointment of any wife and good at- 
 tempt, by external force, or accidents which one could 
 not forefee, can diminifh the virtue: nor do unexpec- 
 ted or unintended good confequents increafe it, -f or 
 diminifh the Q-uilt of a bad action. In human affairs 
 men muft follow probabilities. If the probable good 
 
 * See concluflon of book i. f B. ii. c. i,
 
 2d6 Riles 0/ computing 
 
 Book II. effects intended, which could not be obtained in a 
 (■far way, iurpafs all the ill effects we could forefee, 
 the action is good, altho' fuperior evil confequents en- 
 fue beyond probability. 
 
 j. Profpects of private advantage then only abate 
 the moral beauty of an action, when 'tis known by 
 the agent, or juftly prefumed by others, that without 
 this ielnih motive the agent would not have done fo 
 much o-ood. 
 
 4. Motives of private intereft diminifh the guilt 
 of an evil action undertaken from them, only in pro- 
 portion as they would in fuch cafes affect a virtuous 
 mind. The palTions raifed by the greateft natural 
 evils impending or threatened, more occupy and in- 
 grofs the mind than any defires of poiltive good to be 
 obtained. And hence it is that when a perfon through 
 fear of death, tortures, or ilavery, threatened to him- 
 felf, or thofe who are dear to him. or from fome high 
 provocation to anger, does what brings fuperior de- 
 triment to focietv, the guilt is much more extenua- 
 ted, than if he had been induced to the fame con- 
 duct by the higheft bribes. And refilling the former 
 temptation would lhow a nobler flrength of virtue 
 than refuting the latter, or any inducements of fen- 
 fuality.* In general, the greater the vice is in any acti- 
 on we are tempted to by motives of intereft, the lefs 
 is the virtue evidenced bv our abftainiag from it : and 
 
 J o 
 
 the fmaller the vice is to which we have fuch ftrong 
 
 * f :: .'. c. z'.:, ; -.. l.ii. c. IC-.
 
 the Morality o/*Actions. 247 
 
 temptations, the virtue of refuting them is the*great- Chap. 2. 
 er, provided we have proportionally firmer refolutions ( s-> < V^j 
 againft the greater vices. Some crimes are fo very odi- 
 ous that few amongft the moft corrupt order of men 
 can be brought to commit them. 
 
 5. The temper is the more depraved the greater 
 the motives to goodnefs are which it counteracts. He 
 who fins againft a known law fhews a worfe mind, by 
 furmounting the ftrong motives to obedience from 
 the fandtions, and other circumftances to be mentio- 
 ned hereafter , than one who does the fame action 
 without any knowledge of the law. 
 
 6. Offices of no trouble or expence do not prove 
 an high virtue in the agent, tho' declining them fhews 
 great depravity, as there are no motives of intereft. 
 againft them. 
 
 7. Common offices done to perfons of great me- 
 rit in whom there are high caufes of love, are no evi- 
 dences of great virtue in the agent. He has little vir- 
 tue who fhews no more zeal for a friend, a benefactor, 
 a man of eminent virtue, than another will do from 
 fmaller bonds of affection. And yet the neglecting any 
 friendly fervices due to fuch high virtues or merit, is 
 more vicious than omitting offices of general huma- 
 nity where there were no fuch high claims. 
 
 8. When one cannot at once do offices of both 
 forts, and other circumftances are equal, we fhould 
 follow the ftronger tyes of nature and the higher cau- 
 fes of love. Thus we fhould rather do fervices to a 
 
 • Thus 'tis a good rule of perfeftion, to akjlainfrom the very appearance of evil.
 
 2^8 Rules of computing 
 
 Book IT. parent, a benefactor, a kinfman, a man of eminent 
 virtue, than to a ftranger. As God conftituted thefe 
 fpecial bonds for the wifeft purpofes, 'tis for the ge- 
 neral good that, when other circumftances are equal, 
 thefe ftronger bonds mould engage our fervices ra- 
 ther than the weaker. The omiilion of the other of- 
 fices, now inconfiftent with the more facred ones, is 
 altoo-ether innocent. 
 
 9. When only equal good is done by perfons of 
 equal abilities, from whom more might reafonably 
 have been expected, one acting from mere humanity, 
 the other from additional motives of divine laws and 
 promifes propofed by revelation; we have better evi- 
 dence of a good temper in the former. Our good 
 actions mould rife in proportion to the ftronger mo- 
 tives propofed, * to fhew an equally good temper. 
 
 10. Yet as the true aim of virtue is to promote 
 the publick good, and not the pleahng one's felf with 
 high notions of his own virtue; every good man muft 
 defire to prefent to his mind all thefe motives which 
 can further prompt him to good offices, and make 
 him fteady and refolute againft all difficulties. He 
 muft defire the firmed perfuafion that virtue is his 
 trueft intereft; that God will efpoufe his caufe by mak- 
 ing the virtuous happy either in this life, or the next. 
 Settling thefe points firmly in our minds, and fre- 
 quently reflecting on them to obtain conftancy and vi- 
 gour in a courfe of virtue, fuperior to all temptati- 
 ons of fecular intereft, mews the trueft benevolence: 
 
 * Matth. v. 20. Lukevi. 32, 35.
 
 the Morality ^Actions. 249 
 
 and the rejecting fuch confiderations would fhew a Chap. 2. 
 wrong temper, negligent of the natural means of for-L/"V\_^ 
 tifying all kind difpofitions, and of removing all im- 
 pediments out of their way. Such will be moft conftant 
 and vigorous in all good offices, who have the ftrongeft, 
 motives to them, and have removed all opinions of any 
 oppoflte valuable inter efts. Now fuch are they only 
 who believe and often reflect upon the Divine Provi- 
 dence as protecting the virtuous, and enfuring their 
 happinefs ; who raife an habitual love, efteem, and gra- 
 titude to God, which ftrongly co-operate with all our 
 generous affections to our fellows. A like effect, in a 
 lower degree, arifes from a juft obfervation on human 
 affairs, that a courfe of virtue is the moft probable 
 way of obtaining outward peace and profperity, as it 
 never fails to create inward peace and joy. But all 
 this is no proof that ones own happinefs of any kind 
 is the only thing he ultimately intends in his virtuous 
 offices. 
 
 VI. But as the affections of men are fometimes H™^«fl«« 
 difcovered by the actions of others to which theyxon- "{''£'" < " , ' i " N 
 tributed, 'tis plain any good office of another, to which 
 we have deflgnedly contributed from any good affec- 
 tion, may be imputed in fome degree to our honour. 
 And where we have contributed to any bad a£tion of 
 another by acting or omitting contrary to our duty, 
 it may be imputed alfo as our fault; but in very dif- 
 ferent degrees, as circumftances may be very different. 
 
 1 . As they who exhort, advife,or direct others in virtue 
 fhew a good difpoiition, and fhare in the honourable *v ra * 
 
 Vol. I. I i 
 
 This iii various
 
 2yj Rules of computing 
 
 Book II. imputation ; fo the advifers of wickednefs are alike 
 c/VXJcruilty whether their advice has been followed or not. 
 But bad advice may in many initances abate the guilt 
 of the pcrfon who perpetrates the wickednefs. Human 
 courts indeed feldom puniih for mere advice, where 
 there was no power or authority in the advifer; and 
 where no ihare of the profit by any injury came to 
 him, he is not made lyable to compenfation of the 
 damage. Tis hard to find what effect fuch o-eneral 
 advices may have had on the agent, who without them 
 might have acted the very fame part. 
 
 2. In manv cafes the adviiing, exhorting, or con- 
 gratulating another in any wicked defign may not 
 Ihew fuch depravation as the execution of it, as ma- 
 nv things occur in the execution to dilTuade the un- 
 dertaker, and make him relent, which do not occur 
 to the advifer or congratulator: fuch as itronger feel- 
 ings of companion and remorfe, and views of puniih - 
 ment, and even prefent danger. The furmounting all 
 thefe motives which affect men more deeply in the 
 execution, may lhew a greater depravity in the execu- 
 ter. On the other hand, when the advifer or applau- 
 der has no fuch motives of intereft, or of efcaping 
 from fome great danger, no fuch violent paiTtons mo- 
 ving him, and yet advifes or applauds others in mif- 
 chief ; the executer who performs it from thefe itrong 
 motives may not be fo entirely debafed, fo void of mo- 
 ral feelings, as the advifer and applauder. 
 
 3. He who of his own pure motion commits a crime, 
 ihews a worfe difpolition than one who under com-
 
 tAP. 2. 
 
 the Morality o/Agtions. 251 
 
 mand of a fuperior, and threatened with fevere pu- Ch. 
 nifhment if he declines obedience, executes a like ac- 
 tion with inward reluctance. Where the hurt to others 
 from his obeying the command is much lefs than the 
 evil he had incurred had he difobeyed, his obedience 
 may be perfectly innocent, efpecially if he is ready to 
 compenfate the damage done to others for his own 
 fafety; and the only guilt will be chargeable on the 
 commander. In general, the perfons vefted with au- 
 thority or power, are the principal caufes of what is 
 executed by their command: the fubject is often in- 
 nocent; and where he cannot be wholly juftified, the 
 guilt is extenuated by the temptation. Nay the ftrong 
 importunities of friends are fome extenuation. 
 
 4. But whatever is done in confequence of the com- 
 mand of our will or of our choice, which affects the 
 happinefs or mifery of others, whatever were our mo- 
 tives, is ltill a moral and imputable action, as it is 
 fome indication of our affections. The fear of great 
 evil threatened may, as other pleas of necefTity, make 
 that innocent, in fome cafes, which without that necef- 
 llty had been criminal ; fuch as delivering money or arms 
 to robbers that our lives may be preferved ; throwing 
 our own or other men's goods over-board in a ftorm, 
 are imputed as innocent actions, nay matters of duty. 
 And even where the publick detriment enfuing is grea- 
 ter than that we efcape from by the action, the guilt, 
 tho' not quite removed, is much extenuated. Still 
 fuch actions are moral, and imputable as morally good 
 or evil. 
 
 Ii 2
 
 2 5 2 
 
 Book II. 
 
 ^^ CHAP. III. 
 
 The general Notions o/Rights, and L a w s, ex ■ 
 plained ; with their DiviJIons. 
 
 I. "PROM the conflitucion of our moral faculty 
 ■*■ above-explained,we have our notions of * right, 
 and ivrona, as characters of affections and actions. The 
 affections approved as right, are either univerfal good- 
 will and love of moral excellence, or fuch particular 
 kind affections as are confident with thefe. The ac- 
 tions approved as right, are fuch as are wifely intended 
 either for the general good, or fuch good of fome par- 
 ticular fociety or individual as is confident with it. 
 The contrary affections and actions are wrong. 
 
 An action is called materially good when in fact it 
 tends to the intereft of the fyftem, as far as we can 
 judge of its tendency; or to the good of fome part 
 confident with that of the fyftem, whatever were the 
 affections of the agent. An action is formally good, 
 when it flowed from good affections in a juft propor- 
 tion. A good man deliberating \ which of feveral ac- 
 tions propofed he ihall chufe, regards and compares 
 the material goodnefs of them, and then is determined 
 by his moral fenfe invariably preferring that which ap- 
 pears moft conducive to the happinefs and virtue of 
 mankind. But in judging of his J paft actions he con- 
 
 * This is the reftui/t, as diflinct from the jus, of which prefently : the jus en-fues 
 upon the reftum, f ConfeientUi antecedent* \ Confcientiafuhfiquens.
 
 The Nature of Rights. 25? 
 
 fiders chiefly the affections they flowed from abftrac- Chap. 3. 
 ting from their effects. Actions materially good may^/VXJ< 
 flow from motives void of all virtue. And actions truly 
 virtuous or formally good may by accident, in the 
 event, turn to the publick detriment. 
 
 Our notion of right as a moral quality competent J" :c,,;:; CJ " 
 to fome perfon, as when we fay one has a right to fuch 
 things; is a much more complex conception. What- 
 ever action we would deem either as virtuous or inno- 
 cent were it done by the agent in certain circumdan- 
 ces, we fay he has a right to do it. Whatever one fa 
 poffeffes and enjoys in certain circumdances, that we 
 would deem it a wrong action in any other to didurb 
 or interrupt his poffeilLon, we fay 'tis his right, or he 
 has a right to enjoy and poflefs it. Whatever demand 
 one has upon another in fuch circumftances that we 
 would deem it wrong conduct in that other not to 
 comply with it, we fay one has a right to what is thus 
 demanded. Or we may fay more briefly, a man hath 
 a right to do, poffefs, or demand any thing, f " when 
 " his acting, porTeding, or obtaining from another in 
 " thefe circumftances tends to the good of fociety, or 
 " to the intereft of the individual confidently with 
 " the rights of others and the general good of fociety > 
 " and obftructing him would have the contrary ten- 
 " dency." 
 
 II. The rlmteoufnejs or goodnefs of actions is nor not *&& «- 
 
 ^ e fund tCTO t:\b- 
 
 UckgiOtL 
 
 f This, is the fame with the common definition, Facuitcn .' cjfa ad alijuid 
 
 agendum, ha'-r' : .';i ••;, aut ab alisro con/equendum i Gncc the end of the law oi* nature is 
 the general got d.
 
 r Nature 
 
 Boos II. indeed the fame nock d with t ':.. tendon : . - 
 
 fal kappvr.eh. or flowing from rhe defire of it. This 
 ac higheit fpecies of the former. C 
 Jib other immediate objects of approb 
 rower e rnuft immediate- 
 
 Approve without thinking ot their tender. :he 
 
 no. In like manner we irnmedhtely 
 condemn man v unkind pa iTion . v.ithout 
 
 niidering their diftant effects upon fociety. \\ hen 
 one bv innocent induflrv and fome kind affections pro- 
 cures for hir nd tiofe he loves the means of eafe 
 and pleafure, even* gooc i that he 
 ihould enjoy them, and rnuit condemn the dilturbing 
 his poildfion and enjoyment immediately, without 
 thinking of the err office upon a ccrr - 
 munitv. Indeed if any grand interelt of a community 
 his being deprived of fome part of his acqui- 
 : . dien we fee a fuperior moral form : a publ: 
 intereft, which a good mind mult more regard: and 
 more extenlive affection, appearing more lovely than 
 the narrower, juftines the mind in controlling it. The 
 former af rion was equally immediate ; but this 
 latter is of an higher kind, to which the former is 
 naturally * fubordinate. 
 
 \ it is foi the o-ood oi the fvftem that 
 
 defire and fenfe natural to u n thofe of the 
 
 lowerl kinds, ihould be gratified as far as their gra- 
 tification is conliitent with the nobler enjoyments, and 
 in a juft fubordinarion to them ; there feems a nat: 

 
 The Nature 0/~Rights. 255 
 
 notion of right to attend them all. We think we have Ch ap. 3 . 
 a right to gratify them, as foon as we form moral no- ^~^VVJ 
 tions, until we difcover fome oppofition betw r een thefe 
 lower ones, and fome principle we naturally feel to be 
 fuperior to them. This very fenfe of right feems the 
 foundation of that fenfe of liberty, that claim we all 
 naturally infill: upon to act according to our own in- 
 clination in gratifying any defire, until we fee the in- 
 confiftence of its gratification with fome fuperior prin- 
 ciples. The feveral appetites no doubt operate in us 
 before we have any moral notions, purfuing their fe- 
 veral gratifications. But after moral notions are ob- 
 tained, we affume to ourfelves, and, where our pafli- 
 ons are not raifed, we allow a right to others to grati- 
 fy any defire which is not apprehended oppofite to 
 fome higher natural principle : and not only look upon 
 it as a damage or hurt when we are hindered without 
 this reafon, but deem it immoral and ill-natured in, 
 one who affumes a power to obitrucr. us. We condemn 
 the man who mould by violence, without the juft 
 caufe, obftruct the enjoyments of a third perfon with, 
 whom we are not concerned, f 
 
 But, altho' private hi ft ice, veracity, opennefs of mind, #•*"« 
 companion, are immediately approved, without rete-jaw****"^ 
 rence to a fyftem; yet we mult not imagine that any 
 of thefe principles are deftined to con troll or limit 
 
 \ This feems the intention of Grotius 
 de J. B. et P. I. i. c. 2. § i. where he de- 
 duces the notion of right from thefe two; 
 firft, the initio naturae, or the natural de- 
 fires, which do not alone conftkute right,. 
 
 till we examine alfo the other, which 13 
 the convenientia cum natura rational! et fo- 
 ci 'ali ; ufmg the phrafes of the Stoicks, 
 tho' not presifely in their meaning,
 
 2-6 The Nature &/Rights. 
 
 Book II. that regard to the moft extenfive good which we fhew- 
 \s~v^-J ed to be the nobleft principle of our nature. The moil 
 cxtenlive affection has a dignity furricient to juftify 
 the contracting any other difpoiition: whereas no mo- 
 ral agent can upon clofe reflection approve himfelf in 
 adhering to any fpecial rule, or following any other 
 difpofition of his nature, when he difcerns. upon the 
 belt evidence he can have, that doing fo is contrary 
 to the univerfal intereft or the moft extenfive happi- 
 nefs of the fyitem in the whole of its effects. 
 
 When fome ingenious and good men conceive fome 
 J ' other independent or unfubordinated notion of r juf- 
 tice in punifhing, they feem to have derived it from 
 the feelings and impulfes of a natural paflion, a ge- 
 nerous indignation or anger arifino; aQ-ainit oroffer 
 crimes. But this paflion, however wifely implanted, 
 muft be under the con troll of an higher principle. 
 Its fole impulie is to inflict evil on thofe whofe vices 
 have excited it. This paflion, and pity too, tho' both 
 arc lovely, muft often be restrained by wife magiftrates, 
 
 - There is aoiftake in an argument ing. But where moral cv'l has preceded. 
 
 on this head in an excellent book, Biihop what elfe c 
 
 Butler's Analogy. " iH-Jefert, or merit- ing that punifhing, in fuch cafes, tends to 
 
 '■ '.-g punifhment, urafl be another noticH fome publick good? One tendency to 
 
 '•' than this that the fbtferings offuch tend publick good in punifhing where gu:.- 
 
 to the publick good ; becrufetbe furTe- 
 " rings of innocent perfons may fome- 
 **' times tend to the publick good; and in 
 
 ceeued ju.'::fies die punishment. Another 
 -r.cy to pnblick good in a dif 
 jftifies the fubjecting innocent per - 
 
 joft to (bbjed them to fbns to foflerings. This rather pre . 
 u fuch fuffer yet here there is no there is no other ultimate neafbie of juf- 
 
 " ill-defert. "' All men grant that under tice than fome tendency or other to this 
 foot other notion is involved than ! end ; tho' auger moves us to punifh witb- 
 
 .t this conllderatioa. 
 :t:onoffc: .- |
 
 General Divisions o/Ri'ghts. 257 
 
 parents, guardians. Nay were it poffible to root out Chap. 3, 
 all thefe pafTions, and fubftitute in their place a ftrong \s~v~\j 
 calm regard to the moft extenfive good, ever prefent 
 to the mind, and ever awake to difcern the feveral 
 duties of life fubfervient to this general end, fo much 
 the better would thefe duties be performed. Supe- 
 rior orders of beings may want thefe paffions alto- 
 gether. 
 
 III. Rights, according as they are more or lefs ne- m k 
 ceffary to be maintained and obferved in fociety, are '^^ tr ^' 
 divided into perfect, and imperfect. Every proper 
 right is fome way conducive to the publick intereft, 
 and is founded upon fome fuch tendency. The ob- 
 ferving and fulfilling every proper right of others is 
 matter of confcience, necefTary to obtain the appro- 
 bation o£God, and our own hearts. But fome of them 
 are of fuch a nature that the intereft of fociety re- 
 quires they mould ever be maintained and fulfilled 
 to all who have them, and that even by methods of 
 force, where gentler meafures prove ineffectual ; thefe 
 are called per feci rights ; fuch as every innocent man 
 has to his life ; to a good name ; to the integrity and 
 Ibundnefs of his body ; to the acquifitions of his ho- 
 neft induftry ; to act according to his own choice with- 
 in the limits of the law of nature : this right we call 
 natural liberty, of which liberty of confcience is not 
 only an efTential but an unalienable branch. Thefe 
 rights mould be maintained to all men, when no more 
 general intereft of mankind requires any abridgement 
 of them. Society cannot fubfift unlefs thefe rights are 
 
 Vol. I. Kk
 
 258 General Divisions o/"Rights. 
 
 Book II. facred. No individual can be happy where fuch rights 
 
 <^"V^ of his are promifcuouily violated. 
 
 Other rights as truly facred in the fight of Go 1 9 
 ' " and our own confeiences, vet are of fuch a nature, chat 
 for fome remote reafons of publick utility, they mull: 
 not be averted by violence or compuliion, but left to 
 the 9-oodnefs of other men s hearts. Thefe are the im- 
 'igbts. The regarding and fulfilling them to 
 even" one who has them is of great advantage and or- 
 nament to human life, and die violating or declining 
 to fulfil them to others, in many cafes may be as cri- 
 minal in the fight of God as the violation of perfect 
 rights: but as thev are not of fuch abfolute necefltty 
 to the fu ace of fociety among men, and there 
 
 are the moil obvious reafons why thev ihould be left 
 to men's honour and confeience, thev are not matter 
 of compuliion. Such are the rights of the indigent to 
 relief from the wealthy: the rights of all men to of- 
 fices of no trouble or expence: the rights of frier, 
 and benefactors to friendly and grateful returns: the 
 right of every good man to fuch fervices as are to 
 him of much greater importance than any final] trou- 
 ble or lofs they occalion to men in fplendid Rations 
 or fortunes. 
 
 To make all thefe rights of fo delicate a nature 
 matters of compuliion. efpecially when it is fo h 
 to determine the feveral claims of men, and the nice 
 degrees of them,, about which there muft be great di- 
 versity of fentiment, would furniih matter of eternal 
 contention and war: and were they made matters of
 
 General Divisions ^Rights. 259 
 
 compulfion, there would remain no proper opportu- Chap. 3. 
 nity for good men to difcover their goodnefs to others, ^W 
 and engage their efteem and gratitude. The moft art- 
 fully felfliri, for fear of compulfion, would be the 
 readieft to fulfil thefe rights were themeafuresof them 
 once determined. Nothing too would be left to choice 
 or natural liberty. 
 
 There remains a third fpecies, but rather a fha- ExUriial rl & hi: - 
 dow of right than any thing deferving that honour- 
 able name, which we call an external right; in the ufe 
 of which no man can be approved by God, or his own 
 heart, upon reflection. " When doing, enjoying, or 
 " demanding from others is really detrimental to the 
 * c publick, and contrary to the facred obligations of 
 " humanity, gratitude, friendfhip,or fuch like ; and yet 
 u for fome remote reafons 'tis for the intereft of fociety 
 "" not to deny men this faculty, but on the contrary 
 " in fome inftances to confirm it." 'Tis thus the un- 
 charitable mifer has this fhadow of right even to that 
 fhare of his pofleflions which he mould have employed 
 in offices of humanity, charity, or gratitude; or tore- 
 cal money unfeafonably or cruelly from an induftrious 
 fponfable debtor; to demand performance of too fe- 
 vere and unequal covenants, while no law prohibits 
 them. Many fuch like claims are introduced by civil 
 laws in the cafes of wills, fucceffions to the inteflate, 
 and contracts, where the equitable and humane part 
 may be very different from the legal claim. This ex- 
 ternal appearance of right is all that remains when 
 any duty of gratitude, friend fhip, or humanity re- 
 
 Kk 2
 
 2<5o Divisions of Rights. 
 
 Boom II. quires our receding from what othenvays would have 
 
 i^sf~\j been a perfect right. 
 
 Now as no action, enjoyment, or demand, and its 
 *" //: - '' contrary, can be alike ufeful to fociety, fo nature has 
 in no inftance conftituted proper rights oppoiite the 
 one to the other: imperfect rights of humanity may 
 be oppofite to external rights; but as neither the for- 
 mer, nor the latter, entitle one to ufe force with a 
 good confcicnce, war can never be really juft on both 
 lides. Any obligation in confeience to comply with 
 external fhadows of right which others may have, can 
 arife only from prudence with regard to our own in- 
 tereft, or from fome remote views of the detriment 
 chat may in fome cafes redound to fociety from op- 
 posing them, and not from any fenfe of duty toward 
 the perfon who infills on them in oppoiition to hu- 
 manity. 
 
 There is a like diviiion of the juftice of laws. Some 
 fy items of them are called juft, only in this fenfe, 
 " that they require only what is of high neceility for 
 " every peaceful ftate, and prohibit all that is necef- 
 '•* farily everfive of good order and politv, vet without 
 " a nice regard to promote the nobler virtues, and to 
 " prohibit all actions of a bad tendencv. when d 
 " are not abfolutely pernicious. In fuch ftates aiti- 
 ons are legally juft which violate none of thefe necef- 
 fary laws, and men have legal rights to do whatever 
 the laws permit, tho' often contrary not only to hu- 
 manity, but to what a finer inftitution would make 
 neceffary. Sometimes a good legiilator is conftrained
 
 Divisions of Rights. 261 
 
 to give no better laws, from the bad difpofltions of Chap. 3. 
 his fubjects which would bear no better.* In another v ~ / ~ v ~ N ->* 
 meaning of the word, that fyftem of laws only would 
 be called juft, " where every thing is decreed in the 
 " wifeft manner for the bed order in fociety, and pro- 
 " moting the greateft virtue and happinefs among in- 
 " dividuals." In the former fenfe only can the Jew- 
 ifh fyftem be called juft, while it? permitted polyga- 
 my, divorces at pleafure, and execution of juftice on 
 murderers and all man-flayers by private perfons the 
 neareft kinfmen of the deceafed ; and contained a very 
 burdenfome ritual inftitution of worlhip. 
 
 I 4 V. Our rights kre either aliembU\ or iinall en able; m g its a r«ndu, 
 The former are known by thefe two characters joint- 
 ly, that the tranflation of them to others can be made 
 effectually, and that fome intereft of fociety, or indi^ 
 viduals confiftently with it, may frequently require 
 fuch tranilations. Thus our right to our goods and 
 labours is naturally alienable. But where either the 
 tranflation cannot be made with any effect, or where 
 no good in human life requires it, the right is una- 
 lienable, and cannot- be juftly claimed by any other 
 but the perfon originally poflefllng it. Thus no man 
 can really change his fentiments, judgments, and in- 
 ward affections, at the pleafure of another; nor can 
 it tend to any good to make him profefs what is con- 
 
 * This is probably the moft ufeful ex- ] dence of civilized nations. To call the 
 
 plication of the diftinclion of Civilians of 
 the jus naturale into the primarium and 
 fecundarium : the former unalterable, and 
 die later variable according to the pru- 
 
 one felf-evident, and the other not, is tri- 
 lling: a jult conclusion is as fure as the 
 premifes. See Grot. I.e. 1,2*
 
 2^2 Divisions o/'Rights. 
 
 Boos II. (nuy co his heart. The rightof private judgment is 
 ^\^-\_/ therefore unalienable. 
 
 V. By dividing rights into the two clafTes of per 
 and imperfect: we do not intimate that all thofc 
 of either clafs are of the fame importance or necef- 
 fity; that the guilt of violating all perfect rights, is 
 equal ; or that the violating all imperfect rights is 
 equally criminal. There is plainly a gradation from 
 the weakeft claim of humanity, to the higheft perfect 
 ght, by innumerable fteps. Even* worthy man, tho" 
 not in diltrefs, has a claim upon the great and opu- 
 lent for any good office in their way for improving his 
 condition, when none of greater merit, or greater in- 
 digence, has an interfering claim. This is among the 
 loweit imperfect rights or claims. A good man in di- 
 s an higher claim. One who has done emi- 
 nen: publickfervices has an higher Thill : one who had 
 
 oe fingnLiT fervices of an honourable kind to men 
 now in power has a itronger claim upon them, efpe- 
 cially if he is fallen into diltrefs. All thefe we call 
 imperfect rights. The greater the merit and natu- 
 ral caufes of love there are in the perfon who has 
 thefe claims, the nearer alfo they approach to perfect 
 ght&i A worthy man in diltrefs has an imperfect 
 claim to the neceffaries of life upon all who can re- 
 lieve him, but on his children his claim is almoit per- 
 fect, not only for a bare fupport, but for fuch con- 
 veniencies of life fuited to the parent's itation as 
 
 iey can afford without diitreilTnp: themfelves. The 
 
 :ife of an honeit man, pracdied in the affairs of life.
 
 Divisions ©/"Rights. 263 
 
 muft determine thefe points more precifely in particu- Chap. 3. 
 lar cafes . <y ms / 0m \J 
 
 In general, rights are the more facred the greater upHwhettuir 
 their importance is to the publick good, the greater fire "* tbdef " du ~ 
 the evils are which enfue upon violating them, the lefs 
 the trouble or expence is of obferving them, the grea- 
 ter the merit or caufes of love are in the perfons who 
 have them. And the ftronger the claim is, fo much , 
 the greater is the crime of oppofing it ; and the fmal- 
 ler is the degree of virtue in complying with it. 
 
 On the other hand, the lefs the detriment is which . 
 enfues upon violating a right, the greater the trouble 
 or expence is of fulfilling or complying with it, the 
 fmaller the merit of the perfon is, the right is fo much 
 the weaker : but then the more virtue is evidenced by 
 regarding it, provided there be a proportionably high- 
 er regard to the higher claims of others ; and the 
 moral turpitude of neglecting it is fo much the lefs. 
 Small virtue is fhewn by paying a juft debt, by ab- 
 ftaining from outrages and violence, by common re- 
 turns of good offices where we have been highly obli- 
 ged, by common duty to a worthy parent in diftrefs : 
 but the conduct contrary to fuch facred claims would 
 be moft deteftable. Offices of fingular generofity to 
 a worthy man who has no fpecial claim upon us, are 
 greater evidences of a good temper ( if we fhow a 
 proportionably higher ardour of goodnefs where there 
 is equal merit and peculiar claims upon us ) than of- 
 fices equally beneficent toward a kinfman ; or great 
 benefactor.
 
 2$a Divisions o/Richts. 
 
 Book IT. VI. To each right there correfponds an obligation, 
 <^v"V>' perfect or imperfect, as the right is. The term ob- 
 ligation is both complex and ambiguous. We prima- 
 rily fay one is obliged to an action " when he mull: 
 u lind from the conftitution of human nature that he 
 " and every attentive obferver muft difapprove the 
 '•' omiilton of it as morally evil." The word is fome- 
 timcs taken for " a ftrong motive of intereft confti- 
 i: tutcd ,by the will of fome potent fupcrior to engage 
 " us to act as he requires."' In the former meaning, 
 obligation is founded on our moral faculty, in the la- 
 tcr. it feems to abftract from it. But m defcribing 
 the fhperior who can conftitute obligation, we not on- 
 ly include fufEcient force or power, but alfo a juft 
 right to govern; and this juftice or right will lead us 
 again to our moral faculty. Through this ambiguity 
 f ingenious men have contradicted each other with 
 keennefs; fome afTerting an obligation antecedent to 
 all views of intereft, or laws ; others deriving the ori- 
 ginal fource of all obligation from the law or will of 
 an omnipotent Being. This leads us to conlider the 
 general doctrine of laws, and the foundation of the 
 rieht of o-overnino- rational ap-ents, to which corre- 
 fponds their obligation to obedience. 
 
 VII. As we ihewed in the former book that we all 
 
 the Dtvtn ^ > . 
 
 have fufficient indications of the exiftence and provi- 
 dence of God, and that he is the author of all our na- 
 tural powers and difpofitions, our reafon, our moral 
 ulty, and our affections; we can by juft reflection 
 
 See T ■b:'.':tz , s cenfurc on Tuffcndorf 2nd Barbfyraque's defence of him.
 
 The Nature o/Laws. 265 
 
 alfo plainly difcern what courfe of action this confti- Chap. 3. 
 mtion of our nature recommends both to our appro- <*/~V\J 
 bation as morally excellent, and to our election in point 
 of intereft. We muft therefore fee the intention of 
 the God of Nature in all this, and cannot but look 
 upon all thefe conclufions of jufl reafoning and reflec- 
 tion as fo many indications to us of the will of God 
 concerning our conduct. When we have arrived at 
 this perfuafion, thefe practical conclufions receive new 
 enforcements upon our hearts, both from our moral 
 faculty ', and from our intereft. 
 
 As God is juftly conceived a being of perfect good- n e right of tu 
 nefs and wifdom, and the greateft benefactor to man- Jf^ t0 gavmi 
 kind, our hearts muft be difpofed by the ftrongeft fen- 
 timents of gratitude to comply with all the indicati- 
 ons of his will, and muft feel the ftrongeft difapproba- 
 tion of all difobedience. His moral excellence muft 
 add ftrengch to thefe feelings of gratitude and make a 
 deeper fenfe of the duty incumbent on us to obey 
 him, as it fhews that what he enjoins muft be condu- 
 cive to the univerfal intereft. Thefe practical conclu- 
 fions therefore from the conftitution of our nature 
 do not fuggeft mere matters of private intereft, or fi- 
 ner tafte, which we are at liberty either to follow as 
 the means of more delicate enjoyment, or to counter- 
 act, if we pleafe to content ourf elves with another fort 
 of enjoyments. They are enforced as matters of fa- 
 cred obligation by the very feelings of our hearts, and 
 a neglect of them muft be difapproved in the higheft 
 manner, and be matter of deep remorfe under the odi- 
 
 Vol. I. L 1
 
 266 The Nature o/Laws. 
 
 Book II.ous form of ingratitude, and counteracting the uni- 
 v/V\j verfal intereft. Thus it is that we are fenfible of our 
 moral obligation to obey the will of God. The di- 
 vine perfections which fugged: thefe fentiments arc his 
 moral attributes, and the benefits he has bellowed on 
 mankind. 
 
 For as it mult tend to the univerfal good that a 
 being of perfect wifdom and goodnefs mould fuper- 
 intend human affairs, afTuming to himfelf to govern 
 their actions, and to declare his pleafure about them; 
 fo it muft undoubtedly tend to the univerfal good that 
 all rational creatures obey his will. This fhews his 
 right of moral government. For the ultimate notion 
 of right is that which tends to the univerfal good ; and 
 when one's acting in a certain manner has this ten- 
 dency, he has a right thus to act.-]- The proper foun- 
 dation of right here is infinite goodnefs and wifdom. 
 The benefits conferred on us by God, fuperadd a new 
 enforcement to our obligation by the fenfe of grati- 
 tude, and our natural abhorrence of ingratitude. But 
 benefits alone, are not a proper foundation of right, 
 as they will not prove that the power affumed tends 
 to the univerfal good or is confident with it, however 
 they fugged an amiable motive to obedience. 
 
 But as the Deity is alfo omnipotent, and can make 
 happy or miferable as he pleafes, this attribute fug- 
 gefts to us, not a proper foundation of right, but a 
 llrong motive of intereft to obey his will, and a qua- 
 
 \ Thefe are thefundamentA potcftatisjhe inperii. Power is rather the condi ■
 
 The Nature o/Laws. 267 
 
 lity very neceiTary to execute effectually the right of Chap. 3. 
 o;overnment aflumed. The right itfelf is founded on ^/~V~\J 
 his wifdom and goodnefs, which fhew that his aiTu- 
 ming of power by giving laws and annexing fanctions 
 will conduce to the greater!: good. And if this good 
 cannot be obtained when the laws have no influence 
 on the fubjecls, nor can they have influence upon 
 minds any way depraved, if they find that the fancti- 
 ons are not executed; 'tis plain from the fame perfec- 
 tions, that 'tis right, or the Deity has a right, to exe- 
 cute fuch fanctions as are thus necellary; which his 
 power always enables him to do. 
 
 But as no man can give fuch evidence as mall fa- 
 tisfy his fellows of his fuperior £oodnefs and wifdom, WttT » M t^ 
 and remove fufpicions of his weaknefs and interefted 
 views; as there is no acknowledged criterion of fupe- 
 rior wifdom for governing ; and multitudes at once 
 would pretend to it ; as there is no affurance can be 
 given of good intentions, to which the worlt might 
 by hypocritical fervices pretend ; and as a people can- 
 not be happy while their interefts precariously depend 
 on perfons of fufpecled goodnefs or wifdom ; thefe qua- 
 lities cannot be, among men, the natural foundati- 
 ons of power ; nor can it ferve the general intereft 
 that they mould be deemed fufficient to conftitute 
 fuch a right of governing, or of compelling others 
 to obedience. Some extraordinary cafes may be ex- 
 cepted. 
 
 VIII. As a law is " a declaration made by him who z*™ ^ '> 
 "has a right to govern, what actions he requires, or for- 
 
 Ll 2
 
 2 6§ The Nature of Laws. 
 
 Book II. H bids, for the publick good; and what motives of in- 
 v^vxy tereft he has conftituted to excite to the actions re- 
 " quired, and deter from thofe prohibited. " It con- 
 tains thefe two parts, the precept, fhewing the actions 
 required, or prohibited ; and the janB'wn, fhewing the 
 rewards to eniue upon obedience, or the evils to be in- 
 flicted upon the difobedient. The precept muft al- 
 ways be exprefled, but the fanction may be underftood 
 as refcrved difcretionary to the governor. 
 
 This notion of a law fhews how juftly the practical 
 xonclulions of right reafon from the order of nature 
 conftituted by God, and laid open to our obfervation, 
 are called laws of nature, and laws of God ; as they 
 are clear declarations of his will about our conduct. 
 And all the private advantages, internal or external, 
 which we can forefee as probably enfuing upon our 
 complyance, from the conftitution of our own nature, 
 or that of others, or of the world around us, are fo 
 many fanctions of rewards : and all the evils in like 
 manner to be expected from our non-obfervance of 
 thefe conclufions, are fanctions of puniihment, decla- 
 red or promulgated by the fame means which declare 
 the precepts. 
 
 The fole ufe of words, or writing, inlaws, is to dif- 
 cover the will of the governor. In poiitive laws it muit. 
 by fuch means be difcovered. But there is another and 
 primary way by which God difcovers his will concern- 
 ing our conduct, and like ways propofes the molt in- 
 teiefting motives, even by the conftitution of na- 
 ture, and the powers of reafon, and moral perception,
 
 The NTatureo/Laws. 269 
 
 which he has given to mankind, and thus reveals a Chap. j. 
 law with its fanctions, as effectually as by words, or wri- ^-/VVJ 
 ting; and in a manner more noble and divine.* 
 
 IX. Laws are divided into natural, and pofetvue: and "Jww »». 
 But thefe two terms are ufed in very different mean-^"^^" 
 ings. Sometimes the divifion is taken from the diffe- 
 rent manners of promulgation ; and then by natural 
 laxvs are underftood the moral determinations of the 
 heart and the conclufions of right reafon from thefe 
 determinations and other obfervations of nature; and 
 by pojitivc laxvs, fuch as are promulgated m words or 
 writing, whatever the matter of them be. 
 
 Others take the divifion expreffed by thefe words Lawfneee f ar y> 
 from the diverfity of the matter of laws ; as fome 
 laws declare the natural direct and neceffary means- 
 of fupporting the dignity of human nature and pro- 
 moting the publick good; fo that either oppofite or 
 different laws could not be equally ufeful, nay would 
 be pernicious to fociety: thefe they call natural: fuclr 
 are all the laws of juflice and humanity. Other Jaw?, 
 have indeed in intention fome good end, and with a 
 view to it require certain means, but thefe are not 
 always the fole, or. the neceffary, or preferable means. 
 The fame good end may be obtained by different 
 means, and thefe equally convenient or effectual, and 
 yet it may be neceflary for the good of a fociety that 
 a certain fet of means be agreed upon for all. Nay; 
 certain inftitutions make fome practices ufeful which: 
 in their own nature were of no ufe. Thus fome rites- 
 
 *■ Oo this fubjeit fee Dr t Cumberland de Leg. Nat. Prolegom. etc. i.
 
 - j The Nature o/Lavs. 
 
 Book II. of religion, in their own nature of no importance, yet, 
 
 kj~sT\j by being inftituted in memory of fome great events, 
 
 the frequent remembrance of which muft increafe 
 
 grateful, pious, or humane difpofitions, may become 
 
 very ufeful to mankind. 
 
 The moft frequent occafions for pofitive laws are 
 where the fame good ends may be obtained different 
 ways, but 'tis requifite that fome one way be fixed 
 for all in a certain diftrict. Thus neither can focial 
 worfhip be performed, nor courts of jufKce be kept, 
 unlefs times and places are determined: and yet 'tis 
 feldom found that any one time is fitter than another 
 for any natural reafon. In like manner, in the exe- 
 cution of juftice there are different forms of procefs, 
 different penalties for crimes, different times for exe- 
 cutions. Tis convenient ail thefe. points mould be 
 known and fettled for a whole fociety ; and yet no 
 one of the poflible determinations can be faid to be 
 abfolutely belt, fo that the fmallefl: variation would 
 make it worfe. 
 Tky an Pofitive laws are quite different from what we call 
 
 trary. t . L 
 
 arbitrary or imperious, fuch as are enacted merely 
 from orientation of power, without fubferviency to the 
 publick intereft. 
 
 To the obligation of a law promulgation is nccef- 
 fary; not that every fubjecl fhould actually know it; 
 but that every one have it in his power, by fuch dili- 
 gence as he is capable of, to attain to the knowledge 
 of it. The penalties of laws may be juftly exacted, 
 hare the laws have not been actually known, when
 
 The Nature of Laws. iji 
 
 the fubject is culpably ignorant, and might have Chap. 3. 
 known them by fuch diligence as a good man in his^yvx^ 
 circumftances would have ufed. But the ignorance 
 of fome laws of more difficult difcovery may be very 
 excufable in fome men becaufe of many avocations, 
 and low abilities, or opportunities, which yet may be 
 very culpable in others placed in more advantageous 
 circumftances. 
 
 X. As the laws of nature comprehend not merely mwtht \ 
 the original moral determinations of the mind, but rt "' v: 
 likeways the practical concluflons made by the rea- 
 foning and reflection of men upon the conftitution of 
 nature, lhewing what conduct is worthy and tends to 
 publick good, there needs be little controverfy about 
 their perfection, as all murt own that the reafon even 
 of the moft ingenious and mod improved is ftill im- 
 perfect. And that it may be very poflible that a fu- 
 perior being could fee a certain rule of conduct to 
 be conducive to the publick good, which none of hu- 
 man race could ever have difcovered to be ufeful : 
 and as to the bulk of mankind, they may indeed ea- 
 fily difcover the general and moft necelTary rules, but 
 they feldom can find out or even apprehend well the 
 reafons upon which fome of the more fpecial laws 
 which yet have a fubflantial foundation in nature are 
 built. If one by the fyftem of the laws of nature 
 means the very conititutions of nature itfelf, or the 
 objective evidence laid before rational beings in the 
 whole; this no doubt is perfect: but its perfection does 
 not fuperfede the ufefulnefs of the revelation of laws
 
 :-: T':c Nature oflykwiL 
 
 Boor. II. to mankind by words or writing, or of the difcoreries 
 ^/~v^ of die wifer human legislators or moralifts, or of pre- 
 :tive as to their matter; fmce fo few of man- 
 ::ain any great knowledge of this conlli- 
 turion, and none can pretend to underftand it corn- 
 ea tl v. 
 
 We inould nor cenfure providence on account of 
 'Zj^ " this imperfection, for reafons * mentioned above, any 
 more than we cenfure it for our finall bodily ltrength, 
 the lhortnefs of our lives. If we ufe our powers 
 ortunities well, the condition of human life 
 aid will be in the main an agreeable and hap- 
 irate: and vet bv divine revelation, or even by ac- 
 curate reafonings of wile men. much may be difco- 
 vered for the improvement of this life ; and many rine 
 rituuons contrived, the reafons for which neidier 
 any one in the ruder narions, nor the populace in the 
 more civilized, (hall ever apprehend. 
 
 But this holds in general, that all wife and juft 
 - laws have fomc tendency to die general happinefs 3 01 
 -to the good of fome p f the fvdem fubfervient to 
 :h the general g-ood. The moral 
 eood in v ice confifts in either a direct intention 
 
 d end propofed bv the law, whether we 
 know it folly ourfelves. or imp ba dy trull: to the good- 
 is of the legiilator : or in fome grateful affection to- 
 aid the legillator: where obedience I uly ft 
 
 ir of pv lent, or hope of i no mc i 
 
 : Uency, tho in fome cafes it may be innocent. 
 
 * 3 . i
 
 The Nature o/Laws. 273 
 
 XL Precepts of the law of nature, or thefe prafti- Chap. 3. 
 cal obfervations, are deemed immutable and eternal, ^C)C/^ 
 becaufe fome rules, or rather the difpofitions which""""" imml ~ 
 gave origin to them, and in which they are founded, 
 muft always tend to the general good, and the con- 
 trary to the general detriment, in fuch a fyftem of 
 creatures as we are. But we muft not imagine that all 
 the fpecial precepts of the law of nature are thus im- 
 mutable as they are commonly enunciated univerfal- 
 ly. If we make the precepts immutable, we muft al- 
 low many exceptions as parts of the precept, or un- 
 derftand the precept as holding only generally in or- 
 dinary cafes. As the precept is indeed no more than 
 a conclufion from obfervation of what fort of condudl 
 is ordinarily ufeful to fociety ; fome fingular cafes 
 may happen in which departing from the ordinary rule 
 may be more for the general intereft than following it. 
 And fome wife human inftitutions may take away or 
 limit fome rights which formerly were facredly con- 
 firmed to each individual by the law of nature. Be- 
 fore civil polity each one had a right by private vio- 
 lence when gentler methods were ineffectual, of ob- 
 taining reparation of wrong from the author of it. But 
 in civil polity private individuals ceafe to have a right 
 to ufe thofe means. In like manner civil laws juftly 
 limit our ufe of our own property, and take fome 
 fhare of it for publick exigences, whereas previoufly 
 to fome political inftitution the general law of na- 
 ture allowed to each one the full ufe of all his own 
 acquisitions, and the right of difpofing of them at 
 
 Vol. I. Mm
 
 mm The Nature ^/Lavs. 
 
 Boo:-: II. pleafure. Singular cafes ofneceflity are alfojuftly deem- 
 \y^V%*>ed exceptions from the ordinary laws. Tis injurious 
 ordinarily to ufe the property of another without his 
 confent; but an innocent man when he cannot other- 
 ways fave his life in his flying from an unjuft enemy, 
 does no wrong by taking the horfe of another when 
 he cannot wait for the owners confent. 
 
 The two fundamental precepts of " loving God, 
 * ; and promoting the univerfal happinefs, ! admit of 
 no exceptions: nay in the latter precept are founded 
 all the exceptions from the fpecial laws of nature: all 
 the rights of receding, in cafes of lingular necelTity, 
 from the ordinary rules : and all the limitations of 
 our rights by anv wife inititutions : lince all thefe are 
 
 O -J 
 
 juitiried by then tendency in certain cafes, and upon 
 certain fuppoiitions, to a fuperior good of the fyitem 
 than would enfue from following; the ordinary rule. 
 
 XII. Some intricate controversies arife among mo- 
 talifts and fchoolmen. from not obfervin_ :ien:ly 
 
 the difference between thefe practical obferyations we 
 call laws of nature, and the laws declared in words 
 and writing by legiilators, divine, or human. They 
 may be prevented by the following remarks. 
 
 i. As by* equity, they understand, a f* com 
 " of any defect in the law bv too great or too fmall 
 extent of its expreilion, " when it is julHy interpreted 
 according to the true intention of the legislator, ex- 
 tended as far as the reafon of it extends, and not ex- 
 tended to cafes where the reafon of the law does not 
 
 • The EtauU of . led t'acfcfaoohnm.
 
 The Nature u/Laws, 275 
 
 hold; there is no room for this fort of equity as di- Chap. 3. 
 ftincT: from the letter in the law of nature; as the law^^^^VN-/ 
 is not declared to us by words, in which alone there 
 can be too fmall or great univerfality. Whatever right 
 reafon mews to be humane and equitable in conduct, 
 is a part of the law of nature. 
 
 2. The whole doctrine of difpenfations was intro- n* io*™ of 
 duced by the canomjts, atter many capricious, mcirroftfrLthtc*- 
 prudent, and unneceflary laws were impofed upon the*" 1 Law ' 
 Chriftian world, with the worft defigns, and yet it was 
 
 often found neceffary to free men from the obliga- 
 tion of them. By difpenfation is underftood " fome 
 " act of the legiflator exempting certain perfonsfrom 
 " the obligation of laws which extended to them as 
 " well as others :" and always imports fome abatement 
 or derogation from a law. 
 
 3 . The word difpenfation is very ambiguous ; and *>\fc*fi* 
 
 1 i'rr 1 • 1 r • r\-r r • i ambiguous. 
 
 there are different kinds or it. Uijpenjatwn may be 
 given either from the fanction, after the law is vio- 
 lated, or from the precept, previoufly to any violati- 
 on of the law. A difpenfation from the fanction is 
 " exempting a perfon from the legal punifhment who 
 " has incurred it by violating the law; or the abating 
 " or altering of the punifhment." Now, as we (hall 
 fee hereafter, there are fome very ftrong reafons why 
 a power of fuch difpenfation mould be lodged fome- 
 where in every ftate, when the publick intereft may 
 require fuch difpenfations : and, in like manner, as to 
 fuch puniihments as may naturally enfue, and be ordi- 
 narily neceffary for the general good upon the vio- 
 
 M m 2
 
 2j6 The Nature o/Laws. 
 
 Book II. Iation of the laws of nature, it may be perfectly wife 
 ^/"VN^and benign that God, the great ruler of the world, 
 ihould fometimes mercifully interpofe and prevent 
 thefe fufferings when the true end of them can be o- 
 therways obtained. But as we cannot conceive anyfuch 
 laws limiting God himfelf as may limit even the fu- 
 prcme magistrates of ftates, nor are any fuch particu- 
 lar punifhments fpecified by the laws of nature inva- 
 riably as may be by human laws, there can be little 
 occaiion for debating about the divine right of difpen- 
 flno; with the fanctions of the laws of nature. 
 * re r - 4. As to previous difpenfations from the precepts 
 
 .of laws, if the law itfelf be wife in all its extent, the 
 previous difpenling with any violation of it muff ap- 
 pear unfuft and imprudent in any governor. And 'tis 
 plain that no permillion or command of any perfon 
 can aker the moral nature of our affections fo as to 
 make the love of God, and our neighbour, become 
 evil; or any contrary affections become good: nor can 
 any permillion or command alter the moral nature of 
 the external actions which rlowfrom thefe affections. 
 No man could approve any fuch permiiIions or com- 
 mands, nor can thev ever be given by a good God. 
 Some confufed notions of the divine ri^ht of domi- 
 nion or foverei°;ntv have led fome authors into mch 
 fentiments, as if a divine command could iuitify un- 
 kind or inhumane affections, and actions confequent 
 upon them tending to the general detriment of the 
 fyitem. But if one would conlult the feelings of his 
 heart, and examine well the original notion of right in
 
 The Nature o/Laws. 277 
 
 action, or the right of governing, as diftinct from Chap. 3. 
 mere fuperior force, he would fee fuch tenets to be ^/VX> 
 contradictory to themfelves. 
 
 5. As to external actions required, where nothing 
 is in words prefcribed about the affections, the certain 
 command of a being who we are perfuaded is pofTef- 
 fed of perfect goodnefs and wifdom, may juftly make 
 us conclude that fuch enjoined actions, contrary to 
 the prefent external appearances, may truly tend to 
 fuperior good in the whole, and occaiion no prepol- 
 lent evil : when the evidence for the o-oodnefs of the 
 enj oiner,. and for this fact that he is the author of 
 this injunction, is fo great as to furpafs fufficiently 
 the contrary prefumption from the external appear- 
 ances of a bad tendency in the actions commanded. 
 This cafe can fcarce be called a difpenfation from 
 the laws of nature, ilnce the agent is acting accord- 
 ing to "the law, what he believes is tending to good, 
 tho' his opinion about this tendency is founded upon 
 the teftimony of another, and not upon his own know- 
 ledge. 
 
 6. If by difpenfation be undcrltood only " a grant- frktajfap. 
 " ing external impunity to actions really evil, or con- ^","7 ' 
 
 " trary to thofe rules of right reafon which mew the 
 " molt perfect and virtuous courfe of actions;" hu- 
 man lawgivers muft often grant fuch external impu- 
 nity, as we mail fee hereafter.. And 'tis alledged that 
 many fuch permifHons are in the Mofaick Law, which 
 may be juitiried from the circumftances of that peo^ 
 pie and of the neighbouring nations : fince a more ri-
 
 The Nature o/Laws. 
 oldlv virtuous iriititution would have made them revolt 
 
 O J 
 
 altogether from theworfhip of the true God. But then 
 fuch a grant of external impunity does not remove or 
 abate the moral turpitude of the actions in fuch men 
 as know their pernicious tendency, or their contrari- 
 ety to the mod perfect, and virtuous institutions. By 
 fuch permiillons however, and the general practice 
 cnfuing, the populace may be made generally lefs at- 
 tentive to anv bad tendency of fuch actions, and ie- 
 cure about it, fo that the guilt may be much extenu- 
 ated by the ignorance prevailing, which in fome of 
 - the loweit orders of men may become almolt invin- 
 cible. But Once the guilt is not entirely removed by 
 fuch permiillons, they are not what the Schoolmen 
 and Canonilts generally understand by difpenfations 
 from the law of nature, which they fuppofe makes 
 the actions in confequence of them perfectly innocent. 
 7. Nor do thefe cafes come up to the common 
 notion of difpenfation when a Superior acting accor- 
 ding to the powers verted in him by the law difpofes 
 in an unufual manner of things committed to his dif- 
 pofal; or when the goods oi the Subjects, who have a 
 rieht to them valid a^ainSt their fellows, but not va- 
 lid by law againit their fovereign, are difpofed of by 
 the fovereign according to the powers verted in him 
 bv the law, and transferred from one to another. Or 
 when the prince impowers others to do in his name 
 what he has a right to do by what officers he plea- 
 fes. tho' it would have been criminal in any fubject 
 without his prince's commiilion to have done fuch ac-
 
 The Nature of Laws-. 279 
 
 tions. What is commanded by any one in confe- Chap. 3. 
 quence of the powers conftituted to him by thevy"VV-/ 
 law, and executed accordingly, can fcarce be faid to 
 be done by virtue of a difpenfing from the law. A 
 debtor is bound by the law to make payment: but a 
 remiffion or releafe from the creditor frees him from 
 this obligation. We mould not therefore fay that 
 every creditor has a power of difpenfing with the laws 
 of nature.. The more acute Schoolmen, upon thefe 
 confiderations, do not allow the extraordinary com- 
 mands given to Mofes. and Jofhua to be difpenfations 
 from the laws of nature. But 'tis needlefs to debate 
 about words. If the law itfelf be wife and juft in all 
 the extent in which it is exprefTed, no acl: of any fu- 
 perior can make the counteracting it innocent or love- 
 ly. But moft of the fpecial laws of nature are not to 
 be exprefTed in words flrictly univerfal, without the 
 exception of many cafes; particularly that of God's, 
 exerting his rightful dominion. 
 
 Difpenfations therefore, according to the full in- what a re- 
 tention of the Canonifls, are only to be made withX™?" 
 laws either capricious or imprudent, or too univerfally 
 exprefTed without mentioning the reafonable and juft 
 exceptions, which ought to have been inferted in the 
 very laws themfelves. In the laws of nature there 
 can be no place for them, fince the fame reafon and 
 obfervation which difcovers the ordinary general rule 3 
 difcovers alfo all the exceptions, which are therefore 
 parts of the law. 
 
 Having premifed this general doctrine about. tha
 
 280 Different States. 
 
 Book II. morality of actions, rights and laws, we proceed to the 
 tw/VX^more fpecial confideration of the rights and duties 
 of mankind, and the fpecial laws of nature ; and that 
 firft, as they are conftituted by nature itfelf previouf- 
 ly to adventitious ftates and relations introduced by 
 human inftitution and contrivance, and then as they 
 arife and are founded in fome adventitious relation 
 or inftitution. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 The diferent States o/Men. The State of 'Li- 
 berty not a State of 'War. The Way that pri- 
 vate Rights are known. The Neceffity of a 
 Social Life. 
 
 whst ua « -. W/^^^ we fp ea k °f tne different ftates of men, 
 raif.ae. ▼ V by & ft ate we do not mean any tranllent condi- 
 
 tion a man may be in for a little time, nor any obli- 
 gation he may be under to one or two tranfient acts, 
 but (( a permanent condition including a long feries 
 " of rights and obligations. " The conditions men 
 may be in as to ficknefs or health, beauty or deformi- 
 ty, or any other circumftances which are confidered in 
 the other arts, are foreign to our purpofe. The mo- 
 ral ftates of men alway include a feries of moral obli- 
 gations, and rights. 
 r , , . :f I. In the firft ftate conftituted by nature itfelf we 
 muft difcern abundantly from the doctrine of the pre- 
 ceeding oook that there are many facred rights com-
 
 The State of Natural Liberty. 281 
 
 petent to men, and many obligations incumbent on Chap. 4. 
 each one toward his fellows. The whole fyftem of the 
 mind, efpecially our moral faculty, fhews that we are 
 under natural bonds of beneficence and humanity to- 
 ward all, and under many more fpecial tyes to fome 
 of our fellows, binding us to many fervices of an high- 
 er kind, than what the reft can claim : nor need we 
 other proofs here that this firft ftate founded by na- 
 ture is fo far from being that of war and enmity, that 
 it is a ftate where we are all obliged by the natural feel- 
 ings of our hearts, and by many tender affections, to 
 innocence and beneficence toward all: and that war is 
 one of the accidental ftates arifing folely from inju- 
 ry y when we or fome of our fellows have counteracted 
 the dictates of their nature. 
 
 'Tis true that in this ftate of liberty where there 
 are no civil laws withavifible power to execute their 
 fanclions, men will often do injurious actions contra- 
 ry to the laws of rheir nature; and the refentments of 
 the fufferers will produce wars and violence. But this 
 proves nothing as to the true nature of that ftate, 
 fince all the laws and obligations of that ftate enjoin 
 peace and juftice and beneficence. In civil focieties 
 many difobey the law, by theft and violence, but we 
 do not thence conclude that a political ftate is a ftate 
 of war among men thus united. 
 
 'Tis alfo true that the natural paffions and appe- 
 tites of men will frequently lead them into mutual . Fr i qMn ! ' 
 
 l J nes do not pi 
 
 injuries. But then the laws of this ftate are not deri- 1 ' 
 ved from thefe principles alone. There are fuperior 
 Vol. I. Nn 
 
 injH-
 
 282 The State of 'Natural Liberty. 
 
 BqokII. powers naturally fitted to controll them, particularly 
 U^v~\J that moral faculty which points out the rights and 
 obligations of this ftate, and fhews how far any ap- 
 petite or palTion can be indulged confiftently with the 
 inward approbation of our fouls, and w T hat indul- 
 gences muft be matter of remorfe, felf-abhorrence, 
 and ihame. We are alfo endued with reafon which 
 clearly points out even our external interefts in this 
 matter, and fhews that we cannot probably gratify 
 even our felrifh defires, except by an innocent and 
 friendly deportment toward others. Thefe powers fug- 
 ged the rules or laws of this ftate of liberty, and all 
 ftates are denominated from what the laws and obli- 
 gations of them enjoin or require, and not from fuch 
 conduct as the paffions of men may hurry them into 
 contrary to the laws of thofe ftates. 
 c-trs&imi The authors of this moft unnatural feheme never 
 fail to contradict their own doctrine, by owning and 
 arguing that that rational faculty, which they allow we 
 are naturally endued with for the conduct, of life, will 
 foon mew that this univerfal war of all with all muft 
 be the moft deftructive imaginable ; and that it is to 
 be Ihunned by every one as foon as he can ; and that 
 reafon will alfo ftiew fome obvious rules of conduct 
 proper to preferve or reftore peace to mankind w T ith all 
 its blefllngs. Surely then that conduct which the natu- 
 ral principles of mankind mew to be moft neceffary 
 and moft obvioufly eligible to every one, fhould be 
 deemed the natural conduct in this ftate, and not 
 what a brutal thoughtlefs appetite may hurry one in-
 
 The State of Natural Liberty. 283 
 
 to while the governing principles of his nature are a- Chap. 4. 
 fleep, or unexercifed. \*S~V~\J 
 
 'Tis alfo a foolifh abufe of words to call a ftate of 
 abfolute folitude a natural ftate to mankind, fince in 
 this condition neither could any of mankind come in- 
 to being, or continue in it a few days without a mira- 
 culous interpofition. 
 
 II. This ftate of natural liberty obtains among thofe n t ji*u <,/&- 
 who have no common fuperior or magiftrate, and are^ir^'^" 
 only fubjeel: to Cod, and the law of nature. 'Tis no 
 fictitious ftate; it always exifted and muft exift among 
 men, unlefs the whole earth fhould become one em- 
 pire. The parental power of the firft parents of man* 
 kind muft foon have expired when their children came 
 to maturity, as we fhall mew hereafter, or at leaft when 
 the parents died. This ftate of liberty probably con- 
 tinued a long time among the feveral heads of fami- 
 lies before civil governments were conftituted. And 
 'tis not improbable that it yet fubiifts in fome ruder 
 parts of the world. Nay it ftill muft fubfift among 
 the feveral independent ftates with refpecl to each o- 
 ther, and among the fubjecls of different ftates who 
 may happen to meet in the ocean, or in lands where 
 no civil power is conftituted. The laws of nature are 
 the laws of this ftate, whether they be confirmed by- 
 civil power or not: and tis the main purpofe of civil 
 laws and their fanclions, to reftrain men more effectu- 
 ally by vifible punifhments from the violation of them. 
 The fame reafons which juftify the greater part of our 
 civil laws, mew the obligations of men to obferve 
 
 N n 2
 
 2 § a The State of Natural Liberty. 
 
 Book II. them as laws of nature abftracting from any motives 
 
 vyvxjfrom fecular authority. 
 
 III. As men are (aid to " have rights to do, poffefs, 
 " or demand from others whatibcver the happinefs of 
 " the individual requires and the publick intereft of 
 " mankind permits that they mould be allowed to do, 
 " poffefs, or obtain from others;" and all rights and 
 obligations are founded in fome tendency either to 
 the general happinefs, or to that of individuals con- 
 fidently with the general good, which muft refult from 
 the happinefs of individuals; rights may be divided, 
 according to the fubject or perfons in whom they re- 
 iide or to whom they belong, and for whofe good they 
 are immediately conftituted, into thofe of individuals, 
 thofc of particular focieties or corporations, and thofe 
 in general belonging to all mankind as a fyftem. The 
 firft fort are conitituted immediately for the behoof 
 of individuals, by the law of nature; the fecond for 
 the common intereft of a corporation or date, tho' 
 not more immediately for any one member of it than 
 another; in the third fort of rights neither any one in- 
 dividual, or any one corporation, may be more con- 
 cerned than another, and yet it may be for the gene- 
 ral intereft of mankind that fuch rights be afferted and 
 maintained. And each of thefe three claffes may be 
 either perfect, or imperfect, according as they are more 
 or lefs neceffary to be maintained for the publick in- 
 tereft, and of fuch a nature as to admit of compulli- 
 on and violence in the defence or profecution of them; 
 or, on the other hand, fuch as muft be left to each
 
 The State ^Liberty. 28* 
 
 j 
 
 rights an 
 
 known. 
 
 one's confcience and fenfe of duty : this divifion we Chap. 4. 
 explained above. ^/"VXJ 
 
 IV. The private rights of individuals are obviouf- «« />»' 
 ly intimated to us in the conftitution of our nature, 
 bythefe two circumftances, jointly; firft, natural de- 
 fires and fenfes pointing out the gratifications we are 
 fitted to receive as parts of that happinefs the author 
 of our nature has intended for us, and fecondly, by 
 the powers of reafon and reflection which can difcover 
 how far the gratification of our natural defines is con- 
 fiilent with the finer principles in our conftitution, 
 which, as we (hewed above, are deftrned to govern and 
 controll all our particular deiires. Thefe principles 
 (hew the limits to be put, not only to the felfifh deiires 
 aiming at the private happinefs of the agent, but to 
 the feveral narrower generous affections, and the grati- 
 fications which they purfue; and plainly difcover that 
 the grand end of our being is indeed the promoting 
 the molt univerfal happinefs, but that our heart at the 
 feme time may approve our conduct not only in act3 
 of particular beneficence toward perfbns especially 
 dear to us in fome of the nearer relations, while this 
 beneficence does not interfere with more extenfive in- 
 terefts; but alfo in the purfuit of all private gratifica- 
 tions which are confident with thefe interefts, and do 
 not engrofs- the mind or contract, it too much within 
 itfelf. 
 
 The natural appetites and defines firft intimate the 
 matters of private right, but we can feldom juftify to 
 ourfelves a compliance with their intimations till we
 
 286 TIk State o/^Liberty. 
 
 Book II. have confidcred whether the gratification to which we 
 ■Vy^VN-y are prompted be confident with the defigns of the 
 more noble parts of our conftitution, which are the 
 orand objects of the fouls approbation, aiming at a 
 more extenfive or the univerfal happinefs. Indeed in 
 many of the objects of our defires, this confiftency is 
 fo obvious, or there is fo little prefumption of any 
 oppolition, that we are convinced of our right to them 
 at once without much reflection on more extenfive 
 interefts ; nay in many cafes we feem to have an im- 
 mediate fenfe of right along with the natural defire, 
 and a fenfe of moral evil in any oppofition given to 
 us by others, as we at once apprehend the neceflity 
 of certain gratifications to our having any tolerable 
 enjoyment of life ; and we muft abhor as cruel and 
 inhuman any oppofition given to us, or to others, in 
 thefe gratifications, where we do not fee fuch oppo- 
 fition to be neceflary for fome more extenfive intereft. 
 
 The nectpj *f g c c j ie cn i e f dangers to our manners arife from 
 
 great caution on o 
 
 thufibjtfi. tn e vehemence of our felfifh appetites and paffions, 
 which often break through thefe reftraints from the 
 finer principles in our conftitution regarding a pub- 
 lick intereft, it may be of advantage to fatisfy the 
 mind on every fide of the juftice of thefe reftraints, 
 and to fhew that its own intereft of every kind con- 
 fpires to recommend this fubjection of xhejelfjh, to 
 the generous and foci ' cil principles. Our moral faculty 
 above-explained ihews both the juftice and beauty of 
 fuch fubjection; and ihews a very fublime internal in- 
 tereft in the inward delight and approbation of our
 
 The State ^Liberty. ' 287 
 
 hearts. Our reafon by difcovering to us the moral go- Chap. 4. 
 vernment of the Deity, and his perfections, prefents ^/^v~VJ 
 further motives to preferve this fubordination, both 
 of the generous and interefted kind: and a juft con- 
 fideration of the circumftances of mankind with re- 
 fpect to external things, will afford alfo new motives 
 of fecular intereft to that fame external conduct which 
 thefe fublimer principles excite us to, as we mail en- 
 deavour briefly to explain. 
 
 V. In the firft place, 'tis obvious that for the fup- 
 port of human life, to allay the painful cravings of 
 the appetites, and to afford any of thofe agreeable ex- 
 ternal enjoyments which our nature is capable of, a 
 great many external things are requifite ; fuch as 
 food, cloathing, habitations, many utenfils, and va- 
 rious furniture, which cannot be obtained without a~ 
 great deal of art and labour, and the friendly aids of 
 our fellows. 
 
 Again, 'tis plain that a man in abfolute folitude, J??" 1 
 tho' he were of mature ftrength, and fully inftructed *""♦ 
 in all our arts of life, could fcarcely procure to himfelf 
 the bare necefTaries of life, even in the beft foils or 
 climates ; much lefs could he procure any grateful 
 conveniencies. One uninftructed in the arts of life, . 
 tho' he had full ftrength, would be ftill more incapa- 
 ble of fubfifting in folitude: and it would be abfolute- 
 ly impofftble, without a miracle, that one could fub- 
 fift in this condition from his infancy. And fuppofe 
 that food, raiment, fhelter, and the means of fcnfual 
 pleafure, were fupplied by a miracle ; yet a life in fo^- 
 
 d iudiz
 
 The Necessity of 
 
 licude mu ft be full of fears and dangers. Suppofe 
 farther all chefe dangers removed ; yet in folitude there 
 could be no exercife for many of the natural powers 
 and inftincts of our fpecies; no love, or focial joys, or 
 communication of plcafure, or citeem, or mirth. The 
 contrary dilpolitions of foul muft grow upon a man 
 in this unnatural date, a fiillen melancholy, and dif- 
 content, which muft make life intolerable. This fub- 
 jecl: is abundantly explained by almoft all authors up- 
 on the law of nature. 
 
 The mutual aids of a few in a fmall family, may pro- 
 cure mod of the neceffaries of life,and dimini'h dangers, 
 and afford room for fome focial joys as well as finer 
 plcafures. The fame advantages could ftill be obtain- 
 ed more effectually and copioully by the mutual ai if 
 tance of a few fuch families living in one neighbour- 
 hood, as they could execute more operofe deiigns for 
 the common good of all ; and would furniih more joy- 
 ful exercifes of our focial difpofi dons. 
 ThtaAvavtsgrs Nay '&$ we ^ known that the produce of the la- 
 °fj° : hours of any given number, twenty, for inftance, in 
 
 providing the necellaries or conveniences of life, mall 
 be much greater by alTigning to one, a certain fort of 
 work of one kind, in which he will foon acquire skill 
 and dexterity, and to another aiTigning work of a dif- 
 ferent kind, than if each one of die twenty were ob- 
 liged to employ himfelf, by turns, in all the different 
 forts of labour requiiite for his fubfiftence, without 
 furricient dexterity in any. In the former method each 
 procures a great quantity of goods of one kind, and
 
 a Social Life, 289 
 
 can exchange a part of it for fuch goods obtained by Chap. 4. 
 the labours of others as he fhall ftand in need of. One^/VXj 
 grows expert in tillage, another in pafture and breed- 
 ing cattle, a third in mafonry, a fourth in the chace, 
 a fifth in iron-works, a fixth in the arts of the loom, 
 and fo on throughout the reft. Thus all are fup- 
 plied by means of barter with the works of complete 
 artifts. In the other method fcarce any one could be 
 dextrous and skilful in any one fort of labour. 
 
 Again fome works of the higheft ufe to multitudes ^*<w^- 
 can be effectually executed by the joint labours of' 
 many, which the feparate labours of the fame num- 
 ber could never have executed. The joint force of 
 many can repel dangers arifing from favage beafts 
 or bands of robbers, which might have been fa- 
 tal to many individuals were they feparately to en- 
 counter them. The joint labours of twenty men will 
 cultivate forefts, or drain marfhes, for farms to each 
 one, and provide houfes for habitation, and inclofures 
 for their flocks, much fooner than the feparate la- 
 bours of the fame number. By concert, and alternate 
 relief, they can keep a perpetual watch, which without 
 concert they could not accomplifh. 
 
 Larger affociations may further -enlarge our means 
 of enjoyment, and give more extenfive and delight- 
 ful exercife to our powers of every kind. The inven- 
 tions, experience, and arts of multitudes are commu- 
 nicated; knowledge is increafed, and focial affections 
 more diffufed. Larger focieties have force to exe- 
 cute greater defigns of more lafting and extenfive ad- 
 
 Vol. I. O o
 
 2 oo The Necessity of 
 
 Book II. vantage* Thefc confiderations abundantly fhew the 
 Ky~v~^j necefllty of living in fociety, and obtaining the aid of 
 our fellows, for our very fubfiftence; and the great 
 convenience of larger affociations of men for the im- 
 provement of life, and the increafe of all our enjoy- 
 ments. 
 
 But 'tis obvious that we cannot expect the friend- 
 . ly aids of our fellows, without, on our part, we be 
 ready to good offices, and reftrain all the felrifh paf- 
 fions which may arife upon any interfering interefts 
 fo that they mall not be injurious to others. Much 
 thought and caution is requifite to find out fuch rules 
 of conduct in fociety as mall moit effectually fecure 
 the general intereft, and promote peace and a mu- 
 tual good underftanding. Whatever generous prin- 
 ciples there are in our nature, yet they are not alone, 
 there are likeways many angry paiTions to which we 
 are fubject upon apprehenfion of injury intended, or 
 executed; and all thefe powers by which men can fo 
 effectually give mutual aid, and do good offices, may 
 be alfo employed, upon provocation, to the detri- 
 ment of their fellows. Provoking of others by injury 
 mull: generally be imprudent conduct in point of felf- 
 interelt, as well as matter of remorfe and felf-con- 
 demnation. No man can be tolerably allured that 
 his force or art mail befuperior to that of thofewho 
 may be roufed to oppofe him; multitudes conceive 
 a juft indignation againft any unjuil violence, and are 
 
 * See this whole fubjeit beautifully explained in the fecond book of Oct 
 (Mais.
 
 knee. 
 
 a Social Life. 291 
 
 thence prone to repel it. And they are further rou- Chap. 4. 
 fed by pity for the fufFerer and juft apprehenfions that^/"VX^ 
 fuch mifchiefs unreftrained may foon affect them- 
 felves. How dangerous then muft it be to roufe fuch 
 indignation by any ads of injuftice toward any of our 
 fellows ? 
 
 Nature has alfo prefented to us all a very ftrong ^ >»««? «*• 
 motive to abftainfrom injuries, and to reftrain all the TjrTofZ- 
 extravagancies of the felfifh pafhons from the delica- 
 cy and weaknefs of our frame. Tho' mankind have 
 no powers which can properly be called engines of 
 mifchief, fince fuch as can hurt others can alfo be 
 employed in kind focial offices ; and as all the gover- 
 ning principles of nature rather excite to good offi- 
 ces, all our powers are juftly deemed to be naturally 
 deftined for promoting focial happinefs ; yet 'tis plain 
 our efforts in hurting others, where we intend it hear- 
 tily, can more probably be fuccefsful and effectual, 
 than our defigns to fecure the happinef6 of others, 
 according to a common maxim, that " few have fuf- 
 " ficient talents to do much good, but very mean ones 
 u may do much mifchief." We are of a very delicate 
 texture; our eafe and happinefs not only requires a 
 right difpofition of a great many nice bodily organs 
 which can eafily be put out of order, but a great ma- 
 ny external objects and conveniencies of which we 
 may eafily be deprived ; and the eafe of our minds 
 requires the profperity of many other perfons who are 
 dear to us, whofe texture is as delicate as our own, 
 and expofed to be difordered by any malicious efforts 
 
 O o 2
 
 2Q2 The Necessity (^Society. 
 
 Bo ox II. of our fellows. To our complete eafe and happinefs 
 the profperous concurrence of a great many things is 
 requiiite : whereas we may be heartily difturbed by 
 any thing unprofperous in one or two of thefe circum- 
 ftances : and 'tis very often in the power of our fel- 
 lows to create to us this difturbance, tho' they cannoc 
 lb effectually fecure our happinefs when they dellre it. 
 This infirm uncertain condition of our external 
 happinefs mult powerfully move us to cultivate peace 
 and eood-will in focietv, and to Hum all offence and 
 provocation of others ; iince we hazard more by in- 
 curring the hatred of others than we can probably 
 hope to gain. Tho' the forces of men are unequal, 
 yet art canfupply the defects of force; and an obftinate 
 refolution can fupply the defects of both, fo as to de- 
 prive an adverfary of life and all his other enjoyments, 
 as well as of the advantage he aimed at by the pro- 
 voking injury. Thus when men are not forced into 
 violence for their own defence, peace and juftice are 
 {till eligible to the powerful and artful as well as to 
 others: iince thev know not what univerfal indip-nati- 
 on may be railed by any tiling injurious, from the 
 moral fenfe of mankind, from fympathy with the fuf- 
 ferer, and apprehenfions of their own future dangers: 
 and a friendly juft kind deportment, as it naturally 
 engages the good-will, the eiteem, and good offices of 
 others, is the only probable method of obtaining fecu- 
 rity, and all the external advantages and pleafures of 
 Hfe.
 
 m 
 
 Chap. 5. 
 
 CHAP. V. k^tkj 
 
 T7;e Trivate Rightsc/'Men; fir ft fuch as are called 
 natural; and the natural Equality of Men. 
 
 I. TJRivate rights of individuals according to their R ''- hts natural 
 
 W[ ..«• .. 7 ° 7 and adventitious. 
 
 -*- different originals are either natural or adven- 
 titious. The natural are fuch as each one has from 
 the conftitution of nature itfelf without the interven- 
 tion of any human contrivance, inftitution, compact,, 
 or deed. The adventitious arife from fome human: 
 inftitution, compact, or action'. 
 
 The following natural rights of each individual The m1ural 
 feem of the perfect fort. 1 . A rio-ht to life, and to r ^**f/° lifi * 
 
 • ft * . . and [afetji, 
 
 that perfection of body which nature has given, be- 
 longs to every man as man, while no important pub- 
 lick intereft requires his being expofed to death, or 
 wounds. This right is violated by unjufl aflaults, 
 maiming, or murthering. The connate defire of life 
 and felf-prefervation intimates to every one this right, 
 as does alfo our immediate fenfe of moral evil in all 
 cruelty occafioning unneceflary pain, or abatement of 
 happinefs to any of our fellows ; not to mention the 
 difmal air of the human countenance occafioned by 
 grievous pain, or death, the beholding of which muft 
 move every human heart with pity and terror, and 
 abhorrence of the voluntary caufe of fuch unnecefla- 
 ry fufferings. 
 
 2. As nature has implanted in each man a defire To Merty #-**. 
 of his own happinefs, and many tender affections to* 
 
 t'-C.'i.
 
 .2Q4 Natural Rights o/W/Men. 
 
 Book II. ward others in fome nearer relations of life, and gran- 
 ted to each one fome underftanding and active powers, 
 with a natural impulfe to exercife them for the pur- 
 pofes of thefe natural affections; 'tis plain each one 
 has a natural right to exert his powers, according to 
 his own judgment and inclination, for thefe purpofes, 
 in all fuch induftry, labour, or amufements, as are 
 not hurtful to others in their perfons or goods, while 
 no more publick interefts neceflarily requires his la- 
 bours, or requires that his actions mould be under the 
 direction of others. This right we call natural liberty. 
 Every man has a fenfe of this right, and a fenfe of the 
 evil of cruelty in interrupting this joyful liberty of 
 others, without neceflity for fome more general good. 
 Thofe who judge well about their own innocent in- 
 ter efts will ufe their liberty virtuoufly and honourably; 
 fuch as have lefs wifdom will employ it in meaner 
 purfuits, and perhaps in what may be juftly cenfured 
 as vicious. And yet while they are not injurious to 
 others, and while no wife human inftitution has for 
 the publick good fubjected them to the con troll of 
 magiftrates or laws, the fenfe of natural liberty is fo 
 ftrong, and thelofs of it fo deeply refented by human 
 nature, that it would generally create more mifery to 
 deprive men of it becaufe of their imprudence, than 
 what is to be feared from their imprudent ufe of it. 
 The weakeft of mankind are not fo void of fore- 
 thought but that it would occafion to them exquifite 
 diftrefs, and link their fouls into an abject forrow, or 
 kindle all the paffions of jrefentment, to deprive them
 
 Natural Rights of all Mex. 295 
 
 of their natural liberty, andfubject their actions, and Chap. 5. 
 all interefts dear to them, to the pleafure of others L/vO 
 about whofe fuperior wifdom and good intentions they 
 were not thoroughly fatisfied. Let men inftruct, 
 teach, and convince their fellows as far as they can a- 
 bout the proper ufe of their natural powers, or per- 
 fuade them to fubmit voluntarily to fome wife plans 
 of civil power where their important interefts fhall be 
 fecured. But till this be done, men muft enjoy their 
 natural liberty as long as they are not injurious, and 
 while no great publick mtereft requires fome reftric- 
 tion of it. 
 
 This right of natural liberty is not only fuggefted 
 by the feliiih parts of our conftitution, but by many 
 generous affections, and by our moral fen fe^ which re- 
 prefents our own voluntary actions as the grand dig- 
 nity and perfection of our nature. 
 
 2 . A like natural right every intelligent being; has ' 
 about his own opinions, fpeculative or practical, to 
 judge according to the evidence that appears to him. 
 This right appears from the very conftitution of the 
 rational mind which can aflent or diffent folely ac- 
 cording to the evidence prefented, and naturally de- 
 iires knowledge. The fame confiderations mew this 
 right to be unalienable: it cannot be fubjected to the 
 will of another: tho' where there is a previous judg- 
 ment formed concerning the fuperior wifdom of a- 
 nother, or his infallibility, the opinion of this other, 
 to a weak mind, may become fufficient evidence. As 
 to opinions about the Deity, religion, and virtue, this 
 
 men:.
 
 Natural Rights of all Men'. 
 
 right is further confirmed by all the nobleft defires 
 of the foul: as there can be no virtue, but rather im- 
 piety in not adhering to the opinions we think juft, 
 and in profeffing the contrarv. Such as judge truly 
 in thefeir irtuouily: and as for weak men, 
 
 who form falfe opinions, it may do good to inftruct 
 and convince them of the truth if we can: but to 
 compel them to profefs contrary to their opinions, or 
 to act what they believe to be vicious, or impious in 
 religion, mult always be unjuit, as no intereft o£ foci- 
 cty can require it, and fuch profeflion and action 
 mult be finful to thofe who believe it to be fo. If any 
 Ife opinions of a rehgious or moral nature tend to 
 
 :urb the peace or fafety of fociety, or render men 
 
 .ipable of fuch duties of fubjects as are requiiite for 
 the publick fafety, it maybe jufl to oblige thofe who 
 embrace them to g-ive fuiricient fecuritv for their co:;- 
 duct, * and to defray the charge of employing others 
 
 perform their duties for them ; or to remove them- 
 felves from this ftate with then effects, and make way 
 for better fubjects, where the ftate cannot otherways 
 be fafe. 
 
 4. As God, by thefeveral affections and the moral 
 "v he has wen us, h wed the true ends and 
 
 vpofes of human life and all our powers ; promoting 
 
 - e univerialhappinefs.and. is i> confident with 
 
 it, ourownprivatehappi-.:\ and that of fuch as are 
 
 I ) us : in conformity to his ov _:s purpc-
 
 Natural Rights of all Me k. 397 
 
 fes; we muft difcern not only a right that each one Chap. y. 
 has over his own life to expofe it to even the greateft' 
 dangers when 'tis neceffary for thefe purpofes, but that 
 it is frequently the moft honourable and lovely thing 
 we can do, and what we are facredly obliged to out 
 of duty to Gotland our fellow-creatures. Mankind 
 have often a right to demand this fervice from us, 
 tho' we had no profpect of efcaping. A brave man has 
 a right to act fuch a part, and the publick intereft has 
 this claim upon him, from the conftitution of nature, 
 previoufly to any political conftitutions, or any com- 
 pacts in this affair. Magiftrates have a right to com- 
 pel men to fuch perilous fervices, becaufe they were 
 antecedently good and right: and they are the more 
 glorious, the more voluntarily they are undertaken. 
 
 About thefe cafes where the publick intereft may 
 require the hazarding life, expofmg ourfelves to cer- 
 tain death, men muft judge, by impartially comparing 
 probabilities, as we judge about all human affairs 
 where abfolute certain ty^is feldom attainable. If we 
 have no right over our lives for the publick intereft, 
 we cannot juftly expofe them to danger; what one has 
 no moral power over, he cannot fubj eel to contingen- 
 cies. " God has indeed placed us in life as foldiers in 
 " certain (rations, which we are to maintain till we are 
 " recalled," according to the fine fentiment of Socra- 
 tes, or Pythagoras. But we muff, difcharge the duties 
 of thefe Rations at all hazards. Our fole bufinefs is 
 not to prolong life on any terms. As our reafon and 
 moral faculty fhew us our fiation and its duties, the 
 
 Vol. L P p
 
 spS Natural Rights. 
 
 Be ok II. feme powers muft fhew us when we are recalled, what 
 KS^/~\j the duties of life are, when it is to be expofed even to 
 the greateft dangers; when the publickintereft requires* 
 'hen it is that our Commander recalls us by the fame 
 voice which intimated to us our ftation and its duties. 
 -fl c. Each one has a natural right to the ufe of fuch 
 
 things as are in their nature fitted for the common 
 ufe of all; (of which hereafter:) and has a like right, 
 by any innocenc means, to acquire property in fuch 
 goods as are fit for occupation and property, and have 
 not been occupied by others. The natural defircs of 
 mkind, both of the felfifh and focial kind, fhew this 
 right. And 'tis plainly cruel and unjuft to hinder any 
 innocent acquifitions of another: when indeed fome ac- 
 quifitions would endanger the liberty, independency, 
 or fafety of his neighbours, they have a right either to 
 prevent fuch acquifitions, or to oblige him who makes 
 them to give fufheient fecurity for the fafety of others. 
 
 6. For the like reafons ever}' innocent perfon has 
 a natural right to enter into an intercourfe of inno- 
 cent offices or commerce with all who incline to deal 
 with him. Tis injurious in any third perfon to inter- 
 fere, or confine his or their choice, when he has not 
 acquired fome right to direct their actions. 
 
 7. As we all have a ftrong natural delire of efteem,. 
 and the greateil averiion to infamy, every man has a 
 natural, right to the iimple character of probity and 
 honefty, and of difpofitions fit for a iocial life, until 
 he has forfeited this right by an oppofite conduct. 
 
 8 . From the natural and ilrono- defires of marriage 
 
 ■
 
 Natural Equality. 299 
 
 and offspring we may difcern the natural right each one Cha p. 5, 
 
 has to enter into the matrimonial relation with any^"Y~V-> 
 
 one who confents, and is not in this matter fubjected 
 
 to the controll of others, or under a prior contract. In 
 
 this matter, as much as any, an opinion of happinefs 
 
 and a mutual good liking is neceflary to the happinefs 
 
 of the parties, and compuliion muft create mifery. 
 
 That all thefe rights are of the perfect fort, muft 
 appear from the great mifery which would enfue from 
 the violation of them to the perfon thus injured; and 
 a general violation of them muft break off all friendly 
 fociety among men. 
 
 II. The natural equality of men confifts chiefly in m*w«j *;:.-«. 
 this, that thefe natural rights belong equally to anV " 7 "™' 
 this is the thing intended by the natural equality, let 
 the term be proper or improper. Every one is a 
 part of that great fyftem, whofe greateft intereft is 
 intended by all the laws of God and nature. Thefe 
 laws prohibit the greateft or wifeft of mankind to 
 inflict any mifery on the meaneft, or to deprive 
 them of any of their natural rights, or innocent 
 acquifitions, when no publick intereft requires it. 
 Thefe laws confirm in the fame manner to all their 
 rights natural or acquired, to the weak and Ample 
 their fmall acquifitions, as well as their large ones to 
 the ftrong and artfuL The fame accefs to adventiti- 
 ous rights is open, and the fame means appointed for 
 all who can ufe them. If great occupation and much 
 labour employed, intitles the vigorous and active to 
 great pofleifions ; the weak and indolent have an e* 
 
 Pp a
 
 Nai E u'ality. 
 
 :• n. quail - i right to th : I poffi they occu- 
 py si ■;■: and improve. There is equalit \ how dif- 
 fered: r the objc ms aequum in 
 . the Ron: :;ue freedom. 
 Mien differ mac : other in wifdom, vir- 
 c, beauty, and ftrength : but the loweft of them, 
 : reafer. :his from the 
 fore-thought ai :ion they 
 iicomparably greater happinefs or mill 
 Scant be ha ; that all his 
 en and depending on the will 
 of other, vhofe kind intentions he can have no 
 aflurance. All men have ftrong defires of liberty and 
 pr notions of right, and ftrong r. 
 impulfes to marriage. ar- 
 il defires of : :rue the generality 
 : convinced that fome few are mi perior 
 to them in valuable abii art of the 
 {p. _hts to fuperior I s from 
 the reft: they a inted out : :: :ure as the fitted 
 to be intrufted with the m :: r e :: 
 
 ciefy, in fuch plans of : 
 the commu:.': that its common all be 
 
 : ally confulted. Bat without this iki iongi- 
 
 s r affirmed by force er the : 
 :ers mufl :he mi: 
 
 hole. Mere pre:/, boi ~o fe- 
 
 curity. The dark. 
 
 the faireft fhews till : jd in 
 
 e muft therefore conclu.
 
 The 'natural Equ a lit y o/Men. 301 
 
 natural or acquired, can give a perfect right to affume Chap. 5. 
 power over others, without their confent. Kj^y~\*j 
 
 III. This is intended ao-ainft the doctrine of Ari- . .« . , , 
 
 O slrijiotlc sdoc* 
 
 ftotle, and fome others of the antients, " that fome'"* «*tf*»* 
 
 " men are naturally ilaves, of low genius but great 
 
 " bodily ftrength for labour : and others by nature 
 
 " mafters of finer and wiferfpirits, but weaker bodies; 
 
 " that the former are by nature deftined to be fub- 
 
 " ject to the later, as the work-beafts arefubjecled to 
 
 s * men. That the inhabitants of certain countries, 
 
 " particularly Greece, are univerfally of finer fpirits, 
 
 " and deftined to command; and that the reft of the 
 
 u world are fitted for flavery. That by tliis fubordi- 
 
 " nation of the more ftupid and imprudent to the 
 
 " wife and ingenious, theuniverfal intereftof the fyf- 
 
 " tern is beft promoted, as that of the animal fyftem is 
 
 " promoted by the power of the rational fpecies ove? 
 
 " the irrational." 
 
 The power of education is furptizing ! this author 
 in thefe juftly admired books of politicks is a zealous 
 afferter of liberty, and has feen the fineft and moft hu- 
 mane reafons for all the more equitable plans of civil 
 power. He lived in that lingular century, in which 
 Greece indeed produced more great and ingenious 
 men than perhaps the world ever beheld at once: bue 
 had he lived to our times, he would have known, thac 
 this beloved country, for fix teen centuries, hath fel- 
 dom produced any thing eminent in virtue, polity, 
 arts, or arms ; while great genii were often ariiing in 
 the nations he had adjudged to llavery and barbarity** 
 
 Is it. not abundantly known by experience;., thai:
 
 202 
 
 The natural Equality o/Men. 
 
 Book II. fuch as have a lefs fortunate capacity for the ingenious 
 arts, yet often furpafs the ingenious in fagacity, pru- 
 dence, juitice, and iirmnefs of mind, and all thole a- 
 bilities which fit a man for governing well. And then 
 'tis often found that men of lefs genius for arts, or 
 policy, may have the lovelieit turn of temper for all 
 the fweet focial virtues in private life, and the moil 
 delicate fenfe of liberty. Are fuch amiable characters 
 to be lefs efteemed, or their interefls and inward fatis- 
 f action lefs regarded, or fubjecled to the pleafure of 
 the artful and ambitious? The natural fenfe of ju- 
 itice and humanity abhors the thought. 
 
 Had providence intended that fome men mould 
 have had a perfect right to govern the red: without 
 their confent, we mould have had as vilible undifpu- 
 ted marks diftinguiihing thefe rulers from others as 
 clearly as the human lhape diiHnguiihes men from 
 beafts. Some nations would be found void of care, of 
 fore-thought, of love of liberty, of notions of right 
 of property, or ftoring up for futurity, without any 
 wifdom or opinion of their own wifdom, or deiires of 
 knowledge; and perfectly eafy in drudging for others, 
 and holding all things precariouily while they had pre- 
 lent fupplies; never difputing about the wifdom of 
 their rulers, or having any fufpicions or fore-boding 
 fears about their intentions. But where do we find ar 
 fuch tempers in the human ihape ? 
 
 Superior wifdom or penetration of underftanding, 
 were all convinced of it, cannot give a right to govern, 
 iince it may be employed by a felfifh corrupt temper 
 to die worft purpofes, even the general mifery of the 

 
 The natural Equality o/Men. 
 
 community. Goodnefs muft be afcertained too be- 
 fore the fubjects can have any fatisfaction or happinefs 
 under a dominion founded in will. Now 'tis impof- 
 fible with refpect to man to give aflurance of the liable 
 goodnefs of intention. The worft will pretend to it 
 till they are fettled in power. Nay do not the mod 
 ignorant fometimes fincerely judge themfelves to be 
 wifer than their neighbours, and litter for governing? 
 and how feldom would men of fuperior abilities agree 
 about the perfons moil: eminent in the arts of govern- 
 ment. To found therefore a right of eovernine others 
 upon a fuperiority of abilities, without any confent of 
 the fubjeel:, muft raife eternal controverfies which 
 force alone can decide. 
 
 IV. As to thofe natural rights which are of the Tmperfe 8 , ; ,_ 
 imperfect fort, almoft all the eminent and lovely yir-'* w/r ^* 
 tues of life are employed in obferving and fulfilling 
 them. We may prefent to men a view of their duties 
 by confldering them as fulfilling fome private rights 
 of the perfons to whom they are performed which 
 are neceflary to their happinefs, as a right, perfect or 
 imperfeel:, correfponds to every obligation or duty. 
 But moft of thefe duties are recommended by ftill a 
 nobler moral fpecies, viz. the love of virtue itfelf, and 
 the dignity there is naturally felt in exercifmg every 
 amiable tender humane difpofition toward our fel- 
 lows ; for, as was obferved above, the fulfilling perfect 
 rights rather Ihews only the ab fence of iniquity, where- 
 as all the honourable virtues and duties of life rathen 
 correfpond to the rights called imperfeel:; and the foul
 
 3 04 The natural Rights of Me s. 
 
 Book II. rnuft feel as facred a moral obligation to thefe duties 
 \^v~\j on many occafions, and as great a turpitude in omit- 
 ting them, as in direct acts of injuftice againft the 
 perfect rights of others. 
 
 Thefe imperfect rights are, i . A riffht each man 
 
 • cr ex- -l O ■ ' O 
 
 has to all thofe ufeful offices from his fellows which 
 coft them no trouble or expence. -j~ 'Tis horridly in- 
 human to refufe them. 
 
 2 . Any man has an imperfect right to fuch offices, 
 even of fome trouble or expence, as are neceffary to 
 relieve him from fome great diftrefs or calamity in- 
 comparably greater than any little trouble or expence 
 requifite for his relief. 'Tis often very inhuman to de- 
 cline fuch trouble or expence, and that in proportion 
 to the grcatnefs of the furferer's diftrefs. 
 
 3 . Men of eminent virtue have ftill a more facred 
 * r ' es ' claim to more important good offices, and every vir- 
 tuous heart is fenfible of a deeper obligation to fuch 
 offices, even where one has received no previous fa- 
 vours from them. Such men have a right to be recei- 
 ved into the more near attachments or friendfhip of 
 the virtuous, and to their good offices in promoting 
 them to the higher ftations, where they may do more 
 publick good by the exercife of their virtues. To 
 this we are obliged by the more extenfive virtuous af- 
 fections which regard the publick intereft. 
 
 r, 4. Every perfon difpofed to piety, and willing to 
 
 improve in it, has a like right to be admitted into any 
 religious fociety or inftitution, that he may improve 
 
 f Officia im.oxuie utllitatis.
 
 The natural Rights o/Men. 305 
 
 by the inftructions and devotions of the fociety ; pro- Chap. <. 
 vided that he does not forfeit this right by any im-v^V~\j 
 pious or immoral tenets or practices, which make it 
 opprobrious to the fociety to entertain him* 
 
 5. Perfons in diftrefs, who are not made unworthy To ebarilyi 
 of the liberality of good men by their floth or vices, 
 mould not be excluded from it ; nor mould the libe- 
 rality of good men, who incline to exercife it toward 
 them, be reftrained, unlefs more w r orthy objects in 
 greater or equal diftrefs are unprovided. 
 
 V . In liberality and munificence the importance of m 
 any gift to the receiver is in a joint proportion to the 5//: " ; ' 
 value of the gift and his indigence ; and the real lofs 
 to the giver is in proportion to the faid value, and 
 to his wealth inverfely: that is, the greater his wealth 
 is, the lefs will an honeft heart feel the want of what 
 it gives: and that fenfe of lofs which a poor covetous 
 wretch may have about a trifle is not to be regarded. 
 The virtue of any donation is, in the fame manner, 
 directly as the value of the gift, and inverfely as the 
 wealth of the giver, as far as men can difcern it by 
 external evidence : as thus the itreno;th of fome gene- 
 rous affection above the felfifh is manifeftly difplayed* 
 
 The addition made to the happinefs of the indi- 
 gent may be incomparably greater than the diminu- 
 tion of that of the donor, where the donor is wealthy: 
 and this fhews that perfons in fuch circumftances are 
 chiefly obliged to liberality. But there is no determi- 
 nation can be made of the precife quantity or pro- 
 portion a good man mould give. The different at- 
 
 Vol.L QLq
 
 2 6 The natural Eights o/Mex. 
 
 Be ok II. cachments in life, the numbers of the indigent, and 
 ^^\^ the degrees of their diitreffes, make different quanti- 
 ties and proportions reafonable at different times. 
 Laws fixing a certain quantity, or proportion to the 
 wealth of the giver, would be unreafonable ; and would 
 much abate the beauty of fuch actions. Liberality 
 would then appear like paying a tax, or difcharging 
 a legal debt. Spectators could conclude nothing a- 
 bout the honourable or generous difpofition of the 
 o-iver, and liberality would ceafe to be a bond of love, 
 citecm, or gratitude. 
 
 Several prudent cautions and general rules are de- 
 livered about liberality. Firft, that it be not hurtful 
 to the morals of the object, under a falfe fhew of ad- 
 vantage, by encouraging them in iloth, meannefs of 
 temper, or anv vicious difpofitions ; and again, that it 
 be not fo immoderate as to exhauft its own fountain, 
 and prevent the like for the future when more wor- 
 thy objects may occur; or incapacitate the donor for 
 other offices of life toward thofe whom he may be 
 mere facredly obliged to fupport. 
 
 When many claim relief or fupport from us at 
 once, and we are not capable of affording it to them 
 ail; we fhould be determined by thefe four circum- 
 ftances chiefly, (tho 1 fome more remote ones of a pub- 
 lick nature in fome cafes may for the general intereft 
 be r referred) " the dignity or moral worth of the 
 " objects; the degrees of indigence; the bonds of af- 
 •• A :icn, whether from tycs of blood, or prior friend- 
 " ihip ; and the prior good oiFxqs we have received
 
 The natural Rights o/Men. 307 
 
 " from them." The more of thefe which confpire in Chap. 5. 
 any perfon, our obligation to affift him is the more ^^"^ 
 facred. Virtuous parents in diftrefs are recommended 
 by all thefe cir cum fiances in the firft place. The tyes 
 of blood next recommend our offspring and kinfmem 
 And next to them the tyes of gratitude mould ordi- 
 narily take place, nay fometimes be preferred to the 
 tyes of blood. And when other circumftances are e- 
 qual, the more virtuous mould be preferred to thofe 
 of lefs virtue*. 
 
 Tho' the duties of mere humanity to perfons un- 
 der no fpecial attachment fhould give place to the 
 more fpecial tyes, yet when they can be difcharged, 
 confiftently with more facred duties, they have great 
 moral beauty,and are of more general importance, than 
 one at firft imagines. Such offices raife high gratitude, 
 and by the example encourage the more extenfive af- 
 fections : they give amiable impreffions of a whole na- 
 tion, nay of the human fpecies. Thus courtefy and 
 hofpitality to ftrangers, a general civility and obliging- 
 nefs of deportment, even to perfons unknown, are 
 juftly efteemed high evidences of fweetnefs of temper, 
 and are the more lovely, that they are unfufpecled of 
 inter efted views. 
 
 VI. The duties of gratitude naturally follow thofe 
 
 *^ ., Claims cfvra'%* 
 
 of liberality, and are alfo exceedingly ufeful; as the tu&. 
 neglect of them is very pernicious. The prevailing 
 of gratitude encourages every generous difpofition, 
 and gives lovely impreffions of mankind. The truly 
 
 * See Cicero de offic, I. i. c. 14, 17, 16, 17, 18.
 
 3 : guttural Right Mi \ 
 
 BoosH ?T eat roi 11 ^ does good" ro others a? its natural weak 
 m its own fweet difpofitions and natural impulfe 
 to cxercife them, whatever returns are made. It h 
 its main end when it acts its part well. But the lower 
 
 the ungrateful are the common enemies of all the 
 indigent, as they dhcourage liberality, and as far as 
 they can, dry up the fountain whence the indigent 
 are to be fupplied. 
 
 N a precife meafures can be fixed for returns 
 gratitude, more than for liberality. Equality to the be- 
 nefits received would in many cafes be toomuch,anc 
 many too little. A kind grateful heart with common 
 prudence is to itfelf the true meafure, c liberal 
 
 mmdmaft dermfc liberal things. There is the fame rear 
 fon agamft precife laws in this cafe, as in liberal: :". 
 
 ;ere is a general obligation of gratitude upon 
 
 Jl, toward thofe who have dor generous or 
 
 ufeful fe: Do any valuable part of mankind, that 
 
 we mould efteem and honour them, and promote th 
 interefts, and give them juft praife, one fweet i 
 to noble minds, protecting their characters againft i 
 
 and detraction. Such conduct encourages ev 
 »en trous dn^pofition, and excites men to im i : 
 
 s eminently virtuous. The hopes of honour over- 
 fe diiadvantages aad lofles which of: 
 :er men of weaker virtue from any generoi:
 
 3°9 
 
 "Chap. 6. 
 
 CHAP. VI. ^^tkj 
 
 The adventitious Rights, real and persona L r 
 Property or Dominion. 
 
 I. A Dventitious rights are next to be confidered, 
 
 -**- and they are either real, " when the right ttt^fiZh™ 1 '* 
 " minates upon fome certain goods ;" ox per final, when 
 "the right terminates upon a perfon, without any 
 " morefpecial claim upon one part of his goods than 
 " another." In perfonal rights our claim is to fome 
 preftation, or fome value, leaving it to the perfon jo- 
 bliged to make up this value out of any part of his 
 goods he pleafes. 
 
 Of real rights the chief is property conftituted in 
 thefe things which are of fome ufe in life. As to the 
 origin of it,we firft inquire into the general right which 
 mankind have to the ufe of things inanimate, and the 
 lower animals ; and then into that property which one 
 man may have in certain things to the exclufion of 
 others from all ufe of them. 
 
 II. As the inferior animals are led by their appe- TKe r ;^i to 
 tites and inftin&s, without any capacity of confide- ^"""'"'"^ 
 ring the notions of right or wrong, to ufe fuch fruits 
 of the earth as their fenfes recommend and their ap- 
 petites crave for their fupport, mankind would pro- 
 bably at firft act the like part, without considering 
 the point of right, and that from the like inilindts.. 
 When they attained to the knowledge of a wife and 
 good, God, tire creator of ail thefe curious forms., and
 
 Adventitious Rights. 
 
 to the notions of right, they would foon difcover that 
 it was the will of God that they ihould ufe the ina- 
 nimate products of the earth for their fupport or more 
 comfortable fubiiitence, and that they had a right thus 
 to ufe them, from the following obvious reafons. They 
 would perceive their own fpecies to be the moll excel- 
 - creatures that could be fupported by them, that 
 hout this fupport they mull foon par a mi- 
 
 ble manner ; that then inilincts arid fcnfes were 
 inly deilined to lead them into the vAq of them ; 
 it the inilincts of lower animals; who had no fupe- 
 r powers to rellrain them, plainly (hewed the ina- 
 nimate things to be deilined for the fupport of ani- 
 mals; that thefe forms, however curious and beauti- 
 ful, mud foon periih of their own accord, and return 
 to the common mafs of earth withou ; any 
 
 fuch valuable purpofe as fupporring ind 
 
 :rcafingit inefs: that to thin. all 
 
 ilates are alike, and no diminution or mcrer-fe c 
 pinefs is occaficmcd y changes which be : m, 
 
 ;cpt as they are fubfervient to thii :ed. 
 
 Thefe a ations would clearly 
 
 increafe i >pine£s and abatement of mikry in t 
 
 whole mull enfue upon animals uiing for their fup- 
 port the inanimate fruits of the earth: and on- 
 iequently it is right they ihould ufe them, and the in- 
 tention of their Creator. 
 
 A new created pair indeed could fa ft even 
 
 in the fined climates, without a place c cd for 
 
 them artificially, and ftored with fruits ready for their
 
 Adventitious Rights. xij 
 
 fubfiftence. Their firft days muft be anxious and dan- Chap. 6. 
 gerous, unlefs they were inftructed about the fruits \S~Y~\j 
 proper for their. ufe, the natures of animals around 
 them, the changes of feafons, and the arts of {belter 
 and ftoring up for the future. They would not need 
 a revelation to teach them their right, but would need 
 one to teach them how to ufe it. 
 
 III. The right to ufe inferior animals is not fo ob- n e right to up 
 vious, and here inftruclion would be more necerTary, 
 if there was early any need to ufe them ; and yet rea- 
 fon would pretty foon teach one the right of mankind 
 in this matter. A rational being, who had notions of 
 right and wrong, and in fome diftrefs needed the la- 
 bours or other ufe of creatures fo much inferior in dig> 
 nity, being confcious of his natural power by means of 
 reafon to make fuch creatures fubfcrvient to his {im- 
 port and happinefs, would readily prefumc upon his 
 right, and a little further reflection would confirm 
 his prefumption. 
 
 'Tis true thefe creatures are capable of fome hap- v 
 pinefs and mifery ; their fufferings naturally move our. 
 compafTion; wc approve relieving them in many cafes, 
 and muft condemn all unnecefTary cruelty toward 
 them as {hewing an inhuman temper. Could we fub- 
 {ift fufficiently happy without diminifhing the eafe or 
 pleafure of inferior animals, it would be cruel and 
 unjuft to create to them any needlefs toil or fuffering, 
 or to diminifti their happinefs. But the human fpe- 
 cies is capable of incomparably greater happinefs or 
 mifery: the external fenfes of brutes may be equally,
 
 212 Adventitious Rights. 
 
 Book II. or more acute, but men have fuperiorfenfes or powers 
 L/"W> of enjoyment or fufFering; they have fublimer plea- 
 fures by the imagination, by knowledge, by more ex- 
 tenfive and lafting focial affections, andfympathy, by 
 their moral fen fe, and that of honour. Their reafon 
 and reflection collect joys and forrows, glory and 
 ihame, from events paft and future, affecting others 
 as well as themfelves ; whereas brutes are much con- 
 fined to what at prefent affects their fenfes. Thus 
 mankind are plainly the fupreme part in the animal 
 fyftem of this earth. 
 
 Now fuppofe an impartial governor, regarding all 
 animals in proportion to their dignity, and aiming at 
 the bed ftate of all : fuppofe the higheft fpecies, man- 
 kind, multiplying fo faff that neither the natural fruits 
 of the earth,nor thofe procured by their own labour, are 
 fufficient for their maintenance; and that they are op- 
 preffed with immoderate toil and anxiety, as they muff 
 be without the afliftance of brute animals. In this 
 cafe men could give no aid to the tamer fpecies of 
 brutes in defending them againft favage beaffs, in pro- 
 viding clear paftures, or ftoring forage for the winter: 
 the tamer kinds mud generally periih. Some of thefe 
 kinds, by their greater ftrength, could bear any given 
 quantity of labour, or effect certain works, with far 
 kfs pain than men.; and by want of forethought and 
 reflection would fuffer much lefs by any labour. By 
 their afliftance men might obtain a great increafe of 
 happinefs, and be freed from evils much fuperior to 
 thofe labours impofed on thebeafts. Men could thus
 
 Adventitious Rights. &i 
 
 :• 
 
 have leifure, and it would become their intereft, to Chap. 6. 
 defend and provide for their fellow-labourers, and to ^W 
 incourage their propagating. Here is plainly a well 
 ordered complex fyftem, with a proper connexion and 
 fubordination of parts for the common good of all. 
 It tends to the good of the whole fyftem that as great 
 a part as poffible of the feverer labours ufeful to the 
 whole be caft upon that part of the fyftem to which 
 it is a fmaller evil, and which is incapable of higher 
 offices requiring art and reafon: while the higher 
 part, relieved from fuch toil, gains leifure for nobler 
 offices and enjoyments of which it alone is capable; 
 and can give the neceffary fupport and defence to 
 the inferior. Thus by human dominion over the 
 brutes, when prudently and mercifully exercifed, the 
 tameable kinds are much happier, and human life ex- 
 ceedingly improved. And this fufficiently fliews it to 
 be juft. 
 
 But if after all this, men and other animals mul- b^ju m 
 tiply fo faft, that there is not fufficient food for their valiJ og ^ 
 fuftenance ; it plainly tends to the good of the whole 
 fyftem, that when both the nobler and the meaner 
 kinds cannot fufficiently fubfift and multiply, that the 
 nobler mould rather be increafed : and perifhing by 
 violence, by want of food, or any other caufe which 
 can be forefeen, is a greater evil to the kinds endued 
 with fore-thought, than to thofe who feel only the 
 prefent pain. The brutes therefore can have no right 
 or property valid againft mankind, in any thing ne- 
 ceffary for human fupport. Had God intended fox 
 
 Vol. I, R r
 
 ^4 Adventitious Rights. 
 
 Book II. brutes any fuch right to any parts of the earth, or 
 ^r\^\j any goods they once pofferTed, fo as to exclude men 
 in their greateft indigence of fuch things ; this would 
 have been a right oppofite to the greateft good of 
 the fyftem, which is abfurd. He would certainly have 
 given to brutes fome fagacity to have marked out 
 their bounds, to have made known- their claims, and 
 treated with men about them. 
 
 And yet brutes may very juftly be faid to have a 
 Tighu. right that no ufelefs pain or mifery fhould be inflic- 
 ted on them. Men have intimations of this right, and 
 of their own correfponding obligation, by their fenfe 
 of pity. 'Tis plainly inhuman and immoral to create 
 to brutes any ufelefs torment,or to deprive them of any 
 fuch natural enjoyments as do not interfere with the 
 interefts of men. 'Tis true brutes have no notion of 
 right or of moral qualities : but infants are in the 
 fame cafe, and yet they have their rights, which the 
 adult are obliged to maintain. Not to mention that 
 frequent cruelty to brutes may produce fuch a bad 
 habit of mind as may break out in like treatment of 
 our fellows. 
 
 IV. But if mankind fo increafe that all their la- 
 "fi o/bours, even with the ailiftance of that of beafts, can- 
 not procure them fufficient fupport ; 'tis plain they 
 can fpare no labour for the defence of fuch tameable 
 kinds as are unfit for labour, unlefs they obtained from 
 them fome other ufe: fuch kinds muft be banilhed 
 from all cultivated lands, and be expofed to favage 
 bcafts, and to the winter colds and famine. It muft 
 
 i. ttber
 
 Adventitious Rights, 315 
 
 therefore be for the intereft of thofe kinds that men Chap. 6. 
 fhould make any other advantage they can from them^VX; 
 by their milk or wool, or any other way, which might 
 purchafe to them human defence and protection. By 
 this means thefe creatures mail have an happier and a 
 longer life, and mall be more encreafed. 
 
 But if mankind fo increafe, that all this ufe of Yw-W'" ^ 1 '"'* 
 ing animals is not fufficient, men muft exclude from 
 their care all fuch animals as yield no fuch ufe; un- 
 lefs fome other ufe of them is found out to engage 
 and compenfate human care about them, they muft 
 be left to perifti miferably in defarts and mountains 
 by favage beafts, or by want of forage : fince many of 
 the tameable kinds multiply beyond all necefTity for 
 any ufes men can derive from them during their lives : 
 nature here points out another ufe ; as we fee many 
 animal kinds led by their inftincls to feed upon the 
 flefti of other animals. Thofe of the inferior fpecies 
 thus deftined for food to the fuperior, enjoy life and 
 ienfe and pleafure for fome time, and at laft perifh as 
 eafily as by old age, winter-cold, or famine. The 
 earth and animals muft have had quite different confti- 
 tutions, otherways thefe feeming evils could not have 
 been prevented. The fuperior orders muft have had 
 fome food provided: 'tis better this food be animated 
 for fome time, and have fome low fenfe and enjoy- 
 ment, than be wholly infenfible, and only fubfervient 
 to nourifh animals. Thefe lower orders alfo during 
 their lives may do considerable fervice in the world, 
 as naturalifts obferve that the fmaller infedls, the or- 
 
 R r 2
 
 
 g Adventitious Rights. 
 
 i ; II. dinarv prey of birds and fifties, by feeding on all pu- 
 trefaction, prevent the corruption of the air. and z. 
 are ufeful to the whole fyftem. 
 
 It would be the intereft of an animal fyftem that 
 
 e nobler kinds ftiould be increafed, tho' it dimi- 
 
 niihed the numbers ot the lower. A violent dea 
 
 the hands of men may be a much lefs evil to 
 
 e brutes than they mult othcrways have endured, 
 
 and that much earlier too., had they been excluded 
 
 m human care. By this ufe of them for fo 
 
 men are engaged to make their lives eafier and to 
 
 : outage their propagation. They are defended 
 
 and red by human art, their numbers increafed. and 
 
 their deaths mav be eafier ; and human life made 
 
 reeable in thofe countries which otherways muft 
 
 ve been defolate. Thus the intention of nature to 
 
 : :he brute animals to men for food is abun- 
 
 endency to the general go 
 of the fyftem (hews that men have a to make 
 
 this ufe of them. 
 
 If all thefe reaforings did not foon occur to men, 
 ible thev had not foon any need of the fleftr 
 Is. \\ hen they needed it,, their own fagac: 
 might difcover their right. And vet this right is 
 
 ite to the natural companion of the human hearr 
 that c .not think an exprefs grant of it by reve- 
 
 ion was f.: - reus*? 
 
 * T: . y great fetfs and n 
 
 ; : :hefc reafon'n^s \ I 
 
 _ • E . .3 among otn . .
 
 Adventitious Rights. 317 
 
 V. We next confider the right of private property Chap. 6. 
 which one man may have exclufive of his fellow-men. ^>°^^ 
 
 And here -firft, the natural appetites and defires ofpf'"i b *'ft^ 
 men lead each one to take fuch things as -are fit for" *"?' 
 prefent ufe, and yet lye in common, with full perfua- 
 fion of his right, if he has attained to moral notions ; 
 a3 he fees that fuch things are deftined for the ufe" 
 of men, and none of his fellows have obtained any 
 prior right to them, to preclude him from ufing them. 
 He mull eafily fee too, ihould another take from him 
 what he had thus occupied, that, befide obftructing 
 his natural and innocent defign for his own fupport, 
 which muPt appear odious, as it is ill-natured; fuch 
 practice obtaining among men mult fubjecl them to' 
 the greaterf mifery. What one man now occupies, 
 another without any preferable claim' deprives him of: 
 a third perfon may in like manner deprive him of 
 what he next occupies ; he may in like manner be a- 
 gain defeated by a fourth: and thus the whole grant' 
 made to' him by God and nature of the inferior crea- 
 tures for his fupport, might be defeated by the ill- 
 nature and injuftice of his neighbours, without any 
 neceflity; fince thefe neighbours might by their own* 
 diligence provide for themfelves, without interfering' 
 with his acquifitions. Thus the firrt. impulfes of na- 
 ture toward fupporting ourfelves,or thofe who are dearr 
 to us, point out the right of the firfl occupant to fuch 
 tilings as are fit for prefent ufe. The obftructing shic* 
 
 alfedged that without revelation, or an ex- they were foIiJ, would make any grar^t c_ 
 prefs grant from God, we would have had it by revelation appear incredible, 
 .•bo. fuch' right. Their reafons indeed, if
 
 oi8 The Foundation o/Property. 
 
 Book II. innocent defign mull appear morally evil, as it is ill- 
 «yy>j nacured to hinder any man to take his natural fup- 
 port from the things granted for this purpofe by God 
 and nature, while others can otherways fupport them- 
 felves. And reflection upon the general tendency of 
 fuch practice further confirms this right. Thefe con- 
 fiderarions eftablifli the firft rule of property, that 
 1 •' things fit for prefent ufe the firit occupier mould en- 
 " 1°y undifturbed/' The accident of firft occupation 
 may be a trifling difference; but a trifle may deter- 
 mine the rig-fit to one fide, when there is no confide- 
 ration to weigh againft it on the other.*}* 
 
 The difficulties upon this fubject arife from fome 
 cmfkjii ncu- confufed imagination that property is fome phyfical 
 
 ■ this fob- °. 11 r o." r 
 
 jea. quality or relation produced by iome action of men. 
 
 Whereas in our inquiries about the original of proper- 
 ty, we only mean to difcover what confiderations or 
 circumftances (hew it to be morally good or innocent 
 that a perfon ihould enjoy the full ufe of certain things, 
 and that it would evidence an immoral affection in ano- 
 ther to hinder him. Now from the natural defires of 
 men, of which we are all confcious, and from the ma- 
 nifeft intention of nature, it mull: appear immoral, 
 cruel, or inhumanly felfifh, to hinder any man to ufe 
 
 f By occupation is understood fome- 
 times firit discovering by the eye, fome- 
 times touching with the hand, fometimes 
 it-curing by any instrument, fuch goods as 
 before were common. 'Tis always immo- 
 ral, when we can fupport ourfelves other- 
 wnys, to defeat any innocent defign of 
 another. If without any defign of defeat- 
 icg the attempts of others, feveral perfons 
 
 at once occupy the fame thing, one by 
 firit difcovering, another by touching with 
 his hand, a third by any oiber method, 
 they fhould naturally be deemed joint pro- 
 prietors. Where the defign of one was 
 previoufly known, 'tis immoral and unjuft 
 for another, without neceiTity, to prevent 
 or intercept his advantage.
 
 The Foundation ^Property. 319 
 
 any goods formerly common, which he has firit occu- Chap. 6. 
 pied, while there remains abundance of other things ^-/W 
 which others may occupy for their own fupport. And 
 fuch defeating of the firft occupiers muft give per- 
 petual occafion for the molt deftructive paflions and 
 contentions. 
 
 Before mankind were much increafed, if the reei- *&*»*' «*. 
 
 r f 
 
 ons they porTeflfed were fo very fruitful and mild that ™^J2wi 
 there was plenty of all conveniencies without any un-*""*' 
 eafy labour, there was- little occafion for any further 
 rules of property. But as the world is at prefent, and 
 as mankind are multiplied, the product of the earth,, 
 without great labour, is not fufficient to maintain one 
 hundredth part of them. Paftures for cattle as well 
 as corn are plainly owing to human labour, fmce al- 
 moft all lands would grow into woods unfit even for 
 pafture, were it not for the culture of man. The 
 very fubfiftence therefore of our fpecies, as well as all 
 our agreeable conveniences, require an univerfal la- 
 borious induftry. Nature hath given to all men fome 
 ingenuity and active powers, and a difpofition to ex- 
 ert them: and each man has not only felrHh defires- 
 toward his own happinefs and the means of it, but 
 fome tender generous affections in the feveral relati- 
 ons of life. We are all confcious of fome fuch dif- 
 pofitions in ourfelves, and juflly conclude that o- 
 thers have the like. We know that thefe are the 
 ordinary fprings of the activity of mankind in em- 
 ploying their labour to cultivate the earth, or procure 
 ihings ufeful in human life, We all feel a fenfe of:
 
 The For nd ation c/"Propirtt. 
 
 Bocs II. liberty within us, a ftrong deiire of afijng accord 
 V^*^- co our own inclinations, and to gratify our own af- 
 
 . ether felrilh, or generous: we have a deep 
 re: ait of anv obftruction given to thefe natural 
 
 de. while accompanied with a 
 
 fe of innocence or a c fiids of being void 
 
 : urious incention, and we mult difapprcve it 
 i and cruel, where no importan: k in- 
 
 tereft requi: whether we meet with it ourfel 
 
 fe^ o: has oppofed in their innocent dc 
 
 1 i m :hefe ftronc: £s in our hearts we difcover 
 
 E right of property th h one has in the fruits 
 
 "his own labour: that is. we muft approve the f; 
 ig them to him, where no publick intereft requ 
 j contrary D muft condemn as cruel, unfocia 
 i opp: all de 5 men of the ufe and free 
 
 di. thus occupied and culti- 
 
 : cording t ;.r.: inclination or their 
 
 hear: 
 
 I: end o: ofidei what 
 
 mmi*a*fi. t ke CO mmon intereft of fo; require, we ihall 
 
 find the right c led. L niver- 
 
 fal induf: fuppor t c 
 
 nd T ity 
 
 . : . -\xn tc . hter a: fanter 
 
 ex I intenfe labc 
 
 : he nee convenier. 
 
 of ron g mc: e prefented to eng 
 
 them to tiefe feverer labours. Whatever inftitution 
 erefore mail be found oecefli mote univer-
 
 The Foundation ^Property. 321 
 
 fal diligence and patience, and make labour agreeable Chap. 6. 
 or eligible to mankind, muft alfo tend to the publick ^/W 1 
 good; and inftitutions or practices which difcourage 
 induftry muft be pernicious to mankind. Now no- 
 thing can fo effectually excite men to conftant pati- 
 ence and diligence in all forts of ufeful induftry, as 
 the hopes of future wealth, eafe, and pleafure to them- 
 felves, their offspring, and all who are dear to them, » 
 and of fome honour too to themfelves on account of 
 their ingenuity, and activity, and liberality. All thefe 
 hopes are prefented to men by fecuring to every one 
 the fruits of his own labours, that he may enjoy them, 
 or difpofe of them as he pleafes. If they are not thus 
 fecured, one has no other motive to labour than the 
 general affection to his kind, which is commonly much, 
 weaker than the narrower affections to our friends and 
 relations, not to mention the oppofition which in this 
 cafe would be given by moft of the felfifh ones. 
 
 Nay the moft extenfive affections could fcarce en- , Con fi" neJ */ 
 
 J the extenfive af- 
 
 gage a wife man to induftry, if no property enfued^ 7im - 
 upon it. He muft fee that univerfal diligence is ne- 
 ceffary. Diligence will never be univerfal, unlefs men's 
 own neceftities, and the love of families and friends, 
 excite them. Such as are capable of labour, and yet 
 decline it, fhould find no fupport in the labours of 
 others. If the goods procured, or improved by the 
 induftrious lye in common for the ufe of all, the worft 
 of men have the generous and induftrious for their 
 (laves. The moft benevolent temper muft decline fup- 
 porting the flothful in idlenefs, that their own necef- 
 Vol. I. S s
 
 t :: The Foundation o/Property. 
 
 Book II. fities may force them to contribute their part for the 
 KSV~\J publick good. Thus both the immediate feelings of 
 our hearts, and the confideration of the general inte- 
 reft, fueeeft this law of nature, " that each one ihould 
 " have the free ufe and difpofal of what he has ac- 
 " quired by his own labour*/' and this is proper- 
 ty, which may be denned, when it is unlimited, . " a 
 " right to the fulleft ufe of any goods, and to difpofe 
 " of them as one pleafes. ' 
 
 VI. Thefe reafons for property, from the general 
 ' intereft of fociety requiring univerfal diligence, would 
 not hold if a wife political conftitution could compel 
 all men to bear their part in labour, and then make 
 a wifely proportioned diftribution of all that was ac- 
 quired, according to the indigence, or merit of the 
 citizens. But the other reafons would ftill hold from 
 the natural fenfe of liberty, and the tender natural af- 
 fections. Such conftant vigilance too of magiftrates, 
 and fuch nice difcernment of merit, as could enfure 
 both an univerfal diligence, and a juft and humane 
 diftribution, is not to be expected. Nay, no confidence 
 of a wife diftribution by magiftrates can ever make 
 any given quantity of labour be endured with fuch 
 pleafure and hearty good-will, as when each man is 
 the diftributer of what he has acquired among thole 
 he loves. What magiftrate can judge of the delicate 
 ties of friendship, by which a fine fpirit may be fo at- 
 tached to another as to bear all toils for him with 
 joy ? Why {hould we exclude fo much of the lovelieft 
 offices of life, of liberality and beneficence, and grate-
 
 The Foundation o/'Property. 323 
 
 ful returns; leaving men fcarce any room for exerci- Chap. 6. 
 fing them in the diftribution of their goods ? And ^-/VXj 
 what plan of polity will ever fatisfy men fufficiently as 
 to the juft treatment to be given themfelves, and all 
 who are peculiarly dear to them, out of the common 
 ftock, if all is to depend on the pleafure of magi- 
 ftrates, and no private perfon allowed any exercife of 
 his own wifdom or difcretion in fome of the moft ho- 
 nourable and delightful offices of life ? Muft all men 
 in private ftations ever be treated as children, or fools? 
 
 The inconveniencies arifing from property, which tu faks h 
 Plato and Sir Thomas More endeavour to avoid by t} " om ^T * 
 the fchemes of community, are not fo great as thofe 
 which muft enfue upon community; and moft of them 
 may be prevented where property is allowed with all 
 its innocent pleafures, by a cenforial power, and pro- 
 per laws about education, teftaments, and fucceffion. 
 Plato * indeed confiftently with his fcheme of commu- 
 nity takes away all knowlege of the particular tyes of 
 blood as much as poflible, and all the tender affecti- 
 ons founded on them, at leaft among thofe of the 
 higheft order in his ftate. He is indeed unjuftly charged 
 with indulging any diflblute inclinations of thofe men; 
 but it feems too arrogant in that fine genius to at- 
 tempt an overturning the manifeft conftitution of the 
 Creator, and to root out what is fo deeply fixed in the 
 human foul ; vainly prefuming to contrive fomething 
 better than the God of nature has ordered. The more 
 extenfive affections will never give the generality of 
 
 * See book iii. c. l. 
 
 S s a
 
 7 2 a. How Property is acquired. 
 
 Book II. rnen fuch ardors, nor give them fuch enjoyments, 
 without particular affections, as are plainly neceflfary 
 in our constitution to diligence and happinefs. Leav- 
 ing a place for all the particular bonds of nature, but 
 keeping them in due fubjection to the more noble 
 affections, will anfwer better all the ends of polity and 
 morals : and fuch fchemes as his will never be found 
 practicable among creatures of our constitution. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 The Means of acquiring Property. How far it 
 extends, in what Subje&s it refdes. 
 
 t"C 
 
 I. "D R o p e r t y is either original or derived. The 
 A original is that which is acquired by firft occu- 
 pation and culture : the derived, is what is obtained 
 from fome former proprietor. 
 
 The general reafons for property are already ex- 
 plained, and (hew the original means of acquiring it, 
 viz. occupation, and labour employed in cultivating. 
 But to apprehend the natural grounds of property 
 more fully, we may obferve, that men are naturally 
 folicitous about their own future interests, and thofe 
 of fuch as are dear to them, as well as their prefent 
 interefts; and may be miferable amidft prefent plen- 
 ty, if they have no probable affurance as to futurity. 
 Again, a great part of thofe things which yield the 
 greateft and moft lafting ufe in human life after they 
 are improved, require a long previous courfe of la-
 
 mc rices. 
 
 How Property is acquired. 325 
 
 bour to make them ufeful. Now no man would em- Chap. 7. 
 ploy fuch labour upon them without fome fecurity for \S~v~\J 
 the future enjoyment of the advantages they afford. 
 'Tis necefTary therefore that a continual property, be- 
 yond all poffible prefent confumption, mould enfue 
 upon the culture a man has employed upon things 
 formerly common. Of this kind are flocks, herds, 
 gardens, vineyards, fruit-trees, arable grounds, or 
 pastures. 
 
 II. Since property thus arifes from firft. occupation **«*'«* 
 of things ready for prefent ufe, and labour employed 
 in cultivating goods which require it; we juftly look 
 upon property as begun, as foonas anyperfon, with a 
 view to acquire, undertakes any cultivation of what 
 was common, or any labour previously requifite to cul- 
 tivation or occupation. And the property is complea- 
 ted when he has occupied, begun his culture, and 
 marked out how far he defigns to extend it by him- 
 felf, or thofe whom he obtains to adrift him. 'Tis not 
 always neceflary that we have arrived at or touched 
 the goods occupied. Every ftep taken which is of con- 
 fequence to this end, \ by which goods are made rea- 
 dier, or more fecured for human ufe than they were 
 formerly, gives us a right not to be prevented by o- 
 thers ; and it is unjuft in another to intercept or pre- 
 vent our enjoying the fruits of our innocent la- 
 bours which we have begun and perflft in. He who 
 wounded or tired out any wild creature in the chace* 
 
 •j; Propius kumanis uftbus admoventur.
 
 5 2 6 How Property is acquired. 
 
 Book II fo that it becomes an eafy prey, and continues the 
 ^y^purfuit; or has entangled it in a net, has a property 
 begun, and is wronged by any who intercept his prey, 
 or fruftrate his labours. One who has fitted out mips 
 for a defcent upon unoccupied lands, towards the oc- 
 cupation of which no previous labour has been em- 
 ployed by others, would be wronged if another hear- 
 ing of the defign made greater difpatch and preven- 
 ted him, and afterwards refufed to make a diviiion. 
 Nay had one without knowing the former's defign, 
 arrived riiit, he could not juftly exclude him who ar- 
 rived later, from a mare of the land thus lying in com- 
 mon, if it was furricient for the purpofes of both. 
 p "^ III. But as property is conftituted to encourage 
 and reward induitry, it can never be io extended as to 
 prevent or fruftrate the diligence of mankind. No 
 perfon or fociety therefore can by mere occupation ac- 
 quire fuch a right in a vaft tract of land quite beyond 
 their power to cultivate, as fhall exclude others who 
 may want work, or fuftenance for their numerous 
 hands, from a ihare proportioned to the colonies they 
 can fend. Thus it would be vain for a private man 
 with his domefticks to claim a property, upon the 
 circumftance of his having firft difcovered or arrived 
 at it, in a country capable of maintaining ten thou- 
 fand families, and requiring fo many to cultivate it. 
 Equally vain would it be in a nation of eight or ten 
 millions of fouls to claim, upon the like foundation, 
 a property in a vaft continent capable of maintaining 
 three times that number; as no nation can fend a
 
 nan Laws 
 
 natural libit- 
 
 How Property is acquired. 327 
 
 third part of their people for colonies in one age. Chat, 7, 
 fuch capricious claims, beyond all pofTible ufe or con-^/V^O 
 veniency of the claimants, muft not keep large tracts 
 of the earth defolate, and exclude nations too populous 
 from obtaining for fome of their people that ufe of 
 the earth which God intended for mankind. At this 
 rate the caprice or vain ambition of one ftate might 
 keep half the earth defolate, and opprefs the reft of 
 mankind. 
 
 Nay, as we fhall fhew hereafter, that fome publick A gra 
 interefts of focieties may juftify fuch Agrarian Laws)*, 
 as put a ftop to the immoderate acquisitions of pri- 
 vate citizens which may prove dangerous to the ftate, 
 tho' they be made without any particular injury; the 
 fame or like reafons may hold as to acquifitions made 
 by private men in natural liberty, or by ftates and na- 
 tions. If any acquifition is dangerous to the liberty and 
 independency of a neighbourhood, or of neighbouring 
 ftates, thefe neighbours have a right either to defeat it 
 altogether, or compell the proprietor to give fufficient 
 fecurity for the fafety of all around him. This would 
 be the cafe if one had occupied a narrow pafs, with the 
 adjacent lands; or the lands f unrounding a fountain 
 neceffary to a whole neighbourhood, or a ftrait found, 
 fo that he could ftop all communication and trade of 
 multitudes with each other. But of thefe lefs ordi- 
 nary rights we fhall treat hereafter. 
 
 If it be inquired what is the reafonable time to be 
 allowed to a family or a ftate for cultivating the lands 
 they pretend to occupy, 'tis plain they may occupy
 
 Bam Property is acquired. 
 
 Book II. mote, than the firft fee of hands they fend can cul- 
 ^/^,^\^ rivate. Privace p 1 more fa 
 
 and a ftate mav fend new colonies or new fjpplies of 
 men. No precife anfwer can be given. To limit a ftate 
 to twenty or thirtv years for die cultivating all they 
 
 ; quire bv occupatic: be coo great 
 
 re | and to allow them to keep lands uncul ti- 
 
 led for fome centuries, in profpect of their fending 
 new colonies, mav often be too great indulgence. The 
 meafure of time mull: be dirrerent according to the 
 ices of neighbouring dates. If none be over- 
 :.r^ed with inhabitants, a larger time may be al- 
 lowed. If many are overcharged, a lefs is fuifkient. 
 Mankind mult not for ages be excluded from the 
 ./ intended they ihould enjoy, to g the 
 
 in ambition of a few who would retain what they 
 cr.nnot life, while others are in inconvenient ftrai 
 Neighbouring Hates, upon offering a rateable On 
 of the charges of the firit difcovery and occupation, 
 have a rio-ht to obtain fuch lands as the firft difcove- 
 rers cannoc cultivate. In this and all other controver- 
 here there is no common judge, and the parties 
 cannot a^ree bv amicable conferer. ccs, : . E : i a : oral re- 
 courfe is to un": - arbitrators ; and fuch as decline 
 
 jitration mould be compelled by force. 
 IV. But 'tis plain that our acquilirion by labour in 
 any one fort of goods m; far beyond our own 
 
 efent confumption and that of our families ; and 
 they may be ftored up for the future: nay it may ex- 
 ond all prefent or future confomptkn ; as
 
 How Property is acquired. 329 
 
 we may employ the furplus as matter of beneficence, Chap. 7. 
 or of barter for goods of different kinds which we^VV; 
 may need. Otherways each one would be obliged to 
 praclife all forts of mechanick arts by turns, without 
 attaining dexterity in any; which would be a pub- 
 lick detriment. 
 
 The feveral rules of property as they obtain in na- 
 tural liberty, like all other fpecial laws of nature, not 
 only admit exceptions in cafes of great neceflity, but 
 may juftly be altered and limited under civil polity, 
 as the good of the ftate requires. 
 
 V. The origin of property above explained, mews WUi 
 
 lrii' ore Jlill common, 
 
 the reafon why fuch things as are inexhauftible and 
 anfwer the purpofes of all, and need no labour to 
 make them ufeful, mould remain in common to all, 
 as the air, the water of rivers, and the ocean, and even 
 ftrait feas, which can give pafTage to all mips without 
 being made worfe. Where the ufe is inexhauftible, 
 but fome expence is requifite to fecure it, this may 
 
 . be a juft reafon for obliging all who fhare in it to 
 contribute in an equitable manner to the necefTary 
 
 ■ expence, fuch as that of light-houfes, or mips of force 
 to fecure the feas from pyrates. But the property in 
 the fhores on both fides of fuch ftraits can pive no 
 right to exclude any who are ready to make fuch e- 
 quitable contribution, from pafTing fuch ftraits, or 
 carrying on any innocent commerce with the nations 
 who live within them. 
 
 Where indeed the ufe of any adjacent parts of the 
 fea or fhore allowed to foreigners, may endanger our 
 Vol, I. T t
 
 How Property is acquired. 
 
 Boo- IT. pofleffions, fuch as mooring of mips of force in thofe 
 J ^/VX^ bays which run up into the heart of a country ; we may 
 juftly refufe it, unlefs fuificient fecurity is given againft 
 danger. We may like ways refufe to others, or ex- 
 clude them from fuch ufe of things naturally com- 
 mon and inexhauftible, as would occafion fome un- 
 cafy fcrvitude upon our lands ; fuch as riihing in rivers, 
 or drawing water from them through our ground, tho' 
 the river were not at all appropriated by us, and the 
 filhine were inexhauftible. 
 
 'Tis fcarce conceivable upon what other foundati- 
 on than compact, or confent of neighbouring dates, 
 any one can claim any property in the fea, or any right 
 in it fuperior to that of other nations. Each nation in- 
 deed for its own defence, feems to have a right to pre- 
 vent any ihips of force of other nations to fail fo near 
 its coaft that they could annoy any of its fubjects in 
 
 :ir pofleffions. But this property can extend no fur- 
 ther than a cun-ihot. Hovering; indeed without ne- 
 ceJlity upon our coafts, tho* at a greater diftance, may 
 give juft fufpicion of fome hoftile deiign, and may be 
 
 afk reafoo for expoftulation and demanding fecu- 
 ritv, or obliging them by force to withdraw to a great- 
 er diftance. 
 
 From what is faid we fee abundantly, that this 
 earth, and all it contains, was placed by God in that 
 
 :e the moralifts call , and not 
 
 v. The negative is " the ftate of things not ; 
 d pcrty, but lying open to the occupation of 
 
 d • one/' Pofitive community is the (i ftate of things
 
 How Property is acquired. 3 3 1 
 
 i( in which not any individual but a whole fociety have Chap. 7. 
 " an undivided property." Goods in this pofitive com- Vw/ ~ Y ~ >W 
 munity neither any individual member of the fociety, 
 nor any other, can occupy or difpofe of without con- 
 fent of the whole fociety, or thofe who govern it. Now 
 from the preceeding reafons 'tis plain, that any man 
 could acquire property, and fee his right to acquire 
 any thing he nrft occupied, without confulting the 
 reft of mankind; and it would be injurious in any o- 
 ther perfon to hinder him. Thus we need not have 
 recourfe to any old conventions or compacts, with 
 Grotius and Puffendorf, in explaining the original of 
 property: nor to any decree or grant of our nrft pa- 
 rents, with Filmer. 
 
 VI. All things fit for human ufe either yet remain ^iftuUiJ*' 
 in this negative community, or are in the property of 
 individual men, or of focieties. Bona nniverjitatum, 
 or the goods of corporations are in the property of fo- 
 cieties ; thcf res nullius of the Civilians, viz. things^- 
 cred as temples and their utenfils, and lands for the 
 fupport of religious orders, and the defraying any ex- 
 pences of worfhip ; burial-places and what things are 
 employed in funeral-rites ; and places railed in or 
 fecured from promifcuous ufe, fuch as the walls of 
 cities ; are all in property either of fome larger foci- 
 ety, or fome family; tho' fome fuperftitious laws may 
 reftrain the proprietors from a free and full ufe of 
 
 \ Nullius funt res facrae, relighfae, et 
 fanclae. Quod enim divirti juris eft, id nul- 
 
 lius in bonis eft, Inftit. 1. ii. tit. I. feci. 7. prevailing. 
 
 T t 2 
 
 &c. where thefe three forts of goods arc 
 explained according to the notions then
 
 How Property is acquired. 
 
 Book II. them, or from converting them to other ufes than 
 bat they were fir ft deftinecl to. Thefe laws are often 
 very foolifh, and founded upon fome confufed inex- 
 plicable notions. All fuch goods are truly defigned 
 for the ufe of men alone. The old proprietors, who 
 gave them for thefe purpofes, may have been moved 
 by devotion toward God to make fuch donations for 
 the ufe of certain orders employed in religious offices, 
 or of focieties, to accommodate fuch as inclined to 
 worfhip in thefe places ; or for the burial of their dead; 
 or for defence of focieties by fortifications. But none 
 of thefe lands or goods can yield any ufe to God, nor 
 can his rights receive any increafe or diminution by 
 any deeds of men. Such donations are acceptable to 
 him as far as they do good to his creatures, by pro- 
 moting their piety, virtue, and happinefs. Devotion 
 to God may as juftly move men to make donations 
 for civil ufes to their country, or friends ; and thefe 
 may be as wife and acceptable to God, as any donati- 
 ons to ufes commonly called pious. But none thence 
 imagine that there is fome myftical quality infufed 
 into fuch goods that they cannot be applied upon wife 
 occafions to other purpofes. 
 
 Tis a natural evidence of piety in any perfon or 
 fociety to provide whatever is requisite to accommo- 
 date men in publick worfhip, in proportion to the 
 wealth of a country. It would evidence avarice, and 
 want of piety, if men would not fpare from their pri- 
 ze ufe what is rcquifite to make places of publick 
 •rihip fafe : convenient, and agreeable. When they
 
 How Property is acquired. 332 
 
 are mean and defpicable in proportion to privatebuild- Chap. .7 
 ings, the attending there may be difagreeable. 'Tis 
 yet worfe if thofe whofe office it is to prefide in pub- 
 lick worfhip, and inftruct men in the duties of life,, 
 are not fo fupported as may enable them to attain 
 knowledge riiemfelves, and difcharge their ufeful of- 
 fice. But when fufficient provifion is made for all thefe 
 purpofes, 'tis folly and fuperftition to employ that 
 wealth which might do more good in trade or other 
 civil purpofes, either on expenhVe ornaments of 
 churches, or on their furniture, or in fo enriching the 
 inftruclors of the people as to give them avocations 
 from their builnefs, or temptations to luxury, ambi- 
 tion, and avarice; or to maintain more of them than 
 are requifite. 'Tis ftill more foolifh to maintain men- 
 in floth, or ufelefs ways of life. 
 
 A beautiful metonymy has been artfully abufed by v* *»/« •/ 
 fome orders commonly called religious, with the ba- "" jt ^ 
 fed felfifh purpofes. Donations to them have been- 
 called gifts to God, as all wife liberality and charity* 
 mayjuftlybe called. But thefe donations alone which 
 are made to their orders, or where they are the tru- 
 ftees, are called confecrations. God is proprietor of 
 all things alike, and can receive no gifts from men. 
 Donations can be made to men only. As far as they 
 contribute to the general happincfs of men, fo far 
 they are acceptable to God, and no further. When 
 they are pernicious to a country in its trade, or liber- 
 ty, when they corrupt the clergy, as they are called; 
 by opportunities and temptations to luxury, tyranny,
 
 2 2 a How Property is acquired. 
 
 Bo ok II. or avarice, they are as offenfive to God as any fins of 
 ignorance can be. 'Tis wife and j uft in any ftate, when 
 fufficient provifion is made for the purpofes of reli- 
 gion, to reftrain or make void all further donations ; 
 to refume any ufelefs grants that have been obtained 
 by fraud and impofture, whether from the publick, 
 or private perfons; to free the publick from the charge 
 of fupporting ufelefs ftructures, or idle hands, by con- 
 verting the ftructures to other purpofes, or demolifh- 
 ing them ; and by obliging the idle hands to purfue 
 fome ufeful occupation. This muft be acceptable fer- 
 vice to God. 
 
 Some wild notion of confecration or fanclity infu- 
 fed into ftones, timber, metals, lands, has made men 
 imagine it impious to convert thefe things to other 
 ufes than what they once were deftined to. And yet 
 'tis obvious that no religion or fanctity can inhere in 
 fuch materials. We formerly ufed them when our 
 minds were employed in devotion: but what then? fo 
 we did our bodies, our cloaths, our organs of fpeech: 
 muft they never be ufed to other purpofes ? The fu- 
 perftitious donors perhaps ordered " that fuch houfes 
 " ihould only be ufed for accommodating men in 
 <c worfhip, and fuch lands for the maintenance of fuch 
 " as officiated in it. ' But is it not folly to confine 
 that to one purpofe only, which can anfwer other 
 purpofes, and be no lefs fit for the purpofe chiefly in- 
 tended: The ftate has a juft right to annul fuperfti- 
 tious reftrictions in any conveyances, and to make 
 void all fuch conveyances as prove foolilri or hurtful 
 to fociety.
 
 How Property is acquired. ->->.$ 
 
 Grant that in the confufed imaginations of the vul- Chap. 6. 
 gar, the devotion in churches would be abated, if^/W; 
 they were ufed for other purpofes in the intervals of 
 worfhip. Should this weaknefs be encouraged? And 
 then it requires no more but that fuch edifices while 
 they are ufed for worfhip mould not in the intervals 
 be ufed for other purpofes. If the worfhippers are 
 as well provided with other ftructures or utenfils, and 
 the inftructors provided with other fufflcient fabrics ; 
 nothing hinders the ftate to apply the former ftructures, 
 utenfils, or lands, to any other wife purpofes. But in 
 the Popifh religion the myftery of confecration is fo 
 deeply inculcated that all this appears impious. In 
 that whole inftitution the chief part God is introdu- 
 ced as acting, is that of a (harping purveyor, or agent 
 for the religious orders, grafping at and defending 
 whatever they have obtained by any fraud or artifice 
 from the weakeft and molt fuperftitious of mankind, 
 for the moil foolifh or pernicious purpofes. 
 
 VII. Things once in property may return again m-r^o/^. 
 to a ftate of community if the proprietor quits his y ' 
 property by throwing them away, or deiignedly ne- 
 glecting them : and then the next occupier may ac- 
 quire them. If the proprietor loft any goods unwil- 
 lingly, but being again otherways provided, neglects 
 what he loft, and puts in no claim tho' he knows who 
 has found them ; a long neglect of this kind may fuf- 
 ficiently declare that he quitted the property, and fo 
 preclude his future claim againft the prefent pofTef- 
 for. This feems the only prefcription valid againft
 
 o 5 6 //btt' Property t j acquired. 
 
 Book II. the old proprietor, before civil laws. There are jufl 
 reafons why civil laws ihould introduce other rules of 
 prefcription, partly to engage the fubjects to proper 
 care about their goods and claims in due time while 
 they can be afcertained ; partly becaufe in a long tract 
 of undifturbed pofTeiTion againft fome latent titles, 
 goods may be transferred upon valuable confiderati- 
 ons to fair purchafers, or be for like confiderations 
 fubjected to fettlements and entails and mortgages, 
 which cannot be fet afide without great injuries to 
 innocent perfons ; and partly to exclude artful and 
 undifcoverable frauds, which could not be prevented, 
 if any deeds pretended to be very old, the wimeiTes 
 of which muft be dead, mould be fuftained as valid 
 to overturn a long undifturbed poileillon. 
 
 The civil law makes a prefumptive title, or the 
 hi na fides, upon which the pofTeiTor may probably have 
 believed the goods to be his own, a necefTary begin- 
 ning to prefcription; fo that no length of pofTeflion, 
 begun without a plaulible title, can give a right. But 
 the cafe of a fair purchafer from an old polTeilbr, with- 
 out any intimation made to the purchafer of a latent 
 title of another, is fo favourable, and his plea fo equi- 
 table, when he cannot recover his price from the fel- 
 ler, that tho' the feller had begun poffelTion without 
 this jufl prefumption, it would be very hard to fet 
 afide all claim of the fair purchafer, at leafl to reco- 
 ver the price he paid. Some of the reafons for pre- 
 fcription may hold even where the poiTefiion was not. 
 begun upon a prefumptive tide.
 
 ions. 
 
 How Property is acquired. 337 
 
 VIII. As to acceffions or any additional profits of Chap. 7. 
 goods in property, thefe rules are obvious. 1. " AllS^QQ^ 
 " fruits, increafe, or improvements happening to the •"&• 
 " goods in a man's property, to which neither the 
 " goods or labours of others contributed, belong to 
 " the proprietor, except where another by contract, 
 " or civil law, acquires fome right in them. " But* 
 2. " Where the goods or labours of other perfons 
 " have contributed to any increafe or improvement, 
 " without the fraud or culpable negligence of any 
 " concerned, all thofe who have contributed by their 
 " labours or goods have a joint property in the com- 
 " pound, or in the fruits and improvements, each in 
 " proportion to the value of what he contributed. " 
 If the goods or the fruits can admit of divifion with- 
 out lofs upon the whole, they mould be divided in 
 this proportion among thofe who contributed to 
 them. If the fubject will not admit of divifion with- 
 out lofs upon the whole, it mould be ufed alternately 
 for times proportioned to the values each one contri- 
 buted, or be ufed in common continually if it can 
 admit of fuch ufe. If the fubjecl neither admits of 
 common or alternate ufe, it mould fall to that part- 
 ner to whom it is of the greateft value or importance, 
 in this manner : firft, let the proportion of each one's 
 right to thofe of the other partners be determined, 
 and that partner who bids moft for it mould have it, 
 upon making compenfation to the reft for their fhares.* 
 
 * See cafes of this kind in Cicero deoffic. 1. ii. c. 23. and the judgment of AratM 
 ypon them. 
 
 Vol. I. U 11
 
 Ho'v Property is acquired. 
 
 Book II. Thus he obtains the goods who values them mod, 
 
 ^~ v ~^'and the compenfation to the reft is the greater. * 
 
 Where anv debate arifes about the values of the fe- 
 j 
 
 veral mares contributed, there is no other remc 
 previous to civil polity, but the arbitration of v 
 neighbours who underftand the floods. 
 
 \\ here bv the fraud or blameable neQ-H^ence of 
 one. his labours or goods are blended with the goods 
 of others, fo that the compound or the new form c 
 fes to be definable to the other innocent proprietor, 
 this proprietor has a right to full compenfation for 
 the value of his goods now made unfit for his ufe, 
 id for whatever clear profits he could have made by 
 his goods had they been let alone to him. If my 
 jds are improved for my ufe by another's goods or 
 it, without commiilion from me: I am only to 
 the value of the improvement to my purpofes, 
 . I not the value it may be of to the purpofes oi the 
 ible intermedler with my goods. There is no 
 reafon that through his fault I mould either lofe my 
 goods, or be obliged to pay t more expeniive im- 
 ovements than were convenient for my affairs. The 
 proper puniinment for this fraudulent or culpable in- 
 ter mc e good is a fubjecl of in- 
 ry quite d from this of pre 
 IX. The right of property, when it is entire and 
 onlimi idic three 
 
 
 * T !n2y determine in a ria- ' 
 
 r rooft of the c r the I an 
 
 ■..-...
 
 How Property is acquired. 339 
 
 parts. 1 /A right to the fulleft ufe. 2. A right to ex- Chap. j. 
 elude others from any ufe of the goods in property. O^WJ 
 and 3 . A right of alienating and transferring to others 
 either in part or in whole; abfolutely, or upon any 
 condition or contingency ; gratuitoufly, or for valuable 
 confideration. Civil laws may fometimes juftly limit 
 men in the exercife of thefe rights ; and fome potent 
 reafons of general utility may even in natural liberty 
 require fome limitations, and juftify fome extraordi- 
 nary fteps contrary to the rules which ordinarily ob- 
 lige us. 
 
 To this right of property correfponds a general 
 indefinite obligation upon all not to violate this right 
 or obftruct others in the enjoyment of it. The fa- 
 crednefs of this obligation, we all may find by confider- 
 ing the keen refentment we mould feel upon fuch vio- 
 lation of our rights by others ; and by the ftrong dif- 
 approbation we muft have of fuch avarice or felfifh- 
 nefs as breaks through all regards to the peace and 
 fafety of fociety, and all humanity to our fellows, for 
 the fake of a little private gain; in thofe matters too 
 which we look upon it as honourable and the evidence 
 of a great foul to defpife. This difapprobation we 
 muft feel toward fuch acts of injustice as affect the 
 property of others, even tho' we ourfelves fuffer no- 
 thing by it. 
 
 Uu 2
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 Concerning derived Property, and the ways of 
 alienating or transferring it, 
 
 xhhsrmiandL A Dventitious rights are either real, or perfonaL 
 >; l\ All advent i tious real rights arife from a tranf- 
 
 lation of fome of the original rights of property from 
 one to another. And all pcrfonal adventitious rights 
 are conftituted by transferring to others fome parts 
 of our natural liberty, or of our right of acting as we 
 pleafe, and of obliging ourfelves to certain perfor- 
 mances in behalf of others. The real rights termi- 
 nate on fome definite goods. The perfonal do not. 
 
 The necefHty and ufe of frequent contracts and 
 translations of property is in a good meafure manifeft 
 from what is faid above,* and will ftill more fully ap- 
 pear hereafter. The difference between real and per- 
 fonal rights muft here be explained, and the founda- 
 tion too for this diftinction, previous to any civil laws. 
 tf One may often incline to incur an obligation to 
 another to a certain value, and have all moral cer- 
 tainty and an honeft purpofe of difcharging it faith- 
 fully, while yet he is unwilling to put any one part of 
 his goods more than another in the power of his cre- 
 ditor, and keeps it in his own election what pare of 
 them he will alienate for difcharging this obligation. 
 And a creditor may often be fatisfied with fuch en- 
 eao-ements from the debtor, if he is allured of his 
 
 » Ci;r.p. vi. and vii. 
 
 .
 
 Derived Property. 341 
 
 wealth and integrity, without any fpecifick goods be- Chap. 7. 
 ing fubjecled to the claim. Such an agreement confti- ^W 
 tutes a perfonal, and not a real right. The creditor 
 no doubt in fuch a cafe has a general fecurity from all 
 the debtor's goods, fince upon the debtor's default, 
 he may in natural liberty feize any part of them for 
 difcharge of the debt, if no other creditor has obtained 
 a real right in them. But the advantage of the per- 
 fonal obligation to the debtor is this, that he is flill 
 mafter of all his goods, and retains it ftill in his 
 own election, within the time limited, to difcharo-e 
 the claims upon him in the manner he likes beft. And 
 the advantage of the real right to the creditor con- 
 fifts in this, that from the goods fpecially fubjecled 
 to his claim he maybe fecure, notwithstanding of any 
 fubfequent debts incurred to others, or even prior per- 
 fonal debts which his debtor may be incapable of dis- 
 charging. 
 
 If one has done any damage to another, he be- 
 comes indebted to the perfon who fafFered this da- 
 mage in the full value of it. And yet the fufferer has 
 only a perfonal right, not preferable to any claims of 
 a third perfon, nor affecting one part of the goods 
 of him who did the damage, more than another. If 
 full compenfation is made, he cannot limit the debtor 
 as to the goods out of which this compenfation is to 
 be made. 
 
 When the lender infifts on more fecurity than the 
 faith of the borrower, or fufpects his ability, and gets 
 a pledge or a mortgage, this conftitutes a real right,
 
 r . . ■ .- .. 
 
 * . u Derived Property. 
 
 Boo^ II. as certain goods arc ailigned and fpecially fubjecled to 
 
 ^/~v^\^this claim. 
 
 , ...,.,;., A juft man no doubt will obferve and fulfil the per- 
 '■-'"' fonal "rights of others, as well as the real, to the ut- 
 moft of his power: but the fecuriry is not the fame in 
 both, as 'tis abundantly known, where different claims 
 occur againft a perfon who has not effects to anfwer 
 them. The real rights mult take place of the perio- 
 ral. He who contented to accept of a lefs fecurity, 
 mud not expect to be equally fate with one who in- 
 filled upon and obtained a greater, nor would have 
 contracted or lent upon other terms. 
 
 The prefervatiun of the neceffary faith in com- 
 merce requires this preference of real rights, to per- 
 fonal. In the full tranllation of property, and even in 
 ailigning goods as real fecurities by pledge or mort- 
 <^ae;e, there mult befuch publick forms as will fecure 
 the purchafer or lender againft all prior fecret con- 
 tracts with others, tho' thefe private contracts gave 
 peifonal rights. But no man would buy goods, if he 
 could not be fecured in the poffeilion of what he pur- 
 fed againft former private contracts of fale. Nor 
 could he be fecured if prior fecret contracts did not 
 yield to fuch publick ones with the ufual forms infti- 
 tuted for conveying real rights. Xor would men lend 
 upon any pledge or mortgage, were there not fome 
 publick forms appointed to transfer a real right pre- 
 ferable to any prior peifonal rights conftituted to o- 
 chers bv a latent contract 
 
 All nations agree in having fome publick formali-
 
 Derived Property. 343 
 
 ties for transferring full property or real rights, not Chap. 7. 
 to be defeated by prior latent perfonal rights. Thefe^-^^ 
 formalities mould intimate the tranfaction publickly, 
 or fome way prevent the perfon who transfers to im- 
 pofe afterwards upon others. Delivery anfwers this 
 end in moveables ; and fome publick fymbolical deeds 
 giving poiTeftion, infuch as are immoveable; or fome 
 publick regiftration of the conveyance. Where thefe 
 confirm a contract, a real right is conftituted, which 
 no perfonal one mould defeat. And yet the perfon 
 thus defrauded of his perfonal right by means of the 
 fubfequent real one transferring the property, has a 
 juft claim upon the feller who defrauded him not on- 
 ly for compenfation of all the damage * he fuftains, 
 but for the f full value of all the profit he could have 
 made had he not been deceived. But without this 
 preference of real rights to perfonal, there could be 
 no commerce. 
 
 II. Derived real rights are either fome parts of the d«,w ™r 
 right of property transferred to another, and fepara-^// r ^ v / 
 ted from the reft, or compleat property derived from % a, r ^ d frcm 
 the original proprietor. 
 
 The parts of property frequently transferred fepa- 
 rately from the reft of it are chiefly of thefe four claf- 
 fes. 1. Right ofpojjeffion, thus one may have a right 
 to polTefs the goods he knows belong to others, until 
 the true proprietor mews his title. This right is valid 
 againft all others, and often may be turned into com- 
 pleat property. 2. The right of fuccejfion, which one 
 
 * Penfutio damui. \ Fanfare quod interej}.
 
 344 Derived Property. 
 
 Book II. niay have to goods, while another retains all the other 
 Ky~\^j parts of property except that of alienating. 3. The 
 rights of a mortgage or pledge. 4. Rights to fome fmall 
 ufes of the goods of others, called fervitudes. 
 
 As to the right of poffeiTion. The poffeffor by fraud 
 or unjuft violence has no right: any one who inclines 
 to recover the goods to the owner may juftly difpof- 
 fefs him. But he who poffeffes without fraud or unjuft 
 violence the goods he knows belong to others, has a 
 right valid againft all except the proprietor, or fuch as 
 claim under him. If none fuch can be found, or if 
 the proprietor quits his claim, the poffefTor becomes 
 proprietor by occupation. The poffeffor is always ob- 
 liged to make publick intimation that he has fuch 
 goods, and to ufe all reafonable means to make it 
 known to the proprietor. Defigned concealment of 
 them is no better than theft. When the poffeffor 
 reftores, he may juftly demand to be repaid all pru- 
 dent expences made upon the goods, or upon giving 
 publick intimation about them. 
 
 III. In inftances where one poffeffes goods belong- 
 ' ing to others which yet he obtained upon fome plau- 
 fible title, fuch as donation, legacy, fucceilion, or pur- 
 chafe, and believes them to be his own + ; the fol- 
 lowing rules feem equitable. 1 . If the goods have pe- 
 rifhedby any accident without any fault of the poffef- 
 for, he is not obliged to any compenfation. 2 . If he has 
 confumed them he is obliged to reftore as far as he 
 
 t Thisisthr ~.~cr of the Gvilian< ; not importing that alloiher pc 
 
 fbi* art fraudulent. 

 
 Derived Property. 
 
 was profited by them, or in proportion to the advan- Chj 
 tage or pleafure he obtained by them, which other- 
 ways would have confumed like goods of his own : 
 for he is fo far enriched as he fpared his own goods. 
 But as to pleafure enjoyed and not necefTary mainte- 
 nance, if the pofTefTor enjoyed it only becaufe he be- 
 lieved thefe goods to be his own, and otherways would 
 not have been at fuch expence in matters of pleafure, 
 one cannot pronounce univerfally that he is obliged 
 to Compen&te the value. 'Tis the honourable part 
 to do u whenever the proprietor is indigent, and the 
 pofllflor wealthy; or if they are in equal circumftan- 
 ces ; or if the compenfating would notdiftrefs the 
 pofTefTor in his affairs. But if compenfating would di- 
 ltrefs him, if he obtained the goods by an onerous 
 title, fuch as by paying a price for them which he can- 
 not now recover he would at leaft in moil cafes feem 
 to be under no other obligation than that of huma- 
 nity, which might perhaps direct to fharing the lofs, 
 where it would be too fenfibly felt were it to fall fin- 
 gly on the original poiTefTor. 
 
 3 . When the goods yet remain, the pofTefTor is ob- 
 liged to reftore them with all their acceffions after 
 deducting all prudent expences he has made about 
 them. If he purchafed them, he has recourfe for the 
 price upon the feller. 
 
 4. If the feller is not to be found, or is infolvent, 
 the cafe is more difficult. Here a certain lofs muft be 
 fuftained either by the proprietor, or the prefump- 
 dve poiTefTor : both are fuppofed alike innocent : which 
 
 Vol. I. X x 
 
 1A. \
 
 3 _, 6 Derived Property. 
 
 Book II. of them mud bear it? The cafe of both is equally fa- 
 l/VXJ vourable, and no publick advantage requires the caf- 
 tine the whole lofs on one rather than the other. If 
 freeing the proprietor from it will make purchafers 
 more cautious and inquifitive about the titles of thofe 
 they deal with, and thus thefts may be detected; the 
 fubjec~ting the proprietors to the lofs, will make men 
 more vigilant to prevent thefts, and prevent their goods 
 thus becoming a fnare to honeft purchafers. In Uriel: 
 juftice one would think the lofs lhould be divided e- 
 qually among all thofe through whofe hands the goods 
 parTed without fraud, along with the proprietor, un- 
 til they can recover the whole from the author of the 
 fraud. 
 a In thefe queftions our reafon is difturbed by fome 
 
 confufed imagination of property as fome phyfical 
 quality or chain between the goods, and the propri- 
 etor, conceived to found a more facred right than 
 many other moft equitable claims. And yet it can- 
 not be of a more facred kind than the rights arifing 
 from contracts and fair purchafes: iince tis by con- 
 tracts and purchafes that property is moft frequently 
 acquired : and there is no reafon that an innocent man 
 mould fuffer becaufc of any vice of another in which 
 he had no hand. 
 
 Abftracting from fuch imaginations; property is 
 thus determined by the law of nature;, in certain cir- 
 cumftances we fee at once that it would be cruel and 
 inhuman toward -an individual, to deprive him of the 
 full ufe of certain goods; as when they were acqui-
 
 Derived Property. 
 
 red by his own innocent labour, or by any fair con- 
 tract ; and we fee alfo that like practices generally pre- 
 vailing would be detrimental to fociety. In thefe cir- 
 cumftances we pronounce that the man has the right 
 of property. When equal circumftances of particu- 
 lar humanity plead for two perfons in oppofition to 
 each other; we then confider any circumftance on one 
 fide which fome remote intereft of fociety may re- 
 quire to be regarded; and we deem the right to go 
 along with that circumftance: or at leaft, when a law 
 or cuftom is once received on account of this remote 
 utility, we deem the property to be on that fide, and 
 do not regard the weaker claim of the other: tho' a 
 humane man would not difregard it altogether. Other 
 cafes happen where the pleas from remote utilities of 
 fociety are alfo equal: and in them, there is no other 
 remedy but dividing the lofs among all concerned, in 
 fome proportion or other. 
 
 One fells mean horfe this hour, in difchargeof antefo.^:.- 
 old debt he owed me : and next hour, upon a price paid 
 down, fells and delivers him to another who knew 
 nothing of my bargain. If the feller can be found, and 
 is folvent, there is lefs difficulty: but if he is not; on 
 whom fhall the lofs becaft? The contract and price 
 paid, the grand foundations of the titles and pleas of 
 humanity, are the fame on both fides. 'Tis equally 
 hard that either of the innocent men fhould fuffer. 
 Cuftom and civil laws regarding a remote intereft of 
 afcertaining commerce, and preventing frauds, make 
 the delivery a moft important circumftance for the 
 
 X X 2
 
 D; Property. 
 
 But were it no: for this remote intereft. : he 
 priority in time would plead tor the former. Suppofe 
 ..it the horfe had alfo been delivered to the former. 
 but the fell ved to keep him fome hours in his 
 
 les. When other circumilances are now eq; 
 Prime _..i: importance, and is mi 
 
 regarded in all contr: do (bfpi 
 
 on of fraud in the rirft purchafer ; and as a regard 
 this circumltance too i : great neceffity to afcertain 
 commerce. In our prefent queftion about the claim 
 of the fair purchafer to obtain the price he p i d from 
 the proprietor, when he can hare no recovery from the 
 ler, all pleas, both of a private andpu: li : nature, 
 .ear equal on both fides. A: j 
 
 * general obfervarion about the original notions of pro- 
 perty will be of confiderable ufe in other quefticr . 
 
 ndcularly thefe concerning :: : ir.ent^ 
 
 and by fucceffi intefta : t 
 
 In this and many I fes th 
 
 * fons of humanity anc : (hew I good man what 
 
 Durable par:. I: the pofleflbr be 
 
 poor, an. roprietor rich, it would be barbarou 
 
 the proprietor did not indemnif neit pofleflbr as 
 
 to die price he paid. If the pofleflbr nd the 
 
 prietor poor, it would be inhuman in the pc 
 
 ilon the pri. ! , when it bore no fuch pro- 
 
 :o his wealth that tr ;oulddiirrefs 
 
 him. If their fortunes are nearly equal they i "ho 
 
 ie the lofs, whatev. rtcrmine: or 
 
 in proportion to their wealth, when
 
 Derived Property. 349 
 
 their wealth is unequal, but neither in diflrefs. The Chap. 8. 
 
 want of obvious reafons for calling all the lofs on one ^/VXJ 
 
 fide in this and fome other cafes, will be little regre- 
 
 ted by any but fuch felfifh wretches as are grafping 
 
 at every advantage they can obtain without incurring 
 
 the infamy of direct injuftice, and have no humanity 
 
 to others. 
 
 In general, as far as fuch pofTeflbrs are enriched or 
 profited by means of the goods of others, fo far they 
 are obliged to reftore; but they are enriched only by 
 what remains after all expences they made in prefer- 
 ving, improving, or cultivating are deducted ; and 
 thefe expences the proprietor is obliged to reftore 
 when he obtains his goods. Goods obtained by do- 
 nation, fuccefTion, or any gratuitous title, Ihould plain* 
 ly be reftored without any other compenfation from 
 the proprietor than that of thofe expences for prefer- 
 vation and improvement. 
 
 IV. The next clafs of real rights often feparated R!ght effuce ^ 
 from property is that of fuccefTIons in entails. When^" " tmih - 
 one who has unlimited property conveys a right of 
 fucceffton to feveral perfons, in a certain feries, upon 
 certain contingencies, thefe perfons have a right to 
 this fuccefTion jufl as valid as men acquire by any 
 donation ; as unlimited property includes a right of 
 difpofing upon any contingency or condition, as well 
 as abfolutely. Such entails may be made imprudent- 
 ly, or contrary to reafons of humanity, and fo may 
 donations. When they are fo, the prefent tenant for 
 life who has all the other rights of property except
 
 or Property and other Rights. 
 
 Book II. that of alienating, is not culpable in taking all me- 
 ^r\~\j thods confident with the peace and order of fociety, 
 to break the entail : as a man would not be culpable 
 who ufed fuch peaceful methods to prevent impru- 
 dent or inhuman donations, or to get them revoked. 
 But where there is nothing imprudent or inhuman in 
 the entail, the tenant in reverfion has as good a right 
 to fucceed as the prefent pofTeiTor has to enjoy for 
 life; and it would be criminal to defraud him of it. 
 And the peace of fociety often requires the confirma- 
 tion even of imprudent and inhuman conveyances, of 
 which hereafter ; tho ? the perfon to whom they are 
 made cannot with a good confcience infifl: on them. 
 Civil laws however may juftly limit this power of en- 
 tail as the intereft of the ftate, or the neceflity of 
 encouraging induftry may require. 
 
 V. The third fort of real rights feparable from the 
 ' reft of the property are thofe of the mortgagee, and 
 of the perfon to whom moveable goods are pledged, 
 and delivered for fecurity of fome debt. By either of 
 thefe a right is given to the creditor, in cafe the debt 
 is not duly difcharged, to appropriate to himfelf the 
 lands mortgaged, or the goods pledged *, notwith- 
 ftanding any prior perfonal rights of others againft the 
 debtor. The afTuming a property in the lands mort- 
 gaged, or the moveables pledged, upon non-payment, 
 has no iniquity in it if the pledger or mortgager ob- 
 tain all furplus of the value of the lands or goods 
 
 * he < wmwufforia in p'lgntrihus ,
 
 Derived real Rights. ? 5 1 
 
 above what difcharges the principal debt with all in- Chap. 8. 
 tereft and expences. v^/wj 
 
 VI. The fourth clafs of real rights feparable from &**,** 
 the reft of the property zxz fervitudes, when one has a 
 right to fome fmall ufe of the goods of another. All 
 fervitudes are real rights terminating on fome definite 
 lands or tenements, or goods. But fome are confti- 
 tuted in favour of a perfon and only for his behoof; 
 and others for the advantage of fome adjacent farm 
 or tenement be the proprietor who he will. The for- 
 mer, from the fubjects of thefe rights, and not from 
 the object on which they terminate, are called perfo- 
 nal fervitudes, expiring with the perfon; the later for 
 the like reafon are called real fervitudes, and may be 
 perpetual. Thus the ufe of an houfe or a farm gran- 
 ted to a friend for his life- time when the property is 
 in another, is a perfonal fervitude, which cannot be 
 conveyed by him to another : but when a farm is 
 fubje&ed to a road for the convenience of the pofTef- 
 fors of an adjacent farm, or the poflerTors of one te- 
 nement in a town have a right to put in beams into 
 the gabels of the contiguous houfe for fupporting the 
 floors or roof, thefe are real fervitudes, which may be 
 conftituted for the convenience of lands or tenements, 
 and may be perpetual. \ The nature of the contracts 
 or deeds by which fuch fervitudes are conftituted (hews 
 the rights, and obligations of the parties, which too 
 depend much upon the cuftoms of the places where 
 they are received. 
 
 f See Inftit. 1. ii. tit. 3, 4, 5.
 
 3 j 2 Derived real Right 
 
 :• ii. VII. The complete property may be tr 
 ka/^/Xi either by die voluntary deed of the proprietor, or by 
 
 t*mtL*tn; fpofit'ion of the law of nature, without his c 
 
 the intereit. of others. I 
 
 be trail ither during: . or 
 
 upon the event of his death. An ifpoiition of the 
 
 :.ture. widboi] :, pror be 
 
 .nsferred either during the proprietor or on 
 
 the event of his death. Of : our in order. 
 
 i . Bv voluntary deed of the propri iuring 
 .ither gra: ionari :ertain 
 
 price Le confideration; of this we treat in 
 
 foil y chapter about contracts. 
 . - • :. Property" iiveyed by the voluntary act of 
 
 the proprietor upon the event of his death by laft will 
 or teftament. This right c ifingbywill is oata- 
 
 iudedi: property, which contains a right 
 
 difpofing upon any condition or . c y . Take 
 
 _;ht and induftry fhall be much difcoura- 
 i after men are tolerably provided v. ith neceflaries 
 for then and their families during life ; c 
 
 muft be : into a pretty hazardous conduct by ac- 
 
 tuallv ring life whatever they acquire 
 
 :d their own probable confumption in their 1: 
 e. Not to mention that they muft give away as 
 foon as they acquire any furplufles, fince the fudden- 
 f death, or a delirium, may rr ca- 
 
 p.v:ie : c^::;.:icr-S v.ro:: :he ;.rv :/.. T! 
 
 right the ng by will ft :ianifefHy 
 
 founc : natur civil laws may]*-
 
 Derived real R i g'h t s . 2 c 2 
 
 t - j j j 
 
 rnit the exercife of it in common with all other rights Chap. 8. 
 refpe&ing property, fuch as the difmheriting or paf- v*/VXj 
 fing by a child without any fault of his, or the con- 
 veying almofl: all a man's wealth to one of his nume- 
 rous pofterity from a foolifh defire of raifing one great 
 family. Civil laws alfo j uftly oblige men to fuch forms 
 as fhall beft prevent forgeries. By the law of nature 
 every declaration of a man's will of which credible evi- ■ 
 dence can be given, is valid and obligatory on thofe 
 concerned : but that all men may be engaged to ufe 
 the moil convenient forms, civil laws may confirm no 
 teftaments made without them. 
 
 That the law of nature and the intereft of focietyJ^f^t 
 eftabltm this right of deviling by will is as plain as^ flWM ' f * 
 that they eftablifh other rights of the proprietor. The 
 •natural deiign of mankind in any acquifitions beyond 
 their own confumption is to promote by them the 
 happinefs of thofe they love; this happinefs one de- 
 fires they may obtain not only during his life, but af- 
 ter his deceafe. Thefe kind affections and fui table 
 offices to make others happy, whether we are to live 
 with them or not, are the natural, joyful, and honour- 
 able exercifes of the human foul while we live. And 
 'tis cruel and unjuft to hinder a man either from fuch 
 good offices while he lives, or to deprive him of the 
 joyful hope that his furviving friends mall be profited 
 by the fruits of his labours. 'Tis cruel to thefe friends 
 to intercept the benefit defigned them by their friend 
 now deceafed. There is no method fo convenient for 
 individuals, or for the fociety, by which goods can be 
 
 Vol.1. Yy
 
 - - . Derived real Rights. 
 
 $54 
 
 Bool ii. transferred to furvivors as chat by teitament, or a 
 declaration of the will of the proprietor revocable, 
 u and not to take effect till after his death. "f To leave 
 the o-oods oi the deceafed in common open to occu- 
 pation mult occafion the moll: odious contentions and 
 nri£ To all thefe reafons we may add that a 
 
 dv contrived will is generally in confequence of 
 moral obligation, and a fulfilling of the rights or 
 claims either oi a perfect or imperfect kind which the 
 furvivors had upon the goods of the deceafed. All 
 ich proves abundantly the right of deviling, and 
 the obligation upon all to obferve and maintain the 
 will of the teftator, where it is tolerably prudent, and 
 not contrary to fome ftrong principles of humanity. 
 Where it is contrary, there may be no injuftice in an- 
 nulling it. 
 
 MIL The third manner of transferring property 
 *'is bv the plain law of nature, without confent of the 
 proprietor, during his life, whenever it is requiiite to 
 iatisfy an claim another had againft him which 
 
 he declines to comply with. This will be confidered 
 hereafter among the rights ariiing from the injuries 
 done by other?. Thus for compenfation of damage, or 
 difcharging a juft debc, a man's goods are juiUy feized, 
 
 
 - - - : 
 
 in this fubjeft has nufcd great coatr: 
 fies \f> little purpofe, as if the validity of 
 
 ■ .'.• ~-.zr.t~ '.--: fry'::'. :::.:-. i r.t 
 
 v - - : ; ; - r. : v. :- z.iz: :z~t :- z.r.z 
 
 "ions are railed too from die nature 
 
 of other tranfaetions. The question is 
 
 •:. :- -. •..:.::.-.-;; .:.•:.: :.--'..".:-: :*:.- • 
 
 ■ sfadion of mer 
 ttfl ame u ts be obferved after their death ? 
 and whether the infereft of fociety does 
 not r:^ :: .'. ! which i: . ft. See 
 
 Barhc :.Dtes on Puffer.
 
 Derived real Rights. 55; 
 
 and the property of them acquired by the perfons who Chap. 3. 
 had fuch claims. ^/VV; 
 
 The fourth manner of tranflation is by the law of & m^* w 
 nature, without the deed of the proprietor, upon the ' ei " upai 
 event of his death, in the fucceiTions to the inteftate. 
 The grounds of it are thefe. The intention of the 
 deceafed in all his acquifitions beyond his own ufe, 
 was contributing to the happinefs of fuch as were 
 dear to him, as 'tis abundantly known to all. We fee 
 that one's pofterity, and failing thofe his kinfmen, are 
 dearer to men univerfally than others, tho' they may 
 happen to have converfed more with others, in mat- 
 ters of bufinefs or pleafure. When men declare their 
 wills, we fee the general inclination to improve the 
 fortunes of their pofterity and kinfmen, and juftly pre- 
 fume the fame where it is not exprefsly declared. Tis 
 cruel, without fome publick intereft requiring it, to 
 defeat this natural hope of fucceffion founded by the 
 tyes of blood. Our children, and failing thefe our 
 kinfmen have plainly a right where fome undutiful 
 condudl has not forfeited it, not only to fupport from 
 us in their indigent ftate, but to have their condition 
 improved by any furplus of goods we have beyond our 
 own confumption. 'Tis contrary to nature, as well as 
 humanity, to defeat this claim when no publick in- 
 tereft requires it. Tis plain alfo that leaving the goods 
 of the inteftate in common to be occupied would 
 caufe the greateft confufion. 
 
 If friends were admitted along with kindred, it 
 
 Yy 2
 
 ? c 6 Derived real Rights. 
 
 Book II. niu(l be in fome proportion to the degrees of friend- 
 L/VXJ fhip ; but thefe cannot now be determined ; and much 
 lefs could they be determined if the hopes of fuccef- 
 fion invited all flatterers. We juftly too prefume 
 upon the will of the inteftate from this, that fince 
 the cuftom has univerfally obtained, in all nations al- 
 molt, to admit only kinfmen to fucceiTIon, had the 
 deceafed intended that others mould be admitted, he 
 would have exprefsly declared this peculiar and lefs 
 ufual defire. 
 ■"* The natural affections of men mew that their po- 
 sterity mould be admitted in the firft place, viz. chil- 
 dren and grandchildren ; grandchildren at leaft ad- 
 mitted to their parents mare among them, where a 
 deceafed child has left more than one : and along with 
 pofterity parents lhould be admitted, if they are in 
 ftraits. In default of both, brothers and filters, and 
 alone with them the children of a brother or filler de- 
 ceafcd, at leaft to the fhare their parent would have 
 got had the parent been alive. Reafons of humanity 
 would recommend other proportions fometimes, but 
 they would occafion great controveriies. In default 
 of fuch relations all kindred of equal degrees fhould 
 generally come in equally, and exclude the more re- 
 mote. 
 
 The notion of having fome one reprefentative of 
 
 the perfon deceafed, fucceeding to all his rights, and 
 
 fubjecled to all his obligations, as the Roman heir 
 
 is, has no foundation in nature; nor is there any rea- 
 
 torn.
 
 Derived real Rights. 357 
 
 fon why a far greater part of the inheritance mould Chap. 8. 
 go univerfally to one of many children, or one of ma-^VV 
 ny in the fame degree; nor why feniority among chil- 
 dren, or kinfmen of the fame degree, mould have 
 fuch preference; nor why the diftin&ion of fex mould 
 in the firft degree of children take place of all other 
 considerations, and yet be quite neglected in the de- 
 gree of grandchildren, or be poftponed to that of fe- 
 niority of the parent, fo that an infant grand-daugh^ 
 ter of an elder fon deceafed, mould take before an 
 adult grand-fon by a fecond fon, nay before the fecond 
 fon himfelf. A niece by an elder brother deceafed, 
 nay her daughter, take place of even a younger bro- 
 ther himfelf, as well as the male defcendants of young- 
 er brothers. All thefe things are founded only in 
 civil laws. In the fuccefTion to private fortunes there 
 is feldom any reafon for having one heir rather than 
 many equally related to the deceafed. Cuftoms of 
 many nations and their civil laws about thefe ma ti- 
 ters are very foolifh, and have fome pernicious effects 
 upon fociety. 
 
 IX. Perfonal rio-hts are conffituted ag-ainft a man,, Perfinal '.*& 
 
 . ° m «- J • bow acquired. 
 
 when he has limited fome part of his natural liberty, , 
 or his power of difpofing of his actions and goods, 
 and transferred it to another, who thence acquires the 
 perfonal right. And when this right or claim of ano- 
 ther is fulfilled, or abohilied, the natural liberty of 
 the perfon obliged becomes again in this refpect en= 
 tire, or the perfonal right is confoiidated with it, as
 
 358 Derived real Rights. 
 
 Book II. it was before the right fubfifted. Such rights arife ei- 
 VW ther from fome contraft, or fome deed of the per- 
 fon obliged; and the confideration of them leads to 
 the fubjedl of contracts or covenants, the main en- 
 gine of conftituting either perfonal rights or real. 
 
 THE END OF THE FIRST VOLUME. 
 
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