A A = Al GO 5 = <— =^ 3) = 2 — ^~ -z 9 — > 1 ^ss 1 — ^-^ IE 3 = 5 = — ^ J> 6 — = o — 1 ™^» -< 4 — California Regional I'acility ^ m / V L J AN INQUIRY ^"^^ INTO THE X CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES H. OF THE ORDERS IN COUNCIL: AND AN EXAMWATIOK OF THE CONDUCT OF GREAT BRITAIN TOWARDS THE NEJTRAL COMMERCE AMER[C\ By ALEXANDER BARING, Esq. M. P. '^^fcU (f^iiim. JLOiNDON: PUINTED FOR J. M. RICHARDSON, NO. 23, CORNHILI., OPPOSXitS THE KOVAl. EXCHANGE J AND J. BIDGWAVj PICCADILLY. isoa ■■ I Printed by Mercier and Co. King^ Head Court, St. Paul's Church Yard. #'^ ^ \^r^^ iro INTRODUCTION. THE serious dangers which now surround us have at least the advantage of drawing forth from every quarter efforts to enhghten the public mind, as to the best means of meeting them, and of imprinting on those efforts a stamp of sincerity which can hardly fail to satisfy the most suspicious. It has been usual to exaggerate the consequences of every existing war, and the importance of the object in contest : the loss of America, the occupation of the Netherlands by France, were, in their turns, the subjects of gloomy political predictions ; but unfortunately the vital importance of the question now at issue bids defiance to exaggeration. The dream of universal empire, which sometimes crossed the brain of the vain or imbecile monarchs of France, is now realizing. An union, which the world never before saw, of irre- sistible force with the most consummate art, is employed to rear this gigantic fabric, while the total destitution of energy and geniu<=:, JV on the otlicr side, appears to exhibit, by such an unusual concurrence of circumstances, the hand of Providence in this extraordinary revolution. Tn such a crisis, to suppose in a writer the bias of interest, in its confined meaning, in any opinions he may publish, would be to suppose in him tlie absence of common sense. A few years mist determine the fate of this country ; and it can hardly be imagined that merchants naturally more interested in pre- serving than in acquiring, should be occupied with collecting a few paltry profits from their trade, at the expense of their dearest inte- rest. It would be the folly of a man expecting to get rich by the plunder of his own wreck. To those who are not satisfied with this general declaration, any more minute de- fence must be equally unsatisfactory, and I shall therefore detain the reader no longer with myself or my motives. I must, however, add that a severe indisposition has delayed the publication of these observations, and obliges me to claim indulgence for any inac- curacies of expression which I might other- wise have corrected. P or tman Square :, 4rth Februa?y, 1808. AX INQUIRY, IT might naturally have been expected that, in proportion as our vigilant enemy, pursuing his system of war on our commerce, succeeded in gradually banishing it first from his ow^n domi* nionSj and subsequently from the whole of the Continent of Europe, with the single exception of the poor and barren country of Sweden, con- siderable loss and embarrassment to several branches of that commerce must ensue. The West India Planters, who, from causes which we shall hereafter notice, had extended their cultivation much beyond the consumption of the mother country, were the first to complain. — The ship-owners, excluded from one portafter the other on the Continent, as they fell under the dominion of France, and suffering in some de- gree from the distresses of the West India Plant- ers, soon followed them , The exporter of goods n ta the Continent had lost his trade, and in many instances part of his outstanding capital. The East India Company's warehouses were loaded with goods belonging to the Company and indi- viduals, for which there was a very inadequate demand. These several important and powerful bodies united the principal commercial interests of the country: their distress was well known to be real, and could not fail to attract the attention of the public and of Government. But the remedy was not so apparent : for want of any satisfactory solution of the difficulty, perhaps also, from an inconsiderate disposition to in- volve in their common misfortunes the only re- maining branch of trade left uninjured, a state of things, the real cause of which was sufficient- ly obvious, was ascribed by all to the intercourse of neutrals with the continent of Europe ; and the want of sale for their commodities was as- serted to be the effect, not of the restrictions of the enemy, but of the competition of Americans. This delusive opinion was unfortunately, as I must think, illustrated with too much ability by the author of " War in Disj?*uise ;" and while the sufferers caughteagerlyatthe supposed cause of their misfortunes, the eloquence of this per- formance, employed on materials partially sound, and generally plausible, combined w i when we are prevented, by subsequent oc- currences, iVom deriving the most essential be- nefits it then promised. — The last Administra- tion followed, in point of fact, towards Ameri- ca, nearly the footsteps of Mr. Pitt^, and I do not believe they were more strongly impressed than he was with the sound policy of cultivat- ing a good understanding with that country. If there was any alteration, it consisted more in form than in substance : the one did ungra- ciously what the other did liberally. Mr. Pitt seemed to regret a policy which he could not deny ; while Mr. Fox appeared pleased to find the interests of his own country unite with the conciliation of another, in which he felt an in- terest. For when these favourable circum stances produced a mutual desire to secure the union of the two countries by a treaty, the at- tempt failed, and the terms insisted on by the last Administration were even, upon the whole, less favourable to America than those granted during that of Mr. Pitt. It is not intended here to enter into any exa- mination of these treaties, excepting where it may be necessary for the elucidation of the subjects, already too numerous, which I pro- pose to discuss. It is useless to consider minute details of regulations for the intercourse between the two countries^, when the general policy re- mains unsettled. The diiSferences which mani fested themselves might have given trouble to future negociators, but could never have pro- duced war : at all events they are lost in the magnitude of subsequent measures. It is no Jong'er a question how the trade shall be carried on, but whether it shall exist in any shape. The late Ministers were always accused by their opponents, now in power, of undue parti- ality towards America : two subjects of discus- sion, the American Intercourse Act, and the Pro- clamation of the 7th Januarv, 1807, in retalia- tion of the Berlin Decree, made this a party question ; when, unfortunately for our country, what is done by one side must be disapproved by the other ; and on the accession to power of the present Administration, the hopes of those, who had employed in vain their assiduity with all former Ministers, again revived of at last seeing the first opportunity availed of for going to war with America. Nor were they disappointed ; for the predetermination of the present Go- vernment to have recourse to an entirely new system of conduct was evinced by the Berlin Decree of the 21st November, 1806, of the inadequate retaliation of which they had for- e 10 merlv compliiitied, being brought forward to justify the important Orders of Council of the lith November. But the fashionable vigour of the day did not permit the authors of this measure to confine themselves to the recommendations of the com- mercial interests which had produced it : all the West India planter wanted was a prohibition, of any foreign supply of colonial produce to tlie Continent, which was to be produced by a strict enforcement of the principle of the war of 17 5G. Sensible that after finding a foreign market for his produce, the next object of his solicitude was not to lose that of America for his rum, nor the supplies from that country indispcnsible for his existence, he did not wish to carry the measure further than was necessary for his own purposes, or than, according to his calculation, and that lipon plausible ground, America would probably bear. But this limita- tion was not in his power, and the new orders were of a description to produce a revolution in the whole commerce of the world, and a total derangement of those mutual rights and rela-. tions, by which civilized nations have hitherto been connected. This measure, before its tendency has been duly considered, has been received through the country with that ephemeral popularity which 11 but too generally attends measures of novelty and violence. Ministers have not mistaken the road to public opinion, in establishing a reputa- tion for vigour, the merit of which in most po- litical operations cannot be denied, though it could not be more unfortunately applied than to commerce; No brilliancy of achievement is here able to hide the mischief of bad policy; the balance at last must be struck, and the proofs of the calculation evident to the most ignorant. If questions of political economy of- fer great difficulty to the prospective researches of the most skilful, they have at least the advan- tage of affording through experiment a certain result. Aware that in this science experience only is a safe guide, the wisest statesmen have felt their way with caution and diffidence. The interference of the hand of power in any shape is scarcely ever beneficial to the merchant.- A languid Government generally suits him best, and the little benefit that may sometimes arise from vigour is enormously overbalanced by a single mistake, when it is so much better to be feebly than vigorously wrong. To this may per- haps be attributed, among other causes, why commerce has always prospered better under the old, indecisive and temporizing Government of' Holland, than under that of the most intelligent of despotic princes. c2 12 My object in entering: into this detail of the proceedings of the mer(*hants^ and of the con^- duct of different Administrations, which have at last ended in these important changes, is to shew that, under whatever pretences they are recommended to popuhirity, they are purely the result of commercial calculation. The West India planter and merchant;^ the ship owner, the manufacturer for, and trader with America, all contribute largely to the general mass from which our resources are derived ; while each promotes with that honest zeal, which is the best means of general prosperity — his separate inter- ests. But the public is in the situation of a ge- neral merchant, who has the whole of these vari-r ous branches of commerce united in him. He cn-r deavcurs by his skill to improve them equally, but when the interests of any of them clash, he determines, by a comparative estimate, which must be sacrificed. Such has most erroneously been considered to be the case in the present in- stance, and after long hesitation, that of America has been devoted. It is the correctness of this calculation to which I wish to call the attention of the public; and I think I shall be able to shew^ not only that no sacrifice was called for, but that the victim has been most injudiciously selected, But though this new system is evidently the result of commercial policy, yet, as its adop- 13 tion, by dividing the interest, might be expected to divide the opinions of the public, unusual care has been taken to enlist the impartial in its de- fence, and even to conciliate or alarm many well-meaninff sufferers into neutralitv. The extra-commercial arguments principally urged for this purpose are, the advantages derived by the enemy from the American trade, the im- portant injury we can inflict on him by its de- struction, and the necessity of maintaining in its proudest purity the spirit of the country, and of resisting what are termed the insolent en croachmeuts of America, vs^hich the power 'and number of our enemies have tempted her to impose upon us. The great and extensive importance of these considerations must be sufficiently evident ; and as the public have been misled by the misrepre- sentations of those who have not carried their inquiries much beyond their own supposed in- terests, I shall endeavour to promote opinions which appear to me more correct, by taking a more comprehensive view of the subject. Should I not be wholly successful in this attempt, I am persuaded that I shall at least be so in correcting some very important mistakes as to facts, which at present prevail. With these intentions I pro- pose to examine : 14 Firsts The state of our political and commer- cial relations with America — the nature of her commerce svitli the colonies of our enemies, and our conduct towards it— the consequences to America of the new system introduced by our Orders in Council^ and the conduct which on her part they are likely to produce. Secondly, The effects to be expected from this system on ourselves, on the means and resources of our enemy, and on the general conduct of the war. Though the important consequences of the Orders in Council of the 11th November must have procured them an attentive examination from those who occupy themselves with subjects of this description, yet, as they are so much en- veloped in official jargon as to be hardly intel- ligible out of Doctors' Commons, and not per- fectly so there, it may be proper to give the reader a very short analysis of them, in which I shall confine myself to the points applicable to my subject, and follow entirely the explanations given by the Board of Trade to the American mer- chants, both of the Orders themselves, and of the corresponding regulations intended to be pro- posed to Parliament. Various corrections and new explanatory orders are daily appearing, which may make some change, but the great. 15 features of the system are sujficiently appa- rent*. All trade directlj from America to every port and country of Europe at war with Great Bri- taiuj or from which the British flag is excluded, is totally prohibited. In this general prohibi- tion, every part of Europe, with the exception at present of Sweden, is included, and no distinction whatever is made between the domestic produce of America, and that of the colonies re-exported from thence. The trade from America to the colonies of all nations remains unaltered by the present Orders. — America may export the produce of her own country, but that of no other, directly to Sweden. With the above exception, all articles, whe- ther of domestic or colonial produce, exported by America to Europe, must be landed in this country, from whence it is intended to permit • I beg to disclaim any intention to expound the literal text ; it seems purposely intended that no person should profane it with his comprehension without paying two guineas for an opinion, with the additional benefit of being able to obtain one directlj opposed to it for two more. What the motive can be for such studied obscurity on this occasion, as well as on that of the proclamation respecting seamen, ir is difli«ult to saj, unless it be to surprize the Americans into a belief that they no longer speak English. 16 their re-exportation under such regulations as may hereafter be determined. By these regulations, it is understood that du- ties are to be imposed on all articles so re-export- ed ; but it is intimated that an exception will be made in favour of such as are the produce of the United States^, that of cotton excepted. Any vessel, the cargo whereof shall be accom- panied with certificates of French Consuls abroad of its origin, shall, together with the cargo> be liable to seizure and condemnation. Proper care is taken that the operation of the Orders shall not commence Until time is afforded for their being known to the parties interested. They speak, of course, of neutrals generally ; but as they are applicable only to America, I have named that country, which I shall continue to do throughout these observations, that obscurity tnay be avoided. Nothing shews more the fallacy of theory, in all speculations on political economy, than that this country, remarkable beyond all others for sagacious authors on that subject, should ht the founder of a colony exceeding in present, and still more in promised greatness, that formed by any country ancient or modern, and should have 17 remained so long in ignorance of the conse- quences to be expected, and of the means of de- riving from it the greatest advantages. States- men appear to have been the dupes of names and systems. A colony was called by the same name^ whether established in a West India island or in North Amei'ica, and therefore the same sys- tem was applied to establishments widely differing from each other. Thfe consequence of this igno- rance was the separation of America by war. Like the French revolution, different authors, accord- ing to their fimcy, impute these events to one or other trifling circumstance; but a short distance of time affords us a more comprehensive and con- sequently a more correct view ; and both these great changes are now generally ascribed to an irresistible progress of human events, which pro- duces, and is not produced by, the ostensible trifles that first arrest our attention. The apprehensions of ruin from this separation soon subsided in thediscoveryof ourerror. It ^yas seen that natural causes had operated by force what we hatl neglected to do from foresight : that infgiving up, though involuntarily, the narrow-nunded monopoly of the colonial system, we still retained that which resulted from our being in every thing but Government the same people. The invisible and more pleasing tie* of similar habits, laws, and, above all, language^ 18 j)roduced a monopoly not only without any compulsion, but in spite of the irritation and enmity which a recent and severe contest could not fail to leave behind. The only subject of regret with men of sense and liberality on both sides was^ that this experience had been so dearly bought, and their only wish was to heal and forget the wounds it had occasioned. The same effects may always be expected from the same causes. The sympathy of con- genial character is with great difficulty oblite- rated. Lower Canada, though now nearly half a ceiitury in our hands, under a Government peculiarly mild, to which no objection but that of negligence can be made, if in such a country it can be called an objection, is as perfectly French as the day it was conquered. The French of Louisiana are in the same state. The successive Governments of England, Spain, and America, still leave them Frenchmen, and the people of both those countries w ould afford the same proof of the inveteracy of early habits, if they were allowed a choice in the most import- ant or most trivial concerns of life, in the go- vernment they would live under, or in the coat they would wear*. * It is a lingular circumstance, and may serve to suppress the eagerness with which nations endeavour to impose their own laws, and the contempt thej are apt to shew for those of other countries 19 The advantages of this insensible monopoly were perfectly understood by France^ and M. Talleyrand, in his " Memoire sur les Relations '' commerciales des Etats Unis avec I'Angle- " ieixe," has examined the subject with parti- cular felicity and penetration^ and suggests the policy of some similar establishment on the part of France, by which the benejfits he justly sup- poses it to confer may be counterbalanced. In this country, however, it does not appear ever to have been properly appreciated: the events of a civil war left naturally deeper impressions on the unsuccessful than the successful party, and while every little state of Europe was courted, that afforded limited markets for our manufac- tures, we seemed to regret that we owed any- thing to our former subjects; and an encreasing commercial intercourse has been carried on un- der feelings of unsubdued enmity, of which the Government has set the fashion, instead of check- ing sentiments as void of common sense as of mag- nanimity. To this error, in my opinion, the present state of the public mind towards Ame- rica is in a great measure owing. Her suc-^ cess and prosperity, though we dare not fairly viiich fall to them by conquest, thaton eslablishingthe A merican form of Government in Louisiana, the principal object of dislike was (lie trial b> jury. Habit had made the Louisiauian pri-fcr the arbitrary and frerjucndy corrupt decision of a single judge to (hose pure forms of trial which an English Colonist would have justly coiisiderud as invaluable. D 2 20 avow it, have displeased us, and sentiments have been imperceptibly encouraged towards her as ungenerous as thej are impolitic. If this im- portant subject had been considered dispassion- ately, we should have discovered not only that we had lost nothing except the barren honour of sovereignty, by America being under an inde- pendent Government, but that, upon the whole, her increased utility to us in that situation had, to a greater degree than could have been ex- pected from any other, been the means of en- creasing our resources, in the arduous contest in which we are engaged. She ceases to contri- bute directly to our naval force: this is the only article in the opposite scale; but then she relieves a considerable portion of it from the necessity of protecting her. In every other re spect she contributes, in the highest degree pos- sible, all the benefits which one nation can de- rive from the existence of another, or that one mother country can receive from that of the best regulated colony. .. If the choice could have been offered us of having the United States as a dependent or an independent colony during the present war, we could not, on any principles of sound policy, have hesitated to prefer the latter. If neutrals of some sort have hitherto always been consi- dered as necessary to countries at war, and par- 21 ticularly to those whose resources are derived from commerce, how much must it be our inte- rest to have in that character a people politically independent, but commercially as dependent on us as habits and interest can make them ? Instead of fostering- the naval power of the nations of the Baltic, which at every period of our distress is turned against us, this increase of trade, which we cannot dispense with, is transferred to a coun- try whose policy is necessarily that of peace, and whose form of government, and political institu- tions, render a steady adherence to that policy inseparable from their existence. Our distance and reserve in our public connection w ith Ame- rica, have perhaps so far been of service, that they may have partly concealed from our enemies the intimate connection of the industrious indi- viduals of the two countries, which, if properly understood, might have induced efforts to en- courage a return to the more beneficial channel of neutral trade, w hich the northern powers evi- dently afforded to the Continent. But it is un- pardonable that we should ourselves remain ig- norant of the advantages we have derived from the change, or that we should' entertain any jealousy of the prosperity and wealth it has produced, which have not only served to cir- culate the produce of our industry where we could not carry it ourselves, but, by encreasing 09 the means of America^ have augmented in the same proportion her consumption of that pro- duce at a time when the loss of our former customers^ by the persecution of our enemy, renders it most valuable. The nature and extent of American commerce, with ourselves and with our enemies, will be ex- plained when the operation of the Orders in Council are considered with reference to our im- mediate commercial interests. I shall first exa- mine their consequences to America. A most ingenious and fanciful plan has been formed, which indeed, to be completely successful, wants only the concurrence of one man, but that man is the Emperor of France, whose dissent has been totally lost sight of. The Americans are to bring to this country all the produce of their own, and all that of our enemies' colonies which they export to Europe. We are here to form a grand em- porium of the costly produce of Asia and America, which is to be dispensed to the differ- ent countries of Europe under such regulations as we may think proper, and according, I sup- pose, to their good behaviour. Taxes are to be raised from the consumers on the Continent, and they arc to be contrived with that judicious skill, which is to secure to our own West India Planters a preference over those of Cuba and 23 Martinique ; a distinction wliicli their zeal in promoting this grand discovery certainly de- served. What light has all at once broken in upon us^ and by what ignorant statesmen we have been governed for the last fifteen years ! The secret is at last discovered of making France herself tributary to the fortunes of individuals^ and to the revenues of the state. After complaining so long that she would not employ us as her factors and manufacturers^ we are now^ by contrasting the rich emporium of luxuries on one side of thfi channel with the want and poverty of the other, to offer an exhibition too tempting to be re- sisted : we are to be supplicated in terms of distress to permit the people of the Continent to buy of us the rich produce of the East and of the West ; and, as nothing short of extreme distress can produce such a miracle, have we not also at last found the means of forcino- o Bonaparte to a peace ? It is difficult to con- ceive in what brain, endued with the smallest portion of common sense, so visionary a dream couid have been engendered. Is there a man so perfectly out of his senses, so totally ignorant of the state of Europe, as to suppose its execution possible ? The whole merit of this wonderful discovery must evidently depend on the voluntary or 24- forced concurrence of the enemy ; and if the means from which this might be expected were satisfactorily explained, it would indeed be a prodig-y of political wisdom. It is to be hoped that some information as to the practicability of our plan has been communicated to the Ame- ricans. If they really could be made to believe that the people of the Continent would buy their produce in our ports, it might go far in preventing that general hostility against us, which the more sober conclusions of that peo- ple, as to the consequences of our measure^ must produce. Those consequences cannot in- deed be mistaken. The farmer as well as the merchant of America must know that they might as well throw the produce of their own country, and that of the West Indies^ for which their own has been exchanged, into the sea, as trust to any beneficial disposal of it in this country, beyond the amovmt of its immediate consumption, and a very limited vent by con- traband to the Continent. If the people of America should be deluded with the expec- tation, that we can really distribute on the Continent their immense mass of European and Colonial exports, and should send it to us for that purpose, it must infallibly rot in the ware- houses of the great emporium. If the indus- try of our smugglers can get rid of one-tenth S5 part of ft they will be fortunate, as all the ar- ticles, and particularly those of their own pro- duce, are very bulky. Taking as an instance the principal article produced in the middle states, we should receive about 80,000 liogs- heads of tobacco, of wl;ich our own consump- tion would take 12,000 — what is to become of the remainder ? Nor would America lose only her export to foreign Europe; for such would be the glut of every thing in the emporium, and such the consequent depression of prices, that even the consumption of this country would in part be lost toherbythe inadequate return, which would hard- ly defray the charges of bringing it to market. The consequences of such a state Of things must produce ruin to every class and description of persons in America, and they are indeed so obvious and so inevitable, that one cannot avoid thinking that they must have occurred to the framers of this new system, and that the great advantages they expect to derive from other parts of it had recopxiled them to the loss of those resources, which the extent and variety of our commerce with America afford. — We shall hereafter see how America pays us for the British manufactures she consumes ; how thri consuuip- tion cncreases gradually with her population and her wealth ; that one of her principal means of payment is derived from that intercourse with , E 26 the Continent^ which we are so desirous to sup- press ; whence it will be evident that the ruia which must ensue from the proposed system will fall upon ourselves by a cessation of demand for the future^ and inability to pay for the past, even though America should consent to our measures^ and add her best efforts towards their execution. The fatal effects of this system are so evident;^ that we are naturally induced to search every quarter for the motives or opinions by which it is justified and defended. Every publication and every newspaper I have seen^ with one single exception*;, have been impressing the public mind not so much with calculations of interest^, as insinuations that the honour of the country was at stake. — America^ it is said^ taking advantage, of our perilous situation^ put forward the most haughty claims, which were only increased and encouraged by our concessions ; that she se- duced our seamen, and shewed by every act short of actual hostility towards us, the most decided preference for our enemy, submitting to every indignity from France, while towards us every trifle was disputed with the most captious' insolence. Though these vague insinuations, with which * The Moriirag Chronicle, in which some very ahle papers on thi» subject haTe appeared, under the signature of A. B. 27 the public papers have abounded, seem chiefly calculated to interest the feelings in favour of measures which have been previously the result of calculation, yet their effects are extremely important. In the present crisis, though the means and strength of the country should be preserved and encouraged with the utmost care, yet the resource on which we must principally rely, and of which we can for no consideration admit a sacrifice, is the independent spirit of the people ; without it, our wealth would rather hasten than avert our destruction. If our dan- gers were greater than they are ; if we were contending:: with an army already on our shores, the tone of Government towards foreign coun- tries should never change; for, however ex- treme our peril may be, it is by firmness and courage only that we can have a chance of safe- ty. If, therefore, the conduct of America has really been Mhat it is represented, it would be the extreme of meanness and pusillanimity, as well as of folly, to be calculating the profit and loss of the duty towards ourselves which it would impose. On this point the public appear to be so gross- ly deceived, that I shall endeavour, by a general review of our conduct towards America, to cor- rect errors which uncontradicted misrepresenta- e2 28 tions have every where disseminated. This mode of examination will also introduce an account of the gradual growth of the commerce of that country, and enable us, by determining our own opinion of the justice of the Orders in Council, to form a pretty correct one of the reception they are likely to meet w ith in America. I am well aware of the general unpopularity of the side I am taking, and more particularly in this part of the discussion ; but I am also per- suaded that it is principally owing to the pre- judices which it is my desire to remove. The dangers which surround us are of too serious a nature for any man to be deterred from giving a sincere opinion where he thinks it can be ser- viceable ; and I shall therefore feel perfectly in- sensible to the insinuations of those whose nar-. row minded illiberality leads them to see sinis- ter motives in all opinions opposed to their own, and which it is the characteristic of the most bi- gotted ignorance to set up as the only standard of truth. National vanity is a prominent feature in (he character of every country ; the good opinion the great nation entertain of themselves is pro- verbial ; the Americans gravely debated once in congress, whether they should style themselves / the most enlightened people of the world — and <^ S9 distinguished member of the House of Com- mons * seriously declared in it, and was no doubt as seriously believed, that we were too honest to have any political connections with the Conti- nent. — There is something so amiable in the sentiment, that like the mutual partialities of parents and children, it is an unpleasant task to quarrel with it : but in the present instance, when great national objects are to be decided, it becomes our duty to divest ourselves of a par- tiality which may mislead our judgment. If we are really desirous of avoiding the danger of involving ourselves in an unjust and impolitic war, we should not believe the vapouring asser- tions of our newspapers, and leave the Americans to be guided by theirs, which would confirm both countries in the opinion that they have been equally models of justice and forbearance; but, by a rigid examination, we should endeavour impartially to ascertain what have been the con- cessions which we have made, and what the insolent pretensions of America, which are to weigh so heavily against considerations of policy and interest. Such an examination will be attempted in the following historical account of the neutral com- merce of America, and of our conduct towards it; • Mr. Wilberforce. 30 which will enable me to explain many circum- siances not well understood at present^ and to correct many no doubt iKiintentional errors, into which the author of " War in Disguise" has led the public from the circumstance, probably of his relying too much on the records of the Court of Admiralty and on public newspapers for his commercial opinions. Though we shall not frequently differ as to facts, it will be seen how difi'erently the same story may be toldj and the public may be able to form a more cor- rect opinion, when the merchant as well as the civilian shall be heard. Lest any of my remarks should induce a contrary inference, I beg leave to preface them with the declaration of my respect for the intentions and talents of the ingenious author, who is not otherwise known to me than by his works, and my sincere regret that what appear to me more sound commercial views have not the advantage of being illustrated with equal ability. Every maritime war in Europe^ since civiliza- tion gradually made the benefits of commerce appreciated, has produced discussioii^ about the rights of those nations which remained at peace. In some instances their commerce certainly suf- fered; but where their rights were supported, the balance of advantages was greatly in their favour. The Belligerents themselves found a mutual be- 31 nefitin the exchange of their own produce, which could be only effected by neutral carriers. The intercourse with their colonies was enlarged by all, but principally by the weaker party ; and though the varying opinions of the Belligerents of the comparative advantages they derived from this intercourse produced occasional interrup- tions, neutrals still maintained their rights, part- ly from the power they were able to throw into one scale or the other, but principally by the ge- neral advantages which were recognized by all. — Though, however, power and advantage were the real foundation of this practice, the variety of interests, and the constant changes in them, produced the necessity of some unvarying tribu- nal : for this purpose, the opinions of a few wise meU;, for want of better means, were erected into a code of international law ; and though the con* tradictions and fanciful extravagance of some of their opinions still leave great room for arbi- trary interpretation, something was gained to* wards permanency and justice, by the admission of these authorities. i' America had scarcely recovered from her revo- lution, and begun to prosper under her new con- stitution, when the war, which broke out in Eu- rope, placed her, through the prudence of her Government, in the enjoyment of the benefits of neutrality, and from being herself a colony, she 32 was now to trade as an independent neutral country to the colonies of others. In what state did she find the rights of neu- trals when she assumed that character herself? The armed neutrality, which had taken place at the close of the former war, had brought the subject under very general discusssion, and had at least the advantage of fixing the opinions of moderate men upon it, by rejecting the extrava- gant pretensions to which preponderating power or disinterested vanity had occasionally given rise. The leading points of discussion were, whether the property of an enemy on board a neutral vessel should be condemned ; under what circumstances and regulations a port might be blockaded; and what articles were contra- band of war. But Great Britain had once maintained a doctrine of an importance to neu- trals far exceeding any other, and by which she could extinguish at her pleasure all the increased trade which a state of war gave them, without making any compensation for the inconveniences of such a. state ; this was what is called the rule of the war of 1756 — which declared that a neu- tral had no right to carry on in time of war a trade prohibited to him in time of peace. It cannot be denied that on principles of gene- ,ral reason, much may be said in favour of this limitation of neutral trade, especially when ope- S3 rating- materially on the result of the war; but to make this a part of the law of nations, it is not sufficient that it should be asserted by one power; it must likewise be admitted bv others; which is so far from having- been the case, that in all our discussions about neutral rights, we have not only never obtained from any nation a recogni- tion of this rule, but it does not even appear to have been at any time seriously insisted upon. The war during which this right was first brought forward, and during which alone it was enforced, was the most successful this country ever engaged in ; but without derogating from the exalted character of the late Lord Chatham, much of that success was owing to the particu- larly weak state of the French court. At no period since the union of the feudal provinces to the crown of France, was that country in such a state of imbecility, and no moment could consequently be more favourable for establishing a precedent which we could hardly expect ail opportunity of repeating. Russia and Sweden w ere leagued with France, and the former power had then interfered little in maril ime afl'airs. Den- mark and Holland were neutral, but their wishes and their interest were strongly on the side of the king of Prussia, then struggling for his existence ; and, with the rest of the neutral world, they were under apprehensions from the union of Austria r :j4 and France, which made thcni view with indificr- ence the strong- measures of defence adopted ag'ainst a league so formidable to tlie indepen- dence of Europe. Under such circumstances, this important rule, which we are told is always in force, though it has never since been acted upon, was established. The practice and usage betMcen independent nations, where no particular circumstances occur to produce an undue bias, is perhaps the best criterion of the law of nations; and in this re- spect no treaty can be taken as a safer guide than that of the 17th June 1801, with the pre- sent Emperor of Russia, at his accession to the throne. The state of our relations with that monarch at the time, afforded an expectation which was not disappointed, that the conflicting interests of the belligerent and neutral would be settled with mutual moderation and good sense. In that treaty, not only the rule of the war of 1756 is not recognized, but the right of the neu- tral to trade with the colonies of our enemies, and from his own country in the produce of those colonies to the mother country, is expressly stipulated. What then can be tiie object of holding up this rule as the palladium of our maritime rights, or why has it so long lain dormant ? Instead of America being accused of a disposition of en- ,^^5 croaclimeiit hostile to oiii" dignity, in refusing to admit into tlie law of Nations a principle which has neither been admitted by or enforced towards others ; are we not rather ourselves wanting to our own dignity in proclaiming a law which we have never ventured to defend ; in settino' u]) a riij-ht which bv our treaties with foreign nations, wc have ourselves encouraged them to contest ? But it is said that, though in our treaties, and particularly in the one above mentioned with Russia, made, as the preamble expresses it, " to " settle an invariable determination of the prin- '^ ciples of the two Governments, upon the rights "^ of neutrality," . . . . neutrals have been per- mitted to trade in direct violation of the rule; vet that rule has never been formally renounced: this is certainly true ; and we shall soon see why it is retained by us as part of the law of nations, and that it is by maintaining a nominal right of extreme rigour, while foreign nations were kept quiet by a practice under it, which we termed relaxations and concessions, that occasion has been given to those just complaints which we are called upon indignantly to resent. It is admitted that this rule, forwhat reason it is not material to consider, was lost sight of in the war which ended in 1783, and which brings us to the period of American independence. — f2 36 When the war with France in 1793 first broke out, the recent assistance which America had re^- ccivcd from that country, and the early popula- rity of revolutionary opinions, made it verydoubt^ ful whether the feelings of the people would admit of their neutrality being* preserved ; but the con- fidence universally placed in General Washing- ton enabled him to follow^ at this critical period the manifest interests of his countrj^ On our part, our conduct towards neutrals opened most inauspiciously, and the Orders of the 6th November directed our cruizers "^to stop "and detain for lawful adjudication all vessels " laden with goods the produce of any French " colony, or carrying provisions or other supplies " for the use of any such colony." This, in some respects, exceededthe rigour of the rule of 1756. There was no attempt to determine to what ex- tent the neutral had a trade w ith the enemy's co- lonies before the war, but the whole was devoted te condemnation. This Order produced, of course, a ferment in America, where the Government, having determined on neutrality, was equally resolved to support the rights of that character. Before, however, the manner in which the Order was received there could be well understood here, we reversed at once, by a second proclamation in January, 1794, the rigorous decree of two months before, by ordering our cruizers to seize only 37 -' such vessels as were laden witli goods the pro- " duce of the French West India Islands, and '' coming directly from any ports of the said *' islands to Europe :" and this indulgence, as it is called, was further extended in January, 1798, by an Order permitting neutrals to carry the produce of enemies' colonies, not only to their respective countries, but to Great Britain, which remained in force until the peace of Amiens. It is not easy to account for the precipitate conduct towards neutrals in the first Order, and its subsequent revocation. America could not have been heard on the subject, though her senti- ments might well have been, and probably were, anticipated. The increased relaxation in 1798 was certainly voluntary, and though the ground of the whole of these proceedings is unintelligible, it is evident that they could not have originated in the pretensions or encroachments of America. In November, 1794, an attempt was made by Ireatv to introduce a modification of the rule in question, by stipulating, in the 12th article, that America should not export to Europe articles the produce of the West Indies, by which her trade with all the European colonies would have been confined to the extent of her own consumption This article was rejected on the other side, end that rejection assented to by the ratification of Great Britain. 38 By the same treaty, Comnilssioners Avere ap- pointed to determine the claims of Americans, "^ for illegal captures or condemnations of their '' vessels and other property, under colour of au- '" thority, or commissions from his Majesty." They sat in London, and awarded very large sums to the claimants for losses sustained, prin- cipally, if not wholly, from the execution of the instruction of the 6th Novemher, 1798 : nor can it be pretended that the decision of these commis- sioners is to be attributed to the majority of Ame- ricans composing it, for it w^as well understood what were the illegal captures; as the treaty called them, upon which they were to decide. During the remainder of the war which ended in the peace of Amiens, America, ab- staining from taking any part in the extravagant pretensions of the Northern powers, which she well knew originated in considerations to- tally foreign from any desire of arranging equitably the relative rights of belligerents and neutrals, continued to carry on her commerce, without any further discussion with us about principles ; but, in consequence of some com- plaints of the conduct of our Vice-Admiralty Court, these principles received a memorable confirmation by the correspondence between Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. King in 1801, which ex- plains them with a precision and clearness that 89 has created no little embarrassment to those who have attempted to justify oui subsequent conduct*. « Great Cumberland Place, March 13, l&Ol. MY LORD, The decree of the vice admiralty court of Nassau, a copj of which is annexed ; condeninin^ the cargo of an American vessel, going from the United States to a port in the Spanish colonies, upon the ground that the articles of innocent merchandize composing the same, though bona fide neutral property, -were of the growth of Spain, having heen sanctioned, and the principles extended, hy the prize courts of the British islands, and particularly by the court of Jamaica, has been deemed sufficient authority to the commanders of the sliips of war and privateers cruising in those seas, to fall upon and capture all Ame- rican vessels bound to an enemy's colony, and having on board any article of the growth or manufacture of a nation at war with (Ircat Britain. These captures, which are vindicated by what is termed the belli- gerent's right to distress his enemy by interrupting the supplies which his habits or convenience may require, have produced the strongest and uiost serious complaints among the American merchants, whoJhave seen, with indignation, a reason assigned for the capture and confis- cation of their property, which is totally disregarded in the open trade carried on between the British and Spanish colonies, by British and Spanish subjects, in the very articles, the supply of which, by neutral merchants, is unjustly interrupted. The law of nations, acknowledged in the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, between the United States and Great Britain, allows the goods of an enemy to be lawful prize, and pronounces those of a friend to be free. While the United States take no measures to abridge the rights of Great Britain, as a belligerent, they are bound to resist, with firmness., every attempt to extend them, at the expense of the equally incontest- able rights of nations, which find their interest and duty in living in peace with the rest of the world. So long as the ancient law of nations is observed, which protects the innocent merchandize of neutrals, while it abandons to the belligerent the goods of his enemy, a plain rule exists, and may be appealed to, ia decide the rights of peace and war: the belligerent has no better au- thority to curtail the rights of the neutral, than the neutral has io do the like in regard to the rights of the l)elligcrent; and it is only by an adherence to the ancient code, anJ the rejection of modern glosses, 40 We here see that tliis memorahlc rule of 1756^ the foundation of those maritime rights (bat fixed and precise rules can 1)c found, defining the rights, and re- gulating the duties of independent states. This subject is of such importance, and the essential interests of the United States, whose policy' is that of peace, are so deeply affected by the doctrines which, during the present war, have been set up, in order to enlarge the rights of lielligerents, at the expense of those of neutrals, that I shall, without loss of time, submit to your lordsliip's consideration such further reflections respecting the same, as its great importance appears to demand. In the mean time, as the decisions referred to cannot, from the un- avoidable delay which attends the prosecution of appeals, be speedily reversed, and as the effect of those decrees will continue to be the un- just and ruinous interruption of the American commerce in the West Judia seas, it is my duty to require that precise instructions shall,- with- out delay, be dispatched to the proper officers in the West Indies and Nova Scotia, to correct tlie abuses which have arisen out of these ille- gal decrees, and put an end to the depredations which are wasting the lawful commerce of a peaceable and friendly nation. With great consideration and respect, 1 have the honour to he, your lordship's most obedient and most Immble servant, KUFUS KING. Lord Ilawkesbury, &.c. &c. SIR , JJoKHhfg Street, Jpril ]\th, 1 SO I . I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 1 3th of last mouth, and to inform you that, in consequence of the represen- tation contained in it, a letter has been written, by his Majesty's com- mand, by his grace the duke of Portlauri, to the lords commissioners of the admiralty ; a copy of which letter I herewith enclose to you, for the information of the Government of the United States. I have the honour to be, with great truth, Sir, your most obedient humble servant, (Signed) HAWKESBURY. Rufus King, Esq. &c. &c. MY LORDS, ffhilchall, 50th March, ISO]. I transmit to your lordships herewith a copy of the decree of the vice -admiralty court of Nassau, condemning the cargo of an American 41 without which we are told our power cannot exist, though it was exercised only for a very Tcssel, going: from the United Stat-es t« a port in tlic Spanish colonies ; and the said decree having been referred to the consideratien «t' ths king's advocate-general, j'our lordships will perceive from his report, an extract from which I enclose, that it is his opioion that the sen- tence of the vice -admiralty court is erroneous, and feunded in a mis- apprehension or misapplication of the principles laid down in the de- cision of the high court of admiralty referred to, without attending to the limitations therein contained. In order, therefore, to put a stop to the inconveniences arising from these erroneous sentences of the vice-admiralty courts, I hav^ tiie ho- nour to signify to your lordships the king's pleasure, that a communi- cation of the doctrine laid down in the said report should be immedi- ately made by your lordships to tlie several judges presiding in them, setting forth what is held to be the law upon the subject by the supe- rior tribunals, for their future guidance and direction. I am, Sec. PORTLAND. The Lords Commissioners of Admiralty.. Extract of the Jdvocale-GeneraVs lii^ort,4aied March IG, ISO I. I have the honour to report, that the sentence of the vice-ad- miralty court appears to mc erroncms, and to be founded in a misap- prehension or misapplication of the principles laid down in the decision of the court of admiralty referred to, without attending to the limi- tations therein contained. The general principle respccflng the colonial trade has, in the course of the present war, been to a certain degree relaxed in consi- deration of the present stale of commerce. It is now distinctly un- derstood, and it has been repeat£dly so decided by the high court of appeal, that the produce of the colonies of the enemy may ))e im- ported by a neutral icto his own country, and may be re-exported from thence even to the mother-country of such colony : and, in like iHanner, the produce and manufactures of the mother country may, in this circuitous mode, legally tind their way to the colonies. The direct trade, however, between the mother counir> and its colonies, has not, I apprehend, lieen recogr.ised as legal, cither by his majes- ty's government, or by his tribunals. What is a direct trade, or what amounts to an intermediate impor- tation into the neutral country, may sometimes be a question of some difficulty. A general delinition of either, applicable to all cases, cannot well be laid down. The question must depend upon the parti- G 42 short period, was, during the last war,— First, voluntarily abandoned ; — Secondly, compensa- tion was afterwards made for the consequences of its temporary execution by an act which stigmatizes that execution as illegal ;— Thirdly, a formal treaty with a friendly power esta- blished principles directly opposed to it ; and. Finally, that those principles were most explicitly applied to America. But still no disiinct disavowal had been made of this rule forming part of the law of nations ; a circum- stance on which much stress is laid here, and very little in other countries. Foreign nations look naturally to the practice and to our public acts. In neither could any trace be found of these dangerous pretensions ; and it became im- material for them to ascertain how we reconciled our conduct to our construction of the law of nations : while we, on the contrary, appear to have cared little about our practice or our admissions, as long as we retained what must appear the childish advantage, of not disa- cular circumstances of each case. Perhaps the mere touching in the neutral country to take fresh clearances may properly be considered as a fraudulent evasion, and is, in effect, the direct trade ; but the high court of admiralty has expressly decided (and I see no reason to expect that (he court of appeal will vary the rules) that landing the goods and paying the duties in the neutral country breaks the conti- nuity of the voyage, and is such an importation as legalizes the trade, although the goods be reshipped in the same vessel, and on account of the same neutral proprietors, and be forwarded for sale to the mother country or the colony. 43 vowing a principle which we had not ventured to execute. In this manner the last war ended without any serious cause for disagTeement with America. Before we proceed to the renewal of hostilities^ it will facilitate our inquiry to explain what course the commerce of that country had taken under our former conduct. This part of the subject has more than any other been a source of misrepresentations which it is necessary to explain. The author of " War in Disguise" takes particular pains through his whole work to circulate and establish an opinion, that the great »hass of neutral trade is not bonajide for neutral account, but that it in reality covers the property of Frenchj Spanish, and Dutch merchants, neutralised by the fraud and perjury of the Americans. In confirmation of this serious assertion, he has, contrary to his general practice, been particularly sparing of his authorities, thouiiii he could have had no difficulty in finding them. There is no doubt to be found in the records of our Prize Courts, every possible case of neutral fraud, as in those of the Old Bailey instances of every species of crime; but it would be as unjust to determine the general character of the commerce of a country by a few particular instances of the former, as to decide on the national ft2 44 f Iiaracter of a people bj those of the lattei*. A correct opinion on this point can only be ob- tained from practical knowledge, and upon presiunptive grounds, arising from a considera- tion of the means, views, and interests of the parties. Now I maintain, without fear of con- tradiction from any person acquainted with the commerce of America^ that this character as it respects that country is totally unfounded, and that though the trade with our enemies colo- nies is carried on in a greater proportion by neutrals than at any former period, there is every reasontobelieve that there never was in the course of any war so little property covered under the fraudulent mask of neutrality as at present: That the interests of the parties in these transac- tions do not;, as the author already mentioned supposes, " strongly incline them to the fraudu- lent course ;" That strange as it may appear ta him, America has found, and that very suddenly, *' a commercial capital, and genuine commercial *' credit, adequate to the vast magnitude of their '' present investments • That France, Spain, *' Holland, Genoa, and the late Austrian Ne- '' therlands, and all the Colonies and trans- *' marine dominions of those powers, do not at *' this hour possess merchant ships or merchants '* engaged on their own account in exterior " commerce, and that no subject of those un> 45 "^ fortunate realms has an interest in such " a commerce bejond his commission." In quoting the forcible passages with which this erroneous opinion has been inforced, I do not of course mean to maintain the positive confor- mity of every particular case to my position ; all we have to do with is the general character of the trade in question. The character of that trade was certainly such as it is represented by this author at the be- ginning of the war in 1793^ and it has been that of the neutral trade of the northern powers in the present as well as all former wars ; but the trade of America, though beginning partially on the same plan, has, from natural causes, taken a different course ; and though this asser- tion were not as it is susceptible of the clearest demonstration, yet I would confidently appeal for the truth of it to the information which Go- vernment must receive from our commercial agents in America ; and I would even venture an Appeal to our Prize Courts, whether, in the numerous cases which have been brought before them, the general complexion of American commerce does not confirm this representation; whether the instances of the detection of any foreign interest in the cargoes detained are not very rare, but, on the contrary, whether general circumstances, «ince the commencement of the 46 present war, do not afford strong presumption of the bona fides of this trade. Nor can this appearance be attributed to the increased skill of neutralizers ; it is well known that the Americans have never equalled the European neutrals in this respect. Their distance from those who must be supposed to be their principals is too great, and they labour under the additional disadvantage of their whole correspondence, by passing the ocean, being necessarily subject to our inspection ; which, though some cases might pass undetected, makes it impossible to carry on with successful fraud the great mass of the commerce of a country. The near neighbourhood of the Dutch, Danes, Hamburghers, &c. and their easy communication, similar habits and language of their seamen, for they may be said to take them from a common stock, enabled them in war to pass their ship- ping to one or the other according as their in- terest served — a single house at Brussels,* neutralized in the American war upwards of seven hundred Dutch vessels; and this appears to have been imitated in our time by a shoemaker of East Friesland, whose name has been equally immortalized by the notice universally taken of him by the zealous enemies of neutral frauds. But our Government must have been very i§^- * Baron Romberg^. 47 t. norant indeed, if these frauds tvere really un- known to them^ or if they were first informed of them by the authors^ who appear to have asto- nished the public with their denunciation ; and they must have been very weak if they were con- nived at otherwise than from a conviction that we had an interest in their existence. A little reflection would have pointed out the nature of this interest, and one excursion down the river, where until lately hundreds of Dutch vessels under these ensigns of ne^itrality might have been seen, would have given these sagacious discover- ers some idea of its extent. They would have found out, that our trade with the hostile ports of the continent of Europe could not be otherwise carried on ; that the ex- portation of our surplus of West India produce, of which M'c hear so much, that our own manu factures, a subject though less talked of, at least as interesting, and that in fact our whole com- merce with the country of the enemy, of which we feel so sensibly the deprivation, had no other means of conveyance. That we cannot precisely take the advan- tage of such connivance without some corre- sponding disadvantage, there is no doubt : the fraudulent neutral, suffered for our benefit, will frequently carry the property of our enemy; but it has always hitherto been considered that 48 as our strength and resources depended so much more than those of our enemies on a free circula- tion of commerce, our advantages must greatly preponderate. To hear the good policy of this connivance questioned would certainly have surprised me, but still more must it surprise a practical merchant to find it pointed out to the public as a novel discovery. < Though this part of the subject has little connection with the neutral trade of America, I am induced to take notice of it on account of the singular ignorance which prevails respect- ing it; and it may perhaps incline those, who persist in considering this instance of self-deceit as a grievance, to give a preference to American neutrality, by suggesting that geographical dif- ficulties, and still more, those arising from dis- similar habits, must ever prevent that exchange of shipping which they deplore. A Dutchman will make a tolerable Dane, but he can never b« mistaken for an American. The only instance of America being accused of this practice is in the evidence reported to the House of Commons by the West India Committee*, which, properly examined into, * Extract from the Evidence of Mr. TVihon before the TFest IndU Commiltee. Q. " To what causes principally do you attribute the present " distressed state of the West India colonies ? — A. I conceive the « causes of that to be, first, the too high duty which it laid upon the 49 would certainly not have justified the inferences drawn from it. There can be no doubt, from the respectability of the evidence^ that the fact he states came within his knowledg-e; but from the general complexion of the report there is every reason to suppose this very important subject would have been more minutely examined, if any result favourable to the evident tendency of its arguments could have been expected. It would have been highly interesting to know how many instances had been discovered^, as by pointing them out to our Government, redress might have been obtained by application to that of America, whose strict attention to the cha- racter of her flag has always been remarkable. The vessel so obtained by an American citizen could never have an American register, would always pay the duties of a foreign ship ; and, •• article ; next, the relaxation of the system towards neutrals, '• enabling them to carry away indiscriminately produce from ihe " enemies colonies ; thirdly, the policy of the French in allowing " French ships, bought by neutrals, to enter their ports as if still " carrying: t!ie original flag, making a difference in the duties paid •' in France upon foreign ships, 27 francs fifty cents, or 23 shillings; " by French ships 22 francs fifty cents, or jy shillinjcs per 102 " French pounds of sugar, equal to about one hundred weight, " that measure producing the addiiional advantage of keeping their " own ships in employ during war time, as by bond the purchasers " of those ships are engaged to reinstate them in French ports withia *' a twelvemonth after peace." Though neutrals only are mentioned, this charge was wcU under- stood to apply principally to Americans. H 5d oven to have the rig]it of navigating under the flag, the owner must have been guilty of direct perjury, by s's^earing that no person but himself had directlj or indirectly an interest in her ; and ihe evil could have been cured by our seizing and condemning such vessels wherever they might be found, which could never have been complained of by America. The inference drawn by the witness in this case, that the distressed state of our West India colonies was^ among other causes, principally to be attributed to vessels so circumstanced, being permitted to import sugar into France, at a duty of 4s. per Cxwt. less than w as paid by others, should, instead of inducing the committee to repeat it, have led them rather to receive with CEtution his deduc- tions from facts: There are, no doubt, instances in trade of ope- rations evidently ruinous to those who undertake theni;, but such casual errors soon correct them- selves, and the truth is more easily discovered by examining what the interest of the parties must be, than by taking up an insulated fact by which to establish it. In this instance, from the slight evidence I have mentioned, a conclu- sion is drawn that nearly the whole French mer- cantile marine is transferred to neutrals, to be ^eld by them during war, and to be returned at 51 a peace. Is such an operation on the part of an American to be reconciled to any calculations ft/ of interest ? The French proprietor must trust a very pe- rishable property at a distance^ when he could to greater advantage have sold it outright ; and the French Government^ which is supposed to have authorized the sale^ would better answer its pur- pose of having a mercantile marine on the return of peace, by permitting then the purchase of neutral vessels. The American purchaser has, as his only advantage, the right of importing sugars at a re- duction of four shillings the hundred on the duty, but he must, in the first place, I supp.osc, be paid for his perjury; hemustthen, duringthewar, trust very valuable property in a vessel navigated un- der a sea-letter, and \yithout a register ; and it is known that a considerable difference is always made in the price of insurance. I believe these disadvantages would be a full balance for the low duty, but he certainly would be left a con- siderable loser, when it is considered that in America he would be liable both for his cargo and his tonnage to foreign duties ; that the prin- cipal article exported from France to America is brandy, the duty on which is about 50 per cent, on the first cost, to which 10 per cent, would in this case be added. These circumstances must satisfy any person acquainted with the com- H 2 o. ^2 merce of America^ iliat the transactions com- plained of can have no extent, if it were not far- ther confirmed by the fact that France had, at the breaking out of the present war, very little shipping to transfer. I have been induced to take more notice of this business than its im- portance may appear to deserve, from the exag- gerated consequences attributed to it by others; from the attempt to make a plausible impression on those who were not able properly to appre- ciate it, and from its appearing to have been the cause of the Order in Council, directing the capture of all vessels transferred by the enemy to neutrals— a measure to which there is no other objection than that it is certainly a violation of neutral rights, founded on a most erroneous opinion. It is certainly a circumstance much in favour of the neutrality of America, when compared with that of the Danes and Germans, that it does not screen from our hostility the vessels and seamen of our enemies. If our trade to Hol- land and Hamburgh had been carried on by Americans, instead of pretended Danes, Papen- burghers, &c. we should not now have opposed to us so great a number of able seamen, and the Dutch and Danes would not be able to add to the power of the enemy those sea habits and na- yal skill which it would be of much more im- 53 portance to us to^ have destroyed than ships and naval stores, wliich a short time will replace *. While the Northern nations continued neu- tral, the consequence of their competition with the Americans was found by experience to be^, that the former engrossed much the largest por- tion of the European carrying trade, as also of what has been called the neutralizing trade, where the only benefit of the neutral was his freight, and that additional compensation for a false oath, which we are told, and no doubt if to be had at all, is a cheap article on the Conti- nent. They could navigate their ships much cheaper than the Americans, and by their situa- tion and means of communication by post, they could establish and vary their train of frauds in a manner that the distance of Ihc others, and the examination of their correspondence by our cruizers, rendered impossible. But, on the other hand, the situation of Ame- rica, the value of the produce of her own soil, the want of that produce in the West Indies, * In estimatin.^ the advantages of the Danish expedition, the imporlauce of ships and stores as an ingredient of naval power appears to me over-rated. It is in seamen only we find the enemy cannot equal us. If our ships were all destroyed in a day, our naval power mii^ht soon be restored, if we had, as Den- mark certainly has, the means of procuring others, and of maintain- ing in the mean time our independence. But it is now discovered that we have lost by capture, and the Danes have consequently gained as large a quantity of stores as we brought away. 54 and the early assistance of the capitals of this country, not only gave her a decided advantage out of the European seas, but have enabled her to convert what was before a trade of bellige- rents under a neutral mask into bona fide adven- tures of neutrals for their own account. Several circumstances concurred to promote this change. The Dane and the Swede, in sending their vessels to the West Indies, could contribute towards the adventure nothing but the ship ; their countries furnished little or no- thing of what was wanted there, and the superior capital and commercial advantages of their neigh- bours the Dutch, kept the northern shipping em- ployed for them, and for France and Spain, whose neutral trade during war was generally managed through Holland : on their return, as well as on their outward voyage, they must necessarily pass along the coasts of their employers, which gave every facility to this mode of proceeding, from which little more than a good freight remained with the neutral. — But America, in entering into this commerce, was differently situated. Her distance from Europe prevented her merchants from being set at work to any extent for Eu- ropean account; while the great value of her own produce, which was of first necessity in the islands, brought her forward very early as a prin- cipal. The assistance of British capital was 55 kiso of great service at that period, though her own has since so much increased, that like the effect of European emigrations on her popula- tion, what was once a principal agent is now scarcely felt. The influence I have mentioned of similar language, habits, and origin, were here strongly shewn : The Dutch, with a commercial interest of three per cent, trusted none of their money in the advantageous speculations of these new merchants ; no manufactures, even of that or any country on the Continent, were or are now sold to them on credit; while our merchants and manufacturers entered with avidity into this new and profitable field. The value of the domestic produce of Ame- rica, and that of the manufactures of this coun- try, obtained on a long credit, soon formed there- fore a capital for carrying on this trade for ac- count of the neutral, while his own increased with its importance. In the early period of the war, the old mode of proceeding, to which the French and Spaniards were accustomed with the Northern neutrals, was followed : former habits and opinions prevailed, and the means of America were then unequal to large operations ; but experience, and that tendency which com- merce, when left alone, always has to find its proper channel, gradually turned the whole over to American account. The Spaniards were, as 56 they always are, the last to adopt this change. Agents were sent out to carry on operations un- der the old system, which the competition of Americans on their own account always ren- dered ruinous ; and even at present the little co- vered trade still existing is probably mostly Spanish. I must again repeat, that it is not intended to maintain that instances may not be produced in opposition to this general character of the trade of America with the enemy's colonies : property of all nations is no doubt floating at this moment under the neutral flag; but I am well convinced, strange as it may seem, that if the fact could be ascertained, more British than enemy's property would be found in that situation. The interest of the parties is the only thing to be considered for the purpose of forming a correct opinion, and facts opposed to it should be considered as casualties, and received for that purpose with great caution. It would be absurd to talk of the superior mo- rality of one description of people over another. If the fraudulent trade were more profitable in America it would prevail, though I must say, and I speak from considerable experience, that the character of the great body of merchants of that country little deserves the unjust insinua- tions, in which writers on this subject have so il- liberally indulged. 57 Now let us consider how the interest of the jparties concerned favours my statement. A planter at Martinique, or at Cuba, wants to sell his produce at the highest, and to furnish him- self with European manufactures, and Ame- rican provisions, lumber, &c. at the lowest prices possible; supposing-, which is admitted, that he is under no restrictions, how will he proceed ? If this is to be done for his own ac- count under a neutral mask, which, if he had the poor Dane to deal with, woiild be his only re- medy, he must ship his sugar on board the vessel to the consignment of a person in America, to whom by false papers it must appear to belong. The consignee there must re-ship it to some port on the Continent; and the sugar being there sold, the manufactures of France and Spain would be returned in the same manner ; the provisions from America Would be purchased for him in that country, and sent under the same cover for his own account. The planter must here trust his property in the first instance to strangers whom he knows little about, for the intercourse between America and the West In- dies is principally in the hands of the small trad- ers from every creek and inlet of the country, and carried on in small sloops and schooners : he must secondly, in making his insurance, pay a iiigher premium for not beiii^ able to warrant I 58 the property to be neutral; tliiruly, he hiust j)ay commissions in America and France, and a higli neutralizing freight; and lastly, he must give positive Orders many months before-hand for his supplies, of the receipt of which he must alvv^a;^^ be uncertain. It is difficult to imagine a more unsatisfactoi^j mode of proceeding, or that ttie planter should not soon find out that the American trader cati afford to give him more for his produce at his own door, taking it away under his real neutral character, and selling it where he pleases, and that in the same manner he can buy his Euro- pean and American supplies in the quantity and of a quality he may Select, in a market always^ kept moderate by the most active competition. No precise proportion between the relative ad- vantages of these two proceedings could with any certainty be fixed, but that of the latter would probably not be overvalued at 25 per cent. It should al^o be observed, that a very small proportion of the French and Spanish colonists reside in Europe: allowing therefore for expenses of cultivation, the money to be remitted home is of trifling amount. At no time was the num- ber of European residents equal to those of our Colonies ; and the French revolution produced a separation between them and the mother country, which the short interval of peace did not remove. 59 The revenue derived from the Colonies by persons resident in France must be very trifling; and that formerly was chiefly from St. Domingo. The cul- tivators of Cuba are almost all residents in that island. The colonist is consequently left more at liberty to follow his own interest, though it would almost to the same degree be the interest of the European resident possessing colonial pro- perty to sell in the island and receive his revenue by bills of exchange. The very unfrequent appearance of bills of this description in circula- tion is an additional proof how few West India proprietors reside in France or Spain. That the general interest of all parties naturally tends to produce the state of the trade above-men- tioned cannot be disputed ; but it must be still more evident to our West India merchants, when they consider the nature of their own connection with America. They have every advantage over the foreigner in combining operations with that country; and British property covered or un- covered crosses the sea at less risk than that of our enemies. But is it not well known that it is much more for the benefit of our planters to buy of Americans in the islands as their wants occur, than to send large orders for perishable commodi- ties on their own account? That this is occasion- ally done is not denied ; but of the 1,400,000/. which those supplies amount to yearly, it is cer- I 2 60 tainly not taking too mucli to say that at least ninetpen-twentietlis are sent for American ac- count. Surely then if the British planter finds his interest in this mode of proceeding, its ad- vantages must be infinitely greater to all foreign colonists. But it is asked in JFa?;- in Disguise* '' by v/hat means could the new merchants of the United States be able to purchase all the costly exports of the Havanuah, and the other Spanish ports in the West Indies, which now cross the Atlantic in their names ?" The origin of American capital for this trade from their own produce and from British credit has been already explained : if the ingenious author had condescended to make in- quiry into the actual state of capital and com- merce in America, he would not have been led into his very erroneous opinions of their extent. The West India trade requires in America less capital than any other, and an adventure to the islands can be undertaken almost w ithout any actual disbursement beyond the value of the ship; the provisions, lumber, &c. can be purchased on a short credit; the British manufactures (and it is for that reason that they principally are British ) on a very long one, and the adventurer may frequently sec his cargo of sugar or cofl'ee * P. 92. 61 return before lie is called upon to pay for his outward investment. It is for this reason that this branch of trade is srenerallv carried on by the more needy class of merchants^ and that the opulent houses confine themselves more to that with India and China^ and with Russia, which can only be managed with extensive ca- pitals. But so far from there being any insuffici- ency of capital for the West India trade^ a dozen commercial establishments might perhaps be named^ equal in that respect to its exclusive ma- nagement. The second voyage of West India produce requires little more capital than the first. The importer either sells for home consumption, for exportation, or exports himself, according to his opinion of the relative state of the markets ; those whose means or credit are low generally sell, the richer make their option ; if they ship, they of course select the most favourable market; but whether it is in England, Holland, France, or Italy, the amount, after paying sometimes for a small return cargo, is placed at the dis- posal of their correspondent in London, who, act- ing as banker, withdraws, by means of the foreign exchanges, the property from abroad, and ac- cepts the drafts of his American correspondent, which are remitted to pay the original debt to the British manufacturer. In this part of the 6? transaction, credit is again more wanted than capital; the London merchant, if hp has a good opinion of the solidity of his correspondent, permits him to draw two-thirds or three-fourths of the value in anticipation; but that no disap- pointment may ensue to him froni the loss of the vessel at sea^ he generally insists on making the insurance in Loiidpn, that he may in every ev€ai|^ be secured. This mode of proceeding varies according to occasional circumstances. Since our Court of Admiralty has set its face against re-shipments of West India produce by the original importer^ as being a continuance of the same voyage^ the business of the trader to the islands, and to Eu- rope, has been in a greater degree separated, and the re-exportation by the original importer seldom takes place. The Americans have also, for reasons which I shall presently notice, a dislike to making their insurances in London, and they relieve themselves from this necessity, which is intended only for the security of their correspondent there, according as their means enable them to dispense with anticipated ad- vances. Thus we see the whole round of the Ame- rican West India trade, and that the extent of capital employed in it is subject to contraction or expansion, according to the means of the 6s country; that it may be conducted with yerjr little, and that of course it is more profitably fconducted with more; we also see in what man- ner part of the very large amount of British ma- nufactures is disposed of by re-exportation from America, and how^ we are paid for such part as exceeds our own consumption of American pro- duce, by the exports of that and of West India i)roduce to the Continent of Europe. The proportion of capital to the demand for it has, as might be expected, been gradually im- proving in America, during the last war. Though the legal interest is only 6 per cent., the market rate was from 12 to 20; at present it is at little more than the legal rate; Great assistance w as derived from the establishment of public banks and insurance companies. It may give the reader some idea of the commercial means of that country to know, that in the year 1805 there were estimated to be 72 public banks with capi- tals of about 40 millions of dollars, and 43 insur- ance companies with about 12 millions capital; and, what may appear singular in a country of so much hazardous speculation, there is no in- stance of any establishment of either description stopping payment, although the banks are bountt to pay in specie, and on demand. But if any doubt should still remain of the assertion which I am endeavouring to prove. 6% ihat the tradd of America with the colonies of our enemies is bona fide for their own account ; if the interest of the parties, with the general no- toriety of the fact, should not satisfy those who suppose that a neutral must always find his inte- rest in fraud, it is fortunately susceptible of strong corroboration, if not of positive proof, from official documents. FrOm a report of the Secretary of the Treasury of America to Con- gress, in February 1806, it appears, thitt the annual amount of exports to the West Indies generally, calculated on an average of the three years, 1803, 1803, 1804, was-* t)0llars. In domestic produce of America, viz. provisions, lumber, &c. - 15,700,000 In produce or manufactures of other countries ----- 6,550,000 Together 22,250,000 kiid that the imports into America from the same quarter amounted to about 20,000,000 Dollars, It may here be seen what proportion of the West India produce is paid for in American produce, and what in European manufactures. The ex- cess of the exports beyond the imports is paid 65 for principally in specie, ^yhich is again used for the current circulation of America, and for her trade beyond the Cape of Good Hope. These facts will certainly j ustify me in as- suming that the general character of the trade of America with the colonies of our enemy is that of a bond fide neutral on his own account. The au- thor of ^' War in Disguise" tells us, itistrue, that this would not alter the weight of his argument; but such Diiins are taken throughout to stigmatize these pretended frauds, as '' unprecedented in '' extent and grossness*, and to make us believe, with him, that the freight in every American bill of lading includes a neutralizing commission f, the want of which his imagination supplies, that he roust probably think our right of interfering if not the policy of so doing, more or less at stake in that question. To what degree we are interested in this trade, carried on as I have rppresented it to be, will hereafter be considered; but if the expediency of putting an end to it were made clear, I should feel equal reluctance to permit a mere formality to shield the property of our enemies. If I believed it to be protected by the mass of perjury, fraud and collusion, which has been so eloquently, but so unjustly ascribed to this intercourse; common sense and common * rage 95. + Page "0. 66 honesty would certainly revolt at its finding pro- tection^ under the letter of the* law of nations in direct opposition to its spirit. In this point of view, a proper explanation of the general character of American commerce be- comes important^ and the more so as all writers have argued on the supposition that the opposite character imputed to it in" War in Disguise" had been proved; and prejudices have thence origin- ated both against our suffering a continuance of these pretended delusions^ and against the Ame- ricans for defending them, at a period when it be- comes more than ever necessary to both countries, that their relative situations should be clearly understood;, and all illusions arising from false statements of facts be removed. It would be easy to point out other errors of the same author, which his want of practical com mercial knowledge, and a disposition to study it in Doctors' Commons have given rise to: every document of a neutral vessel has been an ' object of suspicion ; and many circumstances, which to the merchant must appear perfectly re- gular and fair, are enlisted as proofs of fraud and disguise. But having, as I trust, made out my case undeniably, I shall pursue this part of the subject no further than to make some remarks on a digression of this author about insurances, which has tended to mislead the public, and perhaps tp 67 alarm some timid men into a most iinfoimded opinion of self-condemnation *, which will also vanish on a plain statement of facts. The Americans make their insurances in their own country whenever the nature of the operation will admit of it : this is indeed the case with mer- chants every where^ and for an obvious reason^ that they understand the laws of their own better than those of foreign countries, and consequently know when the risk is safely covered. A mer- chant in Philadelphia or Amsterdam cannot be supposed to study Mr. Park's excellent compila- tion on our insurance laws, but those of his own country he knows from practice. The means of insurance in America are abundant, as has been explained; the security quite as good as that of Lloyd's Coffee-house, and so far from following us in fixing their premium a little higher than ours, they are generally more moderate f. But • Page 89. t Page 87. Merchanis very seldom insure out of their own countrj, if they can avoiil it. Amsterdam v/as indeed formerly a great market for insurances for the Continent, in consequence of the solidity of the underwriters, and the unvaryin.i^ certainty of the laws. Insur- ance cases were never the suliject of lawsuits, nv.d foreigners have a dislike to the uncertainty which attends a trial by jury. Our stamp duty of one quarter percent, on the sura insured vill. in time of peace, also I;eep off forcis" orders. In every respect it /.ould be desirable to convert this duty i;ito a percentage on the premium, as by the pre- sent mode it filis very une([ually. On a premium often per ceut. the addition of a ((uarter per cent, makes only two ami a h.ilf per cent- kut ou a preniium of two, it amounts to twelve and a hah per cent. K 9. 68 it has been exphiinccl, that when the Amciican makes his shipment to Europe, and draws in an- ticipation on his London correspondent, the lat- ter, to have his security made perfect, must effect tlie insurance, and it is accordingly on these voy- ages, almost exclusively, that it is made in Lon- don; and even to this the American has natu- rally so great a reluctance, that he generally co- vers only the amount of his drafts here, and the remainder in his own country. There must be in this, as in all cases, exceptions; but, with- out much inquiry on the subject^ I am con- vinced that there are few instances of American insurances effected in this country, ©n voyages cither to the East or West Indies, because such adventures cannot be made the foundation of any security to a London house. The American, in ordering his insurance, and the London merchant in advancing his raoney^ for a very small commission, must be secured against all risks; but how is this to be done? In his own country the American would of course be protected against the consequences of British capture and detention, and he further stipulates there that if his property be condemned in any foreign Court of Admiralty, as not being neutral, and on the insurance on bullion, wliich belweea Holland and this coun- rrv used to be done at one quarter percent, ^le duty amounts almost to a prohibition. 69 hall be allowed to make proof of that fact in his own country. But in insuring in London, he is differently situated ; according to our laws, if any Admiralty Courts in the West Indies, on the American coast, or at home, determine that the property is not neutral, that the voyage is illegal, or if actual war should intervene, he can- not recover his insurance. It has also here been determined thatthe decision of our enemy's prize- courts, and even of some of the most ignorant judges in the islands, in the most revolutionary times, as to points of fact, are conclusive. The American merchant also, with the best intentions of trading legally, cannot always know what this country permits ; for we admit that, uphold- ing a general principle which we never enforce, we may and do vary our permission under it to neutrals as we please. Supposing him even in this respect not liable to error, he is exposed to unjust decisions of our Vice- Admiralty Courts, a danger of no common magnitude, if we are to believe the assertion of Lord Hawkesbury in the house of Commons, the 29th April, 1801, that of three hundred and eighteen appeals from those courts, only thirty-five of the condemnations were confirmed at home. It would therefore follow that a common in- surance in this country would cover little more than the sea risk, and the securitv of the London 70 merchant would be still more imperfect than that of the American, because to all the uncertainties mentioned, as attending" the situation of the latter^ must be added the possible case that he is really deceiving his English correspondent, and that the property belongs to our enemies. Either, there- fore, the whole business must be given up, or the alternative be adopted which has in fact been re- sorted to ; that the underwriter, after signing the common policy, should enter into a separate engagement to pay the loss sixty days after proof of capture or detes^tion by any power British or foreign ; and this clause, not being susceptible of enforcement by law, must depend for its execu- tion on the honour of the parties. Now the merit of the very moral admonition of the author of ''War in Disguise" on this subject, must depend much upon the character of the trade which has been so insured ; and it may be some satisfaction to the underwriter to discover, that it is that of an honest neutral, and that he has not been abetting those perjuries and forgeries*, with which it has been endeavoured to alarm his conscience: he will also be satisfied that to- gether with the merchant, he has materially faci- litated that circulation, by which our manufac- tures are paid for in consequence of our enemies • Page 90. 71 consumption of the produce of the soil or of the commerce of America ; and that it is to our power of facilitating such a circulation by means of capital and credit, that the superiority of those manufactures may in a great degree be im- puted. That enemy's property is in this manner some- times insured there can be no doubt, and there are cases where it has been done knowing it to be so, but certainly to a very limited extent. First, because there is little property of that description at sea (and particularly since our judicious in- terruption of the enemy's coasting trade); and Secondly, because most merchants and most un- derwriters would in this case really entertain those scruples which would be so ill placed in the other. Upon the whole, therefore, without discussing the policy of not permitting insur- ances on enemy's property to be made, which is however very doubtful, and without determining whether according to rigid principles of morality the strict letter of any law may be evaded, it can- not be denied that it is in the present case, if in any, that the malmn prohibitum may be distiu-. guished from the malum in se. Having explained our conduct towards the trade of neutrals, and particularly towards that of America, during the last war, and in what manner this new neutral had totally chang'cd the character of it, I shall proceed to consider what our conduct during the present war has been since the commencement of which only, the clamour has originated which has at last pro- duced our present system. On the recommencement of hostilities in 1803, the measures of the last war were renewed by the instructions to our cruizers, dated the 24th of June in that year, with the single exception, that in permitting the neutral to trade freely between his own country and the hostile colonies, and between his own country and that of the enemy in Europe, we no longer permitted him to bring the produce of those colonies to Great Britain, as was allowed by the instructions of the year 1798, but we returned in this respect to the for- mer provisions of those of 1794*. During a long war, we had had ample time to consider and understand the nature of neutral commerce, and the result was a continuation of our former practice : but we found, very early in the present contest, that the efforts of our enemy were to be principally directed to- wards our commerce, which, however, it was a long time before they could seriously annoy. f Some other unimportaat alterations were made not worth noticing. 73 As long as we were freely admitted into the ports of the continent, and the shutting up of one port was compensated by the opening of another, no complaints were heard ; but as the increasing power of the enemy enabled him by degrees to draw the net closer, our West India merchants, as soon as the effects of exclusion were felt, although they had before combated the competition of neutrals without complaint, now imputed their distress solely to that competition, and lost sight entirely of its real cause. Early in 1805, these complaints accordingly began, and exaggerated statements were circu- lated of the comparative advantages of the hos- tile colpnies over our own.— They Were cauti- ously listened to by Mr. Pitt, who, it appears, determined to give an indirect relief by throw- ing difficulties in the wav of the neutral, which should satisfy the West India planter, by increasing the neutral freight and insurance, the moderate rate of which was a principal subject of complaint * and though little can be said for the justice of the expedient resorted to, its effi- cacy was complete. These vexations were to be produced by start- ing some new principle of conduct towards neu^ tral commerce ; and, as remonstrances were na- turally expected, the public mind was prepared for the discussion of them by inflammatory pub- lications. At this time, October 1805, the pam* L r- 4 plilefj of Nvhich so much notice has been taken, " W-ar in Disguise/' made its appearance, and we arc told by the author, in his preface, '' that it " ^Yas written in considerable haste, on account " of some temporary considerations, which add " to the immediate importance of the subject." We shall now see the advantage which we were to derive from a nominal maintenance of the rule of 1756. By assuming that rule to be law, and that our not enforcing it was the effect of our indulgence, all the privileges which the neu- tral held, as he thought by right, were consider- ed by us as held by sufferance; a doctrine which enables us to establish the most inconsistent practice under the mask of the most consistent theory. Accordingly, though we have seen that principles directly opposed to this doctrine have been established by treaty, and that we have ac- tually paid America for the damages she sus- tained by its temporary, and, as we called it, il- legal execution, yet the law is immutable, and we should be told by Civilians that it is not even in our power to remove this rule out of the code of the law of nations. People are generally most tender when suspi- cions attach to the virtues they are most vv anting in, and accordingly consistency is most warmly contended for by our Admiralty Court. " It is •' no(," says the learned and most respectable Judge of ear) with the U. S. of America. But although bj this answer the four questions, upon which your Excellency has desired to know my opinion, have been implicitly re- solved, I think 1 can add, that the declaration expressed by the 1st article of the Decree of the 21st of November, not at all changing the present French laws concerning maritime captures : there is no reason for inquiring what interpretation, restriction, or extension may be given to this article. 2dly, That seizures contrary to the existing regulations concerning cruizers, will not be allowed to the captors, 3dly, That an American vessel cannot be taken at sea for the mere reasoa that she is going to a port of England, or is returijing froni one, because, conformably with the 7th article of th» said Decree, •we are limited in France not to admit vessels coming from England or the English colonies. 4thly, That the provisions of the 2d and 5 th articles of the said Decree naturally apply to foreign citizens domiciliated in France, or in the countries occupied by the troops of his majesty the Emperor and King, in as much as they have the character of a jrcneral law ; but that it will be proper that your Excellency should communicate with the Minister of Exterior Relations as to what concerns the correspond- ence of the citizens of the U. S. of America with England. 1 pray your Excellency, &c. DECRES. P. S. It will not escape General Armstrong, that my answers cannot have the developement which they would receive from the Minister of Exterior Relations; that it is naturally to him that he ought to ad- dress himself for these explanations, which I am very happy to give him, because he wishes them, but upon which I have much less posi- tive information than the Prince of Benevento. Q 2 116 It is to be presumedj that some communication must have taken place between our Government and that of America, if any doubt remained re- specting her acquiescence in this Decree ; and if we were not satisfied with the notorious fact, that no condemnation of an American vessel had ever taken place under it, and that so little did the French privateers interfere with the trade of America with this country, that the insurance on it has been very little higher than in times of profound peace, while that on the American trade with the continent of Europe has at the same time been doubled, and even trebled, by the conduct of our cruizers. Unless, therefore, his Majesty's Ministers have some information of which the public is not possessed, and which contradicts the very clear evidence the public do possess, we must conclude, that the assertions in the Orders of Council, that America had been guilty of that acquiescence in the decrees of France which was to draw down, and has drawn down upon her, our menaced retaliation, is totally void of foundation. Jt can hardly be necessary to point out, that the French Decree of the 26th of last December, issued in consequence of our Orders in Council, can afford no justification of them, nor would it be necessary here to allude to it, but from the 117 general disposition of the public papers to con found all the transactions together, for the obvi- ous purpose of deception. If what has been stated be correct;, that our orders in Council are not justified by any previous provocation, they must be evidently acts of original aggression, and France has retaliated much in the same manner, and with the same right, as we should ourselves have done, had the Berlin Decree beei^ rigidly executed. This general view of our conduct towards America, w^hich we have now closed, and espe- cially the last and most important scene of it, ex- hibits, 1 fear, the very reverse of those encroach- ments on her part, and of concessions on ours, which have been so industriously repeated to lead the public blindfold to the approbation of a pro- ceeding, as void of honour and good faith, as of any rational calculation of policy. The prize should indeed be great that we are to obtain by such a sacrifice of national charac- ter. But before 1 proceed to consider its value, and to explain the pernicious effects of these new measures to ourselves, I shall close this part of my subject with some remarks on the ' 118 probable conduct which they are likely to pro- duce in America. The citizens of the United States are cer- tainly, as the author of " War in Disguise" tells us, " a sagacious people," and, perhaps, of all others the most likely to discover their own inte- rests, and not to be diverted by enthusiasm of any sort from steadily pursuing it. But they cannot fail to see through the flimsy veil which we have thrown over our conduct, and to be sen- sible of the insult it adds to the serious injuries inflicted on them, If the present were an ordinary war, which, like former ones, might be ended by the transfer of a sugar island to one side or the other, the wishes at least of a sound American politician would certainly bp against us. The balance of power by land interest^ him no farther than as it may ultimately affect the balance by sea : in the latter he is deeply interested, and niuch of the merit of our just complaints against the usurpations of France on the Continent, must be lost on him, when the sufferings of his own country convince him that the abuse of abso- lute power is inseparable from its existence. During a considerable period of the last and present war, we have indeed respected the rights of those not concerned in it; but the con- 119 duct even of France, can furnish few stronger proofs of a disregard of them, and of more fri^ volous pretences by which they have been in- vaded, than may be found in our conduct in 1805, and still more in the recent measures which we have been considering. Still> however, an American, who can take a just view of the state of Europe and the true interests of his country, must feel ex- tremely reluctant to be forced into a war with us : He must be aware, that the contest is really for our existence ; that the conquest of this country, if not followed by that of his own, must irretrievably destroy that balance, on which his right to treat with the nations of Europe as with equals, must depend. The decrees of the lords of the ocean may be unjust and oppressive, but they are still mild, when contrasted with the mere sic volo which would issue from the court of the universal sovereign of both elements. It must also occur to him that the very great naval preponderance of this country cannot be lasting ; that it would not even be required if our existence did not depend upon it ; and that our situation and disposition forbid the possibility of European aggrandize- ment ; but that, on the contrary, the system of universal dominion, now contended for by our enemy, if once firmly established, has every 120 prospect of permanency. In siich a war, there- fore, America would be fighting; against her most decided interest, and any success she might obtain would, in proportion to its importance, by destroying with her own hands the rampart that protects her, accelerate her own ruin. I believe these opinions prevail very generally with all thinking men in America ; and al- though the popular prejudices of those who do not think, which in all countries are in favour of novelty and violence, may, through our errors, carry their country with spirit into the war, it will be a subject of deep and sincere regret to those wh6 are capable of sober reflection. I be- lieve that America, by fair and proper treat- ment, and by care on our part to avoid all cause of popular irritation, might have been induced to consent to such sacrifices as our safety really required. The crooked policy of plead- ing a right which we had not, instead of tiecessity, has induced them to j udge our con- duct by the former test, where it has been found wanting, and to neglect the latter consi- deration, to which we have never called their attention. It might not indeed be easy to make them understand what urgent means of defence or of annoyance could arise to us, by stopping their trade in sugar and coffee, and still less that in the produce of their own soil, or from gratify- 121 iiig at their expense- the senseless, and to them insultins: clamour of our West India merchants, to exclude them from markets to which we could not go ourselves. In estimating- the value to us of such sacrifices^ the American, acquainted with the commerce of his country, not only would not discover the necessity which justified the demand, but must see the injury, even to our- selves, that must i^esult from consenting to it *. Many speculative opinions have lately been published on the character and dispositions of the people of America, upon which correspond- ing predictions of their conduct have been founded ; by some they are considered as hostile to us, while others tell us of the conflicting efforts of an English and a French party. A residence of some years in that country will perhaps justify me in hazarding an opi- nion on a subject not unimportant in our present situation. * While Ihe tenacious disposition of the American Government, respecting maritime riglits, is unjusfly complained of, they, >vho (liiiik. she should make allowance for our particular situation, use the strongest arguments in favour of that tenacity which '.hey condenm. Theauthor of " War in Disguise" concludes, that neutrals admit as lawful every violation of their rights, which thev do not resent hv war. " The " neutral powers ha\e all assented to the rule of ihe war of 175() in " point of principle, h_y suhmitlin,:; to its partial applicition ;" and the preamhle to the Orders ia Council, denouncing the heavy penalty in- curred by " acquiescence of neutrals in a violation of their rights," shews sufTiciiently the necessity of a punctilious atfciition to trillin iuvasioas< R 122 There arc undoubtedly in America many people svho entertain a decided partiality for this countrj, and for a close political connection with it. There are others, on the contrary, with equally decided antipathies against us. Both these classes are principally composed of natu- ralized Europeans, who are very numerous, and are the grevd political agitators of the country. The emigrations from England are principally owing to necessity or discontent, inseparable from an overflowing population ; and those much more numerous from Treland, where we have unfortunately not yd discovered the secret of making the great mass of the people love the Government under which they live, carry with them their hatred, which bursts out into increas- ed violence from the absence of restraints. But although the opposite opinions ofthcse two classes fill the public newspapers w ith ever}' spe- cies of extravagance*, the real Americans, who * Complaints of tlie licentiousness of the American press conn; •with a very ill grace from this country, and it would not be easy to reconcile the indignation expressed in" War in Disguise" at those " false , and incendiary paragraplis, hy which England, iu spite of her extreme indulgence, is insulted" in America, p. 189 ; with the increased indig- nation with which, FpcaKing of Bonaparte, p. 222, it is asked, " Had he not even the audacity to remonstrate to his Majest_y's Go- *' vcrnment, against the freedom of our newspapers, and to demand " that our press should l)e restrained ?'^ This contradiction sufDciently shews, with what a different temper, a country, like an individual, it the author or the object of abuse, and 1 must confess that I can see no jnjury, but, on the contrary, much good that might have resulted from a proper and constitutional attention to this audacious remonstrance. 12^ yc^ have never been out of their own countrv, take little part in them, and their viev/s of policy are g-enerallj governed by their opinions of its true interest, without caring otherwise much about what is passing in Europe. If there be any bias, it is probably in our favour ; the sympathy na- turally arising from language, manners, and a common (extraction, is shewn in a decided pre- ference to us as individuals : " Daus toute la '' partie de TAmerique quej'ai parcourue," says Mons. Talleyrand, ''je n'ai pas trouve un seul " Anglais qui nc se trouvat Americain, pas un . '' seul Francais qui ne se trouvat etranger. " The study of the same authors, the existence of the same laws, insures a general respect and regard for this country, inseparable from similar feelings towards themselves ; and perhaps these circum- stances might have been improved for political purposes, if we had not, since the existence of the independent Government of America, treat- ed it with a studied and repulsive hauleiLr. We have, upon the whole, e\Qvy reason to ex- pect that the political conduct of America on this occasion will be purely American ; and it is to be feared, perhaps, that in resenting the in- juries which she has sustained, her respect for the power of this country will rather lead her to undervalue our dangers in the contest in which we arc engaged. It is not surprising that r2 124 no high opinion of the power of France should be entertained in a country where her flag is sel- dom seen, but in the humiliating state of flying for shelter from an inferior enemy. To the numbers which may go against us from policy, many may certainly be added from resentment for personal suff'erings, especially in the sea-ports. It w ould probably be no exag- geration to say, that upwards of three-fourths of all the merchants, seamen, &c. engaged in com- merce or navigation in America, have, at some time or other, suffered from acts of our cruizers, which to them have appeared unjust, and which frequently must have been so. The unfriendly disposition of American captains, seamen, &c. therefore, though by no means universal, is easily accounted for. People of that descrip- tion are not likely to understand the danger to be apprehended from distant consequences, which, in all republican governments, are doomed to give way to more immediate impressions and sensations ; they read, it is true, of the power of France, but they feel every day that of Britain. Among those American^ who are really dis- posed to study the interest of their country, dif- ferent opinions have prevailed of the value of foreign commerce. The people of New Eng- land, and of the North, are generally desirous of 125 giving the greatest possible extent to it ; while those of the South and West are in favour of an opinion^ that it is only valuable in as far as it assists agriculture, by exchanging the superflu- ous produce of the farmer for those of foreign countries ; and that the large fortunes accumu- lated in the commercial towns by merchants engaged in indirect foreign trade, are rather an injury than a benefit to the country. The state of Virginia, in particular, has acted systematically upon this opinion, and the Legislature, by refus- ing to charter banks and other commercial esta- blishments, has, without any avowal of a positive system,^ given every discouragement to com- merce ; and the consequence has been, that the trade of that state, and North Carolina, is princi pally confined to theexport of their own produce*. One of the principal supporters of this sys- tem is Mr. Randolph, whose speech in Congress has been eagerly circulated in this country with very mistaken ideas of his views and opinions, which are in general unfriendly to us, or rather to that predilection for commerce which he con- siders to be in a great degree owing to the con- * The foHo>?ing statement of the value of the exports of forei,"?n and domestic produce from the States of Massacliusctts, Virginia, and North Caroh'na, for the ^ear 1 i'05, -will shew this consequence more ctearl.y : Ofdvmestic produce. Of foreign produce. jVIassachuscttJ exported <£ 1,280,000 - - - o£'3,0S0,G00 Virginia - - - - 1 , 1 ] 2,000 ... - J 48,000 North Carolina - - - 172,000 ., - - - 2,800 ,126 neclion and intercourse with us. The principles of this gentleman and his followers, who are numerous and respectable, are, that encourage- ment should alone be given to the trade in the productions of their own soil, and that no other commerce should be maintained against any foreign power at the risk of war. This, like all other systems, is by many carried to an absurd extreme. We should probably judge it un- fairly by any European standard ; but it could not be found wanting in plausibility at least, by those who are acquainted with the simple cha- racter of the political institutions of America, and who must be aware how much the preserva- tion of that character of perfect equality must depend on an equality of fortunes, which com- merce has a direct tendency to destroy. We are told, that this difference of opinion between what is called the Agricultural and Commercial interests in America, will always prevent her from engaging in any war with the unanimity necessary to render it successful. This must, of course, be a very speculative question. I am, on the contrary, disposed to entertain a high opinion of the public spirit of America, and to expect the vigorous co-opera- tion of every part of the union in any foreign war, when once undertaken ; the quarrels of po- litical parties in Congress can with as little jus- 127 tice be relied upon, as indications of the con- trary, as our own party disputes would justify any inference unfavourable to our universal re- sistance against external enemies. I see no benefit that Great Britain could derive from the dissolution of the present Federal Go- vernment in America, but, on the contrary, every reason to think that no other state of that coun- try would be equally favourable to us. The con- stitution of the United States insures to the world a general adherence to a system of peace; for although it might be found sufficient for de- fensive war, it is evidently not calculated for the support of large naval and military establish- ments, which views of ambition would require. Any division of the countries would also produce a partial compression of the population in parti- cular districts, which, being now spread over an immense extent, must long make it their interest to import their manufactures from Europe. Expectations, therefore, of a dissolution of the union by war, are founded as little in proba- bility as in sound policy. But if any reliance is placed by our Government on the dissensions in that country, the most effectual step has certainly been taken to prevent tliem; and the American patriot will probably see with pleasure, that if he must have war, the provocation is of a nature 128 ■ to unite every prejudice, and every real interest of his country. By attempting to confine the Euro- pean trade of America to Great Britain, and by the avowal of an intention to tax that trade on its passage to the continent, we are returning to those principles to which, even as a colony, she would not submit. It is immaterial whether it be a tax on stamps or on cotton: this question has already been the subject of a long and bloody war, and it can hardly be supposed that America will now submit to a direct attack on her sovereign and in dependent rights. For the question of our right to search mer chant ships for our seamen, provided a proper apology were made for the attack on their ship of war, I believe few Americans would be dis- posed to go to war. Even the assertion of the rule of 1756, if it had been brought forward early in the w ar, be- fore America had fitted out an immense commer- mercial marine; if it had been equally enforced against other neutral powers ; and if effectual means had been devised to secure from molesta- tion their accustomed peace trade; would have left a very large portion of the American people averse to war. But the vigorous framers of our Orders in Council, disdaining the benefits which might 129 be derived from disuniting their enemy, have^ by devoting* to the same indiscriminate destruction the interest of the farmer, of the merchant, and of every description of persons, taken effectual care to prevent that disunion, which their advo- cates affect to expect. The Americans, interested in the commerce in foreign productions, will see it destroyed by measures, which equally deprive the agriculturer of a market for his produce. That the permis- sion given by us to re-export it from our great emporium to the Continent of Europe, must be nugatory, and that acquiescence on the part of America, in the usurpations of this country, must produce war with France, are circumstances of which little doubt could ])e entertained, before we were told so by the Paris newspapers. Great, therefore, as is our naval power, the produce of America will, perhaps, find a foreign market, as easily in opposition to our warfare, as through the means that might be expected froni peace upon the terms we offer. War, then, there is every reason tQ apprehend, must be the infallible consequence of these mea- sures ; and perhaps of all the foolish and impoli- tic wars recorded in history, not one could be found to equ^l this, nor any two nations whose manifest policy more decidedly pointed to a sys- tem of peace and good understanding. It would 8 130 be a didlciil't task to decide r.pon the various, estimates wbich have been formed of the com- parative disadvantages to Great Britain and America; but so far is certain;, that it must be a great and unqualified injury to both^, and a most decided and permanent benefit to our great ene- my ; whoj forming an opinion widely differing' from ourS;, of the consequences of the increasing wealth and commerce of America, feels almost as great an interest in their destructioUj as in that of the commerce of any county of England ; nor can he fail to feel a malicious satisfaction in seeing this work of self-destruction performed with our own hands*. The comprehensive nature of the injury which America must suffer from our system, by leaving no class of its population unaffected by it, affords little hope of the interference of any for the pre- servation of peace. The great interest which ^ * The opinions of France on tliis subject maj be coFrectly ascer- tained by a perusal of the Me moire sur Ics Relations Commerciales des EtalS'Unis avec VAnglelerre, hy Mons. Talleyrand, read at the Na- tional Institute in 1796. The whole of this memoir is highly in- teresting at the present moment, not only from the important situation of the author, whose intentions at the time of publication could be liable to no suspicion, but from its generai merit. Those who are acquainted with America will not fail to recognize in this small publi- cation, a more correct and profound knowledge of that country, and its commercial relations, than in all the volumes of the numerouj Iravellers, who have described it. It should make us more thaa eommonly cautious in our treatment of America, when we reflect hoit much our adversary is at home with this subject. 131 country, still possessing the means of indepen- dence, should feel in the preservation of ours, will be lost in the more immediate and percepti- ble consequences of our own folly and injustice. It is, however, to be hoped, that an interest and a policy so obvious to America, will not be lost sight of by true friends to their country, and that, on our part, by an early discovery of our errors, which it can take but a short time to make, both countries may again return to that union and good understanding which, although I fear beyond immediate recover}-, may by temper and moderation be hereafter restored. The circumstances, v.hich have been ex- amined in detail, will, I hope, satisfy the reader, that the system of hostility, recommended and practised towards the commerce of America, and which has, at last, been carried by the Orders of Council to such an extreme, as to bring us to the eve of war, cannot be justified by any pretended disposition on the part of tliat country to in- croach on our just rights, or to undermine our power at this very critical period. Had a doubt remained on this point, it would indeed hav« been idle to have entered into ajiy estimate of commercial consequences; not oidy because the s2 132 high and undaunted character of our country is the most precious treasure which we have to preserve, and the best guardian of our safety; but because, submission from such mfttivcs would have tempted a repetition of pretensions, that must have ended at last in the war which we wanted to avoid. It must, on the contrary, be evident from the whole tenor of our proceedings, that commercial interest has been our moving principle through- out; that every demonstration of the slightest hostility on the other side has originated in our attempts to advance that interest, by violating the rights and interests of others ; and that if we are at last called upon to take up arms, it is on our part a quarrel about sugar and coffee, and not in support of national honour. I shall now, therefore, examine the correct- ness of our calculation on this occasion as mer- chants, which will be best done by supposing, in the first instance, that our measures do not pro- duce war with America, but that they have, on the contrary, the consent and co-operation of that country. I shall afterwards shortly allude to the more obvious consequences of a state of actual war; but it is important first to shew, that even under the most favourable circumstances, our jiew system must be eminently mischievous. It has been justly observed by many authors 133 as a singular circumstance, that the conduct of most statesmen, who, unfortunately for our com merce, have made it their peculiar care, has been directly opposed to the generally received ax- ioms of political economy ; and that although every writer would in our days deprecate the interfering regulations of bounties and monopo- lies, and the busy meddling of those, who think they can settle artificially the many complicat- ed relations between the industrious classes of a state ; yet such has been the temptation to try some favourite experiment, and such is the opinion of their own abilities, which people are naturally disposed to entertain, that a justi- fication is easily found in their own minds for that deviation from sound and established max- ims, which in others they would be the first to disapprove. The only beneficial care a Govern- ment can take of commerce, is to afford it gene- ral protection in time of war, tt) remove by trea- ties the restrictions of foreign Governments in time of peace, and cautiously to abstain from any, however plausible, of their own creating. If every law of regulation, either of our internal or external trade, were repealed, with the exception of those necessary for the collection of revenue, it would be an undoubted benefit to commerce, as well as to the community at large. An avowed 131 system of leaving things to take their own course^ and of not listening to the interested solicitations of one class or another for relief, whenever the imprudence of speculation has occasioned losses, would, sooner than any artificial remedy, re-pro- duce that equilibrium of demand and supply, which the ardor of gain will frequently derange, but which the same cause, when left alone, will as infallibly restore. The interference of the political regulator in these cases, is not only a certain injury to other classes of the community, but generally so to that, in whose favour it is exercised. If too much sugar be manufactured in Jamaica, or too much cotton in Manchester, the loss of those concern- ed will soon correct the mischief; but if forced means are devised to provide for the former a temporary increase of demand, which cannot be permanently secured, a recurrence to that natu- ral state of fair profit, which is most to be desir- ed by the planter, is artificially prevented by the very means intended for his relief. And if the cotton manufacturer, on the other hand, is to liave his imprudences relieved, at the expense of those employed on linen, silk, wool, or other ma- terials, the injustice as well as impolicy of such a remedy need no illustration. There is nothing new^ in these opinions. They 135 ^fe those of every writer on political economy : They have the assent of all who talk on the subject ; and it would have been useless to repeat them, but that they are in direct oppo- sition to the general conduct of our Government, and are, more immediately and extensively than ever, violated by the new system we are consi- dering*. Whenever the assistance of Government is called for bv any class of traders or manufac- turers_, it is usual to make the most splendid dis- play of the importance of that particular branch to the nation at large. The West and East India interests, the ship owners, the manufac- turers, the American merchants, have all the means of making these brilliant representations ; but it should be recollected, that the interest of the state consists in the prosperity of the whole, that it is contrary to sound policy to advance one beyond its natural means, and still moretodo soat the expense of the others ; and the only mode of ascertaining the natural limits of each is, to leave them all alone. Our West India planters supply us with their produce to the fuUextent of our wants, but, say they, — " if you will go to war with the '* Americans, who are the principal consumers of '' vour domestic manufactures, and furnishers of '' the raw "materials for them, we shall raise sugar '' and coffee for the whole Continent of Europe, '' and we will prove to you from the custom house 136 *' returns, that the benefit to be derived from the *' increase of our plantations will more than com- " pensate any loss the interruption of your inter- " course with America can produce." Supposuig the planters could prove their position, in which, however, they are totally mistaken, would it thence follow, that it would be for the interest of the state, to increase to an enormous extent the manufacture of sugar by slaves in the West In- dies, at the expense of those carried on by our own people, on the produce principally of our own soil ? The necessity which the planters would in this instance be under to have recourse to the interference of power, would, without further examination, sufficiently prove, that they are themselves as much deceived, as we should be in listening to them. . The effect of power must necessarily be tem- porary ; we cannot continue eternally at war with America, nor keep the produce of the fo- reign colonies for ever locked up : The re-action, therefore, from this forced state of things, when the pressure of power is removed, must inevitably produce that general distress which they, who derange by poisonous nostrums the healthful state of the general economy of a nation, must both expect and deserve. If it were not an undoubted fact, that our pre- sent measures have originated principally, if not 137 wholly, in the persevering representations of the West India interest, I should confine myself to these general observations on this part of my subject ; but as there are still advocates (in prac- tice at least), for measuring out in a privy coun- cil how many people shall be employed in mak- ing sugar, how many in making cloth, or in agri- culture, I shall examine shortly the narrower ground of apparent interest, which is even as singularly adverse to the present measures as the more comprehensive and liberal considerations of policy. This inquiry will be rendered more intelligible, by introducing here an explanation of the nature and extent of the commercial intercourse of America with Great Britain, and with other parts of the world. The origin of the inde- pendent commerce of that country, and the course which it had taken during this and the last war, have been already stated; the whole subject will now be better explained by figures. The last report to Congress, on the 6th of No- vember, 1807, of the state of the finances for the preceding year, although it gives simply a state- ment of articles consumed in the country, and not of those re-exported, justifies, when we com- pare it with former returns, the estimate of the T 138 importations of the produce and manufactures of Great Britain, at about ten millions sterling, wliicli agrees also with the calculations] on this side, although, from the mode of entry in both countries, they are liable to error. It bacomes interesting to consider what pro portion our trade with America bears to that of other countries, that we may form some idea of the benefits to be derived from the estabiishment of independent colonies, and from the neutral state of those colonies, if they may still be called so^ in times of war. As there is a disposition to value highly the commercial benefits of our ene- mies, and to consider them as losses to our- selves, I shall also endeavour to shew what they are when compared with our own. Such an esti- mate will give a general insight into the whole subject, and I am able to give it correctly from a very clear report made to Congress in 1806, previously to the passing of the Non-Importation Act. This return is of the average of the three years, 1803, 1803, and 1804. The whole scale of imports and exports have since increased, but there is no reason to suppose the proportions have varied. The figures I shall state in round sums, and in English money, taking the dollars at 4:s. 6d. 139 ^he amount of annual importation into the United States from all parts of the world, was - £ 16,950,000 c _o o O > u reaching America very fortunately before our Orders in Council, may serve to mitigate the re* sentment with which the latter must otherwise be received. We therefore evidently differ in opinion with France as to the value of this neu- trality, which both countries at the same instant had resolved to extinguish. I am decidedly dis- posed to think the opinion of our enemies the France are not easily reached by commercial restrictions of any sort. It is a singular fact that with almost the whole of the French effective army ahrcwd, the exchange on Paris is high in every part of Europe. Nothing is contributed from France for the suppprt of this immense force. 177 best judged. At all events^ it must serve to re- duce our idea of the extreme annoyance to them which we expect from our measures. The sources of power and strength vary widely in different countries. The general destruction of commerce, manufactures, and of every cir- cumstance of artificial power and prosperity, may suit the interest of France, but we should be greatly mistaken in imitating her. The disorganization of commerce and of industry has not improperly been considered as the best means of subduing a power whose basis rests upon them. But while our enemy is playing this wild but politic game, w€ must not forget that our safety requires the very opposite system of prudence and cautious preservation. France, in attacking our commerce, has pro- ceeded upon the self-evident supposition, that a trading country must have others to trade with. From Europe she has therefore excluded us; but with prudence and skill we might move our island, commercially speaking, out of Europe. The great empire in the North of America, and in a h^ss degree the newly-founded one in the South, would have been sufficient objects of ex- ternal commerce until better times returned ; and it must have been no small gratification to reflect that these were holds of which the enemy could not dispossess us. We might be cxpeHod from A A 178 the wlioie of Europe ; the peninsula of India^ even ihougli at a great distance, was not per- fectly beyond the reach of the conqueror ; but the opposite shores of the Atlantic bid defi- ance to his power, and could only be reached by that naval superiority which would equally enable him to attack us in our own islands. France having nearly attained the utmost ex- tent of her means of commercial annoyance, could only hope from ourselves the destruction of the valuable part of it beyond her reach. The Berlin Decrees have very much the appearance of a provocation to try our temper. We for- merly pursued steadily our interest with a dig- nified disregard of menacing language ; but now — we havebeen insulted, and something vigorous must be done in retaliation. France has used big words, but we will reply with big actions, and in the violence of our passion we have per- haps done the very thing which those words were intended to provoke. The mistaken opinions in this country of the nature and consequences of the French Revolution, have probably contri- buted more than any other cause to the present gigantic power of France. The exaggerated consequences expected from the successive na- tional bankruptcies ; the attempt to crush the re- volution by external force, are errors of which we are surprised io have ever been the dupe ; 179 but thej are certaiuly not exceeded by that of ex- pecting any benefit from running a race with France^, in the destruction of commerce, and in violence towards our friends and allies. The line of conduct we have now adopted is for this country perfectly new ; but we should recollect that we are closely hemmed in on every side ; that we have little room for experiments of any sort ; and that if past errors have brought us to the brink of a precipice, the next must throw us over it. THE END. Printed by C. Mercier and Qo- King's Head Court, St. Paul's Church Vard. University of California SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1388 Return this material to the library from which it was borrowed. J liSl^limH f?.^.?.'°^'^L LIBRARY FACILIP AA 000 291356 J / Univei So\] Li